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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

11

THE POLITICAL MESSAGE OF MATUS CERNAK
By Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum
On J'lliy 5, 1955 Matus CernaJk, a .d istinguished Sl01Vaik
politician and diplomat, was assassinated in Munich, Germany. Forces rabid in orpposing our effort ,to secure and
esfablish an independent Slovakia could have hardly struck
a more tell.mg blow than was this dastardly attack, for
by it they .removed from :actiive service an esteemed patriot,. this Cernak of whom it may be said that of all n:a.
tiona1 movers currently in exile, he most closely approximated what, lt'elatively speaking, we might designate as the
position of a 8Jll-accredited legaJte of the Slovak nation to
the republic of Western Germany. And to him as such were
paid final tributes and honors in death not only by the
ch8Jllcello.r of Western Germany himself who expressed
deep sympathy cm the occasion of Cerna.k's tragic death.
:rn Gemiany Matus Cern.ak signalized himse1f beyond
his office as a desewing politidan and drplomat. It was
due mostly 'to his lll.Iltiring diligence and interest that two
noteworthy pulbl:ications continued to appear after the departure of Dr. Jozef Pauoo; viz., SLOBODNE SLOVENSKO ('Free Slovaikia, founded by Dr. Pauco) and SWWAKi1SCHE KORJRESPO!NiDENe;. Concern for the social
well-being of hundreds of .Slorvak re£ugees who arrived
in Germany also came to, devolrve upon Cerna.k, and his
name is vecy closely associated with the Slorvaik institute
in M'll.Il.ich.

IDven this meagelt' cwt-and-dry survey of his recent
major acltivities yields us the realization that 1lhe foul
politioal murder, which so unexpectedly wrested Matus
Cerna;k f.rom our midst, is to all the Slwaks in the free
world and to the struggle for a democratic independent
Sloiva.k.ia a much greater loss and a much more sigmfi..
cant incident than we had ap1Pmised and accounted it in
the earliest hours of our grief. After the Cernova masS8Jcre of 1907, the murder of Stefanik m 1919 and of Dr.
Jozef Tiso in 1947, this attack of July 5, :1!955, will be re-

�12

corded in Slorvaik national annals as a historically 'Vital
eivent. The death of fMatws Cemak marks mot merely the
passing o.f another exiled SlO'V'3Jk diplomat and ipatriot
who dedicated all his mind and heart to the struggle to
liberate Slorvaikia from Oom.mJUnism and the Czech yoke.
Matus Cerna'k's previ!ous politicial background, his personal character and talents, hi•s uncompromising doggedness and his tireless and successful activities within the
territory of one of the most decisive powers affecting the
fate of Slova,kia - all this contributed to make Cerna·k
indispensalble to the CU"rrent state of our pol,i tical efforts
as w~U as a symlbol of posterity.
Who Was Matus

Oernak?

Matus Cerruik was bo,r n on August 28, 1903, in the
town of Vieska where his father was a miller. After his
preliminary education in iPrievidza, Kezmarok, and Banska
Bystrica,. he undertook university studies ,i n 'Brague and
subsequently ,in Leipzig, Germany. His courses were orientated toward a professorship.
Having attained his diploma, he spent several years
in teaching •a t Trnava, and in 19i30 he became a high school
instnuctor in Bratislava. Until 1937 Cernwk devoted himself a,lmost exclusirvely to aoademic pursuits and to cultural interests. He was, however, one of the younger element, a member of that youthful and vitally conscious
generation of !Slovruks who in the 1932 demonstrations at
Trencianske Teplice gave Prague incontrovertible evidence of the fact that the spiritual and political development of Slova,kia will follow native inspiration and bent
and wiN not ibe trammeled by constraining directirves from
Prague. As a youthful patriot, then, Cernak naturally
found himself an active participant in various political demonstrn:tions Slllpporting ·Slorvakia's interests and deserts.

It wa.s the temper of the times that shaped his destiny. He made more and more public appearances and spirited pronouncements hut after his patriotic manifesto
delivered in the ,Slovak National Theater in 1937, Cernak was overnight not only projected ,i nto popular ac-

�SLOVAKIA

13

claim but was also irrevocably committed to bis role as
an outstanding leader in the political arena, The keynote
of his message on this occasian was "Orurs is that portion
of land 'beneath the Tatras and to us rightfully belongs
all i1ls yield." This cry and justification came to echo from
inrn.1mera:ble speaker's platforms and it blazed its appeal
throughout all the press houses of SlovaJkia. Within. a
year after this induction into public national life, Matus
Cernak, despite his youthful thirty-five years, became
a minister in the Prague government.
Prague,. long accustomed to an accord of fawning
subservience and servility ,o n the part of those to whom
she had granted political ministries and various similar
offices, ,s oon realized that this Cernak who accepted a
ministerial portfolio came as a representative of a new
generation. He was not a hireling. He was a public servant who bore the concerns of the Slovak nation deep in
his heart, one to be touched neither by bribes nor by intimidatioo. He was upright as well as fearless and his
attitude was undisguised. He understood that it served
no purpose to temporize with the Czechs; consequently,
ne had hardly estaJblished himself in his new office when,
mincing no words, he demanded as by a 24-hour ultimatum that Dr. Benes examme the Slova,k problem in the
spirit of the Pittsburgh Pact; i.e.,. Cernak sought to activate Slovakia's autonomy as it had been guaranteed by
the Czechs when Thomas G. Masaryk signed the Pittsburgh Pact in 1918 and the unreserved ratification of the
Parli'ament convened on Noivember 12, 1918 had made the
agreement binding both legally and morally. Benes was
unwilling to meet Cerna.k's terms. Manfully and honorably, Cer:nak offered his resignation from ministerial
duties and his decisive action hastened Slovakia's autonomy and later her complete independence.
In the autonomous state of Slovakia (October 6, 1938
- March 13, 1939) Cernak became a prominent and '!)01)ular personality. iHe was named minister of education
and after the proclamation of independence, he was appointed the first Slovak envoy to Berlin.

�14

SLOVAKIA

Be11lin was not only the most significant, it was also
the most difficult ambassadorial .p ost. The very existence
of the Slovak •r epublic often hUlll.g by a hair there, and the
·Sloviak diplomatic representative had to exercise consummate tact whille at the sarrne time he preserved an inflexible devotion to his country and defended the interests
committed to him in sa:cred trust. Matus Ce.milk proved
himself in this capacity. He again advanced the welfare of
Slovakia with the sarrne degree of ardor and uncomprom~•s ing vigor which had characterized him formerly in
Prague, and his mission was successful. So well, in fact,
did he acquaint himself of his duties that he won for the
SlovaJk caruse the sympathies even of that power that oome
after ,t he occurpaition of Germa.ny, a.nd in its eyes, too, he
was accepted as a non--ae&lt;!redited envoy of the Slovak
nation.
Political reprisals meted out a ,prison sentence for
Cerna.k, and after serving several years in B:vatislava, he
left Slovrukia ,i n 1948. (His country was then degraded by
the Communistic and Czech regimes. Cernak in exille dedicated himself to the struggle to secure a new freedom
and independence for Slo-v:aki-a, a sacred fight against
Communism, a ,c rusade for the triumph of democracy, and
liberty.
For this reason, the ·b rutal political murder .of Matus
Cernak, who had been favored lby fate to assume in this
national struggle for liberty rund independence a role granted only to heroes rund to persons of Ulll.COmmom historic
statUTe,. has shaken every worthy SlorvaJk and every honorable person in the world. For in that little post office
in Munich there feN :at the hands of a cynical muroerer
not merely a member of the little Slovak nation rbut a wholiJ.y dedicated defender of the idea of freedom and democracy, and that at the very hour when the representatives
of international Communism and of Czech imperialism
were sporting the ma:sk of surface smiles and pretending sugiared speeches on peace and coo.p eration and coexistence.
If the world's free press agencies, broadcasts and tele-

�SLOVAKIA

15

vised reports from Bonn to W aslrington, from Paris to
Canada, Australia, Argentina, and all the free world ciroufated reports and commentaries 00: this despica,ble political crime, then it was in tribute to the 'Victim Cerna;k,
a promoter of the ideal of freedom and democracy. Only
the intervention and meddling of the forces of cowardly
appeasement, of colla.:boration with Communism and Czechsown hatred of the Slov,a,ks prevented the .glorification
of this sacrifice, Matus Cernak, as a 1price demanded by
the true instinct of Communism and of Czech chau'Vinism.
Their malice alone precluded the hailing of Matus Cermilk as a martyr to the cause of liberty and democracy,
blessings cherished by the -umiversal free world. This
honor Matus Cernalk fully deserves.
The Slwak nation at home and all loyal Slovaks now
exiled a:nd -scattered throrughout the far-d:hmg countries
of the free world can appraise this holocaust of Matus
Cerna'k in its full historic significance.
Why Was Matus Cernak Slain?
Matus Cernruk fell because he was the foe of Communism and of Czech efforts to dominate Slov,m a and to
usur.p her rights. He was singled orut as one of the most
unyielding exponents of the principle of liberty and a democratic way for Slovalkia. For these reasons he beoame
mar,ked as a sworn enemy of the dual powers of :international Communism and of Czech aggressiv~ pretensions.
Beoaiu:se he had already established a record of several
years o.f sru'Ccessful service on the Slovaik political front
which has !been in the recent past and whlch will very
likely in the near future again be of paramount importance in the 1SlOV'a.:k contest for liberty and independence,
not only Communistic Prague hurt also the adherents of
there-e~bl-ished Czech hegemony QIVer Slovakia ranked
him as the number one man on their list of resistance
leaders active in exile to thwart their nefarious designs.
He fell ,b ecause of his love for SloWJkia suffering under Czech domination., because of his friendly attitude
toward the Gel'Ill.an nation, and b.ecaruse of the fruitf.ul
mission he was accomplishing in the Republic oif Western

�16

SLOVAKIA

Germany where he had all. the p:vospects of continuing an
eminently flourishing career.
·· .. Whether the base assassin will be discoivered as an
individual or not, it is unmistakably clear to every thinking person just whose henchmen he must have been and
in whose employ he accomplished his dastardly, bloody
deed. Since 1945 so great ·a number of outstanding Slovak
patriots has 1b een killed, deported and deprived of liberty that doUJbt concerning the mastermind of this vicious
crime would hardly be in place. Czechs, iboth of the Communist water-mar.k and non-Communist conformers, especially those who in the wake of unsuccessful collaJboration
with Communism escaped into the countries of western
Euvope live in abnormal foar.s bred by guilt, the spawn
of those crimes they per.petrated against the Sudeten and
Cavpathian Ge:rnnans. Their panic mounts as they see Germany mow in the ascendency. as one of the influential nations in international 1p olitics. To iboth classes of Czechs
it is clear that the existence of the Czecho~Slovalk Republic, the question of Czeoh !b oundar~es and conditions affecting the principles of life for the Czech nation in the
future will come to depend in no small measure and in no
negligible way on Germany and on this decisive f.actor
whether or not :Slovalkia will succeed in winning the support of influential ,powers which will further her endeavor
for independence.
Matus Cernak with over 15 years of residence _in Germ.any and very desirable contacts and personal acquaintances even among the highest of German dignitaries was
undenia;bly instrumental ,i n ,s oouring favor for the idea of
SlovaJkia's independence. His peroonal integrity and his
indefatiga;ble efforts in behalf of his country, as posthumously a;ppraised ,b y the German press and attested to
by hll!lldreds ,of telegrams of condolence, won sympathetic response even in the highest levels of political power
in Bonn and presaged ultimate success for the Slova;k
cause. It was primarily for this re8JSOn that the foes of the
Slovak nation and of the Slovalk effort to attain national
independence decided to liquidate Cerna:k.

�SLOVAKIA ,

17

The Political Message of M. Oernak
Cernak was felied in the heat of the national struggle.
He died with a conlViotion -Of Slovak truth, confident in
the ultimate victory of the :natural ri.ght of the Slo.valk
people to enjoy their pro,per national life. He ,c onsummated
his own supreme sacr.ifice in the spirit of his motto "To
liberty through sacrifice" and he signed his political credo
with his own life's blood.
It is not clifficll!lt nor willl it be difficult to• ascertain
what wolilld have been the final political messaige of Cernak. He wrote it in 1938 in terms of his adamant resist•
ance to compromise, his steadfastness and his patriotic
ardorr. You can find it recorded in hundreds of his articles
and political manifestos, in his life-long political career and
in his heroic martyrdom. In the ranks of Slo'Vlak political
figures, personages who have gone ,befo:rre us in death,
Cernak takes hiis pla:ce as the representative of a new political generation, one which has sought ,a nd which stiill
seeks a. solution. of the Slovak problem on a ,b roader European basis within the cadre of modern demo:cratic and
Christian powers.
For his pdlitical mission dn exile, Matus Cernruk was
betteT prepared. than were most .Slovaks, and iby his educational background and his professional experience as
well as by his ,personal endo.w,ments -8Jlld characteristics
he satisfactorily evidenced a Slovalk sense of ,balance and
maturity and fitness :for lirfe. He allso exemplified .Slovakia's innate belonging to Europe and to European traditions.
'Dhe most substantial and eloquent ·proof of his adequacy to fitl the ro[e he chose in the fight for a democratic
and independent .Slov:akia is his very assassination, the
tragiic ,b omb which the antagoodsts orf a Christian and independent SlwaJki'a sent him.
The death of Matus Cerna:k is a painflill and very
grievoU1S loss to the Slovak forces woriking •i n exiJe; it is
one of the severest blows which the Slo¥~k people could
suffer at this time. The manner to which their foes had
to resort in order to bring 0Jbout CernaJk's deswuction,

�18

SLOVAKIA

however, is d.n itself an assurance to all Slovaik em:igres
that in the eyes of Prague and of international Communism ,i t is no "quan·t ite negligeable," that it is, in fact, so
formidable a hindrance to them for the Slovaks to be allied with the democracies that they even ventured such a
brutal scandal to register their reaction.
To Slovruk 1patriots in exile, mourning the death of
their most distinguished representative, Matus Cernak,
this realization begets a fresh spur to redoubled activities.
Consummate triumph of the Slovaik hope for independence beckons on the trail over which Matus Cernak
has forged ahead in honor and in complete unflinching
dedication. God grant it! - "BuNetin of the Slovruk National Council Abroad," June, 1956) .

•

•

•

LABOR AND THE SWVAK REPUBLIC
J. C. Bukovina
" Our policy shall not be socialis·tic, but
social. We shall not incite J:}eople against our.
selves, but we shall train them to be understanding and Wilted . .A:bove all else, work is
the foundation of our policy." 'Dr. Joseph
Tlso, Oct. 8, 1S38.

October 6, 1938, and March 14, 1939, found the S10vruks prepared. The Hlin:ka ·S lovak People's Party, whic:h
had fought consistently for twenty years before Munich
to secure the national existence of the Slova!k nation, was
fully prepared for these two historical milestones - to
take over the direction of the fate of the Slovak nation.
The fight of the Slovaks for national independence in the
pre-Munich Czecho-Slovak State was actually a struggle
and a call of the Slovruk nation for social justice. Once the
Czechs under T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Exlward Benes had
taken over the reigns of state, promises made to the Slovruks in America and elsewhere were soon forgotten, and
the Slovalks found themselves again in the position of the
exploited. Like the Magyars, the Czechs found little trouble
in recruiting Judas Slovaks to promote not the interests of
the Slovak nation, but the interests of the Czech nation,

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1550">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA

11

THE POLITICAL MESSAGE OF MATUS CERNAK
By Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum
On J'lliy 5, 1955 Matus CernaJk, a .d istinguished Sl01Vaik
politician and diplomat, was assassinated in Munich, Germany. Forces rabid in orpposing our effort ,to secure and
esfablish an independent Slovakia could have hardly struck
a more tell.mg blow than was this dastardly attack, for
by it they .removed from :actiive service an esteemed patriot,. this Cernak of whom it may be said that of all n:a.
tiona1 movers currently in exile, he most closely approximated what, lt'elatively speaking, we might designate as the
position of a 8Jll-accredited legaJte of the Slovak nation to
the republic of Western Germany. And to him as such were
paid final tributes and honors in death not only by the
ch8Jllcello.r of Western Germany himself who expressed
deep sympathy cm the occasion of Cerna.k's tragic death.
:rn Gemiany Matus Cern.ak signalized himse1f beyond
his office as a desewing politidan and drplomat. It was
due mostly 'to his lll.Iltiring diligence and interest that two
noteworthy pulbl:ications continued to appear after the departure of Dr. Jozef Pauoo; viz., SLOBODNE SLOVENSKO ('Free Slovaikia, founded by Dr. Pauco) and SWWAKi1SCHE KORJRESPO!NiDENe;. Concern for the social
well-being of hundreds of .Slorvak re£ugees who arrived
in Germany also came to, devolrve upon Cerna.k, and his
name is vecy closely associated with the Slorvaik institute
in M'll.Il.ich.

IDven this meagelt' cwt-and-dry survey of his recent
major acltivities yields us the realization that 1lhe foul
politioal murder, which so unexpectedly wrested Matus
Cerna;k f.rom our midst, is to all the Slwaks in the free
world and to the struggle for a democratic independent
Sloiva.k.ia a much greater loss and a much more sigmfi..
cant incident than we had ap1Pmised and accounted it in
the earliest hours of our grief. After the Cernova masS8Jcre of 1907, the murder of Stefanik m 1919 and of Dr.
Jozef Tiso in 1947, this attack of July 5, :1!955, will be re-

�12

corded in Slorvaik national annals as a historically 'Vital
eivent. The death of fMatws Cemak marks mot merely the
passing o.f another exiled SlO'V'3Jk diplomat and ipatriot
who dedicated all his mind and heart to the struggle to
liberate Slorvaikia from Oom.mJUnism and the Czech yoke.
Matus Cerna'k's previ!ous politicial background, his personal character and talents, hi•s uncompromising doggedness and his tireless and successful activities within the
territory of one of the most decisive powers affecting the
fate of Slova,kia - all this contributed to make Cerna·k
indispensalble to the CU"rrent state of our pol,i tical efforts
as w~U as a symlbol of posterity.
Who Was Matus

Oernak?

Matus Cerruik was bo,r n on August 28, 1903, in the
town of Vieska where his father was a miller. After his
preliminary education in iPrievidza, Kezmarok, and Banska
Bystrica,. he undertook university studies ,i n 'Brague and
subsequently ,in Leipzig, Germany. His courses were orientated toward a professorship.
Having attained his diploma, he spent several years
in teaching •a t Trnava, and in 19i30 he became a high school
instnuctor in Bratislava. Until 1937 Cernwk devoted himself a,lmost exclusirvely to aoademic pursuits and to cultural interests. He was, however, one of the younger element, a member of that youthful and vitally conscious
generation of !Slovruks who in the 1932 demonstrations at
Trencianske Teplice gave Prague incontrovertible evidence of the fact that the spiritual and political development of Slova,kia will follow native inspiration and bent
and wiN not ibe trammeled by constraining directirves from
Prague. As a youthful patriot, then, Cernak naturally
found himself an active participant in various political demonstrn:tions Slllpporting ·Slorvakia's interests and deserts.

It wa.s the temper of the times that shaped his destiny. He made more and more public appearances and spirited pronouncements hut after his patriotic manifesto
delivered in the ,Slovak National Theater in 1937, Cernak was overnight not only projected ,i nto popular ac-

�SLOVAKIA

13

claim but was also irrevocably committed to bis role as
an outstanding leader in the political arena, The keynote
of his message on this occasian was "Orurs is that portion
of land 'beneath the Tatras and to us rightfully belongs
all i1ls yield." This cry and justification came to echo from
inrn.1mera:ble speaker's platforms and it blazed its appeal
throughout all the press houses of SlovaJkia. Within. a
year after this induction into public national life, Matus
Cernak, despite his youthful thirty-five years, became
a minister in the Prague government.
Prague,. long accustomed to an accord of fawning
subservience and servility ,o n the part of those to whom
she had granted political ministries and various similar
offices, ,s oon realized that this Cernak who accepted a
ministerial portfolio came as a representative of a new
generation. He was not a hireling. He was a public servant who bore the concerns of the Slovak nation deep in
his heart, one to be touched neither by bribes nor by intimidatioo. He was upright as well as fearless and his
attitude was undisguised. He understood that it served
no purpose to temporize with the Czechs; consequently,
ne had hardly estaJblished himself in his new office when,
mincing no words, he demanded as by a 24-hour ultimatum that Dr. Benes examme the Slova,k problem in the
spirit of the Pittsburgh Pact; i.e.,. Cernak sought to activate Slovakia's autonomy as it had been guaranteed by
the Czechs when Thomas G. Masaryk signed the Pittsburgh Pact in 1918 and the unreserved ratification of the
Parli'ament convened on Noivember 12, 1918 had made the
agreement binding both legally and morally. Benes was
unwilling to meet Cerna.k's terms. Manfully and honorably, Cer:nak offered his resignation from ministerial
duties and his decisive action hastened Slovakia's autonomy and later her complete independence.
In the autonomous state of Slovakia (October 6, 1938
- March 13, 1939) Cernak became a prominent and '!)01)ular personality. iHe was named minister of education
and after the proclamation of independence, he was appointed the first Slovak envoy to Berlin.

�14

SLOVAKIA

Be11lin was not only the most significant, it was also
the most difficult ambassadorial .p ost. The very existence
of the Slovak •r epublic often hUlll.g by a hair there, and the
·Sloviak diplomatic representative had to exercise consummate tact whille at the sarrne time he preserved an inflexible devotion to his country and defended the interests
committed to him in sa:cred trust. Matus Ce.milk proved
himself in this capacity. He again advanced the welfare of
Slovakia with the sarrne degree of ardor and uncomprom~•s ing vigor which had characterized him formerly in
Prague, and his mission was successful. So well, in fact,
did he acquaint himself of his duties that he won for the
SlovaJk caruse the sympathies even of that power that oome
after ,t he occurpaition of Germa.ny, a.nd in its eyes, too, he
was accepted as a non--ae&lt;!redited envoy of the Slovak
nation.
Political reprisals meted out a ,prison sentence for
Cerna.k, and after serving several years in B:vatislava, he
left Slovrukia ,i n 1948. (His country was then degraded by
the Communistic and Czech regimes. Cernak in exille dedicated himself to the struggle to secure a new freedom
and independence for Slo-v:aki-a, a sacred fight against
Communism, a ,c rusade for the triumph of democracy, and
liberty.
For this reason, the ·b rutal political murder .of Matus
Cernak, who had been favored lby fate to assume in this
national struggle for liberty rund independence a role granted only to heroes rund to persons of Ulll.COmmom historic
statUTe,. has shaken every worthy SlorvaJk and every honorable person in the world. For in that little post office
in Munich there feN :at the hands of a cynical muroerer
not merely a member of the little Slovak nation rbut a wholiJ.y dedicated defender of the idea of freedom and democracy, and that at the very hour when the representatives
of international Communism and of Czech imperialism
were sporting the ma:sk of surface smiles and pretending sugiared speeches on peace and coo.p eration and coexistence.
If the world's free press agencies, broadcasts and tele-

�SLOVAKIA

15

vised reports from Bonn to W aslrington, from Paris to
Canada, Australia, Argentina, and all the free world ciroufated reports and commentaries 00: this despica,ble political crime, then it was in tribute to the 'Victim Cerna;k,
a promoter of the ideal of freedom and democracy. Only
the intervention and meddling of the forces of cowardly
appeasement, of colla.:boration with Communism and Czechsown hatred of the Slov,a,ks prevented the .glorification
of this sacrifice, Matus Cernak, as a 1price demanded by
the true instinct of Communism and of Czech chau'Vinism.
Their malice alone precluded the hailing of Matus Cermilk as a martyr to the cause of liberty and democracy,
blessings cherished by the -umiversal free world. This
honor Matus Cernalk fully deserves.
The Slwak nation at home and all loyal Slovaks now
exiled a:nd -scattered throrughout the far-d:hmg countries
of the free world can appraise this holocaust of Matus
Cerna'k in its full historic significance.
Why Was Matus Cernak Slain?
Matus Cernruk fell because he was the foe of Communism and of Czech efforts to dominate Slov,m a and to
usur.p her rights. He was singled orut as one of the most
unyielding exponents of the principle of liberty and a democratic way for Slovalkia. For these reasons he beoame
mar,ked as a sworn enemy of the dual powers of :international Communism and of Czech aggressiv~ pretensions.
Beoaiu:se he had already established a record of several
years o.f sru'Ccessful service on the Slovaik political front
which has !been in the recent past and whlch will very
likely in the near future again be of paramount importance in the 1SlOV'a.:k contest for liberty and independence,
not only Communistic Prague hurt also the adherents of
there-e~bl-ished Czech hegemony QIVer Slovakia ranked
him as the number one man on their list of resistance
leaders active in exile to thwart their nefarious designs.
He fell ,b ecause of his love for SloWJkia suffering under Czech domination., because of his friendly attitude
toward the Gel'Ill.an nation, and b.ecaruse of the fruitf.ul
mission he was accomplishing in the Republic oif Western

�16

SLOVAKIA

Germany where he had all. the p:vospects of continuing an
eminently flourishing career.
·· .. Whether the base assassin will be discoivered as an
individual or not, it is unmistakably clear to every thinking person just whose henchmen he must have been and
in whose employ he accomplished his dastardly, bloody
deed. Since 1945 so great ·a number of outstanding Slovak
patriots has 1b een killed, deported and deprived of liberty that doUJbt concerning the mastermind of this vicious
crime would hardly be in place. Czechs, iboth of the Communist water-mar.k and non-Communist conformers, especially those who in the wake of unsuccessful collaJboration
with Communism escaped into the countries of western
Euvope live in abnormal foar.s bred by guilt, the spawn
of those crimes they per.petrated against the Sudeten and
Cavpathian Ge:rnnans. Their panic mounts as they see Germany mow in the ascendency. as one of the influential nations in international 1p olitics. To iboth classes of Czechs
it is clear that the existence of the Czecho~Slovalk Republic, the question of Czeoh !b oundar~es and conditions affecting the principles of life for the Czech nation in the
future will come to depend in no small measure and in no
negligible way on Germany and on this decisive f.actor
whether or not :Slovalkia will succeed in winning the support of influential ,powers which will further her endeavor
for independence.
Matus Cernak with over 15 years of residence _in Germ.any and very desirable contacts and personal acquaintances even among the highest of German dignitaries was
undenia;bly instrumental ,i n ,s oouring favor for the idea of
SlovaJkia's independence. His peroonal integrity and his
indefatiga;ble efforts in behalf of his country, as posthumously a;ppraised ,b y the German press and attested to
by hll!lldreds ,of telegrams of condolence, won sympathetic response even in the highest levels of political power
in Bonn and presaged ultimate success for the Slova;k
cause. It was primarily for this re8JSOn that the foes of the
Slovak nation and of the Slovalk effort to attain national
independence decided to liquidate Cerna:k.

�SLOVAKIA ,

17

The Political Message of M. Oernak
Cernak was felied in the heat of the national struggle.
He died with a conlViotion -Of Slovak truth, confident in
the ultimate victory of the :natural ri.ght of the Slo.valk
people to enjoy their pro,per national life. He ,c onsummated
his own supreme sacr.ifice in the spirit of his motto "To
liberty through sacrifice" and he signed his political credo
with his own life's blood.
It is not clifficll!lt nor willl it be difficult to• ascertain
what wolilld have been the final political messaige of Cernak. He wrote it in 1938 in terms of his adamant resist•
ance to compromise, his steadfastness and his patriotic
ardorr. You can find it recorded in hundreds of his articles
and political manifestos, in his life-long political career and
in his heroic martyrdom. In the ranks of Slo'Vlak political
figures, personages who have gone ,befo:rre us in death,
Cernak takes hiis pla:ce as the representative of a new political generation, one which has sought ,a nd which stiill
seeks a. solution. of the Slovak problem on a ,b roader European basis within the cadre of modern demo:cratic and
Christian powers.
For his pdlitical mission dn exile, Matus Cernruk was
betteT prepared. than were most .Slovaks, and iby his educational background and his professional experience as
well as by his ,personal endo.w,ments -8Jlld characteristics
he satisfactorily evidenced a Slovalk sense of ,balance and
maturity and fitness :for lirfe. He allso exemplified .Slovakia's innate belonging to Europe and to European traditions.
'Dhe most substantial and eloquent ·proof of his adequacy to fitl the ro[e he chose in the fight for a democratic
and independent .Slov:akia is his very assassination, the
tragiic ,b omb which the antagoodsts orf a Christian and independent SlwaJki'a sent him.
The death of Matus Cerna:k is a painflill and very
grievoU1S loss to the Slovak forces woriking •i n exiJe; it is
one of the severest blows which the Slo¥~k people could
suffer at this time. The manner to which their foes had
to resort in order to bring 0Jbout CernaJk's deswuction,

�18

SLOVAKIA

however, is d.n itself an assurance to all Slovaik em:igres
that in the eyes of Prague and of international Communism ,i t is no "quan·t ite negligeable," that it is, in fact, so
formidable a hindrance to them for the Slovaks to be allied with the democracies that they even ventured such a
brutal scandal to register their reaction.
To Slovruk 1patriots in exile, mourning the death of
their most distinguished representative, Matus Cernak,
this realization begets a fresh spur to redoubled activities.
Consummate triumph of the Slovaik hope for independence beckons on the trail over which Matus Cernak
has forged ahead in honor and in complete unflinching
dedication. God grant it! - "BuNetin of the Slovruk National Council Abroad," June, 1956) .

•

•

•

LABOR AND THE SWVAK REPUBLIC
J. C. Bukovina
" Our policy shall not be socialis·tic, but
social. We shall not incite J:}eople against our.
selves, but we shall train them to be understanding and Wilted . .A:bove all else, work is
the foundation of our policy." 'Dr. Joseph
Tlso, Oct. 8, 1S38.

October 6, 1938, and March 14, 1939, found the S10vruks prepared. The Hlin:ka ·S lovak People's Party, whic:h
had fought consistently for twenty years before Munich
to secure the national existence of the Slova!k nation, was
fully prepared for these two historical milestones - to
take over the direction of the fate of the Slovak nation.
The fight of the Slovaks for national independence in the
pre-Munich Czecho-Slovak State was actually a struggle
and a call of the Slovruk nation for social justice. Once the
Czechs under T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Exlward Benes had
taken over the reigns of state, promises made to the Slovruks in America and elsewhere were soon forgotten, and
the Slovalks found themselves again in the position of the
exploited. Like the Magyars, the Czechs found little trouble
in recruiting Judas Slovaks to promote not the interests of
the Slovak nation, but the interests of the Czech nation,

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                  <text>1956, Vol. 6</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
11&#13;
&#13;
THE POLITICAL MESSAGE OF MATUS CERNAK&#13;
By Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum&#13;
On J'lliy 5, 1955 Matus CernaJk, a .d istinguished Sl01Vaik&#13;
politician and diplomat, was assassinated in Munich, Germany. Forces rabid in orpposing our effort ,to secure and&#13;
esfablish an independent Slovakia could have hardly struck&#13;
a more tell.mg blow than was this dastardly attack, for&#13;
by it they .removed from :actiive service an esteemed patriot,. this Cernak of whom it may be said that of all n:a.&#13;
tiona1 movers currently in exile, he most closely approximated what, lt'elatively speaking, we might designate as the&#13;
position of a 8Jll-accredited legaJte of the Slovak nation to&#13;
the republic of Western Germany. And to him as such were&#13;
paid final tributes and honors in death not only by the&#13;
ch8Jllcello.r of Western Germany himself who expressed&#13;
deep sympathy cm the occasion of Cerna.k's tragic death.&#13;
:rn Gemiany Matus Cern.ak signalized himse1f beyond&#13;
his office as a desewing politidan and drplomat. It was&#13;
due mostly 'to his lll.Iltiring diligence and interest that two&#13;
noteworthy pulbl:ications continued to appear after the departure of Dr. Jozef Pauoo; viz., SLOBODNE SLOVENSKO ('Free Slovaikia, founded by Dr. Pauco) and SWWAKi1SCHE KORJRESPO!NiDENe;. Concern for the social&#13;
well-being of hundreds of .Slorvak re£ugees who arrived&#13;
in Germany also came to, devolrve upon Cerna.k, and his&#13;
name is vecy closely associated with the Slorvaik institute&#13;
in M'll.Il.ich.&#13;
&#13;
IDven this meagelt' cwt-and-dry survey of his recent&#13;
major acltivities yields us the realization that 1lhe foul&#13;
politioal murder, which so unexpectedly wrested Matus&#13;
Cerna;k f.rom our midst, is to all the Slwaks in the free&#13;
world and to the struggle for a democratic independent&#13;
Sloiva.k.ia a much greater loss and a much more sigmfi..&#13;
cant incident than we had ap1Pmised and accounted it in&#13;
the earliest hours of our grief. After the Cernova masS8Jcre of 1907, the murder of Stefanik m 1919 and of Dr.&#13;
Jozef Tiso in 1947, this attack of July 5, :1!955, will be re-&#13;
&#13;
12&#13;
&#13;
corded in Slorvaik national annals as a historically 'Vital&#13;
eivent. The death of fMatws Cemak marks mot merely the&#13;
passing o.f another exiled SlO'V'3Jk diplomat and ipatriot&#13;
who dedicated all his mind and heart to the struggle to&#13;
liberate Slorvaikia from Oom.mJUnism and the Czech yoke.&#13;
Matus Cerna'k's previ!ous politicial background, his personal character and talents, hi•s uncompromising doggedness and his tireless and successful activities within the&#13;
territory of one of the most decisive powers affecting the&#13;
fate of Slova,kia - all this contributed to make Cerna·k&#13;
indispensalble to the CU"rrent state of our pol,i tical efforts&#13;
as w~U as a symlbol of posterity.&#13;
Who Was Matus&#13;
&#13;
Oernak?&#13;
&#13;
Matus Cerruik was bo,r n on August 28, 1903, in the&#13;
town of Vieska where his father was a miller. After his&#13;
preliminary education in iPrievidza, Kezmarok, and Banska&#13;
Bystrica,. he undertook university studies ,i n 'Brague and&#13;
subsequently ,in Leipzig, Germany. His courses were orientated toward a professorship.&#13;
Having attained his diploma, he spent several years&#13;
in teaching •a t Trnava, and in 19i30 he became a high school&#13;
instnuctor in Bratislava. Until 1937 Cernwk devoted himself a,lmost exclusirvely to aoademic pursuits and to cultural interests. He was, however, one of the younger element, a member of that youthful and vitally conscious&#13;
generation of !Slovruks who in the 1932 demonstrations at&#13;
Trencianske Teplice gave Prague incontrovertible evidence of the fact that the spiritual and political development of Slova,kia will follow native inspiration and bent&#13;
and wiN not ibe trammeled by constraining directirves from&#13;
Prague. As a youthful patriot, then, Cernak naturally&#13;
found himself an active participant in various political demonstrn:tions Slllpporting ·Slorvakia's interests and deserts.&#13;
&#13;
It wa.s the temper of the times that shaped his destiny. He made more and more public appearances and spirited pronouncements hut after his patriotic manifesto&#13;
delivered in the ,Slovak National Theater in 1937, Cernak was overnight not only projected ,i nto popular ac-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
13&#13;
&#13;
claim but was also irrevocably committed to bis role as&#13;
an outstanding leader in the political arena, The keynote&#13;
of his message on this occasian was "Orurs is that portion&#13;
of land 'beneath the Tatras and to us rightfully belongs&#13;
all i1ls yield." This cry and justification came to echo from&#13;
inrn.1mera:ble speaker's platforms and it blazed its appeal&#13;
throughout all the press houses of SlovaJkia. Within. a&#13;
year after this induction into public national life, Matus&#13;
Cernak, despite his youthful thirty-five years, became&#13;
a minister in the Prague government.&#13;
Prague,. long accustomed to an accord of fawning&#13;
subservience and servility ,o n the part of those to whom&#13;
she had granted political ministries and various similar&#13;
offices, ,s oon realized that this Cernak who accepted a&#13;
ministerial portfolio came as a representative of a new&#13;
generation. He was not a hireling. He was a public servant who bore the concerns of the Slovak nation deep in&#13;
his heart, one to be touched neither by bribes nor by intimidatioo. He was upright as well as fearless and his&#13;
attitude was undisguised. He understood that it served&#13;
no purpose to temporize with the Czechs; consequently,&#13;
ne had hardly estaJblished himself in his new office when,&#13;
mincing no words, he demanded as by a 24-hour ultimatum that Dr. Benes examme the Slova,k problem in the&#13;
spirit of the Pittsburgh Pact; i.e.,. Cernak sought to activate Slovakia's autonomy as it had been guaranteed by&#13;
the Czechs when Thomas G. Masaryk signed the Pittsburgh Pact in 1918 and the unreserved ratification of the&#13;
Parli'ament convened on Noivember 12, 1918 had made the&#13;
agreement binding both legally and morally. Benes was&#13;
unwilling to meet Cerna.k's terms. Manfully and honorably, Cer:nak offered his resignation from ministerial&#13;
duties and his decisive action hastened Slovakia's autonomy and later her complete independence.&#13;
In the autonomous state of Slovakia (October 6, 1938&#13;
- March 13, 1939) Cernak became a prominent and '!)01)ular personality. iHe was named minister of education&#13;
and after the proclamation of independence, he was appointed the first Slovak envoy to Berlin.&#13;
&#13;
14&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Be11lin was not only the most significant, it was also&#13;
the most difficult ambassadorial .p ost. The very existence&#13;
of the Slovak •r epublic often hUlll.g by a hair there, and the&#13;
·Sloviak diplomatic representative had to exercise consummate tact whille at the sarrne time he preserved an inflexible devotion to his country and defended the interests&#13;
committed to him in sa:cred trust. Matus Ce.milk proved&#13;
himself in this capacity. He again advanced the welfare of&#13;
Slovakia with the sarrne degree of ardor and uncomprom~•s ing vigor which had characterized him formerly in&#13;
Prague, and his mission was successful. So well, in fact,&#13;
did he acquaint himself of his duties that he won for the&#13;
SlovaJk caruse the sympathies even of that power that oome&#13;
after ,t he occurpaition of Germa.ny, a.nd in its eyes, too, he&#13;
was accepted as a non--ae&lt;!redited envoy of the Slovak&#13;
nation.&#13;
Political reprisals meted out a ,prison sentence for&#13;
Cerna.k, and after serving several years in B:vatislava, he&#13;
left Slovrukia ,i n 1948. (His country was then degraded by&#13;
the Communistic and Czech regimes. Cernak in exille dedicated himself to the struggle to secure a new freedom&#13;
and independence for Slo-v:aki-a, a sacred fight against&#13;
Communism, a ,c rusade for the triumph of democracy, and&#13;
liberty.&#13;
For this reason, the ·b rutal political murder .of Matus&#13;
Cernak, who had been favored lby fate to assume in this&#13;
national struggle for liberty rund independence a role granted only to heroes rund to persons of Ulll.COmmom historic&#13;
statUTe,. has shaken every worthy SlorvaJk and every honorable person in the world. For in that little post office&#13;
in Munich there feN :at the hands of a cynical muroerer&#13;
not merely a member of the little Slovak nation rbut a wholiJ.y dedicated defender of the idea of freedom and democracy, and that at the very hour when the representatives&#13;
of international Communism and of Czech imperialism&#13;
were sporting the ma:sk of surface smiles and pretending sugiared speeches on peace and coo.p eration and coexistence.&#13;
If the world's free press agencies, broadcasts and tele-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
15&#13;
&#13;
vised reports from Bonn to W aslrington, from Paris to&#13;
Canada, Australia, Argentina, and all the free world ciroufated reports and commentaries 00: this despica,ble political crime, then it was in tribute to the 'Victim Cerna;k,&#13;
a promoter of the ideal of freedom and democracy. Only&#13;
the intervention and meddling of the forces of cowardly&#13;
appeasement, of colla.:boration with Communism and Czechsown hatred of the Slov,a,ks prevented the .glorification&#13;
of this sacrifice, Matus Cernak, as a 1price demanded by&#13;
the true instinct of Communism and of Czech chau'Vinism.&#13;
Their malice alone precluded the hailing of Matus Cermilk as a martyr to the cause of liberty and democracy,&#13;
blessings cherished by the -umiversal free world. This&#13;
honor Matus Cernalk fully deserves.&#13;
The Slwak nation at home and all loyal Slovaks now&#13;
exiled a:nd -scattered throrughout the far-d:hmg countries&#13;
of the free world can appraise this holocaust of Matus&#13;
Cerna'k in its full historic significance.&#13;
Why Was Matus Cernak Slain?&#13;
Matus Cernruk fell because he was the foe of Communism and of Czech efforts to dominate Slov,m a and to&#13;
usur.p her rights. He was singled orut as one of the most&#13;
unyielding exponents of the principle of liberty and a democratic way for Slovalkia. For these reasons he beoame&#13;
mar,ked as a sworn enemy of the dual powers of :international Communism and of Czech aggressiv~ pretensions.&#13;
Beoaiu:se he had already established a record of several&#13;
years o.f sru'Ccessful service on the Slovaik political front&#13;
which has !been in the recent past and whlch will very&#13;
likely in the near future again be of paramount importance in the 1SlOV'a.:k contest for liberty and independence,&#13;
not only Communistic Prague hurt also the adherents of&#13;
there-e~bl-ished Czech hegemony QIVer Slovakia ranked&#13;
him as the number one man on their list of resistance&#13;
leaders active in exile to thwart their nefarious designs.&#13;
He fell ,b ecause of his love for SloWJkia suffering under Czech domination., because of his friendly attitude&#13;
toward the Gel'Ill.an nation, and b.ecaruse of the fruitf.ul&#13;
mission he was accomplishing in the Republic oif Western&#13;
&#13;
16&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Germany where he had all. the p:vospects of continuing an&#13;
eminently flourishing career.&#13;
·· .. Whether the base assassin will be discoivered as an&#13;
individual or not, it is unmistakably clear to every thinking person just whose henchmen he must have been and&#13;
in whose employ he accomplished his dastardly, bloody&#13;
deed. Since 1945 so great ·a number of outstanding Slovak&#13;
patriots has 1b een killed, deported and deprived of liberty that doUJbt concerning the mastermind of this vicious&#13;
crime would hardly be in place. Czechs, iboth of the Communist water-mar.k and non-Communist conformers, especially those who in the wake of unsuccessful collaJboration&#13;
with Communism escaped into the countries of western&#13;
Euvope live in abnormal foar.s bred by guilt, the spawn&#13;
of those crimes they per.petrated against the Sudeten and&#13;
Cavpathian Ge:rnnans. Their panic mounts as they see Germany mow in the ascendency. as one of the influential nations in international 1p olitics. To iboth classes of Czechs&#13;
it is clear that the existence of the Czecho~Slovalk Republic, the question of Czeoh !b oundar~es and conditions affecting the principles of life for the Czech nation in the&#13;
future will come to depend in no small measure and in no&#13;
negligible way on Germany and on this decisive f.actor&#13;
whether or not :Slovalkia will succeed in winning the support of influential ,powers which will further her endeavor&#13;
for independence.&#13;
Matus Cernak with over 15 years of residence _in Germ.any and very desirable contacts and personal acquaintances even among the highest of German dignitaries was&#13;
undenia;bly instrumental ,i n ,s oouring favor for the idea of&#13;
SlovaJkia's independence. His peroonal integrity and his&#13;
indefatiga;ble efforts in behalf of his country, as posthumously a;ppraised ,b y the German press and attested to&#13;
by hll!lldreds ,of telegrams of condolence, won sympathetic response even in the highest levels of political power&#13;
in Bonn and presaged ultimate success for the Slova;k&#13;
cause. It was primarily for this re8JSOn that the foes of the&#13;
Slovak nation and of the Slovalk effort to attain national&#13;
independence decided to liquidate Cerna:k.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA ,&#13;
&#13;
17&#13;
&#13;
The Political Message of M. Oernak&#13;
Cernak was felied in the heat of the national struggle.&#13;
He died with a conlViotion -Of Slovak truth, confident in&#13;
the ultimate victory of the :natural ri.ght of the Slo.valk&#13;
people to enjoy their pro,per national life. He ,c onsummated&#13;
his own supreme sacr.ifice in the spirit of his motto "To&#13;
liberty through sacrifice" and he signed his political credo&#13;
with his own life's blood.&#13;
It is not clifficll!lt nor willl it be difficult to• ascertain&#13;
what wolilld have been the final political messaige of Cernak. He wrote it in 1938 in terms of his adamant resist•&#13;
ance to compromise, his steadfastness and his patriotic&#13;
ardorr. You can find it recorded in hundreds of his articles&#13;
and political manifestos, in his life-long political career and&#13;
in his heroic martyrdom. In the ranks of Slo'Vlak political&#13;
figures, personages who have gone ,befo:rre us in death,&#13;
Cernak takes hiis pla:ce as the representative of a new political generation, one which has sought ,a nd which stiill&#13;
seeks a. solution. of the Slovak problem on a ,b roader European basis within the cadre of modern demo:cratic and&#13;
Christian powers.&#13;
For his pdlitical mission dn exile, Matus Cernruk was&#13;
betteT prepared. than were most .Slovaks, and iby his educational background and his professional experience as&#13;
well as by his ,personal endo.w,ments -8Jlld characteristics&#13;
he satisfactorily evidenced a Slovalk sense of ,balance and&#13;
maturity and fitness :for lirfe. He allso exemplified .Slovakia's innate belonging to Europe and to European traditions.&#13;
'Dhe most substantial and eloquent ·proof of his adequacy to fitl the ro[e he chose in the fight for a democratic&#13;
and independent .Slov:akia is his very assassination, the&#13;
tragiic ,b omb which the antagoodsts orf a Christian and independent SlwaJki'a sent him.&#13;
The death of Matus Cerna:k is a painflill and very&#13;
grievoU1S loss to the Slovak forces woriking •i n exiJe; it is&#13;
one of the severest blows which the Slo¥~k people could&#13;
suffer at this time. The manner to which their foes had&#13;
to resort in order to bring 0Jbout CernaJk's deswuction,&#13;
&#13;
18&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
however, is d.n itself an assurance to all Slovaik em:igres&#13;
that in the eyes of Prague and of international Communism ,i t is no "quan·t ite negligeable," that it is, in fact, so&#13;
formidable a hindrance to them for the Slovaks to be allied with the democracies that they even ventured such a&#13;
brutal scandal to register their reaction.&#13;
To Slovruk 1patriots in exile, mourning the death of&#13;
their most distinguished representative, Matus Cernak,&#13;
this realization begets a fresh spur to redoubled activities.&#13;
Consummate triumph of the Slovaik hope for independence beckons on the trail over which Matus Cernak&#13;
has forged ahead in honor and in complete unflinching&#13;
dedication. God grant it! - "BuNetin of the Slovruk National Council Abroad," June, 1956) .&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
LABOR AND THE SWVAK REPUBLIC&#13;
J. C. Bukovina&#13;
" Our policy shall not be socialis·tic, but&#13;
social. We shall not incite J:}eople against our.&#13;
selves, but we shall train them to be understanding and Wilted . .A:bove all else, work is&#13;
the foundation of our policy." 'Dr. Joseph&#13;
Tlso, Oct. 8, 1S38.&#13;
&#13;
October 6, 1938, and March 14, 1939, found the S10vruks prepared. The Hlin:ka ·S lovak People's Party, whic:h&#13;
had fought consistently for twenty years before Munich&#13;
to secure the national existence of the Slova!k nation, was&#13;
fully prepared for these two historical milestones - to&#13;
take over the direction of the fate of the Slovak nation.&#13;
The fight of the Slovaks for national independence in the&#13;
pre-Munich Czecho-Slovak State was actually a struggle&#13;
and a call of the Slovruk nation for social justice. Once the&#13;
Czechs under T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Exlward Benes had&#13;
taken over the reigns of state, promises made to the Slovruks in America and elsewhere were soon forgotten, and&#13;
the Slovalks found themselves again in the position of the&#13;
exploited. Like the Magyars, the Czechs found little trouble&#13;
in recruiting Judas Slovaks to promote not the interests of&#13;
the Slovak nation, but the interests of the Czech nation,&#13;
&#13;
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                <text>The Political Message of Matúš Černák</text>
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                <text>Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum&#13;
Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 2 (19), June 1956&#13;
pp. 11-18</text>
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                    <text>18

SLOVAKIA

however, is d.n itself an assurance to all Slovaik em:igres
that in the eyes of Prague and of international Communism ,i t is no "quan·t ite negligeable," that it is, in fact, so
formidable a hindrance to them for the Slovaks to be allied with the democracies that they even ventured such a
brutal scandal to register their reaction.
To Slovruk 1patriots in exile, mourning the death of
their most distinguished representative, Matus Cernak,
this realization begets a fresh spur to redoubled activities.
Consummate triumph of the Slovaik hope for independence beckons on the trail over which Matus Cernak
has forged ahead in honor and in complete unflinching
dedication. God grant it! - "BuNetin of the Slovruk National Council Abroad," June, 1956) .

•

•

•

LABOR AND THE SWVAK REPUBLIC
J. C. Bukovina
" Our policy shall not be socialis·tic, but
social. We shall not incite J:}eople against our.
selves, but we shall train them to be understanding and Wilted . .A:bove all else, work is
the foundation of our policy." 'Dr. Joseph
Tlso, Oct. 8, 1S38.

October 6, 1938, and March 14, 1939, found the S10vruks prepared. The Hlin:ka ·S lovak People's Party, whic:h
had fought consistently for twenty years before Munich
to secure the national existence of the Slova!k nation, was
fully prepared for these two historical milestones - to
take over the direction of the fate of the Slovak nation.
The fight of the Slovaks for national independence in the
pre-Munich Czecho-Slovak State was actually a struggle
and a call of the Slovruk nation for social justice. Once the
Czechs under T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Exlward Benes had
taken over the reigns of state, promises made to the Slovruks in America and elsewhere were soon forgotten, and
the Slovalks found themselves again in the position of the
exploited. Like the Magyars, the Czechs found little trouble
in recruiting Judas Slovaks to promote not the interests of
the Slovak nation, but the interests of the Czech nation,

�SLOVAKIA

19

which for propaganda .purposes was labeled "Czecho-Slovak" (with or without the hyphen.)
Practically every single utterance of the deputies of
the ffiinka Slovak !People's Party on the floor of the Prague
Parliament directly or indirectly dealt with the social
question of the Sloivak people. When the state ·b udgets
came up for consideration, Andrew Hlinka and iDr. Joseph
Tiso pointed to the injustices suffered by the Slovaiks at
the hands of the Prague centralistic government. Pleas
and admonitions, warnings and threats, were a voice calling oot in the desert; the government and Czech deputies
always played the same record: Slovakia is costing the
"historical" Jra.nds plenty, the policy of the Hlin:ka Slovak
People's Party is separatistfo, and its representatiives
are demagogues, political analphwbets, etc.
While the Prague government continued to add iusuJ.t
to injury whenever 'S lovaks demanded state's rights, Andrew iHlinlka !Prepared his most trusted workers for the
decisive battle. He knew the significance of trade and professional organizations; several of them had joined his
party: the Christian-Social T.rade Federation, led by deputies Rudolph Cajovsky and John Moro; the Allian·ce of Slovruk Railr.oadmen, ,u nder the chairmansh1p of deputy Stephen Surovialk; the Alliance of .Slovak Postal W Oiikers under deputy Joseph Drobny; the Regional Catholic Teachers
Society, in whicih Senator .An1.hony Ha.ncJko served as chairman of many years; and the Society of Slovak Professors,
led by professor Misfile
The occupational organizations, wi1:th their Christia.nSociai program drawn from the Papal Encyclicals, prepared themselves to solve economic, cultural, and social
prdblems after the Slovak people rid itself of the tutorship
of Prague and :a Slovak government would take over in
Slovakia. Now, ·a fter the passage of years, we know that
they did their work notably well during the life of the
Sloivak Republic.
The basis of the political struggle of the Slovak nation for national and state independence was indisputably
the social question and it was decisive in the placing of the

�20

SLOVIA.KIA

foundations for renewed .Slovruk statehood. The words
spoken by Dr. Joseph Tiso, when he assumed the premiership of the Slovak aiutooomou:s government, October 8, 1938,
teH us everything t!hat made the Slovak Republic Christian and democratic. In the •s entences quoted is noted the
social policy of the Slovruk Republic which was conscientiously followed not only by Tiso himself, but by the mem'b ers of the SlOIV3!k government, as well.
The program of social policy during the life of the Slovak State was not a copy of German National ,Socialism,
as enemies of the Slovruk nation liike to point out, but it
was the program of Papal Encyclicals, especially the Encyclicals of Pope Leo XNI (Rerum novarum) :and iPope iPius
XI (Qua:dragesimo anno). And this social ,policy, even
though it was not entirely original because it was ibased on
the Paprul Encyclicals, nevertheless can be regarded as
something · new in central Europe, if not in all of Eurorpe ;
and it was an attempt to get the human society on a new
road within the confines of Christian socialism.
The Slwalk Government realized the social program
ex;pressed iby President Dr. Joseph Tiso by means of a:n
economic program which secured wo!I'k fo,r every 1Slova:k at
home, work rewarded with adequate wages; it increased
its ca:re of tlie family and its health ; it raised the li'Ving
and cu1tuiral standard of all str.ata of the nation; it removed class hatreds and, by systematic re-education of the
population, tried to attain mutual understanding and harmony.
ln former Austria-Hungary and in pre-&lt;Munich Czecho-Slova'kia, the social problem was partly solved by the
emi gration of Slovaks into foreign Jands, notably to America and, later, to Canada and Argentina, and by seeking
seasonal wor.k in neighboring countries, such as Hungary,
Austria, F-rance rurid Germany. Over a quarter of a million
Slovaks left their homeland d'll.I'ing the life of the first
C.zecho-Slo.vak Repulblic, while almost the same number
of Czechs, throug;h the good graces of the centralistic
Pra;gue government, found b;rea:d in Slovakia. This was a
bitter pill for the Slovwks to swaHow. Slovak political and
1

1

1

�SLOVAKIA

21

ccltura,1 leaders iknew that, if the trend continued, the Slovalks would soon be threatened with complete extinction
in their own homeland.
One of the first things the autonomous S1ova;k Government did, after taking office, was to asik Prague to recali all Czechs f.rom Slorvakia - wotikers, teachers, professors, and officials - whose places might well be filled
with SlovaJks. 1P rague agreed. Nevertheless this subject was
brought up in the post-war trials against President Tiso
and memlbern of the Slovaik Government before the National Court in Bratislava, particularly in the process
against Dr. Vojtech Tulka upon whom the court practically
placed the foll blame for the return of Czech immigrants
to Bohemia and Moravia. Let the Czechs exp1ain the release
of Czech employees in Slavaikia as they will, Sl:ovalks regarded it as the only way out to right the inj1U:stices committed during two whole decades by the Prague gorvernment against the SlavaJk people and the only way to secure a livelihood for tholl!Sands of Slovak workers, farmers,
and intellectuals who, because of the unjust social policy
and chauvin~stic attitude of the Prague Government, were
dependent on alms doled out from unemployment funds.
With the departure of Czech employees from Slovakia thousands of positions were made available for Slovaks: in public works, the railways, the army, police department, the trades, and in private enter,prises. The Czechs
learned what the S1ova:ks •knew long before: there was
more tham enough work in ·SlO'Vakia for all inh'a,bitants who
wanted to work. New r.ail lines were laid, new roads constructed, rivers were regufated, fields, meadows and pastures were drained, new faotorie.s, hydrocentrals, schools
public buildings, hospitals, sanatoriums, and libraries were
built. During six short years relati-vely much more was done
in Slovakia than during the twenty-year existence of the
first Ozecho--Slova;k Republic - and without the so-called
"historical" lands contriJbuting a cent.
The wage problem of Slovalk workers constituted a
serio:us problem during the first years of the Slovak Repufblic wa,ges paid in Slovakia were much higher th!an those

�22

SLOVAKIA

paid in Czech lands. In 1939 agricultural worikers, who were
the least paid, had their wages increased. The Slovak laborer, unspoiled by the Marx-Leninist theory and loyal
to the Christian and national tradition, was not in a hurry
to have his wages or salary adjusted: he realized that the
government, even though 'Very willing, needed time to solve
labor problems; to create a state, seC'llire peace for it with
its neighbors, to get the state apparatus going, a:ll this required much time, thought, and ener,gy. The Slova'k Government was aware of the fact that the farmer and the worker
were the main pillars of every state; the welfare of the
state depended on the satisfaction and welfare of all workers. On February 5, 1940, the Premier of the Slo:va:k Government, Dr. Vojtech Tuka, called a meeting of representatives of all workers in Slovakia to Bratislava to discuss
the iProblem of raising the living standard of workers and
everything connected with this problem.
The Slovak Government did concern itself with the fulfillment of the regulations of the Slo:vak Constitution (par.
79) and the Papal Encyclicals, according to which the exploitation of the socially weak was forbidden and every
citizen of Slovakia had a claim to a just wage. F1amily considerations also entered into the problem, and a minimum
wage law was put into effect, so that employers could not
act arbitrarily with the wovkers and seek cheap lalbor.
The result of the meeting with the representatives of
the workers was that the Slovak Government issued a law
(No. 284/ 1940), on the basis of which there was set up a
Centrai Labor Office in Bratislava which was controlled
by the Ministry of the Interior. lt was the task of this office to employ all aivailable workers in Slovakia: find out
what people could do, ascertain their health status, and
gi'Ve them a just wage for the work they were qualified to
do. The Central Labor Office also had charge of hiring
foreigners, inspecting industry, and providmg safeguards
for the iprotection of lahor .and the wonkera. Law No.
283/1940 gave this office the authority to regulate wages
and salaries and to determine woriking conditions. The Labor Office really did a wonderlul job for SlO'Vaik labor. It

�SLOVAKIA

23

ca.n only be iregretted that, at the end of 1942 '8llld the beginning of 1943, the regulation of wages and salaries was
taken over by the Office of Supplies, headed ,b y Dr. Imrich
Karvas, now ·a .professor at the Uni'Versity of Bratislava,
who was definitely anti-labor. It soon became apparent that
Dr. Karvas wanted to incite the Slo'Vak workers ·a gainst the
Slovak State and against the 'Slovak Government. As the
"only expert and economist," Karvas ·a lways opposed an
mcrease in wages for workers, but was O'Verruled by the
Slovak Government and President Tiso himself. And this
is the irony of fate: the ,g reatest friends of the Slovak
wovker either were executed by hanging or are incarcerated
in the Leopoldov prison, while the most implaicable enemy
of Slovak labor enjoys the trust of the Communist Party.
-During the life of the first Czecho-Sloiv~ Republic,
Slovruk labor endeavored in vain to have a law passed in favor of workers with families. What Prague could not do for
Slovak wor,kers was done by the Slovak State. The law
(No. 216/ 1941) pro!Vided additional payments for children
of wage-earners in the form of insurance. The socia:l significance of this law was far-reaching. During the first year,
after the pass·a ge of this law, 115,000 families of Slovak
workers and a total of 260,000 children were given significant aid: 100,000,000 Slovruk crowns ($3,333,000) were
paid out.
The true aim of the family wage was so that the
worker, as the provider for his family, might make enough
to live contendedly, satisfy also his cultural desires, and be
able to save something for his family. The deciding factor
of family wages, however, were the mothers and women of
Slovakia, whom the government wanted to take out of the
labor ,g roup in the course of time, so that they might be
able to return to their original and God-designed mission
- to the family - where they could devote their time to
the care of their children and their households.
It should b.e ,s pecially emphasized that the Slovak
Government endea,yored to do away with piece-work altogether, because this type of labor notably exhausts the
worker so that in a relatively short period of time he be-

�24

SLOVAKIA

comes useless for work and a burden not only :f or the
state, but also his family. Workers were paid by the hoUT.
When the results of the war began to be felt in Slovakia,
the Slwwk government ordered that the workers be compensated for .p rice increases: married men at the rate of
1.20 crowns and the single at 0.80 cro,w ns per hour. Besides that, at the end of each calendar year, the workers
receirved a special, tax-free payment in the form of a bonus, the iamount was determined first ,b y the Central LaJbor
Office, but later by the Office of Supplies.
DUTing the fi11st Czecho-Slovruk Republic workers complained most aJbout social insurance, into which every
wovker had to pay high dues while sick benefits were low.
The Slova;k Government also changed this radically. By an
oroer with the power ·o f -law (No. 300/ 1940), District Socia1 Insurance agencies were dissolved ; from J anuary 1,
1941, the Workers Social Insurance Office, with its main
office in Bratislava, took care of sicik, invalid, old-age, and
accident insurance. Thus, the wo,r kers, their wives, and their
families received better medical ,c are the office had seventeen affiliates in Slovakia and built its own hospitals in Bratislava, Ha.ndlova, and Podbrezova. In 1941 it built and
opened one of the largest and most modern ~a.natoriums
for liung diseases in central Europe ; it is situated in Vysne
Hagy and contains 500 beds: 100 for patients with bone
tuberc'U'losis and 400 fo,r other TB cases. ~urthermore, the
agency managed the Soos Baths, the s 1anatorium for children in Luci'Vlla, and established sanatociums at Sklenne Teplice and at Trencianske Teplice: these were the places
where the Workers 1Social Insurance Office sent afflicted
workers and their wi&lt;ves and cihildren.
The Slovak Government also did something about the
aicute hO'USing problem in industrial centers. The action
of the government called a "thousand homes for workers
families," was COffiiPleted successfully in the targer industrial centers. The Finance Ministry, with special tax relief
for owners of irrdustrial enterprises and large farms, arranged to have these homes built within the framework
of iirwestment. Thu s, entire colonies of new workers homes

�25

SLOVAKIA

sprang up within two-.three years, like mmhrooms after a
rain, in Duibnica, Pova:zska Bystrica, Zilina, Ruzomiberok,
Zbehy, Afruksice, and other industrial centers.
The parliament of the Slovak Republic did not forget
the recreational needs of the workers, either. On J,u,ly 6,
1944, it passed a law (No. 87 of the Slovruk Code of Law)
granting paid vacations to wor,ke,r s. According to this law,
every worker who worked at least six months a year was
entitled to a paid vacation. The length of the vacation was
established by law and depended on the actua1 number of
years wonked and not on the performance of the wor,kers,
as it does presently under the Communist iPmgue regime.
The judiciary in the Slovak Republic was completely
independent. '11his had a marked signific ance for the workers in the labor trials. The la:borer had the right, guaranteed by law, to sue his employer for cruuse; he also had
the right to sue the State for cause, if he was an employee
thereof.
The sodal question of the workers was resolved with
the cooperation of the representatives of the Slovak W10rkers, organized in the tra:de organizatiooo. First, as if mentioned above, it was the Christian-Social Trrude Federation
and, later, the ·F ederation of l'Ildiustry, Tra:des, and Finances. The trade organizations were non~political and their
ta.sk was to help the ,government realize its program for
raising the living and cultural level of the workers.
Under the concept_ of socia1 question, people usually
think of the problem or question of the workers who suffered most, especially in the last years ~fore World War
II. This is not the correct explanati~in oif social policy, because not only the factory wo•r ker, but also the fa.I1mer,
artisans, the teacher, and the office-worker are equal members of the national collectirve. This is something wihich the
Communists do not want to reoog,nize 3/nd the reason why
they "solve" social questions so speedily. Just how they do
th&lt;at is a chapter ,by itself. If, however, the social question
is to be solved to the satisfaction of all the adherents of a
nation, its solution must include the farmer, the businessman, and the office-worker. Ami the Slovak State did just
1

�2-6

SLOVAKIA

that: as far as the social question went, it took care of
every category of wonker, state and private office-.wol'lker.
•F or Slovalk agriculturists, the most significant day
undoubtedly was February 22, 1940 (Washington's birthday) , when the parliament of the Slovak !Republic passed
the new Land Reform Act, whereby ali the injustices suffered by the Slovak farmer during the pre~'Munkh Republic were removed. Land reform of the first CzechoSlova:k
Republic did not consider the actual needs of Slovak farmers and distributed the land according ta a political key
to those in the Czeoho-Slovak political parties who bound
themselves to serve Benes and T. G. Masaryk: to promote
the •p olicy of the Prag1Ue centralistic government and the
interests of the Czech nation.
In a conversation a:bout the new Land Reform Act,
besides addresses by representatives o:f the Slovak farmers, Dr. Gejza Medricky, Minister of Agriculture, speaking for the Slovak Government, among other things, said:
"It is very well known that we do not have too much
arable land in Slovakia. In the whole of Slovakia we have
1,618,000 hectares (3,998,078 aicres) of wooded and agricultural land which come untler the new Land Reform Act ;
this amounts to 45 percent of all our wooded and agricudtural land. It ,i s ev.ident that the government must be concerned that this land be worked in the best manner possible, that this land provide the food necessary for the
people here settled, and that this land serve as a permanent existential foundation for those people who work on
it. That is just why the significance of the plan from the
economic side is clear to every individual. But no less is the
significance of the plan from the political side. 'In the past
the Hlinka Slovak People's Party fought against the injustices which emanated from the realization of the old land
reform. With today's discussion about this law and with
the passage of this plan, the old political demand of the
ffiinka Slovak People's Party, that is, the revision of the
old Land Reform Act, is being realized."
In his speech, Dr. Gejza Medricky pointed to the actuality that 45 percent, that is, almost a half of the land

�SLOVAKIA

27

in SlovaJkia was in the hands of foreigners, while Slovak
farmers had only a bit more than half of it. The intention
of the new Land !Reform Act was to get the land into the
hands of Slova,k farmers and such people, whose social
condition required it; furthemiOTe, to avoid economic losses
with property transfers, to secure the Hveliihood of the
population, and to solve the social question which is connected with an agricultural state (",SLOVAK," Feb. 25,
1940).

The task of executing the Land Reform Act correctly
and speedily wa,s entrusted to the State Land Office, which
C8Jllle into being on the basis of a special law, which the
S1ovruk Parliament ha,d voted that same day. According to
the law, the Land Office had the 3/Uthority to buy the land
concerned fo:r the State and then to sell it to Slovak farmers who were interested in it, guaranteeing that they
would work it to produce the commodities needed by the
population.
According to the law, every citizen of the Slovak State
had a claim to ~and, if he ,u nderstood farming, whose properties, after the Vienna Aribitration, fell to Hungary and,
therefore, were forced by the Magyar government to lose
everything and go to Slovakia empty-handed. Flurtihermore,
priority .r ights to buy land were granted to graduates of
agricultural schools, then to local people or inha:bitants of
neighboring communities; and where none such could be
found, the land was distributed to citizens of more remote
communities of Slovakia.
Of course, those interested in the land did not get it
for free. The farmer, who applied for land, had to pay 50
percent of the sale .price, after hls application had been approved, and the remainder he could pay of in forty years
in the form of rent to the State. The Land Office QOmpensated the owners of land which came under the Act by
paying them the S8Jllle _a moont they paid for it, or payment
wa,s based on prod1Uctive value.
The significance of ia:nd reform for the Slovak farmer, as well as for the whole Slovak nation, was evaluated

�28

SLOVAKIA

by President Dr. Joseph Tiso on March 10, 1940, in Banovce Nad Bebravou, in this manner:
"Gradually we shall harve to learn to forget the expression 'land reform.' Land reform with us is not the rewarding of protected chHdren to catoh the voters. We are concerned so that more he produced agriculturally. We must
increase production. We do not want to reward, to ca:tch,
voters. No one shall ever again, in any manner whatsoever,
buy voters in Slov~ia ! Even in the present situation we
are self-sufficient. This, however, must not satisfy us. We
also want to export. That is why we wish to increruse our
agricultUTal ,prod'Ulction.
"The main idea of land reform is: to enruble as many
husbandmen as possible to oper.ate independently. In this
we shall act sensi,bly. Wherever anything proves itself,
there we shall cultivate it. Whatever ,prorves itself, that we
shall do. There shwl a!lso be so-called indivisi!ble property,
which shall not be parcelled out under any circumstances.
Flur:thermore, we must enaJble ,a higher degree of agrioulture ( experimental agrimtlture) . True, even the farmer
can experiment, burt this c·a n be done only by ·t he man who
has more. Such a farmer then can make experiments, take
risks. We need healthy seeds, quality livestock. The small
farmer is not trained to produce these. Such farmers are
afraid to give their livestock more so that it could put on
more weight. The a:gricwtural industry eannot be maintained only lby the sma'li farmer. [rt is the aim of the State
to increase agricultural production. Therefore, the greater
agricwtural units shall be preser-ved. . . No one shall get
land under the sale price, and no, one shall get something
for nothing. Nothing is valued that comes easily. So, if
you want land, you shall have to pay for it; if you cannot
pay the full iprice, the State will he1p you .p ay it in time in
the form of rent. . . We want to make it possible for our
,b rethren in other lands to come here and go into ventures.
We want to grow in: numbers; our ambition is that we becrone stronger. I do not fear fo;r the future we have the
best outlook There still are some insufficiencies, but that

�SLOVAKIA

29

is not because a new state has ,b een born, but because
there is war around us!"
Strict, 1but fatherly words. Only he could speak thus,
who loved his people and who throughout his life worked
in its interest. Thus it was that the other hallf of Slovak
land got into the hands of Slovak farmers and ceaaed to
be the object of business exploitation. And, fina11y, even
private inrvestors had it good in ,Sl.ov,ak±a. They were not
only given the possibility to enterprise, but were practically forced by the government to participate in the building of the State, so that erven their profits might increase.
On the social policy of the government depended the
reeducation of the population - the policy carried out in
the i:\pirit of Christian charity towards ones illeigh:bor, of
mutual assistance, cooperation, and understanding. The aim
of the reeducation of the 1people waJS to remOIVe the blights
of the past which, under the influence of pressure from the
East, began to find opportune soil even in Slovalkia, especially among the Lutherans. Special attention was given
to the reeducation of employe11S and owners of larger and
smaller industrial enterprises; the relationship between
employer and employee was exiplained according to the
teaching of the social Pope, Leo XIII, who said in the encyclical Rerum Novarum:
"Religion teaches the wealthy owner and the employer
that their woJ'.lk people a,re not to be accO!Uilted their !bondsmen; that in ervery man they m'USt respect his dignity and
worth as a man and as a Christian.; that labor rfor w,a.ges
is not a thing to 'b e ashamed of, if we lend ear to right
reason an.d to Christian (Philosophy, but is to a man's credit, ena;bling -h im to earn his living in an honoraJble way;
and that it is shamefiuil and inhuman to treat men li!ke
chattels to make money by, or to loolk upon them merely
as so muoh musole or physical strength. A,g am the Chrurch
teaches that, in dealing with the workingman, religion and
the ,g ood of his so,ul must be kept in mind. Hence the employer is -bound to see that the wo:rker has time for !his religious duties; that he be not exposed to corrupting influ~.AW¥ and that he ibe not led
ences and

d~A~g~
UII ..

J;Q~VILLE. STATE CO~LE.GE

�SLOVAKIA

30

away to neglect bis thome and f.amily, or to squander his
earnings. Furthermore, the employer must never tax his
work people 'beyond their strength, or employ them in work
unsuited to their sex or age. His ,g reat and principal duty
is to give every one what is just. Doubtless before deciding
whether wages are fair, many things have to be considered; ·b ut wealthy owners and all masters of labor should
be mindful of this - that to exercise pressure upon the
indigent and the destitute for the sa;ke of gain, and to
gather one's profit out of the need of another, is condemned
by all laws, human and Divine."
1

On the other hand, workingmen were expected to carry
out honestly and fairly all equitable agreements freely entered into; never to injure the property of an employer
uselessly and maliciously; never to .r esort to violence in
defending their own cause and to avoid riots and disorders; and, finally, to have nothing to do with persons who
stand in th service of Communism, endeavoring to sow dissention and dissatisfaction among the working ;p eople and
ultimately to enslaJVe them.
1

The results of reeducation were demonstrated especially
when Dr. Karvas, chairman of the Office of Supplies, adamantly opposed ,a ll warranted increases in wages for workingmen.. At that time the employers stood by the workingmen and thus embarrassed iDr. Karvas: instead of hourly
wages, they ,g radually began to introduce piece-work so
that the workmen could gain their increases, but not to sap
their strength and exploit them. This arrangement was
done in agreement with the trade organizations and the
workingmen themselrves; Karvas, therefore, could not punrish employers for increasing wages with out his permission.
Tthe life of cohabitation of the citizens in the Slovak
State resembled the life of a well-ordered family. Slov:rukia
was the envy of States with richer traditions and of nations more mmnerous than the Slova;ks. The SlovaJk workingman ,r eally never had it so good, rund prdbaJbly never
will mwe it again, until a free and ~ndependent Slovrukia,
based on Christian principles, is again established.

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1543">
                    <text>18

SLOVAKIA

however, is d.n itself an assurance to all Slovaik em:igres
that in the eyes of Prague and of international Communism ,i t is no "quan·t ite negligeable," that it is, in fact, so
formidable a hindrance to them for the Slovaks to be allied with the democracies that they even ventured such a
brutal scandal to register their reaction.
To Slovruk 1patriots in exile, mourning the death of
their most distinguished representative, Matus Cernak,
this realization begets a fresh spur to redoubled activities.
Consummate triumph of the Slovaik hope for independence beckons on the trail over which Matus Cernak
has forged ahead in honor and in complete unflinching
dedication. God grant it! - "BuNetin of the Slovruk National Council Abroad," June, 1956) .

•

•

•

LABOR AND THE SWVAK REPUBLIC
J. C. Bukovina
" Our policy shall not be socialis·tic, but
social. We shall not incite J:}eople against our.
selves, but we shall train them to be understanding and Wilted . .A:bove all else, work is
the foundation of our policy." 'Dr. Joseph
Tlso, Oct. 8, 1S38.

October 6, 1938, and March 14, 1939, found the S10vruks prepared. The Hlin:ka ·S lovak People's Party, whic:h
had fought consistently for twenty years before Munich
to secure the national existence of the Slova!k nation, was
fully prepared for these two historical milestones - to
take over the direction of the fate of the Slovak nation.
The fight of the Slovaks for national independence in the
pre-Munich Czecho-Slovak State was actually a struggle
and a call of the Slovruk nation for social justice. Once the
Czechs under T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Exlward Benes had
taken over the reigns of state, promises made to the Slovruks in America and elsewhere were soon forgotten, and
the Slovalks found themselves again in the position of the
exploited. Like the Magyars, the Czechs found little trouble
in recruiting Judas Slovaks to promote not the interests of
the Slovak nation, but the interests of the Czech nation,

�SLOVAKIA

19

which for propaganda .purposes was labeled "Czecho-Slovak" (with or without the hyphen.)
Practically every single utterance of the deputies of
the ffiinka Slovak !People's Party on the floor of the Prague
Parliament directly or indirectly dealt with the social
question of the Sloivak people. When the state ·b udgets
came up for consideration, Andrew Hlinka and iDr. Joseph
Tiso pointed to the injustices suffered by the Slovaiks at
the hands of the Prague centralistic government. Pleas
and admonitions, warnings and threats, were a voice calling oot in the desert; the government and Czech deputies
always played the same record: Slovakia is costing the
"historical" Jra.nds plenty, the policy of the Hlin:ka Slovak
People's Party is separatistfo, and its representatiives
are demagogues, political analphwbets, etc.
While the Prague government continued to add iusuJ.t
to injury whenever 'S lovaks demanded state's rights, Andrew iHlinlka !Prepared his most trusted workers for the
decisive battle. He knew the significance of trade and professional organizations; several of them had joined his
party: the Christian-Social T.rade Federation, led by deputies Rudolph Cajovsky and John Moro; the Allian·ce of Slovruk Railr.oadmen, ,u nder the chairmansh1p of deputy Stephen Surovialk; the Alliance of .Slovak Postal W Oiikers under deputy Joseph Drobny; the Regional Catholic Teachers
Society, in whicih Senator .An1.hony Ha.ncJko served as chairman of many years; and the Society of Slovak Professors,
led by professor Misfile
The occupational organizations, wi1:th their Christia.nSociai program drawn from the Papal Encyclicals, prepared themselves to solve economic, cultural, and social
prdblems after the Slovak people rid itself of the tutorship
of Prague and :a Slovak government would take over in
Slovakia. Now, ·a fter the passage of years, we know that
they did their work notably well during the life of the
Sloivak Republic.
The basis of the political struggle of the Slovak nation for national and state independence was indisputably
the social question and it was decisive in the placing of the

�20

SLOVIA.KIA

foundations for renewed .Slovruk statehood. The words
spoken by Dr. Joseph Tiso, when he assumed the premiership of the Slovak aiutooomou:s government, October 8, 1938,
teH us everything t!hat made the Slovak Republic Christian and democratic. In the •s entences quoted is noted the
social policy of the Slovruk Republic which was conscientiously followed not only by Tiso himself, but by the mem'b ers of the SlOIV3!k government, as well.
The program of social policy during the life of the Slovak State was not a copy of German National ,Socialism,
as enemies of the Slovruk nation liike to point out, but it
was the program of Papal Encyclicals, especially the Encyclicals of Pope Leo XNI (Rerum novarum) :and iPope iPius
XI (Qua:dragesimo anno). And this social ,policy, even
though it was not entirely original because it was ibased on
the Paprul Encyclicals, nevertheless can be regarded as
something · new in central Europe, if not in all of Eurorpe ;
and it was an attempt to get the human society on a new
road within the confines of Christian socialism.
The Slwalk Government realized the social program
ex;pressed iby President Dr. Joseph Tiso by means of a:n
economic program which secured wo!I'k fo,r every 1Slova:k at
home, work rewarded with adequate wages; it increased
its ca:re of tlie family and its health ; it raised the li'Ving
and cu1tuiral standard of all str.ata of the nation; it removed class hatreds and, by systematic re-education of the
population, tried to attain mutual understanding and harmony.
ln former Austria-Hungary and in pre-&lt;Munich Czecho-Slova'kia, the social problem was partly solved by the
emi gration of Slovaks into foreign Jands, notably to America and, later, to Canada and Argentina, and by seeking
seasonal wor.k in neighboring countries, such as Hungary,
Austria, F-rance rurid Germany. Over a quarter of a million
Slovaks left their homeland d'll.I'ing the life of the first
C.zecho-Slo.vak Repulblic, while almost the same number
of Czechs, throug;h the good graces of the centralistic
Pra;gue government, found b;rea:d in Slovakia. This was a
bitter pill for the Slovwks to swaHow. Slovak political and
1

1

1

�SLOVAKIA

21

ccltura,1 leaders iknew that, if the trend continued, the Slovalks would soon be threatened with complete extinction
in their own homeland.
One of the first things the autonomous S1ova;k Government did, after taking office, was to asik Prague to recali all Czechs f.rom Slorvakia - wotikers, teachers, professors, and officials - whose places might well be filled
with SlovaJks. 1P rague agreed. Nevertheless this subject was
brought up in the post-war trials against President Tiso
and memlbern of the Slovaik Government before the National Court in Bratislava, particularly in the process
against Dr. Vojtech Tulka upon whom the court practically
placed the foll blame for the return of Czech immigrants
to Bohemia and Moravia. Let the Czechs exp1ain the release
of Czech employees in Slavaikia as they will, Sl:ovalks regarded it as the only way out to right the inj1U:stices committed during two whole decades by the Prague gorvernment against the SlavaJk people and the only way to secure a livelihood for tholl!Sands of Slovak workers, farmers,
and intellectuals who, because of the unjust social policy
and chauvin~stic attitude of the Prague Government, were
dependent on alms doled out from unemployment funds.
With the departure of Czech employees from Slovakia thousands of positions were made available for Slovaks: in public works, the railways, the army, police department, the trades, and in private enter,prises. The Czechs
learned what the S1ova:ks •knew long before: there was
more tham enough work in ·SlO'Vakia for all inh'a,bitants who
wanted to work. New r.ail lines were laid, new roads constructed, rivers were regufated, fields, meadows and pastures were drained, new faotorie.s, hydrocentrals, schools
public buildings, hospitals, sanatoriums, and libraries were
built. During six short years relati-vely much more was done
in Slovakia than during the twenty-year existence of the
first Ozecho--Slova;k Republic - and without the so-called
"historical" lands contriJbuting a cent.
The wage problem of Slovalk workers constituted a
serio:us problem during the first years of the Slovak Repufblic wa,ges paid in Slovakia were much higher th!an those

�22

SLOVAKIA

paid in Czech lands. In 1939 agricultural worikers, who were
the least paid, had their wages increased. The Slovak laborer, unspoiled by the Marx-Leninist theory and loyal
to the Christian and national tradition, was not in a hurry
to have his wages or salary adjusted: he realized that the
government, even though 'Very willing, needed time to solve
labor problems; to create a state, seC'llire peace for it with
its neighbors, to get the state apparatus going, a:ll this required much time, thought, and ener,gy. The Slova'k Government was aware of the fact that the farmer and the worker
were the main pillars of every state; the welfare of the
state depended on the satisfaction and welfare of all workers. On February 5, 1940, the Premier of the Slo:va:k Government, Dr. Vojtech Tuka, called a meeting of representatives of all workers in Slovakia to Bratislava to discuss
the iProblem of raising the living standard of workers and
everything connected with this problem.
The Slovak Government did concern itself with the fulfillment of the regulations of the Slo:vak Constitution (par.
79) and the Papal Encyclicals, according to which the exploitation of the socially weak was forbidden and every
citizen of Slovakia had a claim to a just wage. F1amily considerations also entered into the problem, and a minimum
wage law was put into effect, so that employers could not
act arbitrarily with the wovkers and seek cheap lalbor.
The result of the meeting with the representatives of
the workers was that the Slovak Government issued a law
(No. 284/ 1940), on the basis of which there was set up a
Centrai Labor Office in Bratislava which was controlled
by the Ministry of the Interior. lt was the task of this office to employ all aivailable workers in Slovakia: find out
what people could do, ascertain their health status, and
gi'Ve them a just wage for the work they were qualified to
do. The Central Labor Office also had charge of hiring
foreigners, inspecting industry, and providmg safeguards
for the iprotection of lahor .and the wonkera. Law No.
283/1940 gave this office the authority to regulate wages
and salaries and to determine woriking conditions. The Labor Office really did a wonderlul job for SlO'Vaik labor. It

�SLOVAKIA

23

ca.n only be iregretted that, at the end of 1942 '8llld the beginning of 1943, the regulation of wages and salaries was
taken over by the Office of Supplies, headed ,b y Dr. Imrich
Karvas, now ·a .professor at the Uni'Versity of Bratislava,
who was definitely anti-labor. It soon became apparent that
Dr. Karvas wanted to incite the Slo'Vak workers ·a gainst the
Slovak State and against the 'Slovak Government. As the
"only expert and economist," Karvas ·a lways opposed an
mcrease in wages for workers, but was O'Verruled by the
Slovak Government and President Tiso himself. And this
is the irony of fate: the ,g reatest friends of the Slovak
wovker either were executed by hanging or are incarcerated
in the Leopoldov prison, while the most implaicable enemy
of Slovak labor enjoys the trust of the Communist Party.
-During the life of the first Czecho-Sloiv~ Republic,
Slovruk labor endeavored in vain to have a law passed in favor of workers with families. What Prague could not do for
Slovak wor,kers was done by the Slovak State. The law
(No. 216/ 1941) pro!Vided additional payments for children
of wage-earners in the form of insurance. The socia:l significance of this law was far-reaching. During the first year,
after the pass·a ge of this law, 115,000 families of Slovak
workers and a total of 260,000 children were given significant aid: 100,000,000 Slovruk crowns ($3,333,000) were
paid out.
The true aim of the family wage was so that the
worker, as the provider for his family, might make enough
to live contendedly, satisfy also his cultural desires, and be
able to save something for his family. The deciding factor
of family wages, however, were the mothers and women of
Slovakia, whom the government wanted to take out of the
labor ,g roup in the course of time, so that they might be
able to return to their original and God-designed mission
- to the family - where they could devote their time to
the care of their children and their households.
It should b.e ,s pecially emphasized that the Slovak
Government endea,yored to do away with piece-work altogether, because this type of labor notably exhausts the
worker so that in a relatively short period of time he be-

�24

SLOVAKIA

comes useless for work and a burden not only :f or the
state, but also his family. Workers were paid by the hoUT.
When the results of the war began to be felt in Slovakia,
the Slwwk government ordered that the workers be compensated for .p rice increases: married men at the rate of
1.20 crowns and the single at 0.80 cro,w ns per hour. Besides that, at the end of each calendar year, the workers
receirved a special, tax-free payment in the form of a bonus, the iamount was determined first ,b y the Central LaJbor
Office, but later by the Office of Supplies.
DUTing the fi11st Czecho-Slovruk Republic workers complained most aJbout social insurance, into which every
wovker had to pay high dues while sick benefits were low.
The Slova;k Government also changed this radically. By an
oroer with the power ·o f -law (No. 300/ 1940), District Socia1 Insurance agencies were dissolved ; from J anuary 1,
1941, the Workers Social Insurance Office, with its main
office in Bratislava, took care of sicik, invalid, old-age, and
accident insurance. Thus, the wo,r kers, their wives, and their
families received better medical ,c are the office had seventeen affiliates in Slovakia and built its own hospitals in Bratislava, Ha.ndlova, and Podbrezova. In 1941 it built and
opened one of the largest and most modern ~a.natoriums
for liung diseases in central Europe ; it is situated in Vysne
Hagy and contains 500 beds: 100 for patients with bone
tuberc'U'losis and 400 fo,r other TB cases. ~urthermore, the
agency managed the Soos Baths, the s 1anatorium for children in Luci'Vlla, and established sanatociums at Sklenne Teplice and at Trencianske Teplice: these were the places
where the Workers 1Social Insurance Office sent afflicted
workers and their wi&lt;ves and cihildren.
The Slovak Government also did something about the
aicute hO'USing problem in industrial centers. The action
of the government called a "thousand homes for workers
families," was COffiiPleted successfully in the targer industrial centers. The Finance Ministry, with special tax relief
for owners of irrdustrial enterprises and large farms, arranged to have these homes built within the framework
of iirwestment. Thu s, entire colonies of new workers homes

�25

SLOVAKIA

sprang up within two-.three years, like mmhrooms after a
rain, in Duibnica, Pova:zska Bystrica, Zilina, Ruzomiberok,
Zbehy, Afruksice, and other industrial centers.
The parliament of the Slovak Republic did not forget
the recreational needs of the workers, either. On J,u,ly 6,
1944, it passed a law (No. 87 of the Slovruk Code of Law)
granting paid vacations to wor,ke,r s. According to this law,
every worker who worked at least six months a year was
entitled to a paid vacation. The length of the vacation was
established by law and depended on the actua1 number of
years wonked and not on the performance of the wor,kers,
as it does presently under the Communist iPmgue regime.
The judiciary in the Slovak Republic was completely
independent. '11his had a marked signific ance for the workers in the labor trials. The la:borer had the right, guaranteed by law, to sue his employer for cruuse; he also had
the right to sue the State for cause, if he was an employee
thereof.
The sodal question of the workers was resolved with
the cooperation of the representatives of the Slovak W10rkers, organized in the tra:de organizatiooo. First, as if mentioned above, it was the Christian-Social Trrude Federation
and, later, the ·F ederation of l'Ildiustry, Tra:des, and Finances. The trade organizations were non~political and their
ta.sk was to help the ,government realize its program for
raising the living and cultural level of the workers.
Under the concept_ of socia1 question, people usually
think of the problem or question of the workers who suffered most, especially in the last years ~fore World War
II. This is not the correct explanati~in oif social policy, because not only the factory wo•r ker, but also the fa.I1mer,
artisans, the teacher, and the office-worker are equal members of the national collectirve. This is something wihich the
Communists do not want to reoog,nize 3/nd the reason why
they "solve" social questions so speedily. Just how they do
th&lt;at is a chapter ,by itself. If, however, the social question
is to be solved to the satisfaction of all the adherents of a
nation, its solution must include the farmer, the businessman, and the office-worker. Ami the Slovak State did just
1

�2-6

SLOVAKIA

that: as far as the social question went, it took care of
every category of wonker, state and private office-.wol'lker.
•F or Slovalk agriculturists, the most significant day
undoubtedly was February 22, 1940 (Washington's birthday) , when the parliament of the Slovak !Republic passed
the new Land Reform Act, whereby ali the injustices suffered by the Slovak farmer during the pre~'Munkh Republic were removed. Land reform of the first CzechoSlova:k
Republic did not consider the actual needs of Slovak farmers and distributed the land according ta a political key
to those in the Czeoho-Slovak political parties who bound
themselves to serve Benes and T. G. Masaryk: to promote
the •p olicy of the Prag1Ue centralistic government and the
interests of the Czech nation.
In a conversation a:bout the new Land Reform Act,
besides addresses by representatives o:f the Slovak farmers, Dr. Gejza Medricky, Minister of Agriculture, speaking for the Slovak Government, among other things, said:
"It is very well known that we do not have too much
arable land in Slovakia. In the whole of Slovakia we have
1,618,000 hectares (3,998,078 aicres) of wooded and agricultural land which come untler the new Land Reform Act ;
this amounts to 45 percent of all our wooded and agricudtural land. It ,i s ev.ident that the government must be concerned that this land be worked in the best manner possible, that this land provide the food necessary for the
people here settled, and that this land serve as a permanent existential foundation for those people who work on
it. That is just why the significance of the plan from the
economic side is clear to every individual. But no less is the
significance of the plan from the political side. 'In the past
the Hlinka Slovak People's Party fought against the injustices which emanated from the realization of the old land
reform. With today's discussion about this law and with
the passage of this plan, the old political demand of the
ffiinka Slovak People's Party, that is, the revision of the
old Land Reform Act, is being realized."
In his speech, Dr. Gejza Medricky pointed to the actuality that 45 percent, that is, almost a half of the land

�SLOVAKIA

27

in SlovaJkia was in the hands of foreigners, while Slovak
farmers had only a bit more than half of it. The intention
of the new Land !Reform Act was to get the land into the
hands of Slova,k farmers and such people, whose social
condition required it; furthemiOTe, to avoid economic losses
with property transfers, to secure the Hveliihood of the
population, and to solve the social question which is connected with an agricultural state (",SLOVAK," Feb. 25,
1940).

The task of executing the Land Reform Act correctly
and speedily wa,s entrusted to the State Land Office, which
C8Jllle into being on the basis of a special law, which the
S1ovruk Parliament ha,d voted that same day. According to
the law, the Land Office had the 3/Uthority to buy the land
concerned fo:r the State and then to sell it to Slovak farmers who were interested in it, guaranteeing that they
would work it to produce the commodities needed by the
population.
According to the law, every citizen of the Slovak State
had a claim to ~and, if he ,u nderstood farming, whose properties, after the Vienna Aribitration, fell to Hungary and,
therefore, were forced by the Magyar government to lose
everything and go to Slovakia empty-handed. Flurtihermore,
priority .r ights to buy land were granted to graduates of
agricultural schools, then to local people or inha:bitants of
neighboring communities; and where none such could be
found, the land was distributed to citizens of more remote
communities of Slovakia.
Of course, those interested in the land did not get it
for free. The farmer, who applied for land, had to pay 50
percent of the sale .price, after hls application had been approved, and the remainder he could pay of in forty years
in the form of rent to the State. The Land Office QOmpensated the owners of land which came under the Act by
paying them the S8Jllle _a moont they paid for it, or payment
wa,s based on prod1Uctive value.
The significance of ia:nd reform for the Slovak farmer, as well as for the whole Slovak nation, was evaluated

�28

SLOVAKIA

by President Dr. Joseph Tiso on March 10, 1940, in Banovce Nad Bebravou, in this manner:
"Gradually we shall harve to learn to forget the expression 'land reform.' Land reform with us is not the rewarding of protected chHdren to catoh the voters. We are concerned so that more he produced agriculturally. We must
increase production. We do not want to reward, to ca:tch,
voters. No one shall ever again, in any manner whatsoever,
buy voters in Slov~ia ! Even in the present situation we
are self-sufficient. This, however, must not satisfy us. We
also want to export. That is why we wish to increruse our
agricultUTal ,prod'Ulction.
"The main idea of land reform is: to enruble as many
husbandmen as possible to oper.ate independently. In this
we shall act sensi,bly. Wherever anything proves itself,
there we shall cultivate it. Whatever ,prorves itself, that we
shall do. There shwl a!lso be so-called indivisi!ble property,
which shall not be parcelled out under any circumstances.
Flur:thermore, we must enaJble ,a higher degree of agrioulture ( experimental agrimtlture) . True, even the farmer
can experiment, burt this c·a n be done only by ·t he man who
has more. Such a farmer then can make experiments, take
risks. We need healthy seeds, quality livestock. The small
farmer is not trained to produce these. Such farmers are
afraid to give their livestock more so that it could put on
more weight. The a:gricwtural industry eannot be maintained only lby the sma'li farmer. [rt is the aim of the State
to increase agricultural production. Therefore, the greater
agricwtural units shall be preser-ved. . . No one shall get
land under the sale price, and no, one shall get something
for nothing. Nothing is valued that comes easily. So, if
you want land, you shall have to pay for it; if you cannot
pay the full iprice, the State will he1p you .p ay it in time in
the form of rent. . . We want to make it possible for our
,b rethren in other lands to come here and go into ventures.
We want to grow in: numbers; our ambition is that we becrone stronger. I do not fear fo;r the future we have the
best outlook There still are some insufficiencies, but that

�SLOVAKIA

29

is not because a new state has ,b een born, but because
there is war around us!"
Strict, 1but fatherly words. Only he could speak thus,
who loved his people and who throughout his life worked
in its interest. Thus it was that the other hallf of Slovak
land got into the hands of Slovak farmers and ceaaed to
be the object of business exploitation. And, fina11y, even
private inrvestors had it good in ,Sl.ov,ak±a. They were not
only given the possibility to enterprise, but were practically forced by the government to participate in the building of the State, so that erven their profits might increase.
On the social policy of the government depended the
reeducation of the population - the policy carried out in
the i:\pirit of Christian charity towards ones illeigh:bor, of
mutual assistance, cooperation, and understanding. The aim
of the reeducation of the 1people waJS to remOIVe the blights
of the past which, under the influence of pressure from the
East, began to find opportune soil even in Slovalkia, especially among the Lutherans. Special attention was given
to the reeducation of employe11S and owners of larger and
smaller industrial enterprises; the relationship between
employer and employee was exiplained according to the
teaching of the social Pope, Leo XIII, who said in the encyclical Rerum Novarum:
"Religion teaches the wealthy owner and the employer
that their woJ'.lk people a,re not to be accO!Uilted their !bondsmen; that in ervery man they m'USt respect his dignity and
worth as a man and as a Christian.; that labor rfor w,a.ges
is not a thing to 'b e ashamed of, if we lend ear to right
reason an.d to Christian (Philosophy, but is to a man's credit, ena;bling -h im to earn his living in an honoraJble way;
and that it is shamefiuil and inhuman to treat men li!ke
chattels to make money by, or to loolk upon them merely
as so muoh musole or physical strength. A,g am the Chrurch
teaches that, in dealing with the workingman, religion and
the ,g ood of his so,ul must be kept in mind. Hence the employer is -bound to see that the wo:rker has time for !his religious duties; that he be not exposed to corrupting influ~.AW¥ and that he ibe not led
ences and

d~A~g~
UII ..

J;Q~VILLE. STATE CO~LE.GE

�SLOVAKIA

30

away to neglect bis thome and f.amily, or to squander his
earnings. Furthermore, the employer must never tax his
work people 'beyond their strength, or employ them in work
unsuited to their sex or age. His ,g reat and principal duty
is to give every one what is just. Doubtless before deciding
whether wages are fair, many things have to be considered; ·b ut wealthy owners and all masters of labor should
be mindful of this - that to exercise pressure upon the
indigent and the destitute for the sa;ke of gain, and to
gather one's profit out of the need of another, is condemned
by all laws, human and Divine."
1

On the other hand, workingmen were expected to carry
out honestly and fairly all equitable agreements freely entered into; never to injure the property of an employer
uselessly and maliciously; never to .r esort to violence in
defending their own cause and to avoid riots and disorders; and, finally, to have nothing to do with persons who
stand in th service of Communism, endeavoring to sow dissention and dissatisfaction among the working ;p eople and
ultimately to enslaJVe them.
1

The results of reeducation were demonstrated especially
when Dr. Karvas, chairman of the Office of Supplies, adamantly opposed ,a ll warranted increases in wages for workingmen.. At that time the employers stood by the workingmen and thus embarrassed iDr. Karvas: instead of hourly
wages, they ,g radually began to introduce piece-work so
that the workmen could gain their increases, but not to sap
their strength and exploit them. This arrangement was
done in agreement with the trade organizations and the
workingmen themselrves; Karvas, therefore, could not punrish employers for increasing wages with out his permission.
Tthe life of cohabitation of the citizens in the Slovak
State resembled the life of a well-ordered family. Slov:rukia
was the envy of States with richer traditions and of nations more mmnerous than the Slova;ks. The SlovaJk workingman ,r eally never had it so good, rund prdbaJbly never
will mwe it again, until a free and ~ndependent Slovrukia,
based on Christian principles, is again established.

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                  <text>1956, Vol. 6</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;</text>
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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                  <text>1956</text>
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            <elementText elementTextId="1541">
              <text>18&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
however, is d.n itself an assurance to all Slovaik em:igres&#13;
that in the eyes of Prague and of international Communism ,i t is no "quan·t ite negligeable," that it is, in fact, so&#13;
formidable a hindrance to them for the Slovaks to be allied with the democracies that they even ventured such a&#13;
brutal scandal to register their reaction.&#13;
To Slovruk 1patriots in exile, mourning the death of&#13;
their most distinguished representative, Matus Cernak,&#13;
this realization begets a fresh spur to redoubled activities.&#13;
Consummate triumph of the Slovaik hope for independence beckons on the trail over which Matus Cernak&#13;
has forged ahead in honor and in complete unflinching&#13;
dedication. God grant it! - "BuNetin of the Slovruk National Council Abroad," June, 1956) .&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
LABOR AND THE SWVAK REPUBLIC&#13;
J. C. Bukovina&#13;
" Our policy shall not be socialis·tic, but&#13;
social. We shall not incite J:}eople against our.&#13;
selves, but we shall train them to be understanding and Wilted . .A:bove all else, work is&#13;
the foundation of our policy." 'Dr. Joseph&#13;
Tlso, Oct. 8, 1S38.&#13;
&#13;
October 6, 1938, and March 14, 1939, found the S10vruks prepared. The Hlin:ka ·S lovak People's Party, whic:h&#13;
had fought consistently for twenty years before Munich&#13;
to secure the national existence of the Slova!k nation, was&#13;
fully prepared for these two historical milestones - to&#13;
take over the direction of the fate of the Slovak nation.&#13;
The fight of the Slovaks for national independence in the&#13;
pre-Munich Czecho-Slovak State was actually a struggle&#13;
and a call of the Slovruk nation for social justice. Once the&#13;
Czechs under T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Exlward Benes had&#13;
taken over the reigns of state, promises made to the Slovruks in America and elsewhere were soon forgotten, and&#13;
the Slovalks found themselves again in the position of the&#13;
exploited. Like the Magyars, the Czechs found little trouble&#13;
in recruiting Judas Slovaks to promote not the interests of&#13;
the Slovak nation, but the interests of the Czech nation,&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
19&#13;
&#13;
which for propaganda .purposes was labeled "Czecho-Slovak" (with or without the hyphen.)&#13;
Practically every single utterance of the deputies of&#13;
the ffiinka Slovak !People's Party on the floor of the Prague&#13;
Parliament directly or indirectly dealt with the social&#13;
question of the Sloivak people. When the state ·b udgets&#13;
came up for consideration, Andrew Hlinka and iDr. Joseph&#13;
Tiso pointed to the injustices suffered by the Slovaiks at&#13;
the hands of the Prague centralistic government. Pleas&#13;
and admonitions, warnings and threats, were a voice calling oot in the desert; the government and Czech deputies&#13;
always played the same record: Slovakia is costing the&#13;
"historical" Jra.nds plenty, the policy of the Hlin:ka Slovak&#13;
People's Party is separatistfo, and its representatiives&#13;
are demagogues, political analphwbets, etc.&#13;
While the Prague government continued to add iusuJ.t&#13;
to injury whenever 'S lovaks demanded state's rights, Andrew iHlinlka !Prepared his most trusted workers for the&#13;
decisive battle. He knew the significance of trade and professional organizations; several of them had joined his&#13;
party: the Christian-Social T.rade Federation, led by deputies Rudolph Cajovsky and John Moro; the Allian·ce of Slovruk Railr.oadmen, ,u nder the chairmansh1p of deputy Stephen Surovialk; the Alliance of .Slovak Postal W Oiikers under deputy Joseph Drobny; the Regional Catholic Teachers&#13;
Society, in whicih Senator .An1.hony Ha.ncJko served as chairman of many years; and the Society of Slovak Professors,&#13;
led by professor Misfile&#13;
The occupational organizations, wi1:th their Christia.nSociai program drawn from the Papal Encyclicals, prepared themselves to solve economic, cultural, and social&#13;
prdblems after the Slovak people rid itself of the tutorship&#13;
of Prague and :a Slovak government would take over in&#13;
Slovakia. Now, ·a fter the passage of years, we know that&#13;
they did their work notably well during the life of the&#13;
Sloivak Republic.&#13;
The basis of the political struggle of the Slovak nation for national and state independence was indisputably&#13;
the social question and it was decisive in the placing of the&#13;
&#13;
20&#13;
&#13;
SLOVIA.KIA&#13;
&#13;
foundations for renewed .Slovruk statehood. The words&#13;
spoken by Dr. Joseph Tiso, when he assumed the premiership of the Slovak aiutooomou:s government, October 8, 1938,&#13;
teH us everything t!hat made the Slovak Republic Christian and democratic. In the •s entences quoted is noted the&#13;
social policy of the Slovruk Republic which was conscientiously followed not only by Tiso himself, but by the mem'b ers of the SlOIV3!k government, as well.&#13;
The program of social policy during the life of the Slovak State was not a copy of German National ,Socialism,&#13;
as enemies of the Slovruk nation liike to point out, but it&#13;
was the program of Papal Encyclicals, especially the Encyclicals of Pope Leo XNI (Rerum novarum) :and iPope iPius&#13;
XI (Qua:dragesimo anno). And this social ,policy, even&#13;
though it was not entirely original because it was ibased on&#13;
the Paprul Encyclicals, nevertheless can be regarded as&#13;
something · new in central Europe, if not in all of Eurorpe ;&#13;
and it was an attempt to get the human society on a new&#13;
road within the confines of Christian socialism.&#13;
The Slwalk Government realized the social program&#13;
ex;pressed iby President Dr. Joseph Tiso by means of a:n&#13;
economic program which secured wo!I'k fo,r every 1Slova:k at&#13;
home, work rewarded with adequate wages; it increased&#13;
its ca:re of tlie family and its health ; it raised the li'Ving&#13;
and cu1tuiral standard of all str.ata of the nation; it removed class hatreds and, by systematic re-education of the&#13;
population, tried to attain mutual understanding and harmony.&#13;
ln former Austria-Hungary and in pre-&lt;Munich Czecho-Slova'kia, the social problem was partly solved by the&#13;
emi gration of Slovaks into foreign Jands, notably to America and, later, to Canada and Argentina, and by seeking&#13;
seasonal wor.k in neighboring countries, such as Hungary,&#13;
Austria, F-rance rurid Germany. Over a quarter of a million&#13;
Slovaks left their homeland d'll.I'ing the life of the first&#13;
C.zecho-Slo.vak Repulblic, while almost the same number&#13;
of Czechs, throug;h the good graces of the centralistic&#13;
Pra;gue government, found b;rea:d in Slovakia. This was a&#13;
bitter pill for the Slovwks to swaHow. Slovak political and&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
21&#13;
&#13;
ccltura,1 leaders iknew that, if the trend continued, the Slovalks would soon be threatened with complete extinction&#13;
in their own homeland.&#13;
One of the first things the autonomous S1ova;k Government did, after taking office, was to asik Prague to recali all Czechs f.rom Slorvakia - wotikers, teachers, professors, and officials - whose places might well be filled&#13;
with SlovaJks. 1P rague agreed. Nevertheless this subject was&#13;
brought up in the post-war trials against President Tiso&#13;
and memlbern of the Slovaik Government before the National Court in Bratislava, particularly in the process&#13;
against Dr. Vojtech Tulka upon whom the court practically&#13;
placed the foll blame for the return of Czech immigrants&#13;
to Bohemia and Moravia. Let the Czechs exp1ain the release&#13;
of Czech employees in Slavaikia as they will, Sl:ovalks regarded it as the only way out to right the inj1U:stices committed during two whole decades by the Prague gorvernment against the SlavaJk people and the only way to secure a livelihood for tholl!Sands of Slovak workers, farmers,&#13;
and intellectuals who, because of the unjust social policy&#13;
and chauvin~stic attitude of the Prague Government, were&#13;
dependent on alms doled out from unemployment funds.&#13;
With the departure of Czech employees from Slovakia thousands of positions were made available for Slovaks: in public works, the railways, the army, police department, the trades, and in private enter,prises. The Czechs&#13;
learned what the S1ova:ks •knew long before: there was&#13;
more tham enough work in ·SlO'Vakia for all inh'a,bitants who&#13;
wanted to work. New r.ail lines were laid, new roads constructed, rivers were regufated, fields, meadows and pastures were drained, new faotorie.s, hydrocentrals, schools&#13;
public buildings, hospitals, sanatoriums, and libraries were&#13;
built. During six short years relati-vely much more was done&#13;
in Slovakia than during the twenty-year existence of the&#13;
first Ozecho--Slova;k Republic - and without the so-called&#13;
"historical" lands contriJbuting a cent.&#13;
The wage problem of Slovalk workers constituted a&#13;
serio:us problem during the first years of the Slovak Repufblic wa,ges paid in Slovakia were much higher th!an those&#13;
&#13;
22&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
paid in Czech lands. In 1939 agricultural worikers, who were&#13;
the least paid, had their wages increased. The Slovak laborer, unspoiled by the Marx-Leninist theory and loyal&#13;
to the Christian and national tradition, was not in a hurry&#13;
to have his wages or salary adjusted: he realized that the&#13;
government, even though 'Very willing, needed time to solve&#13;
labor problems; to create a state, seC'llire peace for it with&#13;
its neighbors, to get the state apparatus going, a:ll this required much time, thought, and ener,gy. The Slova'k Government was aware of the fact that the farmer and the worker&#13;
were the main pillars of every state; the welfare of the&#13;
state depended on the satisfaction and welfare of all workers. On February 5, 1940, the Premier of the Slo:va:k Government, Dr. Vojtech Tuka, called a meeting of representatives of all workers in Slovakia to Bratislava to discuss&#13;
the iProblem of raising the living standard of workers and&#13;
everything connected with this problem.&#13;
The Slovak Government did concern itself with the fulfillment of the regulations of the Slo:vak Constitution (par.&#13;
79) and the Papal Encyclicals, according to which the exploitation of the socially weak was forbidden and every&#13;
citizen of Slovakia had a claim to a just wage. F1amily considerations also entered into the problem, and a minimum&#13;
wage law was put into effect, so that employers could not&#13;
act arbitrarily with the wovkers and seek cheap lalbor.&#13;
The result of the meeting with the representatives of&#13;
the workers was that the Slovak Government issued a law&#13;
(No. 284/ 1940), on the basis of which there was set up a&#13;
Centrai Labor Office in Bratislava which was controlled&#13;
by the Ministry of the Interior. lt was the task of this office to employ all aivailable workers in Slovakia: find out&#13;
what people could do, ascertain their health status, and&#13;
gi'Ve them a just wage for the work they were qualified to&#13;
do. The Central Labor Office also had charge of hiring&#13;
foreigners, inspecting industry, and providmg safeguards&#13;
for the iprotection of lahor .and the wonkera. Law No.&#13;
283/1940 gave this office the authority to regulate wages&#13;
and salaries and to determine woriking conditions. The Labor Office really did a wonderlul job for SlO'Vaik labor. It&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
23&#13;
&#13;
ca.n only be iregretted that, at the end of 1942 '8llld the beginning of 1943, the regulation of wages and salaries was&#13;
taken over by the Office of Supplies, headed ,b y Dr. Imrich&#13;
Karvas, now ·a .professor at the Uni'Versity of Bratislava,&#13;
who was definitely anti-labor. It soon became apparent that&#13;
Dr. Karvas wanted to incite the Slo'Vak workers ·a gainst the&#13;
Slovak State and against the 'Slovak Government. As the&#13;
"only expert and economist," Karvas ·a lways opposed an&#13;
mcrease in wages for workers, but was O'Verruled by the&#13;
Slovak Government and President Tiso himself. And this&#13;
is the irony of fate: the ,g reatest friends of the Slovak&#13;
wovker either were executed by hanging or are incarcerated&#13;
in the Leopoldov prison, while the most implaicable enemy&#13;
of Slovak labor enjoys the trust of the Communist Party.&#13;
-During the life of the first Czecho-Sloiv~ Republic,&#13;
Slovruk labor endeavored in vain to have a law passed in favor of workers with families. What Prague could not do for&#13;
Slovak wor,kers was done by the Slovak State. The law&#13;
(No. 216/ 1941) pro!Vided additional payments for children&#13;
of wage-earners in the form of insurance. The socia:l significance of this law was far-reaching. During the first year,&#13;
after the pass·a ge of this law, 115,000 families of Slovak&#13;
workers and a total of 260,000 children were given significant aid: 100,000,000 Slovruk crowns ($3,333,000) were&#13;
paid out.&#13;
The true aim of the family wage was so that the&#13;
worker, as the provider for his family, might make enough&#13;
to live contendedly, satisfy also his cultural desires, and be&#13;
able to save something for his family. The deciding factor&#13;
of family wages, however, were the mothers and women of&#13;
Slovakia, whom the government wanted to take out of the&#13;
labor ,g roup in the course of time, so that they might be&#13;
able to return to their original and God-designed mission&#13;
- to the family - where they could devote their time to&#13;
the care of their children and their households.&#13;
It should b.e ,s pecially emphasized that the Slovak&#13;
Government endea,yored to do away with piece-work altogether, because this type of labor notably exhausts the&#13;
worker so that in a relatively short period of time he be-&#13;
&#13;
24&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
comes useless for work and a burden not only :f or the&#13;
state, but also his family. Workers were paid by the hoUT.&#13;
When the results of the war began to be felt in Slovakia,&#13;
the Slwwk government ordered that the workers be compensated for .p rice increases: married men at the rate of&#13;
1.20 crowns and the single at 0.80 cro,w ns per hour. Besides that, at the end of each calendar year, the workers&#13;
receirved a special, tax-free payment in the form of a bonus, the iamount was determined first ,b y the Central LaJbor&#13;
Office, but later by the Office of Supplies.&#13;
DUTing the fi11st Czecho-Slovruk Republic workers complained most aJbout social insurance, into which every&#13;
wovker had to pay high dues while sick benefits were low.&#13;
The Slova;k Government also changed this radically. By an&#13;
oroer with the power ·o f -law (No. 300/ 1940), District Socia1 Insurance agencies were dissolved ; from J anuary 1,&#13;
1941, the Workers Social Insurance Office, with its main&#13;
office in Bratislava, took care of sicik, invalid, old-age, and&#13;
accident insurance. Thus, the wo,r kers, their wives, and their&#13;
families received better medical ,c are the office had seventeen affiliates in Slovakia and built its own hospitals in Bratislava, Ha.ndlova, and Podbrezova. In 1941 it built and&#13;
opened one of the largest and most modern ~a.natoriums&#13;
for liung diseases in central Europe ; it is situated in Vysne&#13;
Hagy and contains 500 beds: 100 for patients with bone&#13;
tuberc'U'losis and 400 fo,r other TB cases. ~urthermore, the&#13;
agency managed the Soos Baths, the s 1anatorium for children in Luci'Vlla, and established sanatociums at Sklenne Teplice and at Trencianske Teplice: these were the places&#13;
where the Workers 1Social Insurance Office sent afflicted&#13;
workers and their wi&lt;ves and cihildren.&#13;
The Slovak Government also did something about the&#13;
aicute hO'USing problem in industrial centers. The action&#13;
of the government called a "thousand homes for workers&#13;
families," was COffiiPleted successfully in the targer industrial centers. The Finance Ministry, with special tax relief&#13;
for owners of irrdustrial enterprises and large farms, arranged to have these homes built within the framework&#13;
of iirwestment. Thu s, entire colonies of new workers homes&#13;
&#13;
25&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
sprang up within two-.three years, like mmhrooms after a&#13;
rain, in Duibnica, Pova:zska Bystrica, Zilina, Ruzomiberok,&#13;
Zbehy, Afruksice, and other industrial centers.&#13;
The parliament of the Slovak Republic did not forget&#13;
the recreational needs of the workers, either. On J,u,ly 6,&#13;
1944, it passed a law (No. 87 of the Slovruk Code of Law)&#13;
granting paid vacations to wor,ke,r s. According to this law,&#13;
every worker who worked at least six months a year was&#13;
entitled to a paid vacation. The length of the vacation was&#13;
established by law and depended on the actua1 number of&#13;
years wonked and not on the performance of the wor,kers,&#13;
as it does presently under the Communist iPmgue regime.&#13;
The judiciary in the Slovak Republic was completely&#13;
independent. '11his had a marked signific ance for the workers in the labor trials. The la:borer had the right, guaranteed by law, to sue his employer for cruuse; he also had&#13;
the right to sue the State for cause, if he was an employee&#13;
thereof.&#13;
The sodal question of the workers was resolved with&#13;
the cooperation of the representatives of the Slovak W10rkers, organized in the tra:de organizatiooo. First, as if mentioned above, it was the Christian-Social Trrude Federation&#13;
and, later, the ·F ederation of l'Ildiustry, Tra:des, and Finances. The trade organizations were non~political and their&#13;
ta.sk was to help the ,government realize its program for&#13;
raising the living and cultural level of the workers.&#13;
Under the concept_ of socia1 question, people usually&#13;
think of the problem or question of the workers who suffered most, especially in the last years ~fore World War&#13;
II. This is not the correct explanati~in oif social policy, because not only the factory wo•r ker, but also the fa.I1mer,&#13;
artisans, the teacher, and the office-worker are equal members of the national collectirve. This is something wihich the&#13;
Communists do not want to reoog,nize 3/nd the reason why&#13;
they "solve" social questions so speedily. Just how they do&#13;
th&lt;at is a chapter ,by itself. If, however, the social question&#13;
is to be solved to the satisfaction of all the adherents of a&#13;
nation, its solution must include the farmer, the businessman, and the office-worker. Ami the Slovak State did just&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
2-6&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
that: as far as the social question went, it took care of&#13;
every category of wonker, state and private office-.wol'lker.&#13;
•F or Slovalk agriculturists, the most significant day&#13;
undoubtedly was February 22, 1940 (Washington's birthday) , when the parliament of the Slovak !Republic passed&#13;
the new Land Reform Act, whereby ali the injustices suffered by the Slovak farmer during the pre~'Munkh Republic were removed. Land reform of the first CzechoSlova:k&#13;
Republic did not consider the actual needs of Slovak farmers and distributed the land according ta a political key&#13;
to those in the Czeoho-Slovak political parties who bound&#13;
themselves to serve Benes and T. G. Masaryk: to promote&#13;
the •p olicy of the Prag1Ue centralistic government and the&#13;
interests of the Czech nation.&#13;
In a conversation a:bout the new Land Reform Act,&#13;
besides addresses by representatives o:f the Slovak farmers, Dr. Gejza Medricky, Minister of Agriculture, speaking for the Slovak Government, among other things, said:&#13;
"It is very well known that we do not have too much&#13;
arable land in Slovakia. In the whole of Slovakia we have&#13;
1,618,000 hectares (3,998,078 aicres) of wooded and agricultural land which come untler the new Land Reform Act ;&#13;
this amounts to 45 percent of all our wooded and agricudtural land. It ,i s ev.ident that the government must be concerned that this land be worked in the best manner possible, that this land provide the food necessary for the&#13;
people here settled, and that this land serve as a permanent existential foundation for those people who work on&#13;
it. That is just why the significance of the plan from the&#13;
economic side is clear to every individual. But no less is the&#13;
significance of the plan from the political side. 'In the past&#13;
the Hlinka Slovak People's Party fought against the injustices which emanated from the realization of the old land&#13;
reform. With today's discussion about this law and with&#13;
the passage of this plan, the old political demand of the&#13;
ffiinka Slovak People's Party, that is, the revision of the&#13;
old Land Reform Act, is being realized."&#13;
In his speech, Dr. Gejza Medricky pointed to the actuality that 45 percent, that is, almost a half of the land&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
27&#13;
&#13;
in SlovaJkia was in the hands of foreigners, while Slovak&#13;
farmers had only a bit more than half of it. The intention&#13;
of the new Land !Reform Act was to get the land into the&#13;
hands of Slova,k farmers and such people, whose social&#13;
condition required it; furthemiOTe, to avoid economic losses&#13;
with property transfers, to secure the Hveliihood of the&#13;
population, and to solve the social question which is connected with an agricultural state (",SLOVAK," Feb. 25,&#13;
1940).&#13;
&#13;
The task of executing the Land Reform Act correctly&#13;
and speedily wa,s entrusted to the State Land Office, which&#13;
C8Jllle into being on the basis of a special law, which the&#13;
S1ovruk Parliament ha,d voted that same day. According to&#13;
the law, the Land Office had the 3/Uthority to buy the land&#13;
concerned fo:r the State and then to sell it to Slovak farmers who were interested in it, guaranteeing that they&#13;
would work it to produce the commodities needed by the&#13;
population.&#13;
According to the law, every citizen of the Slovak State&#13;
had a claim to ~and, if he ,u nderstood farming, whose properties, after the Vienna Aribitration, fell to Hungary and,&#13;
therefore, were forced by the Magyar government to lose&#13;
everything and go to Slovakia empty-handed. Flurtihermore,&#13;
priority .r ights to buy land were granted to graduates of&#13;
agricultural schools, then to local people or inha:bitants of&#13;
neighboring communities; and where none such could be&#13;
found, the land was distributed to citizens of more remote&#13;
communities of Slovakia.&#13;
Of course, those interested in the land did not get it&#13;
for free. The farmer, who applied for land, had to pay 50&#13;
percent of the sale .price, after hls application had been approved, and the remainder he could pay of in forty years&#13;
in the form of rent to the State. The Land Office QOmpensated the owners of land which came under the Act by&#13;
paying them the S8Jllle _a moont they paid for it, or payment&#13;
wa,s based on prod1Uctive value.&#13;
The significance of ia:nd reform for the Slovak farmer, as well as for the whole Slovak nation, was evaluated&#13;
&#13;
28&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
by President Dr. Joseph Tiso on March 10, 1940, in Banovce Nad Bebravou, in this manner:&#13;
"Gradually we shall harve to learn to forget the expression 'land reform.' Land reform with us is not the rewarding of protected chHdren to catoh the voters. We are concerned so that more he produced agriculturally. We must&#13;
increase production. We do not want to reward, to ca:tch,&#13;
voters. No one shall ever again, in any manner whatsoever,&#13;
buy voters in Slov~ia ! Even in the present situation we&#13;
are self-sufficient. This, however, must not satisfy us. We&#13;
also want to export. That is why we wish to increruse our&#13;
agricultUTal ,prod'Ulction.&#13;
"The main idea of land reform is: to enruble as many&#13;
husbandmen as possible to oper.ate independently. In this&#13;
we shall act sensi,bly. Wherever anything proves itself,&#13;
there we shall cultivate it. Whatever ,prorves itself, that we&#13;
shall do. There shwl a!lso be so-called indivisi!ble property,&#13;
which shall not be parcelled out under any circumstances.&#13;
Flur:thermore, we must enaJble ,a higher degree of agrioulture ( experimental agrimtlture) . True, even the farmer&#13;
can experiment, burt this c·a n be done only by ·t he man who&#13;
has more. Such a farmer then can make experiments, take&#13;
risks. We need healthy seeds, quality livestock. The small&#13;
farmer is not trained to produce these. Such farmers are&#13;
afraid to give their livestock more so that it could put on&#13;
more weight. The a:gricwtural industry eannot be maintained only lby the sma'li farmer. [rt is the aim of the State&#13;
to increase agricultural production. Therefore, the greater&#13;
agricwtural units shall be preser-ved. . . No one shall get&#13;
land under the sale price, and no, one shall get something&#13;
for nothing. Nothing is valued that comes easily. So, if&#13;
you want land, you shall have to pay for it; if you cannot&#13;
pay the full iprice, the State will he1p you .p ay it in time in&#13;
the form of rent. . . We want to make it possible for our&#13;
,b rethren in other lands to come here and go into ventures.&#13;
We want to grow in: numbers; our ambition is that we becrone stronger. I do not fear fo;r the future we have the&#13;
best outlook There still are some insufficiencies, but that&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
29&#13;
&#13;
is not because a new state has ,b een born, but because&#13;
there is war around us!"&#13;
Strict, 1but fatherly words. Only he could speak thus,&#13;
who loved his people and who throughout his life worked&#13;
in its interest. Thus it was that the other hallf of Slovak&#13;
land got into the hands of Slovak farmers and ceaaed to&#13;
be the object of business exploitation. And, fina11y, even&#13;
private inrvestors had it good in ,Sl.ov,ak±a. They were not&#13;
only given the possibility to enterprise, but were practically forced by the government to participate in the building of the State, so that erven their profits might increase.&#13;
On the social policy of the government depended the&#13;
reeducation of the population - the policy carried out in&#13;
the i:\pirit of Christian charity towards ones illeigh:bor, of&#13;
mutual assistance, cooperation, and understanding. The aim&#13;
of the reeducation of the 1people waJS to remOIVe the blights&#13;
of the past which, under the influence of pressure from the&#13;
East, began to find opportune soil even in Slovalkia, especially among the Lutherans. Special attention was given&#13;
to the reeducation of employe11S and owners of larger and&#13;
smaller industrial enterprises; the relationship between&#13;
employer and employee was exiplained according to the&#13;
teaching of the social Pope, Leo XIII, who said in the encyclical Rerum Novarum:&#13;
"Religion teaches the wealthy owner and the employer&#13;
that their woJ'.lk people a,re not to be accO!Uilted their !bondsmen; that in ervery man they m'USt respect his dignity and&#13;
worth as a man and as a Christian.; that labor rfor w,a.ges&#13;
is not a thing to 'b e ashamed of, if we lend ear to right&#13;
reason an.d to Christian (Philosophy, but is to a man's credit, ena;bling -h im to earn his living in an honoraJble way;&#13;
and that it is shamefiuil and inhuman to treat men li!ke&#13;
chattels to make money by, or to loolk upon them merely&#13;
as so muoh musole or physical strength. A,g am the Chrurch&#13;
teaches that, in dealing with the workingman, religion and&#13;
the ,g ood of his so,ul must be kept in mind. Hence the employer is -bound to see that the wo:rker has time for !his religious duties; that he be not exposed to corrupting influ~.AW¥ and that he ibe not led&#13;
ences and&#13;
&#13;
d~A~g~&#13;
UII ..&#13;
&#13;
J;Q~VILLE. STATE CO~LE.GE&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
30&#13;
&#13;
away to neglect bis thome and f.amily, or to squander his&#13;
earnings. Furthermore, the employer must never tax his&#13;
work people 'beyond their strength, or employ them in work&#13;
unsuited to their sex or age. His ,g reat and principal duty&#13;
is to give every one what is just. Doubtless before deciding&#13;
whether wages are fair, many things have to be considered; ·b ut wealthy owners and all masters of labor should&#13;
be mindful of this - that to exercise pressure upon the&#13;
indigent and the destitute for the sa;ke of gain, and to&#13;
gather one's profit out of the need of another, is condemned&#13;
by all laws, human and Divine."&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
On the other hand, workingmen were expected to carry&#13;
out honestly and fairly all equitable agreements freely entered into; never to injure the property of an employer&#13;
uselessly and maliciously; never to .r esort to violence in&#13;
defending their own cause and to avoid riots and disorders; and, finally, to have nothing to do with persons who&#13;
stand in th service of Communism, endeavoring to sow dissention and dissatisfaction among the working ;p eople and&#13;
ultimately to enslaJVe them.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
The results of reeducation were demonstrated especially&#13;
when Dr. Karvas, chairman of the Office of Supplies, adamantly opposed ,a ll warranted increases in wages for workingmen.. At that time the employers stood by the workingmen and thus embarrassed iDr. Karvas: instead of hourly&#13;
wages, they ,g radually began to introduce piece-work so&#13;
that the workmen could gain their increases, but not to sap&#13;
their strength and exploit them. This arrangement was&#13;
done in agreement with the trade organizations and the&#13;
workingmen themselrves; Karvas, therefore, could not punrish employers for increasing wages with out his permission.&#13;
Tthe life of cohabitation of the citizens in the Slovak&#13;
State resembled the life of a well-ordered family. Slov:rukia&#13;
was the envy of States with richer traditions and of nations more mmnerous than the Slova;ks. The SlovaJk workingman ,r eally never had it so good, rund prdbaJbly never&#13;
will mwe it again, until a free and ~ndependent Slovrukia,&#13;
based on Christian principles, is again established.&#13;
&#13;
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                <text>Labor and the Slovak Republic</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="1538">
                <text>J. C. Bukovina&#13;
Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 2 (19), June 1956&#13;
pp. 18-30</text>
              </elementText>
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              <elementText elementTextId="1539">
                <text>Bukovina, J. C.</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="1540">
                <text>June 1956</text>
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

31

ISRAEL AND SLOVAKIA

K. Oulen

Israel i,s in the news today. And it has been in the
news since it was founded in 1948. Israel is the youngest
state of the oldest nation on earth. Israel is in a precarious
situaition, being surrounded as it is by enemies who have
proclaimed !i.t their aim to force the Israeli into the sea and
destroy the State. To do this, however, they need weapons
and ammunition. The Skoda wOiiks of Pilsen, Bohemia, has
contacted with Egypt to provide materials of war, presumably with the approbation of !Moscow - the same Skoda
works which worked SQ efficiently for Hitler during the
past war and is now working overtime for the men of the
Kremildn, the works that British and U. 1S. bomlbers, it seems,
were not allowed to destroy.
It is both interesting and sur.prising that the Communists began so willingly to supply weapons against Israel,
since it is an admitted fact that no one helped the idea of
Communism more than the Jews: they were its creators,
its standard-bearers, and its ,propagators throughout the
world. It is also interesting to note that it was the Czechs
who began to supply werupons of war to the enemies of
Israel, even though no one in the whole wide world supported Czech interests more than the Jews.
The Jews openly admit ;that their independence is
threatened. And they vow that they shall fight to. preserve
it. And that is, indeed, a JVery nice and proper thing to do.
John Kollar, the Slovak writer, once wrote: Every one
who is worthy of freedom knows how to respect the free.
dom of others.
The Jews renewed their independent state after 2000
years of alien rule, while the Slovaks rid themselves of
alien domination after a 1000 years. But it is a fact that,
excepting the Czechs, no other nation was against Slovak
statehood as were the Jews.
In 1939, when minister Mracna intervened in the State
Department in Washington for recognition of the Slovak

�32

SLOV4KIA

Repwblic, officials of the Department to1d hi.Ip. dire&lt;!tly they
ha.d no objections to su:ch recognition. We know that the
.American am:bassador in Bud~t intervened several times
and recommended the recogmtton of the Slovak Republic.
Against recognition were certain political circles which
were greatlY. influenced by Jewish circles. The latter have
been and still are of the opinion that the Slova;ks must be
under Czech domination. Before the creation of the political
"Czecho-iSlovaJk" moostrooity of T. G. Masaryk and Dr.
Edward Benes, the same circles favored the domination of
the SfovaJks ,b y the Magyars. In every instant, in the struggle of the Slovaks for freedom, the Jews always supported
the oppressors of the Slovaks.
Indeed, it wou1d be apropos to learn directly from a
Jewish s01Urce by what reckoning the Jews came to the
conclusion that they are entitled to a. state while the Slo~
vaks are not. lrf they are not o.f such a mind, why do they
oppose Slovruk statehood?
If the Jews honestly believe that no one sha1l be able
to kill the idea of Jewish statehood, we, on the other hand,
assure them that the Slovaks believe the same thing in
their c~·- Ali naJtions endeavo,r to attain independence. We
believe that the time is coming when natiion wHl cease oppressing nation. The Slovaks firmly believe that they will
one day enjoy political independence, their own Slovak Republic, founded on Ohristian, demo.c ratic principles. Is it in
the interests of the Jews who lived in Slovakia and would
stitl want to live there to persevere to the fast moment on
the siide of the enemies of the Slovak people, against Siovak independence ? We cannot believe that it is.
Preferring one nation to another is not just. There
must be no exceptions. Even the Ozechs must be no exception with their claim that every _mature, self-sustainin g
nation which !knows how to manage itself iis entitled to
independence. If a nation is not left to itself, how can it
be known whether it can manage iitself or nort? Accord.ring
to the Czechs, the Slovak peo,p le was not Slllch a nation.
During the war, however, the Slorvaks proved con:olu:si.vely
that they were a mature and self-sustainin g nation, q_emon_

�SLOVAKIA

33

strating in the Slovak Republic that they were able a.nd
capable of managm,g their own affairs even without Czech
intervention.
Nevertheless, the Je:ws of the whole world are still op-,
posed to Slovak independence, not a single Jewish organizamon voicing itself openly for it. They were the lbacikbone
of the anti-'Slova!k propaganda of Dr. Edward Benes (Klinger, Benau, Ku:nossy, Ifu!jdu, Weisskopf, Dr. Sarissky, HaasKysucky, Frisch, etc.).
The :Slovsaks are of the opinion that the Jewish nation
is entitled to state independence, if it so desires. The same
goes for every nation in the entire world. And, hence, that
holds for their own Slovalk nation.
The Jewish 1State would have coliaipsed long .a go without
foreign. loans and gifts. The Slova:k State did not owe any~
body anything; it got along nicely without foreign. loan.s
and gifts during the most trying years of the war. Conversely, the leaiders of the Slovaik Republic were executed,
imprisoned, disfranchii!zed, deported and di~possessed, because it was aJ.leged that others did owe Slovakia quite a
bit - the same SlovaJk!i-a that the Ozechs had complaJined
about so many years as 'b eing an e~pensive ,ba;llast.
The Slovaks never abandoned their territory. Ml neighboring nations, except the Czechs, were for S1ovak independence. Slovakia, twice as large as Israel, had a ma:jo-rity
of Slovruk inha:bitants. And yet, the very same Jews, who
so enthusiastically and uncompromisingly are fighting fo:r
their own independence, fought and are still fighting against
Slovak independence. Certainly it must be perfectly clear
that if the 1Slova.k.s are not entitled to independence, then
certainil.y neither are the Jews. But ff .that were the case,
iit would mean that we are stiil living in a period of racism,
in which some nations are preferred, while others are oppressed and suppressed.
A nation cannot be fighting for its own independence
with one hand and striking against the independence of
dther nations with the other. The Jews, however, are doing
just thiat in the case of the Slovaks.

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1536">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA

31

ISRAEL AND SLOVAKIA

K. Oulen

Israel i,s in the news today. And it has been in the
news since it was founded in 1948. Israel is the youngest
state of the oldest nation on earth. Israel is in a precarious
situaition, being surrounded as it is by enemies who have
proclaimed !i.t their aim to force the Israeli into the sea and
destroy the State. To do this, however, they need weapons
and ammunition. The Skoda wOiiks of Pilsen, Bohemia, has
contacted with Egypt to provide materials of war, presumably with the approbation of !Moscow - the same Skoda
works which worked SQ efficiently for Hitler during the
past war and is now working overtime for the men of the
Kremildn, the works that British and U. 1S. bomlbers, it seems,
were not allowed to destroy.
It is both interesting and sur.prising that the Communists began so willingly to supply weapons against Israel,
since it is an admitted fact that no one helped the idea of
Communism more than the Jews: they were its creators,
its standard-bearers, and its ,propagators throughout the
world. It is also interesting to note that it was the Czechs
who began to supply werupons of war to the enemies of
Israel, even though no one in the whole wide world supported Czech interests more than the Jews.
The Jews openly admit ;that their independence is
threatened. And they vow that they shall fight to. preserve
it. And that is, indeed, a JVery nice and proper thing to do.
John Kollar, the Slovak writer, once wrote: Every one
who is worthy of freedom knows how to respect the free.
dom of others.
The Jews renewed their independent state after 2000
years of alien rule, while the Slovaks rid themselves of
alien domination after a 1000 years. But it is a fact that,
excepting the Czechs, no other nation was against Slovak
statehood as were the Jews.
In 1939, when minister Mracna intervened in the State
Department in Washington for recognition of the Slovak

�32

SLOV4KIA

Repwblic, officials of the Department to1d hi.Ip. dire&lt;!tly they
ha.d no objections to su:ch recognition. We know that the
.American am:bassador in Bud~t intervened several times
and recommended the recogmtton of the Slovak Republic.
Against recognition were certain political circles which
were greatlY. influenced by Jewish circles. The latter have
been and still are of the opinion that the Slova;ks must be
under Czech domination. Before the creation of the political
"Czecho-iSlovaJk" moostrooity of T. G. Masaryk and Dr.
Edward Benes, the same circles favored the domination of
the SfovaJks ,b y the Magyars. In every instant, in the struggle of the Slovaks for freedom, the Jews always supported
the oppressors of the Slovaks.
Indeed, it wou1d be apropos to learn directly from a
Jewish s01Urce by what reckoning the Jews came to the
conclusion that they are entitled to a. state while the Slo~
vaks are not. lrf they are not o.f such a mind, why do they
oppose Slovruk statehood?
If the Jews honestly believe that no one sha1l be able
to kill the idea of Jewish statehood, we, on the other hand,
assure them that the Slovaks believe the same thing in
their c~·- Ali naJtions endeavo,r to attain independence. We
believe that the time is coming when natiion wHl cease oppressing nation. The Slovaks firmly believe that they will
one day enjoy political independence, their own Slovak Republic, founded on Ohristian, demo.c ratic principles. Is it in
the interests of the Jews who lived in Slovakia and would
stitl want to live there to persevere to the fast moment on
the siide of the enemies of the Slovak people, against Siovak independence ? We cannot believe that it is.
Preferring one nation to another is not just. There
must be no exceptions. Even the Ozechs must be no exception with their claim that every _mature, self-sustainin g
nation which !knows how to manage itself iis entitled to
independence. If a nation is not left to itself, how can it
be known whether it can manage iitself or nort? Accord.ring
to the Czechs, the Slovak peo,p le was not Slllch a nation.
During the war, however, the Slorvaks proved con:olu:si.vely
that they were a mature and self-sustainin g nation, q_emon_

�SLOVAKIA

33

strating in the Slovak Republic that they were able a.nd
capable of managm,g their own affairs even without Czech
intervention.
Nevertheless, the Je:ws of the whole world are still op-,
posed to Slovak independence, not a single Jewish organizamon voicing itself openly for it. They were the lbacikbone
of the anti-'Slova!k propaganda of Dr. Edward Benes (Klinger, Benau, Ku:nossy, Ifu!jdu, Weisskopf, Dr. Sarissky, HaasKysucky, Frisch, etc.).
The :Slovsaks are of the opinion that the Jewish nation
is entitled to state independence, if it so desires. The same
goes for every nation in the entire world. And, hence, that
holds for their own Slovalk nation.
The Jewish 1State would have coliaipsed long .a go without
foreign. loans and gifts. The Slova:k State did not owe any~
body anything; it got along nicely without foreign. loan.s
and gifts during the most trying years of the war. Conversely, the leaiders of the Slovaik Republic were executed,
imprisoned, disfranchii!zed, deported and di~possessed, because it was aJ.leged that others did owe Slovakia quite a
bit - the same SlovaJk!i-a that the Ozechs had complaJined
about so many years as 'b eing an e~pensive ,ba;llast.
The Slovaks never abandoned their territory. Ml neighboring nations, except the Czechs, were for S1ovak independence. Slovakia, twice as large as Israel, had a ma:jo-rity
of Slovruk inha:bitants. And yet, the very same Jews, who
so enthusiastically and uncompromisingly are fighting fo:r
their own independence, fought and are still fighting against
Slovak independence. Certainly it must be perfectly clear
that if the 1Slova.k.s are not entitled to independence, then
certainil.y neither are the Jews. But ff .that were the case,
iit would mean that we are stiil living in a period of racism,
in which some nations are preferred, while others are oppressed and suppressed.
A nation cannot be fighting for its own independence
with one hand and striking against the independence of
dther nations with the other. The Jews, however, are doing
just thiat in the case of the Slovaks.

�</text>
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                  <text>1956, Vol. 6</text>
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                <elementText elementTextId="23">
                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;</text>
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
31&#13;
&#13;
ISRAEL AND SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
K. Oulen&#13;
&#13;
Israel i,s in the news today. And it has been in the&#13;
news since it was founded in 1948. Israel is the youngest&#13;
state of the oldest nation on earth. Israel is in a precarious&#13;
situaition, being surrounded as it is by enemies who have&#13;
proclaimed !i.t their aim to force the Israeli into the sea and&#13;
destroy the State. To do this, however, they need weapons&#13;
and ammunition. The Skoda wOiiks of Pilsen, Bohemia, has&#13;
contacted with Egypt to provide materials of war, presumably with the approbation of !Moscow - the same Skoda&#13;
works which worked SQ efficiently for Hitler during the&#13;
past war and is now working overtime for the men of the&#13;
Kremildn, the works that British and U. 1S. bomlbers, it seems,&#13;
were not allowed to destroy.&#13;
It is both interesting and sur.prising that the Communists began so willingly to supply weapons against Israel,&#13;
since it is an admitted fact that no one helped the idea of&#13;
Communism more than the Jews: they were its creators,&#13;
its standard-bearers, and its ,propagators throughout the&#13;
world. It is also interesting to note that it was the Czechs&#13;
who began to supply werupons of war to the enemies of&#13;
Israel, even though no one in the whole wide world supported Czech interests more than the Jews.&#13;
The Jews openly admit ;that their independence is&#13;
threatened. And they vow that they shall fight to. preserve&#13;
it. And that is, indeed, a JVery nice and proper thing to do.&#13;
John Kollar, the Slovak writer, once wrote: Every one&#13;
who is worthy of freedom knows how to respect the free.&#13;
dom of others.&#13;
The Jews renewed their independent state after 2000&#13;
years of alien rule, while the Slovaks rid themselves of&#13;
alien domination after a 1000 years. But it is a fact that,&#13;
excepting the Czechs, no other nation was against Slovak&#13;
statehood as were the Jews.&#13;
In 1939, when minister Mracna intervened in the State&#13;
Department in Washington for recognition of the Slovak&#13;
&#13;
32&#13;
&#13;
SLOV4KIA&#13;
&#13;
Repwblic, officials of the Department to1d hi.Ip. dire&lt;!tly they&#13;
ha.d no objections to su:ch recognition. We know that the&#13;
.American am:bassador in Bud~t intervened several times&#13;
and recommended the recogmtton of the Slovak Republic.&#13;
Against recognition were certain political circles which&#13;
were greatlY. influenced by Jewish circles. The latter have&#13;
been and still are of the opinion that the Slova;ks must be&#13;
under Czech domination. Before the creation of the political&#13;
"Czecho-iSlovaJk" moostrooity of T. G. Masaryk and Dr.&#13;
Edward Benes, the same circles favored the domination of&#13;
the SfovaJks ,b y the Magyars. In every instant, in the struggle of the Slovaks for freedom, the Jews always supported&#13;
the oppressors of the Slovaks.&#13;
Indeed, it wou1d be apropos to learn directly from a&#13;
Jewish s01Urce by what reckoning the Jews came to the&#13;
conclusion that they are entitled to a. state while the Slo~&#13;
vaks are not. lrf they are not o.f such a mind, why do they&#13;
oppose Slovruk statehood?&#13;
If the Jews honestly believe that no one sha1l be able&#13;
to kill the idea of Jewish statehood, we, on the other hand,&#13;
assure them that the Slovaks believe the same thing in&#13;
their c~·- Ali naJtions endeavo,r to attain independence. We&#13;
believe that the time is coming when natiion wHl cease oppressing nation. The Slovaks firmly believe that they will&#13;
one day enjoy political independence, their own Slovak Republic, founded on Ohristian, demo.c ratic principles. Is it in&#13;
the interests of the Jews who lived in Slovakia and would&#13;
stitl want to live there to persevere to the fast moment on&#13;
the siide of the enemies of the Slovak people, against Siovak independence ? We cannot believe that it is.&#13;
Preferring one nation to another is not just. There&#13;
must be no exceptions. Even the Ozechs must be no exception with their claim that every _mature, self-sustainin g&#13;
nation which !knows how to manage itself iis entitled to&#13;
independence. If a nation is not left to itself, how can it&#13;
be known whether it can manage iitself or nort? Accord.ring&#13;
to the Czechs, the Slovak peo,p le was not Slllch a nation.&#13;
During the war, however, the Slorvaks proved con:olu:si.vely&#13;
that they were a mature and self-sustainin g nation, q_emon_&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
33&#13;
&#13;
strating in the Slovak Republic that they were able a.nd&#13;
capable of managm,g their own affairs even without Czech&#13;
intervention.&#13;
Nevertheless, the Je:ws of the whole world are still op-,&#13;
posed to Slovak independence, not a single Jewish organizamon voicing itself openly for it. They were the lbacikbone&#13;
of the anti-'Slova!k propaganda of Dr. Edward Benes (Klinger, Benau, Ku:nossy, Ifu!jdu, Weisskopf, Dr. Sarissky, HaasKysucky, Frisch, etc.).&#13;
The :Slovsaks are of the opinion that the Jewish nation&#13;
is entitled to state independence, if it so desires. The same&#13;
goes for every nation in the entire world. And, hence, that&#13;
holds for their own Slovalk nation.&#13;
The Jewish 1State would have coliaipsed long .a go without&#13;
foreign. loans and gifts. The Slova:k State did not owe any~&#13;
body anything; it got along nicely without foreign. loan.s&#13;
and gifts during the most trying years of the war. Conversely, the leaiders of the Slovaik Republic were executed,&#13;
imprisoned, disfranchii!zed, deported and di~possessed, because it was aJ.leged that others did owe Slovakia quite a&#13;
bit - the same SlovaJk!i-a that the Ozechs had complaJined&#13;
about so many years as 'b eing an e~pensive ,ba;llast.&#13;
The Slovaks never abandoned their territory. Ml neighboring nations, except the Czechs, were for S1ovak independence. Slovakia, twice as large as Israel, had a ma:jo-rity&#13;
of Slovruk inha:bitants. And yet, the very same Jews, who&#13;
so enthusiastically and uncompromisingly are fighting fo:r&#13;
their own independence, fought and are still fighting against&#13;
Slovak independence. Certainly it must be perfectly clear&#13;
that if the 1Slova.k.s are not entitled to independence, then&#13;
certainil.y neither are the Jews. But ff .that were the case,&#13;
iit would mean that we are stiil living in a period of racism,&#13;
in which some nations are preferred, while others are oppressed and suppressed.&#13;
A nation cannot be fighting for its own independence&#13;
with one hand and striking against the independence of&#13;
dther nations with the other. The Jews, however, are doing&#13;
just thiat in the case of the Slovaks.&#13;
&#13;
</text>
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

SLOVAK LITERATUR E UNDER THE SOVIET IMPACT

Joseph Kirschbaum, Ph.D., LL.D.,
Professor at the University of Montreal
Department of Slavic Studies

A Reprint From "The Slavic and East-Eurooea n Studies."
Published by: The Department of Slavic Studies,
University of Montreal
FOREWORD

The Commumst occupation of SlwaJri,a carved deep
wounds not only •i nto the sociall and political structure of
Slovak life as poliitical occupations and changes used :to
do in the past. The totailiitarian character of Communism
has the specific quality th!a,t it .affects ail the important
sectors of national life, be it !l'eligion or phi!losophy, arts
or literature.
Due to the peculiar citrCu:rnmnces under wbiich the
Slovak people were deprived of national independence and
became a defenseless prey of foreign domination, the cultural life of Slo'V18Jkfa suffered. ,p robably the stirongest impact among all Soviet satellites. The reasons are many.
First of all the character of SlO'V'ak literature and writers.
Slovak culture developed through lbhe ages U'Ilder Western
influences. This is true namely m regard to the Slovak
literature which originated in the classical dlimate of the
Catholic University of Trnava, founded in 1635. (1) With
exception of the Gdthlc period, we find •i n Slovak literature
all the literary currents from humani.!S!m .t hrough (baroque
to classicism, romantic-ism, realism, Catholic "modenie,"
and surrealism. In fact, the olassicaJl. reminiscences , the
era of enlighrtenment and romanticism g,ave birth to SlovaJk poetry and prose. Some of the influences ,ruppeared
[ater, or J:asted. longer, or el-se !their form wa:s not pure,
but we find ianalogies for this phenomenon in all Slavic
literatures.
More than m poetic and literacy forms, the Western
influences and Western orientrution of the Slovak literature is evident in the contents and in the mission that

�SLOVAKIA

35

poetry and prose aimed to accomplish in the Jife of the
Slovak people. Slovak poets and novelists beginning with
Holly (2) in .t he eigJJ.teenth century, and the group of
Eudovit Stur(3) in the nineteenth century to Hviezdoslav(4), Vajansky, Razus, Zarnov, Urban, Bronsky, Beniak, etc., saw tihe reaJI. function of Slovak literrutrure primarNy in equipping !the Sloviak people with the spiritual
resources necessary for survival and the fight for freedom. They endeavored rto bring the Slovak ,p eople to an
awa:reness of rtheir spiritual •a nd nationrul iindi'Viduality and
fought for their politic-al M1d sociral rights. Like .the poetry
of Mickiewicz, Krasinski and Slowac·ki, "summoned the
Poles prom political enslavement to a spir.ituaJI. life and revealed them completely new pwspecltiives of mor,al responsibility resulting from the. ll'ation's politicaJl situatiO!Il," (5)
in the same way tile Slov,aks Jearned through the works of
theiir poets and novel-ists to regard the naitional cause as
a question of honor and the supreme mo,r al criterion
a.round which the. entire spiritual life of the nation was
crystallized.
Slovak poets and novelists who regarded thei!r mission, as described aibove, could not nourish any illusion
about thei1r fate /Under Communist rule. They knew that
literatUTe, •as a means of expression of the national soul
and ait the same time ,t he most efficient instrument in the
intellectual struggle foir ·r eshapiing nation's patterns of
thinking, wou\ld be the first cultwal field undergoing substM1tial changes and losses . The Slovak intelligentsia also
knew that the Czech politicians returning behind the Red
Army in SloV'akia would take revenge o:n a:ll patriotic Slova1ks who claimed the right of seJf-determination for the
Slovak people and applied or aidvoca.ted the ·s ame when the
occasion ,had am-ived.

Jan

Thousands of Slovak intelllectuals, therefore, preferred
the exile with all its uncertainties •a nd ,miseries to the
Czecho-Communist rule. Among the intellectual emigres
the write:ra who were the true irepresentatives of Slova!k
literature .b etween the WaTS a:nd made ,a name for themselves by their works and outstanding talents have been

�36

SLOVAKIA

more numerous than it appears in the literary ,p roduction
of the ilast ten years in exNe. There was, at the beginning,
111ot only the most popUJl,a;r nO'VelList of ,t he period 1918~1939,
Milo Urban, w,hose "Ziivy Bic" (LlNing Whip) was translated into ,s everal European languages, but a:lso .AJildrej
Zarnov, whose poetry became an efficacious instrument
in the Slovak national struggle and summoned the young
Slovalk intelligentsia to fight for justke and freedom. Both
were 1ater kidnapped by the Czech Communists in Austria
and on!ly Zarnov succeeded in a dramati·c filighit f.rom
Slova!lda again and today fights for his ideas ,i n exHe.
There are many others who preferred exile to Communist rule and far from Slovakia - in .Arr-gentma, the U. S.
A., Canada, Australia, etc., jn deep sorrow and fiery resistance fight for rthe.ir people's freedom. Among them is
Joseph C. Hroosky, the most prolific and undoubtedly one of
the greatest 1Slovak noveLists, who celebrated just recently,
or rather the Slovaks in the free world celebrated his
60th annirversary. The literary work of J. C. Hronsky
is of such artistic vrulue and importance for the Slovak
1iterature thait even the literary historian of the Slovak
University of today, professoir A. Mraz, was forced to
ac'knowledge that many of iHronsky's works "belonged
amOID.g the best works of the Slovak post-war literature
by thei.T qualities of style and composition." In regard to
Hronsky's noive1 '~Pisar Grae" (Clerk Grae), Mraz even
writes a'boUJt "hravour of composiUon"; he sees in his
first novels "complicated artistic instrumentality" and
commends him for "exceptional and privileged interpreting of the common people, as weili as of refined and cultivated souls ,a nd hearts of women." During the war years,
in his German book on Slova.!k literature, professor Mraz
qualified J. C. Hironsky's novel "Jozef Mak," whlich was
also translated into German, as "one of the 1b est works
of the Slovruk post~war literature," and the author as the
"most prolific Slovak :novelist."
Altogether J. C. Hironsky published over 50 volumes
of short novels, beasutiful tales for children, novels describing the life of SlorvaJk peasants and worker,s, and mas1

�SLOVAKIA

37

terpieces on the life of the Slovak SIIIl.aN-town intelligentsia (Clerk Grae, The .P rophecy orf Doctor Stan!kovsky) ,
with all social and ideological problems and struggles of
Slovakia's post~war dramatic evolution. Usually regaTded
as the heir and follower of Martin Kuikucin's realism in
Sloivak literature,. !Hronslky attained new artistic heights
and in many ,respects even ,sUTpassed Kulkuoin, who i1s considered even !by the Communist ireg,i.me as a "classic" of
SlO!Vak literature. rHronsky's spi riitual world is broad and
deep, his sphere of artistic interests is extensive and manifold, his style am.d composition masterly clerur and lingui'Sltica:lly perfect and beaubiful.
At the begimning of his literary career, the Siovak
peasant in his traditional way of 'life, poverty, patient
heroism, and sturdy mental~ty was a favolI'ilte subject of
nove!ls. HaNing made his mark with •s hort stories from
Slovak village rlife, in which r ealism matched the best
worlks of the founder of Slovak literary realism, Martin
Kuikucin, Bronsky moved into rthe domain of liteTature for
children and youth and, l,a ter, into the domain of social
and psyohologicaJl problems of smaHtown people, proceeding firom short stories and tales to more and more complicated and artisticaJlly elaborated forms of novel.
Hrrorusky emwged very soon as a towering personality from the group of post-war novelists and writers.
His remarkable literary ,w ork constituted a lin'k between
the talented Slovak n01Velists .of the previous generation
and mode:m Slovak ,},i terature modeled on Western European literary currents. Not an epigon of •a nyone, Hronsky
created: :from his own spiritual funds and had a strong
appeal prim:arily to the heart of the young generation ,of
writers among w'hom his new shade of realas-m had ma!lly
followers.
Hironsky',s •s ignificance in Slovak cultura:l life was,
however, extraordinaJry not only in literatUII'e. Hiis -literary
activity was doubled by his achievements in the highest
Slovak cultUTal institution "Matica Slove:nska" (The Slovak Lnstiwte) , foll'Ilded in 1863 with the aim t 10 s,pread
Slwak cultural valrues and defend Slovak traditions against
1

1

�38

SLOVAKIA

Magyair tendencies of assimilation. There was rarely a
Slovak writex who successifully combined a highly developed literary talent with such organizational ,ability as it
has been in the case of J. C. Bronsky. Acord.mg to many
seri'ous cultwrai worik€1I'S (cf. Cullen's ia.nd Hrusovsky's
articles in the "S:lovensika Obrana" and the "Kainadsky
Slovwk"), J. C. HronSlky has done more usefiU!l work in the
few years of his administration of the "Slovak Institute"
than any Oille of his predecessors during long periods.
Thousands of new books wer edited every year by his
merits, new cultwral sections organized, equipped and reorganized, a new farge printery built, and new activities
initiaited.
an institution of many
The "Slovak In.stitute" merits in the fieild of co111Servation of Slorvak traditioI1JS,
culture, popular art, tiheater, pwrity of language - ip1ayed
an important Tole in Slovak cultura•l life at all times since
its foundation in the nineteenth century. Election to leading funcUons in thls institution was considered one of the
highest honors in SlovaJkia and it undoubtedly was. J . C.
Hronsky was elected and reelected.
For the Communist regime such merits have been,
however, "crimes" against the "people's democracy and
revolution," and J. C. Hrons'ky was arrested before the
Red Army accomplished the occupation of Slovakia. After
many unsuccessful aittempts, he finally escaped from a
prison and fled from 'Slovakia through Austria into Italy,
and later found refuge in Argentina, where he lives, deeply convinced that the Slovaks will never give up their
fight for freedom and their Christian ,t raditions.
We mention HirolilSlky's case in this connection as an
example of the Slovak nationail. tragedy. There are many
others, who in literature, science, arts, aind in ,t he pO'litical
and economic life of Slava,kia, created works of value and
have been silenced by the Communist regime, or preferred
freedom in exile, as Hronsky did. In the following pages
an attempt has been made to present, in a very restricted
way, the main features of the Slovak literature under the
Communist ,r ule. The author has scrupulously tried to paint

�SLOVAKIA

39

the picture objectirvely, and the publishing committee of
the review "The Slavic and East-European .Studies" saw to
it that the study might remain within the limits of a scientific work.
There is on:ly one abjectirve this study ,a ims at: to
se:rve the cause of truth and freedom which in Slova1kia as
well as in other satelilite countiries have been temporarily
stifled.
J. K.
1. Cf. Branislav Vars!k: Le Probleme des nationalites a r Universlte de Trnav,a, Bratislava, 193.8.
2. Jan Holly (178·5-1849) most gifted poet and disciple of A.
Bernolak, glorified in three po ems Slovakia's greatness of one tllousand years ago, "Svatopluk" (18n), "Cyrilo-Methodiada" (1835), and
•·,Slav" (1839). He also translated the main works of Greek and
Roman classics into the Slovak l,a nguage and prepared th e Slovak
renatssanee.
3. Cf. Hans Kohn: "Pan-Slavlsm, Its History and Ideology,"
University of Notre Dame Press, 19.53; and Ernest Denis: "Les
Slovaques,' Paris, Delgrave, 1917.
4. P. 0. Hviezdoslav (1849-1921) by his own name Pavol Or·
szagh, is considered the most talented Slovak poet. His poetry
was publls'hed In fifteen large volumes, one of them, "Bloody Sonnets," was translated also Into English. His main works are "Herodes and Herodlas" (drama), the epics "Hajnlkova zena, Ezo a
Gabor Vlkolinsky, Agar, Rachel, Kron," etc. He also published four
volumes of translation,s from World literatures, Goethe's Faust,
Shakes.p,eare's Hamlet and Mid-Summer Night's Dream, the main
works of Shiller, Lermont-0v, Slowackl and Madach's "The Tragedy
of Man."
,5. C.f. Harvard Slavic Studies, Vol. 2, 19·54, p. 323-4.

SLOVAK LITERATURE UNDER THE SOVIET IMPACT
Within a decade of the forced inclusion of Slovakia
within the Soviet orbit, Slovaik literature weint through
most peculiar transformations. If Slovak novelists and
poets, generally more conservative and traditional than Polish, Czech or Slovene writers, did not leave the country
m- choose silence, they were abruptly compelled to ada;pt
their literary c-reeds, forms and subjects .to a new line of
"socialist reailis,m" and to run exclusively Eastern orientation.
The main characteristics of Slovak literatll!l"e were patriotism, pan-slavism, universalism and a deep religiO'UIS

�40

SLOVAKIA

spirit. The generation after John Holly, namely John Kolla.T and the group of L. Stur, turned their eyes, as fawiders of nineteenth century painslla:vism, to Russia 'but their
literrury works, education and iphllosophy were fundrurnentahly Western. They were educated at German Unive:r,sities
and, while KoHar's "Daughter of Slava" was modelled on
Dante and Petrarca, L. Stur and his group were under the
influence of German romanticism, having foir masters
Herder and Hegel (in their phi1osoiphy) .1 It was in poetry
only that Mickiewicz, Slowacki, Krasinski am.d Pu&lt;s'hkin.
were the:iir ideails. Kol[ar's idea of "S[avic reciprocity" refrruined from any attemipt to mottld the politkal ideology
or the religious charaicter of any Slav group. He aimed
merely at cuiltural and literary reciprocity, •a nd his philo,s ophy was humanistic." He only is wOlI'thy of liberty who
resrpects the :liiberty of 8!11; he who forges the chains of
others, is himself a slave; when thou callest for a Slav,
there must respond a man," are his famous axioms.2
According to W. Bobek, one of the best foreign scholars on Slovak literature, Slovakia c-a n be reasonably considered as the classical country of the Slavic idea, with
several conceptions of panslaV'ism based on the equa[ity of
Slaivic peoples. Howevell", an identification of the idea of a
Slavic cooperaition with russophilism was raire; it appeared
as a result of national depression and despair.3
Such was the case of L. Stur, for whom "P.anslavism
in the political sense was a chimera," but who later, according to W. Lednicki, forunulated about 1850 ":the most
complete and consistently developed program for the subjugation of Slavs to Russia in his bo01k "SlaV'dom and the
World of the Future"4. Stur wrote 'his '.book in a period of
"Nationail depression ,arrd despailr," as mentioned by Boibek. (The book was written in German and never appeared
in Slova!k).
During the last decades of the nirneteenth century
arnd the years before and during the first World War, Sfovak literary •amd cultural life was dominated to some extent by Slovak Russophiles like Vajansky and Skn.lltety.
However, this was merely an interlude; for after the war,
1

�SLOVAKIA

41

the inf1uence ·o f French, English and even Scandinavian
writem which was mani!fest among the younger poe'bs and
novelists (I. Kraslro, V. Roy, P. 0 . Hv:iezdoslav, M. Razus), gained ground firmly and without resistance. The
RussophiJ.e orientation ,i n Slova:k literature was chiefly dru:e
to the political situation following the Austro-Hungarian.
compromise •Of H~67, when the Slovaks were left at the
mercy of Hungarian effonts of assii:rnilation. As the Slovak poets and novelists saw that the only hope for a Slovak national surrvival was in Russia's power, they gave fU!ll
expression to this belief 1n their Hterary woriks. iBut they
did not mean to exohange one oppression for a.mother.
The Bo1sltevik Revolution and the results of the Firat
WorJ,d War changed the picture. The Revo1urbion destroyed
the panslavistic and Russophile dreams of Slovruk poets.
While f,u!lifilling their hope for emancipation foom HUID:giarian ru'le by oreating the Czecho-Slova'k Republic with the
Czechs, jt -left the Slovakis free to choose their cU!ltural
orientation. They e1ther turned again to the West or they
used their own spiritual and moral tradiitions for creative
inspi:ration. The general trend of Slovak liteiratJure in poetry
as well as in prose was to broaden its range of interests
and to become responsive to European literary curents 5
The main representatives of Slovak literatlrre between the
two Wars were uninterested in Soviet Russia, except for a
smal[ groUJp of proJetarian o:r left-wing poets and writers
under Czech influence. Oruy three or four of them acquiired literary recognition. and even fa.me. The older generation of Slovak poets, headed by P. 0. Hiviezdoslav, V.
Roy, Ivan Krasko and Martin Razus, continued to create
in the traditional forms or, Ji.ke Hviezdoslav, to use the
European literrury forms and currents coriresponding to
his great ta:lent and creativeness. In prose, the masters
were the realists Kukucin,6 Hronsky, 'l'ajov!Sky, T. Vansova, Timrava and L. 'Podjavorinska.
The younger generation looked for new fo:rms: to for·eign literatures. The really successful literary woriks of
more tham. ephemera[ value were those which dTew their
motives. from Slovak H!fe, their inspiration from rSlorva!k

�42

SLOVAKIA

national traditions and their art from their own spiritual
reserves (Milo Ur.ban, J. C. Hironsky, A. Za.rn.ov, V. Benia:k, J. Smrek, E. IBolesilav Lu!kac, S. 1K rcmery, T. J.
Gaspar, J. Hrufovsky). Consciously or unconsciously, they
belonged ,t o the West and also to theiir country's social and
ideological evolution. Their orientation was contilnenta,l
in form, in philosophy and in motivation. A:U the European ourents ·a nd literary scho&lt;Yls, from symbolism and
impresiSlionism to Catholiic modernism (especia1ly F!rench)
and su:rirealism, characteri'zed Slovak Hterature between
the wars. According to Bobek, it equalled Czech literature,7
and acOTdilng to A. ,M raz, it "fought for a place in the
context of wor1d 'literatures. " 8
The second World War did not change substantially
the orientation of Slov·a k ,lrl,teratme. Being an island where,
un,ti} the ·f all of 194.'4, the German ,i mpact was neitheir violent nor apparent, Slovakia experienced a strongly literary and cultll!I'al development. The trend remained Western, nationaliist, conservative and traditional.
With the "liberation" of the co'll!ntry, the shock of the
Soviet limparet was violent, spreading deep and wide throughout the literairy and cultural life orf 'Slovakia. A short
analysis brings to light the foUowing features orf contemporary Slovak literature.

Socialist Realism and the Soviet Model
A smail:l group of p:wletarian poets, surrealists and
left-wing critics or nove'lists, headed by L. Novomesky,
who along with J. Rob Ponican, was the only prominent
poet in the group before 1945, not only took over liiterary
and cultural life while Slova;kia was stiU occupied by the
RUSSliam Anny, but :they al:so decided who would be allowed to continue as writer, poet, journalist or scientist
and what kind of literature they would be allowed to pubilish. If the writers wished to continue their wol1k, they had
to become membern of a Society of writers, organized on
the Soviet model. Their main duties were to extirpate the
"corrupting" mfluence of Western "bourgeois; and fascist"
writers and to follow the line of "g.reat socialiist Soviet

�SLOVAKIA

43

literature," inspired 'by the ideaJs brought to reality by
Stalinissm. The Slogan was "progress" and the name of the
new current was "socialist :realism," though many of the
main actors in this "revolutionary reshaping" of the Slovak literature were dmitators of pre-wa,r French sur:realism (R. Fabry, V. R!eisel, M. Mittelman). Soviet litera.tUTe
"with its surpassdng wealth of ideas, its burning socialist
patriotism, its new humanism," was destined ,t o be the
mghest ideal for Slorvak literature.
This reshaping of SlOIVak oultural life was purt into
praotice not only without regard for traditiOIIl, but al:so
wirthout the ,t rue 1representatives of Slwa!k literature hetween the wars, known by .theiT works and thei!r outstanding talent. Neither the ·best novelist of the period 19181939, Milo Urban (!b. 1904) whose Living Whlp9 was translated into serverad EUTopean languages, nor the prominen,t
poet Valentin Benia,k (b. 1894), nor Andrej 2arnov (b. 1903)
whose poetry by its fiery language and reso'l.l'nding verse
became an effective instrument in the Slova:k national
struggle and who summoned the young Sloivak intelligentsia to a struggle for justice and freedom, took part in the
new trend. They pref.erred to be silent. Zarn:ov, who was
under constant threat of arrest and deportation and many
times imprisoned, later left his .coun:try to fight for his
ideas in exHe. 'l'ido J. Gaspar (ib. 1893) author of splendid
short novels and exotic ,t ales, was also ,sidenced in prison.
Many others whose names were held up as worthy representati'ves of Slovak lita-aiture before 1945 fled to Argentina, the U. S. A., Canada, Australia and O'bher plaices,
with deep sorrow and in a spirit of fiery resistance, preferring exile to Communist rule . Among them is the prolific nO&lt;Velist J. C. Hronsky (b .. 1896) whose works desm-ibed ,in mastedy fas:hion the social tUTmoil and political struggles of the Sdov~ks,10 and talented literary critics and aesthetes as :professor :El 2-atiko-Bor, Stanislav
Meciar and Jan Mestancik, tile poets iR. Dillong - prolific
and emotional, with hiS' •r apturouis lyricism, - M. Sprinc,
K. Strmen, Jan Oka,l, J. Doransiky, J. BesenOVSJky, Marusa JUSikova, J. Zvonar-Tien, Hrtus..Jurina, historians (Hru-

�44

SLOVAKIA

swsky, Culen, Durcansky), linguists (prof. Bartek), publicists (Dr. P. Pauco, -Dr. S. Pol~kovic, Dr. J. Mi'kus, Dr.
J. Cieker, Dr. A. Grebert, Dr. J. GleimMl, prof. Zubek,
Nahallka), a dozen university professors and over a hundred highly educated young priests who had prepared
for their careers as ,professors 3/nd educators at the universities of Rome, Paris Louvain, Innsbruck, Brussels and
elsewhere.
To understand the rvast chamge brought aibout by this
"reshaping" of Slovak literature, we must remember that
the proleta:riam poets, like the surrrealist s, weTe only a
sma11 ,g roup alien to the Slovak literary traditi-on and spiritual atmosphere.11 For the most part, they grew up under the :influence of Czech Marxist or Communist intellectuials and writers: (J. Wolker, V. Nezval, J. Fuc:iik, Sekanina). Their movement with its journal Dav, originated
in ,P rague. Novomesky, Ponifan, Oka.Ii, Clementis and
others broug,ht their revolutionary ideas and [eft-wing
orientation .iinto the Slovak puritan literary ·atmosphere
as university students in t,h e Czech capital. Ponican declared this proudly during the "Congress of Nationa,l Culture" held in Prague in 1948. At the same time he condemned "Czech oultural imperialism" and the tendency
to assimilate which, according to him, was the consistent
aim of Prague's bourgeois regimes between the Wa-rs. 12
During the twenties, the group even tried to transplant into Slovakia Communist literacy aesthetics. They
made appeals to break from tiraditonal themes and forms,
fatvored collectivism rather than individl.l!a:lism, materialism
instead of idealism, and often hurt religious feelings by their
youth:£ul revolt a,g ainst God ,and' Christian traditions. hl the
thirties the ,g roup had direct contact with Moscow (No;vomesky attended the Congress of W!riters in Moscow and
Ilja Ehrenburg appeared in Brntisla,va), but .it was still
Prague whose Czech Marxist poets and intellectuals (journal Tvorba) ideologkally nourished Slova..11{ proletaxian
literature amd prescribed its aesthetics.
After 1945 the groUJp, strengthened by sur.realists
and young irntellectuals reared during World Warr: II, con1

1

�SLOVAKIA

4-5

tinued their re'V'olt against individualism., .sU'bjectirvism, art
fo'I' axit'·s sake, petty-,bO'llrgeois realism and clericalism.
Their concept of "socialist realism," based on the philosophy of dia1ectical materialism, the Marx-iLenini.st theory
of ,l iterature, a new aipproaioh to "reality" and active prurHcipation in building ·a new Sodalist s·o ciety, was ,t his time
imposed by the political power of ,the Comunist party. Im
reviews and in the daily press,, the literary critics asked
for conformity with Russian literatuTe, condemned all
"apolitical" approaches and' proudly declared that the
struggJe for socialism. was a struggle for a new and true

art.
As the Communist Party had unlimited control over ali

newspapers, reviews and pubHshing firms and the exdu.sive right to permit or prohibit publircation, traditional Slovak literatme abruptly disappeared. Literary pr,oduction
i,s orgainiized by ,t he !Party and its organs, ,literature was
planned to obtain rapid spiritual reorientation, i.e., .sovietizatio:n and conformity with 'Russia and mental russification.
Under such circumstances, Slovak literature was not
only impoverished but ailso became an imitation of Soviet
literature rather than an expression of the Slovak soul.
Filled with ,s logans aind praise of CmnmUJIHsm and its
leadem, exaggerating .social differences and struggling
aga:in:st religion and old traditions, "socialist realism" has
little in common with artistic values or true .realism.
Mental and Spiritual Russification
·To:i addition, there was a steadri1y increasing flood of
trrunslations of Soviet books, to sovietize the literary life
of Slovaikia not only in form but ailso in spirit.
An aina,l ysis of books ipUlblis:hed under the present regim.e13 shows that at the end of 1953 and in the fin.st month
of 1954, fonty-one translations of poetry -and ipr-0.se were
published in Sloivakia. Twenty-two of tho,s e translations
were from Riussian literature, nineteen from aH others.
Modoon Soviet writers were represented by sixteen works,
the Russian classi,cs by five. Of nineteen translations from

�46

SLOVAKIA

non~ussian literatures. thirteen works were written by
Communists, the o1fuem, apart from a translation of Ovid,
are works of Mark Twain, Maupassant, Bendel and others,
depicting the morail decadence of Western society.
'Dhe picture is similair in rt.he prodiuotion of ,b ooks for
children and youth. Of forty-three books pu:blished in the
same period (end of 1953 and beginning of 1954) twentyone works were written by Slov-aJk writers, eighteen by Russians and the iI'est ·b y Czech, Hungartan rund Rumanirun
aut!hors. No Western writers were Tepresented. Six Slovak
originail works and fourteen translations from RJllssirun
were puirely propaganda.
'Sovietization and mental .r us,sification do not appear
only in the number of translations from Russian alild Soviet satellite languages. By the exclusion of Western. iiteratures, a SOI1t ()If "cultural iron curtain" is buidt in Slovakia, because SlovaJk writers are absolutely dependent on
Soviet ~oiurces, considered by the .r egime as "the most
progressive in the world."
Under the heading "rMarx-Leniinism' one finds sixtynine publications, twenty-five Slovak originals, thirty-eight
translations from IRuSIS'ian, two f.rom German (the works
of Marx and IDngels), one from Hungarian rund one from
Bu[garian. Though some SlovaJk iintellectuals have m0&amp;
tered the Western languages, there is no translatio:n from
French, IDnglish or any 0 1ther Western tongue.
If we consider that book,s translated from RJussian. a.ire
pulblished in :tens of ,t housands and that they are sold at
reduced prices, the picture is clea:r: mental ,russification
and rovietization is promoted by every avaihvble method.

Reforms of the Slovak Language
Following the "theory given to Ma'I'Xist philology by
J. Stalin in ,his work, Marxism and 'P hilological Questions
and the Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR"
the new Slovak "working intelligentsia" not only changed
the spirit, structure and forms of literature but also reformed the Jangua:ge.14 Some of the changes effected by
the Commun1sts, were proposed by Prof. H. Bartek before

�SLOVAKIA

47

and during World War II to simplify SloV'ak or-thog.raiphy.
An expert on linguistics, Prof. Bartek advocated his reforms on the grownds of scientific research -and the evolution of .the Slovak language, Which is, .according to A .
Senn, "more ar-chaic than Czech and Poli$," that is one
of the most archaic Slavic languages.15 ColllSequently, not
all the ohrunges ,o an ,b e regarded as ,ha:rmf\11 or unnecessary; and Slova;k exiles as well as the Slova!k press in the
free world basicrully accepted this reform. Since the eighteenth century, when Anthony Bernolak (176·2 ..J813),
lea.med philologist and patriot, wrote a grammar of the Slo_
vak language rund a huge dictionary &gt;in six language.s and
gave a set of rules of o.rthography, eliminating the use of
Latin in Slovak cuUural and literary life, the 'S:tova;k language has been a field of study foc highly educaited clergymen, Catholic and Protes:tant, and for enthusiastic nationalists.
1

The reform. of 1844, which is mistakenly presented
by some Sla:vists as the date of birth of the Slovak literary lrunguage, was brought a:bout by the particiipation of
Protestant ministers 8Jlld Cathoilfo priests, though the reform wa:s popuila,r ized hy L. Stfrr.16 Stfu himself acted as
a nationaHst leader aiming at the uruon of ,the Slovak
people, the greate:r nium1ber of whom ( over 80 % Ca:tholics) have written in Slovak siince the counter-:Refo'I"mation. Oatholrics used as a hasis one of the Western Slovak
dialects, whereas the Protestants, who accepted the Lutheran fa.1th from Bohemia (Czech lands) together with
an archaic Czooh translation of the Bible, used, apart
from German, as their lit,w giical la:ngua,ge, richly adorned
wtth Slovaik ex1pressions. Regarding the division as a
great misfortune in the face of strong Magyarization,
Stur fought for :the unity of a Hterary fanguage and a
compromise between the Lutheran and the Catholic adherents of the BemolaJk ·s chool. This resulted in the acceptance of a centra:l dialect as a new Slovaik Hterary
language,17 'but preserved much of the beauty of expres~
siOIIl aJD.d idiom of other Slava!k dialects. This ,r eform, and
the rioh litemture which developed later, was merely an

�48

SLOVAKIA

instrll!ffient in the strugg}e for natiorn:ail survival. The SlovaJk intellectuals were co.nrvinced that the very existence
of the nation depended upon the preservation of 1t.s language, rund that nationail identity wrus bound up with languaige. As a result, there was ll'Iltil re&lt;:ently a kind of "sanctity of ,l anguage" among the Slovaks. Applying a reform
by ,referri.ing lto the rules Jaitl down for Marxist philosophy by J. StaHn cannot but hurt the Slovaks in their most
sensitive spot.
Revaluation of Literary History
1

Very soon after the Communists took over the direction of c-ulturrul affair,s in Slovakia, af.ter the potential opposition either fled the country or was silenced, Slovak
literary history was revaluated. The first revaluation was
made a:s early as 1948 when the Slovak Academy of Sciences a.ind Arts, founded d'll!I'ing the S,lova:k Repulblic, edited
the History of Slovak Lit.erature.18 The aiuthor, professor
AII1d!rej• Mraz, was not a Communi st before the War, and
duiring the War he published in Germa!Il another histocy
of 'Slovak literature. His new wovk, however, mirrors in
some respects the present siltuation in the oultural life of
SlovaJkia.
Aware that the Easite•r n orientaJtion of SlovaJkia's cultural life had been made a fait accompli by the so-called
"Program of Kosice" which clearrly stated the SlaJVic, i.e.,
R'll!ssian orientation of Slovruk cu1tuire, profesSOT Mraz
ada;pted his work to the new situation. He revised his
judgment of writers a:nd poets who were jn prisons (T. J.
Gaspar) or in exile. Proletariam and smrealist poets on the
other hand became moire talented, thek novels and poetry
of greaJte,r importJance aJnd artisitk value. On the whole his
book was wriitten in the way of ;pre-War literary schools,
his iphraseology shows little similavity with the iMa;rxi-stLeninist literary critics of the years following Novomes~
ky's imprisonment and lthe condemnation to the gallows of
Clementis, the intellectual leader of the group.
The revaluation of Slovalk literary hlstory by Prof.
Mraz is more iilnteresting as far as tJhe general approaoh to
SlovaJk literature is concerned. 'Dhe Program of Kosice,
1

�SLOVAKIA

49

wihich defined the ideological orientation for the future,
puts an end to an &lt;Yld controversy about Slo¥ak national,
c'U!ltwral and l~terary indi'V'iduality. Thi1s dooomenJt stated
that "the relation between Czechs and Slovaks should be
that of separate nations jomed in common interest in a
single State."19 The C{)lffiillunist intelleotuails also proudly manifested their desire to see Slovaiks. as an autonomous
Soviet Republic rather than a province dominated by
Prague. Professor Mraz adapted .the History of Slovak Literature to this "n:atiOIIlalist" atmosphere of the years
1'945-.48, and consequently he included "ex cathed1ra" i,n to
the Slo'V'a.k C'Ultmral and H,terary heritage not only the
writings of Sts.. Cyiril and ,Methodius and those of their
disciples, which had boon consistently, though erroneously,
claimed by the Czechs, burt also ,t he Latin works of all
scholars and writers who were of ,Slovak origin. He :took
an objectiive and favorable rview, considering the circumstances, of the Slovak iliteratme oreated by Catholics in
the seventeenth ·a nd eighteenth centturies.
The thesis that t!he Slo:vaxs and not the Czechs are
the :true heirs of Great !Moravia, that .there existed a clear
distinction, diwring the centuries, be,t ween Czechs and Slova'k,s and their languages, and that the 'S lovaks preser:ved
a consciousness of their ethnic and cultural individuality
a:nd ,t heir continu!ity with the first Sl,ovak kingdom of Great
Moravia, were accepted as historical facts by Mraz. He
supported his position by quotations and reforences to the
works of SlovaJk writers of the se:venteenuh and eighteenth
ce:n,turies. Mraz aLso accepted the porint of 'View that the
archaic Czech language, which was brought into, Slova,kia
by ,t he Czech P ,r otestants "who found shel:ter in Slovakia
and even ;p rinted books in Czech for the rpurrpose of smuggling rthooi i:nto iBohemia,"20 was merely a bo~rowed language, and that the Slovalk Protesitants used it for litera,ture and litJwrgy in the same way as the Catholics used
Latin. Though ,th:i-s thesis had previously been supported
by m8JIIly serious experts iin Slovalk linguistics, literatrnre
and histocy, the universlities in pre-,War Czechoslova1kia
tried
impose a lt!hoory of a common language with the

to

�SLOVAKIA

50

Czechs until the Stur reform of 1844. "The Slovaik culturra:l
and literairy sphere was never blended or identified with
the Czech; :it always had i&lt;ts specific needs and :set of rules"
says Mraz, ars ,p rofessor of Bratislava university.21
F.rom these premises, Mraz judged favorably the activities of the Jesuit University of Trnava (1635), the
Oaitholic writers of the era of Enlightrnent as well. as the
generation of 1848, who established modern 1Slovruk natiooalism irn letterisi and in politicail life. Mraz's History
of Slovak Literature, probably written -d'UII'ing the Second
World War and adapted to the politicail climate of the first
post-War years when the Communists shared political
power with the Democratic Party, oruly partly ex.pressed
the chianged sit:Juaroion by its method and criiteria. The
book ri:s basically within the framework of values, terminology aind ccmceipt s esta:blished ea,rlier in .Slovaikia. '.Dhe
""revolutionary revaluation" was undertaiken by the young
group orf militamit mamberis of the Comm.UIIlist Party (A.
Bakos, R. Rosenbaum, R. Mrlian, J. Hoirvat and others)
who made a fam.atical reappraiisa'l of Slovak literature,
and "purged" the libraries ·acooroing .to the Party ideology and Marxist-.Leninist theory of literature 22 When
even Novomesky was "purged" as a "bourgeois rn.ationalist and deviationist," the new school of "socialist realllism"
was established. Consequently, only those booik s and writers serving :the new ,s ocial order are regarded as representati.rve of true literary values. The rest aire irejected as
reactionary, deviationist, rightist, and petty-bourgeois.23 As
the literature was also integrated into the structure of
the new Socialist or Communist order and destined to be
suboTdirnated to the 1P arty and its ideology, the poet and
novelist, Jiterary critic and scientist must oontribute by
their talents amd works to the building of a Socialist society. The model: Soviet Russia.
1

1. Cf. S. ,P . Palickar, Slovaki-a n Culture, Cambridge, 1954; A.
MTaz, Die Literatur der •S lov,a ken, Berlin, 1943.
2. P. P . Yurchak, The Slovaks, 1947, pp. 117-57. Also E. Denis, La
Question d' Autriche, Les Slovaques, Paris, 1917, p. 164.
3. W. Semkowicz (eel.) Slowacja i Slowacy, Krakow, 1937, p. 262.
4. Feliks Gross (ed.) European Ideologies, New York, 1948, p. 838.

�SLOVAKIA

51

5. L. I. Strakhovsky (ed.) Handbook of Slavic Studies, Cambridge, 1949, pp. 495-96.
6. Cf. J. J. Potocek, "Martin Kukucin, PJoneer of Slovak Realism," The Slavonic and East ·E uropean Review, XXII, 7944.
7. Ibidem, p. 2&amp;3.
,8. A. Mraz, Dejiny ,slovenskej literatury, Bra-tislav·a , Academia
Scientiarum et Artium, Slovaca, 1948, p. 263.
9. Hand!book of Slavic Studies, p. 505, Mraz, o,p. cit., pp. 17'5-180.
10. Andreas Mraz, Die Literatur der Slowaken, Berlin, Prague,
Vjenna, 1943.
11. Cf. KramorH§, "Slovakia and Slova.c Literature," The Catholic Encyclopedia, XVIU, 19·50.
12. Cf. Sjezd Narodni Kultury, Praha, 1948, p. 239.
1'3. CJ'. ·Bi-b liograficky katalog, Slovenska kni'ha, Bratislava, 1'954,
V. 1-17; also Slobodne Slovensko, X. 2.
14. H. Bartek, Novy slovensky pravopis, Chicago, 1954, p. 19.
1,5. Handbook of Slavic Studies, P'P- -51·57.
1'6. Cf. Yur,C'hak, op. dt. pp. 90-116; also S. P. Palickar, Slovakian Oulture, Oa.mbrid•g e, 1954, pp. 139-55.
17. Cf. Yurohak, op.. cit.
18. A. Mraz, Dejiny slovenskej literatury, Bratislava, Academia
Scientiarum et Artium Slova-ca, 1498.
19. V. Diamond, Czechos\,ovakia Between East and West, London, 1947, p. 6.
20. •Cf. Handbook of SJ.avic Studies, pp. 17 5-80.
21. Ibid., p. 8.
22. Cf. Sjezd Narodni Kultury, pp. 134-41.
23. Cf. K. Rozenbaum, Sovremennaya slovanskaya Uteratura,
Slavy•a ne, 19·515, I, 23-2:9, also J . Martak, Introduction to Su.borne dielo
Jana Bottu, Bratislava, 1955 .

• • •
WHO SAID IT?

"There is another thing to be said aJbouit the Admini&amp;
tration's foreiign policy. It is pUTely negative and defensive.
rt attempts to contain communism; but does nothing to answer the question s.o often asllred: me: How would you finally
ded:ea t COIIIlmUJl.,i sm? - Most of those satellite countries and
peoples were deilitvered into the hands Olf the RULSSian Comml.lind.sit:s by the Y aJt!a Agreement. That American diploanati'c instrument, never submitted to the Senate, sysitematicrulliy violaited iby the RUISSi.ans, defended onliy by those officials
of the D€4)8.rtmenit of Staite who rure aJccessories to the
crime, must be formally discairded by Congressional resol.iu.tion as a b'a sis for American foreign poiicy." - (Senator
Robert A. Taft, NEW YORK TiiMiES, June 2, 1952).

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1529">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA

SLOVAK LITERATUR E UNDER THE SOVIET IMPACT

Joseph Kirschbaum, Ph.D., LL.D.,
Professor at the University of Montreal
Department of Slavic Studies

A Reprint From "The Slavic and East-Eurooea n Studies."
Published by: The Department of Slavic Studies,
University of Montreal
FOREWORD

The Commumst occupation of SlwaJri,a carved deep
wounds not only •i nto the sociall and political structure of
Slovak life as poliitical occupations and changes used :to
do in the past. The totailiitarian character of Communism
has the specific quality th!a,t it .affects ail the important
sectors of national life, be it !l'eligion or phi!losophy, arts
or literature.
Due to the peculiar citrCu:rnmnces under wbiich the
Slovak people were deprived of national independence and
became a defenseless prey of foreign domination, the cultural life of Slo'V18Jkfa suffered. ,p robably the stirongest impact among all Soviet satellites. The reasons are many.
First of all the character of SlO'V'ak literature and writers.
Slovak culture developed through lbhe ages U'Ilder Western
influences. This is true namely m regard to the Slovak
literature which originated in the classical dlimate of the
Catholic University of Trnava, founded in 1635. (1) With
exception of the Gdthlc period, we find •i n Slovak literature
all the literary currents from humani.!S!m .t hrough (baroque
to classicism, romantic-ism, realism, Catholic "modenie,"
and surrealism. In fact, the olassicaJl. reminiscences , the
era of enlighrtenment and romanticism g,ave birth to SlovaJk poetry and prose. Some of the influences ,ruppeared
[ater, or J:asted. longer, or el-se !their form wa:s not pure,
but we find ianalogies for this phenomenon in all Slavic
literatures.
More than m poetic and literacy forms, the Western
influences and Western orientrution of the Slovak literature is evident in the contents and in the mission that

�SLOVAKIA

35

poetry and prose aimed to accomplish in the Jife of the
Slovak people. Slovak poets and novelists beginning with
Holly (2) in .t he eigJJ.teenth century, and the group of
Eudovit Stur(3) in the nineteenth century to Hviezdoslav(4), Vajansky, Razus, Zarnov, Urban, Bronsky, Beniak, etc., saw tihe reaJI. function of Slovak literrutrure primarNy in equipping !the Sloviak people with the spiritual
resources necessary for survival and the fight for freedom. They endeavored rto bring the Slovak ,p eople to an
awa:reness of rtheir spiritual •a nd nationrul iindi'Viduality and
fought for their politic-al M1d sociral rights. Like .the poetry
of Mickiewicz, Krasinski and Slowac·ki, "summoned the
Poles prom political enslavement to a spir.ituaJI. life and revealed them completely new pwspecltiives of mor,al responsibility resulting from the. ll'ation's politicaJl situatiO!Il," (5)
in the same way tile Slov,aks Jearned through the works of
theiir poets and novel-ists to regard the naitional cause as
a question of honor and the supreme mo,r al criterion
a.round which the. entire spiritual life of the nation was
crystallized.
Slovak poets and novelists who regarded thei!r mission, as described aibove, could not nourish any illusion
about thei1r fate /Under Communist rule. They knew that
literatUTe, •as a means of expression of the national soul
and ait the same time ,t he most efficient instrument in the
intellectual struggle foir ·r eshapiing nation's patterns of
thinking, wou\ld be the first cultwal field undergoing substM1tial changes and losses . The Slovak intelligentsia also
knew that the Czech politicians returning behind the Red
Army in SloV'akia would take revenge o:n a:ll patriotic Slova1ks who claimed the right of seJf-determination for the
Slovak people and applied or aidvoca.ted the ·s ame when the
occasion ,had am-ived.

Jan

Thousands of Slovak intelllectuals, therefore, preferred
the exile with all its uncertainties •a nd ,miseries to the
Czecho-Communist rule. Among the intellectual emigres
the write:ra who were the true irepresentatives of Slova!k
literature .b etween the WaTS a:nd made ,a name for themselves by their works and outstanding talents have been

�36

SLOVAKIA

more numerous than it appears in the literary ,p roduction
of the ilast ten years in exNe. There was, at the beginning,
111ot only the most popUJl,a;r nO'VelList of ,t he period 1918~1939,
Milo Urban, w,hose "Ziivy Bic" (LlNing Whip) was translated into ,s everal European languages, but a:lso .AJildrej
Zarnov, whose poetry became an efficacious instrument
in the Slovak national struggle and summoned the young
Slovalk intelligentsia to fight for justke and freedom. Both
were 1ater kidnapped by the Czech Communists in Austria
and on!ly Zarnov succeeded in a dramati·c filighit f.rom
Slova!lda again and today fights for his ideas ,i n exHe.
There are many others who preferred exile to Communist rule and far from Slovakia - in .Arr-gentma, the U. S.
A., Canada, Australia, etc., jn deep sorrow and fiery resistance fight for rthe.ir people's freedom. Among them is
Joseph C. Hroosky, the most prolific and undoubtedly one of
the greatest 1Slovak noveLists, who celebrated just recently,
or rather the Slovaks in the free world celebrated his
60th annirversary. The literary work of J. C. Hronsky
is of such artistic vrulue and importance for the Slovak
1iterature thait even the literary historian of the Slovak
University of today, professoir A. Mraz, was forced to
ac'knowledge that many of iHronsky's works "belonged
amOID.g the best works of the Slovak post-war literature
by thei.T qualities of style and composition." In regard to
Hronsky's noive1 '~Pisar Grae" (Clerk Grae), Mraz even
writes a'boUJt "hravour of composiUon"; he sees in his
first novels "complicated artistic instrumentality" and
commends him for "exceptional and privileged interpreting of the common people, as weili as of refined and cultivated souls ,a nd hearts of women." During the war years,
in his German book on Slova.!k literature, professor Mraz
qualified J. C. Hironsky's novel "Jozef Mak," whlich was
also translated into German, as "one of the 1b est works
of the Slovruk post~war literature," and the author as the
"most prolific Slovak :novelist."
Altogether J. C. Hironsky published over 50 volumes
of short novels, beasutiful tales for children, novels describing the life of SlorvaJk peasants and worker,s, and mas1

�SLOVAKIA

37

terpieces on the life of the Slovak SIIIl.aN-town intelligentsia (Clerk Grae, The .P rophecy orf Doctor Stan!kovsky) ,
with all social and ideological problems and struggles of
Slovakia's post~war dramatic evolution. Usually regaTded
as the heir and follower of Martin Kuikucin's realism in
Sloivak literature,. !Hronslky attained new artistic heights
and in many ,respects even ,sUTpassed Kulkuoin, who i1s considered even !by the Communist ireg,i.me as a "classic" of
SlO!Vak literature. rHronsky's spi riitual world is broad and
deep, his sphere of artistic interests is extensive and manifold, his style am.d composition masterly clerur and lingui'Sltica:lly perfect and beaubiful.
At the begimning of his literary career, the Siovak
peasant in his traditional way of 'life, poverty, patient
heroism, and sturdy mental~ty was a favolI'ilte subject of
nove!ls. HaNing made his mark with •s hort stories from
Slovak village rlife, in which r ealism matched the best
worlks of the founder of Slovak literary realism, Martin
Kuikucin, Bronsky moved into rthe domain of liteTature for
children and youth and, l,a ter, into the domain of social
and psyohologicaJl problems of smaHtown people, proceeding firom short stories and tales to more and more complicated and artisticaJlly elaborated forms of novel.
Hrrorusky emwged very soon as a towering personality from the group of post-war novelists and writers.
His remarkable literary ,w ork constituted a lin'k between
the talented Slovak n01Velists .of the previous generation
and mode:m Slovak ,},i terature modeled on Western European literary currents. Not an epigon of •a nyone, Hronsky
created: :from his own spiritual funds and had a strong
appeal prim:arily to the heart of the young generation ,of
writers among w'hom his new shade of realas-m had ma!lly
followers.
Hironsky',s •s ignificance in Slovak cultura:l life was,
however, extraordinaJry not only in literatUII'e. Hiis -literary
activity was doubled by his achievements in the highest
Slovak cultUTal institution "Matica Slove:nska" (The Slovak Lnstiwte) , foll'Ilded in 1863 with the aim t 10 s,pread
Slwak cultural valrues and defend Slovak traditions against
1

1

�38

SLOVAKIA

Magyair tendencies of assimilation. There was rarely a
Slovak writex who successifully combined a highly developed literary talent with such organizational ,ability as it
has been in the case of J. C. Bronsky. Acord.mg to many
seri'ous cultwrai worik€1I'S (cf. Cullen's ia.nd Hrusovsky's
articles in the "S:lovensika Obrana" and the "Kainadsky
Slovwk"), J. C. HronSlky has done more usefiU!l work in the
few years of his administration of the "Slovak Institute"
than any Oille of his predecessors during long periods.
Thousands of new books wer edited every year by his
merits, new cultwral sections organized, equipped and reorganized, a new farge printery built, and new activities
initiaited.
an institution of many
The "Slovak In.stitute" merits in the fieild of co111Servation of Slorvak traditioI1JS,
culture, popular art, tiheater, pwrity of language - ip1ayed
an important Tole in Slovak cultura•l life at all times since
its foundation in the nineteenth century. Election to leading funcUons in thls institution was considered one of the
highest honors in SlovaJkia and it undoubtedly was. J . C.
Hronsky was elected and reelected.
For the Communist regime such merits have been,
however, "crimes" against the "people's democracy and
revolution," and J. C. Hrons'ky was arrested before the
Red Army accomplished the occupation of Slovakia. After
many unsuccessful aittempts, he finally escaped from a
prison and fled from 'Slovakia through Austria into Italy,
and later found refuge in Argentina, where he lives, deeply convinced that the Slovaks will never give up their
fight for freedom and their Christian ,t raditions.
We mention HirolilSlky's case in this connection as an
example of the Slovak nationail. tragedy. There are many
others, who in literature, science, arts, aind in ,t he pO'litical
and economic life of Slava,kia, created works of value and
have been silenced by the Communist regime, or preferred
freedom in exile, as Hronsky did. In the following pages
an attempt has been made to present, in a very restricted
way, the main features of the Slovak literature under the
Communist ,r ule. The author has scrupulously tried to paint

�SLOVAKIA

39

the picture objectirvely, and the publishing committee of
the review "The Slavic and East-European .Studies" saw to
it that the study might remain within the limits of a scientific work.
There is on:ly one abjectirve this study ,a ims at: to
se:rve the cause of truth and freedom which in Slova1kia as
well as in other satelilite countiries have been temporarily
stifled.
J. K.
1. Cf. Branislav Vars!k: Le Probleme des nationalites a r Universlte de Trnav,a, Bratislava, 193.8.
2. Jan Holly (178·5-1849) most gifted poet and disciple of A.
Bernolak, glorified in three po ems Slovakia's greatness of one tllousand years ago, "Svatopluk" (18n), "Cyrilo-Methodiada" (1835), and
•·,Slav" (1839). He also translated the main works of Greek and
Roman classics into the Slovak l,a nguage and prepared th e Slovak
renatssanee.
3. Cf. Hans Kohn: "Pan-Slavlsm, Its History and Ideology,"
University of Notre Dame Press, 19.53; and Ernest Denis: "Les
Slovaques,' Paris, Delgrave, 1917.
4. P. 0. Hviezdoslav (1849-1921) by his own name Pavol Or·
szagh, is considered the most talented Slovak poet. His poetry
was publls'hed In fifteen large volumes, one of them, "Bloody Sonnets," was translated also Into English. His main works are "Herodes and Herodlas" (drama), the epics "Hajnlkova zena, Ezo a
Gabor Vlkolinsky, Agar, Rachel, Kron," etc. He also published four
volumes of translation,s from World literatures, Goethe's Faust,
Shakes.p,eare's Hamlet and Mid-Summer Night's Dream, the main
works of Shiller, Lermont-0v, Slowackl and Madach's "The Tragedy
of Man."
,5. C.f. Harvard Slavic Studies, Vol. 2, 19·54, p. 323-4.

SLOVAK LITERATURE UNDER THE SOVIET IMPACT
Within a decade of the forced inclusion of Slovakia
within the Soviet orbit, Slovaik literature weint through
most peculiar transformations. If Slovak novelists and
poets, generally more conservative and traditional than Polish, Czech or Slovene writers, did not leave the country
m- choose silence, they were abruptly compelled to ada;pt
their literary c-reeds, forms and subjects .to a new line of
"socialist reailis,m" and to run exclusively Eastern orientation.
The main characteristics of Slovak literatll!l"e were patriotism, pan-slavism, universalism and a deep religiO'UIS

�40

SLOVAKIA

spirit. The generation after John Holly, namely John Kolla.T and the group of L. Stur, turned their eyes, as fawiders of nineteenth century painslla:vism, to Russia 'but their
literrury works, education and iphllosophy were fundrurnentahly Western. They were educated at German Unive:r,sities
and, while KoHar's "Daughter of Slava" was modelled on
Dante and Petrarca, L. Stur and his group were under the
influence of German romanticism, having foir masters
Herder and Hegel (in their phi1osoiphy) .1 It was in poetry
only that Mickiewicz, Slowacki, Krasinski am.d Pu&lt;s'hkin.
were the:iir ideails. Kol[ar's idea of "S[avic reciprocity" refrruined from any attemipt to mottld the politkal ideology
or the religious charaicter of any Slav group. He aimed
merely at cuiltural and literary reciprocity, •a nd his philo,s ophy was humanistic." He only is wOlI'thy of liberty who
resrpects the :liiberty of 8!11; he who forges the chains of
others, is himself a slave; when thou callest for a Slav,
there must respond a man," are his famous axioms.2
According to W. Bobek, one of the best foreign scholars on Slovak literature, Slovakia c-a n be reasonably considered as the classical country of the Slavic idea, with
several conceptions of panslaV'ism based on the equa[ity of
Slaivic peoples. Howevell", an identification of the idea of a
Slavic cooperaition with russophilism was raire; it appeared
as a result of national depression and despair.3
Such was the case of L. Stur, for whom "P.anslavism
in the political sense was a chimera," but who later, according to W. Lednicki, forunulated about 1850 ":the most
complete and consistently developed program for the subjugation of Slavs to Russia in his bo01k "SlaV'dom and the
World of the Future"4. Stur wrote 'his '.book in a period of
"Nationail depression ,arrd despailr," as mentioned by Boibek. (The book was written in German and never appeared
in Slova!k).
During the last decades of the nirneteenth century
arnd the years before and during the first World War, Sfovak literary •amd cultural life was dominated to some extent by Slovak Russophiles like Vajansky and Skn.lltety.
However, this was merely an interlude; for after the war,
1

�SLOVAKIA

41

the inf1uence ·o f French, English and even Scandinavian
writem which was mani!fest among the younger poe'bs and
novelists (I. Kraslro, V. Roy, P. 0 . Hv:iezdoslav, M. Razus), gained ground firmly and without resistance. The
RussophiJ.e orientation ,i n Slova:k literature was chiefly dru:e
to the political situation following the Austro-Hungarian.
compromise •Of H~67, when the Slovaks were left at the
mercy of Hungarian effonts of assii:rnilation. As the Slovak poets and novelists saw that the only hope for a Slovak national surrvival was in Russia's power, they gave fU!ll
expression to this belief 1n their Hterary woriks. iBut they
did not mean to exohange one oppression for a.mother.
The Bo1sltevik Revolution and the results of the Firat
WorJ,d War changed the picture. The Revo1urbion destroyed
the panslavistic and Russophile dreams of Slovruk poets.
While f,u!lifilling their hope for emancipation foom HUID:giarian ru'le by oreating the Czecho-Slova'k Republic with the
Czechs, jt -left the Slovakis free to choose their cU!ltural
orientation. They e1ther turned again to the West or they
used their own spiritual and moral tradiitions for creative
inspi:ration. The general trend of Slovak liteiratJure in poetry
as well as in prose was to broaden its range of interests
and to become responsive to European literary curents 5
The main representatives of Slovak literatlrre between the
two Wars were uninterested in Soviet Russia, except for a
smal[ groUJp of proJetarian o:r left-wing poets and writers
under Czech influence. Oruy three or four of them acquiired literary recognition. and even fa.me. The older generation of Slovak poets, headed by P. 0. Hiviezdoslav, V.
Roy, Ivan Krasko and Martin Razus, continued to create
in the traditional forms or, Ji.ke Hviezdoslav, to use the
European literrury forms and currents coriresponding to
his great ta:lent and creativeness. In prose, the masters
were the realists Kukucin,6 Hronsky, 'l'ajov!Sky, T. Vansova, Timrava and L. 'Podjavorinska.
The younger generation looked for new fo:rms: to for·eign literatures. The really successful literary woriks of
more tham. ephemera[ value were those which dTew their
motives. from Slovak H!fe, their inspiration from rSlorva!k

�42

SLOVAKIA

national traditions and their art from their own spiritual
reserves (Milo Ur.ban, J. C. Hironsky, A. Za.rn.ov, V. Benia:k, J. Smrek, E. IBolesilav Lu!kac, S. 1K rcmery, T. J.
Gaspar, J. Hrufovsky). Consciously or unconsciously, they
belonged ,t o the West and also to theiir country's social and
ideological evolution. Their orientation was contilnenta,l
in form, in philosophy and in motivation. A:U the European ourents ·a nd literary scho&lt;Yls, from symbolism and
impresiSlionism to Catholiic modernism (especia1ly F!rench)
and su:rirealism, characteri'zed Slovak Hterature between
the wars. According to Bobek, it equalled Czech literature,7
and acOTdilng to A. ,M raz, it "fought for a place in the
context of wor1d 'literatures. " 8
The second World War did not change substantially
the orientation of Slov·a k ,lrl,teratme. Being an island where,
un,ti} the ·f all of 194.'4, the German ,i mpact was neitheir violent nor apparent, Slovakia experienced a strongly literary and cultll!I'al development. The trend remained Western, nationaliist, conservative and traditional.
With the "liberation" of the co'll!ntry, the shock of the
Soviet limparet was violent, spreading deep and wide throughout the literairy and cultural life orf 'Slovakia. A short
analysis brings to light the foUowing features orf contemporary Slovak literature.

Socialist Realism and the Soviet Model
A smail:l group of p:wletarian poets, surrealists and
left-wing critics or nove'lists, headed by L. Novomesky,
who along with J. Rob Ponican, was the only prominent
poet in the group before 1945, not only took over liiterary
and cultural life while Slova;kia was stiU occupied by the
RUSSliam Anny, but :they al:so decided who would be allowed to continue as writer, poet, journalist or scientist
and what kind of literature they would be allowed to pubilish. If the writers wished to continue their wol1k, they had
to become membern of a Society of writers, organized on
the Soviet model. Their main duties were to extirpate the
"corrupting" mfluence of Western "bourgeois; and fascist"
writers and to follow the line of "g.reat socialiist Soviet

�SLOVAKIA

43

literature," inspired 'by the ideaJs brought to reality by
Stalinissm. The Slogan was "progress" and the name of the
new current was "socialist :realism," though many of the
main actors in this "revolutionary reshaping" of the Slovak literature were dmitators of pre-wa,r French sur:realism (R. Fabry, V. R!eisel, M. Mittelman). Soviet litera.tUTe
"with its surpassdng wealth of ideas, its burning socialist
patriotism, its new humanism," was destined ,t o be the
mghest ideal for Slorvak literature.
This reshaping of SlOIVak oultural life was purt into
praotice not only without regard for traditiOIIl, but al:so
wirthout the ,t rue 1representatives of Slwa!k literature hetween the wars, known by .theiT works and thei!r outstanding talent. Neither the ·best novelist of the period 19181939, Milo Urban (!b. 1904) whose Living Whlp9 was translated into serverad EUTopean languages, nor the prominen,t
poet Valentin Benia,k (b. 1894), nor Andrej 2arnov (b. 1903)
whose poetry by its fiery language and reso'l.l'nding verse
became an effective instrument in the Slova:k national
struggle and who summoned the young Sloivak intelligentsia to a struggle for justice and freedom, took part in the
new trend. They pref.erred to be silent. Zarn:ov, who was
under constant threat of arrest and deportation and many
times imprisoned, later left his .coun:try to fight for his
ideas in exHe. 'l'ido J. Gaspar (ib. 1893) author of splendid
short novels and exotic ,t ales, was also ,sidenced in prison.
Many others whose names were held up as worthy representati'ves of Slovak lita-aiture before 1945 fled to Argentina, the U. S. A., Canada, Australia and O'bher plaices,
with deep sorrow and in a spirit of fiery resistance, preferring exile to Communist rule . Among them is the prolific nO&lt;Velist J. C. Hronsky (b .. 1896) whose works desm-ibed ,in mastedy fas:hion the social tUTmoil and political struggles of the Sdov~ks,10 and talented literary critics and aesthetes as :professor :El 2-atiko-Bor, Stanislav
Meciar and Jan Mestancik, tile poets iR. Dillong - prolific
and emotional, with hiS' •r apturouis lyricism, - M. Sprinc,
K. Strmen, Jan Oka,l, J. Doransiky, J. BesenOVSJky, Marusa JUSikova, J. Zvonar-Tien, Hrtus..Jurina, historians (Hru-

�44

SLOVAKIA

swsky, Culen, Durcansky), linguists (prof. Bartek), publicists (Dr. P. Pauco, -Dr. S. Pol~kovic, Dr. J. Mi'kus, Dr.
J. Cieker, Dr. A. Grebert, Dr. J. GleimMl, prof. Zubek,
Nahallka), a dozen university professors and over a hundred highly educated young priests who had prepared
for their careers as ,professors 3/nd educators at the universities of Rome, Paris Louvain, Innsbruck, Brussels and
elsewhere.
To understand the rvast chamge brought aibout by this
"reshaping" of Slovak literature, we must remember that
the proleta:riam poets, like the surrrealist s, weTe only a
sma11 ,g roup alien to the Slovak literary traditi-on and spiritual atmosphere.11 For the most part, they grew up under the :influence of Czech Marxist or Communist intellectuials and writers: (J. Wolker, V. Nezval, J. Fuc:iik, Sekanina). Their movement with its journal Dav, originated
in ,P rague. Novomesky, Ponifan, Oka.Ii, Clementis and
others broug,ht their revolutionary ideas and [eft-wing
orientation .iinto the Slovak puritan literary ·atmosphere
as university students in t,h e Czech capital. Ponican declared this proudly during the "Congress of Nationa,l Culture" held in Prague in 1948. At the same time he condemned "Czech oultural imperialism" and the tendency
to assimilate which, according to him, was the consistent
aim of Prague's bourgeois regimes between the Wa-rs. 12
During the twenties, the group even tried to transplant into Slovakia Communist literacy aesthetics. They
made appeals to break from tiraditonal themes and forms,
fatvored collectivism rather than individl.l!a:lism, materialism
instead of idealism, and often hurt religious feelings by their
youth:£ul revolt a,g ainst God ,and' Christian traditions. hl the
thirties the ,g roup had direct contact with Moscow (No;vomesky attended the Congress of W!riters in Moscow and
Ilja Ehrenburg appeared in Brntisla,va), but .it was still
Prague whose Czech Marxist poets and intellectuals (journal Tvorba) ideologkally nourished Slova..11{ proletaxian
literature amd prescribed its aesthetics.
After 1945 the groUJp, strengthened by sur.realists
and young irntellectuals reared during World Warr: II, con1

1

�SLOVAKIA

4-5

tinued their re'V'olt against individualism., .sU'bjectirvism, art
fo'I' axit'·s sake, petty-,bO'llrgeois realism and clericalism.
Their concept of "socialist realism," based on the philosophy of dia1ectical materialism, the Marx-iLenini.st theory
of ,l iterature, a new aipproaioh to "reality" and active prurHcipation in building ·a new Sodalist s·o ciety, was ,t his time
imposed by the political power of ,the Comunist party. Im
reviews and in the daily press,, the literary critics asked
for conformity with Russian literatuTe, condemned all
"apolitical" approaches and' proudly declared that the
struggJe for socialism. was a struggle for a new and true

art.
As the Communist Party had unlimited control over ali

newspapers, reviews and pubHshing firms and the exdu.sive right to permit or prohibit publircation, traditional Slovak literatme abruptly disappeared. Literary pr,oduction
i,s orgainiized by ,t he !Party and its organs, ,literature was
planned to obtain rapid spiritual reorientation, i.e., .sovietizatio:n and conformity with 'Russia and mental russification.
Under such circumstances, Slovak literature was not
only impoverished but ailso became an imitation of Soviet
literature rather than an expression of the Slovak soul.
Filled with ,s logans aind praise of CmnmUJIHsm and its
leadem, exaggerating .social differences and struggling
aga:in:st religion and old traditions, "socialist realism" has
little in common with artistic values or true .realism.
Mental and Spiritual Russification
·To:i addition, there was a steadri1y increasing flood of
trrunslations of Soviet books, to sovietize the literary life
of Slovaikia not only in form but ailso in spirit.
An aina,l ysis of books ipUlblis:hed under the present regim.e13 shows that at the end of 1953 and in the fin.st month
of 1954, fonty-one translations of poetry -and ipr-0.se were
published in Sloivakia. Twenty-two of tho,s e translations
were from Riussian literature, nineteen from aH others.
Modoon Soviet writers were represented by sixteen works,
the Russian classi,cs by five. Of nineteen translations from

�46

SLOVAKIA

non~ussian literatures. thirteen works were written by
Communists, the o1fuem, apart from a translation of Ovid,
are works of Mark Twain, Maupassant, Bendel and others,
depicting the morail decadence of Western society.
'Dhe picture is similair in rt.he prodiuotion of ,b ooks for
children and youth. Of forty-three books pu:blished in the
same period (end of 1953 and beginning of 1954) twentyone works were written by Slov-aJk writers, eighteen by Russians and the iI'est ·b y Czech, Hungartan rund Rumanirun
aut!hors. No Western writers were Tepresented. Six Slovak
originail works and fourteen translations from RJllssirun
were puirely propaganda.
'Sovietization and mental .r us,sification do not appear
only in the number of translations from Russian alild Soviet satellite languages. By the exclusion of Western. iiteratures, a SOI1t ()If "cultural iron curtain" is buidt in Slovakia, because SlovaJk writers are absolutely dependent on
Soviet ~oiurces, considered by the .r egime as "the most
progressive in the world."
Under the heading "rMarx-Leniinism' one finds sixtynine publications, twenty-five Slovak originals, thirty-eight
translations from IRuSIS'ian, two f.rom German (the works
of Marx and IDngels), one from Hungarian rund one from
Bu[garian. Though some SlovaJk iintellectuals have m0&amp;
tered the Western languages, there is no translatio:n from
French, IDnglish or any 0 1ther Western tongue.
If we consider that book,s translated from RJussian. a.ire
pulblished in :tens of ,t housands and that they are sold at
reduced prices, the picture is clea:r: mental ,russification
and rovietization is promoted by every avaihvble method.

Reforms of the Slovak Language
Following the "theory given to Ma'I'Xist philology by
J. Stalin in ,his work, Marxism and 'P hilological Questions
and the Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR"
the new Slovak "working intelligentsia" not only changed
the spirit, structure and forms of literature but also reformed the Jangua:ge.14 Some of the changes effected by
the Commun1sts, were proposed by Prof. H. Bartek before

�SLOVAKIA

47

and during World War II to simplify SloV'ak or-thog.raiphy.
An expert on linguistics, Prof. Bartek advocated his reforms on the grownds of scientific research -and the evolution of .the Slovak language, Which is, .according to A .
Senn, "more ar-chaic than Czech and Poli$," that is one
of the most archaic Slavic languages.15 ColllSequently, not
all the ohrunges ,o an ,b e regarded as ,ha:rmf\11 or unnecessary; and Slova;k exiles as well as the Slova!k press in the
free world basicrully accepted this reform. Since the eighteenth century, when Anthony Bernolak (176·2 ..J813),
lea.med philologist and patriot, wrote a grammar of the Slo_
vak language rund a huge dictionary &gt;in six language.s and
gave a set of rules of o.rthography, eliminating the use of
Latin in Slovak cuUural and literary life, the 'S:tova;k language has been a field of study foc highly educaited clergymen, Catholic and Protes:tant, and for enthusiastic nationalists.
1

The reform. of 1844, which is mistakenly presented
by some Sla:vists as the date of birth of the Slovak literary lrunguage, was brought a:bout by the particiipation of
Protestant ministers 8Jlld Cathoilfo priests, though the reform wa:s popuila,r ized hy L. Stfrr.16 Stfu himself acted as
a nationaHst leader aiming at the uruon of ,the Slovak
people, the greate:r nium1ber of whom ( over 80 % Ca:tholics) have written in Slovak siince the counter-:Refo'I"mation. Oatholrics used as a hasis one of the Western Slovak
dialects, whereas the Protestants, who accepted the Lutheran fa.1th from Bohemia (Czech lands) together with
an archaic Czooh translation of the Bible, used, apart
from German, as their lit,w giical la:ngua,ge, richly adorned
wtth Slovaik ex1pressions. Regarding the division as a
great misfortune in the face of strong Magyarization,
Stur fought for :the unity of a Hterary fanguage and a
compromise between the Lutheran and the Catholic adherents of the BemolaJk ·s chool. This resulted in the acceptance of a centra:l dialect as a new Slovaik Hterary
language,17 'but preserved much of the beauty of expres~
siOIIl aJD.d idiom of other Slava!k dialects. This ,r eform, and
the rioh litemture which developed later, was merely an

�48

SLOVAKIA

instrll!ffient in the strugg}e for natiorn:ail survival. The SlovaJk intellectuals were co.nrvinced that the very existence
of the nation depended upon the preservation of 1t.s language, rund that nationail identity wrus bound up with languaige. As a result, there was ll'Iltil re&lt;:ently a kind of "sanctity of ,l anguage" among the Slovaks. Applying a reform
by ,referri.ing lto the rules Jaitl down for Marxist philosophy by J. StaHn cannot but hurt the Slovaks in their most
sensitive spot.
Revaluation of Literary History
1

Very soon after the Communists took over the direction of c-ulturrul affair,s in Slovakia, af.ter the potential opposition either fled the country or was silenced, Slovak
literary history was revaluated. The first revaluation was
made a:s early as 1948 when the Slovak Academy of Sciences a.ind Arts, founded d'll!I'ing the S,lova:k Repulblic, edited
the History of Slovak Lit.erature.18 The aiuthor, professor
AII1d!rej• Mraz, was not a Communi st before the War, and
duiring the War he published in Germa!Il another histocy
of 'Slovak literature. His new wovk, however, mirrors in
some respects the present siltuation in the oultural life of
SlovaJkia.
Aware that the Easite•r n orientaJtion of SlovaJkia's cultural life had been made a fait accompli by the so-called
"Program of Kosice" which clearrly stated the SlaJVic, i.e.,
R'll!ssian orientation of Slovruk cu1tuire, profesSOT Mraz
ada;pted his work to the new situation. He revised his
judgment of writers a:nd poets who were jn prisons (T. J.
Gaspar) or in exile. Proletariam and smrealist poets on the
other hand became moire talented, thek novels and poetry
of greaJte,r importJance aJnd artisitk value. On the whole his
book was wriitten in the way of ;pre-War literary schools,
his iphraseology shows little similavity with the iMa;rxi-stLeninist literary critics of the years following Novomes~
ky's imprisonment and lthe condemnation to the gallows of
Clementis, the intellectual leader of the group.
The revaluation of Slovalk literary hlstory by Prof.
Mraz is more iilnteresting as far as tJhe general approaoh to
SlovaJk literature is concerned. 'Dhe Program of Kosice,
1

�SLOVAKIA

49

wihich defined the ideological orientation for the future,
puts an end to an &lt;Yld controversy about Slo¥ak national,
c'U!ltwral and l~terary indi'V'iduality. Thi1s dooomenJt stated
that "the relation between Czechs and Slovaks should be
that of separate nations jomed in common interest in a
single State."19 The C{)lffiillunist intelleotuails also proudly manifested their desire to see Slovaiks. as an autonomous
Soviet Republic rather than a province dominated by
Prague. Professor Mraz adapted .the History of Slovak Literature to this "n:atiOIIlalist" atmosphere of the years
1'945-.48, and consequently he included "ex cathed1ra" i,n to
the Slo'V'a.k C'Ultmral and H,terary heritage not only the
writings of Sts.. Cyiril and ,Methodius and those of their
disciples, which had boon consistently, though erroneously,
claimed by the Czechs, burt also ,t he Latin works of all
scholars and writers who were of ,Slovak origin. He :took
an objectiive and favorable rview, considering the circumstances, of the Slovak iliteratme oreated by Catholics in
the seventeenth ·a nd eighteenth centturies.
The thesis that t!he Slo:vaxs and not the Czechs are
the :true heirs of Great !Moravia, that .there existed a clear
distinction, diwring the centuries, be,t ween Czechs and Slova'k,s and their languages, and that the 'S lovaks preser:ved
a consciousness of their ethnic and cultural individuality
a:nd ,t heir continu!ity with the first Sl,ovak kingdom of Great
Moravia, were accepted as historical facts by Mraz. He
supported his position by quotations and reforences to the
works of SlovaJk writers of the se:venteenuh and eighteenth
ce:n,turies. Mraz aLso accepted the porint of 'View that the
archaic Czech language, which was brought into, Slova,kia
by ,t he Czech P ,r otestants "who found shel:ter in Slovakia
and even ;p rinted books in Czech for the rpurrpose of smuggling rthooi i:nto iBohemia,"20 was merely a bo~rowed language, and that the Slovalk Protesitants used it for litera,ture and litJwrgy in the same way as the Catholics used
Latin. Though ,th:i-s thesis had previously been supported
by m8JIIly serious experts iin Slovalk linguistics, literatrnre
and histocy, the universlities in pre-,War Czechoslova1kia
tried
impose a lt!hoory of a common language with the

to

�SLOVAKIA

50

Czechs until the Stur reform of 1844. "The Slovaik culturra:l
and literairy sphere was never blended or identified with
the Czech; :it always had i&lt;ts specific needs and :set of rules"
says Mraz, ars ,p rofessor of Bratislava university.21
F.rom these premises, Mraz judged favorably the activities of the Jesuit University of Trnava (1635), the
Oaitholic writers of the era of Enlightrnent as well. as the
generation of 1848, who established modern 1Slovruk natiooalism irn letterisi and in politicail life. Mraz's History
of Slovak Literature, probably written -d'UII'ing the Second
World War and adapted to the politicail climate of the first
post-War years when the Communists shared political
power with the Democratic Party, oruly partly ex.pressed
the chianged sit:Juaroion by its method and criiteria. The
book ri:s basically within the framework of values, terminology aind ccmceipt s esta:blished ea,rlier in .Slovaikia. '.Dhe
""revolutionary revaluation" was undertaiken by the young
group orf militamit mamberis of the Comm.UIIlist Party (A.
Bakos, R. Rosenbaum, R. Mrlian, J. Hoirvat and others)
who made a fam.atical reappraiisa'l of Slovak literature,
and "purged" the libraries ·acooroing .to the Party ideology and Marxist-.Leninist theory of literature 22 When
even Novomesky was "purged" as a "bourgeois rn.ationalist and deviationist," the new school of "socialist realllism"
was established. Consequently, only those booik s and writers serving :the new ,s ocial order are regarded as representati.rve of true literary values. The rest aire irejected as
reactionary, deviationist, rightist, and petty-bourgeois.23 As
the literature was also integrated into the structure of
the new Socialist or Communist order and destined to be
suboTdirnated to the 1P arty and its ideology, the poet and
novelist, Jiterary critic and scientist must oontribute by
their talents amd works to the building of a Socialist society. The model: Soviet Russia.
1

1. Cf. S. ,P . Palickar, Slovaki-a n Culture, Cambridge, 1954; A.
MTaz, Die Literatur der •S lov,a ken, Berlin, 1943.
2. P. P . Yurchak, The Slovaks, 1947, pp. 117-57. Also E. Denis, La
Question d' Autriche, Les Slovaques, Paris, 1917, p. 164.
3. W. Semkowicz (eel.) Slowacja i Slowacy, Krakow, 1937, p. 262.
4. Feliks Gross (ed.) European Ideologies, New York, 1948, p. 838.

�SLOVAKIA

51

5. L. I. Strakhovsky (ed.) Handbook of Slavic Studies, Cambridge, 1949, pp. 495-96.
6. Cf. J. J. Potocek, "Martin Kukucin, PJoneer of Slovak Realism," The Slavonic and East ·E uropean Review, XXII, 7944.
7. Ibidem, p. 2&amp;3.
,8. A. Mraz, Dejiny ,slovenskej literatury, Bra-tislav·a , Academia
Scientiarum et Artium, Slovaca, 1948, p. 263.
9. Hand!book of Slavic Studies, p. 505, Mraz, o,p. cit., pp. 17'5-180.
10. Andreas Mraz, Die Literatur der Slowaken, Berlin, Prague,
Vjenna, 1943.
11. Cf. KramorH§, "Slovakia and Slova.c Literature," The Catholic Encyclopedia, XVIU, 19·50.
12. Cf. Sjezd Narodni Kultury, Praha, 1948, p. 239.
1'3. CJ'. ·Bi-b liograficky katalog, Slovenska kni'ha, Bratislava, 1'954,
V. 1-17; also Slobodne Slovensko, X. 2.
14. H. Bartek, Novy slovensky pravopis, Chicago, 1954, p. 19.
1,5. Handbook of Slavic Studies, P'P- -51·57.
1'6. Cf. Yur,C'hak, op. dt. pp. 90-116; also S. P. Palickar, Slovakian Oulture, Oa.mbrid•g e, 1954, pp. 139-55.
17. Cf. Yurohak, op.. cit.
18. A. Mraz, Dejiny slovenskej literatury, Bratislava, Academia
Scientiarum et Artium Slova-ca, 1498.
19. V. Diamond, Czechos\,ovakia Between East and West, London, 1947, p. 6.
20. •Cf. Handbook of SJ.avic Studies, pp. 17 5-80.
21. Ibid., p. 8.
22. Cf. Sjezd Narodni Kultury, pp. 134-41.
23. Cf. K. Rozenbaum, Sovremennaya slovanskaya Uteratura,
Slavy•a ne, 19·515, I, 23-2:9, also J . Martak, Introduction to Su.borne dielo
Jana Bottu, Bratislava, 1955 .

• • •
WHO SAID IT?

"There is another thing to be said aJbouit the Admini&amp;
tration's foreiign policy. It is pUTely negative and defensive.
rt attempts to contain communism; but does nothing to answer the question s.o often asllred: me: How would you finally
ded:ea t COIIIlmUJl.,i sm? - Most of those satellite countries and
peoples were deilitvered into the hands Olf the RULSSian Comml.lind.sit:s by the Y aJt!a Agreement. That American diploanati'c instrument, never submitted to the Senate, sysitematicrulliy violaited iby the RUISSi.ans, defended onliy by those officials
of the D€4)8.rtmenit of Staite who rure aJccessories to the
crime, must be formally discairded by Congressional resol.iu.tion as a b'a sis for American foreign poiicy." - (Senator
Robert A. Taft, NEW YORK TiiMiES, June 2, 1952).

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&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAK LITERATUR E UNDER THE SOVIET IMPACT&#13;
&#13;
Joseph Kirschbaum, Ph.D., LL.D.,&#13;
Professor at the University of Montreal&#13;
Department of Slavic Studies&#13;
&#13;
A Reprint From "The Slavic and East-Eurooea n Studies."&#13;
Published by: The Department of Slavic Studies,&#13;
University of Montreal&#13;
FOREWORD&#13;
&#13;
The Commumst occupation of SlwaJri,a carved deep&#13;
wounds not only •i nto the sociall and political structure of&#13;
Slovak life as poliitical occupations and changes used :to&#13;
do in the past. The totailiitarian character of Communism&#13;
has the specific quality th!a,t it .affects ail the important&#13;
sectors of national life, be it !l'eligion or phi!losophy, arts&#13;
or literature.&#13;
Due to the peculiar citrCu:rnmnces under wbiich the&#13;
Slovak people were deprived of national independence and&#13;
became a defenseless prey of foreign domination, the cultural life of Slo'V18Jkfa suffered. ,p robably the stirongest impact among all Soviet satellites. The reasons are many.&#13;
First of all the character of SlO'V'ak literature and writers.&#13;
Slovak culture developed through lbhe ages U'Ilder Western&#13;
influences. This is true namely m regard to the Slovak&#13;
literature which originated in the classical dlimate of the&#13;
Catholic University of Trnava, founded in 1635. (1) With&#13;
exception of the Gdthlc period, we find •i n Slovak literature&#13;
all the literary currents from humani.!S!m .t hrough (baroque&#13;
to classicism, romantic-ism, realism, Catholic "modenie,"&#13;
and surrealism. In fact, the olassicaJl. reminiscences , the&#13;
era of enlighrtenment and romanticism g,ave birth to SlovaJk poetry and prose. Some of the influences ,ruppeared&#13;
[ater, or J:asted. longer, or el-se !their form wa:s not pure,&#13;
but we find ianalogies for this phenomenon in all Slavic&#13;
literatures.&#13;
More than m poetic and literacy forms, the Western&#13;
influences and Western orientrution of the Slovak literature is evident in the contents and in the mission that&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
35&#13;
&#13;
poetry and prose aimed to accomplish in the Jife of the&#13;
Slovak people. Slovak poets and novelists beginning with&#13;
Holly (2) in .t he eigJJ.teenth century, and the group of&#13;
Eudovit Stur(3) in the nineteenth century to Hviezdoslav(4), Vajansky, Razus, Zarnov, Urban, Bronsky, Beniak, etc., saw tihe reaJI. function of Slovak literrutrure primarNy in equipping !the Sloviak people with the spiritual&#13;
resources necessary for survival and the fight for freedom. They endeavored rto bring the Slovak ,p eople to an&#13;
awa:reness of rtheir spiritual •a nd nationrul iindi'Viduality and&#13;
fought for their politic-al M1d sociral rights. Like .the poetry&#13;
of Mickiewicz, Krasinski and Slowac·ki, "summoned the&#13;
Poles prom political enslavement to a spir.ituaJI. life and revealed them completely new pwspecltiives of mor,al responsibility resulting from the. ll'ation's politicaJl situatiO!Il," (5)&#13;
in the same way tile Slov,aks Jearned through the works of&#13;
theiir poets and novel-ists to regard the naitional cause as&#13;
a question of honor and the supreme mo,r al criterion&#13;
a.round which the. entire spiritual life of the nation was&#13;
crystallized.&#13;
Slovak poets and novelists who regarded thei!r mission, as described aibove, could not nourish any illusion&#13;
about thei1r fate /Under Communist rule. They knew that&#13;
literatUTe, •as a means of expression of the national soul&#13;
and ait the same time ,t he most efficient instrument in the&#13;
intellectual struggle foir ·r eshapiing nation's patterns of&#13;
thinking, wou\ld be the first cultwal field undergoing substM1tial changes and losses . The Slovak intelligentsia also&#13;
knew that the Czech politicians returning behind the Red&#13;
Army in SloV'akia would take revenge o:n a:ll patriotic Slova1ks who claimed the right of seJf-determination for the&#13;
Slovak people and applied or aidvoca.ted the ·s ame when the&#13;
occasion ,had am-ived.&#13;
&#13;
Jan&#13;
&#13;
Thousands of Slovak intelllectuals, therefore, preferred&#13;
the exile with all its uncertainties •a nd ,miseries to the&#13;
Czecho-Communist rule. Among the intellectual emigres&#13;
the write:ra who were the true irepresentatives of Slova!k&#13;
literature .b etween the WaTS a:nd made ,a name for themselves by their works and outstanding talents have been&#13;
&#13;
36&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
more numerous than it appears in the literary ,p roduction&#13;
of the ilast ten years in exNe. There was, at the beginning,&#13;
111ot only the most popUJl,a;r nO'VelList of ,t he period 1918~1939,&#13;
Milo Urban, w,hose "Ziivy Bic" (LlNing Whip) was translated into ,s everal European languages, but a:lso .AJildrej&#13;
Zarnov, whose poetry became an efficacious instrument&#13;
in the Slovak national struggle and summoned the young&#13;
Slovalk intelligentsia to fight for justke and freedom. Both&#13;
were 1ater kidnapped by the Czech Communists in Austria&#13;
and on!ly Zarnov succeeded in a dramati·c filighit f.rom&#13;
Slova!lda again and today fights for his ideas ,i n exHe.&#13;
There are many others who preferred exile to Communist rule and far from Slovakia - in .Arr-gentma, the U. S.&#13;
A., Canada, Australia, etc., jn deep sorrow and fiery resistance fight for rthe.ir people's freedom. Among them is&#13;
Joseph C. Hroosky, the most prolific and undoubtedly one of&#13;
the greatest 1Slovak noveLists, who celebrated just recently,&#13;
or rather the Slovaks in the free world celebrated his&#13;
60th annirversary. The literary work of J. C. Hronsky&#13;
is of such artistic vrulue and importance for the Slovak&#13;
1iterature thait even the literary historian of the Slovak&#13;
University of today, professoir A. Mraz, was forced to&#13;
ac'knowledge that many of iHronsky's works "belonged&#13;
amOID.g the best works of the Slovak post-war literature&#13;
by thei.T qualities of style and composition." In regard to&#13;
Hronsky's noive1 '~Pisar Grae" (Clerk Grae), Mraz even&#13;
writes a'boUJt "hravour of composiUon"; he sees in his&#13;
first novels "complicated artistic instrumentality" and&#13;
commends him for "exceptional and privileged interpreting of the common people, as weili as of refined and cultivated souls ,a nd hearts of women." During the war years,&#13;
in his German book on Slova.!k literature, professor Mraz&#13;
qualified J. C. Hironsky's novel "Jozef Mak," whlich was&#13;
also translated into German, as "one of the 1b est works&#13;
of the Slovruk post~war literature," and the author as the&#13;
"most prolific Slovak :novelist."&#13;
Altogether J. C. Hironsky published over 50 volumes&#13;
of short novels, beasutiful tales for children, novels describing the life of SlorvaJk peasants and worker,s, and mas1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
37&#13;
&#13;
terpieces on the life of the Slovak SIIIl.aN-town intelligentsia (Clerk Grae, The .P rophecy orf Doctor Stan!kovsky) ,&#13;
with all social and ideological problems and struggles of&#13;
Slovakia's post~war dramatic evolution. Usually regaTded&#13;
as the heir and follower of Martin Kuikucin's realism in&#13;
Sloivak literature,. !Hronslky attained new artistic heights&#13;
and in many ,respects even ,sUTpassed Kulkuoin, who i1s considered even !by the Communist ireg,i.me as a "classic" of&#13;
SlO!Vak literature. rHronsky's spi riitual world is broad and&#13;
deep, his sphere of artistic interests is extensive and manifold, his style am.d composition masterly clerur and lingui'Sltica:lly perfect and beaubiful.&#13;
At the begimning of his literary career, the Siovak&#13;
peasant in his traditional way of 'life, poverty, patient&#13;
heroism, and sturdy mental~ty was a favolI'ilte subject of&#13;
nove!ls. HaNing made his mark with •s hort stories from&#13;
Slovak village rlife, in which r ealism matched the best&#13;
worlks of the founder of Slovak literary realism, Martin&#13;
Kuikucin, Bronsky moved into rthe domain of liteTature for&#13;
children and youth and, l,a ter, into the domain of social&#13;
and psyohologicaJl problems of smaHtown people, proceeding firom short stories and tales to more and more complicated and artisticaJlly elaborated forms of novel.&#13;
Hrrorusky emwged very soon as a towering personality from the group of post-war novelists and writers.&#13;
His remarkable literary ,w ork constituted a lin'k between&#13;
the talented Slovak n01Velists .of the previous generation&#13;
and mode:m Slovak ,},i terature modeled on Western European literary currents. Not an epigon of •a nyone, Hronsky&#13;
created: :from his own spiritual funds and had a strong&#13;
appeal prim:arily to the heart of the young generation ,of&#13;
writers among w'hom his new shade of realas-m had ma!lly&#13;
followers.&#13;
Hironsky',s •s ignificance in Slovak cultura:l life was,&#13;
however, extraordinaJry not only in literatUII'e. Hiis -literary&#13;
activity was doubled by his achievements in the highest&#13;
Slovak cultUTal institution "Matica Slove:nska" (The Slovak Lnstiwte) , foll'Ilded in 1863 with the aim t 10 s,pread&#13;
Slwak cultural valrues and defend Slovak traditions against&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
38&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Magyair tendencies of assimilation. There was rarely a&#13;
Slovak writex who successifully combined a highly developed literary talent with such organizational ,ability as it&#13;
has been in the case of J. C. Bronsky. Acord.mg to many&#13;
seri'ous cultwrai worik€1I'S (cf. Cullen's ia.nd Hrusovsky's&#13;
articles in the "S:lovensika Obrana" and the "Kainadsky&#13;
Slovwk"), J. C. HronSlky has done more usefiU!l work in the&#13;
few years of his administration of the "Slovak Institute"&#13;
than any Oille of his predecessors during long periods.&#13;
Thousands of new books wer edited every year by his&#13;
merits, new cultwral sections organized, equipped and reorganized, a new farge printery built, and new activities&#13;
initiaited.&#13;
an institution of many&#13;
The "Slovak In.stitute" merits in the fieild of co111Servation of Slorvak traditioI1JS,&#13;
culture, popular art, tiheater, pwrity of language - ip1ayed&#13;
an important Tole in Slovak cultura•l life at all times since&#13;
its foundation in the nineteenth century. Election to leading funcUons in thls institution was considered one of the&#13;
highest honors in SlovaJkia and it undoubtedly was. J . C.&#13;
Hronsky was elected and reelected.&#13;
For the Communist regime such merits have been,&#13;
however, "crimes" against the "people's democracy and&#13;
revolution," and J. C. Hrons'ky was arrested before the&#13;
Red Army accomplished the occupation of Slovakia. After&#13;
many unsuccessful aittempts, he finally escaped from a&#13;
prison and fled from 'Slovakia through Austria into Italy,&#13;
and later found refuge in Argentina, where he lives, deeply convinced that the Slovaks will never give up their&#13;
fight for freedom and their Christian ,t raditions.&#13;
We mention HirolilSlky's case in this connection as an&#13;
example of the Slovak nationail. tragedy. There are many&#13;
others, who in literature, science, arts, aind in ,t he pO'litical&#13;
and economic life of Slava,kia, created works of value and&#13;
have been silenced by the Communist regime, or preferred&#13;
freedom in exile, as Hronsky did. In the following pages&#13;
an attempt has been made to present, in a very restricted&#13;
way, the main features of the Slovak literature under the&#13;
Communist ,r ule. The author has scrupulously tried to paint&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
39&#13;
&#13;
the picture objectirvely, and the publishing committee of&#13;
the review "The Slavic and East-European .Studies" saw to&#13;
it that the study might remain within the limits of a scientific work.&#13;
There is on:ly one abjectirve this study ,a ims at: to&#13;
se:rve the cause of truth and freedom which in Slova1kia as&#13;
well as in other satelilite countiries have been temporarily&#13;
stifled.&#13;
J. K.&#13;
1. Cf. Branislav Vars!k: Le Probleme des nationalites a r Universlte de Trnav,a, Bratislava, 193.8.&#13;
2. Jan Holly (178·5-1849) most gifted poet and disciple of A.&#13;
Bernolak, glorified in three po ems Slovakia's greatness of one tllousand years ago, "Svatopluk" (18n), "Cyrilo-Methodiada" (1835), and&#13;
•·,Slav" (1839). He also translated the main works of Greek and&#13;
Roman classics into the Slovak l,a nguage and prepared th e Slovak&#13;
renatssanee.&#13;
3. Cf. Hans Kohn: "Pan-Slavlsm, Its History and Ideology,"&#13;
University of Notre Dame Press, 19.53; and Ernest Denis: "Les&#13;
Slovaques,' Paris, Delgrave, 1917.&#13;
4. P. 0. Hviezdoslav (1849-1921) by his own name Pavol Or·&#13;
szagh, is considered the most talented Slovak poet. His poetry&#13;
was publls'hed In fifteen large volumes, one of them, "Bloody Sonnets," was translated also Into English. His main works are "Herodes and Herodlas" (drama), the epics "Hajnlkova zena, Ezo a&#13;
Gabor Vlkolinsky, Agar, Rachel, Kron," etc. He also published four&#13;
volumes of translation,s from World literatures, Goethe's Faust,&#13;
Shakes.p,eare's Hamlet and Mid-Summer Night's Dream, the main&#13;
works of Shiller, Lermont-0v, Slowackl and Madach's "The Tragedy&#13;
of Man."&#13;
,5. C.f. Harvard Slavic Studies, Vol. 2, 19·54, p. 323-4.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAK LITERATURE UNDER THE SOVIET IMPACT&#13;
Within a decade of the forced inclusion of Slovakia&#13;
within the Soviet orbit, Slovaik literature weint through&#13;
most peculiar transformations. If Slovak novelists and&#13;
poets, generally more conservative and traditional than Polish, Czech or Slovene writers, did not leave the country&#13;
m- choose silence, they were abruptly compelled to ada;pt&#13;
their literary c-reeds, forms and subjects .to a new line of&#13;
"socialist reailis,m" and to run exclusively Eastern orientation.&#13;
The main characteristics of Slovak literatll!l"e were patriotism, pan-slavism, universalism and a deep religiO'UIS&#13;
&#13;
40&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
spirit. The generation after John Holly, namely John Kolla.T and the group of L. Stur, turned their eyes, as fawiders of nineteenth century painslla:vism, to Russia 'but their&#13;
literrury works, education and iphllosophy were fundrurnentahly Western. They were educated at German Unive:r,sities&#13;
and, while KoHar's "Daughter of Slava" was modelled on&#13;
Dante and Petrarca, L. Stur and his group were under the&#13;
influence of German romanticism, having foir masters&#13;
Herder and Hegel (in their phi1osoiphy) .1 It was in poetry&#13;
only that Mickiewicz, Slowacki, Krasinski am.d Pu&lt;s'hkin.&#13;
were the:iir ideails. Kol[ar's idea of "S[avic reciprocity" refrruined from any attemipt to mottld the politkal ideology&#13;
or the religious charaicter of any Slav group. He aimed&#13;
merely at cuiltural and literary reciprocity, •a nd his philo,s ophy was humanistic." He only is wOlI'thy of liberty who&#13;
resrpects the :liiberty of 8!11; he who forges the chains of&#13;
others, is himself a slave; when thou callest for a Slav,&#13;
there must respond a man," are his famous axioms.2&#13;
According to W. Bobek, one of the best foreign scholars on Slovak literature, Slovakia c-a n be reasonably considered as the classical country of the Slavic idea, with&#13;
several conceptions of panslaV'ism based on the equa[ity of&#13;
Slaivic peoples. Howevell", an identification of the idea of a&#13;
Slavic cooperaition with russophilism was raire; it appeared&#13;
as a result of national depression and despair.3&#13;
Such was the case of L. Stur, for whom "P.anslavism&#13;
in the political sense was a chimera," but who later, according to W. Lednicki, forunulated about 1850 ":the most&#13;
complete and consistently developed program for the subjugation of Slavs to Russia in his bo01k "SlaV'dom and the&#13;
World of the Future"4. Stur wrote 'his '.book in a period of&#13;
"Nationail depression ,arrd despailr," as mentioned by Boibek. (The book was written in German and never appeared&#13;
in Slova!k).&#13;
During the last decades of the nirneteenth century&#13;
arnd the years before and during the first World War, Sfovak literary •amd cultural life was dominated to some extent by Slovak Russophiles like Vajansky and Skn.lltety.&#13;
However, this was merely an interlude; for after the war,&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
41&#13;
&#13;
the inf1uence ·o f French, English and even Scandinavian&#13;
writem which was mani!fest among the younger poe'bs and&#13;
novelists (I. Kraslro, V. Roy, P. 0 . Hv:iezdoslav, M. Razus), gained ground firmly and without resistance. The&#13;
RussophiJ.e orientation ,i n Slova:k literature was chiefly dru:e&#13;
to the political situation following the Austro-Hungarian.&#13;
compromise •Of H~67, when the Slovaks were left at the&#13;
mercy of Hungarian effonts of assii:rnilation. As the Slovak poets and novelists saw that the only hope for a Slovak national surrvival was in Russia's power, they gave fU!ll&#13;
expression to this belief 1n their Hterary woriks. iBut they&#13;
did not mean to exohange one oppression for a.mother.&#13;
The Bo1sltevik Revolution and the results of the Firat&#13;
WorJ,d War changed the picture. The Revo1urbion destroyed&#13;
the panslavistic and Russophile dreams of Slovruk poets.&#13;
While f,u!lifilling their hope for emancipation foom HUID:giarian ru'le by oreating the Czecho-Slova'k Republic with the&#13;
Czechs, jt -left the Slovakis free to choose their cU!ltural&#13;
orientation. They e1ther turned again to the West or they&#13;
used their own spiritual and moral tradiitions for creative&#13;
inspi:ration. The general trend of Slovak liteiratJure in poetry&#13;
as well as in prose was to broaden its range of interests&#13;
and to become responsive to European literary curents 5&#13;
The main representatives of Slovak literatlrre between the&#13;
two Wars were uninterested in Soviet Russia, except for a&#13;
smal[ groUJp of proJetarian o:r left-wing poets and writers&#13;
under Czech influence. Oruy three or four of them acquiired literary recognition. and even fa.me. The older generation of Slovak poets, headed by P. 0. Hiviezdoslav, V.&#13;
Roy, Ivan Krasko and Martin Razus, continued to create&#13;
in the traditional forms or, Ji.ke Hviezdoslav, to use the&#13;
European literrury forms and currents coriresponding to&#13;
his great ta:lent and creativeness. In prose, the masters&#13;
were the realists Kukucin,6 Hronsky, 'l'ajov!Sky, T. Vansova, Timrava and L. 'Podjavorinska.&#13;
The younger generation looked for new fo:rms: to for·eign literatures. The really successful literary woriks of&#13;
more tham. ephemera[ value were those which dTew their&#13;
motives. from Slovak H!fe, their inspiration from rSlorva!k&#13;
&#13;
42&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
national traditions and their art from their own spiritual&#13;
reserves (Milo Ur.ban, J. C. Hironsky, A. Za.rn.ov, V. Benia:k, J. Smrek, E. IBolesilav Lu!kac, S. 1K rcmery, T. J.&#13;
Gaspar, J. Hrufovsky). Consciously or unconsciously, they&#13;
belonged ,t o the West and also to theiir country's social and&#13;
ideological evolution. Their orientation was contilnenta,l&#13;
in form, in philosophy and in motivation. A:U the European ourents ·a nd literary scho&lt;Yls, from symbolism and&#13;
impresiSlionism to Catholiic modernism (especia1ly F!rench)&#13;
and su:rirealism, characteri'zed Slovak Hterature between&#13;
the wars. According to Bobek, it equalled Czech literature,7&#13;
and acOTdilng to A. ,M raz, it "fought for a place in the&#13;
context of wor1d 'literatures. " 8&#13;
The second World War did not change substantially&#13;
the orientation of Slov·a k ,lrl,teratme. Being an island where,&#13;
un,ti} the ·f all of 194.'4, the German ,i mpact was neitheir violent nor apparent, Slovakia experienced a strongly literary and cultll!I'al development. The trend remained Western, nationaliist, conservative and traditional.&#13;
With the "liberation" of the co'll!ntry, the shock of the&#13;
Soviet limparet was violent, spreading deep and wide throughout the literairy and cultural life orf 'Slovakia. A short&#13;
analysis brings to light the foUowing features orf contemporary Slovak literature.&#13;
&#13;
Socialist Realism and the Soviet Model&#13;
A smail:l group of p:wletarian poets, surrealists and&#13;
left-wing critics or nove'lists, headed by L. Novomesky,&#13;
who along with J. Rob Ponican, was the only prominent&#13;
poet in the group before 1945, not only took over liiterary&#13;
and cultural life while Slova;kia was stiU occupied by the&#13;
RUSSliam Anny, but :they al:so decided who would be allowed to continue as writer, poet, journalist or scientist&#13;
and what kind of literature they would be allowed to pubilish. If the writers wished to continue their wol1k, they had&#13;
to become membern of a Society of writers, organized on&#13;
the Soviet model. Their main duties were to extirpate the&#13;
"corrupting" mfluence of Western "bourgeois; and fascist"&#13;
writers and to follow the line of "g.reat socialiist Soviet&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
43&#13;
&#13;
literature," inspired 'by the ideaJs brought to reality by&#13;
Stalinissm. The Slogan was "progress" and the name of the&#13;
new current was "socialist :realism," though many of the&#13;
main actors in this "revolutionary reshaping" of the Slovak literature were dmitators of pre-wa,r French sur:realism (R. Fabry, V. R!eisel, M. Mittelman). Soviet litera.tUTe&#13;
"with its surpassdng wealth of ideas, its burning socialist&#13;
patriotism, its new humanism," was destined ,t o be the&#13;
mghest ideal for Slorvak literature.&#13;
This reshaping of SlOIVak oultural life was purt into&#13;
praotice not only without regard for traditiOIIl, but al:so&#13;
wirthout the ,t rue 1representatives of Slwa!k literature hetween the wars, known by .theiT works and thei!r outstanding talent. Neither the ·best novelist of the period 19181939, Milo Urban (!b. 1904) whose Living Whlp9 was translated into serverad EUTopean languages, nor the prominen,t&#13;
poet Valentin Benia,k (b. 1894), nor Andrej 2arnov (b. 1903)&#13;
whose poetry by its fiery language and reso'l.l'nding verse&#13;
became an effective instrument in the Slova:k national&#13;
struggle and who summoned the young Sloivak intelligentsia to a struggle for justice and freedom, took part in the&#13;
new trend. They pref.erred to be silent. Zarn:ov, who was&#13;
under constant threat of arrest and deportation and many&#13;
times imprisoned, later left his .coun:try to fight for his&#13;
ideas in exHe. 'l'ido J. Gaspar (ib. 1893) author of splendid&#13;
short novels and exotic ,t ales, was also ,sidenced in prison.&#13;
Many others whose names were held up as worthy representati'ves of Slovak lita-aiture before 1945 fled to Argentina, the U. S. A., Canada, Australia and O'bher plaices,&#13;
with deep sorrow and in a spirit of fiery resistance, preferring exile to Communist rule . Among them is the prolific nO&lt;Velist J. C. Hronsky (b .. 1896) whose works desm-ibed ,in mastedy fas:hion the social tUTmoil and political struggles of the Sdov~ks,10 and talented literary critics and aesthetes as :professor :El 2-atiko-Bor, Stanislav&#13;
Meciar and Jan Mestancik, tile poets iR. Dillong - prolific&#13;
and emotional, with hiS' •r apturouis lyricism, - M. Sprinc,&#13;
K. Strmen, Jan Oka,l, J. Doransiky, J. BesenOVSJky, Marusa JUSikova, J. Zvonar-Tien, Hrtus..Jurina, historians (Hru-&#13;
&#13;
44&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
swsky, Culen, Durcansky), linguists (prof. Bartek), publicists (Dr. P. Pauco, -Dr. S. Pol~kovic, Dr. J. Mi'kus, Dr.&#13;
J. Cieker, Dr. A. Grebert, Dr. J. GleimMl, prof. Zubek,&#13;
Nahallka), a dozen university professors and over a hundred highly educated young priests who had prepared&#13;
for their careers as ,professors 3/nd educators at the universities of Rome, Paris Louvain, Innsbruck, Brussels and&#13;
elsewhere.&#13;
To understand the rvast chamge brought aibout by this&#13;
"reshaping" of Slovak literature, we must remember that&#13;
the proleta:riam poets, like the surrrealist s, weTe only a&#13;
sma11 ,g roup alien to the Slovak literary traditi-on and spiritual atmosphere.11 For the most part, they grew up under the :influence of Czech Marxist or Communist intellectuials and writers: (J. Wolker, V. Nezval, J. Fuc:iik, Sekanina). Their movement with its journal Dav, originated&#13;
in ,P rague. Novomesky, Ponifan, Oka.Ii, Clementis and&#13;
others broug,ht their revolutionary ideas and [eft-wing&#13;
orientation .iinto the Slovak puritan literary ·atmosphere&#13;
as university students in t,h e Czech capital. Ponican declared this proudly during the "Congress of Nationa,l Culture" held in Prague in 1948. At the same time he condemned "Czech oultural imperialism" and the tendency&#13;
to assimilate which, according to him, was the consistent&#13;
aim of Prague's bourgeois regimes between the Wa-rs. 12&#13;
During the twenties, the group even tried to transplant into Slovakia Communist literacy aesthetics. They&#13;
made appeals to break from tiraditonal themes and forms,&#13;
fatvored collectivism rather than individl.l!a:lism, materialism&#13;
instead of idealism, and often hurt religious feelings by their&#13;
youth:£ul revolt a,g ainst God ,and' Christian traditions. hl the&#13;
thirties the ,g roup had direct contact with Moscow (No;vomesky attended the Congress of W!riters in Moscow and&#13;
Ilja Ehrenburg appeared in Brntisla,va), but .it was still&#13;
Prague whose Czech Marxist poets and intellectuals (journal Tvorba) ideologkally nourished Slova..11{ proletaxian&#13;
literature amd prescribed its aesthetics.&#13;
After 1945 the groUJp, strengthened by sur.realists&#13;
and young irntellectuals reared during World Warr: II, con1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
4-5&#13;
&#13;
tinued their re'V'olt against individualism., .sU'bjectirvism, art&#13;
fo'I' axit'·s sake, petty-,bO'llrgeois realism and clericalism.&#13;
Their concept of "socialist realism," based on the philosophy of dia1ectical materialism, the Marx-iLenini.st theory&#13;
of ,l iterature, a new aipproaioh to "reality" and active prurHcipation in building ·a new Sodalist s·o ciety, was ,t his time&#13;
imposed by the political power of ,the Comunist party. Im&#13;
reviews and in the daily press,, the literary critics asked&#13;
for conformity with Russian literatuTe, condemned all&#13;
"apolitical" approaches and' proudly declared that the&#13;
struggJe for socialism. was a struggle for a new and true&#13;
&#13;
art.&#13;
As the Communist Party had unlimited control over ali&#13;
&#13;
newspapers, reviews and pubHshing firms and the exdu.sive right to permit or prohibit publircation, traditional Slovak literatme abruptly disappeared. Literary pr,oduction&#13;
i,s orgainiized by ,t he !Party and its organs, ,literature was&#13;
planned to obtain rapid spiritual reorientation, i.e., .sovietizatio:n and conformity with 'Russia and mental russification.&#13;
Under such circumstances, Slovak literature was not&#13;
only impoverished but ailso became an imitation of Soviet&#13;
literature rather than an expression of the Slovak soul.&#13;
Filled with ,s logans aind praise of CmnmUJIHsm and its&#13;
leadem, exaggerating .social differences and struggling&#13;
aga:in:st religion and old traditions, "socialist realism" has&#13;
little in common with artistic values or true .realism.&#13;
Mental and Spiritual Russification&#13;
·To:i addition, there was a steadri1y increasing flood of&#13;
trrunslations of Soviet books, to sovietize the literary life&#13;
of Slovaikia not only in form but ailso in spirit.&#13;
An aina,l ysis of books ipUlblis:hed under the present regim.e13 shows that at the end of 1953 and in the fin.st month&#13;
of 1954, fonty-one translations of poetry -and ipr-0.se were&#13;
published in Sloivakia. Twenty-two of tho,s e translations&#13;
were from Riussian literature, nineteen from aH others.&#13;
Modoon Soviet writers were represented by sixteen works,&#13;
the Russian classi,cs by five. Of nineteen translations from&#13;
&#13;
46&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
non~ussian literatures. thirteen works were written by&#13;
Communists, the o1fuem, apart from a translation of Ovid,&#13;
are works of Mark Twain, Maupassant, Bendel and others,&#13;
depicting the morail decadence of Western society.&#13;
'Dhe picture is similair in rt.he prodiuotion of ,b ooks for&#13;
children and youth. Of forty-three books pu:blished in the&#13;
same period (end of 1953 and beginning of 1954) twentyone works were written by Slov-aJk writers, eighteen by Russians and the iI'est ·b y Czech, Hungartan rund Rumanirun&#13;
aut!hors. No Western writers were Tepresented. Six Slovak&#13;
originail works and fourteen translations from RJllssirun&#13;
were puirely propaganda.&#13;
'Sovietization and mental .r us,sification do not appear&#13;
only in the number of translations from Russian alild Soviet satellite languages. By the exclusion of Western. iiteratures, a SOI1t ()If "cultural iron curtain" is buidt in Slovakia, because SlovaJk writers are absolutely dependent on&#13;
Soviet ~oiurces, considered by the .r egime as "the most&#13;
progressive in the world."&#13;
Under the heading "rMarx-Leniinism' one finds sixtynine publications, twenty-five Slovak originals, thirty-eight&#13;
translations from IRuSIS'ian, two f.rom German (the works&#13;
of Marx and IDngels), one from Hungarian rund one from&#13;
Bu[garian. Though some SlovaJk iintellectuals have m0&amp;&#13;
tered the Western languages, there is no translatio:n from&#13;
French, IDnglish or any 0 1ther Western tongue.&#13;
If we consider that book,s translated from RJussian. a.ire&#13;
pulblished in :tens of ,t housands and that they are sold at&#13;
reduced prices, the picture is clea:r: mental ,russification&#13;
and rovietization is promoted by every avaihvble method.&#13;
&#13;
Reforms of the Slovak Language&#13;
Following the "theory given to Ma'I'Xist philology by&#13;
J. Stalin in ,his work, Marxism and 'P hilological Questions&#13;
and the Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR"&#13;
the new Slovak "working intelligentsia" not only changed&#13;
the spirit, structure and forms of literature but also reformed the Jangua:ge.14 Some of the changes effected by&#13;
the Commun1sts, were proposed by Prof. H. Bartek before&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
47&#13;
&#13;
and during World War II to simplify SloV'ak or-thog.raiphy.&#13;
An expert on linguistics, Prof. Bartek advocated his reforms on the grownds of scientific research -and the evolution of .the Slovak language, Which is, .according to A .&#13;
Senn, "more ar-chaic than Czech and Poli$," that is one&#13;
of the most archaic Slavic languages.15 ColllSequently, not&#13;
all the ohrunges ,o an ,b e regarded as ,ha:rmf\11 or unnecessary; and Slova;k exiles as well as the Slova!k press in the&#13;
free world basicrully accepted this reform. Since the eighteenth century, when Anthony Bernolak (176·2 ..J813),&#13;
lea.med philologist and patriot, wrote a grammar of the Slo_&#13;
vak language rund a huge dictionary &gt;in six language.s and&#13;
gave a set of rules of o.rthography, eliminating the use of&#13;
Latin in Slovak cuUural and literary life, the 'S:tova;k language has been a field of study foc highly educaited clergymen, Catholic and Protes:tant, and for enthusiastic nationalists.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
The reform. of 1844, which is mistakenly presented&#13;
by some Sla:vists as the date of birth of the Slovak literary lrunguage, was brought a:bout by the particiipation of&#13;
Protestant ministers 8Jlld Cathoilfo priests, though the reform wa:s popuila,r ized hy L. Stfrr.16 Stfu himself acted as&#13;
a nationaHst leader aiming at the uruon of ,the Slovak&#13;
people, the greate:r nium1ber of whom ( over 80 % Ca:tholics) have written in Slovak siince the counter-:Refo'I"mation. Oatholrics used as a hasis one of the Western Slovak&#13;
dialects, whereas the Protestants, who accepted the Lutheran fa.1th from Bohemia (Czech lands) together with&#13;
an archaic Czooh translation of the Bible, used, apart&#13;
from German, as their lit,w giical la:ngua,ge, richly adorned&#13;
wtth Slovaik ex1pressions. Regarding the division as a&#13;
great misfortune in the face of strong Magyarization,&#13;
Stur fought for :the unity of a Hterary fanguage and a&#13;
compromise between the Lutheran and the Catholic adherents of the BemolaJk ·s chool. This resulted in the acceptance of a centra:l dialect as a new Slovaik Hterary&#13;
language,17 'but preserved much of the beauty of expres~&#13;
siOIIl aJD.d idiom of other Slava!k dialects. This ,r eform, and&#13;
the rioh litemture which developed later, was merely an&#13;
&#13;
48&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
instrll!ffient in the strugg}e for natiorn:ail survival. The SlovaJk intellectuals were co.nrvinced that the very existence&#13;
of the nation depended upon the preservation of 1t.s language, rund that nationail identity wrus bound up with languaige. As a result, there was ll'Iltil re&lt;:ently a kind of "sanctity of ,l anguage" among the Slovaks. Applying a reform&#13;
by ,referri.ing lto the rules Jaitl down for Marxist philosophy by J. StaHn cannot but hurt the Slovaks in their most&#13;
sensitive spot.&#13;
Revaluation of Literary History&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
Very soon after the Communists took over the direction of c-ulturrul affair,s in Slovakia, af.ter the potential opposition either fled the country or was silenced, Slovak&#13;
literary history was revaluated. The first revaluation was&#13;
made a:s early as 1948 when the Slovak Academy of Sciences a.ind Arts, founded d'll!I'ing the S,lova:k Repulblic, edited&#13;
the History of Slovak Lit.erature.18 The aiuthor, professor&#13;
AII1d!rej• Mraz, was not a Communi st before the War, and&#13;
duiring the War he published in Germa!Il another histocy&#13;
of 'Slovak literature. His new wovk, however, mirrors in&#13;
some respects the present siltuation in the oultural life of&#13;
SlovaJkia.&#13;
Aware that the Easite•r n orientaJtion of SlovaJkia's cultural life had been made a fait accompli by the so-called&#13;
"Program of Kosice" which clearrly stated the SlaJVic, i.e.,&#13;
R'll!ssian orientation of Slovruk cu1tuire, profesSOT Mraz&#13;
ada;pted his work to the new situation. He revised his&#13;
judgment of writers a:nd poets who were jn prisons (T. J.&#13;
Gaspar) or in exile. Proletariam and smrealist poets on the&#13;
other hand became moire talented, thek novels and poetry&#13;
of greaJte,r importJance aJnd artisitk value. On the whole his&#13;
book was wriitten in the way of ;pre-War literary schools,&#13;
his iphraseology shows little similavity with the iMa;rxi-stLeninist literary critics of the years following Novomes~&#13;
ky's imprisonment and lthe condemnation to the gallows of&#13;
Clementis, the intellectual leader of the group.&#13;
The revaluation of Slovalk literary hlstory by Prof.&#13;
Mraz is more iilnteresting as far as tJhe general approaoh to&#13;
SlovaJk literature is concerned. 'Dhe Program of Kosice,&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
49&#13;
&#13;
wihich defined the ideological orientation for the future,&#13;
puts an end to an &lt;Yld controversy about Slo¥ak national,&#13;
c'U!ltwral and l~terary indi'V'iduality. Thi1s dooomenJt stated&#13;
that "the relation between Czechs and Slovaks should be&#13;
that of separate nations jomed in common interest in a&#13;
single State."19 The C{)lffiillunist intelleotuails also proudly manifested their desire to see Slovaiks. as an autonomous&#13;
Soviet Republic rather than a province dominated by&#13;
Prague. Professor Mraz adapted .the History of Slovak Literature to this "n:atiOIIlalist" atmosphere of the years&#13;
1'945-.48, and consequently he included "ex cathed1ra" i,n to&#13;
the Slo'V'a.k C'Ultmral and H,terary heritage not only the&#13;
writings of Sts.. Cyiril and ,Methodius and those of their&#13;
disciples, which had boon consistently, though erroneously,&#13;
claimed by the Czechs, burt also ,t he Latin works of all&#13;
scholars and writers who were of ,Slovak origin. He :took&#13;
an objectiive and favorable rview, considering the circumstances, of the Slovak iliteratme oreated by Catholics in&#13;
the seventeenth ·a nd eighteenth centturies.&#13;
The thesis that t!he Slo:vaxs and not the Czechs are&#13;
the :true heirs of Great !Moravia, that .there existed a clear&#13;
distinction, diwring the centuries, be,t ween Czechs and Slova'k,s and their languages, and that the 'S lovaks preser:ved&#13;
a consciousness of their ethnic and cultural individuality&#13;
a:nd ,t heir continu!ity with the first Sl,ovak kingdom of Great&#13;
Moravia, were accepted as historical facts by Mraz. He&#13;
supported his position by quotations and reforences to the&#13;
works of SlovaJk writers of the se:venteenuh and eighteenth&#13;
ce:n,turies. Mraz aLso accepted the porint of 'View that the&#13;
archaic Czech language, which was brought into, Slova,kia&#13;
by ,t he Czech P ,r otestants "who found shel:ter in Slovakia&#13;
and even ;p rinted books in Czech for the rpurrpose of smuggling rthooi i:nto iBohemia,"20 was merely a bo~rowed language, and that the Slovalk Protesitants used it for litera,ture and litJwrgy in the same way as the Catholics used&#13;
Latin. Though ,th:i-s thesis had previously been supported&#13;
by m8JIIly serious experts iin Slovalk linguistics, literatrnre&#13;
and histocy, the universlities in pre-,War Czechoslova1kia&#13;
tried&#13;
impose a lt!hoory of a common language with the&#13;
&#13;
to&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
50&#13;
&#13;
Czechs until the Stur reform of 1844. "The Slovaik culturra:l&#13;
and literairy sphere was never blended or identified with&#13;
the Czech; :it always had i&lt;ts specific needs and :set of rules"&#13;
says Mraz, ars ,p rofessor of Bratislava university.21&#13;
F.rom these premises, Mraz judged favorably the activities of the Jesuit University of Trnava (1635), the&#13;
Oaitholic writers of the era of Enlightrnent as well. as the&#13;
generation of 1848, who established modern 1Slovruk natiooalism irn letterisi and in politicail life. Mraz's History&#13;
of Slovak Literature, probably written -d'UII'ing the Second&#13;
World War and adapted to the politicail climate of the first&#13;
post-War years when the Communists shared political&#13;
power with the Democratic Party, oruly partly ex.pressed&#13;
the chianged sit:Juaroion by its method and criiteria. The&#13;
book ri:s basically within the framework of values, terminology aind ccmceipt s esta:blished ea,rlier in .Slovaikia. '.Dhe&#13;
""revolutionary revaluation" was undertaiken by the young&#13;
group orf militamit mamberis of the Comm.UIIlist Party (A.&#13;
Bakos, R. Rosenbaum, R. Mrlian, J. Hoirvat and others)&#13;
who made a fam.atical reappraiisa'l of Slovak literature,&#13;
and "purged" the libraries ·acooroing .to the Party ideology and Marxist-.Leninist theory of literature 22 When&#13;
even Novomesky was "purged" as a "bourgeois rn.ationalist and deviationist," the new school of "socialist realllism"&#13;
was established. Consequently, only those booik s and writers serving :the new ,s ocial order are regarded as representati.rve of true literary values. The rest aire irejected as&#13;
reactionary, deviationist, rightist, and petty-bourgeois.23 As&#13;
the literature was also integrated into the structure of&#13;
the new Socialist or Communist order and destined to be&#13;
suboTdirnated to the 1P arty and its ideology, the poet and&#13;
novelist, Jiterary critic and scientist must oontribute by&#13;
their talents amd works to the building of a Socialist society. The model: Soviet Russia.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1. Cf. S. ,P . Palickar, Slovaki-a n Culture, Cambridge, 1954; A.&#13;
MTaz, Die Literatur der •S lov,a ken, Berlin, 1943.&#13;
2. P. P . Yurchak, The Slovaks, 1947, pp. 117-57. Also E. Denis, La&#13;
Question d' Autriche, Les Slovaques, Paris, 1917, p. 164.&#13;
3. W. Semkowicz (eel.) Slowacja i Slowacy, Krakow, 1937, p. 262.&#13;
4. Feliks Gross (ed.) European Ideologies, New York, 1948, p. 838.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
51&#13;
&#13;
5. L. I. Strakhovsky (ed.) Handbook of Slavic Studies, Cambridge, 1949, pp. 495-96.&#13;
6. Cf. J. J. Potocek, "Martin Kukucin, PJoneer of Slovak Realism," The Slavonic and East ·E uropean Review, XXII, 7944.&#13;
7. Ibidem, p. 2&amp;3.&#13;
,8. A. Mraz, Dejiny ,slovenskej literatury, Bra-tislav·a , Academia&#13;
Scientiarum et Artium, Slovaca, 1948, p. 263.&#13;
9. Hand!book of Slavic Studies, p. 505, Mraz, o,p. cit., pp. 17'5-180.&#13;
10. Andreas Mraz, Die Literatur der Slowaken, Berlin, Prague,&#13;
Vjenna, 1943.&#13;
11. Cf. KramorH§, "Slovakia and Slova.c Literature," The Catholic Encyclopedia, XVIU, 19·50.&#13;
12. Cf. Sjezd Narodni Kultury, Praha, 1948, p. 239.&#13;
1'3. CJ'. ·Bi-b liograficky katalog, Slovenska kni'ha, Bratislava, 1'954,&#13;
V. 1-17; also Slobodne Slovensko, X. 2.&#13;
14. H. Bartek, Novy slovensky pravopis, Chicago, 1954, p. 19.&#13;
1,5. Handbook of Slavic Studies, P'P- -51·57.&#13;
1'6. Cf. Yur,C'hak, op. dt. pp. 90-116; also S. P. Palickar, Slovakian Oulture, Oa.mbrid•g e, 1954, pp. 139-55.&#13;
17. Cf. Yurohak, op.. cit.&#13;
18. A. Mraz, Dejiny slovenskej literatury, Bratislava, Academia&#13;
Scientiarum et Artium Slova-ca, 1498.&#13;
19. V. Diamond, Czechos\,ovakia Between East and West, London, 1947, p. 6.&#13;
20. •Cf. Handbook of SJ.avic Studies, pp. 17 5-80.&#13;
21. Ibid., p. 8.&#13;
22. Cf. Sjezd Narodni Kultury, pp. 134-41.&#13;
23. Cf. K. Rozenbaum, Sovremennaya slovanskaya Uteratura,&#13;
Slavy•a ne, 19·515, I, 23-2:9, also J . Martak, Introduction to Su.borne dielo&#13;
Jana Bottu, Bratislava, 1955 .&#13;
&#13;
• • •&#13;
WHO SAID IT?&#13;
&#13;
"There is another thing to be said aJbouit the Admini&amp;&#13;
tration's foreiign policy. It is pUTely negative and defensive.&#13;
rt attempts to contain communism; but does nothing to answer the question s.o often asllred: me: How would you finally&#13;
ded:ea t COIIIlmUJl.,i sm? - Most of those satellite countries and&#13;
peoples were deilitvered into the hands Olf the RULSSian Comml.lind.sit:s by the Y aJt!a Agreement. That American diploanati'c instrument, never submitted to the Senate, sysitematicrulliy violaited iby the RUISSi.ans, defended onliy by those officials&#13;
of the D€4)8.rtmenit of Staite who rure aJccessories to the&#13;
crime, must be formally discairded by Congressional resol.iu.tion as a b'a sis for American foreign poiicy." - (Senator&#13;
Robert A. Taft, NEW YORK TiiMiES, June 2, 1952).&#13;
&#13;
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                    <text>52

SLOVAKIA

ENSLAVERS OF THE CZECH NATION: HOW BENES
"GOT" STRiBRNf
(From the September 23, 1955, issue of "BOHEMIA," Czech monthl,y
published by the Czech Democratic Federalists in Munich, Germany.)
BY: SIRIUS

Flrequently we fail to notice the flow of hi story. What
to some of us is iapparently self-evident, that is fo.r many
veiled by a cu:rtain of forgetfulness 'rund to the younger
generation is something unknown. Forgetfulness and ignorance have created many Je,g ends, which have fatefully extended into the politic~ development of our natiOlll and
have placed in ,power forces which had to coMapse again
and again, ,b ecause they betrayed everything upon which
the state was built .and that which formed its ideological
substa:nce. Perhwps dt is ,t imely to remind the Czech public
about the tirings we had witnessed, so that it might be
able to form its own judgment and to create its own view.
When the press reported the death of George Stribrny
in the Ilava prison last summer (1955), the news shodked
only those who knew him and witnessed his struggles. Not
all these struggles were wa,ged "cleverly," ibut they were
waged to the end which 'Stribmy ,guessed and supposed
more than he reasonably knew: for the consolidation of
democracy agai:ns,t aJl'bitrary power and violence.
George Strib.rny was one of the "men of October 28th."
This designation was no:t simply ,a n empty phvase. The
Czecho-Slavak Republic did not come into existence just oult
of nothing from the minds of statesmen; in the beginning
its existence was doubtfuJ; aJD.d when T. G. Masaryk went
out of Austria-Hung ary to attempt to Liberate the Czech
nation from aibsolutism, he wanted only to gain respect for
the constitutional rights o.f his nation, which aliready were
guaranteed by the so-.caJled "October Rescript," in which
the emperor solemnly :promised rto have ,h imself crowned
as Czech king in /Prague. While aJbroad Masaryk had no
other ooorception in the beginning. In a memorandum to
the British foreign office, dated in April of 1915, T. G.
Masaryk wrote:
1

�SLOVAKIA

53

"We intended to make Bohemia a monarchist State; a Czech Republic is wanted only by a few radicals ••• Either the Allied Powers
will give us one of their Princes, or there will be a personal union
between Bohemia and Serbia ••• A Russian dynasty would be in every
way popular ••. Russia's wishes and plans will have to be of decisive
influence ••• "

The idea of ,a Czecho~Slovak State ripened only gradually; the republican concept won out only under the influence of American Czec'llis and Slova!ks.. In the Pit,tsburgh
Agreement, concluded by T. G. ,M asaryk with the American
Slovaks on May '30, 1918, we read: "The Czecho-.Slovak
StaJte shall be a Republic ... " This a,greement guaTanteed
the Slovaks equal rights with the Czech nation, tha,t is,
their own state government and assembly. Afl later attempts to explain this a;greement as only a private agreement, wihich did not bind in l aw, only sharpened the tensions
between the Czechs and Slovaros and led to coil!Sequeinces
which are stiH fresh in our minds.
1

Stribrny a Member of the "Committee of Five"
During the period that .Masaryk traveled abroad, lectured and organlized the legions, Stffbo:ny was mi active
member of the Vienna parliament where he represented the
Czech National !Socialist Party, which formerly was called
the Czech Nationa;l Labor Parity. This party came into being ais 3Jil opposi,tiO!Il paJrty to the inoceasing :influence of
international social democracy, and its founder was the
journalist Vaclav Klofac, a convinced anti-militarist. Later
he became the fi~st Minister ,o f [Defense in the first Cre&lt;!hoS1o:va;k government of iDr. Chades Kramaf.
Klofac and Stfibrny were the two lea,ding personalities
of the movement of na;tional workers. During the first
World WaT the Czech anarchists joined with them, led by
Dr. iBohumil Vrbensky, a dentist, who was named Min:ister
of Supplies !in the first Czceho-Slo:va:k government. When
Kiofac wa;s jailed by the Austrian authorities soon after
the outbreak of the war and later conrvicted, Stfibmy became the leading personality of the Czech National Socialists and represented ,t hem on the "Committee of Five",the other members being: Dr. Alois Rasin (Czech National
Democrat), Arrtonirn Svehla (Agrarian), DT. Francis Sou-

�54

SLOVAKIA

ikup (Soeial Democrat), who was later replaced by deputy
Haibrman, :and a depresentative of the Czech People's Party
whkh had separated from the conservative wing represented
by the perfodicai •~CEoH"; the latter became a member of
the committee laiter.

Benes Arrives on the Scene
A plaque on ,t he House of Deputies in the city of
Prague told one (•I do inot know if it is still there) that
the Committee of ,F ive, Jin Stribrny among them, had a
session in tlris house on October 28, 1918, to proclaim the
first la:w of the Czecho-.Slovak Republic, the proclamatioo.
of the existence af the new State. This act really was :revolutionary. Even though Czecho-Slovakia was recognized.
by the Allied Governments, it was not certain when the
practical transfer of power would take place. The seizure
of power, which :these men managed, surprised even the
Czech ,political delegaitfon which at that moment was in
session in the Beau iRivage Hotel in Geneva, where it had
gOille with ,t he permission of the Austrian government to
ma'ke oontacts with the Czech politicians rub.road, among
whom was a new personality, a young docent of sociology
at the Prague University, ,D r. Edtwa:rd (Benes.
Dr. !Benes was a very ambitious and energetic man.
Originally a member of the Social Democratic iPa:rty, like
his brother, he became a correspondent for the social-democratic daily •~BRAVIO UIDU" (The People's Right) tn
Paris, where his lire waJS anything but pleaSia'D!t. IHe learned
French, English much fater, ibut he could never speak it
correctly. Benes was attracted ,b y Masaryk's person:ality.
Masaryk at that ti.me was iintroducing in the Charles University methods of English p:nactical thought, which are
often mistakenly reg,arded rus same kind of independent
philosophical system. iMasaryk was quite well known because of his appearrunces before the public, ,b ut he was not
too well liked. His ireailism rather shocked Ith.an inspired
Czech 111.ationaliism in-Austria-Hunga ry. A reflection of the
valiant stand of 'Z ola in France was the participation of
Masaryk in the Hilsner murder case, in which he proved
the fals1ty of the so'-'Called "Mrunuscripts," but :it evoked

�SLOVAKIA

55

a wave of hostility agaJinst him. When deputy Sviil:a sued
Alllyz, it.he editor of t:he N.ARODNE DISTY, !because he ac..
cused Sviha of !being an informer for the Austrian police,
Masaryk took sides with Anyz and so turned the Czech
N atio:rraJ Socialists against himself.
Antagonism 'between Masaryk and the N ationai Socialist
Party had existed fo~ some time. :Since Benes always sfu'essed 3,nd underil!ined the intention and :aims of his master,
it was expected th:a,t !lie would soon get into an a;rgument
with ithe National Socialists. 'Dhe fight was a strange one,
indeed. When it became clear that the Social Democrats
would not place [)r. Benes on ,t he baJlOlt as their candidaite,
and since Dr. Benes could not count OIIl being a candidate
on the -ballot of the National Democrats, because of his
opposition to ,t hem, there rernamed little '1.ef.t for him to do
butt try to get on the !ballot as a candidate of the Czech
NatiOIIlal 1Socialists. At that time it was still thought that
a minister must be a deputy and that it was necessary to
uphold the rules of parliamb.'lltary democracy. The National
Socialist Party, which Benes wanted to 'balilot him, however, was over:whelmingily a .p arty of the workers and not
intellectuals.
But danger threatened Benes from another quarter. At
t hat time Dr. iKramar was quite a power and naJtional hero.
Benes !mnew that. But he also was determined to wreck the
prur.ty of Kramar and, if need be, Kramar himself. He set
himself to the taslk. The group associated with Dr. Jaro,.
slav Stransky, a yoU1I1g deputy of the National Democratic
Party, quit the party ,t o, join the so-called "Labor Party"
which rwas in a transitiOIIlal stage; it ,w as through this party that the g,roup ent&amp;ed the Czech National Socialist
Party. The first attack within the party was made against
Stflbrny, directed behind the scenes ,b y !Benes. [t ended
with the expulsion ,oif Stribrny from the party.
1

Stfibrny Organizes the "Castle" Opposition
Stribmy was hurt, but 111ort helpless. He knew his enemy
very well.. In Prague, on Jungman iS treet, he began to build
up his own publishing enterprises; his "Vecemi list" (Eveni1nig News) soon ibecame a feared boulevard newspaper.

�56

SLOVAKIA

Stribrny consolidated practically the entire "am.ti-Castle"
opposition. 1Many persons who did not like Benes's methods
were aHowed space in his paper, among them: J. S. Machar,
fo:mner intimate of T. G. Masaryk, the writer Francis Zavfola, whom Dr. Benes never forgave for criticizing him in
the novel "For.tinbras," Arnost Dvorak, author of the co..
medy "Matej 'Poctivy (Honest Matt), and many others.
Wlhat did the opposition hold . against the ambitious,
vainglorious Benes? IJ:t would take seve,r al pages just to
enumerate all reproaches, complaints and charges, but sub.struintially all were concerned with one matter: Benes's
dictatorial methods, which he developed throughout his life
as ·a confirmed socialist. Dr. Benes came to parliament from
the outside; he did not bother attending meetings, did not
seek favor of the voters, and thought that his foreign activity was fin itself so great that he should be trusted without question in ·all things. If any one doubted the correotness of his views or of his politics and dared to express
an opposite view, Benes considered that as a sign of enmity. Benes had no wide support among the voters; if the
system of "binding ballots of candidates" did not exist,
Benes never would have become a deputy of pa'I'liament.
Benes was conscious of his unpopularity with the voters
and his lack of ipoilitical ba:ckg,r ound, and .t his he coil'.Sidoced
as his greatest personal defioiency. Naturally, this meant,
if he wanted to stay in power - 3Jlld he certainly did Benes would have to find other methods of disposing of
his political opponents. Of course, we know he not only
found them, but also used them quite effectively.
Whi~e Benes studied in Dijon one name attracted his
attention: Fouche. The methods applied by th.is man, Na,.
poleon's police director, !impressed the youthful, ambitious
Benes. He reC"alled them later when he decided to become
a power in Czech politics. He knew that a person could be
destroyed ,pol1ticailly by malicious smeair and vilification;
and he also learned• how the criminal courts aided Fouche,
who bought witnesses who were wiHing to testify to anything for pay. Dr. Benes, who tested' this method when he
rem()IVed Jirak, sectional ,chief o,f the !M:inistry of Trade,

�SLOVAKIA

57

thought he was strong enough to try it against Stribrny.
At that itime Dr. K,a,reil Larry in the Ministry oif Justice
was Benes's righit hand. ·L awyer Drobny, who complained
of a meagre law practice, !became an all-powerful perso..,
nalii.ty in the Ministry of Justice and Bene.s's willing servant.
It was not easy to fabric-a te a ca:se against Stribrny; Benes
knew he had to be very cautions. Stribrny was a publisher
and was ba,cked by a small burt very ·a ctive political party;
Dr. Charles iPergler, American-born Czech and outspoken
adversary of Benes's policies, rulso joined •t he opposition
headed by Stribmy.
Dr. Lany worked haTd and long to come up with something against Stfibmy and ,so to please Benes. Finally, he
cooked up something which Be111es thought would finish
Stribrny: Larry said Stribrny had perjured ihimseJf during
one of his trials. A great number of witnesses was rounded
up to testify as l.&lt;I1Slbructed by 'Larry; the trial got under
way ·a nd the press featured it. Everything seemed to be
running smoothly for Lany until a certain detective was
called upon to testify; that detective sruid thait he saw Stribrny with the accused Sichrovsky in the Hotel de Saxe in
Prague; he mentioned the point from which he saw them;
it was from not rtoo, great a di,s tance, but a corner came
into the picture. O.vdinary people cannot see a-r ound a corner, but the detective Lany produced as a witness was
blessed, it •seems, with airOU!Ild-the-corner-sighrt. The court
at thart time could not 1b e influenced; it did not believe thaJt
the detective could see aToun.d corners. So the court threw
out the case against Strib,rny.
1

Benes was :fm-ious, but he was by no means through
with 1Stfibrny. '.I1lwough the staJte pmcUI1ator he made application for -a wrirt of error, which was gra111ted; the request rto ihave the trial tramsferred to another city "to re..,
move the influence of the iPrague street" was also granted
- Jihlava was ,given the honor. The second .part of the
drarrna dragged on .in Ji'hlava · a nd caused no end of worry
to Stribrny. Benes, however, had nothing to lose, except
possibly a: ,b it of face. When the trial ended, Stribmy won
out -again.

�58

SLOVAKIA

In the meantime, time marched on. Benes was kept
busy with the cOI11sequences of his polides MJ.d ideological
constructions. Afraid of 1osing his influence, he still thoug,ht
that the [Habsburgs were 's till dangerous, so he oreated the
Little Entente (Yugoslavia, Rumamfa ·a nd Czecho-!Slova'kia:) ,
wh!ich f,1opped when faced with rthe first crisis. Autocrat
that he was, Benes ,a lways waited nntil he was forced to
negotirution or to 0.!g.reement.
No matter :how we judge the event,s of that time, one
thing stands: out quite clear and certain: Benes failed to
;recognize two problems whicli were of vital .importance to
the Repuiblic - the German p:mblem and the Slovak problem. He thought both would be solved by silence and proCTaJStination. Because he was a man who iregaroed discussion ·a s a personal atta0k, there never were any objective
discussions about the vital proiblerns orf the country.
Truthfully speaking, it must be said that Benes did
not even have the desired understanding for those two problems. He was a man who gloried in moving in foreign circles; he saiw his strength on the diplomatic parquets among
his a,oquaintances, club, colleagues, wd hi-red journ.ailists.
Problems of internal politics neveir reaJ.Iy interested Benes.
Una:ble to tolerate criticism, he contriived the laiw "for the
protection of the (Republic," which was enthusiastically endorsed by the other "coalition" parties, becall!Se it put a
perfect muzZJle io n the mouths o.f the opposition. Benes paid
lip service to democracy, but sinned against it gravely. P&amp;haps inexperience, a ilaclr of honest courage to give in when
wrong, affiliaiting politics too much with person:al advantages run:d gains, commerc.iali·z ing politics at the ~nse of
the ideal interests of ,t he nation - all this .became the hot/bed of dictatorial whims which culminated in whait Benes
began rto do in 1945, when without even consuWng the nation he pu:bli,s:hed -and enforC"ed his famous- "decrees." He
had become a dictator, something he had always striven
for. To Benes it did not matter that he served the forces
which ilater rwere to orvercome him, ibeca:use rthey were more
powerful, experienced .and tactically more mature. The
Czech nation tolerated dictatorship. Wea:kened by the war,

�SLOVAKIA

69

confused and befuddled by the political situation which was
not presented in its :tirue colors, and led by ·a personality
who thought he had won the war, the nation hum!bly sue..
cumbed to serious breaches and limitations of its rights
and freedoms.
Benes Finally "Gets" Stribrny
Just before the war ended, as I recaill, while several
of us were discussing the future, one of iBenes's very close
friends Temarked: "Things will not be as they were under
Masairyk. Benes is a vengeful man and will not forgive any
one!"
This characterization of Benes hit me hard later, when
I learned that Stfibrny was arrested at the Grii.fenberg
Baths in Silesia. Every one was convinced that this was
a m~staJke. Wha;t could any o.ne have against Stribrny? During the war he was not active politically ·a t all. Benes nevertheless came out against Stribrny because of his pre ...war
activity, which did not fall under the notion of "retribution" at all. Stfibrny's journalists, we know, frequently
criticized Benes, as did many others. The court could not
resolve whether the criticism was proper or not, but omy
whether criticism was allowed and whether free criticism
comes under the notion of "retribution." The defendant's
counsel, a brilliant iPrague lawyer, was convinced that Stribrny could not be convicted. When the trial was over and
tha,t lawyer heard the verdiot of life in jail, he wanted to
give up his law practice. Stfibrny's son, hearing ,t he verdict,
said only one word: "Dad!" and for that he was accused
of disturbing public order and later sentenced to 18 months
in jail.
Jin 1S tribrny probably could have gotten out of the
·n ava prison, if he would have requested amnesty. But he
refused to ask Benes for mercy. Stfibrny was not indicted
and tried ·e ven by the Oommunists. "The mrun of October
28th," one of the founders of the Republic, apparently did
not consider it dignified and proper to ask any one for
mercy, for pardon for anything that he did not commit,
for pardon because at the moment his antagonist was
stronger than he was.

�60

SLOVAKIA

Let people think what they like a;bout Stribrny. One.
thlng .they ml.l!st admit: he was am enthusiastic and stouthearted man. If he did do wrong, he was willing to admit
it; often he may have attacked hairder than he should have
and let himself be guided ,b y personal bitterness more than
by political motive, but he was one orf the few moo who
did found the Republic. The founders of states of civilized
nations ·a re usualty glorified by monuments and a;rticles in
school reade:ra. But Sitribrrny was allowed to die in jail. A
shame? !indeed, it was a shame, but it was not Stribrny's
shame.
Getting rid of opponents. by any and all methods leads
in ,p olitics to dictatorship. As soon as "liberaito:ris" cha:nge
into enslavers of their nation, it is up to the na,tion to defend its rig,hts.. It cannot stand idly on the sidelines. Tihe
ipeople who do that beair the responsibility for the victims
of dictatorship. Stribrny was one of the victims. His deeply
furrowed countenance will be long remembered iby those
who knew him. His high forehead was crowned with a rich
set of hair - ,w avy, beautiful lrair. 'Dhe physic,a l personality
of Stribrny is slowly disappearing in the chasms of oblivion,
ibut hiis hair still waves as if it were a li'Viing torch!

•

•

•

WHO SAID IT?

"President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his
Irutest statemenJts rulways stressed, tiliait ouir pact of a.Hiance

with Soviet Russia and ouir friendshiip with other S1 av Ill8.tions must not encrooch on o.ur friendly and cordirul relations with other democratic states. This is .t he natuiral desire, shared by an enormous ma;jority of oor people, and
nothing .p revents us from keeping the comidence of the
democratic states and stroogthenmg and deepening OUT
friendship with ouT great western Allies. Moscow, too,
wanlts tio ful~ow thi s line of poliic y. rt will., however, be necessary for certain prejudices of the West with regard to
the Soviet Union, which are stiU existing, to be swept
away." - Premier Fierlinger of Ozecho-Slorvakia, OW7I Bulletin, June 1, 194'5.
1

1

�</text>
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                    <text>52

SLOVAKIA

ENSLAVERS OF THE CZECH NATION: HOW BENES
"GOT" STRiBRNf
(From the September 23, 1955, issue of "BOHEMIA," Czech monthl,y
published by the Czech Democratic Federalists in Munich, Germany.)
BY: SIRIUS

Flrequently we fail to notice the flow of hi story. What
to some of us is iapparently self-evident, that is fo.r many
veiled by a cu:rtain of forgetfulness 'rund to the younger
generation is something unknown. Forgetfulness and ignorance have created many Je,g ends, which have fatefully extended into the politic~ development of our natiOlll and
have placed in ,power forces which had to coMapse again
and again, ,b ecause they betrayed everything upon which
the state was built .and that which formed its ideological
substa:nce. Perhwps dt is ,t imely to remind the Czech public
about the tirings we had witnessed, so that it might be
able to form its own judgment and to create its own view.
When the press reported the death of George Stribrny
in the Ilava prison last summer (1955), the news shodked
only those who knew him and witnessed his struggles. Not
all these struggles were wa,ged "cleverly," ibut they were
waged to the end which 'Stribmy ,guessed and supposed
more than he reasonably knew: for the consolidation of
democracy agai:ns,t aJl'bitrary power and violence.
George Strib.rny was one of the "men of October 28th."
This designation was no:t simply ,a n empty phvase. The
Czecho-Slavak Republic did not come into existence just oult
of nothing from the minds of statesmen; in the beginning
its existence was doubtfuJ; aJD.d when T. G. Masaryk went
out of Austria-Hung ary to attempt to Liberate the Czech
nation from aibsolutism, he wanted only to gain respect for
the constitutional rights o.f his nation, which aliready were
guaranteed by the so-.caJled "October Rescript," in which
the emperor solemnly :promised rto have ,h imself crowned
as Czech king in /Prague. While aJbroad Masaryk had no
other ooorception in the beginning. In a memorandum to
the British foreign office, dated in April of 1915, T. G.
Masaryk wrote:
1

�SLOVAKIA

53

"We intended to make Bohemia a monarchist State; a Czech Republic is wanted only by a few radicals ••• Either the Allied Powers
will give us one of their Princes, or there will be a personal union
between Bohemia and Serbia ••• A Russian dynasty would be in every
way popular ••. Russia's wishes and plans will have to be of decisive
influence ••• "

The idea of ,a Czecho~Slovak State ripened only gradually; the republican concept won out only under the influence of American Czec'llis and Slova!ks.. In the Pit,tsburgh
Agreement, concluded by T. G. ,M asaryk with the American
Slovaks on May '30, 1918, we read: "The Czecho-.Slovak
StaJte shall be a Republic ... " This a,greement guaTanteed
the Slovaks equal rights with the Czech nation, tha,t is,
their own state government and assembly. Afl later attempts to explain this a;greement as only a private agreement, wihich did not bind in l aw, only sharpened the tensions
between the Czechs and Slovaros and led to coil!Sequeinces
which are stiH fresh in our minds.
1

Stribrny a Member of the "Committee of Five"
During the period that .Masaryk traveled abroad, lectured and organlized the legions, Stffbo:ny was mi active
member of the Vienna parliament where he represented the
Czech National !Socialist Party, which formerly was called
the Czech Nationa;l Labor Parity. This party came into being ais 3Jil opposi,tiO!Il paJrty to the inoceasing :influence of
international social democracy, and its founder was the
journalist Vaclav Klofac, a convinced anti-militarist. Later
he became the fi~st Minister ,o f [Defense in the first Cre&lt;!hoS1o:va;k government of iDr. Chades Kramaf.
Klofac and Stfibrny were the two lea,ding personalities
of the movement of na;tional workers. During the first
World WaT the Czech anarchists joined with them, led by
Dr. iBohumil Vrbensky, a dentist, who was named Min:ister
of Supplies !in the first Czceho-Slo:va:k government. When
Kiofac wa;s jailed by the Austrian authorities soon after
the outbreak of the war and later conrvicted, Stfibmy became the leading personality of the Czech National Socialists and represented ,t hem on the "Committee of Five",the other members being: Dr. Alois Rasin (Czech National
Democrat), Arrtonirn Svehla (Agrarian), DT. Francis Sou-

�54

SLOVAKIA

ikup (Soeial Democrat), who was later replaced by deputy
Haibrman, :and a depresentative of the Czech People's Party
whkh had separated from the conservative wing represented
by the perfodicai •~CEoH"; the latter became a member of
the committee laiter.

Benes Arrives on the Scene
A plaque on ,t he House of Deputies in the city of
Prague told one (•I do inot know if it is still there) that
the Committee of ,F ive, Jin Stribrny among them, had a
session in tlris house on October 28, 1918, to proclaim the
first la:w of the Czecho-.Slovak Republic, the proclamatioo.
of the existence af the new State. This act really was :revolutionary. Even though Czecho-Slovakia was recognized.
by the Allied Governments, it was not certain when the
practical transfer of power would take place. The seizure
of power, which :these men managed, surprised even the
Czech ,political delegaitfon which at that moment was in
session in the Beau iRivage Hotel in Geneva, where it had
gOille with ,t he permission of the Austrian government to
ma'ke oontacts with the Czech politicians rub.road, among
whom was a new personality, a young docent of sociology
at the Prague University, ,D r. Edtwa:rd (Benes.
Dr. !Benes was a very ambitious and energetic man.
Originally a member of the Social Democratic iPa:rty, like
his brother, he became a correspondent for the social-democratic daily •~BRAVIO UIDU" (The People's Right) tn
Paris, where his lire waJS anything but pleaSia'D!t. IHe learned
French, English much fater, ibut he could never speak it
correctly. Benes was attracted ,b y Masaryk's person:ality.
Masaryk at that ti.me was iintroducing in the Charles University methods of English p:nactical thought, which are
often mistakenly reg,arded rus same kind of independent
philosophical system. iMasaryk was quite well known because of his appearrunces before the public, ,b ut he was not
too well liked. His ireailism rather shocked Ith.an inspired
Czech 111.ationaliism in-Austria-Hunga ry. A reflection of the
valiant stand of 'Z ola in France was the participation of
Masaryk in the Hilsner murder case, in which he proved
the fals1ty of the so'-'Called "Mrunuscripts," but :it evoked

�SLOVAKIA

55

a wave of hostility agaJinst him. When deputy Sviil:a sued
Alllyz, it.he editor of t:he N.ARODNE DISTY, !because he ac..
cused Sviha of !being an informer for the Austrian police,
Masaryk took sides with Anyz and so turned the Czech
N atio:rraJ Socialists against himself.
Antagonism 'between Masaryk and the N ationai Socialist
Party had existed fo~ some time. :Since Benes always sfu'essed 3,nd underil!ined the intention and :aims of his master,
it was expected th:a,t !lie would soon get into an a;rgument
with ithe National Socialists. 'Dhe fight was a strange one,
indeed. When it became clear that the Social Democrats
would not place [)r. Benes on ,t he baJlOlt as their candidaite,
and since Dr. Benes could not count OIIl being a candidate
on the -ballot of the National Democrats, because of his
opposition to ,t hem, there rernamed little '1.ef.t for him to do
butt try to get on the !ballot as a candidate of the Czech
NatiOIIlal 1Socialists. At that time it was still thought that
a minister must be a deputy and that it was necessary to
uphold the rules of parliamb.'lltary democracy. The National
Socialist Party, which Benes wanted to 'balilot him, however, was over:whelmingily a .p arty of the workers and not
intellectuals.
But danger threatened Benes from another quarter. At
t hat time Dr. iKramar was quite a power and naJtional hero.
Benes !mnew that. But he also was determined to wreck the
prur.ty of Kramar and, if need be, Kramar himself. He set
himself to the taslk. The group associated with Dr. Jaro,.
slav Stransky, a yoU1I1g deputy of the National Democratic
Party, quit the party ,t o, join the so-called "Labor Party"
which rwas in a transitiOIIlal stage; it ,w as through this party that the g,roup ent&amp;ed the Czech National Socialist
Party. The first attack within the party was made against
Stflbrny, directed behind the scenes ,b y !Benes. [t ended
with the expulsion ,oif Stribrny from the party.
1

Stfibrny Organizes the "Castle" Opposition
Stribmy was hurt, but 111ort helpless. He knew his enemy
very well.. In Prague, on Jungman iS treet, he began to build
up his own publishing enterprises; his "Vecemi list" (Eveni1nig News) soon ibecame a feared boulevard newspaper.

�56

SLOVAKIA

Stribrny consolidated practically the entire "am.ti-Castle"
opposition. 1Many persons who did not like Benes's methods
were aHowed space in his paper, among them: J. S. Machar,
fo:mner intimate of T. G. Masaryk, the writer Francis Zavfola, whom Dr. Benes never forgave for criticizing him in
the novel "For.tinbras," Arnost Dvorak, author of the co..
medy "Matej 'Poctivy (Honest Matt), and many others.
Wlhat did the opposition hold . against the ambitious,
vainglorious Benes? IJ:t would take seve,r al pages just to
enumerate all reproaches, complaints and charges, but sub.struintially all were concerned with one matter: Benes's
dictatorial methods, which he developed throughout his life
as ·a confirmed socialist. Dr. Benes came to parliament from
the outside; he did not bother attending meetings, did not
seek favor of the voters, and thought that his foreign activity was fin itself so great that he should be trusted without question in ·all things. If any one doubted the correotness of his views or of his politics and dared to express
an opposite view, Benes considered that as a sign of enmity. Benes had no wide support among the voters; if the
system of "binding ballots of candidates" did not exist,
Benes never would have become a deputy of pa'I'liament.
Benes was conscious of his unpopularity with the voters
and his lack of ipoilitical ba:ckg,r ound, and .t his he coil'.Sidoced
as his greatest personal defioiency. Naturally, this meant,
if he wanted to stay in power - 3Jlld he certainly did Benes would have to find other methods of disposing of
his political opponents. Of course, we know he not only
found them, but also used them quite effectively.
Whi~e Benes studied in Dijon one name attracted his
attention: Fouche. The methods applied by th.is man, Na,.
poleon's police director, !impressed the youthful, ambitious
Benes. He reC"alled them later when he decided to become
a power in Czech politics. He knew that a person could be
destroyed ,pol1ticailly by malicious smeair and vilification;
and he also learned• how the criminal courts aided Fouche,
who bought witnesses who were wiHing to testify to anything for pay. Dr. Benes, who tested' this method when he
rem()IVed Jirak, sectional ,chief o,f the !M:inistry of Trade,

�SLOVAKIA

57

thought he was strong enough to try it against Stribrny.
At that itime Dr. K,a,reil Larry in the Ministry oif Justice
was Benes's righit hand. ·L awyer Drobny, who complained
of a meagre law practice, !became an all-powerful perso..,
nalii.ty in the Ministry of Justice and Bene.s's willing servant.
It was not easy to fabric-a te a ca:se against Stribrny; Benes
knew he had to be very cautions. Stribrny was a publisher
and was ba,cked by a small burt very ·a ctive political party;
Dr. Charles iPergler, American-born Czech and outspoken
adversary of Benes's policies, rulso joined •t he opposition
headed by Stribmy.
Dr. Lany worked haTd and long to come up with something against Stfibmy and ,so to please Benes. Finally, he
cooked up something which Be111es thought would finish
Stribrny: Larry said Stribrny had perjured ihimseJf during
one of his trials. A great number of witnesses was rounded
up to testify as l.&lt;I1Slbructed by 'Larry; the trial got under
way ·a nd the press featured it. Everything seemed to be
running smoothly for Lany until a certain detective was
called upon to testify; that detective sruid thait he saw Stribrny with the accused Sichrovsky in the Hotel de Saxe in
Prague; he mentioned the point from which he saw them;
it was from not rtoo, great a di,s tance, but a corner came
into the picture. O.vdinary people cannot see a-r ound a corner, but the detective Lany produced as a witness was
blessed, it •seems, with airOU!Ild-the-corner-sighrt. The court
at thart time could not 1b e influenced; it did not believe thaJt
the detective could see aToun.d corners. So the court threw
out the case against Strib,rny.
1

Benes was :fm-ious, but he was by no means through
with 1Stfibrny. '.I1lwough the staJte pmcUI1ator he made application for -a wrirt of error, which was gra111ted; the request rto ihave the trial tramsferred to another city "to re..,
move the influence of the iPrague street" was also granted
- Jihlava was ,given the honor. The second .part of the
drarrna dragged on .in Ji'hlava · a nd caused no end of worry
to Stribrny. Benes, however, had nothing to lose, except
possibly a: ,b it of face. When the trial ended, Stribmy won
out -again.

�58

SLOVAKIA

In the meantime, time marched on. Benes was kept
busy with the cOI11sequences of his polides MJ.d ideological
constructions. Afraid of 1osing his influence, he still thoug,ht
that the [Habsburgs were 's till dangerous, so he oreated the
Little Entente (Yugoslavia, Rumamfa ·a nd Czecho-!Slova'kia:) ,
wh!ich f,1opped when faced with rthe first crisis. Autocrat
that he was, Benes ,a lways waited nntil he was forced to
negotirution or to 0.!g.reement.
No matter :how we judge the event,s of that time, one
thing stands: out quite clear and certain: Benes failed to
;recognize two problems whicli were of vital .importance to
the Repuiblic - the German p:mblem and the Slovak problem. He thought both would be solved by silence and proCTaJStination. Because he was a man who iregaroed discussion ·a s a personal atta0k, there never were any objective
discussions about the vital proiblerns orf the country.
Truthfully speaking, it must be said that Benes did
not even have the desired understanding for those two problems. He was a man who gloried in moving in foreign circles; he saiw his strength on the diplomatic parquets among
his a,oquaintances, club, colleagues, wd hi-red journ.ailists.
Problems of internal politics neveir reaJ.Iy interested Benes.
Una:ble to tolerate criticism, he contriived the laiw "for the
protection of the (Republic," which was enthusiastically endorsed by the other "coalition" parties, becall!Se it put a
perfect muzZJle io n the mouths o.f the opposition. Benes paid
lip service to democracy, but sinned against it gravely. P&amp;haps inexperience, a ilaclr of honest courage to give in when
wrong, affiliaiting politics too much with person:al advantages run:d gains, commerc.iali·z ing politics at the ~nse of
the ideal interests of ,t he nation - all this .became the hot/bed of dictatorial whims which culminated in whait Benes
began rto do in 1945, when without even consuWng the nation he pu:bli,s:hed -and enforC"ed his famous- "decrees." He
had become a dictator, something he had always striven
for. To Benes it did not matter that he served the forces
which ilater rwere to orvercome him, ibeca:use rthey were more
powerful, experienced .and tactically more mature. The
Czech nation tolerated dictatorship. Wea:kened by the war,

�SLOVAKIA

69

confused and befuddled by the political situation which was
not presented in its :tirue colors, and led by ·a personality
who thought he had won the war, the nation hum!bly sue..
cumbed to serious breaches and limitations of its rights
and freedoms.
Benes Finally "Gets" Stribrny
Just before the war ended, as I recaill, while several
of us were discussing the future, one of iBenes's very close
friends Temarked: "Things will not be as they were under
Masairyk. Benes is a vengeful man and will not forgive any
one!"
This characterization of Benes hit me hard later, when
I learned that Stfibrny was arrested at the Grii.fenberg
Baths in Silesia. Every one was convinced that this was
a m~staJke. Wha;t could any o.ne have against Stribrny? During the war he was not active politically ·a t all. Benes nevertheless came out against Stribrny because of his pre ...war
activity, which did not fall under the notion of "retribution" at all. Stfibrny's journalists, we know, frequently
criticized Benes, as did many others. The court could not
resolve whether the criticism was proper or not, but omy
whether criticism was allowed and whether free criticism
comes under the notion of "retribution." The defendant's
counsel, a brilliant iPrague lawyer, was convinced that Stribrny could not be convicted. When the trial was over and
tha,t lawyer heard the verdiot of life in jail, he wanted to
give up his law practice. Stfibrny's son, hearing ,t he verdict,
said only one word: "Dad!" and for that he was accused
of disturbing public order and later sentenced to 18 months
in jail.
Jin 1S tribrny probably could have gotten out of the
·n ava prison, if he would have requested amnesty. But he
refused to ask Benes for mercy. Stfibrny was not indicted
and tried ·e ven by the Oommunists. "The mrun of October
28th," one of the founders of the Republic, apparently did
not consider it dignified and proper to ask any one for
mercy, for pardon for anything that he did not commit,
for pardon because at the moment his antagonist was
stronger than he was.

�60

SLOVAKIA

Let people think what they like a;bout Stribrny. One.
thlng .they ml.l!st admit: he was am enthusiastic and stouthearted man. If he did do wrong, he was willing to admit
it; often he may have attacked hairder than he should have
and let himself be guided ,b y personal bitterness more than
by political motive, but he was one orf the few moo who
did found the Republic. The founders of states of civilized
nations ·a re usualty glorified by monuments and a;rticles in
school reade:ra. But Sitribrrny was allowed to die in jail. A
shame? !indeed, it was a shame, but it was not Stribrny's
shame.
Getting rid of opponents. by any and all methods leads
in ,p olitics to dictatorship. As soon as "liberaito:ris" cha:nge
into enslavers of their nation, it is up to the na,tion to defend its rig,hts.. It cannot stand idly on the sidelines. Tihe
ipeople who do that beair the responsibility for the victims
of dictatorship. Stribrny was one of the victims. His deeply
furrowed countenance will be long remembered iby those
who knew him. His high forehead was crowned with a rich
set of hair - ,w avy, beautiful lrair. 'Dhe physic,a l personality
of Stribrny is slowly disappearing in the chasms of oblivion,
ibut hiis hair still waves as if it were a li'Viing torch!

•

•

•

WHO SAID IT?

"President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his
Irutest statemenJts rulways stressed, tiliait ouir pact of a.Hiance

with Soviet Russia and ouir friendshiip with other S1 av Ill8.tions must not encrooch on o.ur friendly and cordirul relations with other democratic states. This is .t he natuiral desire, shared by an enormous ma;jority of oor people, and
nothing .p revents us from keeping the comidence of the
democratic states and stroogthenmg and deepening OUT
friendship with ouT great western Allies. Moscow, too,
wanlts tio ful~ow thi s line of poliic y. rt will., however, be necessary for certain prejudices of the West with regard to
the Soviet Union, which are stiU existing, to be swept
away." - Premier Fierlinger of Ozecho-Slorvakia, OW7I Bulletin, June 1, 194'5.
1

1

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              <text>52&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
ENSLAVERS OF THE CZECH NATION: HOW BENES&#13;
"GOT" STRiBRNf&#13;
(From the September 23, 1955, issue of "BOHEMIA," Czech monthl,y&#13;
published by the Czech Democratic Federalists in Munich, Germany.)&#13;
BY: SIRIUS&#13;
&#13;
Flrequently we fail to notice the flow of hi story. What&#13;
to some of us is iapparently self-evident, that is fo.r many&#13;
veiled by a cu:rtain of forgetfulness 'rund to the younger&#13;
generation is something unknown. Forgetfulness and ignorance have created many Je,g ends, which have fatefully extended into the politic~ development of our natiOlll and&#13;
have placed in ,power forces which had to coMapse again&#13;
and again, ,b ecause they betrayed everything upon which&#13;
the state was built .and that which formed its ideological&#13;
substa:nce. Perhwps dt is ,t imely to remind the Czech public&#13;
about the tirings we had witnessed, so that it might be&#13;
able to form its own judgment and to create its own view.&#13;
When the press reported the death of George Stribrny&#13;
in the Ilava prison last summer (1955), the news shodked&#13;
only those who knew him and witnessed his struggles. Not&#13;
all these struggles were wa,ged "cleverly," ibut they were&#13;
waged to the end which 'Stribmy ,guessed and supposed&#13;
more than he reasonably knew: for the consolidation of&#13;
democracy agai:ns,t aJl'bitrary power and violence.&#13;
George Strib.rny was one of the "men of October 28th."&#13;
This designation was no:t simply ,a n empty phvase. The&#13;
Czecho-Slavak Republic did not come into existence just oult&#13;
of nothing from the minds of statesmen; in the beginning&#13;
its existence was doubtfuJ; aJD.d when T. G. Masaryk went&#13;
out of Austria-Hung ary to attempt to Liberate the Czech&#13;
nation from aibsolutism, he wanted only to gain respect for&#13;
the constitutional rights o.f his nation, which aliready were&#13;
guaranteed by the so-.caJled "October Rescript," in which&#13;
the emperor solemnly :promised rto have ,h imself crowned&#13;
as Czech king in /Prague. While aJbroad Masaryk had no&#13;
other ooorception in the beginning. In a memorandum to&#13;
the British foreign office, dated in April of 1915, T. G.&#13;
Masaryk wrote:&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
53&#13;
&#13;
"We intended to make Bohemia a monarchist State; a Czech Republic is wanted only by a few radicals ••• Either the Allied Powers&#13;
will give us one of their Princes, or there will be a personal union&#13;
between Bohemia and Serbia ••• A Russian dynasty would be in every&#13;
way popular ••. Russia's wishes and plans will have to be of decisive&#13;
influence ••• "&#13;
&#13;
The idea of ,a Czecho~Slovak State ripened only gradually; the republican concept won out only under the influence of American Czec'llis and Slova!ks.. In the Pit,tsburgh&#13;
Agreement, concluded by T. G. ,M asaryk with the American&#13;
Slovaks on May '30, 1918, we read: "The Czecho-.Slovak&#13;
StaJte shall be a Republic ... " This a,greement guaTanteed&#13;
the Slovaks equal rights with the Czech nation, tha,t is,&#13;
their own state government and assembly. Afl later attempts to explain this a;greement as only a private agreement, wihich did not bind in l aw, only sharpened the tensions&#13;
between the Czechs and Slovaros and led to coil!Sequeinces&#13;
which are stiH fresh in our minds.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
Stribrny a Member of the "Committee of Five"&#13;
During the period that .Masaryk traveled abroad, lectured and organlized the legions, Stffbo:ny was mi active&#13;
member of the Vienna parliament where he represented the&#13;
Czech National !Socialist Party, which formerly was called&#13;
the Czech Nationa;l Labor Parity. This party came into being ais 3Jil opposi,tiO!Il paJrty to the inoceasing :influence of&#13;
international social democracy, and its founder was the&#13;
journalist Vaclav Klofac, a convinced anti-militarist. Later&#13;
he became the fi~st Minister ,o f [Defense in the first Cre&lt;!hoS1o:va;k government of iDr. Chades Kramaf.&#13;
Klofac and Stfibrny were the two lea,ding personalities&#13;
of the movement of na;tional workers. During the first&#13;
World WaT the Czech anarchists joined with them, led by&#13;
Dr. iBohumil Vrbensky, a dentist, who was named Min:ister&#13;
of Supplies !in the first Czceho-Slo:va:k government. When&#13;
Kiofac wa;s jailed by the Austrian authorities soon after&#13;
the outbreak of the war and later conrvicted, Stfibmy became the leading personality of the Czech National Socialists and represented ,t hem on the "Committee of Five",the other members being: Dr. Alois Rasin (Czech National&#13;
Democrat), Arrtonirn Svehla (Agrarian), DT. Francis Sou-&#13;
&#13;
54&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
ikup (Soeial Democrat), who was later replaced by deputy&#13;
Haibrman, :and a depresentative of the Czech People's Party&#13;
whkh had separated from the conservative wing represented&#13;
by the perfodicai •~CEoH"; the latter became a member of&#13;
the committee laiter.&#13;
&#13;
Benes Arrives on the Scene&#13;
A plaque on ,t he House of Deputies in the city of&#13;
Prague told one (•I do inot know if it is still there) that&#13;
the Committee of ,F ive, Jin Stribrny among them, had a&#13;
session in tlris house on October 28, 1918, to proclaim the&#13;
first la:w of the Czecho-.Slovak Republic, the proclamatioo.&#13;
of the existence af the new State. This act really was :revolutionary. Even though Czecho-Slovakia was recognized.&#13;
by the Allied Governments, it was not certain when the&#13;
practical transfer of power would take place. The seizure&#13;
of power, which :these men managed, surprised even the&#13;
Czech ,political delegaitfon which at that moment was in&#13;
session in the Beau iRivage Hotel in Geneva, where it had&#13;
gOille with ,t he permission of the Austrian government to&#13;
ma'ke oontacts with the Czech politicians rub.road, among&#13;
whom was a new personality, a young docent of sociology&#13;
at the Prague University, ,D r. Edtwa:rd (Benes.&#13;
Dr. !Benes was a very ambitious and energetic man.&#13;
Originally a member of the Social Democratic iPa:rty, like&#13;
his brother, he became a correspondent for the social-democratic daily •~BRAVIO UIDU" (The People's Right) tn&#13;
Paris, where his lire waJS anything but pleaSia'D!t. IHe learned&#13;
French, English much fater, ibut he could never speak it&#13;
correctly. Benes was attracted ,b y Masaryk's person:ality.&#13;
Masaryk at that ti.me was iintroducing in the Charles University methods of English p:nactical thought, which are&#13;
often mistakenly reg,arded rus same kind of independent&#13;
philosophical system. iMasaryk was quite well known because of his appearrunces before the public, ,b ut he was not&#13;
too well liked. His ireailism rather shocked Ith.an inspired&#13;
Czech 111.ationaliism in-Austria-Hunga ry. A reflection of the&#13;
valiant stand of 'Z ola in France was the participation of&#13;
Masaryk in the Hilsner murder case, in which he proved&#13;
the fals1ty of the so'-'Called "Mrunuscripts," but :it evoked&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
55&#13;
&#13;
a wave of hostility agaJinst him. When deputy Sviil:a sued&#13;
Alllyz, it.he editor of t:he N.ARODNE DISTY, !because he ac..&#13;
cused Sviha of !being an informer for the Austrian police,&#13;
Masaryk took sides with Anyz and so turned the Czech&#13;
N atio:rraJ Socialists against himself.&#13;
Antagonism 'between Masaryk and the N ationai Socialist&#13;
Party had existed fo~ some time. :Since Benes always sfu'essed 3,nd underil!ined the intention and :aims of his master,&#13;
it was expected th:a,t !lie would soon get into an a;rgument&#13;
with ithe National Socialists. 'Dhe fight was a strange one,&#13;
indeed. When it became clear that the Social Democrats&#13;
would not place [)r. Benes on ,t he baJlOlt as their candidaite,&#13;
and since Dr. Benes could not count OIIl being a candidate&#13;
on the -ballot of the National Democrats, because of his&#13;
opposition to ,t hem, there rernamed little '1.ef.t for him to do&#13;
butt try to get on the !ballot as a candidate of the Czech&#13;
NatiOIIlal 1Socialists. At that time it was still thought that&#13;
a minister must be a deputy and that it was necessary to&#13;
uphold the rules of parliamb.'lltary democracy. The National&#13;
Socialist Party, which Benes wanted to 'balilot him, however, was over:whelmingily a .p arty of the workers and not&#13;
intellectuals.&#13;
But danger threatened Benes from another quarter. At&#13;
t hat time Dr. iKramar was quite a power and naJtional hero.&#13;
Benes !mnew that. But he also was determined to wreck the&#13;
prur.ty of Kramar and, if need be, Kramar himself. He set&#13;
himself to the taslk. The group associated with Dr. Jaro,.&#13;
slav Stransky, a yoU1I1g deputy of the National Democratic&#13;
Party, quit the party ,t o, join the so-called "Labor Party"&#13;
which rwas in a transitiOIIlal stage; it ,w as through this party that the g,roup ent&amp;ed the Czech National Socialist&#13;
Party. The first attack within the party was made against&#13;
Stflbrny, directed behind the scenes ,b y !Benes. [t ended&#13;
with the expulsion ,oif Stribrny from the party.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
Stfibrny Organizes the "Castle" Opposition&#13;
Stribmy was hurt, but 111ort helpless. He knew his enemy&#13;
very well.. In Prague, on Jungman iS treet, he began to build&#13;
up his own publishing enterprises; his "Vecemi list" (Eveni1nig News) soon ibecame a feared boulevard newspaper.&#13;
&#13;
56&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Stribrny consolidated practically the entire "am.ti-Castle"&#13;
opposition. 1Many persons who did not like Benes's methods&#13;
were aHowed space in his paper, among them: J. S. Machar,&#13;
fo:mner intimate of T. G. Masaryk, the writer Francis Zavfola, whom Dr. Benes never forgave for criticizing him in&#13;
the novel "For.tinbras," Arnost Dvorak, author of the co..&#13;
medy "Matej 'Poctivy (Honest Matt), and many others.&#13;
Wlhat did the opposition hold . against the ambitious,&#13;
vainglorious Benes? IJ:t would take seve,r al pages just to&#13;
enumerate all reproaches, complaints and charges, but sub.struintially all were concerned with one matter: Benes's&#13;
dictatorial methods, which he developed throughout his life&#13;
as ·a confirmed socialist. Dr. Benes came to parliament from&#13;
the outside; he did not bother attending meetings, did not&#13;
seek favor of the voters, and thought that his foreign activity was fin itself so great that he should be trusted without question in ·all things. If any one doubted the correotness of his views or of his politics and dared to express&#13;
an opposite view, Benes considered that as a sign of enmity. Benes had no wide support among the voters; if the&#13;
system of "binding ballots of candidates" did not exist,&#13;
Benes never would have become a deputy of pa'I'liament.&#13;
Benes was conscious of his unpopularity with the voters&#13;
and his lack of ipoilitical ba:ckg,r ound, and .t his he coil'.Sidoced&#13;
as his greatest personal defioiency. Naturally, this meant,&#13;
if he wanted to stay in power - 3Jlld he certainly did Benes would have to find other methods of disposing of&#13;
his political opponents. Of course, we know he not only&#13;
found them, but also used them quite effectively.&#13;
Whi~e Benes studied in Dijon one name attracted his&#13;
attention: Fouche. The methods applied by th.is man, Na,.&#13;
poleon's police director, !impressed the youthful, ambitious&#13;
Benes. He reC"alled them later when he decided to become&#13;
a power in Czech politics. He knew that a person could be&#13;
destroyed ,pol1ticailly by malicious smeair and vilification;&#13;
and he also learned• how the criminal courts aided Fouche,&#13;
who bought witnesses who were wiHing to testify to anything for pay. Dr. Benes, who tested' this method when he&#13;
rem()IVed Jirak, sectional ,chief o,f the !M:inistry of Trade,&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
57&#13;
&#13;
thought he was strong enough to try it against Stribrny.&#13;
At that itime Dr. K,a,reil Larry in the Ministry oif Justice&#13;
was Benes's righit hand. ·L awyer Drobny, who complained&#13;
of a meagre law practice, !became an all-powerful perso..,&#13;
nalii.ty in the Ministry of Justice and Bene.s's willing servant.&#13;
It was not easy to fabric-a te a ca:se against Stribrny; Benes&#13;
knew he had to be very cautions. Stribrny was a publisher&#13;
and was ba,cked by a small burt very ·a ctive political party;&#13;
Dr. Charles iPergler, American-born Czech and outspoken&#13;
adversary of Benes's policies, rulso joined •t he opposition&#13;
headed by Stribmy.&#13;
Dr. Lany worked haTd and long to come up with something against Stfibmy and ,so to please Benes. Finally, he&#13;
cooked up something which Be111es thought would finish&#13;
Stribrny: Larry said Stribrny had perjured ihimseJf during&#13;
one of his trials. A great number of witnesses was rounded&#13;
up to testify as l.&lt;I1Slbructed by 'Larry; the trial got under&#13;
way ·a nd the press featured it. Everything seemed to be&#13;
running smoothly for Lany until a certain detective was&#13;
called upon to testify; that detective sruid thait he saw Stribrny with the accused Sichrovsky in the Hotel de Saxe in&#13;
Prague; he mentioned the point from which he saw them;&#13;
it was from not rtoo, great a di,s tance, but a corner came&#13;
into the picture. O.vdinary people cannot see a-r ound a corner, but the detective Lany produced as a witness was&#13;
blessed, it •seems, with airOU!Ild-the-corner-sighrt. The court&#13;
at thart time could not 1b e influenced; it did not believe thaJt&#13;
the detective could see aToun.d corners. So the court threw&#13;
out the case against Strib,rny.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
Benes was :fm-ious, but he was by no means through&#13;
with 1Stfibrny. '.I1lwough the staJte pmcUI1ator he made application for -a wrirt of error, which was gra111ted; the request rto ihave the trial tramsferred to another city "to re..,&#13;
move the influence of the iPrague street" was also granted&#13;
- Jihlava was ,given the honor. The second .part of the&#13;
drarrna dragged on .in Ji'hlava · a nd caused no end of worry&#13;
to Stribrny. Benes, however, had nothing to lose, except&#13;
possibly a: ,b it of face. When the trial ended, Stribmy won&#13;
out -again.&#13;
&#13;
58&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
In the meantime, time marched on. Benes was kept&#13;
busy with the cOI11sequences of his polides MJ.d ideological&#13;
constructions. Afraid of 1osing his influence, he still thoug,ht&#13;
that the [Habsburgs were 's till dangerous, so he oreated the&#13;
Little Entente (Yugoslavia, Rumamfa ·a nd Czecho-!Slova'kia:) ,&#13;
wh!ich f,1opped when faced with rthe first crisis. Autocrat&#13;
that he was, Benes ,a lways waited nntil he was forced to&#13;
negotirution or to 0.!g.reement.&#13;
No matter :how we judge the event,s of that time, one&#13;
thing stands: out quite clear and certain: Benes failed to&#13;
;recognize two problems whicli were of vital .importance to&#13;
the Repuiblic - the German p:mblem and the Slovak problem. He thought both would be solved by silence and proCTaJStination. Because he was a man who iregaroed discussion ·a s a personal atta0k, there never were any objective&#13;
discussions about the vital proiblerns orf the country.&#13;
Truthfully speaking, it must be said that Benes did&#13;
not even have the desired understanding for those two problems. He was a man who gloried in moving in foreign circles; he saiw his strength on the diplomatic parquets among&#13;
his a,oquaintances, club, colleagues, wd hi-red journ.ailists.&#13;
Problems of internal politics neveir reaJ.Iy interested Benes.&#13;
Una:ble to tolerate criticism, he contriived the laiw "for the&#13;
protection of the (Republic," which was enthusiastically endorsed by the other "coalition" parties, becall!Se it put a&#13;
perfect muzZJle io n the mouths o.f the opposition. Benes paid&#13;
lip service to democracy, but sinned against it gravely. P&amp;haps inexperience, a ilaclr of honest courage to give in when&#13;
wrong, affiliaiting politics too much with person:al advantages run:d gains, commerc.iali·z ing politics at the ~nse of&#13;
the ideal interests of ,t he nation - all this .became the hot/bed of dictatorial whims which culminated in whait Benes&#13;
began rto do in 1945, when without even consuWng the nation he pu:bli,s:hed -and enforC"ed his famous- "decrees." He&#13;
had become a dictator, something he had always striven&#13;
for. To Benes it did not matter that he served the forces&#13;
which ilater rwere to orvercome him, ibeca:use rthey were more&#13;
powerful, experienced .and tactically more mature. The&#13;
Czech nation tolerated dictatorship. Wea:kened by the war,&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
69&#13;
&#13;
confused and befuddled by the political situation which was&#13;
not presented in its :tirue colors, and led by ·a personality&#13;
who thought he had won the war, the nation hum!bly sue..&#13;
cumbed to serious breaches and limitations of its rights&#13;
and freedoms.&#13;
Benes Finally "Gets" Stribrny&#13;
Just before the war ended, as I recaill, while several&#13;
of us were discussing the future, one of iBenes's very close&#13;
friends Temarked: "Things will not be as they were under&#13;
Masairyk. Benes is a vengeful man and will not forgive any&#13;
one!"&#13;
This characterization of Benes hit me hard later, when&#13;
I learned that Stfibrny was arrested at the Grii.fenberg&#13;
Baths in Silesia. Every one was convinced that this was&#13;
a m~staJke. Wha;t could any o.ne have against Stribrny? During the war he was not active politically ·a t all. Benes nevertheless came out against Stribrny because of his pre ...war&#13;
activity, which did not fall under the notion of "retribution" at all. Stfibrny's journalists, we know, frequently&#13;
criticized Benes, as did many others. The court could not&#13;
resolve whether the criticism was proper or not, but omy&#13;
whether criticism was allowed and whether free criticism&#13;
comes under the notion of "retribution." The defendant's&#13;
counsel, a brilliant iPrague lawyer, was convinced that Stribrny could not be convicted. When the trial was over and&#13;
tha,t lawyer heard the verdiot of life in jail, he wanted to&#13;
give up his law practice. Stfibrny's son, hearing ,t he verdict,&#13;
said only one word: "Dad!" and for that he was accused&#13;
of disturbing public order and later sentenced to 18 months&#13;
in jail.&#13;
Jin 1S tribrny probably could have gotten out of the&#13;
·n ava prison, if he would have requested amnesty. But he&#13;
refused to ask Benes for mercy. Stfibrny was not indicted&#13;
and tried ·e ven by the Oommunists. "The mrun of October&#13;
28th," one of the founders of the Republic, apparently did&#13;
not consider it dignified and proper to ask any one for&#13;
mercy, for pardon for anything that he did not commit,&#13;
for pardon because at the moment his antagonist was&#13;
stronger than he was.&#13;
&#13;
60&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Let people think what they like a;bout Stribrny. One.&#13;
thlng .they ml.l!st admit: he was am enthusiastic and stouthearted man. If he did do wrong, he was willing to admit&#13;
it; often he may have attacked hairder than he should have&#13;
and let himself be guided ,b y personal bitterness more than&#13;
by political motive, but he was one orf the few moo who&#13;
did found the Republic. The founders of states of civilized&#13;
nations ·a re usualty glorified by monuments and a;rticles in&#13;
school reade:ra. But Sitribrrny was allowed to die in jail. A&#13;
shame? !indeed, it was a shame, but it was not Stribrny's&#13;
shame.&#13;
Getting rid of opponents. by any and all methods leads&#13;
in ,p olitics to dictatorship. As soon as "liberaito:ris" cha:nge&#13;
into enslavers of their nation, it is up to the na,tion to defend its rig,hts.. It cannot stand idly on the sidelines. Tihe&#13;
ipeople who do that beair the responsibility for the victims&#13;
of dictatorship. Stribrny was one of the victims. His deeply&#13;
furrowed countenance will be long remembered iby those&#13;
who knew him. His high forehead was crowned with a rich&#13;
set of hair - ,w avy, beautiful lrair. 'Dhe physic,a l personality&#13;
of Stribrny is slowly disappearing in the chasms of oblivion,&#13;
ibut hiis hair still waves as if it were a li'Viing torch!&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
WHO SAID IT?&#13;
&#13;
"President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his&#13;
Irutest statemenJts rulways stressed, tiliait ouir pact of a.Hiance&#13;
&#13;
with Soviet Russia and ouir friendshiip with other S1 av Ill8.tions must not encrooch on o.ur friendly and cordirul relations with other democratic states. This is .t he natuiral desire, shared by an enormous ma;jority of oor people, and&#13;
nothing .p revents us from keeping the comidence of the&#13;
democratic states and stroogthenmg and deepening OUT&#13;
friendship with ouT great western Allies. Moscow, too,&#13;
wanlts tio ful~ow thi s line of poliic y. rt will., however, be necessary for certain prejudices of the West with regard to&#13;
the Soviet Union, which are stiU existing, to be swept&#13;
away." - Premier Fierlinger of Ozecho-Slorvakia, OW7I Bulletin, June 1, 194'5.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
</text>
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Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 2 (19), June 1956&#13;
pp. 52-60</text>
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

61

Kerner's "Czechoslovakia" (Cont'd.)
HISTORY OR PROPAGANDA?
P.A.B1ROB.A.K

When the Syrovy government was faced with "the
accomplished fact of the Munich Agreement, it had to
make the supreme choice": accept Munich, or the death of
the Czecho..1Slovak nation. We know what happened. But
Mr. Graham says:
"The choice ended the possibility of maintaining the regime of
democracy and organized multi-1.&gt;arty Hfe w1hich had
made Czecho-S1ovakia renowned throughout the world, and occasioned
the departure from public life of Pres:ident Benes."
equalitarian

Is there any doubt in any informed person's mind that
Mr. Graham can say the nicest, even though not exactly
truthful, things in the nicest way about Dr. Edward Benes and his "equalitarian democracy"? Benes capitulated
to Munich without consulting Parliame:rrt, hence acted unconstitutionally, but Mr. Graham would have us !believe
that the Symvy government did the capitulating. Munich
did "occasion the deiparture of Benes from public life" as Graham puts it - hut we have it from several Czechs,
who were members of the Prague Parliament, that it was
rather a "forced" departure to esca,pe punishment for Munich, for which they held him responsilble. In a manner
typical of Kerner's "Ozecho:slova:kia," Mr. Graham concludes his chapter on ":Parties and Politics" with these
words:
"Politically, the regime which was born of the lifelong endeavor of Masaryk and Benes to found institutionally the resurgent
Czechoslovak nationality passed out of ex&lt;i.stence on October ,5, 1938,
betmyed but not defeated . For thos e of us who have survived its
passing, the ironic tra,gedy is that its chastisement brought neither
peace nor healing to tJhe Danubian and central European world."

For those of us who really knew the regime of Masary,k and Benes, and for the Czechs and Slovaks who were
mi'Sled by it or suffered under it, let it be said that the
world would :be iby far the better for it had the OzechoSlovak business, the political monstrosity that was CzechoSlovaikia, never /been born. We know that Benes resigned

�62

SLOVAKIA

on October 5, 1938, after he betrayed not only the Slovaks, ,b ut also his own Czech nation to Hitler. We also
know that the same Benes five years later betrayed the
nations of Czecho-1Slcwakia the second time, this time to
Stalin, when he formally sold them out with the OzechSoviet Treaty of December 12, 1943, so that he might return as "president" of Czecho-Slcwa,kia again and smite
all those who o.pposed his anti-Christian and pro-'So,v iet
policies. To Benes revenge was sweet in 1945. Three years
later, before he died, Benes wailed again that he was betrayed, this time not ·b y the Slovaks, Poles, Germans, Magyars, Catholics and all anti..,Marxist socialists, but by
Moscow and the Czech communists under Gottwald. No
honor among thieves!
CHAPTER IX - "Czechoslovakia and Her Minorities"
- by Joseph S. Roucek, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science and Sociology, and Chairman, Department of
political Science, Hofstra College; member, editorial board,
World Affairs Inter,preter; knight, Order of the Star (Rumania), Crown of Jugoslavia; author of The Working of the
Minorities System under the League of Nations (Prague,
1928); Contemporary World Politics (1939); etc.
The bibliography cited by Roucek tells us at a glance
what we might expect; it really is a roster of Czech propagandists. The Slovaks, not considered a "minority," do not
even get as much play as the minorities, who caused quite
some concern "when Czecho-Slovakia renewed her independent existence as a state in 1918" (p. 171). Of course, Roucek,
like other Czech and pro-Czech historians, simply presumes
that Czecho-Slovakia, at one time or another, did in fact
exist and, hence, in 1918 simply "renewed" her independence.
This, however, has no historical basis in fact. It is strictly
Czech propaganda.
"Czecho-Slovakia accepted without hesitation international responsibility for the protection of minorities as an integral part of the Constitution."

Benes, like the Magyars of Hungary, declared that
Czecho-Slovakia would grant all rights to her minorities
when the question was broached at the Paris Peace Con-

�SLOVAKIA

63

ference. What happened in reality is something else. We
remember how nice the Hungarian Constitution read, too.
Roucek, however, seems to forget exactly how the minorities
were treated by Prague; he forgets, too, that the Slovaks,
who had joined the Czechs to form a common political state
as "equal partners," were just as badly off, if not worse,
than the minorities themselves.
The statistics given on pp. 174-176 tell us how many
Magyars, Germans, Ruthenians, Poles, Jews, Rumanians,
etc., there were in Czecho-Slovakia, how many deputies they
had in parliament, the number of schools provided for them,
but no statistics on the Slovaks and Czechs. Roucek lumps
them together so that talk might be made about a "CzechoSlovak majority." This tendency is followed by all Czech
propagandists; it is supposed to conceal the fact that the
Czechs were in fact the minority people in Czecho-Slovakia,
that is, there were more non-Czech people in it.
"Contrary to the popular conception, Czecho-Slovakia did not
acquire the Sudete Germans from modern Germany. The Slav tribes
which settled during the fifth and sixth centuries on the territories,
which were to become the foundation of the Czech (Bohemian) State,
were separated from their German neighbors by mountain ranges.
But they were continually in contact'' (p. 176).

It is highly questionable whether Roucek knew what
"popular" conception concerning the Sudeten Germans was.
If he did, then he should have gone a bit further and told
us why it was wrong. To what country did the Sudetenland
belong? The Slav tribes that settled there might, in a sense,
be considered the foundation of a Czech state, but what is
the purpose of the parenthetical "Bohemian"? It is obvious
that Roucek wants readers of Kerner's "Czechoslovakia"
to believe that the terms "Czech" and "Bohemian" are synonymous. But we know that the Slav tribes (the ancestors
of the Czechs) settled on the territory of the Boii, which was
known as BOHEMIA at that time and not as any CZECH
state. Germans had settled there, too; they did not have to
wait for invitations from "Czech" princes or kings, either,
as Roucek states. And when a Czech did become ruler of
Bohemia, he never could get along without the Germans.
"Hence Czechs and Germans lived together for eight centuries in

�64
Bohemia .
out clearly the latter did
pendence" (p.

SLOVAKIA
But throughout the history of Bohemia one fact stands
the Czechs got along with the Germans only so long as
not try to become dominant and overthrow Czech inde·
177).

What Czech independence, and when? How long were
the Czechs really dominant in Bohemia? There certainly are
many facts that stand out more clearly than the one mentioned, but they are omitted by Roucek for reasons obvious
to informed observer,s. He is simply doing a job for the
Czechs, who, he says
"learned their lesson from past experiences. After the disastrous
Battle of White Moun tain, which brought the Czechs under the dominance of Austria, the German element ul timately reduced the Czechs
to a nation of servants and doorkeepers, despised in their own homes
by their German masters. The struggle went on with the reawakening
of the Czech nation in the nineteenth century" (p. 177 ).

By whom were the Czechs dominated before the Battle
of White Mountain, if not by Austria and the Germans? Is
it not a fact that the Czechs even after their "reawakening "
wished to be dominated by Austria (the Habsburgs)? Palacky, the Czech historian who was so greatly admired and
followed by Masaryk and Benes, would have invented Austria
if she did not exist! The Battle of White Mountain was not
a nationalistic, but strictly a religious and dynastic affair.
The fact is that the Czechs would still be under Austria, if
the Habsburgs would have granted them autonomy (states'
rights) within the empire, the only thing they really fought
for until Masaryk and Benes messed up everything during
World War I.
(•More coming)
WHO SAID IT?

"Deviating :threes shall be jailed. . . Devi•a ting forces
are todary er1adicalted or liquidated. Today only the Democrats and Communists, and members of oither political parties (of .the NaJtional Fronlt) bear the respons~bility of detemnli.ning which forces shaJ11 control S10V'akia and in which
direction Sl(}IVakia shall go." - (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, ViceChairman of the Executive Committee of the "Co11n.~il of
Free Ozoohoslovrukia,." CAS, Bratislava, No. 130, 194.S~.

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1516">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA

61

Kerner's "Czechoslovakia" (Cont'd.)
HISTORY OR PROPAGANDA?
P.A.B1ROB.A.K

When the Syrovy government was faced with "the
accomplished fact of the Munich Agreement, it had to
make the supreme choice": accept Munich, or the death of
the Czecho..1Slovak nation. We know what happened. But
Mr. Graham says:
"The choice ended the possibility of maintaining the regime of
democracy and organized multi-1.&gt;arty Hfe w1hich had
made Czecho-S1ovakia renowned throughout the world, and occasioned
the departure from public life of Pres:ident Benes."
equalitarian

Is there any doubt in any informed person's mind that
Mr. Graham can say the nicest, even though not exactly
truthful, things in the nicest way about Dr. Edward Benes and his "equalitarian democracy"? Benes capitulated
to Munich without consulting Parliame:rrt, hence acted unconstitutionally, but Mr. Graham would have us !believe
that the Symvy government did the capitulating. Munich
did "occasion the deiparture of Benes from public life" as Graham puts it - hut we have it from several Czechs,
who were members of the Prague Parliament, that it was
rather a "forced" departure to esca,pe punishment for Munich, for which they held him responsilble. In a manner
typical of Kerner's "Ozecho:slova:kia," Mr. Graham concludes his chapter on ":Parties and Politics" with these
words:
"Politically, the regime which was born of the lifelong endeavor of Masaryk and Benes to found institutionally the resurgent
Czechoslovak nationality passed out of ex&lt;i.stence on October ,5, 1938,
betmyed but not defeated . For thos e of us who have survived its
passing, the ironic tra,gedy is that its chastisement brought neither
peace nor healing to tJhe Danubian and central European world."

For those of us who really knew the regime of Masary,k and Benes, and for the Czechs and Slovaks who were
mi'Sled by it or suffered under it, let it be said that the
world would :be iby far the better for it had the OzechoSlovak business, the political monstrosity that was CzechoSlovaikia, never /been born. We know that Benes resigned

�62

SLOVAKIA

on October 5, 1938, after he betrayed not only the Slovaks, ,b ut also his own Czech nation to Hitler. We also
know that the same Benes five years later betrayed the
nations of Czecho-1Slcwakia the second time, this time to
Stalin, when he formally sold them out with the OzechSoviet Treaty of December 12, 1943, so that he might return as "president" of Czecho-Slcwa,kia again and smite
all those who o.pposed his anti-Christian and pro-'So,v iet
policies. To Benes revenge was sweet in 1945. Three years
later, before he died, Benes wailed again that he was betrayed, this time not ·b y the Slovaks, Poles, Germans, Magyars, Catholics and all anti..,Marxist socialists, but by
Moscow and the Czech communists under Gottwald. No
honor among thieves!
CHAPTER IX - "Czechoslovakia and Her Minorities"
- by Joseph S. Roucek, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science and Sociology, and Chairman, Department of
political Science, Hofstra College; member, editorial board,
World Affairs Inter,preter; knight, Order of the Star (Rumania), Crown of Jugoslavia; author of The Working of the
Minorities System under the League of Nations (Prague,
1928); Contemporary World Politics (1939); etc.
The bibliography cited by Roucek tells us at a glance
what we might expect; it really is a roster of Czech propagandists. The Slovaks, not considered a "minority," do not
even get as much play as the minorities, who caused quite
some concern "when Czecho-Slovakia renewed her independent existence as a state in 1918" (p. 171). Of course, Roucek,
like other Czech and pro-Czech historians, simply presumes
that Czecho-Slovakia, at one time or another, did in fact
exist and, hence, in 1918 simply "renewed" her independence.
This, however, has no historical basis in fact. It is strictly
Czech propaganda.
"Czecho-Slovakia accepted without hesitation international responsibility for the protection of minorities as an integral part of the Constitution."

Benes, like the Magyars of Hungary, declared that
Czecho-Slovakia would grant all rights to her minorities
when the question was broached at the Paris Peace Con-

�SLOVAKIA

63

ference. What happened in reality is something else. We
remember how nice the Hungarian Constitution read, too.
Roucek, however, seems to forget exactly how the minorities
were treated by Prague; he forgets, too, that the Slovaks,
who had joined the Czechs to form a common political state
as "equal partners," were just as badly off, if not worse,
than the minorities themselves.
The statistics given on pp. 174-176 tell us how many
Magyars, Germans, Ruthenians, Poles, Jews, Rumanians,
etc., there were in Czecho-Slovakia, how many deputies they
had in parliament, the number of schools provided for them,
but no statistics on the Slovaks and Czechs. Roucek lumps
them together so that talk might be made about a "CzechoSlovak majority." This tendency is followed by all Czech
propagandists; it is supposed to conceal the fact that the
Czechs were in fact the minority people in Czecho-Slovakia,
that is, there were more non-Czech people in it.
"Contrary to the popular conception, Czecho-Slovakia did not
acquire the Sudete Germans from modern Germany. The Slav tribes
which settled during the fifth and sixth centuries on the territories,
which were to become the foundation of the Czech (Bohemian) State,
were separated from their German neighbors by mountain ranges.
But they were continually in contact'' (p. 176).

It is highly questionable whether Roucek knew what
"popular" conception concerning the Sudeten Germans was.
If he did, then he should have gone a bit further and told
us why it was wrong. To what country did the Sudetenland
belong? The Slav tribes that settled there might, in a sense,
be considered the foundation of a Czech state, but what is
the purpose of the parenthetical "Bohemian"? It is obvious
that Roucek wants readers of Kerner's "Czechoslovakia"
to believe that the terms "Czech" and "Bohemian" are synonymous. But we know that the Slav tribes (the ancestors
of the Czechs) settled on the territory of the Boii, which was
known as BOHEMIA at that time and not as any CZECH
state. Germans had settled there, too; they did not have to
wait for invitations from "Czech" princes or kings, either,
as Roucek states. And when a Czech did become ruler of
Bohemia, he never could get along without the Germans.
"Hence Czechs and Germans lived together for eight centuries in

�64
Bohemia .
out clearly the latter did
pendence" (p.

SLOVAKIA
But throughout the history of Bohemia one fact stands
the Czechs got along with the Germans only so long as
not try to become dominant and overthrow Czech inde·
177).

What Czech independence, and when? How long were
the Czechs really dominant in Bohemia? There certainly are
many facts that stand out more clearly than the one mentioned, but they are omitted by Roucek for reasons obvious
to informed observer,s. He is simply doing a job for the
Czechs, who, he says
"learned their lesson from past experiences. After the disastrous
Battle of White Moun tain, which brought the Czechs under the dominance of Austria, the German element ul timately reduced the Czechs
to a nation of servants and doorkeepers, despised in their own homes
by their German masters. The struggle went on with the reawakening
of the Czech nation in the nineteenth century" (p. 177 ).

By whom were the Czechs dominated before the Battle
of White Mountain, if not by Austria and the Germans? Is
it not a fact that the Czechs even after their "reawakening "
wished to be dominated by Austria (the Habsburgs)? Palacky, the Czech historian who was so greatly admired and
followed by Masaryk and Benes, would have invented Austria
if she did not exist! The Battle of White Mountain was not
a nationalistic, but strictly a religious and dynastic affair.
The fact is that the Czechs would still be under Austria, if
the Habsburgs would have granted them autonomy (states'
rights) within the empire, the only thing they really fought
for until Masaryk and Benes messed up everything during
World War I.
(•More coming)
WHO SAID IT?

"Deviating :threes shall be jailed. . . Devi•a ting forces
are todary er1adicalted or liquidated. Today only the Democrats and Communists, and members of oither political parties (of .the NaJtional Fronlt) bear the respons~bility of detemnli.ning which forces shaJ11 control S10V'akia and in which
direction Sl(}IVakia shall go." - (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, ViceChairman of the Executive Committee of the "Co11n.~il of
Free Ozoohoslovrukia,." CAS, Bratislava, No. 130, 194.S~.

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                  <text>1956, Vol. 6</text>
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              <elementTextContainer>
                <elementText elementTextId="23">
                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;</text>
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
61&#13;
&#13;
Kerner's "Czechoslovakia" (Cont'd.)&#13;
HISTORY OR PROPAGANDA?&#13;
P.A.B1ROB.A.K&#13;
&#13;
When the Syrovy government was faced with "the&#13;
accomplished fact of the Munich Agreement, it had to&#13;
make the supreme choice": accept Munich, or the death of&#13;
the Czecho..1Slovak nation. We know what happened. But&#13;
Mr. Graham says:&#13;
"The choice ended the possibility of maintaining the regime of&#13;
democracy and organized multi-1.&gt;arty Hfe w1hich had&#13;
made Czecho-S1ovakia renowned throughout the world, and occasioned&#13;
the departure from public life of Pres:ident Benes."&#13;
equalitarian&#13;
&#13;
Is there any doubt in any informed person's mind that&#13;
Mr. Graham can say the nicest, even though not exactly&#13;
truthful, things in the nicest way about Dr. Edward Benes and his "equalitarian democracy"? Benes capitulated&#13;
to Munich without consulting Parliame:rrt, hence acted unconstitutionally, but Mr. Graham would have us !believe&#13;
that the Symvy government did the capitulating. Munich&#13;
did "occasion the deiparture of Benes from public life" as Graham puts it - hut we have it from several Czechs,&#13;
who were members of the Prague Parliament, that it was&#13;
rather a "forced" departure to esca,pe punishment for Munich, for which they held him responsilble. In a manner&#13;
typical of Kerner's "Ozecho:slova:kia," Mr. Graham concludes his chapter on ":Parties and Politics" with these&#13;
words:&#13;
"Politically, the regime which was born of the lifelong endeavor of Masaryk and Benes to found institutionally the resurgent&#13;
Czechoslovak nationality passed out of ex&lt;i.stence on October ,5, 1938,&#13;
betmyed but not defeated . For thos e of us who have survived its&#13;
passing, the ironic tra,gedy is that its chastisement brought neither&#13;
peace nor healing to tJhe Danubian and central European world."&#13;
&#13;
For those of us who really knew the regime of Masary,k and Benes, and for the Czechs and Slovaks who were&#13;
mi'Sled by it or suffered under it, let it be said that the&#13;
world would :be iby far the better for it had the OzechoSlovak business, the political monstrosity that was CzechoSlovaikia, never /been born. We know that Benes resigned&#13;
&#13;
62&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
on October 5, 1938, after he betrayed not only the Slovaks, ,b ut also his own Czech nation to Hitler. We also&#13;
know that the same Benes five years later betrayed the&#13;
nations of Czecho-1Slcwakia the second time, this time to&#13;
Stalin, when he formally sold them out with the OzechSoviet Treaty of December 12, 1943, so that he might return as "president" of Czecho-Slcwa,kia again and smite&#13;
all those who o.pposed his anti-Christian and pro-'So,v iet&#13;
policies. To Benes revenge was sweet in 1945. Three years&#13;
later, before he died, Benes wailed again that he was betrayed, this time not ·b y the Slovaks, Poles, Germans, Magyars, Catholics and all anti..,Marxist socialists, but by&#13;
Moscow and the Czech communists under Gottwald. No&#13;
honor among thieves!&#13;
CHAPTER IX - "Czechoslovakia and Her Minorities"&#13;
- by Joseph S. Roucek, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science and Sociology, and Chairman, Department of&#13;
political Science, Hofstra College; member, editorial board,&#13;
World Affairs Inter,preter; knight, Order of the Star (Rumania), Crown of Jugoslavia; author of The Working of the&#13;
Minorities System under the League of Nations (Prague,&#13;
1928); Contemporary World Politics (1939); etc.&#13;
The bibliography cited by Roucek tells us at a glance&#13;
what we might expect; it really is a roster of Czech propagandists. The Slovaks, not considered a "minority," do not&#13;
even get as much play as the minorities, who caused quite&#13;
some concern "when Czecho-Slovakia renewed her independent existence as a state in 1918" (p. 171). Of course, Roucek,&#13;
like other Czech and pro-Czech historians, simply presumes&#13;
that Czecho-Slovakia, at one time or another, did in fact&#13;
exist and, hence, in 1918 simply "renewed" her independence.&#13;
This, however, has no historical basis in fact. It is strictly&#13;
Czech propaganda.&#13;
"Czecho-Slovakia accepted without hesitation international responsibility for the protection of minorities as an integral part of the Constitution."&#13;
&#13;
Benes, like the Magyars of Hungary, declared that&#13;
Czecho-Slovakia would grant all rights to her minorities&#13;
when the question was broached at the Paris Peace Con-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
63&#13;
&#13;
ference. What happened in reality is something else. We&#13;
remember how nice the Hungarian Constitution read, too.&#13;
Roucek, however, seems to forget exactly how the minorities&#13;
were treated by Prague; he forgets, too, that the Slovaks,&#13;
who had joined the Czechs to form a common political state&#13;
as "equal partners," were just as badly off, if not worse,&#13;
than the minorities themselves.&#13;
The statistics given on pp. 174-176 tell us how many&#13;
Magyars, Germans, Ruthenians, Poles, Jews, Rumanians,&#13;
etc., there were in Czecho-Slovakia, how many deputies they&#13;
had in parliament, the number of schools provided for them,&#13;
but no statistics on the Slovaks and Czechs. Roucek lumps&#13;
them together so that talk might be made about a "CzechoSlovak majority." This tendency is followed by all Czech&#13;
propagandists; it is supposed to conceal the fact that the&#13;
Czechs were in fact the minority people in Czecho-Slovakia,&#13;
that is, there were more non-Czech people in it.&#13;
"Contrary to the popular conception, Czecho-Slovakia did not&#13;
acquire the Sudete Germans from modern Germany. The Slav tribes&#13;
which settled during the fifth and sixth centuries on the territories,&#13;
which were to become the foundation of the Czech (Bohemian) State,&#13;
were separated from their German neighbors by mountain ranges.&#13;
But they were continually in contact'' (p. 176).&#13;
&#13;
It is highly questionable whether Roucek knew what&#13;
"popular" conception concerning the Sudeten Germans was.&#13;
If he did, then he should have gone a bit further and told&#13;
us why it was wrong. To what country did the Sudetenland&#13;
belong? The Slav tribes that settled there might, in a sense,&#13;
be considered the foundation of a Czech state, but what is&#13;
the purpose of the parenthetical "Bohemian"? It is obvious&#13;
that Roucek wants readers of Kerner's "Czechoslovakia"&#13;
to believe that the terms "Czech" and "Bohemian" are synonymous. But we know that the Slav tribes (the ancestors&#13;
of the Czechs) settled on the territory of the Boii, which was&#13;
known as BOHEMIA at that time and not as any CZECH&#13;
state. Germans had settled there, too; they did not have to&#13;
wait for invitations from "Czech" princes or kings, either,&#13;
as Roucek states. And when a Czech did become ruler of&#13;
Bohemia, he never could get along without the Germans.&#13;
"Hence Czechs and Germans lived together for eight centuries in&#13;
&#13;
64&#13;
Bohemia .&#13;
out clearly the latter did&#13;
pendence" (p.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
But throughout the history of Bohemia one fact stands&#13;
the Czechs got along with the Germans only so long as&#13;
not try to become dominant and overthrow Czech inde·&#13;
177).&#13;
&#13;
What Czech independence, and when? How long were&#13;
the Czechs really dominant in Bohemia? There certainly are&#13;
many facts that stand out more clearly than the one mentioned, but they are omitted by Roucek for reasons obvious&#13;
to informed observer,s. He is simply doing a job for the&#13;
Czechs, who, he says&#13;
"learned their lesson from past experiences. After the disastrous&#13;
Battle of White Moun tain, which brought the Czechs under the dominance of Austria, the German element ul timately reduced the Czechs&#13;
to a nation of servants and doorkeepers, despised in their own homes&#13;
by their German masters. The struggle went on with the reawakening&#13;
of the Czech nation in the nineteenth century" (p. 177 ).&#13;
&#13;
By whom were the Czechs dominated before the Battle&#13;
of White Mountain, if not by Austria and the Germans? Is&#13;
it not a fact that the Czechs even after their "reawakening "&#13;
wished to be dominated by Austria (the Habsburgs)? Palacky, the Czech historian who was so greatly admired and&#13;
followed by Masaryk and Benes, would have invented Austria&#13;
if she did not exist! The Battle of White Mountain was not&#13;
a nationalistic, but strictly a religious and dynastic affair.&#13;
The fact is that the Czechs would still be under Austria, if&#13;
the Habsburgs would have granted them autonomy (states'&#13;
rights) within the empire, the only thing they really fought&#13;
for until Masaryk and Benes messed up everything during&#13;
World War I.&#13;
(•More coming)&#13;
WHO SAID IT?&#13;
&#13;
"Deviating :threes shall be jailed. . . Devi•a ting forces&#13;
are todary er1adicalted or liquidated. Today only the Democrats and Communists, and members of oither political parties (of .the NaJtional Fronlt) bear the respons~bility of detemnli.ning which forces shaJ11 control S10V'akia and in which&#13;
direction Sl(}IVakia shall go." - (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, ViceChairman of the Executive Committee of the "Co11n.~il of&#13;
Free Ozoohoslovrukia,." CAS, Bratislava, No. 130, 194.S~.&#13;
&#13;
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                <text>P. A. Hrobak&#13;
Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 2 (19), June 1956&#13;
pp. 61-64</text>
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                <text>Hrobak, Philip Anthony, 1904-1964</text>
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                <text>continued from &lt;a href="/items/show/222"&gt;Vol. 6, No. 1 (18), pp. 57-64&lt;/a&gt; &lt;br /&gt;continues in &lt;a href="/items/show/197"&gt;Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), pp. 88-96&lt;/a&gt;</text>
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                    <text>Officers of the Slovak League of America
(Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio
•
Hono r ary President

Franc es L. Mizenko

3756 Lee !Road
Cleveland 28, Ohio

Dr. Peter P. Hletko

1943 W. -ISth Street
Chicago ~. Illinois

IStephen

President
A . Hroba k

Ph i l i p

P. 0. Box 150, Middletown, Pa.

Andrew J . Hamrock

61 Wood-land Avenue
Campbell , Ohio

Vice-President
Jacob Kocis

ADVISORY COUNCIL
Mic hael J. Vargovi c h

15n -- 167th Street
Hammond, Ind.

National President
First Catholic S lornk Cnion

Vice-President
Julia K rajcovlc

Hel en Kocan

1648 W. 18th St., Chicago 8, 111.

National President
First Catholic Slovak
Ladies Union

Recording Secreta.ry
Fra nc is

J . Tkach

173 N. Main Street
\ Vilkes-Barre, Pa.

H rusovsky

2900 East Boulevard
Cleveland 4, Ohio

Pau l Fallat

, ational President
Slovak Catholic Sokol

Secretary-Treasurer

Stephen J. Tkach

Milan V . Blazek

National President
Penna. S lovak Uni on

4922 S. Leclaire Avenue
Chicago 38, Ill .
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Cath erine

Paul P. Jamriska

810 Montooth Street
Pitts burgh 10, Pa.

Volosin

N ati onaJ President
Ladies Pennsylvania
Slovak Uni on
John Rozbor i l

Joseph Prusa

205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J .

Nati onal President
Slovak Catholic Cadet Union

SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Aff il iated with th e Slovak League of America )
JEDNOTA

SLOVENSKA OBRANA

ZENSKA JEDNOTA

:\fiddletown, Pa.

Scranton, Pa.

Cleveland, Ohio

BRATSTVO

SLOVENSKE

NOVINY

ZORNICKA

Cleveland, Ohio

Chicago, Ill.

K ATOLiCKY SOKOL

SVORNOST

OSADNE HLASY

Passaic, N . J .

Whitaker, Pa.

Chicago, Ill .

Wi lkes-Barre, Pa.

SLOVAK V AMERIK E

Whiting, Ind.

�1856 - 1956
LOUIS STUR: Father of Modern Slovak Nationalism

GANSER LIBRAR"Y

·~!~~~~~X!·~~~ ~1:ATE__f9!-1EG£

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1508">
                    <text>Officers of the Slovak League of America
(Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio
•
Hono r ary President

Franc es L. Mizenko

3756 Lee !Road
Cleveland 28, Ohio

Dr. Peter P. Hletko

1943 W. -ISth Street
Chicago ~. Illinois

IStephen

President
A . Hroba k

Ph i l i p

P. 0. Box 150, Middletown, Pa.

Andrew J . Hamrock

61 Wood-land Avenue
Campbell , Ohio

Vice-President
Jacob Kocis

ADVISORY COUNCIL
Mic hael J. Vargovi c h

15n -- 167th Street
Hammond, Ind.

National President
First Catholic S lornk Cnion

Vice-President
Julia K rajcovlc

Hel en Kocan

1648 W. 18th St., Chicago 8, 111.

National President
First Catholic Slovak
Ladies Union

Recording Secreta.ry
Fra nc is

J . Tkach

173 N. Main Street
\ Vilkes-Barre, Pa.

H rusovsky

2900 East Boulevard
Cleveland 4, Ohio

Pau l Fallat

, ational President
Slovak Catholic Sokol

Secretary-Treasurer

Stephen J. Tkach

Milan V . Blazek

National President
Penna. S lovak Uni on

4922 S. Leclaire Avenue
Chicago 38, Ill .
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Cath erine

Paul P. Jamriska

810 Montooth Street
Pitts burgh 10, Pa.

Volosin

N ati onaJ President
Ladies Pennsylvania
Slovak Uni on
John Rozbor i l

Joseph Prusa

205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J .

Nati onal President
Slovak Catholic Cadet Union

SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Aff il iated with th e Slovak League of America )
JEDNOTA

SLOVENSKA OBRANA

ZENSKA JEDNOTA

:\fiddletown, Pa.

Scranton, Pa.

Cleveland, Ohio

BRATSTVO

SLOVENSKE

NOVINY

ZORNICKA

Cleveland, Ohio

Chicago, Ill.

K ATOLiCKY SOKOL

SVORNOST

OSADNE HLASY

Passaic, N . J .

Whitaker, Pa.

Chicago, Ill .

Wi lkes-Barre, Pa.

SLOVAK V AMERIK E

Whiting, Ind.

�1856 - 1956
LOUIS STUR: Father of Modern Slovak Nationalism

GANSER LIBRAR"Y

·~!~~~~~X!·~~~ ~1:ATE__f9!-1EG£

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(Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio&#13;
•&#13;
Hono r ary President&#13;
&#13;
Franc es L. Mizenko&#13;
&#13;
3756 Lee !Road&#13;
Cleveland 28, Ohio&#13;
&#13;
Dr. Peter P. Hletko&#13;
&#13;
1943 W. -ISth Street&#13;
Chicago ~. Illinois&#13;
&#13;
IStephen&#13;
&#13;
President&#13;
A . Hroba k&#13;
&#13;
Ph i l i p&#13;
&#13;
P. 0. Box 150, Middletown, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
Andrew J . Hamrock&#13;
&#13;
61 Wood-land Avenue&#13;
Campbell , Ohio&#13;
&#13;
Vice-President&#13;
Jacob Kocis&#13;
&#13;
ADVISORY COUNCIL&#13;
Mic hael J. Vargovi c h&#13;
&#13;
15n -- 167th Street&#13;
Hammond, Ind.&#13;
&#13;
National President&#13;
First Catholic S lornk Cnion&#13;
&#13;
Vice-President&#13;
Julia K rajcovlc&#13;
&#13;
Hel en Kocan&#13;
&#13;
1648 W. 18th St., Chicago 8, 111.&#13;
&#13;
National President&#13;
First Catholic Slovak&#13;
Ladies Union&#13;
&#13;
Recording Secreta.ry&#13;
Fra nc is&#13;
&#13;
J . Tkach&#13;
&#13;
173 N. Main Street&#13;
\ Vilkes-Barre, Pa.&#13;
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H rusovsky&#13;
&#13;
2900 East Boulevard&#13;
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&#13;
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, ational President&#13;
Slovak Catholic Sokol&#13;
&#13;
Secretary-Treasurer&#13;
&#13;
Stephen J. Tkach&#13;
&#13;
Milan V . Blazek&#13;
&#13;
National President&#13;
Penna. S lovak Uni on&#13;
&#13;
4922 S. Leclaire Avenue&#13;
Chicago 38, Ill .&#13;
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE&#13;
&#13;
Cath erine&#13;
&#13;
Paul P. Jamriska&#13;
&#13;
810 Montooth Street&#13;
Pitts burgh 10, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
Volosin&#13;
&#13;
N ati onaJ President&#13;
Ladies Pennsylvania&#13;
Slovak Uni on&#13;
John Rozbor i l&#13;
&#13;
Joseph Prusa&#13;
&#13;
205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J .&#13;
&#13;
Nati onal President&#13;
Slovak Catholic Cadet Union&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS&#13;
( Aff il iated with th e Slovak League of America )&#13;
JEDNOTA&#13;
&#13;
SLOVENSKA OBRANA&#13;
&#13;
ZENSKA JEDNOTA&#13;
&#13;
:\fiddletown, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
Scranton, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
Cleveland, Ohio&#13;
&#13;
BRATSTVO&#13;
&#13;
SLOVENSKE&#13;
&#13;
NOVINY&#13;
&#13;
ZORNICKA&#13;
&#13;
Cleveland, Ohio&#13;
&#13;
Chicago, Ill.&#13;
&#13;
K ATOLiCKY SOKOL&#13;
&#13;
SVORNOST&#13;
&#13;
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&#13;
Passaic, N . J .&#13;
&#13;
Whitaker, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
Chicago, Ill .&#13;
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Wi lkes-Barre, Pa.&#13;
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SLOVAK V AMERIK E&#13;
&#13;
Whiting, Ind.&#13;
&#13;
1856 - 1956&#13;
LOUIS STUR: Father of Modern Slovak Nationalism&#13;
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GANSER LIBRAR"Y&#13;
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·~!~~~~~X!·~~~ ~1:ATE__f9!-1EG£&#13;
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                    <text>VO L. V I

SEPTEMBER - DECEMBER , 1956

NO . 3-4 ( 20-21)

IN THIS ISSUE:
R. I. P . Dr. Fra n c is H rusovsky ,
Monsignor Jo zef Tiso -

Controv ersial Personality

-

Cz ec h o-S l o vaki a or Czechos lo vakii!l.
S t,~r a n d the Slov a k In depe nd e n ce Moveme nt
B en es a nd t h e Communization of Czecho-S lo vak i a
~saryk ' ~ D(}-IQ:l9oPaoy

aiqs

i!ile"alt+a

Why Di d Benes Resi gn in 1938?
M emora ndum
Th e History of S lovak i a
1856 -

Dr. Samu e l Cz a mb el -

1956

Castles of S lovak i a : Starohrad ( Th e Old Cast l e) of Li ptov
K ern e r 's "Czec h os l ovak i a" ( Cont 'd.):

History or Pro paganda?

WHO SA ID IT : 24, 39, 54, 58, 62, 87

*

*

*

Edit ed a nd co mpil ed by
PHILIP A. HROBAK

SLOVAKIA
Box 150
Middletown , P a .

•
Pub I ished by

~~v

t1-BkA'Wf

E

oF

AM ER I CA

.MlU.£RSV1LLE STATE cqu.EGE

~Ji.SV41.lt, l&gt;A. 17551

�SLOVAK IA is published periodically by the Slovak League of America,
a cultural and civic fedel'ation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOVAK .IA
is to pl'omote a better understan ding
and appreciat ion of the Slovak nation
and its long stl'uggle fol' freedom and
independe nce.
As American s, members of the
Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
right to freedom and independe nce.
They are dedicated to the cause of the
American way of life, Slovak freedom
and world peace and are determine d to
oppose the plague of Communi sm and
all other totalitaria n political systems.
Subscript ion to Slovakia $1.00 per
year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscripti ons to:
SLOV AKIA
Box 150
Middletow n, Pa.

Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA

PRESS

Middletown, Pa.

�SLO VAK IA
Published

VOL. VI

quarterly by the Slovak

League of America

SEPTEMBER-DECEM BER, 1956

NO. 3-4 (2{}-21)

SLOVA.KIA AND THE RECENT REBELLIONS
Whatever happened and is happening in Poland, Hungary, the
Middle East, and other countTies
of Europe ,a nd .A!si.a must be
blamed on the policies followed by
the western democracies, on the
so many "wise men" from the
West, who knew how to win another war, ,b ut could not win an
honorable and just peace.
The press has done a little to
help the situation; an,d intelligence agencies of our Government
did even less to clarify it. We always had and still ·h ave our
embassies, employing hundreds of
thousands of ,people, in the many
countries of Europe and Asia, but
still do not know the nations
thereof sufficiently well to work
with them effectively in the interests of genuine democracy. mhe
Poles, we are supposed to 1b elieve,
would lbe satisfied with ,G omulka
Communism, the Yugoslavs like
the "Tito" ,b rand, while the Slovaks go for the Czeoh type of the
late Dr. Edward ·B enes. Nothing
could be !farther from the truth:
.all these nations pray fervently
that they might be Hberated
.s peedily from the scouTge of godCommunism
materialistic
less,
which was :forced upon them durIng ,a nd iafter World War illl.
Much has ,b een said and .w ritten recently about the disturbances in Poland and Hungary, but
little or nothing ,about what is going on in Slovakia. But the met

is that Slov,akia is not and never
will be satisfied with the situation it w,a s forced into after
World War II .against the will of
her people. The Slovaks proved it
on many occasions . .A!nd they did ti
again during 1956. The students
of Slovakia demonstrated in May;
this was followed ,b y Poznan In
Poland in June; then Hungary
rebelled In October, and iPo1and
a:gain was heard from. What was
the situation in Slov,ak.ia when
open Tebellion broke out in Budapest on October 23?
,several Slovak escapees said
that the Czech Red Army immediately sealed the Slovak-iHungarian border to prevent Slovaks
from helping the, Magyars; Czeoh
"security police" and the Czech
Army ocoupied all of Slovakia; all
former Slovak deputies, ministers
of government, and political leaders were rounded up as "unreliable
elements" and shipped to Bohemia
and Moravia. Even Gustav Husi!.k,
Slovak Red leader, was transferred
from a .Slovak jail to o.ne in Czech
territory. The Prague Ministry of
Defense ousted all Slovak oMicers
from Lt. Col. up from .the "CzechoSlovak" Army and replaced Slovak militia In d'actol'ies iby Czech
workers' militia.
'The Slovaks -s~pathized with
the MagY'ars ,and ·h elped as much
as they could under the most difficult ciTcumstances. Thousands of
Slovaks and M.agyar.s from Slova-

�2

SLOVAKIA

while Czech reserves served with
the army in Slovakia.
A second Slovak escapee wrote:
"Twenty-two Soviet divisions came
into Hungary many of them through
Slovakia. Besides that a special
Czech military unit of five divisions
operated in the Kosice-Miskovec
aTea. . . . Controls a r e v er y
Border guards have
strict. . .
been tripled; they shoot at practically anyone not in uniform."
·R eporters and writers for the
world press still do not distinguish between Slovakia and Bohemia, the Slovaks and the Czechs:
they write about the "Hung,a,rianCzechoslovak" frontier, when they
actually mean the "Hungarian-SloThe Czechs took no ohances vak" frontier; for them the Reo
with the Slovaks; they knew that Czech Army becomes the "Czechothe sentiment jn Slovakia was not slovak" Army. The Slovaks, it
only strongly anti-Communist and seems, are bound to ,b e involved
anti-Soviet, ,b ut also strongly anti- in everything the Czechs do since
Czech. As one Slovak escapee, who the birth o.f the political monwitnessed the disturbances in Bra- strosity known as Czecho-Slovakia.
tisla'V'a, put it: ",S ince the execuTo keep t!h e record straight,
tion of President Tiso, the sentiment in Slovakia was never so ,allow us to remind all uninformed,
anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, and misinformed and "slightly" confused writers, and the reading ;pubanti-Czech as it is now."
lic that: the Slovaks are not
During the M~.gyar revolt Slo- Czechs; Slovakia is not Bohemia;
vakia iresembled ,a large military so-called "Czecho-Slovak" policy is
camp; the streets of 'Bratislava strictly Czech policy; the Slovaks
were •f ull of tanks, all roads -were outlawed Communism in their Re·b locked •b y the Czech Army, and public in 1939, while the Czechs
machine-gun nests were planted umler .Benes would not govern with
everywihere. Bratislava was the al- out them; the Slovaks were and
leged headquarters of 1both the still are anti 0 Soviet, while the
Soviet and Magyar ,R eds: the lat- Czechs under M-asaryk and Benes,
ter were quartered in Hotel Carl- Gottwald and Zapotocky, were
ton, the former in iHotel Devin. and still are :pro-Soviet; the SloBoth hotels were ,h eavily guarded, va:ks sym:pathized with the Hunas were all vublic builoing.s. All I garian "rebels" and helved them
Slovak reserves were called into as much as they could under the
service, 1but were not allowed to circumstances, while the Czechs
serve in Slovakia; ,t hey were /collaborated with the Soviet armies
shipped to Moravia ,and Bohemia, to crush the Magyar revolt.
kia joined the Hungarian patriota
to help shake off the halter of
Moscow. Lively demonstrations
against the Soviets ,and the Czechs
were staged in Bratislava, Surany,
Nove ZAmky, Lucenec, Kosice, and
other Slovak towns. They destroyed large sections of track to hinder the movement of Red soldiers
and supplies through Slovakia;
heavy fighting took place near
Presov. Demonstrating in Bratislava, October 27, students shouted:
"Freedom for Hunga,ry - Freedom
for Slovakia - Get out Russi•a ns
- Go home Czechs - No more
Czecho-Slovakia - ,Down with the
Reds," etc.

I

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1502">
                    <text>VO L. V I

SEPTEMBER - DECEMBER , 1956

NO . 3-4 ( 20-21)

IN THIS ISSUE:
R. I. P . Dr. Fra n c is H rusovsky ,
Monsignor Jo zef Tiso -

Controv ersial Personality

-

Cz ec h o-S l o vaki a or Czechos lo vakii!l.
S t,~r a n d the Slov a k In depe nd e n ce Moveme nt
B en es a nd t h e Communization of Czecho-S lo vak i a
~saryk ' ~ D(}-IQ:l9oPaoy

aiqs

i!ile"alt+a

Why Di d Benes Resi gn in 1938?
M emora ndum
Th e History of S lovak i a
1856 -

Dr. Samu e l Cz a mb el -

1956

Castles of S lovak i a : Starohrad ( Th e Old Cast l e) of Li ptov
K ern e r 's "Czec h os l ovak i a" ( Cont 'd.):

History or Pro paganda?

WHO SA ID IT : 24, 39, 54, 58, 62, 87

*

*

*

Edit ed a nd co mpil ed by
PHILIP A. HROBAK

SLOVAKIA
Box 150
Middletown , P a .

•
Pub I ished by

~~v

t1-BkA'Wf

E

oF

AM ER I CA

.MlU.£RSV1LLE STATE cqu.EGE

~Ji.SV41.lt, l&gt;A. 17551

�SLOVAK IA is published periodically by the Slovak League of America,
a cultural and civic fedel'ation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOVAK .IA
is to pl'omote a better understan ding
and appreciat ion of the Slovak nation
and its long stl'uggle fol' freedom and
independe nce.
As American s, members of the
Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
right to freedom and independe nce.
They are dedicated to the cause of the
American way of life, Slovak freedom
and world peace and are determine d to
oppose the plague of Communi sm and
all other totalitaria n political systems.
Subscript ion to Slovakia $1.00 per
year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscripti ons to:
SLOV AKIA
Box 150
Middletow n, Pa.

Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA

PRESS

Middletown, Pa.

�SLO VAK IA
Published

VOL. VI

quarterly by the Slovak

League of America

SEPTEMBER-DECEM BER, 1956

NO. 3-4 (2{}-21)

SLOVA.KIA AND THE RECENT REBELLIONS
Whatever happened and is happening in Poland, Hungary, the
Middle East, and other countTies
of Europe ,a nd .A!si.a must be
blamed on the policies followed by
the western democracies, on the
so many "wise men" from the
West, who knew how to win another war, ,b ut could not win an
honorable and just peace.
The press has done a little to
help the situation; an,d intelligence agencies of our Government
did even less to clarify it. We always had and still ·h ave our
embassies, employing hundreds of
thousands of ,people, in the many
countries of Europe and Asia, but
still do not know the nations
thereof sufficiently well to work
with them effectively in the interests of genuine democracy. mhe
Poles, we are supposed to 1b elieve,
would lbe satisfied with ,G omulka
Communism, the Yugoslavs like
the "Tito" ,b rand, while the Slovaks go for the Czeoh type of the
late Dr. Edward ·B enes. Nothing
could be !farther from the truth:
.all these nations pray fervently
that they might be Hberated
.s peedily from the scouTge of godCommunism
materialistic
less,
which was :forced upon them durIng ,a nd iafter World War illl.
Much has ,b een said and .w ritten recently about the disturbances in Poland and Hungary, but
little or nothing ,about what is going on in Slovakia. But the met

is that Slov,akia is not and never
will be satisfied with the situation it w,a s forced into after
World War II .against the will of
her people. The Slovaks proved it
on many occasions . .A!nd they did ti
again during 1956. The students
of Slovakia demonstrated in May;
this was followed ,b y Poznan In
Poland in June; then Hungary
rebelled In October, and iPo1and
a:gain was heard from. What was
the situation in Slov,ak.ia when
open Tebellion broke out in Budapest on October 23?
,several Slovak escapees said
that the Czech Red Army immediately sealed the Slovak-iHungarian border to prevent Slovaks
from helping the, Magyars; Czeoh
"security police" and the Czech
Army ocoupied all of Slovakia; all
former Slovak deputies, ministers
of government, and political leaders were rounded up as "unreliable
elements" and shipped to Bohemia
and Moravia. Even Gustav Husi!.k,
Slovak Red leader, was transferred
from a .Slovak jail to o.ne in Czech
territory. The Prague Ministry of
Defense ousted all Slovak oMicers
from Lt. Col. up from .the "CzechoSlovak" Army and replaced Slovak militia In d'actol'ies iby Czech
workers' militia.
'The Slovaks -s~pathized with
the MagY'ars ,and ·h elped as much
as they could under the most difficult ciTcumstances. Thousands of
Slovaks and M.agyar.s from Slova-

�2

SLOVAKIA

while Czech reserves served with
the army in Slovakia.
A second Slovak escapee wrote:
"Twenty-two Soviet divisions came
into Hungary many of them through
Slovakia. Besides that a special
Czech military unit of five divisions
operated in the Kosice-Miskovec
aTea. . . . Controls a r e v er y
Border guards have
strict. . .
been tripled; they shoot at practically anyone not in uniform."
·R eporters and writers for the
world press still do not distinguish between Slovakia and Bohemia, the Slovaks and the Czechs:
they write about the "Hung,a,rianCzechoslovak" frontier, when they
actually mean the "Hungarian-SloThe Czechs took no ohances vak" frontier; for them the Reo
with the Slovaks; they knew that Czech Army becomes the "Czechothe sentiment jn Slovakia was not slovak" Army. The Slovaks, it
only strongly anti-Communist and seems, are bound to ,b e involved
anti-Soviet, ,b ut also strongly anti- in everything the Czechs do since
Czech. As one Slovak escapee, who the birth o.f the political monwitnessed the disturbances in Bra- strosity known as Czecho-Slovakia.
tisla'V'a, put it: ",S ince the execuTo keep t!h e record straight,
tion of President Tiso, the sentiment in Slovakia was never so ,allow us to remind all uninformed,
anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, and misinformed and "slightly" confused writers, and the reading ;pubanti-Czech as it is now."
lic that: the Slovaks are not
During the M~.gyar revolt Slo- Czechs; Slovakia is not Bohemia;
vakia iresembled ,a large military so-called "Czecho-Slovak" policy is
camp; the streets of 'Bratislava strictly Czech policy; the Slovaks
were •f ull of tanks, all roads -were outlawed Communism in their Re·b locked •b y the Czech Army, and public in 1939, while the Czechs
machine-gun nests were planted umler .Benes would not govern with
everywihere. Bratislava was the al- out them; the Slovaks were and
leged headquarters of 1both the still are anti 0 Soviet, while the
Soviet and Magyar ,R eds: the lat- Czechs under M-asaryk and Benes,
ter were quartered in Hotel Carl- Gottwald and Zapotocky, were
ton, the former in iHotel Devin. and still are :pro-Soviet; the SloBoth hotels were ,h eavily guarded, va:ks sym:pathized with the Hunas were all vublic builoing.s. All I garian "rebels" and helved them
Slovak reserves were called into as much as they could under the
service, 1but were not allowed to circumstances, while the Czechs
serve in Slovakia; ,t hey were /collaborated with the Soviet armies
shipped to Moravia ,and Bohemia, to crush the Magyar revolt.
kia joined the Hungarian patriota
to help shake off the halter of
Moscow. Lively demonstrations
against the Soviets ,and the Czechs
were staged in Bratislava, Surany,
Nove ZAmky, Lucenec, Kosice, and
other Slovak towns. They destroyed large sections of track to hinder the movement of Red soldiers
and supplies through Slovakia;
heavy fighting took place near
Presov. Demonstrating in Bratislava, October 27, students shouted:
"Freedom for Hunga,ry - Freedom
for Slovakia - Get out Russi•a ns
- Go home Czechs - No more
Czecho-Slovakia - ,Down with the
Reds," etc.

I

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                  <text>1956, Vol. 6</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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              <text>VO L. V I&#13;
&#13;
SEPTEMBER - DECEMBER , 1956&#13;
&#13;
NO . 3-4 ( 20-21)&#13;
&#13;
IN THIS ISSUE:&#13;
R. I. P . Dr. Fra n c is H rusovsky ,&#13;
Monsignor Jo zef Tiso -&#13;
&#13;
Controv ersial Personality&#13;
&#13;
-&#13;
&#13;
Cz ec h o-S l o vaki a or Czechos lo vakii!l.&#13;
S t,~r a n d the Slov a k In depe nd e n ce Moveme nt&#13;
B en es a nd t h e Communization of Czecho-S lo vak i a&#13;
~saryk ' ~ D(}-IQ:l9oPaoy&#13;
&#13;
aiqs&#13;
&#13;
i!ile"alt+a&#13;
&#13;
Why Di d Benes Resi gn in 1938?&#13;
M emora ndum&#13;
Th e History of S lovak i a&#13;
1856 -&#13;
&#13;
Dr. Samu e l Cz a mb el -&#13;
&#13;
1956&#13;
&#13;
Castles of S lovak i a : Starohrad ( Th e Old Cast l e) of Li ptov&#13;
K ern e r 's "Czec h os l ovak i a" ( Cont 'd.):&#13;
&#13;
History or Pro paganda?&#13;
&#13;
WHO SA ID IT : 24, 39, 54, 58, 62, 87&#13;
&#13;
*&#13;
&#13;
*&#13;
&#13;
*&#13;
&#13;
Edit ed a nd co mpil ed by&#13;
PHILIP A. HROBAK&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
Box 150&#13;
Middletown , P a .&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
Pub I ished by&#13;
&#13;
~~v&#13;
&#13;
t1-BkA'Wf&#13;
&#13;
E&#13;
&#13;
oF&#13;
&#13;
AM ER I CA&#13;
&#13;
.MlU.£RSV1LLE STATE cqu.EGE&#13;
&#13;
~Ji.SV41.lt, l&gt;A. 17551&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAK IA is published periodically by the Slovak League of America,&#13;
a cultural and civic fedel'ation of Americans of Slovak descent.&#13;
The chief purpose of SLOVAK .IA&#13;
is to pl'omote a better understan ding&#13;
and appreciat ion of the Slovak nation&#13;
and its long stl'uggle fol' freedom and&#13;
independe nce.&#13;
As American s, members of the&#13;
Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all&#13;
nations, has an inherent and God-given&#13;
right to freedom and independe nce.&#13;
They are dedicated to the cause of the&#13;
American way of life, Slovak freedom&#13;
and world peace and are determine d to&#13;
oppose the plague of Communi sm and&#13;
all other totalitaria n political systems.&#13;
Subscript ion to Slovakia $1.00 per&#13;
year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.&#13;
Send subscripti ons to:&#13;
SLOV AKIA&#13;
Box 150&#13;
Middletow n, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
Printed in the U. S. A.&#13;
JEDNOTA&#13;
&#13;
PRESS&#13;
&#13;
Middletown, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
SLO VAK IA&#13;
Published&#13;
&#13;
VOL. VI&#13;
&#13;
quarterly by the Slovak&#13;
&#13;
League of America&#13;
&#13;
SEPTEMBER-DECEM BER, 1956&#13;
&#13;
NO. 3-4 (2{}-21)&#13;
&#13;
SLOVA.KIA AND THE RECENT REBELLIONS&#13;
Whatever happened and is happening in Poland, Hungary, the&#13;
Middle East, and other countTies&#13;
of Europe ,a nd .A!si.a must be&#13;
blamed on the policies followed by&#13;
the western democracies, on the&#13;
so many "wise men" from the&#13;
West, who knew how to win another war, ,b ut could not win an&#13;
honorable and just peace.&#13;
The press has done a little to&#13;
help the situation; an,d intelligence agencies of our Government&#13;
did even less to clarify it. We always had and still ·h ave our&#13;
embassies, employing hundreds of&#13;
thousands of ,people, in the many&#13;
countries of Europe and Asia, but&#13;
still do not know the nations&#13;
thereof sufficiently well to work&#13;
with them effectively in the interests of genuine democracy. mhe&#13;
Poles, we are supposed to 1b elieve,&#13;
would lbe satisfied with ,G omulka&#13;
Communism, the Yugoslavs like&#13;
the "Tito" ,b rand, while the Slovaks go for the Czeoh type of the&#13;
late Dr. Edward ·B enes. Nothing&#13;
could be !farther from the truth:&#13;
.all these nations pray fervently&#13;
that they might be Hberated&#13;
.s peedily from the scouTge of godCommunism&#13;
materialistic&#13;
less,&#13;
which was :forced upon them durIng ,a nd iafter World War illl.&#13;
Much has ,b een said and .w ritten recently about the disturbances in Poland and Hungary, but&#13;
little or nothing ,about what is going on in Slovakia. But the met&#13;
&#13;
is that Slov,akia is not and never&#13;
will be satisfied with the situation it w,a s forced into after&#13;
World War II .against the will of&#13;
her people. The Slovaks proved it&#13;
on many occasions . .A!nd they did ti&#13;
again during 1956. The students&#13;
of Slovakia demonstrated in May;&#13;
this was followed ,b y Poznan In&#13;
Poland in June; then Hungary&#13;
rebelled In October, and iPo1and&#13;
a:gain was heard from. What was&#13;
the situation in Slov,ak.ia when&#13;
open Tebellion broke out in Budapest on October 23?&#13;
,several Slovak escapees said&#13;
that the Czech Red Army immediately sealed the Slovak-iHungarian border to prevent Slovaks&#13;
from helping the, Magyars; Czeoh&#13;
"security police" and the Czech&#13;
Army ocoupied all of Slovakia; all&#13;
former Slovak deputies, ministers&#13;
of government, and political leaders were rounded up as "unreliable&#13;
elements" and shipped to Bohemia&#13;
and Moravia. Even Gustav Husi!.k,&#13;
Slovak Red leader, was transferred&#13;
from a .Slovak jail to o.ne in Czech&#13;
territory. The Prague Ministry of&#13;
Defense ousted all Slovak oMicers&#13;
from Lt. Col. up from .the "CzechoSlovak" Army and replaced Slovak militia In d'actol'ies iby Czech&#13;
workers' militia.&#13;
'The Slovaks -s~pathized with&#13;
the MagY'ars ,and ·h elped as much&#13;
as they could under the most difficult ciTcumstances. Thousands of&#13;
Slovaks and M.agyar.s from Slova-&#13;
&#13;
2&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
while Czech reserves served with&#13;
the army in Slovakia.&#13;
A second Slovak escapee wrote:&#13;
"Twenty-two Soviet divisions came&#13;
into Hungary many of them through&#13;
Slovakia. Besides that a special&#13;
Czech military unit of five divisions&#13;
operated in the Kosice-Miskovec&#13;
aTea. . . . Controls a r e v er y&#13;
Border guards have&#13;
strict. . .&#13;
been tripled; they shoot at practically anyone not in uniform."&#13;
·R eporters and writers for the&#13;
world press still do not distinguish between Slovakia and Bohemia, the Slovaks and the Czechs:&#13;
they write about the "Hung,a,rianCzechoslovak" frontier, when they&#13;
actually mean the "Hungarian-SloThe Czechs took no ohances vak" frontier; for them the Reo&#13;
with the Slovaks; they knew that Czech Army becomes the "Czechothe sentiment jn Slovakia was not slovak" Army. The Slovaks, it&#13;
only strongly anti-Communist and seems, are bound to ,b e involved&#13;
anti-Soviet, ,b ut also strongly anti- in everything the Czechs do since&#13;
Czech. As one Slovak escapee, who the birth o.f the political monwitnessed the disturbances in Bra- strosity known as Czecho-Slovakia.&#13;
tisla'V'a, put it: ",S ince the execuTo keep t!h e record straight,&#13;
tion of President Tiso, the sentiment in Slovakia was never so ,allow us to remind all uninformed,&#13;
anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, and misinformed and "slightly" confused writers, and the reading ;pubanti-Czech as it is now."&#13;
lic that: the Slovaks are not&#13;
During the M~.gyar revolt Slo- Czechs; Slovakia is not Bohemia;&#13;
vakia iresembled ,a large military so-called "Czecho-Slovak" policy is&#13;
camp; the streets of 'Bratislava strictly Czech policy; the Slovaks&#13;
were •f ull of tanks, all roads -were outlawed Communism in their Re·b locked •b y the Czech Army, and public in 1939, while the Czechs&#13;
machine-gun nests were planted umler .Benes would not govern with&#13;
everywihere. Bratislava was the al- out them; the Slovaks were and&#13;
leged headquarters of 1both the still are anti 0 Soviet, while the&#13;
Soviet and Magyar ,R eds: the lat- Czechs under M-asaryk and Benes,&#13;
ter were quartered in Hotel Carl- Gottwald and Zapotocky, were&#13;
ton, the former in iHotel Devin. and still are :pro-Soviet; the SloBoth hotels were ,h eavily guarded, va:ks sym:pathized with the Hunas were all vublic builoing.s. All I garian "rebels" and helved them&#13;
Slovak reserves were called into as much as they could under the&#13;
service, 1but were not allowed to circumstances, while the Czechs&#13;
serve in Slovakia; ,t hey were /collaborated with the Soviet armies&#13;
shipped to Moravia ,and Bohemia, to crush the Magyar revolt.&#13;
kia joined the Hungarian patriota&#13;
to help shake off the halter of&#13;
Moscow. Lively demonstrations&#13;
against the Soviets ,and the Czechs&#13;
were staged in Bratislava, Surany,&#13;
Nove ZAmky, Lucenec, Kosice, and&#13;
other Slovak towns. They destroyed large sections of track to hinder the movement of Red soldiers&#13;
and supplies through Slovakia;&#13;
heavy fighting took place near&#13;
Presov. Demonstrating in Bratislava, October 27, students shouted:&#13;
"Freedom for Hunga,ry - Freedom&#13;
for Slovakia - Get out Russi•a ns&#13;
- Go home Czechs - No more&#13;
Czecho-Slovakia - ,Down with the&#13;
Reds," etc.&#13;
&#13;
I&#13;
&#13;
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                    <text>::,lLUVAKlA

3

R. I. P.

Dr. Francis Hrusovsky
Jos eph Kir schbaum , LL.D., Ph.D.

Thousands of Slovaks living on this side of the Iron
Curtain were stunned by the unexpected news which broke
the night of September 9. It struck them as an incredible
report, this word announcing the sudden death of Dr.
Frap.cis Hrus01Vsky, president of the Slav,a k National Council Abroad, outstanding patriot, eminent historian and
educator, and a man of .s terling moral caliber. Among pro_
minent representatives of a Slovak generation, to which
it was given to see their cherished dream of Sl01Viakia's independence and statehood fU'lfiHed only to be ruthlessly
destroyed within a few years. Dr. Hrusovsky personified
the best traditions and characteristics which distinguish
our Slovak intellectuals, men of a class that is being me-rciless[y hol\.lllded to extermination ,by the Communists.
The loss of Dr. Hrusovslky is very keenly fe~t both because of what he was per s.e and because of what he meant
to the nation. And it is precisely these two reasons that
quicken the realization that no blow could have been more
grievous in our ranks than this death of Dr. Hrusovsky
which so sorely afflicts all our Slov1aik communities in the
free world and especially affects alil Slorva;k e:rnigres dedicated to the vindication of IS lavakia's liberation fTom foreign
rule.
1 t has be-en our unhappy lot to suffer three irrepara;ble
losses within the span of tlrree consecutive years: the passing of Karol Sidor, dilplomat, statesman and key leader of
the Sl01Vaik exile movement; the political assassination of
Matus Cernak, a most valua;bJe force among Slovak exiles
in Germany, and now the death of Dr. Hrusavsiky, Sidor's
successor, in the prime of his caireer at the age of 53.
One short year ago, when Dr. Hrusovrsky aocepted the
chief executive responsibilities of the Slovak National
Council Albroad, we rejoiced in being under his capable
leaderahip. We confidently fixed all our prospects on him

�4

SLOVAKIA

as being the individual best qualified to effect a united
effort of all Slovak exiled groups engaged in the struggle
to attain Slovakia's justified liberation and independence.
Mild-mannere d and unassuming as he was, Dr. Hrusovsky
commanded the respect of all Slovaks. His personal inclination and preference were not for the tensions amd strategems of a political career but he did not decline wholehearted service to his nation in this difficult post, when it
was evident that the need of the hour required it of him.
The Cleveland weekly "Slovak News" wrote of him:
"In less than a decade in his adopted country he became a
beloved figure in Slovak circles everywhere. Everyone who
met him was impressed by his personality. Those who knew
him learned to admire his schol,a rship, to respect his unwavering devotion to 1principles, and to love him for his
boundless charity. Seldom can one expect to meet a man
of his moral stature, dignity, idealism, and faith."
The ,primary interest of Dr. Hrusovsky's life was teaching, specifically the teaching of history and the pursuit of
historical research. His innate love of his people and his
instinctive devotion to youth •p rompted him to choose education as his profession. He attained distinction in this
field, and it was as, an educator and a historian that he
entered the ,p olitical arena. Here he looked upon all his political functions and commitments as a service to his nation's highest interests and, hence, wo·r ked with a sen:se of
dedication to public duty.
'Specializing as he did in medieval history, Dr. Hru_
sovsky published several fully documented studies on Great
Moravia, t:he first Slovak and Slav state on the Danube. He
also prepared a Slovak history text for secondary schools
which established a precedent in the Slovak pu:blishing
world. In its second edition this book was welcomed with
such wide acclaim that it became a national best seller.
In the early part of his exile, during his sojourn in
Rome and in the United States, Dr. Hrusovsky iprepared a
scholarly work on the earliest Slovak rulers and an exhaustive study investigating the relations of the Slovak
rulers of Great Moravia with the Holy See.

�5

SLOVAKIA

Slovak letters, as well as American Slovak history,
were definitely enriched by Dr. Hrusovsky's book surveying
the growth and ex;pansion of Slovak religious orders in the
United States. This book incidentally develops a great deal
of the cultural 'history of American citizens of Slovak descent.
Besides these book length productions, Dr. Hruso:vsky has to his credit hundreds of articles and numeTous
addresses delivered on various occasions.
Reflecting on some of these merits of Dr. 'Hrusovsky,
we find that our sentiments, too, correspond v\ith the ex.pression of one of the prominent American leaders in Slovak
cultral life who said with deepest sincerity that we "will
miss his wise guidance, his great capacity for wo,r k, and his
lmfaltering hope of a better world on the morrow."
Afl true Slovaks on both sides of the Iron Curtain bear
with pain the loss of Dr. IHruso,vsky. Our one comfort and
consolation stems from the belief that national leaders of
Dr. Hrusovs:k y's moral stature and defenders of a nation's
rights and li'berties share the prerogative of great soldiers
who never die .
Thus, indeed, will Dr. Hrusovsky continue to live, partaking of an immorality among us, his courage, his vision,
his selflessness seTVing as an undying example for coming
generations of Slo:vaks, inspiring them tq win fOT their
country that freedom, that independent and recognized state
for which Hrusovsky wo!"ked literally to his last breath .
1

•

•

•

DR. FRANCIS HRUSOVSKY -

THE MAN

Constantine Culen

Franc.is Hrufovsky was eminently an historian. He could
have distinguished himself by a career at the University of
Bratislava even under the tuteJage of the Czech professor
Chaloupecky. The ,professor was aware that this yo'll'Ilg collegian's views were radical,l y oppooed to his own outlook,
nevertheless entertained high esteem for him. It was something which Hirusovsky merited 'because of his consistent
gravity, his critical acumen, and his broad knowledge. But

�</text>
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                    <text>::,lLUVAKlA

3

R. I. P.

Dr. Francis Hrusovsky
Jos eph Kir schbaum , LL.D., Ph.D.

Thousands of Slovaks living on this side of the Iron
Curtain were stunned by the unexpected news which broke
the night of September 9. It struck them as an incredible
report, this word announcing the sudden death of Dr.
Frap.cis Hrus01Vsky, president of the Slav,a k National Council Abroad, outstanding patriot, eminent historian and
educator, and a man of .s terling moral caliber. Among pro_
minent representatives of a Slovak generation, to which
it was given to see their cherished dream of Sl01Viakia's independence and statehood fU'lfiHed only to be ruthlessly
destroyed within a few years. Dr. Hrusovsky personified
the best traditions and characteristics which distinguish
our Slovak intellectuals, men of a class that is being me-rciless[y hol\.lllded to extermination ,by the Communists.
The loss of Dr. Hrusovslky is very keenly fe~t both because of what he was per s.e and because of what he meant
to the nation. And it is precisely these two reasons that
quicken the realization that no blow could have been more
grievous in our ranks than this death of Dr. Hrusovsky
which so sorely afflicts all our Slov1aik communities in the
free world and especially affects alil Slorva;k e:rnigres dedicated to the vindication of IS lavakia's liberation fTom foreign
rule.
1 t has be-en our unhappy lot to suffer three irrepara;ble
losses within the span of tlrree consecutive years: the passing of Karol Sidor, dilplomat, statesman and key leader of
the Sl01Vaik exile movement; the political assassination of
Matus Cernak, a most valua;bJe force among Slovak exiles
in Germany, and now the death of Dr. Hrusavsiky, Sidor's
successor, in the prime of his caireer at the age of 53.
One short year ago, when Dr. Hrusovrsky aocepted the
chief executive responsibilities of the Slovak National
Council Albroad, we rejoiced in being under his capable
leaderahip. We confidently fixed all our prospects on him

�4

SLOVAKIA

as being the individual best qualified to effect a united
effort of all Slovak exiled groups engaged in the struggle
to attain Slovakia's justified liberation and independence.
Mild-mannere d and unassuming as he was, Dr. Hrusovsky
commanded the respect of all Slovaks. His personal inclination and preference were not for the tensions amd strategems of a political career but he did not decline wholehearted service to his nation in this difficult post, when it
was evident that the need of the hour required it of him.
The Cleveland weekly "Slovak News" wrote of him:
"In less than a decade in his adopted country he became a
beloved figure in Slovak circles everywhere. Everyone who
met him was impressed by his personality. Those who knew
him learned to admire his schol,a rship, to respect his unwavering devotion to 1principles, and to love him for his
boundless charity. Seldom can one expect to meet a man
of his moral stature, dignity, idealism, and faith."
The ,primary interest of Dr. Hrusovsky's life was teaching, specifically the teaching of history and the pursuit of
historical research. His innate love of his people and his
instinctive devotion to youth •p rompted him to choose education as his profession. He attained distinction in this
field, and it was as, an educator and a historian that he
entered the ,p olitical arena. Here he looked upon all his political functions and commitments as a service to his nation's highest interests and, hence, wo·r ked with a sen:se of
dedication to public duty.
'Specializing as he did in medieval history, Dr. Hru_
sovsky published several fully documented studies on Great
Moravia, t:he first Slovak and Slav state on the Danube. He
also prepared a Slovak history text for secondary schools
which established a precedent in the Slovak pu:blishing
world. In its second edition this book was welcomed with
such wide acclaim that it became a national best seller.
In the early part of his exile, during his sojourn in
Rome and in the United States, Dr. Hrusovsky iprepared a
scholarly work on the earliest Slovak rulers and an exhaustive study investigating the relations of the Slovak
rulers of Great Moravia with the Holy See.

�5

SLOVAKIA

Slovak letters, as well as American Slovak history,
were definitely enriched by Dr. Hrusovsky's book surveying
the growth and ex;pansion of Slovak religious orders in the
United States. This book incidentally develops a great deal
of the cultural 'history of American citizens of Slovak descent.
Besides these book length productions, Dr. Hruso:vsky has to his credit hundreds of articles and numeTous
addresses delivered on various occasions.
Reflecting on some of these merits of Dr. 'Hrusovsky,
we find that our sentiments, too, correspond v\ith the ex.pression of one of the prominent American leaders in Slovak
cultral life who said with deepest sincerity that we "will
miss his wise guidance, his great capacity for wo,r k, and his
lmfaltering hope of a better world on the morrow."
Afl true Slovaks on both sides of the Iron Curtain bear
with pain the loss of Dr. IHruso,vsky. Our one comfort and
consolation stems from the belief that national leaders of
Dr. Hrusovs:k y's moral stature and defenders of a nation's
rights and li'berties share the prerogative of great soldiers
who never die .
Thus, indeed, will Dr. Hrusovsky continue to live, partaking of an immorality among us, his courage, his vision,
his selflessness seTVing as an undying example for coming
generations of Slo:vaks, inspiring them tq win fOT their
country that freedom, that independent and recognized state
for which Hrusovsky wo!"ked literally to his last breath .
1

•

•

•

DR. FRANCIS HRUSOVSKY -

THE MAN

Constantine Culen

Franc.is Hrufovsky was eminently an historian. He could
have distinguished himself by a career at the University of
Bratislava even under the tuteJage of the Czech professor
Chaloupecky. The ,professor was aware that this yo'll'Ilg collegian's views were radical,l y oppooed to his own outlook,
nevertheless entertained high esteem for him. It was something which Hirusovsky merited 'because of his consistent
gravity, his critical acumen, and his broad knowledge. But

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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
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              <text>::,lLUVAKlA&#13;
&#13;
3&#13;
&#13;
R. I. P.&#13;
&#13;
Dr. Francis Hrusovsky&#13;
Jos eph Kir schbaum , LL.D., Ph.D.&#13;
&#13;
Thousands of Slovaks living on this side of the Iron&#13;
Curtain were stunned by the unexpected news which broke&#13;
the night of September 9. It struck them as an incredible&#13;
report, this word announcing the sudden death of Dr.&#13;
Frap.cis Hrus01Vsky, president of the Slav,a k National Council Abroad, outstanding patriot, eminent historian and&#13;
educator, and a man of .s terling moral caliber. Among pro_&#13;
minent representatives of a Slovak generation, to which&#13;
it was given to see their cherished dream of Sl01Viakia's independence and statehood fU'lfiHed only to be ruthlessly&#13;
destroyed within a few years. Dr. Hrusovsky personified&#13;
the best traditions and characteristics which distinguish&#13;
our Slovak intellectuals, men of a class that is being me-rciless[y hol\.lllded to extermination ,by the Communists.&#13;
The loss of Dr. Hrusovslky is very keenly fe~t both because of what he was per s.e and because of what he meant&#13;
to the nation. And it is precisely these two reasons that&#13;
quicken the realization that no blow could have been more&#13;
grievous in our ranks than this death of Dr. Hrusovsky&#13;
which so sorely afflicts all our Slov1aik communities in the&#13;
free world and especially affects alil Slorva;k e:rnigres dedicated to the vindication of IS lavakia's liberation fTom foreign&#13;
rule.&#13;
1 t has be-en our unhappy lot to suffer three irrepara;ble&#13;
losses within the span of tlrree consecutive years: the passing of Karol Sidor, dilplomat, statesman and key leader of&#13;
the Sl01Vaik exile movement; the political assassination of&#13;
Matus Cernak, a most valua;bJe force among Slovak exiles&#13;
in Germany, and now the death of Dr. Hrusavsiky, Sidor's&#13;
successor, in the prime of his caireer at the age of 53.&#13;
One short year ago, when Dr. Hrusovrsky aocepted the&#13;
chief executive responsibilities of the Slovak National&#13;
Council Albroad, we rejoiced in being under his capable&#13;
leaderahip. We confidently fixed all our prospects on him&#13;
&#13;
4&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
as being the individual best qualified to effect a united&#13;
effort of all Slovak exiled groups engaged in the struggle&#13;
to attain Slovakia's justified liberation and independence.&#13;
Mild-mannere d and unassuming as he was, Dr. Hrusovsky&#13;
commanded the respect of all Slovaks. His personal inclination and preference were not for the tensions amd strategems of a political career but he did not decline wholehearted service to his nation in this difficult post, when it&#13;
was evident that the need of the hour required it of him.&#13;
The Cleveland weekly "Slovak News" wrote of him:&#13;
"In less than a decade in his adopted country he became a&#13;
beloved figure in Slovak circles everywhere. Everyone who&#13;
met him was impressed by his personality. Those who knew&#13;
him learned to admire his schol,a rship, to respect his unwavering devotion to 1principles, and to love him for his&#13;
boundless charity. Seldom can one expect to meet a man&#13;
of his moral stature, dignity, idealism, and faith."&#13;
The ,primary interest of Dr. Hrusovsky's life was teaching, specifically the teaching of history and the pursuit of&#13;
historical research. His innate love of his people and his&#13;
instinctive devotion to youth •p rompted him to choose education as his profession. He attained distinction in this&#13;
field, and it was as, an educator and a historian that he&#13;
entered the ,p olitical arena. Here he looked upon all his political functions and commitments as a service to his nation's highest interests and, hence, wo·r ked with a sen:se of&#13;
dedication to public duty.&#13;
'Specializing as he did in medieval history, Dr. Hru_&#13;
sovsky published several fully documented studies on Great&#13;
Moravia, t:he first Slovak and Slav state on the Danube. He&#13;
also prepared a Slovak history text for secondary schools&#13;
which established a precedent in the Slovak pu:blishing&#13;
world. In its second edition this book was welcomed with&#13;
such wide acclaim that it became a national best seller.&#13;
In the early part of his exile, during his sojourn in&#13;
Rome and in the United States, Dr. Hrusovsky iprepared a&#13;
scholarly work on the earliest Slovak rulers and an exhaustive study investigating the relations of the Slovak&#13;
rulers of Great Moravia with the Holy See.&#13;
&#13;
5&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Slovak letters, as well as American Slovak history,&#13;
were definitely enriched by Dr. Hrusovsky's book surveying&#13;
the growth and ex;pansion of Slovak religious orders in the&#13;
United States. This book incidentally develops a great deal&#13;
of the cultural 'history of American citizens of Slovak descent.&#13;
Besides these book length productions, Dr. Hruso:vsky has to his credit hundreds of articles and numeTous&#13;
addresses delivered on various occasions.&#13;
Reflecting on some of these merits of Dr. 'Hrusovsky,&#13;
we find that our sentiments, too, correspond v\ith the ex.pression of one of the prominent American leaders in Slovak&#13;
cultral life who said with deepest sincerity that we "will&#13;
miss his wise guidance, his great capacity for wo,r k, and his&#13;
lmfaltering hope of a better world on the morrow."&#13;
Afl true Slovaks on both sides of the Iron Curtain bear&#13;
with pain the loss of Dr. IHruso,vsky. Our one comfort and&#13;
consolation stems from the belief that national leaders of&#13;
Dr. Hrusovs:k y's moral stature and defenders of a nation's&#13;
rights and li'berties share the prerogative of great soldiers&#13;
who never die .&#13;
Thus, indeed, will Dr. Hrusovsky continue to live, partaking of an immorality among us, his courage, his vision,&#13;
his selflessness seTVing as an undying example for coming&#13;
generations of Slo:vaks, inspiring them tq win fOT their&#13;
country that freedom, that independent and recognized state&#13;
for which Hrusovsky wo!"ked literally to his last breath .&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
DR. FRANCIS HRUSOVSKY -&#13;
&#13;
THE MAN&#13;
&#13;
Constantine Culen&#13;
&#13;
Franc.is Hrufovsky was eminently an historian. He could&#13;
have distinguished himself by a career at the University of&#13;
Bratislava even under the tuteJage of the Czech professor&#13;
Chaloupecky. The ,professor was aware that this yo'll'Ilg collegian's views were radical,l y oppooed to his own outlook,&#13;
nevertheless entertained high esteem for him. It was something which Hirusovsky merited 'because of his consistent&#13;
gravity, his critical acumen, and his broad knowledge. But&#13;
&#13;
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                <text>R.I.P. Dr. Francis Hrušovský</text>
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                <text>Joseph Kirschbaum, LL.D., Ph.D.&#13;
Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956&#13;
pp. 3-5</text>
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                    <text>5

SLOVAKIA

Slovak letters, as well as American Slovak history,
were definitely enriched by Dr. Hrusovsky's book surveying
the growth and ex;pansion of Slovak religious orders in the
United States. This book incidentally develops a great deal
of the cultural 'history of American citizens of Slovak descent.
Besides these book length productions, Dr. Hruso:vsky has to his credit hundreds of articles and numeTous
addresses delivered on various occasions.
Reflecting on some of these merits of Dr. 'Hrusovsky,
we find that our sentiments, too, correspond v\ith the ex.pression of one of the prominent American leaders in Slovak
cultral life who said with deepest sincerity that we "will
miss his wise guidance, his great capacity for wo,r k, and his
lmfaltering hope of a better world on the morrow."
Afl true Slovaks on both sides of the Iron Curtain bear
with pain the loss of Dr. IHruso,vsky. Our one comfort and
consolation stems from the belief that national leaders of
Dr. Hrusovs:k y's moral stature and defenders of a nation's
rights and li'berties share the prerogative of great soldiers
who never die .
Thus, indeed, will Dr. Hrusovsky continue to live, partaking of an immorality among us, his courage, his vision,
his selflessness seTVing as an undying example for coming
generations of Slo:vaks, inspiring them tq win fOT their
country that freedom, that independent and recognized state
for which Hrusovsky wo!"ked literally to his last breath .
1

•

•

•

DR. FRANCIS HRUSOVSKY -

THE MAN

Constantine Culen

Franc.is Hrufovsky was eminently an historian. He could
have distinguished himself by a career at the University of
Bratislava even under the tuteJage of the Czech professor
Chaloupecky. The ,professor was aware that this yo'll'Ilg collegian's views were radical,l y oppooed to his own outlook,
nevertheless entertained high esteem for him. It was something which Hirusovsky merited 'because of his consistent
gravity, his critical acumen, and his broad knowledge. But

�6

SLOVAKIA

on completing his university training, Hruswsky decided
on a different course of life.
There happened to be a vaicancy for the head.mastership at the Catholic Slovalk high school or gymna:zium at
Klastor pod Znievom and Hrusovsky chose to apply for the
post. It was not considered an enviable position by reason
of the fact that the institution was burdened with financiaJ
difficulties amd very often the first of the month found the
administration really straitened ~bout meeting the payroll.
Moreover, the school faced an expansion prog~am which
complicated financial matters to an even greater degree.
Nevertheless, Hrusovsky did not decide on the assured se_
curity and prestige of a university chair in pr,e ference to
this position which was less rewarding in material ivalues.
He became the school's director and made of it the intellectual center which Bishop Stefan Moyses, its founder, had
hoped it would once become.
This particular gymnazium was the only institution
which ,b ore upon its facade the inscription "SLOVIDNSKE
GYMNAZl/lJ.M (,SI.JOV!AK GYiMiNAZIUM); all other similar
schools were inscribed as "OZE}()HO-SLOiVA1K." It is not
dear just how this detail escaped the notice of the civic authorities at the time, but the point is that Dr. HTusovsky
was singularly proud of such a distinctive designation of
his school. And it was, in reality, the only genuine SLOV A1K gymna·zium, not merely in name, but also in spirit and
in purpose.
It was my privilege to go there often. And each visit
proved to me a more refreshing experience. Perhaps there
had never yet been as demanding a headmaster as was
Hrusovsky, but certainly there never yet was one who had
been so universally loved and respected "Pan direk:to:r" -that was his title; it was a designation or an ruppellation by
which we understood without question and immediately that
the reference was to Dr. Hrusorvsky and to him alone.
The greatest penalty meted out to an unhappy offender
was to hear from pan direktor no word rubout the transgression. Once I happened to be in his school office with hin1
when a student approached with an explanation and apology.

�SLOVAKIA

7

"Did I say anything to you?" said pan direktor to the offender in a tone of voice which betrayed no wiarmth. "Well,
that's just it, pan direktor; thia t's the point. You said not a
wo,r d," the student complained.
Even here, in immigration, his former students often
soug,h t out their pan direktor. The confidently referred to
him for counsel and always ·p arted from him strengthened
and imbued with resolution. Hrusorvsiky never recommended
inconsiderate or rash and merely contentious conflict, he did
encourage vigorous effort and endorsed even justified force
that was deliberate and purposeful.
Hrusorvsky was one of the most highly regarded members of the Parliament of the Slovak Republic (193'8--1945).
We happened to, serive together ,o n various committees. I
learned that he looked even upon current problems with the
dis1p osition of a serious historian, and it was especially in our
committee sessions that a comparison of the past with the
present helped to resolve our difficulties and to ease our
tasks.
He was not given to frequent expression in Parliament
but when he did speak, he delivered a speech that left a lasting impression. Although 'he was a,ble to, speak without prolonged ,p reparation, he always took pains to :p repare his par.
liamentary addresses with care. Every sentence, every word
was selected for a specific purpo,s e and a particula:r significance. These addresses are of such merit that one day they
will be e!ID!bodied in handbooks of ;public speaking as classic
creations. The thought-ieontent, as well as the delivery and
all that was connected with these addresses, was thoroughly
studied and weighed, tI believe that I derogate from no one's
merits of fame when I judge thaJt Hrusovsky was one of.
the best speakers of the Slovaik nation within the past century.
Frequently HI'us01Vslky was also the speaker of the day
in villages and towns celebrating this or that occasion. Very
many people must recall these celebrations with a deep sense
of appreciation of his talents.
One of the interests of Dr. Hrusovsky's s,pooial .p redilec-,
tion was the Slov,a,k Institute of Arts and -Sciences (1M atica

�8

SLOVAKIA

slovenska). As chairman of various science departments and
as secretary of the history depa:rtment of the Slovak Institute of Arts and Sciences, he contributed a great deal to the
organization of scientific pursuits and undertrukings in Slovakia. He was a real responsibility; he had accomplished
much; but he still had a great deal of work .planned. Even
the very last evening of his life he discussed several longstanding iprojects which he hoped to realize some future
day that would grant a happy return to his native land.
Recently a certain Slovak political leader who was en.
gaiged in conversation with Dr. Hrusovsky remarked that at
this ,p oint it was quite beyond him even to imagine a return
to his former calling, a!bsor'bed as, he had become with national politics. Dr. Hrusovsky observed, "With me it is quite
the contrary. What I can most r,e adily imagine and what
would give me the greatest satisfaction right at this moment would be to return to the teaching field at the gymnazilliill."
It was most natural and logical that on the death of
Ka,rol Sidor, Hrusovsky should succeed to the presidency of
the Slovak National Council AJbroad. Never at home, and
much less in exile, did he aspire to p'U'blic office. 'In response
to the insistence of his friends and colleagues, however, he
finally yielded to, this extent that he agreed to undertake
whatever responsibilities the membe'I'.s of the SNCA should
decide to entrust to him.
He conceived of this office as a service to the nation.
Two days ,before his, death we were occupied in discussion
until midnight. When he became engrossed in the subject of
Slovakia, his eyes shone bdlliantly. He said that evening,
and he repeated it with emphasis several times, that when
our nation attains its freedom and independence, not one of
us may presume .pretensions to a privileged position at home.
Our only duty, here in a new land which affords us liberty
and the opportunity to live unshackled by the terror which
dominates aJl life at home, is to devote ourseilves tq work
for our naJtion . This is one of the most important convictions
which each one of us must g~asp. Anyone who would arrogate to himself special advantages or favors at home in re-

�SLOVAKIA

9

turn for his labor in exile is not welcome in our midst. On
the other hand, he continued, qualified aind deserving indi,v iduals will be fully appreciated at home in due time; they
will be in demand, and there need be no apprehensions that
any worthy indi1vidurul will receive less than his due.
•I t behooves us all to re reasonable, non-extremist, and to
do our utmost in beha[f of the Slovak cause under extraterritorial circumstances.
This is the spirit in which Dr. Hrusorvsky dedicated himself to his nation throughout his whole life.
This article would be incomplete were I to omit recollections from Rome in the years 1945-1947. Those were
trying times. We lived in constant danger of ,b eing overtaken
and apprehended and committed. to our foes. Terrific pressure was .b eing put on iltalian officialdom, but Italian autho.
rities, sympathetic to our case because of ~arol Sidor, with.,
stood and resisted this .pressure successfully.
Rome captured: Hlrusovsky's heart. Day after day he
frequented the Vatican library and devcoted himself particular1y to the study of the olosest relationships between .t he
V aitican and Sl01Vrukia. !His finished wo11k on this sUJbject has
already been published.
When it was not a jaunt to the library that he planned,
we went out togethm-, tramping the streets of Rome, touring its boulevards and ma,rket ;plaices, and visiting its
shrines and churches. Hrnsovsky ha,d so intimate a knowledge of ancient Roman villages and country sites that
when he began to re.late what happened in this or that
locality, or how a ,plaice had distinguished itself, his listener
lost ali cootact with time and became wholly unaware that
planes roared in the Slky, that trolleys jangled in the streets,
that cars meed by. Lost in the spell of Hrusovsky's words,
one relirved the glory of ancient days. Before one's eyes
the Roman Emp:i!re caime. to life again. Hrusovsky had a
rare genius for creating this kind of atmosphere: It was
this type of historica1 ,p resentation that also held the key
to his eminent success as a classroom lecturer. Just as in
Rome he made Roman history live before our eyes, so did
he regale his students in ,Slo'Va:kia with Slovak history.

�SLOVAKIA

Just as Jan Holly over a hundred years ago captivated and
instructed the followers of Stur, so did Hrusovsky inspire
and educate his high school students at the gymnazium.
lt was in this manner, too, that he held audiences spellbound when he delivered occasional addresses at the various celebrations in Slovak villages and towns. ThaJt was
his ,life; that was his life's work: to conjure an authentic
image of the true greatness and the true glory of the distant past, t.o bridge the gay between the presBnt and the
past, and then to forecast and build a more prosperous
Slovak future.
There is a very large number of Hrusovsky's addresses
and articles in which he developed the subject of Slovak
statehood. There have been many opponents to Slovaikia's
aspirations to statehood, ,b ut not one of them has been
able to foil or to refute the iron logic of Hrusovsky's aJI1guments in its favor.
In the ,p ast, the works of the most popular Slovak
writers were putblished in editions running to several hundred copies. Never yet, however, did any Slovak booik win
such ready ·a nd such widespread populairity as did Hlru_
sovsky's "Slovenske Dejiny" (Slovak History). It was the
first complete survey of our Slovruk historicaJ record. Pre-.
pared as it was ,b y Dr. Hrnsovsky, the first Slovak historian of learning and of note, it presented to the Slovak nation a continuous reel of a:bsoirbing scenes from its past.
We were all ag,reeaJbly surprised when edition upon edition
of his work was exhausted so that by 1945 when Hrusovsky was leaving Slova:kia, over one hundred thousand copies of this 'book were in the hands of the Slovak people.
'Dhis volume of Hrusovsky's history found its way even
into homes where formerly hardly another book haid been
brought besides the prayer book and an infrequent almanac
or annual.
Hrusovsky's book was written in a style which had
been so often recommended to us by Karol Sidor, who repeatedly reminded us to write clearly, simply, so that even
unschooled ;parents in remote hamlets would haive no difficulty in following and understanding what we wrote.
That was its styllistic merit. In content, this history is

�SLOVAKIA

ll

prepared. with so scholarl:y an approach - with restraint,
with fairmindedness, with an oibjective outlook - that it
ser.ves as a substantial refreshment for both the educated
classes and for the less privileged.
With this volume, which the new regime proscribed
in 194'5, Hrusavsky turned in Slovak national life so deep
and so broad a furrow that no foreign usurpers can sue.
ceed. in leveling it eiven in the course of years of effort.
Even today reports from home reveal that this is the book
which is still the most widely read Slovak work and the
most frequently sought book in the black ma.T!kets where,
alas, an enonnous number of Slovaik writings are listed.
In the early part of 1945 it was rll!ffiOTed that Communist par tisans caiptured and executed Hrusovsky. Thank
God that this was a false rumor. The partisans were defeated; they retreated. and Hlrl.l'sovsky returned home.
His first visit took him to Bresto vany to see 'his mother.
It is understanda]ble that she embraced him warmly and
held him close to her heart. Shortly after the e,raltation
of their meeting, however., she ·b ravely reminded. him:
"For a great cause, it is a worthy thing eiven to die, my
son -- and Slovak statehood is a great cause." Dr. Hrus ovsky often repeated these w&lt;&gt;irds, commenting: "Our
peasant mothers embody much of the heroism of ancient
Rome's noble matrons."
And now the noble heart of •F rancis Hrusovsky has
stilled its ibeating. He departed., mourned by a company
of outstanding quinquagenarians who had worked with
him toward a common goal in ,puiblic life: Sidor, Cernak,
Janci.
All were oa.lled by the Angel of Death at an age when
a public servant usually attains the peak and the full de.
velopment of his strength and activity. National leaders
though they were, their hearts, so devoted to theiT nation,
could not withstand the strain orf the hour; they were
overworked and exhausted. The burden of the yoke overtaxed their physical limitations, and their spark of life was
crushed by it.

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1490">
                    <text>5

SLOVAKIA

Slovak letters, as well as American Slovak history,
were definitely enriched by Dr. Hrusovsky's book surveying
the growth and ex;pansion of Slovak religious orders in the
United States. This book incidentally develops a great deal
of the cultural 'history of American citizens of Slovak descent.
Besides these book length productions, Dr. Hruso:vsky has to his credit hundreds of articles and numeTous
addresses delivered on various occasions.
Reflecting on some of these merits of Dr. 'Hrusovsky,
we find that our sentiments, too, correspond v\ith the ex.pression of one of the prominent American leaders in Slovak
cultral life who said with deepest sincerity that we "will
miss his wise guidance, his great capacity for wo,r k, and his
lmfaltering hope of a better world on the morrow."
Afl true Slovaks on both sides of the Iron Curtain bear
with pain the loss of Dr. IHruso,vsky. Our one comfort and
consolation stems from the belief that national leaders of
Dr. Hrusovs:k y's moral stature and defenders of a nation's
rights and li'berties share the prerogative of great soldiers
who never die .
Thus, indeed, will Dr. Hrusovsky continue to live, partaking of an immorality among us, his courage, his vision,
his selflessness seTVing as an undying example for coming
generations of Slo:vaks, inspiring them tq win fOT their
country that freedom, that independent and recognized state
for which Hrusovsky wo!"ked literally to his last breath .
1

•

•

•

DR. FRANCIS HRUSOVSKY -

THE MAN

Constantine Culen

Franc.is Hrufovsky was eminently an historian. He could
have distinguished himself by a career at the University of
Bratislava even under the tuteJage of the Czech professor
Chaloupecky. The ,professor was aware that this yo'll'Ilg collegian's views were radical,l y oppooed to his own outlook,
nevertheless entertained high esteem for him. It was something which Hirusovsky merited 'because of his consistent
gravity, his critical acumen, and his broad knowledge. But

�6

SLOVAKIA

on completing his university training, Hruswsky decided
on a different course of life.
There happened to be a vaicancy for the head.mastership at the Catholic Slovalk high school or gymna:zium at
Klastor pod Znievom and Hrusovsky chose to apply for the
post. It was not considered an enviable position by reason
of the fact that the institution was burdened with financiaJ
difficulties amd very often the first of the month found the
administration really straitened ~bout meeting the payroll.
Moreover, the school faced an expansion prog~am which
complicated financial matters to an even greater degree.
Nevertheless, Hrusovsky did not decide on the assured se_
curity and prestige of a university chair in pr,e ference to
this position which was less rewarding in material ivalues.
He became the school's director and made of it the intellectual center which Bishop Stefan Moyses, its founder, had
hoped it would once become.
This particular gymnazium was the only institution
which ,b ore upon its facade the inscription "SLOVIDNSKE
GYMNAZl/lJ.M (,SI.JOV!AK GYiMiNAZIUM); all other similar
schools were inscribed as "OZE}()HO-SLOiVA1K." It is not
dear just how this detail escaped the notice of the civic authorities at the time, but the point is that Dr. HTusovsky
was singularly proud of such a distinctive designation of
his school. And it was, in reality, the only genuine SLOV A1K gymna·zium, not merely in name, but also in spirit and
in purpose.
It was my privilege to go there often. And each visit
proved to me a more refreshing experience. Perhaps there
had never yet been as demanding a headmaster as was
Hrusovsky, but certainly there never yet was one who had
been so universally loved and respected "Pan direk:to:r" -that was his title; it was a designation or an ruppellation by
which we understood without question and immediately that
the reference was to Dr. Hrusorvsky and to him alone.
The greatest penalty meted out to an unhappy offender
was to hear from pan direktor no word rubout the transgression. Once I happened to be in his school office with hin1
when a student approached with an explanation and apology.

�SLOVAKIA

7

"Did I say anything to you?" said pan direktor to the offender in a tone of voice which betrayed no wiarmth. "Well,
that's just it, pan direktor; thia t's the point. You said not a
wo,r d," the student complained.
Even here, in immigration, his former students often
soug,h t out their pan direktor. The confidently referred to
him for counsel and always ·p arted from him strengthened
and imbued with resolution. Hrusorvsiky never recommended
inconsiderate or rash and merely contentious conflict, he did
encourage vigorous effort and endorsed even justified force
that was deliberate and purposeful.
Hrusorvsky was one of the most highly regarded members of the Parliament of the Slovak Republic (193'8--1945).
We happened to, serive together ,o n various committees. I
learned that he looked even upon current problems with the
dis1p osition of a serious historian, and it was especially in our
committee sessions that a comparison of the past with the
present helped to resolve our difficulties and to ease our
tasks.
He was not given to frequent expression in Parliament
but when he did speak, he delivered a speech that left a lasting impression. Although 'he was a,ble to, speak without prolonged ,p reparation, he always took pains to :p repare his par.
liamentary addresses with care. Every sentence, every word
was selected for a specific purpo,s e and a particula:r significance. These addresses are of such merit that one day they
will be e!ID!bodied in handbooks of ;public speaking as classic
creations. The thought-ieontent, as well as the delivery and
all that was connected with these addresses, was thoroughly
studied and weighed, tI believe that I derogate from no one's
merits of fame when I judge thaJt Hrusovsky was one of.
the best speakers of the Slovaik nation within the past century.
Frequently HI'us01Vslky was also the speaker of the day
in villages and towns celebrating this or that occasion. Very
many people must recall these celebrations with a deep sense
of appreciation of his talents.
One of the interests of Dr. Hrusovsky's s,pooial .p redilec-,
tion was the Slov,a,k Institute of Arts and -Sciences (1M atica

�8

SLOVAKIA

slovenska). As chairman of various science departments and
as secretary of the history depa:rtment of the Slovak Institute of Arts and Sciences, he contributed a great deal to the
organization of scientific pursuits and undertrukings in Slovakia. He was a real responsibility; he had accomplished
much; but he still had a great deal of work .planned. Even
the very last evening of his life he discussed several longstanding iprojects which he hoped to realize some future
day that would grant a happy return to his native land.
Recently a certain Slovak political leader who was en.
gaiged in conversation with Dr. Hrusovsky remarked that at
this ,p oint it was quite beyond him even to imagine a return
to his former calling, a!bsor'bed as, he had become with national politics. Dr. Hrusovsky observed, "With me it is quite
the contrary. What I can most r,e adily imagine and what
would give me the greatest satisfaction right at this moment would be to return to the teaching field at the gymnazilliill."
It was most natural and logical that on the death of
Ka,rol Sidor, Hrusovsky should succeed to the presidency of
the Slovak National Council AJbroad. Never at home, and
much less in exile, did he aspire to p'U'blic office. 'In response
to the insistence of his friends and colleagues, however, he
finally yielded to, this extent that he agreed to undertake
whatever responsibilities the membe'I'.s of the SNCA should
decide to entrust to him.
He conceived of this office as a service to the nation.
Two days ,before his, death we were occupied in discussion
until midnight. When he became engrossed in the subject of
Slovakia, his eyes shone bdlliantly. He said that evening,
and he repeated it with emphasis several times, that when
our nation attains its freedom and independence, not one of
us may presume .pretensions to a privileged position at home.
Our only duty, here in a new land which affords us liberty
and the opportunity to live unshackled by the terror which
dominates aJl life at home, is to devote ourseilves tq work
for our naJtion . This is one of the most important convictions
which each one of us must g~asp. Anyone who would arrogate to himself special advantages or favors at home in re-

�SLOVAKIA

9

turn for his labor in exile is not welcome in our midst. On
the other hand, he continued, qualified aind deserving indi,v iduals will be fully appreciated at home in due time; they
will be in demand, and there need be no apprehensions that
any worthy indi1vidurul will receive less than his due.
•I t behooves us all to re reasonable, non-extremist, and to
do our utmost in beha[f of the Slovak cause under extraterritorial circumstances.
This is the spirit in which Dr. Hrusorvsky dedicated himself to his nation throughout his whole life.
This article would be incomplete were I to omit recollections from Rome in the years 1945-1947. Those were
trying times. We lived in constant danger of ,b eing overtaken
and apprehended and committed. to our foes. Terrific pressure was .b eing put on iltalian officialdom, but Italian autho.
rities, sympathetic to our case because of ~arol Sidor, with.,
stood and resisted this .pressure successfully.
Rome captured: Hlrusovsky's heart. Day after day he
frequented the Vatican library and devcoted himself particular1y to the study of the olosest relationships between .t he
V aitican and Sl01Vrukia. !His finished wo11k on this sUJbject has
already been published.
When it was not a jaunt to the library that he planned,
we went out togethm-, tramping the streets of Rome, touring its boulevards and ma,rket ;plaices, and visiting its
shrines and churches. Hrnsovsky ha,d so intimate a knowledge of ancient Roman villages and country sites that
when he began to re.late what happened in this or that
locality, or how a ,plaice had distinguished itself, his listener
lost ali cootact with time and became wholly unaware that
planes roared in the Slky, that trolleys jangled in the streets,
that cars meed by. Lost in the spell of Hrusovsky's words,
one relirved the glory of ancient days. Before one's eyes
the Roman Emp:i!re caime. to life again. Hrusovsky had a
rare genius for creating this kind of atmosphere: It was
this type of historica1 ,p resentation that also held the key
to his eminent success as a classroom lecturer. Just as in
Rome he made Roman history live before our eyes, so did
he regale his students in ,Slo'Va:kia with Slovak history.

�SLOVAKIA

Just as Jan Holly over a hundred years ago captivated and
instructed the followers of Stur, so did Hrusovsky inspire
and educate his high school students at the gymnazium.
lt was in this manner, too, that he held audiences spellbound when he delivered occasional addresses at the various celebrations in Slovak villages and towns. ThaJt was
his ,life; that was his life's work: to conjure an authentic
image of the true greatness and the true glory of the distant past, t.o bridge the gay between the presBnt and the
past, and then to forecast and build a more prosperous
Slovak future.
There is a very large number of Hrusovsky's addresses
and articles in which he developed the subject of Slovak
statehood. There have been many opponents to Slovaikia's
aspirations to statehood, ,b ut not one of them has been
able to foil or to refute the iron logic of Hrusovsky's aJI1guments in its favor.
In the ,p ast, the works of the most popular Slovak
writers were putblished in editions running to several hundred copies. Never yet, however, did any Slovak booik win
such ready ·a nd such widespread populairity as did Hlru_
sovsky's "Slovenske Dejiny" (Slovak History). It was the
first complete survey of our Slovruk historicaJ record. Pre-.
pared as it was ,b y Dr. Hrnsovsky, the first Slovak historian of learning and of note, it presented to the Slovak nation a continuous reel of a:bsoirbing scenes from its past.
We were all ag,reeaJbly surprised when edition upon edition
of his work was exhausted so that by 1945 when Hrusovsky was leaving Slova:kia, over one hundred thousand copies of this 'book were in the hands of the Slovak people.
'Dhis volume of Hrusovsky's history found its way even
into homes where formerly hardly another book haid been
brought besides the prayer book and an infrequent almanac
or annual.
Hrusovsky's book was written in a style which had
been so often recommended to us by Karol Sidor, who repeatedly reminded us to write clearly, simply, so that even
unschooled ;parents in remote hamlets would haive no difficulty in following and understanding what we wrote.
That was its styllistic merit. In content, this history is

�SLOVAKIA

ll

prepared. with so scholarl:y an approach - with restraint,
with fairmindedness, with an oibjective outlook - that it
ser.ves as a substantial refreshment for both the educated
classes and for the less privileged.
With this volume, which the new regime proscribed
in 194'5, Hrusavsky turned in Slovak national life so deep
and so broad a furrow that no foreign usurpers can sue.
ceed. in leveling it eiven in the course of years of effort.
Even today reports from home reveal that this is the book
which is still the most widely read Slovak work and the
most frequently sought book in the black ma.T!kets where,
alas, an enonnous number of Slovaik writings are listed.
In the early part of 1945 it was rll!ffiOTed that Communist par tisans caiptured and executed Hrusovsky. Thank
God that this was a false rumor. The partisans were defeated; they retreated. and Hlrl.l'sovsky returned home.
His first visit took him to Bresto vany to see 'his mother.
It is understanda]ble that she embraced him warmly and
held him close to her heart. Shortly after the e,raltation
of their meeting, however., she ·b ravely reminded. him:
"For a great cause, it is a worthy thing eiven to die, my
son -- and Slovak statehood is a great cause." Dr. Hrus ovsky often repeated these w&lt;&gt;irds, commenting: "Our
peasant mothers embody much of the heroism of ancient
Rome's noble matrons."
And now the noble heart of •F rancis Hrusovsky has
stilled its ibeating. He departed., mourned by a company
of outstanding quinquagenarians who had worked with
him toward a common goal in ,puiblic life: Sidor, Cernak,
Janci.
All were oa.lled by the Angel of Death at an age when
a public servant usually attains the peak and the full de.
velopment of his strength and activity. National leaders
though they were, their hearts, so devoted to theiT nation,
could not withstand the strain orf the hour; they were
overworked and exhausted. The burden of the yoke overtaxed their physical limitations, and their spark of life was
crushed by it.

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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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            <elementText elementTextId="1488">
              <text>5&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Slovak letters, as well as American Slovak history,&#13;
were definitely enriched by Dr. Hrusovsky's book surveying&#13;
the growth and ex;pansion of Slovak religious orders in the&#13;
United States. This book incidentally develops a great deal&#13;
of the cultural 'history of American citizens of Slovak descent.&#13;
Besides these book length productions, Dr. Hruso:vsky has to his credit hundreds of articles and numeTous&#13;
addresses delivered on various occasions.&#13;
Reflecting on some of these merits of Dr. 'Hrusovsky,&#13;
we find that our sentiments, too, correspond v\ith the ex.pression of one of the prominent American leaders in Slovak&#13;
cultral life who said with deepest sincerity that we "will&#13;
miss his wise guidance, his great capacity for wo,r k, and his&#13;
lmfaltering hope of a better world on the morrow."&#13;
Afl true Slovaks on both sides of the Iron Curtain bear&#13;
with pain the loss of Dr. IHruso,vsky. Our one comfort and&#13;
consolation stems from the belief that national leaders of&#13;
Dr. Hrusovs:k y's moral stature and defenders of a nation's&#13;
rights and li'berties share the prerogative of great soldiers&#13;
who never die .&#13;
Thus, indeed, will Dr. Hrusovsky continue to live, partaking of an immorality among us, his courage, his vision,&#13;
his selflessness seTVing as an undying example for coming&#13;
generations of Slo:vaks, inspiring them tq win fOT their&#13;
country that freedom, that independent and recognized state&#13;
for which Hrusovsky wo!"ked literally to his last breath .&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
DR. FRANCIS HRUSOVSKY -&#13;
&#13;
THE MAN&#13;
&#13;
Constantine Culen&#13;
&#13;
Franc.is Hrufovsky was eminently an historian. He could&#13;
have distinguished himself by a career at the University of&#13;
Bratislava even under the tuteJage of the Czech professor&#13;
Chaloupecky. The ,professor was aware that this yo'll'Ilg collegian's views were radical,l y oppooed to his own outlook,&#13;
nevertheless entertained high esteem for him. It was something which Hirusovsky merited 'because of his consistent&#13;
gravity, his critical acumen, and his broad knowledge. But&#13;
&#13;
6&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
on completing his university training, Hruswsky decided&#13;
on a different course of life.&#13;
There happened to be a vaicancy for the head.mastership at the Catholic Slovalk high school or gymna:zium at&#13;
Klastor pod Znievom and Hrusovsky chose to apply for the&#13;
post. It was not considered an enviable position by reason&#13;
of the fact that the institution was burdened with financiaJ&#13;
difficulties amd very often the first of the month found the&#13;
administration really straitened ~bout meeting the payroll.&#13;
Moreover, the school faced an expansion prog~am which&#13;
complicated financial matters to an even greater degree.&#13;
Nevertheless, Hrusovsky did not decide on the assured se_&#13;
curity and prestige of a university chair in pr,e ference to&#13;
this position which was less rewarding in material ivalues.&#13;
He became the school's director and made of it the intellectual center which Bishop Stefan Moyses, its founder, had&#13;
hoped it would once become.&#13;
This particular gymnazium was the only institution&#13;
which ,b ore upon its facade the inscription "SLOVIDNSKE&#13;
GYMNAZl/lJ.M (,SI.JOV!AK GYiMiNAZIUM); all other similar&#13;
schools were inscribed as "OZE}()HO-SLOiVA1K." It is not&#13;
dear just how this detail escaped the notice of the civic authorities at the time, but the point is that Dr. HTusovsky&#13;
was singularly proud of such a distinctive designation of&#13;
his school. And it was, in reality, the only genuine SLOV A1K gymna·zium, not merely in name, but also in spirit and&#13;
in purpose.&#13;
It was my privilege to go there often. And each visit&#13;
proved to me a more refreshing experience. Perhaps there&#13;
had never yet been as demanding a headmaster as was&#13;
Hrusovsky, but certainly there never yet was one who had&#13;
been so universally loved and respected "Pan direk:to:r" -that was his title; it was a designation or an ruppellation by&#13;
which we understood without question and immediately that&#13;
the reference was to Dr. Hrusorvsky and to him alone.&#13;
The greatest penalty meted out to an unhappy offender&#13;
was to hear from pan direktor no word rubout the transgression. Once I happened to be in his school office with hin1&#13;
when a student approached with an explanation and apology.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
7&#13;
&#13;
"Did I say anything to you?" said pan direktor to the offender in a tone of voice which betrayed no wiarmth. "Well,&#13;
that's just it, pan direktor; thia t's the point. You said not a&#13;
wo,r d," the student complained.&#13;
Even here, in immigration, his former students often&#13;
soug,h t out their pan direktor. The confidently referred to&#13;
him for counsel and always ·p arted from him strengthened&#13;
and imbued with resolution. Hrusorvsiky never recommended&#13;
inconsiderate or rash and merely contentious conflict, he did&#13;
encourage vigorous effort and endorsed even justified force&#13;
that was deliberate and purposeful.&#13;
Hrusorvsky was one of the most highly regarded members of the Parliament of the Slovak Republic (193'8--1945).&#13;
We happened to, serive together ,o n various committees. I&#13;
learned that he looked even upon current problems with the&#13;
dis1p osition of a serious historian, and it was especially in our&#13;
committee sessions that a comparison of the past with the&#13;
present helped to resolve our difficulties and to ease our&#13;
tasks.&#13;
He was not given to frequent expression in Parliament&#13;
but when he did speak, he delivered a speech that left a lasting impression. Although 'he was a,ble to, speak without prolonged ,p reparation, he always took pains to :p repare his par.&#13;
liamentary addresses with care. Every sentence, every word&#13;
was selected for a specific purpo,s e and a particula:r significance. These addresses are of such merit that one day they&#13;
will be e!ID!bodied in handbooks of ;public speaking as classic&#13;
creations. The thought-ieontent, as well as the delivery and&#13;
all that was connected with these addresses, was thoroughly&#13;
studied and weighed, tI believe that I derogate from no one's&#13;
merits of fame when I judge thaJt Hrusovsky was one of.&#13;
the best speakers of the Slovaik nation within the past century.&#13;
Frequently HI'us01Vslky was also the speaker of the day&#13;
in villages and towns celebrating this or that occasion. Very&#13;
many people must recall these celebrations with a deep sense&#13;
of appreciation of his talents.&#13;
One of the interests of Dr. Hrusovsky's s,pooial .p redilec-,&#13;
tion was the Slov,a,k Institute of Arts and -Sciences (1M atica&#13;
&#13;
8&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
slovenska). As chairman of various science departments and&#13;
as secretary of the history depa:rtment of the Slovak Institute of Arts and Sciences, he contributed a great deal to the&#13;
organization of scientific pursuits and undertrukings in Slovakia. He was a real responsibility; he had accomplished&#13;
much; but he still had a great deal of work .planned. Even&#13;
the very last evening of his life he discussed several longstanding iprojects which he hoped to realize some future&#13;
day that would grant a happy return to his native land.&#13;
Recently a certain Slovak political leader who was en.&#13;
gaiged in conversation with Dr. Hrusovsky remarked that at&#13;
this ,p oint it was quite beyond him even to imagine a return&#13;
to his former calling, a!bsor'bed as, he had become with national politics. Dr. Hrusovsky observed, "With me it is quite&#13;
the contrary. What I can most r,e adily imagine and what&#13;
would give me the greatest satisfaction right at this moment would be to return to the teaching field at the gymnazilliill."&#13;
It was most natural and logical that on the death of&#13;
Ka,rol Sidor, Hrusovsky should succeed to the presidency of&#13;
the Slovak National Council AJbroad. Never at home, and&#13;
much less in exile, did he aspire to p'U'blic office. 'In response&#13;
to the insistence of his friends and colleagues, however, he&#13;
finally yielded to, this extent that he agreed to undertake&#13;
whatever responsibilities the membe'I'.s of the SNCA should&#13;
decide to entrust to him.&#13;
He conceived of this office as a service to the nation.&#13;
Two days ,before his, death we were occupied in discussion&#13;
until midnight. When he became engrossed in the subject of&#13;
Slovakia, his eyes shone bdlliantly. He said that evening,&#13;
and he repeated it with emphasis several times, that when&#13;
our nation attains its freedom and independence, not one of&#13;
us may presume .pretensions to a privileged position at home.&#13;
Our only duty, here in a new land which affords us liberty&#13;
and the opportunity to live unshackled by the terror which&#13;
dominates aJl life at home, is to devote ourseilves tq work&#13;
for our naJtion . This is one of the most important convictions&#13;
which each one of us must g~asp. Anyone who would arrogate to himself special advantages or favors at home in re-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
9&#13;
&#13;
turn for his labor in exile is not welcome in our midst. On&#13;
the other hand, he continued, qualified aind deserving indi,v iduals will be fully appreciated at home in due time; they&#13;
will be in demand, and there need be no apprehensions that&#13;
any worthy indi1vidurul will receive less than his due.&#13;
•I t behooves us all to re reasonable, non-extremist, and to&#13;
do our utmost in beha[f of the Slovak cause under extraterritorial circumstances.&#13;
This is the spirit in which Dr. Hrusorvsky dedicated himself to his nation throughout his whole life.&#13;
This article would be incomplete were I to omit recollections from Rome in the years 1945-1947. Those were&#13;
trying times. We lived in constant danger of ,b eing overtaken&#13;
and apprehended and committed. to our foes. Terrific pressure was .b eing put on iltalian officialdom, but Italian autho.&#13;
rities, sympathetic to our case because of ~arol Sidor, with.,&#13;
stood and resisted this .pressure successfully.&#13;
Rome captured: Hlrusovsky's heart. Day after day he&#13;
frequented the Vatican library and devcoted himself particular1y to the study of the olosest relationships between .t he&#13;
V aitican and Sl01Vrukia. !His finished wo11k on this sUJbject has&#13;
already been published.&#13;
When it was not a jaunt to the library that he planned,&#13;
we went out togethm-, tramping the streets of Rome, touring its boulevards and ma,rket ;plaices, and visiting its&#13;
shrines and churches. Hrnsovsky ha,d so intimate a knowledge of ancient Roman villages and country sites that&#13;
when he began to re.late what happened in this or that&#13;
locality, or how a ,plaice had distinguished itself, his listener&#13;
lost ali cootact with time and became wholly unaware that&#13;
planes roared in the Slky, that trolleys jangled in the streets,&#13;
that cars meed by. Lost in the spell of Hrusovsky's words,&#13;
one relirved the glory of ancient days. Before one's eyes&#13;
the Roman Emp:i!re caime. to life again. Hrusovsky had a&#13;
rare genius for creating this kind of atmosphere: It was&#13;
this type of historica1 ,p resentation that also held the key&#13;
to his eminent success as a classroom lecturer. Just as in&#13;
Rome he made Roman history live before our eyes, so did&#13;
he regale his students in ,Slo'Va:kia with Slovak history.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Just as Jan Holly over a hundred years ago captivated and&#13;
instructed the followers of Stur, so did Hrusovsky inspire&#13;
and educate his high school students at the gymnazium.&#13;
lt was in this manner, too, that he held audiences spellbound when he delivered occasional addresses at the various celebrations in Slovak villages and towns. ThaJt was&#13;
his ,life; that was his life's work: to conjure an authentic&#13;
image of the true greatness and the true glory of the distant past, t.o bridge the gay between the presBnt and the&#13;
past, and then to forecast and build a more prosperous&#13;
Slovak future.&#13;
There is a very large number of Hrusovsky's addresses&#13;
and articles in which he developed the subject of Slovak&#13;
statehood. There have been many opponents to Slovaikia's&#13;
aspirations to statehood, ,b ut not one of them has been&#13;
able to foil or to refute the iron logic of Hrusovsky's aJI1guments in its favor.&#13;
In the ,p ast, the works of the most popular Slovak&#13;
writers were putblished in editions running to several hundred copies. Never yet, however, did any Slovak booik win&#13;
such ready ·a nd such widespread populairity as did Hlru_&#13;
sovsky's "Slovenske Dejiny" (Slovak History). It was the&#13;
first complete survey of our Slovruk historicaJ record. Pre-.&#13;
pared as it was ,b y Dr. Hrnsovsky, the first Slovak historian of learning and of note, it presented to the Slovak nation a continuous reel of a:bsoirbing scenes from its past.&#13;
We were all ag,reeaJbly surprised when edition upon edition&#13;
of his work was exhausted so that by 1945 when Hrusovsky was leaving Slova:kia, over one hundred thousand copies of this 'book were in the hands of the Slovak people.&#13;
'Dhis volume of Hrusovsky's history found its way even&#13;
into homes where formerly hardly another book haid been&#13;
brought besides the prayer book and an infrequent almanac&#13;
or annual.&#13;
Hrusovsky's book was written in a style which had&#13;
been so often recommended to us by Karol Sidor, who repeatedly reminded us to write clearly, simply, so that even&#13;
unschooled ;parents in remote hamlets would haive no difficulty in following and understanding what we wrote.&#13;
That was its styllistic merit. In content, this history is&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
ll&#13;
&#13;
prepared. with so scholarl:y an approach - with restraint,&#13;
with fairmindedness, with an oibjective outlook - that it&#13;
ser.ves as a substantial refreshment for both the educated&#13;
classes and for the less privileged.&#13;
With this volume, which the new regime proscribed&#13;
in 194'5, Hrusavsky turned in Slovak national life so deep&#13;
and so broad a furrow that no foreign usurpers can sue.&#13;
ceed. in leveling it eiven in the course of years of effort.&#13;
Even today reports from home reveal that this is the book&#13;
which is still the most widely read Slovak work and the&#13;
most frequently sought book in the black ma.T!kets where,&#13;
alas, an enonnous number of Slovaik writings are listed.&#13;
In the early part of 1945 it was rll!ffiOTed that Communist par tisans caiptured and executed Hrusovsky. Thank&#13;
God that this was a false rumor. The partisans were defeated; they retreated. and Hlrl.l'sovsky returned home.&#13;
His first visit took him to Bresto vany to see 'his mother.&#13;
It is understanda]ble that she embraced him warmly and&#13;
held him close to her heart. Shortly after the e,raltation&#13;
of their meeting, however., she ·b ravely reminded. him:&#13;
"For a great cause, it is a worthy thing eiven to die, my&#13;
son -- and Slovak statehood is a great cause." Dr. Hrus ovsky often repeated these w&lt;&gt;irds, commenting: "Our&#13;
peasant mothers embody much of the heroism of ancient&#13;
Rome's noble matrons."&#13;
And now the noble heart of •F rancis Hrusovsky has&#13;
stilled its ibeating. He departed., mourned by a company&#13;
of outstanding quinquagenarians who had worked with&#13;
him toward a common goal in ,puiblic life: Sidor, Cernak,&#13;
Janci.&#13;
All were oa.lled by the Angel of Death at an age when&#13;
a public servant usually attains the peak and the full de.&#13;
velopment of his strength and activity. National leaders&#13;
though they were, their hearts, so devoted to theiT nation,&#13;
could not withstand the strain orf the hour; they were&#13;
overworked and exhausted. The burden of the yoke overtaxed their physical limitations, and their spark of life was&#13;
crushed by it.&#13;
&#13;
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                <text>Dr. Francis Hrušovský - The Man</text>
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                <text>Constantine Čulen&#13;
Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956&#13;
pp. 5-11</text>
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                <text>Čulen, Konštantín, 1904-1964</text>
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                    <text>12

SLOVAKIA

DR. HRUSOVSKY'S LAST COLUMN
(,P repared and sent to press by Dr. Hrusovsky the day before he died; it appeared in the Cleveland weekly SLOVAK
NEWS dated the day of his funeral, September 13.)

A number of our Slovak compatriot s recently under~
took a trip from America to 'Slova,kia. They had waited
a long time for an opportunity to visit with their parents
who had often written their sons and daughters in America
that they yearned for the comfort of at least one more
visit together. Naturally, once they undertook the long
voyage, the visitors hoped also to meet their other relatives and friends and to extend their travels to other parts
of S1ovakia.

Travel agencies dispatched all that was necessary and
our Slovak friends set out from America within a few
weeks or a few months. They left with the fond hope that
they would spend at least a short stay beneath their family
roof, that beloved home they had to leave a long time ago,
and they looked forward to being in· the circle of their
dearest ones who expected them with open arms. lncidentally too, they were anxious to see for themselves in just
what kind of circumstan ces their kin now live in Slovakia.
~he Czecho-Slovaik Communis t ,b oards which expedited these trips of our Slovak countryme n from the United
States to Slovakia certainly did not do, it in order to affocd
American Slovaks an opportunit y to visit with their closest
relatives. They did it ·b ecause they covet American dollars which are very welcome even in Communist ic countries and they hoped to per.suade visitors from America
that the Slovak peop1e feel satisfied and happy under the
current Red regime.
A Slovak lady fr,O!Ill Cleveland made one of these trips
to Slorva!kia. On arriving in Prague, she wrote a letter to
her husband in America, describing how the American
Slovruk visitors were welcomed at the station with a .playing
band and with flowers. The elated husband ma;de a full
report to the editorial office of the .Communis tic paper

�SLOVAKIA

13

"l'.,udove Noviny" of Chicago, which in turn relayed to its
readers the message that the Communists extend to Slo.
vak visitoo-s from America a signal welcome with music
and bouquets.
The entire affair merely hides a ruse of the crafty
Communists, an artifice which might mislead superficially-minded persons w'ho return to their enslaved homeland. The implication is that the casual visitor to America
is not pomipousily welcomed; he is not showered with flowers; he is not greeted with melody and song. But he comes
into a free country; it is his privilege to move about at
will anywhere firom New York to San Francisco, to con.
verse with whomever he wishes. He is at full liberty to
fo:mn his own convictions about the life of free citirens
living in a democracy, and he bases his conclusions and
opinions on personal contacts, on firsthand impressions,
and on unrestricted study.
The Communists are iprepared to delude visitors from
the first moment of their arrival at a railroad, station or
airport. They pay them a stirring march and send a
coached committee of children to present flowers. They
are meticulously solicitous about their guests; they take
pains to point out whaitever featurns will redound to their
advantage or credit and they proceed along a studied plan
to create a favora1ble impression and to lead their visitors
to conclude that the American press is circulating untrue
reports about Communist-controlled countries .
The Communists have made punctilious arrangements
for the visits of our countrymen from America and their
schedules orf entertainment are nothing but a studied
scheme of propaganda. One who is not sufficiently shrewd
and discerning, who has not the faculty to see things with
his own eyes as they really are and to formulate his own
judgments with a nicety of discretion becomes the gulhble victim of this Communistic propaganda program and
accepts without question all this artificial ~litter.
But there are and have been visitOTs to Slovrukia who
have no need of anyone's reception with floral tokens and
music, who have no disposition to learn what the Com-

�14

SLOVAKIA

munists themselves wish to tell them. Accustomed to life
in a free and democratic land, they look for this liiberty
and democracy in Slovakia. They draw comparisons between the life of a laborer in America and the lot of a
worker in Slovakia. They hear what the Slo,va,k pea;sants
ha:ve to tell them, the sad e~periences of men who have
been despoiled of their property. They see for themselVFis
how jaded Slovak women have become. They cannot fail to
observe that the people are scantily clothed. They learn
that it is extremely hard to ma;ke a living on the meager
earnings that are realized, and at every step their convictions are confirmed that under Communistic domination there is no contentment, no prosperity, no paradise,
none of those advantages and blessings which Communistic propa,ganda repeatedly and volubly advertises.
If guests from America are given the occasion to
speak with their relatives in ,priivate, removed from the
hearing of witnesses or spies, they are informed not only
of the abject servitude imposed upon Slovakia, not only
of her resistance to Communism, but also of the vital hope
which sustains the Slovaiks in the ho,p e that liberty and independence will yet be granted to the country.
Who has eyes to _see will not be blinded by flowers.
Who has ears to hear will not be deafened by CO!mIDunistic
music. And he who has a rational mind for thinking will
not become confused by Communist propaganda. Many
SlO'V'aks who retU1I1I1 from Slovakia bring us reports which
only cor.firm the fact that today S1ovakia enjoys neither
freedom nor democracy, because under Red rule only terror and misery and iviolence prevail. The Slova!k people
never accepted Communism; they will never become reconciled with it, and they only await the opportunity to
throw off the despised yoke. And when they throw off this
yoke, they will likewise throw off Czech doonination, and
Slovakia will again be an independent republic.
1

•

•

'Il.HE SLOVAKS by Peter P. Yurchak, should be in
every pUiblic library, in every college ·a nd university, in the
home of every American of Slovak descent. Get your copy
NOW. Paper bound copy - $2.00; in cloth $3.00.

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1483">
                    <text>12

SLOVAKIA

DR. HRUSOVSKY'S LAST COLUMN
(,P repared and sent to press by Dr. Hrusovsky the day before he died; it appeared in the Cleveland weekly SLOVAK
NEWS dated the day of his funeral, September 13.)

A number of our Slovak compatriot s recently under~
took a trip from America to 'Slova,kia. They had waited
a long time for an opportunity to visit with their parents
who had often written their sons and daughters in America
that they yearned for the comfort of at least one more
visit together. Naturally, once they undertook the long
voyage, the visitors hoped also to meet their other relatives and friends and to extend their travels to other parts
of S1ovakia.

Travel agencies dispatched all that was necessary and
our Slovak friends set out from America within a few
weeks or a few months. They left with the fond hope that
they would spend at least a short stay beneath their family
roof, that beloved home they had to leave a long time ago,
and they looked forward to being in· the circle of their
dearest ones who expected them with open arms. lncidentally too, they were anxious to see for themselves in just
what kind of circumstan ces their kin now live in Slovakia.
~he Czecho-Slovaik Communis t ,b oards which expedited these trips of our Slovak countryme n from the United
States to Slovakia certainly did not do, it in order to affocd
American Slovaks an opportunit y to visit with their closest
relatives. They did it ·b ecause they covet American dollars which are very welcome even in Communist ic countries and they hoped to per.suade visitors from America
that the Slovak peop1e feel satisfied and happy under the
current Red regime.
A Slovak lady fr,O!Ill Cleveland made one of these trips
to Slorva!kia. On arriving in Prague, she wrote a letter to
her husband in America, describing how the American
Slovruk visitors were welcomed at the station with a .playing
band and with flowers. The elated husband ma;de a full
report to the editorial office of the .Communis tic paper

�SLOVAKIA

13

"l'.,udove Noviny" of Chicago, which in turn relayed to its
readers the message that the Communists extend to Slo.
vak visitoo-s from America a signal welcome with music
and bouquets.
The entire affair merely hides a ruse of the crafty
Communists, an artifice which might mislead superficially-minded persons w'ho return to their enslaved homeland. The implication is that the casual visitor to America
is not pomipousily welcomed; he is not showered with flowers; he is not greeted with melody and song. But he comes
into a free country; it is his privilege to move about at
will anywhere firom New York to San Francisco, to con.
verse with whomever he wishes. He is at full liberty to
fo:mn his own convictions about the life of free citirens
living in a democracy, and he bases his conclusions and
opinions on personal contacts, on firsthand impressions,
and on unrestricted study.
The Communists are iprepared to delude visitors from
the first moment of their arrival at a railroad, station or
airport. They pay them a stirring march and send a
coached committee of children to present flowers. They
are meticulously solicitous about their guests; they take
pains to point out whaitever featurns will redound to their
advantage or credit and they proceed along a studied plan
to create a favora1ble impression and to lead their visitors
to conclude that the American press is circulating untrue
reports about Communist-controlled countries .
The Communists have made punctilious arrangements
for the visits of our countrymen from America and their
schedules orf entertainment are nothing but a studied
scheme of propaganda. One who is not sufficiently shrewd
and discerning, who has not the faculty to see things with
his own eyes as they really are and to formulate his own
judgments with a nicety of discretion becomes the gulhble victim of this Communistic propaganda program and
accepts without question all this artificial ~litter.
But there are and have been visitOTs to Slovrukia who
have no need of anyone's reception with floral tokens and
music, who have no disposition to learn what the Com-

�14

SLOVAKIA

munists themselves wish to tell them. Accustomed to life
in a free and democratic land, they look for this liiberty
and democracy in Slovakia. They draw comparisons between the life of a laborer in America and the lot of a
worker in Slovakia. They hear what the Slo,va,k pea;sants
ha:ve to tell them, the sad e~periences of men who have
been despoiled of their property. They see for themselVFis
how jaded Slovak women have become. They cannot fail to
observe that the people are scantily clothed. They learn
that it is extremely hard to ma;ke a living on the meager
earnings that are realized, and at every step their convictions are confirmed that under Communistic domination there is no contentment, no prosperity, no paradise,
none of those advantages and blessings which Communistic propa,ganda repeatedly and volubly advertises.
If guests from America are given the occasion to
speak with their relatives in ,priivate, removed from the
hearing of witnesses or spies, they are informed not only
of the abject servitude imposed upon Slovakia, not only
of her resistance to Communism, but also of the vital hope
which sustains the Slovaiks in the ho,p e that liberty and independence will yet be granted to the country.
Who has eyes to _see will not be blinded by flowers.
Who has ears to hear will not be deafened by CO!mIDunistic
music. And he who has a rational mind for thinking will
not become confused by Communist propaganda. Many
SlO'V'aks who retU1I1I1 from Slovakia bring us reports which
only cor.firm the fact that today S1ovakia enjoys neither
freedom nor democracy, because under Red rule only terror and misery and iviolence prevail. The Slova!k people
never accepted Communism; they will never become reconciled with it, and they only await the opportunity to
throw off the despised yoke. And when they throw off this
yoke, they will likewise throw off Czech doonination, and
Slovakia will again be an independent republic.
1

•

•

'Il.HE SLOVAKS by Peter P. Yurchak, should be in
every pUiblic library, in every college ·a nd university, in the
home of every American of Slovak descent. Get your copy
NOW. Paper bound copy - $2.00; in cloth $3.00.

�</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;</text>
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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              <text>12&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
DR. HRUSOVSKY'S LAST COLUMN&#13;
(,P repared and sent to press by Dr. Hrusovsky the day before he died; it appeared in the Cleveland weekly SLOVAK&#13;
NEWS dated the day of his funeral, September 13.)&#13;
&#13;
A number of our Slovak compatriot s recently under~&#13;
took a trip from America to 'Slova,kia. They had waited&#13;
a long time for an opportunity to visit with their parents&#13;
who had often written their sons and daughters in America&#13;
that they yearned for the comfort of at least one more&#13;
visit together. Naturally, once they undertook the long&#13;
voyage, the visitors hoped also to meet their other relatives and friends and to extend their travels to other parts&#13;
of S1ovakia.&#13;
&#13;
Travel agencies dispatched all that was necessary and&#13;
our Slovak friends set out from America within a few&#13;
weeks or a few months. They left with the fond hope that&#13;
they would spend at least a short stay beneath their family&#13;
roof, that beloved home they had to leave a long time ago,&#13;
and they looked forward to being in· the circle of their&#13;
dearest ones who expected them with open arms. lncidentally too, they were anxious to see for themselves in just&#13;
what kind of circumstan ces their kin now live in Slovakia.&#13;
~he Czecho-Slovaik Communis t ,b oards which expedited these trips of our Slovak countryme n from the United&#13;
States to Slovakia certainly did not do, it in order to affocd&#13;
American Slovaks an opportunit y to visit with their closest&#13;
relatives. They did it ·b ecause they covet American dollars which are very welcome even in Communist ic countries and they hoped to per.suade visitors from America&#13;
that the Slovak peop1e feel satisfied and happy under the&#13;
current Red regime.&#13;
A Slovak lady fr,O!Ill Cleveland made one of these trips&#13;
to Slorva!kia. On arriving in Prague, she wrote a letter to&#13;
her husband in America, describing how the American&#13;
Slovruk visitors were welcomed at the station with a .playing&#13;
band and with flowers. The elated husband ma;de a full&#13;
report to the editorial office of the .Communis tic paper&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
13&#13;
&#13;
"l'.,udove Noviny" of Chicago, which in turn relayed to its&#13;
readers the message that the Communists extend to Slo.&#13;
vak visitoo-s from America a signal welcome with music&#13;
and bouquets.&#13;
The entire affair merely hides a ruse of the crafty&#13;
Communists, an artifice which might mislead superficially-minded persons w'ho return to their enslaved homeland. The implication is that the casual visitor to America&#13;
is not pomipousily welcomed; he is not showered with flowers; he is not greeted with melody and song. But he comes&#13;
into a free country; it is his privilege to move about at&#13;
will anywhere firom New York to San Francisco, to con.&#13;
verse with whomever he wishes. He is at full liberty to&#13;
fo:mn his own convictions about the life of free citirens&#13;
living in a democracy, and he bases his conclusions and&#13;
opinions on personal contacts, on firsthand impressions,&#13;
and on unrestricted study.&#13;
The Communists are iprepared to delude visitors from&#13;
the first moment of their arrival at a railroad, station or&#13;
airport. They pay them a stirring march and send a&#13;
coached committee of children to present flowers. They&#13;
are meticulously solicitous about their guests; they take&#13;
pains to point out whaitever featurns will redound to their&#13;
advantage or credit and they proceed along a studied plan&#13;
to create a favora1ble impression and to lead their visitors&#13;
to conclude that the American press is circulating untrue&#13;
reports about Communist-controlled countries .&#13;
The Communists have made punctilious arrangements&#13;
for the visits of our countrymen from America and their&#13;
schedules orf entertainment are nothing but a studied&#13;
scheme of propaganda. One who is not sufficiently shrewd&#13;
and discerning, who has not the faculty to see things with&#13;
his own eyes as they really are and to formulate his own&#13;
judgments with a nicety of discretion becomes the gulhble victim of this Communistic propaganda program and&#13;
accepts without question all this artificial ~litter.&#13;
But there are and have been visitOTs to Slovrukia who&#13;
have no need of anyone's reception with floral tokens and&#13;
music, who have no disposition to learn what the Com-&#13;
&#13;
14&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
munists themselves wish to tell them. Accustomed to life&#13;
in a free and democratic land, they look for this liiberty&#13;
and democracy in Slovakia. They draw comparisons between the life of a laborer in America and the lot of a&#13;
worker in Slovakia. They hear what the Slo,va,k pea;sants&#13;
ha:ve to tell them, the sad e~periences of men who have&#13;
been despoiled of their property. They see for themselVFis&#13;
how jaded Slovak women have become. They cannot fail to&#13;
observe that the people are scantily clothed. They learn&#13;
that it is extremely hard to ma;ke a living on the meager&#13;
earnings that are realized, and at every step their convictions are confirmed that under Communistic domination there is no contentment, no prosperity, no paradise,&#13;
none of those advantages and blessings which Communistic propa,ganda repeatedly and volubly advertises.&#13;
If guests from America are given the occasion to&#13;
speak with their relatives in ,priivate, removed from the&#13;
hearing of witnesses or spies, they are informed not only&#13;
of the abject servitude imposed upon Slovakia, not only&#13;
of her resistance to Communism, but also of the vital hope&#13;
which sustains the Slovaiks in the ho,p e that liberty and independence will yet be granted to the country.&#13;
Who has eyes to _see will not be blinded by flowers.&#13;
Who has ears to hear will not be deafened by CO!mIDunistic&#13;
music. And he who has a rational mind for thinking will&#13;
not become confused by Communist propaganda. Many&#13;
SlO'V'aks who retU1I1I1 from Slovakia bring us reports which&#13;
only cor.firm the fact that today S1ovakia enjoys neither&#13;
freedom nor democracy, because under Red rule only terror and misery and iviolence prevail. The Slova!k people&#13;
never accepted Communism; they will never become reconciled with it, and they only await the opportunity to&#13;
throw off the despised yoke. And when they throw off this&#13;
yoke, they will likewise throw off Czech doonination, and&#13;
Slovakia will again be an independent republic.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
'Il.HE SLOVAKS by Peter P. Yurchak, should be in&#13;
every pUiblic library, in every college ·a nd university, in the&#13;
home of every American of Slovak descent. Get your copy&#13;
NOW. Paper bound copy - $2.00; in cloth $3.00.&#13;
&#13;
</text>
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                <text>Dr. Hrušovský's Last Column</text>
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                <text>Dr. Francis Hrušovský&#13;
Prepared and sent to press by Dr. Hrušovský the day before he died; it appeared in the Cleveland weekly SLOVAK NEWS dated the day of his funeral, September 13.&#13;
Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956&#13;
pp. 12-14</text>
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

15

MONSIGNOR JOZEF TISO - CONTROVERSIAL
PERSONALITY
By Th. J. Zubek, 0.F.M., S.T.D.

The name of Msgr. Jozef Tiso, S.T.D., the executed
president of the Slovak Republic, is generally known . .However, his ,p ersonality is not sufficiently recognized and
understood in the Western world.
The concept of a priest as an active politician and high
state functionary is today somewhat unusual in Western
Europe, more so in the United States. Too, it is generally
,k nown that the standpoint of the Holy See is against Catholic priests actively engaging in political activity.
Moreover, cwtain gr,o ups present Msgr. Tiso as a
disrupter of the Czecho..:Slova;k Repuiblic, a traitor, Nazi,
Quisling, and a lackey of Adolf Hitler. This i:s done solely
for the political motiives of presenting Sl()IVaks, their political aspirations, and their leaders in an unfavorable
light. It is not strange, then, that in the Western world
the .p ersonality of Msgir. T-iso appem-s Olbscured, incomprehensi'ble, controversial.
To reach a true understanding and evaluation of Jozef
Tiso, it is necessary to look upon his persona1ity and activities in the environment in which he lived and wo:riked;
it is necessary to delve mo'l:'e deeply into the inner man, into
his motiva·t ions and ideological ,bac:kground.
Slovaik Clergy and Politics

The Slovak nation lived for many centuries in the
Hungarian Kingdom. The awaikening to national conscious.ness by the nations of Hungary brought a!bout nationalistic struggles among these nations. The national consciousness of the MaJgyars, the leading nation in Hungary, culminated in the idea of a great Magyar state, politically, culturally and lingu~tically hornogenous. The Ma.
gyars wished to Magyarize the non~Magyar nations of
Hungary, namely, the Slovaks, Roumanians, Croats, and
Germans.
The first victims of the forced Magyarization were
1

�16

SLOVAKIA

the Slovaks. The overwhelming majority of the intelligent..
sia of Slovak origin succumbed to Magyar pressure and
followed the official Magyar line, for .this was a prerequisite in the furtherance of one's career. Of the inteMigentsia
it was almost exclusively the clerigy who remained loyal
to the Slovak nation. The clergy became bearers of the Slovak populace with religious instruction and cultural and
social enlightenment. They were Catholic priests and Lutheran minister s.
Outstanding among the priests were Anton Bernolak
(1762-1813), formulator of the Slovak literary language;
Juraj Fandly (17514~1810) , social educator and popular
writer on husbandry; Jan Holly (1785--1849), a poet who
wrote heroic epics about the Slovaik past; Bishop Stephen
Moyses (1797-1869) , founder and first .president of the
cultural institute, Matica Sloven.ska; Andrej RadlinSlky
(1818.---1879) , founder of St. Adalbert Society, a Catholic
publishing house ; Ferdis Juriga (1874- 1953), an excellent orator and political leader,1 and Andrej Hlinka, (1864
-1938), a fiery defender orf Slova:k rights and founder of
the Slovak People's Party.
Of the Lutheran ministers~patriots there were Michal
M. Hodza (1811-1880) and J ozef M. Hurban (1817-1888),
writers who ,o rganized and led the armed uprising of thB
SlovaJks against the 'Magyars in 1'948; Karol iKuzmany
(1806-1866) , poet and ,c o-founder of the Matica Sloven.ska,
and Martin Razus (1888-1937), poet and politica1 leader.
Upon the basis of solidifying the Slovaks against Magyarization and fighting for their political and social rights,
the clergy entered into the politcal life of Hungary.

Jozef Tiso in the Parliament at Prague
Wllen, in 1918, Slovakia became a part •o f the CzechoSlovak Republic, it appeared at first that more favorable
conditions ,w ould prevail for the Slovaks. However, it soon
became apparent that the Czechs had much the same conceptions as the !Magyars. The Czechs, too, dreamed of a
great Czechoslovak national state, with a politically insignificant minority of Germans and Magyars. The Slovaks
were to cede their national individuality and merge with

�SLOVAKIA

17

the Czechs to create a new Czechoslovak nationality and
to become Czechs eventually.
The Slovaks, however, had long ago developed the
consciousness of a distinct nationality and had no intention
of ceding their national individuality in the interest of the
Czechs. The Slovaks also felt the impact of the economic
exploitation which the Czechs initiated imrne4iately after
1918 when they practically made Slovakia their colony.
It was almost impossible for a ~ovak to enter civil service,
since almost all civil positions and important economic
functions in SlorvaJkia weTe occupied by the Czechs. Further,
the Slorvaks, as a deeply religious Catholic nation (80 %- ),
resented the anti-religious acts of the Czechs, which were
also provocatively perpetrated in Slovaikia.
In the struggle against Ozechization of the Slov,alks
and in defense of Slovak rights, the Slovak People's Party,
founded and led by Msgr. Andrej Hlinka, took the lead.
Hlinka and Juriga, even as they had fought Magyar machinations,, began to fight Czech improprieties in the parliament at Prague, in the 1press, and through political campaigns among the people. The ,p olitical pla;tform of the S10vak People's Party was autonomy for Slovakia as guaran_
teed by the pact between American Slov.aks and the representative of Czecho-Slovakia, Professor Thomas G. Masaryk, in ·P ittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in 1918. 'I'he Slovak
People's Party with its program and motto, "·F or God and
Nation," aippealed to the feelings of the Slovaik populace,
and soon became the most important political party in Slovakia. The autonomistic program was also foUowed by the
Slorvak National Party of Martin Razus, a Lutheran minister.
From the beginning of Czecho-Slovakia (1918), Jozef
Tiso, a young a;nd zeailous priest, spiritual director and professor at the diocesan ·s eminary in Nitra, joined the autonomistic movement of Hlinka's Slovak Peoiple's Party.
In 1925, Tiso became a member oif the Czecho--1Slovak par_
liament and then vice-president of the Slo,vaJk People's
Party. When the Slorvak People's Party entered the government, he became Minister of Health (1927-1929). Tiso

�18

SLOV.A!KIA.

evolved soon into the staunchest e~ponent of Slovak autonomistic policies.
Tiso as President of the Slovak People's Party

Andrej iHlinka died in August of the critical year of
1938. At that time the Slovak People's Party was the most
powerful. political group in SlovaJkia. It had in its ranks
many young workers of the Slovaik inteHigentsia. None
compared to Msgr. Tiso in moral and in political acumen
and in expeTience. Commanding great esteem among the
Slovaik populace and clergy, Tiso logically became the successor of Msgr. Hilinka in the leadership of the Slovak
People's Party.
Under the pressuxe of Hitler's driive, following H!Linka's death in 1938, events in CzechC&gt;-iSlovakfa and in Europe moved quickly. That which the Czechs were loathe to
grant the Slorvaiks under nonnal oonditions, they were
foreed to grant in the enfeebled post-Munich Czecho...Slov-a kia. On October 6, 1938, the Slovaiks gained their political autonomy; they became the masters in Slorvakia.
Msgr. 'l"iso, as the president of the Poople',s Party became
the premier of the Slovak autonomous government, with
the permission of his Bishop and the Vatican.
Even :when Slovakia suffered by ceding territory to
Hung,ary as a result of the Vienna A11bitration on Novem•b er 2, 1938, the ,Slovaiks were hruppy with the newly-gained
autonomy. The Czechs left Slorva!kia; the Slovaiks began
to manage their own affairs in the ·b est interests of the nation. It appeared that with the attainment of autonomy
the aspirations of the Slovaiks were fulfilled and that the
staJbilization of conditions in Slovakia would ·b e enduring.

Tiso, President of the Republic
Hitler was not satisfied with the dismemberment an.d
neutralization of Czecho-Slovakia. When he decided to
wa-ge war aigainst Poland, he wanted Ozecho-,SloviaJkia oom,p letcly under his control, particularly the western part
(Bdhemia and Moravia) which was heavil'Y industriaJUzed
and entirely encircled by the German Reich.
On March 13, 1939, !H itler summoned Tiso• to Berlin

�SLOVAKIA

19

and confronted him with the German decision regarding
Slrovakia : Either secede from the Czechs and proclaim an
independent Slorvak State or suffer the oonsequence of
partition between Germany and Hungary. On IMa.Tch 14,
1939, Tiso presented the German proposition to the Slovak pavliament for decision. 'Ehe Slovak parliament voted
for independence of !Slovakia. Msgr. Tiso became the ,p re.
sident of the Slovak Republic.2
Msgr. Tiso and other Slovak political [eaders were
somewhat hesitant to proclaim Slovak independence. Said
Tiso, in his defense before the National Court in Bratislava
(1947) : "Were it not for Hitler's pressure, the Slo:vak
parliament would never have proclaimed indeipendence. "3
The MaJgyars amd the Czechs, to justify their claims upon
Slo:va,kia, ha,d in the past repeatedly asserted that Siovllikia,
for economic reasons, was incapable of independence.
Slovak politica:l lea,ders, suddenly confronted with the question of independence for Sl01V,a kia, were aipprehensive of
the future. But rather than have their country partitioned
and occupied, they logi,cally chose the attempt at independence. And after this decision, they strove for the economic
prosperity and cultural development of Slova,kia, permanently to integrate Slovakia into the family of European
nations.
It can be said that the Slovruk attempt was successful.
The wave of naJtional enthusiasm engulfed the coll'Iltry,
and Siovaikia's eoonomi:c and cultural standards flourished.
The Slovaks. even those who at first were reserved, warmed
to the Slorva!k .State and ha,d faith in its chief, Msgr. Jozef
Tiso. 4 Even the most bitter enemies of the Slovaks had to
acknowledge that the Slova;k Republic was capable of existence.
That which Slovakia had proved in the years 1939-1945
is in no small measure ithe result of the political activity of
Msgr. Tiso. But it is also the most controversial period of
his political career.
1

The Fundamentals and Components of Tiso's Policies
Msgr. Tiso's defense plea before the National COU'rt at
Bratislava, encompasses many noteworthy ,p ronouncements

�20

SLOVAKIA

that point out the principles of his political activity. Con.
sider but a few characteristic quotations.
The key to the evaluation of my activity is my
character of the priest with its motivations and regulations, established by Christian teaching for public
activity. 5
Tiso as president of the Slovak Republic tried to lead
his nation like a solicitous father according to Christian
principles,, to which, as a priest, he consecrated his life.
Politically I only did that which the well-being and
inter est of the Slovak n::.ttion dictated. What I did, I
always did according to, the best dictates of my knowledge and conscience, ... always guided by the rules of
morality ... I fought evil with all my power, yielding
to evil only when a greater evil threatened the nation. G
'In this light, Msgr. Tiso explained his aHeged collaboration with the Nazis. Msgr. Tiso• stated that some collaboration with Germany was at that time a necessity dictated
by Slovakia 's geographic position, the develorpment of European events and the law of self..preservation. Slovakia
did not have its own foreign policy, but neither did other
larger nations in Hitleir-controUed Europe. Tiso pleaded
that he was so concerned with the internal consolidation
and development of Slovakia that he wa,s unruble to study
the problems of international politics, including the war,
upon which, because of his position, he could wield no influence. Slovak participation in the war against Russia,
with two divisions, was merely symbolic, Tiso explained. 7
According to Msgr. Tiso, his paramount ;po'1icy was t o
secure the maximum of internal freedom and independence
within the German sphere. Outwardly it was necessary to
yield somewhat to German pressure, to keep them apart,
thus avoiding armed intervention. For this reason it was
necessary to ban the Communist Party (one of the main
accusations against Tiso) ; it was necessary to participate
in the war against Russia, and it was necessary to institute
some elements of a totalitarian regime. All this was done ,
however, to pull wool over the eyes of the Germans. Inter-

�SLOVAKIA

21

nally, pleaded Tiso, Slovrukia was governed democratically
- and there was freedom. &amp;
In this light -Msgr. Tiso aJ,s,o ex;plained anti-semitic activity in Slovakia. Msgr. 'Di.so stated that the rationalization of the Jewish problem was &lt;based on a percentual partic1pation in the nation's economy. There were aibout
100,000 Jews in Sloivakia, or 4 % of the total .p opulation.
Therefore only 4 % of the nation's economy was pe:mnitted
to Jews. Jewish ,b usinesses were being aryanized, that is, a
non-Jew would buy 51 % of a business, at an officially esta:blished rate, and the former Jewish proprietor would remain as a partrn~r. Later, at the dictate of the Gernnans,
Jews were put into con centration camps and e vacuated into
Poland under the pretext that land would be ,p rovided for
them so that they wou!ld be able to Hve under their own
ru:le. Tiso justified his position ·b y saying that he did
not know at that time that the evacuated Jews would be
exterminated in Polish and German concentration camps.9

A Weak Defense Herein
In regard to the Jewish question, Msgr. Giuseppe Burzio, r epresentative of the Holy See in Slovakia, intervened
with President Tiso in behalf of the Jews. It was rumored
that Msigr. Tiso, 'a s a Catholic priest, should have resigned
from the presidency, since he was unable to curtail the antisemitic campaign dictated by the Germans and waged by
Slovak extremists unde r the direction of Premier Dr. Vojtech Tuka.
Concerning the possibility o.f his resignation, let Tiso
speak:
I did not resign because I felt a moral obligation
to fulfill. the duty that I had undertaken until I had
been released from it by lega1ly constituted functionaries ... My action would have been egotistica,l had I
left my nation in those difficult times and entered ;pri..,
vate life. My action would haive been irresponsible and
against the nation had I not truken into private life the
moral values that I felt I represented 10
He stated further that had he received an official request from his ecclesiastical authorities, he would ha,ve re.

�22

SLOV.i\KIA

signed, for then there would have been no- decision to maJke,
the responsibility would have been the Church authorities'.
It is generally known that even repre sentatiives of the Jews
had begged him to remain in office, for it would have been a
total catastrophe for the Jews if someone else would have
,b een president oif the Slovak Republic.
Tiso managed to insert into- ithe anti.Jewish law a provision to exempt some Jews. He wa:s a:ble to qualify a Jew
as indispensa:ble to Slovak economy and thus save him from
deportation. About 9,000 such exemptions were made. Despite this, howeveT, the Jewish question was really a weak
point of Tiso's policy and of his defense.

The End of Msgr. Tiso
Msgr. Tiso's trial beg,an at the end of 1946 and lasted
until April of 1947. On April 17, 1947, the jury of the Naticmal Court at Bratisla'Va brought forth the verdict of
death by hanging, and the sentence was carried out on
the following morning. Msgr. Tiso died peacefully, committing himself to God. His body was either destroyed or
buried secretly to iprevent the SloIVaks from paying their
respects.
The standpoint of the Holy See, dissuading priests
from participating directly in political actirvity and not
identifying the Church with any particular politicail system
or party, ,proved itself very much correct during the trial.
Ev~ though Msgr. Tiso was tried as a politcian, it was
difficult to separate his priesthood from his political function. Through Msg,r. Tiso's trial the Catholic Church of
Slovakia was pilloried, ,altho'll!g'h unjustly. From the
Church's point of view, it would ha.ve been 'b etter if, during the years of 1939 to 1945, the political life of Slovakia had been headed by a layman rather than a C'lex,gyman.
On the other hand, it is certain that Tiso had been
unj,u stly condemned. Under German ·control it was imposs1ble oo conduct a 'better policy in the interests of Slovakia than the one Tiso im:Plemented. Outright collaboration with Nazism, whkh Dr. 'Iuka attempted, would have

�SLOVAKIA

23

done an immeasurably greater harm to Slovrukia. Msgr.
Tiso constantly thwarted TU!ka's attempts.
Msgr. Tiso's trial cuhninated. during Lent when Chris...
tians are reminded. of the trial and death of Christ. Slovaks
openly compared. Tiso's trial with the trial of Ohrist. Tiso,
too, in his defense, alluded to this circumstance.
The court that sentenced Tiso was dominated by
Communists. The president of the court, Dr. Ivan Daxner
and the state prosecutors, Dr. Juraj Sujan and Dr. Anton
Rasla, were die-hard Communists. Furthermore, it seemed
that the first two mentioned were predisposed against
Msgr. Tiso, the Catholic priest, on religious grounds. Msgr.
Tiso in his testament to the nation, written an hour before his death, rightfully sitated: ". . . I consider myself, in
the first place a martyr in the defense of Christianity
against Communism."11
"Martyr of Love"

Msgr. Tiso was a victim of political revenge. It was
expected. that even if he were condemned, he would be
granted amnesty ,b y Dr. IDdward Benes, President of the
new Czecho-Slo:v akia. Benes refused. "Osservatore Romano," of April 28, 1947, wrote that in the event of Msgr.
Tiso's condemnation "political discretion would make it
necessary to grant amnesty, even though in self interest ... " to amelfo,r ate the tense situation ·b etween S1-ovaiks
and Czechs. "As a martyr of love toward his homeland,
Dr. Tiso will live on in the Slovaik Catholic nation," "Osservatore Romano," concluded.
Although Dr. Benes had rid himself of Msgr. Tiso, it
is certain that Tiso in death is a greater pro'b lem in the
relationship between Czechs and Slova:ks than Tiso would
have boon in life.
Msgr. Tiso lives in the Sl01Vak nation as a hero and
martyr. To the SlOIVruks he is a symbol of a crusader for
the God.given rights 'Of the Slovak nation. The Slovak
Republic, with its six years of successful existence, is an
actuality that ca:nnot be eradicated from history. The
SlavaJks at home and wbroad. in the absolute majority stand

�24

SLOVAKIA

behind the ideals for which Msgr. Tiso, .p resident of the
"The Homiletic and
Slovak R epublic, Lived and died. 1955.
Pastoral Review," N 01Vember,
1. Coura,geous member of the Hungarian Parliament (1905-1918).
2. In parall el, Msgr. J an Sram ek, a Czech priest, becam e premier of the Czecho-Slovak governm ent in exile.
3. Dr. J ozef Tiso Abou t Him self, Edited by Dr. J oseph Pauco,
Passaic, N. J .
4. As the war-front b egan to app roach Slo vakia, certain grou ps
within the country, inspi.red d'rom a broad, provoked an u pri-sin g in
August of 1944. T o ga_in the support of the Slovak populace, t h ey
spread r umors that Tiso had been imprisoned by the Germ ans and,
therefore, it was necessary to fight Ge rmany.
5. Op. cit., p. 121.
6. Op. cit., p. 111.
7. Op. cit., p. 37, 277 .
8. Op. cit., p . 213 ss., 199, 201.
9. Op. ci t., p. 313 ss.
10. Op. cit., p . 21.
11. Op. cit., p. 8.

•

•

•

WHO SAID IT?

"The relations of today and tomorro,w between Cze,c hoSloivaikia and the Sorviet Union a.re defined in the treaty of
Deceim:be.r 1'2, 1943, . . It proclaims the lasting friMdshir,
of the two nations, for the future whic h will be, strengthened
by widespread economic cooperation af t e r the war. The fu hire general collaJboratiion is defined as that of two ftree
alilld independent ,s tates, in whi ch there wrn be no inter1fore111ce
(Jan Papane k , Interin the internrul affairs of either.'' York, 19415 )
New
Inc.,
Press,
nati-onrul Universities
1

• • •

"Norvemlber 7, 1917, is t he day thaJt is ma:riked in history as the beginning of a new era, which sought the guarantee of happiness to mankind by means of a new me1Jhod
of equalling differences among people and th.us achi&amp;ving
contentment on earth. Today it is- stNa too eaJI'ly from thaJt
epochal occasion to judge objootively the consequences of
that great deed. One thing, however, is certain: it was the
beginndng of an enormous process full of ideas bo:rn of idealism." - (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, V ~ of the Executive Conu:mttee of the "Council of Free OzecboslolV'a:kia,"
NOW PR.ODY, Novemiber 18, 1946).

�</text>
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

15

MONSIGNOR JOZEF TISO - CONTROVERSIAL
PERSONALITY
By Th. J. Zubek, 0.F.M., S.T.D.

The name of Msgr. Jozef Tiso, S.T.D., the executed
president of the Slovak Republic, is generally known . .However, his ,p ersonality is not sufficiently recognized and
understood in the Western world.
The concept of a priest as an active politician and high
state functionary is today somewhat unusual in Western
Europe, more so in the United States. Too, it is generally
,k nown that the standpoint of the Holy See is against Catholic priests actively engaging in political activity.
Moreover, cwtain gr,o ups present Msgr. Tiso as a
disrupter of the Czecho..:Slova;k Repuiblic, a traitor, Nazi,
Quisling, and a lackey of Adolf Hitler. This i:s done solely
for the political motiives of presenting Sl()IVaks, their political aspirations, and their leaders in an unfavorable
light. It is not strange, then, that in the Western world
the .p ersonality of Msgir. T-iso appem-s Olbscured, incomprehensi'ble, controversial.
To reach a true understanding and evaluation of Jozef
Tiso, it is necessary to look upon his persona1ity and activities in the environment in which he lived and wo:riked;
it is necessary to delve mo'l:'e deeply into the inner man, into
his motiva·t ions and ideological ,bac:kground.
Slovaik Clergy and Politics

The Slovak nation lived for many centuries in the
Hungarian Kingdom. The awaikening to national conscious.ness by the nations of Hungary brought a!bout nationalistic struggles among these nations. The national consciousness of the MaJgyars, the leading nation in Hungary, culminated in the idea of a great Magyar state, politically, culturally and lingu~tically hornogenous. The Ma.
gyars wished to Magyarize the non~Magyar nations of
Hungary, namely, the Slovaks, Roumanians, Croats, and
Germans.
The first victims of the forced Magyarization were
1

�16

SLOVAKIA

the Slovaks. The overwhelming majority of the intelligent..
sia of Slovak origin succumbed to Magyar pressure and
followed the official Magyar line, for .this was a prerequisite in the furtherance of one's career. Of the inteMigentsia
it was almost exclusively the clerigy who remained loyal
to the Slovak nation. The clergy became bearers of the Slovak populace with religious instruction and cultural and
social enlightenment. They were Catholic priests and Lutheran minister s.
Outstanding among the priests were Anton Bernolak
(1762-1813), formulator of the Slovak literary language;
Juraj Fandly (17514~1810) , social educator and popular
writer on husbandry; Jan Holly (1785--1849), a poet who
wrote heroic epics about the Slovaik past; Bishop Stephen
Moyses (1797-1869) , founder and first .president of the
cultural institute, Matica Sloven.ska; Andrej RadlinSlky
(1818.---1879) , founder of St. Adalbert Society, a Catholic
publishing house ; Ferdis Juriga (1874- 1953), an excellent orator and political leader,1 and Andrej Hlinka, (1864
-1938), a fiery defender orf Slova:k rights and founder of
the Slovak People's Party.
Of the Lutheran ministers~patriots there were Michal
M. Hodza (1811-1880) and J ozef M. Hurban (1817-1888),
writers who ,o rganized and led the armed uprising of thB
SlovaJks against the 'Magyars in 1'948; Karol iKuzmany
(1806-1866) , poet and ,c o-founder of the Matica Sloven.ska,
and Martin Razus (1888-1937), poet and politica1 leader.
Upon the basis of solidifying the Slovaks against Magyarization and fighting for their political and social rights,
the clergy entered into the politcal life of Hungary.

Jozef Tiso in the Parliament at Prague
Wllen, in 1918, Slovakia became a part •o f the CzechoSlovak Republic, it appeared at first that more favorable
conditions ,w ould prevail for the Slovaks. However, it soon
became apparent that the Czechs had much the same conceptions as the !Magyars. The Czechs, too, dreamed of a
great Czechoslovak national state, with a politically insignificant minority of Germans and Magyars. The Slovaks
were to cede their national individuality and merge with

�SLOVAKIA

17

the Czechs to create a new Czechoslovak nationality and
to become Czechs eventually.
The Slovaks, however, had long ago developed the
consciousness of a distinct nationality and had no intention
of ceding their national individuality in the interest of the
Czechs. The Slovaks also felt the impact of the economic
exploitation which the Czechs initiated imrne4iately after
1918 when they practically made Slovakia their colony.
It was almost impossible for a ~ovak to enter civil service,
since almost all civil positions and important economic
functions in SlorvaJkia weTe occupied by the Czechs. Further,
the Slorvaks, as a deeply religious Catholic nation (80 %- ),
resented the anti-religious acts of the Czechs, which were
also provocatively perpetrated in Slovaikia.
In the struggle against Ozechization of the Slov,alks
and in defense of Slovak rights, the Slovak People's Party,
founded and led by Msgr. Andrej Hlinka, took the lead.
Hlinka and Juriga, even as they had fought Magyar machinations,, began to fight Czech improprieties in the parliament at Prague, in the 1press, and through political campaigns among the people. The ,p olitical pla;tform of the S10vak People's Party was autonomy for Slovakia as guaran_
teed by the pact between American Slov.aks and the representative of Czecho-Slovakia, Professor Thomas G. Masaryk, in ·P ittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in 1918. 'I'he Slovak
People's Party with its program and motto, "·F or God and
Nation," aippealed to the feelings of the Slovaik populace,
and soon became the most important political party in Slovakia. The autonomistic program was also foUowed by the
Slorvak National Party of Martin Razus, a Lutheran minister.
From the beginning of Czecho-Slovakia (1918), Jozef
Tiso, a young a;nd zeailous priest, spiritual director and professor at the diocesan ·s eminary in Nitra, joined the autonomistic movement of Hlinka's Slovak Peoiple's Party.
In 1925, Tiso became a member oif the Czecho--1Slovak par_
liament and then vice-president of the Slo,vaJk People's
Party. When the Slorvak People's Party entered the government, he became Minister of Health (1927-1929). Tiso

�18

SLOV.A!KIA.

evolved soon into the staunchest e~ponent of Slovak autonomistic policies.
Tiso as President of the Slovak People's Party

Andrej iHlinka died in August of the critical year of
1938. At that time the Slovak People's Party was the most
powerful. political group in SlovaJkia. It had in its ranks
many young workers of the Slovaik inteHigentsia. None
compared to Msgr. Tiso in moral and in political acumen
and in expeTience. Commanding great esteem among the
Slovaik populace and clergy, Tiso logically became the successor of Msgr. Hilinka in the leadership of the Slovak
People's Party.
Under the pressuxe of Hitler's driive, following H!Linka's death in 1938, events in CzechC&gt;-iSlovakfa and in Europe moved quickly. That which the Czechs were loathe to
grant the Slorvaiks under nonnal oonditions, they were
foreed to grant in the enfeebled post-Munich Czecho...Slov-a kia. On October 6, 1938, the Slovaiks gained their political autonomy; they became the masters in Slorvakia.
Msgr. 'l"iso, as the president of the Poople',s Party became
the premier of the Slovak autonomous government, with
the permission of his Bishop and the Vatican.
Even :when Slovakia suffered by ceding territory to
Hung,ary as a result of the Vienna A11bitration on Novem•b er 2, 1938, the ,Slovaiks were hruppy with the newly-gained
autonomy. The Czechs left Slorva!kia; the Slovaiks began
to manage their own affairs in the ·b est interests of the nation. It appeared that with the attainment of autonomy
the aspirations of the Slovaiks were fulfilled and that the
staJbilization of conditions in Slovakia would ·b e enduring.

Tiso, President of the Republic
Hitler was not satisfied with the dismemberment an.d
neutralization of Czecho-Slovakia. When he decided to
wa-ge war aigainst Poland, he wanted Ozecho-,SloviaJkia oom,p letcly under his control, particularly the western part
(Bdhemia and Moravia) which was heavil'Y industriaJUzed
and entirely encircled by the German Reich.
On March 13, 1939, !H itler summoned Tiso• to Berlin

�SLOVAKIA

19

and confronted him with the German decision regarding
Slrovakia : Either secede from the Czechs and proclaim an
independent Slorvak State or suffer the oonsequence of
partition between Germany and Hungary. On IMa.Tch 14,
1939, Tiso presented the German proposition to the Slovak pavliament for decision. 'Ehe Slovak parliament voted
for independence of !Slovakia. Msgr. Tiso became the ,p re.
sident of the Slovak Republic.2
Msgr. Tiso and other Slovak political [eaders were
somewhat hesitant to proclaim Slovak independence. Said
Tiso, in his defense before the National Court in Bratislava
(1947) : "Were it not for Hitler's pressure, the Slo:vak
parliament would never have proclaimed indeipendence. "3
The MaJgyars amd the Czechs, to justify their claims upon
Slo:va,kia, ha,d in the past repeatedly asserted that Siovllikia,
for economic reasons, was incapable of independence.
Slovak politica:l lea,ders, suddenly confronted with the question of independence for Sl01V,a kia, were aipprehensive of
the future. But rather than have their country partitioned
and occupied, they logi,cally chose the attempt at independence. And after this decision, they strove for the economic
prosperity and cultural development of Slova,kia, permanently to integrate Slovakia into the family of European
nations.
It can be said that the Slovruk attempt was successful.
The wave of naJtional enthusiasm engulfed the coll'Iltry,
and Siovaikia's eoonomi:c and cultural standards flourished.
The Slovaks. even those who at first were reserved, warmed
to the Slorva!k .State and ha,d faith in its chief, Msgr. Jozef
Tiso. 4 Even the most bitter enemies of the Slovaks had to
acknowledge that the Slova;k Republic was capable of existence.
That which Slovakia had proved in the years 1939-1945
is in no small measure ithe result of the political activity of
Msgr. Tiso. But it is also the most controversial period of
his political career.
1

The Fundamentals and Components of Tiso's Policies
Msgr. Tiso's defense plea before the National COU'rt at
Bratislava, encompasses many noteworthy ,p ronouncements

�20

SLOVAKIA

that point out the principles of his political activity. Con.
sider but a few characteristic quotations.
The key to the evaluation of my activity is my
character of the priest with its motivations and regulations, established by Christian teaching for public
activity. 5
Tiso as president of the Slovak Republic tried to lead
his nation like a solicitous father according to Christian
principles,, to which, as a priest, he consecrated his life.
Politically I only did that which the well-being and
inter est of the Slovak n::.ttion dictated. What I did, I
always did according to, the best dictates of my knowledge and conscience, ... always guided by the rules of
morality ... I fought evil with all my power, yielding
to evil only when a greater evil threatened the nation. G
'In this light, Msgr. Tiso explained his aHeged collaboration with the Nazis. Msgr. Tiso• stated that some collaboration with Germany was at that time a necessity dictated
by Slovakia 's geographic position, the develorpment of European events and the law of self..preservation. Slovakia
did not have its own foreign policy, but neither did other
larger nations in Hitleir-controUed Europe. Tiso pleaded
that he was so concerned with the internal consolidation
and development of Slovakia that he wa,s unruble to study
the problems of international politics, including the war,
upon which, because of his position, he could wield no influence. Slovak participation in the war against Russia,
with two divisions, was merely symbolic, Tiso explained. 7
According to Msgr. Tiso, his paramount ;po'1icy was t o
secure the maximum of internal freedom and independence
within the German sphere. Outwardly it was necessary to
yield somewhat to German pressure, to keep them apart,
thus avoiding armed intervention. For this reason it was
necessary to ban the Communist Party (one of the main
accusations against Tiso) ; it was necessary to participate
in the war against Russia, and it was necessary to institute
some elements of a totalitarian regime. All this was done ,
however, to pull wool over the eyes of the Germans. Inter-

�SLOVAKIA

21

nally, pleaded Tiso, Slovrukia was governed democratically
- and there was freedom. &amp;
In this light -Msgr. Tiso aJ,s,o ex;plained anti-semitic activity in Slovakia. Msgr. 'Di.so stated that the rationalization of the Jewish problem was &lt;based on a percentual partic1pation in the nation's economy. There were aibout
100,000 Jews in Sloivakia, or 4 % of the total .p opulation.
Therefore only 4 % of the nation's economy was pe:mnitted
to Jews. Jewish ,b usinesses were being aryanized, that is, a
non-Jew would buy 51 % of a business, at an officially esta:blished rate, and the former Jewish proprietor would remain as a partrn~r. Later, at the dictate of the Gernnans,
Jews were put into con centration camps and e vacuated into
Poland under the pretext that land would be ,p rovided for
them so that they wou!ld be able to Hve under their own
ru:le. Tiso justified his position ·b y saying that he did
not know at that time that the evacuated Jews would be
exterminated in Polish and German concentration camps.9

A Weak Defense Herein
In regard to the Jewish question, Msgr. Giuseppe Burzio, r epresentative of the Holy See in Slovakia, intervened
with President Tiso in behalf of the Jews. It was rumored
that Msigr. Tiso, 'a s a Catholic priest, should have resigned
from the presidency, since he was unable to curtail the antisemitic campaign dictated by the Germans and waged by
Slovak extremists unde r the direction of Premier Dr. Vojtech Tuka.
Concerning the possibility o.f his resignation, let Tiso
speak:
I did not resign because I felt a moral obligation
to fulfill. the duty that I had undertaken until I had
been released from it by lega1ly constituted functionaries ... My action would have been egotistica,l had I
left my nation in those difficult times and entered ;pri..,
vate life. My action would haive been irresponsible and
against the nation had I not truken into private life the
moral values that I felt I represented 10
He stated further that had he received an official request from his ecclesiastical authorities, he would ha,ve re.

�22

SLOV.i\KIA

signed, for then there would have been no- decision to maJke,
the responsibility would have been the Church authorities'.
It is generally known that even repre sentatiives of the Jews
had begged him to remain in office, for it would have been a
total catastrophe for the Jews if someone else would have
,b een president oif the Slovak Republic.
Tiso managed to insert into- ithe anti.Jewish law a provision to exempt some Jews. He wa:s a:ble to qualify a Jew
as indispensa:ble to Slovak economy and thus save him from
deportation. About 9,000 such exemptions were made. Despite this, howeveT, the Jewish question was really a weak
point of Tiso's policy and of his defense.

The End of Msgr. Tiso
Msgr. Tiso's trial beg,an at the end of 1946 and lasted
until April of 1947. On April 17, 1947, the jury of the Naticmal Court at Bratisla'Va brought forth the verdict of
death by hanging, and the sentence was carried out on
the following morning. Msgr. Tiso died peacefully, committing himself to God. His body was either destroyed or
buried secretly to iprevent the SloIVaks from paying their
respects.
The standpoint of the Holy See, dissuading priests
from participating directly in political actirvity and not
identifying the Church with any particular politicail system
or party, ,proved itself very much correct during the trial.
Ev~ though Msgr. Tiso was tried as a politcian, it was
difficult to separate his priesthood from his political function. Through Msg,r. Tiso's trial the Catholic Church of
Slovakia was pilloried, ,altho'll!g'h unjustly. From the
Church's point of view, it would ha.ve been 'b etter if, during the years of 1939 to 1945, the political life of Slovakia had been headed by a layman rather than a C'lex,gyman.
On the other hand, it is certain that Tiso had been
unj,u stly condemned. Under German ·control it was imposs1ble oo conduct a 'better policy in the interests of Slovakia than the one Tiso im:Plemented. Outright collaboration with Nazism, whkh Dr. 'Iuka attempted, would have

�SLOVAKIA

23

done an immeasurably greater harm to Slovrukia. Msgr.
Tiso constantly thwarted TU!ka's attempts.
Msgr. Tiso's trial cuhninated. during Lent when Chris...
tians are reminded. of the trial and death of Christ. Slovaks
openly compared. Tiso's trial with the trial of Ohrist. Tiso,
too, in his defense, alluded to this circumstance.
The court that sentenced Tiso was dominated by
Communists. The president of the court, Dr. Ivan Daxner
and the state prosecutors, Dr. Juraj Sujan and Dr. Anton
Rasla, were die-hard Communists. Furthermore, it seemed
that the first two mentioned were predisposed against
Msgr. Tiso, the Catholic priest, on religious grounds. Msgr.
Tiso in his testament to the nation, written an hour before his death, rightfully sitated: ". . . I consider myself, in
the first place a martyr in the defense of Christianity
against Communism."11
"Martyr of Love"

Msgr. Tiso was a victim of political revenge. It was
expected. that even if he were condemned, he would be
granted amnesty ,b y Dr. IDdward Benes, President of the
new Czecho-Slo:v akia. Benes refused. "Osservatore Romano," of April 28, 1947, wrote that in the event of Msgr.
Tiso's condemnation "political discretion would make it
necessary to grant amnesty, even though in self interest ... " to amelfo,r ate the tense situation ·b etween S1-ovaiks
and Czechs. "As a martyr of love toward his homeland,
Dr. Tiso will live on in the Slovaik Catholic nation," "Osservatore Romano," concluded.
Although Dr. Benes had rid himself of Msgr. Tiso, it
is certain that Tiso in death is a greater pro'b lem in the
relationship between Czechs and Slova:ks than Tiso would
have boon in life.
Msgr. Tiso lives in the Sl01Vak nation as a hero and
martyr. To the SlOIVruks he is a symbol of a crusader for
the God.given rights 'Of the Slovak nation. The Slovak
Republic, with its six years of successful existence, is an
actuality that ca:nnot be eradicated from history. The
SlavaJks at home and wbroad. in the absolute majority stand

�24

SLOVAKIA

behind the ideals for which Msgr. Tiso, .p resident of the
"The Homiletic and
Slovak R epublic, Lived and died. 1955.
Pastoral Review," N 01Vember,
1. Coura,geous member of the Hungarian Parliament (1905-1918).
2. In parall el, Msgr. J an Sram ek, a Czech priest, becam e premier of the Czecho-Slovak governm ent in exile.
3. Dr. J ozef Tiso Abou t Him self, Edited by Dr. J oseph Pauco,
Passaic, N. J .
4. As the war-front b egan to app roach Slo vakia, certain grou ps
within the country, inspi.red d'rom a broad, provoked an u pri-sin g in
August of 1944. T o ga_in the support of the Slovak populace, t h ey
spread r umors that Tiso had been imprisoned by the Germ ans and,
therefore, it was necessary to fight Ge rmany.
5. Op. cit., p. 121.
6. Op. cit., p. 111.
7. Op. cit., p. 37, 277 .
8. Op. cit., p . 213 ss., 199, 201.
9. Op. ci t., p. 313 ss.
10. Op. cit., p . 21.
11. Op. cit., p. 8.

•

•

•

WHO SAID IT?

"The relations of today and tomorro,w between Cze,c hoSloivaikia and the Sorviet Union a.re defined in the treaty of
Deceim:be.r 1'2, 1943, . . It proclaims the lasting friMdshir,
of the two nations, for the future whic h will be, strengthened
by widespread economic cooperation af t e r the war. The fu hire general collaJboratiion is defined as that of two ftree
alilld independent ,s tates, in whi ch there wrn be no inter1fore111ce
(Jan Papane k , Interin the internrul affairs of either.'' York, 19415 )
New
Inc.,
Press,
nati-onrul Universities
1

• • •

"Norvemlber 7, 1917, is t he day thaJt is ma:riked in history as the beginning of a new era, which sought the guarantee of happiness to mankind by means of a new me1Jhod
of equalling differences among people and th.us achi&amp;ving
contentment on earth. Today it is- stNa too eaJI'ly from thaJt
epochal occasion to judge objootively the consequences of
that great deed. One thing, however, is certain: it was the
beginndng of an enormous process full of ideas bo:rn of idealism." - (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, V ~ of the Executive Conu:mttee of the "Council of Free OzecboslolV'a:kia,"
NOW PR.ODY, Novemiber 18, 1946).

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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
15&#13;
&#13;
MONSIGNOR JOZEF TISO - CONTROVERSIAL&#13;
PERSONALITY&#13;
By Th. J. Zubek, 0.F.M., S.T.D.&#13;
&#13;
The name of Msgr. Jozef Tiso, S.T.D., the executed&#13;
president of the Slovak Republic, is generally known . .However, his ,p ersonality is not sufficiently recognized and&#13;
understood in the Western world.&#13;
The concept of a priest as an active politician and high&#13;
state functionary is today somewhat unusual in Western&#13;
Europe, more so in the United States. Too, it is generally&#13;
,k nown that the standpoint of the Holy See is against Catholic priests actively engaging in political activity.&#13;
Moreover, cwtain gr,o ups present Msgr. Tiso as a&#13;
disrupter of the Czecho..:Slova;k Repuiblic, a traitor, Nazi,&#13;
Quisling, and a lackey of Adolf Hitler. This i:s done solely&#13;
for the political motiives of presenting Sl()IVaks, their political aspirations, and their leaders in an unfavorable&#13;
light. It is not strange, then, that in the Western world&#13;
the .p ersonality of Msgir. T-iso appem-s Olbscured, incomprehensi'ble, controversial.&#13;
To reach a true understanding and evaluation of Jozef&#13;
Tiso, it is necessary to look upon his persona1ity and activities in the environment in which he lived and wo:riked;&#13;
it is necessary to delve mo'l:'e deeply into the inner man, into&#13;
his motiva·t ions and ideological ,bac:kground.&#13;
Slovaik Clergy and Politics&#13;
&#13;
The Slovak nation lived for many centuries in the&#13;
Hungarian Kingdom. The awaikening to national conscious.ness by the nations of Hungary brought a!bout nationalistic struggles among these nations. The national consciousness of the MaJgyars, the leading nation in Hungary, culminated in the idea of a great Magyar state, politically, culturally and lingu~tically hornogenous. The Ma.&#13;
gyars wished to Magyarize the non~Magyar nations of&#13;
Hungary, namely, the Slovaks, Roumanians, Croats, and&#13;
Germans.&#13;
The first victims of the forced Magyarization were&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
16&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
the Slovaks. The overwhelming majority of the intelligent..&#13;
sia of Slovak origin succumbed to Magyar pressure and&#13;
followed the official Magyar line, for .this was a prerequisite in the furtherance of one's career. Of the inteMigentsia&#13;
it was almost exclusively the clerigy who remained loyal&#13;
to the Slovak nation. The clergy became bearers of the Slovak populace with religious instruction and cultural and&#13;
social enlightenment. They were Catholic priests and Lutheran minister s.&#13;
Outstanding among the priests were Anton Bernolak&#13;
(1762-1813), formulator of the Slovak literary language;&#13;
Juraj Fandly (17514~1810) , social educator and popular&#13;
writer on husbandry; Jan Holly (1785--1849), a poet who&#13;
wrote heroic epics about the Slovaik past; Bishop Stephen&#13;
Moyses (1797-1869) , founder and first .president of the&#13;
cultural institute, Matica Sloven.ska; Andrej RadlinSlky&#13;
(1818.---1879) , founder of St. Adalbert Society, a Catholic&#13;
publishing house ; Ferdis Juriga (1874- 1953), an excellent orator and political leader,1 and Andrej Hlinka, (1864&#13;
-1938), a fiery defender orf Slova:k rights and founder of&#13;
the Slovak People's Party.&#13;
Of the Lutheran ministers~patriots there were Michal&#13;
M. Hodza (1811-1880) and J ozef M. Hurban (1817-1888),&#13;
writers who ,o rganized and led the armed uprising of thB&#13;
SlovaJks against the 'Magyars in 1'948; Karol iKuzmany&#13;
(1806-1866) , poet and ,c o-founder of the Matica Sloven.ska,&#13;
and Martin Razus (1888-1937), poet and politica1 leader.&#13;
Upon the basis of solidifying the Slovaks against Magyarization and fighting for their political and social rights,&#13;
the clergy entered into the politcal life of Hungary.&#13;
&#13;
Jozef Tiso in the Parliament at Prague&#13;
Wllen, in 1918, Slovakia became a part •o f the CzechoSlovak Republic, it appeared at first that more favorable&#13;
conditions ,w ould prevail for the Slovaks. However, it soon&#13;
became apparent that the Czechs had much the same conceptions as the !Magyars. The Czechs, too, dreamed of a&#13;
great Czechoslovak national state, with a politically insignificant minority of Germans and Magyars. The Slovaks&#13;
were to cede their national individuality and merge with&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
17&#13;
&#13;
the Czechs to create a new Czechoslovak nationality and&#13;
to become Czechs eventually.&#13;
The Slovaks, however, had long ago developed the&#13;
consciousness of a distinct nationality and had no intention&#13;
of ceding their national individuality in the interest of the&#13;
Czechs. The Slovaks also felt the impact of the economic&#13;
exploitation which the Czechs initiated imrne4iately after&#13;
1918 when they practically made Slovakia their colony.&#13;
It was almost impossible for a ~ovak to enter civil service,&#13;
since almost all civil positions and important economic&#13;
functions in SlorvaJkia weTe occupied by the Czechs. Further,&#13;
the Slorvaks, as a deeply religious Catholic nation (80 %- ),&#13;
resented the anti-religious acts of the Czechs, which were&#13;
also provocatively perpetrated in Slovaikia.&#13;
In the struggle against Ozechization of the Slov,alks&#13;
and in defense of Slovak rights, the Slovak People's Party,&#13;
founded and led by Msgr. Andrej Hlinka, took the lead.&#13;
Hlinka and Juriga, even as they had fought Magyar machinations,, began to fight Czech improprieties in the parliament at Prague, in the 1press, and through political campaigns among the people. The ,p olitical pla;tform of the S10vak People's Party was autonomy for Slovakia as guaran_&#13;
teed by the pact between American Slov.aks and the representative of Czecho-Slovakia, Professor Thomas G. Masaryk, in ·P ittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in 1918. 'I'he Slovak&#13;
People's Party with its program and motto, "·F or God and&#13;
Nation," aippealed to the feelings of the Slovaik populace,&#13;
and soon became the most important political party in Slovakia. The autonomistic program was also foUowed by the&#13;
Slorvak National Party of Martin Razus, a Lutheran minister.&#13;
From the beginning of Czecho-Slovakia (1918), Jozef&#13;
Tiso, a young a;nd zeailous priest, spiritual director and professor at the diocesan ·s eminary in Nitra, joined the autonomistic movement of Hlinka's Slovak Peoiple's Party.&#13;
In 1925, Tiso became a member oif the Czecho--1Slovak par_&#13;
liament and then vice-president of the Slo,vaJk People's&#13;
Party. When the Slorvak People's Party entered the government, he became Minister of Health (1927-1929). Tiso&#13;
&#13;
18&#13;
&#13;
SLOV.A!KIA.&#13;
&#13;
evolved soon into the staunchest e~ponent of Slovak autonomistic policies.&#13;
Tiso as President of the Slovak People's Party&#13;
&#13;
Andrej iHlinka died in August of the critical year of&#13;
1938. At that time the Slovak People's Party was the most&#13;
powerful. political group in SlovaJkia. It had in its ranks&#13;
many young workers of the Slovaik inteHigentsia. None&#13;
compared to Msgr. Tiso in moral and in political acumen&#13;
and in expeTience. Commanding great esteem among the&#13;
Slovaik populace and clergy, Tiso logically became the successor of Msgr. Hilinka in the leadership of the Slovak&#13;
People's Party.&#13;
Under the pressuxe of Hitler's driive, following H!Linka's death in 1938, events in CzechC&gt;-iSlovakfa and in Europe moved quickly. That which the Czechs were loathe to&#13;
grant the Slorvaiks under nonnal oonditions, they were&#13;
foreed to grant in the enfeebled post-Munich Czecho...Slov-a kia. On October 6, 1938, the Slovaiks gained their political autonomy; they became the masters in Slorvakia.&#13;
Msgr. 'l"iso, as the president of the Poople',s Party became&#13;
the premier of the Slovak autonomous government, with&#13;
the permission of his Bishop and the Vatican.&#13;
Even :when Slovakia suffered by ceding territory to&#13;
Hung,ary as a result of the Vienna A11bitration on Novem•b er 2, 1938, the ,Slovaiks were hruppy with the newly-gained&#13;
autonomy. The Czechs left Slorva!kia; the Slovaiks began&#13;
to manage their own affairs in the ·b est interests of the nation. It appeared that with the attainment of autonomy&#13;
the aspirations of the Slovaiks were fulfilled and that the&#13;
staJbilization of conditions in Slovakia would ·b e enduring.&#13;
&#13;
Tiso, President of the Republic&#13;
Hitler was not satisfied with the dismemberment an.d&#13;
neutralization of Czecho-Slovakia. When he decided to&#13;
wa-ge war aigainst Poland, he wanted Ozecho-,SloviaJkia oom,p letcly under his control, particularly the western part&#13;
(Bdhemia and Moravia) which was heavil'Y industriaJUzed&#13;
and entirely encircled by the German Reich.&#13;
On March 13, 1939, !H itler summoned Tiso• to Berlin&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
19&#13;
&#13;
and confronted him with the German decision regarding&#13;
Slrovakia : Either secede from the Czechs and proclaim an&#13;
independent Slorvak State or suffer the oonsequence of&#13;
partition between Germany and Hungary. On IMa.Tch 14,&#13;
1939, Tiso presented the German proposition to the Slovak pavliament for decision. 'Ehe Slovak parliament voted&#13;
for independence of !Slovakia. Msgr. Tiso became the ,p re.&#13;
sident of the Slovak Republic.2&#13;
Msgr. Tiso and other Slovak political [eaders were&#13;
somewhat hesitant to proclaim Slovak independence. Said&#13;
Tiso, in his defense before the National Court in Bratislava&#13;
(1947) : "Were it not for Hitler's pressure, the Slo:vak&#13;
parliament would never have proclaimed indeipendence. "3&#13;
The MaJgyars amd the Czechs, to justify their claims upon&#13;
Slo:va,kia, ha,d in the past repeatedly asserted that Siovllikia,&#13;
for economic reasons, was incapable of independence.&#13;
Slovak politica:l lea,ders, suddenly confronted with the question of independence for Sl01V,a kia, were aipprehensive of&#13;
the future. But rather than have their country partitioned&#13;
and occupied, they logi,cally chose the attempt at independence. And after this decision, they strove for the economic&#13;
prosperity and cultural development of Slova,kia, permanently to integrate Slovakia into the family of European&#13;
nations.&#13;
It can be said that the Slovruk attempt was successful.&#13;
The wave of naJtional enthusiasm engulfed the coll'Iltry,&#13;
and Siovaikia's eoonomi:c and cultural standards flourished.&#13;
The Slovaks. even those who at first were reserved, warmed&#13;
to the Slorva!k .State and ha,d faith in its chief, Msgr. Jozef&#13;
Tiso. 4 Even the most bitter enemies of the Slovaks had to&#13;
acknowledge that the Slova;k Republic was capable of existence.&#13;
That which Slovakia had proved in the years 1939-1945&#13;
is in no small measure ithe result of the political activity of&#13;
Msgr. Tiso. But it is also the most controversial period of&#13;
his political career.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
The Fundamentals and Components of Tiso's Policies&#13;
Msgr. Tiso's defense plea before the National COU'rt at&#13;
Bratislava, encompasses many noteworthy ,p ronouncements&#13;
&#13;
20&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
that point out the principles of his political activity. Con.&#13;
sider but a few characteristic quotations.&#13;
The key to the evaluation of my activity is my&#13;
character of the priest with its motivations and regulations, established by Christian teaching for public&#13;
activity. 5&#13;
Tiso as president of the Slovak Republic tried to lead&#13;
his nation like a solicitous father according to Christian&#13;
principles,, to which, as a priest, he consecrated his life.&#13;
Politically I only did that which the well-being and&#13;
inter est of the Slovak n::.ttion dictated. What I did, I&#13;
always did according to, the best dictates of my knowledge and conscience, ... always guided by the rules of&#13;
morality ... I fought evil with all my power, yielding&#13;
to evil only when a greater evil threatened the nation. G&#13;
'In this light, Msgr. Tiso explained his aHeged collaboration with the Nazis. Msgr. Tiso• stated that some collaboration with Germany was at that time a necessity dictated&#13;
by Slovakia 's geographic position, the develorpment of European events and the law of self..preservation. Slovakia&#13;
did not have its own foreign policy, but neither did other&#13;
larger nations in Hitleir-controUed Europe. Tiso pleaded&#13;
that he was so concerned with the internal consolidation&#13;
and development of Slovakia that he wa,s unruble to study&#13;
the problems of international politics, including the war,&#13;
upon which, because of his position, he could wield no influence. Slovak participation in the war against Russia,&#13;
with two divisions, was merely symbolic, Tiso explained. 7&#13;
According to Msgr. Tiso, his paramount ;po'1icy was t o&#13;
secure the maximum of internal freedom and independence&#13;
within the German sphere. Outwardly it was necessary to&#13;
yield somewhat to German pressure, to keep them apart,&#13;
thus avoiding armed intervention. For this reason it was&#13;
necessary to ban the Communist Party (one of the main&#13;
accusations against Tiso) ; it was necessary to participate&#13;
in the war against Russia, and it was necessary to institute&#13;
some elements of a totalitarian regime. All this was done ,&#13;
however, to pull wool over the eyes of the Germans. Inter-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
21&#13;
&#13;
nally, pleaded Tiso, Slovrukia was governed democratically&#13;
- and there was freedom. &amp;&#13;
In this light -Msgr. Tiso aJ,s,o ex;plained anti-semitic activity in Slovakia. Msgr. 'Di.so stated that the rationalization of the Jewish problem was &lt;based on a percentual partic1pation in the nation's economy. There were aibout&#13;
100,000 Jews in Sloivakia, or 4 % of the total .p opulation.&#13;
Therefore only 4 % of the nation's economy was pe:mnitted&#13;
to Jews. Jewish ,b usinesses were being aryanized, that is, a&#13;
non-Jew would buy 51 % of a business, at an officially esta:blished rate, and the former Jewish proprietor would remain as a partrn~r. Later, at the dictate of the Gernnans,&#13;
Jews were put into con centration camps and e vacuated into&#13;
Poland under the pretext that land would be ,p rovided for&#13;
them so that they wou!ld be able to Hve under their own&#13;
ru:le. Tiso justified his position ·b y saying that he did&#13;
not know at that time that the evacuated Jews would be&#13;
exterminated in Polish and German concentration camps.9&#13;
&#13;
A Weak Defense Herein&#13;
In regard to the Jewish question, Msgr. Giuseppe Burzio, r epresentative of the Holy See in Slovakia, intervened&#13;
with President Tiso in behalf of the Jews. It was rumored&#13;
that Msigr. Tiso, 'a s a Catholic priest, should have resigned&#13;
from the presidency, since he was unable to curtail the antisemitic campaign dictated by the Germans and waged by&#13;
Slovak extremists unde r the direction of Premier Dr. Vojtech Tuka.&#13;
Concerning the possibility o.f his resignation, let Tiso&#13;
speak:&#13;
I did not resign because I felt a moral obligation&#13;
to fulfill. the duty that I had undertaken until I had&#13;
been released from it by lega1ly constituted functionaries ... My action would have been egotistica,l had I&#13;
left my nation in those difficult times and entered ;pri..,&#13;
vate life. My action would haive been irresponsible and&#13;
against the nation had I not truken into private life the&#13;
moral values that I felt I represented 10&#13;
He stated further that had he received an official request from his ecclesiastical authorities, he would ha,ve re.&#13;
&#13;
22&#13;
&#13;
SLOV.i\KIA&#13;
&#13;
signed, for then there would have been no- decision to maJke,&#13;
the responsibility would have been the Church authorities'.&#13;
It is generally known that even repre sentatiives of the Jews&#13;
had begged him to remain in office, for it would have been a&#13;
total catastrophe for the Jews if someone else would have&#13;
,b een president oif the Slovak Republic.&#13;
Tiso managed to insert into- ithe anti.Jewish law a provision to exempt some Jews. He wa:s a:ble to qualify a Jew&#13;
as indispensa:ble to Slovak economy and thus save him from&#13;
deportation. About 9,000 such exemptions were made. Despite this, howeveT, the Jewish question was really a weak&#13;
point of Tiso's policy and of his defense.&#13;
&#13;
The End of Msgr. Tiso&#13;
Msgr. Tiso's trial beg,an at the end of 1946 and lasted&#13;
until April of 1947. On April 17, 1947, the jury of the Naticmal Court at Bratisla'Va brought forth the verdict of&#13;
death by hanging, and the sentence was carried out on&#13;
the following morning. Msgr. Tiso died peacefully, committing himself to God. His body was either destroyed or&#13;
buried secretly to iprevent the SloIVaks from paying their&#13;
respects.&#13;
The standpoint of the Holy See, dissuading priests&#13;
from participating directly in political actirvity and not&#13;
identifying the Church with any particular politicail system&#13;
or party, ,proved itself very much correct during the trial.&#13;
Ev~ though Msgr. Tiso was tried as a politcian, it was&#13;
difficult to separate his priesthood from his political function. Through Msg,r. Tiso's trial the Catholic Church of&#13;
Slovakia was pilloried, ,altho'll!g'h unjustly. From the&#13;
Church's point of view, it would ha.ve been 'b etter if, during the years of 1939 to 1945, the political life of Slovakia had been headed by a layman rather than a C'lex,gyman.&#13;
On the other hand, it is certain that Tiso had been&#13;
unj,u stly condemned. Under German ·control it was imposs1ble oo conduct a 'better policy in the interests of Slovakia than the one Tiso im:Plemented. Outright collaboration with Nazism, whkh Dr. 'Iuka attempted, would have&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
23&#13;
&#13;
done an immeasurably greater harm to Slovrukia. Msgr.&#13;
Tiso constantly thwarted TU!ka's attempts.&#13;
Msgr. Tiso's trial cuhninated. during Lent when Chris...&#13;
tians are reminded. of the trial and death of Christ. Slovaks&#13;
openly compared. Tiso's trial with the trial of Ohrist. Tiso,&#13;
too, in his defense, alluded to this circumstance.&#13;
The court that sentenced Tiso was dominated by&#13;
Communists. The president of the court, Dr. Ivan Daxner&#13;
and the state prosecutors, Dr. Juraj Sujan and Dr. Anton&#13;
Rasla, were die-hard Communists. Furthermore, it seemed&#13;
that the first two mentioned were predisposed against&#13;
Msgr. Tiso, the Catholic priest, on religious grounds. Msgr.&#13;
Tiso in his testament to the nation, written an hour before his death, rightfully sitated: ". . . I consider myself, in&#13;
the first place a martyr in the defense of Christianity&#13;
against Communism."11&#13;
"Martyr of Love"&#13;
&#13;
Msgr. Tiso was a victim of political revenge. It was&#13;
expected. that even if he were condemned, he would be&#13;
granted amnesty ,b y Dr. IDdward Benes, President of the&#13;
new Czecho-Slo:v akia. Benes refused. "Osservatore Romano," of April 28, 1947, wrote that in the event of Msgr.&#13;
Tiso's condemnation "political discretion would make it&#13;
necessary to grant amnesty, even though in self interest ... " to amelfo,r ate the tense situation ·b etween S1-ovaiks&#13;
and Czechs. "As a martyr of love toward his homeland,&#13;
Dr. Tiso will live on in the Slovaik Catholic nation," "Osservatore Romano," concluded.&#13;
Although Dr. Benes had rid himself of Msgr. Tiso, it&#13;
is certain that Tiso in death is a greater pro'b lem in the&#13;
relationship between Czechs and Slova:ks than Tiso would&#13;
have boon in life.&#13;
Msgr. Tiso lives in the Sl01Vak nation as a hero and&#13;
martyr. To the SlOIVruks he is a symbol of a crusader for&#13;
the God.given rights 'Of the Slovak nation. The Slovak&#13;
Republic, with its six years of successful existence, is an&#13;
actuality that ca:nnot be eradicated from history. The&#13;
SlavaJks at home and wbroad. in the absolute majority stand&#13;
&#13;
24&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
behind the ideals for which Msgr. Tiso, .p resident of the&#13;
"The Homiletic and&#13;
Slovak R epublic, Lived and died. 1955.&#13;
Pastoral Review," N 01Vember,&#13;
1. Coura,geous member of the Hungarian Parliament (1905-1918).&#13;
2. In parall el, Msgr. J an Sram ek, a Czech priest, becam e premier of the Czecho-Slovak governm ent in exile.&#13;
3. Dr. J ozef Tiso Abou t Him self, Edited by Dr. J oseph Pauco,&#13;
Passaic, N. J .&#13;
4. As the war-front b egan to app roach Slo vakia, certain grou ps&#13;
within the country, inspi.red d'rom a broad, provoked an u pri-sin g in&#13;
August of 1944. T o ga_in the support of the Slovak populace, t h ey&#13;
spread r umors that Tiso had been imprisoned by the Germ ans and,&#13;
therefore, it was necessary to fight Ge rmany.&#13;
5. Op. cit., p. 121.&#13;
6. Op. cit., p. 111.&#13;
7. Op. cit., p. 37, 277 .&#13;
8. Op. cit., p . 213 ss., 199, 201.&#13;
9. Op. ci t., p. 313 ss.&#13;
10. Op. cit., p . 21.&#13;
11. Op. cit., p. 8.&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
WHO SAID IT?&#13;
&#13;
"The relations of today and tomorro,w between Cze,c hoSloivaikia and the Sorviet Union a.re defined in the treaty of&#13;
Deceim:be.r 1'2, 1943, . . It proclaims the lasting friMdshir,&#13;
of the two nations, for the future whic h will be, strengthened&#13;
by widespread economic cooperation af t e r the war. The fu hire general collaJboratiion is defined as that of two ftree&#13;
alilld independent ,s tates, in whi ch there wrn be no inter1fore111ce&#13;
(Jan Papane k , Interin the internrul affairs of either.'' York, 19415 )&#13;
New&#13;
Inc.,&#13;
Press,&#13;
nati-onrul Universities&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
• • •&#13;
&#13;
"Norvemlber 7, 1917, is t he day thaJt is ma:riked in history as the beginning of a new era, which sought the guarantee of happiness to mankind by means of a new me1Jhod&#13;
of equalling differences among people and th.us achi&amp;ving&#13;
contentment on earth. Today it is- stNa too eaJI'ly from thaJt&#13;
epochal occasion to judge objootively the consequences of&#13;
that great deed. One thing, however, is certain: it was the&#13;
beginndng of an enormous process full of ideas bo:rn of idealism." - (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, V ~ of the Executive Conu:mttee of the "Council of Free OzecboslolV'a:kia,"&#13;
NOW PR.ODY, Novemiber 18, 1946).&#13;
&#13;
</text>
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                <text>Th. J. Zubek, O.F.M., S.T.D.&#13;
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                <text>Zúbek, Teodorik J., 1914-1988</text>
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

25

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA OR CZECHOSLOVAKIA?
P.A. Hrobak

The ancestors of the Slovak people settled in the Danuibe territory during the fourth and sixth centuries and
have occwpied that territory eiver since. Boundaries changed
some with the centuries, buit the Slovaks held on to their
present land ever since they became a part of the Hungarian kingdom at the beginning of the 11th century. The
Slovaks settled on both •s ides of the Morrava and Danube
rivers; the ancestors of the Ozec'hs settled in the land of
the Boii (Bohemia). The liand of the Slova:ks formed the
heart of the Great Mora;vian Empire of the ninth century.
The Slovaks already had 'built their first Christian church
at Nitra in 830 - the first church in the entire territory
of the western Slovanic peaples. The Magyara came into
the Danube Valley long after the Slovaks.
TheTe was no Czecho-:Slo,v akia, no Czecho-Slovak political formation of any kind, until 1918, when the Hi~bsburg Empire collaipsed. There was a Bohemia, Moravia,
Silesia - geneiralily referred to by non-Czech historians as
the "Bohemian Crown Lands," and by the Czechs as
"Czech Crown Lands" and the land of the Slovaks,
which n0in-!Slovak historians refe,rred to as "Upper Hungary" or "Northern Hungary," while Slovaks called their
land "Slovensko" (Slovrukia).
The Slovaks did not have a common history, religious
and national traditions, culture, and economy, with the
Czechs until after 1918; b,ut even after that date the Slovaks did not ado-pt the culture and national traditions of
t he Czechs, but adhered to their own. It is significant that
the Catholic Church in Slovakia - the SloivaJk dioceses was not under the jurisdiction of the ordinaries ,o f Bohemia and Moravia, but under the jUTisdiction of Rome and
was directly responsible thereto. In America the Czechs
refer to their chuvches as CZEJCHi churches, while the
Slovaks call theirs SUOIVI.AJK churches.
In short: the Czechs never were, are not, and do not
want to be Slovaks - and the Slovaks never were, are not,

�SLOVAKIA

and do not want to be Czechs. The Slovaks developed under entirely different circumstances than .the Czechs; the
latter were dominated for centuries ,by the Germans and
Austria, the former by the Magyars of Hungary. Both are
members of the Slovanic (Slav) family of nations, but each
is a distinct ethnic entiity, just as are the Po~·es, Ukrainians,
Croatians, Slovenians, Serbians, Bulgarians and Russians.
The treaty by which Czecho-1Slovakia came into being
out o.f the rubble and ashes of the Ha:bsburg Empire recognized the fact that the Czechs and Slovaks had agreed
to form a joint political sita1:e, as political equals and as two
distinct ethnic entities and, hence, the form used for the
name in the treaty creating the new state wais not the
solid word "Czechoslovakia," buit the hyphenated form
"Czecho-Slovakia."
The Ozechs and the Slovaks were supposed to enjoy
equal rights, privileges, and responsibilities in their joint
state. T . G. •Masaryik told the Slovaks not to worry a:bout
being majorized by the more numerous Czec&lt;hs: the Slovaks would manage their own household, whHe the Czechs
would be masters in their land; the new staJte would be a
federation like Switzerland or the United States. Because
the Slovruks of America did not trust Masarylk, they asked
him to put it in writing; he did on May 30, 1918, at Pittsburgh, .Pennsylvania, when he, drrafted and signed the Pittsburgh Agreement. Without it Czecho-S:Jova,kia never would
have been born. This agreement is reproduced here as docu:menba.ry proof that "Czecho-Slovak (ia)" was spelled with
a hyiphen.
However, once T. G. Masaryk, Dr. Edward Benes,
and their socialistic political entourage took over the government of the new State in Prague, the tendency developed to drop the hyphen and use the solid form. It soon
became obvious to the 'Slovaks tha-t "Czechoslov;rukia" was
becoming synonymous with "Czech": domestic and foreign
policy, culture, and economy, traditions and history, even
though referred to as "Czechoslovak," were strictly Czech.
promoted by
The "Czechoslovak National Church" the embarto
and
expense
Czechs in government at the
rassment of the overwhelming m'ajority of the Czech Ca-

�SLOVAKIA

27

itr,ko•~louttt!ikofflohobo,
1na1,rtnti o Pittsbur9hu.1}tt.,bntt )O. tnrijn. t9J8.
".Prrbsttu,ittliR GfootuaklJ,~ uuskQ ,h organi1adfuo
~poj. ~tato,h.
~loutttskej i!Ifg~. ~!skiho 3Tarobniho ~bvufttliR
n ~uii1u irsk~tth1&amp;ntolf~90.
porC1kC1t1,1li ta pntonmosti pm'sc~u ec~lto-Slovcns.lt.:J Gf!,{,·.uR,,,,~. pr,,f.~U.,;,w~1lt.1, 6 t~:;11..,-:;lot .:n$luj ,,t,i1lw ,, ,,
p,•$,wl,\n!1.:b pr,•9~m1N•~(d, pw.i,w,•d, ~, uf.,1i.:1li 1hl tM;l~•'••t•t'\11:
''Sd,MltLi.:m.:
1,diti.:hy1m:•,;,-.m,
,,
.
. . ..., t1ioiluil1,·i
. f.•l ,, S1,,•i.:ui11
€.:.-11-•v ., $IN1,Ht,•t• l' $,~\\h'$t,,h,,•1111t.,t.. 1 e.:i-lt11.:h i.-,,,(,, SIN•.:nt-h,t.

,,.,.,ch

1

~

"Sl,w.:tH,h,• ht~II m,lt f.t'':\tl t•lMtmf .,~minish,,t(vu,tv~j

,,,.:m ,, £-t•••it :;ti~tt.

. ·. st..•t•;n1i

\

\h\

.
"·
Al•.:,·.
.:N~n,•m
?nt•• t.: ""

bu~.: tfr,,~,,~m j,,1~lt,•U1 V ;lt.:-k t• t1r,,,,, ., "'" •

1

•
"'E'.-s.l,,•-$l.:-t•,:ti-:,k\/~Mt h,~.. w~•ubli~.:-u. jch,•~4'nftituci4'
~u,\.: ,,c,n,•1',·,,tidhi.
•
·
"'9r,,L\\1\~,, ..·i.,, ~1,.•luprlcc e,.·b.:-t• ,, Sl-,t1,,lwu t•c Sp.•j ..
St.~t,•,·h l•m'.: p:•~t, p,•tr,l,y ,, m,,,i,wcj ~,,.fih,.,cie,pri $p.,lc':fo"\U
~1.•r,•1umrnC pt·chll-c,i., ,, upr,wcn,{.
"u)",, ..,,.... h,E tltt•\\lC\ 11\l\•l "J•Wi,,~c,1.{fo1+1\.,.,1 •• \ ll\'\thch"
~tau p,•n~ch,fo,,,,tr~.., ••H•••~•• ~.mym €tt11..9.:-m .., Sl.,v,Ht..•m ., icb
---======= pr,f1.•.:-pl,1tn:1m lH·c,\$t,witd..•m."
1

1

====~---

�28

SLOVAKIA

tholic poipulation of Czecho-Slova kia - was strictly a Czech
enteriprise.
The Slovaks resisted the tendency and protested
against it many times, but to no avail. In time the Czechs
were able to influence historians, lexicographer s, writers,
university professors, editors, and government ,printing offices to drop the hyphen from the name of the joint political state of the Slovaks and Czechs and write it as a solid
word: "Czechoslovakia." Many of these very people use
the words Slovak, Czech, Slovakian, Slovakia, etc., properly respecting the ,spelling of these proper names and
their derivati&lt;ves, but make a common noun out of Slovak (ia) when using it in the compound form "Czechoslovak (ia)" !
Frank H. Vizetelly, the eminent lexicographer , noting the trend, had this to say a!bout it in 1934:
"It was not without surprise that I found the form 'Czechoslovakia' - originally written with a capital 'C,' to represent three ele-

m ents of the ,p eople under one name, and a capital 'S' to represent
another element - printed in the U. S. Geographic Board's report
as a solid word. How can these things be in the fact of the formal
• proclamation of the independence of the new republic issued from
Prague, Nov. 14, 1918, and the treaty of peace between the allied
and ~sociated powers and the enemy, signed June 28, 1919, to say
nothing of the treaty of peace with Austria, which was signed
Sept. 10, 1919? In these documents, which are surely 'legal authority

for the spelling of the name,' the form 'Czecho-Slovakia ' was used.

It ·would be interesting to hear why the memb ers of the J3oard anrl
the press of the U. S. A. pretty generally decided to supl)'res.s th e
capital letter in 'Slovakia'? Why make fish of one and flesh of another?
"It would be interesting to hear officially on these points, for it
is well known that in Czecho-Slovakia the Czechs hold office in the
cabinet, whil e the Slovaks are left in the cold, yet the Slovaks are
the toilers of the nation. If the war was fought 'to vindica'te the
principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed in defiance
of international good faith by the arbitrary will of a stronger and
overmasterly power,' have we not there evidence of the survival of

this spirit in the way the Czechs are suppressing the Slovaks?" (1)

''In this connection," said professor Alois R. Nykl, a
Ozech, "a careful perusal of historical material contained
in The New Europe and in The New York Times Curreut
History between 1917 and 1922 should render signal service. lt has become too wide-spread a ipractice of late to
dismiss important facts from consideration, and to regard

�SLOVAKIA

29

yesterday as having been completely wirped. out today ....
The term 'Czecho lovak,' a.s far as I know, was first used
in Russia, as the title of a journal published in Kiev a year
before Masaryk's first public appearance at Geneva, on
July 6, 1915 (John Hus Day)." (2)
When writing, T. G. MasaTyk himself often used the
hyphenated form tin 1917. In his essay "Bohemia and the
European Crisis," published in The New Europe, January
25, 1917, we find: 'Bohemia is a part of Austria-Hungary,
but, nevertheless, the Czecho-Slovaks are working and
even fighting for and with the Allies" (p. 33) ... "In this
vast struggle the place of the Czecho-Slovaks can only be
on the side of the Slavs and of the Western nations" (p .
46); and on p. 64, we find an excellent mrup showing "the
racial distribution of the Czechs and Slovaks."
In the issue of February 22, 1917, of the same journal, Masaryk wrote about "The Future Status of Bohemia"; there we find: "One of the nations to be liberated
is the Czecho-Slovak" (p. 161) ; on the following ,page, the
note to President Wilson proipo-ses the liberation of "the
Czechs and the Slovaks" (des Tcheques et des Slovaques),
whereas the English translation has it "Czecho-Slovaks~• !
Furthermore, and not without significance, Masaryk said
on pg. 162: "The Slovaks are a ,part of the Czech nation. . . It will depend, for instance, how close the union
is as to whether the name 'Czechoslovak, Czecho-Slovak,'
or 'Czech and Slovak' will be decided upon. There is no
doubt that the union of the two branches will grow."
The old dream of Czech imperialists: that one day
the Czechs would substantially increase the numbers of
their nation by "absorbing" the Slovaks one way or another. Irt probably did not occur to them at the time that
the Slovruks might have something to say and do about
the matter: twenty years of Czecho-Slovalkia later, the
SlovaJks were less absol'bab'le than ever!
Telling us how the Sloivaks feel a:bout the hyphen and
the fiction of a united "Creoho;:;lo'V'aik" nrution, Professor
Nykl says:
"T.be term 'Czechoslovak, Czechos lovakia' creates in the vast
majority of Slovaks (roduverni Slovaci - patrioti c Slovaks) an in-

�30

SLOVAKIA

tensive antagonism, such as would ,be created in other people by
terms like: Swedonorwegia, 1Hispanoportugalia, Amerocanadia, Austrohungaria . . . . For that reason, I entertain doubts a,s to Slovaks
being willing to drop the hyphen. If they decide willingly, without
violence, to cooperate with the Czechs in 'Czecho-Slovakia' as
stated in the Pittsburgh P.act - it would seem wise not to quarrel
over a small detail in spelling. In their homeland they had had sufficient experience wit'h 'Czechoslovakia,' then six months in 'CzechoSlovakia,' a.nd finally in a 'Slovakia' trimmed by the csonka Magy,ars.
"If they really think that they can do better a,s an independent
unit, after their pa,st experience, Jet us leave them alone and be
friends just .the same, instead of eternally bickering and fighting.
Elurope, after all, is not a land of African or o.ther native tribes,
which have to be kept down 'for their own good,' accordi,n,g to the
theories of Lebensraum phiJosophers of all shades and persuasions.
Great Britain seems to be getting along passably with Eire. The vast
majority of the Germans in Czechoslovakia will not call themselves
Czechoslovaks, but Germans of Czechoslovak citizenship, and similarly the Magyars and orthodpx Jews. Nor will there ever exist a
Czechoslovak or a Czecho-Slovak ~anguage, but only the CZ.ECH language and the SLOVAK language." (3)

What do we find in dictionaries, encyclopedias, and
reference wonks in regard to the hyphen, and the Czechs
and Slovaks? Let me cite just a few examples:
1. The Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th :BJdition, 1911,
has the word "CZECH" (Vol. Vfil, p. 722; and "SWV.AJKS"
(VoJ. XXV, p. 244). Of coUTse, there was no Czecho-Slovakia prior to October, 1918, so we cannot e ~ t to find
it in books published before that time.
2. Webst.er's Secondary-School Dictionary - abridged
from Webster's International Dictionary 1913, ,published by the Amerioan Book Company, G. and C. Merriman
Co., Springfield, Mass., has: "Czech - an individual of the
most westerly brainch of the Slavs, chiefly inhrubiting Bohemia and Moravia. Also the language of the Czechs;
Bohemian." . . . "Slovak one of a Slavic ipeople of
northwestern Hungary; also their la;nguage."
3 The Catholic Encyclopedia, Supplement I, Vol. XVII,
192!2, has "Slovakia. See Jugoslavia" (ip. 694). Slovakia, we
learn, was then a part of "Jugos~aviia" (p. 425), but at thP
same time also a part of "Czechoslovakia" (,p. 245) !
4. The Standard Reference Work, for the Home, School,
and Library, 1924, by the (Minneapolis and Chicago) Standard, Education Society, gives us: "Czecho-Slovakia, a republic composed of the former Austrian states of Bohemia,

�SLOVAKIA

31

Moravia, .part of Silesia, and the district of Hungary known
as Slovakia" . . . "Bohemia, formerly a province of the Aus.
tria.n ffirnpire , today a portion of the new Czecho-Slovak republic" . . . "Slovaks, a portion of the Shwic race, living in
former northern Hungary and adjacent parts of Moravia,
now inc'luded in Czecho-Slovakia. They are related to the
:Poles, Bohemians, and Morarvians. "
5. Webster's Universal Dictionary of the English Language, 1936. by The World 'Syndicate Publishing Company,
has : "Czecho--Slovak."
6. The New Universities Webster Dictionary, 1938, by
The World Syndicate Publishing Company, dose not include
"Ozecho-Slovaikia" or "Ozechoslovakia" at all, but has "Slovak - one of the Slavic people of northwestern Hungary and
part of Moravia; the la;nguage of the Slovaiks" . . . "Czech
- a member of the most westerly branches of the Sl'lwonic
family , including Bohemians, Mor-avians, and Slovaiks."
7. Webster's Elementary Dictionary - a dictionary for
boys and girls - 1941, by the American Book Company,
G. and C. Meririman Co. , Springfield, Mass., confuses youngsters thus~y : "Czech - a member of one of the two branches
of the Slavic race in Czechoslo¥akia" . . . ''Slovak - one of
t he people Hving in Slovakia, a province of Cuchoslovakia;
also the language spoken by these people" . . . "Czechoslovakia - a republic in central Europe."
8. The Winston Universal Reference Library, 1942 by
The John C. Winston Co., Philadelphia, Pa., gives both the
hyphenated and the unhyphenated forms, as well as: "Czech
- 1. a member of the most westerly 'brrunch of the Slavonic family, which includes Bohemians, Moravians and Slovaks; 2. their language : also called Czechish; 3. a citizen
of Czechoslovakia" . . . "Slovak - one of the race of
Sla&lt;vs living dn Central Europe, closely a:kin to the Czechs
of Bohemia ; 2. the la,nguage of these people."
9. The American College Dictfonary, 1953, by Random House, New Y:oirk, has "Slovak, Slovakia," but _gwes
both "Czecho-Slovakia" and "Czechoslovakia."
10. Information Please Almanac, 1954, by Dan Golenpaul Associates, The Macmillan Company, New York, carried a brief Czech story on "Czechoslovakia" and men-

�32

SLOVAKIA

tioned Slovakia, excluding the laitter from its index, though
it did include Serbia and Slaverua.
11. The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1956, by
the New Yoir,k World-Telegram and The Sun, gives a short
version of "Czechoslovakia," in which it mentions "Slovakia," excluding it, however, from its index, though it does
include Croatia, Serbia and Sloveni·a
the component
parts of Yugoslavia; "noted Czechs" are listed but not
Slovaks.
12. The 1956 Catholic Almanac - Catholic Facts at
Your Fingertiips, by St. Anthony's Guild, Paterson, N. J.,
gives us a listing of four Slovak Catholic benevolent societies and two Czech Catholic organizations, carries some
six iitems on the Ohurch in "Czechoolovakia," 'but makes
absolutely no distinction between Slovak,s and Czechs.
13. A Catholic Dictionary the Catholic Encyclopaedic Dictionary - 1949, edited by Donald Attwater, The
Macmillan Company, New Yo:rk, tells, us about "The
ChU'rch in Czechoslovakia":
" T.his state now consists of Bohemia, Moravia an d Slovakia,
w'hose inhabitants are Czechs and Slovaks, with minorities of Ger•
m an and Hu ngarian origin, a bout 14 million in all; 80 percent are
OatlhoUcs, but both Protestantism ·and secul arism are strong. After
the s'tate was form ed in 1918, there was a nationalist schism among
the Czechs.
"Th ere .are two ecclesiastical provinces, Prague and Olomouc,
with four suffragan oio ceses and five others immediately subject to
the Holy See, and a Byzantine-rite dio cese of Ruthenians."

Though Attwater does not tell us where the underscored "five others" are, we know that the reference is to
the dioceses in Slovakia.
14. Example Sheets from Sections of Proposed N. C.
W. C. News Service Style Book, Section X - Special, 1956:
"Czechoslovakia - X. 29 - without a hyphen. Buit do not
say Czech in a story or head when you mean Czechoslovak."
When I received the a!bO'Ve, I wrote to Mr. Frank Hall,
NCWC News Service Director, on May 24, 1956, telling him
it was wrong to write Czecho-Slovakia without a hyphen,
citing some of the .aJbove informaition to back my argument. 'Mr. Hall, rupparently knows ,that there ·a re Slova;ks
and Czechs, that there is a Czech ilanguage and a Slovak

�SLOVAKIA

33

language, that the Slovaks are not Czechs, and vice~versa,
but still insists on "Czechoslovakia" as a solid word. In
his reply (June 8, 1956), Mr. Hall said among other things:
" As for the u se of the hyphen: The Diplomatic List of the U. S.
State Department, the Political Handbook of the World, the Congressional Directory, the Associated Press, the United Press, the
I. N. S., the yearbook 'Information Please' write it Czechoslovakian .
I don't know of any other standard guide that does it any other way."

Mr. Hall like many others, obviously did not inquire
how the "standard guides" he referred to came to write
"Czechoslovakia" as a solid word. Taking the stand that
"everybody is doing it" can hardly be accepted as justification. If it is right, according to standard guides and
authoritative sources, to write Austria~Hungary, AngloAmerican, American~British, Anglo-,S axon, Sino-Japanese,
Anglo-Norman, Anglo-iindian, Franco--American, Anglo_
Irish, Spanish-American, German-American, Indo~European,
etc . - all with a hyiphen - then it certainly must also be
right to write Czecho-Slovakia with a hyphen!
To the Slovaks omitting the hyphen means the _denial
of thei_r national existence and subordination and subservL
ence to the Czechs. The Slova;ks insisted and still insist on
the hyiphen whenever the joint political state, which they
agre€d to establish under certain conditions, is referred to.
They insist more on that than they do on the continued ex_
1stence of the political monstrosity which Czecho-Slovakia,
under the guidance of T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Edward Benes, turned out to be.
T oday, Slorvaks everywhere cr1 out resolutely: NO
MORE CZECHO-SLOVAKIA !
That, of course, would defiruitely solve the question of
the hyphen. America helped to liberate the Slovaks from the
Magyars and was in a great measure respon.sib.le for the
creation of Czecho-Slovakia in 1918. America stands for the
freedom and independence of all nations, whether large or
small. How then can any responsible American insist that
Slovaks must forever be dominated by the Czechs?
The Chicago Tribune, May 8, 1934.
(2) The Slavonic and East European Review (American Serie s,
III, 4), Vol. XXII, No. 61, December 1944.
(3) Ibidem.
(1)

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1469">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA

25

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA OR CZECHOSLOVAKIA?
P.A. Hrobak

The ancestors of the Slovak people settled in the Danuibe territory during the fourth and sixth centuries and
have occwpied that territory eiver since. Boundaries changed
some with the centuries, buit the Slovaks held on to their
present land ever since they became a part of the Hungarian kingdom at the beginning of the 11th century. The
Slovaks settled on both •s ides of the Morrava and Danube
rivers; the ancestors of the Ozec'hs settled in the land of
the Boii (Bohemia). The liand of the Slova:ks formed the
heart of the Great Mora;vian Empire of the ninth century.
The Slovaks already had 'built their first Christian church
at Nitra in 830 - the first church in the entire territory
of the western Slovanic peaples. The Magyara came into
the Danube Valley long after the Slovaks.
TheTe was no Czecho-:Slo,v akia, no Czecho-Slovak political formation of any kind, until 1918, when the Hi~bsburg Empire collaipsed. There was a Bohemia, Moravia,
Silesia - geneiralily referred to by non-Czech historians as
the "Bohemian Crown Lands," and by the Czechs as
"Czech Crown Lands" and the land of the Slovaks,
which n0in-!Slovak historians refe,rred to as "Upper Hungary" or "Northern Hungary," while Slovaks called their
land "Slovensko" (Slovrukia).
The Slovaks did not have a common history, religious
and national traditions, culture, and economy, with the
Czechs until after 1918; b,ut even after that date the Slovaks did not ado-pt the culture and national traditions of
t he Czechs, but adhered to their own. It is significant that
the Catholic Church in Slovakia - the SloivaJk dioceses was not under the jurisdiction of the ordinaries ,o f Bohemia and Moravia, but under the jUTisdiction of Rome and
was directly responsible thereto. In America the Czechs
refer to their chuvches as CZEJCHi churches, while the
Slovaks call theirs SUOIVI.AJK churches.
In short: the Czechs never were, are not, and do not
want to be Slovaks - and the Slovaks never were, are not,

�SLOVAKIA

and do not want to be Czechs. The Slovaks developed under entirely different circumstances than .the Czechs; the
latter were dominated for centuries ,by the Germans and
Austria, the former by the Magyars of Hungary. Both are
members of the Slovanic (Slav) family of nations, but each
is a distinct ethnic entiity, just as are the Po~·es, Ukrainians,
Croatians, Slovenians, Serbians, Bulgarians and Russians.
The treaty by which Czecho-1Slovakia came into being
out o.f the rubble and ashes of the Ha:bsburg Empire recognized the fact that the Czechs and Slovaks had agreed
to form a joint political sita1:e, as political equals and as two
distinct ethnic entities and, hence, the form used for the
name in the treaty creating the new state wais not the
solid word "Czechoslovakia," buit the hyphenated form
"Czecho-Slovakia."
The Ozechs and the Slovaks were supposed to enjoy
equal rights, privileges, and responsibilities in their joint
state. T . G. •Masaryik told the Slovaks not to worry a:bout
being majorized by the more numerous Czec&lt;hs: the Slovaks would manage their own household, whHe the Czechs
would be masters in their land; the new staJte would be a
federation like Switzerland or the United States. Because
the Slovruks of America did not trust Masarylk, they asked
him to put it in writing; he did on May 30, 1918, at Pittsburgh, .Pennsylvania, when he, drrafted and signed the Pittsburgh Agreement. Without it Czecho-S:Jova,kia never would
have been born. This agreement is reproduced here as docu:menba.ry proof that "Czecho-Slovak (ia)" was spelled with
a hyiphen.
However, once T. G. Masaryk, Dr. Edward Benes,
and their socialistic political entourage took over the government of the new State in Prague, the tendency developed to drop the hyphen and use the solid form. It soon
became obvious to the 'Slovaks tha-t "Czechoslov;rukia" was
becoming synonymous with "Czech": domestic and foreign
policy, culture, and economy, traditions and history, even
though referred to as "Czechoslovak," were strictly Czech.
promoted by
The "Czechoslovak National Church" the embarto
and
expense
Czechs in government at the
rassment of the overwhelming m'ajority of the Czech Ca-

�SLOVAKIA

27

itr,ko•~louttt!ikofflohobo,
1na1,rtnti o Pittsbur9hu.1}tt.,bntt )O. tnrijn. t9J8.
".Prrbsttu,ittliR GfootuaklJ,~ uuskQ ,h organi1adfuo
~poj. ~tato,h.
~loutttskej i!Ifg~. ~!skiho 3Tarobniho ~bvufttliR
n ~uii1u irsk~tth1&amp;ntolf~90.
porC1kC1t1,1li ta pntonmosti pm'sc~u ec~lto-Slovcns.lt.:J Gf!,{,·.uR,,,,~. pr,,f.~U.,;,w~1lt.1, 6 t~:;11..,-:;lot .:n$luj ,,t,i1lw ,, ,,
p,•$,wl,\n!1.:b pr,•9~m1N•~(d, pw.i,w,•d, ~, uf.,1i.:1li 1hl tM;l~•'••t•t'\11:
''Sd,MltLi.:m.:
1,diti.:hy1m:•,;,-.m,
,,
.
. . ..., t1ioiluil1,·i
. f.•l ,, S1,,•i.:ui11
€.:.-11-•v ., $IN1,Ht,•t• l' $,~\\h'$t,,h,,•1111t.,t.. 1 e.:i-lt11.:h i.-,,,(,, SIN•.:nt-h,t.

,,.,.,ch

1

~

"Sl,w.:tH,h,• ht~II m,lt f.t'':\tl t•lMtmf .,~minish,,t(vu,tv~j

,,,.:m ,, £-t•••it :;ti~tt.

. ·. st..•t•;n1i

\

\h\

.
"·
Al•.:,·.
.:N~n,•m
?nt•• t.: ""

bu~.: tfr,,~,,~m j,,1~lt,•U1 V ;lt.:-k t• t1r,,,,, ., "'" •

1

•
"'E'.-s.l,,•-$l.:-t•,:ti-:,k\/~Mt h,~.. w~•ubli~.:-u. jch,•~4'nftituci4'
~u,\.: ,,c,n,•1',·,,tidhi.
•
·
"'9r,,L\\1\~,, ..·i.,, ~1,.•luprlcc e,.·b.:-t• ,, Sl-,t1,,lwu t•c Sp.•j ..
St.~t,•,·h l•m'.: p:•~t, p,•tr,l,y ,, m,,,i,wcj ~,,.fih,.,cie,pri $p.,lc':fo"\U
~1.•r,•1umrnC pt·chll-c,i., ,, upr,wcn,{.
"u)",, ..,,.... h,E tltt•\\lC\ 11\l\•l "J•Wi,,~c,1.{fo1+1\.,.,1 •• \ ll\'\thch"
~tau p,•n~ch,fo,,,,tr~.., ••H•••~•• ~.mym €tt11..9.:-m .., Sl.,v,Ht..•m ., icb
---======= pr,f1.•.:-pl,1tn:1m lH·c,\$t,witd..•m."
1

1

====~---

�28

SLOVAKIA

tholic poipulation of Czecho-Slova kia - was strictly a Czech
enteriprise.
The Slovaks resisted the tendency and protested
against it many times, but to no avail. In time the Czechs
were able to influence historians, lexicographer s, writers,
university professors, editors, and government ,printing offices to drop the hyphen from the name of the joint political state of the Slovaks and Czechs and write it as a solid
word: "Czechoslovakia." Many of these very people use
the words Slovak, Czech, Slovakian, Slovakia, etc., properly respecting the ,spelling of these proper names and
their derivati&lt;ves, but make a common noun out of Slovak (ia) when using it in the compound form "Czechoslovak (ia)" !
Frank H. Vizetelly, the eminent lexicographer , noting the trend, had this to say a!bout it in 1934:
"It was not without surprise that I found the form 'Czechoslovakia' - originally written with a capital 'C,' to represent three ele-

m ents of the ,p eople under one name, and a capital 'S' to represent
another element - printed in the U. S. Geographic Board's report
as a solid word. How can these things be in the fact of the formal
• proclamation of the independence of the new republic issued from
Prague, Nov. 14, 1918, and the treaty of peace between the allied
and ~sociated powers and the enemy, signed June 28, 1919, to say
nothing of the treaty of peace with Austria, which was signed
Sept. 10, 1919? In these documents, which are surely 'legal authority

for the spelling of the name,' the form 'Czecho-Slovakia ' was used.

It ·would be interesting to hear why the memb ers of the J3oard anrl
the press of the U. S. A. pretty generally decided to supl)'res.s th e
capital letter in 'Slovakia'? Why make fish of one and flesh of another?
"It would be interesting to hear officially on these points, for it
is well known that in Czecho-Slovakia the Czechs hold office in the
cabinet, whil e the Slovaks are left in the cold, yet the Slovaks are
the toilers of the nation. If the war was fought 'to vindica'te the
principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed in defiance
of international good faith by the arbitrary will of a stronger and
overmasterly power,' have we not there evidence of the survival of

this spirit in the way the Czechs are suppressing the Slovaks?" (1)

''In this connection," said professor Alois R. Nykl, a
Ozech, "a careful perusal of historical material contained
in The New Europe and in The New York Times Curreut
History between 1917 and 1922 should render signal service. lt has become too wide-spread a ipractice of late to
dismiss important facts from consideration, and to regard

�SLOVAKIA

29

yesterday as having been completely wirped. out today ....
The term 'Czecho lovak,' a.s far as I know, was first used
in Russia, as the title of a journal published in Kiev a year
before Masaryk's first public appearance at Geneva, on
July 6, 1915 (John Hus Day)." (2)
When writing, T. G. MasaTyk himself often used the
hyphenated form tin 1917. In his essay "Bohemia and the
European Crisis," published in The New Europe, January
25, 1917, we find: 'Bohemia is a part of Austria-Hungary,
but, nevertheless, the Czecho-Slovaks are working and
even fighting for and with the Allies" (p. 33) ... "In this
vast struggle the place of the Czecho-Slovaks can only be
on the side of the Slavs and of the Western nations" (p .
46); and on p. 64, we find an excellent mrup showing "the
racial distribution of the Czechs and Slovaks."
In the issue of February 22, 1917, of the same journal, Masaryk wrote about "The Future Status of Bohemia"; there we find: "One of the nations to be liberated
is the Czecho-Slovak" (p. 161) ; on the following ,page, the
note to President Wilson proipo-ses the liberation of "the
Czechs and the Slovaks" (des Tcheques et des Slovaques),
whereas the English translation has it "Czecho-Slovaks~• !
Furthermore, and not without significance, Masaryk said
on pg. 162: "The Slovaks are a ,part of the Czech nation. . . It will depend, for instance, how close the union
is as to whether the name 'Czechoslovak, Czecho-Slovak,'
or 'Czech and Slovak' will be decided upon. There is no
doubt that the union of the two branches will grow."
The old dream of Czech imperialists: that one day
the Czechs would substantially increase the numbers of
their nation by "absorbing" the Slovaks one way or another. Irt probably did not occur to them at the time that
the Slovruks might have something to say and do about
the matter: twenty years of Czecho-Slovalkia later, the
SlovaJks were less absol'bab'le than ever!
Telling us how the Sloivaks feel a:bout the hyphen and
the fiction of a united "Creoho;:;lo'V'aik" nrution, Professor
Nykl says:
"T.be term 'Czechoslovak, Czechos lovakia' creates in the vast
majority of Slovaks (roduverni Slovaci - patrioti c Slovaks) an in-

�30

SLOVAKIA

tensive antagonism, such as would ,be created in other people by
terms like: Swedonorwegia, 1Hispanoportugalia, Amerocanadia, Austrohungaria . . . . For that reason, I entertain doubts a,s to Slovaks
being willing to drop the hyphen. If they decide willingly, without
violence, to cooperate with the Czechs in 'Czecho-Slovakia' as
stated in the Pittsburgh P.act - it would seem wise not to quarrel
over a small detail in spelling. In their homeland they had had sufficient experience wit'h 'Czechoslovakia,' then six months in 'CzechoSlovakia,' a.nd finally in a 'Slovakia' trimmed by the csonka Magy,ars.
"If they really think that they can do better a,s an independent
unit, after their pa,st experience, Jet us leave them alone and be
friends just .the same, instead of eternally bickering and fighting.
Elurope, after all, is not a land of African or o.ther native tribes,
which have to be kept down 'for their own good,' accordi,n,g to the
theories of Lebensraum phiJosophers of all shades and persuasions.
Great Britain seems to be getting along passably with Eire. The vast
majority of the Germans in Czechoslovakia will not call themselves
Czechoslovaks, but Germans of Czechoslovak citizenship, and similarly the Magyars and orthodpx Jews. Nor will there ever exist a
Czechoslovak or a Czecho-Slovak ~anguage, but only the CZ.ECH language and the SLOVAK language." (3)

What do we find in dictionaries, encyclopedias, and
reference wonks in regard to the hyphen, and the Czechs
and Slovaks? Let me cite just a few examples:
1. The Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th :BJdition, 1911,
has the word "CZECH" (Vol. Vfil, p. 722; and "SWV.AJKS"
(VoJ. XXV, p. 244). Of coUTse, there was no Czecho-Slovakia prior to October, 1918, so we cannot e ~ t to find
it in books published before that time.
2. Webst.er's Secondary-School Dictionary - abridged
from Webster's International Dictionary 1913, ,published by the Amerioan Book Company, G. and C. Merriman
Co., Springfield, Mass., has: "Czech - an individual of the
most westerly brainch of the Slavs, chiefly inhrubiting Bohemia and Moravia. Also the language of the Czechs;
Bohemian." . . . "Slovak one of a Slavic ipeople of
northwestern Hungary; also their la;nguage."
3 The Catholic Encyclopedia, Supplement I, Vol. XVII,
192!2, has "Slovakia. See Jugoslavia" (ip. 694). Slovakia, we
learn, was then a part of "Jugos~aviia" (p. 425), but at thP
same time also a part of "Czechoslovakia" (,p. 245) !
4. The Standard Reference Work, for the Home, School,
and Library, 1924, by the (Minneapolis and Chicago) Standard, Education Society, gives us: "Czecho-Slovakia, a republic composed of the former Austrian states of Bohemia,

�SLOVAKIA

31

Moravia, .part of Silesia, and the district of Hungary known
as Slovakia" . . . "Bohemia, formerly a province of the Aus.
tria.n ffirnpire , today a portion of the new Czecho-Slovak republic" . . . "Slovaks, a portion of the Shwic race, living in
former northern Hungary and adjacent parts of Moravia,
now inc'luded in Czecho-Slovakia. They are related to the
:Poles, Bohemians, and Morarvians. "
5. Webster's Universal Dictionary of the English Language, 1936. by The World 'Syndicate Publishing Company,
has : "Czecho--Slovak."
6. The New Universities Webster Dictionary, 1938, by
The World Syndicate Publishing Company, dose not include
"Ozecho-Slovaikia" or "Ozechoslovakia" at all, but has "Slovak - one of the Slavic people of northwestern Hungary and
part of Moravia; the la;nguage of the Slovaiks" . . . "Czech
- a member of the most westerly branches of the Sl'lwonic
family , including Bohemians, Mor-avians, and Slovaiks."
7. Webster's Elementary Dictionary - a dictionary for
boys and girls - 1941, by the American Book Company,
G. and C. Meririman Co. , Springfield, Mass., confuses youngsters thus~y : "Czech - a member of one of the two branches
of the Slavic race in Czechoslo¥akia" . . . ''Slovak - one of
t he people Hving in Slovakia, a province of Cuchoslovakia;
also the language spoken by these people" . . . "Czechoslovakia - a republic in central Europe."
8. The Winston Universal Reference Library, 1942 by
The John C. Winston Co., Philadelphia, Pa., gives both the
hyphenated and the unhyphenated forms, as well as: "Czech
- 1. a member of the most westerly 'brrunch of the Slavonic family, which includes Bohemians, Moravians and Slovaks; 2. their language : also called Czechish; 3. a citizen
of Czechoslovakia" . . . "Slovak - one of the race of
Sla&lt;vs living dn Central Europe, closely a:kin to the Czechs
of Bohemia ; 2. the la,nguage of these people."
9. The American College Dictfonary, 1953, by Random House, New Y:oirk, has "Slovak, Slovakia," but _gwes
both "Czecho-Slovakia" and "Czechoslovakia."
10. Information Please Almanac, 1954, by Dan Golenpaul Associates, The Macmillan Company, New York, carried a brief Czech story on "Czechoslovakia" and men-

�32

SLOVAKIA

tioned Slovakia, excluding the laitter from its index, though
it did include Serbia and Slaverua.
11. The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1956, by
the New Yoir,k World-Telegram and The Sun, gives a short
version of "Czechoslovakia," in which it mentions "Slovakia," excluding it, however, from its index, though it does
include Croatia, Serbia and Sloveni·a
the component
parts of Yugoslavia; "noted Czechs" are listed but not
Slovaks.
12. The 1956 Catholic Almanac - Catholic Facts at
Your Fingertiips, by St. Anthony's Guild, Paterson, N. J.,
gives us a listing of four Slovak Catholic benevolent societies and two Czech Catholic organizations, carries some
six iitems on the Ohurch in "Czechoolovakia," 'but makes
absolutely no distinction between Slovak,s and Czechs.
13. A Catholic Dictionary the Catholic Encyclopaedic Dictionary - 1949, edited by Donald Attwater, The
Macmillan Company, New Yo:rk, tells, us about "The
ChU'rch in Czechoslovakia":
" T.his state now consists of Bohemia, Moravia an d Slovakia,
w'hose inhabitants are Czechs and Slovaks, with minorities of Ger•
m an and Hu ngarian origin, a bout 14 million in all; 80 percent are
OatlhoUcs, but both Protestantism ·and secul arism are strong. After
the s'tate was form ed in 1918, there was a nationalist schism among
the Czechs.
"Th ere .are two ecclesiastical provinces, Prague and Olomouc,
with four suffragan oio ceses and five others immediately subject to
the Holy See, and a Byzantine-rite dio cese of Ruthenians."

Though Attwater does not tell us where the underscored "five others" are, we know that the reference is to
the dioceses in Slovakia.
14. Example Sheets from Sections of Proposed N. C.
W. C. News Service Style Book, Section X - Special, 1956:
"Czechoslovakia - X. 29 - without a hyphen. Buit do not
say Czech in a story or head when you mean Czechoslovak."
When I received the a!bO'Ve, I wrote to Mr. Frank Hall,
NCWC News Service Director, on May 24, 1956, telling him
it was wrong to write Czecho-Slovakia without a hyphen,
citing some of the .aJbove informaition to back my argument. 'Mr. Hall, rupparently knows ,that there ·a re Slova;ks
and Czechs, that there is a Czech ilanguage and a Slovak

�SLOVAKIA

33

language, that the Slovaks are not Czechs, and vice~versa,
but still insists on "Czechoslovakia" as a solid word. In
his reply (June 8, 1956), Mr. Hall said among other things:
" As for the u se of the hyphen: The Diplomatic List of the U. S.
State Department, the Political Handbook of the World, the Congressional Directory, the Associated Press, the United Press, the
I. N. S., the yearbook 'Information Please' write it Czechoslovakian .
I don't know of any other standard guide that does it any other way."

Mr. Hall like many others, obviously did not inquire
how the "standard guides" he referred to came to write
"Czechoslovakia" as a solid word. Taking the stand that
"everybody is doing it" can hardly be accepted as justification. If it is right, according to standard guides and
authoritative sources, to write Austria~Hungary, AngloAmerican, American~British, Anglo-,S axon, Sino-Japanese,
Anglo-Norman, Anglo-iindian, Franco--American, Anglo_
Irish, Spanish-American, German-American, Indo~European,
etc . - all with a hyiphen - then it certainly must also be
right to write Czecho-Slovakia with a hyphen!
To the Slovaks omitting the hyphen means the _denial
of thei_r national existence and subordination and subservL
ence to the Czechs. The Slova;ks insisted and still insist on
the hyiphen whenever the joint political state, which they
agre€d to establish under certain conditions, is referred to.
They insist more on that than they do on the continued ex_
1stence of the political monstrosity which Czecho-Slovakia,
under the guidance of T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Edward Benes, turned out to be.
T oday, Slorvaks everywhere cr1 out resolutely: NO
MORE CZECHO-SLOVAKIA !
That, of course, would defiruitely solve the question of
the hyphen. America helped to liberate the Slovaks from the
Magyars and was in a great measure respon.sib.le for the
creation of Czecho-Slovakia in 1918. America stands for the
freedom and independence of all nations, whether large or
small. How then can any responsible American insist that
Slovaks must forever be dominated by the Czechs?
The Chicago Tribune, May 8, 1934.
(2) The Slavonic and East European Review (American Serie s,
III, 4), Vol. XXII, No. 61, December 1944.
(3) Ibidem.
(1)

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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
25&#13;
&#13;
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA OR CZECHOSLOVAKIA?&#13;
P.A. Hrobak&#13;
&#13;
The ancestors of the Slovak people settled in the Danuibe territory during the fourth and sixth centuries and&#13;
have occwpied that territory eiver since. Boundaries changed&#13;
some with the centuries, buit the Slovaks held on to their&#13;
present land ever since they became a part of the Hungarian kingdom at the beginning of the 11th century. The&#13;
Slovaks settled on both •s ides of the Morrava and Danube&#13;
rivers; the ancestors of the Ozec'hs settled in the land of&#13;
the Boii (Bohemia). The liand of the Slova:ks formed the&#13;
heart of the Great Mora;vian Empire of the ninth century.&#13;
The Slovaks already had 'built their first Christian church&#13;
at Nitra in 830 - the first church in the entire territory&#13;
of the western Slovanic peaples. The Magyara came into&#13;
the Danube Valley long after the Slovaks.&#13;
TheTe was no Czecho-:Slo,v akia, no Czecho-Slovak political formation of any kind, until 1918, when the Hi~bsburg Empire collaipsed. There was a Bohemia, Moravia,&#13;
Silesia - geneiralily referred to by non-Czech historians as&#13;
the "Bohemian Crown Lands," and by the Czechs as&#13;
"Czech Crown Lands" and the land of the Slovaks,&#13;
which n0in-!Slovak historians refe,rred to as "Upper Hungary" or "Northern Hungary," while Slovaks called their&#13;
land "Slovensko" (Slovrukia).&#13;
The Slovaks did not have a common history, religious&#13;
and national traditions, culture, and economy, with the&#13;
Czechs until after 1918; b,ut even after that date the Slovaks did not ado-pt the culture and national traditions of&#13;
t he Czechs, but adhered to their own. It is significant that&#13;
the Catholic Church in Slovakia - the SloivaJk dioceses was not under the jurisdiction of the ordinaries ,o f Bohemia and Moravia, but under the jUTisdiction of Rome and&#13;
was directly responsible thereto. In America the Czechs&#13;
refer to their chuvches as CZEJCHi churches, while the&#13;
Slovaks call theirs SUOIVI.AJK churches.&#13;
In short: the Czechs never were, are not, and do not&#13;
want to be Slovaks - and the Slovaks never were, are not,&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
and do not want to be Czechs. The Slovaks developed under entirely different circumstances than .the Czechs; the&#13;
latter were dominated for centuries ,by the Germans and&#13;
Austria, the former by the Magyars of Hungary. Both are&#13;
members of the Slovanic (Slav) family of nations, but each&#13;
is a distinct ethnic entiity, just as are the Po~·es, Ukrainians,&#13;
Croatians, Slovenians, Serbians, Bulgarians and Russians.&#13;
The treaty by which Czecho-1Slovakia came into being&#13;
out o.f the rubble and ashes of the Ha:bsburg Empire recognized the fact that the Czechs and Slovaks had agreed&#13;
to form a joint political sita1:e, as political equals and as two&#13;
distinct ethnic entities and, hence, the form used for the&#13;
name in the treaty creating the new state wais not the&#13;
solid word "Czechoslovakia," buit the hyphenated form&#13;
"Czecho-Slovakia."&#13;
The Ozechs and the Slovaks were supposed to enjoy&#13;
equal rights, privileges, and responsibilities in their joint&#13;
state. T . G. •Masaryik told the Slovaks not to worry a:bout&#13;
being majorized by the more numerous Czec&lt;hs: the Slovaks would manage their own household, whHe the Czechs&#13;
would be masters in their land; the new staJte would be a&#13;
federation like Switzerland or the United States. Because&#13;
the Slovruks of America did not trust Masarylk, they asked&#13;
him to put it in writing; he did on May 30, 1918, at Pittsburgh, .Pennsylvania, when he, drrafted and signed the Pittsburgh Agreement. Without it Czecho-S:Jova,kia never would&#13;
have been born. This agreement is reproduced here as docu:menba.ry proof that "Czecho-Slovak (ia)" was spelled with&#13;
a hyiphen.&#13;
However, once T. G. Masaryk, Dr. Edward Benes,&#13;
and their socialistic political entourage took over the government of the new State in Prague, the tendency developed to drop the hyphen and use the solid form. It soon&#13;
became obvious to the 'Slovaks tha-t "Czechoslov;rukia" was&#13;
becoming synonymous with "Czech": domestic and foreign&#13;
policy, culture, and economy, traditions and history, even&#13;
though referred to as "Czechoslovak," were strictly Czech.&#13;
promoted by&#13;
The "Czechoslovak National Church" the embarto&#13;
and&#13;
expense&#13;
Czechs in government at the&#13;
rassment of the overwhelming m'ajority of the Czech Ca-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
27&#13;
&#13;
itr,ko•~louttt!ikofflohobo,&#13;
1na1,rtnti o Pittsbur9hu.1}tt.,bntt )O. tnrijn. t9J8.&#13;
".Prrbsttu,ittliR GfootuaklJ,~ uuskQ ,h organi1adfuo&#13;
~poj. ~tato,h.&#13;
~loutttskej i!Ifg~. ~!skiho 3Tarobniho ~bvufttliR&#13;
n ~uii1u irsk~tth1&amp;ntolf~90.&#13;
porC1kC1t1,1li ta pntonmosti pm'sc~u ec~lto-Slovcns.lt.:J Gf!,{,·.uR,,,,~. pr,,f.~U.,;,w~1lt.1, 6 t~:;11..,-:;lot .:n$luj ,,t,i1lw ,, ,,&#13;
p,•$,wl,\n!1.:b pr,•9~m1N•~(d, pw.i,w,•d, ~, uf.,1i.:1li 1hl tM;l~•'••t•t'\11:&#13;
''Sd,MltLi.:m.:&#13;
1,diti.:hy1m:•,;,-.m,&#13;
,,&#13;
.&#13;
. . ..., t1ioiluil1,·i&#13;
. f.•l ,, S1,,•i.:ui11&#13;
€.:.-11-•v ., $IN1,Ht,•t• l' $,~\\h'$t,,h,,•1111t.,t.. 1 e.:i-lt11.:h i.-,,,(,, SIN•.:nt-h,t.&#13;
&#13;
,,.,.,ch&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
~&#13;
&#13;
"Sl,w.:tH,h,• ht~II m,lt f.t'':\tl t•lMtmf .,~minish,,t(vu,tv~j&#13;
&#13;
,,,.:m ,, £-t•••it :;ti~tt.&#13;
&#13;
. ·. st..•t•;n1i&#13;
&#13;
\&#13;
&#13;
\h\&#13;
&#13;
.&#13;
"·&#13;
Al•.:,·.&#13;
.:N~n,•m&#13;
?nt•• t.: ""&#13;
&#13;
bu~.: tfr,,~,,~m j,,1~lt,•U1 V ;lt.:-k t• t1r,,,,, ., "'" •&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
"'E'.-s.l,,•-$l.:-t•,:ti-:,k\/~Mt h,~.. w~•ubli~.:-u. jch,•~4'nftituci4'&#13;
~u,\.: ,,c,n,•1',·,,tidhi.&#13;
•&#13;
·&#13;
"'9r,,L\\1\~,, ..·i.,, ~1,.•luprlcc e,.·b.:-t• ,, Sl-,t1,,lwu t•c Sp.•j ..&#13;
St.~t,•,·h l•m'.: p:•~t, p,•tr,l,y ,, m,,,i,wcj ~,,.fih,.,cie,pri $p.,lc':fo"\U&#13;
~1.•r,•1umrnC pt·chll-c,i., ,, upr,wcn,{.&#13;
"u)",, ..,,.... h,E tltt•\\lC\ 11\l\•l "J•Wi,,~c,1.{fo1+1\.,.,1 •• \ ll\'\thch"&#13;
~tau p,•n~ch,fo,,,,tr~.., ••H•••~•• ~.mym €tt11..9.:-m .., Sl.,v,Ht..•m ., icb&#13;
---======= pr,f1.•.:-pl,1tn:1m lH·c,\$t,witd..•m."&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
====~---&#13;
&#13;
28&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
tholic poipulation of Czecho-Slova kia - was strictly a Czech&#13;
enteriprise.&#13;
The Slovaks resisted the tendency and protested&#13;
against it many times, but to no avail. In time the Czechs&#13;
were able to influence historians, lexicographer s, writers,&#13;
university professors, editors, and government ,printing offices to drop the hyphen from the name of the joint political state of the Slovaks and Czechs and write it as a solid&#13;
word: "Czechoslovakia." Many of these very people use&#13;
the words Slovak, Czech, Slovakian, Slovakia, etc., properly respecting the ,spelling of these proper names and&#13;
their derivati&lt;ves, but make a common noun out of Slovak (ia) when using it in the compound form "Czechoslovak (ia)" !&#13;
Frank H. Vizetelly, the eminent lexicographer , noting the trend, had this to say a!bout it in 1934:&#13;
"It was not without surprise that I found the form 'Czechoslovakia' - originally written with a capital 'C,' to represent three ele-&#13;
&#13;
m ents of the ,p eople under one name, and a capital 'S' to represent&#13;
another element - printed in the U. S. Geographic Board's report&#13;
as a solid word. How can these things be in the fact of the formal&#13;
• proclamation of the independence of the new republic issued from&#13;
Prague, Nov. 14, 1918, and the treaty of peace between the allied&#13;
and ~sociated powers and the enemy, signed June 28, 1919, to say&#13;
nothing of the treaty of peace with Austria, which was signed&#13;
Sept. 10, 1919? In these documents, which are surely 'legal authority&#13;
&#13;
for the spelling of the name,' the form 'Czecho-Slovakia ' was used.&#13;
&#13;
It ·would be interesting to hear why the memb ers of the J3oard anrl&#13;
the press of the U. S. A. pretty generally decided to supl)'res.s th e&#13;
capital letter in 'Slovakia'? Why make fish of one and flesh of another?&#13;
"It would be interesting to hear officially on these points, for it&#13;
is well known that in Czecho-Slovakia the Czechs hold office in the&#13;
cabinet, whil e the Slovaks are left in the cold, yet the Slovaks are&#13;
the toilers of the nation. If the war was fought 'to vindica'te the&#13;
principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed in defiance&#13;
of international good faith by the arbitrary will of a stronger and&#13;
overmasterly power,' have we not there evidence of the survival of&#13;
&#13;
this spirit in the way the Czechs are suppressing the Slovaks?" (1)&#13;
&#13;
''In this connection," said professor Alois R. Nykl, a&#13;
Ozech, "a careful perusal of historical material contained&#13;
in The New Europe and in The New York Times Curreut&#13;
History between 1917 and 1922 should render signal service. lt has become too wide-spread a ipractice of late to&#13;
dismiss important facts from consideration, and to regard&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
29&#13;
&#13;
yesterday as having been completely wirped. out today ....&#13;
The term 'Czecho lovak,' a.s far as I know, was first used&#13;
in Russia, as the title of a journal published in Kiev a year&#13;
before Masaryk's first public appearance at Geneva, on&#13;
July 6, 1915 (John Hus Day)." (2)&#13;
When writing, T. G. MasaTyk himself often used the&#13;
hyphenated form tin 1917. In his essay "Bohemia and the&#13;
European Crisis," published in The New Europe, January&#13;
25, 1917, we find: 'Bohemia is a part of Austria-Hungary,&#13;
but, nevertheless, the Czecho-Slovaks are working and&#13;
even fighting for and with the Allies" (p. 33) ... "In this&#13;
vast struggle the place of the Czecho-Slovaks can only be&#13;
on the side of the Slavs and of the Western nations" (p .&#13;
46); and on p. 64, we find an excellent mrup showing "the&#13;
racial distribution of the Czechs and Slovaks."&#13;
In the issue of February 22, 1917, of the same journal, Masaryk wrote about "The Future Status of Bohemia"; there we find: "One of the nations to be liberated&#13;
is the Czecho-Slovak" (p. 161) ; on the following ,page, the&#13;
note to President Wilson proipo-ses the liberation of "the&#13;
Czechs and the Slovaks" (des Tcheques et des Slovaques),&#13;
whereas the English translation has it "Czecho-Slovaks~• !&#13;
Furthermore, and not without significance, Masaryk said&#13;
on pg. 162: "The Slovaks are a ,part of the Czech nation. . . It will depend, for instance, how close the union&#13;
is as to whether the name 'Czechoslovak, Czecho-Slovak,'&#13;
or 'Czech and Slovak' will be decided upon. There is no&#13;
doubt that the union of the two branches will grow."&#13;
The old dream of Czech imperialists: that one day&#13;
the Czechs would substantially increase the numbers of&#13;
their nation by "absorbing" the Slovaks one way or another. Irt probably did not occur to them at the time that&#13;
the Slovruks might have something to say and do about&#13;
the matter: twenty years of Czecho-Slovalkia later, the&#13;
SlovaJks were less absol'bab'le than ever!&#13;
Telling us how the Sloivaks feel a:bout the hyphen and&#13;
the fiction of a united "Creoho;:;lo'V'aik" nrution, Professor&#13;
Nykl says:&#13;
"T.be term 'Czechoslovak, Czechos lovakia' creates in the vast&#13;
majority of Slovaks (roduverni Slovaci - patrioti c Slovaks) an in-&#13;
&#13;
30&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
tensive antagonism, such as would ,be created in other people by&#13;
terms like: Swedonorwegia, 1Hispanoportugalia, Amerocanadia, Austrohungaria . . . . For that reason, I entertain doubts a,s to Slovaks&#13;
being willing to drop the hyphen. If they decide willingly, without&#13;
violence, to cooperate with the Czechs in 'Czecho-Slovakia' as&#13;
stated in the Pittsburgh P.act - it would seem wise not to quarrel&#13;
over a small detail in spelling. In their homeland they had had sufficient experience wit'h 'Czechoslovakia,' then six months in 'CzechoSlovakia,' a.nd finally in a 'Slovakia' trimmed by the csonka Magy,ars.&#13;
"If they really think that they can do better a,s an independent&#13;
unit, after their pa,st experience, Jet us leave them alone and be&#13;
friends just .the same, instead of eternally bickering and fighting.&#13;
Elurope, after all, is not a land of African or o.ther native tribes,&#13;
which have to be kept down 'for their own good,' accordi,n,g to the&#13;
theories of Lebensraum phiJosophers of all shades and persuasions.&#13;
Great Britain seems to be getting along passably with Eire. The vast&#13;
majority of the Germans in Czechoslovakia will not call themselves&#13;
Czechoslovaks, but Germans of Czechoslovak citizenship, and similarly the Magyars and orthodpx Jews. Nor will there ever exist a&#13;
Czechoslovak or a Czecho-Slovak ~anguage, but only the CZ.ECH language and the SLOVAK language." (3)&#13;
&#13;
What do we find in dictionaries, encyclopedias, and&#13;
reference wonks in regard to the hyphen, and the Czechs&#13;
and Slovaks? Let me cite just a few examples:&#13;
1. The Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th :BJdition, 1911,&#13;
has the word "CZECH" (Vol. Vfil, p. 722; and "SWV.AJKS"&#13;
(VoJ. XXV, p. 244). Of coUTse, there was no Czecho-Slovakia prior to October, 1918, so we cannot e ~ t to find&#13;
it in books published before that time.&#13;
2. Webst.er's Secondary-School Dictionary - abridged&#13;
from Webster's International Dictionary 1913, ,published by the Amerioan Book Company, G. and C. Merriman&#13;
Co., Springfield, Mass., has: "Czech - an individual of the&#13;
most westerly brainch of the Slavs, chiefly inhrubiting Bohemia and Moravia. Also the language of the Czechs;&#13;
Bohemian." . . . "Slovak one of a Slavic ipeople of&#13;
northwestern Hungary; also their la;nguage."&#13;
3 The Catholic Encyclopedia, Supplement I, Vol. XVII,&#13;
192!2, has "Slovakia. See Jugoslavia" (ip. 694). Slovakia, we&#13;
learn, was then a part of "Jugos~aviia" (p. 425), but at thP&#13;
same time also a part of "Czechoslovakia" (,p. 245) !&#13;
4. The Standard Reference Work, for the Home, School,&#13;
and Library, 1924, by the (Minneapolis and Chicago) Standard, Education Society, gives us: "Czecho-Slovakia, a republic composed of the former Austrian states of Bohemia,&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
31&#13;
&#13;
Moravia, .part of Silesia, and the district of Hungary known&#13;
as Slovakia" . . . "Bohemia, formerly a province of the Aus.&#13;
tria.n ffirnpire , today a portion of the new Czecho-Slovak republic" . . . "Slovaks, a portion of the Shwic race, living in&#13;
former northern Hungary and adjacent parts of Moravia,&#13;
now inc'luded in Czecho-Slovakia. They are related to the&#13;
:Poles, Bohemians, and Morarvians. "&#13;
5. Webster's Universal Dictionary of the English Language, 1936. by The World 'Syndicate Publishing Company,&#13;
has : "Czecho--Slovak."&#13;
6. The New Universities Webster Dictionary, 1938, by&#13;
The World Syndicate Publishing Company, dose not include&#13;
"Ozecho-Slovaikia" or "Ozechoslovakia" at all, but has "Slovak - one of the Slavic people of northwestern Hungary and&#13;
part of Moravia; the la;nguage of the Slovaiks" . . . "Czech&#13;
- a member of the most westerly branches of the Sl'lwonic&#13;
family , including Bohemians, Mor-avians, and Slovaiks."&#13;
7. Webster's Elementary Dictionary - a dictionary for&#13;
boys and girls - 1941, by the American Book Company,&#13;
G. and C. Meririman Co. , Springfield, Mass., confuses youngsters thus~y : "Czech - a member of one of the two branches&#13;
of the Slavic race in Czechoslo¥akia" . . . ''Slovak - one of&#13;
t he people Hving in Slovakia, a province of Cuchoslovakia;&#13;
also the language spoken by these people" . . . "Czechoslovakia - a republic in central Europe."&#13;
8. The Winston Universal Reference Library, 1942 by&#13;
The John C. Winston Co., Philadelphia, Pa., gives both the&#13;
hyphenated and the unhyphenated forms, as well as: "Czech&#13;
- 1. a member of the most westerly 'brrunch of the Slavonic family, which includes Bohemians, Moravians and Slovaks; 2. their language : also called Czechish; 3. a citizen&#13;
of Czechoslovakia" . . . "Slovak - one of the race of&#13;
Sla&lt;vs living dn Central Europe, closely a:kin to the Czechs&#13;
of Bohemia ; 2. the la,nguage of these people."&#13;
9. The American College Dictfonary, 1953, by Random House, New Y:oirk, has "Slovak, Slovakia," but _gwes&#13;
both "Czecho-Slovakia" and "Czechoslovakia."&#13;
10. Information Please Almanac, 1954, by Dan Golenpaul Associates, The Macmillan Company, New York, carried a brief Czech story on "Czechoslovakia" and men-&#13;
&#13;
32&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
tioned Slovakia, excluding the laitter from its index, though&#13;
it did include Serbia and Slaverua.&#13;
11. The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1956, by&#13;
the New Yoir,k World-Telegram and The Sun, gives a short&#13;
version of "Czechoslovakia," in which it mentions "Slovakia," excluding it, however, from its index, though it does&#13;
include Croatia, Serbia and Sloveni·a&#13;
the component&#13;
parts of Yugoslavia; "noted Czechs" are listed but not&#13;
Slovaks.&#13;
12. The 1956 Catholic Almanac - Catholic Facts at&#13;
Your Fingertiips, by St. Anthony's Guild, Paterson, N. J.,&#13;
gives us a listing of four Slovak Catholic benevolent societies and two Czech Catholic organizations, carries some&#13;
six iitems on the Ohurch in "Czechoolovakia," 'but makes&#13;
absolutely no distinction between Slovak,s and Czechs.&#13;
13. A Catholic Dictionary the Catholic Encyclopaedic Dictionary - 1949, edited by Donald Attwater, The&#13;
Macmillan Company, New Yo:rk, tells, us about "The&#13;
ChU'rch in Czechoslovakia":&#13;
" T.his state now consists of Bohemia, Moravia an d Slovakia,&#13;
w'hose inhabitants are Czechs and Slovaks, with minorities of Ger•&#13;
m an and Hu ngarian origin, a bout 14 million in all; 80 percent are&#13;
OatlhoUcs, but both Protestantism ·and secul arism are strong. After&#13;
the s'tate was form ed in 1918, there was a nationalist schism among&#13;
the Czechs.&#13;
"Th ere .are two ecclesiastical provinces, Prague and Olomouc,&#13;
with four suffragan oio ceses and five others immediately subject to&#13;
the Holy See, and a Byzantine-rite dio cese of Ruthenians."&#13;
&#13;
Though Attwater does not tell us where the underscored "five others" are, we know that the reference is to&#13;
the dioceses in Slovakia.&#13;
14. Example Sheets from Sections of Proposed N. C.&#13;
W. C. News Service Style Book, Section X - Special, 1956:&#13;
"Czechoslovakia - X. 29 - without a hyphen. Buit do not&#13;
say Czech in a story or head when you mean Czechoslovak."&#13;
When I received the a!bO'Ve, I wrote to Mr. Frank Hall,&#13;
NCWC News Service Director, on May 24, 1956, telling him&#13;
it was wrong to write Czecho-Slovakia without a hyphen,&#13;
citing some of the .aJbove informaition to back my argument. 'Mr. Hall, rupparently knows ,that there ·a re Slova;ks&#13;
and Czechs, that there is a Czech ilanguage and a Slovak&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
33&#13;
&#13;
language, that the Slovaks are not Czechs, and vice~versa,&#13;
but still insists on "Czechoslovakia" as a solid word. In&#13;
his reply (June 8, 1956), Mr. Hall said among other things:&#13;
" As for the u se of the hyphen: The Diplomatic List of the U. S.&#13;
State Department, the Political Handbook of the World, the Congressional Directory, the Associated Press, the United Press, the&#13;
I. N. S., the yearbook 'Information Please' write it Czechoslovakian .&#13;
I don't know of any other standard guide that does it any other way."&#13;
&#13;
Mr. Hall like many others, obviously did not inquire&#13;
how the "standard guides" he referred to came to write&#13;
"Czechoslovakia" as a solid word. Taking the stand that&#13;
"everybody is doing it" can hardly be accepted as justification. If it is right, according to standard guides and&#13;
authoritative sources, to write Austria~Hungary, AngloAmerican, American~British, Anglo-,S axon, Sino-Japanese,&#13;
Anglo-Norman, Anglo-iindian, Franco--American, Anglo_&#13;
Irish, Spanish-American, German-American, Indo~European,&#13;
etc . - all with a hyiphen - then it certainly must also be&#13;
right to write Czecho-Slovakia with a hyphen!&#13;
To the Slovaks omitting the hyphen means the _denial&#13;
of thei_r national existence and subordination and subservL&#13;
ence to the Czechs. The Slova;ks insisted and still insist on&#13;
the hyiphen whenever the joint political state, which they&#13;
agre€d to establish under certain conditions, is referred to.&#13;
They insist more on that than they do on the continued ex_&#13;
1stence of the political monstrosity which Czecho-Slovakia,&#13;
under the guidance of T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Edward Benes, turned out to be.&#13;
T oday, Slorvaks everywhere cr1 out resolutely: NO&#13;
MORE CZECHO-SLOVAKIA !&#13;
That, of course, would defiruitely solve the question of&#13;
the hyphen. America helped to liberate the Slovaks from the&#13;
Magyars and was in a great measure respon.sib.le for the&#13;
creation of Czecho-Slovakia in 1918. America stands for the&#13;
freedom and independence of all nations, whether large or&#13;
small. How then can any responsible American insist that&#13;
Slovaks must forever be dominated by the Czechs?&#13;
The Chicago Tribune, May 8, 1934.&#13;
(2) The Slavonic and East European Review (American Serie s,&#13;
III, 4), Vol. XXII, No. 61, December 1944.&#13;
(3) Ibidem.&#13;
(1)&#13;
&#13;
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                    <text>34

SLOVAKIA

STUR AND THE SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT
P.A. Hrobak

John Kollar and John Holly, eminent Slorvak poets,
had sung their great songs, when a group of some fifty
Slovak youngsters assembled on the ruins of Devin the unmariked ruins which spoke so eloquently of the glorious past of the ancestors of the Slovak nation. The group
sang "Devin, mily Devin" (Devin, deair Devin) to the tune
of "N1tra, mila Nitra" and had themselves baptized anew :
to their Christian names, they added new Slovanic names
as a symbol that they were being born to a new life dedicated wholly to the service of their nation. The Slovak
students were inspired by Kollar',s sonnets, HoUy's epics,
Mickiewicz's Ode to Youth, and by the magnetic personali,t y of Louis Stur.
These Slovak young peotple carried the new era of
Slovak history on their shoulders. This was the youth of
the capital of SlovaJkia, Bratislava. Since the time of Matthew Bel, the Bratislava Lyceum enjoyed great fame as
an educational institution and, hence, attracted the youth
of Slovakia. At the beginning of the nineteenth century
something new was introduced at the Lyceum : an institute o,f the Slovak and Czech languages and literaitures.
Kollar was there in 1816 and exerci,s ed great influence on
the students. One evening in 1818 two young men walked
the road to Devin, discussing national matters quite se.
riously. One was Safarik, who late,r wrote the great wocrk
"SloivaJnic antiquities," and the other was Palacky, who
later became a great Czech historian. Although Kollar and
Saifarik left Bratislava, the sparks of their ardor fell among
the youthful scholars and smouldered in their minds.
Then some OIIle came among them to fan the embers into
a flame and to unite them in one service, as he so aptly expressed it: we ha,v e entered the service of the spirit - and
therefore we must travel the thorny road of life!
That young man was Louis Shir.
Stur entered the "service of the spirit" in a natural
manner, without extraordinary crises. He was born in
Zay-iUhrovec in 1815; his father was a teacher and ardent

�SLOVAKIA

36

Slovak; his mother, too, was a loyal Slovak, graced with
a quiet, pleasant disposition; and his older brother, Charles,
excelled as a writer of Slovak poetry. In short, the home
of Stur was truly Slovak. Wlhile in Raab, Stur was greatly influenced by Professor Pee; and in Bratislava (1829) it
was his fortune to fall in with congenial SlQlV'ak young men.
Stur admired his elders, especially the youthful Chalupka, who had contributed much with their writings to
awaken the Slovaks nationally. Stur became the favorite
of the eminent Schroer and Palkovic, who recognized in
Stur the quahfica!Jions for leadership. Stur's dynMnic personality attracted Slovak youth to the Slovak cause. One
evening Stur met a young man on the street; he knew he
was from Beckov and two years younger than himself;
but he also .knew ,that this young man for some reason
avoided Slovruk company. After greeting him, Stur had a
talk with him. The young man later admitted that what
Stur had said to him on that occasion kept him awake for
several nights and made him resolve to, join Stu.r's group.
That young man was Joseph M. Hurban, who later became one of the great men of Slovak letters.
Stur did not persuade others with any special, expert arguments; he persuaded them with his entire personality. Stur was a dynamo of action; what he asked
others to do, he did himself; his entire life was a labor of
}()IVe for his people. The Slovaks, his people, needed scholars Who would dig iinto the past to build for the future.
Stur knew that the Slovaks were doomed as a nation,
unless they were awakened nationally, and thrut without
selfless terucher,s this wrus impossible. He set himself to
the task of providing them.
Julius Botto, Sl()IVa!k historian, said that "Stur trained
for the Slo1Vak nation' energetic, selfless men, genllline na_
tional heroes " Stur and his followers prepared the Slovak nation for the difficult times ahead. Indeed, without
them the Slovalks might now be a forgotten nation, a nation suppressed and beaten into oblivion by a powerful,
foreign and hostile ruler. Stur united the Slovak nation
by establishing the central dialect of Slovakia as the lit-

�36

SLOVAKIA

erary medium and thus made the Slovaks stronger in the
face of the enemy. He was a genuine Slovaik patriot and
democrat; he fought n:o t only for the rights of his own
,people, but also for the rights of all subjugated nations of
Europe.
The national life of the Slovruks ,in the past was not
only a passive bewailment, a life of hapless "do nothing."
lit was filled with positive wor.k, creating higher cultural
and 1political values. Slovaks should remember this and ikeep
on preaching it in their schools, boo.k s, public assemblies,
newspapeirs, and everywhere. Perhaps we need no.thing
more than a large portion of national pride. Let us not
seek the source of our Slovak national life in foreign gardens when we have it at home, that is what Louis Stur
told his people.
The Magyars once unveiled a gigantic statue of Louis
Kossuth before the Hungarian (Magyar) Parliament with
reaI occidental pomposity. The Slovaks who went through
a Magyar school, or have any knowledge of Magyar history and literatwre, know the kind of superman Magyar
history and lite rature made of our Slo·v ak countryman, the
renegade Kossuth. To the Magyars Kossuth is a most brilliant historic ,phenomenon, a man whose equal it would be
difficult to find in all Europe, nay, in all the world. Kossuth is depicted as a fighter o.f freedom , as the first man
who raised his voice for the liberation of the subjugated.
But the fact remains, nevertheless, that Louis Stur, the
patriotic Slovalk , did more in this regard than did Kossuth.
From the forties of the last century down to our
times, Slovak national life lived in the spirit of Louis Stur.
Yet it so happened that the merits of this great man of
Slovak history were little acknowledged by writers of
EUJropean history. Once Stu.r's magnificent characteristics
become known, the world wil.l come ' to know the great son
that Slovakia gave to mankind.
Today, Louis Stu.r's 1personality cannot be hewed into
the narrow frameworik of Slorvaikia. His influence and significance was broader. In Bratislava, Stur did not bring
only the Slovaks together; among his enthusiastic disciples were also the Croatians and Serbs What did Stur

�SLOVAKIA

37

give to mankind? He devoted his entire life for the rights
of the subjugated and oppressed.
In the memorable iBratislava parliament of 1847, two
Slovak countrymen met in a battle of words. Both were
inteliligent, educated and f~ery speakers. NevertheLess,
there was a great difference between them. One entered
the services of Ma:gyarization, while the other remained
loyal to his Slovak nation. The first was Kossuth, the sec_
ond Stur.
Kossuth represented the County of Pesf, Stur the free
royal city of Zvolen. Free royal cities had the right to send
their repres€1Iltatives to the Assembly, but these could
only speak and not vote. As a delegate of a free royal
city, Stur represented the privileged laildowner's class Li
the Ass,embly. But eiven this matter did not ma:ke a renegade of him, because he served ideas and ideals and not
particular people
"We want freedom," Stur said in that Parliament.
"But it is saiid that there is plenty of freedom in our homeland; yes, not only ,plenty, but even too much freedom,"
continued Stur, "but only the landow:ner's .b rand of free.
dom, and of the real, human freedom there is very little.
If our towns had more freedom, even our people would
have never fallen into such thraildom."
Kossuth replied to Stur. But, lo and behold, what this
Magyar idol and champion of freedom said on that occasion:
"That cannot be helped; that is the way the wor1d
goes. It is fate that the one who stands lower in the com.
munity is suppressed and must bear the burden and
taxes; on the other hand, the one who comes along in civic life receives rights and stands in honor. At this time
I am opposed to granting towns a vote in our Assembly."
It was thus that Kossuth "defended" freedom.
Stur, however, would not be silenced. When he came
together with Kossuth in December, he said in the Hungarian Assembly:
"Recently, when I wa:s present here and mentioned
the sorrowful plight of the wretched taxpayers, the worthy deputy from Pesf Oounty, Mr. Kossuth, saw the hand
1

�38

SLOVAKIA

of fate in the o,ppression of the people and said that is the
way the world goes when the lower class is suppre.s sed
and the higher class receives more ri,g hts. I see no ha,nd of
fate in the matter, beoouse then the staitus of the oppressed could never be corrected. We demand freedom in
the country and to allow urbarial jobs which are not in Hne
with freedom. Does such a peirson, who works for others
and instead of being rewarded is despised, have a fatherland, will such a ipe~on become attached to his country
as he would to his mother? The sacred cause of mankind
challenges us so that once we would express the iprinci,ple
of the Hberation of people and honestly bring it into being.
When this redemption is accomplished, the judicial power
of the landowner and the county gentry must cease, because freedom would not be served if a people liberated
from the robot would continue to .remai:n under the club
of the -lords."
Behold the difference between Stur and Kossuth. Of
course, some months later even Kossuth took up Stur's cry
for the liJberation of al.l the people of Hlungary. But he did
this not out of internal conviction, but because circumstamces had forced him to take such a benev:olent ,position.
Stur fought for the rights of the subjugated even against
the will of those who had sent him .to the Assembly, while
Kossuth fought for them only after a revolutionairy wave
had inundated Hungary.
The fundamental trai,t of Stur's ideals was his love
for freedom. If Stur had done nothing else but fought in
the iBratislruva Assembly for the rights of the enslaved
and subjugated, even then he would have deserved to be
p'laced by the Slovak nation amo.ng its most distinguished
sons But he meant more than that to the Slovak nation.
Stur was not a naive romantic, as he is frequently
depicted. No one since his time ha;s yet come wp with a
more reaHstic program. Stuir- did not flatter faults and
mistrukes; his articles in the "Slovenske N a:rodne Noviny"
prove that he fought fearlessly ag,ai,n st the sho&gt;Ttcomi:ngs
and delinquencies o.f his people. His leading editorials
would be just as actual today as they were in his time.

�SLOVAKIA

39

No:t only in the defense of the 1purity of the Slova:k language, but .in defense of the recognition of the inherent
rights of the Slovak naition.
Stur's "let us not abandon our,selves, Slovak countrymen" is just as timely today as .it was in 184!5. And is it
not just as timely .to stress that "higher is the cause of the
entire nation, higher is the cause of the whole than that of
individual persons and even though individuals harm us,
the cause itself does ,n ot do so . But with us thus far it ha..c:;
·b een so that individuals offended iby our people immedL
ately abandoned the cause itself. . . "
Today ou~ mighty America with her Allies is fighting
for the freedom of al,l enslaved and oppressed nations. Th:s
freedom mu:st not miss the Slovak nation. The Slovaks even
today, rus during the times of Stur, have inherent and Godgiiven rights to complete freedom as do all other nations.
To fight for the freedom of all nations, including the Slovak naition, is the obligation not only of the Slovaks and
Americans of Slovak descen_t, but also the obligation of
all ,l overs of truth and freedom. Indeed, the Slovak,s existed
and shall continue to exist, if they only remember Stur's:
"Let us not abandon ourselves, Slova1k countrymen!"
StUJI"'s schoo-1 of thought built the foundation for the
independence movement of Slovakia over a hundred years
ago - and the Slovaks are building upon this foundation
ever since, and will keep on building until they attain complete freedom from al,l foreign and hostile domination.
Just as Stur repudiated a:nd condemned the hegemony of
the Magyars and the materialistic ,p hHosophy of Marx and
Engels, so the Slovaks today stand solidly agaim,t materi_
alistic Communism and all forms of totalitarianiSim and
the hegemony of the Czechs. The sipirit of Stur lives on!

•

• •

WHO SAID IT?

"The Dernocrati,c Prunty knows ithat the Sloivak nation
can be aSS1Ured of a haippier, more secure and a brighter
future oru,y by wo'Iilcing together with the Oommunist Prurty." - (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, Vfce-Ohainman of the Executive Comm,i ttee of the "Council of Free Ozechoslovakia,"
CA!S, Bratisfa,v;a, F~ary 1, 1946).

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1462">
                    <text>34

SLOVAKIA

STUR AND THE SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT
P.A. Hrobak

John Kollar and John Holly, eminent Slorvak poets,
had sung their great songs, when a group of some fifty
Slovak youngsters assembled on the ruins of Devin the unmariked ruins which spoke so eloquently of the glorious past of the ancestors of the Slovak nation. The group
sang "Devin, mily Devin" (Devin, deair Devin) to the tune
of "N1tra, mila Nitra" and had themselves baptized anew :
to their Christian names, they added new Slovanic names
as a symbol that they were being born to a new life dedicated wholly to the service of their nation. The Slovak
students were inspired by Kollar',s sonnets, HoUy's epics,
Mickiewicz's Ode to Youth, and by the magnetic personali,t y of Louis Stur.
These Slovak young peotple carried the new era of
Slovak history on their shoulders. This was the youth of
the capital of SlovaJkia, Bratislava. Since the time of Matthew Bel, the Bratislava Lyceum enjoyed great fame as
an educational institution and, hence, attracted the youth
of Slovakia. At the beginning of the nineteenth century
something new was introduced at the Lyceum : an institute o,f the Slovak and Czech languages and literaitures.
Kollar was there in 1816 and exerci,s ed great influence on
the students. One evening in 1818 two young men walked
the road to Devin, discussing national matters quite se.
riously. One was Safarik, who late,r wrote the great wocrk
"SloivaJnic antiquities," and the other was Palacky, who
later became a great Czech historian. Although Kollar and
Saifarik left Bratislava, the sparks of their ardor fell among
the youthful scholars and smouldered in their minds.
Then some OIIle came among them to fan the embers into
a flame and to unite them in one service, as he so aptly expressed it: we ha,v e entered the service of the spirit - and
therefore we must travel the thorny road of life!
That young man was Louis Shir.
Stur entered the "service of the spirit" in a natural
manner, without extraordinary crises. He was born in
Zay-iUhrovec in 1815; his father was a teacher and ardent

�SLOVAKIA

36

Slovak; his mother, too, was a loyal Slovak, graced with
a quiet, pleasant disposition; and his older brother, Charles,
excelled as a writer of Slovak poetry. In short, the home
of Stur was truly Slovak. Wlhile in Raab, Stur was greatly influenced by Professor Pee; and in Bratislava (1829) it
was his fortune to fall in with congenial SlQlV'ak young men.
Stur admired his elders, especially the youthful Chalupka, who had contributed much with their writings to
awaken the Slovaks nationally. Stur became the favorite
of the eminent Schroer and Palkovic, who recognized in
Stur the quahfica!Jions for leadership. Stur's dynMnic personality attracted Slovak youth to the Slovak cause. One
evening Stur met a young man on the street; he knew he
was from Beckov and two years younger than himself;
but he also .knew ,that this young man for some reason
avoided Slovruk company. After greeting him, Stur had a
talk with him. The young man later admitted that what
Stur had said to him on that occasion kept him awake for
several nights and made him resolve to, join Stu.r's group.
That young man was Joseph M. Hurban, who later became one of the great men of Slovak letters.
Stur did not persuade others with any special, expert arguments; he persuaded them with his entire personality. Stur was a dynamo of action; what he asked
others to do, he did himself; his entire life was a labor of
}()IVe for his people. The Slovaks, his people, needed scholars Who would dig iinto the past to build for the future.
Stur knew that the Slovaks were doomed as a nation,
unless they were awakened nationally, and thrut without
selfless terucher,s this wrus impossible. He set himself to
the task of providing them.
Julius Botto, Sl()IVa!k historian, said that "Stur trained
for the Slo1Vak nation' energetic, selfless men, genllline na_
tional heroes " Stur and his followers prepared the Slovak nation for the difficult times ahead. Indeed, without
them the Slovalks might now be a forgotten nation, a nation suppressed and beaten into oblivion by a powerful,
foreign and hostile ruler. Stur united the Slovak nation
by establishing the central dialect of Slovakia as the lit-

�36

SLOVAKIA

erary medium and thus made the Slovaks stronger in the
face of the enemy. He was a genuine Slovaik patriot and
democrat; he fought n:o t only for the rights of his own
,people, but also for the rights of all subjugated nations of
Europe.
The national life of the Slovruks ,in the past was not
only a passive bewailment, a life of hapless "do nothing."
lit was filled with positive wor.k, creating higher cultural
and 1political values. Slovaks should remember this and ikeep
on preaching it in their schools, boo.k s, public assemblies,
newspapeirs, and everywhere. Perhaps we need no.thing
more than a large portion of national pride. Let us not
seek the source of our Slovak national life in foreign gardens when we have it at home, that is what Louis Stur
told his people.
The Magyars once unveiled a gigantic statue of Louis
Kossuth before the Hungarian (Magyar) Parliament with
reaI occidental pomposity. The Slovaks who went through
a Magyar school, or have any knowledge of Magyar history and literatwre, know the kind of superman Magyar
history and lite rature made of our Slo·v ak countryman, the
renegade Kossuth. To the Magyars Kossuth is a most brilliant historic ,phenomenon, a man whose equal it would be
difficult to find in all Europe, nay, in all the world. Kossuth is depicted as a fighter o.f freedom , as the first man
who raised his voice for the liberation of the subjugated.
But the fact remains, nevertheless, that Louis Stur, the
patriotic Slovalk , did more in this regard than did Kossuth.
From the forties of the last century down to our
times, Slovak national life lived in the spirit of Louis Stur.
Yet it so happened that the merits of this great man of
Slovak history were little acknowledged by writers of
EUJropean history. Once Stu.r's magnificent characteristics
become known, the world wil.l come ' to know the great son
that Slovakia gave to mankind.
Today, Louis Stu.r's 1personality cannot be hewed into
the narrow frameworik of Slorvaikia. His influence and significance was broader. In Bratislava, Stur did not bring
only the Slovaks together; among his enthusiastic disciples were also the Croatians and Serbs What did Stur

�SLOVAKIA

37

give to mankind? He devoted his entire life for the rights
of the subjugated and oppressed.
In the memorable iBratislava parliament of 1847, two
Slovak countrymen met in a battle of words. Both were
inteliligent, educated and f~ery speakers. NevertheLess,
there was a great difference between them. One entered
the services of Ma:gyarization, while the other remained
loyal to his Slovak nation. The first was Kossuth, the sec_
ond Stur.
Kossuth represented the County of Pesf, Stur the free
royal city of Zvolen. Free royal cities had the right to send
their repres€1Iltatives to the Assembly, but these could
only speak and not vote. As a delegate of a free royal
city, Stur represented the privileged laildowner's class Li
the Ass,embly. But eiven this matter did not ma:ke a renegade of him, because he served ideas and ideals and not
particular people
"We want freedom," Stur said in that Parliament.
"But it is saiid that there is plenty of freedom in our homeland; yes, not only ,plenty, but even too much freedom,"
continued Stur, "but only the landow:ner's .b rand of free.
dom, and of the real, human freedom there is very little.
If our towns had more freedom, even our people would
have never fallen into such thraildom."
Kossuth replied to Stur. But, lo and behold, what this
Magyar idol and champion of freedom said on that occasion:
"That cannot be helped; that is the way the wor1d
goes. It is fate that the one who stands lower in the com.
munity is suppressed and must bear the burden and
taxes; on the other hand, the one who comes along in civic life receives rights and stands in honor. At this time
I am opposed to granting towns a vote in our Assembly."
It was thus that Kossuth "defended" freedom.
Stur, however, would not be silenced. When he came
together with Kossuth in December, he said in the Hungarian Assembly:
"Recently, when I wa:s present here and mentioned
the sorrowful plight of the wretched taxpayers, the worthy deputy from Pesf Oounty, Mr. Kossuth, saw the hand
1

�38

SLOVAKIA

of fate in the o,ppression of the people and said that is the
way the world goes when the lower class is suppre.s sed
and the higher class receives more ri,g hts. I see no ha,nd of
fate in the matter, beoouse then the staitus of the oppressed could never be corrected. We demand freedom in
the country and to allow urbarial jobs which are not in Hne
with freedom. Does such a peirson, who works for others
and instead of being rewarded is despised, have a fatherland, will such a ipe~on become attached to his country
as he would to his mother? The sacred cause of mankind
challenges us so that once we would express the iprinci,ple
of the Hberation of people and honestly bring it into being.
When this redemption is accomplished, the judicial power
of the landowner and the county gentry must cease, because freedom would not be served if a people liberated
from the robot would continue to .remai:n under the club
of the -lords."
Behold the difference between Stur and Kossuth. Of
course, some months later even Kossuth took up Stur's cry
for the liJberation of al.l the people of Hlungary. But he did
this not out of internal conviction, but because circumstamces had forced him to take such a benev:olent ,position.
Stur fought for the rights of the subjugated even against
the will of those who had sent him .to the Assembly, while
Kossuth fought for them only after a revolutionairy wave
had inundated Hungary.
The fundamental trai,t of Stur's ideals was his love
for freedom. If Stur had done nothing else but fought in
the iBratislruva Assembly for the rights of the enslaved
and subjugated, even then he would have deserved to be
p'laced by the Slovak nation amo.ng its most distinguished
sons But he meant more than that to the Slovak nation.
Stur was not a naive romantic, as he is frequently
depicted. No one since his time ha;s yet come wp with a
more reaHstic program. Stuir- did not flatter faults and
mistrukes; his articles in the "Slovenske N a:rodne Noviny"
prove that he fought fearlessly ag,ai,n st the sho&gt;Ttcomi:ngs
and delinquencies o.f his people. His leading editorials
would be just as actual today as they were in his time.

�SLOVAKIA

39

No:t only in the defense of the 1purity of the Slova:k language, but .in defense of the recognition of the inherent
rights of the Slovak naition.
Stur's "let us not abandon our,selves, Slovak countrymen" is just as timely today as .it was in 184!5. And is it
not just as timely .to stress that "higher is the cause of the
entire nation, higher is the cause of the whole than that of
individual persons and even though individuals harm us,
the cause itself does ,n ot do so . But with us thus far it ha..c:;
·b een so that individuals offended iby our people immedL
ately abandoned the cause itself. . . "
Today ou~ mighty America with her Allies is fighting
for the freedom of al,l enslaved and oppressed nations. Th:s
freedom mu:st not miss the Slovak nation. The Slovaks even
today, rus during the times of Stur, have inherent and Godgiiven rights to complete freedom as do all other nations.
To fight for the freedom of all nations, including the Slovak naition, is the obligation not only of the Slovaks and
Americans of Slovak descen_t, but also the obligation of
all ,l overs of truth and freedom. Indeed, the Slovak,s existed
and shall continue to exist, if they only remember Stur's:
"Let us not abandon ourselves, Slova1k countrymen!"
StUJI"'s schoo-1 of thought built the foundation for the
independence movement of Slovakia over a hundred years
ago - and the Slovaks are building upon this foundation
ever since, and will keep on building until they attain complete freedom from al,l foreign and hostile domination.
Just as Stur repudiated a:nd condemned the hegemony of
the Magyars and the materialistic ,p hHosophy of Marx and
Engels, so the Slovaks today stand solidly agaim,t materi_
alistic Communism and all forms of totalitarianiSim and
the hegemony of the Czechs. The sipirit of Stur lives on!

•

• •

WHO SAID IT?

"The Dernocrati,c Prunty knows ithat the Sloivak nation
can be aSS1Ured of a haippier, more secure and a brighter
future oru,y by wo'Iilcing together with the Oommunist Prurty." - (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, Vfce-Ohainman of the Executive Comm,i ttee of the "Council of Free Ozechoslovakia,"
CA!S, Bratisfa,v;a, F~ary 1, 1946).

�</text>
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                  <text>1956, Vol. 6</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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            <elementText elementTextId="1460">
              <text>34&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
STUR AND THE SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT&#13;
P.A. Hrobak&#13;
&#13;
John Kollar and John Holly, eminent Slorvak poets,&#13;
had sung their great songs, when a group of some fifty&#13;
Slovak youngsters assembled on the ruins of Devin the unmariked ruins which spoke so eloquently of the glorious past of the ancestors of the Slovak nation. The group&#13;
sang "Devin, mily Devin" (Devin, deair Devin) to the tune&#13;
of "N1tra, mila Nitra" and had themselves baptized anew :&#13;
to their Christian names, they added new Slovanic names&#13;
as a symbol that they were being born to a new life dedicated wholly to the service of their nation. The Slovak&#13;
students were inspired by Kollar',s sonnets, HoUy's epics,&#13;
Mickiewicz's Ode to Youth, and by the magnetic personali,t y of Louis Stur.&#13;
These Slovak young peotple carried the new era of&#13;
Slovak history on their shoulders. This was the youth of&#13;
the capital of SlovaJkia, Bratislava. Since the time of Matthew Bel, the Bratislava Lyceum enjoyed great fame as&#13;
an educational institution and, hence, attracted the youth&#13;
of Slovakia. At the beginning of the nineteenth century&#13;
something new was introduced at the Lyceum : an institute o,f the Slovak and Czech languages and literaitures.&#13;
Kollar was there in 1816 and exerci,s ed great influence on&#13;
the students. One evening in 1818 two young men walked&#13;
the road to Devin, discussing national matters quite se.&#13;
riously. One was Safarik, who late,r wrote the great wocrk&#13;
"SloivaJnic antiquities," and the other was Palacky, who&#13;
later became a great Czech historian. Although Kollar and&#13;
Saifarik left Bratislava, the sparks of their ardor fell among&#13;
the youthful scholars and smouldered in their minds.&#13;
Then some OIIle came among them to fan the embers into&#13;
a flame and to unite them in one service, as he so aptly expressed it: we ha,v e entered the service of the spirit - and&#13;
therefore we must travel the thorny road of life!&#13;
That young man was Louis Shir.&#13;
Stur entered the "service of the spirit" in a natural&#13;
manner, without extraordinary crises. He was born in&#13;
Zay-iUhrovec in 1815; his father was a teacher and ardent&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
36&#13;
&#13;
Slovak; his mother, too, was a loyal Slovak, graced with&#13;
a quiet, pleasant disposition; and his older brother, Charles,&#13;
excelled as a writer of Slovak poetry. In short, the home&#13;
of Stur was truly Slovak. Wlhile in Raab, Stur was greatly influenced by Professor Pee; and in Bratislava (1829) it&#13;
was his fortune to fall in with congenial SlQlV'ak young men.&#13;
Stur admired his elders, especially the youthful Chalupka, who had contributed much with their writings to&#13;
awaken the Slovaks nationally. Stur became the favorite&#13;
of the eminent Schroer and Palkovic, who recognized in&#13;
Stur the quahfica!Jions for leadership. Stur's dynMnic personality attracted Slovak youth to the Slovak cause. One&#13;
evening Stur met a young man on the street; he knew he&#13;
was from Beckov and two years younger than himself;&#13;
but he also .knew ,that this young man for some reason&#13;
avoided Slovruk company. After greeting him, Stur had a&#13;
talk with him. The young man later admitted that what&#13;
Stur had said to him on that occasion kept him awake for&#13;
several nights and made him resolve to, join Stu.r's group.&#13;
That young man was Joseph M. Hurban, who later became one of the great men of Slovak letters.&#13;
Stur did not persuade others with any special, expert arguments; he persuaded them with his entire personality. Stur was a dynamo of action; what he asked&#13;
others to do, he did himself; his entire life was a labor of&#13;
}()IVe for his people. The Slovaks, his people, needed scholars Who would dig iinto the past to build for the future.&#13;
Stur knew that the Slovaks were doomed as a nation,&#13;
unless they were awakened nationally, and thrut without&#13;
selfless terucher,s this wrus impossible. He set himself to&#13;
the task of providing them.&#13;
Julius Botto, Sl()IVa!k historian, said that "Stur trained&#13;
for the Slo1Vak nation' energetic, selfless men, genllline na_&#13;
tional heroes " Stur and his followers prepared the Slovak nation for the difficult times ahead. Indeed, without&#13;
them the Slovalks might now be a forgotten nation, a nation suppressed and beaten into oblivion by a powerful,&#13;
foreign and hostile ruler. Stur united the Slovak nation&#13;
by establishing the central dialect of Slovakia as the lit-&#13;
&#13;
36&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
erary medium and thus made the Slovaks stronger in the&#13;
face of the enemy. He was a genuine Slovaik patriot and&#13;
democrat; he fought n:o t only for the rights of his own&#13;
,people, but also for the rights of all subjugated nations of&#13;
Europe.&#13;
The national life of the Slovruks ,in the past was not&#13;
only a passive bewailment, a life of hapless "do nothing."&#13;
lit was filled with positive wor.k, creating higher cultural&#13;
and 1political values. Slovaks should remember this and ikeep&#13;
on preaching it in their schools, boo.k s, public assemblies,&#13;
newspapeirs, and everywhere. Perhaps we need no.thing&#13;
more than a large portion of national pride. Let us not&#13;
seek the source of our Slovak national life in foreign gardens when we have it at home, that is what Louis Stur&#13;
told his people.&#13;
The Magyars once unveiled a gigantic statue of Louis&#13;
Kossuth before the Hungarian (Magyar) Parliament with&#13;
reaI occidental pomposity. The Slovaks who went through&#13;
a Magyar school, or have any knowledge of Magyar history and literatwre, know the kind of superman Magyar&#13;
history and lite rature made of our Slo·v ak countryman, the&#13;
renegade Kossuth. To the Magyars Kossuth is a most brilliant historic ,phenomenon, a man whose equal it would be&#13;
difficult to find in all Europe, nay, in all the world. Kossuth is depicted as a fighter o.f freedom , as the first man&#13;
who raised his voice for the liberation of the subjugated.&#13;
But the fact remains, nevertheless, that Louis Stur, the&#13;
patriotic Slovalk , did more in this regard than did Kossuth.&#13;
From the forties of the last century down to our&#13;
times, Slovak national life lived in the spirit of Louis Stur.&#13;
Yet it so happened that the merits of this great man of&#13;
Slovak history were little acknowledged by writers of&#13;
EUJropean history. Once Stu.r's magnificent characteristics&#13;
become known, the world wil.l come ' to know the great son&#13;
that Slovakia gave to mankind.&#13;
Today, Louis Stu.r's 1personality cannot be hewed into&#13;
the narrow frameworik of Slorvaikia. His influence and significance was broader. In Bratislava, Stur did not bring&#13;
only the Slovaks together; among his enthusiastic disciples were also the Croatians and Serbs What did Stur&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
37&#13;
&#13;
give to mankind? He devoted his entire life for the rights&#13;
of the subjugated and oppressed.&#13;
In the memorable iBratislava parliament of 1847, two&#13;
Slovak countrymen met in a battle of words. Both were&#13;
inteliligent, educated and f~ery speakers. NevertheLess,&#13;
there was a great difference between them. One entered&#13;
the services of Ma:gyarization, while the other remained&#13;
loyal to his Slovak nation. The first was Kossuth, the sec_&#13;
ond Stur.&#13;
Kossuth represented the County of Pesf, Stur the free&#13;
royal city of Zvolen. Free royal cities had the right to send&#13;
their repres€1Iltatives to the Assembly, but these could&#13;
only speak and not vote. As a delegate of a free royal&#13;
city, Stur represented the privileged laildowner's class Li&#13;
the Ass,embly. But eiven this matter did not ma:ke a renegade of him, because he served ideas and ideals and not&#13;
particular people&#13;
"We want freedom," Stur said in that Parliament.&#13;
"But it is saiid that there is plenty of freedom in our homeland; yes, not only ,plenty, but even too much freedom,"&#13;
continued Stur, "but only the landow:ner's .b rand of free.&#13;
dom, and of the real, human freedom there is very little.&#13;
If our towns had more freedom, even our people would&#13;
have never fallen into such thraildom."&#13;
Kossuth replied to Stur. But, lo and behold, what this&#13;
Magyar idol and champion of freedom said on that occasion:&#13;
"That cannot be helped; that is the way the wor1d&#13;
goes. It is fate that the one who stands lower in the com.&#13;
munity is suppressed and must bear the burden and&#13;
taxes; on the other hand, the one who comes along in civic life receives rights and stands in honor. At this time&#13;
I am opposed to granting towns a vote in our Assembly."&#13;
It was thus that Kossuth "defended" freedom.&#13;
Stur, however, would not be silenced. When he came&#13;
together with Kossuth in December, he said in the Hungarian Assembly:&#13;
"Recently, when I wa:s present here and mentioned&#13;
the sorrowful plight of the wretched taxpayers, the worthy deputy from Pesf Oounty, Mr. Kossuth, saw the hand&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
38&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
of fate in the o,ppression of the people and said that is the&#13;
way the world goes when the lower class is suppre.s sed&#13;
and the higher class receives more ri,g hts. I see no ha,nd of&#13;
fate in the matter, beoouse then the staitus of the oppressed could never be corrected. We demand freedom in&#13;
the country and to allow urbarial jobs which are not in Hne&#13;
with freedom. Does such a peirson, who works for others&#13;
and instead of being rewarded is despised, have a fatherland, will such a ipe~on become attached to his country&#13;
as he would to his mother? The sacred cause of mankind&#13;
challenges us so that once we would express the iprinci,ple&#13;
of the Hberation of people and honestly bring it into being.&#13;
When this redemption is accomplished, the judicial power&#13;
of the landowner and the county gentry must cease, because freedom would not be served if a people liberated&#13;
from the robot would continue to .remai:n under the club&#13;
of the -lords."&#13;
Behold the difference between Stur and Kossuth. Of&#13;
course, some months later even Kossuth took up Stur's cry&#13;
for the liJberation of al.l the people of Hlungary. But he did&#13;
this not out of internal conviction, but because circumstamces had forced him to take such a benev:olent ,position.&#13;
Stur fought for the rights of the subjugated even against&#13;
the will of those who had sent him .to the Assembly, while&#13;
Kossuth fought for them only after a revolutionairy wave&#13;
had inundated Hungary.&#13;
The fundamental trai,t of Stur's ideals was his love&#13;
for freedom. If Stur had done nothing else but fought in&#13;
the iBratislruva Assembly for the rights of the enslaved&#13;
and subjugated, even then he would have deserved to be&#13;
p'laced by the Slovak nation amo.ng its most distinguished&#13;
sons But he meant more than that to the Slovak nation.&#13;
Stur was not a naive romantic, as he is frequently&#13;
depicted. No one since his time ha;s yet come wp with a&#13;
more reaHstic program. Stuir- did not flatter faults and&#13;
mistrukes; his articles in the "Slovenske N a:rodne Noviny"&#13;
prove that he fought fearlessly ag,ai,n st the sho&gt;Ttcomi:ngs&#13;
and delinquencies o.f his people. His leading editorials&#13;
would be just as actual today as they were in his time.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
39&#13;
&#13;
No:t only in the defense of the 1purity of the Slova:k language, but .in defense of the recognition of the inherent&#13;
rights of the Slovak naition.&#13;
Stur's "let us not abandon our,selves, Slovak countrymen" is just as timely today as .it was in 184!5. And is it&#13;
not just as timely .to stress that "higher is the cause of the&#13;
entire nation, higher is the cause of the whole than that of&#13;
individual persons and even though individuals harm us,&#13;
the cause itself does ,n ot do so . But with us thus far it ha..c:;&#13;
·b een so that individuals offended iby our people immedL&#13;
ately abandoned the cause itself. . . "&#13;
Today ou~ mighty America with her Allies is fighting&#13;
for the freedom of al,l enslaved and oppressed nations. Th:s&#13;
freedom mu:st not miss the Slovak nation. The Slovaks even&#13;
today, rus during the times of Stur, have inherent and Godgiiven rights to complete freedom as do all other nations.&#13;
To fight for the freedom of all nations, including the Slovak naition, is the obligation not only of the Slovaks and&#13;
Americans of Slovak descen_t, but also the obligation of&#13;
all ,l overs of truth and freedom. Indeed, the Slovak,s existed&#13;
and shall continue to exist, if they only remember Stur's:&#13;
"Let us not abandon ourselves, Slova1k countrymen!"&#13;
StUJI"'s schoo-1 of thought built the foundation for the&#13;
independence movement of Slovakia over a hundred years&#13;
ago - and the Slovaks are building upon this foundation&#13;
ever since, and will keep on building until they attain complete freedom from al,l foreign and hostile domination.&#13;
Just as Stur repudiated a:nd condemned the hegemony of&#13;
the Magyars and the materialistic ,p hHosophy of Marx and&#13;
Engels, so the Slovaks today stand solidly agaim,t materi_&#13;
alistic Communism and all forms of totalitarianiSim and&#13;
the hegemony of the Czechs. The sipirit of Stur lives on!&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
• •&#13;
&#13;
WHO SAID IT?&#13;
&#13;
"The Dernocrati,c Prunty knows ithat the Sloivak nation&#13;
can be aSS1Ured of a haippier, more secure and a brighter&#13;
future oru,y by wo'Iilcing together with the Oommunist Prurty." - (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, Vfce-Ohainman of the Executive Comm,i ttee of the "Council of Free Ozechoslovakia,"&#13;
CA!S, Bratisfa,v;a, F~ary 1, 1946).&#13;
&#13;
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pp. 34-39</text>
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                    <text>40

SLOVAKIA

BENES AND THE COMMUNIZATION OF
CZECHO-SWVAKIA
John B. Fox

The foreign policy of our country, from the Monroe
Doctrine till the late nineteen-forties, was aimed at the
greatest .possi1ble isolation. This was e specially true, because of the principles laid down in the mentioned Monroe
Doctrine, as far as the Eastern hemisphere was concerned.
Thus, afteir World War U, the call to leadership of the democratic world found us. in many respects unprepared.
Suddenly we •l earned that our knowledge of the rest of the
world, especially Europe, was quite limited.
We set about with known American assiduousness to
tackle the .great tasik thrust upon us. Realizing that in order
to present real leadership we must know our allies, we
commenced to accumulate information about the various
nations, sea rching eJVery aspect of their national lives . In
pursuing this, our leaders solicited the aid of exiled politicians and also that of the various n8Jti-onal organizations
in this country.
Though we have made tremendous progress in the
above undertaking, in many instances, especially as far as
some small nations are concerned, we have hardly started
the job.
To state a case where our Administration, mostly due
to complexity of the situation, has hardly obtained a true
picture, we mention Czecho-Slovakia.
The foreign policy of Czecho-Slovakia from 1918-1948
was molded by Eduard Benes and his political aide s. During
those thirty yea-rs !Benes was a virtual dictator a s far as
the foreign affairs of his countr,y were concerned. In addition to that, he did more than any other politician outside the USSR to make the SOIViet Union acceptable to
the West and gain admission to the League of Nations.
Benes is now deceased, ibut his disciples, many of whom are
in this country, carry ·on in his work. They are acting as
consultants to our Administration, exercising influence on
Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, Congress, etc .
1

�SLOVAKIA

il

It seems worth-.while, therefore, to examine Benes's
political relationship to the USSR. In doing so, we will not
repeat Sir Winston Churchill's condemning opinion of Benes, stated in one of his present books, but will quote from
a neat little boo'k published by the Czech-American National Alliance in 1944 entitled, "Eduard Benes in His Own
Words." Therein friends of Mr. Benes did us a favor in
selecting f,vom the mass of his speeches and publications
statements expressing his stand on major political issues in
chronoilogical order from 1914~1944.
The following, then, are quotes from "Eduard Benes
in His Own Words" pertaining to the USSR, giving the
date when they were made:
1917: Our revolutionary action welcomed the Russian Revolution openly and sincerely . . .
1918: The Allies tried to use our soldiers in Russia for intervention, •but .this was o,pposed . . .
H-.'.O: We refute t'he assertion that if decisive steps had been
taken in time against the Bolsheviks, they could have been de.;;tl"'Oyed.
In connection with Russia it was our (i.e., Czecho-SJovak) government, almost the only one in the whole of Europe, that understood the situation and foresaw corroctly the evolution of events ....
.AIS to Russia, we must and shall help her, so far as it is in our
powe r . . . .
1921: Our position on Russian problems, which we often det'ended with difficulty, but which our government executed, is today
generally and fully ,accepted. The Allies and the whole European
public opinion turned away from the idea of intervention in Russia.
Our Republic has been following this policy honestly and consistently for more than three years and is therefore now in a strong
moral position.
1922: In the future . . . it will be a struggle for a federalistic,
democratic Russia. We believe in the future of this Russia. Our
relations to the Russian .peo,ple are proved by our tra,dition and our
whole policy.
The Czecho-Slov,ak government feels sati'sfaction in having followed for five years a policy in Russian affairs that was fully justified even in the struggle for that policy in Geneva. We shall continue on this course ,also in the future without change.
1923: Our affection for and interest in Russia must be preserved and deepened. Without Russia, European politics and European peace are not imaginable; we have therefore tried, so far as
-possible, to open the doors for the mutual contact of Russia and
Europe.
This Russia simply b:y its existence will be a. rea.l safeguard to
our national independence.
I have faith in this future democratic Russia and therefore do
not worry about our fate.

�42

SLOVAKIA

1924: The natural conclusion of this evolution is ,a defini.te de
jure ,r ecognition of Russia by all states and the establishme1tt of
normal relations with the Soviet Union . . . .
1925: Perhaps 1t will not be long before we shall achieve a
second Locarno when the Whole of Europe comes to an understanding with Russia. This will be for the good and well-bein,g of Russia as well as of Europe. . . .
1926: Our policy toward Russia was always guided, by the b elief that we should be p.repared for the moment when Russia would
take up her position in Europe . . . .
1933: . . . also the policy of Soviet Russia has displayed certain symptoms of changed orientation. Russia bas sihown great understanding of the needs of peace, having concluded pacts of non-ag.
gression with her neighbors, Poland and the Little Entente.
1934: The return of Russia to European politics ,vm facilitate
the creation of r eal equilibrium ,a mong the powers in Europe. The
policy of rapprochement between ours elves and Soviet Russia is
proceeding along normal lines. . . .
1935: Efforts for the strengthening of peace for the good of
all the countries of Europe lay at the bottom of the cooperation between Russia .and Czecho-Slovakia.
1937: Soviet Russia is devoting herself more to her internal
affairs.
A great deficiency in the political systems of Europe after the
last war was that that Soviet Un.ion had not been invited ,t o cooperate in its foundation and direction, but only in 1934, when it was
already late, became involved in its c ollective defense.
1938: Russia remains faithful to us to the very last; I know
that . . . .
1939: If -Soviet Russia were again excluded from the organization of Europe the new collaboration of the o,rganized ,political uni.ts
would again lose their equilibrium. This would also inevitably lead
to attempts to isoiate Soviet Europe from European influences.
Geographically and politically European Russia belongs to Europe. This is an inescapable fact . . . .
1942: Russia is fighting not only for herself, but for all of us.
And none of us can contemplate another two decades in which
Soviet Russi.a would be isolated from the affairs of Europe.
Immediaitely after .t he assault on the Soviet Union by Germany,
we ente,red into official negotiations for the resumption of our old
friendly and allied relations w.ith the Soviet Union, as they existed
before Munich. These negotiations were proceeding without any difficulties and in the .spirit of our former friendship. On July 18, 1941,
a treaty of alliance was signed, which contained a full recognition
of us, without any reservations. [ wish to state objectively that our
relations with the Soviet Union are really friendly and loyal; there
is today between us the same rela;tion,s hip of alliance as was before
Munich, ·a nd it is our conv.i-ction and wish this remain so after the
war. II am certain the collaboration of Europe with the Soviet Union
will again make for ,t he -cooperation of the Union with Europe, tJhat
confidence and friendship will result and develop, that there will be
an equil!b,rium of forces . . . .

�SLOVAKIA

43

In Czec-ho-Slovakia, we had for twenty years worked for collabo1-a,tion between the West and the East of Europe . . . .
The 1United. Nations are determined today to ,c reate a new system
of collective security in Europe s oon after the war . . . I suppor,t the
conception of Anglo-American-Soviet collaboration.
1943: For my ·part I have a,n ,a;biding confidence in the Russians .
They will fulfill scrupulously .t he Teheran decisions so as to safeguard future ipeace.
Between the Soviet ,U nion and Czec,ho-Slovakia all fundamental
and important questions relating .to their mutual relations have •b een
settled. 'Ilhis fact has great political significance for the future . . . .
-Much o,f what is now being appreciated about the Soviet Union,
I saw during my fkst V\isit to Moscow in 1935; for this reason, I
have trusted the Soviet Union in the present war. Certain modifications in the Soviet Union that have recently surprised the rest
of the world are natural consequences, partly of the war ,a nd partly
of the changes associated •w ith its world position (the a bolition of
the Internation,al, the new attitude ,towards religion, intensified Soviet :patriotic feeling and the r ecent changes in the Soviet Constitution to the. ,adv,a n.tage of the F ederated Republics) . . I see in it the
natumJ attitude of a successful evolution of the victorious revolution, that !has to be polHically stabiUzed and that is simply progresssing in accordance with its own laws. Hence, from 1922 on I
strove for a rapprochement between Europe and the Soviets . . . .
1944: Lt seemed to me that if full unders.tandin,g were reached
between ourselves and t'he Soviets, and if there were also complete
and mutual trust among us, it would be possi ble to point to this
very achievement as an example, even in ithe United States, and that
the Allies, particularly the greater powers, would thereby be fundamentally drawn closer together.

Thus Mr. Benes and his ipolitical co-workers preached
to the world for thirty years. It is evident that this was
not just a spell of fleeting enthusiasm for the seemingly
humanitarian element in Soviet propaganda, but rather
the life: wo.rk of po-liticians who, for some reason or other,
are still recognized in some circles.
Mr. Benes and hrs government-in-exile were granted
asylum in England during World War ll. In 1945 Benes
went to Moscow for instructions before returning to Cze.
cho ..Stlorvakia. ,I n violation of the principles of the United
Nations Declaration, somewhere in the shuffle, Ruthenia,
which had b,een part of Czecho~Slovakia between the wars,
was lost, apparently offered up as a token of good will to
the iKremlin chieif. Certainly Benes made other major concessions a:bout which few were informed, so that he might
retmn as "president" to Czecho-Slovakia.
It is our contention thait Czecho-Slovakia after World

�44

SLOVAKIA

Wair JiI could hardly be considered a free agent. The entire
police power throughout the country was in Communist
hands from the very beginning. Still Mr. B enes decided to
play his hand till the end. IH e, as "president," shortly after the "liberation," nationalized the greater part of Czecho..,Slovruk indust:r,y by mere presidential decree, thus paralyzing the oountry's, economy. And none of Stalin's agents
did a better joib of eliminating all anti-Communists and
anti-Socialistic elements from politics than did Benes.
Afiter Benes and his co-wovkers had achieved their
long-sought goal, the entrance of the Soviets into the Eurnpean political arena, they could not possibly be of any
further sel'IVice to the Communists. Thus, when the latter
took ()IVer complete control of Czecho-:S lovakia in February,
19·48, Benes was demoted from the presidency and Jan Masaryk, his foreign minister in despair killed himself by
jumping from a window. Dorothy Thompson, on the margin of the Ozecho--Slovak disaster, in a magazine article
summed up the situation with the comment that "such is
the fate of collaborators "
Today the co-wonkers of the same Benes, with a ounningness approaching that of a Talleyrand, are still presen ting themselves to our Administrntion as representatives of the Ozech and Slovak peoples. One can imagine how
the Czechs and Sfovaks behind the 'Iron Curtaiin feel, when
they hear the same ;voices which over a period of thirty
years advocated the 'Soviet cause, now being broadcast
over the waves of the Voice of America and Radio Free
Europe: the same politicians who contributed to the en_
slaivement oif their country!
Today the whole democratic world is suffering from
what Mr. Benes ·and his collaborato!'.s advocated and helped
bring about. And the oppressed and persecuted Czechr:; and
Sloivaks might turn to Shakespeare and utter with Mark
Anthony: "the evil that men do lives after them.
"

• • •

(JUTche.k
$3.00; SWVAK FOR BEGINNERS" (Books I~) $1.50
(the set); "Hirobak's English-Sl01VaJk Dictionary" $4.00;
"SLOVAK I...ESSONS" (IHrobak) $3.50.
REOOMMENDED BOOKS: "The Slovaks"

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1455">
                    <text>40

SLOVAKIA

BENES AND THE COMMUNIZATION OF
CZECHO-SWVAKIA
John B. Fox

The foreign policy of our country, from the Monroe
Doctrine till the late nineteen-forties, was aimed at the
greatest .possi1ble isolation. This was e specially true, because of the principles laid down in the mentioned Monroe
Doctrine, as far as the Eastern hemisphere was concerned.
Thus, afteir World War U, the call to leadership of the democratic world found us. in many respects unprepared.
Suddenly we •l earned that our knowledge of the rest of the
world, especially Europe, was quite limited.
We set about with known American assiduousness to
tackle the .great tasik thrust upon us. Realizing that in order
to present real leadership we must know our allies, we
commenced to accumulate information about the various
nations, sea rching eJVery aspect of their national lives . In
pursuing this, our leaders solicited the aid of exiled politicians and also that of the various n8Jti-onal organizations
in this country.
Though we have made tremendous progress in the
above undertaking, in many instances, especially as far as
some small nations are concerned, we have hardly started
the job.
To state a case where our Administration, mostly due
to complexity of the situation, has hardly obtained a true
picture, we mention Czecho-Slovakia.
The foreign policy of Czecho-Slovakia from 1918-1948
was molded by Eduard Benes and his political aide s. During
those thirty yea-rs !Benes was a virtual dictator a s far as
the foreign affairs of his countr,y were concerned. In addition to that, he did more than any other politician outside the USSR to make the SOIViet Union acceptable to
the West and gain admission to the League of Nations.
Benes is now deceased, ibut his disciples, many of whom are
in this country, carry ·on in his work. They are acting as
consultants to our Administration, exercising influence on
Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, Congress, etc .
1

�SLOVAKIA

il

It seems worth-.while, therefore, to examine Benes's
political relationship to the USSR. In doing so, we will not
repeat Sir Winston Churchill's condemning opinion of Benes, stated in one of his present books, but will quote from
a neat little boo'k published by the Czech-American National Alliance in 1944 entitled, "Eduard Benes in His Own
Words." Therein friends of Mr. Benes did us a favor in
selecting f,vom the mass of his speeches and publications
statements expressing his stand on major political issues in
chronoilogical order from 1914~1944.
The following, then, are quotes from "Eduard Benes
in His Own Words" pertaining to the USSR, giving the
date when they were made:
1917: Our revolutionary action welcomed the Russian Revolution openly and sincerely . . .
1918: The Allies tried to use our soldiers in Russia for intervention, •but .this was o,pposed . . .
H-.'.O: We refute t'he assertion that if decisive steps had been
taken in time against the Bolsheviks, they could have been de.;;tl"'Oyed.
In connection with Russia it was our (i.e., Czecho-SJovak) government, almost the only one in the whole of Europe, that understood the situation and foresaw corroctly the evolution of events ....
.AIS to Russia, we must and shall help her, so far as it is in our
powe r . . . .
1921: Our position on Russian problems, which we often det'ended with difficulty, but which our government executed, is today
generally and fully ,accepted. The Allies and the whole European
public opinion turned away from the idea of intervention in Russia.
Our Republic has been following this policy honestly and consistently for more than three years and is therefore now in a strong
moral position.
1922: In the future . . . it will be a struggle for a federalistic,
democratic Russia. We believe in the future of this Russia. Our
relations to the Russian .peo,ple are proved by our tra,dition and our
whole policy.
The Czecho-Slov,ak government feels sati'sfaction in having followed for five years a policy in Russian affairs that was fully justified even in the struggle for that policy in Geneva. We shall continue on this course ,also in the future without change.
1923: Our affection for and interest in Russia must be preserved and deepened. Without Russia, European politics and European peace are not imaginable; we have therefore tried, so far as
-possible, to open the doors for the mutual contact of Russia and
Europe.
This Russia simply b:y its existence will be a. rea.l safeguard to
our national independence.
I have faith in this future democratic Russia and therefore do
not worry about our fate.

�42

SLOVAKIA

1924: The natural conclusion of this evolution is ,a defini.te de
jure ,r ecognition of Russia by all states and the establishme1tt of
normal relations with the Soviet Union . . . .
1925: Perhaps 1t will not be long before we shall achieve a
second Locarno when the Whole of Europe comes to an understanding with Russia. This will be for the good and well-bein,g of Russia as well as of Europe. . . .
1926: Our policy toward Russia was always guided, by the b elief that we should be p.repared for the moment when Russia would
take up her position in Europe . . . .
1933: . . . also the policy of Soviet Russia has displayed certain symptoms of changed orientation. Russia bas sihown great understanding of the needs of peace, having concluded pacts of non-ag.
gression with her neighbors, Poland and the Little Entente.
1934: The return of Russia to European politics ,vm facilitate
the creation of r eal equilibrium ,a mong the powers in Europe. The
policy of rapprochement between ours elves and Soviet Russia is
proceeding along normal lines. . . .
1935: Efforts for the strengthening of peace for the good of
all the countries of Europe lay at the bottom of the cooperation between Russia .and Czecho-Slovakia.
1937: Soviet Russia is devoting herself more to her internal
affairs.
A great deficiency in the political systems of Europe after the
last war was that that Soviet Un.ion had not been invited ,t o cooperate in its foundation and direction, but only in 1934, when it was
already late, became involved in its c ollective defense.
1938: Russia remains faithful to us to the very last; I know
that . . . .
1939: If -Soviet Russia were again excluded from the organization of Europe the new collaboration of the o,rganized ,political uni.ts
would again lose their equilibrium. This would also inevitably lead
to attempts to isoiate Soviet Europe from European influences.
Geographically and politically European Russia belongs to Europe. This is an inescapable fact . . . .
1942: Russia is fighting not only for herself, but for all of us.
And none of us can contemplate another two decades in which
Soviet Russi.a would be isolated from the affairs of Europe.
Immediaitely after .t he assault on the Soviet Union by Germany,
we ente,red into official negotiations for the resumption of our old
friendly and allied relations w.ith the Soviet Union, as they existed
before Munich. These negotiations were proceeding without any difficulties and in the .spirit of our former friendship. On July 18, 1941,
a treaty of alliance was signed, which contained a full recognition
of us, without any reservations. [ wish to state objectively that our
relations with the Soviet Union are really friendly and loyal; there
is today between us the same rela;tion,s hip of alliance as was before
Munich, ·a nd it is our conv.i-ction and wish this remain so after the
war. II am certain the collaboration of Europe with the Soviet Union
will again make for ,t he -cooperation of the Union with Europe, tJhat
confidence and friendship will result and develop, that there will be
an equil!b,rium of forces . . . .

�SLOVAKIA

43

In Czec-ho-Slovakia, we had for twenty years worked for collabo1-a,tion between the West and the East of Europe . . . .
The 1United. Nations are determined today to ,c reate a new system
of collective security in Europe s oon after the war . . . I suppor,t the
conception of Anglo-American-Soviet collaboration.
1943: For my ·part I have a,n ,a;biding confidence in the Russians .
They will fulfill scrupulously .t he Teheran decisions so as to safeguard future ipeace.
Between the Soviet ,U nion and Czec,ho-Slovakia all fundamental
and important questions relating .to their mutual relations have •b een
settled. 'Ilhis fact has great political significance for the future . . . .
-Much o,f what is now being appreciated about the Soviet Union,
I saw during my fkst V\isit to Moscow in 1935; for this reason, I
have trusted the Soviet Union in the present war. Certain modifications in the Soviet Union that have recently surprised the rest
of the world are natural consequences, partly of the war ,a nd partly
of the changes associated •w ith its world position (the a bolition of
the Internation,al, the new attitude ,towards religion, intensified Soviet :patriotic feeling and the r ecent changes in the Soviet Constitution to the. ,adv,a n.tage of the F ederated Republics) . . I see in it the
natumJ attitude of a successful evolution of the victorious revolution, that !has to be polHically stabiUzed and that is simply progresssing in accordance with its own laws. Hence, from 1922 on I
strove for a rapprochement between Europe and the Soviets . . . .
1944: Lt seemed to me that if full unders.tandin,g were reached
between ourselves and t'he Soviets, and if there were also complete
and mutual trust among us, it would be possi ble to point to this
very achievement as an example, even in ithe United States, and that
the Allies, particularly the greater powers, would thereby be fundamentally drawn closer together.

Thus Mr. Benes and his ipolitical co-workers preached
to the world for thirty years. It is evident that this was
not just a spell of fleeting enthusiasm for the seemingly
humanitarian element in Soviet propaganda, but rather
the life: wo.rk of po-liticians who, for some reason or other,
are still recognized in some circles.
Mr. Benes and hrs government-in-exile were granted
asylum in England during World War ll. In 1945 Benes
went to Moscow for instructions before returning to Cze.
cho ..Stlorvakia. ,I n violation of the principles of the United
Nations Declaration, somewhere in the shuffle, Ruthenia,
which had b,een part of Czecho~Slovakia between the wars,
was lost, apparently offered up as a token of good will to
the iKremlin chieif. Certainly Benes made other major concessions a:bout which few were informed, so that he might
retmn as "president" to Czecho-Slovakia.
It is our contention thait Czecho-Slovakia after World

�44

SLOVAKIA

Wair JiI could hardly be considered a free agent. The entire
police power throughout the country was in Communist
hands from the very beginning. Still Mr. B enes decided to
play his hand till the end. IH e, as "president," shortly after the "liberation," nationalized the greater part of Czecho..,Slovruk indust:r,y by mere presidential decree, thus paralyzing the oountry's, economy. And none of Stalin's agents
did a better joib of eliminating all anti-Communists and
anti-Socialistic elements from politics than did Benes.
Afiter Benes and his co-wovkers had achieved their
long-sought goal, the entrance of the Soviets into the Eurnpean political arena, they could not possibly be of any
further sel'IVice to the Communists. Thus, when the latter
took ()IVer complete control of Czecho-:S lovakia in February,
19·48, Benes was demoted from the presidency and Jan Masaryk, his foreign minister in despair killed himself by
jumping from a window. Dorothy Thompson, on the margin of the Ozecho--Slovak disaster, in a magazine article
summed up the situation with the comment that "such is
the fate of collaborators "
Today the co-wonkers of the same Benes, with a ounningness approaching that of a Talleyrand, are still presen ting themselves to our Administrntion as representatives of the Ozech and Slovak peoples. One can imagine how
the Czechs and Sfovaks behind the 'Iron Curtaiin feel, when
they hear the same ;voices which over a period of thirty
years advocated the 'Soviet cause, now being broadcast
over the waves of the Voice of America and Radio Free
Europe: the same politicians who contributed to the en_
slaivement oif their country!
Today the whole democratic world is suffering from
what Mr. Benes ·and his collaborato!'.s advocated and helped
bring about. And the oppressed and persecuted Czechr:; and
Sloivaks might turn to Shakespeare and utter with Mark
Anthony: "the evil that men do lives after them.
"

• • •

(JUTche.k
$3.00; SWVAK FOR BEGINNERS" (Books I~) $1.50
(the set); "Hirobak's English-Sl01VaJk Dictionary" $4.00;
"SLOVAK I...ESSONS" (IHrobak) $3.50.
REOOMMENDED BOOKS: "The Slovaks"

�</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
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              <text>40&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
BENES AND THE COMMUNIZATION OF&#13;
CZECHO-SWVAKIA&#13;
John B. Fox&#13;
&#13;
The foreign policy of our country, from the Monroe&#13;
Doctrine till the late nineteen-forties, was aimed at the&#13;
greatest .possi1ble isolation. This was e specially true, because of the principles laid down in the mentioned Monroe&#13;
Doctrine, as far as the Eastern hemisphere was concerned.&#13;
Thus, afteir World War U, the call to leadership of the democratic world found us. in many respects unprepared.&#13;
Suddenly we •l earned that our knowledge of the rest of the&#13;
world, especially Europe, was quite limited.&#13;
We set about with known American assiduousness to&#13;
tackle the .great tasik thrust upon us. Realizing that in order&#13;
to present real leadership we must know our allies, we&#13;
commenced to accumulate information about the various&#13;
nations, sea rching eJVery aspect of their national lives . In&#13;
pursuing this, our leaders solicited the aid of exiled politicians and also that of the various n8Jti-onal organizations&#13;
in this country.&#13;
Though we have made tremendous progress in the&#13;
above undertaking, in many instances, especially as far as&#13;
some small nations are concerned, we have hardly started&#13;
the job.&#13;
To state a case where our Administration, mostly due&#13;
to complexity of the situation, has hardly obtained a true&#13;
picture, we mention Czecho-Slovakia.&#13;
The foreign policy of Czecho-Slovakia from 1918-1948&#13;
was molded by Eduard Benes and his political aide s. During&#13;
those thirty yea-rs !Benes was a virtual dictator a s far as&#13;
the foreign affairs of his countr,y were concerned. In addition to that, he did more than any other politician outside the USSR to make the SOIViet Union acceptable to&#13;
the West and gain admission to the League of Nations.&#13;
Benes is now deceased, ibut his disciples, many of whom are&#13;
in this country, carry ·on in his work. They are acting as&#13;
consultants to our Administration, exercising influence on&#13;
Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, Congress, etc .&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
il&#13;
&#13;
It seems worth-.while, therefore, to examine Benes's&#13;
political relationship to the USSR. In doing so, we will not&#13;
repeat Sir Winston Churchill's condemning opinion of Benes, stated in one of his present books, but will quote from&#13;
a neat little boo'k published by the Czech-American National Alliance in 1944 entitled, "Eduard Benes in His Own&#13;
Words." Therein friends of Mr. Benes did us a favor in&#13;
selecting f,vom the mass of his speeches and publications&#13;
statements expressing his stand on major political issues in&#13;
chronoilogical order from 1914~1944.&#13;
The following, then, are quotes from "Eduard Benes&#13;
in His Own Words" pertaining to the USSR, giving the&#13;
date when they were made:&#13;
1917: Our revolutionary action welcomed the Russian Revolution openly and sincerely . . .&#13;
1918: The Allies tried to use our soldiers in Russia for intervention, •but .this was o,pposed . . .&#13;
H-.'.O: We refute t'he assertion that if decisive steps had been&#13;
taken in time against the Bolsheviks, they could have been de.;;tl"'Oyed.&#13;
In connection with Russia it was our (i.e., Czecho-SJovak) government, almost the only one in the whole of Europe, that understood the situation and foresaw corroctly the evolution of events ....&#13;
.AIS to Russia, we must and shall help her, so far as it is in our&#13;
powe r . . . .&#13;
1921: Our position on Russian problems, which we often det'ended with difficulty, but which our government executed, is today&#13;
generally and fully ,accepted. The Allies and the whole European&#13;
public opinion turned away from the idea of intervention in Russia.&#13;
Our Republic has been following this policy honestly and consistently for more than three years and is therefore now in a strong&#13;
moral position.&#13;
1922: In the future . . . it will be a struggle for a federalistic,&#13;
democratic Russia. We believe in the future of this Russia. Our&#13;
relations to the Russian .peo,ple are proved by our tra,dition and our&#13;
whole policy.&#13;
The Czecho-Slov,ak government feels sati'sfaction in having followed for five years a policy in Russian affairs that was fully justified even in the struggle for that policy in Geneva. We shall continue on this course ,also in the future without change.&#13;
1923: Our affection for and interest in Russia must be preserved and deepened. Without Russia, European politics and European peace are not imaginable; we have therefore tried, so far as&#13;
-possible, to open the doors for the mutual contact of Russia and&#13;
Europe.&#13;
This Russia simply b:y its existence will be a. rea.l safeguard to&#13;
our national independence.&#13;
I have faith in this future democratic Russia and therefore do&#13;
not worry about our fate.&#13;
&#13;
42&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
1924: The natural conclusion of this evolution is ,a defini.te de&#13;
jure ,r ecognition of Russia by all states and the establishme1tt of&#13;
normal relations with the Soviet Union . . . .&#13;
1925: Perhaps 1t will not be long before we shall achieve a&#13;
second Locarno when the Whole of Europe comes to an understanding with Russia. This will be for the good and well-bein,g of Russia as well as of Europe. . . .&#13;
1926: Our policy toward Russia was always guided, by the b elief that we should be p.repared for the moment when Russia would&#13;
take up her position in Europe . . . .&#13;
1933: . . . also the policy of Soviet Russia has displayed certain symptoms of changed orientation. Russia bas sihown great understanding of the needs of peace, having concluded pacts of non-ag.&#13;
gression with her neighbors, Poland and the Little Entente.&#13;
1934: The return of Russia to European politics ,vm facilitate&#13;
the creation of r eal equilibrium ,a mong the powers in Europe. The&#13;
policy of rapprochement between ours elves and Soviet Russia is&#13;
proceeding along normal lines. . . .&#13;
1935: Efforts for the strengthening of peace for the good of&#13;
all the countries of Europe lay at the bottom of the cooperation between Russia .and Czecho-Slovakia.&#13;
1937: Soviet Russia is devoting herself more to her internal&#13;
affairs.&#13;
A great deficiency in the political systems of Europe after the&#13;
last war was that that Soviet Un.ion had not been invited ,t o cooperate in its foundation and direction, but only in 1934, when it was&#13;
already late, became involved in its c ollective defense.&#13;
1938: Russia remains faithful to us to the very last; I know&#13;
that . . . .&#13;
1939: If -Soviet Russia were again excluded from the organization of Europe the new collaboration of the o,rganized ,political uni.ts&#13;
would again lose their equilibrium. This would also inevitably lead&#13;
to attempts to isoiate Soviet Europe from European influences.&#13;
Geographically and politically European Russia belongs to Europe. This is an inescapable fact . . . .&#13;
1942: Russia is fighting not only for herself, but for all of us.&#13;
And none of us can contemplate another two decades in which&#13;
Soviet Russi.a would be isolated from the affairs of Europe.&#13;
Immediaitely after .t he assault on the Soviet Union by Germany,&#13;
we ente,red into official negotiations for the resumption of our old&#13;
friendly and allied relations w.ith the Soviet Union, as they existed&#13;
before Munich. These negotiations were proceeding without any difficulties and in the .spirit of our former friendship. On July 18, 1941,&#13;
a treaty of alliance was signed, which contained a full recognition&#13;
of us, without any reservations. [ wish to state objectively that our&#13;
relations with the Soviet Union are really friendly and loyal; there&#13;
is today between us the same rela;tion,s hip of alliance as was before&#13;
Munich, ·a nd it is our conv.i-ction and wish this remain so after the&#13;
war. II am certain the collaboration of Europe with the Soviet Union&#13;
will again make for ,t he -cooperation of the Union with Europe, tJhat&#13;
confidence and friendship will result and develop, that there will be&#13;
an equil!b,rium of forces . . . .&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
43&#13;
&#13;
In Czec-ho-Slovakia, we had for twenty years worked for collabo1-a,tion between the West and the East of Europe . . . .&#13;
The 1United. Nations are determined today to ,c reate a new system&#13;
of collective security in Europe s oon after the war . . . I suppor,t the&#13;
conception of Anglo-American-Soviet collaboration.&#13;
1943: For my ·part I have a,n ,a;biding confidence in the Russians .&#13;
They will fulfill scrupulously .t he Teheran decisions so as to safeguard future ipeace.&#13;
Between the Soviet ,U nion and Czec,ho-Slovakia all fundamental&#13;
and important questions relating .to their mutual relations have •b een&#13;
settled. 'Ilhis fact has great political significance for the future . . . .&#13;
-Much o,f what is now being appreciated about the Soviet Union,&#13;
I saw during my fkst V\isit to Moscow in 1935; for this reason, I&#13;
have trusted the Soviet Union in the present war. Certain modifications in the Soviet Union that have recently surprised the rest&#13;
of the world are natural consequences, partly of the war ,a nd partly&#13;
of the changes associated •w ith its world position (the a bolition of&#13;
the Internation,al, the new attitude ,towards religion, intensified Soviet :patriotic feeling and the r ecent changes in the Soviet Constitution to the. ,adv,a n.tage of the F ederated Republics) . . I see in it the&#13;
natumJ attitude of a successful evolution of the victorious revolution, that !has to be polHically stabiUzed and that is simply progresssing in accordance with its own laws. Hence, from 1922 on I&#13;
strove for a rapprochement between Europe and the Soviets . . . .&#13;
1944: Lt seemed to me that if full unders.tandin,g were reached&#13;
between ourselves and t'he Soviets, and if there were also complete&#13;
and mutual trust among us, it would be possi ble to point to this&#13;
very achievement as an example, even in ithe United States, and that&#13;
the Allies, particularly the greater powers, would thereby be fundamentally drawn closer together.&#13;
&#13;
Thus Mr. Benes and his ipolitical co-workers preached&#13;
to the world for thirty years. It is evident that this was&#13;
not just a spell of fleeting enthusiasm for the seemingly&#13;
humanitarian element in Soviet propaganda, but rather&#13;
the life: wo.rk of po-liticians who, for some reason or other,&#13;
are still recognized in some circles.&#13;
Mr. Benes and hrs government-in-exile were granted&#13;
asylum in England during World War ll. In 1945 Benes&#13;
went to Moscow for instructions before returning to Cze.&#13;
cho ..Stlorvakia. ,I n violation of the principles of the United&#13;
Nations Declaration, somewhere in the shuffle, Ruthenia,&#13;
which had b,een part of Czecho~Slovakia between the wars,&#13;
was lost, apparently offered up as a token of good will to&#13;
the iKremlin chieif. Certainly Benes made other major concessions a:bout which few were informed, so that he might&#13;
retmn as "president" to Czecho-Slovakia.&#13;
It is our contention thait Czecho-Slovakia after World&#13;
&#13;
44&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Wair JiI could hardly be considered a free agent. The entire&#13;
police power throughout the country was in Communist&#13;
hands from the very beginning. Still Mr. B enes decided to&#13;
play his hand till the end. IH e, as "president," shortly after the "liberation," nationalized the greater part of Czecho..,Slovruk indust:r,y by mere presidential decree, thus paralyzing the oountry's, economy. And none of Stalin's agents&#13;
did a better joib of eliminating all anti-Communists and&#13;
anti-Socialistic elements from politics than did Benes.&#13;
Afiter Benes and his co-wovkers had achieved their&#13;
long-sought goal, the entrance of the Soviets into the Eurnpean political arena, they could not possibly be of any&#13;
further sel'IVice to the Communists. Thus, when the latter&#13;
took ()IVer complete control of Czecho-:S lovakia in February,&#13;
19·48, Benes was demoted from the presidency and Jan Masaryk, his foreign minister in despair killed himself by&#13;
jumping from a window. Dorothy Thompson, on the margin of the Ozecho--Slovak disaster, in a magazine article&#13;
summed up the situation with the comment that "such is&#13;
the fate of collaborators "&#13;
Today the co-wonkers of the same Benes, with a ounningness approaching that of a Talleyrand, are still presen ting themselves to our Administrntion as representatives of the Ozech and Slovak peoples. One can imagine how&#13;
the Czechs and Sfovaks behind the 'Iron Curtaiin feel, when&#13;
they hear the same ;voices which over a period of thirty&#13;
years advocated the 'Soviet cause, now being broadcast&#13;
over the waves of the Voice of America and Radio Free&#13;
Europe: the same politicians who contributed to the en_&#13;
slaivement oif their country!&#13;
Today the whole democratic world is suffering from&#13;
what Mr. Benes ·and his collaborato!'.s advocated and helped&#13;
bring about. And the oppressed and persecuted Czechr:; and&#13;
Sloivaks might turn to Shakespeare and utter with Mark&#13;
Anthony: "the evil that men do lives after them.&#13;
"&#13;
&#13;
• • •&#13;
&#13;
(JUTche.k&#13;
$3.00; SWVAK FOR BEGINNERS" (Books I~) $1.50&#13;
(the set); "Hirobak's English-Sl01VaJk Dictionary" $4.00;&#13;
"SLOVAK I...ESSONS" (IHrobak) $3.50.&#13;
REOOMMENDED BOOKS: "The Slovaks"&#13;
&#13;
</text>
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Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956&#13;
pp. 40-44</text>
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

MASARYK'S DEMOCRACY ANH SLOVAKIA
Joseph A. Mikus

An American newspaperman, desiring to know the details about Czecho-.Slorv&lt;akia, put the following questions
to me recently:
1. What does the Pittsburgh Agreement mean to the
Slovaks?
2. What might have been the opinion of M. R. Stefa.
nik albout the status of Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak
State?
3. Did the Slovak deputies in the Prague Parliament
vote for the Constitution of Czecho~Slovaki'a in 1920?
4. Is it true that the autonomist movement never at..,
tained a majority among the voters of Slovakia?
'5. How strong were the "Magya:rones" in the Slovaik
Peop~e's Party?
6. What is the political significance of Catholicism and
Protestantism in Slovakia?
7. What is the present Slorvruk pohtical program?
1

Since these questions are asked morn frequently by
persons interested in the truth a!bout the Czecho~lovakia
of T. G. Masaryik and Dr. Edward Benes, the following
article, I hope, will greatly help to, clear up matters in this
regard.
Before 1918, S~orvakia was an integral part of the
Kingdom of Hungary. For almost a hundred years the
Slova!ks we,r e for a federative reform of Hungary, accord.
ing to the principles of nationalities. Since the Magyars
were shortsighted and did not consent to any such refo:rim,
the Slovruks decided, during the first World War, with the
Czechs on a Czecho-Slovak federation. I.f there is, any lo.
gic in the effort of a man who tries to save himself when
sinking in a pond, it is rather in hi,s will to preserve his
life than in the choice between two ponds that he would
prefer to drown in. The SlovaJks, abandoning Hung,ary and
ag;reeing to the formation orf a Czecho-SllOv•a k State, were
motivated by the idea of preserving and deive1oping their
national individuality. The Pittsburgh Agreement - con-

�46

SLOVAKIA

eluded between the representatives of the Slovak League
of America, on the one side, and the Czech National Alliance and the Federation of the Czech Catholics, on the
other, and signed on May 30, 1918, by T. G. Masaryk as
the representative of the Czecho-Slov,a k National Council - contains precise stipulations in this respect.
The Czecho-Slovak problem, .as developed after HH8,
arose from the subsequent repudiation ,of the PittS1burgh
Agreement 'by Masaryk, as President of Czecho..,Slovakia.
Masaryk did this despite the fact _giat this agreement was
by far a much more important document in the moderp.
history of Czechs and Slovaks ,t han any other one, includ- ,
ing tlie "Czecho-Sfovak" Oonstltubon of 1920. The Pitts ..
burgh Agreement assured moral and political foundations
to the prospective state of Czeeho..,Slovakia. Law cannot
be considered separately from morals and politics. It is
indeed only a formal expression of co-ordination attained
by certain social forces toward a higher end. Undoubted ..
ly, those forces manifested themselves in the Pittsburgh
Agreement.
Masaryk denied the "legal" validity of this document,
but he could not deny it!he fact of having received about a
million dollars from the Sl()JVaJk League of America, which
had been given hlm to finance the activity of the CzechoSlovak National Counicil in Barrs. Without this money
from Americans of Slovak descent, Masaryk and Benes
would have remained somewhere in France as obscure
journalists or poor college-iteachers.
In any deal none of the two contracting parties has
the right arbitrarily to pick up advantages and repudiate o'b'ligatioIIB. Something like that would be doubledealing. To say that the members of the Slovruk League of
America were American citizens and, consequently, did not
have the right to pledge themselves for Slovakia is not
honest. When he signe&lt;l. the Pittsburgh Agreement, Masa..
ryk was a ,political rnfugee acting in contradiction with a
pro-Hapsburig declaration of the Union of Czech writers.
He himself had no delegation from anybody. But the Slovaks have never said that he was an :impostor. Why should,
then, his indirect affirmation 1be accepted that the signa-

�SLOVAKIA

47

tories of the Pittsburgh Agreement on behalf of the Slovak League were nothing else than impostors?
What might have been the attitude of M. R. Stefanik
in regard to the politica;l structure and organization of
Czecho-Slovakia?
It is ,k nown that Stefanik did not sign the Declaration
of Independence of the Czecho-Slovak Nation, as pUlblished
on Octoiber 18, 1918, by Benes in Paris ,and T. G. Masaryk
in Washingiton. At that time Stefanik was outside Europe.
His name was therefore simply written down by Benes who
was pre-supposing Stefanik's consent. Stefanik might have
even admitted the western legal concept of a Czecho-Slovak
nation coo.sis-ting of citizens of various ethnic origins. But
there are sources proving that his concept of unity of the
Czecho-Slovak State did not imply the political and cultural
absoI'ption of the Slovaks by the Czechs.
In 1917, on a trip in the United Stafos, Stefanik gave
an inte1wiew to the purbli-sher of the magazine "Slovenska
mladez" (Slava,k Youth), ·Pittsburgh, Pa. 'l'his interview,
,published in this magazine on November 15, 1917 (No. 7) ,
reproduced the following passage from Stefanik's sta,tement:
"Slovakia has to maintain her cultural and linguistic
character. There is no question about that and on this point
- as well as on the question of autonomy of Slovakia, Moravia, Silesia and Bohemia - there is a complete agreement." (1)
That was in fact a realistic evaluaition of the situation,
contrasting the wishful thinking theories of Masaryk and
Bein.es, and even of such Sloivaiks as Hodza, Derer and Srobar. In 1918, Woodrow Wilson .pronounced in Congress the
following significant words : "Self-determination· is not a
mere phrase. It is an imperative principle which statesmen
will henceforth ignore at their peril."
1

fflE "Czechoslovak" Constitution of 1920
The last paragraph of the Pittsburgh Agreement says :
"Detailed regulations, concerning the establishment of the
Czecho-Slovak State, are left to the liberated Czechs and
Slovaks and their legal representatives." This places the

�48

SLOVAKIA

problem of the legal representation orf S'lovakia in the
Constituent Assembly of Czecho--Slo,yakia in 1918-1920.
This serious problem, h10wever, was, resolved in a very
simple way. The :s elf-ruppointed revolutionary government of
T. G. Masaryk and E. Benes, after ha'Ving returned to
Brague in triumph mrn Paris, appointed a "Revolutionary
Oonistitiuent Parliament of CzechoslO'Vakia." In such a parliament the "deputies" for Slovakia formed the so~called
Slovaik C'lub which at the beginning of 1920 had 54 members. Who were they?
Twelve orf those "Slovak" deputies were Czechs, including Mr. Benes and AJfoe Masaryk, the daughter of the
"·P resident~Libe,r ator." And of the remaining 42 ,Slovaks,
the.re were only 8 autonomist!s . Of course, it would be difficult to find an objective ikey to these figures. But such
was the will of the Praigue Oa;srtle.
At the ,same time Stefanik died in a plane crash under
mysterious circumstances. 1n fact, he was shot down ,
from the sky of Bratislava by a Czech anti ..aircraft battery
as he was returning home from 'I taly. Andrej HTiinka had
been in the Mirov prison since October, 1919, after his
courageous but unsuccessful trip ,t o the Peace Oonference
in Paris, where he tried to defend Slovaili:ia',s .political rights
before the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated
Powers. Slovakia was occupied hy Czech legions and Prague
was threatening the Slova:k People's Party with dis,s o,lution. Strong censorship of the press and a rigid police control of the Slovak P eople's Party gatherings were exeircised by the Prague-imposed Czech authorities in Slov,a kia.
Under terrific pressure, the six Slovak "autonomist" deputies could do nothing but vote for the Constitution, establishing the new State of the Czechs and Slovaks, but at
the same time they delivered a statement in the Parliament
reassuring the Slovruk -public that they would not cease in
their str.uggle for the complete autonomy of Slovakia.
Thus, the "Czechoslorv,a:k" centralistic Constitution is
far from being a result of what in An1erica is known as a
"due democratic process." It was a victory of narrow Czech
nationalism OlVer b,road-minded Slo•v ak federalism .

�SLOVAKIA

49

After this triumph, Prague proceeded to the first elections in Czecho-Slovakia ! When one takes into considera.
tion the conditions under which those elections were organized in Slovakia, there is no su:ripris-e in the fact that the
Slovak People's Party wa:s then placed in minority. The
Czechs opened a full sca:le campaign for their various political 1parties, including the Oommunis.Unfilt,rated SodalDemocratic one. By new catchwords, they attempted to
disorientate Slovak eleeito:ris. Prague spent a lot of money
in this "divide et impera" campaign, controlled the press
by a draconian censorship, and Czech .police and soldier:;
terrorized the population during the electoral campaign
as well as on the day of the elections. In Rumanova, itwo
men were killed iby the police during a political gathering.
Fearful of the official Czech terrorism and trying to
escape a concentrated attack f:mm the side of the Czech
"liberal" parties, Dr. Joseph Buday, who during the imprisonment of Hlin'ka had been the policymlliker of the Slovak People's Party, agreed with the Czech People's Party
of Msgr . J. Sramek to go into elections with hi:s ipar.ty under the common name of the "Czecho-SlovaJk People's Party."
Slovak electors, however, did not understand the meaning
of such an electoral coalition and, therefore, the Slovak
People's Party got only 12 deputi-es, the So.cial Democrats
23, the Agrarians 12, other smaller parties 10 .
In his commentary on the e1ections of April 1920, Dr.
Ferdinand Juriga, on June 10, 1920, speaking for the Slovak People's Party, declared in the Prague Parliament:
"We do not regard the elections of April 18--20 as
a free expression of the Slo•v a;t people. There were involved
in them non-Slovaik soldiers, non-Slo,vak officials, and other
non-Slovak factors. A terrifying censorship, arbitrary im.
prisonment of our people and leaders ,prevent this act from
expressing the free will of our popuilation." (2)
It is significant to note how Czech "democracy" interpreted the principle of equality of citizens by the Law on
Elections. While the Constitution introduced a rigid uni.
fied centralistic system for the whole Republic, the number of vot@ANS~sUBRAA\he election of one deputy was

MILLERSVILLE STATE COLLEGE

�50

SLOVAKIA

fixed at 43,840 in the Czech }ands, at 53,384 in Slovakia,
and at 78,538 in Suhcarpath ian Ruthenia. iin this way the
electoral district of Prague, with around one million population, had 45 deputies in. the first Czecho-Slo vak Parliament, while Subcarpaith ian Rutherua, with a popuilaJtion
of 750,000, had only 9.
The poltitical terrorism exerted against the SlO'Vak
People's Party did not cease after the election:s. On October 10, 1920, while this .p arty held a political gathering in
Namestovo , Czech soldiers shot into the assembly and
killed two peasants. (3)
All this h·a ppened under a Constitutio n which guaranteed, for the consUII11ption of Western scholars, "Czechoslovwk" citizens and all modern human and political rights.
That the Slovak People's Party of Hlinka did nevertheless vote for the election of Masaryk as president can
mean only one thing: the political leadership of Hlinka's
Party held a higher view of the interests of the newly-born
Czecho.-!Slovak State than Mr. Edward Benes, the narrowminded Czech nationaJist, whose political views on Central Europe had, up to that time, never ex.tended beyond
the frontiers of the former Bohemian Kingdom.

Slovakia's Reaction to Prague Centralism: Autonomism
The Czech policy, aiming at the disintegrat ion of the
Slovalk national individuali ty w1thin the new Repu'blic,
awakened the self~preser vation instincts of the Slovaks.
In the elections of 1925, the Slovak People's !Party gained 23
deputies. Since that year until the very end of Czecho~Slovakia that ,party remained not only the relatively ~trongest party in Slovakia, but it managed to rally to its program the absolute majority of the Slovak voters. Here, of
course, nobody could consider as Slovak voters the members of the Magyar and German minorities, and the members of the Communis t ;party, because for these minorities
Czecho·-1Slovakia was a foreign state.
While a good part of the Magyar intelligents ia served
rather the cause of HU!Ilgarian ir,r edenta and Magyar peasants in Slovakia sO!ld their votes for certain economic advantages to the "Czechoslo vak" Agrarian Party. Neither

�SLOVAKIA

51

was it possible to recognize any right of decision about
Slovakia's political destinies to the Communists, who,
preaching a World Proletarian State, were thereby against
any national criterion in politics. Moreover, the Communist Party in Slovakia recruited its voters mostly from
among the minority groups: Magyars, Czechs, Jews, etc.
Thus, taking into considera.tion the electoral returns of
1925, from 58 deputies corresponding to Slovakia, 17 deputies were discounted as non-Slovaik: 10 Magyars, 1 German
and 6 Communists. Out of the remaining 41 deputies, the
22 corresponding to the Slov,a k People's Party is, in fact, a
majority. The same can be said about the political structure of Sl01Vakia's 'Population in the elections of 1925 and
19'29.
Because of the attractive force the Slovaik People's
Party exerted upon the Slova,k population, Prague always
sought to vilify this party by different accusations and
denigrations. One of frequent accusations was that directed
against Andrej Hlinka for having admitted "Magyarones"
into the leading positions of the party. Such allegations
were mostly connected with the name and activity of Vojtech Tuka. This former professor of International Law at
Pees University in Hunga ry had a Hungarian educational
background, but his Slova;k origin has never been doubted.
When Czech authorities refused Tuka as professor for the
"Czechoslavak" Komensky University in Bratislava, in
1920, he became a collaborator of Hlinka and, later, a
deputy of the Slovaik People's Party. In 1929, Tuka was
accused for high treason and on the basis of false testimonies brought against him b,y witnesses who had been
paid by the Czech secret ipolice, he had been sentenced
to 15 years in jail. It must not be focgotten, however, that
in the decisive years, i e., 1938 and 1939, when M. Horthy,
regent of Hungary, did everything possible to get Hitler's
consent to occupy Slovakia, Tuka was one of t'he most ardent promoters of a free Slovak State.
What connections are there 'between Catholicism and
autonomism in Slova:kia? Catholicism is the religion of some
82 percent of t'he entire population; it is the original religion of the country. The first Catholic church was con-

�52

SLOVAKIA

structed in Slovakia in 833. in Nitra, by Prince Pribiina,
i.e., decades earlier than in any other Central European
country. in contradistinction to that, Protestantism, which
now represents about 14 percent of the population in Slovakia, is a Crech and German ideological importation. It
happened that after the White Mountain debacle many
Czech P11otestants settled in Slovakia and, even though
afrter a certain time they adopted the Slovaik language,
they did not rid themselves of the nostalgia for their Czech
origin and their Czech cultural ,b ackground. It is not without interest to quote what BohuJS'lav Tablic (1769-1832),
a prominent Slovak Pr01testant, wrote about that Czech
religious emigration in Slovrukia:
"When in 1620. after that fatal battle on White Mountain, it had come to a large emigration among the Czechs
for religious reasons, more than thirty thousands of these
emigrants, Czechs and Moravians. found refuge in Hitmgary and Poland. They settled in scattered farming groups
among the Slovaks in Nitra county in view of being able to
return easily from there back tio their native country in
order to take care of their derelinquislhed belongings or to
visit their friends, or, the storm of persecution once oveT,
to be able to simply return home witih their whole furnishings. !However, when .t hey lost the ho,pe of returning back
to their fatherland and having in the meantime bought
settlements, lands, and pastures, and other lands, they
. found security under tlie protection of big landowners in
the settlements of Myjava, Vrbo'Ve, Lubina, Stara Tura,
etc" C4l
This is the historical ex,planation of the "Czechoslovak" orientation of many Slovak Protestants, such as Milan
Hodza, Method Bella, Milan Ivanka, Ivan Derer, George
Slavik, Stephen Osusky, John P.apanek, Joseph Lettrich,
Stephen Kocvara, Martin Krvebko, Fedor Hodfa and Samuel Bellus.
It must be stated, however, that not all Slovak Protestants have been or are orientated toward political and
cultural "Czechoslovakism." We can mention the name of
Louis Stur, Charles Kuzmany, Svetozar Hurban Vajan.sky,

�SLOVAKIA

53

Joseph S!kultety, Martin Razus, Emil Stodola, etc., all of
them Slovak Pmtestants who h'ave written brilliant pages
of Slovak national ,h istory. In reminiscences of the Sl()JVak
people they enjo,y the same consideration as any ,g reat Catholic personality.
One reality must be partioularly .stressed in this respect: differences between Catholics and Protestants in
Slovakia have never been of a dogmaiiical or religious
nature. They have their proper explanations in the different origin and cultural background orf the Slov8ik Protestants. The great majority of the Slova:k population thinks,
however, that the Protestant minority did not rightly understand their role in their adoptive country. Sometimes
they dosely approac,h ed the attitude that may easily be
qua:lified as a "double loyalty" and at other times they
were openly active like a sort orf Czech cultural, and in the
last 50 years even Czech political fifth column in Slovakia. There is a general agreement in the democratic world
that the human rights of racial and religious minorities
should be ,protected. But it would be far from po1itical wisdom, if a religious minority. against the general political
evolution of their adoptive country, tried to politically substitute themselves, for the nation whose hosipi.Jtality they
had accepted. One ca:n imagine the reaction of American
Protestllints and Jews, if the Catholic minority in the USA
had sought to convert America into an Irish, Roman, Italian, Spanish or Polish colony.
Conclusion
The Slovak proiblem is what it has always been: an
effort to get rid of the domination of all smaller or bigger
nei,g hbors: Magyars, Czechs, Germans, Russians. Federali'z ation of Europe is necessary, because that is the way
to eliminate feudaHsm in international relations and bring
about democracy there. The SlovaJks are disposed to sacrifice certain of their rights in favor of a European Federation, such as foreign ,policy, defense, economy, but they
are not disposed to sacrifice their fundamental national
rights or their individuality in fiavor of a Central Euro1pean foreign nationalism.

�54

SLOVAKIA

This is in substa:nce the reason why the Slovaks in Slovakia are refusing to recognize the political leadership of
~arel Bacilek, a Czech Communist. This man has been sent
to SlO'Vlakia as Acting Secretary General of the Communist
Party in order to break the resistance of the population
aigainst Prague and Communism. Having hanged Vladimir
Clementis and impri,s oned other Slova;k "deviationists," iiike
Gustav Husak and Laco Novomesky, etc., Prag,ue took over
cont:t1ol of SlovaJkia by a man who had been ·M inister of
State Seourity.
For the same reason the Slovaks in the free world
could never recognize the leadership of some Benes-inspired old Pan-Czech politicians, like Peter Zenkl, Hubert
Ripka, and others. But the Slovaks woufd be delighted to
collaborate as equals with the Czechs who adopt as their
prog_ram the equa:lity of peoples within a Federated Europe.
(1) Quoted in "Juhoamericky Slovak," Buenos Aires, May, 1955.
(2) K. Sidor: T.he Slovaks on the floor of the Prague Parliament,
Bratislav,a, 1943, Vol. 1, 'P- 144.
(3) 1bidem: pp. Hi3-165.
(4) Quoted in: "Hlasove o potfebe jednoty sp!sovneho jazyka
pro Cechy, Moravany, a Slova.ky," Praha, 184-6, p. 102 .

•

•

•

WHO SAID IT?

"I't is am inconltesitialble fact that from 1946 to 1948
there was no demom-a1ey in Czecho-S1avaJki1a. Aflter February 25, 1948, when t'he Communists were no more in want
of the semr:ices of their feJ.il.ow-traveler,s from other NaJtional
Front parties, they reruliized wiith the fuH aid of Dr. Benes
their famous February "coup d'etat" (Dr. Benes remained
president till June 1948). Orre part of the Natioml Front,
led by Clemenlt Gotrbw.a:ld, remained in the country, where ilt
is strn terrom:ng oUT naJ!Jion. Another part, led by Dr.
Zenilcl, went into exiiJ..e, where tt wa'S o r ~ in tlhe sooalled "Council of Flree Ozeohoslova:kia." Both parts are
united by the same "governhlent-program of Kiosice." Today Red Prague a:s well a:s the Council olf Free Ozechoslovalcia are sbill folioweTs of tlhia t program." ('.I1he Czech
"BOHEMIA," Nov. 1952).

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1448">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA

MASARYK'S DEMOCRACY ANH SLOVAKIA
Joseph A. Mikus

An American newspaperman, desiring to know the details about Czecho-.Slorv&lt;akia, put the following questions
to me recently:
1. What does the Pittsburgh Agreement mean to the
Slovaks?
2. What might have been the opinion of M. R. Stefa.
nik albout the status of Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak
State?
3. Did the Slovak deputies in the Prague Parliament
vote for the Constitution of Czecho~Slovaki'a in 1920?
4. Is it true that the autonomist movement never at..,
tained a majority among the voters of Slovakia?
'5. How strong were the "Magya:rones" in the Slovaik
Peop~e's Party?
6. What is the political significance of Catholicism and
Protestantism in Slovakia?
7. What is the present Slorvruk pohtical program?
1

Since these questions are asked morn frequently by
persons interested in the truth a!bout the Czecho~lovakia
of T. G. Masaryik and Dr. Edward Benes, the following
article, I hope, will greatly help to, clear up matters in this
regard.
Before 1918, S~orvakia was an integral part of the
Kingdom of Hungary. For almost a hundred years the
Slova!ks we,r e for a federative reform of Hungary, accord.
ing to the principles of nationalities. Since the Magyars
were shortsighted and did not consent to any such refo:rim,
the Slovruks decided, during the first World War, with the
Czechs on a Czecho-Slovak federation. I.f there is, any lo.
gic in the effort of a man who tries to save himself when
sinking in a pond, it is rather in hi,s will to preserve his
life than in the choice between two ponds that he would
prefer to drown in. The SlovaJks, abandoning Hung,ary and
ag;reeing to the formation orf a Czecho-SllOv•a k State, were
motivated by the idea of preserving and deive1oping their
national individuality. The Pittsburgh Agreement - con-

�46

SLOVAKIA

eluded between the representatives of the Slovak League
of America, on the one side, and the Czech National Alliance and the Federation of the Czech Catholics, on the
other, and signed on May 30, 1918, by T. G. Masaryk as
the representative of the Czecho-Slov,a k National Council - contains precise stipulations in this respect.
The Czecho-Slovak problem, .as developed after HH8,
arose from the subsequent repudiation ,of the PittS1burgh
Agreement 'by Masaryk, as President of Czecho..,Slovakia.
Masaryk did this despite the fact _giat this agreement was
by far a much more important document in the moderp.
history of Czechs and Slovaks ,t han any other one, includ- ,
ing tlie "Czecho-Sfovak" Oonstltubon of 1920. The Pitts ..
burgh Agreement assured moral and political foundations
to the prospective state of Czeeho..,Slovakia. Law cannot
be considered separately from morals and politics. It is
indeed only a formal expression of co-ordination attained
by certain social forces toward a higher end. Undoubted ..
ly, those forces manifested themselves in the Pittsburgh
Agreement.
Masaryk denied the "legal" validity of this document,
but he could not deny it!he fact of having received about a
million dollars from the Sl()JVaJk League of America, which
had been given hlm to finance the activity of the CzechoSlovak National Counicil in Barrs. Without this money
from Americans of Slovak descent, Masaryk and Benes
would have remained somewhere in France as obscure
journalists or poor college-iteachers.
In any deal none of the two contracting parties has
the right arbitrarily to pick up advantages and repudiate o'b'ligatioIIB. Something like that would be doubledealing. To say that the members of the Slovruk League of
America were American citizens and, consequently, did not
have the right to pledge themselves for Slovakia is not
honest. When he signe&lt;l. the Pittsburgh Agreement, Masa..
ryk was a ,political rnfugee acting in contradiction with a
pro-Hapsburig declaration of the Union of Czech writers.
He himself had no delegation from anybody. But the Slovaks have never said that he was an :impostor. Why should,
then, his indirect affirmation 1be accepted that the signa-

�SLOVAKIA

47

tories of the Pittsburgh Agreement on behalf of the Slovak League were nothing else than impostors?
What might have been the attitude of M. R. Stefanik
in regard to the politica;l structure and organization of
Czecho-Slovakia?
It is ,k nown that Stefanik did not sign the Declaration
of Independence of the Czecho-Slovak Nation, as pUlblished
on Octoiber 18, 1918, by Benes in Paris ,and T. G. Masaryk
in Washingiton. At that time Stefanik was outside Europe.
His name was therefore simply written down by Benes who
was pre-supposing Stefanik's consent. Stefanik might have
even admitted the western legal concept of a Czecho-Slovak
nation coo.sis-ting of citizens of various ethnic origins. But
there are sources proving that his concept of unity of the
Czecho-Slovak State did not imply the political and cultural
absoI'ption of the Slovaks by the Czechs.
In 1917, on a trip in the United Stafos, Stefanik gave
an inte1wiew to the purbli-sher of the magazine "Slovenska
mladez" (Slava,k Youth), ·Pittsburgh, Pa. 'l'his interview,
,published in this magazine on November 15, 1917 (No. 7) ,
reproduced the following passage from Stefanik's sta,tement:
"Slovakia has to maintain her cultural and linguistic
character. There is no question about that and on this point
- as well as on the question of autonomy of Slovakia, Moravia, Silesia and Bohemia - there is a complete agreement." (1)
That was in fact a realistic evaluaition of the situation,
contrasting the wishful thinking theories of Masaryk and
Bein.es, and even of such Sloivaiks as Hodza, Derer and Srobar. In 1918, Woodrow Wilson .pronounced in Congress the
following significant words : "Self-determination· is not a
mere phrase. It is an imperative principle which statesmen
will henceforth ignore at their peril."
1

fflE "Czechoslovak" Constitution of 1920
The last paragraph of the Pittsburgh Agreement says :
"Detailed regulations, concerning the establishment of the
Czecho-Slovak State, are left to the liberated Czechs and
Slovaks and their legal representatives." This places the

�48

SLOVAKIA

problem of the legal representation orf S'lovakia in the
Constituent Assembly of Czecho--Slo,yakia in 1918-1920.
This serious problem, h10wever, was, resolved in a very
simple way. The :s elf-ruppointed revolutionary government of
T. G. Masaryk and E. Benes, after ha'Ving returned to
Brague in triumph mrn Paris, appointed a "Revolutionary
Oonistitiuent Parliament of CzechoslO'Vakia." In such a parliament the "deputies" for Slovakia formed the so~called
Slovaik C'lub which at the beginning of 1920 had 54 members. Who were they?
Twelve orf those "Slovak" deputies were Czechs, including Mr. Benes and AJfoe Masaryk, the daughter of the
"·P resident~Libe,r ator." And of the remaining 42 ,Slovaks,
the.re were only 8 autonomist!s . Of course, it would be difficult to find an objective ikey to these figures. But such
was the will of the Praigue Oa;srtle.
At the ,same time Stefanik died in a plane crash under
mysterious circumstances. 1n fact, he was shot down ,
from the sky of Bratislava by a Czech anti ..aircraft battery
as he was returning home from 'I taly. Andrej HTiinka had
been in the Mirov prison since October, 1919, after his
courageous but unsuccessful trip ,t o the Peace Oonference
in Paris, where he tried to defend Slovaili:ia',s .political rights
before the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated
Powers. Slovakia was occupied hy Czech legions and Prague
was threatening the Slova:k People's Party with dis,s o,lution. Strong censorship of the press and a rigid police control of the Slovak P eople's Party gatherings were exeircised by the Prague-imposed Czech authorities in Slov,a kia.
Under terrific pressure, the six Slovak "autonomist" deputies could do nothing but vote for the Constitution, establishing the new State of the Czechs and Slovaks, but at
the same time they delivered a statement in the Parliament
reassuring the Slovruk -public that they would not cease in
their str.uggle for the complete autonomy of Slovakia.
Thus, the "Czechoslorv,a:k" centralistic Constitution is
far from being a result of what in An1erica is known as a
"due democratic process." It was a victory of narrow Czech
nationalism OlVer b,road-minded Slo•v ak federalism .

�SLOVAKIA

49

After this triumph, Prague proceeded to the first elections in Czecho-Slovakia ! When one takes into considera.
tion the conditions under which those elections were organized in Slovakia, there is no su:ripris-e in the fact that the
Slovak People's Party wa:s then placed in minority. The
Czechs opened a full sca:le campaign for their various political 1parties, including the Oommunis.Unfilt,rated SodalDemocratic one. By new catchwords, they attempted to
disorientate Slovak eleeito:ris. Prague spent a lot of money
in this "divide et impera" campaign, controlled the press
by a draconian censorship, and Czech .police and soldier:;
terrorized the population during the electoral campaign
as well as on the day of the elections. In Rumanova, itwo
men were killed iby the police during a political gathering.
Fearful of the official Czech terrorism and trying to
escape a concentrated attack f:mm the side of the Czech
"liberal" parties, Dr. Joseph Buday, who during the imprisonment of Hlin'ka had been the policymlliker of the Slovak People's Party, agreed with the Czech People's Party
of Msgr . J. Sramek to go into elections with hi:s ipar.ty under the common name of the "Czecho-SlovaJk People's Party."
Slovak electors, however, did not understand the meaning
of such an electoral coalition and, therefore, the Slovak
People's Party got only 12 deputi-es, the So.cial Democrats
23, the Agrarians 12, other smaller parties 10 .
In his commentary on the e1ections of April 1920, Dr.
Ferdinand Juriga, on June 10, 1920, speaking for the Slovak People's Party, declared in the Prague Parliament:
"We do not regard the elections of April 18--20 as
a free expression of the Slo•v a;t people. There were involved
in them non-Slovaik soldiers, non-Slo,vak officials, and other
non-Slovak factors. A terrifying censorship, arbitrary im.
prisonment of our people and leaders ,prevent this act from
expressing the free will of our popuilation." (2)
It is significant to note how Czech "democracy" interpreted the principle of equality of citizens by the Law on
Elections. While the Constitution introduced a rigid uni.
fied centralistic system for the whole Republic, the number of vot@ANS~sUBRAA\he election of one deputy was

MILLERSVILLE STATE COLLEGE

�50

SLOVAKIA

fixed at 43,840 in the Czech }ands, at 53,384 in Slovakia,
and at 78,538 in Suhcarpath ian Ruthenia. iin this way the
electoral district of Prague, with around one million population, had 45 deputies in. the first Czecho-Slo vak Parliament, while Subcarpaith ian Rutherua, with a popuilaJtion
of 750,000, had only 9.
The poltitical terrorism exerted against the SlO'Vak
People's Party did not cease after the election:s. On October 10, 1920, while this .p arty held a political gathering in
Namestovo , Czech soldiers shot into the assembly and
killed two peasants. (3)
All this h·a ppened under a Constitutio n which guaranteed, for the consUII11ption of Western scholars, "Czechoslovwk" citizens and all modern human and political rights.
That the Slovak People's Party of Hlinka did nevertheless vote for the election of Masaryk as president can
mean only one thing: the political leadership of Hlinka's
Party held a higher view of the interests of the newly-born
Czecho.-!Slovak State than Mr. Edward Benes, the narrowminded Czech nationaJist, whose political views on Central Europe had, up to that time, never ex.tended beyond
the frontiers of the former Bohemian Kingdom.

Slovakia's Reaction to Prague Centralism: Autonomism
The Czech policy, aiming at the disintegrat ion of the
Slovalk national individuali ty w1thin the new Repu'blic,
awakened the self~preser vation instincts of the Slovaks.
In the elections of 1925, the Slovak People's !Party gained 23
deputies. Since that year until the very end of Czecho~Slovakia that ,party remained not only the relatively ~trongest party in Slovakia, but it managed to rally to its program the absolute majority of the Slovak voters. Here, of
course, nobody could consider as Slovak voters the members of the Magyar and German minorities, and the members of the Communis t ;party, because for these minorities
Czecho·-1Slovakia was a foreign state.
While a good part of the Magyar intelligents ia served
rather the cause of HU!Ilgarian ir,r edenta and Magyar peasants in Slovakia sO!ld their votes for certain economic advantages to the "Czechoslo vak" Agrarian Party. Neither

�SLOVAKIA

51

was it possible to recognize any right of decision about
Slovakia's political destinies to the Communists, who,
preaching a World Proletarian State, were thereby against
any national criterion in politics. Moreover, the Communist Party in Slovakia recruited its voters mostly from
among the minority groups: Magyars, Czechs, Jews, etc.
Thus, taking into considera.tion the electoral returns of
1925, from 58 deputies corresponding to Slovakia, 17 deputies were discounted as non-Slovaik: 10 Magyars, 1 German
and 6 Communists. Out of the remaining 41 deputies, the
22 corresponding to the Slov,a k People's Party is, in fact, a
majority. The same can be said about the political structure of Sl01Vakia's 'Population in the elections of 1925 and
19'29.
Because of the attractive force the Slovaik People's
Party exerted upon the Slova,k population, Prague always
sought to vilify this party by different accusations and
denigrations. One of frequent accusations was that directed
against Andrej Hlinka for having admitted "Magyarones"
into the leading positions of the party. Such allegations
were mostly connected with the name and activity of Vojtech Tuka. This former professor of International Law at
Pees University in Hunga ry had a Hungarian educational
background, but his Slova;k origin has never been doubted.
When Czech authorities refused Tuka as professor for the
"Czechoslavak" Komensky University in Bratislava, in
1920, he became a collaborator of Hlinka and, later, a
deputy of the Slovaik People's Party. In 1929, Tuka was
accused for high treason and on the basis of false testimonies brought against him b,y witnesses who had been
paid by the Czech secret ipolice, he had been sentenced
to 15 years in jail. It must not be focgotten, however, that
in the decisive years, i e., 1938 and 1939, when M. Horthy,
regent of Hungary, did everything possible to get Hitler's
consent to occupy Slovakia, Tuka was one of t'he most ardent promoters of a free Slovak State.
What connections are there 'between Catholicism and
autonomism in Slova:kia? Catholicism is the religion of some
82 percent of t'he entire population; it is the original religion of the country. The first Catholic church was con-

�52

SLOVAKIA

structed in Slovakia in 833. in Nitra, by Prince Pribiina,
i.e., decades earlier than in any other Central European
country. in contradistinction to that, Protestantism, which
now represents about 14 percent of the population in Slovakia, is a Crech and German ideological importation. It
happened that after the White Mountain debacle many
Czech P11otestants settled in Slovakia and, even though
afrter a certain time they adopted the Slovaik language,
they did not rid themselves of the nostalgia for their Czech
origin and their Czech cultural ,b ackground. It is not without interest to quote what BohuJS'lav Tablic (1769-1832),
a prominent Slovak Pr01testant, wrote about that Czech
religious emigration in Slovrukia:
"When in 1620. after that fatal battle on White Mountain, it had come to a large emigration among the Czechs
for religious reasons, more than thirty thousands of these
emigrants, Czechs and Moravians. found refuge in Hitmgary and Poland. They settled in scattered farming groups
among the Slovaks in Nitra county in view of being able to
return easily from there back tio their native country in
order to take care of their derelinquislhed belongings or to
visit their friends, or, the storm of persecution once oveT,
to be able to simply return home witih their whole furnishings. !However, when .t hey lost the ho,pe of returning back
to their fatherland and having in the meantime bought
settlements, lands, and pastures, and other lands, they
. found security under tlie protection of big landowners in
the settlements of Myjava, Vrbo'Ve, Lubina, Stara Tura,
etc" C4l
This is the historical ex,planation of the "Czechoslovak" orientation of many Slovak Protestants, such as Milan
Hodza, Method Bella, Milan Ivanka, Ivan Derer, George
Slavik, Stephen Osusky, John P.apanek, Joseph Lettrich,
Stephen Kocvara, Martin Krvebko, Fedor Hodfa and Samuel Bellus.
It must be stated, however, that not all Slovak Protestants have been or are orientated toward political and
cultural "Czechoslovakism." We can mention the name of
Louis Stur, Charles Kuzmany, Svetozar Hurban Vajan.sky,

�SLOVAKIA

53

Joseph S!kultety, Martin Razus, Emil Stodola, etc., all of
them Slovak Pmtestants who h'ave written brilliant pages
of Slovak national ,h istory. In reminiscences of the Sl()JVak
people they enjo,y the same consideration as any ,g reat Catholic personality.
One reality must be partioularly .stressed in this respect: differences between Catholics and Protestants in
Slovakia have never been of a dogmaiiical or religious
nature. They have their proper explanations in the different origin and cultural background orf the Slov8ik Protestants. The great majority of the Slova:k population thinks,
however, that the Protestant minority did not rightly understand their role in their adoptive country. Sometimes
they dosely approac,h ed the attitude that may easily be
qua:lified as a "double loyalty" and at other times they
were openly active like a sort orf Czech cultural, and in the
last 50 years even Czech political fifth column in Slovakia. There is a general agreement in the democratic world
that the human rights of racial and religious minorities
should be ,protected. But it would be far from po1itical wisdom, if a religious minority. against the general political
evolution of their adoptive country, tried to politically substitute themselves, for the nation whose hosipi.Jtality they
had accepted. One ca:n imagine the reaction of American
Protestllints and Jews, if the Catholic minority in the USA
had sought to convert America into an Irish, Roman, Italian, Spanish or Polish colony.
Conclusion
The Slovak proiblem is what it has always been: an
effort to get rid of the domination of all smaller or bigger
nei,g hbors: Magyars, Czechs, Germans, Russians. Federali'z ation of Europe is necessary, because that is the way
to eliminate feudaHsm in international relations and bring
about democracy there. The SlovaJks are disposed to sacrifice certain of their rights in favor of a European Federation, such as foreign ,policy, defense, economy, but they
are not disposed to sacrifice their fundamental national
rights or their individuality in fiavor of a Central Euro1pean foreign nationalism.

�54

SLOVAKIA

This is in substa:nce the reason why the Slovaks in Slovakia are refusing to recognize the political leadership of
~arel Bacilek, a Czech Communist. This man has been sent
to SlO'Vlakia as Acting Secretary General of the Communist
Party in order to break the resistance of the population
aigainst Prague and Communism. Having hanged Vladimir
Clementis and impri,s oned other Slova;k "deviationists," iiike
Gustav Husak and Laco Novomesky, etc., Prag,ue took over
cont:t1ol of SlovaJkia by a man who had been ·M inister of
State Seourity.
For the same reason the Slovaks in the free world
could never recognize the leadership of some Benes-inspired old Pan-Czech politicians, like Peter Zenkl, Hubert
Ripka, and others. But the Slovaks woufd be delighted to
collaborate as equals with the Czechs who adopt as their
prog_ram the equa:lity of peoples within a Federated Europe.
(1) Quoted in "Juhoamericky Slovak," Buenos Aires, May, 1955.
(2) K. Sidor: T.he Slovaks on the floor of the Prague Parliament,
Bratislav,a, 1943, Vol. 1, 'P- 144.
(3) 1bidem: pp. Hi3-165.
(4) Quoted in: "Hlasove o potfebe jednoty sp!sovneho jazyka
pro Cechy, Moravany, a Slova.ky," Praha, 184-6, p. 102 .

•

•

•

WHO SAID IT?

"I't is am inconltesitialble fact that from 1946 to 1948
there was no demom-a1ey in Czecho-S1avaJki1a. Aflter February 25, 1948, when t'he Communists were no more in want
of the semr:ices of their feJ.il.ow-traveler,s from other NaJtional
Front parties, they reruliized wiith the fuH aid of Dr. Benes
their famous February "coup d'etat" (Dr. Benes remained
president till June 1948). Orre part of the Natioml Front,
led by Clemenlt Gotrbw.a:ld, remained in the country, where ilt
is strn terrom:ng oUT naJ!Jion. Another part, led by Dr.
Zenilcl, went into exiiJ..e, where tt wa'S o r ~ in tlhe sooalled "Council of Flree Ozeohoslova:kia." Both parts are
united by the same "governhlent-program of Kiosice." Today Red Prague a:s well a:s the Council olf Free Ozechoslovalcia are sbill folioweTs of tlhia t program." ('.I1he Czech
"BOHEMIA," Nov. 1952).

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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
MASARYK'S DEMOCRACY ANH SLOVAKIA&#13;
Joseph A. Mikus&#13;
&#13;
An American newspaperman, desiring to know the details about Czecho-.Slorv&lt;akia, put the following questions&#13;
to me recently:&#13;
1. What does the Pittsburgh Agreement mean to the&#13;
Slovaks?&#13;
2. What might have been the opinion of M. R. Stefa.&#13;
nik albout the status of Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak&#13;
State?&#13;
3. Did the Slovak deputies in the Prague Parliament&#13;
vote for the Constitution of Czecho~Slovaki'a in 1920?&#13;
4. Is it true that the autonomist movement never at..,&#13;
tained a majority among the voters of Slovakia?&#13;
'5. How strong were the "Magya:rones" in the Slovaik&#13;
Peop~e's Party?&#13;
6. What is the political significance of Catholicism and&#13;
Protestantism in Slovakia?&#13;
7. What is the present Slorvruk pohtical program?&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
Since these questions are asked morn frequently by&#13;
persons interested in the truth a!bout the Czecho~lovakia&#13;
of T. G. Masaryik and Dr. Edward Benes, the following&#13;
article, I hope, will greatly help to, clear up matters in this&#13;
regard.&#13;
Before 1918, S~orvakia was an integral part of the&#13;
Kingdom of Hungary. For almost a hundred years the&#13;
Slova!ks we,r e for a federative reform of Hungary, accord.&#13;
ing to the principles of nationalities. Since the Magyars&#13;
were shortsighted and did not consent to any such refo:rim,&#13;
the Slovruks decided, during the first World War, with the&#13;
Czechs on a Czecho-Slovak federation. I.f there is, any lo.&#13;
gic in the effort of a man who tries to save himself when&#13;
sinking in a pond, it is rather in hi,s will to preserve his&#13;
life than in the choice between two ponds that he would&#13;
prefer to drown in. The SlovaJks, abandoning Hung,ary and&#13;
ag;reeing to the formation orf a Czecho-SllOv•a k State, were&#13;
motivated by the idea of preserving and deive1oping their&#13;
national individuality. The Pittsburgh Agreement - con-&#13;
&#13;
46&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
eluded between the representatives of the Slovak League&#13;
of America, on the one side, and the Czech National Alliance and the Federation of the Czech Catholics, on the&#13;
other, and signed on May 30, 1918, by T. G. Masaryk as&#13;
the representative of the Czecho-Slov,a k National Council - contains precise stipulations in this respect.&#13;
The Czecho-Slovak problem, .as developed after HH8,&#13;
arose from the subsequent repudiation ,of the PittS1burgh&#13;
Agreement 'by Masaryk, as President of Czecho..,Slovakia.&#13;
Masaryk did this despite the fact _giat this agreement was&#13;
by far a much more important document in the moderp.&#13;
history of Czechs and Slovaks ,t han any other one, includ- ,&#13;
ing tlie "Czecho-Sfovak" Oonstltubon of 1920. The Pitts ..&#13;
burgh Agreement assured moral and political foundations&#13;
to the prospective state of Czeeho..,Slovakia. Law cannot&#13;
be considered separately from morals and politics. It is&#13;
indeed only a formal expression of co-ordination attained&#13;
by certain social forces toward a higher end. Undoubted ..&#13;
ly, those forces manifested themselves in the Pittsburgh&#13;
Agreement.&#13;
Masaryk denied the "legal" validity of this document,&#13;
but he could not deny it!he fact of having received about a&#13;
million dollars from the Sl()JVaJk League of America, which&#13;
had been given hlm to finance the activity of the CzechoSlovak National Counicil in Barrs. Without this money&#13;
from Americans of Slovak descent, Masaryk and Benes&#13;
would have remained somewhere in France as obscure&#13;
journalists or poor college-iteachers.&#13;
In any deal none of the two contracting parties has&#13;
the right arbitrarily to pick up advantages and repudiate o'b'ligatioIIB. Something like that would be doubledealing. To say that the members of the Slovruk League of&#13;
America were American citizens and, consequently, did not&#13;
have the right to pledge themselves for Slovakia is not&#13;
honest. When he signe&lt;l. the Pittsburgh Agreement, Masa..&#13;
ryk was a ,political rnfugee acting in contradiction with a&#13;
pro-Hapsburig declaration of the Union of Czech writers.&#13;
He himself had no delegation from anybody. But the Slovaks have never said that he was an :impostor. Why should,&#13;
then, his indirect affirmation 1be accepted that the signa-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
47&#13;
&#13;
tories of the Pittsburgh Agreement on behalf of the Slovak League were nothing else than impostors?&#13;
What might have been the attitude of M. R. Stefanik&#13;
in regard to the politica;l structure and organization of&#13;
Czecho-Slovakia?&#13;
It is ,k nown that Stefanik did not sign the Declaration&#13;
of Independence of the Czecho-Slovak Nation, as pUlblished&#13;
on Octoiber 18, 1918, by Benes in Paris ,and T. G. Masaryk&#13;
in Washingiton. At that time Stefanik was outside Europe.&#13;
His name was therefore simply written down by Benes who&#13;
was pre-supposing Stefanik's consent. Stefanik might have&#13;
even admitted the western legal concept of a Czecho-Slovak&#13;
nation coo.sis-ting of citizens of various ethnic origins. But&#13;
there are sources proving that his concept of unity of the&#13;
Czecho-Slovak State did not imply the political and cultural&#13;
absoI'ption of the Slovaks by the Czechs.&#13;
In 1917, on a trip in the United Stafos, Stefanik gave&#13;
an inte1wiew to the purbli-sher of the magazine "Slovenska&#13;
mladez" (Slava,k Youth), ·Pittsburgh, Pa. 'l'his interview,&#13;
,published in this magazine on November 15, 1917 (No. 7) ,&#13;
reproduced the following passage from Stefanik's sta,tement:&#13;
"Slovakia has to maintain her cultural and linguistic&#13;
character. There is no question about that and on this point&#13;
- as well as on the question of autonomy of Slovakia, Moravia, Silesia and Bohemia - there is a complete agreement." (1)&#13;
That was in fact a realistic evaluaition of the situation,&#13;
contrasting the wishful thinking theories of Masaryk and&#13;
Bein.es, and even of such Sloivaiks as Hodza, Derer and Srobar. In 1918, Woodrow Wilson .pronounced in Congress the&#13;
following significant words : "Self-determination· is not a&#13;
mere phrase. It is an imperative principle which statesmen&#13;
will henceforth ignore at their peril."&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
fflE "Czechoslovak" Constitution of 1920&#13;
The last paragraph of the Pittsburgh Agreement says :&#13;
"Detailed regulations, concerning the establishment of the&#13;
Czecho-Slovak State, are left to the liberated Czechs and&#13;
Slovaks and their legal representatives." This places the&#13;
&#13;
48&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
problem of the legal representation orf S'lovakia in the&#13;
Constituent Assembly of Czecho--Slo,yakia in 1918-1920.&#13;
This serious problem, h10wever, was, resolved in a very&#13;
simple way. The :s elf-ruppointed revolutionary government of&#13;
T. G. Masaryk and E. Benes, after ha'Ving returned to&#13;
Brague in triumph mrn Paris, appointed a "Revolutionary&#13;
Oonistitiuent Parliament of CzechoslO'Vakia." In such a parliament the "deputies" for Slovakia formed the so~called&#13;
Slovaik C'lub which at the beginning of 1920 had 54 members. Who were they?&#13;
Twelve orf those "Slovak" deputies were Czechs, including Mr. Benes and AJfoe Masaryk, the daughter of the&#13;
"·P resident~Libe,r ator." And of the remaining 42 ,Slovaks,&#13;
the.re were only 8 autonomist!s . Of course, it would be difficult to find an objective ikey to these figures. But such&#13;
was the will of the Praigue Oa;srtle.&#13;
At the ,same time Stefanik died in a plane crash under&#13;
mysterious circumstances. 1n fact, he was shot down ,&#13;
from the sky of Bratislava by a Czech anti ..aircraft battery&#13;
as he was returning home from 'I taly. Andrej HTiinka had&#13;
been in the Mirov prison since October, 1919, after his&#13;
courageous but unsuccessful trip ,t o the Peace Oonference&#13;
in Paris, where he tried to defend Slovaili:ia',s .political rights&#13;
before the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated&#13;
Powers. Slovakia was occupied hy Czech legions and Prague&#13;
was threatening the Slova:k People's Party with dis,s o,lution. Strong censorship of the press and a rigid police control of the Slovak P eople's Party gatherings were exeircised by the Prague-imposed Czech authorities in Slov,a kia.&#13;
Under terrific pressure, the six Slovak "autonomist" deputies could do nothing but vote for the Constitution, establishing the new State of the Czechs and Slovaks, but at&#13;
the same time they delivered a statement in the Parliament&#13;
reassuring the Slovruk -public that they would not cease in&#13;
their str.uggle for the complete autonomy of Slovakia.&#13;
Thus, the "Czechoslorv,a:k" centralistic Constitution is&#13;
far from being a result of what in An1erica is known as a&#13;
"due democratic process." It was a victory of narrow Czech&#13;
nationalism OlVer b,road-minded Slo•v ak federalism .&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
49&#13;
&#13;
After this triumph, Prague proceeded to the first elections in Czecho-Slovakia ! When one takes into considera.&#13;
tion the conditions under which those elections were organized in Slovakia, there is no su:ripris-e in the fact that the&#13;
Slovak People's Party wa:s then placed in minority. The&#13;
Czechs opened a full sca:le campaign for their various political 1parties, including the Oommunis.Unfilt,rated SodalDemocratic one. By new catchwords, they attempted to&#13;
disorientate Slovak eleeito:ris. Prague spent a lot of money&#13;
in this "divide et impera" campaign, controlled the press&#13;
by a draconian censorship, and Czech .police and soldier:;&#13;
terrorized the population during the electoral campaign&#13;
as well as on the day of the elections. In Rumanova, itwo&#13;
men were killed iby the police during a political gathering.&#13;
Fearful of the official Czech terrorism and trying to&#13;
escape a concentrated attack f:mm the side of the Czech&#13;
"liberal" parties, Dr. Joseph Buday, who during the imprisonment of Hlin'ka had been the policymlliker of the Slovak People's Party, agreed with the Czech People's Party&#13;
of Msgr . J. Sramek to go into elections with hi:s ipar.ty under the common name of the "Czecho-SlovaJk People's Party."&#13;
Slovak electors, however, did not understand the meaning&#13;
of such an electoral coalition and, therefore, the Slovak&#13;
People's Party got only 12 deputi-es, the So.cial Democrats&#13;
23, the Agrarians 12, other smaller parties 10 .&#13;
In his commentary on the e1ections of April 1920, Dr.&#13;
Ferdinand Juriga, on June 10, 1920, speaking for the Slovak People's Party, declared in the Prague Parliament:&#13;
"We do not regard the elections of April 18--20 as&#13;
a free expression of the Slo•v a;t people. There were involved&#13;
in them non-Slovaik soldiers, non-Slo,vak officials, and other&#13;
non-Slovak factors. A terrifying censorship, arbitrary im.&#13;
prisonment of our people and leaders ,prevent this act from&#13;
expressing the free will of our popuilation." (2)&#13;
It is significant to note how Czech "democracy" interpreted the principle of equality of citizens by the Law on&#13;
Elections. While the Constitution introduced a rigid uni.&#13;
fied centralistic system for the whole Republic, the number of vot@ANS~sUBRAA\he election of one deputy was&#13;
&#13;
MILLERSVILLE STATE COLLEGE&#13;
&#13;
50&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
fixed at 43,840 in the Czech }ands, at 53,384 in Slovakia,&#13;
and at 78,538 in Suhcarpath ian Ruthenia. iin this way the&#13;
electoral district of Prague, with around one million population, had 45 deputies in. the first Czecho-Slo vak Parliament, while Subcarpaith ian Rutherua, with a popuilaJtion&#13;
of 750,000, had only 9.&#13;
The poltitical terrorism exerted against the SlO'Vak&#13;
People's Party did not cease after the election:s. On October 10, 1920, while this .p arty held a political gathering in&#13;
Namestovo , Czech soldiers shot into the assembly and&#13;
killed two peasants. (3)&#13;
All this h·a ppened under a Constitutio n which guaranteed, for the consUII11ption of Western scholars, "Czechoslovwk" citizens and all modern human and political rights.&#13;
That the Slovak People's Party of Hlinka did nevertheless vote for the election of Masaryk as president can&#13;
mean only one thing: the political leadership of Hlinka's&#13;
Party held a higher view of the interests of the newly-born&#13;
Czecho.-!Slovak State than Mr. Edward Benes, the narrowminded Czech nationaJist, whose political views on Central Europe had, up to that time, never ex.tended beyond&#13;
the frontiers of the former Bohemian Kingdom.&#13;
&#13;
Slovakia's Reaction to Prague Centralism: Autonomism&#13;
The Czech policy, aiming at the disintegrat ion of the&#13;
Slovalk national individuali ty w1thin the new Repu'blic,&#13;
awakened the self~preser vation instincts of the Slovaks.&#13;
In the elections of 1925, the Slovak People's !Party gained 23&#13;
deputies. Since that year until the very end of Czecho~Slovakia that ,party remained not only the relatively ~trongest party in Slovakia, but it managed to rally to its program the absolute majority of the Slovak voters. Here, of&#13;
course, nobody could consider as Slovak voters the members of the Magyar and German minorities, and the members of the Communis t ;party, because for these minorities&#13;
Czecho·-1Slovakia was a foreign state.&#13;
While a good part of the Magyar intelligents ia served&#13;
rather the cause of HU!Ilgarian ir,r edenta and Magyar peasants in Slovakia sO!ld their votes for certain economic advantages to the "Czechoslo vak" Agrarian Party. Neither&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
51&#13;
&#13;
was it possible to recognize any right of decision about&#13;
Slovakia's political destinies to the Communists, who,&#13;
preaching a World Proletarian State, were thereby against&#13;
any national criterion in politics. Moreover, the Communist Party in Slovakia recruited its voters mostly from&#13;
among the minority groups: Magyars, Czechs, Jews, etc.&#13;
Thus, taking into considera.tion the electoral returns of&#13;
1925, from 58 deputies corresponding to Slovakia, 17 deputies were discounted as non-Slovaik: 10 Magyars, 1 German&#13;
and 6 Communists. Out of the remaining 41 deputies, the&#13;
22 corresponding to the Slov,a k People's Party is, in fact, a&#13;
majority. The same can be said about the political structure of Sl01Vakia's 'Population in the elections of 1925 and&#13;
19'29.&#13;
Because of the attractive force the Slovaik People's&#13;
Party exerted upon the Slova,k population, Prague always&#13;
sought to vilify this party by different accusations and&#13;
denigrations. One of frequent accusations was that directed&#13;
against Andrej Hlinka for having admitted "Magyarones"&#13;
into the leading positions of the party. Such allegations&#13;
were mostly connected with the name and activity of Vojtech Tuka. This former professor of International Law at&#13;
Pees University in Hunga ry had a Hungarian educational&#13;
background, but his Slova;k origin has never been doubted.&#13;
When Czech authorities refused Tuka as professor for the&#13;
"Czechoslavak" Komensky University in Bratislava, in&#13;
1920, he became a collaborator of Hlinka and, later, a&#13;
deputy of the Slovaik People's Party. In 1929, Tuka was&#13;
accused for high treason and on the basis of false testimonies brought against him b,y witnesses who had been&#13;
paid by the Czech secret ipolice, he had been sentenced&#13;
to 15 years in jail. It must not be focgotten, however, that&#13;
in the decisive years, i e., 1938 and 1939, when M. Horthy,&#13;
regent of Hungary, did everything possible to get Hitler's&#13;
consent to occupy Slovakia, Tuka was one of t'he most ardent promoters of a free Slovak State.&#13;
What connections are there 'between Catholicism and&#13;
autonomism in Slova:kia? Catholicism is the religion of some&#13;
82 percent of t'he entire population; it is the original religion of the country. The first Catholic church was con-&#13;
&#13;
52&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
structed in Slovakia in 833. in Nitra, by Prince Pribiina,&#13;
i.e., decades earlier than in any other Central European&#13;
country. in contradistinction to that, Protestantism, which&#13;
now represents about 14 percent of the population in Slovakia, is a Crech and German ideological importation. It&#13;
happened that after the White Mountain debacle many&#13;
Czech P11otestants settled in Slovakia and, even though&#13;
afrter a certain time they adopted the Slovaik language,&#13;
they did not rid themselves of the nostalgia for their Czech&#13;
origin and their Czech cultural ,b ackground. It is not without interest to quote what BohuJS'lav Tablic (1769-1832),&#13;
a prominent Slovak Pr01testant, wrote about that Czech&#13;
religious emigration in Slovrukia:&#13;
"When in 1620. after that fatal battle on White Mountain, it had come to a large emigration among the Czechs&#13;
for religious reasons, more than thirty thousands of these&#13;
emigrants, Czechs and Moravians. found refuge in Hitmgary and Poland. They settled in scattered farming groups&#13;
among the Slovaks in Nitra county in view of being able to&#13;
return easily from there back tio their native country in&#13;
order to take care of their derelinquislhed belongings or to&#13;
visit their friends, or, the storm of persecution once oveT,&#13;
to be able to simply return home witih their whole furnishings. !However, when .t hey lost the ho,pe of returning back&#13;
to their fatherland and having in the meantime bought&#13;
settlements, lands, and pastures, and other lands, they&#13;
. found security under tlie protection of big landowners in&#13;
the settlements of Myjava, Vrbo'Ve, Lubina, Stara Tura,&#13;
etc" C4l&#13;
This is the historical ex,planation of the "Czechoslovak" orientation of many Slovak Protestants, such as Milan&#13;
Hodza, Method Bella, Milan Ivanka, Ivan Derer, George&#13;
Slavik, Stephen Osusky, John P.apanek, Joseph Lettrich,&#13;
Stephen Kocvara, Martin Krvebko, Fedor Hodfa and Samuel Bellus.&#13;
It must be stated, however, that not all Slovak Protestants have been or are orientated toward political and&#13;
cultural "Czechoslovakism." We can mention the name of&#13;
Louis Stur, Charles Kuzmany, Svetozar Hurban Vajan.sky,&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
53&#13;
&#13;
Joseph S!kultety, Martin Razus, Emil Stodola, etc., all of&#13;
them Slovak Pmtestants who h'ave written brilliant pages&#13;
of Slovak national ,h istory. In reminiscences of the Sl()JVak&#13;
people they enjo,y the same consideration as any ,g reat Catholic personality.&#13;
One reality must be partioularly .stressed in this respect: differences between Catholics and Protestants in&#13;
Slovakia have never been of a dogmaiiical or religious&#13;
nature. They have their proper explanations in the different origin and cultural background orf the Slov8ik Protestants. The great majority of the Slova:k population thinks,&#13;
however, that the Protestant minority did not rightly understand their role in their adoptive country. Sometimes&#13;
they dosely approac,h ed the attitude that may easily be&#13;
qua:lified as a "double loyalty" and at other times they&#13;
were openly active like a sort orf Czech cultural, and in the&#13;
last 50 years even Czech political fifth column in Slovakia. There is a general agreement in the democratic world&#13;
that the human rights of racial and religious minorities&#13;
should be ,protected. But it would be far from po1itical wisdom, if a religious minority. against the general political&#13;
evolution of their adoptive country, tried to politically substitute themselves, for the nation whose hosipi.Jtality they&#13;
had accepted. One ca:n imagine the reaction of American&#13;
Protestllints and Jews, if the Catholic minority in the USA&#13;
had sought to convert America into an Irish, Roman, Italian, Spanish or Polish colony.&#13;
Conclusion&#13;
The Slovak proiblem is what it has always been: an&#13;
effort to get rid of the domination of all smaller or bigger&#13;
nei,g hbors: Magyars, Czechs, Germans, Russians. Federali'z ation of Europe is necessary, because that is the way&#13;
to eliminate feudaHsm in international relations and bring&#13;
about democracy there. The SlovaJks are disposed to sacrifice certain of their rights in favor of a European Federation, such as foreign ,policy, defense, economy, but they&#13;
are not disposed to sacrifice their fundamental national&#13;
rights or their individuality in fiavor of a Central Euro1pean foreign nationalism.&#13;
&#13;
54&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
This is in substa:nce the reason why the Slovaks in Slovakia are refusing to recognize the political leadership of&#13;
~arel Bacilek, a Czech Communist. This man has been sent&#13;
to SlO'Vlakia as Acting Secretary General of the Communist&#13;
Party in order to break the resistance of the population&#13;
aigainst Prague and Communism. Having hanged Vladimir&#13;
Clementis and impri,s oned other Slova;k "deviationists," iiike&#13;
Gustav Husak and Laco Novomesky, etc., Prag,ue took over&#13;
cont:t1ol of SlovaJkia by a man who had been ·M inister of&#13;
State Seourity.&#13;
For the same reason the Slovaks in the free world&#13;
could never recognize the leadership of some Benes-inspired old Pan-Czech politicians, like Peter Zenkl, Hubert&#13;
Ripka, and others. But the Slovaks woufd be delighted to&#13;
collaborate as equals with the Czechs who adopt as their&#13;
prog_ram the equa:lity of peoples within a Federated Europe.&#13;
(1) Quoted in "Juhoamericky Slovak," Buenos Aires, May, 1955.&#13;
(2) K. Sidor: T.he Slovaks on the floor of the Prague Parliament,&#13;
Bratislav,a, 1943, Vol. 1, 'P- 144.&#13;
(3) 1bidem: pp. Hi3-165.&#13;
(4) Quoted in: "Hlasove o potfebe jednoty sp!sovneho jazyka&#13;
pro Cechy, Moravany, a Slova.ky," Praha, 184-6, p. 102 .&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
WHO SAID IT?&#13;
&#13;
"I't is am inconltesitialble fact that from 1946 to 1948&#13;
there was no demom-a1ey in Czecho-S1avaJki1a. Aflter February 25, 1948, when t'he Communists were no more in want&#13;
of the semr:ices of their feJ.il.ow-traveler,s from other NaJtional&#13;
Front parties, they reruliized wiith the fuH aid of Dr. Benes&#13;
their famous February "coup d'etat" (Dr. Benes remained&#13;
president till June 1948). Orre part of the Natioml Front,&#13;
led by Clemenlt Gotrbw.a:ld, remained in the country, where ilt&#13;
is strn terrom:ng oUT naJ!Jion. Another part, led by Dr.&#13;
Zenilcl, went into exiiJ..e, where tt wa'S o r ~ in tlhe sooalled "Council of Flree Ozeohoslova:kia." Both parts are&#13;
united by the same "governhlent-program of Kiosice." Today Red Prague a:s well a:s the Council olf Free Ozechoslovalcia are sbill folioweTs of tlhia t program." ('.I1he Czech&#13;
"BOHEMIA," Nov. 1952).&#13;
&#13;
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                <text>Joseph A. Mikuš&#13;
Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956&#13;
pp. 45-54</text>
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

55

MEMORANDUM
TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OF TID~
UNITED STATES FROM THE PITTSBURGH-JOHNSTOWN, PA. REGIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA, SLOVAK BAND HALL,
JOHNSTOWN, PA., NOVEMBER 3, 1956

Assembled in the Slovak Band Hall, in the interest of
the welfare and security of our America and the rest of the
free world, we solemnly declare that:
1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the
basic principles set forth in the American Declaration of
Independence and of the basic law of our country, the Constitution of the United States of America.
2. We condemn all forms of tyranny, every form orf totalitarian political system. We recognize the godless philosophy of materialistic communism as the greatest conspiracy against free humanity, as a political system which
threatens all of mankind with utter enslavement. Therefore
we cannot subscribe to the policy that doing business with
the Soviet Union and its satellites is in the best interests
of the welfare and security of the United States and the
rest of the free world.
We commend our Government for its efforts to resist
and to resolutely count~ract the aggressive policies of Soviet imperialism with all the spiritual and material forces at
our command and heartily endorse all actions of our Government to expose, demobilize, and outlaw the evil forces
of brutal godless Communism in our country - the forces
that are dedicated to our destruction.
3. We strongly denounce the intervention of the Soviet
Union in the internal affairs of Poland and Hungary, as
well as other countries of Europe and Asia. We express our
deepest sympathy with the peoples of Hungary and Poland
and urge our Government to denounce in the strongest
terms the massacre of these liberty-loving and liberty-seeking peoples, immediately initiating all steps that may be
taken by our Government to end the brutal treatment and
repression of the Polish and Hungarian nations.

�56

SLOVAKIA

4. We oppose the admission of Red China into the
United Nations. We fully endorse the principle that our
Government shall refuse to recogmze every form of government and political formation which is imposed on any
nation by the force of an alien power and we respectfully
request that this policy be followed even in the case of the
nation we are descended from, the Slovak nation, which is
tyrannized by the Czecho-Comm unist regime of Prague
in flagrant violation of the political will of the Slovak
people and of the fundamental principles of the Charter
of the United Nations and in utter contempt for the basic
principle of the American foreign policy of self-determina tion.
Once again, we respectfully request the President and
the Congress of the United States to re-examine the question of the destruction of the Slovak Republic in 1945, because we are certain that the political will of the Slovak
nation was violated. We also respectfully request our President to instruct our delegate to the United Nations to ask
for an investigation by the U. N. of the destruction of the
Slovak State in 1945, the independence of which was pro_
claimed by the duly elected representative s of the Slovak
people on March 14, 1939, and eventually reco,g nized by
twenty-seven countries.
5. We deeply resent the fact that our Government is
inclined to recognize and favor former Slovak and Czech
politicians who are in a large measure responsible for the
present terrible plight of the Slovaks and the Czechs. We
refer particularly to the politicians who promoted the proSoviet and anti-Slovak policies of the late Dr. Edward Benes - the Czech Socialists and Judas Slovaks, now organized in the so-called "Council of Free Czechoslovakia,·,
who collaborated with Moscow and the Communists until
1948 as members of the Communist-do minated National
Front Government of the Benes-Gottwa ld coalition.
We respectfully request the President and the Congress of the United States to re-examine the so-called
"Czechoslovak" policy of our Government, which is still
based on the information and actions of Dr. Edward Benes

�SLOVAKIA

57

and other Czech Socialists. It is embarrassing to us, as it
also should be to our Government, that the members of
Benes's pro-Soviet political clique are employed by various
departments and agencies of our Government. They have
compromised the good name of the United States entirely
too long and, therefore, should no longer enjoy our trust
and favor.
The Slovak League of America, with the organizations
affiliated with it, has expressed itself in the past more
than once on the subject of U. S. policy in regard to Czecho-Slovakia, and especially in regard to the Slovak nation, but little or nothing has been done to correct the situation. Representing the vast majority of organized Americans of Slovak descent, the Slovak League of America feels
that it has the right and the obligation to speak for them
in matters of general and particular concern, both domestic and foreign. As loyal Americans, we are not, we trust.
overly presumptuous in assuming that we merit at least
the same measure of consideration and trust from our Government as the bankrupt, pro-Soviet political entourage of
Dr. Edward Benes, which suddenly became "anti-Communist and democratic" after February, 1948. when the
Communists, with their collaboration, seized all power in
Czecho-Slovakia.
6. We stand opposed to the concept that the power
and size of the federal government of the United States
should be increased to the detriment of the powers of the
individual States of the Union. We, therefore, respectfully
request the adoption of the recommendations of the Hoover
Commission as speedily as possible.
7. Furthermore, we respectfully request the President
and the Congress of the United States to promote legislation to decrease federal taxes, particularly the income tax
and withholding tax laws during the next session of Congress, because we belie'Ve this can be done without endangering the welfare and security of our country.
8. Finally, we recommend the President of the United
States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, for his stand on the crisis
in the Middle East to oppose and condemn all aggressors
and violators of others natural rights

�58

SLOVAKIA

Adopted unanimously this third day of November
1956, by the Conference of the Pittsburgh-Johnstown,
Pa. Region of the Slovak League of America, Slovak Band
Hall, Johnstown, Pa.
For the Conference :
PHILIP A. HROBAK. President
Slovak League of America.
ELIZABETH ANDREJKO, Chairlady
of Conference and president of Johnstown Assembly S. L. A.
MICHAEL BERES, Chairman
Pittsburgh District S. L. A.

•

• •

WHO SAID IT?

"Never in his,tory was Russia so mighty, illever were
the forces of socia1isrrn so colossally foi,ged together. This
is a new historical epoch. N e,v ertheless some pecxple think
in a stiClk-in-the-mud fashion. It has not yet been possible
to convince everyone cxf the necessity for the orverthrow of
crupitalism." - (Ferdinand Peroutka, a Benes Czech, in his
book TAK NEBO TAK, 1947, pg. 8).

• • •

"The gossip that the Democratic Party is not fur cooperation with the Soviet Union is wtroI11g. rt is clear to
every Slovak, regardless oif his polftica'1 and religio;us beliefs,
that the existence of the Czechoslovak Reipulblic is 100 per
cent dependent on the e~stence and the .p ower cxf our
strongest Slavic ally. This a1lli.ance cannot be regarded as a
matter of onJ.y feeHng graciorus for erverything the Soviet
Union has done for us. It is, a matter oif rationa:1 thinking
and of our unaJteraJble foreign policy." - (Dr. Joseph Let.
trich, Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee cxf the
"Council of Free Czechoslovakia," NOV:E PRUDY, No.
28-29, 1947, pg. 658).

• • •

"Let us declare war against the fear oif Bolshevism and
forbid at the same time, the for.mation of any anti-COlln-

(Va;olav Majer, PRAVO
mlIDist f:ront whatsoever." LIDU, officirul organ orf the O;ech Sooi!al Demooratic Party,
Novemlber 25, 1947)

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1441">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA

55

MEMORANDUM
TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OF TID~
UNITED STATES FROM THE PITTSBURGH-JOHNSTOWN, PA. REGIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA, SLOVAK BAND HALL,
JOHNSTOWN, PA., NOVEMBER 3, 1956

Assembled in the Slovak Band Hall, in the interest of
the welfare and security of our America and the rest of the
free world, we solemnly declare that:
1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the
basic principles set forth in the American Declaration of
Independence and of the basic law of our country, the Constitution of the United States of America.
2. We condemn all forms of tyranny, every form orf totalitarian political system. We recognize the godless philosophy of materialistic communism as the greatest conspiracy against free humanity, as a political system which
threatens all of mankind with utter enslavement. Therefore
we cannot subscribe to the policy that doing business with
the Soviet Union and its satellites is in the best interests
of the welfare and security of the United States and the
rest of the free world.
We commend our Government for its efforts to resist
and to resolutely count~ract the aggressive policies of Soviet imperialism with all the spiritual and material forces at
our command and heartily endorse all actions of our Government to expose, demobilize, and outlaw the evil forces
of brutal godless Communism in our country - the forces
that are dedicated to our destruction.
3. We strongly denounce the intervention of the Soviet
Union in the internal affairs of Poland and Hungary, as
well as other countries of Europe and Asia. We express our
deepest sympathy with the peoples of Hungary and Poland
and urge our Government to denounce in the strongest
terms the massacre of these liberty-loving and liberty-seeking peoples, immediately initiating all steps that may be
taken by our Government to end the brutal treatment and
repression of the Polish and Hungarian nations.

�56

SLOVAKIA

4. We oppose the admission of Red China into the
United Nations. We fully endorse the principle that our
Government shall refuse to recogmze every form of government and political formation which is imposed on any
nation by the force of an alien power and we respectfully
request that this policy be followed even in the case of the
nation we are descended from, the Slovak nation, which is
tyrannized by the Czecho-Comm unist regime of Prague
in flagrant violation of the political will of the Slovak
people and of the fundamental principles of the Charter
of the United Nations and in utter contempt for the basic
principle of the American foreign policy of self-determina tion.
Once again, we respectfully request the President and
the Congress of the United States to re-examine the question of the destruction of the Slovak Republic in 1945, because we are certain that the political will of the Slovak
nation was violated. We also respectfully request our President to instruct our delegate to the United Nations to ask
for an investigation by the U. N. of the destruction of the
Slovak State in 1945, the independence of which was pro_
claimed by the duly elected representative s of the Slovak
people on March 14, 1939, and eventually reco,g nized by
twenty-seven countries.
5. We deeply resent the fact that our Government is
inclined to recognize and favor former Slovak and Czech
politicians who are in a large measure responsible for the
present terrible plight of the Slovaks and the Czechs. We
refer particularly to the politicians who promoted the proSoviet and anti-Slovak policies of the late Dr. Edward Benes - the Czech Socialists and Judas Slovaks, now organized in the so-called "Council of Free Czechoslovakia,·,
who collaborated with Moscow and the Communists until
1948 as members of the Communist-do minated National
Front Government of the Benes-Gottwa ld coalition.
We respectfully request the President and the Congress of the United States to re-examine the so-called
"Czechoslovak" policy of our Government, which is still
based on the information and actions of Dr. Edward Benes

�SLOVAKIA

57

and other Czech Socialists. It is embarrassing to us, as it
also should be to our Government, that the members of
Benes's pro-Soviet political clique are employed by various
departments and agencies of our Government. They have
compromised the good name of the United States entirely
too long and, therefore, should no longer enjoy our trust
and favor.
The Slovak League of America, with the organizations
affiliated with it, has expressed itself in the past more
than once on the subject of U. S. policy in regard to Czecho-Slovakia, and especially in regard to the Slovak nation, but little or nothing has been done to correct the situation. Representing the vast majority of organized Americans of Slovak descent, the Slovak League of America feels
that it has the right and the obligation to speak for them
in matters of general and particular concern, both domestic and foreign. As loyal Americans, we are not, we trust.
overly presumptuous in assuming that we merit at least
the same measure of consideration and trust from our Government as the bankrupt, pro-Soviet political entourage of
Dr. Edward Benes, which suddenly became "anti-Communist and democratic" after February, 1948. when the
Communists, with their collaboration, seized all power in
Czecho-Slovakia.
6. We stand opposed to the concept that the power
and size of the federal government of the United States
should be increased to the detriment of the powers of the
individual States of the Union. We, therefore, respectfully
request the adoption of the recommendations of the Hoover
Commission as speedily as possible.
7. Furthermore, we respectfully request the President
and the Congress of the United States to promote legislation to decrease federal taxes, particularly the income tax
and withholding tax laws during the next session of Congress, because we belie'Ve this can be done without endangering the welfare and security of our country.
8. Finally, we recommend the President of the United
States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, for his stand on the crisis
in the Middle East to oppose and condemn all aggressors
and violators of others natural rights

�58

SLOVAKIA

Adopted unanimously this third day of November
1956, by the Conference of the Pittsburgh-Johnstown,
Pa. Region of the Slovak League of America, Slovak Band
Hall, Johnstown, Pa.
For the Conference :
PHILIP A. HROBAK. President
Slovak League of America.
ELIZABETH ANDREJKO, Chairlady
of Conference and president of Johnstown Assembly S. L. A.
MICHAEL BERES, Chairman
Pittsburgh District S. L. A.

•

• •

WHO SAID IT?

"Never in his,tory was Russia so mighty, illever were
the forces of socia1isrrn so colossally foi,ged together. This
is a new historical epoch. N e,v ertheless some pecxple think
in a stiClk-in-the-mud fashion. It has not yet been possible
to convince everyone cxf the necessity for the orverthrow of
crupitalism." - (Ferdinand Peroutka, a Benes Czech, in his
book TAK NEBO TAK, 1947, pg. 8).

• • •

"The gossip that the Democratic Party is not fur cooperation with the Soviet Union is wtroI11g. rt is clear to
every Slovak, regardless oif his polftica'1 and religio;us beliefs,
that the existence of the Czechoslovak Reipulblic is 100 per
cent dependent on the e~stence and the .p ower cxf our
strongest Slavic ally. This a1lli.ance cannot be regarded as a
matter of onJ.y feeHng graciorus for erverything the Soviet
Union has done for us. It is, a matter oif rationa:1 thinking
and of our unaJteraJble foreign policy." - (Dr. Joseph Let.
trich, Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee cxf the
"Council of Free Czechoslovakia," NOV:E PRUDY, No.
28-29, 1947, pg. 658).

• • •

"Let us declare war against the fear oif Bolshevism and
forbid at the same time, the for.mation of any anti-COlln-

(Va;olav Majer, PRAVO
mlIDist f:ront whatsoever." LIDU, officirul organ orf the O;ech Sooi!al Demooratic Party,
Novemlber 25, 1947)

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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
55&#13;
&#13;
MEMORANDUM&#13;
TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OF TID~&#13;
UNITED STATES FROM THE PITTSBURGH-JOHNSTOWN, PA. REGIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA, SLOVAK BAND HALL,&#13;
JOHNSTOWN, PA., NOVEMBER 3, 1956&#13;
&#13;
Assembled in the Slovak Band Hall, in the interest of&#13;
the welfare and security of our America and the rest of the&#13;
free world, we solemnly declare that:&#13;
1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the&#13;
basic principles set forth in the American Declaration of&#13;
Independence and of the basic law of our country, the Constitution of the United States of America.&#13;
2. We condemn all forms of tyranny, every form orf totalitarian political system. We recognize the godless philosophy of materialistic communism as the greatest conspiracy against free humanity, as a political system which&#13;
threatens all of mankind with utter enslavement. Therefore&#13;
we cannot subscribe to the policy that doing business with&#13;
the Soviet Union and its satellites is in the best interests&#13;
of the welfare and security of the United States and the&#13;
rest of the free world.&#13;
We commend our Government for its efforts to resist&#13;
and to resolutely count~ract the aggressive policies of Soviet imperialism with all the spiritual and material forces at&#13;
our command and heartily endorse all actions of our Government to expose, demobilize, and outlaw the evil forces&#13;
of brutal godless Communism in our country - the forces&#13;
that are dedicated to our destruction.&#13;
3. We strongly denounce the intervention of the Soviet&#13;
Union in the internal affairs of Poland and Hungary, as&#13;
well as other countries of Europe and Asia. We express our&#13;
deepest sympathy with the peoples of Hungary and Poland&#13;
and urge our Government to denounce in the strongest&#13;
terms the massacre of these liberty-loving and liberty-seeking peoples, immediately initiating all steps that may be&#13;
taken by our Government to end the brutal treatment and&#13;
repression of the Polish and Hungarian nations.&#13;
&#13;
56&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
4. We oppose the admission of Red China into the&#13;
United Nations. We fully endorse the principle that our&#13;
Government shall refuse to recogmze every form of government and political formation which is imposed on any&#13;
nation by the force of an alien power and we respectfully&#13;
request that this policy be followed even in the case of the&#13;
nation we are descended from, the Slovak nation, which is&#13;
tyrannized by the Czecho-Comm unist regime of Prague&#13;
in flagrant violation of the political will of the Slovak&#13;
people and of the fundamental principles of the Charter&#13;
of the United Nations and in utter contempt for the basic&#13;
principle of the American foreign policy of self-determina tion.&#13;
Once again, we respectfully request the President and&#13;
the Congress of the United States to re-examine the question of the destruction of the Slovak Republic in 1945, because we are certain that the political will of the Slovak&#13;
nation was violated. We also respectfully request our President to instruct our delegate to the United Nations to ask&#13;
for an investigation by the U. N. of the destruction of the&#13;
Slovak State in 1945, the independence of which was pro_&#13;
claimed by the duly elected representative s of the Slovak&#13;
people on March 14, 1939, and eventually reco,g nized by&#13;
twenty-seven countries.&#13;
5. We deeply resent the fact that our Government is&#13;
inclined to recognize and favor former Slovak and Czech&#13;
politicians who are in a large measure responsible for the&#13;
present terrible plight of the Slovaks and the Czechs. We&#13;
refer particularly to the politicians who promoted the proSoviet and anti-Slovak policies of the late Dr. Edward Benes - the Czech Socialists and Judas Slovaks, now organized in the so-called "Council of Free Czechoslovakia,·,&#13;
who collaborated with Moscow and the Communists until&#13;
1948 as members of the Communist-do minated National&#13;
Front Government of the Benes-Gottwa ld coalition.&#13;
We respectfully request the President and the Congress of the United States to re-examine the so-called&#13;
"Czechoslovak" policy of our Government, which is still&#13;
based on the information and actions of Dr. Edward Benes&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
57&#13;
&#13;
and other Czech Socialists. It is embarrassing to us, as it&#13;
also should be to our Government, that the members of&#13;
Benes's pro-Soviet political clique are employed by various&#13;
departments and agencies of our Government. They have&#13;
compromised the good name of the United States entirely&#13;
too long and, therefore, should no longer enjoy our trust&#13;
and favor.&#13;
The Slovak League of America, with the organizations&#13;
affiliated with it, has expressed itself in the past more&#13;
than once on the subject of U. S. policy in regard to Czecho-Slovakia, and especially in regard to the Slovak nation, but little or nothing has been done to correct the situation. Representing the vast majority of organized Americans of Slovak descent, the Slovak League of America feels&#13;
that it has the right and the obligation to speak for them&#13;
in matters of general and particular concern, both domestic and foreign. As loyal Americans, we are not, we trust.&#13;
overly presumptuous in assuming that we merit at least&#13;
the same measure of consideration and trust from our Government as the bankrupt, pro-Soviet political entourage of&#13;
Dr. Edward Benes, which suddenly became "anti-Communist and democratic" after February, 1948. when the&#13;
Communists, with their collaboration, seized all power in&#13;
Czecho-Slovakia.&#13;
6. We stand opposed to the concept that the power&#13;
and size of the federal government of the United States&#13;
should be increased to the detriment of the powers of the&#13;
individual States of the Union. We, therefore, respectfully&#13;
request the adoption of the recommendations of the Hoover&#13;
Commission as speedily as possible.&#13;
7. Furthermore, we respectfully request the President&#13;
and the Congress of the United States to promote legislation to decrease federal taxes, particularly the income tax&#13;
and withholding tax laws during the next session of Congress, because we belie'Ve this can be done without endangering the welfare and security of our country.&#13;
8. Finally, we recommend the President of the United&#13;
States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, for his stand on the crisis&#13;
in the Middle East to oppose and condemn all aggressors&#13;
and violators of others natural rights&#13;
&#13;
58&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Adopted unanimously this third day of November&#13;
1956, by the Conference of the Pittsburgh-Johnstown,&#13;
Pa. Region of the Slovak League of America, Slovak Band&#13;
Hall, Johnstown, Pa.&#13;
For the Conference :&#13;
PHILIP A. HROBAK. President&#13;
Slovak League of America.&#13;
ELIZABETH ANDREJKO, Chairlady&#13;
of Conference and president of Johnstown Assembly S. L. A.&#13;
MICHAEL BERES, Chairman&#13;
Pittsburgh District S. L. A.&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
• •&#13;
&#13;
WHO SAID IT?&#13;
&#13;
"Never in his,tory was Russia so mighty, illever were&#13;
the forces of socia1isrrn so colossally foi,ged together. This&#13;
is a new historical epoch. N e,v ertheless some pecxple think&#13;
in a stiClk-in-the-mud fashion. It has not yet been possible&#13;
to convince everyone cxf the necessity for the orverthrow of&#13;
crupitalism." - (Ferdinand Peroutka, a Benes Czech, in his&#13;
book TAK NEBO TAK, 1947, pg. 8).&#13;
&#13;
• • •&#13;
&#13;
"The gossip that the Democratic Party is not fur cooperation with the Soviet Union is wtroI11g. rt is clear to&#13;
every Slovak, regardless oif his polftica'1 and religio;us beliefs,&#13;
that the existence of the Czechoslovak Reipulblic is 100 per&#13;
cent dependent on the e~stence and the .p ower cxf our&#13;
strongest Slavic ally. This a1lli.ance cannot be regarded as a&#13;
matter of onJ.y feeHng graciorus for erverything the Soviet&#13;
Union has done for us. It is, a matter oif rationa:1 thinking&#13;
and of our unaJteraJble foreign policy." - (Dr. Joseph Let.&#13;
trich, Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee cxf the&#13;
"Council of Free Czechoslovakia," NOV:E PRUDY, No.&#13;
28-29, 1947, pg. 658).&#13;
&#13;
• • •&#13;
&#13;
"Let us declare war against the fear oif Bolshevism and&#13;
forbid at the same time, the for.mation of any anti-COlln-&#13;
&#13;
(Va;olav Majer, PRAVO&#13;
mlIDist f:ront whatsoever." LIDU, officirul organ orf the O;ech Sooi!al Demooratic Party,&#13;
Novemlber 25, 1947)&#13;
&#13;
</text>
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                <text>Memorandum to the President and the Congress of the United States from the Pittsburgh-Johnstown, Pa. Regional Conference of the Slovak League of America, Slovak Band Hall, Johnstown, Pa., November 3, 1956&#13;
Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956&#13;
pp. 55-58</text>
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

59

WHY DID BENES RESIGN IN 1938?
P. A. Hrobak
This quest.ion still. puzzles many people. Benes hlmself,
both in his letter to the government and in !his speech to the
people in paTting, 1lol'd Why he had Tesigned, but he told it
in such a way :that it is not fully clear to the average person. To say it simply a:nd briefJy: Benes resigned beca1USe
the policy of which he himself had been the chief exponent and representative for twenty years had proved faulty;
it went bankrupt and he could, therefore, no longer remain at the head Ol:f the State.
He himself told it in !this manner:
"I 'had played so great a role in this deve1opment of
events that I had to contemplate seTiously what my duty
should be under ,c hanged ciircumstances. . . . I came into
office under entirely different circumstances; and iI must
reckon this adtuality. Circumstances have changed so completely, that I feel my remaining in office might create an
obstacle in the new ci;z-cumstances with which our State
is now coping . . . This is mainly so, as it concerns the international situation with a view towards :t:Jhe speedy
(In a
building up of cooperation with om neighbors" letter to Premier GeneTal Syirovy).
"I have reached my decision of my own free will and
in accordance with my person:al conviction after conswltation with &lt;politi~al and constibuitional circles and with a
number of other leading persons. . . In these ciiroomstances
I think it is advisable that the new developments and the
new European coliaboration should not be disturbed from
our side through the faot that the personal position of
its leading 1representative rupparently 0onstitutes an obstacle to tihls development. I was elected to my present
position at a time s:ubstamJtially different from 1Jhe pres(,Farewell Broadcast, Oct. 5, 1938: MEMOIRS,
ent." 1954, pp. 292-293).
What these words of Benes actwail.ly meant wiU, perhaps, be best e.xiplained by a few quotations from Czech
periodicals of 1938:

�60

SLOVAKIA

"Orf necessity our. :uuture pr0igram ,c ontains good re'lations with Ge:ranany - a program which we could have
adopted long ago, iif ilt were not for the 'oavalierislh' Western Poweir,s which threatened to brook off theiir allialil.ce
with us m suiCh an event" - Stanislav Yester, "Lidove
Noviny, Oct. 5).
'~Venlkov" called fOT lnew, friendlly conltacits with
,n eighbodng states, and a;sked for "awaJkening from dreams
into reality .a nd the acceptance of a program which will be
ours."
"We do not know what wihl come next in :@urope. We
do know, however, that nea,r us iis a power with which
our state 0annot a,1low itself to come irnto dispute. Long
enough already have we played for othern the role of a
genda;rme who keeps Genmany in check: when the crucial
moment came, we fownd ourseLves deseTted - alone. . .
Well, good. If the woTild is to be governed not by j,u stice,
bwt by force, the:n our place is with those who harve the
greater strength and are more d ecisive. N ot!hing else remains for us. We &lt;look for unity with Germany . .. And let
us become, liike Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, one of G€rmamy's }a,rge 1proviiders and buyers, amd let uis refuse to
enter into a ,c ombination of any kind, in which we would
become part .o f an anti-Genm~ front. We are now thinking onily of O'lN'.selves and 'let UIS be loyal only to ourselves"
-- ("Lidove Noviny," Oct. 5).
"We have aJ.ready 'had more than enaugh ·orf t'he wailing sympathy of the western states 'towaJrdsi that courageous little n:a tion.' . . . We call beyond our bo,rdecrs:
Put am end to your unwelcome manifestations oif sympathy towards Czecho-Slovakia. We are finally realizing what
om standing in Cenrtrrul Emrope is, and we shaU guide OIUTselves 1acoordingly, whether you J[ke it or not. Ouir nation
hears its defeat and hum..hliation not onily with pain, but
wi11h great pride. We had /been betting on t'he wrong horse,
a,nd we know how to take the necessaJry consequences.''
- ("Lidove Listy," OcJt. '5 ).
We see that one after the other they admit to the
fault of Czecho-Slovakia's twenty-year foreign policy. But

�SLOVAKIA

61

who wa,s i,t that determined the trend of :Czecho-Slavakia's
foreign policy for :twenty yearn? Of coUJrse, it rwa;s Benes!

It was Benes who made Czecho~SlovaJkia whoHy dependent upon the ,l ove of France and, England, and it was Benes
who did not permit Czecho-Slova:kia to attempt to make
friends with Germany, as Bulga~ia and Yiugo,s[avia had
done. It wa:s Bernes who made of CzecJho-Slov,aJkia a French
gendarme to stand guard over Germany; and it was Benes who did not know how to ,rouse himself frrom a d&lt;re3Jlll.
and open his eyes to the reality that France and England
did not know how to derul with Germany. It was Benes
who ohstiinately held Czecho-Slovaikia in that runti-German
front. Jt was IBenes who !bet on the wrong horse. And finally, it was Benes who paid no heed to the warnings coming frolffi the Slovak awtonomisrt ,camp (P.opul1ists and Nati,onalists), but also from Czech soUTces (Kramaf and
otJhers) : that tJhe fore~gn po1ky of Czecho-Slovwkia was
dangerous. and against her interests .
Under such circumstances, when his h1wndering foreign poHcy contribulted in no smal,l measure to what had
happened, Benes co'lllld do nothing else but resign. Of
course, his apologists may say that Benes meant well,
that he did not wish the State ill, but he was too trusting,
since he depended upon the alliance with France; and, perh1a ps, he was not foresi,g hted enough, 1siince he did not see
long ago,, in s,pite orf numerous and repeated warnings,
which way the European wind was blowing.
People noticed it in Yugoslavia, they noticed it in
Bulgaria, they noticed it in Ro:umamia and they noticed it
a lso in P.Oiland - aJnd they went with the wind. Benes did
not notice it; he went ,a gainst the wind. And when he did
begin to notice that things were going bad, he committed
the cardinal error of not turning ,a bout quickly, hut against
the wiind even more and cond uded a military pact
with Soviet Rlu!ssia! 'J.1hat was the red cloth ,b efore the al,r e~dy hl'ritated dictators, Hitleir and iMus,s,o1ini. And ffingland, Whffil it came to deciding for or against war, was
fiHed with fear that, if there should be a war, Central

�62

SLOVAKIA

EUTope would be O'Ver-run by Stalin's red army, which nobody, perhaps, omtld ever drive Ol,!t of it.
When Benes departed, there left with him twenty
years of faulty Czecho-Slovak foreign poticy. As we see
from qu'Otations above, it has already been admitted also
by those who approved of his policy and supported it. And
with Benes there rulso departed twenty years of faulty internall policy, for let us not forget that Benes was one of
the most leadmg exiponents of "Czechoslovruk" national
unity and 1:he greatest opponent of Slovak autonomy. The
Czechs also noticed thi,s fault of internal policy, lbut did
not profit by it am.y more than T. G. Masaryk and Benes
did by the ,l esson of Austr10-&lt;Hl\l!Ilgary. Perhaps it was too
late to do anything about the malignant cancer which had
been planted in the political life of Czecho-Slova.kia, which,
liike Austro-Hungary, ihad ,b ecome a prison to non-Czech
nations. T. G. ,M.asarylk and Dr. Edward Benes had founded
Ozecho~Slovakia on a [ie, bwlt it on more lies and inequities, but still Joudly proclaimed on every occasion that
the "truth prevaiJs" ! Well, truth did prevail, despite the
hypocrisy of the Czech founders of the Repuiblic.
Benes resigned the presidency a.nd fled the country
during its f,i rst great crisis, because he was a coward. He
did wrong 13.iild he knew it. H1s people knew it, too. He
capitulated to Hlitler, ,a ccepting .Muruch without even consuJlting the iparliament of CzeC'ho-Slovrukia. Ha:d he not
:fled, who knows butt that iBenes might have been tried
for treason and hung in 1938 by his own people?

•

•

•

WHO SAID IT?

"New Ozecho..Slovakia will be a Slav state which, while
having good relations with the great western democracies,
will politically, economically, militarily and ou1turn1ly lean
without any resel"Vations on the victorious ibuliwruik olf Slav
peoples, the USSR, and cooperate with the Sl8JV and democratic states of Poland and the Yugoslav federation of
states." - Laco Novomesky, d~puty-chairman of the Slovaik
National Council.,. headed by Dr. Joseph Lettrich, OWI Bll!lletin, May 26, 1945.

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1435">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA

59

WHY DID BENES RESIGN IN 1938?
P. A. Hrobak
This quest.ion still. puzzles many people. Benes hlmself,
both in his letter to the government and in !his speech to the
people in paTting, 1lol'd Why he had Tesigned, but he told it
in such a way :that it is not fully clear to the average person. To say it simply a:nd briefJy: Benes resigned beca1USe
the policy of which he himself had been the chief exponent and representative for twenty years had proved faulty;
it went bankrupt and he could, therefore, no longer remain at the head Ol:f the State.
He himself told it in !this manner:
"I 'had played so great a role in this deve1opment of
events that I had to contemplate seTiously what my duty
should be under ,c hanged ciircumstances. . . . I came into
office under entirely different circumstances; and iI must
reckon this adtuality. Circumstances have changed so completely, that I feel my remaining in office might create an
obstacle in the new ci;z-cumstances with which our State
is now coping . . . This is mainly so, as it concerns the international situation with a view towards :t:Jhe speedy
(In a
building up of cooperation with om neighbors" letter to Premier GeneTal Syirovy).
"I have reached my decision of my own free will and
in accordance with my person:al conviction after conswltation with &lt;politi~al and constibuitional circles and with a
number of other leading persons. . . In these ciiroomstances
I think it is advisable that the new developments and the
new European coliaboration should not be disturbed from
our side through the faot that the personal position of
its leading 1representative rupparently 0onstitutes an obstacle to tihls development. I was elected to my present
position at a time s:ubstamJtially different from 1Jhe pres(,Farewell Broadcast, Oct. 5, 1938: MEMOIRS,
ent." 1954, pp. 292-293).
What these words of Benes actwail.ly meant wiU, perhaps, be best e.xiplained by a few quotations from Czech
periodicals of 1938:

�60

SLOVAKIA

"Orf necessity our. :uuture pr0igram ,c ontains good re'lations with Ge:ranany - a program which we could have
adopted long ago, iif ilt were not for the 'oavalierislh' Western Poweir,s which threatened to brook off theiir allialil.ce
with us m suiCh an event" - Stanislav Yester, "Lidove
Noviny, Oct. 5).
'~Venlkov" called fOT lnew, friendlly conltacits with
,n eighbodng states, and a;sked for "awaJkening from dreams
into reality .a nd the acceptance of a program which will be
ours."
"We do not know what wihl come next in :@urope. We
do know, however, that nea,r us iis a power with which
our state 0annot a,1low itself to come irnto dispute. Long
enough already have we played for othern the role of a
genda;rme who keeps Genmany in check: when the crucial
moment came, we fownd ourseLves deseTted - alone. . .
Well, good. If the woTild is to be governed not by j,u stice,
bwt by force, the:n our place is with those who harve the
greater strength and are more d ecisive. N ot!hing else remains for us. We &lt;look for unity with Germany . .. And let
us become, liike Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, one of G€rmamy's }a,rge 1proviiders and buyers, amd let uis refuse to
enter into a ,c ombination of any kind, in which we would
become part .o f an anti-Genm~ front. We are now thinking onily of O'lN'.selves and 'let UIS be loyal only to ourselves"
-- ("Lidove Noviny," Oct. 5).
"We have aJ.ready 'had more than enaugh ·orf t'he wailing sympathy of the western states 'towaJrdsi that courageous little n:a tion.' . . . We call beyond our bo,rdecrs:
Put am end to your unwelcome manifestations oif sympathy towards Czecho-Slovakia. We are finally realizing what
om standing in Cenrtrrul Emrope is, and we shaU guide OIUTselves 1acoordingly, whether you J[ke it or not. Ouir nation
hears its defeat and hum..hliation not onily with pain, but
wi11h great pride. We had /been betting on t'he wrong horse,
a,nd we know how to take the necessaJry consequences.''
- ("Lidove Listy," OcJt. '5 ).
We see that one after the other they admit to the
fault of Czecho-Slovakia's twenty-year foreign policy. But

�SLOVAKIA

61

who wa,s i,t that determined the trend of :Czecho-Slavakia's
foreign policy for :twenty yearn? Of coUJrse, it rwa;s Benes!

It was Benes who made Czecho~SlovaJkia whoHy dependent upon the ,l ove of France and, England, and it was Benes
who did not permit Czecho-Slova:kia to attempt to make
friends with Germany, as Bulga~ia and Yiugo,s[avia had
done. It wa:s Bernes who made of CzecJho-Slov,aJkia a French
gendarme to stand guard over Germany; and it was Benes who did not know how to ,rouse himself frrom a d&lt;re3Jlll.
and open his eyes to the reality that France and England
did not know how to derul with Germany. It was Benes
who ohstiinately held Czecho-Slovaikia in that runti-German
front. Jt was IBenes who !bet on the wrong horse. And finally, it was Benes who paid no heed to the warnings coming frolffi the Slovak awtonomisrt ,camp (P.opul1ists and Nati,onalists), but also from Czech soUTces (Kramaf and
otJhers) : that tJhe fore~gn po1ky of Czecho-Slovwkia was
dangerous. and against her interests .
Under such circumstances, when his h1wndering foreign poHcy contribulted in no smal,l measure to what had
happened, Benes co'lllld do nothing else but resign. Of
course, his apologists may say that Benes meant well,
that he did not wish the State ill, but he was too trusting,
since he depended upon the alliance with France; and, perh1a ps, he was not foresi,g hted enough, 1siince he did not see
long ago,, in s,pite orf numerous and repeated warnings,
which way the European wind was blowing.
People noticed it in Yugoslavia, they noticed it in
Bulgaria, they noticed it in Ro:umamia and they noticed it
a lso in P.Oiland - aJnd they went with the wind. Benes did
not notice it; he went ,a gainst the wind. And when he did
begin to notice that things were going bad, he committed
the cardinal error of not turning ,a bout quickly, hut against
the wiind even more and cond uded a military pact
with Soviet Rlu!ssia! 'J.1hat was the red cloth ,b efore the al,r e~dy hl'ritated dictators, Hitleir and iMus,s,o1ini. And ffingland, Whffil it came to deciding for or against war, was
fiHed with fear that, if there should be a war, Central

�62

SLOVAKIA

EUTope would be O'Ver-run by Stalin's red army, which nobody, perhaps, omtld ever drive Ol,!t of it.
When Benes departed, there left with him twenty
years of faulty Czecho-Slovak foreign poticy. As we see
from qu'Otations above, it has already been admitted also
by those who approved of his policy and supported it. And
with Benes there rulso departed twenty years of faulty internall policy, for let us not forget that Benes was one of
the most leadmg exiponents of "Czechoslovruk" national
unity and 1:he greatest opponent of Slovak autonomy. The
Czechs also noticed thi,s fault of internal policy, lbut did
not profit by it am.y more than T. G. Masaryk and Benes
did by the ,l esson of Austr10-&lt;Hl\l!Ilgary. Perhaps it was too
late to do anything about the malignant cancer which had
been planted in the political life of Czecho-Slova.kia, which,
liike Austro-Hungary, ihad ,b ecome a prison to non-Czech
nations. T. G. ,M.asarylk and Dr. Edward Benes had founded
Ozecho~Slovakia on a [ie, bwlt it on more lies and inequities, but still Joudly proclaimed on every occasion that
the "truth prevaiJs" ! Well, truth did prevail, despite the
hypocrisy of the Czech founders of the Repuiblic.
Benes resigned the presidency a.nd fled the country
during its f,i rst great crisis, because he was a coward. He
did wrong 13.iild he knew it. H1s people knew it, too. He
capitulated to Hlitler, ,a ccepting .Muruch without even consuJlting the iparliament of CzeC'ho-Slovrukia. Ha:d he not
:fled, who knows butt that iBenes might have been tried
for treason and hung in 1938 by his own people?

•

•

•

WHO SAID IT?

"New Ozecho..Slovakia will be a Slav state which, while
having good relations with the great western democracies,
will politically, economically, militarily and ou1turn1ly lean
without any resel"Vations on the victorious ibuliwruik olf Slav
peoples, the USSR, and cooperate with the Sl8JV and democratic states of Poland and the Yugoslav federation of
states." - Laco Novomesky, d~puty-chairman of the Slovaik
National Council.,. headed by Dr. Joseph Lettrich, OWI Bll!lletin, May 26, 1945.

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                  <text>1956, Vol. 6</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
59&#13;
&#13;
WHY DID BENES RESIGN IN 1938?&#13;
P. A. Hrobak&#13;
This quest.ion still. puzzles many people. Benes hlmself,&#13;
both in his letter to the government and in !his speech to the&#13;
people in paTting, 1lol'd Why he had Tesigned, but he told it&#13;
in such a way :that it is not fully clear to the average person. To say it simply a:nd briefJy: Benes resigned beca1USe&#13;
the policy of which he himself had been the chief exponent and representative for twenty years had proved faulty;&#13;
it went bankrupt and he could, therefore, no longer remain at the head Ol:f the State.&#13;
He himself told it in !this manner:&#13;
"I 'had played so great a role in this deve1opment of&#13;
events that I had to contemplate seTiously what my duty&#13;
should be under ,c hanged ciircumstances. . . . I came into&#13;
office under entirely different circumstances; and iI must&#13;
reckon this adtuality. Circumstances have changed so completely, that I feel my remaining in office might create an&#13;
obstacle in the new ci;z-cumstances with which our State&#13;
is now coping . . . This is mainly so, as it concerns the international situation with a view towards :t:Jhe speedy&#13;
(In a&#13;
building up of cooperation with om neighbors" letter to Premier GeneTal Syirovy).&#13;
"I have reached my decision of my own free will and&#13;
in accordance with my person:al conviction after conswltation with &lt;politi~al and constibuitional circles and with a&#13;
number of other leading persons. . . In these ciiroomstances&#13;
I think it is advisable that the new developments and the&#13;
new European coliaboration should not be disturbed from&#13;
our side through the faot that the personal position of&#13;
its leading 1representative rupparently 0onstitutes an obstacle to tihls development. I was elected to my present&#13;
position at a time s:ubstamJtially different from 1Jhe pres(,Farewell Broadcast, Oct. 5, 1938: MEMOIRS,&#13;
ent." 1954, pp. 292-293).&#13;
What these words of Benes actwail.ly meant wiU, perhaps, be best e.xiplained by a few quotations from Czech&#13;
periodicals of 1938:&#13;
&#13;
60&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
"Orf necessity our. :uuture pr0igram ,c ontains good re'lations with Ge:ranany - a program which we could have&#13;
adopted long ago, iif ilt were not for the 'oavalierislh' Western Poweir,s which threatened to brook off theiir allialil.ce&#13;
with us m suiCh an event" - Stanislav Yester, "Lidove&#13;
Noviny, Oct. 5).&#13;
'~Venlkov" called fOT lnew, friendlly conltacits with&#13;
,n eighbodng states, and a;sked for "awaJkening from dreams&#13;
into reality .a nd the acceptance of a program which will be&#13;
ours."&#13;
"We do not know what wihl come next in :@urope. We&#13;
do know, however, that nea,r us iis a power with which&#13;
our state 0annot a,1low itself to come irnto dispute. Long&#13;
enough already have we played for othern the role of a&#13;
genda;rme who keeps Genmany in check: when the crucial&#13;
moment came, we fownd ourseLves deseTted - alone. . .&#13;
Well, good. If the woTild is to be governed not by j,u stice,&#13;
bwt by force, the:n our place is with those who harve the&#13;
greater strength and are more d ecisive. N ot!hing else remains for us. We &lt;look for unity with Germany . .. And let&#13;
us become, liike Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, one of G€rmamy's }a,rge 1proviiders and buyers, amd let uis refuse to&#13;
enter into a ,c ombination of any kind, in which we would&#13;
become part .o f an anti-Genm~ front. We are now thinking onily of O'lN'.selves and 'let UIS be loyal only to ourselves"&#13;
-- ("Lidove Noviny," Oct. 5).&#13;
"We have aJ.ready 'had more than enaugh ·orf t'he wailing sympathy of the western states 'towaJrdsi that courageous little n:a tion.' . . . We call beyond our bo,rdecrs:&#13;
Put am end to your unwelcome manifestations oif sympathy towards Czecho-Slovakia. We are finally realizing what&#13;
om standing in Cenrtrrul Emrope is, and we shaU guide OIUTselves 1acoordingly, whether you J[ke it or not. Ouir nation&#13;
hears its defeat and hum..hliation not onily with pain, but&#13;
wi11h great pride. We had /been betting on t'he wrong horse,&#13;
a,nd we know how to take the necessaJry consequences.''&#13;
- ("Lidove Listy," OcJt. '5 ).&#13;
We see that one after the other they admit to the&#13;
fault of Czecho-Slovakia's twenty-year foreign policy. But&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
61&#13;
&#13;
who wa,s i,t that determined the trend of :Czecho-Slavakia's&#13;
foreign policy for :twenty yearn? Of coUJrse, it rwa;s Benes!&#13;
&#13;
It was Benes who made Czecho~SlovaJkia whoHy dependent upon the ,l ove of France and, England, and it was Benes&#13;
who did not permit Czecho-Slova:kia to attempt to make&#13;
friends with Germany, as Bulga~ia and Yiugo,s[avia had&#13;
done. It wa:s Bernes who made of CzecJho-Slov,aJkia a French&#13;
gendarme to stand guard over Germany; and it was Benes who did not know how to ,rouse himself frrom a d&lt;re3Jlll.&#13;
and open his eyes to the reality that France and England&#13;
did not know how to derul with Germany. It was Benes&#13;
who ohstiinately held Czecho-Slovaikia in that runti-German&#13;
front. Jt was IBenes who !bet on the wrong horse. And finally, it was Benes who paid no heed to the warnings coming frolffi the Slovak awtonomisrt ,camp (P.opul1ists and Nati,onalists), but also from Czech soUTces (Kramaf and&#13;
otJhers) : that tJhe fore~gn po1ky of Czecho-Slovwkia was&#13;
dangerous. and against her interests .&#13;
Under such circumstances, when his h1wndering foreign poHcy contribulted in no smal,l measure to what had&#13;
happened, Benes co'lllld do nothing else but resign. Of&#13;
course, his apologists may say that Benes meant well,&#13;
that he did not wish the State ill, but he was too trusting,&#13;
since he depended upon the alliance with France; and, perh1a ps, he was not foresi,g hted enough, 1siince he did not see&#13;
long ago,, in s,pite orf numerous and repeated warnings,&#13;
which way the European wind was blowing.&#13;
People noticed it in Yugoslavia, they noticed it in&#13;
Bulgaria, they noticed it in Ro:umamia and they noticed it&#13;
a lso in P.Oiland - aJnd they went with the wind. Benes did&#13;
not notice it; he went ,a gainst the wind. And when he did&#13;
begin to notice that things were going bad, he committed&#13;
the cardinal error of not turning ,a bout quickly, hut against&#13;
the wiind even more and cond uded a military pact&#13;
with Soviet Rlu!ssia! 'J.1hat was the red cloth ,b efore the al,r e~dy hl'ritated dictators, Hitleir and iMus,s,o1ini. And ffingland, Whffil it came to deciding for or against war, was&#13;
fiHed with fear that, if there should be a war, Central&#13;
&#13;
62&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
EUTope would be O'Ver-run by Stalin's red army, which nobody, perhaps, omtld ever drive Ol,!t of it.&#13;
When Benes departed, there left with him twenty&#13;
years of faulty Czecho-Slovak foreign poticy. As we see&#13;
from qu'Otations above, it has already been admitted also&#13;
by those who approved of his policy and supported it. And&#13;
with Benes there rulso departed twenty years of faulty internall policy, for let us not forget that Benes was one of&#13;
the most leadmg exiponents of "Czechoslovruk" national&#13;
unity and 1:he greatest opponent of Slovak autonomy. The&#13;
Czechs also noticed thi,s fault of internal policy, lbut did&#13;
not profit by it am.y more than T. G. Masaryk and Benes&#13;
did by the ,l esson of Austr10-&lt;Hl\l!Ilgary. Perhaps it was too&#13;
late to do anything about the malignant cancer which had&#13;
been planted in the political life of Czecho-Slova.kia, which,&#13;
liike Austro-Hungary, ihad ,b ecome a prison to non-Czech&#13;
nations. T. G. ,M.asarylk and Dr. Edward Benes had founded&#13;
Ozecho~Slovakia on a [ie, bwlt it on more lies and inequities, but still Joudly proclaimed on every occasion that&#13;
the "truth prevaiJs" ! Well, truth did prevail, despite the&#13;
hypocrisy of the Czech founders of the Repuiblic.&#13;
Benes resigned the presidency a.nd fled the country&#13;
during its f,i rst great crisis, because he was a coward. He&#13;
did wrong 13.iild he knew it. H1s people knew it, too. He&#13;
capitulated to Hlitler, ,a ccepting .Muruch without even consuJlting the iparliament of CzeC'ho-Slovrukia. Ha:d he not&#13;
:fled, who knows butt that iBenes might have been tried&#13;
for treason and hung in 1938 by his own people?&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
WHO SAID IT?&#13;
&#13;
"New Ozecho..Slovakia will be a Slav state which, while&#13;
having good relations with the great western democracies,&#13;
will politically, economically, militarily and ou1turn1ly lean&#13;
without any resel"Vations on the victorious ibuliwruik olf Slav&#13;
peoples, the USSR, and cooperate with the Sl8JV and democratic states of Poland and the Yugoslav federation of&#13;
states." - Laco Novomesky, d~puty-chairman of the Slovaik&#13;
National Council.,. headed by Dr. Joseph Lettrich, OWI Bll!lletin, May 26, 1945.&#13;
&#13;
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                <text>Why Did Beneš Resign in 1938?</text>
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Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956&#13;
pp. 59-62</text>
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                    <text>63

SLOVAKIA

The History of Slovakia:
By PHILIP A . HROBAiK

SLOVENSKO -

SLOVAKIA -

SLOVAKLAND

The territory occupied by the Slovak people for the
past 1500 years is known as Slovakia. It is situated in the
very heart of Europe. Present-day Slovakia has an area of
49,015 square kilometers (approximately 19,000 sq. miles)
and a population of 4,000,000. There were times when the
borders of Slovakia extended beyond their present limits
and times when the land of the Slovaks had no definite
borders at all.
In ancient times the Slovaks occupied even the western
bank of the Morava river and the north bank of the Tisa
(Theiss) river. Though the area and the borders of Slovakia changed at various times, its topography - the land
and its waterways - did not.
Slovakia is bound on the north by the Carpathian
Mountains and on the south by the blue Danube and the
upper arm of the Tisa river. Into these two streams empty
all the rivers of Slovakia that have their origin in the foothills of the King's Plateau (Krafova Hofa) - the natural
center of Slovakia: those that run off to the southwest
empty into the Danube, while those that course to the
southwest pour into the Tisa, forming deep valleys and
broad basins between the ,i ndividual mountain :zones that
fill out the largest part of the territory of Slovakia.
This territory is divided into three parts: 1. western
Slovakia which drains into the Danube tributaries; 2. eastern Slovakia that drains into the tributaries of the Tisa;
3. the mountainous country of central Slovakia.
The geographical picture of Slovakia is extremely
varied, because high mountain ranges alternate with deep
valleys which, in places, spread out into basins. Fertile
plains stretch out from the foothills of the mountains.
Slovakia is situated in the very center of Europe
where the north-eastern spurs of the Alps near the central
Danube touch upon the mountainous arch of the Carpa-

�64

SLOVAKIA

thians which is the main watershed of central Europe.
From this watershed the streams of central Europe run
into several seas. In olden times the course of these
streams determined the course of roads along which nations migrated and business and culture flowed. We find
Slovakia at the juction of these roads which cross the
Caripathian Mountains kom the north and the south.
Two roads were especially significant in deciding the
fate of Slovakia and the Slovak nation. One coursed along
the Danube and connected the western oountTies of Europe
with the eastern world. Near the Carpatho-Alpian gate this
road intersected with the other important highway which
started from the coast of the Adriatic Sea, crossed the
Danube, proceeded to the north against the current of the
Morava river and went to the coast of the Baltic Sea.
Slovakia, according to archeological researches, was
well inhabited as early as 5000 B. C., but we do not know
the race or the names of the peoples who inhabited the
land. Traces of the Neolithic Man, who used stone weapons
in hunting the mammoth and the huge cave bear, have
been found. The scientific investigator will find much material on the prehistoric period in the museum of Bratislava
and Turciansky Svaty Martin.
About the year 2000 B.C. begins the Bronze Age with
its burial urns, and clay and stone remains, found on the
sites of ancient settlements in Slovakland. During the ensuing Iron Age, we find traces of the Illyrians in the west,
of the Thracians in the east. The latter came into contact
with the Scythians in the valley of the Tisa river.
Several nations of various origins and culture lived in
Slovakia just before the dawn of the Christian era. According to ancient Greek and Roman writers, the land of
the Slovaiks was inhabited by the Gauls and the Celts at
that time. In the fourth century B. C., we note traces of
the more advanced Gallic culture from the discoveries of
golden ornaments and coins, imitations of those issued by
Philip III of Macedonia and his son, Alexander the Great.
At Bratislava coins of the Roman Republic, dating from
the first century B. C., have been found. A Greek map of
the Slovak territory, dating back to the third century,

�SLOVAKIA

65

shows many Slovanic names for mountains and rivers,
The fertile plains of south-eastern Slovakia were occupied by the Boii, a Gallic tri'be, and in the mountainous
parts of central Slovakia lived the Kotin (Gothine) tribe
which worked the ore of the Iron Mountains. The Osi settled in the neighborhood of the Kotins, while the Korkonti
- tribes of southern origin - occupied the northwestern
part of Slovakia.
In the first half of the last century before Christ the
Dacians came to Slovakia from the east and overpowered
the Gallic Boii. But in the first quarter of the first century
after Christ, the Dacians were forced to migrate to the
north into the mountains, because they were iha:rd pressed
by the J azygi who had come from the Black Sea to take
over the land on the left side of the Danube.
During the reign of Tiberius, two Germanic tribes settled in the territory of the Slovaks, the Quadi and the
Marcomanni, who frequently raided the Roman proi\Tince
of Pannonia on the other side of the Danube. Vannius, the
bellicose king of the Quadi, built military fortresses along
the V ah river and extended his power to the Turiec a:nd
Kysuca rivers.
About twenty years after Christ, when a large part of
the territory of Slovakia was occupied by the Quadi, the
Romans were consolidating their might near the Danube.
The Franks and the Romans began to wage war for the
control of the territory of Slovakia, a struggle that lasted
several centuries.
South of the Danube the Romans organized the province of Pannonia, east of which was the province of Dacia.
To conquer the whole Danube basin to the Carpathians, the
Romans built military strongholds along the south bank of
the Danube. Such fortresses were established at Vindobona
(Vienna), Carnanthum (Hainburg), Brigetium (Komarno)
and at Aquincum (Budapest). To defend and to secure the
frontier along the Danube against incursions of barbaric
tribes, the Romans sent detachments across the river to
established military stations on the northern bank, on the
territory of Slovakia. From excacations we know that Ro-

�66

SLOVAK.IA

man troops were stationed at Devin, Stupava, Bratislava
and opposite Komarno at li.
The Romans bested the Quadi in battle. Their king
Vannius ruled over the territory of Slovakia by the grace
of the Roman Emperor. Of course, the Quadi resented this.
After Vannius' death the aggressive Quadi challenged the
power of the Romans on the Danube and the Roman Emperors had to defend their rule with large armies. Along
the Vah river the Roman troops penetrated as far as Trencin. Emperor Marcus Aurelius and his son Commodus defeated the Quadi in 179 A. D. after several bloody skirmishes on Slovak territory, as is commemorate d by inscription on a roc'k at Trencin: "In memory of the IVictory of the
Emperor's army that encamped at Laugaricio, 855 soldiers
of the II. Legion. Made by Constantine, commander of the
II. auxiliary Legion." This army was stationed at Laugaritio, a Roman settlement near Trencin, which has since
disappeared.
During these skirmishes with the Quadi, probably
about 173 A. D., the Roman army in Slovakia found itself
threatened by a scarcity of water. In the army that fought
against the Germans somewhere along the Hron river,
there were several Christians who had come from Asia
Minor. These Christian soldiers - the first Christians on
Slovak territory - prayed for raiin and their prayers were
answered. The Roman army was saved. This incident is immortalized on the Arch of Triumph of Emperor Marcus
Aurelius in Rome.
The Quadi, 1b eaten repeatedly by the Romans, never
·gwve up trying to drive the Romans out of Slovakia. Emperor Constantine LI defeated them in 258 A.ID. and Emperor
Valentian, the last Roman emperor who cowd claim sovereignty over the territory of Slovakia, repeated the pel'for:mance in 3·74. Upon the latter's death in 376, the great Mig;ra~
tion of Nations begain.. Shortly thereafter the Romans
ipulled thek gax.risoDJS out of Slo-y;aJk ia and let the Quadi
take over. The Quadi, however, were evicted from the territory by the Huns in the first half of the fifth century.
The Huns in turn were displaced by the Heruli, who held
the territory until about 491 when the Lombards defeated

�SLOVAKIA

87

them, occupied their lands and held them until about 526,
when they crossed the Danube into Pannonia.
Slovrukia, however, did not remain even under the Huns
for long. After the disintegration of the Roman Empire,
the Germans migrated from Slovakia to the south. The
Marcomanni, weakened by the wars with the Romans and
forced by the hordes of Attila to join his army, were wiped
out in the battle of Cha.Ions (Catalaunian Fields) in 451.
There is as yet no definite proof, even though it may be
safely assumed, that the Slovaks and related Slovanic tribes
came into Slovakia in increasing numbers after the extinction of the Marcomanni. The historian J ordannes, writing
in the sixth century, said that all the Hungarian plain was
inhabited by Slovanic people (the Slavs).
AFTIDR THE ADVENT OF THE SLOVAKS

The Slovaks came to their present territory from the
East, probably from India. At the time Frankish tribes
fought the Roman Legions over the territory of Slovakia,
the Slovanic peoples occupied the land that stretched to the
north of the Carpathians and to the east of the river Vistula. It was a marshy and unfertile land. In time the growing Slovanic families were forced to emigrate to neighboring territories.
The Slovanic peoples who migrated to the west and
occupied the territory to the Elbe and Saal rivers are called
We,stern Slavs; they are the Poles, the SlOJVaks and! the
Czechs; those that occwpied the territory between t'he Elbe
and Oder rivers and the country along the coast of the
Baltic Sea are known as the Lusatian Serbs (northern Germany) and the Kashubes (near the Baltic Sea); today their
numbers are few. The Slovanic peoples, who migrated from
their ancient land to the south and occupied the Balkan
peninsula, are called the Southern Slavs: the Slovenes,
Croatians, Serbs and Bulgarians. A large part of the Slovanic peoples migrated to the east and occupied the plains
of eastern Europe. They are the Eastern Slavs: the White
Russians, the Little Russians (Ukrainians) and the Great
Russians.
As the great Slovanic family disintegrated, separate

�68

SLOVAKIA

Slovanic nations developed with the centuries, each with
its dictinct culture, language, customs and traditions.
The Slovaks, like other Slovanic peoples, originally
were hunters. After a time they took to bee culture and
animal husbandry, especially sheep raising. From their
neighbors they learned to cultivate the soil. The men folk
hunted and herded sheep, while .the women and the slaves
did the farm work. The only trades known to them were
pottery making and blacksmithing. In business transactions
they exchanged products or paid in cloth; money was not
known as a means of barter. The Slovaks lived in simple
huts made of poles driven into the ground, around which
were wound branches and twigs which were then covered
with mud.
Several families, originating from a common forefather, formed a clan ("rod"). The head of the clan was the
oldest member; he was in charge of the common property
of the clan. A Slovanic settlement, inhabited by several related families, i.e. a clan, was called a village ("dedina"
from "dedo"-grandfather). The village was the common
heritage ("dedicstvo") of the whole clan. Several related
clans made up a tribe ("kmeii"), the leader of which was
the tribal chief, called a priest ("kiiaz") or prince ("knieza). When several such related tribes lived in one territory
for a long time a Slovanic state evolved and a Slovanic
nation was born.
SLOVAK CHARACTERISTICS

The Slovanic peoples had many good and bad characteristics. They loved songs and entertainment. Not possessing great wealth, they lived frugally. They were goodhearted and hospitable, but suffered discipline with difficulty.
They did not know how to obey, hence there was no harmony among them. They did not seek a battle, but when
they had to defend themselves they fought heroically and
also knew how to be cruel. All these characterictics of the
Slovanic nature can be found in the Slovanic nations even
at the ,p resent time.
The historian Procopius (562) said that the Slavs were
rather tall, hardy, blond-haired people and honesty was one

�SlJOVAK.I.A

69

of their marked characteristics. Theophylactus recorded an
interesting commentary on the Slavs. He said: "In 590
three men were captured by the Greeks in Thrace; the men
carried musical instruments instead of weapons. When
Caesar M:auricus asked who they ,w ere, the men answered:
'We are Slavs; we love music; we play the guitar and violin
and sing.' Mauricus was overcome by their simplicity. Af..,
ter feasting them he had a guard escort them to their
lands."
The German historian Herder had this to say about
the Slavs: "They loved farming; they had herds and implements and a home industry ; with the products of their
land and their industry they carried on a useful business.
They built cities and in places occupied themselves with
mining; they knew how to melt and mold metals. The Slavs
prepared salt, made cloth, brewed beer, grafted trees, and
lived according to their manner a happy, musical life.''
The Slovaks of old had names for implements, furniture, grains, fruit trees, trades and animals. They had their
own words for: plow, iron, cloth, needle, pliers, wheel,
wagon, seal, ring, blacksmith, spoon, clothier, butcher,
cape, jeweler.
As a musical people they had many folk songs. In
number and variety of content they are second to those
of no other nation.
SLOVAK MYTHOLOGY

There are very few reliable records of the religion of
ancient Slovanic peoples. We know that they believed in a
Supreme Being and in immortality. The Slovaks called the
Supreme Being "Praboh" :_ the God of all gods. They had
a White God - the God of all good, and a Black God - the
God of evil and death. Many lesser gods, belonging to both
the white and black groups, also existed for the ancient
Slovaks and other Slovanic peoples.
"ZIVENA" was the godess of life, and "MORENA"
the godess of death. Brooks and streams housed nymphs,
and fairies inhabited the woods and forests. "LADA" was
the godess of beauty, while "URODA" was the godess of
the fields and crops. ' ~PfilRUIN" (P.AJROM" ) , the God of
thunder, was held in great respect.

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SLOVAKIA

The ancient Slovaks worshipped and invoked their gods
in sacred groves. They offered sacrifices of grain and animals to images of wood and stone through their priests.
The White Priests (BieJok:iiazi) served and invoked the
White Gods. The White Priests were most important men
of the tribe; they presided at all councils and trials and
their judgments and decisions were final. The Black Priests
- the magicians and sorcerers - were believed to possess
powers of tmnsforming peraons into animals and inanimate
objects.
The Slovaks, like most of the other Slovanic peoples
of ancient times, cremated or buried their dead. Food,
weapons, wine and jewelry were usually placed in the
graves of the dead. Ashes of the dead were placed in urns
of clay and then buried. Mounds of clay and stone were
built over burial places; the greater the mound, the more
important the person or persons buried there. Several such
mounds were found and excavated in Slovakia (at Skalica,
Brezolupy, Boooivce, Kras:iiany near 2ilina and at Cepcin in
Turiec). One of the most extensive burial grounds was uncovered at Devinska Nova Ves.
Some of the customs and practices of the ancient pagan Slovaks have survived the centuries and are still observed in many quaint villages of Slovakia today. Many of
the pagan practices, however, disappeared with the advent
of Christianity.
As the Slovanic peoples abandoned their ancient lands
and began to colonize central and eastern Europe - after
the Germanic Heruli and Lombards withdrew from the territory of Slovakia in the sixth ·century and the Slovaks
came in - the savage nation of the Avars tore into the
Danube basin, overran the whole territory, and pushed
deeply into the Frankish kingdom in the west. During the
next hundred years the whole region seethed in turmoil.
The Avars were wild nomads of Turko-Tartarian origin
who rode their horses rough-shod over the countries of
their neighbors and subjugated them. They settled in Pannonia, where they built military camps which were protected by huge, circular mounds of earth and stone and
wooden fences. The Slovaks withdrew from this territory

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71

and settled north of the Danube . Part of the Slovak tribes
lived in the mounta ins; they were govern ed by their own
princes .
The Slovan ic peoples along the Danube had to serve
the Avars and were forced to go with them on their rampages into neighb oring territor ies. The A vars looted the
Germa n lands in the west and Constan tinoiple (Cari•h rad)
and Salonik a in the east. Natura lly, the Slovan ic peoples
wanted tQ throw off the yoke of the Aivars and waited for
the opportu ne momen t to rebel. That time came in 624,
when Samo, a Franki sh mercha nt, succeed ed in uniting the
Slovani c peoples and led them in battle agains t the savage
A;vars. Sa.mo defeate d the Arv,a xs rund founde d the first SlovaJllic state ,near the central Danube . Encour aged by the
victory over the A vars, Samo led the Slovan ic peoples
agains t the German ic Franks . Samo again was victorio us;
his Slovani c army defeate d the Franks under Dagob ert in
a three-d ay battle near the Vogast e castle in 631. Becaus e
the Slovak s were settled north of the Danub e and the Slovenians south of it, Samo's empire stretch ed over these
territor ies. The Slovani c peoples within these territor ies
were called by the commo n name of Sloven es (Slovie ni).
The main fortres s of this Slovani c empire was situate d in
Slovak ia at the conflue nce of the Morava and Danube rivers. Samo's empire , howeve r, disinte grated soon after his
death (658). Wheth er it was the ,k ingdom of the Slova!ks
alone is questio nable, but the fact remain s that the territory of Slovak ia formed the core of it.
ilfu-edegar's "Chron icles" ;record that a ~trong westem Slovan ic empire existed already in the seventh century ,
strong enough to, resist the pressu re of the Avars and the
rule of Dagob ert. Fredeg ar wrote quite plainly that Samo
came along when the Slovam c tribes of the area were successful ly rebellin g aga~t the rule of the A vars. His "Chro.nioles" form the basis of most theorie s in ;regard to the
ethnica l composiition of Samo's Empire , its territor ial extent
and the site of its princip al city or strongh old. In recent
yeara Slova!k, Polish, and Czech scholar s of Slavist ics agreed
that Samo's strongh old, the center of his empire , was at De...
vin, at ,t he conflue nce of the Morav a and Danll!be rivers.

�SLOVAK.IA

72

Professor Oettinger, well-knOIWll historian and archeologis t
of Vienna, however, .prefers to Tegard Vienna as the center
of Samo's Empire. In his book "Das Warden Wiens" (19M),
he tells that he .bases his conclusion especially on the findings resulting from the discovery of the ancient Berghof
Castle in Vienna, the remains of which can ibe traced ;to
Samo's time. The Ava.rs, a nomadic people, could not build
such a g,reat citadel of stone. Presenting a whole series of
philological airguments to baclk his theory, professor Oettinger states that tt is self-eviden t that SlovaJks and ,p ossibly
other Slwanic peoples lived in the aJrea of Vienna iaJIJ.d far to
the west along the Danube territory during Samo's time.
While the Slovanic peoples were resisting the A vars
heroically, a strong Frankish empire was being built in the
west. The power of this empire, whose borders in the eighth
century extended from the Pyrenees to the Sumava River,
became consolidate d especially during the reign of Charles
the Great (Charlemag ne), who ruled from 768 to 814, and
united all the Germanic tribes, subjugated the Bavarians
and the Saxons in the east, and came into contact with the
most westerly tribes of the Slovans. In 799 the armies of
Charlemag ne defeated the Arvars, who lateT were aJbso;z1bed
by the Slovanic inhabitants of the Danube countries.
But the great empire of Charlemag ne, who became
Emperor in 800, had another weapon besides its strong
army for its aggression s into the neighborin g countries of
the east. That weapon was Christianit y, which in the
Franldsh empire had spread and become so strong that already during the reign of Charlemag ne the way was prepared for it to reach the Danubian Slovans who were settled along the eastern borders of the Frankish empire.
To safegururd the eastern f:rontier of his empiire, Charlemagne placed heavy military garrisons along bordering
countries. Such territories were called "Marks" and were
managed by so-called "Markgrav es." In a short time it became evident that the military garriso!IlS of such Marks
were not only for defense, but also for advance into the
neighboring Slovanic countries. Contempor aneously new
bishoprics and monasterie s were built along these bordering countries which strengthen ed the Christian faith and
1

�SIJOVAKIA

73

propagated Christian culture. It was thus that Christianity
came to the neighboring Slovanic nations.
Slovakia already in the very beginning of the ninth
century came into immediate contact with the military and
cultural might of the Frankish empire. The Slovak nation
crossed the threshhold of its national and cultural history.
~RiINCiE PRJ.BINA

The Slovanic tribes, which settled on the northern
bank of the Danube, on ,b oth sides of the 1Mora,va river, weTe
called Moravians. Philologis~, historians, a,nd aroheologists
have a.miply demonstrated that whatever had b,een mentioned
in old historical documents aibout the MoraJVian.s referred
in £act to the ancestors of the Slovaks, the Slovans (ISla&lt;vS)
who already in the first half of the ninth century were the
inhaJbitants of the territory on both sides of the MoTava
river.
in anoient d0&lt;:uments we find the name "Slovenica"
used interchangeably with ' 1Moravia" and "Magna Moravia"
to designate the territory on both sides of the Morava riveT.
A document of King Loruis from the year 861 also, calls that
area "Slovenica." In western (Latin) sources, the inhabit..,
ants of that territory were called ''Moravians" and "the
Slarvs of Moravia" (Slavi; Sclavi; Sch1avi; Sc,l a,v i Marahenses; Marehenses; Maravi; Mairavani; Moravi; Maraibi; MarahaJvi; Sclavini; Selavi Margenses) to distinguish them from
the Slorvans (Slavs) who had occupied other territories (Behemi; Sclavi Boehemia; Boemie; Beheimi; Boemani ; Boo-.
manici; Behemani; Bohemani; Bulgari; Vulgari; ChTobati;
BeJochrobati; .Kosari; Czechi; Poloni; ,Russi; etc.). In eastern sources, however, the inhabitants of the same territory
were called "Slovenes" ('Slovieni; Sloveni), while their land
wa:s rreferred to as "Slovak Land" and "Moravia" (.Slovenska
zemlja; Morava). It is significant that af.ter the fall olf Great
Moravia, her inhabitants were referred to by their a,ndent
name: Slavi; ,Sclavi; Slovieni; Sloveni - older forms of the
term Slovak, which began to appear onyl after the fifteenth centUTY.
From reliable sources we learn that about the year
830,. there ruled in Slovakia a prince named Pribina, who
resided in Nitra. The name Pribina and Nitra are very dear

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to ,t he hearts of all .Slovaks, because Prilbina is the name
of the first Slovak ruler ever mentioned by history, and
Nitra is the name of the first Slovak castle which became
the cradle of Slovak national history. Pribina reigned in
Nitra and his principality extended over the territory of
the fertile basin of the Nitra river. The sovereignty of the
Prince of Nitra was acknowledged by other Slovak principalities that extended along the Hron river country, the
banks of the Vah and other Slovak lands. Under the rule
of Prince Pribina belonged the Slovaik principalities that lay
to the east of the Small Carpathians.
The same sources tell us that Archbishop Adalram of
Salzburg blessed a church on Pribina's land in Nitra. This
consecration is proof that the Christianity spread by the
German priests among the Slovaks already had taken firm
root. Pribina's church in Nitra is the first Christian church
on the territory of the western Slovans. While other Slovanic peoples in the eastern half of Europe still lived far
off from western-European Christian culture and wandered
in the darkness of paganism, the Slovak nation already in
the beginning of the ninth century was counted among the
Christian, the cultured nations of Europe.
At the time of the consecration of the Nitra church,
in 833, Pribina himself was not yet a Christian. But the
circumstance that Pribina allowed the Christian faith to be
preached to his nation proves that the first Slovak ruler,
even though he probably could not grasp the significance
of Christian doctrine, nevertheless understood the political
and cultural significance of Christianity on the SlovanoGermanic border. Pribina, a wise and prudent ruler, knew
that a small nation at this dangerous crossroad could defend itself against its stronger neighbors only when it was
equal to them culturally.
Not long afterwards, however, cruel calamity befell the
ruler of Nitra. Prince Mojmir, who had united the Slovak
tribes in the western part of the Slovak territory under his
rule and who probably resided at Devin, drove Pribina out
of Nitra and occupied his domain. Out of this union of
.Mojmirs country with Pribina's, there arose on the north
bank of the Danube a state that united all the Slovak

�SLOVAKIA

75

tribes. The state, thus established about the year 830, was
called Great Moravia (VeFka Morava) or the Great Moravian Empire (Vefkomoravska risa).
Pribina, with his son Kocef and a retinue of Slovak
magnates, sought refuge in the neighboring Mark to the
east, near the Danube. Markgrave Ratbod presented Pribina to King Louis the German. The latter had Pribina in:structed in the Christian faith and baptized in St. Martin's
,c hurch in the city of Treisma (probably the present city of
Sankt Polten in Germany). For a time Pribina and his
group lived in the court of Markgrave Ratbod, but when
the latter refused to aid him against Mojmir, he went to
the Bulgars. However, he did not tarry there for long
either, because soon after we find him seeking the aid of
Ratimar, the Croatian Prince. At that time (about 838),
Ratimar was not on good terms with Ratbod, so Pribina
had to take refuge with Count Salach of Corutania. The
latter succeeded in reconciling Pribina with Ratbod.
In exile Pribina convinced himself that he could not
regain his lost domain and return to Nitra. He became reconciled with his fate and sought to gain the favor of King
Louis the German. The latter entrusted to Pribina the new
principality beyond the Danube, the country of Pannonia
near Blatno. In 847 he became the independent ruler of this
principality and built a formidable citadel there that was
called Blatnohrad (Moosburg). After his baptism, Pribina
became a zealous Christian and sought to convert all his
subjects to Christianity. He invited German missionaries
into his domain, built churches, endowed monasteries and
often welcomed the archbishop of Salzburg at his court.
In his work, Pribina had a zealous helper in the person of
his son Kocel'. When Pribina died in 861 under mysterious
circumstances, Kocel' inherited his principality. The Slovak
nation, immediately with its first appearance on the stage
of European history, entered the services of Christian culture. The Slovaks are the oldest nation on the central
Danube and they were the first nation in Central Europe
to have its own independent state. It is well to note that
the Slovak State from its very inception was ,a Christian

State.

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SLOVAKIA

CHAPTER TWO
'DHiE GREAT M!ORA~ EJMPI'RE

The studies of historians, philologists, and -archeolo~
gists clearly indicate that the Great Moravian Empire was

not the empire of the ''Great Moravians," but the land of
the ancietn Slov•a k s who had settled on both sides of the
'Morava river. The Great Moravian IDmpire, then, was in reality a Great Slova!k Empire, if we are to call the territory
by the name of the peole who had occupied it from the dawn
of history. These studies refute the hypothesis of the Czech
and non-Czech philologists, ethnogr~phers, and historians,
who claim that "Czechs and Slovaks of Bohemia, MMoraviia,
and Nor.them Hung•a ry (SlovaJkia) fornied a single group
with a common langua,ge."
Furthermore, these studies tell us that at first there
were two estates or rprinciipalities in that area: the one
called "Mol'ova" was around the Morava up to the Vah with
its capital city at Devin, while the other called "Nitra" the capital city of which bore the i,;ame name - was around
the Nitra river. When Mojmir, the ruler of Moravia, conquered Pribina, the ruler of Nitra, German chronicles 'began
to call his empire "Magna Mora'Via," whk'h meant the annexation of the NitJ:ra principality to that of Mor8JVia.
We afso leiarn from these studies that the ancestors of
the Czechs had settled in the land of the Boii (Boehemi,a;
Behemia; Bohemia) just ltbout at the same time that the
Slovaks occupied the territory of the Morava river. Moj!mir,
Rastislav, and Sviitopllllk built the empire of the Slova!ks,
while Hostivit and Borivoj built .the state of the Czechs.
The Annales Fra,ncofuldenses tell us that "Sviitoplwk extricated the Czech tribes from Frankish rule by force." Later
the Czechs (Slavs of Bohemia) even joined the Germans to
wage war agaJnst the Great Moravian EmpiTe.
When Mojmir, some time in the year 836, drove Pribina out of Nitra and united the territory inhabited by
Slovak trib,es into a larger unit, there arose on the northern
bank of the Danube an empire which the Byzantine em1

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peror, Constantine Po.rphyrogennetos, in his work "About
the Management of a State" (950), calls Great Moravia.
Mojmir's empire stretched over the territory of present
Slovakia and Moravia and was, after Samo's empire, the
second Slovanic state near the Danube on the German-Slovanic border.
Just as Samo's Empire, so even the Great Mora'Vlian
Empire had its origin at the same historic crossroad, because it was here that the greatest danger threatened the
Slovanic peoples and they had to unite in defense of their
freedom a,nd independence. While Samo's empire , arose because the Slovans along the Danube wanted to protect
themselves against the enemies from the east, Great Moravia was established under pressure of danger from the
west.
Mojmir, like Pribina, tried to live in peace with the
neighboring Germans, because he knew that war with them
could only end disastrously for the Slovaks. Mojmir was
already a Christian, so the missionary activity of the German priests on the territory of Great Moravia went on nuhampered. We must remember that Great Moravia at that
time did not have any definite borders, because the borders
of states of the Middle Ages never were defined strictly.
The area of Great Moravia changed because the successors
of Mojmir did undertake expeditions into neighboring countries, defeated them in battle and annexed them to the
empire.
Louis the German did not relish the idea of a great,
united Slovanic empire as a neighbor. In 846 he unseated
Mojmir and replaced him with Rastislav. The latter simu~
lated friendship for Louis, but knew well that the independence of his country was constantly threatened by the
Germans. The independence of Great Moravia was threatened not only by German armies, but also by the missionary activity of the German priests, who had begun to look
upon the territory as a part of the German empire. In
about 860 Rastislav sent a special messenger to Pope Nicholas I in Rome with a request for missionaries who had
a command of the Slovanic tongues. The Pope, however,
answered he was sorry that he could not help Rastislav,

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because at that time there were no such priests in Rome.
After due deliberation with his advisers, Rastislav decided to send a special mission to .Constantinople, to .E mperor Michael ill. Rastislav's request, as presented to the
Emperor, read: "Since our people has cast off paganism
and follows the Christian law, we do not have such a teacher, who might explain the true Christian Faith to us in our
own tongue, so that even other parties, witnessing this,
might become like unto us. So send us, Emperor, such a
bishop and teacher, because your country is everywhere
recognized for its good laws."
Just about that time the German empire found strong
allies in the Bulgarians, who bordered with Great Moravia
at the Tisa river and lived in enmity with the Byzantine
emperor. Michael did not have to deliberate long with his
counsellors. He wanted Rastislav as an ally against the
German-Bulgarian alliance and, hence, decided to aid the
ruler of Great Moravia in his quest for missionaries who
could speak the language of Rastislav's people. Up to this
time the land of the Slovaks was subject to the influence
of western culture only. Now it was to make contacts with
the Christian culture of the European east.
SLOVAK .APOSTLES: CYRIL .AND METHODLUS

Em;peror Michael of Constantinople decided to send
Constantine (Cyril), the philosopher and linguist, and his
brother Methodius, who was versed in the art of government, to preach the Gospel to the people of Rastislav. Constantine had distinguished himself in apostolic work before,
at first alone and later with his brother Methodius. As
natives of Salonica (Thessalonica) they were suited for the
mission: they new the language of Rastislav's people, the
forefathers of the Slovaks. The Emperor, having summoned them, told the brothers: "You are from Salonica, and
all Salonicans speak pUTe Slovanic."
Upon learning that Rastislav's people did not have their
own script, the task of inventing one fell to the lot of Constantine. Legend has it that the alphabet worked out by
Constantine (Cyril) had been revealed to him by God. It
was quite an achievement. Constantine started with Greek

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79

characters, but Slovanic sounds of the ninth century varied
greatly with the Greek, therefore signs and characters had
to be created to designate them. The alphabet that resulted
is known as "Cyrillic."
After due preparation for their new mission, the brothers Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius set out for the
country of Rastislav. They arrived in Rastislav's empire
in 863 and began preaching the Word of God in the language of the people. Soon ,a fter the translation of the
Scriptl.ll'es and liturgical 1b ooks was completed and present...
ed to Rastislav's court at Devin. Naturally the saintly brothers gained many admirers and disciples. These catechists
went among their people and aided Constantine and Methodius in their missionary work. Up to the time of the Slovak
apostles, only three languages were considered feasible for
ecclesiastic life, the Holy Scriptures and the Church liturgy: Hebrew, Latin and Greek. The latter two were used
extensively-the Greek in the Byzantine (eastern) Church
and Latin in the Roman (western) Church. Due to the efforts of Constantine and Methodius, the language of the
Slovaks (early Slovanic) became the third language to be
used in Church liturgy.
The work of Constantine and Methodius in Rastislav's
empire was blessed with success. The saintly brothers united the people of Rastislav spiritually and. also contributed
handsomely to the material welfare of the Great Moravian
Empire. Their disciples later spread the Gospel to other
neighboring Slovanic nations (Czechs, Serbs, Russians) in
a language that was for the most part understandable to
all Slo-\'anic nations.
The German clergy of Salzburg viewed the work of
Constantine and Methodius with envy and accused the brothers of introdllJlcing dangerous innovations into the liturgy
of the Church. A protest against their activities was lodged
in Rome, and the brothers were summoned by Pope Nicholas (858-867) to vindicate themselves.
Constantine and Methodius set out for Rome in 867.
Their journey led them through Lake Blatno (Balaton),
the residence of Prince Kocer, Pribina's son. Kocer received
the brothers with great joy and examined their liturgical

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books in the Slovanic script with great interest. Leaving
Kocer, Constantine and Methodius passed through Corinthia to Venice on the Adriatic Sea. At Venice they successfully defended their use of the language of Rastislav's people in the liturgy of the Church, while the ecclesiastics
there had to concede defeat in the debate.
While Constantine and Methodius made their way to
Rome, Pope Nicholas died. Four days later his successor,
Adriam ]I (867--872), was elected head of the ChuTch.
The saintly brothers were given a cordial reception by the
Pope, and, after convincing a synod of bishops that they
were not guilty of introducing any dangerous innovations
into the liturgy of the Church, their activities were accorded Adrian's approval. The Holy Father accepted the liturgical books in ;the Slov,anic language, blessed them on the aUar
of the church of St. Mary Major, and celebrated the Divine
Liturgy over them himself. The Pope then proceeded to
consecrate Constantine and Methodius as bishops. A number of their disciples (Clement, Gorazd, Angelar, Sava and
Naum) were ordained to the priesthood by the bishops Formosus and Gaundenrich.
Shortly thereafter Constantine became seriously ill and
retired to a monastery. There he joined the religious community, taking the name of Cyril. He died February 14,
869, and his earthly remains were buried on the right side
of the high altar of the church of St. Clement in Rome.
After the death of Saint Cyril, the entire burden of
spreading the Gospel and teaching of Christ rested on the
shoulders of his brother. Methodius returned as archbishop
and papal legate fully authorized to organize the Church
in the land of Rastislav. Archbishop Methodius became the
head of Slovanic Christendom. Besides receiving the highest ecclesiastical dignity, Methodius carried letters from the
Pope for Rastislav of Great Moravia, Svatopluk of Nitra
and Kocef of Blatnohrad Castle (Moosburg), the three Slovak princes, which stated that the Pope permitted the use
of Slovanic liturgy with the reservation that the epistle
and ,gospel always be read in Latin before being read in
the vernacular (Slovanic). The archdiocese of Methodius
extended over Great Moravia and beyond the Danube over

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Pannonia, uniting the lands governed by Slovak rulers. But
as Methodius was returing to continue his apostolic work
among the people of Rastislav, a new ruler was taking
over the throne of Great Moravia.
KING S,V ATOPDUCK

While Methodius was in Rome, the Germans continued
to harass Rastislav. In 869 King Louis the German declared
war against the neighboring Slovanic peoples and invaded
their lands with his armies headed by his three sons. Prince
Louis attacked the Lusatian Serbs, Charles went after Rastislav, and Carloman tore into the territory that was ruled
by Rastislav's nephew, Svatopluk of Nitra. The German
armies plundered and pillaged the Great Moravian Empire.
But Rastislav's stronghold, the mighty Devin, proved impregnable and Rastislav's empire retained its independence.
The following year, however, Rastislav was betrayed
by his own kinsman, his nephew Svatopluk, regent of Nitra.
Success in battle had turned Svatopluk's head. The Germans played up to Svatopluk and promised to help him
gain the throne of Great Moravia. Svatopluk decided to
betray his uncle and vowed loyalty to Carloman. Rastislav,
however, learned of the plot and became furious. Having
vowed to punish his traitorous nephew, he ordered his men
to do away with Svatopluk at a banquet, but their attempt
to take and kill him failed. Soon thereafter Rastislav led
his army against Svatopluk. In the ensuing battle, Rastislav was defeated. Worse than that, he was captured and
handed over to the Germans. Carloman sent Rastislav
bound in chains to Bavaria where King Louis the German
imprisoned him and had his eyes ,gouged out. Rastislav
died later as a prisoner of the Germans.
With Rastislav's defeat the Great Moravian Empire
passed completely into the hands of the German crown.
The Germans also seized Archbishop Methodius, who had
returned from Rome, and imprisoned him. The Bavarian
bishops, who regarded Methodius as a foreign intruder,
made claims to the territories of the Slovanic peoples along
the Danube and dealt with Methodius so inhumanely that
Svatopluk himself intervened in his behalf. When Carlo-

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man took possession of Rastislav's country and seized his
royal treasures, he entrusted the rule of the ravaged country to Svatopluk.
Svatopluk soon proved himself a strong ruler. As a
soldier he excelled in ruthless courage. The Germans began
to distrust him, because they feared he would build an empire so strong as to imperil their country. Louis the German decided to put Svatopluk out of the way. In 871 the
Germans succeeded in taking Svatopluk and imprisoned
him. Some of his castles were taken over by the German
Markgraves. Svatopluk denied the charge of Carloman that
he plotted against the German crown, but that did not help
him. When the Slovaks learned what had happened to their
ruler, they elected Slavomir to take his place and rebelled
against the Germans.
Slavomir was supported by the whole country. A terrilble war followed. The Germans suffered heaivy losses.
Devin proved impregnable to their attacks. In the meantime, the wily Svatopluk was plotting to even matters with
the Germans who had tricked him. While in prison he repented his betrayal of Rastislav and vowed to even the
score with his German captors.
Svatopluk begged Carloman to release him so that he
might subdue the Slovaks under Slavomir. Carloman was
reluctant at first, but finally gave in to Svatopluk's pleadings. Accompanyin g a large German army, Sviitopluk soon
found himself below the mighty fortress of Devin. While
the German army encamped quietly below the citadel, Svatopluk set out with a small detachment of men to the castle
to persuade Slavomir to surrender without a battle. Once
inside the castle, Svatopluk disclosed his plan to Slavomir.
Assuming command of the Slovak army, Svatopluk tore
out of the courtyard and attacked the Germans with such
sa;vagery that only few were able to esc•a;pe alirve. Carloman's army was caught unawares and crushed.
Svatopluk knew that the Germans would come after
him sooner or later. He looked around for allies. That same
year (871), he married the sister of Borivoj, ruler of the
Bohemian fand, and formed an alliance with' him. Svatopluk
pressed the offensive against the Germans and was quite

�SLOVAKIA

83

successful. In 873 he defeated Carloman decisively. Carloman asked his father Louis for help to fight the Slovaks.
When aid was not forthcoming, Carloman decided to seek
a truce with Svatopluk. He signed a pact with Svatopluk
at Forsheim in 874 and recognized the independence of the
Great Moravian Empire. Svatopluk had reached the pinnacle of his ambitions: he was sole ruler of the Great Moravian Empire, with its crupital at Devin near Bratislava.
(Continued)

• • •
1856 -

DR. SAMUEL CZAMBEL -

1956

P.A. HROBAK

T.he year 1956 marks not only the centennial of the
dea:th o:f the great Slovak fighter for freedom and democracy, Dr. Louis Sti1r, ,b ut it is a}so the centennial of the
birth of the eminent SlovaJk philologist, Samuel Czam:bel.
Czambel was born September 1, 1856, in the town of
Slovenska Eupca, Zvolen County, 1Slova;kia. The ~tudy of
his native Slovak language attracted him early in his life
and he devoted much of his adult Hfe to it. He died in Buda.pest, December 18, 1909.
In 1887, Czam'bel wrote his Contrioutions to the History of the Slovak Language (''Prispevlky k dejinam jazy.ka slovenskeho") ; he followed this with his Slovak Orthography ("Slovensky praivopis") in 1890; A Manual of
the Literary Slovak Language ("Rukovaf spisovnej reci
slovenskej") in 1902; The Slovaks and Their Language
("Slovaci a kh rec") in 1903; 8Jlld The Slovak Language
and its Place in the Family of Slovanic Languages ("Slo-.
venska rec a jej miesto v rodine slovenskych jazykov"),
624 pp., in 1906. Of course, Czambel contributed many
other articles on Slovak subjects to Slovak newspapers,
periodical reviiews and magazines.
Czambel's "Rukovae (Slovak Grammar), revised and
modified several times since its first edition by the late
Dr. Joseph SkU!ltety, is a ,s tandard work with ,p hilologists,
grammarians, and students of Slovak. In his "Slovaoi a ich
rec," Czambel promoted the theory that the SlovaJks were
every closely related to the Croatians, Slovenes and Serbs

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1428">
                    <text>63

SLOVAKIA

The History of Slovakia:
By PHILIP A . HROBAiK

SLOVENSKO -

SLOVAKIA -

SLOVAKLAND

The territory occupied by the Slovak people for the
past 1500 years is known as Slovakia. It is situated in the
very heart of Europe. Present-day Slovakia has an area of
49,015 square kilometers (approximately 19,000 sq. miles)
and a population of 4,000,000. There were times when the
borders of Slovakia extended beyond their present limits
and times when the land of the Slovaks had no definite
borders at all.
In ancient times the Slovaks occupied even the western
bank of the Morava river and the north bank of the Tisa
(Theiss) river. Though the area and the borders of Slovakia changed at various times, its topography - the land
and its waterways - did not.
Slovakia is bound on the north by the Carpathian
Mountains and on the south by the blue Danube and the
upper arm of the Tisa river. Into these two streams empty
all the rivers of Slovakia that have their origin in the foothills of the King's Plateau (Krafova Hofa) - the natural
center of Slovakia: those that run off to the southwest
empty into the Danube, while those that course to the
southwest pour into the Tisa, forming deep valleys and
broad basins between the ,i ndividual mountain :zones that
fill out the largest part of the territory of Slovakia.
This territory is divided into three parts: 1. western
Slovakia which drains into the Danube tributaries; 2. eastern Slovakia that drains into the tributaries of the Tisa;
3. the mountainous country of central Slovakia.
The geographical picture of Slovakia is extremely
varied, because high mountain ranges alternate with deep
valleys which, in places, spread out into basins. Fertile
plains stretch out from the foothills of the mountains.
Slovakia is situated in the very center of Europe
where the north-eastern spurs of the Alps near the central
Danube touch upon the mountainous arch of the Carpa-

�64

SLOVAKIA

thians which is the main watershed of central Europe.
From this watershed the streams of central Europe run
into several seas. In olden times the course of these
streams determined the course of roads along which nations migrated and business and culture flowed. We find
Slovakia at the juction of these roads which cross the
Caripathian Mountains kom the north and the south.
Two roads were especially significant in deciding the
fate of Slovakia and the Slovak nation. One coursed along
the Danube and connected the western oountTies of Europe
with the eastern world. Near the Carpatho-Alpian gate this
road intersected with the other important highway which
started from the coast of the Adriatic Sea, crossed the
Danube, proceeded to the north against the current of the
Morava river and went to the coast of the Baltic Sea.
Slovakia, according to archeological researches, was
well inhabited as early as 5000 B. C., but we do not know
the race or the names of the peoples who inhabited the
land. Traces of the Neolithic Man, who used stone weapons
in hunting the mammoth and the huge cave bear, have
been found. The scientific investigator will find much material on the prehistoric period in the museum of Bratislava
and Turciansky Svaty Martin.
About the year 2000 B.C. begins the Bronze Age with
its burial urns, and clay and stone remains, found on the
sites of ancient settlements in Slovakland. During the ensuing Iron Age, we find traces of the Illyrians in the west,
of the Thracians in the east. The latter came into contact
with the Scythians in the valley of the Tisa river.
Several nations of various origins and culture lived in
Slovakia just before the dawn of the Christian era. According to ancient Greek and Roman writers, the land of
the Slovaiks was inhabited by the Gauls and the Celts at
that time. In the fourth century B. C., we note traces of
the more advanced Gallic culture from the discoveries of
golden ornaments and coins, imitations of those issued by
Philip III of Macedonia and his son, Alexander the Great.
At Bratislava coins of the Roman Republic, dating from
the first century B. C., have been found. A Greek map of
the Slovak territory, dating back to the third century,

�SLOVAKIA

65

shows many Slovanic names for mountains and rivers,
The fertile plains of south-eastern Slovakia were occupied by the Boii, a Gallic tri'be, and in the mountainous
parts of central Slovakia lived the Kotin (Gothine) tribe
which worked the ore of the Iron Mountains. The Osi settled in the neighborhood of the Kotins, while the Korkonti
- tribes of southern origin - occupied the northwestern
part of Slovakia.
In the first half of the last century before Christ the
Dacians came to Slovakia from the east and overpowered
the Gallic Boii. But in the first quarter of the first century
after Christ, the Dacians were forced to migrate to the
north into the mountains, because they were iha:rd pressed
by the J azygi who had come from the Black Sea to take
over the land on the left side of the Danube.
During the reign of Tiberius, two Germanic tribes settled in the territory of the Slovaks, the Quadi and the
Marcomanni, who frequently raided the Roman proi\Tince
of Pannonia on the other side of the Danube. Vannius, the
bellicose king of the Quadi, built military fortresses along
the V ah river and extended his power to the Turiec a:nd
Kysuca rivers.
About twenty years after Christ, when a large part of
the territory of Slovakia was occupied by the Quadi, the
Romans were consolidating their might near the Danube.
The Franks and the Romans began to wage war for the
control of the territory of Slovakia, a struggle that lasted
several centuries.
South of the Danube the Romans organized the province of Pannonia, east of which was the province of Dacia.
To conquer the whole Danube basin to the Carpathians, the
Romans built military strongholds along the south bank of
the Danube. Such fortresses were established at Vindobona
(Vienna), Carnanthum (Hainburg), Brigetium (Komarno)
and at Aquincum (Budapest). To defend and to secure the
frontier along the Danube against incursions of barbaric
tribes, the Romans sent detachments across the river to
established military stations on the northern bank, on the
territory of Slovakia. From excacations we know that Ro-

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SLOVAK.IA

man troops were stationed at Devin, Stupava, Bratislava
and opposite Komarno at li.
The Romans bested the Quadi in battle. Their king
Vannius ruled over the territory of Slovakia by the grace
of the Roman Emperor. Of course, the Quadi resented this.
After Vannius' death the aggressive Quadi challenged the
power of the Romans on the Danube and the Roman Emperors had to defend their rule with large armies. Along
the Vah river the Roman troops penetrated as far as Trencin. Emperor Marcus Aurelius and his son Commodus defeated the Quadi in 179 A. D. after several bloody skirmishes on Slovak territory, as is commemorate d by inscription on a roc'k at Trencin: "In memory of the IVictory of the
Emperor's army that encamped at Laugaricio, 855 soldiers
of the II. Legion. Made by Constantine, commander of the
II. auxiliary Legion." This army was stationed at Laugaritio, a Roman settlement near Trencin, which has since
disappeared.
During these skirmishes with the Quadi, probably
about 173 A. D., the Roman army in Slovakia found itself
threatened by a scarcity of water. In the army that fought
against the Germans somewhere along the Hron river,
there were several Christians who had come from Asia
Minor. These Christian soldiers - the first Christians on
Slovak territory - prayed for raiin and their prayers were
answered. The Roman army was saved. This incident is immortalized on the Arch of Triumph of Emperor Marcus
Aurelius in Rome.
The Quadi, 1b eaten repeatedly by the Romans, never
·gwve up trying to drive the Romans out of Slovakia. Emperor Constantine LI defeated them in 258 A.ID. and Emperor
Valentian, the last Roman emperor who cowd claim sovereignty over the territory of Slovakia, repeated the pel'for:mance in 3·74. Upon the latter's death in 376, the great Mig;ra~
tion of Nations begain.. Shortly thereafter the Romans
ipulled thek gax.risoDJS out of Slo-y;aJk ia and let the Quadi
take over. The Quadi, however, were evicted from the territory by the Huns in the first half of the fifth century.
The Huns in turn were displaced by the Heruli, who held
the territory until about 491 when the Lombards defeated

�SLOVAKIA

87

them, occupied their lands and held them until about 526,
when they crossed the Danube into Pannonia.
Slovrukia, however, did not remain even under the Huns
for long. After the disintegration of the Roman Empire,
the Germans migrated from Slovakia to the south. The
Marcomanni, weakened by the wars with the Romans and
forced by the hordes of Attila to join his army, were wiped
out in the battle of Cha.Ions (Catalaunian Fields) in 451.
There is as yet no definite proof, even though it may be
safely assumed, that the Slovaks and related Slovanic tribes
came into Slovakia in increasing numbers after the extinction of the Marcomanni. The historian J ordannes, writing
in the sixth century, said that all the Hungarian plain was
inhabited by Slovanic people (the Slavs).
AFTIDR THE ADVENT OF THE SLOVAKS

The Slovaks came to their present territory from the
East, probably from India. At the time Frankish tribes
fought the Roman Legions over the territory of Slovakia,
the Slovanic peoples occupied the land that stretched to the
north of the Carpathians and to the east of the river Vistula. It was a marshy and unfertile land. In time the growing Slovanic families were forced to emigrate to neighboring territories.
The Slovanic peoples who migrated to the west and
occupied the territory to the Elbe and Saal rivers are called
We,stern Slavs; they are the Poles, the SlOJVaks and! the
Czechs; those that occwpied the territory between t'he Elbe
and Oder rivers and the country along the coast of the
Baltic Sea are known as the Lusatian Serbs (northern Germany) and the Kashubes (near the Baltic Sea); today their
numbers are few. The Slovanic peoples, who migrated from
their ancient land to the south and occupied the Balkan
peninsula, are called the Southern Slavs: the Slovenes,
Croatians, Serbs and Bulgarians. A large part of the Slovanic peoples migrated to the east and occupied the plains
of eastern Europe. They are the Eastern Slavs: the White
Russians, the Little Russians (Ukrainians) and the Great
Russians.
As the great Slovanic family disintegrated, separate

�68

SLOVAKIA

Slovanic nations developed with the centuries, each with
its dictinct culture, language, customs and traditions.
The Slovaks, like other Slovanic peoples, originally
were hunters. After a time they took to bee culture and
animal husbandry, especially sheep raising. From their
neighbors they learned to cultivate the soil. The men folk
hunted and herded sheep, while .the women and the slaves
did the farm work. The only trades known to them were
pottery making and blacksmithing. In business transactions
they exchanged products or paid in cloth; money was not
known as a means of barter. The Slovaks lived in simple
huts made of poles driven into the ground, around which
were wound branches and twigs which were then covered
with mud.
Several families, originating from a common forefather, formed a clan ("rod"). The head of the clan was the
oldest member; he was in charge of the common property
of the clan. A Slovanic settlement, inhabited by several related families, i.e. a clan, was called a village ("dedina"
from "dedo"-grandfather). The village was the common
heritage ("dedicstvo") of the whole clan. Several related
clans made up a tribe ("kmeii"), the leader of which was
the tribal chief, called a priest ("kiiaz") or prince ("knieza). When several such related tribes lived in one territory
for a long time a Slovanic state evolved and a Slovanic
nation was born.
SLOVAK CHARACTERISTICS

The Slovanic peoples had many good and bad characteristics. They loved songs and entertainment. Not possessing great wealth, they lived frugally. They were goodhearted and hospitable, but suffered discipline with difficulty.
They did not know how to obey, hence there was no harmony among them. They did not seek a battle, but when
they had to defend themselves they fought heroically and
also knew how to be cruel. All these characterictics of the
Slovanic nature can be found in the Slovanic nations even
at the ,p resent time.
The historian Procopius (562) said that the Slavs were
rather tall, hardy, blond-haired people and honesty was one

�SlJOVAK.I.A

69

of their marked characteristics. Theophylactus recorded an
interesting commentary on the Slavs. He said: "In 590
three men were captured by the Greeks in Thrace; the men
carried musical instruments instead of weapons. When
Caesar M:auricus asked who they ,w ere, the men answered:
'We are Slavs; we love music; we play the guitar and violin
and sing.' Mauricus was overcome by their simplicity. Af..,
ter feasting them he had a guard escort them to their
lands."
The German historian Herder had this to say about
the Slavs: "They loved farming; they had herds and implements and a home industry ; with the products of their
land and their industry they carried on a useful business.
They built cities and in places occupied themselves with
mining; they knew how to melt and mold metals. The Slavs
prepared salt, made cloth, brewed beer, grafted trees, and
lived according to their manner a happy, musical life.''
The Slovaks of old had names for implements, furniture, grains, fruit trees, trades and animals. They had their
own words for: plow, iron, cloth, needle, pliers, wheel,
wagon, seal, ring, blacksmith, spoon, clothier, butcher,
cape, jeweler.
As a musical people they had many folk songs. In
number and variety of content they are second to those
of no other nation.
SLOVAK MYTHOLOGY

There are very few reliable records of the religion of
ancient Slovanic peoples. We know that they believed in a
Supreme Being and in immortality. The Slovaks called the
Supreme Being "Praboh" :_ the God of all gods. They had
a White God - the God of all good, and a Black God - the
God of evil and death. Many lesser gods, belonging to both
the white and black groups, also existed for the ancient
Slovaks and other Slovanic peoples.
"ZIVENA" was the godess of life, and "MORENA"
the godess of death. Brooks and streams housed nymphs,
and fairies inhabited the woods and forests. "LADA" was
the godess of beauty, while "URODA" was the godess of
the fields and crops. ' ~PfilRUIN" (P.AJROM" ) , the God of
thunder, was held in great respect.

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SLOVAKIA

The ancient Slovaks worshipped and invoked their gods
in sacred groves. They offered sacrifices of grain and animals to images of wood and stone through their priests.
The White Priests (BieJok:iiazi) served and invoked the
White Gods. The White Priests were most important men
of the tribe; they presided at all councils and trials and
their judgments and decisions were final. The Black Priests
- the magicians and sorcerers - were believed to possess
powers of tmnsforming peraons into animals and inanimate
objects.
The Slovaks, like most of the other Slovanic peoples
of ancient times, cremated or buried their dead. Food,
weapons, wine and jewelry were usually placed in the
graves of the dead. Ashes of the dead were placed in urns
of clay and then buried. Mounds of clay and stone were
built over burial places; the greater the mound, the more
important the person or persons buried there. Several such
mounds were found and excavated in Slovakia (at Skalica,
Brezolupy, Boooivce, Kras:iiany near 2ilina and at Cepcin in
Turiec). One of the most extensive burial grounds was uncovered at Devinska Nova Ves.
Some of the customs and practices of the ancient pagan Slovaks have survived the centuries and are still observed in many quaint villages of Slovakia today. Many of
the pagan practices, however, disappeared with the advent
of Christianity.
As the Slovanic peoples abandoned their ancient lands
and began to colonize central and eastern Europe - after
the Germanic Heruli and Lombards withdrew from the territory of Slovakia in the sixth ·century and the Slovaks
came in - the savage nation of the Avars tore into the
Danube basin, overran the whole territory, and pushed
deeply into the Frankish kingdom in the west. During the
next hundred years the whole region seethed in turmoil.
The Avars were wild nomads of Turko-Tartarian origin
who rode their horses rough-shod over the countries of
their neighbors and subjugated them. They settled in Pannonia, where they built military camps which were protected by huge, circular mounds of earth and stone and
wooden fences. The Slovaks withdrew from this territory

�SLOVAKIA

71

and settled north of the Danube . Part of the Slovak tribes
lived in the mounta ins; they were govern ed by their own
princes .
The Slovan ic peoples along the Danube had to serve
the Avars and were forced to go with them on their rampages into neighb oring territor ies. The A vars looted the
Germa n lands in the west and Constan tinoiple (Cari•h rad)
and Salonik a in the east. Natura lly, the Slovan ic peoples
wanted tQ throw off the yoke of the Aivars and waited for
the opportu ne momen t to rebel. That time came in 624,
when Samo, a Franki sh mercha nt, succeed ed in uniting the
Slovani c peoples and led them in battle agains t the savage
A;vars. Sa.mo defeate d the Arv,a xs rund founde d the first SlovaJllic state ,near the central Danube . Encour aged by the
victory over the A vars, Samo led the Slovan ic peoples
agains t the German ic Franks . Samo again was victorio us;
his Slovani c army defeate d the Franks under Dagob ert in
a three-d ay battle near the Vogast e castle in 631. Becaus e
the Slovak s were settled north of the Danub e and the Slovenians south of it, Samo's empire stretch ed over these
territor ies. The Slovani c peoples within these territor ies
were called by the commo n name of Sloven es (Slovie ni).
The main fortres s of this Slovani c empire was situate d in
Slovak ia at the conflue nce of the Morava and Danube rivers. Samo's empire , howeve r, disinte grated soon after his
death (658). Wheth er it was the ,k ingdom of the Slova!ks
alone is questio nable, but the fact remain s that the territory of Slovak ia formed the core of it.
ilfu-edegar's "Chron icles" ;record that a ~trong westem Slovan ic empire existed already in the seventh century ,
strong enough to, resist the pressu re of the Avars and the
rule of Dagob ert. Fredeg ar wrote quite plainly that Samo
came along when the Slovam c tribes of the area were successful ly rebellin g aga~t the rule of the A vars. His "Chro.nioles" form the basis of most theorie s in ;regard to the
ethnica l composiition of Samo's Empire , its territor ial extent
and the site of its princip al city or strongh old. In recent
yeara Slova!k, Polish, and Czech scholar s of Slavist ics agreed
that Samo's strongh old, the center of his empire , was at De...
vin, at ,t he conflue nce of the Morav a and Danll!be rivers.

�SLOVAK.IA

72

Professor Oettinger, well-knOIWll historian and archeologis t
of Vienna, however, .prefers to Tegard Vienna as the center
of Samo's Empire. In his book "Das Warden Wiens" (19M),
he tells that he .bases his conclusion especially on the findings resulting from the discovery of the ancient Berghof
Castle in Vienna, the remains of which can ibe traced ;to
Samo's time. The Ava.rs, a nomadic people, could not build
such a g,reat citadel of stone. Presenting a whole series of
philological airguments to baclk his theory, professor Oettinger states that tt is self-eviden t that SlovaJks and ,p ossibly
other Slwanic peoples lived in the aJrea of Vienna iaJIJ.d far to
the west along the Danube territory during Samo's time.
While the Slovanic peoples were resisting the A vars
heroically, a strong Frankish empire was being built in the
west. The power of this empire, whose borders in the eighth
century extended from the Pyrenees to the Sumava River,
became consolidate d especially during the reign of Charles
the Great (Charlemag ne), who ruled from 768 to 814, and
united all the Germanic tribes, subjugated the Bavarians
and the Saxons in the east, and came into contact with the
most westerly tribes of the Slovans. In 799 the armies of
Charlemag ne defeated the Arvars, who lateT were aJbso;z1bed
by the Slovanic inhabitants of the Danube countries.
But the great empire of Charlemag ne, who became
Emperor in 800, had another weapon besides its strong
army for its aggression s into the neighborin g countries of
the east. That weapon was Christianit y, which in the
Franldsh empire had spread and become so strong that already during the reign of Charlemag ne the way was prepared for it to reach the Danubian Slovans who were settled along the eastern borders of the Frankish empire.
To safegururd the eastern f:rontier of his empiire, Charlemagne placed heavy military garrisons along bordering
countries. Such territories were called "Marks" and were
managed by so-called "Markgrav es." In a short time it became evident that the military garriso!IlS of such Marks
were not only for defense, but also for advance into the
neighboring Slovanic countries. Contempor aneously new
bishoprics and monasterie s were built along these bordering countries which strengthen ed the Christian faith and
1

�SIJOVAKIA

73

propagated Christian culture. It was thus that Christianity
came to the neighboring Slovanic nations.
Slovakia already in the very beginning of the ninth
century came into immediate contact with the military and
cultural might of the Frankish empire. The Slovak nation
crossed the threshhold of its national and cultural history.
~RiINCiE PRJ.BINA

The Slovanic tribes, which settled on the northern
bank of the Danube, on ,b oth sides of the 1Mora,va river, weTe
called Moravians. Philologis~, historians, a,nd aroheologists
have a.miply demonstrated that whatever had b,een mentioned
in old historical documents aibout the MoraJVian.s referred
in £act to the ancestors of the Slovaks, the Slovans (ISla&lt;vS)
who already in the first half of the ninth century were the
inhaJbitants of the territory on both sides of the MoTava
river.
in anoient d0&lt;:uments we find the name "Slovenica"
used interchangeably with ' 1Moravia" and "Magna Moravia"
to designate the territory on both sides of the Morava riveT.
A document of King Loruis from the year 861 also, calls that
area "Slovenica." In western (Latin) sources, the inhabit..,
ants of that territory were called ''Moravians" and "the
Slarvs of Moravia" (Slavi; Sclavi; Sch1avi; Sc,l a,v i Marahenses; Marehenses; Maravi; Mairavani; Moravi; Maraibi; MarahaJvi; Sclavini; Selavi Margenses) to distinguish them from
the Slorvans (Slavs) who had occupied other territories (Behemi; Sclavi Boehemia; Boemie; Beheimi; Boemani ; Boo-.
manici; Behemani; Bohemani; Bulgari; Vulgari; ChTobati;
BeJochrobati; .Kosari; Czechi; Poloni; ,Russi; etc.). In eastern sources, however, the inhabitants of the same territory
were called "Slovenes" ('Slovieni; Sloveni), while their land
wa:s rreferred to as "Slovak Land" and "Moravia" (.Slovenska
zemlja; Morava). It is significant that af.ter the fall olf Great
Moravia, her inhabitants were referred to by their a,ndent
name: Slavi; ,Sclavi; Slovieni; Sloveni - older forms of the
term Slovak, which began to appear onyl after the fifteenth centUTY.
From reliable sources we learn that about the year
830,. there ruled in Slovakia a prince named Pribina, who
resided in Nitra. The name Pribina and Nitra are very dear

�74

SLOVAKIA

to ,t he hearts of all .Slovaks, because Prilbina is the name
of the first Slovak ruler ever mentioned by history, and
Nitra is the name of the first Slovak castle which became
the cradle of Slovak national history. Pribina reigned in
Nitra and his principality extended over the territory of
the fertile basin of the Nitra river. The sovereignty of the
Prince of Nitra was acknowledged by other Slovak principalities that extended along the Hron river country, the
banks of the Vah and other Slovak lands. Under the rule
of Prince Pribina belonged the Slovaik principalities that lay
to the east of the Small Carpathians.
The same sources tell us that Archbishop Adalram of
Salzburg blessed a church on Pribina's land in Nitra. This
consecration is proof that the Christianity spread by the
German priests among the Slovaks already had taken firm
root. Pribina's church in Nitra is the first Christian church
on the territory of the western Slovans. While other Slovanic peoples in the eastern half of Europe still lived far
off from western-European Christian culture and wandered
in the darkness of paganism, the Slovak nation already in
the beginning of the ninth century was counted among the
Christian, the cultured nations of Europe.
At the time of the consecration of the Nitra church,
in 833, Pribina himself was not yet a Christian. But the
circumstance that Pribina allowed the Christian faith to be
preached to his nation proves that the first Slovak ruler,
even though he probably could not grasp the significance
of Christian doctrine, nevertheless understood the political
and cultural significance of Christianity on the SlovanoGermanic border. Pribina, a wise and prudent ruler, knew
that a small nation at this dangerous crossroad could defend itself against its stronger neighbors only when it was
equal to them culturally.
Not long afterwards, however, cruel calamity befell the
ruler of Nitra. Prince Mojmir, who had united the Slovak
tribes in the western part of the Slovak territory under his
rule and who probably resided at Devin, drove Pribina out
of Nitra and occupied his domain. Out of this union of
.Mojmirs country with Pribina's, there arose on the north
bank of the Danube a state that united all the Slovak

�SLOVAKIA

75

tribes. The state, thus established about the year 830, was
called Great Moravia (VeFka Morava) or the Great Moravian Empire (Vefkomoravska risa).
Pribina, with his son Kocef and a retinue of Slovak
magnates, sought refuge in the neighboring Mark to the
east, near the Danube. Markgrave Ratbod presented Pribina to King Louis the German. The latter had Pribina in:structed in the Christian faith and baptized in St. Martin's
,c hurch in the city of Treisma (probably the present city of
Sankt Polten in Germany). For a time Pribina and his
group lived in the court of Markgrave Ratbod, but when
the latter refused to aid him against Mojmir, he went to
the Bulgars. However, he did not tarry there for long
either, because soon after we find him seeking the aid of
Ratimar, the Croatian Prince. At that time (about 838),
Ratimar was not on good terms with Ratbod, so Pribina
had to take refuge with Count Salach of Corutania. The
latter succeeded in reconciling Pribina with Ratbod.
In exile Pribina convinced himself that he could not
regain his lost domain and return to Nitra. He became reconciled with his fate and sought to gain the favor of King
Louis the German. The latter entrusted to Pribina the new
principality beyond the Danube, the country of Pannonia
near Blatno. In 847 he became the independent ruler of this
principality and built a formidable citadel there that was
called Blatnohrad (Moosburg). After his baptism, Pribina
became a zealous Christian and sought to convert all his
subjects to Christianity. He invited German missionaries
into his domain, built churches, endowed monasteries and
often welcomed the archbishop of Salzburg at his court.
In his work, Pribina had a zealous helper in the person of
his son Kocel'. When Pribina died in 861 under mysterious
circumstances, Kocel' inherited his principality. The Slovak
nation, immediately with its first appearance on the stage
of European history, entered the services of Christian culture. The Slovaks are the oldest nation on the central
Danube and they were the first nation in Central Europe
to have its own independent state. It is well to note that
the Slovak State from its very inception was ,a Christian

State.

�76

SLOVAKIA

CHAPTER TWO
'DHiE GREAT M!ORA~ EJMPI'RE

The studies of historians, philologists, and -archeolo~
gists clearly indicate that the Great Moravian Empire was

not the empire of the ''Great Moravians," but the land of
the ancietn Slov•a k s who had settled on both sides of the
'Morava river. The Great Moravian IDmpire, then, was in reality a Great Slova!k Empire, if we are to call the territory
by the name of the peole who had occupied it from the dawn
of history. These studies refute the hypothesis of the Czech
and non-Czech philologists, ethnogr~phers, and historians,
who claim that "Czechs and Slovaks of Bohemia, MMoraviia,
and Nor.them Hung•a ry (SlovaJkia) fornied a single group
with a common langua,ge."
Furthermore, these studies tell us that at first there
were two estates or rprinciipalities in that area: the one
called "Mol'ova" was around the Morava up to the Vah with
its capital city at Devin, while the other called "Nitra" the capital city of which bore the i,;ame name - was around
the Nitra river. When Mojmir, the ruler of Moravia, conquered Pribina, the ruler of Nitra, German chronicles 'began
to call his empire "Magna Mora'Via," whk'h meant the annexation of the NitJ:ra principality to that of Mor8JVia.
We afso leiarn from these studies that the ancestors of
the Czechs had settled in the land of the Boii (Boehemi,a;
Behemia; Bohemia) just ltbout at the same time that the
Slovaks occupied the territory of the Morava river. Moj!mir,
Rastislav, and Sviitopllllk built the empire of the Slova!ks,
while Hostivit and Borivoj built .the state of the Czechs.
The Annales Fra,ncofuldenses tell us that "Sviitoplwk extricated the Czech tribes from Frankish rule by force." Later
the Czechs (Slavs of Bohemia) even joined the Germans to
wage war agaJnst the Great Moravian EmpiTe.
When Mojmir, some time in the year 836, drove Pribina out of Nitra and united the territory inhabited by
Slovak trib,es into a larger unit, there arose on the northern
bank of the Danube an empire which the Byzantine em1

�SLOVAKIA

77

peror, Constantine Po.rphyrogennetos, in his work "About
the Management of a State" (950), calls Great Moravia.
Mojmir's empire stretched over the territory of present
Slovakia and Moravia and was, after Samo's empire, the
second Slovanic state near the Danube on the German-Slovanic border.
Just as Samo's Empire, so even the Great Mora'Vlian
Empire had its origin at the same historic crossroad, because it was here that the greatest danger threatened the
Slovanic peoples and they had to unite in defense of their
freedom a,nd independence. While Samo's empire , arose because the Slovans along the Danube wanted to protect
themselves against the enemies from the east, Great Moravia was established under pressure of danger from the
west.
Mojmir, like Pribina, tried to live in peace with the
neighboring Germans, because he knew that war with them
could only end disastrously for the Slovaks. Mojmir was
already a Christian, so the missionary activity of the German priests on the territory of Great Moravia went on nuhampered. We must remember that Great Moravia at that
time did not have any definite borders, because the borders
of states of the Middle Ages never were defined strictly.
The area of Great Moravia changed because the successors
of Mojmir did undertake expeditions into neighboring countries, defeated them in battle and annexed them to the
empire.
Louis the German did not relish the idea of a great,
united Slovanic empire as a neighbor. In 846 he unseated
Mojmir and replaced him with Rastislav. The latter simu~
lated friendship for Louis, but knew well that the independence of his country was constantly threatened by the
Germans. The independence of Great Moravia was threatened not only by German armies, but also by the missionary activity of the German priests, who had begun to look
upon the territory as a part of the German empire. In
about 860 Rastislav sent a special messenger to Pope Nicholas I in Rome with a request for missionaries who had
a command of the Slovanic tongues. The Pope, however,
answered he was sorry that he could not help Rastislav,

�78

SLOVAKIA

because at that time there were no such priests in Rome.
After due deliberation with his advisers, Rastislav decided to send a special mission to .Constantinople, to .E mperor Michael ill. Rastislav's request, as presented to the
Emperor, read: "Since our people has cast off paganism
and follows the Christian law, we do not have such a teacher, who might explain the true Christian Faith to us in our
own tongue, so that even other parties, witnessing this,
might become like unto us. So send us, Emperor, such a
bishop and teacher, because your country is everywhere
recognized for its good laws."
Just about that time the German empire found strong
allies in the Bulgarians, who bordered with Great Moravia
at the Tisa river and lived in enmity with the Byzantine
emperor. Michael did not have to deliberate long with his
counsellors. He wanted Rastislav as an ally against the
German-Bulgarian alliance and, hence, decided to aid the
ruler of Great Moravia in his quest for missionaries who
could speak the language of Rastislav's people. Up to this
time the land of the Slovaks was subject to the influence
of western culture only. Now it was to make contacts with
the Christian culture of the European east.
SLOVAK .APOSTLES: CYRIL .AND METHODLUS

Em;peror Michael of Constantinople decided to send
Constantine (Cyril), the philosopher and linguist, and his
brother Methodius, who was versed in the art of government, to preach the Gospel to the people of Rastislav. Constantine had distinguished himself in apostolic work before,
at first alone and later with his brother Methodius. As
natives of Salonica (Thessalonica) they were suited for the
mission: they new the language of Rastislav's people, the
forefathers of the Slovaks. The Emperor, having summoned them, told the brothers: "You are from Salonica, and
all Salonicans speak pUTe Slovanic."
Upon learning that Rastislav's people did not have their
own script, the task of inventing one fell to the lot of Constantine. Legend has it that the alphabet worked out by
Constantine (Cyril) had been revealed to him by God. It
was quite an achievement. Constantine started with Greek

�SLOVAKIA

79

characters, but Slovanic sounds of the ninth century varied
greatly with the Greek, therefore signs and characters had
to be created to designate them. The alphabet that resulted
is known as "Cyrillic."
After due preparation for their new mission, the brothers Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius set out for the
country of Rastislav. They arrived in Rastislav's empire
in 863 and began preaching the Word of God in the language of the people. Soon ,a fter the translation of the
Scriptl.ll'es and liturgical 1b ooks was completed and present...
ed to Rastislav's court at Devin. Naturally the saintly brothers gained many admirers and disciples. These catechists
went among their people and aided Constantine and Methodius in their missionary work. Up to the time of the Slovak
apostles, only three languages were considered feasible for
ecclesiastic life, the Holy Scriptures and the Church liturgy: Hebrew, Latin and Greek. The latter two were used
extensively-the Greek in the Byzantine (eastern) Church
and Latin in the Roman (western) Church. Due to the efforts of Constantine and Methodius, the language of the
Slovaks (early Slovanic) became the third language to be
used in Church liturgy.
The work of Constantine and Methodius in Rastislav's
empire was blessed with success. The saintly brothers united the people of Rastislav spiritually and. also contributed
handsomely to the material welfare of the Great Moravian
Empire. Their disciples later spread the Gospel to other
neighboring Slovanic nations (Czechs, Serbs, Russians) in
a language that was for the most part understandable to
all Slo-\'anic nations.
The German clergy of Salzburg viewed the work of
Constantine and Methodius with envy and accused the brothers of introdllJlcing dangerous innovations into the liturgy
of the Church. A protest against their activities was lodged
in Rome, and the brothers were summoned by Pope Nicholas (858-867) to vindicate themselves.
Constantine and Methodius set out for Rome in 867.
Their journey led them through Lake Blatno (Balaton),
the residence of Prince Kocer, Pribina's son. Kocer received
the brothers with great joy and examined their liturgical

�80

SLOVAKIA

books in the Slovanic script with great interest. Leaving
Kocer, Constantine and Methodius passed through Corinthia to Venice on the Adriatic Sea. At Venice they successfully defended their use of the language of Rastislav's people in the liturgy of the Church, while the ecclesiastics
there had to concede defeat in the debate.
While Constantine and Methodius made their way to
Rome, Pope Nicholas died. Four days later his successor,
Adriam ]I (867--872), was elected head of the ChuTch.
The saintly brothers were given a cordial reception by the
Pope, and, after convincing a synod of bishops that they
were not guilty of introducing any dangerous innovations
into the liturgy of the Church, their activities were accorded Adrian's approval. The Holy Father accepted the liturgical books in ;the Slov,anic language, blessed them on the aUar
of the church of St. Mary Major, and celebrated the Divine
Liturgy over them himself. The Pope then proceeded to
consecrate Constantine and Methodius as bishops. A number of their disciples (Clement, Gorazd, Angelar, Sava and
Naum) were ordained to the priesthood by the bishops Formosus and Gaundenrich.
Shortly thereafter Constantine became seriously ill and
retired to a monastery. There he joined the religious community, taking the name of Cyril. He died February 14,
869, and his earthly remains were buried on the right side
of the high altar of the church of St. Clement in Rome.
After the death of Saint Cyril, the entire burden of
spreading the Gospel and teaching of Christ rested on the
shoulders of his brother. Methodius returned as archbishop
and papal legate fully authorized to organize the Church
in the land of Rastislav. Archbishop Methodius became the
head of Slovanic Christendom. Besides receiving the highest ecclesiastical dignity, Methodius carried letters from the
Pope for Rastislav of Great Moravia, Svatopluk of Nitra
and Kocef of Blatnohrad Castle (Moosburg), the three Slovak princes, which stated that the Pope permitted the use
of Slovanic liturgy with the reservation that the epistle
and ,gospel always be read in Latin before being read in
the vernacular (Slovanic). The archdiocese of Methodius
extended over Great Moravia and beyond the Danube over

�SLOVAKIA

81

Pannonia, uniting the lands governed by Slovak rulers. But
as Methodius was returing to continue his apostolic work
among the people of Rastislav, a new ruler was taking
over the throne of Great Moravia.
KING S,V ATOPDUCK

While Methodius was in Rome, the Germans continued
to harass Rastislav. In 869 King Louis the German declared
war against the neighboring Slovanic peoples and invaded
their lands with his armies headed by his three sons. Prince
Louis attacked the Lusatian Serbs, Charles went after Rastislav, and Carloman tore into the territory that was ruled
by Rastislav's nephew, Svatopluk of Nitra. The German
armies plundered and pillaged the Great Moravian Empire.
But Rastislav's stronghold, the mighty Devin, proved impregnable and Rastislav's empire retained its independence.
The following year, however, Rastislav was betrayed
by his own kinsman, his nephew Svatopluk, regent of Nitra.
Success in battle had turned Svatopluk's head. The Germans played up to Svatopluk and promised to help him
gain the throne of Great Moravia. Svatopluk decided to
betray his uncle and vowed loyalty to Carloman. Rastislav,
however, learned of the plot and became furious. Having
vowed to punish his traitorous nephew, he ordered his men
to do away with Svatopluk at a banquet, but their attempt
to take and kill him failed. Soon thereafter Rastislav led
his army against Svatopluk. In the ensuing battle, Rastislav was defeated. Worse than that, he was captured and
handed over to the Germans. Carloman sent Rastislav
bound in chains to Bavaria where King Louis the German
imprisoned him and had his eyes ,gouged out. Rastislav
died later as a prisoner of the Germans.
With Rastislav's defeat the Great Moravian Empire
passed completely into the hands of the German crown.
The Germans also seized Archbishop Methodius, who had
returned from Rome, and imprisoned him. The Bavarian
bishops, who regarded Methodius as a foreign intruder,
made claims to the territories of the Slovanic peoples along
the Danube and dealt with Methodius so inhumanely that
Svatopluk himself intervened in his behalf. When Carlo-

�82

SLOVAKIA

man took possession of Rastislav's country and seized his
royal treasures, he entrusted the rule of the ravaged country to Svatopluk.
Svatopluk soon proved himself a strong ruler. As a
soldier he excelled in ruthless courage. The Germans began
to distrust him, because they feared he would build an empire so strong as to imperil their country. Louis the German decided to put Svatopluk out of the way. In 871 the
Germans succeeded in taking Svatopluk and imprisoned
him. Some of his castles were taken over by the German
Markgraves. Svatopluk denied the charge of Carloman that
he plotted against the German crown, but that did not help
him. When the Slovaks learned what had happened to their
ruler, they elected Slavomir to take his place and rebelled
against the Germans.
Slavomir was supported by the whole country. A terrilble war followed. The Germans suffered heaivy losses.
Devin proved impregnable to their attacks. In the meantime, the wily Svatopluk was plotting to even matters with
the Germans who had tricked him. While in prison he repented his betrayal of Rastislav and vowed to even the
score with his German captors.
Svatopluk begged Carloman to release him so that he
might subdue the Slovaks under Slavomir. Carloman was
reluctant at first, but finally gave in to Svatopluk's pleadings. Accompanyin g a large German army, Sviitopluk soon
found himself below the mighty fortress of Devin. While
the German army encamped quietly below the citadel, Svatopluk set out with a small detachment of men to the castle
to persuade Slavomir to surrender without a battle. Once
inside the castle, Svatopluk disclosed his plan to Slavomir.
Assuming command of the Slovak army, Svatopluk tore
out of the courtyard and attacked the Germans with such
sa;vagery that only few were able to esc•a;pe alirve. Carloman's army was caught unawares and crushed.
Svatopluk knew that the Germans would come after
him sooner or later. He looked around for allies. That same
year (871), he married the sister of Borivoj, ruler of the
Bohemian fand, and formed an alliance with' him. Svatopluk
pressed the offensive against the Germans and was quite

�SLOVAKIA

83

successful. In 873 he defeated Carloman decisively. Carloman asked his father Louis for help to fight the Slovaks.
When aid was not forthcoming, Carloman decided to seek
a truce with Svatopluk. He signed a pact with Svatopluk
at Forsheim in 874 and recognized the independence of the
Great Moravian Empire. Svatopluk had reached the pinnacle of his ambitions: he was sole ruler of the Great Moravian Empire, with its crupital at Devin near Bratislava.
(Continued)

• • •
1856 -

DR. SAMUEL CZAMBEL -

1956

P.A. HROBAK

T.he year 1956 marks not only the centennial of the
dea:th o:f the great Slovak fighter for freedom and democracy, Dr. Louis Sti1r, ,b ut it is a}so the centennial of the
birth of the eminent SlovaJk philologist, Samuel Czam:bel.
Czambel was born September 1, 1856, in the town of
Slovenska Eupca, Zvolen County, 1Slova;kia. The ~tudy of
his native Slovak language attracted him early in his life
and he devoted much of his adult Hfe to it. He died in Buda.pest, December 18, 1909.
In 1887, Czam'bel wrote his Contrioutions to the History of the Slovak Language (''Prispevlky k dejinam jazy.ka slovenskeho") ; he followed this with his Slovak Orthography ("Slovensky praivopis") in 1890; A Manual of
the Literary Slovak Language ("Rukovaf spisovnej reci
slovenskej") in 1902; The Slovaks and Their Language
("Slovaci a kh rec") in 1903; 8Jlld The Slovak Language
and its Place in the Family of Slovanic Languages ("Slo-.
venska rec a jej miesto v rodine slovenskych jazykov"),
624 pp., in 1906. Of course, Czambel contributed many
other articles on Slovak subjects to Slovak newspapers,
periodical reviiews and magazines.
Czambel's "Rukovae (Slovak Grammar), revised and
modified several times since its first edition by the late
Dr. Joseph SkU!ltety, is a ,s tandard work with ,p hilologists,
grammarians, and students of Slovak. In his "Slovaoi a ich
rec," Czambel promoted the theory that the SlovaJks were
every closely related to the Croatians, Slovenes and Serbs

�</text>
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                  <text>1956, Vol. 6</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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              <text>63&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
The History of Slovakia:&#13;
By PHILIP A . HROBAiK&#13;
&#13;
SLOVENSKO -&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA -&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKLAND&#13;
&#13;
The territory occupied by the Slovak people for the&#13;
past 1500 years is known as Slovakia. It is situated in the&#13;
very heart of Europe. Present-day Slovakia has an area of&#13;
49,015 square kilometers (approximately 19,000 sq. miles)&#13;
and a population of 4,000,000. There were times when the&#13;
borders of Slovakia extended beyond their present limits&#13;
and times when the land of the Slovaks had no definite&#13;
borders at all.&#13;
In ancient times the Slovaks occupied even the western&#13;
bank of the Morava river and the north bank of the Tisa&#13;
(Theiss) river. Though the area and the borders of Slovakia changed at various times, its topography - the land&#13;
and its waterways - did not.&#13;
Slovakia is bound on the north by the Carpathian&#13;
Mountains and on the south by the blue Danube and the&#13;
upper arm of the Tisa river. Into these two streams empty&#13;
all the rivers of Slovakia that have their origin in the foothills of the King's Plateau (Krafova Hofa) - the natural&#13;
center of Slovakia: those that run off to the southwest&#13;
empty into the Danube, while those that course to the&#13;
southwest pour into the Tisa, forming deep valleys and&#13;
broad basins between the ,i ndividual mountain :zones that&#13;
fill out the largest part of the territory of Slovakia.&#13;
This territory is divided into three parts: 1. western&#13;
Slovakia which drains into the Danube tributaries; 2. eastern Slovakia that drains into the tributaries of the Tisa;&#13;
3. the mountainous country of central Slovakia.&#13;
The geographical picture of Slovakia is extremely&#13;
varied, because high mountain ranges alternate with deep&#13;
valleys which, in places, spread out into basins. Fertile&#13;
plains stretch out from the foothills of the mountains.&#13;
Slovakia is situated in the very center of Europe&#13;
where the north-eastern spurs of the Alps near the central&#13;
Danube touch upon the mountainous arch of the Carpa-&#13;
&#13;
64&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
thians which is the main watershed of central Europe.&#13;
From this watershed the streams of central Europe run&#13;
into several seas. In olden times the course of these&#13;
streams determined the course of roads along which nations migrated and business and culture flowed. We find&#13;
Slovakia at the juction of these roads which cross the&#13;
Caripathian Mountains kom the north and the south.&#13;
Two roads were especially significant in deciding the&#13;
fate of Slovakia and the Slovak nation. One coursed along&#13;
the Danube and connected the western oountTies of Europe&#13;
with the eastern world. Near the Carpatho-Alpian gate this&#13;
road intersected with the other important highway which&#13;
started from the coast of the Adriatic Sea, crossed the&#13;
Danube, proceeded to the north against the current of the&#13;
Morava river and went to the coast of the Baltic Sea.&#13;
Slovakia, according to archeological researches, was&#13;
well inhabited as early as 5000 B. C., but we do not know&#13;
the race or the names of the peoples who inhabited the&#13;
land. Traces of the Neolithic Man, who used stone weapons&#13;
in hunting the mammoth and the huge cave bear, have&#13;
been found. The scientific investigator will find much material on the prehistoric period in the museum of Bratislava&#13;
and Turciansky Svaty Martin.&#13;
About the year 2000 B.C. begins the Bronze Age with&#13;
its burial urns, and clay and stone remains, found on the&#13;
sites of ancient settlements in Slovakland. During the ensuing Iron Age, we find traces of the Illyrians in the west,&#13;
of the Thracians in the east. The latter came into contact&#13;
with the Scythians in the valley of the Tisa river.&#13;
Several nations of various origins and culture lived in&#13;
Slovakia just before the dawn of the Christian era. According to ancient Greek and Roman writers, the land of&#13;
the Slovaiks was inhabited by the Gauls and the Celts at&#13;
that time. In the fourth century B. C., we note traces of&#13;
the more advanced Gallic culture from the discoveries of&#13;
golden ornaments and coins, imitations of those issued by&#13;
Philip III of Macedonia and his son, Alexander the Great.&#13;
At Bratislava coins of the Roman Republic, dating from&#13;
the first century B. C., have been found. A Greek map of&#13;
the Slovak territory, dating back to the third century,&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
65&#13;
&#13;
shows many Slovanic names for mountains and rivers,&#13;
The fertile plains of south-eastern Slovakia were occupied by the Boii, a Gallic tri'be, and in the mountainous&#13;
parts of central Slovakia lived the Kotin (Gothine) tribe&#13;
which worked the ore of the Iron Mountains. The Osi settled in the neighborhood of the Kotins, while the Korkonti&#13;
- tribes of southern origin - occupied the northwestern&#13;
part of Slovakia.&#13;
In the first half of the last century before Christ the&#13;
Dacians came to Slovakia from the east and overpowered&#13;
the Gallic Boii. But in the first quarter of the first century&#13;
after Christ, the Dacians were forced to migrate to the&#13;
north into the mountains, because they were iha:rd pressed&#13;
by the J azygi who had come from the Black Sea to take&#13;
over the land on the left side of the Danube.&#13;
During the reign of Tiberius, two Germanic tribes settled in the territory of the Slovaks, the Quadi and the&#13;
Marcomanni, who frequently raided the Roman proi\Tince&#13;
of Pannonia on the other side of the Danube. Vannius, the&#13;
bellicose king of the Quadi, built military fortresses along&#13;
the V ah river and extended his power to the Turiec a:nd&#13;
Kysuca rivers.&#13;
About twenty years after Christ, when a large part of&#13;
the territory of Slovakia was occupied by the Quadi, the&#13;
Romans were consolidating their might near the Danube.&#13;
The Franks and the Romans began to wage war for the&#13;
control of the territory of Slovakia, a struggle that lasted&#13;
several centuries.&#13;
South of the Danube the Romans organized the province of Pannonia, east of which was the province of Dacia.&#13;
To conquer the whole Danube basin to the Carpathians, the&#13;
Romans built military strongholds along the south bank of&#13;
the Danube. Such fortresses were established at Vindobona&#13;
(Vienna), Carnanthum (Hainburg), Brigetium (Komarno)&#13;
and at Aquincum (Budapest). To defend and to secure the&#13;
frontier along the Danube against incursions of barbaric&#13;
tribes, the Romans sent detachments across the river to&#13;
established military stations on the northern bank, on the&#13;
territory of Slovakia. From excacations we know that Ro-&#13;
&#13;
66&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAK.IA&#13;
&#13;
man troops were stationed at Devin, Stupava, Bratislava&#13;
and opposite Komarno at li.&#13;
The Romans bested the Quadi in battle. Their king&#13;
Vannius ruled over the territory of Slovakia by the grace&#13;
of the Roman Emperor. Of course, the Quadi resented this.&#13;
After Vannius' death the aggressive Quadi challenged the&#13;
power of the Romans on the Danube and the Roman Emperors had to defend their rule with large armies. Along&#13;
the Vah river the Roman troops penetrated as far as Trencin. Emperor Marcus Aurelius and his son Commodus defeated the Quadi in 179 A. D. after several bloody skirmishes on Slovak territory, as is commemorate d by inscription on a roc'k at Trencin: "In memory of the IVictory of the&#13;
Emperor's army that encamped at Laugaricio, 855 soldiers&#13;
of the II. Legion. Made by Constantine, commander of the&#13;
II. auxiliary Legion." This army was stationed at Laugaritio, a Roman settlement near Trencin, which has since&#13;
disappeared.&#13;
During these skirmishes with the Quadi, probably&#13;
about 173 A. D., the Roman army in Slovakia found itself&#13;
threatened by a scarcity of water. In the army that fought&#13;
against the Germans somewhere along the Hron river,&#13;
there were several Christians who had come from Asia&#13;
Minor. These Christian soldiers - the first Christians on&#13;
Slovak territory - prayed for raiin and their prayers were&#13;
answered. The Roman army was saved. This incident is immortalized on the Arch of Triumph of Emperor Marcus&#13;
Aurelius in Rome.&#13;
The Quadi, 1b eaten repeatedly by the Romans, never&#13;
·gwve up trying to drive the Romans out of Slovakia. Emperor Constantine LI defeated them in 258 A.ID. and Emperor&#13;
Valentian, the last Roman emperor who cowd claim sovereignty over the territory of Slovakia, repeated the pel'for:mance in 3·74. Upon the latter's death in 376, the great Mig;ra~&#13;
tion of Nations begain.. Shortly thereafter the Romans&#13;
ipulled thek gax.risoDJS out of Slo-y;aJk ia and let the Quadi&#13;
take over. The Quadi, however, were evicted from the territory by the Huns in the first half of the fifth century.&#13;
The Huns in turn were displaced by the Heruli, who held&#13;
the territory until about 491 when the Lombards defeated&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
87&#13;
&#13;
them, occupied their lands and held them until about 526,&#13;
when they crossed the Danube into Pannonia.&#13;
Slovrukia, however, did not remain even under the Huns&#13;
for long. After the disintegration of the Roman Empire,&#13;
the Germans migrated from Slovakia to the south. The&#13;
Marcomanni, weakened by the wars with the Romans and&#13;
forced by the hordes of Attila to join his army, were wiped&#13;
out in the battle of Cha.Ions (Catalaunian Fields) in 451.&#13;
There is as yet no definite proof, even though it may be&#13;
safely assumed, that the Slovaks and related Slovanic tribes&#13;
came into Slovakia in increasing numbers after the extinction of the Marcomanni. The historian J ordannes, writing&#13;
in the sixth century, said that all the Hungarian plain was&#13;
inhabited by Slovanic people (the Slavs).&#13;
AFTIDR THE ADVENT OF THE SLOVAKS&#13;
&#13;
The Slovaks came to their present territory from the&#13;
East, probably from India. At the time Frankish tribes&#13;
fought the Roman Legions over the territory of Slovakia,&#13;
the Slovanic peoples occupied the land that stretched to the&#13;
north of the Carpathians and to the east of the river Vistula. It was a marshy and unfertile land. In time the growing Slovanic families were forced to emigrate to neighboring territories.&#13;
The Slovanic peoples who migrated to the west and&#13;
occupied the territory to the Elbe and Saal rivers are called&#13;
We,stern Slavs; they are the Poles, the SlOJVaks and! the&#13;
Czechs; those that occwpied the territory between t'he Elbe&#13;
and Oder rivers and the country along the coast of the&#13;
Baltic Sea are known as the Lusatian Serbs (northern Germany) and the Kashubes (near the Baltic Sea); today their&#13;
numbers are few. The Slovanic peoples, who migrated from&#13;
their ancient land to the south and occupied the Balkan&#13;
peninsula, are called the Southern Slavs: the Slovenes,&#13;
Croatians, Serbs and Bulgarians. A large part of the Slovanic peoples migrated to the east and occupied the plains&#13;
of eastern Europe. They are the Eastern Slavs: the White&#13;
Russians, the Little Russians (Ukrainians) and the Great&#13;
Russians.&#13;
As the great Slovanic family disintegrated, separate&#13;
&#13;
68&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Slovanic nations developed with the centuries, each with&#13;
its dictinct culture, language, customs and traditions.&#13;
The Slovaks, like other Slovanic peoples, originally&#13;
were hunters. After a time they took to bee culture and&#13;
animal husbandry, especially sheep raising. From their&#13;
neighbors they learned to cultivate the soil. The men folk&#13;
hunted and herded sheep, while .the women and the slaves&#13;
did the farm work. The only trades known to them were&#13;
pottery making and blacksmithing. In business transactions&#13;
they exchanged products or paid in cloth; money was not&#13;
known as a means of barter. The Slovaks lived in simple&#13;
huts made of poles driven into the ground, around which&#13;
were wound branches and twigs which were then covered&#13;
with mud.&#13;
Several families, originating from a common forefather, formed a clan ("rod"). The head of the clan was the&#13;
oldest member; he was in charge of the common property&#13;
of the clan. A Slovanic settlement, inhabited by several related families, i.e. a clan, was called a village ("dedina"&#13;
from "dedo"-grandfather). The village was the common&#13;
heritage ("dedicstvo") of the whole clan. Several related&#13;
clans made up a tribe ("kmeii"), the leader of which was&#13;
the tribal chief, called a priest ("kiiaz") or prince ("knieza). When several such related tribes lived in one territory&#13;
for a long time a Slovanic state evolved and a Slovanic&#13;
nation was born.&#13;
SLOVAK CHARACTERISTICS&#13;
&#13;
The Slovanic peoples had many good and bad characteristics. They loved songs and entertainment. Not possessing great wealth, they lived frugally. They were goodhearted and hospitable, but suffered discipline with difficulty.&#13;
They did not know how to obey, hence there was no harmony among them. They did not seek a battle, but when&#13;
they had to defend themselves they fought heroically and&#13;
also knew how to be cruel. All these characterictics of the&#13;
Slovanic nature can be found in the Slovanic nations even&#13;
at the ,p resent time.&#13;
The historian Procopius (562) said that the Slavs were&#13;
rather tall, hardy, blond-haired people and honesty was one&#13;
&#13;
SlJOVAK.I.A&#13;
&#13;
69&#13;
&#13;
of their marked characteristics. Theophylactus recorded an&#13;
interesting commentary on the Slavs. He said: "In 590&#13;
three men were captured by the Greeks in Thrace; the men&#13;
carried musical instruments instead of weapons. When&#13;
Caesar M:auricus asked who they ,w ere, the men answered:&#13;
'We are Slavs; we love music; we play the guitar and violin&#13;
and sing.' Mauricus was overcome by their simplicity. Af..,&#13;
ter feasting them he had a guard escort them to their&#13;
lands."&#13;
The German historian Herder had this to say about&#13;
the Slavs: "They loved farming; they had herds and implements and a home industry ; with the products of their&#13;
land and their industry they carried on a useful business.&#13;
They built cities and in places occupied themselves with&#13;
mining; they knew how to melt and mold metals. The Slavs&#13;
prepared salt, made cloth, brewed beer, grafted trees, and&#13;
lived according to their manner a happy, musical life.''&#13;
The Slovaks of old had names for implements, furniture, grains, fruit trees, trades and animals. They had their&#13;
own words for: plow, iron, cloth, needle, pliers, wheel,&#13;
wagon, seal, ring, blacksmith, spoon, clothier, butcher,&#13;
cape, jeweler.&#13;
As a musical people they had many folk songs. In&#13;
number and variety of content they are second to those&#13;
of no other nation.&#13;
SLOVAK MYTHOLOGY&#13;
&#13;
There are very few reliable records of the religion of&#13;
ancient Slovanic peoples. We know that they believed in a&#13;
Supreme Being and in immortality. The Slovaks called the&#13;
Supreme Being "Praboh" :_ the God of all gods. They had&#13;
a White God - the God of all good, and a Black God - the&#13;
God of evil and death. Many lesser gods, belonging to both&#13;
the white and black groups, also existed for the ancient&#13;
Slovaks and other Slovanic peoples.&#13;
"ZIVENA" was the godess of life, and "MORENA"&#13;
the godess of death. Brooks and streams housed nymphs,&#13;
and fairies inhabited the woods and forests. "LADA" was&#13;
the godess of beauty, while "URODA" was the godess of&#13;
the fields and crops. ' ~PfilRUIN" (P.AJROM" ) , the God of&#13;
thunder, was held in great respect.&#13;
&#13;
70&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
The ancient Slovaks worshipped and invoked their gods&#13;
in sacred groves. They offered sacrifices of grain and animals to images of wood and stone through their priests.&#13;
The White Priests (BieJok:iiazi) served and invoked the&#13;
White Gods. The White Priests were most important men&#13;
of the tribe; they presided at all councils and trials and&#13;
their judgments and decisions were final. The Black Priests&#13;
- the magicians and sorcerers - were believed to possess&#13;
powers of tmnsforming peraons into animals and inanimate&#13;
objects.&#13;
The Slovaks, like most of the other Slovanic peoples&#13;
of ancient times, cremated or buried their dead. Food,&#13;
weapons, wine and jewelry were usually placed in the&#13;
graves of the dead. Ashes of the dead were placed in urns&#13;
of clay and then buried. Mounds of clay and stone were&#13;
built over burial places; the greater the mound, the more&#13;
important the person or persons buried there. Several such&#13;
mounds were found and excavated in Slovakia (at Skalica,&#13;
Brezolupy, Boooivce, Kras:iiany near 2ilina and at Cepcin in&#13;
Turiec). One of the most extensive burial grounds was uncovered at Devinska Nova Ves.&#13;
Some of the customs and practices of the ancient pagan Slovaks have survived the centuries and are still observed in many quaint villages of Slovakia today. Many of&#13;
the pagan practices, however, disappeared with the advent&#13;
of Christianity.&#13;
As the Slovanic peoples abandoned their ancient lands&#13;
and began to colonize central and eastern Europe - after&#13;
the Germanic Heruli and Lombards withdrew from the territory of Slovakia in the sixth ·century and the Slovaks&#13;
came in - the savage nation of the Avars tore into the&#13;
Danube basin, overran the whole territory, and pushed&#13;
deeply into the Frankish kingdom in the west. During the&#13;
next hundred years the whole region seethed in turmoil.&#13;
The Avars were wild nomads of Turko-Tartarian origin&#13;
who rode their horses rough-shod over the countries of&#13;
their neighbors and subjugated them. They settled in Pannonia, where they built military camps which were protected by huge, circular mounds of earth and stone and&#13;
wooden fences. The Slovaks withdrew from this territory&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
71&#13;
&#13;
and settled north of the Danube . Part of the Slovak tribes&#13;
lived in the mounta ins; they were govern ed by their own&#13;
princes .&#13;
The Slovan ic peoples along the Danube had to serve&#13;
the Avars and were forced to go with them on their rampages into neighb oring territor ies. The A vars looted the&#13;
Germa n lands in the west and Constan tinoiple (Cari•h rad)&#13;
and Salonik a in the east. Natura lly, the Slovan ic peoples&#13;
wanted tQ throw off the yoke of the Aivars and waited for&#13;
the opportu ne momen t to rebel. That time came in 624,&#13;
when Samo, a Franki sh mercha nt, succeed ed in uniting the&#13;
Slovani c peoples and led them in battle agains t the savage&#13;
A;vars. Sa.mo defeate d the Arv,a xs rund founde d the first SlovaJllic state ,near the central Danube . Encour aged by the&#13;
victory over the A vars, Samo led the Slovan ic peoples&#13;
agains t the German ic Franks . Samo again was victorio us;&#13;
his Slovani c army defeate d the Franks under Dagob ert in&#13;
a three-d ay battle near the Vogast e castle in 631. Becaus e&#13;
the Slovak s were settled north of the Danub e and the Slovenians south of it, Samo's empire stretch ed over these&#13;
territor ies. The Slovani c peoples within these territor ies&#13;
were called by the commo n name of Sloven es (Slovie ni).&#13;
The main fortres s of this Slovani c empire was situate d in&#13;
Slovak ia at the conflue nce of the Morava and Danube rivers. Samo's empire , howeve r, disinte grated soon after his&#13;
death (658). Wheth er it was the ,k ingdom of the Slova!ks&#13;
alone is questio nable, but the fact remain s that the territory of Slovak ia formed the core of it.&#13;
ilfu-edegar's "Chron icles" ;record that a ~trong westem Slovan ic empire existed already in the seventh century ,&#13;
strong enough to, resist the pressu re of the Avars and the&#13;
rule of Dagob ert. Fredeg ar wrote quite plainly that Samo&#13;
came along when the Slovam c tribes of the area were successful ly rebellin g aga~t the rule of the A vars. His "Chro.nioles" form the basis of most theorie s in ;regard to the&#13;
ethnica l composiition of Samo's Empire , its territor ial extent&#13;
and the site of its princip al city or strongh old. In recent&#13;
yeara Slova!k, Polish, and Czech scholar s of Slavist ics agreed&#13;
that Samo's strongh old, the center of his empire , was at De...&#13;
vin, at ,t he conflue nce of the Morav a and Danll!be rivers.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAK.IA&#13;
&#13;
72&#13;
&#13;
Professor Oettinger, well-knOIWll historian and archeologis t&#13;
of Vienna, however, .prefers to Tegard Vienna as the center&#13;
of Samo's Empire. In his book "Das Warden Wiens" (19M),&#13;
he tells that he .bases his conclusion especially on the findings resulting from the discovery of the ancient Berghof&#13;
Castle in Vienna, the remains of which can ibe traced ;to&#13;
Samo's time. The Ava.rs, a nomadic people, could not build&#13;
such a g,reat citadel of stone. Presenting a whole series of&#13;
philological airguments to baclk his theory, professor Oettinger states that tt is self-eviden t that SlovaJks and ,p ossibly&#13;
other Slwanic peoples lived in the aJrea of Vienna iaJIJ.d far to&#13;
the west along the Danube territory during Samo's time.&#13;
While the Slovanic peoples were resisting the A vars&#13;
heroically, a strong Frankish empire was being built in the&#13;
west. The power of this empire, whose borders in the eighth&#13;
century extended from the Pyrenees to the Sumava River,&#13;
became consolidate d especially during the reign of Charles&#13;
the Great (Charlemag ne), who ruled from 768 to 814, and&#13;
united all the Germanic tribes, subjugated the Bavarians&#13;
and the Saxons in the east, and came into contact with the&#13;
most westerly tribes of the Slovans. In 799 the armies of&#13;
Charlemag ne defeated the Arvars, who lateT were aJbso;z1bed&#13;
by the Slovanic inhabitants of the Danube countries.&#13;
But the great empire of Charlemag ne, who became&#13;
Emperor in 800, had another weapon besides its strong&#13;
army for its aggression s into the neighborin g countries of&#13;
the east. That weapon was Christianit y, which in the&#13;
Franldsh empire had spread and become so strong that already during the reign of Charlemag ne the way was prepared for it to reach the Danubian Slovans who were settled along the eastern borders of the Frankish empire.&#13;
To safegururd the eastern f:rontier of his empiire, Charlemagne placed heavy military garrisons along bordering&#13;
countries. Such territories were called "Marks" and were&#13;
managed by so-called "Markgrav es." In a short time it became evident that the military garriso!IlS of such Marks&#13;
were not only for defense, but also for advance into the&#13;
neighboring Slovanic countries. Contempor aneously new&#13;
bishoprics and monasterie s were built along these bordering countries which strengthen ed the Christian faith and&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
SIJOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
73&#13;
&#13;
propagated Christian culture. It was thus that Christianity&#13;
came to the neighboring Slovanic nations.&#13;
Slovakia already in the very beginning of the ninth&#13;
century came into immediate contact with the military and&#13;
cultural might of the Frankish empire. The Slovak nation&#13;
crossed the threshhold of its national and cultural history.&#13;
~RiINCiE PRJ.BINA&#13;
&#13;
The Slovanic tribes, which settled on the northern&#13;
bank of the Danube, on ,b oth sides of the 1Mora,va river, weTe&#13;
called Moravians. Philologis~, historians, a,nd aroheologists&#13;
have a.miply demonstrated that whatever had b,een mentioned&#13;
in old historical documents aibout the MoraJVian.s referred&#13;
in £act to the ancestors of the Slovaks, the Slovans (ISla&lt;vS)&#13;
who already in the first half of the ninth century were the&#13;
inhaJbitants of the territory on both sides of the MoTava&#13;
river.&#13;
in anoient d0&lt;:uments we find the name "Slovenica"&#13;
used interchangeably with ' 1Moravia" and "Magna Moravia"&#13;
to designate the territory on both sides of the Morava riveT.&#13;
A document of King Loruis from the year 861 also, calls that&#13;
area "Slovenica." In western (Latin) sources, the inhabit..,&#13;
ants of that territory were called ''Moravians" and "the&#13;
Slarvs of Moravia" (Slavi; Sclavi; Sch1avi; Sc,l a,v i Marahenses; Marehenses; Maravi; Mairavani; Moravi; Maraibi; MarahaJvi; Sclavini; Selavi Margenses) to distinguish them from&#13;
the Slorvans (Slavs) who had occupied other territories (Behemi; Sclavi Boehemia; Boemie; Beheimi; Boemani ; Boo-.&#13;
manici; Behemani; Bohemani; Bulgari; Vulgari; ChTobati;&#13;
BeJochrobati; .Kosari; Czechi; Poloni; ,Russi; etc.). In eastern sources, however, the inhabitants of the same territory&#13;
were called "Slovenes" ('Slovieni; Sloveni), while their land&#13;
wa:s rreferred to as "Slovak Land" and "Moravia" (.Slovenska&#13;
zemlja; Morava). It is significant that af.ter the fall olf Great&#13;
Moravia, her inhabitants were referred to by their a,ndent&#13;
name: Slavi; ,Sclavi; Slovieni; Sloveni - older forms of the&#13;
term Slovak, which began to appear onyl after the fifteenth centUTY.&#13;
From reliable sources we learn that about the year&#13;
830,. there ruled in Slovakia a prince named Pribina, who&#13;
resided in Nitra. The name Pribina and Nitra are very dear&#13;
&#13;
74&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
to ,t he hearts of all .Slovaks, because Prilbina is the name&#13;
of the first Slovak ruler ever mentioned by history, and&#13;
Nitra is the name of the first Slovak castle which became&#13;
the cradle of Slovak national history. Pribina reigned in&#13;
Nitra and his principality extended over the territory of&#13;
the fertile basin of the Nitra river. The sovereignty of the&#13;
Prince of Nitra was acknowledged by other Slovak principalities that extended along the Hron river country, the&#13;
banks of the Vah and other Slovak lands. Under the rule&#13;
of Prince Pribina belonged the Slovaik principalities that lay&#13;
to the east of the Small Carpathians.&#13;
The same sources tell us that Archbishop Adalram of&#13;
Salzburg blessed a church on Pribina's land in Nitra. This&#13;
consecration is proof that the Christianity spread by the&#13;
German priests among the Slovaks already had taken firm&#13;
root. Pribina's church in Nitra is the first Christian church&#13;
on the territory of the western Slovans. While other Slovanic peoples in the eastern half of Europe still lived far&#13;
off from western-European Christian culture and wandered&#13;
in the darkness of paganism, the Slovak nation already in&#13;
the beginning of the ninth century was counted among the&#13;
Christian, the cultured nations of Europe.&#13;
At the time of the consecration of the Nitra church,&#13;
in 833, Pribina himself was not yet a Christian. But the&#13;
circumstance that Pribina allowed the Christian faith to be&#13;
preached to his nation proves that the first Slovak ruler,&#13;
even though he probably could not grasp the significance&#13;
of Christian doctrine, nevertheless understood the political&#13;
and cultural significance of Christianity on the SlovanoGermanic border. Pribina, a wise and prudent ruler, knew&#13;
that a small nation at this dangerous crossroad could defend itself against its stronger neighbors only when it was&#13;
equal to them culturally.&#13;
Not long afterwards, however, cruel calamity befell the&#13;
ruler of Nitra. Prince Mojmir, who had united the Slovak&#13;
tribes in the western part of the Slovak territory under his&#13;
rule and who probably resided at Devin, drove Pribina out&#13;
of Nitra and occupied his domain. Out of this union of&#13;
.Mojmirs country with Pribina's, there arose on the north&#13;
bank of the Danube a state that united all the Slovak&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
75&#13;
&#13;
tribes. The state, thus established about the year 830, was&#13;
called Great Moravia (VeFka Morava) or the Great Moravian Empire (Vefkomoravska risa).&#13;
Pribina, with his son Kocef and a retinue of Slovak&#13;
magnates, sought refuge in the neighboring Mark to the&#13;
east, near the Danube. Markgrave Ratbod presented Pribina to King Louis the German. The latter had Pribina in:structed in the Christian faith and baptized in St. Martin's&#13;
,c hurch in the city of Treisma (probably the present city of&#13;
Sankt Polten in Germany). For a time Pribina and his&#13;
group lived in the court of Markgrave Ratbod, but when&#13;
the latter refused to aid him against Mojmir, he went to&#13;
the Bulgars. However, he did not tarry there for long&#13;
either, because soon after we find him seeking the aid of&#13;
Ratimar, the Croatian Prince. At that time (about 838),&#13;
Ratimar was not on good terms with Ratbod, so Pribina&#13;
had to take refuge with Count Salach of Corutania. The&#13;
latter succeeded in reconciling Pribina with Ratbod.&#13;
In exile Pribina convinced himself that he could not&#13;
regain his lost domain and return to Nitra. He became reconciled with his fate and sought to gain the favor of King&#13;
Louis the German. The latter entrusted to Pribina the new&#13;
principality beyond the Danube, the country of Pannonia&#13;
near Blatno. In 847 he became the independent ruler of this&#13;
principality and built a formidable citadel there that was&#13;
called Blatnohrad (Moosburg). After his baptism, Pribina&#13;
became a zealous Christian and sought to convert all his&#13;
subjects to Christianity. He invited German missionaries&#13;
into his domain, built churches, endowed monasteries and&#13;
often welcomed the archbishop of Salzburg at his court.&#13;
In his work, Pribina had a zealous helper in the person of&#13;
his son Kocel'. When Pribina died in 861 under mysterious&#13;
circumstances, Kocel' inherited his principality. The Slovak&#13;
nation, immediately with its first appearance on the stage&#13;
of European history, entered the services of Christian culture. The Slovaks are the oldest nation on the central&#13;
Danube and they were the first nation in Central Europe&#13;
to have its own independent state. It is well to note that&#13;
the Slovak State from its very inception was ,a Christian&#13;
&#13;
State.&#13;
&#13;
76&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
CHAPTER TWO&#13;
'DHiE GREAT M!ORA~ EJMPI'RE&#13;
&#13;
The studies of historians, philologists, and -archeolo~&#13;
gists clearly indicate that the Great Moravian Empire was&#13;
&#13;
not the empire of the ''Great Moravians," but the land of&#13;
the ancietn Slov•a k s who had settled on both sides of the&#13;
'Morava river. The Great Moravian IDmpire, then, was in reality a Great Slova!k Empire, if we are to call the territory&#13;
by the name of the peole who had occupied it from the dawn&#13;
of history. These studies refute the hypothesis of the Czech&#13;
and non-Czech philologists, ethnogr~phers, and historians,&#13;
who claim that "Czechs and Slovaks of Bohemia, MMoraviia,&#13;
and Nor.them Hung•a ry (SlovaJkia) fornied a single group&#13;
with a common langua,ge."&#13;
Furthermore, these studies tell us that at first there&#13;
were two estates or rprinciipalities in that area: the one&#13;
called "Mol'ova" was around the Morava up to the Vah with&#13;
its capital city at Devin, while the other called "Nitra" the capital city of which bore the i,;ame name - was around&#13;
the Nitra river. When Mojmir, the ruler of Moravia, conquered Pribina, the ruler of Nitra, German chronicles 'began&#13;
to call his empire "Magna Mora'Via," whk'h meant the annexation of the NitJ:ra principality to that of Mor8JVia.&#13;
We afso leiarn from these studies that the ancestors of&#13;
the Czechs had settled in the land of the Boii (Boehemi,a;&#13;
Behemia; Bohemia) just ltbout at the same time that the&#13;
Slovaks occupied the territory of the Morava river. Moj!mir,&#13;
Rastislav, and Sviitopllllk built the empire of the Slova!ks,&#13;
while Hostivit and Borivoj built .the state of the Czechs.&#13;
The Annales Fra,ncofuldenses tell us that "Sviitoplwk extricated the Czech tribes from Frankish rule by force." Later&#13;
the Czechs (Slavs of Bohemia) even joined the Germans to&#13;
wage war agaJnst the Great Moravian EmpiTe.&#13;
When Mojmir, some time in the year 836, drove Pribina out of Nitra and united the territory inhabited by&#13;
Slovak trib,es into a larger unit, there arose on the northern&#13;
bank of the Danube an empire which the Byzantine em1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
77&#13;
&#13;
peror, Constantine Po.rphyrogennetos, in his work "About&#13;
the Management of a State" (950), calls Great Moravia.&#13;
Mojmir's empire stretched over the territory of present&#13;
Slovakia and Moravia and was, after Samo's empire, the&#13;
second Slovanic state near the Danube on the German-Slovanic border.&#13;
Just as Samo's Empire, so even the Great Mora'Vlian&#13;
Empire had its origin at the same historic crossroad, because it was here that the greatest danger threatened the&#13;
Slovanic peoples and they had to unite in defense of their&#13;
freedom a,nd independence. While Samo's empire , arose because the Slovans along the Danube wanted to protect&#13;
themselves against the enemies from the east, Great Moravia was established under pressure of danger from the&#13;
west.&#13;
Mojmir, like Pribina, tried to live in peace with the&#13;
neighboring Germans, because he knew that war with them&#13;
could only end disastrously for the Slovaks. Mojmir was&#13;
already a Christian, so the missionary activity of the German priests on the territory of Great Moravia went on nuhampered. We must remember that Great Moravia at that&#13;
time did not have any definite borders, because the borders&#13;
of states of the Middle Ages never were defined strictly.&#13;
The area of Great Moravia changed because the successors&#13;
of Mojmir did undertake expeditions into neighboring countries, defeated them in battle and annexed them to the&#13;
empire.&#13;
Louis the German did not relish the idea of a great,&#13;
united Slovanic empire as a neighbor. In 846 he unseated&#13;
Mojmir and replaced him with Rastislav. The latter simu~&#13;
lated friendship for Louis, but knew well that the independence of his country was constantly threatened by the&#13;
Germans. The independence of Great Moravia was threatened not only by German armies, but also by the missionary activity of the German priests, who had begun to look&#13;
upon the territory as a part of the German empire. In&#13;
about 860 Rastislav sent a special messenger to Pope Nicholas I in Rome with a request for missionaries who had&#13;
a command of the Slovanic tongues. The Pope, however,&#13;
answered he was sorry that he could not help Rastislav,&#13;
&#13;
78&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
because at that time there were no such priests in Rome.&#13;
After due deliberation with his advisers, Rastislav decided to send a special mission to .Constantinople, to .E mperor Michael ill. Rastislav's request, as presented to the&#13;
Emperor, read: "Since our people has cast off paganism&#13;
and follows the Christian law, we do not have such a teacher, who might explain the true Christian Faith to us in our&#13;
own tongue, so that even other parties, witnessing this,&#13;
might become like unto us. So send us, Emperor, such a&#13;
bishop and teacher, because your country is everywhere&#13;
recognized for its good laws."&#13;
Just about that time the German empire found strong&#13;
allies in the Bulgarians, who bordered with Great Moravia&#13;
at the Tisa river and lived in enmity with the Byzantine&#13;
emperor. Michael did not have to deliberate long with his&#13;
counsellors. He wanted Rastislav as an ally against the&#13;
German-Bulgarian alliance and, hence, decided to aid the&#13;
ruler of Great Moravia in his quest for missionaries who&#13;
could speak the language of Rastislav's people. Up to this&#13;
time the land of the Slovaks was subject to the influence&#13;
of western culture only. Now it was to make contacts with&#13;
the Christian culture of the European east.&#13;
SLOVAK .APOSTLES: CYRIL .AND METHODLUS&#13;
&#13;
Em;peror Michael of Constantinople decided to send&#13;
Constantine (Cyril), the philosopher and linguist, and his&#13;
brother Methodius, who was versed in the art of government, to preach the Gospel to the people of Rastislav. Constantine had distinguished himself in apostolic work before,&#13;
at first alone and later with his brother Methodius. As&#13;
natives of Salonica (Thessalonica) they were suited for the&#13;
mission: they new the language of Rastislav's people, the&#13;
forefathers of the Slovaks. The Emperor, having summoned them, told the brothers: "You are from Salonica, and&#13;
all Salonicans speak pUTe Slovanic."&#13;
Upon learning that Rastislav's people did not have their&#13;
own script, the task of inventing one fell to the lot of Constantine. Legend has it that the alphabet worked out by&#13;
Constantine (Cyril) had been revealed to him by God. It&#13;
was quite an achievement. Constantine started with Greek&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
79&#13;
&#13;
characters, but Slovanic sounds of the ninth century varied&#13;
greatly with the Greek, therefore signs and characters had&#13;
to be created to designate them. The alphabet that resulted&#13;
is known as "Cyrillic."&#13;
After due preparation for their new mission, the brothers Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius set out for the&#13;
country of Rastislav. They arrived in Rastislav's empire&#13;
in 863 and began preaching the Word of God in the language of the people. Soon ,a fter the translation of the&#13;
Scriptl.ll'es and liturgical 1b ooks was completed and present...&#13;
ed to Rastislav's court at Devin. Naturally the saintly brothers gained many admirers and disciples. These catechists&#13;
went among their people and aided Constantine and Methodius in their missionary work. Up to the time of the Slovak&#13;
apostles, only three languages were considered feasible for&#13;
ecclesiastic life, the Holy Scriptures and the Church liturgy: Hebrew, Latin and Greek. The latter two were used&#13;
extensively-the Greek in the Byzantine (eastern) Church&#13;
and Latin in the Roman (western) Church. Due to the efforts of Constantine and Methodius, the language of the&#13;
Slovaks (early Slovanic) became the third language to be&#13;
used in Church liturgy.&#13;
The work of Constantine and Methodius in Rastislav's&#13;
empire was blessed with success. The saintly brothers united the people of Rastislav spiritually and. also contributed&#13;
handsomely to the material welfare of the Great Moravian&#13;
Empire. Their disciples later spread the Gospel to other&#13;
neighboring Slovanic nations (Czechs, Serbs, Russians) in&#13;
a language that was for the most part understandable to&#13;
all Slo-\'anic nations.&#13;
The German clergy of Salzburg viewed the work of&#13;
Constantine and Methodius with envy and accused the brothers of introdllJlcing dangerous innovations into the liturgy&#13;
of the Church. A protest against their activities was lodged&#13;
in Rome, and the brothers were summoned by Pope Nicholas (858-867) to vindicate themselves.&#13;
Constantine and Methodius set out for Rome in 867.&#13;
Their journey led them through Lake Blatno (Balaton),&#13;
the residence of Prince Kocer, Pribina's son. Kocer received&#13;
the brothers with great joy and examined their liturgical&#13;
&#13;
80&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
books in the Slovanic script with great interest. Leaving&#13;
Kocer, Constantine and Methodius passed through Corinthia to Venice on the Adriatic Sea. At Venice they successfully defended their use of the language of Rastislav's people in the liturgy of the Church, while the ecclesiastics&#13;
there had to concede defeat in the debate.&#13;
While Constantine and Methodius made their way to&#13;
Rome, Pope Nicholas died. Four days later his successor,&#13;
Adriam ]I (867--872), was elected head of the ChuTch.&#13;
The saintly brothers were given a cordial reception by the&#13;
Pope, and, after convincing a synod of bishops that they&#13;
were not guilty of introducing any dangerous innovations&#13;
into the liturgy of the Church, their activities were accorded Adrian's approval. The Holy Father accepted the liturgical books in ;the Slov,anic language, blessed them on the aUar&#13;
of the church of St. Mary Major, and celebrated the Divine&#13;
Liturgy over them himself. The Pope then proceeded to&#13;
consecrate Constantine and Methodius as bishops. A number of their disciples (Clement, Gorazd, Angelar, Sava and&#13;
Naum) were ordained to the priesthood by the bishops Formosus and Gaundenrich.&#13;
Shortly thereafter Constantine became seriously ill and&#13;
retired to a monastery. There he joined the religious community, taking the name of Cyril. He died February 14,&#13;
869, and his earthly remains were buried on the right side&#13;
of the high altar of the church of St. Clement in Rome.&#13;
After the death of Saint Cyril, the entire burden of&#13;
spreading the Gospel and teaching of Christ rested on the&#13;
shoulders of his brother. Methodius returned as archbishop&#13;
and papal legate fully authorized to organize the Church&#13;
in the land of Rastislav. Archbishop Methodius became the&#13;
head of Slovanic Christendom. Besides receiving the highest ecclesiastical dignity, Methodius carried letters from the&#13;
Pope for Rastislav of Great Moravia, Svatopluk of Nitra&#13;
and Kocef of Blatnohrad Castle (Moosburg), the three Slovak princes, which stated that the Pope permitted the use&#13;
of Slovanic liturgy with the reservation that the epistle&#13;
and ,gospel always be read in Latin before being read in&#13;
the vernacular (Slovanic). The archdiocese of Methodius&#13;
extended over Great Moravia and beyond the Danube over&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
81&#13;
&#13;
Pannonia, uniting the lands governed by Slovak rulers. But&#13;
as Methodius was returing to continue his apostolic work&#13;
among the people of Rastislav, a new ruler was taking&#13;
over the throne of Great Moravia.&#13;
KING S,V ATOPDUCK&#13;
&#13;
While Methodius was in Rome, the Germans continued&#13;
to harass Rastislav. In 869 King Louis the German declared&#13;
war against the neighboring Slovanic peoples and invaded&#13;
their lands with his armies headed by his three sons. Prince&#13;
Louis attacked the Lusatian Serbs, Charles went after Rastislav, and Carloman tore into the territory that was ruled&#13;
by Rastislav's nephew, Svatopluk of Nitra. The German&#13;
armies plundered and pillaged the Great Moravian Empire.&#13;
But Rastislav's stronghold, the mighty Devin, proved impregnable and Rastislav's empire retained its independence.&#13;
The following year, however, Rastislav was betrayed&#13;
by his own kinsman, his nephew Svatopluk, regent of Nitra.&#13;
Success in battle had turned Svatopluk's head. The Germans played up to Svatopluk and promised to help him&#13;
gain the throne of Great Moravia. Svatopluk decided to&#13;
betray his uncle and vowed loyalty to Carloman. Rastislav,&#13;
however, learned of the plot and became furious. Having&#13;
vowed to punish his traitorous nephew, he ordered his men&#13;
to do away with Svatopluk at a banquet, but their attempt&#13;
to take and kill him failed. Soon thereafter Rastislav led&#13;
his army against Svatopluk. In the ensuing battle, Rastislav was defeated. Worse than that, he was captured and&#13;
handed over to the Germans. Carloman sent Rastislav&#13;
bound in chains to Bavaria where King Louis the German&#13;
imprisoned him and had his eyes ,gouged out. Rastislav&#13;
died later as a prisoner of the Germans.&#13;
With Rastislav's defeat the Great Moravian Empire&#13;
passed completely into the hands of the German crown.&#13;
The Germans also seized Archbishop Methodius, who had&#13;
returned from Rome, and imprisoned him. The Bavarian&#13;
bishops, who regarded Methodius as a foreign intruder,&#13;
made claims to the territories of the Slovanic peoples along&#13;
the Danube and dealt with Methodius so inhumanely that&#13;
Svatopluk himself intervened in his behalf. When Carlo-&#13;
&#13;
82&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
man took possession of Rastislav's country and seized his&#13;
royal treasures, he entrusted the rule of the ravaged country to Svatopluk.&#13;
Svatopluk soon proved himself a strong ruler. As a&#13;
soldier he excelled in ruthless courage. The Germans began&#13;
to distrust him, because they feared he would build an empire so strong as to imperil their country. Louis the German decided to put Svatopluk out of the way. In 871 the&#13;
Germans succeeded in taking Svatopluk and imprisoned&#13;
him. Some of his castles were taken over by the German&#13;
Markgraves. Svatopluk denied the charge of Carloman that&#13;
he plotted against the German crown, but that did not help&#13;
him. When the Slovaks learned what had happened to their&#13;
ruler, they elected Slavomir to take his place and rebelled&#13;
against the Germans.&#13;
Slavomir was supported by the whole country. A terrilble war followed. The Germans suffered heaivy losses.&#13;
Devin proved impregnable to their attacks. In the meantime, the wily Svatopluk was plotting to even matters with&#13;
the Germans who had tricked him. While in prison he repented his betrayal of Rastislav and vowed to even the&#13;
score with his German captors.&#13;
Svatopluk begged Carloman to release him so that he&#13;
might subdue the Slovaks under Slavomir. Carloman was&#13;
reluctant at first, but finally gave in to Svatopluk's pleadings. Accompanyin g a large German army, Sviitopluk soon&#13;
found himself below the mighty fortress of Devin. While&#13;
the German army encamped quietly below the citadel, Svatopluk set out with a small detachment of men to the castle&#13;
to persuade Slavomir to surrender without a battle. Once&#13;
inside the castle, Svatopluk disclosed his plan to Slavomir.&#13;
Assuming command of the Slovak army, Svatopluk tore&#13;
out of the courtyard and attacked the Germans with such&#13;
sa;vagery that only few were able to esc•a;pe alirve. Carloman's army was caught unawares and crushed.&#13;
Svatopluk knew that the Germans would come after&#13;
him sooner or later. He looked around for allies. That same&#13;
year (871), he married the sister of Borivoj, ruler of the&#13;
Bohemian fand, and formed an alliance with' him. Svatopluk&#13;
pressed the offensive against the Germans and was quite&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
83&#13;
&#13;
successful. In 873 he defeated Carloman decisively. Carloman asked his father Louis for help to fight the Slovaks.&#13;
When aid was not forthcoming, Carloman decided to seek&#13;
a truce with Svatopluk. He signed a pact with Svatopluk&#13;
at Forsheim in 874 and recognized the independence of the&#13;
Great Moravian Empire. Svatopluk had reached the pinnacle of his ambitions: he was sole ruler of the Great Moravian Empire, with its crupital at Devin near Bratislava.&#13;
(Continued)&#13;
&#13;
• • •&#13;
1856 -&#13;
&#13;
DR. SAMUEL CZAMBEL -&#13;
&#13;
1956&#13;
&#13;
P.A. HROBAK&#13;
&#13;
T.he year 1956 marks not only the centennial of the&#13;
dea:th o:f the great Slovak fighter for freedom and democracy, Dr. Louis Sti1r, ,b ut it is a}so the centennial of the&#13;
birth of the eminent SlovaJk philologist, Samuel Czam:bel.&#13;
Czambel was born September 1, 1856, in the town of&#13;
Slovenska Eupca, Zvolen County, 1Slova;kia. The ~tudy of&#13;
his native Slovak language attracted him early in his life&#13;
and he devoted much of his adult Hfe to it. He died in Buda.pest, December 18, 1909.&#13;
In 1887, Czam'bel wrote his Contrioutions to the History of the Slovak Language (''Prispevlky k dejinam jazy.ka slovenskeho") ; he followed this with his Slovak Orthography ("Slovensky praivopis") in 1890; A Manual of&#13;
the Literary Slovak Language ("Rukovaf spisovnej reci&#13;
slovenskej") in 1902; The Slovaks and Their Language&#13;
("Slovaci a kh rec") in 1903; 8Jlld The Slovak Language&#13;
and its Place in the Family of Slovanic Languages ("Slo-.&#13;
venska rec a jej miesto v rodine slovenskych jazykov"),&#13;
624 pp., in 1906. Of course, Czambel contributed many&#13;
other articles on Slovak subjects to Slovak newspapers,&#13;
periodical reviiews and magazines.&#13;
Czambel's "Rukovae (Slovak Grammar), revised and&#13;
modified several times since its first edition by the late&#13;
Dr. Joseph SkU!ltety, is a ,s tandard work with ,p hilologists,&#13;
grammarians, and students of Slovak. In his "Slovaoi a ich&#13;
rec," Czambel promoted the theory that the SlovaJks were&#13;
every closely related to the Croatians, Slovenes and Serbs&#13;
&#13;
</text>
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                <text>The History of Slovakia (1/9)</text>
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Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956&#13;
pp. 63-83</text>
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                <text>Hrobak, Philip Anthony, 1904-1964</text>
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                <text>continues in &lt;a href="https://slovakia.omeka.net/items/show/252"&gt;Vol. 7, No. 1 (22), pp. 53-59&lt;/a&gt;</text>
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

83

successful. In 873 he defeated Carloman decisively. Carloman asked his father Louis for help to fight the Slovaks.
When aid was not forthcoming, Carloman decided to seek
a truce with Svatopluk. He signed a pact with Svatopluk
at Forsheim in 874 and recognized the independence of the
Great Moravian Empire. Svatopluk had reached the pinnacle of his ambitions: he was sole ruler of the Great Moravian Empire, with its crupital at Devin near Bratislava.
(Continued)

• • •
1856 -

DR. SAMUEL CZAMBEL -

1956

P.A. HROBAK

T.he year 1956 marks not only the centennial of the
dea:th o:f the great Slovak fighter for freedom and democracy, Dr. Louis Sti1r, ,b ut it is a}so the centennial of the
birth of the eminent SlovaJk philologist, Samuel Czam:bel.
Czambel was born September 1, 1856, in the town of
Slovenska Eupca, Zvolen County, 1Slova;kia. The ~tudy of
his native Slovak language attracted him early in his life
and he devoted much of his adult Hfe to it. He died in Buda.pest, December 18, 1909.
In 1887, Czam'bel wrote his Contrioutions to the History of the Slovak Language (''Prispevlky k dejinam jazy.ka slovenskeho") ; he followed this with his Slovak Orthography ("Slovensky praivopis") in 1890; A Manual of
the Literary Slovak Language ("Rukovaf spisovnej reci
slovenskej") in 1902; The Slovaks and Their Language
("Slovaci a kh rec") in 1903; 8Jlld The Slovak Language
and its Place in the Family of Slovanic Languages ("Slo-.
venska rec a jej miesto v rodine slovenskych jazykov"),
624 pp., in 1906. Of course, Czambel contributed many
other articles on Slovak subjects to Slovak newspapers,
periodical reviiews and magazines.
Czambel's "Rukovae (Slovak Grammar), revised and
modified several times since its first edition by the late
Dr. Joseph SkU!ltety, is a ,s tandard work with ,p hilologists,
grammarians, and students of Slovak. In his "Slovaoi a ich
rec," Czambel promoted the theory that the SlovaJks were
every closely related to the Croatians, Slovenes and Serbs

�84

SLOVAKIA

(Yugoslavs) ; this, of course, was disproved by the studies of ,S kultety and Pastrnek. iin his last work, relating
to the Slovak language and other Slovanic languages,
Czambel systematically dealt with Slovak dialects, beginning with the eastern. He had intended to• add several volumes to show the relationship between the other Slovamic
languages and the Slavak - to the preparation of which
he had devoted years of study - but, unfortunately, illhealth and death overtook Czambel ,b efore he could com-.
plete the planned monumental philological work.
Because Samuel Czam:bel was employed as an official
in a Magyar ministry, and because he had written a ibrochure in Magyar (1902) - even though in favor of the
Slova!k language - he was accused by some writers of being a Magyarcme. The truth is, however, that those write:rs were more influenced by the fact that Czambel ref1Used
to accept the "Czecho-Slo!Vak" theory a!bout the "unity"
of the !Slovaks and Czechs than they were by his Magyar
brochure.
In regard to that Magyar brochure, Dr. Jo8e[)h Skul-i
tety, the grand old defender of :Slovruk history, philology
and culture, had this to say in the "'Slovenske Pohl'ady"
(1923):

"We saw no reason why we should write against this
iMagyar brochure. Were we supposed to write agairnst its
author because he wanted to. have a dean, ,g enuine Slovruk language? Or because he wanted to a.iid it wherever it
needed it? That here 'in politics' he goes a bit too far, well,
that is his business; Dr. Czambel al,w ays stood out so indiividually that we have no right to concern ourselves
a-bout him."
Objective observers will not deny that Czamlbel did
serve the Slova;k caJUSe; he did not serve -Magyarism or Ma...
gyarization as a jobholder in the Ma:gyar ministry, or with
his linguistic theory and his patriotic Slovak verses. In
spirit Czambel was Sloivak, even thoogh he did study in
Vienna and P;r ague·. But a Slovak intellectual could not
easily get the kind of work he ,prepared for in Hungary.
Czambel's father, as a Justice of the Peace in Sloven.ska
tU1pCa, was an acquaintance of Bela Griinwald, who w~

�SLOVAKIA

86

first the Vice-Commissa;r of Zvolen County and then a mem..
ber of the Hungarian Diet. It was Grunwald who placed
young Czambel in the press bureau of the Premier at Budin. And Gri.inwald, we know, ,w as for some 25 years the
greatest oppressor of the Slovaks in Hungary. We can imagine then what it meant to a young Slo;va!k ;patriot to hawe
his protection. Because of that, however, young CZiambel
did not become a Magyarone, but devoted himself to the
study of his people and their language.
In 1890, Czambel was persuaded to write for the "Slo-.
venske Pohl'ady" (Slovak Review); of course, holding a
job under the Magyars, he could not write under his own
name. When he published his book, "Slovaci a ich rec" in
1903, iJ&gt;resenting t'he theory that the Slovaks were a Yu"'
goslav tribe, Czambel was severely criticized by the "Na:rodne Noviny" and the "Slovenske Pohl'ady," which proved
mm wrong and condemned him. Informed ,p ersons, however,
knew t'hat Czambel proposed the Yugoslav theory not because of convictions, lbut rather as a matter of tactics: it
was only thus that he could keep his state job.
:S amuel Czambel definitely proved that man does ,n ot
live by lbreoo alone. Suspected as a Magyarone by some of
his own people, and as a Pan-Slarv by the Magyars, Samuel
Czambel nevertheless rendered a g,reat service to his people by his literary efforts. His grammar of the Slovak lan-.
guage is, still the best, according to Slovak philologists .

•

•

CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA

STAROHRAD (THE OLD CASTLE) OF LIPTOV

The village of Liptovska Tepla in Slovakia lies east of
the ,city of Ruzomlberok. Not far from the village we find
the mineral springs called Lucky. Traveling by train from
Ruizomberok to Lucky we see the mighty roC'ky cliffs of
the Sielinica fortress, which is almost as high as Sitno. On
these rocky cliffs can still. be seen the remnants of the on~e
mighty Old Castle (Starohroo). It is accessi1b le from the
valley of Sestrca; at one time it served as a guard for the
highway that led from Liptov to Ora:va.
'In the fourteenth century Starohrad wa:s the proper-

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1420">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA

83

successful. In 873 he defeated Carloman decisively. Carloman asked his father Louis for help to fight the Slovaks.
When aid was not forthcoming, Carloman decided to seek
a truce with Svatopluk. He signed a pact with Svatopluk
at Forsheim in 874 and recognized the independence of the
Great Moravian Empire. Svatopluk had reached the pinnacle of his ambitions: he was sole ruler of the Great Moravian Empire, with its crupital at Devin near Bratislava.
(Continued)

• • •
1856 -

DR. SAMUEL CZAMBEL -

1956

P.A. HROBAK

T.he year 1956 marks not only the centennial of the
dea:th o:f the great Slovak fighter for freedom and democracy, Dr. Louis Sti1r, ,b ut it is a}so the centennial of the
birth of the eminent SlovaJk philologist, Samuel Czam:bel.
Czambel was born September 1, 1856, in the town of
Slovenska Eupca, Zvolen County, 1Slova;kia. The ~tudy of
his native Slovak language attracted him early in his life
and he devoted much of his adult Hfe to it. He died in Buda.pest, December 18, 1909.
In 1887, Czam'bel wrote his Contrioutions to the History of the Slovak Language (''Prispevlky k dejinam jazy.ka slovenskeho") ; he followed this with his Slovak Orthography ("Slovensky praivopis") in 1890; A Manual of
the Literary Slovak Language ("Rukovaf spisovnej reci
slovenskej") in 1902; The Slovaks and Their Language
("Slovaci a kh rec") in 1903; 8Jlld The Slovak Language
and its Place in the Family of Slovanic Languages ("Slo-.
venska rec a jej miesto v rodine slovenskych jazykov"),
624 pp., in 1906. Of course, Czambel contributed many
other articles on Slovak subjects to Slovak newspapers,
periodical reviiews and magazines.
Czambel's "Rukovae (Slovak Grammar), revised and
modified several times since its first edition by the late
Dr. Joseph SkU!ltety, is a ,s tandard work with ,p hilologists,
grammarians, and students of Slovak. In his "Slovaoi a ich
rec," Czambel promoted the theory that the SlovaJks were
every closely related to the Croatians, Slovenes and Serbs

�84

SLOVAKIA

(Yugoslavs) ; this, of course, was disproved by the studies of ,S kultety and Pastrnek. iin his last work, relating
to the Slovak language and other Slovanic languages,
Czambel systematically dealt with Slovak dialects, beginning with the eastern. He had intended to• add several volumes to show the relationship between the other Slovamic
languages and the Slavak - to the preparation of which
he had devoted years of study - but, unfortunately, illhealth and death overtook Czambel ,b efore he could com-.
plete the planned monumental philological work.
Because Samuel Czam:bel was employed as an official
in a Magyar ministry, and because he had written a ibrochure in Magyar (1902) - even though in favor of the
Slova!k language - he was accused by some writers of being a Magyarcme. The truth is, however, that those write:rs were more influenced by the fact that Czambel ref1Used
to accept the "Czecho-Slo!Vak" theory a!bout the "unity"
of the !Slovaks and Czechs than they were by his Magyar
brochure.
In regard to that Magyar brochure, Dr. Jo8e[)h Skul-i
tety, the grand old defender of :Slovruk history, philology
and culture, had this to say in the "'Slovenske Pohl'ady"
(1923):

"We saw no reason why we should write against this
iMagyar brochure. Were we supposed to write agairnst its
author because he wanted to. have a dean, ,g enuine Slovruk language? Or because he wanted to a.iid it wherever it
needed it? That here 'in politics' he goes a bit too far, well,
that is his business; Dr. Czambel al,w ays stood out so indiividually that we have no right to concern ourselves
a-bout him."
Objective observers will not deny that Czamlbel did
serve the Slova;k caJUSe; he did not serve -Magyarism or Ma...
gyarization as a jobholder in the Ma:gyar ministry, or with
his linguistic theory and his patriotic Slovak verses. In
spirit Czambel was Sloivak, even thoogh he did study in
Vienna and P;r ague·. But a Slovak intellectual could not
easily get the kind of work he ,prepared for in Hungary.
Czambel's father, as a Justice of the Peace in Sloven.ska
tU1pCa, was an acquaintance of Bela Griinwald, who w~

�SLOVAKIA

86

first the Vice-Commissa;r of Zvolen County and then a mem..
ber of the Hungarian Diet. It was Grunwald who placed
young Czambel in the press bureau of the Premier at Budin. And Gri.inwald, we know, ,w as for some 25 years the
greatest oppressor of the Slovaks in Hungary. We can imagine then what it meant to a young Slo;va!k ;patriot to hawe
his protection. Because of that, however, young CZiambel
did not become a Magyarone, but devoted himself to the
study of his people and their language.
In 1890, Czambel was persuaded to write for the "Slo-.
venske Pohl'ady" (Slovak Review); of course, holding a
job under the Magyars, he could not write under his own
name. When he published his book, "Slovaci a ich rec" in
1903, iJ&gt;resenting t'he theory that the Slovaks were a Yu"'
goslav tribe, Czambel was severely criticized by the "Na:rodne Noviny" and the "Slovenske Pohl'ady," which proved
mm wrong and condemned him. Informed ,p ersons, however,
knew t'hat Czambel proposed the Yugoslav theory not because of convictions, lbut rather as a matter of tactics: it
was only thus that he could keep his state job.
:S amuel Czambel definitely proved that man does ,n ot
live by lbreoo alone. Suspected as a Magyarone by some of
his own people, and as a Pan-Slarv by the Magyars, Samuel
Czambel nevertheless rendered a g,reat service to his people by his literary efforts. His grammar of the Slovak lan-.
guage is, still the best, according to Slovak philologists .

•

•

CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA

STAROHRAD (THE OLD CASTLE) OF LIPTOV

The village of Liptovska Tepla in Slovakia lies east of
the ,city of Ruzomlberok. Not far from the village we find
the mineral springs called Lucky. Traveling by train from
Ruizomberok to Lucky we see the mighty roC'ky cliffs of
the Sielinica fortress, which is almost as high as Sitno. On
these rocky cliffs can still. be seen the remnants of the on~e
mighty Old Castle (Starohroo). It is accessi1b le from the
valley of Sestrca; at one time it served as a guard for the
highway that led from Liptov to Ora:va.
'In the fourteenth century Starohrad wa:s the proper-

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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;</text>
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
83&#13;
&#13;
successful. In 873 he defeated Carloman decisively. Carloman asked his father Louis for help to fight the Slovaks.&#13;
When aid was not forthcoming, Carloman decided to seek&#13;
a truce with Svatopluk. He signed a pact with Svatopluk&#13;
at Forsheim in 874 and recognized the independence of the&#13;
Great Moravian Empire. Svatopluk had reached the pinnacle of his ambitions: he was sole ruler of the Great Moravian Empire, with its crupital at Devin near Bratislava.&#13;
(Continued)&#13;
&#13;
• • •&#13;
1856 -&#13;
&#13;
DR. SAMUEL CZAMBEL -&#13;
&#13;
1956&#13;
&#13;
P.A. HROBAK&#13;
&#13;
T.he year 1956 marks not only the centennial of the&#13;
dea:th o:f the great Slovak fighter for freedom and democracy, Dr. Louis Sti1r, ,b ut it is a}so the centennial of the&#13;
birth of the eminent SlovaJk philologist, Samuel Czam:bel.&#13;
Czambel was born September 1, 1856, in the town of&#13;
Slovenska Eupca, Zvolen County, 1Slova;kia. The ~tudy of&#13;
his native Slovak language attracted him early in his life&#13;
and he devoted much of his adult Hfe to it. He died in Buda.pest, December 18, 1909.&#13;
In 1887, Czam'bel wrote his Contrioutions to the History of the Slovak Language (''Prispevlky k dejinam jazy.ka slovenskeho") ; he followed this with his Slovak Orthography ("Slovensky praivopis") in 1890; A Manual of&#13;
the Literary Slovak Language ("Rukovaf spisovnej reci&#13;
slovenskej") in 1902; The Slovaks and Their Language&#13;
("Slovaci a kh rec") in 1903; 8Jlld The Slovak Language&#13;
and its Place in the Family of Slovanic Languages ("Slo-.&#13;
venska rec a jej miesto v rodine slovenskych jazykov"),&#13;
624 pp., in 1906. Of course, Czambel contributed many&#13;
other articles on Slovak subjects to Slovak newspapers,&#13;
periodical reviiews and magazines.&#13;
Czambel's "Rukovae (Slovak Grammar), revised and&#13;
modified several times since its first edition by the late&#13;
Dr. Joseph SkU!ltety, is a ,s tandard work with ,p hilologists,&#13;
grammarians, and students of Slovak. In his "Slovaoi a ich&#13;
rec," Czambel promoted the theory that the SlovaJks were&#13;
every closely related to the Croatians, Slovenes and Serbs&#13;
&#13;
84&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
(Yugoslavs) ; this, of course, was disproved by the studies of ,S kultety and Pastrnek. iin his last work, relating&#13;
to the Slovak language and other Slovanic languages,&#13;
Czambel systematically dealt with Slovak dialects, beginning with the eastern. He had intended to• add several volumes to show the relationship between the other Slovamic&#13;
languages and the Slavak - to the preparation of which&#13;
he had devoted years of study - but, unfortunately, illhealth and death overtook Czambel ,b efore he could com-.&#13;
plete the planned monumental philological work.&#13;
Because Samuel Czam:bel was employed as an official&#13;
in a Magyar ministry, and because he had written a ibrochure in Magyar (1902) - even though in favor of the&#13;
Slova!k language - he was accused by some writers of being a Magyarcme. The truth is, however, that those write:rs were more influenced by the fact that Czambel ref1Used&#13;
to accept the "Czecho-Slo!Vak" theory a!bout the "unity"&#13;
of the !Slovaks and Czechs than they were by his Magyar&#13;
brochure.&#13;
In regard to that Magyar brochure, Dr. Jo8e[)h Skul-i&#13;
tety, the grand old defender of :Slovruk history, philology&#13;
and culture, had this to say in the "'Slovenske Pohl'ady"&#13;
(1923):&#13;
&#13;
"We saw no reason why we should write against this&#13;
iMagyar brochure. Were we supposed to write agairnst its&#13;
author because he wanted to. have a dean, ,g enuine Slovruk language? Or because he wanted to a.iid it wherever it&#13;
needed it? That here 'in politics' he goes a bit too far, well,&#13;
that is his business; Dr. Czambel al,w ays stood out so indiividually that we have no right to concern ourselves&#13;
a-bout him."&#13;
Objective observers will not deny that Czamlbel did&#13;
serve the Slova;k caJUSe; he did not serve -Magyarism or Ma...&#13;
gyarization as a jobholder in the Ma:gyar ministry, or with&#13;
his linguistic theory and his patriotic Slovak verses. In&#13;
spirit Czambel was Sloivak, even thoogh he did study in&#13;
Vienna and P;r ague·. But a Slovak intellectual could not&#13;
easily get the kind of work he ,prepared for in Hungary.&#13;
Czambel's father, as a Justice of the Peace in Sloven.ska&#13;
tU1pCa, was an acquaintance of Bela Griinwald, who w~&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
86&#13;
&#13;
first the Vice-Commissa;r of Zvolen County and then a mem..&#13;
ber of the Hungarian Diet. It was Grunwald who placed&#13;
young Czambel in the press bureau of the Premier at Budin. And Gri.inwald, we know, ,w as for some 25 years the&#13;
greatest oppressor of the Slovaks in Hungary. We can imagine then what it meant to a young Slo;va!k ;patriot to hawe&#13;
his protection. Because of that, however, young CZiambel&#13;
did not become a Magyarone, but devoted himself to the&#13;
study of his people and their language.&#13;
In 1890, Czambel was persuaded to write for the "Slo-.&#13;
venske Pohl'ady" (Slovak Review); of course, holding a&#13;
job under the Magyars, he could not write under his own&#13;
name. When he published his book, "Slovaci a ich rec" in&#13;
1903, iJ&gt;resenting t'he theory that the Slovaks were a Yu"'&#13;
goslav tribe, Czambel was severely criticized by the "Na:rodne Noviny" and the "Slovenske Pohl'ady," which proved&#13;
mm wrong and condemned him. Informed ,p ersons, however,&#13;
knew t'hat Czambel proposed the Yugoslav theory not because of convictions, lbut rather as a matter of tactics: it&#13;
was only thus that he could keep his state job.&#13;
:S amuel Czambel definitely proved that man does ,n ot&#13;
live by lbreoo alone. Suspected as a Magyarone by some of&#13;
his own people, and as a Pan-Slarv by the Magyars, Samuel&#13;
Czambel nevertheless rendered a g,reat service to his people by his literary efforts. His grammar of the Slovak lan-.&#13;
guage is, still the best, according to Slovak philologists .&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
STAROHRAD (THE OLD CASTLE) OF LIPTOV&#13;
&#13;
The village of Liptovska Tepla in Slovakia lies east of&#13;
the ,city of Ruzomlberok. Not far from the village we find&#13;
the mineral springs called Lucky. Traveling by train from&#13;
Ruizomberok to Lucky we see the mighty roC'ky cliffs of&#13;
the Sielinica fortress, which is almost as high as Sitno. On&#13;
these rocky cliffs can still. be seen the remnants of the on~e&#13;
mighty Old Castle (Starohroo). It is accessi1b le from the&#13;
valley of Sestrca; at one time it served as a guard for the&#13;
highway that led from Liptov to Ora:va.&#13;
'In the fourteenth century Starohrad wa:s the proper-&#13;
&#13;
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

86

first the Vice-Commissa;r of Zvolen County and then a mem..
ber of the Hungarian Diet. It was Grunwald who placed
young Czambel in the press bureau of the Premier at Budin. And Gri.inwald, we know, ,w as for some 25 years the
greatest oppressor of the Slovaks in Hungary. We can imagine then what it meant to a young Slo;va!k ;patriot to hawe
his protection. Because of that, however, young CZiambel
did not become a Magyarone, but devoted himself to the
study of his people and their language.
In 1890, Czambel was persuaded to write for the "Slo-.
venske Pohl'ady" (Slovak Review); of course, holding a
job under the Magyars, he could not write under his own
name. When he published his book, "Slovaci a ich rec" in
1903, iJ&gt;resenting t'he theory that the Slovaks were a Yu"'
goslav tribe, Czambel was severely criticized by the "Na:rodne Noviny" and the "Slovenske Pohl'ady," which proved
mm wrong and condemned him. Informed ,p ersons, however,
knew t'hat Czambel proposed the Yugoslav theory not because of convictions, lbut rather as a matter of tactics: it
was only thus that he could keep his state job.
:S amuel Czambel definitely proved that man does ,n ot
live by lbreoo alone. Suspected as a Magyarone by some of
his own people, and as a Pan-Slarv by the Magyars, Samuel
Czambel nevertheless rendered a g,reat service to his people by his literary efforts. His grammar of the Slovak lan-.
guage is, still the best, according to Slovak philologists .

•

•

CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA

STAROHRAD (THE OLD CASTLE) OF LIPTOV

The village of Liptovska Tepla in Slovakia lies east of
the ,city of Ruzomlberok. Not far from the village we find
the mineral springs called Lucky. Traveling by train from
Ruizomberok to Lucky we see the mighty roC'ky cliffs of
the Sielinica fortress, which is almost as high as Sitno. On
these rocky cliffs can still. be seen the remnants of the on~e
mighty Old Castle (Starohroo). It is accessi1b le from the
valley of Sestrca; at one time it served as a guard for the
highway that led from Liptov to Ora:va.
'In the fourteenth century Starohrad wa:s the proper-

�86

SLOVAKIA

ty of Done; in the fifteenth it belonged to Pankrac of Lip-.
:tovsky Svaty Miku:las and then to Peter KiomO'.rovsky. The
county administratorrs resided there. In 1433 Starohrad
W&lt;3JS taken by the Czech Hussites who came from Bohemia
to ra.vage and plunder Slovaikia. King Mathias took the
castle from Komorovsky and had it completely destroyed
in 1474. Little remains of the ruins today, but Starohrad
lives on in many legends.
The 'brook called Sestrca separates the fortress of
Sielnica, with its historical Starohrad, from the mighty
cliff of 2ipov; with the .passage of years it cut a narrow
but deep valley. People say that when King Mathias besieged Starohrad, his army encamped Oiil 2ipov, cannonaded :Starohrad with such foTce that the walls giwe in. One
of the cannon balls, the story goes, flew all the way to
Sielnica, and since that time the inhab,itants of Sielnica
claim the entire cliff as, their property, even though they
a.re separated from it by three communit&gt;ie~.
People of the community of St. Ann also have pre~
served a legend 8Jbout Starohrad. They say that Starohrad
was at one time besieged by unknown enemies, who were
as numerous as flies, so that one could not even see a
blade of grass on the slope beneath the castle.. Try as they
might, however, they could not ta;ke the castle. That is, at
least, not until love ,prompted treason. People say that the
daughter of Starohrad's owner fell in love with one of the
lrnights of the besieging army and one .night threw him the
keys to the main gate. And that is the way the enemy was
able to get in:to fue courtyard of the castle.
The Joni of the castie, however, as is always the C8Jse
in such legends, was ,prepared for su~h an eventuality. He
and hi!S family escruped through an underground passage.
It was only after they were '3afe from the enemy that the
lord learned that the castle was betrayed by his own daughter. Thereupon he flew into a great rage and cursed her.
And a father's curse is never without effect. The unfor...
tunate girl wandered about the ruins of Starohrad for
seven years, longingly awaiting her liberation. The people
of the vicinity, however, would have nothing to do with her
and ke;pt their distance from her. Well, ,i t so happened that

�SLOVAKIA

87

a certain shepherd finally did get UJP enough courage to
talk to, the cursed girl.
She begged him to help her and liberate her from the
infinite sufferings. The shepheTd promised that he would
come to the same spot the very next day and when she ap,peairs in :the form of a pig, he would snatch the golden
1keys
from her snout. She ,i n turn ;promised him to reveal
the spot on rS'tarohrad where her father had concealed a
great treasure when he was attacked by the enemy, which
would be his ~eward.
'l'he $hepherd did as he had promised. He came to
the spot, but when a pig did maJke its aippearance, fear overcame him and he began to shake all over. The pig was so
ugly that he .took to flight. The pig, however, ran after
him. ln terror the shepherd shouted: "Would to God that
you wouid vanish!" Right then and there the apparition
sto[Pped and said "Now you did it; you cursed me even
more." And with that the girl did ,v anish, leaving not a
single trace behind herself.

•

•

•

WHO SAID IT?

"Let me be allowed to point to the example given by
Dr. H. Ripka ... It was no accident that he was entrusted
with the leadership of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that
he was entrusted with the care of our foreign press and radio, that he was entrusted to negotiate an agreement of our
alliamce with the Soviet Union, that he was the head of
practically ail negotiation s by which the foundation was
placed for the greatest success of our national revolution,
the transfer of Germans from our lands. And neither was it
an accident, but it emanated from the stand of our brethren,
that it was a National Socialist who was unanimous ly
elected as president of the State Council of our parliament
abroad, that a National Socialist was the Chairman of the
British-Cze choslovak Friendship Society, that a National
Socialist was the Chairman of the Society to cultivate cultural and economical contacts with the USSR." - (J. Firt,
a Benes Czech, in the SVOBODN E SLOVO, 3-2-47).

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1413">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA

86

first the Vice-Commissa;r of Zvolen County and then a mem..
ber of the Hungarian Diet. It was Grunwald who placed
young Czambel in the press bureau of the Premier at Budin. And Gri.inwald, we know, ,w as for some 25 years the
greatest oppressor of the Slovaks in Hungary. We can imagine then what it meant to a young Slo;va!k ;patriot to hawe
his protection. Because of that, however, young CZiambel
did not become a Magyarone, but devoted himself to the
study of his people and their language.
In 1890, Czambel was persuaded to write for the "Slo-.
venske Pohl'ady" (Slovak Review); of course, holding a
job under the Magyars, he could not write under his own
name. When he published his book, "Slovaci a ich rec" in
1903, iJ&gt;resenting t'he theory that the Slovaks were a Yu"'
goslav tribe, Czambel was severely criticized by the "Na:rodne Noviny" and the "Slovenske Pohl'ady," which proved
mm wrong and condemned him. Informed ,p ersons, however,
knew t'hat Czambel proposed the Yugoslav theory not because of convictions, lbut rather as a matter of tactics: it
was only thus that he could keep his state job.
:S amuel Czambel definitely proved that man does ,n ot
live by lbreoo alone. Suspected as a Magyarone by some of
his own people, and as a Pan-Slarv by the Magyars, Samuel
Czambel nevertheless rendered a g,reat service to his people by his literary efforts. His grammar of the Slovak lan-.
guage is, still the best, according to Slovak philologists .

•

•

CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA

STAROHRAD (THE OLD CASTLE) OF LIPTOV

The village of Liptovska Tepla in Slovakia lies east of
the ,city of Ruzomlberok. Not far from the village we find
the mineral springs called Lucky. Traveling by train from
Ruizomberok to Lucky we see the mighty roC'ky cliffs of
the Sielinica fortress, which is almost as high as Sitno. On
these rocky cliffs can still. be seen the remnants of the on~e
mighty Old Castle (Starohroo). It is accessi1b le from the
valley of Sestrca; at one time it served as a guard for the
highway that led from Liptov to Ora:va.
'In the fourteenth century Starohrad wa:s the proper-

�86

SLOVAKIA

ty of Done; in the fifteenth it belonged to Pankrac of Lip-.
:tovsky Svaty Miku:las and then to Peter KiomO'.rovsky. The
county administratorrs resided there. In 1433 Starohrad
W&lt;3JS taken by the Czech Hussites who came from Bohemia
to ra.vage and plunder Slovaikia. King Mathias took the
castle from Komorovsky and had it completely destroyed
in 1474. Little remains of the ruins today, but Starohrad
lives on in many legends.
The 'brook called Sestrca separates the fortress of
Sielnica, with its historical Starohrad, from the mighty
cliff of 2ipov; with the .passage of years it cut a narrow
but deep valley. People say that when King Mathias besieged Starohrad, his army encamped Oiil 2ipov, cannonaded :Starohrad with such foTce that the walls giwe in. One
of the cannon balls, the story goes, flew all the way to
Sielnica, and since that time the inhab,itants of Sielnica
claim the entire cliff as, their property, even though they
a.re separated from it by three communit&gt;ie~.
People of the community of St. Ann also have pre~
served a legend 8Jbout Starohrad. They say that Starohrad
was at one time besieged by unknown enemies, who were
as numerous as flies, so that one could not even see a
blade of grass on the slope beneath the castle.. Try as they
might, however, they could not ta;ke the castle. That is, at
least, not until love ,prompted treason. People say that the
daughter of Starohrad's owner fell in love with one of the
lrnights of the besieging army and one .night threw him the
keys to the main gate. And that is the way the enemy was
able to get in:to fue courtyard of the castle.
The Joni of the castie, however, as is always the C8Jse
in such legends, was ,prepared for su~h an eventuality. He
and hi!S family escruped through an underground passage.
It was only after they were '3afe from the enemy that the
lord learned that the castle was betrayed by his own daughter. Thereupon he flew into a great rage and cursed her.
And a father's curse is never without effect. The unfor...
tunate girl wandered about the ruins of Starohrad for
seven years, longingly awaiting her liberation. The people
of the vicinity, however, would have nothing to do with her
and ke;pt their distance from her. Well, ,i t so happened that

�SLOVAKIA

87

a certain shepherd finally did get UJP enough courage to
talk to, the cursed girl.
She begged him to help her and liberate her from the
infinite sufferings. The shepheTd promised that he would
come to the same spot the very next day and when she ap,peairs in :the form of a pig, he would snatch the golden
1keys
from her snout. She ,i n turn ;promised him to reveal
the spot on rS'tarohrad where her father had concealed a
great treasure when he was attacked by the enemy, which
would be his ~eward.
'l'he $hepherd did as he had promised. He came to
the spot, but when a pig did maJke its aippearance, fear overcame him and he began to shake all over. The pig was so
ugly that he .took to flight. The pig, however, ran after
him. ln terror the shepherd shouted: "Would to God that
you wouid vanish!" Right then and there the apparition
sto[Pped and said "Now you did it; you cursed me even
more." And with that the girl did ,v anish, leaving not a
single trace behind herself.

•

•

•

WHO SAID IT?

"Let me be allowed to point to the example given by
Dr. H. Ripka ... It was no accident that he was entrusted
with the leadership of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that
he was entrusted with the care of our foreign press and radio, that he was entrusted to negotiate an agreement of our
alliamce with the Soviet Union, that he was the head of
practically ail negotiation s by which the foundation was
placed for the greatest success of our national revolution,
the transfer of Germans from our lands. And neither was it
an accident, but it emanated from the stand of our brethren,
that it was a National Socialist who was unanimous ly
elected as president of the State Council of our parliament
abroad, that a National Socialist was the Chairman of the
British-Cze choslovak Friendship Society, that a National
Socialist was the Chairman of the Society to cultivate cultural and economical contacts with the USSR." - (J. Firt,
a Benes Czech, in the SVOBODN E SLOVO, 3-2-47).

�</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
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&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
86&#13;
&#13;
first the Vice-Commissa;r of Zvolen County and then a mem..&#13;
ber of the Hungarian Diet. It was Grunwald who placed&#13;
young Czambel in the press bureau of the Premier at Budin. And Gri.inwald, we know, ,w as for some 25 years the&#13;
greatest oppressor of the Slovaks in Hungary. We can imagine then what it meant to a young Slo;va!k ;patriot to hawe&#13;
his protection. Because of that, however, young CZiambel&#13;
did not become a Magyarone, but devoted himself to the&#13;
study of his people and their language.&#13;
In 1890, Czambel was persuaded to write for the "Slo-.&#13;
venske Pohl'ady" (Slovak Review); of course, holding a&#13;
job under the Magyars, he could not write under his own&#13;
name. When he published his book, "Slovaci a ich rec" in&#13;
1903, iJ&gt;resenting t'he theory that the Slovaks were a Yu"'&#13;
goslav tribe, Czambel was severely criticized by the "Na:rodne Noviny" and the "Slovenske Pohl'ady," which proved&#13;
mm wrong and condemned him. Informed ,p ersons, however,&#13;
knew t'hat Czambel proposed the Yugoslav theory not because of convictions, lbut rather as a matter of tactics: it&#13;
was only thus that he could keep his state job.&#13;
:S amuel Czambel definitely proved that man does ,n ot&#13;
live by lbreoo alone. Suspected as a Magyarone by some of&#13;
his own people, and as a Pan-Slarv by the Magyars, Samuel&#13;
Czambel nevertheless rendered a g,reat service to his people by his literary efforts. His grammar of the Slovak lan-.&#13;
guage is, still the best, according to Slovak philologists .&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
STAROHRAD (THE OLD CASTLE) OF LIPTOV&#13;
&#13;
The village of Liptovska Tepla in Slovakia lies east of&#13;
the ,city of Ruzomlberok. Not far from the village we find&#13;
the mineral springs called Lucky. Traveling by train from&#13;
Ruizomberok to Lucky we see the mighty roC'ky cliffs of&#13;
the Sielinica fortress, which is almost as high as Sitno. On&#13;
these rocky cliffs can still. be seen the remnants of the on~e&#13;
mighty Old Castle (Starohroo). It is accessi1b le from the&#13;
valley of Sestrca; at one time it served as a guard for the&#13;
highway that led from Liptov to Ora:va.&#13;
'In the fourteenth century Starohrad wa:s the proper-&#13;
&#13;
86&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
ty of Done; in the fifteenth it belonged to Pankrac of Lip-.&#13;
:tovsky Svaty Miku:las and then to Peter KiomO'.rovsky. The&#13;
county administratorrs resided there. In 1433 Starohrad&#13;
W&lt;3JS taken by the Czech Hussites who came from Bohemia&#13;
to ra.vage and plunder Slovaikia. King Mathias took the&#13;
castle from Komorovsky and had it completely destroyed&#13;
in 1474. Little remains of the ruins today, but Starohrad&#13;
lives on in many legends.&#13;
The 'brook called Sestrca separates the fortress of&#13;
Sielnica, with its historical Starohrad, from the mighty&#13;
cliff of 2ipov; with the .passage of years it cut a narrow&#13;
but deep valley. People say that when King Mathias besieged Starohrad, his army encamped Oiil 2ipov, cannonaded :Starohrad with such foTce that the walls giwe in. One&#13;
of the cannon balls, the story goes, flew all the way to&#13;
Sielnica, and since that time the inhab,itants of Sielnica&#13;
claim the entire cliff as, their property, even though they&#13;
a.re separated from it by three communit&gt;ie~.&#13;
People of the community of St. Ann also have pre~&#13;
served a legend 8Jbout Starohrad. They say that Starohrad&#13;
was at one time besieged by unknown enemies, who were&#13;
as numerous as flies, so that one could not even see a&#13;
blade of grass on the slope beneath the castle.. Try as they&#13;
might, however, they could not ta;ke the castle. That is, at&#13;
least, not until love ,prompted treason. People say that the&#13;
daughter of Starohrad's owner fell in love with one of the&#13;
lrnights of the besieging army and one .night threw him the&#13;
keys to the main gate. And that is the way the enemy was&#13;
able to get in:to fue courtyard of the castle.&#13;
The Joni of the castie, however, as is always the C8Jse&#13;
in such legends, was ,prepared for su~h an eventuality. He&#13;
and hi!S family escruped through an underground passage.&#13;
It was only after they were '3afe from the enemy that the&#13;
lord learned that the castle was betrayed by his own daughter. Thereupon he flew into a great rage and cursed her.&#13;
And a father's curse is never without effect. The unfor...&#13;
tunate girl wandered about the ruins of Starohrad for&#13;
seven years, longingly awaiting her liberation. The people&#13;
of the vicinity, however, would have nothing to do with her&#13;
and ke;pt their distance from her. Well, ,i t so happened that&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
87&#13;
&#13;
a certain shepherd finally did get UJP enough courage to&#13;
talk to, the cursed girl.&#13;
She begged him to help her and liberate her from the&#13;
infinite sufferings. The shepheTd promised that he would&#13;
come to the same spot the very next day and when she ap,peairs in :the form of a pig, he would snatch the golden&#13;
1keys&#13;
from her snout. She ,i n turn ;promised him to reveal&#13;
the spot on rS'tarohrad where her father had concealed a&#13;
great treasure when he was attacked by the enemy, which&#13;
would be his ~eward.&#13;
'l'he $hepherd did as he had promised. He came to&#13;
the spot, but when a pig did maJke its aippearance, fear overcame him and he began to shake all over. The pig was so&#13;
ugly that he .took to flight. The pig, however, ran after&#13;
him. ln terror the shepherd shouted: "Would to God that&#13;
you wouid vanish!" Right then and there the apparition&#13;
sto[Pped and said "Now you did it; you cursed me even&#13;
more." And with that the girl did ,v anish, leaving not a&#13;
single trace behind herself.&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
WHO SAID IT?&#13;
&#13;
"Let me be allowed to point to the example given by&#13;
Dr. H. Ripka ... It was no accident that he was entrusted&#13;
with the leadership of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that&#13;
he was entrusted with the care of our foreign press and radio, that he was entrusted to negotiate an agreement of our&#13;
alliamce with the Soviet Union, that he was the head of&#13;
practically ail negotiation s by which the foundation was&#13;
placed for the greatest success of our national revolution,&#13;
the transfer of Germans from our lands. And neither was it&#13;
an accident, but it emanated from the stand of our brethren,&#13;
that it was a National Socialist who was unanimous ly&#13;
elected as president of the State Council of our parliament&#13;
abroad, that a National Socialist was the Chairman of the&#13;
British-Cze choslovak Friendship Society, that a National&#13;
Socialist was the Chairman of the Society to cultivate cultural and economical contacts with the USSR." - (J. Firt,&#13;
a Benes Czech, in the SVOBODN E SLOVO, 3-2-47).&#13;
&#13;
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                    <text>88

SLOVAKIA

Kerner's "Czechoslov~kia" (Cont'd.)
IDSTORY OR PROPAGANDA?
P.A. HROBAK
"With the formation of the Czecho,Slovak State, the Germans
refused to accept the new situation and to cooperate with the new
government at Prague" (p. 177) .

But the fact is that even though they were forced to
accept the situation, on various occasions the Sudetenlanders
showed their willingness to cooperate with Prague, but the
Czechs were not disposed to cooperate. "The Germans, reduced from the position of dominance to that of a minority,
naturally resented the new setup," Roucek tells us, which
is true, but the entire blame for the bad blood between the
Czechs and the Germans, could hardly be placed on the latter,
as Roucek would have us do. Masaryk and Benes and their
followers were responsible for what happened in and to
Czecho-Slovakia, because they practically ran the whole
show.
"But why did the Czechs ask that this hostile element be included
in their state? In the memorandum which the Czechs submitted to the
Peace Conference, they claimed the historic frontiers of Bohemia. All
history showed, they argued, and economic and strategic considerations
demanded, that the historic Lands of the Bohemian Crown should remain a single unit. The exclusion of the Sudete areas would have broken
the virtually indissoluble geographical and economic ties with central
Bohemia. The Germans of Bohemia d6lsired to be united with the new
Austrian Republic and not with the Reich. The areas settled by the
Germans were never, of themselves, component parts of the German
Reich nor were they independent elements in the former Austria•
Hungary. So far as these territories were connected constitutionally
with the Holy Roman Empire, they were connected solely as part and
parcel of the Czech State, consisting of the Lands of the Bohemian
Crown, and only as an entity with those Lands." - (p. 178).

Roucek's tendency is obvious: the Czechs had a claim,
but the Germans did not. Bohemia, we know, was an independent kingdom until 1526; the Germans were no less a part
of it than were the Czechs. Roucek, however, tells us that
the territories settled by the Germans "were connected solely
as part and parcel of the "CZECH" State and not the BOHEMIAN Crown lands. What Benes and Masaryk submitted
to the Peace Conference to back their "claims" to the his-

�SLOVAKIA

89

toric frontiers of Bohemia is one thing, but the truth is something else. Roucek apparently preferred not to deal with
the latter. For his edification, I quote Robert Ingrim, eminent
journalist and author, who says that:
_ . . before Huss's reformation, Bohemia had been the scene of
the most felicitous Czech-German cooperation. Of this, Prague, one of
the most magnificent cities in Europe, is still a living witness. It must
be added that in those dark times, when people had not yet learned to
regard another language as a symptom of inferiority, no one spoke of
Czechs or 'G ermans. They were just Bohemians. This explains why no
two other races have more similarity than Czechs and Sudeten Germans. There was perpetual intermarriage and it became, in the towns,
purely accidental whether a family considered itself German or Czech.
The race which profited most by this close community were the Czechs
because the Germans had an older and more highly developed culture
and could draw from the great receptacle of the Germanies. The Czechs
as part and parcel of the Holy Roman Empire became entirely different
from Slavic peoples outside." ("After Hitler Stalin?" - 1946 - Bruce

Publishing Company, Milwaukee, Wis.; pp. 54-55) .

It is significant that Roucek did not include the works
of such eminent historians as C. A. Macartney and A. J. P.
Taylor, which shed much light on Bohemia and the Habsburg
Empire. Macartney, for example, says that Bohemia did
"become a member of the German Reich," whereas Roucek
claims that "the areas settled by the Germans were never,
of themselves, component parts of the German Reich," which
is a tricky way of putting it, to say the least. iHow many
students and teachers of history, using Kerner's "Czechoslovakia," noticed or paid any attention to Roucek's "of themselves," and if some did, what did they make of it? What
real claim did Masaryk and Benes have to the 3,231,688
Germans of Bohemia, the figure mentioned by Roucek (.p.
178)?
Furthermore, according to Roucek:
"The whole problem of the Sudete Germans was a counter in the
game of power politics and a part of the larger problem of Germany
in Europe. It was not a debate between the 11,000,000 Czecho-Slovaks
and the 75,0'00,000 Germans concerning the treatment of Germans in
Czecho-Slovakia, or the frontiers of that Repu'blic, or of the destiny
of the national fragments which remained outside the German borders.
It was a question of the desire of Germany to establish a new empire"
(p. 182).

Now this may have been the desire of Hitler after he
came to power. But why should Roucek consider the Sudete

�90

SLOVAKIA

problem only from this angle? The situation in 1938 may
have been ~s described, but what the Sudeten Germans themselves had to say about their treatment at the hands of the
Czechs from 1918 to 1938 is not at all worth mentioning
by Roucek. Furthermore, the debate certainly did not concern "11,000,000 Czecho-Slovaks," as Roucek would have us
believe. The Slovaks had nothing to do with it; foreign policy
was dominated by Benes and the Czechs.
The Slovaks, we know, had their own arguments with
the Czechs. The Czechs under Masaryk and Benes were on
one side, while the non-Czech nationalities - the majority
of the population of Czecho-Slovakia - were on the opposite
side. The demands of these non-Czech nations may have
been, as Roucek says, "incompatible with the fundamental
principles of democracy as understood and practiced in
Czecho-Slovakia," nevertheless they were not incompatible
with natural rights and the fundamental principles of democracy as understood and practiced in genuinely democratic
countries.
The simple truth is that the Czechs, especially the
Masaryk-Bene s Czechs, did not learn the lesson of AustriaHungary. They followed Masaryk and Benes blindly, ruling
high and mighty over the non-Czech nations, in the fashion
of Stalin and Hitler.
" The problem of nationalism played no part In Slovak ia up to the
end of the eighteenth cen t ury because the official language of Hungary
was Latin" (p. 183) .

Following this line of reasoning, then, nationalism played
no part in any country, at any time, whenever the official
language of a country was any other than that of the inhabitants. Does professor Roucek really believe that? Writing about the period of Joseph II, when "Bohemian politics
of the nineteenth century received their first rehearsal," A.
J. P. Taylor says in his "The Habsburg Monarchy":
Even In Bohemia the Imperial nobility, which had been Imported
by the Habsburgs, cloaked their hostility to social reform In a display
of Bohemian patriotism , and in the ante-rooms of the &gt;Habsburgi the!
descendants of German, ,Scottish, or Spanish adventurers ostentatiously
exchanged a few words of CZECH which they had laboriously learnt
from their stable-boys" (pp. 19-20).

�SLOVAKIA

91

This relates to the time that Roucek writes about (Joseph
died in 1790). What then was the official language of Bohemia, or of the Habsburg Empire up to the end of the eighteenth century?
"The Slovaks were not considered as a minority by Prague, and
certainly not by the Slovaks themselves. This is attested to by the
fact that the Czech parties had their adherents in Slovakia, that there
was no discrimination against the inclusion of Slovaks in various cabinets, and that Dr. Milan Hodza, a member of the R epublican Party
and a Slovak, headed the cabinets from 1935 to 1938" (p. 184).

If the Slovaks were not considered "as a minority" by
Prague, what were they considered? An equal partner, a
colony, a branch of the Czech nation? What does Roucek's
"attestation" prove? What were CZECH parties doing in
Slovakia? Does not Roucek know that the Slovaks selected
by Masaryk and Benes for cabinet or other posts did not
represent the will of the vast masses of the Slovak people?
We remember that Judas was one of the apostles, too. Masaryk and Benes could hardly make the new-born Republic
appear "Czecho-Slovak" without including several Slovaks
in their cabinets. But those Slovaks knew that they had to
serve the interests of Masaryk and Benes, the interests of the
Czechs, if · they wanted to keep their posts. Every one of
them repudiated the right of their own nation to freedom
and political independence, nay, even autonomy (states'
rights). What kind of Slovaks were they, if not "Judas"
Slovaks? Dr. Milan Hod.fa was a smart politician; he knew
what was best for Milan Hod.fa. He served Masaryk and Benes
well for decades, but, in the end, was made the scapegoat
of Munich, being discarded by Benes, as were so many
other Slovaks and Czechs who got out of line with the policies of Masaryk and Benes. (Pergler, Stfibrny, Beran, Osusky, etc.).
"The autonomist tendencies of the Catholic Slovaks found their
expression, however, in the Slovak Populist Party of Father Andrej
Hlinka, wt-lose policies can be understood best when we recall the demands for states' rights in the United States which culminated in the
Civil War" (p. 184) .

Roucek, however, omitted to mention that Hlinka was
joined in "the autonomist tendencies" by the Lutheran minister and poet, Martin Razus, Slovak patriot and head of

�92

SLOVAKIA

the Slovak National Party. Biased historians propagate the
idea that only the Slovak Catholics fought for autonomy
(states' rights) :in Slovakia.
What does Mr. Roucek mean when he says that Hlinka's
policies "can be underst.ood best when we recall the demands
for stat.es' rights in the United Stat.es which culminated in
the Civil War"? In the first place, does it make sense to
compare the relationship between the individual 48 States
to the United States and the relationship of Slovakia to
Czecho-Slovakia? Demands by how many states and for
what states' rights culminated in the Civil War? Do not the
States comprising the United States have their rights defined and secured by the Constitution of the U. S. A.? What
states' rights did Slovakia have guaranteed and secured by
the Czecho-Slovak Constitution of Masaryk and Benes, which,
in fact , even denied the existence of the Slovak nation? Or
is it possible that Mr. Roucek wants us to believe that
Hlinka's .policies advocated slavery? It is quite obvious that
Roucek did not know Hlinka and his policies!
"The Czechs and the Slovaks had been separated politically for
one thousand years. The former had become very largely industrialized,
Influenced by German and Western thought and technical development.
The Slovaks, on the contrary, r emained agriculturists and under a
Magyar (that is, Eastern) type of culture. The Czechs were nominally
Roman Catholics, and those who opposed Roman Catholicism during
their national struggle against the Catholic tHabsburgs had earned
the reputation in the eyes of devout Slovaks of being irreligious" (pp.
184-185).

Roucek and other pro-Czech historians like to dwell on
the theme that the Czechs and Slovaks were "separated politically for one thousand years," but somehow always forget
to tell when and under what conditions the Czechs and
Slovaks were ever united politically or otherwise. They also
favor the theme that the Czechs were "largely industrialized,"
while the Slovaks "remained agriculturists," but never have
an explanation for the fact that Slovakia was more industrialized under the Magyars of Hungary than it was under Masaryk and Benes of Czecho-Slovakia. The tendency is only too
obvious!
The Czechs, it is true, did not fare badly under the Germans (Austria); the Slovaks suffered incomparably greater

�SLOVAKIA

93

political and economic oppression under the Magyars of
Hungary. The culture of the Slovaks, however, was not
"Magyar (that is, Eastern)," as Roucek maintains. The
Slovaks evidently knew the Czechs better than Roucek did.
Many Czechs were undoubtedly "nominally Roman Catholics," hut many times many mOTe became so-called "progressive" Roman Catholics, having succumbed to the influence of Huss, Palacky, Rieger, Havlicek, Masaryk and
Benes. The Slovaks did not consider the Czechs "irreligious"
because they fought against the "Catholic Ha:bsburgs," but
rather because they repudiated the teachings of the Roman
Catholic Church and deeply insulted the religious feelings of
the Slovak people by destroying religious monuments, removing crucifixes from classrooms, etc., soon after Masaryk
and Benes took over the reins of the Czecho-Slova k State.
Roucek may not like to admit it, nevertheless the possibility does exist that the Slovaks could have regarded the
Czechs as "irreligious" also for denying the existence of the
Slovak nation and its inherent and God-given right to freedom and political independence. Or is it possible that Roucek
believes that recognition of and respect for the natural
rights of nations does not come under the title of religion?
"Whereas the standard of literacy among the Czechs was high,
the percentage of Slovaks who could read and write was very low In
1919. For that reason, many officials, teachers, and intellectuals from
the Czech regions had to be sent to Slovakia in 1918-1919, and many of
them antagonized the Slovaks with their well-intentioned, but often too
matter-of-fact, methods . . . When, during the eourse of time, Slovaks
became available, it was not easy to dismiss the Czechs, many of
whom had married and settled down" (p. 185).

By what standards or statistics professor Roucek was
influenced, I do not know, but I honestly believe that his
statement regarding the literacy of the Slovaks in 1919 is
highly exaggerated. How low is very low? What were the
"well-intentioned, but often too matter-of-fac t, methods" of
Czech intellectuals which antagonized the Slovaks? Is it not
significant that Roucek has no sympathy for the many
Slovaks who, during the course of time, did become available, got married and had children, but could hardly settle
down in their own homeland, because the jobs they had been
trained for were taken by Czechs? R. W. Seton-Watson , the

�94

SLOVAKIA

Czech propagandi st, admits much more in his "The New
Slovakia" (Fr. Borovy, Prague; 1924) ; I heartily recommend
it to Roucek and to all readers of Kerner's "Czechoslo vakia."
The fact is that Prague sent about 110,000 Czechs to Slovakia
to do jobs which the Slovaks themselves could have done
erusily and effectively.
Roucek asks "what was the Pittsburgh Agreement ?"
and then answers the typical Masaryk-B enes way, using
Ivan Derer's (the Judas Slovak) "The Unity of the Czechs
and Slovaks" (Prague, 1938) and Benes's "Central European
Observer" (Dec. 16, 1938) as his "catechism s"! It is evident
that Roucek never even saw a copy of the original, because
he dates the Pittsburgh Agreement June 30, 1918, instead of
May 30, 1918, the same mistake made by other Czech propagandists, including T. G. Masaryk (Svet.ova Revoluce, p.
262) and professor S. Harrison Thomson of the University
of Colorado, author of "Czechoslovakia in European mstory" (Princeton University Press, 1953) and editor of the
"Journal of Central European Affairs." Roucek does not
produce the full text of the Pittsburgh Agreement , but simply states:
"These American Czechs and Slovaks, together with Dr. Masaryk,
agreed that Slovakia should 'have her own administrativ e system, her

own diet and her own courts, (and that) the Slovak
the official language in the schools, In the public
affairs generally'. Actually the points in agreement
ried out - except the one stipulating the setting up

kia."

language should be
offices and public

were virtually carof a diet for Slova-

Roucek, however, does not tell the whole story about
the Pittsburgh Agreement . By presenting only the Czech
side and omitting the Slovak side of it, he proves himself
partial and prejudiced. Without the support of the Slovaks,
T. G. Masaryk knew that his proposed "Czecho-Sl ovakia"
was doomed. There was no way of contacting the Slovaks
at home (in Hungary at that time), hence he came to the
United States to seek the support of Americans of Slovak
descent; also the support of Americans of Czech descent,
since the Czechs at home did not react favorably to Masaryk's
plan to destroy Austria-Hu ngary and to establish CzechoSlovakia.
The weightiest objection to Masaryk's plan was that

�SLOVAKIA

95

about six and a half million Czechs would hardly make a
.state fit to live, even if they were allowed to swallow three
and a half million Germans in order to obtain the historical
frontiers of the Bohemian kingdom. To meet this argument,
Robert Ing,rirn tells us ("After Hitler Stalin" - ip. 80):
"Masaryk invented the fiction that the Czechs and Slovaks were the
same, that is Czecho-Slovaks, thus claiming a large part of Hungary for
his new state. As this discovery failed to impress the Allies, he enlisted
the support of the Americans of Slovakian descent. Disliking the Magyars, who . . . had not given them a fair deal, they favored the idea
of separating Slovakia from Hungary. But sufficiently history conscious,
they rejected emphatically the theory of the Czecho-Slovak race."

Americans of Slovak descent did not put much trust in
Masaryk's oral pronouncements and promises. They remembered that the Magyars had made quite a few promises to
the Slovaks and never kept them. When Masaryk came to
America to gain the support of the citizens of Slovak descent,
the latter insisted on a written guaranree that Slovakia would
enjoy full autonomy (states' rights) within the proposed
Czecho-Slovakian republic. The result was the Pittsburgh
Agreement or Convention which Masaryk drafted and signed
during a meeting of representatives of Slovak and Czech
organizations at Pittsburgh, Pa., May 30, 1918. Masaryk,
however, repudiated it soon after he and Benes took over
the reins of the Czecho-Slovak State. To refute Slovakia's
claim for autonomy, Masaryk wrote in 1925:
"It (the Pittsburgh Convention) was concluded in order to appease
a small Slovak fraction which was dreaming of God knows what sort
of independence for Slovakia ... I signed the agreement unhesitatingly
because it was a local agreement of American Czechs and Slovaks between themselves'' (SVETOV.A REVOLUCE, p . 262).

To attain a "Czecho-Slovak" majority in the proposed
Czecho-Slovak Republic T. G. Masaryk did not hesitate to
resort to• falsehood and dishonesty. How else can we explain
his preposterous statement that the Pittsburgh Agreement
was only a "local agreement of American Czechs and Slovaks
between themselves"!
What need did .Amerkan Crechs and Slovaks have for
such an agreement? And if Masaryk actually did think it was
only a "local agreement" between Americans, why did he,
a foreigner, even consider drafting and signing it? iHe con-

�96

SLOVAKIA

eluded the agreement, he says, "in order to appease a small
SWVAK fraction which was dreaming of God knows what
sort of independence for Slovakia," but the fact is that the
Slovaks at that Pittsburgh meeting represented an overwhelming majority of organized Slovaks in America. And
what sort of independence for Slovakia could they possibly
be dreaming of when Masaryk himself told them that CzechoSlovakia would be modeled after the United States or Switzerland?
In 1918, T. G. Masaryk presented the Pittsburgh Convention to President Woodrow Wilson as a solemn treaty
between the Slovaks and the Czechs to induce him to grant
official recognition to the Czech and Slovak union and its
provisional government. Wilson would hardly have been
charmed by Masaryk to destroy Austria if Masaryk had described the Pittsburgh convention, in 1918, in the disparaging
terms he set in the record in 1925. The "great" Masaryk,
who so persistently insisted on the truth in all things, obviously lied to President Wilson and the Slovaks!
By saying that "actually the points in agreement were
virtually carried out - except the one stipulating the setting
up of a diet for Slovakia," professor Roucek admits that he
does not know what went on in Czecho-Slovakia and, hence,
is hardly qualified to write with authority about that country, and especially the Slovak portion of it. The fact is that
the Masaryk and Benes regimes were deaf to the just demand
of the Slovaks that the Pittsburgh Convention be honored
by the Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and, hence,
both were responsible for the consequences. The relations
between the Czechs and the Slovaks were actually worse
in 1938 than they were in 1918.
(More Coming)

• • •

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�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1407">
                    <text>88

SLOVAKIA

Kerner's "Czechoslov~kia" (Cont'd.)
IDSTORY OR PROPAGANDA?
P.A. HROBAK
"With the formation of the Czecho,Slovak State, the Germans
refused to accept the new situation and to cooperate with the new
government at Prague" (p. 177) .

But the fact is that even though they were forced to
accept the situation, on various occasions the Sudetenlanders
showed their willingness to cooperate with Prague, but the
Czechs were not disposed to cooperate. "The Germans, reduced from the position of dominance to that of a minority,
naturally resented the new setup," Roucek tells us, which
is true, but the entire blame for the bad blood between the
Czechs and the Germans, could hardly be placed on the latter,
as Roucek would have us do. Masaryk and Benes and their
followers were responsible for what happened in and to
Czecho-Slovakia, because they practically ran the whole
show.
"But why did the Czechs ask that this hostile element be included
in their state? In the memorandum which the Czechs submitted to the
Peace Conference, they claimed the historic frontiers of Bohemia. All
history showed, they argued, and economic and strategic considerations
demanded, that the historic Lands of the Bohemian Crown should remain a single unit. The exclusion of the Sudete areas would have broken
the virtually indissoluble geographical and economic ties with central
Bohemia. The Germans of Bohemia d6lsired to be united with the new
Austrian Republic and not with the Reich. The areas settled by the
Germans were never, of themselves, component parts of the German
Reich nor were they independent elements in the former Austria•
Hungary. So far as these territories were connected constitutionally
with the Holy Roman Empire, they were connected solely as part and
parcel of the Czech State, consisting of the Lands of the Bohemian
Crown, and only as an entity with those Lands." - (p. 178).

Roucek's tendency is obvious: the Czechs had a claim,
but the Germans did not. Bohemia, we know, was an independent kingdom until 1526; the Germans were no less a part
of it than were the Czechs. Roucek, however, tells us that
the territories settled by the Germans "were connected solely
as part and parcel of the "CZECH" State and not the BOHEMIAN Crown lands. What Benes and Masaryk submitted
to the Peace Conference to back their "claims" to the his-

�SLOVAKIA

89

toric frontiers of Bohemia is one thing, but the truth is something else. Roucek apparently preferred not to deal with
the latter. For his edification, I quote Robert Ingrim, eminent
journalist and author, who says that:
_ . . before Huss's reformation, Bohemia had been the scene of
the most felicitous Czech-German cooperation. Of this, Prague, one of
the most magnificent cities in Europe, is still a living witness. It must
be added that in those dark times, when people had not yet learned to
regard another language as a symptom of inferiority, no one spoke of
Czechs or 'G ermans. They were just Bohemians. This explains why no
two other races have more similarity than Czechs and Sudeten Germans. There was perpetual intermarriage and it became, in the towns,
purely accidental whether a family considered itself German or Czech.
The race which profited most by this close community were the Czechs
because the Germans had an older and more highly developed culture
and could draw from the great receptacle of the Germanies. The Czechs
as part and parcel of the Holy Roman Empire became entirely different
from Slavic peoples outside." ("After Hitler Stalin?" - 1946 - Bruce

Publishing Company, Milwaukee, Wis.; pp. 54-55) .

It is significant that Roucek did not include the works
of such eminent historians as C. A. Macartney and A. J. P.
Taylor, which shed much light on Bohemia and the Habsburg
Empire. Macartney, for example, says that Bohemia did
"become a member of the German Reich," whereas Roucek
claims that "the areas settled by the Germans were never,
of themselves, component parts of the German Reich," which
is a tricky way of putting it, to say the least. iHow many
students and teachers of history, using Kerner's "Czechoslovakia," noticed or paid any attention to Roucek's "of themselves," and if some did, what did they make of it? What
real claim did Masaryk and Benes have to the 3,231,688
Germans of Bohemia, the figure mentioned by Roucek (.p.
178)?
Furthermore, according to Roucek:
"The whole problem of the Sudete Germans was a counter in the
game of power politics and a part of the larger problem of Germany
in Europe. It was not a debate between the 11,000,000 Czecho-Slovaks
and the 75,0'00,000 Germans concerning the treatment of Germans in
Czecho-Slovakia, or the frontiers of that Repu'blic, or of the destiny
of the national fragments which remained outside the German borders.
It was a question of the desire of Germany to establish a new empire"
(p. 182).

Now this may have been the desire of Hitler after he
came to power. But why should Roucek consider the Sudete

�90

SLOVAKIA

problem only from this angle? The situation in 1938 may
have been ~s described, but what the Sudeten Germans themselves had to say about their treatment at the hands of the
Czechs from 1918 to 1938 is not at all worth mentioning
by Roucek. Furthermore, the debate certainly did not concern "11,000,000 Czecho-Slovaks," as Roucek would have us
believe. The Slovaks had nothing to do with it; foreign policy
was dominated by Benes and the Czechs.
The Slovaks, we know, had their own arguments with
the Czechs. The Czechs under Masaryk and Benes were on
one side, while the non-Czech nationalities - the majority
of the population of Czecho-Slovakia - were on the opposite
side. The demands of these non-Czech nations may have
been, as Roucek says, "incompatible with the fundamental
principles of democracy as understood and practiced in
Czecho-Slovakia," nevertheless they were not incompatible
with natural rights and the fundamental principles of democracy as understood and practiced in genuinely democratic
countries.
The simple truth is that the Czechs, especially the
Masaryk-Bene s Czechs, did not learn the lesson of AustriaHungary. They followed Masaryk and Benes blindly, ruling
high and mighty over the non-Czech nations, in the fashion
of Stalin and Hitler.
" The problem of nationalism played no part In Slovak ia up to the
end of the eighteenth cen t ury because the official language of Hungary
was Latin" (p. 183) .

Following this line of reasoning, then, nationalism played
no part in any country, at any time, whenever the official
language of a country was any other than that of the inhabitants. Does professor Roucek really believe that? Writing about the period of Joseph II, when "Bohemian politics
of the nineteenth century received their first rehearsal," A.
J. P. Taylor says in his "The Habsburg Monarchy":
Even In Bohemia the Imperial nobility, which had been Imported
by the Habsburgs, cloaked their hostility to social reform In a display
of Bohemian patriotism , and in the ante-rooms of the &gt;Habsburgi the!
descendants of German, ,Scottish, or Spanish adventurers ostentatiously
exchanged a few words of CZECH which they had laboriously learnt
from their stable-boys" (pp. 19-20).

�SLOVAKIA

91

This relates to the time that Roucek writes about (Joseph
died in 1790). What then was the official language of Bohemia, or of the Habsburg Empire up to the end of the eighteenth century?
"The Slovaks were not considered as a minority by Prague, and
certainly not by the Slovaks themselves. This is attested to by the
fact that the Czech parties had their adherents in Slovakia, that there
was no discrimination against the inclusion of Slovaks in various cabinets, and that Dr. Milan Hodza, a member of the R epublican Party
and a Slovak, headed the cabinets from 1935 to 1938" (p. 184).

If the Slovaks were not considered "as a minority" by
Prague, what were they considered? An equal partner, a
colony, a branch of the Czech nation? What does Roucek's
"attestation" prove? What were CZECH parties doing in
Slovakia? Does not Roucek know that the Slovaks selected
by Masaryk and Benes for cabinet or other posts did not
represent the will of the vast masses of the Slovak people?
We remember that Judas was one of the apostles, too. Masaryk and Benes could hardly make the new-born Republic
appear "Czecho-Slovak" without including several Slovaks
in their cabinets. But those Slovaks knew that they had to
serve the interests of Masaryk and Benes, the interests of the
Czechs, if · they wanted to keep their posts. Every one of
them repudiated the right of their own nation to freedom
and political independence, nay, even autonomy (states'
rights). What kind of Slovaks were they, if not "Judas"
Slovaks? Dr. Milan Hod.fa was a smart politician; he knew
what was best for Milan Hod.fa. He served Masaryk and Benes
well for decades, but, in the end, was made the scapegoat
of Munich, being discarded by Benes, as were so many
other Slovaks and Czechs who got out of line with the policies of Masaryk and Benes. (Pergler, Stfibrny, Beran, Osusky, etc.).
"The autonomist tendencies of the Catholic Slovaks found their
expression, however, in the Slovak Populist Party of Father Andrej
Hlinka, wt-lose policies can be understood best when we recall the demands for states' rights in the United States which culminated in the
Civil War" (p. 184) .

Roucek, however, omitted to mention that Hlinka was
joined in "the autonomist tendencies" by the Lutheran minister and poet, Martin Razus, Slovak patriot and head of

�92

SLOVAKIA

the Slovak National Party. Biased historians propagate the
idea that only the Slovak Catholics fought for autonomy
(states' rights) :in Slovakia.
What does Mr. Roucek mean when he says that Hlinka's
policies "can be underst.ood best when we recall the demands
for stat.es' rights in the United Stat.es which culminated in
the Civil War"? In the first place, does it make sense to
compare the relationship between the individual 48 States
to the United States and the relationship of Slovakia to
Czecho-Slovakia? Demands by how many states and for
what states' rights culminated in the Civil War? Do not the
States comprising the United States have their rights defined and secured by the Constitution of the U. S. A.? What
states' rights did Slovakia have guaranteed and secured by
the Czecho-Slovak Constitution of Masaryk and Benes, which,
in fact , even denied the existence of the Slovak nation? Or
is it possible that Mr. Roucek wants us to believe that
Hlinka's .policies advocated slavery? It is quite obvious that
Roucek did not know Hlinka and his policies!
"The Czechs and the Slovaks had been separated politically for
one thousand years. The former had become very largely industrialized,
Influenced by German and Western thought and technical development.
The Slovaks, on the contrary, r emained agriculturists and under a
Magyar (that is, Eastern) type of culture. The Czechs were nominally
Roman Catholics, and those who opposed Roman Catholicism during
their national struggle against the Catholic tHabsburgs had earned
the reputation in the eyes of devout Slovaks of being irreligious" (pp.
184-185).

Roucek and other pro-Czech historians like to dwell on
the theme that the Czechs and Slovaks were "separated politically for one thousand years," but somehow always forget
to tell when and under what conditions the Czechs and
Slovaks were ever united politically or otherwise. They also
favor the theme that the Czechs were "largely industrialized,"
while the Slovaks "remained agriculturists," but never have
an explanation for the fact that Slovakia was more industrialized under the Magyars of Hungary than it was under Masaryk and Benes of Czecho-Slovakia. The tendency is only too
obvious!
The Czechs, it is true, did not fare badly under the Germans (Austria); the Slovaks suffered incomparably greater

�SLOVAKIA

93

political and economic oppression under the Magyars of
Hungary. The culture of the Slovaks, however, was not
"Magyar (that is, Eastern)," as Roucek maintains. The
Slovaks evidently knew the Czechs better than Roucek did.
Many Czechs were undoubtedly "nominally Roman Catholics," hut many times many mOTe became so-called "progressive" Roman Catholics, having succumbed to the influence of Huss, Palacky, Rieger, Havlicek, Masaryk and
Benes. The Slovaks did not consider the Czechs "irreligious"
because they fought against the "Catholic Ha:bsburgs," but
rather because they repudiated the teachings of the Roman
Catholic Church and deeply insulted the religious feelings of
the Slovak people by destroying religious monuments, removing crucifixes from classrooms, etc., soon after Masaryk
and Benes took over the reins of the Czecho-Slova k State.
Roucek may not like to admit it, nevertheless the possibility does exist that the Slovaks could have regarded the
Czechs as "irreligious" also for denying the existence of the
Slovak nation and its inherent and God-given right to freedom and political independence. Or is it possible that Roucek
believes that recognition of and respect for the natural
rights of nations does not come under the title of religion?
"Whereas the standard of literacy among the Czechs was high,
the percentage of Slovaks who could read and write was very low In
1919. For that reason, many officials, teachers, and intellectuals from
the Czech regions had to be sent to Slovakia in 1918-1919, and many of
them antagonized the Slovaks with their well-intentioned, but often too
matter-of-fact, methods . . . When, during the eourse of time, Slovaks
became available, it was not easy to dismiss the Czechs, many of
whom had married and settled down" (p. 185).

By what standards or statistics professor Roucek was
influenced, I do not know, but I honestly believe that his
statement regarding the literacy of the Slovaks in 1919 is
highly exaggerated. How low is very low? What were the
"well-intentioned, but often too matter-of-fac t, methods" of
Czech intellectuals which antagonized the Slovaks? Is it not
significant that Roucek has no sympathy for the many
Slovaks who, during the course of time, did become available, got married and had children, but could hardly settle
down in their own homeland, because the jobs they had been
trained for were taken by Czechs? R. W. Seton-Watson , the

�94

SLOVAKIA

Czech propagandi st, admits much more in his "The New
Slovakia" (Fr. Borovy, Prague; 1924) ; I heartily recommend
it to Roucek and to all readers of Kerner's "Czechoslo vakia."
The fact is that Prague sent about 110,000 Czechs to Slovakia
to do jobs which the Slovaks themselves could have done
erusily and effectively.
Roucek asks "what was the Pittsburgh Agreement ?"
and then answers the typical Masaryk-B enes way, using
Ivan Derer's (the Judas Slovak) "The Unity of the Czechs
and Slovaks" (Prague, 1938) and Benes's "Central European
Observer" (Dec. 16, 1938) as his "catechism s"! It is evident
that Roucek never even saw a copy of the original, because
he dates the Pittsburgh Agreement June 30, 1918, instead of
May 30, 1918, the same mistake made by other Czech propagandists, including T. G. Masaryk (Svet.ova Revoluce, p.
262) and professor S. Harrison Thomson of the University
of Colorado, author of "Czechoslovakia in European mstory" (Princeton University Press, 1953) and editor of the
"Journal of Central European Affairs." Roucek does not
produce the full text of the Pittsburgh Agreement , but simply states:
"These American Czechs and Slovaks, together with Dr. Masaryk,
agreed that Slovakia should 'have her own administrativ e system, her

own diet and her own courts, (and that) the Slovak
the official language in the schools, In the public
affairs generally'. Actually the points in agreement
ried out - except the one stipulating the setting up

kia."

language should be
offices and public

were virtually carof a diet for Slova-

Roucek, however, does not tell the whole story about
the Pittsburgh Agreement . By presenting only the Czech
side and omitting the Slovak side of it, he proves himself
partial and prejudiced. Without the support of the Slovaks,
T. G. Masaryk knew that his proposed "Czecho-Sl ovakia"
was doomed. There was no way of contacting the Slovaks
at home (in Hungary at that time), hence he came to the
United States to seek the support of Americans of Slovak
descent; also the support of Americans of Czech descent,
since the Czechs at home did not react favorably to Masaryk's
plan to destroy Austria-Hu ngary and to establish CzechoSlovakia.
The weightiest objection to Masaryk's plan was that

�SLOVAKIA

95

about six and a half million Czechs would hardly make a
.state fit to live, even if they were allowed to swallow three
and a half million Germans in order to obtain the historical
frontiers of the Bohemian kingdom. To meet this argument,
Robert Ing,rirn tells us ("After Hitler Stalin" - ip. 80):
"Masaryk invented the fiction that the Czechs and Slovaks were the
same, that is Czecho-Slovaks, thus claiming a large part of Hungary for
his new state. As this discovery failed to impress the Allies, he enlisted
the support of the Americans of Slovakian descent. Disliking the Magyars, who . . . had not given them a fair deal, they favored the idea
of separating Slovakia from Hungary. But sufficiently history conscious,
they rejected emphatically the theory of the Czecho-Slovak race."

Americans of Slovak descent did not put much trust in
Masaryk's oral pronouncements and promises. They remembered that the Magyars had made quite a few promises to
the Slovaks and never kept them. When Masaryk came to
America to gain the support of the citizens of Slovak descent,
the latter insisted on a written guaranree that Slovakia would
enjoy full autonomy (states' rights) within the proposed
Czecho-Slovakian republic. The result was the Pittsburgh
Agreement or Convention which Masaryk drafted and signed
during a meeting of representatives of Slovak and Czech
organizations at Pittsburgh, Pa., May 30, 1918. Masaryk,
however, repudiated it soon after he and Benes took over
the reins of the Czecho-Slovak State. To refute Slovakia's
claim for autonomy, Masaryk wrote in 1925:
"It (the Pittsburgh Convention) was concluded in order to appease
a small Slovak fraction which was dreaming of God knows what sort
of independence for Slovakia ... I signed the agreement unhesitatingly
because it was a local agreement of American Czechs and Slovaks between themselves'' (SVETOV.A REVOLUCE, p . 262).

To attain a "Czecho-Slovak" majority in the proposed
Czecho-Slovak Republic T. G. Masaryk did not hesitate to
resort to• falsehood and dishonesty. How else can we explain
his preposterous statement that the Pittsburgh Agreement
was only a "local agreement of American Czechs and Slovaks
between themselves"!
What need did .Amerkan Crechs and Slovaks have for
such an agreement? And if Masaryk actually did think it was
only a "local agreement" between Americans, why did he,
a foreigner, even consider drafting and signing it? iHe con-

�96

SLOVAKIA

eluded the agreement, he says, "in order to appease a small
SWVAK fraction which was dreaming of God knows what
sort of independence for Slovakia," but the fact is that the
Slovaks at that Pittsburgh meeting represented an overwhelming majority of organized Slovaks in America. And
what sort of independence for Slovakia could they possibly
be dreaming of when Masaryk himself told them that CzechoSlovakia would be modeled after the United States or Switzerland?
In 1918, T. G. Masaryk presented the Pittsburgh Convention to President Woodrow Wilson as a solemn treaty
between the Slovaks and the Czechs to induce him to grant
official recognition to the Czech and Slovak union and its
provisional government. Wilson would hardly have been
charmed by Masaryk to destroy Austria if Masaryk had described the Pittsburgh convention, in 1918, in the disparaging
terms he set in the record in 1925. The "great" Masaryk,
who so persistently insisted on the truth in all things, obviously lied to President Wilson and the Slovaks!
By saying that "actually the points in agreement were
virtually carried out - except the one stipulating the setting
up of a diet for Slovakia," professor Roucek admits that he
does not know what went on in Czecho-Slovakia and, hence,
is hardly qualified to write with authority about that country, and especially the Slovak portion of it. The fact is that
the Masaryk and Benes regimes were deaf to the just demand
of the Slovaks that the Pittsburgh Convention be honored
by the Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and, hence,
both were responsible for the consequences. The relations
between the Czechs and the Slovaks were actually worse
in 1938 than they were in 1918.
(More Coming)

• • •

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�</text>
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                  <text>1956, Vol. 6</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;</text>
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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            <elementText elementTextId="1405">
              <text>88&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Kerner's "Czechoslov~kia" (Cont'd.)&#13;
IDSTORY OR PROPAGANDA?&#13;
P.A. HROBAK&#13;
"With the formation of the Czecho,Slovak State, the Germans&#13;
refused to accept the new situation and to cooperate with the new&#13;
government at Prague" (p. 177) .&#13;
&#13;
But the fact is that even though they were forced to&#13;
accept the situation, on various occasions the Sudetenlanders&#13;
showed their willingness to cooperate with Prague, but the&#13;
Czechs were not disposed to cooperate. "The Germans, reduced from the position of dominance to that of a minority,&#13;
naturally resented the new setup," Roucek tells us, which&#13;
is true, but the entire blame for the bad blood between the&#13;
Czechs and the Germans, could hardly be placed on the latter,&#13;
as Roucek would have us do. Masaryk and Benes and their&#13;
followers were responsible for what happened in and to&#13;
Czecho-Slovakia, because they practically ran the whole&#13;
show.&#13;
"But why did the Czechs ask that this hostile element be included&#13;
in their state? In the memorandum which the Czechs submitted to the&#13;
Peace Conference, they claimed the historic frontiers of Bohemia. All&#13;
history showed, they argued, and economic and strategic considerations&#13;
demanded, that the historic Lands of the Bohemian Crown should remain a single unit. The exclusion of the Sudete areas would have broken&#13;
the virtually indissoluble geographical and economic ties with central&#13;
Bohemia. The Germans of Bohemia d6lsired to be united with the new&#13;
Austrian Republic and not with the Reich. The areas settled by the&#13;
Germans were never, of themselves, component parts of the German&#13;
Reich nor were they independent elements in the former Austria•&#13;
Hungary. So far as these territories were connected constitutionally&#13;
with the Holy Roman Empire, they were connected solely as part and&#13;
parcel of the Czech State, consisting of the Lands of the Bohemian&#13;
Crown, and only as an entity with those Lands." - (p. 178).&#13;
&#13;
Roucek's tendency is obvious: the Czechs had a claim,&#13;
but the Germans did not. Bohemia, we know, was an independent kingdom until 1526; the Germans were no less a part&#13;
of it than were the Czechs. Roucek, however, tells us that&#13;
the territories settled by the Germans "were connected solely&#13;
as part and parcel of the "CZECH" State and not the BOHEMIAN Crown lands. What Benes and Masaryk submitted&#13;
to the Peace Conference to back their "claims" to the his-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
89&#13;
&#13;
toric frontiers of Bohemia is one thing, but the truth is something else. Roucek apparently preferred not to deal with&#13;
the latter. For his edification, I quote Robert Ingrim, eminent&#13;
journalist and author, who says that:&#13;
_ . . before Huss's reformation, Bohemia had been the scene of&#13;
the most felicitous Czech-German cooperation. Of this, Prague, one of&#13;
the most magnificent cities in Europe, is still a living witness. It must&#13;
be added that in those dark times, when people had not yet learned to&#13;
regard another language as a symptom of inferiority, no one spoke of&#13;
Czechs or 'G ermans. They were just Bohemians. This explains why no&#13;
two other races have more similarity than Czechs and Sudeten Germans. There was perpetual intermarriage and it became, in the towns,&#13;
purely accidental whether a family considered itself German or Czech.&#13;
The race which profited most by this close community were the Czechs&#13;
because the Germans had an older and more highly developed culture&#13;
and could draw from the great receptacle of the Germanies. The Czechs&#13;
as part and parcel of the Holy Roman Empire became entirely different&#13;
from Slavic peoples outside." ("After Hitler Stalin?" - 1946 - Bruce&#13;
&#13;
Publishing Company, Milwaukee, Wis.; pp. 54-55) .&#13;
&#13;
It is significant that Roucek did not include the works&#13;
of such eminent historians as C. A. Macartney and A. J. P.&#13;
Taylor, which shed much light on Bohemia and the Habsburg&#13;
Empire. Macartney, for example, says that Bohemia did&#13;
"become a member of the German Reich," whereas Roucek&#13;
claims that "the areas settled by the Germans were never,&#13;
of themselves, component parts of the German Reich," which&#13;
is a tricky way of putting it, to say the least. iHow many&#13;
students and teachers of history, using Kerner's "Czechoslovakia," noticed or paid any attention to Roucek's "of themselves," and if some did, what did they make of it? What&#13;
real claim did Masaryk and Benes have to the 3,231,688&#13;
Germans of Bohemia, the figure mentioned by Roucek (.p.&#13;
178)?&#13;
Furthermore, according to Roucek:&#13;
"The whole problem of the Sudete Germans was a counter in the&#13;
game of power politics and a part of the larger problem of Germany&#13;
in Europe. It was not a debate between the 11,000,000 Czecho-Slovaks&#13;
and the 75,0'00,000 Germans concerning the treatment of Germans in&#13;
Czecho-Slovakia, or the frontiers of that Repu'blic, or of the destiny&#13;
of the national fragments which remained outside the German borders.&#13;
It was a question of the desire of Germany to establish a new empire"&#13;
(p. 182).&#13;
&#13;
Now this may have been the desire of Hitler after he&#13;
came to power. But why should Roucek consider the Sudete&#13;
&#13;
90&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
problem only from this angle? The situation in 1938 may&#13;
have been ~s described, but what the Sudeten Germans themselves had to say about their treatment at the hands of the&#13;
Czechs from 1918 to 1938 is not at all worth mentioning&#13;
by Roucek. Furthermore, the debate certainly did not concern "11,000,000 Czecho-Slovaks," as Roucek would have us&#13;
believe. The Slovaks had nothing to do with it; foreign policy&#13;
was dominated by Benes and the Czechs.&#13;
The Slovaks, we know, had their own arguments with&#13;
the Czechs. The Czechs under Masaryk and Benes were on&#13;
one side, while the non-Czech nationalities - the majority&#13;
of the population of Czecho-Slovakia - were on the opposite&#13;
side. The demands of these non-Czech nations may have&#13;
been, as Roucek says, "incompatible with the fundamental&#13;
principles of democracy as understood and practiced in&#13;
Czecho-Slovakia," nevertheless they were not incompatible&#13;
with natural rights and the fundamental principles of democracy as understood and practiced in genuinely democratic&#13;
countries.&#13;
The simple truth is that the Czechs, especially the&#13;
Masaryk-Bene s Czechs, did not learn the lesson of AustriaHungary. They followed Masaryk and Benes blindly, ruling&#13;
high and mighty over the non-Czech nations, in the fashion&#13;
of Stalin and Hitler.&#13;
" The problem of nationalism played no part In Slovak ia up to the&#13;
end of the eighteenth cen t ury because the official language of Hungary&#13;
was Latin" (p. 183) .&#13;
&#13;
Following this line of reasoning, then, nationalism played&#13;
no part in any country, at any time, whenever the official&#13;
language of a country was any other than that of the inhabitants. Does professor Roucek really believe that? Writing about the period of Joseph II, when "Bohemian politics&#13;
of the nineteenth century received their first rehearsal," A.&#13;
J. P. Taylor says in his "The Habsburg Monarchy":&#13;
Even In Bohemia the Imperial nobility, which had been Imported&#13;
by the Habsburgs, cloaked their hostility to social reform In a display&#13;
of Bohemian patriotism , and in the ante-rooms of the &gt;Habsburgi the!&#13;
descendants of German, ,Scottish, or Spanish adventurers ostentatiously&#13;
exchanged a few words of CZECH which they had laboriously learnt&#13;
from their stable-boys" (pp. 19-20).&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
91&#13;
&#13;
This relates to the time that Roucek writes about (Joseph&#13;
died in 1790). What then was the official language of Bohemia, or of the Habsburg Empire up to the end of the eighteenth century?&#13;
"The Slovaks were not considered as a minority by Prague, and&#13;
certainly not by the Slovaks themselves. This is attested to by the&#13;
fact that the Czech parties had their adherents in Slovakia, that there&#13;
was no discrimination against the inclusion of Slovaks in various cabinets, and that Dr. Milan Hodza, a member of the R epublican Party&#13;
and a Slovak, headed the cabinets from 1935 to 1938" (p. 184).&#13;
&#13;
If the Slovaks were not considered "as a minority" by&#13;
Prague, what were they considered? An equal partner, a&#13;
colony, a branch of the Czech nation? What does Roucek's&#13;
"attestation" prove? What were CZECH parties doing in&#13;
Slovakia? Does not Roucek know that the Slovaks selected&#13;
by Masaryk and Benes for cabinet or other posts did not&#13;
represent the will of the vast masses of the Slovak people?&#13;
We remember that Judas was one of the apostles, too. Masaryk and Benes could hardly make the new-born Republic&#13;
appear "Czecho-Slovak" without including several Slovaks&#13;
in their cabinets. But those Slovaks knew that they had to&#13;
serve the interests of Masaryk and Benes, the interests of the&#13;
Czechs, if · they wanted to keep their posts. Every one of&#13;
them repudiated the right of their own nation to freedom&#13;
and political independence, nay, even autonomy (states'&#13;
rights). What kind of Slovaks were they, if not "Judas"&#13;
Slovaks? Dr. Milan Hod.fa was a smart politician; he knew&#13;
what was best for Milan Hod.fa. He served Masaryk and Benes&#13;
well for decades, but, in the end, was made the scapegoat&#13;
of Munich, being discarded by Benes, as were so many&#13;
other Slovaks and Czechs who got out of line with the policies of Masaryk and Benes. (Pergler, Stfibrny, Beran, Osusky, etc.).&#13;
"The autonomist tendencies of the Catholic Slovaks found their&#13;
expression, however, in the Slovak Populist Party of Father Andrej&#13;
Hlinka, wt-lose policies can be understood best when we recall the demands for states' rights in the United States which culminated in the&#13;
Civil War" (p. 184) .&#13;
&#13;
Roucek, however, omitted to mention that Hlinka was&#13;
joined in "the autonomist tendencies" by the Lutheran minister and poet, Martin Razus, Slovak patriot and head of&#13;
&#13;
92&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
the Slovak National Party. Biased historians propagate the&#13;
idea that only the Slovak Catholics fought for autonomy&#13;
(states' rights) :in Slovakia.&#13;
What does Mr. Roucek mean when he says that Hlinka's&#13;
policies "can be underst.ood best when we recall the demands&#13;
for stat.es' rights in the United Stat.es which culminated in&#13;
the Civil War"? In the first place, does it make sense to&#13;
compare the relationship between the individual 48 States&#13;
to the United States and the relationship of Slovakia to&#13;
Czecho-Slovakia? Demands by how many states and for&#13;
what states' rights culminated in the Civil War? Do not the&#13;
States comprising the United States have their rights defined and secured by the Constitution of the U. S. A.? What&#13;
states' rights did Slovakia have guaranteed and secured by&#13;
the Czecho-Slovak Constitution of Masaryk and Benes, which,&#13;
in fact , even denied the existence of the Slovak nation? Or&#13;
is it possible that Mr. Roucek wants us to believe that&#13;
Hlinka's .policies advocated slavery? It is quite obvious that&#13;
Roucek did not know Hlinka and his policies!&#13;
"The Czechs and the Slovaks had been separated politically for&#13;
one thousand years. The former had become very largely industrialized,&#13;
Influenced by German and Western thought and technical development.&#13;
The Slovaks, on the contrary, r emained agriculturists and under a&#13;
Magyar (that is, Eastern) type of culture. The Czechs were nominally&#13;
Roman Catholics, and those who opposed Roman Catholicism during&#13;
their national struggle against the Catholic tHabsburgs had earned&#13;
the reputation in the eyes of devout Slovaks of being irreligious" (pp.&#13;
184-185).&#13;
&#13;
Roucek and other pro-Czech historians like to dwell on&#13;
the theme that the Czechs and Slovaks were "separated politically for one thousand years," but somehow always forget&#13;
to tell when and under what conditions the Czechs and&#13;
Slovaks were ever united politically or otherwise. They also&#13;
favor the theme that the Czechs were "largely industrialized,"&#13;
while the Slovaks "remained agriculturists," but never have&#13;
an explanation for the fact that Slovakia was more industrialized under the Magyars of Hungary than it was under Masaryk and Benes of Czecho-Slovakia. The tendency is only too&#13;
obvious!&#13;
The Czechs, it is true, did not fare badly under the Germans (Austria); the Slovaks suffered incomparably greater&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
93&#13;
&#13;
political and economic oppression under the Magyars of&#13;
Hungary. The culture of the Slovaks, however, was not&#13;
"Magyar (that is, Eastern)," as Roucek maintains. The&#13;
Slovaks evidently knew the Czechs better than Roucek did.&#13;
Many Czechs were undoubtedly "nominally Roman Catholics," hut many times many mOTe became so-called "progressive" Roman Catholics, having succumbed to the influence of Huss, Palacky, Rieger, Havlicek, Masaryk and&#13;
Benes. The Slovaks did not consider the Czechs "irreligious"&#13;
because they fought against the "Catholic Ha:bsburgs," but&#13;
rather because they repudiated the teachings of the Roman&#13;
Catholic Church and deeply insulted the religious feelings of&#13;
the Slovak people by destroying religious monuments, removing crucifixes from classrooms, etc., soon after Masaryk&#13;
and Benes took over the reins of the Czecho-Slova k State.&#13;
Roucek may not like to admit it, nevertheless the possibility does exist that the Slovaks could have regarded the&#13;
Czechs as "irreligious" also for denying the existence of the&#13;
Slovak nation and its inherent and God-given right to freedom and political independence. Or is it possible that Roucek&#13;
believes that recognition of and respect for the natural&#13;
rights of nations does not come under the title of religion?&#13;
"Whereas the standard of literacy among the Czechs was high,&#13;
the percentage of Slovaks who could read and write was very low In&#13;
1919. For that reason, many officials, teachers, and intellectuals from&#13;
the Czech regions had to be sent to Slovakia in 1918-1919, and many of&#13;
them antagonized the Slovaks with their well-intentioned, but often too&#13;
matter-of-fact, methods . . . When, during the eourse of time, Slovaks&#13;
became available, it was not easy to dismiss the Czechs, many of&#13;
whom had married and settled down" (p. 185).&#13;
&#13;
By what standards or statistics professor Roucek was&#13;
influenced, I do not know, but I honestly believe that his&#13;
statement regarding the literacy of the Slovaks in 1919 is&#13;
highly exaggerated. How low is very low? What were the&#13;
"well-intentioned, but often too matter-of-fac t, methods" of&#13;
Czech intellectuals which antagonized the Slovaks? Is it not&#13;
significant that Roucek has no sympathy for the many&#13;
Slovaks who, during the course of time, did become available, got married and had children, but could hardly settle&#13;
down in their own homeland, because the jobs they had been&#13;
trained for were taken by Czechs? R. W. Seton-Watson , the&#13;
&#13;
94&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Czech propagandi st, admits much more in his "The New&#13;
Slovakia" (Fr. Borovy, Prague; 1924) ; I heartily recommend&#13;
it to Roucek and to all readers of Kerner's "Czechoslo vakia."&#13;
The fact is that Prague sent about 110,000 Czechs to Slovakia&#13;
to do jobs which the Slovaks themselves could have done&#13;
erusily and effectively.&#13;
Roucek asks "what was the Pittsburgh Agreement ?"&#13;
and then answers the typical Masaryk-B enes way, using&#13;
Ivan Derer's (the Judas Slovak) "The Unity of the Czechs&#13;
and Slovaks" (Prague, 1938) and Benes's "Central European&#13;
Observer" (Dec. 16, 1938) as his "catechism s"! It is evident&#13;
that Roucek never even saw a copy of the original, because&#13;
he dates the Pittsburgh Agreement June 30, 1918, instead of&#13;
May 30, 1918, the same mistake made by other Czech propagandists, including T. G. Masaryk (Svet.ova Revoluce, p.&#13;
262) and professor S. Harrison Thomson of the University&#13;
of Colorado, author of "Czechoslovakia in European mstory" (Princeton University Press, 1953) and editor of the&#13;
"Journal of Central European Affairs." Roucek does not&#13;
produce the full text of the Pittsburgh Agreement , but simply states:&#13;
"These American Czechs and Slovaks, together with Dr. Masaryk,&#13;
agreed that Slovakia should 'have her own administrativ e system, her&#13;
&#13;
own diet and her own courts, (and that) the Slovak&#13;
the official language in the schools, In the public&#13;
affairs generally'. Actually the points in agreement&#13;
ried out - except the one stipulating the setting up&#13;
&#13;
kia."&#13;
&#13;
language should be&#13;
offices and public&#13;
&#13;
were virtually carof a diet for Slova-&#13;
&#13;
Roucek, however, does not tell the whole story about&#13;
the Pittsburgh Agreement . By presenting only the Czech&#13;
side and omitting the Slovak side of it, he proves himself&#13;
partial and prejudiced. Without the support of the Slovaks,&#13;
T. G. Masaryk knew that his proposed "Czecho-Sl ovakia"&#13;
was doomed. There was no way of contacting the Slovaks&#13;
at home (in Hungary at that time), hence he came to the&#13;
United States to seek the support of Americans of Slovak&#13;
descent; also the support of Americans of Czech descent,&#13;
since the Czechs at home did not react favorably to Masaryk's&#13;
plan to destroy Austria-Hu ngary and to establish CzechoSlovakia.&#13;
The weightiest objection to Masaryk's plan was that&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
95&#13;
&#13;
about six and a half million Czechs would hardly make a&#13;
.state fit to live, even if they were allowed to swallow three&#13;
and a half million Germans in order to obtain the historical&#13;
frontiers of the Bohemian kingdom. To meet this argument,&#13;
Robert Ing,rirn tells us ("After Hitler Stalin" - ip. 80):&#13;
"Masaryk invented the fiction that the Czechs and Slovaks were the&#13;
same, that is Czecho-Slovaks, thus claiming a large part of Hungary for&#13;
his new state. As this discovery failed to impress the Allies, he enlisted&#13;
the support of the Americans of Slovakian descent. Disliking the Magyars, who . . . had not given them a fair deal, they favored the idea&#13;
of separating Slovakia from Hungary. But sufficiently history conscious,&#13;
they rejected emphatically the theory of the Czecho-Slovak race."&#13;
&#13;
Americans of Slovak descent did not put much trust in&#13;
Masaryk's oral pronouncements and promises. They remembered that the Magyars had made quite a few promises to&#13;
the Slovaks and never kept them. When Masaryk came to&#13;
America to gain the support of the citizens of Slovak descent,&#13;
the latter insisted on a written guaranree that Slovakia would&#13;
enjoy full autonomy (states' rights) within the proposed&#13;
Czecho-Slovakian republic. The result was the Pittsburgh&#13;
Agreement or Convention which Masaryk drafted and signed&#13;
during a meeting of representatives of Slovak and Czech&#13;
organizations at Pittsburgh, Pa., May 30, 1918. Masaryk,&#13;
however, repudiated it soon after he and Benes took over&#13;
the reins of the Czecho-Slovak State. To refute Slovakia's&#13;
claim for autonomy, Masaryk wrote in 1925:&#13;
"It (the Pittsburgh Convention) was concluded in order to appease&#13;
a small Slovak fraction which was dreaming of God knows what sort&#13;
of independence for Slovakia ... I signed the agreement unhesitatingly&#13;
because it was a local agreement of American Czechs and Slovaks between themselves'' (SVETOV.A REVOLUCE, p . 262).&#13;
&#13;
To attain a "Czecho-Slovak" majority in the proposed&#13;
Czecho-Slovak Republic T. G. Masaryk did not hesitate to&#13;
resort to• falsehood and dishonesty. How else can we explain&#13;
his preposterous statement that the Pittsburgh Agreement&#13;
was only a "local agreement of American Czechs and Slovaks&#13;
between themselves"!&#13;
What need did .Amerkan Crechs and Slovaks have for&#13;
such an agreement? And if Masaryk actually did think it was&#13;
only a "local agreement" between Americans, why did he,&#13;
a foreigner, even consider drafting and signing it? iHe con-&#13;
&#13;
96&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
eluded the agreement, he says, "in order to appease a small&#13;
SWVAK fraction which was dreaming of God knows what&#13;
sort of independence for Slovakia," but the fact is that the&#13;
Slovaks at that Pittsburgh meeting represented an overwhelming majority of organized Slovaks in America. And&#13;
what sort of independence for Slovakia could they possibly&#13;
be dreaming of when Masaryk himself told them that CzechoSlovakia would be modeled after the United States or Switzerland?&#13;
In 1918, T. G. Masaryk presented the Pittsburgh Convention to President Woodrow Wilson as a solemn treaty&#13;
between the Slovaks and the Czechs to induce him to grant&#13;
official recognition to the Czech and Slovak union and its&#13;
provisional government. Wilson would hardly have been&#13;
charmed by Masaryk to destroy Austria if Masaryk had described the Pittsburgh convention, in 1918, in the disparaging&#13;
terms he set in the record in 1925. The "great" Masaryk,&#13;
who so persistently insisted on the truth in all things, obviously lied to President Wilson and the Slovaks!&#13;
By saying that "actually the points in agreement were&#13;
virtually carried out - except the one stipulating the setting&#13;
up of a diet for Slovakia," professor Roucek admits that he&#13;
does not know what went on in Czecho-Slovakia and, hence,&#13;
is hardly qualified to write with authority about that country, and especially the Slovak portion of it. The fact is that&#13;
the Masaryk and Benes regimes were deaf to the just demand&#13;
of the Slovaks that the Pittsburgh Convention be honored&#13;
by the Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and, hence,&#13;
both were responsible for the consequences. The relations&#13;
between the Czechs and the Slovaks were actually worse&#13;
in 1938 than they were in 1918.&#13;
(More Coming)&#13;
&#13;
• • •&#13;
&#13;
He1p expose the political monstrosity that was CzechoSlov;aJkia by getting the SLOV'AK NEWSLEITER to as&#13;
many Americans as possible. Renew youT subscriptions&#13;
NOW and send one in for a friend .&#13;
The BEST availaJble mNGLlSH-1SLOVAlK DICTIONARY? Yes, we have it. Get your copy of HROBAICS ENGLISH-.SLOVAK DICTIONARY today! Only $4.00 per copy.&#13;
&#13;
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                <text>continued from &lt;a href="/items/show/213"&gt;Vol. 6, No. 2 (19), pp. 61-64&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;continues in &lt;a href="/items/show/251"&gt;Vol. 7, No. 1 (22), pp. 59-64&lt;/a&gt;</text>
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                    <text>Officers of the Slovak League of America
1

(Orwanized 1907 in Cleveland, Oh:io

•

Honorary President

Frances L. Mizenko

37 56 Lee R oad
Cleveland 28, Ohio

Dr. Peter P. H letko

1!143 W. 48th Street
Chica.go 9, lllinois

Stephen J . Tkach

173 N. Main Street
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.

President
Philip

A.

Hrobak

P . 0 . Box 150, Middletown, Pa.

Andrew J. Hamrock

61 Woodland Avenue
Camp bell, Ohio

Vice-President
Jacob Koci&amp;

ADVISORY COUNCIL
Michael J. Vargovich

1547 -- 167th Street
Hammond, Ind.

National President
First Catholic Slovak Union

Vice-President
Julia Krajcovic

Helen Kocan

1648 W . 18th St., Chicago 8, Ill.

National President
First Catholic Slovak
Ladies Union

Recording Secretary
Constantine Culen

2900 East Boulevard
Clevaland 4, Ohio

Paul Fallat

National President
Slovak Catholic Sokol

Secreta.ry-Treasurer

Stephen J. Tkach

Milan V. Blazek

National President
Penna. Slovak Union

4922 S. Leclaire Avenue
Chicago 38, Ill.
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Anna Sotak

ational President
Ladies Pennsylvania
Slovak Union

Paul P. Jamriska

810 Montooth Street
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.

John Rozboril

Joseph Prusa

205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J .

ational President
Slovak Catholic Cadet Union

SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affiliated with the Slovak League of America)

JEDNOTA

SLOVENSKA OBRANA

ZENSKA JEDNOTA

Middletown, Pa.

Scranton, Pa.

Cleveland, Ohio

BRATSTVO

SLOVENSKE

NOVINY

ZORNICKA

Cleveland, Ohio

Chicago, Ill.

KATOLiCKY SOKOL

SVORNOST

Pa.ssaic, N . J.

Whitaker, Pa.

OSADNE HLASY
Chicago, Ill.

Wilkes-Barre, Pa..

SLOVAK V AMERIKE

Whiting, Ind.

�GAN'S.ER LIBRARY
MILLERSVILLE STATE COLLEGE
MfLLERSVILLE, PA. 17551

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1

(Orwanized 1907 in Cleveland, Oh:io

•

Honorary President

Frances L. Mizenko

37 56 Lee R oad
Cleveland 28, Ohio

Dr. Peter P. H letko

1!143 W. 48th Street
Chica.go 9, lllinois

Stephen J . Tkach

173 N. Main Street
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.

President
Philip

A.

Hrobak

P . 0 . Box 150, Middletown, Pa.

Andrew J. Hamrock

61 Woodland Avenue
Camp bell, Ohio

Vice-President
Jacob Koci&amp;

ADVISORY COUNCIL
Michael J. Vargovich

1547 -- 167th Street
Hammond, Ind.

National President
First Catholic Slovak Union

Vice-President
Julia Krajcovic

Helen Kocan

1648 W . 18th St., Chicago 8, Ill.

National President
First Catholic Slovak
Ladies Union

Recording Secretary
Constantine Culen

2900 East Boulevard
Clevaland 4, Ohio

Paul Fallat

National President
Slovak Catholic Sokol

Secreta.ry-Treasurer

Stephen J. Tkach

Milan V. Blazek

National President
Penna. Slovak Union

4922 S. Leclaire Avenue
Chicago 38, Ill.
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Anna Sotak

ational President
Ladies Pennsylvania
Slovak Union

Paul P. Jamriska

810 Montooth Street
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.

John Rozboril

Joseph Prusa

205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J .

ational President
Slovak Catholic Cadet Union

SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affiliated with the Slovak League of America)

JEDNOTA

SLOVENSKA OBRANA

ZENSKA JEDNOTA

Middletown, Pa.

Scranton, Pa.

Cleveland, Ohio

BRATSTVO

SLOVENSKE

NOVINY

ZORNICKA

Cleveland, Ohio

Chicago, Ill.

KATOLiCKY SOKOL

SVORNOST

Pa.ssaic, N . J.

Whitaker, Pa.

OSADNE HLASY
Chicago, Ill.

Wilkes-Barre, Pa..

SLOVAK V AMERIKE

Whiting, Ind.

�GAN'S.ER LIBRARY
MILLERSVILLE STATE COLLEGE
MfLLERSVILLE, PA. 17551

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              <text>Officers of the Slovak League of America&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
(Orwanized 1907 in Cleveland, Oh:io&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
Honorary President&#13;
&#13;
Frances L. Mizenko&#13;
&#13;
37 56 Lee R oad&#13;
Cleveland 28, Ohio&#13;
&#13;
Dr. Peter P. H letko&#13;
&#13;
1!143 W. 48th Street&#13;
Chica.go 9, lllinois&#13;
&#13;
Stephen J . Tkach&#13;
&#13;
173 N. Main Street&#13;
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
President&#13;
Philip&#13;
&#13;
A.&#13;
&#13;
Hrobak&#13;
&#13;
P . 0 . Box 150, Middletown, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
Andrew J. Hamrock&#13;
&#13;
61 Woodland Avenue&#13;
Camp bell, Ohio&#13;
&#13;
Vice-President&#13;
Jacob Koci&amp;&#13;
&#13;
ADVISORY COUNCIL&#13;
Michael J. Vargovich&#13;
&#13;
1547 -- 167th Street&#13;
Hammond, Ind.&#13;
&#13;
National President&#13;
First Catholic Slovak Union&#13;
&#13;
Vice-President&#13;
Julia Krajcovic&#13;
&#13;
Helen Kocan&#13;
&#13;
1648 W . 18th St., Chicago 8, Ill.&#13;
&#13;
National President&#13;
First Catholic Slovak&#13;
Ladies Union&#13;
&#13;
Recording Secretary&#13;
Constantine Culen&#13;
&#13;
2900 East Boulevard&#13;
Clevaland 4, Ohio&#13;
&#13;
Paul Fallat&#13;
&#13;
National President&#13;
Slovak Catholic Sokol&#13;
&#13;
Secreta.ry-Treasurer&#13;
&#13;
Stephen J. Tkach&#13;
&#13;
Milan V. Blazek&#13;
&#13;
National President&#13;
Penna. Slovak Union&#13;
&#13;
4922 S. Leclaire Avenue&#13;
Chicago 38, Ill.&#13;
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE&#13;
&#13;
Anna Sotak&#13;
&#13;
ational President&#13;
Ladies Pennsylvania&#13;
Slovak Union&#13;
&#13;
Paul P. Jamriska&#13;
&#13;
810 Montooth Street&#13;
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
John Rozboril&#13;
&#13;
Joseph Prusa&#13;
&#13;
205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J .&#13;
&#13;
ational President&#13;
Slovak Catholic Cadet Union&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS&#13;
( Affiliated with the Slovak League of America)&#13;
&#13;
JEDNOTA&#13;
&#13;
SLOVENSKA OBRANA&#13;
&#13;
ZENSKA JEDNOTA&#13;
&#13;
Middletown, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
Scranton, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
Cleveland, Ohio&#13;
&#13;
BRATSTVO&#13;
&#13;
SLOVENSKE&#13;
&#13;
NOVINY&#13;
&#13;
ZORNICKA&#13;
&#13;
Cleveland, Ohio&#13;
&#13;
Chicago, Ill.&#13;
&#13;
KATOLiCKY SOKOL&#13;
&#13;
SVORNOST&#13;
&#13;
Pa.ssaic, N . J.&#13;
&#13;
Whitaker, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
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Chicago, Ill.&#13;
&#13;
Wilkes-Barre, Pa..&#13;
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SLOVAK V AMERIKE&#13;
&#13;
Whiting, Ind.&#13;
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GAN'S.ER LIBRARY&#13;
MILLERSVILLE STATE COLLEGE&#13;
MfLLERSVILLE, PA. 17551&#13;
&#13;
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                    <text>MARCH 1955

VOL. V

NO . 1 ( 14)

o,~:o STAT E
U ~1 sl qr=-,~. J; T~

t

_; :L\UG 16 J960

LIBRAR'V
IN THIS ISSUE:
HOW THE COMMUNISTS SEIZED S1LOVAKIA
From the testimony of witnesses before the Select Committee on
Communist Aggression of the House of Representatives

1.

From the Special Report No . 8

2.

Michael Galayda

3.

Mr. and

4.

Dr. Joseph Pauco

Mr!l. Smrekovsky

5.

Dr. Joseph Mikula

6.

Philip A. Hrobak

7.

.Dr. Joseph A. Mikus

8.

Father Anton

9.

Father Stephen Nahalka

Botek

10.

Jan Dobrotka

11.

J ur

12.

Reaction of Benes Czechs, Lettrich "Democrats" and Czecho-

Detviansky

Slovak Reds

*

•

Edited and compiled by
PHILIP - A. HROBAK

Published by
THE S LOVAK

LEAGUE OF AMERICA

�I'

SLOVAKIA is prnblish d periodically by the Slovak Leaigue of Ameri ca, a cultural and civi c federation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOV A_KIA is to promote
a better und,entanding and appreciation of the S lovak natio n and its long s truggl e for freedom and
i.nd ependence.
As Americans, memb er of the Slovak League o[
America firm ly believe that the Slovak nation, just
as all n,ations, has an inherent and God-given right
to freedom and inde,pend e nce. They are decli&lt;'atecl
to the cause of the Am erican way nf life, Slovak freedom and world peace, ::rnd are determ ·ned to oppose
the plague of Co=unism and all other totalitarian
political systems.
Subscri•ption to SLOVAK IA is $1.00 per year in
the U. S. A. - $2 .00 elsewhere.

SLOVAKIA
Box 150
MiclcIJetown , Pa.

CORREC'l'ION - ln the pTevious issue of SLOVAKIA several mistakes were made inadvertently
in the ,a rticle written by Dr. George W. Cesarich,
"The Apo,s tles o.f Bogus Federa lism ." Please mak e
the foll01wing cor,rection s : p,g. 68, first three lin,e,s
shoul d r ead: "the, sufferings o,f subjugated nation s
in the artificial .states which th e Croats an.cl the S lovak,s definitely an,d finall y r efus e to accept as theiT
own", instead of " ... definitely anrl finally do ac cept
as their own;" p,g. 69 , par 3, lin e -1, to read "is not
true that these states have e v er corresponded to ,"
instead of "nev e r corres-ponded to;" pg. 73, par. 2.
line 2, " unc onceivable" should read "i ncon ceivabl e."
We regret the errors in printing and hope to avoid
t h em in the future.

P,r inted in the U. S. A.

JEDNOTA PRESS
Middletown , Pa.

�</text>
                  </elementText>
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                    <text>MARCH 1955

VOL. V

NO . 1 ( 14)

o,~:o STAT E
U ~1 sl qr=-,~. J; T~

t

_; :L\UG 16 J960

LIBRAR'V
IN THIS ISSUE:
HOW THE COMMUNISTS SEIZED S1LOVAKIA
From the testimony of witnesses before the Select Committee on
Communist Aggression of the House of Representatives

1.

From the Special Report No . 8

2.

Michael Galayda

3.

Mr. and

4.

Dr. Joseph Pauco

Mr!l. Smrekovsky

5.

Dr. Joseph Mikula

6.

Philip A. Hrobak

7.

.Dr. Joseph A. Mikus

8.

Father Anton

9.

Father Stephen Nahalka

Botek

10.

Jan Dobrotka

11.

J ur

12.

Reaction of Benes Czechs, Lettrich "Democrats" and Czecho-

Detviansky

Slovak Reds

*

•

Edited and compiled by
PHILIP - A. HROBAK

Published by
THE S LOVAK

LEAGUE OF AMERICA

�I'

SLOVAKIA is prnblish d periodically by the Slovak Leaigue of Ameri ca, a cultural and civi c federation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOV A_KIA is to promote
a better und,entanding and appreciation of the S lovak natio n and its long s truggl e for freedom and
i.nd ependence.
As Americans, memb er of the Slovak League o[
America firm ly believe that the Slovak nation, just
as all n,ations, has an inherent and God-given right
to freedom and inde,pend e nce. They are decli&lt;'atecl
to the cause of the Am erican way nf life, Slovak freedom and world peace, ::rnd are determ ·ned to oppose
the plague of Co=unism and all other totalitarian
political systems.
Subscri•ption to SLOVAK IA is $1.00 per year in
the U. S. A. - $2 .00 elsewhere.

SLOVAKIA
Box 150
MiclcIJetown , Pa.

CORREC'l'ION - ln the pTevious issue of SLOVAKIA several mistakes were made inadvertently
in the ,a rticle written by Dr. George W. Cesarich,
"The Apo,s tles o.f Bogus Federa lism ." Please mak e
the foll01wing cor,rection s : p,g. 68, first three lin,e,s
shoul d r ead: "the, sufferings o,f subjugated nation s
in the artificial .states which th e Croats an.cl the S lovak,s definitely an,d finall y r efus e to accept as theiT
own", instead of " ... definitely anrl finally do ac cept
as their own;" p,g. 69 , par 3, lin e -1, to read "is not
true that these states have e v er corresponded to ,"
instead of "nev e r corres-ponded to;" pg. 73, par. 2.
line 2, " unc onceivable" should read "i ncon ceivabl e."
We regret the errors in printing and hope to avoid
t h em in the future.

P,r inted in the U. S. A.

JEDNOTA PRESS
Middletown , Pa.

�</text>
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              <text>MARCH 1955&#13;
&#13;
VOL. V&#13;
&#13;
NO . 1 ( 14)&#13;
&#13;
o,~:o STAT E&#13;
U ~1 sl qr=-,~. J; T~&#13;
&#13;
t&#13;
&#13;
_; :L\UG 16 J960&#13;
&#13;
LIBRAR'V&#13;
IN THIS ISSUE:&#13;
HOW THE COMMUNISTS SEIZED S1LOVAKIA&#13;
From the testimony of witnesses before the Select Committee on&#13;
Communist Aggression of the House of Representatives&#13;
&#13;
1.&#13;
&#13;
From the Special Report No . 8&#13;
&#13;
2.&#13;
&#13;
Michael Galayda&#13;
&#13;
3.&#13;
&#13;
Mr. and&#13;
&#13;
4.&#13;
&#13;
Dr. Joseph Pauco&#13;
&#13;
Mr!l. Smrekovsky&#13;
&#13;
5.&#13;
&#13;
Dr. Joseph Mikula&#13;
&#13;
6.&#13;
&#13;
Philip A. Hrobak&#13;
&#13;
7.&#13;
&#13;
.Dr. Joseph A. Mikus&#13;
&#13;
8.&#13;
&#13;
Father Anton&#13;
&#13;
9.&#13;
&#13;
Father Stephen Nahalka&#13;
&#13;
Botek&#13;
&#13;
10.&#13;
&#13;
Jan Dobrotka&#13;
&#13;
11.&#13;
&#13;
J ur&#13;
&#13;
12.&#13;
&#13;
Reaction of Benes Czechs, Lettrich "Democrats" and Czecho-&#13;
&#13;
Detviansky&#13;
&#13;
Slovak Reds&#13;
&#13;
*&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
Edited and compiled by&#13;
PHILIP - A. HROBAK&#13;
&#13;
Published by&#13;
THE S LOVAK&#13;
&#13;
LEAGUE OF AMERICA&#13;
&#13;
I'&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA is prnblish d periodically by the Slovak Leaigue of Ameri ca, a cultural and civi c federation of Americans of Slovak descent.&#13;
The chief purpose of SLOV A_KIA is to promote&#13;
a better und,entanding and appreciation of the S lovak natio n and its long s truggl e for freedom and&#13;
i.nd ependence.&#13;
As Americans, memb er of the Slovak League o[&#13;
America firm ly believe that the Slovak nation, just&#13;
as all n,ations, has an inherent and God-given right&#13;
to freedom and inde,pend e nce. They are decli&lt;'atecl&#13;
to the cause of the Am erican way nf life, Slovak freedom and world peace, ::rnd are determ ·ned to oppose&#13;
the plague of Co=unism and all other totalitarian&#13;
political systems.&#13;
Subscri•ption to SLOVAK IA is $1.00 per year in&#13;
the U. S. A. - $2 .00 elsewhere.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
Box 150&#13;
MiclcIJetown , Pa.&#13;
&#13;
CORREC'l'ION - ln the pTevious issue of SLOVAKIA several mistakes were made inadvertently&#13;
in the ,a rticle written by Dr. George W. Cesarich,&#13;
"The Apo,s tles o.f Bogus Federa lism ." Please mak e&#13;
the foll01wing cor,rection s : p,g. 68, first three lin,e,s&#13;
shoul d r ead: "the, sufferings o,f subjugated nation s&#13;
in the artificial .states which th e Croats an.cl the S lovak,s definitely an,d finall y r efus e to accept as theiT&#13;
own", instead of " ... definitely anrl finally do ac cept&#13;
as their own;" p,g. 69 , par 3, lin e -1, to read "is not&#13;
true that these states have e v er corresponded to ,"&#13;
instead of "nev e r corres-ponded to;" pg. 73, par. 2.&#13;
line 2, " unc onceivable" should read "i ncon ceivabl e."&#13;
We regret the errors in printing and hope to avoid&#13;
t h em in the future.&#13;
&#13;
P,r inted in the U. S. A.&#13;
&#13;
JEDNOTA PRESS&#13;
Middletown , Pa.&#13;
&#13;
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA
Published

VOL. V

quarterly by the

Slovak

League of

MARCH 1955

America

NO . 1 (14)

HOW THE COMMUNISTS SEIZED SLOVAKIA
is told on the following pa,ges by
witnesses called upon to testify
by the Select Committee on Com•
mu.nist Aiggression of the House
of Representatives, headed by the
Hon. Ch:a.J'lles J . Kersten of Mil·
waukee, Wis.
Michael Galayda is an .American
citzen who experienced Communist terror in Slovakia. He was
there W1,d saw Communism at
work a mong his people w'ho had
persdstenUy ,and consistently fought
the Red plague for over a hundred
years. H e makes his home in
Hazleton, Pa.
Mr. and Mrs. Smrekovsky, American citizens, also witnessed the
terror and horror of Red rule in
Slovakia ,f irst hand. They have relatives and many friends in S1ovakia and, hen.ce are using an assumed name.
Dr. Joseph Pauco, news.paperman and writer, c ame to America
in 1950; he is assistant editor of
the .TIIDDNOTA (Union), the official organ of the First Catholic
Slovak Union, and a1so chairman
of the U. S. Bran,ch of the Slov,a k
National Council Abroad.
Dr. Joseph Mikula studied law
1 and politics and was very active
' in student circ'les of Slovakia ,before he Jlled the Red terror which
invaded his native Slovakia.
Dr. Joseph Mikus, foraner Slovak dilplomat, lawyer and writer,
became the director of the Press
Bureau of the Slovak League of
America, Wash!lngton, D. C., soon
after his arrival in America several years ago.

Jan Dobrotka, now an exile in
West Germany, was a Sergeant of
the Department of National Security in Bratislava, Slovakia.
Jur Detviansky was an active
officer of the Sloviak Army before
he Hed to the West.
Rev. Anton Botek, S.T.D., editor
and former director of the Catholic Center in Bratd•slava, S-Jovakia,
is in charge of the S lovak Catholic Action in Exiile; he edits
"HLASY Z RiMA," (Voices From
Rome), Italy.
Rev.

Stephen

Nahalka,

S.T.D.,

ecclesiastical writer and former
personal secretary to Bishop John
Vojtassak of t'he Spis Diocese,
1Slovaki,a - who, by the way, was
sentenced to 24 years 1n prison
1by the Reds lives in Rome.
Italy.
Philip A. Hrobak, editor of the
JEDNl()TA since 1938 and president of t'he Slovak League of
America since 19'50, is a native
AmerLcan, born in Cleveland, Ohio,
in 1904. Active in Slovak aff.airs
for the past 35 years,, Mr. Hrobak
has devoted much time to the study of Czecho-Slovakda and Slovakia and the people responsible for
government. His
articles
and
pampb:lets in Engilish have contributed greatly to expose "Czechoslo,v ak" pseudo-democracy, the
maohinations of the Benes Czechs
(Socialists) and Lettri.ch "detnocrats", the people responsible for
the betrayal of the Slova;ks to the
men of the Kremlin - +and the
Reds and Socialists aictJ!ve In Slovak circles in Amertlca. ·

�SLOVAKIA

Communist Aggression Against Slovakia
(The Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, EJighty-Third Congress, 1954, under the ch·a irmans•h lp of
the HonoraJble Oharles J. Kersten, did quite a. remarkable jdb to
ascertain how the !Communists seized pO'wer in the various countries
of IDurope. I believe it is the first time in our history that an honest
attempt was made to understand the 'background of the -peoples behind the Iron Curtain. 1Slovak representatives were among those
who gave testimony of Communist a,ggression in S-tovakia, which differed in so.me respects from th.at in other countries. From the testimony of various witnesses who were heard, and the many others
who sent in their statements fl'Qm various countries, it is quite eviden,t that 1Slovrukia fell an easy prey to Moscow iand the C-Ommunlsts
because of the pro-Soviet -poli&lt;:y of Dr. Edward ,B enes and the Czech
Socialists, who ruled in Czecho-Siovakia with the Communists after
World War ]I. Slovakia, traditionally anti-Communist, was jn fact
sold out by the National Front ,Government of Prague. The vast
masses of the Slovak population ,had no ,c•hoice; their wiH meant
nothin,g to Benes and tib.e Prague regime, whJ.ch took over Slovakia
with the help of Soviet bayonets, disregardin,g the pollti-cal wHl of
the peOII)le completely. Excerpts from the testimony of Slovak witnesses, l'\Vlhic,h are contained on these pages, definitely prove that. P.A. H.).

FROM THE SPECIAL REPORT NO. 8
SLOVAKIA
!Slovaki,a is situated between the Carpathian Mountains on the north and the Danube and the Tisa Rivers on
the south. The in!hrubitants are !known as Slov,aks and with
the !Poles a111d the Ozechs, belong to the group of western
Slaivs.
The political history of the ·S lov,a!ks goes back to the
beginnmg of the ninth century when ChmsUan civilization
was introduced into their territoTy, and it was during this
period that tlhe ruler, H;astisfav, 84~70, made himself
lmown by an intensiive ChTistiianmation of the country.
FoJilowing hls ti,nvitation, two brothers, Saints Cyril and
Methodius, who henceforth were to b.ecome the rupostles of
the Slaivs, came in 863 from Byoo.ntium to Great Moravia. B y their activities, they laid the foundations for church
organizaibions, the Slav liturgy, a'.Jiphrubet, •a nd literature. It
was in this way that the rwork of the two missionaries

�SLOVAKIA

3

from Byzruntrl:l.l!Ill brought ,t he western Slavs into the fold of
the Catholic OhuTch, an historical event of paramount ipolitic,al and oulturral importance.
In the tenth century, ,Slovakia ,b ecame for a time a
battlefie'ld in the struggles .among the SlaVIS, Magyars, and
Germans, and at the fbegiillnmg of the eleventh century,
she became a part of the kingdom of Hungary, organized
under the Arpad dynasty.
In the fifteenth and at the !beginning of the si~teenth
century the internal prOiblems of Hungary reached a certain degree of consolidation. The invasions of •c entral Europe by the 'Dmks in tJhe ,s ixteenth and seventeenth ceinturies, however, reduced Hungary to the area of the Slovalda
of today and political and cultural liife was concentrated in
that area. For a long time sessions of the Hungarian Pa•r liament were held •a nd coronations of the Hungarian llings
were celebrated in BratisJava.
The end o,f the eighteenth and the first half of the
nineteenth centuries mark the /beginning of the Slovak national renaissance. At this time, the nationa1ities tin central Emope we,r e about to abrundon Latin as the literary
and spoken language of the cu!tiivated claS'S and to replace
it by their own national language. Consequently, a spiritual
rebirth stirred up national aspirations among the different peoples of the !Hapsburg monarchy.
In 1848, the Slov,a,ks -organiized a military uprising
against the centralism of 'BudaJpeSt and: helped 1:Jhe Emperor
crush the Kossuth rebellion against the Hapsburgs. They
did it with the hope that Slovrukia wocld ibe finally acknowledged as an autonomous land within a federated
monaTohy, ibut thedr hopes in this respect were never
satisfied.
h1 the "Memorand'll!IIl of the Slovak Nation" of Jl.l'lle
7, 1861, a Slovak National Assemlbly, asked the Parliament
of Hungary to create an rarl!ministiratirve unit from the oounties imlhaJbited lby tlhe iSloviaJc population under the name of
"Slovak region." It was to ,b e ,provjdedJ with such a degree
of poaitical and oultural autonomy which would be compatible wiith the prniciiple of u.mty of the monarchy. But the
Hungarian Parlioonent failed to act.

�4

SLOVAKIA

In 1868 the Nationality Act was passed in the /Pairliament of Hunga:ry .b y which Magyar was proclaimed. the official language of the ,s tate administration in the kingdom,
except for some autonomous bodies.
1n 1895, the Serbs, the Rwmanians from Transylvania
and the Slovaks convOlked a congress of nationalities in Budapest in which they claimed ,respect for their national
rights and asked once more for a federative reform of the
kingdom on the ,p rinciple of equality. Such a reform was
not carried out. As a ,c onsequence the non.,Magy,ar nationa!lities lost, during the First World War, their interest in
the continued existence ()ff the dual monarchy oif AustriaHu.ngary.
1

World War I and Formation of the Czecho-Slovak State
Dwring World War [ the ,s pirit of nationalism was
greatly stimulated within the Alustro-Hungari:ain Empire.
Thi•s spirit was reflected iby increasing demands for greater
autonomy or ouwi:ght independence ,f or the clifforent nations within that empire. The advocacy of the principle of
nationa:l self-tdeter-mination by President Wilson further
stimulated these iaJS!)iratiOill,s. and dlid much to set the stage
for the peace settlements.
Dur:i.ng the course of the war Czech political leaders
established a secret committee wh~ch directed the ,a ctivities of Ozech nationalists at home and abroad. Thomas G.
Masaryk, as the leader of this movement, toured Europe
and the United 'States Wlhere h e recei.:ved encouragement
and support.
Meanwhile a movement ,a rose among the ·l arge number oif Americans of Slovaik descent promoting Slovak!ia's
separation from Hungary. Th.Tee different solutions of the
Slovaik prob1em were oovi,saged: Slovakia as a new state,
as ia partner orf a Czecho-Slovruk Federation •o r a·s a territory forming a pollitircal union with the prospectirve Polish
Republic.
Finally, the SloivaJk -League of Amerioa entered into
contact with the Amemcans of Czech descent and signed
with their organilzations, in 191 5, t;he Cleveland agreement,
and in 1918 the Pittsburgh Parct, 'both of which aim·e d at
1

1

1

�5

SLOVAKIA

the creation of a Czecho-.Slova1k federal state. In these doouments the Slov,aik organi•z ation stipulated that Slovakfa
should 'be an equal mem1ber iwitJh the Czech lands ·a nd have
complete legislative, executive, judiciary and cultural autonomy in strictly national matters, while matters of common interest, such as foreign affairs and defense, should
be within the competence '()!f a common parlitailllent.
1

A tangi!ble proof of the aspi-rabions of 1:Jhe Ozec:h and
Slo:vruk peoples toiward foll mdependence iwas demonstrated
by the thousands of thei:r soldiers who had swrendeired on
the 'Various fronts. They formed the Czecho-Slovak Legions
in Russia, France, amd Ita1y and fought on the side of the
Al[ied and Associated \P,o wers.
1

In order to convince ·W estern statesmen that the concept of national states 1was, ~n concern with the iwill of the
people a Congress otf !Peop1es Oppressed ·b y the Hrups'burg
Monarchy was commenced in Apilil 191'8 at Rome. This congress did much to mfl,uence the th,i nking in western Europe
and in the United States. ln the summer of 1918, F'ra.nce,
Great Britain, the United States, and Italy offici,all,y recognized the Czecho-1Slovak National Council as a defacto gOIVerrunent and the Gzecho-lSlwak forces as an Allied army
waging regu~ar warfare agarl.nst kustria-Hungary and Germany.
A Ozeoho-4Slwak IPro:visionrul Government •w as set up
in Paris with Masaryik as President and was recogn.iized de
jure by the Aflied and Associated Powers. It issued the Declaration of Czecho..SlovaJk Independence on October 18,
1918, in Paris. On the saime day President Wilson rejected
the Austrian ,proiposa:l for the organi zation of Austria-Hungary on a federa l !b asis iby reiplyiing that !he could no longer
accept •~ere autonomy of these peoples as a basis of
peace .. ."
On Octolber 28, 1918, the Ozecho-Slo,yak Nationial Colllllcil in !P:mgue proclaimed the deiposibion of the Austrian
Emperor as so,yereign of the Czech and Slcxvak lands and the
estrublishment of a free and united Republic ,of Ozecho-4SlovavaJda. The ,SiovaJk National Counchl, a revolutionary 'body
composed of Slovak patriots, convened on October 30, 1918,
1

1

�SLOVAKIA

6

and ,pwb1isihed a document known •a s the Dec1aration of
Turcia.nsky rSv. Martlin. In. this document they proclaimed
the separation of Slo.va:lci&lt;a from the Kiingdom of Hungary
and their intention to form with the Ozech lands a CzeohoSlOWlik .state. On November 14, 1918, this decision was ratified 1~ the Crecho--iSlvoruk National Assembly which elected
T. G. 1M as•aryik as President of the Republic and set up the
first ,caJbinet.
However, it was not long !b efore serious dlisagreement
developed between the Ozechs and ISlovaJks on the form of
government for the new state. The Ozeohs farvored a Czecho~Sl01Vak ,centralist state whHe the Sllo,vaiks ins.i:sted upon
a Czecho~SlQl\llaJk feder.ation ~n whioo the identity and individrua:lity of each nation would ibe •recognized and preserved.
In the opinion of !Slovak leadJers the Ozecho,..slovak state,
for all practical purposes, was to become a Czech ,s tate, enlarged 'by Slovakia ra nd :sulb-Oaripathlian Ruthenia. This situation resulted .in the !Slovaks taking a firm ,position a,g ainst
the centralist form of government. Monsignor Andrew Hilinka, a great patriotic [eader from the time of pre~a:r HrUlllgar.y, went dandestine1y in !September 1919 to Pairis in order to present S1ova;kia's cause before the Peace Conference, ,a dvocating an international guaranty fo·r the selfgovernment of the ,Slovruk nation withi:n OzechoJSlova!kia.
Denounced to the •French authorities !by the Ozecho,.;Slovak
delegation as a Hapsburg spy, he was foTced to return to
Slovaikia without any result. Toniprisoned 1by order of Prague
at Mirov, Mara'Via, Hlinka was to stay tJhere until April
1920, when he was elected deputy of the 'Slovak People's
Party, founded iby him under the Hungarian regime and
reestabllished in December 19'18.
1

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
ConstitutJional Structure
Althowg,h the !basic ,constitution was not adopted until.
February 1920, its .gener.al principles had been B!pplied
from the very •b eginning of Cze.cho-Slovaik independence.
The philosophy underlying this fundamental law is expressed in the preamble, whfoh is striikingly similar to the

�SLOVAKIA

7

preamble of the Constitution of the United States.
The main body of the Consbitution provided for a
popularly elected Parliament, a President selected by both
houses of Parliament and an independent judiciary.

Parties and Politics
The politics of the period may ibe divided into four

phases:
1. Nationalistic phase (1918-19)
Following the proclamation of independence, ,a ll Czech
political parties agreed on the fundamental principles on
which the new state ,w as to be bui1t. Having reaohed this
major consensus and the necessary leg,islation having been
enacted, the coalition had accomplished its task and a
split on partisan lines followed.
2. Swing toward Social Democraicy (1919-20)
The period of Socia.dist rule in the Czecho-Slovruk Republic did not accom;plish too many changes in the country's economy although the r,a,iUwa,ys, mines, and water
power were socialiized. The division of the 1Soci:alists into
Socialist amd Communist ranks ended the brief era of Socialist eJQ!)erimentation in Czooho-Slovrukia.
3. The agrarian era (1922-35)
This was a period of Telative ·parliamentary stability
under the leadershiip of the Agrarian Party, which managed
the government along m.iddile-of~the-road policies. A satisfactory coalition government was maintained throughout
this period.
4. The crisis ( 1935-38)
This period iwas the touchstone of the solidity of the
Czecho-1Slovruk state. Confronted with the serious iproblem
of the Sudeten Germain poipuil.ation, Czecho-6lovakia betrayed no signs, of political panic.
The .principal political ,parties in Ozecho-Slovrukia in the
period betiween the two World Wars formed the following
groups:
National 'Democrats. - This party, conservative and intensely nationalist, drew its princi'pa:l support from businessmen, the professions, and hi,gher cirvil servants. It never
beoame very ,powenfu:l.

�8

SLOVAKIA

Populists. - Under the name of the Czech Populist
Party and the Slovak Pe&gt;ipulist Party, respectiively, this
group endeavored to bring CathoiJ.ic ideas into plllblic life.
The Sllllall faruners and workers in rural districts were its
strongholds, especially in Slovakia.
Agrarians. - This poJitica-1 groUJp, the largest in the
subsequent parliaments, was solidly entrenched in both
rural aind town districts by means 0£ a widespread network
of cooperat:1ve, economic, and mtlturnJl organimtions. Its
broaid economic and so.cia'l program att•r acted wide support.
National Socialists. - Thi1s non-Marxian Socialist Party may ibie described as a "radicai national party of the
lower middle class and of the wonkers." It had rather more
influence than its moderate numerical strength would indii;cate.
Social Democrats. - This, party, resembling the social
democratic parties of other European countries, had more
influence during the first two years of bhe Republic. Though
outwardly united it was, however, undermined by dissension within its own ranks, whicih finally resulted in the expu1lsion of the Communist faction .
Communists. - The Ozecho-Sloivaik Commll!Ilist Party
was created in 1920 as a result of the e~ulsion of Communist elements from the 'Social Democratic Party. Though
equia:lly subversive and aggressiive as elsewhere in Europe,
the Ozecho-iSlovaJk Communists never secured a la:rge foll-owing during the two decades before the Second World
War.
Economic, Social and Cultural Development
Agrarian reform
iRediistribu:tion of land was an urgent iprOlblem facing
the IIlew government and a Land Reform Act, therefore,
was one of the first measures passed ,b y the Czecho-Slovak
Parliament. This ,a ct entitled the state to truke over, •a,fter
com;pensation, all ,1and :from the great estates in excess of a
fixed maximum and to permit land purcha,se by those who
needed it most. The agr,ariam. refomi program substantially improved the material conditions of the rural popula-

�SLOVAKIA

9

tion aml averted the diam.ger of ,agrarian disturbances.
Economic development
While Czecho-1Slovruk agricl.l!ltura:l resources almost
covered domestic req,uiTements, indrustrial prodUJCtion was
far in excess of the needs of the home market since Ozecho-1Slovakia had been the industrial center of the former
Austro..lHJungarian Empire.
'Since the Danulbiian countries, originally Czooho-Slovakia'•s principal foreign ma,r ket fOT manufadured goods,
were increasing the tempo of their industria;lization with a
view to :restricting tihe import orf industrial µvoducts, Ozecho..JSlovruk foreign trade was olbJiiged to look for new outlets. These were found ma,i nly in those western and oversea
countries which were Czecho-1SloV1aJkia's .principal suppliers
of •r aw materials, especially the United States and Great
Britain.
Economically aJnd fin!andalil.y Czecho-Slorvaikia was a
sound state in central Europe. As an exporting country it
was severely hlt by the wodd economic depression of the
early thirties, hut, lby timely adtj:ustments to new price and
exchange levels, it was one orf the first Eiurropean countries
to weather the crisis.
Education and social progress
The cl.l!ltmrra1 level orf the Czechs was hlgh and their passion fOT education was prQIVeribial in central Eur.ope. The
new R.ep'Ulblic fostered educaition by establishing additional
free schools •a nd by, improving the existing ,schools.
The Ozecho-1Slorva,k :S tate a,lso forged ahead in the
field of social impmve:ment. All groU!ps and interests pos,sessed the rig:ht of organi,z ation ,a nd thus organized lalbor
had its trade unio,n s, farmers their cooperative societies,
and white--coUar worker,s and businessmen their associations. Health a,nd other types of ,social insurance were either
provided for or encouraged iby the State and pro¥i:sion was
made for State assistance to hoursing and cooperatives.

The Religious Situation

The re1igious .situation created after the esmblishment
of the Repu'blic in 19'18 must, like many other of the coun-

�SLOVAKIA

:iO

try's developments, ibe rvieiwed against its historical backgrou!Ild.
A strong Czech groUJp of modernist, nationalistic Roman clergy insisted on radicall reforms, such as the use of
the vernacuiliar in the lituvgy ,and the abolition of compulsory celibacy, Wlhich the Roman Curia could not accept. As
a result, this group seceded from Rome and esta:blished an
independent "Ozecho-1S1ovak Church" ,w hioh originally numbered aJbout one million adherents, lbut ,w hich lost half its
meimlbership by 1939, so that Roman Catholics still comprised 80 •p er cent of the popul,a tion. In spite of adverse
circu:mstl8Jnces, the Roman Cathoilic ChUTch adjusted itself,
therefore, to the new millieu and recovered much for its former influence.
In the political and cultural life of the new Repwblic,
the Protestant element played a role far beyond its numerical strength. Many ,prominent political leaders, Thomas
G. Masaryk among them, 1be'longed to the Protestant faith.
1

Internal Problems

'J.'lhe OOIIlstituition of 1920, in }airge measure disiregarding the ethnographic realities of Czecho-Slovakia, was to
become a bone of contention 1b ,etween the Czechs on the
one side, and 1:Jhe. 1Slova:k,s, Ger.mans, Mag,yar:s, and Ruthenians on the other. The Slovaks demanded the incorporation
of the main clauses of the Pittsburgh Pa-ct into the Constitution. The Ruthemans, whose autonomy within CzechoSlovakia had ,b een granted by the Treaty of St. Germain,
asked that this international obligation be respected 'by the
Prague Government. The Ge:rana:ns ,and the Magyars solicited oulturaJ rig,hts and adnninistr,a,ti,ve autonomy on the
local level, as granted iby the same Treaty of St. Germain.
'Dhis psychological split among the ,populatiOIIl of OzechoSlova1ki,a wea:kened consideriaJbly the new state from both
the internal and international point of rview. The Czech
statesmen tried to iremedy this situation by creating a system of international treaties such as the Little Entente,
1920, the Pact of Alliance and FriendsihiJp with France,
1924, and a similar pact with the Soviet Union, 1935. Uke
the Austro-Hunga1rian staite'Smen in 1867, Benes believed

�11

SLOVAKIA

that the transformation of Czech~Slova!kia into a federation of three memlbers, the Czech lands, 1Slov,a kia, and Subcarpaitlliian iRuthenia, would weaken the international position of the centralized state, I)a)rticularly with reference
to HW11gary and Germany. Consequently, in the field of internal ,administraJtio,n he developed a system, in which aJll
branches of Gove:rnment in Slov.a:kia and Sulbca rpathiian Ruthenia ,w ere reserved iprimari1y to 1:Jhe Czec,hs.
Politicall'Y, al·l problems of these bwo lands we.re to ibe
decided in the Pa:-ag,ue Parliament, where !Slovakia had only
58 and Ruthenia 9 deputies out of 300. Thus, even the most
important questions such a;s the relation betlween state
and church, official language, system of schools, the economy, were to be decided ib;y the Ozech parliamentarian majority.
Ai3 to the cutural aspect, secondary schodls in Slovakia as wel[ ,as the Bratislava Universirty lbecaJm.e an officiaJl
domain of Ozech ,professors, teacihing the UJnitarian concept of a "Czechoslovak" nation m ithe ethnic sense. On October 1, 1938, there were 523 Czech and 345 Sloviaik instructors teaching in the secondary schools of Slovaikia. At the
same time, there were 66 Czech and only 24 Slov~k professors in the Bratisl,a,va Uruversity.
From the standpoint of the economy Slovakia was to
remain a predominantly agrarian land, while the Czech
part of the Repulblic was highly induskialized. This policy
of two dif,ferent measures is shown by the share of Slovakia and Ruthenia ~n the industrial production of the RepU!blic. The participation of these two lands in the whole
industry, !between 1934 and 1937, was only 8.5 per cent,
while 91.5 iper cent went to the Czec,h lands. The proper
importance of these figures is stressed by the fact, that
Slwakia constituted 23 per cent and Rutheinia 5.5 per cent
of the total popuJation of the Re1pulblic.
From the adlministratifve ,p oint of view, the district and
county offices in Slo,vakia and iRuthenia were mostly direcited iby Czech off,iciais who were directly responsible to
Prague ,as were the police. In 1938 there were 120,926 Czech
pwb1ic offici,a ls in 'Slovakia.
All these aspects created in Ozecho-Slovakia what has
1

1

�12

SLOVAKIA

been knoiWn as the "Sll.ova;k problem." The Slovak People's
Party which, in 1925 had 23 deputies, became not only the
strongest single party in Slav,aJkia, lbut a majority party of
the Slovak people (not counting minorities and the Comm1.1!11ists) endorsed 1:Jhe federative reform of the Republic
asking for the accomplishment of stipulations contained in
the ,PittslblllI'gh Pact. A:s early as Jianuary 25, 1922, this
party presented its fiTst project for c01I1stituti01I1al reform
in Czecho-Slovakia. The prog,ram hatl the following main
points:
!Slovakia to be granted her own Diet and Government.
As common affairs would ,b e considered: The President, the
Army, Foreign Affairs, and Communications. The Sloviak Diet to harve exolU1Sive competence in such matters as
natiOIIlal eduoaJtion, denominations, justice, commerce, agriculture, publric works, social welifare, and corresponding
finances. The executive ;power in Slov-rukia, as iregards b.oth
the laws which wound be :voted by the Central Parliament
in Prague and those which would be enacted. lby the Diet
of Bratis:larva, would belong to the Slovruk Gorvernment.
Laws voted ,by ithe Central Parliament would lbe without
validity in .Slovakia if rejected by a two-.thirds majority in
the •Sll.ovak Diet. This proposal would have satisfied !Slovak
aspirations, but it was 111ever put on the agenda o;f Parliament.
A second proposed reform concerning the decentirali&gt;zation of the state administration was presented to the Czecho4S1avruk Parliiament by the 1Slovak People's 1Party, May
8, 1930. More modest in -i ts scope than the first one, this
document claimed for -Slovakia the same constitutional position which had 1b een gr8.lllted ihwt never carried out by
article 3 of the constitwtion relating to Sub.carpathian Ruthenia. According to this proposal, IS1ovakta should have
had her own 'Diet as a national legislative ,b ody and a governor as chief of the land executiive.
The iDiet would have lbeen competent to enact laws concerning [anguage, education, religion, municipal, and district administration and justice as well as other matters
whioh the laws of the Central ,Parliament would comer wpon
it. Laws enacted by the &lt;Diet of Slovakia and .si:gned by the
1

�SLOVAKIA

13

President of the Republic would ibe promulgated, under sigruature of the gavemor, in a sipecial col1ection of laiws for
Slova:kia. Although presented in due form, this proposal
was never discussed in the Parliament.
Octdber 16, 1932, the Slovak People's Party of Andrew
H!linika and the Slova!k National Party of M. Ra;zus (a small
traditionailist &lt;Protestant party) having joined in an agreement a;b,out the necessity of autonomy for Slovakia,
stressed their detemnination to pursue the fight for Slovakia's national rights, "even ,t houg,h it may ,bring the disintegration of &gt;the Ozecho..,Slov,a;k Republic."
Fol1.owing the resignation of T. G. Masaryk as President of the Repulblic, E. Benes became 1a candidate in Deceimber 19315 for that office. After some consultations, the
Slovak People's Party end!orsed his election, stiipwlating,
however, that a ,pol,icy of national equality between the
Czechs and the 1Slava:kis should ibe inaugrnrated by the President aind a law concerning 'Slovak~a's autonomy ,be promulgated in one year. Nevertheless, it was two years later
before the Prague Government was ready to, consider the
Sl()IVruk prdblem and this ooourred in connection wit!h the
Sudeto·- German claims for nation,a,1 rights within the Republic.
This nationality group had been integrated into CzechoSlovakia in spite of their protest. -Since the very foTlffiation
of Czecho,..,Sl'ovakia, the German minority had been soliciting a form of cultural autonomy in the schools, local administration, and in the courts. Later on they asked for
a better economic amd social &lt;poll.icy in the German areas
suffering from unemployment. For a long time, Prague
did not lristen to such :voices. But with Hitler's accession in
Gennany, the Sudeto-Germans recei;ved the !backing of the
'I1hl1rd Reich. Consequent11 theiT claims increased at the
same time as their courage. In 1935 the ,Sudeto-German
P,a rty, with 44 deputies, lbeoame the second ,g reatest party
in the Repuiblic. The (P,raigue Goverll!!Ilent, not willing to ~ppear as acting under foreign pressure, remained reluctant.
T.he stiffer the Czecho..jSlovak Government 1becaime, the more
Hitler determined to annihilate Czecho ... Slovakia.

�14

SLOVAKIA

PairalJel to this evolution was Sfovrukia's struggle for
its own rrights. JU/Ile 5, 1938, a third projed concerning the
federalization of the Repulblic was pU!blished lby the SlovaJk
People's Party, a!lld presented to the Central Government.
It was only one week !before the, Munich Conference, 1Septem'be:r 22, 1'938, that E . Benes sent a counteriproject to the
Praesidium of the Sllovaik ,People's Barty.
Shortly after, the conflict :betiween Prague and: the Sudeto-Ge:rrmans was resolrved in Munich, where, on the basis
of Lord Rundman's rrecommendation, the Sudetenl:and went
to Germany.
This decision created for ISlovaikia a new situation. As
a consequence of a policy in whioh she had praotically no
share, Sllovrukia was ,a lso to surrender in favor Olf ifllUJilgary
her Southern !boundary ·zone, ,s ettled mostly ,b y Magyar population. This was a psychdlo,gical blow which brought an
agreement among all Slova!k ,political parties, except for
the Communist, Social-Democrat and minority parties, rubout
Slovakia's autonomy. Thus on October 6, 1938, one day
after the resignation of ,E . Benes, six ipolitica,,l parties of
SlovaJkia, representing 36 out of 58 deputies, puiblished a
dedarration in which they agreed that the third project of
constitutional reform shO'llld be immediat~ly put in practice
and l8Jil autonomous gorverrnment for Slovakia 1b e appointed
,u nder the chairmanship of iDr. Joseph Tiso.
1

November 2, 1938, lby the ar,bi,tration of Ciano and Von
Ribbentrop in Vienna, 10,309 .s quare kilometers with ·853,670
inhafbitants were to .b,e ceded by :Slovakia to Hungary. This
included 503,980 'Magyars and 272,145 Slovaks. ISfovakia
saw that she was becoming a viotim of an international
po1itica1 game ,w ithout aniy faJllJlt of her own. The Vienna
decision proved the futility of the fomner party dirvisions
and produced ra n integrating effect upon the Slo:va;k politica:l
spectrum. Parties which had signed rt.he Declaration of Zilina on October 6, agreed on NovembeT 10, 1938, on the
formation of a common party !known henceforth as the
Party of National Unity.
This political evolution in 1Slovrukia was f:inal:ly sanctioned by the Ozech and Slovak representatives irn the

�15

SLOVAKIA

Prague Parliament on No-vemlber 19, 193'8. Then, by a constitutionall ,amendiment, Ozecho-Slovrukia became a federation of Bohemi!a-&lt;Maravfa, !Slovakia and! Oa:rpathian Ukraine
(,Ruthenia). Burt the relations between Prague and the Slova:k Government remained tenJSe, because of 9,000 Czech
officia1s who 1Were removed lby the Slovak Goivernment, and
the share of Slovakia in the income and expense, orf the
common &lt;budget.
FOREIGN ,R ELATIONS
Beforre Munich
The principal aim of Ozecho-Slovakia's foreign policy
was the preserivation of the status quo as estaJblished by

the 19~9 peace settlements, and the estaJblishment of friend-ly relations with all her neighlbors through ,a n exten1Sive
system of adequate agreements. Eduard Benes, Minister of
Foreign Affairs until 11936 and 1ater 1P resident of the Repulblic, was the girniding sipiirit of this policy.
A solid :f oundation for rthe, presewation .o f the status
quo in cenibral Europe was laid !by the CTeation of the Little
Entente formed by Ozecho-Sfoivakia, Yugos1a;vfa and Rumania, and three victorious Danulbian states bordering on
vanquished Austda and Hungary.
Ozecho-1Slovalda was ·a n enthusiastic supporter of the
League of Nations and colktJborated ,w holeiheartedly in the
negotiations which brought Germany and the ,Soiviet Union
into the League.
When Hitler came to power in 1933, Ozecho-iSlovakia's
foreign relations entered into a critical phase and two
ye31rs of vi,r,uJent Nazi pro,paganda among the Sudeten Germans !bore frwt in the results of the 1935 elections. The
NaJZi..sponsored :Sudetendeutsche IPartei poiiled over 62 per
cent of the total Ge1riman vote and c01Wed the smaller German parties .i nto submission.
1

Later .on, acting on instructioillS from iBer,Hn, the &lt;leaders od: the Sudeten German movement put fomvard demands
which no Czecho-S1,orva'k 1g overnment •c ould a·c cept and, with
the anne:,ration of Austria, the srtage was set for final action.
De.seprately anxious to avert a new war, France and

�16

SLOVAKIA

Great Britain proposed to Czecho-Slovakia that she should
cede to Germany all areas with a German majority. When
Ozecho--srtovakia demwred, she was informed that she must
ae&lt;!ept the proposal or bear the conisequences alone. The result was tihat the Czechs gave in and at Munich their
country was di vided on the lines dictated by Hitler.
1

After Munich
After MU1J1ioh, Czecho-.Slova:kia tried to adjust itself to
the new situation. President Benes resigned and left the
country. He was succeeded 1b y Emil Hacha, an eldeI1ly and
experienced jurist with no politioa1 affiliations, who believed that close cooperation with the Third Reich was the
country's only hope of sur:vival.
The tra,nsition to Hitler's New Order was swift. Obnoxious parties were dissolived and the Government was
given wide power,s to govern by decree. The ,administration
was purged, the 1press put under rigorous control and antiSemitic measures were ena,cted.
The situation in central Europe after Mlliilloh became
even more confused. Germany began to remind the Bohemian puibLic of the role the Kingdom of Bohemia had played
within the Holy Roman Empire. !Hungary started to speak
about her histor,i,cal boundaries and the necessity of a common frontier with Poland. According to the Nuremberg
documents, Hitler 1at that time. had already decided to destroy Czecho-Slovakia. But there was apparently no definite decision o.n S1ova:kia as to wihether to place it under German OCOU1pation or to ha;ve it occU1pied by Hungary. In this
situation, the Slovak GOIVernment had only one preoccupation: to preserve what unity had remained of Sloviakia after the Vienna a11bitration and to avoid:, as far as possible,
direct domination lby a:ny of her neighbors.
On Ma11ch 10, 1969, the Prague Government dismissed
the government of Dr. Joseph Tiso and proclaimed martial
law in 'Slovakia. The Slova!k people considered this a violation
of agreements that had /been si,gned ~tween Prague and
Bratislaiva and incorporated into the Constitution. Puibl~c
demonstrations spread throll!g.hout 'Slova:kia.
Invited to a consultation by Hitler in Berlin, Dr. Joseph

�SLOVAKIA

17

Tiso, the dismissed chairman of the Slov,ak Gooernment
was shown a telegram by Von Ribbentrop, according to
which HUIIlgary iwas ready to occupy Slova,kia. Hlitler then
suggested that this eventuality may be prevented by the
declaration of 1Slovakia's independence. Consequently, Dr.
Tiso returned to Bratisl,aiva where, om March 14, 1939, following his report, the IS'lovak Diet proclaimed independence.
President Hacha was then summoned to Berlin and presented with an ultimatum aiming at the i.mJpos.ition of a
protectorate upon Bohemia-Moravia. Forced into submission, the Presiderut ,s igned ,a declruration by w1hich he "ip1aced
the destiny of the Czech people and country with confidence in the 'hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich."
German troo1ps marched into Bohemia and from Prague
(March 16) Hitler issued the proclamation establishing the
"Protectorate of Bohemia-Mora'Via."
Thereafter, Hungary annexed Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Czecho-SlovaJkia was dead.

The Establishment of the Slovak Republic
Even though the Slovak state was largely the result
of a tense international situation, it nevertheless co.rresponded to· the aspirations of the Slovak ~ple for freedom
and the principle of self-determination a,nd seltf-1govern.ment.
After Munich, central EUTotpe became a part of the German
orbit. Therefore, in oroer to. d.~scourage Hungary in her
armed attack launched against Eastern Slovakia, the Slovak Government concluded •w ith Germany a treaty of protection, March 23, 1939, by which the &lt;Reich assured the existence of Sloiva;kia without destroying its .national pe,r sonality. In exchange, S1ova:kia ha,d to, follow the German line
in foreign policy.
Altogether, 2:l states. reoogniiized the international .i ndividuality of Slovaikia. Besides the countries which were
later to become members of the Axis, S~ovaikia was recognized by the Holy See, the -Soviet Union, iSpain, 1Switzedand,
Sweden, Grea,t Britain (de facto) , France (de facto), Liberia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador.
According to the constitution voted on July 21, 1939,

�18

SLOVAKIA

SlovaJkiia became a Repulblic with a Parliament of 80 members and a Government of nine.
The constitution contained princi!pleis, which in some
aspects combined features of the liberal staite, the Christian democracy, and the authoritarian state,. In the beginning all poweT of the 'Slova:k Reipu'blic was vested in the
Parliiamenrt !but later on, in 19·41, after Slovakia had entered
the war against the S'Oviet Union, the executive was to prevail over the legislature.
The numlber of political parties was reduced. The Communist and the :Social il)emocrat pa·r ties, representing only
ten deputies, had been 1s uppressed as suJbversive, in October
1938. Six other parties merged mto the Slov,ak Unity Party, the baokibone of the ipolitcal system of the SLovak state,
and tlhere were two minority parties: German and Magyar.
The SlOIVaJk state was far froon being a perfect democracy in the trarlitional sense. R reflected a compromise
between the past and the present, between an old tradition
and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central Europe. lBut, in ,general, it was an expression of the
se'Lf-q&gt;reservation instinct of the 1SlO'Vak nation.
The Sloviruk Government, in 1941, joined Gernnany, with
two armored dirvisions, in :the war against the Soviet Union.
Although on [)ecemlber 1:2, 1941, the Slovak Press Bureau
had pulb'lished an anno'UIIlcement that the ISlovia;k Repulblic
was in a state of war with the United !States and Great Britain, neither the President nO'r the tS lovak Pa:rliament or
Government ever made such a decision or declaration. In
fact, the Sl01Vruk forces, during the Second World War, did
not engage in comlbat against any of the Western Powers.
1

World War B and the Restoration of Czecho-Slovakia
Czechs in the protectorate of Bohemia-Morawa ,w ere
not directly iDJVolved in the •S econd World War. They were
exempt from militaJry service hut had to work for the German war machine. Though their contribution in the fight
for freedom was not Sipectacular, thousands of Czech patriots ipaid with their live'S for their efforts to 1keep the flame
of freedom fHalrering.
After Munich, many Czechs and SlovaJks left the coun-

�SLOVAKIA

19

try and established themsel,ves talbroad, mostly in Paris and
London, which became the cenrters of their political activities.
Headed by Eduaxd Benes, these emigres set urp a National Committee to taJke up the struggle for the restoration
of a free Czecho-iSlovakia.
The committee was recognized first as the provisional
and eventwall.'y as the regulaT Government of Czecho-Sloviakia, by Great Britain and, later, iby the United !S tates and
the Soviet Union. Czecho-'Sl01Vaikia was thus given the status of an allied state under foreign ocoupation. The Munich
agreement was declared null and void and Czecho-.Slova.kia's
original frontiein; were guaranteed.
While the C!zecho-.Slovak GQI\Ternment-ii.n-exile was primarily concerned with the consolidation of the international
position of the Republic, the Czecho-Sfovak Communist
leaders in Moscow were com1pleting their plan for immediately seizing power after the li/beration. Moscow knew precisely what Ozecho-Slovalkia's &lt;international .p osition would
be once the Red army was stationed within the ter.ritory
and was concerned on:ly with tadica:l movements aimed at
bringing ahout a speedy sovietfomtion of the country.
Toward the end of 1943, E. Benes went to Mosco.w
where, on Decembe:r 12, 1943, he signed with Stalin a treaty
of alliance, friendship, and mutual help between the Soviet
Union and Czecho-Slovakia. tBy this treaty, the ·S oviet
Uruon was to approach Ozecho-1Slova1kia after the end of
the war as an ally.
No. such treaty having been &lt;:oncluded. with the Western Powers, the influence of Moscow on the future of emergent Ozecho-Slovakia became predominant. In Soviet tactics, this treaty was to create a favora!ble atmosphere in
Bohemia-lMo:ravia fm: tbe idea of a Soviet ·l iberation.
During his visit in Moscow, E. Benes came to a,n agreement with K. Gottwald, the ex,iled chief of the Czech Communist Party, aJbouit the main prindples upon which the
edifice of the future Ozecho-,Slovakia wouJd rely: (1) The
state admin.stration 'wouJld be repla&lt;:ed by "natio,n_aa committees" (IS01Viet.s); (2) the .fOI1II1er right-of--center parties
would 1b e eliiminaited; (3) the non-Communist parties in ire-

�20

SLOVAKIA

,s tored Ozecho ..Slovak,ia would form ,w ith the Communists a
"government of National 1F ront"; (4) "people's courts"
would lbe established to eliminate all war criminals. These
principles with an extensive inter,pretation and -aipplication
of ipoints (2) and ( 4) and the nationali2ation of indiustcy
were to, lay the fou:ndaitions for a "People's !Democracy" in
Czecho-1Slovakia.
In Slov:alkia, the treaty of friendship , mutual help, and
coJ1aboration with the Soviet Union iProduced a stimulating
effect upon the Commun1st .and Social Democrat undergroUIIlds and also on a group of lilberals whose imaigiination,
with respect to central Europe, was tempted more lb y the
absent Soviet Union than 'by the present Germany.
These ,groll!ps met secretly on Christmas 1943 in Bratislava and signed what is known as the "ChristJmas agreement." In this declaration they reaffirmed their will to
work for the restoration of "Ozecho·-IS1ov•a kia," for a Illarrow collalboration with the iSov.ieit Union in the field of foreign policy, for the estaiblishment of political justice and
for the continuation oif resistance against the Germans and
the Slovak Government.

:FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL GALAYDA,
AMERICAN CITIZEN FROM HAZLETON, PA.
Mr. McTigue. The Russians deported to Russia the
teachers and iwell-educated ,peoip le?
Mr. G alayda. Yes, t eachers and educated people.
Mr. McTigue. And you were in Slova:kia while this was
going on; is that correct?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. :McTigue. Now, while these deportations were going
on did you then endeavor to get a visa o.ut ·o f the country ?
Mr. GaJayda. I :tried a couple of times but it was impossible at that time. I was put in ja•il two tim es.
Mr. tM cTigue. Who puit you in jail?
Mr . Galayda. The Ozecho-Sloivak Army. They asked me
to fight ,a gainst the Germans. I ref,u:sed. I said, "I am an
American citizen and I refuse to serve in the Czec,ho..,Slovaik
Army."

�SLOVAKIA

21

!Mr. (McTigue. 1S0, you were put in jail because. you refused to serve?
Mr. Galayda. Yes, thaJt's right.
MT. !MoTigue. Now, when was t1he second time you were
put in jail?
Mr. Galayda. Wel1, the second time was in 1946.
Mr. Mc'Digue. iBy the Communists?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Why?
Mr. Galayda. Well, because I was campaigning against
communism.
Mr. McT,i gue. You were making taiks against communism?
Mir. Ga1ayda. Yes, I made ,a couple speeches in the villages against communi sm. That is why I was jailed.
'M r. iMcTigue. Noiw, in 1'94fi, at the end of the war, did
you try to get a Un~ted States passport?
Mir. Galayda. Yes, I did.
Mr. McTiig ue To return to the United States?
Mr. Galayda. Yes. [n 1945, when the war was 0 1ver, me
and my brothers decided to Oeaive, because at that time the
United States was ,stil'l fighting with the Japanese. So we
decided to leave and join the American Army.
Mr. iMcTigue. iDecided to come home?
Mr. Galayda. Yes. We went to the American cons,ul in
Prague. He refused. He saiid, "You have to get your passport
finst, then you can join American Army." So ,J came home.
Mir. McTigue. How did you go about gettiing your passpont?
Mr. Galadya. Well, we went to Hungary. On the way
from Budapest to Bratislava - weH, i will tell you something 3:borut the !Russian s-oldd.ers, what they did.
Mr. McTigue. Yes, I wish you woiuld. This is while you
are taiking the train to 'Bratislava?
Mr. Galayda Yes. 'l never am going to forget that time
what happened.
Mr. McTigue. You are on the train now?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mir. McTigue. Is this what you are describing?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
1

1

�22

SLOVAKIA

Mir. McTigue. And you rure en route to Prague lby way
of Budapest and Bratislava?
Mr. Galayda. The Russians pulled the emergency brake.
They had guns; they took the money frOirn .the ipoople, and
in every coach was one soldier. He had a gun. They robbed
the people. They ta!ke everything. Then I heard some
screaming, a girl, a couple of giTls started screaming. I
know that. I remember that. And I don't know what happened because 1I didn't see because in every coach was one
soldier and we can't move.
Mr. McTigue. And they -to ok the girls off the tra,i n ?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. How long did they hold the train up?
Mr. Gailay&lt;la. Oh, Irt was, I think, at least one hour.
Mr. Boll!in. One hour.
Mr. :Mc'I'igue. And everybody on the train ·w as relieved
of his valualbles, jewelry, money?
Mr. Galaiyda. They took everything.
Mr. McTigue. Now, what !hia:ppened when you finally
reached .Prague ?
Mr. Galayda. Well, when I reached the Prague, liike I
said, I went to the American consul. I itold hd.m I ,wanted to
join the American Army. H~ said, "!No. You have to get
your Arnevican ,p assport first." So then I came home.
Mr. McTigue. You came home to Slovakia?
Mr. Galadya. Yes. I came baok home. Then I start
speruking agafast communism.
Mr. Mc'lligue. You started writing against communism ;
you made some speeches against communism?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. ls that correct?
Mr. Bonin. Now, did any,body ma!ke any complaint rubout
theiir activities, itaking this property aJway from them?
Mr. Ga1ayd:a. No, 'alt that time it rwaiS impossible to say
something.
iMr. Bonin. You had nobody to turn to to even make a
Mr. Galayda. No.
complaint?
Mr. Bonin. If you did ma!ke a compla int you would probably ·b e arre&amp;t ed ?
1

1

�SLOVAKIA

23

Mr. Galayda. Then yOl\l are sent ito Russia.
Mr. Bonin. In other wocds, tllere was a c0111Stant fear
in the minds of the peoiple that they would go to a concentration camp?
Mr. Galayda. Yes, that's tight.
Mrr. Bonin. Into 'Si-ber-ia?
Mr. Ga:layda. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. Which, of course, is nothing ito .p leasant to
M1ybody living ·b ehind the Iron Curtain?
Mr. Gafayda. No, I don't think so.
Mr. Bonin. You were very happy to get ou:t of there?
Mr. Galayda. Yes,. The Communist Party is no good for
this world; a!bsoI1U1telly no good. Becaiuse ,I was over there -and
I lb.ave experience: ,I lived in Czecho-lS1ovakia for 20 years,
and I know. They iaire no good in this world.
Mr. Bonin. They are no good for this world. Well, do
you have any moos-a ge to tell ,to the people of the United
States who may feel that communism is a good system of
government?
Mr. Galayda. Well, there is one thing I can say, and that
is the American ,p eople should be proud of what they have,
freedom of speech and everything They should ibe ,p roud o.f
what they have.
Mr. Bomn. ls, it-here any freedom of religion under the
Communists?
iMr. Galayda. No.
Mir. Bonoin. Is there Mly freedom iof the press?
Mr. Galayda. No.
Mr. Bonin. Is there any freedom of assembly?
Mr. Galayda . No.
Mr. Bonin. Is there any freedom to use radio and teleMr. Galayda. No.
visi'o n as we do !ill America here.?
Mr. Bonin. [t i,s a ,pretty lblack picture, this lirving behind t.he Iron Curtain; isn't iit?
Mir. Galayda. That's ~ight.
(Wilkes-Barre, Pa., ISeptemiber 30, 1954).

FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MR. SMREKOVSKY
MT. McTigue. You came to this country in 1928; is that
correct?
Mr. Smrekiovsky. 1928 is correct.
Mr. MoTigue. And did you become a:n American citizen
at that time?

�2-l

SLOVAKIA

Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes, sir, after being five years in this
country.
Mr. McTi!gue. I under,stand that you returned to Slovakfa in 1939; is that cor.root?
Mr. 1Smrekovgky_ 1939; yes.
Mr. !l\foTigue. What iwas the purpose for returning to
Slova·k ia at that time?
Mr. Smrekovsky. To. visit my father because he was
reaching 90 rund wrote me that he was i'll; so I wanted to
visit him and see him.
Mr. Mc'figue. Now, did you return to Slovakia before
the 'Outlbreak oif wa;r between Germa;ny a.ind Polamd?
Mr. 1Sm.rekovsky. Yes. We had a little difficll'l,ty crossing
t:he ·Polish boroer, lbut ,that didn't amount to much.
Mr . .McTigiue. Noiw, at thait time, conditions were good
in ,Slovakia; is that correct?
Mr. Smreko'V'sky. Yes, they were.
Mr. Mc'figue. There wasn't any difficulty as far as
Mr. ,S mrekovs,k y. We didn't .know anything about wa:r
then.
Mr. McTigue. There was ,c omplete fu-eedom of ithe
Mr. ISm.rekovsky. Yes.
press...
Mr. McTigue. Freedom of ireligion . . .
Mr. 1Smerkovsky. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. And freedom of assembly
Mr. Smerkov:sky. Yes.
iMr. iMcTigue. Hoiw long did you stay in 1Slovakia?
Mr. 1Smrekovsky. 1Seven years.
Mr. McTigue. Then you were there at the time the Rus1M r. !Smrekov.s ky. Ye·s, I was.
sians C'aime into 1Slovaikia?
Mrr. Mc'figue. What - or, w:hen did you first come .in
contact with the Commun.ists?
Mr. Smrekovsky. After the German Army was defeated,
they started to drop parachutists to organize Communist
bands to pers.e cute and rob middle class and decent people.
1M r. Mc'.Dig,ue. Noiw, did this haJppen in 1944?
Mr. IS mrekovs.ky. Yes.
lMr. Mcrrigue. And thls i1s the Communist-inspir ed uprising that you are talk,i ng a:bout.

�SLOVAKIA

25

Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes.
Mr. McTi,g ue And in the community where you were
liviing rthey had parachuted agents into the community to organi1ze Communist bands in order to continue the uprising?
Mr. Smreko,v,s ky. That's right.
Mr. McTi'gue. And bring it to a successful conclusion, if
necessary?
!Mr. ISmrekovsky. Yes, and spread commurnsm at the
same time.
Mr. Mc'I'igue. Now, can you teH us some of the things
you wit:ne.ssed, yourself, during the course of this Communist-inspired uprising?
Mr. Smrekovsky. I remember a family cruptured by the
OommUIIllists. There were five memlbers in the fami'ly, a twoyear-old giirl, there was another bigger girl, a son-in-laiw, a,n
old man, and his wife. They were dragged to the edge of
the forest and shot from ithe back. Then they dug a hole for
them and buried them.
Mr. Bonin. Mr. Counsel, I just want to interrupt here.
We hea.ird testimony .b efore from different witnesses when stating that ithey were shot in the back, do you mean
that the . . .
Mr. Smrekoivsky. They start •t o run.
Mr. Bonin. They ,s tarted to run?
Mr. Smrekovsky. They started to run and they shot
them from the back.
iMr. Bonin. And they shot tlhem firom the bru~k whiie
they were trying to get away from them?
Mr. 1Smrekovsky. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. Now, they were agents of the Russian Government - that were doing that?
Mr. Smrekovs:ky. Exactly.
Mr. Bonin. .A!nd were they armed, these people that were
shot, or were they with01Ut a,r,ms?
Mr. IS mrekovsky. They were without arms.
Mir. Bonin. They were without arms?
Mr. '.Smrekovsky. Without arr-ms, innocent people.
Mr. Bonin. But, nevertheless, they were all .s hot in the
baC'k, the one two years of a,ge, four years of age, the two
larger ones, the son-in...,Jaw, and the father?
1

1

�26

SLOVAKIA

,M r. Smrekovsky. And the mother, too. Five persons.

Mr. Bonin. Five persons? Now, you say that they were
tossed in •a mass grave; is that correct?
Mr. Smrekovsky. That's right.
Mr. Bonin. They were a:11 placed in the same g:raJVe?
MT. 1Smrekovsky. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. Was there any re1iigious burirul service involrved?
MT. Smrekovsky. No, sir. No, sir. They just buried them
there like any criminals. It ha:ppened around Oot:ctber, and
during tJhe winter they dug them out and :p ut them in the
cemetery, in the corner of the cemetery, where they are
Mr. Bonin. Continue Mr. Counsel.
sti1l buried.
'Mr. IMcTiigue. Now, after the Communists had occuipied
Slovwkia, did there come a time when you were put in
jail your1self?
1Mr. Smreikovsky. Yes. r:r was there 14 days.
Mr. Mcfl'igue. Why?
Mir. 1Smrekovsky. Of course, they had no reason. They
wanted to get rid of the middle-class people. My ·brother-4nlaw and a friend of mine were an-ested. Finally, my wife
went to the authorities &lt;a!Ild they let me free after 14 days.
Mr. McTigue. What happened to your brother-in~law?
Mr. 1Smrekovsky. Well, he was jailed also, hut they released him.
Mr. Mc'I'igue. But there were others whom they didn't
Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes.
,r elease?
~fr. lMc'l'igue. You know that of your own personal
Mr. 'Sm~kOIV'sky. Yes.
knowledge?
Mr. Mc'.Digue. They were friends of yours?
Mr. 'Smrekov,s ky. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Leading people in the community?
•M r. Smrekovsky. Yes.
Mr. Smrekov,s ky. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Priests?
Mr. Smrekovsky. That's right.
Mr. McTigue. Nuns?
of different rel,i gious faiths?
people
And
lMcTigu.e.
Mr.
Mr. SmTekovsky. Yes.
MT McTigue.·· Now, when did you and how did you get
back to the United States?

�SLOVAKIA

27

Mr. SmrekoV!Siky. As soon as the American constcl came
to Prague, I a,pplied for visa to the United States, and as
soon as my transportation was ready I lef.t and came to the
United States, first of Octolber 1946. I left my we there
for three years until I could bring her 'O'Ver.
Mr. iMcTigue. Now, at the time you le.flt you awned some
Mr. Smrelwvsky. Yes.
·
property; didn't you?
Mr. iMcTigue. What lhaippened to that iproperty af.ter
you left? .
Mr. Smrekovsky. Well, that was a1l confiscated. My
wife had to sign a statement tha,t it's gi;ven to ,the Govem.ment. And every'body ,w ho wamts to come to America had to
do that. Otherwise she would't get a !Visa.
The Chairman. That is a method of highway robbery that
they hold against somebody that wants to migraJte from one
country to. another?
Mr. S'mrekovsky. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bonin. They compel them to transfer their i)roperty
to the Government.
(Wil:kes-iBarre, Pa., September 30, 1954).

a

FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MRS. SMREKOVSKY

iMr. McTigue. When yoUJr husband left Slova!kia in 1946
to come to the Untted States, he left you in Slovakia; is
(Mrs. Smrekovsky. Yes.
that correct.
Mr. iMcTigue. And at the time he left you in 1946 you
had under yourr care the property which you both owned; is
Mrs. :SmrekoV'Slky. Yes.
thaJt correct?
Mr. McTigue. rNow, when your husband left and you had
the ipropeirty under your management, what experience did
you have with the Communists?
Mrs. Smrekovsky. Very ibad.
Mr. McTigue. Did they make efforts to frig,hten you in
--any way so that you would give your property ;to them?
Mrs. Sinreko1Vsky. ThaJt was the only hope to come to
this country, unless if agreed that the property is transferred to the Government.
Mr. McTigue. So until you signed over your property to

�28

SLOVAKIA

the Government you 'had no chance of leaving Slovakia; is
!Mrs. 1Smrekovsky. Yes.
that correct?
MT. iMcTigue. iln it.he meantime, while you were still
there, in 1946 and b,efore you left the country, were your
friends mistreated by the Comrnurusts? Were any of yoll'I'
close friends that you harve personal ikno,w ledge of mistreated
in any way by the Communists?
!Mrs. Smrekorvsky. In my hometown there were shot or
massacred four 1people while I was wiith my ,p arents - there
was a senator, a notary public, a mayo.r , and a foo-ester. DuTing the night, in theilr ntght clothes, they loaded them UJp in
one truck rund took them away.
Mr. McTigue. What was their crime? Why were they
shot?
Mrs. Smrekovsky. Because they were not Communists
and they never a:gireed with the Comml.llilists.
MT. Bonin. Oongressman Feighan. Just a minute. In
other words, even though the Communists ,have been in Slo1Mrs.
Smre~ovsky. Yes.
va:kia since 1945 . . .
Mir. Bonin. StiM your relatives ·a nd friends have not beMrs. Smrekovsky. Right.
come Communists?
Mr. Bonin. They still belie·v e in ,t he religion and the freedom of religion that they had before?.
Mrs. Smrekovsky. And they hope they wihl be £.reed and
live again like decent people.
MT. Bonin. In other words, regardless of how long the
Communists may dominate Slorvrukia, there is still that desire for freedom on theiiT prurt and to live as they used to
prior to the Communist regime that has been imposed upon
Mrs. Smrekovsky. Yes, sir.
them?
Mr. Bonin. Now, I understand that t:hese four influential 1poople, a senator, a mayor, a t:imiber man and a notary
public, were also shot because rthey failed to accept communism and to lead the people through Communist doctrines and
princilples under the domination of the Russian system?
Mrs. Smrekorvsky. Right.
Mr. Bottin. That is the type of freedom thaJt is being
sold to the ,people behind the lTOn Currtain?
Mrs. -Smrekovsky. Yes, sir.

�SLOVAKIA

29

MT. Bonin. Force, threats, violence, and intimidation, in
order to constantly keep them in fear of whait is apt to happen to them?
1M rs. Smrekovsky. Exactly.
Mr. Bonin. Now, your wifo came out of Czecho-iSliovrukia
in 1'9 49; ts thart: correct?
Mr. IS mrekovsky. Yes, sirr.
Mr. !Bonin. And the principal reason ,w hy you aTe testifying under an assumed name is lbecaUJSe you are fearrful of
what might haJppen to your relaUves and ,t he friends. that
you ,s till 1haJVe in 1s1ova~ia?
Mr. Srnrekovsky. Exactly.
(WiJJkes-iBarre, Pa., ,September 30, 1954).

FROM THE TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH PAU00

Mr. McTigue. 1Mr. Pall'co, where are you living at the
present ,t ime? - - - Dr. Pauco. ln Middletown, Pa.
Mr. McTigue. H ow are yiou employed?
Dr. Pa:ll!co. I am assistant editor of the Slova.k weekly,
Jednota.
Mr. McTigue. Mir. !PauJco, I understand that you were
born in Slovakia, is that correct.
Dr. PaU!co. Yes; that is true.
Mr. ,M cTigue. What part of Slovakia?
Dr. Pauco. In ceilltraJl Slovakia.
Mr. McTigue. Central ISlovaJkia. And it's my understanding that you spent most of your adult life as a journalist; is
that coTrect?
[)r. ,Pawc'O. Yes; that is correct, sir.
Mr. McTi:gue. W1hiile yiou were in Slova!kia, it is also my
understanding that in yiour capacity as -a journa:list, you had
the occasion to witness the Communist~in,s;pired uprising in
1944; is that correct?
Dr. Pa'Ulco. Yes, that's true.
Mr. Mc'lligue. And were, you also present at the uncovering of the mass graves at Vinnitsia in the Ukraine?
Dr. Pauico. Yes; that's right.
Mr. McTigue . . How d!id you happen to be there?
Dr. 1Pau'co. I was a member of a journalist expedition in
July 1943 It wa:s an e~pedition of all journalists firom cen.trrul Europe. I came to Vmnitsia in July 1943 and I wais there
four days. In those four days I saw five ,o.r six maSIS grarves
of the Ukrainian people and some Polish people, who were

�30

SLOVAKIA

murdered by the ,Soviets. An eX!planation was girven to us
by the Geamam.. dootors that these people were shot between
1939 and 1941.
I spoke with the local people, Ukrainia:n and Polish people, some dozens of these people, because we were allowed
to spealk to those people - a,t the mass graves there in Vinnitsia, in the town of Vinnitsia. For example, I was shaved
twice in a local lba'.l'bershop, and I spoke to these men and
with some. other people ,i n Vinnitsi,a. A concert was gurven
in t'he town of Vinnitsia in honor of ,t he journaliSll:s' e,q;&gt;edition, and after this concert, I spoke with several men and
women, and all these Ukrairuian people trul'ked to me. They
said what I saiw there in mass graJVes is true, and that their
relaitirves were shot by the Soviets between 1939 and 1941,
after the occupation of west Uikra,inia in 1939. Some people
of Ukrainian nationality known as strong anti-Communists
were deported in the Illight. And late,r , at the begmning of the
wa:r !between 1Sovieit Russia and Germany, deporta:tion was in
~eat masses. Nob,ody ,w as sure that hls, relatives, hrusbands,
sons, or some other of the family, wilhl not be shot in the
night. I have in my memory six ox seven cases of the wives
and daughters of the shot fathers and brothers, who told
me their relatives were deported in the night. The people
knew nothing. Their husbands and fathers were sent to Siberia or probably shot.
Mir. McTigu:e. How many people were killed
Dr. Pauco. Several 'hundred.
iMr. McTigue. At Vinnitsia?
Dr. Pau'co. 1Severrul hundred. I was at the graves four
days and I spoke with several dozens of Ukrainian women,
and, I learned, several ·hundred were buried in these mass
grarves.
iMr. McTigue. In these mass grarves that you knew
about?
Dr. ·P auco. Yes; in Vinniitsi.a.
Mr. McTigue. Yes. But there were other mass graves
disc01Vered later on; is that correct?
Dr. Pau'CO. I heard about it. I know a;bout Katyn, but I
wasn't there. ,I was in Vinnitsia and I can state only what l
saw at these mass graves. I have here a statement of what

�SLOVAKIA

:n

I saJW at these mass graves.
Mr. McTigue. iMay I suggest, Mir. Chairman, since we
hawe other testimony that we want to develop, and since we
haJVe other witnesses, t:ha.t we admit this statement into the
reoord, but not have it read at this time?
Dr. Paulco. All right.
Mr. ,McTig;ue. IMaJke it a ,p art of the reoord.
Mr. !Bo:nin. Woll!ld you have any objection if we make
this staitement a part of the record at this time and you g;ilVe
us the highlights of it as of thJis moment?
Dr. PaUlc&lt;&gt;. All right.
Mr. Bonin. Without oibjootion, we will take the statement and place it in the committee files.
Mr. iMcTigue. You may recall, Mr. Chairman, tllait we
had testimony at our hearings in Munich on the Vinnd.tsia
murders very much ,a long the same 1ines Mr. Paruoo is testifying. This testimony that he has given today on the subject of the Vin.nlitsi.ai massacre eertainlly corroibo,rates wha,t we
hea.Td from many ,wiit:nesses in Munich. You aJlso recall in
connection with that testimony that one of ibhe witnesses
descri1bed the finding of hundreds of bod!ies of Vinnitsi:a \'i,ctims under the floor of a d'ance hall in one of the amusement •pariks iw:hen these mass graves were investig;ated. iI am
sure you recall thait testimony.
Mr. Bonin. Yes. I distinctly recall that, a'lld this corroborates the faot tJhat these mass graves and the mass kfiling of citizens of Vinnirtsia was deli;b erate and ,pe~trated
entirely by ,t he Communist regime in Russia.
Now, I understand, Mr. Pauioo., that you have some addition.al testimony suipplementing what 1happene:d in V!innitsia aind what took ,p lace in 'Slov,aikia; is that C()lrrect?
Dr. PaU!co. Yes. I woltld iiJke to say thiat the same thing
that h~ppened in Vinnitsia in 1939-41 happened in Slovakia in lr944. The Sovli.ets' s~hool oif prurtisans were parachuted
in the s,prmg of 1'94'4 in the mou:nrtains of Slorvaki1a, and then
in August 1'9414 they orga.ruzed a so-calil ed uprising against
the SlovaJk Government a'lld shot hundredlS and thousands of
Slovaks of anti..Communist feeling. Im Slova1ci(a, we had at
this time, 1944, several mass graves of innocent Slovak ciiti-

�32

SLOVAKIA

zens, Slova.ik ainti-Oommunist patriots. The Communist part~,s ans ,w ere 1pariachUJted, as I mentioned, by the Soviets, and
the partisans were also furnh,,hed Soviiet ammunition. This
so-called upris,i ng in 1Slov-akia started with prepairations in
194'3. Some so.-,called underground politicians made an 8.'greement with the Communist leader, Karol Schmidke. And
this Karol ;Schmidke saiid in 1946 that this action in 1943,
this preparation of the uprising, was the merit o;f the illegal
Communist Party. All the people who declined to collaborate
with the Communist ieaders in 1944 were shot. Thiiis happened in central 1Slova.ikia because central Slovakia is a
mountainous land. Then the German armies came to S1ova-kia and :Slorvak ter:nitory was a battlefield. After this Communist uprising in ,Slovrukia, I heard f.rom my friends, from
my relatives in ISJ.ovakria thrut many innocent ,p eople, farmers, ,w orkei,s, priests, ,s ome ipriesits, ,s ome congressmen,
were shot by the Communists. I recall a congressman, a Catholic priest Anthony Salat. He was of very strnnig feeling
against the Communists. He wrote several books againist
communism and, iin the first week of the uprising, he was
shot. In 1Slw8!kia were liquidated about forty to fifty thousand :S lovaks in this Communist putsch.
1

Mr. IMc'Digue. T1hey were shot?
Dr. Pauco. They were shot 1b y the Soviets, b,y the Soviets' paritisan,s and by the collaborators in Slovakia.
!Mr. McTigue. About '50,000?
Dr. Paufo. Yes, aJbout '50,000.
Mr. McTigue. 1In the period of one year?
Dr. Pauco. In the period of three months.
Mr. McTigue. Three months?

Dr. Pauco. The purtsch was defeated in two months, but
after there were some battles in the mountains in Slovakia,
and in December the Red Army ,c ame to Slovalkia. Several
thousand Slo.vaJks fr,om eas,t ern Sl01viakia were sent by the
NK_,V il) to Russia, to Siberia and concentration camps. and
to the mines in Dombas.
Mr. IMcTigue. Norw, when and how did ,t he uprising finally
end?

�33

SLOVAKIA

Dr. Pauco. The German Army came into Slovakia in
September 1944.
Mr. McTigue. Now, you had a close relationship with
Monsignor Tiso; isn't that correct?
Dr. Pauco. 'f.hat's true.
Ylr. McTigue. Now, will you tell the committee who Monsignor Tiso is and briefly explain your relationship with him
and your discussion with h~m afte,r the putsch?
Dr. Pauco. I was editor-in-chief of the greatest daily in
Slovakia, the "Slovak." This daily was the organ ,o f Monsignor Tiso. Joseph Tiso was the first Slovak President. He was
the legal President of the SlovaJk Republic, which came into
being on March 14, 1939. The ,Slovaik Republic had diplomatic relations with 27 naJtions, of them 17 or 18 were on the
side of the western allies. Monsignor Tiso was a Christian
ruler - after a thousand years, the first Slovak irll'ler and I had the opportunity to spea:k with him practically
every week . I reca:11 thrut on August 20, 1944, I was in Presov at a meeting called by the Government, by the army,
and by the Slovak People's Party. At that time, in eastern
Slovrukia the situation was very critica•l and the delegates
practicaly from every village and every town from eastern
Slovakda told the Government and government representatirves of Bratislava, tha:t something wliitl hruppen if the Slovak
Army and Slovak police do not interlere. Pradically the
whole of eastern Slovakia was, parachuted at this ,t ime by
the So;yiets, the Soviet parti,sans and Soviet a;genrts. I spoke
after this meeting with Dr. Tiso, and ag,ain when the pUJtsch
was liquidated. Dr. Tiso at this time was ready to resign.
He hoped that some Slovak politician would take the Slovak
question to the International Tribunal.
Mr. Bonin. Tribunal?
Dr. Pauco . Tribunal, yes, because he would iiike to
change the regime, but to preserve independent Slovakia.
That was the goal of Monsignor Dr. Tiso.
Mr. McTigue. What happened to Monsignor Tiso eventuallv?
Dr. Pauco. Monsignor Tiso was hanged, executed by the
Communist nation:i.l court, April 18, 1947, in Bratislava. Dr.
1

�34

SLOVAKIA

Tiso wa.s the first among the Catholic prelrates in central
Europe who were executed by the Communists afte,r Warld
War Iil.
Mr McTigue. The usual phony charges, I suppose, were
applied, and the usurul phony court procedures were set in
motion?
Dr. Pauco. Just becallise he had anti-Communist feelings; I know, 'Il!Ot from Dr. Ttso, but from his personal secretary who its living now i n Caniada, seiveral times, Soviet
agents were ready to assuire to Slova.ks and Dr. Tiso himself
a seperate Slovak-,Soviet Repulblic if Dr. Tiso will go wtth the
Soviets, and Dr. Tiso refused. Tiso said one time, I recall,
that tf his own brother were a Communist, he would fii.ght
him. And I am SJure that i·s why Dr. Tiso wa:s executed by
the Commtmists' so-called nahonal court in April 1947.
Mr. Fetghain When you state that Monsirgnor Tiso was
the first of the clergymen to he executed by the Russian
Communists, you mean the first outstanding figure, both in
the spiritual and politic8il world?
Dr. Pll!uico. Yes, sn-. That's correct.
Mr. Feiigihain. That's 1a ll.
Mir. Bonin. W-ell, Mr. Pauco, it is nothing uncommon for
a priest or a member of the clergy in central EUI'Opean
countries to be in political life; isn't that correct?
Dr. Paooo . Yes, that's ri.ghit.
Mr. Bonin. And, therefore, they would be permitted to
engBlge in political lifo . . .
Dr. Pauco. Yes.
MT. Bonin. Bllit they took a leave od' absence from their
clerical life; isn't that coreivct?
Dr. Pauco. No, that was not so in S1ovakiia. Monsignoir
Tiso, as Prresident of the Slovak RepU!blic, was the adm~nistrator of his own parish in Bano:vce, rund sang Holy Mass
there practically every Sunday.
'Mr. McTigue. Tell me, Mr. P8iuoo., how and why did you
escaipe from Slo1Va!kia arnd come to this country?
Dr. Praulco. After what I ,s aw in Vinnitsia, then in Slovakia , and what I hearo from many hundreds orf escll!pees
from Ukrainia, from Poland, from Russia, from Hu'Il!gary,

�SLOVAKIA

35

from Ruman:i:a ., from Lithiuani:a, about ·p ractices of 1S01Viets,
I could not stay in rS1()1VlaJk:J,a, because I hated communism ; I
hated oolsiheiv:ism, and I hoped to live in the free Western
World. I am happy that 1 am here in this free ,a nd democratic couliltTy. I haive my relatives over there, ,a nd one of
my relatives came through the border just several months
ago to Austriia. He. ~s: now in the American Zone, and he
writes to me. thlat Oill!r ;p eople over there behind the Iron
Curtain have friends. here in the United States, and they
are praying every d·a y that the Gorvernmen t of the United
States wHl win the battle against communism . ,A nd Slorvaks,
like IPoles, the Uikrairuans , the Baltic nations, or Rum•a nia,
Hung,ary, the Czechs:, Croatians,, :Serbians, and so on, they
like to be free like you are here in this country; they like to
be independen t, and, maybe, wiH sometime be ruinified in a
great European federation li,k e yoru are here urnfied in the
United States.
Mr. M:c~•g ue. When di:d you say you left Slovakia?
Dr. Pauco. It wa:s in Apr.ii 1945.
Mr. McTigue. And when did you arrive in this country?
Dr. 'P auco. WoUT years aglO, in Apri[ 1950.
Mr. McTigue. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bonin. Mir. Feiglha:n.
Mr. Feighan. Mr. Pau!co, we have heard testimony with
reference to the Vinnitsia massacres ,w hich stated' to us that
after the Commllllllists were diriiven out of the Ukm.i.ne in
1943 and the Naizis came in, they opened up graves of which
there were 38, each of them the same length, and widlhh, and
depth, that they conWned ov:er 10,000 rpeople they
weiI'en't aill U!kirruinians; some were IPoJes, and of other nationalities ; 'that the people there were of various status ;
they were, :farmers, armsan;s, wovkers, ,a nd rinteilleotUJals, and
the testimony th1at we rnceived also. indicated, at iJ.east with
reference to those particulaT graves, that tlhey were done by
the So;viet Russ,i ans durJng the years 1937 and 1938, but I assume that they did many othera besides those.
Dr. Pa:uco. I spoke ,t o the 1people of Vinniitsia, these

�SLOVAKIA

36

people, Ukramiians and Poles, were all liquidated tb y the
Soviet agents.
,MT. Feighan. Yes. That ~s my understanding.
Dr. Pauoo. Yes.
Mr. Feighan. The testimony that we had shows that.
I 1have no further que,s1t1:ons
Mr. Bonin. WeH, Mr. Pa.'Ulco, you stated that this alleged uprising in Slovakiia was clearly Communist inspired,
is that OOlITect..
Mr. Pauco. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. BODJin. They created dissension and they created an
atmospheTe Olf revolt within Slova:ki:a?
Dr. Pauoo. Yes.
!Mr. !Bonin. And a.gents had been sent in there, is that
cor,rec.t, to irritate and agitate this revolt?
Dr. Pauico. That is correct.
Mr. iBonin. And by thait means using the Commurnst
tecfunique to wipe out the ,people that were undesiralble to
them?
Dr. Pauco. Yes
Mr. !Bonin. Of coU1I1Se, iwe lhruve had testimony where thait
same identicaJl truing was used in- other countries that have
come under the domi'Il'ation of the Russians throughout different parts of Ea;sitern EuTope, lbut this is &lt;the fhist time,
I beli'e!V'e, that we had testimony that they were aotually
dvopped in by pamchute to iITitate and agitaite rund crnate
the trouble.
Dr. Pauc·o. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. But, in the meantime, they !had some agitators in there already; iis tlhat correct?
Dr. Pauico. Oh, yes.
Mr. Bonin. And they had le:6twingers ,i n there?
iDr. Pallico. Yes.
iMr. !Bonin. Who were ready to follow the agents tha:t
were dTopped in?
Dr. PauJco. Yes.
Mir. !Bonin. In other words, isome people in the United
States fool that there are not many Communistls, lb ut they
are aliways :ready, willing w:hen the o.p portune time cOllnes,
to seize that opportunity to overthrow the existing governmenrt: in any partioular place .
Dr. Pauco. Thait's wue.
Mr. Bondn. Now, of course, since you have lbeen in the
1

�SLOVAKIA

37

United States, you have been trying to. bring to the attention
of the people of the free world this Commwnist threat; is
that correct?
Dr. P,a uco. Yes, that is oorredt.
Mrr. Bonin. And in each instance where you haive an opportUillity, and I understand that you are still a newspaperman and a joornalist, you bring these facts to .t he attention of the people that Tead your newspaper, the Je&lt;lnota?
Dr. fuuco. Yes, that's correct
Mr. Boniin. This isn't tJhe fiiirst part, of Eastern Europe
that we have heard of where forty to f,i fty thousand people
have boon slaughtered.; O'Ilce a;gain demonstrating that the
Communist regime holds power only because 1t UJSeS force
and threats and intimidation to keep the people ias helpless
as they possibly can.
Dr. Paiu100. That is correct.
Mr. Bonin. WeH, on behalf of the committee.. I 'Wish to
thank yow for your splendid staJte:rnent tlhat you haive made
as a part of thii:s ree-0,r d and for the reswme orf yo'lllI' experiences in Ozecho-Siovakia and in .Slov•a kia.
Dr. Pauco. Thank you.
Mr. Boiruin. Mr. Feighan has another question 'h e would
like to as!k you, Mr. Pauco.
Mr. Fei,ghan. Do you not feel that it is correct, Mr.
Pautco, that the people of 1Slo;v;akia are imbued with the nationali-stic -spirit, a love of God and a love of colUllltry, and
they just seek the right of self-deteTmination as ~ sovereign
nation?
- Dr. Pauco. That is co,r rect, Slir.
Mr Bonin. In other words, they are asking nothing
more than some of the principles: that have been em.mcia:ted
through long yea.rs, that each people have the right to de- ·
termine the kmd o.f government they wish to have, the type
of leaders they wish to have, and to conooct their Lives and
thei,r g01Vernment in theiT own nationialistic spirit and attitude. The people orf R!Umania, Hung,a ry, Po•land, Lithuania,
Latvia, EJSltooila, ruid o:their nations ha,v e the same desire to
goveTn themselves; is that correct.
Dr. Pauico. Yes; iliat iis correct.
MT. Bomn. Welil., I 'Wliish to thank you ,v ery much for
your testimony, and we sincerely hope thait the opportunity
1

�SLOVAKIA

38

presents itself to defeat thls Communist threat, not only to
the Ewopean natio111S., burt: also to the peoples of the free
world. Thank you ve,r y much.
Dr. P,aulco. Thank you.
Mr. Feiighan. Waiit a minute, Mr. Pauco·.
Dr. Pauco. Yes.
Mr. Feighan. During your experience in Slova&gt;lcia, did
you haive an opportunity to witness the manner by which
the Russian Commlln!isbs tried to break up the culture, the
1,anguage, the customs, and the religion of the Slovak people?
Dr. Pauco. I lived in Bratislava. Bvatislava is the capital
of Sllo;v,rukdoa, and is on fille west border of Slovrukia. The Soviets came from the east. The whole of Slov-akJa was occupied on April 7 or 8, ,a nd I escaped from Bratis lav,a on
April 4.
Mr. Feighan. I see.
Dr. Paulco. I wasn't there after the Soviets occupied the
whole of Slov.alk,i a, ·b ut I was in Braitiosla:va during three
months thait the eastern part of Sl()!Va:kia was occupied by
the !Soviets, and I heard from my relatives, from my f11iends ,
of the methods which I mentioned before.
Mr. !Feighan. Yes; but you were noi there yourself t o
see it and observe .iit?
Dr. Pmrco. No, no.
Mr. Feigihan. Well thank you, Mr. Pauco
Or. Paulco. You are wekome.
Mr. Bonin. Thank you &lt;very much.
(Wil'kes-,Barre, Pa. , September 30, 1954).

FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JOSEPH l\1IKULA
IMr. iMcTigue. Were you in Sl'OVlaJkia during World War
Dr. Miku1a. Yes, I was.
Mr. iMcTigue. Were you a pairt of the underground
movemerut in Slovakia?
Dr. Mikul,a. Yes, sir. We started the underground movement at the end of World War II. I was one of those who
started it.
iMr. Mc'Digue. When did it start ?
Dr. Mi1kula. It was in 1944.
tr?

�SLOVAKIA

39

:Mir. McTigue. What caused you amd others to form this

underground moivement?
Dr. Mikula. I will read a short statement in this connection. The inception of the anti-Communist arganirlation
is attrilbutafule to the iintellectuals wlho foresaw the necessity
of truking preventive measures aga,inst the imminent d001ger
of communism. They studied communism and decided to
combat it, ~cause tlhey had no false illusions of whether or
not the Communists wOIU!ld Telax their demands after World
War II.
The first communistic pressur~ was expected in the
field of religion. Conseqiue.ntly, the preparations were directed for the defense of re!l,i gious freed.om and the preservation of religious life in the event of intensive persecutions.
The second fi.eld was the po[iltical field. Ourr ca1cuJations
at the !beginning w&amp;e wrong. They didn't staTt at the beginning in religiious _peil'Sooution, but it:Jhey concentrated an theliir
activities in the political field.
Mr. Kersten. Have you finished with your s1:Jatement?
Dir. Mikul,a. No; very briefly about this polii!tical field.
The most essential elements in tlhe polritical life of the nation
are political parties. The Communists knew it, and acted accordingly. They were verry cautious. that no par.ty existed
which by attracting the sympathy of a majority of the _population wouild endanger t'he position of the Commumst Party.
So, the parties which airose after the war with the petrmisSlion of the Communusts were incapable of eiffecting
strong anti-Communist oipposition, because, first, theiy had
no roots, no tradition, a;mong the population.
Second, part of their leadeffi, were either tools of Communists ior opportunists who, /because of l,a ck of principles
and courage, completely sulbmitted to the Communist pressure, and third, throug;h the assistance of the ColIIlm.unist
Party, they were s'h ackJed - aM other parties were shackled
by the coordinating comrruttee of all the parrties, the socalled National Front. This Nationa'l Front was nothing else
but a machine in the ih ands of the Communists to control
aU o,pposiition against the Communist Party.
Mr. Mc'l'igue. Were you the recognized leader of the un-

�40

SLOVAKIA

derground in Slovakia?
Dr. Mikula I woll!ldn't say so.
Mr McTig;ue. Were you one of ,t he leaders?
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. !Did you ar.ronge to have some of your
members sent abroad in order to assist in the underground
movement from without ?
Dr. Mtkula. I thin:k I can state it quite openly. Our program was to prepa1re things, firs,t, at home, and, second, we
had some people out aibroad. I mean, out of ,the count.Ty. We
,s end them out of the country ,a nd directed the situ.aitiion,
informed them, they ind'ormed us. The illlformatiion we receirved we direoted to ,proper aut'horitie;,
iMr. Keirsiten. Now, just at this ipoint - we want to
ma:ke sure that you understand ,p erfectly clearly, Mr. Mikula. We know, of course, that you did operate in the underground in Slovakia, and there are undou!btedly a number of things that you would not wish to spea;k a.'bout specifiicaHy and openly. 1S0 that any question the oounseil or
any member here might ask in that regard, you just use
yom own judgment. We don':t want you to disclose pU!blicly
anything t hat would in any way endanger the ipresent situation there, a:nd that is what you 'ha,,ve in mind, Mr. Counsel, I am sure.
Mr McTigue. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. [Mikula. Yes. I 'Wl3.'Ilted to ask yo u for this permission.
Mr. Mc'Tugue. How long were you a part of the undergroU1I1d in Slovakia.?
Dr. Miikwla. I was wor,king directly in the field almost
fiiive years to the. end ,o f 1'949. 1Iin Feb:rua.ry 11950 I left for
the United States.
·Mr. McTigue. And did you emigrate to the Uniited
States in 1950?
Dr. Milkula. Yes, I did.
Mr. McTigue. Now, when you left 1S1ova.ki.a in 1949, were
you furced to !leave your wife b e hind'(
Dr. Mikula. No, I was one of tho se who was sent
abroad when the Communists took over and legia.l opposition
was ailimost iimpossilble in ,the country. So, I went out from
Slova:kfa in 1945, and I was wonk,i ng outside of Sfoviakia.. I
was worlcing abroad. I have here a little bo~ldet edited by
1

1

�41

SLOVAKIA

the Ministry of l!nterior in .Prague; the head of the Ministry
of Interior was a well-iknown Oommunist •o y the name of Nosek. It was edited and published by the Ministry of Interior, 5,000 issues were distrilbuted over here. My name is
mentioned aJbout 70 or 80 times in this booklet.
Mr. Kersten. Just .so we get th•a t clearly, as I understand it, you ~eift Sloivaikia in 1945.
Dr. Mikuia. Yes, I did.
Mr. Kersten. And you were outside the country?
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
Mr. Kersten. !But while you were outside the coll!Ilitry
during the fullowmg yerurs up 'll'Iltil -about 1949 or 1950, you
were woriking in t'hiis movement, is that correct?
Mr. '.Mhlm~ia. I was in steady contact, and I was one of
the leaders outside.
MT. Kersten. Of the lllillderground freedom m01vement in
Slova,kiia?
Dr. Mii kula. Yes.
Mr. Kersten. And this :book ,t hat you have ha,nded us
here is a booldet put out by the Communists in Bratislava?
Dr. Miikula. 1:rl ·P rague. The Ministry of InteriOT, Czecho-Slovakia.
Mr. [Kersten. Maylbe we 1had better mark this.
Dr. Milrula. The title of .the book is "Conspiracy Agaiinst
the Repl]blic."
iMT•. Kersten. Would you mark thi&lt;s "Milwaukee Exhibit 4."
And you have stated rthat this Milwaukee Exhibit 4 is a
Communist ,pubH1cation ipulblished in what year?
Dr. Miiktl'l.a:. ffit was printed Noivemlber 1947.
Mr. Kersten. And it contains rtJhe accounts of operations
2.gainst the Communist g01Vernmen t; is that correct?
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
Mr. Kersten. And you are named in here, as you say,
70 or 80 times?
[)r. Mii:ku1 a !Something liike that.
Mr. Kersten. In rw1hat crupacity?
Dr. Miikuila. Someitiiimes as ibhe leadeT of the underground, sometimes as an American agenrt, sometimes
Mr. Kerstein. Always in a derogatory sense?
Dr. M~kuJ1a. Absolutely.
1

1

1

�42

SLOVAKIA

Mr. Kersten. I notice on 1:Jhe first page of the printing
here - one of the first rpages - it is aotually page 7,, but it
seems to be the start "Of the body of t'he article - I notice
a name - Joseph rMi!kufa. Is that you?
Dr. Mikula. That i:s me.
Mr. Kersten. Then you are named frequently therearfter;
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
is t:Jhiat rig1ht?
Mr. Kersten. Proceed, Mr. Coltl7lsel.
Mr. McTigue. I w,ant to •ask you two questions. Dr. Mikula. Wi'fil you briefly tell uis something about the ac'tiivities
of the ll!Ilderground, and secondly, were these actiivities effectiive, in y;our j,udg,menit?
Mr. iKersten. Keeping in mind tJhe safety maitters that
we tahlced albout.
Dr. Miikua,a. As I mentioned before, the legaiJ. resistance
or Jega!l oppositilion againJSt communism was foiling. So, the
people 1wirt:Jh ra nti-Oommunist tendencies lost faith m their
weaik and oppo:rbuni,stic party leaders, and consequently,
sought -0ther mea.lilS wiherelby they might prevenit the Communists from ·aocompl:iishing their ,plans.
Now, the diTect answer to your question, "Wihat were
the actiivities ?" Fiirst, to do e,verythiing that would undermine the Coimmu!nist IP .arty, and the ends of tfue Oommunist
Party. We knew that they will try to Sovietize, to taike over
the counwy.
So, we rpuibliiished leaflets. We published booklets. We
pu'b1is,ihed pe;riodiools. IDverytilimg was hllegal and underground. That w.as at 'the b~imling. Laiter on, when it wiIB
pretty hrurd to distrilbute mimeographed leaflets or publications - because they were against the Communists - we
started an illegal triansimi-titer - a shortwaive radio station.
It is not necessairy to teH where and how it was, but it
existed and rit worked very effectively. Then, later on, we
tried to collect all possible rnformaitiorn from political, economical, military, oullJtu,r,a-1 life; get it out and mfomi the
worild 1aJbout the si•tUJatiion over there.
JUJst to show you how it was done, here are some photostatic copies of the orders issued by the commander in
ohlef of the nati'Onal security guard. It was a gend:armery
police.

�SLOVAKIA

43

Mr. McTigue. Communis t police?
Dr. Milrula. CommUIIlist, yes.
Mr. McTiguei. What did the ·o rder say?
Dr. Mikula. They are different o:rders. For example, I
will just ~ k of the first one. lt i,s dated Bratislava, March
4, 1947, firom the head{l_uall'lters of Nationail !S ecurity Guiard.
The orders to the lower units of National Security Guards :
il order that ,s pecial attention be paid to tJhe transports
of Volhyi.ruia Ozechs cOIInli.ng from tihe U. S. S. R. - thait is
the Soviet Union - they have already settled on the territory of Slovrukia. They have to lbe constantly watched arid
fO!Nowed, because they are spreadling internationr uUy false
infurmation a:bOUJt iour eastern ally, the U. S. S. R.
Mr. !McTigue. Wha:t people is he talking rubout in tlhis
order?
Dr. !M.ikiula. One of the tactics of Commt.Lll!ist takeover
was tramsplanta tion; movements of the people. Right after
t'he war we had a HUJngarian minority in 1Slcwakia and a SlovaJki,a n minoniity in iH ungary. Now , right aft.er the war
started the transportru tion orf these minorities frQiffi HUI11gary
to Slovwkia, a,:nd from 1S1ova!kfa. to Hungary.
What happened to Slovakia? From H1.1!11.g,acy came the
people who couldn't sipealk any word of Sloviak. To Hungacy
came people from Slova:kiia.
There were Ozeohs iwho Hived about 200 or 300 years in
one province of [Russia calllled Vo1hynia. Just to show good
faith tor something like bha.t, the Sowet moved those Volhynia: Czechs to Ozeciho-Slovaikia.
'Dhe movements of the population are very serious
thinigs, because they !bring insecurity. Noibody knows how
long he stays in his ()IWll house., in his 01W11 neighlborllood, and
so insecure people are aliways much easier for the CommUilasts to handle.
Mr. McTigue. That is the grnup to whiioh he has reference in the order?
Dr. Mikula. That is tihe explanation . So further:
Specifically , I ask the units of Nationa,] Soourity Guard
to watch the tI"ansports corning in and the transient transports orf V oohyniia Czec:hs going through the railroad station.

�44

SLOVAKIA

Those Czechs wouldn't come !into any contact with the
public. I mea.n witJh the popu1ati10n. Then you hiwe here the
order to maintain ~ continuous oontro1l on ail calls in post
offices and telephone-Office excihanges. This was done by
the ipol!ice. They ccmtr.ol all calls ·c oming in and W:hait was
said. If they find something against the regime they wt
accorcmng to regufations.
Thls here is concerning the control of the pop.wlation in
traiins. Everyone - they sa,y here, "Everyone is Slllpposed to
have this ridentificaitioo. card1." So, the units of SiNB - lower
units - are ordered lh:ere to control the population, and if
somebody hasn't his idenitificatlion card, he ris supposed to
be arrested am.cl brougiht ilil for investigation to the nearest
police station.
This order ooncerns the former gendarmes orr mem!bers
of the National Security Guard poiice who were deported to
Russia, were coniiined there, and later on brought 1b ack to
Slovakia. Same of them were put in the!ir fonner positions.
They were ·agaiin rcinsitated a:s gendarmes, but the order says:
To the Ministry ()If Interior came the information t:Jhat
the behavior ()If these returned former memlbers of gendarme is not satisfactory. They taJlk very sharply against
the !S oviets iand are doring that even in the company of the
other members of the unit.
I order you to follow those memlbers in your d±sbr.icits
and remind them that for bad talk aibout the brother nation, Russia, they can be ,p unished and arrested.
Mr. McTigue. Now, what you haNe been de.scmbing to
the oommittee . . .
Dr. Mikll!la. These •a re just the examples of how information was oolle_c ted and brought out and utilized.
Mr. McTigue. Now, do you know, or oan you tell the
oommittee whether there is an wnderground operating in
SwvaJkia ,a t the present time?
Dr. Miilmla. l am posritive there is. First, I would just
say from the general point of vtl.ew, so long as the Comm'Ulilists are unaJble to change human nait'UT'e, there wiU [be the
will. to 1be free. It means there will be the will to rresist. That
is a general rea:son

�SLOVAKIA

45

Second, the best proof ,i s that you still read in the papers how much troulble they haJVe in .t his or that group or
with this group, and so on. These are the 1best documents
that the :resistance is not only aJlii.ve, but is acti1Ve.
Mr. iMcTigue. Do you fool thaJt the underground is the
heart of the resistance, the core of the resisltance, in Slovaki,a today?
Dr. Mhlrul'a. I would say so. I would dare say that albout
80 or 90 per cent of the population is anti-Communist, but
not aU of these 80 o:r 90 per cent are willing to ta!ke am.
acti:ve part to fight oommundsm.
Mr. iMcrrigiue. Why?
Dr. (Mlikula. Because of the advances of oommumsm
they are very cautious ito. d:o nothing which could provoke or
cailll for Communist reprisals This is one reason.
!Second, urSU1ally the people WOII'king activei1y and directly are, in my opinion, heroes, and not everyone cam. be a
hero. So, from thds group, from this 80 per cent, we can sruy
whaJt is in tlhe underground is the most ii.miporllant and most
vaJLuiaJble co,re of passive and ,a ctive resistam.ce.
Mr. McTigue. You were in Slov,rukia at the time of the
Communist taikeover; is that correct?
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
Mr. IMc'Digue. Were there wholesaile arrests and deportations in Slovakia. as there were in the other C-Ollll!tries?
Dr. Milkllll,a. Slovakia. is a small counrtry of 31bou,t 3½
million poipuilation. So the figures. are not so enormous, but
in relatio1I1, in proportion to ,t he whole popll'laition, they are
pretty big They deported in :t'he fi.rst month aifteir the occupa1tion of Slovakia rubout 38,000 people.
Besides this, in tlhe !first half year, when they took over,
aibout 133,000 people were put in ja,i1s, in camps, amd taken
out of theiir normal life.
Mr.' Mcrrigue. [ ha;ve M further questions.
Mir. Kersten. Mr. Bentley?
.
Mr. Be1I1tley. When did you leave Slovakia?
Dr. Mikula. I lefit Slovalci.a in 1945.
Mr. Bentley. That was just the beginni.DJg of the antiCornmi.mist resistance then,, I presume.
Dr. Mitkula. Yes.

�46

SLOVAKIA

Mir. Bentley. ilfaJVe you mamta.ined contacits, or how
have yiou gotten yml'I' worrunaJtion regarding the activities
of the underground since that time?
Dr. MikU!la. As I Wld you, we haJVe steady contact
through couriers. I wi!ll j!U'st mention one thing: In 1945
our coUJriers hrougiht over my wife with two little children.
Mr. Chai:run:an rememJbers those l.ititle children. One w:as four
and one was ,s ix.
Mr. Bentley. How l01ng was co111tact of this kind maintained?
Dr. Miikulia. ,J t.hinik that contac.t is stiH mamtarlned, but
I could rta1k 3111d testify ,t o the end of 1'949.
Mr. Bentley. Until the end of 1949, which was a,bout
two years after the coup d'etat in Pra,gue?
Dr. Milrula. Yes.
!Mr. Bentley. And srunce .that time, your ilmowledge has
been 01JJ.ly fTom information, not direct; rum I correct?
Dr. Miku]a. lit is secondary. Before I reccived mormatron diirecil,y. I was ll'S'lllally the first who received it. Now I
a'In receiving informia,tion, but later.
Mr. Bentley. How dloes the situation in Slovakia compare wi;th that of otfuer countries in the Soviet satellite,
would YOIU say? Iis it -b etter or worae?
DT. MikU!la. I thiinlk .t he condifti,ons a;re generaHy the
same in all the coU!Iltries. As for the resistance, maybe in
S'lovakira, the resistance is a little bit stronger and maybe a
little bit more success:fluil, 1becall!se, as you iknow, Slovakia is
a country orf farnners, a country of mountainee:ris, ·a nd the
people i1I1: Slovaiki'a are deeply reliigtlous. T.he hardest thing
for the Communists to break ~re the farmers and /besides
that, to remove Teligion from the sow of the rpeoiple and
rep}ace it by Leninism is not so easy. You know .t hat.
Mr. Bentley. So you would say that the cond!itiOIIl!S are
about the same, but -the resistance itJhere is a little bit
·stronger?
Dr. Mikula. Yes. The same. The same concentration
camps, liaJbor orumps, the same tendency to create Kollkhozes
and co[lectiive farms, the same tendency to brealk any possible resistance, and if there dsn't any hope, arrest the peo-

�SLOVAKIA

47

ple, seind them ,t o uranii.ium mines; tJhe same everywhere,
the same procedure.
Mr. Bentley. Am ,I correct in believing that part of Slovakiia has been incorporiated in the 'Soviet Union?
Dr. Mi:kula. A very small eastern part. Abowt 15 or 18
villages of S1ova1-da were inconporated inito the Soviet Ull!ion.
Mr. Bentley. '.Dhe fiact that this resi,s tance dioes exist or
does not exist in 'SlrovaJkia to the extent you say it does,
what, in your opinio!Il, can lbe done most effectiively to eniruble
this resistance to continue ,and maintain itself. Whrut encouragement or assistrunce can be givan, if any?
Dr. 1M:iikuil.a. I would state .it in ·one way: To increase
the hopes of ipeople lh'ling over there that soonetime there
will be a cha1I1ge.
iMr. Bentley. We ,a:re ta:lking specificailly of SLovaik:i!a.
Dr. M:ikula. Spooiffioa.My, for 1Slovakia, it is absolutely
necessary to reassure a;gaiin and again those people tlhat we
are not forgetting them, we are not •giviing them up, and we
have unde.rstaind!i!Il!g for their specific prolblems.
Mr. Bentley. Including the right 'O'f self-determination?
Dr. iMitkullia. '.Dhia.t is w!hat I walllted to say. We should
not stick to the owtmoded, ourtlived st'I'luctures. '.Dhey have
proved to be un:successfol, and rwe should give to the people
the right to be free and to have therr OIWIIl: government, ·a ccording to their own c1hooce. That is one o.f the most important t'hd.ngs. Then th'i&lt;s po&lt;l.tnt: The people are, I wou!l.d say, 90
per cent 'llillited in Slovalk:ta. .Anyrt;hin,g whioh .poi.nrt:s o.wt thait
we are forgetting them, rwe are not undersibanding them, is
cutting otff the will to resist.
iMr. Bentley. Thank you very much. Thiat i'S a:11, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Kersten. Congressman Feighan?
MT. Feighan. Dr. 'Mikula, as I understand it, you feel
thrut the people of 1SIOV1akia should be ,giiven assurances that
the free ,w orld would sirnpport their desire for seiltf national
determiniation of thei:r own identity as a nation if they so
desiire?
·
Dr. Miikula. Wihen you are talking generally albout the
popu1ation of Slovakia, that is one of the most important

�48

SLOVAKIA

things that they need; some kind of good will that we have
a.!11 understanding oif thei'l' problem.
MT. Feighan. Then if ,w e ,w ould tell the whole world that
we stand by the principle upon which our Naition was founded, thiat is, the ri!ght of self-determi:ri:ati-cm, that would be
he'l!pful to them. 'In other words, Mr. Mikula, if the free
w0irld shO'Uld gi,ve the Communists a free hand !in t!hese
caiptiive nations,, this would cause those people to lose hope,
ilS that right?
Dr. iM:ikuil:a. Absolutely. One of the most •i mportant
things is to show those people :tlhait we are really l!Iliform.etl
a'boUJt their plight, a.Jbout tlhe conditions under ,w hich they
are 11ivimg, that rwe hacve actually access to the most secret
communistic conspiracies. 'We shouJ.d convey t:his knowledge
to the masses. That is one of the moot imlportant th,i ngs.
Mr. Kersten. Does thrat hellp to sha:ke and lessen the
Communist ipawer in 'Uhose countries?
Dr. iMikul1a. It is •curttin.g off the arrogamt communistic
se!lf-corufiderice, amd when we ta.Jke such a cut through the
Communist Party, we see there are just a few intellectuals,
a group of fanatics, and a great nuim ber of opportunists.
The greatest ipart of them a.Te oppoiitun:ists. Activities must
be directed against those opportunists, because they are
afmid. They betrayed, first, second, thoird time. They a.re
readty to betray todlay and every day.
Mr. Kersten. ~irst o;f iaU, let me ask you this: YO!U have
gone to Detroit from iMHrwaUJkee?
Dr. M~kula. Yes. MHiwaiUJkee is my ,h ome.
Mr. Ker,s ten. You li:ved 1here several years and ~eft for
Detroit a short whlle ago wlhere you now live and :work
Dr. MikuiJ.a. Yes.
with your family?
Mr. Kersten. Dr. MikU'la, you iha,ve given us a great deal
of valuable inlfoirmation, rparticula:rly the knowledge that
I know you ha'V'e, of the existence of the undeiig,round in
Slocvakii a, resi,s tance, opposition, which our evidence indicates exists in all the other cOUIIltries likewise to a very
great extent.
!Mr. Kersten. Thank you, Dr. ~u!la, for yOUT aippear~Milwaukee, Wis., October 22, 1954).
ance here today. 1

�SLOVAKIA

49

FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PHILIP A. HROBAK

Mir. Kersten. I want to say we are rvery honored and
happy to haive you here with us, Mr. Hrobak, as the president of the Slovak League of America.
:Mr. Hrobak. And tihe editor of the Jednota, the official organ of the First Catholic SlovaJk Union of the United
States and Canada.
·
Mr. Kersten. I notice through several years of knowledge of your activities that you have keen understa:ndmg
of whaJt it means for a nation or a country or a people
to be occupied lby the Communists and some of the ways
in whioh they fight and some of the thinigs that we should
do to combat this new kind of enemy.
Mr. iMcTigue. How many memlb:ers, Mr. Hro'bak, are
a:ssociated or affiliated with the Slo:vak League of
America?
Mr. Hroba:k. The SloviaJk League .o f America, rubout
300,000.

!Mr. Mo'Dig,ue. What, ibriefly, is the Slovak League of
.America?
Mr. Hrobaik. The pur:poses?
Mr. McTigue. Yes.
1Mr. HTdbak. A cirvic and culturial origarnzation of
Americans of Slov,a;k descent. It was organized in Oleveland in 1907.
'Mr. Mc'lligue. It is mry understanding, MT. Chaimnan,
that !Mr. HrdbaJk has a statement which he wiSlhes to present to the committee, and if there is no objection, may I
sugigest that the witness be permitted to proceed wiith
the statement?
· Mr. Kersten. Without objection, it is so ordered.
!Mr. Hrdbalk. If you permit me, I would like to first
express my deep appreciation to this committee for the
opportunity given me to present the Slovruk chaipter in the
dread detail of Communist aggression.
I believe it is for the first time, at least as far as I
know, that ,a real, honest effort is :being miade to know
the background olf the many peoples behind the Iron Curtain, nations who always were and still are our friends,

�50

SLOVAKIA

peoiples who with all their hearts want to be our friends
because to them America has always lbee:n a living symbol
of freedom and independence, and now is just aJbout their
last hope of sa1vation from Red tyranny. I harve the greatest respect for the hono-raJble gentlemen on this committee
and its chairman, Charles Kersten. The coonmittee has a
difficult taslk, b,ut it is doing that task admiraJbliy well.
Helping the nations behind the Ixon Curtain to helrp
liberate themselves from the curse of communism cannot
and must not become ipOlitically a partisan a:flf1air. It is the
business, the duty, of every American to take part in it;
every Almerican must see it in that perspectirve, because
it is, after all, in the interest of the security of our own
America.
I would li!ke to e~press one point ,b efore I read my
statement, and that is that the SlovaJks have no quarreJ
with the Czech nation as such. The Czech nation today is
in the same Red fix as the SlovaJk nation.
The Sfovak•s, however, cannot remain silent about
Czech .p olitical leaders who were in a very large measure
responsible for the present terrilble plight of the Ozech and
Slovak nations over there, and who made it possilble foc
the Communists to seize power in Czecho-Slova!kia practically without any troUJble.
("How the Communists Seized Power in SlovaJkia" the statement by P. A. Hrobaik, president of the Slovak
League of America and Editor of the "J ednota," official
011gan of the First CathoHc Slorvak Union, •b efore the Kersten Committee on Communist Aggr(}SSion, in the County
Court House, Milwaukee, Wis., Friday afternoon, October 22, 1954 - was .pulblished in full in the iprevious issue
[Septemlber.,Decemlber 19541 of SLOVAKIA and, hence,, is
not repeated here.)
Mr. iMcTi,gue. 1I take it from your statement, Mrr. Hrobaik, that you consider the National Socialistic Party of
Czecho-,Slovalda a:s the one which was responsible for the
sellout to Moscow; is that correct?
Mr. HrrobaJk. I do, sir.
Mr. McTigue. Do you consider that the case of Czecho1

�SLOVAKIA

51

Slovakia is a practical or typical example of what happens to a nation that attemipts to coo,peirate or coexist with
Communists?
Mr. Hroba:k. Definitely.
Mr. McTigue. What do you think of the present Kremlin campaign to sell the nati0'11s of the free world on peaceful coexistence?
Mr. Hrohak. That is the Kremilin's way of trying to
lull us to sleep; forget our problems, our troubles; forget
what communism is, and just let them get strong enough
until they can take all of us.
Mr. McTigue. In your opinion, what do you think we
can do to keeip the ho,pes of the people of Slovakia alive?
How can we most help them at a time like this?
Mr. Hrolba!k. We must let them know that we a;re behind them; that we have not forgotten them; that .Americans stiH believe in the principles uip on which their country was founded, in the principle of freedom and independence ; and let them know that we shall do everything
to help them he1p themselves to overthrow the regime
they have.
~fir. McTigue. You agree with Mr. Mikula, who testified
here earlier today, that the resistance is still strong among
the ,people of SlovaJkia?
Mr. Hrabaik. It certainly is. We have had cootact with
the people directly and indirectly right through the war,
and we still get letters from people, who come from Slovakia today.
Mr. McT-fgue. You are able to maintain an effective
system of communicati10n with the Slovakian people with
what is going on over there today; is that correct?
Mr. Hrobalk. indirectly. Certain people get the info;rmation from persons in Sl&gt;ova~ia and then we get it.
Mr. Kersten. Mr. Bentley?
Mr. Bentley. Mr. HrobaJk, I want to go 1b aclt a little
bit before the period of Communist domanation of Slovakia
and look at the situation there !b:rfofly during the Second
World War. When SlO'V'aJkia was an independent reipulblic,
what exactly was the relationship at that time between
Slovakia and Germany?

�52

SLOVAKIA

Mr. HrOlbalk. Foveign policy was undoulbtedlly dictaited
by Germmy, /but the domestic policy was not, until the uprising of 1944, when the German Aiimy came in to occupy
Sloval~ia. Then bhe Slova.ks were in for it.
Mr. Bentley. -Would you say that the fad, for example,
that Slovalkia had troops on the Russian f.vont was a voluntary action or wa:s that dd.otated b:y Genmany?
Mr. Hvdbalk. I think it was both. I think th13Jt the Germans expected it, and the Slovaks, to make it aippear that
they aire really taking the business seriously, s.e nt a token
division there. The Slovaks had a way of exchanging men
by classes; they never had many men in the field.
Mr. Bentley. Did -Slov:akia take any action toward the
UTrited States at the time or shortlly after Pearl Harbor
when the Germans declared war?
Mr. Hrobaac. No; we tried to ascertain thait business.
We found out that some ,p erson, I believe it was the German radlio in Vienrna, d'id ma.Ike a statement that Slovakia
declared warr, but as far as- we could find out from our
own State Department and War Department, there is absolUJtely no formal declaration of war aga:inst the United
States.
iMr. Bentley. Never was at any time?
Mr. Hlrolbruk. Never was at any time. We couldn't find
that out from our own United States Goveirnment because
that point interested us rvery much, and so far there is
absolutely no record of it.
Mr. Bentley. Now, you say there was a distinction between the foreign policy of the Slov,a k Repulbl:ic which was
exercised and the domesti'c .poHicy. You mean -t he domestic
policy of the Slovak Repulblic was independent of Gennany?
Mr. HrobaJk. Yes; just about all independent; I mean,
running the country of Slovakia itself.
Mr. Bentley. Was there any form of oppression at
thait time?
Mr. Hrobaik. There was no oppression of religion or any
other thing. Some laiws. were enacted that ha;d to coincide
with some of the laiws that · the Germans had, but oUJtside
of that, the economic conditions - even Mr. Sr0ib31r, one of

�SLOVAKIA

53

the most intimate foiends of Benes had to admit after the
wax, were good.
Mr. Kersten. You say there was no oppression. There
was freedom of religion and the other political freedoms
that you normally would expect?
Mr. HrOlb.ak. None. Some claim that there was ,political swppression in Sl01Va!kia, but they don't explain the
problem correctly. The fact is that the ISlovaik parties, the
two only genuine !Slovak parties, are the Hlinka People's
Barty sometimes called the Catholic Party, and the Razus
Slwalk National Party, whi·c h was considered the Lutheran
Parby. Now these worked for the same program with one
accoro.
Mr. Bent-ley. Following the wprising of August 1944,
when the German mHitary came in to ,p ut it down, from
that time Slovakia lost its. independence?
Mr. Hrrolbak Yes. The Slovaks got it from both sides.
They were murdered by the occupation troops a.ind then by
the partisans on the other end.
Mr. Bentley. After the German military occupation
did the Tiso government continue in po,w er?
Mr. HrdbaJk. They continued. in ,power until 1945. Tiso
tried to explain away as best he coui'd that it was not a
national uprising; that the Slovruk Army and the Slovak
gendarmerie couild ta.Ike care olf the troubles in Slova:kia
themselves. The Germans firral,l y did not believe the Slovaks rufter General Otto's military mission was stopped at
Turciansky :S vaty Martin. I believe it was on August 25;
the group of aJbout 25 or 30 people, women and children
included, were taken off the train and put up in barracks
for the night. The neoct morning ~l were lined up against
a wall and mowed down with machine guns by the prurtisans.
Then there were other murders, sabotage, terrorrist
activities, which all came too soon, even for Benes's liberation movement which he had allegedly organized. The
leader of that movement was supposed to be General Golian. The uiprising was Communist-in spired and did not
have popular support.

�54

SLOVAKIA

Mr. Bentley. The Rm!ssian military OCCUipation of Slovalkia took place about when?
Mr. HrQbak. Albout Easter Sunday, 1945.
Mr. Bentley. And at that time the Slovak Government escaped to Germany?
Mr. Hlrobak. The Slovak Government went to Austria.
Mr. Bentley. And I believe they were finally captured
with the American troops?
Mr. Hrobak They were not captured. They surrendered to General Walker's army at that time. We had a
copy of the surrender papers and we gave it to, our State
Department, and, of course, the Army Department.
Mr. Bentley. And what happened to the members of
the Slovak Goivernment?
Mr. Hrohak. Well, unfortunately, even despite all our
effovts in America to preivent their being handed over to
Benes and his governrrnent in London, unfortunately, I
say, our pleas availed us nothing, and Tiso's Slovak Government was gi'Ven up to Benes and the Benes.Gottwald
coalition government. Tiso, after being tried by a "people's" court, was hanged on April 18, 1947, while members of the Slovak Govenunent were sentenced to prison.
Mr. Bentley. They were tried as war criminals?
Mr. Hrabaik. Yes, "war criminals," according to Prague.
Mr. Bentley. What is the sit'lllation in Slovakia today
under the Commrunist government of Prague? Is there any
form of committee for Slo;vaikia or is there a completely
unified government?
Mr. Hrobaik. Prague is still trying to tell us that the
Slovaiks themselves govern the.ir part of the state and the
Czechs govern their part, and so on, but that is not true.
The Czech Red centralized government in Prague is running the whole show. Even Slovak Communists are not
safe; Clementis is gone, so are others, and the secretary
general of the Slovak Communist Party is Karel Bacilek,
a Czech.
Mr. Bentley. You say the Communists are trying to
appeal to Slovak nationa1ism somewhat?
Mr. Hrobak. They did. Today it doesn't mean any-

�SLOVAKIA

55

thing. They are done for. In fact, 1S lovak Reds were for
separation in 1926, long ibefore Hlinka's pa,r ty.
Mr. Bentley. Who?
Mr. Hrdba.lk. The Communists. It is a matter of record.
They knew what the people wanted. They figtN"ed that there
are no people in any country who, do not desire to be free
and independent and they used that to gain their SUipport.
Hlinka's Party fought for autonomy; in the beginning, you
know, it wanted to haive a federation where SlovaJk,i a would
simply have states' rights.
The fight was simply for states' rights, as we understand them here in the States. The Slovaks wanted to elect
their own governor, their own judges, their school di,rectors, and so on. They were not for separatism until much
later.
Mr. Bentley. Mr. Hrobak, you were here, I imagine,
when Dr. Milkiu.la was testifying, and he said it was his belief that so far as the people of Slovakia are concerned,
what they really wanted was the right to self-determination. Do, you concur in that?
Mr. HroibaJk. That is correct.
Mr. Bentley. Thanik you ivery much. Your statement
and your testimony has contributed to the hearings, I am
sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1Mr. Kersten. Mr. Hrolbak, l
think at this time it is
quite clear from the records of recent history that the attempts of the Benes government to collaborate with and
have coexistence with the Soviet Union is a classic case
of what it means to make this attempt. I meant merely
for that government to put itsel1' in a position to be swallowed wp by the COll'Il.Illunists.
Mr. Hrobak. That is correct.
Mr. Kersten. It is a classic case in that regard.
Mr. Hrobak. Correct.
iMr. Kersten. And I believe one of the ministers of the
Benes government in London, Dr. Stransky, thought that
Mr. Hrobak Yes.
too.
Mr. Kersten. And that, along with other similar epi-

�56

SLOVAKIA

sod.es, certainly proves that there is no such thing as peaceful coexistence with the Communist s.
Mr. HTolbaik. That is correct.
Mr. Ker.sten. Well, I want to than!k you. The records
show if it doesn't already that Congressm an Bentley knows
a great deal about this situation in Ea:stern Europe because
he was an American diplomat in Hungary for several
yeairs, and he knows firsthand sOime of the real maichinations of the Communist s when they truke aver a country.
Mr. Bentley. I was ailso in Slova-kia.
Mr. Kersten. I am sure he has firstha:nd knowledge
of that, too.
Mr. HrolbaJk. Mr. Chairman, -t he statement that I have
made is based not only on what we haive from Slovaks,
patriotic Slovaks, 'but it iis also based O!t1 the 'book that the
regime put out in 1946, that is by the Lettrich "Demo-.
crats" arid the Husak Communist s; the name of it is
"Natl Tatrou sa Blyska" - (Lightning over the Tatras).
The booik has contr~butio ns from both sides, MT. Lettrich's
men and the Husaik men. And, of coocse, on the book that
was already introduced, there were only 5,000 of these,
The Conspiracy .Aigainst the Republic, which was introd uced as testimony by Dr. Mikula. That is my oopy. Then
on a boolk that was published here in America by the Communists called "Parti:zani na Slovensku" - (Partisans in
Slovakia), published in Chicago. And, I believe, another
booklet called "Verni ostruli," (They Remained Faithful). This book dealt with the uprising; it was written by
Deso Benau, ,w ho was editor of the New Yonksky Dennik (The New York Daily), in 1946.
Mr. Benau wa:s editor of that paper from 1942 to 1946
and tod!ay is doing an admiraJble job for the Communist s
in BraUshwa.

In this pamphlet - I will leaNe you this copy - you
can see the organizatio ns that are affiliated with us The SlovaJk League of America -- and the me:rrubers they
have. - I might add here that our papers were outlaiwed
from Ozecho-Slovakia by the Communist s on October 10,

�57

SLOVAKIA

1946 - that is this paper, the Jednota. and three other
Slova!k p8{!)ers.
Now, as you see here in this particular paper dated
Decemlber 13, 1944, we didn't wait until 1948 to tell America that Benes sold out the Czechs and Slova!ks to Stalin.
The big headline in that Decemlber 13, 1944, issue right on
the front page reads: "Sl()IVakia soJd out by Dr. Ed/ward
Benes."
Mr. Mc'Digue. What is that .pu!blication?
Mr. Hro!b.ruk. This is the Jednota, the official organ of
the First Catholic Slovak Union of the United States and
Canada.
And my statement is further ·b ased on the information contained in the booklet "The Rise and Fall of the Democratic Party in Slovakia," which was written by Constantine Cu1en, a new:spruperman from Slova;kia now residing in Canada, and ipu!blished in Slovaik by the Slovaik League
of America. I have translated it into English and the committee is welcome to it any time.
Mr. Kersten. Thank you, Mr. Hrobak.
(Milwaukee, Wis., Octo'ber 22, 1954).
1

STATEMENT BY DR. JOSEPH A. MIKUS

Fram 1944 until my escape from Soviet-dominated
Czecho-Slovakra, i:n March, 1948, I resided in Bratislava.
During this period I was three times imprisoned by the National Front Government: in 1945, 1946, and 1947. Now,
as a Slovalk refugee in the United States, I am glad to
have the opportunity of exposing to the Committee on
Communist A!ggression the tactics which, to miy own
knowledge and ibased on my personal experience, were
utilized 'b y the Communists in Slovakia to establish themselves first as a politca.-1 party and finally as a dominant
force in tha,t country.
Introduction

Before entering upon a discussion of the subject: proper, I would like to outline in general terms what has until now been the main trend in Slovakia's political history.

�58

SLOVAKIA

After losing her political independe nce in the ninth
century, Slovakia existed for a thousand years under for
eign dominatio n. Desrpite this fact, the Sl01Va!k nation did
not lose its ethnograp hic and cultural individua lity. Within
the nraime~o rik of the Austro-H ungarian Empire, it was
ruble to survive all the ;pressure of the Magyar cultural
and political centralism whioh seriously menaced its very
naJtional existence in the 19th century. World War I finally
providied an opportun ity for the 1SlovaJks to rid themsel'Ves
of the restrictin g grip of this ancient and obsolete power
structure .
On May 30, 1918, at the close of World War I, the
Slovak League of America signed together with the organilzatio ns of .Amemcans of Czech descent the so-called
Pittsburg h Agreeme nt, aimed at creating a dualist federal
union of the Czechs and Slov,atk,s which a little later entered the world communi ty of nations under the name of
Ozecho-!Slio:vakia. Although provision s guarantee ing the
preservat ion of the Slovak national and po1itical individuality were, according to the principle of self-deter mination, the essential condition of this solution, the Ozech political leaders, T. G. Masaryik and E. Benes, never made
any real attempt to fulfill their pledges. Instead of a federal union providing for a reasonaib le degree of self-gover nment for the Slovaks, and in utter disregard of the political will of the Slo1V.:\k people, Prague organized a strongly
centralize d state. On !February 29, 1920, the first so-called
revolutio nary parliame nt Oif Oze:cho..JSlovakia, ~inted !by
the Prague revolutio nary governme nt, voted for the first
Czecho-lSlovak Constitut ion which suibmerge d the Slovak
national individua lity through the device of a speciousl y
conceirved "Ozecho-!Slorvaik" nation, wherein the Czechs
wouid always lbe assured of their majority status and their
predomin ance. Not being a minority group in the sense
provided for under internatio nal treaties signed after
World War I, Slovakia ·r emained without any internatio nal
protection . Contrary to the famous definition of democracy by Abraham Lincoln, the regime a:rfuitrarily established by Prague in Slo:vaJkia could be described not as
a governme nt of the people, by the people, for the
"

�SLOVAKIA

69

people," 'but rather as "the g,overnment of the Ozech bureaucracy by the concept of the 'Czecho..:Slovak' nation
foisted upon the Sl01Vak people."
For 20 years SlovaJkia sought to· haive the principle
of equality between the Czechs and the Slovalks inco:r.porated into the constitution. The Slo,vak political leaders
argued that the Pittsburgh Agreement was of international relevance and that it should 'be respected by both
parties in the very interest of the joint Czecho-Slovalk
state. Prague, conrfident of the support implicit in the
Little Entente (1920), thie Mutual Defense Treaty with
France (1924), and, last but not least, the 'Dreaty of
Friendship and Mutual Aid concluded with the Soviet
Union (1935), felt strong enough to refuse any discU1ssion
on this pomt at any time.
The Munich Oonference of Septemlber 28, 1938, the
primary sig.niificance of which was the coUaipse of the
Ozecho~SlovaJk sysltem · of military a,lliances, inevitaJbly
brouight the nationality problem of the heterogeneous
Ozecho-Slovak State into the foreground. By the policy o;f
E. Benes, and in accordance with the Vienna arbitration
of Von R~bentro,p and Ciano on Novemb,er 2, 1938, SlOIVakia, lost over 10,000 square kilometers of territory to Hungary; an a·rea which included 853,000 inhabitants. This
was a national catastrophe. Ha,ving experienced this and
other deceptions,, and !being confronted in MaTch 193,9 with
the alternative of the partition of her territory among
Germany, Hung,a ry, and Poland, or of falling under direct
German administration, Slovakia voted on March 14, 1939,
thrnugh her legitimately constituted Diet in Bratislava, for
independence.
During World War II -E. Benes, who had voluntarily
resigned his oflice of President of Czecho-Slovakia, found
refuge as a ,pri'Vl8.te indilvidual in ,London. His basic goal
was to reestrublish Czecho"'Slo,valkia and, in spite of the oppositi'on. of the SlOIValk people, he was able to achieve this
goal ,b y relying essentially on the help of the Red army
and a grourp of domestic colla!borato~s. lirl the main body of
my statement I will explain the ;principal facts of this evo-

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60

lution, but I would first of all li!ke to stress one important
point :
All 'Slovaiks in the free world greatly ruppreciate the
fact that the House Committee on Oommunist Aggression
has paid particul ar attention to the tactics• which communism aipplied in Slovaikia. As a matter of fact, these tactics
were very difforenit 'from - for exMn1ple - those adopted
in the Czech area. This fine distinction - an a,rt in which
Moscow h•a s aliways been a master - resllilted from the clifference of attitude demonstrated toward the Sovieit Union
by the population of Slova:kia at the end of World Wa:r II.
As is kno,wn, during World War IT the Czech lands were a
German protectorate. At that time and until 1944, Slovaikia
was a relatively fTee state, imbued with only one desire:
To reaffirm her status as a national state after the end
of the war. Whereas the populaition of Bohemia and Moravia loolked fonwa:rd with high hO!pe to its liberation from
German domination 1by the Soviets, that of Slovakia considered the approach of the Soviet Army as a dista:ster
which would put an end to the Slovak national state.
Because of this difference in psychological attitude,
Moscow decided from the•outset on a policy of appeasement
of the Czechs and on a prog,r am designed to smash the resistance of the Slova:ks. A detailed ,plan for this program
had ibeen elalborated, with the Kremlin's blessing, by E. Benes and K. Gottwald, who as early as 1943 were in Moscow.
1

A. The Blueprint for Sovietization

After the Teheran Conference, which toolk place Novemlber 28 - December 1, 1943, it b,ecame clear that the
Soviet Union would inevitaJbly play an important role in
post-war Europe . This conference gave substantial encouragement to the hopes of the Communists and certain
pro.-Soviet non~ommunists in Slovakia. Immediately thereafter, on December 12, 1943, Dr. Edward Benes, as chief of
the Czecho-Slova:k: Government-rn-exile, signed the Treaity
of F'riends·hip, Mutual Aid and Col1ia/boration ,w ith Stalin in
Moscow. In article 4 of this treaty the two· signafories
agreed upon close political and economic cooperaition. "Talking into consideration their respective peaceful interests,"

�SLOVAKIA

61

says the treaty, "the high contracting parties have decided,
after the restoration of peace, to estaiblish a close and
friendly collaboration . . ." They will develop to the maximum their economic relations and will grant each other,
after the war, all possilble economic help."
No such treaty haw.ing been signed with the United
States, Great Britain, or France, this international a:greement predetermined the orientation of Ozecho~SlovaJkia
toward Moscow in the post-iwar European scheme of politica:l relations.
The Benes-Stalin treaty served as a strong stimulus
for those who had been aspiring to political power within
the framework of Soviet influence in central Europe. In
this category were included, among others, fOTmer memJbers
of the Slova:k Communist P,arty. In the 1935 elections, this
party had gained six sea:ts of the 58 corresponding to
Slo;vaikia in the Pmgue Pa:rliament. Consequently, around
10 per cent of the total ,p opulation of the country had voted
for this party, which the Government of the Sl01Vak Republic had suppressed as a subversive group in 1938.
The non-Communist growp, smaller and weaker in its
common punpose, was composed mostly of descendants of
Czech exiles who in the seventeenth century, at the time
of the Count er Refiormation, had settled in Slovakia.
Both of these factions, equally willing to back " ... the
apocaly,ptical horse from the E}ast" (as communism was
perfervidly described lby one of the factional leaders, r..udovit Sensel ), met secretly on Christmas Day, 1943, and
created a joint r evolutionary organization under the name
of the Slovak National Council. The goal of this movement,
as estaJblished under article 2 of the respective secret document, was: " . . . to ta:ke over, at the expedient time, all
political, legislative, military, and governmental executive
power in Slova:kia and to use it according to the will of the
,people until such time as their freely elected reipresentati&lt;ves
shall themsel,ves ibe ruble to take it over."
The b.asic political tenets of the so-called Christmas
Agreement were laid down in another document, the first
three articles of which read as follows :

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SLOVAKIA

"(1) It is our desire that the Slovaks and the Czechs,
as the two most closely related Slav nations, shall unite
their destinies in a Czecho-Slovalk Republic which will be
their common government organized on the principle of
equality.
"(2) We desire close collaboration with all Slav states
and peoples, particularly with the Soviet Union, in whioh
we see a protecting shield for the free life and welfare of
all small nations in general, and of the Slav nations in particular.
"(3) The future Czecho..Slovak Republic shall conduct
its foreign policy in the spirit of these .principles and should
therefore, lean on the Soviet Union."
It is appropriate to mention here that, during his visit
to Moscow in Deceimib er 1943, E. Benes had in principle
agreed with K. Gottwald to set up a So'Viet ty;pe of internal administration in Cze.cho-Slovakia after its reestablishment as a dualist union ; to eliminate all traditional conservative political parties in the Ozech area, as well as in
Slovakia; and to esta:bli,s h the regime of a so-called National Front Government. In his Memoirs, published in
Prague in 1947, E . Benes recognized this in the following
passage (pp. 408-409) :
''Thereafter Gottwald e,opressed his opinion a'bout the
way in which this revolution should be prepared. He stressed
the necessity of forming national committees (i.e., So¥iets) ,
which would not only constitute the revolutionary cells of
insurrection, but would even se:rve as embryos for the whole
revolutionary political administration, I was not apposed.''
- wrote Benes - "to this opinion . . ."
1

"Then Deputy Gottwald," continued Benes, "went on
to consider the question of the structure of political parties after the revolution in Czecho-Slovakia. He was certain of a great Te1volutionary shift to the leift, of a great
Socialist majority, rund of a great defeat of our block of
right-of-center parties as it existed before the war: agrarians, national democrats, and artisans . . . As to the admission of the Agrarian Party, our Communists were not
willing to commit themselves in any specific way in De-

�SLOVAKIA

63

cember 1943. For all of us the merciless liquidation of
fasoism was without any distinction the basic and obvious issue."
In the same discussion., Benes and Gottwald touched
on the problem of the National Front Government: "It
will be necessary," ~ote Benes, "for the governmental
parties to form a unified national front after the Uberation, to form a common reivolutionary program, and to
pledge themselves to put it jointly into practiice. I then expressed my agreement with the plan concerning a national
front ." (pp. 409-410).
On the basis of these three principles,: Sovietization
of administTati'ons, elimination of the conservative parties,
and organization of the National Front Government as it
emerged in 194'5, Cze'cho-1Siovakia was inevitrubly fated to
become a "people's" democrwcy.
Wihat was the practical result for SlorvaJkia of the
Benes-Gottwald agreement? The Communist and the nonCommunist pro~Soviet group conspiring a.gain.st the Slovak Repulblic, although not representing more than 24
percent of the population, became the future leading force
of Slwakia.
B. The August 1944 Insurrection

Since early 1944 the Soviet partisan headqll!arters in
Kiev, with Rudo1ph Slanslky as i.ts main political adviser,
had 1been pouring Red ,p arachutists and Communist agents
into the mountains of central Slovakia, far behind the
German frontlines. Through contacts with many Communists and non-Communist symjpathizers, Sfova'ks, Czeehs,
and fornigners in various cities and villages of the country, these agents maI11a,g ed to create a network of informants and future collruborators.
More recent documents reveal that as early as Fehrua·r y 7, 1944. Proif. Viladimir Jershov of Russian· origin,
Gregorij Soloshenko, second lieutenant of the Red army,
and William Zingor, a Slo~-ak Communist, came to an
agreement in Tureiansky Sv. Martin that " . . . all future
partisan activities in Slovakia would follow instructions

�64

SLOVAKIA

from Mos:cow."l It was also agreed that 2ingor would be
the chief of the Slova:k partisans, with Soloshenko as his
sulbstitute. These self-appointments were later " . . . recognized by partisan headquarters in Kiev, and the Turiec
County group was integrated into the general Soviet partisan system. By this act the partisan movement in Turiec assumed the character of a militaTy organ~tion." 2
Moreover, in the summer of 1944 the following Sol\Tiet
rugents were, a.mong many others, actiive in Slovakia: Ing.
Nicolai Avenaria, as liaison officer in Myjawa; Jmfa Nikolaiev, a graduate of the Leningrad Naival Academy, as distrilbutor of arnns; Ing. Dimitrij Venero:vsky am.d Ivan Platonovich, active in preparing the partisan or.ganization of
Liptov County. In Turiec, whioh was the center of the So·viet partisan activities, I·v:an Stepanol\Tich and Alexander
Fjodorovich Krajushkin were actively operating. The real
Soviet partisan camp was organized in the Kantorska Valle~, near Sklabina. It was commanded by a second lieutenant of the Red Army, Ilvan VySOIC!ldj. Nikola Sur:kov, second
lieutenant of the Red army, was in command of a similar
camp near Priekopa. The most effective of these Soviet
agents was Alexei Velichko, captain oif the Soviet paratroopers, who, in fact, ibecame the chief of all partisan actil\Tity in Central Slovakia. Even General Osmolov was sent
to SlovaJda for a period of time to assure coordination of
the activity of the different groups.
In the meantime, on August 1, 1944, Gen. Bar Komorovs:ki, in command of the Polis:h underground army, ordered a general insurrection in Wa.rsa.w. H e did this after
hea.iring an a;ppeal of _Radio Moscow encouraging the people
of Warsaiw to carry out a ·general uprising. "The hour of
a·ction has already arriived," declared Moscow. Bor Komor-ovski was consequently firmly conivinced that he would
receive eiffoctiive aid from the Red army, which had just
reached the gates of the Praga sulbwr.b, 10 miles from Warsaw. But the e~pected hel.p neyer came. In his telegram of
(1) Cont ributions to the H istory of th e Slo vak Nationa:l Insurrection (In Slovalk ) , Turcians ky Sv. M.arrt in , 1947, p . 26.
( 2 ) IbM.. , p. 29.

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66

August 16, 1944, to Prime Minister Churchill, Stalin dissociated himself from the "Wa1rsaiw venture." And so under the very eyes of the Red .army, the German units were
able to carry out their m8Sllicre of those Polish patTiots
who to Strulin (,according to his telegram of August 22,
1944, to Churchill) were but "a groU!p of criminals." On
Octdber 2 the uiprising collapsed 1because Stalin was unwilling to help "the Polish reactionaries."
The Waraaw insurrection seemed to ha:ve no effect on
Slovalkia. This was a ibloiw to Soviet expectations. To the
U. S. S. R., Sl~i,a, in the summer of 1944 was, from a
military viewpoint, an eID1Pty tera'itory with a "reactionary
government and nationalist populations," with some "deviated Communists" and some opporturustic non-Communist elements looking hopefully to Benes in London. A
civH W8JI' in Ozecho~Sloiwukia wouild haive been immensely helpful to the political aim!s of Moscow. But patriotic Slovaks
were too wise to begin an internal struggle. Three weeks
had passed siI11Ce the beginning of the Warsaw U!prising,
and still no rea.c,tion in Slovakia. In order to purge this
country of its "reactionary" elements before the impending occupat:rion, Moscow needed German military intervention there. ft was up to the Soviet aigen.ts to provoke it and
their opportunity was not long in arising.
On August 24, 1944, a spec,ial German military train
stopped in Tureiansky Sv. Martin, some miles from the
Soviet partisan headquarters illl ,Sklabina. The chief of
the railway station, in collusion with Captain Velichko,
refused to let it leaive. G€aleral Otto, former chielf olf the
Gernnan milimry mission in Rumania and now retwrmng
from Bucharest to .Berlin with his suite of 28 ;persons, was
then oonducted to the military barracik,s, held a prisoner
on instructions from Velichko, and together with all his
aides was killed by a unit of revolting soldiers the fohlawirtg day.
ThereUJPOn Hitler, infuriated with a Slovaik Government which was "unalble to 'k eep oroer in the hinterland
of the German lines," decided to send General Hloeffle into
Slovakia with an army of six di,visions to arunihrilate the

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partisan movement. It was as a result of this decision that
the political and military leaders of the pro-Soviet conspiracy started the U[&gt;rising whioh was announced on August
29, by Radio Banslka Bystrica. Within two months General
Hoeffle crushed this Sorviet-inspired venture. Although the
political chiefs of the insurrection, such as the "Demo ..
crats" Joseph Lettrich, Jan Ursiny, iMatej Josiko, Martin
Kvetko, Samuel Bellus, etc., and the Commum,s ts Gusta,v
Husak, Laco Novomesky, Karol Schmidke, etc., were aible
to escrupe, its military chiefs, General Viest and General
Golian, were not so fortunate. As they were attempting to
escrupe by plane, the latter was burned by their angry and
disillusioned soldiers. Both of them were then captured by
the Germans and ta:ken to a concentration camip in the
Reich from ,w hich they were never to return.
Wihile alll of this was going on, the Soviet Army was
quietly resting on the north side of the Carpathian Mountams where it had been stationed for ove,r four months,
tranquilly ruwaiting the last act in this &amp;ama. It is evident
that the U!prising was only a trrup set b.y the Soviet partisans to ensnare the ". . . Sl~ak reactionary and opportunist elements." This pur,pose of the insurrection was revealed during the trial against Slansky in Prague in 1952.
As has already been mentioned, the former secretary general of the Comm.1N1ist Party of Ozeoho-1Slovakia had been
the main ctivil adviser for the 1944 insurrection in Kiev.
With respect to this function the state prosecutor ques~
tioned him as follows:
Prosecutor: Why did th.e Anglo-iAmerican agent (general) P1ka show an interest in placing the partisan units in
Slovakia under the command of (General) Golian?
Slanslky: He sought to place all partisan units under
the command of the reactionary General Golian at Banska
Bys:trica so as to faciJ.itate Golian's supervision of their
activities. Pika tried, in the interest of the imperialists and
of the London Government of Dr. Benes, to reduce the influence of the par1Usa.n.s as far as possdible.3
(3) Marcel Peju: Hier et Aujourd1hui: Le sens du proces Slansky II. Les Temps Modernes. P.ari,s, June 1953, p. 2013.

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67

Thus Slansky revealed many years later what the Soviets really thought of the leading non-Communist personalities in the 1944 insurrection in Slovaikia.
This event is a great national tragedy. Whereas during the thref' years of her participation in the struggle
against bolshevism, Slovakia lost only 2,500 soldiers on
the eastern front, she lost around 30,000 persons in the insurrection in the short space of two months. Unlike the
insurrection of Warsaw, that of Banska Bystrica has nothing to do with Slovak ~triotism. It is quite clear that
Slovak patriots would have never organized an insurrection the purpose of which was to reestablish foreign external and internal control in their country.
C. The "Liberation" of Slovakia

What is known as the liberation of Slovakia by the
Soviets is in fact a misnomer and a grave distortion of the
historical facts. During World War II, though subject to
a certain international supervision by Germany, Slovalkia
was a relatively free country. During five years, until the
insurrection of Banska Bystrica, no one was executed for
political reasons . The Slovak Government in Bratislava
was able to master all the difficulties of the war period
during these years. Then the Red army came.
I waited for the Soviet "liberation" with a family
which lived on the outskirts of a small town, S., in western Slovakia. They had a nice, or as the Communists would
say, a '~bourgeois" home here. On the morning of a day of
mid-April 1945, the Soviet Army entered the town. The
house in question, which was located on a hill, was then
chosen as headquarters for the Soviet commanding generral in that sector of the front. During the two days that
the general stayed in the house, the conduct of the Russians was exemplary.
After the general and his staff had left, we congratulated ourselves on our not too bad experience with the
Soviet Army and prepared to cel~brate this event with a
good family dinner that evening. At p. m., just as we were
sitting down to table, a first lieutenant and a sergeant of

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SLOVAKJA

the Red army entered the house. The latter put his gun on
the dining-room ta&gt;ble and began checking on our identity.
Meanwhile the officer began to inspect the house "looking for hidden German spies." In the course of this inspection he found our ,p ersonal effects in Oiile of the bedrooms
and ·b rought them into the dining room. He then proceeded
to examine these things in detail and chose for himself
whatever happened to please him: A watch, a leather
suitcase, etc.
We then saw that a second lieutenant of the Red
army had entered the house and began in turn to forage
through it. After a while he ordered a young lady to go
into the kitchen to give him a glass of water. When these
three left, after 9 :30 p. m., the lady in question colJapsed
because she had been violated. After this visit by offi ..
cers, two other groups of soldiers, many of them drunk,
successively entered bhe house, each one having held us,
that is, four men and three ladies, under terror in their
own way, until 2 :30 a. m.
In the city of Bratislava, which numbered around
200,000 inhabitants, more than 4,000 dishonored women
had to go to the hospital for examination.
During the "liberation" of SlovaJkia by the Soviets,
around 20,000 Slovaks, mostly intellectuals, were sent by
po1itical commissarias into la;bor camps of Russia, while
various tens of thousands of inhaJbitants were imprisoned.
D. Political Evolution Aft.er 1945
On April 5, 1945, the government of Dr. E. Benes
followed the advancing Red army from Moscow into the
easVSlovaikian city of Kosice and estaJblished the Third
Czecho-iSlova!k Republic in the shadow of Soviet bayonets,
through the so-called Kosice declaration. Thus a foreign
government was imposed upon the Slovaik people which,
except for two small :factions of political opportunists, had
been loyal to the Slova&gt;k State - all of this without any
plebiscite. The Communists and pro-Soviet "Democrats",
who had already rendered a great service to Moscow in
the 1944 uprising, became the ex cutors of the n w state
will in Slovaikia.

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69

According to. the Benes-Gotlbwald agreement of December 1943 in Mos'coiw, they eliminated from the political
life of Slovrukia all other former political ,parties, namely,
the Slovak People's Party, the Agrarian Party, the Slovak National Party, and the Artisans Party. These parties }:lad received in the 1935 elections 19 plus 112, plus 1,
plus 1, or a total of 33 seats in the Prague Parliament out
of the grand total of 58 seats corresponding to Slovalkia.
Not countiing the Magyar and the German minorities which
had then elected 11 deputies and did not take part in the
uprising, the two pro-Soviet factions cor,r esiponded in
strengbh to only 1'4 deputies of the pre~war Slova,k representation in the Prague Parliament, six of them being
Communists, four Social Democrats, and four others.
Now, after haiving assured the mo!Ilopoly of political
re,presentation for themselves, the Communist and pro~
Soviet "Democrat" fa.c tions agreed upon a spo.ils system
exipressed in the form of a 50-50 share in the political
aJff~irs of Slovakia. In this way the political irufl:uence of
the Communists increased, in comparison with the year
1935, from 10 to 50 percent, and that of the pro...Soviet
"Democrntic" faction from 13 to 50 percent. Afthough this
50--50 relation 'between the two factions was corrected
by the elections of May 26, 1946, in favor of the "Democrats" who, 'becauS€ of the exdusion of other traditional
,parties, gained 62 .p ercent of all voters in SlovaJkia, while
the Communists got only 30 percent, the actual influence
of the Communist Party did not diminish at all. From the
outset the Communists had taken oiver the Commissariat
of Interior, including the Police; o;f EducatiOIIl; and of Industry, together with other key ,p ositions in the administration Oif Slovakia. They also retained the chairmanship of
the Board of Commissioners, i.e., the regional g01vernment
for Slo:vaikia.
MeaI11Whhle the Sovietizaition of Czecho~Slovaikia was
progressing in every field of Government activity: In the
field of industry, President Benes, ever olbedient to the
Communi,s ts, nationalized the main branches of industry
by Decrees Nos. 100, 102 and 103 of October 28, 1945, and
this without any consultation with the nation - mines,
1

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100 percent; steel industry, 100 percent; sugar production,
80 percent; electricity, 73 percent; chemical industry, 72
percent; metallurgy, 68.5 percent; glass industry, 65 percent; leather, 53.5 percent; gas, 50 percent; textiles, 47
percent; ceramics, 46.5 percent; pruper industry, 4'5.5 percent; distilleries, 31.5 percent; breweries, 27.5 percent;
clothing, 25 percent; mills, 14 percent; food, 9 percent;
wood industry, 8 percent.
By these acts the IIlum!ber of wor.kers in the nationalized sector ,b ecame 570,000, whereas only 430,000 working
people fell within the field of private industry.
ln the field of education all the schools were nationalized by decree of the Slovalk National Council (No. 34,
dated May 16, 1945). Decree No. 47 of 1945 comiscated
the property of pri:viate schools, without compensation.
By decree of the Slovak National Council • (No. 33 of
May 15, 1945) the following institubions of political justice
were created: Oommunit,y and &lt;list.riot "people's courts"
and a national court in Bratislava. The legal task of these
courts was to judge war criminals, but their political pmpose was to get rid of the -p olitical adversaries of the two
factions in power, under the pretext of collaboration with
Germany.
The political character of this distorted justice was
determined by three circumstances :
1. According to article 42 of Executive Decree No. 55
Board of Commissioner s, dated June 5, 1945, the
the
of
memlbers of these courts were to be ruppoinrted by the two
political ,parties in power.
2. These courts, disregarding the classiical principle
nulla poena, sine lege, were made component to decide
upon cases which were not punishable according to the
Penal Code.
3. This legislation introduced the principle of collective guilt and collective :responsilbility.
4. Art.i.cle 5 of Decree No. 33 of May 15, 194!5, provided
for labor camps, which were estaJblished through Executive
Decree No. 105 of August 23, 1945. According to the provisions of article 2 of this last decree, the following cate-

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71

gories of persons were to be sent to lrubor camps:
a. Those sentenced by the "ipeople's courts";
b. Tho,s e whose activities were a threat to "the people's demoeratic regime," public security, puib1ic peace and
order, rpulblic nutrition and the reconstruction o:f economic
life; or those who were enemies of the state or conspirators against it;
c. Those who· do not work;
d. Those who declined to do the work assigned to them
within the framework of laibor duty.
'5. No plea was admissible agaiinst the act of indictment; the defendant did not have a free choice in selecting
his defender; no ·a ppeal was granted to a sentenced de. fendaJI11t.
6. Sentences to imprisonment usually involved the
confiscation of the ded'endant's property.
It 4, ruppropriate to add here tha,t before being .brought
to· trial the "traitors," "Fasci.Sits," "collaJborationists," and
"unreliable persons" were entirely at the memy of their
indictor~. There was no impartial court, as the grand jury
in America, to examine into the basis of an accusation.
This was an era of arlbitrary indictments and personal
revenge.
By its decree No. 5,1 of May 2, 1945, the Sloivaik Natiooal Council dissolved in Slorvakia all assodations, except for those few which were eixipressly exempted from
thls general ,p rovision. Freedom of the press, of assembly,
and other human rights were likewise a;bolished.
E. The "Coup de Force" of November 1947 in Slovakia
All these measures were aimed at the weakening of
traditional political forces and the estaiblishmenrt of an exclusively Communist power. For a long time the leading
personalities of the Sloivak Democratic Party, such as Joseph Lettrich, Jan Ursiny, Matej Josko, Martin Kvetko,
Stephen Koovara, etc., did not know whether they should
remain loyal to their "gentleman's agreement" of 1945 with
the Communists or follow the anti-Communist line orf the
great ma;j.ority of the Slwak people. Finally they decided

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72

to remain loyal to their agreements with the Communist s.
Instead of getting .r id of the Oommunist s, as would have
been normal for a party which had won 62 percent of all
the votes of SlovaJkia, the "Democrat s" did not alb.andon
the principle of the National Front G01Vernment. This
loyalty was to prove their fatal undoing later on.
In Selptemlber 1947, under the pretext of having disc01Vexed a conspiracy a,gainst the governmen t in the Democratic Party, the Communist s decided to liqUJidate this party. Jan Kempny, Milos iBugar, and Joseph St8!sko., three
deputies of the Catholic wing of this party, were imprisoned, as well as a,bout 2,000 other Slova\k patriots. Thereafter the Communist s organized demonstrat ions against
" . . . the reactionari es hidden within the Democratic Party." In this violent dispute between the two political parties in Slo vaJkia, the Ozech-1Soci alist block - i.e., the Communists, the Social Democrats , and the National Socialists
of Benes - representin g togeither 18'5 deputies (93 plus 37
plus 55) out of the 300 in the Prague Parliament , threw
their weight on the side of the Slovak Communis ts (23
deputies) and against the Democratic Party (43 deputies).
The Czech Catholics ( 44 deputies) remained undecided.
There was only one honora,ble way to prevent the constant intewenUo n of Prague in the internal affairs of Slova!kia, name ly, to proclaim the inde pendence of Slovakia.
Instead of doing that, Joseph Lettrich, chaimnan of :the
Slovaik Demooratic Party, gave his consent to further
limitatio!Ils on the politi&gt;Cal preirogative s of his own party.
1

After a visit of Klement Gottwald to Bratislava, the
Democratic Party was relegated on Novemlber 18, 1947,
to a minority status in the regional governmen t of Slova1kia. Out of 15 seats there, it retained only 7, while the
triumphant Communist bloc got 8: The Communist Party
itself (including the chairman), 5; the Wreedom Party, 1;
the Social Democratic La,bor Pairty, 1; and the last seat
fell to General M~kttlas Ferjencik, "the neutral Oommis,s ioner of the Interior," playing in fact into the hands of
the Communist s. Such a hll!IIliliating change would have
been impossi!ble without a Czech coup de force in SloV3Jkia.

�SI.IOVAKIA

73

Having thus eliminated the greatest obstacle from the
way of their ambition for exclusive power, the Czech Marxist rbloc (includ!ing 56 percent of aU Czech voters of 1946
and 130 deputies (93 Communists and 37 Social Democrats) out of 23,1 corresponding to the Ozec&lt;h area) was
finally able, on February 25, 1948, to, peacefully consolidate
its position and, by eliminating the Czech Catholics and
National Socialists, to pass over from the priniciple od' the
National Front Gorvernment to a sheer Communist dictatorshilp.
Conclusion
As a conolusion to this statement, I wish to repeat
that I welcome this. opportunity of finally putting the
events which took place in Ozecho-iSlovia'k ia between 19451948 in the pro.per historical light. It is with regret that I
must state. that neither of the two congressional documents dealing with the Communist subjtu gation of CzechoSlovakia - i.e., House Document No. 154, part I, on The
Coup de Force in Prague, pulblished in 1,9 49 by the Foreign
Affairs Committee, and DoCIU!Illent No. 70, pa,rt 4, on internal tensions in Ozecho-,Slovalkia, recently pulblished by
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate (July 1954),
contain aipproprfate facts and analyses of the acts of
Commun.ist aggression committed during that period in
Slovrukia.
(Wa,s hington, D. C., December 3, 1954).

fflE TESTIMONY OF FATHER ANTON BOTEK
Mr. Kersten. 'Dhe hearings will come to orde•r .
Mr. McTigue. Your name is Father Anton Botelk, is
that correct, Father?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. And you were fOl'!Illerly director of Catholic Action in Slo:vahla, is that correct?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. McTi:gue. fa it true you were in prison a total
number of seven times?
Father Botelk. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Imprisoned by the Communists.?
Father Botek. Yes.

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SLOVAKIA

Mr. iMcTigue. From 1945 to 1949?
Father Botek. No, from 1949 till 1950.
Mr. McTigue. When did the Communists occupy SlovaFather Botek. In 1944.
kia, Father?
Mr. McTigue. Norw, Father, tell us something a!bout
the f,i ght to !keep the Catholic schools open in 1945 and
1946 following the Communist occupation.
Father Botek. As early as 1944, during the 1944 CommUJili.st uprising in SlovaJkia, the so-,ca,lled Slovakian National Council was concerned with the abolition of all
church-Operated school,s.
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something aJbout the
tactics of the Communists used to destroy the organizations of the church?
Father Botek. At first they rubolished all Catholic
Church operated schools; then they disbanded all Catholic associations, and fina:lly they sll!ppressed the Catholic
press.
Mr. McTigue. Slo:v akia is predominantly Catholic in
Father Botek. Yes.
religion, is tihat right, Father?
Mr. McTigue. What are the percentages of Catholics
in Slo;vakia?
Father Botek. Eighty-two ,p ercent are Catholic.
Mr. McTigue. Is there anything you can tell us, Father, rubout the so-called elections in 1946 in Slovaikia?
F1a:ther Bote:k. As early as 1944, there were only two
political .p arties admitted; that is, the Communist Party
and the so-.c alled Slovaikiian Democratic Party. .The Slovakian Democratic Party denied any political party that
would be able to defend their rights by democratic method.
Mr. MoTigue. Wasn't there some agreement between
the Slova1kian bishops amd the Democratic Party, Father?
Father Botek. Since there was no political representation of Slovakian Catholics, the Sloviakian bishops and
clergy tried to find means by which Slovitkian Catholics
could exipress their political will. This was necessary especially since the Communasts were anxious to win the sympathies of the Slovakian people. The Communists tried to
use, especially, the Sloivakian Nation's. feelings for their
1

�SLOVAKIA

75

pu~ses and they suggested to the SlovaJkian people the
creation of an independent SlovaJkian State after the end
of World War II. This, howerver, wasn't approved by Mos~
cow. Therefore, the Commurusts tried to achieve a selfrule for ISlovaJkia within the frame of the Czecho...Slovakian
Re,pulblic and they finally succeeded in it; this was then
inco:riporated into the so-called
Kosice agreement concluded in 1945.
The Communists also tried to win the sympathy and
support of SlovaJkian Oathol.ics, promising the former members of the CathoJic Slova;kian People's Party tha;t they
woU!ldn't be punished for their wrur-time activities if they
joined the Communist Party. They also wanted some priests
for their policies; for instance, a certain priest, Joseph
Straka, who was previously suspended from his office b,y
his bishop because of irregularities in administration. The
bishOipS foribade Catholic priests to make any canvassing
prior to the 1946 elections and the Catholic priests were
also fonbidden to be candidates for any political party in
those elections. Father Straka, however, disobeyed this
order of the Catholic bishops and made .propaganda for
the Communist Party in winning Catholics for that party.
He promised Slovakian Catholics that the Com1rm.11n.ist
Party would guarantee complete religious freedom to CathoJics and he issued also several ~itten statements to
the peoiple, one of which I am in position to furnish to this
committee. The Slovafidan people, however, didn't let themselves be misled by the Communist propa;ganda and they
trusted the bishops because they knew their a;ttitude toward the Communists was the only correct one, since the
bishops warned them agaiinst the Communists even during
the time Oif Worlld War fil. Therefore, we tried to find some
cooperation with the Democrati:c Party of Slovakia, which
was not at least Communist, even tho.ugh this party was
also coresponsilble for the fact that the Communists were
aJble to penetrate SloiV'a!kia. The Catholics were es'peci'ally
indignant aigainst the Democratic Barty of Slova1cia ~
cause they rug-reed to the confiscation of 1,800 elementary
schools and 80 schools of higher grade which were prevfo:us..
ly operated by the Catholic Church, because this conifisca1

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SLOVAKIA

tion took place. i,n 19'115, at the time when the commissioner
for education was the chairman of the Democratic Party,
Dr. Joseph Lettriich, T.he so-called "Democrats," however,
became aware of the great pressure, and the great activities developed by the Communists and therefore they
also, on their part, tried to win su&gt;ppo•r t of the Catholic
population of SlovaJkia for themseJves. At tha,t time we
Catholics still conducted negotiations with both the Communists and the Democratic Pa·:rity since we still hoip ed that
we would be aJble to achieve from the Communists the admission of a Catholic Party to be on the other side.
There were also preparations made for an ag,r eement
with the Democratic Party. The Communists, during the
negotia.tions, always applied the tactics of postponement
of a final decision. They made indications that they might
be inclined ·to admit, if not an ex,plicity Catholic party but
a P'arty which would at least, to some extent, aP\peal to the
Catholic population of Slovaikia. However, it soon became
apparent that no agreement could be reached with the
Communists. Therefore, on the 30th of March, 1946, we
concluded an agreement with the Democratic Party of
SlovaJkia. In this agreement, the Democratic Party of SlovaJkia pledged itself to admit Catholics as candidates on
their list of candidates in the 1946 elections. When the
Communists realized this they qtlliokly allowed another
party, which was called the Freedom Pa,rty and of which
they claimed this was a Catholic party. In this party there
were several good Catholics, even such persons who previously part-icilpated in the negotiations with the Democratic Party, but the chief leaders of that party couldn't
be trusted. The Communists also made propaganda or encouraged voters to cast inrvalid votes beca:UJSe they calculated that Slovakians who• disrug,reed both with the Communist and Democratk Pa!r ty would prefer to cast invalid
votes which then would diminish the percentage of votes
received by the Democratic Party. These irnvalid votes
were. generally referred to as "white ballots" because they
were plain slips ()If ,paper. This oppovtunity to use these white
ballots was voted in the Parliament prim· to the elections,
and the Communists and the representative s of the Free-

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SLOVAKIA

dom Party were in favor of this policy. Then it became ob.viou:s thalt the Fireedom Party was merely a pwppet party
under control orf the Communist s. We therefore started
,pmpagand a among the Catholics to vote for the Democratic Party.
We couldn't deve1orp this propaganda publicly, hut we
r equested Slovakian bishops to issue a statement to the Slovalkian voters. In this statement orf the bishops, Caltholics
were called upon to vote according to their Christian conscience; they we&lt;re forihidden to vote for an undemocra tic
party which would .not admit religious freedom and they
were called upon to vote for the party wh~,ch would guarantee demncratic freedom. This statement clearly indicated thalt SlovaJkiam. CathoUcs were foiibidden to vote in
favor of the Communist Party but it still was necessary
to instruct the Slovakian Catholics that it ,w asn't good for
them to vote for the Freedom Party either. Therefore, a
statement was included in this aipipeal by the bi shops stating that it was not true; that the rumors were not true
which stated that the Slovakian bishops joined the Freedom Party and that they were inclined to vote for that
party. Those :mimors we.re spread by the Communis t Party
and hy the Freedom Party. Copies of this proclamati on oif
the bishops were sent to all iparish priests; it was also published in the Catholic press and we had couriers talking
them personally to each priest. As a result of this campaign, the Democratic Party won in the 1946 elections and
receiived 61 ½ percent of all votes cast. HO!Wever, we found
out that the Democratic Party didn't de.fend the interests
of the Slovakian Catholics and that this ,p arty even failed
to defend its own memlbers of Parliament who were Catholics. The Oomnmniirst-controlled Commissio n of the Interior in SlovaJkia had arrested the leaders of the Catholic
group within the Pairliame.nrt who were members of the
Democratic Party. In the a,greement reruohed between the
Catholic representati v,es and the representat ives of the
Democratic Party, the Democratic Pat-ty pledged itself, or
guaranteed to, Catholics that the schools would be returned to. the Catholiircs ag·a:in and that the press would
also be allowed, as well as Catholic organrzatio ns. How1

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SLOVAKIA

ever, the Democratic Party failed to honor these promises
and in arguments with the Communists they always
yielded to the Communist demands in order to avoid personal troubles with them. Therefore, Catholics decided to
take up direct negotiations with the Government itself in
order to defend their rights.
Bishop Jantausch persona1ly called on the chairman
of the Board of Commissioner s in Slovakia trying to achieve
the fulfillment of the promises given by the Democrats
and the guarantees for the democratic rights of Catholics. However, he failed to achieive any results. I accompanied him on his visits to the Communist Commissioner
HusaJk, and the Communist Commissioner Viktory, and
neither of these two ever agreed to any concessions to the
Catholics. Then a commission was. introduced which was to
find a solution of all ,pr01blems of the Catholics. In this
commission, representative s of the Communist Party were
Husak and Novomesky, and the representative s of the
Demooratic Party were Filo and Frastacky. On the part of
the Catholics, the representative s were Bishop Lazik, Cannon Cvincek, Carnogursky, and myself. The pro!blems to
be solved were the reesta!blishme nt of church-Operat ed
schools, a free Catholic press, admission of Catholic organizations, discontinuatio n of inhuman deportations of the
Germans and Hungarians from Slovakia, confiscation of
property and cancellation of work on Sundays. This commission convened only twice in the winter of 1947, but no
results were achieved. In 1945 the Communists abolished
the following Catholic organizations : Organization of Catholic women, with a memlbership of 100,000; the Organization of Catholic Men, with 30,000, and the Association
of Catholic Youth, with a membership of 50,000.
Mr. MoTigue. In 1948, is it true that the central office of Catholic Action, of which you were director, was
liquidated and you were arrested?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. What were you charged with when you
were arrested, Fathoc?
Father Botek. The Central Catholic Bureau received

�SLOVAKIA

instructions from the Catholic bishops to taJke over all
acti,v ities previously carried out by the Catholic Action.
However, we were aware of the fad that all organrizations didn't haive a legal background, a legal footing, and
therefore any acttvities developed by this organization
oould be stopped by the Communists any time they wanted.
The activitie.g of the Central Bureau, the Catholic Action
Bureaiu, were carried on with a great risk. I knew I was
collSltantly shadowed by one or two secret policemen and
that offic:ially all persons who entered the offices of our orgaruza.tions were super.vised by the· Communists. Instances
happened that visitors at or1.1r office were then apprehended
by these policemen, searched, beaten Uip , and adivised to
omit further visits to our bureau. Therefore, we were
anx,ious to keep our activities in the field of the Cathohl.c
Action strictly within the limits of religion a,nd not to mix
in any political aspects. Nevertheless, the Communists
didn't permit our activities and on December 7, 1948, eigiht
Communist po1icemen inivaded our bureau and declared
that our organization was disbanded and that the 'b,ureau
had to be closed dQIWiJl. The employees at the bureau we.r e
sent to a room where they were searched while, in the
meantime, in the ibwreau itself, all documents were
searched by the Communist police. This search la,s ted from
8 o'clook in the morning until evening hours, but finally
the employees of the bureau were released to their homes,
and I was t aiken by the police to my apartment which also
was searched by the police. The office rooms of the bureau were then sealed by the Communist police. 1:'he Communists then entered the office rooms of the Catholic bureau twice more and also, I, myself, was twice investigated by the pol,ice. Likewise, my assistant at the bureau
was investigated by the police.
On the 29th of January 1949, three policemen oame
to my apartment at 6 :30 o'clock in the · morning and intended to ta ke me to. the police station. At that time I was
just saying my daily Mass and I was notified that the
policemen were waiting for me. I could escrupe, but I decided aga,inst this, because I suspected that I would discredit, by esca,ping, the Central Catholic Bureau and also
1

�80

SLOVAKlA

the Slovakian bishops. I was taken to the police station
at Bra:tislav and held for seven days U1I1der very poor conditions. The iinrvestigators tried to force me to confess
that I had connections with the Western Powers, that I
engaged in espionage activities, and that I develO!I)ed subversive activities against the Peoiple's Democratic regime
in Ozecho-iSlO!Vak.ia. They didn't have any evidence a,gainst
me and, therefore, the]' tr8.lllsferred me to the regional
court's prison where they held me for another five months
pending investigation. At the end of these five months,
my foI1IDer assistant at the Catholic Bureau, as well as
the expert for pastoral activities in the border areas, were
released and I was put on trial. Since they couldn't produce any evidence in support of the charges that I wo:riked
for foreign powers and that I engaged in espionage activities, they forced a student to testif,y against me, that I
knew of his espionage activities and failed to reiport this
to the police. For this offense I was sentenced to seven
months' imprisonment. On July 7, 1'949, I was transferred
to the Leopoldov penitentiary b.eca:use, at the time the
Communists organized their so-called CathoHc Action,
which was controlled by them, many Catholics who supported the genuine Catholic Action were imprisoned, so
that the prisons were crowded. I served the rest of my
term at LeO!poldov and on the 28th of August 1949 I was
released. I was in poor health as a result of my imprisonment and, therefore, I had to go to a hosip ital, but after
a month I myself requested to ibe assigned to a small parish so as to disappear from the eyes od' the Communists.
Mr. McTigue. Was this in 1950, Father?
F,8 /ther Botek. 1949. While at this small parish, we were
preparing an ecdesiastical sermon and at this time a local
Communist called on me and requested me, pleaded with
me, that I shouldn't launch any attacks against Communists in my sermon, bec3/Use he stated he was charged with
my suI1veillance and was to report everything on me, including that whicih I told in my sermons, and he stated
he was a Catholic, too, and was the father of eight children he couldn't refuse this Communist order to spy on me
and on the other hand, if another .person would be given

�SLOVAKIA

81

the same instructions, this other person could do harm
to me. When I was approximatel,y two months at this
par,ish, the local chairman of the Communist Party called
on me and notified me that I was swpposed to report at
the district national committee for some discussion. I
was afraid, however, that this was just a triok and that
people were previously sentenced on charges of underground activities and were sent to forced-.JaJb.or camps even
after they had served their terms imposed by the courts.
However, the Communists are very cautious while proceeding against Catholic priests since the parishioners defended their ,priest$ against arrest and there were clashes
between the population and the Communist police who a,r rived to arrest Catholic priests, especially at the time when
the Communists started their own sponsored Catholic Action. There.fore, they endeavored to lure our parish priests
fronn their parishes and to arrest them at a place where
such resistance by local parishioners couldn't be offered.
TherefoiI'e, I decided not to report at the district national
committee and await my arrest at the parish office, and
on the same day the police arrived and took me to a
forced-labor camp at Nova:ky
My parishioners protested against my arrest; however,
they didn't put up any ·physical resistance since they already experienced that such resistance was followed by
arrests of hundreds of innocent people and that it still was
to no avail because the pTiests were always eventuaUy arrested. I could tell you about conditions there, albout my
experiences which I had at that time when I was held at
the Bmtisl8'va County jail. At that time there were members at least of ten underground groups held at that prison. When I had an opportunity to talik to them, I asked
how they became involved in underground activities and
how it happened that they were arrested since there were
always rubout 50 persons from each group arrested. Most
of these for.mer members of the undengr.ound groups stated
that there was always a Communist spy planted by the
Communists within their organizations, and that this Communist spy even encouraged them to develop underground
activ:ities which he then reported to the Communist police.

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SLOVAKIA

I realized that the Communists had put under sur:veill~e
all people whom they suspected might engage in underground activ-ities and if they failed to find anything, any
underground actiivities, they encouraged such people to
develop such activities, and be.fore a group could actually
start its undeirground activities, the spy denounced them
to the police and the memJbers of the group were arrested.
In 1,9 49, the Communists realized that they were U!Ilaible to
win the Catholic bishops for their puriposes; therefore,
they decided to organize their o,w n Catholic Action. They
coTI1Vened a meeting of the so-&lt;:aJled representaUves of the
Catholic Church in Prague on June 10, 1949. To this
meeting they invited several priests under false pretexts,
stating that this was to he a conference to negotiate and
discuss church pro1b lems. In addition, there were also several Catholic laymen invited to this meeting, who were
mostly mem!bers of the Communist Party but didn't play
any decisive role in the Catholic life, and the Communists
eventually declared this meeting as the new leadership of
the Catholic Action.
The Communists declared that since the Vatican was
against the people and since the bishops supported the
v ,a tican in this policy, they intended to leave to the Ohu:rch
only the spiritual care and admit only the kind of questions and morals that the Pope could rule in .the affairs
concerning the Catholic morals a:nd the· Catholic faith; but
all other religious· questions would be taken care of by this
Catholic Action. This evidently was an attempt by the Communists to seize control over the administration of the Catholic Church in Czecho-Slovakia. However, they real.ized
that they didn't haNe the sU1pport of the people. Therefore,
they initiated an aotion of signatures which were to be rutta,c hed by the entire population of C!zecho-Sloivakia, to a
memorandUllll issued by the rubove-mentioned meeting at
which this Communist Catholic Action was founded.
Branches of the Communist Party organization were entrusted with the carrying out of this signature action. They
convened meetings in towns and in viUages, and also at
wo:rikiplaces. at which the present people were called uipon
to put their signatu:re on the memorandum. The bishops,

�SLOVAKIA

83

however, condemned this Catholic Action, and the Holy See
declared every person who would sign this memorandum as
excommunicated from the Catholic Church.
Mr. McTigue. Father, you were in a forced labor camp
in 1950; is that correct?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Did you get sick at that time and were
you sent to a hospital?
Father Botelk. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us very briefly something
about how the Communists treated the Sister,s at the
hospital?
Father Botek. A Communist order previously arrested
all nuns those who were nurses at hospitals because
there was a great laclk of trained nurses at the hospitals.
These nuns, however, who were left as nurses at the hospitals, were e~posed to various Communist chicaneries.
That was done by Communist functionaries at the hospital, by Communist doctors, and men, and assistants.
They were called upon to renounce their mernlbership in
their religious orders and to become civilian nurses. The
Communists tried to Lure · the younger nuns with a promise that if they agreed to renounce their membership in
the religious order, tihey would be permitted to go to a
university without any previous education, which was
otheIWise required from university students. This was the
same pattern as was rupplied in the case of young Communist woI'kers who also were admitted to university studies without adequate education and just attend a short
preparatory course. Except for a few exceptions, most of
these nuns refused the Communist demands and so the
Communists started to remove the nun nur,ses from hospitals.
MT. McTigue. When did you learve Slovrukia, Father?
Father Botek. On the 26th of June 1951.
Mir. McT,~giue. Did you have any trouble in getting out
of SlQIVakia?
Father Botek. I made a previous attempt to escrupe.
At that time we were a group of 22 escapees. However,

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SLOVAKIA

this escrupe mdn't succeed and. so I had to try it a second
time, at which time we were only four escapees and we
succeeded in crossing the border.
,M r. McTigue. Your present assignment at this time
is in Rome; is that correct, Father?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. Busby. Father Botek, we know that communism
is opposed to all religions, but I think the comm~ttee might
like t-0 know how successful the Communists were in their
efforts to infiltrate and to destroy the Catholic religion
in SlovaJkia.
Father Botek. Previously, when I still was at the Central Catholic Bureau, we intercepted a secret Communist
instruction in continuing a Commumst plian for destruc,tion
of the Church and for its seizure and control. Under these
instructions, the indirvidual phases were to be the following: At first the ibishops of the Catholic Church in Czecho-,Slova:kia were to be separated from the Vatican; the
second step was to be. that the bishops were t-0 be discredited in the eyes of the priests, as well as of the laymen Catholics, and finally, the last phase was to be the
separation of the Catholic laymen from their priests.
IMr. Busbey. Now, that leads ri,ght up to my question.
Up until the time you left Slovakia, and from yOIUI' own
personal olbservation, h ow successful was this plan of the
Communists?
Father Botek. They succeeded in accomplishing the
first oibjective; that is, to separate the Catholic Church in
Czecho'"'Slorvrukia from the Vatican. They expelled the Annuncias from the Vatican to Ozech0-Slovakia so that contacts of Ozecho-iSl01Vakian authorities with the Vatican
were interrupted. Nevertheless, the Catholics in OzechoSlovaJkia remained faithful to the Vatican, to the Holy See.
However, they failed in achieving their second olbjective.
to make the Catholic bishops bend to their demands and
to have them - to maJke them tools in the propagation of
communism in Slovakia. Therefore, the Communists ,pliaced
a commissary to each episcoipal office who was to taike
care that the bjsho,ps didn't have any contacts with the

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86

clergy and with the congregation. These Communist commissars controlled the in- and out-going mail; they controlled the visitors who intended to call on the bishops,
and admitted only those whom they considered harmless;
but even the talks of such visitors with the bishops were
monitored.
Mr. Busbey. Father, can you tell us aJbout the methods
and technics used by the Communists to indoctrinate the
pupils with the, theory of Marxism?
Father Botek. The Communists innoculated the Marxist ideology and way of thin'king to the pupils from the
very first grade of elementary school. When I was in hiding with a family who had an 8-year-old daughter, I overheard her tal!ks with her parents and I heard that this
girl was thinking in Communist terms and that her way
of thinking was completely inJfiluenced by the Communist doctrine.
Mr. Busbey. Father, do you agree with some of the
other witnesses we have heard, in the belief that if something isn't done in the immediate future and that if we let
the Communists ikeep on educating the real young boys and
girls, it will be more difficult, as time goes on, to defeat
this Communist march toward worrld revolution?
Father Botek. lt is a fact that the Communists have
had great successes in educating the very young people
in their ideology and the parents are almost unable to influence or to counteract against this Communist ideology
implanted inrto the chlldren because these children are instructed to report at school any attempts ,b y their parents
to dissuade them :13rom communism. Therefore, it is a fact;
that if communism is given enough time, that these youths
will become completely communistic and the Communist
strength will be increased.
Mr. Busbey. Can you give the committee any illustrations of the technics used by the Communists to make
the children believe in Stalin before he died, instead of God?
Father Botek. Yes, I saw the mrugazines for children,
for school-children, containing slogans such as "Stalin is
our sun; everything we haive, we've got from Stalin," and

�86

SLOVAK IA

"Stalin is ouT benefac tor, Stalin is our greatest benefac tor,
Stalin is the greatest man, Stalin is the most beautifu l man."

Mr. Busbey. Father, are you qualified to. tell the committee how the Commu nists rocploited the economy of Slovakia?
Father Botek. In these economi c aspects, I am not
well versed; I only Olbse,r:ved thait there was a general lack
of all consum er goods and that the living conditio ns were
poor.
Mr. Busbey. WhiJe you were in prison, were you given
any consider ation at all because of the fact that you were
a member of the clergy?
Father Botek. This ,prdbaJbly was the case 'b ecause I
never was maltreat ed, never was beaten at interrog ations,
and I observe d that many fello•w prisoner s were beaten,
so that I prolbaibly enjoyed preferen tial treatme nt. This,
may!be, was due to the faot that there was still a trace of
Catholic faith in my investig ators so that they were reluctant to rai,se their hands aigainst me as a priest. I also
had the followin g experien ce. While I was in ,prison, a prison guard caime to me and asked me whether he should
give his signatur e to the Commu nist Ac~ion Manifes to.
IMT. Busbey. My final question ; do you lbelieve tha,t any
agreeme nt made with the Commu nists is worth the paper
it is written on?
Father Botek. From my e~perience, I had negotiat ions
with the Commu nists, I can sta:te thait the Commu nists
never honor their word thait they gave in such negotiations, and this is in accorda nce with their general policy
which goes that everyth ing is good that promote s the Communist cause, and therefor e I am convinced thait any negotiatio ns or any agreeme nts reached with the Communists are worthle ss.
Mr. Madden . Father Botek, you in your testimon y
haive covered very well your experien ces back over the
years with the Commu nist Party in Slovakia and the only
question I would like to ask is what percenta ge of the
populati on of Sloviahla today are Commun ists, true Communists at heart; what percent age: 5 percent; 10 percent; 20 ; or what would you say?

�SLOVAKIA

87

Father Botclc. I thin!k that the percentage doesn't exceed 10 ,p ercent.
Mr. No71blad. Is the Voice of America or Radio Free
Europe listened to by many of the people in the area you
come from?
F1ather Botclc. While I was in hiding with several fa ..
milies in Slovakia, we frequently listened to the Voice of
America and Free EuTope programs. However, I heard
from these ipeople many objections against the spirit of
those programs beamed to Ozecho-.S1ovaJkia.
Mr. Nor.blad. What were the dbjoctions, generally, in
Slovakia? I am refemnig to the conditions in Slovakia.
Father Botek. The objections were mainly of a national and religious nature. The Slavaikian peqple are a
very religious people. They are 82 percent Catholics and
13 pereent Protestants, who also are active Protestaints.
Therefore, programs promoting ideas of a reformer, Jan
Huss, or the religious ideas of Masaryk and the other socalled free thinlkers, are not appeaJ.ing to the Sl01Vakian
population.
Ma-. Noy,blad. Do they believe the world news, the
straight news given on those programs?
Father Botek. Well, the Slovallcian people listen eagerly to the news broadcasts by the Voice of America. However, once OT twice I .w itnessed the following incident. Slovakian listeners who listened to the program of the Voice
of America, said, after the news was over, just said, "Well,
turn it off because the news is over and they are now
going to stam their propaganda for the Czech Republic
and we do not want any Oze&lt;!h Republic."
Mr. Norblad. Do you feel that the radio broadoasts are
doing some good behind the Iron Curtain?
Father Botek They certainly are of great use and
great efficiency but this efficiency would still be greater
if the rest of the pro.grams, except for the news, was also
adjusted to those two major feelings of the Slovakian
popufation, the religious feelin:g and the national feeling.
Mr. No:rlblad. Do you get the programs clearly or are
they j&amp;mmed by the Soviets?

�88

SLOVAKIA

Father Botek. The programs are being jammed but
on la11ger radio sets they still can be received and if the
transmission is jammed on one wave, on one b,and of the
radio,, it may ,be still tuned in on another one.
Mr. Feighan. There is, is there not, a very strict feeling of healthy nationalism within Slovakia?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. Feighan. And that of course. is the reason why
there has been some resentment to the broadcasts?
F1ather Botek. Yes. I also heard comments by listeners to the Radio Free Europe, and Voice of America programs to ·the effect that in spite of the fact that there are
almost one million SlO'Vitk immigrants in the United States,
who ha.ve their own homes there and national life in the
United States, these programs do not bring any reports on
the activities developed by these Slovak organi~atrons in
the United States; they only bring reports. of aotivities
of organi•z ations which are not sympathetic to the Slovak
people and, therefore, the Slova!kian population, in order
to learn of the activities of the Slov:ak organizations in
the United States, tune in on Radio Rome, which also
beams SlO'Vakian programs.
Mr. Feighan. Well, it is a pity that the pe-o:ple within
Slovak,ia are not acquainted with the tremendous contribution of the Slovakian immigrants to the culture and ciivic
development of our cotmtry. l!"'ather, would y;ou relate. in
a U.ttle more detail, if you are familiar with the fact that
the Communists in 1948, I believe, offered Slovakia the
opportunity to ·b ecome a Slovak S01Viet Republic?
Fiather Botek. That was actually in 1944 and 1945,
not in 1948. At that time this policy was promoted by the
S]pvaikian Communists, Husak and Novomesky. However,
Moscow disapproved. of this policy and, therefore, the
Slovakian Communists had to put up with Czecho-Slovakia, within which SlO'V•a!kia was to have broad autonomy,
self-rule.
Mr. Feighan. Was it no,t the Slo¥ak Government that refused rather than Moscow's refusing?
Father Botek. Naturally the Slovak Government was

�SLOVAKIA

89

opposed to this idea since it was a Catholic Government.
Mr. Feighan. Well, you've got it both ways; now there
is only one way.
Flather Botek. I would like to explain this apparent
discrepancy. This was due to the fact that there was in
1944, there was a Sl,QIV'a)ldan Govemment of an independent Slovakian State which to some extent - whose sovereignty was to some extent restricted by Germans. When
the Communists started their wprising, in August 1944,
they tried to arouse the sympathies of the SlOIVa:k people
with promises of an independent Slovakian State but
within the framework of the S01Viet Socialist Repulblic. Rusruk and N ovomesky were leading organizers of the wprising in 1944. This policy of the Slovakian Communists,
however, was disapproved by Moscow.
Mr. Feighan. Is it not true thait because of the spirit
of healthy nationalism within Slovrukia that the Slovak
people would not accept the offer to be a part of the U. S.
S. R., ~a,use they knew that such a so-.called independence of Slo,vaikia would be national in structme only, but
in su!bstance it would be socialistic?
Father Botek This is possible. This is possilble, but
President Booes, who was at Moscow at that time, persuaded the Moscow leaders to drop that idea; and he made
also great concessions to the Russia,ns so that they considered it more profitruble for them to hruve a CzechoSlovak Republic rather than a small Slovakian Repulblic.
Mr. Feighan. F'ather, did thi s Communist Catholic Action still function between that time of its first meeting
in June 1949 until you left in Jll!Ile of 1951?
Father Botek. This Communist- sponsored Catholic
action prorved to be a complete failure. They still held an
anniversary meeting the following year but they didn't
celebra,te the foundation of thls Catholic Action in the
third year any more.
Mr. Kersten. I hope you understand, Father, that all of
ourr questions are asked in the spirit of inquiry regarding
the Communist aggression upon Slovakia. That is our
overall purpose, and thank you, Father, for the testimony.
(Munich, Germany, June 26, 1954).
1

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SLOVAKIA

TESTIMONY OF FATHER STEFAN NAHALKA
(The witness wa:s sworn. The same interipreter was utilized as for the previous witness.)
Mr. McTigue. Your name is Father Stefan N ahal!ka, is
Father Nahalka. Yes.
that correct?
Mr. McTigue. Were you born in Slovakia?
Father N ahalka. Yes.
Mir. McTigue. Were you ordained a priest in Slov,aJkia?
Father N ahalka. I studiied theology in Rome, so I was
ordained in Rome.
Mir. McTigue. And assigned to parish duties in Slovakia,
is that correct?
!Father Naha1ka. Since 1943, I was a'SSigned to duty in
Slovakia.
Mr. MicTigue. And at one time, Father, you were secretary to Bishop Vojtassa!k, is that correct?
Father Naha1ka. Yes, I was in that capacity from 1946
to 1949.
Mr. McTigue. Do you recall the uprising, so-called,
Father Nrahalka. Yes.
in Slovakia?
Mr. McTigue. When did the t11prising taike place?
Flather NahaLka. At the place in which I resided, the
uprising started on the 26th of August 1944, when this
town was occupied by Communist guerillas.
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something aborut what
the guerillas did in that town?
Father Nrahalka. At that time I was chruplain at the
town of Ruio:miberoik and during the firist days of the
Communist uprising, the relbels forced the popll!lation, the
men in tha;t town, forcibly to join the rebel army even
though they were completely disiruterested and even opposed to the uprising. They also committed grave atroci~ies. In a valley called Podsucha, they murdered over 80
innocent people and buried them in a mass grave. In a
nea'Iiby village, the partisans mwdered without any connection with the military, a Catholic priest named Martin:ko. In the Lupca valley, the Communist guerillas tortured to death there a Catholic priest named Seda; they cut

�SLOVAKIA

91

stri!Ps of hi,s skin from his back and finally even cut off
his genitals. Since the population was not in favor of the
uprising, the rebels used this deceptive propa,ganda to wm
the sympathles of the popul ation. To this end they spread
the rumor,s that the president of the Slovakian R~Ulbl,ic,
Dr. Tiso, was arrested and de1p orted by the Germans and
that, therefore, Slovrukia should arise.
Mr. McTigue. Father, in 1949, did each b:i,shop have a
political commissar assigned to him so that he could watch
over the bishop's activiities?
FaJther Naha1ka. In 1949, when the negotia,tions between the Communists and the Slovakian bishops broke
down, the Communists placed Communist commissars into
every ibishop's oftfice and they also placed one commissar
into Bishop Vojtassa:k's oft:Eice, who was a young Communist, ,a former tailor. He was approximately 24 years old
at that time, and t'here was aJil'Other Co:mmun,ist placed in
the main entrance to the ,b ishop's office who chooked on all
visitors at the bishop's office. The. commissar opened: the
bishop's mail, in- and out...going, and overheard all conversations the bishop had with his visitors and also acoompanied him on ,a ll his trips,. He also seized control O'Ver the
files of the bishop's office and he tooik out items firom
those files.
Mr. McTigue. Were the rooms in the hishoip's home,
for example, wired ?
Father N ahallm. There were no microphones in the
rooms of the bishoip's office because the commissar wa,s
present at all conversations, ibut I know orf a case. when the
Communists placed microphones in the conference room
for the bishop's conferences.
Mr. McTi,g ue. Were you secretary to Bishop Vojtassa.k
in 1949?
Father Nahalika. Well, I was secretary to Bishop Vojta:ssaik until January 1'949 and afterwards I lived in the
'Vicinity of the bish0tp's residence, in the priest's seminary.
Mr. McTigue. Were you arrested by the Communists,
Father?
1
Fruther N ahalika. I was arrested in December 1945 and
held in imprisonment until January 1946.
1

�92

SLOVAKIA

,Mr. McTigue. When did you leaive Slovakia, Father?
-Father Nahalk,a. llll May 1953.
Mr. McTigue. That is a little more than a year ago.
Did you hawe any difficulty in getting out of Slovakia?
FaJther Nahiallk,a. Well, the crossing of the bo,rder was
very difficult. At first we had to wait fo~ 14 days for run
opportunity, for a favnrruble time to cross the border and
we had to ~ very cautious while crossing to a :border area
in which the border g,u ards are authorized to fire at anybody whom they see, without warning and finally we h,ad
to cut through the barbed wire fences directly on the
border.
Mr. Madden. Father Nahallka, when Father Boteik was
testifying, he mentioned something regarding certain broadcasts thaJt were cormng over the Voice of . Arrnerioa and
Radio Wree Europe; do you know anything regarding the
broadcasts th·a t come 01Ver? Do you have any knowldge
on th-at?
Father Nahallka. I was in hiding f.or two years with
the viarious people from almost all social striafa and during
this time I had ample opportUillity to 1isten to foreign
broadcasts.
Mr. Madden. Oou:ld you tell us regarding your knowledge of the hmadcasts that come into, Slovaikia?
Father Nruha.1':ma. The people in Slovakia eaigerly listen
to democriaitic broadcasts. However, the preferences a.re
different and also the foreign broadcasts axe hOON'ily
jammed by the Communists. The people in Slovakia listen
to news broadcasts in the Slovak language by Riadio Free
Europe, Voice of America and also BBC in London; however, they disaigree on many aspects in the poJ.i;tical comments broadcast from these stations. They are opposed
to the political part of the program of those broad~asts
mainly beca'll'Se they realize that such programs do not
state the entire Communist case in Slovakia.
Mr. Madden. You mean anti-Communist?
Father Nahalka. Are not efficient enough to inspire
anti.Communist feelinig or to keep up the ainti-Communist
attitude of the population. This opposition to the programs,

�93

SLOVAKIA

the poJitical programs of those stations is due to the fact
that they do not appeal to the national and religious fee~
ings of the Slovakians and a.iso from the ideological viewpoint, there are some oibjections, since they are sometimes very much alike with the Communist propaganda.
'.Dhey teJl people who know, in these broadcasts, there are
people who formerly collaiborated with the Communists
and they are now talking aib,out anti-Communists. For instance, the reports of the so~called Slovia,kian national uprising was a very, very - was a great mistake. At the
time when the transmitters were still in operation, people
in Slovakia eagerly listened to an illegal transmitter called
the Wlhite Legion transmitter and the people in Slo;vakia also :5requently listened to the religious programs
broadoost by Radio Vatican.
IMr. Madden. Do yoo think the programs broadcast
by the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe do any
good - I mean, against the Communists?
Father Nahalka. These broadcasts have their effects
in the line of anti-communism, but especially thr01Ugh their
news which they broadlcast. However, they could be still
more efficient if they adjusted their political programs
also to the needs and desires of the Slovak population.
(Munich, Germany, June 26, 1954).
THE TESTIMONY OF JAN DOBROTKA
Mr. McTigue. You are a Slovak, is that correct?
Mr. Dobrotka. ¥ es.
iMr. McTigue. And you were 'bom on OctOlber 20, 1913
at Dechtice, Slovakia, is that correct?
Mr. Dolbrotka. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. During the Communist occupation of
SlovaJkia you were a master sergeant in the SiN.B, socalled, which is known as the Bureau of Internal Security,
is that correct?
Mr. Dob:mtka. Yes, sir.
Mr. McTigue. And you were a uniformed master sergeant in the Buireau of Internal Security from 1947 to
1951, is that correct?
Mr. Dobrotka. That is right.
1

�94

SLOVAKIA

Mr. McTigue. Was the Bureau of Internal Security
completely controlled by the Communists,?
Mr. DobTOtka. As of 194'8 it was completely under
Communist control.
Mr. M'CTigue. But you were a member of the Bureau
of Internal Security prior to the time that it was under
Communist control, isn't that correct?
Mr. Ddbrotka. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. And you were required to stay on as
a member of the Bureau of Internal Security after the
Communists got control, is that corerct?
Mr. Ddbrotka. Well, I was automatically taken over.
Mr. McTigiue. After the Bureau of Internal Security
was taiken over by the Communists, did you from time
to time receive orders to arrest priests, to make house
searches, and so forth and so on?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes, I received such orders.
Mr. McTigue. Were there many of such arrests made?
Mr. Dobrotka. Many wealthy farmers were arrested.
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something about the
orders that were given to suppress and liquidate the Slovak Democratic Party members and the Slovak League?
Mr. Dobrotka. As of 1948 memlbers of the Democratic
Party were removed from all leadmg positioos in the administraJtion. The Slovak League was completely liquidated
because the Communists considered this organization a
swbversive and reactionary organizati'on, because it wa3
supporteq by the Slovak Leagiue of America.
iMr. McTigue. Did you ever rec{:ive orde~s to give close
supervision to the activity of certain parish priests in
Slovakia?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; I recei,v ed such orders.
Mr. McTigue. What kind of orders were they?
iMr. Dobrotka. We received such orders through channels from the government down to our posts and such
orders arrived in sealed envelopes and were classified as
secret, and we were instructed to open these eI1JVeloipes only
u:pon special order by telephone.
!Mr. McTigue. Who were the men that actually handed

�SLOVAKIA

95

you the orders, were they uniformed Soviet police or were
they plain-clothes men?
Mr. Dolbrotka. These were members of the uniformed
police. They were my immedia,te superiors and they related these orders to me.
Mr. McTigue. Iif you were instructed under sealed orders to report on certain priests, what kind of reports did
you m0lke,?
Mr. Dobrotka. Under these orders we were to Sllipervise the sernnons of priests and to report periodically on
whether there were any political aspects in those sermons by priests.
Mr. McTigue. Did you ever report, for example, that
there was any political significance to what a priest
had to say?
Mr. Dobrotka. I &lt;know I sulbmitted annual reports to
this effect, and I can state approximately 60 to 70 percent
of the memlbers of the SNB did not reporit any priests
to their superiors. This was also due to the fact that the
priests were aware of the fact that they were Slllpervised
by the police and, therefore, they avoided any political
speeches within their sermons.
Mr. MoTigue. Did the same kind of procedure, that is
reporting on their activities, apply to businessmen and
peasants and the PQpulace in general?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; we received such orders to supervise the activities of the entire population, especially to
observe whether the former mem!bers of the partially liquidated Democratic Party developed any underground
acti&lt;vities.
Mr. McTigue. Were many priests arrested and interned at the time you were in the Bureau of Internal
Security?
Mr. Ddbratka. From the entire district in which I
was active there were approximately three cases of arrests
of priests, however, not a single priest was arrested in the
area under my jurisdiction.
Mr. McTigue. Tha,t is because you kept reporting
to your superiors that the priests were only talking to
God, is that correct?

�96

SLOVAKIA

Mr. Ddbrotka. That is right; there was no reason for
their arrest.
Mr. McTigue. When did you manage to esca,pe from
SlorvaJkia?
Mr. Dobrotka. On Deoomlber 3, 1951.
Mr. McTigue. Did yiou haive any troUJble in getting out of
Slorvalcia?
Mr. Dobrotka. No; I did not have any tro'Ulble in
escaping.
Mr. McTigue. You are now a member of the Labor
Service unit at Bad Kreuznach?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kersten. Any questions?
Mr. Busbey. When did you ·become a mem!ber of the
Bureau of Internal Security? Is that the correct name?
Mr. Dobrotka. In 1938. At that time the name of my
headquarterrs was Provincial Command of Gendarmerie,
which was under the Minister of Interior.
Mr. Buskey. That was in 1938?
Mr. DOlbrotlra. Yes, in 1938, at which time Slovakia became an independent state.
Mr. Busbey. Were you a memlber of the Communist
Party at that time in 1938?
Mr. Dobrotka. No, sir ; at that time memibers of the
gendarmerie were fonbidden to become memlbers of any
political parties.
Mr. Busbey. In what year was, it that you assumed
your duties of reporting on priesrts?
Mr. Dabrotka. That was after February 1948, at the
time when the Catholic Action was started.
Mr. Busbey. You were a member of the Communist
Party at that time ?
Mr. Dobrotka. No, sir.
Mr. Busbey. Were you ever a memlber of the Communist Party?
Mr. Dobrotka. In March 1948 all members orf the SNB
in order to protect their own existence were forced to file
an application fur mem'bership in the COIIDmunist Party.
Mr. BUS1bey. In order to saive your life, you had to
become a member of the Communi'St Party at that time?

�SLOVAKIA

97

Inter:preter. He became a memiber in March 1M8, but
your previous quesltion was whether he was a member in
February 1948.
Mr. Busbey. Did you attend church prior to March
1948?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; I did. I am a practical Catholic
and I attended Mass every Sunday.
Mr. Bustbey. And how rubout after March 1948?
Mr. Do!brotka. After March 1948 I continued attending Mass regularly, however, we were aware that from
that time on we were under supervision by the Communists, particularly all our contacts with priests, with the
local priest, local teacher and local government officer
were suspicious, because these persons were considered as
reactionary, and our activities and connections with the people were supervised by Communists spies which were set
on us by the Communist Party.
Mr. Busbey. Would you agree with me that the greatest bulrwark ag,ainst communism, and the hope of the whole
world for e:venrual elimination of communism and for
world peace, is the fact that the people, not only behind
the Iron Curtain, 'b ut all over the world, will continue to
belie:ve in God?
Mr. DO!brotka. This I 'believe.
Mr. Buslbey. In other words, as long as the people have
a deep-seated, strong belief in God, we can be sure that
we will eventually eradicate communism from the earth?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes. May this ha,ppen as soon as
possilble.
Mr. Bus•bey. Thank you. No further questions.
(The witness was excused.)
(,Munich, Germany, June 29, 1954).
THE TESTIMONY OF JUR DETVIANSKY
Mr. Det'Vianslky was called a:nd duly sworn and testified through the Slo,vak interpreter as follows:
Mr. McTigue. Your name is Jur Detviansky?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.
Mr. McTigue And you were born on September 6, 1919,

�98

SLOVAKIA

in Slovakia in the village of Ladomila, is that correct?
_Mr. Detviansiky. Yes.
Mr. McTig,ue. You were a recorder of vital statistics
in the town of Deitv:a until August 1950, is that correct?
Mr. DetvfanSlky. That is correct.
Mr. McTigue. This is the time, of course,, that Slovakia was under the Communist domination or occupation?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.
iMr. McTigue. Later you were an administrative officer at Zvolen until Septemlber 1951, is that correct?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes, sir.
,M r. McTi,gue. Were you discharged from this office
by the Communists?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.
Mr. McTig,ue. Why?
Mr. Detviansiky. As a politically unreliable person.
Mr. McTigue. In your ,p osition you know something
about the quotas which were set for the farmers lby the
Communists, is that correct?
Mr. Detviansiky. Yes.
Mr. Kersten. Will you speaJk a little louder in Slovaik
and in English.
Mr. McTigue. How were these quotas set?
Mr. Detrviansky. The quotas were estalbJished for individual farmers in the presence of a representative of the
Communist Party. The •p rinci:p le for this establishment,
this prescrilbing of quotas, was· to prescribe those quotas
to wealthy farmers in such a manner that nothing would
be left for their own needs. This policy was aimed at desiroying the independenec of farmers and forcing them to
join the farmers' cooperative wh[ch would make them the
farmers dependent on the Communists. To the same end
also several other measures were taken by the Communists, such as, for instance, that all laJbor force was taken
away from the farmers and transferred to industrial
pul'p()ses.
Mr. McTigue. So it was impossible for these farmers, big and small, to meet the quotas imposed by the
Communists, is that correct?
,M r. Detvianslky. At first the farmers managed to
meet the delivery quotas because they helped each other

�SWVAKIA

99

in tendmg the soil. But later this task became imposs~b'l.e
to fttlfill and famJ.ers rubandoned. their farms and/ or were
arrested for not ful£illing their deliivery quotas.
~- McTigue. Can you give any examples which you
know of from your own personal knowledge, of how some
of the peasants on small farims reacted to the quotas?
Mr. Debviansky. There were several instances, but the
most significant of them was that which occurred at
Detva-lKostolna. It was on: Decemiber 5, 1951, when a farmer named Jan Ba/bic from despair because of the hard
delivery quotas prescriibed to him 1knifed his three children, 1, 3 and 5 years old. His wife and two older children succeeded in escaping his desperate aJCt. He committed
this action of despair because he stated that since they
took aiway from him everything they should take away
also his family.
Mr. McTigue. When did you escape to the West?
Mr. Detviansky. In Decemlber 1951.
Mr. McTigrue. And you are now a caiptain in one of
the Labor Service COIJ:Il!pany units at Kaiserslautern , is
that correct?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.
Mr. No:rlblad. Is the treatment which you harve been
receiving here aH you expected?
Mr. Detvfansky. Well, the treatment l received here
meets my expectations, however, I am dissatisfied with the
slow progress of the struggle rugainst the Communists and
I am impatient to return to my home country.
Mr. Norblad. Many of us are quite dissatisfied with
the progress of OUI' fight against communism.
Mr. Kersten. In other words I understrund you feel
that the men, the young men of Slovakia as well as the
people of the other captive nations that are in the free
world would like to try to help the people ibaok in those
countries and your country to regain their fireedom, is
that right?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes, sir, the sooner the better.
Mr. Kersten. And you likewise feel that the young
main back behind the Iron Curtain, even those under arms,

�100

S!LOVAIHA

would if they have the Oipportunity help get rid of Communists?
Mr. Detviansky. As far as Slovakia is concerned, I
can srtaite that since I was previously an active army officer and knew the mentality of the Sl01Vakian soldiers, I
can state that 90 percent orf the Slova,kian young men
would use such an oipportunity.
Mr. Kersten. Thank you.
The witness was. excused.
(Munich, Germany, June 29, 1954).

When the Kersten Committee pwblished its findings,
the Benes Czechs (Socialists), the Slovak renegades the Lettrich "democrats" - and the Reds began to scream
"murder!" That, of course, is quite understandaJble. For
the ladk of positive al'gument, they resort to the smear
technique, the usua,l line of the Reds. "CAS" (TIME) the official propaganda sheet of the Lettrich "we-got-6'2 %of-the,JSlovak-vote-in-1946" democrats, who actively collaborated with the Reds and Moscow from 1943 to Fe!bruary
25, 1948 - in its issue of February 1, 195:5, attaciked the
Kersten Committee and the testimony of most of the Slovak
witnesses, laJbeling the report "scandalous."
It is unfortunate that the Keraten Committee did not
call wpon the Lettrioh "democrats" to testify; the story
would have been more complete. At least Dr. Joseph Lettrich, "leader" of the Slovak "democrats," and Gen. Nicholas
Ferjencik, "non-!I)artisan" head of Lettrich's gestapo, should
have ,b een given the opportunity to confess that the "democrats" did .conclude agreements with the Reds in 1943 and
1945 to collaJborate closely on all issues. The Kersten Committee did a good job in the time allotted to it. The wol1k
initiated: should !be completed. Albove all else, leading Benes
Czechs (Socialists) and Lettrich "democrats" - former
members of the Communist-d ominated National Front government of Prague - should be girven the opportunity to
"sing"!

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1388">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA
Published

VOL. V

quarterly by the

Slovak

League of

MARCH 1955

America

NO . 1 (14)

HOW THE COMMUNISTS SEIZED SLOVAKIA
is told on the following pa,ges by
witnesses called upon to testify
by the Select Committee on Com•
mu.nist Aiggression of the House
of Representatives, headed by the
Hon. Ch:a.J'lles J . Kersten of Mil·
waukee, Wis.
Michael Galayda is an .American
citzen who experienced Communist terror in Slovakia. He was
there W1,d saw Communism at
work a mong his people w'ho had
persdstenUy ,and consistently fought
the Red plague for over a hundred
years. H e makes his home in
Hazleton, Pa.
Mr. and Mrs. Smrekovsky, American citizens, also witnessed the
terror and horror of Red rule in
Slovakia ,f irst hand. They have relatives and many friends in S1ovakia and, hen.ce are using an assumed name.
Dr. Joseph Pauco, news.paperman and writer, c ame to America
in 1950; he is assistant editor of
the .TIIDDNOTA (Union), the official organ of the First Catholic
Slovak Union, and a1so chairman
of the U. S. Bran,ch of the Slov,a k
National Council Abroad.
Dr. Joseph Mikula studied law
1 and politics and was very active
' in student circ'les of Slovakia ,before he Jlled the Red terror which
invaded his native Slovakia.
Dr. Joseph Mikus, foraner Slovak dilplomat, lawyer and writer,
became the director of the Press
Bureau of the Slovak League of
America, Wash!lngton, D. C., soon
after his arrival in America several years ago.

Jan Dobrotka, now an exile in
West Germany, was a Sergeant of
the Department of National Security in Bratislava, Slovakia.
Jur Detviansky was an active
officer of the Sloviak Army before
he Hed to the West.
Rev. Anton Botek, S.T.D., editor
and former director of the Catholic Center in Bratd•slava, S-Jovakia,
is in charge of the S lovak Catholic Action in Exiile; he edits
"HLASY Z RiMA," (Voices From
Rome), Italy.
Rev.

Stephen

Nahalka,

S.T.D.,

ecclesiastical writer and former
personal secretary to Bishop John
Vojtassak of t'he Spis Diocese,
1Slovaki,a - who, by the way, was
sentenced to 24 years 1n prison
1by the Reds lives in Rome.
Italy.
Philip A. Hrobak, editor of the
JEDNl()TA since 1938 and president of t'he Slovak League of
America since 19'50, is a native
AmerLcan, born in Cleveland, Ohio,
in 1904. Active in Slovak aff.airs
for the past 35 years,, Mr. Hrobak
has devoted much time to the study of Czecho-Slovakda and Slovakia and the people responsible for
government. His
articles
and
pampb:lets in Engilish have contributed greatly to expose "Czechoslo,v ak" pseudo-democracy, the
maohinations of the Benes Czechs
(Socialists) and Lettri.ch "detnocrats", the people responsible for
the betrayal of the Slova;ks to the
men of the Kremlin - +and the
Reds and Socialists aictJ!ve In Slovak circles in Amertlca. ·

�SLOVAKIA

Communist Aggression Against Slovakia
(The Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, EJighty-Third Congress, 1954, under the ch·a irmans•h lp of
the HonoraJble Oharles J. Kersten, did quite a. remarkable jdb to
ascertain how the !Communists seized pO'wer in the various countries
of IDurope. I believe it is the first time in our history that an honest
attempt was made to understand the 'background of the -peoples behind the Iron Curtain. 1Slovak representatives were among those
who gave testimony of Communist a,ggression in S-tovakia, which differed in so.me respects from th.at in other countries. From the testimony of various witnesses who were heard, and the many others
who sent in their statements fl'Qm various countries, it is quite eviden,t that 1Slovrukia fell an easy prey to Moscow iand the C-Ommunlsts
because of the pro-Soviet -poli&lt;:y of Dr. Edward ,B enes and the Czech
Socialists, who ruled in Czecho-Siovakia with the Communists after
World War ]I. Slovakia, traditionally anti-Communist, was jn fact
sold out by the National Front ,Government of Prague. The vast
masses of the Slovak population ,had no ,c•hoice; their wiH meant
nothin,g to Benes and tib.e Prague regime, whJ.ch took over Slovakia
with the help of Soviet bayonets, disregardin,g the pollti-cal wHl of
the peOII)le completely. Excerpts from the testimony of Slovak witnesses, l'\Vlhic,h are contained on these pages, definitely prove that. P.A. H.).

FROM THE SPECIAL REPORT NO. 8
SLOVAKIA
!Slovaki,a is situated between the Carpathian Mountains on the north and the Danube and the Tisa Rivers on
the south. The in!hrubitants are !known as Slov,aks and with
the !Poles a111d the Ozechs, belong to the group of western
Slaivs.
The political history of the ·S lov,a!ks goes back to the
beginnmg of the ninth century when ChmsUan civilization
was introduced into their territoTy, and it was during this
period that tlhe ruler, H;astisfav, 84~70, made himself
lmown by an intensiive ChTistiianmation of the country.
FoJilowing hls ti,nvitation, two brothers, Saints Cyril and
Methodius, who henceforth were to b.ecome the rupostles of
the Slaivs, came in 863 from Byoo.ntium to Great Moravia. B y their activities, they laid the foundations for church
organizaibions, the Slav liturgy, a'.Jiphrubet, •a nd literature. It
was in this way that the rwork of the two missionaries

�SLOVAKIA

3

from Byzruntrl:l.l!Ill brought ,t he western Slavs into the fold of
the Catholic OhuTch, an historical event of paramount ipolitic,al and oulturral importance.
In the tenth century, ,Slovakia ,b ecame for a time a
battlefie'ld in the struggles .among the SlaVIS, Magyars, and
Germans, and at the fbegiillnmg of the eleventh century,
she became a part of the kingdom of Hungary, organized
under the Arpad dynasty.
In the fifteenth and at the !beginning of the si~teenth
century the internal prOiblems of Hungary reached a certain degree of consolidation. The invasions of •c entral Europe by the 'Dmks in tJhe ,s ixteenth and seventeenth ceinturies, however, reduced Hungary to the area of the Slovalda
of today and political and cultural liife was concentrated in
that area. For a long time sessions of the Hungarian Pa•r liament were held •a nd coronations of the Hungarian llings
were celebrated in BratisJava.
The end o,f the eighteenth and the first half of the
nineteenth centuries mark the /beginning of the Slovak national renaissance. At this time, the nationa1ities tin central Emope we,r e about to abrundon Latin as the literary
and spoken language of the cu!tiivated claS'S and to replace
it by their own national language. Consequently, a spiritual
rebirth stirred up national aspirations among the different peoples of the !Hapsburg monarchy.
In 1848, the Slov,a,ks -organiized a military uprising
against the centralism of 'BudaJpeSt and: helped 1:Jhe Emperor
crush the Kossuth rebellion against the Hapsburgs. They
did it with the hope that Slovrukia wocld ibe finally acknowledged as an autonomous land within a federated
monaTohy, ibut thedr hopes in this respect were never
satisfied.
h1 the "Memorand'll!IIl of the Slovak Nation" of Jl.l'lle
7, 1861, a Slovak National Assemlbly, asked the Parliament
of Hungary to create an rarl!ministiratirve unit from the oounties imlhaJbited lby tlhe iSloviaJc population under the name of
"Slovak region." It was to ,b e ,provjdedJ with such a degree
of poaitical and oultural autonomy which would be compatible wiith the prniciiple of u.mty of the monarchy. But the
Hungarian Parlioonent failed to act.

�4

SLOVAKIA

In 1868 the Nationality Act was passed in the /Pairliament of Hunga:ry .b y which Magyar was proclaimed. the official language of the ,s tate administration in the kingdom,
except for some autonomous bodies.
1n 1895, the Serbs, the Rwmanians from Transylvania
and the Slovaks convOlked a congress of nationalities in Budapest in which they claimed ,respect for their national
rights and asked once more for a federative reform of the
kingdom on the ,p rinciple of equality. Such a reform was
not carried out. As a ,c onsequence the non.,Magy,ar nationa!lities lost, during the First World War, their interest in
the continued existence ()ff the dual monarchy oif AustriaHu.ngary.
1

World War I and Formation of the Czecho-Slovak State
Dwring World War [ the ,s pirit of nationalism was
greatly stimulated within the Alustro-Hungari:ain Empire.
Thi•s spirit was reflected iby increasing demands for greater
autonomy or ouwi:ght independence ,f or the clifforent nations within that empire. The advocacy of the principle of
nationa:l self-tdeter-mination by President Wilson further
stimulated these iaJS!)iratiOill,s. and dlid much to set the stage
for the peace settlements.
Dur:i.ng the course of the war Czech political leaders
established a secret committee wh~ch directed the ,a ctivities of Ozech nationalists at home and abroad. Thomas G.
Masaryk, as the leader of this movement, toured Europe
and the United 'States Wlhere h e recei.:ved encouragement
and support.
Meanwhile a movement ,a rose among the ·l arge number oif Americans of Slovaik descent promoting Slovak!ia's
separation from Hungary. Th.Tee different solutions of the
Slovaik prob1em were oovi,saged: Slovakia as a new state,
as ia partner orf a Czecho-Slovruk Federation •o r a·s a territory forming a pollitircal union with the prospectirve Polish
Republic.
Finally, the SloivaJk -League of Amerioa entered into
contact with the Amemcans of Czech descent and signed
with their organilzations, in 191 5, t;he Cleveland agreement,
and in 1918 the Pittsburgh Parct, 'both of which aim·e d at
1

1

1

�5

SLOVAKIA

the creation of a Czecho-.Slova1k federal state. In these doouments the Slov,aik organi•z ation stipulated that Slovakfa
should 'be an equal mem1ber iwitJh the Czech lands ·a nd have
complete legislative, executive, judiciary and cultural autonomy in strictly national matters, while matters of common interest, such as foreign affairs and defense, should
be within the competence '()!f a common parlitailllent.
1

A tangi!ble proof of the aspi-rabions of 1:Jhe Ozec:h and
Slo:vruk peoples toiward foll mdependence iwas demonstrated
by the thousands of thei:r soldiers who had swrendeired on
the 'Various fronts. They formed the Czecho-Slovak Legions
in Russia, France, amd Ita1y and fought on the side of the
Al[ied and Associated \P,o wers.
1

In order to convince ·W estern statesmen that the concept of national states 1was, ~n concern with the iwill of the
people a Congress otf !Peop1es Oppressed ·b y the Hrups'burg
Monarchy was commenced in Apilil 191'8 at Rome. This congress did much to mfl,uence the th,i nking in western Europe
and in the United States. ln the summer of 1918, F'ra.nce,
Great Britain, the United States, and Italy offici,all,y recognized the Czecho-1Slovak National Council as a defacto gOIVerrunent and the Gzecho-lSlwak forces as an Allied army
waging regu~ar warfare agarl.nst kustria-Hungary and Germany.
A Ozeoho-4Slwak IPro:visionrul Government •w as set up
in Paris with Masaryik as President and was recogn.iized de
jure by the Aflied and Associated Powers. It issued the Declaration of Czecho..SlovaJk Independence on October 18,
1918, in Paris. On the saime day President Wilson rejected
the Austrian ,proiposa:l for the organi zation of Austria-Hungary on a federa l !b asis iby reiplyiing that !he could no longer
accept •~ere autonomy of these peoples as a basis of
peace .. ."
On Octolber 28, 1918, the Ozecho-Slo,yak Nationial Colllllcil in !P:mgue proclaimed the deiposibion of the Austrian
Emperor as so,yereign of the Czech and Slcxvak lands and the
estrublishment of a free and united Republic ,of Ozecho-4SlovavaJda. The ,SiovaJk National Counchl, a revolutionary 'body
composed of Slovak patriots, convened on October 30, 1918,
1

1

�SLOVAKIA

6

and ,pwb1isihed a document known •a s the Dec1aration of
Turcia.nsky rSv. Martlin. In. this document they proclaimed
the separation of Slo.va:lci&lt;a from the Kiingdom of Hungary
and their intention to form with the Ozech lands a CzeohoSlOWlik .state. On November 14, 1918, this decision was ratified 1~ the Crecho--iSlvoruk National Assembly which elected
T. G. 1M as•aryik as President of the Republic and set up the
first ,caJbinet.
However, it was not long !b efore serious dlisagreement
developed between the Ozechs and ISlovaJks on the form of
government for the new state. The Ozeohs farvored a Czecho~Sl01Vak ,centralist state whHe the Sllo,vaiks ins.i:sted upon
a Czecho~SlQl\llaJk feder.ation ~n whioo the identity and individrua:lity of each nation would ibe •recognized and preserved.
In the opinion of !Slovak leadJers the Ozecho,..slovak state,
for all practical purposes, was to become a Czech ,s tate, enlarged 'by Slovakia ra nd :sulb-Oaripathlian Ruthenia. This situation resulted .in the !Slovaks taking a firm ,position a,g ainst
the centralist form of government. Monsignor Andrew Hilinka, a great patriotic [eader from the time of pre~a:r HrUlllgar.y, went dandestine1y in !September 1919 to Pairis in order to present S1ova;kia's cause before the Peace Conference, ,a dvocating an international guaranty fo·r the selfgovernment of the ,Slovruk nation withi:n OzechoJSlova!kia.
Denounced to the •French authorities !by the Ozecho,.;Slovak
delegation as a Hapsburg spy, he was foTced to return to
Slovaikia without any result. Toniprisoned 1by order of Prague
at Mirov, Mara'Via, Hlinka was to stay tJhere until April
1920, when he was elected deputy of the 'Slovak People's
Party, founded iby him under the Hungarian regime and
reestabllished in December 19'18.
1

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
ConstitutJional Structure
Althowg,h the !basic ,constitution was not adopted until.
February 1920, its .gener.al principles had been B!pplied
from the very •b eginning of Cze.cho-Slovaik independence.
The philosophy underlying this fundamental law is expressed in the preamble, whfoh is striikingly similar to the

�SLOVAKIA

7

preamble of the Constitution of the United States.
The main body of the Consbitution provided for a
popularly elected Parliament, a President selected by both
houses of Parliament and an independent judiciary.

Parties and Politics
The politics of the period may ibe divided into four

phases:
1. Nationalistic phase (1918-19)
Following the proclamation of independence, ,a ll Czech
political parties agreed on the fundamental principles on
which the new state ,w as to be bui1t. Having reaohed this
major consensus and the necessary leg,islation having been
enacted, the coalition had accomplished its task and a
split on partisan lines followed.
2. Swing toward Social Democraicy (1919-20)
The period of Socia.dist rule in the Czecho-Slovruk Republic did not accom;plish too many changes in the country's economy although the r,a,iUwa,ys, mines, and water
power were socialiized. The division of the 1Soci:alists into
Socialist amd Communist ranks ended the brief era of Socialist eJQ!)erimentation in Czooho-Slovrukia.
3. The agrarian era (1922-35)
This was a period of Telative ·parliamentary stability
under the leadershiip of the Agrarian Party, which managed
the government along m.iddile-of~the-road policies. A satisfactory coalition government was maintained throughout
this period.
4. The crisis ( 1935-38)
This period iwas the touchstone of the solidity of the
Czecho-1Slovruk state. Confronted with the serious iproblem
of the Sudeten Germain poipuil.ation, Czecho-6lovakia betrayed no signs, of political panic.
The .principal political ,parties in Ozecho-Slovrukia in the
period betiween the two World Wars formed the following
groups:
National 'Democrats. - This party, conservative and intensely nationalist, drew its princi'pa:l support from businessmen, the professions, and hi,gher cirvil servants. It never
beoame very ,powenfu:l.

�8

SLOVAKIA

Populists. - Under the name of the Czech Populist
Party and the Slovak Pe&gt;ipulist Party, respectiively, this
group endeavored to bring CathoiJ.ic ideas into plllblic life.
The Sllllall faruners and workers in rural districts were its
strongholds, especially in Slovakia.
Agrarians. - This poJitica-1 groUJp, the largest in the
subsequent parliaments, was solidly entrenched in both
rural aind town districts by means 0£ a widespread network
of cooperat:1ve, economic, and mtlturnJl organimtions. Its
broaid economic and so.cia'l program att•r acted wide support.
National Socialists. - Thi1s non-Marxian Socialist Party may ibie described as a "radicai national party of the
lower middle class and of the wonkers." It had rather more
influence than its moderate numerical strength would indii;cate.
Social Democrats. - This, party, resembling the social
democratic parties of other European countries, had more
influence during the first two years of bhe Republic. Though
outwardly united it was, however, undermined by dissension within its own ranks, whicih finally resulted in the expu1lsion of the Communist faction .
Communists. - The Ozecho-Sloivaik Commll!Ilist Party
was created in 1920 as a result of the e~ulsion of Communist elements from the 'Social Democratic Party. Though
equia:lly subversive and aggressiive as elsewhere in Europe,
the Ozecho-iSlovaJk Communists never secured a la:rge foll-owing during the two decades before the Second World
War.
Economic, Social and Cultural Development
Agrarian reform
iRediistribu:tion of land was an urgent iprOlblem facing
the IIlew government and a Land Reform Act, therefore,
was one of the first measures passed ,b y the Czecho-Slovak
Parliament. This ,a ct entitled the state to truke over, •a,fter
com;pensation, all ,1and :from the great estates in excess of a
fixed maximum and to permit land purcha,se by those who
needed it most. The agr,ariam. refomi program substantially improved the material conditions of the rural popula-

�SLOVAKIA

9

tion aml averted the diam.ger of ,agrarian disturbances.
Economic development
While Czecho-1Slovruk agricl.l!ltura:l resources almost
covered domestic req,uiTements, indrustrial prodUJCtion was
far in excess of the needs of the home market since Ozecho-1Slovakia had been the industrial center of the former
Austro..lHJungarian Empire.
'Since the Danulbiian countries, originally Czooho-Slovakia'•s principal foreign ma,r ket fOT manufadured goods,
were increasing the tempo of their industria;lization with a
view to :restricting tihe import orf industrial µvoducts, Ozecho..JSlovruk foreign trade was olbJiiged to look for new outlets. These were found ma,i nly in those western and oversea
countries which were Czecho-1SloV1aJkia's .principal suppliers
of •r aw materials, especially the United States and Great
Britain.
Economically aJnd fin!andalil.y Czecho-Slorvaikia was a
sound state in central Europe. As an exporting country it
was severely hlt by the wodd economic depression of the
early thirties, hut, lby timely adtj:ustments to new price and
exchange levels, it was one orf the first Eiurropean countries
to weather the crisis.
Education and social progress
The cl.l!ltmrra1 level orf the Czechs was hlgh and their passion fOT education was prQIVeribial in central Eur.ope. The
new R.ep'Ulblic fostered educaition by establishing additional
free schools •a nd by, improving the existing ,schools.
The Ozecho-1Slorva,k :S tate a,lso forged ahead in the
field of social impmve:ment. All groU!ps and interests pos,sessed the rig:ht of organi,z ation ,a nd thus organized lalbor
had its trade unio,n s, farmers their cooperative societies,
and white--coUar worker,s and businessmen their associations. Health a,nd other types of ,social insurance were either
provided for or encouraged iby the State and pro¥i:sion was
made for State assistance to hoursing and cooperatives.

The Religious Situation

The re1igious .situation created after the esmblishment
of the Repu'blic in 19'18 must, like many other of the coun-

�SLOVAKIA

:iO

try's developments, ibe rvieiwed against its historical backgrou!Ild.
A strong Czech groUJp of modernist, nationalistic Roman clergy insisted on radicall reforms, such as the use of
the vernacuiliar in the lituvgy ,and the abolition of compulsory celibacy, Wlhich the Roman Curia could not accept. As
a result, this group seceded from Rome and esta:blished an
independent "Ozecho-1S1ovak Church" ,w hioh originally numbered aJbout one million adherents, lbut ,w hich lost half its
meimlbership by 1939, so that Roman Catholics still comprised 80 •p er cent of the popul,a tion. In spite of adverse
circu:mstl8Jnces, the Roman Cathoilic ChUTch adjusted itself,
therefore, to the new millieu and recovered much for its former influence.
In the political and cultural life of the new Repwblic,
the Protestant element played a role far beyond its numerical strength. Many ,prominent political leaders, Thomas
G. Masaryk among them, 1be'longed to the Protestant faith.
1

Internal Problems

'J.'lhe OOIIlstituition of 1920, in }airge measure disiregarding the ethnographic realities of Czecho-Slovakia, was to
become a bone of contention 1b ,etween the Czechs on the
one side, and 1:Jhe. 1Slova:k,s, Ger.mans, Mag,yar:s, and Ruthenians on the other. The Slovaks demanded the incorporation
of the main clauses of the Pittsburgh Pa-ct into the Constitution. The Ruthemans, whose autonomy within CzechoSlovakia had ,b een granted by the Treaty of St. Germain,
asked that this international obligation be respected 'by the
Prague Government. The Ge:rana:ns ,and the Magyars solicited oulturaJ rig,hts and adnninistr,a,ti,ve autonomy on the
local level, as granted iby the same Treaty of St. Germain.
'Dhis psychological split among the ,populatiOIIl of OzechoSlova1ki,a wea:kened consideriaJbly the new state from both
the internal and international point of rview. The Czech
statesmen tried to iremedy this situation by creating a system of international treaties such as the Little Entente,
1920, the Pact of Alliance and FriendsihiJp with France,
1924, and a similar pact with the Soviet Union, 1935. Uke
the Austro-Hunga1rian staite'Smen in 1867, Benes believed

�11

SLOVAKIA

that the transformation of Czech~Slova!kia into a federation of three memlbers, the Czech lands, 1Slov,a kia, and Subcarpaitlliian iRuthenia, would weaken the international position of the centralized state, I)a)rticularly with reference
to HW11gary and Germany. Consequently, in the field of internal ,administraJtio,n he developed a system, in which aJll
branches of Gove:rnment in Slov.a:kia and Sulbca rpathiian Ruthenia ,w ere reserved iprimari1y to 1:Jhe Czec,hs.
Politicall'Y, al·l problems of these bwo lands we.re to ibe
decided in the Pa:-ag,ue Parliament, where !Slovakia had only
58 and Ruthenia 9 deputies out of 300. Thus, even the most
important questions such a;s the relation betlween state
and church, official language, system of schools, the economy, were to be decided ib;y the Ozech parliamentarian majority.
Ai3 to the cutural aspect, secondary schodls in Slovakia as wel[ ,as the Bratislava Universirty lbecaJm.e an officiaJl
domain of Ozech ,professors, teacihing the UJnitarian concept of a "Czechoslovak" nation m ithe ethnic sense. On October 1, 1938, there were 523 Czech and 345 Sloviaik instructors teaching in the secondary schools of Slovaikia. At the
same time, there were 66 Czech and only 24 Slov~k professors in the Bratisl,a,va Uruversity.
From the standpoint of the economy Slovakia was to
remain a predominantly agrarian land, while the Czech
part of the Repulblic was highly induskialized. This policy
of two dif,ferent measures is shown by the share of Slovakia and Ruthenia ~n the industrial production of the RepU!blic. The participation of these two lands in the whole
industry, !between 1934 and 1937, was only 8.5 per cent,
while 91.5 iper cent went to the Czec,h lands. The proper
importance of these figures is stressed by the fact, that
Slwakia constituted 23 per cent and Rutheinia 5.5 per cent
of the total popuJation of the Re1pulblic.
From the adlministratifve ,p oint of view, the district and
county offices in Slo,vakia and iRuthenia were mostly direcited iby Czech off,iciais who were directly responsible to
Prague ,as were the police. In 1938 there were 120,926 Czech
pwb1ic offici,a ls in 'Slovakia.
All these aspects created in Ozecho-Slovakia what has
1

1

�12

SLOVAKIA

been knoiWn as the "Sll.ova;k problem." The Slovak People's
Party which, in 1925 had 23 deputies, became not only the
strongest single party in Slav,aJkia, lbut a majority party of
the Slovak people (not counting minorities and the Comm1.1!11ists) endorsed 1:Jhe federative reform of the Republic
asking for the accomplishment of stipulations contained in
the ,PittslblllI'gh Pact. A:s early as Jianuary 25, 1922, this
party presented its fiTst project for c01I1stituti01I1al reform
in Czecho-Slovakia. The prog,ram hatl the following main
points:
!Slovakia to be granted her own Diet and Government.
As common affairs would ,b e considered: The President, the
Army, Foreign Affairs, and Communications. The Sloviak Diet to harve exolU1Sive competence in such matters as
natiOIIlal eduoaJtion, denominations, justice, commerce, agriculture, publric works, social welifare, and corresponding
finances. The executive ;power in Slov-rukia, as iregards b.oth
the laws which wound be :voted by the Central Parliament
in Prague and those which would be enacted. lby the Diet
of Bratis:larva, would belong to the Slovruk Gorvernment.
Laws voted ,by ithe Central Parliament would lbe without
validity in .Slovakia if rejected by a two-.thirds majority in
the •Sll.ovak Diet. This proposal would have satisfied !Slovak
aspirations, but it was 111ever put on the agenda o;f Parliament.
A second proposed reform concerning the decentirali&gt;zation of the state administration was presented to the Czecho4S1avruk Parliiament by the 1Slovak People's 1Party, May
8, 1930. More modest in -i ts scope than the first one, this
document claimed for -Slovakia the same constitutional position which had 1b een gr8.lllted ihwt never carried out by
article 3 of the constitwtion relating to Sub.carpathian Ruthenia. According to this proposal, IS1ovakta should have
had her own 'Diet as a national legislative ,b ody and a governor as chief of the land executiive.
The iDiet would have lbeen competent to enact laws concerning [anguage, education, religion, municipal, and district administration and justice as well as other matters
whioh the laws of the Central ,Parliament would comer wpon
it. Laws enacted by the &lt;Diet of Slovakia and .si:gned by the
1

�SLOVAKIA

13

President of the Republic would ibe promulgated, under sigruature of the gavemor, in a sipecial col1ection of laiws for
Slova:kia. Although presented in due form, this proposal
was never discussed in the Parliament.
Octdber 16, 1932, the Slovak People's Party of Andrew
H!linika and the Slova!k National Party of M. Ra;zus (a small
traditionailist &lt;Protestant party) having joined in an agreement a;b,out the necessity of autonomy for Slovakia,
stressed their detemnination to pursue the fight for Slovakia's national rights, "even ,t houg,h it may ,bring the disintegration of &gt;the Ozecho..,Slov,a;k Republic."
Fol1.owing the resignation of T. G. Masaryk as President of the Repulblic, E. Benes became 1a candidate in Deceimber 19315 for that office. After some consultations, the
Slovak People's Party end!orsed his election, stiipwlating,
however, that a ,pol,icy of national equality between the
Czechs and the 1Slava:kis should ibe inaugrnrated by the President aind a law concerning 'Slovak~a's autonomy ,be promulgated in one year. Nevertheless, it was two years later
before the Prague Government was ready to, consider the
Sl()IVruk prdblem and this ooourred in connection wit!h the
Sudeto·- German claims for nation,a,1 rights within the Republic.
This nationality group had been integrated into CzechoSlovakia in spite of their protest. -Since the very foTlffiation
of Czecho,..,Sl'ovakia, the German minority had been soliciting a form of cultural autonomy in the schools, local administration, and in the courts. Later on they asked for
a better economic amd social &lt;poll.icy in the German areas
suffering from unemployment. For a long time, Prague
did not lristen to such :voices. But with Hitler's accession in
Gennany, the Sudeto-Germans recei;ved the !backing of the
'I1hl1rd Reich. Consequent11 theiT claims increased at the
same time as their courage. In 1935 the ,Sudeto-German
P,a rty, with 44 deputies, lbeoame the second ,g reatest party
in the Repuiblic. The (P,raigue Goverll!!Ilent, not willing to ~ppear as acting under foreign pressure, remained reluctant.
T.he stiffer the Czecho..jSlovak Government 1becaime, the more
Hitler determined to annihilate Czecho ... Slovakia.

�14

SLOVAKIA

PairalJel to this evolution was Sfovrukia's struggle for
its own rrights. JU/Ile 5, 1938, a third projed concerning the
federalization of the Repulblic was pU!blished lby the SlovaJk
People's Party, a!lld presented to the Central Government.
It was only one week !before the, Munich Conference, 1Septem'be:r 22, 1'938, that E . Benes sent a counteriproject to the
Praesidium of the Sllovaik ,People's Barty.
Shortly after, the conflict :betiween Prague and: the Sudeto-Ge:rrmans was resolrved in Munich, where, on the basis
of Lord Rundman's rrecommendation, the Sudetenl:and went
to Germany.
This decision created for ISlovaikia a new situation. As
a consequence of a policy in whioh she had praotically no
share, Sllovrukia was ,a lso to surrender in favor Olf ifllUJilgary
her Southern !boundary ·zone, ,s ettled mostly ,b y Magyar population. This was a psychdlo,gical blow which brought an
agreement among all Slova!k ,political parties, except for
the Communist, Social-Democrat and minority parties, rubout
Slovakia's autonomy. Thus on October 6, 1938, one day
after the resignation of ,E . Benes, six ipolitica,,l parties of
SlovaJkia, representing 36 out of 58 deputies, puiblished a
dedarration in which they agreed that the third project of
constitutional reform shO'llld be immediat~ly put in practice
and l8Jil autonomous gorverrnment for Slovakia 1b e appointed
,u nder the chairmanship of iDr. Joseph Tiso.
1

November 2, 1938, lby the ar,bi,tration of Ciano and Von
Ribbentrop in Vienna, 10,309 .s quare kilometers with ·853,670
inhafbitants were to .b,e ceded by :Slovakia to Hungary. This
included 503,980 'Magyars and 272,145 Slovaks. ISfovakia
saw that she was becoming a viotim of an international
po1itica1 game ,w ithout aniy faJllJlt of her own. The Vienna
decision proved the futility of the fomner party dirvisions
and produced ra n integrating effect upon the Slo:va;k politica:l
spectrum. Parties which had signed rt.he Declaration of Zilina on October 6, agreed on NovembeT 10, 1938, on the
formation of a common party !known henceforth as the
Party of National Unity.
This political evolution in 1Slovrukia was f:inal:ly sanctioned by the Ozech and Slovak representatives irn the

�15

SLOVAKIA

Prague Parliament on No-vemlber 19, 193'8. Then, by a constitutionall ,amendiment, Ozecho-Slovrukia became a federation of Bohemi!a-&lt;Maravfa, !Slovakia and! Oa:rpathian Ukraine
(,Ruthenia). Burt the relations between Prague and the Slova:k Government remained tenJSe, because of 9,000 Czech
officia1s who 1Were removed lby the Slovak Goivernment, and
the share of Slovakia in the income and expense, orf the
common &lt;budget.
FOREIGN ,R ELATIONS
Beforre Munich
The principal aim of Ozecho-Slovakia's foreign policy
was the preserivation of the status quo as estaJblished by

the 19~9 peace settlements, and the estaJblishment of friend-ly relations with all her neighlbors through ,a n exten1Sive
system of adequate agreements. Eduard Benes, Minister of
Foreign Affairs until 11936 and 1ater 1P resident of the Repulblic, was the girniding sipiirit of this policy.
A solid :f oundation for rthe, presewation .o f the status
quo in cenibral Europe was laid !by the CTeation of the Little
Entente formed by Ozecho-Sfoivakia, Yugos1a;vfa and Rumania, and three victorious Danulbian states bordering on
vanquished Austda and Hungary.
Ozecho-1Slovalda was ·a n enthusiastic supporter of the
League of Nations and colktJborated ,w holeiheartedly in the
negotiations which brought Germany and the ,Soiviet Union
into the League.
When Hitler came to power in 1933, Ozecho-iSlovakia's
foreign relations entered into a critical phase and two
ye31rs of vi,r,uJent Nazi pro,paganda among the Sudeten Germans !bore frwt in the results of the 1935 elections. The
NaJZi..sponsored :Sudetendeutsche IPartei poiiled over 62 per
cent of the total Ge1riman vote and c01Wed the smaller German parties .i nto submission.
1

Later .on, acting on instructioillS from iBer,Hn, the &lt;leaders od: the Sudeten German movement put fomvard demands
which no Czecho-S1,orva'k 1g overnment •c ould a·c cept and, with
the anne:,ration of Austria, the srtage was set for final action.
De.seprately anxious to avert a new war, France and

�16

SLOVAKIA

Great Britain proposed to Czecho-Slovakia that she should
cede to Germany all areas with a German majority. When
Ozecho--srtovakia demwred, she was informed that she must
ae&lt;!ept the proposal or bear the conisequences alone. The result was tihat the Czechs gave in and at Munich their
country was di vided on the lines dictated by Hitler.
1

After Munich
After MU1J1ioh, Czecho-.Slova:kia tried to adjust itself to
the new situation. President Benes resigned and left the
country. He was succeeded 1b y Emil Hacha, an eldeI1ly and
experienced jurist with no politioa1 affiliations, who believed that close cooperation with the Third Reich was the
country's only hope of sur:vival.
The tra,nsition to Hitler's New Order was swift. Obnoxious parties were dissolived and the Government was
given wide power,s to govern by decree. The ,administration
was purged, the 1press put under rigorous control and antiSemitic measures were ena,cted.
The situation in central Europe after Mlliilloh became
even more confused. Germany began to remind the Bohemian puibLic of the role the Kingdom of Bohemia had played
within the Holy Roman Empire. !Hungary started to speak
about her histor,i,cal boundaries and the necessity of a common frontier with Poland. According to the Nuremberg
documents, Hitler 1at that time. had already decided to destroy Czecho-Slovakia. But there was apparently no definite decision o.n S1ova:kia as to wihether to place it under German OCOU1pation or to ha;ve it occU1pied by Hungary. In this
situation, the Slovak GOIVernment had only one preoccupation: to preserve what unity had remained of Sloviakia after the Vienna a11bitration and to avoid:, as far as possible,
direct domination lby a:ny of her neighbors.
On Ma11ch 10, 1969, the Prague Government dismissed
the government of Dr. Joseph Tiso and proclaimed martial
law in 'Slovakia. The Slova!k people considered this a violation
of agreements that had /been si,gned ~tween Prague and
Bratislaiva and incorporated into the Constitution. Puibl~c
demonstrations spread throll!g.hout 'Slova:kia.
Invited to a consultation by Hitler in Berlin, Dr. Joseph

�SLOVAKIA

17

Tiso, the dismissed chairman of the Slov,ak Gooernment
was shown a telegram by Von Ribbentrop, according to
which HUIIlgary iwas ready to occupy Slova,kia. Hlitler then
suggested that this eventuality may be prevented by the
declaration of 1Slovakia's independence. Consequently, Dr.
Tiso returned to Bratisl,aiva where, om March 14, 1939, following his report, the IS'lovak Diet proclaimed independence.
President Hacha was then summoned to Berlin and presented with an ultimatum aiming at the i.mJpos.ition of a
protectorate upon Bohemia-Moravia. Forced into submission, the Presiderut ,s igned ,a declruration by w1hich he "ip1aced
the destiny of the Czech people and country with confidence in the 'hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich."
German troo1ps marched into Bohemia and from Prague
(March 16) Hitler issued the proclamation establishing the
"Protectorate of Bohemia-Mora'Via."
Thereafter, Hungary annexed Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Czecho-SlovaJkia was dead.

The Establishment of the Slovak Republic
Even though the Slovak state was largely the result
of a tense international situation, it nevertheless co.rresponded to· the aspirations of the Slovak ~ple for freedom
and the principle of self-determination a,nd seltf-1govern.ment.
After Munich, central EUTotpe became a part of the German
orbit. Therefore, in oroer to. d.~scourage Hungary in her
armed attack launched against Eastern Slovakia, the Slovak Government concluded •w ith Germany a treaty of protection, March 23, 1939, by which the &lt;Reich assured the existence of Sloiva;kia without destroying its .national pe,r sonality. In exchange, S1ova:kia ha,d to, follow the German line
in foreign policy.
Altogether, 2:l states. reoogniiized the international .i ndividuality of Slovaikia. Besides the countries which were
later to become members of the Axis, S~ovaikia was recognized by the Holy See, the -Soviet Union, iSpain, 1Switzedand,
Sweden, Grea,t Britain (de facto) , France (de facto), Liberia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador.
According to the constitution voted on July 21, 1939,

�18

SLOVAKIA

SlovaJkiia became a Repulblic with a Parliament of 80 members and a Government of nine.
The constitution contained princi!pleis, which in some
aspects combined features of the liberal staite, the Christian democracy, and the authoritarian state,. In the beginning all poweT of the 'Slova:k Reipu'blic was vested in the
Parliiamenrt !but later on, in 19·41, after Slovakia had entered
the war against the S'Oviet Union, the executive was to prevail over the legislature.
The numlber of political parties was reduced. The Communist and the :Social il)emocrat pa·r ties, representing only
ten deputies, had been 1s uppressed as suJbversive, in October
1938. Six other parties merged mto the Slov,ak Unity Party, the baokibone of the ipolitcal system of the SLovak state,
and tlhere were two minority parties: German and Magyar.
The SlOIVaJk state was far froon being a perfect democracy in the trarlitional sense. R reflected a compromise
between the past and the present, between an old tradition
and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central Europe. lBut, in ,general, it was an expression of the
se'Lf-q&gt;reservation instinct of the 1SlO'Vak nation.
The Sloviruk Government, in 1941, joined Gernnany, with
two armored dirvisions, in :the war against the Soviet Union.
Although on [)ecemlber 1:2, 1941, the Slovak Press Bureau
had pulb'lished an anno'UIIlcement that the ISlovia;k Repulblic
was in a state of war with the United !States and Great Britain, neither the President nO'r the tS lovak Pa:rliament or
Government ever made such a decision or declaration. In
fact, the Sl01Vruk forces, during the Second World War, did
not engage in comlbat against any of the Western Powers.
1

World War B and the Restoration of Czecho-Slovakia
Czechs in the protectorate of Bohemia-Morawa ,w ere
not directly iDJVolved in the •S econd World War. They were
exempt from militaJry service hut had to work for the German war machine. Though their contribution in the fight
for freedom was not Sipectacular, thousands of Czech patriots ipaid with their live'S for their efforts to 1keep the flame
of freedom fHalrering.
After Munich, many Czechs and SlovaJks left the coun-

�SLOVAKIA

19

try and established themsel,ves talbroad, mostly in Paris and
London, which became the cenrters of their political activities.
Headed by Eduaxd Benes, these emigres set urp a National Committee to taJke up the struggle for the restoration
of a free Czecho-iSlovakia.
The committee was recognized first as the provisional
and eventwall.'y as the regulaT Government of Czecho-Sloviakia, by Great Britain and, later, iby the United !S tates and
the Soviet Union. Czecho-'Sl01Vaikia was thus given the status of an allied state under foreign ocoupation. The Munich
agreement was declared null and void and Czecho-.Slova.kia's
original frontiein; were guaranteed.
While the C!zecho-.Slovak GQI\Ternment-ii.n-exile was primarily concerned with the consolidation of the international
position of the Republic, the Czecho-Sfovak Communist
leaders in Moscow were com1pleting their plan for immediately seizing power after the li/beration. Moscow knew precisely what Ozecho-Slovalkia's &lt;international .p osition would
be once the Red army was stationed within the ter.ritory
and was concerned on:ly with tadica:l movements aimed at
bringing ahout a speedy sovietfomtion of the country.
Toward the end of 1943, E. Benes went to Mosco.w
where, on Decembe:r 12, 1943, he signed with Stalin a treaty
of alliance, friendship, and mutual help between the Soviet
Union and Czecho-Slovakia. tBy this treaty, the ·S oviet
Uruon was to approach Ozecho-1Slova1kia after the end of
the war as an ally.
No. such treaty having been &lt;:oncluded. with the Western Powers, the influence of Moscow on the future of emergent Ozecho-Slovakia became predominant. In Soviet tactics, this treaty was to create a favora!ble atmosphere in
Bohemia-lMo:ravia fm: tbe idea of a Soviet ·l iberation.
During his visit in Moscow, E. Benes came to a,n agreement with K. Gottwald, the ex,iled chief of the Czech Communist Party, aJbouit the main prindples upon which the
edifice of the future Ozecho-,Slovakia wouJd rely: (1) The
state admin.stration 'wouJld be repla&lt;:ed by "natio,n_aa committees" (IS01Viet.s); (2) the .fOI1II1er right-of--center parties
would 1b e eliiminaited; (3) the non-Communist parties in ire-

�20

SLOVAKIA

,s tored Ozecho ..Slovak,ia would form ,w ith the Communists a
"government of National 1F ront"; (4) "people's courts"
would lbe established to eliminate all war criminals. These
principles with an extensive inter,pretation and -aipplication
of ipoints (2) and ( 4) and the nationali2ation of indiustcy
were to, lay the fou:ndaitions for a "People's !Democracy" in
Czecho-1Slovakia.
In Slov:alkia, the treaty of friendship , mutual help, and
coJ1aboration with the Soviet Union iProduced a stimulating
effect upon the Commun1st .and Social Democrat undergroUIIlds and also on a group of lilberals whose imaigiination,
with respect to central Europe, was tempted more lb y the
absent Soviet Union than 'by the present Germany.
These ,groll!ps met secretly on Christmas 1943 in Bratislava and signed what is known as the "ChristJmas agreement." In this declaration they reaffirmed their will to
work for the restoration of "Ozecho·-IS1ov•a kia," for a Illarrow collalboration with the iSov.ieit Union in the field of foreign policy, for the estaiblishment of political justice and
for the continuation oif resistance against the Germans and
the Slovak Government.

:FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL GALAYDA,
AMERICAN CITIZEN FROM HAZLETON, PA.
Mr. McTigue. The Russians deported to Russia the
teachers and iwell-educated ,peoip le?
Mr. G alayda. Yes, t eachers and educated people.
Mr. McTigue. And you were in Slova:kia while this was
going on; is that correct?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. :McTigue. Now, while these deportations were going
on did you then endeavor to get a visa o.ut ·o f the country ?
Mr. GaJayda. I :tried a couple of times but it was impossible at that time. I was put in ja•il two tim es.
Mr. tM cTigue. Who puit you in jail?
Mr . Galayda. The Ozecho-Sloivak Army. They asked me
to fight ,a gainst the Germans. I ref,u:sed. I said, "I am an
American citizen and I refuse to serve in the Czec,ho..,Slovaik
Army."

�SLOVAKIA

21

!Mr. (McTigue. 1S0, you were put in jail because. you refused to serve?
Mr. Galayda. Yes, thaJt's right.
MT. !MoTigue. Now, when was t1he second time you were
put in jail?
Mr. Galayda. Wel1, the second time was in 1946.
Mr. Mc'Digue. iBy the Communists?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Why?
Mr. Galayda. Well, because I was campaigning against
communism.
Mr. McT,i gue. You were making taiks against communism?
Mir. Ga1ayda. Yes, I made ,a couple speeches in the villages against communi sm. That is why I was jailed.
'M r. iMcTigue. Noiw, in 1'94fi, at the end of the war, did
you try to get a Un~ted States passport?
Mir. Galayda. Yes, I did.
Mr. McTiig ue To return to the United States?
Mr. Galayda. Yes. [n 1945, when the war was 0 1ver, me
and my brothers decided to Oeaive, because at that time the
United States was ,stil'l fighting with the Japanese. So we
decided to leave and join the American Army.
Mr. iMcTigue. iDecided to come home?
Mr. Galayda. Yes. We went to the American cons,ul in
Prague. He refused. He saiid, "You have to get your passport
finst, then you can join American Army." So ,J came home.
Mir. McTigue. How did you go about gettiing your passpont?
Mr. Galadya. Well, we went to Hungary. On the way
from Budapest to Bratislava - weH, i will tell you something 3:borut the !Russian s-oldd.ers, what they did.
Mr. McTigue. Yes, I wish you woiuld. This is while you
are taiking the train to 'Bratislava?
Mr. Galayda Yes. 'l never am going to forget that time
what happened.
Mr. McTigue. You are on the train now?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mir. McTigue. Is this what you are describing?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
1

1

�22

SLOVAKIA

Mir. McTigue. And you rure en route to Prague lby way
of Budapest and Bratislava?
Mr. Galayda. The Russians pulled the emergency brake.
They had guns; they took the money frOirn .the ipoople, and
in every coach was one soldier. He had a gun. They robbed
the people. They ta!ke everything. Then I heard some
screaming, a girl, a couple of giTls started screaming. I
know that. I remember that. And I don't know what happened because 1I didn't see because in every coach was one
soldier and we can't move.
Mr. McTigue. And they -to ok the girls off the tra,i n ?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. How long did they hold the train up?
Mr. Gailay&lt;la. Oh, Irt was, I think, at least one hour.
Mr. Boll!in. One hour.
Mr. :Mc'I'igue. And everybody on the train ·w as relieved
of his valualbles, jewelry, money?
Mr. Galaiyda. They took everything.
Mr. McTigue. Now, what !hia:ppened when you finally
reached .Prague ?
Mr. Galayda. Well, when I reached the Prague, liike I
said, I went to the American consul. I itold hd.m I ,wanted to
join the American Army. H~ said, "!No. You have to get
your Arnevican ,p assport first." So then I came home.
Mr. McTigue. You came home to Slovakia?
Mr. Galadya. Yes. I came baok home. Then I start
speruking agafast communism.
Mr. Mc'lligue. You started writing against communism ;
you made some speeches against communism?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. ls that correct?
Mr. Bonin. Now, did any,body ma!ke any complaint rubout
theiir activities, itaking this property aJway from them?
Mr. Ga1ayd:a. No, 'alt that time it rwaiS impossible to say
something.
iMr. Bonin. You had nobody to turn to to even make a
Mr. Galayda. No.
complaint?
Mr. Bonin. If you did ma!ke a compla int you would probably ·b e arre&amp;t ed ?
1

1

�SLOVAKIA

23

Mr. Galayda. Then yOl\l are sent ito Russia.
Mr. Bonin. In other wocds, tllere was a c0111Stant fear
in the minds of the peoiple that they would go to a concentration camp?
Mr. Galayda. Yes, that's tight.
Mrr. Bonin. Into 'Si-ber-ia?
Mr. Ga:layda. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. Which, of course, is nothing ito .p leasant to
M1ybody living ·b ehind the Iron Curtain?
Mr. Gafayda. No, I don't think so.
Mr. Bonin. You were very happy to get ou:t of there?
Mr. Galayda. Yes,. The Communist Party is no good for
this world; a!bsoI1U1telly no good. Becaiuse ,I was over there -and
I lb.ave experience: ,I lived in Czecho-lS1ovakia for 20 years,
and I know. They iaire no good in this world.
Mr. Bonin. They are no good for this world. Well, do
you have any moos-a ge to tell ,to the people of the United
States who may feel that communism is a good system of
government?
Mr. Galayda. Well, there is one thing I can say, and that
is the American ,p eople should be proud of what they have,
freedom of speech and everything They should ibe ,p roud o.f
what they have.
Mr. Bomn. ls, it-here any freedom of religion under the
Communists?
iMr. Galayda. No.
Mir. Bonoin. Is there Mly freedom iof the press?
Mr. Galayda. No.
Mr. Bonin. Is there any freedom of assembly?
Mr. Galayda . No.
Mr. Bonin. Is there any freedom to use radio and teleMr. Galayda. No.
visi'o n as we do !ill America here.?
Mr. Bonin. [t i,s a ,pretty lblack picture, this lirving behind t.he Iron Curtain; isn't iit?
Mir. Galayda. That's ~ight.
(Wilkes-Barre, Pa., ISeptemiber 30, 1954).

FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MR. SMREKOVSKY
MT. McTigue. You came to this country in 1928; is that
correct?
Mr. Smrekiovsky. 1928 is correct.
Mr. MoTigue. And did you become a:n American citizen
at that time?

�2-l

SLOVAKIA

Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes, sir, after being five years in this
country.
Mr. McTi!gue. I under,stand that you returned to Slovakfa in 1939; is that cor.root?
Mr. 1Smrekovgky_ 1939; yes.
Mr. !l\foTigue. What iwas the purpose for returning to
Slova·k ia at that time?
Mr. Smrekovsky. To. visit my father because he was
reaching 90 rund wrote me that he was i'll; so I wanted to
visit him and see him.
Mr. Mc'figue. Now, did you return to Slovakia before
the 'Outlbreak oif wa;r between Germa;ny a.ind Polamd?
Mr. 1Sm.rekovsky. Yes. We had a little difficll'l,ty crossing
t:he ·Polish boroer, lbut ,that didn't amount to much.
Mr . .McTigiue. Noiw, at thait time, conditions were good
in ,Slovakia; is that correct?
Mr. Smreko'V'sky. Yes, they were.
Mr. Mc'figue. There wasn't any difficulty as far as
Mr. ,S mrekovs,k y. We didn't .know anything about wa:r
then.
Mr. McTigue. There was ,c omplete fu-eedom of ithe
Mr. ISm.rekovsky. Yes.
press...
Mr. McTigue. Freedom of ireligion . . .
Mr. 1Smerkovsky. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. And freedom of assembly
Mr. Smerkov:sky. Yes.
iMr. iMcTigue. Hoiw long did you stay in 1Slovakia?
Mr. 1Smrekovsky. 1Seven years.
Mr. McTigue. Then you were there at the time the Rus1M r. !Smrekov.s ky. Ye·s, I was.
sians C'aime into 1Slovaikia?
Mrr. Mc'figue. What - or, w:hen did you first come .in
contact with the Commun.ists?
Mr. Smrekovsky. After the German Army was defeated,
they started to drop parachutists to organize Communist
bands to pers.e cute and rob middle class and decent people.
1M r. Mc'.Dig,ue. Noiw, did this haJppen in 1944?
Mr. IS mrekovs.ky. Yes.
lMr. Mcrrigue. And thls i1s the Communist-inspir ed uprising that you are talk,i ng a:bout.

�SLOVAKIA

25

Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes.
Mr. McTi,g ue And in the community where you were
liviing rthey had parachuted agents into the community to organi1ze Communist bands in order to continue the uprising?
Mr. Smreko,v,s ky. That's right.
Mr. McTi'gue. And bring it to a successful conclusion, if
necessary?
!Mr. ISmrekovsky. Yes, and spread commurnsm at the
same time.
Mr. Mc'I'igue. Now, can you teH us some of the things
you wit:ne.ssed, yourself, during the course of this Communist-inspired uprising?
Mr. Smrekovsky. I remember a family cruptured by the
OommUIIllists. There were five memlbers in the fami'ly, a twoyear-old giirl, there was another bigger girl, a son-in-laiw, a,n
old man, and his wife. They were dragged to the edge of
the forest and shot from ithe back. Then they dug a hole for
them and buried them.
Mr. Bonin. Mr. Counsel, I just want to interrupt here.
We hea.ird testimony .b efore from different witnesses when stating that ithey were shot in the back, do you mean
that the . . .
Mr. Smrekoivsky. They start •t o run.
Mr. Bonin. They ,s tarted to run?
Mr. Smrekovsky. They started to run and they shot
them from the back.
iMr. Bonin. And they shot tlhem firom the bru~k whiie
they were trying to get away from them?
Mr. 1Smrekovsky. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. Now, they were agents of the Russian Government - that were doing that?
Mr. Smrekovs:ky. Exactly.
Mr. Bonin. .A!nd were they armed, these people that were
shot, or were they with01Ut a,r,ms?
Mr. IS mrekovsky. They were without arms.
Mir. Bonin. They were without arms?
Mr. '.Smrekovsky. Without arr-ms, innocent people.
Mr. Bonin. But, nevertheless, they were all .s hot in the
baC'k, the one two years of a,ge, four years of age, the two
larger ones, the son-in...,Jaw, and the father?
1

1

�26

SLOVAKIA

,M r. Smrekovsky. And the mother, too. Five persons.

Mr. Bonin. Five persons? Now, you say that they were
tossed in •a mass grave; is that correct?
Mr. Smrekovsky. That's right.
Mr. Bonin. They were a:11 placed in the same g:raJVe?
MT. 1Smrekovsky. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. Was there any re1iigious burirul service involrved?
MT. Smrekovsky. No, sir. No, sir. They just buried them
there like any criminals. It ha:ppened around Oot:ctber, and
during tJhe winter they dug them out and :p ut them in the
cemetery, in the corner of the cemetery, where they are
Mr. Bonin. Continue Mr. Counsel.
sti1l buried.
'Mr. IMcTiigue. Now, after the Communists had occuipied
Slovwkia, did there come a time when you were put in
jail your1self?
1Mr. Smreikovsky. Yes. r:r was there 14 days.
Mr. Mcfl'igue. Why?
Mir. 1Smrekovsky. Of course, they had no reason. They
wanted to get rid of the middle-class people. My ·brother-4nlaw and a friend of mine were an-ested. Finally, my wife
went to the authorities &lt;a!Ild they let me free after 14 days.
Mr. McTigue. What happened to your brother-in~law?
Mr. 1Smrekovsky. Well, he was jailed also, hut they released him.
Mr. Mc'I'igue. But there were others whom they didn't
Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes.
,r elease?
~fr. lMc'l'igue. You know that of your own personal
Mr. 'Sm~kOIV'sky. Yes.
knowledge?
Mr. Mc'.Digue. They were friends of yours?
Mr. 'Smrekov,s ky. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Leading people in the community?
•M r. Smrekovsky. Yes.
Mr. Smrekov,s ky. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Priests?
Mr. Smrekovsky. That's right.
Mr. McTigue. Nuns?
of different rel,i gious faiths?
people
And
lMcTigu.e.
Mr.
Mr. SmTekovsky. Yes.
MT McTigue.·· Now, when did you and how did you get
back to the United States?

�SLOVAKIA

27

Mr. SmrekoV!Siky. As soon as the American constcl came
to Prague, I a,pplied for visa to the United States, and as
soon as my transportation was ready I lef.t and came to the
United States, first of Octolber 1946. I left my we there
for three years until I could bring her 'O'Ver.
Mr. iMcTigue. Now, at the time you le.flt you awned some
Mr. Smrelwvsky. Yes.
·
property; didn't you?
Mr. iMcTigue. What lhaippened to that iproperty af.ter
you left? .
Mr. Smrekovsky. Well, that was a1l confiscated. My
wife had to sign a statement tha,t it's gi;ven to ,the Govem.ment. And every'body ,w ho wamts to come to America had to
do that. Otherwise she would't get a !Visa.
The Chairman. That is a method of highway robbery that
they hold against somebody that wants to migraJte from one
country to. another?
Mr. S'mrekovsky. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bonin. They compel them to transfer their i)roperty
to the Government.
(Wil:kes-iBarre, Pa., September 30, 1954).

a

FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MRS. SMREKOVSKY

iMr. McTigue. When yoUJr husband left Slova!kia in 1946
to come to the Untted States, he left you in Slovakia; is
(Mrs. Smrekovsky. Yes.
that correct.
Mr. iMcTigue. And at the time he left you in 1946 you
had under yourr care the property which you both owned; is
Mrs. :SmrekoV'Slky. Yes.
thaJt correct?
Mr. McTigue. rNow, when your husband left and you had
the ipropeirty under your management, what experience did
you have with the Communists?
Mrs. Smrekovsky. Very ibad.
Mr. McTigue. Did they make efforts to frig,hten you in
--any way so that you would give your property ;to them?
Mrs. Sinreko1Vsky. ThaJt was the only hope to come to
this country, unless if agreed that the property is transferred to the Government.
Mr. McTigue. So until you signed over your property to

�28

SLOVAKIA

the Government you 'had no chance of leaving Slovakia; is
!Mrs. 1Smrekovsky. Yes.
that correct?
MT. iMcTigue. iln it.he meantime, while you were still
there, in 1946 and b,efore you left the country, were your
friends mistreated by the Comrnurusts? Were any of yoll'I'
close friends that you harve personal ikno,w ledge of mistreated
in any way by the Communists?
!Mrs. Smrekorvsky. In my hometown there were shot or
massacred four 1people while I was wiith my ,p arents - there
was a senator, a notary public, a mayo.r , and a foo-ester. DuTing the night, in theilr ntght clothes, they loaded them UJp in
one truck rund took them away.
Mr. McTigue. What was their crime? Why were they
shot?
Mrs. Smrekovsky. Because they were not Communists
and they never a:gireed with the Comml.llilists.
MT. Bonin. Oongressman Feighan. Just a minute. In
other words, even though the Communists ,have been in Slo1Mrs.
Smre~ovsky. Yes.
va:kia since 1945 . . .
Mir. Bonin. StiM your relatives ·a nd friends have not beMrs. Smrekovsky. Right.
come Communists?
Mr. Bonin. They still belie·v e in ,t he religion and the freedom of religion that they had before?.
Mrs. Smrekovsky. And they hope they wihl be £.reed and
live again like decent people.
MT. Bonin. In other words, regardless of how long the
Communists may dominate Slorvrukia, there is still that desire for freedom on theiiT prurt and to live as they used to
prior to the Communist regime that has been imposed upon
Mrs. Smrekovsky. Yes, sir.
them?
Mr. Bonin. Now, I understand that t:hese four influential 1poople, a senator, a mayor, a t:imiber man and a notary
public, were also shot because rthey failed to accept communism and to lead the people through Communist doctrines and
princilples under the domination of the Russian system?
Mrs. Smrekorvsky. Right.
Mr. Bottin. That is the type of freedom thaJt is being
sold to the ,people behind the lTOn Currtain?
Mrs. -Smrekovsky. Yes, sir.

�SLOVAKIA

29

MT. Bonin. Force, threats, violence, and intimidation, in
order to constantly keep them in fear of whait is apt to happen to them?
1M rs. Smrekovsky. Exactly.
Mr. Bonin. Now, your wifo came out of Czecho-iSliovrukia
in 1'9 49; ts thart: correct?
Mr. IS mrekovsky. Yes, sirr.
Mr. !Bonin. And the principal reason ,w hy you aTe testifying under an assumed name is lbecaUJSe you are fearrful of
what might haJppen to your relaUves and ,t he friends. that
you ,s till 1haJVe in 1s1ova~ia?
Mr. Srnrekovsky. Exactly.
(WiJJkes-iBarre, Pa., ,September 30, 1954).

FROM THE TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH PAU00

Mr. McTigue. 1Mr. Pall'co, where are you living at the
present ,t ime? - - - Dr. Pauco. ln Middletown, Pa.
Mr. McTigue. H ow are yiou employed?
Dr. Pa:ll!co. I am assistant editor of the Slova.k weekly,
Jednota.
Mr. McTigue. Mir. !PauJco, I understand that you were
born in Slovakia, is that correct.
Dr. PaU!co. Yes; that is true.
Mr. ,M cTigue. What part of Slovakia?
Dr. Pauco. In ceilltraJl Slovakia.
Mr. McTigue. Central ISlovaJkia. And it's my understanding that you spent most of your adult life as a journalist; is
that coTrect?
[)r. ,Pawc'O. Yes; that is correct, sir.
Mr. McTi:gue. W1hiile yiou were in Slova!kia, it is also my
understanding that in yiour capacity as -a journa:list, you had
the occasion to witness the Communist~in,s;pired uprising in
1944; is that correct?
Dr. Pa'Ulco. Yes, that's true.
Mr. Mc'lligue. And were, you also present at the uncovering of the mass graves at Vinnitsia in the Ukraine?
Dr. Pauico. Yes; that's right.
Mr. McTigue . . How d!id you happen to be there?
Dr. 1Pau'co. I was a member of a journalist expedition in
July 1943 It wa:s an e~pedition of all journalists firom cen.trrul Europe. I came to Vmnitsia in July 1943 and I wais there
four days. In those four days I saw five ,o.r six maSIS grarves
of the Ukrainian people and some Polish people, who were

�30

SLOVAKIA

murdered by the ,Soviets. An eX!planation was girven to us
by the Geamam.. dootors that these people were shot between
1939 and 1941.
I spoke with the local people, Ukrainia:n and Polish people, some dozens of these people, because we were allowed
to spealk to those people - a,t the mass graves there in Vinnitsia, in the town of Vinnitsia. For example, I was shaved
twice in a local lba'.l'bershop, and I spoke to these men and
with some. other people ,i n Vinnitsi,a. A concert was gurven
in t'he town of Vinnitsia in honor of ,t he journaliSll:s' e,q;&gt;edition, and after this concert, I spoke with several men and
women, and all these Ukrairuian people trul'ked to me. They
said what I saiw there in mass graJVes is true, and that their
relaitirves were shot by the Soviets between 1939 and 1941,
after the occupation of west Uikra,inia in 1939. Some people
of Ukrainian nationality known as strong anti-Communists
were deported in the Illight. And late,r , at the begmning of the
wa:r !between 1Sovieit Russia and Germany, deporta:tion was in
~eat masses. Nob,ody ,w as sure that hls, relatives, hrusbands,
sons, or some other of the family, wilhl not be shot in the
night. I have in my memory six ox seven cases of the wives
and daughters of the shot fathers and brothers, who told
me their relatives were deported in the night. The people
knew nothing. Their husbands and fathers were sent to Siberia or probably shot.
Mir. McTigu:e. How many people were killed
Dr. Pauco. Several 'hundred.
iMr. McTigue. At Vinnitsia?
Dr. Pau'co. 1Severrul hundred. I was at the graves four
days and I spoke with several dozens of Ukrainian women,
and, I learned, several ·hundred were buried in these mass
grarves.
iMr. McTigue. In these mass grarves that you knew
about?
Dr. ·P auco. Yes; in Vinniitsi.a.
Mr. McTigue. Yes. But there were other mass graves
disc01Vered later on; is that correct?
Dr. Pau'CO. I heard about it. I know a;bout Katyn, but I
wasn't there. ,I was in Vinnitsia and I can state only what l
saw at these mass graves. I have here a statement of what

�SLOVAKIA

:n

I saJW at these mass graves.
Mr. McTigue. iMay I suggest, Mir. Chairman, since we
hawe other testimony that we want to develop, and since we
haJVe other witnesses, t:ha.t we admit this statement into the
reoord, but not have it read at this time?
Dr. Paulco. All right.
Mr. ,McTig;ue. IMaJke it a ,p art of the reoord.
Mr. !Bo:nin. Woll!ld you have any objection if we make
this staitement a part of the record at this time and you g;ilVe
us the highlights of it as of thJis moment?
Dr. PaUlc&lt;&gt;. All right.
Mr. Bonin. Without oibjootion, we will take the statement and place it in the committee files.
Mr. iMcTigue. You may recall, Mr. Chairman, tllait we
had testimony at our hearings in Munich on the Vinnd.tsia
murders very much ,a long the same 1ines Mr. Paruoo is testifying. This testimony that he has given today on the subject of the Vin.nlitsi.ai massacre eertainlly corroibo,rates wha,t we
hea.Td from many ,wiit:nesses in Munich. You aJlso recall in
connection with that testimony that one of ibhe witnesses
descri1bed the finding of hundreds of bod!ies of Vinnitsi:a \'i,ctims under the floor of a d'ance hall in one of the amusement •pariks iw:hen these mass graves were investig;ated. iI am
sure you recall thait testimony.
Mr. Bonin. Yes. I distinctly recall that, a'lld this corroborates the faot tJhat these mass graves and the mass kfiling of citizens of Vinnirtsia was deli;b erate and ,pe~trated
entirely by ,t he Communist regime in Russia.
Now, I understand, Mr. Pauioo., that you have some addition.al testimony suipplementing what 1happene:d in V!innitsia aind what took ,p lace in 'Slov,aikia; is that C()lrrect?
Dr. PaU!co. Yes. I woltld iiJke to say thiat the same thing
that h~ppened in Vinnitsia in 1939-41 happened in Slovakia in lr944. The Sovli.ets' s~hool oif prurtisans were parachuted
in the s,prmg of 1'94'4 in the mou:nrtains of Slorvaki1a, and then
in August 1'9414 they orga.ruzed a so-calil ed uprising against
the SlovaJk Government a'lld shot hundredlS and thousands of
Slovaks of anti..Communist feeling. Im Slova1ci(a, we had at
this time, 1944, several mass graves of innocent Slovak ciiti-

�32

SLOVAKIA

zens, Slova.ik ainti-Oommunist patriots. The Communist part~,s ans ,w ere 1pariachUJted, as I mentioned, by the Soviets, and
the partisans were also furnh,,hed Soviiet ammunition. This
so-called upris,i ng in 1Slov-akia started with prepairations in
194'3. Some so.-,called underground politicians made an 8.'greement with the Communist leader, Karol Schmidke. And
this Karol ;Schmidke saiid in 1946 that this action in 1943,
this preparation of the uprising, was the merit o;f the illegal
Communist Party. All the people who declined to collaborate
with the Communist ieaders in 1944 were shot. Thiiis happened in central 1Slova.ikia because central Slovakia is a
mountainous land. Then the German armies came to S1ova-kia and :Slorvak ter:nitory was a battlefield. After this Communist uprising in ,Slovrukia, I heard f.rom my friends, from
my relatives in ISJ.ovakria thrut many innocent ,p eople, farmers, ,w orkei,s, priests, ,s ome ipriesits, ,s ome congressmen,
were shot by the Communists. I recall a congressman, a Catholic priest Anthony Salat. He was of very strnnig feeling
against the Communists. He wrote several books againist
communism and, iin the first week of the uprising, he was
shot. In 1Slw8!kia were liquidated about forty to fifty thousand :S lovaks in this Communist putsch.
1

Mr. IMc'Digue. T1hey were shot?
Dr. Pauco. They were shot 1b y the Soviets, b,y the Soviets' paritisan,s and by the collaborators in Slovakia.
!Mr. McTigue. About '50,000?
Dr. Paufo. Yes, aJbout '50,000.
Mr. McTigue. 1In the period of one year?
Dr. Pauco. In the period of three months.
Mr. McTigue. Three months?

Dr. Pauco. The purtsch was defeated in two months, but
after there were some battles in the mountains in Slovakia,
and in December the Red Army ,c ame to Slovalkia. Several
thousand Slo.vaJks fr,om eas,t ern Sl01viakia were sent by the
NK_,V il) to Russia, to Siberia and concentration camps. and
to the mines in Dombas.
Mr. IMcTigue. Norw, when and how did ,t he uprising finally
end?

�33

SLOVAKIA

Dr. Pauco. The German Army came into Slovakia in
September 1944.
Mr. McTigue. Now, you had a close relationship with
Monsignor Tiso; isn't that correct?
Dr. Pauco. 'f.hat's true.
Ylr. McTigue. Now, will you tell the committee who Monsignor Tiso is and briefly explain your relationship with him
and your discussion with h~m afte,r the putsch?
Dr. Pauco. I was editor-in-chief of the greatest daily in
Slovakia, the "Slovak." This daily was the organ ,o f Monsignor Tiso. Joseph Tiso was the first Slovak President. He was
the legal President of the SlovaJk Republic, which came into
being on March 14, 1939. The ,Slovaik Republic had diplomatic relations with 27 naJtions, of them 17 or 18 were on the
side of the western allies. Monsignor Tiso was a Christian
ruler - after a thousand years, the first Slovak irll'ler and I had the opportunity to spea:k with him practically
every week . I reca:11 thrut on August 20, 1944, I was in Presov at a meeting called by the Government, by the army,
and by the Slovak People's Party. At that time, in eastern
Slovrukia the situation was very critica•l and the delegates
practicaly from every village and every town from eastern
Slovakda told the Government and government representatirves of Bratislava, tha:t something wliitl hruppen if the Slovak
Army and Slovak police do not interlere. Pradically the
whole of eastern Slovakia was, parachuted at this ,t ime by
the So;yiets, the Soviet parti,sans and Soviet a;genrts. I spoke
after this meeting with Dr. Tiso, and ag,ain when the pUJtsch
was liquidated. Dr. Tiso at this time was ready to resign.
He hoped that some Slovak politician would take the Slovak
question to the International Tribunal.
Mr. Bonin. Tribunal?
Dr. Pauco . Tribunal, yes, because he would iiike to
change the regime, but to preserve independent Slovakia.
That was the goal of Monsignor Dr. Tiso.
Mr. McTigue. What happened to Monsignor Tiso eventuallv?
Dr. Pauco. Monsignor Tiso was hanged, executed by the
Communist nation:i.l court, April 18, 1947, in Bratislava. Dr.
1

�34

SLOVAKIA

Tiso wa.s the first among the Catholic prelrates in central
Europe who were executed by the Communists afte,r Warld
War Iil.
Mr McTigue. The usual phony charges, I suppose, were
applied, and the usurul phony court procedures were set in
motion?
Dr. Pauco. Just becallise he had anti-Communist feelings; I know, 'Il!Ot from Dr. Ttso, but from his personal secretary who its living now i n Caniada, seiveral times, Soviet
agents were ready to assuire to Slova.ks and Dr. Tiso himself
a seperate Slovak-,Soviet Repulblic if Dr. Tiso will go wtth the
Soviets, and Dr. Tiso refused. Tiso said one time, I recall,
that tf his own brother were a Communist, he would fii.ght
him. And I am SJure that i·s why Dr. Tiso wa:s executed by
the Commtmists' so-called nahonal court in April 1947.
Mr. Fetghain When you state that Monsirgnor Tiso was
the first of the clergymen to he executed by the Russian
Communists, you mean the first outstanding figure, both in
the spiritual and politic8il world?
Dr. Pll!uico. Yes, sn-. That's correct.
Mr. Feiigihain. That's 1a ll.
Mir. Bonin. W-ell, Mr. Pauco, it is nothing uncommon for
a priest or a member of the clergy in central EUI'Opean
countries to be in political life; isn't that correct?
Dr. Paooo . Yes, that's ri.ghit.
Mr. Bonin. And, therefore, they would be permitted to
engBlge in political lifo . . .
Dr. Pauco. Yes.
MT. Bonin. Bllit they took a leave od' absence from their
clerical life; isn't that coreivct?
Dr. Pauco. No, that was not so in S1ovakiia. Monsignoir
Tiso, as Prresident of the Slovak RepU!blic, was the adm~nistrator of his own parish in Bano:vce, rund sang Holy Mass
there practically every Sunday.
'Mr. McTigue. Tell me, Mr. P8iuoo., how and why did you
escaipe from Slo1Va!kia arnd come to this country?
Dr. Praulco. After what I ,s aw in Vinnitsia, then in Slovakia , and what I hearo from many hundreds orf escll!pees
from Ukrainia, from Poland, from Russia, from Hu'Il!gary,

�SLOVAKIA

35

from Ruman:i:a ., from Lithiuani:a, about ·p ractices of 1S01Viets,
I could not stay in rS1()1VlaJk:J,a, because I hated communism ; I
hated oolsiheiv:ism, and I hoped to live in the free Western
World. I am happy that 1 am here in this free ,a nd democratic couliltTy. I haive my relatives over there, ,a nd one of
my relatives came through the border just several months
ago to Austriia. He. ~s: now in the American Zone, and he
writes to me. thlat Oill!r ;p eople over there behind the Iron
Curtain have friends. here in the United States, and they
are praying every d·a y that the Gorvernmen t of the United
States wHl win the battle against communism . ,A nd Slorvaks,
like IPoles, the Uikrairuans , the Baltic nations, or Rum•a nia,
Hung,ary, the Czechs:, Croatians,, :Serbians, and so on, they
like to be free like you are here in this country; they like to
be independen t, and, maybe, wiH sometime be ruinified in a
great European federation li,k e yoru are here urnfied in the
United States.
Mr. M:c~•g ue. When di:d you say you left Slovakia?
Dr. Pauco. It wa:s in Apr.ii 1945.
Mr. McTigue. And when did you arrive in this country?
Dr. 'P auco. WoUT years aglO, in Apri[ 1950.
Mr. McTigue. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bonin. Mir. Feiglha:n.
Mr. Feighan. Mr. Pau!co, we have heard testimony with
reference to the Vinnitsia massacres ,w hich stated' to us that
after the Commllllllists were diriiven out of the Ukm.i.ne in
1943 and the Naizis came in, they opened up graves of which
there were 38, each of them the same length, and widlhh, and
depth, that they conWned ov:er 10,000 rpeople they
weiI'en't aill U!kirruinians; some were IPoJes, and of other nationalities ; 'that the people there were of various status ;
they were, :farmers, armsan;s, wovkers, ,a nd rinteilleotUJals, and
the testimony th1at we rnceived also. indicated, at iJ.east with
reference to those particulaT graves, that tlhey were done by
the So;viet Russ,i ans durJng the years 1937 and 1938, but I assume that they did many othera besides those.
Dr. Pa:uco. I spoke ,t o the 1people of Vinniitsia, these

�SLOVAKIA

36

people, Ukramiians and Poles, were all liquidated tb y the
Soviet agents.
,MT. Feighan. Yes. That ~s my understanding.
Dr. Pauoo. Yes.
Mr. Feighan. The testimony that we had shows that.
I 1have no further que,s1t1:ons
Mr. Bonin. WeH, Mr. Pa.'Ulco, you stated that this alleged uprising in Slovakiia was clearly Communist inspired,
is that OOlITect..
Mr. Pauco. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. BODJin. They created dissension and they created an
atmospheTe Olf revolt within Slova:ki:a?
Dr. Pauoo. Yes.
!Mr. !Bonin. And a.gents had been sent in there, is that
cor,rec.t, to irritate and agitate this revolt?
Dr. Pauico. That is correct.
Mr. iBonin. And by thait means using the Commurnst
tecfunique to wipe out the ,people that were undesiralble to
them?
Dr. Pauco. Yes
Mr. !Bonin. Of coU1I1Se, iwe lhruve had testimony where thait
same identicaJl truing was used in- other countries that have
come under the domi'Il'ation of the Russians throughout different parts of Ea;sitern EuTope, lbut this is &lt;the fhist time,
I beli'e!V'e, that we had testimony that they were aotually
dvopped in by pamchute to iITitate and agitaite rund crnate
the trouble.
Dr. Pauc·o. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. But, in the meantime, they !had some agitators in there already; iis tlhat correct?
Dr. Pauico. Oh, yes.
Mr. Bonin. And they had le:6twingers ,i n there?
iDr. Pallico. Yes.
iMr. !Bonin. Who were ready to follow the agents tha:t
were dTopped in?
Dr. PauJco. Yes.
Mir. !Bonin. In other words, isome people in the United
States fool that there are not many Communistls, lb ut they
are aliways :ready, willing w:hen the o.p portune time cOllnes,
to seize that opportunity to overthrow the existing governmenrt: in any partioular place .
Dr. Pauco. Thait's wue.
Mr. Bondn. Now, of course, since you have lbeen in the
1

�SLOVAKIA

37

United States, you have been trying to. bring to the attention
of the people of the free world this Commwnist threat; is
that correct?
Dr. P,a uco. Yes, that is oorredt.
Mrr. Bonin. And in each instance where you haive an opportUillity, and I understand that you are still a newspaperman and a joornalist, you bring these facts to .t he attention of the people that Tead your newspaper, the Je&lt;lnota?
Dr. fuuco. Yes, that's correct
Mr. Boniin. This isn't tJhe fiiirst part, of Eastern Europe
that we have heard of where forty to f,i fty thousand people
have boon slaughtered.; O'Ilce a;gain demonstrating that the
Communist regime holds power only because 1t UJSeS force
and threats and intimidation to keep the people ias helpless
as they possibly can.
Dr. Paiu100. That is correct.
Mr. Bonin. WeH, on behalf of the committee.. I 'Wish to
thank yow for your splendid staJte:rnent tlhat you haive made
as a part of thii:s ree-0,r d and for the reswme orf yo'lllI' experiences in Ozecho-Siovakia and in .Slov•a kia.
Dr. Pauco. Thank you.
Mr. Boiruin. Mr. Feighan has another question 'h e would
like to as!k you, Mr. Pauco.
Mr. Fei,ghan. Do you not feel that it is correct, Mr.
Pautco, that the people of 1Slo;v;akia are imbued with the nationali-stic -spirit, a love of God and a love of colUllltry, and
they just seek the right of self-deteTmination as ~ sovereign
nation?
- Dr. Pauco. That is co,r rect, Slir.
Mr Bonin. In other words, they are asking nothing
more than some of the principles: that have been em.mcia:ted
through long yea.rs, that each people have the right to de- ·
termine the kmd o.f government they wish to have, the type
of leaders they wish to have, and to conooct their Lives and
thei,r g01Vernment in theiT own nationialistic spirit and attitude. The people orf R!Umania, Hung,a ry, Po•land, Lithuania,
Latvia, EJSltooila, ruid o:their nations ha,v e the same desire to
goveTn themselves; is that correct.
Dr. Pauico. Yes; iliat iis correct.
MT. Bomn. Welil., I 'Wliish to thank you ,v ery much for
your testimony, and we sincerely hope thait the opportunity
1

�SLOVAKIA

38

presents itself to defeat thls Communist threat, not only to
the Ewopean natio111S., burt: also to the peoples of the free
world. Thank you ve,r y much.
Dr. P,aulco. Thank you.
Mr. Feiighan. Waiit a minute, Mr. Pauco·.
Dr. Pauco. Yes.
Mr. Feighan. During your experience in Slova&gt;lcia, did
you haive an opportunity to witness the manner by which
the Russian Commlln!isbs tried to break up the culture, the
1,anguage, the customs, and the religion of the Slovak people?
Dr. Pauco. I lived in Bratislava. Bvatislava is the capital
of Sllo;v,rukdoa, and is on fille west border of Slovrukia. The Soviets came from the east. The whole of Slov-akJa was occupied on April 7 or 8, ,a nd I escaped from Bratis lav,a on
April 4.
Mr. Feighan. I see.
Dr. Paulco. I wasn't there after the Soviets occupied the
whole of Slov.alk,i a, ·b ut I was in Braitiosla:va during three
months thait the eastern part of Sl()!Va:kia was occupied by
the !Soviets, and I heard from my relatives, from my f11iends ,
of the methods which I mentioned before.
Mr. !Feighan. Yes; but you were noi there yourself t o
see it and observe .iit?
Dr. Pmrco. No, no.
Mr. Feigihan. Well thank you, Mr. Pauco
Or. Paulco. You are wekome.
Mr. Bonin. Thank you &lt;very much.
(Wil'kes-,Barre, Pa. , September 30, 1954).

FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JOSEPH l\1IKULA
IMr. iMcTigue. Were you in Sl'OVlaJkia during World War
Dr. Miku1a. Yes, I was.
Mr. iMcTigue. Were you a pairt of the underground
movemerut in Slovakia?
Dr. Mikul,a. Yes, sir. We started the underground movement at the end of World War II. I was one of those who
started it.
iMr. Mc'Digue. When did it start ?
Dr. Mi1kula. It was in 1944.
tr?

�SLOVAKIA

39

:Mir. McTigue. What caused you amd others to form this

underground moivement?
Dr. Mikula. I will read a short statement in this connection. The inception of the anti-Communist arganirlation
is attrilbutafule to the iintellectuals wlho foresaw the necessity
of truking preventive measures aga,inst the imminent d001ger
of communism. They studied communism and decided to
combat it, ~cause tlhey had no false illusions of whether or
not the Communists wOIU!ld Telax their demands after World
War II.
The first communistic pressur~ was expected in the
field of religion. Conseqiue.ntly, the preparations were directed for the defense of re!l,i gious freed.om and the preservation of religious life in the event of intensive persecutions.
The second fi.eld was the po[iltical field. Ourr ca1cuJations
at the !beginning w&amp;e wrong. They didn't staTt at the beginning in religiious _peil'Sooution, but it:Jhey concentrated an theliir
activities in the political field.
Mr. Kersten. Have you finished with your s1:Jatement?
Dir. Mikul,a. No; very briefly about this polii!tical field.
The most essential elements in tlhe polritical life of the nation
are political parties. The Communists knew it, and acted accordingly. They were verry cautious. that no par.ty existed
which by attracting the sympathy of a majority of the _population wouild endanger t'he position of the Commumst Party.
So, the parties which airose after the war with the petrmisSlion of the Communusts were incapable of eiffecting
strong anti-Communist oipposition, because, first, theiy had
no roots, no tradition, a;mong the population.
Second, part of their leadeffi, were either tools of Communists ior opportunists who, /because of l,a ck of principles
and courage, completely sulbmitted to the Communist pressure, and third, throug;h the assistance of the ColIIlm.unist
Party, they were s'h ackJed - aM other parties were shackled
by the coordinating comrruttee of all the parrties, the socalled National Front. This Nationa'l Front was nothing else
but a machine in the ih ands of the Communists to control
aU o,pposiition against the Communist Party.
Mr. Mc'l'igue. Were you the recognized leader of the un-

�40

SLOVAKIA

derground in Slovakia?
Dr. Mikula I woll!ldn't say so.
Mr McTig;ue. Were you one of ,t he leaders?
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. !Did you ar.ronge to have some of your
members sent abroad in order to assist in the underground
movement from without ?
Dr. Mtkula. I thin:k I can state it quite openly. Our program was to prepa1re things, firs,t, at home, and, second, we
had some people out aibroad. I mean, out of ,the count.Ty. We
,s end them out of the country ,a nd directed the situ.aitiion,
informed them, they ind'ormed us. The illlformatiion we receirved we direoted to ,proper aut'horitie;,
iMr. Keirsiten. Now, just at this ipoint - we want to
ma:ke sure that you understand ,p erfectly clearly, Mr. Mikula. We know, of course, that you did operate in the underground in Slovakia, and there are undou!btedly a number of things that you would not wish to spea;k a.'bout specifiicaHy and openly. 1S0 that any question the oounseil or
any member here might ask in that regard, you just use
yom own judgment. We don':t want you to disclose pU!blicly
anything t hat would in any way endanger the ipresent situation there, a:nd that is what you 'ha,,ve in mind, Mr. Counsel, I am sure.
Mr McTigue. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. [Mikula. Yes. I 'Wl3.'Ilted to ask yo u for this permission.
Mr. Mc'Tugue. How long were you a part of the undergroU1I1d in Slovakia.?
Dr. Miikwla. I was wor,king directly in the field almost
fiiive years to the. end ,o f 1'949. 1Iin Feb:rua.ry 11950 I left for
the United States.
·Mr. McTigue. And did you emigrate to the Uniited
States in 1950?
Dr. Milkula. Yes, I did.
Mr. McTigue. Now, when you left 1S1ova.ki.a in 1949, were
you furced to !leave your wife b e hind'(
Dr. Mikula. No, I was one of tho se who was sent
abroad when the Communists took over and legia.l opposition
was ailimost iimpossilble in ,the country. So, I went out from
Slova:kfa in 1945, and I was wonk,i ng outside of Sfoviakia.. I
was worlcing abroad. I have here a little bo~ldet edited by
1

1

�41

SLOVAKIA

the Ministry of l!nterior in .Prague; the head of the Ministry
of Interior was a well-iknown Oommunist •o y the name of Nosek. It was edited and published by the Ministry of Interior, 5,000 issues were distrilbuted over here. My name is
mentioned aJbout 70 or 80 times in this booklet.
Mr. Kersten. Just .so we get th•a t clearly, as I understand it, you ~eift Sloivaikia in 1945.
Dr. Mikuia. Yes, I did.
Mr. Kersten. And you were outside the country?
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
Mr. Kersten. !But while you were outside the coll!Ilitry
during the fullowmg yerurs up 'll'Iltil -about 1949 or 1950, you
were woriking in t'hiis movement, is that correct?
Mr. '.Mhlm~ia. I was in steady contact, and I was one of
the leaders outside.
MT. Kersten. Of the lllillderground freedom m01vement in
Slova,kiia?
Dr. Mii kula. Yes.
Mr. Kersten. And this :book ,t hat you have ha,nded us
here is a booldet put out by the Communists in Bratislava?
Dr. Miikula. 1:rl ·P rague. The Ministry of InteriOT, Czecho-Slovakia.
Mr. [Kersten. Maylbe we 1had better mark this.
Dr. Milrula. The title of .the book is "Conspiracy Agaiinst
the Repl]blic."
iMT•. Kersten. Would you mark thi&lt;s "Milwaukee Exhibit 4."
And you have stated rthat this Milwaukee Exhibit 4 is a
Communist ,pubH1cation ipulblished in what year?
Dr. Miiktl'l.a:. ffit was printed Noivemlber 1947.
Mr. Kersten. And it contains rtJhe accounts of operations
2.gainst the Communist g01Vernmen t; is that correct?
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
Mr. Kersten. And you are named in here, as you say,
70 or 80 times?
[)r. Mii:ku1 a !Something liike that.
Mr. Kersten. In rw1hat crupacity?
Dr. Miikuila. Someitiiimes as ibhe leadeT of the underground, sometimes as an American agenrt, sometimes
Mr. Kerstein. Always in a derogatory sense?
Dr. M~kuJ1a. Absolutely.
1

1

1

�42

SLOVAKIA

Mr. Kersten. I notice on 1:Jhe first page of the printing
here - one of the first rpages - it is aotually page 7,, but it
seems to be the start "Of the body of t'he article - I notice
a name - Joseph rMi!kufa. Is that you?
Dr. Mikula. That i:s me.
Mr. Kersten. Then you are named frequently therearfter;
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
is t:Jhiat rig1ht?
Mr. Kersten. Proceed, Mr. Coltl7lsel.
Mr. McTigue. I w,ant to •ask you two questions. Dr. Mikula. Wi'fil you briefly tell uis something about the ac'tiivities
of the ll!Ilderground, and secondly, were these actiivities effectiive, in y;our j,udg,menit?
Mr. iKersten. Keeping in mind tJhe safety maitters that
we tahlced albout.
Dr. Miikua,a. As I mentioned before, the legaiJ. resistance
or Jega!l oppositilion againJSt communism was foiling. So, the
people 1wirt:Jh ra nti-Oommunist tendencies lost faith m their
weaik and oppo:rbuni,stic party leaders, and consequently,
sought -0ther mea.lilS wiherelby they might prevenit the Communists from ·aocompl:iishing their ,plans.
Now, the diTect answer to your question, "Wihat were
the actiivities ?" Fiirst, to do e,verythiing that would undermine the Coimmu!nist IP .arty, and the ends of tfue Oommunist
Party. We knew that they will try to Sovietize, to taike over
the counwy.
So, we rpuibliiished leaflets. We published booklets. We
pu'b1is,ihed pe;riodiools. IDverytilimg was hllegal and underground. That w.as at 'the b~imling. Laiter on, when it wiIB
pretty hrurd to distrilbute mimeographed leaflets or publications - because they were against the Communists - we
started an illegal triansimi-titer - a shortwaive radio station.
It is not necessairy to teH where and how it was, but it
existed and rit worked very effectively. Then, later on, we
tried to collect all possible rnformaitiorn from political, economical, military, oullJtu,r,a-1 life; get it out and mfomi the
worild 1aJbout the si•tUJatiion over there.
JUJst to show you how it was done, here are some photostatic copies of the orders issued by the commander in
ohlef of the nati'Onal security guard. It was a gend:armery
police.

�SLOVAKIA

43

Mr. McTigue. Communis t police?
Dr. Milrula. CommUIIlist, yes.
Mr. McTiguei. What did the ·o rder say?
Dr. Mikula. They are different o:rders. For example, I
will just ~ k of the first one. lt i,s dated Bratislava, March
4, 1947, firom the head{l_uall'lters of Nationail !S ecurity Guiard.
The orders to the lower units of National Security Guards :
il order that ,s pecial attention be paid to tJhe transports
of Volhyi.ruia Ozechs cOIInli.ng from tihe U. S. S. R. - thait is
the Soviet Union - they have already settled on the territory of Slovrukia. They have to lbe constantly watched arid
fO!Nowed, because they are spreadling internationr uUy false
infurmation a:bOUJt iour eastern ally, the U. S. S. R.
Mr. !McTigue. Wha:t people is he talking rubout in tlhis
order?
Dr. !M.ikiula. One of the tactics of Commt.Lll!ist takeover
was tramsplanta tion; movements of the people. Right after
t'he war we had a HUJngarian minority in 1Slcwakia and a SlovaJki,a n minoniity in iH ungary. Now , right aft.er the war
started the transportru tion orf these minorities frQiffi HUI11gary
to Slovwkia, a,:nd from 1S1ova!kfa. to Hungary.
What happened to Slovakia? From H1.1!11.g,acy came the
people who couldn't sipealk any word of Sloviak. To Hungacy
came people from Slova:kiia.
There were Ozeohs iwho Hived about 200 or 300 years in
one province of [Russia calllled Vo1hynia. Just to show good
faith tor something like bha.t, the Sowet moved those Volhynia: Czechs to Ozeciho-Slovaikia.
'Dhe movements of the population are very serious
thinigs, because they !bring insecurity. Noibody knows how
long he stays in his ()IWll house., in his 01W11 neighlborllood, and
so insecure people are aliways much easier for the CommUilasts to handle.
Mr. McTigue. That is the grnup to whiioh he has reference in the order?
Dr. Mikula. That is tihe explanation . So further:
Specifically , I ask the units of Nationa,] Soourity Guard
to watch the tI"ansports corning in and the transient transports orf V oohyniia Czec:hs going through the railroad station.

�44

SLOVAKIA

Those Czechs wouldn't come !into any contact with the
public. I mea.n witJh the popu1ati10n. Then you hiwe here the
order to maintain ~ continuous oontro1l on ail calls in post
offices and telephone-Office excihanges. This was done by
the ipol!ice. They ccmtr.ol all calls ·c oming in and W:hait was
said. If they find something against the regime they wt
accorcmng to regufations.
Thls here is concerning the control of the pop.wlation in
traiins. Everyone - they sa,y here, "Everyone is Slllpposed to
have this ridentificaitioo. card1." So, the units of SiNB - lower
units - are ordered lh:ere to control the population, and if
somebody hasn't his idenitificatlion card, he ris supposed to
be arrested am.cl brougiht ilil for investigation to the nearest
police station.
This order ooncerns the former gendarmes orr mem!bers
of the National Security Guard poiice who were deported to
Russia, were coniiined there, and later on brought 1b ack to
Slovakia. Same of them were put in the!ir fonner positions.
They were ·agaiin rcinsitated a:s gendarmes, but the order says:
To the Ministry ()If Interior came the information t:Jhat
the behavior ()If these returned former memlbers of gendarme is not satisfactory. They taJlk very sharply against
the !S oviets iand are doring that even in the company of the
other members of the unit.
I order you to follow those memlbers in your d±sbr.icits
and remind them that for bad talk aibout the brother nation, Russia, they can be ,p unished and arrested.
Mr. McTigue. Now, what you haNe been de.scmbing to
the oommittee . . .
Dr. Mikll!la. These •a re just the examples of how information was oolle_c ted and brought out and utilized.
Mr. McTigue. Now, do you know, or oan you tell the
oommittee whether there is an wnderground operating in
SwvaJkia ,a t the present time?
Dr. Miilmla. l am posritive there is. First, I would just
say from the general point of vtl.ew, so long as the Comm'Ulilists are unaJble to change human nait'UT'e, there wiU [be the
will. to 1be free. It means there will be the will to rresist. That
is a general rea:son

�SLOVAKIA

45

Second, the best proof ,i s that you still read in the papers how much troulble they haJVe in .t his or that group or
with this group, and so on. These are the 1best documents
that the :resistance is not only aJlii.ve, but is acti1Ve.
Mr. iMcTigue. Do you fool thaJt the underground is the
heart of the resistance, the core of the resisltance, in Slovaki,a today?
Dr. Mhlrul'a. I would say so. I would dare say that albout
80 or 90 per cent of the population is anti-Communist, but
not aU of these 80 o:r 90 per cent are willing to ta!ke am.
acti:ve part to fight oommundsm.
Mr. iMcrrigiue. Why?
Dr. (Mlikula. Because of the advances of oommumsm
they are very cautious ito. d:o nothing which could provoke or
cailll for Communist reprisals This is one reason.
!Second, urSU1ally the people WOII'king activei1y and directly are, in my opinion, heroes, and not everyone cam. be a
hero. So, from thds group, from this 80 per cent, we can sruy
whaJt is in tlhe underground is the most ii.miporllant and most
vaJLuiaJble co,re of passive and ,a ctive resistam.ce.
Mr. McTigue. You were in Slov,rukia at the time of the
Communist taikeover; is that correct?
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
Mr. IMc'Digue. Were there wholesaile arrests and deportations in Slovakia. as there were in the other C-Ollll!tries?
Dr. Milkllll,a. Slovakia. is a small counrtry of 31bou,t 3½
million poipuilation. So the figures. are not so enormous, but
in relatio1I1, in proportion to ,t he whole popll'laition, they are
pretty big They deported in :t'he fi.rst month aifteir the occupa1tion of Slovakia rubout 38,000 people.
Besides this, in tlhe !first half year, when they took over,
aibout 133,000 people were put in ja,i1s, in camps, amd taken
out of theiir normal life.
Mr.' Mcrrigue. [ ha;ve M further questions.
Mir. Kersten. Mr. Bentley?
.
Mr. Be1I1tley. When did you leave Slovakia?
Dr. Mikula. I lefit Slovalci.a in 1945.
Mr. Bentley. That was just the beginni.DJg of the antiCornmi.mist resistance then,, I presume.
Dr. Mitkula. Yes.

�46

SLOVAKIA

Mir. Bentley. ilfaJVe you mamta.ined contacits, or how
have yiou gotten yml'I' worrunaJtion regarding the activities
of the underground since that time?
Dr. MikU!la. As I Wld you, we haJVe steady contact
through couriers. I wi!ll j!U'st mention one thing: In 1945
our coUJriers hrougiht over my wife with two little children.
Mr. Chai:run:an rememJbers those l.ititle children. One w:as four
and one was ,s ix.
Mr. Bentley. How l01ng was co111tact of this kind maintained?
Dr. Miikulia. ,J t.hinik that contac.t is stiH mamtarlned, but
I could rta1k 3111d testify ,t o the end of 1'949.
Mr. Bentley. Until the end of 1949, which was a,bout
two years after the coup d'etat in Pra,gue?
Dr. Milrula. Yes.
!Mr. Bentley. And srunce .that time, your ilmowledge has
been 01JJ.ly fTom information, not direct; rum I correct?
Dr. Miku]a. lit is secondary. Before I reccived mormatron diirecil,y. I was ll'S'lllally the first who received it. Now I
a'In receiving informia,tion, but later.
Mr. Bentley. How dloes the situation in Slovakia compare wi;th that of otfuer countries in the Soviet satellite,
would YOIU say? Iis it -b etter or worae?
DT. MikU!la. I thiinlk .t he condifti,ons a;re generaHy the
same in all the coU!Iltries. As for the resistance, maybe in
S'lovakira, the resistance is a little bit stronger and maybe a
little bit more success:fluil, 1becall!se, as you iknow, Slovakia is
a country orf farnners, a country of mountainee:ris, ·a nd the
people i1I1: Slovaiki'a are deeply reliigtlous. T.he hardest thing
for the Communists to break ~re the farmers and /besides
that, to remove Teligion from the sow of the rpeoiple and
rep}ace it by Leninism is not so easy. You know .t hat.
Mr. Bentley. So you would say that the cond!itiOIIl!S are
about the same, but -the resistance itJhere is a little bit
·stronger?
Dr. Mikula. Yes. The same. The same concentration
camps, liaJbor orumps, the same tendency to create Kollkhozes
and co[lectiive farms, the same tendency to brealk any possible resistance, and if there dsn't any hope, arrest the peo-

�SLOVAKIA

47

ple, seind them ,t o uranii.ium mines; tJhe same everywhere,
the same procedure.
Mr. Bentley. Am ,I correct in believing that part of Slovakiia has been incorporiated in the 'Soviet Union?
Dr. Mi:kula. A very small eastern part. Abowt 15 or 18
villages of S1ova1-da were inconporated inito the Soviet Ull!ion.
Mr. Bentley. '.Dhe fiact that this resi,s tance dioes exist or
does not exist in 'SlrovaJkia to the extent you say it does,
what, in your opinio!Il, can lbe done most effectiively to eniruble
this resistance to continue ,and maintain itself. Whrut encouragement or assistrunce can be givan, if any?
Dr. 1M:iikuil.a. I would state .it in ·one way: To increase
the hopes of ipeople lh'ling over there that soonetime there
will be a cha1I1ge.
iMr. Bentley. We ,a:re ta:lking specificailly of SLovaik:i!a.
Dr. M:ikula. Spooiffioa.My, for 1Slovakia, it is absolutely
necessary to reassure a;gaiin and again those people tlhat we
are not forgetting them, we are not •giviing them up, and we
have unde.rstaind!i!Il!g for their specific prolblems.
Mr. Bentley. Including the right 'O'f self-determination?
Dr. iMitkullia. '.Dhia.t is w!hat I walllted to say. We should
not stick to the owtmoded, ourtlived st'I'luctures. '.Dhey have
proved to be un:successfol, and rwe should give to the people
the right to be free and to have therr OIWIIl: government, ·a ccording to their own c1hooce. That is one o.f the most important t'hd.ngs. Then th'i&lt;s po&lt;l.tnt: The people are, I wou!l.d say, 90
per cent 'llillited in Slovalk:ta. .Anyrt;hin,g whioh .poi.nrt:s o.wt thait
we are forgetting them, rwe are not undersibanding them, is
cutting otff the will to resist.
iMr. Bentley. Thank you very much. Thiat i'S a:11, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Kersten. Congressman Feighan?
MT. Feighan. Dr. 'Mikula, as I understand it, you feel
thrut the people of 1SIOV1akia should be ,giiven assurances that
the free ,w orld would sirnpport their desire for seiltf national
determiniation of thei:r own identity as a nation if they so
desiire?
·
Dr. Miikula. Wihen you are talking generally albout the
popu1ation of Slovakia, that is one of the most important

�48

SLOVAKIA

things that they need; some kind of good will that we have
a.!11 understanding oif thei'l' problem.
MT. Feighan. Then if ,w e ,w ould tell the whole world that
we stand by the principle upon which our Naition was founded, thiat is, the ri!ght of self-determi:ri:ati-cm, that would be
he'l!pful to them. 'In other words, Mr. Mikula, if the free
w0irld shO'Uld gi,ve the Communists a free hand !in t!hese
caiptiive nations,, this would cause those people to lose hope,
ilS that right?
Dr. iM:ikuil:a. Absolutely. One of the most •i mportant
things is to show those people :tlhait we are really l!Iliform.etl
a'boUJt their plight, a.Jbout tlhe conditions under ,w hich they
are 11ivimg, that rwe hacve actually access to the most secret
communistic conspiracies. 'We shouJ.d convey t:his knowledge
to the masses. That is one of the moot imlportant th,i ngs.
Mr. Kersten. Does thrat hellp to sha:ke and lessen the
Communist ipawer in 'Uhose countries?
Dr. iMikul1a. It is •curttin.g off the arrogamt communistic
se!lf-corufiderice, amd when we ta.Jke such a cut through the
Communist Party, we see there are just a few intellectuals,
a group of fanatics, and a great nuim ber of opportunists.
The greatest ipart of them a.Te oppoiitun:ists. Activities must
be directed against those opportunists, because they are
afmid. They betrayed, first, second, thoird time. They a.re
readty to betray todlay and every day.
Mr. Kersten. ~irst o;f iaU, let me ask you this: YO!U have
gone to Detroit from iMHrwaUJkee?
Dr. M~kula. Yes. MHiwaiUJkee is my ,h ome.
Mr. Ker,s ten. You li:ved 1here several years and ~eft for
Detroit a short whlle ago wlhere you now live and :work
Dr. MikuiJ.a. Yes.
with your family?
Mr. Kersten. Dr. MikU'la, you iha,ve given us a great deal
of valuable inlfoirmation, rparticula:rly the knowledge that
I know you ha'V'e, of the existence of the undeiig,round in
Slocvakii a, resi,s tance, opposition, which our evidence indicates exists in all the other cOUIIltries likewise to a very
great extent.
!Mr. Kersten. Thank you, Dr. ~u!la, for yOUT aippear~Milwaukee, Wis., October 22, 1954).
ance here today. 1

�SLOVAKIA

49

FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PHILIP A. HROBAK

Mir. Kersten. I want to say we are rvery honored and
happy to haive you here with us, Mr. Hrobak, as the president of the Slovak League of America.
:Mr. Hrobak. And tihe editor of the Jednota, the official organ of the First Catholic SlovaJk Union of the United
States and Canada.
·
Mr. Kersten. I notice through several years of knowledge of your activities that you have keen understa:ndmg
of whaJt it means for a nation or a country or a people
to be occupied lby the Communists and some of the ways
in whioh they fight and some of the thinigs that we should
do to combat this new kind of enemy.
Mr. iMcTigue. How many memlb:ers, Mr. Hro'bak, are
a:ssociated or affiliated with the Slo:vak League of
America?
Mr. Hroba:k. The SloviaJk League .o f America, rubout
300,000.

!Mr. Mo'Dig,ue. What, ibriefly, is the Slovak League of
.America?
Mr. Hrobaik. The pur:poses?
Mr. McTigue. Yes.
1Mr. HTdbak. A cirvic and culturial origarnzation of
Americans of Slov,a;k descent. It was organized in Oleveland in 1907.
'Mr. Mc'lligue. It is mry understanding, MT. Chaimnan,
that !Mr. HrdbaJk has a statement which he wiSlhes to present to the committee, and if there is no objection, may I
sugigest that the witness be permitted to proceed wiith
the statement?
· Mr. Kersten. Without objection, it is so ordered.
!Mr. Hrdbalk. If you permit me, I would like to first
express my deep appreciation to this committee for the
opportunity given me to present the Slovruk chaipter in the
dread detail of Communist aggression.
I believe it is for the first time, at least as far as I
know, that ,a real, honest effort is :being miade to know
the background olf the many peoples behind the Iron Curtain, nations who always were and still are our friends,

�50

SLOVAKIA

peoiples who with all their hearts want to be our friends
because to them America has always lbee:n a living symbol
of freedom and independence, and now is just aJbout their
last hope of sa1vation from Red tyranny. I harve the greatest respect for the hono-raJble gentlemen on this committee
and its chairman, Charles Kersten. The coonmittee has a
difficult taslk, b,ut it is doing that task admiraJbliy well.
Helping the nations behind the Ixon Curtain to helrp
liberate themselves from the curse of communism cannot
and must not become ipOlitically a partisan a:flf1air. It is the
business, the duty, of every American to take part in it;
every Almerican must see it in that perspectirve, because
it is, after all, in the interest of the security of our own
America.
I would li!ke to e~press one point ,b efore I read my
statement, and that is that the SlovaJks have no quarreJ
with the Czech nation as such. The Czech nation today is
in the same Red fix as the SlovaJk nation.
The Sfovak•s, however, cannot remain silent about
Czech .p olitical leaders who were in a very large measure
responsible for the present terrilble plight of the Ozech and
Slovak nations over there, and who made it possilble foc
the Communists to seize power in Czecho-Slova!kia practically without any troUJble.
("How the Communists Seized Power in SlovaJkia" the statement by P. A. Hrobaik, president of the Slovak
League of America and Editor of the "J ednota," official
011gan of the First CathoHc Slorvak Union, •b efore the Kersten Committee on Communist Aggr(}SSion, in the County
Court House, Milwaukee, Wis., Friday afternoon, October 22, 1954 - was .pulblished in full in the iprevious issue
[Septemlber.,Decemlber 19541 of SLOVAKIA and, hence,, is
not repeated here.)
Mr. iMcTi,gue. 1I take it from your statement, Mrr. Hrobaik, that you consider the National Socialistic Party of
Czecho-,Slovalda a:s the one which was responsible for the
sellout to Moscow; is that correct?
Mr. HrrobaJk. I do, sir.
Mr. McTigue. Do you consider that the case of Czecho1

�SLOVAKIA

51

Slovakia is a practical or typical example of what happens to a nation that attemipts to coo,peirate or coexist with
Communists?
Mr. Hroba:k. Definitely.
Mr. McTigue. What do you think of the present Kremlin campaign to sell the nati0'11s of the free world on peaceful coexistence?
Mr. Hrohak. That is the Kremilin's way of trying to
lull us to sleep; forget our problems, our troubles; forget
what communism is, and just let them get strong enough
until they can take all of us.
Mr. McTigue. In your opinion, what do you think we
can do to keeip the ho,pes of the people of Slovakia alive?
How can we most help them at a time like this?
Mr. Hrolba!k. We must let them know that we a;re behind them; that we have not forgotten them; that .Americans stiH believe in the principles uip on which their country was founded, in the principle of freedom and independence ; and let them know that we shall do everything
to help them he1p themselves to overthrow the regime
they have.
~fir. McTigue. You agree with Mr. Mikula, who testified
here earlier today, that the resistance is still strong among
the ,people of SlovaJkia?
Mr. Hrabaik. It certainly is. We have had cootact with
the people directly and indirectly right through the war,
and we still get letters from people, who come from Slovakia today.
Mr. McT-fgue. You are able to maintain an effective
system of communicati10n with the Slovakian people with
what is going on over there today; is that correct?
Mr. Hrobalk. indirectly. Certain people get the info;rmation from persons in Sl&gt;ova~ia and then we get it.
Mr. Kersten. Mr. Bentley?
Mr. Bentley. Mr. HrobaJk, I want to go 1b aclt a little
bit before the period of Communist domanation of Slovakia
and look at the situation there !b:rfofly during the Second
World War. When SlO'V'aJkia was an independent reipulblic,
what exactly was the relationship at that time between
Slovakia and Germany?

�52

SLOVAKIA

Mr. HrOlbalk. Foveign policy was undoulbtedlly dictaited
by Germmy, /but the domestic policy was not, until the uprising of 1944, when the German Aiimy came in to occupy
Sloval~ia. Then bhe Slova.ks were in for it.
Mr. Bentley. -Would you say that the fad, for example,
that Slovalkia had troops on the Russian f.vont was a voluntary action or wa:s that dd.otated b:y Genmany?
Mr. Hvdbalk. I think it was both. I think th13Jt the Germans expected it, and the Slovaks, to make it aippear that
they aire really taking the business seriously, s.e nt a token
division there. The Slovaks had a way of exchanging men
by classes; they never had many men in the field.
Mr. Bentley. Did -Slov:akia take any action toward the
UTrited States at the time or shortlly after Pearl Harbor
when the Germans declared war?
Mr. Hrobaac. No; we tried to ascertain thait business.
We found out that some ,p erson, I believe it was the German radlio in Vienrna, d'id ma.Ike a statement that Slovakia
declared warr, but as far as- we could find out from our
own State Department and War Department, there is absolUJtely no formal declaration of war aga:inst the United
States.
iMr. Bentley. Never was at any time?
Mr. Hlrolbruk. Never was at any time. We couldn't find
that out from our own United States Goveirnment because
that point interested us rvery much, and so far there is
absolutely no record of it.
Mr. Bentley. Now, you say there was a distinction between the foreign policy of the Slov,a k Repulbl:ic which was
exercised and the domesti'c .poHicy. You mean -t he domestic
policy of the Slovak Repulblic was independent of Gennany?
Mr. HrobaJk. Yes; just about all independent; I mean,
running the country of Slovakia itself.
Mr. Bentley. Was there any form of oppression at
thait time?
Mr. Hrobaik. There was no oppression of religion or any
other thing. Some laiws. were enacted that ha;d to coincide
with some of the laiws that · the Germans had, but oUJtside
of that, the economic conditions - even Mr. Sr0ib31r, one of

�SLOVAKIA

53

the most intimate foiends of Benes had to admit after the
wax, were good.
Mr. Kersten. You say there was no oppression. There
was freedom of religion and the other political freedoms
that you normally would expect?
Mr. HrOlb.ak. None. Some claim that there was ,political swppression in Sl01Va!kia, but they don't explain the
problem correctly. The fact is that the ISlovaik parties, the
two only genuine !Slovak parties, are the Hlinka People's
Barty sometimes called the Catholic Party, and the Razus
Slwalk National Party, whi·c h was considered the Lutheran
Parby. Now these worked for the same program with one
accoro.
Mr. Bent-ley. Following the wprising of August 1944,
when the German mHitary came in to ,p ut it down, from
that time Slovakia lost its. independence?
Mr. Hrrolbak Yes. The Slovaks got it from both sides.
They were murdered by the occupation troops a.ind then by
the partisans on the other end.
Mr. Bentley. After the German military occupation
did the Tiso government continue in po,w er?
Mr. HrdbaJk. They continued. in ,power until 1945. Tiso
tried to explain away as best he coui'd that it was not a
national uprising; that the Slovruk Army and the Slovak
gendarmerie couild ta.Ike care olf the troubles in Slova:kia
themselves. The Germans firral,l y did not believe the Slovaks rufter General Otto's military mission was stopped at
Turciansky :S vaty Martin. I believe it was on August 25;
the group of aJbout 25 or 30 people, women and children
included, were taken off the train and put up in barracks
for the night. The neoct morning ~l were lined up against
a wall and mowed down with machine guns by the prurtisans.
Then there were other murders, sabotage, terrorrist
activities, which all came too soon, even for Benes's liberation movement which he had allegedly organized. The
leader of that movement was supposed to be General Golian. The uiprising was Communist-in spired and did not
have popular support.

�54

SLOVAKIA

Mr. Bentley. The Rm!ssian military OCCUipation of Slovalkia took place about when?
Mr. HrQbak. Albout Easter Sunday, 1945.
Mr. Bentley. And at that time the Slovak Government escaped to Germany?
Mr. Hlrobak. The Slovak Government went to Austria.
Mr. Bentley. And I believe they were finally captured
with the American troops?
Mr. Hrobak They were not captured. They surrendered to General Walker's army at that time. We had a
copy of the surrender papers and we gave it to, our State
Department, and, of course, the Army Department.
Mr. Bentley. And what happened to the members of
the Slovak Goivernment?
Mr. Hrohak. Well, unfortunately, even despite all our
effovts in America to preivent their being handed over to
Benes and his governrrnent in London, unfortunately, I
say, our pleas availed us nothing, and Tiso's Slovak Government was gi'Ven up to Benes and the Benes.Gottwald
coalition government. Tiso, after being tried by a "people's" court, was hanged on April 18, 1947, while members of the Slovak Govenunent were sentenced to prison.
Mr. Bentley. They were tried as war criminals?
Mr. Hrabaik. Yes, "war criminals," according to Prague.
Mr. Bentley. What is the sit'lllation in Slovakia today
under the Commrunist government of Prague? Is there any
form of committee for Slo;vaikia or is there a completely
unified government?
Mr. Hrobaik. Prague is still trying to tell us that the
Slovaiks themselves govern the.ir part of the state and the
Czechs govern their part, and so on, but that is not true.
The Czech Red centralized government in Prague is running the whole show. Even Slovak Communists are not
safe; Clementis is gone, so are others, and the secretary
general of the Slovak Communist Party is Karel Bacilek,
a Czech.
Mr. Bentley. You say the Communists are trying to
appeal to Slovak nationa1ism somewhat?
Mr. Hrobak. They did. Today it doesn't mean any-

�SLOVAKIA

55

thing. They are done for. In fact, 1S lovak Reds were for
separation in 1926, long ibefore Hlinka's pa,r ty.
Mr. Bentley. Who?
Mr. Hrdba.lk. The Communists. It is a matter of record.
They knew what the people wanted. They figtN"ed that there
are no people in any country who, do not desire to be free
and independent and they used that to gain their SUipport.
Hlinka's Party fought for autonomy; in the beginning, you
know, it wanted to haive a federation where SlovaJk,i a would
simply have states' rights.
The fight was simply for states' rights, as we understand them here in the States. The Slovaks wanted to elect
their own governor, their own judges, their school di,rectors, and so on. They were not for separatism until much
later.
Mr. Bentley. Mr. Hrobak, you were here, I imagine,
when Dr. Milkiu.la was testifying, and he said it was his belief that so far as the people of Slovakia are concerned,
what they really wanted was the right to self-determination. Do, you concur in that?
Mr. HroibaJk. That is correct.
Mr. Bentley. Thanik you ivery much. Your statement
and your testimony has contributed to the hearings, I am
sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1Mr. Kersten. Mr. Hrolbak, l
think at this time it is
quite clear from the records of recent history that the attempts of the Benes government to collaborate with and
have coexistence with the Soviet Union is a classic case
of what it means to make this attempt. I meant merely
for that government to put itsel1' in a position to be swallowed wp by the COll'Il.Illunists.
Mr. Hrobak. That is correct.
Mr. Kersten. It is a classic case in that regard.
Mr. Hrobak. Correct.
iMr. Kersten. And I believe one of the ministers of the
Benes government in London, Dr. Stransky, thought that
Mr. Hrobak Yes.
too.
Mr. Kersten. And that, along with other similar epi-

�56

SLOVAKIA

sod.es, certainly proves that there is no such thing as peaceful coexistence with the Communist s.
Mr. HTolbaik. That is correct.
Mr. Ker.sten. Well, I want to than!k you. The records
show if it doesn't already that Congressm an Bentley knows
a great deal about this situation in Ea:stern Europe because
he was an American diplomat in Hungary for several
yeairs, and he knows firsthand sOime of the real maichinations of the Communist s when they truke aver a country.
Mr. Bentley. I was ailso in Slova-kia.
Mr. Kersten. I am sure he has firstha:nd knowledge
of that, too.
Mr. HrolbaJk. Mr. Chairman, -t he statement that I have
made is based not only on what we haive from Slovaks,
patriotic Slovaks, 'but it iis also based O!t1 the 'book that the
regime put out in 1946, that is by the Lettrich "Demo-.
crats" arid the Husak Communist s; the name of it is
"Natl Tatrou sa Blyska" - (Lightning over the Tatras).
The booik has contr~butio ns from both sides, MT. Lettrich's
men and the Husaik men. And, of coocse, on the book that
was already introduced, there were only 5,000 of these,
The Conspiracy .Aigainst the Republic, which was introd uced as testimony by Dr. Mikula. That is my oopy. Then
on a boolk that was published here in America by the Communists called "Parti:zani na Slovensku" - (Partisans in
Slovakia), published in Chicago. And, I believe, another
booklet called "Verni ostruli," (They Remained Faithful). This book dealt with the uprising; it was written by
Deso Benau, ,w ho was editor of the New Yonksky Dennik (The New York Daily), in 1946.
Mr. Benau wa:s editor of that paper from 1942 to 1946
and tod!ay is doing an admiraJble job for the Communist s
in BraUshwa.

In this pamphlet - I will leaNe you this copy - you
can see the organizatio ns that are affiliated with us The SlovaJk League of America -- and the me:rrubers they
have. - I might add here that our papers were outlaiwed
from Ozecho-Slovakia by the Communist s on October 10,

�57

SLOVAKIA

1946 - that is this paper, the Jednota. and three other
Slova!k p8{!)ers.
Now, as you see here in this particular paper dated
Decemlber 13, 1944, we didn't wait until 1948 to tell America that Benes sold out the Czechs and Slova!ks to Stalin.
The big headline in that Decemlber 13, 1944, issue right on
the front page reads: "Sl()IVakia soJd out by Dr. Ed/ward
Benes."
Mr. Mc'Digue. What is that .pu!blication?
Mr. Hro!b.ruk. This is the Jednota, the official organ of
the First Catholic Slovak Union of the United States and
Canada.
And my statement is further ·b ased on the information contained in the booklet "The Rise and Fall of the Democratic Party in Slovakia," which was written by Constantine Cu1en, a new:spruperman from Slova;kia now residing in Canada, and ipu!blished in Slovaik by the Slovaik League
of America. I have translated it into English and the committee is welcome to it any time.
Mr. Kersten. Thank you, Mr. Hrobak.
(Milwaukee, Wis., Octo'ber 22, 1954).
1

STATEMENT BY DR. JOSEPH A. MIKUS

Fram 1944 until my escape from Soviet-dominated
Czecho-Slovakra, i:n March, 1948, I resided in Bratislava.
During this period I was three times imprisoned by the National Front Government: in 1945, 1946, and 1947. Now,
as a Slovalk refugee in the United States, I am glad to
have the opportunity of exposing to the Committee on
Communist A!ggression the tactics which, to miy own
knowledge and ibased on my personal experience, were
utilized 'b y the Communists in Slovakia to establish themselves first as a politca.-1 party and finally as a dominant
force in tha,t country.
Introduction

Before entering upon a discussion of the subject: proper, I would like to outline in general terms what has until now been the main trend in Slovakia's political history.

�58

SLOVAKIA

After losing her political independe nce in the ninth
century, Slovakia existed for a thousand years under for
eign dominatio n. Desrpite this fact, the Sl01Va!k nation did
not lose its ethnograp hic and cultural individua lity. Within
the nraime~o rik of the Austro-H ungarian Empire, it was
ruble to survive all the ;pressure of the Magyar cultural
and political centralism whioh seriously menaced its very
naJtional existence in the 19th century. World War I finally
providied an opportun ity for the 1SlovaJks to rid themsel'Ves
of the restrictin g grip of this ancient and obsolete power
structure .
On May 30, 1918, at the close of World War I, the
Slovak League of America signed together with the organilzatio ns of .Amemcans of Czech descent the so-called
Pittsburg h Agreeme nt, aimed at creating a dualist federal
union of the Czechs and Slov,atk,s which a little later entered the world communi ty of nations under the name of
Ozecho-!Slio:vakia. Although provision s guarantee ing the
preservat ion of the Slovak national and po1itical individuality were, according to the principle of self-deter mination, the essential condition of this solution, the Ozech political leaders, T. G. Masaryik and E. Benes, never made
any real attempt to fulfill their pledges. Instead of a federal union providing for a reasonaib le degree of self-gover nment for the Slovaks, and in utter disregard of the political will of the Slo1V.:\k people, Prague organized a strongly
centralize d state. On !February 29, 1920, the first so-called
revolutio nary parliame nt Oif Oze:cho..JSlovakia, ~inted !by
the Prague revolutio nary governme nt, voted for the first
Czecho-lSlovak Constitut ion which suibmerge d the Slovak
national individua lity through the device of a speciousl y
conceirved "Ozecho-!Slorvaik" nation, wherein the Czechs
wouid always lbe assured of their majority status and their
predomin ance. Not being a minority group in the sense
provided for under internatio nal treaties signed after
World War I, Slovakia ·r emained without any internatio nal
protection . Contrary to the famous definition of democracy by Abraham Lincoln, the regime a:rfuitrarily established by Prague in Slo:vaJkia could be described not as
a governme nt of the people, by the people, for the
"

�SLOVAKIA

69

people," 'but rather as "the g,overnment of the Ozech bureaucracy by the concept of the 'Czecho..:Slovak' nation
foisted upon the Sl01Vak people."
For 20 years SlovaJkia sought to· haive the principle
of equality between the Czechs and the Slovalks inco:r.porated into the constitution. The Slo,vak political leaders
argued that the Pittsburgh Agreement was of international relevance and that it should 'be respected by both
parties in the very interest of the joint Czecho-Slovalk
state. Prague, conrfident of the support implicit in the
Little Entente (1920), thie Mutual Defense Treaty with
France (1924), and, last but not least, the 'Dreaty of
Friendship and Mutual Aid concluded with the Soviet
Union (1935), felt strong enough to refuse any discU1ssion
on this pomt at any time.
The Munich Oonference of Septemlber 28, 1938, the
primary sig.niificance of which was the coUaipse of the
Ozecho~SlovaJk sysltem · of military a,lliances, inevitaJbly
brouight the nationality problem of the heterogeneous
Ozecho-Slovak State into the foreground. By the policy o;f
E. Benes, and in accordance with the Vienna arbitration
of Von R~bentro,p and Ciano on Novemb,er 2, 1938, SlOIVakia, lost over 10,000 square kilometers of territory to Hungary; an a·rea which included 853,000 inhabitants. This
was a national catastrophe. Ha,ving experienced this and
other deceptions,, and !being confronted in MaTch 193,9 with
the alternative of the partition of her territory among
Germany, Hung,a ry, and Poland, or of falling under direct
German administration, Slovakia voted on March 14, 1939,
thrnugh her legitimately constituted Diet in Bratislava, for
independence.
During World War II -E. Benes, who had voluntarily
resigned his oflice of President of Czecho-Slovakia, found
refuge as a ,pri'Vl8.te indilvidual in ,London. His basic goal
was to reestrublish Czecho"'Slo,valkia and, in spite of the oppositi'on. of the SlOIValk people, he was able to achieve this
goal ,b y relying essentially on the help of the Red army
and a grourp of domestic colla!borato~s. lirl the main body of
my statement I will explain the ;principal facts of this evo-

�SLOVAKIA

60

lution, but I would first of all li!ke to stress one important
point :
All 'Slovaiks in the free world greatly ruppreciate the
fact that the House Committee on Oommunist Aggression
has paid particul ar attention to the tactics• which communism aipplied in Slovaikia. As a matter of fact, these tactics
were very difforenit 'from - for exMn1ple - those adopted
in the Czech area. This fine distinction - an a,rt in which
Moscow h•a s aliways been a master - resllilted from the clifference of attitude demonstrated toward the Sovieit Union
by the population of Slova:kia at the end of World Wa:r II.
As is kno,wn, during World War IT the Czech lands were a
German protectorate. At that time and until 1944, Slovaikia
was a relatively fTee state, imbued with only one desire:
To reaffirm her status as a national state after the end
of the war. Whereas the populaition of Bohemia and Moravia loolked fonwa:rd with high hO!pe to its liberation from
German domination 1by the Soviets, that of Slovakia considered the approach of the Soviet Army as a dista:ster
which would put an end to the Slovak national state.
Because of this difference in psychological attitude,
Moscow decided from the•outset on a policy of appeasement
of the Czechs and on a prog,r am designed to smash the resistance of the Slova:ks. A detailed ,plan for this program
had ibeen elalborated, with the Kremlin's blessing, by E. Benes and K. Gottwald, who as early as 1943 were in Moscow.
1

A. The Blueprint for Sovietization

After the Teheran Conference, which toolk place Novemlber 28 - December 1, 1943, it b,ecame clear that the
Soviet Union would inevitaJbly play an important role in
post-war Europe . This conference gave substantial encouragement to the hopes of the Communists and certain
pro.-Soviet non~ommunists in Slovakia. Immediately thereafter, on December 12, 1943, Dr. Edward Benes, as chief of
the Czecho-Slova:k: Government-rn-exile, signed the Treaity
of F'riends·hip, Mutual Aid and Col1ia/boration ,w ith Stalin in
Moscow. In article 4 of this treaty the two· signafories
agreed upon close political and economic cooperaition. "Talking into consideration their respective peaceful interests,"

�SLOVAKIA

61

says the treaty, "the high contracting parties have decided,
after the restoration of peace, to estaiblish a close and
friendly collaboration . . ." They will develop to the maximum their economic relations and will grant each other,
after the war, all possilble economic help."
No such treaty haw.ing been signed with the United
States, Great Britain, or France, this international a:greement predetermined the orientation of Ozecho~SlovaJkia
toward Moscow in the post-iwar European scheme of politica:l relations.
The Benes-Stalin treaty served as a strong stimulus
for those who had been aspiring to political power within
the framework of Soviet influence in central Europe. In
this category were included, among others, fOTmer memJbers
of the Slova:k Communist P,arty. In the 1935 elections, this
party had gained six sea:ts of the 58 corresponding to
Slo;vaikia in the Pmgue Pa:rliament. Consequently, around
10 per cent of the total ,p opulation of the country had voted
for this party, which the Government of the Sl01Vak Republic had suppressed as a subversive group in 1938.
The non-Communist growp, smaller and weaker in its
common punpose, was composed mostly of descendants of
Czech exiles who in the seventeenth century, at the time
of the Count er Refiormation, had settled in Slovakia.
Both of these factions, equally willing to back " ... the
apocaly,ptical horse from the E}ast" (as communism was
perfervidly described lby one of the factional leaders, r..udovit Sensel ), met secretly on Christmas Day, 1943, and
created a joint r evolutionary organization under the name
of the Slovak National Council. The goal of this movement,
as estaJblished under article 2 of the respective secret document, was: " . . . to ta:ke over, at the expedient time, all
political, legislative, military, and governmental executive
power in Slova:kia and to use it according to the will of the
,people until such time as their freely elected reipresentati&lt;ves
shall themsel,ves ibe ruble to take it over."
The b.asic political tenets of the so-called Christmas
Agreement were laid down in another document, the first
three articles of which read as follows :

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SLOVAKIA

"(1) It is our desire that the Slovaks and the Czechs,
as the two most closely related Slav nations, shall unite
their destinies in a Czecho-Slovalk Republic which will be
their common government organized on the principle of
equality.
"(2) We desire close collaboration with all Slav states
and peoples, particularly with the Soviet Union, in whioh
we see a protecting shield for the free life and welfare of
all small nations in general, and of the Slav nations in particular.
"(3) The future Czecho..Slovak Republic shall conduct
its foreign policy in the spirit of these .principles and should
therefore, lean on the Soviet Union."
It is appropriate to mention here that, during his visit
to Moscow in Deceimib er 1943, E. Benes had in principle
agreed with K. Gottwald to set up a So'Viet ty;pe of internal administration in Cze.cho-Slovakia after its reestablishment as a dualist union ; to eliminate all traditional conservative political parties in the Ozech area, as well as in
Slovakia; and to esta:bli,s h the regime of a so-called National Front Government. In his Memoirs, published in
Prague in 1947, E . Benes recognized this in the following
passage (pp. 408-409) :
''Thereafter Gottwald e,opressed his opinion a'bout the
way in which this revolution should be prepared. He stressed
the necessity of forming national committees (i.e., So¥iets) ,
which would not only constitute the revolutionary cells of
insurrection, but would even se:rve as embryos for the whole
revolutionary political administration, I was not apposed.''
- wrote Benes - "to this opinion . . ."
1

"Then Deputy Gottwald," continued Benes, "went on
to consider the question of the structure of political parties after the revolution in Czecho-Slovakia. He was certain of a great Te1volutionary shift to the leift, of a great
Socialist majority, rund of a great defeat of our block of
right-of-center parties as it existed before the war: agrarians, national democrats, and artisans . . . As to the admission of the Agrarian Party, our Communists were not
willing to commit themselves in any specific way in De-

�SLOVAKIA

63

cember 1943. For all of us the merciless liquidation of
fasoism was without any distinction the basic and obvious issue."
In the same discussion., Benes and Gottwald touched
on the problem of the National Front Government: "It
will be necessary," ~ote Benes, "for the governmental
parties to form a unified national front after the Uberation, to form a common reivolutionary program, and to
pledge themselves to put it jointly into practiice. I then expressed my agreement with the plan concerning a national
front ." (pp. 409-410).
On the basis of these three principles,: Sovietization
of administTati'ons, elimination of the conservative parties,
and organization of the National Front Government as it
emerged in 194'5, Cze'cho-1Siovakia was inevitrubly fated to
become a "people's" democrwcy.
Wihat was the practical result for SlorvaJkia of the
Benes-Gottwald agreement? The Communist and the nonCommunist pro~Soviet group conspiring a.gain.st the Slovak Repulblic, although not representing more than 24
percent of the population, became the future leading force
of Slwakia.
B. The August 1944 Insurrection

Since early 1944 the Soviet partisan headqll!arters in
Kiev, with Rudo1ph Slanslky as i.ts main political adviser,
had 1been pouring Red ,p arachutists and Communist agents
into the mountains of central Slovakia, far behind the
German frontlines. Through contacts with many Communists and non-Communist symjpathizers, Sfova'ks, Czeehs,
and fornigners in various cities and villages of the country, these agents maI11a,g ed to create a network of informants and future collruborators.
More recent documents reveal that as early as Fehrua·r y 7, 1944. Proif. Viladimir Jershov of Russian· origin,
Gregorij Soloshenko, second lieutenant of the Red army,
and William Zingor, a Slo~-ak Communist, came to an
agreement in Tureiansky Sv. Martin that " . . . all future
partisan activities in Slovakia would follow instructions

�64

SLOVAKIA

from Mos:cow."l It was also agreed that 2ingor would be
the chief of the Slova:k partisans, with Soloshenko as his
sulbstitute. These self-appointments were later " . . . recognized by partisan headquarters in Kiev, and the Turiec
County group was integrated into the general Soviet partisan system. By this act the partisan movement in Turiec assumed the character of a militaTy organ~tion." 2
Moreover, in the summer of 1944 the following Sol\Tiet
rugents were, a.mong many others, actiive in Slovakia: Ing.
Nicolai Avenaria, as liaison officer in Myjawa; Jmfa Nikolaiev, a graduate of the Leningrad Naival Academy, as distrilbutor of arnns; Ing. Dimitrij Venero:vsky am.d Ivan Platonovich, active in preparing the partisan or.ganization of
Liptov County. In Turiec, whioh was the center of the So·viet partisan activities, I·v:an Stepanol\Tich and Alexander
Fjodorovich Krajushkin were actively operating. The real
Soviet partisan camp was organized in the Kantorska Valle~, near Sklabina. It was commanded by a second lieutenant of the Red Army, Ilvan VySOIC!ldj. Nikola Sur:kov, second
lieutenant of the Red army, was in command of a similar
camp near Priekopa. The most effective of these Soviet
agents was Alexei Velichko, captain oif the Soviet paratroopers, who, in fact, ibecame the chief of all partisan actil\Tity in Central Slovakia. Even General Osmolov was sent
to SlovaJda for a period of time to assure coordination of
the activity of the different groups.
In the meantime, on August 1, 1944, Gen. Bar Komorovs:ki, in command of the Polis:h underground army, ordered a general insurrection in Wa.rsa.w. H e did this after
hea.iring an a;ppeal of _Radio Moscow encouraging the people
of Warsaiw to carry out a ·general uprising. "The hour of
a·ction has already arriived," declared Moscow. Bor Komor-ovski was consequently firmly conivinced that he would
receive eiffoctiive aid from the Red army, which had just
reached the gates of the Praga sulbwr.b, 10 miles from Warsaw. But the e~pected hel.p neyer came. In his telegram of
(1) Cont ributions to the H istory of th e Slo vak Nationa:l Insurrection (In Slovalk ) , Turcians ky Sv. M.arrt in , 1947, p . 26.
( 2 ) IbM.. , p. 29.

�SLOVAKIA

66

August 16, 1944, to Prime Minister Churchill, Stalin dissociated himself from the "Wa1rsaiw venture." And so under the very eyes of the Red .army, the German units were
able to carry out their m8Sllicre of those Polish patTiots
who to Strulin (,according to his telegram of August 22,
1944, to Churchill) were but "a groU!p of criminals." On
Octdber 2 the uiprising collapsed 1because Stalin was unwilling to help "the Polish reactionaries."
The Waraaw insurrection seemed to ha:ve no effect on
Slovalkia. This was a ibloiw to Soviet expectations. To the
U. S. S. R., Sl~i,a, in the summer of 1944 was, from a
military viewpoint, an eID1Pty tera'itory with a "reactionary
government and nationalist populations," with some "deviated Communists" and some opporturustic non-Communist elements looking hopefully to Benes in London. A
civH W8JI' in Ozecho~Sloiwukia wouild haive been immensely helpful to the political aim!s of Moscow. But patriotic Slovaks
were too wise to begin an internal struggle. Three weeks
had passed siI11Ce the beginning of the Warsaw U!prising,
and still no rea.c,tion in Slovakia. In order to purge this
country of its "reactionary" elements before the impending occupat:rion, Moscow needed German military intervention there. ft was up to the Soviet aigen.ts to provoke it and
their opportunity was not long in arising.
On August 24, 1944, a spec,ial German military train
stopped in Tureiansky Sv. Martin, some miles from the
Soviet partisan headquarters illl ,Sklabina. The chief of
the railway station, in collusion with Captain Velichko,
refused to let it leaive. G€aleral Otto, former chielf olf the
Gernnan milimry mission in Rumania and now retwrmng
from Bucharest to .Berlin with his suite of 28 ;persons, was
then oonducted to the military barracik,s, held a prisoner
on instructions from Velichko, and together with all his
aides was killed by a unit of revolting soldiers the fohlawirtg day.
ThereUJPOn Hitler, infuriated with a Slovaik Government which was "unalble to 'k eep oroer in the hinterland
of the German lines," decided to send General Hloeffle into
Slovakia with an army of six di,visions to arunihrilate the

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SLOVAKIA

partisan movement. It was as a result of this decision that
the political and military leaders of the pro-Soviet conspiracy started the U[&gt;rising whioh was announced on August
29, by Radio Banslka Bystrica. Within two months General
Hoeffle crushed this Sorviet-inspired venture. Although the
political chiefs of the insurrection, such as the "Demo ..
crats" Joseph Lettrich, Jan Ursiny, iMatej Josiko, Martin
Kvetko, Samuel Bellus, etc., and the Commum,s ts Gusta,v
Husak, Laco Novomesky, Karol Schmidke, etc., were aible
to escrupe, its military chiefs, General Viest and General
Golian, were not so fortunate. As they were attempting to
escrupe by plane, the latter was burned by their angry and
disillusioned soldiers. Both of them were then captured by
the Germans and ta:ken to a concentration camip in the
Reich from ,w hich they were never to return.
Wihile alll of this was going on, the Soviet Army was
quietly resting on the north side of the Carpathian Mountams where it had been stationed for ove,r four months,
tranquilly ruwaiting the last act in this &amp;ama. It is evident
that the U!prising was only a trrup set b.y the Soviet partisans to ensnare the ". . . Sl~ak reactionary and opportunist elements." This pur,pose of the insurrection was revealed during the trial against Slansky in Prague in 1952.
As has already been mentioned, the former secretary general of the Comm.1N1ist Party of Ozeoho-1Slovakia had been
the main ctivil adviser for the 1944 insurrection in Kiev.
With respect to this function the state prosecutor ques~
tioned him as follows:
Prosecutor: Why did th.e Anglo-iAmerican agent (general) P1ka show an interest in placing the partisan units in
Slovakia under the command of (General) Golian?
Slanslky: He sought to place all partisan units under
the command of the reactionary General Golian at Banska
Bys:trica so as to faciJ.itate Golian's supervision of their
activities. Pika tried, in the interest of the imperialists and
of the London Government of Dr. Benes, to reduce the influence of the par1Usa.n.s as far as possdible.3
(3) Marcel Peju: Hier et Aujourd1hui: Le sens du proces Slansky II. Les Temps Modernes. P.ari,s, June 1953, p. 2013.

�SLOVAKIA

67

Thus Slansky revealed many years later what the Soviets really thought of the leading non-Communist personalities in the 1944 insurrection in Slovaikia.
This event is a great national tragedy. Whereas during the thref' years of her participation in the struggle
against bolshevism, Slovakia lost only 2,500 soldiers on
the eastern front, she lost around 30,000 persons in the insurrection in the short space of two months. Unlike the
insurrection of Warsaw, that of Banska Bystrica has nothing to do with Slovak ~triotism. It is quite clear that
Slovak patriots would have never organized an insurrection the purpose of which was to reestablish foreign external and internal control in their country.
C. The "Liberation" of Slovakia

What is known as the liberation of Slovakia by the
Soviets is in fact a misnomer and a grave distortion of the
historical facts. During World War II, though subject to
a certain international supervision by Germany, Slovalkia
was a relatively free country. During five years, until the
insurrection of Banska Bystrica, no one was executed for
political reasons . The Slovak Government in Bratislava
was able to master all the difficulties of the war period
during these years. Then the Red army came.
I waited for the Soviet "liberation" with a family
which lived on the outskirts of a small town, S., in western Slovakia. They had a nice, or as the Communists would
say, a '~bourgeois" home here. On the morning of a day of
mid-April 1945, the Soviet Army entered the town. The
house in question, which was located on a hill, was then
chosen as headquarters for the Soviet commanding generral in that sector of the front. During the two days that
the general stayed in the house, the conduct of the Russians was exemplary.
After the general and his staff had left, we congratulated ourselves on our not too bad experience with the
Soviet Army and prepared to cel~brate this event with a
good family dinner that evening. At p. m., just as we were
sitting down to table, a first lieutenant and a sergeant of

�68

SLOVAKJA

the Red army entered the house. The latter put his gun on
the dining-room ta&gt;ble and began checking on our identity.
Meanwhile the officer began to inspect the house "looking for hidden German spies." In the course of this inspection he found our ,p ersonal effects in Oiile of the bedrooms
and ·b rought them into the dining room. He then proceeded
to examine these things in detail and chose for himself
whatever happened to please him: A watch, a leather
suitcase, etc.
We then saw that a second lieutenant of the Red
army had entered the house and began in turn to forage
through it. After a while he ordered a young lady to go
into the kitchen to give him a glass of water. When these
three left, after 9 :30 p. m., the lady in question colJapsed
because she had been violated. After this visit by offi ..
cers, two other groups of soldiers, many of them drunk,
successively entered bhe house, each one having held us,
that is, four men and three ladies, under terror in their
own way, until 2 :30 a. m.
In the city of Bratislava, which numbered around
200,000 inhabitants, more than 4,000 dishonored women
had to go to the hospital for examination.
During the "liberation" of SlovaJkia by the Soviets,
around 20,000 Slovaks, mostly intellectuals, were sent by
po1itical commissarias into la;bor camps of Russia, while
various tens of thousands of inhaJbitants were imprisoned.
D. Political Evolution Aft.er 1945
On April 5, 1945, the government of Dr. E. Benes
followed the advancing Red army from Moscow into the
easVSlovaikian city of Kosice and estaJblished the Third
Czecho-iSlova!k Republic in the shadow of Soviet bayonets,
through the so-called Kosice declaration. Thus a foreign
government was imposed upon the Slovaik people which,
except for two small :factions of political opportunists, had
been loyal to the Slova&gt;k State - all of this without any
plebiscite. The Communists and pro-Soviet "Democrats",
who had already rendered a great service to Moscow in
the 1944 uprising, became the ex cutors of the n w state
will in Slovaikia.

�SuOVA.KIA

69

According to. the Benes-Gotlbwald agreement of December 1943 in Mos'coiw, they eliminated from the political
life of Slovrukia all other former political ,parties, namely,
the Slovak People's Party, the Agrarian Party, the Slovak National Party, and the Artisans Party. These parties }:lad received in the 1935 elections 19 plus 112, plus 1,
plus 1, or a total of 33 seats in the Prague Parliament out
of the grand total of 58 seats corresponding to Slovalkia.
Not countiing the Magyar and the German minorities which
had then elected 11 deputies and did not take part in the
uprising, the two pro-Soviet factions cor,r esiponded in
strengbh to only 1'4 deputies of the pre~war Slova,k representation in the Prague Parliament, six of them being
Communists, four Social Democrats, and four others.
Now, after haiving assured the mo!Ilopoly of political
re,presentation for themselves, the Communist and pro~
Soviet "Democrat" fa.c tions agreed upon a spo.ils system
exipressed in the form of a 50-50 share in the political
aJff~irs of Slovakia. In this way the political irufl:uence of
the Communists increased, in comparison with the year
1935, from 10 to 50 percent, and that of the pro...Soviet
"Democrntic" faction from 13 to 50 percent. Afthough this
50--50 relation 'between the two factions was corrected
by the elections of May 26, 1946, in favor of the "Democrats" who, 'becauS€ of the exdusion of other traditional
,parties, gained 62 .p ercent of all voters in SlovaJkia, while
the Communists got only 30 percent, the actual influence
of the Communist Party did not diminish at all. From the
outset the Communists had taken oiver the Commissariat
of Interior, including the Police; o;f EducatiOIIl; and of Industry, together with other key ,p ositions in the administration Oif Slovakia. They also retained the chairmanship of
the Board of Commissioners, i.e., the regional g01vernment
for Slo:vaikia.
MeaI11Whhle the Sovietizaition of Czecho~Slovaikia was
progressing in every field of Government activity: In the
field of industry, President Benes, ever olbedient to the
Communi,s ts, nationalized the main branches of industry
by Decrees Nos. 100, 102 and 103 of October 28, 1945, and
this without any consultation with the nation - mines,
1

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SLOVAKIA

100 percent; steel industry, 100 percent; sugar production,
80 percent; electricity, 73 percent; chemical industry, 72
percent; metallurgy, 68.5 percent; glass industry, 65 percent; leather, 53.5 percent; gas, 50 percent; textiles, 47
percent; ceramics, 46.5 percent; pruper industry, 4'5.5 percent; distilleries, 31.5 percent; breweries, 27.5 percent;
clothing, 25 percent; mills, 14 percent; food, 9 percent;
wood industry, 8 percent.
By these acts the IIlum!ber of wor.kers in the nationalized sector ,b ecame 570,000, whereas only 430,000 working
people fell within the field of private industry.
ln the field of education all the schools were nationalized by decree of the Slovalk National Council (No. 34,
dated May 16, 1945). Decree No. 47 of 1945 comiscated
the property of pri:viate schools, without compensation.
By decree of the Slovak National Council • (No. 33 of
May 15, 1945) the following institubions of political justice
were created: Oommunit,y and &lt;list.riot "people's courts"
and a national court in Bratislava. The legal task of these
courts was to judge war criminals, but their political pmpose was to get rid of the -p olitical adversaries of the two
factions in power, under the pretext of collaboration with
Germany.
The political character of this distorted justice was
determined by three circumstances :
1. According to article 42 of Executive Decree No. 55
Board of Commissioner s, dated June 5, 1945, the
the
of
memlbers of these courts were to be ruppoinrted by the two
political ,parties in power.
2. These courts, disregarding the classiical principle
nulla poena, sine lege, were made component to decide
upon cases which were not punishable according to the
Penal Code.
3. This legislation introduced the principle of collective guilt and collective :responsilbility.
4. Art.i.cle 5 of Decree No. 33 of May 15, 194!5, provided
for labor camps, which were estaJblished through Executive
Decree No. 105 of August 23, 1945. According to the provisions of article 2 of this last decree, the following cate-

�SLOVAKIA

71

gories of persons were to be sent to lrubor camps:
a. Those sentenced by the "ipeople's courts";
b. Tho,s e whose activities were a threat to "the people's demoeratic regime," public security, puib1ic peace and
order, rpulblic nutrition and the reconstruction o:f economic
life; or those who were enemies of the state or conspirators against it;
c. Those who· do not work;
d. Those who declined to do the work assigned to them
within the framework of laibor duty.
'5. No plea was admissible agaiinst the act of indictment; the defendant did not have a free choice in selecting
his defender; no ·a ppeal was granted to a sentenced de. fendaJI11t.
6. Sentences to imprisonment usually involved the
confiscation of the ded'endant's property.
It 4, ruppropriate to add here tha,t before being .brought
to· trial the "traitors," "Fasci.Sits," "collaJborationists," and
"unreliable persons" were entirely at the memy of their
indictor~. There was no impartial court, as the grand jury
in America, to examine into the basis of an accusation.
This was an era of arlbitrary indictments and personal
revenge.
By its decree No. 5,1 of May 2, 1945, the Sloivaik Natiooal Council dissolved in Slorvakia all assodations, except for those few which were eixipressly exempted from
thls general ,p rovision. Freedom of the press, of assembly,
and other human rights were likewise a;bolished.
E. The "Coup de Force" of November 1947 in Slovakia
All these measures were aimed at the weakening of
traditional political forces and the estaiblishmenrt of an exclusively Communist power. For a long time the leading
personalities of the Sloivak Democratic Party, such as Joseph Lettrich, Jan Ursiny, Matej Josko, Martin Kvetko,
Stephen Koovara, etc., did not know whether they should
remain loyal to their "gentleman's agreement" of 1945 with
the Communists or follow the anti-Communist line orf the
great ma;j.ority of the Slwak people. Finally they decided

�SLOVAK.IA

72

to remain loyal to their agreements with the Communist s.
Instead of getting .r id of the Oommunist s, as would have
been normal for a party which had won 62 percent of all
the votes of SlovaJkia, the "Democrat s" did not alb.andon
the principle of the National Front G01Vernment. This
loyalty was to prove their fatal undoing later on.
In Selptemlber 1947, under the pretext of having disc01Vexed a conspiracy a,gainst the governmen t in the Democratic Party, the Communist s decided to liqUJidate this party. Jan Kempny, Milos iBugar, and Joseph St8!sko., three
deputies of the Catholic wing of this party, were imprisoned, as well as a,bout 2,000 other Slova\k patriots. Thereafter the Communist s organized demonstrat ions against
" . . . the reactionari es hidden within the Democratic Party." In this violent dispute between the two political parties in Slo vaJkia, the Ozech-1Soci alist block - i.e., the Communists, the Social Democrats , and the National Socialists
of Benes - representin g togeither 18'5 deputies (93 plus 37
plus 55) out of the 300 in the Prague Parliament , threw
their weight on the side of the Slovak Communis ts (23
deputies) and against the Democratic Party (43 deputies).
The Czech Catholics ( 44 deputies) remained undecided.
There was only one honora,ble way to prevent the constant intewenUo n of Prague in the internal affairs of Slova!kia, name ly, to proclaim the inde pendence of Slovakia.
Instead of doing that, Joseph Lettrich, chaimnan of :the
Slovaik Demooratic Party, gave his consent to further
limitatio!Ils on the politi&gt;Cal preirogative s of his own party.
1

After a visit of Klement Gottwald to Bratislava, the
Democratic Party was relegated on Novemlber 18, 1947,
to a minority status in the regional governmen t of Slova1kia. Out of 15 seats there, it retained only 7, while the
triumphant Communist bloc got 8: The Communist Party
itself (including the chairman), 5; the Wreedom Party, 1;
the Social Democratic La,bor Pairty, 1; and the last seat
fell to General M~kttlas Ferjencik, "the neutral Oommis,s ioner of the Interior," playing in fact into the hands of
the Communist s. Such a hll!IIliliating change would have
been impossi!ble without a Czech coup de force in SloV3Jkia.

�SI.IOVAKIA

73

Having thus eliminated the greatest obstacle from the
way of their ambition for exclusive power, the Czech Marxist rbloc (includ!ing 56 percent of aU Czech voters of 1946
and 130 deputies (93 Communists and 37 Social Democrats) out of 23,1 corresponding to the Ozec&lt;h area) was
finally able, on February 25, 1948, to, peacefully consolidate
its position and, by eliminating the Czech Catholics and
National Socialists, to pass over from the priniciple od' the
National Front Gorvernment to a sheer Communist dictatorshilp.
Conclusion
As a conolusion to this statement, I wish to repeat
that I welcome this. opportunity of finally putting the
events which took place in Ozecho-iSlovia'k ia between 19451948 in the pro.per historical light. It is with regret that I
must state. that neither of the two congressional documents dealing with the Communist subjtu gation of CzechoSlovakia - i.e., House Document No. 154, part I, on The
Coup de Force in Prague, pulblished in 1,9 49 by the Foreign
Affairs Committee, and DoCIU!Illent No. 70, pa,rt 4, on internal tensions in Ozecho-,Slovalkia, recently pulblished by
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate (July 1954),
contain aipproprfate facts and analyses of the acts of
Commun.ist aggression committed during that period in
Slovrukia.
(Wa,s hington, D. C., December 3, 1954).

fflE TESTIMONY OF FATHER ANTON BOTEK
Mr. Kersten. 'Dhe hearings will come to orde•r .
Mr. McTigue. Your name is Father Anton Botelk, is
that correct, Father?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. And you were fOl'!Illerly director of Catholic Action in Slo:vahla, is that correct?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. McTi:gue. fa it true you were in prison a total
number of seven times?
Father Botelk. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Imprisoned by the Communists.?
Father Botek. Yes.

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SLOVAKIA

Mr. iMcTigue. From 1945 to 1949?
Father Botek. No, from 1949 till 1950.
Mr. McTigue. When did the Communists occupy SlovaFather Botek. In 1944.
kia, Father?
Mr. McTigue. Norw, Father, tell us something a!bout
the f,i ght to !keep the Catholic schools open in 1945 and
1946 following the Communist occupation.
Father Botek. As early as 1944, during the 1944 CommUJili.st uprising in SlovaJkia, the so-,ca,lled Slovakian National Council was concerned with the abolition of all
church-Operated school,s.
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something aJbout the
tactics of the Communists used to destroy the organizations of the church?
Father Botek. At first they rubolished all Catholic
Church operated schools; then they disbanded all Catholic associations, and fina:lly they sll!ppressed the Catholic
press.
Mr. McTigue. Slo:v akia is predominantly Catholic in
Father Botek. Yes.
religion, is tihat right, Father?
Mr. McTigue. What are the percentages of Catholics
in Slo;vakia?
Father Botek. Eighty-two ,p ercent are Catholic.
Mr. McTigue. Is there anything you can tell us, Father, rubout the so-called elections in 1946 in Slovaikia?
F1a:ther Bote:k. As early as 1944, there were only two
political .p arties admitted; that is, the Communist Party
and the so-.c alled Slovaikiian Democratic Party. .The Slovakian Democratic Party denied any political party that
would be able to defend their rights by democratic method.
Mr. MoTigue. Wasn't there some agreement between
the Slova1kian bishops amd the Democratic Party, Father?
Father Botek. Since there was no political representation of Slovakian Catholics, the Sloviakian bishops and
clergy tried to find means by which Slovitkian Catholics
could exipress their political will. This was necessary especially since the Communasts were anxious to win the sympathies of the Slovakian people. The Communists tried to
use, especially, the Sloivakian Nation's. feelings for their
1

�SLOVAKIA

75

pu~ses and they suggested to the SlovaJkian people the
creation of an independent SlovaJkian State after the end
of World War II. This, howerver, wasn't approved by Mos~
cow. Therefore, the Commurusts tried to achieve a selfrule for ISlovaJkia within the frame of the Czecho...Slovakian
Re,pulblic and they finally succeeded in it; this was then
inco:riporated into the so-called
Kosice agreement concluded in 1945.
The Communists also tried to win the sympathy and
support of SlovaJkian Oathol.ics, promising the former members of the CathoJic Slova;kian People's Party tha;t they
woU!ldn't be punished for their wrur-time activities if they
joined the Communist Party. They also wanted some priests
for their policies; for instance, a certain priest, Joseph
Straka, who was previously suspended from his office b,y
his bishop because of irregularities in administration. The
bishOipS foribade Catholic priests to make any canvassing
prior to the 1946 elections and the Catholic priests were
also fonbidden to be candidates for any political party in
those elections. Father Straka, however, disobeyed this
order of the Catholic bishops and made .propaganda for
the Communist Party in winning Catholics for that party.
He promised Slovakian Catholics that the Com1rm.11n.ist
Party would guarantee complete religious freedom to CathoJics and he issued also several ~itten statements to
the peoiple, one of which I am in position to furnish to this
committee. The Slovafidan people, however, didn't let themselves be misled by the Communist propa;ganda and they
trusted the bishops because they knew their a;ttitude toward the Communists was the only correct one, since the
bishops warned them agaiinst the Communists even during
the time Oif Worlld War fil. Therefore, we tried to find some
cooperation with the Democrati:c Party of Slovakia, which
was not at least Communist, even tho.ugh this party was
also coresponsilble for the fact that the Communists were
aJble to penetrate SloiV'a!kia. The Catholics were es'peci'ally
indignant aigainst the Democratic Barty of Slova1cia ~
cause they rug-reed to the confiscation of 1,800 elementary
schools and 80 schools of higher grade which were prevfo:us..
ly operated by the Catholic Church, because this conifisca1

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SLOVAKIA

tion took place. i,n 19'115, at the time when the commissioner
for education was the chairman of the Democratic Party,
Dr. Joseph Lettriich, T.he so-called "Democrats," however,
became aware of the great pressure, and the great activities developed by the Communists and therefore they
also, on their part, tried to win su&gt;ppo•r t of the Catholic
population of SlovaJkia for themseJves. At tha,t time we
Catholics still conducted negotiations with both the Communists and the Democratic Pa·:rity since we still hoip ed that
we would be aJble to achieve from the Communists the admission of a Catholic Party to be on the other side.
There were also preparations made for an ag,r eement
with the Democratic Party. The Communists, during the
negotia.tions, always applied the tactics of postponement
of a final decision. They made indications that they might
be inclined ·to admit, if not an ex,plicity Catholic party but
a P'arty which would at least, to some extent, aP\peal to the
Catholic population of Slovaikia. However, it soon became
apparent that no agreement could be reached with the
Communists. Therefore, on the 30th of March, 1946, we
concluded an agreement with the Democratic Party of
SlovaJkia. In this agreement, the Democratic Party of SlovaJkia pledged itself to admit Catholics as candidates on
their list of candidates in the 1946 elections. When the
Communists realized this they qtlliokly allowed another
party, which was called the Freedom Pa,rty and of which
they claimed this was a Catholic party. In this party there
were several good Catholics, even such persons who previously part-icilpated in the negotiations with the Democratic Party, but the chief leaders of that party couldn't
be trusted. The Communists also made propaganda or encouraged voters to cast inrvalid votes beca:UJSe they calculated that Slovakians who• disrug,reed both with the Communist and Democratk Pa!r ty would prefer to cast invalid
votes which then would diminish the percentage of votes
received by the Democratic Party. These irnvalid votes
were. generally referred to as "white ballots" because they
were plain slips ()If ,paper. This oppovtunity to use these white
ballots was voted in the Parliament prim· to the elections,
and the Communists and the representative s of the Free-

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SLOVAKIA

dom Party were in favor of this policy. Then it became ob.viou:s thalt the Fireedom Party was merely a pwppet party
under control orf the Communist s. We therefore started
,pmpagand a among the Catholics to vote for the Democratic Party.
We couldn't deve1orp this propaganda publicly, hut we
r equested Slovakian bishops to issue a statement to the Slovalkian voters. In this statement orf the bishops, Caltholics
were called upon to vote according to their Christian conscience; they we&lt;re forihidden to vote for an undemocra tic
party which would .not admit religious freedom and they
were called upon to vote for the party wh~,ch would guarantee demncratic freedom. This statement clearly indicated thalt SlovaJkiam. CathoUcs were foiibidden to vote in
favor of the Communist Party but it still was necessary
to instruct the Slovakian Catholics that it ,w asn't good for
them to vote for the Freedom Party either. Therefore, a
statement was included in this aipipeal by the bi shops stating that it was not true; that the rumors were not true
which stated that the Slovakian bishops joined the Freedom Party and that they were inclined to vote for that
party. Those :mimors we.re spread by the Communis t Party
and hy the Freedom Party. Copies of this proclamati on oif
the bishops were sent to all iparish priests; it was also published in the Catholic press and we had couriers talking
them personally to each priest. As a result of this campaign, the Democratic Party won in the 1946 elections and
receiived 61 ½ percent of all votes cast. HO!Wever, we found
out that the Democratic Party didn't de.fend the interests
of the Slovakian Catholics and that this ,p arty even failed
to defend its own memlbers of Parliament who were Catholics. The Oomnmniirst-controlled Commissio n of the Interior in SlovaJkia had arrested the leaders of the Catholic
group within the Pairliame.nrt who were members of the
Democratic Party. In the a,greement reruohed between the
Catholic representati v,es and the representat ives of the
Democratic Party, the Democratic Pat-ty pledged itself, or
guaranteed to, Catholics that the schools would be returned to. the Catholiircs ag·a:in and that the press would
also be allowed, as well as Catholic organrzatio ns. How1

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SLOVAKIA

ever, the Democratic Party failed to honor these promises
and in arguments with the Communists they always
yielded to the Communist demands in order to avoid personal troubles with them. Therefore, Catholics decided to
take up direct negotiations with the Government itself in
order to defend their rights.
Bishop Jantausch persona1ly called on the chairman
of the Board of Commissioner s in Slovakia trying to achieve
the fulfillment of the promises given by the Democrats
and the guarantees for the democratic rights of Catholics. However, he failed to achieive any results. I accompanied him on his visits to the Communist Commissioner
HusaJk, and the Communist Commissioner Viktory, and
neither of these two ever agreed to any concessions to the
Catholics. Then a commission was. introduced which was to
find a solution of all ,pr01blems of the Catholics. In this
commission, representative s of the Communist Party were
Husak and Novomesky, and the representative s of the
Demooratic Party were Filo and Frastacky. On the part of
the Catholics, the representative s were Bishop Lazik, Cannon Cvincek, Carnogursky, and myself. The pro!blems to
be solved were the reesta!blishme nt of church-Operat ed
schools, a free Catholic press, admission of Catholic organizations, discontinuatio n of inhuman deportations of the
Germans and Hungarians from Slovakia, confiscation of
property and cancellation of work on Sundays. This commission convened only twice in the winter of 1947, but no
results were achieved. In 1945 the Communists abolished
the following Catholic organizations : Organization of Catholic women, with a memlbership of 100,000; the Organization of Catholic Men, with 30,000, and the Association
of Catholic Youth, with a membership of 50,000.
Mr. MoTigue. In 1948, is it true that the central office of Catholic Action, of which you were director, was
liquidated and you were arrested?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. What were you charged with when you
were arrested, Fathoc?
Father Botek. The Central Catholic Bureau received

�SLOVAKIA

instructions from the Catholic bishops to taJke over all
acti,v ities previously carried out by the Catholic Action.
However, we were aware of the fad that all organrizations didn't haive a legal background, a legal footing, and
therefore any acttvities developed by this organization
oould be stopped by the Communists any time they wanted.
The activitie.g of the Central Bureau, the Catholic Action
Bureaiu, were carried on with a great risk. I knew I was
collSltantly shadowed by one or two secret policemen and
that offic:ially all persons who entered the offices of our orgaruza.tions were super.vised by the· Communists. Instances
happened that visitors at or1.1r office were then apprehended
by these policemen, searched, beaten Uip , and adivised to
omit further visits to our bureau. Therefore, we were
anx,ious to keep our activities in the field of the Cathohl.c
Action strictly within the limits of religion a,nd not to mix
in any political aspects. Nevertheless, the Communists
didn't permit our activities and on December 7, 1948, eigiht
Communist po1icemen inivaded our bureau and declared
that our organization was disbanded and that the 'b,ureau
had to be closed dQIWiJl. The employees at the bureau we.r e
sent to a room where they were searched while, in the
meantime, in the ibwreau itself, all documents were
searched by the Communist police. This search la,s ted from
8 o'clook in the morning until evening hours, but finally
the employees of the bureau were released to their homes,
and I was t aiken by the police to my apartment which also
was searched by the police. The office rooms of the bureau were then sealed by the Communist police. 1:'he Communists then entered the office rooms of the Catholic bureau twice more and also, I, myself, was twice investigated by the pol,ice. Likewise, my assistant at the bureau
was investigated by the police.
On the 29th of January 1949, three policemen oame
to my apartment at 6 :30 o'clock in the · morning and intended to ta ke me to. the police station. At that time I was
just saying my daily Mass and I was notified that the
policemen were waiting for me. I could escrupe, but I decided aga,inst this, because I suspected that I would discredit, by esca,ping, the Central Catholic Bureau and also
1

�80

SLOVAKlA

the Slovakian bishops. I was taken to the police station
at Bra:tislav and held for seven days U1I1der very poor conditions. The iinrvestigators tried to force me to confess
that I had connections with the Western Powers, that I
engaged in espionage activities, and that I develO!I)ed subversive activities against the Peoiple's Democratic regime
in Ozecho-iSlO!Vak.ia. They didn't have any evidence a,gainst
me and, therefore, the]' tr8.lllsferred me to the regional
court's prison where they held me for another five months
pending investigation. At the end of these five months,
my foI1IDer assistant at the Catholic Bureau, as well as
the expert for pastoral activities in the border areas, were
released and I was put on trial. Since they couldn't produce any evidence in support of the charges that I wo:riked
for foreign powers and that I engaged in espionage activities, they forced a student to testif,y against me, that I
knew of his espionage activities and failed to reiport this
to the police. For this offense I was sentenced to seven
months' imprisonment. On July 7, 1'949, I was transferred
to the Leopoldov penitentiary b.eca:use, at the time the
Communists organized their so-called CathoHc Action,
which was controlled by them, many Catholics who supported the genuine Catholic Action were imprisoned, so
that the prisons were crowded. I served the rest of my
term at LeO!poldov and on the 28th of August 1949 I was
released. I was in poor health as a result of my imprisonment and, therefore, I had to go to a hosip ital, but after
a month I myself requested to ibe assigned to a small parish so as to disappear from the eyes od' the Communists.
Mr. McTigue. Was this in 1950, Father?
F,8 /ther Botek. 1949. While at this small parish, we were
preparing an ecdesiastical sermon and at this time a local
Communist called on me and requested me, pleaded with
me, that I shouldn't launch any attacks against Communists in my sermon, bec3/Use he stated he was charged with
my suI1veillance and was to report everything on me, including that whicih I told in my sermons, and he stated
he was a Catholic, too, and was the father of eight children he couldn't refuse this Communist order to spy on me
and on the other hand, if another .person would be given

�SLOVAKIA

81

the same instructions, this other person could do harm
to me. When I was approximatel,y two months at this
par,ish, the local chairman of the Communist Party called
on me and notified me that I was swpposed to report at
the district national committee for some discussion. I
was afraid, however, that this was just a triok and that
people were previously sentenced on charges of underground activities and were sent to forced-.JaJb.or camps even
after they had served their terms imposed by the courts.
However, the Communists are very cautious while proceeding against Catholic priests since the parishioners defended their ,priest$ against arrest and there were clashes
between the population and the Communist police who a,r rived to arrest Catholic priests, especially at the time when
the Communists started their own sponsored Catholic Action. There.fore, they endeavored to lure our parish priests
fronn their parishes and to arrest them at a place where
such resistance by local parishioners couldn't be offered.
TherefoiI'e, I decided not to report at the district national
committee and await my arrest at the parish office, and
on the same day the police arrived and took me to a
forced-labor camp at Nova:ky
My parishioners protested against my arrest; however,
they didn't put up any ·physical resistance since they already experienced that such resistance was followed by
arrests of hundreds of innocent people and that it still was
to no avail because the pTiests were always eventuaUy arrested. I could tell you about conditions there, albout my
experiences which I had at that time when I was held at
the Bmtisl8'va County jail. At that time there were members at least of ten underground groups held at that prison. When I had an opportunity to talik to them, I asked
how they became involved in underground activities and
how it happened that they were arrested since there were
always rubout 50 persons from each group arrested. Most
of these for.mer members of the undengr.ound groups stated
that there was always a Communist spy planted by the
Communists within their organizations, and that this Communist spy even encouraged them to develop underground
activ:ities which he then reported to the Communist police.

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SLOVAKIA

I realized that the Communists had put under sur:veill~e
all people whom they suspected might engage in underground activ-ities and if they failed to find anything, any
underground actiivities, they encouraged such people to
develop such activities, and be.fore a group could actually
start its undeirground activities, the spy denounced them
to the police and the memJbers of the group were arrested.
In 1,9 49, the Communists realized that they were U!Ilaible to
win the Catholic bishops for their puriposes; therefore,
they decided to organize their o,w n Catholic Action. They
coTI1Vened a meeting of the so-&lt;:aJled representaUves of the
Catholic Church in Prague on June 10, 1949. To this
meeting they invited several priests under false pretexts,
stating that this was to he a conference to negotiate and
discuss church pro1b lems. In addition, there were also several Catholic laymen invited to this meeting, who were
mostly mem!bers of the Communist Party but didn't play
any decisive role in the Catholic life, and the Communists
eventually declared this meeting as the new leadership of
the Catholic Action.
The Communists declared that since the Vatican was
against the people and since the bishops supported the
v ,a tican in this policy, they intended to leave to the Ohu:rch
only the spiritual care and admit only the kind of questions and morals that the Pope could rule in .the affairs
concerning the Catholic morals a:nd the· Catholic faith; but
all other religious· questions would be taken care of by this
Catholic Action. This evidently was an attempt by the Communists to seize control over the administration of the Catholic Church in Czecho-Slovakia. However, they real.ized
that they didn't haNe the sU1pport of the people. Therefore,
they initiated an aotion of signatures which were to be rutta,c hed by the entire population of C!zecho-Sloivakia, to a
memorandUllll issued by the rubove-mentioned meeting at
which this Communist Catholic Action was founded.
Branches of the Communist Party organization were entrusted with the carrying out of this signature action. They
convened meetings in towns and in viUages, and also at
wo:rikiplaces. at which the present people were called uipon
to put their signatu:re on the memorandum. The bishops,

�SLOVAKIA

83

however, condemned this Catholic Action, and the Holy See
declared every person who would sign this memorandum as
excommunicated from the Catholic Church.
Mr. McTigue. Father, you were in a forced labor camp
in 1950; is that correct?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Did you get sick at that time and were
you sent to a hospital?
Father Botelk. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us very briefly something
about how the Communists treated the Sister,s at the
hospital?
Father Botek. A Communist order previously arrested
all nuns those who were nurses at hospitals because
there was a great laclk of trained nurses at the hospitals.
These nuns, however, who were left as nurses at the hospitals, were e~posed to various Communist chicaneries.
That was done by Communist functionaries at the hospital, by Communist doctors, and men, and assistants.
They were called upon to renounce their mernlbership in
their religious orders and to become civilian nurses. The
Communists tried to Lure · the younger nuns with a promise that if they agreed to renounce their membership in
the religious order, tihey would be permitted to go to a
university without any previous education, which was
otheIWise required from university students. This was the
same pattern as was rupplied in the case of young Communist woI'kers who also were admitted to university studies without adequate education and just attend a short
preparatory course. Except for a few exceptions, most of
these nuns refused the Communist demands and so the
Communists started to remove the nun nur,ses from hospitals.
MT. McTigue. When did you learve Slovrukia, Father?
Father Botek. On the 26th of June 1951.
Mir. McT,~giue. Did you have any trouble in getting out
of SlQIVakia?
Father Botek. I made a previous attempt to escrupe.
At that time we were a group of 22 escapees. However,

�84

SLOVAKIA

this escrupe mdn't succeed and. so I had to try it a second
time, at which time we were only four escapees and we
succeeded in crossing the border.
,M r. McTigue. Your present assignment at this time
is in Rome; is that correct, Father?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. Busby. Father Botek, we know that communism
is opposed to all religions, but I think the comm~ttee might
like t-0 know how successful the Communists were in their
efforts to infiltrate and to destroy the Catholic religion
in SlovaJkia.
Father Botek. Previously, when I still was at the Central Catholic Bureau, we intercepted a secret Communist
instruction in continuing a Commumst plian for destruc,tion
of the Church and for its seizure and control. Under these
instructions, the indirvidual phases were to be the following: At first the ibishops of the Catholic Church in Czecho-,Slova:kia were to be separated from the Vatican; the
second step was to be. that the bishops were t-0 be discredited in the eyes of the priests, as well as of the laymen Catholics, and finally, the last phase was to be the
separation of the Catholic laymen from their priests.
IMr. Busbey. Now, that leads ri,ght up to my question.
Up until the time you left Slovakia, and from yOIUI' own
personal olbservation, h ow successful was this plan of the
Communists?
Father Botek. They succeeded in accomplishing the
first oibjective; that is, to separate the Catholic Church in
Czecho'"'Slorvrukia from the Vatican. They expelled the Annuncias from the Vatican to Ozech0-Slovakia so that contacts of Ozecho-iSl01Vakian authorities with the Vatican
were interrupted. Nevertheless, the Catholics in OzechoSlovaJkia remained faithful to the Vatican, to the Holy See.
However, they failed in achieving their second olbjective.
to make the Catholic bishops bend to their demands and
to have them - to maJke them tools in the propagation of
communism in Slovakia. Therefore, the Communists ,pliaced
a commissary to each episcoipal office who was to taike
care that the bjsho,ps didn't have any contacts with the

�SLOVAKIA

86

clergy and with the congregation. These Communist commissars controlled the in- and out-going mail; they controlled the visitors who intended to call on the bishops,
and admitted only those whom they considered harmless;
but even the talks of such visitors with the bishops were
monitored.
Mr. Busbey. Father, can you tell us aJbout the methods
and technics used by the Communists to indoctrinate the
pupils with the, theory of Marxism?
Father Botek. The Communists innoculated the Marxist ideology and way of thin'king to the pupils from the
very first grade of elementary school. When I was in hiding with a family who had an 8-year-old daughter, I overheard her tal!ks with her parents and I heard that this
girl was thinking in Communist terms and that her way
of thinking was completely inJfiluenced by the Communist doctrine.
Mr. Busbey. Father, do you agree with some of the
other witnesses we have heard, in the belief that if something isn't done in the immediate future and that if we let
the Communists ikeep on educating the real young boys and
girls, it will be more difficult, as time goes on, to defeat
this Communist march toward worrld revolution?
Father Botek. lt is a fact that the Communists have
had great successes in educating the very young people
in their ideology and the parents are almost unable to influence or to counteract against this Communist ideology
implanted inrto the chlldren because these children are instructed to report at school any attempts ,b y their parents
to dissuade them :13rom communism. Therefore, it is a fact;
that if communism is given enough time, that these youths
will become completely communistic and the Communist
strength will be increased.
Mr. Busbey. Can you give the committee any illustrations of the technics used by the Communists to make
the children believe in Stalin before he died, instead of God?
Father Botek. Yes, I saw the mrugazines for children,
for school-children, containing slogans such as "Stalin is
our sun; everything we haive, we've got from Stalin," and

�86

SLOVAK IA

"Stalin is ouT benefac tor, Stalin is our greatest benefac tor,
Stalin is the greatest man, Stalin is the most beautifu l man."

Mr. Busbey. Father, are you qualified to. tell the committee how the Commu nists rocploited the economy of Slovakia?
Father Botek. In these economi c aspects, I am not
well versed; I only Olbse,r:ved thait there was a general lack
of all consum er goods and that the living conditio ns were
poor.
Mr. Busbey. WhiJe you were in prison, were you given
any consider ation at all because of the fact that you were
a member of the clergy?
Father Botek. This ,prdbaJbly was the case 'b ecause I
never was maltreat ed, never was beaten at interrog ations,
and I observe d that many fello•w prisoner s were beaten,
so that I prolbaibly enjoyed preferen tial treatme nt. This,
may!be, was due to the faot that there was still a trace of
Catholic faith in my investig ators so that they were reluctant to rai,se their hands aigainst me as a priest. I also
had the followin g experien ce. While I was in ,prison, a prison guard caime to me and asked me whether he should
give his signatur e to the Commu nist Ac~ion Manifes to.
IMT. Busbey. My final question ; do you lbelieve tha,t any
agreeme nt made with the Commu nists is worth the paper
it is written on?
Father Botek. From my e~perience, I had negotiat ions
with the Commu nists, I can sta:te thait the Commu nists
never honor their word thait they gave in such negotiations, and this is in accorda nce with their general policy
which goes that everyth ing is good that promote s the Communist cause, and therefor e I am convinced thait any negotiatio ns or any agreeme nts reached with the Communists are worthle ss.
Mr. Madden . Father Botek, you in your testimon y
haive covered very well your experien ces back over the
years with the Commu nist Party in Slovakia and the only
question I would like to ask is what percenta ge of the
populati on of Sloviahla today are Commun ists, true Communists at heart; what percent age: 5 percent; 10 percent; 20 ; or what would you say?

�SLOVAKIA

87

Father Botclc. I thin!k that the percentage doesn't exceed 10 ,p ercent.
Mr. No71blad. Is the Voice of America or Radio Free
Europe listened to by many of the people in the area you
come from?
F1ather Botclc. While I was in hiding with several fa ..
milies in Slovakia, we frequently listened to the Voice of
America and Free EuTope programs. However, I heard
from these ipeople many objections against the spirit of
those programs beamed to Ozecho-.S1ovaJkia.
Mr. Nor.blad. What were the dbjoctions, generally, in
Slovakia? I am refemnig to the conditions in Slovakia.
Father Botek. The objections were mainly of a national and religious nature. The Slavaikian peqple are a
very religious people. They are 82 percent Catholics and
13 pereent Protestants, who also are active Protestaints.
Therefore, programs promoting ideas of a reformer, Jan
Huss, or the religious ideas of Masaryk and the other socalled free thinlkers, are not appeaJ.ing to the Sl01Vakian
population.
Ma-. Noy,blad. Do they believe the world news, the
straight news given on those programs?
Father Botek. Well, the Slovallcian people listen eagerly to the news broadcasts by the Voice of America. However, once OT twice I .w itnessed the following incident. Slovakian listeners who listened to the program of the Voice
of America, said, after the news was over, just said, "Well,
turn it off because the news is over and they are now
going to stam their propaganda for the Czech Republic
and we do not want any Oze&lt;!h Republic."
Mr. Norblad. Do you feel that the radio broadoasts are
doing some good behind the Iron Curtain?
Father Botek They certainly are of great use and
great efficiency but this efficiency would still be greater
if the rest of the pro.grams, except for the news, was also
adjusted to those two major feelings of the Slovakian
popufation, the religious feelin:g and the national feeling.
Mr. No:rlblad. Do you get the programs clearly or are
they j&amp;mmed by the Soviets?

�88

SLOVAKIA

Father Botek. The programs are being jammed but
on la11ger radio sets they still can be received and if the
transmission is jammed on one wave, on one b,and of the
radio,, it may ,be still tuned in on another one.
Mr. Feighan. There is, is there not, a very strict feeling of healthy nationalism within Slovakia?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. Feighan. And that of course. is the reason why
there has been some resentment to the broadcasts?
F1ather Botek. Yes. I also heard comments by listeners to the Radio Free Europe, and Voice of America programs to ·the effect that in spite of the fact that there are
almost one million SlO'Vitk immigrants in the United States,
who ha.ve their own homes there and national life in the
United States, these programs do not bring any reports on
the activities developed by these Slovak organi~atrons in
the United States; they only bring reports. of aotivities
of organi•z ations which are not sympathetic to the Slovak
people and, therefore, the Slova!kian population, in order
to learn of the activities of the Slov:ak organizations in
the United States, tune in on Radio Rome, which also
beams SlO'Vakian programs.
Mr. Feighan. Well, it is a pity that the pe-o:ple within
Slovak,ia are not acquainted with the tremendous contribution of the Slovakian immigrants to the culture and ciivic
development of our cotmtry. l!"'ather, would y;ou relate. in
a U.ttle more detail, if you are familiar with the fact that
the Communists in 1948, I believe, offered Slovakia the
opportunity to ·b ecome a Slovak S01Viet Republic?
Fiather Botek. That was actually in 1944 and 1945,
not in 1948. At that time this policy was promoted by the
S]pvaikian Communists, Husak and Novomesky. However,
Moscow disapproved. of this policy and, therefore, the
Slovakian Communists had to put up with Czecho-Slovakia, within which SlO'V•a!kia was to have broad autonomy,
self-rule.
Mr. Feighan. Was it no,t the Slo¥ak Government that refused rather than Moscow's refusing?
Father Botek. Naturally the Slovak Government was

�SLOVAKIA

89

opposed to this idea since it was a Catholic Government.
Mr. Feighan. Well, you've got it both ways; now there
is only one way.
Flather Botek. I would like to explain this apparent
discrepancy. This was due to the fact that there was in
1944, there was a Sl,QIV'a)ldan Govemment of an independent Slovakian State which to some extent - whose sovereignty was to some extent restricted by Germans. When
the Communists started their wprising, in August 1944,
they tried to arouse the sympathies of the SlOIVa:k people
with promises of an independent Slovakian State but
within the framework of the S01Viet Socialist Repulblic. Rusruk and N ovomesky were leading organizers of the wprising in 1944. This policy of the Slovakian Communists,
however, was disapproved by Moscow.
Mr. Feighan. Is it not true thait because of the spirit
of healthy nationalism within Slovrukia that the Slovak
people would not accept the offer to be a part of the U. S.
S. R., ~a,use they knew that such a so-.called independence of Slo,vaikia would be national in structme only, but
in su!bstance it would be socialistic?
Father Botek This is possible. This is possilble, but
President Booes, who was at Moscow at that time, persuaded the Moscow leaders to drop that idea; and he made
also great concessions to the Russia,ns so that they considered it more profitruble for them to hruve a CzechoSlovak Republic rather than a small Slovakian Repulblic.
Mr. Feighan. F'ather, did thi s Communist Catholic Action still function between that time of its first meeting
in June 1949 until you left in Jll!Ile of 1951?
Father Botek. This Communist- sponsored Catholic
action prorved to be a complete failure. They still held an
anniversary meeting the following year but they didn't
celebra,te the foundation of thls Catholic Action in the
third year any more.
Mr. Kersten. I hope you understand, Father, that all of
ourr questions are asked in the spirit of inquiry regarding
the Communist aggression upon Slovakia. That is our
overall purpose, and thank you, Father, for the testimony.
(Munich, Germany, June 26, 1954).
1

�90

SLOVAKIA

TESTIMONY OF FATHER STEFAN NAHALKA
(The witness wa:s sworn. The same interipreter was utilized as for the previous witness.)
Mr. McTigue. Your name is Father Stefan N ahal!ka, is
Father Nahalka. Yes.
that correct?
Mr. McTigue. Were you born in Slovakia?
Father N ahalka. Yes.
Mir. McTigue. Were you ordained a priest in Slov,aJkia?
Father N ahalka. I studiied theology in Rome, so I was
ordained in Rome.
Mir. McTigue. And assigned to parish duties in Slovakia,
is that correct?
!Father Naha1ka. Since 1943, I was a'SSigned to duty in
Slovakia.
Mr. MicTigue. And at one time, Father, you were secretary to Bishop Vojtassa!k, is that correct?
Father Naha1ka. Yes, I was in that capacity from 1946
to 1949.
Mr. McTigue. Do you recall the uprising, so-called,
Father Nrahalka. Yes.
in Slovakia?
Mr. McTigue. When did the t11prising taike place?
Flather NahaLka. At the place in which I resided, the
uprising started on the 26th of August 1944, when this
town was occupied by Communist guerillas.
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something aborut what
the guerillas did in that town?
Father Nrahalka. At that time I was chruplain at the
town of Ruio:miberoik and during the firist days of the
Communist uprising, the relbels forced the popll!lation, the
men in tha;t town, forcibly to join the rebel army even
though they were completely disiruterested and even opposed to the uprising. They also committed grave atroci~ies. In a valley called Podsucha, they murdered over 80
innocent people and buried them in a mass grave. In a
nea'Iiby village, the partisans mwdered without any connection with the military, a Catholic priest named Martin:ko. In the Lupca valley, the Communist guerillas tortured to death there a Catholic priest named Seda; they cut

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91

stri!Ps of hi,s skin from his back and finally even cut off
his genitals. Since the population was not in favor of the
uprising, the rebels used this deceptive propa,ganda to wm
the sympathles of the popul ation. To this end they spread
the rumor,s that the president of the Slovakian R~Ulbl,ic,
Dr. Tiso, was arrested and de1p orted by the Germans and
that, therefore, Slovrukia should arise.
Mr. McTigue. Father, in 1949, did each b:i,shop have a
political commissar assigned to him so that he could watch
over the bishop's activiities?
FaJther Naha1ka. In 1949, when the negotia,tions between the Communists and the Slovakian bishops broke
down, the Communists placed Communist commissars into
every ibishop's oftfice and they also placed one commissar
into Bishop Vojtassa:k's oft:Eice, who was a young Communist, ,a former tailor. He was approximately 24 years old
at that time, and t'here was aJil'Other Co:mmun,ist placed in
the main entrance to the ,b ishop's office who chooked on all
visitors at the bishop's office. The. commissar opened: the
bishop's mail, in- and out...going, and overheard all conversations the bishop had with his visitors and also acoompanied him on ,a ll his trips,. He also seized control O'Ver the
files of the bishop's office and he tooik out items firom
those files.
Mr. McTigue. Were the rooms in the hishoip's home,
for example, wired ?
Father N ahallm. There were no microphones in the
rooms of the bishoip's office because the commissar wa,s
present at all conversations, ibut I know orf a case. when the
Communists placed microphones in the conference room
for the bishop's conferences.
Mr. McTi,g ue. Were you secretary to Bishop Vojtassa.k
in 1949?
Father Nahalika. Well, I was secretary to Bishop Vojta:ssaik until January 1'949 and afterwards I lived in the
'Vicinity of the bish0tp's residence, in the priest's seminary.
Mr. McTigue. Were you arrested by the Communists,
Father?
1
Fruther N ahalika. I was arrested in December 1945 and
held in imprisonment until January 1946.
1

�92

SLOVAKIA

,Mr. McTigue. When did you leaive Slovakia, Father?
-Father Nahalk,a. llll May 1953.
Mr. McTigue. That is a little more than a year ago.
Did you hawe any difficulty in getting out of Slovakia?
FaJther Nahiallk,a. Well, the crossing of the bo,rder was
very difficult. At first we had to wait fo~ 14 days for run
opportunity, for a favnrruble time to cross the border and
we had to ~ very cautious while crossing to a :border area
in which the border g,u ards are authorized to fire at anybody whom they see, without warning and finally we h,ad
to cut through the barbed wire fences directly on the
border.
Mr. Madden. Father Nahallka, when Father Boteik was
testifying, he mentioned something regarding certain broadcasts thaJt were cormng over the Voice of . Arrnerioa and
Radio Wree Europe; do you know anything regarding the
broadcasts th·a t come 01Ver? Do you have any knowldge
on th-at?
Father Nahallka. I was in hiding f.or two years with
the viarious people from almost all social striafa and during
this time I had ample opportUillity to 1isten to foreign
broadcasts.
Mr. Madden. Oou:ld you tell us regarding your knowledge of the hmadcasts that come into, Slovaikia?
Father Nruha.1':ma. The people in Slovakia eaigerly listen
to democriaitic broadcasts. However, the preferences a.re
different and also the foreign broadcasts axe hOON'ily
jammed by the Communists. The people in Slovakia listen
to news broadcasts in the Slovak language by Riadio Free
Europe, Voice of America and also BBC in London; however, they disaigree on many aspects in the poJ.i;tical comments broadcast from these stations. They are opposed
to the political part of the program of those broad~asts
mainly beca'll'Se they realize that such programs do not
state the entire Communist case in Slovakia.
Mr. Madden. You mean anti-Communist?
Father Nahalka. Are not efficient enough to inspire
anti.Communist feelinig or to keep up the ainti-Communist
attitude of the population. This opposition to the programs,

�93

SLOVAKIA

the poJitical programs of those stations is due to the fact
that they do not appeal to the national and religious fee~
ings of the Slovakians and a.iso from the ideological viewpoint, there are some oibjections, since they are sometimes very much alike with the Communist propaganda.
'.Dhey teJl people who know, in these broadcasts, there are
people who formerly collaiborated with the Communists
and they are now talking aib,out anti-Communists. For instance, the reports of the so~called Slovia,kian national uprising was a very, very - was a great mistake. At the
time when the transmitters were still in operation, people
in Slovakia eagerly listened to an illegal transmitter called
the Wlhite Legion transmitter and the people in Slo;vakia also :5requently listened to the religious programs
broadoost by Radio Vatican.
IMr. Madden. Do yoo think the programs broadcast
by the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe do any
good - I mean, against the Communists?
Father Nahalka. These broadcasts have their effects
in the line of anti-communism, but especially thr01Ugh their
news which they broadlcast. However, they could be still
more efficient if they adjusted their political programs
also to the needs and desires of the Slovak population.
(Munich, Germany, June 26, 1954).
THE TESTIMONY OF JAN DOBROTKA
Mr. McTigue. You are a Slovak, is that correct?
Mr. Dobrotka. ¥ es.
iMr. McTigue. And you were 'bom on OctOlber 20, 1913
at Dechtice, Slovakia, is that correct?
Mr. Dolbrotka. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. During the Communist occupation of
SlovaJkia you were a master sergeant in the SiN.B, socalled, which is known as the Bureau of Internal Security,
is that correct?
Mr. Dob:mtka. Yes, sir.
Mr. McTigue. And you were a uniformed master sergeant in the Buireau of Internal Security from 1947 to
1951, is that correct?
Mr. Dobrotka. That is right.
1

�94

SLOVAKIA

Mr. McTigue. Was the Bureau of Internal Security
completely controlled by the Communists,?
Mr. DobTOtka. As of 194'8 it was completely under
Communist control.
Mr. M'CTigue. But you were a member of the Bureau
of Internal Security prior to the time that it was under
Communist control, isn't that correct?
Mr. Ddbrotka. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. And you were required to stay on as
a member of the Bureau of Internal Security after the
Communists got control, is that corerct?
Mr. Ddbrotka. Well, I was automatically taken over.
Mr. McTigiue. After the Bureau of Internal Security
was taiken over by the Communists, did you from time
to time receive orders to arrest priests, to make house
searches, and so forth and so on?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes, I received such orders.
Mr. McTigue. Were there many of such arrests made?
Mr. Dobrotka. Many wealthy farmers were arrested.
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something about the
orders that were given to suppress and liquidate the Slovak Democratic Party members and the Slovak League?
Mr. Dobrotka. As of 1948 memlbers of the Democratic
Party were removed from all leadmg positioos in the administraJtion. The Slovak League was completely liquidated
because the Communists considered this organization a
swbversive and reactionary organizati'on, because it wa3
supporteq by the Slovak Leagiue of America.
iMr. McTigue. Did you ever rec{:ive orde~s to give close
supervision to the activity of certain parish priests in
Slovakia?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; I recei,v ed such orders.
Mr. McTigue. What kind of orders were they?
iMr. Dobrotka. We received such orders through channels from the government down to our posts and such
orders arrived in sealed envelopes and were classified as
secret, and we were instructed to open these eI1JVeloipes only
u:pon special order by telephone.
!Mr. McTigue. Who were the men that actually handed

�SLOVAKIA

95

you the orders, were they uniformed Soviet police or were
they plain-clothes men?
Mr. Dolbrotka. These were members of the uniformed
police. They were my immedia,te superiors and they related these orders to me.
Mr. McTigue. Iif you were instructed under sealed orders to report on certain priests, what kind of reports did
you m0lke,?
Mr. Dobrotka. Under these orders we were to Sllipervise the sernnons of priests and to report periodically on
whether there were any political aspects in those sermons by priests.
Mr. McTigue. Did you ever report, for example, that
there was any political significance to what a priest
had to say?
Mr. Dobrotka. I &lt;know I sulbmitted annual reports to
this effect, and I can state approximately 60 to 70 percent
of the memlbers of the SNB did not reporit any priests
to their superiors. This was also due to the fact that the
priests were aware of the fact that they were Slllpervised
by the police and, therefore, they avoided any political
speeches within their sermons.
Mr. MoTigue. Did the same kind of procedure, that is
reporting on their activities, apply to businessmen and
peasants and the PQpulace in general?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; we received such orders to supervise the activities of the entire population, especially to
observe whether the former mem!bers of the partially liquidated Democratic Party developed any underground
acti&lt;vities.
Mr. McTigue. Were many priests arrested and interned at the time you were in the Bureau of Internal
Security?
Mr. Ddbratka. From the entire district in which I
was active there were approximately three cases of arrests
of priests, however, not a single priest was arrested in the
area under my jurisdiction.
Mr. McTigue. Tha,t is because you kept reporting
to your superiors that the priests were only talking to
God, is that correct?

�96

SLOVAKIA

Mr. Ddbrotka. That is right; there was no reason for
their arrest.
Mr. McTigue. When did you manage to esca,pe from
SlorvaJkia?
Mr. Dobrotka. On Deoomlber 3, 1951.
Mr. McTigue. Did yiou haive any troUJble in getting out of
Slorvalcia?
Mr. Dobrotka. No; I did not have any tro'Ulble in
escaping.
Mr. McTigue. You are now a member of the Labor
Service unit at Bad Kreuznach?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kersten. Any questions?
Mr. Busbey. When did you ·become a mem!ber of the
Bureau of Internal Security? Is that the correct name?
Mr. Dobrotka. In 1938. At that time the name of my
headquarterrs was Provincial Command of Gendarmerie,
which was under the Minister of Interior.
Mr. Buskey. That was in 1938?
Mr. DOlbrotlra. Yes, in 1938, at which time Slovakia became an independent state.
Mr. Busbey. Were you a memlber of the Communist
Party at that time in 1938?
Mr. Dobrotka. No, sir ; at that time memibers of the
gendarmerie were fonbidden to become memlbers of any
political parties.
Mr. Busbey. In what year was, it that you assumed
your duties of reporting on priesrts?
Mr. Dabrotka. That was after February 1948, at the
time when the Catholic Action was started.
Mr. Busbey. You were a member of the Communist
Party at that time ?
Mr. Dobrotka. No, sir.
Mr. Busbey. Were you ever a memlber of the Communist Party?
Mr. Dobrotka. In March 1948 all members orf the SNB
in order to protect their own existence were forced to file
an application fur mem'bership in the COIIDmunist Party.
Mr. BUS1bey. In order to saive your life, you had to
become a member of the Communi'St Party at that time?

�SLOVAKIA

97

Inter:preter. He became a memiber in March 1M8, but
your previous quesltion was whether he was a member in
February 1948.
Mr. Busbey. Did you attend church prior to March
1948?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; I did. I am a practical Catholic
and I attended Mass every Sunday.
Mr. Bustbey. And how rubout after March 1948?
Mr. Do!brotka. After March 1948 I continued attending Mass regularly, however, we were aware that from
that time on we were under supervision by the Communists, particularly all our contacts with priests, with the
local priest, local teacher and local government officer
were suspicious, because these persons were considered as
reactionary, and our activities and connections with the people were supervised by Communists spies which were set
on us by the Communist Party.
Mr. Busbey. Would you agree with me that the greatest bulrwark ag,ainst communism, and the hope of the whole
world for e:venrual elimination of communism and for
world peace, is the fact that the people, not only behind
the Iron Curtain, 'b ut all over the world, will continue to
belie:ve in God?
Mr. DO!brotka. This I 'believe.
Mr. Buslbey. In other words, as long as the people have
a deep-seated, strong belief in God, we can be sure that
we will eventually eradicate communism from the earth?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes. May this ha,ppen as soon as
possilble.
Mr. Bus•bey. Thank you. No further questions.
(The witness was excused.)
(,Munich, Germany, June 29, 1954).
THE TESTIMONY OF JUR DETVIANSKY
Mr. Det'Vianslky was called a:nd duly sworn and testified through the Slo,vak interpreter as follows:
Mr. McTigue. Your name is Jur Detviansky?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.
Mr. McTigue And you were born on September 6, 1919,

�98

SLOVAKIA

in Slovakia in the village of Ladomila, is that correct?
_Mr. Detviansiky. Yes.
Mr. McTig,ue. You were a recorder of vital statistics
in the town of Deitv:a until August 1950, is that correct?
Mr. DetvfanSlky. That is correct.
Mr. McTigue. This is the time, of course,, that Slovakia was under the Communist domination or occupation?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.
iMr. McTigue. Later you were an administrative officer at Zvolen until Septemlber 1951, is that correct?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes, sir.
,M r. McTi,gue. Were you discharged from this office
by the Communists?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.
Mr. McTig,ue. Why?
Mr. Detviansiky. As a politically unreliable person.
Mr. McTigue. In your ,p osition you know something
about the quotas which were set for the farmers lby the
Communists, is that correct?
Mr. Detviansiky. Yes.
Mr. Kersten. Will you speaJk a little louder in Slovaik
and in English.
Mr. McTigue. How were these quotas set?
Mr. Detrviansky. The quotas were estalbJished for individual farmers in the presence of a representative of the
Communist Party. The •p rinci:p le for this establishment,
this prescrilbing of quotas, was· to prescribe those quotas
to wealthy farmers in such a manner that nothing would
be left for their own needs. This policy was aimed at desiroying the independenec of farmers and forcing them to
join the farmers' cooperative wh[ch would make them the
farmers dependent on the Communists. To the same end
also several other measures were taken by the Communists, such as, for instance, that all laJbor force was taken
away from the farmers and transferred to industrial
pul'p()ses.
Mr. McTigue. So it was impossible for these farmers, big and small, to meet the quotas imposed by the
Communists, is that correct?
,M r. Detvianslky. At first the farmers managed to
meet the delivery quotas because they helped each other

�SWVAKIA

99

in tendmg the soil. But later this task became imposs~b'l.e
to fttlfill and famJ.ers rubandoned. their farms and/ or were
arrested for not ful£illing their deliivery quotas.
~- McTigue. Can you give any examples which you
know of from your own personal knowledge, of how some
of the peasants on small farims reacted to the quotas?
Mr. Debviansky. There were several instances, but the
most significant of them was that which occurred at
Detva-lKostolna. It was on: Decemiber 5, 1951, when a farmer named Jan Ba/bic from despair because of the hard
delivery quotas prescriibed to him 1knifed his three children, 1, 3 and 5 years old. His wife and two older children succeeded in escaping his desperate aJCt. He committed
this action of despair because he stated that since they
took aiway from him everything they should take away
also his family.
Mr. McTigue. When did you escape to the West?
Mr. Detviansky. In Decemlber 1951.
Mr. McTigrue. And you are now a caiptain in one of
the Labor Service COIJ:Il!pany units at Kaiserslautern , is
that correct?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.
Mr. No:rlblad. Is the treatment which you harve been
receiving here aH you expected?
Mr. Detvfansky. Well, the treatment l received here
meets my expectations, however, I am dissatisfied with the
slow progress of the struggle rugainst the Communists and
I am impatient to return to my home country.
Mr. Norblad. Many of us are quite dissatisfied with
the progress of OUI' fight against communism.
Mr. Kersten. In other words I understrund you feel
that the men, the young men of Slovakia as well as the
people of the other captive nations that are in the free
world would like to try to help the people ibaok in those
countries and your country to regain their fireedom, is
that right?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes, sir, the sooner the better.
Mr. Kersten. And you likewise feel that the young
main back behind the Iron Curtain, even those under arms,

�100

S!LOVAIHA

would if they have the Oipportunity help get rid of Communists?
Mr. Detviansky. As far as Slovakia is concerned, I
can srtaite that since I was previously an active army officer and knew the mentality of the Sl01Vakian soldiers, I
can state that 90 percent orf the Slova,kian young men
would use such an oipportunity.
Mr. Kersten. Thank you.
The witness was. excused.
(Munich, Germany, June 29, 1954).

When the Kersten Committee pwblished its findings,
the Benes Czechs (Socialists), the Slovak renegades the Lettrich "democrats" - and the Reds began to scream
"murder!" That, of course, is quite understandaJble. For
the ladk of positive al'gument, they resort to the smear
technique, the usua,l line of the Reds. "CAS" (TIME) the official propaganda sheet of the Lettrich "we-got-6'2 %of-the,JSlovak-vote-in-1946" democrats, who actively collaborated with the Reds and Moscow from 1943 to Fe!bruary
25, 1948 - in its issue of February 1, 195:5, attaciked the
Kersten Committee and the testimony of most of the Slovak
witnesses, laJbeling the report "scandalous."
It is unfortunate that the Keraten Committee did not
call wpon the Lettrioh "democrats" to testify; the story
would have been more complete. At least Dr. Joseph Lettrich, "leader" of the Slovak "democrats," and Gen. Nicholas
Ferjencik, "non-!I)artisan" head of Lettrich's gestapo, should
have ,b een given the opportunity to confess that the "democrats" did .conclude agreements with the Reds in 1943 and
1945 to collaJborate closely on all issues. The Kersten Committee did a good job in the time allotted to it. The wol1k
initiated: should !be completed. Albove all else, leading Benes
Czechs (Socialists) and Lettrich "democrats" - former
members of the Communist-d ominated National Front government of Prague - should be girven the opportunity to
"sing"!

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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
Published&#13;
&#13;
VOL. V&#13;
&#13;
quarterly by the&#13;
&#13;
Slovak&#13;
&#13;
League of&#13;
&#13;
MARCH 1955&#13;
&#13;
America&#13;
&#13;
NO . 1 (14)&#13;
&#13;
HOW THE COMMUNISTS SEIZED SLOVAKIA&#13;
is told on the following pa,ges by&#13;
witnesses called upon to testify&#13;
by the Select Committee on Com•&#13;
mu.nist Aiggression of the House&#13;
of Representatives, headed by the&#13;
Hon. Ch:a.J'lles J . Kersten of Mil·&#13;
waukee, Wis.&#13;
Michael Galayda is an .American&#13;
citzen who experienced Communist terror in Slovakia. He was&#13;
there W1,d saw Communism at&#13;
work a mong his people w'ho had&#13;
persdstenUy ,and consistently fought&#13;
the Red plague for over a hundred&#13;
years. H e makes his home in&#13;
Hazleton, Pa.&#13;
Mr. and Mrs. Smrekovsky, American citizens, also witnessed the&#13;
terror and horror of Red rule in&#13;
Slovakia ,f irst hand. They have relatives and many friends in S1ovakia and, hen.ce are using an assumed name.&#13;
Dr. Joseph Pauco, news.paperman and writer, c ame to America&#13;
in 1950; he is assistant editor of&#13;
the .TIIDDNOTA (Union), the official organ of the First Catholic&#13;
Slovak Union, and a1so chairman&#13;
of the U. S. Bran,ch of the Slov,a k&#13;
National Council Abroad.&#13;
Dr. Joseph Mikula studied law&#13;
1 and politics and was very active&#13;
' in student circ'les of Slovakia ,before he Jlled the Red terror which&#13;
invaded his native Slovakia.&#13;
Dr. Joseph Mikus, foraner Slovak dilplomat, lawyer and writer,&#13;
became the director of the Press&#13;
Bureau of the Slovak League of&#13;
America, Wash!lngton, D. C., soon&#13;
after his arrival in America several years ago.&#13;
&#13;
Jan Dobrotka, now an exile in&#13;
West Germany, was a Sergeant of&#13;
the Department of National Security in Bratislava, Slovakia.&#13;
Jur Detviansky was an active&#13;
officer of the Sloviak Army before&#13;
he Hed to the West.&#13;
Rev. Anton Botek, S.T.D., editor&#13;
and former director of the Catholic Center in Bratd•slava, S-Jovakia,&#13;
is in charge of the S lovak Catholic Action in Exiile; he edits&#13;
"HLASY Z RiMA," (Voices From&#13;
Rome), Italy.&#13;
Rev.&#13;
&#13;
Stephen&#13;
&#13;
Nahalka,&#13;
&#13;
S.T.D.,&#13;
&#13;
ecclesiastical writer and former&#13;
personal secretary to Bishop John&#13;
Vojtassak of t'he Spis Diocese,&#13;
1Slovaki,a - who, by the way, was&#13;
sentenced to 24 years 1n prison&#13;
1by the Reds lives in Rome.&#13;
Italy.&#13;
Philip A. Hrobak, editor of the&#13;
JEDNl()TA since 1938 and president of t'he Slovak League of&#13;
America since 19'50, is a native&#13;
AmerLcan, born in Cleveland, Ohio,&#13;
in 1904. Active in Slovak aff.airs&#13;
for the past 35 years,, Mr. Hrobak&#13;
has devoted much time to the study of Czecho-Slovakda and Slovakia and the people responsible for&#13;
government. His&#13;
articles&#13;
and&#13;
pampb:lets in Engilish have contributed greatly to expose "Czechoslo,v ak" pseudo-democracy, the&#13;
maohinations of the Benes Czechs&#13;
(Socialists) and Lettri.ch "detnocrats", the people responsible for&#13;
the betrayal of the Slova;ks to the&#13;
men of the Kremlin - +and the&#13;
Reds and Socialists aictJ!ve In Slovak circles in Amertlca. ·&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Communist Aggression Against Slovakia&#13;
(The Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, EJighty-Third Congress, 1954, under the ch·a irmans•h lp of&#13;
the HonoraJble Oharles J. Kersten, did quite a. remarkable jdb to&#13;
ascertain how the !Communists seized pO'wer in the various countries&#13;
of IDurope. I believe it is the first time in our history that an honest&#13;
attempt was made to understand the 'background of the -peoples behind the Iron Curtain. 1Slovak representatives were among those&#13;
who gave testimony of Communist a,ggression in S-tovakia, which differed in so.me respects from th.at in other countries. From the testimony of various witnesses who were heard, and the many others&#13;
who sent in their statements fl'Qm various countries, it is quite eviden,t that 1Slovrukia fell an easy prey to Moscow iand the C-Ommunlsts&#13;
because of the pro-Soviet -poli&lt;:y of Dr. Edward ,B enes and the Czech&#13;
Socialists, who ruled in Czecho-Siovakia with the Communists after&#13;
World War ]I. Slovakia, traditionally anti-Communist, was jn fact&#13;
sold out by the National Front ,Government of Prague. The vast&#13;
masses of the Slovak population ,had no ,c•hoice; their wiH meant&#13;
nothin,g to Benes and tib.e Prague regime, whJ.ch took over Slovakia&#13;
with the help of Soviet bayonets, disregardin,g the pollti-cal wHl of&#13;
the peOII)le completely. Excerpts from the testimony of Slovak witnesses, l'\Vlhic,h are contained on these pages, definitely prove that. P.A. H.).&#13;
&#13;
FROM THE SPECIAL REPORT NO. 8&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
!Slovaki,a is situated between the Carpathian Mountains on the north and the Danube and the Tisa Rivers on&#13;
the south. The in!hrubitants are !known as Slov,aks and with&#13;
the !Poles a111d the Ozechs, belong to the group of western&#13;
Slaivs.&#13;
The political history of the ·S lov,a!ks goes back to the&#13;
beginnmg of the ninth century when ChmsUan civilization&#13;
was introduced into their territoTy, and it was during this&#13;
period that tlhe ruler, H;astisfav, 84~70, made himself&#13;
lmown by an intensiive ChTistiianmation of the country.&#13;
FoJilowing hls ti,nvitation, two brothers, Saints Cyril and&#13;
Methodius, who henceforth were to b.ecome the rupostles of&#13;
the Slaivs, came in 863 from Byoo.ntium to Great Moravia. B y their activities, they laid the foundations for church&#13;
organizaibions, the Slav liturgy, a'.Jiphrubet, •a nd literature. It&#13;
was in this way that the rwork of the two missionaries&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
3&#13;
&#13;
from Byzruntrl:l.l!Ill brought ,t he western Slavs into the fold of&#13;
the Catholic OhuTch, an historical event of paramount ipolitic,al and oulturral importance.&#13;
In the tenth century, ,Slovakia ,b ecame for a time a&#13;
battlefie'ld in the struggles .among the SlaVIS, Magyars, and&#13;
Germans, and at the fbegiillnmg of the eleventh century,&#13;
she became a part of the kingdom of Hungary, organized&#13;
under the Arpad dynasty.&#13;
In the fifteenth and at the !beginning of the si~teenth&#13;
century the internal prOiblems of Hungary reached a certain degree of consolidation. The invasions of •c entral Europe by the 'Dmks in tJhe ,s ixteenth and seventeenth ceinturies, however, reduced Hungary to the area of the Slovalda&#13;
of today and political and cultural liife was concentrated in&#13;
that area. For a long time sessions of the Hungarian Pa•r liament were held •a nd coronations of the Hungarian llings&#13;
were celebrated in BratisJava.&#13;
The end o,f the eighteenth and the first half of the&#13;
nineteenth centuries mark the /beginning of the Slovak national renaissance. At this time, the nationa1ities tin central Emope we,r e about to abrundon Latin as the literary&#13;
and spoken language of the cu!tiivated claS'S and to replace&#13;
it by their own national language. Consequently, a spiritual&#13;
rebirth stirred up national aspirations among the different peoples of the !Hapsburg monarchy.&#13;
In 1848, the Slov,a,ks -organiized a military uprising&#13;
against the centralism of 'BudaJpeSt and: helped 1:Jhe Emperor&#13;
crush the Kossuth rebellion against the Hapsburgs. They&#13;
did it with the hope that Slovrukia wocld ibe finally acknowledged as an autonomous land within a federated&#13;
monaTohy, ibut thedr hopes in this respect were never&#13;
satisfied.&#13;
h1 the "Memorand'll!IIl of the Slovak Nation" of Jl.l'lle&#13;
7, 1861, a Slovak National Assemlbly, asked the Parliament&#13;
of Hungary to create an rarl!ministiratirve unit from the oounties imlhaJbited lby tlhe iSloviaJc population under the name of&#13;
"Slovak region." It was to ,b e ,provjdedJ with such a degree&#13;
of poaitical and oultural autonomy which would be compatible wiith the prniciiple of u.mty of the monarchy. But the&#13;
Hungarian Parlioonent failed to act.&#13;
&#13;
4&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
In 1868 the Nationality Act was passed in the /Pairliament of Hunga:ry .b y which Magyar was proclaimed. the official language of the ,s tate administration in the kingdom,&#13;
except for some autonomous bodies.&#13;
1n 1895, the Serbs, the Rwmanians from Transylvania&#13;
and the Slovaks convOlked a congress of nationalities in Budapest in which they claimed ,respect for their national&#13;
rights and asked once more for a federative reform of the&#13;
kingdom on the ,p rinciple of equality. Such a reform was&#13;
not carried out. As a ,c onsequence the non.,Magy,ar nationa!lities lost, during the First World War, their interest in&#13;
the continued existence ()ff the dual monarchy oif AustriaHu.ngary.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
World War I and Formation of the Czecho-Slovak State&#13;
Dwring World War [ the ,s pirit of nationalism was&#13;
greatly stimulated within the Alustro-Hungari:ain Empire.&#13;
Thi•s spirit was reflected iby increasing demands for greater&#13;
autonomy or ouwi:ght independence ,f or the clifforent nations within that empire. The advocacy of the principle of&#13;
nationa:l self-tdeter-mination by President Wilson further&#13;
stimulated these iaJS!)iratiOill,s. and dlid much to set the stage&#13;
for the peace settlements.&#13;
Dur:i.ng the course of the war Czech political leaders&#13;
established a secret committee wh~ch directed the ,a ctivities of Ozech nationalists at home and abroad. Thomas G.&#13;
Masaryk, as the leader of this movement, toured Europe&#13;
and the United 'States Wlhere h e recei.:ved encouragement&#13;
and support.&#13;
Meanwhile a movement ,a rose among the ·l arge number oif Americans of Slovaik descent promoting Slovak!ia's&#13;
separation from Hungary. Th.Tee different solutions of the&#13;
Slovaik prob1em were oovi,saged: Slovakia as a new state,&#13;
as ia partner orf a Czecho-Slovruk Federation •o r a·s a territory forming a pollitircal union with the prospectirve Polish&#13;
Republic.&#13;
Finally, the SloivaJk -League of Amerioa entered into&#13;
contact with the Amemcans of Czech descent and signed&#13;
with their organilzations, in 191 5, t;he Cleveland agreement,&#13;
and in 1918 the Pittsburgh Parct, 'both of which aim·e d at&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
5&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
the creation of a Czecho-.Slova1k federal state. In these doouments the Slov,aik organi•z ation stipulated that Slovakfa&#13;
should 'be an equal mem1ber iwitJh the Czech lands ·a nd have&#13;
complete legislative, executive, judiciary and cultural autonomy in strictly national matters, while matters of common interest, such as foreign affairs and defense, should&#13;
be within the competence '()!f a common parlitailllent.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
A tangi!ble proof of the aspi-rabions of 1:Jhe Ozec:h and&#13;
Slo:vruk peoples toiward foll mdependence iwas demonstrated&#13;
by the thousands of thei:r soldiers who had swrendeired on&#13;
the 'Various fronts. They formed the Czecho-Slovak Legions&#13;
in Russia, France, amd Ita1y and fought on the side of the&#13;
Al[ied and Associated \P,o wers.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
In order to convince ·W estern statesmen that the concept of national states 1was, ~n concern with the iwill of the&#13;
people a Congress otf !Peop1es Oppressed ·b y the Hrups'burg&#13;
Monarchy was commenced in Apilil 191'8 at Rome. This congress did much to mfl,uence the th,i nking in western Europe&#13;
and in the United States. ln the summer of 1918, F'ra.nce,&#13;
Great Britain, the United States, and Italy offici,all,y recognized the Czecho-1Slovak National Council as a defacto gOIVerrunent and the Gzecho-lSlwak forces as an Allied army&#13;
waging regu~ar warfare agarl.nst kustria-Hungary and Germany.&#13;
A Ozeoho-4Slwak IPro:visionrul Government •w as set up&#13;
in Paris with Masaryik as President and was recogn.iized de&#13;
jure by the Aflied and Associated Powers. It issued the Declaration of Czecho..SlovaJk Independence on October 18,&#13;
1918, in Paris. On the saime day President Wilson rejected&#13;
the Austrian ,proiposa:l for the organi zation of Austria-Hungary on a federa l !b asis iby reiplyiing that !he could no longer&#13;
accept •~ere autonomy of these peoples as a basis of&#13;
peace .. ."&#13;
On Octolber 28, 1918, the Ozecho-Slo,yak Nationial Colllllcil in !P:mgue proclaimed the deiposibion of the Austrian&#13;
Emperor as so,yereign of the Czech and Slcxvak lands and the&#13;
estrublishment of a free and united Republic ,of Ozecho-4SlovavaJda. The ,SiovaJk National Counchl, a revolutionary 'body&#13;
composed of Slovak patriots, convened on October 30, 1918,&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
6&#13;
&#13;
and ,pwb1isihed a document known •a s the Dec1aration of&#13;
Turcia.nsky rSv. Martlin. In. this document they proclaimed&#13;
the separation of Slo.va:lci&lt;a from the Kiingdom of Hungary&#13;
and their intention to form with the Ozech lands a CzeohoSlOWlik .state. On November 14, 1918, this decision was ratified 1~ the Crecho--iSlvoruk National Assembly which elected&#13;
T. G. 1M as•aryik as President of the Republic and set up the&#13;
first ,caJbinet.&#13;
However, it was not long !b efore serious dlisagreement&#13;
developed between the Ozechs and ISlovaJks on the form of&#13;
government for the new state. The Ozeohs farvored a Czecho~Sl01Vak ,centralist state whHe the Sllo,vaiks ins.i:sted upon&#13;
a Czecho~SlQl\llaJk feder.ation ~n whioo the identity and individrua:lity of each nation would ibe •recognized and preserved.&#13;
In the opinion of !Slovak leadJers the Ozecho,..slovak state,&#13;
for all practical purposes, was to become a Czech ,s tate, enlarged 'by Slovakia ra nd :sulb-Oaripathlian Ruthenia. This situation resulted .in the !Slovaks taking a firm ,position a,g ainst&#13;
the centralist form of government. Monsignor Andrew Hilinka, a great patriotic [eader from the time of pre~a:r HrUlllgar.y, went dandestine1y in !September 1919 to Pairis in order to present S1ova;kia's cause before the Peace Conference, ,a dvocating an international guaranty fo·r the selfgovernment of the ,Slovruk nation withi:n OzechoJSlova!kia.&#13;
Denounced to the •French authorities !by the Ozecho,.;Slovak&#13;
delegation as a Hapsburg spy, he was foTced to return to&#13;
Slovaikia without any result. Toniprisoned 1by order of Prague&#13;
at Mirov, Mara'Via, Hlinka was to stay tJhere until April&#13;
1920, when he was elected deputy of the 'Slovak People's&#13;
Party, founded iby him under the Hungarian regime and&#13;
reestabllished in December 19'18.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT&#13;
ConstitutJional Structure&#13;
Althowg,h the !basic ,constitution was not adopted until.&#13;
February 1920, its .gener.al principles had been B!pplied&#13;
from the very •b eginning of Cze.cho-Slovaik independence.&#13;
The philosophy underlying this fundamental law is expressed in the preamble, whfoh is striikingly similar to the&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
7&#13;
&#13;
preamble of the Constitution of the United States.&#13;
The main body of the Consbitution provided for a&#13;
popularly elected Parliament, a President selected by both&#13;
houses of Parliament and an independent judiciary.&#13;
&#13;
Parties and Politics&#13;
The politics of the period may ibe divided into four&#13;
&#13;
phases:&#13;
1. Nationalistic phase (1918-19)&#13;
Following the proclamation of independence, ,a ll Czech&#13;
political parties agreed on the fundamental principles on&#13;
which the new state ,w as to be bui1t. Having reaohed this&#13;
major consensus and the necessary leg,islation having been&#13;
enacted, the coalition had accomplished its task and a&#13;
split on partisan lines followed.&#13;
2. Swing toward Social Democraicy (1919-20)&#13;
The period of Socia.dist rule in the Czecho-Slovruk Republic did not accom;plish too many changes in the country's economy although the r,a,iUwa,ys, mines, and water&#13;
power were socialiized. The division of the 1Soci:alists into&#13;
Socialist amd Communist ranks ended the brief era of Socialist eJQ!)erimentation in Czooho-Slovrukia.&#13;
3. The agrarian era (1922-35)&#13;
This was a period of Telative ·parliamentary stability&#13;
under the leadershiip of the Agrarian Party, which managed&#13;
the government along m.iddile-of~the-road policies. A satisfactory coalition government was maintained throughout&#13;
this period.&#13;
4. The crisis ( 1935-38)&#13;
This period iwas the touchstone of the solidity of the&#13;
Czecho-1Slovruk state. Confronted with the serious iproblem&#13;
of the Sudeten Germain poipuil.ation, Czecho-6lovakia betrayed no signs, of political panic.&#13;
The .principal political ,parties in Ozecho-Slovrukia in the&#13;
period betiween the two World Wars formed the following&#13;
groups:&#13;
National 'Democrats. - This party, conservative and intensely nationalist, drew its princi'pa:l support from businessmen, the professions, and hi,gher cirvil servants. It never&#13;
beoame very ,powenfu:l.&#13;
&#13;
8&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Populists. - Under the name of the Czech Populist&#13;
Party and the Slovak Pe&gt;ipulist Party, respectiively, this&#13;
group endeavored to bring CathoiJ.ic ideas into plllblic life.&#13;
The Sllllall faruners and workers in rural districts were its&#13;
strongholds, especially in Slovakia.&#13;
Agrarians. - This poJitica-1 groUJp, the largest in the&#13;
subsequent parliaments, was solidly entrenched in both&#13;
rural aind town districts by means 0£ a widespread network&#13;
of cooperat:1ve, economic, and mtlturnJl organimtions. Its&#13;
broaid economic and so.cia'l program att•r acted wide support.&#13;
National Socialists. - Thi1s non-Marxian Socialist Party may ibie described as a "radicai national party of the&#13;
lower middle class and of the wonkers." It had rather more&#13;
influence than its moderate numerical strength would indii;cate.&#13;
Social Democrats. - This, party, resembling the social&#13;
democratic parties of other European countries, had more&#13;
influence during the first two years of bhe Republic. Though&#13;
outwardly united it was, however, undermined by dissension within its own ranks, whicih finally resulted in the expu1lsion of the Communist faction .&#13;
Communists. - The Ozecho-Sloivaik Commll!Ilist Party&#13;
was created in 1920 as a result of the e~ulsion of Communist elements from the 'Social Democratic Party. Though&#13;
equia:lly subversive and aggressiive as elsewhere in Europe,&#13;
the Ozecho-iSlovaJk Communists never secured a la:rge foll-owing during the two decades before the Second World&#13;
War.&#13;
Economic, Social and Cultural Development&#13;
Agrarian reform&#13;
iRediistribu:tion of land was an urgent iprOlblem facing&#13;
the IIlew government and a Land Reform Act, therefore,&#13;
was one of the first measures passed ,b y the Czecho-Slovak&#13;
Parliament. This ,a ct entitled the state to truke over, •a,fter&#13;
com;pensation, all ,1and :from the great estates in excess of a&#13;
fixed maximum and to permit land purcha,se by those who&#13;
needed it most. The agr,ariam. refomi program substantially improved the material conditions of the rural popula-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
9&#13;
&#13;
tion aml averted the diam.ger of ,agrarian disturbances.&#13;
Economic development&#13;
While Czecho-1Slovruk agricl.l!ltura:l resources almost&#13;
covered domestic req,uiTements, indrustrial prodUJCtion was&#13;
far in excess of the needs of the home market since Ozecho-1Slovakia had been the industrial center of the former&#13;
Austro..lHJungarian Empire.&#13;
'Since the Danulbiian countries, originally Czooho-Slovakia'•s principal foreign ma,r ket fOT manufadured goods,&#13;
were increasing the tempo of their industria;lization with a&#13;
view to :restricting tihe import orf industrial µvoducts, Ozecho..JSlovruk foreign trade was olbJiiged to look for new outlets. These were found ma,i nly in those western and oversea&#13;
countries which were Czecho-1SloV1aJkia's .principal suppliers&#13;
of •r aw materials, especially the United States and Great&#13;
Britain.&#13;
Economically aJnd fin!andalil.y Czecho-Slorvaikia was a&#13;
sound state in central Europe. As an exporting country it&#13;
was severely hlt by the wodd economic depression of the&#13;
early thirties, hut, lby timely adtj:ustments to new price and&#13;
exchange levels, it was one orf the first Eiurropean countries&#13;
to weather the crisis.&#13;
Education and social progress&#13;
The cl.l!ltmrra1 level orf the Czechs was hlgh and their passion fOT education was prQIVeribial in central Eur.ope. The&#13;
new R.ep'Ulblic fostered educaition by establishing additional&#13;
free schools •a nd by, improving the existing ,schools.&#13;
The Ozecho-1Slorva,k :S tate a,lso forged ahead in the&#13;
field of social impmve:ment. All groU!ps and interests pos,sessed the rig:ht of organi,z ation ,a nd thus organized lalbor&#13;
had its trade unio,n s, farmers their cooperative societies,&#13;
and white--coUar worker,s and businessmen their associations. Health a,nd other types of ,social insurance were either&#13;
provided for or encouraged iby the State and pro¥i:sion was&#13;
made for State assistance to hoursing and cooperatives.&#13;
&#13;
The Religious Situation&#13;
&#13;
The re1igious .situation created after the esmblishment&#13;
of the Repu'blic in 19'18 must, like many other of the coun-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
:iO&#13;
&#13;
try's developments, ibe rvieiwed against its historical backgrou!Ild.&#13;
A strong Czech groUJp of modernist, nationalistic Roman clergy insisted on radicall reforms, such as the use of&#13;
the vernacuiliar in the lituvgy ,and the abolition of compulsory celibacy, Wlhich the Roman Curia could not accept. As&#13;
a result, this group seceded from Rome and esta:blished an&#13;
independent "Ozecho-1S1ovak Church" ,w hioh originally numbered aJbout one million adherents, lbut ,w hich lost half its&#13;
meimlbership by 1939, so that Roman Catholics still comprised 80 •p er cent of the popul,a tion. In spite of adverse&#13;
circu:mstl8Jnces, the Roman Cathoilic ChUTch adjusted itself,&#13;
therefore, to the new millieu and recovered much for its former influence.&#13;
In the political and cultural life of the new Repwblic,&#13;
the Protestant element played a role far beyond its numerical strength. Many ,prominent political leaders, Thomas&#13;
G. Masaryk among them, 1be'longed to the Protestant faith.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
Internal Problems&#13;
&#13;
'J.'lhe OOIIlstituition of 1920, in }airge measure disiregarding the ethnographic realities of Czecho-Slovakia, was to&#13;
become a bone of contention 1b ,etween the Czechs on the&#13;
one side, and 1:Jhe. 1Slova:k,s, Ger.mans, Mag,yar:s, and Ruthenians on the other. The Slovaks demanded the incorporation&#13;
of the main clauses of the Pittsburgh Pa-ct into the Constitution. The Ruthemans, whose autonomy within CzechoSlovakia had ,b een granted by the Treaty of St. Germain,&#13;
asked that this international obligation be respected 'by the&#13;
Prague Government. The Ge:rana:ns ,and the Magyars solicited oulturaJ rig,hts and adnninistr,a,ti,ve autonomy on the&#13;
local level, as granted iby the same Treaty of St. Germain.&#13;
'Dhis psychological split among the ,populatiOIIl of OzechoSlova1ki,a wea:kened consideriaJbly the new state from both&#13;
the internal and international point of rview. The Czech&#13;
statesmen tried to iremedy this situation by creating a system of international treaties such as the Little Entente,&#13;
1920, the Pact of Alliance and FriendsihiJp with France,&#13;
1924, and a similar pact with the Soviet Union, 1935. Uke&#13;
the Austro-Hunga1rian staite'Smen in 1867, Benes believed&#13;
&#13;
11&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
that the transformation of Czech~Slova!kia into a federation of three memlbers, the Czech lands, 1Slov,a kia, and Subcarpaitlliian iRuthenia, would weaken the international position of the centralized state, I)a)rticularly with reference&#13;
to HW11gary and Germany. Consequently, in the field of internal ,administraJtio,n he developed a system, in which aJll&#13;
branches of Gove:rnment in Slov.a:kia and Sulbca rpathiian Ruthenia ,w ere reserved iprimari1y to 1:Jhe Czec,hs.&#13;
Politicall'Y, al·l problems of these bwo lands we.re to ibe&#13;
decided in the Pa:-ag,ue Parliament, where !Slovakia had only&#13;
58 and Ruthenia 9 deputies out of 300. Thus, even the most&#13;
important questions such a;s the relation betlween state&#13;
and church, official language, system of schools, the economy, were to be decided ib;y the Ozech parliamentarian majority.&#13;
Ai3 to the cutural aspect, secondary schodls in Slovakia as wel[ ,as the Bratislava Universirty lbecaJm.e an officiaJl&#13;
domain of Ozech ,professors, teacihing the UJnitarian concept of a "Czechoslovak" nation m ithe ethnic sense. On October 1, 1938, there were 523 Czech and 345 Sloviaik instructors teaching in the secondary schools of Slovaikia. At the&#13;
same time, there were 66 Czech and only 24 Slov~k professors in the Bratisl,a,va Uruversity.&#13;
From the standpoint of the economy Slovakia was to&#13;
remain a predominantly agrarian land, while the Czech&#13;
part of the Repulblic was highly induskialized. This policy&#13;
of two dif,ferent measures is shown by the share of Slovakia and Ruthenia ~n the industrial production of the RepU!blic. The participation of these two lands in the whole&#13;
industry, !between 1934 and 1937, was only 8.5 per cent,&#13;
while 91.5 iper cent went to the Czec,h lands. The proper&#13;
importance of these figures is stressed by the fact, that&#13;
Slwakia constituted 23 per cent and Rutheinia 5.5 per cent&#13;
of the total popuJation of the Re1pulblic.&#13;
From the adlministratifve ,p oint of view, the district and&#13;
county offices in Slo,vakia and iRuthenia were mostly direcited iby Czech off,iciais who were directly responsible to&#13;
Prague ,as were the police. In 1938 there were 120,926 Czech&#13;
pwb1ic offici,a ls in 'Slovakia.&#13;
All these aspects created in Ozecho-Slovakia what has&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
12&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
been knoiWn as the "Sll.ova;k problem." The Slovak People's&#13;
Party which, in 1925 had 23 deputies, became not only the&#13;
strongest single party in Slav,aJkia, lbut a majority party of&#13;
the Slovak people (not counting minorities and the Comm1.1!11ists) endorsed 1:Jhe federative reform of the Republic&#13;
asking for the accomplishment of stipulations contained in&#13;
the ,PittslblllI'gh Pact. A:s early as Jianuary 25, 1922, this&#13;
party presented its fiTst project for c01I1stituti01I1al reform&#13;
in Czecho-Slovakia. The prog,ram hatl the following main&#13;
points:&#13;
!Slovakia to be granted her own Diet and Government.&#13;
As common affairs would ,b e considered: The President, the&#13;
Army, Foreign Affairs, and Communications. The Sloviak Diet to harve exolU1Sive competence in such matters as&#13;
natiOIIlal eduoaJtion, denominations, justice, commerce, agriculture, publric works, social welifare, and corresponding&#13;
finances. The executive ;power in Slov-rukia, as iregards b.oth&#13;
the laws which wound be :voted by the Central Parliament&#13;
in Prague and those which would be enacted. lby the Diet&#13;
of Bratis:larva, would belong to the Slovruk Gorvernment.&#13;
Laws voted ,by ithe Central Parliament would lbe without&#13;
validity in .Slovakia if rejected by a two-.thirds majority in&#13;
the •Sll.ovak Diet. This proposal would have satisfied !Slovak&#13;
aspirations, but it was 111ever put on the agenda o;f Parliament.&#13;
A second proposed reform concerning the decentirali&gt;zation of the state administration was presented to the Czecho4S1avruk Parliiament by the 1Slovak People's 1Party, May&#13;
8, 1930. More modest in -i ts scope than the first one, this&#13;
document claimed for -Slovakia the same constitutional position which had 1b een gr8.lllted ihwt never carried out by&#13;
article 3 of the constitwtion relating to Sub.carpathian Ruthenia. According to this proposal, IS1ovakta should have&#13;
had her own 'Diet as a national legislative ,b ody and a governor as chief of the land executiive.&#13;
The iDiet would have lbeen competent to enact laws concerning [anguage, education, religion, municipal, and district administration and justice as well as other matters&#13;
whioh the laws of the Central ,Parliament would comer wpon&#13;
it. Laws enacted by the &lt;Diet of Slovakia and .si:gned by the&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
13&#13;
&#13;
President of the Republic would ibe promulgated, under sigruature of the gavemor, in a sipecial col1ection of laiws for&#13;
Slova:kia. Although presented in due form, this proposal&#13;
was never discussed in the Parliament.&#13;
Octdber 16, 1932, the Slovak People's Party of Andrew&#13;
H!linika and the Slova!k National Party of M. Ra;zus (a small&#13;
traditionailist &lt;Protestant party) having joined in an agreement a;b,out the necessity of autonomy for Slovakia,&#13;
stressed their detemnination to pursue the fight for Slovakia's national rights, "even ,t houg,h it may ,bring the disintegration of &gt;the Ozecho..,Slov,a;k Republic."&#13;
Fol1.owing the resignation of T. G. Masaryk as President of the Repulblic, E. Benes became 1a candidate in Deceimber 19315 for that office. After some consultations, the&#13;
Slovak People's Party end!orsed his election, stiipwlating,&#13;
however, that a ,pol,icy of national equality between the&#13;
Czechs and the 1Slava:kis should ibe inaugrnrated by the President aind a law concerning 'Slovak~a's autonomy ,be promulgated in one year. Nevertheless, it was two years later&#13;
before the Prague Government was ready to, consider the&#13;
Sl()IVruk prdblem and this ooourred in connection wit!h the&#13;
Sudeto·- German claims for nation,a,1 rights within the Republic.&#13;
This nationality group had been integrated into CzechoSlovakia in spite of their protest. -Since the very foTlffiation&#13;
of Czecho,..,Sl'ovakia, the German minority had been soliciting a form of cultural autonomy in the schools, local administration, and in the courts. Later on they asked for&#13;
a better economic amd social &lt;poll.icy in the German areas&#13;
suffering from unemployment. For a long time, Prague&#13;
did not lristen to such :voices. But with Hitler's accession in&#13;
Gennany, the Sudeto-Germans recei;ved the !backing of the&#13;
'I1hl1rd Reich. Consequent11 theiT claims increased at the&#13;
same time as their courage. In 1935 the ,Sudeto-German&#13;
P,a rty, with 44 deputies, lbeoame the second ,g reatest party&#13;
in the Repuiblic. The (P,raigue Goverll!!Ilent, not willing to ~ppear as acting under foreign pressure, remained reluctant.&#13;
T.he stiffer the Czecho..jSlovak Government 1becaime, the more&#13;
Hitler determined to annihilate Czecho ... Slovakia.&#13;
&#13;
14&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
PairalJel to this evolution was Sfovrukia's struggle for&#13;
its own rrights. JU/Ile 5, 1938, a third projed concerning the&#13;
federalization of the Repulblic was pU!blished lby the SlovaJk&#13;
People's Party, a!lld presented to the Central Government.&#13;
It was only one week !before the, Munich Conference, 1Septem'be:r 22, 1'938, that E . Benes sent a counteriproject to the&#13;
Praesidium of the Sllovaik ,People's Barty.&#13;
Shortly after, the conflict :betiween Prague and: the Sudeto-Ge:rrmans was resolrved in Munich, where, on the basis&#13;
of Lord Rundman's rrecommendation, the Sudetenl:and went&#13;
to Germany.&#13;
This decision created for ISlovaikia a new situation. As&#13;
a consequence of a policy in whioh she had praotically no&#13;
share, Sllovrukia was ,a lso to surrender in favor Olf ifllUJilgary&#13;
her Southern !boundary ·zone, ,s ettled mostly ,b y Magyar population. This was a psychdlo,gical blow which brought an&#13;
agreement among all Slova!k ,political parties, except for&#13;
the Communist, Social-Democrat and minority parties, rubout&#13;
Slovakia's autonomy. Thus on October 6, 1938, one day&#13;
after the resignation of ,E . Benes, six ipolitica,,l parties of&#13;
SlovaJkia, representing 36 out of 58 deputies, puiblished a&#13;
dedarration in which they agreed that the third project of&#13;
constitutional reform shO'llld be immediat~ly put in practice&#13;
and l8Jil autonomous gorverrnment for Slovakia 1b e appointed&#13;
,u nder the chairmanship of iDr. Joseph Tiso.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
November 2, 1938, lby the ar,bi,tration of Ciano and Von&#13;
Ribbentrop in Vienna, 10,309 .s quare kilometers with ·853,670&#13;
inhafbitants were to .b,e ceded by :Slovakia to Hungary. This&#13;
included 503,980 'Magyars and 272,145 Slovaks. ISfovakia&#13;
saw that she was becoming a viotim of an international&#13;
po1itica1 game ,w ithout aniy faJllJlt of her own. The Vienna&#13;
decision proved the futility of the fomner party dirvisions&#13;
and produced ra n integrating effect upon the Slo:va;k politica:l&#13;
spectrum. Parties which had signed rt.he Declaration of Zilina on October 6, agreed on NovembeT 10, 1938, on the&#13;
formation of a common party !known henceforth as the&#13;
Party of National Unity.&#13;
This political evolution in 1Slovrukia was f:inal:ly sanctioned by the Ozech and Slovak representatives irn the&#13;
&#13;
15&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Prague Parliament on No-vemlber 19, 193'8. Then, by a constitutionall ,amendiment, Ozecho-Slovrukia became a federation of Bohemi!a-&lt;Maravfa, !Slovakia and! Oa:rpathian Ukraine&#13;
(,Ruthenia). Burt the relations between Prague and the Slova:k Government remained tenJSe, because of 9,000 Czech&#13;
officia1s who 1Were removed lby the Slovak Goivernment, and&#13;
the share of Slovakia in the income and expense, orf the&#13;
common &lt;budget.&#13;
FOREIGN ,R ELATIONS&#13;
Beforre Munich&#13;
The principal aim of Ozecho-Slovakia's foreign policy&#13;
was the preserivation of the status quo as estaJblished by&#13;
&#13;
the 19~9 peace settlements, and the estaJblishment of friend-ly relations with all her neighlbors through ,a n exten1Sive&#13;
system of adequate agreements. Eduard Benes, Minister of&#13;
Foreign Affairs until 11936 and 1ater 1P resident of the Repulblic, was the girniding sipiirit of this policy.&#13;
A solid :f oundation for rthe, presewation .o f the status&#13;
quo in cenibral Europe was laid !by the CTeation of the Little&#13;
Entente formed by Ozecho-Sfoivakia, Yugos1a;vfa and Rumania, and three victorious Danulbian states bordering on&#13;
vanquished Austda and Hungary.&#13;
Ozecho-1Slovalda was ·a n enthusiastic supporter of the&#13;
League of Nations and colktJborated ,w holeiheartedly in the&#13;
negotiations which brought Germany and the ,Soiviet Union&#13;
into the League.&#13;
When Hitler came to power in 1933, Ozecho-iSlovakia's&#13;
foreign relations entered into a critical phase and two&#13;
ye31rs of vi,r,uJent Nazi pro,paganda among the Sudeten Germans !bore frwt in the results of the 1935 elections. The&#13;
NaJZi..sponsored :Sudetendeutsche IPartei poiiled over 62 per&#13;
cent of the total Ge1riman vote and c01Wed the smaller German parties .i nto submission.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
Later .on, acting on instructioillS from iBer,Hn, the &lt;leaders od: the Sudeten German movement put fomvard demands&#13;
which no Czecho-S1,orva'k 1g overnment •c ould a·c cept and, with&#13;
the anne:,ration of Austria, the srtage was set for final action.&#13;
De.seprately anxious to avert a new war, France and&#13;
&#13;
16&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Great Britain proposed to Czecho-Slovakia that she should&#13;
cede to Germany all areas with a German majority. When&#13;
Ozecho--srtovakia demwred, she was informed that she must&#13;
ae&lt;!ept the proposal or bear the conisequences alone. The result was tihat the Czechs gave in and at Munich their&#13;
country was di vided on the lines dictated by Hitler.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
After Munich&#13;
After MU1J1ioh, Czecho-.Slova:kia tried to adjust itself to&#13;
the new situation. President Benes resigned and left the&#13;
country. He was succeeded 1b y Emil Hacha, an eldeI1ly and&#13;
experienced jurist with no politioa1 affiliations, who believed that close cooperation with the Third Reich was the&#13;
country's only hope of sur:vival.&#13;
The tra,nsition to Hitler's New Order was swift. Obnoxious parties were dissolived and the Government was&#13;
given wide power,s to govern by decree. The ,administration&#13;
was purged, the 1press put under rigorous control and antiSemitic measures were ena,cted.&#13;
The situation in central Europe after Mlliilloh became&#13;
even more confused. Germany began to remind the Bohemian puibLic of the role the Kingdom of Bohemia had played&#13;
within the Holy Roman Empire. !Hungary started to speak&#13;
about her histor,i,cal boundaries and the necessity of a common frontier with Poland. According to the Nuremberg&#13;
documents, Hitler 1at that time. had already decided to destroy Czecho-Slovakia. But there was apparently no definite decision o.n S1ova:kia as to wihether to place it under German OCOU1pation or to ha;ve it occU1pied by Hungary. In this&#13;
situation, the Slovak GOIVernment had only one preoccupation: to preserve what unity had remained of Sloviakia after the Vienna a11bitration and to avoid:, as far as possible,&#13;
direct domination lby a:ny of her neighbors.&#13;
On Ma11ch 10, 1969, the Prague Government dismissed&#13;
the government of Dr. Joseph Tiso and proclaimed martial&#13;
law in 'Slovakia. The Slova!k people considered this a violation&#13;
of agreements that had /been si,gned ~tween Prague and&#13;
Bratislaiva and incorporated into the Constitution. Puibl~c&#13;
demonstrations spread throll!g.hout 'Slova:kia.&#13;
Invited to a consultation by Hitler in Berlin, Dr. Joseph&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
17&#13;
&#13;
Tiso, the dismissed chairman of the Slov,ak Gooernment&#13;
was shown a telegram by Von Ribbentrop, according to&#13;
which HUIIlgary iwas ready to occupy Slova,kia. Hlitler then&#13;
suggested that this eventuality may be prevented by the&#13;
declaration of 1Slovakia's independence. Consequently, Dr.&#13;
Tiso returned to Bratisl,aiva where, om March 14, 1939, following his report, the IS'lovak Diet proclaimed independence.&#13;
President Hacha was then summoned to Berlin and presented with an ultimatum aiming at the i.mJpos.ition of a&#13;
protectorate upon Bohemia-Moravia. Forced into submission, the Presiderut ,s igned ,a declruration by w1hich he "ip1aced&#13;
the destiny of the Czech people and country with confidence in the 'hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich."&#13;
German troo1ps marched into Bohemia and from Prague&#13;
(March 16) Hitler issued the proclamation establishing the&#13;
"Protectorate of Bohemia-Mora'Via."&#13;
Thereafter, Hungary annexed Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Czecho-SlovaJkia was dead.&#13;
&#13;
The Establishment of the Slovak Republic&#13;
Even though the Slovak state was largely the result&#13;
of a tense international situation, it nevertheless co.rresponded to· the aspirations of the Slovak ~ple for freedom&#13;
and the principle of self-determination a,nd seltf-1govern.ment.&#13;
After Munich, central EUTotpe became a part of the German&#13;
orbit. Therefore, in oroer to. d.~scourage Hungary in her&#13;
armed attack launched against Eastern Slovakia, the Slovak Government concluded •w ith Germany a treaty of protection, March 23, 1939, by which the &lt;Reich assured the existence of Sloiva;kia without destroying its .national pe,r sonality. In exchange, S1ova:kia ha,d to, follow the German line&#13;
in foreign policy.&#13;
Altogether, 2:l states. reoogniiized the international .i ndividuality of Slovaikia. Besides the countries which were&#13;
later to become members of the Axis, S~ovaikia was recognized by the Holy See, the -Soviet Union, iSpain, 1Switzedand,&#13;
Sweden, Grea,t Britain (de facto) , France (de facto), Liberia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador.&#13;
According to the constitution voted on July 21, 1939,&#13;
&#13;
18&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
SlovaJkiia became a Repulblic with a Parliament of 80 members and a Government of nine.&#13;
The constitution contained princi!pleis, which in some&#13;
aspects combined features of the liberal staite, the Christian democracy, and the authoritarian state,. In the beginning all poweT of the 'Slova:k Reipu'blic was vested in the&#13;
Parliiamenrt !but later on, in 19·41, after Slovakia had entered&#13;
the war against the S'Oviet Union, the executive was to prevail over the legislature.&#13;
The numlber of political parties was reduced. The Communist and the :Social il)emocrat pa·r ties, representing only&#13;
ten deputies, had been 1s uppressed as suJbversive, in October&#13;
1938. Six other parties merged mto the Slov,ak Unity Party, the baokibone of the ipolitcal system of the SLovak state,&#13;
and tlhere were two minority parties: German and Magyar.&#13;
The SlOIVaJk state was far froon being a perfect democracy in the trarlitional sense. R reflected a compromise&#13;
between the past and the present, between an old tradition&#13;
and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central Europe. lBut, in ,general, it was an expression of the&#13;
se'Lf-q&gt;reservation instinct of the 1SlO'Vak nation.&#13;
The Sloviruk Government, in 1941, joined Gernnany, with&#13;
two armored dirvisions, in :the war against the Soviet Union.&#13;
Although on [)ecemlber 1:2, 1941, the Slovak Press Bureau&#13;
had pulb'lished an anno'UIIlcement that the ISlovia;k Repulblic&#13;
was in a state of war with the United !States and Great Britain, neither the President nO'r the tS lovak Pa:rliament or&#13;
Government ever made such a decision or declaration. In&#13;
fact, the Sl01Vruk forces, during the Second World War, did&#13;
not engage in comlbat against any of the Western Powers.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
World War B and the Restoration of Czecho-Slovakia&#13;
Czechs in the protectorate of Bohemia-Morawa ,w ere&#13;
not directly iDJVolved in the •S econd World War. They were&#13;
exempt from militaJry service hut had to work for the German war machine. Though their contribution in the fight&#13;
for freedom was not Sipectacular, thousands of Czech patriots ipaid with their live'S for their efforts to 1keep the flame&#13;
of freedom fHalrering.&#13;
After Munich, many Czechs and SlovaJks left the coun-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
19&#13;
&#13;
try and established themsel,ves talbroad, mostly in Paris and&#13;
London, which became the cenrters of their political activities.&#13;
Headed by Eduaxd Benes, these emigres set urp a National Committee to taJke up the struggle for the restoration&#13;
of a free Czecho-iSlovakia.&#13;
The committee was recognized first as the provisional&#13;
and eventwall.'y as the regulaT Government of Czecho-Sloviakia, by Great Britain and, later, iby the United !S tates and&#13;
the Soviet Union. Czecho-'Sl01Vaikia was thus given the status of an allied state under foreign ocoupation. The Munich&#13;
agreement was declared null and void and Czecho-.Slova.kia's&#13;
original frontiein; were guaranteed.&#13;
While the C!zecho-.Slovak GQI\Ternment-ii.n-exile was primarily concerned with the consolidation of the international&#13;
position of the Republic, the Czecho-Sfovak Communist&#13;
leaders in Moscow were com1pleting their plan for immediately seizing power after the li/beration. Moscow knew precisely what Ozecho-Slovalkia's &lt;international .p osition would&#13;
be once the Red army was stationed within the ter.ritory&#13;
and was concerned on:ly with tadica:l movements aimed at&#13;
bringing ahout a speedy sovietfomtion of the country.&#13;
Toward the end of 1943, E. Benes went to Mosco.w&#13;
where, on Decembe:r 12, 1943, he signed with Stalin a treaty&#13;
of alliance, friendship, and mutual help between the Soviet&#13;
Union and Czecho-Slovakia. tBy this treaty, the ·S oviet&#13;
Uruon was to approach Ozecho-1Slova1kia after the end of&#13;
the war as an ally.&#13;
No. such treaty having been &lt;:oncluded. with the Western Powers, the influence of Moscow on the future of emergent Ozecho-Slovakia became predominant. In Soviet tactics, this treaty was to create a favora!ble atmosphere in&#13;
Bohemia-lMo:ravia fm: tbe idea of a Soviet ·l iberation.&#13;
During his visit in Moscow, E. Benes came to a,n agreement with K. Gottwald, the ex,iled chief of the Czech Communist Party, aJbouit the main prindples upon which the&#13;
edifice of the future Ozecho-,Slovakia wouJd rely: (1) The&#13;
state admin.stration 'wouJld be repla&lt;:ed by "natio,n_aa committees" (IS01Viet.s); (2) the .fOI1II1er right-of--center parties&#13;
would 1b e eliiminaited; (3) the non-Communist parties in ire-&#13;
&#13;
20&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
,s tored Ozecho ..Slovak,ia would form ,w ith the Communists a&#13;
"government of National 1F ront"; (4) "people's courts"&#13;
would lbe established to eliminate all war criminals. These&#13;
principles with an extensive inter,pretation and -aipplication&#13;
of ipoints (2) and ( 4) and the nationali2ation of indiustcy&#13;
were to, lay the fou:ndaitions for a "People's !Democracy" in&#13;
Czecho-1Slovakia.&#13;
In Slov:alkia, the treaty of friendship , mutual help, and&#13;
coJ1aboration with the Soviet Union iProduced a stimulating&#13;
effect upon the Commun1st .and Social Democrat undergroUIIlds and also on a group of lilberals whose imaigiination,&#13;
with respect to central Europe, was tempted more lb y the&#13;
absent Soviet Union than 'by the present Germany.&#13;
These ,groll!ps met secretly on Christmas 1943 in Bratislava and signed what is known as the "ChristJmas agreement." In this declaration they reaffirmed their will to&#13;
work for the restoration of "Ozecho·-IS1ov•a kia," for a Illarrow collalboration with the iSov.ieit Union in the field of foreign policy, for the estaiblishment of political justice and&#13;
for the continuation oif resistance against the Germans and&#13;
the Slovak Government.&#13;
&#13;
:FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL GALAYDA,&#13;
AMERICAN CITIZEN FROM HAZLETON, PA.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. The Russians deported to Russia the&#13;
teachers and iwell-educated ,peoip le?&#13;
Mr. G alayda. Yes, t eachers and educated people.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. And you were in Slova:kia while this was&#13;
going on; is that correct?&#13;
Mr. Galayda. Yes.&#13;
Mr. :McTigue. Now, while these deportations were going&#13;
on did you then endeavor to get a visa o.ut ·o f the country ?&#13;
Mr. GaJayda. I :tried a couple of times but it was impossible at that time. I was put in ja•il two tim es.&#13;
Mr. tM cTigue. Who puit you in jail?&#13;
Mr . Galayda. The Ozecho-Sloivak Army. They asked me&#13;
to fight ,a gainst the Germans. I ref,u:sed. I said, "I am an&#13;
American citizen and I refuse to serve in the Czec,ho..,Slovaik&#13;
Army."&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
21&#13;
&#13;
!Mr. (McTigue. 1S0, you were put in jail because. you refused to serve?&#13;
Mr. Galayda. Yes, thaJt's right.&#13;
MT. !MoTigue. Now, when was t1he second time you were&#13;
put in jail?&#13;
Mr. Galayda. Wel1, the second time was in 1946.&#13;
Mr. Mc'Digue. iBy the Communists?&#13;
Mr. Galayda. Yes.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Why?&#13;
Mr. Galayda. Well, because I was campaigning against&#13;
communism.&#13;
Mr. McT,i gue. You were making taiks against communism?&#13;
Mir. Ga1ayda. Yes, I made ,a couple speeches in the villages against communi sm. That is why I was jailed.&#13;
'M r. iMcTigue. Noiw, in 1'94fi, at the end of the war, did&#13;
you try to get a Un~ted States passport?&#13;
Mir. Galayda. Yes, I did.&#13;
Mr. McTiig ue To return to the United States?&#13;
Mr. Galayda. Yes. [n 1945, when the war was 0 1ver, me&#13;
and my brothers decided to Oeaive, because at that time the&#13;
United States was ,stil'l fighting with the Japanese. So we&#13;
decided to leave and join the American Army.&#13;
Mr. iMcTigue. iDecided to come home?&#13;
Mr. Galayda. Yes. We went to the American cons,ul in&#13;
Prague. He refused. He saiid, "You have to get your passport&#13;
finst, then you can join American Army." So ,J came home.&#13;
Mir. McTigue. How did you go about gettiing your passpont?&#13;
Mr. Galadya. Well, we went to Hungary. On the way&#13;
from Budapest to Bratislava - weH, i will tell you something 3:borut the !Russian s-oldd.ers, what they did.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Yes, I wish you woiuld. This is while you&#13;
are taiking the train to 'Bratislava?&#13;
Mr. Galayda Yes. 'l never am going to forget that time&#13;
what happened.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. You are on the train now?&#13;
Mr. Galayda. Yes.&#13;
Mir. McTigue. Is this what you are describing?&#13;
Mr. Galayda. Yes.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
22&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Mir. McTigue. And you rure en route to Prague lby way&#13;
of Budapest and Bratislava?&#13;
Mr. Galayda. The Russians pulled the emergency brake.&#13;
They had guns; they took the money frOirn .the ipoople, and&#13;
in every coach was one soldier. He had a gun. They robbed&#13;
the people. They ta!ke everything. Then I heard some&#13;
screaming, a girl, a couple of giTls started screaming. I&#13;
know that. I remember that. And I don't know what happened because 1I didn't see because in every coach was one&#13;
soldier and we can't move.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. And they -to ok the girls off the tra,i n ?&#13;
Mr. Galayda. Yes.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. How long did they hold the train up?&#13;
Mr. Gailay&lt;la. Oh, Irt was, I think, at least one hour.&#13;
Mr. Boll!in. One hour.&#13;
Mr. :Mc'I'igue. And everybody on the train ·w as relieved&#13;
of his valualbles, jewelry, money?&#13;
Mr. Galaiyda. They took everything.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Now, what !hia:ppened when you finally&#13;
reached .Prague ?&#13;
Mr. Galayda. Well, when I reached the Prague, liike I&#13;
said, I went to the American consul. I itold hd.m I ,wanted to&#13;
join the American Army. H~ said, "!No. You have to get&#13;
your Arnevican ,p assport first." So then I came home.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. You came home to Slovakia?&#13;
Mr. Galadya. Yes. I came baok home. Then I start&#13;
speruking agafast communism.&#13;
Mr. Mc'lligue. You started writing against communism ;&#13;
you made some speeches against communism?&#13;
Mr. Galayda. Yes.&#13;
Mr. Galayda. Yes.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. ls that correct?&#13;
Mr. Bonin. Now, did any,body ma!ke any complaint rubout&#13;
theiir activities, itaking this property aJway from them?&#13;
Mr. Ga1ayd:a. No, 'alt that time it rwaiS impossible to say&#13;
something.&#13;
iMr. Bonin. You had nobody to turn to to even make a&#13;
Mr. Galayda. No.&#13;
complaint?&#13;
Mr. Bonin. If you did ma!ke a compla int you would probably ·b e arre&amp;t ed ?&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
23&#13;
&#13;
Mr. Galayda. Then yOl\l are sent ito Russia.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. In other wocds, tllere was a c0111Stant fear&#13;
in the minds of the peoiple that they would go to a concentration camp?&#13;
Mr. Galayda. Yes, that's tight.&#13;
Mrr. Bonin. Into 'Si-ber-ia?&#13;
Mr. Ga:layda. Yes.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. Which, of course, is nothing ito .p leasant to&#13;
M1ybody living ·b ehind the Iron Curtain?&#13;
Mr. Gafayda. No, I don't think so.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. You were very happy to get ou:t of there?&#13;
Mr. Galayda. Yes,. The Communist Party is no good for&#13;
this world; a!bsoI1U1telly no good. Becaiuse ,I was over there -and&#13;
I lb.ave experience: ,I lived in Czecho-lS1ovakia for 20 years,&#13;
and I know. They iaire no good in this world.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. They are no good for this world. Well, do&#13;
you have any moos-a ge to tell ,to the people of the United&#13;
States who may feel that communism is a good system of&#13;
government?&#13;
Mr. Galayda. Well, there is one thing I can say, and that&#13;
is the American ,p eople should be proud of what they have,&#13;
freedom of speech and everything They should ibe ,p roud o.f&#13;
what they have.&#13;
Mr. Bomn. ls, it-here any freedom of religion under the&#13;
Communists?&#13;
iMr. Galayda. No.&#13;
Mir. Bonoin. Is there Mly freedom iof the press?&#13;
Mr. Galayda. No.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. Is there any freedom of assembly?&#13;
Mr. Galayda . No.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. Is there any freedom to use radio and teleMr. Galayda. No.&#13;
visi'o n as we do !ill America here.?&#13;
Mr. Bonin. [t i,s a ,pretty lblack picture, this lirving behind t.he Iron Curtain; isn't iit?&#13;
Mir. Galayda. That's ~ight.&#13;
(Wilkes-Barre, Pa., ISeptemiber 30, 1954).&#13;
&#13;
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MR. SMREKOVSKY&#13;
MT. McTigue. You came to this country in 1928; is that&#13;
correct?&#13;
Mr. Smrekiovsky. 1928 is correct.&#13;
Mr. MoTigue. And did you become a:n American citizen&#13;
at that time?&#13;
&#13;
2-l&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes, sir, after being five years in this&#13;
country.&#13;
Mr. McTi!gue. I under,stand that you returned to Slovakfa in 1939; is that cor.root?&#13;
Mr. 1Smrekovgky_ 1939; yes.&#13;
Mr. !l\foTigue. What iwas the purpose for returning to&#13;
Slova·k ia at that time?&#13;
Mr. Smrekovsky. To. visit my father because he was&#13;
reaching 90 rund wrote me that he was i'll; so I wanted to&#13;
visit him and see him.&#13;
Mr. Mc'figue. Now, did you return to Slovakia before&#13;
the 'Outlbreak oif wa;r between Germa;ny a.ind Polamd?&#13;
Mr. 1Sm.rekovsky. Yes. We had a little difficll'l,ty crossing&#13;
t:he ·Polish boroer, lbut ,that didn't amount to much.&#13;
Mr . .McTigiue. Noiw, at thait time, conditions were good&#13;
in ,Slovakia; is that correct?&#13;
Mr. Smreko'V'sky. Yes, they were.&#13;
Mr. Mc'figue. There wasn't any difficulty as far as&#13;
Mr. ,S mrekovs,k y. We didn't .know anything about wa:r&#13;
then.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. There was ,c omplete fu-eedom of ithe&#13;
Mr. ISm.rekovsky. Yes.&#13;
press...&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Freedom of ireligion . . .&#13;
Mr. 1Smerkovsky. Yes.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. And freedom of assembly&#13;
Mr. Smerkov:sky. Yes.&#13;
iMr. iMcTigue. Hoiw long did you stay in 1Slovakia?&#13;
Mr. 1Smrekovsky. 1Seven years.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Then you were there at the time the Rus1M r. !Smrekov.s ky. Ye·s, I was.&#13;
sians C'aime into 1Slovaikia?&#13;
Mrr. Mc'figue. What - or, w:hen did you first come .in&#13;
contact with the Commun.ists?&#13;
Mr. Smrekovsky. After the German Army was defeated,&#13;
they started to drop parachutists to organize Communist&#13;
bands to pers.e cute and rob middle class and decent people.&#13;
1M r. Mc'.Dig,ue. Noiw, did this haJppen in 1944?&#13;
Mr. IS mrekovs.ky. Yes.&#13;
lMr. Mcrrigue. And thls i1s the Communist-inspir ed uprising that you are talk,i ng a:bout.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
25&#13;
&#13;
Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes.&#13;
Mr. McTi,g ue And in the community where you were&#13;
liviing rthey had parachuted agents into the community to organi1ze Communist bands in order to continue the uprising?&#13;
Mr. Smreko,v,s ky. That's right.&#13;
Mr. McTi'gue. And bring it to a successful conclusion, if&#13;
necessary?&#13;
!Mr. ISmrekovsky. Yes, and spread commurnsm at the&#13;
same time.&#13;
Mr. Mc'I'igue. Now, can you teH us some of the things&#13;
you wit:ne.ssed, yourself, during the course of this Communist-inspired uprising?&#13;
Mr. Smrekovsky. I remember a family cruptured by the&#13;
OommUIIllists. There were five memlbers in the fami'ly, a twoyear-old giirl, there was another bigger girl, a son-in-laiw, a,n&#13;
old man, and his wife. They were dragged to the edge of&#13;
the forest and shot from ithe back. Then they dug a hole for&#13;
them and buried them.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. Mr. Counsel, I just want to interrupt here.&#13;
We hea.ird testimony .b efore from different witnesses when stating that ithey were shot in the back, do you mean&#13;
that the . . .&#13;
Mr. Smrekoivsky. They start •t o run.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. They ,s tarted to run?&#13;
Mr. Smrekovsky. They started to run and they shot&#13;
them from the back.&#13;
iMr. Bonin. And they shot tlhem firom the bru~k whiie&#13;
they were trying to get away from them?&#13;
Mr. 1Smrekovsky. Yes.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. Now, they were agents of the Russian Government - that were doing that?&#13;
Mr. Smrekovs:ky. Exactly.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. .A!nd were they armed, these people that were&#13;
shot, or were they with01Ut a,r,ms?&#13;
Mr. IS mrekovsky. They were without arms.&#13;
Mir. Bonin. They were without arms?&#13;
Mr. '.Smrekovsky. Without arr-ms, innocent people.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. But, nevertheless, they were all .s hot in the&#13;
baC'k, the one two years of a,ge, four years of age, the two&#13;
larger ones, the son-in...,Jaw, and the father?&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
26&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
,M r. Smrekovsky. And the mother, too. Five persons.&#13;
&#13;
Mr. Bonin. Five persons? Now, you say that they were&#13;
tossed in •a mass grave; is that correct?&#13;
Mr. Smrekovsky. That's right.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. They were a:11 placed in the same g:raJVe?&#13;
MT. 1Smrekovsky. Yes.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. Was there any re1iigious burirul service involrved?&#13;
MT. Smrekovsky. No, sir. No, sir. They just buried them&#13;
there like any criminals. It ha:ppened around Oot:ctber, and&#13;
during tJhe winter they dug them out and :p ut them in the&#13;
cemetery, in the corner of the cemetery, where they are&#13;
Mr. Bonin. Continue Mr. Counsel.&#13;
sti1l buried.&#13;
'Mr. IMcTiigue. Now, after the Communists had occuipied&#13;
Slovwkia, did there come a time when you were put in&#13;
jail your1self?&#13;
1Mr. Smreikovsky. Yes. r:r was there 14 days.&#13;
Mr. Mcfl'igue. Why?&#13;
Mir. 1Smrekovsky. Of course, they had no reason. They&#13;
wanted to get rid of the middle-class people. My ·brother-4nlaw and a friend of mine were an-ested. Finally, my wife&#13;
went to the authorities &lt;a!Ild they let me free after 14 days.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. What happened to your brother-in~law?&#13;
Mr. 1Smrekovsky. Well, he was jailed also, hut they released him.&#13;
Mr. Mc'I'igue. But there were others whom they didn't&#13;
Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes.&#13;
,r elease?&#13;
~fr. lMc'l'igue. You know that of your own personal&#13;
Mr. 'Sm~kOIV'sky. Yes.&#13;
knowledge?&#13;
Mr. Mc'.Digue. They were friends of yours?&#13;
Mr. 'Smrekov,s ky. Yes.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Leading people in the community?&#13;
•M r. Smrekovsky. Yes.&#13;
Mr. Smrekov,s ky. Yes.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Priests?&#13;
Mr. Smrekovsky. That's right.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Nuns?&#13;
of different rel,i gious faiths?&#13;
people&#13;
And&#13;
lMcTigu.e.&#13;
Mr.&#13;
Mr. SmTekovsky. Yes.&#13;
MT McTigue.·· Now, when did you and how did you get&#13;
back to the United States?&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
27&#13;
&#13;
Mr. SmrekoV!Siky. As soon as the American constcl came&#13;
to Prague, I a,pplied for visa to the United States, and as&#13;
soon as my transportation was ready I lef.t and came to the&#13;
United States, first of Octolber 1946. I left my we there&#13;
for three years until I could bring her 'O'Ver.&#13;
Mr. iMcTigue. Now, at the time you le.flt you awned some&#13;
Mr. Smrelwvsky. Yes.&#13;
·&#13;
property; didn't you?&#13;
Mr. iMcTigue. What lhaippened to that iproperty af.ter&#13;
you left? .&#13;
Mr. Smrekovsky. Well, that was a1l confiscated. My&#13;
wife had to sign a statement tha,t it's gi;ven to ,the Govem.ment. And every'body ,w ho wamts to come to America had to&#13;
do that. Otherwise she would't get a !Visa.&#13;
The Chairman. That is a method of highway robbery that&#13;
they hold against somebody that wants to migraJte from one&#13;
country to. another?&#13;
Mr. S'mrekovsky. Yes, sir.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. They compel them to transfer their i)roperty&#13;
to the Government.&#13;
(Wil:kes-iBarre, Pa., September 30, 1954).&#13;
&#13;
a&#13;
&#13;
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MRS. SMREKOVSKY&#13;
&#13;
iMr. McTigue. When yoUJr husband left Slova!kia in 1946&#13;
to come to the Untted States, he left you in Slovakia; is&#13;
(Mrs. Smrekovsky. Yes.&#13;
that correct.&#13;
Mr. iMcTigue. And at the time he left you in 1946 you&#13;
had under yourr care the property which you both owned; is&#13;
Mrs. :SmrekoV'Slky. Yes.&#13;
thaJt correct?&#13;
Mr. McTigue. rNow, when your husband left and you had&#13;
the ipropeirty under your management, what experience did&#13;
you have with the Communists?&#13;
Mrs. Smrekovsky. Very ibad.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Did they make efforts to frig,hten you in&#13;
--any way so that you would give your property ;to them?&#13;
Mrs. Sinreko1Vsky. ThaJt was the only hope to come to&#13;
this country, unless if agreed that the property is transferred to the Government.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. So until you signed over your property to&#13;
&#13;
28&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
the Government you 'had no chance of leaving Slovakia; is&#13;
!Mrs. 1Smrekovsky. Yes.&#13;
that correct?&#13;
MT. iMcTigue. iln it.he meantime, while you were still&#13;
there, in 1946 and b,efore you left the country, were your&#13;
friends mistreated by the Comrnurusts? Were any of yoll'I'&#13;
close friends that you harve personal ikno,w ledge of mistreated&#13;
in any way by the Communists?&#13;
!Mrs. Smrekorvsky. In my hometown there were shot or&#13;
massacred four 1people while I was wiith my ,p arents - there&#13;
was a senator, a notary public, a mayo.r , and a foo-ester. DuTing the night, in theilr ntght clothes, they loaded them UJp in&#13;
one truck rund took them away.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. What was their crime? Why were they&#13;
shot?&#13;
Mrs. Smrekovsky. Because they were not Communists&#13;
and they never a:gireed with the Comml.llilists.&#13;
MT. Bonin. Oongressman Feighan. Just a minute. In&#13;
other words, even though the Communists ,have been in Slo1Mrs.&#13;
Smre~ovsky. Yes.&#13;
va:kia since 1945 . . .&#13;
Mir. Bonin. StiM your relatives ·a nd friends have not beMrs. Smrekovsky. Right.&#13;
come Communists?&#13;
Mr. Bonin. They still belie·v e in ,t he religion and the freedom of religion that they had before?.&#13;
Mrs. Smrekovsky. And they hope they wihl be £.reed and&#13;
live again like decent people.&#13;
MT. Bonin. In other words, regardless of how long the&#13;
Communists may dominate Slorvrukia, there is still that desire for freedom on theiiT prurt and to live as they used to&#13;
prior to the Communist regime that has been imposed upon&#13;
Mrs. Smrekovsky. Yes, sir.&#13;
them?&#13;
Mr. Bonin. Now, I understand that t:hese four influential 1poople, a senator, a mayor, a t:imiber man and a notary&#13;
public, were also shot because rthey failed to accept communism and to lead the people through Communist doctrines and&#13;
princilples under the domination of the Russian system?&#13;
Mrs. Smrekorvsky. Right.&#13;
Mr. Bottin. That is the type of freedom thaJt is being&#13;
sold to the ,people behind the lTOn Currtain?&#13;
Mrs. -Smrekovsky. Yes, sir.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
29&#13;
&#13;
MT. Bonin. Force, threats, violence, and intimidation, in&#13;
order to constantly keep them in fear of whait is apt to happen to them?&#13;
1M rs. Smrekovsky. Exactly.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. Now, your wifo came out of Czecho-iSliovrukia&#13;
in 1'9 49; ts thart: correct?&#13;
Mr. IS mrekovsky. Yes, sirr.&#13;
Mr. !Bonin. And the principal reason ,w hy you aTe testifying under an assumed name is lbecaUJSe you are fearrful of&#13;
what might haJppen to your relaUves and ,t he friends. that&#13;
you ,s till 1haJVe in 1s1ova~ia?&#13;
Mr. Srnrekovsky. Exactly.&#13;
(WiJJkes-iBarre, Pa., ,September 30, 1954).&#13;
&#13;
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH PAU00&#13;
&#13;
Mr. McTigue. 1Mr. Pall'co, where are you living at the&#13;
present ,t ime? - - - Dr. Pauco. ln Middletown, Pa.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. H ow are yiou employed?&#13;
Dr. Pa:ll!co. I am assistant editor of the Slova.k weekly,&#13;
Jednota.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Mir. !PauJco, I understand that you were&#13;
born in Slovakia, is that correct.&#13;
Dr. PaU!co. Yes; that is true.&#13;
Mr. ,M cTigue. What part of Slovakia?&#13;
Dr. Pauco. In ceilltraJl Slovakia.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Central ISlovaJkia. And it's my understanding that you spent most of your adult life as a journalist; is&#13;
that coTrect?&#13;
[)r. ,Pawc'O. Yes; that is correct, sir.&#13;
Mr. McTi:gue. W1hiile yiou were in Slova!kia, it is also my&#13;
understanding that in yiour capacity as -a journa:list, you had&#13;
the occasion to witness the Communist~in,s;pired uprising in&#13;
1944; is that correct?&#13;
Dr. Pa'Ulco. Yes, that's true.&#13;
Mr. Mc'lligue. And were, you also present at the uncovering of the mass graves at Vinnitsia in the Ukraine?&#13;
Dr. Pauico. Yes; that's right.&#13;
Mr. McTigue . . How d!id you happen to be there?&#13;
Dr. 1Pau'co. I was a member of a journalist expedition in&#13;
July 1943 It wa:s an e~pedition of all journalists firom cen.trrul Europe. I came to Vmnitsia in July 1943 and I wais there&#13;
four days. In those four days I saw five ,o.r six maSIS grarves&#13;
of the Ukrainian people and some Polish people, who were&#13;
&#13;
30&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
murdered by the ,Soviets. An eX!planation was girven to us&#13;
by the Geamam.. dootors that these people were shot between&#13;
1939 and 1941.&#13;
I spoke with the local people, Ukrainia:n and Polish people, some dozens of these people, because we were allowed&#13;
to spealk to those people - a,t the mass graves there in Vinnitsia, in the town of Vinnitsia. For example, I was shaved&#13;
twice in a local lba'.l'bershop, and I spoke to these men and&#13;
with some. other people ,i n Vinnitsi,a. A concert was gurven&#13;
in t'he town of Vinnitsia in honor of ,t he journaliSll:s' e,q;&gt;edition, and after this concert, I spoke with several men and&#13;
women, and all these Ukrairuian people trul'ked to me. They&#13;
said what I saiw there in mass graJVes is true, and that their&#13;
relaitirves were shot by the Soviets between 1939 and 1941,&#13;
after the occupation of west Uikra,inia in 1939. Some people&#13;
of Ukrainian nationality known as strong anti-Communists&#13;
were deported in the Illight. And late,r , at the begmning of the&#13;
wa:r !between 1Sovieit Russia and Germany, deporta:tion was in&#13;
~eat masses. Nob,ody ,w as sure that hls, relatives, hrusbands,&#13;
sons, or some other of the family, wilhl not be shot in the&#13;
night. I have in my memory six ox seven cases of the wives&#13;
and daughters of the shot fathers and brothers, who told&#13;
me their relatives were deported in the night. The people&#13;
knew nothing. Their husbands and fathers were sent to Siberia or probably shot.&#13;
Mir. McTigu:e. How many people were killed&#13;
Dr. Pauco. Several 'hundred.&#13;
iMr. McTigue. At Vinnitsia?&#13;
Dr. Pau'co. 1Severrul hundred. I was at the graves four&#13;
days and I spoke with several dozens of Ukrainian women,&#13;
and, I learned, several ·hundred were buried in these mass&#13;
grarves.&#13;
iMr. McTigue. In these mass grarves that you knew&#13;
about?&#13;
Dr. ·P auco. Yes; in Vinniitsi.a.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Yes. But there were other mass graves&#13;
disc01Vered later on; is that correct?&#13;
Dr. Pau'CO. I heard about it. I know a;bout Katyn, but I&#13;
wasn't there. ,I was in Vinnitsia and I can state only what l&#13;
saw at these mass graves. I have here a statement of what&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
:n&#13;
&#13;
I saJW at these mass graves.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. iMay I suggest, Mir. Chairman, since we&#13;
hawe other testimony that we want to develop, and since we&#13;
haJVe other witnesses, t:ha.t we admit this statement into the&#13;
reoord, but not have it read at this time?&#13;
Dr. Paulco. All right.&#13;
Mr. ,McTig;ue. IMaJke it a ,p art of the reoord.&#13;
Mr. !Bo:nin. Woll!ld you have any objection if we make&#13;
this staitement a part of the record at this time and you g;ilVe&#13;
us the highlights of it as of thJis moment?&#13;
Dr. PaUlc&lt;&gt;. All right.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. Without oibjootion, we will take the statement and place it in the committee files.&#13;
Mr. iMcTigue. You may recall, Mr. Chairman, tllait we&#13;
had testimony at our hearings in Munich on the Vinnd.tsia&#13;
murders very much ,a long the same 1ines Mr. Paruoo is testifying. This testimony that he has given today on the subject of the Vin.nlitsi.ai massacre eertainlly corroibo,rates wha,t we&#13;
hea.Td from many ,wiit:nesses in Munich. You aJlso recall in&#13;
connection with that testimony that one of ibhe witnesses&#13;
descri1bed the finding of hundreds of bod!ies of Vinnitsi:a \'i,ctims under the floor of a d'ance hall in one of the amusement •pariks iw:hen these mass graves were investig;ated. iI am&#13;
sure you recall thait testimony.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. Yes. I distinctly recall that, a'lld this corroborates the faot tJhat these mass graves and the mass kfiling of citizens of Vinnirtsia was deli;b erate and ,pe~trated&#13;
entirely by ,t he Communist regime in Russia.&#13;
Now, I understand, Mr. Pauioo., that you have some addition.al testimony suipplementing what 1happene:d in V!innitsia aind what took ,p lace in 'Slov,aikia; is that C()lrrect?&#13;
Dr. PaU!co. Yes. I woltld iiJke to say thiat the same thing&#13;
that h~ppened in Vinnitsia in 1939-41 happened in Slovakia in lr944. The Sovli.ets' s~hool oif prurtisans were parachuted&#13;
in the s,prmg of 1'94'4 in the mou:nrtains of Slorvaki1a, and then&#13;
in August 1'9414 they orga.ruzed a so-calil ed uprising against&#13;
the SlovaJk Government a'lld shot hundredlS and thousands of&#13;
Slovaks of anti..Communist feeling. Im Slova1ci(a, we had at&#13;
this time, 1944, several mass graves of innocent Slovak ciiti-&#13;
&#13;
32&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
zens, Slova.ik ainti-Oommunist patriots. The Communist part~,s ans ,w ere 1pariachUJted, as I mentioned, by the Soviets, and&#13;
the partisans were also furnh,,hed Soviiet ammunition. This&#13;
so-called upris,i ng in 1Slov-akia started with prepairations in&#13;
194'3. Some so.-,called underground politicians made an 8.'greement with the Communist leader, Karol Schmidke. And&#13;
this Karol ;Schmidke saiid in 1946 that this action in 1943,&#13;
this preparation of the uprising, was the merit o;f the illegal&#13;
Communist Party. All the people who declined to collaborate&#13;
with the Communist ieaders in 1944 were shot. Thiiis happened in central 1Slova.ikia because central Slovakia is a&#13;
mountainous land. Then the German armies came to S1ova-kia and :Slorvak ter:nitory was a battlefield. After this Communist uprising in ,Slovrukia, I heard f.rom my friends, from&#13;
my relatives in ISJ.ovakria thrut many innocent ,p eople, farmers, ,w orkei,s, priests, ,s ome ipriesits, ,s ome congressmen,&#13;
were shot by the Communists. I recall a congressman, a Catholic priest Anthony Salat. He was of very strnnig feeling&#13;
against the Communists. He wrote several books againist&#13;
communism and, iin the first week of the uprising, he was&#13;
shot. In 1Slw8!kia were liquidated about forty to fifty thousand :S lovaks in this Communist putsch.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
Mr. IMc'Digue. T1hey were shot?&#13;
Dr. Pauco. They were shot 1b y the Soviets, b,y the Soviets' paritisan,s and by the collaborators in Slovakia.&#13;
!Mr. McTigue. About '50,000?&#13;
Dr. Paufo. Yes, aJbout '50,000.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. 1In the period of one year?&#13;
Dr. Pauco. In the period of three months.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Three months?&#13;
&#13;
Dr. Pauco. The purtsch was defeated in two months, but&#13;
after there were some battles in the mountains in Slovakia,&#13;
and in December the Red Army ,c ame to Slovalkia. Several&#13;
thousand Slo.vaJks fr,om eas,t ern Sl01viakia were sent by the&#13;
NK_,V il) to Russia, to Siberia and concentration camps. and&#13;
to the mines in Dombas.&#13;
Mr. IMcTigue. Norw, when and how did ,t he uprising finally&#13;
end?&#13;
&#13;
33&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Dr. Pauco. The German Army came into Slovakia in&#13;
September 1944.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Now, you had a close relationship with&#13;
Monsignor Tiso; isn't that correct?&#13;
Dr. Pauco. 'f.hat's true.&#13;
Ylr. McTigue. Now, will you tell the committee who Monsignor Tiso is and briefly explain your relationship with him&#13;
and your discussion with h~m afte,r the putsch?&#13;
Dr. Pauco. I was editor-in-chief of the greatest daily in&#13;
Slovakia, the "Slovak." This daily was the organ ,o f Monsignor Tiso. Joseph Tiso was the first Slovak President. He was&#13;
the legal President of the SlovaJk Republic, which came into&#13;
being on March 14, 1939. The ,Slovaik Republic had diplomatic relations with 27 naJtions, of them 17 or 18 were on the&#13;
side of the western allies. Monsignor Tiso was a Christian&#13;
ruler - after a thousand years, the first Slovak irll'ler and I had the opportunity to spea:k with him practically&#13;
every week . I reca:11 thrut on August 20, 1944, I was in Presov at a meeting called by the Government, by the army,&#13;
and by the Slovak People's Party. At that time, in eastern&#13;
Slovrukia the situation was very critica•l and the delegates&#13;
practicaly from every village and every town from eastern&#13;
Slovakda told the Government and government representatirves of Bratislava, tha:t something wliitl hruppen if the Slovak&#13;
Army and Slovak police do not interlere. Pradically the&#13;
whole of eastern Slovakia was, parachuted at this ,t ime by&#13;
the So;yiets, the Soviet parti,sans and Soviet a;genrts. I spoke&#13;
after this meeting with Dr. Tiso, and ag,ain when the pUJtsch&#13;
was liquidated. Dr. Tiso at this time was ready to resign.&#13;
He hoped that some Slovak politician would take the Slovak&#13;
question to the International Tribunal.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. Tribunal?&#13;
Dr. Pauco . Tribunal, yes, because he would iiike to&#13;
change the regime, but to preserve independent Slovakia.&#13;
That was the goal of Monsignor Dr. Tiso.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. What happened to Monsignor Tiso eventuallv?&#13;
Dr. Pauco. Monsignor Tiso was hanged, executed by the&#13;
Communist nation:i.l court, April 18, 1947, in Bratislava. Dr.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
34&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Tiso wa.s the first among the Catholic prelrates in central&#13;
Europe who were executed by the Communists afte,r Warld&#13;
War Iil.&#13;
Mr McTigue. The usual phony charges, I suppose, were&#13;
applied, and the usurul phony court procedures were set in&#13;
motion?&#13;
Dr. Pauco. Just becallise he had anti-Communist feelings; I know, 'Il!Ot from Dr. Ttso, but from his personal secretary who its living now i n Caniada, seiveral times, Soviet&#13;
agents were ready to assuire to Slova.ks and Dr. Tiso himself&#13;
a seperate Slovak-,Soviet Repulblic if Dr. Tiso will go wtth the&#13;
Soviets, and Dr. Tiso refused. Tiso said one time, I recall,&#13;
that tf his own brother were a Communist, he would fii.ght&#13;
him. And I am SJure that i·s why Dr. Tiso wa:s executed by&#13;
the Commtmists' so-called nahonal court in April 1947.&#13;
Mr. Fetghain When you state that Monsirgnor Tiso was&#13;
the first of the clergymen to he executed by the Russian&#13;
Communists, you mean the first outstanding figure, both in&#13;
the spiritual and politic8il world?&#13;
Dr. Pll!uico. Yes, sn-. That's correct.&#13;
Mr. Feiigihain. That's 1a ll.&#13;
Mir. Bonin. W-ell, Mr. Pauco, it is nothing uncommon for&#13;
a priest or a member of the clergy in central EUI'Opean&#13;
countries to be in political life; isn't that correct?&#13;
Dr. Paooo . Yes, that's ri.ghit.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. And, therefore, they would be permitted to&#13;
engBlge in political lifo . . .&#13;
Dr. Pauco. Yes.&#13;
MT. Bonin. Bllit they took a leave od' absence from their&#13;
clerical life; isn't that coreivct?&#13;
Dr. Pauco. No, that was not so in S1ovakiia. Monsignoir&#13;
Tiso, as Prresident of the Slovak RepU!blic, was the adm~nistrator of his own parish in Bano:vce, rund sang Holy Mass&#13;
there practically every Sunday.&#13;
'Mr. McTigue. Tell me, Mr. P8iuoo., how and why did you&#13;
escaipe from Slo1Va!kia arnd come to this country?&#13;
Dr. Praulco. After what I ,s aw in Vinnitsia, then in Slovakia , and what I hearo from many hundreds orf escll!pees&#13;
from Ukrainia, from Poland, from Russia, from Hu'Il!gary,&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
35&#13;
&#13;
from Ruman:i:a ., from Lithiuani:a, about ·p ractices of 1S01Viets,&#13;
I could not stay in rS1()1VlaJk:J,a, because I hated communism ; I&#13;
hated oolsiheiv:ism, and I hoped to live in the free Western&#13;
World. I am happy that 1 am here in this free ,a nd democratic couliltTy. I haive my relatives over there, ,a nd one of&#13;
my relatives came through the border just several months&#13;
ago to Austriia. He. ~s: now in the American Zone, and he&#13;
writes to me. thlat Oill!r ;p eople over there behind the Iron&#13;
Curtain have friends. here in the United States, and they&#13;
are praying every d·a y that the Gorvernmen t of the United&#13;
States wHl win the battle against communism . ,A nd Slorvaks,&#13;
like IPoles, the Uikrairuans , the Baltic nations, or Rum•a nia,&#13;
Hung,ary, the Czechs:, Croatians,, :Serbians, and so on, they&#13;
like to be free like you are here in this country; they like to&#13;
be independen t, and, maybe, wiH sometime be ruinified in a&#13;
great European federation li,k e yoru are here urnfied in the&#13;
United States.&#13;
Mr. M:c~•g ue. When di:d you say you left Slovakia?&#13;
Dr. Pauco. It wa:s in Apr.ii 1945.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. And when did you arrive in this country?&#13;
Dr. 'P auco. WoUT years aglO, in Apri[ 1950.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. Mir. Feiglha:n.&#13;
Mr. Feighan. Mr. Pau!co, we have heard testimony with&#13;
reference to the Vinnitsia massacres ,w hich stated' to us that&#13;
after the Commllllllists were diriiven out of the Ukm.i.ne in&#13;
1943 and the Naizis came in, they opened up graves of which&#13;
there were 38, each of them the same length, and widlhh, and&#13;
depth, that they conWned ov:er 10,000 rpeople they&#13;
weiI'en't aill U!kirruinians; some were IPoJes, and of other nationalities ; 'that the people there were of various status ;&#13;
they were, :farmers, armsan;s, wovkers, ,a nd rinteilleotUJals, and&#13;
the testimony th1at we rnceived also. indicated, at iJ.east with&#13;
reference to those particulaT graves, that tlhey were done by&#13;
the So;viet Russ,i ans durJng the years 1937 and 1938, but I assume that they did many othera besides those.&#13;
Dr. Pa:uco. I spoke ,t o the 1people of Vinniitsia, these&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
36&#13;
&#13;
people, Ukramiians and Poles, were all liquidated tb y the&#13;
Soviet agents.&#13;
,MT. Feighan. Yes. That ~s my understanding.&#13;
Dr. Pauoo. Yes.&#13;
Mr. Feighan. The testimony that we had shows that.&#13;
I 1have no further que,s1t1:ons&#13;
Mr. Bonin. WeH, Mr. Pa.'Ulco, you stated that this alleged uprising in Slovakiia was clearly Communist inspired,&#13;
is that OOlITect..&#13;
Mr. Pauco. Yes, that is correct.&#13;
Mr. BODJin. They created dissension and they created an&#13;
atmospheTe Olf revolt within Slova:ki:a?&#13;
Dr. Pauoo. Yes.&#13;
!Mr. !Bonin. And a.gents had been sent in there, is that&#13;
cor,rec.t, to irritate and agitate this revolt?&#13;
Dr. Pauico. That is correct.&#13;
Mr. iBonin. And by thait means using the Commurnst&#13;
tecfunique to wipe out the ,people that were undesiralble to&#13;
them?&#13;
Dr. Pauco. Yes&#13;
Mr. !Bonin. Of coU1I1Se, iwe lhruve had testimony where thait&#13;
same identicaJl truing was used in- other countries that have&#13;
come under the domi'Il'ation of the Russians throughout different parts of Ea;sitern EuTope, lbut this is &lt;the fhist time,&#13;
I beli'e!V'e, that we had testimony that they were aotually&#13;
dvopped in by pamchute to iITitate and agitaite rund crnate&#13;
the trouble.&#13;
Dr. Pauc·o. Yes.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. But, in the meantime, they !had some agitators in there already; iis tlhat correct?&#13;
Dr. Pauico. Oh, yes.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. And they had le:6twingers ,i n there?&#13;
iDr. Pallico. Yes.&#13;
iMr. !Bonin. Who were ready to follow the agents tha:t&#13;
were dTopped in?&#13;
Dr. PauJco. Yes.&#13;
Mir. !Bonin. In other words, isome people in the United&#13;
States fool that there are not many Communistls, lb ut they&#13;
are aliways :ready, willing w:hen the o.p portune time cOllnes,&#13;
to seize that opportunity to overthrow the existing governmenrt: in any partioular place .&#13;
Dr. Pauco. Thait's wue.&#13;
Mr. Bondn. Now, of course, since you have lbeen in the&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
37&#13;
&#13;
United States, you have been trying to. bring to the attention&#13;
of the people of the free world this Commwnist threat; is&#13;
that correct?&#13;
Dr. P,a uco. Yes, that is oorredt.&#13;
Mrr. Bonin. And in each instance where you haive an opportUillity, and I understand that you are still a newspaperman and a joornalist, you bring these facts to .t he attention of the people that Tead your newspaper, the Je&lt;lnota?&#13;
Dr. fuuco. Yes, that's correct&#13;
Mr. Boniin. This isn't tJhe fiiirst part, of Eastern Europe&#13;
that we have heard of where forty to f,i fty thousand people&#13;
have boon slaughtered.; O'Ilce a;gain demonstrating that the&#13;
Communist regime holds power only because 1t UJSeS force&#13;
and threats and intimidation to keep the people ias helpless&#13;
as they possibly can.&#13;
Dr. Paiu100. That is correct.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. WeH, on behalf of the committee.. I 'Wish to&#13;
thank yow for your splendid staJte:rnent tlhat you haive made&#13;
as a part of thii:s ree-0,r d and for the reswme orf yo'lllI' experiences in Ozecho-Siovakia and in .Slov•a kia.&#13;
Dr. Pauco. Thank you.&#13;
Mr. Boiruin. Mr. Feighan has another question 'h e would&#13;
like to as!k you, Mr. Pauco.&#13;
Mr. Fei,ghan. Do you not feel that it is correct, Mr.&#13;
Pautco, that the people of 1Slo;v;akia are imbued with the nationali-stic -spirit, a love of God and a love of colUllltry, and&#13;
they just seek the right of self-deteTmination as ~ sovereign&#13;
nation?&#13;
- Dr. Pauco. That is co,r rect, Slir.&#13;
Mr Bonin. In other words, they are asking nothing&#13;
more than some of the principles: that have been em.mcia:ted&#13;
through long yea.rs, that each people have the right to de- ·&#13;
termine the kmd o.f government they wish to have, the type&#13;
of leaders they wish to have, and to conooct their Lives and&#13;
thei,r g01Vernment in theiT own nationialistic spirit and attitude. The people orf R!Umania, Hung,a ry, Po•land, Lithuania,&#13;
Latvia, EJSltooila, ruid o:their nations ha,v e the same desire to&#13;
goveTn themselves; is that correct.&#13;
Dr. Pauico. Yes; iliat iis correct.&#13;
MT. Bomn. Welil., I 'Wliish to thank you ,v ery much for&#13;
your testimony, and we sincerely hope thait the opportunity&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
38&#13;
&#13;
presents itself to defeat thls Communist threat, not only to&#13;
the Ewopean natio111S., burt: also to the peoples of the free&#13;
world. Thank you ve,r y much.&#13;
Dr. P,aulco. Thank you.&#13;
Mr. Feiighan. Waiit a minute, Mr. Pauco·.&#13;
Dr. Pauco. Yes.&#13;
Mr. Feighan. During your experience in Slova&gt;lcia, did&#13;
you haive an opportunity to witness the manner by which&#13;
the Russian Commlln!isbs tried to break up the culture, the&#13;
1,anguage, the customs, and the religion of the Slovak people?&#13;
Dr. Pauco. I lived in Bratislava. Bvatislava is the capital&#13;
of Sllo;v,rukdoa, and is on fille west border of Slovrukia. The Soviets came from the east. The whole of Slov-akJa was occupied on April 7 or 8, ,a nd I escaped from Bratis lav,a on&#13;
April 4.&#13;
Mr. Feighan. I see.&#13;
Dr. Paulco. I wasn't there after the Soviets occupied the&#13;
whole of Slov.alk,i a, ·b ut I was in Braitiosla:va during three&#13;
months thait the eastern part of Sl()!Va:kia was occupied by&#13;
the !Soviets, and I heard from my relatives, from my f11iends ,&#13;
of the methods which I mentioned before.&#13;
Mr. !Feighan. Yes; but you were noi there yourself t o&#13;
see it and observe .iit?&#13;
Dr. Pmrco. No, no.&#13;
Mr. Feigihan. Well thank you, Mr. Pauco&#13;
Or. Paulco. You are wekome.&#13;
Mr. Bonin. Thank you &lt;very much.&#13;
(Wil'kes-,Barre, Pa. , September 30, 1954).&#13;
&#13;
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JOSEPH l\1IKULA&#13;
IMr. iMcTigue. Were you in Sl'OVlaJkia during World War&#13;
Dr. Miku1a. Yes, I was.&#13;
Mr. iMcTigue. Were you a pairt of the underground&#13;
movemerut in Slovakia?&#13;
Dr. Mikul,a. Yes, sir. We started the underground movement at the end of World War II. I was one of those who&#13;
started it.&#13;
iMr. Mc'Digue. When did it start ?&#13;
Dr. Mi1kula. It was in 1944.&#13;
tr?&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
39&#13;
&#13;
:Mir. McTigue. What caused you amd others to form this&#13;
&#13;
underground moivement?&#13;
Dr. Mikula. I will read a short statement in this connection. The inception of the anti-Communist arganirlation&#13;
is attrilbutafule to the iintellectuals wlho foresaw the necessity&#13;
of truking preventive measures aga,inst the imminent d001ger&#13;
of communism. They studied communism and decided to&#13;
combat it, ~cause tlhey had no false illusions of whether or&#13;
not the Communists wOIU!ld Telax their demands after World&#13;
War II.&#13;
The first communistic pressur~ was expected in the&#13;
field of religion. Conseqiue.ntly, the preparations were directed for the defense of re!l,i gious freed.om and the preservation of religious life in the event of intensive persecutions.&#13;
The second fi.eld was the po[iltical field. Ourr ca1cuJations&#13;
at the !beginning w&amp;e wrong. They didn't staTt at the beginning in religiious _peil'Sooution, but it:Jhey concentrated an theliir&#13;
activities in the political field.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. Have you finished with your s1:Jatement?&#13;
Dir. Mikul,a. No; very briefly about this polii!tical field.&#13;
The most essential elements in tlhe polritical life of the nation&#13;
are political parties. The Communists knew it, and acted accordingly. They were verry cautious. that no par.ty existed&#13;
which by attracting the sympathy of a majority of the _population wouild endanger t'he position of the Commumst Party.&#13;
So, the parties which airose after the war with the petrmisSlion of the Communusts were incapable of eiffecting&#13;
strong anti-Communist oipposition, because, first, theiy had&#13;
no roots, no tradition, a;mong the population.&#13;
Second, part of their leadeffi, were either tools of Communists ior opportunists who, /because of l,a ck of principles&#13;
and courage, completely sulbmitted to the Communist pressure, and third, throug;h the assistance of the ColIIlm.unist&#13;
Party, they were s'h ackJed - aM other parties were shackled&#13;
by the coordinating comrruttee of all the parrties, the socalled National Front. This Nationa'l Front was nothing else&#13;
but a machine in the ih ands of the Communists to control&#13;
aU o,pposiition against the Communist Party.&#13;
Mr. Mc'l'igue. Were you the recognized leader of the un-&#13;
&#13;
40&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
derground in Slovakia?&#13;
Dr. Mikula I woll!ldn't say so.&#13;
Mr McTig;ue. Were you one of ,t he leaders?&#13;
Dr. Mikula. Yes.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. !Did you ar.ronge to have some of your&#13;
members sent abroad in order to assist in the underground&#13;
movement from without ?&#13;
Dr. Mtkula. I thin:k I can state it quite openly. Our program was to prepa1re things, firs,t, at home, and, second, we&#13;
had some people out aibroad. I mean, out of ,the count.Ty. We&#13;
,s end them out of the country ,a nd directed the situ.aitiion,&#13;
informed them, they ind'ormed us. The illlformatiion we receirved we direoted to ,proper aut'horitie;,&#13;
iMr. Keirsiten. Now, just at this ipoint - we want to&#13;
ma:ke sure that you understand ,p erfectly clearly, Mr. Mikula. We know, of course, that you did operate in the underground in Slovakia, and there are undou!btedly a number of things that you would not wish to spea;k a.'bout specifiicaHy and openly. 1S0 that any question the oounseil or&#13;
any member here might ask in that regard, you just use&#13;
yom own judgment. We don':t want you to disclose pU!blicly&#13;
anything t hat would in any way endanger the ipresent situation there, a:nd that is what you 'ha,,ve in mind, Mr. Counsel, I am sure.&#13;
Mr McTigue. Yes, Mr. Chairman.&#13;
Dr. [Mikula. Yes. I 'Wl3.'Ilted to ask yo u for this permission.&#13;
Mr. Mc'Tugue. How long were you a part of the undergroU1I1d in Slovakia.?&#13;
Dr. Miikwla. I was wor,king directly in the field almost&#13;
fiiive years to the. end ,o f 1'949. 1Iin Feb:rua.ry 11950 I left for&#13;
the United States.&#13;
·Mr. McTigue. And did you emigrate to the Uniited&#13;
States in 1950?&#13;
Dr. Milkula. Yes, I did.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Now, when you left 1S1ova.ki.a in 1949, were&#13;
you furced to !leave your wife b e hind'(&#13;
Dr. Mikula. No, I was one of tho se who was sent&#13;
abroad when the Communists took over and legia.l opposition&#13;
was ailimost iimpossilble in ,the country. So, I went out from&#13;
Slova:kfa in 1945, and I was wonk,i ng outside of Sfoviakia.. I&#13;
was worlcing abroad. I have here a little bo~ldet edited by&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
41&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
the Ministry of l!nterior in .Prague; the head of the Ministry&#13;
of Interior was a well-iknown Oommunist •o y the name of Nosek. It was edited and published by the Ministry of Interior, 5,000 issues were distrilbuted over here. My name is&#13;
mentioned aJbout 70 or 80 times in this booklet.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. Just .so we get th•a t clearly, as I understand it, you ~eift Sloivaikia in 1945.&#13;
Dr. Mikuia. Yes, I did.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. And you were outside the country?&#13;
Dr. Mikula. Yes.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. !But while you were outside the coll!Ilitry&#13;
during the fullowmg yerurs up 'll'Iltil -about 1949 or 1950, you&#13;
were woriking in t'hiis movement, is that correct?&#13;
Mr. '.Mhlm~ia. I was in steady contact, and I was one of&#13;
the leaders outside.&#13;
MT. Kersten. Of the lllillderground freedom m01vement in&#13;
Slova,kiia?&#13;
Dr. Mii kula. Yes.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. And this :book ,t hat you have ha,nded us&#13;
here is a booldet put out by the Communists in Bratislava?&#13;
Dr. Miikula. 1:rl ·P rague. The Ministry of InteriOT, Czecho-Slovakia.&#13;
Mr. [Kersten. Maylbe we 1had better mark this.&#13;
Dr. Milrula. The title of .the book is "Conspiracy Agaiinst&#13;
the Repl]blic."&#13;
iMT•. Kersten. Would you mark thi&lt;s "Milwaukee Exhibit 4."&#13;
And you have stated rthat this Milwaukee Exhibit 4 is a&#13;
Communist ,pubH1cation ipulblished in what year?&#13;
Dr. Miiktl'l.a:. ffit was printed Noivemlber 1947.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. And it contains rtJhe accounts of operations&#13;
2.gainst the Communist g01Vernmen t; is that correct?&#13;
Dr. Mikula. Yes.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. And you are named in here, as you say,&#13;
70 or 80 times?&#13;
[)r. Mii:ku1 a !Something liike that.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. In rw1hat crupacity?&#13;
Dr. Miikuila. Someitiiimes as ibhe leadeT of the underground, sometimes as an American agenrt, sometimes&#13;
Mr. Kerstein. Always in a derogatory sense?&#13;
Dr. M~kuJ1a. Absolutely.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
42&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Mr. Kersten. I notice on 1:Jhe first page of the printing&#13;
here - one of the first rpages - it is aotually page 7,, but it&#13;
seems to be the start "Of the body of t'he article - I notice&#13;
a name - Joseph rMi!kufa. Is that you?&#13;
Dr. Mikula. That i:s me.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. Then you are named frequently therearfter;&#13;
Dr. Mikula. Yes.&#13;
is t:Jhiat rig1ht?&#13;
Mr. Kersten. Proceed, Mr. Coltl7lsel.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. I w,ant to •ask you two questions. Dr. Mikula. Wi'fil you briefly tell uis something about the ac'tiivities&#13;
of the ll!Ilderground, and secondly, were these actiivities effectiive, in y;our j,udg,menit?&#13;
Mr. iKersten. Keeping in mind tJhe safety maitters that&#13;
we tahlced albout.&#13;
Dr. Miikua,a. As I mentioned before, the legaiJ. resistance&#13;
or Jega!l oppositilion againJSt communism was foiling. So, the&#13;
people 1wirt:Jh ra nti-Oommunist tendencies lost faith m their&#13;
weaik and oppo:rbuni,stic party leaders, and consequently,&#13;
sought -0ther mea.lilS wiherelby they might prevenit the Communists from ·aocompl:iishing their ,plans.&#13;
Now, the diTect answer to your question, "Wihat were&#13;
the actiivities ?" Fiirst, to do e,verythiing that would undermine the Coimmu!nist IP .arty, and the ends of tfue Oommunist&#13;
Party. We knew that they will try to Sovietize, to taike over&#13;
the counwy.&#13;
So, we rpuibliiished leaflets. We published booklets. We&#13;
pu'b1is,ihed pe;riodiools. IDverytilimg was hllegal and underground. That w.as at 'the b~imling. Laiter on, when it wiIB&#13;
pretty hrurd to distrilbute mimeographed leaflets or publications - because they were against the Communists - we&#13;
started an illegal triansimi-titer - a shortwaive radio station.&#13;
It is not necessairy to teH where and how it was, but it&#13;
existed and rit worked very effectively. Then, later on, we&#13;
tried to collect all possible rnformaitiorn from political, economical, military, oullJtu,r,a-1 life; get it out and mfomi the&#13;
worild 1aJbout the si•tUJatiion over there.&#13;
JUJst to show you how it was done, here are some photostatic copies of the orders issued by the commander in&#13;
ohlef of the nati'Onal security guard. It was a gend:armery&#13;
police.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
43&#13;
&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Communis t police?&#13;
Dr. Milrula. CommUIIlist, yes.&#13;
Mr. McTiguei. What did the ·o rder say?&#13;
Dr. Mikula. They are different o:rders. For example, I&#13;
will just ~ k of the first one. lt i,s dated Bratislava, March&#13;
4, 1947, firom the head{l_uall'lters of Nationail !S ecurity Guiard.&#13;
The orders to the lower units of National Security Guards :&#13;
il order that ,s pecial attention be paid to tJhe transports&#13;
of Volhyi.ruia Ozechs cOIInli.ng from tihe U. S. S. R. - thait is&#13;
the Soviet Union - they have already settled on the territory of Slovrukia. They have to lbe constantly watched arid&#13;
fO!Nowed, because they are spreadling internationr uUy false&#13;
infurmation a:bOUJt iour eastern ally, the U. S. S. R.&#13;
Mr. !McTigue. Wha:t people is he talking rubout in tlhis&#13;
order?&#13;
Dr. !M.ikiula. One of the tactics of Commt.Lll!ist takeover&#13;
was tramsplanta tion; movements of the people. Right after&#13;
t'he war we had a HUJngarian minority in 1Slcwakia and a SlovaJki,a n minoniity in iH ungary. Now , right aft.er the war&#13;
started the transportru tion orf these minorities frQiffi HUI11gary&#13;
to Slovwkia, a,:nd from 1S1ova!kfa. to Hungary.&#13;
What happened to Slovakia? From H1.1!11.g,acy came the&#13;
people who couldn't sipealk any word of Sloviak. To Hungacy&#13;
came people from Slova:kiia.&#13;
There were Ozeohs iwho Hived about 200 or 300 years in&#13;
one province of [Russia calllled Vo1hynia. Just to show good&#13;
faith tor something like bha.t, the Sowet moved those Volhynia: Czechs to Ozeciho-Slovaikia.&#13;
'Dhe movements of the population are very serious&#13;
thinigs, because they !bring insecurity. Noibody knows how&#13;
long he stays in his ()IWll house., in his 01W11 neighlborllood, and&#13;
so insecure people are aliways much easier for the CommUilasts to handle.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. That is the grnup to whiioh he has reference in the order?&#13;
Dr. Mikula. That is tihe explanation . So further:&#13;
Specifically , I ask the units of Nationa,] Soourity Guard&#13;
to watch the tI"ansports corning in and the transient transports orf V oohyniia Czec:hs going through the railroad station.&#13;
&#13;
44&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Those Czechs wouldn't come !into any contact with the&#13;
public. I mea.n witJh the popu1ati10n. Then you hiwe here the&#13;
order to maintain ~ continuous oontro1l on ail calls in post&#13;
offices and telephone-Office excihanges. This was done by&#13;
the ipol!ice. They ccmtr.ol all calls ·c oming in and W:hait was&#13;
said. If they find something against the regime they wt&#13;
accorcmng to regufations.&#13;
Thls here is concerning the control of the pop.wlation in&#13;
traiins. Everyone - they sa,y here, "Everyone is Slllpposed to&#13;
have this ridentificaitioo. card1." So, the units of SiNB - lower&#13;
units - are ordered lh:ere to control the population, and if&#13;
somebody hasn't his idenitificatlion card, he ris supposed to&#13;
be arrested am.cl brougiht ilil for investigation to the nearest&#13;
police station.&#13;
This order ooncerns the former gendarmes orr mem!bers&#13;
of the National Security Guard poiice who were deported to&#13;
Russia, were coniiined there, and later on brought 1b ack to&#13;
Slovakia. Same of them were put in the!ir fonner positions.&#13;
They were ·agaiin rcinsitated a:s gendarmes, but the order says:&#13;
To the Ministry ()If Interior came the information t:Jhat&#13;
the behavior ()If these returned former memlbers of gendarme is not satisfactory. They taJlk very sharply against&#13;
the !S oviets iand are doring that even in the company of the&#13;
other members of the unit.&#13;
I order you to follow those memlbers in your d±sbr.icits&#13;
and remind them that for bad talk aibout the brother nation, Russia, they can be ,p unished and arrested.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Now, what you haNe been de.scmbing to&#13;
the oommittee . . .&#13;
Dr. Mikll!la. These •a re just the examples of how information was oolle_c ted and brought out and utilized.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Now, do you know, or oan you tell the&#13;
oommittee whether there is an wnderground operating in&#13;
SwvaJkia ,a t the present time?&#13;
Dr. Miilmla. l am posritive there is. First, I would just&#13;
say from the general point of vtl.ew, so long as the Comm'Ulilists are unaJble to change human nait'UT'e, there wiU [be the&#13;
will. to 1be free. It means there will be the will to rresist. That&#13;
is a general rea:son&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
45&#13;
&#13;
Second, the best proof ,i s that you still read in the papers how much troulble they haJVe in .t his or that group or&#13;
with this group, and so on. These are the 1best documents&#13;
that the :resistance is not only aJlii.ve, but is acti1Ve.&#13;
Mr. iMcTigue. Do you fool thaJt the underground is the&#13;
heart of the resistance, the core of the resisltance, in Slovaki,a today?&#13;
Dr. Mhlrul'a. I would say so. I would dare say that albout&#13;
80 or 90 per cent of the population is anti-Communist, but&#13;
not aU of these 80 o:r 90 per cent are willing to ta!ke am.&#13;
acti:ve part to fight oommundsm.&#13;
Mr. iMcrrigiue. Why?&#13;
Dr. (Mlikula. Because of the advances of oommumsm&#13;
they are very cautious ito. d:o nothing which could provoke or&#13;
cailll for Communist reprisals This is one reason.&#13;
!Second, urSU1ally the people WOII'king activei1y and directly are, in my opinion, heroes, and not everyone cam. be a&#13;
hero. So, from thds group, from this 80 per cent, we can sruy&#13;
whaJt is in tlhe underground is the most ii.miporllant and most&#13;
vaJLuiaJble co,re of passive and ,a ctive resistam.ce.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. You were in Slov,rukia at the time of the&#13;
Communist taikeover; is that correct?&#13;
Dr. Mikula. Yes.&#13;
Mr. IMc'Digue. Were there wholesaile arrests and deportations in Slovakia. as there were in the other C-Ollll!tries?&#13;
Dr. Milkllll,a. Slovakia. is a small counrtry of 31bou,t 3½&#13;
million poipuilation. So the figures. are not so enormous, but&#13;
in relatio1I1, in proportion to ,t he whole popll'laition, they are&#13;
pretty big They deported in :t'he fi.rst month aifteir the occupa1tion of Slovakia rubout 38,000 people.&#13;
Besides this, in tlhe !first half year, when they took over,&#13;
aibout 133,000 people were put in ja,i1s, in camps, amd taken&#13;
out of theiir normal life.&#13;
Mr.' Mcrrigue. [ ha;ve M further questions.&#13;
Mir. Kersten. Mr. Bentley?&#13;
.&#13;
Mr. Be1I1tley. When did you leave Slovakia?&#13;
Dr. Mikula. I lefit Slovalci.a in 1945.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. That was just the beginni.DJg of the antiCornmi.mist resistance then,, I presume.&#13;
Dr. Mitkula. Yes.&#13;
&#13;
46&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Mir. Bentley. ilfaJVe you mamta.ined contacits, or how&#13;
have yiou gotten yml'I' worrunaJtion regarding the activities&#13;
of the underground since that time?&#13;
Dr. MikU!la. As I Wld you, we haJVe steady contact&#13;
through couriers. I wi!ll j!U'st mention one thing: In 1945&#13;
our coUJriers hrougiht over my wife with two little children.&#13;
Mr. Chai:run:an rememJbers those l.ititle children. One w:as four&#13;
and one was ,s ix.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. How l01ng was co111tact of this kind maintained?&#13;
Dr. Miikulia. ,J t.hinik that contac.t is stiH mamtarlned, but&#13;
I could rta1k 3111d testify ,t o the end of 1'949.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. Until the end of 1949, which was a,bout&#13;
two years after the coup d'etat in Pra,gue?&#13;
Dr. Milrula. Yes.&#13;
!Mr. Bentley. And srunce .that time, your ilmowledge has&#13;
been 01JJ.ly fTom information, not direct; rum I correct?&#13;
Dr. Miku]a. lit is secondary. Before I reccived mormatron diirecil,y. I was ll'S'lllally the first who received it. Now I&#13;
a'In receiving informia,tion, but later.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. How dloes the situation in Slovakia compare wi;th that of otfuer countries in the Soviet satellite,&#13;
would YOIU say? Iis it -b etter or worae?&#13;
DT. MikU!la. I thiinlk .t he condifti,ons a;re generaHy the&#13;
same in all the coU!Iltries. As for the resistance, maybe in&#13;
S'lovakira, the resistance is a little bit stronger and maybe a&#13;
little bit more success:fluil, 1becall!se, as you iknow, Slovakia is&#13;
a country orf farnners, a country of mountainee:ris, ·a nd the&#13;
people i1I1: Slovaiki'a are deeply reliigtlous. T.he hardest thing&#13;
for the Communists to break ~re the farmers and /besides&#13;
that, to remove Teligion from the sow of the rpeoiple and&#13;
rep}ace it by Leninism is not so easy. You know .t hat.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. So you would say that the cond!itiOIIl!S are&#13;
about the same, but -the resistance itJhere is a little bit&#13;
·stronger?&#13;
Dr. Mikula. Yes. The same. The same concentration&#13;
camps, liaJbor orumps, the same tendency to create Kollkhozes&#13;
and co[lectiive farms, the same tendency to brealk any possible resistance, and if there dsn't any hope, arrest the peo-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
47&#13;
&#13;
ple, seind them ,t o uranii.ium mines; tJhe same everywhere,&#13;
the same procedure.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. Am ,I correct in believing that part of Slovakiia has been incorporiated in the 'Soviet Union?&#13;
Dr. Mi:kula. A very small eastern part. Abowt 15 or 18&#13;
villages of S1ova1-da were inconporated inito the Soviet Ull!ion.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. '.Dhe fiact that this resi,s tance dioes exist or&#13;
does not exist in 'SlrovaJkia to the extent you say it does,&#13;
what, in your opinio!Il, can lbe done most effectiively to eniruble&#13;
this resistance to continue ,and maintain itself. Whrut encouragement or assistrunce can be givan, if any?&#13;
Dr. 1M:iikuil.a. I would state .it in ·one way: To increase&#13;
the hopes of ipeople lh'ling over there that soonetime there&#13;
will be a cha1I1ge.&#13;
iMr. Bentley. We ,a:re ta:lking specificailly of SLovaik:i!a.&#13;
Dr. M:ikula. Spooiffioa.My, for 1Slovakia, it is absolutely&#13;
necessary to reassure a;gaiin and again those people tlhat we&#13;
are not forgetting them, we are not •giviing them up, and we&#13;
have unde.rstaind!i!Il!g for their specific prolblems.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. Including the right 'O'f self-determination?&#13;
Dr. iMitkullia. '.Dhia.t is w!hat I walllted to say. We should&#13;
not stick to the owtmoded, ourtlived st'I'luctures. '.Dhey have&#13;
proved to be un:successfol, and rwe should give to the people&#13;
the right to be free and to have therr OIWIIl: government, ·a ccording to their own c1hooce. That is one o.f the most important t'hd.ngs. Then th'i&lt;s po&lt;l.tnt: The people are, I wou!l.d say, 90&#13;
per cent 'llillited in Slovalk:ta. .Anyrt;hin,g whioh .poi.nrt:s o.wt thait&#13;
we are forgetting them, rwe are not undersibanding them, is&#13;
cutting otff the will to resist.&#13;
iMr. Bentley. Thank you very much. Thiat i'S a:11, Mr.&#13;
Chairman.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. Congressman Feighan?&#13;
MT. Feighan. Dr. 'Mikula, as I understand it, you feel&#13;
thrut the people of 1SIOV1akia should be ,giiven assurances that&#13;
the free ,w orld would sirnpport their desire for seiltf national&#13;
determiniation of thei:r own identity as a nation if they so&#13;
desiire?&#13;
·&#13;
Dr. Miikula. Wihen you are talking generally albout the&#13;
popu1ation of Slovakia, that is one of the most important&#13;
&#13;
48&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
things that they need; some kind of good will that we have&#13;
a.!11 understanding oif thei'l' problem.&#13;
MT. Feighan. Then if ,w e ,w ould tell the whole world that&#13;
we stand by the principle upon which our Naition was founded, thiat is, the ri!ght of self-determi:ri:ati-cm, that would be&#13;
he'l!pful to them. 'In other words, Mr. Mikula, if the free&#13;
w0irld shO'Uld gi,ve the Communists a free hand !in t!hese&#13;
caiptiive nations,, this would cause those people to lose hope,&#13;
ilS that right?&#13;
Dr. iM:ikuil:a. Absolutely. One of the most •i mportant&#13;
things is to show those people :tlhait we are really l!Iliform.etl&#13;
a'boUJt their plight, a.Jbout tlhe conditions under ,w hich they&#13;
are 11ivimg, that rwe hacve actually access to the most secret&#13;
communistic conspiracies. 'We shouJ.d convey t:his knowledge&#13;
to the masses. That is one of the moot imlportant th,i ngs.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. Does thrat hellp to sha:ke and lessen the&#13;
Communist ipawer in 'Uhose countries?&#13;
Dr. iMikul1a. It is •curttin.g off the arrogamt communistic&#13;
se!lf-corufiderice, amd when we ta.Jke such a cut through the&#13;
Communist Party, we see there are just a few intellectuals,&#13;
a group of fanatics, and a great nuim ber of opportunists.&#13;
The greatest ipart of them a.Te oppoiitun:ists. Activities must&#13;
be directed against those opportunists, because they are&#13;
afmid. They betrayed, first, second, thoird time. They a.re&#13;
readty to betray todlay and every day.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. ~irst o;f iaU, let me ask you this: YO!U have&#13;
gone to Detroit from iMHrwaUJkee?&#13;
Dr. M~kula. Yes. MHiwaiUJkee is my ,h ome.&#13;
Mr. Ker,s ten. You li:ved 1here several years and ~eft for&#13;
Detroit a short whlle ago wlhere you now live and :work&#13;
Dr. MikuiJ.a. Yes.&#13;
with your family?&#13;
Mr. Kersten. Dr. MikU'la, you iha,ve given us a great deal&#13;
of valuable inlfoirmation, rparticula:rly the knowledge that&#13;
I know you ha'V'e, of the existence of the undeiig,round in&#13;
Slocvakii a, resi,s tance, opposition, which our evidence indicates exists in all the other cOUIIltries likewise to a very&#13;
great extent.&#13;
!Mr. Kersten. Thank you, Dr. ~u!la, for yOUT aippear~Milwaukee, Wis., October 22, 1954).&#13;
ance here today. 1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
49&#13;
&#13;
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PHILIP A. HROBAK&#13;
&#13;
Mir. Kersten. I want to say we are rvery honored and&#13;
happy to haive you here with us, Mr. Hrobak, as the president of the Slovak League of America.&#13;
:Mr. Hrobak. And tihe editor of the Jednota, the official organ of the First Catholic SlovaJk Union of the United&#13;
States and Canada.&#13;
·&#13;
Mr. Kersten. I notice through several years of knowledge of your activities that you have keen understa:ndmg&#13;
of whaJt it means for a nation or a country or a people&#13;
to be occupied lby the Communists and some of the ways&#13;
in whioh they fight and some of the thinigs that we should&#13;
do to combat this new kind of enemy.&#13;
Mr. iMcTigue. How many memlb:ers, Mr. Hro'bak, are&#13;
a:ssociated or affiliated with the Slo:vak League of&#13;
America?&#13;
Mr. Hroba:k. The SloviaJk League .o f America, rubout&#13;
300,000.&#13;
&#13;
!Mr. Mo'Dig,ue. What, ibriefly, is the Slovak League of&#13;
.America?&#13;
Mr. Hrobaik. The pur:poses?&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Yes.&#13;
1Mr. HTdbak. A cirvic and culturial origarnzation of&#13;
Americans of Slov,a;k descent. It was organized in Oleveland in 1907.&#13;
'Mr. Mc'lligue. It is mry understanding, MT. Chaimnan,&#13;
that !Mr. HrdbaJk has a statement which he wiSlhes to present to the committee, and if there is no objection, may I&#13;
sugigest that the witness be permitted to proceed wiith&#13;
the statement?&#13;
· Mr. Kersten. Without objection, it is so ordered.&#13;
!Mr. Hrdbalk. If you permit me, I would like to first&#13;
express my deep appreciation to this committee for the&#13;
opportunity given me to present the Slovruk chaipter in the&#13;
dread detail of Communist aggression.&#13;
I believe it is for the first time, at least as far as I&#13;
know, that ,a real, honest effort is :being miade to know&#13;
the background olf the many peoples behind the Iron Curtain, nations who always were and still are our friends,&#13;
&#13;
50&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
peoiples who with all their hearts want to be our friends&#13;
because to them America has always lbee:n a living symbol&#13;
of freedom and independence, and now is just aJbout their&#13;
last hope of sa1vation from Red tyranny. I harve the greatest respect for the hono-raJble gentlemen on this committee&#13;
and its chairman, Charles Kersten. The coonmittee has a&#13;
difficult taslk, b,ut it is doing that task admiraJbliy well.&#13;
Helping the nations behind the Ixon Curtain to helrp&#13;
liberate themselves from the curse of communism cannot&#13;
and must not become ipOlitically a partisan a:flf1air. It is the&#13;
business, the duty, of every American to take part in it;&#13;
every Almerican must see it in that perspectirve, because&#13;
it is, after all, in the interest of the security of our own&#13;
America.&#13;
I would li!ke to e~press one point ,b efore I read my&#13;
statement, and that is that the SlovaJks have no quarreJ&#13;
with the Czech nation as such. The Czech nation today is&#13;
in the same Red fix as the SlovaJk nation.&#13;
The Sfovak•s, however, cannot remain silent about&#13;
Czech .p olitical leaders who were in a very large measure&#13;
responsible for the present terrilble plight of the Ozech and&#13;
Slovak nations over there, and who made it possilble foc&#13;
the Communists to seize power in Czecho-Slova!kia practically without any troUJble.&#13;
("How the Communists Seized Power in SlovaJkia" the statement by P. A. Hrobaik, president of the Slovak&#13;
League of America and Editor of the "J ednota," official&#13;
011gan of the First CathoHc Slorvak Union, •b efore the Kersten Committee on Communist Aggr(}SSion, in the County&#13;
Court House, Milwaukee, Wis., Friday afternoon, October 22, 1954 - was .pulblished in full in the iprevious issue&#13;
[Septemlber.,Decemlber 19541 of SLOVAKIA and, hence,, is&#13;
not repeated here.)&#13;
Mr. iMcTi,gue. 1I take it from your statement, Mrr. Hrobaik, that you consider the National Socialistic Party of&#13;
Czecho-,Slovalda a:s the one which was responsible for the&#13;
sellout to Moscow; is that correct?&#13;
Mr. HrrobaJk. I do, sir.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Do you consider that the case of Czecho1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
51&#13;
&#13;
Slovakia is a practical or typical example of what happens to a nation that attemipts to coo,peirate or coexist with&#13;
Communists?&#13;
Mr. Hroba:k. Definitely.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. What do you think of the present Kremlin campaign to sell the nati0'11s of the free world on peaceful coexistence?&#13;
Mr. Hrohak. That is the Kremilin's way of trying to&#13;
lull us to sleep; forget our problems, our troubles; forget&#13;
what communism is, and just let them get strong enough&#13;
until they can take all of us.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. In your opinion, what do you think we&#13;
can do to keeip the ho,pes of the people of Slovakia alive?&#13;
How can we most help them at a time like this?&#13;
Mr. Hrolba!k. We must let them know that we a;re behind them; that we have not forgotten them; that .Americans stiH believe in the principles uip on which their country was founded, in the principle of freedom and independence ; and let them know that we shall do everything&#13;
to help them he1p themselves to overthrow the regime&#13;
they have.&#13;
~fir. McTigue. You agree with Mr. Mikula, who testified&#13;
here earlier today, that the resistance is still strong among&#13;
the ,people of SlovaJkia?&#13;
Mr. Hrabaik. It certainly is. We have had cootact with&#13;
the people directly and indirectly right through the war,&#13;
and we still get letters from people, who come from Slovakia today.&#13;
Mr. McT-fgue. You are able to maintain an effective&#13;
system of communicati10n with the Slovakian people with&#13;
what is going on over there today; is that correct?&#13;
Mr. Hrobalk. indirectly. Certain people get the info;rmation from persons in Sl&gt;ova~ia and then we get it.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. Mr. Bentley?&#13;
Mr. Bentley. Mr. HrobaJk, I want to go 1b aclt a little&#13;
bit before the period of Communist domanation of Slovakia&#13;
and look at the situation there !b:rfofly during the Second&#13;
World War. When SlO'V'aJkia was an independent reipulblic,&#13;
what exactly was the relationship at that time between&#13;
Slovakia and Germany?&#13;
&#13;
52&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Mr. HrOlbalk. Foveign policy was undoulbtedlly dictaited&#13;
by Germmy, /but the domestic policy was not, until the uprising of 1944, when the German Aiimy came in to occupy&#13;
Sloval~ia. Then bhe Slova.ks were in for it.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. -Would you say that the fad, for example,&#13;
that Slovalkia had troops on the Russian f.vont was a voluntary action or wa:s that dd.otated b:y Genmany?&#13;
Mr. Hvdbalk. I think it was both. I think th13Jt the Germans expected it, and the Slovaks, to make it aippear that&#13;
they aire really taking the business seriously, s.e nt a token&#13;
division there. The Slovaks had a way of exchanging men&#13;
by classes; they never had many men in the field.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. Did -Slov:akia take any action toward the&#13;
UTrited States at the time or shortlly after Pearl Harbor&#13;
when the Germans declared war?&#13;
Mr. Hrobaac. No; we tried to ascertain thait business.&#13;
We found out that some ,p erson, I believe it was the German radlio in Vienrna, d'id ma.Ike a statement that Slovakia&#13;
declared warr, but as far as- we could find out from our&#13;
own State Department and War Department, there is absolUJtely no formal declaration of war aga:inst the United&#13;
States.&#13;
iMr. Bentley. Never was at any time?&#13;
Mr. Hlrolbruk. Never was at any time. We couldn't find&#13;
that out from our own United States Goveirnment because&#13;
that point interested us rvery much, and so far there is&#13;
absolutely no record of it.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. Now, you say there was a distinction between the foreign policy of the Slov,a k Repulbl:ic which was&#13;
exercised and the domesti'c .poHicy. You mean -t he domestic&#13;
policy of the Slovak Repulblic was independent of Gennany?&#13;
Mr. HrobaJk. Yes; just about all independent; I mean,&#13;
running the country of Slovakia itself.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. Was there any form of oppression at&#13;
thait time?&#13;
Mr. Hrobaik. There was no oppression of religion or any&#13;
other thing. Some laiws. were enacted that ha;d to coincide&#13;
with some of the laiws that · the Germans had, but oUJtside&#13;
of that, the economic conditions - even Mr. Sr0ib31r, one of&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
53&#13;
&#13;
the most intimate foiends of Benes had to admit after the&#13;
wax, were good.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. You say there was no oppression. There&#13;
was freedom of religion and the other political freedoms&#13;
that you normally would expect?&#13;
Mr. HrOlb.ak. None. Some claim that there was ,political swppression in Sl01Va!kia, but they don't explain the&#13;
problem correctly. The fact is that the ISlovaik parties, the&#13;
two only genuine !Slovak parties, are the Hlinka People's&#13;
Barty sometimes called the Catholic Party, and the Razus&#13;
Slwalk National Party, whi·c h was considered the Lutheran&#13;
Parby. Now these worked for the same program with one&#13;
accoro.&#13;
Mr. Bent-ley. Following the wprising of August 1944,&#13;
when the German mHitary came in to ,p ut it down, from&#13;
that time Slovakia lost its. independence?&#13;
Mr. Hrrolbak Yes. The Slovaks got it from both sides.&#13;
They were murdered by the occupation troops a.ind then by&#13;
the partisans on the other end.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. After the German military occupation&#13;
did the Tiso government continue in po,w er?&#13;
Mr. HrdbaJk. They continued. in ,power until 1945. Tiso&#13;
tried to explain away as best he coui'd that it was not a&#13;
national uprising; that the Slovruk Army and the Slovak&#13;
gendarmerie couild ta.Ike care olf the troubles in Slova:kia&#13;
themselves. The Germans firral,l y did not believe the Slovaks rufter General Otto's military mission was stopped at&#13;
Turciansky :S vaty Martin. I believe it was on August 25;&#13;
the group of aJbout 25 or 30 people, women and children&#13;
included, were taken off the train and put up in barracks&#13;
for the night. The neoct morning ~l were lined up against&#13;
a wall and mowed down with machine guns by the prurtisans.&#13;
Then there were other murders, sabotage, terrorrist&#13;
activities, which all came too soon, even for Benes's liberation movement which he had allegedly organized. The&#13;
leader of that movement was supposed to be General Golian. The uiprising was Communist-in spired and did not&#13;
have popular support.&#13;
&#13;
54&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Mr. Bentley. The Rm!ssian military OCCUipation of Slovalkia took place about when?&#13;
Mr. HrQbak. Albout Easter Sunday, 1945.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. And at that time the Slovak Government escaped to Germany?&#13;
Mr. Hlrobak. The Slovak Government went to Austria.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. And I believe they were finally captured&#13;
with the American troops?&#13;
Mr. Hrobak They were not captured. They surrendered to General Walker's army at that time. We had a&#13;
copy of the surrender papers and we gave it to, our State&#13;
Department, and, of course, the Army Department.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. And what happened to the members of&#13;
the Slovak Goivernment?&#13;
Mr. Hrohak. Well, unfortunately, even despite all our&#13;
effovts in America to preivent their being handed over to&#13;
Benes and his governrrnent in London, unfortunately, I&#13;
say, our pleas availed us nothing, and Tiso's Slovak Government was gi'Ven up to Benes and the Benes.Gottwald&#13;
coalition government. Tiso, after being tried by a "people's" court, was hanged on April 18, 1947, while members of the Slovak Govenunent were sentenced to prison.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. They were tried as war criminals?&#13;
Mr. Hrabaik. Yes, "war criminals," according to Prague.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. What is the sit'lllation in Slovakia today&#13;
under the Commrunist government of Prague? Is there any&#13;
form of committee for Slo;vaikia or is there a completely&#13;
unified government?&#13;
Mr. Hrobaik. Prague is still trying to tell us that the&#13;
Slovaiks themselves govern the.ir part of the state and the&#13;
Czechs govern their part, and so on, but that is not true.&#13;
The Czech Red centralized government in Prague is running the whole show. Even Slovak Communists are not&#13;
safe; Clementis is gone, so are others, and the secretary&#13;
general of the Slovak Communist Party is Karel Bacilek,&#13;
a Czech.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. You say the Communists are trying to&#13;
appeal to Slovak nationa1ism somewhat?&#13;
Mr. Hrobak. They did. Today it doesn't mean any-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
55&#13;
&#13;
thing. They are done for. In fact, 1S lovak Reds were for&#13;
separation in 1926, long ibefore Hlinka's pa,r ty.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. Who?&#13;
Mr. Hrdba.lk. The Communists. It is a matter of record.&#13;
They knew what the people wanted. They figtN"ed that there&#13;
are no people in any country who, do not desire to be free&#13;
and independent and they used that to gain their SUipport.&#13;
Hlinka's Party fought for autonomy; in the beginning, you&#13;
know, it wanted to haive a federation where SlovaJk,i a would&#13;
simply have states' rights.&#13;
The fight was simply for states' rights, as we understand them here in the States. The Slovaks wanted to elect&#13;
their own governor, their own judges, their school di,rectors, and so on. They were not for separatism until much&#13;
later.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. Mr. Hrobak, you were here, I imagine,&#13;
when Dr. Milkiu.la was testifying, and he said it was his belief that so far as the people of Slovakia are concerned,&#13;
what they really wanted was the right to self-determination. Do, you concur in that?&#13;
Mr. HroibaJk. That is correct.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. Thanik you ivery much. Your statement&#13;
and your testimony has contributed to the hearings, I am&#13;
sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.&#13;
1Mr. Kersten. Mr. Hrolbak, l&#13;
think at this time it is&#13;
quite clear from the records of recent history that the attempts of the Benes government to collaborate with and&#13;
have coexistence with the Soviet Union is a classic case&#13;
of what it means to make this attempt. I meant merely&#13;
for that government to put itsel1' in a position to be swallowed wp by the COll'Il.Illunists.&#13;
Mr. Hrobak. That is correct.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. It is a classic case in that regard.&#13;
Mr. Hrobak. Correct.&#13;
iMr. Kersten. And I believe one of the ministers of the&#13;
Benes government in London, Dr. Stransky, thought that&#13;
Mr. Hrobak Yes.&#13;
too.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. And that, along with other similar epi-&#13;
&#13;
56&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
sod.es, certainly proves that there is no such thing as peaceful coexistence with the Communist s.&#13;
Mr. HTolbaik. That is correct.&#13;
Mr. Ker.sten. Well, I want to than!k you. The records&#13;
show if it doesn't already that Congressm an Bentley knows&#13;
a great deal about this situation in Ea:stern Europe because&#13;
he was an American diplomat in Hungary for several&#13;
yeairs, and he knows firsthand sOime of the real maichinations of the Communist s when they truke aver a country.&#13;
Mr. Bentley. I was ailso in Slova-kia.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. I am sure he has firstha:nd knowledge&#13;
of that, too.&#13;
Mr. HrolbaJk. Mr. Chairman, -t he statement that I have&#13;
made is based not only on what we haive from Slovaks,&#13;
patriotic Slovaks, 'but it iis also based O!t1 the 'book that the&#13;
regime put out in 1946, that is by the Lettrich "Demo-.&#13;
crats" arid the Husak Communist s; the name of it is&#13;
"Natl Tatrou sa Blyska" - (Lightning over the Tatras).&#13;
The booik has contr~butio ns from both sides, MT. Lettrich's&#13;
men and the Husaik men. And, of coocse, on the book that&#13;
was already introduced, there were only 5,000 of these,&#13;
The Conspiracy .Aigainst the Republic, which was introd uced as testimony by Dr. Mikula. That is my oopy. Then&#13;
on a boolk that was published here in America by the Communists called "Parti:zani na Slovensku" - (Partisans in&#13;
Slovakia), published in Chicago. And, I believe, another&#13;
booklet called "Verni ostruli," (They Remained Faithful). This book dealt with the uprising; it was written by&#13;
Deso Benau, ,w ho was editor of the New Yonksky Dennik (The New York Daily), in 1946.&#13;
Mr. Benau wa:s editor of that paper from 1942 to 1946&#13;
and tod!ay is doing an admiraJble job for the Communist s&#13;
in BraUshwa.&#13;
&#13;
In this pamphlet - I will leaNe you this copy - you&#13;
can see the organizatio ns that are affiliated with us The SlovaJk League of America -- and the me:rrubers they&#13;
have. - I might add here that our papers were outlaiwed&#13;
from Ozecho-Slovakia by the Communist s on October 10,&#13;
&#13;
57&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
1946 - that is this paper, the Jednota. and three other&#13;
Slova!k p8{!)ers.&#13;
Now, as you see here in this particular paper dated&#13;
Decemlber 13, 1944, we didn't wait until 1948 to tell America that Benes sold out the Czechs and Slova!ks to Stalin.&#13;
The big headline in that Decemlber 13, 1944, issue right on&#13;
the front page reads: "Sl()IVakia soJd out by Dr. Ed/ward&#13;
Benes."&#13;
Mr. Mc'Digue. What is that .pu!blication?&#13;
Mr. Hro!b.ruk. This is the Jednota, the official organ of&#13;
the First Catholic Slovak Union of the United States and&#13;
Canada.&#13;
And my statement is further ·b ased on the information contained in the booklet "The Rise and Fall of the Democratic Party in Slovakia," which was written by Constantine Cu1en, a new:spruperman from Slova;kia now residing in Canada, and ipu!blished in Slovaik by the Slovaik League&#13;
of America. I have translated it into English and the committee is welcome to it any time.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. Thank you, Mr. Hrobak.&#13;
(Milwaukee, Wis., Octo'ber 22, 1954).&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
STATEMENT BY DR. JOSEPH A. MIKUS&#13;
&#13;
Fram 1944 until my escape from Soviet-dominated&#13;
Czecho-Slovakra, i:n March, 1948, I resided in Bratislava.&#13;
During this period I was three times imprisoned by the National Front Government: in 1945, 1946, and 1947. Now,&#13;
as a Slovalk refugee in the United States, I am glad to&#13;
have the opportunity of exposing to the Committee on&#13;
Communist A!ggression the tactics which, to miy own&#13;
knowledge and ibased on my personal experience, were&#13;
utilized 'b y the Communists in Slovakia to establish themselves first as a politca.-1 party and finally as a dominant&#13;
force in tha,t country.&#13;
Introduction&#13;
&#13;
Before entering upon a discussion of the subject: proper, I would like to outline in general terms what has until now been the main trend in Slovakia's political history.&#13;
&#13;
58&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
After losing her political independe nce in the ninth&#13;
century, Slovakia existed for a thousand years under for&#13;
eign dominatio n. Desrpite this fact, the Sl01Va!k nation did&#13;
not lose its ethnograp hic and cultural individua lity. Within&#13;
the nraime~o rik of the Austro-H ungarian Empire, it was&#13;
ruble to survive all the ;pressure of the Magyar cultural&#13;
and political centralism whioh seriously menaced its very&#13;
naJtional existence in the 19th century. World War I finally&#13;
providied an opportun ity for the 1SlovaJks to rid themsel'Ves&#13;
of the restrictin g grip of this ancient and obsolete power&#13;
structure .&#13;
On May 30, 1918, at the close of World War I, the&#13;
Slovak League of America signed together with the organilzatio ns of .Amemcans of Czech descent the so-called&#13;
Pittsburg h Agreeme nt, aimed at creating a dualist federal&#13;
union of the Czechs and Slov,atk,s which a little later entered the world communi ty of nations under the name of&#13;
Ozecho-!Slio:vakia. Although provision s guarantee ing the&#13;
preservat ion of the Slovak national and po1itical individuality were, according to the principle of self-deter mination, the essential condition of this solution, the Ozech political leaders, T. G. Masaryik and E. Benes, never made&#13;
any real attempt to fulfill their pledges. Instead of a federal union providing for a reasonaib le degree of self-gover nment for the Slovaks, and in utter disregard of the political will of the Slo1V.:\k people, Prague organized a strongly&#13;
centralize d state. On !February 29, 1920, the first so-called&#13;
revolutio nary parliame nt Oif Oze:cho..JSlovakia, ~inted !by&#13;
the Prague revolutio nary governme nt, voted for the first&#13;
Czecho-lSlovak Constitut ion which suibmerge d the Slovak&#13;
national individua lity through the device of a speciousl y&#13;
conceirved "Ozecho-!Slorvaik" nation, wherein the Czechs&#13;
wouid always lbe assured of their majority status and their&#13;
predomin ance. Not being a minority group in the sense&#13;
provided for under internatio nal treaties signed after&#13;
World War I, Slovakia ·r emained without any internatio nal&#13;
protection . Contrary to the famous definition of democracy by Abraham Lincoln, the regime a:rfuitrarily established by Prague in Slo:vaJkia could be described not as&#13;
a governme nt of the people, by the people, for the&#13;
"&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
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69&#13;
&#13;
people," 'but rather as "the g,overnment of the Ozech bureaucracy by the concept of the 'Czecho..:Slovak' nation&#13;
foisted upon the Sl01Vak people."&#13;
For 20 years SlovaJkia sought to· haive the principle&#13;
of equality between the Czechs and the Slovalks inco:r.porated into the constitution. The Slo,vak political leaders&#13;
argued that the Pittsburgh Agreement was of international relevance and that it should 'be respected by both&#13;
parties in the very interest of the joint Czecho-Slovalk&#13;
state. Prague, conrfident of the support implicit in the&#13;
Little Entente (1920), thie Mutual Defense Treaty with&#13;
France (1924), and, last but not least, the 'Dreaty of&#13;
Friendship and Mutual Aid concluded with the Soviet&#13;
Union (1935), felt strong enough to refuse any discU1ssion&#13;
on this pomt at any time.&#13;
The Munich Oonference of Septemlber 28, 1938, the&#13;
primary sig.niificance of which was the coUaipse of the&#13;
Ozecho~SlovaJk sysltem · of military a,lliances, inevitaJbly&#13;
brouight the nationality problem of the heterogeneous&#13;
Ozecho-Slovak State into the foreground. By the policy o;f&#13;
E. Benes, and in accordance with the Vienna arbitration&#13;
of Von R~bentro,p and Ciano on Novemb,er 2, 1938, SlOIVakia, lost over 10,000 square kilometers of territory to Hungary; an a·rea which included 853,000 inhabitants. This&#13;
was a national catastrophe. Ha,ving experienced this and&#13;
other deceptions,, and !being confronted in MaTch 193,9 with&#13;
the alternative of the partition of her territory among&#13;
Germany, Hung,a ry, and Poland, or of falling under direct&#13;
German administration, Slovakia voted on March 14, 1939,&#13;
thrnugh her legitimately constituted Diet in Bratislava, for&#13;
independence.&#13;
During World War II -E. Benes, who had voluntarily&#13;
resigned his oflice of President of Czecho-Slovakia, found&#13;
refuge as a ,pri'Vl8.te indilvidual in ,London. His basic goal&#13;
was to reestrublish Czecho"'Slo,valkia and, in spite of the oppositi'on. of the SlOIValk people, he was able to achieve this&#13;
goal ,b y relying essentially on the help of the Red army&#13;
and a grourp of domestic colla!borato~s. lirl the main body of&#13;
my statement I will explain the ;principal facts of this evo-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
60&#13;
&#13;
lution, but I would first of all li!ke to stress one important&#13;
point :&#13;
All 'Slovaiks in the free world greatly ruppreciate the&#13;
fact that the House Committee on Oommunist Aggression&#13;
has paid particul ar attention to the tactics• which communism aipplied in Slovaikia. As a matter of fact, these tactics&#13;
were very difforenit 'from - for exMn1ple - those adopted&#13;
in the Czech area. This fine distinction - an a,rt in which&#13;
Moscow h•a s aliways been a master - resllilted from the clifference of attitude demonstrated toward the Sovieit Union&#13;
by the population of Slova:kia at the end of World Wa:r II.&#13;
As is kno,wn, during World War IT the Czech lands were a&#13;
German protectorate. At that time and until 1944, Slovaikia&#13;
was a relatively fTee state, imbued with only one desire:&#13;
To reaffirm her status as a national state after the end&#13;
of the war. Whereas the populaition of Bohemia and Moravia loolked fonwa:rd with high hO!pe to its liberation from&#13;
German domination 1by the Soviets, that of Slovakia considered the approach of the Soviet Army as a dista:ster&#13;
which would put an end to the Slovak national state.&#13;
Because of this difference in psychological attitude,&#13;
Moscow decided from the•outset on a policy of appeasement&#13;
of the Czechs and on a prog,r am designed to smash the resistance of the Slova:ks. A detailed ,plan for this program&#13;
had ibeen elalborated, with the Kremlin's blessing, by E. Benes and K. Gottwald, who as early as 1943 were in Moscow.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
A. The Blueprint for Sovietization&#13;
&#13;
After the Teheran Conference, which toolk place Novemlber 28 - December 1, 1943, it b,ecame clear that the&#13;
Soviet Union would inevitaJbly play an important role in&#13;
post-war Europe . This conference gave substantial encouragement to the hopes of the Communists and certain&#13;
pro.-Soviet non~ommunists in Slovakia. Immediately thereafter, on December 12, 1943, Dr. Edward Benes, as chief of&#13;
the Czecho-Slova:k: Government-rn-exile, signed the Treaity&#13;
of F'riends·hip, Mutual Aid and Col1ia/boration ,w ith Stalin in&#13;
Moscow. In article 4 of this treaty the two· signafories&#13;
agreed upon close political and economic cooperaition. "Talking into consideration their respective peaceful interests,"&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
61&#13;
&#13;
says the treaty, "the high contracting parties have decided,&#13;
after the restoration of peace, to estaiblish a close and&#13;
friendly collaboration . . ." They will develop to the maximum their economic relations and will grant each other,&#13;
after the war, all possilble economic help."&#13;
No such treaty haw.ing been signed with the United&#13;
States, Great Britain, or France, this international a:greement predetermined the orientation of Ozecho~SlovaJkia&#13;
toward Moscow in the post-iwar European scheme of politica:l relations.&#13;
The Benes-Stalin treaty served as a strong stimulus&#13;
for those who had been aspiring to political power within&#13;
the framework of Soviet influence in central Europe. In&#13;
this category were included, among others, fOTmer memJbers&#13;
of the Slova:k Communist P,arty. In the 1935 elections, this&#13;
party had gained six sea:ts of the 58 corresponding to&#13;
Slo;vaikia in the Pmgue Pa:rliament. Consequently, around&#13;
10 per cent of the total ,p opulation of the country had voted&#13;
for this party, which the Government of the Sl01Vak Republic had suppressed as a subversive group in 1938.&#13;
The non-Communist growp, smaller and weaker in its&#13;
common punpose, was composed mostly of descendants of&#13;
Czech exiles who in the seventeenth century, at the time&#13;
of the Count er Refiormation, had settled in Slovakia.&#13;
Both of these factions, equally willing to back " ... the&#13;
apocaly,ptical horse from the E}ast" (as communism was&#13;
perfervidly described lby one of the factional leaders, r..udovit Sensel ), met secretly on Christmas Day, 1943, and&#13;
created a joint r evolutionary organization under the name&#13;
of the Slovak National Council. The goal of this movement,&#13;
as estaJblished under article 2 of the respective secret document, was: " . . . to ta:ke over, at the expedient time, all&#13;
political, legislative, military, and governmental executive&#13;
power in Slova:kia and to use it according to the will of the&#13;
,people until such time as their freely elected reipresentati&lt;ves&#13;
shall themsel,ves ibe ruble to take it over."&#13;
The b.asic political tenets of the so-called Christmas&#13;
Agreement were laid down in another document, the first&#13;
three articles of which read as follows :&#13;
&#13;
62&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
"(1) It is our desire that the Slovaks and the Czechs,&#13;
as the two most closely related Slav nations, shall unite&#13;
their destinies in a Czecho-Slovalk Republic which will be&#13;
their common government organized on the principle of&#13;
equality.&#13;
"(2) We desire close collaboration with all Slav states&#13;
and peoples, particularly with the Soviet Union, in whioh&#13;
we see a protecting shield for the free life and welfare of&#13;
all small nations in general, and of the Slav nations in particular.&#13;
"(3) The future Czecho..Slovak Republic shall conduct&#13;
its foreign policy in the spirit of these .principles and should&#13;
therefore, lean on the Soviet Union."&#13;
It is appropriate to mention here that, during his visit&#13;
to Moscow in Deceimib er 1943, E. Benes had in principle&#13;
agreed with K. Gottwald to set up a So'Viet ty;pe of internal administration in Cze.cho-Slovakia after its reestablishment as a dualist union ; to eliminate all traditional conservative political parties in the Ozech area, as well as in&#13;
Slovakia; and to esta:bli,s h the regime of a so-called National Front Government. In his Memoirs, published in&#13;
Prague in 1947, E . Benes recognized this in the following&#13;
passage (pp. 408-409) :&#13;
''Thereafter Gottwald e,opressed his opinion a'bout the&#13;
way in which this revolution should be prepared. He stressed&#13;
the necessity of forming national committees (i.e., So¥iets) ,&#13;
which would not only constitute the revolutionary cells of&#13;
insurrection, but would even se:rve as embryos for the whole&#13;
revolutionary political administration, I was not apposed.''&#13;
- wrote Benes - "to this opinion . . ."&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
"Then Deputy Gottwald," continued Benes, "went on&#13;
to consider the question of the structure of political parties after the revolution in Czecho-Slovakia. He was certain of a great Te1volutionary shift to the leift, of a great&#13;
Socialist majority, rund of a great defeat of our block of&#13;
right-of-center parties as it existed before the war: agrarians, national democrats, and artisans . . . As to the admission of the Agrarian Party, our Communists were not&#13;
willing to commit themselves in any specific way in De-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
63&#13;
&#13;
cember 1943. For all of us the merciless liquidation of&#13;
fasoism was without any distinction the basic and obvious issue."&#13;
In the same discussion., Benes and Gottwald touched&#13;
on the problem of the National Front Government: "It&#13;
will be necessary," ~ote Benes, "for the governmental&#13;
parties to form a unified national front after the Uberation, to form a common reivolutionary program, and to&#13;
pledge themselves to put it jointly into practiice. I then expressed my agreement with the plan concerning a national&#13;
front ." (pp. 409-410).&#13;
On the basis of these three principles,: Sovietization&#13;
of administTati'ons, elimination of the conservative parties,&#13;
and organization of the National Front Government as it&#13;
emerged in 194'5, Cze'cho-1Siovakia was inevitrubly fated to&#13;
become a "people's" democrwcy.&#13;
Wihat was the practical result for SlorvaJkia of the&#13;
Benes-Gottwald agreement? The Communist and the nonCommunist pro~Soviet group conspiring a.gain.st the Slovak Repulblic, although not representing more than 24&#13;
percent of the population, became the future leading force&#13;
of Slwakia.&#13;
B. The August 1944 Insurrection&#13;
&#13;
Since early 1944 the Soviet partisan headqll!arters in&#13;
Kiev, with Rudo1ph Slanslky as i.ts main political adviser,&#13;
had 1been pouring Red ,p arachutists and Communist agents&#13;
into the mountains of central Slovakia, far behind the&#13;
German frontlines. Through contacts with many Communists and non-Communist symjpathizers, Sfova'ks, Czeehs,&#13;
and fornigners in various cities and villages of the country, these agents maI11a,g ed to create a network of informants and future collruborators.&#13;
More recent documents reveal that as early as Fehrua·r y 7, 1944. Proif. Viladimir Jershov of Russian· origin,&#13;
Gregorij Soloshenko, second lieutenant of the Red army,&#13;
and William Zingor, a Slo~-ak Communist, came to an&#13;
agreement in Tureiansky Sv. Martin that " . . . all future&#13;
partisan activities in Slovakia would follow instructions&#13;
&#13;
64&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
from Mos:cow."l It was also agreed that 2ingor would be&#13;
the chief of the Slova:k partisans, with Soloshenko as his&#13;
sulbstitute. These self-appointments were later " . . . recognized by partisan headquarters in Kiev, and the Turiec&#13;
County group was integrated into the general Soviet partisan system. By this act the partisan movement in Turiec assumed the character of a militaTy organ~tion." 2&#13;
Moreover, in the summer of 1944 the following Sol\Tiet&#13;
rugents were, a.mong many others, actiive in Slovakia: Ing.&#13;
Nicolai Avenaria, as liaison officer in Myjawa; Jmfa Nikolaiev, a graduate of the Leningrad Naival Academy, as distrilbutor of arnns; Ing. Dimitrij Venero:vsky am.d Ivan Platonovich, active in preparing the partisan or.ganization of&#13;
Liptov County. In Turiec, whioh was the center of the So·viet partisan activities, I·v:an Stepanol\Tich and Alexander&#13;
Fjodorovich Krajushkin were actively operating. The real&#13;
Soviet partisan camp was organized in the Kantorska Valle~, near Sklabina. It was commanded by a second lieutenant of the Red Army, Ilvan VySOIC!ldj. Nikola Sur:kov, second&#13;
lieutenant of the Red army, was in command of a similar&#13;
camp near Priekopa. The most effective of these Soviet&#13;
agents was Alexei Velichko, captain oif the Soviet paratroopers, who, in fact, ibecame the chief of all partisan actil\Tity in Central Slovakia. Even General Osmolov was sent&#13;
to SlovaJda for a period of time to assure coordination of&#13;
the activity of the different groups.&#13;
In the meantime, on August 1, 1944, Gen. Bar Komorovs:ki, in command of the Polis:h underground army, ordered a general insurrection in Wa.rsa.w. H e did this after&#13;
hea.iring an a;ppeal of _Radio Moscow encouraging the people&#13;
of Warsaiw to carry out a ·general uprising. "The hour of&#13;
a·ction has already arriived," declared Moscow. Bor Komor-ovski was consequently firmly conivinced that he would&#13;
receive eiffoctiive aid from the Red army, which had just&#13;
reached the gates of the Praga sulbwr.b, 10 miles from Warsaw. But the e~pected hel.p neyer came. In his telegram of&#13;
(1) Cont ributions to the H istory of th e Slo vak Nationa:l Insurrection (In Slovalk ) , Turcians ky Sv. M.arrt in , 1947, p . 26.&#13;
( 2 ) IbM.. , p. 29.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
66&#13;
&#13;
August 16, 1944, to Prime Minister Churchill, Stalin dissociated himself from the "Wa1rsaiw venture." And so under the very eyes of the Red .army, the German units were&#13;
able to carry out their m8Sllicre of those Polish patTiots&#13;
who to Strulin (,according to his telegram of August 22,&#13;
1944, to Churchill) were but "a groU!p of criminals." On&#13;
Octdber 2 the uiprising collapsed 1because Stalin was unwilling to help "the Polish reactionaries."&#13;
The Waraaw insurrection seemed to ha:ve no effect on&#13;
Slovalkia. This was a ibloiw to Soviet expectations. To the&#13;
U. S. S. R., Sl~i,a, in the summer of 1944 was, from a&#13;
military viewpoint, an eID1Pty tera'itory with a "reactionary&#13;
government and nationalist populations," with some "deviated Communists" and some opporturustic non-Communist elements looking hopefully to Benes in London. A&#13;
civH W8JI' in Ozecho~Sloiwukia wouild haive been immensely helpful to the political aim!s of Moscow. But patriotic Slovaks&#13;
were too wise to begin an internal struggle. Three weeks&#13;
had passed siI11Ce the beginning of the Warsaw U!prising,&#13;
and still no rea.c,tion in Slovakia. In order to purge this&#13;
country of its "reactionary" elements before the impending occupat:rion, Moscow needed German military intervention there. ft was up to the Soviet aigen.ts to provoke it and&#13;
their opportunity was not long in arising.&#13;
On August 24, 1944, a spec,ial German military train&#13;
stopped in Tureiansky Sv. Martin, some miles from the&#13;
Soviet partisan headquarters illl ,Sklabina. The chief of&#13;
the railway station, in collusion with Captain Velichko,&#13;
refused to let it leaive. G€aleral Otto, former chielf olf the&#13;
Gernnan milimry mission in Rumania and now retwrmng&#13;
from Bucharest to .Berlin with his suite of 28 ;persons, was&#13;
then oonducted to the military barracik,s, held a prisoner&#13;
on instructions from Velichko, and together with all his&#13;
aides was killed by a unit of revolting soldiers the fohlawirtg day.&#13;
ThereUJPOn Hitler, infuriated with a Slovaik Government which was "unalble to 'k eep oroer in the hinterland&#13;
of the German lines," decided to send General Hloeffle into&#13;
Slovakia with an army of six di,visions to arunihrilate the&#13;
&#13;
66&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
partisan movement. It was as a result of this decision that&#13;
the political and military leaders of the pro-Soviet conspiracy started the U[&gt;rising whioh was announced on August&#13;
29, by Radio Banslka Bystrica. Within two months General&#13;
Hoeffle crushed this Sorviet-inspired venture. Although the&#13;
political chiefs of the insurrection, such as the "Demo ..&#13;
crats" Joseph Lettrich, Jan Ursiny, iMatej Josiko, Martin&#13;
Kvetko, Samuel Bellus, etc., and the Commum,s ts Gusta,v&#13;
Husak, Laco Novomesky, Karol Schmidke, etc., were aible&#13;
to escrupe, its military chiefs, General Viest and General&#13;
Golian, were not so fortunate. As they were attempting to&#13;
escrupe by plane, the latter was burned by their angry and&#13;
disillusioned soldiers. Both of them were then captured by&#13;
the Germans and ta:ken to a concentration camip in the&#13;
Reich from ,w hich they were never to return.&#13;
Wihile alll of this was going on, the Soviet Army was&#13;
quietly resting on the north side of the Carpathian Mountams where it had been stationed for ove,r four months,&#13;
tranquilly ruwaiting the last act in this &amp;ama. It is evident&#13;
that the U!prising was only a trrup set b.y the Soviet partisans to ensnare the ". . . Sl~ak reactionary and opportunist elements." This pur,pose of the insurrection was revealed during the trial against Slansky in Prague in 1952.&#13;
As has already been mentioned, the former secretary general of the Comm.1N1ist Party of Ozeoho-1Slovakia had been&#13;
the main ctivil adviser for the 1944 insurrection in Kiev.&#13;
With respect to this function the state prosecutor ques~&#13;
tioned him as follows:&#13;
Prosecutor: Why did th.e Anglo-iAmerican agent (general) P1ka show an interest in placing the partisan units in&#13;
Slovakia under the command of (General) Golian?&#13;
Slanslky: He sought to place all partisan units under&#13;
the command of the reactionary General Golian at Banska&#13;
Bys:trica so as to faciJ.itate Golian's supervision of their&#13;
activities. Pika tried, in the interest of the imperialists and&#13;
of the London Government of Dr. Benes, to reduce the influence of the par1Usa.n.s as far as possdible.3&#13;
(3) Marcel Peju: Hier et Aujourd1hui: Le sens du proces Slansky II. Les Temps Modernes. P.ari,s, June 1953, p. 2013.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
67&#13;
&#13;
Thus Slansky revealed many years later what the Soviets really thought of the leading non-Communist personalities in the 1944 insurrection in Slovaikia.&#13;
This event is a great national tragedy. Whereas during the thref' years of her participation in the struggle&#13;
against bolshevism, Slovakia lost only 2,500 soldiers on&#13;
the eastern front, she lost around 30,000 persons in the insurrection in the short space of two months. Unlike the&#13;
insurrection of Warsaw, that of Banska Bystrica has nothing to do with Slovak ~triotism. It is quite clear that&#13;
Slovak patriots would have never organized an insurrection the purpose of which was to reestablish foreign external and internal control in their country.&#13;
C. The "Liberation" of Slovakia&#13;
&#13;
What is known as the liberation of Slovakia by the&#13;
Soviets is in fact a misnomer and a grave distortion of the&#13;
historical facts. During World War II, though subject to&#13;
a certain international supervision by Germany, Slovalkia&#13;
was a relatively free country. During five years, until the&#13;
insurrection of Banska Bystrica, no one was executed for&#13;
political reasons . The Slovak Government in Bratislava&#13;
was able to master all the difficulties of the war period&#13;
during these years. Then the Red army came.&#13;
I waited for the Soviet "liberation" with a family&#13;
which lived on the outskirts of a small town, S., in western Slovakia. They had a nice, or as the Communists would&#13;
say, a '~bourgeois" home here. On the morning of a day of&#13;
mid-April 1945, the Soviet Army entered the town. The&#13;
house in question, which was located on a hill, was then&#13;
chosen as headquarters for the Soviet commanding generral in that sector of the front. During the two days that&#13;
the general stayed in the house, the conduct of the Russians was exemplary.&#13;
After the general and his staff had left, we congratulated ourselves on our not too bad experience with the&#13;
Soviet Army and prepared to cel~brate this event with a&#13;
good family dinner that evening. At p. m., just as we were&#13;
sitting down to table, a first lieutenant and a sergeant of&#13;
&#13;
68&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKJA&#13;
&#13;
the Red army entered the house. The latter put his gun on&#13;
the dining-room ta&gt;ble and began checking on our identity.&#13;
Meanwhile the officer began to inspect the house "looking for hidden German spies." In the course of this inspection he found our ,p ersonal effects in Oiile of the bedrooms&#13;
and ·b rought them into the dining room. He then proceeded&#13;
to examine these things in detail and chose for himself&#13;
whatever happened to please him: A watch, a leather&#13;
suitcase, etc.&#13;
We then saw that a second lieutenant of the Red&#13;
army had entered the house and began in turn to forage&#13;
through it. After a while he ordered a young lady to go&#13;
into the kitchen to give him a glass of water. When these&#13;
three left, after 9 :30 p. m., the lady in question colJapsed&#13;
because she had been violated. After this visit by offi ..&#13;
cers, two other groups of soldiers, many of them drunk,&#13;
successively entered bhe house, each one having held us,&#13;
that is, four men and three ladies, under terror in their&#13;
own way, until 2 :30 a. m.&#13;
In the city of Bratislava, which numbered around&#13;
200,000 inhabitants, more than 4,000 dishonored women&#13;
had to go to the hospital for examination.&#13;
During the "liberation" of SlovaJkia by the Soviets,&#13;
around 20,000 Slovaks, mostly intellectuals, were sent by&#13;
po1itical commissarias into la;bor camps of Russia, while&#13;
various tens of thousands of inhaJbitants were imprisoned.&#13;
D. Political Evolution Aft.er 1945&#13;
On April 5, 1945, the government of Dr. E. Benes&#13;
followed the advancing Red army from Moscow into the&#13;
easVSlovaikian city of Kosice and estaJblished the Third&#13;
Czecho-iSlova!k Republic in the shadow of Soviet bayonets,&#13;
through the so-called Kosice declaration. Thus a foreign&#13;
government was imposed upon the Slovaik people which,&#13;
except for two small :factions of political opportunists, had&#13;
been loyal to the Slova&gt;k State - all of this without any&#13;
plebiscite. The Communists and pro-Soviet "Democrats",&#13;
who had already rendered a great service to Moscow in&#13;
the 1944 uprising, became the ex cutors of the n w state&#13;
will in Slovaikia.&#13;
&#13;
SuOVA.KIA&#13;
&#13;
69&#13;
&#13;
According to. the Benes-Gotlbwald agreement of December 1943 in Mos'coiw, they eliminated from the political&#13;
life of Slovrukia all other former political ,parties, namely,&#13;
the Slovak People's Party, the Agrarian Party, the Slovak National Party, and the Artisans Party. These parties }:lad received in the 1935 elections 19 plus 112, plus 1,&#13;
plus 1, or a total of 33 seats in the Prague Parliament out&#13;
of the grand total of 58 seats corresponding to Slovalkia.&#13;
Not countiing the Magyar and the German minorities which&#13;
had then elected 11 deputies and did not take part in the&#13;
uprising, the two pro-Soviet factions cor,r esiponded in&#13;
strengbh to only 1'4 deputies of the pre~war Slova,k representation in the Prague Parliament, six of them being&#13;
Communists, four Social Democrats, and four others.&#13;
Now, after haiving assured the mo!Ilopoly of political&#13;
re,presentation for themselves, the Communist and pro~&#13;
Soviet "Democrat" fa.c tions agreed upon a spo.ils system&#13;
exipressed in the form of a 50-50 share in the political&#13;
aJff~irs of Slovakia. In this way the political irufl:uence of&#13;
the Communists increased, in comparison with the year&#13;
1935, from 10 to 50 percent, and that of the pro...Soviet&#13;
"Democrntic" faction from 13 to 50 percent. Afthough this&#13;
50--50 relation 'between the two factions was corrected&#13;
by the elections of May 26, 1946, in favor of the "Democrats" who, 'becauS€ of the exdusion of other traditional&#13;
,parties, gained 62 .p ercent of all voters in SlovaJkia, while&#13;
the Communists got only 30 percent, the actual influence&#13;
of the Communist Party did not diminish at all. From the&#13;
outset the Communists had taken oiver the Commissariat&#13;
of Interior, including the Police; o;f EducatiOIIl; and of Industry, together with other key ,p ositions in the administration Oif Slovakia. They also retained the chairmanship of&#13;
the Board of Commissioners, i.e., the regional g01vernment&#13;
for Slo:vaikia.&#13;
MeaI11Whhle the Sovietizaition of Czecho~Slovaikia was&#13;
progressing in every field of Government activity: In the&#13;
field of industry, President Benes, ever olbedient to the&#13;
Communi,s ts, nationalized the main branches of industry&#13;
by Decrees Nos. 100, 102 and 103 of October 28, 1945, and&#13;
this without any consultation with the nation - mines,&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
70&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
100 percent; steel industry, 100 percent; sugar production,&#13;
80 percent; electricity, 73 percent; chemical industry, 72&#13;
percent; metallurgy, 68.5 percent; glass industry, 65 percent; leather, 53.5 percent; gas, 50 percent; textiles, 47&#13;
percent; ceramics, 46.5 percent; pruper industry, 4'5.5 percent; distilleries, 31.5 percent; breweries, 27.5 percent;&#13;
clothing, 25 percent; mills, 14 percent; food, 9 percent;&#13;
wood industry, 8 percent.&#13;
By these acts the IIlum!ber of wor.kers in the nationalized sector ,b ecame 570,000, whereas only 430,000 working&#13;
people fell within the field of private industry.&#13;
ln the field of education all the schools were nationalized by decree of the Slovalk National Council (No. 34,&#13;
dated May 16, 1945). Decree No. 47 of 1945 comiscated&#13;
the property of pri:viate schools, without compensation.&#13;
By decree of the Slovak National Council • (No. 33 of&#13;
May 15, 1945) the following institubions of political justice&#13;
were created: Oommunit,y and &lt;list.riot "people's courts"&#13;
and a national court in Bratislava. The legal task of these&#13;
courts was to judge war criminals, but their political pmpose was to get rid of the -p olitical adversaries of the two&#13;
factions in power, under the pretext of collaboration with&#13;
Germany.&#13;
The political character of this distorted justice was&#13;
determined by three circumstances :&#13;
1. According to article 42 of Executive Decree No. 55&#13;
Board of Commissioner s, dated June 5, 1945, the&#13;
the&#13;
of&#13;
memlbers of these courts were to be ruppoinrted by the two&#13;
political ,parties in power.&#13;
2. These courts, disregarding the classiical principle&#13;
nulla poena, sine lege, were made component to decide&#13;
upon cases which were not punishable according to the&#13;
Penal Code.&#13;
3. This legislation introduced the principle of collective guilt and collective :responsilbility.&#13;
4. Art.i.cle 5 of Decree No. 33 of May 15, 194!5, provided&#13;
for labor camps, which were estaJblished through Executive&#13;
Decree No. 105 of August 23, 1945. According to the provisions of article 2 of this last decree, the following cate-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
71&#13;
&#13;
gories of persons were to be sent to lrubor camps:&#13;
a. Those sentenced by the "ipeople's courts";&#13;
b. Tho,s e whose activities were a threat to "the people's demoeratic regime," public security, puib1ic peace and&#13;
order, rpulblic nutrition and the reconstruction o:f economic&#13;
life; or those who were enemies of the state or conspirators against it;&#13;
c. Those who· do not work;&#13;
d. Those who declined to do the work assigned to them&#13;
within the framework of laibor duty.&#13;
'5. No plea was admissible agaiinst the act of indictment; the defendant did not have a free choice in selecting&#13;
his defender; no ·a ppeal was granted to a sentenced de. fendaJI11t.&#13;
6. Sentences to imprisonment usually involved the&#13;
confiscation of the ded'endant's property.&#13;
It 4, ruppropriate to add here tha,t before being .brought&#13;
to· trial the "traitors," "Fasci.Sits," "collaJborationists," and&#13;
"unreliable persons" were entirely at the memy of their&#13;
indictor~. There was no impartial court, as the grand jury&#13;
in America, to examine into the basis of an accusation.&#13;
This was an era of arlbitrary indictments and personal&#13;
revenge.&#13;
By its decree No. 5,1 of May 2, 1945, the Sloivaik Natiooal Council dissolved in Slorvakia all assodations, except for those few which were eixipressly exempted from&#13;
thls general ,p rovision. Freedom of the press, of assembly,&#13;
and other human rights were likewise a;bolished.&#13;
E. The "Coup de Force" of November 1947 in Slovakia&#13;
All these measures were aimed at the weakening of&#13;
traditional political forces and the estaiblishmenrt of an exclusively Communist power. For a long time the leading&#13;
personalities of the Sloivak Democratic Party, such as Joseph Lettrich, Jan Ursiny, Matej Josko, Martin Kvetko,&#13;
Stephen Koovara, etc., did not know whether they should&#13;
remain loyal to their "gentleman's agreement" of 1945 with&#13;
the Communists or follow the anti-Communist line orf the&#13;
great ma;j.ority of the Slwak people. Finally they decided&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAK.IA&#13;
&#13;
72&#13;
&#13;
to remain loyal to their agreements with the Communist s.&#13;
Instead of getting .r id of the Oommunist s, as would have&#13;
been normal for a party which had won 62 percent of all&#13;
the votes of SlovaJkia, the "Democrat s" did not alb.andon&#13;
the principle of the National Front G01Vernment. This&#13;
loyalty was to prove their fatal undoing later on.&#13;
In Selptemlber 1947, under the pretext of having disc01Vexed a conspiracy a,gainst the governmen t in the Democratic Party, the Communist s decided to liqUJidate this party. Jan Kempny, Milos iBugar, and Joseph St8!sko., three&#13;
deputies of the Catholic wing of this party, were imprisoned, as well as a,bout 2,000 other Slova\k patriots. Thereafter the Communist s organized demonstrat ions against&#13;
" . . . the reactionari es hidden within the Democratic Party." In this violent dispute between the two political parties in Slo vaJkia, the Ozech-1Soci alist block - i.e., the Communists, the Social Democrats , and the National Socialists&#13;
of Benes - representin g togeither 18'5 deputies (93 plus 37&#13;
plus 55) out of the 300 in the Prague Parliament , threw&#13;
their weight on the side of the Slovak Communis ts (23&#13;
deputies) and against the Democratic Party (43 deputies).&#13;
The Czech Catholics ( 44 deputies) remained undecided.&#13;
There was only one honora,ble way to prevent the constant intewenUo n of Prague in the internal affairs of Slova!kia, name ly, to proclaim the inde pendence of Slovakia.&#13;
Instead of doing that, Joseph Lettrich, chaimnan of :the&#13;
Slovaik Demooratic Party, gave his consent to further&#13;
limitatio!Ils on the politi&gt;Cal preirogative s of his own party.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
After a visit of Klement Gottwald to Bratislava, the&#13;
Democratic Party was relegated on Novemlber 18, 1947,&#13;
to a minority status in the regional governmen t of Slova1kia. Out of 15 seats there, it retained only 7, while the&#13;
triumphant Communist bloc got 8: The Communist Party&#13;
itself (including the chairman), 5; the Wreedom Party, 1;&#13;
the Social Democratic La,bor Pairty, 1; and the last seat&#13;
fell to General M~kttlas Ferjencik, "the neutral Oommis,s ioner of the Interior," playing in fact into the hands of&#13;
the Communist s. Such a hll!IIliliating change would have&#13;
been impossi!ble without a Czech coup de force in SloV3Jkia.&#13;
&#13;
SI.IOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
73&#13;
&#13;
Having thus eliminated the greatest obstacle from the&#13;
way of their ambition for exclusive power, the Czech Marxist rbloc (includ!ing 56 percent of aU Czech voters of 1946&#13;
and 130 deputies (93 Communists and 37 Social Democrats) out of 23,1 corresponding to the Ozec&lt;h area) was&#13;
finally able, on February 25, 1948, to, peacefully consolidate&#13;
its position and, by eliminating the Czech Catholics and&#13;
National Socialists, to pass over from the priniciple od' the&#13;
National Front Gorvernment to a sheer Communist dictatorshilp.&#13;
Conclusion&#13;
As a conolusion to this statement, I wish to repeat&#13;
that I welcome this. opportunity of finally putting the&#13;
events which took place in Ozecho-iSlovia'k ia between 19451948 in the pro.per historical light. It is with regret that I&#13;
must state. that neither of the two congressional documents dealing with the Communist subjtu gation of CzechoSlovakia - i.e., House Document No. 154, part I, on The&#13;
Coup de Force in Prague, pulblished in 1,9 49 by the Foreign&#13;
Affairs Committee, and DoCIU!Illent No. 70, pa,rt 4, on internal tensions in Ozecho-,Slovalkia, recently pulblished by&#13;
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate (July 1954),&#13;
contain aipproprfate facts and analyses of the acts of&#13;
Commun.ist aggression committed during that period in&#13;
Slovrukia.&#13;
(Wa,s hington, D. C., December 3, 1954).&#13;
&#13;
fflE TESTIMONY OF FATHER ANTON BOTEK&#13;
Mr. Kersten. 'Dhe hearings will come to orde•r .&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Your name is Father Anton Botelk, is&#13;
that correct, Father?&#13;
Father Botek. Yes.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. And you were fOl'!Illerly director of Catholic Action in Slo:vahla, is that correct?&#13;
Father Botek. Yes.&#13;
Mr. McTi:gue. fa it true you were in prison a total&#13;
number of seven times?&#13;
Father Botelk. Yes.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Imprisoned by the Communists.?&#13;
Father Botek. Yes.&#13;
&#13;
74&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Mr. iMcTigue. From 1945 to 1949?&#13;
Father Botek. No, from 1949 till 1950.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. When did the Communists occupy SlovaFather Botek. In 1944.&#13;
kia, Father?&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Norw, Father, tell us something a!bout&#13;
the f,i ght to !keep the Catholic schools open in 1945 and&#13;
1946 following the Communist occupation.&#13;
Father Botek. As early as 1944, during the 1944 CommUJili.st uprising in SlovaJkia, the so-,ca,lled Slovakian National Council was concerned with the abolition of all&#13;
church-Operated school,s.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something aJbout the&#13;
tactics of the Communists used to destroy the organizations of the church?&#13;
Father Botek. At first they rubolished all Catholic&#13;
Church operated schools; then they disbanded all Catholic associations, and fina:lly they sll!ppressed the Catholic&#13;
press.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Slo:v akia is predominantly Catholic in&#13;
Father Botek. Yes.&#13;
religion, is tihat right, Father?&#13;
Mr. McTigue. What are the percentages of Catholics&#13;
in Slo;vakia?&#13;
Father Botek. Eighty-two ,p ercent are Catholic.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Is there anything you can tell us, Father, rubout the so-called elections in 1946 in Slovaikia?&#13;
F1a:ther Bote:k. As early as 1944, there were only two&#13;
political .p arties admitted; that is, the Communist Party&#13;
and the so-.c alled Slovaikiian Democratic Party. .The Slovakian Democratic Party denied any political party that&#13;
would be able to defend their rights by democratic method.&#13;
Mr. MoTigue. Wasn't there some agreement between&#13;
the Slova1kian bishops amd the Democratic Party, Father?&#13;
Father Botek. Since there was no political representation of Slovakian Catholics, the Sloviakian bishops and&#13;
clergy tried to find means by which Slovitkian Catholics&#13;
could exipress their political will. This was necessary especially since the Communasts were anxious to win the sympathies of the Slovakian people. The Communists tried to&#13;
use, especially, the Sloivakian Nation's. feelings for their&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
75&#13;
&#13;
pu~ses and they suggested to the SlovaJkian people the&#13;
creation of an independent SlovaJkian State after the end&#13;
of World War II. This, howerver, wasn't approved by Mos~&#13;
cow. Therefore, the Commurusts tried to achieve a selfrule for ISlovaJkia within the frame of the Czecho...Slovakian&#13;
Re,pulblic and they finally succeeded in it; this was then&#13;
inco:riporated into the so-called&#13;
Kosice agreement concluded in 1945.&#13;
The Communists also tried to win the sympathy and&#13;
support of SlovaJkian Oathol.ics, promising the former members of the CathoJic Slova;kian People's Party tha;t they&#13;
woU!ldn't be punished for their wrur-time activities if they&#13;
joined the Communist Party. They also wanted some priests&#13;
for their policies; for instance, a certain priest, Joseph&#13;
Straka, who was previously suspended from his office b,y&#13;
his bishop because of irregularities in administration. The&#13;
bishOipS foribade Catholic priests to make any canvassing&#13;
prior to the 1946 elections and the Catholic priests were&#13;
also fonbidden to be candidates for any political party in&#13;
those elections. Father Straka, however, disobeyed this&#13;
order of the Catholic bishops and made .propaganda for&#13;
the Communist Party in winning Catholics for that party.&#13;
He promised Slovakian Catholics that the Com1rm.11n.ist&#13;
Party would guarantee complete religious freedom to CathoJics and he issued also several ~itten statements to&#13;
the peoiple, one of which I am in position to furnish to this&#13;
committee. The Slovafidan people, however, didn't let themselves be misled by the Communist propa;ganda and they&#13;
trusted the bishops because they knew their a;ttitude toward the Communists was the only correct one, since the&#13;
bishops warned them agaiinst the Communists even during&#13;
the time Oif Worlld War fil. Therefore, we tried to find some&#13;
cooperation with the Democrati:c Party of Slovakia, which&#13;
was not at least Communist, even tho.ugh this party was&#13;
also coresponsilble for the fact that the Communists were&#13;
aJble to penetrate SloiV'a!kia. The Catholics were es'peci'ally&#13;
indignant aigainst the Democratic Barty of Slova1cia ~&#13;
cause they rug-reed to the confiscation of 1,800 elementary&#13;
schools and 80 schools of higher grade which were prevfo:us..&#13;
ly operated by the Catholic Church, because this conifisca1&#13;
&#13;
76&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
tion took place. i,n 19'115, at the time when the commissioner&#13;
for education was the chairman of the Democratic Party,&#13;
Dr. Joseph Lettriich, T.he so-called "Democrats," however,&#13;
became aware of the great pressure, and the great activities developed by the Communists and therefore they&#13;
also, on their part, tried to win su&gt;ppo•r t of the Catholic&#13;
population of SlovaJkia for themseJves. At tha,t time we&#13;
Catholics still conducted negotiations with both the Communists and the Democratic Pa·:rity since we still hoip ed that&#13;
we would be aJble to achieve from the Communists the admission of a Catholic Party to be on the other side.&#13;
There were also preparations made for an ag,r eement&#13;
with the Democratic Party. The Communists, during the&#13;
negotia.tions, always applied the tactics of postponement&#13;
of a final decision. They made indications that they might&#13;
be inclined ·to admit, if not an ex,plicity Catholic party but&#13;
a P'arty which would at least, to some extent, aP\peal to the&#13;
Catholic population of Slovaikia. However, it soon became&#13;
apparent that no agreement could be reached with the&#13;
Communists. Therefore, on the 30th of March, 1946, we&#13;
concluded an agreement with the Democratic Party of&#13;
SlovaJkia. In this agreement, the Democratic Party of SlovaJkia pledged itself to admit Catholics as candidates on&#13;
their list of candidates in the 1946 elections. When the&#13;
Communists realized this they qtlliokly allowed another&#13;
party, which was called the Freedom Pa,rty and of which&#13;
they claimed this was a Catholic party. In this party there&#13;
were several good Catholics, even such persons who previously part-icilpated in the negotiations with the Democratic Party, but the chief leaders of that party couldn't&#13;
be trusted. The Communists also made propaganda or encouraged voters to cast inrvalid votes beca:UJSe they calculated that Slovakians who• disrug,reed both with the Communist and Democratk Pa!r ty would prefer to cast invalid&#13;
votes which then would diminish the percentage of votes&#13;
received by the Democratic Party. These irnvalid votes&#13;
were. generally referred to as "white ballots" because they&#13;
were plain slips ()If ,paper. This oppovtunity to use these white&#13;
ballots was voted in the Parliament prim· to the elections,&#13;
and the Communists and the representative s of the Free-&#13;
&#13;
77&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
dom Party were in favor of this policy. Then it became ob.viou:s thalt the Fireedom Party was merely a pwppet party&#13;
under control orf the Communist s. We therefore started&#13;
,pmpagand a among the Catholics to vote for the Democratic Party.&#13;
We couldn't deve1orp this propaganda publicly, hut we&#13;
r equested Slovakian bishops to issue a statement to the Slovalkian voters. In this statement orf the bishops, Caltholics&#13;
were called upon to vote according to their Christian conscience; they we&lt;re forihidden to vote for an undemocra tic&#13;
party which would .not admit religious freedom and they&#13;
were called upon to vote for the party wh~,ch would guarantee demncratic freedom. This statement clearly indicated thalt SlovaJkiam. CathoUcs were foiibidden to vote in&#13;
favor of the Communist Party but it still was necessary&#13;
to instruct the Slovakian Catholics that it ,w asn't good for&#13;
them to vote for the Freedom Party either. Therefore, a&#13;
statement was included in this aipipeal by the bi shops stating that it was not true; that the rumors were not true&#13;
which stated that the Slovakian bishops joined the Freedom Party and that they were inclined to vote for that&#13;
party. Those :mimors we.re spread by the Communis t Party&#13;
and hy the Freedom Party. Copies of this proclamati on oif&#13;
the bishops were sent to all iparish priests; it was also published in the Catholic press and we had couriers talking&#13;
them personally to each priest. As a result of this campaign, the Democratic Party won in the 1946 elections and&#13;
receiived 61 ½ percent of all votes cast. HO!Wever, we found&#13;
out that the Democratic Party didn't de.fend the interests&#13;
of the Slovakian Catholics and that this ,p arty even failed&#13;
to defend its own memlbers of Parliament who were Catholics. The Oomnmniirst-controlled Commissio n of the Interior in SlovaJkia had arrested the leaders of the Catholic&#13;
group within the Pairliame.nrt who were members of the&#13;
Democratic Party. In the a,greement reruohed between the&#13;
Catholic representati v,es and the representat ives of the&#13;
Democratic Party, the Democratic Pat-ty pledged itself, or&#13;
guaranteed to, Catholics that the schools would be returned to. the Catholiircs ag·a:in and that the press would&#13;
also be allowed, as well as Catholic organrzatio ns. How1&#13;
&#13;
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SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
ever, the Democratic Party failed to honor these promises&#13;
and in arguments with the Communists they always&#13;
yielded to the Communist demands in order to avoid personal troubles with them. Therefore, Catholics decided to&#13;
take up direct negotiations with the Government itself in&#13;
order to defend their rights.&#13;
Bishop Jantausch persona1ly called on the chairman&#13;
of the Board of Commissioner s in Slovakia trying to achieve&#13;
the fulfillment of the promises given by the Democrats&#13;
and the guarantees for the democratic rights of Catholics. However, he failed to achieive any results. I accompanied him on his visits to the Communist Commissioner&#13;
HusaJk, and the Communist Commissioner Viktory, and&#13;
neither of these two ever agreed to any concessions to the&#13;
Catholics. Then a commission was. introduced which was to&#13;
find a solution of all ,pr01blems of the Catholics. In this&#13;
commission, representative s of the Communist Party were&#13;
Husak and Novomesky, and the representative s of the&#13;
Demooratic Party were Filo and Frastacky. On the part of&#13;
the Catholics, the representative s were Bishop Lazik, Cannon Cvincek, Carnogursky, and myself. The pro!blems to&#13;
be solved were the reesta!blishme nt of church-Operat ed&#13;
schools, a free Catholic press, admission of Catholic organizations, discontinuatio n of inhuman deportations of the&#13;
Germans and Hungarians from Slovakia, confiscation of&#13;
property and cancellation of work on Sundays. This commission convened only twice in the winter of 1947, but no&#13;
results were achieved. In 1945 the Communists abolished&#13;
the following Catholic organizations : Organization of Catholic women, with a memlbership of 100,000; the Organization of Catholic Men, with 30,000, and the Association&#13;
of Catholic Youth, with a membership of 50,000.&#13;
Mr. MoTigue. In 1948, is it true that the central office of Catholic Action, of which you were director, was&#13;
liquidated and you were arrested?&#13;
Father Botek. Yes.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. What were you charged with when you&#13;
were arrested, Fathoc?&#13;
Father Botek. The Central Catholic Bureau received&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
instructions from the Catholic bishops to taJke over all&#13;
acti,v ities previously carried out by the Catholic Action.&#13;
However, we were aware of the fad that all organrizations didn't haive a legal background, a legal footing, and&#13;
therefore any acttvities developed by this organization&#13;
oould be stopped by the Communists any time they wanted.&#13;
The activitie.g of the Central Bureau, the Catholic Action&#13;
Bureaiu, were carried on with a great risk. I knew I was&#13;
collSltantly shadowed by one or two secret policemen and&#13;
that offic:ially all persons who entered the offices of our orgaruza.tions were super.vised by the· Communists. Instances&#13;
happened that visitors at or1.1r office were then apprehended&#13;
by these policemen, searched, beaten Uip , and adivised to&#13;
omit further visits to our bureau. Therefore, we were&#13;
anx,ious to keep our activities in the field of the Cathohl.c&#13;
Action strictly within the limits of religion a,nd not to mix&#13;
in any political aspects. Nevertheless, the Communists&#13;
didn't permit our activities and on December 7, 1948, eigiht&#13;
Communist po1icemen inivaded our bureau and declared&#13;
that our organization was disbanded and that the 'b,ureau&#13;
had to be closed dQIWiJl. The employees at the bureau we.r e&#13;
sent to a room where they were searched while, in the&#13;
meantime, in the ibwreau itself, all documents were&#13;
searched by the Communist police. This search la,s ted from&#13;
8 o'clook in the morning until evening hours, but finally&#13;
the employees of the bureau were released to their homes,&#13;
and I was t aiken by the police to my apartment which also&#13;
was searched by the police. The office rooms of the bureau were then sealed by the Communist police. 1:'he Communists then entered the office rooms of the Catholic bureau twice more and also, I, myself, was twice investigated by the pol,ice. Likewise, my assistant at the bureau&#13;
was investigated by the police.&#13;
On the 29th of January 1949, three policemen oame&#13;
to my apartment at 6 :30 o'clock in the · morning and intended to ta ke me to. the police station. At that time I was&#13;
just saying my daily Mass and I was notified that the&#13;
policemen were waiting for me. I could escrupe, but I decided aga,inst this, because I suspected that I would discredit, by esca,ping, the Central Catholic Bureau and also&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
80&#13;
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SLOVAKlA&#13;
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the Slovakian bishops. I was taken to the police station&#13;
at Bra:tislav and held for seven days U1I1der very poor conditions. The iinrvestigators tried to force me to confess&#13;
that I had connections with the Western Powers, that I&#13;
engaged in espionage activities, and that I develO!I)ed subversive activities against the Peoiple's Democratic regime&#13;
in Ozecho-iSlO!Vak.ia. They didn't have any evidence a,gainst&#13;
me and, therefore, the]' tr8.lllsferred me to the regional&#13;
court's prison where they held me for another five months&#13;
pending investigation. At the end of these five months,&#13;
my foI1IDer assistant at the Catholic Bureau, as well as&#13;
the expert for pastoral activities in the border areas, were&#13;
released and I was put on trial. Since they couldn't produce any evidence in support of the charges that I wo:riked&#13;
for foreign powers and that I engaged in espionage activities, they forced a student to testif,y against me, that I&#13;
knew of his espionage activities and failed to reiport this&#13;
to the police. For this offense I was sentenced to seven&#13;
months' imprisonment. On July 7, 1'949, I was transferred&#13;
to the Leopoldov penitentiary b.eca:use, at the time the&#13;
Communists organized their so-called CathoHc Action,&#13;
which was controlled by them, many Catholics who supported the genuine Catholic Action were imprisoned, so&#13;
that the prisons were crowded. I served the rest of my&#13;
term at LeO!poldov and on the 28th of August 1949 I was&#13;
released. I was in poor health as a result of my imprisonment and, therefore, I had to go to a hosip ital, but after&#13;
a month I myself requested to ibe assigned to a small parish so as to disappear from the eyes od' the Communists.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Was this in 1950, Father?&#13;
F,8 /ther Botek. 1949. While at this small parish, we were&#13;
preparing an ecdesiastical sermon and at this time a local&#13;
Communist called on me and requested me, pleaded with&#13;
me, that I shouldn't launch any attacks against Communists in my sermon, bec3/Use he stated he was charged with&#13;
my suI1veillance and was to report everything on me, including that whicih I told in my sermons, and he stated&#13;
he was a Catholic, too, and was the father of eight children he couldn't refuse this Communist order to spy on me&#13;
and on the other hand, if another .person would be given&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
81&#13;
&#13;
the same instructions, this other person could do harm&#13;
to me. When I was approximatel,y two months at this&#13;
par,ish, the local chairman of the Communist Party called&#13;
on me and notified me that I was swpposed to report at&#13;
the district national committee for some discussion. I&#13;
was afraid, however, that this was just a triok and that&#13;
people were previously sentenced on charges of underground activities and were sent to forced-.JaJb.or camps even&#13;
after they had served their terms imposed by the courts.&#13;
However, the Communists are very cautious while proceeding against Catholic priests since the parishioners defended their ,priest$ against arrest and there were clashes&#13;
between the population and the Communist police who a,r rived to arrest Catholic priests, especially at the time when&#13;
the Communists started their own sponsored Catholic Action. There.fore, they endeavored to lure our parish priests&#13;
fronn their parishes and to arrest them at a place where&#13;
such resistance by local parishioners couldn't be offered.&#13;
TherefoiI'e, I decided not to report at the district national&#13;
committee and await my arrest at the parish office, and&#13;
on the same day the police arrived and took me to a&#13;
forced-labor camp at Nova:ky&#13;
My parishioners protested against my arrest; however,&#13;
they didn't put up any ·physical resistance since they already experienced that such resistance was followed by&#13;
arrests of hundreds of innocent people and that it still was&#13;
to no avail because the pTiests were always eventuaUy arrested. I could tell you about conditions there, albout my&#13;
experiences which I had at that time when I was held at&#13;
the Bmtisl8'va County jail. At that time there were members at least of ten underground groups held at that prison. When I had an opportunity to talik to them, I asked&#13;
how they became involved in underground activities and&#13;
how it happened that they were arrested since there were&#13;
always rubout 50 persons from each group arrested. Most&#13;
of these for.mer members of the undengr.ound groups stated&#13;
that there was always a Communist spy planted by the&#13;
Communists within their organizations, and that this Communist spy even encouraged them to develop underground&#13;
activ:ities which he then reported to the Communist police.&#13;
&#13;
82&#13;
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SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
I realized that the Communists had put under sur:veill~e&#13;
all people whom they suspected might engage in underground activ-ities and if they failed to find anything, any&#13;
underground actiivities, they encouraged such people to&#13;
develop such activities, and be.fore a group could actually&#13;
start its undeirground activities, the spy denounced them&#13;
to the police and the memJbers of the group were arrested.&#13;
In 1,9 49, the Communists realized that they were U!Ilaible to&#13;
win the Catholic bishops for their puriposes; therefore,&#13;
they decided to organize their o,w n Catholic Action. They&#13;
coTI1Vened a meeting of the so-&lt;:aJled representaUves of the&#13;
Catholic Church in Prague on June 10, 1949. To this&#13;
meeting they invited several priests under false pretexts,&#13;
stating that this was to he a conference to negotiate and&#13;
discuss church pro1b lems. In addition, there were also several Catholic laymen invited to this meeting, who were&#13;
mostly mem!bers of the Communist Party but didn't play&#13;
any decisive role in the Catholic life, and the Communists&#13;
eventually declared this meeting as the new leadership of&#13;
the Catholic Action.&#13;
The Communists declared that since the Vatican was&#13;
against the people and since the bishops supported the&#13;
v ,a tican in this policy, they intended to leave to the Ohu:rch&#13;
only the spiritual care and admit only the kind of questions and morals that the Pope could rule in .the affairs&#13;
concerning the Catholic morals a:nd the· Catholic faith; but&#13;
all other religious· questions would be taken care of by this&#13;
Catholic Action. This evidently was an attempt by the Communists to seize control over the administration of the Catholic Church in Czecho-Slovakia. However, they real.ized&#13;
that they didn't haNe the sU1pport of the people. Therefore,&#13;
they initiated an aotion of signatures which were to be rutta,c hed by the entire population of C!zecho-Sloivakia, to a&#13;
memorandUllll issued by the rubove-mentioned meeting at&#13;
which this Communist Catholic Action was founded.&#13;
Branches of the Communist Party organization were entrusted with the carrying out of this signature action. They&#13;
convened meetings in towns and in viUages, and also at&#13;
wo:rikiplaces. at which the present people were called uipon&#13;
to put their signatu:re on the memorandum. The bishops,&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
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83&#13;
&#13;
however, condemned this Catholic Action, and the Holy See&#13;
declared every person who would sign this memorandum as&#13;
excommunicated from the Catholic Church.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Father, you were in a forced labor camp&#13;
in 1950; is that correct?&#13;
Father Botek. Yes.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Did you get sick at that time and were&#13;
you sent to a hospital?&#13;
Father Botelk. Yes.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us very briefly something&#13;
about how the Communists treated the Sister,s at the&#13;
hospital?&#13;
Father Botek. A Communist order previously arrested&#13;
all nuns those who were nurses at hospitals because&#13;
there was a great laclk of trained nurses at the hospitals.&#13;
These nuns, however, who were left as nurses at the hospitals, were e~posed to various Communist chicaneries.&#13;
That was done by Communist functionaries at the hospital, by Communist doctors, and men, and assistants.&#13;
They were called upon to renounce their mernlbership in&#13;
their religious orders and to become civilian nurses. The&#13;
Communists tried to Lure · the younger nuns with a promise that if they agreed to renounce their membership in&#13;
the religious order, tihey would be permitted to go to a&#13;
university without any previous education, which was&#13;
otheIWise required from university students. This was the&#13;
same pattern as was rupplied in the case of young Communist woI'kers who also were admitted to university studies without adequate education and just attend a short&#13;
preparatory course. Except for a few exceptions, most of&#13;
these nuns refused the Communist demands and so the&#13;
Communists started to remove the nun nur,ses from hospitals.&#13;
MT. McTigue. When did you learve Slovrukia, Father?&#13;
Father Botek. On the 26th of June 1951.&#13;
Mir. McT,~giue. Did you have any trouble in getting out&#13;
of SlQIVakia?&#13;
Father Botek. I made a previous attempt to escrupe.&#13;
At that time we were a group of 22 escapees. However,&#13;
&#13;
84&#13;
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SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
this escrupe mdn't succeed and. so I had to try it a second&#13;
time, at which time we were only four escapees and we&#13;
succeeded in crossing the border.&#13;
,M r. McTigue. Your present assignment at this time&#13;
is in Rome; is that correct, Father?&#13;
Father Botek. Yes.&#13;
Mr. Busby. Father Botek, we know that communism&#13;
is opposed to all religions, but I think the comm~ttee might&#13;
like t-0 know how successful the Communists were in their&#13;
efforts to infiltrate and to destroy the Catholic religion&#13;
in SlovaJkia.&#13;
Father Botek. Previously, when I still was at the Central Catholic Bureau, we intercepted a secret Communist&#13;
instruction in continuing a Commumst plian for destruc,tion&#13;
of the Church and for its seizure and control. Under these&#13;
instructions, the indirvidual phases were to be the following: At first the ibishops of the Catholic Church in Czecho-,Slova:kia were to be separated from the Vatican; the&#13;
second step was to be. that the bishops were t-0 be discredited in the eyes of the priests, as well as of the laymen Catholics, and finally, the last phase was to be the&#13;
separation of the Catholic laymen from their priests.&#13;
IMr. Busbey. Now, that leads ri,ght up to my question.&#13;
Up until the time you left Slovakia, and from yOIUI' own&#13;
personal olbservation, h ow successful was this plan of the&#13;
Communists?&#13;
Father Botek. They succeeded in accomplishing the&#13;
first oibjective; that is, to separate the Catholic Church in&#13;
Czecho'"'Slorvrukia from the Vatican. They expelled the Annuncias from the Vatican to Ozech0-Slovakia so that contacts of Ozecho-iSl01Vakian authorities with the Vatican&#13;
were interrupted. Nevertheless, the Catholics in OzechoSlovaJkia remained faithful to the Vatican, to the Holy See.&#13;
However, they failed in achieving their second olbjective.&#13;
to make the Catholic bishops bend to their demands and&#13;
to have them - to maJke them tools in the propagation of&#13;
communism in Slovakia. Therefore, the Communists ,pliaced&#13;
a commissary to each episcoipal office who was to taike&#13;
care that the bjsho,ps didn't have any contacts with the&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
86&#13;
&#13;
clergy and with the congregation. These Communist commissars controlled the in- and out-going mail; they controlled the visitors who intended to call on the bishops,&#13;
and admitted only those whom they considered harmless;&#13;
but even the talks of such visitors with the bishops were&#13;
monitored.&#13;
Mr. Busbey. Father, can you tell us aJbout the methods&#13;
and technics used by the Communists to indoctrinate the&#13;
pupils with the, theory of Marxism?&#13;
Father Botek. The Communists innoculated the Marxist ideology and way of thin'king to the pupils from the&#13;
very first grade of elementary school. When I was in hiding with a family who had an 8-year-old daughter, I overheard her tal!ks with her parents and I heard that this&#13;
girl was thinking in Communist terms and that her way&#13;
of thinking was completely inJfiluenced by the Communist doctrine.&#13;
Mr. Busbey. Father, do you agree with some of the&#13;
other witnesses we have heard, in the belief that if something isn't done in the immediate future and that if we let&#13;
the Communists ikeep on educating the real young boys and&#13;
girls, it will be more difficult, as time goes on, to defeat&#13;
this Communist march toward worrld revolution?&#13;
Father Botek. lt is a fact that the Communists have&#13;
had great successes in educating the very young people&#13;
in their ideology and the parents are almost unable to influence or to counteract against this Communist ideology&#13;
implanted inrto the chlldren because these children are instructed to report at school any attempts ,b y their parents&#13;
to dissuade them :13rom communism. Therefore, it is a fact;&#13;
that if communism is given enough time, that these youths&#13;
will become completely communistic and the Communist&#13;
strength will be increased.&#13;
Mr. Busbey. Can you give the committee any illustrations of the technics used by the Communists to make&#13;
the children believe in Stalin before he died, instead of God?&#13;
Father Botek. Yes, I saw the mrugazines for children,&#13;
for school-children, containing slogans such as "Stalin is&#13;
our sun; everything we haive, we've got from Stalin," and&#13;
&#13;
86&#13;
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SLOVAK IA&#13;
&#13;
"Stalin is ouT benefac tor, Stalin is our greatest benefac tor,&#13;
Stalin is the greatest man, Stalin is the most beautifu l man."&#13;
&#13;
Mr. Busbey. Father, are you qualified to. tell the committee how the Commu nists rocploited the economy of Slovakia?&#13;
Father Botek. In these economi c aspects, I am not&#13;
well versed; I only Olbse,r:ved thait there was a general lack&#13;
of all consum er goods and that the living conditio ns were&#13;
poor.&#13;
Mr. Busbey. WhiJe you were in prison, were you given&#13;
any consider ation at all because of the fact that you were&#13;
a member of the clergy?&#13;
Father Botek. This ,prdbaJbly was the case 'b ecause I&#13;
never was maltreat ed, never was beaten at interrog ations,&#13;
and I observe d that many fello•w prisoner s were beaten,&#13;
so that I prolbaibly enjoyed preferen tial treatme nt. This,&#13;
may!be, was due to the faot that there was still a trace of&#13;
Catholic faith in my investig ators so that they were reluctant to rai,se their hands aigainst me as a priest. I also&#13;
had the followin g experien ce. While I was in ,prison, a prison guard caime to me and asked me whether he should&#13;
give his signatur e to the Commu nist Ac~ion Manifes to.&#13;
IMT. Busbey. My final question ; do you lbelieve tha,t any&#13;
agreeme nt made with the Commu nists is worth the paper&#13;
it is written on?&#13;
Father Botek. From my e~perience, I had negotiat ions&#13;
with the Commu nists, I can sta:te thait the Commu nists&#13;
never honor their word thait they gave in such negotiations, and this is in accorda nce with their general policy&#13;
which goes that everyth ing is good that promote s the Communist cause, and therefor e I am convinced thait any negotiatio ns or any agreeme nts reached with the Communists are worthle ss.&#13;
Mr. Madden . Father Botek, you in your testimon y&#13;
haive covered very well your experien ces back over the&#13;
years with the Commu nist Party in Slovakia and the only&#13;
question I would like to ask is what percenta ge of the&#13;
populati on of Sloviahla today are Commun ists, true Communists at heart; what percent age: 5 percent; 10 percent; 20 ; or what would you say?&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
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87&#13;
&#13;
Father Botclc. I thin!k that the percentage doesn't exceed 10 ,p ercent.&#13;
Mr. No71blad. Is the Voice of America or Radio Free&#13;
Europe listened to by many of the people in the area you&#13;
come from?&#13;
F1ather Botclc. While I was in hiding with several fa ..&#13;
milies in Slovakia, we frequently listened to the Voice of&#13;
America and Free EuTope programs. However, I heard&#13;
from these ipeople many objections against the spirit of&#13;
those programs beamed to Ozecho-.S1ovaJkia.&#13;
Mr. Nor.blad. What were the dbjoctions, generally, in&#13;
Slovakia? I am refemnig to the conditions in Slovakia.&#13;
Father Botek. The objections were mainly of a national and religious nature. The Slavaikian peqple are a&#13;
very religious people. They are 82 percent Catholics and&#13;
13 pereent Protestants, who also are active Protestaints.&#13;
Therefore, programs promoting ideas of a reformer, Jan&#13;
Huss, or the religious ideas of Masaryk and the other socalled free thinlkers, are not appeaJ.ing to the Sl01Vakian&#13;
population.&#13;
Ma-. Noy,blad. Do they believe the world news, the&#13;
straight news given on those programs?&#13;
Father Botek. Well, the Slovallcian people listen eagerly to the news broadcasts by the Voice of America. However, once OT twice I .w itnessed the following incident. Slovakian listeners who listened to the program of the Voice&#13;
of America, said, after the news was over, just said, "Well,&#13;
turn it off because the news is over and they are now&#13;
going to stam their propaganda for the Czech Republic&#13;
and we do not want any Oze&lt;!h Republic."&#13;
Mr. Norblad. Do you feel that the radio broadoasts are&#13;
doing some good behind the Iron Curtain?&#13;
Father Botek They certainly are of great use and&#13;
great efficiency but this efficiency would still be greater&#13;
if the rest of the pro.grams, except for the news, was also&#13;
adjusted to those two major feelings of the Slovakian&#13;
popufation, the religious feelin:g and the national feeling.&#13;
Mr. No:rlblad. Do you get the programs clearly or are&#13;
they j&amp;mmed by the Soviets?&#13;
&#13;
88&#13;
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SLOVAKIA&#13;
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Father Botek. The programs are being jammed but&#13;
on la11ger radio sets they still can be received and if the&#13;
transmission is jammed on one wave, on one b,and of the&#13;
radio,, it may ,be still tuned in on another one.&#13;
Mr. Feighan. There is, is there not, a very strict feeling of healthy nationalism within Slovakia?&#13;
Father Botek. Yes.&#13;
Mr. Feighan. And that of course. is the reason why&#13;
there has been some resentment to the broadcasts?&#13;
F1ather Botek. Yes. I also heard comments by listeners to the Radio Free Europe, and Voice of America programs to ·the effect that in spite of the fact that there are&#13;
almost one million SlO'Vitk immigrants in the United States,&#13;
who ha.ve their own homes there and national life in the&#13;
United States, these programs do not bring any reports on&#13;
the activities developed by these Slovak organi~atrons in&#13;
the United States; they only bring reports. of aotivities&#13;
of organi•z ations which are not sympathetic to the Slovak&#13;
people and, therefore, the Slova!kian population, in order&#13;
to learn of the activities of the Slov:ak organizations in&#13;
the United States, tune in on Radio Rome, which also&#13;
beams SlO'Vakian programs.&#13;
Mr. Feighan. Well, it is a pity that the pe-o:ple within&#13;
Slovak,ia are not acquainted with the tremendous contribution of the Slovakian immigrants to the culture and ciivic&#13;
development of our cotmtry. l!"'ather, would y;ou relate. in&#13;
a U.ttle more detail, if you are familiar with the fact that&#13;
the Communists in 1948, I believe, offered Slovakia the&#13;
opportunity to ·b ecome a Slovak S01Viet Republic?&#13;
Fiather Botek. That was actually in 1944 and 1945,&#13;
not in 1948. At that time this policy was promoted by the&#13;
S]pvaikian Communists, Husak and Novomesky. However,&#13;
Moscow disapproved. of this policy and, therefore, the&#13;
Slovakian Communists had to put up with Czecho-Slovakia, within which SlO'V•a!kia was to have broad autonomy,&#13;
self-rule.&#13;
Mr. Feighan. Was it no,t the Slo¥ak Government that refused rather than Moscow's refusing?&#13;
Father Botek. Naturally the Slovak Government was&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
89&#13;
&#13;
opposed to this idea since it was a Catholic Government.&#13;
Mr. Feighan. Well, you've got it both ways; now there&#13;
is only one way.&#13;
Flather Botek. I would like to explain this apparent&#13;
discrepancy. This was due to the fact that there was in&#13;
1944, there was a Sl,QIV'a)ldan Govemment of an independent Slovakian State which to some extent - whose sovereignty was to some extent restricted by Germans. When&#13;
the Communists started their wprising, in August 1944,&#13;
they tried to arouse the sympathies of the SlOIVa:k people&#13;
with promises of an independent Slovakian State but&#13;
within the framework of the S01Viet Socialist Repulblic. Rusruk and N ovomesky were leading organizers of the wprising in 1944. This policy of the Slovakian Communists,&#13;
however, was disapproved by Moscow.&#13;
Mr. Feighan. Is it not true thait because of the spirit&#13;
of healthy nationalism within Slovrukia that the Slovak&#13;
people would not accept the offer to be a part of the U. S.&#13;
S. R., ~a,use they knew that such a so-.called independence of Slo,vaikia would be national in structme only, but&#13;
in su!bstance it would be socialistic?&#13;
Father Botek This is possible. This is possilble, but&#13;
President Booes, who was at Moscow at that time, persuaded the Moscow leaders to drop that idea; and he made&#13;
also great concessions to the Russia,ns so that they considered it more profitruble for them to hruve a CzechoSlovak Republic rather than a small Slovakian Repulblic.&#13;
Mr. Feighan. F'ather, did thi s Communist Catholic Action still function between that time of its first meeting&#13;
in June 1949 until you left in Jll!Ile of 1951?&#13;
Father Botek. This Communist- sponsored Catholic&#13;
action prorved to be a complete failure. They still held an&#13;
anniversary meeting the following year but they didn't&#13;
celebra,te the foundation of thls Catholic Action in the&#13;
third year any more.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. I hope you understand, Father, that all of&#13;
ourr questions are asked in the spirit of inquiry regarding&#13;
the Communist aggression upon Slovakia. That is our&#13;
overall purpose, and thank you, Father, for the testimony.&#13;
(Munich, Germany, June 26, 1954).&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
90&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
TESTIMONY OF FATHER STEFAN NAHALKA&#13;
(The witness wa:s sworn. The same interipreter was utilized as for the previous witness.)&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Your name is Father Stefan N ahal!ka, is&#13;
Father Nahalka. Yes.&#13;
that correct?&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Were you born in Slovakia?&#13;
Father N ahalka. Yes.&#13;
Mir. McTigue. Were you ordained a priest in Slov,aJkia?&#13;
Father N ahalka. I studiied theology in Rome, so I was&#13;
ordained in Rome.&#13;
Mir. McTigue. And assigned to parish duties in Slovakia,&#13;
is that correct?&#13;
!Father Naha1ka. Since 1943, I was a'SSigned to duty in&#13;
Slovakia.&#13;
Mr. MicTigue. And at one time, Father, you were secretary to Bishop Vojtassa!k, is that correct?&#13;
Father Naha1ka. Yes, I was in that capacity from 1946&#13;
to 1949.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Do you recall the uprising, so-called,&#13;
Father Nrahalka. Yes.&#13;
in Slovakia?&#13;
Mr. McTigue. When did the t11prising taike place?&#13;
Flather NahaLka. At the place in which I resided, the&#13;
uprising started on the 26th of August 1944, when this&#13;
town was occupied by Communist guerillas.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something aborut what&#13;
the guerillas did in that town?&#13;
Father Nrahalka. At that time I was chruplain at the&#13;
town of Ruio:miberoik and during the firist days of the&#13;
Communist uprising, the relbels forced the popll!lation, the&#13;
men in tha;t town, forcibly to join the rebel army even&#13;
though they were completely disiruterested and even opposed to the uprising. They also committed grave atroci~ies. In a valley called Podsucha, they murdered over 80&#13;
innocent people and buried them in a mass grave. In a&#13;
nea'Iiby village, the partisans mwdered without any connection with the military, a Catholic priest named Martin:ko. In the Lupca valley, the Communist guerillas tortured to death there a Catholic priest named Seda; they cut&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
91&#13;
&#13;
stri!Ps of hi,s skin from his back and finally even cut off&#13;
his genitals. Since the population was not in favor of the&#13;
uprising, the rebels used this deceptive propa,ganda to wm&#13;
the sympathles of the popul ation. To this end they spread&#13;
the rumor,s that the president of the Slovakian R~Ulbl,ic,&#13;
Dr. Tiso, was arrested and de1p orted by the Germans and&#13;
that, therefore, Slovrukia should arise.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Father, in 1949, did each b:i,shop have a&#13;
political commissar assigned to him so that he could watch&#13;
over the bishop's activiities?&#13;
FaJther Naha1ka. In 1949, when the negotia,tions between the Communists and the Slovakian bishops broke&#13;
down, the Communists placed Communist commissars into&#13;
every ibishop's oftfice and they also placed one commissar&#13;
into Bishop Vojtassa:k's oft:Eice, who was a young Communist, ,a former tailor. He was approximately 24 years old&#13;
at that time, and t'here was aJil'Other Co:mmun,ist placed in&#13;
the main entrance to the ,b ishop's office who chooked on all&#13;
visitors at the bishop's office. The. commissar opened: the&#13;
bishop's mail, in- and out...going, and overheard all conversations the bishop had with his visitors and also acoompanied him on ,a ll his trips,. He also seized control O'Ver the&#13;
files of the bishop's office and he tooik out items firom&#13;
those files.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Were the rooms in the hishoip's home,&#13;
for example, wired ?&#13;
Father N ahallm. There were no microphones in the&#13;
rooms of the bishoip's office because the commissar wa,s&#13;
present at all conversations, ibut I know orf a case. when the&#13;
Communists placed microphones in the conference room&#13;
for the bishop's conferences.&#13;
Mr. McTi,g ue. Were you secretary to Bishop Vojtassa.k&#13;
in 1949?&#13;
Father Nahalika. Well, I was secretary to Bishop Vojta:ssaik until January 1'949 and afterwards I lived in the&#13;
'Vicinity of the bish0tp's residence, in the priest's seminary.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Were you arrested by the Communists,&#13;
Father?&#13;
1&#13;
Fruther N ahalika. I was arrested in December 1945 and&#13;
held in imprisonment until January 1946.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
92&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
,Mr. McTigue. When did you leaive Slovakia, Father?&#13;
-Father Nahalk,a. llll May 1953.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. That is a little more than a year ago.&#13;
Did you hawe any difficulty in getting out of Slovakia?&#13;
FaJther Nahiallk,a. Well, the crossing of the bo,rder was&#13;
very difficult. At first we had to wait fo~ 14 days for run&#13;
opportunity, for a favnrruble time to cross the border and&#13;
we had to ~ very cautious while crossing to a :border area&#13;
in which the border g,u ards are authorized to fire at anybody whom they see, without warning and finally we h,ad&#13;
to cut through the barbed wire fences directly on the&#13;
border.&#13;
Mr. Madden. Father Nahallka, when Father Boteik was&#13;
testifying, he mentioned something regarding certain broadcasts thaJt were cormng over the Voice of . Arrnerioa and&#13;
Radio Wree Europe; do you know anything regarding the&#13;
broadcasts th·a t come 01Ver? Do you have any knowldge&#13;
on th-at?&#13;
Father Nahallka. I was in hiding f.or two years with&#13;
the viarious people from almost all social striafa and during&#13;
this time I had ample opportUillity to 1isten to foreign&#13;
broadcasts.&#13;
Mr. Madden. Oou:ld you tell us regarding your knowledge of the hmadcasts that come into, Slovaikia?&#13;
Father Nruha.1':ma. The people in Slovakia eaigerly listen&#13;
to democriaitic broadcasts. However, the preferences a.re&#13;
different and also the foreign broadcasts axe hOON'ily&#13;
jammed by the Communists. The people in Slovakia listen&#13;
to news broadcasts in the Slovak language by Riadio Free&#13;
Europe, Voice of America and also BBC in London; however, they disaigree on many aspects in the poJ.i;tical comments broadcast from these stations. They are opposed&#13;
to the political part of the program of those broad~asts&#13;
mainly beca'll'Se they realize that such programs do not&#13;
state the entire Communist case in Slovakia.&#13;
Mr. Madden. You mean anti-Communist?&#13;
Father Nahalka. Are not efficient enough to inspire&#13;
anti.Communist feelinig or to keep up the ainti-Communist&#13;
attitude of the population. This opposition to the programs,&#13;
&#13;
93&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
the poJitical programs of those stations is due to the fact&#13;
that they do not appeal to the national and religious fee~&#13;
ings of the Slovakians and a.iso from the ideological viewpoint, there are some oibjections, since they are sometimes very much alike with the Communist propaganda.&#13;
'.Dhey teJl people who know, in these broadcasts, there are&#13;
people who formerly collaiborated with the Communists&#13;
and they are now talking aib,out anti-Communists. For instance, the reports of the so~called Slovia,kian national uprising was a very, very - was a great mistake. At the&#13;
time when the transmitters were still in operation, people&#13;
in Slovakia eagerly listened to an illegal transmitter called&#13;
the Wlhite Legion transmitter and the people in Slo;vakia also :5requently listened to the religious programs&#13;
broadoost by Radio Vatican.&#13;
IMr. Madden. Do yoo think the programs broadcast&#13;
by the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe do any&#13;
good - I mean, against the Communists?&#13;
Father Nahalka. These broadcasts have their effects&#13;
in the line of anti-communism, but especially thr01Ugh their&#13;
news which they broadlcast. However, they could be still&#13;
more efficient if they adjusted their political programs&#13;
also to the needs and desires of the Slovak population.&#13;
(Munich, Germany, June 26, 1954).&#13;
THE TESTIMONY OF JAN DOBROTKA&#13;
Mr. McTigue. You are a Slovak, is that correct?&#13;
Mr. Dobrotka. ¥ es.&#13;
iMr. McTigue. And you were 'bom on OctOlber 20, 1913&#13;
at Dechtice, Slovakia, is that correct?&#13;
Mr. Dolbrotka. Yes.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. During the Communist occupation of&#13;
SlovaJkia you were a master sergeant in the SiN.B, socalled, which is known as the Bureau of Internal Security,&#13;
is that correct?&#13;
Mr. Dob:mtka. Yes, sir.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. And you were a uniformed master sergeant in the Buireau of Internal Security from 1947 to&#13;
1951, is that correct?&#13;
Mr. Dobrotka. That is right.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
94&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Was the Bureau of Internal Security&#13;
completely controlled by the Communists,?&#13;
Mr. DobTOtka. As of 194'8 it was completely under&#13;
Communist control.&#13;
Mr. M'CTigue. But you were a member of the Bureau&#13;
of Internal Security prior to the time that it was under&#13;
Communist control, isn't that correct?&#13;
Mr. Ddbrotka. Yes.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. And you were required to stay on as&#13;
a member of the Bureau of Internal Security after the&#13;
Communists got control, is that corerct?&#13;
Mr. Ddbrotka. Well, I was automatically taken over.&#13;
Mr. McTigiue. After the Bureau of Internal Security&#13;
was taiken over by the Communists, did you from time&#13;
to time receive orders to arrest priests, to make house&#13;
searches, and so forth and so on?&#13;
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes, I received such orders.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Were there many of such arrests made?&#13;
Mr. Dobrotka. Many wealthy farmers were arrested.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something about the&#13;
orders that were given to suppress and liquidate the Slovak Democratic Party members and the Slovak League?&#13;
Mr. Dobrotka. As of 1948 memlbers of the Democratic&#13;
Party were removed from all leadmg positioos in the administraJtion. The Slovak League was completely liquidated&#13;
because the Communists considered this organization a&#13;
swbversive and reactionary organizati'on, because it wa3&#13;
supporteq by the Slovak Leagiue of America.&#13;
iMr. McTigue. Did you ever rec{:ive orde~s to give close&#13;
supervision to the activity of certain parish priests in&#13;
Slovakia?&#13;
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; I recei,v ed such orders.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. What kind of orders were they?&#13;
iMr. Dobrotka. We received such orders through channels from the government down to our posts and such&#13;
orders arrived in sealed envelopes and were classified as&#13;
secret, and we were instructed to open these eI1JVeloipes only&#13;
u:pon special order by telephone.&#13;
!Mr. McTigue. Who were the men that actually handed&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
95&#13;
&#13;
you the orders, were they uniformed Soviet police or were&#13;
they plain-clothes men?&#13;
Mr. Dolbrotka. These were members of the uniformed&#13;
police. They were my immedia,te superiors and they related these orders to me.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Iif you were instructed under sealed orders to report on certain priests, what kind of reports did&#13;
you m0lke,?&#13;
Mr. Dobrotka. Under these orders we were to Sllipervise the sernnons of priests and to report periodically on&#13;
whether there were any political aspects in those sermons by priests.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Did you ever report, for example, that&#13;
there was any political significance to what a priest&#13;
had to say?&#13;
Mr. Dobrotka. I &lt;know I sulbmitted annual reports to&#13;
this effect, and I can state approximately 60 to 70 percent&#13;
of the memlbers of the SNB did not reporit any priests&#13;
to their superiors. This was also due to the fact that the&#13;
priests were aware of the fact that they were Slllpervised&#13;
by the police and, therefore, they avoided any political&#13;
speeches within their sermons.&#13;
Mr. MoTigue. Did the same kind of procedure, that is&#13;
reporting on their activities, apply to businessmen and&#13;
peasants and the PQpulace in general?&#13;
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; we received such orders to supervise the activities of the entire population, especially to&#13;
observe whether the former mem!bers of the partially liquidated Democratic Party developed any underground&#13;
acti&lt;vities.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Were many priests arrested and interned at the time you were in the Bureau of Internal&#13;
Security?&#13;
Mr. Ddbratka. From the entire district in which I&#13;
was active there were approximately three cases of arrests&#13;
of priests, however, not a single priest was arrested in the&#13;
area under my jurisdiction.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Tha,t is because you kept reporting&#13;
to your superiors that the priests were only talking to&#13;
God, is that correct?&#13;
&#13;
96&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Mr. Ddbrotka. That is right; there was no reason for&#13;
their arrest.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. When did you manage to esca,pe from&#13;
SlorvaJkia?&#13;
Mr. Dobrotka. On Deoomlber 3, 1951.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Did yiou haive any troUJble in getting out of&#13;
Slorvalcia?&#13;
Mr. Dobrotka. No; I did not have any tro'Ulble in&#13;
escaping.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. You are now a member of the Labor&#13;
Service unit at Bad Kreuznach?&#13;
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes, sir.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. Any questions?&#13;
Mr. Busbey. When did you ·become a mem!ber of the&#13;
Bureau of Internal Security? Is that the correct name?&#13;
Mr. Dobrotka. In 1938. At that time the name of my&#13;
headquarterrs was Provincial Command of Gendarmerie,&#13;
which was under the Minister of Interior.&#13;
Mr. Buskey. That was in 1938?&#13;
Mr. DOlbrotlra. Yes, in 1938, at which time Slovakia became an independent state.&#13;
Mr. Busbey. Were you a memlber of the Communist&#13;
Party at that time in 1938?&#13;
Mr. Dobrotka. No, sir ; at that time memibers of the&#13;
gendarmerie were fonbidden to become memlbers of any&#13;
political parties.&#13;
Mr. Busbey. In what year was, it that you assumed&#13;
your duties of reporting on priesrts?&#13;
Mr. Dabrotka. That was after February 1948, at the&#13;
time when the Catholic Action was started.&#13;
Mr. Busbey. You were a member of the Communist&#13;
Party at that time ?&#13;
Mr. Dobrotka. No, sir.&#13;
Mr. Busbey. Were you ever a memlber of the Communist Party?&#13;
Mr. Dobrotka. In March 1948 all members orf the SNB&#13;
in order to protect their own existence were forced to file&#13;
an application fur mem'bership in the COIIDmunist Party.&#13;
Mr. BUS1bey. In order to saive your life, you had to&#13;
become a member of the Communi'St Party at that time?&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
97&#13;
&#13;
Inter:preter. He became a memiber in March 1M8, but&#13;
your previous quesltion was whether he was a member in&#13;
February 1948.&#13;
Mr. Busbey. Did you attend church prior to March&#13;
1948?&#13;
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; I did. I am a practical Catholic&#13;
and I attended Mass every Sunday.&#13;
Mr. Bustbey. And how rubout after March 1948?&#13;
Mr. Do!brotka. After March 1948 I continued attending Mass regularly, however, we were aware that from&#13;
that time on we were under supervision by the Communists, particularly all our contacts with priests, with the&#13;
local priest, local teacher and local government officer&#13;
were suspicious, because these persons were considered as&#13;
reactionary, and our activities and connections with the people were supervised by Communists spies which were set&#13;
on us by the Communist Party.&#13;
Mr. Busbey. Would you agree with me that the greatest bulrwark ag,ainst communism, and the hope of the whole&#13;
world for e:venrual elimination of communism and for&#13;
world peace, is the fact that the people, not only behind&#13;
the Iron Curtain, 'b ut all over the world, will continue to&#13;
belie:ve in God?&#13;
Mr. DO!brotka. This I 'believe.&#13;
Mr. Buslbey. In other words, as long as the people have&#13;
a deep-seated, strong belief in God, we can be sure that&#13;
we will eventually eradicate communism from the earth?&#13;
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes. May this ha,ppen as soon as&#13;
possilble.&#13;
Mr. Bus•bey. Thank you. No further questions.&#13;
(The witness was excused.)&#13;
(,Munich, Germany, June 29, 1954).&#13;
THE TESTIMONY OF JUR DETVIANSKY&#13;
Mr. Det'Vianslky was called a:nd duly sworn and testified through the Slo,vak interpreter as follows:&#13;
Mr. McTigue. Your name is Jur Detviansky?&#13;
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.&#13;
Mr. McTigue And you were born on September 6, 1919,&#13;
&#13;
98&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
in Slovakia in the village of Ladomila, is that correct?&#13;
_Mr. Detviansiky. Yes.&#13;
Mr. McTig,ue. You were a recorder of vital statistics&#13;
in the town of Deitv:a until August 1950, is that correct?&#13;
Mr. DetvfanSlky. That is correct.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. This is the time, of course,, that Slovakia was under the Communist domination or occupation?&#13;
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.&#13;
iMr. McTigue. Later you were an administrative officer at Zvolen until Septemlber 1951, is that correct?&#13;
Mr. Detviansky. Yes, sir.&#13;
,M r. McTi,gue. Were you discharged from this office&#13;
by the Communists?&#13;
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.&#13;
Mr. McTig,ue. Why?&#13;
Mr. Detviansiky. As a politically unreliable person.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. In your ,p osition you know something&#13;
about the quotas which were set for the farmers lby the&#13;
Communists, is that correct?&#13;
Mr. Detviansiky. Yes.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. Will you speaJk a little louder in Slovaik&#13;
and in English.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. How were these quotas set?&#13;
Mr. Detrviansky. The quotas were estalbJished for individual farmers in the presence of a representative of the&#13;
Communist Party. The •p rinci:p le for this establishment,&#13;
this prescrilbing of quotas, was· to prescribe those quotas&#13;
to wealthy farmers in such a manner that nothing would&#13;
be left for their own needs. This policy was aimed at desiroying the independenec of farmers and forcing them to&#13;
join the farmers' cooperative wh[ch would make them the&#13;
farmers dependent on the Communists. To the same end&#13;
also several other measures were taken by the Communists, such as, for instance, that all laJbor force was taken&#13;
away from the farmers and transferred to industrial&#13;
pul'p()ses.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. So it was impossible for these farmers, big and small, to meet the quotas imposed by the&#13;
Communists, is that correct?&#13;
,M r. Detvianslky. At first the farmers managed to&#13;
meet the delivery quotas because they helped each other&#13;
&#13;
SWVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
99&#13;
&#13;
in tendmg the soil. But later this task became imposs~b'l.e&#13;
to fttlfill and famJ.ers rubandoned. their farms and/ or were&#13;
arrested for not ful£illing their deliivery quotas.&#13;
~- McTigue. Can you give any examples which you&#13;
know of from your own personal knowledge, of how some&#13;
of the peasants on small farims reacted to the quotas?&#13;
Mr. Debviansky. There were several instances, but the&#13;
most significant of them was that which occurred at&#13;
Detva-lKostolna. It was on: Decemiber 5, 1951, when a farmer named Jan Ba/bic from despair because of the hard&#13;
delivery quotas prescriibed to him 1knifed his three children, 1, 3 and 5 years old. His wife and two older children succeeded in escaping his desperate aJCt. He committed&#13;
this action of despair because he stated that since they&#13;
took aiway from him everything they should take away&#13;
also his family.&#13;
Mr. McTigue. When did you escape to the West?&#13;
Mr. Detviansky. In Decemlber 1951.&#13;
Mr. McTigrue. And you are now a caiptain in one of&#13;
the Labor Service COIJ:Il!pany units at Kaiserslautern , is&#13;
that correct?&#13;
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.&#13;
Mr. No:rlblad. Is the treatment which you harve been&#13;
receiving here aH you expected?&#13;
Mr. Detvfansky. Well, the treatment l received here&#13;
meets my expectations, however, I am dissatisfied with the&#13;
slow progress of the struggle rugainst the Communists and&#13;
I am impatient to return to my home country.&#13;
Mr. Norblad. Many of us are quite dissatisfied with&#13;
the progress of OUI' fight against communism.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. In other words I understrund you feel&#13;
that the men, the young men of Slovakia as well as the&#13;
people of the other captive nations that are in the free&#13;
world would like to try to help the people ibaok in those&#13;
countries and your country to regain their fireedom, is&#13;
that right?&#13;
Mr. Detviansky. Yes, sir, the sooner the better.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. And you likewise feel that the young&#13;
main back behind the Iron Curtain, even those under arms,&#13;
&#13;
100&#13;
&#13;
S!LOVAIHA&#13;
&#13;
would if they have the Oipportunity help get rid of Communists?&#13;
Mr. Detviansky. As far as Slovakia is concerned, I&#13;
can srtaite that since I was previously an active army officer and knew the mentality of the Sl01Vakian soldiers, I&#13;
can state that 90 percent orf the Slova,kian young men&#13;
would use such an oipportunity.&#13;
Mr. Kersten. Thank you.&#13;
The witness was. excused.&#13;
(Munich, Germany, June 29, 1954).&#13;
&#13;
When the Kersten Committee pwblished its findings,&#13;
the Benes Czechs (Socialists), the Slovak renegades the Lettrich "democrats" - and the Reds began to scream&#13;
"murder!" That, of course, is quite understandaJble. For&#13;
the ladk of positive al'gument, they resort to the smear&#13;
technique, the usua,l line of the Reds. "CAS" (TIME) the official propaganda sheet of the Lettrich "we-got-6'2 %of-the,JSlovak-vote-in-1946" democrats, who actively collaborated with the Reds and Moscow from 1943 to Fe!bruary&#13;
25, 1948 - in its issue of February 1, 195:5, attaciked the&#13;
Kersten Committee and the testimony of most of the Slovak&#13;
witnesses, laJbeling the report "scandalous."&#13;
It is unfortunate that the Keraten Committee did not&#13;
call wpon the Lettrioh "democrats" to testify; the story&#13;
would have been more complete. At least Dr. Joseph Lettrich, "leader" of the Slovak "democrats," and Gen. Nicholas&#13;
Ferjencik, "non-!I)artisan" head of Lettrich's gestapo, should&#13;
have ,b een given the opportunity to confess that the "democrats" did .conclude agreements with the Reds in 1943 and&#13;
1945 to collaJborate closely on all issues. The Kersten Committee did a good job in the time allotted to it. The wol1k&#13;
initiated: should !be completed. Albove all else, leading Benes&#13;
Czechs (Socialists) and Lettrich "democrats" - former&#13;
members of the Communist-d ominated National Front government of Prague - should be girven the opportunity to&#13;
"sing"!&#13;
&#13;
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                <text>From the testimony of witnesses before the Select Committee on Communist Aggression of the House of Representatives&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ol&gt;&lt;li&gt;From the Special Report No. 8&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Michael Galayda&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Mr. and Mrs. Smrekovský&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Dr. Joseph Paučo&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Dr. Joseph Mikula&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Philip A. Hrobák&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Dr. Joseph A. Mikuš&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Father Anton Botek&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Father Stephen Náhalka&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Ján Dobrotka&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Jur Detviansky&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Reaction of Beneš Czechs, Lettrich "Democrats" and Czecho-Slovak Reds&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 1 (14), March 1955&lt;br /&gt;pp. 1-100</text>
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                    <text>Officers of the Slovak League of America
(O rganiz ed 1907 in C leveland . Ohio.)

•
John J . Sirotnak
610-612 Li:lcoln Trust Bl dg.
Scranton 3, Pa.

Honorar y Presillen1
Dr. Peter P. H letko
1943 W. 4Sth Street
Chi cago n. Illinoi s

Dr. Julius Janci
215 East ' Mason Street
Owoss o, Mich.

President
Philip A. Hrobak
P. O. Dux 150. i\l idd letuwn. Pa. St e phani e 0. H usek
Georgian Cour t Co ll ege
Vice-Pres ident
Lak e wood, N. J .
Jacob Kocis
A DVISORY COUNCIL
1547 - 167th Sll eet
Mic hae l J . Vargovich
Ha mmond , Ind .
Nat iona l President
First Catholi c Slovak Un ion
\'ice-Pr e s ident
of U. S. A.
Ju Iia K rajcovic
1/i.J W. 18th SL. Chicago 8, m. Helen Kocan
National President
Re cording Secretary
First Catholic Slovak
Francis H rusovsky
Ladies Union
2900 East Bo ul evard
Frank Sobus
Cle veland 4, Olli:&gt;
National President
Slovak Catholic Sokol
Secr e tary-Tre asurer
Milan V. Blazek
Stephen J. Tkach
4205 W. Cull erton Street
National Presid ent
Chicago 23, Ill.
Penna. Slovak U ni on
Gabriela E. Vavrek
National President
Ladies P e nnsylvania
Slovak Union

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Paul P. Jamriska
Sl O Montooth Street
PittRhurgh 10, Pa.
Joseph Prusa
205 Madison St .. Passaic, N. J .

John Rozboril
National President
S lovak Cath o li c Cfldet Union

SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affil ia ted with th e S lovak Lea gue of Amer ica)

JEDNOTA
Middletown, Pa.

BRATST VO

SLOVENSKA OBRANA ZENSKA JEDNOTA
Cleveland , Ohio
Scrnn ton , P a.

Wilk es-Barre, Pa.

SL OV ENSKE NOVINY
Cleveland , Ohio

ZORNICKA
Wilke.s -Barre, Pa.

KATOLiCKY SOKOL
Pass ai c, N . J.

SVORNOST
Whitaker, Pa .

OSADNE HLASY
Chic,a go, Ill.

SLOVAK V AMERIKE
Whiting, Ind.

�Ruins of the S!pis Castle from the western side, Spis County, Slovakia. The fortress, built
in the 13th century, was destroyed by fire in 1780 .

•

�</text>
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                    <text>Officers of the Slovak League of America
(O rganiz ed 1907 in C leveland . Ohio.)

•
John J . Sirotnak
610-612 Li:lcoln Trust Bl dg.
Scranton 3, Pa.

Honorar y Presillen1
Dr. Peter P. H letko
1943 W. 4Sth Street
Chi cago n. Illinoi s

Dr. Julius Janci
215 East ' Mason Street
Owoss o, Mich.

President
Philip A. Hrobak
P. O. Dux 150. i\l idd letuwn. Pa. St e phani e 0. H usek
Georgian Cour t Co ll ege
Vice-Pres ident
Lak e wood, N. J .
Jacob Kocis
A DVISORY COUNCIL
1547 - 167th Sll eet
Mic hae l J . Vargovich
Ha mmond , Ind .
Nat iona l President
First Catholi c Slovak Un ion
\'ice-Pr e s ident
of U. S. A.
Ju Iia K rajcovic
1/i.J W. 18th SL. Chicago 8, m. Helen Kocan
National President
Re cording Secretary
First Catholic Slovak
Francis H rusovsky
Ladies Union
2900 East Bo ul evard
Frank Sobus
Cle veland 4, Olli:&gt;
National President
Slovak Catholic Sokol
Secr e tary-Tre asurer
Milan V. Blazek
Stephen J. Tkach
4205 W. Cull erton Street
National Presid ent
Chicago 23, Ill.
Penna. Slovak U ni on
Gabriela E. Vavrek
National President
Ladies P e nnsylvania
Slovak Union

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Paul P. Jamriska
Sl O Montooth Street
PittRhurgh 10, Pa.
Joseph Prusa
205 Madison St .. Passaic, N. J .

John Rozboril
National President
S lovak Cath o li c Cfldet Union

SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affil ia ted with th e S lovak Lea gue of Amer ica)

JEDNOTA
Middletown, Pa.

BRATST VO

SLOVENSKA OBRANA ZENSKA JEDNOTA
Cleveland , Ohio
Scrnn ton , P a.

Wilk es-Barre, Pa.

SL OV ENSKE NOVINY
Cleveland , Ohio

ZORNICKA
Wilke.s -Barre, Pa.

KATOLiCKY SOKOL
Pass ai c, N . J.

SVORNOST
Whitaker, Pa .

OSADNE HLASY
Chic,a go, Ill.

SLOVAK V AMERIKE
Whiting, Ind.

�Ruins of the S!pis Castle from the western side, Spis County, Slovakia. The fortress, built
in the 13th century, was destroyed by fire in 1780 .

•

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(O rganiz ed 1907 in C leveland . Ohio.)&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
John J . Sirotnak&#13;
610-612 Li:lcoln Trust Bl dg.&#13;
Scranton 3, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
Honorar y Presillen1&#13;
Dr. Peter P. H letko&#13;
1943 W. 4Sth Street&#13;
Chi cago n. Illinoi s&#13;
&#13;
Dr. Julius Janci&#13;
215 East ' Mason Street&#13;
Owoss o, Mich.&#13;
&#13;
President&#13;
Philip A. Hrobak&#13;
P. O. Dux 150. i\l idd letuwn. Pa. St e phani e 0. H usek&#13;
Georgian Cour t Co ll ege&#13;
Vice-Pres ident&#13;
Lak e wood, N. J .&#13;
Jacob Kocis&#13;
A DVISORY COUNCIL&#13;
1547 - 167th Sll eet&#13;
Mic hae l J . Vargovich&#13;
Ha mmond , Ind .&#13;
Nat iona l President&#13;
First Catholi c Slovak Un ion&#13;
\'ice-Pr e s ident&#13;
of U. S. A.&#13;
Ju Iia K rajcovic&#13;
1/i.J W. 18th SL. Chicago 8, m. Helen Kocan&#13;
National President&#13;
Re cording Secretary&#13;
First Catholic Slovak&#13;
Francis H rusovsky&#13;
Ladies Union&#13;
2900 East Bo ul evard&#13;
Frank Sobus&#13;
Cle veland 4, Olli:&gt;&#13;
National President&#13;
Slovak Catholic Sokol&#13;
Secr e tary-Tre asurer&#13;
Milan V. Blazek&#13;
Stephen J. Tkach&#13;
4205 W. Cull erton Street&#13;
National Presid ent&#13;
Chicago 23, Ill.&#13;
Penna. Slovak U ni on&#13;
Gabriela E. Vavrek&#13;
National President&#13;
Ladies P e nnsylvania&#13;
Slovak Union&#13;
&#13;
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Paul P. Jamriska&#13;
Sl O Montooth Street&#13;
PittRhurgh 10, Pa.&#13;
Joseph Prusa&#13;
205 Madison St .. Passaic, N. J .&#13;
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National President&#13;
S lovak Cath o li c Cfldet Union&#13;
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Cleveland , Ohio&#13;
Scrnn ton , P a.&#13;
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Cleveland , Ohio&#13;
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                    <text>IN TID!-1. ISSUE:
THE REV. STEPHEN FURDEK
Remarks of the Hon . Alvin M. Bentley
Memorandum of the 34th Congress of the Slovak League
The Murder of Matus Cernak
Professor

Kerner's

"CZECHOSLOVAKIA":
History or Propaganda ?

The Significance of Small Nations
Czech Social Democrats and Red Espionage
WHO SAID IT?: 62-96

*

*

*

Edited and compi led by
PHILIP A. HROBAK

Published by
THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA

�\

:

\' I

SLO \ .AKlA ~s. 1mblishetl pei·iodically by the Slo,·ak League of .Arnel'ica,
a cu]hll'al and ciYit fedel'ation of Ame1·icans of SloYak: descent.
rl'he chief purpose of SLOYAKlA
is to 1J1·omote a bettel' w1derntanding
and aJJlJreciation o} the Slontk nation
and its long struggle for fl'eedom and
.i.J ulependence.
As Ame1·i cam,, members of the
Slontk League of Ame1·ica finnly beh eYe that the Slovak nation, just as all
natiorn,, has an i_n hel'ent and God-given
1·ight to freedom and .i.J1dependence.
!J.'hey al'e tledi&lt;·ated to the cause of the
Amel'ican \Yay of life, Slovak freedom
and \\'Ol'lcl peaee arnl are detennined to
oppose the plague ot Communism and
all other totalih\_i-1ai1 lJOlitical systems.
Subscription to SloYakia $LOO pe1·
yea1· in the U. N. .A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to:
SLOVAKIA
l3ox ·+50
Middletown, Pa.

-------~------------------------Printed in the U . S. A.
i EDN OT A:

PR ES S

M iddletown, P a.

�SLOVAKIA
Published quarterly by the Slovak
VOL. V

League of America

JUNE-SEPTEMBER, 1955

NO. 2-3 (15-16 )

TEN YEARS AGO . ...

I

the Benes and Gottwald Czechs published report a bout the attempt
and the Lettrjch Slovak "de• of the Soviet Union to i:ncorporate
mocrats" celebrated the "libera• 1 Sub-Carpathian H.ussila into the So•
tion" of Czecho-Slovak ia by Sta- v'iet Ukmine "was absolutely w ith.
Jiu and his heroic armies. T&lt;he out foundation. "
"joyous, historic" event was cele·
At t he same time Monsignor Jan
orated for months. By the ,g1,ace Sramek, leaoer of the Czech Peo·
of Stalin, Benes became president pie's Party and a member of Be·
again; the Czech communists and nes's London government, sent a
socialists ruled in Prague; and telegram to Marshal Stalin, telling
t he Slovak National Council - him :
" All
Czecho-Slovaks
are
Lettrich's newborn "demoC'rats" filled with joy. The Soviet Union 's
and Schmidke's Slovak commun· limitless sacrifices for our libera.
ists reigned supreme in Bra• tion will never be forgotten .....
tislava. The people of the Czech Your gesture, naming Red Army
lands .really were ,hap,py, we were units after Kosice and Presov, will
told, but the Slovak nation was perpetuate the m e mory of the fight
sorrowful and fearful of the fu· against the common enemy, this
ture . Benes and 'h is Czechs had being the foundation of lasting
a1ways promoted pro·SOV'iet, SO· brotherhood in arms."
cialiistic policy and philosophy,
Dr. Juraj Slavik, Slovak Judas
whereas the S~ovaks had c onsi~t- and member of Benes's political
ently and persistently opposed it. entourage, who as ambassador in
As early as February 14, 1945, Washington somehow could not
Jan Masaryk, broadcasting to Cze· I recognize known Reds in the Cze•
cha-Slovakia from London, pro· cho-Slovak embassy, bubbled with
claimed the Crimea Conference ·a unbridled
joy:
"Presov
aga in

I

I
i

"triumph of allied statesmanship." breathes a free life. Kosice is fib.
Czecho-Slovakia, he said, 'has no erated.. . . Slovakia and the Cze.
serious international µrob l ems and cho-Slovak Republic shall remain
"our lasting gratit,ude is due to eternally grateful to th e Red
our Slav liberators, the Great Army."
Powers, to Providence for putting
Before leaving Britain, Dr. Edmankind's d estiny in the hands ward Benes, broadcasting from
of Churchill , Roosevelt, and Sta- London to Czecho-Slovakia, said :
fi n, and giving us Benes."
"Do not allow yourselves to be
A month earlier, Dr. Jan Papa- frightened by the Goebbels bolshenek, minister plenipotentiary and vik bogey ..... We have a treaty
director of the information ser· of alliance with the Soviet Union ,
vice in New York of Benes's which we rate very highly and
government-in-exile in London, told which we will always fulfill In
the NEW YORK P OST that t-he spirit and letter, Just as the Soviet

�2

SLOVAKIA

Dr. Fedor Hodza - a Lettrich
Union will do." Later, after -b eing
welcomed in Moscow, Benes said: "de•m ocrat," member of the com"The road to Iiberated Czecho- munist-dominated National Front
SloVTakia leads through Moscow. government of the Benes-Gottwald
Soon the whole of Europe shall be coalition, but now in the USA, a
member of the so-called Council of
free."
Dr. Hubert Ripka, member of Free Czecho-Slo vak-ia and the A£Bene/i's London government, told sembly of Captive European Naa fa!'ffivell press conference in tions, as well as of the InternaLondon that he did not consider t'.onal Pea-s ant Union - said bethe Western .A:lhles' apprehensions fore the provis'ional National Aschat his country mi,ght become a sembly in Prague, in 1945: "The
vassal of the Soviet Un·i on were Sov,i et Union is our ally and our
grounded. He said: "it is natural friend, and we are its ally and
that Czecho-Slovakia should seek friends. Our friendship and alliance
her security primarily in the is not based only on ideological
friendship with the Soviet Union." ties. It is something more. It stems
from political and geographical
Dr. Joseph Lettrfoh, Slovak Jureality, from the depth of our
das and Red collaborator now enhearts and from the living idea of
joying freedom in tJhe USA, told
Slavic unity."
A. I. Goldberg of the NEW YORK
1:11MiES that "Russia has kept al I
The Benes Czechs (e:enkl, tR.ipthe terms of the occupation treaty ka, Majer, Has·a l, Taborsky, Heivery fairly." The s·ame Lettrich dirich, etc.) and Slovak Judases
who praised Stalin, the Red Army (•L ettri,ch, Papanek, Slavik, Hodza,
of "libemtion," and the g,reat So- Kocvara, Mudry, Kvetko, etc.) beviet Union.
Jleved that collaboration between
Dr. Vlado Clementis, Slovak Red the UISSR and CzeC'ho-Slov,a kia
who was a member of Lettrich's \W1S not only ,f easihle, but highly
Slovak National Council ·a nd Be- desirable. They •believed
that
ne/i's communist-dominated Prague peaceful coexistence with the Reds
government, broadcast over the was possible without the loss of
Pl'ague l'adio on June 13, 1945, freedoms and rights. They proabout the "conditions of Czecho- moted the disastrous pro-Soviet
Slovak seourity." Of course, there and anti-Slovak policy of Dr. Ed·
could be no security wit:Jhout the ward Benes to the bitter end. Why
Czecho-Slovak-Soviet
Treaty of should they not ,b e considered re1!943. His address was published sponsible for the present terrible
in the NrIDW YOR.KiSKY DIDNN1K plight of the Czech -a nd Slovak
as the leading editorial on July 18,
nations? And w·hy should they
1945.
Dr. Jaroslav Stransky, Benes's presently be favored by our State
minister now in the USA and glad Department, various agencies of
to serve the FR&gt;EE IDUROPE COM- U. S. Government (USIA, CIA,
Mil'DTEE (Radio Free Europe), told j etc.), the Free Europe Committee
a mass meeting in Most in 1945:
.
"We shall be eternally grateful to (1Rad10 Free Europe), ·and some of
those who helped us, above all to our universities? Or must we beo-ur great Slav brother, the So- lieve that similar forces a.re enviet Union."
trenched in these institutions?

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1376">
                    <text>IN TID!-1. ISSUE:
THE REV. STEPHEN FURDEK
Remarks of the Hon . Alvin M. Bentley
Memorandum of the 34th Congress of the Slovak League
The Murder of Matus Cernak
Professor

Kerner's

"CZECHOSLOVAKIA":
History or Propaganda ?

The Significance of Small Nations
Czech Social Democrats and Red Espionage
WHO SAID IT?: 62-96

*

*

*

Edited and compi led by
PHILIP A. HROBAK

Published by
THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA

�\

:

\' I

SLO \ .AKlA ~s. 1mblishetl pei·iodically by the Slo,·ak League of .Arnel'ica,
a cu]hll'al and ciYit fedel'ation of Ame1·icans of SloYak: descent.
rl'he chief purpose of SLOYAKlA
is to 1J1·omote a bettel' w1derntanding
and aJJlJreciation o} the Slontk nation
and its long struggle for fl'eedom and
.i.J ulependence.
As Ame1·i cam,, members of the
Slontk League of Ame1·ica finnly beh eYe that the Slovak nation, just as all
natiorn,, has an i_n hel'ent and God-given
1·ight to freedom and .i.J1dependence.
!J.'hey al'e tledi&lt;·ated to the cause of the
Amel'ican \Yay of life, Slovak freedom
and \\'Ol'lcl peaee arnl are detennined to
oppose the plague ot Communism and
all other totalih\_i-1ai1 lJOlitical systems.
Subscription to SloYakia $LOO pe1·
yea1· in the U. N. .A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to:
SLOVAKIA
l3ox ·+50
Middletown, Pa.

-------~------------------------Printed in the U . S. A.
i EDN OT A:

PR ES S

M iddletown, P a.

�SLOVAKIA
Published quarterly by the Slovak
VOL. V

League of America

JUNE-SEPTEMBER, 1955

NO. 2-3 (15-16 )

TEN YEARS AGO . ...

I

the Benes and Gottwald Czechs published report a bout the attempt
and the Lettrjch Slovak "de• of the Soviet Union to i:ncorporate
mocrats" celebrated the "libera• 1 Sub-Carpathian H.ussila into the So•
tion" of Czecho-Slovak ia by Sta- v'iet Ukmine "was absolutely w ith.
Jiu and his heroic armies. T&lt;he out foundation. "
"joyous, historic" event was cele·
At t he same time Monsignor Jan
orated for months. By the ,g1,ace Sramek, leaoer of the Czech Peo·
of Stalin, Benes became president pie's Party and a member of Be·
again; the Czech communists and nes's London government, sent a
socialists ruled in Prague; and telegram to Marshal Stalin, telling
t he Slovak National Council - him :
" All
Czecho-Slovaks
are
Lettrich's newborn "demoC'rats" filled with joy. The Soviet Union 's
and Schmidke's Slovak commun· limitless sacrifices for our libera.
ists reigned supreme in Bra• tion will never be forgotten .....
tislava. The people of the Czech Your gesture, naming Red Army
lands .really were ,hap,py, we were units after Kosice and Presov, will
told, but the Slovak nation was perpetuate the m e mory of the fight
sorrowful and fearful of the fu· against the common enemy, this
ture . Benes and 'h is Czechs had being the foundation of lasting
a1ways promoted pro·SOV'iet, SO· brotherhood in arms."
cialiistic policy and philosophy,
Dr. Juraj Slavik, Slovak Judas
whereas the S~ovaks had c onsi~t- and member of Benes's political
ently and persistently opposed it. entourage, who as ambassador in
As early as February 14, 1945, Washington somehow could not
Jan Masaryk, broadcasting to Cze· I recognize known Reds in the Cze•
cha-Slovakia from London, pro· cho-Slovak embassy, bubbled with
claimed the Crimea Conference ·a unbridled
joy:
"Presov
aga in

I

I
i

"triumph of allied statesmanship." breathes a free life. Kosice is fib.
Czecho-Slovakia, he said, 'has no erated.. . . Slovakia and the Cze.
serious international µrob l ems and cho-Slovak Republic shall remain
"our lasting gratit,ude is due to eternally grateful to th e Red
our Slav liberators, the Great Army."
Powers, to Providence for putting
Before leaving Britain, Dr. Edmankind's d estiny in the hands ward Benes, broadcasting from
of Churchill , Roosevelt, and Sta- London to Czecho-Slovakia, said :
fi n, and giving us Benes."
"Do not allow yourselves to be
A month earlier, Dr. Jan Papa- frightened by the Goebbels bolshenek, minister plenipotentiary and vik bogey ..... We have a treaty
director of the information ser· of alliance with the Soviet Union ,
vice in New York of Benes's which we rate very highly and
government-in-exile in London, told which we will always fulfill In
the NEW YORK P OST that t-he spirit and letter, Just as the Soviet

�2

SLOVAKIA

Dr. Fedor Hodza - a Lettrich
Union will do." Later, after -b eing
welcomed in Moscow, Benes said: "de•m ocrat," member of the com"The road to Iiberated Czecho- munist-dominated National Front
SloVTakia leads through Moscow. government of the Benes-Gottwald
Soon the whole of Europe shall be coalition, but now in the USA, a
member of the so-called Council of
free."
Dr. Hubert Ripka, member of Free Czecho-Slo vak-ia and the A£Bene/i's London government, told sembly of Captive European Naa fa!'ffivell press conference in tions, as well as of the InternaLondon that he did not consider t'.onal Pea-s ant Union - said bethe Western .A:lhles' apprehensions fore the provis'ional National Aschat his country mi,ght become a sembly in Prague, in 1945: "The
vassal of the Soviet Un·i on were Sov,i et Union is our ally and our
grounded. He said: "it is natural friend, and we are its ally and
that Czecho-Slovakia should seek friends. Our friendship and alliance
her security primarily in the is not based only on ideological
friendship with the Soviet Union." ties. It is something more. It stems
from political and geographical
Dr. Joseph Lettrfoh, Slovak Jureality, from the depth of our
das and Red collaborator now enhearts and from the living idea of
joying freedom in tJhe USA, told
Slavic unity."
A. I. Goldberg of the NEW YORK
1:11MiES that "Russia has kept al I
The Benes Czechs (e:enkl, tR.ipthe terms of the occupation treaty ka, Majer, Has·a l, Taborsky, Heivery fairly." The s·ame Lettrich dirich, etc.) and Slovak Judases
who praised Stalin, the Red Army (•L ettri,ch, Papanek, Slavik, Hodza,
of "libemtion," and the g,reat So- Kocvara, Mudry, Kvetko, etc.) beviet Union.
Jleved that collaboration between
Dr. Vlado Clementis, Slovak Red the UISSR and CzeC'ho-Slov,a kia
who was a member of Lettrich's \W1S not only ,f easihle, but highly
Slovak National Council ·a nd Be- desirable. They •believed
that
ne/i's communist-dominated Prague peaceful coexistence with the Reds
government, broadcast over the was possible without the loss of
Pl'ague l'adio on June 13, 1945, freedoms and rights. They proabout the "conditions of Czecho- moted the disastrous pro-Soviet
Slovak seourity." Of course, there and anti-Slovak policy of Dr. Ed·
could be no security wit:Jhout the ward Benes to the bitter end. Why
Czecho-Slovak-Soviet
Treaty of should they not ,b e considered re1!943. His address was published sponsible for the present terrible
in the NrIDW YOR.KiSKY DIDNN1K plight of the Czech -a nd Slovak
as the leading editorial on July 18,
nations? And w·hy should they
1945.
Dr. Jaroslav Stransky, Benes's presently be favored by our State
minister now in the USA and glad Department, various agencies of
to serve the FR&gt;EE IDUROPE COM- U. S. Government (USIA, CIA,
Mil'DTEE (Radio Free Europe), told j etc.), the Free Europe Committee
a mass meeting in Most in 1945:
.
"We shall be eternally grateful to (1Rad10 Free Europe), ·and some of
those who helped us, above all to our universities? Or must we beo-ur great Slav brother, the So- lieve that similar forces a.re enviet Union."
trenched in these institutions?

�</text>
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                  <text>1955, Vol. 5</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;</text>
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            <elementText elementTextId="1374">
              <text>IN TID!-1. ISSUE:&#13;
THE REV. STEPHEN FURDEK&#13;
Remarks of the Hon . Alvin M. Bentley&#13;
Memorandum of the 34th Congress of the Slovak League&#13;
The Murder of Matus Cernak&#13;
Professor&#13;
&#13;
Kerner's&#13;
&#13;
"CZECHOSLOVAKIA":&#13;
History or Propaganda ?&#13;
&#13;
The Significance of Small Nations&#13;
Czech Social Democrats and Red Espionage&#13;
WHO SAID IT?: 62-96&#13;
&#13;
*&#13;
&#13;
*&#13;
&#13;
*&#13;
&#13;
Edited and compi led by&#13;
PHILIP A. HROBAK&#13;
&#13;
Published by&#13;
THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA&#13;
&#13;
\&#13;
&#13;
:&#13;
&#13;
\' I&#13;
&#13;
SLO \ .AKlA ~s. 1mblishetl pei·iodically by the Slo,·ak League of .Arnel'ica,&#13;
a cu]hll'al and ciYit fedel'ation of Ame1·icans of SloYak: descent.&#13;
rl'he chief purpose of SLOYAKlA&#13;
is to 1J1·omote a bettel' w1derntanding&#13;
and aJJlJreciation o} the Slontk nation&#13;
and its long struggle for fl'eedom and&#13;
.i.J ulependence.&#13;
As Ame1·i cam,, members of the&#13;
Slontk League of Ame1·ica finnly beh eYe that the Slovak nation, just as all&#13;
natiorn,, has an i_n hel'ent and God-given&#13;
1·ight to freedom and .i.J1dependence.&#13;
!J.'hey al'e tledi&lt;·ated to the cause of the&#13;
Amel'ican \Yay of life, Slovak freedom&#13;
and \\'Ol'lcl peaee arnl are detennined to&#13;
oppose the plague ot Communism and&#13;
all other totalih\_i-1ai1 lJOlitical systems.&#13;
Subscription to SloYakia $LOO pe1·&#13;
yea1· in the U. N. .A. - $2.00 elsewhere.&#13;
Send subscriptions to:&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
l3ox ·+50&#13;
Middletown, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
-------~------------------------Printed in the U . S. A.&#13;
i EDN OT A:&#13;
&#13;
PR ES S&#13;
&#13;
M iddletown, P a.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
Published quarterly by the Slovak&#13;
VOL. V&#13;
&#13;
League of America&#13;
&#13;
JUNE-SEPTEMBER, 1955&#13;
&#13;
NO. 2-3 (15-16 )&#13;
&#13;
TEN YEARS AGO . ...&#13;
&#13;
I&#13;
&#13;
the Benes and Gottwald Czechs published report a bout the attempt&#13;
and the Lettrjch Slovak "de• of the Soviet Union to i:ncorporate&#13;
mocrats" celebrated the "libera• 1 Sub-Carpathian H.ussila into the So•&#13;
tion" of Czecho-Slovak ia by Sta- v'iet Ukmine "was absolutely w ith.&#13;
Jiu and his heroic armies. T&lt;he out foundation. "&#13;
"joyous, historic" event was cele·&#13;
At t he same time Monsignor Jan&#13;
orated for months. By the ,g1,ace Sramek, leaoer of the Czech Peo·&#13;
of Stalin, Benes became president pie's Party and a member of Be·&#13;
again; the Czech communists and nes's London government, sent a&#13;
socialists ruled in Prague; and telegram to Marshal Stalin, telling&#13;
t he Slovak National Council - him :&#13;
" All&#13;
Czecho-Slovaks&#13;
are&#13;
Lettrich's newborn "demoC'rats" filled with joy. The Soviet Union 's&#13;
and Schmidke's Slovak commun· limitless sacrifices for our libera.&#13;
ists reigned supreme in Bra• tion will never be forgotten .....&#13;
tislava. The people of the Czech Your gesture, naming Red Army&#13;
lands .really were ,hap,py, we were units after Kosice and Presov, will&#13;
told, but the Slovak nation was perpetuate the m e mory of the fight&#13;
sorrowful and fearful of the fu· against the common enemy, this&#13;
ture . Benes and 'h is Czechs had being the foundation of lasting&#13;
a1ways promoted pro·SOV'iet, SO· brotherhood in arms."&#13;
cialiistic policy and philosophy,&#13;
Dr. Juraj Slavik, Slovak Judas&#13;
whereas the S~ovaks had c onsi~t- and member of Benes's political&#13;
ently and persistently opposed it. entourage, who as ambassador in&#13;
As early as February 14, 1945, Washington somehow could not&#13;
Jan Masaryk, broadcasting to Cze· I recognize known Reds in the Cze•&#13;
cha-Slovakia from London, pro· cho-Slovak embassy, bubbled with&#13;
claimed the Crimea Conference ·a unbridled&#13;
joy:&#13;
"Presov&#13;
aga in&#13;
&#13;
I&#13;
&#13;
I&#13;
i&#13;
&#13;
"triumph of allied statesmanship." breathes a free life. Kosice is fib.&#13;
Czecho-Slovakia, he said, 'has no erated.. . . Slovakia and the Cze.&#13;
serious international µrob l ems and cho-Slovak Republic shall remain&#13;
"our lasting gratit,ude is due to eternally grateful to th e Red&#13;
our Slav liberators, the Great Army."&#13;
Powers, to Providence for putting&#13;
Before leaving Britain, Dr. Edmankind's d estiny in the hands ward Benes, broadcasting from&#13;
of Churchill , Roosevelt, and Sta- London to Czecho-Slovakia, said :&#13;
fi n, and giving us Benes."&#13;
"Do not allow yourselves to be&#13;
A month earlier, Dr. Jan Papa- frightened by the Goebbels bolshenek, minister plenipotentiary and vik bogey ..... We have a treaty&#13;
director of the information ser· of alliance with the Soviet Union ,&#13;
vice in New York of Benes's which we rate very highly and&#13;
government-in-exile in London, told which we will always fulfill In&#13;
the NEW YORK P OST that t-he spirit and letter, Just as the Soviet&#13;
&#13;
2&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Dr. Fedor Hodza - a Lettrich&#13;
Union will do." Later, after -b eing&#13;
welcomed in Moscow, Benes said: "de•m ocrat," member of the com"The road to Iiberated Czecho- munist-dominated National Front&#13;
SloVTakia leads through Moscow. government of the Benes-Gottwald&#13;
Soon the whole of Europe shall be coalition, but now in the USA, a&#13;
member of the so-called Council of&#13;
free."&#13;
Dr. Hubert Ripka, member of Free Czecho-Slo vak-ia and the A£Bene/i's London government, told sembly of Captive European Naa fa!'ffivell press conference in tions, as well as of the InternaLondon that he did not consider t'.onal Pea-s ant Union - said bethe Western .A:lhles' apprehensions fore the provis'ional National Aschat his country mi,ght become a sembly in Prague, in 1945: "The&#13;
vassal of the Soviet Un·i on were Sov,i et Union is our ally and our&#13;
grounded. He said: "it is natural friend, and we are its ally and&#13;
that Czecho-Slovakia should seek friends. Our friendship and alliance&#13;
her security primarily in the is not based only on ideological&#13;
friendship with the Soviet Union." ties. It is something more. It stems&#13;
from political and geographical&#13;
Dr. Joseph Lettrfoh, Slovak Jureality, from the depth of our&#13;
das and Red collaborator now enhearts and from the living idea of&#13;
joying freedom in tJhe USA, told&#13;
Slavic unity."&#13;
A. I. Goldberg of the NEW YORK&#13;
1:11MiES that "Russia has kept al I&#13;
The Benes Czechs (e:enkl, tR.ipthe terms of the occupation treaty ka, Majer, Has·a l, Taborsky, Heivery fairly." The s·ame Lettrich dirich, etc.) and Slovak Judases&#13;
who praised Stalin, the Red Army (•L ettri,ch, Papanek, Slavik, Hodza,&#13;
of "libemtion," and the g,reat So- Kocvara, Mudry, Kvetko, etc.) beviet Union.&#13;
Jleved that collaboration between&#13;
Dr. Vlado Clementis, Slovak Red the UISSR and CzeC'ho-Slov,a kia&#13;
who was a member of Lettrich's \W1S not only ,f easihle, but highly&#13;
Slovak National Council ·a nd Be- desirable. They •believed&#13;
that&#13;
ne/i's communist-dominated Prague peaceful coexistence with the Reds&#13;
government, broadcast over the was possible without the loss of&#13;
Pl'ague l'adio on June 13, 1945, freedoms and rights. They proabout the "conditions of Czecho- moted the disastrous pro-Soviet&#13;
Slovak seourity." Of course, there and anti-Slovak policy of Dr. Ed·&#13;
could be no security wit:Jhout the ward Benes to the bitter end. Why&#13;
Czecho-Slovak-Soviet&#13;
Treaty of should they not ,b e considered re1!943. His address was published sponsible for the present terrible&#13;
in the NrIDW YOR.KiSKY DIDNN1K plight of the Czech -a nd Slovak&#13;
as the leading editorial on July 18,&#13;
nations? And w·hy should they&#13;
1945.&#13;
Dr. Jaroslav Stransky, Benes's presently be favored by our State&#13;
minister now in the USA and glad Department, various agencies of&#13;
to serve the FR&gt;EE IDUROPE COM- U. S. Government (USIA, CIA,&#13;
Mil'DTEE (Radio Free Europe), told j etc.), the Free Europe Committee&#13;
a mass meeting in Most in 1945:&#13;
.&#13;
"We shall be eternally grateful to (1Rad10 Free Europe), ·and some of&#13;
those who helped us, above all to our universities? Or must we beo-ur great Slav brother, the So- lieve that similar forces a.re enviet Union."&#13;
trenched in these institutions?&#13;
&#13;
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

3

APOSTLE OF A'MErRICAN SLOVAKS

THE REV. STEPHEN FURDEK
By Phi1ip A . Hrobak

Father Stephen Furdek was called to his eternal reward forty years ago, bwt his stature continues to grow
with the years. When Furrdek died on January 18, 1915,
he was mourned by Slovaks everywhere. Father Furdek
was, indeed, a great American, a good Slovak, an exemplary
priest of God, a true apostle of Christian charity, a successful organizer and leader of men.
Rev. Stephen Furdek was born September 2, 1856, in
the village of Trstena, Orava County, S1ovakia, materially
probably one of the poorest of the poor communities of
the land of the Tatras, which hras 'been inhabited 1zy Slovaks during the past 1500 years. It was there that Furdek completed his primary education as a boy. Then he
attended the gymnasium at Banska Bystrica, transferring
later to, the one at Nitra; and af.ter that he entered the
seminary at Nitra. Completing his studies at Nitra with
distinction, Furdek was sent to Pest University, where he
became, ill a short time later and returned to Nitra. After
recuperating, Fu.rdek taught school for a time in Straznice, Moravia, and then decided to study at the University
of Prague. It was here that he studied classical ,philology
for three years and became acquainted with Dr. Francis Bauer, rector of the seminary and, later, Cardinal and
Archbishop of the Olomouc archbishopric, with whom he
corresponded to his death. It was on the advice of Dr.
Bauer that Furdek entered the seminary at Prague to
complete his priestly studies. But he did not quite complete those there, because as a theologian in his fourth
year he answered the call of Bishop Richard Gilmour of
Cleveland, Ohio, for priests who could spook and understand Slovak and other SloV'anic languages. Parting wi:tlh
his family and acquaintances in Trstena, Furdek set sail
for America in March, 1882, and arrived in Cleveland,
Ohio, several weelks Irater.
··

�4

SLOVAKIA

In Cleveland, Furdek completed his studies for the
priesthood and was ordained priest July 1, 1882. His first
assignment was a chaplaincy at the Czech parish of St.
Wenceslaus. In .Aipril, 1883, Bishop Gilmour appointed him
pastor of the newly..founded congregation of Ourr Lady of
Lourdes in the East 55th and Broadway section of Cleveland. However, at the end of May, 1883, Bishop Gilmour
asked F1ather Furdek to take over the administration of
the St. Procopius parish on the West Side, where a disturbance had occurred. Father furdek acquiesced, listened
patiently to arguments proferred by the various ''warring"
factions, reconciled and set them straight and made the
parish a going concern. By February, 1884, Furdek was
back at his old post of Our Lady of Lorurdes parish, where
he labored successfully until his death in 1915.
In the meantime, quite a number of Slorvrukis had settled in the downtown Wood.land-Scorvill-Commercial Avenue section of Cleveland; they attended St. Joseph's church
on 23rd and Woodland Arvenue. Since the Franciscan Fathers there did not know Slovak or any related language,
the Slov~s begged F'ather Furdek to do something about
it. And he did. With the permission of the Bishop and the
Franciscans, F'ather Furdek made his appearance regularly at one of the Masses at St. Joseph's to preach and
instruct in Slov,aik, while one of the Franci,sca.n Fathers
read the Holy Mass.
As the number of Slovaik immigrants in Cleveland increased, they asked Father Furdek to help them esta;blish
a parish "of our own" - a Slovak parish. This he did in
1888, when a lot, 180 by 180 feet, was bought at the corner
of Corwin and Holton Avenues, just below Woodhill Road.
IDven the Magyars of the Buckeye Road area contributed
so that a wooden church was constructed on the site that
same year. That was the start of St. Ladislaus parish.
In 1890, at the request of his Bishop, Father Furdek
went to Europe to seeGc out priests who would serve the
spiritual needs of Slovaks, Slovenes and Croatians of the
Cleveland diocese. After completing his mission, Furdek
visited Lourdes and Rome and then returned to his parish
in Cleveland.

�SLOVAKIA

5

Father Furdek'.s entire life was a life of dedication
to God and his fellowmen. EJarly in life he adopted the
slogan "Za Boha a narod" (For God and nation) and adhered to it strictly throughout his life. The motto was
adopted by the organizations which Furdek founded: the
First Catholic Slovak Union of the United States of America (1890); the First Caitholic Slovak Ladies Union (1892);
the Slovak Institute (Slovenska Matica - 1893); the Slovak
League of America (1907); the National Fund, the Fund
to Preserve our National Heritage. F'u.rdek also organized
the St. Ladislaus parish in Cleveland and helped to found
many others, including the parish schools which were built
later.
The First Catholic Slovak Union is undoubtedly the
greatest achievement of Father Furdek's fruitful life. The
biography of Furdek is substantially the history of the
F'irst Catholic Slovak Union. Today this organization is the
largest fraternal benefit society of Slovaks in the world.
Furdek not only organized it, but was also its guiding
spirit throughout his life.
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Slovruks from the Tatra country were literally pouring into
America to better their economic lot and escape the political oppression of alien rulers at home. Furdek realized
that much more could be acomplished by an organization
than by an individual. He also knew that it was only natural for men to band together in a common cause. At the
close of the nineteenth century, Slovak immigrants in various cities of the United States had already organized
into benefit and social organizations on the local level.
Furdek put hi:s sights on a national organization, which
would do so much more "for God and nation." And Furdek's dream was realized when representatives of eight
such Slovak societies answered his call for a convention
at Cleveland, Ohio, September 4, 1890, and established
the First Catholic Slovak Union.
Today the First Catholic Slovruk Union is worth
$22,000,000.00; over 200,000 Slovaks joined it since it was
organized; the orgainization paid out some $40,000,000.00

�6

SLOV.A,~IA

in death benefits to widows and or,phans of its members;
another $5,000,000.00 in charity to individuals and institutions; and the Jednota Home for orphans, -opened in
1914, hras taken care of some 2,000 children of its members
who lost one or both of their parents. In addition, the organization has paid for the high school education of many
boys and girls who otherwise might have been deprived of
it, because relatives could not afford to give it to them.
Furdek and his followers, the members of the First
Catholic Slovak Union, also ·played a major role in establishing some 300 Catholic •Slovak parishes, 150 parochial
schools, several high schools; also St. Andrew's A:bbey of
Slovruk Benedictines, Cleveland, Ohio, the Slovruk Franciscan Fathers of Clifton, N. J., P1ttsburgh, Pa., and Valparaiso, Ind., the Order of Sisters of Sts. Cyril and 'Methodius, Danville, Pa., the Slovak Dominican Sisters, Oxford,
Mich., the Slovak Vincentian Sisters of Perrysville, Pa., and
Bedford, Ohio, the Slovak Franciscan Sisters of Bellevue,
Pa., Lacon, Ill., Bethlehem, Pa., and the Slovruk Btmedictine Sisters, Tinley Park, Ill.
The First Catholic Slov~k Union of the United States
and Canada has some 1100 subordinate branches with a
total membership of 98,000. There are branches of the organization at practically every Catholic SlovaJk parish, as
well as many non~Slovak parishes.
Father Stephen Furdek was a man of U!Illblemished
character, deep c01nvictions, and keen foresigiht; a man of
the highest princtples, intelligent, kind, patient, just, understanding, ever ready to forgive and advise, quick to
help and comfort the unfortunate. That is why Furdek
was loved and revered by his own people and respected
even by the enemies of his Church and nation.
Thoroughly familiar with the virtues and failings of his
people, Father Furdek did everything in his power to improve their material and spiritual -c ondition. All his labors
tended to uplift his Slovak countrymen. His heart and
haJnds were in practically every national and religious undertaking of the Slovaks in America. His only oomrplaitnt
seemed to be that he could not do enough for his God and

�SLOVAKIA

7

his people. Not only did he rouse the Slovaks of America
and the members of the organization he founded to be up
and doing, but he himself led the way, working selflessly
and tirelessly, and supporting generously the cause at
hand, whether it be a new church, a newly created foundation, a new school, the Holy Father, the domestic and
foreign missions, etc.
At the same time, however, Father Furdek was ever
mindful of the sad plight of the Slovaks beneath the Tatras, the land of his fathers . Not only was he aware of it,
but also decided to do something rubout it. He constantly appealed to the sons Ml.d daughters of the Slovak nation who
came to the shores of free America not to be ashamed of
their Slovak origin, but to proudly proclaim it. He appr~
ciated the blessings of freedom and wished to share them
with his less fortunate brethren in Slovakia. How many
times did Furdek sigh and pray "Lord, that our Slovak people over there might once enjoy the blessings of freedom
that are mine in America!" And Father Furdek and his
followers did much to alleviate the oppression of their
countrymen at home Mld inspired many others to do likewise.
The Slovak League of America, founded by Furdek in
J 907, Cleveland, Ohio, is aJso a going concern today. Unlike
the Jednota, the Slovaik League of Amerioa is not a fraternal insurance organi'zation, but a cultural and civic organizatioo of Americans of Slovruk desceint. Being an AmericMl institution it is primarily interested in promoting the welfare
and security of the United States of America. But it is also
interested in creating a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovaik nation, its histery, culture, traditions,
achievements, and its long, hard struggle for freedom and independence. As a truly American organization it is resolutely opposed to the domination and exploitation of t:he Slovak
nation by any other nation or political state. Like the other
orgamzations founded by Furdek, the Slovruk League consistently repudiates Ml.d condemns Marxist communism.
Father Furde'k believed that individuals . and nations
could better their lot if they drew their strength from the
rich, vital fountains of mO'ral forees, the foundation of

�8

SLOVAKIA

which are faith, religion and spiritual traditions. The circumstances that prevailed in Slovakia did not allow the
Slovruks to prosper materially. As a nation they were humbled and alien rulers repudiated their inherent, God-given
rights to freedom and independence. But spiritually, the
Slovak nation never was poor but, in fact, wealthier than
many other larger nations which were free and independent. The Slo'Vaks preserved their Christian character even
under the most adverse conditions, and generation after
generation preserved the individualistic traditions of the
Slovak s,pirit. Father Furdek knew that the Slovaks in
America did not have to surrender their character, their
national traditions, but could in fact even develop the spiritual heritage of their forefathers and thus with the
treasures of their own spirit contribute to the enrichment
of Americam life. Father Furdek always contended that
good Slovaks made good American citizens, that a Slovruk
who remained loyal to God and his own nation simply could
not become an unworthy citizen.
Father Stephen Furdek was also a writer and poet of
no mean a;bility. In 1891, he began publishing the newspaper "Jednota" (The Union) weekly, and fi'Ve years later
the annual "Kalendar Jednota" or Jednota Almanac as it
is called. Both are still being published by the First Catholic Slovak Union. Father Furdek not only ecli,ted these ,pu:blication.s, but also contributed heavily to them until his
death in 1915. He found time, too, to write for several
plllblications in Sloivakia. His was a very popular style; hL5
articles, stories, anecdotes and poems were relished 'by the
Slovruks of America amd Europe. In 1910, he pub1'ished the
book "S'Vet a jeho zahady" (The World and its Mysteries),
an apologetic wurk repudiating the atheistic theories of
scientists about the origin of the world and man.
The importance vf hruving a school in every ,S lovak
parish was highly appreciated and strongly advocated by
Father Furdelk. It could be used to great advantage by
both the young and the old. The latter could be instructed
in English, and the former in SlO'Vak. Furdek aippreciated
the fact that children especially .:ould not be expected to

�SLOVAKIA

9

love something that was unlknown to them; they could love
and a,ppreciate only wha.t they had an opportunity to become acquainted with. His Slovruk grammar and readers
for children did much to preserve the Slovak 1-anguage in
several generations of Slovaks in America.
Father Furdek endearvored to a&lt;!quaint Amerioans with
Slovakia and the Slov,a ks, and the latter wi~ America. To
win recogmtion for his people and preserve their good
name was one of the principle aims of Father FurdeJk. Up
to the time that Furdek began to pwblish his "Jedinota"
(1891), the Slova,ks were referred to as "Hungarians,
Huns, Sla,vish people, Slavonians, Slavs" - in a word, almost anything but what they really were. It was Furdek
who insisted on the appellation •~sLOVAKS" and appealed
to the readers of the J ednota in particU!lar to do likewise.
Father Furdek enjoyed universal popul,a rity and the
trust of his people. He was a man of great understanding,
tact and diplomacy. Furdek settled many arguments and
misunderstandings to the satisfaction of all parties COIIlcerned. An apostle of ,peace and tolerance, Furdek endeavored to a.void whatever might ca.use dissension and misunderstanding a,mong his people.
To those who did not know him well, Furdek appeared
to be cool, reserved and difficult to appl'Oach. That was
Furdek O!Il the outside. Inside, however, beat a heart of
gold, in fiact, Father Furdek was all heart. Furdek was not
easily irritated, possessing surpr,i sing self-contro'I. even under the most trying circumstances. Hleated debates might
be carried O!Il in his presence when, finally, he would be
called upon to settle the a:vgument in question. Furdek always spoke little, 1but said very much, carefully weighing
every word. He spoke softly, without any show of anger,
bitterness or aggravation; he was fair and objectirve towards friend and foe alike in private as well as public relations with them.
Father
culties and
thoroughly,
fered what

Furdek was not easily discouraged by diffidisappointmoots. He studied every problem
presented his views intelligently and then ofhe thought was the best soJution. When he

�10

SLOVAKIA

decided it was in the best interests of the F,iz,st Oaitholic
Slovak Union to change to the reserve system, he kept
hammering away at it, appealing and ~laining to the
membership and the delegates to the convention until the
proposition was approved. We know today that if it had
not been, the First CathoUc Slovak Union most liikely would
not be in existence today. When Father Furdek thought
it was time to seriously think of building a home for the
orphaned children of the memlbers of the Je&lt;lnota, he let
the membership know rubout it and set himself to the task
until the Jednota Home in Middletown, Pa., became a r~
ality in 1914. He also dreamed of building a high school
and a uniiversity on the Jednota Home property, and if the
good Lord had spared Furdek another decade, he undoubtedly would ha,ve promoted even these worthy objects successfully.
Ailing for several years, Father Furdek ga,ve up his
soul to its Maiker at 4 :40 p. m., January 18, 1915. The news
of his death spread liike fire throughout Slovaik settlements
in America; Slov~ks everywhere, Catholics aind non..Catholics alike, were deeply touched and mourned the passing
of the greatest Slovaik in America. After the solemn Requiem chanted by the Rt. Rev. Monsignor O'Reilly, Ohancellor of the Diocese of Cleveland, in our Lady of Lourdes
church, January 20, 1915, the earthly remains of Father
Furdek were laid to rest in ,t he CalV'ary Cemetery. Over
10,000 people, including Bishop J. M. Koudelka of Superior,
Wisconsin, 65 priests from Slovaik parishes of America,
the Supreme Officers of the First Catholic SlovaJk Union,
the Slovak League of America and other Slovak organizations, and many civic leaders, attended the last rites foc
Father Furdek.
Father Stephen Furdek, worthy son of the land of the
majestic Tatras and adopted son of the land of the free
and the home of the brave, fought the good fight, finished
the course, and kept the faith. He shall live in the 'hearts
of the Slovaks forever. Guided by his noble spirit they aire
determined to carry on the good fight ''Za Boha a na:rod"
until the end of time.

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1371">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA

3

APOSTLE OF A'MErRICAN SLOVAKS

THE REV. STEPHEN FURDEK
By Phi1ip A . Hrobak

Father Stephen Furdek was called to his eternal reward forty years ago, bwt his stature continues to grow
with the years. When Furrdek died on January 18, 1915,
he was mourned by Slovaks everywhere. Father Furdek
was, indeed, a great American, a good Slovak, an exemplary
priest of God, a true apostle of Christian charity, a successful organizer and leader of men.
Rev. Stephen Furdek was born September 2, 1856, in
the village of Trstena, Orava County, S1ovakia, materially
probably one of the poorest of the poor communities of
the land of the Tatras, which hras 'been inhabited 1zy Slovaks during the past 1500 years. It was there that Furdek completed his primary education as a boy. Then he
attended the gymnasium at Banska Bystrica, transferring
later to, the one at Nitra; and af.ter that he entered the
seminary at Nitra. Completing his studies at Nitra with
distinction, Furdek was sent to Pest University, where he
became, ill a short time later and returned to Nitra. After
recuperating, Fu.rdek taught school for a time in Straznice, Moravia, and then decided to study at the University
of Prague. It was here that he studied classical ,philology
for three years and became acquainted with Dr. Francis Bauer, rector of the seminary and, later, Cardinal and
Archbishop of the Olomouc archbishopric, with whom he
corresponded to his death. It was on the advice of Dr.
Bauer that Furdek entered the seminary at Prague to
complete his priestly studies. But he did not quite complete those there, because as a theologian in his fourth
year he answered the call of Bishop Richard Gilmour of
Cleveland, Ohio, for priests who could spook and understand Slovak and other SloV'anic languages. Parting wi:tlh
his family and acquaintances in Trstena, Furdek set sail
for America in March, 1882, and arrived in Cleveland,
Ohio, several weelks Irater.
··

�4

SLOVAKIA

In Cleveland, Furdek completed his studies for the
priesthood and was ordained priest July 1, 1882. His first
assignment was a chaplaincy at the Czech parish of St.
Wenceslaus. In .Aipril, 1883, Bishop Gilmour appointed him
pastor of the newly..founded congregation of Ourr Lady of
Lourdes in the East 55th and Broadway section of Cleveland. However, at the end of May, 1883, Bishop Gilmour
asked F1ather Furdek to take over the administration of
the St. Procopius parish on the West Side, where a disturbance had occurred. Father furdek acquiesced, listened
patiently to arguments proferred by the various ''warring"
factions, reconciled and set them straight and made the
parish a going concern. By February, 1884, Furdek was
back at his old post of Our Lady of Lorurdes parish, where
he labored successfully until his death in 1915.
In the meantime, quite a number of Slorvrukis had settled in the downtown Wood.land-Scorvill-Commercial Avenue section of Cleveland; they attended St. Joseph's church
on 23rd and Woodland Arvenue. Since the Franciscan Fathers there did not know Slovak or any related language,
the Slov~s begged F'ather Furdek to do something about
it. And he did. With the permission of the Bishop and the
Franciscans, F'ather Furdek made his appearance regularly at one of the Masses at St. Joseph's to preach and
instruct in Slov,aik, while one of the Franci,sca.n Fathers
read the Holy Mass.
As the number of Slovaik immigrants in Cleveland increased, they asked Father Furdek to help them esta;blish
a parish "of our own" - a Slovak parish. This he did in
1888, when a lot, 180 by 180 feet, was bought at the corner
of Corwin and Holton Avenues, just below Woodhill Road.
IDven the Magyars of the Buckeye Road area contributed
so that a wooden church was constructed on the site that
same year. That was the start of St. Ladislaus parish.
In 1890, at the request of his Bishop, Father Furdek
went to Europe to seeGc out priests who would serve the
spiritual needs of Slovaks, Slovenes and Croatians of the
Cleveland diocese. After completing his mission, Furdek
visited Lourdes and Rome and then returned to his parish
in Cleveland.

�SLOVAKIA

5

Father Furdek'.s entire life was a life of dedication
to God and his fellowmen. EJarly in life he adopted the
slogan "Za Boha a narod" (For God and nation) and adhered to it strictly throughout his life. The motto was
adopted by the organizations which Furdek founded: the
First Catholic Slovak Union of the United States of America (1890); the First Caitholic Slovak Ladies Union (1892);
the Slovak Institute (Slovenska Matica - 1893); the Slovak
League of America (1907); the National Fund, the Fund
to Preserve our National Heritage. F'u.rdek also organized
the St. Ladislaus parish in Cleveland and helped to found
many others, including the parish schools which were built
later.
The First Catholic Slovak Union is undoubtedly the
greatest achievement of Father Furdek's fruitful life. The
biography of Furdek is substantially the history of the
F'irst Catholic Slovak Union. Today this organization is the
largest fraternal benefit society of Slovaks in the world.
Furdek not only organized it, but was also its guiding
spirit throughout his life.
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Slovruks from the Tatra country were literally pouring into
America to better their economic lot and escape the political oppression of alien rulers at home. Furdek realized
that much more could be acomplished by an organization
than by an individual. He also knew that it was only natural for men to band together in a common cause. At the
close of the nineteenth century, Slovak immigrants in various cities of the United States had already organized
into benefit and social organizations on the local level.
Furdek put hi:s sights on a national organization, which
would do so much more "for God and nation." And Furdek's dream was realized when representatives of eight
such Slovak societies answered his call for a convention
at Cleveland, Ohio, September 4, 1890, and established
the First Catholic Slovak Union.
Today the First Catholic Slovruk Union is worth
$22,000,000.00; over 200,000 Slovaks joined it since it was
organized; the orgainization paid out some $40,000,000.00

�6

SLOV.A,~IA

in death benefits to widows and or,phans of its members;
another $5,000,000.00 in charity to individuals and institutions; and the Jednota Home for orphans, -opened in
1914, hras taken care of some 2,000 children of its members
who lost one or both of their parents. In addition, the organization has paid for the high school education of many
boys and girls who otherwise might have been deprived of
it, because relatives could not afford to give it to them.
Furdek and his followers, the members of the First
Catholic Slovak Union, also ·played a major role in establishing some 300 Catholic •Slovak parishes, 150 parochial
schools, several high schools; also St. Andrew's A:bbey of
Slovruk Benedictines, Cleveland, Ohio, the Slovruk Franciscan Fathers of Clifton, N. J., P1ttsburgh, Pa., and Valparaiso, Ind., the Order of Sisters of Sts. Cyril and 'Methodius, Danville, Pa., the Slovak Dominican Sisters, Oxford,
Mich., the Slovak Vincentian Sisters of Perrysville, Pa., and
Bedford, Ohio, the Slovak Franciscan Sisters of Bellevue,
Pa., Lacon, Ill., Bethlehem, Pa., and the Slovruk Btmedictine Sisters, Tinley Park, Ill.
The First Catholic Slov~k Union of the United States
and Canada has some 1100 subordinate branches with a
total membership of 98,000. There are branches of the organization at practically every Catholic SlovaJk parish, as
well as many non~Slovak parishes.
Father Stephen Furdek was a man of U!Illblemished
character, deep c01nvictions, and keen foresigiht; a man of
the highest princtples, intelligent, kind, patient, just, understanding, ever ready to forgive and advise, quick to
help and comfort the unfortunate. That is why Furdek
was loved and revered by his own people and respected
even by the enemies of his Church and nation.
Thoroughly familiar with the virtues and failings of his
people, Father Furdek did everything in his power to improve their material and spiritual -c ondition. All his labors
tended to uplift his Slovak countrymen. His heart and
haJnds were in practically every national and religious undertaking of the Slovaks in America. His only oomrplaitnt
seemed to be that he could not do enough for his God and

�SLOVAKIA

7

his people. Not only did he rouse the Slovaks of America
and the members of the organization he founded to be up
and doing, but he himself led the way, working selflessly
and tirelessly, and supporting generously the cause at
hand, whether it be a new church, a newly created foundation, a new school, the Holy Father, the domestic and
foreign missions, etc.
At the same time, however, Father Furdek was ever
mindful of the sad plight of the Slovaks beneath the Tatras, the land of his fathers . Not only was he aware of it,
but also decided to do something rubout it. He constantly appealed to the sons Ml.d daughters of the Slovak nation who
came to the shores of free America not to be ashamed of
their Slovak origin, but to proudly proclaim it. He appr~
ciated the blessings of freedom and wished to share them
with his less fortunate brethren in Slovakia. How many
times did Furdek sigh and pray "Lord, that our Slovak people over there might once enjoy the blessings of freedom
that are mine in America!" And Father Furdek and his
followers did much to alleviate the oppression of their
countrymen at home Mld inspired many others to do likewise.
The Slovak League of America, founded by Furdek in
J 907, Cleveland, Ohio, is aJso a going concern today. Unlike
the Jednota, the Slovaik League of Amerioa is not a fraternal insurance organi'zation, but a cultural and civic organizatioo of Americans of Slovruk desceint. Being an AmericMl institution it is primarily interested in promoting the welfare
and security of the United States of America. But it is also
interested in creating a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovaik nation, its histery, culture, traditions,
achievements, and its long, hard struggle for freedom and independence. As a truly American organization it is resolutely opposed to the domination and exploitation of t:he Slovak
nation by any other nation or political state. Like the other
orgamzations founded by Furdek, the Slovruk League consistently repudiates Ml.d condemns Marxist communism.
Father Furde'k believed that individuals . and nations
could better their lot if they drew their strength from the
rich, vital fountains of mO'ral forees, the foundation of

�8

SLOVAKIA

which are faith, religion and spiritual traditions. The circumstances that prevailed in Slovakia did not allow the
Slovruks to prosper materially. As a nation they were humbled and alien rulers repudiated their inherent, God-given
rights to freedom and independence. But spiritually, the
Slovak nation never was poor but, in fact, wealthier than
many other larger nations which were free and independent. The Slo'Vaks preserved their Christian character even
under the most adverse conditions, and generation after
generation preserved the individualistic traditions of the
Slovak s,pirit. Father Furdek knew that the Slovaks in
America did not have to surrender their character, their
national traditions, but could in fact even develop the spiritual heritage of their forefathers and thus with the
treasures of their own spirit contribute to the enrichment
of Americam life. Father Furdek always contended that
good Slovaks made good American citizens, that a Slovruk
who remained loyal to God and his own nation simply could
not become an unworthy citizen.
Father Stephen Furdek was also a writer and poet of
no mean a;bility. In 1891, he began publishing the newspaper "Jednota" (The Union) weekly, and fi'Ve years later
the annual "Kalendar Jednota" or Jednota Almanac as it
is called. Both are still being published by the First Catholic Slovak Union. Father Furdek not only ecli,ted these ,pu:blication.s, but also contributed heavily to them until his
death in 1915. He found time, too, to write for several
plllblications in Sloivakia. His was a very popular style; hL5
articles, stories, anecdotes and poems were relished 'by the
Slovruks of America amd Europe. In 1910, he pub1'ished the
book "S'Vet a jeho zahady" (The World and its Mysteries),
an apologetic wurk repudiating the atheistic theories of
scientists about the origin of the world and man.
The importance vf hruving a school in every ,S lovak
parish was highly appreciated and strongly advocated by
Father Furdelk. It could be used to great advantage by
both the young and the old. The latter could be instructed
in English, and the former in SlO'Vak. Furdek aippreciated
the fact that children especially .:ould not be expected to

�SLOVAKIA

9

love something that was unlknown to them; they could love
and a,ppreciate only wha.t they had an opportunity to become acquainted with. His Slovruk grammar and readers
for children did much to preserve the Slovak 1-anguage in
several generations of Slovaks in America.
Father Furdek endearvored to a&lt;!quaint Amerioans with
Slovakia and the Slov,a ks, and the latter wi~ America. To
win recogmtion for his people and preserve their good
name was one of the principle aims of Father FurdeJk. Up
to the time that Furdek began to pwblish his "Jedinota"
(1891), the Slova,ks were referred to as "Hungarians,
Huns, Sla,vish people, Slavonians, Slavs" - in a word, almost anything but what they really were. It was Furdek
who insisted on the appellation •~sLOVAKS" and appealed
to the readers of the J ednota in particU!lar to do likewise.
Father Furdek enjoyed universal popul,a rity and the
trust of his people. He was a man of great understanding,
tact and diplomacy. Furdek settled many arguments and
misunderstandings to the satisfaction of all parties COIIlcerned. An apostle of ,peace and tolerance, Furdek endeavored to a.void whatever might ca.use dissension and misunderstanding a,mong his people.
To those who did not know him well, Furdek appeared
to be cool, reserved and difficult to appl'Oach. That was
Furdek O!Il the outside. Inside, however, beat a heart of
gold, in fiact, Father Furdek was all heart. Furdek was not
easily irritated, possessing surpr,i sing self-contro'I. even under the most trying circumstances. Hleated debates might
be carried O!Il in his presence when, finally, he would be
called upon to settle the a:vgument in question. Furdek always spoke little, 1but said very much, carefully weighing
every word. He spoke softly, without any show of anger,
bitterness or aggravation; he was fair and objectirve towards friend and foe alike in private as well as public relations with them.
Father
culties and
thoroughly,
fered what

Furdek was not easily discouraged by diffidisappointmoots. He studied every problem
presented his views intelligently and then ofhe thought was the best soJution. When he

�10

SLOVAKIA

decided it was in the best interests of the F,iz,st Oaitholic
Slovak Union to change to the reserve system, he kept
hammering away at it, appealing and ~laining to the
membership and the delegates to the convention until the
proposition was approved. We know today that if it had
not been, the First CathoUc Slovak Union most liikely would
not be in existence today. When Father Furdek thought
it was time to seriously think of building a home for the
orphaned children of the memlbers of the Je&lt;lnota, he let
the membership know rubout it and set himself to the task
until the Jednota Home in Middletown, Pa., became a r~
ality in 1914. He also dreamed of building a high school
and a uniiversity on the Jednota Home property, and if the
good Lord had spared Furdek another decade, he undoubtedly would ha,ve promoted even these worthy objects successfully.
Ailing for several years, Father Furdek ga,ve up his
soul to its Maiker at 4 :40 p. m., January 18, 1915. The news
of his death spread liike fire throughout Slovaik settlements
in America; Slov~ks everywhere, Catholics aind non..Catholics alike, were deeply touched and mourned the passing
of the greatest Slovaik in America. After the solemn Requiem chanted by the Rt. Rev. Monsignor O'Reilly, Ohancellor of the Diocese of Cleveland, in our Lady of Lourdes
church, January 20, 1915, the earthly remains of Father
Furdek were laid to rest in ,t he CalV'ary Cemetery. Over
10,000 people, including Bishop J. M. Koudelka of Superior,
Wisconsin, 65 priests from Slovaik parishes of America,
the Supreme Officers of the First Catholic SlovaJk Union,
the Slovak League of America and other Slovak organizations, and many civic leaders, attended the last rites foc
Father Furdek.
Father Stephen Furdek, worthy son of the land of the
majestic Tatras and adopted son of the land of the free
and the home of the brave, fought the good fight, finished
the course, and kept the faith. He shall live in the 'hearts
of the Slovaks forever. Guided by his noble spirit they aire
determined to carry on the good fight ''Za Boha a na:rod"
until the end of time.

�</text>
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            <element elementId="50">
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              <description>A name given to the resource</description>
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                <elementText elementTextId="18">
                  <text>1955, Vol. 5</text>
                </elementText>
              </elementTextContainer>
            </element>
            <element elementId="41">
              <name>Description</name>
              <description>An account of the resource</description>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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                  <text>1955</text>
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
3&#13;
&#13;
APOSTLE OF A'MErRICAN SLOVAKS&#13;
&#13;
THE REV. STEPHEN FURDEK&#13;
By Phi1ip A . Hrobak&#13;
&#13;
Father Stephen Furdek was called to his eternal reward forty years ago, bwt his stature continues to grow&#13;
with the years. When Furrdek died on January 18, 1915,&#13;
he was mourned by Slovaks everywhere. Father Furdek&#13;
was, indeed, a great American, a good Slovak, an exemplary&#13;
priest of God, a true apostle of Christian charity, a successful organizer and leader of men.&#13;
Rev. Stephen Furdek was born September 2, 1856, in&#13;
the village of Trstena, Orava County, S1ovakia, materially&#13;
probably one of the poorest of the poor communities of&#13;
the land of the Tatras, which hras 'been inhabited 1zy Slovaks during the past 1500 years. It was there that Furdek completed his primary education as a boy. Then he&#13;
attended the gymnasium at Banska Bystrica, transferring&#13;
later to, the one at Nitra; and af.ter that he entered the&#13;
seminary at Nitra. Completing his studies at Nitra with&#13;
distinction, Furdek was sent to Pest University, where he&#13;
became, ill a short time later and returned to Nitra. After&#13;
recuperating, Fu.rdek taught school for a time in Straznice, Moravia, and then decided to study at the University&#13;
of Prague. It was here that he studied classical ,philology&#13;
for three years and became acquainted with Dr. Francis Bauer, rector of the seminary and, later, Cardinal and&#13;
Archbishop of the Olomouc archbishopric, with whom he&#13;
corresponded to his death. It was on the advice of Dr.&#13;
Bauer that Furdek entered the seminary at Prague to&#13;
complete his priestly studies. But he did not quite complete those there, because as a theologian in his fourth&#13;
year he answered the call of Bishop Richard Gilmour of&#13;
Cleveland, Ohio, for priests who could spook and understand Slovak and other SloV'anic languages. Parting wi:tlh&#13;
his family and acquaintances in Trstena, Furdek set sail&#13;
for America in March, 1882, and arrived in Cleveland,&#13;
Ohio, several weelks Irater.&#13;
··&#13;
&#13;
4&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
In Cleveland, Furdek completed his studies for the&#13;
priesthood and was ordained priest July 1, 1882. His first&#13;
assignment was a chaplaincy at the Czech parish of St.&#13;
Wenceslaus. In .Aipril, 1883, Bishop Gilmour appointed him&#13;
pastor of the newly..founded congregation of Ourr Lady of&#13;
Lourdes in the East 55th and Broadway section of Cleveland. However, at the end of May, 1883, Bishop Gilmour&#13;
asked F1ather Furdek to take over the administration of&#13;
the St. Procopius parish on the West Side, where a disturbance had occurred. Father furdek acquiesced, listened&#13;
patiently to arguments proferred by the various ''warring"&#13;
factions, reconciled and set them straight and made the&#13;
parish a going concern. By February, 1884, Furdek was&#13;
back at his old post of Our Lady of Lorurdes parish, where&#13;
he labored successfully until his death in 1915.&#13;
In the meantime, quite a number of Slorvrukis had settled in the downtown Wood.land-Scorvill-Commercial Avenue section of Cleveland; they attended St. Joseph's church&#13;
on 23rd and Woodland Arvenue. Since the Franciscan Fathers there did not know Slovak or any related language,&#13;
the Slov~s begged F'ather Furdek to do something about&#13;
it. And he did. With the permission of the Bishop and the&#13;
Franciscans, F'ather Furdek made his appearance regularly at one of the Masses at St. Joseph's to preach and&#13;
instruct in Slov,aik, while one of the Franci,sca.n Fathers&#13;
read the Holy Mass.&#13;
As the number of Slovaik immigrants in Cleveland increased, they asked Father Furdek to help them esta;blish&#13;
a parish "of our own" - a Slovak parish. This he did in&#13;
1888, when a lot, 180 by 180 feet, was bought at the corner&#13;
of Corwin and Holton Avenues, just below Woodhill Road.&#13;
IDven the Magyars of the Buckeye Road area contributed&#13;
so that a wooden church was constructed on the site that&#13;
same year. That was the start of St. Ladislaus parish.&#13;
In 1890, at the request of his Bishop, Father Furdek&#13;
went to Europe to seeGc out priests who would serve the&#13;
spiritual needs of Slovaks, Slovenes and Croatians of the&#13;
Cleveland diocese. After completing his mission, Furdek&#13;
visited Lourdes and Rome and then returned to his parish&#13;
in Cleveland.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
5&#13;
&#13;
Father Furdek'.s entire life was a life of dedication&#13;
to God and his fellowmen. EJarly in life he adopted the&#13;
slogan "Za Boha a narod" (For God and nation) and adhered to it strictly throughout his life. The motto was&#13;
adopted by the organizations which Furdek founded: the&#13;
First Catholic Slovak Union of the United States of America (1890); the First Caitholic Slovak Ladies Union (1892);&#13;
the Slovak Institute (Slovenska Matica - 1893); the Slovak&#13;
League of America (1907); the National Fund, the Fund&#13;
to Preserve our National Heritage. F'u.rdek also organized&#13;
the St. Ladislaus parish in Cleveland and helped to found&#13;
many others, including the parish schools which were built&#13;
later.&#13;
The First Catholic Slovak Union is undoubtedly the&#13;
greatest achievement of Father Furdek's fruitful life. The&#13;
biography of Furdek is substantially the history of the&#13;
F'irst Catholic Slovak Union. Today this organization is the&#13;
largest fraternal benefit society of Slovaks in the world.&#13;
Furdek not only organized it, but was also its guiding&#13;
spirit throughout his life.&#13;
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Slovruks from the Tatra country were literally pouring into&#13;
America to better their economic lot and escape the political oppression of alien rulers at home. Furdek realized&#13;
that much more could be acomplished by an organization&#13;
than by an individual. He also knew that it was only natural for men to band together in a common cause. At the&#13;
close of the nineteenth century, Slovak immigrants in various cities of the United States had already organized&#13;
into benefit and social organizations on the local level.&#13;
Furdek put hi:s sights on a national organization, which&#13;
would do so much more "for God and nation." And Furdek's dream was realized when representatives of eight&#13;
such Slovak societies answered his call for a convention&#13;
at Cleveland, Ohio, September 4, 1890, and established&#13;
the First Catholic Slovak Union.&#13;
Today the First Catholic Slovruk Union is worth&#13;
$22,000,000.00; over 200,000 Slovaks joined it since it was&#13;
organized; the orgainization paid out some $40,000,000.00&#13;
&#13;
6&#13;
&#13;
SLOV.A,~IA&#13;
&#13;
in death benefits to widows and or,phans of its members;&#13;
another $5,000,000.00 in charity to individuals and institutions; and the Jednota Home for orphans, -opened in&#13;
1914, hras taken care of some 2,000 children of its members&#13;
who lost one or both of their parents. In addition, the organization has paid for the high school education of many&#13;
boys and girls who otherwise might have been deprived of&#13;
it, because relatives could not afford to give it to them.&#13;
Furdek and his followers, the members of the First&#13;
Catholic Slovak Union, also ·played a major role in establishing some 300 Catholic •Slovak parishes, 150 parochial&#13;
schools, several high schools; also St. Andrew's A:bbey of&#13;
Slovruk Benedictines, Cleveland, Ohio, the Slovruk Franciscan Fathers of Clifton, N. J., P1ttsburgh, Pa., and Valparaiso, Ind., the Order of Sisters of Sts. Cyril and 'Methodius, Danville, Pa., the Slovak Dominican Sisters, Oxford,&#13;
Mich., the Slovak Vincentian Sisters of Perrysville, Pa., and&#13;
Bedford, Ohio, the Slovak Franciscan Sisters of Bellevue,&#13;
Pa., Lacon, Ill., Bethlehem, Pa., and the Slovruk Btmedictine Sisters, Tinley Park, Ill.&#13;
The First Catholic Slov~k Union of the United States&#13;
and Canada has some 1100 subordinate branches with a&#13;
total membership of 98,000. There are branches of the organization at practically every Catholic SlovaJk parish, as&#13;
well as many non~Slovak parishes.&#13;
Father Stephen Furdek was a man of U!Illblemished&#13;
character, deep c01nvictions, and keen foresigiht; a man of&#13;
the highest princtples, intelligent, kind, patient, just, understanding, ever ready to forgive and advise, quick to&#13;
help and comfort the unfortunate. That is why Furdek&#13;
was loved and revered by his own people and respected&#13;
even by the enemies of his Church and nation.&#13;
Thoroughly familiar with the virtues and failings of his&#13;
people, Father Furdek did everything in his power to improve their material and spiritual -c ondition. All his labors&#13;
tended to uplift his Slovak countrymen. His heart and&#13;
haJnds were in practically every national and religious undertaking of the Slovaks in America. His only oomrplaitnt&#13;
seemed to be that he could not do enough for his God and&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
7&#13;
&#13;
his people. Not only did he rouse the Slovaks of America&#13;
and the members of the organization he founded to be up&#13;
and doing, but he himself led the way, working selflessly&#13;
and tirelessly, and supporting generously the cause at&#13;
hand, whether it be a new church, a newly created foundation, a new school, the Holy Father, the domestic and&#13;
foreign missions, etc.&#13;
At the same time, however, Father Furdek was ever&#13;
mindful of the sad plight of the Slovaks beneath the Tatras, the land of his fathers . Not only was he aware of it,&#13;
but also decided to do something rubout it. He constantly appealed to the sons Ml.d daughters of the Slovak nation who&#13;
came to the shores of free America not to be ashamed of&#13;
their Slovak origin, but to proudly proclaim it. He appr~&#13;
ciated the blessings of freedom and wished to share them&#13;
with his less fortunate brethren in Slovakia. How many&#13;
times did Furdek sigh and pray "Lord, that our Slovak people over there might once enjoy the blessings of freedom&#13;
that are mine in America!" And Father Furdek and his&#13;
followers did much to alleviate the oppression of their&#13;
countrymen at home Mld inspired many others to do likewise.&#13;
The Slovak League of America, founded by Furdek in&#13;
J 907, Cleveland, Ohio, is aJso a going concern today. Unlike&#13;
the Jednota, the Slovaik League of Amerioa is not a fraternal insurance organi'zation, but a cultural and civic organizatioo of Americans of Slovruk desceint. Being an AmericMl institution it is primarily interested in promoting the welfare&#13;
and security of the United States of America. But it is also&#13;
interested in creating a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovaik nation, its histery, culture, traditions,&#13;
achievements, and its long, hard struggle for freedom and independence. As a truly American organization it is resolutely opposed to the domination and exploitation of t:he Slovak&#13;
nation by any other nation or political state. Like the other&#13;
orgamzations founded by Furdek, the Slovruk League consistently repudiates Ml.d condemns Marxist communism.&#13;
Father Furde'k believed that individuals . and nations&#13;
could better their lot if they drew their strength from the&#13;
rich, vital fountains of mO'ral forees, the foundation of&#13;
&#13;
8&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
which are faith, religion and spiritual traditions. The circumstances that prevailed in Slovakia did not allow the&#13;
Slovruks to prosper materially. As a nation they were humbled and alien rulers repudiated their inherent, God-given&#13;
rights to freedom and independence. But spiritually, the&#13;
Slovak nation never was poor but, in fact, wealthier than&#13;
many other larger nations which were free and independent. The Slo'Vaks preserved their Christian character even&#13;
under the most adverse conditions, and generation after&#13;
generation preserved the individualistic traditions of the&#13;
Slovak s,pirit. Father Furdek knew that the Slovaks in&#13;
America did not have to surrender their character, their&#13;
national traditions, but could in fact even develop the spiritual heritage of their forefathers and thus with the&#13;
treasures of their own spirit contribute to the enrichment&#13;
of Americam life. Father Furdek always contended that&#13;
good Slovaks made good American citizens, that a Slovruk&#13;
who remained loyal to God and his own nation simply could&#13;
not become an unworthy citizen.&#13;
Father Stephen Furdek was also a writer and poet of&#13;
no mean a;bility. In 1891, he began publishing the newspaper "Jednota" (The Union) weekly, and fi'Ve years later&#13;
the annual "Kalendar Jednota" or Jednota Almanac as it&#13;
is called. Both are still being published by the First Catholic Slovak Union. Father Furdek not only ecli,ted these ,pu:blication.s, but also contributed heavily to them until his&#13;
death in 1915. He found time, too, to write for several&#13;
plllblications in Sloivakia. His was a very popular style; hL5&#13;
articles, stories, anecdotes and poems were relished 'by the&#13;
Slovruks of America amd Europe. In 1910, he pub1'ished the&#13;
book "S'Vet a jeho zahady" (The World and its Mysteries),&#13;
an apologetic wurk repudiating the atheistic theories of&#13;
scientists about the origin of the world and man.&#13;
The importance vf hruving a school in every ,S lovak&#13;
parish was highly appreciated and strongly advocated by&#13;
Father Furdelk. It could be used to great advantage by&#13;
both the young and the old. The latter could be instructed&#13;
in English, and the former in SlO'Vak. Furdek aippreciated&#13;
the fact that children especially .:ould not be expected to&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
9&#13;
&#13;
love something that was unlknown to them; they could love&#13;
and a,ppreciate only wha.t they had an opportunity to become acquainted with. His Slovruk grammar and readers&#13;
for children did much to preserve the Slovak 1-anguage in&#13;
several generations of Slovaks in America.&#13;
Father Furdek endearvored to a&lt;!quaint Amerioans with&#13;
Slovakia and the Slov,a ks, and the latter wi~ America. To&#13;
win recogmtion for his people and preserve their good&#13;
name was one of the principle aims of Father FurdeJk. Up&#13;
to the time that Furdek began to pwblish his "Jedinota"&#13;
(1891), the Slova,ks were referred to as "Hungarians,&#13;
Huns, Sla,vish people, Slavonians, Slavs" - in a word, almost anything but what they really were. It was Furdek&#13;
who insisted on the appellation •~sLOVAKS" and appealed&#13;
to the readers of the J ednota in particU!lar to do likewise.&#13;
Father Furdek enjoyed universal popul,a rity and the&#13;
trust of his people. He was a man of great understanding,&#13;
tact and diplomacy. Furdek settled many arguments and&#13;
misunderstandings to the satisfaction of all parties COIIlcerned. An apostle of ,peace and tolerance, Furdek endeavored to a.void whatever might ca.use dissension and misunderstanding a,mong his people.&#13;
To those who did not know him well, Furdek appeared&#13;
to be cool, reserved and difficult to appl'Oach. That was&#13;
Furdek O!Il the outside. Inside, however, beat a heart of&#13;
gold, in fiact, Father Furdek was all heart. Furdek was not&#13;
easily irritated, possessing surpr,i sing self-contro'I. even under the most trying circumstances. Hleated debates might&#13;
be carried O!Il in his presence when, finally, he would be&#13;
called upon to settle the a:vgument in question. Furdek always spoke little, 1but said very much, carefully weighing&#13;
every word. He spoke softly, without any show of anger,&#13;
bitterness or aggravation; he was fair and objectirve towards friend and foe alike in private as well as public relations with them.&#13;
Father&#13;
culties and&#13;
thoroughly,&#13;
fered what&#13;
&#13;
Furdek was not easily discouraged by diffidisappointmoots. He studied every problem&#13;
presented his views intelligently and then ofhe thought was the best soJution. When he&#13;
&#13;
10&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
decided it was in the best interests of the F,iz,st Oaitholic&#13;
Slovak Union to change to the reserve system, he kept&#13;
hammering away at it, appealing and ~laining to the&#13;
membership and the delegates to the convention until the&#13;
proposition was approved. We know today that if it had&#13;
not been, the First CathoUc Slovak Union most liikely would&#13;
not be in existence today. When Father Furdek thought&#13;
it was time to seriously think of building a home for the&#13;
orphaned children of the memlbers of the Je&lt;lnota, he let&#13;
the membership know rubout it and set himself to the task&#13;
until the Jednota Home in Middletown, Pa., became a r~&#13;
ality in 1914. He also dreamed of building a high school&#13;
and a uniiversity on the Jednota Home property, and if the&#13;
good Lord had spared Furdek another decade, he undoubtedly would ha,ve promoted even these worthy objects successfully.&#13;
Ailing for several years, Father Furdek ga,ve up his&#13;
soul to its Maiker at 4 :40 p. m., January 18, 1915. The news&#13;
of his death spread liike fire throughout Slovaik settlements&#13;
in America; Slov~ks everywhere, Catholics aind non..Catholics alike, were deeply touched and mourned the passing&#13;
of the greatest Slovaik in America. After the solemn Requiem chanted by the Rt. Rev. Monsignor O'Reilly, Ohancellor of the Diocese of Cleveland, in our Lady of Lourdes&#13;
church, January 20, 1915, the earthly remains of Father&#13;
Furdek were laid to rest in ,t he CalV'ary Cemetery. Over&#13;
10,000 people, including Bishop J. M. Koudelka of Superior,&#13;
Wisconsin, 65 priests from Slovaik parishes of America,&#13;
the Supreme Officers of the First Catholic SlovaJk Union,&#13;
the Slovak League of America and other Slovak organizations, and many civic leaders, attended the last rites foc&#13;
Father Furdek.&#13;
Father Stephen Furdek, worthy son of the land of the&#13;
majestic Tatras and adopted son of the land of the free&#13;
and the home of the brave, fought the good fight, finished&#13;
the course, and kept the faith. He shall live in the 'hearts&#13;
of the Slovaks forever. Guided by his noble spirit they aire&#13;
determined to carry on the good fight ''Za Boha a na:rod"&#13;
until the end of time.&#13;
&#13;
</text>
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                <text>The Rev. Stephen Furdek</text>
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Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), June-September 1955&#13;
pp. 3-10</text>
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

11

REMAR~S OF HON. ALVIN M. BENTLEY
{iBefore the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak Lea gue
of America in Washington, May 23, 1955)

I am, of course, happy to be here with Mrs. Bentley
thts evening with so many of our good Slovak friends from
Michigan and elsewhere throughout the country. I remember two years ago when I had inserted in the Congressional Record an article from the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and how many letters of protest I received from
your members throughout the country. I was, frankly,
at that time quite amazed to learn how widespread was
your organization. For many reasons, of course, I am
happy that my subsequent actions have only evoked commendation from you.
In my talks with your members, both in Michigan and
here in Washington, I have come to realize that one of
your greatest difficulties lies with the Free Europe Committee and, specifically with Radio Free Europe and its
apparent tendency to swbordinate Slovak matters to Cze&lt;:h
or, rather, to "Czecho~lovak" matters.
Now I have had occasion in the past to deal with
Radio Free Europe and with its director, Mr. Whitney
Shepardson. I have broadcast over their facilities, both
here in the United States and in Germany. Concerning
the work they are doing in their broadcasts to Poland,
Hungary and many of the other satellites, I think there
can be little or no criticism. From my own experiences
behind the Iron Curtain and from my contacts since I left
there, I should say that Radio Free Europe has as great,
if not greater, audience than any other media of propaganda used by the free world. So, on the whole, we must
admit the RFE is performing a useful and valuable task.
Only in this matter of Czech and Slovak programs have
we run into a problem.
About two months ago, I wrote Mr. Shepardson, expressing my concern in this matter and asking him for a
public statement of policy in this respect. I have here the
text of his reply, dated April 19, and I think it is important enough to read to you at this time:

�12

SLOVAKIA

Dear Congressman Bentley:
You ask in your letter of March 25 for a public statement of this Committee's policy with respect to the Slovruk question. I am glad to note that what you have in
mind, specifically, is that we arrive at as nearly an equal
balance as possible of Czech and Slovak persons on our
staff - and I presume, of air time on Radio Free Europe.
I say this because at bottom the Slovak question concerns
the future political status of the people of Slovakia. This
is, of course, something which lies wholly outside the competence of the Free Europe Committee. We are not a
foreign office, we are a political warfare organization. We
try to follow United States policy, we do not U111dertake to
make it.
United States policy, we are informed, favors the
eventual restoration of a truly democratic Republic of
Czechoslovak ia ; it does not favor the establishment of a
Republic of Slovakia. (As I will point out later, I think
Mr. Shepardson is mistaken in this belief). Radio Free
Europe is not obliged to reiterate this fact in its broadcasts to Czechs and Slovaks, and indeed it does not do so :
It refrains from discussing it. This means also that it refrains and indeed it should refrain, in view of U. S. policy
- from promoting Slovak separatism over its facilities.
As to Czech and Slovak personnel and air time, by
equal I take it you mean equitable, since, according to statistics as of February 1955 published by the Prague regime, the proportion of Slovaks to Czechs in Czechoslovakia was 34 percent. 2,990,000 Slovaks and 8,870,000
Czechs. As to Radio Free Europe air time. the Slovak proportion is 67 percent of the Czech ( 40 percent of the total
of 113½ hours a week). Here is a breakdown of our employment records:
Ratio of

Czech

RFE New York
1. Employees full time

18

Slovak

6

Slovaks
To Czech s

33 %

�13

SLOVAKIA

2.

Freelance employed in 1954

Total
RFffi Munich
l.Employees at radio desk
Employees Production Dept.

51

31

60 %

69

37

44 %

72
30

26
13

36 1/c
40 %

39 %
39
102
Broadcasting total
26 %
26
98
1954
in
employed
2. Freelance
%
16
6
36
Munich, non-broadcasting
The total broadcasting staff includes 120 Czechs and
45 Slovaks, the latter in the ratio of 38 percent. The freelance record for 1954 is 149 Czechs and 57 Slovaks, the
Slovak ratio being again 38 percent. In non~broadcasting
(common labor, etc.) the Slovak proportion is 16 percent
and is probably a fair reflection of the escapee situation
in Germany.
Statistics by themselves never tell the whole story,
and something must be added to these figures:
The function of the Free Europe Committee is not to
concern itself with future political and territorial arrangements in Europe. Its function is to carry on the present
fight against Communism, especially behind the Iron Curtain. To carry on that fight successfully, it must have the
good will of the peoples it addresses: Therefore, it seeks
to win the approval of the people of Slovakia. To this end,
it invites into the service Slovak escapees of talent who,
speaking in their own name (not in the name of the U. S.
Government or of the American people), inform their captive fellow-countrymen of what is going on in the free
world, report evidences of American (particularly SlovakAmericrun) concern for their fate, support them in their
struggle against the Communist oppressors, instill in them
the hope of eventually regaining their freedom, and sustain their deep spirit of non-cooperation with the Communist regime.
How do our Slovak co-workers contribute to our common purposes? They listen to the Comunist radio day and
night. They read the Communist press. They interview Slovaik escapees. They watch events in Soviet Russia and
neighboring countries and estimate the impact of those

�14

SLOV.MGA.

events upon Slovakia. They seek to learn and respond to
what is in the mind of the Slovak listeners this very day .
They ask themselves: What is the particular form of oppression the Slovaks are at this moment undergoing?
What is their present hope or fear? What is happening
to the wife and children, the church, the living standard,
the spiritual and cultural life of the Slovak peasant and
worker? How weak or strong are the regime and the party
at this time?
For these reasons, our Slovak staff must be chosen
for its intimate knowledge of present-day Slovakia and for
its professional competence, not its party allegiance. It
must be made u:e, so far as possible, of recent or fairly
recent escapees, men and women, who haVe had experience with life under Communism in Slovakia; but they
must at the same time be editors, writers, actors, radio producers and other professionals experienced in our work.
Our staff possesses this competence and this experience. And they are patriots, not partisans. The cause of
the people, not the cause of this or that faction is what
they work for. You are aware that they have been both
criticized and defended right inside Slov3Jk separatist circles. Some are Protestant, some are Catholic. Some are Czechoslovruk federalists, some even sepaTatists. We hono.r
them all for their belief that they must get on with the
fight against Communism and wait to cross the separatist
bridge, or federalist bridge, until they come to it, which is
to say, until the time when the Slavak people will be free
to speak for themselves.
I am sure that we have your sympathetic understanding. I am happy to think that you will interpret our position to the American Slovak League as you have interpreted theirs to us, and I send our respectful regrurds to
you.
Yours sincerely,
(s) WHITNEY S. SHEPARDSON.
There you have the official statement of policy of the
Free Europe Committee on the whole Slovak question.

�SLOVAKIA

15

Now I know that many, if not all of you, would have much
fault to find with this letter. Only ten days ago I received
a ten-page letter from Phil Hrobak after I had sent him a
copy of the Shepardson letter. But let me go back and refer to the one great mistake which I think Mr. Shepardson
maikes when he speaks of the policy of our government regarding the Slovak question and when he says: "United
States policy, we are informed, favors the eventual restoration of a truly democratic Republic of Czechoslovakia;
it does not favor the establishment of a Republic of Slovakia."
On April 25, I wrote the Secretary of State and directed his attention to that sentence. I went on to say:
"Although I am aware that thi,s government never entered
into diplomatic relations with the war-time government of
the Republic of Slovakia but, on the contrary, has maintained such recognition with the Republic of Czechoslovakia ever since its inception, I nevertheless presume to request a statement of the Department's
thinking in regard to tlhis i mp or t a n t matter. I
have always been under the firm impression that this government properly considered the political status of the enslaved countries, following their liberation, to be one for
the peo•ples of those countries to determine for themselves
That is to say, that such status would be resolved by
means o.f independent self-determination consistent with a
proper regard for the rights and privileges of their neighbors and founded upon the ideas of justice and freedom
for all.
"I, therefore, hesitate to believe that this government
has committed itself to a continuation of the Republic of
Czecho,s lovakia at such a time as the liberation of that
country may truke place. I would rather believe that the
Department has not committed itself in the future to either
the idea of Czechoslovakia or of independent Slovakia but
that it would make its own decision and base its own support on whatever form of government or governments the
people of that area should freely choose at the time they
may be aible to enjoy such freedom of choice."

�16

SLOVAKIA

The reply from the Department of State dated May 2
sets forth the official position of our government in this
respect and I presume you will be interested in hearing
this also:
"In dealing with Central and IDastern European states,
their territorial organization, and their national composition, the policy of the department has been predicated on
the belief that support for the principle of self-determination makes it incumbent on us to await a conclusive manifestation of the will of the people of those states under
free conditions, and to consider fully the consequences of
any action in favor o.f a new state from the standpoint of
the stability, security and economic viability of Central and
Eastern Europe generally. The focus of this policy is on
the creation of conditions under which the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe will be able freely to determine
their own governmental and economic institutions, as well
as their relationships with each other and with the other
peoples of Europe.
"With respect to the question of the future territorial
organization of Czechoslova;kia, it is the view of the department that the Czech and Slovak peoples should themselves determine under free conditions whether they will
continue to live together in a common Czechoslovak State.
"The Czechs and Slovaks have been united in one
state since 1918, except for the period of World War II
when the Czechoslovak Republic was dismembered through
Nazi aggression. Advocates of a separate Slovak State
seek to have this government take action which may be
construed 8/S an indication that the United States Government has changed its attitude toward the territorial State
of Czechoslovakia, apart from its attitude toward the
present Communist regime, and has come to favor the
break-up of that state and the creation of a separate Slovak State.
"'Dhe department believes, however, that a departure
along this line from continuing to deal with the historical
concept of a united Czechoslovakia until the Czechs and
Slovaks themselves may otherwise determine o.f their own

�SLOVAKIA

17

free choice would have fateful consequences in Eastern
Europe, consequences which would exist long after that
area wins independence of Soviet domination. These consequences would involve such matters as the eventual political organization of all of Eastern Europe, the status
of each of the many ethnic groups in that area, the relations of each such group to the United States and to Germany, Russia and other European powers, and safeguards
against the territorial, political and economic fragmentation of Eastern Europe and even of Slovakia itself, since it
includes national minorities."
So there you have the official views of the Free :mu.
rope Committee and of the Department of State as regards
the Slovaik question. It may seem to some of you that all
I have been doing this evening has been to read letters instead of giving a speech, but I believed that it was more
important for you to know these official viewpoints than
to hear anythtng which I might have to say.
You, of course, have noticed the outstanding discrepancy between these two viewpoints a discrepancy
which I intend to see is reconciled at the earliest possible
moment. Mr. Shepardson declared that our governmental
policy favors the restoration of the Republic of Czechoslova:lda and not an independent Republic of Slovakia.
However, the State Department, on the other hand, ta;kes
what appears to me to be the correct position and that
is that this is a matter for the Czech and Slovak peoples
themsel'Ves to determine following the li'beration of their
homeland.
I think that is a noteworthy admission on the part
of the State Department and I think it is something we
all should bear in mind. I know how all of you long for
the day when Slovakia will again be free and independent
and I sympathize with your viewpoint in that respect. But
there is one all-important task before us at the moment
and that is to work together in e&lt;Very possible way for the
lrberation of the enslaved peoples from the grip of Communist tyranny. No purpose, no aim, however important,
should be allowed to take precedence over this task. So I
say to you that you do well indeed to keep up the fight for

�18

SLOVAKIA

an independent Slovakia but do not forget that Slovakia
must be free before she can be independent. The achie,vement of freedom from the Communists is something to
which we must devote our all.
Developments are taking place today in Europe which
are most important in the matter of considering liberation. For the first time since the war, the Iron Curtain is
being pushed eastwards with the signing of the Austrian
peace treaty and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from
Eastern Austria. According to the terms of the treaty,
they are supposed to withdraw from Hungary and Rumania. Now not only Hungary but also Slovakia will have
a common border with freedom. Now your fellow-countrymen in Bratislava can look across the Danube into free
Austria. Think what a tremendous attraction that will be
for them and think how it will add to the difficulties of the
Czech Communist regime in trying to retain its totalitarian control. I do believe the li,b eration of Eastern Austria will have far~reaching consequences for many other
enslaved peoples in that part of Europe .
And I do believe that this happy development has
come about because of the internal difficulties faced by the
Soviet Union as well as a result of the external pressures
engendered upon her by the free world of which this
country is the leader. I trust that these pressures will now
be intensified on the Soviet Union and I certainly intend to
do my small part in seeing that the heat remains on.
Take the work of the Select Committee on Communist
Aggression, the former Kersten Committee, on which I
had the honor to serve during the 83rd Congress, and
which did so much to reveal to the free world the story of
Communist enslavement and brutality, in Slovakia and
elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain. This committee may or
may not be reactivated - I do not know. But every former member of the committee who is still in Congress four Democrats and two Republicans - has introduced an
identical resolution which would call on the Secretary of
State to have introduced in the United Nations a resolution declaring the Soviet Union to he an international aggressbr because of her takeover and occupation of Slova-

�SLOVAKIA

19

kia, the Baltic States and others of the satellites. Two
weeks ago, this resolution was overwhelmingly adopted
and approved by the House Foreign Affairs Oommittee,
of which I am also a member, and we hope soon to have a
rule to bring it to the floor of the House for consideration
and action. This is the type of pressure used against the
Soviet Union in the past and which is now paying dividends - this is the type of pressure which I want to see
continued in the future.
Some people, I know, have expressed misgivings regarding the forthcoming meeting "at the summit" between
the leaders of the Big Four. With the unhappy memories
of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam in mind, there are those
who have wondered if this would be another such meeting whereby the United States might agree to further
concessions which would further abandon the enslaved
people to their fate. I personally think there will be little,
if any, value to a Big Four meeting and that is why I
have consistently opposed it. But, if it does take place, I
give you the pledge of this government, of this administration, that there will be no sell-out of the captive peoples
such as took place at similar meetings in the past. Listen
to this letter which I received from the State Department
last December:
'During the past two years this goveTnment has issued, or subscribed to, a number of public statements indicating that it is not reconciled to the present fate of the
captive peoples of Eastern Europe; that it will not be a
party to any arrangement or treaty confirming or prolonging their subjection to Soviet despotism; and that it
seeks by peaceful means conditions permitting these enslaved national groups to recover genuine freedom and independence.
"Recently in a speech reviewing United States foreign
policy before the Thirty-Third Annual 4-H Club Congress
in Chicago, the Secretary spoke of our efforts in the
realistic pursuit of peace and at the same time of our action in many ways to sustain the hope of freedom among
the captive peoples. As of particular relevance in this connection, he stated that 'The scope of conferences with the

�20

Soviet government is necessarily limited by our attitude
toward the captive peoples, for the Soviets know that we
will not make ~y deal which would condone and perpetuate the captivity of men and nations.' The principles enunciated in this speech show that our objective remains unchanged, namely to work in all peaceful ways for the creation of a Europe in which the captive peoples will again
enjoy governments as well as social and economic institutions of their own free choice."
In regard to the Slovak League of America itself and
the value of the work you are doing, I can do no better
than to let you know what the Communists think about
you. We on the Kersten Committee found that the louder
the Commun~sts screamed about us the more effective was
our work, the more we were hurting them. Now last April
19 the Czech Communist foreign office in Prague delivered a note to our embassy there, a note of protest regarding many things. I inserted the text of this note in the
Congressional Record on May 10 and I want to read you a
few paragraphs from this Communist document to close
my remarks this evening:
"The report of the Kersten Committee extols the socalled Slovak State, covers up the crimes of the occupants
and their henchmen and stresses their merits in their fight
against the Soviet Union and Communism. The anti-fascist resistance of the Czechoslovak people is disparaged
in the repo.r t, the Slovak national uprising is described as
an improvised relbellion of suJbversive elements, and the
liberation of Czechoslovakia by the heroic Soviet army is
described with bitter sorrow at the defeat of Hitlerite occupants.
"The Kersten Committee reports are a gross provocation not only against all Czech and Slovak patriots, but
also against all honest and democratic Americans who, together with the peoples of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and other Democratic countries, sacrificed their lirves
in the fight against their common fascist enemy.
"At the present time, reports, both in the American
and the world press, daily give the reader a picture of how
American justice and various congressional investigating

�SLOVAKIA

21

committees fabricate anti-Communist testimony. As to the
investigation of the so-called Kersten Committee and its
report on Czechoslovakia, however, it is worthy of note that
the principal witnesses and experts named and quoted by
the reiport are iprimarilly notorious fascists and coNaJborators from the time of World War II.
"Thus, for instance, the section dealing with the antifascist struggle of the Slovak people is based on the testimony of the former Charge D' Affaires of the so-called
Slovak State in Madrid, Jozef Mikus, to whom the report
gives his full title, obvio1.l1Sily in order to eliminaite any doUJbts
as to his qualifications or loyalty. The official circles of
the United States of America base their hostile activities
against Czechoslovakia on the most reactionary fascist
emigre groups.
"'Dhe present Government of the United States quite
openly gives support to and encourages those elements,
who, as early as the period before World War II, sided
with Hitler in the breaking up of the unity and territorial
integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic, who gave convincing proof of their political convictions by their servility
to the fascist occupants and who, speculating on a new
World War and a new occupation of Czechoslovakia, have
now placed themselves fully at the disposal of aggressive
groups in the United Sates of America.
"Similarly, the United States occupation -:mbhorities in
Western Germany, in the organization of plots against
Ozec'hoslovakia, cooperate closely with the traitors of the
people, with convicted war criminals. Thus, under the protection of the United States occupation authorities, the former minister of the so-called Slovak State in Berlin, Matus Cernak, together with a number of other traitors who
escaped from Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European
States, continue in their treacherous activities under a new
master but along the same fascist line."
So there you have it. You can readily perceive that the
work of our own Kersten Committee, the work done by
your own organization and its leaders, must be effective,
must be hurting the communists to judge by their pained
outcries. You know, for a great many years we were the

�22

SLOVAKIA

ones who were writing all the notes and doing all the pro·testing and that's as far as it ever got. Our notes were
snubbed and our protests were ignored. That passive attitude on the part of our government at that time was one
reason I resigned from the State Department in' disgust
five years ago. But how times have changed since then!
Isn't it with a feeling of pleasure and relief that we witness the other side writing notes and protests for a
change? Isn't it great to know that the initiative in this
cold war is really passing into our hands?
It is always a pleasure to meet with members of your
organization and it has been a great privilege for ·_ Mrs.
Bentley and me to be here this evening. Keep u,p the
good work.
Thank you very much .

•

•

•

MEMORANDUM
To the President and the Congress of the United States,
Adopted by the Delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, May 23-24,
1955, Washington, D. C.
We, the delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of
the Slovak League of America, assembled in Washington, D. C., May 23-24, 1955 - send most cordial greetings
to President Dwight D. Eisenho-w er and the members of
the Congress of the United States of America, and do
solemnly and unanimously resolve that:
1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the
principles upon which our Country was founded under
God, the American Way of Life, which has made our
America the envy of the world, and declare that the welfare and the security of the United States of America
shall continue to be our primary interest.
2. We subsor1be wihole'heartedly to the expressed printhe. fundamental principle
ciple of self-determination of American policy in Europe since the administration of
President Woodrow Wilson, which declares that all nations have the . right to determine for themselves the state

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1364">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA

11

REMAR~S OF HON. ALVIN M. BENTLEY
{iBefore the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak Lea gue
of America in Washington, May 23, 1955)

I am, of course, happy to be here with Mrs. Bentley
thts evening with so many of our good Slovak friends from
Michigan and elsewhere throughout the country. I remember two years ago when I had inserted in the Congressional Record an article from the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and how many letters of protest I received from
your members throughout the country. I was, frankly,
at that time quite amazed to learn how widespread was
your organization. For many reasons, of course, I am
happy that my subsequent actions have only evoked commendation from you.
In my talks with your members, both in Michigan and
here in Washington, I have come to realize that one of
your greatest difficulties lies with the Free Europe Committee and, specifically with Radio Free Europe and its
apparent tendency to swbordinate Slovak matters to Cze&lt;:h
or, rather, to "Czecho~lovak" matters.
Now I have had occasion in the past to deal with
Radio Free Europe and with its director, Mr. Whitney
Shepardson. I have broadcast over their facilities, both
here in the United States and in Germany. Concerning
the work they are doing in their broadcasts to Poland,
Hungary and many of the other satellites, I think there
can be little or no criticism. From my own experiences
behind the Iron Curtain and from my contacts since I left
there, I should say that Radio Free Europe has as great,
if not greater, audience than any other media of propaganda used by the free world. So, on the whole, we must
admit the RFE is performing a useful and valuable task.
Only in this matter of Czech and Slovak programs have
we run into a problem.
About two months ago, I wrote Mr. Shepardson, expressing my concern in this matter and asking him for a
public statement of policy in this respect. I have here the
text of his reply, dated April 19, and I think it is important enough to read to you at this time:

�12

SLOVAKIA

Dear Congressman Bentley:
You ask in your letter of March 25 for a public statement of this Committee's policy with respect to the Slovruk question. I am glad to note that what you have in
mind, specifically, is that we arrive at as nearly an equal
balance as possible of Czech and Slovak persons on our
staff - and I presume, of air time on Radio Free Europe.
I say this because at bottom the Slovak question concerns
the future political status of the people of Slovakia. This
is, of course, something which lies wholly outside the competence of the Free Europe Committee. We are not a
foreign office, we are a political warfare organization. We
try to follow United States policy, we do not U111dertake to
make it.
United States policy, we are informed, favors the
eventual restoration of a truly democratic Republic of
Czechoslovak ia ; it does not favor the establishment of a
Republic of Slovakia. (As I will point out later, I think
Mr. Shepardson is mistaken in this belief). Radio Free
Europe is not obliged to reiterate this fact in its broadcasts to Czechs and Slovaks, and indeed it does not do so :
It refrains from discussing it. This means also that it refrains and indeed it should refrain, in view of U. S. policy
- from promoting Slovak separatism over its facilities.
As to Czech and Slovak personnel and air time, by
equal I take it you mean equitable, since, according to statistics as of February 1955 published by the Prague regime, the proportion of Slovaks to Czechs in Czechoslovakia was 34 percent. 2,990,000 Slovaks and 8,870,000
Czechs. As to Radio Free Europe air time. the Slovak proportion is 67 percent of the Czech ( 40 percent of the total
of 113½ hours a week). Here is a breakdown of our employment records:
Ratio of

Czech

RFE New York
1. Employees full time

18

Slovak

6

Slovaks
To Czech s

33 %

�13

SLOVAKIA

2.

Freelance employed in 1954

Total
RFffi Munich
l.Employees at radio desk
Employees Production Dept.

51

31

60 %

69

37

44 %

72
30

26
13

36 1/c
40 %

39 %
39
102
Broadcasting total
26 %
26
98
1954
in
employed
2. Freelance
%
16
6
36
Munich, non-broadcasting
The total broadcasting staff includes 120 Czechs and
45 Slovaks, the latter in the ratio of 38 percent. The freelance record for 1954 is 149 Czechs and 57 Slovaks, the
Slovak ratio being again 38 percent. In non~broadcasting
(common labor, etc.) the Slovak proportion is 16 percent
and is probably a fair reflection of the escapee situation
in Germany.
Statistics by themselves never tell the whole story,
and something must be added to these figures:
The function of the Free Europe Committee is not to
concern itself with future political and territorial arrangements in Europe. Its function is to carry on the present
fight against Communism, especially behind the Iron Curtain. To carry on that fight successfully, it must have the
good will of the peoples it addresses: Therefore, it seeks
to win the approval of the people of Slovakia. To this end,
it invites into the service Slovak escapees of talent who,
speaking in their own name (not in the name of the U. S.
Government or of the American people), inform their captive fellow-countrymen of what is going on in the free
world, report evidences of American (particularly SlovakAmericrun) concern for their fate, support them in their
struggle against the Communist oppressors, instill in them
the hope of eventually regaining their freedom, and sustain their deep spirit of non-cooperation with the Communist regime.
How do our Slovak co-workers contribute to our common purposes? They listen to the Comunist radio day and
night. They read the Communist press. They interview Slovaik escapees. They watch events in Soviet Russia and
neighboring countries and estimate the impact of those

�14

SLOV.MGA.

events upon Slovakia. They seek to learn and respond to
what is in the mind of the Slovak listeners this very day .
They ask themselves: What is the particular form of oppression the Slovaks are at this moment undergoing?
What is their present hope or fear? What is happening
to the wife and children, the church, the living standard,
the spiritual and cultural life of the Slovak peasant and
worker? How weak or strong are the regime and the party
at this time?
For these reasons, our Slovak staff must be chosen
for its intimate knowledge of present-day Slovakia and for
its professional competence, not its party allegiance. It
must be made u:e, so far as possible, of recent or fairly
recent escapees, men and women, who haVe had experience with life under Communism in Slovakia; but they
must at the same time be editors, writers, actors, radio producers and other professionals experienced in our work.
Our staff possesses this competence and this experience. And they are patriots, not partisans. The cause of
the people, not the cause of this or that faction is what
they work for. You are aware that they have been both
criticized and defended right inside Slov3Jk separatist circles. Some are Protestant, some are Catholic. Some are Czechoslovruk federalists, some even sepaTatists. We hono.r
them all for their belief that they must get on with the
fight against Communism and wait to cross the separatist
bridge, or federalist bridge, until they come to it, which is
to say, until the time when the Slavak people will be free
to speak for themselves.
I am sure that we have your sympathetic understanding. I am happy to think that you will interpret our position to the American Slovak League as you have interpreted theirs to us, and I send our respectful regrurds to
you.
Yours sincerely,
(s) WHITNEY S. SHEPARDSON.
There you have the official statement of policy of the
Free Europe Committee on the whole Slovak question.

�SLOVAKIA

15

Now I know that many, if not all of you, would have much
fault to find with this letter. Only ten days ago I received
a ten-page letter from Phil Hrobak after I had sent him a
copy of the Shepardson letter. But let me go back and refer to the one great mistake which I think Mr. Shepardson
maikes when he speaks of the policy of our government regarding the Slovak question and when he says: "United
States policy, we are informed, favors the eventual restoration of a truly democratic Republic of Czechoslovakia;
it does not favor the establishment of a Republic of Slovakia."
On April 25, I wrote the Secretary of State and directed his attention to that sentence. I went on to say:
"Although I am aware that thi,s government never entered
into diplomatic relations with the war-time government of
the Republic of Slovakia but, on the contrary, has maintained such recognition with the Republic of Czechoslovakia ever since its inception, I nevertheless presume to request a statement of the Department's
thinking in regard to tlhis i mp or t a n t matter. I
have always been under the firm impression that this government properly considered the political status of the enslaved countries, following their liberation, to be one for
the peo•ples of those countries to determine for themselves
That is to say, that such status would be resolved by
means o.f independent self-determination consistent with a
proper regard for the rights and privileges of their neighbors and founded upon the ideas of justice and freedom
for all.
"I, therefore, hesitate to believe that this government
has committed itself to a continuation of the Republic of
Czecho,s lovakia at such a time as the liberation of that
country may truke place. I would rather believe that the
Department has not committed itself in the future to either
the idea of Czechoslovakia or of independent Slovakia but
that it would make its own decision and base its own support on whatever form of government or governments the
people of that area should freely choose at the time they
may be aible to enjoy such freedom of choice."

�16

SLOVAKIA

The reply from the Department of State dated May 2
sets forth the official position of our government in this
respect and I presume you will be interested in hearing
this also:
"In dealing with Central and IDastern European states,
their territorial organization, and their national composition, the policy of the department has been predicated on
the belief that support for the principle of self-determination makes it incumbent on us to await a conclusive manifestation of the will of the people of those states under
free conditions, and to consider fully the consequences of
any action in favor o.f a new state from the standpoint of
the stability, security and economic viability of Central and
Eastern Europe generally. The focus of this policy is on
the creation of conditions under which the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe will be able freely to determine
their own governmental and economic institutions, as well
as their relationships with each other and with the other
peoples of Europe.
"With respect to the question of the future territorial
organization of Czechoslova;kia, it is the view of the department that the Czech and Slovak peoples should themselves determine under free conditions whether they will
continue to live together in a common Czechoslovak State.
"The Czechs and Slovaks have been united in one
state since 1918, except for the period of World War II
when the Czechoslovak Republic was dismembered through
Nazi aggression. Advocates of a separate Slovak State
seek to have this government take action which may be
construed 8/S an indication that the United States Government has changed its attitude toward the territorial State
of Czechoslovakia, apart from its attitude toward the
present Communist regime, and has come to favor the
break-up of that state and the creation of a separate Slovak State.
"'Dhe department believes, however, that a departure
along this line from continuing to deal with the historical
concept of a united Czechoslovakia until the Czechs and
Slovaks themselves may otherwise determine o.f their own

�SLOVAKIA

17

free choice would have fateful consequences in Eastern
Europe, consequences which would exist long after that
area wins independence of Soviet domination. These consequences would involve such matters as the eventual political organization of all of Eastern Europe, the status
of each of the many ethnic groups in that area, the relations of each such group to the United States and to Germany, Russia and other European powers, and safeguards
against the territorial, political and economic fragmentation of Eastern Europe and even of Slovakia itself, since it
includes national minorities."
So there you have the official views of the Free :mu.
rope Committee and of the Department of State as regards
the Slovaik question. It may seem to some of you that all
I have been doing this evening has been to read letters instead of giving a speech, but I believed that it was more
important for you to know these official viewpoints than
to hear anythtng which I might have to say.
You, of course, have noticed the outstanding discrepancy between these two viewpoints a discrepancy
which I intend to see is reconciled at the earliest possible
moment. Mr. Shepardson declared that our governmental
policy favors the restoration of the Republic of Czechoslova:lda and not an independent Republic of Slovakia.
However, the State Department, on the other hand, ta;kes
what appears to me to be the correct position and that
is that this is a matter for the Czech and Slovak peoples
themsel'Ves to determine following the li'beration of their
homeland.
I think that is a noteworthy admission on the part
of the State Department and I think it is something we
all should bear in mind. I know how all of you long for
the day when Slovakia will again be free and independent
and I sympathize with your viewpoint in that respect. But
there is one all-important task before us at the moment
and that is to work together in e&lt;Very possible way for the
lrberation of the enslaved peoples from the grip of Communist tyranny. No purpose, no aim, however important,
should be allowed to take precedence over this task. So I
say to you that you do well indeed to keep up the fight for

�18

SLOVAKIA

an independent Slovakia but do not forget that Slovakia
must be free before she can be independent. The achie,vement of freedom from the Communists is something to
which we must devote our all.
Developments are taking place today in Europe which
are most important in the matter of considering liberation. For the first time since the war, the Iron Curtain is
being pushed eastwards with the signing of the Austrian
peace treaty and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from
Eastern Austria. According to the terms of the treaty,
they are supposed to withdraw from Hungary and Rumania. Now not only Hungary but also Slovakia will have
a common border with freedom. Now your fellow-countrymen in Bratislava can look across the Danube into free
Austria. Think what a tremendous attraction that will be
for them and think how it will add to the difficulties of the
Czech Communist regime in trying to retain its totalitarian control. I do believe the li,b eration of Eastern Austria will have far~reaching consequences for many other
enslaved peoples in that part of Europe .
And I do believe that this happy development has
come about because of the internal difficulties faced by the
Soviet Union as well as a result of the external pressures
engendered upon her by the free world of which this
country is the leader. I trust that these pressures will now
be intensified on the Soviet Union and I certainly intend to
do my small part in seeing that the heat remains on.
Take the work of the Select Committee on Communist
Aggression, the former Kersten Committee, on which I
had the honor to serve during the 83rd Congress, and
which did so much to reveal to the free world the story of
Communist enslavement and brutality, in Slovakia and
elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain. This committee may or
may not be reactivated - I do not know. But every former member of the committee who is still in Congress four Democrats and two Republicans - has introduced an
identical resolution which would call on the Secretary of
State to have introduced in the United Nations a resolution declaring the Soviet Union to he an international aggressbr because of her takeover and occupation of Slova-

�SLOVAKIA

19

kia, the Baltic States and others of the satellites. Two
weeks ago, this resolution was overwhelmingly adopted
and approved by the House Foreign Affairs Oommittee,
of which I am also a member, and we hope soon to have a
rule to bring it to the floor of the House for consideration
and action. This is the type of pressure used against the
Soviet Union in the past and which is now paying dividends - this is the type of pressure which I want to see
continued in the future.
Some people, I know, have expressed misgivings regarding the forthcoming meeting "at the summit" between
the leaders of the Big Four. With the unhappy memories
of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam in mind, there are those
who have wondered if this would be another such meeting whereby the United States might agree to further
concessions which would further abandon the enslaved
people to their fate. I personally think there will be little,
if any, value to a Big Four meeting and that is why I
have consistently opposed it. But, if it does take place, I
give you the pledge of this government, of this administration, that there will be no sell-out of the captive peoples
such as took place at similar meetings in the past. Listen
to this letter which I received from the State Department
last December:
'During the past two years this goveTnment has issued, or subscribed to, a number of public statements indicating that it is not reconciled to the present fate of the
captive peoples of Eastern Europe; that it will not be a
party to any arrangement or treaty confirming or prolonging their subjection to Soviet despotism; and that it
seeks by peaceful means conditions permitting these enslaved national groups to recover genuine freedom and independence.
"Recently in a speech reviewing United States foreign
policy before the Thirty-Third Annual 4-H Club Congress
in Chicago, the Secretary spoke of our efforts in the
realistic pursuit of peace and at the same time of our action in many ways to sustain the hope of freedom among
the captive peoples. As of particular relevance in this connection, he stated that 'The scope of conferences with the

�20

Soviet government is necessarily limited by our attitude
toward the captive peoples, for the Soviets know that we
will not make ~y deal which would condone and perpetuate the captivity of men and nations.' The principles enunciated in this speech show that our objective remains unchanged, namely to work in all peaceful ways for the creation of a Europe in which the captive peoples will again
enjoy governments as well as social and economic institutions of their own free choice."
In regard to the Slovak League of America itself and
the value of the work you are doing, I can do no better
than to let you know what the Communists think about
you. We on the Kersten Committee found that the louder
the Commun~sts screamed about us the more effective was
our work, the more we were hurting them. Now last April
19 the Czech Communist foreign office in Prague delivered a note to our embassy there, a note of protest regarding many things. I inserted the text of this note in the
Congressional Record on May 10 and I want to read you a
few paragraphs from this Communist document to close
my remarks this evening:
"The report of the Kersten Committee extols the socalled Slovak State, covers up the crimes of the occupants
and their henchmen and stresses their merits in their fight
against the Soviet Union and Communism. The anti-fascist resistance of the Czechoslovak people is disparaged
in the repo.r t, the Slovak national uprising is described as
an improvised relbellion of suJbversive elements, and the
liberation of Czechoslovakia by the heroic Soviet army is
described with bitter sorrow at the defeat of Hitlerite occupants.
"The Kersten Committee reports are a gross provocation not only against all Czech and Slovak patriots, but
also against all honest and democratic Americans who, together with the peoples of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and other Democratic countries, sacrificed their lirves
in the fight against their common fascist enemy.
"At the present time, reports, both in the American
and the world press, daily give the reader a picture of how
American justice and various congressional investigating

�SLOVAKIA

21

committees fabricate anti-Communist testimony. As to the
investigation of the so-called Kersten Committee and its
report on Czechoslovakia, however, it is worthy of note that
the principal witnesses and experts named and quoted by
the reiport are iprimarilly notorious fascists and coNaJborators from the time of World War II.
"Thus, for instance, the section dealing with the antifascist struggle of the Slovak people is based on the testimony of the former Charge D' Affaires of the so-called
Slovak State in Madrid, Jozef Mikus, to whom the report
gives his full title, obvio1.l1Sily in order to eliminaite any doUJbts
as to his qualifications or loyalty. The official circles of
the United States of America base their hostile activities
against Czechoslovakia on the most reactionary fascist
emigre groups.
"'Dhe present Government of the United States quite
openly gives support to and encourages those elements,
who, as early as the period before World War II, sided
with Hitler in the breaking up of the unity and territorial
integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic, who gave convincing proof of their political convictions by their servility
to the fascist occupants and who, speculating on a new
World War and a new occupation of Czechoslovakia, have
now placed themselves fully at the disposal of aggressive
groups in the United Sates of America.
"Similarly, the United States occupation -:mbhorities in
Western Germany, in the organization of plots against
Ozec'hoslovakia, cooperate closely with the traitors of the
people, with convicted war criminals. Thus, under the protection of the United States occupation authorities, the former minister of the so-called Slovak State in Berlin, Matus Cernak, together with a number of other traitors who
escaped from Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European
States, continue in their treacherous activities under a new
master but along the same fascist line."
So there you have it. You can readily perceive that the
work of our own Kersten Committee, the work done by
your own organization and its leaders, must be effective,
must be hurting the communists to judge by their pained
outcries. You know, for a great many years we were the

�22

SLOVAKIA

ones who were writing all the notes and doing all the pro·testing and that's as far as it ever got. Our notes were
snubbed and our protests were ignored. That passive attitude on the part of our government at that time was one
reason I resigned from the State Department in' disgust
five years ago. But how times have changed since then!
Isn't it with a feeling of pleasure and relief that we witness the other side writing notes and protests for a
change? Isn't it great to know that the initiative in this
cold war is really passing into our hands?
It is always a pleasure to meet with members of your
organization and it has been a great privilege for ·_ Mrs.
Bentley and me to be here this evening. Keep u,p the
good work.
Thank you very much .

•

•

•

MEMORANDUM
To the President and the Congress of the United States,
Adopted by the Delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, May 23-24,
1955, Washington, D. C.
We, the delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of
the Slovak League of America, assembled in Washington, D. C., May 23-24, 1955 - send most cordial greetings
to President Dwight D. Eisenho-w er and the members of
the Congress of the United States of America, and do
solemnly and unanimously resolve that:
1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the
principles upon which our Country was founded under
God, the American Way of Life, which has made our
America the envy of the world, and declare that the welfare and the security of the United States of America
shall continue to be our primary interest.
2. We subsor1be wihole'heartedly to the expressed printhe. fundamental principle
ciple of self-determination of American policy in Europe since the administration of
President Woodrow Wilson, which declares that all nations have the . right to determine for themselves the state

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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
11&#13;
&#13;
REMAR~S OF HON. ALVIN M. BENTLEY&#13;
{iBefore the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak Lea gue&#13;
of America in Washington, May 23, 1955)&#13;
&#13;
I am, of course, happy to be here with Mrs. Bentley&#13;
thts evening with so many of our good Slovak friends from&#13;
Michigan and elsewhere throughout the country. I remember two years ago when I had inserted in the Congressional Record an article from the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and how many letters of protest I received from&#13;
your members throughout the country. I was, frankly,&#13;
at that time quite amazed to learn how widespread was&#13;
your organization. For many reasons, of course, I am&#13;
happy that my subsequent actions have only evoked commendation from you.&#13;
In my talks with your members, both in Michigan and&#13;
here in Washington, I have come to realize that one of&#13;
your greatest difficulties lies with the Free Europe Committee and, specifically with Radio Free Europe and its&#13;
apparent tendency to swbordinate Slovak matters to Cze&lt;:h&#13;
or, rather, to "Czecho~lovak" matters.&#13;
Now I have had occasion in the past to deal with&#13;
Radio Free Europe and with its director, Mr. Whitney&#13;
Shepardson. I have broadcast over their facilities, both&#13;
here in the United States and in Germany. Concerning&#13;
the work they are doing in their broadcasts to Poland,&#13;
Hungary and many of the other satellites, I think there&#13;
can be little or no criticism. From my own experiences&#13;
behind the Iron Curtain and from my contacts since I left&#13;
there, I should say that Radio Free Europe has as great,&#13;
if not greater, audience than any other media of propaganda used by the free world. So, on the whole, we must&#13;
admit the RFE is performing a useful and valuable task.&#13;
Only in this matter of Czech and Slovak programs have&#13;
we run into a problem.&#13;
About two months ago, I wrote Mr. Shepardson, expressing my concern in this matter and asking him for a&#13;
public statement of policy in this respect. I have here the&#13;
text of his reply, dated April 19, and I think it is important enough to read to you at this time:&#13;
&#13;
12&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Dear Congressman Bentley:&#13;
You ask in your letter of March 25 for a public statement of this Committee's policy with respect to the Slovruk question. I am glad to note that what you have in&#13;
mind, specifically, is that we arrive at as nearly an equal&#13;
balance as possible of Czech and Slovak persons on our&#13;
staff - and I presume, of air time on Radio Free Europe.&#13;
I say this because at bottom the Slovak question concerns&#13;
the future political status of the people of Slovakia. This&#13;
is, of course, something which lies wholly outside the competence of the Free Europe Committee. We are not a&#13;
foreign office, we are a political warfare organization. We&#13;
try to follow United States policy, we do not U111dertake to&#13;
make it.&#13;
United States policy, we are informed, favors the&#13;
eventual restoration of a truly democratic Republic of&#13;
Czechoslovak ia ; it does not favor the establishment of a&#13;
Republic of Slovakia. (As I will point out later, I think&#13;
Mr. Shepardson is mistaken in this belief). Radio Free&#13;
Europe is not obliged to reiterate this fact in its broadcasts to Czechs and Slovaks, and indeed it does not do so :&#13;
It refrains from discussing it. This means also that it refrains and indeed it should refrain, in view of U. S. policy&#13;
- from promoting Slovak separatism over its facilities.&#13;
As to Czech and Slovak personnel and air time, by&#13;
equal I take it you mean equitable, since, according to statistics as of February 1955 published by the Prague regime, the proportion of Slovaks to Czechs in Czechoslovakia was 34 percent. 2,990,000 Slovaks and 8,870,000&#13;
Czechs. As to Radio Free Europe air time. the Slovak proportion is 67 percent of the Czech ( 40 percent of the total&#13;
of 113½ hours a week). Here is a breakdown of our employment records:&#13;
Ratio of&#13;
&#13;
Czech&#13;
&#13;
RFE New York&#13;
1. Employees full time&#13;
&#13;
18&#13;
&#13;
Slovak&#13;
&#13;
6&#13;
&#13;
Slovaks&#13;
To Czech s&#13;
&#13;
33 %&#13;
&#13;
13&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
2.&#13;
&#13;
Freelance employed in 1954&#13;
&#13;
Total&#13;
RFffi Munich&#13;
l.Employees at radio desk&#13;
Employees Production Dept.&#13;
&#13;
51&#13;
&#13;
31&#13;
&#13;
60 %&#13;
&#13;
69&#13;
&#13;
37&#13;
&#13;
44 %&#13;
&#13;
72&#13;
30&#13;
&#13;
26&#13;
13&#13;
&#13;
36 1/c&#13;
40 %&#13;
&#13;
39 %&#13;
39&#13;
102&#13;
Broadcasting total&#13;
26 %&#13;
26&#13;
98&#13;
1954&#13;
in&#13;
employed&#13;
2. Freelance&#13;
%&#13;
16&#13;
6&#13;
36&#13;
Munich, non-broadcasting&#13;
The total broadcasting staff includes 120 Czechs and&#13;
45 Slovaks, the latter in the ratio of 38 percent. The freelance record for 1954 is 149 Czechs and 57 Slovaks, the&#13;
Slovak ratio being again 38 percent. In non~broadcasting&#13;
(common labor, etc.) the Slovak proportion is 16 percent&#13;
and is probably a fair reflection of the escapee situation&#13;
in Germany.&#13;
Statistics by themselves never tell the whole story,&#13;
and something must be added to these figures:&#13;
The function of the Free Europe Committee is not to&#13;
concern itself with future political and territorial arrangements in Europe. Its function is to carry on the present&#13;
fight against Communism, especially behind the Iron Curtain. To carry on that fight successfully, it must have the&#13;
good will of the peoples it addresses: Therefore, it seeks&#13;
to win the approval of the people of Slovakia. To this end,&#13;
it invites into the service Slovak escapees of talent who,&#13;
speaking in their own name (not in the name of the U. S.&#13;
Government or of the American people), inform their captive fellow-countrymen of what is going on in the free&#13;
world, report evidences of American (particularly SlovakAmericrun) concern for their fate, support them in their&#13;
struggle against the Communist oppressors, instill in them&#13;
the hope of eventually regaining their freedom, and sustain their deep spirit of non-cooperation with the Communist regime.&#13;
How do our Slovak co-workers contribute to our common purposes? They listen to the Comunist radio day and&#13;
night. They read the Communist press. They interview Slovaik escapees. They watch events in Soviet Russia and&#13;
neighboring countries and estimate the impact of those&#13;
&#13;
14&#13;
&#13;
SLOV.MGA.&#13;
&#13;
events upon Slovakia. They seek to learn and respond to&#13;
what is in the mind of the Slovak listeners this very day .&#13;
They ask themselves: What is the particular form of oppression the Slovaks are at this moment undergoing?&#13;
What is their present hope or fear? What is happening&#13;
to the wife and children, the church, the living standard,&#13;
the spiritual and cultural life of the Slovak peasant and&#13;
worker? How weak or strong are the regime and the party&#13;
at this time?&#13;
For these reasons, our Slovak staff must be chosen&#13;
for its intimate knowledge of present-day Slovakia and for&#13;
its professional competence, not its party allegiance. It&#13;
must be made u:e, so far as possible, of recent or fairly&#13;
recent escapees, men and women, who haVe had experience with life under Communism in Slovakia; but they&#13;
must at the same time be editors, writers, actors, radio producers and other professionals experienced in our work.&#13;
Our staff possesses this competence and this experience. And they are patriots, not partisans. The cause of&#13;
the people, not the cause of this or that faction is what&#13;
they work for. You are aware that they have been both&#13;
criticized and defended right inside Slov3Jk separatist circles. Some are Protestant, some are Catholic. Some are Czechoslovruk federalists, some even sepaTatists. We hono.r&#13;
them all for their belief that they must get on with the&#13;
fight against Communism and wait to cross the separatist&#13;
bridge, or federalist bridge, until they come to it, which is&#13;
to say, until the time when the Slavak people will be free&#13;
to speak for themselves.&#13;
I am sure that we have your sympathetic understanding. I am happy to think that you will interpret our position to the American Slovak League as you have interpreted theirs to us, and I send our respectful regrurds to&#13;
you.&#13;
Yours sincerely,&#13;
(s) WHITNEY S. SHEPARDSON.&#13;
There you have the official statement of policy of the&#13;
Free Europe Committee on the whole Slovak question.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
15&#13;
&#13;
Now I know that many, if not all of you, would have much&#13;
fault to find with this letter. Only ten days ago I received&#13;
a ten-page letter from Phil Hrobak after I had sent him a&#13;
copy of the Shepardson letter. But let me go back and refer to the one great mistake which I think Mr. Shepardson&#13;
maikes when he speaks of the policy of our government regarding the Slovak question and when he says: "United&#13;
States policy, we are informed, favors the eventual restoration of a truly democratic Republic of Czechoslovakia;&#13;
it does not favor the establishment of a Republic of Slovakia."&#13;
On April 25, I wrote the Secretary of State and directed his attention to that sentence. I went on to say:&#13;
"Although I am aware that thi,s government never entered&#13;
into diplomatic relations with the war-time government of&#13;
the Republic of Slovakia but, on the contrary, has maintained such recognition with the Republic of Czechoslovakia ever since its inception, I nevertheless presume to request a statement of the Department's&#13;
thinking in regard to tlhis i mp or t a n t matter. I&#13;
have always been under the firm impression that this government properly considered the political status of the enslaved countries, following their liberation, to be one for&#13;
the peo•ples of those countries to determine for themselves&#13;
That is to say, that such status would be resolved by&#13;
means o.f independent self-determination consistent with a&#13;
proper regard for the rights and privileges of their neighbors and founded upon the ideas of justice and freedom&#13;
for all.&#13;
"I, therefore, hesitate to believe that this government&#13;
has committed itself to a continuation of the Republic of&#13;
Czecho,s lovakia at such a time as the liberation of that&#13;
country may truke place. I would rather believe that the&#13;
Department has not committed itself in the future to either&#13;
the idea of Czechoslovakia or of independent Slovakia but&#13;
that it would make its own decision and base its own support on whatever form of government or governments the&#13;
people of that area should freely choose at the time they&#13;
may be aible to enjoy such freedom of choice."&#13;
&#13;
16&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
The reply from the Department of State dated May 2&#13;
sets forth the official position of our government in this&#13;
respect and I presume you will be interested in hearing&#13;
this also:&#13;
"In dealing with Central and IDastern European states,&#13;
their territorial organization, and their national composition, the policy of the department has been predicated on&#13;
the belief that support for the principle of self-determination makes it incumbent on us to await a conclusive manifestation of the will of the people of those states under&#13;
free conditions, and to consider fully the consequences of&#13;
any action in favor o.f a new state from the standpoint of&#13;
the stability, security and economic viability of Central and&#13;
Eastern Europe generally. The focus of this policy is on&#13;
the creation of conditions under which the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe will be able freely to determine&#13;
their own governmental and economic institutions, as well&#13;
as their relationships with each other and with the other&#13;
peoples of Europe.&#13;
"With respect to the question of the future territorial&#13;
organization of Czechoslova;kia, it is the view of the department that the Czech and Slovak peoples should themselves determine under free conditions whether they will&#13;
continue to live together in a common Czechoslovak State.&#13;
"The Czechs and Slovaks have been united in one&#13;
state since 1918, except for the period of World War II&#13;
when the Czechoslovak Republic was dismembered through&#13;
Nazi aggression. Advocates of a separate Slovak State&#13;
seek to have this government take action which may be&#13;
construed 8/S an indication that the United States Government has changed its attitude toward the territorial State&#13;
of Czechoslovakia, apart from its attitude toward the&#13;
present Communist regime, and has come to favor the&#13;
break-up of that state and the creation of a separate Slovak State.&#13;
"'Dhe department believes, however, that a departure&#13;
along this line from continuing to deal with the historical&#13;
concept of a united Czechoslovakia until the Czechs and&#13;
Slovaks themselves may otherwise determine o.f their own&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
17&#13;
&#13;
free choice would have fateful consequences in Eastern&#13;
Europe, consequences which would exist long after that&#13;
area wins independence of Soviet domination. These consequences would involve such matters as the eventual political organization of all of Eastern Europe, the status&#13;
of each of the many ethnic groups in that area, the relations of each such group to the United States and to Germany, Russia and other European powers, and safeguards&#13;
against the territorial, political and economic fragmentation of Eastern Europe and even of Slovakia itself, since it&#13;
includes national minorities."&#13;
So there you have the official views of the Free :mu.&#13;
rope Committee and of the Department of State as regards&#13;
the Slovaik question. It may seem to some of you that all&#13;
I have been doing this evening has been to read letters instead of giving a speech, but I believed that it was more&#13;
important for you to know these official viewpoints than&#13;
to hear anythtng which I might have to say.&#13;
You, of course, have noticed the outstanding discrepancy between these two viewpoints a discrepancy&#13;
which I intend to see is reconciled at the earliest possible&#13;
moment. Mr. Shepardson declared that our governmental&#13;
policy favors the restoration of the Republic of Czechoslova:lda and not an independent Republic of Slovakia.&#13;
However, the State Department, on the other hand, ta;kes&#13;
what appears to me to be the correct position and that&#13;
is that this is a matter for the Czech and Slovak peoples&#13;
themsel'Ves to determine following the li'beration of their&#13;
homeland.&#13;
I think that is a noteworthy admission on the part&#13;
of the State Department and I think it is something we&#13;
all should bear in mind. I know how all of you long for&#13;
the day when Slovakia will again be free and independent&#13;
and I sympathize with your viewpoint in that respect. But&#13;
there is one all-important task before us at the moment&#13;
and that is to work together in e&lt;Very possible way for the&#13;
lrberation of the enslaved peoples from the grip of Communist tyranny. No purpose, no aim, however important,&#13;
should be allowed to take precedence over this task. So I&#13;
say to you that you do well indeed to keep up the fight for&#13;
&#13;
18&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
an independent Slovakia but do not forget that Slovakia&#13;
must be free before she can be independent. The achie,vement of freedom from the Communists is something to&#13;
which we must devote our all.&#13;
Developments are taking place today in Europe which&#13;
are most important in the matter of considering liberation. For the first time since the war, the Iron Curtain is&#13;
being pushed eastwards with the signing of the Austrian&#13;
peace treaty and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from&#13;
Eastern Austria. According to the terms of the treaty,&#13;
they are supposed to withdraw from Hungary and Rumania. Now not only Hungary but also Slovakia will have&#13;
a common border with freedom. Now your fellow-countrymen in Bratislava can look across the Danube into free&#13;
Austria. Think what a tremendous attraction that will be&#13;
for them and think how it will add to the difficulties of the&#13;
Czech Communist regime in trying to retain its totalitarian control. I do believe the li,b eration of Eastern Austria will have far~reaching consequences for many other&#13;
enslaved peoples in that part of Europe .&#13;
And I do believe that this happy development has&#13;
come about because of the internal difficulties faced by the&#13;
Soviet Union as well as a result of the external pressures&#13;
engendered upon her by the free world of which this&#13;
country is the leader. I trust that these pressures will now&#13;
be intensified on the Soviet Union and I certainly intend to&#13;
do my small part in seeing that the heat remains on.&#13;
Take the work of the Select Committee on Communist&#13;
Aggression, the former Kersten Committee, on which I&#13;
had the honor to serve during the 83rd Congress, and&#13;
which did so much to reveal to the free world the story of&#13;
Communist enslavement and brutality, in Slovakia and&#13;
elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain. This committee may or&#13;
may not be reactivated - I do not know. But every former member of the committee who is still in Congress four Democrats and two Republicans - has introduced an&#13;
identical resolution which would call on the Secretary of&#13;
State to have introduced in the United Nations a resolution declaring the Soviet Union to he an international aggressbr because of her takeover and occupation of Slova-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
19&#13;
&#13;
kia, the Baltic States and others of the satellites. Two&#13;
weeks ago, this resolution was overwhelmingly adopted&#13;
and approved by the House Foreign Affairs Oommittee,&#13;
of which I am also a member, and we hope soon to have a&#13;
rule to bring it to the floor of the House for consideration&#13;
and action. This is the type of pressure used against the&#13;
Soviet Union in the past and which is now paying dividends - this is the type of pressure which I want to see&#13;
continued in the future.&#13;
Some people, I know, have expressed misgivings regarding the forthcoming meeting "at the summit" between&#13;
the leaders of the Big Four. With the unhappy memories&#13;
of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam in mind, there are those&#13;
who have wondered if this would be another such meeting whereby the United States might agree to further&#13;
concessions which would further abandon the enslaved&#13;
people to their fate. I personally think there will be little,&#13;
if any, value to a Big Four meeting and that is why I&#13;
have consistently opposed it. But, if it does take place, I&#13;
give you the pledge of this government, of this administration, that there will be no sell-out of the captive peoples&#13;
such as took place at similar meetings in the past. Listen&#13;
to this letter which I received from the State Department&#13;
last December:&#13;
'During the past two years this goveTnment has issued, or subscribed to, a number of public statements indicating that it is not reconciled to the present fate of the&#13;
captive peoples of Eastern Europe; that it will not be a&#13;
party to any arrangement or treaty confirming or prolonging their subjection to Soviet despotism; and that it&#13;
seeks by peaceful means conditions permitting these enslaved national groups to recover genuine freedom and independence.&#13;
"Recently in a speech reviewing United States foreign&#13;
policy before the Thirty-Third Annual 4-H Club Congress&#13;
in Chicago, the Secretary spoke of our efforts in the&#13;
realistic pursuit of peace and at the same time of our action in many ways to sustain the hope of freedom among&#13;
the captive peoples. As of particular relevance in this connection, he stated that 'The scope of conferences with the&#13;
&#13;
20&#13;
&#13;
Soviet government is necessarily limited by our attitude&#13;
toward the captive peoples, for the Soviets know that we&#13;
will not make ~y deal which would condone and perpetuate the captivity of men and nations.' The principles enunciated in this speech show that our objective remains unchanged, namely to work in all peaceful ways for the creation of a Europe in which the captive peoples will again&#13;
enjoy governments as well as social and economic institutions of their own free choice."&#13;
In regard to the Slovak League of America itself and&#13;
the value of the work you are doing, I can do no better&#13;
than to let you know what the Communists think about&#13;
you. We on the Kersten Committee found that the louder&#13;
the Commun~sts screamed about us the more effective was&#13;
our work, the more we were hurting them. Now last April&#13;
19 the Czech Communist foreign office in Prague delivered a note to our embassy there, a note of protest regarding many things. I inserted the text of this note in the&#13;
Congressional Record on May 10 and I want to read you a&#13;
few paragraphs from this Communist document to close&#13;
my remarks this evening:&#13;
"The report of the Kersten Committee extols the socalled Slovak State, covers up the crimes of the occupants&#13;
and their henchmen and stresses their merits in their fight&#13;
against the Soviet Union and Communism. The anti-fascist resistance of the Czechoslovak people is disparaged&#13;
in the repo.r t, the Slovak national uprising is described as&#13;
an improvised relbellion of suJbversive elements, and the&#13;
liberation of Czechoslovakia by the heroic Soviet army is&#13;
described with bitter sorrow at the defeat of Hitlerite occupants.&#13;
"The Kersten Committee reports are a gross provocation not only against all Czech and Slovak patriots, but&#13;
also against all honest and democratic Americans who, together with the peoples of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and other Democratic countries, sacrificed their lirves&#13;
in the fight against their common fascist enemy.&#13;
"At the present time, reports, both in the American&#13;
and the world press, daily give the reader a picture of how&#13;
American justice and various congressional investigating&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
21&#13;
&#13;
committees fabricate anti-Communist testimony. As to the&#13;
investigation of the so-called Kersten Committee and its&#13;
report on Czechoslovakia, however, it is worthy of note that&#13;
the principal witnesses and experts named and quoted by&#13;
the reiport are iprimarilly notorious fascists and coNaJborators from the time of World War II.&#13;
"Thus, for instance, the section dealing with the antifascist struggle of the Slovak people is based on the testimony of the former Charge D' Affaires of the so-called&#13;
Slovak State in Madrid, Jozef Mikus, to whom the report&#13;
gives his full title, obvio1.l1Sily in order to eliminaite any doUJbts&#13;
as to his qualifications or loyalty. The official circles of&#13;
the United States of America base their hostile activities&#13;
against Czechoslovakia on the most reactionary fascist&#13;
emigre groups.&#13;
"'Dhe present Government of the United States quite&#13;
openly gives support to and encourages those elements,&#13;
who, as early as the period before World War II, sided&#13;
with Hitler in the breaking up of the unity and territorial&#13;
integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic, who gave convincing proof of their political convictions by their servility&#13;
to the fascist occupants and who, speculating on a new&#13;
World War and a new occupation of Czechoslovakia, have&#13;
now placed themselves fully at the disposal of aggressive&#13;
groups in the United Sates of America.&#13;
"Similarly, the United States occupation -:mbhorities in&#13;
Western Germany, in the organization of plots against&#13;
Ozec'hoslovakia, cooperate closely with the traitors of the&#13;
people, with convicted war criminals. Thus, under the protection of the United States occupation authorities, the former minister of the so-called Slovak State in Berlin, Matus Cernak, together with a number of other traitors who&#13;
escaped from Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European&#13;
States, continue in their treacherous activities under a new&#13;
master but along the same fascist line."&#13;
So there you have it. You can readily perceive that the&#13;
work of our own Kersten Committee, the work done by&#13;
your own organization and its leaders, must be effective,&#13;
must be hurting the communists to judge by their pained&#13;
outcries. You know, for a great many years we were the&#13;
&#13;
22&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
ones who were writing all the notes and doing all the pro·testing and that's as far as it ever got. Our notes were&#13;
snubbed and our protests were ignored. That passive attitude on the part of our government at that time was one&#13;
reason I resigned from the State Department in' disgust&#13;
five years ago. But how times have changed since then!&#13;
Isn't it with a feeling of pleasure and relief that we witness the other side writing notes and protests for a&#13;
change? Isn't it great to know that the initiative in this&#13;
cold war is really passing into our hands?&#13;
It is always a pleasure to meet with members of your&#13;
organization and it has been a great privilege for ·_ Mrs.&#13;
Bentley and me to be here this evening. Keep u,p the&#13;
good work.&#13;
Thank you very much .&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
MEMORANDUM&#13;
To the President and the Congress of the United States,&#13;
Adopted by the Delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, May 23-24,&#13;
1955, Washington, D. C.&#13;
We, the delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of&#13;
the Slovak League of America, assembled in Washington, D. C., May 23-24, 1955 - send most cordial greetings&#13;
to President Dwight D. Eisenho-w er and the members of&#13;
the Congress of the United States of America, and do&#13;
solemnly and unanimously resolve that:&#13;
1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the&#13;
principles upon which our Country was founded under&#13;
God, the American Way of Life, which has made our&#13;
America the envy of the world, and declare that the welfare and the security of the United States of America&#13;
shall continue to be our primary interest.&#13;
2. We subsor1be wihole'heartedly to the expressed printhe. fundamental principle&#13;
ciple of self-determination of American policy in Europe since the administration of&#13;
President Woodrow Wilson, which declares that all nations have the . right to determine for themselves the state&#13;
&#13;
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                <text>Remarks of the Hon. Alvin M. Bentley</text>
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                <text>Before the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America in Washington, May 23, 1955)&#13;
Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), June-September 1955&#13;
pp. 11-22</text>
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                <text>June-September 1955</text>
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                    <text>22

SLOVAKIA

ones who were writing all the notes and doing all the pro·testing and that's as far as it ever got. Our notes were
snubbed and our protests were ignored. That passive attitude on the part of our government at that time was one
reason I resigned from the State Department in' disgust
five years ago. But how times have changed since then!
Isn't it with a feeling of pleasure and relief that we witness the other side writing notes and protests for a
change? Isn't it great to know that the initiative in this
cold war is really passing into our hands?
It is always a pleasure to meet with members of your
organization and it has been a great privilege for ·_ Mrs.
Bentley and me to be here this evening. Keep u,p the
good work.
Thank you very much .

•

•

•

MEMORANDUM
To the President and the Congress of the United States,
Adopted by the Delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, May 23-24,
1955, Washington, D. C.
We, the delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of
the Slovak League of America, assembled in Washington, D. C., May 23-24, 1955 - send most cordial greetings
to President Dwight D. Eisenho-w er and the members of
the Congress of the United States of America, and do
solemnly and unanimously resolve that:
1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the
principles upon which our Country was founded under
God, the American Way of Life, which has made our
America the envy of the world, and declare that the welfare and the security of the United States of America
shall continue to be our primary interest.
2. We subsor1be wihole'heartedly to the expressed printhe. fundamental principle
ciple of self-determination of American policy in Europe since the administration of
President Woodrow Wilson, which declares that all nations have the . right to determine for themselves the state

�SLOVAKIA

23

or form of political organization under which they wish
to live
This principle, not applied practically in the past with
respect to the Slovruk nation, must apply without any reservaJtion even to the Slovak nation from which we are descended.
We fully endorae the principle that the Government of
the United States of America shall refuse to recognize any
government and any state or form of political organization
which has been imposed upon any nation by the force of an
alien power and we respectfully request that this policy be
followed even in the case of the Slovak nation, which is tyrannized by the Czecho-Communist regime of Prague in
flagrant violation of the fundamental principle of the
Charter of the United Nations and in utter contempt for
the fundamental principle of the American foreign policy
of self-detezmina.tion.
3. As Americans and Christians, we condemn all
forms of tyranny, every form of totalitarianism which has
no regard for the ri,g hts and liberties of the individual
and is determined to maJke individuals slaves of a political state.
We recognize godless, materialistic Communism as a
conspiracy against free humanity, as a ,p olitical and economic sy,stem which threatens mankind with utter enslavement. Therefore, we cannot snhs&lt;!ribe to the policy
that doing business with the Savi.et Union and other Communist governments is in the best interests of the welfare
and security of the United States of America and the rest
of the free world. We have fought the plague of Communism openly and resolutely in the past and today are determined more than ever to persevere in the fight against
it until it is completely e:z,adicated from the face of the
earth.
We shall not be deceived by the "pea:ced:Uil co-exist..
ence" propagated by the Soviet Union. Peaceful co-existence with the USSR, the Communist world, is strictly a
myth and a hoax. To give it credence would be folly. To the
godless materialists of the Kremlin peaceful co-existence

�24

SLOVAKIA

means full collaboration with the USSR. And collaboration with the USSR means, in the end, a brutal suppression of all freedoms and liberties and utter enslavement.
Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, China, and other countries are proof of that.
4. We heartily commend all efforts of the Administration and the Congress of the United States and of the
agencies of our Government to ferret out, unmask and
prosecute all subversive elements, specifically all Communists and pro-Communi sts, who propagate class hatreds,
economic strife, chaos and anarchy, and promote the interests of the USSR which is determined to destroy us.
We appreciate especially the work of the House Committee on Communist Aggression of the 83rd Congress,
under the chairmanship of the Hon. Charles J. Kersten
of Milwaukee, Wis. The Committee had a very difficult
task to perform, but did it admirrubly well. We believe it
was the first time that a real, honest effort was made by
a congressional committee to become acquainted with the
background of the many peoples behind the Iron Curtain,
the nations who always were and still are our friends, the
peoples who with all their hearts want to be our friends,
because to them America has always been a living symbol
of freedom and independence, and today is just about their
last hope of liberation from Communist tyranny.
5. We approve of the idea of a United Nations to promote peace and prosperity in all countries as far as is humanly possible. Ten years after the establishment of the
U. N., however, we note with regret that it has not been
very effective in doing the work it set out to do. As presently constituted the U. N. is not an organization of nations united in the common purpose, so nobly expressed in
its charter, but an organization of governments, several
of which definitely are not representative of the political
will and national interests of the nations they presume to
represent, but are dedicated to the enslavement of those
very nations and, furthermore, to the destruction of the
free political systems of the world, including our own
American Way of Life.

�SLOVAKIA

25

The sad experiences with the United Nations during
the past ten years have convinced us that the Soviet
Union definitely is not interested in promoting the noble
aims and purposes of the U. N. Moscow apparently accepted the U. N. only to mask and facilitate its program
of world domination; the Soviet Union is in fact promoting world revolution from within the General Assembly
and the Security Council of the United Nations.
As we see it, there is something monstrous about the
idea of associating in a pretended peace organization with
the godless mass murderers of the Kremlin, who have
enslaved one-third of the human race and vowed to bring
us all under their yoke.
We, therefore, respectfully request the President and
the Congress of the United States not only to oppose the
entrance of Red China to the United Nations, but also to
demand the expulsion of all nations and governments
espousing the godless philosophy of Marxistic materialism, so that the United Nations, rid of all tyrants and quislings of tyrants, might function effectively as an assembly of free men. Provisions for such expulsions, if already
not included in the Charter of the U. N., should be made
to that effect, and one of these provis,i ons definitely should
make it cause for expulsion if any member of the U. N.,
gives any aid and succor to any nation or government
which is judged guilty of aggression by the U. N.
6. We stand opposed to the Genocide Convention as
presently written, because we feel that it is dangerous
in the extreme to our Constitutional freedoms and fails in
its primary purpose - the outlawing of mass extermination of peoples by governments - and because it will
not apply to genocide as practiced by the USSR and in
countries captured by it. Genocide should be outlawed by
all nations. But genocide should be properly defined to include government approval, for then and only then is it
genocide. Furthermore, the Genocide Convention should
include "political groups" as well as national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups, and it should not be used as a
vehicle for domestic legislation.

�26

SLOVAKIA

7. Because we fear that the adoption of the International Covenant on Human Rights - as proposed by the
United Nations Commission - would destroy our basic Constitutional concept of inalienable God-given liberty, we do not
recommend its adoption as a treaty by the United States.
8. Once again we respectfully request the President
rund the Congress of the United States to re-examine the
question on the destruction of the Slovak Republic in 1945,
because we are certain that the political will of the Slovak
nation was violated. We also request the President and the
Congress of the United States to instruct our delegate to
the United Nations to ask for an investigation by the U
N. of the destruction of the Slovak State, the independence
of which was proclaimed by duly elected r/ilpresentatives
of the Slovak people on March 14, 1939, th~t is, approximately six months before the start of World" War II.
We further petition the President and the Congress
of the United States to voice a strong protest against the
violation of human rights in Slovakia, the brutal persecution of Slovak religious, cultural and politcal leaders by
the Czecho-Communis t regime of Prague.
9. We deeply resent the fact that even the present Administration of the United States Government is inclined
to recognize and favor former Czech and Slovak politicians who are in a large measure responsible for the present terrible plight of the Czech and Slovak nations. We refer particularly to the followers of Dr. Edward Bein.es who
promoted pro-Soviet and anti-Slovak policy - the Czech
and Slovak Socialists and radical left-wingers who collaborated with Moscow and the Communists until 1948 as
members of the Communist-domin ated National Front Government of Czecho-Slovakia of the Benes-Gottwald coalition.
The Czechs and their Slovak hirelings organiized in
various so-called "Czechoslovak" organizations - no matter what their political plumage - never did and never
will represent the political will of the Slovak nation, even
if they continue to presume to do so. One such organization, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," allegedly regarded as a semi-official provisional government-in-exi le
by our State Department, boasts that it is an organization

�SLOVAKIA

27

of "anti-Communist, democratic" exiles from Czecho-Slovakia, but, in fact, is an organization controlled by Czech
Socialists who were prominent members of the Communistdominated National Front Government of Dr. Benes,
which collaborated closely with Moscow and outlawed all
anti-Socialistic and anti-Communistic elements in CzechoSlovakia after the war ended in 1945, when it came to power
with the blessing of Stalin and the force of the Red armies.
We, therefore, respectfully request the President and
the Congress of the United States to recognize the members of this Council for what they really were in their
homeland - as promoters of Socialism and the pro-Soviet
policy of the Czech Socialists and Communists - and deal
with them accordingly.
We also respectfully request the President and Congress of the United States to re-examine the so-called
"Czechoolovak" policy of our Government, which is still
based on the information supplied by Dr. Eldward Benes
and other Czech Socialists and radical leftwingers. This
information, naturally, glorifies and favors the Czech
"progreflSives" who promoted Socialism and pro-Soviet policy, and maliciously smears and vilifies genuine political,
cultural and religious leaders of the Slovak nation who
fought Socialism and Communism all their lives. It is embarrassing to us, as it should also be to the present Administration and Congress of the United States, that such
people are employed by various agencies of government,
like the USIA (Voice of America), CIA, Library of Congress, and others, as well as by so-called "privately-sponsored" organizations, like the Free Europe Committee
(Radio Free Europe). The Benes Czechs have embarrassed and compromised the prestige of the United States
entirely too long and, therefore, should not be relied upon
any longer. We respectfully request the President and
Congress of the United States to give this matter their
serious attention, 1b ecause it does affect the security of
our country.
10. Since the Slovaks are not and do not wish to be
Czechs, and the Czeclls are ·n ot and do not want to be Slovaks, we believe that it is only just and proper in the in-

�28

SLOVAKIA

terests of all concerned that this ethnic distinction be observed when any so-&lt;:alled "Czechoslovak" problem is considered.
The Slovak League of America, together with the organization.s affiliated with it, petition the President and
the Congress of the United States not to abandon the principle of nationality, the ethnic principle, with respect to
the Slovak nation, be&lt;!ause it still is the most effective
weapon against Communism. We urge the liberation of
the Slov8Jk nation along with other nations behind the Iron
Curtain, including the Czech nation. We recommend moral
and financial aid to the fighters for Czech liberation, freedom and independence, but we certainly cannot recommend less for the genuine representatives of the nation we
are descended from. We protested when the fundamental
rights of other nations were threatened or violated and
we certainly cannot be expected to do less when the rights
of the SlovaJk nation are violated and its national existence is threatened.
As Americans who believe in inherent, God-given
rights of nations, we believe those same rights of the
Slovak naJtion must be recognized and respected not only
by the United States and other democratic countries, but
even by the Czech nation as well. As Christians and followers of the American Way of Life, dedicated to human
liberty and the dignity of the human person which are the
cornerstones of democracy, we resolutely oppose the dominaJtion and exiploiitaiticm of one nation by another nation or
political state. We seek no special benefits or grants for
the nation we are descended from, but only plead for the
recognition of and respect for its inherent and fundamental rights, because the Slovak nation cannot voice itself freely today.
Approved and adopted this 23rd day of May, 1955,
with the unanimous consent of all the delegates to the
Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slov8Jk League of America,
in the City of Washington, D. C.
PIDLIP A. HROBAK, President.
DR. FRANCIS HRUSOVSK°£", Secretary

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1358">
                    <text>22

SLOVAKIA

ones who were writing all the notes and doing all the pro·testing and that's as far as it ever got. Our notes were
snubbed and our protests were ignored. That passive attitude on the part of our government at that time was one
reason I resigned from the State Department in' disgust
five years ago. But how times have changed since then!
Isn't it with a feeling of pleasure and relief that we witness the other side writing notes and protests for a
change? Isn't it great to know that the initiative in this
cold war is really passing into our hands?
It is always a pleasure to meet with members of your
organization and it has been a great privilege for ·_ Mrs.
Bentley and me to be here this evening. Keep u,p the
good work.
Thank you very much .

•

•

•

MEMORANDUM
To the President and the Congress of the United States,
Adopted by the Delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, May 23-24,
1955, Washington, D. C.
We, the delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of
the Slovak League of America, assembled in Washington, D. C., May 23-24, 1955 - send most cordial greetings
to President Dwight D. Eisenho-w er and the members of
the Congress of the United States of America, and do
solemnly and unanimously resolve that:
1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the
principles upon which our Country was founded under
God, the American Way of Life, which has made our
America the envy of the world, and declare that the welfare and the security of the United States of America
shall continue to be our primary interest.
2. We subsor1be wihole'heartedly to the expressed printhe. fundamental principle
ciple of self-determination of American policy in Europe since the administration of
President Woodrow Wilson, which declares that all nations have the . right to determine for themselves the state

�SLOVAKIA

23

or form of political organization under which they wish
to live
This principle, not applied practically in the past with
respect to the Slovruk nation, must apply without any reservaJtion even to the Slovak nation from which we are descended.
We fully endorae the principle that the Government of
the United States of America shall refuse to recognize any
government and any state or form of political organization
which has been imposed upon any nation by the force of an
alien power and we respectfully request that this policy be
followed even in the case of the Slovak nation, which is tyrannized by the Czecho-Communist regime of Prague in
flagrant violation of the fundamental principle of the
Charter of the United Nations and in utter contempt for
the fundamental principle of the American foreign policy
of self-detezmina.tion.
3. As Americans and Christians, we condemn all
forms of tyranny, every form of totalitarianism which has
no regard for the ri,g hts and liberties of the individual
and is determined to maJke individuals slaves of a political state.
We recognize godless, materialistic Communism as a
conspiracy against free humanity, as a ,p olitical and economic sy,stem which threatens mankind with utter enslavement. Therefore, we cannot snhs&lt;!ribe to the policy
that doing business with the Savi.et Union and other Communist governments is in the best interests of the welfare
and security of the United States of America and the rest
of the free world. We have fought the plague of Communism openly and resolutely in the past and today are determined more than ever to persevere in the fight against
it until it is completely e:z,adicated from the face of the
earth.
We shall not be deceived by the "pea:ced:Uil co-exist..
ence" propagated by the Soviet Union. Peaceful co-existence with the USSR, the Communist world, is strictly a
myth and a hoax. To give it credence would be folly. To the
godless materialists of the Kremlin peaceful co-existence

�24

SLOVAKIA

means full collaboration with the USSR. And collaboration with the USSR means, in the end, a brutal suppression of all freedoms and liberties and utter enslavement.
Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, China, and other countries are proof of that.
4. We heartily commend all efforts of the Administration and the Congress of the United States and of the
agencies of our Government to ferret out, unmask and
prosecute all subversive elements, specifically all Communists and pro-Communi sts, who propagate class hatreds,
economic strife, chaos and anarchy, and promote the interests of the USSR which is determined to destroy us.
We appreciate especially the work of the House Committee on Communist Aggression of the 83rd Congress,
under the chairmanship of the Hon. Charles J. Kersten
of Milwaukee, Wis. The Committee had a very difficult
task to perform, but did it admirrubly well. We believe it
was the first time that a real, honest effort was made by
a congressional committee to become acquainted with the
background of the many peoples behind the Iron Curtain,
the nations who always were and still are our friends, the
peoples who with all their hearts want to be our friends,
because to them America has always been a living symbol
of freedom and independence, and today is just about their
last hope of liberation from Communist tyranny.
5. We approve of the idea of a United Nations to promote peace and prosperity in all countries as far as is humanly possible. Ten years after the establishment of the
U. N., however, we note with regret that it has not been
very effective in doing the work it set out to do. As presently constituted the U. N. is not an organization of nations united in the common purpose, so nobly expressed in
its charter, but an organization of governments, several
of which definitely are not representative of the political
will and national interests of the nations they presume to
represent, but are dedicated to the enslavement of those
very nations and, furthermore, to the destruction of the
free political systems of the world, including our own
American Way of Life.

�SLOVAKIA

25

The sad experiences with the United Nations during
the past ten years have convinced us that the Soviet
Union definitely is not interested in promoting the noble
aims and purposes of the U. N. Moscow apparently accepted the U. N. only to mask and facilitate its program
of world domination; the Soviet Union is in fact promoting world revolution from within the General Assembly
and the Security Council of the United Nations.
As we see it, there is something monstrous about the
idea of associating in a pretended peace organization with
the godless mass murderers of the Kremlin, who have
enslaved one-third of the human race and vowed to bring
us all under their yoke.
We, therefore, respectfully request the President and
the Congress of the United States not only to oppose the
entrance of Red China to the United Nations, but also to
demand the expulsion of all nations and governments
espousing the godless philosophy of Marxistic materialism, so that the United Nations, rid of all tyrants and quislings of tyrants, might function effectively as an assembly of free men. Provisions for such expulsions, if already
not included in the Charter of the U. N., should be made
to that effect, and one of these provis,i ons definitely should
make it cause for expulsion if any member of the U. N.,
gives any aid and succor to any nation or government
which is judged guilty of aggression by the U. N.
6. We stand opposed to the Genocide Convention as
presently written, because we feel that it is dangerous
in the extreme to our Constitutional freedoms and fails in
its primary purpose - the outlawing of mass extermination of peoples by governments - and because it will
not apply to genocide as practiced by the USSR and in
countries captured by it. Genocide should be outlawed by
all nations. But genocide should be properly defined to include government approval, for then and only then is it
genocide. Furthermore, the Genocide Convention should
include "political groups" as well as national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups, and it should not be used as a
vehicle for domestic legislation.

�26

SLOVAKIA

7. Because we fear that the adoption of the International Covenant on Human Rights - as proposed by the
United Nations Commission - would destroy our basic Constitutional concept of inalienable God-given liberty, we do not
recommend its adoption as a treaty by the United States.
8. Once again we respectfully request the President
rund the Congress of the United States to re-examine the
question on the destruction of the Slovak Republic in 1945,
because we are certain that the political will of the Slovak
nation was violated. We also request the President and the
Congress of the United States to instruct our delegate to
the United Nations to ask for an investigation by the U
N. of the destruction of the Slovak State, the independence
of which was proclaimed by duly elected r/ilpresentatives
of the Slovak people on March 14, 1939, th~t is, approximately six months before the start of World" War II.
We further petition the President and the Congress
of the United States to voice a strong protest against the
violation of human rights in Slovakia, the brutal persecution of Slovak religious, cultural and politcal leaders by
the Czecho-Communis t regime of Prague.
9. We deeply resent the fact that even the present Administration of the United States Government is inclined
to recognize and favor former Czech and Slovak politicians who are in a large measure responsible for the present terrible plight of the Czech and Slovak nations. We refer particularly to the followers of Dr. Edward Bein.es who
promoted pro-Soviet and anti-Slovak policy - the Czech
and Slovak Socialists and radical left-wingers who collaborated with Moscow and the Communists until 1948 as
members of the Communist-domin ated National Front Government of Czecho-Slovakia of the Benes-Gottwald coalition.
The Czechs and their Slovak hirelings organiized in
various so-called "Czechoslovak" organizations - no matter what their political plumage - never did and never
will represent the political will of the Slovak nation, even
if they continue to presume to do so. One such organization, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," allegedly regarded as a semi-official provisional government-in-exi le
by our State Department, boasts that it is an organization

�SLOVAKIA

27

of "anti-Communist, democratic" exiles from Czecho-Slovakia, but, in fact, is an organization controlled by Czech
Socialists who were prominent members of the Communistdominated National Front Government of Dr. Benes,
which collaborated closely with Moscow and outlawed all
anti-Socialistic and anti-Communistic elements in CzechoSlovakia after the war ended in 1945, when it came to power
with the blessing of Stalin and the force of the Red armies.
We, therefore, respectfully request the President and
the Congress of the United States to recognize the members of this Council for what they really were in their
homeland - as promoters of Socialism and the pro-Soviet
policy of the Czech Socialists and Communists - and deal
with them accordingly.
We also respectfully request the President and Congress of the United States to re-examine the so-called
"Czechoolovak" policy of our Government, which is still
based on the information supplied by Dr. Eldward Benes
and other Czech Socialists and radical leftwingers. This
information, naturally, glorifies and favors the Czech
"progreflSives" who promoted Socialism and pro-Soviet policy, and maliciously smears and vilifies genuine political,
cultural and religious leaders of the Slovak nation who
fought Socialism and Communism all their lives. It is embarrassing to us, as it should also be to the present Administration and Congress of the United States, that such
people are employed by various agencies of government,
like the USIA (Voice of America), CIA, Library of Congress, and others, as well as by so-called "privately-sponsored" organizations, like the Free Europe Committee
(Radio Free Europe). The Benes Czechs have embarrassed and compromised the prestige of the United States
entirely too long and, therefore, should not be relied upon
any longer. We respectfully request the President and
Congress of the United States to give this matter their
serious attention, 1b ecause it does affect the security of
our country.
10. Since the Slovaks are not and do not wish to be
Czechs, and the Czeclls are ·n ot and do not want to be Slovaks, we believe that it is only just and proper in the in-

�28

SLOVAKIA

terests of all concerned that this ethnic distinction be observed when any so-&lt;:alled "Czechoslovak" problem is considered.
The Slovak League of America, together with the organization.s affiliated with it, petition the President and
the Congress of the United States not to abandon the principle of nationality, the ethnic principle, with respect to
the Slovak nation, be&lt;!ause it still is the most effective
weapon against Communism. We urge the liberation of
the Slov8Jk nation along with other nations behind the Iron
Curtain, including the Czech nation. We recommend moral
and financial aid to the fighters for Czech liberation, freedom and independence, but we certainly cannot recommend less for the genuine representatives of the nation we
are descended from. We protested when the fundamental
rights of other nations were threatened or violated and
we certainly cannot be expected to do less when the rights
of the SlovaJk nation are violated and its national existence is threatened.
As Americans who believe in inherent, God-given
rights of nations, we believe those same rights of the
Slovak naJtion must be recognized and respected not only
by the United States and other democratic countries, but
even by the Czech nation as well. As Christians and followers of the American Way of Life, dedicated to human
liberty and the dignity of the human person which are the
cornerstones of democracy, we resolutely oppose the dominaJtion and exiploiitaiticm of one nation by another nation or
political state. We seek no special benefits or grants for
the nation we are descended from, but only plead for the
recognition of and respect for its inherent and fundamental rights, because the Slovak nation cannot voice itself freely today.
Approved and adopted this 23rd day of May, 1955,
with the unanimous consent of all the delegates to the
Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slov8Jk League of America,
in the City of Washington, D. C.
PIDLIP A. HROBAK, President.
DR. FRANCIS HRUSOVSK°£", Secretary

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                  <text>1955, Vol. 5</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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            <elementText elementTextId="1356">
              <text>22&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
ones who were writing all the notes and doing all the pro·testing and that's as far as it ever got. Our notes were&#13;
snubbed and our protests were ignored. That passive attitude on the part of our government at that time was one&#13;
reason I resigned from the State Department in' disgust&#13;
five years ago. But how times have changed since then!&#13;
Isn't it with a feeling of pleasure and relief that we witness the other side writing notes and protests for a&#13;
change? Isn't it great to know that the initiative in this&#13;
cold war is really passing into our hands?&#13;
It is always a pleasure to meet with members of your&#13;
organization and it has been a great privilege for ·_ Mrs.&#13;
Bentley and me to be here this evening. Keep u,p the&#13;
good work.&#13;
Thank you very much .&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
MEMORANDUM&#13;
To the President and the Congress of the United States,&#13;
Adopted by the Delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, May 23-24,&#13;
1955, Washington, D. C.&#13;
We, the delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of&#13;
the Slovak League of America, assembled in Washington, D. C., May 23-24, 1955 - send most cordial greetings&#13;
to President Dwight D. Eisenho-w er and the members of&#13;
the Congress of the United States of America, and do&#13;
solemnly and unanimously resolve that:&#13;
1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the&#13;
principles upon which our Country was founded under&#13;
God, the American Way of Life, which has made our&#13;
America the envy of the world, and declare that the welfare and the security of the United States of America&#13;
shall continue to be our primary interest.&#13;
2. We subsor1be wihole'heartedly to the expressed printhe. fundamental principle&#13;
ciple of self-determination of American policy in Europe since the administration of&#13;
President Woodrow Wilson, which declares that all nations have the . right to determine for themselves the state&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
23&#13;
&#13;
or form of political organization under which they wish&#13;
to live&#13;
This principle, not applied practically in the past with&#13;
respect to the Slovruk nation, must apply without any reservaJtion even to the Slovak nation from which we are descended.&#13;
We fully endorae the principle that the Government of&#13;
the United States of America shall refuse to recognize any&#13;
government and any state or form of political organization&#13;
which has been imposed upon any nation by the force of an&#13;
alien power and we respectfully request that this policy be&#13;
followed even in the case of the Slovak nation, which is tyrannized by the Czecho-Communist regime of Prague in&#13;
flagrant violation of the fundamental principle of the&#13;
Charter of the United Nations and in utter contempt for&#13;
the fundamental principle of the American foreign policy&#13;
of self-detezmina.tion.&#13;
3. As Americans and Christians, we condemn all&#13;
forms of tyranny, every form of totalitarianism which has&#13;
no regard for the ri,g hts and liberties of the individual&#13;
and is determined to maJke individuals slaves of a political state.&#13;
We recognize godless, materialistic Communism as a&#13;
conspiracy against free humanity, as a ,p olitical and economic sy,stem which threatens mankind with utter enslavement. Therefore, we cannot snhs&lt;!ribe to the policy&#13;
that doing business with the Savi.et Union and other Communist governments is in the best interests of the welfare&#13;
and security of the United States of America and the rest&#13;
of the free world. We have fought the plague of Communism openly and resolutely in the past and today are determined more than ever to persevere in the fight against&#13;
it until it is completely e:z,adicated from the face of the&#13;
earth.&#13;
We shall not be deceived by the "pea:ced:Uil co-exist..&#13;
ence" propagated by the Soviet Union. Peaceful co-existence with the USSR, the Communist world, is strictly a&#13;
myth and a hoax. To give it credence would be folly. To the&#13;
godless materialists of the Kremlin peaceful co-existence&#13;
&#13;
24&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
means full collaboration with the USSR. And collaboration with the USSR means, in the end, a brutal suppression of all freedoms and liberties and utter enslavement.&#13;
Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, China, and other countries are proof of that.&#13;
4. We heartily commend all efforts of the Administration and the Congress of the United States and of the&#13;
agencies of our Government to ferret out, unmask and&#13;
prosecute all subversive elements, specifically all Communists and pro-Communi sts, who propagate class hatreds,&#13;
economic strife, chaos and anarchy, and promote the interests of the USSR which is determined to destroy us.&#13;
We appreciate especially the work of the House Committee on Communist Aggression of the 83rd Congress,&#13;
under the chairmanship of the Hon. Charles J. Kersten&#13;
of Milwaukee, Wis. The Committee had a very difficult&#13;
task to perform, but did it admirrubly well. We believe it&#13;
was the first time that a real, honest effort was made by&#13;
a congressional committee to become acquainted with the&#13;
background of the many peoples behind the Iron Curtain,&#13;
the nations who always were and still are our friends, the&#13;
peoples who with all their hearts want to be our friends,&#13;
because to them America has always been a living symbol&#13;
of freedom and independence, and today is just about their&#13;
last hope of liberation from Communist tyranny.&#13;
5. We approve of the idea of a United Nations to promote peace and prosperity in all countries as far as is humanly possible. Ten years after the establishment of the&#13;
U. N., however, we note with regret that it has not been&#13;
very effective in doing the work it set out to do. As presently constituted the U. N. is not an organization of nations united in the common purpose, so nobly expressed in&#13;
its charter, but an organization of governments, several&#13;
of which definitely are not representative of the political&#13;
will and national interests of the nations they presume to&#13;
represent, but are dedicated to the enslavement of those&#13;
very nations and, furthermore, to the destruction of the&#13;
free political systems of the world, including our own&#13;
American Way of Life.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
25&#13;
&#13;
The sad experiences with the United Nations during&#13;
the past ten years have convinced us that the Soviet&#13;
Union definitely is not interested in promoting the noble&#13;
aims and purposes of the U. N. Moscow apparently accepted the U. N. only to mask and facilitate its program&#13;
of world domination; the Soviet Union is in fact promoting world revolution from within the General Assembly&#13;
and the Security Council of the United Nations.&#13;
As we see it, there is something monstrous about the&#13;
idea of associating in a pretended peace organization with&#13;
the godless mass murderers of the Kremlin, who have&#13;
enslaved one-third of the human race and vowed to bring&#13;
us all under their yoke.&#13;
We, therefore, respectfully request the President and&#13;
the Congress of the United States not only to oppose the&#13;
entrance of Red China to the United Nations, but also to&#13;
demand the expulsion of all nations and governments&#13;
espousing the godless philosophy of Marxistic materialism, so that the United Nations, rid of all tyrants and quislings of tyrants, might function effectively as an assembly of free men. Provisions for such expulsions, if already&#13;
not included in the Charter of the U. N., should be made&#13;
to that effect, and one of these provis,i ons definitely should&#13;
make it cause for expulsion if any member of the U. N.,&#13;
gives any aid and succor to any nation or government&#13;
which is judged guilty of aggression by the U. N.&#13;
6. We stand opposed to the Genocide Convention as&#13;
presently written, because we feel that it is dangerous&#13;
in the extreme to our Constitutional freedoms and fails in&#13;
its primary purpose - the outlawing of mass extermination of peoples by governments - and because it will&#13;
not apply to genocide as practiced by the USSR and in&#13;
countries captured by it. Genocide should be outlawed by&#13;
all nations. But genocide should be properly defined to include government approval, for then and only then is it&#13;
genocide. Furthermore, the Genocide Convention should&#13;
include "political groups" as well as national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups, and it should not be used as a&#13;
vehicle for domestic legislation.&#13;
&#13;
26&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
7. Because we fear that the adoption of the International Covenant on Human Rights - as proposed by the&#13;
United Nations Commission - would destroy our basic Constitutional concept of inalienable God-given liberty, we do not&#13;
recommend its adoption as a treaty by the United States.&#13;
8. Once again we respectfully request the President&#13;
rund the Congress of the United States to re-examine the&#13;
question on the destruction of the Slovak Republic in 1945,&#13;
because we are certain that the political will of the Slovak&#13;
nation was violated. We also request the President and the&#13;
Congress of the United States to instruct our delegate to&#13;
the United Nations to ask for an investigation by the U&#13;
N. of the destruction of the Slovak State, the independence&#13;
of which was proclaimed by duly elected r/ilpresentatives&#13;
of the Slovak people on March 14, 1939, th~t is, approximately six months before the start of World" War II.&#13;
We further petition the President and the Congress&#13;
of the United States to voice a strong protest against the&#13;
violation of human rights in Slovakia, the brutal persecution of Slovak religious, cultural and politcal leaders by&#13;
the Czecho-Communis t regime of Prague.&#13;
9. We deeply resent the fact that even the present Administration of the United States Government is inclined&#13;
to recognize and favor former Czech and Slovak politicians who are in a large measure responsible for the present terrible plight of the Czech and Slovak nations. We refer particularly to the followers of Dr. Edward Bein.es who&#13;
promoted pro-Soviet and anti-Slovak policy - the Czech&#13;
and Slovak Socialists and radical left-wingers who collaborated with Moscow and the Communists until 1948 as&#13;
members of the Communist-domin ated National Front Government of Czecho-Slovakia of the Benes-Gottwald coalition.&#13;
The Czechs and their Slovak hirelings organiized in&#13;
various so-called "Czechoslovak" organizations - no matter what their political plumage - never did and never&#13;
will represent the political will of the Slovak nation, even&#13;
if they continue to presume to do so. One such organization, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," allegedly regarded as a semi-official provisional government-in-exi le&#13;
by our State Department, boasts that it is an organization&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
27&#13;
&#13;
of "anti-Communist, democratic" exiles from Czecho-Slovakia, but, in fact, is an organization controlled by Czech&#13;
Socialists who were prominent members of the Communistdominated National Front Government of Dr. Benes,&#13;
which collaborated closely with Moscow and outlawed all&#13;
anti-Socialistic and anti-Communistic elements in CzechoSlovakia after the war ended in 1945, when it came to power&#13;
with the blessing of Stalin and the force of the Red armies.&#13;
We, therefore, respectfully request the President and&#13;
the Congress of the United States to recognize the members of this Council for what they really were in their&#13;
homeland - as promoters of Socialism and the pro-Soviet&#13;
policy of the Czech Socialists and Communists - and deal&#13;
with them accordingly.&#13;
We also respectfully request the President and Congress of the United States to re-examine the so-called&#13;
"Czechoolovak" policy of our Government, which is still&#13;
based on the information supplied by Dr. Eldward Benes&#13;
and other Czech Socialists and radical leftwingers. This&#13;
information, naturally, glorifies and favors the Czech&#13;
"progreflSives" who promoted Socialism and pro-Soviet policy, and maliciously smears and vilifies genuine political,&#13;
cultural and religious leaders of the Slovak nation who&#13;
fought Socialism and Communism all their lives. It is embarrassing to us, as it should also be to the present Administration and Congress of the United States, that such&#13;
people are employed by various agencies of government,&#13;
like the USIA (Voice of America), CIA, Library of Congress, and others, as well as by so-called "privately-sponsored" organizations, like the Free Europe Committee&#13;
(Radio Free Europe). The Benes Czechs have embarrassed and compromised the prestige of the United States&#13;
entirely too long and, therefore, should not be relied upon&#13;
any longer. We respectfully request the President and&#13;
Congress of the United States to give this matter their&#13;
serious attention, 1b ecause it does affect the security of&#13;
our country.&#13;
10. Since the Slovaks are not and do not wish to be&#13;
Czechs, and the Czeclls are ·n ot and do not want to be Slovaks, we believe that it is only just and proper in the in-&#13;
&#13;
28&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
terests of all concerned that this ethnic distinction be observed when any so-&lt;:alled "Czechoslovak" problem is considered.&#13;
The Slovak League of America, together with the organization.s affiliated with it, petition the President and&#13;
the Congress of the United States not to abandon the principle of nationality, the ethnic principle, with respect to&#13;
the Slovak nation, be&lt;!ause it still is the most effective&#13;
weapon against Communism. We urge the liberation of&#13;
the Slov8Jk nation along with other nations behind the Iron&#13;
Curtain, including the Czech nation. We recommend moral&#13;
and financial aid to the fighters for Czech liberation, freedom and independence, but we certainly cannot recommend less for the genuine representatives of the nation we&#13;
are descended from. We protested when the fundamental&#13;
rights of other nations were threatened or violated and&#13;
we certainly cannot be expected to do less when the rights&#13;
of the SlovaJk nation are violated and its national existence is threatened.&#13;
As Americans who believe in inherent, God-given&#13;
rights of nations, we believe those same rights of the&#13;
Slovak naJtion must be recognized and respected not only&#13;
by the United States and other democratic countries, but&#13;
even by the Czech nation as well. As Christians and followers of the American Way of Life, dedicated to human&#13;
liberty and the dignity of the human person which are the&#13;
cornerstones of democracy, we resolutely oppose the dominaJtion and exiploiitaiticm of one nation by another nation or&#13;
political state. We seek no special benefits or grants for&#13;
the nation we are descended from, but only plead for the&#13;
recognition of and respect for its inherent and fundamental rights, because the Slovak nation cannot voice itself freely today.&#13;
Approved and adopted this 23rd day of May, 1955,&#13;
with the unanimous consent of all the delegates to the&#13;
Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slov8Jk League of America,&#13;
in the City of Washington, D. C.&#13;
PIDLIP A. HROBAK, President.&#13;
DR. FRANCIS HRUSOVSK°£", Secretary&#13;
&#13;
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pp. 22-28</text>
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

29

THE MURDER OF MATUS CERNAK

Fr. Janik-Horak
(This article results from the contents of the corresponding
article in ,Czech, wJJ.ich ,appeared in " BOHEMIA" (July 22, 1955), published monthly in Munich, Germany, by the rCzech Democmtic Federalists. T·h e author, its editor-in-chief, is quite outspoken about the
ruinous pro-Soviet and a'llti-'.Slovak policy of Dr. \Edward ,B enes and
his socialistic political entourage whi ch brought Moscow to CzechoSlovakia and the heart of (Europe.)

Two months ago - when we had written that the
Communists were maiking an all-out attack against our
exiles and that this would be a ,b rutaily merciless fight some of our exiles prdbably thought that we iwere using
strong but empty words. That we meant what we wrote at
that time has been proved by the explosion in !Munich
which mutilated Matthew CernaJk (Tchernah1k) ibeyond
recognition.
We do nat doubt that this brutal murder is the work
of the Prague Communists. Let us consider why they committed it and what they exipected to gain by it.
First of ·all, they wanted to liquidate the dangerous
anti-Communist, Matthew Cernak. That is the opinion of
the ipolice commission of experts assigned to the case,
which ascertained that the diabolical instrument which
killed Cernak contained one kHogram (2.2 ~bs.) of a high
ex;plosive which is not at all obtaina!ble in Germany. With
the murder of Cernak, the Reds figured the rest of the
exiles would lbe frightened into inaction.
Nen, the Prague Reds figured that the murder of
Cerna,k in M&lt;Unich would incite the German population,
and the German authorities as well, against all exiles in
general, 1a nd against the exiles from Ozecho-lSlovakia in
particular. They almost succeeded in this, since two Germans were kiHed and 21 others wounded when Cernak
opened the bomlb~ac'kage in a Munich post-office. Premier Hogneir of Bavaria ibro1a dcast a warning to all exiles,
while the leading "foreign affairs" editor of the "Siiddeutsche Zeitung," Mr. Birnbaum, strongly urged the cessation of ,politica1 ,a ctivity of all exile groups.

�30

SLOVAKIA

It is significant that Mr. Birnibaum's editorial, together
with a commentary sup,plied by Red Prague, ,w as propagated
the very next day by the Czeoh Press Bureau (CTK) and
the entire Communist press of 0zecho-Slova!kia.
We can thank the leadership of the Union of Democratic Exiles (UIDU) ithat the German public convinced
that the guilty party o,r parties must :b e sought in Red Czecho-,Slovrukia and not among the exiles in Germany. The
Union is made up of seven central organi~ations of exiles;
the fate 'M. Cerna,k was a member of its presidium, and
Vladimir Pekelsiky (owner and publisher of BOHEM[A) is
its secretary-general. Credit must also be .given to editor
Birnbaum for allowing himself to be convinced that he wa:s
in error and that in the interests of impartiality he himself offered to publish the lengthy article of the DIDU, and
which, in fact, he did ;p ublish.
The shocking murder of Cernak was supposed to silence and frighten the rest of his fellow-exiles. Even in this
case, however, we must state that the Communist murderers miscaloulated. rt is true, of course, that the murder of Cernak did strlke fear in the hearts of many exiles ;
it did not, however, frighten of.f the w,arriors. And that is
n;iost important. Cowards always crawl aiway from a fight;
they never did hel,p fight the Reds, so we might just say:
good riddance !
Courageously then -

Heroically Now!

Matthew Cerna:k was our closest Slovak felQow-warrior
on the exile fvont in Ger.many. We stood on the same political platform against Communists and ·against their assistants here in exHe an:d, therefore, even against the ruinous ideology of IDr. Edward Benes in the Council of Free
Czecho~Slovakia and in RiA!DIO FREE EUR.OPE.
'Dhat is why we say that the murder of Cernak was a
murderous attempt aimed even against us here in the
editorial offices of B0HEMtI:A. The German press, seeking
sensations, and some malicious exiles wringing their hands
joyously where nobody might see them, are even writing
and Wking about the people in .the editoriaJl offices of
B0HIElMIA who are "dedicated to death," because we a.r e

�SLOVAKIA

31

now supposed to be-next. We are not surprised, therefore,
that we are _urged !by some of our friends to lbe most
careful, to t ~ r our writing and even to quit our fight
against the Reds, ,bec,ause, they say, it is in the best interests of our security that we do not incite the Communists against us.
In reply, we can only say that we are fully aware
o.f the seriousness of the times. Fighters, however, carry
on the fight Entil they either win o•r fall in combat; never,
however, do_,they flee from battle! Now, we fled into exile to fight for the freedom ,o f our nation and for the freedom of all nations. For us this has never ,b een an empty
meaningless phrase which we might use in America to
coiled dollars for a carefree, comfortable life. somewhere
in a seoure 'land !beyond the ,s ea. When the •program of the
Czech 'Democratic Federalists was ,p rodaimed, we ·p ledged
to our adherents . that we would loyally -p ersevere, and that
pledge iwe conside·r sacred even today.
If we have written courageously up to this time, then
from now on ·we shafl' write heroica:lly ! The explosion of
the iMunich murder of Cernak binds us to do so. We know
that our strength and our significance and al,s o our danger to the Communists lies in the fact that we speaik to the
wide masses of the common ipeople of our exile, that we are
young and that we are not dreamers - and that we do
have a positive, healthy, political program.
We are familiar with the bloody and bushwhacking
methods o.f the Communists. As political prisoners we
ha'V'e passed through tens of jails and riruvestigating torture-chambers. That is why we e~pect no quarters and no
mercy from them. We •also know that they undertake
everything according to plan and, therefore, that the murder of Cernak might well lbe followed by a series of further 'killings, even though they m~ght be per.petrated in a
manner different than that oif ,s ending heHish devices.
We warn the Reds, however, that the day ,shaH come
when they ,wjll know that our God of the Old Testament
still lives! There ,w ill come a day when the exiles murdered
by them shall foad baok into the homeland an anny of
merciless avengers. That day shall come. For that day
1

�32

SLOVAKIA

we are strug,g ling for years, and rfor that day we shaH
even be prepared to fall, because that shall lbe the day
of a new rising of the sun over our enslaved country!
It is neces,s ary to note here that Cema!k's death has
caused joy not on~y to the initiators and per.petrators in
Red Prague, but even to his opponents in the Council of
Free Czecho-Slovakia. Certainly they. must realize that
dead Cernruk is much more dangerous to them than when
he was alive. '.Dhey know that Cerna.k's death as a martyr
will give SlovaJk patriots a new motive and added cO'llJrage
in their fight for the freedom and independence of the
Slova!k nation.
'.Dhe 'Munich &lt;killing of Cernak hais cast light on several
real~ties. [t has demonstrated what section of the front
is most dangerous to Red Prague. That section is not the
so~oalled Council of Free Ozecho-Slova:kia, nor the "Czecho-Slovax" dirvi,sion of RiAJD]O FREE EUROOE; neither is
it the loudmouths around the dollar trough, nor the dis~
honest people in the social organizaUons who crullously rob
needy refugees. !But it is certainlly our section of the front.
'!'hat is the section that is ,b eing hit from all sides and
stands - and solidly stands - without a single dollar of
American support; nay, it is that section which must resist not only the attacks of the Communists, but even the
mad attacks of the "peoples' democrats" in exile who are
being financed •b y American dollars.
Little wonder, then, that some morally irresponsi'ble
people in the interests of RFE spread among the uninformed foreign journalists the shameless, false statement
that Matus Cernak was •a n employee of the "Ozecho-Slovak" unit of !Radio Free Europe - the same Cernak who
stood loyally at our side on the same forefronit, even when
RJF:Ei rightfully deserved sharp criticism for the propaganda sprea:d iby the "Ozecho-1Slovak" unit of RIFE.
Must All Exiles Think Alike?
The Munich murder forces us to speak openly and
truthfully about conditions in exile.
Our ipolitkal exile. is accustomed to, a.oknowledging
every generosity of the free world gra,tefu!lly and uncritic-

�SLOVAKIA

33

a1ly. But the free world owes us much more. . . Whether
the West gave us anything or not, we always regarded it
as our moral duty to ibe sincere allies of the West; and we
remain true to this principle. But is it only our fault that
we are in exile, that our country is enslaved by Moscow?
Or is it not the fauiLt ,o f the Yalta and Porbsdam leaders of
the free world? They negotiated with StaJlin about oor
land even though they knew practically nothing about it .
And it is l.iikewise rtheir fault that at that time they would
listen only to Stalin's agent, Dr. Edward Benes. They told
us to like Stalin against our will, just li:ke they are teHing us
now in exile to like Titoism, which is not a hair different
than Stalinism. We know, too, that tomorrow they shall
persecute every Titoist, even those who became Titoists
at their advice. This is nothing but imbecile uniform:rzing
of the views of the exile. Should any one in exile express
a different view, his own and sane view, immediately he is
suspected and spied upon, smeared and accused of beiillg
an enemy agent. They have no respect for the views of
others.
1

No Thanks to the Free Europe Committee

Americans in the ,F1REE ;JDUROPE COMiMI['DTEE already for years are forcing upon us the political oonc~
tion of the criminal and 1Stalin's agent, Dr. Edward Benes.
What do those men !know a:bout our nation? By ,w hat right
are they trying to force that criminal political conception
upon us? They :would ,probaJbly be very much ,sur,prised if
some foreigners, ignorant of American conditions, would
continually try to force into the administration of their
country Quislings, whOlm the ,A merican nation despises,
and the terror of the immoral "ipeoples'" democracy. Not
only that, but they even demand that the Czech exile sing
praises to them daily and with hat in hand humlbly rkiss
their hands.
With the Munich murder the situation has gone so
far that we cannot lkoop silent a.:bout it any longer. Our
exile has nothing to be grateful for to the Free Europe
Committee. Whatever it gave to the profaned politicians
in the so-oa:lled Council of Free Ozecho-Slovakia does not
1

�34

SLOVAKIA

interest the anti-Communist exile at all. And rwe are not
interested if they throw out the windows of RIFE millions
of dollairs of American contributors. Out of that money not
a single cent has gone to support the anti-Oorrununist resistance,. ibut, conversely, those hard-earned dollars have
been used to divide and suppress the anti-Communist resistance and for the support of pro~·Communist tendencies
and elements, if not even outright Communist agents! Red
Prague has murdered \Matthew Cernaik in a manner which
has shaken the entire free world, as witnessed by its press .
In R:ADIO ,F,RIDE EJUROPE the ernme incident was disposed of in a few simple sentences ia.nd they would prefer
that the murder be fo.r,gotten altogether. Why?
Propaganda of RFE iis Responsible
The "Ozecho-iSlovaJk" unit of R!FE with its continual
blabbering of .primitive phrases ·aJbout the Iack of baloney
in Czecho-Slovakia completely diverts the attention of the
free world from the substance of the Communist threat
which is inherent in the moral disintegration of the family
and hum8.1Il society and never in the ~ack of meat. For us
Communism is unacceptaJble, 1b ecause it is immoral, and
immoral even if under it every citirzen would ibe entitled to
10 kilograms of meat daily. This mistaken, primitive propaganda of the "Czecho-'Slov,ak" unit of IRF1E wifil in the
end place our exile in the eyes of the West into such a
light that not only shall we be understood at all why we
are agaJinst a Communist regime, but that rwe also ,s hall ibe
regarded as cheats, adventurers and 1 iars, ,b ecause the
Prague regime, with the help of ente:r,prises such as the
olympics ·a nd others, will easily and altogether convince
western journalists and visitors that in Czecho-iSlovaki-a
there exist other economic and social conditions th·a n those
described by IR@E. It iwill convince them that autos ride
normally on the streets of Prague (a certain journalistic
primitive recently reported from Brno that the residents
of that city hruve not seen any auto fo:r six months!); that
people there are nonnaUy dressed, and in many cases even
better than in the West; that there are dances at which
the bands play western tunes; that there are cultural en-

�SLOVAKIA

36

twprises,. calba.rets and night clubs, lange commercial
houses, etc., and that wirbh this our nation will ·b e disin~
tegrated internally by the most immoral Communistic sea.
In the interest of a more effective fight against Communism, it i,s 1high time that the anti-Communist exile presents a unified and decisive protest rugainst this harmfol
activity of the "Ozecho.JSlovruk" unit of RFE, which benefits the Communists in many ways, and so that before
the western public a:nd our nation it keep its distance from
this irresponsible propaganda. At the same time it is necessary to clearly and loudly point out the actual threat
of Communism and the program efforts of t he anti-Communist part of the nation.
Shady Acts of the National Socialists in Exile
At the same time we must not .r emain siilent rubout the
support of the "peoples" democrats by the American Flree
Europe Comrruttee. With this support the American F'EC
one-sidedly puts itself on record for the party of the
OLecho..slovaik National :Socialists. Now, the Committee
will have to reconcile itself with the ,f.act thrut we are going to tell the whole iworld a.lbout this situation. 'Ilhis Committee should also know that in its one-sided swpport we
see a coarse inter:vention against the health of the exile,
if it is not directly against its freedom, and ,a rude political coercion and even moral orientation of the nation in
its homeiland. [fit were not for the support of the American
FEC, today in exile there would not be even by far so
much demoralization and moral disintegration, and there
would not be by far so much disgust, bitterness and disappointments in the wide masses of exiles. [f in Australia,
Canada, the USA and elsewhere we ·are today the witnesses of how the political exile, after only several years,
is beginning to go through the process of old settlers,
which ,w ere friendly to emigrants, then rwe can thank the
American _cirdes which financiailly suppor,t and poilitically
protect the Czecho-lSlovaJk !National Socialists for these
anti-exile sentiments.
Likewise iwe can /keep silent no longer albout the shady
acts of the Ozooh National .Socialists in exile, rubout their

�36

SLOVAKIA

prepared -o ffensive against the Catholic Church, about
their shameless and lbra;zen presumption that ibhey speruk
for the exiles and tile nation, and about their immoral political tactics, which might be called a science which !best
seHs itself without iregard to the interests of the nation.
Indeed, that the alliance with the Czech National !Socialists
for those several America;ns is a very ugly calling card even if they use them only because th•e Ozech National
Socialists are, according to their views, the most reliable
enemies of the Germans and, hence, also reliable agents
in Germany.
What are we to say about the threats made against
refugees in the camps who read "BOHEMIDA"? Why -is it
not allowed to sell it there? The "GESKE SWVO" - organ of the Czech National Socialists - is sent on miJitairy
postal numbers to Czechs and Slovaks in the U. S. Anny
together with sharply anti-German flyers of the RFE en,
titled "DEMOCRATIC GUIDE FOR PRAGUE"? Where
did the GESKE SLOVO get those milit.a.ry addresses? Who
was it that let them have them? And how come that
GESKE SLOVO is sent together with leaflets of RFE?
Is this a single enterprise and to be regarded as such?
While American authorities are assuring iDr. Konrad
Adenauer and the west Germans of their friendship and
alliance, members ,o f the U. S. Army in western Germany
and elsewhere are ·b eing sent inciting, anti-GeTman literature! W,h o is responsilble for this? Wihy is it tolerated?
Exiles Lick the Hand for Every Slap in the Face

We •k now with what eilithusiasm our article wiH be
translated, embellished and sent to various rplaces in the
USA with the statement that we are writing against the
Americans. So that there be no mistake albout it, we repeat, that for us it is not a question of what side of the
:bar.ricades our rplace is. We reiterate that for the freedom of tp.e nation and humanity we shali fight on the side
of the free world rto the J:ast drop of !blood. At the same
time we pvoc1aim that we are no longer willing to 'keep
silent if out of the exile is made a ;political clown,. who not
oil'ly no longer defends the. interes.ts of his own nation, but
1

�SLOVAKIA

37

when commanded even I-a.ughs and cries and humlbly and
gratefully thanlks and licks the hand for every slap in the
face.
We Tepeat our call so that the democra:tic, anti-Communist exile ,u nitedly and shanply distance itself from the
irresponsilble, primitive ipropaganda of the "Ozecho,.,Slovak"
unit of ruiE, which ma.inly serves the Communists and
which tomorr.ow ,can mean the disintegration and ruin of
our exile. LikewiJSe it should keep away from the "peoples"
democratic Council .o f !Free Czecho-Slovakia, which is only
an expanded party of the Czeich National Socialists.
Let us not ibe fooled. Every period is a period of transition. Even the period during which some American circles surppOirt the ",p eoples" democrats. There will come a
day when those Americans will come to ·r ecognize the truth
which we write today and the snakes they toyed with on
their bosoms.
Let us not forget that even the Communist Adolf
Hoffmeister for two years was an official of the U. S. Office of War Information, which he ridicules today at home
telling how he became an official of the State Department.
He used to ibe acceptruble and supported in the USA. When
he came to the USA during World War IT, he was dined
and wined by the "Czecho-Slovak" countrymen, who today are wining and dining the "peoples" demoaats Zenkl,
Rirpka, Peroutlka and company. In Chicago they solemnly
welcomed him amid even let him sound off on a Ozech
Radio hour.
Let us, therefore, not ,b,e deceived. We must pr.otect our
anti-Commll!Irist exile so that it remains healthy and unyielding at all costs. ,F or this we need honest men and not
doUar politicians.

•

•

•

Recommended Books: McCARTHY AND HIS ENEMIES, by Buckley and Bozell, Henry Regnery Co., Chicago;
AFTER HI'.DLER STALIN? - by Robert Ingrim, Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee; F1ALSE FREEDOM, by Edward L.
Delaney, Sequoia University Press, Los Angeles.

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1352">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA

29

THE MURDER OF MATUS CERNAK

Fr. Janik-Horak
(This article results from the contents of the corresponding
article in ,Czech, wJJ.ich ,appeared in " BOHEMIA" (July 22, 1955), published monthly in Munich, Germany, by the rCzech Democmtic Federalists. T·h e author, its editor-in-chief, is quite outspoken about the
ruinous pro-Soviet and a'llti-'.Slovak policy of Dr. \Edward ,B enes and
his socialistic political entourage whi ch brought Moscow to CzechoSlovakia and the heart of (Europe.)

Two months ago - when we had written that the
Communists were maiking an all-out attack against our
exiles and that this would be a ,b rutaily merciless fight some of our exiles prdbably thought that we iwere using
strong but empty words. That we meant what we wrote at
that time has been proved by the explosion in !Munich
which mutilated Matthew CernaJk (Tchernah1k) ibeyond
recognition.
We do nat doubt that this brutal murder is the work
of the Prague Communists. Let us consider why they committed it and what they exipected to gain by it.
First of ·all, they wanted to liquidate the dangerous
anti-Communist, Matthew Cernak. That is the opinion of
the ipolice commission of experts assigned to the case,
which ascertained that the diabolical instrument which
killed Cernak contained one kHogram (2.2 ~bs.) of a high
ex;plosive which is not at all obtaina!ble in Germany. With
the murder of Cernak, the Reds figured the rest of the
exiles would lbe frightened into inaction.
Nen, the Prague Reds figured that the murder of
Cerna,k in M&lt;Unich would incite the German population,
and the German authorities as well, against all exiles in
general, 1a nd against the exiles from Ozecho-lSlovakia in
particular. They almost succeeded in this, since two Germans were kiHed and 21 others wounded when Cernak
opened the bomlb~ac'kage in a Munich post-office. Premier Hogneir of Bavaria ibro1a dcast a warning to all exiles,
while the leading "foreign affairs" editor of the "Siiddeutsche Zeitung," Mr. Birnbaum, strongly urged the cessation of ,politica1 ,a ctivity of all exile groups.

�30

SLOVAKIA

It is significant that Mr. Birnibaum's editorial, together
with a commentary sup,plied by Red Prague, ,w as propagated
the very next day by the Czeoh Press Bureau (CTK) and
the entire Communist press of 0zecho-Slova!kia.
We can thank the leadership of the Union of Democratic Exiles (UIDU) ithat the German public convinced
that the guilty party o,r parties must :b e sought in Red Czecho-,Slovrukia and not among the exiles in Germany. The
Union is made up of seven central organi~ations of exiles;
the fate 'M. Cerna,k was a member of its presidium, and
Vladimir Pekelsiky (owner and publisher of BOHEM[A) is
its secretary-general. Credit must also be .given to editor
Birnbaum for allowing himself to be convinced that he wa:s
in error and that in the interests of impartiality he himself offered to publish the lengthy article of the DIDU, and
which, in fact, he did ;p ublish.
The shocking murder of Cernak was supposed to silence and frighten the rest of his fellow-exiles. Even in this
case, however, we must state that the Communist murderers miscaloulated. rt is true, of course, that the murder of Cernak did strlke fear in the hearts of many exiles ;
it did not, however, frighten of.f the w,arriors. And that is
n;iost important. Cowards always crawl aiway from a fight;
they never did hel,p fight the Reds, so we might just say:
good riddance !
Courageously then -

Heroically Now!

Matthew Cerna:k was our closest Slovak felQow-warrior
on the exile fvont in Ger.many. We stood on the same political platform against Communists and ·against their assistants here in exHe an:d, therefore, even against the ruinous ideology of IDr. Edward Benes in the Council of Free
Czecho~Slovakia and in RiA!DIO FREE EUR.OPE.
'Dhat is why we say that the murder of Cernak was a
murderous attempt aimed even against us here in the
editorial offices of B0HEMtI:A. The German press, seeking
sensations, and some malicious exiles wringing their hands
joyously where nobody might see them, are even writing
and Wking about the people in .the editoriaJl offices of
B0HIElMIA who are "dedicated to death," because we a.r e

�SLOVAKIA

31

now supposed to be-next. We are not surprised, therefore,
that we are _urged !by some of our friends to lbe most
careful, to t ~ r our writing and even to quit our fight
against the Reds, ,bec,ause, they say, it is in the best interests of our security that we do not incite the Communists against us.
In reply, we can only say that we are fully aware
o.f the seriousness of the times. Fighters, however, carry
on the fight Entil they either win o•r fall in combat; never,
however, do_,they flee from battle! Now, we fled into exile to fight for the freedom ,o f our nation and for the freedom of all nations. For us this has never ,b een an empty
meaningless phrase which we might use in America to
coiled dollars for a carefree, comfortable life. somewhere
in a seoure 'land !beyond the ,s ea. When the •program of the
Czech 'Democratic Federalists was ,p rodaimed, we ·p ledged
to our adherents . that we would loyally -p ersevere, and that
pledge iwe conside·r sacred even today.
If we have written courageously up to this time, then
from now on ·we shafl' write heroica:lly ! The explosion of
the iMunich murder of Cernak binds us to do so. We know
that our strength and our significance and al,s o our danger to the Communists lies in the fact that we speaik to the
wide masses of the common ipeople of our exile, that we are
young and that we are not dreamers - and that we do
have a positive, healthy, political program.
We are familiar with the bloody and bushwhacking
methods o.f the Communists. As political prisoners we
ha'V'e passed through tens of jails and riruvestigating torture-chambers. That is why we e~pect no quarters and no
mercy from them. We •also know that they undertake
everything according to plan and, therefore, that the murder of Cernak might well lbe followed by a series of further 'killings, even though they m~ght be per.petrated in a
manner different than that oif ,s ending heHish devices.
We warn the Reds, however, that the day ,shaH come
when they ,wjll know that our God of the Old Testament
still lives! There ,w ill come a day when the exiles murdered
by them shall foad baok into the homeland an anny of
merciless avengers. That day shall come. For that day
1

�32

SLOVAKIA

we are strug,g ling for years, and rfor that day we shaH
even be prepared to fall, because that shall lbe the day
of a new rising of the sun over our enslaved country!
It is neces,s ary to note here that Cema!k's death has
caused joy not on~y to the initiators and per.petrators in
Red Prague, but even to his opponents in the Council of
Free Czecho-Slovakia. Certainly they. must realize that
dead Cernruk is much more dangerous to them than when
he was alive. '.Dhey know that Cerna.k's death as a martyr
will give SlovaJk patriots a new motive and added cO'llJrage
in their fight for the freedom and independence of the
Slova!k nation.
'.Dhe 'Munich &lt;killing of Cernak hais cast light on several
real~ties. [t has demonstrated what section of the front
is most dangerous to Red Prague. That section is not the
so~oalled Council of Free Ozecho-Slova:kia, nor the "Czecho-Slovax" dirvi,sion of RiAJD]O FREE EUROOE; neither is
it the loudmouths around the dollar trough, nor the dis~
honest people in the social organizaUons who crullously rob
needy refugees. !But it is certainlly our section of the front.
'!'hat is the section that is ,b eing hit from all sides and
stands - and solidly stands - without a single dollar of
American support; nay, it is that section which must resist not only the attacks of the Communists, but even the
mad attacks of the "peoples' democrats" in exile who are
being financed •b y American dollars.
Little wonder, then, that some morally irresponsi'ble
people in the interests of RFE spread among the uninformed foreign journalists the shameless, false statement
that Matus Cernak was •a n employee of the "Ozecho-Slovak" unit of !Radio Free Europe - the same Cernak who
stood loyally at our side on the same forefronit, even when
RJF:Ei rightfully deserved sharp criticism for the propaganda sprea:d iby the "Ozecho-1Slovak" unit of RIFE.
Must All Exiles Think Alike?
The Munich murder forces us to speak openly and
truthfully about conditions in exile.
Our ipolitkal exile. is accustomed to, a.oknowledging
every generosity of the free world gra,tefu!lly and uncritic-

�SLOVAKIA

33

a1ly. But the free world owes us much more. . . Whether
the West gave us anything or not, we always regarded it
as our moral duty to ibe sincere allies of the West; and we
remain true to this principle. But is it only our fault that
we are in exile, that our country is enslaved by Moscow?
Or is it not the fauiLt ,o f the Yalta and Porbsdam leaders of
the free world? They negotiated with StaJlin about oor
land even though they knew practically nothing about it .
And it is l.iikewise rtheir fault that at that time they would
listen only to Stalin's agent, Dr. Edward Benes. They told
us to like Stalin against our will, just li:ke they are teHing us
now in exile to like Titoism, which is not a hair different
than Stalinism. We know, too, that tomorrow they shall
persecute every Titoist, even those who became Titoists
at their advice. This is nothing but imbecile uniform:rzing
of the views of the exile. Should any one in exile express
a different view, his own and sane view, immediately he is
suspected and spied upon, smeared and accused of beiillg
an enemy agent. They have no respect for the views of
others.
1

No Thanks to the Free Europe Committee

Americans in the ,F1REE ;JDUROPE COMiMI['DTEE already for years are forcing upon us the political oonc~
tion of the criminal and 1Stalin's agent, Dr. Edward Benes.
What do those men !know a:bout our nation? By ,w hat right
are they trying to force that criminal political conception
upon us? They :would ,probaJbly be very much ,sur,prised if
some foreigners, ignorant of American conditions, would
continually try to force into the administration of their
country Quislings, whOlm the ,A merican nation despises,
and the terror of the immoral "ipeoples'" democracy. Not
only that, but they even demand that the Czech exile sing
praises to them daily and with hat in hand humlbly rkiss
their hands.
With the Munich murder the situation has gone so
far that we cannot lkoop silent a.:bout it any longer. Our
exile has nothing to be grateful for to the Free Europe
Committee. Whatever it gave to the profaned politicians
in the so-oa:lled Council of Free Ozecho-Slovakia does not
1

�34

SLOVAKIA

interest the anti-Communist exile at all. And rwe are not
interested if they throw out the windows of RIFE millions
of dollairs of American contributors. Out of that money not
a single cent has gone to support the anti-Oorrununist resistance,. ibut, conversely, those hard-earned dollars have
been used to divide and suppress the anti-Communist resistance and for the support of pro~·Communist tendencies
and elements, if not even outright Communist agents! Red
Prague has murdered \Matthew Cernaik in a manner which
has shaken the entire free world, as witnessed by its press .
In R:ADIO ,F,RIDE EJUROPE the ernme incident was disposed of in a few simple sentences ia.nd they would prefer
that the murder be fo.r,gotten altogether. Why?
Propaganda of RFE iis Responsible
The "Ozecho-iSlovaJk" unit of R!FE with its continual
blabbering of .primitive phrases ·aJbout the Iack of baloney
in Czecho-Slovakia completely diverts the attention of the
free world from the substance of the Communist threat
which is inherent in the moral disintegration of the family
and hum8.1Il society and never in the ~ack of meat. For us
Communism is unacceptaJble, 1b ecause it is immoral, and
immoral even if under it every citirzen would ibe entitled to
10 kilograms of meat daily. This mistaken, primitive propaganda of the "Czecho-'Slov,ak" unit of IRF1E wifil in the
end place our exile in the eyes of the West into such a
light that not only shall we be understood at all why we
are agaJinst a Communist regime, but that rwe also ,s hall ibe
regarded as cheats, adventurers and 1 iars, ,b ecause the
Prague regime, with the help of ente:r,prises such as the
olympics ·a nd others, will easily and altogether convince
western journalists and visitors that in Czecho-iSlovaki-a
there exist other economic and social conditions th·a n those
described by IR@E. It iwill convince them that autos ride
normally on the streets of Prague (a certain journalistic
primitive recently reported from Brno that the residents
of that city hruve not seen any auto fo:r six months!); that
people there are nonnaUy dressed, and in many cases even
better than in the West; that there are dances at which
the bands play western tunes; that there are cultural en-

�SLOVAKIA

36

twprises,. calba.rets and night clubs, lange commercial
houses, etc., and that wirbh this our nation will ·b e disin~
tegrated internally by the most immoral Communistic sea.
In the interest of a more effective fight against Communism, it i,s 1high time that the anti-Communist exile presents a unified and decisive protest rugainst this harmfol
activity of the "Ozecho.JSlovruk" unit of RFE, which benefits the Communists in many ways, and so that before
the western public a:nd our nation it keep its distance from
this irresponsible propaganda. At the same time it is necessary to clearly and loudly point out the actual threat
of Communism and the program efforts of t he anti-Communist part of the nation.
Shady Acts of the National Socialists in Exile
At the same time we must not .r emain siilent rubout the
support of the "peoples" democrats by the American Flree
Europe Comrruttee. With this support the American F'EC
one-sidedly puts itself on record for the party of the
OLecho..slovaik National :Socialists. Now, the Committee
will have to reconcile itself with the ,f.act thrut we are going to tell the whole iworld a.lbout this situation. 'Ilhis Committee should also know that in its one-sided swpport we
see a coarse inter:vention against the health of the exile,
if it is not directly against its freedom, and ,a rude political coercion and even moral orientation of the nation in
its homeiland. [fit were not for the support of the American
FEC, today in exile there would not be even by far so
much demoralization and moral disintegration, and there
would not be by far so much disgust, bitterness and disappointments in the wide masses of exiles. [f in Australia,
Canada, the USA and elsewhere we ·are today the witnesses of how the political exile, after only several years,
is beginning to go through the process of old settlers,
which ,w ere friendly to emigrants, then rwe can thank the
American _cirdes which financiailly suppor,t and poilitically
protect the Czecho-lSlovaJk !National Socialists for these
anti-exile sentiments.
Likewise iwe can /keep silent no longer albout the shady
acts of the Ozooh National .Socialists in exile, rubout their

�36

SLOVAKIA

prepared -o ffensive against the Catholic Church, about
their shameless and lbra;zen presumption that ibhey speruk
for the exiles and tile nation, and about their immoral political tactics, which might be called a science which !best
seHs itself without iregard to the interests of the nation.
Indeed, that the alliance with the Czech National !Socialists
for those several America;ns is a very ugly calling card even if they use them only because th•e Ozech National
Socialists are, according to their views, the most reliable
enemies of the Germans and, hence, also reliable agents
in Germany.
What are we to say about the threats made against
refugees in the camps who read "BOHEMIDA"? Why -is it
not allowed to sell it there? The "GESKE SWVO" - organ of the Czech National Socialists - is sent on miJitairy
postal numbers to Czechs and Slovaks in the U. S. Anny
together with sharply anti-German flyers of the RFE en,
titled "DEMOCRATIC GUIDE FOR PRAGUE"? Where
did the GESKE SLOVO get those milit.a.ry addresses? Who
was it that let them have them? And how come that
GESKE SLOVO is sent together with leaflets of RFE?
Is this a single enterprise and to be regarded as such?
While American authorities are assuring iDr. Konrad
Adenauer and the west Germans of their friendship and
alliance, members ,o f the U. S. Army in western Germany
and elsewhere are ·b eing sent inciting, anti-GeTman literature! W,h o is responsilble for this? Wihy is it tolerated?
Exiles Lick the Hand for Every Slap in the Face

We •k now with what eilithusiasm our article wiH be
translated, embellished and sent to various rplaces in the
USA with the statement that we are writing against the
Americans. So that there be no mistake albout it, we repeat, that for us it is not a question of what side of the
:bar.ricades our rplace is. We reiterate that for the freedom of tp.e nation and humanity we shali fight on the side
of the free world rto the J:ast drop of !blood. At the same
time we pvoc1aim that we are no longer willing to 'keep
silent if out of the exile is made a ;political clown,. who not
oil'ly no longer defends the. interes.ts of his own nation, but
1

�SLOVAKIA

37

when commanded even I-a.ughs and cries and humlbly and
gratefully thanlks and licks the hand for every slap in the
face.
We Tepeat our call so that the democra:tic, anti-Communist exile ,u nitedly and shanply distance itself from the
irresponsilble, primitive ipropaganda of the "Ozecho,.,Slovak"
unit of ruiE, which ma.inly serves the Communists and
which tomorr.ow ,can mean the disintegration and ruin of
our exile. LikewiJSe it should keep away from the "peoples"
democratic Council .o f !Free Czecho-Slovakia, which is only
an expanded party of the Czeich National Socialists.
Let us not ibe fooled. Every period is a period of transition. Even the period during which some American circles surppOirt the ",p eoples" democrats. There will come a
day when those Americans will come to ·r ecognize the truth
which we write today and the snakes they toyed with on
their bosoms.
Let us not forget that even the Communist Adolf
Hoffmeister for two years was an official of the U. S. Office of War Information, which he ridicules today at home
telling how he became an official of the State Department.
He used to ibe acceptruble and supported in the USA. When
he came to the USA during World War IT, he was dined
and wined by the "Czecho-Slovak" countrymen, who today are wining and dining the "peoples" demoaats Zenkl,
Rirpka, Peroutlka and company. In Chicago they solemnly
welcomed him amid even let him sound off on a Ozech
Radio hour.
Let us, therefore, not ,b,e deceived. We must pr.otect our
anti-Commll!Irist exile so that it remains healthy and unyielding at all costs. ,F or this we need honest men and not
doUar politicians.

•

•

•

Recommended Books: McCARTHY AND HIS ENEMIES, by Buckley and Bozell, Henry Regnery Co., Chicago;
AFTER HI'.DLER STALIN? - by Robert Ingrim, Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee; F1ALSE FREEDOM, by Edward L.
Delaney, Sequoia University Press, Los Angeles.

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                  <text>1955, Vol. 5</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
29&#13;
&#13;
THE MURDER OF MATUS CERNAK&#13;
&#13;
Fr. Janik-Horak&#13;
(This article results from the contents of the corresponding&#13;
article in ,Czech, wJJ.ich ,appeared in " BOHEMIA" (July 22, 1955), published monthly in Munich, Germany, by the rCzech Democmtic Federalists. T·h e author, its editor-in-chief, is quite outspoken about the&#13;
ruinous pro-Soviet and a'llti-'.Slovak policy of Dr. \Edward ,B enes and&#13;
his socialistic political entourage whi ch brought Moscow to CzechoSlovakia and the heart of (Europe.)&#13;
&#13;
Two months ago - when we had written that the&#13;
Communists were maiking an all-out attack against our&#13;
exiles and that this would be a ,b rutaily merciless fight some of our exiles prdbably thought that we iwere using&#13;
strong but empty words. That we meant what we wrote at&#13;
that time has been proved by the explosion in !Munich&#13;
which mutilated Matthew CernaJk (Tchernah1k) ibeyond&#13;
recognition.&#13;
We do nat doubt that this brutal murder is the work&#13;
of the Prague Communists. Let us consider why they committed it and what they exipected to gain by it.&#13;
First of ·all, they wanted to liquidate the dangerous&#13;
anti-Communist, Matthew Cernak. That is the opinion of&#13;
the ipolice commission of experts assigned to the case,&#13;
which ascertained that the diabolical instrument which&#13;
killed Cernak contained one kHogram (2.2 ~bs.) of a high&#13;
ex;plosive which is not at all obtaina!ble in Germany. With&#13;
the murder of Cernak, the Reds figured the rest of the&#13;
exiles would lbe frightened into inaction.&#13;
Nen, the Prague Reds figured that the murder of&#13;
Cerna,k in M&lt;Unich would incite the German population,&#13;
and the German authorities as well, against all exiles in&#13;
general, 1a nd against the exiles from Ozecho-lSlovakia in&#13;
particular. They almost succeeded in this, since two Germans were kiHed and 21 others wounded when Cernak&#13;
opened the bomlb~ac'kage in a Munich post-office. Premier Hogneir of Bavaria ibro1a dcast a warning to all exiles,&#13;
while the leading "foreign affairs" editor of the "Siiddeutsche Zeitung," Mr. Birnbaum, strongly urged the cessation of ,politica1 ,a ctivity of all exile groups.&#13;
&#13;
30&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
It is significant that Mr. Birnibaum's editorial, together&#13;
with a commentary sup,plied by Red Prague, ,w as propagated&#13;
the very next day by the Czeoh Press Bureau (CTK) and&#13;
the entire Communist press of 0zecho-Slova!kia.&#13;
We can thank the leadership of the Union of Democratic Exiles (UIDU) ithat the German public convinced&#13;
that the guilty party o,r parties must :b e sought in Red Czecho-,Slovrukia and not among the exiles in Germany. The&#13;
Union is made up of seven central organi~ations of exiles;&#13;
the fate 'M. Cerna,k was a member of its presidium, and&#13;
Vladimir Pekelsiky (owner and publisher of BOHEM[A) is&#13;
its secretary-general. Credit must also be .given to editor&#13;
Birnbaum for allowing himself to be convinced that he wa:s&#13;
in error and that in the interests of impartiality he himself offered to publish the lengthy article of the DIDU, and&#13;
which, in fact, he did ;p ublish.&#13;
The shocking murder of Cernak was supposed to silence and frighten the rest of his fellow-exiles. Even in this&#13;
case, however, we must state that the Communist murderers miscaloulated. rt is true, of course, that the murder of Cernak did strlke fear in the hearts of many exiles ;&#13;
it did not, however, frighten of.f the w,arriors. And that is&#13;
n;iost important. Cowards always crawl aiway from a fight;&#13;
they never did hel,p fight the Reds, so we might just say:&#13;
good riddance !&#13;
Courageously then -&#13;
&#13;
Heroically Now!&#13;
&#13;
Matthew Cerna:k was our closest Slovak felQow-warrior&#13;
on the exile fvont in Ger.many. We stood on the same political platform against Communists and ·against their assistants here in exHe an:d, therefore, even against the ruinous ideology of IDr. Edward Benes in the Council of Free&#13;
Czecho~Slovakia and in RiA!DIO FREE EUR.OPE.&#13;
'Dhat is why we say that the murder of Cernak was a&#13;
murderous attempt aimed even against us here in the&#13;
editorial offices of B0HEMtI:A. The German press, seeking&#13;
sensations, and some malicious exiles wringing their hands&#13;
joyously where nobody might see them, are even writing&#13;
and Wking about the people in .the editoriaJl offices of&#13;
B0HIElMIA who are "dedicated to death," because we a.r e&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
31&#13;
&#13;
now supposed to be-next. We are not surprised, therefore,&#13;
that we are _urged !by some of our friends to lbe most&#13;
careful, to t ~ r our writing and even to quit our fight&#13;
against the Reds, ,bec,ause, they say, it is in the best interests of our security that we do not incite the Communists against us.&#13;
In reply, we can only say that we are fully aware&#13;
o.f the seriousness of the times. Fighters, however, carry&#13;
on the fight Entil they either win o•r fall in combat; never,&#13;
however, do_,they flee from battle! Now, we fled into exile to fight for the freedom ,o f our nation and for the freedom of all nations. For us this has never ,b een an empty&#13;
meaningless phrase which we might use in America to&#13;
coiled dollars for a carefree, comfortable life. somewhere&#13;
in a seoure 'land !beyond the ,s ea. When the •program of the&#13;
Czech 'Democratic Federalists was ,p rodaimed, we ·p ledged&#13;
to our adherents . that we would loyally -p ersevere, and that&#13;
pledge iwe conside·r sacred even today.&#13;
If we have written courageously up to this time, then&#13;
from now on ·we shafl' write heroica:lly ! The explosion of&#13;
the iMunich murder of Cernak binds us to do so. We know&#13;
that our strength and our significance and al,s o our danger to the Communists lies in the fact that we speaik to the&#13;
wide masses of the common ipeople of our exile, that we are&#13;
young and that we are not dreamers - and that we do&#13;
have a positive, healthy, political program.&#13;
We are familiar with the bloody and bushwhacking&#13;
methods o.f the Communists. As political prisoners we&#13;
ha'V'e passed through tens of jails and riruvestigating torture-chambers. That is why we e~pect no quarters and no&#13;
mercy from them. We •also know that they undertake&#13;
everything according to plan and, therefore, that the murder of Cernak might well lbe followed by a series of further 'killings, even though they m~ght be per.petrated in a&#13;
manner different than that oif ,s ending heHish devices.&#13;
We warn the Reds, however, that the day ,shaH come&#13;
when they ,wjll know that our God of the Old Testament&#13;
still lives! There ,w ill come a day when the exiles murdered&#13;
by them shall foad baok into the homeland an anny of&#13;
merciless avengers. That day shall come. For that day&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
32&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
we are strug,g ling for years, and rfor that day we shaH&#13;
even be prepared to fall, because that shall lbe the day&#13;
of a new rising of the sun over our enslaved country!&#13;
It is neces,s ary to note here that Cema!k's death has&#13;
caused joy not on~y to the initiators and per.petrators in&#13;
Red Prague, but even to his opponents in the Council of&#13;
Free Czecho-Slovakia. Certainly they. must realize that&#13;
dead Cernruk is much more dangerous to them than when&#13;
he was alive. '.Dhey know that Cerna.k's death as a martyr&#13;
will give SlovaJk patriots a new motive and added cO'llJrage&#13;
in their fight for the freedom and independence of the&#13;
Slova!k nation.&#13;
'.Dhe 'Munich &lt;killing of Cernak hais cast light on several&#13;
real~ties. [t has demonstrated what section of the front&#13;
is most dangerous to Red Prague. That section is not the&#13;
so~oalled Council of Free Ozecho-Slova:kia, nor the "Czecho-Slovax" dirvi,sion of RiAJD]O FREE EUROOE; neither is&#13;
it the loudmouths around the dollar trough, nor the dis~&#13;
honest people in the social organizaUons who crullously rob&#13;
needy refugees. !But it is certainlly our section of the front.&#13;
'!'hat is the section that is ,b eing hit from all sides and&#13;
stands - and solidly stands - without a single dollar of&#13;
American support; nay, it is that section which must resist not only the attacks of the Communists, but even the&#13;
mad attacks of the "peoples' democrats" in exile who are&#13;
being financed •b y American dollars.&#13;
Little wonder, then, that some morally irresponsi'ble&#13;
people in the interests of RFE spread among the uninformed foreign journalists the shameless, false statement&#13;
that Matus Cernak was •a n employee of the "Ozecho-Slovak" unit of !Radio Free Europe - the same Cernak who&#13;
stood loyally at our side on the same forefronit, even when&#13;
RJF:Ei rightfully deserved sharp criticism for the propaganda sprea:d iby the "Ozecho-1Slovak" unit of RIFE.&#13;
Must All Exiles Think Alike?&#13;
The Munich murder forces us to speak openly and&#13;
truthfully about conditions in exile.&#13;
Our ipolitkal exile. is accustomed to, a.oknowledging&#13;
every generosity of the free world gra,tefu!lly and uncritic-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
33&#13;
&#13;
a1ly. But the free world owes us much more. . . Whether&#13;
the West gave us anything or not, we always regarded it&#13;
as our moral duty to ibe sincere allies of the West; and we&#13;
remain true to this principle. But is it only our fault that&#13;
we are in exile, that our country is enslaved by Moscow?&#13;
Or is it not the fauiLt ,o f the Yalta and Porbsdam leaders of&#13;
the free world? They negotiated with StaJlin about oor&#13;
land even though they knew practically nothing about it .&#13;
And it is l.iikewise rtheir fault that at that time they would&#13;
listen only to Stalin's agent, Dr. Edward Benes. They told&#13;
us to like Stalin against our will, just li:ke they are teHing us&#13;
now in exile to like Titoism, which is not a hair different&#13;
than Stalinism. We know, too, that tomorrow they shall&#13;
persecute every Titoist, even those who became Titoists&#13;
at their advice. This is nothing but imbecile uniform:rzing&#13;
of the views of the exile. Should any one in exile express&#13;
a different view, his own and sane view, immediately he is&#13;
suspected and spied upon, smeared and accused of beiillg&#13;
an enemy agent. They have no respect for the views of&#13;
others.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
No Thanks to the Free Europe Committee&#13;
&#13;
Americans in the ,F1REE ;JDUROPE COMiMI['DTEE already for years are forcing upon us the political oonc~&#13;
tion of the criminal and 1Stalin's agent, Dr. Edward Benes.&#13;
What do those men !know a:bout our nation? By ,w hat right&#13;
are they trying to force that criminal political conception&#13;
upon us? They :would ,probaJbly be very much ,sur,prised if&#13;
some foreigners, ignorant of American conditions, would&#13;
continually try to force into the administration of their&#13;
country Quislings, whOlm the ,A merican nation despises,&#13;
and the terror of the immoral "ipeoples'" democracy. Not&#13;
only that, but they even demand that the Czech exile sing&#13;
praises to them daily and with hat in hand humlbly rkiss&#13;
their hands.&#13;
With the Munich murder the situation has gone so&#13;
far that we cannot lkoop silent a.:bout it any longer. Our&#13;
exile has nothing to be grateful for to the Free Europe&#13;
Committee. Whatever it gave to the profaned politicians&#13;
in the so-oa:lled Council of Free Ozecho-Slovakia does not&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
34&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
interest the anti-Communist exile at all. And rwe are not&#13;
interested if they throw out the windows of RIFE millions&#13;
of dollairs of American contributors. Out of that money not&#13;
a single cent has gone to support the anti-Oorrununist resistance,. ibut, conversely, those hard-earned dollars have&#13;
been used to divide and suppress the anti-Communist resistance and for the support of pro~·Communist tendencies&#13;
and elements, if not even outright Communist agents! Red&#13;
Prague has murdered \Matthew Cernaik in a manner which&#13;
has shaken the entire free world, as witnessed by its press .&#13;
In R:ADIO ,F,RIDE EJUROPE the ernme incident was disposed of in a few simple sentences ia.nd they would prefer&#13;
that the murder be fo.r,gotten altogether. Why?&#13;
Propaganda of RFE iis Responsible&#13;
The "Ozecho-iSlovaJk" unit of R!FE with its continual&#13;
blabbering of .primitive phrases ·aJbout the Iack of baloney&#13;
in Czecho-Slovakia completely diverts the attention of the&#13;
free world from the substance of the Communist threat&#13;
which is inherent in the moral disintegration of the family&#13;
and hum8.1Il society and never in the ~ack of meat. For us&#13;
Communism is unacceptaJble, 1b ecause it is immoral, and&#13;
immoral even if under it every citirzen would ibe entitled to&#13;
10 kilograms of meat daily. This mistaken, primitive propaganda of the "Czecho-'Slov,ak" unit of IRF1E wifil in the&#13;
end place our exile in the eyes of the West into such a&#13;
light that not only shall we be understood at all why we&#13;
are agaJinst a Communist regime, but that rwe also ,s hall ibe&#13;
regarded as cheats, adventurers and 1 iars, ,b ecause the&#13;
Prague regime, with the help of ente:r,prises such as the&#13;
olympics ·a nd others, will easily and altogether convince&#13;
western journalists and visitors that in Czecho-iSlovaki-a&#13;
there exist other economic and social conditions th·a n those&#13;
described by IR@E. It iwill convince them that autos ride&#13;
normally on the streets of Prague (a certain journalistic&#13;
primitive recently reported from Brno that the residents&#13;
of that city hruve not seen any auto fo:r six months!); that&#13;
people there are nonnaUy dressed, and in many cases even&#13;
better than in the West; that there are dances at which&#13;
the bands play western tunes; that there are cultural en-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
36&#13;
&#13;
twprises,. calba.rets and night clubs, lange commercial&#13;
houses, etc., and that wirbh this our nation will ·b e disin~&#13;
tegrated internally by the most immoral Communistic sea.&#13;
In the interest of a more effective fight against Communism, it i,s 1high time that the anti-Communist exile presents a unified and decisive protest rugainst this harmfol&#13;
activity of the "Ozecho.JSlovruk" unit of RFE, which benefits the Communists in many ways, and so that before&#13;
the western public a:nd our nation it keep its distance from&#13;
this irresponsible propaganda. At the same time it is necessary to clearly and loudly point out the actual threat&#13;
of Communism and the program efforts of t he anti-Communist part of the nation.&#13;
Shady Acts of the National Socialists in Exile&#13;
At the same time we must not .r emain siilent rubout the&#13;
support of the "peoples" democrats by the American Flree&#13;
Europe Comrruttee. With this support the American F'EC&#13;
one-sidedly puts itself on record for the party of the&#13;
OLecho..slovaik National :Socialists. Now, the Committee&#13;
will have to reconcile itself with the ,f.act thrut we are going to tell the whole iworld a.lbout this situation. 'Ilhis Committee should also know that in its one-sided swpport we&#13;
see a coarse inter:vention against the health of the exile,&#13;
if it is not directly against its freedom, and ,a rude political coercion and even moral orientation of the nation in&#13;
its homeiland. [fit were not for the support of the American&#13;
FEC, today in exile there would not be even by far so&#13;
much demoralization and moral disintegration, and there&#13;
would not be by far so much disgust, bitterness and disappointments in the wide masses of exiles. [f in Australia,&#13;
Canada, the USA and elsewhere we ·are today the witnesses of how the political exile, after only several years,&#13;
is beginning to go through the process of old settlers,&#13;
which ,w ere friendly to emigrants, then rwe can thank the&#13;
American _cirdes which financiailly suppor,t and poilitically&#13;
protect the Czecho-lSlovaJk !National Socialists for these&#13;
anti-exile sentiments.&#13;
Likewise iwe can /keep silent no longer albout the shady&#13;
acts of the Ozooh National .Socialists in exile, rubout their&#13;
&#13;
36&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
prepared -o ffensive against the Catholic Church, about&#13;
their shameless and lbra;zen presumption that ibhey speruk&#13;
for the exiles and tile nation, and about their immoral political tactics, which might be called a science which !best&#13;
seHs itself without iregard to the interests of the nation.&#13;
Indeed, that the alliance with the Czech National !Socialists&#13;
for those several America;ns is a very ugly calling card even if they use them only because th•e Ozech National&#13;
Socialists are, according to their views, the most reliable&#13;
enemies of the Germans and, hence, also reliable agents&#13;
in Germany.&#13;
What are we to say about the threats made against&#13;
refugees in the camps who read "BOHEMIDA"? Why -is it&#13;
not allowed to sell it there? The "GESKE SWVO" - organ of the Czech National Socialists - is sent on miJitairy&#13;
postal numbers to Czechs and Slovaks in the U. S. Anny&#13;
together with sharply anti-German flyers of the RFE en,&#13;
titled "DEMOCRATIC GUIDE FOR PRAGUE"? Where&#13;
did the GESKE SLOVO get those milit.a.ry addresses? Who&#13;
was it that let them have them? And how come that&#13;
GESKE SLOVO is sent together with leaflets of RFE?&#13;
Is this a single enterprise and to be regarded as such?&#13;
While American authorities are assuring iDr. Konrad&#13;
Adenauer and the west Germans of their friendship and&#13;
alliance, members ,o f the U. S. Army in western Germany&#13;
and elsewhere are ·b eing sent inciting, anti-GeTman literature! W,h o is responsilble for this? Wihy is it tolerated?&#13;
Exiles Lick the Hand for Every Slap in the Face&#13;
&#13;
We •k now with what eilithusiasm our article wiH be&#13;
translated, embellished and sent to various rplaces in the&#13;
USA with the statement that we are writing against the&#13;
Americans. So that there be no mistake albout it, we repeat, that for us it is not a question of what side of the&#13;
:bar.ricades our rplace is. We reiterate that for the freedom of tp.e nation and humanity we shali fight on the side&#13;
of the free world rto the J:ast drop of !blood. At the same&#13;
time we pvoc1aim that we are no longer willing to 'keep&#13;
silent if out of the exile is made a ;political clown,. who not&#13;
oil'ly no longer defends the. interes.ts of his own nation, but&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
37&#13;
&#13;
when commanded even I-a.ughs and cries and humlbly and&#13;
gratefully thanlks and licks the hand for every slap in the&#13;
face.&#13;
We Tepeat our call so that the democra:tic, anti-Communist exile ,u nitedly and shanply distance itself from the&#13;
irresponsilble, primitive ipropaganda of the "Ozecho,.,Slovak"&#13;
unit of ruiE, which ma.inly serves the Communists and&#13;
which tomorr.ow ,can mean the disintegration and ruin of&#13;
our exile. LikewiJSe it should keep away from the "peoples"&#13;
democratic Council .o f !Free Czecho-Slovakia, which is only&#13;
an expanded party of the Czeich National Socialists.&#13;
Let us not ibe fooled. Every period is a period of transition. Even the period during which some American circles surppOirt the ",p eoples" democrats. There will come a&#13;
day when those Americans will come to ·r ecognize the truth&#13;
which we write today and the snakes they toyed with on&#13;
their bosoms.&#13;
Let us not forget that even the Communist Adolf&#13;
Hoffmeister for two years was an official of the U. S. Office of War Information, which he ridicules today at home&#13;
telling how he became an official of the State Department.&#13;
He used to ibe acceptruble and supported in the USA. When&#13;
he came to the USA during World War IT, he was dined&#13;
and wined by the "Czecho-Slovak" countrymen, who today are wining and dining the "peoples" demoaats Zenkl,&#13;
Rirpka, Peroutlka and company. In Chicago they solemnly&#13;
welcomed him amid even let him sound off on a Ozech&#13;
Radio hour.&#13;
Let us, therefore, not ,b,e deceived. We must pr.otect our&#13;
anti-Commll!Irist exile so that it remains healthy and unyielding at all costs. ,F or this we need honest men and not&#13;
doUar politicians.&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
Recommended Books: McCARTHY AND HIS ENEMIES, by Buckley and Bozell, Henry Regnery Co., Chicago;&#13;
AFTER HI'.DLER STALIN? - by Robert Ingrim, Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee; F1ALSE FREEDOM, by Edward L.&#13;
Delaney, Sequoia University Press, Los Angeles.&#13;
&#13;
</text>
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                    <text>38

SLOVAKIA

HISTORY OR PROPAGANDA?
P. A. HIROBAK

In 1'9149, the Uniiversity of California Press, ipulblished
the "third printing" of the !book "CZEOHOSW VAKIA"
(504 pages) which was edited iby Rolbert J. Kerner, Sather
professor of history in the Unilversity :of California. 'Dhe
book was made ipossilble, ,p rofessor Kerner states in his
preface, iby "the oolla!boration of twenty distinguished and
alble scholiars and writers" and that, concludes Mir. Kerner, "has made it ;possiible to present a vo1ume ,which is an
honest, unprejudiced:, and frank appraisal of the important
contrilbution which the Czechoslovak nation made to the
history of our time in its two short decades of independence between two world wars."
Just how honest, unprejudiced and frank that aipp:r,aisal of the "important" contribution is, the ireader may
be a;ble to g,ather from what follows here and arrive at the
condusion, stated so aiptly iby professor Kerner, that, indeed, "few nations, if any can show such a record" or,
possibly, go a bit .farther and state cate.gorically that, indeed, no niation can show .such a record!
But how honest and unprejudiced are "distinguished
and able scholars" who set out to do a job beyond their
competency? Can a distinguished historian write a true
history of CZIDCH0-1SUOVAKITA without a thorough lmowledge of the SlovaJks and the land they 'haive occupied during the past 1500 years? And yet that is exaotly what the
"twenty distinguished and aJble scholars and writers" of
Kerner's "Ozechoslovaikia" did to ,produce something which,
in his opinion, was "hQlrulst, unprejudiced" !
Kerner's "Ozechoslovikia' is dirvided into six parts,
but the tendency in all parts is much the same: strictly
Czech. Kerner should haive named the 1b ook "Czechia,"
t'hen the wonk might ibe called, by a stretch of the imagination, a semlblance of something "hlOlll.est and unprejudiced." Otherwise, informed readers know rthat it definitely is not, and the uninformed axe cruelly deceived.
The s~gniificance of this may be !better understood when
we glance at the remarkaible selection of books in the sug-

�SLOVAKIA

39

geeted bibliog,r aphy at the end of each cha;pter. The list is
rema.r.kaJble not only for the !books and literary woi,ks included, but for the 1bodks and literary works omitted. The
impression created is that the Slovruks had no ,w riters of
a!lly impor-t and that no sourees of informatiO!ll on their
history are availruble. iBut that i.'S not so. '.Dhis proves that
the "twenty distinguished a:nd able scholars and writers,"
who collalborated with Kerner .cm his "Czechoslovakia"
were little or not at all concerned with the history of the
Sl01Vak people and their land. To magnify and glorify the
history of the Ozechs and minimize, practically ignore, the
history of the Slavruks, certainly cannot be the aim of an
honest, UDJprejudiced and abjecti;ve writer of Ozecho~lovak history.
Ozecho-Blovakia, as presented ,b y Kerner and his
"twenty distinguished and aJble .s cholars and writers,"
does not give us a true picture of Czech-0-1Slovakia; it is
not a true history of the Ozechs and SlOIV'aJks and their
lands; it is definitely more propaga:nda than history - in
line with other .such wm,ks which were promoted by the
propaganda apparatus of Prag,ue. !Students of history
should not 'be exposed to faJsifications and distortions of
history, su&lt;!h as that exemplified ·b y Kerner's "Ozechoslovakia," because. that does not make for the truth, or for
better relations ibetween the Ozechs and the Slovalks, or
for a ·pr.oper understanding of those nations.
I do not want to say unequirvocally that the writers
who collaborated to produce Kerner's "Ozechoslovrukia"
were knowingly dishonest ,a nd prejudiced, but their work
co.n,vinced me definitely that ,w ittingly or uniwitti.ngly they
did ibeoome Ozech propa:gandists. The writers have an undu:ly high regard for the chairacter and accomplishments
of T. G. Masaryk amd Benes and the Ozechs in general,
without an equa:lJy high reg,aro for facts, and little or no
regard for the Slorvaks and their history.
,M ost writers of Ozeolio..Slovaik history and "Ozecho..slovak" democracy (IS. Harrison Thomson, Joseph S. Roucek, Herbert AdolJphus ,Miller, Brackett Lewis, among
them), follow the Ozech line of T. G. Masaryik and Ed-

�40

SLOVAKIA

ward Benes and their governmeints ,w ho ,c ontrolled the entire propaganda apparatus• o;f ,Czecho-1Slov8Jkia. This Masaryk~enes line was and e;ve:n now is adhered to iby exchange students and iprofessors, heads of official and unofficial information !bureaus, the America.n Institute in
Prague, the YMCA and YWCA of 0zecho-Slovrukia and
other countries, the "OzechoslQIViruk N ationa,1- Ohurch"
(strictly a Czech enteriprise) and most other religious
sects, and practically all "eminent" writers, scholars and
correspondents. And today the governments of all countries of the ,w orld still lbase their knowledge 'Of OzechoSlovakia and the vario:us nations that comprise it on the
information supplied by the state propaganda apparatUJS of
T. G. iMasaryk and Edward Benes. The import Ol:f this will
undouibtedly be appreciated iby students of history, and
even historians themselves, if they rememlber that this
line has been followed and ipvopagaJted for ·a t least the past
thirty-seven years.
Accordirrrgly, the Czechs are a "historical" nation,
while the SlovaJks are oruy a •~branch" of it and their language just a "dialect" orf the Czech. Ridiculous attempts
are made to trace the histo,r y of the non-.existent "Ozechoslovruk" nation to the times of the Great Moravian Empire
,a nd Sts. Cyril and [Methodius. The "CzechoslOW!Jks" are
supposed to 1b e the nation of Hus, Masaryk, and Benes,
but also the nation of Sts. Cyril and Methoilius, WenceslaUJS and Ludlmila. The Ozechs, however, are ",p rogressive"
Catholics and the 1Slovruks "reactionary" Catholics.
,F rom officiail statistics we learn how many Poles,
Germruns, Jews, 'Magyars and Uikrainians there Weir'e iin
Czecho-1Slovakia at any ,g iven time,. but not how many
,SlQIVlaks. That is explained ruway by the s1Jateme.nt th:at the
Slovaks were not considered a tminority, hence, they were
included under the category of "0zechosloivaiks." The latter term, however, is terr1bly l&lt;_?ng, so the shorter "Czech"
is used in many in,stainces as an "aJbbreviation." The term
"Slovalk" could not •b e us.ed, I suppose, because it has O'Ile
more letter than "Czech"! When statistics do, however,
mention Czechs and .Slovaks se,pairately, the figures are in-

�SLOVAKIA

41

variably magnified on bhe Ozech side and minim1zed on the
Slovak side. The !Magyars were experts at this sort of
"mathematics" long before Ozecho-iSlova!kia was !born. The
tendency is too olbviou.s.
Many distinguished and aJble scholars and writers of
the tyipe mentioned lby Kerner, can tell us exactly wh&amp;e
and albout when the Czechs, Poles, Russians, Slovenians,
Croatians, rSe11bs, etc., fust settled in their respective territories, lbut, it seems, they cannot even venture a.in honest
guess when it comes to the Slovaks. I say again: the tendency is dl:wious.
They tell us that the Great Moraivian Empilre was the
prede•cessor of the Czecho-Slol\TaJk RepU!blic, a Czech venttl!re,
when in fact it was not. The Slova:ks, their predecesors
that is, occupied both sides of the Morawa River at that
time (whence, the name of :the empire) aind, hence, formed
the very heart of the shor-Uived emipire, which was destroyed by the GermaJI1s with the aid of the Ozechs who had
settled in, Bohemia, the land of the Boii.
And we used to hear and read aJboot the "Crown lands
of Bohemia," lbut now it seems to be the mode in "1p rogress,ive" historical ch'cles, to use the expression "Crech crown
lands." I repeat : the tendency is only too. ohvio.us.
The Czechs are not and do, not ,wa,,nt to be Slovaks a,nd,
co,ruversely, the Slorva'ks are not and do not want to be
Czechs. The SlovaJks .a nd the Ozechs did not have a common
history, language, culture and tradition du.ring the past
1500 years, ~ause they did not occupy the same territQry.
In a word, the Cizechs 0JI1d the Sl01Vaks developed sepaJTa tely and are, therefore, two distinct ethnic nations. 'l'he
Slovaks never were, nor are they now, a "part" of the
Czech nation. This simple truth, recognized 'by fille Czechs
and SlOIVaJks themselves for many centuries ;past, should
also be recognized lby "distinguished and alble scholars ood
writers" of our time.
It is tiiue that the SlovaJks formed a common political
State with the Czechs in 19'.18, but only on certain conditions, the most important of which was that they would
be a completely autonomous unit of the Ozecho-SlovaJk

�42

SLOV.AKIA

federatio.n, that is, that they would en~oy full states' rights.
The condition not obeiirrg fulfilled, spelled the end of OrechoSlovaJkia. Because Benes insisted that the Czechs be the
"stat~ation," Czecho-Slo1vaJk ia was doomed to perdition.
Today the Slovaks do not want to be contained in any common State wti.th the Czechs or any other foreign nation.
They can be kept so temporarily only lby force. !But that is
not what the "distinguished and aJble sch~lars and writers"
who oo1lalboraJted with professor Kerner tell us in the book
"CzechoslovaJkia."
Propaganda oa.- history?
Let us anailyize Kerner's ''Czechoslovakia" chapter by
chapter to prove our contentions. But let me note first t!hat
on page xvii, at the end of the "contents," professor Kerner tells us how to pronounce "Czech" (not "Czechoslovak,"
mind you) letters; and on p. xxi, the poem by Edna St.
Vincent Millay is entitled "Ozecho-iSlovakia" (:not "Czechoslovalkia") , which b,rings uip the question of hyphenization of the 1political state of tihe 1SlovaJks and the Czechs
which was 'b orn iln 1918. The treaty 1b y which Czecho--Slova1kia came into being spelled ithe name with a hyphen to
indicate that two indiividual ethnic entities, two distinct
nations, 'had formed one political state. The hyiphen was
dropped lby Masaryk and Ben-es and their followers. Whether the hyphen was J.eft in the title of the ipoem because
of the author's insistence, or prof. Kerner's "careless"
editing, I do not know, but it is singular that the hyphen
should a;ppear in a book liike "Ozechoslova;lcia" at all!
1

•

"C~ECHOSLOVA:KIA, Part I: BACKGROUND
Chapter I-"The Czechoslovaiks-Anthropol ogical Notes . .."
By Ales Hrdlfclka, M.D., Sc.D., Gura.tor, Division of Physical Anthropology, United States National Museum; Huxley 'Medal Lecturer, London (1927) ; memlber, National
Academy of Scien-ces; honorary Doctor of 1S cience (Prague,
Br.no)," etc., etc. Please not.e: The underscoring here and
in the following is mine.
"The term Czechoslovak ,i,s o! r ecen t coinage, dating from 1918,
l\·hen the united Cze chs and Slovaks proclaimed. thei r independence
of the Dual Mon,archy and th eir est abHshmi:mt of the Czeohoslovak

�SLOVAKIA

43

Republic. . . . 'Illie name Czech (pronounced Chekh) ls derived, accord Ing to an old tradition, from the chiefta&amp;n of the main Slav
tribe who brought them some time during the dawn, of ihistory probably in tihe fifth cent\.U'ly A.!D. - to the heart of the land (IP,
3) . . . In fact, the hLstoTY of the Czechoslovak tribes, from the dawn
of written ,r ecords to the present day, has •be.en one of ever.Jiasting
struggles ·a.galns,t dnvooers (PP. 4.-5) . . . Tihe Slovaks, who u.p to
1029 formed a unit with Moravia, were then torn away by the Ma•
gya,rs, isolated from the west, for,c ed .away from the best grounds
iu the warm •lolwland,s, and eventuaUy repressed. in every way" (p. 6).

It is evident that even Dr. Ales Hrrdli6ka, distinguished ,anthropologist of ~ech origin, :seems to be a bit
confused about when the "Czechslovruks" came into being.
Whether the Ozechs -are descendants ,of the "main. 'Slav
trilbe" is open to ·question. The 'SlO!Vaks fo:nrned a "unit"
with Moravia up to. 1029, according to Hrdlicka, 1but who
the people were who settled in Morruvia is Jeft to the
reader. Mora,via, of ooUTse, came under the influence of the
Ozechs in time, at least the western portion of it, :b ut was
not settled lby the Ozechs when the .Slovruks formed a unit
with it, for the simple reason, it seems, that the for~
fathers of ithe Slovaiks settled on iboth sides of the river
Morava, w'hile the Ozechs settled in fue J.and of the Boii,
which was a distinot geographical unit, ,prolbaJbly a/bout the
size of present-day Bohemia .

•
"The Czechoslovaks to 1620'' - ,b y S.
Harrison Thomson, Ph ..D., BLitt. - Professor of Medieval History, Unirversity of Co-lorado; Ph.D., Charles Uni'Vers,ty, Prague; B.Litt., Omord University; Ewtor, Magistri Johannis Hus Tractatus Res-ponsivus; Johannis Wyclif Summa de Ente (1930) ;" etc., etc.
CI:I\A.PrIDR III -

"Led ,b y a travelln,g IFI'lankish merchant, Samo, tihe Slavic tribes
freed themselves ,from the Av,a r rule, and chose Samo for their •k ing
(623-624) . . . This ,e arly kingdom, which would appea,r to !have
been pr.emature, iw,as ,neither Czech nor Slovak. It would have to
be called Western ·s1av, ,b y .reason or a large intermixture of Slavic
tribes which became gra.dua:l!y differentiated as they settled in
different local!tes . . . The names of the princess Llbuiie and the
peasant Premysl whom she cih ose to be her husband are in all proba•
bility tJhe names of real persons. At any rate ,t he male descendants
or this ,s-emilegendaxy .Pfemysl were to rule over ,Bohemia and neighboring regions until 1306 . . . It is not certain whether tihe Slavic
chi,eftalne. enga,ged at this time to pay .tribute to the Fr,alllk.is~ emperor or not" (P. 9).

�SLOVAKIA

44

Id: Samo, the "traveling 1F ranlkish merchant," established a kingdom, he necessarily must hruve stopped traveling somewhere, and that "somewhere" ,w as on territory
occupied 'by "S1'arvic" tr.i!bes, out of which later a certain
nation, or certain nations, arose. ,s amo's kingdom was not
on the territory settled by the Czechs or other Sla-vonic
peoples, 1b ut Olll the terri1lory settled by the "Slavs" who
were later oalled ISlorvaks. Fredegar's Chronicles seem to
indicate as much (THIE ISI.JOV~S AND !UNG SAMO'S
EMiP]RE, by iDr. Henrich Bartelk, SU)VA.KIA, June 1954).
The "Slavic trilbes" whioh ibecame gradually differentiated as they settled in "different localities" could not be
identical witll the "Slruvic tribes" which remained on the
territory of ISrum&lt;&gt;'s kingdom and, later, came to ~ ca1led
the SlovaJks.
As far ,as, the Ozech "Llbuse and Pfemysl" are concerned, let us talke the word Olf learned Czechs that they
were legendary characters ("Ottuv SLOVN1K NAUONY,"
Vol.. XV, p. 1038; Vol. XX, rp. 625). We might a.loo concede,
without offending historical truth, t!hat all "1S1'avic" chieftains, including the forefathers of the 'Czechs, paid tribute
to the Frankish emperor, when he was strong enough to
exact it. Why should the 'Slavs of Bohemia" be an exception? II t seems that professor Harrison is interested in
building up a case for the Czechs to prove that they were
completely independent during the time of Charlemagne
(8th-9th cenrtury). Why?
1

•

"Later in the ,c entury (846) !Louis the German su,bju,g-ated Mora.
11ia, •b ut suffered defeat wihen he ,a ttacked the Slavs of Bohemia. Th1s
,a ttack of tLouis the German n,vas directed ,against the empire of the
Moravian prince Mojmir, who had shown rem arkable abllity in consolidating his rule south, east •a nd west to include southern Poland,
Silesia, Bohemia, Moravia, and the valleys of the middle Danube
and Theiss rivers a,s far as the northern boundaries of the Byzantine Empil'e . .. After the death of Svato,pluk (894) the Moravian
Empire rapidly broke up into its component parts. The Czech princes
of the Pi'emyslide line .gained independence for Bohemia, and the
Magyars, new arrivals dn. t,he east, -extended llieir power over n~rthern Pannonia. German's and Slavs, united for the moment, were de•
feated by the Ma,gyars in 907 neax (Bratislava (Pressburg), and the
ruin of the Moravian state was complete" (P. 10).

Louis subjugaited iMoravia, but was defeated by the
"Slavs of Bohemia," which means that the latter were not

�SLOVAKIA

45

identioal with the Slavs of Moravia, who were ruled by
Mojmir. !Professor !Harrison also tells us that Mojmir, the
Moravian prince, consolidated his rule by consolidating various ISlmrianic ('Slavic) trilbes, including those of Bohemia.
This Mojmir did by force. It is significant that Harrison
does not refer to Mojmir as a "Slovak" ,p rince, though
he does not hesitate to say that 'Czech" princes gained
independence fur Bohemia. He also omits to say that the
Czechs, not the ",Slavs of Bohemia," mind you, gained
their independence by !breaking ·a way from ,t he !MO!'aJVian
Empire in 895, :aJfter the death of S,v atopluk. The Czechs,
then, heliped to destro¥ the integrity of the Grea,t Moravian
ffimpire, the heart of which ,was in Slovak country, the
country of the Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia. In 900 the
Czechs, the Slavs of Bohemia, together with the Germans,
invaded the territory of the Sl01VaJks, the Slavs of Great
Moravia, aJild after a terrific /battle forced !Mojmir II to
sue for peace.
Svatoplulk's three sons, ruling various areas of the
Empire and constantly •a t each others throats, contributed
greatly to the dissolution of Great Moravia. When the !Magyars moved into northern IPannonia, they met with little
resistance, lbut professor Harriso n neglects to say what
people settled in northern Pannonia, even though history
tells us that the forefathers of the Slovaks occu'Pied tha.t
territooy at the time. And where professor Harrison found
the legend that "Germans and Slavs, uni.ted for the moment,." tried to save t!he Great Morawian Empire from falling into the hands of the Magyars in 907, he does !IlOt say.
As mentioned rubove, the Germans, and the 'Slavs of Bohemia" (the Coochs) contributed to the downfall of Great
Morawia. It is not, I thinlk, unreasonaJble to say that if the
Germans and Slavs were really united to sruve the Moravian Em'Pire from falling into the hands of the Magyars,
the latter would hardly have taken what was left of it
in 907.
Careless reporting of history? Probably, ·b ut to me it
seems to be tendencious and puTposeful. Professor Harrison, it seems, was doing a jolb for the Brague regime and

�46

SLOVAKIA

the Ozechs. This is all the more obvious in his !book "Czechoslovakia in EmQpean H!istory" (Princeton Uniiversity
Press, 1943, 1195'3), for which Harrison was ·aJWarded the
"Czechoslovak State Prize for Literature" in 1944, when
the Ozecho-1Slova'k State factually did not exist for five
years. 'Dhe award was made iby Dr. Benes's ·g overnmentin.J..ondon at the Uni:versity Clulb in New Yorik, Decem.lber
30, 1944.

•

•~remysl Otaka.r [ (1197-1230:) was able to use circumstances
for the •b enefit of his dynrusty and the Czech kingdom . . . iHe shifted
his allegiance four times. eadh time gaining conoession:s or confirmation of eonc-essions .previously granted ,b y another claimant to
the throne . . . . But to Pfomysl must be assigned the responsibility
for inviting tJhe German immig,r ation. Encouraged by the court, many
Czech nobles. had married Germ,a;n ,w omen; some of the best positions of the ·churoh in ,Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by German clerics; ·German mf.nnesin,g ers ,w,ere in high favor at the royal
court and at the courts of the Ticher nobles" (P. 13).

Here professor !Harrison tells us tJhat 1P rem.ysl Otakar
was quite a "shifity" ruler, using circumstances for the
benefit of his dynasty and the "Czech" kingdom, not the
"Boh,emian" ikingdom, but favored German immigration,
and "Czech" (not Bohemian) ndbles married: German
women, and some of the best ;positions of ,t he Church
in Bohemia and Moravia were held lby German clerics, etc.
It is evident here rthat professor Harrison cannot make up
his mind whether the Bohemians were Ozechs or GelUllans,
or both! It is quite clear, however, that the Slovaiks, the
Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia, did not .fit into the picture of the "Cz,ech" ikingdom at that ,t ime.
The twenty ipa,ges of Kerner's "OzechosloivaJlda" taken
up iby Harrison's "'IJhe Czechoolovaks to 1620" use the
word Slovak(ia) some seven times and, therefore, repudiate the idea, insinuation or implication, that .there were
any "Czechoslovaks" up ,t o 1620. Not only that, but for
Harrison, it seems, the ISlo.vaJks - the Slavs of Moravia
and Pannonia - simply do not exist at all after the fall
of the Great iMoraivian Empire, except for the mention
(p. 17) of "a consideraJble number of (Hussiite) adherents
1? Sfovalkia," which is quite a stretch of the imagination.
The Hussite !business was strictly Cezch; the Hussites did

�SLOVAKIA

47

more damage than good for the Czechs themselves, and
aibsolutely no good for the Slovaks, whose lands they invaded, pillaging and !burning their homes, and murdering
their population.
Furthermore, !Harri.son oreaites the impression that
the !Battle of White !Mountain (1620) was ,a; nationalistic
affair, W1aJged lby the Ozechs against the Genmans. That is
the legend fabricated 'Mld propagated by some Protestant
Czechs. The White 1MoU1DJtain affair, however, was definitely a religious and dynastic aifafir. After Tilly, the emperor's general, defeated Frederiok and the Bohemian (111ot
Czech!) maignates, some 27 of the leading "rebels" were
beheaded: one a Catholic; six were Germans. Not one, however, was executed becaJUse of his nationality.
Not without interest is Harrison's mention (p. 11) that
the Premyslide iprinces di'Vided the country, in .t he tenth
century, "into administrative distrfots (zupy) with a royal
representative (zupan) at the head of each distTiot." wf
the Czech Premys.lides actually used the terms "zupa,
zupan," I wonder if professor Harrison mi,g ht enlighten us
from whom they might have acquired those words, since
they are rarely used !by the Czechs .

•

CHA!PTER III - "The Czechoslovaks from the Battle
of White ,Mountain to the World War" - by RO'bert J.
Kerner, Ph. D ., i.lL.D., /Litt.D. - Sather Professor of History, Uni'Versity of California; LL.D., Omaha University;
Litt.iD., Paiik College; foreign memlber, Royal Bohemian Society of Letters and Sciences (Prague); foreign member,
Safarik Learned Society (Bratislava); commander, Order
of the Whlite Lion (Ozecho~SlovaJkia); memlber, Expert
Staff, Colonel House Inquiry and American Commission to
Negotiate Peace (!Paris); etc., etc.
"The dlsa,strous battle of W•h ite Mountain on November 8, 1620,
uslhered lin a period of three centur.les in which the Klngdom of
Bohemia was reduced to .three provinces, Bohemia, Moravia and
Silesia, in ,t he Habs,b urg MOIIlarchy. During the first centUTY of •t his
period the nation lost three-fourths of its native nobility, its most
eminent and wealthy citizens, its schools and noted scholara, and its
national independen-ce. A remarkable national renaissance took place
in the second century. In the remainder of the period, the Czecho•
slovak nation, after tlailin.g to bring •about a reorganization of the

�48

SLOVAKIA

Ha;bsburg Monarchy on ,a federal -basis, or to secure the same dg,h ts
as tfue Magyars, ,c arried out a ,s uccessful revolution a,nd obtained
its independence" (P. 29).

!Referring to the underscored words, I ask professor
Kerner: 1. What nation, the Czech or Bohemian? 2. What
"Czechoslovak." nraition, when there was none? 3. What
Magyars, ,o r does iKerner mean Hungarians? 4. What revolution 1by the "Ozechoslovaik" nation?.
Kerner used the title he did for this chapter delilberately, because he must haJVe known there were no "CzechoslO'V8Jks," ethnically spooking, ,b efore or after the battle
of White Mol.l.[ltain, to the World War, except in the minds
of dreamers and chauvinistic, imperialistic Creohs. He
could easily haJVe ,o mitted the d:ew references to Slovaks
and the m8Jny to "Orechos}ovaiks" in the 211 1pages of the
chrupter and had ,a rpretty good ,s tory on the "Czechs'' from
the Battle of White Mountain to the World War." Practically everything in the chapter is "Czech" - language,
literature, nation, historians, pe3Jsants noblemen, renaissance, Catholics, Pr.otestants, opera, national anthem, Lutherans, journalists - lbut Kerner still makes pretense at
writing aJbout "Czechoslovaks." Is there any good ,r eason
why an honest, Ulliprejudiced, objective historian should
try to fool even himself? Surely, Kerner musrt !know that
the ~echs devel01ped in the Austrian ,p art, ,w hile the Slova!ks developed in ,t he Hungarirun prurt of the Dual
Monarchy.
What Kerner means to imply when he says that the
"Czechoslovak nafilon . . . . . . carried out a successful revolution" and db.tamed its independence is at least questionaJble. We know that there was not even a revolution in
Prague. !Robert Ingrim tells us:
"All that J:J.a;ppened ,was tJhat Emperor-King Charles, seeing that
Wilson :a:bandoned his former program in the hour of victory,
dropped tJhe fed,ema;listic idea and ordered his minds.tern and lieutenant-governors to surrend,e r the admi'llistration to coonmittees of
the various nationalities. Thi,s explains among other things why
Masaryk, as the first president of Czecho-Slovakia, had to decree
which date was to be regarded as the beginning of the Czech re·
volution. It simply had not taken place. All bhe successor states,
including little. Austria, needed the legal fiction of a ,r evolution, because as• new states they repudiated the idea of continuity and based

�SLOVAKIA

49

their la/\V,s upon a revolutionary origin. For the Czechs this was
very important. When, in 1921, .the .Sudeten Germans complained to

the League of Nations t:hat they had not been allowed to take par.t in
the making of the constitution of the new State, the Czecho-Siov•a k
government replied. that 'the Cz~ho./Slovak State was the work and
product of the revolution, made solely by the Czecho-Slovak nation,'
which was, therefore, 'the only constitutional factor.' Hence, 'the

Natiooru Revolutionary Assembly was alone authorized to set up the
constitution' by W1h1ch Germans, \Hungarians, Ruthenians, and Poles
had •b een made second-class citizens" (After Hitler Sta11n? P. 107).

To complete the above piotu.re, '.I might add that the
Slovak memlbers of the "Na,tional Revolutioaiary Assembly" were lhand-'I)icked lby Masaryk and Benes and, included firve Czechs, hence, were not truly representa.tirve of
the political will of the 1S101Vaik nation. The constitution
that resulted, therefore, was strictly a Czech product, j'llSt
as was Ozecho-lSlovak domestic iand foreign policy.
In referring to the development that took ipla.ce during
the Reformation and ICoU!Ilter-lReformation in Ozech rund
Slovak territories, Kerner says that "in general the same
development took place in the ISloivaJk counties od' Hungary
as in Bohemia, /Moravia and \S ilesia." If a person did not
know !better, he might be led to 1believe that Kerner did
not use the express-ion "Ozech counties" in his comparison,
because Bohemia, Moria.via and !Silesia were supposedly
solidly Czech. We know that they were not. And we know,
too, that Bohemia was not the only country that suffered
during the Thirty Yea.rs' War; that war "ravaged Bohemia
with the same fury it unleashed all over the Germanies. . . There was no, difference and certainly no national ,pll!'.pose" (I.n,g rim, op. cit., ,p. 57).
Kerner, furthermore, writes ab.9-ut "Magyar'' magnates
and "Magyar" nolbility, rwhen he really means "Hungarian"
magnates and noibility. There is a difference: the Magyars
were not the only inhabitants of Hungary before or aft-er
the 17th century. The same applies .to the terms "Czech"
and "Bohemian." Of course, we might say that the tenns
today - af.ter the expulsion of over three million Germans - are mo.re or less synonymous. Let us, however,
remember that they were not even in ,t he recent past:
the Czechs were not the only inhabitants of Bohemia.

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SLOVAKIA

"A new period in .the history of the Czechoslovak
nation was inaJugurated" (p. 32), when 1Fredericik the
Great seirzed Silesia in 1740, Kerner states oaitegorically
and, fartiher down on the same page, that "the reforms of
Maria '.Dheresa and Joseph JiI . . . not only culminated in
the completion of the evolution ,which tra.nsf.ormed the
Kingdom of Bohemia into three provinces and hence virtual amalg,amaJtion of 1!he Austrian Hereditary Lands with
the Lands of the (Bohemim Crown into a single administrative unit, but they threatened the Czechoslovaks with
loss of identity as a nation 'by the process• of Germanization in schools, government, ,and church."
Here, it is obvious that Kerner w-..s a 1b it ~fuddled
and •a )pparently forgot, in his zeal to promot.e the concept
of a "Czoohoslovaik nation," that ,t he SkwaJks lived in HU!Ilg,ary and,. hence, !by no stretch of t'he imaigination, even
in this "enlightened" and "iprogres.sive" era, could have had
any connection with the "Austrian Hereditary Lands" and
the "Lamds of the Bohemi,a n Crown." It w.as the existent
Czechs and not the nJOn-existent "OzechoslwaJks" who were
threatened with the loss of identity as a nation iby the process of ~a.n:rzatiorn, in Austria. We can concede that the
policy of Joseph ll "of trying to denationalize" Magyars,
Italians, Poles, and Rumaniians "aroused them to activity"
(p. 34), as it did the ~echs, SlovaJks, Croats, Slovenes,
and Serbians, ibut why does Kerner lump the latter nations together as "Czeichoslovaiks" and "Jugoslavs" when
he knows that such did not exist either in Joseph !I's time
or even later? 'I'he reason fur this is only too obvious.
On page 3Q,. the "Czechoslovaks" we.re threatened
"w1t'h Joss of identity as a nation," but three pages later,
according to Kerner, "at the same time the situation of the
Slovaks in HWigary was somewhat improved by the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II" (p. 35). The same
reforms even led "to a great national revival (p. 32) . . .
the Czech renaissance develo ped momentum step by step
as decree after decree of Maria Theresa and Joseph II
sought to a'bolish the use of the Czech language. When
Joseph II completed t!he official demise of the Czech Ian1

�SLOVAKIA

51

guage in school, government, allld church in 1790, the
Czech nation revwed. 1So mysterious was this development
that its exact oauses have been a su:bject: of dispute among
the best ·scholars" (1p. 34). Then on t:he following pa;ge
(35) Kerner states: "The Ohurch feared that it would lose
its ,g rip on the Czech nation i:f its priests spolke only German. These and other indications led to the establishment
by Leoipold rnr of a chair in the Czech language at the University of ,Praigue in 1791."
What, then, is this business ,th,a,t the reforms of Maria
Theresa and Joseph JiI ''threatened the Czechoslovaks with
loss of identity as a nation"? And what is so mysterious
about &lt;the reviival of the Czech nation in 1790? Kerner certainly must ha,ve ,h eard a;bouit the principle of action and
reaction! If the iMa~rs, and laiter the Ozechs, had not tried
to suppress the Slovak lang,uage and oppressed the Slovaks, they would have rprobaibly .perished as a nation in
time . .Js it not olbtvious what ha,ppens to languages and peo~
ples in America rwhere freedom abounds? [n America
peoples of every color, .race and creed enjoy freedom of the
press, freedom of religion and freedom of asoomibly; they
are d':ree to !build their own churches, schools, liibraries, 'beneficial organi:zations and ipubHsh new.s,pa,pers and books
in their respective languages. Yet, there is no doufbt in. my
mind that in time non-®nglish iperiodioa1s and 1books, published in America, will /be a rarity. Certainly, this must
be just as olbvious - ,a nd not myst.erious - even to professor Kerner.

•

"A Protestant sc hool, -witJh a c hair in the Czech language a.nd

literature, was founded in Brati,s.lava, and this inst:i,tution counted
amQ/Ilg its s,t udents the future Czech his torian !FrantAse'k Palacky
from Moravia and tlhe Slovaks Jan Kolla r ia.n.d Pave.I Josef i:lafaiik.
The Protestant Slovaks followed closely the d·e velopment or the
Czechs, Wlhereas the Catholic Slovaks under Antonin Bernolak tried
to create, with indlff-erent success at the time, a. written Slovak dialect, which W'&lt;IS s-eparate from .but closely akin to the Czech because
a western dialect of spoken ,Slovak was used. The course of poli•
tical events could not cheok the national revival of Czechoslovaks"
(p. 36) .

,P rofessor Kerner does not relate the whole story, but
only the part that s'l.lits his ipUTpOSe and, hence, sins by

�52

SLOVAKIA

omi-ssion. The Catholic Slcwa!ks oonstituted rut least 75 per
cent of the Sl()IVaik nation, while the Protestant Slovaks
only aibout ill per cent. Koillar and Safarik cultivated ,a
"dead" 1amgiuage, a langu,a;ge tha;t was used iby a small part
of tile Slovak nation, the Lutherans. And the latter used
that language - "biblical" Czech, therefore, not the "live"
language of the vast masses of the Czech people - mostly for and during religious functions, while at home they
used Sloiv•aik.
Anton, not Antonin (the Czech equivalent), Bernolwk
not only "tried" to create a Slo.va!k literary language, but
actually did estaibLish such a literary medium of Slorvak
which was u:sed :some fifty years b,y S[ovak writers. There
was no need :for iBernolaik to. create "a written Slovak dialect," ;b ecause various 'Slova!k dialects already were existent at that time. And iBernola:k definitely did 111ot choose
the western dialect because it was "closely alkin" to Czech.
Kerner, however, is quite right when he says that "the
comse of political events could not check the nationa:I revival of the Ozechoslovalks," lbecaJuse they were non--existenrt. Those events could not check the national rerv:wal
of either the Ozechs or the :S'1ov0iks .
1

•

"Caug,h t between their sympathies with the Czechs and their
fears of their .Magyar ov•erlord:s, Slovak patri'ots saw their security,
not in coalescing at once with their Czech brethren, but in iworking
to create a separate Slovak national movement by taking up once
more the unsuccessful jdea of Bernolak that of developing a
separate written Slovak language. Ludevit Stur, Michal Hodza, and
Jo.:,ef Hurban, fearing the reproaches of the Magyars if they continued to use the Czech language, and hoping to attract the Slovak
peasant masses, chooe in 184-5 to make. a dialect spoiken. in tlle
central Slovak counties the '!lew literary language. The Czechs wa,r ned
in v,a in against this departure from t.he practice of a thousand years.
·T hey argued that dts r esults would only be. to the &gt;benefit of the

Germans and Magy,ar.i" (p. 38).

This statement is not based on 'hone.sit, hi:sitorical research. ilt is a fabrication pure and simple. Slova!k patriots ,t hen, even as now, fully realized that they could not
safegu,,ard their nation.al existence !by playing second-,
fiddle to other nations in the political coTIJCert. They did
not fear the 'Maigyiars who sought to Magy.arme them any
more than they feared the Czechs who sought to Ozechize

�SLOVAKIA

53

the:rn. True Slovak ·p atriots never let their sympathies for
the Ozechs or other oppressed nations interfere with their
ultimate natioo.a.1 aim: freedom and rpolitioal independence
- to become masters of their own household, of their own
destiny. '.Dhey rebelled against the Magyars and, later,
eiven against the Czechs, just as the Magyars and the
Ozechs had rebelled ag,ainst the HlaJbsburgs.
Stur, Hodza, Hurban (Jozef, not Josef) a,nd other
Slova,k patriots developed the literary SlovaJk medilllIIl
estrublished by iBen1i0laJk and his followers - the "lilve"
language used lby the vast masses of the Slovalk people,
both O~tholic and also Lutheran. They wrote in Czech for
the Cze.ohs and in Slovak for the Slov,aks. Kerner does not
say so directly, ibut the implication is ,t here that Stur,
Hod.fa •a nd Hurb-an did use the Czech language exclusively in rtheir writings. The fact is thaJt; they did not and they
did not fear the "reproaches of the Magyairs" for using
Czech at ,any time they desired to do so. As int.elligent men
they knew fully well they ieould not rouse their people nationally by using a language that was foreign to them, a
language they did not consider their own.
Why, then, the 'balderdash a:bout the Czechs warning
Slo;vak paitriots against their depa;rture "from the practice
of a thousand years"? '.Dhe vast majority of .the IS1ovruk natiO!Il, i!he Catholic Slovaiks, used their own Slovak language in their churches, homes and in their Hterary worlks,
b;ut 'Professorr Kerner wO'Uld hruve students of history "Czechoslovak" history - believe that they used the Czech
language forr a "thousand years" prior t,o 1845. Why does
Kerner resort to outright falsehoods and aJbsurrd falbrications? Czech was brought into Siovakia, it is true, by
Czech exiles during i!he Coun.ter..R.eformation to strengthen
Lutheranism, ibut it never 'became the predominant literary medium of the ,vast masses of the Slovak people and
their ,w riters.
1

•

"The Magyar large landholder, the Catholic clergyman, and the
Jewish merchant, screened, ,b ehind a blatant Magyar propaganda,
worked to denaclonalize the Slovak peasant by falsifying his history
and •by asserting tihat his language had no orelation to the Czech and
did not belong to the languages of western Europe" (p. 44).

�54

SLOVAKIA

It is significant that Kerner should put the finger on
"Catholic clergymen" - without mentioning names - and
omit Protestant "progressilve" preachers and Jewish R3Jb..
bis who were equally interested in "denationiali ~ng" the
Slovalk peasant, practically always woTking aigainst :the
national interests of the ISlovalk nation. Of course, this is
nothing new in history. T. G. iMasaryik and Benes, who
should have learned the lesson of :A.ustr1a:-Hungary, denied the existence of it.he !Slovak nation as an individual
ethnic entity, declaring the ISlovia!ks were only a "branch"
of the Czech nation and their language only ,a "dialect" of
the Ozech. (Falsifying history seems to be a specialty of
the followem of Masaryk and Benes. And Kerner proves it!
1

•

I

"Whereas Kr-amai' became, so to ~,peak, the symbol of the
economic u,psm1ge of the Czech lboUTgeoisie, Masaryk became the intellectual and spiritual head of the entire nation, including the Slovaks . • • . He (~·a saryk) became a Protestant, a modern Czech Puritan. Influenced by his reading af Czech history, he ,b elieved that

h-e found. !ts plhilosophy 1n the religious ideal of il:he Hussites and
the Ozeoh !Brethren" (pp. 47-48).

The truth, however, is that T. G. Masaryk never was
the "intellectual and spiritual head" of the 1Slov•lrlLs. If the
Ozechs wish to consider Masaryk :as such, they are free
to do so. The o.vel'IWhelming Catholic majority oif the Slovak people could not. Hlas Kerner forgotten Masaryk's blatant cries "away from !R;ome!" and "Rcxme must (be put on
trial and condemned!"? Czech history is not Slovak history;
the philosophy of Slova:k history does not rest on the "religious ideal of the Hussites and the Czech Brethren." Catholic Czechs form ibhe majority of the Czech nation,
hence, we have good reason to doulbt Kerner's evaluation
of Masaryik -as far as •t hey ,a re concerned, lbecaJuse Masaryk never did represent or COlllcern himself !With their spiritual interests, in fact, put them in jeopardy.
Masaryik, according to Kerner, "viewed the problem
of the small oppressed n.a:tiO'IlS ,as the polilticai and international phase of the social question - the exploit,aitdon
of one nation by anot!her, for political exploitation meant
cheap lalbor to the laboring drasse.s." 'But what happened
after Czeoho-!Slovakiia was lborn and Masaryk !became he:r
first president? He denied staites' rights to Slovakia and

�SLOVAKIA

55

thought nothing of the OLechs exploiting the ,S lovaks and
their national wealth!
CHA[PTER [V -

Peace Conference" -

•

"The World War, Revolution and
iby RO{'bert J. Kern.er.

'10n July 4 (191,5), Masaryk publicly in,a ugurated the revolutionary movement •by a ,l ecture on Jan Hus in Zurich, Srwitzerl•a nd.
After Benes succeeded in escaping J.irom Austria, the Czech Foreign
Committee issued its public manifesto for Czechoslovak independence
in Pans on !November 14, 1915. This manifesto had previously been
agreed upon by the leaders at home and by the leaders of Czech
and Slovak colonies In America, England, and France a point
on wihich !Masaryk insisted" (p. 53).

'W ho were those leaders "alt home" and in the Czech
and Slovak colonies in America, England, and France?
The record tells us that the leaders of the Czechs and Slovalks at home ikinew practically nothing of Masaryk's plans
at that time; and the leaders of their respective colonies
in various countries still less!

•

"This Committee (the Czech Foreign Committee) led to the
creation of the •Czechoslovak Nation-al Council in 1916., which under
Masaryk, Benes, and ~tefanlk gradually assumed the functions of
goverJlllilent" (pg. 153-54) . . . "The Czechoslovak National Council,
which was leading the struggle abroad, had not been disavowed by
the nation at home" (p. 56).

1t is quite clear, rt:hen, that the Czech Committee is
credited with the creation of the "Czechoslovak" Council,
which Masaryk headed. But it is not in accord with fact
that the Council "had not been disruvowed 1b y the nation at
home." Masaryk was the leader of the Czech (Progressive
Party, which he alone represented in the .Austrian ,parliament. When he left Austria, late .in 1914, Miasaryk went
abroad with a ipr.ogram of his own. As far as is !known,
he had not consulited wii.th Ozech and Siovalk leaders a:t
home and had no authorization f.ram the Czechs or the Slovaks at home ito represent their politioal will. Of course,
wherever Masaryk went, he did pose as a competent representative of the Czechs at home.
When President. Wilson, .late in Decemlber 1916, requested an lb;elligerents to state their war aims, the Allied
reply of January 1'2, 1917, included the following demand:
"Lilberation of Italians, Riumaniains, Slaws,. and Czeciio-

�56

SLOVAKIA

Slovaks from foreign rule." Please note the "Slavs and
Czecho-Slovaks" part, lbecaUJSe thaJt tells us 'j ust how well
the Allies were informed on the sUJbjoot. Since Slovruks and
Czechs spoke different languages, occupied different territories, and never in history had been united, rbhe appelation "Ozecho-1Slorvruk,s " was real new. At that time, when the
British government was asked, in ithe Commons, ,w hethmit could indicate the territory inhabited iby "Czecho-1Slo-·
vakis," the ra nswer was "no."
The Czechs at home resented being mentioned as a nation under "foreign rule." One of their leading ipaipers, the
NARODNE I.1IiSTY, had this tto say aJbout it:
1

"It is amazing how indefatigably Masaryk endeavors to defile
the honor of the CZECH nation. The enemies have learnt that the
love of all Austrian peoples for their inherited dynasty and their
fatherland is firm and unshakable. The enemies have realized that
those who make contradictory statements abroad are liars and impostors."

In Norvem!ber, 1916, all the Czech parties in the Austrian rparliament, without a single exception, had issued a
solemn declaration, stating thrat "the basis and guaranty of
the national existence of the Czech people are the dynasty,
called to the throne centuries ago, and the indivisibly constituted Monarchy." In the declaration they demanded foderafozation. And oin December 30, 191.6, all the Czech party
leaders attended ttihe emiperor's coronation as king of Hungary as "guesrts of honor."
After the Afli.ed reply to, Wilson became !known, the
society of Czech memlbers of parliament sent the following
letter (J,a nuary 23, 1'917) to the foreign minister of AustroHtrogary:
"In view of the Alli-ed runswer to President ,W ilson in which the
liberation of the Czechs figures as a war ,a im, we reject this insinuation whiClh is based on entirely erroneous assumptions. We declare emphatically that the Czech people, as always in the past, is
convinced that it can be assured of a prosperous development only
under the Habsburg scepter and within the Habsburg Monarchy"

(Ingrim: "After Hitler Stalin?" p. 75).

The very same Czech members of parliament requested
Prime M:in.istffi' C1am....Martinic, a Czech, to arrange an audience with the emperor for them. Why? !Because :they said:
"We want to tell His Majesty that we shall always stand by
him and his successors; that our demands will always be compatible

�SLOVAKIA

57

with the interests of the Habsburg dyansty and of the realm; that
we are loyal servants of the king and the country; that our complaints have never shaken our belief that after victory the claims
of the ,Czech people will find satisfaction within the framework of
the realm and under the Habsburg crown."

It is quite obvious, then, thaJt the representatirves of the
Czech people did not want separation - independence but federalization. Furthermore, Masaryk ,a nd his Council
were hiit from another quarter. At the conference of the
Sociiailist International in 1Stockho1m, June 1:917, the Czech
delegates vociferously demanded "an independent Czech
State within a federated Austria-Hungary."
Is it possible that professor Kerner, an expert on
Czecho-SloiValkia, is ignorant of what w:as going on even m
Czech lands while !Masaryk a.nd Benes were calling for the
destruction of Austria? I cannot ·believe it •a nd, therefore,
say that iKerner delilberately did not tell the truth when he
said that Mas•a ry'k's Council "had not been disavowed by the
nation at home." Masarylk :himself admits it in his work
"Svetowa RevoJuce" (pp. 1150-il.52; 253-254 ; 32,1 ).
When 'Kerneir wr1tes aJbo.ut the organimtion of the
"Czechoslovak Legions," the work a,ccomplished lby Masarylk and iBenes in ,E ngland, France, Russia allld America for
the esta;blishment of the "Ozechosloivalk Reipulblic," he completely ignores the effort put forth by Gen&amp;al Milan R.
Stefanik, the !Slovak who, did much in France, the U.S. A.,
Italy and Russi.a for the realization of the Republic. fu the
twenty pages of this cltaJpter, Kerner mentiom; the name
of this great Slovak only once, but does not tell us a single
thing aJbo,ut the ,w ork he did so tha,t Czecho-,Slova'l da might
become a reality. If Ma,s aryk himself was not loath to give
credit to •S tefanik for his accompl.isihmen,ts, why should Kerner ibe?
Furthermore, Kerner devotes. several pages to the
"OzechoslavaJk" Legion in Siiberia - "the ,a rmy which had
fought vicitorio'll.Sly at !Kiev, Zhitamir, and Baikhmach, and
which yearned to leave Russia in peace in order to continue the conflict ,a gainst the Germans in the West." He
almost outdoes Masaryk himself on the ·" Siberian anabasis"
legend.

�58

SLOVAKIA

The fact is, however, that the legion was offered a
short route home via Murmansk and Archangel whence
British sh1ps were to transport it to the battle front in
France. But the legion, afraid of German sulbmarines and
not too eager to fight, preferred ithe long way home via
Siberia to Viadfuvostok. AB a result, Masarylk's a:xmy
reached Europe long after the smoke of the war had lifted,
without haJVing contributed ,to the defeat of Germany and
Austria. The IStberian anabas:is made greait propagand a for
Masaryk's cause, as he himself atlmitted, and without it,
in fact, the "calli:!e" m1ght haive 'been lost. '.I recommend
that Kerner and other students •o f history, read pp. 81-83
of fugrim's "After Hlitler !Stalin?" - and, ibut carefully,
even Masaryik's "Svetava. Revoluce."

•

"In the ,a ims publicized as the objectives of peace, the Czechosl ovaks were promised their independence on the basis of the selfdetermination of the Czechoslovak nation. It is a fum:l.amentaJ question just what "self-deteirmi natlon of the nations" meant a.t tihat
time. It s eems most probrul&gt;le that when it ,was first uttered it
meant the determinatio n of a n entire nation to choo.se whether it
wished to be jndependent or live under another, and not self-determination of small parts of it" (p. 62).

Here, Kerner quite naively would have us :b elieve
that he iis be.fuddled lby the meaning of "self-determ ination." Of course, he could have given credit ,to Masaryk
and especially Benes for his 1pretended quandary. I say
"pretended ," /because he himself tells us on the page following:

" In many regions the populations were thoroughly mixed in
composition . . . . As far as the Czechoslovak s were concerned, the
matter was complicated by the fact that their claims in the Czech
regions rested on historic rights, the Lands of the Bohemian Crown
(Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia), which they as a nation had created and maintained in history, rund on the rights of nationality for
the ,Slovaks in Hungary, wihere the Magyars cJ.almed 'historic rights
of the Lands of tihe Hungarian Crown" (p. 63) .

So, what is this business "the Czechoslov aks were promised their independen ce on the ,basis of the self-determ ination of the Czechoslovak nation"? !Kerner purt:s himse1f in
a ivery ludicrous situation: he admits the existence of the
Czech naition, Czech regions, etc., does not admit directly
the existence of the Slovak counterpar ts, but still insists
on having a "Orechoslovak" nation!

�SLOVAKIA

69

AP, mentioned earlier, one of the aims of the Allies
was the "lilberaition of Iltalians, Rumanians, Slavs and Cze-

choslovaks from foreign r.ule." The Czechs and Slova;ks
got i'lllto the picture also as "Ozech~ova ks," and not only
as Slavs, at the persistent insistence of Dr. Edward Benes to support the fiction promoted by M'aJSaryik and himself that "Czechs and Slovaks were the same." The truth,
however, remains that the SlovaJks are an individual nation in the great family of Slovanic nations, as are the
Poles, Byelorussians , Ukrainians, Russians, C.zec'hs, Bulg,aria:ns, .S erbs, ISlO!Veni•a ns, Croatians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, a,nd Lusatia,n tSerbs, whatever Kerner and other
"historians" of his type might have to say to the contrary
notwithstandi ng.
If Kerner does not be1ieve that t:he right of self-dete:nmination applies equally to the Czechs and /Slovaks, let
him .say so outright and be done wi~h it. Kerner should
know, as we certainly lmow, that the magic formula that
druzzled. and charmed. President Wilson was "national determination," which meant that every ethnic group be
conceded the right to decide to which state it wished to
belong. More dmpo:ntrunt than what it meanit, of course,
was what it implied: the notion that the id68.l state would
be one inhabited only by one ethnic entity, one nation.
The tenth of WiliSion's "1Fo!Urteen Points" reads as follows:
''!The peoples of Austria-iHu111gary , whose place among the nations
we wish to see s·afeguaro€d and •a ssured, should be accorded the
freest opportunity of autonomous development."

What does "the peoples of Austria-Hung ary" mean
to professor Kerner? Does it mean all the peoples, except
the Slova1k people? If Masaryik used his charms to maJk:e
Wilson •b elieve the fiction that the "Czechs and the Slovaiks were the same," and so to deceive him does that
alter the .truth that the Ozechs a.nd the Slov~ are not
one people, one nation? Why should Kenner want us to
believe otheIWise?

•

"The !Peace Conference chose to give the Czechos-lovaks the
hiatoric boundaries in the Czech regions of Austri•a and ethnic bound•a rles In the Slovak districts of Hungary. Furthermore, it •a ddoo,
under cond,l tlons of autonomy, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. It thmi created a state in Wlhlch 34 per cent of the population was non-Czech0-

�60

SLOVAKIA

slovak, ,a nd this element included a German .population of over three

millimi.s, livin,g chiefly in the outer rim of Bohemia, in a state of
less than fifteen millions" (p. 63).

But this is 111ot quite the whole ,s tory. The Peace Conference decided as it did, 'becaJUOO it relied on the "expert"
information supplied iby Masaryk and Benes, !both Czechs,
who presumed to represent iboth the Czechs and also the
Slova!ks. In the state created, the non-Czech population
was in the majority, and this included some three and a
half million Germams, in a state of "less than fifteen millions" (how much less?). The Conference ga;ve the "Czechoslovaks" nothing, lbuit it did allow the boundaries for
the "new" state that was -created, as Kerner states, "on
the -g round that rune or ten million Czechoslovaks should
be favored •w ith independence oiver three million Germans"
(p. 65) - the argument Oif Masaryk and Benes! They
needed the almost three million Slovaiks of Hrung,ary to
m.aJce "nine or ten n:rlllion Czechoslovaks," but the Czechs
and the ISloivaJks, were "the same"!

•

"The Duchy of TesC'hen was ,w,hat was left of Silesia, one of the
Lands of the Bohemian Crown, after Frederiick the Great had seized
fourte en-fifteeruths of that territory in 1740. The historic rights of the
Czechs went •back to t!he fourteenth century. Before that the Duchy
had been ,Polish {p. r66) . . . It was, however, Poland's diss·a tisfaction with this decision which led her diplomacy into d.e manding a.nd
acquiring Czech Teschen on the occasion of the Conference of Mu·
nlch (October, 1938). This blow from the rear really made it impossible for Czechoslovakia to fight after she was abandoned by her
Western allies" (p. 68) .

It is ,olbvious that Kerner either laoks knowledge
about Teschen or is deli'berately attemptilllg to confuse the
readers of his "Ozechoslova:kia." Just lilke Miasaryik and
Benes, iit seems that Kerner does not want students oif
history to know the whole tmth about Ozecho-Sloivaki,a.
Furthermore, the ,allegation that Ozecho,...Slov,rukia was
"forced" to :su,r render to iHitler !Without firing a shot, because her "Western allies" had abandoned her, OT because IDngland ·a nd France asked her to, is purely fictitious.
Benes surrendered Czecho-Slovaki.a to Hitler without
the approval of parliament. The Benes Czechs knew fully
well that Czeoho-SlovaJkia could not be saved, because her
non-Czech majority was not wiling to fight for her. They

�SLOVAKIA

61

chose to urrender "at the behest of their faithless friends,"
because an attempt to fight would have revealed to the
world that the Germa~lovak-Magyar~Rutib.en.ian-iPolish
majority of her population was not ready to die for a
tate that had treated them as second-rate citizens for
ome thirty years. And let us not forget that even the
Czech,s, who considered themselves t he "State-nation," did
not fire a single shot in defense of Czecho-JSlovrukia. Furthermore, it is no secret ,t hat Benes did not cultivate
friendshiip with Poland and other neigh'boring states : his
pro Soviet policy over decades of years is proof of that.
Already in 1929 Viscount D'Abernon prophesied:
"The treaty between Czecbo S lovakia and Poland is thought a
triumph of French m ilitarism . o it m a y be, but the duration w ill b e
te mpo rary . . . the Czech satellite will revert to the orbit of the
Moscow planet as soon as disturbing forces cease to operate quite
as powerfully as today."

•

"Germ an propaganda l ater s ought to spread the view that the
bou ndaries of Czeoho slovakia, a s well as t hose of P ol and, wer e
drawn by the Peace Conferene e in ignorance and that they repres e nted a failure to understand the problems of central Europe. N ot hing could be far th er from tJh e facts . The deleg ates o f the Peace
Cont rence had access to and used the best available information
and considered these problems from all possible angles" (p. 6 ).

After reviewing the events that followed World Wa.r
I Mld led to World War IiI, I believe it is safe to say that

Kerner's statement is "farther from the facts" than even
the "German propaganda" he alludes to. The fact rernains
t hat World War I not only failed to solive Europe's problems, ,b ut even ,a ccentuated them and led t o World War II.
At Paris there was a meeting of two continents which were
quite ignorant of each other. The peacemakers blundered
when they accepted interested parties as experts wit hout
having them chedked 'by the opposition. When Lloyd
George asked Benes how many Ma.gyam would fall undeT
Ozech rule, Benes replied that their number would lbe
350,000 ('D. H. Miller: "My Diary at the Conference in Paris"; in reality it was more ibhan one million. Benes, plead..,
ing fOT a "natural frontier," described a little ~oolk as a
nasvigalble river.
Repudiation of Kerner's claim may also be found in
A . J. P. Taylor's "The HaJbsbu.rg Monarchy," C. A . Ma-

�62

SLOVAKIA

cartney's "Problems of the Danubiam Basin," Lloyd
George's "The Tr.urth About the Peace Treaties," J. M.
Keynes "The Economic Consequences of the Peace." Winston Churchill's "Afternnath and World Crises,." Robert fugrim's "After Hitler :Stalin?" and even T. G. Masa;ryk's
"Svet&lt;Jva Revoluce." But Kerner himself does that quite
effecti:vely with the last three sentences - especially the
last sentence - of the ivery same par.aJgraph, ,whi.oh reads:
"Another ,s olution of the Czechoslovak problem might indeed be
sought •by some future .p eace conference, if the poignant problem of
the German nation is solved, for example, on the model of Switzerla:nd rather than that permitting a rampant totalitarian racialism.
U.nti,l then it may be said that the work of t!he Peace Conference
was a reasonable solution for its time. Common sense and Intelligence and a few minor boundary rectifications might have aecured
a durable settlement" (p. 69).

Of course, Professor Kerner, could hardly have intended it that way, but this is quite an admission from a mem.
her of the "EXPERT STAFF, Colonel House Inquiry and
American Commission to Negotiate Peace"! We know today
that Kerner was not the only "exipert" who la'o ked sufficient
"common sense and intelligence" at that time.
(More coming)
WHO SAID IT?

"In 1868 the Ozeoh initel,lectuails and the Bohemian aristocrats renewed filleir allegi1ance. . . The eighty Bohemian
a&lt;bsentees from the Reicllsrat made a declaration of their
aims: they asked for equal na:tional rights for the Czechs in
Bohemia, and for a refornn of the electoral system; they
demanded also the unity of the lands of St. We:nceslaus and
the same independence for this "grea,t Bohemia" a;s HUlllgary
possessed. The Ozech leaders were bewitched by the Hungarian example. '1'1hey saw, quite rightly, that the Magyars
had achieved their nation'al freedom by associating it with
historic rilghts, and they supposed that the way to achieve
the national freed~m of the Czechs was to claim the historic
rights of Bohemia. They did not see that the historic rights
of Hungary were real, the historic rights of Bohemia imaginary. . . " - (A. J. P. Taylor, TH1E HABSIBURG MONA'ROHY, London, 1948; p. 142).

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1345">
                    <text>38

SLOVAKIA

HISTORY OR PROPAGANDA?
P. A. HIROBAK

In 1'9149, the Uniiversity of California Press, ipulblished
the "third printing" of the !book "CZEOHOSW VAKIA"
(504 pages) which was edited iby Rolbert J. Kerner, Sather
professor of history in the Unilversity :of California. 'Dhe
book was made ipossilble, ,p rofessor Kerner states in his
preface, iby "the oolla!boration of twenty distinguished and
alble scholiars and writers" and that, concludes Mir. Kerner, "has made it ;possiible to present a vo1ume ,which is an
honest, unprejudiced:, and frank appraisal of the important
contrilbution which the Czechoslovak nation made to the
history of our time in its two short decades of independence between two world wars."
Just how honest, unprejudiced and frank that aipp:r,aisal of the "important" contribution is, the ireader may
be a;ble to g,ather from what follows here and arrive at the
condusion, stated so aiptly iby professor Kerner, that, indeed, "few nations, if any can show such a record" or,
possibly, go a bit .farther and state cate.gorically that, indeed, no niation can show .such a record!
But how honest and unprejudiced are "distinguished
and able scholars" who set out to do a job beyond their
competency? Can a distinguished historian write a true
history of CZIDCH0-1SUOVAKITA without a thorough lmowledge of the SlovaJks and the land they 'haive occupied during the past 1500 years? And yet that is exaotly what the
"twenty distinguished and aJble scholars and writers" of
Kerner's "Ozechoslovaikia" did to ,produce something which,
in his opinion, was "hQlrulst, unprejudiced" !
Kerner's "Ozechoslovikia' is dirvided into six parts,
but the tendency in all parts is much the same: strictly
Czech. Kerner should haive named the 1b ook "Czechia,"
t'hen the wonk might ibe called, by a stretch of the imagination, a semlblance of something "hlOlll.est and unprejudiced." Otherwise, informed readers know rthat it definitely is not, and the uninformed axe cruelly deceived.
The s~gniificance of this may be !better understood when
we glance at the remarkaible selection of books in the sug-

�SLOVAKIA

39

geeted bibliog,r aphy at the end of each cha;pter. The list is
rema.r.kaJble not only for the !books and literary woi,ks included, but for the 1bodks and literary works omitted. The
impression created is that the Slovruks had no ,w riters of
a!lly impor-t and that no sourees of informatiO!ll on their
history are availruble. iBut that i.'S not so. '.Dhis proves that
the "twenty distinguished a:nd able scholars and writers,"
who collalborated with Kerner .cm his "Czechoslovakia"
were little or not at all concerned with the history of the
Sl01Vak people and their land. To magnify and glorify the
history of the Ozechs and minimize, practically ignore, the
history of the Slavruks, certainly cannot be the aim of an
honest, UDJprejudiced and abjecti;ve writer of Ozecho~lovak history.
Ozecho-Blovakia, as presented ,b y Kerner and his
"twenty distinguished and aJble .s cholars and writers,"
does not give us a true picture of Czech-0-1Slovakia; it is
not a true history of the Ozechs and SlOIV'aJks and their
lands; it is definitely more propaga:nda than history - in
line with other .such wm,ks which were promoted by the
propaganda apparatus of Prag,ue. !Students of history
should not 'be exposed to faJsifications and distortions of
history, su&lt;!h as that exemplified ·b y Kerner's "Ozechoslovakia," because. that does not make for the truth, or for
better relations ibetween the Ozechs and the Slovalks, or
for a ·pr.oper understanding of those nations.
I do not want to say unequirvocally that the writers
who collaborated to produce Kerner's "Ozechoslovrukia"
were knowingly dishonest ,a nd prejudiced, but their work
co.n,vinced me definitely that ,w ittingly or uniwitti.ngly they
did ibeoome Ozech propa:gandists. The writers have an undu:ly high regard for the chairacter and accomplishments
of T. G. Masaryk amd Benes and the Ozechs in general,
without an equa:lJy high reg,aro for facts, and little or no
regard for the Slorvaks and their history.
,M ost writers of Ozeolio..Slovaik history and "Ozecho..slovak" democracy (IS. Harrison Thomson, Joseph S. Roucek, Herbert AdolJphus ,Miller, Brackett Lewis, among
them), follow the Ozech line of T. G. Masaryik and Ed-

�40

SLOVAKIA

ward Benes and their governmeints ,w ho ,c ontrolled the entire propaganda apparatus• o;f ,Czecho-1Slov8Jkia. This Masaryk~enes line was and e;ve:n now is adhered to iby exchange students and iprofessors, heads of official and unofficial information !bureaus, the America.n Institute in
Prague, the YMCA and YWCA of 0zecho-Slovrukia and
other countries, the "OzechoslQIViruk N ationa,1- Ohurch"
(strictly a Czech enteriprise) and most other religious
sects, and practically all "eminent" writers, scholars and
correspondents. And today the governments of all countries of the ,w orld still lbase their knowledge 'Of OzechoSlovakia and the vario:us nations that comprise it on the
information supplied by the state propaganda apparatUJS of
T. G. iMasaryk and Edward Benes. The import Ol:f this will
undouibtedly be appreciated iby students of history, and
even historians themselves, if they rememlber that this
line has been followed and ipvopagaJted for ·a t least the past
thirty-seven years.
Accordirrrgly, the Czechs are a "historical" nation,
while the SlovaJks are oruy a •~branch" of it and their language just a "dialect" orf the Czech. Ridiculous attempts
are made to trace the histo,r y of the non-.existent "Ozechoslovruk" nation to the times of the Great Moravian Empire
,a nd Sts. Cyril and [Methodius. The "CzechoslOW!Jks" are
supposed to 1b e the nation of Hus, Masaryk, and Benes,
but also the nation of Sts. Cyril and Methoilius, WenceslaUJS and Ludlmila. The Ozechs, however, are ",p rogressive"
Catholics and the 1Slovruks "reactionary" Catholics.
,F rom officiail statistics we learn how many Poles,
Germruns, Jews, 'Magyars and Uikrainians there Weir'e iin
Czecho-1Slovakia at any ,g iven time,. but not how many
,SlQIVlaks. That is explained ruway by the s1Jateme.nt th:at the
Slovaks were not considered a tminority, hence, they were
included under the category of "0zechosloivaiks." The latter term, however, is terr1bly l&lt;_?ng, so the shorter "Czech"
is used in many in,stainces as an "aJbbreviation." The term
"Slovalk" could not •b e us.ed, I suppose, because it has O'Ile
more letter than "Czech"! When statistics do, however,
mention Czechs and .Slovaks se,pairately, the figures are in-

�SLOVAKIA

41

variably magnified on bhe Ozech side and minim1zed on the
Slovak side. The !Magyars were experts at this sort of
"mathematics" long before Ozecho-iSlova!kia was !born. The
tendency is too olbviou.s.
Many distinguished and aJble scholars and writers of
the tyipe mentioned lby Kerner, can tell us exactly wh&amp;e
and albout when the Czechs, Poles, Russians, Slovenians,
Croatians, rSe11bs, etc., fust settled in their respective territories, lbut, it seems, they cannot even venture a.in honest
guess when it comes to the Slovaks. I say again: the tendency is dl:wious.
They tell us that the Great Moraivian Empilre was the
prede•cessor of the Czecho-Slol\TaJk RepU!blic, a Czech venttl!re,
when in fact it was not. The Slova:ks, their predecesors
that is, occupied both sides of the Morawa River at that
time (whence, the name of :the empire) aind, hence, formed
the very heart of the shor-Uived emipire, which was destroyed by the GermaJI1s with the aid of the Ozechs who had
settled in, Bohemia, the land of the Boii.
And we used to hear and read aJboot the "Crown lands
of Bohemia," lbut now it seems to be the mode in "1p rogress,ive" historical ch'cles, to use the expression "Crech crown
lands." I repeat : the tendency is only too. ohvio.us.
The Czechs are not and do, not ,wa,,nt to be Slovaks a,nd,
co,ruversely, the Slorva'ks are not and do not want to be
Czechs. The SlovaJks .a nd the Ozechs did not have a common
history, language, culture and tradition du.ring the past
1500 years, ~ause they did not occupy the same territQry.
In a word, the Cizechs 0JI1d the Sl01Vaks developed sepaJTa tely and are, therefore, two distinct ethnic nations. 'l'he
Slovaks never were, nor are they now, a "part" of the
Czech nation. This simple truth, recognized 'by fille Czechs
and SlOIVaJks themselves for many centuries ;past, should
also be recognized lby "distinguished and alble scholars ood
writers" of our time.
It is tiiue that the SlovaJks formed a common political
State with the Czechs in 19'.18, but only on certain conditions, the most important of which was that they would
be a completely autonomous unit of the Ozecho-SlovaJk

�42

SLOV.AKIA

federatio.n, that is, that they would en~oy full states' rights.
The condition not obeiirrg fulfilled, spelled the end of OrechoSlovaJkia. Because Benes insisted that the Czechs be the
"stat~ation," Czecho-Slo1vaJk ia was doomed to perdition.
Today the Slovaks do not want to be contained in any common State wti.th the Czechs or any other foreign nation.
They can be kept so temporarily only lby force. !But that is
not what the "distinguished and aJble sch~lars and writers"
who oo1lalboraJted with professor Kerner tell us in the book
"CzechoslovaJkia."
Propaganda oa.- history?
Let us anailyize Kerner's ''Czechoslovakia" chapter by
chapter to prove our contentions. But let me note first t!hat
on page xvii, at the end of the "contents," professor Kerner tells us how to pronounce "Czech" (not "Czechoslovak,"
mind you) letters; and on p. xxi, the poem by Edna St.
Vincent Millay is entitled "Ozecho-iSlovakia" (:not "Czechoslovalkia") , which b,rings uip the question of hyphenization of the 1political state of tihe 1SlovaJks and the Czechs
which was 'b orn iln 1918. The treaty 1b y which Czecho--Slova1kia came into being spelled ithe name with a hyphen to
indicate that two indiividual ethnic entities, two distinct
nations, 'had formed one political state. The hyiphen was
dropped lby Masaryk and Ben-es and their followers. Whether the hyphen was J.eft in the title of the ipoem because
of the author's insistence, or prof. Kerner's "careless"
editing, I do not know, but it is singular that the hyphen
should a;ppear in a book liike "Ozechoslova;lcia" at all!
1

•

"C~ECHOSLOVA:KIA, Part I: BACKGROUND
Chapter I-"The Czechoslovaiks-Anthropol ogical Notes . .."
By Ales Hrdlfclka, M.D., Sc.D., Gura.tor, Division of Physical Anthropology, United States National Museum; Huxley 'Medal Lecturer, London (1927) ; memlber, National
Academy of Scien-ces; honorary Doctor of 1S cience (Prague,
Br.no)," etc., etc. Please not.e: The underscoring here and
in the following is mine.
"The term Czechoslovak ,i,s o! r ecen t coinage, dating from 1918,
l\·hen the united Cze chs and Slovaks proclaimed. thei r independence
of the Dual Mon,archy and th eir est abHshmi:mt of the Czeohoslovak

�SLOVAKIA

43

Republic. . . . 'Illie name Czech (pronounced Chekh) ls derived, accord Ing to an old tradition, from the chiefta&amp;n of the main Slav
tribe who brought them some time during the dawn, of ihistory probably in tihe fifth cent\.U'ly A.!D. - to the heart of the land (IP,
3) . . . In fact, the hLstoTY of the Czechoslovak tribes, from the dawn
of written ,r ecords to the present day, has •be.en one of ever.Jiasting
struggles ·a.galns,t dnvooers (PP. 4.-5) . . . Tihe Slovaks, who u.p to
1029 formed a unit with Moravia, were then torn away by the Ma•
gya,rs, isolated from the west, for,c ed .away from the best grounds
iu the warm •lolwland,s, and eventuaUy repressed. in every way" (p. 6).

It is evident that even Dr. Ales Hrrdli6ka, distinguished ,anthropologist of ~ech origin, :seems to be a bit
confused about when the "Czechslovruks" came into being.
Whether the Ozechs -are descendants ,of the "main. 'Slav
trilbe" is open to ·question. The 'SlO!Vaks fo:nrned a "unit"
with Moravia up to. 1029, according to Hrdlicka, 1but who
the people were who settled in Morruvia is Jeft to the
reader. Mora,via, of ooUTse, came under the influence of the
Ozechs in time, at least the western portion of it, :b ut was
not settled lby the Ozechs when the .Slovruks formed a unit
with it, for the simple reason, it seems, that the for~
fathers of ithe Slovaiks settled on iboth sides of the river
Morava, w'hile the Ozechs settled in fue J.and of the Boii,
which was a distinot geographical unit, ,prolbaJbly a/bout the
size of present-day Bohemia .

•
"The Czechoslovaks to 1620'' - ,b y S.
Harrison Thomson, Ph ..D., BLitt. - Professor of Medieval History, Unirversity of Co-lorado; Ph.D., Charles Uni'Vers,ty, Prague; B.Litt., Omord University; Ewtor, Magistri Johannis Hus Tractatus Res-ponsivus; Johannis Wyclif Summa de Ente (1930) ;" etc., etc.
CI:I\A.PrIDR III -

"Led ,b y a travelln,g IFI'lankish merchant, Samo, tihe Slavic tribes
freed themselves ,from the Av,a r rule, and chose Samo for their •k ing
(623-624) . . . This ,e arly kingdom, which would appea,r to !have
been pr.emature, iw,as ,neither Czech nor Slovak. It would have to
be called Western ·s1av, ,b y .reason or a large intermixture of Slavic
tribes which became gra.dua:l!y differentiated as they settled in
different local!tes . . . The names of the princess Llbuiie and the
peasant Premysl whom she cih ose to be her husband are in all proba•
bility tJhe names of real persons. At any rate ,t he male descendants
or this ,s-emilegendaxy .Pfemysl were to rule over ,Bohemia and neighboring regions until 1306 . . . It is not certain whether tihe Slavic
chi,eftalne. enga,ged at this time to pay .tribute to the Fr,alllk.is~ emperor or not" (P. 9).

�SLOVAKIA

44

Id: Samo, the "traveling 1F ranlkish merchant," established a kingdom, he necessarily must hruve stopped traveling somewhere, and that "somewhere" ,w as on territory
occupied 'by "S1'arvic" tr.i!bes, out of which later a certain
nation, or certain nations, arose. ,s amo's kingdom was not
on the territory settled by the Czechs or other Sla-vonic
peoples, 1b ut Olll the terri1lory settled by the "Slavs" who
were later oalled ISlorvaks. Fredegar's Chronicles seem to
indicate as much (THIE ISI.JOV~S AND !UNG SAMO'S
EMiP]RE, by iDr. Henrich Bartelk, SU)VA.KIA, June 1954).
The "Slavic trilbes" whioh ibecame gradually differentiated as they settled in "different localities" could not be
identical witll the "Slruvic tribes" which remained on the
territory of ISrum&lt;&gt;'s kingdom and, later, came to ~ ca1led
the SlovaJks.
As far ,as, the Ozech "Llbuse and Pfemysl" are concerned, let us talke the word Olf learned Czechs that they
were legendary characters ("Ottuv SLOVN1K NAUONY,"
Vol.. XV, p. 1038; Vol. XX, rp. 625). We might a.loo concede,
without offending historical truth, t!hat all "1S1'avic" chieftains, including the forefathers of the 'Czechs, paid tribute
to the Frankish emperor, when he was strong enough to
exact it. Why should the 'Slavs of Bohemia" be an exception? II t seems that professor Harrison is interested in
building up a case for the Czechs to prove that they were
completely independent during the time of Charlemagne
(8th-9th cenrtury). Why?
1

•

"Later in the ,c entury (846) !Louis the German su,bju,g-ated Mora.
11ia, •b ut suffered defeat wihen he ,a ttacked the Slavs of Bohemia. Th1s
,a ttack of tLouis the German n,vas directed ,against the empire of the
Moravian prince Mojmir, who had shown rem arkable abllity in consolidating his rule south, east •a nd west to include southern Poland,
Silesia, Bohemia, Moravia, and the valleys of the middle Danube
and Theiss rivers a,s far as the northern boundaries of the Byzantine Empil'e . .. After the death of Svato,pluk (894) the Moravian
Empire rapidly broke up into its component parts. The Czech princes
of the Pi'emyslide line .gained independence for Bohemia, and the
Magyars, new arrivals dn. t,he east, -extended llieir power over n~rthern Pannonia. German's and Slavs, united for the moment, were de•
feated by the Ma,gyars in 907 neax (Bratislava (Pressburg), and the
ruin of the Moravian state was complete" (P. 10).

Louis subjugaited iMoravia, but was defeated by the
"Slavs of Bohemia," which means that the latter were not

�SLOVAKIA

45

identioal with the Slavs of Moravia, who were ruled by
Mojmir. !Professor !Harrison also tells us that Mojmir, the
Moravian prince, consolidated his rule by consolidating various ISlmrianic ('Slavic) trilbes, including those of Bohemia.
This Mojmir did by force. It is significant that Harrison
does not refer to Mojmir as a "Slovak" ,p rince, though
he does not hesitate to say that 'Czech" princes gained
independence fur Bohemia. He also omits to say that the
Czechs, not the ",Slavs of Bohemia," mind you, gained
their independence by !breaking ·a way from ,t he !MO!'aJVian
Empire in 895, :aJfter the death of S,v atopluk. The Czechs,
then, heliped to destro¥ the integrity of the Grea,t Moravian
ffimpire, the heart of which ,was in Slovak country, the
country of the Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia. In 900 the
Czechs, the Slavs of Bohemia, together with the Germans,
invaded the territory of the Sl01VaJks, the Slavs of Great
Moravia, aJild after a terrific /battle forced !Mojmir II to
sue for peace.
Svatoplulk's three sons, ruling various areas of the
Empire and constantly •a t each others throats, contributed
greatly to the dissolution of Great Moravia. When the !Magyars moved into northern IPannonia, they met with little
resistance, lbut professor Harriso n neglects to say what
people settled in northern Pannonia, even though history
tells us that the forefathers of the Slovaks occu'Pied tha.t
territooy at the time. And where professor Harrison found
the legend that "Germans and Slavs, uni.ted for the moment,." tried to save t!he Great Morawian Empire from falling into the hands of the Magyars in 907, he does !IlOt say.
As mentioned rubove, the Germans, and the 'Slavs of Bohemia" (the Coochs) contributed to the downfall of Great
Morawia. It is not, I thinlk, unreasonaJble to say that if the
Germans and Slavs were really united to sruve the Moravian Em'Pire from falling into the hands of the Magyars,
the latter would hardly have taken what was left of it
in 907.
Careless reporting of history? Probably, ·b ut to me it
seems to be tendencious and puTposeful. Professor Harrison, it seems, was doing a jolb for the Brague regime and

�46

SLOVAKIA

the Ozechs. This is all the more obvious in his !book "Czechoslovakia in EmQpean H!istory" (Princeton Uniiversity
Press, 1943, 1195'3), for which Harrison was ·aJWarded the
"Czechoslovak State Prize for Literature" in 1944, when
the Ozecho-1Slova'k State factually did not exist for five
years. 'Dhe award was made iby Dr. Benes's ·g overnmentin.J..ondon at the Uni:versity Clulb in New Yorik, Decem.lber
30, 1944.

•

•~remysl Otaka.r [ (1197-1230:) was able to use circumstances
for the •b enefit of his dynrusty and the Czech kingdom . . . iHe shifted
his allegiance four times. eadh time gaining conoession:s or confirmation of eonc-essions .previously granted ,b y another claimant to
the throne . . . . But to Pfomysl must be assigned the responsibility
for inviting tJhe German immig,r ation. Encouraged by the court, many
Czech nobles. had married Germ,a;n ,w omen; some of the best positions of the ·churoh in ,Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by German clerics; ·German mf.nnesin,g ers ,w,ere in high favor at the royal
court and at the courts of the Ticher nobles" (P. 13).

Here professor !Harrison tells us tJhat 1P rem.ysl Otakar
was quite a "shifity" ruler, using circumstances for the
benefit of his dynasty and the "Czech" kingdom, not the
"Boh,emian" ikingdom, but favored German immigration,
and "Czech" (not Bohemian) ndbles married: German
women, and some of the best ;positions of ,t he Church
in Bohemia and Moravia were held lby German clerics, etc.
It is evident here rthat professor Harrison cannot make up
his mind whether the Bohemians were Ozechs or GelUllans,
or both! It is quite clear, however, that the Slovaiks, the
Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia, did not .fit into the picture of the "Cz,ech" ikingdom at that ,t ime.
The twenty ipa,ges of Kerner's "OzechosloivaJlda" taken
up iby Harrison's "'IJhe Czechoolovaks to 1620" use the
word Slovak(ia) some seven times and, therefore, repudiate the idea, insinuation or implication, that .there were
any "Czechoslovaks" up ,t o 1620. Not only that, but for
Harrison, it seems, the ISlo.vaJks - the Slavs of Moravia
and Pannonia - simply do not exist at all after the fall
of the Great iMoraivian Empire, except for the mention
(p. 17) of "a consideraJble number of (Hussiite) adherents
1? Sfovalkia," which is quite a stretch of the imagination.
The Hussite !business was strictly Cezch; the Hussites did

�SLOVAKIA

47

more damage than good for the Czechs themselves, and
aibsolutely no good for the Slovaks, whose lands they invaded, pillaging and !burning their homes, and murdering
their population.
Furthermore, !Harri.son oreaites the impression that
the !Battle of White !Mountain (1620) was ,a; nationalistic
affair, W1aJged lby the Ozechs against the Genmans. That is
the legend fabricated 'Mld propagated by some Protestant
Czechs. The White 1MoU1DJtain affair, however, was definitely a religious and dynastic aifafir. After Tilly, the emperor's general, defeated Frederiok and the Bohemian (111ot
Czech!) maignates, some 27 of the leading "rebels" were
beheaded: one a Catholic; six were Germans. Not one, however, was executed becaJUse of his nationality.
Not without interest is Harrison's mention (p. 11) that
the Premyslide iprinces di'Vided the country, in .t he tenth
century, "into administrative distrfots (zupy) with a royal
representative (zupan) at the head of each distTiot." wf
the Czech Premys.lides actually used the terms "zupa,
zupan," I wonder if professor Harrison mi,g ht enlighten us
from whom they might have acquired those words, since
they are rarely used !by the Czechs .

•

CHA!PTER III - "The Czechoslovaks from the Battle
of White ,Mountain to the World War" - by RO'bert J.
Kerner, Ph. D ., i.lL.D., /Litt.D. - Sather Professor of History, Uni'Versity of California; LL.D., Omaha University;
Litt.iD., Paiik College; foreign memlber, Royal Bohemian Society of Letters and Sciences (Prague); foreign member,
Safarik Learned Society (Bratislava); commander, Order
of the Whlite Lion (Ozecho~SlovaJkia); memlber, Expert
Staff, Colonel House Inquiry and American Commission to
Negotiate Peace (!Paris); etc., etc.
"The dlsa,strous battle of W•h ite Mountain on November 8, 1620,
uslhered lin a period of three centur.les in which the Klngdom of
Bohemia was reduced to .three provinces, Bohemia, Moravia and
Silesia, in ,t he Habs,b urg MOIIlarchy. During the first centUTY of •t his
period the nation lost three-fourths of its native nobility, its most
eminent and wealthy citizens, its schools and noted scholara, and its
national independen-ce. A remarkable national renaissance took place
in the second century. In the remainder of the period, the Czecho•
slovak nation, after tlailin.g to bring •about a reorganization of the

�48

SLOVAKIA

Ha;bsburg Monarchy on ,a federal -basis, or to secure the same dg,h ts
as tfue Magyars, ,c arried out a ,s uccessful revolution a,nd obtained
its independence" (P. 29).

!Referring to the underscored words, I ask professor
Kerner: 1. What nation, the Czech or Bohemian? 2. What
"Czechoslovak." nraition, when there was none? 3. What
Magyars, ,o r does iKerner mean Hungarians? 4. What revolution 1by the "Ozechoslovaik" nation?.
Kerner used the title he did for this chapter delilberately, because he must haJVe known there were no "CzechoslO'V8Jks," ethnically spooking, ,b efore or after the battle
of White Mol.l.[ltain, to the World War, except in the minds
of dreamers and chauvinistic, imperialistic Creohs. He
could easily haJVe ,o mitted the d:ew references to Slovaks
and the m8Jny to "Orechos}ovaiks" in the 211 1pages of the
chrupter and had ,a rpretty good ,s tory on the "Czechs'' from
the Battle of White Mountain to the World War." Practically everything in the chapter is "Czech" - language,
literature, nation, historians, pe3Jsants noblemen, renaissance, Catholics, Pr.otestants, opera, national anthem, Lutherans, journalists - lbut Kerner still makes pretense at
writing aJbout "Czechoslovaks." Is there any good ,r eason
why an honest, Ulliprejudiced, objective historian should
try to fool even himself? Surely, Kerner musrt !know that
the ~echs devel01ped in the Austrian ,p art, ,w hile the Slova!ks developed in ,t he Hungarirun prurt of the Dual
Monarchy.
What Kerner means to imply when he says that the
"Czechoslovak nafilon . . . . . . carried out a successful revolution" and db.tamed its independence is at least questionaJble. We know that there was not even a revolution in
Prague. !Robert Ingrim tells us:
"All that J:J.a;ppened ,was tJhat Emperor-King Charles, seeing that
Wilson :a:bandoned his former program in the hour of victory,
dropped tJhe fed,ema;listic idea and ordered his minds.tern and lieutenant-governors to surrend,e r the admi'llistration to coonmittees of
the various nationalities. Thi,s explains among other things why
Masaryk, as the first president of Czecho-Slovakia, had to decree
which date was to be regarded as the beginning of the Czech re·
volution. It simply had not taken place. All bhe successor states,
including little. Austria, needed the legal fiction of a ,r evolution, because as• new states they repudiated the idea of continuity and based

�SLOVAKIA

49

their la/\V,s upon a revolutionary origin. For the Czechs this was
very important. When, in 1921, .the .Sudeten Germans complained to

the League of Nations t:hat they had not been allowed to take par.t in
the making of the constitution of the new State, the Czecho-Siov•a k
government replied. that 'the Cz~ho./Slovak State was the work and
product of the revolution, made solely by the Czecho-Slovak nation,'
which was, therefore, 'the only constitutional factor.' Hence, 'the

Natiooru Revolutionary Assembly was alone authorized to set up the
constitution' by W1h1ch Germans, \Hungarians, Ruthenians, and Poles
had •b een made second-class citizens" (After Hitler Sta11n? P. 107).

To complete the above piotu.re, '.I might add that the
Slovak memlbers of the "Na,tional Revolutioaiary Assembly" were lhand-'I)icked lby Masaryk and Benes and, included firve Czechs, hence, were not truly representa.tirve of
the political will of the 1S101Vaik nation. The constitution
that resulted, therefore, was strictly a Czech product, j'llSt
as was Ozecho-lSlovak domestic iand foreign policy.
In referring to the development that took ipla.ce during
the Reformation and ICoU!Ilter-lReformation in Ozech rund
Slovak territories, Kerner says that "in general the same
development took place in the ISloivaJk counties od' Hungary
as in Bohemia, /Moravia and \S ilesia." If a person did not
know !better, he might be led to 1believe that Kerner did
not use the express-ion "Ozech counties" in his comparison,
because Bohemia, Moria.via and !Silesia were supposedly
solidly Czech. We know that they were not. And we know,
too, that Bohemia was not the only country that suffered
during the Thirty Yea.rs' War; that war "ravaged Bohemia
with the same fury it unleashed all over the Germanies. . . There was no, difference and certainly no national ,pll!'.pose" (I.n,g rim, op. cit., ,p. 57).
Kerner, furthermore, writes ab.9-ut "Magyar'' magnates
and "Magyar" nolbility, rwhen he really means "Hungarian"
magnates and noibility. There is a difference: the Magyars
were not the only inhabitants of Hungary before or aft-er
the 17th century. The same applies .to the terms "Czech"
and "Bohemian." Of course, we might say that the tenns
today - af.ter the expulsion of over three million Germans - are mo.re or less synonymous. Let us, however,
remember that they were not even in ,t he recent past:
the Czechs were not the only inhabitants of Bohemia.

�50

SLOVAKIA

"A new period in .the history of the Czechoslovak
nation was inaJugurated" (p. 32), when 1Fredericik the
Great seirzed Silesia in 1740, Kerner states oaitegorically
and, fartiher down on the same page, that "the reforms of
Maria '.Dheresa and Joseph JiI . . . not only culminated in
the completion of the evolution ,which tra.nsf.ormed the
Kingdom of Bohemia into three provinces and hence virtual amalg,amaJtion of 1!he Austrian Hereditary Lands with
the Lands of the (Bohemim Crown into a single administrative unit, but they threatened the Czechoslovaks with
loss of identity as a nation 'by the process• of Germanization in schools, government, ,and church."
Here, it is obvious that Kerner w-..s a 1b it ~fuddled
and •a )pparently forgot, in his zeal to promot.e the concept
of a "Czoohoslovaik nation," that ,t he SkwaJks lived in HU!Ilg,ary and,. hence, !by no stretch of t'he imaigination, even
in this "enlightened" and "iprogres.sive" era, could have had
any connection with the "Austrian Hereditary Lands" and
the "Lamds of the Bohemi,a n Crown." It w.as the existent
Czechs and not the nJOn-existent "OzechoslwaJks" who were
threatened with the loss of identity as a nation iby the process of ~a.n:rzatiorn, in Austria. We can concede that the
policy of Joseph ll "of trying to denationalize" Magyars,
Italians, Poles, and Rumaniians "aroused them to activity"
(p. 34), as it did the ~echs, SlovaJks, Croats, Slovenes,
and Serbians, ibut why does Kerner lump the latter nations together as "Czeichoslovaiks" and "Jugoslavs" when
he knows that such did not exist either in Joseph !I's time
or even later? 'I'he reason fur this is only too obvious.
On page 3Q,. the "Czechoslovaks" we.re threatened
"w1t'h Joss of identity as a nation," but three pages later,
according to Kerner, "at the same time the situation of the
Slovaks in HWigary was somewhat improved by the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II" (p. 35). The same
reforms even led "to a great national revival (p. 32) . . .
the Czech renaissance develo ped momentum step by step
as decree after decree of Maria Theresa and Joseph II
sought to a'bolish the use of the Czech language. When
Joseph II completed t!he official demise of the Czech Ian1

�SLOVAKIA

51

guage in school, government, allld church in 1790, the
Czech nation revwed. 1So mysterious was this development
that its exact oauses have been a su:bject: of dispute among
the best ·scholars" (1p. 34). Then on t:he following pa;ge
(35) Kerner states: "The Ohurch feared that it would lose
its ,g rip on the Czech nation i:f its priests spolke only German. These and other indications led to the establishment
by Leoipold rnr of a chair in the Czech language at the University of ,Praigue in 1791."
What, then, is this business ,th,a,t the reforms of Maria
Theresa and Joseph JiI ''threatened the Czechoslovaks with
loss of identity as a nation"? And what is so mysterious
about &lt;the reviival of the Czech nation in 1790? Kerner certainly must ha,ve ,h eard a;bouit the principle of action and
reaction! If the iMa~rs, and laiter the Ozechs, had not tried
to suppress the Slovak lang,uage and oppressed the Slovaks, they would have rprobaibly .perished as a nation in
time . .Js it not olbtvious what ha,ppens to languages and peo~
ples in America rwhere freedom abounds? [n America
peoples of every color, .race and creed enjoy freedom of the
press, freedom of religion and freedom of asoomibly; they
are d':ree to !build their own churches, schools, liibraries, 'beneficial organi:zations and ipubHsh new.s,pa,pers and books
in their respective languages. Yet, there is no doufbt in. my
mind that in time non-®nglish iperiodioa1s and 1books, published in America, will /be a rarity. Certainly, this must
be just as olbvious - ,a nd not myst.erious - even to professor Kerner.

•

"A Protestant sc hool, -witJh a c hair in the Czech language a.nd

literature, was founded in Brati,s.lava, and this inst:i,tution counted
amQ/Ilg its s,t udents the future Czech his torian !FrantAse'k Palacky
from Moravia and tlhe Slovaks Jan Kolla r ia.n.d Pave.I Josef i:lafaiik.
The Protestant Slovaks followed closely the d·e velopment or the
Czechs, Wlhereas the Catholic Slovaks under Antonin Bernolak tried
to create, with indlff-erent success at the time, a. written Slovak dialect, which W'&lt;IS s-eparate from .but closely akin to the Czech because
a western dialect of spoken ,Slovak was used. The course of poli•
tical events could not cheok the national revival of Czechoslovaks"
(p. 36) .

,P rofessor Kerner does not relate the whole story, but
only the part that s'l.lits his ipUTpOSe and, hence, sins by

�52

SLOVAKIA

omi-ssion. The Catholic Slcwa!ks oonstituted rut least 75 per
cent of the Sl()IVaik nation, while the Protestant Slovaks
only aibout ill per cent. Koillar and Safarik cultivated ,a
"dead" 1amgiuage, a langu,a;ge tha;t was used iby a small part
of tile Slovak nation, the Lutherans. And the latter used
that language - "biblical" Czech, therefore, not the "live"
language of the vast masses of the Czech people - mostly for and during religious functions, while at home they
used Sloiv•aik.
Anton, not Antonin (the Czech equivalent), Bernolwk
not only "tried" to create a Slo.va!k literary language, but
actually did estaibLish such a literary medium of Slorvak
which was u:sed :some fifty years b,y S[ovak writers. There
was no need :for iBernolaik to. create "a written Slovak dialect," ;b ecause various 'Slova!k dialects already were existent at that time. And iBernola:k definitely did 111ot choose
the western dialect because it was "closely alkin" to Czech.
Kerner, however, is quite right when he says that "the
comse of political events could not check the nationa:I revival of the Ozechoslovalks," lbecaJuse they were non--existenrt. Those events could not check the national rerv:wal
of either the Ozechs or the :S'1ov0iks .
1

•

"Caug,h t between their sympathies with the Czechs and their
fears of their .Magyar ov•erlord:s, Slovak patri'ots saw their security,
not in coalescing at once with their Czech brethren, but in iworking
to create a separate Slovak national movement by taking up once
more the unsuccessful jdea of Bernolak that of developing a
separate written Slovak language. Ludevit Stur, Michal Hodza, and
Jo.:,ef Hurban, fearing the reproaches of the Magyars if they continued to use the Czech language, and hoping to attract the Slovak
peasant masses, chooe in 184-5 to make. a dialect spoiken. in tlle
central Slovak counties the '!lew literary language. The Czechs wa,r ned
in v,a in against this departure from t.he practice of a thousand years.
·T hey argued that dts r esults would only be. to the &gt;benefit of the

Germans and Magy,ar.i" (p. 38).

This statement is not based on 'hone.sit, hi:sitorical research. ilt is a fabrication pure and simple. Slova!k patriots ,t hen, even as now, fully realized that they could not
safegu,,ard their nation.al existence !by playing second-,
fiddle to other nations in the political coTIJCert. They did
not fear the 'Maigyiars who sought to Magy.arme them any
more than they feared the Czechs who sought to Ozechize

�SLOVAKIA

53

the:rn. True Slovak ·p atriots never let their sympathies for
the Ozechs or other oppressed nations interfere with their
ultimate natioo.a.1 aim: freedom and rpolitioal independence
- to become masters of their own household, of their own
destiny. '.Dhey rebelled against the Magyars and, later,
eiven against the Czechs, just as the Magyars and the
Ozechs had rebelled ag,ainst the HlaJbsburgs.
Stur, Hodza, Hurban (Jozef, not Josef) a,nd other
Slova,k patriots developed the literary SlovaJk medilllIIl
estrublished by iBen1i0laJk and his followers - the "lilve"
language used lby the vast masses of the Slovalk people,
both O~tholic and also Lutheran. They wrote in Czech for
the Cze.ohs and in Slovak for the Slov,aks. Kerner does not
say so directly, ibut the implication is ,t here that Stur,
Hod.fa •a nd Hurb-an did use the Czech language exclusively in rtheir writings. The fact is thaJt; they did not and they
did not fear the "reproaches of the Magyairs" for using
Czech at ,any time they desired to do so. As int.elligent men
they knew fully well they ieould not rouse their people nationally by using a language that was foreign to them, a
language they did not consider their own.
Why, then, the 'balderdash a:bout the Czechs warning
Slo;vak paitriots against their depa;rture "from the practice
of a thousand years"? '.Dhe vast majority of .the IS1ovruk natiO!Il, i!he Catholic Slovaiks, used their own Slovak language in their churches, homes and in their Hterary worlks,
b;ut 'Professorr Kerner wO'Uld hruve students of history "Czechoslovak" history - believe that they used the Czech
language forr a "thousand years" prior t,o 1845. Why does
Kerner resort to outright falsehoods and aJbsurrd falbrications? Czech was brought into Siovakia, it is true, by
Czech exiles during i!he Coun.ter..R.eformation to strengthen
Lutheranism, ibut it never 'became the predominant literary medium of the ,vast masses of the Slovak people and
their ,w riters.
1

•

"The Magyar large landholder, the Catholic clergyman, and the
Jewish merchant, screened, ,b ehind a blatant Magyar propaganda,
worked to denaclonalize the Slovak peasant by falsifying his history
and •by asserting tihat his language had no orelation to the Czech and
did not belong to the languages of western Europe" (p. 44).

�54

SLOVAKIA

It is significant that Kerner should put the finger on
"Catholic clergymen" - without mentioning names - and
omit Protestant "progressilve" preachers and Jewish R3Jb..
bis who were equally interested in "denationiali ~ng" the
Slovalk peasant, practically always woTking aigainst :the
national interests of the ISlovalk nation. Of course, this is
nothing new in history. T. G. iMasaryik and Benes, who
should have learned the lesson of :A.ustr1a:-Hungary, denied the existence of it.he !Slovak nation as an individual
ethnic entity, declaring the ISlovia!ks were only a "branch"
of the Czech nation and their language only ,a "dialect" of
the Ozech. (Falsifying history seems to be a specialty of
the followem of Masaryk and Benes. And Kerner proves it!
1

•

I

"Whereas Kr-amai' became, so to ~,peak, the symbol of the
economic u,psm1ge of the Czech lboUTgeoisie, Masaryk became the intellectual and spiritual head of the entire nation, including the Slovaks . • • . He (~·a saryk) became a Protestant, a modern Czech Puritan. Influenced by his reading af Czech history, he ,b elieved that

h-e found. !ts plhilosophy 1n the religious ideal of il:he Hussites and
the Ozeoh !Brethren" (pp. 47-48).

The truth, however, is that T. G. Masaryk never was
the "intellectual and spiritual head" of the 1Slov•lrlLs. If the
Ozechs wish to consider Masaryk :as such, they are free
to do so. The o.vel'IWhelming Catholic majority oif the Slovak people could not. Hlas Kerner forgotten Masaryk's blatant cries "away from !R;ome!" and "Rcxme must (be put on
trial and condemned!"? Czech history is not Slovak history;
the philosophy of Slova:k history does not rest on the "religious ideal of the Hussites and the Czech Brethren." Catholic Czechs form ibhe majority of the Czech nation,
hence, we have good reason to doulbt Kerner's evaluation
of Masaryik -as far as •t hey ,a re concerned, lbecaJuse Masaryk never did represent or COlllcern himself !With their spiritual interests, in fact, put them in jeopardy.
Masaryik, according to Kerner, "viewed the problem
of the small oppressed n.a:tiO'IlS ,as the polilticai and international phase of the social question - the exploit,aitdon
of one nation by anot!her, for political exploitation meant
cheap lalbor to the laboring drasse.s." 'But what happened
after Czeoho-!Slovakiia was lborn and Masaryk !became he:r
first president? He denied staites' rights to Slovakia and

�SLOVAKIA

55

thought nothing of the OLechs exploiting the ,S lovaks and
their national wealth!
CHA[PTER [V -

Peace Conference" -

•

"The World War, Revolution and
iby RO{'bert J. Kern.er.

'10n July 4 (191,5), Masaryk publicly in,a ugurated the revolutionary movement •by a ,l ecture on Jan Hus in Zurich, Srwitzerl•a nd.
After Benes succeeded in escaping J.irom Austria, the Czech Foreign
Committee issued its public manifesto for Czechoslovak independence
in Pans on !November 14, 1915. This manifesto had previously been
agreed upon by the leaders at home and by the leaders of Czech
and Slovak colonies In America, England, and France a point
on wihich !Masaryk insisted" (p. 53).

'W ho were those leaders "alt home" and in the Czech
and Slovak colonies in America, England, and France?
The record tells us that the leaders of the Czechs and Slovalks at home ikinew practically nothing of Masaryk's plans
at that time; and the leaders of their respective colonies
in various countries still less!

•

"This Committee (the Czech Foreign Committee) led to the
creation of the •Czechoslovak Nation-al Council in 1916., which under
Masaryk, Benes, and ~tefanlk gradually assumed the functions of
goverJlllilent" (pg. 153-54) . . . "The Czechoslovak National Council,
which was leading the struggle abroad, had not been disavowed by
the nation at home" (p. 56).

1t is quite clear, rt:hen, that the Czech Committee is
credited with the creation of the "Czechoslovak" Council,
which Masaryk headed. But it is not in accord with fact
that the Council "had not been disruvowed 1b y the nation at
home." Masaryk was the leader of the Czech (Progressive
Party, which he alone represented in the .Austrian ,parliament. When he left Austria, late .in 1914, Miasaryk went
abroad with a ipr.ogram of his own. As far as is !known,
he had not consulited wii.th Ozech and Siovalk leaders a:t
home and had no authorization f.ram the Czechs or the Slovaks at home ito represent their politioal will. Of course,
wherever Masaryk went, he did pose as a competent representative of the Czechs at home.
When President. Wilson, .late in Decemlber 1916, requested an lb;elligerents to state their war aims, the Allied
reply of January 1'2, 1917, included the following demand:
"Lilberation of Italians, Riumaniains, Slaws,. and Czeciio-

�56

SLOVAKIA

Slovaks from foreign rule." Please note the "Slavs and
Czecho-Slovaks" part, lbecaUJSe thaJt tells us 'j ust how well
the Allies were informed on the sUJbjoot. Since Slovruks and
Czechs spoke different languages, occupied different territories, and never in history had been united, rbhe appelation "Ozecho-1Slorvruk,s " was real new. At that time, when the
British government was asked, in ithe Commons, ,w hethmit could indicate the territory inhabited iby "Czecho-1Slo-·
vakis," the ra nswer was "no."
The Czechs at home resented being mentioned as a nation under "foreign rule." One of their leading ipaipers, the
NARODNE I.1IiSTY, had this tto say aJbout it:
1

"It is amazing how indefatigably Masaryk endeavors to defile
the honor of the CZECH nation. The enemies have learnt that the
love of all Austrian peoples for their inherited dynasty and their
fatherland is firm and unshakable. The enemies have realized that
those who make contradictory statements abroad are liars and impostors."

In Norvem!ber, 1916, all the Czech parties in the Austrian rparliament, without a single exception, had issued a
solemn declaration, stating thrat "the basis and guaranty of
the national existence of the Czech people are the dynasty,
called to the throne centuries ago, and the indivisibly constituted Monarchy." In the declaration they demanded foderafozation. And oin December 30, 191.6, all the Czech party
leaders attended ttihe emiperor's coronation as king of Hungary as "guesrts of honor."
After the Afli.ed reply to, Wilson became !known, the
society of Czech memlbers of parliament sent the following
letter (J,a nuary 23, 1'917) to the foreign minister of AustroHtrogary:
"In view of the Alli-ed runswer to President ,W ilson in which the
liberation of the Czechs figures as a war ,a im, we reject this insinuation whiClh is based on entirely erroneous assumptions. We declare emphatically that the Czech people, as always in the past, is
convinced that it can be assured of a prosperous development only
under the Habsburg scepter and within the Habsburg Monarchy"

(Ingrim: "After Hitler Stalin?" p. 75).

The very same Czech members of parliament requested
Prime M:in.istffi' C1am....Martinic, a Czech, to arrange an audience with the emperor for them. Why? !Because :they said:
"We want to tell His Majesty that we shall always stand by
him and his successors; that our demands will always be compatible

�SLOVAKIA

57

with the interests of the Habsburg dyansty and of the realm; that
we are loyal servants of the king and the country; that our complaints have never shaken our belief that after victory the claims
of the ,Czech people will find satisfaction within the framework of
the realm and under the Habsburg crown."

It is quite obvious, then, thaJt the representatirves of the
Czech people did not want separation - independence but federalization. Furthermore, Masaryk ,a nd his Council
were hiit from another quarter. At the conference of the
Sociiailist International in 1Stockho1m, June 1:917, the Czech
delegates vociferously demanded "an independent Czech
State within a federated Austria-Hungary."
Is it possible that professor Kerner, an expert on
Czecho-SloiValkia, is ignorant of what w:as going on even m
Czech lands while !Masaryk a.nd Benes were calling for the
destruction of Austria? I cannot ·believe it •a nd, therefore,
say that iKerner delilberately did not tell the truth when he
said that Mas•a ry'k's Council "had not been disavowed by the
nation at home." Masarylk :himself admits it in his work
"Svetowa RevoJuce" (pp. 1150-il.52; 253-254 ; 32,1 ).
When 'Kerneir wr1tes aJbo.ut the organimtion of the
"Czechoslovak Legions," the work a,ccomplished lby Masarylk and iBenes in ,E ngland, France, Russia allld America for
the esta;blishment of the "Ozechosloivalk Reipulblic," he completely ignores the effort put forth by Gen&amp;al Milan R.
Stefanik, the !Slovak who, did much in France, the U.S. A.,
Italy and Russi.a for the realization of the Republic. fu the
twenty pages of this cltaJpter, Kerner mentiom; the name
of this great Slovak only once, but does not tell us a single
thing aJbo,ut the ,w ork he did so tha,t Czecho-,Slova'l da might
become a reality. If Ma,s aryk himself was not loath to give
credit to •S tefanik for his accompl.isihmen,ts, why should Kerner ibe?
Furthermore, Kerner devotes. several pages to the
"OzechoslavaJk" Legion in Siiberia - "the ,a rmy which had
fought vicitorio'll.Sly at !Kiev, Zhitamir, and Baikhmach, and
which yearned to leave Russia in peace in order to continue the conflict ,a gainst the Germans in the West." He
almost outdoes Masaryk himself on the ·" Siberian anabasis"
legend.

�58

SLOVAKIA

The fact is, however, that the legion was offered a
short route home via Murmansk and Archangel whence
British sh1ps were to transport it to the battle front in
France. But the legion, afraid of German sulbmarines and
not too eager to fight, preferred ithe long way home via
Siberia to Viadfuvostok. AB a result, Masarylk's a:xmy
reached Europe long after the smoke of the war had lifted,
without haJVing contributed ,to the defeat of Germany and
Austria. The IStberian anabas:is made greait propagand a for
Masaryk's cause, as he himself atlmitted, and without it,
in fact, the "calli:!e" m1ght haive 'been lost. '.I recommend
that Kerner and other students •o f history, read pp. 81-83
of fugrim's "After Hlitler !Stalin?" - and, ibut carefully,
even Masaryik's "Svetava. Revoluce."

•

"In the ,a ims publicized as the objectives of peace, the Czechosl ovaks were promised their independence on the basis of the selfdetermination of the Czechoslovak nation. It is a fum:l.amentaJ question just what "self-deteirmi natlon of the nations" meant a.t tihat
time. It s eems most probrul&gt;le that when it ,was first uttered it
meant the determinatio n of a n entire nation to choo.se whether it
wished to be jndependent or live under another, and not self-determination of small parts of it" (p. 62).

Here, Kerner quite naively would have us :b elieve
that he iis be.fuddled lby the meaning of "self-determ ination." Of course, he could have given credit ,to Masaryk
and especially Benes for his 1pretended quandary. I say
"pretended ," /because he himself tells us on the page following:

" In many regions the populations were thoroughly mixed in
composition . . . . As far as the Czechoslovak s were concerned, the
matter was complicated by the fact that their claims in the Czech
regions rested on historic rights, the Lands of the Bohemian Crown
(Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia), which they as a nation had created and maintained in history, rund on the rights of nationality for
the ,Slovaks in Hungary, wihere the Magyars cJ.almed 'historic rights
of the Lands of tihe Hungarian Crown" (p. 63) .

So, what is this business "the Czechoslov aks were promised their independen ce on the ,basis of the self-determ ination of the Czechoslovak nation"? !Kerner purt:s himse1f in
a ivery ludicrous situation: he admits the existence of the
Czech naition, Czech regions, etc., does not admit directly
the existence of the Slovak counterpar ts, but still insists
on having a "Orechoslovak" nation!

�SLOVAKIA

69

AP, mentioned earlier, one of the aims of the Allies
was the "lilberaition of Iltalians, Rumanians, Slavs and Cze-

choslovaks from foreign r.ule." The Czechs and Slova;ks
got i'lllto the picture also as "Ozech~ova ks," and not only
as Slavs, at the persistent insistence of Dr. Edward Benes to support the fiction promoted by M'aJSaryik and himself that "Czechs and Slovaks were the same." The truth,
however, remains that the SlovaJks are an individual nation in the great family of Slovanic nations, as are the
Poles, Byelorussians , Ukrainians, Russians, C.zec'hs, Bulg,aria:ns, .S erbs, ISlO!Veni•a ns, Croatians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, a,nd Lusatia,n tSerbs, whatever Kerner and other
"historians" of his type might have to say to the contrary
notwithstandi ng.
If Kerner does not be1ieve that t:he right of self-dete:nmination applies equally to the Czechs and /Slovaks, let
him .say so outright and be done wi~h it. Kerner should
know, as we certainly lmow, that the magic formula that
druzzled. and charmed. President Wilson was "national determination," which meant that every ethnic group be
conceded the right to decide to which state it wished to
belong. More dmpo:ntrunt than what it meanit, of course,
was what it implied: the notion that the id68.l state would
be one inhabited only by one ethnic entity, one nation.
The tenth of WiliSion's "1Fo!Urteen Points" reads as follows:
''!The peoples of Austria-iHu111gary , whose place among the nations
we wish to see s·afeguaro€d and •a ssured, should be accorded the
freest opportunity of autonomous development."

What does "the peoples of Austria-Hung ary" mean
to professor Kerner? Does it mean all the peoples, except
the Slova1k people? If Masaryik used his charms to maJk:e
Wilson •b elieve the fiction that the "Czechs and the Slovaiks were the same," and so to deceive him does that
alter the .truth that the Ozechs a.nd the Slov~ are not
one people, one nation? Why should Kenner want us to
believe otheIWise?

•

"The !Peace Conference chose to give the Czechos-lovaks the
hiatoric boundaries in the Czech regions of Austri•a and ethnic bound•a rles In the Slovak districts of Hungary. Furthermore, it •a ddoo,
under cond,l tlons of autonomy, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. It thmi created a state in Wlhlch 34 per cent of the population was non-Czech0-

�60

SLOVAKIA

slovak, ,a nd this element included a German .population of over three

millimi.s, livin,g chiefly in the outer rim of Bohemia, in a state of
less than fifteen millions" (p. 63).

But this is 111ot quite the whole ,s tory. The Peace Conference decided as it did, 'becaJUOO it relied on the "expert"
information supplied iby Masaryk and Benes, !both Czechs,
who presumed to represent iboth the Czechs and also the
Slova!ks. In the state created, the non-Czech population
was in the majority, and this included some three and a
half million Germams, in a state of "less than fifteen millions" (how much less?). The Conference ga;ve the "Czechoslovaks" nothing, lbuit it did allow the boundaries for
the "new" state that was -created, as Kerner states, "on
the -g round that rune or ten million Czechoslovaks should
be favored •w ith independence oiver three million Germans"
(p. 65) - the argument Oif Masaryk and Benes! They
needed the almost three million Slovaiks of Hrung,ary to
m.aJce "nine or ten n:rlllion Czechoslovaks," but the Czechs
and the ISloivaJks, were "the same"!

•

"The Duchy of TesC'hen was ,w,hat was left of Silesia, one of the
Lands of the Bohemian Crown, after Frederiick the Great had seized
fourte en-fifteeruths of that territory in 1740. The historic rights of the
Czechs went •back to t!he fourteenth century. Before that the Duchy
had been ,Polish {p. r66) . . . It was, however, Poland's diss·a tisfaction with this decision which led her diplomacy into d.e manding a.nd
acquiring Czech Teschen on the occasion of the Conference of Mu·
nlch (October, 1938). This blow from the rear really made it impossible for Czechoslovakia to fight after she was abandoned by her
Western allies" (p. 68) .

It is ,olbvious that Kerner either laoks knowledge
about Teschen or is deli'berately attemptilllg to confuse the
readers of his "Ozechoslova:kia." Just lilke Miasaryik and
Benes, iit seems that Kerner does not want students oif
history to know the whole tmth about Ozecho-Sloivaki,a.
Furthermore, the ,allegation that Ozecho,...Slov,rukia was
"forced" to :su,r render to iHitler !Without firing a shot, because her "Western allies" had abandoned her, OT because IDngland ·a nd France asked her to, is purely fictitious.
Benes surrendered Czecho-Slovaki.a to Hitler without
the approval of parliament. The Benes Czechs knew fully
well that Czeoho-SlovaJkia could not be saved, because her
non-Czech majority was not wiling to fight for her. They

�SLOVAKIA

61

chose to urrender "at the behest of their faithless friends,"
because an attempt to fight would have revealed to the
world that the Germa~lovak-Magyar~Rutib.en.ian-iPolish
majority of her population was not ready to die for a
tate that had treated them as second-rate citizens for
ome thirty years. And let us not forget that even the
Czech,s, who considered themselves t he "State-nation," did
not fire a single shot in defense of Czecho-JSlovrukia. Furthermore, it is no secret ,t hat Benes did not cultivate
friendshiip with Poland and other neigh'boring states : his
pro Soviet policy over decades of years is proof of that.
Already in 1929 Viscount D'Abernon prophesied:
"The treaty between Czecbo S lovakia and Poland is thought a
triumph of French m ilitarism . o it m a y be, but the duration w ill b e
te mpo rary . . . the Czech satellite will revert to the orbit of the
Moscow planet as soon as disturbing forces cease to operate quite
as powerfully as today."

•

"Germ an propaganda l ater s ought to spread the view that the
bou ndaries of Czeoho slovakia, a s well as t hose of P ol and, wer e
drawn by the Peace Conferene e in ignorance and that they repres e nted a failure to understand the problems of central Europe. N ot hing could be far th er from tJh e facts . The deleg ates o f the Peace
Cont rence had access to and used the best available information
and considered these problems from all possible angles" (p. 6 ).

After reviewing the events that followed World Wa.r
I Mld led to World War IiI, I believe it is safe to say that

Kerner's statement is "farther from the facts" than even
the "German propaganda" he alludes to. The fact rernains
t hat World War I not only failed to solive Europe's problems, ,b ut even ,a ccentuated them and led t o World War II.
At Paris there was a meeting of two continents which were
quite ignorant of each other. The peacemakers blundered
when they accepted interested parties as experts wit hout
having them chedked 'by the opposition. When Lloyd
George asked Benes how many Ma.gyam would fall undeT
Ozech rule, Benes replied that their number would lbe
350,000 ('D. H. Miller: "My Diary at the Conference in Paris"; in reality it was more ibhan one million. Benes, plead..,
ing fOT a "natural frontier," described a little ~oolk as a
nasvigalble river.
Repudiation of Kerner's claim may also be found in
A . J. P. Taylor's "The HaJbsbu.rg Monarchy," C. A . Ma-

�62

SLOVAKIA

cartney's "Problems of the Danubiam Basin," Lloyd
George's "The Tr.urth About the Peace Treaties," J. M.
Keynes "The Economic Consequences of the Peace." Winston Churchill's "Afternnath and World Crises,." Robert fugrim's "After Hitler :Stalin?" and even T. G. Masa;ryk's
"Svet&lt;Jva Revoluce." But Kerner himself does that quite
effecti:vely with the last three sentences - especially the
last sentence - of the ivery same par.aJgraph, ,whi.oh reads:
"Another ,s olution of the Czechoslovak problem might indeed be
sought •by some future .p eace conference, if the poignant problem of
the German nation is solved, for example, on the model of Switzerla:nd rather than that permitting a rampant totalitarian racialism.
U.nti,l then it may be said that the work of t!he Peace Conference
was a reasonable solution for its time. Common sense and Intelligence and a few minor boundary rectifications might have aecured
a durable settlement" (p. 69).

Of course, Professor Kerner, could hardly have intended it that way, but this is quite an admission from a mem.
her of the "EXPERT STAFF, Colonel House Inquiry and
American Commission to Negotiate Peace"! We know today
that Kerner was not the only "exipert" who la'o ked sufficient
"common sense and intelligence" at that time.
(More coming)
WHO SAID IT?

"In 1868 the Ozeoh initel,lectuails and the Bohemian aristocrats renewed filleir allegi1ance. . . The eighty Bohemian
a&lt;bsentees from the Reicllsrat made a declaration of their
aims: they asked for equal na:tional rights for the Czechs in
Bohemia, and for a refornn of the electoral system; they
demanded also the unity of the lands of St. We:nceslaus and
the same independence for this "grea,t Bohemia" a;s HUlllgary
possessed. The Ozech leaders were bewitched by the Hungarian example. '1'1hey saw, quite rightly, that the Magyars
had achieved their nation'al freedom by associating it with
historic rilghts, and they supposed that the way to achieve
the national freed~m of the Czechs was to claim the historic
rights of Bohemia. They did not see that the historic rights
of Hungary were real, the historic rights of Bohemia imaginary. . . " - (A. J. P. Taylor, TH1E HABSIBURG MONA'ROHY, London, 1948; p. 142).

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                <elementText elementTextId="19">
                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;</text>
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              <name>Publisher</name>
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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              <name>Date</name>
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                  <text>1955</text>
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      <name>Text</name>
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            <elementText elementTextId="1343">
              <text>38&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
HISTORY OR PROPAGANDA?&#13;
P. A. HIROBAK&#13;
&#13;
In 1'9149, the Uniiversity of California Press, ipulblished&#13;
the "third printing" of the !book "CZEOHOSW VAKIA"&#13;
(504 pages) which was edited iby Rolbert J. Kerner, Sather&#13;
professor of history in the Unilversity :of California. 'Dhe&#13;
book was made ipossilble, ,p rofessor Kerner states in his&#13;
preface, iby "the oolla!boration of twenty distinguished and&#13;
alble scholiars and writers" and that, concludes Mir. Kerner, "has made it ;possiible to present a vo1ume ,which is an&#13;
honest, unprejudiced:, and frank appraisal of the important&#13;
contrilbution which the Czechoslovak nation made to the&#13;
history of our time in its two short decades of independence between two world wars."&#13;
Just how honest, unprejudiced and frank that aipp:r,aisal of the "important" contribution is, the ireader may&#13;
be a;ble to g,ather from what follows here and arrive at the&#13;
condusion, stated so aiptly iby professor Kerner, that, indeed, "few nations, if any can show such a record" or,&#13;
possibly, go a bit .farther and state cate.gorically that, indeed, no niation can show .such a record!&#13;
But how honest and unprejudiced are "distinguished&#13;
and able scholars" who set out to do a job beyond their&#13;
competency? Can a distinguished historian write a true&#13;
history of CZIDCH0-1SUOVAKITA without a thorough lmowledge of the SlovaJks and the land they 'haive occupied during the past 1500 years? And yet that is exaotly what the&#13;
"twenty distinguished and aJble scholars and writers" of&#13;
Kerner's "Ozechoslovaikia" did to ,produce something which,&#13;
in his opinion, was "hQlrulst, unprejudiced" !&#13;
Kerner's "Ozechoslovikia' is dirvided into six parts,&#13;
but the tendency in all parts is much the same: strictly&#13;
Czech. Kerner should haive named the 1b ook "Czechia,"&#13;
t'hen the wonk might ibe called, by a stretch of the imagination, a semlblance of something "hlOlll.est and unprejudiced." Otherwise, informed readers know rthat it definitely is not, and the uninformed axe cruelly deceived.&#13;
The s~gniificance of this may be !better understood when&#13;
we glance at the remarkaible selection of books in the sug-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
39&#13;
&#13;
geeted bibliog,r aphy at the end of each cha;pter. The list is&#13;
rema.r.kaJble not only for the !books and literary woi,ks included, but for the 1bodks and literary works omitted. The&#13;
impression created is that the Slovruks had no ,w riters of&#13;
a!lly impor-t and that no sourees of informatiO!ll on their&#13;
history are availruble. iBut that i.'S not so. '.Dhis proves that&#13;
the "twenty distinguished a:nd able scholars and writers,"&#13;
who collalborated with Kerner .cm his "Czechoslovakia"&#13;
were little or not at all concerned with the history of the&#13;
Sl01Vak people and their land. To magnify and glorify the&#13;
history of the Ozechs and minimize, practically ignore, the&#13;
history of the Slavruks, certainly cannot be the aim of an&#13;
honest, UDJprejudiced and abjecti;ve writer of Ozecho~lovak history.&#13;
Ozecho-Blovakia, as presented ,b y Kerner and his&#13;
"twenty distinguished and aJble .s cholars and writers,"&#13;
does not give us a true picture of Czech-0-1Slovakia; it is&#13;
not a true history of the Ozechs and SlOIV'aJks and their&#13;
lands; it is definitely more propaga:nda than history - in&#13;
line with other .such wm,ks which were promoted by the&#13;
propaganda apparatus of Prag,ue. !Students of history&#13;
should not 'be exposed to faJsifications and distortions of&#13;
history, su&lt;!h as that exemplified ·b y Kerner's "Ozechoslovakia," because. that does not make for the truth, or for&#13;
better relations ibetween the Ozechs and the Slovalks, or&#13;
for a ·pr.oper understanding of those nations.&#13;
I do not want to say unequirvocally that the writers&#13;
who collaborated to produce Kerner's "Ozechoslovrukia"&#13;
were knowingly dishonest ,a nd prejudiced, but their work&#13;
co.n,vinced me definitely that ,w ittingly or uniwitti.ngly they&#13;
did ibeoome Ozech propa:gandists. The writers have an undu:ly high regard for the chairacter and accomplishments&#13;
of T. G. Masaryk amd Benes and the Ozechs in general,&#13;
without an equa:lJy high reg,aro for facts, and little or no&#13;
regard for the Slorvaks and their history.&#13;
,M ost writers of Ozeolio..Slovaik history and "Ozecho..slovak" democracy (IS. Harrison Thomson, Joseph S. Roucek, Herbert AdolJphus ,Miller, Brackett Lewis, among&#13;
them), follow the Ozech line of T. G. Masaryik and Ed-&#13;
&#13;
40&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
ward Benes and their governmeints ,w ho ,c ontrolled the entire propaganda apparatus• o;f ,Czecho-1Slov8Jkia. This Masaryk~enes line was and e;ve:n now is adhered to iby exchange students and iprofessors, heads of official and unofficial information !bureaus, the America.n Institute in&#13;
Prague, the YMCA and YWCA of 0zecho-Slovrukia and&#13;
other countries, the "OzechoslQIViruk N ationa,1- Ohurch"&#13;
(strictly a Czech enteriprise) and most other religious&#13;
sects, and practically all "eminent" writers, scholars and&#13;
correspondents. And today the governments of all countries of the ,w orld still lbase their knowledge 'Of OzechoSlovakia and the vario:us nations that comprise it on the&#13;
information supplied by the state propaganda apparatUJS of&#13;
T. G. iMasaryk and Edward Benes. The import Ol:f this will&#13;
undouibtedly be appreciated iby students of history, and&#13;
even historians themselves, if they rememlber that this&#13;
line has been followed and ipvopagaJted for ·a t least the past&#13;
thirty-seven years.&#13;
Accordirrrgly, the Czechs are a "historical" nation,&#13;
while the SlovaJks are oruy a •~branch" of it and their language just a "dialect" orf the Czech. Ridiculous attempts&#13;
are made to trace the histo,r y of the non-.existent "Ozechoslovruk" nation to the times of the Great Moravian Empire&#13;
,a nd Sts. Cyril and [Methodius. The "CzechoslOW!Jks" are&#13;
supposed to 1b e the nation of Hus, Masaryk, and Benes,&#13;
but also the nation of Sts. Cyril and Methoilius, WenceslaUJS and Ludlmila. The Ozechs, however, are ",p rogressive"&#13;
Catholics and the 1Slovruks "reactionary" Catholics.&#13;
,F rom officiail statistics we learn how many Poles,&#13;
Germruns, Jews, 'Magyars and Uikrainians there Weir'e iin&#13;
Czecho-1Slovakia at any ,g iven time,. but not how many&#13;
,SlQIVlaks. That is explained ruway by the s1Jateme.nt th:at the&#13;
Slovaks were not considered a tminority, hence, they were&#13;
included under the category of "0zechosloivaiks." The latter term, however, is terr1bly l&lt;_?ng, so the shorter "Czech"&#13;
is used in many in,stainces as an "aJbbreviation." The term&#13;
"Slovalk" could not •b e us.ed, I suppose, because it has O'Ile&#13;
more letter than "Czech"! When statistics do, however,&#13;
mention Czechs and .Slovaks se,pairately, the figures are in-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
41&#13;
&#13;
variably magnified on bhe Ozech side and minim1zed on the&#13;
Slovak side. The !Magyars were experts at this sort of&#13;
"mathematics" long before Ozecho-iSlova!kia was !born. The&#13;
tendency is too olbviou.s.&#13;
Many distinguished and aJble scholars and writers of&#13;
the tyipe mentioned lby Kerner, can tell us exactly wh&amp;e&#13;
and albout when the Czechs, Poles, Russians, Slovenians,&#13;
Croatians, rSe11bs, etc., fust settled in their respective territories, lbut, it seems, they cannot even venture a.in honest&#13;
guess when it comes to the Slovaks. I say again: the tendency is dl:wious.&#13;
They tell us that the Great Moraivian Empilre was the&#13;
prede•cessor of the Czecho-Slol\TaJk RepU!blic, a Czech venttl!re,&#13;
when in fact it was not. The Slova:ks, their predecesors&#13;
that is, occupied both sides of the Morawa River at that&#13;
time (whence, the name of :the empire) aind, hence, formed&#13;
the very heart of the shor-Uived emipire, which was destroyed by the GermaJI1s with the aid of the Ozechs who had&#13;
settled in, Bohemia, the land of the Boii.&#13;
And we used to hear and read aJboot the "Crown lands&#13;
of Bohemia," lbut now it seems to be the mode in "1p rogress,ive" historical ch'cles, to use the expression "Crech crown&#13;
lands." I repeat : the tendency is only too. ohvio.us.&#13;
The Czechs are not and do, not ,wa,,nt to be Slovaks a,nd,&#13;
co,ruversely, the Slorva'ks are not and do not want to be&#13;
Czechs. The SlovaJks .a nd the Ozechs did not have a common&#13;
history, language, culture and tradition du.ring the past&#13;
1500 years, ~ause they did not occupy the same territQry.&#13;
In a word, the Cizechs 0JI1d the Sl01Vaks developed sepaJTa tely and are, therefore, two distinct ethnic nations. 'l'he&#13;
Slovaks never were, nor are they now, a "part" of the&#13;
Czech nation. This simple truth, recognized 'by fille Czechs&#13;
and SlOIVaJks themselves for many centuries ;past, should&#13;
also be recognized lby "distinguished and alble scholars ood&#13;
writers" of our time.&#13;
It is tiiue that the SlovaJks formed a common political&#13;
State with the Czechs in 19'.18, but only on certain conditions, the most important of which was that they would&#13;
be a completely autonomous unit of the Ozecho-SlovaJk&#13;
&#13;
42&#13;
&#13;
SLOV.AKIA&#13;
&#13;
federatio.n, that is, that they would en~oy full states' rights.&#13;
The condition not obeiirrg fulfilled, spelled the end of OrechoSlovaJkia. Because Benes insisted that the Czechs be the&#13;
"stat~ation," Czecho-Slo1vaJk ia was doomed to perdition.&#13;
Today the Slovaks do not want to be contained in any common State wti.th the Czechs or any other foreign nation.&#13;
They can be kept so temporarily only lby force. !But that is&#13;
not what the "distinguished and aJble sch~lars and writers"&#13;
who oo1lalboraJted with professor Kerner tell us in the book&#13;
"CzechoslovaJkia."&#13;
Propaganda oa.- history?&#13;
Let us anailyize Kerner's ''Czechoslovakia" chapter by&#13;
chapter to prove our contentions. But let me note first t!hat&#13;
on page xvii, at the end of the "contents," professor Kerner tells us how to pronounce "Czech" (not "Czechoslovak,"&#13;
mind you) letters; and on p. xxi, the poem by Edna St.&#13;
Vincent Millay is entitled "Ozecho-iSlovakia" (:not "Czechoslovalkia") , which b,rings uip the question of hyphenization of the 1political state of tihe 1SlovaJks and the Czechs&#13;
which was 'b orn iln 1918. The treaty 1b y which Czecho--Slova1kia came into being spelled ithe name with a hyphen to&#13;
indicate that two indiividual ethnic entities, two distinct&#13;
nations, 'had formed one political state. The hyiphen was&#13;
dropped lby Masaryk and Ben-es and their followers. Whether the hyphen was J.eft in the title of the ipoem because&#13;
of the author's insistence, or prof. Kerner's "careless"&#13;
editing, I do not know, but it is singular that the hyphen&#13;
should a;ppear in a book liike "Ozechoslova;lcia" at all!&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
"C~ECHOSLOVA:KIA, Part I: BACKGROUND&#13;
Chapter I-"The Czechoslovaiks-Anthropol ogical Notes . .."&#13;
By Ales Hrdlfclka, M.D., Sc.D., Gura.tor, Division of Physical Anthropology, United States National Museum; Huxley 'Medal Lecturer, London (1927) ; memlber, National&#13;
Academy of Scien-ces; honorary Doctor of 1S cience (Prague,&#13;
Br.no)," etc., etc. Please not.e: The underscoring here and&#13;
in the following is mine.&#13;
"The term Czechoslovak ,i,s o! r ecen t coinage, dating from 1918,&#13;
l\·hen the united Cze chs and Slovaks proclaimed. thei r independence&#13;
of the Dual Mon,archy and th eir est abHshmi:mt of the Czeohoslovak&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
43&#13;
&#13;
Republic. . . . 'Illie name Czech (pronounced Chekh) ls derived, accord Ing to an old tradition, from the chiefta&amp;n of the main Slav&#13;
tribe who brought them some time during the dawn, of ihistory probably in tihe fifth cent\.U'ly A.!D. - to the heart of the land (IP,&#13;
3) . . . In fact, the hLstoTY of the Czechoslovak tribes, from the dawn&#13;
of written ,r ecords to the present day, has •be.en one of ever.Jiasting&#13;
struggles ·a.galns,t dnvooers (PP. 4.-5) . . . Tihe Slovaks, who u.p to&#13;
1029 formed a unit with Moravia, were then torn away by the Ma•&#13;
gya,rs, isolated from the west, for,c ed .away from the best grounds&#13;
iu the warm •lolwland,s, and eventuaUy repressed. in every way" (p. 6).&#13;
&#13;
It is evident that even Dr. Ales Hrrdli6ka, distinguished ,anthropologist of ~ech origin, :seems to be a bit&#13;
confused about when the "Czechslovruks" came into being.&#13;
Whether the Ozechs -are descendants ,of the "main. 'Slav&#13;
trilbe" is open to ·question. The 'SlO!Vaks fo:nrned a "unit"&#13;
with Moravia up to. 1029, according to Hrdlicka, 1but who&#13;
the people were who settled in Morruvia is Jeft to the&#13;
reader. Mora,via, of ooUTse, came under the influence of the&#13;
Ozechs in time, at least the western portion of it, :b ut was&#13;
not settled lby the Ozechs when the .Slovruks formed a unit&#13;
with it, for the simple reason, it seems, that the for~&#13;
fathers of ithe Slovaiks settled on iboth sides of the river&#13;
Morava, w'hile the Ozechs settled in fue J.and of the Boii,&#13;
which was a distinot geographical unit, ,prolbaJbly a/bout the&#13;
size of present-day Bohemia .&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
"The Czechoslovaks to 1620'' - ,b y S.&#13;
Harrison Thomson, Ph ..D., BLitt. - Professor of Medieval History, Unirversity of Co-lorado; Ph.D., Charles Uni'Vers,ty, Prague; B.Litt., Omord University; Ewtor, Magistri Johannis Hus Tractatus Res-ponsivus; Johannis Wyclif Summa de Ente (1930) ;" etc., etc.&#13;
CI:I\A.PrIDR III -&#13;
&#13;
"Led ,b y a travelln,g IFI'lankish merchant, Samo, tihe Slavic tribes&#13;
freed themselves ,from the Av,a r rule, and chose Samo for their •k ing&#13;
(623-624) . . . This ,e arly kingdom, which would appea,r to !have&#13;
been pr.emature, iw,as ,neither Czech nor Slovak. It would have to&#13;
be called Western ·s1av, ,b y .reason or a large intermixture of Slavic&#13;
tribes which became gra.dua:l!y differentiated as they settled in&#13;
different local!tes . . . The names of the princess Llbuiie and the&#13;
peasant Premysl whom she cih ose to be her husband are in all proba•&#13;
bility tJhe names of real persons. At any rate ,t he male descendants&#13;
or this ,s-emilegendaxy .Pfemysl were to rule over ,Bohemia and neighboring regions until 1306 . . . It is not certain whether tihe Slavic&#13;
chi,eftalne. enga,ged at this time to pay .tribute to the Fr,alllk.is~ emperor or not" (P. 9).&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
44&#13;
&#13;
Id: Samo, the "traveling 1F ranlkish merchant," established a kingdom, he necessarily must hruve stopped traveling somewhere, and that "somewhere" ,w as on territory&#13;
occupied 'by "S1'arvic" tr.i!bes, out of which later a certain&#13;
nation, or certain nations, arose. ,s amo's kingdom was not&#13;
on the territory settled by the Czechs or other Sla-vonic&#13;
peoples, 1b ut Olll the terri1lory settled by the "Slavs" who&#13;
were later oalled ISlorvaks. Fredegar's Chronicles seem to&#13;
indicate as much (THIE ISI.JOV~S AND !UNG SAMO'S&#13;
EMiP]RE, by iDr. Henrich Bartelk, SU)VA.KIA, June 1954).&#13;
The "Slavic trilbes" whioh ibecame gradually differentiated as they settled in "different localities" could not be&#13;
identical witll the "Slruvic tribes" which remained on the&#13;
territory of ISrum&lt;&gt;'s kingdom and, later, came to ~ ca1led&#13;
the SlovaJks.&#13;
As far ,as, the Ozech "Llbuse and Pfemysl" are concerned, let us talke the word Olf learned Czechs that they&#13;
were legendary characters ("Ottuv SLOVN1K NAUONY,"&#13;
Vol.. XV, p. 1038; Vol. XX, rp. 625). We might a.loo concede,&#13;
without offending historical truth, t!hat all "1S1'avic" chieftains, including the forefathers of the 'Czechs, paid tribute&#13;
to the Frankish emperor, when he was strong enough to&#13;
exact it. Why should the 'Slavs of Bohemia" be an exception? II t seems that professor Harrison is interested in&#13;
building up a case for the Czechs to prove that they were&#13;
completely independent during the time of Charlemagne&#13;
(8th-9th cenrtury). Why?&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
"Later in the ,c entury (846) !Louis the German su,bju,g-ated Mora.&#13;
11ia, •b ut suffered defeat wihen he ,a ttacked the Slavs of Bohemia. Th1s&#13;
,a ttack of tLouis the German n,vas directed ,against the empire of the&#13;
Moravian prince Mojmir, who had shown rem arkable abllity in consolidating his rule south, east •a nd west to include southern Poland,&#13;
Silesia, Bohemia, Moravia, and the valleys of the middle Danube&#13;
and Theiss rivers a,s far as the northern boundaries of the Byzantine Empil'e . .. After the death of Svato,pluk (894) the Moravian&#13;
Empire rapidly broke up into its component parts. The Czech princes&#13;
of the Pi'emyslide line .gained independence for Bohemia, and the&#13;
Magyars, new arrivals dn. t,he east, -extended llieir power over n~rthern Pannonia. German's and Slavs, united for the moment, were de•&#13;
feated by the Ma,gyars in 907 neax (Bratislava (Pressburg), and the&#13;
ruin of the Moravian state was complete" (P. 10).&#13;
&#13;
Louis subjugaited iMoravia, but was defeated by the&#13;
"Slavs of Bohemia," which means that the latter were not&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
45&#13;
&#13;
identioal with the Slavs of Moravia, who were ruled by&#13;
Mojmir. !Professor !Harrison also tells us that Mojmir, the&#13;
Moravian prince, consolidated his rule by consolidating various ISlmrianic ('Slavic) trilbes, including those of Bohemia.&#13;
This Mojmir did by force. It is significant that Harrison&#13;
does not refer to Mojmir as a "Slovak" ,p rince, though&#13;
he does not hesitate to say that 'Czech" princes gained&#13;
independence fur Bohemia. He also omits to say that the&#13;
Czechs, not the ",Slavs of Bohemia," mind you, gained&#13;
their independence by !breaking ·a way from ,t he !MO!'aJVian&#13;
Empire in 895, :aJfter the death of S,v atopluk. The Czechs,&#13;
then, heliped to destro¥ the integrity of the Grea,t Moravian&#13;
ffimpire, the heart of which ,was in Slovak country, the&#13;
country of the Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia. In 900 the&#13;
Czechs, the Slavs of Bohemia, together with the Germans,&#13;
invaded the territory of the Sl01VaJks, the Slavs of Great&#13;
Moravia, aJild after a terrific /battle forced !Mojmir II to&#13;
sue for peace.&#13;
Svatoplulk's three sons, ruling various areas of the&#13;
Empire and constantly •a t each others throats, contributed&#13;
greatly to the dissolution of Great Moravia. When the !Magyars moved into northern IPannonia, they met with little&#13;
resistance, lbut professor Harriso n neglects to say what&#13;
people settled in northern Pannonia, even though history&#13;
tells us that the forefathers of the Slovaks occu'Pied tha.t&#13;
territooy at the time. And where professor Harrison found&#13;
the legend that "Germans and Slavs, uni.ted for the moment,." tried to save t!he Great Morawian Empire from falling into the hands of the Magyars in 907, he does !IlOt say.&#13;
As mentioned rubove, the Germans, and the 'Slavs of Bohemia" (the Coochs) contributed to the downfall of Great&#13;
Morawia. It is not, I thinlk, unreasonaJble to say that if the&#13;
Germans and Slavs were really united to sruve the Moravian Em'Pire from falling into the hands of the Magyars,&#13;
the latter would hardly have taken what was left of it&#13;
in 907.&#13;
Careless reporting of history? Probably, ·b ut to me it&#13;
seems to be tendencious and puTposeful. Professor Harrison, it seems, was doing a jolb for the Brague regime and&#13;
&#13;
46&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
the Ozechs. This is all the more obvious in his !book "Czechoslovakia in EmQpean H!istory" (Princeton Uniiversity&#13;
Press, 1943, 1195'3), for which Harrison was ·aJWarded the&#13;
"Czechoslovak State Prize for Literature" in 1944, when&#13;
the Ozecho-1Slova'k State factually did not exist for five&#13;
years. 'Dhe award was made iby Dr. Benes's ·g overnmentin.J..ondon at the Uni:versity Clulb in New Yorik, Decem.lber&#13;
30, 1944.&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•~remysl Otaka.r [ (1197-1230:) was able to use circumstances&#13;
for the •b enefit of his dynrusty and the Czech kingdom . . . iHe shifted&#13;
his allegiance four times. eadh time gaining conoession:s or confirmation of eonc-essions .previously granted ,b y another claimant to&#13;
the throne . . . . But to Pfomysl must be assigned the responsibility&#13;
for inviting tJhe German immig,r ation. Encouraged by the court, many&#13;
Czech nobles. had married Germ,a;n ,w omen; some of the best positions of the ·churoh in ,Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by German clerics; ·German mf.nnesin,g ers ,w,ere in high favor at the royal&#13;
court and at the courts of the Ticher nobles" (P. 13).&#13;
&#13;
Here professor !Harrison tells us tJhat 1P rem.ysl Otakar&#13;
was quite a "shifity" ruler, using circumstances for the&#13;
benefit of his dynasty and the "Czech" kingdom, not the&#13;
"Boh,emian" ikingdom, but favored German immigration,&#13;
and "Czech" (not Bohemian) ndbles married: German&#13;
women, and some of the best ;positions of ,t he Church&#13;
in Bohemia and Moravia were held lby German clerics, etc.&#13;
It is evident here rthat professor Harrison cannot make up&#13;
his mind whether the Bohemians were Ozechs or GelUllans,&#13;
or both! It is quite clear, however, that the Slovaiks, the&#13;
Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia, did not .fit into the picture of the "Cz,ech" ikingdom at that ,t ime.&#13;
The twenty ipa,ges of Kerner's "OzechosloivaJlda" taken&#13;
up iby Harrison's "'IJhe Czechoolovaks to 1620" use the&#13;
word Slovak(ia) some seven times and, therefore, repudiate the idea, insinuation or implication, that .there were&#13;
any "Czechoslovaks" up ,t o 1620. Not only that, but for&#13;
Harrison, it seems, the ISlo.vaJks - the Slavs of Moravia&#13;
and Pannonia - simply do not exist at all after the fall&#13;
of the Great iMoraivian Empire, except for the mention&#13;
(p. 17) of "a consideraJble number of (Hussiite) adherents&#13;
1? Sfovalkia," which is quite a stretch of the imagination.&#13;
The Hussite !business was strictly Cezch; the Hussites did&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
47&#13;
&#13;
more damage than good for the Czechs themselves, and&#13;
aibsolutely no good for the Slovaks, whose lands they invaded, pillaging and !burning their homes, and murdering&#13;
their population.&#13;
Furthermore, !Harri.son oreaites the impression that&#13;
the !Battle of White !Mountain (1620) was ,a; nationalistic&#13;
affair, W1aJged lby the Ozechs against the Genmans. That is&#13;
the legend fabricated 'Mld propagated by some Protestant&#13;
Czechs. The White 1MoU1DJtain affair, however, was definitely a religious and dynastic aifafir. After Tilly, the emperor's general, defeated Frederiok and the Bohemian (111ot&#13;
Czech!) maignates, some 27 of the leading "rebels" were&#13;
beheaded: one a Catholic; six were Germans. Not one, however, was executed becaJUse of his nationality.&#13;
Not without interest is Harrison's mention (p. 11) that&#13;
the Premyslide iprinces di'Vided the country, in .t he tenth&#13;
century, "into administrative distrfots (zupy) with a royal&#13;
representative (zupan) at the head of each distTiot." wf&#13;
the Czech Premys.lides actually used the terms "zupa,&#13;
zupan," I wonder if professor Harrison mi,g ht enlighten us&#13;
from whom they might have acquired those words, since&#13;
they are rarely used !by the Czechs .&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
CHA!PTER III - "The Czechoslovaks from the Battle&#13;
of White ,Mountain to the World War" - by RO'bert J.&#13;
Kerner, Ph. D ., i.lL.D., /Litt.D. - Sather Professor of History, Uni'Versity of California; LL.D., Omaha University;&#13;
Litt.iD., Paiik College; foreign memlber, Royal Bohemian Society of Letters and Sciences (Prague); foreign member,&#13;
Safarik Learned Society (Bratislava); commander, Order&#13;
of the Whlite Lion (Ozecho~SlovaJkia); memlber, Expert&#13;
Staff, Colonel House Inquiry and American Commission to&#13;
Negotiate Peace (!Paris); etc., etc.&#13;
"The dlsa,strous battle of W•h ite Mountain on November 8, 1620,&#13;
uslhered lin a period of three centur.les in which the Klngdom of&#13;
Bohemia was reduced to .three provinces, Bohemia, Moravia and&#13;
Silesia, in ,t he Habs,b urg MOIIlarchy. During the first centUTY of •t his&#13;
period the nation lost three-fourths of its native nobility, its most&#13;
eminent and wealthy citizens, its schools and noted scholara, and its&#13;
national independen-ce. A remarkable national renaissance took place&#13;
in the second century. In the remainder of the period, the Czecho•&#13;
slovak nation, after tlailin.g to bring •about a reorganization of the&#13;
&#13;
48&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Ha;bsburg Monarchy on ,a federal -basis, or to secure the same dg,h ts&#13;
as tfue Magyars, ,c arried out a ,s uccessful revolution a,nd obtained&#13;
its independence" (P. 29).&#13;
&#13;
!Referring to the underscored words, I ask professor&#13;
Kerner: 1. What nation, the Czech or Bohemian? 2. What&#13;
"Czechoslovak." nraition, when there was none? 3. What&#13;
Magyars, ,o r does iKerner mean Hungarians? 4. What revolution 1by the "Ozechoslovaik" nation?.&#13;
Kerner used the title he did for this chapter delilberately, because he must haJVe known there were no "CzechoslO'V8Jks," ethnically spooking, ,b efore or after the battle&#13;
of White Mol.l.[ltain, to the World War, except in the minds&#13;
of dreamers and chauvinistic, imperialistic Creohs. He&#13;
could easily haJVe ,o mitted the d:ew references to Slovaks&#13;
and the m8Jny to "Orechos}ovaiks" in the 211 1pages of the&#13;
chrupter and had ,a rpretty good ,s tory on the "Czechs'' from&#13;
the Battle of White Mountain to the World War." Practically everything in the chapter is "Czech" - language,&#13;
literature, nation, historians, pe3Jsants noblemen, renaissance, Catholics, Pr.otestants, opera, national anthem, Lutherans, journalists - lbut Kerner still makes pretense at&#13;
writing aJbout "Czechoslovaks." Is there any good ,r eason&#13;
why an honest, Ulliprejudiced, objective historian should&#13;
try to fool even himself? Surely, Kerner musrt !know that&#13;
the ~echs devel01ped in the Austrian ,p art, ,w hile the Slova!ks developed in ,t he Hungarirun prurt of the Dual&#13;
Monarchy.&#13;
What Kerner means to imply when he says that the&#13;
"Czechoslovak nafilon . . . . . . carried out a successful revolution" and db.tamed its independence is at least questionaJble. We know that there was not even a revolution in&#13;
Prague. !Robert Ingrim tells us:&#13;
"All that J:J.a;ppened ,was tJhat Emperor-King Charles, seeing that&#13;
Wilson :a:bandoned his former program in the hour of victory,&#13;
dropped tJhe fed,ema;listic idea and ordered his minds.tern and lieutenant-governors to surrend,e r the admi'llistration to coonmittees of&#13;
the various nationalities. Thi,s explains among other things why&#13;
Masaryk, as the first president of Czecho-Slovakia, had to decree&#13;
which date was to be regarded as the beginning of the Czech re·&#13;
volution. It simply had not taken place. All bhe successor states,&#13;
including little. Austria, needed the legal fiction of a ,r evolution, because as• new states they repudiated the idea of continuity and based&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
49&#13;
&#13;
their la/\V,s upon a revolutionary origin. For the Czechs this was&#13;
very important. When, in 1921, .the .Sudeten Germans complained to&#13;
&#13;
the League of Nations t:hat they had not been allowed to take par.t in&#13;
the making of the constitution of the new State, the Czecho-Siov•a k&#13;
government replied. that 'the Cz~ho./Slovak State was the work and&#13;
product of the revolution, made solely by the Czecho-Slovak nation,'&#13;
which was, therefore, 'the only constitutional factor.' Hence, 'the&#13;
&#13;
Natiooru Revolutionary Assembly was alone authorized to set up the&#13;
constitution' by W1h1ch Germans, \Hungarians, Ruthenians, and Poles&#13;
had •b een made second-class citizens" (After Hitler Sta11n? P. 107).&#13;
&#13;
To complete the above piotu.re, '.I might add that the&#13;
Slovak memlbers of the "Na,tional Revolutioaiary Assembly" were lhand-'I)icked lby Masaryk and Benes and, included firve Czechs, hence, were not truly representa.tirve of&#13;
the political will of the 1S101Vaik nation. The constitution&#13;
that resulted, therefore, was strictly a Czech product, j'llSt&#13;
as was Ozecho-lSlovak domestic iand foreign policy.&#13;
In referring to the development that took ipla.ce during&#13;
the Reformation and ICoU!Ilter-lReformation in Ozech rund&#13;
Slovak territories, Kerner says that "in general the same&#13;
development took place in the ISloivaJk counties od' Hungary&#13;
as in Bohemia, /Moravia and \S ilesia." If a person did not&#13;
know !better, he might be led to 1believe that Kerner did&#13;
not use the express-ion "Ozech counties" in his comparison,&#13;
because Bohemia, Moria.via and !Silesia were supposedly&#13;
solidly Czech. We know that they were not. And we know,&#13;
too, that Bohemia was not the only country that suffered&#13;
during the Thirty Yea.rs' War; that war "ravaged Bohemia&#13;
with the same fury it unleashed all over the Germanies. . . There was no, difference and certainly no national ,pll!'.pose" (I.n,g rim, op. cit., ,p. 57).&#13;
Kerner, furthermore, writes ab.9-ut "Magyar'' magnates&#13;
and "Magyar" nolbility, rwhen he really means "Hungarian"&#13;
magnates and noibility. There is a difference: the Magyars&#13;
were not the only inhabitants of Hungary before or aft-er&#13;
the 17th century. The same applies .to the terms "Czech"&#13;
and "Bohemian." Of course, we might say that the tenns&#13;
today - af.ter the expulsion of over three million Germans - are mo.re or less synonymous. Let us, however,&#13;
remember that they were not even in ,t he recent past:&#13;
the Czechs were not the only inhabitants of Bohemia.&#13;
&#13;
50&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
"A new period in .the history of the Czechoslovak&#13;
nation was inaJugurated" (p. 32), when 1Fredericik the&#13;
Great seirzed Silesia in 1740, Kerner states oaitegorically&#13;
and, fartiher down on the same page, that "the reforms of&#13;
Maria '.Dheresa and Joseph JiI . . . not only culminated in&#13;
the completion of the evolution ,which tra.nsf.ormed the&#13;
Kingdom of Bohemia into three provinces and hence virtual amalg,amaJtion of 1!he Austrian Hereditary Lands with&#13;
the Lands of the (Bohemim Crown into a single administrative unit, but they threatened the Czechoslovaks with&#13;
loss of identity as a nation 'by the process• of Germanization in schools, government, ,and church."&#13;
Here, it is obvious that Kerner w-..s a 1b it ~fuddled&#13;
and •a )pparently forgot, in his zeal to promot.e the concept&#13;
of a "Czoohoslovaik nation," that ,t he SkwaJks lived in HU!Ilg,ary and,. hence, !by no stretch of t'he imaigination, even&#13;
in this "enlightened" and "iprogres.sive" era, could have had&#13;
any connection with the "Austrian Hereditary Lands" and&#13;
the "Lamds of the Bohemi,a n Crown." It w.as the existent&#13;
Czechs and not the nJOn-existent "OzechoslwaJks" who were&#13;
threatened with the loss of identity as a nation iby the process of ~a.n:rzatiorn, in Austria. We can concede that the&#13;
policy of Joseph ll "of trying to denationalize" Magyars,&#13;
Italians, Poles, and Rumaniians "aroused them to activity"&#13;
(p. 34), as it did the ~echs, SlovaJks, Croats, Slovenes,&#13;
and Serbians, ibut why does Kerner lump the latter nations together as "Czeichoslovaiks" and "Jugoslavs" when&#13;
he knows that such did not exist either in Joseph !I's time&#13;
or even later? 'I'he reason fur this is only too obvious.&#13;
On page 3Q,. the "Czechoslovaks" we.re threatened&#13;
"w1t'h Joss of identity as a nation," but three pages later,&#13;
according to Kerner, "at the same time the situation of the&#13;
Slovaks in HWigary was somewhat improved by the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II" (p. 35). The same&#13;
reforms even led "to a great national revival (p. 32) . . .&#13;
the Czech renaissance develo ped momentum step by step&#13;
as decree after decree of Maria Theresa and Joseph II&#13;
sought to a'bolish the use of the Czech language. When&#13;
Joseph II completed t!he official demise of the Czech Ian1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
51&#13;
&#13;
guage in school, government, allld church in 1790, the&#13;
Czech nation revwed. 1So mysterious was this development&#13;
that its exact oauses have been a su:bject: of dispute among&#13;
the best ·scholars" (1p. 34). Then on t:he following pa;ge&#13;
(35) Kerner states: "The Ohurch feared that it would lose&#13;
its ,g rip on the Czech nation i:f its priests spolke only German. These and other indications led to the establishment&#13;
by Leoipold rnr of a chair in the Czech language at the University of ,Praigue in 1791."&#13;
What, then, is this business ,th,a,t the reforms of Maria&#13;
Theresa and Joseph JiI ''threatened the Czechoslovaks with&#13;
loss of identity as a nation"? And what is so mysterious&#13;
about &lt;the reviival of the Czech nation in 1790? Kerner certainly must ha,ve ,h eard a;bouit the principle of action and&#13;
reaction! If the iMa~rs, and laiter the Ozechs, had not tried&#13;
to suppress the Slovak lang,uage and oppressed the Slovaks, they would have rprobaibly .perished as a nation in&#13;
time . .Js it not olbtvious what ha,ppens to languages and peo~&#13;
ples in America rwhere freedom abounds? [n America&#13;
peoples of every color, .race and creed enjoy freedom of the&#13;
press, freedom of religion and freedom of asoomibly; they&#13;
are d':ree to !build their own churches, schools, liibraries, 'beneficial organi:zations and ipubHsh new.s,pa,pers and books&#13;
in their respective languages. Yet, there is no doufbt in. my&#13;
mind that in time non-®nglish iperiodioa1s and 1books, published in America, will /be a rarity. Certainly, this must&#13;
be just as olbvious - ,a nd not myst.erious - even to professor Kerner.&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
"A Protestant sc hool, -witJh a c hair in the Czech language a.nd&#13;
&#13;
literature, was founded in Brati,s.lava, and this inst:i,tution counted&#13;
amQ/Ilg its s,t udents the future Czech his torian !FrantAse'k Palacky&#13;
from Moravia and tlhe Slovaks Jan Kolla r ia.n.d Pave.I Josef i:lafaiik.&#13;
The Protestant Slovaks followed closely the d·e velopment or the&#13;
Czechs, Wlhereas the Catholic Slovaks under Antonin Bernolak tried&#13;
to create, with indlff-erent success at the time, a. written Slovak dialect, which W'&lt;IS s-eparate from .but closely akin to the Czech because&#13;
a western dialect of spoken ,Slovak was used. The course of poli•&#13;
tical events could not cheok the national revival of Czechoslovaks"&#13;
(p. 36) .&#13;
&#13;
,P rofessor Kerner does not relate the whole story, but&#13;
only the part that s'l.lits his ipUTpOSe and, hence, sins by&#13;
&#13;
52&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
omi-ssion. The Catholic Slcwa!ks oonstituted rut least 75 per&#13;
cent of the Sl()IVaik nation, while the Protestant Slovaks&#13;
only aibout ill per cent. Koillar and Safarik cultivated ,a&#13;
"dead" 1amgiuage, a langu,a;ge tha;t was used iby a small part&#13;
of tile Slovak nation, the Lutherans. And the latter used&#13;
that language - "biblical" Czech, therefore, not the "live"&#13;
language of the vast masses of the Czech people - mostly for and during religious functions, while at home they&#13;
used Sloiv•aik.&#13;
Anton, not Antonin (the Czech equivalent), Bernolwk&#13;
not only "tried" to create a Slo.va!k literary language, but&#13;
actually did estaibLish such a literary medium of Slorvak&#13;
which was u:sed :some fifty years b,y S[ovak writers. There&#13;
was no need :for iBernolaik to. create "a written Slovak dialect," ;b ecause various 'Slova!k dialects already were existent at that time. And iBernola:k definitely did 111ot choose&#13;
the western dialect because it was "closely alkin" to Czech.&#13;
Kerner, however, is quite right when he says that "the&#13;
comse of political events could not check the nationa:I revival of the Ozechoslovalks," lbecaJuse they were non--existenrt. Those events could not check the national rerv:wal&#13;
of either the Ozechs or the :S'1ov0iks .&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
"Caug,h t between their sympathies with the Czechs and their&#13;
fears of their .Magyar ov•erlord:s, Slovak patri'ots saw their security,&#13;
not in coalescing at once with their Czech brethren, but in iworking&#13;
to create a separate Slovak national movement by taking up once&#13;
more the unsuccessful jdea of Bernolak that of developing a&#13;
separate written Slovak language. Ludevit Stur, Michal Hodza, and&#13;
Jo.:,ef Hurban, fearing the reproaches of the Magyars if they continued to use the Czech language, and hoping to attract the Slovak&#13;
peasant masses, chooe in 184-5 to make. a dialect spoiken. in tlle&#13;
central Slovak counties the '!lew literary language. The Czechs wa,r ned&#13;
in v,a in against this departure from t.he practice of a thousand years.&#13;
·T hey argued that dts r esults would only be. to the &gt;benefit of the&#13;
&#13;
Germans and Magy,ar.i" (p. 38).&#13;
&#13;
This statement is not based on 'hone.sit, hi:sitorical research. ilt is a fabrication pure and simple. Slova!k patriots ,t hen, even as now, fully realized that they could not&#13;
safegu,,ard their nation.al existence !by playing second-,&#13;
fiddle to other nations in the political coTIJCert. They did&#13;
not fear the 'Maigyiars who sought to Magy.arme them any&#13;
more than they feared the Czechs who sought to Ozechize&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
53&#13;
&#13;
the:rn. True Slovak ·p atriots never let their sympathies for&#13;
the Ozechs or other oppressed nations interfere with their&#13;
ultimate natioo.a.1 aim: freedom and rpolitioal independence&#13;
- to become masters of their own household, of their own&#13;
destiny. '.Dhey rebelled against the Magyars and, later,&#13;
eiven against the Czechs, just as the Magyars and the&#13;
Ozechs had rebelled ag,ainst the HlaJbsburgs.&#13;
Stur, Hodza, Hurban (Jozef, not Josef) a,nd other&#13;
Slova,k patriots developed the literary SlovaJk medilllIIl&#13;
estrublished by iBen1i0laJk and his followers - the "lilve"&#13;
language used lby the vast masses of the Slovalk people,&#13;
both O~tholic and also Lutheran. They wrote in Czech for&#13;
the Cze.ohs and in Slovak for the Slov,aks. Kerner does not&#13;
say so directly, ibut the implication is ,t here that Stur,&#13;
Hod.fa •a nd Hurb-an did use the Czech language exclusively in rtheir writings. The fact is thaJt; they did not and they&#13;
did not fear the "reproaches of the Magyairs" for using&#13;
Czech at ,any time they desired to do so. As int.elligent men&#13;
they knew fully well they ieould not rouse their people nationally by using a language that was foreign to them, a&#13;
language they did not consider their own.&#13;
Why, then, the 'balderdash a:bout the Czechs warning&#13;
Slo;vak paitriots against their depa;rture "from the practice&#13;
of a thousand years"? '.Dhe vast majority of .the IS1ovruk natiO!Il, i!he Catholic Slovaiks, used their own Slovak language in their churches, homes and in their Hterary worlks,&#13;
b;ut 'Professorr Kerner wO'Uld hruve students of history "Czechoslovak" history - believe that they used the Czech&#13;
language forr a "thousand years" prior t,o 1845. Why does&#13;
Kerner resort to outright falsehoods and aJbsurrd falbrications? Czech was brought into Siovakia, it is true, by&#13;
Czech exiles during i!he Coun.ter..R.eformation to strengthen&#13;
Lutheranism, ibut it never 'became the predominant literary medium of the ,vast masses of the Slovak people and&#13;
their ,w riters.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
"The Magyar large landholder, the Catholic clergyman, and the&#13;
Jewish merchant, screened, ,b ehind a blatant Magyar propaganda,&#13;
worked to denaclonalize the Slovak peasant by falsifying his history&#13;
and •by asserting tihat his language had no orelation to the Czech and&#13;
did not belong to the languages of western Europe" (p. 44).&#13;
&#13;
54&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
It is significant that Kerner should put the finger on&#13;
"Catholic clergymen" - without mentioning names - and&#13;
omit Protestant "progressilve" preachers and Jewish R3Jb..&#13;
bis who were equally interested in "denationiali ~ng" the&#13;
Slovalk peasant, practically always woTking aigainst :the&#13;
national interests of the ISlovalk nation. Of course, this is&#13;
nothing new in history. T. G. iMasaryik and Benes, who&#13;
should have learned the lesson of :A.ustr1a:-Hungary, denied the existence of it.he !Slovak nation as an individual&#13;
ethnic entity, declaring the ISlovia!ks were only a "branch"&#13;
of the Czech nation and their language only ,a "dialect" of&#13;
the Ozech. (Falsifying history seems to be a specialty of&#13;
the followem of Masaryk and Benes. And Kerner proves it!&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
I&#13;
&#13;
"Whereas Kr-amai' became, so to ~,peak, the symbol of the&#13;
economic u,psm1ge of the Czech lboUTgeoisie, Masaryk became the intellectual and spiritual head of the entire nation, including the Slovaks . • • . He (~·a saryk) became a Protestant, a modern Czech Puritan. Influenced by his reading af Czech history, he ,b elieved that&#13;
&#13;
h-e found. !ts plhilosophy 1n the religious ideal of il:he Hussites and&#13;
the Ozeoh !Brethren" (pp. 47-48).&#13;
&#13;
The truth, however, is that T. G. Masaryk never was&#13;
the "intellectual and spiritual head" of the 1Slov•lrlLs. If the&#13;
Ozechs wish to consider Masaryk :as such, they are free&#13;
to do so. The o.vel'IWhelming Catholic majority oif the Slovak people could not. Hlas Kerner forgotten Masaryk's blatant cries "away from !R;ome!" and "Rcxme must (be put on&#13;
trial and condemned!"? Czech history is not Slovak history;&#13;
the philosophy of Slova:k history does not rest on the "religious ideal of the Hussites and the Czech Brethren." Catholic Czechs form ibhe majority of the Czech nation,&#13;
hence, we have good reason to doulbt Kerner's evaluation&#13;
of Masaryik -as far as •t hey ,a re concerned, lbecaJuse Masaryk never did represent or COlllcern himself !With their spiritual interests, in fact, put them in jeopardy.&#13;
Masaryik, according to Kerner, "viewed the problem&#13;
of the small oppressed n.a:tiO'IlS ,as the polilticai and international phase of the social question - the exploit,aitdon&#13;
of one nation by anot!her, for political exploitation meant&#13;
cheap lalbor to the laboring drasse.s." 'But what happened&#13;
after Czeoho-!Slovakiia was lborn and Masaryk !became he:r&#13;
first president? He denied staites' rights to Slovakia and&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
55&#13;
&#13;
thought nothing of the OLechs exploiting the ,S lovaks and&#13;
their national wealth!&#13;
CHA[PTER [V -&#13;
&#13;
Peace Conference" -&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
"The World War, Revolution and&#13;
iby RO{'bert J. Kern.er.&#13;
&#13;
'10n July 4 (191,5), Masaryk publicly in,a ugurated the revolutionary movement •by a ,l ecture on Jan Hus in Zurich, Srwitzerl•a nd.&#13;
After Benes succeeded in escaping J.irom Austria, the Czech Foreign&#13;
Committee issued its public manifesto for Czechoslovak independence&#13;
in Pans on !November 14, 1915. This manifesto had previously been&#13;
agreed upon by the leaders at home and by the leaders of Czech&#13;
and Slovak colonies In America, England, and France a point&#13;
on wihich !Masaryk insisted" (p. 53).&#13;
&#13;
'W ho were those leaders "alt home" and in the Czech&#13;
and Slovak colonies in America, England, and France?&#13;
The record tells us that the leaders of the Czechs and Slovalks at home ikinew practically nothing of Masaryk's plans&#13;
at that time; and the leaders of their respective colonies&#13;
in various countries still less!&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
"This Committee (the Czech Foreign Committee) led to the&#13;
creation of the •Czechoslovak Nation-al Council in 1916., which under&#13;
Masaryk, Benes, and ~tefanlk gradually assumed the functions of&#13;
goverJlllilent" (pg. 153-54) . . . "The Czechoslovak National Council,&#13;
which was leading the struggle abroad, had not been disavowed by&#13;
the nation at home" (p. 56).&#13;
&#13;
1t is quite clear, rt:hen, that the Czech Committee is&#13;
credited with the creation of the "Czechoslovak" Council,&#13;
which Masaryk headed. But it is not in accord with fact&#13;
that the Council "had not been disruvowed 1b y the nation at&#13;
home." Masaryk was the leader of the Czech (Progressive&#13;
Party, which he alone represented in the .Austrian ,parliament. When he left Austria, late .in 1914, Miasaryk went&#13;
abroad with a ipr.ogram of his own. As far as is !known,&#13;
he had not consulited wii.th Ozech and Siovalk leaders a:t&#13;
home and had no authorization f.ram the Czechs or the Slovaks at home ito represent their politioal will. Of course,&#13;
wherever Masaryk went, he did pose as a competent representative of the Czechs at home.&#13;
When President. Wilson, .late in Decemlber 1916, requested an lb;elligerents to state their war aims, the Allied&#13;
reply of January 1'2, 1917, included the following demand:&#13;
"Lilberation of Italians, Riumaniains, Slaws,. and Czeciio-&#13;
&#13;
56&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Slovaks from foreign rule." Please note the "Slavs and&#13;
Czecho-Slovaks" part, lbecaUJSe thaJt tells us 'j ust how well&#13;
the Allies were informed on the sUJbjoot. Since Slovruks and&#13;
Czechs spoke different languages, occupied different territories, and never in history had been united, rbhe appelation "Ozecho-1Slorvruk,s " was real new. At that time, when the&#13;
British government was asked, in ithe Commons, ,w hethmit could indicate the territory inhabited iby "Czecho-1Slo-·&#13;
vakis," the ra nswer was "no."&#13;
The Czechs at home resented being mentioned as a nation under "foreign rule." One of their leading ipaipers, the&#13;
NARODNE I.1IiSTY, had this tto say aJbout it:&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
"It is amazing how indefatigably Masaryk endeavors to defile&#13;
the honor of the CZECH nation. The enemies have learnt that the&#13;
love of all Austrian peoples for their inherited dynasty and their&#13;
fatherland is firm and unshakable. The enemies have realized that&#13;
those who make contradictory statements abroad are liars and impostors."&#13;
&#13;
In Norvem!ber, 1916, all the Czech parties in the Austrian rparliament, without a single exception, had issued a&#13;
solemn declaration, stating thrat "the basis and guaranty of&#13;
the national existence of the Czech people are the dynasty,&#13;
called to the throne centuries ago, and the indivisibly constituted Monarchy." In the declaration they demanded foderafozation. And oin December 30, 191.6, all the Czech party&#13;
leaders attended ttihe emiperor's coronation as king of Hungary as "guesrts of honor."&#13;
After the Afli.ed reply to, Wilson became !known, the&#13;
society of Czech memlbers of parliament sent the following&#13;
letter (J,a nuary 23, 1'917) to the foreign minister of AustroHtrogary:&#13;
"In view of the Alli-ed runswer to President ,W ilson in which the&#13;
liberation of the Czechs figures as a war ,a im, we reject this insinuation whiClh is based on entirely erroneous assumptions. We declare emphatically that the Czech people, as always in the past, is&#13;
convinced that it can be assured of a prosperous development only&#13;
under the Habsburg scepter and within the Habsburg Monarchy"&#13;
&#13;
(Ingrim: "After Hitler Stalin?" p. 75).&#13;
&#13;
The very same Czech members of parliament requested&#13;
Prime M:in.istffi' C1am....Martinic, a Czech, to arrange an audience with the emperor for them. Why? !Because :they said:&#13;
"We want to tell His Majesty that we shall always stand by&#13;
him and his successors; that our demands will always be compatible&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
57&#13;
&#13;
with the interests of the Habsburg dyansty and of the realm; that&#13;
we are loyal servants of the king and the country; that our complaints have never shaken our belief that after victory the claims&#13;
of the ,Czech people will find satisfaction within the framework of&#13;
the realm and under the Habsburg crown."&#13;
&#13;
It is quite obvious, then, thaJt the representatirves of the&#13;
Czech people did not want separation - independence but federalization. Furthermore, Masaryk ,a nd his Council&#13;
were hiit from another quarter. At the conference of the&#13;
Sociiailist International in 1Stockho1m, June 1:917, the Czech&#13;
delegates vociferously demanded "an independent Czech&#13;
State within a federated Austria-Hungary."&#13;
Is it possible that professor Kerner, an expert on&#13;
Czecho-SloiValkia, is ignorant of what w:as going on even m&#13;
Czech lands while !Masaryk a.nd Benes were calling for the&#13;
destruction of Austria? I cannot ·believe it •a nd, therefore,&#13;
say that iKerner delilberately did not tell the truth when he&#13;
said that Mas•a ry'k's Council "had not been disavowed by the&#13;
nation at home." Masarylk :himself admits it in his work&#13;
"Svetowa RevoJuce" (pp. 1150-il.52; 253-254 ; 32,1 ).&#13;
When 'Kerneir wr1tes aJbo.ut the organimtion of the&#13;
"Czechoslovak Legions," the work a,ccomplished lby Masarylk and iBenes in ,E ngland, France, Russia allld America for&#13;
the esta;blishment of the "Ozechosloivalk Reipulblic," he completely ignores the effort put forth by Gen&amp;al Milan R.&#13;
Stefanik, the !Slovak who, did much in France, the U.S. A.,&#13;
Italy and Russi.a for the realization of the Republic. fu the&#13;
twenty pages of this cltaJpter, Kerner mentiom; the name&#13;
of this great Slovak only once, but does not tell us a single&#13;
thing aJbo,ut the ,w ork he did so tha,t Czecho-,Slova'l da might&#13;
become a reality. If Ma,s aryk himself was not loath to give&#13;
credit to •S tefanik for his accompl.isihmen,ts, why should Kerner ibe?&#13;
Furthermore, Kerner devotes. several pages to the&#13;
"OzechoslavaJk" Legion in Siiberia - "the ,a rmy which had&#13;
fought vicitorio'll.Sly at !Kiev, Zhitamir, and Baikhmach, and&#13;
which yearned to leave Russia in peace in order to continue the conflict ,a gainst the Germans in the West." He&#13;
almost outdoes Masaryk himself on the ·" Siberian anabasis"&#13;
legend.&#13;
&#13;
58&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
The fact is, however, that the legion was offered a&#13;
short route home via Murmansk and Archangel whence&#13;
British sh1ps were to transport it to the battle front in&#13;
France. But the legion, afraid of German sulbmarines and&#13;
not too eager to fight, preferred ithe long way home via&#13;
Siberia to Viadfuvostok. AB a result, Masarylk's a:xmy&#13;
reached Europe long after the smoke of the war had lifted,&#13;
without haJVing contributed ,to the defeat of Germany and&#13;
Austria. The IStberian anabas:is made greait propagand a for&#13;
Masaryk's cause, as he himself atlmitted, and without it,&#13;
in fact, the "calli:!e" m1ght haive 'been lost. '.I recommend&#13;
that Kerner and other students •o f history, read pp. 81-83&#13;
of fugrim's "After Hlitler !Stalin?" - and, ibut carefully,&#13;
even Masaryik's "Svetava. Revoluce."&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
"In the ,a ims publicized as the objectives of peace, the Czechosl ovaks were promised their independence on the basis of the selfdetermination of the Czechoslovak nation. It is a fum:l.amentaJ question just what "self-deteirmi natlon of the nations" meant a.t tihat&#13;
time. It s eems most probrul&gt;le that when it ,was first uttered it&#13;
meant the determinatio n of a n entire nation to choo.se whether it&#13;
wished to be jndependent or live under another, and not self-determination of small parts of it" (p. 62).&#13;
&#13;
Here, Kerner quite naively would have us :b elieve&#13;
that he iis be.fuddled lby the meaning of "self-determ ination." Of course, he could have given credit ,to Masaryk&#13;
and especially Benes for his 1pretended quandary. I say&#13;
"pretended ," /because he himself tells us on the page following:&#13;
&#13;
" In many regions the populations were thoroughly mixed in&#13;
composition . . . . As far as the Czechoslovak s were concerned, the&#13;
matter was complicated by the fact that their claims in the Czech&#13;
regions rested on historic rights, the Lands of the Bohemian Crown&#13;
(Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia), which they as a nation had created and maintained in history, rund on the rights of nationality for&#13;
the ,Slovaks in Hungary, wihere the Magyars cJ.almed 'historic rights&#13;
of the Lands of tihe Hungarian Crown" (p. 63) .&#13;
&#13;
So, what is this business "the Czechoslov aks were promised their independen ce on the ,basis of the self-determ ination of the Czechoslovak nation"? !Kerner purt:s himse1f in&#13;
a ivery ludicrous situation: he admits the existence of the&#13;
Czech naition, Czech regions, etc., does not admit directly&#13;
the existence of the Slovak counterpar ts, but still insists&#13;
on having a "Orechoslovak" nation!&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
69&#13;
&#13;
AP, mentioned earlier, one of the aims of the Allies&#13;
was the "lilberaition of Iltalians, Rumanians, Slavs and Cze-&#13;
&#13;
choslovaks from foreign r.ule." The Czechs and Slova;ks&#13;
got i'lllto the picture also as "Ozech~ova ks," and not only&#13;
as Slavs, at the persistent insistence of Dr. Edward Benes to support the fiction promoted by M'aJSaryik and himself that "Czechs and Slovaks were the same." The truth,&#13;
however, remains that the SlovaJks are an individual nation in the great family of Slovanic nations, as are the&#13;
Poles, Byelorussians , Ukrainians, Russians, C.zec'hs, Bulg,aria:ns, .S erbs, ISlO!Veni•a ns, Croatians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, a,nd Lusatia,n tSerbs, whatever Kerner and other&#13;
"historians" of his type might have to say to the contrary&#13;
notwithstandi ng.&#13;
If Kerner does not be1ieve that t:he right of self-dete:nmination applies equally to the Czechs and /Slovaks, let&#13;
him .say so outright and be done wi~h it. Kerner should&#13;
know, as we certainly lmow, that the magic formula that&#13;
druzzled. and charmed. President Wilson was "national determination," which meant that every ethnic group be&#13;
conceded the right to decide to which state it wished to&#13;
belong. More dmpo:ntrunt than what it meanit, of course,&#13;
was what it implied: the notion that the id68.l state would&#13;
be one inhabited only by one ethnic entity, one nation.&#13;
The tenth of WiliSion's "1Fo!Urteen Points" reads as follows:&#13;
''!The peoples of Austria-iHu111gary , whose place among the nations&#13;
we wish to see s·afeguaro€d and •a ssured, should be accorded the&#13;
freest opportunity of autonomous development."&#13;
&#13;
What does "the peoples of Austria-Hung ary" mean&#13;
to professor Kerner? Does it mean all the peoples, except&#13;
the Slova1k people? If Masaryik used his charms to maJk:e&#13;
Wilson •b elieve the fiction that the "Czechs and the Slovaiks were the same," and so to deceive him does that&#13;
alter the .truth that the Ozechs a.nd the Slov~ are not&#13;
one people, one nation? Why should Kenner want us to&#13;
believe otheIWise?&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
"The !Peace Conference chose to give the Czechos-lovaks the&#13;
hiatoric boundaries in the Czech regions of Austri•a and ethnic bound•a rles In the Slovak districts of Hungary. Furthermore, it •a ddoo,&#13;
under cond,l tlons of autonomy, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. It thmi created a state in Wlhlch 34 per cent of the population was non-Czech0-&#13;
&#13;
60&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
slovak, ,a nd this element included a German .population of over three&#13;
&#13;
millimi.s, livin,g chiefly in the outer rim of Bohemia, in a state of&#13;
less than fifteen millions" (p. 63).&#13;
&#13;
But this is 111ot quite the whole ,s tory. The Peace Conference decided as it did, 'becaJUOO it relied on the "expert"&#13;
information supplied iby Masaryk and Benes, !both Czechs,&#13;
who presumed to represent iboth the Czechs and also the&#13;
Slova!ks. In the state created, the non-Czech population&#13;
was in the majority, and this included some three and a&#13;
half million Germams, in a state of "less than fifteen millions" (how much less?). The Conference ga;ve the "Czechoslovaks" nothing, lbuit it did allow the boundaries for&#13;
the "new" state that was -created, as Kerner states, "on&#13;
the -g round that rune or ten million Czechoslovaks should&#13;
be favored •w ith independence oiver three million Germans"&#13;
(p. 65) - the argument Oif Masaryk and Benes! They&#13;
needed the almost three million Slovaiks of Hrung,ary to&#13;
m.aJce "nine or ten n:rlllion Czechoslovaks," but the Czechs&#13;
and the ISloivaJks, were "the same"!&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
"The Duchy of TesC'hen was ,w,hat was left of Silesia, one of the&#13;
Lands of the Bohemian Crown, after Frederiick the Great had seized&#13;
fourte en-fifteeruths of that territory in 1740. The historic rights of the&#13;
Czechs went •back to t!he fourteenth century. Before that the Duchy&#13;
had been ,Polish {p. r66) . . . It was, however, Poland's diss·a tisfaction with this decision which led her diplomacy into d.e manding a.nd&#13;
acquiring Czech Teschen on the occasion of the Conference of Mu·&#13;
nlch (October, 1938). This blow from the rear really made it impossible for Czechoslovakia to fight after she was abandoned by her&#13;
Western allies" (p. 68) .&#13;
&#13;
It is ,olbvious that Kerner either laoks knowledge&#13;
about Teschen or is deli'berately attemptilllg to confuse the&#13;
readers of his "Ozechoslova:kia." Just lilke Miasaryik and&#13;
Benes, iit seems that Kerner does not want students oif&#13;
history to know the whole tmth about Ozecho-Sloivaki,a.&#13;
Furthermore, the ,allegation that Ozecho,...Slov,rukia was&#13;
"forced" to :su,r render to iHitler !Without firing a shot, because her "Western allies" had abandoned her, OT because IDngland ·a nd France asked her to, is purely fictitious.&#13;
Benes surrendered Czecho-Slovaki.a to Hitler without&#13;
the approval of parliament. The Benes Czechs knew fully&#13;
well that Czeoho-SlovaJkia could not be saved, because her&#13;
non-Czech majority was not wiling to fight for her. They&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
61&#13;
&#13;
chose to urrender "at the behest of their faithless friends,"&#13;
because an attempt to fight would have revealed to the&#13;
world that the Germa~lovak-Magyar~Rutib.en.ian-iPolish&#13;
majority of her population was not ready to die for a&#13;
tate that had treated them as second-rate citizens for&#13;
ome thirty years. And let us not forget that even the&#13;
Czech,s, who considered themselves t he "State-nation," did&#13;
not fire a single shot in defense of Czecho-JSlovrukia. Furthermore, it is no secret ,t hat Benes did not cultivate&#13;
friendshiip with Poland and other neigh'boring states : his&#13;
pro Soviet policy over decades of years is proof of that.&#13;
Already in 1929 Viscount D'Abernon prophesied:&#13;
"The treaty between Czecbo S lovakia and Poland is thought a&#13;
triumph of French m ilitarism . o it m a y be, but the duration w ill b e&#13;
te mpo rary . . . the Czech satellite will revert to the orbit of the&#13;
Moscow planet as soon as disturbing forces cease to operate quite&#13;
as powerfully as today."&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
"Germ an propaganda l ater s ought to spread the view that the&#13;
bou ndaries of Czeoho slovakia, a s well as t hose of P ol and, wer e&#13;
drawn by the Peace Conferene e in ignorance and that they repres e nted a failure to understand the problems of central Europe. N ot hing could be far th er from tJh e facts . The deleg ates o f the Peace&#13;
Cont rence had access to and used the best available information&#13;
and considered these problems from all possible angles" (p. 6 ).&#13;
&#13;
After reviewing the events that followed World Wa.r&#13;
I Mld led to World War IiI, I believe it is safe to say that&#13;
&#13;
Kerner's statement is "farther from the facts" than even&#13;
the "German propaganda" he alludes to. The fact rernains&#13;
t hat World War I not only failed to solive Europe's problems, ,b ut even ,a ccentuated them and led t o World War II.&#13;
At Paris there was a meeting of two continents which were&#13;
quite ignorant of each other. The peacemakers blundered&#13;
when they accepted interested parties as experts wit hout&#13;
having them chedked 'by the opposition. When Lloyd&#13;
George asked Benes how many Ma.gyam would fall undeT&#13;
Ozech rule, Benes replied that their number would lbe&#13;
350,000 ('D. H. Miller: "My Diary at the Conference in Paris"; in reality it was more ibhan one million. Benes, plead..,&#13;
ing fOT a "natural frontier," described a little ~oolk as a&#13;
nasvigalble river.&#13;
Repudiation of Kerner's claim may also be found in&#13;
A . J. P. Taylor's "The HaJbsbu.rg Monarchy," C. A . Ma-&#13;
&#13;
62&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
cartney's "Problems of the Danubiam Basin," Lloyd&#13;
George's "The Tr.urth About the Peace Treaties," J. M.&#13;
Keynes "The Economic Consequences of the Peace." Winston Churchill's "Afternnath and World Crises,." Robert fugrim's "After Hitler :Stalin?" and even T. G. Masa;ryk's&#13;
"Svet&lt;Jva Revoluce." But Kerner himself does that quite&#13;
effecti:vely with the last three sentences - especially the&#13;
last sentence - of the ivery same par.aJgraph, ,whi.oh reads:&#13;
"Another ,s olution of the Czechoslovak problem might indeed be&#13;
sought •by some future .p eace conference, if the poignant problem of&#13;
the German nation is solved, for example, on the model of Switzerla:nd rather than that permitting a rampant totalitarian racialism.&#13;
U.nti,l then it may be said that the work of t!he Peace Conference&#13;
was a reasonable solution for its time. Common sense and Intelligence and a few minor boundary rectifications might have aecured&#13;
a durable settlement" (p. 69).&#13;
&#13;
Of course, Professor Kerner, could hardly have intended it that way, but this is quite an admission from a mem.&#13;
her of the "EXPERT STAFF, Colonel House Inquiry and&#13;
American Commission to Negotiate Peace"! We know today&#13;
that Kerner was not the only "exipert" who la'o ked sufficient&#13;
"common sense and intelligence" at that time.&#13;
(More coming)&#13;
WHO SAID IT?&#13;
&#13;
"In 1868 the Ozeoh initel,lectuails and the Bohemian aristocrats renewed filleir allegi1ance. . . The eighty Bohemian&#13;
a&lt;bsentees from the Reicllsrat made a declaration of their&#13;
aims: they asked for equal na:tional rights for the Czechs in&#13;
Bohemia, and for a refornn of the electoral system; they&#13;
demanded also the unity of the lands of St. We:nceslaus and&#13;
the same independence for this "grea,t Bohemia" a;s HUlllgary&#13;
possessed. The Ozech leaders were bewitched by the Hungarian example. '1'1hey saw, quite rightly, that the Magyars&#13;
had achieved their nation'al freedom by associating it with&#13;
historic rilghts, and they supposed that the way to achieve&#13;
the national freed~m of the Czechs was to claim the historic&#13;
rights of Bohemia. They did not see that the historic rights&#13;
of Hungary were real, the historic rights of Bohemia imaginary. . . " - (A. J. P. Taylor, TH1E HABSIBURG MONA'ROHY, London, 1948; p. 142).&#13;
&#13;
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                <text>Professor Kerner's "CZECHOSLOVAKIA": History or Propaganda? (1/8)</text>
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Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), June-September 1955&#13;
pp. 38-62</text>
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                <text>June-September 1955</text>
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                <text>continues in &lt;a href="/items/show/176"&gt;Vol. 5, No. 4 (17), pp. 55-62&lt;/a&gt;</text>
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

63

THE SIGNIFICA NCE OF SMALL NATIONS
Dr. Henrich Bartek

Tonrmediate results of the first bloody, world-wide conflict, which ended in 191.8, were such conflicting principles
as: the right to se1f-determ ination, national sovereignty ,
ctrltural self-existen ce, buffer states and spheres of influence. At the sll!me time, small nations with national
aSpirations were blamed for igniting catastrophi c, international upheavals when, as a matter ,of fact, they were only
pawns in the internation al ,g ame of power 1politics in which
the greait nations engage from time to time for world domination.
The history of European nations and States during
the past century and a half demonstrat es clearly that when
small nations make marked social and cultural progress,
their desire for political independen ce - a national state of
their own - increases, in order to secure their future development as :a free people whose contributio ns are infinitely more valuable to civilization and progress when not
handioo.pped by foreign influences and ,p olitical subservienc e.
To accuse small countries of harboring imperialisti c
schemes is not historically correct, !because both world
wars were caused by intense rivalries among the great
powers of the world. It is interesting to note that the main
arguments against the existence of small nations as independent political states, according to the chief exponents of aggressi~e imperialism of the big ,powers, are their
smallness, their inaibility to protect themselves militarily
against their stronger neighlbors and to sustain themselves
eco111omically. ,F rom the standpoint of historical truth and
justice, however, it is always the bigger powers which are
at fault when they attempt to subjugate a smaH ,power by
brute force. It is significant that no cultural or .social ll!rguments are advanced against :the independen t existence of
small nations. '11he truth is that alil small nations are able
to hold their own and prove their ability in all fields of
human endeavor, if they are not molested by the greater
powers. lit is true that there are political, cultural and so-

�64

SLOVAKIA

cial differences among the several small nations and t:hat
their living standards differ, too-, but we find these same
differences even in the larger nations and states. Hence,
one cannot rightfully determine the right to independen t
statehood for SIITlaill. nations merely by such superficial arguments. And who shall say that only the large and mighty
nations and states shall possess the right to freedom and
independen ce?
In the last war, neith·e r France nor Poland were a!ble to
defend themselves successfull y - and they a·r e not small
nations. If one were to limit the right to statehood on military might, then on:ly those states and nations which could
maintain their independen ce against the most powerf.ul nation o.r state would have a "right" to exist. In that case,
Europe would pass out of existence.
Before World War ill, half the European continent
was dominated iby three major powers - Great Britain,
Germany and Russia. The other half of Europe was divided
into large, middle-size d and small states. That was the true
face of the map of Europe; and nothing can change the
historic reality that there exists considerabl y more than
a score of different nationalitie s on the Continent. In
charting the future course of Europe, we must fake into
account the national aspirations of these historic ,peoples,
who look forward to the historic future as a united people
with rights to political freedom and statehood. 'Dhis holds
equally true for all nations, the large and the small. The
question may arise, hoiWever, whether the recognition of
smaU states is for the betterment of mankind and for the
emlbellishm ent of European culture, or whether it may turn
out to be a detriment to modern civilization .
The political and national states which exist as such
at present are recognized ; their right to statehood is not
questioned. For example, the Norwegian s, Finns, Swiss,
Danes, and even the Albanians are officially conceded the
right to an independen t political status. After Wocld War
I, the Baltic !States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were
orga:ni~ as independen t, political states as called for by
the princuple of nationail self-determ ination. Other nationalities, less fortunate and sulbject to power politics, were

�SLOVAKIA

66

forced to aissert their :right to statehood. Thus, the Slovenes, a highly cultured nation with a pop_ulation larger
than the Alibanians, failed to organize their own national
State .because of geopolitical reasons. And as long as aggressive militarism and imperialism hold sway in European
politics, the Slovenes will. not be able to establish their
natural right to national independence. In 1918, they chose
lo become incorporated in the kingdom of Yugoslavia for
reasons of self-preservation and security. Nevertheless, this
united southern Slavic monarchy -proved incapable of reJ
sistinig German aggression in 1941.
lt is not at all certain that the Slovenes, or other small
nations, would clamor for complete independence, although
this is the ideal of all peoP'les -w ith national traditions and
a common language, iif international relations iwere.,. founded
on genuine democratic prindples of justice and mutual
welfare. There are many similar cases in the history of
Eurapea,n nationalities. A typical case is that of Slovalkia
which has made 1great strides in its cultural, social, and political life. The :Slovaks, as a progressive and democraticminded people, are an idool representative of all the small
nations of central and eastern Europe.

Slovakia -

a Democratic Nation

At the close of the 18th century when feudal Hungary,
which h.ad been ruled for centuries by pri'Vileged classes
without oonsideratiOIIl of national origin, began to change
its tradition of supra-nationalism into a national Magyar
statism, the various nationalities, moved by their instinct
of self..ip.reservation, naturally resisted the new Magyarization program. Accordingly, the Slova:ks intensified their
efforts to promote the study of their own ancient native
language and national traditions. Slovruk aristocrats, unfortunately, aJbandoned their nationru traditions and succumbed to the Magyar influence for fear of losing their
old prerogatives as members of the nobility. The Slovak
common people, however, became the chief exponents of
SlOV1a;k nationalism; their dbjectives were national in scope,
but they aimed at a higher standard of living and, hence,
their aims were social and oultural as well as political.

�66

SLOVAKIA

This, then, is proof of the existence of truly democratic
ideals among iSlova.k classes.
1D uring the 19th .c entury, the Slov.aiks repeatedly attempted to oome to an undeMtanding with the Magyars,
but the rulers refused to grant their subjects local selfgovernment within the confines of the kingdom. As a direct consequence of their failure .to secUTe national recognition, the Slovaks resolved on a cultural program which
was designed for a 1ong range future with the hope that
this ,w ould prepare them for the opportune moment in the_ir
history when .they would inevi.taJbly emerge ru, a f,uH-fledged
natioo.al state.
Obstacles in the way of the cultural development of
the 'Slovaks were constantly placed "by state authorities rwho
were determined to destroy all vestiges of a national tra.,
dition ainong the tVarious nationalities in the kingdom except those of the Ma:gyar nation. Inspired by their c-hauvinistic mood, the Magyars, following their union with
Austria in 1867, closed a:11 schools, suppressed the Slovak
Institute (Matica 'Slovenska), imprisoned leading Slova!ks
in s•ocia:l, political, educational and cultural life, and made
Ma:gyar the sole official language in Hungary.
Despite official proscription of all non-Magyar acti-·
vities in Hungary, the struggle for national survival in
Slovakia went on for more than a century. And even after
1918 the Slovaks resumed the struggle for their national
rights to self-government and self-determination in the
first Czecho--Slova'k Republic. In their unending fight for
political freedom and national equality, the Sl()lVaJks attained a high degree of! eoonomic self-sufficiency and
reached a new high in cultural and social ,p rogress,, scarcely equalled by any small nation in Europe in so short a
time and under such unfavorable circumstances.
In the first Czecho-&gt;Slovak Republic, the Slovaks were
forced to defend their national individuality against the
officiail attempt of the Czechs to suJbmerge their native
Sl-ovaJk origin in an artificial ideological "Czechoslovak"
nationality. Moreover, due to. the economic crisis in the joint
republic of the Czechs and Slovruks, ten per cent of the
latter emigrated to foreign lands to seek a livelihood.

�SLOVAKIA

67

At last, the inte:maticmal situation in the fall of 1938
gave the Slova,k,s their long-.awaited opportunity to secure
their nati01I1al aiutonomy on October 6, 1938, for which they
had hoped in vain for a score of years during the life-time
of the first Ozecho-lSlo:vruk Republic and during the thous-·
and-yeair-rule o:f the Hungarian 'State.
Post-\Munich Cz-ooho-lSlova:kia disintegrated rapidly. The
Slov.aJks, lbhrootened ,w ith national extinction by being divided among their neig.hlbors as a protectorate of the German Reich, like Bohemia and Moravia, declared their independence on March 14, 1939, through their autonomous
national iparjiament in Bratislava. And when Poland and
Hungary recognilzed the ISlova;k ,State, Germany, after annexing Bohemia and Moravia, a1so recognized the newlycreated 8'lovak Republic. Before the outlbreak of hostilities
in the autumn of 19319, the 1S lovak Republic became a fuMfledged subject of international la:w. Many nations, including the U .IS.1S.R, not only gave their official recognition
to the new democratic state in central Europe and its de
jure goveirnrnent, ibut exchanged d1plomatic representatives
with the newly-.organi!Zed Slovak national state on the Danulbe in central Europe, henceforth to be known as the
Slovak Republic.
Neutrality was the national policy of the ,Slo,vak Republic in the second World War. The Slovaks were in graive
danger of national destruction, caurght as they were in
the midst of the mor.ta;l oombat .b etween the Germans and
Russians. Nevertheless, they continued to work for the
common welfiare of their new state, so, that the Slovruk RepubJic made unprecedented social, economic, industrial,
educational a:nd cultural ,progress.
1Slovaik coUeges were founded, the Slova;k lJIIliversity at
Bratislava made great progress, thousands of publications
and books were published yearly, literary and scientific
wo:i:iks appeared in lailge numlbers, living ·s tandards im•
proved considera;bly, ,s ocial and industrial relations reached
a new hltgh. So ,s pirited amd pros'Perous wes this new life
in their pwn !State that the SlovaJks really maJde history
in the short span of six years of self-rule in the 'Slovak
Republic.

�68

SLOVAKIA

All these facts have /been cited merely to show how a
small nation, freed from fore:ign domination, and then made
sulbject to the Ozechs, at last emerged as a self-governing
state, and demonstrated beyond a doubt that even in the
worst possible situation, that of war, this small nation
was aJble to .govern itself wisely and jusUy, ond become a
,p riosperous country and a worthy member of the family
of European nations.
The present Ozecho-1SJavak regime is far diffeJ"ent
from the first Czecho-iSlovak government that attempted to
Ozechi·ze the Slovaks and which refused to grant self-.gov-·
ernment to. them. The persistent fight of the Sloivak nation
for its_ rights for more than a century and a half has
1brought the 1Sl01Vaks some notewo-rthy gains, namely, a
high social and cultural standa.rrd, so that the Czechs today must treat them as equals, not as the Czech politiciruis
treated them during the years 19118-•19,38, when they looked
down upon the Slovaks as an inferior race. What the future
rcla,tions between the Czechs and Slovaks will be uncertain, although there are ,s igns of the rene;wal of another
Ozech attempt to force the old "Czechoslovak" ideoJogy
upon the SloivaJks who defiantly oppose this political heresy.
Whatever may be said of the bitterness of the opposition
of the Sloiva'ks in the 'Past, it is certain that this opposition in the future shall .be even greater, because the Slovaks proved their ability to govern themselves. The attempt
to fuse the Ozechs and Slovaks into one nation is just as
futile as the attempt to make .a united nation out of the
Swedes and the Norwegians.
Slovakia's e:iGperience has amply illustrated the ca;pabiiJ.ity of ,a small country, without the interference of power
interests, to work out her national destiny a,nd reach a
high standard of living and attain a high degree of culture. This she was ,a ble to do solely through the persevering
efforts of her native sons who were inspired to w&lt;mk in the
interests of their country and mankind. That the Slovaiks
were newcomers on the world's political st.age did not alter the fact that they accomplished a worthwhile feait, one
that merits the admiration of the whole civmzed world,
for they created their own national state, a creation at the
1

�SI..JOVAK.IA

69

same time of their innate skill and their social, oulturlrl
and biological ,p owers as a. virile nation. This achievement
of an entire race assures the tSlovaiks a promising future
in the history of central Europe.
Nationalistic aspkations among ·t he Slovaks were not
a new thing, for they had cherished their naUve historic
traditions for centuries /before they blossomed into the full
bloom of statehood in the spring of 1939. The dormant
creative energies of a people, kept in political :bondage fol"
a thousand years, were suddenly released and, behold, the
Sloviaks erected a monumental and amazingly beautiful national edifice, known forever in history as. the SlovaJk Republic!
The miraculous ·CTeation of the Slovak national movement, namely, the tSlo;vak State, was truly the greatest
achievement af the Slovak people in all history. And this
sha,U continue to inspire them in all their trials and vicissitudes in the .future, for the glorious memory of this brief
moment (}If freedom cannot be obliterated from the minds
of a gallant people who dedicated themselves to the cause
of democracy at the very daiwn af their naition's history.
Does this brief review of historic events in the national Hfe of Slovakia hiave any lesson for us? Perhaips, but
at any rate there are some very significant observations
to be deri!Ved fl'om this consideration. One of these is that
a small nation, building its own national culture, labors
under greater handica:ps than a large nation; and it must
work more intensely to secure its ,p roper place in the social and cultural life of nations. That is why small nations
which eD'joy national independence generally have a high
cultural standard ,t hat is borne out by statistics which
show that, as a rule, they have ·a much smaller percentage of illiterates than the larger nations. fu a small nation, the conditions are lacking for creaiting widely divergent social classes which a.rise from the formation of huge
capitalistic monopolies. For that reason, too, the socia:l or~
der in small nations is far more democratic by its· very nature than thait of large countries, and certainly far less
complex.
'Small states are oonstaintly aware of the imperative

�SLOVAKIA

70

necessity of maintaining high social and cultural standards
and, consequently, the individual citi,z en feels his personal
responsilbility more keenly than the average citi'zen of a
large country. Every ,p rivate citi~n of a small state knows
to •w hat extent his country depends on hi:rn and, hence,
seeks to make a personal contribution to his society. In the
economic field, a small nation cannot afford to emlbark
on a large ex-pansion program that ultimately leads to
overproduction. Every parcel of land must be made productive and new scientific methods. must lbe constantly
introduced into agriculture. 'I1his system of mtensi;ve farming is vitally necessaxy to th~ international economy of an
overpopulated Europe.
!Social, 'Political, economic, or cultural experiments may
be tried with greater safety ,b y sman nations, rfor large
nations cannot exiperiment in these fieJds without endangering the very existence of their entire system ,o f government and nationra1 economy. Moreover, there is less danger
for the usurpation of porwer in a smalf state, 1becau.se the
goal of a111y particular political trend is eaJSHy detected in
its incipient stages. In short, a small country is more easily
manaiged, and by its very nature is more democratic than
a large state.
'I1here are many added advantages that small states
have. Not the least among them is the one that small nations are not confined rwithin the narrow limits of a non-·
creatiive and non-progres,s ive traditionalism that hinders
progress and shuts the door on new ideas. But for humanity the most significant of all is the fact that the small
nations cannot harbor imperialistic aims and, for that
reason, they concentrate all their resources and energies
on cultural and economic endeavor. T,hi,s alone justifies
the existence of small nations whioh have a natural right
to be founded and maintained. Small states ca:n well be-·
come the greatest boon for civilization.
The !bitter ex:periences of two World Wars in quick succession haive clearly shorwn that, sooner or later, the world
must recognize as an incontrovertible principle that eve;ry
nation has a right to its national existence unde,r its own
state ,government. Complete equality of all European na1

�SLOVAK.IA

71

tion.s, which are willing to cooperate for universal and 1per~
manent peace among the nations of the world, rmust be the
basic principle of civiililzation and the ideal of every national culture. Until this universal ideal is reali~ed, the
small nations must persevere in their struggle to attain or
maintain their statehood, as the ca.se may be. The middlesized and great nations of Europe, which have ,repeatedly
suffered the ravages of war and have just experienced
the worst disaster in all history, ought to support the cause
of the small states if they hope to preserve our modern
civilization and, ,w hat is more important, save humanity
from total exUnction.
Today - ten years after the termination of the Great
War - the situation in Europe is well nigh hopeless cul~
turally, as it is economically. There is a real danger of
losing the priceless 01.cltural heritage that has been the
pride of Western ·E urope for centuries. lit is the ,g rave responsi'bility of those in power to work honestly and fear•
lessly for the preservaition of the high cultural values oi
European cirvilization and, through international cooperation among the natiolllS that oherish this age-old inheritance, inaugurate an era of genuine democracy for the
peoples of Euroipe, for this alone can save IDurope from
complete ruin and decay.
We who cherish our Western heritage still have the
will and courage to 1preserve it from destruction and we
. have high hopes of restoring it to its former ,p restige under the inspiration of true democracy, but we need the
wholehearted support of all democratic for-c es throughout
the world. If we unite these forces, we can revive the sparlk
of life in the smouldering ruins of Europe and save European culture from spiritual ana'.I1chy and desolation. There
is still .time, hut only predous little ,t ime, for time is running out. It is the eleventh hour. If we do not act at once,
all will be lost for a long time to come .

•

•

•

REOOMMENDED BOOKS: "The Slorvaiks" (Juirchak
$3.00; SLOVAK FOR BEGINNERS" (Books I-ill!) $1.50
(the set) ; "Htrdbailr's English-Slovak Dictioniary" $4.00;

"SLOVAK LIESSONS" (!Hrdbak) $3.50.

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1337">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA

63

THE SIGNIFICA NCE OF SMALL NATIONS
Dr. Henrich Bartek

Tonrmediate results of the first bloody, world-wide conflict, which ended in 191.8, were such conflicting principles
as: the right to se1f-determ ination, national sovereignty ,
ctrltural self-existen ce, buffer states and spheres of influence. At the sll!me time, small nations with national
aSpirations were blamed for igniting catastrophi c, international upheavals when, as a matter ,of fact, they were only
pawns in the internation al ,g ame of power 1politics in which
the greait nations engage from time to time for world domination.
The history of European nations and States during
the past century and a half demonstrat es clearly that when
small nations make marked social and cultural progress,
their desire for political independen ce - a national state of
their own - increases, in order to secure their future development as :a free people whose contributio ns are infinitely more valuable to civilization and progress when not
handioo.pped by foreign influences and ,p olitical subservienc e.
To accuse small countries of harboring imperialisti c
schemes is not historically correct, !because both world
wars were caused by intense rivalries among the great
powers of the world. It is interesting to note that the main
arguments against the existence of small nations as independent political states, according to the chief exponents of aggressi~e imperialism of the big ,powers, are their
smallness, their inaibility to protect themselves militarily
against their stronger neighlbors and to sustain themselves
eco111omically. ,F rom the standpoint of historical truth and
justice, however, it is always the bigger powers which are
at fault when they attempt to subjugate a smaH ,power by
brute force. It is significant that no cultural or .social ll!rguments are advanced against :the independen t existence of
small nations. '11he truth is that alil small nations are able
to hold their own and prove their ability in all fields of
human endeavor, if they are not molested by the greater
powers. lit is true that there are political, cultural and so-

�64

SLOVAKIA

cial differences among the several small nations and t:hat
their living standards differ, too-, but we find these same
differences even in the larger nations and states. Hence,
one cannot rightfully determine the right to independen t
statehood for SIITlaill. nations merely by such superficial arguments. And who shall say that only the large and mighty
nations and states shall possess the right to freedom and
independen ce?
In the last war, neith·e r France nor Poland were a!ble to
defend themselves successfull y - and they a·r e not small
nations. If one were to limit the right to statehood on military might, then on:ly those states and nations which could
maintain their independen ce against the most powerf.ul nation o.r state would have a "right" to exist. In that case,
Europe would pass out of existence.
Before World War ill, half the European continent
was dominated iby three major powers - Great Britain,
Germany and Russia. The other half of Europe was divided
into large, middle-size d and small states. That was the true
face of the map of Europe; and nothing can change the
historic reality that there exists considerabl y more than
a score of different nationalitie s on the Continent. In
charting the future course of Europe, we must fake into
account the national aspirations of these historic ,peoples,
who look forward to the historic future as a united people
with rights to political freedom and statehood. 'Dhis holds
equally true for all nations, the large and the small. The
question may arise, hoiWever, whether the recognition of
smaU states is for the betterment of mankind and for the
emlbellishm ent of European culture, or whether it may turn
out to be a detriment to modern civilization .
The political and national states which exist as such
at present are recognized ; their right to statehood is not
questioned. For example, the Norwegian s, Finns, Swiss,
Danes, and even the Albanians are officially conceded the
right to an independen t political status. After Wocld War
I, the Baltic !States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were
orga:ni~ as independen t, political states as called for by
the princuple of nationail self-determ ination. Other nationalities, less fortunate and sulbject to power politics, were

�SLOVAKIA

66

forced to aissert their :right to statehood. Thus, the Slovenes, a highly cultured nation with a pop_ulation larger
than the Alibanians, failed to organize their own national
State .because of geopolitical reasons. And as long as aggressive militarism and imperialism hold sway in European
politics, the Slovenes will. not be able to establish their
natural right to national independence. In 1918, they chose
lo become incorporated in the kingdom of Yugoslavia for
reasons of self-preservation and security. Nevertheless, this
united southern Slavic monarchy -proved incapable of reJ
sistinig German aggression in 1941.
lt is not at all certain that the Slovenes, or other small
nations, would clamor for complete independence, although
this is the ideal of all peoP'les -w ith national traditions and
a common language, iif international relations iwere.,. founded
on genuine democratic prindples of justice and mutual
welfare. There are many similar cases in the history of
Eurapea,n nationalities. A typical case is that of Slovalkia
which has made 1great strides in its cultural, social, and political life. The :Slovaks, as a progressive and democraticminded people, are an idool representative of all the small
nations of central and eastern Europe.

Slovakia -

a Democratic Nation

At the close of the 18th century when feudal Hungary,
which h.ad been ruled for centuries by pri'Vileged classes
without oonsideratiOIIl of national origin, began to change
its tradition of supra-nationalism into a national Magyar
statism, the various nationalities, moved by their instinct
of self..ip.reservation, naturally resisted the new Magyarization program. Accordingly, the Slova:ks intensified their
efforts to promote the study of their own ancient native
language and national traditions. Slovruk aristocrats, unfortunately, aJbandoned their nationru traditions and succumbed to the Magyar influence for fear of losing their
old prerogatives as members of the nobility. The Slovak
common people, however, became the chief exponents of
SlOV1a;k nationalism; their dbjectives were national in scope,
but they aimed at a higher standard of living and, hence,
their aims were social and oultural as well as political.

�66

SLOVAKIA

This, then, is proof of the existence of truly democratic
ideals among iSlova.k classes.
1D uring the 19th .c entury, the Slov.aiks repeatedly attempted to oome to an undeMtanding with the Magyars,
but the rulers refused to grant their subjects local selfgovernment within the confines of the kingdom. As a direct consequence of their failure .to secUTe national recognition, the Slovaks resolved on a cultural program which
was designed for a 1ong range future with the hope that
this ,w ould prepare them for the opportune moment in the_ir
history when .they would inevi.taJbly emerge ru, a f,uH-fledged
natioo.al state.
Obstacles in the way of the cultural development of
the 'Slovaks were constantly placed "by state authorities rwho
were determined to destroy all vestiges of a national tra.,
dition ainong the tVarious nationalities in the kingdom except those of the Ma:gyar nation. Inspired by their c-hauvinistic mood, the Magyars, following their union with
Austria in 1867, closed a:11 schools, suppressed the Slovak
Institute (Matica 'Slovenska), imprisoned leading Slova!ks
in s•ocia:l, political, educational and cultural life, and made
Ma:gyar the sole official language in Hungary.
Despite official proscription of all non-Magyar acti-·
vities in Hungary, the struggle for national survival in
Slovakia went on for more than a century. And even after
1918 the Slovaks resumed the struggle for their national
rights to self-government and self-determination in the
first Czecho--Slova'k Republic. In their unending fight for
political freedom and national equality, the Sl()lVaJks attained a high degree of! eoonomic self-sufficiency and
reached a new high in cultural and social ,p rogress,, scarcely equalled by any small nation in Europe in so short a
time and under such unfavorable circumstances.
In the first Czecho-&gt;Slovak Republic, the Slovaks were
forced to defend their national individuality against the
officiail attempt of the Czechs to suJbmerge their native
Sl-ovaJk origin in an artificial ideological "Czechoslovak"
nationality. Moreover, due to. the economic crisis in the joint
republic of the Czechs and Slovruks, ten per cent of the
latter emigrated to foreign lands to seek a livelihood.

�SLOVAKIA

67

At last, the inte:maticmal situation in the fall of 1938
gave the Slova,k,s their long-.awaited opportunity to secure
their nati01I1al aiutonomy on October 6, 1938, for which they
had hoped in vain for a score of years during the life-time
of the first Ozecho-lSlo:vruk Republic and during the thous-·
and-yeair-rule o:f the Hungarian 'State.
Post-\Munich Cz-ooho-lSlova:kia disintegrated rapidly. The
Slov.aJks, lbhrootened ,w ith national extinction by being divided among their neig.hlbors as a protectorate of the German Reich, like Bohemia and Moravia, declared their independence on March 14, 1939, through their autonomous
national iparjiament in Bratislava. And when Poland and
Hungary recognilzed the ISlova;k ,State, Germany, after annexing Bohemia and Moravia, a1so recognized the newlycreated 8'lovak Republic. Before the outlbreak of hostilities
in the autumn of 19319, the 1S lovak Republic became a fuMfledged subject of international la:w. Many nations, including the U .IS.1S.R, not only gave their official recognition
to the new democratic state in central Europe and its de
jure goveirnrnent, ibut exchanged d1plomatic representatives
with the newly-.organi!Zed Slovak national state on the Danulbe in central Europe, henceforth to be known as the
Slovak Republic.
Neutrality was the national policy of the ,Slo,vak Republic in the second World War. The Slovaks were in graive
danger of national destruction, caurght as they were in
the midst of the mor.ta;l oombat .b etween the Germans and
Russians. Nevertheless, they continued to work for the
common welfiare of their new state, so, that the Slovruk RepubJic made unprecedented social, economic, industrial,
educational a:nd cultural ,progress.
1Slovaik coUeges were founded, the Slova;k lJIIliversity at
Bratislava made great progress, thousands of publications
and books were published yearly, literary and scientific
wo:i:iks appeared in lailge numlbers, living ·s tandards im•
proved considera;bly, ,s ocial and industrial relations reached
a new hltgh. So ,s pirited amd pros'Perous wes this new life
in their pwn !State that the SlovaJks really maJde history
in the short span of six years of self-rule in the 'Slovak
Republic.

�68

SLOVAKIA

All these facts have /been cited merely to show how a
small nation, freed from fore:ign domination, and then made
sulbject to the Ozechs, at last emerged as a self-governing
state, and demonstrated beyond a doubt that even in the
worst possible situation, that of war, this small nation
was aJble to .govern itself wisely and jusUy, ond become a
,p riosperous country and a worthy member of the family
of European nations.
The present Ozecho-1SJavak regime is far diffeJ"ent
from the first Czecho-iSlovak government that attempted to
Ozechi·ze the Slovaks and which refused to grant self-.gov-·
ernment to. them. The persistent fight of the Sloivak nation
for its_ rights for more than a century and a half has
1brought the 1Sl01Vaks some notewo-rthy gains, namely, a
high social and cultural standa.rrd, so that the Czechs today must treat them as equals, not as the Czech politiciruis
treated them during the years 19118-•19,38, when they looked
down upon the Slovaks as an inferior race. What the future
rcla,tions between the Czechs and Slovaks will be uncertain, although there are ,s igns of the rene;wal of another
Ozech attempt to force the old "Czechoslovak" ideoJogy
upon the SloivaJks who defiantly oppose this political heresy.
Whatever may be said of the bitterness of the opposition
of the Sloiva'ks in the 'Past, it is certain that this opposition in the future shall .be even greater, because the Slovaks proved their ability to govern themselves. The attempt
to fuse the Ozechs and Slovaks into one nation is just as
futile as the attempt to make .a united nation out of the
Swedes and the Norwegians.
Slovakia's e:iGperience has amply illustrated the ca;pabiiJ.ity of ,a small country, without the interference of power
interests, to work out her national destiny a,nd reach a
high standard of living and attain a high degree of culture. This she was ,a ble to do solely through the persevering
efforts of her native sons who were inspired to w&lt;mk in the
interests of their country and mankind. That the Slovaiks
were newcomers on the world's political st.age did not alter the fact that they accomplished a worthwhile feait, one
that merits the admiration of the whole civmzed world,
for they created their own national state, a creation at the
1

�SI..JOVAK.IA

69

same time of their innate skill and their social, oulturlrl
and biological ,p owers as a. virile nation. This achievement
of an entire race assures the tSlovaiks a promising future
in the history of central Europe.
Nationalistic aspkations among ·t he Slovaks were not
a new thing, for they had cherished their naUve historic
traditions for centuries /before they blossomed into the full
bloom of statehood in the spring of 1939. The dormant
creative energies of a people, kept in political :bondage fol"
a thousand years, were suddenly released and, behold, the
Sloviaks erected a monumental and amazingly beautiful national edifice, known forever in history as. the SlovaJk Republic!
The miraculous ·CTeation of the Slovak national movement, namely, the tSlo;vak State, was truly the greatest
achievement af the Slovak people in all history. And this
sha,U continue to inspire them in all their trials and vicissitudes in the .future, for the glorious memory of this brief
moment (}If freedom cannot be obliterated from the minds
of a gallant people who dedicated themselves to the cause
of democracy at the very daiwn af their naition's history.
Does this brief review of historic events in the national Hfe of Slovakia hiave any lesson for us? Perhaips, but
at any rate there are some very significant observations
to be deri!Ved fl'om this consideration. One of these is that
a small nation, building its own national culture, labors
under greater handica:ps than a large nation; and it must
work more intensely to secure its ,p roper place in the social and cultural life of nations. That is why small nations
which eD'joy national independence generally have a high
cultural standard ,t hat is borne out by statistics which
show that, as a rule, they have ·a much smaller percentage of illiterates than the larger nations. fu a small nation, the conditions are lacking for creaiting widely divergent social classes which a.rise from the formation of huge
capitalistic monopolies. For that reason, too, the socia:l or~
der in small nations is far more democratic by its· very nature than thait of large countries, and certainly far less
complex.
'Small states are oonstaintly aware of the imperative

�SLOVAKIA

70

necessity of maintaining high social and cultural standards
and, consequently, the individual citi,z en feels his personal
responsilbility more keenly than the average citi'zen of a
large country. Every ,p rivate citi~n of a small state knows
to •w hat extent his country depends on hi:rn and, hence,
seeks to make a personal contribution to his society. In the
economic field, a small nation cannot afford to emlbark
on a large ex-pansion program that ultimately leads to
overproduction. Every parcel of land must be made productive and new scientific methods. must lbe constantly
introduced into agriculture. 'I1his system of mtensi;ve farming is vitally necessaxy to th~ international economy of an
overpopulated Europe.
!Social, 'Political, economic, or cultural experiments may
be tried with greater safety ,b y sman nations, rfor large
nations cannot exiperiment in these fieJds without endangering the very existence of their entire system ,o f government and nationra1 economy. Moreover, there is less danger
for the usurpation of porwer in a smalf state, 1becau.se the
goal of a111y particular political trend is eaJSHy detected in
its incipient stages. In short, a small country is more easily
manaiged, and by its very nature is more democratic than
a large state.
'I1here are many added advantages that small states
have. Not the least among them is the one that small nations are not confined rwithin the narrow limits of a non-·
creatiive and non-progres,s ive traditionalism that hinders
progress and shuts the door on new ideas. But for humanity the most significant of all is the fact that the small
nations cannot harbor imperialistic aims and, for that
reason, they concentrate all their resources and energies
on cultural and economic endeavor. T,hi,s alone justifies
the existence of small nations whioh have a natural right
to be founded and maintained. Small states ca:n well be-·
come the greatest boon for civilization.
The !bitter ex:periences of two World Wars in quick succession haive clearly shorwn that, sooner or later, the world
must recognize as an incontrovertible principle that eve;ry
nation has a right to its national existence unde,r its own
state ,government. Complete equality of all European na1

�SLOVAK.IA

71

tion.s, which are willing to cooperate for universal and 1per~
manent peace among the nations of the world, rmust be the
basic principle of civiililzation and the ideal of every national culture. Until this universal ideal is reali~ed, the
small nations must persevere in their struggle to attain or
maintain their statehood, as the ca.se may be. The middlesized and great nations of Europe, which have ,repeatedly
suffered the ravages of war and have just experienced
the worst disaster in all history, ought to support the cause
of the small states if they hope to preserve our modern
civilization and, ,w hat is more important, save humanity
from total exUnction.
Today - ten years after the termination of the Great
War - the situation in Europe is well nigh hopeless cul~
turally, as it is economically. There is a real danger of
losing the priceless 01.cltural heritage that has been the
pride of Western ·E urope for centuries. lit is the ,g rave responsi'bility of those in power to work honestly and fear•
lessly for the preservaition of the high cultural values oi
European cirvilization and, through international cooperation among the natiolllS that oherish this age-old inheritance, inaugurate an era of genuine democracy for the
peoples of Euroipe, for this alone can save IDurope from
complete ruin and decay.
We who cherish our Western heritage still have the
will and courage to 1preserve it from destruction and we
. have high hopes of restoring it to its former ,p restige under the inspiration of true democracy, but we need the
wholehearted support of all democratic for-c es throughout
the world. If we unite these forces, we can revive the sparlk
of life in the smouldering ruins of Europe and save European culture from spiritual ana'.I1chy and desolation. There
is still .time, hut only predous little ,t ime, for time is running out. It is the eleventh hour. If we do not act at once,
all will be lost for a long time to come .

•

•

•

REOOMMENDED BOOKS: "The Slorvaiks" (Juirchak
$3.00; SLOVAK FOR BEGINNERS" (Books I-ill!) $1.50
(the set) ; "Htrdbailr's English-Slovak Dictioniary" $4.00;

"SLOVAK LIESSONS" (!Hrdbak) $3.50.

�</text>
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                  <text>1955, Vol. 5</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
63&#13;
&#13;
THE SIGNIFICA NCE OF SMALL NATIONS&#13;
Dr. Henrich Bartek&#13;
&#13;
Tonrmediate results of the first bloody, world-wide conflict, which ended in 191.8, were such conflicting principles&#13;
as: the right to se1f-determ ination, national sovereignty ,&#13;
ctrltural self-existen ce, buffer states and spheres of influence. At the sll!me time, small nations with national&#13;
aSpirations were blamed for igniting catastrophi c, international upheavals when, as a matter ,of fact, they were only&#13;
pawns in the internation al ,g ame of power 1politics in which&#13;
the greait nations engage from time to time for world domination.&#13;
The history of European nations and States during&#13;
the past century and a half demonstrat es clearly that when&#13;
small nations make marked social and cultural progress,&#13;
their desire for political independen ce - a national state of&#13;
their own - increases, in order to secure their future development as :a free people whose contributio ns are infinitely more valuable to civilization and progress when not&#13;
handioo.pped by foreign influences and ,p olitical subservienc e.&#13;
To accuse small countries of harboring imperialisti c&#13;
schemes is not historically correct, !because both world&#13;
wars were caused by intense rivalries among the great&#13;
powers of the world. It is interesting to note that the main&#13;
arguments against the existence of small nations as independent political states, according to the chief exponents of aggressi~e imperialism of the big ,powers, are their&#13;
smallness, their inaibility to protect themselves militarily&#13;
against their stronger neighlbors and to sustain themselves&#13;
eco111omically. ,F rom the standpoint of historical truth and&#13;
justice, however, it is always the bigger powers which are&#13;
at fault when they attempt to subjugate a smaH ,power by&#13;
brute force. It is significant that no cultural or .social ll!rguments are advanced against :the independen t existence of&#13;
small nations. '11he truth is that alil small nations are able&#13;
to hold their own and prove their ability in all fields of&#13;
human endeavor, if they are not molested by the greater&#13;
powers. lit is true that there are political, cultural and so-&#13;
&#13;
64&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
cial differences among the several small nations and t:hat&#13;
their living standards differ, too-, but we find these same&#13;
differences even in the larger nations and states. Hence,&#13;
one cannot rightfully determine the right to independen t&#13;
statehood for SIITlaill. nations merely by such superficial arguments. And who shall say that only the large and mighty&#13;
nations and states shall possess the right to freedom and&#13;
independen ce?&#13;
In the last war, neith·e r France nor Poland were a!ble to&#13;
defend themselves successfull y - and they a·r e not small&#13;
nations. If one were to limit the right to statehood on military might, then on:ly those states and nations which could&#13;
maintain their independen ce against the most powerf.ul nation o.r state would have a "right" to exist. In that case,&#13;
Europe would pass out of existence.&#13;
Before World War ill, half the European continent&#13;
was dominated iby three major powers - Great Britain,&#13;
Germany and Russia. The other half of Europe was divided&#13;
into large, middle-size d and small states. That was the true&#13;
face of the map of Europe; and nothing can change the&#13;
historic reality that there exists considerabl y more than&#13;
a score of different nationalitie s on the Continent. In&#13;
charting the future course of Europe, we must fake into&#13;
account the national aspirations of these historic ,peoples,&#13;
who look forward to the historic future as a united people&#13;
with rights to political freedom and statehood. 'Dhis holds&#13;
equally true for all nations, the large and the small. The&#13;
question may arise, hoiWever, whether the recognition of&#13;
smaU states is for the betterment of mankind and for the&#13;
emlbellishm ent of European culture, or whether it may turn&#13;
out to be a detriment to modern civilization .&#13;
The political and national states which exist as such&#13;
at present are recognized ; their right to statehood is not&#13;
questioned. For example, the Norwegian s, Finns, Swiss,&#13;
Danes, and even the Albanians are officially conceded the&#13;
right to an independen t political status. After Wocld War&#13;
I, the Baltic !States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were&#13;
orga:ni~ as independen t, political states as called for by&#13;
the princuple of nationail self-determ ination. Other nationalities, less fortunate and sulbject to power politics, were&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
66&#13;
&#13;
forced to aissert their :right to statehood. Thus, the Slovenes, a highly cultured nation with a pop_ulation larger&#13;
than the Alibanians, failed to organize their own national&#13;
State .because of geopolitical reasons. And as long as aggressive militarism and imperialism hold sway in European&#13;
politics, the Slovenes will. not be able to establish their&#13;
natural right to national independence. In 1918, they chose&#13;
lo become incorporated in the kingdom of Yugoslavia for&#13;
reasons of self-preservation and security. Nevertheless, this&#13;
united southern Slavic monarchy -proved incapable of reJ&#13;
sistinig German aggression in 1941.&#13;
lt is not at all certain that the Slovenes, or other small&#13;
nations, would clamor for complete independence, although&#13;
this is the ideal of all peoP'les -w ith national traditions and&#13;
a common language, iif international relations iwere.,. founded&#13;
on genuine democratic prindples of justice and mutual&#13;
welfare. There are many similar cases in the history of&#13;
Eurapea,n nationalities. A typical case is that of Slovalkia&#13;
which has made 1great strides in its cultural, social, and political life. The :Slovaks, as a progressive and democraticminded people, are an idool representative of all the small&#13;
nations of central and eastern Europe.&#13;
&#13;
Slovakia -&#13;
&#13;
a Democratic Nation&#13;
&#13;
At the close of the 18th century when feudal Hungary,&#13;
which h.ad been ruled for centuries by pri'Vileged classes&#13;
without oonsideratiOIIl of national origin, began to change&#13;
its tradition of supra-nationalism into a national Magyar&#13;
statism, the various nationalities, moved by their instinct&#13;
of self..ip.reservation, naturally resisted the new Magyarization program. Accordingly, the Slova:ks intensified their&#13;
efforts to promote the study of their own ancient native&#13;
language and national traditions. Slovruk aristocrats, unfortunately, aJbandoned their nationru traditions and succumbed to the Magyar influence for fear of losing their&#13;
old prerogatives as members of the nobility. The Slovak&#13;
common people, however, became the chief exponents of&#13;
SlOV1a;k nationalism; their dbjectives were national in scope,&#13;
but they aimed at a higher standard of living and, hence,&#13;
their aims were social and oultural as well as political.&#13;
&#13;
66&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
This, then, is proof of the existence of truly democratic&#13;
ideals among iSlova.k classes.&#13;
1D uring the 19th .c entury, the Slov.aiks repeatedly attempted to oome to an undeMtanding with the Magyars,&#13;
but the rulers refused to grant their subjects local selfgovernment within the confines of the kingdom. As a direct consequence of their failure .to secUTe national recognition, the Slovaks resolved on a cultural program which&#13;
was designed for a 1ong range future with the hope that&#13;
this ,w ould prepare them for the opportune moment in the_ir&#13;
history when .they would inevi.taJbly emerge ru, a f,uH-fledged&#13;
natioo.al state.&#13;
Obstacles in the way of the cultural development of&#13;
the 'Slovaks were constantly placed "by state authorities rwho&#13;
were determined to destroy all vestiges of a national tra.,&#13;
dition ainong the tVarious nationalities in the kingdom except those of the Ma:gyar nation. Inspired by their c-hauvinistic mood, the Magyars, following their union with&#13;
Austria in 1867, closed a:11 schools, suppressed the Slovak&#13;
Institute (Matica 'Slovenska), imprisoned leading Slova!ks&#13;
in s•ocia:l, political, educational and cultural life, and made&#13;
Ma:gyar the sole official language in Hungary.&#13;
Despite official proscription of all non-Magyar acti-·&#13;
vities in Hungary, the struggle for national survival in&#13;
Slovakia went on for more than a century. And even after&#13;
1918 the Slovaks resumed the struggle for their national&#13;
rights to self-government and self-determination in the&#13;
first Czecho--Slova'k Republic. In their unending fight for&#13;
political freedom and national equality, the Sl()lVaJks attained a high degree of! eoonomic self-sufficiency and&#13;
reached a new high in cultural and social ,p rogress,, scarcely equalled by any small nation in Europe in so short a&#13;
time and under such unfavorable circumstances.&#13;
In the first Czecho-&gt;Slovak Republic, the Slovaks were&#13;
forced to defend their national individuality against the&#13;
officiail attempt of the Czechs to suJbmerge their native&#13;
Sl-ovaJk origin in an artificial ideological "Czechoslovak"&#13;
nationality. Moreover, due to. the economic crisis in the joint&#13;
republic of the Czechs and Slovruks, ten per cent of the&#13;
latter emigrated to foreign lands to seek a livelihood.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
67&#13;
&#13;
At last, the inte:maticmal situation in the fall of 1938&#13;
gave the Slova,k,s their long-.awaited opportunity to secure&#13;
their nati01I1al aiutonomy on October 6, 1938, for which they&#13;
had hoped in vain for a score of years during the life-time&#13;
of the first Ozecho-lSlo:vruk Republic and during the thous-·&#13;
and-yeair-rule o:f the Hungarian 'State.&#13;
Post-\Munich Cz-ooho-lSlova:kia disintegrated rapidly. The&#13;
Slov.aJks, lbhrootened ,w ith national extinction by being divided among their neig.hlbors as a protectorate of the German Reich, like Bohemia and Moravia, declared their independence on March 14, 1939, through their autonomous&#13;
national iparjiament in Bratislava. And when Poland and&#13;
Hungary recognilzed the ISlova;k ,State, Germany, after annexing Bohemia and Moravia, a1so recognized the newlycreated 8'lovak Republic. Before the outlbreak of hostilities&#13;
in the autumn of 19319, the 1S lovak Republic became a fuMfledged subject of international la:w. Many nations, including the U .IS.1S.R, not only gave their official recognition&#13;
to the new democratic state in central Europe and its de&#13;
jure goveirnrnent, ibut exchanged d1plomatic representatives&#13;
with the newly-.organi!Zed Slovak national state on the Danulbe in central Europe, henceforth to be known as the&#13;
Slovak Republic.&#13;
Neutrality was the national policy of the ,Slo,vak Republic in the second World War. The Slovaks were in graive&#13;
danger of national destruction, caurght as they were in&#13;
the midst of the mor.ta;l oombat .b etween the Germans and&#13;
Russians. Nevertheless, they continued to work for the&#13;
common welfiare of their new state, so, that the Slovruk RepubJic made unprecedented social, economic, industrial,&#13;
educational a:nd cultural ,progress.&#13;
1Slovaik coUeges were founded, the Slova;k lJIIliversity at&#13;
Bratislava made great progress, thousands of publications&#13;
and books were published yearly, literary and scientific&#13;
wo:i:iks appeared in lailge numlbers, living ·s tandards im•&#13;
proved considera;bly, ,s ocial and industrial relations reached&#13;
a new hltgh. So ,s pirited amd pros'Perous wes this new life&#13;
in their pwn !State that the SlovaJks really maJde history&#13;
in the short span of six years of self-rule in the 'Slovak&#13;
Republic.&#13;
&#13;
68&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
All these facts have /been cited merely to show how a&#13;
small nation, freed from fore:ign domination, and then made&#13;
sulbject to the Ozechs, at last emerged as a self-governing&#13;
state, and demonstrated beyond a doubt that even in the&#13;
worst possible situation, that of war, this small nation&#13;
was aJble to .govern itself wisely and jusUy, ond become a&#13;
,p riosperous country and a worthy member of the family&#13;
of European nations.&#13;
The present Ozecho-1SJavak regime is far diffeJ"ent&#13;
from the first Czecho-iSlovak government that attempted to&#13;
Ozechi·ze the Slovaks and which refused to grant self-.gov-·&#13;
ernment to. them. The persistent fight of the Sloivak nation&#13;
for its_ rights for more than a century and a half has&#13;
1brought the 1Sl01Vaks some notewo-rthy gains, namely, a&#13;
high social and cultural standa.rrd, so that the Czechs today must treat them as equals, not as the Czech politiciruis&#13;
treated them during the years 19118-•19,38, when they looked&#13;
down upon the Slovaks as an inferior race. What the future&#13;
rcla,tions between the Czechs and Slovaks will be uncertain, although there are ,s igns of the rene;wal of another&#13;
Ozech attempt to force the old "Czechoslovak" ideoJogy&#13;
upon the SloivaJks who defiantly oppose this political heresy.&#13;
Whatever may be said of the bitterness of the opposition&#13;
of the Sloiva'ks in the 'Past, it is certain that this opposition in the future shall .be even greater, because the Slovaks proved their ability to govern themselves. The attempt&#13;
to fuse the Ozechs and Slovaks into one nation is just as&#13;
futile as the attempt to make .a united nation out of the&#13;
Swedes and the Norwegians.&#13;
Slovakia's e:iGperience has amply illustrated the ca;pabiiJ.ity of ,a small country, without the interference of power&#13;
interests, to work out her national destiny a,nd reach a&#13;
high standard of living and attain a high degree of culture. This she was ,a ble to do solely through the persevering&#13;
efforts of her native sons who were inspired to w&lt;mk in the&#13;
interests of their country and mankind. That the Slovaiks&#13;
were newcomers on the world's political st.age did not alter the fact that they accomplished a worthwhile feait, one&#13;
that merits the admiration of the whole civmzed world,&#13;
for they created their own national state, a creation at the&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
SI..JOVAK.IA&#13;
&#13;
69&#13;
&#13;
same time of their innate skill and their social, oulturlrl&#13;
and biological ,p owers as a. virile nation. This achievement&#13;
of an entire race assures the tSlovaiks a promising future&#13;
in the history of central Europe.&#13;
Nationalistic aspkations among ·t he Slovaks were not&#13;
a new thing, for they had cherished their naUve historic&#13;
traditions for centuries /before they blossomed into the full&#13;
bloom of statehood in the spring of 1939. The dormant&#13;
creative energies of a people, kept in political :bondage fol"&#13;
a thousand years, were suddenly released and, behold, the&#13;
Sloviaks erected a monumental and amazingly beautiful national edifice, known forever in history as. the SlovaJk Republic!&#13;
The miraculous ·CTeation of the Slovak national movement, namely, the tSlo;vak State, was truly the greatest&#13;
achievement af the Slovak people in all history. And this&#13;
sha,U continue to inspire them in all their trials and vicissitudes in the .future, for the glorious memory of this brief&#13;
moment (}If freedom cannot be obliterated from the minds&#13;
of a gallant people who dedicated themselves to the cause&#13;
of democracy at the very daiwn af their naition's history.&#13;
Does this brief review of historic events in the national Hfe of Slovakia hiave any lesson for us? Perhaips, but&#13;
at any rate there are some very significant observations&#13;
to be deri!Ved fl'om this consideration. One of these is that&#13;
a small nation, building its own national culture, labors&#13;
under greater handica:ps than a large nation; and it must&#13;
work more intensely to secure its ,p roper place in the social and cultural life of nations. That is why small nations&#13;
which eD'joy national independence generally have a high&#13;
cultural standard ,t hat is borne out by statistics which&#13;
show that, as a rule, they have ·a much smaller percentage of illiterates than the larger nations. fu a small nation, the conditions are lacking for creaiting widely divergent social classes which a.rise from the formation of huge&#13;
capitalistic monopolies. For that reason, too, the socia:l or~&#13;
der in small nations is far more democratic by its· very nature than thait of large countries, and certainly far less&#13;
complex.&#13;
'Small states are oonstaintly aware of the imperative&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
70&#13;
&#13;
necessity of maintaining high social and cultural standards&#13;
and, consequently, the individual citi,z en feels his personal&#13;
responsilbility more keenly than the average citi'zen of a&#13;
large country. Every ,p rivate citi~n of a small state knows&#13;
to •w hat extent his country depends on hi:rn and, hence,&#13;
seeks to make a personal contribution to his society. In the&#13;
economic field, a small nation cannot afford to emlbark&#13;
on a large ex-pansion program that ultimately leads to&#13;
overproduction. Every parcel of land must be made productive and new scientific methods. must lbe constantly&#13;
introduced into agriculture. 'I1his system of mtensi;ve farming is vitally necessaxy to th~ international economy of an&#13;
overpopulated Europe.&#13;
!Social, 'Political, economic, or cultural experiments may&#13;
be tried with greater safety ,b y sman nations, rfor large&#13;
nations cannot exiperiment in these fieJds without endangering the very existence of their entire system ,o f government and nationra1 economy. Moreover, there is less danger&#13;
for the usurpation of porwer in a smalf state, 1becau.se the&#13;
goal of a111y particular political trend is eaJSHy detected in&#13;
its incipient stages. In short, a small country is more easily&#13;
manaiged, and by its very nature is more democratic than&#13;
a large state.&#13;
'I1here are many added advantages that small states&#13;
have. Not the least among them is the one that small nations are not confined rwithin the narrow limits of a non-·&#13;
creatiive and non-progres,s ive traditionalism that hinders&#13;
progress and shuts the door on new ideas. But for humanity the most significant of all is the fact that the small&#13;
nations cannot harbor imperialistic aims and, for that&#13;
reason, they concentrate all their resources and energies&#13;
on cultural and economic endeavor. T,hi,s alone justifies&#13;
the existence of small nations whioh have a natural right&#13;
to be founded and maintained. Small states ca:n well be-·&#13;
come the greatest boon for civilization.&#13;
The !bitter ex:periences of two World Wars in quick succession haive clearly shorwn that, sooner or later, the world&#13;
must recognize as an incontrovertible principle that eve;ry&#13;
nation has a right to its national existence unde,r its own&#13;
state ,government. Complete equality of all European na1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAK.IA&#13;
&#13;
71&#13;
&#13;
tion.s, which are willing to cooperate for universal and 1per~&#13;
manent peace among the nations of the world, rmust be the&#13;
basic principle of civiililzation and the ideal of every national culture. Until this universal ideal is reali~ed, the&#13;
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                <text>The Significance of Small Nations</text>
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                    <text>SLOVAK.IA

72

The Czecho-Slovak Exile
CZECH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND RED ESPIONAGE
Dr. Mi chael Zibrin

July of l91J5 found the "Council of Free Ozechoslovaki:a" just as July of J.ast year left it; without eleded of~
fi.cials, without elected representatives. This is because
the CoUIIld, during the 20-month period of its re-organi-.
zation, could not reach !any agreement and is operating on
a rotation system, i.e., eacth month ,a reipresentati:ve of a
diifferent political iparty se:rves as its executive head. This
proves what we had said b,e fore: the Council is a coillglomerate of people of quite different bmnds and that Lettrich' s exdamation two years ago - "Gentlemen, I think
only dollars keep us here together" - was and is still true.
The present chaos in the Council is caused partly by
the fact that political partie.s are coming to prevail more
than personalities, and the Councril -resembJ.es more and
more an enlarged National Front. The purpose of .t his article
is to revie;w the past policies and deeds of that part.yin the
CoU!Ilcil which did most to communize the o~ooho-1Slov•8Jk
Republic and prepare an easy Communist take-over in
1948. ,Such a review is necessitated by the shocking pulblic
deception that hias gained influentiral positions for the exile
members of th±s ,p arty. Reformed Communists and coUaiboratom can perform valuable functions, but in men who
deny their Olbvfous politic,al actions there can be no question of reform.
The most flagrant a,id to Communism was given by the
Czecho-iSlovak Social ·D emocratic party. In exile today, the
leaders of this panty are men who, by their open colfa,boration wit:h Stalin, p~ayed the most important ,part in the
bolsheviz;ation o,f Czecho-Slova&gt;k,i1a. These men have always
Etood very close to the Communists, even during small
political skirmishes like those occasion.any now among Zenkl,
Ripka, and Peroutka. Particularly after the Stalin-Benes
pact of 1943, they were the most efficient signers and executors of Benes':s bloody decrees, not reaHzing that, once
they had finished their jdbs for the Communists, the fate

�Sl.JOVAKIA

73

they had prepared for others wo'Ulld become their own.
History shows that aliready in 1928 the Soc,i al Demo.
cr:ats formulated their program thus: "Today as also in
the past we are decided to protect the Soviet Union against
any inimical action of the capitalistic governments and
against any counter-revolutionary attack." Nine years
earlier this belief had been realized in action. When Polish
General Pilsudski was fighting a bloody (battle with the
Communist ar-my near Wairsaw in 1920, the socialistic ma-·
jority in Prague forbade the transportation of military
material t.lirnugh ,Ozocho-1Slo,v0Jkia, despite the fact that
lhis material was sent by France and a French military
mi,s sion was at that time already in Prague. A yea,r earlier,
when General Stefanik telegraiphed a wairning to Prague
against Bolshevism as the greatest plague o!I' mankind a:nd
asked for uruty in tihe f.ight to destroy it, it was this same
Social Democratic Party whiclh - wit:h Masarylk's consent
- stopped Stefamk's program. Masaryk's consent is less
surprising when one remembers that he was actually among
the first to hail the Octo!ber Bolshevik Revolution in 1917,
which now in Prague !is considered fundamental to the ere.
ation of Ozecho-,Slovaki:a. Thus one couid go on ,w ithout
end and show that the Social Democratic party was an effective avant garde of Communism in Central Europe, not
only in Czecho-!Slovakia.
Certainly one of the most important persons in the
Czecho-!Slovak .Social Democratic party was V ojta Benes,
the oldest brother of the !:ate president. Gottwald officially,
on the Cabinet's decision (and Moscow's aippro,vail) , sent
him into West Germany in 1949, where he keipt in. regular
contact with Prague and acted more oir less ,a,s Gottwald's
unofficial ambassador. He did not conce·a l this fact, and
t he members of the "Council of Free Czechoslova!ld:a" knew
it. Therefore, many times, VojJa Benes took a different
position from the official Council and o;piposed some steps
undertaken by non.JSocialists in the Council.
Benes's brother passed away, ,but equally important
representatives remain, particularly: Vacl:av Majer, B. Vilem, the former Sec:retary-General of the Party, and the
ill-ifamed Bohumiil Lausman. Ailso, the Social Democratic
1

�74

SLOVAKIA

party has its two generalls, Sergei Ingr, and Hasal Niz!borJ
sky, and, jn Canada, the former minister Frantisek Nemec, who together with Hasal affected the cession of Ruthenia to .Stalin. To this party belongs also a Communist
famous in Europe, Milos Vanek, and some questionaJble individuals in Radio F,ree Europe in MUTI!ich. These are all
Czechs.
Milos Vanek, who is reported to hruve 1b een a charter
mem1ber of the "Czeohoslovak Communist Party," remained
an ardent adherent of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship even
after he 1had left that .p arty to ~me a left.;win.g Social
Democrat. I personaHy know Mr. Vanek and I must confirm that Vanek was one of the founders of the Communist Party in Europe. This is described in the book of Lu.
cien Laurat ",Du Komiintern au Kominfo·r m" (!Paris, France
Des 1'sles, 1'951), in which on page 10 we read: "The manifest issued by the second Congress of the Kominform, July,
1920, carries a great number of sigrra:tures - Lenin, Zinoviev, Boukarine, Trotski, for iRussia; Vane'k, Hlula, Zapotocky (the president of Ozecho-;Slovakia today), etc."
T,his signer and founder of the Communist Party is
today the Chief of the Economics Deparbment of Radio
Free Europe and a member of the "Colllilcil of Free Ozechoslovalcia" in New York, ·b oth financed by the Free Europe Committee!
On the Slovak side there are: Dr. Ziak, well-known
Czecho-'SlovaJk; Dr. Joseph Mrazek, the only •Slov;ak s~gner
of the oath of fidelity to Communism in 1948, and posing
as a Slovak, a certain Belak, whose real name is Berger.
A,bout these people, Kurt Glaser, American writer wrote :
"The principa.J Czechs and Slovaks associated with the Free
Europe Committee and those employed by Radio Free Europe are not
- as is commonly supposed - fi•g hters ag,a inst Communism. Quite
on the contrary, they fellow-travele&lt;l. with t•he Communists rfrom at
least 1939 to 1948, helpe&lt;l. t'hem to power, and even today follow a
Communist-sponsored propaganda line.
"These indivjduals belong to an or.ganlzation which has systematically be-trayed members of the democratic underground in CzechoSlovalda by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwald's secret police.
"A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either
Communist a.gents or have criminal records.
'1Radio Free Europe's Czecho-Slovak program is helping Stalin

�SLOVAKIA

75

by s,a,botaging internation-a l understand ing and promoting rivalry and
hatred between European peoples.
'
"Mr. Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectdcal materialis m, Dr. Zak and Dr. (Berger) Belak. Dr. Zak is the editor of •a n
intellectual magazine called 'Tribuna' w-hich is forbidden in France
and a no-llher called 'Reality' (Sk,utecnost) which is fofibidden in
Switzerland. Unfortunately, I have not been able to peruse these
journals as I do not read c zech, but I am told that their basic thesis is the need for the party m asses to submit to leadership by the
elite cadre. Belak was formerly a Communist Party functionary in
Slovalda under the n ame of Berger. He puts out a Germ an-language
sheet called 'Militant Democracy' which few Germans read because
it takes S&lt;talin's anti-Ger,man line."

I. who know this gentleman (Belak-Berger) persona1'ly, must confirm that Mr. Glaser's opinion is 100 percent right!
The former membe.r of the Social Democratic party
in 1Slov akia, Pavel Viboch, need not be dealt with as a party
memlber , and the other three Slovaks mentioned are al,so
not significant. Never receiving any mandate from the
Slovruk nation, they represent colonialism in Central Europe
at a time when oolonialism is. dying even in Africa. The
best proof is the elections in 1946, when the Social Demo~
crats in Slovakia could not elect even one representaitive
without Ozech help. It was an old Prague trick to transfeT
unneeded votes from one district to another. As a rule, the
Social Democratic ipanty has been a Czech origani·z ation only.
To return to the history of this _p arty, however, one
can say that its activities during the second World War
are very revooling. The majority of the party ,p oliticians
fled wiith Benes, or shoritly after, and served in his "c!libi.
net.,in-exile." An e~ception was Ambassador Fierlinger,
who remained in Moscow serving the Communists instead
of Benes, according to Ripka and Benes himself. When it
came to .the wol"st, Benes's "govennment-in-exile" reoolled
him to London. Having the support of Moscow, however,
Fierlinger refused to return, and Benes, in order .to keep
his presidency, ha:d :to. ,g o to Moscow and take ordern from
his personal enemy. These statements are proved by the
cablegrams exchanged by the "government-in--exile" and
Fierlinger, which were published in Fierlinger's hodk. In
addition to Moscow's rs upport, Fierlinger also had help
within the "government-in-exile." This was the left wing of
1

�76

SLOVAKIA

the Social Democrats, wirth Lausman and Bechyne as leaders in London. This group, moreover, closely cooperated
with other admirers of the Soviet Union in the Czech National Sodalist party, Rip_ka, Firt, and others. This party
supporte'd several pro-Communistic organizations, where
Rip'ka rused to be president and Josef Ko!'bel and Tig.rid
Schonfeld were in leading ,positions, .pleadin,g for help for
Stalin. In 1942 and 1943, Vlase:k and Majer organized the
Commu:niisrt demonstrations that heiLpe&lt;l to· force the second
front against Churchill's will.
We recall that Benes traveled to Moscow in 1943
against the wishes of Eden, Churchill, and other statesmen. There he approved the seill-out o&lt;f Ruthenia and cleared
the roa:d to Ozecho-SloV'akia for the Soviet Union. This he
did without any regard for the will of the peoples of SlovaJki!a, Bohemia, Moravia and Ruthenia. Nay, even without
the full consent of the "Provisional Czechosloviruk Government" in London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia, Moravia, and ,Ruthenia certainly had nothing to do with it.
1

I recaH the speeches of Octdber and November, 1943,
in the chambers of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in
London. They were made not only by the admirers of the
Kremlin, but also by the so-called civil politicians who were
blinded by Moscow. Among them were Lausman and Majer, Dr. Uhlir and Paul Macha.eek; all strongly approved
the journey to Moscow and insisrted on going along with
Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant the loss of
asylum in England and the good wiU of the allies. Benes
simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the "higher
interests of our nations" demanded it. When Benes returned from his trip to Moscow, he brought the request
to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a la!lge
part of Poland to the Soviets.
If any one should quesrtion ,t he truth of my statements,
I am ready and willing at all times to produce the repo~ts
of the "Czechoslovak Srtate Council,." the speeches Lausman and Uhlir, and even Benes's speech in its entirety
after he returned fa-om Moscow. They tel11 us clearly why
the Communist "putsch" of Februa:ry 1948 took place so

�SLOVAKIA

77

smoothly. Repetition o.f these facts is important for understandmg the effective collaboration of the Social Democrats with the Communists after the ,second war.
Showing their allegiance to the principle from 1928,
"Never against the Soviet Union," tihe Social Demoorats
without an exception pressed for the Benes-Stalin agree~
ment in 1943. Therefore, in the first post-war government,
formed in Kosice in 1945, and the most communistic of all
governments returning ho.me, they dominated. There was
no Slovak representative - evidence that Social Democracy had praictically no influence in Slovakia.
Besides Prime Minister Zdenek Fierlinger, there was
Frantisek Nemec and the liaison officer between the Red
Armv and Benes, General Niziborsky (known now as General
Hasal), who is at present, I believe, a consultant in the
Pentagon Other ministers in that government were the infamous spy, Bohumil Lausman, and a present leader in the
"Council of Free Czechoslovakia," Vaclav Majer. We know,
that all except Fierlinger came unharimed into exile after
February, 1948. Lausman, of course, after having accomplished his espionage in Radio Free Europe, returned to
Pra:gue. Clearly Lausman has the lowest character among
the contemporary •politicians, but he was a most trusted
comrade of ,t he present so-called "anti-Communist" politicians in the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia."
They all were united in their pro-Communist activities,
and their claim now to belong to this or that wing is no.t at
all convincing. In 1946 the •s ame Vaclav Majer praised the
top Communist in Czecho-Slovakia lavishly: "Gottwald's
name will be forever connected not only with our fight for
national liberation, but also with the struggle for social
liberation as well as for new forms of life and work. . . .
Gottwald, not only by his determination, but also by his
understanding for the opinions of others, showed his great
qualities as politician and man." Sudh were then the expressions of Vaola.JV Majer, an "anti-Communist" fighter
of today. But Ma:jer is not alone in this. After working together for the Communists at home, the Social Democrats
came to the United States and suddenly discovered that
they, too, have fought Communism. Their present fabrica-

�78

SLOVAKIA

tions rubout their post-war aotivity, which the following
facts disprove, are a deep offense to the witnesses of their
activities back home.
The first document signed by the ministers and the
members of the Executive Committee of the Social Demo~
cratic Party iby which a smooth Communi!zation of thei,r
homeland was assured, was their agreement of June 25,
1945, at once after returning to Praigue, to form the "National Front of the Working People." This agreement
shows the serviI.fty of the wholle Social Democralti1c Party,
not only of the leaders, because it was discussed and una~
nimously approved by aJll the ;party before being signed by
the Executive Commiittee. This means tha,t all politicians
of the $ociaJ Democratic Party, now posing as anti-Communists in exile, agreed to the bolshevi zation of CzechoSlovakta. Zenkl aind his National Socialists C'an at least attempt to excuse themsel,v es that they did not want to accept this ag,r eement lbut were forced to by the Social Democrats.
But it is not a question of who forced wlhom; they all
signed and pulblished this agreement and, what is woTse,
they put it into effect. The most important parts of this
agreement are the following:
1. While maintaining a politica:l and organizational
independence, the three parties wil.l closely cooperate and
follow a common policy in all matters of .p u!blio life.
2 . . The political iba;si,s o.f the National Front orf Working People is the government program, unanimously a:g-re.ed
upon in conference in MoS&lt;:ow and unanimously accepted
by the government in Kosice on April 5, 1945. Through
this agreemenit, also a Central Coordinating Committee
is being created with an equal numlber of representatives
from all participating iparties, and also a United Alliance
of Trade Organizations, based on voluntary membership,
wJll be formed. F'urther wili be formed a Non-.Political
Alliance of Czech Farmers and a United Organization of
Czech Youth; both of these organizations shaH be supported ,by all parties.
This publicly dedared aigreement was signed for the
Social Democrats by Zdenek Fierlinger; for the Commun1

�SLOVAKIA

79

ists by Klement Gottwald, and for the National Socialist
Party by Peter Zenkl.
It is both very int.eresting and quit,e significant that
not a single Slovak att.ended that meeting and that among
those who· called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka, and other leaders of Dr. Benes's old Czech National
Socilalist Party - the very same people who today are
telling the American public and the world that they always hated the Reds and that the Reds "ousted" them from
Government.
But the truth is something else a;gatin. The fact is that
both Zenlcl and Ripika welcomed the Communists, sought
their favor, and wanted to win politicrul prestige with the
help of the Reds at the exipense of the other political parties. Of course, today we know that they failed. The same
thing happened to them ,that had happened and 1s still
happening to an tho.se who try to, collruborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are
worth and then swallo;w them up or get rid of them.
The "National Front of the' Working People" created
a "Central Coordinating Committee," in which e'very affiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This
committee had the task of coordinating the work of the
socialist parties. The sooiwlfst bloc prepared the ground for
the various activities which led to the suppression of political and religious fireedom - the first st~s taken toward
a socialist dictatorship.
The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the
Agrarian Party would be suppressed, the Catholic IDaigle
organization outiawed, and that Catholic youth, as such,
would not be allowed to orgamize. Together t@y wo,r ked
out a plan whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would
be done away with and, at the same time, how these votes,
together with the Communist-contro lled ..peasant unions,
, would he brought into the Communist P,a,rty. They also
created and later legalized the Communist trade organizations, then the non-political Fedeiration of Farmers and the
United Youth Or,g,anization - all of which were SU!ppo.s ed
to be fornned by the joint participation of all parties, but

�80

SLOVAKlA

actually served onlly to communize Ozecho-iSlovakia from
the instant they began to function.
Therefore, it is not true that Zenlkl, Rtpka, Vilem,
Majer, and other Czech Sooial DemocraJts opposed Com~
munist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is
that from the moment they accepted the so--called "Kosice
Agreement ," they were aJlways subordinat ed to and in the
train of .t he Communis t Party and willingly continued tha,t
way not only on Russian soil, or in Russian-·occuipied Kosice, but a1so in "Jiberated" Pr'cllgue. The "Joint Declaration "
to the nation on June 28, 194'5, is indisputalble proof of the
fact that they wanted to get into governmen t with the help
of the Oommunist s, even at the roopense of democracy,
Christ'ianit y, and freedom.
This is the sound lesson for all who would col'la!borate
with Oommunist s. All such ,p eople are digging their own
graves, because Communism recogn.i'zes no agreements , concessions, or compromis es, and swallows wp all who collaborate with it.
A Czech Catholic editor, A. J. Jandacek, commented
on major effects of this agreement in this manner:
"The aims of the socialist bloc were many:
"1. First of all not to allow workers to organiz.e in Catholic
trade unions, and so far as they are alread,y organized in them,
through a mass effort .to storm them into the socialist bloc by
maintaining that Oatholic organizations wm anyhow be in the mi·
nority an d that, therefore, it is better to go together.
"2. Not to ,a llow an independent unification of Catholic farmers. The party of farm people wi ll not be allowed to exist at all,
and as far as the Catholics have their Catholic farmers organized, the
Communists will divide them among themselves.
"3. A United Organization of Czech Youth will be formed and,
thus, the Cat·holic you1Jh wJll not have an opportunity to organize on
a Oatholic platform, eitilier politiooJly or religiously. Simply, ,a ll youth
will be forced to go into the state-formed and socialist-led organization. Thus, organizing an "Alliance of Catholi c Youtll" or ,a "Czechoslovak Orel" will be .impossible. A daily and weekJ.y have already
been published for this so-called united youth organization and are
led by the Commundsts.
"In view of these three aims, it is possible to call the establishing and maintaining of t!he socialist bloc an intention-al act against
political and religious freedom and the establishmen t of a socialist
dictatorship."

Although I am not a Catholic and never was a member

�SLOVAKIA

81

of any clerical party, I am ready to sign this analysis by
the editor Jandaceik.
Whereais, Ze:rukl and his party, in December, 11947, begain not to abide by the 1946 agreement, the Social Democrats kept it even after the Oommunist "putsch" in Februa:ry, 1948. Professor Macek, for instance, accepted lead~
ing positions in o,rganizations which bolsheviized the University, and as president of the Aotion Committee of the
University he expelled those students who had participated
in demO'Il!Strations against the Communists in February.
Furthermore, for a long time he helped the Constitutional
Oommittee of Ozecho-Slovakia:n P.arliam.ent and its chairman, Dr. Procha:zka, a leading Communist. As a matte~
of fact, the whole section on Economics in the Communist
constitution is his work. Both as an expert and as a member of the :Sociail Demo:cra,tic Party, he supported the
Communist bi1ls; a;ctua:1ly, rhe was the right hrui.d of Dr.
Procha:zka, the most Communist jurist in Czecho-Slovakia
and chairman of the Constitutional Committee. To us it is
not surprising that Macek led in the persecution of democratic students after the Communist putsch, since he had
earlier been well known as a fervent exponent of Marx
at the tUrnversity of Brno, where he was professor of National Eoonomics. The surprise is that he is now a university professor in the United States.
Professor Maicek, during the yearn 1929...1939, was a
member of Parliament for the Social Democratic Party.
Simultaneously, he edited a left-orientated monthly called
"Our Times" which was sponso,r ed by Presidents Masaryk
and Benes. He published numerous books, a base of which
was, repeatedly, the teachings of Marx. In these books
Professor Maicek defended the theories orf Marx very emphatica!lly and wanted to introduce them into our social
and economic life, evein as early as 1930-1938. He wanted
to sociailize everything. His aim was identical to that of the
Communi,s ts. They wanted to put it into practice after 194'5.
Origtlnafly, Professor Macek migrated to Canada and
lived on the fann of a certain Mr. Karel Buzek,. where he
wrote artides for the Ozech newspapers in Canada. In his
articles he rejeoted and condemned the very same ideas he

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SLOVAKIA

was not so long ago an apostle of and a very able and
thorough propagator.
From Canada he came to the United States and at
the present time he is active as a professor at some university m Pennsylvania.
iB. Vilem, as Genera'} Secretary of the Ozech Social
Democratic Party, was more a personal "whip" for Fierliniger than a "whip" for the ,party. While I was a member
of the Agricultural Committee, we succeeded sometimes in
winning over .t he chairman of the committee, who was a
Social Democrat, against the Communist proposa!ls. Vilem,
however, before the voting day, and often at midnight,
cal'led the members of 'his party and dictated: "Fierlinger
lets you know that the party cannot stand for your proposals; you have to vote with the Communist Party." One
of these Social Democrats that was forced by Vi1em to
vote with the Communists is in exile ; several committee
memlbers from the other parties who lost ,w ith me because
of Vil.em's actions are now in the "Council of Free Ozechosloviaikia," but they wil'l never forget those defeats (Sliva,
Torn, and other.s). Wathout this servility to the Communists, Gottwald would never have gained the majority he had.
The saddest chapter of the Social Democrati'C Party,
however, was written by its memiber who was the Minister of
Industry, Bohumil Dausman. He served the at!reernent of
June 25, 1945, so faithfully that he went out to disintegrate
even the exile and worked for three years as a spy, after
being employed by Radio Free Europe with the help of the
Social Democrats and other memlbers of the "Council of
Free Czechoslo;vakia," particularly Ripka and his group.
The case of Lausman's treason was not yet completely
closed when new espionage process was started against further exiponent of Prague government and close collaborator
of Dr. Hubert Riipka. Hardly had a French .court sentenced
Kubala on a charge of espionage for Communist OzechoSlovakia before the Prague radio reacted in this case and the
spea,keir, himself a collaJborator of Mr. Ferdinand Peroutka
and a former employee of Radio Free EuTope, used the most
despiooble language against the West. Slovak newspapers
unanimousily reported - unfOTtunaitely without desirable

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83

results on the aictions orf Radio F.ree Europe - that Lausman would be followed by the others. The newspapers asked
for effect1ve preventive measures in Radio Free Europe
rugainst subversive elements but nothing was done. Many
very dubious elements are sitting in Radio F,r ee Europe and
are paid by the Amerilcan citizens.
In the warning concerning espionage, we have not only
staJted several times that there are Marxists ood Oommunists in "Czechoslovak" organizations, but we also said openly
that they were, and silll are espionage agents of the Prague
government. The Prague broadcasts have confirmed our allegation. On the same ibroadlca;st where, some time a;go, Laus-·
man broadcast in Prague, now spoke Bruno Folta, who was
working as an employee of Radio Free Europe under the protection of Dr. M. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko. He minutely copied
the style of Lausrnan, H~ confessed that originally he betrayed the Communist government in Prague and filed to the
West, requesting political asylum.
Here in the West, in Radio Free Europe Folta came to
the conclusion that the western world was rotten and readily
seized the chance to return home and accept what was offered to him in the inteliligence service conducted by the
Czech General Moravec. He repented like Lausman and, hruving the desire to make some reparations, he put himself at
the disposal of the "people's Democracy" against the West.
He went on to threaten that he would use all the knowledge
which he ooquired as an employee of Radio Free Europe.
Our reports from Munich and behind the Iron Ourtain
explain the Folta case as foHo:ws: Like Lausman, he was sent
by the Prague government for espionage purposes and to esta:blish the contacts. When he succeeded and gathered
enough material and collaborators, especially in Munich
and Paris, he simply ,r eturned to Prague as a highly appreciruted a;gent, in order to accUJSe the anti-Communist citizens at home. of whose attitude he learned while abroad.
What is Folita telling the peoples of Czecho~Slova;kia?
The Vienna newspapers published long articles explaining
how Foll.ta, this confident servant of Mr. Peroutka and Dr.
Mudry, was blaming Radio Free Europe and the Western
World and praising everything he found after his return to

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Brague: •~Prague has everything good and new, all the
new technical inventions, and everything in plenty. Meantime, in the Weslt, o:nlly the capitalist dwpes have all the
goods in their possession and the common people are
starving." Thrut is the picture cxf the West presented by
Folt'a, who coJ:lected American doJlars from RJFE.
When will Washington be conV'inced? The case of
Folta is certainly a cha,pter of shameful history, but we
feair that even this fact will not be strong enough to convince the F1ree Europe Committee or the Department of
State in W8!Shi:nigton. We repeat that such exile orga.n±zations, which are SUipported at the ex;pense of genuine demo-cratic and anti-Communist organizations, wre nuisances
and wreckers of all the actiOIIlS of the Western. WorJd in
the cold war. In the "Ozechoslovak" orgarazations there
have been, since the start, members who were sent West by
the Prague go,v ernment only for tlhe purpose of serving the
Communists. On the roster of "Czechoslovak" organizations
in exile you wilil find many persons who were elected to
office on the Oommunist baHot, ,p oliticians who mostly
helped the Communists not only to gain control of CzechoSlova!kia, but also the whole Danube valley.
The same persons, who with Benes in 1939, in London, were in touch with SDalin's ambrussa.dor, agreed on the
invasion of U.iS.IS.IR. south of the Carpathian Mountains.
To the Americans in Washington and the Einglishmen in
London, they disiplayed an rug·r eement concerning the integrity of the Czecho-Slavaik State while knowing the deficiencies of this treaty. They .co!~JIBitted the same crime
as did Lausman and Bruno, Folta. These people simply betrayed the Allies.
But beyond that are their protectors, the "Council of
Free Czechoslovakia" and its leading representatives Zenkl, Lettrich, IPerou'bka, Mudry and others - iess guilty
of betrayal? They 1let Lausma.n into R1adio :ffiree Europe
and allowed him to• broadcast for American money. On the
payroll they kept Folta, R1.12icka, and others as well; and
they still do that and help to betray America. There is no
excuse for them, or is there?
Parrticipants in a crime are as punishable as the crim1

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86

inal. J&gt;a:rtici:pan.ts in this betriayal can not excuse themselves on the grounds that they did not know anything
about suoh action. Several times suspicious caJSes were
brought to their notice but they did not pay any ,a ttention
to these warnings. What should we say to this criminal
negligence on the .part of responsible pemonaHties :in Radio
Free Europe Oir in the "Council of ~ree OzechoslovaJda ?"
There they are unanimous: Zenkl, Cerny, Osuis'ky -- all
plead for the innocence of Peroutka. The continuous scandaJls should waike up the security officials of the Western
Powers. Until now only the Germans in Munich asked fo-r
a c1erun-1.l'p of Marxists and other elements hostile to democracy in the whole territory of the German Federal Republfo. They aimed at "Czechoslovak" organizations which
aire infiltrated with highly suspicious elements.
Let us apply our knowledge whi'1e there is still time.
Many think that only in Germany are such cases possible.
but that is not true. The same oases, even more paradoxi~
cal, we find in Washington where the Czech officers are
working. They distinguished themselves in the sell~,ut of
Carpathian Ruthenia to the Soviets, or kept in the service of American Intelligence the sister-in-ilaw of a welL
known Communist in the old country. Why should we be
shocked that in rPairis the Communists received confiden•
tial materia'l? Even in Washington security mea5UJres are
neglected. We know the persons at wol'k in W81Shington
and we will not be surpri,s ed if the Lausman affair breaks
out a,gain despite our warning. Those who wHl be suT1prised
will be Americans. Let us take lessons from Parts.
Since Lausman's return to Prague, the whole CzechoSlovak exile, in its confusion, has been producing deceptions and charges of for.gery. When Mr. Osusky of the
"Council of F'lree Ozechoslovakia" does not succeed in his
enterprises, .o r the situation changes after his proclamations hawe been pulblished, he simply proclaims them unauthentic or falsified, o:r he simply a&amp;:!rilbes them to Lausman.
'Sometimes the matter is trivial, as it was in the proclamation concerning the is udeten G€Tmans which was allegedly signed by Osusky. There he stressed the necessity

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that the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans are reconciled and
charged that Ripka and Zenk! were unsuitalble because of
their collaJboration with the Communists. The subj~ct was
given great publicity by Josten (a former official of the
Foreign Ministry and now editor of "Czechoslovak" in
LondO'Il) and his Marxist cell in London, w:hiich always
tries to please Prague. In this matter, Osusky probably
figured that a dea!l with the ,Sudeten GeI'IDans could per.,
haps be of he1p to him if he should have trouble in the
Council with Ripka and Zenk!. But here chance helped
him. R:iipka had difficulties in the United States because
of his colla;boration with the Communists and therefore
planned to return to his socialist friends in Europe. For
this reason he, as weU as Zenkl, did not fight for leading
positions .i n the Counchl - a fact that allowed the November reconciliation of the Council. Osusky does not need
the Sudeten Germany any longer, whereas for Zenk! and
Ripka the Sudeten German question will be a ,problem. So
Osusky denied his Sudeten German proclamation and
charged tha;t its publfoation in the "Czechoslovak" was a
fOTgery .
Simila.rly, "Nase Cesta," a Marxist paper printed in
the Czech language ,in Vienna, published a who[e issue of
articles written by several memibers of the "Council of Free
Czechoslovak ia.'' Arfter Osusik y and Zen kl were reconciled
and the articles did not fit into the changed opinion of the
Council, the editor procilaimed the whole earlier issue a
for,g ery. Thus, suddenly we are told that the ,articles were
not writt® by the members oif the Council, and that the
who'le issue was forged with the purpose of s,plitting the
"Czechoslova k" exile. Lt is interesting to see whose names
first a;ppea.r as authors o,f the disputed rurticles: Dr. Taiborsky, Benes's secretary; Jan Zak, Slovak socialist and confidant of MaTxists and "Ozechosloivaks" ; Jozef Dieska, member of the Council, etc. I can only dismiss the editor's
charge that the whole issue originated with Lau:sman as
ridiculous and highly impossible.
In the newspruper "Novy Domov," published in Canada,
another member of the Council, Fras'tacky, attacked Colonel
M~ksohe, who does not go along with the "Ozeichoslova!ks"

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87

in the Council. (Oolon~l Miksche, a Czecho-Slovak military
attache in Pa.r-is, resigned in December, 1947, in protest to
the policy of the present members of the Council then in
Praigue.) When Colonel Miiksche threatened to sue him,
Frastaoky quiokly denied writing the article and declared
it a forgery. Certainiy this comedy cannot be cailled anything but ridiculous; fortunately, it did not harm Colonel
Miksche.
It is regrettruble, however, that the exile "Czechoslovak" press sees in these and other incidents the intervention of Genera:! Molotka of P,r ague, whose assignment,
with Lausman, is to influence and distunb the exik It does
not at all seem to me that these .incidents, are of Lausman's making, for he would think of different methods
among the members of the Ooll!Ilcil. In the Council he feels
at home, after spending three years in its midst and working with Council members in Radio Free Europe. There
he does not need any mediators and can at any time directly interfere. Using Lausman's name, however, provides
Osusky and others wJth a handy scapegoat for the.i~ own
failures and a!bandoned projects.
SimHarly, the "CzechosloV'ak" exile press is not unanimous and constant in its aocount of the Council's November compromise and in its list of representatives.
Sometimes it leaves out Dr. Cerny',s name, and other times
it puts it in, depending on whom it serves . .Professor Hlavaty is referred to as a neutraJl sometimes, and at other times
as ·a former socialist representative in the temporary National Assembly in Prrugue.
Moreover, the "Czechoslovak" exile even today is
hel:ping and promoting the accessories of spies as did some
other memlbers of the Courrcil while they were ambassadors
in the United States and elsewhere. This is the way the
"Czechoslovak" organizations operate while the socialist
parties in the West do not realize their dange,r . So, for ex-·
ample Zdenka Schonova, in :Eingland one of the leading
Czech Social Democrats, is supported today by the "Czech
Trust Fund," even though her collaboration with the convicted spy, Peter Arton, was proved. It is evident that the
persons from the Council do not distinguish between a
1

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Czech patriot and a Czech spy. For them everyone is first
of aH Czech, from Benes down to Lausman, and in this belief they .not only help the spies and pay them, but also
pay for their protection and defense
It is also well known that Colonel Koenig, who is a
leader orf the reporting division of the "Council of Free
Ozechos!ovaktla" and also working for the West, still employs the same Hungarian Communis t as his secret,a ry,
his sister-in-ilaw, Klara Fedak. Fedfuk is in New York without letting the U. S. authorities know that she is a Oommunist. Her former "1b oy friend" is now chief of the espionage office in Bratislava; yet the persons from the "Co,u ncii
of Free Ozechoslov aikia" do not find it difficult to affirm
to the West the ,reliaJbiliity of these Communist s. Koonig's
group is also responsible for the murder of a Slovak un.,
dergrmLnd leader and patriot, Pavol Harusiak, and others
from Bratislava, whose bordeT-cro ssing they betrayed to the
Communis t police. Ifurusiak was my friend, an'd I kn.ow that
a member of Koenig's group, iDr. Patek, gained access to
him only through representin g himself as from me.
When the "Czechosio. vak" exile has such help and affiliations, how lO'Ilg must O'Ile state that this "Czechoslo vak"
group is not reliable? It is seen to be a very dangerous
group when we realize that it hrus, accomplice s in the un.
derground who were given money and introd1..1JCtions by
Zenkl and Ripka, as the spy Bohumil Cerny and his accompJices were. This situation is also true orf the "C'zechoslova!k" section of R:adio Flree Europe in Munich, where
there is always someone who helps such men as La.usma,,n
and Folta, or other ex-Commu nists and .future re-immigrants to Red Prague. Bures, who brought Folta to Radio
Free Europe, was dismissed, but his friends - Kvetko,
Mudry, and Peroutka - are still in leading positions.
If Radio Free Europe and the Voice of Ame11ica would
try to lbrea:k the reputation. oif this "Czechoslo vak"' army
with truth and with real anti-Comm unist speakers who
ha,ve a good reputation and an anti...Communist record at
home, it could be done. Not, however, with the present
group. What is broadcast and written now - for American
money - helps the Oommunis ts more than it harms them.

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89

These org,a nizations which are supposed to wage psy.
chological warfaire against Communism behind the !iron
Curtain do just the opposite - as far as Czecho-Slovakia
is concerned. Too often they he:lp spies and broadcast material which does not harm the Communists, but rather
amuses them. Sending pigeons and balloons across the
Iron Curtain maikes people there laugh or curse, because
the police always get some of those who pick up the leaf~
lets. When aJlmost every month someone returns to Pra•g ue
and te1'ls of the low moral tone, the scandals, and suicides
in the "Czechoslovak" section of Radio Tuee Europe in
Munich, the Communists give this excellent publicity. No
wonder that Radio· Free Europe does not have any respect
there! IDven when Radio Free Euroipe, or the Voice of
America, gains some SlovaJk renegade, these organizations
are not made 1:.iherelby eiffecti:ve, nor are their names re~
stored at home behind the Iron Curtain. People theTe ceased
to believe them loog ago, and after the Lausman and Folta
affairs they only curse them.
Folta, Ru!zicka, and Bures worked in Radio Free Europe; they were the proteges of those Siova.k employees in
Radio Free Europe - Dr. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko - who
are supposed to represent the r eal Slovak anti-Communist cause. And yet nothing happened to Mu.dry or Kvetko,
much less to Peroutka, because they brought Bures and
Ruzicka and Folta to RF'E, nor because they paid their
comrade Lausmrun, who is also back in Prague.
The new chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on In.
vesitigations, Senator McCleUan, who is a capable lawyer
to whom the security of the United States is of paramount
internst is, we hear, curious about many things. We hope,
therefore, thlat this suibcommittee will succeed in this mat~
ter also and that the organizations in question will be
cleansed of the ,present "Czecho,slovaJk" group.
iLausman was so aggressive that during the second
World War, after his return from Moscow to London, he
succeeded in the State Council in speeding up Benes's trip
to Moscow. Further, as he admits in his book, published in
Vienna, he forced Benes to na,tionalize aH private industry
by presidential decree before the Pro,v isional National As-

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sembly convened in October, 194'5. He also :points out in
his book that, whereas he admits his actions, the associates who agireed with hiim on aU the issues of col1aboration now are renouncing him only in order to be accept.,
able to Washington. In this way, Lausman has unmasked
the Sodal Democrats who in exile pre.tend to fight Communism, but actually are responsi!ble for the :f act that
Russian territory extends for the first time in history west
of the Carpathians into the Danube basJn.
In this bolshevik expansion it was two Social Democrats who represented Benes and the whoJ.e state leadership: Flrantisek Nemec and Generail Ni:ziborsky - Hasal.
Both went to Moscow from London in 1944 and then fol.,
lowed the Red Army into Ozecho-1Slovaiki,a to take over
the liberated territory :from the Red Army in accordance
with the Benes-lSta:li,n treaty. They did it so successfully
with the he1p of Fierlinger in Moscow that in three months
they gave Stalin the eastern part of Czecho-1Slovaikia, the
whole of Ruthenia. Russia ,o ffered to the Slovaks, through
the Communists Dr. Husak and Novomesky, an independent ,Slovak State, provided that it would be another
Soviet republic. When Husak and Novomesky made the
proposal to the Slov,a ks, to Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of
S'lovakia and the Slow.1Jk Government, the Slovaks, however,
refused the •bolshevi~atio!Il of their country.
Nemec was not given a cordial re:ception ~n Ruthenia
at all. The in'haibitants everywh&amp;e were signing petitions,
sponsored by the Communist Petruscak, which started that
the Ruthenians no longer existed and that there were only
Sub-Carpathi an Ukrainians in Ruthenia who yearned to
be embrruced by their greait mother, Ukrainia.
After many long squabbles, Nemec fina:lly got a message through to Benes in London through General Pika.
The telegrams that Benes sent through F1ierlinger were
never seen by Nemec, ,b ecause Fierlinger already then was
Stalin's envoy and never a paitTiotic cii.ti,z en of his own
State. It is significant, therefore, that despite these experiences thi,s same traitor, Fierling&amp;, was named, several
months later, as the premier by Benes.
Nemec was in a very trying position. When he wanted

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to be connected with London, he had to ask for permission
to do so from the Chief of the Russi,an ISJtafif so that he
could travel to Moscow, where with the heilp of the vad.io
conneotion of General Biika, who was the Chief of the Mtilitary Mission, Nemec could tell Benes how matters were
going and koop him informed on Fierlinger. The latter was
doing right well. He still is a minister in the Prague Gov~
ernment, but Genera,1 Bika was killed by the Commund.sts.
At that time the Communists had asked the Slovak
non-Communists whether it would not he more profitable
to support tJhe idea of a Slovak Soviet Republic so that the
Slovaks could go,vern their own territory rather than adhere to the "Czecho-slova;k" ideology which denied the existence of the Slovak nation. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Reipulblk could be promoted without diff,iculty,
because the Slovak State still existed. Husak and Novomesky, however, did not get anywhere with their proposal.
The Slova,k non-Commumsrts turned it down, declaring that
it was contrary to the Christmas Agreement of December,
1943, as well as the agreement which Ursiny concluded -w ith
Dr. Benes in Octolber, 1944, when he acted iJ?- the name of
thie SloViak National Council.
When Husak and N01Vomesky failed to promote the
idea of a Slovruk Soviet Repwblic in London, they imrmediiately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakia
to present the ,p rop·a sal to President Joseph Tiso and the
Slovruk Govemment. But Tiso· and the Slovak Government
would not hear rubout it. Husak and N ovomesky failed in
thek mission. Several months later, with mMly Slova;ks in
emigration, Clemenitis took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today an the leading Reds of Slavrukia are paying
dearly for failing in theiT mission. Clementis paJid with his
life.
Ruthenia was loot. Benes's delegation had to go to
Trebisov ·a nd after that things went rather smoothly. ~erliillger ma:de the propositions and Benes aocepted them.
When he was returning from Moscow in March, 1945, Benes could no longer enter Ruthenia. In fact he renounced
it solemnly on severai occasions. FinaMy, Benes had an
agreement prepared which Fierlinger signed for the Czecho1

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SlovaJk Government with great solemnity in the Kremlin on
June 29, 1945. No one outside the CommU'Ilists agreed with
this act of Benes. No law, however, could contain or restrain Benes. He acted dictatori.ally at any time that it
benefited him.
On August 24, 1945, without even corum1tling the
Parliament, Benes issued his presidential decree No. 4, concluding the pa:ct between the U .S.S.&lt;R. and the C.S.R. This
decree was the basis for assigning new borders to Slovakia in the East. In Octoher, 1946, everything "legalized"
on the ,b asis orf foregoing decrees was published in the Col~
lection of Laws and Regulations.
T.he text orf the rubove-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as significant. It begins with the words:
". . . being certain that the provisional National Assembly
of the Orecho-1Slovaik Republic shal[ concur with this ag.reement . . . "
Benes did not wait. He and John Masaryk and VI-ado
Clementis decided matters without Pa.rlia,ment. As good
prophets, they knew tha't Parliament would certainly approve this ag,r eement !
Since Ruthenia was not a very big bite, Benes did not
stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2,
1945, he issued decree No. 8, whereby a numbeir of homes
in the most beautiful seo'tion of BUJbenec - in the modern
section of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, the greaJt s•a crifices
the nations of the U .IS.S.R. had made on the altar of liberation of humanity.
WeM, it is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great
extent did l,iibera-te SlwaJcia from a gre,aJt many things the
Slovaks could use themselves, but it certamly was not
ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them
without evsen consulting the nation about it. Only dictators
act like that. And Benes was a dictator by the grace of
MoS&lt;!ow, even id: only a temporary one.
'Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later
Benes showed his aP!)Teoiation to the so-called "iLiberator"
of Prague, M&lt;rurshaJ Konev, by giving him several very
•b eautiful vi1las which were oonfiscated from the 1g ood citi-

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93

zens .o f Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiflrl
view of Prague.
All these decTees we re signed by General Hasal-Nizborsky, who was at that time Minister of Thansportation,
and •by Vaclav iMajer, who was also a member of Benes's
caJbinet. The servility to Stalin and Go'titwald, and the
boundless adulation iby HasaJl..,Niziborsky a,nd Frantiseik
Nemec would be best illustrated if we pu!blished the congratulatory telegrams sent by them to their idols.
I mtend to publish all these facts in a book, but they
hawe already !been quoted by Fierlinger and Lausman in
their books.
Later, many Communists who fell out of favor tried to
rescue their political careers in exile with the help of membership cards in the Social Democratic Party. Those Communists, rulmost without exception, we find in Radio Free
Europe - (Graf, Berger-!Belak, and Ti.grid Schonfeld), or
(Josef Konbel, the
with other American institutions Communist amlbas:sador from Prague to Tito in Belgrade,
now a member of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" and
a uni,versity professor ,i n the United Staltes).
Regarding Tigrid Schonfeld, it is only necessary to
note what has been written albout him here in the United
States. As it is quite a lo't, I only quote some parts of a
more serious character:
"Tigrid is a former m emb er of the C2:ech Communist Party. According to tJhe newspaper Christ und Welt (Stuttgart, October 16,
1952), •his political ac tivjty began in 1932 when he published the illegal Communist paper Hal lo Noviny, w,hich specialhr.ed in subversion of morale in the Czecho slovak Army.
" He was also a contri butor to the Co mmunist magazine Leva Kultura (Left Culture). Dur:ing Wo r ld W ar II he w as a member of the
Communfot-domiuated Czechoslovak staff of t'he British Broadcasting Company, where one of his colleagues and iruti mate friend w.as
Colonel Otto BlheJer, the Czech mi.Jitary attache whom the United
States Government declared persona non grata in 1949 for es pionage activities."

I hope this short excerpt will be enough to show what
pro-Communist elements were picked 1by the U. S. Ad-·
ministration and by the Firee Europe Commitltee for importa,nt pos,itions. These quotations will also prove tha,t SUJCh
people cannot be expected to be trusted 'back a,t home by

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the Nation as anti-Communist fighters and thaJt the whole
expensive propa,gand'a program is practicrully useless and
ineffective.
About the others aJbove, I must confess the same
opinion as to character.
The deeds of these men, however, I am intentionally
separating from the actions of the leaders of the Czec'h
Social Democratic Prurty. I am presenting the Communist
co1la:"boration of only those Social Democ~ats who represent the party in exile and who :firom 1945 until they went
in to exiile were also of some importance back home. I am
leaving aside those persons who are now abusing the sympath4es of the Labor Party in London, because they wd
not amount to much back home, being only opporlll!Il.ists
and regularly havmg two memib ership cards, one of the
Communist and the other of the Social Democratic Party.
But these also oannot claim that they opposed the agreement of June 25, 1945; everyone conisenited to it and carried it out in h:is capacity.
It is no wonder that :b y 1946 their policy of complete
conformance with the Communists had negated the party
as opposi,t ion. Simifarly now the party is destroying itself
in an attempt to gain strength by accepting and proteotin.g
even men who were strong Communrists, like Milos Vanek
and Tigrid Schonfeld, or men who possessed membership
cards of several Marxist parities, like M8!cek, Kwbel, and
others. Furthermore, an affidav1t of anti-Communism signed
by the Social Demoorat le·aders is ridiculous, indeed, beca use the party's claim to anti--Communism is itself destroyed by the evidence of its history.
During the February, 1948 c,r isis, the Social Democratic Party tried to look neutral, but the fact ilid everything to help t'he COIIllmunists succeed. Hol!cling to the
agreement of J.une, 1945, the party as a unit gave its support to the Commumsts and so broke the political equilibrium in favor of the Oorrum.1~sts. Even if it is not pos•
sible to .state that without the help of the Sociail. Democrats,
Gottwald would not have succeeded in the "putsch" of
February, 1948, nevertheless it remains a great guilt
against the Sooial Democrats that in the time when it was

�SLOVAKIA

95

clear to everyone what tJhe Communists were doing, the
Czech Social Democrats stood by them and did not help
the opposition. This attitude of the Czech Social Democrats
is not very well known and evaluated in the United States;
if it were, not one of them could pose in Washington as
anti-Communists. And their protector, Steinhardt, U. S.
am:bassador to, •Prague in 1948, and former Secretary · of
State Acheson could not have secured for them influential
positions in the United States on the U. S. payroll.
It is worthwhile to note that up to 19-38 the Czech Sociall. Democrats cooperated strongly with the Sudeten German Sociail. Democrats in Ozecho-Slovakia. When the German Social Democrats got into trouble with the N a:llis and
were persecuted, there was no Czech Social Democrait to help
his coHeague in the Sudetenland; they were betrayed. Later
the expulsion. decrees bore the signature of aH the Czech
Social Democrat ministers, who had no social or human feeling. It will forever remain -a shame against the Czech Social
Democrats that they let their coUe,agues from the German
Social Democratic Party be so persecuted, robbed, expelled,
and even JnUrdered.
They ail.so had a similar attitude towards the Slovaks
in their domestic .p olky and always helped Prague centralism and imperia•1ism. Furtherimore, they helped to destroy
the Slov:ak Democratic Party ,b y dema.ndiing in the fall of
1947 the .p osition of one commissioner. Thiis commissioner,
working hand-in-hand with bloody Ferjencik, then commissioner of police but now in the United States, iru::reased the
public terror and forced the courts to serve the police. The
Social Democrats in the government of Slovakia held to ,t he
agreement from June 25, 1945, until they had performed
their jobs in 1945 and then were kioked out when no longer
needed by the Communists.
Looking over the record of the Czech SociaJl Democratic Party, their willing coUaiboration with Communists and
their fierce figiht against every anti-Communist, one cannot
understand their presel!t a;lilbi thait they acted only under
Russian pressure. One incident epitomizes this contradiction.
On the sixtieth anniversary of Karl Marx's death, Mareh
14, 1943, they were living in London. On that day the Czech

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SLOVAKIA

Socia:l Democrats and the Communislts made a piJ.grimage
to Mairx's torn!b in an English ·c emetery. At this tomlb, in
free England, the present representative of the "Council of
Free Ozechosl'Ovakia" in Washington, then Benes's mmiister and member oif his State Council, Vaclav Miajer, delivered a speech in the name of t!he Social Democraits in which
he said:
"WE BELIEVE WITH MARX THAT SOCIALISM 1,s THE WAY
TOWARD INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, TOWARD EVERLASTING PEACE, AND THE WELFARE OF NATIONS . TO•DAY HERE
WE ARE, A SMALL GROUP OF SOCIALIST EMIGRANTS FROM
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA . BUT THE TIME WILL COME WHEN MARX'S
TO,MB WILL BE THE SHRINE OF MANKIND LIBERATED FROM
THE BLIND IMPRISONMENT O,F DEAD SOCIAL DOCTRINES."

1M inister -Majer's speech was published on March 19,
1'943, in Benes's officiail newspaper in London, the "Czechoslovak," whikh was financed by Jan Masaryk and Hulbert
Ri,pka.
In conclusion, I say that the basis of the Communist
victory in Czecho-iSiovrukia was 1Jhe agreement of June 25,
1945, which was cauied out with the help of the current
members of the "Council of Free Czechoslov;rukia." Their
present pose as anti-Communists is undemtandable, of
course, because by continumg to deceive Americans is now
their only means of survival.

•

•

•

WHO SAID IT?

"Himself a Slovak, though from Moravia, he had to
provide a future for the two million Slovaks, who were even
less a!ble to stand alone than the Ozechs. Masaryk revived
the radical idea of 1848 and proposed to create a single
'Czechoslovak' nation by will-power. Masaryk knew little of
the Slovaks; others !knew even less. This was hi's strength
in dealing wi,tll the allied leaders; it could not solve the Slovak prdblem. The few conscious Slovak politicians aspired
only to cll!ltural autonomy within Hungary; living in the
shadow of Magyar arrogance, they could not imagine the
dis8ippearance of the Hungarian frontier." - (A. J. P. Taylor, 'NIE HABSBURG MONARCHY, London, 1948; p . 240).

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1330">
                    <text>SLOVAK.IA

72

The Czecho-Slovak Exile
CZECH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND RED ESPIONAGE
Dr. Mi chael Zibrin

July of l91J5 found the "Council of Free Ozechoslovaki:a" just as July of J.ast year left it; without eleded of~
fi.cials, without elected representatives. This is because
the CoUIIld, during the 20-month period of its re-organi-.
zation, could not reach !any agreement and is operating on
a rotation system, i.e., eacth month ,a reipresentati:ve of a
diifferent political iparty se:rves as its executive head. This
proves what we had said b,e fore: the Council is a coillglomerate of people of quite different bmnds and that Lettrich' s exdamation two years ago - "Gentlemen, I think
only dollars keep us here together" - was and is still true.
The present chaos in the Council is caused partly by
the fact that political partie.s are coming to prevail more
than personalities, and the Councril -resembJ.es more and
more an enlarged National Front. The purpose of .t his article
is to revie;w the past policies and deeds of that part.yin the
CoU!Ilcil which did most to communize the o~ooho-1Slov•8Jk
Republic and prepare an easy Communist take-over in
1948. ,Such a review is necessitated by the shocking pulblic
deception that hias gained influentiral positions for the exile
members of th±s ,p arty. Reformed Communists and coUaiboratom can perform valuable functions, but in men who
deny their Olbvfous politic,al actions there can be no question of reform.
The most flagrant a,id to Communism was given by the
Czecho-iSlovak Social ·D emocratic party. In exile today, the
leaders of this panty are men who, by their open colfa,boration wit:h Stalin, p~ayed the most important ,part in the
bolsheviz;ation o,f Czecho-Slova&gt;k,i1a. These men have always
Etood very close to the Communists, even during small
political skirmishes like those occasion.any now among Zenkl,
Ripka, and Peroutka. Particularly after the Stalin-Benes
pact of 1943, they were the most efficient signers and executors of Benes':s bloody decrees, not reaHzing that, once
they had finished their jdbs for the Communists, the fate

�Sl.JOVAKIA

73

they had prepared for others wo'Ulld become their own.
History shows that aliready in 1928 the Soc,i al Demo.
cr:ats formulated their program thus: "Today as also in
the past we are decided to protect the Soviet Union against
any inimical action of the capitalistic governments and
against any counter-revolutionary attack." Nine years
earlier this belief had been realized in action. When Polish
General Pilsudski was fighting a bloody (battle with the
Communist ar-my near Wairsaw in 1920, the socialistic ma-·
jority in Prague forbade the transportation of military
material t.lirnugh ,Ozocho-1Slo,v0Jkia, despite the fact that
lhis material was sent by France and a French military
mi,s sion was at that time already in Prague. A yea,r earlier,
when General Stefanik telegraiphed a wairning to Prague
against Bolshevism as the greatest plague o!I' mankind a:nd
asked for uruty in tihe f.ight to destroy it, it was this same
Social Democratic Party whiclh - wit:h Masarylk's consent
- stopped Stefamk's program. Masaryk's consent is less
surprising when one remembers that he was actually among
the first to hail the Octo!ber Bolshevik Revolution in 1917,
which now in Prague !is considered fundamental to the ere.
ation of Ozecho-,Slovaki:a. Thus one couid go on ,w ithout
end and show that the Social Democratic party was an effective avant garde of Communism in Central Europe, not
only in Czecho-!Slovakia.
Certainly one of the most important persons in the
Czecho-!Slovak .Social Democratic party was V ojta Benes,
the oldest brother of the !:ate president. Gottwald officially,
on the Cabinet's decision (and Moscow's aippro,vail) , sent
him into West Germany in 1949, where he keipt in. regular
contact with Prague and acted more oir less ,a,s Gottwald's
unofficial ambassador. He did not conce·a l this fact, and
t he members of the "Council of Free Czechoslova!ld:a" knew
it. Therefore, many times, VojJa Benes took a different
position from the official Council and o;piposed some steps
undertaken by non.JSocialists in the Council.
Benes's brother passed away, ,but equally important
representatives remain, particularly: Vacl:av Majer, B. Vilem, the former Sec:retary-General of the Party, and the
ill-ifamed Bohumiil Lausman. Ailso, the Social Democratic
1

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party has its two generalls, Sergei Ingr, and Hasal Niz!borJ
sky, and, jn Canada, the former minister Frantisek Nemec, who together with Hasal affected the cession of Ruthenia to .Stalin. To this party belongs also a Communist
famous in Europe, Milos Vanek, and some questionaJble individuals in Radio F,ree Europe in MUTI!ich. These are all
Czechs.
Milos Vanek, who is reported to hruve 1b een a charter
mem1ber of the "Czeohoslovak Communist Party," remained
an ardent adherent of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship even
after he 1had left that .p arty to ~me a left.;win.g Social
Democrat. I personaHy know Mr. Vanek and I must confirm that Vanek was one of the founders of the Communist Party in Europe. This is described in the book of Lu.
cien Laurat ",Du Komiintern au Kominfo·r m" (!Paris, France
Des 1'sles, 1'951), in which on page 10 we read: "The manifest issued by the second Congress of the Kominform, July,
1920, carries a great number of sigrra:tures - Lenin, Zinoviev, Boukarine, Trotski, for iRussia; Vane'k, Hlula, Zapotocky (the president of Ozecho-;Slovakia today), etc."
T,his signer and founder of the Communist Party is
today the Chief of the Economics Deparbment of Radio
Free Europe and a member of the "Colllilcil of Free Ozechoslovalcia" in New York, ·b oth financed by the Free Europe Committee!
On the Slovak side there are: Dr. Ziak, well-known
Czecho-'SlovaJk; Dr. Joseph Mrazek, the only •Slov;ak s~gner
of the oath of fidelity to Communism in 1948, and posing
as a Slovak, a certain Belak, whose real name is Berger.
A,bout these people, Kurt Glaser, American writer wrote :
"The principa.J Czechs and Slovaks associated with the Free
Europe Committee and those employed by Radio Free Europe are not
- as is commonly supposed - fi•g hters ag,a inst Communism. Quite
on the contrary, they fellow-travele&lt;l. with t•he Communists rfrom at
least 1939 to 1948, helpe&lt;l. t'hem to power, and even today follow a
Communist-sponsored propaganda line.
"These indivjduals belong to an or.ganlzation which has systematically be-trayed members of the democratic underground in CzechoSlovalda by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwald's secret police.
"A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either
Communist a.gents or have criminal records.
'1Radio Free Europe's Czecho-Slovak program is helping Stalin

�SLOVAKIA

75

by s,a,botaging internation-a l understand ing and promoting rivalry and
hatred between European peoples.
'
"Mr. Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectdcal materialis m, Dr. Zak and Dr. (Berger) Belak. Dr. Zak is the editor of •a n
intellectual magazine called 'Tribuna' w-hich is forbidden in France
and a no-llher called 'Reality' (Sk,utecnost) which is fofibidden in
Switzerland. Unfortunately, I have not been able to peruse these
journals as I do not read c zech, but I am told that their basic thesis is the need for the party m asses to submit to leadership by the
elite cadre. Belak was formerly a Communist Party functionary in
Slovalda under the n ame of Berger. He puts out a Germ an-language
sheet called 'Militant Democracy' which few Germans read because
it takes S&lt;talin's anti-Ger,man line."

I. who know this gentleman (Belak-Berger) persona1'ly, must confirm that Mr. Glaser's opinion is 100 percent right!
The former membe.r of the Social Democratic party
in 1Slov akia, Pavel Viboch, need not be dealt with as a party
memlber , and the other three Slovaks mentioned are al,so
not significant. Never receiving any mandate from the
Slovruk nation, they represent colonialism in Central Europe
at a time when oolonialism is. dying even in Africa. The
best proof is the elections in 1946, when the Social Demo~
crats in Slovakia could not elect even one representaitive
without Ozech help. It was an old Prague trick to transfeT
unneeded votes from one district to another. As a rule, the
Social Democratic ipanty has been a Czech origani·z ation only.
To return to the history of this _p arty, however, one
can say that its activities during the second World War
are very revooling. The majority of the party ,p oliticians
fled wiith Benes, or shoritly after, and served in his "c!libi.
net.,in-exile." An e~ception was Ambassador Fierlinger,
who remained in Moscow serving the Communists instead
of Benes, according to Ripka and Benes himself. When it
came to .the wol"st, Benes's "govennment-in-exile" reoolled
him to London. Having the support of Moscow, however,
Fierlinger refused to return, and Benes, in order .to keep
his presidency, ha:d :to. ,g o to Moscow and take ordern from
his personal enemy. These statements are proved by the
cablegrams exchanged by the "government-in--exile" and
Fierlinger, which were published in Fierlinger's hodk. In
addition to Moscow's rs upport, Fierlinger also had help
within the "government-in-exile." This was the left wing of
1

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the Social Democrats, wirth Lausman and Bechyne as leaders in London. This group, moreover, closely cooperated
with other admirers of the Soviet Union in the Czech National Sodalist party, Rip_ka, Firt, and others. This party
supporte'd several pro-Communistic organizations, where
Rip'ka rused to be president and Josef Ko!'bel and Tig.rid
Schonfeld were in leading ,positions, .pleadin,g for help for
Stalin. In 1942 and 1943, Vlase:k and Majer organized the
Commu:niisrt demonstrations that heiLpe&lt;l to· force the second
front against Churchill's will.
We recall that Benes traveled to Moscow in 1943
against the wishes of Eden, Churchill, and other statesmen. There he approved the seill-out o&lt;f Ruthenia and cleared
the roa:d to Ozecho-SloV'akia for the Soviet Union. This he
did without any regard for the will of the peoples of SlovaJki!a, Bohemia, Moravia and Ruthenia. Nay, even without
the full consent of the "Provisional Czechosloviruk Government" in London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia, Moravia, and ,Ruthenia certainly had nothing to do with it.
1

I recaH the speeches of Octdber and November, 1943,
in the chambers of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in
London. They were made not only by the admirers of the
Kremlin, but also by the so-called civil politicians who were
blinded by Moscow. Among them were Lausman and Majer, Dr. Uhlir and Paul Macha.eek; all strongly approved
the journey to Moscow and insisrted on going along with
Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant the loss of
asylum in England and the good wiU of the allies. Benes
simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the "higher
interests of our nations" demanded it. When Benes returned from his trip to Moscow, he brought the request
to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a la!lge
part of Poland to the Soviets.
If any one should quesrtion ,t he truth of my statements,
I am ready and willing at all times to produce the repo~ts
of the "Czechoslovak Srtate Council,." the speeches Lausman and Uhlir, and even Benes's speech in its entirety
after he returned fa-om Moscow. They tel11 us clearly why
the Communist "putsch" of Februa:ry 1948 took place so

�SLOVAKIA

77

smoothly. Repetition o.f these facts is important for understandmg the effective collaboration of the Social Democrats with the Communists after the ,second war.
Showing their allegiance to the principle from 1928,
"Never against the Soviet Union," tihe Social Demoorats
without an exception pressed for the Benes-Stalin agree~
ment in 1943. Therefore, in the first post-war government,
formed in Kosice in 1945, and the most communistic of all
governments returning ho.me, they dominated. There was
no Slovak representative - evidence that Social Democracy had praictically no influence in Slovakia.
Besides Prime Minister Zdenek Fierlinger, there was
Frantisek Nemec and the liaison officer between the Red
Armv and Benes, General Niziborsky (known now as General
Hasal), who is at present, I believe, a consultant in the
Pentagon Other ministers in that government were the infamous spy, Bohumil Lausman, and a present leader in the
"Council of Free Czechoslovakia," Vaclav Majer. We know,
that all except Fierlinger came unharimed into exile after
February, 1948. Lausman, of course, after having accomplished his espionage in Radio Free Europe, returned to
Pra:gue. Clearly Lausman has the lowest character among
the contemporary •politicians, but he was a most trusted
comrade of ,t he present so-called "anti-Communist" politicians in the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia."
They all were united in their pro-Communist activities,
and their claim now to belong to this or that wing is no.t at
all convincing. In 1946 the •s ame Vaclav Majer praised the
top Communist in Czecho-Slovakia lavishly: "Gottwald's
name will be forever connected not only with our fight for
national liberation, but also with the struggle for social
liberation as well as for new forms of life and work. . . .
Gottwald, not only by his determination, but also by his
understanding for the opinions of others, showed his great
qualities as politician and man." Sudh were then the expressions of Vaola.JV Majer, an "anti-Communist" fighter
of today. But Ma:jer is not alone in this. After working together for the Communists at home, the Social Democrats
came to the United States and suddenly discovered that
they, too, have fought Communism. Their present fabrica-

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tions rubout their post-war aotivity, which the following
facts disprove, are a deep offense to the witnesses of their
activities back home.
The first document signed by the ministers and the
members of the Executive Committee of the Social Demo~
cratic Party iby which a smooth Communi!zation of thei,r
homeland was assured, was their agreement of June 25,
1945, at once after returning to Praigue, to form the "National Front of the Working People." This agreement
shows the serviI.fty of the wholle Social Democralti1c Party,
not only of the leaders, because it was discussed and una~
nimously approved by aJll the ;party before being signed by
the Executive Commiittee. This means tha,t all politicians
of the $ociaJ Democratic Party, now posing as anti-Communists in exile, agreed to the bolshevi zation of CzechoSlovakta. Zenkl aind his National Socialists C'an at least attempt to excuse themsel,v es that they did not want to accept this ag,r eement lbut were forced to by the Social Democrats.
But it is not a question of who forced wlhom; they all
signed and pulblished this agreement and, what is woTse,
they put it into effect. The most important parts of this
agreement are the following:
1. While maintaining a politica:l and organizational
independence, the three parties wil.l closely cooperate and
follow a common policy in all matters of .p u!blio life.
2 . . The political iba;si,s o.f the National Front orf Working People is the government program, unanimously a:g-re.ed
upon in conference in MoS&lt;:ow and unanimously accepted
by the government in Kosice on April 5, 1945. Through
this agreemenit, also a Central Coordinating Committee
is being created with an equal numlber of representatives
from all participating iparties, and also a United Alliance
of Trade Organizations, based on voluntary membership,
wJll be formed. F'urther wili be formed a Non-.Political
Alliance of Czech Farmers and a United Organization of
Czech Youth; both of these organizations shaH be supported ,by all parties.
This publicly dedared aigreement was signed for the
Social Democrats by Zdenek Fierlinger; for the Commun1

�SLOVAKIA

79

ists by Klement Gottwald, and for the National Socialist
Party by Peter Zenkl.
It is both very int.eresting and quit,e significant that
not a single Slovak att.ended that meeting and that among
those who· called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka, and other leaders of Dr. Benes's old Czech National
Socilalist Party - the very same people who today are
telling the American public and the world that they always hated the Reds and that the Reds "ousted" them from
Government.
But the truth is something else a;gatin. The fact is that
both Zenlcl and Ripika welcomed the Communists, sought
their favor, and wanted to win politicrul prestige with the
help of the Reds at the exipense of the other political parties. Of course, today we know that they failed. The same
thing happened to them ,that had happened and 1s still
happening to an tho.se who try to, collruborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are
worth and then swallo;w them up or get rid of them.
The "National Front of the' Working People" created
a "Central Coordinating Committee," in which e'very affiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This
committee had the task of coordinating the work of the
socialist parties. The sooiwlfst bloc prepared the ground for
the various activities which led to the suppression of political and religious fireedom - the first st~s taken toward
a socialist dictatorship.
The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the
Agrarian Party would be suppressed, the Catholic IDaigle
organization outiawed, and that Catholic youth, as such,
would not be allowed to orgamize. Together t@y wo,r ked
out a plan whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would
be done away with and, at the same time, how these votes,
together with the Communist-contro lled ..peasant unions,
, would he brought into the Communist P,a,rty. They also
created and later legalized the Communist trade organizations, then the non-political Fedeiration of Farmers and the
United Youth Or,g,anization - all of which were SU!ppo.s ed
to be fornned by the joint participation of all parties, but

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actually served onlly to communize Ozecho-iSlovakia from
the instant they began to function.
Therefore, it is not true that Zenlkl, Rtpka, Vilem,
Majer, and other Czech Sooial DemocraJts opposed Com~
munist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is
that from the moment they accepted the so--called "Kosice
Agreement ," they were aJlways subordinat ed to and in the
train of .t he Communis t Party and willingly continued tha,t
way not only on Russian soil, or in Russian-·occuipied Kosice, but a1so in "Jiberated" Pr'cllgue. The "Joint Declaration "
to the nation on June 28, 194'5, is indisputalble proof of the
fact that they wanted to get into governmen t with the help
of the Oommunist s, even at the roopense of democracy,
Christ'ianit y, and freedom.
This is the sound lesson for all who would col'la!borate
with Oommunist s. All such ,p eople are digging their own
graves, because Communism recogn.i'zes no agreements , concessions, or compromis es, and swallows wp all who collaborate with it.
A Czech Catholic editor, A. J. Jandacek, commented
on major effects of this agreement in this manner:
"The aims of the socialist bloc were many:
"1. First of all not to allow workers to organiz.e in Catholic
trade unions, and so far as they are alread,y organized in them,
through a mass effort .to storm them into the socialist bloc by
maintaining that Oatholic organizations wm anyhow be in the mi·
nority an d that, therefore, it is better to go together.
"2. Not to ,a llow an independent unification of Catholic farmers. The party of farm people wi ll not be allowed to exist at all,
and as far as the Catholics have their Catholic farmers organized, the
Communists will divide them among themselves.
"3. A United Organization of Czech Youth will be formed and,
thus, the Cat·holic you1Jh wJll not have an opportunity to organize on
a Oatholic platform, eitilier politiooJly or religiously. Simply, ,a ll youth
will be forced to go into the state-formed and socialist-led organization. Thus, organizing an "Alliance of Catholi c Youtll" or ,a "Czechoslovak Orel" will be .impossible. A daily and weekJ.y have already
been published for this so-called united youth organization and are
led by the Commundsts.
"In view of these three aims, it is possible to call the establishing and maintaining of t!he socialist bloc an intention-al act against
political and religious freedom and the establishmen t of a socialist
dictatorship."

Although I am not a Catholic and never was a member

�SLOVAKIA

81

of any clerical party, I am ready to sign this analysis by
the editor Jandaceik.
Whereais, Ze:rukl and his party, in December, 11947, begain not to abide by the 1946 agreement, the Social Democrats kept it even after the Oommunist "putsch" in Februa:ry, 1948. Professor Macek, for instance, accepted lead~
ing positions in o,rganizations which bolsheviized the University, and as president of the Aotion Committee of the
University he expelled those students who had participated
in demO'Il!Strations against the Communists in February.
Furthermore, for a long time he helped the Constitutional
Oommittee of Ozecho-Slovakia:n P.arliam.ent and its chairman, Dr. Procha:zka, a leading Communist. As a matte~
of fact, the whole section on Economics in the Communist
constitution is his work. Both as an expert and as a member of the :Sociail Demo:cra,tic Party, he supported the
Communist bi1ls; a;ctua:1ly, rhe was the right hrui.d of Dr.
Procha:zka, the most Communist jurist in Czecho-Slovakia
and chairman of the Constitutional Committee. To us it is
not surprising that Macek led in the persecution of democratic students after the Communist putsch, since he had
earlier been well known as a fervent exponent of Marx
at the tUrnversity of Brno, where he was professor of National Eoonomics. The surprise is that he is now a university professor in the United States.
Professor Maicek, during the yearn 1929...1939, was a
member of Parliament for the Social Democratic Party.
Simultaneously, he edited a left-orientated monthly called
"Our Times" which was sponso,r ed by Presidents Masaryk
and Benes. He published numerous books, a base of which
was, repeatedly, the teachings of Marx. In these books
Professor Maicek defended the theories orf Marx very emphatica!lly and wanted to introduce them into our social
and economic life, evein as early as 1930-1938. He wanted
to sociailize everything. His aim was identical to that of the
Communi,s ts. They wanted to put it into practice after 194'5.
Origtlnafly, Professor Macek migrated to Canada and
lived on the fann of a certain Mr. Karel Buzek,. where he
wrote artides for the Ozech newspapers in Canada. In his
articles he rejeoted and condemned the very same ideas he

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was not so long ago an apostle of and a very able and
thorough propagator.
From Canada he came to the United States and at
the present time he is active as a professor at some university m Pennsylvania.
iB. Vilem, as Genera'} Secretary of the Ozech Social
Democratic Party, was more a personal "whip" for Fierliniger than a "whip" for the ,party. While I was a member
of the Agricultural Committee, we succeeded sometimes in
winning over .t he chairman of the committee, who was a
Social Democrat, against the Communist proposa!ls. Vilem,
however, before the voting day, and often at midnight,
cal'led the members of 'his party and dictated: "Fierlinger
lets you know that the party cannot stand for your proposals; you have to vote with the Communist Party." One
of these Social Democrats that was forced by Vi1em to
vote with the Communists is in exile ; several committee
memlbers from the other parties who lost ,w ith me because
of Vil.em's actions are now in the "Council of Free Ozechosloviaikia," but they wil'l never forget those defeats (Sliva,
Torn, and other.s). Wathout this servility to the Communists, Gottwald would never have gained the majority he had.
The saddest chapter of the Social Democrati'C Party,
however, was written by its memiber who was the Minister of
Industry, Bohumil Dausman. He served the at!reernent of
June 25, 1945, so faithfully that he went out to disintegrate
even the exile and worked for three years as a spy, after
being employed by Radio Free Europe with the help of the
Social Democrats and other memlbers of the "Council of
Free Czechoslo;vakia," particularly Ripka and his group.
The case of Lausman's treason was not yet completely
closed when new espionage process was started against further exiponent of Prague government and close collaborator
of Dr. Hubert Riipka. Hardly had a French .court sentenced
Kubala on a charge of espionage for Communist OzechoSlovakia before the Prague radio reacted in this case and the
spea,keir, himself a collaJborator of Mr. Ferdinand Peroutka
and a former employee of Radio Free EuTope, used the most
despiooble language against the West. Slovak newspapers
unanimousily reported - unfOTtunaitely without desirable

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83

results on the aictions orf Radio F.ree Europe - that Lausman would be followed by the others. The newspapers asked
for effect1ve preventive measures in Radio Free Europe
rugainst subversive elements but nothing was done. Many
very dubious elements are sitting in Radio F,r ee Europe and
are paid by the Amerilcan citizens.
In the warning concerning espionage, we have not only
staJted several times that there are Marxists ood Oommunists in "Czechoslovak" organizations, but we also said openly
that they were, and silll are espionage agents of the Prague
government. The Prague broadcasts have confirmed our allegation. On the same ibroadlca;st where, some time a;go, Laus-·
man broadcast in Prague, now spoke Bruno Folta, who was
working as an employee of Radio Free Europe under the protection of Dr. M. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko. He minutely copied
the style of Lausrnan, H~ confessed that originally he betrayed the Communist government in Prague and filed to the
West, requesting political asylum.
Here in the West, in Radio Free Europe Folta came to
the conclusion that the western world was rotten and readily
seized the chance to return home and accept what was offered to him in the inteliligence service conducted by the
Czech General Moravec. He repented like Lausman and, hruving the desire to make some reparations, he put himself at
the disposal of the "people's Democracy" against the West.
He went on to threaten that he would use all the knowledge
which he ooquired as an employee of Radio Free Europe.
Our reports from Munich and behind the Iron Ourtain
explain the Folta case as foHo:ws: Like Lausman, he was sent
by the Prague government for espionage purposes and to esta:blish the contacts. When he succeeded and gathered
enough material and collaborators, especially in Munich
and Paris, he simply ,r eturned to Prague as a highly appreciruted a;gent, in order to accUJSe the anti-Communist citizens at home. of whose attitude he learned while abroad.
What is Folita telling the peoples of Czecho~Slova;kia?
The Vienna newspapers published long articles explaining
how Foll.ta, this confident servant of Mr. Peroutka and Dr.
Mudry, was blaming Radio Free Europe and the Western
World and praising everything he found after his return to

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Brague: •~Prague has everything good and new, all the
new technical inventions, and everything in plenty. Meantime, in the Weslt, o:nlly the capitalist dwpes have all the
goods in their possession and the common people are
starving." Thrut is the picture cxf the West presented by
Folt'a, who coJ:lected American doJlars from RJFE.
When will Washington be conV'inced? The case of
Folta is certainly a cha,pter of shameful history, but we
feair that even this fact will not be strong enough to convince the F1ree Europe Committee or the Department of
State in W8!Shi:nigton. We repeat that such exile orga.n±zations, which are SUipported at the ex;pense of genuine demo-cratic and anti-Communist organizations, wre nuisances
and wreckers of all the actiOIIlS of the Western. WorJd in
the cold war. In the "Ozechoslovak" orgarazations there
have been, since the start, members who were sent West by
the Prague go,v ernment only for tlhe purpose of serving the
Communists. On the roster of "Czechoslovak" organizations
in exile you wilil find many persons who were elected to
office on the Oommunist baHot, ,p oliticians who mostly
helped the Communists not only to gain control of CzechoSlova!kia, but also the whole Danube valley.
The same persons, who with Benes in 1939, in London, were in touch with SDalin's ambrussa.dor, agreed on the
invasion of U.iS.IS.IR. south of the Carpathian Mountains.
To the Americans in Washington and the Einglishmen in
London, they disiplayed an rug·r eement concerning the integrity of the Czecho-Slavaik State while knowing the deficiencies of this treaty. They .co!~JIBitted the same crime
as did Lausman and Bruno, Folta. These people simply betrayed the Allies.
But beyond that are their protectors, the "Council of
Free Czechoslovakia" and its leading representatives Zenkl, Lettrich, IPerou'bka, Mudry and others - iess guilty
of betrayal? They 1let Lausma.n into R1adio :ffiree Europe
and allowed him to• broadcast for American money. On the
payroll they kept Folta, R1.12icka, and others as well; and
they still do that and help to betray America. There is no
excuse for them, or is there?
Parrticipants in a crime are as punishable as the crim1

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86

inal. J&gt;a:rtici:pan.ts in this betriayal can not excuse themselves on the grounds that they did not know anything
about suoh action. Several times suspicious caJSes were
brought to their notice but they did not pay any ,a ttention
to these warnings. What should we say to this criminal
negligence on the .part of responsible pemonaHties :in Radio
Free Europe Oir in the "Council of ~ree OzechoslovaJda ?"
There they are unanimous: Zenkl, Cerny, Osuis'ky -- all
plead for the innocence of Peroutka. The continuous scandaJls should waike up the security officials of the Western
Powers. Until now only the Germans in Munich asked fo-r
a c1erun-1.l'p of Marxists and other elements hostile to democracy in the whole territory of the German Federal Republfo. They aimed at "Czechoslovak" organizations which
aire infiltrated with highly suspicious elements.
Let us apply our knowledge whi'1e there is still time.
Many think that only in Germany are such cases possible.
but that is not true. The same oases, even more paradoxi~
cal, we find in Washington where the Czech officers are
working. They distinguished themselves in the sell~,ut of
Carpathian Ruthenia to the Soviets, or kept in the service of American Intelligence the sister-in-ilaw of a welL
known Communist in the old country. Why should we be
shocked that in rPairis the Communists received confiden•
tial materia'l? Even in Washington security mea5UJres are
neglected. We know the persons at wol'k in W81Shington
and we will not be surpri,s ed if the Lausman affair breaks
out a,gain despite our warning. Those who wHl be suT1prised
will be Americans. Let us take lessons from Parts.
Since Lausman's return to Prague, the whole CzechoSlovak exile, in its confusion, has been producing deceptions and charges of for.gery. When Mr. Osusky of the
"Council of F'lree Ozechoslovakia" does not succeed in his
enterprises, .o r the situation changes after his proclamations hawe been pulblished, he simply proclaims them unauthentic or falsified, o:r he simply a&amp;:!rilbes them to Lausman.
'Sometimes the matter is trivial, as it was in the proclamation concerning the is udeten G€Tmans which was allegedly signed by Osusky. There he stressed the necessity

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that the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans are reconciled and
charged that Ripka and Zenk! were unsuitalble because of
their collaJboration with the Communists. The subj~ct was
given great publicity by Josten (a former official of the
Foreign Ministry and now editor of "Czechoslovak" in
LondO'Il) and his Marxist cell in London, w:hiich always
tries to please Prague. In this matter, Osusky probably
figured that a dea!l with the ,Sudeten GeI'IDans could per.,
haps be of he1p to him if he should have trouble in the
Council with Ripka and Zenk!. But here chance helped
him. R:iipka had difficulties in the United States because
of his colla;boration with the Communists and therefore
planned to return to his socialist friends in Europe. For
this reason he, as weU as Zenkl, did not fight for leading
positions .i n the Counchl - a fact that allowed the November reconciliation of the Council. Osusky does not need
the Sudeten Germany any longer, whereas for Zenk! and
Ripka the Sudeten German question will be a ,problem. So
Osusky denied his Sudeten German proclamation and
charged tha;t its publfoation in the "Czechoslovak" was a
fOTgery .
Simila.rly, "Nase Cesta," a Marxist paper printed in
the Czech language ,in Vienna, published a who[e issue of
articles written by several memibers of the "Council of Free
Czechoslovak ia.'' Arfter Osusik y and Zen kl were reconciled
and the articles did not fit into the changed opinion of the
Council, the editor procilaimed the whole earlier issue a
for,g ery. Thus, suddenly we are told that the ,articles were
not writt® by the members oif the Council, and that the
who'le issue was forged with the purpose of s,plitting the
"Czechoslova k" exile. Lt is interesting to see whose names
first a;ppea.r as authors o,f the disputed rurticles: Dr. Taiborsky, Benes's secretary; Jan Zak, Slovak socialist and confidant of MaTxists and "Ozechosloivaks" ; Jozef Dieska, member of the Council, etc. I can only dismiss the editor's
charge that the whole issue originated with Lau:sman as
ridiculous and highly impossible.
In the newspruper "Novy Domov," published in Canada,
another member of the Council, Fras'tacky, attacked Colonel
M~ksohe, who does not go along with the "Ozeichoslova!ks"

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87

in the Council. (Oolon~l Miksche, a Czecho-Slovak military
attache in Pa.r-is, resigned in December, 1947, in protest to
the policy of the present members of the Council then in
Praigue.) When Colonel Miiksche threatened to sue him,
Frastaoky quiokly denied writing the article and declared
it a forgery. Certainiy this comedy cannot be cailled anything but ridiculous; fortunately, it did not harm Colonel
Miksche.
It is regrettruble, however, that the exile "Czechoslovak" press sees in these and other incidents the intervention of Genera:! Molotka of P,r ague, whose assignment,
with Lausman, is to influence and distunb the exik It does
not at all seem to me that these .incidents, are of Lausman's making, for he would think of different methods
among the members of the Ooll!Ilcil. In the Council he feels
at home, after spending three years in its midst and working with Council members in Radio Free Europe. There
he does not need any mediators and can at any time directly interfere. Using Lausman's name, however, provides
Osusky and others wJth a handy scapegoat for the.i~ own
failures and a!bandoned projects.
SimHarly, the "CzechosloV'ak" exile press is not unanimous and constant in its aocount of the Council's November compromise and in its list of representatives.
Sometimes it leaves out Dr. Cerny',s name, and other times
it puts it in, depending on whom it serves . .Professor Hlavaty is referred to as a neutraJl sometimes, and at other times
as ·a former socialist representative in the temporary National Assembly in Prrugue.
Moreover, the "Czechoslovak" exile even today is
hel:ping and promoting the accessories of spies as did some
other memlbers of the Courrcil while they were ambassadors
in the United States and elsewhere. This is the way the
"Czechoslovak" organizations operate while the socialist
parties in the West do not realize their dange,r . So, for ex-·
ample Zdenka Schonova, in :Eingland one of the leading
Czech Social Democrats, is supported today by the "Czech
Trust Fund," even though her collaboration with the convicted spy, Peter Arton, was proved. It is evident that the
persons from the Council do not distinguish between a
1

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Czech patriot and a Czech spy. For them everyone is first
of aH Czech, from Benes down to Lausman, and in this belief they .not only help the spies and pay them, but also
pay for their protection and defense
It is also well known that Colonel Koenig, who is a
leader orf the reporting division of the "Council of Free
Ozechos!ovaktla" and also working for the West, still employs the same Hungarian Communis t as his secret,a ry,
his sister-in-ilaw, Klara Fedak. Fedfuk is in New York without letting the U. S. authorities know that she is a Oommunist. Her former "1b oy friend" is now chief of the espionage office in Bratislava; yet the persons from the "Co,u ncii
of Free Ozechoslov aikia" do not find it difficult to affirm
to the West the ,reliaJbiliity of these Communist s. Koonig's
group is also responsible for the murder of a Slovak un.,
dergrmLnd leader and patriot, Pavol Harusiak, and others
from Bratislava, whose bordeT-cro ssing they betrayed to the
Communis t police. Ifurusiak was my friend, an'd I kn.ow that
a member of Koenig's group, iDr. Patek, gained access to
him only through representin g himself as from me.
When the "Czechosio. vak" exile has such help and affiliations, how lO'Ilg must O'Ile state that this "Czechoslo vak"
group is not reliable? It is seen to be a very dangerous
group when we realize that it hrus, accomplice s in the un.
derground who were given money and introd1..1JCtions by
Zenkl and Ripka, as the spy Bohumil Cerny and his accompJices were. This situation is also true orf the "C'zechoslova!k" section of R:adio Flree Europe in Munich, where
there is always someone who helps such men as La.usma,,n
and Folta, or other ex-Commu nists and .future re-immigrants to Red Prague. Bures, who brought Folta to Radio
Free Europe, was dismissed, but his friends - Kvetko,
Mudry, and Peroutka - are still in leading positions.
If Radio Free Europe and the Voice of Ame11ica would
try to lbrea:k the reputation. oif this "Czechoslo vak"' army
with truth and with real anti-Comm unist speakers who
ha,ve a good reputation and an anti...Communist record at
home, it could be done. Not, however, with the present
group. What is broadcast and written now - for American
money - helps the Oommunis ts more than it harms them.

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89

These org,a nizations which are supposed to wage psy.
chological warfaire against Communism behind the !iron
Curtain do just the opposite - as far as Czecho-Slovakia
is concerned. Too often they he:lp spies and broadcast material which does not harm the Communists, but rather
amuses them. Sending pigeons and balloons across the
Iron Curtain maikes people there laugh or curse, because
the police always get some of those who pick up the leaf~
lets. When aJlmost every month someone returns to Pra•g ue
and te1'ls of the low moral tone, the scandals, and suicides
in the "Czechoslovak" section of Radio Tuee Europe in
Munich, the Communists give this excellent publicity. No
wonder that Radio· Free Europe does not have any respect
there! IDven when Radio Free Euroipe, or the Voice of
America, gains some SlovaJk renegade, these organizations
are not made 1:.iherelby eiffecti:ve, nor are their names re~
stored at home behind the Iron Curtain. People theTe ceased
to believe them loog ago, and after the Lausman and Folta
affairs they only curse them.
Folta, Ru!zicka, and Bures worked in Radio Free Europe; they were the proteges of those Siova.k employees in
Radio Free Europe - Dr. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko - who
are supposed to represent the r eal Slovak anti-Communist cause. And yet nothing happened to Mu.dry or Kvetko,
much less to Peroutka, because they brought Bures and
Ruzicka and Folta to RF'E, nor because they paid their
comrade Lausmrun, who is also back in Prague.
The new chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on In.
vesitigations, Senator McCleUan, who is a capable lawyer
to whom the security of the United States is of paramount
internst is, we hear, curious about many things. We hope,
therefore, thlat this suibcommittee will succeed in this mat~
ter also and that the organizations in question will be
cleansed of the ,present "Czecho,slovaJk" group.
iLausman was so aggressive that during the second
World War, after his return from Moscow to London, he
succeeded in the State Council in speeding up Benes's trip
to Moscow. Further, as he admits in his book, published in
Vienna, he forced Benes to na,tionalize aH private industry
by presidential decree before the Pro,v isional National As-

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sembly convened in October, 194'5. He also :points out in
his book that, whereas he admits his actions, the associates who agireed with hiim on aU the issues of col1aboration now are renouncing him only in order to be accept.,
able to Washington. In this way, Lausman has unmasked
the Sodal Democrats who in exile pre.tend to fight Communism, but actually are responsi!ble for the :f act that
Russian territory extends for the first time in history west
of the Carpathians into the Danube basJn.
In this bolshevik expansion it was two Social Democrats who represented Benes and the whoJ.e state leadership: Flrantisek Nemec and Generail Ni:ziborsky - Hasal.
Both went to Moscow from London in 1944 and then fol.,
lowed the Red Army into Ozecho-1Slovaiki,a to take over
the liberated territory :from the Red Army in accordance
with the Benes-lSta:li,n treaty. They did it so successfully
with the he1p of Fierlinger in Moscow that in three months
they gave Stalin the eastern part of Czecho-1Slovaikia, the
whole of Ruthenia. Russia ,o ffered to the Slovaks, through
the Communists Dr. Husak and Novomesky, an independent ,Slovak State, provided that it would be another
Soviet republic. When Husak and Novomesky made the
proposal to the Slov,a ks, to Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of
S'lovakia and the Slow.1Jk Government, the Slovaks, however,
refused the •bolshevi~atio!Il of their country.
Nemec was not given a cordial re:ception ~n Ruthenia
at all. The in'haibitants everywh&amp;e were signing petitions,
sponsored by the Communist Petruscak, which started that
the Ruthenians no longer existed and that there were only
Sub-Carpathi an Ukrainians in Ruthenia who yearned to
be embrruced by their greait mother, Ukrainia.
After many long squabbles, Nemec fina:lly got a message through to Benes in London through General Pika.
The telegrams that Benes sent through F1ierlinger were
never seen by Nemec, ,b ecause Fierlinger already then was
Stalin's envoy and never a paitTiotic cii.ti,z en of his own
State. It is significant, therefore, that despite these experiences thi,s same traitor, Fierling&amp;, was named, several
months later, as the premier by Benes.
Nemec was in a very trying position. When he wanted

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to be connected with London, he had to ask for permission
to do so from the Chief of the Russi,an ISJtafif so that he
could travel to Moscow, where with the heilp of the vad.io
conneotion of General Biika, who was the Chief of the Mtilitary Mission, Nemec could tell Benes how matters were
going and koop him informed on Fierlinger. The latter was
doing right well. He still is a minister in the Prague Gov~
ernment, but Genera,1 Bika was killed by the Commund.sts.
At that time the Communists had asked the Slovak
non-Communists whether it would not he more profitable
to support tJhe idea of a Slovak Soviet Republic so that the
Slovaks could go,vern their own territory rather than adhere to the "Czecho-slova;k" ideology which denied the existence of the Slovak nation. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Reipulblk could be promoted without diff,iculty,
because the Slovak State still existed. Husak and Novomesky, however, did not get anywhere with their proposal.
The Slova,k non-Commumsrts turned it down, declaring that
it was contrary to the Christmas Agreement of December,
1943, as well as the agreement which Ursiny concluded -w ith
Dr. Benes in Octolber, 1944, when he acted iJ?- the name of
thie SloViak National Council.
When Husak and N01Vomesky failed to promote the
idea of a Slovruk Soviet Repwblic in London, they imrmediiately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakia
to present the ,p rop·a sal to President Joseph Tiso and the
Slovruk Govemment. But Tiso· and the Slovak Government
would not hear rubout it. Husak and N ovomesky failed in
thek mission. Several months later, with mMly Slova;ks in
emigration, Clemenitis took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today an the leading Reds of Slavrukia are paying
dearly for failing in theiT mission. Clementis paJid with his
life.
Ruthenia was loot. Benes's delegation had to go to
Trebisov ·a nd after that things went rather smoothly. ~erliillger ma:de the propositions and Benes aocepted them.
When he was returning from Moscow in March, 1945, Benes could no longer enter Ruthenia. In fact he renounced
it solemnly on severai occasions. FinaMy, Benes had an
agreement prepared which Fierlinger signed for the Czecho1

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SlovaJk Government with great solemnity in the Kremlin on
June 29, 1945. No one outside the CommU'Ilists agreed with
this act of Benes. No law, however, could contain or restrain Benes. He acted dictatori.ally at any time that it
benefited him.
On August 24, 1945, without even corum1tling the
Parliament, Benes issued his presidential decree No. 4, concluding the pa:ct between the U .S.S.&lt;R. and the C.S.R. This
decree was the basis for assigning new borders to Slovakia in the East. In Octoher, 1946, everything "legalized"
on the ,b asis orf foregoing decrees was published in the Col~
lection of Laws and Regulations.
T.he text orf the rubove-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as significant. It begins with the words:
". . . being certain that the provisional National Assembly
of the Orecho-1Slovaik Republic shal[ concur with this ag.reement . . . "
Benes did not wait. He and John Masaryk and VI-ado
Clementis decided matters without Pa.rlia,ment. As good
prophets, they knew tha't Parliament would certainly approve this ag,r eement !
Since Ruthenia was not a very big bite, Benes did not
stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2,
1945, he issued decree No. 8, whereby a numbeir of homes
in the most beautiful seo'tion of BUJbenec - in the modern
section of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, the greaJt s•a crifices
the nations of the U .IS.S.R. had made on the altar of liberation of humanity.
WeM, it is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great
extent did l,iibera-te SlwaJcia from a gre,aJt many things the
Slovaks could use themselves, but it certamly was not
ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them
without evsen consulting the nation about it. Only dictators
act like that. And Benes was a dictator by the grace of
MoS&lt;!ow, even id: only a temporary one.
'Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later
Benes showed his aP!)Teoiation to the so-called "iLiberator"
of Prague, M&lt;rurshaJ Konev, by giving him several very
•b eautiful vi1las which were oonfiscated from the 1g ood citi-

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93

zens .o f Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiflrl
view of Prague.
All these decTees we re signed by General Hasal-Nizborsky, who was at that time Minister of Thansportation,
and •by Vaclav iMajer, who was also a member of Benes's
caJbinet. The servility to Stalin and Go'titwald, and the
boundless adulation iby HasaJl..,Niziborsky a,nd Frantiseik
Nemec would be best illustrated if we pu!blished the congratulatory telegrams sent by them to their idols.
I mtend to publish all these facts in a book, but they
hawe already !been quoted by Fierlinger and Lausman in
their books.
Later, many Communists who fell out of favor tried to
rescue their political careers in exile with the help of membership cards in the Social Democratic Party. Those Communists, rulmost without exception, we find in Radio Free
Europe - (Graf, Berger-!Belak, and Ti.grid Schonfeld), or
(Josef Konbel, the
with other American institutions Communist amlbas:sador from Prague to Tito in Belgrade,
now a member of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" and
a uni,versity professor ,i n the United Staltes).
Regarding Tigrid Schonfeld, it is only necessary to
note what has been written albout him here in the United
States. As it is quite a lo't, I only quote some parts of a
more serious character:
"Tigrid is a former m emb er of the C2:ech Communist Party. According to tJhe newspaper Christ und Welt (Stuttgart, October 16,
1952), •his political ac tivjty began in 1932 when he published the illegal Communist paper Hal lo Noviny, w,hich specialhr.ed in subversion of morale in the Czecho slovak Army.
" He was also a contri butor to the Co mmunist magazine Leva Kultura (Left Culture). Dur:ing Wo r ld W ar II he w as a member of the
Communfot-domiuated Czechoslovak staff of t'he British Broadcasting Company, where one of his colleagues and iruti mate friend w.as
Colonel Otto BlheJer, the Czech mi.Jitary attache whom the United
States Government declared persona non grata in 1949 for es pionage activities."

I hope this short excerpt will be enough to show what
pro-Communist elements were picked 1by the U. S. Ad-·
ministration and by the Firee Europe Commitltee for importa,nt pos,itions. These quotations will also prove tha,t SUJCh
people cannot be expected to be trusted 'back a,t home by

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the Nation as anti-Communist fighters and thaJt the whole
expensive propa,gand'a program is practicrully useless and
ineffective.
About the others aJbove, I must confess the same
opinion as to character.
The deeds of these men, however, I am intentionally
separating from the actions of the leaders of the Czec'h
Social Democratic Prurty. I am presenting the Communist
co1la:"boration of only those Social Democ~ats who represent the party in exile and who :firom 1945 until they went
in to exiile were also of some importance back home. I am
leaving aside those persons who are now abusing the sympath4es of the Labor Party in London, because they wd
not amount to much back home, being only opporlll!Il.ists
and regularly havmg two memib ership cards, one of the
Communist and the other of the Social Democratic Party.
But these also oannot claim that they opposed the agreement of June 25, 1945; everyone conisenited to it and carried it out in h:is capacity.
It is no wonder that :b y 1946 their policy of complete
conformance with the Communists had negated the party
as opposi,t ion. Simifarly now the party is destroying itself
in an attempt to gain strength by accepting and proteotin.g
even men who were strong Communrists, like Milos Vanek
and Tigrid Schonfeld, or men who possessed membership
cards of several Marxist parities, like M8!cek, Kwbel, and
others. Furthermore, an affidav1t of anti-Communism signed
by the Social Demoorat le·aders is ridiculous, indeed, beca use the party's claim to anti--Communism is itself destroyed by the evidence of its history.
During the February, 1948 c,r isis, the Social Democratic Party tried to look neutral, but the fact ilid everything to help t'he COIIllmunists succeed. Hol!cling to the
agreement of J.une, 1945, the party as a unit gave its support to the Commumsts and so broke the political equilibrium in favor of the Oorrum.1~sts. Even if it is not pos•
sible to .state that without the help of the Sociail. Democrats,
Gottwald would not have succeeded in the "putsch" of
February, 1948, nevertheless it remains a great guilt
against the Sooial Democrats that in the time when it was

�SLOVAKIA

95

clear to everyone what tJhe Communists were doing, the
Czech Social Democrats stood by them and did not help
the opposition. This attitude of the Czech Social Democrats
is not very well known and evaluated in the United States;
if it were, not one of them could pose in Washington as
anti-Communists. And their protector, Steinhardt, U. S.
am:bassador to, •Prague in 1948, and former Secretary · of
State Acheson could not have secured for them influential
positions in the United States on the U. S. payroll.
It is worthwhile to note that up to 19-38 the Czech Sociall. Democrats cooperated strongly with the Sudeten German Sociail. Democrats in Ozecho-Slovakia. When the German Social Democrats got into trouble with the N a:llis and
were persecuted, there was no Czech Social Democrait to help
his coHeague in the Sudetenland; they were betrayed. Later
the expulsion. decrees bore the signature of aH the Czech
Social Democrat ministers, who had no social or human feeling. It will forever remain -a shame against the Czech Social
Democrats that they let their coUe,agues from the German
Social Democratic Party be so persecuted, robbed, expelled,
and even JnUrdered.
They ail.so had a similar attitude towards the Slovaks
in their domestic .p olky and always helped Prague centralism and imperia•1ism. Furtherimore, they helped to destroy
the Slov:ak Democratic Party ,b y dema.ndiing in the fall of
1947 the .p osition of one commissioner. Thiis commissioner,
working hand-in-hand with bloody Ferjencik, then commissioner of police but now in the United States, iru::reased the
public terror and forced the courts to serve the police. The
Social Democrats in the government of Slovakia held to ,t he
agreement from June 25, 1945, until they had performed
their jobs in 1945 and then were kioked out when no longer
needed by the Communists.
Looking over the record of the Czech SociaJl Democratic Party, their willing coUaiboration with Communists and
their fierce figiht against every anti-Communist, one cannot
understand their presel!t a;lilbi thait they acted only under
Russian pressure. One incident epitomizes this contradiction.
On the sixtieth anniversary of Karl Marx's death, Mareh
14, 1943, they were living in London. On that day the Czech

�96

SLOVAKIA

Socia:l Democrats and the Communislts made a piJ.grimage
to Mairx's torn!b in an English ·c emetery. At this tomlb, in
free England, the present representative of the "Council of
Free Ozechosl'Ovakia" in Washington, then Benes's mmiister and member oif his State Council, Vaclav Miajer, delivered a speech in the name of t!he Social Democraits in which
he said:
"WE BELIEVE WITH MARX THAT SOCIALISM 1,s THE WAY
TOWARD INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, TOWARD EVERLASTING PEACE, AND THE WELFARE OF NATIONS . TO•DAY HERE
WE ARE, A SMALL GROUP OF SOCIALIST EMIGRANTS FROM
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA . BUT THE TIME WILL COME WHEN MARX'S
TO,MB WILL BE THE SHRINE OF MANKIND LIBERATED FROM
THE BLIND IMPRISONMENT O,F DEAD SOCIAL DOCTRINES."

1M inister -Majer's speech was published on March 19,
1'943, in Benes's officiail newspaper in London, the "Czechoslovak," whikh was financed by Jan Masaryk and Hulbert
Ri,pka.
In conclusion, I say that the basis of the Communist
victory in Czecho-iSiovrukia was 1Jhe agreement of June 25,
1945, which was cauied out with the help of the current
members of the "Council of Free Czechoslov;rukia." Their
present pose as anti-Communists is undemtandable, of
course, because by continumg to deceive Americans is now
their only means of survival.

•

•

•

WHO SAID IT?

"Himself a Slovak, though from Moravia, he had to
provide a future for the two million Slovaks, who were even
less a!ble to stand alone than the Ozechs. Masaryk revived
the radical idea of 1848 and proposed to create a single
'Czechoslovak' nation by will-power. Masaryk knew little of
the Slovaks; others !knew even less. This was hi's strength
in dealing wi,tll the allied leaders; it could not solve the Slovak prdblem. The few conscious Slovak politicians aspired
only to cll!ltural autonomy within Hungary; living in the
shadow of Magyar arrogance, they could not imagine the
dis8ippearance of the Hungarian frontier." - (A. J. P. Taylor, 'NIE HABSBURG MONARCHY, London, 1948; p . 240).

�</text>
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                  <text>1955, Vol. 5</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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            <elementText elementTextId="1328">
              <text>SLOVAK.IA&#13;
&#13;
72&#13;
&#13;
The Czecho-Slovak Exile&#13;
CZECH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND RED ESPIONAGE&#13;
Dr. Mi chael Zibrin&#13;
&#13;
July of l91J5 found the "Council of Free Ozechoslovaki:a" just as July of J.ast year left it; without eleded of~&#13;
fi.cials, without elected representatives. This is because&#13;
the CoUIIld, during the 20-month period of its re-organi-.&#13;
zation, could not reach !any agreement and is operating on&#13;
a rotation system, i.e., eacth month ,a reipresentati:ve of a&#13;
diifferent political iparty se:rves as its executive head. This&#13;
proves what we had said b,e fore: the Council is a coillglomerate of people of quite different bmnds and that Lettrich' s exdamation two years ago - "Gentlemen, I think&#13;
only dollars keep us here together" - was and is still true.&#13;
The present chaos in the Council is caused partly by&#13;
the fact that political partie.s are coming to prevail more&#13;
than personalities, and the Councril -resembJ.es more and&#13;
more an enlarged National Front. The purpose of .t his article&#13;
is to revie;w the past policies and deeds of that part.yin the&#13;
CoU!Ilcil which did most to communize the o~ooho-1Slov•8Jk&#13;
Republic and prepare an easy Communist take-over in&#13;
1948. ,Such a review is necessitated by the shocking pulblic&#13;
deception that hias gained influentiral positions for the exile&#13;
members of th±s ,p arty. Reformed Communists and coUaiboratom can perform valuable functions, but in men who&#13;
deny their Olbvfous politic,al actions there can be no question of reform.&#13;
The most flagrant a,id to Communism was given by the&#13;
Czecho-iSlovak Social ·D emocratic party. In exile today, the&#13;
leaders of this panty are men who, by their open colfa,boration wit:h Stalin, p~ayed the most important ,part in the&#13;
bolsheviz;ation o,f Czecho-Slova&gt;k,i1a. These men have always&#13;
Etood very close to the Communists, even during small&#13;
political skirmishes like those occasion.any now among Zenkl,&#13;
Ripka, and Peroutka. Particularly after the Stalin-Benes&#13;
pact of 1943, they were the most efficient signers and executors of Benes':s bloody decrees, not reaHzing that, once&#13;
they had finished their jdbs for the Communists, the fate&#13;
&#13;
Sl.JOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
73&#13;
&#13;
they had prepared for others wo'Ulld become their own.&#13;
History shows that aliready in 1928 the Soc,i al Demo.&#13;
cr:ats formulated their program thus: "Today as also in&#13;
the past we are decided to protect the Soviet Union against&#13;
any inimical action of the capitalistic governments and&#13;
against any counter-revolutionary attack." Nine years&#13;
earlier this belief had been realized in action. When Polish&#13;
General Pilsudski was fighting a bloody (battle with the&#13;
Communist ar-my near Wairsaw in 1920, the socialistic ma-·&#13;
jority in Prague forbade the transportation of military&#13;
material t.lirnugh ,Ozocho-1Slo,v0Jkia, despite the fact that&#13;
lhis material was sent by France and a French military&#13;
mi,s sion was at that time already in Prague. A yea,r earlier,&#13;
when General Stefanik telegraiphed a wairning to Prague&#13;
against Bolshevism as the greatest plague o!I' mankind a:nd&#13;
asked for uruty in tihe f.ight to destroy it, it was this same&#13;
Social Democratic Party whiclh - wit:h Masarylk's consent&#13;
- stopped Stefamk's program. Masaryk's consent is less&#13;
surprising when one remembers that he was actually among&#13;
the first to hail the Octo!ber Bolshevik Revolution in 1917,&#13;
which now in Prague !is considered fundamental to the ere.&#13;
ation of Ozecho-,Slovaki:a. Thus one couid go on ,w ithout&#13;
end and show that the Social Democratic party was an effective avant garde of Communism in Central Europe, not&#13;
only in Czecho-!Slovakia.&#13;
Certainly one of the most important persons in the&#13;
Czecho-!Slovak .Social Democratic party was V ojta Benes,&#13;
the oldest brother of the !:ate president. Gottwald officially,&#13;
on the Cabinet's decision (and Moscow's aippro,vail) , sent&#13;
him into West Germany in 1949, where he keipt in. regular&#13;
contact with Prague and acted more oir less ,a,s Gottwald's&#13;
unofficial ambassador. He did not conce·a l this fact, and&#13;
t he members of the "Council of Free Czechoslova!ld:a" knew&#13;
it. Therefore, many times, VojJa Benes took a different&#13;
position from the official Council and o;piposed some steps&#13;
undertaken by non.JSocialists in the Council.&#13;
Benes's brother passed away, ,but equally important&#13;
representatives remain, particularly: Vacl:av Majer, B. Vilem, the former Sec:retary-General of the Party, and the&#13;
ill-ifamed Bohumiil Lausman. Ailso, the Social Democratic&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
74&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
party has its two generalls, Sergei Ingr, and Hasal Niz!borJ&#13;
sky, and, jn Canada, the former minister Frantisek Nemec, who together with Hasal affected the cession of Ruthenia to .Stalin. To this party belongs also a Communist&#13;
famous in Europe, Milos Vanek, and some questionaJble individuals in Radio F,ree Europe in MUTI!ich. These are all&#13;
Czechs.&#13;
Milos Vanek, who is reported to hruve 1b een a charter&#13;
mem1ber of the "Czeohoslovak Communist Party," remained&#13;
an ardent adherent of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship even&#13;
after he 1had left that .p arty to ~me a left.;win.g Social&#13;
Democrat. I personaHy know Mr. Vanek and I must confirm that Vanek was one of the founders of the Communist Party in Europe. This is described in the book of Lu.&#13;
cien Laurat ",Du Komiintern au Kominfo·r m" (!Paris, France&#13;
Des 1'sles, 1'951), in which on page 10 we read: "The manifest issued by the second Congress of the Kominform, July,&#13;
1920, carries a great number of sigrra:tures - Lenin, Zinoviev, Boukarine, Trotski, for iRussia; Vane'k, Hlula, Zapotocky (the president of Ozecho-;Slovakia today), etc."&#13;
T,his signer and founder of the Communist Party is&#13;
today the Chief of the Economics Deparbment of Radio&#13;
Free Europe and a member of the "Colllilcil of Free Ozechoslovalcia" in New York, ·b oth financed by the Free Europe Committee!&#13;
On the Slovak side there are: Dr. Ziak, well-known&#13;
Czecho-'SlovaJk; Dr. Joseph Mrazek, the only •Slov;ak s~gner&#13;
of the oath of fidelity to Communism in 1948, and posing&#13;
as a Slovak, a certain Belak, whose real name is Berger.&#13;
A,bout these people, Kurt Glaser, American writer wrote :&#13;
"The principa.J Czechs and Slovaks associated with the Free&#13;
Europe Committee and those employed by Radio Free Europe are not&#13;
- as is commonly supposed - fi•g hters ag,a inst Communism. Quite&#13;
on the contrary, they fellow-travele&lt;l. with t•he Communists rfrom at&#13;
least 1939 to 1948, helpe&lt;l. t'hem to power, and even today follow a&#13;
Communist-sponsored propaganda line.&#13;
"These indivjduals belong to an or.ganlzation which has systematically be-trayed members of the democratic underground in CzechoSlovalda by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwald's secret police.&#13;
"A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either&#13;
Communist a.gents or have criminal records.&#13;
'1Radio Free Europe's Czecho-Slovak program is helping Stalin&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
75&#13;
&#13;
by s,a,botaging internation-a l understand ing and promoting rivalry and&#13;
hatred between European peoples.&#13;
'&#13;
"Mr. Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectdcal materialis m, Dr. Zak and Dr. (Berger) Belak. Dr. Zak is the editor of •a n&#13;
intellectual magazine called 'Tribuna' w-hich is forbidden in France&#13;
and a no-llher called 'Reality' (Sk,utecnost) which is fofibidden in&#13;
Switzerland. Unfortunately, I have not been able to peruse these&#13;
journals as I do not read c zech, but I am told that their basic thesis is the need for the party m asses to submit to leadership by the&#13;
elite cadre. Belak was formerly a Communist Party functionary in&#13;
Slovalda under the n ame of Berger. He puts out a Germ an-language&#13;
sheet called 'Militant Democracy' which few Germans read because&#13;
it takes S&lt;talin's anti-Ger,man line."&#13;
&#13;
I. who know this gentleman (Belak-Berger) persona1'ly, must confirm that Mr. Glaser's opinion is 100 percent right!&#13;
The former membe.r of the Social Democratic party&#13;
in 1Slov akia, Pavel Viboch, need not be dealt with as a party&#13;
memlber , and the other three Slovaks mentioned are al,so&#13;
not significant. Never receiving any mandate from the&#13;
Slovruk nation, they represent colonialism in Central Europe&#13;
at a time when oolonialism is. dying even in Africa. The&#13;
best proof is the elections in 1946, when the Social Demo~&#13;
crats in Slovakia could not elect even one representaitive&#13;
without Ozech help. It was an old Prague trick to transfeT&#13;
unneeded votes from one district to another. As a rule, the&#13;
Social Democratic ipanty has been a Czech origani·z ation only.&#13;
To return to the history of this _p arty, however, one&#13;
can say that its activities during the second World War&#13;
are very revooling. The majority of the party ,p oliticians&#13;
fled wiith Benes, or shoritly after, and served in his "c!libi.&#13;
net.,in-exile." An e~ception was Ambassador Fierlinger,&#13;
who remained in Moscow serving the Communists instead&#13;
of Benes, according to Ripka and Benes himself. When it&#13;
came to .the wol"st, Benes's "govennment-in-exile" reoolled&#13;
him to London. Having the support of Moscow, however,&#13;
Fierlinger refused to return, and Benes, in order .to keep&#13;
his presidency, ha:d :to. ,g o to Moscow and take ordern from&#13;
his personal enemy. These statements are proved by the&#13;
cablegrams exchanged by the "government-in--exile" and&#13;
Fierlinger, which were published in Fierlinger's hodk. In&#13;
addition to Moscow's rs upport, Fierlinger also had help&#13;
within the "government-in-exile." This was the left wing of&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
76&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
the Social Democrats, wirth Lausman and Bechyne as leaders in London. This group, moreover, closely cooperated&#13;
with other admirers of the Soviet Union in the Czech National Sodalist party, Rip_ka, Firt, and others. This party&#13;
supporte'd several pro-Communistic organizations, where&#13;
Rip'ka rused to be president and Josef Ko!'bel and Tig.rid&#13;
Schonfeld were in leading ,positions, .pleadin,g for help for&#13;
Stalin. In 1942 and 1943, Vlase:k and Majer organized the&#13;
Commu:niisrt demonstrations that heiLpe&lt;l to· force the second&#13;
front against Churchill's will.&#13;
We recall that Benes traveled to Moscow in 1943&#13;
against the wishes of Eden, Churchill, and other statesmen. There he approved the seill-out o&lt;f Ruthenia and cleared&#13;
the roa:d to Ozecho-SloV'akia for the Soviet Union. This he&#13;
did without any regard for the will of the peoples of SlovaJki!a, Bohemia, Moravia and Ruthenia. Nay, even without&#13;
the full consent of the "Provisional Czechosloviruk Government" in London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia, Moravia, and ,Ruthenia certainly had nothing to do with it.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
I recaH the speeches of Octdber and November, 1943,&#13;
in the chambers of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in&#13;
London. They were made not only by the admirers of the&#13;
Kremlin, but also by the so-called civil politicians who were&#13;
blinded by Moscow. Among them were Lausman and Majer, Dr. Uhlir and Paul Macha.eek; all strongly approved&#13;
the journey to Moscow and insisrted on going along with&#13;
Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant the loss of&#13;
asylum in England and the good wiU of the allies. Benes&#13;
simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the "higher&#13;
interests of our nations" demanded it. When Benes returned from his trip to Moscow, he brought the request&#13;
to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a la!lge&#13;
part of Poland to the Soviets.&#13;
If any one should quesrtion ,t he truth of my statements,&#13;
I am ready and willing at all times to produce the repo~ts&#13;
of the "Czechoslovak Srtate Council,." the speeches Lausman and Uhlir, and even Benes's speech in its entirety&#13;
after he returned fa-om Moscow. They tel11 us clearly why&#13;
the Communist "putsch" of Februa:ry 1948 took place so&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
77&#13;
&#13;
smoothly. Repetition o.f these facts is important for understandmg the effective collaboration of the Social Democrats with the Communists after the ,second war.&#13;
Showing their allegiance to the principle from 1928,&#13;
"Never against the Soviet Union," tihe Social Demoorats&#13;
without an exception pressed for the Benes-Stalin agree~&#13;
ment in 1943. Therefore, in the first post-war government,&#13;
formed in Kosice in 1945, and the most communistic of all&#13;
governments returning ho.me, they dominated. There was&#13;
no Slovak representative - evidence that Social Democracy had praictically no influence in Slovakia.&#13;
Besides Prime Minister Zdenek Fierlinger, there was&#13;
Frantisek Nemec and the liaison officer between the Red&#13;
Armv and Benes, General Niziborsky (known now as General&#13;
Hasal), who is at present, I believe, a consultant in the&#13;
Pentagon Other ministers in that government were the infamous spy, Bohumil Lausman, and a present leader in the&#13;
"Council of Free Czechoslovakia," Vaclav Majer. We know,&#13;
that all except Fierlinger came unharimed into exile after&#13;
February, 1948. Lausman, of course, after having accomplished his espionage in Radio Free Europe, returned to&#13;
Pra:gue. Clearly Lausman has the lowest character among&#13;
the contemporary •politicians, but he was a most trusted&#13;
comrade of ,t he present so-called "anti-Communist" politicians in the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia."&#13;
They all were united in their pro-Communist activities,&#13;
and their claim now to belong to this or that wing is no.t at&#13;
all convincing. In 1946 the •s ame Vaclav Majer praised the&#13;
top Communist in Czecho-Slovakia lavishly: "Gottwald's&#13;
name will be forever connected not only with our fight for&#13;
national liberation, but also with the struggle for social&#13;
liberation as well as for new forms of life and work. . . .&#13;
Gottwald, not only by his determination, but also by his&#13;
understanding for the opinions of others, showed his great&#13;
qualities as politician and man." Sudh were then the expressions of Vaola.JV Majer, an "anti-Communist" fighter&#13;
of today. But Ma:jer is not alone in this. After working together for the Communists at home, the Social Democrats&#13;
came to the United States and suddenly discovered that&#13;
they, too, have fought Communism. Their present fabrica-&#13;
&#13;
78&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
tions rubout their post-war aotivity, which the following&#13;
facts disprove, are a deep offense to the witnesses of their&#13;
activities back home.&#13;
The first document signed by the ministers and the&#13;
members of the Executive Committee of the Social Demo~&#13;
cratic Party iby which a smooth Communi!zation of thei,r&#13;
homeland was assured, was their agreement of June 25,&#13;
1945, at once after returning to Praigue, to form the "National Front of the Working People." This agreement&#13;
shows the serviI.fty of the wholle Social Democralti1c Party,&#13;
not only of the leaders, because it was discussed and una~&#13;
nimously approved by aJll the ;party before being signed by&#13;
the Executive Commiittee. This means tha,t all politicians&#13;
of the $ociaJ Democratic Party, now posing as anti-Communists in exile, agreed to the bolshevi zation of CzechoSlovakta. Zenkl aind his National Socialists C'an at least attempt to excuse themsel,v es that they did not want to accept this ag,r eement lbut were forced to by the Social Democrats.&#13;
But it is not a question of who forced wlhom; they all&#13;
signed and pulblished this agreement and, what is woTse,&#13;
they put it into effect. The most important parts of this&#13;
agreement are the following:&#13;
1. While maintaining a politica:l and organizational&#13;
independence, the three parties wil.l closely cooperate and&#13;
follow a common policy in all matters of .p u!blio life.&#13;
2 . . The political iba;si,s o.f the National Front orf Working People is the government program, unanimously a:g-re.ed&#13;
upon in conference in MoS&lt;:ow and unanimously accepted&#13;
by the government in Kosice on April 5, 1945. Through&#13;
this agreemenit, also a Central Coordinating Committee&#13;
is being created with an equal numlber of representatives&#13;
from all participating iparties, and also a United Alliance&#13;
of Trade Organizations, based on voluntary membership,&#13;
wJll be formed. F'urther wili be formed a Non-.Political&#13;
Alliance of Czech Farmers and a United Organization of&#13;
Czech Youth; both of these organizations shaH be supported ,by all parties.&#13;
This publicly dedared aigreement was signed for the&#13;
Social Democrats by Zdenek Fierlinger; for the Commun1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
79&#13;
&#13;
ists by Klement Gottwald, and for the National Socialist&#13;
Party by Peter Zenkl.&#13;
It is both very int.eresting and quit,e significant that&#13;
not a single Slovak att.ended that meeting and that among&#13;
those who· called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka, and other leaders of Dr. Benes's old Czech National&#13;
Socilalist Party - the very same people who today are&#13;
telling the American public and the world that they always hated the Reds and that the Reds "ousted" them from&#13;
Government.&#13;
But the truth is something else a;gatin. The fact is that&#13;
both Zenlcl and Ripika welcomed the Communists, sought&#13;
their favor, and wanted to win politicrul prestige with the&#13;
help of the Reds at the exipense of the other political parties. Of course, today we know that they failed. The same&#13;
thing happened to them ,that had happened and 1s still&#13;
happening to an tho.se who try to, collruborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are&#13;
worth and then swallo;w them up or get rid of them.&#13;
The "National Front of the' Working People" created&#13;
a "Central Coordinating Committee," in which e'very affiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This&#13;
committee had the task of coordinating the work of the&#13;
socialist parties. The sooiwlfst bloc prepared the ground for&#13;
the various activities which led to the suppression of political and religious fireedom - the first st~s taken toward&#13;
a socialist dictatorship.&#13;
The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the&#13;
Agrarian Party would be suppressed, the Catholic IDaigle&#13;
organization outiawed, and that Catholic youth, as such,&#13;
would not be allowed to orgamize. Together t@y wo,r ked&#13;
out a plan whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would&#13;
be done away with and, at the same time, how these votes,&#13;
together with the Communist-contro lled ..peasant unions,&#13;
, would he brought into the Communist P,a,rty. They also&#13;
created and later legalized the Communist trade organizations, then the non-political Fedeiration of Farmers and the&#13;
United Youth Or,g,anization - all of which were SU!ppo.s ed&#13;
to be fornned by the joint participation of all parties, but&#13;
&#13;
80&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKlA&#13;
&#13;
actually served onlly to communize Ozecho-iSlovakia from&#13;
the instant they began to function.&#13;
Therefore, it is not true that Zenlkl, Rtpka, Vilem,&#13;
Majer, and other Czech Sooial DemocraJts opposed Com~&#13;
munist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is&#13;
that from the moment they accepted the so--called "Kosice&#13;
Agreement ," they were aJlways subordinat ed to and in the&#13;
train of .t he Communis t Party and willingly continued tha,t&#13;
way not only on Russian soil, or in Russian-·occuipied Kosice, but a1so in "Jiberated" Pr'cllgue. The "Joint Declaration "&#13;
to the nation on June 28, 194'5, is indisputalble proof of the&#13;
fact that they wanted to get into governmen t with the help&#13;
of the Oommunist s, even at the roopense of democracy,&#13;
Christ'ianit y, and freedom.&#13;
This is the sound lesson for all who would col'la!borate&#13;
with Oommunist s. All such ,p eople are digging their own&#13;
graves, because Communism recogn.i'zes no agreements , concessions, or compromis es, and swallows wp all who collaborate with it.&#13;
A Czech Catholic editor, A. J. Jandacek, commented&#13;
on major effects of this agreement in this manner:&#13;
"The aims of the socialist bloc were many:&#13;
"1. First of all not to allow workers to organiz.e in Catholic&#13;
trade unions, and so far as they are alread,y organized in them,&#13;
through a mass effort .to storm them into the socialist bloc by&#13;
maintaining that Oatholic organizations wm anyhow be in the mi·&#13;
nority an d that, therefore, it is better to go together.&#13;
"2. Not to ,a llow an independent unification of Catholic farmers. The party of farm people wi ll not be allowed to exist at all,&#13;
and as far as the Catholics have their Catholic farmers organized, the&#13;
Communists will divide them among themselves.&#13;
"3. A United Organization of Czech Youth will be formed and,&#13;
thus, the Cat·holic you1Jh wJll not have an opportunity to organize on&#13;
a Oatholic platform, eitilier politiooJly or religiously. Simply, ,a ll youth&#13;
will be forced to go into the state-formed and socialist-led organization. Thus, organizing an "Alliance of Catholi c Youtll" or ,a "Czechoslovak Orel" will be .impossible. A daily and weekJ.y have already&#13;
been published for this so-called united youth organization and are&#13;
led by the Commundsts.&#13;
"In view of these three aims, it is possible to call the establishing and maintaining of t!he socialist bloc an intention-al act against&#13;
political and religious freedom and the establishmen t of a socialist&#13;
dictatorship."&#13;
&#13;
Although I am not a Catholic and never was a member&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
81&#13;
&#13;
of any clerical party, I am ready to sign this analysis by&#13;
the editor Jandaceik.&#13;
Whereais, Ze:rukl and his party, in December, 11947, begain not to abide by the 1946 agreement, the Social Democrats kept it even after the Oommunist "putsch" in Februa:ry, 1948. Professor Macek, for instance, accepted lead~&#13;
ing positions in o,rganizations which bolsheviized the University, and as president of the Aotion Committee of the&#13;
University he expelled those students who had participated&#13;
in demO'Il!Strations against the Communists in February.&#13;
Furthermore, for a long time he helped the Constitutional&#13;
Oommittee of Ozecho-Slovakia:n P.arliam.ent and its chairman, Dr. Procha:zka, a leading Communist. As a matte~&#13;
of fact, the whole section on Economics in the Communist&#13;
constitution is his work. Both as an expert and as a member of the :Sociail Demo:cra,tic Party, he supported the&#13;
Communist bi1ls; a;ctua:1ly, rhe was the right hrui.d of Dr.&#13;
Procha:zka, the most Communist jurist in Czecho-Slovakia&#13;
and chairman of the Constitutional Committee. To us it is&#13;
not surprising that Macek led in the persecution of democratic students after the Communist putsch, since he had&#13;
earlier been well known as a fervent exponent of Marx&#13;
at the tUrnversity of Brno, where he was professor of National Eoonomics. The surprise is that he is now a university professor in the United States.&#13;
Professor Maicek, during the yearn 1929...1939, was a&#13;
member of Parliament for the Social Democratic Party.&#13;
Simultaneously, he edited a left-orientated monthly called&#13;
"Our Times" which was sponso,r ed by Presidents Masaryk&#13;
and Benes. He published numerous books, a base of which&#13;
was, repeatedly, the teachings of Marx. In these books&#13;
Professor Maicek defended the theories orf Marx very emphatica!lly and wanted to introduce them into our social&#13;
and economic life, evein as early as 1930-1938. He wanted&#13;
to sociailize everything. His aim was identical to that of the&#13;
Communi,s ts. They wanted to put it into practice after 194'5.&#13;
Origtlnafly, Professor Macek migrated to Canada and&#13;
lived on the fann of a certain Mr. Karel Buzek,. where he&#13;
wrote artides for the Ozech newspapers in Canada. In his&#13;
articles he rejeoted and condemned the very same ideas he&#13;
&#13;
82&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
was not so long ago an apostle of and a very able and&#13;
thorough propagator.&#13;
From Canada he came to the United States and at&#13;
the present time he is active as a professor at some university m Pennsylvania.&#13;
iB. Vilem, as Genera'} Secretary of the Ozech Social&#13;
Democratic Party, was more a personal "whip" for Fierliniger than a "whip" for the ,party. While I was a member&#13;
of the Agricultural Committee, we succeeded sometimes in&#13;
winning over .t he chairman of the committee, who was a&#13;
Social Democrat, against the Communist proposa!ls. Vilem,&#13;
however, before the voting day, and often at midnight,&#13;
cal'led the members of 'his party and dictated: "Fierlinger&#13;
lets you know that the party cannot stand for your proposals; you have to vote with the Communist Party." One&#13;
of these Social Democrats that was forced by Vi1em to&#13;
vote with the Communists is in exile ; several committee&#13;
memlbers from the other parties who lost ,w ith me because&#13;
of Vil.em's actions are now in the "Council of Free Ozechosloviaikia," but they wil'l never forget those defeats (Sliva,&#13;
Torn, and other.s). Wathout this servility to the Communists, Gottwald would never have gained the majority he had.&#13;
The saddest chapter of the Social Democrati'C Party,&#13;
however, was written by its memiber who was the Minister of&#13;
Industry, Bohumil Dausman. He served the at!reernent of&#13;
June 25, 1945, so faithfully that he went out to disintegrate&#13;
even the exile and worked for three years as a spy, after&#13;
being employed by Radio Free Europe with the help of the&#13;
Social Democrats and other memlbers of the "Council of&#13;
Free Czechoslo;vakia," particularly Ripka and his group.&#13;
The case of Lausman's treason was not yet completely&#13;
closed when new espionage process was started against further exiponent of Prague government and close collaborator&#13;
of Dr. Hubert Riipka. Hardly had a French .court sentenced&#13;
Kubala on a charge of espionage for Communist OzechoSlovakia before the Prague radio reacted in this case and the&#13;
spea,keir, himself a collaJborator of Mr. Ferdinand Peroutka&#13;
and a former employee of Radio Free EuTope, used the most&#13;
despiooble language against the West. Slovak newspapers&#13;
unanimousily reported - unfOTtunaitely without desirable&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
83&#13;
&#13;
results on the aictions orf Radio F.ree Europe - that Lausman would be followed by the others. The newspapers asked&#13;
for effect1ve preventive measures in Radio Free Europe&#13;
rugainst subversive elements but nothing was done. Many&#13;
very dubious elements are sitting in Radio F,r ee Europe and&#13;
are paid by the Amerilcan citizens.&#13;
In the warning concerning espionage, we have not only&#13;
staJted several times that there are Marxists ood Oommunists in "Czechoslovak" organizations, but we also said openly&#13;
that they were, and silll are espionage agents of the Prague&#13;
government. The Prague broadcasts have confirmed our allegation. On the same ibroadlca;st where, some time a;go, Laus-·&#13;
man broadcast in Prague, now spoke Bruno Folta, who was&#13;
working as an employee of Radio Free Europe under the protection of Dr. M. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko. He minutely copied&#13;
the style of Lausrnan, H~ confessed that originally he betrayed the Communist government in Prague and filed to the&#13;
West, requesting political asylum.&#13;
Here in the West, in Radio Free Europe Folta came to&#13;
the conclusion that the western world was rotten and readily&#13;
seized the chance to return home and accept what was offered to him in the inteliligence service conducted by the&#13;
Czech General Moravec. He repented like Lausman and, hruving the desire to make some reparations, he put himself at&#13;
the disposal of the "people's Democracy" against the West.&#13;
He went on to threaten that he would use all the knowledge&#13;
which he ooquired as an employee of Radio Free Europe.&#13;
Our reports from Munich and behind the Iron Ourtain&#13;
explain the Folta case as foHo:ws: Like Lausman, he was sent&#13;
by the Prague government for espionage purposes and to esta:blish the contacts. When he succeeded and gathered&#13;
enough material and collaborators, especially in Munich&#13;
and Paris, he simply ,r eturned to Prague as a highly appreciruted a;gent, in order to accUJSe the anti-Communist citizens at home. of whose attitude he learned while abroad.&#13;
What is Folita telling the peoples of Czecho~Slova;kia?&#13;
The Vienna newspapers published long articles explaining&#13;
how Foll.ta, this confident servant of Mr. Peroutka and Dr.&#13;
Mudry, was blaming Radio Free Europe and the Western&#13;
World and praising everything he found after his return to&#13;
&#13;
84&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAK.IA&#13;
&#13;
Brague: •~Prague has everything good and new, all the&#13;
new technical inventions, and everything in plenty. Meantime, in the Weslt, o:nlly the capitalist dwpes have all the&#13;
goods in their possession and the common people are&#13;
starving." Thrut is the picture cxf the West presented by&#13;
Folt'a, who coJ:lected American doJlars from RJFE.&#13;
When will Washington be conV'inced? The case of&#13;
Folta is certainly a cha,pter of shameful history, but we&#13;
feair that even this fact will not be strong enough to convince the F1ree Europe Committee or the Department of&#13;
State in W8!Shi:nigton. We repeat that such exile orga.n±zations, which are SUipported at the ex;pense of genuine demo-cratic and anti-Communist organizations, wre nuisances&#13;
and wreckers of all the actiOIIlS of the Western. WorJd in&#13;
the cold war. In the "Ozechoslovak" orgarazations there&#13;
have been, since the start, members who were sent West by&#13;
the Prague go,v ernment only for tlhe purpose of serving the&#13;
Communists. On the roster of "Czechoslovak" organizations&#13;
in exile you wilil find many persons who were elected to&#13;
office on the Oommunist baHot, ,p oliticians who mostly&#13;
helped the Communists not only to gain control of CzechoSlova!kia, but also the whole Danube valley.&#13;
The same persons, who with Benes in 1939, in London, were in touch with SDalin's ambrussa.dor, agreed on the&#13;
invasion of U.iS.IS.IR. south of the Carpathian Mountains.&#13;
To the Americans in Washington and the Einglishmen in&#13;
London, they disiplayed an rug·r eement concerning the integrity of the Czecho-Slavaik State while knowing the deficiencies of this treaty. They .co!~JIBitted the same crime&#13;
as did Lausman and Bruno, Folta. These people simply betrayed the Allies.&#13;
But beyond that are their protectors, the "Council of&#13;
Free Czechoslovakia" and its leading representatives Zenkl, Lettrich, IPerou'bka, Mudry and others - iess guilty&#13;
of betrayal? They 1let Lausma.n into R1adio :ffiree Europe&#13;
and allowed him to• broadcast for American money. On the&#13;
payroll they kept Folta, R1.12icka, and others as well; and&#13;
they still do that and help to betray America. There is no&#13;
excuse for them, or is there?&#13;
Parrticipants in a crime are as punishable as the crim1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
86&#13;
&#13;
inal. J&gt;a:rtici:pan.ts in this betriayal can not excuse themselves on the grounds that they did not know anything&#13;
about suoh action. Several times suspicious caJSes were&#13;
brought to their notice but they did not pay any ,a ttention&#13;
to these warnings. What should we say to this criminal&#13;
negligence on the .part of responsible pemonaHties :in Radio&#13;
Free Europe Oir in the "Council of ~ree OzechoslovaJda ?"&#13;
There they are unanimous: Zenkl, Cerny, Osuis'ky -- all&#13;
plead for the innocence of Peroutka. The continuous scandaJls should waike up the security officials of the Western&#13;
Powers. Until now only the Germans in Munich asked fo-r&#13;
a c1erun-1.l'p of Marxists and other elements hostile to democracy in the whole territory of the German Federal Republfo. They aimed at "Czechoslovak" organizations which&#13;
aire infiltrated with highly suspicious elements.&#13;
Let us apply our knowledge whi'1e there is still time.&#13;
Many think that only in Germany are such cases possible.&#13;
but that is not true. The same oases, even more paradoxi~&#13;
cal, we find in Washington where the Czech officers are&#13;
working. They distinguished themselves in the sell~,ut of&#13;
Carpathian Ruthenia to the Soviets, or kept in the service of American Intelligence the sister-in-ilaw of a welL&#13;
known Communist in the old country. Why should we be&#13;
shocked that in rPairis the Communists received confiden•&#13;
tial materia'l? Even in Washington security mea5UJres are&#13;
neglected. We know the persons at wol'k in W81Shington&#13;
and we will not be surpri,s ed if the Lausman affair breaks&#13;
out a,gain despite our warning. Those who wHl be suT1prised&#13;
will be Americans. Let us take lessons from Parts.&#13;
Since Lausman's return to Prague, the whole CzechoSlovak exile, in its confusion, has been producing deceptions and charges of for.gery. When Mr. Osusky of the&#13;
"Council of F'lree Ozechoslovakia" does not succeed in his&#13;
enterprises, .o r the situation changes after his proclamations hawe been pulblished, he simply proclaims them unauthentic or falsified, o:r he simply a&amp;:!rilbes them to Lausman.&#13;
'Sometimes the matter is trivial, as it was in the proclamation concerning the is udeten G€Tmans which was allegedly signed by Osusky. There he stressed the necessity&#13;
&#13;
86&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
that the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans are reconciled and&#13;
charged that Ripka and Zenk! were unsuitalble because of&#13;
their collaJboration with the Communists. The subj~ct was&#13;
given great publicity by Josten (a former official of the&#13;
Foreign Ministry and now editor of "Czechoslovak" in&#13;
LondO'Il) and his Marxist cell in London, w:hiich always&#13;
tries to please Prague. In this matter, Osusky probably&#13;
figured that a dea!l with the ,Sudeten GeI'IDans could per.,&#13;
haps be of he1p to him if he should have trouble in the&#13;
Council with Ripka and Zenk!. But here chance helped&#13;
him. R:iipka had difficulties in the United States because&#13;
of his colla;boration with the Communists and therefore&#13;
planned to return to his socialist friends in Europe. For&#13;
this reason he, as weU as Zenkl, did not fight for leading&#13;
positions .i n the Counchl - a fact that allowed the November reconciliation of the Council. Osusky does not need&#13;
the Sudeten Germany any longer, whereas for Zenk! and&#13;
Ripka the Sudeten German question will be a ,problem. So&#13;
Osusky denied his Sudeten German proclamation and&#13;
charged tha;t its publfoation in the "Czechoslovak" was a&#13;
fOTgery .&#13;
Simila.rly, "Nase Cesta," a Marxist paper printed in&#13;
the Czech language ,in Vienna, published a who[e issue of&#13;
articles written by several memibers of the "Council of Free&#13;
Czechoslovak ia.'' Arfter Osusik y and Zen kl were reconciled&#13;
and the articles did not fit into the changed opinion of the&#13;
Council, the editor procilaimed the whole earlier issue a&#13;
for,g ery. Thus, suddenly we are told that the ,articles were&#13;
not writt® by the members oif the Council, and that the&#13;
who'le issue was forged with the purpose of s,plitting the&#13;
"Czechoslova k" exile. Lt is interesting to see whose names&#13;
first a;ppea.r as authors o,f the disputed rurticles: Dr. Taiborsky, Benes's secretary; Jan Zak, Slovak socialist and confidant of MaTxists and "Ozechosloivaks" ; Jozef Dieska, member of the Council, etc. I can only dismiss the editor's&#13;
charge that the whole issue originated with Lau:sman as&#13;
ridiculous and highly impossible.&#13;
In the newspruper "Novy Domov," published in Canada,&#13;
another member of the Council, Fras'tacky, attacked Colonel&#13;
M~ksohe, who does not go along with the "Ozeichoslova!ks"&#13;
&#13;
f?LOV,AKIA&#13;
&#13;
87&#13;
&#13;
in the Council. (Oolon~l Miksche, a Czecho-Slovak military&#13;
attache in Pa.r-is, resigned in December, 1947, in protest to&#13;
the policy of the present members of the Council then in&#13;
Praigue.) When Colonel Miiksche threatened to sue him,&#13;
Frastaoky quiokly denied writing the article and declared&#13;
it a forgery. Certainiy this comedy cannot be cailled anything but ridiculous; fortunately, it did not harm Colonel&#13;
Miksche.&#13;
It is regrettruble, however, that the exile "Czechoslovak" press sees in these and other incidents the intervention of Genera:! Molotka of P,r ague, whose assignment,&#13;
with Lausman, is to influence and distunb the exik It does&#13;
not at all seem to me that these .incidents, are of Lausman's making, for he would think of different methods&#13;
among the members of the Ooll!Ilcil. In the Council he feels&#13;
at home, after spending three years in its midst and working with Council members in Radio Free Europe. There&#13;
he does not need any mediators and can at any time directly interfere. Using Lausman's name, however, provides&#13;
Osusky and others wJth a handy scapegoat for the.i~ own&#13;
failures and a!bandoned projects.&#13;
SimHarly, the "CzechosloV'ak" exile press is not unanimous and constant in its aocount of the Council's November compromise and in its list of representatives.&#13;
Sometimes it leaves out Dr. Cerny',s name, and other times&#13;
it puts it in, depending on whom it serves . .Professor Hlavaty is referred to as a neutraJl sometimes, and at other times&#13;
as ·a former socialist representative in the temporary National Assembly in Prrugue.&#13;
Moreover, the "Czechoslovak" exile even today is&#13;
hel:ping and promoting the accessories of spies as did some&#13;
other memlbers of the Courrcil while they were ambassadors&#13;
in the United States and elsewhere. This is the way the&#13;
"Czechoslovak" organizations operate while the socialist&#13;
parties in the West do not realize their dange,r . So, for ex-·&#13;
ample Zdenka Schonova, in :Eingland one of the leading&#13;
Czech Social Democrats, is supported today by the "Czech&#13;
Trust Fund," even though her collaboration with the convicted spy, Peter Arton, was proved. It is evident that the&#13;
persons from the Council do not distinguish between a&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
88&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Czech patriot and a Czech spy. For them everyone is first&#13;
of aH Czech, from Benes down to Lausman, and in this belief they .not only help the spies and pay them, but also&#13;
pay for their protection and defense&#13;
It is also well known that Colonel Koenig, who is a&#13;
leader orf the reporting division of the "Council of Free&#13;
Ozechos!ovaktla" and also working for the West, still employs the same Hungarian Communis t as his secret,a ry,&#13;
his sister-in-ilaw, Klara Fedak. Fedfuk is in New York without letting the U. S. authorities know that she is a Oommunist. Her former "1b oy friend" is now chief of the espionage office in Bratislava; yet the persons from the "Co,u ncii&#13;
of Free Ozechoslov aikia" do not find it difficult to affirm&#13;
to the West the ,reliaJbiliity of these Communist s. Koonig's&#13;
group is also responsible for the murder of a Slovak un.,&#13;
dergrmLnd leader and patriot, Pavol Harusiak, and others&#13;
from Bratislava, whose bordeT-cro ssing they betrayed to the&#13;
Communis t police. Ifurusiak was my friend, an'd I kn.ow that&#13;
a member of Koenig's group, iDr. Patek, gained access to&#13;
him only through representin g himself as from me.&#13;
When the "Czechosio. vak" exile has such help and affiliations, how lO'Ilg must O'Ile state that this "Czechoslo vak"&#13;
group is not reliable? It is seen to be a very dangerous&#13;
group when we realize that it hrus, accomplice s in the un.&#13;
derground who were given money and introd1..1JCtions by&#13;
Zenkl and Ripka, as the spy Bohumil Cerny and his accompJices were. This situation is also true orf the "C'zechoslova!k" section of R:adio Flree Europe in Munich, where&#13;
there is always someone who helps such men as La.usma,,n&#13;
and Folta, or other ex-Commu nists and .future re-immigrants to Red Prague. Bures, who brought Folta to Radio&#13;
Free Europe, was dismissed, but his friends - Kvetko,&#13;
Mudry, and Peroutka - are still in leading positions.&#13;
If Radio Free Europe and the Voice of Ame11ica would&#13;
try to lbrea:k the reputation. oif this "Czechoslo vak"' army&#13;
with truth and with real anti-Comm unist speakers who&#13;
ha,ve a good reputation and an anti...Communist record at&#13;
home, it could be done. Not, however, with the present&#13;
group. What is broadcast and written now - for American&#13;
money - helps the Oommunis ts more than it harms them.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
89&#13;
&#13;
These org,a nizations which are supposed to wage psy.&#13;
chological warfaire against Communism behind the !iron&#13;
Curtain do just the opposite - as far as Czecho-Slovakia&#13;
is concerned. Too often they he:lp spies and broadcast material which does not harm the Communists, but rather&#13;
amuses them. Sending pigeons and balloons across the&#13;
Iron Curtain maikes people there laugh or curse, because&#13;
the police always get some of those who pick up the leaf~&#13;
lets. When aJlmost every month someone returns to Pra•g ue&#13;
and te1'ls of the low moral tone, the scandals, and suicides&#13;
in the "Czechoslovak" section of Radio Tuee Europe in&#13;
Munich, the Communists give this excellent publicity. No&#13;
wonder that Radio· Free Europe does not have any respect&#13;
there! IDven when Radio Free Euroipe, or the Voice of&#13;
America, gains some SlovaJk renegade, these organizations&#13;
are not made 1:.iherelby eiffecti:ve, nor are their names re~&#13;
stored at home behind the Iron Curtain. People theTe ceased&#13;
to believe them loog ago, and after the Lausman and Folta&#13;
affairs they only curse them.&#13;
Folta, Ru!zicka, and Bures worked in Radio Free Europe; they were the proteges of those Siova.k employees in&#13;
Radio Free Europe - Dr. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko - who&#13;
are supposed to represent the r eal Slovak anti-Communist cause. And yet nothing happened to Mu.dry or Kvetko,&#13;
much less to Peroutka, because they brought Bures and&#13;
Ruzicka and Folta to RF'E, nor because they paid their&#13;
comrade Lausmrun, who is also back in Prague.&#13;
The new chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on In.&#13;
vesitigations, Senator McCleUan, who is a capable lawyer&#13;
to whom the security of the United States is of paramount&#13;
internst is, we hear, curious about many things. We hope,&#13;
therefore, thlat this suibcommittee will succeed in this mat~&#13;
ter also and that the organizations in question will be&#13;
cleansed of the ,present "Czecho,slovaJk" group.&#13;
iLausman was so aggressive that during the second&#13;
World War, after his return from Moscow to London, he&#13;
succeeded in the State Council in speeding up Benes's trip&#13;
to Moscow. Further, as he admits in his book, published in&#13;
Vienna, he forced Benes to na,tionalize aH private industry&#13;
by presidential decree before the Pro,v isional National As-&#13;
&#13;
90&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
sembly convened in October, 194'5. He also :points out in&#13;
his book that, whereas he admits his actions, the associates who agireed with hiim on aU the issues of col1aboration now are renouncing him only in order to be accept.,&#13;
able to Washington. In this way, Lausman has unmasked&#13;
the Sodal Democrats who in exile pre.tend to fight Communism, but actually are responsi!ble for the :f act that&#13;
Russian territory extends for the first time in history west&#13;
of the Carpathians into the Danube basJn.&#13;
In this bolshevik expansion it was two Social Democrats who represented Benes and the whoJ.e state leadership: Flrantisek Nemec and Generail Ni:ziborsky - Hasal.&#13;
Both went to Moscow from London in 1944 and then fol.,&#13;
lowed the Red Army into Ozecho-1Slovaiki,a to take over&#13;
the liberated territory :from the Red Army in accordance&#13;
with the Benes-lSta:li,n treaty. They did it so successfully&#13;
with the he1p of Fierlinger in Moscow that in three months&#13;
they gave Stalin the eastern part of Czecho-1Slovaikia, the&#13;
whole of Ruthenia. Russia ,o ffered to the Slovaks, through&#13;
the Communists Dr. Husak and Novomesky, an independent ,Slovak State, provided that it would be another&#13;
Soviet republic. When Husak and Novomesky made the&#13;
proposal to the Slov,a ks, to Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of&#13;
S'lovakia and the Slow.1Jk Government, the Slovaks, however,&#13;
refused the •bolshevi~atio!Il of their country.&#13;
Nemec was not given a cordial re:ception ~n Ruthenia&#13;
at all. The in'haibitants everywh&amp;e were signing petitions,&#13;
sponsored by the Communist Petruscak, which started that&#13;
the Ruthenians no longer existed and that there were only&#13;
Sub-Carpathi an Ukrainians in Ruthenia who yearned to&#13;
be embrruced by their greait mother, Ukrainia.&#13;
After many long squabbles, Nemec fina:lly got a message through to Benes in London through General Pika.&#13;
The telegrams that Benes sent through F1ierlinger were&#13;
never seen by Nemec, ,b ecause Fierlinger already then was&#13;
Stalin's envoy and never a paitTiotic cii.ti,z en of his own&#13;
State. It is significant, therefore, that despite these experiences thi,s same traitor, Fierling&amp;, was named, several&#13;
months later, as the premier by Benes.&#13;
Nemec was in a very trying position. When he wanted&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
91&#13;
&#13;
to be connected with London, he had to ask for permission&#13;
to do so from the Chief of the Russi,an ISJtafif so that he&#13;
could travel to Moscow, where with the heilp of the vad.io&#13;
conneotion of General Biika, who was the Chief of the Mtilitary Mission, Nemec could tell Benes how matters were&#13;
going and koop him informed on Fierlinger. The latter was&#13;
doing right well. He still is a minister in the Prague Gov~&#13;
ernment, but Genera,1 Bika was killed by the Commund.sts.&#13;
At that time the Communists had asked the Slovak&#13;
non-Communists whether it would not he more profitable&#13;
to support tJhe idea of a Slovak Soviet Republic so that the&#13;
Slovaks could go,vern their own territory rather than adhere to the "Czecho-slova;k" ideology which denied the existence of the Slovak nation. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Reipulblk could be promoted without diff,iculty,&#13;
because the Slovak State still existed. Husak and Novomesky, however, did not get anywhere with their proposal.&#13;
The Slova,k non-Commumsrts turned it down, declaring that&#13;
it was contrary to the Christmas Agreement of December,&#13;
1943, as well as the agreement which Ursiny concluded -w ith&#13;
Dr. Benes in Octolber, 1944, when he acted iJ?- the name of&#13;
thie SloViak National Council.&#13;
When Husak and N01Vomesky failed to promote the&#13;
idea of a Slovruk Soviet Repwblic in London, they imrmediiately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakia&#13;
to present the ,p rop·a sal to President Joseph Tiso and the&#13;
Slovruk Govemment. But Tiso· and the Slovak Government&#13;
would not hear rubout it. Husak and N ovomesky failed in&#13;
thek mission. Several months later, with mMly Slova;ks in&#13;
emigration, Clemenitis took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today an the leading Reds of Slavrukia are paying&#13;
dearly for failing in theiT mission. Clementis paJid with his&#13;
life.&#13;
Ruthenia was loot. Benes's delegation had to go to&#13;
Trebisov ·a nd after that things went rather smoothly. ~erliillger ma:de the propositions and Benes aocepted them.&#13;
When he was returning from Moscow in March, 1945, Benes could no longer enter Ruthenia. In fact he renounced&#13;
it solemnly on severai occasions. FinaMy, Benes had an&#13;
agreement prepared which Fierlinger signed for the Czecho1&#13;
&#13;
92&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
SlovaJk Government with great solemnity in the Kremlin on&#13;
June 29, 1945. No one outside the CommU'Ilists agreed with&#13;
this act of Benes. No law, however, could contain or restrain Benes. He acted dictatori.ally at any time that it&#13;
benefited him.&#13;
On August 24, 1945, without even corum1tling the&#13;
Parliament, Benes issued his presidential decree No. 4, concluding the pa:ct between the U .S.S.&lt;R. and the C.S.R. This&#13;
decree was the basis for assigning new borders to Slovakia in the East. In Octoher, 1946, everything "legalized"&#13;
on the ,b asis orf foregoing decrees was published in the Col~&#13;
lection of Laws and Regulations.&#13;
T.he text orf the rubove-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as significant. It begins with the words:&#13;
". . . being certain that the provisional National Assembly&#13;
of the Orecho-1Slovaik Republic shal[ concur with this ag.reement . . . "&#13;
Benes did not wait. He and John Masaryk and VI-ado&#13;
Clementis decided matters without Pa.rlia,ment. As good&#13;
prophets, they knew tha't Parliament would certainly approve this ag,r eement !&#13;
Since Ruthenia was not a very big bite, Benes did not&#13;
stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2,&#13;
1945, he issued decree No. 8, whereby a numbeir of homes&#13;
in the most beautiful seo'tion of BUJbenec - in the modern&#13;
section of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, the greaJt s•a crifices&#13;
the nations of the U .IS.S.R. had made on the altar of liberation of humanity.&#13;
WeM, it is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great&#13;
extent did l,iibera-te SlwaJcia from a gre,aJt many things the&#13;
Slovaks could use themselves, but it certamly was not&#13;
ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them&#13;
without evsen consulting the nation about it. Only dictators&#13;
act like that. And Benes was a dictator by the grace of&#13;
MoS&lt;!ow, even id: only a temporary one.&#13;
'Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later&#13;
Benes showed his aP!)Teoiation to the so-called "iLiberator"&#13;
of Prague, M&lt;rurshaJ Konev, by giving him several very&#13;
•b eautiful vi1las which were oonfiscated from the 1g ood citi-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
93&#13;
&#13;
zens .o f Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiflrl&#13;
view of Prague.&#13;
All these decTees we re signed by General Hasal-Nizborsky, who was at that time Minister of Thansportation,&#13;
and •by Vaclav iMajer, who was also a member of Benes's&#13;
caJbinet. The servility to Stalin and Go'titwald, and the&#13;
boundless adulation iby HasaJl..,Niziborsky a,nd Frantiseik&#13;
Nemec would be best illustrated if we pu!blished the congratulatory telegrams sent by them to their idols.&#13;
I mtend to publish all these facts in a book, but they&#13;
hawe already !been quoted by Fierlinger and Lausman in&#13;
their books.&#13;
Later, many Communists who fell out of favor tried to&#13;
rescue their political careers in exile with the help of membership cards in the Social Democratic Party. Those Communists, rulmost without exception, we find in Radio Free&#13;
Europe - (Graf, Berger-!Belak, and Ti.grid Schonfeld), or&#13;
(Josef Konbel, the&#13;
with other American institutions Communist amlbas:sador from Prague to Tito in Belgrade,&#13;
now a member of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" and&#13;
a uni,versity professor ,i n the United Staltes).&#13;
Regarding Tigrid Schonfeld, it is only necessary to&#13;
note what has been written albout him here in the United&#13;
States. As it is quite a lo't, I only quote some parts of a&#13;
more serious character:&#13;
"Tigrid is a former m emb er of the C2:ech Communist Party. According to tJhe newspaper Christ und Welt (Stuttgart, October 16,&#13;
1952), •his political ac tivjty began in 1932 when he published the illegal Communist paper Hal lo Noviny, w,hich specialhr.ed in subversion of morale in the Czecho slovak Army.&#13;
" He was also a contri butor to the Co mmunist magazine Leva Kultura (Left Culture). Dur:ing Wo r ld W ar II he w as a member of the&#13;
Communfot-domiuated Czechoslovak staff of t'he British Broadcasting Company, where one of his colleagues and iruti mate friend w.as&#13;
Colonel Otto BlheJer, the Czech mi.Jitary attache whom the United&#13;
States Government declared persona non grata in 1949 for es pionage activities."&#13;
&#13;
I hope this short excerpt will be enough to show what&#13;
pro-Communist elements were picked 1by the U. S. Ad-·&#13;
ministration and by the Firee Europe Commitltee for importa,nt pos,itions. These quotations will also prove tha,t SUJCh&#13;
people cannot be expected to be trusted 'back a,t home by&#13;
&#13;
94&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAK.IA&#13;
&#13;
the Nation as anti-Communist fighters and thaJt the whole&#13;
expensive propa,gand'a program is practicrully useless and&#13;
ineffective.&#13;
About the others aJbove, I must confess the same&#13;
opinion as to character.&#13;
The deeds of these men, however, I am intentionally&#13;
separating from the actions of the leaders of the Czec'h&#13;
Social Democratic Prurty. I am presenting the Communist&#13;
co1la:"boration of only those Social Democ~ats who represent the party in exile and who :firom 1945 until they went&#13;
in to exiile were also of some importance back home. I am&#13;
leaving aside those persons who are now abusing the sympath4es of the Labor Party in London, because they wd&#13;
not amount to much back home, being only opporlll!Il.ists&#13;
and regularly havmg two memib ership cards, one of the&#13;
Communist and the other of the Social Democratic Party.&#13;
But these also oannot claim that they opposed the agreement of June 25, 1945; everyone conisenited to it and carried it out in h:is capacity.&#13;
It is no wonder that :b y 1946 their policy of complete&#13;
conformance with the Communists had negated the party&#13;
as opposi,t ion. Simifarly now the party is destroying itself&#13;
in an attempt to gain strength by accepting and proteotin.g&#13;
even men who were strong Communrists, like Milos Vanek&#13;
and Tigrid Schonfeld, or men who possessed membership&#13;
cards of several Marxist parities, like M8!cek, Kwbel, and&#13;
others. Furthermore, an affidav1t of anti-Communism signed&#13;
by the Social Demoorat le·aders is ridiculous, indeed, beca use the party's claim to anti--Communism is itself destroyed by the evidence of its history.&#13;
During the February, 1948 c,r isis, the Social Democratic Party tried to look neutral, but the fact ilid everything to help t'he COIIllmunists succeed. Hol!cling to the&#13;
agreement of J.une, 1945, the party as a unit gave its support to the Commumsts and so broke the political equilibrium in favor of the Oorrum.1~sts. Even if it is not pos•&#13;
sible to .state that without the help of the Sociail. Democrats,&#13;
Gottwald would not have succeeded in the "putsch" of&#13;
February, 1948, nevertheless it remains a great guilt&#13;
against the Sooial Democrats that in the time when it was&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
95&#13;
&#13;
clear to everyone what tJhe Communists were doing, the&#13;
Czech Social Democrats stood by them and did not help&#13;
the opposition. This attitude of the Czech Social Democrats&#13;
is not very well known and evaluated in the United States;&#13;
if it were, not one of them could pose in Washington as&#13;
anti-Communists. And their protector, Steinhardt, U. S.&#13;
am:bassador to, •Prague in 1948, and former Secretary · of&#13;
State Acheson could not have secured for them influential&#13;
positions in the United States on the U. S. payroll.&#13;
It is worthwhile to note that up to 19-38 the Czech Sociall. Democrats cooperated strongly with the Sudeten German Sociail. Democrats in Ozecho-Slovakia. When the German Social Democrats got into trouble with the N a:llis and&#13;
were persecuted, there was no Czech Social Democrait to help&#13;
his coHeague in the Sudetenland; they were betrayed. Later&#13;
the expulsion. decrees bore the signature of aH the Czech&#13;
Social Democrat ministers, who had no social or human feeling. It will forever remain -a shame against the Czech Social&#13;
Democrats that they let their coUe,agues from the German&#13;
Social Democratic Party be so persecuted, robbed, expelled,&#13;
and even JnUrdered.&#13;
They ail.so had a similar attitude towards the Slovaks&#13;
in their domestic .p olky and always helped Prague centralism and imperia•1ism. Furtherimore, they helped to destroy&#13;
the Slov:ak Democratic Party ,b y dema.ndiing in the fall of&#13;
1947 the .p osition of one commissioner. Thiis commissioner,&#13;
working hand-in-hand with bloody Ferjencik, then commissioner of police but now in the United States, iru::reased the&#13;
public terror and forced the courts to serve the police. The&#13;
Social Democrats in the government of Slovakia held to ,t he&#13;
agreement from June 25, 1945, until they had performed&#13;
their jobs in 1945 and then were kioked out when no longer&#13;
needed by the Communists.&#13;
Looking over the record of the Czech SociaJl Democratic Party, their willing coUaiboration with Communists and&#13;
their fierce figiht against every anti-Communist, one cannot&#13;
understand their presel!t a;lilbi thait they acted only under&#13;
Russian pressure. One incident epitomizes this contradiction.&#13;
On the sixtieth anniversary of Karl Marx's death, Mareh&#13;
14, 1943, they were living in London. On that day the Czech&#13;
&#13;
96&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Socia:l Democrats and the Communislts made a piJ.grimage&#13;
to Mairx's torn!b in an English ·c emetery. At this tomlb, in&#13;
free England, the present representative of the "Council of&#13;
Free Ozechosl'Ovakia" in Washington, then Benes's mmiister and member oif his State Council, Vaclav Miajer, delivered a speech in the name of t!he Social Democraits in which&#13;
he said:&#13;
"WE BELIEVE WITH MARX THAT SOCIALISM 1,s THE WAY&#13;
TOWARD INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, TOWARD EVERLASTING PEACE, AND THE WELFARE OF NATIONS . TO•DAY HERE&#13;
WE ARE, A SMALL GROUP OF SOCIALIST EMIGRANTS FROM&#13;
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA . BUT THE TIME WILL COME WHEN MARX'S&#13;
TO,MB WILL BE THE SHRINE OF MANKIND LIBERATED FROM&#13;
THE BLIND IMPRISONMENT O,F DEAD SOCIAL DOCTRINES."&#13;
&#13;
1M inister -Majer's speech was published on March 19,&#13;
1'943, in Benes's officiail newspaper in London, the "Czechoslovak," whikh was financed by Jan Masaryk and Hulbert&#13;
Ri,pka.&#13;
In conclusion, I say that the basis of the Communist&#13;
victory in Czecho-iSiovrukia was 1Jhe agreement of June 25,&#13;
1945, which was cauied out with the help of the current&#13;
members of the "Council of Free Czechoslov;rukia." Their&#13;
present pose as anti-Communists is undemtandable, of&#13;
course, because by continumg to deceive Americans is now&#13;
their only means of survival.&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
WHO SAID IT?&#13;
&#13;
"Himself a Slovak, though from Moravia, he had to&#13;
provide a future for the two million Slovaks, who were even&#13;
less a!ble to stand alone than the Ozechs. Masaryk revived&#13;
the radical idea of 1848 and proposed to create a single&#13;
'Czechoslovak' nation by will-power. Masaryk knew little of&#13;
the Slovaks; others !knew even less. This was hi's strength&#13;
in dealing wi,tll the allied leaders; it could not solve the Slovak prdblem. The few conscious Slovak politicians aspired&#13;
only to cll!ltural autonomy within Hungary; living in the&#13;
shadow of Magyar arrogance, they could not imagine the&#13;
dis8ippearance of the Hungarian frontier." - (A. J. P. Taylor, 'NIE HABSBURG MONARCHY, London, 1948; p . 240).&#13;
&#13;
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                <text>The Czecho-Slovak Exile: Czech Social Democrats and Red Espionage</text>
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                <text>Dr. Michael Zibrin&#13;
Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), June-September 1955&#13;
pp.72-96</text>
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                    <text>Officers of the Slovak League of America
(Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio

•
Honorary
Dr. Peter
19-13 W.
Chicago

Fran ce s L. Mizenko
3756 Lee Road
Cl eve l and 2 , Ohio

President
P. H letko
I th Street
~. Illinoi s

J

President
Philip A . Hro ba k
P. 0. Box 150, Middl etown, Pa.
\'ice-Pre sident
Jacob Kocis
15-17 - 167th Street
Hammond, Ind.
Vice-President
Julia Krajcovic
1648 W. L th St.,

St ephen J . Tka c h
173 N . Main Street
Wi l kes-Barre, Pa .
A ndre w J . H amrock
61 Woodland Av enue
Campbel l , Ohio
ADVISORY COUNCIL
Mi c hael J . Vargovich
National President
l•'irst Cathol i c Sl ovak Unio n

'hie-ago 8, Ill.

Recording 'ecretary
Franc is H rusovsky
2900 East Bou l evard
Cleveland I, Ohio

H e l en Ko c an
.'fationa l Pre sident
Fir st Catholic Sl ovak
Ladie s 1-nion
F ra n k Sobus
- :-lational President
lovak Cathol i c- Soko l

Secretary-Treasurer
Milan V . Blazek
.J922 S. Lec laire Avenu
Chicago 38, Ill.

St ephen J . Tkach
National President
nion
Penna . Sl ovak

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Paul P. Jamriska
810 Montooth Street
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.
Joseph Prusa
205 Madi son St., Passaic, N. J.

· Gabri el a E. Vavrek
National President
Ladies Pennsy lvania
Sl ovak Union
Jo h n Rozbor il
~ational President
Sl ovak 'atholic Cadet Union

SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affiliat ed with th e Slova k League of Am erica )
JEDNOTA
Middletown , Pa.

SLOVENSKA OBRANA
Scranton, Pa.

ZENSKA JEDNOTA
Cleve l and, Ohio

BRATSTVO
Wi l kes-Barre , Pa.

SLOVENSKE NOVINY
C l eve l and, Ohio

ZORNICKA
Chica.go, Ill.

KATOLiCKY SOKOL
Passai c, N. J.

SVORNOST
Whitaker, Pa.

OSADNE HLASY
Chicago, Ill.

SLOVAK V AMERIKE
Whiting, Ind .

�SLOVAK.IA: Ruins of Bzovik Castle, Hont County, built in the 12th century. It served as
a monastery for the Premonstratensians from 1130 until about 1433, when the Czech Hussites took it over and converted it into a fortress.

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                    <text>Officers of the Slovak League of America
(Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio

•
Honorary
Dr. Peter
19-13 W.
Chicago

Fran ce s L. Mizenko
3756 Lee Road
Cl eve l and 2 , Ohio

President
P. H letko
I th Street
~. Illinoi s

J

President
Philip A . Hro ba k
P. 0. Box 150, Middl etown, Pa.
\'ice-Pre sident
Jacob Kocis
15-17 - 167th Street
Hammond, Ind.
Vice-President
Julia Krajcovic
1648 W. L th St.,

St ephen J . Tka c h
173 N . Main Street
Wi l kes-Barre, Pa .
A ndre w J . H amrock
61 Woodland Av enue
Campbel l , Ohio
ADVISORY COUNCIL
Mi c hael J . Vargovich
National President
l•'irst Cathol i c Sl ovak Unio n

'hie-ago 8, Ill.

Recording 'ecretary
Franc is H rusovsky
2900 East Bou l evard
Cleveland I, Ohio

H e l en Ko c an
.'fationa l Pre sident
Fir st Catholic Sl ovak
Ladie s 1-nion
F ra n k Sobus
- :-lational President
lovak Cathol i c- Soko l

Secretary-Treasurer
Milan V . Blazek
.J922 S. Lec laire Avenu
Chicago 38, Ill.

St ephen J . Tkach
National President
nion
Penna . Sl ovak

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Paul P. Jamriska
810 Montooth Street
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.
Joseph Prusa
205 Madi son St., Passaic, N. J.

· Gabri el a E. Vavrek
National President
Ladies Pennsy lvania
Sl ovak Union
Jo h n Rozbor il
~ational President
Sl ovak 'atholic Cadet Union

SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affiliat ed with th e Slova k League of Am erica )
JEDNOTA
Middletown , Pa.

SLOVENSKA OBRANA
Scranton, Pa.

ZENSKA JEDNOTA
Cleve l and, Ohio

BRATSTVO
Wi l kes-Barre , Pa.

SLOVENSKE NOVINY
C l eve l and, Ohio

ZORNICKA
Chica.go, Ill.

KATOLiCKY SOKOL
Passai c, N. J.

SVORNOST
Whitaker, Pa.

OSADNE HLASY
Chicago, Ill.

SLOVAK V AMERIKE
Whiting, Ind .

�SLOVAK.IA: Ruins of Bzovik Castle, Hont County, built in the 12th century. It served as
a monastery for the Premonstratensians from 1130 until about 1433, when the Czech Hussites took it over and converted it into a fortress.

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                  <text>1955, Vol. 5</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
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              <text>Officers of the Slovak League of America&#13;
(Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
Honorary&#13;
Dr. Peter&#13;
19-13 W.&#13;
Chicago&#13;
&#13;
Fran ce s L. Mizenko&#13;
3756 Lee Road&#13;
Cl eve l and 2 , Ohio&#13;
&#13;
President&#13;
P. H letko&#13;
I th Street&#13;
~. Illinoi s&#13;
&#13;
J&#13;
&#13;
President&#13;
Philip A . Hro ba k&#13;
P. 0. Box 150, Middl etown, Pa.&#13;
\'ice-Pre sident&#13;
Jacob Kocis&#13;
15-17 - 167th Street&#13;
Hammond, Ind.&#13;
Vice-President&#13;
Julia Krajcovic&#13;
1648 W. L th St.,&#13;
&#13;
St ephen J . Tka c h&#13;
173 N . Main Street&#13;
Wi l kes-Barre, Pa .&#13;
A ndre w J . H amrock&#13;
61 Woodland Av enue&#13;
Campbel l , Ohio&#13;
ADVISORY COUNCIL&#13;
Mi c hael J . Vargovich&#13;
National President&#13;
l•'irst Cathol i c Sl ovak Unio n&#13;
&#13;
'hie-ago 8, Ill.&#13;
&#13;
Recording 'ecretary&#13;
Franc is H rusovsky&#13;
2900 East Bou l evard&#13;
Cleveland I, Ohio&#13;
&#13;
H e l en Ko c an&#13;
.'fationa l Pre sident&#13;
Fir st Catholic Sl ovak&#13;
Ladie s 1-nion&#13;
F ra n k Sobus&#13;
- :-lational President&#13;
lovak Cathol i c- Soko l&#13;
&#13;
Secretary-Treasurer&#13;
Milan V . Blazek&#13;
.J922 S. Lec laire Avenu&#13;
Chicago 38, Ill.&#13;
&#13;
St ephen J . Tkach&#13;
National President&#13;
nion&#13;
Penna . Sl ovak&#13;
&#13;
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE&#13;
Paul P. Jamriska&#13;
810 Montooth Street&#13;
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.&#13;
Joseph Prusa&#13;
205 Madi son St., Passaic, N. J.&#13;
&#13;
· Gabri el a E. Vavrek&#13;
National President&#13;
Ladies Pennsy lvania&#13;
Sl ovak Union&#13;
Jo h n Rozbor il&#13;
~ational President&#13;
Sl ovak 'atholic Cadet Union&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS&#13;
( Affiliat ed with th e Slova k League of Am erica )&#13;
JEDNOTA&#13;
Middletown , Pa.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVENSKA OBRANA&#13;
Scranton, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
ZENSKA JEDNOTA&#13;
Cleve l and, Ohio&#13;
&#13;
BRATSTVO&#13;
Wi l kes-Barre , Pa.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVENSKE NOVINY&#13;
C l eve l and, Ohio&#13;
&#13;
ZORNICKA&#13;
Chica.go, Ill.&#13;
&#13;
KATOLiCKY SOKOL&#13;
Passai c, N. J.&#13;
&#13;
SVORNOST&#13;
Whitaker, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
OSADNE HLASY&#13;
Chicago, Ill.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAK V AMERIKE&#13;
Whiting, Ind .&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAK.IA: Ruins of Bzovik Castle, Hont County, built in the 12th century. It served as&#13;
a monastery for the Premonstratensians from 1130 until about 1433, when the Czech Hussites took it over and converted it into a fortress.&#13;
&#13;
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                    <text>\t OL. V

DECEMBER , · 1955

IN THIS ISSUE:
??? "Truth Dollars"???
Th e Failur es o f C o mmunist Politi cs in Slovakia
( '

L ettri c h' s Hist o r y o f Slovakia
The, Slovaks and Slavonic Civilization
Ben es' s· Trip to Moscow and Cz ec ho-Slov ak Propaga nd a
l( ern er's ·"Czechoslovakia":
Cast les of Slovakia:
WHO S AID IT ? -

History or Propag a nda ?

Liptovsky H ra dok

54

*

*

*

. Ed ited and comp il ed by
PHILIP A. HROBAK

Publi s h ed by
TH E SLOVAK L E AGU E O F AME1R ICA

NO. 4

( 17 )

�SLOVAKIA is' published periodically by the Slovak League of America,
a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOVAKIA
is to promote a better understanding
and appreciation of the Slovak nation
and its long struggle for freedom and
independence.
As Americans, members of the
Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
right to freedom and independence.
They are dedicated to the cause of the
American way of life, Slovak freedom
and world peace and are determined to
oppose the plague of Communism and
all other totalitarian political systems.
Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per
year in the U . S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to:
SLOVAKIA
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.

Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA

PRESS

Middletown, Pa,

�</text>
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                    <text>\t OL. V

DECEMBER , · 1955

IN THIS ISSUE:
??? "Truth Dollars"???
Th e Failur es o f C o mmunist Politi cs in Slovakia
( '

L ettri c h' s Hist o r y o f Slovakia
The, Slovaks and Slavonic Civilization
Ben es' s· Trip to Moscow and Cz ec ho-Slov ak Propaga nd a
l( ern er's ·"Czechoslovakia":
Cast les of Slovakia:
WHO S AID IT ? -

History or Propag a nda ?

Liptovsky H ra dok

54

*

*

*

. Ed ited and comp il ed by
PHILIP A. HROBAK

Publi s h ed by
TH E SLOVAK L E AGU E O F AME1R ICA

NO. 4

( 17 )

�SLOVAKIA is' published periodically by the Slovak League of America,
a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOVAKIA
is to promote a better understanding
and appreciation of the Slovak nation
and its long struggle for freedom and
independence.
As Americans, members of the
Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
right to freedom and independence.
They are dedicated to the cause of the
American way of life, Slovak freedom
and world peace and are determined to
oppose the plague of Communism and
all other totalitarian political systems.
Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per
year in the U . S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to:
SLOVAKIA
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.

Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA

PRESS

Middletown, Pa,

�</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
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              <text>\t OL. V&#13;
&#13;
DECEMBER , · 1955&#13;
&#13;
IN THIS ISSUE:&#13;
??? "Truth Dollars"???&#13;
Th e Failur es o f C o mmunist Politi cs in Slovakia&#13;
( '&#13;
&#13;
L ettri c h' s Hist o r y o f Slovakia&#13;
The, Slovaks and Slavonic Civilization&#13;
Ben es' s· Trip to Moscow and Cz ec ho-Slov ak Propaga nd a&#13;
l( ern er's ·"Czechoslovakia":&#13;
Cast les of Slovakia:&#13;
WHO S AID IT ? -&#13;
&#13;
History or Propag a nda ?&#13;
&#13;
Liptovsky H ra dok&#13;
&#13;
54&#13;
&#13;
*&#13;
&#13;
*&#13;
&#13;
*&#13;
&#13;
. Ed ited and comp il ed by&#13;
PHILIP A. HROBAK&#13;
&#13;
Publi s h ed by&#13;
TH E SLOVAK L E AGU E O F AME1R ICA&#13;
&#13;
NO. 4&#13;
&#13;
( 17 )&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA is' published periodically by the Slovak League of America,&#13;
a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent.&#13;
The chief purpose of SLOVAKIA&#13;
is to promote a better understanding&#13;
and appreciation of the Slovak nation&#13;
and its long struggle for freedom and&#13;
independence.&#13;
As Americans, members of the&#13;
Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all&#13;
nations, has an inherent and God-given&#13;
right to freedom and independence.&#13;
They are dedicated to the cause of the&#13;
American way of life, Slovak freedom&#13;
and world peace and are determined to&#13;
oppose the plague of Communism and&#13;
all other totalitarian political systems.&#13;
Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per&#13;
year in the U . S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.&#13;
Send subscriptions to:&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
Box 150&#13;
Middletown, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
Printed in the U. S. A.&#13;
JEDNOTA&#13;
&#13;
PRESS&#13;
&#13;
Middletown, Pa,&#13;
&#13;
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA
Published quarter ly by the S lovak League of Ame r ica
VOL. V

DECEMBER, 1955

NO. 4 ( 17)

??? "TRUTH DOLLARS" ???
Wa:nt to fight Communism? You
don 't know how? Well, here's the
answer, according to CRUSADE
FOR FREEDOM: Fight it with
"TRJUTH DOLJLARS"
that's
how! American "Truth Dollars,"
we are told, " send words of truth
a nd hop e to the 70 million freedom loving people behind the Iron
Curtain." But have you ever read
or ·heard those "words of truth
and hope" which bombard the
Iron Curtain countries? Neither
have most Americans!
Take the case of ,Slovakia, which
was wantonly destroyed by the
victorious ,United Nations ,a fter the
war in total d'isregard o.f the will
of the Slovak nation, what have
your "Truth Dollars" done for the
unfortunate people of that country? The iORUSADE F10 R FREEDOM collects the "TRUTH DOLLA•RS" and hands them over to
the FRIDE EUROPE COMMITTEE,
which
oper,a tes
RA'DIO
FRIDE IDUROBE. But the latter has
not been •s ending words of truth
and hope to the Slovak people.
The "Czechoslovak" division or
unit of RFE is completely under
the influence of persons who collaborated with Moscow .and the Communists for many years. They are
Benes Czechs - Czech Soci'alists
and Red collabomtors former
members of the ·Communist-dominated National Front ,g overnment of
the Benes-Gottwald coalition (19451948). The Slovaks (/Lettrich "democrats") in their service are regarded ,as Judases by all patriotic
Slovaks, because they are and have
been opposed to freedom and poli-

tical independence for their own
nation. Both these groups have
a ctively supported the anWS'.ovak,
anti°Chri'Stian, and pro-Soviet policies of Dr. Edward Benes before,
during and after the laist war. And
we have not heard that they have
publicly repudiated those policies.
American "TRUTH DOLLARS"
are used to pay t.he Benes Czechs
and S lovak J udases in the service
of RADIO F,RJEE EIUIROPE. And
yet, the CRUSA DE F OR FIREEJDOM tells you that your TRUTH
DOLLARS fight Communism "by
exposing
Red
lies ... reveallng
news suppressed by Moscow and
by unmasking Communist collaborators." Patriotic Slovaks have ·
been ener,g etically trying to unmask the Co m munist collaborators
in the_ "Czechoslovak"
(really
CZ ECH) unit of RFE ever sin&lt;:e
it was founded, ,but with little success. The SLOVAK NlEWSLETTER and the SLOVA~Ii.A have
been sent regularly to V'arious
leading lights of the Free Europe
Committee ,a nd the Am,e rican
Heritaige Foundation (which sponsors CRUS•A'DE F10R FREEDOM);
both periodicals exposed the Benes Czechs and Lettrich "democrats," but the situation in RFE
remains
practicall y unchanged.
Personal visits to the New York
Office of RFE have not helped
much either.
It seem s that the Fnee Europe
Committee people themseJ.ves are
not interested in knowing the
truth about what happened in
Czecho Slovakia ,b efore, during and.
after the war. In fact, they have
1

0

�2

SLOVAKIA

made it quite obvious that they
do not know the difference between a Czech and a Slovak and
have adopted a "so what?" attitude in the matter. This attitude
is not helping the cause of freedom or the cause of justice. Patriotic Slovaks in exile and in Slova,kia are confused by this behavior of the FEC and even now
find it hard. to believe that it reflects the policy of our Government and the sentiments of the
American public. I know definitely that it does not. And yet, RFE
began operations with the blessing
of our State Department!
When the Slov·a ks fought the
Communists and pro-Soviet policy,
they were beaten down by the Be,.
nes Czechs ('Ripka, Zenk!, Majer,
Vanek,
Tigrid,Schoenfeld,
Firt,
Stransky, Peroutka, etc.) and the
Judas Slovaks (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, Mudry-::§ebik, Kvetko, Belus, Viboch, Belak-Berger, etc.).
These Red collaborators did not
know how to fight Communism at
home, but we are supposed to !)elieve they can now show Americans and patriotic Slovaks and
.Czechs how to fight it. Of course,
for American "TRUTH DOLAIRS" !
The idea behind IRAIDIO FRE'E
EUROPE is, we believe, a good
idea, but the way it is being put
a.cross by the "Czechoslovak" unit
or division is defeating its purpose. The contents of the broadcasts ,are not the things the Slo•
va,ks at ho.me want to hear. The
peopl,e preparing them certainly
must know that by now. But they
~e not in their jobs to tell that
Slovaks are entitled to freedom
,a nd independence, or what Amerlcans of Slovak descent a.re doing
or thinking ,about various matters. They were instructed by the
.persons who got them the jobs,
so they are not impartial. And
those persons are the Benes

Czechs. If we wene to judge the
entire venture of •ThFE by the "Cz.echoslovak" unit, then we would
have to say that it is strictly a
socialistic enterpris·e. Since we
are not sufficiently informed on
the other sections of ThFE, we desist from saying so at this time.
But we do insist that the ",Cz-echoslovak" unit is under the influence of .Czec•h socialists.
"Every doU.ar 'buys 100 words
of truth; that's how hard 'Truth
Dollars' work. Your dollars will
.hel,2 70 million people resist the
Kremlin . . . . The broadcasts are
by exiles in the native tongue of
the people to whom they a,re
beamed." All this, from a recent
advertisement of the Crusa,de for
Freedom, sounds n~ce, but Slovaks at home ,a nd in exile, as well
as Ame1icans of •S lovak descent
say bluntly: We don't believe it
as long as the "Czechoslovak" unit
exists, because it denies our existence, our right to 'freedom and
independence, distorts facts of the
past and favors enemies of the
Slov,a k nation, the enemies of
America, as well!
The Benes Czechs and •t heir
hirelings, the Lettrich "democrats,"
have deceived and embarrassed
Americans entirely too tong. Their
own people at home have discredited them, so why should we load
them with American "TRUTH
DOI,LARS"?
The Czechs are not and do not
want to be Slovaks, and the Slovaks are not and do not want to
be Czechs. That's all there 'is to
it. And not even "T1RUTH iDO'LLARS" can alter that fact. There
·are plenty of non-Benes Czechs
and. non-Lettrich "democrat!!" all good characters, loved ,a nd esteemed by their people at ·home who can do the job the Free Europe Committee and its Radio
Free Europe are supposed to do.
Why not let them do it?

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1312">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA
Published quarter ly by the S lovak League of Ame r ica
VOL. V

DECEMBER, 1955

NO. 4 ( 17)

??? "TRUTH DOLLARS" ???
Wa:nt to fight Communism? You
don 't know how? Well, here's the
answer, according to CRUSADE
FOR FREEDOM: Fight it with
"TRJUTH DOLJLARS"
that's
how! American "Truth Dollars,"
we are told, " send words of truth
a nd hop e to the 70 million freedom loving people behind the Iron
Curtain." But have you ever read
or ·heard those "words of truth
and hope" which bombard the
Iron Curtain countries? Neither
have most Americans!
Take the case of ,Slovakia, which
was wantonly destroyed by the
victorious ,United Nations ,a fter the
war in total d'isregard o.f the will
of the Slovak nation, what have
your "Truth Dollars" done for the
unfortunate people of that country? The iORUSADE F10 R FREEDOM collects the "TRUTH DOLLA•RS" and hands them over to
the FRIDE EUROPE COMMITTEE,
which
oper,a tes
RA'DIO
FRIDE IDUROBE. But the latter has
not been •s ending words of truth
and hope to the Slovak people.
The "Czechoslovak" division or
unit of RFE is completely under
the influence of persons who collaborated with Moscow .and the Communists for many years. They are
Benes Czechs - Czech Soci'alists
and Red collabomtors former
members of the ·Communist-dominated National Front ,g overnment of
the Benes-Gottwald coalition (19451948). The Slovaks (/Lettrich "democrats") in their service are regarded ,as Judases by all patriotic
Slovaks, because they are and have
been opposed to freedom and poli-

tical independence for their own
nation. Both these groups have
a ctively supported the anWS'.ovak,
anti°Chri'Stian, and pro-Soviet policies of Dr. Edward Benes before,
during and after the laist war. And
we have not heard that they have
publicly repudiated those policies.
American "TRUTH DOLLARS"
are used to pay t.he Benes Czechs
and S lovak J udases in the service
of RADIO F,RJEE EIUIROPE. And
yet, the CRUSA DE F OR FIREEJDOM tells you that your TRUTH
DOLLARS fight Communism "by
exposing
Red
lies ... reveallng
news suppressed by Moscow and
by unmasking Communist collaborators." Patriotic Slovaks have ·
been ener,g etically trying to unmask the Co m munist collaborators
in the_ "Czechoslovak"
(really
CZ ECH) unit of RFE ever sin&lt;:e
it was founded, ,but with little success. The SLOVAK NlEWSLETTER and the SLOVA~Ii.A have
been sent regularly to V'arious
leading lights of the Free Europe
Committee ,a nd the Am,e rican
Heritaige Foundation (which sponsors CRUS•A'DE F10R FREEDOM);
both periodicals exposed the Benes Czechs and Lettrich "democrats," but the situation in RFE
remains
practicall y unchanged.
Personal visits to the New York
Office of RFE have not helped
much either.
It seem s that the Fnee Europe
Committee people themseJ.ves are
not interested in knowing the
truth about what happened in
Czecho Slovakia ,b efore, during and.
after the war. In fact, they have
1

0

�2

SLOVAKIA

made it quite obvious that they
do not know the difference between a Czech and a Slovak and
have adopted a "so what?" attitude in the matter. This attitude
is not helping the cause of freedom or the cause of justice. Patriotic Slovaks in exile and in Slova,kia are confused by this behavior of the FEC and even now
find it hard. to believe that it reflects the policy of our Government and the sentiments of the
American public. I know definitely that it does not. And yet, RFE
began operations with the blessing
of our State Department!
When the Slov·a ks fought the
Communists and pro-Soviet policy,
they were beaten down by the Be,.
nes Czechs ('Ripka, Zenk!, Majer,
Vanek,
Tigrid,Schoenfeld,
Firt,
Stransky, Peroutka, etc.) and the
Judas Slovaks (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, Mudry-::§ebik, Kvetko, Belus, Viboch, Belak-Berger, etc.).
These Red collaborators did not
know how to fight Communism at
home, but we are supposed to !)elieve they can now show Americans and patriotic Slovaks and
.Czechs how to fight it. Of course,
for American "TRUTH DOLAIRS" !
The idea behind IRAIDIO FRE'E
EUROPE is, we believe, a good
idea, but the way it is being put
a.cross by the "Czechoslovak" unit
or division is defeating its purpose. The contents of the broadcasts ,are not the things the Slo•
va,ks at ho.me want to hear. The
peopl,e preparing them certainly
must know that by now. But they
~e not in their jobs to tell that
Slovaks are entitled to freedom
,a nd independence, or what Amerlcans of Slovak descent a.re doing
or thinking ,about various matters. They were instructed by the
.persons who got them the jobs,
so they are not impartial. And
those persons are the Benes

Czechs. If we wene to judge the
entire venture of •ThFE by the "Cz.echoslovak" unit, then we would
have to say that it is strictly a
socialistic enterpris·e. Since we
are not sufficiently informed on
the other sections of ThFE, we desist from saying so at this time.
But we do insist that the ",Cz-echoslovak" unit is under the influence of .Czec•h socialists.
"Every doU.ar 'buys 100 words
of truth; that's how hard 'Truth
Dollars' work. Your dollars will
.hel,2 70 million people resist the
Kremlin . . . . The broadcasts are
by exiles in the native tongue of
the people to whom they a,re
beamed." All this, from a recent
advertisement of the Crusa,de for
Freedom, sounds n~ce, but Slovaks at home ,a nd in exile, as well
as Ame1icans of •S lovak descent
say bluntly: We don't believe it
as long as the "Czechoslovak" unit
exists, because it denies our existence, our right to 'freedom and
independence, distorts facts of the
past and favors enemies of the
Slov,a k nation, the enemies of
America, as well!
The Benes Czechs and •t heir
hirelings, the Lettrich "democrats,"
have deceived and embarrassed
Americans entirely too tong. Their
own people at home have discredited them, so why should we load
them with American "TRUTH
DOI,LARS"?
The Czechs are not and do not
want to be Slovaks, and the Slovaks are not and do not want to
be Czechs. That's all there 'is to
it. And not even "T1RUTH iDO'LLARS" can alter that fact. There
·are plenty of non-Benes Czechs
and. non-Lettrich "democrat!!" all good characters, loved ,a nd esteemed by their people at ·home who can do the job the Free Europe Committee and its Radio
Free Europe are supposed to do.
Why not let them do it?

�</text>
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                  <text>1955, Vol. 5</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
Published quarter ly by the S lovak League of Ame r ica&#13;
VOL. V&#13;
&#13;
DECEMBER, 1955&#13;
&#13;
NO. 4 ( 17)&#13;
&#13;
??? "TRUTH DOLLARS" ???&#13;
Wa:nt to fight Communism? You&#13;
don 't know how? Well, here's the&#13;
answer, according to CRUSADE&#13;
FOR FREEDOM: Fight it with&#13;
"TRJUTH DOLJLARS"&#13;
that's&#13;
how! American "Truth Dollars,"&#13;
we are told, " send words of truth&#13;
a nd hop e to the 70 million freedom loving people behind the Iron&#13;
Curtain." But have you ever read&#13;
or ·heard those "words of truth&#13;
and hope" which bombard the&#13;
Iron Curtain countries? Neither&#13;
have most Americans!&#13;
Take the case of ,Slovakia, which&#13;
was wantonly destroyed by the&#13;
victorious ,United Nations ,a fter the&#13;
war in total d'isregard o.f the will&#13;
of the Slovak nation, what have&#13;
your "Truth Dollars" done for the&#13;
unfortunate people of that country? The iORUSADE F10 R FREEDOM collects the "TRUTH DOLLA•RS" and hands them over to&#13;
the FRIDE EUROPE COMMITTEE,&#13;
which&#13;
oper,a tes&#13;
RA'DIO&#13;
FRIDE IDUROBE. But the latter has&#13;
not been •s ending words of truth&#13;
and hope to the Slovak people.&#13;
The "Czechoslovak" division or&#13;
unit of RFE is completely under&#13;
the influence of persons who collaborated with Moscow .and the Communists for many years. They are&#13;
Benes Czechs - Czech Soci'alists&#13;
and Red collabomtors former&#13;
members of the ·Communist-dominated National Front ,g overnment of&#13;
the Benes-Gottwald coalition (19451948). The Slovaks (/Lettrich "democrats") in their service are regarded ,as Judases by all patriotic&#13;
Slovaks, because they are and have&#13;
been opposed to freedom and poli-&#13;
&#13;
tical independence for their own&#13;
nation. Both these groups have&#13;
a ctively supported the anWS'.ovak,&#13;
anti°Chri'Stian, and pro-Soviet policies of Dr. Edward Benes before,&#13;
during and after the laist war. And&#13;
we have not heard that they have&#13;
publicly repudiated those policies.&#13;
American "TRUTH DOLLARS"&#13;
are used to pay t.he Benes Czechs&#13;
and S lovak J udases in the service&#13;
of RADIO F,RJEE EIUIROPE. And&#13;
yet, the CRUSA DE F OR FIREEJDOM tells you that your TRUTH&#13;
DOLLARS fight Communism "by&#13;
exposing&#13;
Red&#13;
lies ... reveallng&#13;
news suppressed by Moscow and&#13;
by unmasking Communist collaborators." Patriotic Slovaks have ·&#13;
been ener,g etically trying to unmask the Co m munist collaborators&#13;
in the_ "Czechoslovak"&#13;
(really&#13;
CZ ECH) unit of RFE ever sin&lt;:e&#13;
it was founded, ,but with little success. The SLOVAK NlEWSLETTER and the SLOVA~Ii.A have&#13;
been sent regularly to V'arious&#13;
leading lights of the Free Europe&#13;
Committee ,a nd the Am,e rican&#13;
Heritaige Foundation (which sponsors CRUS•A'DE F10R FREEDOM);&#13;
both periodicals exposed the Benes Czechs and Lettrich "democrats," but the situation in RFE&#13;
remains&#13;
practicall y unchanged.&#13;
Personal visits to the New York&#13;
Office of RFE have not helped&#13;
much either.&#13;
It seem s that the Fnee Europe&#13;
Committee people themseJ.ves are&#13;
not interested in knowing the&#13;
truth about what happened in&#13;
Czecho Slovakia ,b efore, during and.&#13;
after the war. In fact, they have&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
0&#13;
&#13;
2&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
made it quite obvious that they&#13;
do not know the difference between a Czech and a Slovak and&#13;
have adopted a "so what?" attitude in the matter. This attitude&#13;
is not helping the cause of freedom or the cause of justice. Patriotic Slovaks in exile and in Slova,kia are confused by this behavior of the FEC and even now&#13;
find it hard. to believe that it reflects the policy of our Government and the sentiments of the&#13;
American public. I know definitely that it does not. And yet, RFE&#13;
began operations with the blessing&#13;
of our State Department!&#13;
When the Slov·a ks fought the&#13;
Communists and pro-Soviet policy,&#13;
they were beaten down by the Be,.&#13;
nes Czechs ('Ripka, Zenk!, Majer,&#13;
Vanek,&#13;
Tigrid,Schoenfeld,&#13;
Firt,&#13;
Stransky, Peroutka, etc.) and the&#13;
Judas Slovaks (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, Mudry-::§ebik, Kvetko, Belus, Viboch, Belak-Berger, etc.).&#13;
These Red collaborators did not&#13;
know how to fight Communism at&#13;
home, but we are supposed to !)elieve they can now show Americans and patriotic Slovaks and&#13;
.Czechs how to fight it. Of course,&#13;
for American "TRUTH DOLAIRS" !&#13;
The idea behind IRAIDIO FRE'E&#13;
EUROPE is, we believe, a good&#13;
idea, but the way it is being put&#13;
a.cross by the "Czechoslovak" unit&#13;
or division is defeating its purpose. The contents of the broadcasts ,are not the things the Slo•&#13;
va,ks at ho.me want to hear. The&#13;
peopl,e preparing them certainly&#13;
must know that by now. But they&#13;
~e not in their jobs to tell that&#13;
Slovaks are entitled to freedom&#13;
,a nd independence, or what Amerlcans of Slovak descent a.re doing&#13;
or thinking ,about various matters. They were instructed by the&#13;
.persons who got them the jobs,&#13;
so they are not impartial. And&#13;
those persons are the Benes&#13;
&#13;
Czechs. If we wene to judge the&#13;
entire venture of •ThFE by the "Cz.echoslovak" unit, then we would&#13;
have to say that it is strictly a&#13;
socialistic enterpris·e. Since we&#13;
are not sufficiently informed on&#13;
the other sections of ThFE, we desist from saying so at this time.&#13;
But we do insist that the ",Cz-echoslovak" unit is under the influence of .Czec•h socialists.&#13;
"Every doU.ar 'buys 100 words&#13;
of truth; that's how hard 'Truth&#13;
Dollars' work. Your dollars will&#13;
.hel,2 70 million people resist the&#13;
Kremlin . . . . The broadcasts are&#13;
by exiles in the native tongue of&#13;
the people to whom they a,re&#13;
beamed." All this, from a recent&#13;
advertisement of the Crusa,de for&#13;
Freedom, sounds n~ce, but Slovaks at home ,a nd in exile, as well&#13;
as Ame1icans of •S lovak descent&#13;
say bluntly: We don't believe it&#13;
as long as the "Czechoslovak" unit&#13;
exists, because it denies our existence, our right to 'freedom and&#13;
independence, distorts facts of the&#13;
past and favors enemies of the&#13;
Slov,a k nation, the enemies of&#13;
America, as well!&#13;
The Benes Czechs and •t heir&#13;
hirelings, the Lettrich "democrats,"&#13;
have deceived and embarrassed&#13;
Americans entirely too tong. Their&#13;
own people at home have discredited them, so why should we load&#13;
them with American "TRUTH&#13;
DOI,LARS"?&#13;
The Czechs are not and do not&#13;
want to be Slovaks, and the Slovaks are not and do not want to&#13;
be Czechs. That's all there 'is to&#13;
it. And not even "T1RUTH iDO'LLARS" can alter that fact. There&#13;
·are plenty of non-Benes Czechs&#13;
and. non-Lettrich "democrat!!" all good characters, loved ,a nd esteemed by their people at ·home who can do the job the Free Europe Committee and its Radio&#13;
Free Europe are supposed to do.&#13;
Why not let them do it?&#13;
&#13;
</text>
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                <text>Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17), December 1955&#13;
pp. 1-2</text>
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

3

THE FAILURES OF COMMUNIST POUTICS
IN SLOVAKIA
Dr. Joseph Pauco
In recent months many evident proofs of the failures
of the Communist Party .in Slovaikia have been supplied
by the communists themselves. Their policies flailed not only
in tlhe political dom aii:n, but also in the eoonomfoa!l and especiailly the agricultural fields. What is the situation in SlovaJkia today aicco:rding to the admissions of the communists
themselves?
Centralization
1

On the one hand, it is 'k nown that the communists in
Slovak!ia did SUipport the recognition of the national indiviiduality of the :S lovak naJtion, yet, on the other hand, it is
true thaJt in Slovakia power is no longer in the hands of
communists who respect tlhis principle and oppose the imperialIBtic influences of Ozech communism.
F'0trmally, the 1name o:f the CommUIIl1ist Party of Slovakia has been retained, but not a single commuru.srt: factor will
say thaJt it is ,representati.ve of Slovak communist forces, or
any kind of autonomoUJS organization of Slovak communists.
The first secretary of the Communist Parity of Slovald1a, the
Czech communJ.st ~arel Badlek, proc,laimed on April 22,
19'55, at the XI Congre ss of the Communist Party of Slo-vakia:
"The Communist Party of Slovakia is a region.a:! organization of the one Communist Party of Czecho-lSlovaJkia;
it is its fighting diivision."
The :flirst sec·r etary of the Communist Party of CzechoSlovakiia, the Czeclh .Amt onin Novotny, addressing that Con~
gress said thrut "the Communist Party of Slwaikia is an indivi:silble 1part and unit of the Communist Party of CzechoSloW!Jki,a."
Tit is clear, then, beyond all shadow of doubt, that two
of the pre-eminent leaJders of the present communist regime
in PTague and Bratislava no longer consider it n.ecessary
for the Slwak commundsts to appear independently. This is
apparent not oinly in the o,r ganization by the fact th•a t the
1

1

�4

SLOVAKIA

Slovak Communist Party is suboirdinated to the Ozech Communist Party as its "division," but also in the .poili'tical field
as well, where the Czechs rule surpreme. ln the so-oalled
"Czeoho-Slovruk" Communist Barty, there were only Ozechs.
As an aip.pendage of the Czech Oommunist Party, the Slovak Communist Party is .powerless to ,i nitiate or realize anything; everything is done through the Czecho--Slovak (really CZECH) Communist Party. Bacilek attested to this fact
openly, when he said:
"Important and fundamental •p olitical questions concerning Slovakia were presented for resolution to the Central Committee od' the Communist Party of Czecho-iSlovakia, and we go,v erned ourselves iby those decisions."
For Slovakiia iit pr~baJbly is fortunate tJhat Prrugue is
today responsilble for all politics. On the other band, however, it is quite significant for the Soviets, who loudly demand the a,ssurance of aU national freedoms. In the Slo·vak case it is one orf the cleaTest 1proofs thaJt SOV'iet slo.gans
about independence a~e only a s:ham and delus,ion. Under
the communist reg,ime the Slovaks lost aitl remnants of autonomous government. IDven though the Communist Party
·of Slovakia exists fonmally, its first secretary is not a Slovruk, but a Czech - ~arel Bacilek - and that means, for
all practi'crul purposes, that SlnvaJkia is again a Ozech colony.
'Dhis situation conceals within itself many known
thinigs. While the Ozech comrmmists could rely on Husa'k,
Novomesiky, Okaly, and Clementis, they readily e~loited
their services. But just as soon as these Slovak communists, who possessed a certruin am'ount of national pride, began to make more and more demands, they were marked
for liquidiaJtion. And Ozech communists did liquidate them .
"Bourgeois nationalists," said Bacilek, "led by Husak,
in agreement with the Slovak reaction, oppo-s ed the validation of a uniform poHcy and a urniform agricultural program for the entire Czecho-iSlovalk Reipublic. And since this
un~formity wa;s a prerequisite of the politic•al, and mainly
the agriculturnJl, equality of the rig1hts of the Slovak nation, tihen, fa:ct:ually, they s1a:botaged this equa:lity orf rights."
Hlusak's ,g roup was no more considerate toward the
anti-communist Slova:k camp than was Bacilek. The oillly

�SLOVAKIA

5

dif;ference between them was that Husak was a Slovak and
Bacilek a Ozec'h. Because Husak, a Slovak communist, had
dared to oppose the concept that his party was s.imrply "a
fighting division oif the Communist Party of Ozecho-,Slovakia," that is, subservient to tlhe CZECH CommU'Ilist Party - hiis name was added to the last of traitor:rs, even though
he did render inivaluaJble se:rwices to the commU'Ilist cause.
Slovak Nationalism

The greatest enemy of communism in Slovakia is nationa'1isrm - the real cause of the failures of communist
policy. Becau:se the foli:owers of the Hlinka 'Slo'V'ak People's
Party were identrified with Slovak nationaliism, they were
most violently attooked by the communists.
William Siroky recalled at the XI Congress of the Slovak CommU'Il.ist Prurty in Bratislava that the Communi,s t
Party "revealed the plague of tJhe anti~peop[e's populist
separatist traitocrs and the other nationa;lisbic groups."
Thus far Slovak nationalism could not be wiped out. Afrter
ten years Siroky had to admit that "national :wejudices
are very much allive especially among the Slovak intellectuals and officials; they are penetrating into other classes,
aTe influencing even cultural lifo, and that a constant,
stu!bborn ideofogiica1l war must be waged against them."
Bacilek also complained that Slovak nationalism is
not a sim,ple problem, saying: "While consolidating the
brotherhood of the Ozechs and the Slovaks, let us not even
for a moment storp waging a decisive battle against tJhe
populists, the ideolo,gical man.ifestation of one part of the
banikmpt Slovaik bourgeoisie."
Karel Brucilek is stumped by the Slovak bourgeoisie
and, therefore, oalils upon scientific workers to fight the
Slovak IJ.orpulists: "From the workers of the sociaJ sciences
we demand that they systematically and olbjectively uncover and help to oiveroome the manifestations of bourgeois
ideologies in the minds of the people, especiaUy the manifestations of bourgeois natiorrali:s m and its most de~
structive variety - populist s~paratism."
!Slovak natiO'Ilalism, however, is not a matter of some
smail[ group. Novotny understood that very well when he

�6

said: ". . .Almost everywhere up to now we rmeet with
dangerous mainifestations of bourgeois nationaliSlm, es,peciaUy with one of its forms, with populist separatism,
carrying wi·t h it reactionary darkness, which was designedly kept up in Slovakiia by the htgh Church hieraTchy."
Judging ,a ccordingly, then, we can say that Slova:k
nation:aliSlm is the "Enemy No.. l" of the communist regime. So for Novotny it is very clear that "the commun~
ists, the natfona1 committee, and the basi,c partisan organizations must constantly exiplain the harmfulness of nationalistic views and e:,QJJose them . . . "
·s1ovaJk naticma1ism is still quite strong. 'J.1he communists did not khl[ it and, according to their own admission,
the propaganda they used against Slo,vaik nationrulism did
not he1p much. This is made quite clear from Sirdky's
speech, in which he says: "our agitation and ,propaganda
are not suifficiently penetrating and convincing; we are
losing sight of the increasjng claims of our people. This
holds for the press, lectures, and also for many sections
of cultura,1 practice. . . In Slovrukia es:pe:cially, we must be
aware of tJhe fact that any weakening of the ideological
wor,k will oniy strengthen national prejudices."
This is quite a sj_gnifican,t adrmission from a man who
untitl recently held the first position in the Communist
Party of Slo.vakfa. To, keep his. head a:bo,ve water as long
as possible, Sirdky, even though he is not a S'1ovaik by ori~
gin and sentiment, knows tha;t he must be grateful to those
by whose grace he is •s till tolerated as a member of the
politburo. So he encourages comm!Ullist propaganda "to devote itself more sy,stematically and profoundly and more
concretely to the greaJt and actual ideoilogica[ problems of
the present per,iod - to concern itself witlh t:he questions
whkh preoccupy the minds O!f our people. We must see to
it that the feeling of collectiveness and mutua'lity of the
Czechs and Slovaks, of Cze&lt;:ho..Slovak patriotiSlm - just
like the feeling of lo,yalty and love towaTd the Soviet Union
- become the fundamental. lines orf the socialistic and pat.Piotic consciousness of our citizens."
Obviously, then, there is no so-·caNed "mutuality of
Slovaks and Czechs," there is no "Czecho-tSlovak patriot-

�SLOVAKIA

7

ism." These concepts existed only in the minds of poHtical
dreamers in t!he past and, as we see, even communist prisons and concentration camps could not create them. After
ten years of terror and violence, comrade Siroky, who rendered great services iin Slovakia for Ozech communists, is
leaving the leadership of the Slovak Communist Party beca use the desired union of the Slovaks with the Ozechs did
not materialize.
Many people dreamed a:bout a brotherhood of the
Czechs and Slova'ks. But this was nothing but an unsuccessful dream . The situation has not changed even today. Even
Bacile&lt;k would be happy if he couild change it. So, he turns
his attention to the communist writers, saying:
"Litemture and the arts o,we very much to the systematic conso[idation of the brotherhood o!f the Czechs and
Slova;ks. After ten years our literature has not produced a
romantic novel which would depict the fact that without
the aid qf the Czech working class there would be no penetrating successes in the soci'alisti&lt;: industria&gt;liza,tion of Slovakia. We do not have a book which would show the historical roots of the brotherhood of the Czechs and Slovaks."
If there is no such volume, then there are no, writers
who stand in the service of communism and the so-called
"Czecho-,Slo,v ak" union; there are no writern w'ho would be
wililing to serve communist propaganda and the policy of a
"Great Czec,hia." And this fact is as significam.t a reality as
is the strength of Slovak nationalism itself. Both comple~
ment and control each other mutually. Writers are the coo.science of a nation. In present-day Slovaki'a, if this conscience does .not subordinate itself to communist dictates,
then this is a matter of great significam.ce a,nd of an extraordinary hisitorical manifestati'on. In natinnal questions,
we know, a genuinely honest w_riter would not dare to misrepresent the thoughts of his own peo.ple.
The schools of Slova'kia are also• resisting commun•
ism very va1iantly; they .p refer to stand on the side of
the nation thian on the side of a foreign clique which
wants to demoralize the character of Slovak history. Bacilek obviously was fuily aware of the school situation, because in attacking SlO'Vak teachers he said:

�8

SLOVAKIA

"If we arnailyre the work of the ,s chools from the standpoint of contemporary needs, we must come to the conclusion tihat thus far they are not performing their basic
task satisfoctorily and are little concerned a;bout the quality af education and, at the saime time, abourt 'the creation
of c•o mmunistic conviction and momls in all the youth. . .
We must seek the reason therefore albove aiH else in the
low level of the teaching and training work of our
teruohers."
That's the kind of talk we hear long after the Communiist Party of Slovakia repl'aced qualified teachers with
its most loyal followera whether they qualified .as teaahers
or not. That such people had no idea what the teaching or
training level was is l.mderstand01ble; on this point we can
agree with Ba;cilek, because the commurust regime did not
care whether the persons employed as t eachers ,w ere qualified to tea:ch, hut was onJ.y concerned whether bhey were
party memlbern. However, the admission of the fact that
these Red teaichers were not sufficiently relialb1e for the
communists, that they are not creating communist convictions, rund are not strengthening communist vices in the
youth - all this is one af the most reiveal,i ng proofo of
the failures of communist policy in Slovakia. The communists hurried to .produce intellectuals loyal to tlhem by
a wholesale process. Even though some intellectuals ap-·
parently did join them, they did not lose their healthy
.Sl·OVaJk core and are now causing the leadership of the
Communist Party no end of trouble.
That is the wo11k and the influence of Sloviak nationalism. And SlovaJk natiornalism is more irufluential than
all communist terror and vioO.errce. The iruflueillCe af Slovak
nationali&lt;Slm rea:ches ,i nto the Communist Party itselrf. Ba-·
cilek admitted tihat from the time of the X Assembly
of the Slovak Coimmunist Party "the numiber of dead,
dropped and ex,pelled members and candidates £rom the
party wrus 12,940. The party rid itse'Lf of UillW:Orthy, hostiJ.e
elements, of violators of state and party mscirpline, or
peoiple who fai,l ed in their oibligations as members of the
party.''
Bacilek, however, did not dare publ,~Sh the number

�SLOVAKIA

9

of expelled members and, of course, not even the detail.s
sUTrounding the deaith of some of the memb,e rs. They
could ha,ve lbeen eliminated or liq.uida,ted secretly, wor.ked
to death in .tlhe Uranium mines, or beaten to death in jails
In every instance, however, Bacilek reports that a great
many members were expelled. We understand fiuNy well
that they were enemies of the communist go:vernment and
party.
Communists evidently do no,t know exactly where their
main enemies are am.d, hence, look for them everywhere.
Nationalism .has its sharply designated posts am.d is perfonniin!g its duty. ,Slovak nationalism is no exception.

The Resistance Movement
Sl-ovak nationaJlism is alive and ,a gg,ressi,ve. This was
recently demonstrated, when on June 13, 1955, the communist military trilbunaJl con!Victed 12 memlbers of a Slovak resistam.ce movement, dealing out high penalties, including a sentenice of death for a leading memlber of t;h.e
movement, Bernard Nemcek.
Reports from Prague about the communist verdict
tell us more than all the explanations of the situation in
Slovaikfa. And that because, surprisingly enough, the
br,oadcast of June 16, 1955, designated the movement by
its ,r,ight name: a resistance movement and a movement
to create an independent Slovak State.
The supreme desire of every rnation is to h'ave its own
state. The Slovaks a,re n:o exception. If Slovak nationalists
on native soH can bring the supreme sacri.lfice for this
idea, this is irre.futalble proof that the Slovruk naroion is
not am.d iw:illl not be satisfied with foreign domiination. In
Slovrukia and in tlhe ranks of SlovaJk mo,vements, the fight
against commun~sm is comprehended as determination .to
free itself once and for all time from the yoke of every
a1ien hegemony. That is why the fight of 1Sllovaik nationalists tends in two directions: against communi-sm and for
state independence.
Does a Slovak resistance movement actuafily exist?
In the light of the a;bove, a str,ong resista,nce movement dbviiously does exist in Slovakia. At times, the com-

�10

SLOVAKIA

munists may at:teinipt to minimize its efd'eetiiveness, but
we know that it must ,b e quite a movement, if the Reds
themselves see fit to discuss it during their congresses.
Basing OUT conviction on statements made and adions
taken by the communists themselves, there can be no
doubt that commun'ists really fear Slovak bomigeois :nationialism.
In my possession I have a letter from a well-informed Slovak in Western Gerunany who just recently
escaped from Slovakia. For nine long years he ob.served
how the Red regime worked in Slovai~ia. He took note of
the opinions and manifestations 'Of the population and was
active in western, central and eastern Slovakia. Thris person maide contacts with officials and wwkere, farmers
and priests, teachers and politiJCal prisoners. When I asked
him what the Slovaks thought a;bout state independence
for Slova!kia, he replied:
"I dare write that about 95 percent of the Slovaks
is for an independent state, a SlovaJk State wruiclh iwil[ be
Chri stian and democratic. The Slovaks are holding to the
determination to have their own state and there is no
power whrich wil!l force them to be satisfied with less, with
any other state form ."
Over 90 percent of the Slovruks who escaped from the
homeland during the past ten years have joined o;rganizations tJhat strun:d for an independent Slo-~a;k Repuiblic.
And this is clear testimony of the. political conviction of
the aJbso1ute maj'orirty of the Slovak naition, because it is
obvious that the thoughts of the exiles on fundamental
questions is identical with the thinking of the Slov•a k nation, witJh which just up to not long ago it was shaTing
its bitter fate.
It is not important to seek the answer to the questions of how many resi,s'tance movements tJhere are in Slovakia and how stroTIJg they might be. Certainly it would
not ibe p:mdent to discuss this question pulblicly. What
does count is the fact that they are causing the Red re-·
gime many emlbarassments and difficulties. June 13, 1955,
definitely tells us that resistance movements do exist in
Slovakfa. The rverdict of J·u ne 13, 1955, was not the first
1

�SLOVAKIA

11

one - and most likely not the last one, either - to be
rendered against Slovak patriots. Many conspiracies have
1b een uncoivered in SlovaJkia 1b y Prague since 1945, both by
the communii.st-dominateld Benes-Gottwald coalition government and also by the Red regime whioh took over
comrplete power in Ozedh-0-Slovak'ia in February 1948.
It is certain that under other circumstances the
strength of .t he resistance mo,v ements wouild be greater.
What do we mean by saying under other circumstances?
The concept orf "peacefu11 coexistence" with the communists is creating a very confused situation; this nonsense ,is, in fact, breaking the backbone of the nations
behind the I11on Curtain. Fundamentally, coexistence betmys weakness, and the West is terribly mistaken, if it
thms it can over:come tlhe danger of communism by following such a policy. In practical poHtics coexistence
means a viofation of the fronts m tlhe cold war, which already have in many instances shown signs of great weakness.
Res·.iJstance movements of an anti-communist chiarac•
ter should be gebting more moral aid from sources designated for this pul1)0se. Unfortunately, as far as Slovakia
is corrcemed in this ,p sychological struggle, wrong methods
have frequently been used; whether intentional~y, o,r because of la:C!k of iruformation, does not change the matter.
Thi,s was and is undoubtedly due to the influence of the
very people, who together with tihe communists for three
years (194'5-·1948) were trying to break doWtn. al1l anticommunist re:s•.i!stance of the Sfovak nation. The West defirately does not bolster or build the morale of the Slov,a k resistance movements by aiding and comforting, employing and letting itself be influenced by people who col.,
•J aborated with communists and Moscow and, hen:ce, are
in a large measure responsilble for the terrible situation
that prev:ails in Slovakia today; Slovak Judases, as the
Slwaks at home and in exile refer to them, should not
'be trusted by tlhe West.
Dr. Joseplh Lettrich and his followers - who suddenly ·b ecame "demo:cratic exiles firom Czech0-Slovakia" after
February 2-5, 1948, and are now members of the S&lt;&gt;-&lt;!alled

�12

SLOVAKIA

~'Council of Free Ozecho-&lt;Slovrukia" - should not be used
or employed in any capacity :b y such organizations as the
F!REE E}(JROPE COMIM!I'l'T'iIDE (iRadio F.ree Euroipe),
United States Information Agency (Voice of America),
and other offictla1 and semi--0fficial aigendes of the United
States Government, because they are totally discredited
and cursed by the Slovaks at home.
1Should
anyone wish to, be corredly informed about
how Slo,viakia thinks and feels a:bout its fate, what anticommuniist wor.keris are doing there, let him delve into
the verdict of June 13, 1955, against the tJweilve Slovak
heroes, and let him find time .t o study the attacks of communist propag,amda against ISlovruk nationalists, whose sole
aim ,i s to oause the downfall oif commumsm and to estrub-·
lish a Slovak independent state.
The Reds Fear the West

.C ommenting on the verdict rendered by the "people's"
court againist the tweilve Slovak anti-,c ommunists, the
Prague radio OIIl June 16, 1955, reminded its listeners that
fhis particular resistance orgrumzation receiyed its orders
from Slovak exiles in the West. The military prooorator
called the following Slovak patriots archtraitors : Du:rcansky, Cerna!k, Paiulco, Mikus, ·Mikula, and Hassik. 'Dhis
i,s not t!he forst time, and not the last, that Slovak patriots
in exile have 'been accused by Red Prague. In recent times
attacks of this kind are made almost daily.
On May 2, 1955, for example, the Prague Radio, referring to Slovak patriots in exile, said that "they already
have behind them ten furrl years of service in the interests
of foreigners, ten full years oif collaJboration with the most
rea:ctionary elemernts against the people . . . and the aim
of all exile origa.ni2Jations 1s war."
Thiat is how the Prague commtlillists comprehend
"pea'Ce:ful coexistence." While the West is leaning danger~
ously ibac!k waTd and even sacrificing tJhe interests of some
satellite nations behind the Iron Curtain fOT tJhe saxe of
peiace, the Retl sateJ..lite governments, in the meantime,
reg,ard freedom of expression, movement and political activiity in the states which have given asyilum to Central-

�SLOVAKIA

13

European escapees as "colllalboration with the most reac.
tionary elements."
The .Prague communists, for example, are terribly
worried that Slovaks in exile can speak freely every day
over the tranS1mitting facilities of Spain and Ita:J.y. That
these broadcasts are completely identical with the natural
and democratic demands of rull patriotic Slovaks in exile,
who speak for state independence for their own nation,
is only n:aturrul and,( therefore, quit'e u:nderstand!able.
Communist propaganda, of course, is doing everything
it can do to silence 1:Jhem, disarm them, and discredit them
with the worn-·oU:t eipithets of "fascists, separatists, nazis,
reactionaries," etc. It is signific·a nt, too, that Benes Czechs
and Slovak Judases use the same epithets and tactics as
the Reds. Where they cannot successfully refute a statement, they resort to denunciation, viHfication, and invective.
The Pr31gue bvoadicast, red:erred to above, vicioosly
attacked the Christian character of the prog,r am of the
Slovak exiles. "Well, as far as the activity of the Slovak
exiles abroad is concerned," said the Prague commentator,
"they have in comparison with the rest of the groups one
specialty. More than any other group they are concealing
their actual aims /by a,ppealing to ChriJstianity, Christian
morals, Ohristian charity, etc. Dr. Francis Hrusorvsky even
went as far as to designate tJhe Central-Eu:ropean Union,
that is, tlhe rearming of German miilitarists, as an expression of Christian charity. Not even the former editor-inchief of the newspaper S:L0VAK, Dr. Pauco, who edited
the SLOVAK during the time of the greatest nazi massacre in Slova!kia, will l now never fail to appeal to ChrisHan ethics. And the Sloviak fascists from Madrid, on the
other hand, shall always recall that they are not aslhamed
of Tiso's Legacy."
On June 9, 1955, filie Bratislava broadcast quoted the
angry article of the PiRAVDA against the Slov;aJk People's
Party, distorting its historical role. On that occasion the
PRAY.DA - ac0ording to the radio commentator - wrote
aJbout "the dirty role of the populi,s t emigrants, who are
allying themselves not only with the aggressive groups in

�14

SLOVAKIA

the United States, but aJso with the avengers in western
Germ.any."
The radio broadcast f.rom Prague on June 11 and that
from Bratislava on June 12, 1955, sollillded off against
"the provoc,ative Madrid and Rome tran1simitters," and
against the "Paucos, Cerna.ks, and :Dur:canskys," who are
constantly warning escapees not to return home.
The Brague 'broadcast of May 9, 1955, was :f.ull of insults and epithets aJbout the "madness of the rulers of the
imperi,a listic world and their humble ser,vrunts, the traitors of our nations," that is, the exiles.
It is symboli'c of communist audacity that the Reds
are using such propaganda at a time wlhen in Moscow they
began a new o£fensive so that they might again meet and
confer with "imperialistic rulers," and so whet tlheir ruppetite for "capitalistic" trade. Of course, the communists
say one thing at home, something else at the conference
ta!ble, and still something difrferent to exri1les. Whosoever
,p erforce walilts to be deaf will believe only one or the
other side of their story and will not compare the communist propaganda of an shades and tendencies. We have
always been of tlhe conviction that to come to an agreement with communism is the greatest trM1.Sg,ressicm
against the pri,n ciples of humanity, the basest violation of
the rights to freedom, and a grave insttlt to Christian
sentiment. Communism is most often irritated by the constant repetition and practical realization olf Christian-democratic principles. That is why they cry out loudly
against a poHticail prog,ram to which the v;ast majority of
Slovaks in the West look for thei&lt;r sup,po&lt;rt.
ChrJstianity and the !help of the West, whrreh Slovaks
enjoy, throw the communists off balance. They say all
Slovak exiil es "have one boss,." as reported by the Prague
broadcast of May 2, 195'5, aJUd "all are paid from one
treasury, the trea:sury of American militarilsm. The socalJ.ed Slovak N aitiona1 Coundl .Aibroad, the Sloviak League
of America, and the Canadian SloviaJk League - as the
separati'st organi~ations of iSlova.k :fascists - serve American military interests."
To show their hatred the communist madmen ini1

�SLOVAKIA

15

tialed the names of tihe organizaitJions they attadked witJh
small letters wlhen tlhey pwbH,sihed the commentary in the
periodical L'UD ('People). This is qurite si,gnifica,nit. As if
thereby they could alter the facts. They a.Jltered and will
alter nothing; and their anger only attests to a serious
nervours condition. Iif eve-ryithing were in order in SlOIV'akia and the communists were in complete command of the
situation, they would not have to concern themselves with
the Slov;ak situation so excitedly on the inlternati:onal
field. However, when one once succumbs to fear and has
lost his conscience and has two gall bladders instead of
one heart, there hardly is any helrp for him. The commnnist dic-tators in S1ovakia have a very small sowl. The poon~
tom of American caipitalism and tihe activity of free Slovak or:ganization:s and individuals will not let t'hem sleep.
Perhaps this is best refle&lt;&gt;Jro in the words of Karel
Bacilek, who said at the XI Oommunist Congress at Bratislava: ". . . Imperialist aggressors, led by the ruling
circles of the USA and with tihe aid of treacherous esca-.
pees, are attemipting to srcore and deceive the working people, divert it from the path of social construction. Hostile
propaganda can at times penetr"ate and bear in:filuence in
various ways even oin memlbers olf the ;party."
In other words, what is being done in the, West in the
interest of the liberation of 1:lhe Slovak natit&gt;n does have
a great influence on the Slo.vaks at home. But obviously
this influence also affects the communists. They are afraid
of every step that is taken in the defense of the ,rigihts of
the Slovak nation.
The COilllmunists in Prague and in Slovalkia fear nothing more than the concept of Slovak statehood. Tha;t is
why, for example, William Siroky practicaUy writhed in
cramps when he revealed at the Congress. in Bratislava
that Americans "iha&lt;ve exhumed the compromised and bankrupt slogan of the so-.called S1'()1V'ak Sta:te."
The fact , however, is that the concept of the Slovak
State is not bankrupt and is not dead. It is a thing very
much aJiNe, otheriwiise Sirdky amd other communists would
-hardly concern themselves with it. The Slo,vaks are encouraged by it, while the communists are haruntetl by it.

�16

SLOV.AKIA

The princilples of freedom are so strong that no one can
compromise them. Only dictators, and among them foremost are the communists, have attempted to compromise
the governmental form. But they shaH never convince the
Slovaks that an aJli.en and tyrannical government is better
for them than a government of their own choice.
Against the Kersten Committee

The Kersten Committee evaluated the Slova:k question
justly and correctly and published its findings how Slovakia was taken over by tJhe Reds so that America and the
rest of the free world might learn the truth a:bout the
struggles and demands of the Sl10V1a!k nation. For that the
communist propaganda of Prague and Bratislava fired a
barrage of smear and vilification at the Committee.
The BratislaN radio sharply attaoked Charles Kersten
and the Slovak witnesses on February 7, 1955. The former
congressman from MHwaukee, Wis., •w as called the "counsellor of the escapees," while the Slovak witnesses who
testifiied oof1ore tJhe Committee were designated as "traitors of the Slovak nation."
The 'b roadcast ,a ttacked Dr. Joseph Mikula, ,b ecause he
was supposed to have stated that '~he and his companions
now did not have the legal possilbility to poison the soul
of the 1Sl1ovax nation." Dr. Pauco, the commentator barked,
"rel,aJtekl fables before the Committee about an alleged
suppression of the freedom of the press in Czecho-Slovakia." Dr. Mikus was reviled because he defended the principles of private ownership. Matthew Cemalk, Slovak pa~
triot and leader of the S'lov,a k exiles in Germany, did not
escape the wrath of the Reds either. 'I1he communist propagandist stated that •a ll the Slova.lk witnesses before the
Committee wanted to start a war. In this instance, he said,
'in full nakedness wa:s demonstrated the wretchedness of
the methods, which are used by the American reaction to
slander the countries of tJhe peace camp. At the same time,
however, it aJlso shows the depth of filth and muck -into
which the traitors of the Slovak nation shall end up in."
On May 2, 1955, the Prague radio again attacked
Charles Kersten, declaring that "on the basis of h'is law

�SLOVAKIA

17

about financing suib versi,v e ructivities in the countries promoting peace, he is distributing dollars generously among
federalists, separatists, unionists, and all kinds oif other organizations" fo,r rendering "servile service to aggressive
plans to start a new war."
On Miay 5, 1955, t!he PRAVDA of Bratislav,a ,p ublished
a lengthy article in regard to the actiivi-ties of the Ke:rsten
Committee and tihe testimony of Slov,ak witnesses. Among
otiher things in that article, we read:
"On December 31, 1954, there was published in the
United States a so..,caJl:led official document of the American Congress, which !insults the nations of OUT country in
a very c:m de and inept manner. In this gossiipy 'document', which was prepared by the special Keristen Committee, Ozecho.JSlorvak history is written up in a genuinely
fascist spirit, the glorious Slovak national uiprising is descri'b ed as 'an impro,vised rebellion of subversive elements',
and the liherati:on. of our country by the heroic Soviet,
army is depicted with the bitter sorrow over the defeat
of Hitler's occupat ion troops and thei:r native assistants ...
The Kersten Committee preparnd this 'document' on the
basis of the so--c alled 12 Slovak testimonies, which it collected from Slovak fascist outcasts. . .
"About Kersten it i'S generally known that he has
intimate, friendly contacts with fascists and cOIHalborators,
who fled the country after Wo:rld War II to escape punishment and found asylum in the United States. Therefore, it
surprised no one when the Kersten Committee on its hunt
for gossipy 'testimonies' sought out only genuiine fascists
in London, P,aris, Madrid, Rome, Munich and other Cen~
tral-European ciities. With witnesses like Cemak, Pauco,
Mikus, Mikula, Nahalka, and theiir hke, it naturally could
not be proud of in ,pU!bfic. So it met, with them in absolute
secrecy, behind closed doors.
"The g:reatest degree of deipra,vity a:nd lacik of character
was successfolly attained by Charles Kersten and his
twelve fascist 'witnesses', who in their hellpless hatred
against the Slavruk people incite, slander and cry for another war against o.ur country.
"Among the paid perjurers of the American Govern-

�18

SLOVAKIA

ment of th~ tyipe of Harvey Matusow, Paul Crouch, Elizaibeth Bentley, and_Charle~ Ke:risten, on the one hand, and
Oernak, :Dur.canslky, Pauico, Kirschbaum, Mikus and company, on the other, there is no difference. American and
Slov,aJk fascis'ts alike 'betmy their own people. Of course,
there may be this difference: the former do tfuis for dollar.s while the fascist renegades of Cerna.k's type do it for
anything _of value.
"The so...called document of the American Government,
prepared on the basis of the gossip of 12 Slovak fascists
clearly proves how deep the traitorous escrupees have sunk
in their hatred against our people. And simultaneously this
lying document is further ,p roof that American r,u ling cir-·
cles willingly sl,a nder countries whlicih have rid themselves
of crupitalistic e,oploite:m, the creatures that betrayed their
nati·o n to Hitler." .
We find the very same insults and abusive names also
jn the official note of the Prague Coo:nmuni,s t government
of April 19, which is addressed to the Governmenlt of the
United States. The separate report of the Kersten Committee is designated as.. "bra:zen" and "is equal to t:he wildest product of Goeibbels' fascist proipagandisti'c mach'i nery .
It is nothing else but the pasting tog~her of lies and gossip,
which are supposed to deepen hatred against Czecho-,Slovrukfa, to encourage war hysteria, to incite and campaign
against coounl\.Ulism and to ,p repare a preventive war
against peace-J.oving countries."
The Prague government is also angry because the
Kersten report is opposed to coexi,s tence with communism
and warns the Whole world of the threats of communist
dictators. The Prrugue note attacked Dr. Joseph Mikus
and Matthew Cern.aJk, two act~ve Slov-a:k exiles, pointing out
especi,a lly that they sewed in the dtplomatic cOI1ps of the
Sl~va:k Republic.
As far as the reproaches of the Prague government
and its propaganda against American and Slovak factors
is concerned, it must be stated unequivocally tlhat not in
-a single testimony wrus there any talk aibout the need of
unleashing a war. In the testimonies we do find, however,
mention in seveTal places of the need of good and effective
1

�SLOVAKIA

19

work in the puiblishing and broadcasting fields against communism, of the need of preparations for the spiritual renovation of the world whioh is slowly being crushed by
the satanic forces of ciom.munism. All Slovak witnesses
strongly condemne!d the crimes and the evil perpetrated
against the SlovaJk nation by communism; and tfu.ey told
how communism enslaves the Slovaks spiriturulJy and exploits them economicailly and suppresses every manifestation of the Slova;k people for freedom and state independence.
Tlhe wor'k of the Kersten Committee has become a
thorn in the eyes of communist aggressive politics and pro._,
pagainda. The Czech communi,s ts h'a d hoped that the West
wouM continue to beHeve blindly their old lies a.nd falbles
against the Sloviak nation; tihey did everything possilble to
discredit Slovaks in exile in the eyes of tfu.e West and so
make life as m[seraJble as possible for them. Flaiiing in
this, it was only natUII'al for the Reds of Prague and Bratislaiva to unleash the wildest war in the press and over the
radio ag,ainst Slovaks in exile and against every one who
sympathized with them.
But it does not matter whom they single out for
abuse and vilification; important it is, however, that com~
munists are afraid of the solidly organized anti-commun:..
ist Slovak camp and their friends. And they are frightfully
afraid of the thought that the whole principle of the right
of self-determination must once be accorded the Slovak
nation, without the reaJlization of which the conterruporary
struggle to bring order and political balance in Central
Europe has no su'b stantiation.
While communism must reso;rt to a;buse and invective
in its fits of anger, the Slova~s in exile are presenting
facts, they are building on them and witlh them are defending the righteousness of their demands. Of course,
it is not true that the Kersten Committeee used to meet
secretly with ,Slovaik witnesses. All the hearings were ,public. They were attended by reporters and the puiblic. The
press reported on the hearings, so did the radio and the
television. Expert stenographers recorded everything that
was said by every Slorvak witness and this was then pub1

�.20

SLOVAKIA

lished iby t:he American Governmen t. The reports record
.the minds of those people, w:ho foom the beginning of their
pulblic activity adaimanfily opposed communism .
The SlovaJks in exile do- not deny that they are antL
,c ommuni,s,t. It is a historical fac:t that the Slovak nation as
:a w,hole condemned t:he tea•ching.s of Marx and Engels materialistic phHos0rphy soon after it was made pulb1ic and
.has fouight it consistentl y and persistently throughout the
years. The S1ova'ks in exile, then, do not even request secret sessions. Oommunist s, however, commit the foulest
crimes where there are no witnesses. But they •c annot deny
them, ,b ecause even the dead testify against murderers.
And communism will one day ,be on the be,n ch of the acc used.
It seems ,t he cards have faHen from the hands of the
communist rulers in ,Slova;kia, !because they sysit:ematica lJy
return to, the activity of the native "reaction" and the
Slovaiks in exile. This is nothing else but an attempt to
ma,sk all the crimes and grave injusti ces which they have
committed and are stil,l commiltinig against the SlovaJk nation. Communis ts cannot conceal or deny the evil they have
done. The entire nation is testifying against them. To
.waint to deny something and to- concea•l one's own crimes
,b y hurling poi sonous insu1,ts at others is, indeed, a much
more difficult and hopeless. task than pouring water inrto
the ocean.
We are profoundly touched by the heavy losses of
life, cultural, moral and economic values, which the .Slovak nation has suffered from the Red Moloch. The murder
of Matthew Cernak in Munich, Ju1y 5, 1955, by a bomb
s ent through the mail is still fresh in our minds. However, we see that tJhe communist s are writhing like wounded
sna!kes, hissing with anger and hate. And that is a good
sign. It is the beginning of the end. Thus far no communist ruler has remained long in po,w er; and those forced on
the Slovaks will be no exception. They are. he:Jipless and
have no defense for the failures of their policies and, hence,
must find scaipegoats : so they thunder againsit the native
"populist reaction" at home, the "traitorous exile," and
"imperialis tic American capitalism."
1

1

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1306">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA

3

THE FAILURES OF COMMUNIST POUTICS
IN SLOVAKIA
Dr. Joseph Pauco
In recent months many evident proofs of the failures
of the Communist Party .in Slovaikia have been supplied
by the communists themselves. Their policies flailed not only
in tlhe political dom aii:n, but also in the eoonomfoa!l and especiailly the agricultural fields. What is the situation in SlovaJkia today aicco:rding to the admissions of the communists
themselves?
Centralization
1

On the one hand, it is 'k nown that the communists in
Slovak!ia did SUipport the recognition of the national indiviiduality of the :S lovak naJtion, yet, on the other hand, it is
true thaJt in Slovakia power is no longer in the hands of
communists who respect tlhis principle and oppose the imperialIBtic influences of Ozech communism.
F'0trmally, the 1name o:f the CommUIIl1ist Party of Slovakia has been retained, but not a single commuru.srt: factor will
say thaJt it is ,representati.ve of Slovak communist forces, or
any kind of autonomoUJS organization of Slovak communists.
The first secretary of the Communist Parity of Slovald1a, the
Czech communJ.st ~arel Badlek, proc,laimed on April 22,
19'55, at the XI Congre ss of the Communist Party of Slo-vakia:
"The Communist Party of Slovakia is a region.a:! organization of the one Communist Party of Czecho-lSlovaJkia;
it is its fighting diivision."
The :flirst sec·r etary of the Communist Party of CzechoSlovakiia, the Czeclh .Amt onin Novotny, addressing that Con~
gress said thrut "the Communist Party of Slwaikia is an indivi:silble 1part and unit of the Communist Party of CzechoSloW!Jki,a."
Tit is clear, then, beyond all shadow of doubt, that two
of the pre-eminent leaJders of the present communist regime
in PTague and Bratislava no longer consider it n.ecessary
for the Slwak commundsts to appear independently. This is
apparent not oinly in the o,r ganization by the fact th•a t the
1

1

�4

SLOVAKIA

Slovak Communist Party is suboirdinated to the Ozech Communist Party as its "division," but also in the .poili'tical field
as well, where the Czechs rule surpreme. ln the so-oalled
"Czeoho-Slovruk" Communist Barty, there were only Ozechs.
As an aip.pendage of the Czech Oommunist Party, the Slovak Communist Party is .powerless to ,i nitiate or realize anything; everything is done through the Czecho--Slovak (really CZECH) Communist Party. Bacilek attested to this fact
openly, when he said:
"Important and fundamental •p olitical questions concerning Slovakia were presented for resolution to the Central Committee od' the Communist Party of Czecho-iSlovakia, and we go,v erned ourselves iby those decisions."
For Slovakiia iit pr~baJbly is fortunate tJhat Prrugue is
today responsilble for all politics. On the other band, however, it is quite significant for the Soviets, who loudly demand the a,ssurance of aU national freedoms. In the Slo·vak case it is one orf the cleaTest 1proofs thaJt SOV'iet slo.gans
about independence a~e only a s:ham and delus,ion. Under
the communist reg,ime the Slovaks lost aitl remnants of autonomous government. IDven though the Communist Party
·of Slovakia exists fonmally, its first secretary is not a Slovruk, but a Czech - ~arel Bacilek - and that means, for
all practi'crul purposes, that SlnvaJkia is again a Ozech colony.
'Dhis situation conceals within itself many known
thinigs. While the Ozech comrmmists could rely on Husa'k,
Novomesiky, Okaly, and Clementis, they readily e~loited
their services. But just as soon as these Slovak communists, who possessed a certruin am'ount of national pride, began to make more and more demands, they were marked
for liquidiaJtion. And Ozech communists did liquidate them .
"Bourgeois nationalists," said Bacilek, "led by Husak,
in agreement with the Slovak reaction, oppo-s ed the validation of a uniform poHcy and a urniform agricultural program for the entire Czecho-iSlovalk Reipublic. And since this
un~formity wa;s a prerequisite of the politic•al, and mainly
the agriculturnJl, equality of the rig1hts of the Slovak nation, tihen, fa:ct:ually, they s1a:botaged this equa:lity orf rights."
Hlusak's ,g roup was no more considerate toward the
anti-communist Slova:k camp than was Bacilek. The oillly

�SLOVAKIA

5

dif;ference between them was that Husak was a Slovak and
Bacilek a Ozec'h. Because Husak, a Slovak communist, had
dared to oppose the concept that his party was s.imrply "a
fighting division oif the Communist Party of Ozecho-,Slovakia," that is, subservient to tlhe CZECH CommU'Ilist Party - hiis name was added to the last of traitor:rs, even though
he did render inivaluaJble se:rwices to the commU'Ilist cause.
Slovak Nationalism

The greatest enemy of communism in Slovakia is nationa'1isrm - the real cause of the failures of communist
policy. Becau:se the foli:owers of the Hlinka 'Slo'V'ak People's
Party were identrified with Slovak nationaliism, they were
most violently attooked by the communists.
William Siroky recalled at the XI Congress of the Slovak CommU'Il.ist Prurty in Bratislava that the Communi,s t
Party "revealed the plague of tJhe anti~peop[e's populist
separatist traitocrs and the other nationa;lisbic groups."
Thus far Slovak nationalism could not be wiped out. Afrter
ten years Siroky had to admit that "national :wejudices
are very much allive especially among the Slovak intellectuals and officials; they are penetrating into other classes,
aTe influencing even cultural lifo, and that a constant,
stu!bborn ideofogiica1l war must be waged against them."
Bacilek also complained that Slovak nationalism is
not a sim,ple problem, saying: "While consolidating the
brotherhood of the Ozechs and the Slovaks, let us not even
for a moment storp waging a decisive battle against tJhe
populists, the ideolo,gical man.ifestation of one part of the
banikmpt Slovaik bourgeoisie."
Karel Brucilek is stumped by the Slovak bourgeoisie
and, therefore, oalils upon scientific workers to fight the
Slovak IJ.orpulists: "From the workers of the sociaJ sciences
we demand that they systematically and olbjectively uncover and help to oiveroome the manifestations of bourgeois
ideologies in the minds of the people, especiaUy the manifestations of bourgeois natiorrali:s m and its most de~
structive variety - populist s~paratism."
!Slovak natiO'Ilalism, however, is not a matter of some
smail[ group. Novotny understood that very well when he

�6

said: ". . .Almost everywhere up to now we rmeet with
dangerous mainifestations of bourgeois nationaliSlm, es,peciaUy with one of its forms, with populist separatism,
carrying wi·t h it reactionary darkness, which was designedly kept up in Slovakiia by the htgh Church hieraTchy."
Judging ,a ccordingly, then, we can say that Slova:k
nation:aliSlm is the "Enemy No.. l" of the communist regime. So for Novotny it is very clear that "the commun~
ists, the natfona1 committee, and the basi,c partisan organizations must constantly exiplain the harmfulness of nationalistic views and e:,QJJose them . . . "
·s1ovaJk naticma1ism is still quite strong. 'J.1he communists did not khl[ it and, according to their own admission,
the propaganda they used against Slo,vaik nationrulism did
not he1p much. This is made quite clear from Sirdky's
speech, in which he says: "our agitation and ,propaganda
are not suifficiently penetrating and convincing; we are
losing sight of the increasjng claims of our people. This
holds for the press, lectures, and also for many sections
of cultura,1 practice. . . In Slovrukia es:pe:cially, we must be
aware of tJhe fact that any weakening of the ideological
wor,k will oniy strengthen national prejudices."
This is quite a sj_gnifican,t adrmission from a man who
untitl recently held the first position in the Communist
Party of Slo.vakfa. To, keep his. head a:bo,ve water as long
as possible, Sirdky, even though he is not a S'1ovaik by ori~
gin and sentiment, knows tha;t he must be grateful to those
by whose grace he is •s till tolerated as a member of the
politburo. So he encourages comm!Ullist propaganda "to devote itself more sy,stematically and profoundly and more
concretely to the greaJt and actual ideoilogica[ problems of
the present per,iod - to concern itself witlh t:he questions
whkh preoccupy the minds O!f our people. We must see to
it that the feeling of collectiveness and mutua'lity of the
Czechs and Slovaks, of Cze&lt;:ho..Slovak patriotiSlm - just
like the feeling of lo,yalty and love towaTd the Soviet Union
- become the fundamental. lines orf the socialistic and pat.Piotic consciousness of our citizens."
Obviously, then, there is no so-·caNed "mutuality of
Slovaks and Czechs," there is no "Czecho-tSlovak patriot-

�SLOVAKIA

7

ism." These concepts existed only in the minds of poHtical
dreamers in t!he past and, as we see, even communist prisons and concentration camps could not create them. After
ten years of terror and violence, comrade Siroky, who rendered great services iin Slovakia for Ozech communists, is
leaving the leadership of the Slovak Communist Party beca use the desired union of the Slovaks with the Ozechs did
not materialize.
Many people dreamed a:bout a brotherhood of the
Czechs and Slova'ks. But this was nothing but an unsuccessful dream . The situation has not changed even today. Even
Bacile&lt;k would be happy if he couild change it. So, he turns
his attention to the communist writers, saying:
"Litemture and the arts o,we very much to the systematic conso[idation of the brotherhood o!f the Czechs and
Slova;ks. After ten years our literature has not produced a
romantic novel which would depict the fact that without
the aid qf the Czech working class there would be no penetrating successes in the soci'alisti&lt;: industria&gt;liza,tion of Slovakia. We do not have a book which would show the historical roots of the brotherhood of the Czechs and Slovaks."
If there is no such volume, then there are no, writers
who stand in the service of communism and the so-called
"Czecho-,Slo,v ak" union; there are no writern w'ho would be
wililing to serve communist propaganda and the policy of a
"Great Czec,hia." And this fact is as significam.t a reality as
is the strength of Slovak nationalism itself. Both comple~
ment and control each other mutually. Writers are the coo.science of a nation. In present-day Slovaki'a, if this conscience does .not subordinate itself to communist dictates,
then this is a matter of great significam.ce a,nd of an extraordinary hisitorical manifestati'on. In natinnal questions,
we know, a genuinely honest w_riter would not dare to misrepresent the thoughts of his own peo.ple.
The schools of Slova'kia are also• resisting commun•
ism very va1iantly; they .p refer to stand on the side of
the nation thian on the side of a foreign clique which
wants to demoralize the character of Slovak history. Bacilek obviously was fuily aware of the school situation, because in attacking SlO'Vak teachers he said:

�8

SLOVAKIA

"If we arnailyre the work of the ,s chools from the standpoint of contemporary needs, we must come to the conclusion tihat thus far they are not performing their basic
task satisfoctorily and are little concerned a;bout the quality af education and, at the saime time, abourt 'the creation
of c•o mmunistic conviction and momls in all the youth. . .
We must seek the reason therefore albove aiH else in the
low level of the teaching and training work of our
teruohers."
That's the kind of talk we hear long after the Communiist Party of Slovakia repl'aced qualified teachers with
its most loyal followera whether they qualified .as teaahers
or not. That such people had no idea what the teaching or
training level was is l.mderstand01ble; on this point we can
agree with Ba;cilek, because the commurust regime did not
care whether the persons employed as t eachers ,w ere qualified to tea:ch, hut was onJ.y concerned whether bhey were
party memlbern. However, the admission of the fact that
these Red teaichers were not sufficiently relialb1e for the
communists, that they are not creating communist convictions, rund are not strengthening communist vices in the
youth - all this is one af the most reiveal,i ng proofo of
the failures of communist policy in Slovakia. The communists hurried to .produce intellectuals loyal to tlhem by
a wholesale process. Even though some intellectuals ap-·
parently did join them, they did not lose their healthy
.Sl·OVaJk core and are now causing the leadership of the
Communist Party no end of trouble.
That is the wo11k and the influence of Sloviak nationalism. And SlovaJk natiornalism is more irufluential than
all communist terror and vioO.errce. The iruflueillCe af Slovak
nationali&lt;Slm rea:ches ,i nto the Communist Party itselrf. Ba-·
cilek admitted tihat from the time of the X Assembly
of the Slovak Coimmunist Party "the numiber of dead,
dropped and ex,pelled members and candidates £rom the
party wrus 12,940. The party rid itse'Lf of UillW:Orthy, hostiJ.e
elements, of violators of state and party mscirpline, or
peoiple who fai,l ed in their oibligations as members of the
party.''
Bacilek, however, did not dare publ,~Sh the number

�SLOVAKIA

9

of expelled members and, of course, not even the detail.s
sUTrounding the deaith of some of the memb,e rs. They
could ha,ve lbeen eliminated or liq.uida,ted secretly, wor.ked
to death in .tlhe Uranium mines, or beaten to death in jails
In every instance, however, Bacilek reports that a great
many members were expelled. We understand fiuNy well
that they were enemies of the communist go:vernment and
party.
Communists evidently do no,t know exactly where their
main enemies are am.d, hence, look for them everywhere.
Nationalism .has its sharply designated posts am.d is perfonniin!g its duty. ,Slovak nationalism is no exception.

The Resistance Movement
Sl-ovak nationaJlism is alive and ,a gg,ressi,ve. This was
recently demonstrated, when on June 13, 1955, the communist military trilbunaJl con!Victed 12 memlbers of a Slovak resistam.ce movement, dealing out high penalties, including a sentenice of death for a leading memlber of t;h.e
movement, Bernard Nemcek.
Reports from Prague about the communist verdict
tell us more than all the explanations of the situation in
Slovaikfa. And that because, surprisingly enough, the
br,oadcast of June 16, 1955, designated the movement by
its ,r,ight name: a resistance movement and a movement
to create an independent Slovak State.
The supreme desire of every rnation is to h'ave its own
state. The Slovaks a,re n:o exception. If Slovak nationalists
on native soH can bring the supreme sacri.lfice for this
idea, this is irre.futalble proof that the Slovruk naroion is
not am.d iw:illl not be satisfied with foreign domiination. In
Slovrukia and in tlhe ranks of SlovaJk mo,vements, the fight
against commun~sm is comprehended as determination .to
free itself once and for all time from the yoke of every
a1ien hegemony. That is why the fight of 1Sllovaik nationalists tends in two directions: against communi-sm and for
state independence.
Does a Slovak resistance movement actuafily exist?
In the light of the a;bove, a str,ong resista,nce movement dbviiously does exist in Slovakia. At times, the com-

�10

SLOVAKIA

munists may at:teinipt to minimize its efd'eetiiveness, but
we know that it must ,b e quite a movement, if the Reds
themselves see fit to discuss it during their congresses.
Basing OUT conviction on statements made and adions
taken by the communists themselves, there can be no
doubt that commun'ists really fear Slovak bomigeois :nationialism.
In my possession I have a letter from a well-informed Slovak in Western Gerunany who just recently
escaped from Slovakia. For nine long years he ob.served
how the Red regime worked in Slovai~ia. He took note of
the opinions and manifestations 'Of the population and was
active in western, central and eastern Slovakia. Thris person maide contacts with officials and wwkere, farmers
and priests, teachers and politiJCal prisoners. When I asked
him what the Slovaks thought a;bout state independence
for Slova!kia, he replied:
"I dare write that about 95 percent of the Slovaks
is for an independent state, a SlovaJk State wruiclh iwil[ be
Chri stian and democratic. The Slovaks are holding to the
determination to have their own state and there is no
power whrich wil!l force them to be satisfied with less, with
any other state form ."
Over 90 percent of the Slovruks who escaped from the
homeland during the past ten years have joined o;rganizations tJhat strun:d for an independent Slo-~a;k Repuiblic.
And this is clear testimony of the. political conviction of
the aJbso1ute maj'orirty of the Slovak naition, because it is
obvious that the thoughts of the exiles on fundamental
questions is identical with the thinking of the Slov•a k nation, witJh which just up to not long ago it was shaTing
its bitter fate.
It is not important to seek the answer to the questions of how many resi,s'tance movements tJhere are in Slovakia and how stroTIJg they might be. Certainly it would
not ibe p:mdent to discuss this question pulblicly. What
does count is the fact that they are causing the Red re-·
gime many emlbarassments and difficulties. June 13, 1955,
definitely tells us that resistance movements do exist in
Slovakfa. The rverdict of J·u ne 13, 1955, was not the first
1

�SLOVAKIA

11

one - and most likely not the last one, either - to be
rendered against Slovak patriots. Many conspiracies have
1b een uncoivered in SlovaJkia 1b y Prague since 1945, both by
the communii.st-dominateld Benes-Gottwald coalition government and also by the Red regime whioh took over
comrplete power in Ozedh-0-Slovak'ia in February 1948.
It is certain that under other circumstances the
strength of .t he resistance mo,v ements wouild be greater.
What do we mean by saying under other circumstances?
The concept orf "peacefu11 coexistence" with the communists is creating a very confused situation; this nonsense ,is, in fact, breaking the backbone of the nations
behind the I11on Curtain. Fundamentally, coexistence betmys weakness, and the West is terribly mistaken, if it
thms it can over:come tlhe danger of communism by following such a policy. In practical poHtics coexistence
means a viofation of the fronts m tlhe cold war, which already have in many instances shown signs of great weakness.
Res·.iJstance movements of an anti-communist chiarac•
ter should be gebting more moral aid from sources designated for this pul1)0se. Unfortunately, as far as Slovakia
is corrcemed in this ,p sychological struggle, wrong methods
have frequently been used; whether intentional~y, o,r because of la:C!k of iruformation, does not change the matter.
Thi,s was and is undoubtedly due to the influence of the
very people, who together with tihe communists for three
years (194'5-·1948) were trying to break doWtn. al1l anticommunist re:s•.i!stance of the Sfovak nation. The West defirately does not bolster or build the morale of the Slov,a k resistance movements by aiding and comforting, employing and letting itself be influenced by people who col.,
•J aborated with communists and Moscow and, hen:ce, are
in a large measure responsilble for the terrible situation
that prev:ails in Slovakia today; Slovak Judases, as the
Slwaks at home and in exile refer to them, should not
'be trusted by tlhe West.
Dr. Joseplh Lettrich and his followers - who suddenly ·b ecame "demo:cratic exiles firom Czech0-Slovakia" after
February 2-5, 1948, and are now members of the S&lt;&gt;-&lt;!alled

�12

SLOVAKIA

~'Council of Free Ozecho-&lt;Slovrukia" - should not be used
or employed in any capacity :b y such organizations as the
F!REE E}(JROPE COMIM!I'l'T'iIDE (iRadio F.ree Euroipe),
United States Information Agency (Voice of America),
and other offictla1 and semi--0fficial aigendes of the United
States Government, because they are totally discredited
and cursed by the Slovaks at home.
1Should
anyone wish to, be corredly informed about
how Slo,viakia thinks and feels a:bout its fate, what anticommuniist wor.keris are doing there, let him delve into
the verdict of June 13, 1955, against the tJweilve Slovak
heroes, and let him find time .t o study the attacks of communist propag,amda against ISlovruk nationalists, whose sole
aim ,i s to oause the downfall oif commumsm and to estrub-·
lish a Slovak independent state.
The Reds Fear the West

.C ommenting on the verdict rendered by the "people's"
court againist the tweilve Slovak anti-,c ommunists, the
Prague radio OIIl June 16, 1955, reminded its listeners that
fhis particular resistance orgrumzation receiyed its orders
from Slovak exiles in the West. The military prooorator
called the following Slovak patriots archtraitors : Du:rcansky, Cerna!k, Paiulco, Mikus, ·Mikula, and Hassik. 'Dhis
i,s not t!he forst time, and not the last, that Slovak patriots
in exile have 'been accused by Red Prague. In recent times
attacks of this kind are made almost daily.
On May 2, 1955, for example, the Prague Radio, referring to Slovak patriots in exile, said that "they already
have behind them ten furrl years of service in the interests
of foreigners, ten full years oif collaJboration with the most
rea:ctionary elemernts against the people . . . and the aim
of all exile origa.ni2Jations 1s war."
Thiat is how the Prague commtlillists comprehend
"pea'Ce:ful coexistence." While the West is leaning danger~
ously ibac!k waTd and even sacrificing tJhe interests of some
satellite nations behind the Iron Curtain fOT tJhe saxe of
peiace, the Retl sateJ..lite governments, in the meantime,
reg,ard freedom of expression, movement and political activiity in the states which have given asyilum to Central-

�SLOVAKIA

13

European escapees as "colllalboration with the most reac.
tionary elements."
The .Prague communists, for example, are terribly
worried that Slovaks in exile can speak freely every day
over the tranS1mitting facilities of Spain and Ita:J.y. That
these broadcasts are completely identical with the natural
and democratic demands of rull patriotic Slovaks in exile,
who speak for state independence for their own nation,
is only n:aturrul and,( therefore, quit'e u:nderstand!able.
Communist propaganda, of course, is doing everything
it can do to silence 1:Jhem, disarm them, and discredit them
with the worn-·oU:t eipithets of "fascists, separatists, nazis,
reactionaries," etc. It is signific·a nt, too, that Benes Czechs
and Slovak Judases use the same epithets and tactics as
the Reds. Where they cannot successfully refute a statement, they resort to denunciation, viHfication, and invective.
The Pr31gue bvoadicast, red:erred to above, vicioosly
attacked the Christian character of the prog,r am of the
Slovak exiles. "Well, as far as the activity of the Slovak
exiles abroad is concerned," said the Prague commentator,
"they have in comparison with the rest of the groups one
specialty. More than any other group they are concealing
their actual aims /by a,ppealing to ChriJstianity, Christian
morals, Ohristian charity, etc. Dr. Francis Hrusorvsky even
went as far as to designate tJhe Central-Eu:ropean Union,
that is, tlhe rearming of German miilitarists, as an expression of Christian charity. Not even the former editor-inchief of the newspaper S:L0VAK, Dr. Pauco, who edited
the SLOVAK during the time of the greatest nazi massacre in Slova!kia, will l now never fail to appeal to ChrisHan ethics. And the Sloviak fascists from Madrid, on the
other hand, shall always recall that they are not aslhamed
of Tiso's Legacy."
On June 9, 1955, filie Bratislava broadcast quoted the
angry article of the PiRAVDA against the Slov;aJk People's
Party, distorting its historical role. On that occasion the
PRAY.DA - ac0ording to the radio commentator - wrote
aJbout "the dirty role of the populi,s t emigrants, who are
allying themselves not only with the aggressive groups in

�14

SLOVAKIA

the United States, but aJso with the avengers in western
Germ.any."
The radio broadcast f.rom Prague on June 11 and that
from Bratislava on June 12, 1955, sollillded off against
"the provoc,ative Madrid and Rome tran1simitters," and
against the "Paucos, Cerna.ks, and :Dur:canskys," who are
constantly warning escapees not to return home.
The Brague 'broadcast of May 9, 1955, was :f.ull of insults and epithets aJbout the "madness of the rulers of the
imperi,a listic world and their humble ser,vrunts, the traitors of our nations," that is, the exiles.
It is symboli'c of communist audacity that the Reds
are using such propaganda at a time wlhen in Moscow they
began a new o£fensive so that they might again meet and
confer with "imperialistic rulers," and so whet tlheir ruppetite for "capitalistic" trade. Of course, the communists
say one thing at home, something else at the conference
ta!ble, and still something difrferent to exri1les. Whosoever
,p erforce walilts to be deaf will believe only one or the
other side of their story and will not compare the communist propaganda of an shades and tendencies. We have
always been of tlhe conviction that to come to an agreement with communism is the greatest trM1.Sg,ressicm
against the pri,n ciples of humanity, the basest violation of
the rights to freedom, and a grave insttlt to Christian
sentiment. Communism is most often irritated by the constant repetition and practical realization olf Christian-democratic principles. That is why they cry out loudly
against a poHticail prog,ram to which the v;ast majority of
Slovaks in the West look for thei&lt;r sup,po&lt;rt.
ChrJstianity and the !help of the West, whrreh Slovaks
enjoy, throw the communists off balance. They say all
Slovak exiil es "have one boss,." as reported by the Prague
broadcast of May 2, 195'5, aJUd "all are paid from one
treasury, the trea:sury of American militarilsm. The socalJ.ed Slovak N aitiona1 Coundl .Aibroad, the Sloviak League
of America, and the Canadian SloviaJk League - as the
separati'st organi~ations of iSlova.k :fascists - serve American military interests."
To show their hatred the communist madmen ini1

�SLOVAKIA

15

tialed the names of tihe organizaitJions they attadked witJh
small letters wlhen tlhey pwbH,sihed the commentary in the
periodical L'UD ('People). This is qurite si,gnifica,nit. As if
thereby they could alter the facts. They a.Jltered and will
alter nothing; and their anger only attests to a serious
nervours condition. Iif eve-ryithing were in order in SlOIV'akia and the communists were in complete command of the
situation, they would not have to concern themselves with
the Slov;ak situation so excitedly on the inlternati:onal
field. However, when one once succumbs to fear and has
lost his conscience and has two gall bladders instead of
one heart, there hardly is any helrp for him. The commnnist dic-tators in S1ovakia have a very small sowl. The poon~
tom of American caipitalism and tihe activity of free Slovak or:ganization:s and individuals will not let t'hem sleep.
Perhaps this is best refle&lt;&gt;Jro in the words of Karel
Bacilek, who said at the XI Oommunist Congress at Bratislava: ". . . Imperialist aggressors, led by the ruling
circles of the USA and with tihe aid of treacherous esca-.
pees, are attemipting to srcore and deceive the working people, divert it from the path of social construction. Hostile
propaganda can at times penetr"ate and bear in:filuence in
various ways even oin memlbers olf the ;party."
In other words, what is being done in the, West in the
interest of the liberation of 1:lhe Slovak natit&gt;n does have
a great influence on the Slo.vaks at home. But obviously
this influence also affects the communists. They are afraid
of every step that is taken in the defense of the ,rigihts of
the Slovak nation.
The COilllmunists in Prague and in Slovalkia fear nothing more than the concept of Slovak statehood. Tha;t is
why, for example, William Siroky practicaUy writhed in
cramps when he revealed at the Congress. in Bratislava
that Americans "iha&lt;ve exhumed the compromised and bankrupt slogan of the so-.called S1'()1V'ak Sta:te."
The fact , however, is that the concept of the Slovak
State is not bankrupt and is not dead. It is a thing very
much aJiNe, otheriwiise Sirdky amd other communists would
-hardly concern themselves with it. The Slo,vaks are encouraged by it, while the communists are haruntetl by it.

�16

SLOV.AKIA

The princilples of freedom are so strong that no one can
compromise them. Only dictators, and among them foremost are the communists, have attempted to compromise
the governmental form. But they shaH never convince the
Slovaks that an aJli.en and tyrannical government is better
for them than a government of their own choice.
Against the Kersten Committee

The Kersten Committee evaluated the Slova:k question
justly and correctly and published its findings how Slovakia was taken over by tJhe Reds so that America and the
rest of the free world might learn the truth a:bout the
struggles and demands of the Sl10V1a!k nation. For that the
communist propaganda of Prague and Bratislava fired a
barrage of smear and vilification at the Committee.
The BratislaN radio sharply attaoked Charles Kersten
and the Slovak witnesses on February 7, 1955. The former
congressman from MHwaukee, Wis., •w as called the "counsellor of the escapees," while the Slovak witnesses who
testifiied oof1ore tJhe Committee were designated as "traitors of the Slovak nation."
The 'b roadcast ,a ttacked Dr. Joseph Mikula, ,b ecause he
was supposed to have stated that '~he and his companions
now did not have the legal possilbility to poison the soul
of the 1Sl1ovax nation." Dr. Pauco, the commentator barked,
"rel,aJtekl fables before the Committee about an alleged
suppression of the freedom of the press in Czecho-Slovakia." Dr. Mikus was reviled because he defended the principles of private ownership. Matthew Cemalk, Slovak pa~
triot and leader of the S'lov,a k exiles in Germany, did not
escape the wrath of the Reds either. 'I1he communist propagandist stated that •a ll the Slova.lk witnesses before the
Committee wanted to start a war. In this instance, he said,
'in full nakedness wa:s demonstrated the wretchedness of
the methods, which are used by the American reaction to
slander the countries of tJhe peace camp. At the same time,
however, it aJlso shows the depth of filth and muck -into
which the traitors of the Slovak nation shall end up in."
On May 2, 1955, the Prague radio again attacked
Charles Kersten, declaring that "on the basis of h'is law

�SLOVAKIA

17

about financing suib versi,v e ructivities in the countries promoting peace, he is distributing dollars generously among
federalists, separatists, unionists, and all kinds oif other organizations" fo,r rendering "servile service to aggressive
plans to start a new war."
On Miay 5, 1955, t!he PRAVDA of Bratislav,a ,p ublished
a lengthy article in regard to the actiivi-ties of the Ke:rsten
Committee and tihe testimony of Slov,ak witnesses. Among
otiher things in that article, we read:
"On December 31, 1954, there was published in the
United States a so..,caJl:led official document of the American Congress, which !insults the nations of OUT country in
a very c:m de and inept manner. In this gossiipy 'document', which was prepared by the special Keristen Committee, Ozecho.JSlorvak history is written up in a genuinely
fascist spirit, the glorious Slovak national uiprising is descri'b ed as 'an impro,vised rebellion of subversive elements',
and the liherati:on. of our country by the heroic Soviet,
army is depicted with the bitter sorrow over the defeat
of Hitler's occupat ion troops and thei:r native assistants ...
The Kersten Committee preparnd this 'document' on the
basis of the so--c alled 12 Slovak testimonies, which it collected from Slovak fascist outcasts. . .
"About Kersten it i'S generally known that he has
intimate, friendly contacts with fascists and cOIHalborators,
who fled the country after Wo:rld War II to escape punishment and found asylum in the United States. Therefore, it
surprised no one when the Kersten Committee on its hunt
for gossipy 'testimonies' sought out only genuiine fascists
in London, P,aris, Madrid, Rome, Munich and other Cen~
tral-European ciities. With witnesses like Cemak, Pauco,
Mikus, Mikula, Nahalka, and theiir hke, it naturally could
not be proud of in ,pU!bfic. So it met, with them in absolute
secrecy, behind closed doors.
"The g:reatest degree of deipra,vity a:nd lacik of character
was successfolly attained by Charles Kersten and his
twelve fascist 'witnesses', who in their hellpless hatred
against the Slavruk people incite, slander and cry for another war against o.ur country.
"Among the paid perjurers of the American Govern-

�18

SLOVAKIA

ment of th~ tyipe of Harvey Matusow, Paul Crouch, Elizaibeth Bentley, and_Charle~ Ke:risten, on the one hand, and
Oernak, :Dur.canslky, Pauico, Kirschbaum, Mikus and company, on the other, there is no difference. American and
Slov,aJk fascis'ts alike 'betmy their own people. Of course,
there may be this difference: the former do tfuis for dollar.s while the fascist renegades of Cerna.k's type do it for
anything _of value.
"The so...called document of the American Government,
prepared on the basis of the gossip of 12 Slovak fascists
clearly proves how deep the traitorous escrupees have sunk
in their hatred against our people. And simultaneously this
lying document is further ,p roof that American r,u ling cir-·
cles willingly sl,a nder countries whlicih have rid themselves
of crupitalistic e,oploite:m, the creatures that betrayed their
nati·o n to Hitler." .
We find the very same insults and abusive names also
jn the official note of the Prague Coo:nmuni,s t government
of April 19, which is addressed to the Governmenlt of the
United States. The separate report of the Kersten Committee is designated as.. "bra:zen" and "is equal to t:he wildest product of Goeibbels' fascist proipagandisti'c mach'i nery .
It is nothing else but the pasting tog~her of lies and gossip,
which are supposed to deepen hatred against Czecho-,Slovrukfa, to encourage war hysteria, to incite and campaign
against coounl\.Ulism and to ,p repare a preventive war
against peace-J.oving countries."
The Prague government is also angry because the
Kersten report is opposed to coexi,s tence with communism
and warns the Whole world of the threats of communist
dictators. The Prrugue note attacked Dr. Joseph Mikus
and Matthew Cern.aJk, two act~ve Slov-a:k exiles, pointing out
especi,a lly that they sewed in the dtplomatic cOI1ps of the
Sl~va:k Republic.
As far as the reproaches of the Prague government
and its propaganda against American and Slovak factors
is concerned, it must be stated unequivocally tlhat not in
-a single testimony wrus there any talk aibout the need of
unleashing a war. In the testimonies we do find, however,
mention in seveTal places of the need of good and effective
1

�SLOVAKIA

19

work in the puiblishing and broadcasting fields against communism, of the need of preparations for the spiritual renovation of the world whioh is slowly being crushed by
the satanic forces of ciom.munism. All Slovak witnesses
strongly condemne!d the crimes and the evil perpetrated
against the SlovaJk nation by communism; and tfu.ey told
how communism enslaves the Slovaks spiriturulJy and exploits them economicailly and suppresses every manifestation of the Slova;k people for freedom and state independence.
Tlhe wor'k of the Kersten Committee has become a
thorn in the eyes of communist aggressive politics and pro._,
pagainda. The Czech communi,s ts h'a d hoped that the West
wouM continue to beHeve blindly their old lies a.nd falbles
against the Sloviak nation; tihey did everything possilble to
discredit Slovaks in exile in the eyes of tfu.e West and so
make life as m[seraJble as possible for them. Flaiiing in
this, it was only natUII'al for the Reds of Prague and Bratislaiva to unleash the wildest war in the press and over the
radio ag,ainst Slovaks in exile and against every one who
sympathized with them.
But it does not matter whom they single out for
abuse and vilification; important it is, however, that com~
munists are afraid of the solidly organized anti-commun:..
ist Slovak camp and their friends. And they are frightfully
afraid of the thought that the whole principle of the right
of self-determination must once be accorded the Slovak
nation, without the reaJlization of which the conterruporary
struggle to bring order and political balance in Central
Europe has no su'b stantiation.
While communism must reso;rt to a;buse and invective
in its fits of anger, the Slova~s in exile are presenting
facts, they are building on them and witlh them are defending the righteousness of their demands. Of course,
it is not true that the Kersten Committeee used to meet
secretly with ,Slovaik witnesses. All the hearings were ,public. They were attended by reporters and the puiblic. The
press reported on the hearings, so did the radio and the
television. Expert stenographers recorded everything that
was said by every Slorvak witness and this was then pub1

�.20

SLOVAKIA

lished iby t:he American Governmen t. The reports record
.the minds of those people, w:ho foom the beginning of their
pulblic activity adaimanfily opposed communism .
The SlovaJks in exile do- not deny that they are antL
,c ommuni,s,t. It is a historical fac:t that the Slovak nation as
:a w,hole condemned t:he tea•ching.s of Marx and Engels materialistic phHos0rphy soon after it was made pulb1ic and
.has fouight it consistentl y and persistently throughout the
years. The S1ova'ks in exile, then, do not even request secret sessions. Oommunist s, however, commit the foulest
crimes where there are no witnesses. But they •c annot deny
them, ,b ecause even the dead testify against murderers.
And communism will one day ,be on the be,n ch of the acc used.
It seems ,t he cards have faHen from the hands of the
communist rulers in ,Slova;kia, !because they sysit:ematica lJy
return to, the activity of the native "reaction" and the
Slovaiks in exile. This is nothing else but an attempt to
ma,sk all the crimes and grave injusti ces which they have
committed and are stil,l commiltinig against the SlovaJk nation. Communis ts cannot conceal or deny the evil they have
done. The entire nation is testifying against them. To
.waint to deny something and to- concea•l one's own crimes
,b y hurling poi sonous insu1,ts at others is, indeed, a much
more difficult and hopeless. task than pouring water inrto
the ocean.
We are profoundly touched by the heavy losses of
life, cultural, moral and economic values, which the .Slovak nation has suffered from the Red Moloch. The murder
of Matthew Cernak in Munich, Ju1y 5, 1955, by a bomb
s ent through the mail is still fresh in our minds. However, we see that tJhe communist s are writhing like wounded
sna!kes, hissing with anger and hate. And that is a good
sign. It is the beginning of the end. Thus far no communist ruler has remained long in po,w er; and those forced on
the Slovaks will be no exception. They are. he:Jipless and
have no defense for the failures of their policies and, hence,
must find scaipegoats : so they thunder againsit the native
"populist reaction" at home, the "traitorous exile," and
"imperialis tic American capitalism."
1

1

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                  <text>1955, Vol. 5</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
3&#13;
&#13;
THE FAILURES OF COMMUNIST POUTICS&#13;
IN SLOVAKIA&#13;
Dr. Joseph Pauco&#13;
In recent months many evident proofs of the failures&#13;
of the Communist Party .in Slovaikia have been supplied&#13;
by the communists themselves. Their policies flailed not only&#13;
in tlhe political dom aii:n, but also in the eoonomfoa!l and especiailly the agricultural fields. What is the situation in SlovaJkia today aicco:rding to the admissions of the communists&#13;
themselves?&#13;
Centralization&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
On the one hand, it is 'k nown that the communists in&#13;
Slovak!ia did SUipport the recognition of the national indiviiduality of the :S lovak naJtion, yet, on the other hand, it is&#13;
true thaJt in Slovakia power is no longer in the hands of&#13;
communists who respect tlhis principle and oppose the imperialIBtic influences of Ozech communism.&#13;
F'0trmally, the 1name o:f the CommUIIl1ist Party of Slovakia has been retained, but not a single commuru.srt: factor will&#13;
say thaJt it is ,representati.ve of Slovak communist forces, or&#13;
any kind of autonomoUJS organization of Slovak communists.&#13;
The first secretary of the Communist Parity of Slovald1a, the&#13;
Czech communJ.st ~arel Badlek, proc,laimed on April 22,&#13;
19'55, at the XI Congre ss of the Communist Party of Slo-vakia:&#13;
"The Communist Party of Slovakia is a region.a:! organization of the one Communist Party of Czecho-lSlovaJkia;&#13;
it is its fighting diivision."&#13;
The :flirst sec·r etary of the Communist Party of CzechoSlovakiia, the Czeclh .Amt onin Novotny, addressing that Con~&#13;
gress said thrut "the Communist Party of Slwaikia is an indivi:silble 1part and unit of the Communist Party of CzechoSloW!Jki,a."&#13;
Tit is clear, then, beyond all shadow of doubt, that two&#13;
of the pre-eminent leaJders of the present communist regime&#13;
in PTague and Bratislava no longer consider it n.ecessary&#13;
for the Slwak commundsts to appear independently. This is&#13;
apparent not oinly in the o,r ganization by the fact th•a t the&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
4&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Slovak Communist Party is suboirdinated to the Ozech Communist Party as its "division," but also in the .poili'tical field&#13;
as well, where the Czechs rule surpreme. ln the so-oalled&#13;
"Czeoho-Slovruk" Communist Barty, there were only Ozechs.&#13;
As an aip.pendage of the Czech Oommunist Party, the Slovak Communist Party is .powerless to ,i nitiate or realize anything; everything is done through the Czecho--Slovak (really CZECH) Communist Party. Bacilek attested to this fact&#13;
openly, when he said:&#13;
"Important and fundamental •p olitical questions concerning Slovakia were presented for resolution to the Central Committee od' the Communist Party of Czecho-iSlovakia, and we go,v erned ourselves iby those decisions."&#13;
For Slovakiia iit pr~baJbly is fortunate tJhat Prrugue is&#13;
today responsilble for all politics. On the other band, however, it is quite significant for the Soviets, who loudly demand the a,ssurance of aU national freedoms. In the Slo·vak case it is one orf the cleaTest 1proofs thaJt SOV'iet slo.gans&#13;
about independence a~e only a s:ham and delus,ion. Under&#13;
the communist reg,ime the Slovaks lost aitl remnants of autonomous government. IDven though the Communist Party&#13;
·of Slovakia exists fonmally, its first secretary is not a Slovruk, but a Czech - ~arel Bacilek - and that means, for&#13;
all practi'crul purposes, that SlnvaJkia is again a Ozech colony.&#13;
'Dhis situation conceals within itself many known&#13;
thinigs. While the Ozech comrmmists could rely on Husa'k,&#13;
Novomesiky, Okaly, and Clementis, they readily e~loited&#13;
their services. But just as soon as these Slovak communists, who possessed a certruin am'ount of national pride, began to make more and more demands, they were marked&#13;
for liquidiaJtion. And Ozech communists did liquidate them .&#13;
"Bourgeois nationalists," said Bacilek, "led by Husak,&#13;
in agreement with the Slovak reaction, oppo-s ed the validation of a uniform poHcy and a urniform agricultural program for the entire Czecho-iSlovalk Reipublic. And since this&#13;
un~formity wa;s a prerequisite of the politic•al, and mainly&#13;
the agriculturnJl, equality of the rig1hts of the Slovak nation, tihen, fa:ct:ually, they s1a:botaged this equa:lity orf rights."&#13;
Hlusak's ,g roup was no more considerate toward the&#13;
anti-communist Slova:k camp than was Bacilek. The oillly&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
5&#13;
&#13;
dif;ference between them was that Husak was a Slovak and&#13;
Bacilek a Ozec'h. Because Husak, a Slovak communist, had&#13;
dared to oppose the concept that his party was s.imrply "a&#13;
fighting division oif the Communist Party of Ozecho-,Slovakia," that is, subservient to tlhe CZECH CommU'Ilist Party - hiis name was added to the last of traitor:rs, even though&#13;
he did render inivaluaJble se:rwices to the commU'Ilist cause.&#13;
Slovak Nationalism&#13;
&#13;
The greatest enemy of communism in Slovakia is nationa'1isrm - the real cause of the failures of communist&#13;
policy. Becau:se the foli:owers of the Hlinka 'Slo'V'ak People's&#13;
Party were identrified with Slovak nationaliism, they were&#13;
most violently attooked by the communists.&#13;
William Siroky recalled at the XI Congress of the Slovak CommU'Il.ist Prurty in Bratislava that the Communi,s t&#13;
Party "revealed the plague of tJhe anti~peop[e's populist&#13;
separatist traitocrs and the other nationa;lisbic groups."&#13;
Thus far Slovak nationalism could not be wiped out. Afrter&#13;
ten years Siroky had to admit that "national :wejudices&#13;
are very much allive especially among the Slovak intellectuals and officials; they are penetrating into other classes,&#13;
aTe influencing even cultural lifo, and that a constant,&#13;
stu!bborn ideofogiica1l war must be waged against them."&#13;
Bacilek also complained that Slovak nationalism is&#13;
not a sim,ple problem, saying: "While consolidating the&#13;
brotherhood of the Ozechs and the Slovaks, let us not even&#13;
for a moment storp waging a decisive battle against tJhe&#13;
populists, the ideolo,gical man.ifestation of one part of the&#13;
banikmpt Slovaik bourgeoisie."&#13;
Karel Brucilek is stumped by the Slovak bourgeoisie&#13;
and, therefore, oalils upon scientific workers to fight the&#13;
Slovak IJ.orpulists: "From the workers of the sociaJ sciences&#13;
we demand that they systematically and olbjectively uncover and help to oiveroome the manifestations of bourgeois&#13;
ideologies in the minds of the people, especiaUy the manifestations of bourgeois natiorrali:s m and its most de~&#13;
structive variety - populist s~paratism."&#13;
!Slovak natiO'Ilalism, however, is not a matter of some&#13;
smail[ group. Novotny understood that very well when he&#13;
&#13;
6&#13;
&#13;
said: ". . .Almost everywhere up to now we rmeet with&#13;
dangerous mainifestations of bourgeois nationaliSlm, es,peciaUy with one of its forms, with populist separatism,&#13;
carrying wi·t h it reactionary darkness, which was designedly kept up in Slovakiia by the htgh Church hieraTchy."&#13;
Judging ,a ccordingly, then, we can say that Slova:k&#13;
nation:aliSlm is the "Enemy No.. l" of the communist regime. So for Novotny it is very clear that "the commun~&#13;
ists, the natfona1 committee, and the basi,c partisan organizations must constantly exiplain the harmfulness of nationalistic views and e:,QJJose them . . . "&#13;
·s1ovaJk naticma1ism is still quite strong. 'J.1he communists did not khl[ it and, according to their own admission,&#13;
the propaganda they used against Slo,vaik nationrulism did&#13;
not he1p much. This is made quite clear from Sirdky's&#13;
speech, in which he says: "our agitation and ,propaganda&#13;
are not suifficiently penetrating and convincing; we are&#13;
losing sight of the increasjng claims of our people. This&#13;
holds for the press, lectures, and also for many sections&#13;
of cultura,1 practice. . . In Slovrukia es:pe:cially, we must be&#13;
aware of tJhe fact that any weakening of the ideological&#13;
wor,k will oniy strengthen national prejudices."&#13;
This is quite a sj_gnifican,t adrmission from a man who&#13;
untitl recently held the first position in the Communist&#13;
Party of Slo.vakfa. To, keep his. head a:bo,ve water as long&#13;
as possible, Sirdky, even though he is not a S'1ovaik by ori~&#13;
gin and sentiment, knows tha;t he must be grateful to those&#13;
by whose grace he is •s till tolerated as a member of the&#13;
politburo. So he encourages comm!Ullist propaganda "to devote itself more sy,stematically and profoundly and more&#13;
concretely to the greaJt and actual ideoilogica[ problems of&#13;
the present per,iod - to concern itself witlh t:he questions&#13;
whkh preoccupy the minds O!f our people. We must see to&#13;
it that the feeling of collectiveness and mutua'lity of the&#13;
Czechs and Slovaks, of Cze&lt;:ho..Slovak patriotiSlm - just&#13;
like the feeling of lo,yalty and love towaTd the Soviet Union&#13;
- become the fundamental. lines orf the socialistic and pat.Piotic consciousness of our citizens."&#13;
Obviously, then, there is no so-·caNed "mutuality of&#13;
Slovaks and Czechs," there is no "Czecho-tSlovak patriot-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
7&#13;
&#13;
ism." These concepts existed only in the minds of poHtical&#13;
dreamers in t!he past and, as we see, even communist prisons and concentration camps could not create them. After&#13;
ten years of terror and violence, comrade Siroky, who rendered great services iin Slovakia for Ozech communists, is&#13;
leaving the leadership of the Slovak Communist Party beca use the desired union of the Slovaks with the Ozechs did&#13;
not materialize.&#13;
Many people dreamed a:bout a brotherhood of the&#13;
Czechs and Slova'ks. But this was nothing but an unsuccessful dream . The situation has not changed even today. Even&#13;
Bacile&lt;k would be happy if he couild change it. So, he turns&#13;
his attention to the communist writers, saying:&#13;
"Litemture and the arts o,we very much to the systematic conso[idation of the brotherhood o!f the Czechs and&#13;
Slova;ks. After ten years our literature has not produced a&#13;
romantic novel which would depict the fact that without&#13;
the aid qf the Czech working class there would be no penetrating successes in the soci'alisti&lt;: industria&gt;liza,tion of Slovakia. We do not have a book which would show the historical roots of the brotherhood of the Czechs and Slovaks."&#13;
If there is no such volume, then there are no, writers&#13;
who stand in the service of communism and the so-called&#13;
"Czecho-,Slo,v ak" union; there are no writern w'ho would be&#13;
wililing to serve communist propaganda and the policy of a&#13;
"Great Czec,hia." And this fact is as significam.t a reality as&#13;
is the strength of Slovak nationalism itself. Both comple~&#13;
ment and control each other mutually. Writers are the coo.science of a nation. In present-day Slovaki'a, if this conscience does .not subordinate itself to communist dictates,&#13;
then this is a matter of great significam.ce a,nd of an extraordinary hisitorical manifestati'on. In natinnal questions,&#13;
we know, a genuinely honest w_riter would not dare to misrepresent the thoughts of his own peo.ple.&#13;
The schools of Slova'kia are also• resisting commun•&#13;
ism very va1iantly; they .p refer to stand on the side of&#13;
the nation thian on the side of a foreign clique which&#13;
wants to demoralize the character of Slovak history. Bacilek obviously was fuily aware of the school situation, because in attacking SlO'Vak teachers he said:&#13;
&#13;
8&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
"If we arnailyre the work of the ,s chools from the standpoint of contemporary needs, we must come to the conclusion tihat thus far they are not performing their basic&#13;
task satisfoctorily and are little concerned a;bout the quality af education and, at the saime time, abourt 'the creation&#13;
of c•o mmunistic conviction and momls in all the youth. . .&#13;
We must seek the reason therefore albove aiH else in the&#13;
low level of the teaching and training work of our&#13;
teruohers."&#13;
That's the kind of talk we hear long after the Communiist Party of Slovakia repl'aced qualified teachers with&#13;
its most loyal followera whether they qualified .as teaahers&#13;
or not. That such people had no idea what the teaching or&#13;
training level was is l.mderstand01ble; on this point we can&#13;
agree with Ba;cilek, because the commurust regime did not&#13;
care whether the persons employed as t eachers ,w ere qualified to tea:ch, hut was onJ.y concerned whether bhey were&#13;
party memlbern. However, the admission of the fact that&#13;
these Red teaichers were not sufficiently relialb1e for the&#13;
communists, that they are not creating communist convictions, rund are not strengthening communist vices in the&#13;
youth - all this is one af the most reiveal,i ng proofo of&#13;
the failures of communist policy in Slovakia. The communists hurried to .produce intellectuals loyal to tlhem by&#13;
a wholesale process. Even though some intellectuals ap-·&#13;
parently did join them, they did not lose their healthy&#13;
.Sl·OVaJk core and are now causing the leadership of the&#13;
Communist Party no end of trouble.&#13;
That is the wo11k and the influence of Sloviak nationalism. And SlovaJk natiornalism is more irufluential than&#13;
all communist terror and vioO.errce. The iruflueillCe af Slovak&#13;
nationali&lt;Slm rea:ches ,i nto the Communist Party itselrf. Ba-·&#13;
cilek admitted tihat from the time of the X Assembly&#13;
of the Slovak Coimmunist Party "the numiber of dead,&#13;
dropped and ex,pelled members and candidates £rom the&#13;
party wrus 12,940. The party rid itse'Lf of UillW:Orthy, hostiJ.e&#13;
elements, of violators of state and party mscirpline, or&#13;
peoiple who fai,l ed in their oibligations as members of the&#13;
party.''&#13;
Bacilek, however, did not dare publ,~Sh the number&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
9&#13;
&#13;
of expelled members and, of course, not even the detail.s&#13;
sUTrounding the deaith of some of the memb,e rs. They&#13;
could ha,ve lbeen eliminated or liq.uida,ted secretly, wor.ked&#13;
to death in .tlhe Uranium mines, or beaten to death in jails&#13;
In every instance, however, Bacilek reports that a great&#13;
many members were expelled. We understand fiuNy well&#13;
that they were enemies of the communist go:vernment and&#13;
party.&#13;
Communists evidently do no,t know exactly where their&#13;
main enemies are am.d, hence, look for them everywhere.&#13;
Nationalism .has its sharply designated posts am.d is perfonniin!g its duty. ,Slovak nationalism is no exception.&#13;
&#13;
The Resistance Movement&#13;
Sl-ovak nationaJlism is alive and ,a gg,ressi,ve. This was&#13;
recently demonstrated, when on June 13, 1955, the communist military trilbunaJl con!Victed 12 memlbers of a Slovak resistam.ce movement, dealing out high penalties, including a sentenice of death for a leading memlber of t;h.e&#13;
movement, Bernard Nemcek.&#13;
Reports from Prague about the communist verdict&#13;
tell us more than all the explanations of the situation in&#13;
Slovaikfa. And that because, surprisingly enough, the&#13;
br,oadcast of June 16, 1955, designated the movement by&#13;
its ,r,ight name: a resistance movement and a movement&#13;
to create an independent Slovak State.&#13;
The supreme desire of every rnation is to h'ave its own&#13;
state. The Slovaks a,re n:o exception. If Slovak nationalists&#13;
on native soH can bring the supreme sacri.lfice for this&#13;
idea, this is irre.futalble proof that the Slovruk naroion is&#13;
not am.d iw:illl not be satisfied with foreign domiination. In&#13;
Slovrukia and in tlhe ranks of SlovaJk mo,vements, the fight&#13;
against commun~sm is comprehended as determination .to&#13;
free itself once and for all time from the yoke of every&#13;
a1ien hegemony. That is why the fight of 1Sllovaik nationalists tends in two directions: against communi-sm and for&#13;
state independence.&#13;
Does a Slovak resistance movement actuafily exist?&#13;
In the light of the a;bove, a str,ong resista,nce movement dbviiously does exist in Slovakia. At times, the com-&#13;
&#13;
10&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
munists may at:teinipt to minimize its efd'eetiiveness, but&#13;
we know that it must ,b e quite a movement, if the Reds&#13;
themselves see fit to discuss it during their congresses.&#13;
Basing OUT conviction on statements made and adions&#13;
taken by the communists themselves, there can be no&#13;
doubt that commun'ists really fear Slovak bomigeois :nationialism.&#13;
In my possession I have a letter from a well-informed Slovak in Western Gerunany who just recently&#13;
escaped from Slovakia. For nine long years he ob.served&#13;
how the Red regime worked in Slovai~ia. He took note of&#13;
the opinions and manifestations 'Of the population and was&#13;
active in western, central and eastern Slovakia. Thris person maide contacts with officials and wwkere, farmers&#13;
and priests, teachers and politiJCal prisoners. When I asked&#13;
him what the Slovaks thought a;bout state independence&#13;
for Slova!kia, he replied:&#13;
"I dare write that about 95 percent of the Slovaks&#13;
is for an independent state, a SlovaJk State wruiclh iwil[ be&#13;
Chri stian and democratic. The Slovaks are holding to the&#13;
determination to have their own state and there is no&#13;
power whrich wil!l force them to be satisfied with less, with&#13;
any other state form ."&#13;
Over 90 percent of the Slovruks who escaped from the&#13;
homeland during the past ten years have joined o;rganizations tJhat strun:d for an independent Slo-~a;k Repuiblic.&#13;
And this is clear testimony of the. political conviction of&#13;
the aJbso1ute maj'orirty of the Slovak naition, because it is&#13;
obvious that the thoughts of the exiles on fundamental&#13;
questions is identical with the thinking of the Slov•a k nation, witJh which just up to not long ago it was shaTing&#13;
its bitter fate.&#13;
It is not important to seek the answer to the questions of how many resi,s'tance movements tJhere are in Slovakia and how stroTIJg they might be. Certainly it would&#13;
not ibe p:mdent to discuss this question pulblicly. What&#13;
does count is the fact that they are causing the Red re-·&#13;
gime many emlbarassments and difficulties. June 13, 1955,&#13;
definitely tells us that resistance movements do exist in&#13;
Slovakfa. The rverdict of J·u ne 13, 1955, was not the first&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
11&#13;
&#13;
one - and most likely not the last one, either - to be&#13;
rendered against Slovak patriots. Many conspiracies have&#13;
1b een uncoivered in SlovaJkia 1b y Prague since 1945, both by&#13;
the communii.st-dominateld Benes-Gottwald coalition government and also by the Red regime whioh took over&#13;
comrplete power in Ozedh-0-Slovak'ia in February 1948.&#13;
It is certain that under other circumstances the&#13;
strength of .t he resistance mo,v ements wouild be greater.&#13;
What do we mean by saying under other circumstances?&#13;
The concept orf "peacefu11 coexistence" with the communists is creating a very confused situation; this nonsense ,is, in fact, breaking the backbone of the nations&#13;
behind the I11on Curtain. Fundamentally, coexistence betmys weakness, and the West is terribly mistaken, if it&#13;
thms it can over:come tlhe danger of communism by following such a policy. In practical poHtics coexistence&#13;
means a viofation of the fronts m tlhe cold war, which already have in many instances shown signs of great weakness.&#13;
Res·.iJstance movements of an anti-communist chiarac•&#13;
ter should be gebting more moral aid from sources designated for this pul1)0se. Unfortunately, as far as Slovakia&#13;
is corrcemed in this ,p sychological struggle, wrong methods&#13;
have frequently been used; whether intentional~y, o,r because of la:C!k of iruformation, does not change the matter.&#13;
Thi,s was and is undoubtedly due to the influence of the&#13;
very people, who together with tihe communists for three&#13;
years (194'5-·1948) were trying to break doWtn. al1l anticommunist re:s•.i!stance of the Sfovak nation. The West defirately does not bolster or build the morale of the Slov,a k resistance movements by aiding and comforting, employing and letting itself be influenced by people who col.,&#13;
•J aborated with communists and Moscow and, hen:ce, are&#13;
in a large measure responsilble for the terrible situation&#13;
that prev:ails in Slovakia today; Slovak Judases, as the&#13;
Slwaks at home and in exile refer to them, should not&#13;
'be trusted by tlhe West.&#13;
Dr. Joseplh Lettrich and his followers - who suddenly ·b ecame "demo:cratic exiles firom Czech0-Slovakia" after&#13;
February 2-5, 1948, and are now members of the S&lt;&gt;-&lt;!alled&#13;
&#13;
12&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
~'Council of Free Ozecho-&lt;Slovrukia" - should not be used&#13;
or employed in any capacity :b y such organizations as the&#13;
F!REE E}(JROPE COMIM!I'l'T'iIDE (iRadio F.ree Euroipe),&#13;
United States Information Agency (Voice of America),&#13;
and other offictla1 and semi--0fficial aigendes of the United&#13;
States Government, because they are totally discredited&#13;
and cursed by the Slovaks at home.&#13;
1Should&#13;
anyone wish to, be corredly informed about&#13;
how Slo,viakia thinks and feels a:bout its fate, what anticommuniist wor.keris are doing there, let him delve into&#13;
the verdict of June 13, 1955, against the tJweilve Slovak&#13;
heroes, and let him find time .t o study the attacks of communist propag,amda against ISlovruk nationalists, whose sole&#13;
aim ,i s to oause the downfall oif commumsm and to estrub-·&#13;
lish a Slovak independent state.&#13;
The Reds Fear the West&#13;
&#13;
.C ommenting on the verdict rendered by the "people's"&#13;
court againist the tweilve Slovak anti-,c ommunists, the&#13;
Prague radio OIIl June 16, 1955, reminded its listeners that&#13;
fhis particular resistance orgrumzation receiyed its orders&#13;
from Slovak exiles in the West. The military prooorator&#13;
called the following Slovak patriots archtraitors : Du:rcansky, Cerna!k, Paiulco, Mikus, ·Mikula, and Hassik. 'Dhis&#13;
i,s not t!he forst time, and not the last, that Slovak patriots&#13;
in exile have 'been accused by Red Prague. In recent times&#13;
attacks of this kind are made almost daily.&#13;
On May 2, 1955, for example, the Prague Radio, referring to Slovak patriots in exile, said that "they already&#13;
have behind them ten furrl years of service in the interests&#13;
of foreigners, ten full years oif collaJboration with the most&#13;
rea:ctionary elemernts against the people . . . and the aim&#13;
of all exile origa.ni2Jations 1s war."&#13;
Thiat is how the Prague commtlillists comprehend&#13;
"pea'Ce:ful coexistence." While the West is leaning danger~&#13;
ously ibac!k waTd and even sacrificing tJhe interests of some&#13;
satellite nations behind the Iron Curtain fOT tJhe saxe of&#13;
peiace, the Retl sateJ..lite governments, in the meantime,&#13;
reg,ard freedom of expression, movement and political activiity in the states which have given asyilum to Central-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
13&#13;
&#13;
European escapees as "colllalboration with the most reac.&#13;
tionary elements."&#13;
The .Prague communists, for example, are terribly&#13;
worried that Slovaks in exile can speak freely every day&#13;
over the tranS1mitting facilities of Spain and Ita:J.y. That&#13;
these broadcasts are completely identical with the natural&#13;
and democratic demands of rull patriotic Slovaks in exile,&#13;
who speak for state independence for their own nation,&#13;
is only n:aturrul and,( therefore, quit'e u:nderstand!able.&#13;
Communist propaganda, of course, is doing everything&#13;
it can do to silence 1:Jhem, disarm them, and discredit them&#13;
with the worn-·oU:t eipithets of "fascists, separatists, nazis,&#13;
reactionaries," etc. It is signific·a nt, too, that Benes Czechs&#13;
and Slovak Judases use the same epithets and tactics as&#13;
the Reds. Where they cannot successfully refute a statement, they resort to denunciation, viHfication, and invective.&#13;
The Pr31gue bvoadicast, red:erred to above, vicioosly&#13;
attacked the Christian character of the prog,r am of the&#13;
Slovak exiles. "Well, as far as the activity of the Slovak&#13;
exiles abroad is concerned," said the Prague commentator,&#13;
"they have in comparison with the rest of the groups one&#13;
specialty. More than any other group they are concealing&#13;
their actual aims /by a,ppealing to ChriJstianity, Christian&#13;
morals, Ohristian charity, etc. Dr. Francis Hrusorvsky even&#13;
went as far as to designate tJhe Central-Eu:ropean Union,&#13;
that is, tlhe rearming of German miilitarists, as an expression of Christian charity. Not even the former editor-inchief of the newspaper S:L0VAK, Dr. Pauco, who edited&#13;
the SLOVAK during the time of the greatest nazi massacre in Slova!kia, will l now never fail to appeal to ChrisHan ethics. And the Sloviak fascists from Madrid, on the&#13;
other hand, shall always recall that they are not aslhamed&#13;
of Tiso's Legacy."&#13;
On June 9, 1955, filie Bratislava broadcast quoted the&#13;
angry article of the PiRAVDA against the Slov;aJk People's&#13;
Party, distorting its historical role. On that occasion the&#13;
PRAY.DA - ac0ording to the radio commentator - wrote&#13;
aJbout "the dirty role of the populi,s t emigrants, who are&#13;
allying themselves not only with the aggressive groups in&#13;
&#13;
14&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
the United States, but aJso with the avengers in western&#13;
Germ.any."&#13;
The radio broadcast f.rom Prague on June 11 and that&#13;
from Bratislava on June 12, 1955, sollillded off against&#13;
"the provoc,ative Madrid and Rome tran1simitters," and&#13;
against the "Paucos, Cerna.ks, and :Dur:canskys," who are&#13;
constantly warning escapees not to return home.&#13;
The Brague 'broadcast of May 9, 1955, was :f.ull of insults and epithets aJbout the "madness of the rulers of the&#13;
imperi,a listic world and their humble ser,vrunts, the traitors of our nations," that is, the exiles.&#13;
It is symboli'c of communist audacity that the Reds&#13;
are using such propaganda at a time wlhen in Moscow they&#13;
began a new o£fensive so that they might again meet and&#13;
confer with "imperialistic rulers," and so whet tlheir ruppetite for "capitalistic" trade. Of course, the communists&#13;
say one thing at home, something else at the conference&#13;
ta!ble, and still something difrferent to exri1les. Whosoever&#13;
,p erforce walilts to be deaf will believe only one or the&#13;
other side of their story and will not compare the communist propaganda of an shades and tendencies. We have&#13;
always been of tlhe conviction that to come to an agreement with communism is the greatest trM1.Sg,ressicm&#13;
against the pri,n ciples of humanity, the basest violation of&#13;
the rights to freedom, and a grave insttlt to Christian&#13;
sentiment. Communism is most often irritated by the constant repetition and practical realization olf Christian-democratic principles. That is why they cry out loudly&#13;
against a poHticail prog,ram to which the v;ast majority of&#13;
Slovaks in the West look for thei&lt;r sup,po&lt;rt.&#13;
ChrJstianity and the !help of the West, whrreh Slovaks&#13;
enjoy, throw the communists off balance. They say all&#13;
Slovak exiil es "have one boss,." as reported by the Prague&#13;
broadcast of May 2, 195'5, aJUd "all are paid from one&#13;
treasury, the trea:sury of American militarilsm. The socalJ.ed Slovak N aitiona1 Coundl .Aibroad, the Sloviak League&#13;
of America, and the Canadian SloviaJk League - as the&#13;
separati'st organi~ations of iSlova.k :fascists - serve American military interests."&#13;
To show their hatred the communist madmen ini1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
15&#13;
&#13;
tialed the names of tihe organizaitJions they attadked witJh&#13;
small letters wlhen tlhey pwbH,sihed the commentary in the&#13;
periodical L'UD ('People). This is qurite si,gnifica,nit. As if&#13;
thereby they could alter the facts. They a.Jltered and will&#13;
alter nothing; and their anger only attests to a serious&#13;
nervours condition. Iif eve-ryithing were in order in SlOIV'akia and the communists were in complete command of the&#13;
situation, they would not have to concern themselves with&#13;
the Slov;ak situation so excitedly on the inlternati:onal&#13;
field. However, when one once succumbs to fear and has&#13;
lost his conscience and has two gall bladders instead of&#13;
one heart, there hardly is any helrp for him. The commnnist dic-tators in S1ovakia have a very small sowl. The poon~&#13;
tom of American caipitalism and tihe activity of free Slovak or:ganization:s and individuals will not let t'hem sleep.&#13;
Perhaps this is best refle&lt;&gt;Jro in the words of Karel&#13;
Bacilek, who said at the XI Oommunist Congress at Bratislava: ". . . Imperialist aggressors, led by the ruling&#13;
circles of the USA and with tihe aid of treacherous esca-.&#13;
pees, are attemipting to srcore and deceive the working people, divert it from the path of social construction. Hostile&#13;
propaganda can at times penetr"ate and bear in:filuence in&#13;
various ways even oin memlbers olf the ;party."&#13;
In other words, what is being done in the, West in the&#13;
interest of the liberation of 1:lhe Slovak natit&gt;n does have&#13;
a great influence on the Slo.vaks at home. But obviously&#13;
this influence also affects the communists. They are afraid&#13;
of every step that is taken in the defense of the ,rigihts of&#13;
the Slovak nation.&#13;
The COilllmunists in Prague and in Slovalkia fear nothing more than the concept of Slovak statehood. Tha;t is&#13;
why, for example, William Siroky practicaUy writhed in&#13;
cramps when he revealed at the Congress. in Bratislava&#13;
that Americans "iha&lt;ve exhumed the compromised and bankrupt slogan of the so-.called S1'()1V'ak Sta:te."&#13;
The fact , however, is that the concept of the Slovak&#13;
State is not bankrupt and is not dead. It is a thing very&#13;
much aJiNe, otheriwiise Sirdky amd other communists would&#13;
-hardly concern themselves with it. The Slo,vaks are encouraged by it, while the communists are haruntetl by it.&#13;
&#13;
16&#13;
&#13;
SLOV.AKIA&#13;
&#13;
The princilples of freedom are so strong that no one can&#13;
compromise them. Only dictators, and among them foremost are the communists, have attempted to compromise&#13;
the governmental form. But they shaH never convince the&#13;
Slovaks that an aJli.en and tyrannical government is better&#13;
for them than a government of their own choice.&#13;
Against the Kersten Committee&#13;
&#13;
The Kersten Committee evaluated the Slova:k question&#13;
justly and correctly and published its findings how Slovakia was taken over by tJhe Reds so that America and the&#13;
rest of the free world might learn the truth a:bout the&#13;
struggles and demands of the Sl10V1a!k nation. For that the&#13;
communist propaganda of Prague and Bratislava fired a&#13;
barrage of smear and vilification at the Committee.&#13;
The BratislaN radio sharply attaoked Charles Kersten&#13;
and the Slovak witnesses on February 7, 1955. The former&#13;
congressman from MHwaukee, Wis., •w as called the "counsellor of the escapees," while the Slovak witnesses who&#13;
testifiied oof1ore tJhe Committee were designated as "traitors of the Slovak nation."&#13;
The 'b roadcast ,a ttacked Dr. Joseph Mikula, ,b ecause he&#13;
was supposed to have stated that '~he and his companions&#13;
now did not have the legal possilbility to poison the soul&#13;
of the 1Sl1ovax nation." Dr. Pauco, the commentator barked,&#13;
"rel,aJtekl fables before the Committee about an alleged&#13;
suppression of the freedom of the press in Czecho-Slovakia." Dr. Mikus was reviled because he defended the principles of private ownership. Matthew Cemalk, Slovak pa~&#13;
triot and leader of the S'lov,a k exiles in Germany, did not&#13;
escape the wrath of the Reds either. 'I1he communist propagandist stated that •a ll the Slova.lk witnesses before the&#13;
Committee wanted to start a war. In this instance, he said,&#13;
'in full nakedness wa:s demonstrated the wretchedness of&#13;
the methods, which are used by the American reaction to&#13;
slander the countries of tJhe peace camp. At the same time,&#13;
however, it aJlso shows the depth of filth and muck -into&#13;
which the traitors of the Slovak nation shall end up in."&#13;
On May 2, 1955, the Prague radio again attacked&#13;
Charles Kersten, declaring that "on the basis of h'is law&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
17&#13;
&#13;
about financing suib versi,v e ructivities in the countries promoting peace, he is distributing dollars generously among&#13;
federalists, separatists, unionists, and all kinds oif other organizations" fo,r rendering "servile service to aggressive&#13;
plans to start a new war."&#13;
On Miay 5, 1955, t!he PRAVDA of Bratislav,a ,p ublished&#13;
a lengthy article in regard to the actiivi-ties of the Ke:rsten&#13;
Committee and tihe testimony of Slov,ak witnesses. Among&#13;
otiher things in that article, we read:&#13;
"On December 31, 1954, there was published in the&#13;
United States a so..,caJl:led official document of the American Congress, which !insults the nations of OUT country in&#13;
a very c:m de and inept manner. In this gossiipy 'document', which was prepared by the special Keristen Committee, Ozecho.JSlorvak history is written up in a genuinely&#13;
fascist spirit, the glorious Slovak national uiprising is descri'b ed as 'an impro,vised rebellion of subversive elements',&#13;
and the liherati:on. of our country by the heroic Soviet,&#13;
army is depicted with the bitter sorrow over the defeat&#13;
of Hitler's occupat ion troops and thei:r native assistants ...&#13;
The Kersten Committee preparnd this 'document' on the&#13;
basis of the so--c alled 12 Slovak testimonies, which it collected from Slovak fascist outcasts. . .&#13;
"About Kersten it i'S generally known that he has&#13;
intimate, friendly contacts with fascists and cOIHalborators,&#13;
who fled the country after Wo:rld War II to escape punishment and found asylum in the United States. Therefore, it&#13;
surprised no one when the Kersten Committee on its hunt&#13;
for gossipy 'testimonies' sought out only genuiine fascists&#13;
in London, P,aris, Madrid, Rome, Munich and other Cen~&#13;
tral-European ciities. With witnesses like Cemak, Pauco,&#13;
Mikus, Mikula, Nahalka, and theiir hke, it naturally could&#13;
not be proud of in ,pU!bfic. So it met, with them in absolute&#13;
secrecy, behind closed doors.&#13;
"The g:reatest degree of deipra,vity a:nd lacik of character&#13;
was successfolly attained by Charles Kersten and his&#13;
twelve fascist 'witnesses', who in their hellpless hatred&#13;
against the Slavruk people incite, slander and cry for another war against o.ur country.&#13;
"Among the paid perjurers of the American Govern-&#13;
&#13;
18&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
ment of th~ tyipe of Harvey Matusow, Paul Crouch, Elizaibeth Bentley, and_Charle~ Ke:risten, on the one hand, and&#13;
Oernak, :Dur.canslky, Pauico, Kirschbaum, Mikus and company, on the other, there is no difference. American and&#13;
Slov,aJk fascis'ts alike 'betmy their own people. Of course,&#13;
there may be this difference: the former do tfuis for dollar.s while the fascist renegades of Cerna.k's type do it for&#13;
anything _of value.&#13;
"The so...called document of the American Government,&#13;
prepared on the basis of the gossip of 12 Slovak fascists&#13;
clearly proves how deep the traitorous escrupees have sunk&#13;
in their hatred against our people. And simultaneously this&#13;
lying document is further ,p roof that American r,u ling cir-·&#13;
cles willingly sl,a nder countries whlicih have rid themselves&#13;
of crupitalistic e,oploite:m, the creatures that betrayed their&#13;
nati·o n to Hitler." .&#13;
We find the very same insults and abusive names also&#13;
jn the official note of the Prague Coo:nmuni,s t government&#13;
of April 19, which is addressed to the Governmenlt of the&#13;
United States. The separate report of the Kersten Committee is designated as.. "bra:zen" and "is equal to t:he wildest product of Goeibbels' fascist proipagandisti'c mach'i nery .&#13;
It is nothing else but the pasting tog~her of lies and gossip,&#13;
which are supposed to deepen hatred against Czecho-,Slovrukfa, to encourage war hysteria, to incite and campaign&#13;
against coounl\.Ulism and to ,p repare a preventive war&#13;
against peace-J.oving countries."&#13;
The Prague government is also angry because the&#13;
Kersten report is opposed to coexi,s tence with communism&#13;
and warns the Whole world of the threats of communist&#13;
dictators. The Prrugue note attacked Dr. Joseph Mikus&#13;
and Matthew Cern.aJk, two act~ve Slov-a:k exiles, pointing out&#13;
especi,a lly that they sewed in the dtplomatic cOI1ps of the&#13;
Sl~va:k Republic.&#13;
As far as the reproaches of the Prague government&#13;
and its propaganda against American and Slovak factors&#13;
is concerned, it must be stated unequivocally tlhat not in&#13;
-a single testimony wrus there any talk aibout the need of&#13;
unleashing a war. In the testimonies we do find, however,&#13;
mention in seveTal places of the need of good and effective&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
19&#13;
&#13;
work in the puiblishing and broadcasting fields against communism, of the need of preparations for the spiritual renovation of the world whioh is slowly being crushed by&#13;
the satanic forces of ciom.munism. All Slovak witnesses&#13;
strongly condemne!d the crimes and the evil perpetrated&#13;
against the SlovaJk nation by communism; and tfu.ey told&#13;
how communism enslaves the Slovaks spiriturulJy and exploits them economicailly and suppresses every manifestation of the Slova;k people for freedom and state independence.&#13;
Tlhe wor'k of the Kersten Committee has become a&#13;
thorn in the eyes of communist aggressive politics and pro._,&#13;
pagainda. The Czech communi,s ts h'a d hoped that the West&#13;
wouM continue to beHeve blindly their old lies a.nd falbles&#13;
against the Sloviak nation; tihey did everything possilble to&#13;
discredit Slovaks in exile in the eyes of tfu.e West and so&#13;
make life as m[seraJble as possible for them. Flaiiing in&#13;
this, it was only natUII'al for the Reds of Prague and Bratislaiva to unleash the wildest war in the press and over the&#13;
radio ag,ainst Slovaks in exile and against every one who&#13;
sympathized with them.&#13;
But it does not matter whom they single out for&#13;
abuse and vilification; important it is, however, that com~&#13;
munists are afraid of the solidly organized anti-commun:..&#13;
ist Slovak camp and their friends. And they are frightfully&#13;
afraid of the thought that the whole principle of the right&#13;
of self-determination must once be accorded the Slovak&#13;
nation, without the reaJlization of which the conterruporary&#13;
struggle to bring order and political balance in Central&#13;
Europe has no su'b stantiation.&#13;
While communism must reso;rt to a;buse and invective&#13;
in its fits of anger, the Slova~s in exile are presenting&#13;
facts, they are building on them and witlh them are defending the righteousness of their demands. Of course,&#13;
it is not true that the Kersten Committeee used to meet&#13;
secretly with ,Slovaik witnesses. All the hearings were ,public. They were attended by reporters and the puiblic. The&#13;
press reported on the hearings, so did the radio and the&#13;
television. Expert stenographers recorded everything that&#13;
was said by every Slorvak witness and this was then pub1&#13;
&#13;
.20&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
lished iby t:he American Governmen t. The reports record&#13;
.the minds of those people, w:ho foom the beginning of their&#13;
pulblic activity adaimanfily opposed communism .&#13;
The SlovaJks in exile do- not deny that they are antL&#13;
,c ommuni,s,t. It is a historical fac:t that the Slovak nation as&#13;
:a w,hole condemned t:he tea•ching.s of Marx and Engels materialistic phHos0rphy soon after it was made pulb1ic and&#13;
.has fouight it consistentl y and persistently throughout the&#13;
years. The S1ova'ks in exile, then, do not even request secret sessions. Oommunist s, however, commit the foulest&#13;
crimes where there are no witnesses. But they •c annot deny&#13;
them, ,b ecause even the dead testify against murderers.&#13;
And communism will one day ,be on the be,n ch of the acc used.&#13;
It seems ,t he cards have faHen from the hands of the&#13;
communist rulers in ,Slova;kia, !because they sysit:ematica lJy&#13;
return to, the activity of the native "reaction" and the&#13;
Slovaiks in exile. This is nothing else but an attempt to&#13;
ma,sk all the crimes and grave injusti ces which they have&#13;
committed and are stil,l commiltinig against the SlovaJk nation. Communis ts cannot conceal or deny the evil they have&#13;
done. The entire nation is testifying against them. To&#13;
.waint to deny something and to- concea•l one's own crimes&#13;
,b y hurling poi sonous insu1,ts at others is, indeed, a much&#13;
more difficult and hopeless. task than pouring water inrto&#13;
the ocean.&#13;
We are profoundly touched by the heavy losses of&#13;
life, cultural, moral and economic values, which the .Slovak nation has suffered from the Red Moloch. The murder&#13;
of Matthew Cernak in Munich, Ju1y 5, 1955, by a bomb&#13;
s ent through the mail is still fresh in our minds. However, we see that tJhe communist s are writhing like wounded&#13;
sna!kes, hissing with anger and hate. And that is a good&#13;
sign. It is the beginning of the end. Thus far no communist ruler has remained long in po,w er; and those forced on&#13;
the Slovaks will be no exception. They are. he:Jipless and&#13;
have no defense for the failures of their policies and, hence,&#13;
must find scaipegoats : so they thunder againsit the native&#13;
"populist reaction" at home, the "traitorous exile," and&#13;
"imperialis tic American capitalism."&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
</text>
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                <text>The Failures of Communist Politics in Slovakia</text>
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pp. 3-20</text>
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

21

LETI'RIOH'S IDSTORY OF SLOVAK.IA
By Constantine Oulen
We shall not criticize the ideological side of his booik,
because according to Letitric,h only the Slovak Catholics
were Nazis, only they praised Hitler, only they wrote derogatively of the Jews, only they Aryanized, only they
were in the Hlinka Guards, and only they were dissatis ...
fied in the Czecho.,Slovak Reipu1blic.
We shall not carry on polemics with Lettrich even on
as, for example, the Sudanians, because we know that Lettrich is of the conviction that what is the right of the unclothed Sudanian at home, does not belong to the Slovaks
at home even if they were to weM' fro-cks and uniforms.
We know that from a feeling of his own inferio,r 'ity even
an under-average Czech is an unattainable ideal. Lettrich
really belongs under the Czechs.
We shall not d~bate about whether Lettrich was en~
titled to let thousands od' Slova;ks lhe jailed, and we shall
not deJbate ,a bout the Magyarism of the politicians of the
Slo,vaik People's Party, beC'ause that is, after aJll, a matter
of personal opinion, and it is useless to talik about the
beauty of colors with a color-blind person.
The statistics presented or ref erred to by Lettrich,
however, really is not 'history, but news. They demonst11ate the superficiality, irresponsiibility and outright falsification of facts.
L ettrich wanted to prove Urat the progress Slovakia
made in the Czecho-iSlovak Repu:bli·c from 1918 to 1938
"had never been surpassed in any phase of history" by
referring to the gigantic growth of various Slovak cities
(p. 64). He compares the 1919 with the 1948 numlber of inha:bitants of some cities. Many cities, indeed, did develop
and grow, while otihers showed a decrease in population.
But we see that everywhere, not only in .Slovakia. So, are
we to regard that as a "Czecho..,Slovaik" miracle? Is it not
practically a universal oustom that :people leave the farms
for the cities? And even Lettrich should know that the
influx of some 200,000 Czechs into Slovakia, especially into
1

�22

SLOVAKIA

the cities, certainly had something to do with the increase
in population of those cities.
But why shou1d Lettrich resort to false statistics
even in this case? He could have proved his case even with
correct statistics, selected from official statistical publications. It is obvious that Leittrich preferred to use other statistics: those which sulbstantially decrease the numlber of
inhabitants from Magyar times and su:b stantially increase
the number of inhaJbitants from the times of the Czecho~
Slovruk Republic.
According to Lett.rich, Zilina had 9,000 inh~bitants
in 1919 and 18,000 in 1948 (p. 64). But Zilina, we know,
already :had 9,166 inhaJbitants in 1910; 12,073 after the
census was taken in Ozecho-Slo•v akia; and in 1940, in the
Slovak Republic, 19,329 (Vd. SOZNAM OBOI NA SLOVEN~U, p. 161). Aooording to Lettrich, then, Zilina had
1~ people in 1948 than in 1940. According to Dr. Palic
(Vd. OIDSKOSLOVENSKY PR!EHLED), Zilina had 16,400
i.nhabitants in 1949.
According to Lettrich, Turciansky &amp;vaty Martin had
3,000 inhabitants in 1919, but 20,000 in 1948. However, we
know that T. iSv. M. had 3,351 inha,bitants already in 1900;
4,101 in 11910; and 5,6'57 after the first Czecho--,Slova:k
census. Where did Lettrich get the 20,000 figure? And the
other statistics? In the footnote (ip. 64), he says his source
was (pp. '118-157) of "':NIE POPULATION OF CZECHOSLOV~ " by Waller Wynne, Jr. (Washington, 1953).
But that source does not show 20,000 inha:bitants. for T.
Sv. M . ! It shows 11,300 for the year 1940; in 1946 only
10,600, hence, less t'han during the time of the Slovak Republic. In fact a closer loolk at pages 47-57 shows Wynne's
book of afificfal American statistics does not carry the
figures either for 1919, with which Lettrich begins, or
for 1948, with which Lettrich ends; but we do find there
the figures for 1940 and 1946.
It seems that pseudohistorian Lettrich did not understand ,w hat he read. Wynne gives the figures for the
growth of cities between 1930 and 1947 "in 1948 area."
Lettrich quotes the number of inhabitants of the various
Slovak cities for 194i8 from statistics, of Octolber 1, 1946.

�SLOVAKIA

23

When . a historian writes a:bout ithe growth of some
cities and towns, it is not unusual for him to mention the
decrease in populat'ion of others. But Lettrich is different;
he is determined to pmve that the Czecho--•SltoviaJk Republic
was responsible only for "growth" figures,. For example,
the following cities and towns decreased as indicated: Skalica 2.3 percent; Myjava 2.7 percent; Pukanec 2.9 percent;
Bansika Stiavnica 8.3 •p ercent; Doib,sina 12:3 percent; Gelnica 24.1 percent; Reviuca 32.2 percent. Why these old industria~ centers decreased in populatfon could also form an
interesting chapter in a SlovaJk history, which is cal,l ed
'modern"!
"Between 1906 and 1908 alone, 56·0 Slovaks were sentenced for
political crimes to a total of 91 years in jail and fines of 42,000
Crowns" (p. 38).

That's what Lettrfoh says rubout Magyar persecution,
but even here there seems to :b e a slight error of some
ten years. The figures given are for a period of 12 years
and not two. We suggest that Lettrich c'hook .this item
with the figures given by R. W. Seton-·Watson, whom he
probaibly wanted to quote (RAOIAL BROBLEM!S IN HUNGARY, p. 466). To check this item, he might also use the
SLOVENISKY OB~OR and the PIRUDY, with which he is
quite familiar.
It is, significant, too, that, in the matter of persecution,
oppression and suppression, Mr. Lettrich quite conveniently forgets to rememb.er what the Slovaks suffered from
1945 to 1'948, when he and Communist Schmidke ,w ere cocha_imnen of the SlovaJk National Council, the lbody supreme
in Slovakia. The Magyars treated the Slo1vaks harshly and
unjustly, it is true; Magyar statistics themselves prove
that. There is no need to add anything to thek figures; we
need not magnid'y those statistics in 1955. As they are, tihey
are a monument to intolerance., dishonesty, and especially
.p olitical short-sightedness. In the final analysis, what the
ruling Magyaris did was a crime even against the Magyar
nation.
On the other hand, however, what was done to the
Slovaks during the Benes-Lettrich er.a is so terribfo, r8JW,
and criminal that it simply is without parallel in the

�24

SLOVAKIA

thousand-year history O!f the Slovaks. Lettrich's regime
pa:s:ses into Sliovak history as a regime O!f an unbroken
skein of the most terrilble and blo·odiest crimes.
At one of the meetings of the Board of Commissars,
when Lettrirch ruled, a reiport was given that 19,740 persons, most of them in:tellectuals, were jailed; 56 of them
already were sentenced to death and the rest o£ them received a total of 12,555 years in jail; and the property
of most of them ,w a s confiscated. And that was only the
beginning. In 19416, the a'Verage jail senitence was 19
months; at the end of 1'947, it was 33 months and 14
days. 'Dhiat was in the days when Lettrich's word could
save a person's life, or a:meliorate a sentence. Lettrioh's
cowts meted out jail sentenices which were 1,250 percent
higher, besides that also executions, which in peace time
did not even happen in Hungary.
But Lettrilch makes a lb ig issue of 91 yearn in jail which
the Magyar-s meted out to 560 Slovaks in twelve years!
What is 1:lhaJt in •c omparison to what Leittrich's regime was
responsible for? Hias, Lettrich already fongotten the Slova:ks executed, the thousands in Silberia, the crammed jaHs
and concentration camps, the people beaten by his police?
Hias he forgotten the thous•a nds of women who were raped
by rhis glorified partisans, the freight cars crammed with
Magyars whom he tra:nsferred to Czech lands for slave
la!bor, the 15 frozen Magyar children in one of those ft-eight
car-s, which waited under the Bratis1a~a bridge in January
without any heat for over rbwo weeks until an order was
given to move? Yes, and what is that in comparison to the
300,000 ,b eaten Germans? Lettrich made thi,s history, was
a respoinsilble patt of it, so why should he not include it in
his "History of Modern Slo'Vakia"?
1

".fn 1918 Hungarian statistics listed no more than 30,118 children
of Slovak nationality" (p. 37).

But the truth is that Magyar staUstiJcs for that year
showed 255,7'92 school child.rein of Slovak natli onality (Vd .
.Judr Fojifr: NAIRODNi SKOLY V REPUBillCE Cs DLE
S'DAVU ZID DNIE 31. PROS. 1'92,1, which contains detailed
statistics of Slovak elementary schiools from 11881 to 1919).
Lettrich is a bit befuddled or wants to befuddle others.
1

�SLOVAKIA

25

Magyar statistics show that in 1'918 there were 30,118
Slovalk children in 365 Slovak schooJs, but the same statistics showed that there were 255,792 Slovak school children, the rubsolute majority of which, of course, had to attend Magyar schools. Magyar statli.stics were false, but
even Magyar statisticians were not so stupid .as to show
30,000 school children for a nation of three million. They
left .that to Lettrioh !
"In 1918 ... there were 12,447 Hungarian civil servants on Slovak territory. Only 35 offered their services to the new Republic
The others, being of Magyar nat ionality, refused to serve" (p. 39) ,

Now, -if that were kue, then Count Apponyi was right
when he said that the Slovaks were against uniting with
the Czechs. But Lettrich is wrong again. Ho,w did he arrive at those figures? Lettrich not only accepts the statistics supplied by Count Al1bert Apponyd. to support his ar•
guments to save the unity of greater Hungairy at the Peace
Conference, 1b ut even e~plains them more unfavorably for
the Slovaks than Apponyi himself. At .the Peace Oonference CoU!nt A,pponyi presented stabstics about the number
of offidals and teachers in Hungary. He said th'at in the
whole of Hungary there were 12,447 state employees:
12,412 Magyars and 35 Slo,vaks. Of the 35 SlQIV'akS, 18
were employed in 17 ISl,ova;k districts.
Lettrich, not understanding what he read, wrote that
in Slovakia there were 12,447 Magyar officiaJs, 35 of whom
were Slovak, and the rest (12,412) refused to ta;ke the
loyalty oath to the Ozecho-Slovruk Reip,ublic. Now, what
are the facts ?
1. It is not true that there were 12,447 Magyar State
emip loyees in Slo,v a1kia. The figure relates to, the whole of
Hungiary, with the e:x:ception of Croatia. In Slovakia there
were 920 Magyars, 11 Germans and 18 Slovaks employed
by the Hungarian State.
2. lt is not true that only 3'5 were willing to serve the
Czecho-•Slova;k Repulb1iic. The figures refer only to those
who were 'listed as Slovalks, but say nothing about their
willingness or unwillingless to serve the Czecho-1Slova:k Republic.
3. It is not true that the rest ref.used to• serve the
1

�26

SLOVAKIA

Ozecho-lSlovruk Repulblic. If that were so, then it would
not have been possilble even ,w ith the help of the Ozechs to
establish a Cze:cho-SlovaJk regime in Slovakia. The absolute
majority of State employees, even those of German and
Mrugyar origin, took the oath of loyalty to the Czecho-Slo . .
vak Repu:blk. Only ,a minority ref.used to take the loyalty
oath; the number of those who r&amp;fused was never recorded
statistically (Vd. .Dr. H. Rashofer: Die Tschechoslowa,kischen Denks-chriften fiir die Friedenskonference von Paris 1919-1920, pp. 187~193; and Magyar Beketargyalasok).
Continuing to falsify statistics, Lettrich states that
only "10 of the 660 high school teachers and college professors" offered their services to the new Repulblic of Czecho-iSlovakia (,p. 40).
At the Peace Conference, Count Apponyi stated that
there ,w ere 23 Slovaks teaching in the secondary schools ;
10 of these taught in Slwaikia. Dr. Derer, speaiking on the
floor of the Prague Parliament, February 7, 1931, said
that there was only 1 Slovak professor under Hungary.
Michael Slavik counted 25 in his 'book : 115 Lutherans and
10 Catho'.1 ks. The fact is, however, that the 11918-19 school
year began in SlovaJkia. with over a 100 Slov8Jk professors.
Many left good positions in large Magyar cities to accept
teaching positions in Slovruk towns and villages; they sacrificed muoh just so th'at they might serve their nation.
But the Czechs rejected ·s:ome of them and relegated
many of them to teach in Magyar schools!
Certainly Lettrich himself could, if he only wanted to,
name more than 10 Slovak professors of the Lutheran
faith alone w'ho served the young Repulblic enthusiastically
in HH8. We might mention the following Sl~vak professors
who definitely did tea.ch in SlovaJkia in 191'8: Rozim, Kmet'.,
Branecky, Potkan, Fr. Tiso, Kra.jniak, Vallo, Kovalik, Mruirgas, Hlavaty, Hronec, Ohra.pa, Lisy, Klein--Tesnoskals:ky,
Horniaik, BeniaJC, Poto:cky, Misik, Bezak, '.Domaja, Resek,
FJorek, Necikar, Bu;jnaik, Vo~ko-Starohorsky, Twdy.
Count Aipponyi ma.de all kinds of statements at the
Paris Pea.:ce Coruferenice; but he did not go as far as Lettrich. What Lettrich says could be used adrvantageously

�SLOVAKIA

27

by Magyar revisionist propaganda. And yet he thmks this
is an argument for the "Czecho-lSlovak" concept! It is
strange, indeed, tha,t we who are considered "seiparatists"
should have to defend the Czecho-iSlavak Republic even
against Lettrich. Did he forget about the five Slovak university pro,fessors from Budapest who came to Bratislava
to, offer their services to the new Republic, but not ooe was
accepted? Tuka and Kviatcala, too, were rejected in favor of
Czech professo:vs,, were they not?
It is almost useaess to attempt to analyize otther statistics given 'by Lettrich in his "history." They are all
equally false. Lettriich simply either did not understand
the significance of what he read, or, if he did, then he falsified knowingly. In this category he outdid Apponyi. Lettrich could have proved his point easHy in an hooest manner, but he preferred to use the Magyar system: minim.ie.e
and vilify everything that was SloV'ak. Slovaks never regarded tMagyar figures as reliable, so why should Lettrich
regard them as the last word? A Ozech statistician Wl'ote
the foUowing a;bout Magyar statistics:
1

"The incorrectness of Magyar official statistics is attested to
even by official Magyar data about the spreading of knowledge of
the individual languages. On the territory of the 16 Slovak counwhich either completely or partly fell to Czecho-Slovakia ties in 1910, there were 300,584 Magyars who knew Slovak; that is, 25.3
percent of all the Magyar inhabitants of those 16 counties. On that
same territory, in 1910, it was recorded that only 281,230 Slovaks
(16.5 percent) knew Magyar, even though the great majority of
Slovaks was educated in Magyar schools whose main job was to
teach Magyar. On the other hand, it is still more odd that 25.3 percent of the Magyars in the 16 Slovak counties could speak Slovak,
that is, the language of the Pariahs, the language that was despised,
suppressed and cast out of the schools, offices and public life.
"This discordance must be explained only by the fact that a
great number of ·Slovaks, who knew Magyar, were counted among
the Magyars. We need not conjecture that 300,000 Magyars learned
Slovak either out of love for Slovak or other motives. Mraz, in his
book "Slovensko vo svetle statistiky," estimates that of the 300,000
'Magyars who know Slovak,' there are at least 200,000 Slovaks who
did not learn Magyar, but were counted as Magyars when the census was taken" (Ph. Dr. VI. Slaninka: Narodnostni vyvoj Ceskoslovenske republiky, Pra,gue 1938 ; pp. 67-68) .

And that is a fad. There is a difference !between actually &gt;Magy,ari'zed SlovaJks and 'Slovruks whom only Magyar
statistics regarded as Magyars. Lettrich obviously under-

�28

SLOVAKIA

took the task of proving the miraculous "progre.ss" oif the
Slovaks in the Czecho-·S lovak Repuiblic by ma:gnifying Magyar injustices and aJbolishing all Czoch injustices. But a
historian should write olbjec·Uvely; he must not forget even
what was good in Hungary, jrust as he must record what
was good in Cz~cho-:Slovakia; and he must not close his
eyes ei.theT to Magyar o,r Czech injustices.
"Serious unemployment and perpetual depression reigned in Slovakia from the Austrian-Hungarian Settlement in 1867, unti I the outbreak of World War I. In that period three-quarters of a million
Slovaks emigrated to earn their bread abroad, mostly in the United
States" (p. 40) .

Why Lettrich uses the year 1867 as his initial year is ·
diffictrlt to understand, becaiuse it was just at the end of
the last and the 1beginning of the present century that Hungary began to ,b uild up_ industrially, and most of the enteriprises were built in .SlovaJkia with state funds.
From 1881 to 191'4, there we.:re 960 industrial enterprises built in Slovaikia; another 760 were remodeled to
manufacture various products. Jlt is estimated that this
cost the Hungarian State 63 million pre-war Gold Orowns.
There was one industrial enterprise for every 617 inhaJbitants in Slova;kia, according to lli. E. Stodola ("Statistika
Slo;v enska").
How did industry in Slovaikia fare under Ozecho-Slovakia?
Well, when the Cze·c hs came to power, Slov,a k industrial enterprises rwere graidually dosed up. The Czechs
said: 1. Slovakia should be the agricultural country of
the Staite; 2. Slovak industry did not have natural prerequisites; it was lb uilt with the he1p of the Magyar State,
hence, it had to be destroyed; 3. Slo,vaik industry belongs
to Magya:r Jews and foreigners, who suppressed the Slo-·
va:ks nationally; this must be aivenged by destroying their
properties; 4. More modern Ozech industry can produce
more cheaply and abundantly all the products which were
produced by faicfories in Sfovakia, therefore, the latter
must be liquidated.
The "Morgenthau" plan for Germany in 1945 was put
into effoct by the Benes Czechs for Slovakia in 1918 ! Lettrich might pretend not to ·know the facts, or may simply

�SLOVAKIA

29

ignore them, lbut nevertheless facts they still remain. The
Federation of Slovak Industrialists pU!blished reports annually; Lettrich undoubtedly knows aJbout them, or should
have, if he wanted his "history" to be objective. What do
the r eports of that Federation tell us?
In the Slovak wood industry, in the 11 largest enterprises, workers put in 9,04'5,000 hours in 1914, tbut only
3,786,000 hours in 1923 ; in 19 of the largest chemical
plants, Sl()IVak workers put in 8,352,000 hours in 1914, but
only 4,5·38,000 hours in 1923; in three of the largest glass
enter,prises, 2,937,000 hours in 1914, but only 468,000
hours in 1 92,6 ; in 9 of the largest mining and smelting
enteriprises 11,469,000 hours in 1914, but only 5,684,000
hours in 1922; in 8 of the largest grain mills 1,·680,000
hours in 1914, but only 853,000 hours in 1926 ; in 19 metal
enter.prises 14,271,000 hours in 1914, but only 7,059,000
hours in 1923; in 12 textile enterprises 29,080,000 hours in
1914, ibut only 115,829,000 hours in 1922; in 9 cellulose
and paper mills 9,528,000 hours in 1914, but only 5,4155,000
hours in 1923 ; in three breweries 435,000 hours in 1914,
but only 236,000 hours in 1923; in 6 enterprises of building
materials 5,195,000 hours in 1914, but only 2,585,000 hours
in 1923 ; in 6 of the largest fur and leather enterprises
2,538,000 hours in 191'4 ; but only 1,024,000 hours in 1923;
in 6 food enterprises 4,155,000 hours in 1914, but only
898,000 hours in 1003.
These figures tell us that there must have b.een
greater unemployment in Slovakia under Czecho-1Slovakia
than prior to 1918. For the edification of the readers of
Lettirich's "his tory' and of Lettrich himself, we call to their
attention a 'book written by R. W. Seton-.Watson, who has
been known as an agent of Czech propaganda for almost
40 years ; it is ca:lled "THE NEW SLOV.AlKifA" and was
pulblished in 1924 by Fr. Borovy, Pvague. Several quotes
from Chaipter V (Economic Difficulties) may be in order:
1

1

1

1

"In the case of Slovakia today it would be quite idle to deny
that many serious economic grievances do exist, and further, that the
Centralist regime, as at present directed from Prague, is in many respects contr-ary to the economic interests of Slovakia" (p. 78) . ..

"No favo ur was shown even t o th e coal mines of H an dlova, with
disastrous effects upon industry in eastern Slovakia and in Ruth e-

�30

SLOVAKIA

nia" (p. 84) . . . ",I rritation and suspicion are already so general,
that a leailing Slovak industrialist, whom no one to whom I should
name him could deny the titles of patriot and unionist, roundly declared to me that Slova,kia is .reg,a rded •b y 'Prague' as so much economic ballast! The argument that because 80 percent or even more
of Slovak industry is owned by Magyars or Jews it therefore need
not receive the same consideration, is a mere feebl-e pretext, intended
to justify a very doubtful operation. It ma,y be countered in the
first place by a reminder tihat 60-70 percent of Bohemian industry is
owned by Germa:ns or Jews, most of whom are - only to a lesser de·
gree than the Ma,gyars of Slovakia - unwilling citizens of the Republic. . . . However questionable may be the first origins of Slovak
industry - and on this point there is in the main no dispute - it
represents today the means of liv-e lihood of a large population which
is over,w heLmingly Slovak" (p. 94) . . . "The deliberate reduction
of Slovak industries, as a part of a Government programme, without any corresponding reduction in the industries of Bohemia and
Mol'lavia, would be a direct incitement to separatism, and would in
any case force Slovaks, Maigyars, Ruthenes and Germans into an economic alliance so strong as to overshadow the divergencies of political outlook" (P. 95) .. . "According to a calculation of "t,he Union
of Slovak Industrialists, the cost of transport in Slovakia, as late as
the autumn of 1922, was 50 .p ercent ·h igher than in the western half
of the Republic" (p. 84) . . . "But a great deal still requires to be
done in the way of adjusting the general tariff system. . . For the
result o.f these unequal tariffs is to favour still . further the competition of Czech and German firms in Slovakia and to make of Slovakia a dumping ,g round for their surplus goods, while rendering retaliation almost impossible. As a result, it is possible for Moravian
firms to import sand to Zilina and timber to Orava - thus refuting
the proverbial absurility of 'carrying coals to Newcastle' - and thus
Slovak fi.rms are undersold, and cheaper labor is brought from outside, under the eyes of the Slovak unemployed. This creates a great
deal of bad blood and gives rise to the demand, at once objectionable and impracticable, that Czech firms should not be allowed to
compete in Slovakia" (pp. 85-86).

"The Germans exploited SlovaJk natural resources, such
as lumber and o,r es" (p. 171), according to . Lettrich, who
already seems to have forigotten the arguments put forth
to save the skin of Dr. Ing. Zatko in 1946, when he stood
before the National Court in Bratislava. You see, Lettrich
and his SlovaJk National Council had decreed that eivery
deputy of the SlovaJk Parliament had to stand trial. Since
Zatko was such a deputy, he, too, had to •g o through the
or.deal. But he was more fortJunate than most of the other
deputies; being a Lutheran, he had Dr. Lett.rich on his side.
What~er was good in the SlovaJk Republic, Lettrich would
have us know, was the merit of the Lutheran or non-

�SLOVAKIA

31

Catholic deputies; whatever was no good or just plain bad
in it was due to the Catholic deputies. Since Zafko was,
during the war, the mightiest man in the departmen t of
Slova:k economy, and he and Dr. Karvas (head of the Slovak National Bank), were really dictators in this field, Mr.
Lettrich and the other witnesses who testified in Zafko's
behalf tried to prove that it was a splendid dictatorship
a nd that economical ly Slov,aJkia prospered to such a great
extent tha,t its pos-ition could not even be coonpared with
the poor economy of the Czech lands.
At the trial Dr. Matura, an economic expert, showed
that while in the protectorat e 50 percent more than the
average amount of lumlber was exacted, in Slovakia the
production did not reach the norma:l average, so that some
15 million cubic feet of lwmlber, valued at 5 milliard (5
thousand million) Czecho-Sio vak crowns was saved for
the RepuJblic. At that trial Dr. Matura also said that after
the passage of the front "the supplies of raw materials in
Slovakia were higher than on January 1, 1939." Mr. Lettrich's official organ, the CAS, recorded the testimony
gi;ven during Zafko's trial ('CAS, Sept. 7, 1946) . What he
,a nd witnesses said in deferuse of Dr. Zafiko in 1946 is just
the opposite of what he contends in his "history," that
is, that "1Sl0V1akia also pro;vided valuaJble economic and ma~
terial aid to Germany" (ip. 171).
Is Lettrich now teYing us that the testimony given in
behalf of the ecorromic e:,q&gt;erls before the National Court
was false? What else, unless hiis "history" is ,a record of
frauds and falsificatio ns?
Lettrich feels that the power of the Jews is great
and, hence, that it is necessary to flatter the mighty of
this world. So he attempts to do just that in his "history."
The greater ipart of the pictorial supiplemen t is devoted
to the fate of the Jews during the war. It seems that he
borrowed the pictures from a certain book Which was published by the Jews of Prague and Bratislawa in 1949, which
means that it was allowed by the Red regime of Gottwald.
Of course, Lettrich does not want us to know that. To ma!ke
the affair look as horrilble as possible, he graced his "his..
t:ory" with pictures of mass graves from somewhere in

�32

SLOVAKIA

Poland or Germany with which Slovakia had no connection whatever. In this connection he proba:b ly would have
contri,buted to history had he published at least one picture of the hanging of the Jews in Zvolen by the CzechoSlovaJk legionnaires in 1919. At least it would have !been
something ,brused on fact. Looking at the pictures in Lettrich's book, the uninformed reader must get the impression, for example, that the hole filled with dead Jewish
women must lb e in SlovaJkia. Lettrich conveniently avoided
writing an introduction to his pictorial s111pplement; he
simply adds the ipictures arfter the index, and lets the rest
to the imagination of his readers, of course, first offering
several pictures of Slovak political figures. The intent is
only all too clear to all informed observers. But deception
and misrepresentation are hardly the devices of genuine
historians. Lettrich wamited to prove that the anti-Semites
in Slovakia were Catholics and separatists exclusively, so
he resorted to a daring falsification of the facts.
According to Lettrich, the Jews in Slovakia had an
acti;ve participation in Slovak national and cultural life, but
he does not dep~ct the extent of this participation. He even
states .that the Jews were co·- foun&lt;lers of the Matica Slovenska (The Slova1k l!nstitute) . And that certainly is news.
Furthermore, Lettrich would hruve the readers of his "history" know that there never was any anti-Semi.tic feeling
in Slovakia until the "separatists" came into lbeing.
Up to 1919 there is not a single article in Slovak liter ..
ature which shows sympathy for the Jews. There is not a
single S1ovak cultural or national event, about which it
can be said that the Jews of SlovaJkia participated in .
There are very many proofs of the opposite. The Jews
pla,yed an important role only in the economic life of Slova;kia. There is a weal.th of literature depicting just what
that role wa.s.
The first anti-Semitic article in Slo,vakia was printed
in 1785, in the "Stare Noviny" (Old News) of Bystrica,
which was pu'blished and edited 'by IDvangelical (1L utheran)
preachers. In the "Orol TatranSlky" (The Tatra Eagle) of
1845 is an article by Stu.T, recommending the transfer of
Jews; the second time thi,s recommendation was made in a

�SLOVAKIA

33

publication was after the first world war - and it came
from the NEW YORK.SKY DEJNN1K ("Czechoslovak daily
in Slovak language") ! The most radical anti-:Semite in Slovakia was Svetoizar Hurban Vajansky, the son of an Evangelical preacher and the father of the late Ozecho-Slo;vaJk
ambassador to, the US'A. The newspapers whiich excelled
in anti-Semitic articles at that time were the Narodnie
Noviny and the New York.sky Dennik.
The old Matica Slovenska did not have a single founder
who was a J ew. Lettrich iillVented one. It had only one
regular memiber who was Jewish, a certain tavern keeper in
'l'urciansky Svaty Martin. This fellow, h owever, became a
memiber only because most of the people who visited the
Matica were lodged in his home at night and ate in his
tavern. The other J ew, who up to 1919, openly iba;cked the
Slovaks, was a certain Jewish tavern keeper from Sucany;
he was the only J ew in 1S1ovakia who voted for a Slovak
candidate in the parliamentary elections. In the Slovak
Republic the families of both of these Jews enjoyed all privileges and had special protection.
To prove that oruy Catholics and "separatists" were
anti-Semites, Mr. Lettrich quotes from the writings of Gajdos-Breza, to wit: "The J ews are our greatest enemies;
they destroy, spread dissension and demoralize. But these
very same words were used a countless number of times by
Dr. M. Hbd.za, T. G. Masaryk, Mirrosla;v J. Hurban, Svetozar Hu:r'ban-Vajansky, Joseph Skultety, John Slavik, Julius Bodnar, and by many other •w riters and politicians,
scientists and clerics, who were more significant in 'Slovak life than was Gajdos-Breza. Lettrich, however, preferred to forget them in this connection.
T. G. Masaryk founded his "•p rogressive" movement
(the Hlasists) with these counsels:
"Anti-Semitism in Slovakia is warranted (just). . . . In your
land the Jews are everywhere, without exception , against the cultural
efforts of the people. They practice usury. People must be saved from
the yoke of alcohol and Jewish capital. • .. Priests must be national;
the Church must be anti.Semitic so that the people might free itself
economically from Jewish capital. . •."

Srobar, one of the greatest opponents of separatism,
preached the anti-Semitic gospel of Masaryk. "The Jews

�34

SLOVAKIA

always were the exploiters and extortioners of the Slovak
people. The enemies of the State are punished in the entire
world," said -Mr. Vavro Srnlbar at a meeting of the 2upans (Distri:ct Administrators) on August 4, 19,19.
Dr. Anton Stefanek, another great antagonist o,f Slovak autonomy, wrote in the NEW YORKSKY DENNIK
(August 25, 1'920): "Neither the Germans, nor the Magyars, but not even any other nation on earth is more
harmful to our nation than the Jews. But not only to us
Slovaks, but also to the whole Slav world the Jews are the
greatest enemies, and this is a factually and historically
proven matter." Just aJbout a year 1b efore that (June 22,
1919), Stefanelk said in the same newspaper: "One of the
most difficult problems which we shall have to resolve is
the question how the vast masses of this nation shall be
protected from the flood of the Jews, that is, from the destructive and subversive vices that have taken hold. . . ."
T.he NEW YO!RJKISIKY DIDNNlK was quite enthused
by such words and offered this advice: "Send all the Jews
to hell" (N()lV. 11, 191'9) . . . "Since we do not allow a
Jew to become a Zupan, then we must not allow him to be
an owner or director of large factories, enterprises, homes,
and businesses in Slovakia," wrote 'Dvaroiz~k, one orf Lettrich's commissars, already in 191'9 in the NYD . . . "The
irrefutable fact is that something ought to be done about
the Jews in Slovakia already now" (NYD, Oct. 8, 1938).
And what ought to be done, the NYD explains: "So that
they might go to the lands of those nations, which they
voluntarily claimed as their own in 1930" (resolution of the
Czecho-iSlovak Sokol Community, Oct . 7, H)3'8).
Of cour,se, that meant that the Jews. were supposed to
go back to Germany, Hungary and Poland.
in 1938, the newspaper edited 1by Dr. Martin Kivetko,
another commissar of Lettrich's and no,w a significant factor in the Council of Free Czecho~S,lovrukia and one orf the
so-icalled lbig gl,lns of the Free Europe Committee, wrote unequivocally that there was only one effective way to deal
with the Jewish prolblem, so he presented it in this manner:
"Germany has shown us how we must deal with the foreign element. We must apply such methods even more than

�SLOV.AKI.A

35

Germany" (Narodnie Noviny, Sept. 18, 1938). In other
words, he recommended Hitler's methods.
Gabo Rapos, who received the greatest decoration
from the hands of Dr. Lettrich, wrote the foJlorwing in
the Narodnie Noviny (Oct. 6, 1938). "We must also rid
ourselves of one more element which economically is pauperizfog Slovakia - we must resolve the Jewish question
which impedes the development of Slovakia, and we must
rid ourselves of all parasites!"
Did the situation change in 1945? Well, Senior Sensel,
a deputy of Lettrich's "democratic" party, prophesied as
follows: "We'll first lay aside our Lutheran garb and stop
reading the Passion, before we put anti-Semitism aside."
Dr. Martin BeHus, another o.f Lettri.ch's stalwarts,
wrote in a similar vein in· the Narodnie Noviny and recommended the use of Hitler's methods: "Every half-way solution ( of the Jewish question) supported by pseudodemo('ratic principles is bound to fail, because it opposes the interests of the whole of autonomous Slovakia and the State
of the Czechs, Slovaks and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians."
But even Dr. Lettrich himself, as co-ehairman of the
Slovaik National Coun'Cil, demanded that the Jews in Slovakia be treated or dealt with as with enemies, the Germans and Magyars. In 1945, he proclaimed: "We must
endeavor without mercy to chase the Magyars and Germans out of our countr:y. 'Ilhe Jews, who by their feelings
and their language show sympathy toward the Magyars
or Germans, we shall regard as Germans and Magyars and
they shall have to share the lot of Germans and Magyars."
And those he did expel !
Dry statistical figures say nothing about the Slovak
nationality of Jews. In 11890, 6 percent of the Jews living in
Slovakia claimed ,SlovaJk as their mother tongue, but in
1910 only 2 percent did.
It is both interesting and significant to the informed
reader that Lettrich devotes qll.lite a bit of his space in his
"history" to quotations of altogether unimportant and
ipoliticaUy, insignificant people, but conveniently forgets
to quote authorities,, such as 'Masaryk, Srolbar, Stefaneik,
Hodza, Jan Slavik, Sensel. He quotes from the "Slovak,"

�36

SLOVAKIA

but forgets to do so from the "!Stare No,v iny, Orol Tatransky, Narodnie Noviny, Cirkevne Listy, New YorksJky Dennik, Slovensky Dennik, Slov,enstke :Pohfady" and other periodicals.
Lettrich tries to place the entire responsiibiUty for the
sufferings of the Jews on the Slovak Go;vernment, even
though an institution regarded as reS1ponsilble and serious,
which proba;bly was mo.re concerned than any other with
this prdblem the International Red Cross - stated
that: at certain times SlovaJkia was regarded as a refuge
of the Jews, especially Polish Jews; the Jews who remained in .Slovakia were comparatively protected until the
uprising against the German army at the end of August
1944; it is true that the law of . May 5, 1942, resulted in
the arrest of several thousands of Jews, but in the cam,ps,
where living and housing conditions were adequate, the
prisoners were aUowed to wovk for pay under conditions
which approximated free economy; in H,ungary, like in
Slovrukia, Israelites were spared as long as the local gov~
ernment hrud a certain freedom of action (Vd. Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge, Vol 29, No•. 348, Dec. 1947).
The EVA1NGEil.;]ST, t'he official organ of the Diocese
of A]bany, N. Y., carried a ,r eport from Prague sayi,nig that
a comparison of the ipre-,war andi ipost-war nUlilliber of ,perisons of the Jewish faith and r,a.ce in Czecho-Slova;kia shows
that while in Ozechia and 1M oravia - which were under
Ge.r,man rule - 85 pevcent of the Jews perished, in Sl0&gt;vakia, on the other hand, during the reign of President
Joseph Tiso, 85 percent of the Jews were saved.
After 194!5, at the Bratislava University, several sons
of the foremost "Oze:cho-Slovak and Lutheran" families
objected to receiving doctorates together with Jews and
the university had to arrange another time for the ceremO'Ily; the Jews recei,v ed their doctorates with former
members of the Hllinlka youth. And Lettrich wa:S boss in
SlovaJkia at that time!
History !b,ooks usually carry pictures of leading personalities and events that made history. Lettrich's "history," however, is different; it tells the story of so-called
"Catholic crimes" and, quite understandably then, Lettrich

�SLOVAKIA

37

used only photographs of so--called "Catholic criminals."
Under one ,p icture whi'ch is a,lmost ineligiible, for example,
we read: "Canon KaroJ Korper wearing a Hlinka Guard
cap while sperukirng." What the occasion was and what
Korper said is left to the imagination of the reader. Orf
course, those who were present on that occasion know that
a blessing of the Slovalk colors took place. They also ,k now
that the speaker who followed K6r,p er was the Eviangelical
(Lutheran) chaplain of the Hllinka Guard, Dr. Ladislaus
Jurkovilc. The latter and I went to school together and
were good friends; I was glad to see him in Lettrich's
book; he is to. the left of Ko:nper, 'b etween two German
officers. Lettrich obviously was only interested in lifting
out the name of Canon Korper.
Then there is the picture of Comrade Kaftanov. He,
too, made Lettrich's "history," even though he proibrubly
will not make Russian history. Kaftanov attended the
occasion of Dr. Tuka's instaH.ation as rector of the Bratislava University, at which he is reported to have predicted a "glorious future for the Slovak 'State, because it
resulted from the collaboration of the two. most powerful
nations, the Germans an.d the Russians, who had decided
to reorganize the a,ppearance of Euro,pe." Since Lettrich
bothered with Kaftanov, he should have also mentioned the
names of very distinguished scholars and representatives
of world-renowned uni.versities (American, French, English, Italian, '11unkish, etc.) who· sent congratulatory messages to Dr. Tuka.
And Lettrich's picture is lacking, too, even though
he was photographed while pinning decorations on quite
a few Red Russians. We are supposed to believe, too, that
theire are no ,p ictures of LeUrich with Tito, Gottwald, Siroky, Duris, Pull, Smidike, Husak, and other Communists.
Too bad, too, that he could not embellish his pictorial supplement with a few ,photos Off the German ambassador to
Slovaikia, of N a zi generals and economic represen.tat1ves
all orf whom enjoyed huntin,g wiitih Lettrich's friends on
their pri•v•a te hunting reserves and were very happy to
shruke hands with Na;zis. But even this is all petty and
trivial.
1

�38

SLOVAKIA

The ,S lovak RepU!blic was the work of peo,ple and it
was managed ,b y people. It is, therefore, quite understandable that, like other states, the Slovruk RepUibliic also had
its faults ,a nd deficiencies. It was born during a world crisis, in the shadow of the gigantic German Reich, to which
the western ,p owers aJbandoned the whole of Europe. At
that time there was no force, single or combined, which
could or did intervene to change the course o!f events.
Lettrich states that Benes and others, including himself,
were forced to do things under given circumstances, which
they probably would not have done under no•I1Inal condi~
tions. And that is und~rstandable.
But why shotl!ld Lettrich create the impression that the
Slovruks and Tiso, w'ho were respons~ble for the welfare of
the Slovak Republic, willingly and voluntarily went along
in all things with the Nazis? The answer is obvious. Lettrich could not control or overcome his ,prejudices and his
intense hatred of Tiso and his group, which he calls the •
"Catholic Party" and which represented the overwhelming
majority of the Slov3;ks. In this he was no different than
the Communists and the chauvinistic Benes Czechs.
In a word, Lettrich's "history" is one of the most
shameful, vicious and malicious books about Sl01Vakia tihat
was ever published. Griinwald's infamous "Felvidek" in
comparison is an inno.c ent song. To those who read Lettrich's book, I say this: do not even believe the figures he
gives as the .p opulation for any Slovak town or city, because thev are most certainly falsified. The "History of
Modern 'Slovwkia" is, indeed, a true picture of Lettrich's
,p olitical and moral stature!

•

•

•

"CZEOHOSLOVAKISM VERSUS A'MERICANISIM" an ~pose of .t he pr~Soviet "National Froniters" in the socalled Oouncil of Free Ozechoslov-ailcia - is a 48 :page booklet pwbliished by the Slovak League o!f America, which
should be read 'by every one seekdng the answer to the
queQtion of how "Ozecho-.Slovak demoora·c y" ooniveirted to a
",p eople's demoocacy." Send 25 cents (coin or stamps) to
the SIJOVAKiiA for your copy today.

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1299">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA

21

LETI'RIOH'S IDSTORY OF SLOVAK.IA
By Constantine Oulen
We shall not criticize the ideological side of his booik,
because according to Letitric,h only the Slovak Catholics
were Nazis, only they praised Hitler, only they wrote derogatively of the Jews, only they Aryanized, only they
were in the Hlinka Guards, and only they were dissatis ...
fied in the Czecho.,Slovak Reipu1blic.
We shall not carry on polemics with Lettrich even on
as, for example, the Sudanians, because we know that Lettrich is of the conviction that what is the right of the unclothed Sudanian at home, does not belong to the Slovaks
at home even if they were to weM' fro-cks and uniforms.
We know that from a feeling of his own inferio,r 'ity even
an under-average Czech is an unattainable ideal. Lettrich
really belongs under the Czechs.
We shall not d~bate about whether Lettrich was en~
titled to let thousands od' Slova;ks lhe jailed, and we shall
not deJbate ,a bout the Magyarism of the politicians of the
Slo,vaik People's Party, beC'ause that is, after aJll, a matter
of personal opinion, and it is useless to talik about the
beauty of colors with a color-blind person.
The statistics presented or ref erred to by Lettrich,
however, really is not 'history, but news. They demonst11ate the superficiality, irresponsiibility and outright falsification of facts.
L ettrich wanted to prove Urat the progress Slovakia
made in the Czecho-iSlovak Repu:bli·c from 1918 to 1938
"had never been surpassed in any phase of history" by
referring to the gigantic growth of various Slovak cities
(p. 64). He compares the 1919 with the 1948 numlber of inha:bitants of some cities. Many cities, indeed, did develop
and grow, while otihers showed a decrease in population.
But we see that everywhere, not only in .Slovakia. So, are
we to regard that as a "Czecho..,Slovaik" miracle? Is it not
practically a universal oustom that :people leave the farms
for the cities? And even Lettrich should know that the
influx of some 200,000 Czechs into Slovakia, especially into
1

�22

SLOVAKIA

the cities, certainly had something to do with the increase
in population of those cities.
But why shou1d Lettrich resort to false statistics
even in this case? He could have proved his case even with
correct statistics, selected from official statistical publications. It is obvious that Leittrich preferred to use other statistics: those which sulbstantially decrease the numlber of
inhabitants from Magyar times and su:b stantially increase
the number of inhaJbitants from the times of the Czecho~
Slovruk Republic.
According to Lett.rich, Zilina had 9,000 inh~bitants
in 1919 and 18,000 in 1948 (p. 64). But Zilina, we know,
already :had 9,166 inhaJbitants in 1910; 12,073 after the
census was taken in Ozecho-Slo•v akia; and in 1940, in the
Slovak Republic, 19,329 (Vd. SOZNAM OBOI NA SLOVEN~U, p. 161). Aooording to Lettrich, then, Zilina had
1~ people in 1948 than in 1940. According to Dr. Palic
(Vd. OIDSKOSLOVENSKY PR!EHLED), Zilina had 16,400
i.nhabitants in 1949.
According to Lettrich, Turciansky &amp;vaty Martin had
3,000 inhabitants in 1919, but 20,000 in 1948. However, we
know that T. iSv. M. had 3,351 inha,bitants already in 1900;
4,101 in 11910; and 5,6'57 after the first Czecho--,Slova:k
census. Where did Lettrich get the 20,000 figure? And the
other statistics? In the footnote (ip. 64), he says his source
was (pp. '118-157) of "':NIE POPULATION OF CZECHOSLOV~ " by Waller Wynne, Jr. (Washington, 1953).
But that source does not show 20,000 inha:bitants. for T.
Sv. M . ! It shows 11,300 for the year 1940; in 1946 only
10,600, hence, less t'han during the time of the Slovak Republic. In fact a closer loolk at pages 47-57 shows Wynne's
book of afificfal American statistics does not carry the
figures either for 1919, with which Lettrich begins, or
for 1948, with which Lettrich ends; but we do find there
the figures for 1940 and 1946.
It seems that pseudohistorian Lettrich did not understand ,w hat he read. Wynne gives the figures for the
growth of cities between 1930 and 1947 "in 1948 area."
Lettrich quotes the number of inhabitants of the various
Slovak cities for 194i8 from statistics, of Octolber 1, 1946.

�SLOVAKIA

23

When . a historian writes a:bout ithe growth of some
cities and towns, it is not unusual for him to mention the
decrease in populat'ion of others. But Lettrich is different;
he is determined to pmve that the Czecho--•SltoviaJk Republic
was responsible only for "growth" figures,. For example,
the following cities and towns decreased as indicated: Skalica 2.3 percent; Myjava 2.7 percent; Pukanec 2.9 percent;
Bansika Stiavnica 8.3 •p ercent; Doib,sina 12:3 percent; Gelnica 24.1 percent; Reviuca 32.2 percent. Why these old industria~ centers decreased in populatfon could also form an
interesting chapter in a SlovaJk history, which is cal,l ed
'modern"!
"Between 1906 and 1908 alone, 56·0 Slovaks were sentenced for
political crimes to a total of 91 years in jail and fines of 42,000
Crowns" (p. 38).

That's what Lettrfoh says rubout Magyar persecution,
but even here there seems to :b e a slight error of some
ten years. The figures given are for a period of 12 years
and not two. We suggest that Lettrich c'hook .this item
with the figures given by R. W. Seton-·Watson, whom he
probaibly wanted to quote (RAOIAL BROBLEM!S IN HUNGARY, p. 466). To check this item, he might also use the
SLOVENISKY OB~OR and the PIRUDY, with which he is
quite familiar.
It is, significant, too, that, in the matter of persecution,
oppression and suppression, Mr. Lettrich quite conveniently forgets to rememb.er what the Slovaks suffered from
1945 to 1'948, when he and Communist Schmidke ,w ere cocha_imnen of the SlovaJk National Council, the lbody supreme
in Slovakia. The Magyars treated the Slo1vaks harshly and
unjustly, it is true; Magyar statistics themselves prove
that. There is no need to add anything to thek figures; we
need not magnid'y those statistics in 1955. As they are, tihey
are a monument to intolerance., dishonesty, and especially
.p olitical short-sightedness. In the final analysis, what the
ruling Magyaris did was a crime even against the Magyar
nation.
On the other hand, however, what was done to the
Slovaks during the Benes-Lettrich er.a is so terribfo, r8JW,
and criminal that it simply is without parallel in the

�24

SLOVAKIA

thousand-year history O!f the Slovaks. Lettrich's regime
pa:s:ses into Sliovak history as a regime O!f an unbroken
skein of the most terrilble and blo·odiest crimes.
At one of the meetings of the Board of Commissars,
when Lettrirch ruled, a reiport was given that 19,740 persons, most of them in:tellectuals, were jailed; 56 of them
already were sentenced to death and the rest o£ them received a total of 12,555 years in jail; and the property
of most of them ,w a s confiscated. And that was only the
beginning. In 19416, the a'Verage jail senitence was 19
months; at the end of 1'947, it was 33 months and 14
days. 'Dhiat was in the days when Lettrich's word could
save a person's life, or a:meliorate a sentence. Lettrioh's
cowts meted out jail sentenices which were 1,250 percent
higher, besides that also executions, which in peace time
did not even happen in Hungary.
But Lettrilch makes a lb ig issue of 91 yearn in jail which
the Magyar-s meted out to 560 Slovaks in twelve years!
What is 1:lhaJt in •c omparison to what Leittrich's regime was
responsible for? Hias, Lettrich already fongotten the Slova:ks executed, the thousands in Silberia, the crammed jaHs
and concentration camps, the people beaten by his police?
Hias he forgotten the thous•a nds of women who were raped
by rhis glorified partisans, the freight cars crammed with
Magyars whom he tra:nsferred to Czech lands for slave
la!bor, the 15 frozen Magyar children in one of those ft-eight
car-s, which waited under the Bratis1a~a bridge in January
without any heat for over rbwo weeks until an order was
given to move? Yes, and what is that in comparison to the
300,000 ,b eaten Germans? Lettrich made thi,s history, was
a respoinsilble patt of it, so why should he not include it in
his "History of Modern Slo'Vakia"?
1

".fn 1918 Hungarian statistics listed no more than 30,118 children
of Slovak nationality" (p. 37).

But the truth is that Magyar staUstiJcs for that year
showed 255,7'92 school child.rein of Slovak natli onality (Vd .
.Judr Fojifr: NAIRODNi SKOLY V REPUBillCE Cs DLE
S'DAVU ZID DNIE 31. PROS. 1'92,1, which contains detailed
statistics of Slovak elementary schiools from 11881 to 1919).
Lettrich is a bit befuddled or wants to befuddle others.
1

�SLOVAKIA

25

Magyar statistics show that in 1'918 there were 30,118
Slovalk children in 365 Slovak schooJs, but the same statistics showed that there were 255,792 Slovak school children, the rubsolute majority of which, of course, had to attend Magyar schools. Magyar statli.stics were false, but
even Magyar statisticians were not so stupid .as to show
30,000 school children for a nation of three million. They
left .that to Lettrioh !
"In 1918 ... there were 12,447 Hungarian civil servants on Slovak territory. Only 35 offered their services to the new Republic
The others, being of Magyar nat ionality, refused to serve" (p. 39) ,

Now, -if that were kue, then Count Apponyi was right
when he said that the Slovaks were against uniting with
the Czechs. But Lettrich is wrong again. Ho,w did he arrive at those figures? Lettrich not only accepts the statistics supplied by Count Al1bert Apponyd. to support his ar•
guments to save the unity of greater Hungairy at the Peace
Conference, 1b ut even e~plains them more unfavorably for
the Slovaks than Apponyi himself. At .the Peace Oonference CoU!nt A,pponyi presented stabstics about the number
of offidals and teachers in Hungary. He said th'at in the
whole of Hungary there were 12,447 state employees:
12,412 Magyars and 35 Slo,vaks. Of the 35 SlQIV'akS, 18
were employed in 17 ISl,ova;k districts.
Lettrich, not understanding what he read, wrote that
in Slovakia there were 12,447 Magyar officiaJs, 35 of whom
were Slovak, and the rest (12,412) refused to ta;ke the
loyalty oath to the Ozecho-Slovruk Reip,ublic. Now, what
are the facts ?
1. It is not true that there were 12,447 Magyar State
emip loyees in Slo,v a1kia. The figure relates to, the whole of
Hungiary, with the e:x:ception of Croatia. In Slovakia there
were 920 Magyars, 11 Germans and 18 Slovaks employed
by the Hungarian State.
2. lt is not true that only 3'5 were willing to serve the
Czecho-•Slova;k Repulb1iic. The figures refer only to those
who were 'listed as Slovalks, but say nothing about their
willingness or unwillingless to serve the Czecho-1Slova:k Republic.
3. It is not true that the rest ref.used to• serve the
1

�26

SLOVAKIA

Ozecho-lSlovruk Repulblic. If that were so, then it would
not have been possilble even ,w ith the help of the Ozechs to
establish a Cze:cho-SlovaJk regime in Slovakia. The absolute
majority of State employees, even those of German and
Mrugyar origin, took the oath of loyalty to the Czecho-Slo . .
vak Repu:blk. Only ,a minority ref.used to take the loyalty
oath; the number of those who r&amp;fused was never recorded
statistically (Vd. .Dr. H. Rashofer: Die Tschechoslowa,kischen Denks-chriften fiir die Friedenskonference von Paris 1919-1920, pp. 187~193; and Magyar Beketargyalasok).
Continuing to falsify statistics, Lettrich states that
only "10 of the 660 high school teachers and college professors" offered their services to the new Repulblic of Czecho-iSlovakia (,p. 40).
At the Peace Conference, Count Apponyi stated that
there ,w ere 23 Slovaks teaching in the secondary schools ;
10 of these taught in Slwaikia. Dr. Derer, speaiking on the
floor of the Prague Parliament, February 7, 1931, said
that there was only 1 Slovak professor under Hungary.
Michael Slavik counted 25 in his 'book : 115 Lutherans and
10 Catho'.1 ks. The fact is, however, that the 11918-19 school
year began in SlovaJkia. with over a 100 Slov8Jk professors.
Many left good positions in large Magyar cities to accept
teaching positions in Slovruk towns and villages; they sacrificed muoh just so th'at they might serve their nation.
But the Czechs rejected ·s:ome of them and relegated
many of them to teach in Magyar schools!
Certainly Lettrich himself could, if he only wanted to,
name more than 10 Slovak professors of the Lutheran
faith alone w'ho served the young Repulblic enthusiastically
in HH8. We might mention the following Sl~vak professors
who definitely did tea.ch in SlovaJkia in 191'8: Rozim, Kmet'.,
Branecky, Potkan, Fr. Tiso, Kra.jniak, Vallo, Kovalik, Mruirgas, Hlavaty, Hronec, Ohra.pa, Lisy, Klein--Tesnoskals:ky,
Horniaik, BeniaJC, Poto:cky, Misik, Bezak, '.Domaja, Resek,
FJorek, Necikar, Bu;jnaik, Vo~ko-Starohorsky, Twdy.
Count Aipponyi ma.de all kinds of statements at the
Paris Pea.:ce Coruferenice; but he did not go as far as Lettrich. What Lettrich says could be used adrvantageously

�SLOVAKIA

27

by Magyar revisionist propaganda. And yet he thmks this
is an argument for the "Czecho-lSlovak" concept! It is
strange, indeed, tha,t we who are considered "seiparatists"
should have to defend the Czecho-iSlavak Republic even
against Lettrich. Did he forget about the five Slovak university pro,fessors from Budapest who came to Bratislava
to, offer their services to the new Republic, but not ooe was
accepted? Tuka and Kviatcala, too, were rejected in favor of
Czech professo:vs,, were they not?
It is almost useaess to attempt to analyize otther statistics given 'by Lettrich in his "history." They are all
equally false. Lettriich simply either did not understand
the significance of what he read, or, if he did, then he falsified knowingly. In this category he outdid Apponyi. Lettrich could have proved his point easHy in an hooest manner, but he preferred to use the Magyar system: minim.ie.e
and vilify everything that was SloV'ak. Slovaks never regarded tMagyar figures as reliable, so why should Lettrich
regard them as the last word? A Ozech statistician Wl'ote
the foUowing a;bout Magyar statistics:
1

"The incorrectness of Magyar official statistics is attested to
even by official Magyar data about the spreading of knowledge of
the individual languages. On the territory of the 16 Slovak counwhich either completely or partly fell to Czecho-Slovakia ties in 1910, there were 300,584 Magyars who knew Slovak; that is, 25.3
percent of all the Magyar inhabitants of those 16 counties. On that
same territory, in 1910, it was recorded that only 281,230 Slovaks
(16.5 percent) knew Magyar, even though the great majority of
Slovaks was educated in Magyar schools whose main job was to
teach Magyar. On the other hand, it is still more odd that 25.3 percent of the Magyars in the 16 Slovak counties could speak Slovak,
that is, the language of the Pariahs, the language that was despised,
suppressed and cast out of the schools, offices and public life.
"This discordance must be explained only by the fact that a
great number of ·Slovaks, who knew Magyar, were counted among
the Magyars. We need not conjecture that 300,000 Magyars learned
Slovak either out of love for Slovak or other motives. Mraz, in his
book "Slovensko vo svetle statistiky," estimates that of the 300,000
'Magyars who know Slovak,' there are at least 200,000 Slovaks who
did not learn Magyar, but were counted as Magyars when the census was taken" (Ph. Dr. VI. Slaninka: Narodnostni vyvoj Ceskoslovenske republiky, Pra,gue 1938 ; pp. 67-68) .

And that is a fad. There is a difference !between actually &gt;Magy,ari'zed SlovaJks and 'Slovruks whom only Magyar
statistics regarded as Magyars. Lettrich obviously under-

�28

SLOVAKIA

took the task of proving the miraculous "progre.ss" oif the
Slovaks in the Czecho-·S lovak Repuiblic by ma:gnifying Magyar injustices and aJbolishing all Czoch injustices. But a
historian should write olbjec·Uvely; he must not forget even
what was good in Hungary, jrust as he must record what
was good in Cz~cho-:Slovakia; and he must not close his
eyes ei.theT to Magyar o,r Czech injustices.
"Serious unemployment and perpetual depression reigned in Slovakia from the Austrian-Hungarian Settlement in 1867, unti I the outbreak of World War I. In that period three-quarters of a million
Slovaks emigrated to earn their bread abroad, mostly in the United
States" (p. 40) .

Why Lettrich uses the year 1867 as his initial year is ·
diffictrlt to understand, becaiuse it was just at the end of
the last and the 1beginning of the present century that Hungary began to ,b uild up_ industrially, and most of the enteriprises were built in .SlovaJkia with state funds.
From 1881 to 191'4, there we.:re 960 industrial enterprises built in Slovaikia; another 760 were remodeled to
manufacture various products. Jlt is estimated that this
cost the Hungarian State 63 million pre-war Gold Orowns.
There was one industrial enterprise for every 617 inhaJbitants in Slova;kia, according to lli. E. Stodola ("Statistika
Slo;v enska").
How did industry in Slovaikia fare under Ozecho-Slovakia?
Well, when the Cze·c hs came to power, Slov,a k industrial enterprises rwere graidually dosed up. The Czechs
said: 1. Slovakia should be the agricultural country of
the Staite; 2. Slovak industry did not have natural prerequisites; it was lb uilt with the he1p of the Magyar State,
hence, it had to be destroyed; 3. Slo,vaik industry belongs
to Magya:r Jews and foreigners, who suppressed the Slo-·
va:ks nationally; this must be aivenged by destroying their
properties; 4. More modern Ozech industry can produce
more cheaply and abundantly all the products which were
produced by faicfories in Sfovakia, therefore, the latter
must be liquidated.
The "Morgenthau" plan for Germany in 1945 was put
into effoct by the Benes Czechs for Slovakia in 1918 ! Lettrich might pretend not to ·know the facts, or may simply

�SLOVAKIA

29

ignore them, lbut nevertheless facts they still remain. The
Federation of Slovak Industrialists pU!blished reports annually; Lettrich undoubtedly knows aJbout them, or should
have, if he wanted his "history" to be objective. What do
the r eports of that Federation tell us?
In the Slovak wood industry, in the 11 largest enterprises, workers put in 9,04'5,000 hours in 1914, tbut only
3,786,000 hours in 1923 ; in 19 of the largest chemical
plants, Sl()IVak workers put in 8,352,000 hours in 1914, but
only 4,5·38,000 hours in 1923; in three of the largest glass
enter,prises, 2,937,000 hours in 1914, but only 468,000
hours in 1 92,6 ; in 9 of the largest mining and smelting
enteriprises 11,469,000 hours in 1914, but only 5,684,000
hours in 1922; in 8 of the largest grain mills 1,·680,000
hours in 1914, but only 853,000 hours in 1926 ; in 19 metal
enter.prises 14,271,000 hours in 1914, but only 7,059,000
hours in 1923; in 12 textile enterprises 29,080,000 hours in
1914, ibut only 115,829,000 hours in 1922; in 9 cellulose
and paper mills 9,528,000 hours in 1914, but only 5,4155,000
hours in 1923 ; in three breweries 435,000 hours in 1914,
but only 236,000 hours in 1923; in 6 enterprises of building
materials 5,195,000 hours in 1914, but only 2,585,000 hours
in 1923 ; in 6 of the largest fur and leather enterprises
2,538,000 hours in 191'4 ; but only 1,024,000 hours in 1923;
in 6 food enterprises 4,155,000 hours in 1914, but only
898,000 hours in 1003.
These figures tell us that there must have b.een
greater unemployment in Slovakia under Czecho-1Slovakia
than prior to 1918. For the edification of the readers of
Lettirich's "his tory' and of Lettrich himself, we call to their
attention a 'book written by R. W. Seton-.Watson, who has
been known as an agent of Czech propaganda for almost
40 years ; it is ca:lled "THE NEW SLOV.AlKifA" and was
pulblished in 1924 by Fr. Borovy, Pvague. Several quotes
from Chaipter V (Economic Difficulties) may be in order:
1

1

1

1

"In the case of Slovakia today it would be quite idle to deny
that many serious economic grievances do exist, and further, that the
Centralist regime, as at present directed from Prague, is in many respects contr-ary to the economic interests of Slovakia" (p. 78) . ..

"No favo ur was shown even t o th e coal mines of H an dlova, with
disastrous effects upon industry in eastern Slovakia and in Ruth e-

�30

SLOVAKIA

nia" (p. 84) . . . ",I rritation and suspicion are already so general,
that a leailing Slovak industrialist, whom no one to whom I should
name him could deny the titles of patriot and unionist, roundly declared to me that Slova,kia is .reg,a rded •b y 'Prague' as so much economic ballast! The argument that because 80 percent or even more
of Slovak industry is owned by Magyars or Jews it therefore need
not receive the same consideration, is a mere feebl-e pretext, intended
to justify a very doubtful operation. It ma,y be countered in the
first place by a reminder tihat 60-70 percent of Bohemian industry is
owned by Germa:ns or Jews, most of whom are - only to a lesser de·
gree than the Ma,gyars of Slovakia - unwilling citizens of the Republic. . . . However questionable may be the first origins of Slovak
industry - and on this point there is in the main no dispute - it
represents today the means of liv-e lihood of a large population which
is over,w heLmingly Slovak" (p. 94) . . . "The deliberate reduction
of Slovak industries, as a part of a Government programme, without any corresponding reduction in the industries of Bohemia and
Mol'lavia, would be a direct incitement to separatism, and would in
any case force Slovaks, Maigyars, Ruthenes and Germans into an economic alliance so strong as to overshadow the divergencies of political outlook" (P. 95) .. . "According to a calculation of "t,he Union
of Slovak Industrialists, the cost of transport in Slovakia, as late as
the autumn of 1922, was 50 .p ercent ·h igher than in the western half
of the Republic" (p. 84) . . . "But a great deal still requires to be
done in the way of adjusting the general tariff system. . . For the
result o.f these unequal tariffs is to favour still . further the competition of Czech and German firms in Slovakia and to make of Slovakia a dumping ,g round for their surplus goods, while rendering retaliation almost impossible. As a result, it is possible for Moravian
firms to import sand to Zilina and timber to Orava - thus refuting
the proverbial absurility of 'carrying coals to Newcastle' - and thus
Slovak fi.rms are undersold, and cheaper labor is brought from outside, under the eyes of the Slovak unemployed. This creates a great
deal of bad blood and gives rise to the demand, at once objectionable and impracticable, that Czech firms should not be allowed to
compete in Slovakia" (pp. 85-86).

"The Germans exploited SlovaJk natural resources, such
as lumber and o,r es" (p. 171), according to . Lettrich, who
already seems to have forigotten the arguments put forth
to save the skin of Dr. Ing. Zatko in 1946, when he stood
before the National Court in Bratislava. You see, Lettrich
and his SlovaJk National Council had decreed that eivery
deputy of the SlovaJk Parliament had to stand trial. Since
Zatko was such a deputy, he, too, had to •g o through the
or.deal. But he was more fortJunate than most of the other
deputies; being a Lutheran, he had Dr. Lett.rich on his side.
What~er was good in the SlovaJk Republic, Lettrich would
have us know, was the merit of the Lutheran or non-

�SLOVAKIA

31

Catholic deputies; whatever was no good or just plain bad
in it was due to the Catholic deputies. Since Zafko was,
during the war, the mightiest man in the departmen t of
Slova:k economy, and he and Dr. Karvas (head of the Slovak National Bank), were really dictators in this field, Mr.
Lettrich and the other witnesses who testified in Zafko's
behalf tried to prove that it was a splendid dictatorship
a nd that economical ly Slov,aJkia prospered to such a great
extent tha,t its pos-ition could not even be coonpared with
the poor economy of the Czech lands.
At the trial Dr. Matura, an economic expert, showed
that while in the protectorat e 50 percent more than the
average amount of lumlber was exacted, in Slovakia the
production did not reach the norma:l average, so that some
15 million cubic feet of lwmlber, valued at 5 milliard (5
thousand million) Czecho-Sio vak crowns was saved for
the RepuJblic. At that trial Dr. Matura also said that after
the passage of the front "the supplies of raw materials in
Slovakia were higher than on January 1, 1939." Mr. Lettrich's official organ, the CAS, recorded the testimony
gi;ven during Zafko's trial ('CAS, Sept. 7, 1946) . What he
,a nd witnesses said in deferuse of Dr. Zafiko in 1946 is just
the opposite of what he contends in his "history," that
is, that "1Sl0V1akia also pro;vided valuaJble economic and ma~
terial aid to Germany" (ip. 171).
Is Lettrich now teYing us that the testimony given in
behalf of the ecorromic e:,q&gt;erls before the National Court
was false? What else, unless hiis "history" is ,a record of
frauds and falsificatio ns?
Lettrich feels that the power of the Jews is great
and, hence, that it is necessary to flatter the mighty of
this world. So he attempts to do just that in his "history."
The greater ipart of the pictorial supiplemen t is devoted
to the fate of the Jews during the war. It seems that he
borrowed the pictures from a certain book Which was published by the Jews of Prague and Bratislawa in 1949, which
means that it was allowed by the Red regime of Gottwald.
Of course, Lettrich does not want us to know that. To ma!ke
the affair look as horrilble as possible, he graced his "his..
t:ory" with pictures of mass graves from somewhere in

�32

SLOVAKIA

Poland or Germany with which Slovakia had no connection whatever. In this connection he proba:b ly would have
contri,buted to history had he published at least one picture of the hanging of the Jews in Zvolen by the CzechoSlovaJk legionnaires in 1919. At least it would have !been
something ,brused on fact. Looking at the pictures in Lettrich's book, the uninformed reader must get the impression, for example, that the hole filled with dead Jewish
women must lb e in SlovaJkia. Lettrich conveniently avoided
writing an introduction to his pictorial s111pplement; he
simply adds the ipictures arfter the index, and lets the rest
to the imagination of his readers, of course, first offering
several pictures of Slovak political figures. The intent is
only all too clear to all informed observers. But deception
and misrepresentation are hardly the devices of genuine
historians. Lettrich wamited to prove that the anti-Semites
in Slovakia were Catholics and separatists exclusively, so
he resorted to a daring falsification of the facts.
According to Lettrich, the Jews in Slovakia had an
acti;ve participation in Slovak national and cultural life, but
he does not dep~ct the extent of this participation. He even
states .that the Jews were co·- foun&lt;lers of the Matica Slovenska (The Slova1k l!nstitute) . And that certainly is news.
Furthermore, Lettrich would hruve the readers of his "history" know that there never was any anti-Semi.tic feeling
in Slovakia until the "separatists" came into lbeing.
Up to 1919 there is not a single article in Slovak liter ..
ature which shows sympathy for the Jews. There is not a
single S1ovak cultural or national event, about which it
can be said that the Jews of SlovaJkia participated in .
There are very many proofs of the opposite. The Jews
pla,yed an important role only in the economic life of Slova;kia. There is a weal.th of literature depicting just what
that role wa.s.
The first anti-Semitic article in Slo,vakia was printed
in 1785, in the "Stare Noviny" (Old News) of Bystrica,
which was pu'blished and edited 'by IDvangelical (1L utheran)
preachers. In the "Orol TatranSlky" (The Tatra Eagle) of
1845 is an article by Stu.T, recommending the transfer of
Jews; the second time thi,s recommendation was made in a

�SLOVAKIA

33

publication was after the first world war - and it came
from the NEW YORK.SKY DEJNN1K ("Czechoslovak daily
in Slovak language") ! The most radical anti-:Semite in Slovakia was Svetoizar Hurban Vajansky, the son of an Evangelical preacher and the father of the late Ozecho-Slo;vaJk
ambassador to, the US'A. The newspapers whiich excelled
in anti-Semitic articles at that time were the Narodnie
Noviny and the New York.sky Dennik.
The old Matica Slovenska did not have a single founder
who was a J ew. Lettrich iillVented one. It had only one
regular memiber who was Jewish, a certain tavern keeper in
'l'urciansky Svaty Martin. This fellow, h owever, became a
memiber only because most of the people who visited the
Matica were lodged in his home at night and ate in his
tavern. The other J ew, who up to 1919, openly iba;cked the
Slovaks, was a certain Jewish tavern keeper from Sucany;
he was the only J ew in 1S1ovakia who voted for a Slovak
candidate in the parliamentary elections. In the Slovak
Republic the families of both of these Jews enjoyed all privileges and had special protection.
To prove that oruy Catholics and "separatists" were
anti-Semites, Mr. Lettrich quotes from the writings of Gajdos-Breza, to wit: "The J ews are our greatest enemies;
they destroy, spread dissension and demoralize. But these
very same words were used a countless number of times by
Dr. M. Hbd.za, T. G. Masaryk, Mirrosla;v J. Hurban, Svetozar Hu:r'ban-Vajansky, Joseph Skultety, John Slavik, Julius Bodnar, and by many other •w riters and politicians,
scientists and clerics, who were more significant in 'Slovak life than was Gajdos-Breza. Lettrich, however, preferred to forget them in this connection.
T. G. Masaryk founded his "•p rogressive" movement
(the Hlasists) with these counsels:
"Anti-Semitism in Slovakia is warranted (just). . . . In your
land the Jews are everywhere, without exception , against the cultural
efforts of the people. They practice usury. People must be saved from
the yoke of alcohol and Jewish capital. • .. Priests must be national;
the Church must be anti.Semitic so that the people might free itself
economically from Jewish capital. . •."

Srobar, one of the greatest opponents of separatism,
preached the anti-Semitic gospel of Masaryk. "The Jews

�34

SLOVAKIA

always were the exploiters and extortioners of the Slovak
people. The enemies of the State are punished in the entire
world," said -Mr. Vavro Srnlbar at a meeting of the 2upans (Distri:ct Administrators) on August 4, 19,19.
Dr. Anton Stefanek, another great antagonist o,f Slovak autonomy, wrote in the NEW YORKSKY DENNIK
(August 25, 1'920): "Neither the Germans, nor the Magyars, but not even any other nation on earth is more
harmful to our nation than the Jews. But not only to us
Slovaks, but also to the whole Slav world the Jews are the
greatest enemies, and this is a factually and historically
proven matter." Just aJbout a year 1b efore that (June 22,
1919), Stefanelk said in the same newspaper: "One of the
most difficult problems which we shall have to resolve is
the question how the vast masses of this nation shall be
protected from the flood of the Jews, that is, from the destructive and subversive vices that have taken hold. . . ."
T.he NEW YO!RJKISIKY DIDNNlK was quite enthused
by such words and offered this advice: "Send all the Jews
to hell" (N()lV. 11, 191'9) . . . "Since we do not allow a
Jew to become a Zupan, then we must not allow him to be
an owner or director of large factories, enterprises, homes,
and businesses in Slovakia," wrote 'Dvaroiz~k, one orf Lettrich's commissars, already in 191'9 in the NYD . . . "The
irrefutable fact is that something ought to be done about
the Jews in Slovakia already now" (NYD, Oct. 8, 1938).
And what ought to be done, the NYD explains: "So that
they might go to the lands of those nations, which they
voluntarily claimed as their own in 1930" (resolution of the
Czecho-iSlovak Sokol Community, Oct . 7, H)3'8).
Of cour,se, that meant that the Jews. were supposed to
go back to Germany, Hungary and Poland.
in 1938, the newspaper edited 1by Dr. Martin Kivetko,
another commissar of Lettrich's and no,w a significant factor in the Council of Free Czecho~S,lovrukia and one orf the
so-icalled lbig gl,lns of the Free Europe Committee, wrote unequivocally that there was only one effective way to deal
with the Jewish prolblem, so he presented it in this manner:
"Germany has shown us how we must deal with the foreign element. We must apply such methods even more than

�SLOV.AKI.A

35

Germany" (Narodnie Noviny, Sept. 18, 1938). In other
words, he recommended Hitler's methods.
Gabo Rapos, who received the greatest decoration
from the hands of Dr. Lettrich, wrote the foJlorwing in
the Narodnie Noviny (Oct. 6, 1938). "We must also rid
ourselves of one more element which economically is pauperizfog Slovakia - we must resolve the Jewish question
which impedes the development of Slovakia, and we must
rid ourselves of all parasites!"
Did the situation change in 1945? Well, Senior Sensel,
a deputy of Lettrich's "democratic" party, prophesied as
follows: "We'll first lay aside our Lutheran garb and stop
reading the Passion, before we put anti-Semitism aside."
Dr. Martin BeHus, another o.f Lettri.ch's stalwarts,
wrote in a similar vein in· the Narodnie Noviny and recommended the use of Hitler's methods: "Every half-way solution ( of the Jewish question) supported by pseudodemo('ratic principles is bound to fail, because it opposes the interests of the whole of autonomous Slovakia and the State
of the Czechs, Slovaks and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians."
But even Dr. Lettrich himself, as co-ehairman of the
Slovaik National Coun'Cil, demanded that the Jews in Slovakia be treated or dealt with as with enemies, the Germans and Magyars. In 1945, he proclaimed: "We must
endeavor without mercy to chase the Magyars and Germans out of our countr:y. 'Ilhe Jews, who by their feelings
and their language show sympathy toward the Magyars
or Germans, we shall regard as Germans and Magyars and
they shall have to share the lot of Germans and Magyars."
And those he did expel !
Dry statistical figures say nothing about the Slovak
nationality of Jews. In 11890, 6 percent of the Jews living in
Slovakia claimed ,SlovaJk as their mother tongue, but in
1910 only 2 percent did.
It is both interesting and significant to the informed
reader that Lettrich devotes qll.lite a bit of his space in his
"history" to quotations of altogether unimportant and
ipoliticaUy, insignificant people, but conveniently forgets
to quote authorities,, such as 'Masaryk, Srolbar, Stefaneik,
Hodza, Jan Slavik, Sensel. He quotes from the "Slovak,"

�36

SLOVAKIA

but forgets to do so from the "!Stare No,v iny, Orol Tatransky, Narodnie Noviny, Cirkevne Listy, New YorksJky Dennik, Slovensky Dennik, Slov,enstke :Pohfady" and other periodicals.
Lettrich tries to place the entire responsiibiUty for the
sufferings of the Jews on the Slovak Go;vernment, even
though an institution regarded as reS1ponsilble and serious,
which proba;bly was mo.re concerned than any other with
this prdblem the International Red Cross - stated
that: at certain times SlovaJkia was regarded as a refuge
of the Jews, especially Polish Jews; the Jews who remained in .Slovakia were comparatively protected until the
uprising against the German army at the end of August
1944; it is true that the law of . May 5, 1942, resulted in
the arrest of several thousands of Jews, but in the cam,ps,
where living and housing conditions were adequate, the
prisoners were aUowed to wovk for pay under conditions
which approximated free economy; in H,ungary, like in
Slovrukia, Israelites were spared as long as the local gov~
ernment hrud a certain freedom of action (Vd. Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge, Vol 29, No•. 348, Dec. 1947).
The EVA1NGEil.;]ST, t'he official organ of the Diocese
of A]bany, N. Y., carried a ,r eport from Prague sayi,nig that
a comparison of the ipre-,war andi ipost-war nUlilliber of ,perisons of the Jewish faith and r,a.ce in Czecho-Slova;kia shows
that while in Ozechia and 1M oravia - which were under
Ge.r,man rule - 85 pevcent of the Jews perished, in Sl0&gt;vakia, on the other hand, during the reign of President
Joseph Tiso, 85 percent of the Jews were saved.
After 194!5, at the Bratislava University, several sons
of the foremost "Oze:cho-Slovak and Lutheran" families
objected to receiving doctorates together with Jews and
the university had to arrange another time for the ceremO'Ily; the Jews recei,v ed their doctorates with former
members of the Hllinlka youth. And Lettrich wa:S boss in
SlovaJkia at that time!
History !b,ooks usually carry pictures of leading personalities and events that made history. Lettrich's "history," however, is different; it tells the story of so-called
"Catholic crimes" and, quite understandably then, Lettrich

�SLOVAKIA

37

used only photographs of so--called "Catholic criminals."
Under one ,p icture whi'ch is a,lmost ineligiible, for example,
we read: "Canon KaroJ Korper wearing a Hlinka Guard
cap while sperukirng." What the occasion was and what
Korper said is left to the imagination of the reader. Orf
course, those who were present on that occasion know that
a blessing of the Slovalk colors took place. They also ,k now
that the speaker who followed K6r,p er was the Eviangelical
(Lutheran) chaplain of the Hllinka Guard, Dr. Ladislaus
Jurkovilc. The latter and I went to school together and
were good friends; I was glad to see him in Lettrich's
book; he is to. the left of Ko:nper, 'b etween two German
officers. Lettrich obviously was only interested in lifting
out the name of Canon Korper.
Then there is the picture of Comrade Kaftanov. He,
too, made Lettrich's "history," even though he proibrubly
will not make Russian history. Kaftanov attended the
occasion of Dr. Tuka's instaH.ation as rector of the Bratislava University, at which he is reported to have predicted a "glorious future for the Slovak 'State, because it
resulted from the collaboration of the two. most powerful
nations, the Germans an.d the Russians, who had decided
to reorganize the a,ppearance of Euro,pe." Since Lettrich
bothered with Kaftanov, he should have also mentioned the
names of very distinguished scholars and representatives
of world-renowned uni.versities (American, French, English, Italian, '11unkish, etc.) who· sent congratulatory messages to Dr. Tuka.
And Lettrich's picture is lacking, too, even though
he was photographed while pinning decorations on quite
a few Red Russians. We are supposed to believe, too, that
theire are no ,p ictures of LeUrich with Tito, Gottwald, Siroky, Duris, Pull, Smidike, Husak, and other Communists.
Too bad, too, that he could not embellish his pictorial supplement with a few ,photos Off the German ambassador to
Slovaikia, of N a zi generals and economic represen.tat1ves
all orf whom enjoyed huntin,g wiitih Lettrich's friends on
their pri•v•a te hunting reserves and were very happy to
shruke hands with Na;zis. But even this is all petty and
trivial.
1

�38

SLOVAKIA

The ,S lovak RepU!blic was the work of peo,ple and it
was managed ,b y people. It is, therefore, quite understandable that, like other states, the Slovruk RepUibliic also had
its faults ,a nd deficiencies. It was born during a world crisis, in the shadow of the gigantic German Reich, to which
the western ,p owers aJbandoned the whole of Europe. At
that time there was no force, single or combined, which
could or did intervene to change the course o!f events.
Lettrich states that Benes and others, including himself,
were forced to do things under given circumstances, which
they probably would not have done under no•I1Inal condi~
tions. And that is und~rstandable.
But why shotl!ld Lettrich create the impression that the
Slovruks and Tiso, w'ho were respons~ble for the welfare of
the Slovak Republic, willingly and voluntarily went along
in all things with the Nazis? The answer is obvious. Lettrich could not control or overcome his ,prejudices and his
intense hatred of Tiso and his group, which he calls the •
"Catholic Party" and which represented the overwhelming
majority of the Slov3;ks. In this he was no different than
the Communists and the chauvinistic Benes Czechs.
In a word, Lettrich's "history" is one of the most
shameful, vicious and malicious books about Sl01Vakia tihat
was ever published. Griinwald's infamous "Felvidek" in
comparison is an inno.c ent song. To those who read Lettrich's book, I say this: do not even believe the figures he
gives as the .p opulation for any Slovak town or city, because thev are most certainly falsified. The "History of
Modern 'Slovwkia" is, indeed, a true picture of Lettrich's
,p olitical and moral stature!

•

•

•

"CZEOHOSLOVAKISM VERSUS A'MERICANISIM" an ~pose of .t he pr~Soviet "National Froniters" in the socalled Oouncil of Free Ozechoslov-ailcia - is a 48 :page booklet pwbliished by the Slovak League o!f America, which
should be read 'by every one seekdng the answer to the
queQtion of how "Ozecho-.Slovak demoora·c y" ooniveirted to a
",p eople's demoocacy." Send 25 cents (coin or stamps) to
the SIJOVAKiiA for your copy today.

�</text>
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                  <text>1955, Vol. 5</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
21&#13;
&#13;
LETI'RIOH'S IDSTORY OF SLOVAK.IA&#13;
By Constantine Oulen&#13;
We shall not criticize the ideological side of his booik,&#13;
because according to Letitric,h only the Slovak Catholics&#13;
were Nazis, only they praised Hitler, only they wrote derogatively of the Jews, only they Aryanized, only they&#13;
were in the Hlinka Guards, and only they were dissatis ...&#13;
fied in the Czecho.,Slovak Reipu1blic.&#13;
We shall not carry on polemics with Lettrich even on&#13;
as, for example, the Sudanians, because we know that Lettrich is of the conviction that what is the right of the unclothed Sudanian at home, does not belong to the Slovaks&#13;
at home even if they were to weM' fro-cks and uniforms.&#13;
We know that from a feeling of his own inferio,r 'ity even&#13;
an under-average Czech is an unattainable ideal. Lettrich&#13;
really belongs under the Czechs.&#13;
We shall not d~bate about whether Lettrich was en~&#13;
titled to let thousands od' Slova;ks lhe jailed, and we shall&#13;
not deJbate ,a bout the Magyarism of the politicians of the&#13;
Slo,vaik People's Party, beC'ause that is, after aJll, a matter&#13;
of personal opinion, and it is useless to talik about the&#13;
beauty of colors with a color-blind person.&#13;
The statistics presented or ref erred to by Lettrich,&#13;
however, really is not 'history, but news. They demonst11ate the superficiality, irresponsiibility and outright falsification of facts.&#13;
L ettrich wanted to prove Urat the progress Slovakia&#13;
made in the Czecho-iSlovak Repu:bli·c from 1918 to 1938&#13;
"had never been surpassed in any phase of history" by&#13;
referring to the gigantic growth of various Slovak cities&#13;
(p. 64). He compares the 1919 with the 1948 numlber of inha:bitants of some cities. Many cities, indeed, did develop&#13;
and grow, while otihers showed a decrease in population.&#13;
But we see that everywhere, not only in .Slovakia. So, are&#13;
we to regard that as a "Czecho..,Slovaik" miracle? Is it not&#13;
practically a universal oustom that :people leave the farms&#13;
for the cities? And even Lettrich should know that the&#13;
influx of some 200,000 Czechs into Slovakia, especially into&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
22&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
the cities, certainly had something to do with the increase&#13;
in population of those cities.&#13;
But why shou1d Lettrich resort to false statistics&#13;
even in this case? He could have proved his case even with&#13;
correct statistics, selected from official statistical publications. It is obvious that Leittrich preferred to use other statistics: those which sulbstantially decrease the numlber of&#13;
inhabitants from Magyar times and su:b stantially increase&#13;
the number of inhaJbitants from the times of the Czecho~&#13;
Slovruk Republic.&#13;
According to Lett.rich, Zilina had 9,000 inh~bitants&#13;
in 1919 and 18,000 in 1948 (p. 64). But Zilina, we know,&#13;
already :had 9,166 inhaJbitants in 1910; 12,073 after the&#13;
census was taken in Ozecho-Slo•v akia; and in 1940, in the&#13;
Slovak Republic, 19,329 (Vd. SOZNAM OBOI NA SLOVEN~U, p. 161). Aooording to Lettrich, then, Zilina had&#13;
1~ people in 1948 than in 1940. According to Dr. Palic&#13;
(Vd. OIDSKOSLOVENSKY PR!EHLED), Zilina had 16,400&#13;
i.nhabitants in 1949.&#13;
According to Lettrich, Turciansky &amp;vaty Martin had&#13;
3,000 inhabitants in 1919, but 20,000 in 1948. However, we&#13;
know that T. iSv. M. had 3,351 inha,bitants already in 1900;&#13;
4,101 in 11910; and 5,6'57 after the first Czecho--,Slova:k&#13;
census. Where did Lettrich get the 20,000 figure? And the&#13;
other statistics? In the footnote (ip. 64), he says his source&#13;
was (pp. '118-157) of "':NIE POPULATION OF CZECHOSLOV~ " by Waller Wynne, Jr. (Washington, 1953).&#13;
But that source does not show 20,000 inha:bitants. for T.&#13;
Sv. M . ! It shows 11,300 for the year 1940; in 1946 only&#13;
10,600, hence, less t'han during the time of the Slovak Republic. In fact a closer loolk at pages 47-57 shows Wynne's&#13;
book of afificfal American statistics does not carry the&#13;
figures either for 1919, with which Lettrich begins, or&#13;
for 1948, with which Lettrich ends; but we do find there&#13;
the figures for 1940 and 1946.&#13;
It seems that pseudohistorian Lettrich did not understand ,w hat he read. Wynne gives the figures for the&#13;
growth of cities between 1930 and 1947 "in 1948 area."&#13;
Lettrich quotes the number of inhabitants of the various&#13;
Slovak cities for 194i8 from statistics, of Octolber 1, 1946.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
23&#13;
&#13;
When . a historian writes a:bout ithe growth of some&#13;
cities and towns, it is not unusual for him to mention the&#13;
decrease in populat'ion of others. But Lettrich is different;&#13;
he is determined to pmve that the Czecho--•SltoviaJk Republic&#13;
was responsible only for "growth" figures,. For example,&#13;
the following cities and towns decreased as indicated: Skalica 2.3 percent; Myjava 2.7 percent; Pukanec 2.9 percent;&#13;
Bansika Stiavnica 8.3 •p ercent; Doib,sina 12:3 percent; Gelnica 24.1 percent; Reviuca 32.2 percent. Why these old industria~ centers decreased in populatfon could also form an&#13;
interesting chapter in a SlovaJk history, which is cal,l ed&#13;
'modern"!&#13;
"Between 1906 and 1908 alone, 56·0 Slovaks were sentenced for&#13;
political crimes to a total of 91 years in jail and fines of 42,000&#13;
Crowns" (p. 38).&#13;
&#13;
That's what Lettrfoh says rubout Magyar persecution,&#13;
but even here there seems to :b e a slight error of some&#13;
ten years. The figures given are for a period of 12 years&#13;
and not two. We suggest that Lettrich c'hook .this item&#13;
with the figures given by R. W. Seton-·Watson, whom he&#13;
probaibly wanted to quote (RAOIAL BROBLEM!S IN HUNGARY, p. 466). To check this item, he might also use the&#13;
SLOVENISKY OB~OR and the PIRUDY, with which he is&#13;
quite familiar.&#13;
It is, significant, too, that, in the matter of persecution,&#13;
oppression and suppression, Mr. Lettrich quite conveniently forgets to rememb.er what the Slovaks suffered from&#13;
1945 to 1'948, when he and Communist Schmidke ,w ere cocha_imnen of the SlovaJk National Council, the lbody supreme&#13;
in Slovakia. The Magyars treated the Slo1vaks harshly and&#13;
unjustly, it is true; Magyar statistics themselves prove&#13;
that. There is no need to add anything to thek figures; we&#13;
need not magnid'y those statistics in 1955. As they are, tihey&#13;
are a monument to intolerance., dishonesty, and especially&#13;
.p olitical short-sightedness. In the final analysis, what the&#13;
ruling Magyaris did was a crime even against the Magyar&#13;
nation.&#13;
On the other hand, however, what was done to the&#13;
Slovaks during the Benes-Lettrich er.a is so terribfo, r8JW,&#13;
and criminal that it simply is without parallel in the&#13;
&#13;
24&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
thousand-year history O!f the Slovaks. Lettrich's regime&#13;
pa:s:ses into Sliovak history as a regime O!f an unbroken&#13;
skein of the most terrilble and blo·odiest crimes.&#13;
At one of the meetings of the Board of Commissars,&#13;
when Lettrirch ruled, a reiport was given that 19,740 persons, most of them in:tellectuals, were jailed; 56 of them&#13;
already were sentenced to death and the rest o£ them received a total of 12,555 years in jail; and the property&#13;
of most of them ,w a s confiscated. And that was only the&#13;
beginning. In 19416, the a'Verage jail senitence was 19&#13;
months; at the end of 1'947, it was 33 months and 14&#13;
days. 'Dhiat was in the days when Lettrich's word could&#13;
save a person's life, or a:meliorate a sentence. Lettrioh's&#13;
cowts meted out jail sentenices which were 1,250 percent&#13;
higher, besides that also executions, which in peace time&#13;
did not even happen in Hungary.&#13;
But Lettrilch makes a lb ig issue of 91 yearn in jail which&#13;
the Magyar-s meted out to 560 Slovaks in twelve years!&#13;
What is 1:lhaJt in •c omparison to what Leittrich's regime was&#13;
responsible for? Hias, Lettrich already fongotten the Slova:ks executed, the thousands in Silberia, the crammed jaHs&#13;
and concentration camps, the people beaten by his police?&#13;
Hias he forgotten the thous•a nds of women who were raped&#13;
by rhis glorified partisans, the freight cars crammed with&#13;
Magyars whom he tra:nsferred to Czech lands for slave&#13;
la!bor, the 15 frozen Magyar children in one of those ft-eight&#13;
car-s, which waited under the Bratis1a~a bridge in January&#13;
without any heat for over rbwo weeks until an order was&#13;
given to move? Yes, and what is that in comparison to the&#13;
300,000 ,b eaten Germans? Lettrich made thi,s history, was&#13;
a respoinsilble patt of it, so why should he not include it in&#13;
his "History of Modern Slo'Vakia"?&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
".fn 1918 Hungarian statistics listed no more than 30,118 children&#13;
of Slovak nationality" (p. 37).&#13;
&#13;
But the truth is that Magyar staUstiJcs for that year&#13;
showed 255,7'92 school child.rein of Slovak natli onality (Vd .&#13;
.Judr Fojifr: NAIRODNi SKOLY V REPUBillCE Cs DLE&#13;
S'DAVU ZID DNIE 31. PROS. 1'92,1, which contains detailed&#13;
statistics of Slovak elementary schiools from 11881 to 1919).&#13;
Lettrich is a bit befuddled or wants to befuddle others.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
25&#13;
&#13;
Magyar statistics show that in 1'918 there were 30,118&#13;
Slovalk children in 365 Slovak schooJs, but the same statistics showed that there were 255,792 Slovak school children, the rubsolute majority of which, of course, had to attend Magyar schools. Magyar statli.stics were false, but&#13;
even Magyar statisticians were not so stupid .as to show&#13;
30,000 school children for a nation of three million. They&#13;
left .that to Lettrioh !&#13;
"In 1918 ... there were 12,447 Hungarian civil servants on Slovak territory. Only 35 offered their services to the new Republic&#13;
The others, being of Magyar nat ionality, refused to serve" (p. 39) ,&#13;
&#13;
Now, -if that were kue, then Count Apponyi was right&#13;
when he said that the Slovaks were against uniting with&#13;
the Czechs. But Lettrich is wrong again. Ho,w did he arrive at those figures? Lettrich not only accepts the statistics supplied by Count Al1bert Apponyd. to support his ar•&#13;
guments to save the unity of greater Hungairy at the Peace&#13;
Conference, 1b ut even e~plains them more unfavorably for&#13;
the Slovaks than Apponyi himself. At .the Peace Oonference CoU!nt A,pponyi presented stabstics about the number&#13;
of offidals and teachers in Hungary. He said th'at in the&#13;
whole of Hungary there were 12,447 state employees:&#13;
12,412 Magyars and 35 Slo,vaks. Of the 35 SlQIV'akS, 18&#13;
were employed in 17 ISl,ova;k districts.&#13;
Lettrich, not understanding what he read, wrote that&#13;
in Slovakia there were 12,447 Magyar officiaJs, 35 of whom&#13;
were Slovak, and the rest (12,412) refused to ta;ke the&#13;
loyalty oath to the Ozecho-Slovruk Reip,ublic. Now, what&#13;
are the facts ?&#13;
1. It is not true that there were 12,447 Magyar State&#13;
emip loyees in Slo,v a1kia. The figure relates to, the whole of&#13;
Hungiary, with the e:x:ception of Croatia. In Slovakia there&#13;
were 920 Magyars, 11 Germans and 18 Slovaks employed&#13;
by the Hungarian State.&#13;
2. lt is not true that only 3'5 were willing to serve the&#13;
Czecho-•Slova;k Repulb1iic. The figures refer only to those&#13;
who were 'listed as Slovalks, but say nothing about their&#13;
willingness or unwillingless to serve the Czecho-1Slova:k Republic.&#13;
3. It is not true that the rest ref.used to• serve the&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
26&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Ozecho-lSlovruk Repulblic. If that were so, then it would&#13;
not have been possilble even ,w ith the help of the Ozechs to&#13;
establish a Cze:cho-SlovaJk regime in Slovakia. The absolute&#13;
majority of State employees, even those of German and&#13;
Mrugyar origin, took the oath of loyalty to the Czecho-Slo . .&#13;
vak Repu:blk. Only ,a minority ref.used to take the loyalty&#13;
oath; the number of those who r&amp;fused was never recorded&#13;
statistically (Vd. .Dr. H. Rashofer: Die Tschechoslowa,kischen Denks-chriften fiir die Friedenskonference von Paris 1919-1920, pp. 187~193; and Magyar Beketargyalasok).&#13;
Continuing to falsify statistics, Lettrich states that&#13;
only "10 of the 660 high school teachers and college professors" offered their services to the new Repulblic of Czecho-iSlovakia (,p. 40).&#13;
At the Peace Conference, Count Apponyi stated that&#13;
there ,w ere 23 Slovaks teaching in the secondary schools ;&#13;
10 of these taught in Slwaikia. Dr. Derer, speaiking on the&#13;
floor of the Prague Parliament, February 7, 1931, said&#13;
that there was only 1 Slovak professor under Hungary.&#13;
Michael Slavik counted 25 in his 'book : 115 Lutherans and&#13;
10 Catho'.1 ks. The fact is, however, that the 11918-19 school&#13;
year began in SlovaJkia. with over a 100 Slov8Jk professors.&#13;
Many left good positions in large Magyar cities to accept&#13;
teaching positions in Slovruk towns and villages; they sacrificed muoh just so th'at they might serve their nation.&#13;
But the Czechs rejected ·s:ome of them and relegated&#13;
many of them to teach in Magyar schools!&#13;
Certainly Lettrich himself could, if he only wanted to,&#13;
name more than 10 Slovak professors of the Lutheran&#13;
faith alone w'ho served the young Repulblic enthusiastically&#13;
in HH8. We might mention the following Sl~vak professors&#13;
who definitely did tea.ch in SlovaJkia in 191'8: Rozim, Kmet'.,&#13;
Branecky, Potkan, Fr. Tiso, Kra.jniak, Vallo, Kovalik, Mruirgas, Hlavaty, Hronec, Ohra.pa, Lisy, Klein--Tesnoskals:ky,&#13;
Horniaik, BeniaJC, Poto:cky, Misik, Bezak, '.Domaja, Resek,&#13;
FJorek, Necikar, Bu;jnaik, Vo~ko-Starohorsky, Twdy.&#13;
Count Aipponyi ma.de all kinds of statements at the&#13;
Paris Pea.:ce Coruferenice; but he did not go as far as Lettrich. What Lettrich says could be used adrvantageously&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
27&#13;
&#13;
by Magyar revisionist propaganda. And yet he thmks this&#13;
is an argument for the "Czecho-lSlovak" concept! It is&#13;
strange, indeed, tha,t we who are considered "seiparatists"&#13;
should have to defend the Czecho-iSlavak Republic even&#13;
against Lettrich. Did he forget about the five Slovak university pro,fessors from Budapest who came to Bratislava&#13;
to, offer their services to the new Republic, but not ooe was&#13;
accepted? Tuka and Kviatcala, too, were rejected in favor of&#13;
Czech professo:vs,, were they not?&#13;
It is almost useaess to attempt to analyize otther statistics given 'by Lettrich in his "history." They are all&#13;
equally false. Lettriich simply either did not understand&#13;
the significance of what he read, or, if he did, then he falsified knowingly. In this category he outdid Apponyi. Lettrich could have proved his point easHy in an hooest manner, but he preferred to use the Magyar system: minim.ie.e&#13;
and vilify everything that was SloV'ak. Slovaks never regarded tMagyar figures as reliable, so why should Lettrich&#13;
regard them as the last word? A Ozech statistician Wl'ote&#13;
the foUowing a;bout Magyar statistics:&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
"The incorrectness of Magyar official statistics is attested to&#13;
even by official Magyar data about the spreading of knowledge of&#13;
the individual languages. On the territory of the 16 Slovak counwhich either completely or partly fell to Czecho-Slovakia ties in 1910, there were 300,584 Magyars who knew Slovak; that is, 25.3&#13;
percent of all the Magyar inhabitants of those 16 counties. On that&#13;
same territory, in 1910, it was recorded that only 281,230 Slovaks&#13;
(16.5 percent) knew Magyar, even though the great majority of&#13;
Slovaks was educated in Magyar schools whose main job was to&#13;
teach Magyar. On the other hand, it is still more odd that 25.3 percent of the Magyars in the 16 Slovak counties could speak Slovak,&#13;
that is, the language of the Pariahs, the language that was despised,&#13;
suppressed and cast out of the schools, offices and public life.&#13;
"This discordance must be explained only by the fact that a&#13;
great number of ·Slovaks, who knew Magyar, were counted among&#13;
the Magyars. We need not conjecture that 300,000 Magyars learned&#13;
Slovak either out of love for Slovak or other motives. Mraz, in his&#13;
book "Slovensko vo svetle statistiky," estimates that of the 300,000&#13;
'Magyars who know Slovak,' there are at least 200,000 Slovaks who&#13;
did not learn Magyar, but were counted as Magyars when the census was taken" (Ph. Dr. VI. Slaninka: Narodnostni vyvoj Ceskoslovenske republiky, Pra,gue 1938 ; pp. 67-68) .&#13;
&#13;
And that is a fad. There is a difference !between actually &gt;Magy,ari'zed SlovaJks and 'Slovruks whom only Magyar&#13;
statistics regarded as Magyars. Lettrich obviously under-&#13;
&#13;
28&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
took the task of proving the miraculous "progre.ss" oif the&#13;
Slovaks in the Czecho-·S lovak Repuiblic by ma:gnifying Magyar injustices and aJbolishing all Czoch injustices. But a&#13;
historian should write olbjec·Uvely; he must not forget even&#13;
what was good in Hungary, jrust as he must record what&#13;
was good in Cz~cho-:Slovakia; and he must not close his&#13;
eyes ei.theT to Magyar o,r Czech injustices.&#13;
"Serious unemployment and perpetual depression reigned in Slovakia from the Austrian-Hungarian Settlement in 1867, unti I the outbreak of World War I. In that period three-quarters of a million&#13;
Slovaks emigrated to earn their bread abroad, mostly in the United&#13;
States" (p. 40) .&#13;
&#13;
Why Lettrich uses the year 1867 as his initial year is ·&#13;
diffictrlt to understand, becaiuse it was just at the end of&#13;
the last and the 1beginning of the present century that Hungary began to ,b uild up_ industrially, and most of the enteriprises were built in .SlovaJkia with state funds.&#13;
From 1881 to 191'4, there we.:re 960 industrial enterprises built in Slovaikia; another 760 were remodeled to&#13;
manufacture various products. Jlt is estimated that this&#13;
cost the Hungarian State 63 million pre-war Gold Orowns.&#13;
There was one industrial enterprise for every 617 inhaJbitants in Slova;kia, according to lli. E. Stodola ("Statistika&#13;
Slo;v enska").&#13;
How did industry in Slovaikia fare under Ozecho-Slovakia?&#13;
Well, when the Cze·c hs came to power, Slov,a k industrial enterprises rwere graidually dosed up. The Czechs&#13;
said: 1. Slovakia should be the agricultural country of&#13;
the Staite; 2. Slovak industry did not have natural prerequisites; it was lb uilt with the he1p of the Magyar State,&#13;
hence, it had to be destroyed; 3. Slo,vaik industry belongs&#13;
to Magya:r Jews and foreigners, who suppressed the Slo-·&#13;
va:ks nationally; this must be aivenged by destroying their&#13;
properties; 4. More modern Ozech industry can produce&#13;
more cheaply and abundantly all the products which were&#13;
produced by faicfories in Sfovakia, therefore, the latter&#13;
must be liquidated.&#13;
The "Morgenthau" plan for Germany in 1945 was put&#13;
into effoct by the Benes Czechs for Slovakia in 1918 ! Lettrich might pretend not to ·know the facts, or may simply&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
29&#13;
&#13;
ignore them, lbut nevertheless facts they still remain. The&#13;
Federation of Slovak Industrialists pU!blished reports annually; Lettrich undoubtedly knows aJbout them, or should&#13;
have, if he wanted his "history" to be objective. What do&#13;
the r eports of that Federation tell us?&#13;
In the Slovak wood industry, in the 11 largest enterprises, workers put in 9,04'5,000 hours in 1914, tbut only&#13;
3,786,000 hours in 1923 ; in 19 of the largest chemical&#13;
plants, Sl()IVak workers put in 8,352,000 hours in 1914, but&#13;
only 4,5·38,000 hours in 1923; in three of the largest glass&#13;
enter,prises, 2,937,000 hours in 1914, but only 468,000&#13;
hours in 1 92,6 ; in 9 of the largest mining and smelting&#13;
enteriprises 11,469,000 hours in 1914, but only 5,684,000&#13;
hours in 1922; in 8 of the largest grain mills 1,·680,000&#13;
hours in 1914, but only 853,000 hours in 1926 ; in 19 metal&#13;
enter.prises 14,271,000 hours in 1914, but only 7,059,000&#13;
hours in 1923; in 12 textile enterprises 29,080,000 hours in&#13;
1914, ibut only 115,829,000 hours in 1922; in 9 cellulose&#13;
and paper mills 9,528,000 hours in 1914, but only 5,4155,000&#13;
hours in 1923 ; in three breweries 435,000 hours in 1914,&#13;
but only 236,000 hours in 1923; in 6 enterprises of building&#13;
materials 5,195,000 hours in 1914, but only 2,585,000 hours&#13;
in 1923 ; in 6 of the largest fur and leather enterprises&#13;
2,538,000 hours in 191'4 ; but only 1,024,000 hours in 1923;&#13;
in 6 food enterprises 4,155,000 hours in 1914, but only&#13;
898,000 hours in 1003.&#13;
These figures tell us that there must have b.een&#13;
greater unemployment in Slovakia under Czecho-1Slovakia&#13;
than prior to 1918. For the edification of the readers of&#13;
Lettirich's "his tory' and of Lettrich himself, we call to their&#13;
attention a 'book written by R. W. Seton-.Watson, who has&#13;
been known as an agent of Czech propaganda for almost&#13;
40 years ; it is ca:lled "THE NEW SLOV.AlKifA" and was&#13;
pulblished in 1924 by Fr. Borovy, Pvague. Several quotes&#13;
from Chaipter V (Economic Difficulties) may be in order:&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
"In the case of Slovakia today it would be quite idle to deny&#13;
that many serious economic grievances do exist, and further, that the&#13;
Centralist regime, as at present directed from Prague, is in many respects contr-ary to the economic interests of Slovakia" (p. 78) . ..&#13;
&#13;
"No favo ur was shown even t o th e coal mines of H an dlova, with&#13;
disastrous effects upon industry in eastern Slovakia and in Ruth e-&#13;
&#13;
30&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
nia" (p. 84) . . . ",I rritation and suspicion are already so general,&#13;
that a leailing Slovak industrialist, whom no one to whom I should&#13;
name him could deny the titles of patriot and unionist, roundly declared to me that Slova,kia is .reg,a rded •b y 'Prague' as so much economic ballast! The argument that because 80 percent or even more&#13;
of Slovak industry is owned by Magyars or Jews it therefore need&#13;
not receive the same consideration, is a mere feebl-e pretext, intended&#13;
to justify a very doubtful operation. It ma,y be countered in the&#13;
first place by a reminder tihat 60-70 percent of Bohemian industry is&#13;
owned by Germa:ns or Jews, most of whom are - only to a lesser de·&#13;
gree than the Ma,gyars of Slovakia - unwilling citizens of the Republic. . . . However questionable may be the first origins of Slovak&#13;
industry - and on this point there is in the main no dispute - it&#13;
represents today the means of liv-e lihood of a large population which&#13;
is over,w heLmingly Slovak" (p. 94) . . . "The deliberate reduction&#13;
of Slovak industries, as a part of a Government programme, without any corresponding reduction in the industries of Bohemia and&#13;
Mol'lavia, would be a direct incitement to separatism, and would in&#13;
any case force Slovaks, Maigyars, Ruthenes and Germans into an economic alliance so strong as to overshadow the divergencies of political outlook" (P. 95) .. . "According to a calculation of "t,he Union&#13;
of Slovak Industrialists, the cost of transport in Slovakia, as late as&#13;
the autumn of 1922, was 50 .p ercent ·h igher than in the western half&#13;
of the Republic" (p. 84) . . . "But a great deal still requires to be&#13;
done in the way of adjusting the general tariff system. . . For the&#13;
result o.f these unequal tariffs is to favour still . further the competition of Czech and German firms in Slovakia and to make of Slovakia a dumping ,g round for their surplus goods, while rendering retaliation almost impossible. As a result, it is possible for Moravian&#13;
firms to import sand to Zilina and timber to Orava - thus refuting&#13;
the proverbial absurility of 'carrying coals to Newcastle' - and thus&#13;
Slovak fi.rms are undersold, and cheaper labor is brought from outside, under the eyes of the Slovak unemployed. This creates a great&#13;
deal of bad blood and gives rise to the demand, at once objectionable and impracticable, that Czech firms should not be allowed to&#13;
compete in Slovakia" (pp. 85-86).&#13;
&#13;
"The Germans exploited SlovaJk natural resources, such&#13;
as lumber and o,r es" (p. 171), according to . Lettrich, who&#13;
already seems to have forigotten the arguments put forth&#13;
to save the skin of Dr. Ing. Zatko in 1946, when he stood&#13;
before the National Court in Bratislava. You see, Lettrich&#13;
and his SlovaJk National Council had decreed that eivery&#13;
deputy of the SlovaJk Parliament had to stand trial. Since&#13;
Zatko was such a deputy, he, too, had to •g o through the&#13;
or.deal. But he was more fortJunate than most of the other&#13;
deputies; being a Lutheran, he had Dr. Lett.rich on his side.&#13;
What~er was good in the SlovaJk Republic, Lettrich would&#13;
have us know, was the merit of the Lutheran or non-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
31&#13;
&#13;
Catholic deputies; whatever was no good or just plain bad&#13;
in it was due to the Catholic deputies. Since Zafko was,&#13;
during the war, the mightiest man in the departmen t of&#13;
Slova:k economy, and he and Dr. Karvas (head of the Slovak National Bank), were really dictators in this field, Mr.&#13;
Lettrich and the other witnesses who testified in Zafko's&#13;
behalf tried to prove that it was a splendid dictatorship&#13;
a nd that economical ly Slov,aJkia prospered to such a great&#13;
extent tha,t its pos-ition could not even be coonpared with&#13;
the poor economy of the Czech lands.&#13;
At the trial Dr. Matura, an economic expert, showed&#13;
that while in the protectorat e 50 percent more than the&#13;
average amount of lumlber was exacted, in Slovakia the&#13;
production did not reach the norma:l average, so that some&#13;
15 million cubic feet of lwmlber, valued at 5 milliard (5&#13;
thousand million) Czecho-Sio vak crowns was saved for&#13;
the RepuJblic. At that trial Dr. Matura also said that after&#13;
the passage of the front "the supplies of raw materials in&#13;
Slovakia were higher than on January 1, 1939." Mr. Lettrich's official organ, the CAS, recorded the testimony&#13;
gi;ven during Zafko's trial ('CAS, Sept. 7, 1946) . What he&#13;
,a nd witnesses said in deferuse of Dr. Zafiko in 1946 is just&#13;
the opposite of what he contends in his "history," that&#13;
is, that "1Sl0V1akia also pro;vided valuaJble economic and ma~&#13;
terial aid to Germany" (ip. 171).&#13;
Is Lettrich now teYing us that the testimony given in&#13;
behalf of the ecorromic e:,q&gt;erls before the National Court&#13;
was false? What else, unless hiis "history" is ,a record of&#13;
frauds and falsificatio ns?&#13;
Lettrich feels that the power of the Jews is great&#13;
and, hence, that it is necessary to flatter the mighty of&#13;
this world. So he attempts to do just that in his "history."&#13;
The greater ipart of the pictorial supiplemen t is devoted&#13;
to the fate of the Jews during the war. It seems that he&#13;
borrowed the pictures from a certain book Which was published by the Jews of Prague and Bratislawa in 1949, which&#13;
means that it was allowed by the Red regime of Gottwald.&#13;
Of course, Lettrich does not want us to know that. To ma!ke&#13;
the affair look as horrilble as possible, he graced his "his..&#13;
t:ory" with pictures of mass graves from somewhere in&#13;
&#13;
32&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Poland or Germany with which Slovakia had no connection whatever. In this connection he proba:b ly would have&#13;
contri,buted to history had he published at least one picture of the hanging of the Jews in Zvolen by the CzechoSlovaJk legionnaires in 1919. At least it would have !been&#13;
something ,brused on fact. Looking at the pictures in Lettrich's book, the uninformed reader must get the impression, for example, that the hole filled with dead Jewish&#13;
women must lb e in SlovaJkia. Lettrich conveniently avoided&#13;
writing an introduction to his pictorial s111pplement; he&#13;
simply adds the ipictures arfter the index, and lets the rest&#13;
to the imagination of his readers, of course, first offering&#13;
several pictures of Slovak political figures. The intent is&#13;
only all too clear to all informed observers. But deception&#13;
and misrepresentation are hardly the devices of genuine&#13;
historians. Lettrich wamited to prove that the anti-Semites&#13;
in Slovakia were Catholics and separatists exclusively, so&#13;
he resorted to a daring falsification of the facts.&#13;
According to Lettrich, the Jews in Slovakia had an&#13;
acti;ve participation in Slovak national and cultural life, but&#13;
he does not dep~ct the extent of this participation. He even&#13;
states .that the Jews were co·- foun&lt;lers of the Matica Slovenska (The Slova1k l!nstitute) . And that certainly is news.&#13;
Furthermore, Lettrich would hruve the readers of his "history" know that there never was any anti-Semi.tic feeling&#13;
in Slovakia until the "separatists" came into lbeing.&#13;
Up to 1919 there is not a single article in Slovak liter ..&#13;
ature which shows sympathy for the Jews. There is not a&#13;
single S1ovak cultural or national event, about which it&#13;
can be said that the Jews of SlovaJkia participated in .&#13;
There are very many proofs of the opposite. The Jews&#13;
pla,yed an important role only in the economic life of Slova;kia. There is a weal.th of literature depicting just what&#13;
that role wa.s.&#13;
The first anti-Semitic article in Slo,vakia was printed&#13;
in 1785, in the "Stare Noviny" (Old News) of Bystrica,&#13;
which was pu'blished and edited 'by IDvangelical (1L utheran)&#13;
preachers. In the "Orol TatranSlky" (The Tatra Eagle) of&#13;
1845 is an article by Stu.T, recommending the transfer of&#13;
Jews; the second time thi,s recommendation was made in a&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
33&#13;
&#13;
publication was after the first world war - and it came&#13;
from the NEW YORK.SKY DEJNN1K ("Czechoslovak daily&#13;
in Slovak language") ! The most radical anti-:Semite in Slovakia was Svetoizar Hurban Vajansky, the son of an Evangelical preacher and the father of the late Ozecho-Slo;vaJk&#13;
ambassador to, the US'A. The newspapers whiich excelled&#13;
in anti-Semitic articles at that time were the Narodnie&#13;
Noviny and the New York.sky Dennik.&#13;
The old Matica Slovenska did not have a single founder&#13;
who was a J ew. Lettrich iillVented one. It had only one&#13;
regular memiber who was Jewish, a certain tavern keeper in&#13;
'l'urciansky Svaty Martin. This fellow, h owever, became a&#13;
memiber only because most of the people who visited the&#13;
Matica were lodged in his home at night and ate in his&#13;
tavern. The other J ew, who up to 1919, openly iba;cked the&#13;
Slovaks, was a certain Jewish tavern keeper from Sucany;&#13;
he was the only J ew in 1S1ovakia who voted for a Slovak&#13;
candidate in the parliamentary elections. In the Slovak&#13;
Republic the families of both of these Jews enjoyed all privileges and had special protection.&#13;
To prove that oruy Catholics and "separatists" were&#13;
anti-Semites, Mr. Lettrich quotes from the writings of Gajdos-Breza, to wit: "The J ews are our greatest enemies;&#13;
they destroy, spread dissension and demoralize. But these&#13;
very same words were used a countless number of times by&#13;
Dr. M. Hbd.za, T. G. Masaryk, Mirrosla;v J. Hurban, Svetozar Hu:r'ban-Vajansky, Joseph Skultety, John Slavik, Julius Bodnar, and by many other •w riters and politicians,&#13;
scientists and clerics, who were more significant in 'Slovak life than was Gajdos-Breza. Lettrich, however, preferred to forget them in this connection.&#13;
T. G. Masaryk founded his "•p rogressive" movement&#13;
(the Hlasists) with these counsels:&#13;
"Anti-Semitism in Slovakia is warranted (just). . . . In your&#13;
land the Jews are everywhere, without exception , against the cultural&#13;
efforts of the people. They practice usury. People must be saved from&#13;
the yoke of alcohol and Jewish capital. • .. Priests must be national;&#13;
the Church must be anti.Semitic so that the people might free itself&#13;
economically from Jewish capital. . •."&#13;
&#13;
Srobar, one of the greatest opponents of separatism,&#13;
preached the anti-Semitic gospel of Masaryk. "The Jews&#13;
&#13;
34&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
always were the exploiters and extortioners of the Slovak&#13;
people. The enemies of the State are punished in the entire&#13;
world," said -Mr. Vavro Srnlbar at a meeting of the 2upans (Distri:ct Administrators) on August 4, 19,19.&#13;
Dr. Anton Stefanek, another great antagonist o,f Slovak autonomy, wrote in the NEW YORKSKY DENNIK&#13;
(August 25, 1'920): "Neither the Germans, nor the Magyars, but not even any other nation on earth is more&#13;
harmful to our nation than the Jews. But not only to us&#13;
Slovaks, but also to the whole Slav world the Jews are the&#13;
greatest enemies, and this is a factually and historically&#13;
proven matter." Just aJbout a year 1b efore that (June 22,&#13;
1919), Stefanelk said in the same newspaper: "One of the&#13;
most difficult problems which we shall have to resolve is&#13;
the question how the vast masses of this nation shall be&#13;
protected from the flood of the Jews, that is, from the destructive and subversive vices that have taken hold. . . ."&#13;
T.he NEW YO!RJKISIKY DIDNNlK was quite enthused&#13;
by such words and offered this advice: "Send all the Jews&#13;
to hell" (N()lV. 11, 191'9) . . . "Since we do not allow a&#13;
Jew to become a Zupan, then we must not allow him to be&#13;
an owner or director of large factories, enterprises, homes,&#13;
and businesses in Slovakia," wrote 'Dvaroiz~k, one orf Lettrich's commissars, already in 191'9 in the NYD . . . "The&#13;
irrefutable fact is that something ought to be done about&#13;
the Jews in Slovakia already now" (NYD, Oct. 8, 1938).&#13;
And what ought to be done, the NYD explains: "So that&#13;
they might go to the lands of those nations, which they&#13;
voluntarily claimed as their own in 1930" (resolution of the&#13;
Czecho-iSlovak Sokol Community, Oct . 7, H)3'8).&#13;
Of cour,se, that meant that the Jews. were supposed to&#13;
go back to Germany, Hungary and Poland.&#13;
in 1938, the newspaper edited 1by Dr. Martin Kivetko,&#13;
another commissar of Lettrich's and no,w a significant factor in the Council of Free Czecho~S,lovrukia and one orf the&#13;
so-icalled lbig gl,lns of the Free Europe Committee, wrote unequivocally that there was only one effective way to deal&#13;
with the Jewish prolblem, so he presented it in this manner:&#13;
"Germany has shown us how we must deal with the foreign element. We must apply such methods even more than&#13;
&#13;
SLOV.AKI.A&#13;
&#13;
35&#13;
&#13;
Germany" (Narodnie Noviny, Sept. 18, 1938). In other&#13;
words, he recommended Hitler's methods.&#13;
Gabo Rapos, who received the greatest decoration&#13;
from the hands of Dr. Lettrich, wrote the foJlorwing in&#13;
the Narodnie Noviny (Oct. 6, 1938). "We must also rid&#13;
ourselves of one more element which economically is pauperizfog Slovakia - we must resolve the Jewish question&#13;
which impedes the development of Slovakia, and we must&#13;
rid ourselves of all parasites!"&#13;
Did the situation change in 1945? Well, Senior Sensel,&#13;
a deputy of Lettrich's "democratic" party, prophesied as&#13;
follows: "We'll first lay aside our Lutheran garb and stop&#13;
reading the Passion, before we put anti-Semitism aside."&#13;
Dr. Martin BeHus, another o.f Lettri.ch's stalwarts,&#13;
wrote in a similar vein in· the Narodnie Noviny and recommended the use of Hitler's methods: "Every half-way solution ( of the Jewish question) supported by pseudodemo('ratic principles is bound to fail, because it opposes the interests of the whole of autonomous Slovakia and the State&#13;
of the Czechs, Slovaks and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians."&#13;
But even Dr. Lettrich himself, as co-ehairman of the&#13;
Slovaik National Coun'Cil, demanded that the Jews in Slovakia be treated or dealt with as with enemies, the Germans and Magyars. In 1945, he proclaimed: "We must&#13;
endeavor without mercy to chase the Magyars and Germans out of our countr:y. 'Ilhe Jews, who by their feelings&#13;
and their language show sympathy toward the Magyars&#13;
or Germans, we shall regard as Germans and Magyars and&#13;
they shall have to share the lot of Germans and Magyars."&#13;
And those he did expel !&#13;
Dry statistical figures say nothing about the Slovak&#13;
nationality of Jews. In 11890, 6 percent of the Jews living in&#13;
Slovakia claimed ,SlovaJk as their mother tongue, but in&#13;
1910 only 2 percent did.&#13;
It is both interesting and significant to the informed&#13;
reader that Lettrich devotes qll.lite a bit of his space in his&#13;
"history" to quotations of altogether unimportant and&#13;
ipoliticaUy, insignificant people, but conveniently forgets&#13;
to quote authorities,, such as 'Masaryk, Srolbar, Stefaneik,&#13;
Hodza, Jan Slavik, Sensel. He quotes from the "Slovak,"&#13;
&#13;
36&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
but forgets to do so from the "!Stare No,v iny, Orol Tatransky, Narodnie Noviny, Cirkevne Listy, New YorksJky Dennik, Slovensky Dennik, Slov,enstke :Pohfady" and other periodicals.&#13;
Lettrich tries to place the entire responsiibiUty for the&#13;
sufferings of the Jews on the Slovak Go;vernment, even&#13;
though an institution regarded as reS1ponsilble and serious,&#13;
which proba;bly was mo.re concerned than any other with&#13;
this prdblem the International Red Cross - stated&#13;
that: at certain times SlovaJkia was regarded as a refuge&#13;
of the Jews, especially Polish Jews; the Jews who remained in .Slovakia were comparatively protected until the&#13;
uprising against the German army at the end of August&#13;
1944; it is true that the law of . May 5, 1942, resulted in&#13;
the arrest of several thousands of Jews, but in the cam,ps,&#13;
where living and housing conditions were adequate, the&#13;
prisoners were aUowed to wovk for pay under conditions&#13;
which approximated free economy; in H,ungary, like in&#13;
Slovrukia, Israelites were spared as long as the local gov~&#13;
ernment hrud a certain freedom of action (Vd. Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge, Vol 29, No•. 348, Dec. 1947).&#13;
The EVA1NGEil.;]ST, t'he official organ of the Diocese&#13;
of A]bany, N. Y., carried a ,r eport from Prague sayi,nig that&#13;
a comparison of the ipre-,war andi ipost-war nUlilliber of ,perisons of the Jewish faith and r,a.ce in Czecho-Slova;kia shows&#13;
that while in Ozechia and 1M oravia - which were under&#13;
Ge.r,man rule - 85 pevcent of the Jews perished, in Sl0&gt;vakia, on the other hand, during the reign of President&#13;
Joseph Tiso, 85 percent of the Jews were saved.&#13;
After 194!5, at the Bratislava University, several sons&#13;
of the foremost "Oze:cho-Slovak and Lutheran" families&#13;
objected to receiving doctorates together with Jews and&#13;
the university had to arrange another time for the ceremO'Ily; the Jews recei,v ed their doctorates with former&#13;
members of the Hllinlka youth. And Lettrich wa:S boss in&#13;
SlovaJkia at that time!&#13;
History !b,ooks usually carry pictures of leading personalities and events that made history. Lettrich's "history," however, is different; it tells the story of so-called&#13;
"Catholic crimes" and, quite understandably then, Lettrich&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
37&#13;
&#13;
used only photographs of so--called "Catholic criminals."&#13;
Under one ,p icture whi'ch is a,lmost ineligiible, for example,&#13;
we read: "Canon KaroJ Korper wearing a Hlinka Guard&#13;
cap while sperukirng." What the occasion was and what&#13;
Korper said is left to the imagination of the reader. Orf&#13;
course, those who were present on that occasion know that&#13;
a blessing of the Slovalk colors took place. They also ,k now&#13;
that the speaker who followed K6r,p er was the Eviangelical&#13;
(Lutheran) chaplain of the Hllinka Guard, Dr. Ladislaus&#13;
Jurkovilc. The latter and I went to school together and&#13;
were good friends; I was glad to see him in Lettrich's&#13;
book; he is to. the left of Ko:nper, 'b etween two German&#13;
officers. Lettrich obviously was only interested in lifting&#13;
out the name of Canon Korper.&#13;
Then there is the picture of Comrade Kaftanov. He,&#13;
too, made Lettrich's "history," even though he proibrubly&#13;
will not make Russian history. Kaftanov attended the&#13;
occasion of Dr. Tuka's instaH.ation as rector of the Bratislava University, at which he is reported to have predicted a "glorious future for the Slovak 'State, because it&#13;
resulted from the collaboration of the two. most powerful&#13;
nations, the Germans an.d the Russians, who had decided&#13;
to reorganize the a,ppearance of Euro,pe." Since Lettrich&#13;
bothered with Kaftanov, he should have also mentioned the&#13;
names of very distinguished scholars and representatives&#13;
of world-renowned uni.versities (American, French, English, Italian, '11unkish, etc.) who· sent congratulatory messages to Dr. Tuka.&#13;
And Lettrich's picture is lacking, too, even though&#13;
he was photographed while pinning decorations on quite&#13;
a few Red Russians. We are supposed to believe, too, that&#13;
theire are no ,p ictures of LeUrich with Tito, Gottwald, Siroky, Duris, Pull, Smidike, Husak, and other Communists.&#13;
Too bad, too, that he could not embellish his pictorial supplement with a few ,photos Off the German ambassador to&#13;
Slovaikia, of N a zi generals and economic represen.tat1ves&#13;
all orf whom enjoyed huntin,g wiitih Lettrich's friends on&#13;
their pri•v•a te hunting reserves and were very happy to&#13;
shruke hands with Na;zis. But even this is all petty and&#13;
trivial.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
38&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
The ,S lovak RepU!blic was the work of peo,ple and it&#13;
was managed ,b y people. It is, therefore, quite understandable that, like other states, the Slovruk RepUibliic also had&#13;
its faults ,a nd deficiencies. It was born during a world crisis, in the shadow of the gigantic German Reich, to which&#13;
the western ,p owers aJbandoned the whole of Europe. At&#13;
that time there was no force, single or combined, which&#13;
could or did intervene to change the course o!f events.&#13;
Lettrich states that Benes and others, including himself,&#13;
were forced to do things under given circumstances, which&#13;
they probably would not have done under no•I1Inal condi~&#13;
tions. And that is und~rstandable.&#13;
But why shotl!ld Lettrich create the impression that the&#13;
Slovruks and Tiso, w'ho were respons~ble for the welfare of&#13;
the Slovak Republic, willingly and voluntarily went along&#13;
in all things with the Nazis? The answer is obvious. Lettrich could not control or overcome his ,prejudices and his&#13;
intense hatred of Tiso and his group, which he calls the •&#13;
"Catholic Party" and which represented the overwhelming&#13;
majority of the Slov3;ks. In this he was no different than&#13;
the Communists and the chauvinistic Benes Czechs.&#13;
In a word, Lettrich's "history" is one of the most&#13;
shameful, vicious and malicious books about Sl01Vakia tihat&#13;
was ever published. Griinwald's infamous "Felvidek" in&#13;
comparison is an inno.c ent song. To those who read Lettrich's book, I say this: do not even believe the figures he&#13;
gives as the .p opulation for any Slovak town or city, because thev are most certainly falsified. The "History of&#13;
Modern 'Slovwkia" is, indeed, a true picture of Lettrich's&#13;
,p olitical and moral stature!&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
"CZEOHOSLOVAKISM VERSUS A'MERICANISIM" an ~pose of .t he pr~Soviet "National Froniters" in the socalled Oouncil of Free Ozechoslov-ailcia - is a 48 :page booklet pwbliished by the Slovak League o!f America, which&#13;
should be read 'by every one seekdng the answer to the&#13;
queQtion of how "Ozecho-.Slovak demoora·c y" ooniveirted to a&#13;
",p eople's demoocacy." Send 25 cents (coin or stamps) to&#13;
the SIJOVAKiiA for your copy today.&#13;
&#13;
</text>
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

39

THE SLOVAKS AND SLAVONIC CIVILIZATION
Joseph Kirschbaum, LL.D., Ph.D.

There seems to be some confusion even among ,specialists in the fi.eld of Slav,iic studies as far as Slorvalkia's
contribution to the civilization of other Slav peoples is
concerned. The question, then, as to· what role the SlovaJkis reaHy did 'Play in the civilization of the Slavonic peoples, is not only interesting, but worthy of consideration
and study. To answer that question, we must first consider several fundamental questions:
First: What role did IS'loviaikiia play in the Great Mora.
vian Empire, on the territory o.f which the cultura)l~reHgioll'S mission of Saints Cyril and Methodiius was developed?
Second: Into the cultural history of what nation can
we place the cuatural and literary work of Cyril and Me.
thodius and their immediate puipils?
Third: Are the Slovaks of today ethnically and culturally bound with the people of Great Moravia?
In a significant 1portion of ,Slavonic histriography,
especially in the works of sciientific workers and Slavists
whiich were !pUb1ished in English in the past three decades,
there is no agreemoot on these fundamental questions.
R. A. Kamn in hiis "The Multinational Empire"(l)
states, for example, that "the !Slav popuJ.ation, ,p articularly
the eastern SlaN populaition of the Great Moravian Ehnpire,
is unquestionaJbly the historic ancestor of the Slovaks of
today," but he adds that those historic ,p redcessors ·a re "by
no means ethnically identical with them (the Slovaks)."
John D. lJa Monte in his "World of the Middle Ages"
omits the 'Slovaks cOIIIllpletely when naming the ethnic
gro'll!ps which .formed the Great iMoiravian Empire.
H. S. Thompson, J. S. Roucek, Milan Hodza, Francis
Dvornik, and many other •less significant iSlavists ,present
the first ,Slavonic !State in Central Europe - which Porfyl'ogenetos named topogrruphically accordmg to the river
bearing that name - as if it belonged to the political and
cultural history of the Ozechs, or at best of the Ozecho-

�40

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Slovaks. And thus they a:lso present the cultUTal-Ohristiarn work of Saints Cyril and Methodius.
Professor Francis Dvornik, one of the most acknowledged authorities of cultural and political history
of the IShwonic ,p eoples of the ninth century, regards "Bohemia the heir of .t he Mo11avian Empire"C2).
For ,p rofessor Rouceik (ISla;vonic Encyclopedia) Great
Moravia and the cultmal wor&gt;k of Cyril-Methodius is exclusively a part of Czech history, while for Dr. Miilan
Hodza it is the first "CzechosJovaJk" State(3).
This -wew, which the aibove mentioned authors at~
tempt to support with the hypothesis that "Czechs and
Slova!ks of Bohemia, Moravia and Northern Hungary
(Silova;k,i•a ) fovmed a single group with a common language"( 4) - the iview held ,b y several Ozech histor1ans,
phil'()llogists and ethnographers, specially Cha1oupeoky, Niederle, Pra•z ak, and Pastmek - is, of course, at odds with
older views of some Czech, Slovak, German and otiher European histovians, philologists and ethnographers. And ,i t
certainly cannot find support in histor,ical sources, which
though not abundant are nevertheless sufficient to cast
dou'bt on the aibove theses .
Professor Dvornik himself, who- regards Czechia-Bohemi1a as the heir of the Great Moravian Elmpire, leads rto
the logical conclusion that the Czech tribes belonged to the
Great Moravian Empire only for a very sho-rt time, when
Svatoplulk was extending his power on a1'1 sides, and .that
after Svatopluk's death in 895 "the Bohemians appeared
again at the Re.ichrsita;g at Regensburg and renewed their
allegiance to the FrMllkish Empire. " And Dvornik also
states that "Bohemia's submission to the Franks naturally
implied severance of all !l'.'cligious ties with the Mora-wan
eoclesirus-tical organization" (5)
The statement that "the Bohemians appeared again
at Regensburg" requiTes supplementation from the Arnnales Fuldenses, which Dvornik himself quotes a;nd depends
upon, that is, tha;t in the year 8415 "fourteen chieftains of
Czech tribes a:ppeared at the court of Louis and accepted
baptism with their escorts"(6), which under the givoo
cir&lt;:umstances clearly indicates the political dependence of

�SLOVAKIA

41

the Czech tribes on Bavaria. According to the Armales Xantenses, the Czechs quarreled and fought with Bai\Tlaria in.
849, but could not rid themselves of Bavarian rule and
join the Ozech lands to the Great Moravian Empire, which
Dvornik regards as a "federation under the authority of
the Mojmir dynasty"(7), until aJbout 880. According to Novotny and the Annales Fuldenses •~svatopl,uk extricated
the Czech tribes from Frankish rule b.y force"&lt; 8) .
Since the beginnings of Gre,a t MoTavia are placed in
the year 822 a:nd 'h istorical sources mention Pribina and
the dedication of the Church in Nitrn in 833; furthermore
since, even accordmg to, professor Dvornilk, Czech tribes
were still defin,itely :sUJbordinated to Bavaria in 8'49, even
though that was already the era of Rastis1av, the third
ruler of the Great Moravian Empire, and since the Czech
trilbes separated from the Great Moravian Empire and
sutbmitted to Bavaria and then even waged war together
witJh the Germans against the Great Moravian :EJmpire:(9),
it ,i s indeed quite difficult to find a historical or logical argument for the thesis that Great Moravia did belong to
Czech polirti'cal history and that the cultural work of Cyril
and Methodius belonged to Ozech cultm-al history.
The question of what tribes formed the Great Moravian Empire and what lands the empire consisted of
could not be considered satisfactorily and defi.n,i tely resolved and, therefore, a group of scientific workers began
a new search and technica{ researdh of sources. The historians were joined :b y philologists, archeo[og,ists and ex-·
,p erts on medieval history; the era of the Great Moravian
Emrpire was studied ~at only ,f rom 'a nnals and chronicles,
from legends and liturgical texts of iS lavonic antiquity,
but also on the baisis of archeological finds, names of
rivers and mountaiins, villages and towns, ·c hurches, Christi'an and fomily names, popular traditions, etc. The list
of speo~ali,s ts of the Great Moravian era is surprisingly
lange in the rpast years and while some of them are known
internationally (1Dvornik, Jam:ohson), significant works of
others are tJhus far unknown on the Amerfoan continent
only becruuse they were not trans.Jated into ,various world

�42

SLOVAKIA

languages, nor were they presented to the learned world
even in a:bst:mct form.
Among the uruknown or little-known ,s pecialists in the
Anglo-Saxon world, we find a si,,gnif.icant group of Slovwk
university professors and e~perts of whom I might men.,
tion the following:
a) In history: Joseph Skultety, Francis lHruso,v sky,
Daniel Rapant, J. Dakan.
:b) In philofogy: John Stanislav, Henry Bartek, Louis
Novaik, Jizacenko, B. Varsi1k, V . Pogorielov, Anthony !Banik.
c) In literary histoiry: Andrew Mraz, Steplhen Krcmery.
d) In ar,cheology: John Eisner.
Every one of these men made a study of one or the
other phase of the em of Great Momvi,a and the work, of
Saiints Cyril and Methodiius, ,and some of them - Stanislav,
Hrusovsky, Bartek, ,:maicenlko, Pogorielov of several
,p hases and some of their studies were ,published even in
foreign languaiges(l0).
To what conclusions does the scientific research of
these experts lead to, even though the results of their
studies thus far ,a re available for the main part only to
Slavonic scholars and haive not been made availruble in
suita!ble form for the western world? Professo.r Otokar Odlozilik, in the ' ~Harvard Slavic Studies," summwri'zes
them 1.Jhiis way: "'1:t can ibe said of them in general that
they not only shed fuller light on po1'itical and cultuTal
dev~lopments in the Mor.avian State, but invalidated earlier concepts, aiccording to which the work of the Slavic
Apostles wais short-lived and doomed to failure"(ll).
'F undamentally, the results of the scienti.f1ic research
of Slovaik historians, philofogists., archeologists and cultural wovkers of the past decades are these:
1. In agreement with Dobrovsky, who alreaidy in 1825
wrote that ",S lovakia was really Great MoraJVlia" (12), and
in agreement with Safarik (:Slovanske starozitnosti, pp.
794-795), Skultety, Hrusovsky, Stanislav ,a nd Dekan con.,
sider Slovakia as 1Jhe central and main part of the Great
Moravian Elm.pi.re, which in the "Skazani o prelozeni knig"
was already called "1Slovensk,a zemlja" (Sloviak country).
2. In agreement with V. Jag-i:c, who in his wcmk a'bout

�43

SLOVAKIA

the origin of the Church ISlaJV1onic tongue wrote in 1900
that "in Great Moravia ,p eople must have spoken dn the
ninth century with a tQ!1lgue which in its fundamental,s was
identkal witJh the !Slov•aik language of today"(13), Stamislav,
Bartek, Rapant, Varsik and No,vak arrived at the conclu-·
si•o n through .scientific study that the inhalbitants of Great
Moravia •w ere the direct ancestors of the 1Slovaks of today.
3. On the ,b asis of the abOIVe mentioned premi ses, the
above historians and philologists, as ,well ·a s A. Mraz, the
literary historian, oo.me to the conclusion that the cultural-Christianiz.ing adiv:ity of 1Sruints Cyril and Methodius
related to, iin tJhe first ,place, the ancestors of present-day
Slovltks and ISlovwkia and, therefore, their literary work,
including the literary activity of some of their ipupil.s, is a
·component ,part of SlOl\"aik 1iternture. It may be interesting
to note here that this .thesis is supported even by profes~
so:rs of the Bratislava University today (A. Mira~ and J.
Dek1an) , even though in present C'zecho-Slo,vaikia nationalism and everything which might be susipected of nationa:l- .
1sm is prmishable according to the lruw as "deviationism."
By what .scientif,i.c arguments are these tJheises supported? On what scientific order do they mainfy depend?
What new contributions do they bring to the evaluation
of the work of Cy11itl and Methodius?
Besides a new search and ev;aluation of known sources,
such as the Annales Fuldenses, Annales, regni &amp;ancormn,
Libellus de conversione Bagoariorum et Carantanorum, the
chronicles of Heriman, Regino, Nestor, legends and biogrruphies, etc., the brusis for the above mentioned conclusions are in the main philological researches(14). The name
Mora;via and Miaravian.s, incidental~y also "Scalvi," which
we meet with mainly in Latin sources, whHe eastern sources
spook of ".Sfoveni" (in the S!K'A'Z ANi, the Mornvian State
is, as we have seen, alternatively ca:lled "Monwa" and
"Slovenska zemljia" - Morav;ia iand the Sl01vak l,and), is
considered a topo,g ra;phical term, which received its ,political character and was used ,in the etatistical meaning to
indica,te the inhabitants of the Moravian State, besides
the Czechs and the Se11bians wllw belonged only for short
time to SvatoplUJk's empire.
1

a

�44

SLOVAKIA

"The fall of Great Moravia," writes Dr. J. Delkan,
"brings a. return to the original topographical signif.icance
of the name, and tJhe inhabitants of the eastern .part of
Great Morav;ia, i.e., the territory of Slovakia, ,b esides isolated toponomastk remiscences, are called iby their own ancient ethnic name of "Sclavi, Slovieni, namely, the Slovaks" (15). The thesis tha:t the term Moravians had only
a specifically topographic •a nd, later, a politicaHy ebatistical
meaning was unfolded long before Dekan by several Slo!Vak Slav;ists and hi,s torians, especially by Joseph Skultety(16), Hrusovsky and Stanis:lav.
The .philologists John 1Stantisliav, L. Novak, H. Bartek ,
V. Pogorielov, mcenko, and others, lby philologioa1 inquiry
of the Cyrilo-.Methodius texts, the Cividalian Gospel Book ,
legends and chronicles, as well as by searching names of
people, J'livers., mountains, villages, churches and traditions
and, furthermOTe, the dia!lects and "loan words", confirm
the theses and the hypotheses ,o;f the historians. as regard..c;
even the ethnical nature of the inhia,bitants of Great Moravia as well as the mission of Cyril and Methodius in relation to Slovaikia.
According to the latest researches, of Slovak Sl-avists,
the mission of Saints Cyril and Methodius took pla:ce mainly on the territo-ry o,f the Slova,ks - professor Stanislav
states with certainty that Method's residence was in Nitra(l 7) and the great cultural-Christianizing work of
Cynil and MetJhodius is consequently placed first of all in
the cultural history of the Slovaks. Even Dvornik confiir.ms this indirectly when he states that "Slo,vam.ic liturgy
in Slovakia outlived the catastrophe of the Great Morawian
Empire," that the territory o.f present-day Slo,vrukia was
"in a definite sense the most cultured part of the Magyar
empire" (,correctly, the Hungarian empire), and the Slavonic monks, after being ex,pelled from Czech lands (from
the Monastery at Sazavia) in 1055, found refuge in !Slovakia.
According to Dvornilk, Slovakia and her ancient Slavonic
cente11s served as ''half~way transmitting centers" not only
between Croatia, but even Kievian Russia08l.
As far as tJhe literary work of Cyril-Methodius and
their immedi,a te .students is ,c oncerned, we know from the

�SLOVAKIA

45

;'SKAZANI" that they translated "i proceJe knigy" (also
many other books) and from Latin legends "pluraque
aliia documenta sacrae scri,ptuare" (according to the legend
of Bodescens), or only ".plura que a'lia," according to the
legend of Christian. ,Sbanisla'V reco.rds that "after his arri'Val in Great Mora'Via, Constantine translated almost the
entire ecclesiastical rituial." We know definiteJy, Stanislav
writes, that Constantine completed the translation of the
Gospel texts of all four ev,angelists in Great Mora'Via, and
that he also translated the Acts of the Apostles and the
Psa1ms(l9l.
St . Methodius, according to Stanis1a'V, continued in the
work ,b egun by his brother and after the issuance of the
glorious Bull "I:ndustriae tuae," by which the Sla'V•Onic
liturgy a;gain was confirmed and permitted, "made a compendium of everything that was translated during the
twel1Ve years (869-881) oif hris independent '1eadership of
the Great Moravian mission. He selected -t wo priest 'rapid
writers' a111d with them translated - probably dictated to
them - the entire text of the Holy B ible - tJhe Old and
New Testaments, besides the books of the 1faccalbees, within eight months."
Methodius also t:mnslated, or had translated, the Latin Missal, which is •.p reserved as the so-•called Kiev Missal;
written in Gl agolic letters it is preserved in a copy from
the 10th century wi,1fu the elements of the Great Mora1Vian
tongue. Stanisla'V aJso mentions the translation of the ri-·
tual, the fbrev;iary and the credo•, which, according to Methiodius' biog,r,ruphy, Sva.toplUik was Slllpposed to hav,e
prayed in the Slovak translation.
Of the non..Jiturgica11 books, Sfanislav mentions the
translation of the Nomocanon, or the Korm'.caja bodk, i.e.,
a collection of laiws and regulations o.f the By,zantian rulers
and Chwch Fiatlhers, then Cyril's po~emic treatise in Greek
against the Jews, which was translated :b y Methodius, ,a nd
the original works "A Preface to the Gospels" and "Writings A'bout the True Faith," both written by Cyril. Among
the original mementoes belong the so-caUed iPannonianMO'ravian Legends, "The Life of St. Cyril and iMethodius,"
written, according to, Stanjslav, without a doubt in Great
1

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SLOVAKIA

Moravia, also the "Praiises of Cyril and Metihodius" and
"albou;t the end of the ancient Slovak epoch of Slovak culture" - the 'legend aJbout Naum. One of the "MoravianSloviak sons" - Stanislav says - composed also the ancient
Slovalk legend about St. Wenceslaius around the year 935.
Stan:is1aiv states quite clearJy that this literacy activity
developed on rSlovaJk territory and that in the "great work
along wiith Cyril and .M ethod.ius undoubtedly other sons
of the Slovak nation had a part, especially Gorazd(20) .
Traces of thii:s are found especially in many words of these
mementoes." And since "tlhese memoirs were written for
the religious, i.e., the cultural needs of the Slovak nation
and prompted by it, the predecessors of the Slovaks took
part in this work passi'Vely and actively and, therefore,
this literary wor.k, according to Sta.nislav, belongs also to
our (Slovak) nationaJl treasure."
"Old Slavonic was the first liter,a ry language of the
Slwa;k nation," J. Stanrislav wrote in 1944 at the conolusion of his studies. This the.sis was taken up after him by
Dr. A. Mra:z, professor orf Slova,k literature at ,t he Bratisl1a va U-p.iversity today. The Slovaik nation actuaHy regards it as lits langua:ge, states Stanislav. Prnof of this we
have, for example, in tihe letter of Pope Hadrian IT to
Rastislav, Svatophrk and Kocel, in which is written: "We
have decided . . . to send Methodius . . . to teach you as
you requested, e~laining the Bible in your language (21) .
This clarif,ioation of the re'1ation of the mission of
Saints Cyril and Methodius to Slo;vakia appeared to be necessary to find the answer to the question what role the
Slova;ks and !Slovakia ,p layed in the ibegiinnings of civilization of the 1Slruvonic rpeoples. -If we accept the thesis, demonstrated by Slovak IS lavists, ,tJhen the matlter is in surbstance simple : the participation oif the Slovaks and Slova-·
kia in the civilization of the rest of the Slavonic nations
is proved by .the signifioance of Saints Cyril and Methodius
and their immediate pupils in the cultural life .of the individua:l Sliwonic nations.
As for as the content and extent of the cultural-Christian~ing work of Cyri'l .and Methodius is concerned, SlovaJk Slavists, wiit:h their scientific inquiries, confirm the

�SLOVAKIA

47

view ,o f professor K. J. Grot(22), who wrote rub-Out Great
Moravia and the work of the Slovak Aipostles that in
Great Moravia was made not only "the most important at..
temrpt at a politicail unification of the Slovanic peoples the Greater Moravian Union - but also that: 1. there
"were l aid the foundations for the national Church and
nati.onal Christian education; 2. there origina,ted the draft
and the directive of the future of the who&gt;J.e subsequent
historic development of Slavdom, its world :riole and re.1ation to Roman-Germaillic Europe, to the West and to the
Asiatic question; 3. the foundation of Church-1Slov,a nic
literature and education in the .Slovanic South among the
BuLgars and the 1Seribs, and in the East among the Russians, and pa:rtly also among other western Slavs, was
only a continuation of that work whfoh Cyril and Methodius had begun in Great Moravia."
Before concluding, it is iperhaps necessary to recall
iha:t bortih histori'Oal and cu1tural conclusions here indicated are nothing new in ,Slovak cultUTal life, but onily a
scientific support of the tradition and endu:riing consciousness of the continuity of Great Mora'\ria w1th Slovakia,
which already in rthe 17th and 18th centuries found expression in several scientific and literary wo-:r,ks b-Oth from
the ci~de of Trnavia University (1635), and also from the
circle of Bernol1ruk's school at the end of the 18th century.
In the preface to 1:Jhe significant Cantus Catholiic,i (1655),
Benedict ,S zolosi (1609-56) tells ·clearly about the consciousness of historical continuity of the Slovaks wiith the
history of Great Moravia; the greia.t epic "Cy:rifoimertodiada"
_and "IS vatoplulk" from John Holly and the Latin work of
Samu~l Timon (16'715-1736), .the distinguished wor:k of Johlil
B. Magin from 1712-8 •~Maurices sive Arpologda" aTe irre.
futruble proofs of this.
Of couTse, :Slavists of other nations are &amp;pected to
tell how far the results and conclusions of .the scientific
resoo.rdh of ISlov,a;k Slaviists are in agreement with the histo~ical truth aind where the theses and hypoitheses are in
cases in disagreement with their scientifdc research. Therefore the aim of this dissertation is not only to call at.ten-•
tion to Slovruk -scientific inquiries, to the ·c ontri1bution which
1

1

�48

SLOVAKIA

Slovaks m'ade to Slavistics from Safarlk and Kollar to present-day scientific woiikers in Slovaiki1a and outside its territory, but this short treatise has for its aim also to evoke
moire interest to inquire .into and evaluate a,nd, in cases,
even to refute some theses of contemporary Sfova:k scientific woDkers in ,tJhe field of Slavic studies.
References
1. Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire Nationalism
and National Re.form in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918, Ruil:gers
U niversity, New Y,ork, Columbia Un iversity Press, 1950, 2 vol.
2. ,F rancis Dvornik, The Making of Central and Eastern Europe,
London, 1949, ,p. 241. etc.
3. Dr. Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe, Jarold-s , London, 1942, p. 86: "Slovakia was hlle fiTst cultured and, mayb e also
the first pol'itical centre .of thait Great Moravi-a of A :D. 8,26-907 which
was the early mediev.al precedent of the -modern OzechoJSlovakia.
'l'his original Czecho•Sfovak State mad e 'i tself the first Chrisitian
centre of the Western Slavs."
4. Dvornik, ,i bidem, p. 18.
5. Ibidem , p. 21.
6. "Hludovicus quatuordecim ex ducibus Boemanorum cum hominibus -s ui s Christianam religionem desiderantes suscepit et in octavis ,theopihaniae haptizar.i juss,i t," M. G. H . S ., I, p. 364; Dvornik
ibidem, p. 20.
7. Lbidem, p. 293.
8. V. Novotny, Ceske dejiny, Praha, 1912, p. 380: Annales Fuldenses. p. 126: "(.:B!oemani ) quos Zwentibaldus dux a consortio et
potestate Baio,aricae ,g entis per vim dudum divelendo detr.axerat ... "
9. Ernest Deni-s , La question d' Autriche et les Slovaques, Paris,
1917; Louis Leger, Histoire de I' Autriche-Hongrie, Paris, 1920, p. 89.
10. The principal bo,o k,s dealing with the question of Great Moravia a nd the Mission of Cyri,J and Methodius are as follows: J. Skultety, Sketches from Slovak History, Middletown, P.a ., 1930; F. Hrus ovsky, Gesch ichte der Slowakei, Bratis'lava, 1943, and Slovenskf
vladari , Scranton, Pa., 1948; Jan 'Stanislav, Kultura starych Slovakov, Bratislava, 1944, ,and Rfsa Vel'komoravska , Sbo-r nik v,edeckye'h
prac, Prague, 1933, and Slovanskf apostoli Cyril a Metod a ich cinnosf vo Vel ' komoravskej rfsi , Bratislava, 1945; Izacenko, Zaciatky
vzdelanosti vo Vel'komoravskej rfsi, T. sv. Martin, 1948; V . Pogor,ielov, O narodnosti slovanskych apostolov, Bratislava, No. 2, 1927;
Rap.ant, Pribynov nitriansky kostolik, .Bratislava, 1941; A. Banik,
Apostol Gorazd ; A . Mraz, Dejiny slovenskej literatury, Bratislav,a ,
1948, etc.
11. Harvard Slavic Studies, Vol. I.I, p. 77-78.
12. " . . . die heutige Slorwakey in Oberungern is das eigen,tliche
Gross,Mli.hren . .. " wrote •Dobrovsky in a l etter to J. S. Bandtke
(Correspondence o,f J . Dobrovsky, II, p. 163) .

�SLOVAKIA

49

13. See V. J agic, Entstehungsg eschichte der Kirchenslawischen
Sprache, Vjenna, 1900.
14. Annales Fuldenses and Annales r egni Francorum mention
'·Sclavos Marabenses" . . . "duces Sclavorum circa Danubiu m habitantium .. ." or "legationes Marvanorum . . ." distingui&gt;shin,g
them fro m "legaitiones !Beheimorum," i.e., C2Jechs. In the Reg,e nsburg continuation of Annales Fuldenses we find only "Maravi,
M·aravaui, Marehenses, Marabi, Marahav.i," etc.
15. ,see !Dr. J an Dekan, Slovenske dejiny, Iii, Bratislava, 1951,
p. 42.
16. J . SkuJ.tety already in 1926 writes in this regard: "With the
,d evelopment of science, particularly Slavonic ph ilology, talk of Carpatho,Danubian and Pannonian Slavs w:ill cease, -a nd t!he SloveneSlovaks w'il'l be def,i nitely m entioned . When it is once clear that
ihe inhabitants of present-day Moravia were nothing but Slovaks,
t h e nation of Rastislav and Svatopluk will not be called Moravlans
.a nd Slovaks, but persistently and definitely Slovaks" (Sketches from
Slovak History, p. 30).
17. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 42 .
18. See Chapter, Kievan Russia and Central Europe, p. 236-261.
19. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 10-14.
20. Pogorielov s•a ys em ph a ti cally th at t he Slovakisms in the
Slavonic text of th e H oly Scriptures are th e work of Gorazd and
calls Gorazd the third h oly apos tl e of Slavdom .
21. Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 14.
22. K. J . Grot, Karpato-dunajs kija zemli v sud'bach slavianstva,
1905, p. 18, and Metodijevskij jubilejnij sbornik, W arsaiw, 1885, p. 5.

•

•

•

BENES'S 'JIRiiP TO MOSCOW AND CZECHOSLOVAK PROPAGANDA
Dr. Michael Zibrin

Benes admits in his Memoirs that Eden made some forJ
mal objecUons aigainst his 1943 trip to Moscow, yet he tries
to mmimti:ze the opposition of the IDnglish cabinet . Benes
pr.opaJgandists of today, h owever, do not admit ev~ this
faot and t hey praiise the Benes t rip to Moscow as something
by which Benes greatly ,helped the Allies and to which
Washington and London consented.
Anyone who heard Dr. Ripka's report before the
CzechoJSlovak State Council in London, July 26, 19'43 when he talked aib,out the preparaUons for Benes's trip
to Moscow, made in a;greement with Ozecho.;S1ov,ak Communists, and how Dr. Benes was expected in Moscow in
any case - has an entirely different picture rubout the

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1292">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA

39

THE SLOVAKS AND SLAVONIC CIVILIZATION
Joseph Kirschbaum, LL.D., Ph.D.

There seems to be some confusion even among ,specialists in the fi.eld of Slav,iic studies as far as Slorvalkia's
contribution to the civilization of other Slav peoples is
concerned. The question, then, as to· what role the SlovaJkis reaHy did 'Play in the civilization of the Slavonic peoples, is not only interesting, but worthy of consideration
and study. To answer that question, we must first consider several fundamental questions:
First: What role did IS'loviaikiia play in the Great Mora.
vian Empire, on the territory o.f which the cultura)l~reHgioll'S mission of Saints Cyril and Methodiius was developed?
Second: Into the cultural history of what nation can
we place the cuatural and literary work of Cyril and Me.
thodius and their immediate puipils?
Third: Are the Slovaks of today ethnically and culturally bound with the people of Great Moravia?
In a significant 1portion of ,Slavonic histriography,
especially in the works of sciientific workers and Slavists
whiich were !pUb1ished in English in the past three decades,
there is no agreemoot on these fundamental questions.
R. A. Kamn in hiis "The Multinational Empire"(l)
states, for example, that "the !Slav popuJ.ation, ,p articularly
the eastern SlaN populaition of the Great Moravian Ehnpire,
is unquestionaJbly the historic ancestor of the Slovaks of
today," but he adds that those historic ,p redcessors ·a re "by
no means ethnically identical with them (the Slovaks)."
John D. lJa Monte in his "World of the Middle Ages"
omits the 'Slovaks cOIIIllpletely when naming the ethnic
gro'll!ps which .formed the Great iMoiravian Empire.
H. S. Thompson, J. S. Roucek, Milan Hodza, Francis
Dvornik, and many other •less significant iSlavists ,present
the first ,Slavonic !State in Central Europe - which Porfyl'ogenetos named topogrruphically accordmg to the river
bearing that name - as if it belonged to the political and
cultural history of the Ozechs, or at best of the Ozecho-

�40

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Slovaks. And thus they a:lso present the cultUTal-Ohristiarn work of Saints Cyril and Methodius.
Professor Francis Dvornik, one of the most acknowledged authorities of cultural and political history
of the IShwonic ,p eoples of the ninth century, regards "Bohemia the heir of .t he Mo11avian Empire"C2).
For ,p rofessor Rouceik (ISla;vonic Encyclopedia) Great
Moravia and the cultmal wor&gt;k of Cyril-Methodius is exclusively a part of Czech history, while for Dr. Miilan
Hodza it is the first "CzechosJovaJk" State(3).
This -wew, which the aibove mentioned authors at~
tempt to support with the hypothesis that "Czechs and
Slova!ks of Bohemia, Moravia and Northern Hungary
(Silova;k,i•a ) fovmed a single group with a common language"( 4) - the iview held ,b y several Ozech histor1ans,
phil'()llogists and ethnographers, specially Cha1oupeoky, Niederle, Pra•z ak, and Pastmek - is, of course, at odds with
older views of some Czech, Slovak, German and otiher European histovians, philologists and ethnographers. And ,i t
certainly cannot find support in histor,ical sources, which
though not abundant are nevertheless sufficient to cast
dou'bt on the aibove theses .
Professor Dvornik himself, who- regards Czechia-Bohemi1a as the heir of the Great Moravian Elmpire, leads rto
the logical conclusion that the Czech tribes belonged to the
Great Moravian Empire only for a very sho-rt time, when
Svatoplulk was extending his power on a1'1 sides, and .that
after Svatopluk's death in 895 "the Bohemians appeared
again at the Re.ichrsita;g at Regensburg and renewed their
allegiance to the FrMllkish Empire. " And Dvornik also
states that "Bohemia's submission to the Franks naturally
implied severance of all !l'.'cligious ties with the Mora-wan
eoclesirus-tical organization" (5)
The statement that "the Bohemians appeared again
at Regensburg" requiTes supplementation from the Arnnales Fuldenses, which Dvornik himself quotes a;nd depends
upon, that is, tha;t in the year 8415 "fourteen chieftains of
Czech tribes a:ppeared at the court of Louis and accepted
baptism with their escorts"(6), which under the givoo
cir&lt;:umstances clearly indicates the political dependence of

�SLOVAKIA

41

the Czech tribes on Bavaria. According to the Armales Xantenses, the Czechs quarreled and fought with Bai\Tlaria in.
849, but could not rid themselves of Bavarian rule and
join the Ozech lands to the Great Moravian Empire, which
Dvornik regards as a "federation under the authority of
the Mojmir dynasty"(7), until aJbout 880. According to Novotny and the Annales Fuldenses •~svatopl,uk extricated
the Czech tribes from Frankish rule b.y force"&lt; 8) .
Since the beginnings of Gre,a t MoTavia are placed in
the year 822 a:nd 'h istorical sources mention Pribina and
the dedication of the Church in Nitrn in 833; furthermore
since, even accordmg to, professor Dvornilk, Czech tribes
were still defin,itely :sUJbordinated to Bavaria in 8'49, even
though that was already the era of Rastis1av, the third
ruler of the Great Moravian Empire, and since the Czech
trilbes separated from the Great Moravian Empire and
sutbmitted to Bavaria and then even waged war together
witJh the Germans against the Great Moravian :EJmpire:(9),
it ,i s indeed quite difficult to find a historical or logical argument for the thesis that Great Moravia did belong to
Czech polirti'cal history and that the cultural work of Cyril
and Methodius belonged to Ozech cultm-al history.
The question of what tribes formed the Great Moravian Empire and what lands the empire consisted of
could not be considered satisfactorily and defi.n,i tely resolved and, therefore, a group of scientific workers began
a new search and technica{ researdh of sources. The historians were joined :b y philologists, archeo[og,ists and ex-·
,p erts on medieval history; the era of the Great Moravian
Emrpire was studied ~at only ,f rom 'a nnals and chronicles,
from legends and liturgical texts of iS lavonic antiquity,
but also on the baisis of archeological finds, names of
rivers and mountaiins, villages and towns, ·c hurches, Christi'an and fomily names, popular traditions, etc. The list
of speo~ali,s ts of the Great Moravian era is surprisingly
lange in the rpast years and while some of them are known
internationally (1Dvornik, Jam:ohson), significant works of
others are tJhus far unknown on the Amerfoan continent
only becruuse they were not trans.Jated into ,various world

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languages, nor were they presented to the learned world
even in a:bst:mct form.
Among the uruknown or little-known ,s pecialists in the
Anglo-Saxon world, we find a si,,gnif.icant group of Slovwk
university professors and e~perts of whom I might men.,
tion the following:
a) In history: Joseph Skultety, Francis lHruso,v sky,
Daniel Rapant, J. Dakan.
:b) In philofogy: John Stanislav, Henry Bartek, Louis
Novaik, Jizacenko, B. Varsi1k, V . Pogorielov, Anthony !Banik.
c) In literary histoiry: Andrew Mraz, Steplhen Krcmery.
d) In ar,cheology: John Eisner.
Every one of these men made a study of one or the
other phase of the em of Great Momvi,a and the work, of
Saiints Cyril and Methodiius, ,and some of them - Stanislav,
Hrusovsky, Bartek, ,:maicenlko, Pogorielov of several
,p hases and some of their studies were ,published even in
foreign languaiges(l0).
To what conclusions does the scientific research of
these experts lead to, even though the results of their
studies thus far ,a re available for the main part only to
Slavonic scholars and haive not been made availruble in
suita!ble form for the western world? Professo.r Otokar Odlozilik, in the ' ~Harvard Slavic Studies," summwri'zes
them 1.Jhiis way: "'1:t can ibe said of them in general that
they not only shed fuller light on po1'itical and cultuTal
dev~lopments in the Mor.avian State, but invalidated earlier concepts, aiccording to which the work of the Slavic
Apostles wais short-lived and doomed to failure"(ll).
'F undamentally, the results of the scienti.f1ic research
of Slovaik historians, philofogists., archeologists and cultural wovkers of the past decades are these:
1. In agreement with Dobrovsky, who alreaidy in 1825
wrote that ",S lovakia was really Great MoraJVlia" (12), and
in agreement with Safarik (:Slovanske starozitnosti, pp.
794-795), Skultety, Hrusovsky, Stanislav ,a nd Dekan con.,
sider Slovakia as 1Jhe central and main part of the Great
Moravian Elm.pi.re, which in the "Skazani o prelozeni knig"
was already called "1Slovensk,a zemlja" (Sloviak country).
2. In agreement with V. Jag-i:c, who in his wcmk a'bout

�43

SLOVAKIA

the origin of the Church ISlaJV1onic tongue wrote in 1900
that "in Great Moravia ,p eople must have spoken dn the
ninth century with a tQ!1lgue which in its fundamental,s was
identkal witJh the !Slov•aik language of today"(13), Stamislav,
Bartek, Rapant, Varsik and No,vak arrived at the conclu-·
si•o n through .scientific study that the inhalbitants of Great
Moravia •w ere the direct ancestors of the 1Slovaks of today.
3. On the ,b asis of the abOIVe mentioned premi ses, the
above historians and philologists, as ,well ·a s A. Mraz, the
literary historian, oo.me to the conclusion that the cultural-Christianiz.ing adiv:ity of 1Sruints Cyril and Methodius
related to, iin tJhe first ,place, the ancestors of present-day
Slovltks and ISlovwkia and, therefore, their literary work,
including the literary activity of some of their ipupil.s, is a
·component ,part of SlOl\"aik 1iternture. It may be interesting
to note here that this .thesis is supported even by profes~
so:rs of the Bratislava University today (A. Mira~ and J.
Dek1an) , even though in present C'zecho-Slo,vaikia nationalism and everything which might be susipected of nationa:l- .
1sm is prmishable according to the lruw as "deviationism."
By what .scientif,i.c arguments are these tJheises supported? On what scientific order do they mainfy depend?
What new contributions do they bring to the evaluation
of the work of Cy11itl and Methodius?
Besides a new search and ev;aluation of known sources,
such as the Annales Fuldenses, Annales, regni &amp;ancormn,
Libellus de conversione Bagoariorum et Carantanorum, the
chronicles of Heriman, Regino, Nestor, legends and biogrruphies, etc., the brusis for the above mentioned conclusions are in the main philological researches(14). The name
Mora;via and Miaravian.s, incidental~y also "Scalvi," which
we meet with mainly in Latin sources, whHe eastern sources
spook of ".Sfoveni" (in the S!K'A'Z ANi, the Mornvian State
is, as we have seen, alternatively ca:lled "Monwa" and
"Slovenska zemljia" - Morav;ia iand the Sl01vak l,and), is
considered a topo,g ra;phical term, which received its ,political character and was used ,in the etatistical meaning to
indica,te the inhabitants of the Moravian State, besides
the Czechs and the Se11bians wllw belonged only for short
time to SvatoplUJk's empire.
1

a

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SLOVAKIA

"The fall of Great Moravia," writes Dr. J. Delkan,
"brings a. return to the original topographical signif.icance
of the name, and tJhe inhabitants of the eastern .part of
Great Morav;ia, i.e., the territory of Slovakia, ,b esides isolated toponomastk remiscences, are called iby their own ancient ethnic name of "Sclavi, Slovieni, namely, the Slovaks" (15). The thesis tha:t the term Moravians had only
a specifically topographic •a nd, later, a politicaHy ebatistical
meaning was unfolded long before Dekan by several Slo!Vak Slav;ists and hi,s torians, especially by Joseph Skultety(16), Hrusovsky and Stanis:lav.
The .philologists John 1Stantisliav, L. Novak, H. Bartek ,
V. Pogorielov, mcenko, and others, lby philologioa1 inquiry
of the Cyrilo-.Methodius texts, the Cividalian Gospel Book ,
legends and chronicles, as well as by searching names of
people, J'livers., mountains, villages, churches and traditions
and, furthermOTe, the dia!lects and "loan words", confirm
the theses and the hypotheses ,o;f the historians. as regard..c;
even the ethnical nature of the inhia,bitants of Great Moravia as well as the mission of Cyril and Methodius in relation to Slovaikia.
According to the latest researches, of Slovak Sl-avists,
the mission of Saints Cyril and Methodius took pla:ce mainly on the territo-ry o,f the Slova,ks - professor Stanislav
states with certainty that Method's residence was in Nitra(l 7) and the great cultural-Christianizing work of
Cynil and MetJhodius is consequently placed first of all in
the cultural history of the Slovaks. Even Dvornik confiir.ms this indirectly when he states that "Slo,vam.ic liturgy
in Slovakia outlived the catastrophe of the Great Morawian
Empire," that the territory o.f present-day Slo,vrukia was
"in a definite sense the most cultured part of the Magyar
empire" (,correctly, the Hungarian empire), and the Slavonic monks, after being ex,pelled from Czech lands (from
the Monastery at Sazavia) in 1055, found refuge in !Slovakia.
According to Dvornilk, Slovakia and her ancient Slavonic
cente11s served as ''half~way transmitting centers" not only
between Croatia, but even Kievian Russia08l.
As far as tJhe literary work of Cyril-Methodius and
their immedi,a te .students is ,c oncerned, we know from the

�SLOVAKIA

45

;'SKAZANI" that they translated "i proceJe knigy" (also
many other books) and from Latin legends "pluraque
aliia documenta sacrae scri,ptuare" (according to the legend
of Bodescens), or only ".plura que a'lia," according to the
legend of Christian. ,Sbanisla'V reco.rds that "after his arri'Val in Great Mora'Via, Constantine translated almost the
entire ecclesiastical rituial." We know definiteJy, Stanislav
writes, that Constantine completed the translation of the
Gospel texts of all four ev,angelists in Great Mora'Via, and
that he also translated the Acts of the Apostles and the
Psa1ms(l9l.
St . Methodius, according to Stanis1a'V, continued in the
work ,b egun by his brother and after the issuance of the
glorious Bull "I:ndustriae tuae," by which the Sla'V•Onic
liturgy a;gain was confirmed and permitted, "made a compendium of everything that was translated during the
twel1Ve years (869-881) oif hris independent '1eadership of
the Great Moravian mission. He selected -t wo priest 'rapid
writers' a111d with them translated - probably dictated to
them - the entire text of the Holy B ible - tJhe Old and
New Testaments, besides the books of the 1faccalbees, within eight months."
Methodius also t:mnslated, or had translated, the Latin Missal, which is •.p reserved as the so-•called Kiev Missal;
written in Gl agolic letters it is preserved in a copy from
the 10th century wi,1fu the elements of the Great Mora1Vian
tongue. Stanisla'V aJso mentions the translation of the ri-·
tual, the fbrev;iary and the credo•, which, according to Methiodius' biog,r,ruphy, Sva.toplUik was Slllpposed to hav,e
prayed in the Slovak translation.
Of the non..Jiturgica11 books, Sfanislav mentions the
translation of the Nomocanon, or the Korm'.caja bodk, i.e.,
a collection of laiws and regulations o.f the By,zantian rulers
and Chwch Fiatlhers, then Cyril's po~emic treatise in Greek
against the Jews, which was translated :b y Methodius, ,a nd
the original works "A Preface to the Gospels" and "Writings A'bout the True Faith," both written by Cyril. Among
the original mementoes belong the so-caUed iPannonianMO'ravian Legends, "The Life of St. Cyril and iMethodius,"
written, according to, Stanjslav, without a doubt in Great
1

�46

SLOVAKIA

Moravia, also the "Praiises of Cyril and Metihodius" and
"albou;t the end of the ancient Slovak epoch of Slovak culture" - the 'legend aJbout Naum. One of the "MoravianSloviak sons" - Stanislav says - composed also the ancient
Slovalk legend about St. Wenceslaius around the year 935.
Stan:is1aiv states quite clearJy that this literacy activity
developed on rSlovaJk territory and that in the "great work
along wiith Cyril and .M ethod.ius undoubtedly other sons
of the Slovak nation had a part, especially Gorazd(20) .
Traces of thii:s are found especially in many words of these
mementoes." And since "tlhese memoirs were written for
the religious, i.e., the cultural needs of the Slovak nation
and prompted by it, the predecessors of the Slovaks took
part in this work passi'Vely and actively and, therefore,
this literary wor.k, according to Sta.nislav, belongs also to
our (Slovak) nationaJl treasure."
"Old Slavonic was the first liter,a ry language of the
Slwa;k nation," J. Stanrislav wrote in 1944 at the conolusion of his studies. This the.sis was taken up after him by
Dr. A. Mra:z, professor orf Slova,k literature at ,t he Bratisl1a va U-p.iversity today. The Slovaik nation actuaHy regards it as lits langua:ge, states Stanislav. Prnof of this we
have, for example, in tihe letter of Pope Hadrian IT to
Rastislav, Svatophrk and Kocel, in which is written: "We
have decided . . . to send Methodius . . . to teach you as
you requested, e~laining the Bible in your language (21) .
This clarif,ioation of the re'1ation of the mission of
Saints Cyril and Methodius to Slo;vakia appeared to be necessary to find the answer to the question what role the
Slova;ks and !Slovakia ,p layed in the ibegiinnings of civilization of the 1Slruvonic rpeoples. -If we accept the thesis, demonstrated by Slovak IS lavists, ,tJhen the matlter is in surbstance simple : the participation oif the Slovaks and Slova-·
kia in the civilization of the rest of the Slavonic nations
is proved by .the signifioance of Saints Cyril and Methodius
and their immediate pupils in the cultural life .of the individua:l Sliwonic nations.
As for as the content and extent of the cultural-Christian~ing work of Cyri'l .and Methodius is concerned, SlovaJk Slavists, wiit:h their scientific inquiries, confirm the

�SLOVAKIA

47

view ,o f professor K. J. Grot(22), who wrote rub-Out Great
Moravia and the work of the Slovak Aipostles that in
Great Moravia was made not only "the most important at..
temrpt at a politicail unification of the Slovanic peoples the Greater Moravian Union - but also that: 1. there
"were l aid the foundations for the national Church and
nati.onal Christian education; 2. there origina,ted the draft
and the directive of the future of the who&gt;J.e subsequent
historic development of Slavdom, its world :riole and re.1ation to Roman-Germaillic Europe, to the West and to the
Asiatic question; 3. the foundation of Church-1Slov,a nic
literature and education in the .Slovanic South among the
BuLgars and the 1Seribs, and in the East among the Russians, and pa:rtly also among other western Slavs, was
only a continuation of that work whfoh Cyril and Methodius had begun in Great Moravia."
Before concluding, it is iperhaps necessary to recall
iha:t bortih histori'Oal and cu1tural conclusions here indicated are nothing new in ,Slovak cultUTal life, but onily a
scientific support of the tradition and endu:riing consciousness of the continuity of Great Mora'\ria w1th Slovakia,
which already in rthe 17th and 18th centuries found expression in several scientific and literary wo-:r,ks b-Oth from
the ci~de of Trnavia University (1635), and also from the
circle of Bernol1ruk's school at the end of the 18th century.
In the preface to 1:Jhe significant Cantus Catholiic,i (1655),
Benedict ,S zolosi (1609-56) tells ·clearly about the consciousness of historical continuity of the Slovaks wiith the
history of Great Moravia; the greia.t epic "Cy:rifoimertodiada"
_and "IS vatoplulk" from John Holly and the Latin work of
Samu~l Timon (16'715-1736), .the distinguished wor:k of Johlil
B. Magin from 1712-8 •~Maurices sive Arpologda" aTe irre.
futruble proofs of this.
Of couTse, :Slavists of other nations are &amp;pected to
tell how far the results and conclusions of .the scientific
resoo.rdh of ISlov,a;k Slaviists are in agreement with the histo~ical truth aind where the theses and hypoitheses are in
cases in disagreement with their scientifdc research. Therefore the aim of this dissertation is not only to call at.ten-•
tion to Slovruk -scientific inquiries, to the ·c ontri1bution which
1

1

�48

SLOVAKIA

Slovaks m'ade to Slavistics from Safarlk and Kollar to present-day scientific woiikers in Slovaiki1a and outside its territory, but this short treatise has for its aim also to evoke
moire interest to inquire .into and evaluate a,nd, in cases,
even to refute some theses of contemporary Sfova:k scientific woDkers in ,tJhe field of Slavic studies.
References
1. Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire Nationalism
and National Re.form in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918, Ruil:gers
U niversity, New Y,ork, Columbia Un iversity Press, 1950, 2 vol.
2. ,F rancis Dvornik, The Making of Central and Eastern Europe,
London, 1949, ,p. 241. etc.
3. Dr. Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe, Jarold-s , London, 1942, p. 86: "Slovakia was hlle fiTst cultured and, mayb e also
the first pol'itical centre .of thait Great Moravi-a of A :D. 8,26-907 which
was the early mediev.al precedent of the -modern OzechoJSlovakia.
'l'his original Czecho•Sfovak State mad e 'i tself the first Chrisitian
centre of the Western Slavs."
4. Dvornik, ,i bidem, p. 18.
5. Ibidem , p. 21.
6. "Hludovicus quatuordecim ex ducibus Boemanorum cum hominibus -s ui s Christianam religionem desiderantes suscepit et in octavis ,theopihaniae haptizar.i juss,i t," M. G. H . S ., I, p. 364; Dvornik
ibidem, p. 20.
7. Lbidem, p. 293.
8. V. Novotny, Ceske dejiny, Praha, 1912, p. 380: Annales Fuldenses. p. 126: "(.:B!oemani ) quos Zwentibaldus dux a consortio et
potestate Baio,aricae ,g entis per vim dudum divelendo detr.axerat ... "
9. Ernest Deni-s , La question d' Autriche et les Slovaques, Paris,
1917; Louis Leger, Histoire de I' Autriche-Hongrie, Paris, 1920, p. 89.
10. The principal bo,o k,s dealing with the question of Great Moravia a nd the Mission of Cyri,J and Methodius are as follows: J. Skultety, Sketches from Slovak History, Middletown, P.a ., 1930; F. Hrus ovsky, Gesch ichte der Slowakei, Bratis'lava, 1943, and Slovenskf
vladari , Scranton, Pa., 1948; Jan 'Stanislav, Kultura starych Slovakov, Bratislava, 1944, ,and Rfsa Vel'komoravska , Sbo-r nik v,edeckye'h
prac, Prague, 1933, and Slovanskf apostoli Cyril a Metod a ich cinnosf vo Vel ' komoravskej rfsi , Bratislava, 1945; Izacenko, Zaciatky
vzdelanosti vo Vel'komoravskej rfsi, T. sv. Martin, 1948; V . Pogor,ielov, O narodnosti slovanskych apostolov, Bratislava, No. 2, 1927;
Rap.ant, Pribynov nitriansky kostolik, .Bratislava, 1941; A. Banik,
Apostol Gorazd ; A . Mraz, Dejiny slovenskej literatury, Bratislav,a ,
1948, etc.
11. Harvard Slavic Studies, Vol. I.I, p. 77-78.
12. " . . . die heutige Slorwakey in Oberungern is das eigen,tliche
Gross,Mli.hren . .. " wrote •Dobrovsky in a l etter to J. S. Bandtke
(Correspondence o,f J . Dobrovsky, II, p. 163) .

�SLOVAKIA

49

13. See V. J agic, Entstehungsg eschichte der Kirchenslawischen
Sprache, Vjenna, 1900.
14. Annales Fuldenses and Annales r egni Francorum mention
'·Sclavos Marabenses" . . . "duces Sclavorum circa Danubiu m habitantium .. ." or "legationes Marvanorum . . ." distingui&gt;shin,g
them fro m "legaitiones !Beheimorum," i.e., C2Jechs. In the Reg,e nsburg continuation of Annales Fuldenses we find only "Maravi,
M·aravaui, Marehenses, Marabi, Marahav.i," etc.
15. ,see !Dr. J an Dekan, Slovenske dejiny, Iii, Bratislava, 1951,
p. 42.
16. J . SkuJ.tety already in 1926 writes in this regard: "With the
,d evelopment of science, particularly Slavonic ph ilology, talk of Carpatho,Danubian and Pannonian Slavs w:ill cease, -a nd t!he SloveneSlovaks w'il'l be def,i nitely m entioned . When it is once clear that
ihe inhabitants of present-day Moravia were nothing but Slovaks,
t h e nation of Rastislav and Svatopluk will not be called Moravlans
.a nd Slovaks, but persistently and definitely Slovaks" (Sketches from
Slovak History, p. 30).
17. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 42 .
18. See Chapter, Kievan Russia and Central Europe, p. 236-261.
19. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 10-14.
20. Pogorielov s•a ys em ph a ti cally th at t he Slovakisms in the
Slavonic text of th e H oly Scriptures are th e work of Gorazd and
calls Gorazd the third h oly apos tl e of Slavdom .
21. Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 14.
22. K. J . Grot, Karpato-dunajs kija zemli v sud'bach slavianstva,
1905, p. 18, and Metodijevskij jubilejnij sbornik, W arsaiw, 1885, p. 5.

•

•

•

BENES'S 'JIRiiP TO MOSCOW AND CZECHOSLOVAK PROPAGANDA
Dr. Michael Zibrin

Benes admits in his Memoirs that Eden made some forJ
mal objecUons aigainst his 1943 trip to Moscow, yet he tries
to mmimti:ze the opposition of the IDnglish cabinet . Benes
pr.opaJgandists of today, h owever, do not admit ev~ this
faot and t hey praiise the Benes t rip to Moscow as something
by which Benes greatly ,helped the Allies and to which
Washington and London consented.
Anyone who heard Dr. Ripka's report before the
CzechoJSlovak State Council in London, July 26, 19'43 when he talked aib,out the preparaUons for Benes's trip
to Moscow, made in a;greement with Ozecho.;S1ov,ak Communists, and how Dr. Benes was expected in Moscow in
any case - has an entirely different picture rubout the

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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
39&#13;
&#13;
THE SLOVAKS AND SLAVONIC CIVILIZATION&#13;
Joseph Kirschbaum, LL.D., Ph.D.&#13;
&#13;
There seems to be some confusion even among ,specialists in the fi.eld of Slav,iic studies as far as Slorvalkia's&#13;
contribution to the civilization of other Slav peoples is&#13;
concerned. The question, then, as to· what role the SlovaJkis reaHy did 'Play in the civilization of the Slavonic peoples, is not only interesting, but worthy of consideration&#13;
and study. To answer that question, we must first consider several fundamental questions:&#13;
First: What role did IS'loviaikiia play in the Great Mora.&#13;
vian Empire, on the territory o.f which the cultura)l~reHgioll'S mission of Saints Cyril and Methodiius was developed?&#13;
Second: Into the cultural history of what nation can&#13;
we place the cuatural and literary work of Cyril and Me.&#13;
thodius and their immediate puipils?&#13;
Third: Are the Slovaks of today ethnically and culturally bound with the people of Great Moravia?&#13;
In a significant 1portion of ,Slavonic histriography,&#13;
especially in the works of sciientific workers and Slavists&#13;
whiich were !pUb1ished in English in the past three decades,&#13;
there is no agreemoot on these fundamental questions.&#13;
R. A. Kamn in hiis "The Multinational Empire"(l)&#13;
states, for example, that "the !Slav popuJ.ation, ,p articularly&#13;
the eastern SlaN populaition of the Great Moravian Ehnpire,&#13;
is unquestionaJbly the historic ancestor of the Slovaks of&#13;
today," but he adds that those historic ,p redcessors ·a re "by&#13;
no means ethnically identical with them (the Slovaks)."&#13;
John D. lJa Monte in his "World of the Middle Ages"&#13;
omits the 'Slovaks cOIIIllpletely when naming the ethnic&#13;
gro'll!ps which .formed the Great iMoiravian Empire.&#13;
H. S. Thompson, J. S. Roucek, Milan Hodza, Francis&#13;
Dvornik, and many other •less significant iSlavists ,present&#13;
the first ,Slavonic !State in Central Europe - which Porfyl'ogenetos named topogrruphically accordmg to the river&#13;
bearing that name - as if it belonged to the political and&#13;
cultural history of the Ozechs, or at best of the Ozecho-&#13;
&#13;
40&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Slovaks. And thus they a:lso present the cultUTal-Ohristiarn work of Saints Cyril and Methodius.&#13;
Professor Francis Dvornik, one of the most acknowledged authorities of cultural and political history&#13;
of the IShwonic ,p eoples of the ninth century, regards "Bohemia the heir of .t he Mo11avian Empire"C2).&#13;
For ,p rofessor Rouceik (ISla;vonic Encyclopedia) Great&#13;
Moravia and the cultmal wor&gt;k of Cyril-Methodius is exclusively a part of Czech history, while for Dr. Miilan&#13;
Hodza it is the first "CzechosJovaJk" State(3).&#13;
This -wew, which the aibove mentioned authors at~&#13;
tempt to support with the hypothesis that "Czechs and&#13;
Slova!ks of Bohemia, Moravia and Northern Hungary&#13;
(Silova;k,i•a ) fovmed a single group with a common language"( 4) - the iview held ,b y several Ozech histor1ans,&#13;
phil'()llogists and ethnographers, specially Cha1oupeoky, Niederle, Pra•z ak, and Pastmek - is, of course, at odds with&#13;
older views of some Czech, Slovak, German and otiher European histovians, philologists and ethnographers. And ,i t&#13;
certainly cannot find support in histor,ical sources, which&#13;
though not abundant are nevertheless sufficient to cast&#13;
dou'bt on the aibove theses .&#13;
Professor Dvornik himself, who- regards Czechia-Bohemi1a as the heir of the Great Moravian Elmpire, leads rto&#13;
the logical conclusion that the Czech tribes belonged to the&#13;
Great Moravian Empire only for a very sho-rt time, when&#13;
Svatoplulk was extending his power on a1'1 sides, and .that&#13;
after Svatopluk's death in 895 "the Bohemians appeared&#13;
again at the Re.ichrsita;g at Regensburg and renewed their&#13;
allegiance to the FrMllkish Empire. " And Dvornik also&#13;
states that "Bohemia's submission to the Franks naturally&#13;
implied severance of all !l'.'cligious ties with the Mora-wan&#13;
eoclesirus-tical organization" (5)&#13;
The statement that "the Bohemians appeared again&#13;
at Regensburg" requiTes supplementation from the Arnnales Fuldenses, which Dvornik himself quotes a;nd depends&#13;
upon, that is, tha;t in the year 8415 "fourteen chieftains of&#13;
Czech tribes a:ppeared at the court of Louis and accepted&#13;
baptism with their escorts"(6), which under the givoo&#13;
cir&lt;:umstances clearly indicates the political dependence of&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
41&#13;
&#13;
the Czech tribes on Bavaria. According to the Armales Xantenses, the Czechs quarreled and fought with Bai\Tlaria in.&#13;
849, but could not rid themselves of Bavarian rule and&#13;
join the Ozech lands to the Great Moravian Empire, which&#13;
Dvornik regards as a "federation under the authority of&#13;
the Mojmir dynasty"(7), until aJbout 880. According to Novotny and the Annales Fuldenses •~svatopl,uk extricated&#13;
the Czech tribes from Frankish rule b.y force"&lt; 8) .&#13;
Since the beginnings of Gre,a t MoTavia are placed in&#13;
the year 822 a:nd 'h istorical sources mention Pribina and&#13;
the dedication of the Church in Nitrn in 833; furthermore&#13;
since, even accordmg to, professor Dvornilk, Czech tribes&#13;
were still defin,itely :sUJbordinated to Bavaria in 8'49, even&#13;
though that was already the era of Rastis1av, the third&#13;
ruler of the Great Moravian Empire, and since the Czech&#13;
trilbes separated from the Great Moravian Empire and&#13;
sutbmitted to Bavaria and then even waged war together&#13;
witJh the Germans against the Great Moravian :EJmpire:(9),&#13;
it ,i s indeed quite difficult to find a historical or logical argument for the thesis that Great Moravia did belong to&#13;
Czech polirti'cal history and that the cultural work of Cyril&#13;
and Methodius belonged to Ozech cultm-al history.&#13;
The question of what tribes formed the Great Moravian Empire and what lands the empire consisted of&#13;
could not be considered satisfactorily and defi.n,i tely resolved and, therefore, a group of scientific workers began&#13;
a new search and technica{ researdh of sources. The historians were joined :b y philologists, archeo[og,ists and ex-·&#13;
,p erts on medieval history; the era of the Great Moravian&#13;
Emrpire was studied ~at only ,f rom 'a nnals and chronicles,&#13;
from legends and liturgical texts of iS lavonic antiquity,&#13;
but also on the baisis of archeological finds, names of&#13;
rivers and mountaiins, villages and towns, ·c hurches, Christi'an and fomily names, popular traditions, etc. The list&#13;
of speo~ali,s ts of the Great Moravian era is surprisingly&#13;
lange in the rpast years and while some of them are known&#13;
internationally (1Dvornik, Jam:ohson), significant works of&#13;
others are tJhus far unknown on the Amerfoan continent&#13;
only becruuse they were not trans.Jated into ,various world&#13;
&#13;
42&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
languages, nor were they presented to the learned world&#13;
even in a:bst:mct form.&#13;
Among the uruknown or little-known ,s pecialists in the&#13;
Anglo-Saxon world, we find a si,,gnif.icant group of Slovwk&#13;
university professors and e~perts of whom I might men.,&#13;
tion the following:&#13;
a) In history: Joseph Skultety, Francis lHruso,v sky,&#13;
Daniel Rapant, J. Dakan.&#13;
:b) In philofogy: John Stanislav, Henry Bartek, Louis&#13;
Novaik, Jizacenko, B. Varsi1k, V . Pogorielov, Anthony !Banik.&#13;
c) In literary histoiry: Andrew Mraz, Steplhen Krcmery.&#13;
d) In ar,cheology: John Eisner.&#13;
Every one of these men made a study of one or the&#13;
other phase of the em of Great Momvi,a and the work, of&#13;
Saiints Cyril and Methodiius, ,and some of them - Stanislav,&#13;
Hrusovsky, Bartek, ,:maicenlko, Pogorielov of several&#13;
,p hases and some of their studies were ,published even in&#13;
foreign languaiges(l0).&#13;
To what conclusions does the scientific research of&#13;
these experts lead to, even though the results of their&#13;
studies thus far ,a re available for the main part only to&#13;
Slavonic scholars and haive not been made availruble in&#13;
suita!ble form for the western world? Professo.r Otokar Odlozilik, in the ' ~Harvard Slavic Studies," summwri'zes&#13;
them 1.Jhiis way: "'1:t can ibe said of them in general that&#13;
they not only shed fuller light on po1'itical and cultuTal&#13;
dev~lopments in the Mor.avian State, but invalidated earlier concepts, aiccording to which the work of the Slavic&#13;
Apostles wais short-lived and doomed to failure"(ll).&#13;
'F undamentally, the results of the scienti.f1ic research&#13;
of Slovaik historians, philofogists., archeologists and cultural wovkers of the past decades are these:&#13;
1. In agreement with Dobrovsky, who alreaidy in 1825&#13;
wrote that ",S lovakia was really Great MoraJVlia" (12), and&#13;
in agreement with Safarik (:Slovanske starozitnosti, pp.&#13;
794-795), Skultety, Hrusovsky, Stanislav ,a nd Dekan con.,&#13;
sider Slovakia as 1Jhe central and main part of the Great&#13;
Moravian Elm.pi.re, which in the "Skazani o prelozeni knig"&#13;
was already called "1Slovensk,a zemlja" (Sloviak country).&#13;
2. In agreement with V. Jag-i:c, who in his wcmk a'bout&#13;
&#13;
43&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
the origin of the Church ISlaJV1onic tongue wrote in 1900&#13;
that "in Great Moravia ,p eople must have spoken dn the&#13;
ninth century with a tQ!1lgue which in its fundamental,s was&#13;
identkal witJh the !Slov•aik language of today"(13), Stamislav,&#13;
Bartek, Rapant, Varsik and No,vak arrived at the conclu-·&#13;
si•o n through .scientific study that the inhalbitants of Great&#13;
Moravia •w ere the direct ancestors of the 1Slovaks of today.&#13;
3. On the ,b asis of the abOIVe mentioned premi ses, the&#13;
above historians and philologists, as ,well ·a s A. Mraz, the&#13;
literary historian, oo.me to the conclusion that the cultural-Christianiz.ing adiv:ity of 1Sruints Cyril and Methodius&#13;
related to, iin tJhe first ,place, the ancestors of present-day&#13;
Slovltks and ISlovwkia and, therefore, their literary work,&#13;
including the literary activity of some of their ipupil.s, is a&#13;
·component ,part of SlOl\"aik 1iternture. It may be interesting&#13;
to note here that this .thesis is supported even by profes~&#13;
so:rs of the Bratislava University today (A. Mira~ and J.&#13;
Dek1an) , even though in present C'zecho-Slo,vaikia nationalism and everything which might be susipected of nationa:l- .&#13;
1sm is prmishable according to the lruw as "deviationism."&#13;
By what .scientif,i.c arguments are these tJheises supported? On what scientific order do they mainfy depend?&#13;
What new contributions do they bring to the evaluation&#13;
of the work of Cy11itl and Methodius?&#13;
Besides a new search and ev;aluation of known sources,&#13;
such as the Annales Fuldenses, Annales, regni &amp;ancormn,&#13;
Libellus de conversione Bagoariorum et Carantanorum, the&#13;
chronicles of Heriman, Regino, Nestor, legends and biogrruphies, etc., the brusis for the above mentioned conclusions are in the main philological researches(14). The name&#13;
Mora;via and Miaravian.s, incidental~y also "Scalvi," which&#13;
we meet with mainly in Latin sources, whHe eastern sources&#13;
spook of ".Sfoveni" (in the S!K'A'Z ANi, the Mornvian State&#13;
is, as we have seen, alternatively ca:lled "Monwa" and&#13;
"Slovenska zemljia" - Morav;ia iand the Sl01vak l,and), is&#13;
considered a topo,g ra;phical term, which received its ,political character and was used ,in the etatistical meaning to&#13;
indica,te the inhabitants of the Moravian State, besides&#13;
the Czechs and the Se11bians wllw belonged only for short&#13;
time to SvatoplUJk's empire.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
a&#13;
&#13;
44&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
"The fall of Great Moravia," writes Dr. J. Delkan,&#13;
"brings a. return to the original topographical signif.icance&#13;
of the name, and tJhe inhabitants of the eastern .part of&#13;
Great Morav;ia, i.e., the territory of Slovakia, ,b esides isolated toponomastk remiscences, are called iby their own ancient ethnic name of "Sclavi, Slovieni, namely, the Slovaks" (15). The thesis tha:t the term Moravians had only&#13;
a specifically topographic •a nd, later, a politicaHy ebatistical&#13;
meaning was unfolded long before Dekan by several Slo!Vak Slav;ists and hi,s torians, especially by Joseph Skultety(16), Hrusovsky and Stanis:lav.&#13;
The .philologists John 1Stantisliav, L. Novak, H. Bartek ,&#13;
V. Pogorielov, mcenko, and others, lby philologioa1 inquiry&#13;
of the Cyrilo-.Methodius texts, the Cividalian Gospel Book ,&#13;
legends and chronicles, as well as by searching names of&#13;
people, J'livers., mountains, villages, churches and traditions&#13;
and, furthermOTe, the dia!lects and "loan words", confirm&#13;
the theses and the hypotheses ,o;f the historians. as regard..c;&#13;
even the ethnical nature of the inhia,bitants of Great Moravia as well as the mission of Cyril and Methodius in relation to Slovaikia.&#13;
According to the latest researches, of Slovak Sl-avists,&#13;
the mission of Saints Cyril and Methodius took pla:ce mainly on the territo-ry o,f the Slova,ks - professor Stanislav&#13;
states with certainty that Method's residence was in Nitra(l 7) and the great cultural-Christianizing work of&#13;
Cynil and MetJhodius is consequently placed first of all in&#13;
the cultural history of the Slovaks. Even Dvornik confiir.ms this indirectly when he states that "Slo,vam.ic liturgy&#13;
in Slovakia outlived the catastrophe of the Great Morawian&#13;
Empire," that the territory o.f present-day Slo,vrukia was&#13;
"in a definite sense the most cultured part of the Magyar&#13;
empire" (,correctly, the Hungarian empire), and the Slavonic monks, after being ex,pelled from Czech lands (from&#13;
the Monastery at Sazavia) in 1055, found refuge in !Slovakia.&#13;
According to Dvornilk, Slovakia and her ancient Slavonic&#13;
cente11s served as ''half~way transmitting centers" not only&#13;
between Croatia, but even Kievian Russia08l.&#13;
As far as tJhe literary work of Cyril-Methodius and&#13;
their immedi,a te .students is ,c oncerned, we know from the&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
45&#13;
&#13;
;'SKAZANI" that they translated "i proceJe knigy" (also&#13;
many other books) and from Latin legends "pluraque&#13;
aliia documenta sacrae scri,ptuare" (according to the legend&#13;
of Bodescens), or only ".plura que a'lia," according to the&#13;
legend of Christian. ,Sbanisla'V reco.rds that "after his arri'Val in Great Mora'Via, Constantine translated almost the&#13;
entire ecclesiastical rituial." We know definiteJy, Stanislav&#13;
writes, that Constantine completed the translation of the&#13;
Gospel texts of all four ev,angelists in Great Mora'Via, and&#13;
that he also translated the Acts of the Apostles and the&#13;
Psa1ms(l9l.&#13;
St . Methodius, according to Stanis1a'V, continued in the&#13;
work ,b egun by his brother and after the issuance of the&#13;
glorious Bull "I:ndustriae tuae," by which the Sla'V•Onic&#13;
liturgy a;gain was confirmed and permitted, "made a compendium of everything that was translated during the&#13;
twel1Ve years (869-881) oif hris independent '1eadership of&#13;
the Great Moravian mission. He selected -t wo priest 'rapid&#13;
writers' a111d with them translated - probably dictated to&#13;
them - the entire text of the Holy B ible - tJhe Old and&#13;
New Testaments, besides the books of the 1faccalbees, within eight months."&#13;
Methodius also t:mnslated, or had translated, the Latin Missal, which is •.p reserved as the so-•called Kiev Missal;&#13;
written in Gl agolic letters it is preserved in a copy from&#13;
the 10th century wi,1fu the elements of the Great Mora1Vian&#13;
tongue. Stanisla'V aJso mentions the translation of the ri-·&#13;
tual, the fbrev;iary and the credo•, which, according to Methiodius' biog,r,ruphy, Sva.toplUik was Slllpposed to hav,e&#13;
prayed in the Slovak translation.&#13;
Of the non..Jiturgica11 books, Sfanislav mentions the&#13;
translation of the Nomocanon, or the Korm'.caja bodk, i.e.,&#13;
a collection of laiws and regulations o.f the By,zantian rulers&#13;
and Chwch Fiatlhers, then Cyril's po~emic treatise in Greek&#13;
against the Jews, which was translated :b y Methodius, ,a nd&#13;
the original works "A Preface to the Gospels" and "Writings A'bout the True Faith," both written by Cyril. Among&#13;
the original mementoes belong the so-caUed iPannonianMO'ravian Legends, "The Life of St. Cyril and iMethodius,"&#13;
written, according to, Stanjslav, without a doubt in Great&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
46&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Moravia, also the "Praiises of Cyril and Metihodius" and&#13;
"albou;t the end of the ancient Slovak epoch of Slovak culture" - the 'legend aJbout Naum. One of the "MoravianSloviak sons" - Stanislav says - composed also the ancient&#13;
Slovalk legend about St. Wenceslaius around the year 935.&#13;
Stan:is1aiv states quite clearJy that this literacy activity&#13;
developed on rSlovaJk territory and that in the "great work&#13;
along wiith Cyril and .M ethod.ius undoubtedly other sons&#13;
of the Slovak nation had a part, especially Gorazd(20) .&#13;
Traces of thii:s are found especially in many words of these&#13;
mementoes." And since "tlhese memoirs were written for&#13;
the religious, i.e., the cultural needs of the Slovak nation&#13;
and prompted by it, the predecessors of the Slovaks took&#13;
part in this work passi'Vely and actively and, therefore,&#13;
this literary wor.k, according to Sta.nislav, belongs also to&#13;
our (Slovak) nationaJl treasure."&#13;
"Old Slavonic was the first liter,a ry language of the&#13;
Slwa;k nation," J. Stanrislav wrote in 1944 at the conolusion of his studies. This the.sis was taken up after him by&#13;
Dr. A. Mra:z, professor orf Slova,k literature at ,t he Bratisl1a va U-p.iversity today. The Slovaik nation actuaHy regards it as lits langua:ge, states Stanislav. Prnof of this we&#13;
have, for example, in tihe letter of Pope Hadrian IT to&#13;
Rastislav, Svatophrk and Kocel, in which is written: "We&#13;
have decided . . . to send Methodius . . . to teach you as&#13;
you requested, e~laining the Bible in your language (21) .&#13;
This clarif,ioation of the re'1ation of the mission of&#13;
Saints Cyril and Methodius to Slo;vakia appeared to be necessary to find the answer to the question what role the&#13;
Slova;ks and !Slovakia ,p layed in the ibegiinnings of civilization of the 1Slruvonic rpeoples. -If we accept the thesis, demonstrated by Slovak IS lavists, ,tJhen the matlter is in surbstance simple : the participation oif the Slovaks and Slova-·&#13;
kia in the civilization of the rest of the Slavonic nations&#13;
is proved by .the signifioance of Saints Cyril and Methodius&#13;
and their immediate pupils in the cultural life .of the individua:l Sliwonic nations.&#13;
As for as the content and extent of the cultural-Christian~ing work of Cyri'l .and Methodius is concerned, SlovaJk Slavists, wiit:h their scientific inquiries, confirm the&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
47&#13;
&#13;
view ,o f professor K. J. Grot(22), who wrote rub-Out Great&#13;
Moravia and the work of the Slovak Aipostles that in&#13;
Great Moravia was made not only "the most important at..&#13;
temrpt at a politicail unification of the Slovanic peoples the Greater Moravian Union - but also that: 1. there&#13;
"were l aid the foundations for the national Church and&#13;
nati.onal Christian education; 2. there origina,ted the draft&#13;
and the directive of the future of the who&gt;J.e subsequent&#13;
historic development of Slavdom, its world :riole and re.1ation to Roman-Germaillic Europe, to the West and to the&#13;
Asiatic question; 3. the foundation of Church-1Slov,a nic&#13;
literature and education in the .Slovanic South among the&#13;
BuLgars and the 1Seribs, and in the East among the Russians, and pa:rtly also among other western Slavs, was&#13;
only a continuation of that work whfoh Cyril and Methodius had begun in Great Moravia."&#13;
Before concluding, it is iperhaps necessary to recall&#13;
iha:t bortih histori'Oal and cu1tural conclusions here indicated are nothing new in ,Slovak cultUTal life, but onily a&#13;
scientific support of the tradition and endu:riing consciousness of the continuity of Great Mora'\ria w1th Slovakia,&#13;
which already in rthe 17th and 18th centuries found expression in several scientific and literary wo-:r,ks b-Oth from&#13;
the ci~de of Trnavia University (1635), and also from the&#13;
circle of Bernol1ruk's school at the end of the 18th century.&#13;
In the preface to 1:Jhe significant Cantus Catholiic,i (1655),&#13;
Benedict ,S zolosi (1609-56) tells ·clearly about the consciousness of historical continuity of the Slovaks wiith the&#13;
history of Great Moravia; the greia.t epic "Cy:rifoimertodiada"&#13;
_and "IS vatoplulk" from John Holly and the Latin work of&#13;
Samu~l Timon (16'715-1736), .the distinguished wor:k of Johlil&#13;
B. Magin from 1712-8 •~Maurices sive Arpologda" aTe irre.&#13;
futruble proofs of this.&#13;
Of couTse, :Slavists of other nations are &amp;pected to&#13;
tell how far the results and conclusions of .the scientific&#13;
resoo.rdh of ISlov,a;k Slaviists are in agreement with the histo~ical truth aind where the theses and hypoitheses are in&#13;
cases in disagreement with their scientifdc research. Therefore the aim of this dissertation is not only to call at.ten-•&#13;
tion to Slovruk -scientific inquiries, to the ·c ontri1bution which&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
48&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Slovaks m'ade to Slavistics from Safarlk and Kollar to present-day scientific woiikers in Slovaiki1a and outside its territory, but this short treatise has for its aim also to evoke&#13;
moire interest to inquire .into and evaluate a,nd, in cases,&#13;
even to refute some theses of contemporary Sfova:k scientific woDkers in ,tJhe field of Slavic studies.&#13;
References&#13;
1. Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire Nationalism&#13;
and National Re.form in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918, Ruil:gers&#13;
U niversity, New Y,ork, Columbia Un iversity Press, 1950, 2 vol.&#13;
2. ,F rancis Dvornik, The Making of Central and Eastern Europe,&#13;
London, 1949, ,p. 241. etc.&#13;
3. Dr. Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe, Jarold-s , London, 1942, p. 86: "Slovakia was hlle fiTst cultured and, mayb e also&#13;
the first pol'itical centre .of thait Great Moravi-a of A :D. 8,26-907 which&#13;
was the early mediev.al precedent of the -modern OzechoJSlovakia.&#13;
'l'his original Czecho•Sfovak State mad e 'i tself the first Chrisitian&#13;
centre of the Western Slavs."&#13;
4. Dvornik, ,i bidem, p. 18.&#13;
5. Ibidem , p. 21.&#13;
6. "Hludovicus quatuordecim ex ducibus Boemanorum cum hominibus -s ui s Christianam religionem desiderantes suscepit et in octavis ,theopihaniae haptizar.i juss,i t," M. G. H . S ., I, p. 364; Dvornik&#13;
ibidem, p. 20.&#13;
7. Lbidem, p. 293.&#13;
8. V. Novotny, Ceske dejiny, Praha, 1912, p. 380: Annales Fuldenses. p. 126: "(.:B!oemani ) quos Zwentibaldus dux a consortio et&#13;
potestate Baio,aricae ,g entis per vim dudum divelendo detr.axerat ... "&#13;
9. Ernest Deni-s , La question d' Autriche et les Slovaques, Paris,&#13;
1917; Louis Leger, Histoire de I' Autriche-Hongrie, Paris, 1920, p. 89.&#13;
10. The principal bo,o k,s dealing with the question of Great Moravia a nd the Mission of Cyri,J and Methodius are as follows: J. Skultety, Sketches from Slovak History, Middletown, P.a ., 1930; F. Hrus ovsky, Gesch ichte der Slowakei, Bratis'lava, 1943, and Slovenskf&#13;
vladari , Scranton, Pa., 1948; Jan 'Stanislav, Kultura starych Slovakov, Bratislava, 1944, ,and Rfsa Vel'komoravska , Sbo-r nik v,edeckye'h&#13;
prac, Prague, 1933, and Slovanskf apostoli Cyril a Metod a ich cinnosf vo Vel ' komoravskej rfsi , Bratislava, 1945; Izacenko, Zaciatky&#13;
vzdelanosti vo Vel'komoravskej rfsi, T. sv. Martin, 1948; V . Pogor,ielov, O narodnosti slovanskych apostolov, Bratislava, No. 2, 1927;&#13;
Rap.ant, Pribynov nitriansky kostolik, .Bratislava, 1941; A. Banik,&#13;
Apostol Gorazd ; A . Mraz, Dejiny slovenskej literatury, Bratislav,a ,&#13;
1948, etc.&#13;
11. Harvard Slavic Studies, Vol. I.I, p. 77-78.&#13;
12. " . . . die heutige Slorwakey in Oberungern is das eigen,tliche&#13;
Gross,Mli.hren . .. " wrote •Dobrovsky in a l etter to J. S. Bandtke&#13;
(Correspondence o,f J . Dobrovsky, II, p. 163) .&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
49&#13;
&#13;
13. See V. J agic, Entstehungsg eschichte der Kirchenslawischen&#13;
Sprache, Vjenna, 1900.&#13;
14. Annales Fuldenses and Annales r egni Francorum mention&#13;
'·Sclavos Marabenses" . . . "duces Sclavorum circa Danubiu m habitantium .. ." or "legationes Marvanorum . . ." distingui&gt;shin,g&#13;
them fro m "legaitiones !Beheimorum," i.e., C2Jechs. In the Reg,e nsburg continuation of Annales Fuldenses we find only "Maravi,&#13;
M·aravaui, Marehenses, Marabi, Marahav.i," etc.&#13;
15. ,see !Dr. J an Dekan, Slovenske dejiny, Iii, Bratislava, 1951,&#13;
p. 42.&#13;
16. J . SkuJ.tety already in 1926 writes in this regard: "With the&#13;
,d evelopment of science, particularly Slavonic ph ilology, talk of Carpatho,Danubian and Pannonian Slavs w:ill cease, -a nd t!he SloveneSlovaks w'il'l be def,i nitely m entioned . When it is once clear that&#13;
ihe inhabitants of present-day Moravia were nothing but Slovaks,&#13;
t h e nation of Rastislav and Svatopluk will not be called Moravlans&#13;
.a nd Slovaks, but persistently and definitely Slovaks" (Sketches from&#13;
Slovak History, p. 30).&#13;
17. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 42 .&#13;
18. See Chapter, Kievan Russia and Central Europe, p. 236-261.&#13;
19. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 10-14.&#13;
20. Pogorielov s•a ys em ph a ti cally th at t he Slovakisms in the&#13;
Slavonic text of th e H oly Scriptures are th e work of Gorazd and&#13;
calls Gorazd the third h oly apos tl e of Slavdom .&#13;
21. Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 14.&#13;
22. K. J . Grot, Karpato-dunajs kija zemli v sud'bach slavianstva,&#13;
1905, p. 18, and Metodijevskij jubilejnij sbornik, W arsaiw, 1885, p. 5.&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
BENES'S 'JIRiiP TO MOSCOW AND CZECHOSLOVAK PROPAGANDA&#13;
Dr. Michael Zibrin&#13;
&#13;
Benes admits in his Memoirs that Eden made some forJ&#13;
mal objecUons aigainst his 1943 trip to Moscow, yet he tries&#13;
to mmimti:ze the opposition of the IDnglish cabinet . Benes&#13;
pr.opaJgandists of today, h owever, do not admit ev~ this&#13;
faot and t hey praiise the Benes t rip to Moscow as something&#13;
by which Benes greatly ,helped the Allies and to which&#13;
Washington and London consented.&#13;
Anyone who heard Dr. Ripka's report before the&#13;
CzechoJSlovak State Council in London, July 26, 19'43 when he talked aib,out the preparaUons for Benes's trip&#13;
to Moscow, made in a;greement with Ozecho.;S1ov,ak Communists, and how Dr. Benes was expected in Moscow in&#13;
any case - has an entirely different picture rubout the&#13;
&#13;
</text>
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Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17), December 1955&#13;
pp. 39-49</text>
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

49

13. See V. J agic, Entstehungsg eschichte der Kirchenslawischen
Sprache, Vjenna, 1900.
14. Annales Fuldenses and Annales r egni Francorum mention
'·Sclavos Marabenses" . . . "duces Sclavorum circa Danubiu m habitantium .. ." or "legationes Marvanorum . . ." distingui&gt;shin,g
them fro m "legaitiones !Beheimorum," i.e., C2Jechs. In the Reg,e nsburg continuation of Annales Fuldenses we find only "Maravi,
M·aravaui, Marehenses, Marabi, Marahav.i," etc.
15. ,see !Dr. J an Dekan, Slovenske dejiny, Iii, Bratislava, 1951,
p. 42.
16. J . SkuJ.tety already in 1926 writes in this regard: "With the
,d evelopment of science, particularly Slavonic ph ilology, talk of Carpatho,Danubian and Pannonian Slavs w:ill cease, -a nd t!he SloveneSlovaks w'il'l be def,i nitely m entioned . When it is once clear that
ihe inhabitants of present-day Moravia were nothing but Slovaks,
t h e nation of Rastislav and Svatopluk will not be called Moravlans
.a nd Slovaks, but persistently and definitely Slovaks" (Sketches from
Slovak History, p. 30).
17. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 42 .
18. See Chapter, Kievan Russia and Central Europe, p. 236-261.
19. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 10-14.
20. Pogorielov s•a ys em ph a ti cally th at t he Slovakisms in the
Slavonic text of th e H oly Scriptures are th e work of Gorazd and
calls Gorazd the third h oly apos tl e of Slavdom .
21. Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 14.
22. K. J . Grot, Karpato-dunajs kija zemli v sud'bach slavianstva,
1905, p. 18, and Metodijevskij jubilejnij sbornik, W arsaiw, 1885, p. 5.

•

•

•

BENES'S 'JIRiiP TO MOSCOW AND CZECHOSLOVAK PROPAGANDA
Dr. Michael Zibrin

Benes admits in his Memoirs that Eden made some forJ
mal objecUons aigainst his 1943 trip to Moscow, yet he tries
to mmimti:ze the opposition of the IDnglish cabinet . Benes
pr.opaJgandists of today, h owever, do not admit ev~ this
faot and t hey praiise the Benes t rip to Moscow as something
by which Benes greatly ,helped the Allies and to which
Washington and London consented.
Anyone who heard Dr. Ripka's report before the
CzechoJSlovak State Council in London, July 26, 19'43 when he talked aib,out the preparaUons for Benes's trip
to Moscow, made in a;greement with Ozecho.;S1ov,ak Communists, and how Dr. Benes was expected in Moscow in
any case - has an entirely different picture rubout the

�50

SLOVAKIA

trip. Lausman and Uhlir, too, iboth of whom had just returned foom Moscow, stressed the necessity of the trip.
A different view of the tTirp is held also ,b y those who were
at the meetings of the Council during September and Octoiber, 1943, or those who read the minutes of these meetings, or even those who in the fall of 11943 read Ripka's
mouthpiece in London, the "Czeichoslovak' and the "Nova
Doha." In these minutes and newspapers, the Benes trip to
Moscow appears in quite a dilfferent light from that the
Benes followers present it now.
Communist Vafo !best characterized the situation in
his speech when he declared that Benes must go to Moscow whether the Englishmen liked it or not. If they do not
Hke it, he said, "we shO'Uild leave England."
The Ozecho-lSlovak State Council unanimously decided
to ask Benes to go to Moscow as soon as possible. Dr.
Riipka brought the Council's decision to iBenes and procured
the traivel means for him and his 0om,pany. Dr. Papanek
and Zenk~ •a t a co:mmemomtion of Benes's birthday praised
Benes's decision to go. to Moscow. Their present writings
about Benes's trip, however, disrugree with what they wrote
in 1943 and with the official news of the Ozecho-Slov8Jk
news rugency.
The Ozech newspaper Denni lllasatel for August lrJ.,
1943, puiblished a report from !Moscow that ,says, "Pravda,
the Communist organ, ::received a report from London that
the President of the Czecho-1Slaviak go,v eTnment, Dr. Benes, was forced to postpone his long-planned trip to Moscow 'because of the oppos~tion of English ci11cles." On Octolber 4, 1943, the same Denni masatel carried this report: • "The Cizecho-.Slovak govemment-in-e:x.Ue announced
today that it wishes to enter a paict of muitua:J. heip and
defense with Soviet Russia despite the demand of Foreign
Minister Eden and of the PoiJ.ish govermnOOJt...in.-exiJ.e that
the debate about the pact 'be postponed. . . Eden asked
Dr. Edward Benes, president of the Czecho~Slovak government-in-exile, to ipostrpone his trip to Moscow. . . " This re-•
port was issued for news agencies as well as for the Cze
cho~Slovak press by iD:r. Ripka himself, as the' ~esult of
the Council's decision. In the United States the report

�SLOVAKIA

51

was published by IDr. Papanek. The Christian Science Monitor for October 13, 1943, had a long article aJbout Benes's tr1p to !Moscow, and Denni Hlasatel, reprinting it in
abbreviated form on October 14, said: "The postponement
is being e,cplained probrubly by the official British action
resulting from Eden's declaration in Parliament on September 22 this year, in which IDden stated that British intervention - for postponement of Benes's trip - resulted
f-rom discussion held du'l'ing Molotov's visit to London in
1942 . .. His Majesty's Government, said Eden thinks that
both governments are of the, opinion that it will be better
for them at present not to conclude such a paot.. ." The
pasS8Jges a.re from Eden's speech.
How then could Dr. Ripka state in his book "Cze,ehoslovakia Enslaved" that Dr. Benes went to iMoscow with
the consent of the Allies? How can .t he other members of
the Council of Free Ozecho-1Slovakia say that Benes went
to Moscow to sign an alli,ance with the USSR with the con~
sent of Was-hington and London? Yes, it was they who
asked Benes in 1943 to go to Moscow even a;gainst the will
of the British Government. This is a matter orf record.
Yet today in America the same people from the Oouncil
of Free Ozecho-·Slov~kia have the impudence to propagate
in official Washington exactly the opposite of the truth.
In 1943 the twenty-fifth anniversary of c~echo-Slovakia's creation was commemorated in radio broadcasts
and artides. In America bvoadcasts were made by Jan
Masaryk and Francis Nemec, and in London by Ripka,
Slavik and Sramek. AJl were inspired by Benes's planned
trip .to Moscow; they were very much in favor of it Their
speeches were published in the officiial Ozecho-S~ovak publications as well as in Denni Hlasatel from October 27. 1943,
and through the first week of November.
It is of interest to note here that during this same time
Denni masatel, as well as other Czecho-SJ:ovak papers,
reprinted the texts of various proclamations from the
Czecho-Slovak National Oouncil in Paris from October 18,
1918, and also the text of the so-caJ.led "Washington De ..
claration. " On these documents we find the name of Gen..
eral Dr. Milan R. Stefanik rus a signer. At that time, how-

�52

SLOVAKIA

ever, General Stefanik was in Russia; therefore he could
not sign any declaration in October, 1918, eiitJher in Washington or in Paris. When Stefa·n ik learned aboot these documents,. according to the memoirs of Fre:noh General Janin, he not onJy did not aJgree with them, but also ,protested
through General Janin that his. signature ,w as used without his knowledge iand authorriity.
I am referring to this incident in order to show that
the Czecho-Slovak politicians did nort change. 'Dhey misrepresented the truth and forged signatures during the
first exile (World War I), they did the same during the
second exile (World Wax l[) and today diUTing the socalled thi·r d exile, they deny even what they themselves had
published earlier througih the Czecho-Slovak press agency.
One could document this. rkhly from 1'94·3 British newspapers, the records of the British Parliament, and particularly the Polish pulblications from 1943. I purposely
cited only the reference of Dr. Zenkl and Ripka from
new:sprupers. This material was ,p ublished at the same time
in New York in 'both of Papanek's newspapers, the New
Yorksky Dennik and New Yorkske Listy.
It is important to note· •t hat Dr. Benes'·s trip to Moscow in 1943 restclted in hiis signing an alliance with the Soviet Union without the approval of the nations at home.
DulI'ing this trip he promised Stia1in to cede Ruthenia, which
had been part of Czecho-lS lovakia before 19138. The fulfillment of Bene.s's promise materialized on June 2,9, 1945,
when Benes formally ceded Ruthenia to the Soviet Union
by treaty without consulting the will of its people and in
flagrant violation of th e Constitution.
As a matter of fact, Benes's dealings anent R.uthenia
began earlier than 1943. According to the official report
handled lby the chiefs of the Ozecho-1Slovaft{ press agencies in London and New Yovk, Dr. Ripka and Dr. IPaJpaneik,
Benes had a conference with ,So-wet Ambassador Majsky
in London on September 19, 19319, a:bout the matter of a
common boundary to be estalblished between the USS'.R and
Czecho-lSlovakia. Benes a:ssured Majsky that as far as
Ruthenia wa,s concerned he and StaJlin would come to an
agreement between themsel,v es, as this was an internal

�SLOVAKIA

53

question. Benes himself admits this fact in his Memoirs
on page 207.
Jaromir Smutny, who accompanied Benes to Moscow,
in his publication The Case of Ruthenia (pubJished by Benes's Institute in London), writes on page 34: "When Benes in Moscow talked about Ruthenia he basically agreed
that Ozecho--Sl,ovrukia will not and cannot be against the
annexation of Ruthenia by t_h e USSR if the population
will wish it."
rm January, 19145, Dr. Fierlinger showed me his re-·
cords of Benes's ta:llks in Moscow. Dr. Fierlinger was at that
time Benes's amib assador in Moscow and together with
Smutny ,a ccompanied Benes during his Moscow conferences. Also Dr. Taborsky, then Benes's secretary, states
that Benes said ,o n August 28, 1941, when he conferred
with .Amlbaissador Majsky: "'Ruthema cannot remain with
the Hungarians; the Poles carmot have it; that pr{)!Vince
can only belong either to, Ozecho-Slovakia or to ,R:us,sia."
Despite aJll these commitments, the Benes proprugandists, particularly Papanek in Washington and Ripka in
London, were declaring that Stalin recogni,z ed pre-war Czecho~1Slov~a in its origin.al boundaries, Ruthenia included.
It was very important to them to assure everyone of Stalin's "good intentions."
On December 1, 1944, when Nemec was acting •a s Benes's representative in Ruthenia, he received from the regional convention of national councils its dedsion that Rutheniia was no lornger a part of Czecho~Slo,vaJldia, and that
the National Council of Ruthenia being estaJblished, Nemec
IliO '1ongeT represented Ruthenia. This decision was signed
'b y Nemec's adviser Turjanic, who with Communists Pctruscak and Valo had been assigned to Nemec by Benes.
It wa:s then that the Czecho-iSlova;k government protested.
When Fierlinger on behalf of his government submitted olbjections to what was going on in Ruthenia, Stalin wrote a letter to Benes on January 23, 1945. I was in
the office of Ambassadoir Fierlinger in Moscow. In his letter Stalin Uipbraided Benes, saying: "You yourself told me
in Moscow of your willingness to give R:uthenia to the So~
viet Union." This quotation is according to the official
1

�54

SLOVAKIA

Czech embassy record. Dr. Fierlinger himself assrured me
there that Stalin was right and that Benes and his government in London were playing a comedy, because they
were afraid of the consequences. Wthen Benes replied to
Stalin on Feb.vuaJry 1, he did not deny to Stalin his earlier
statement rubout iRuthenria; he also conf:h med ,h is talks with
Miajsky, thus: ",J: did not .c hange my stand on this question from that moment when I udked a;bout it fOT the first
time with your ,a mbassado:r I. Majsky in London in Sep~
tember, 1939, no,r wiU I ,change it in the futUTe."
Stalin, therefore, came west of the Oar:pathi:ans according t9 a previous agreement aJbout whicih official circles in London and Washington did not know. They were
informed to the contrary, namely, that "the USSR recognizes and leaves Czecho~lov;akia in its former boundaries,
and that Stalin does not have any territorial demands."
It wais so that Benes informed Roosevelt in 1943 while
an a visit in Washington, and so ,he talked in America and
Canada. ThUS; also tJhe memlbers of the present Council of
Free Ozecho ..Slovaikia ibroadcast home over the BBC in
1943 and 1944, ,praising Benes as a "lilberator." They lied
in 'b oth instances, for neither Washington nor London gave
consent to Benes's tri:p to MoS&lt;!OIW, nor did they know anythinig rubout Benes':s promise to Stalin to cede IRuthenia
to the 1So.viet Union. Nobody wanted this to haJPPen except
'Stalin, Benes, and their foHowers.
1

• • •

WHO SAID IT?

"Thus if we can a;void Sociwlism, we escape Communism. On the contrary, if we surrender to Socia1ism, we
surrender to Communism at the same time. But what is
Socialism? Socialism is government control, government
operation and government ownership of the Nation's business. Socialism thus caill!s for the continu'OU:s ex:pansion and
cenitraili:zation otf governmental power over prirvat.e production, privat.e property, private employment and privat.e
life. Under Socialism a11 'business becomes public 'business,
all property 1b ecomes public properl:y, all employees become
public employees, and thl\IS, all privacy is abolished." (Dean Clarence Ma;nion, MlBC, 1-16-05).

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1285">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA

49

13. See V. J agic, Entstehungsg eschichte der Kirchenslawischen
Sprache, Vjenna, 1900.
14. Annales Fuldenses and Annales r egni Francorum mention
'·Sclavos Marabenses" . . . "duces Sclavorum circa Danubiu m habitantium .. ." or "legationes Marvanorum . . ." distingui&gt;shin,g
them fro m "legaitiones !Beheimorum," i.e., C2Jechs. In the Reg,e nsburg continuation of Annales Fuldenses we find only "Maravi,
M·aravaui, Marehenses, Marabi, Marahav.i," etc.
15. ,see !Dr. J an Dekan, Slovenske dejiny, Iii, Bratislava, 1951,
p. 42.
16. J . SkuJ.tety already in 1926 writes in this regard: "With the
,d evelopment of science, particularly Slavonic ph ilology, talk of Carpatho,Danubian and Pannonian Slavs w:ill cease, -a nd t!he SloveneSlovaks w'il'l be def,i nitely m entioned . When it is once clear that
ihe inhabitants of present-day Moravia were nothing but Slovaks,
t h e nation of Rastislav and Svatopluk will not be called Moravlans
.a nd Slovaks, but persistently and definitely Slovaks" (Sketches from
Slovak History, p. 30).
17. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 42 .
18. See Chapter, Kievan Russia and Central Europe, p. 236-261.
19. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 10-14.
20. Pogorielov s•a ys em ph a ti cally th at t he Slovakisms in the
Slavonic text of th e H oly Scriptures are th e work of Gorazd and
calls Gorazd the third h oly apos tl e of Slavdom .
21. Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 14.
22. K. J . Grot, Karpato-dunajs kija zemli v sud'bach slavianstva,
1905, p. 18, and Metodijevskij jubilejnij sbornik, W arsaiw, 1885, p. 5.

•

•

•

BENES'S 'JIRiiP TO MOSCOW AND CZECHOSLOVAK PROPAGANDA
Dr. Michael Zibrin

Benes admits in his Memoirs that Eden made some forJ
mal objecUons aigainst his 1943 trip to Moscow, yet he tries
to mmimti:ze the opposition of the IDnglish cabinet . Benes
pr.opaJgandists of today, h owever, do not admit ev~ this
faot and t hey praiise the Benes t rip to Moscow as something
by which Benes greatly ,helped the Allies and to which
Washington and London consented.
Anyone who heard Dr. Ripka's report before the
CzechoJSlovak State Council in London, July 26, 19'43 when he talked aib,out the preparaUons for Benes's trip
to Moscow, made in a;greement with Ozecho.;S1ov,ak Communists, and how Dr. Benes was expected in Moscow in
any case - has an entirely different picture rubout the

�50

SLOVAKIA

trip. Lausman and Uhlir, too, iboth of whom had just returned foom Moscow, stressed the necessity of the trip.
A different view of the tTirp is held also ,b y those who were
at the meetings of the Council during September and Octoiber, 1943, or those who read the minutes of these meetings, or even those who in the fall of 11943 read Ripka's
mouthpiece in London, the "Czeichoslovak' and the "Nova
Doha." In these minutes and newspapers, the Benes trip to
Moscow appears in quite a dilfferent light from that the
Benes followers present it now.
Communist Vafo !best characterized the situation in
his speech when he declared that Benes must go to Moscow whether the Englishmen liked it or not. If they do not
Hke it, he said, "we shO'Uild leave England."
The Ozecho-lSlovak State Council unanimously decided
to ask Benes to go to Moscow as soon as possible. Dr.
Riipka brought the Council's decision to iBenes and procured
the traivel means for him and his 0om,pany. Dr. Papanek
and Zenk~ •a t a co:mmemomtion of Benes's birthday praised
Benes's decision to go. to Moscow. Their present writings
about Benes's trip, however, disrugree with what they wrote
in 1943 and with the official news of the Ozecho-Slov8Jk
news rugency.
The Ozech newspaper Denni lllasatel for August lrJ.,
1943, puiblished a report from !Moscow that ,says, "Pravda,
the Communist organ, ::received a report from London that
the President of the Czecho-1Slaviak go,v eTnment, Dr. Benes, was forced to postpone his long-planned trip to Moscow 'because of the oppos~tion of English ci11cles." On Octolber 4, 1943, the same Denni masatel carried this report: • "The Cizecho-.Slovak govemment-in-e:x.Ue announced
today that it wishes to enter a paict of muitua:J. heip and
defense with Soviet Russia despite the demand of Foreign
Minister Eden and of the PoiJ.ish govermnOOJt...in.-exiJ.e that
the debate about the pact 'be postponed. . . Eden asked
Dr. Edward Benes, president of the Czecho~Slovak government-in-exile, to ipostrpone his trip to Moscow. . . " This re-•
port was issued for news agencies as well as for the Cze
cho~Slovak press by iD:r. Ripka himself, as the' ~esult of
the Council's decision. In the United States the report

�SLOVAKIA

51

was published by IDr. Papanek. The Christian Science Monitor for October 13, 1943, had a long article aJbout Benes's tr1p to !Moscow, and Denni Hlasatel, reprinting it in
abbreviated form on October 14, said: "The postponement
is being e,cplained probrubly by the official British action
resulting from Eden's declaration in Parliament on September 22 this year, in which IDden stated that British intervention - for postponement of Benes's trip - resulted
f-rom discussion held du'l'ing Molotov's visit to London in
1942 . .. His Majesty's Government, said Eden thinks that
both governments are of the, opinion that it will be better
for them at present not to conclude such a paot.. ." The
pasS8Jges a.re from Eden's speech.
How then could Dr. Ripka state in his book "Cze,ehoslovakia Enslaved" that Dr. Benes went to iMoscow with
the consent of the Allies? How can .t he other members of
the Council of Free Ozecho-1Slovakia say that Benes went
to Moscow to sign an alli,ance with the USSR with the con~
sent of Was-hington and London? Yes, it was they who
asked Benes in 1943 to go to Moscow even a;gainst the will
of the British Government. This is a matter orf record.
Yet today in America the same people from the Oouncil
of Free Ozecho-·Slov~kia have the impudence to propagate
in official Washington exactly the opposite of the truth.
In 1943 the twenty-fifth anniversary of c~echo-Slovakia's creation was commemorated in radio broadcasts
and artides. In America bvoadcasts were made by Jan
Masaryk and Francis Nemec, and in London by Ripka,
Slavik and Sramek. AJl were inspired by Benes's planned
trip .to Moscow; they were very much in favor of it Their
speeches were published in the officiial Ozecho-S~ovak publications as well as in Denni Hlasatel from October 27. 1943,
and through the first week of November.
It is of interest to note here that during this same time
Denni masatel, as well as other Czecho-SJ:ovak papers,
reprinted the texts of various proclamations from the
Czecho-Slovak National Oouncil in Paris from October 18,
1918, and also the text of the so-caJ.led "Washington De ..
claration. " On these documents we find the name of Gen..
eral Dr. Milan R. Stefanik rus a signer. At that time, how-

�52

SLOVAKIA

ever, General Stefanik was in Russia; therefore he could
not sign any declaration in October, 1918, eiitJher in Washington or in Paris. When Stefa·n ik learned aboot these documents,. according to the memoirs of Fre:noh General Janin, he not onJy did not aJgree with them, but also ,protested
through General Janin that his. signature ,w as used without his knowledge iand authorriity.
I am referring to this incident in order to show that
the Czecho-Slovak politicians did nort change. 'Dhey misrepresented the truth and forged signatures during the
first exile (World War I), they did the same during the
second exile (World Wax l[) and today diUTing the socalled thi·r d exile, they deny even what they themselves had
published earlier througih the Czecho-Slovak press agency.
One could document this. rkhly from 1'94·3 British newspapers, the records of the British Parliament, and particularly the Polish pulblications from 1943. I purposely
cited only the reference of Dr. Zenkl and Ripka from
new:sprupers. This material was ,p ublished at the same time
in New York in 'both of Papanek's newspapers, the New
Yorksky Dennik and New Yorkske Listy.
It is important to note· •t hat Dr. Benes'·s trip to Moscow in 1943 restclted in hiis signing an alliance with the Soviet Union without the approval of the nations at home.
DulI'ing this trip he promised Stia1in to cede Ruthenia, which
had been part of Czecho-lS lovakia before 19138. The fulfillment of Bene.s's promise materialized on June 2,9, 1945,
when Benes formally ceded Ruthenia to the Soviet Union
by treaty without consulting the will of its people and in
flagrant violation of th e Constitution.
As a matter of fact, Benes's dealings anent R.uthenia
began earlier than 1943. According to the official report
handled lby the chiefs of the Ozecho-1Slovaft{ press agencies in London and New Yovk, Dr. Ripka and Dr. IPaJpaneik,
Benes had a conference with ,So-wet Ambassador Majsky
in London on September 19, 19319, a:bout the matter of a
common boundary to be estalblished between the USS'.R and
Czecho-lSlovakia. Benes a:ssured Majsky that as far as
Ruthenia wa,s concerned he and StaJlin would come to an
agreement between themsel,v es, as this was an internal

�SLOVAKIA

53

question. Benes himself admits this fact in his Memoirs
on page 207.
Jaromir Smutny, who accompanied Benes to Moscow,
in his publication The Case of Ruthenia (pubJished by Benes's Institute in London), writes on page 34: "When Benes in Moscow talked about Ruthenia he basically agreed
that Ozecho--Sl,ovrukia will not and cannot be against the
annexation of Ruthenia by t_h e USSR if the population
will wish it."
rm January, 19145, Dr. Fierlinger showed me his re-·
cords of Benes's ta:llks in Moscow. Dr. Fierlinger was at that
time Benes's amib assador in Moscow and together with
Smutny ,a ccompanied Benes during his Moscow conferences. Also Dr. Taborsky, then Benes's secretary, states
that Benes said ,o n August 28, 1941, when he conferred
with .Amlbaissador Majsky: "'Ruthema cannot remain with
the Hungarians; the Poles carmot have it; that pr{)!Vince
can only belong either to, Ozecho-Slovakia or to ,R:us,sia."
Despite aJll these commitments, the Benes proprugandists, particularly Papanek in Washington and Ripka in
London, were declaring that Stalin recogni,z ed pre-war Czecho~1Slov~a in its origin.al boundaries, Ruthenia included.
It was very important to them to assure everyone of Stalin's "good intentions."
On December 1, 1944, when Nemec was acting •a s Benes's representative in Ruthenia, he received from the regional convention of national councils its dedsion that Rutheniia was no lornger a part of Czecho~Slo,vaJldia, and that
the National Council of Ruthenia being estaJblished, Nemec
IliO '1ongeT represented Ruthenia. This decision was signed
'b y Nemec's adviser Turjanic, who with Communists Pctruscak and Valo had been assigned to Nemec by Benes.
It wa:s then that the Czecho-iSlova;k government protested.
When Fierlinger on behalf of his government submitted olbjections to what was going on in Ruthenia, Stalin wrote a letter to Benes on January 23, 1945. I was in
the office of Ambassadoir Fierlinger in Moscow. In his letter Stalin Uipbraided Benes, saying: "You yourself told me
in Moscow of your willingness to give R:uthenia to the So~
viet Union." This quotation is according to the official
1

�54

SLOVAKIA

Czech embassy record. Dr. Fierlinger himself assrured me
there that Stalin was right and that Benes and his government in London were playing a comedy, because they
were afraid of the consequences. Wthen Benes replied to
Stalin on Feb.vuaJry 1, he did not deny to Stalin his earlier
statement rubout iRuthenria; he also conf:h med ,h is talks with
Miajsky, thus: ",J: did not .c hange my stand on this question from that moment when I udked a;bout it fOT the first
time with your ,a mbassado:r I. Majsky in London in Sep~
tember, 1939, no,r wiU I ,change it in the futUTe."
Stalin, therefore, came west of the Oar:pathi:ans according t9 a previous agreement aJbout whicih official circles in London and Washington did not know. They were
informed to the contrary, namely, that "the USSR recognizes and leaves Czecho~lov;akia in its former boundaries,
and that Stalin does not have any territorial demands."
It wais so that Benes informed Roosevelt in 1943 while
an a visit in Washington, and so ,he talked in America and
Canada. ThUS; also tJhe memlbers of the present Council of
Free Ozecho ..Slovaikia ibroadcast home over the BBC in
1943 and 1944, ,praising Benes as a "lilberator." They lied
in 'b oth instances, for neither Washington nor London gave
consent to Benes's tri:p to MoS&lt;!OIW, nor did they know anythinig rubout Benes':s promise to Stalin to cede IRuthenia
to the 1So.viet Union. Nobody wanted this to haJPPen except
'Stalin, Benes, and their foHowers.
1

• • •

WHO SAID IT?

"Thus if we can a;void Sociwlism, we escape Communism. On the contrary, if we surrender to Socia1ism, we
surrender to Communism at the same time. But what is
Socialism? Socialism is government control, government
operation and government ownership of the Nation's business. Socialism thus caill!s for the continu'OU:s ex:pansion and
cenitraili:zation otf governmental power over prirvat.e production, privat.e property, private employment and privat.e
life. Under Socialism a11 'business becomes public 'business,
all property 1b ecomes public properl:y, all employees become
public employees, and thl\IS, all privacy is abolished." (Dean Clarence Ma;nion, MlBC, 1-16-05).

�</text>
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                  <text>1955, Vol. 5</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
49&#13;
&#13;
13. See V. J agic, Entstehungsg eschichte der Kirchenslawischen&#13;
Sprache, Vjenna, 1900.&#13;
14. Annales Fuldenses and Annales r egni Francorum mention&#13;
'·Sclavos Marabenses" . . . "duces Sclavorum circa Danubiu m habitantium .. ." or "legationes Marvanorum . . ." distingui&gt;shin,g&#13;
them fro m "legaitiones !Beheimorum," i.e., C2Jechs. In the Reg,e nsburg continuation of Annales Fuldenses we find only "Maravi,&#13;
M·aravaui, Marehenses, Marabi, Marahav.i," etc.&#13;
15. ,see !Dr. J an Dekan, Slovenske dejiny, Iii, Bratislava, 1951,&#13;
p. 42.&#13;
16. J . SkuJ.tety already in 1926 writes in this regard: "With the&#13;
,d evelopment of science, particularly Slavonic ph ilology, talk of Carpatho,Danubian and Pannonian Slavs w:ill cease, -a nd t!he SloveneSlovaks w'il'l be def,i nitely m entioned . When it is once clear that&#13;
ihe inhabitants of present-day Moravia were nothing but Slovaks,&#13;
t h e nation of Rastislav and Svatopluk will not be called Moravlans&#13;
.a nd Slovaks, but persistently and definitely Slovaks" (Sketches from&#13;
Slovak History, p. 30).&#13;
17. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 42 .&#13;
18. See Chapter, Kievan Russia and Central Europe, p. 236-261.&#13;
19. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 10-14.&#13;
20. Pogorielov s•a ys em ph a ti cally th at t he Slovakisms in the&#13;
Slavonic text of th e H oly Scriptures are th e work of Gorazd and&#13;
calls Gorazd the third h oly apos tl e of Slavdom .&#13;
21. Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 14.&#13;
22. K. J . Grot, Karpato-dunajs kija zemli v sud'bach slavianstva,&#13;
1905, p. 18, and Metodijevskij jubilejnij sbornik, W arsaiw, 1885, p. 5.&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
BENES'S 'JIRiiP TO MOSCOW AND CZECHOSLOVAK PROPAGANDA&#13;
Dr. Michael Zibrin&#13;
&#13;
Benes admits in his Memoirs that Eden made some forJ&#13;
mal objecUons aigainst his 1943 trip to Moscow, yet he tries&#13;
to mmimti:ze the opposition of the IDnglish cabinet . Benes&#13;
pr.opaJgandists of today, h owever, do not admit ev~ this&#13;
faot and t hey praiise the Benes t rip to Moscow as something&#13;
by which Benes greatly ,helped the Allies and to which&#13;
Washington and London consented.&#13;
Anyone who heard Dr. Ripka's report before the&#13;
CzechoJSlovak State Council in London, July 26, 19'43 when he talked aib,out the preparaUons for Benes's trip&#13;
to Moscow, made in a;greement with Ozecho.;S1ov,ak Communists, and how Dr. Benes was expected in Moscow in&#13;
any case - has an entirely different picture rubout the&#13;
&#13;
50&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
trip. Lausman and Uhlir, too, iboth of whom had just returned foom Moscow, stressed the necessity of the trip.&#13;
A different view of the tTirp is held also ,b y those who were&#13;
at the meetings of the Council during September and Octoiber, 1943, or those who read the minutes of these meetings, or even those who in the fall of 11943 read Ripka's&#13;
mouthpiece in London, the "Czeichoslovak' and the "Nova&#13;
Doha." In these minutes and newspapers, the Benes trip to&#13;
Moscow appears in quite a dilfferent light from that the&#13;
Benes followers present it now.&#13;
Communist Vafo !best characterized the situation in&#13;
his speech when he declared that Benes must go to Moscow whether the Englishmen liked it or not. If they do not&#13;
Hke it, he said, "we shO'Uild leave England."&#13;
The Ozecho-lSlovak State Council unanimously decided&#13;
to ask Benes to go to Moscow as soon as possible. Dr.&#13;
Riipka brought the Council's decision to iBenes and procured&#13;
the traivel means for him and his 0om,pany. Dr. Papanek&#13;
and Zenk~ •a t a co:mmemomtion of Benes's birthday praised&#13;
Benes's decision to go. to Moscow. Their present writings&#13;
about Benes's trip, however, disrugree with what they wrote&#13;
in 1943 and with the official news of the Ozecho-Slov8Jk&#13;
news rugency.&#13;
The Ozech newspaper Denni lllasatel for August lrJ.,&#13;
1943, puiblished a report from !Moscow that ,says, "Pravda,&#13;
the Communist organ, ::received a report from London that&#13;
the President of the Czecho-1Slaviak go,v eTnment, Dr. Benes, was forced to postpone his long-planned trip to Moscow 'because of the oppos~tion of English ci11cles." On Octolber 4, 1943, the same Denni masatel carried this report: • "The Cizecho-.Slovak govemment-in-e:x.Ue announced&#13;
today that it wishes to enter a paict of muitua:J. heip and&#13;
defense with Soviet Russia despite the demand of Foreign&#13;
Minister Eden and of the PoiJ.ish govermnOOJt...in.-exiJ.e that&#13;
the debate about the pact 'be postponed. . . Eden asked&#13;
Dr. Edward Benes, president of the Czecho~Slovak government-in-exile, to ipostrpone his trip to Moscow. . . " This re-•&#13;
port was issued for news agencies as well as for the Cze&#13;
cho~Slovak press by iD:r. Ripka himself, as the' ~esult of&#13;
the Council's decision. In the United States the report&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
51&#13;
&#13;
was published by IDr. Papanek. The Christian Science Monitor for October 13, 1943, had a long article aJbout Benes's tr1p to !Moscow, and Denni Hlasatel, reprinting it in&#13;
abbreviated form on October 14, said: "The postponement&#13;
is being e,cplained probrubly by the official British action&#13;
resulting from Eden's declaration in Parliament on September 22 this year, in which IDden stated that British intervention - for postponement of Benes's trip - resulted&#13;
f-rom discussion held du'l'ing Molotov's visit to London in&#13;
1942 . .. His Majesty's Government, said Eden thinks that&#13;
both governments are of the, opinion that it will be better&#13;
for them at present not to conclude such a paot.. ." The&#13;
pasS8Jges a.re from Eden's speech.&#13;
How then could Dr. Ripka state in his book "Cze,ehoslovakia Enslaved" that Dr. Benes went to iMoscow with&#13;
the consent of the Allies? How can .t he other members of&#13;
the Council of Free Ozecho-1Slovakia say that Benes went&#13;
to Moscow to sign an alli,ance with the USSR with the con~&#13;
sent of Was-hington and London? Yes, it was they who&#13;
asked Benes in 1943 to go to Moscow even a;gainst the will&#13;
of the British Government. This is a matter orf record.&#13;
Yet today in America the same people from the Oouncil&#13;
of Free Ozecho-·Slov~kia have the impudence to propagate&#13;
in official Washington exactly the opposite of the truth.&#13;
In 1943 the twenty-fifth anniversary of c~echo-Slovakia's creation was commemorated in radio broadcasts&#13;
and artides. In America bvoadcasts were made by Jan&#13;
Masaryk and Francis Nemec, and in London by Ripka,&#13;
Slavik and Sramek. AJl were inspired by Benes's planned&#13;
trip .to Moscow; they were very much in favor of it Their&#13;
speeches were published in the officiial Ozecho-S~ovak publications as well as in Denni Hlasatel from October 27. 1943,&#13;
and through the first week of November.&#13;
It is of interest to note here that during this same time&#13;
Denni masatel, as well as other Czecho-SJ:ovak papers,&#13;
reprinted the texts of various proclamations from the&#13;
Czecho-Slovak National Oouncil in Paris from October 18,&#13;
1918, and also the text of the so-caJ.led "Washington De ..&#13;
claration. " On these documents we find the name of Gen..&#13;
eral Dr. Milan R. Stefanik rus a signer. At that time, how-&#13;
&#13;
52&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
ever, General Stefanik was in Russia; therefore he could&#13;
not sign any declaration in October, 1918, eiitJher in Washington or in Paris. When Stefa·n ik learned aboot these documents,. according to the memoirs of Fre:noh General Janin, he not onJy did not aJgree with them, but also ,protested&#13;
through General Janin that his. signature ,w as used without his knowledge iand authorriity.&#13;
I am referring to this incident in order to show that&#13;
the Czecho-Slovak politicians did nort change. 'Dhey misrepresented the truth and forged signatures during the&#13;
first exile (World War I), they did the same during the&#13;
second exile (World Wax l[) and today diUTing the socalled thi·r d exile, they deny even what they themselves had&#13;
published earlier througih the Czecho-Slovak press agency.&#13;
One could document this. rkhly from 1'94·3 British newspapers, the records of the British Parliament, and particularly the Polish pulblications from 1943. I purposely&#13;
cited only the reference of Dr. Zenkl and Ripka from&#13;
new:sprupers. This material was ,p ublished at the same time&#13;
in New York in 'both of Papanek's newspapers, the New&#13;
Yorksky Dennik and New Yorkske Listy.&#13;
It is important to note· •t hat Dr. Benes'·s trip to Moscow in 1943 restclted in hiis signing an alliance with the Soviet Union without the approval of the nations at home.&#13;
DulI'ing this trip he promised Stia1in to cede Ruthenia, which&#13;
had been part of Czecho-lS lovakia before 19138. The fulfillment of Bene.s's promise materialized on June 2,9, 1945,&#13;
when Benes formally ceded Ruthenia to the Soviet Union&#13;
by treaty without consulting the will of its people and in&#13;
flagrant violation of th e Constitution.&#13;
As a matter of fact, Benes's dealings anent R.uthenia&#13;
began earlier than 1943. According to the official report&#13;
handled lby the chiefs of the Ozecho-1Slovaft{ press agencies in London and New Yovk, Dr. Ripka and Dr. IPaJpaneik,&#13;
Benes had a conference with ,So-wet Ambassador Majsky&#13;
in London on September 19, 19319, a:bout the matter of a&#13;
common boundary to be estalblished between the USS'.R and&#13;
Czecho-lSlovakia. Benes a:ssured Majsky that as far as&#13;
Ruthenia wa,s concerned he and StaJlin would come to an&#13;
agreement between themsel,v es, as this was an internal&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
53&#13;
&#13;
question. Benes himself admits this fact in his Memoirs&#13;
on page 207.&#13;
Jaromir Smutny, who accompanied Benes to Moscow,&#13;
in his publication The Case of Ruthenia (pubJished by Benes's Institute in London), writes on page 34: "When Benes in Moscow talked about Ruthenia he basically agreed&#13;
that Ozecho--Sl,ovrukia will not and cannot be against the&#13;
annexation of Ruthenia by t_h e USSR if the population&#13;
will wish it."&#13;
rm January, 19145, Dr. Fierlinger showed me his re-·&#13;
cords of Benes's ta:llks in Moscow. Dr. Fierlinger was at that&#13;
time Benes's amib assador in Moscow and together with&#13;
Smutny ,a ccompanied Benes during his Moscow conferences. Also Dr. Taborsky, then Benes's secretary, states&#13;
that Benes said ,o n August 28, 1941, when he conferred&#13;
with .Amlbaissador Majsky: "'Ruthema cannot remain with&#13;
the Hungarians; the Poles carmot have it; that pr{)!Vince&#13;
can only belong either to, Ozecho-Slovakia or to ,R:us,sia."&#13;
Despite aJll these commitments, the Benes proprugandists, particularly Papanek in Washington and Ripka in&#13;
London, were declaring that Stalin recogni,z ed pre-war Czecho~1Slov~a in its origin.al boundaries, Ruthenia included.&#13;
It was very important to them to assure everyone of Stalin's "good intentions."&#13;
On December 1, 1944, when Nemec was acting •a s Benes's representative in Ruthenia, he received from the regional convention of national councils its dedsion that Rutheniia was no lornger a part of Czecho~Slo,vaJldia, and that&#13;
the National Council of Ruthenia being estaJblished, Nemec&#13;
IliO '1ongeT represented Ruthenia. This decision was signed&#13;
'b y Nemec's adviser Turjanic, who with Communists Pctruscak and Valo had been assigned to Nemec by Benes.&#13;
It wa:s then that the Czecho-iSlova;k government protested.&#13;
When Fierlinger on behalf of his government submitted olbjections to what was going on in Ruthenia, Stalin wrote a letter to Benes on January 23, 1945. I was in&#13;
the office of Ambassadoir Fierlinger in Moscow. In his letter Stalin Uipbraided Benes, saying: "You yourself told me&#13;
in Moscow of your willingness to give R:uthenia to the So~&#13;
viet Union." This quotation is according to the official&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
54&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Czech embassy record. Dr. Fierlinger himself assrured me&#13;
there that Stalin was right and that Benes and his government in London were playing a comedy, because they&#13;
were afraid of the consequences. Wthen Benes replied to&#13;
Stalin on Feb.vuaJry 1, he did not deny to Stalin his earlier&#13;
statement rubout iRuthenria; he also conf:h med ,h is talks with&#13;
Miajsky, thus: ",J: did not .c hange my stand on this question from that moment when I udked a;bout it fOT the first&#13;
time with your ,a mbassado:r I. Majsky in London in Sep~&#13;
tember, 1939, no,r wiU I ,change it in the futUTe."&#13;
Stalin, therefore, came west of the Oar:pathi:ans according t9 a previous agreement aJbout whicih official circles in London and Washington did not know. They were&#13;
informed to the contrary, namely, that "the USSR recognizes and leaves Czecho~lov;akia in its former boundaries,&#13;
and that Stalin does not have any territorial demands."&#13;
It wais so that Benes informed Roosevelt in 1943 while&#13;
an a visit in Washington, and so ,he talked in America and&#13;
Canada. ThUS; also tJhe memlbers of the present Council of&#13;
Free Ozecho ..Slovaikia ibroadcast home over the BBC in&#13;
1943 and 1944, ,praising Benes as a "lilberator." They lied&#13;
in 'b oth instances, for neither Washington nor London gave&#13;
consent to Benes's tri:p to MoS&lt;!OIW, nor did they know anythinig rubout Benes':s promise to Stalin to cede IRuthenia&#13;
to the 1So.viet Union. Nobody wanted this to haJPPen except&#13;
'Stalin, Benes, and their foHowers.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
• • •&#13;
&#13;
WHO SAID IT?&#13;
&#13;
"Thus if we can a;void Sociwlism, we escape Communism. On the contrary, if we surrender to Socia1ism, we&#13;
surrender to Communism at the same time. But what is&#13;
Socialism? Socialism is government control, government&#13;
operation and government ownership of the Nation's business. Socialism thus caill!s for the continu'OU:s ex:pansion and&#13;
cenitraili:zation otf governmental power over prirvat.e production, privat.e property, private employment and privat.e&#13;
life. Under Socialism a11 'business becomes public 'business,&#13;
all property 1b ecomes public properl:y, all employees become&#13;
public employees, and thl\IS, all privacy is abolished." (Dean Clarence Ma;nion, MlBC, 1-16-05).&#13;
&#13;
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

55

Kerner's "Czechoslovakia" (Cont'd.)
HISTORY OR PROPAGANDA?
P.A. HROBAK

ORAPTER V - "What Woodrow Wilson and America Meant to Czechoslovakia" - rb y Her:bert Adolphus Miller, .Ph.D., "Lecturer on Social Economy, Bryn Mawr College; Professor of Sociology; Oberlin College (1'914-1925),
and Ohio State Universi,ty (1924-,1931) ; chief, Division of
Immigrant !Heritages, Carnegie Cor,poration; director, MidEuropean Union; president, Masaryk Institut,e," etc.
•~in the year 1914 the number of non-Czech and non-Slovak Americans who had intimate know,l edge of the Czechoslova,ks and their
aspirations could almost 1h,ave been counted on the fingers or one
hMlld. ,E ven up to 1M,ay, 1918, iwhen Thomas Garrigue !Masaryk came
to Amer.lea, the New York Times •h ad not carried a single serious
editorial on the Czec•hoslov,aks. When he left in December of that
year, he was one of the acknowledged g;reat men of the war period
and also president-e,l ect of a country soon to become of recognized
importance in the family of nations" (p. 71).
"lln the face of such ,a complete la,ck of information it waa imposs.ilble for the Ameri= people to give any help to a nationa:l
cause. There w,as a traditional predisposition for Americans to be
interested in ,freedom but it was necessary for the Czechs and
Slovaks in the United States to estahlish their rigiht to freedom"
(p. 72).

This chapter confirms the story that "Czecho-Slovakia" was a state 'born out of propaganda. Masaryk, the un.
known "even up to May 1918," became a celebrated rpoJitical figure 1by DecemJber 1918. it all happened !because Masaryk got to know the "right" people, who in turn got
the U. 1S. Army, the YlMCA and the YWCA, the New York
'l'imes, Woodrow Wilson, the ivarious sectarian churches,
etc., to push the estrublishment of the state proposed by
Masaryk ,a nd Benes. lgnorance of the facts, as usual in
such cases, ,p layed a very, if not the most important role.
"As often hruppens in such cases, the less knowledge, the
greater the enthusioom," M:asary,k himself wrote in his
"The M81king of a 1State" (rS vetova revoluce). Professor
Miller unlblu:.shingly describes the role he played to put
Masaryk's ideas across to the American pulblic and the
American Government.

�56

SLOVAKIA

This chapter should have been titled "What Woodro,w
Wilson and America Meant to· Masaryk, Benes and the
Czechs." True, without Wilson and America Ozecho-Sloivakia would not have been born, lbut the fact nevertheless is
that Ozecho-Slo,vaikia served the interests of the Masaryik
and Benes Ozechs more than it did the interests of the vast
mrujority of the population of that Republic. When MajooGenera1 E. F. Glenn, commander of the iDivision invited
Mr. iMiHer "again to discuss what oould be done rubout reestablishing an eastern front through revolutionary activity," Mr. Miller arranged 1a meeting of the "leaders of the
various g;roups of central Europe' (p. 76). And who, do
you suppose, represented the .Slovaiks? '.Dwo Ozechs to
whom Mr. 'Miller does not refer as Czechs, lbut simply
states: "Charles Pergler and Professor Pisecky reipresented
the Czecho-1Slovaik1s." With Miller, much like most of the
other writers on Czecho-:Slovakia, just albout everything
is "Czech," and "Slovak" is only casually mentioned. An
illustration:
"Att·ention then was turn-ed to the education of public opinion.
The story was told to the !Committee on 'Public ,Information, and immediately the national aspirations of the Czechs, Poles, and Jugoslavs began to get space in the new,s,papers. . . Americ,a n public
opiruion wa;s stimulated, first, by what the Czechs themselves did
in America fr.om the very beginning of the war, ,a nd then later in
Europe; and, secondly, through the immediate acceptance of Professor Masaryk (pp. 76-77) . . . . The ,Czech colonies in Chicago, Cle~land, Cedar Rap'ids, and many other pl:aces had Jon,g b een organized
and respected. At the outbreak of the war they got into action. The
Czech National Alliance w,as formed on August 18, 1914, with the
purpos-e of informing the people of America and Europe of the just
demands of the Czech nation for independence. Very soon the conflicting elements of ,Oa;tholics and anti-Catholics that had long divided the Czechs wer,e ,brought together, and soon afterwards the
Slovaks came in" (p. 73).

The :Slovak League of America, which rp layed just as
active, if not a more active part than the Czech organizations for the estaJblishment of the Ozecho-SloivaJk (Republic,
simply was ignored by 'M;r. Miller. Slovak colonies and the
Slovak organi,z ations a:fifiliated with the iSlovak Lea,gue of
America meant nothing to Mr. Miller. The tendency is only
too obvious. Then, too,. Mr. Miller would have us believe that
Masaryk was spontaneously a:cclaimed and "immediaite1y

�57

SLOVAKIA

accepted" 1by Slovaks and Czechs everywhere in America.
The fact is that he was not. Czech and Slovruk Catholic
leader~ in America knew how Masaryk felt aibout Catholicism (Rome must lbe tried and convicted! Away f:rom
Rome!) and &lt;killed him at length about the status of religion in the !proposed Czecho-:Slovak Republic. The Slovaks
were not satisfied with Masarylk's oral picture of the status of ·Slovakia within the iRepulblic ; to win them over he
met with them, drafted and signed the Pittsburgh Agreement, !May 30, 1918, which ,g uaranteed the SlOIVaks autonomy (IState.s' rights) ,w ithin the framework o,f OzechoSlova!kia. The artificial sibate, created by ipropaganda, fell
apart li:ke a house .o f cards when it faced its fkst crisis.
Miller and others, who rpushed the principles. of self-&lt;letermination for the Ozechs, did not follow through to apply
the principle to other nations. What followed was inevitable.
OH.APTER VI - "The Historical Roots of Czech Democracy" - /by Hans Kohn, J.D. , "professo;z- of Modern
European History, Smith College; J.D., German University
of Prague; visiting Lecturer on Internationia;l Relations,
Harvard University (19317-1938) ; Guggenheim ·F ellow (19401941); author of numerous 'boo~s and articles, among
them: A History of NaJtionalisim in the East (192,9); Na-tiona:lism and Imperialism in the Hither East (1932); Na-,
tionalism in the !Soviet Union (1933) ; Orient and Occident (1934); West(ern Civilization in the Near East
(1936); iForce of Reason (1937); Revolutions and -DictaJtorships (1939) ."
This is strictly another Czech chapter. In it Professor
Kohn does not concern himself with the "historical roots of
'SlovaJk [)emocracy." How this cha,pter lbecaime a 1part of the
history of Ozecho-Slovakia, without a corresponding Slovak
cha!pter might best be expf.ained by Kerner, who sought out
the authors of the chapters of the lbook he edited and published. Kerner ,p robably could not find a Czech to do it.
The whole narrative rrevol,ves around 1F rantisek P,a l,a cky,
"who was much more than the first great Czech historian." PalMky, "the father of modern Czech nationalism,"
gave to the Czechs the "sense of a mission, a raison d'etre
1

�58

SLOVAKIA

for the aspiration to take anew their place o,n the field of
history"; his interpretat ion of the Czech i)ast "created the
secure foundation for Czech democracy " and became a
"living intellectual tradition, ,v italizing all manifestati ons.
of Czech life."
'Palaoky "deeply steeped in the moral philosoiphy of
Kant," set himself to the task of "reinterpre ting" Czech
history, so that he might make "the Czech Reformatio n the
culminatio n and the meaning of Czech history, the decisive
.period of which ,b egan with Jan Hus and the Hussite movement and experience d its last and most sUJblime flowering
on the Czech Brethren."
T. G. Masaryk, Palacky's "great disciple," Mr. Kohn
tells us, "saw rightly not only that Palacky had educated
the Czech people .to democracy , but that he had established in the eyes of Europe the Hussite refonnatio n as
the most valid Czech title to recognition" (p. 104). But he
tells us that "T. G. Masaryk points out rightly in his Palackeho idea naroda ceskeho (Prague, 1926; pp. 42 f.) 'the
conviction that the Czech people cannot become politically
independent is one of the fundament al political conceptions
of Palacky'." The Palacky-Ma sary;k conception of Czech
history is adhered to lby Mr. Kohn, even though it was
criticized by the eminent Czech historian, Josef 'Pekar, as
a falsificatio n of Czech history. The chapter by Mr. Kohn
he1ps prove that Czecho-Slo vakia was a political mon_,
strosity.
OHA!PTER V!III - "Constitutional and Political Structure" - By iMalbone W. Graham, Ph.D., "Professor of Political :Science, University of California, Los Angeles; member, Advisory Committee, Institute of Czechoslovak Studies, Columbia University (1925); member, European Con•
ference of American tProfessors of Internation al Law and
Relations (1926); member of numecrous American learned
societies; author of New Governmen ts of Central :Eiurope
(1924) ; New Governmen ts of Eastern Europe (1927) ; The
Soviet 1S ecurity System (1929); The League of Nations and
the Recognitio n of States (1933); In Quest of a Law of
Recognitio n (1933); The Soviet Union and Peace (1935) ,"
etc.

�SLOVAKIA

59

"The medieval Bohemian State, whose overthrow at the hands
of the iHabsburgs closed a long chapter in Czechoslovak national development and opened a darker one of subjugation, was, if only by
(p. 106).
its historical origins, essenti-ally a feudal structure" -

The very first sentence of Mr. Graham's chapter reveals what is coming. What is the connection !between the
"Bohemian" State and the ISlava:ks? 1Since there is none,
how could the destruction o,f the "Bohemian" !State close
"a long ,c hapter in CZECHOSLOVAK national development"? ·F or what purpo,s e did Mr. Graham resort to this
falsification of history? To us it is quite obvious that here
"Czechoslova k" means "Czech." 'But, Mr. Graham, apparently was more interested in building up the "antiquity" of
the "Czechoslovak " business of chauvinistic ~echs (political reconstruction of the Czechoslo:vak State) than he was
in relating historical facts.
"In its
ent from its
strument of
constituent

•

genesis, the Constitution of Czochoslovakia was differcompeers of the postwar period. Whereas every other ingovernment was the -product of a democratically elected
assembly, the Czechoslovak Constitution was brought

into being without elections, by a strictly national assembly created

through a distinctive cooperative process. This apparently anti-democratic procedure was occasioned by the necessity of having availab le for the country from the outset a body with plen,a ry authority
and full responsibility for its actions. At the moment the future
boundaries of the new state were undecided, and elections could not
be held lawfully in unassigned territory. Moreover, the institutional
flux accompanying the wholesale liquidation of the Habsburg Monarchy ,c alled for the prompt creation of _a. substitute authority - stable,
definite and unchallenged. This the Czechoslovak National Assembly
supplied. It was a unicameral ·body made up of the Reichsrat representatives from the Bohemian, Moravian, and .Silesian Crown
Lands, ai;; .el ected in 1911. Taking this prewar standard of political
normalcy as a point of departure, in accordance with the prescriptions of Emperor Oharles's Federalization Manifesto of October 10,
1938, the Czech leaders awaited the formal adhesion of the Slovaks
to tire new state, by the [)oclaration of Turciansky Sv. Martin of
October 31, 1918, then coopted a bloc of fifty-five Slovaks into the
body to give fundamental represe&lt;ntation to that part of the Czechoslovak nation which, under Hungarian rule, had been deprived of
virtually all means of political self-exvression. Later, when the definite boundaries of the country had been laid down in the draft treaty
of Trianon with Hungary, addit'ional representatives were allotted to
Slovakia" - (p. 109).

Simple was it not? The "democracy" of Masaryk and
Benes was given a Constitution about which the peoples of

�60

SLOVAKIA

Czecho ..Slova:kia had nothing to say. The new "democratic"
State was just ,b orn and already "undemocratic" methods
were resorted to. It is significant .that Professor Graham
should try to excuse it or act as an apologist for it. That
is not the task of a true historian. What does he mean by
saying that the Czecho-1Slova:k Constitution was brought
into being "by a strictly natlonal assembly created through
a distinctive cooperative process"? I,f Mr. Graham did not
know the details of how the Czecho-SlovaJk Constitution was
brought into 1b eing, why did he attempt to write about it?
Who were the Slovaks coopted by the Czech leaders into
the "Czechoslovak National Assembly" to give fundamental
representation TO THE PART OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK Nation ... m:ider Hungarian rule"? Did not Mr.
G:mhaim 1know that Benes and other Czechs presumed to
represent the Slovaks? It should ibe significant, too, that
the Slovaks declared their "formal adhesion to the new
State" on October 31, 1918, that is, three days after the
independence of Czecho-Slovakia was proclaimed, by the
Czech •Mruffia in Prague. There was no "Czechoslo,vaik nation" - ethnically or politically s:peaking - before the
b.irth of Ozecho-:Slorvaikia, so how could the Slo,va!ks be a
part of it? The implication seems to be that the run.democratic "Czechoslo1vaJk Constitution" created such a nation.
"AH formal aspects aside, however," continues Mr.
Graham (,p. 11), "the assemlbly which adopted lboth the
provisional and deifinibve constitutions for the Czechoslovak StaJte was decidedly national, that is, fully representative of the political currents at work in the prewar life of
the nation . .."
But the historical fact is that the "lawful" represen.
tatives, who prepared. and voted the Czecho-'Slova:k Constitution, were anything but lawful. We know that the members of the National Assembly, the first Czecho-Slovak Parliament, were not elected, but handpicked by the political
clique headed lby Masaryk and Benes, who came into po:wer
only with the help of the AHies. When the Constitution of
Czecho ..SlovaJkia was approved on February 29, 1920, Slovakia was occupied by the Czech army and Andrew HJinka,
leader of the Slovaks in their fight for freedom and inde-

�SLOVAKIA

61

pendence, was still in a Czech prison at Mirov in -Moraivia.
The Germans and Hungarians, as well as people of other
nations in the new Czecho-!Slovak State, did not haive a
single representative in this ',undemocratic" National Assemlbly, the Masaryk and Benes Ozechs ignoring all claims
on their ibehalf.
Furthermore, so that no aimendrments might be made
to the Constitution against the will o.f the Ozechs, it was
decreed that a two-thirds majority would be required to
amend it. After the National Assemfbly, picked lby Masaryk
and Benes, ,r atified the Constitution, the .A!ssembly was
&lt;lissolved, ,a nd four weeks Jater new parliaimentary elections were held. Hlinka was elected while he was stiH in
prison; after his election he was released. At the first session Hilir.uka and other Slovaik members of Parliament de-·
mantled the implemtcntation of the Pittsburgh Pact, but
were told that it was contrary to the Ozecho-S'lovak Constitution. Masaryk and Benes had control of everything.
The few !Slovaks who went along with them - called Judas
Slovaks ~v 'Slova;k patriots - were given highly paid po-·
sitions in the !State administration, and the fiction of "Czechoslovak" unity was 1pushed in all corners of the earth .

•

Stating that "it is unnecessary to recount the details
of the actual enactment of the Constitution," because today its temporary or transitional stipulations have lost their
significance and do not require consideration," !Mr. Gra-·
ham says (p. 114) : "Rather is it of interest to discern how
the basic ideolo,gy underlying the repubHcan. regime was
translated into fundamental law." And that ideology, continues Mr. Graham, "is admirably eX!pressed in the preamble of the Constitution, whose phraseology, strongly
redolent of that of the .A!rnerican Constitution, is also in
itself a synthesis of the political philosophy of Masaryk
and Benes." Be that as- Mr. Graham says it is, hut it certainly is not a synthesis of the ,political philosophy of the
Czech and 'Slovak nations. The preamble to the OzechoSlova'k Constitution reads:
"We, the Czechoslovak nation, desiring to consolidate the perfect
unity of our people, to establish t,he reign of justi ce in the Republic,

�SLOVAKIA

62

to assure the peac,e ful development of our native Czechoslovak land,
to con tribute to the common welfare of all citizens of this State, and
to secure the blessings of. freedom to coming generations, have in
our National A,ssembly adopted the following Cons titution for the
Czechoslovak Republic and in doing so we decla.re that it will be
our endeavor to s ee that this Constitution, to·g et•h er with all the laiws
of our land, be carried out in the spirit of our history, as well as in
the spkit of those modern principles embodied in the idea of selfdetermination, for we desir.e to take our place in the Family of Nations as a member at once cultured, peace-loving, democratic and
progressive."

To compare the "eX!act degree of American influence on
the ideology," expressed in the foggy, intellectual tripe
above, Mr. Graham footnotes the American preamble,
which reads as follows:
"WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, i n order to form a
more perfect Union, establish justice, -insure domestic tranquility,
p:rovide for the common Defense, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the blessirngs of Liberty to ourselves ·a nd our Posterity, do
ordain and establish this ,Constitution for the United States of
America."

Now, the American preamble makes sense and reads
like a song, but not so the Czecho-Slovak preamible. What is
"perfect unity" if not perfect consolidation? And why
should "We, the Czechoslovak nation" mean anything lbut
"our people"? Or did the handpicked National Asse:mibly
presume its.elf, and not "our people," to be the "Czechoslovalk nation"? It is significant that the Masaryk-B~nes
constitution makers did not start the preamlble with "'WE
THE PEOBLE oif the Czech0-:Sio,v ak 'State," or with "We
the 1people of the Bohemian Crown Lands and 1Slo'Vakia,"
instead of with :the fiction "We, the OzechosloJVak nation"!
Mr. Graham explains the Czecho-'Slovak preamlble in this
manner:
"The primorcliat principle enunciated is that of the unity of the
nation, not as a goal to be attained, and therefore executory, but, so
far as the Czechs ,and Slovaks were concerned, as an achievement to
be consolidated. W•hat is important in this affirmation o.f achieved constitutional ml'ity is not only its validation of the acts of th€ October
revolution . . . but particularly its absolute rejection of all separatist
tendencies (,p. 115) __ . '1t w,a s not the, intent of the Czechoslovak founding fathers to create legal pediments for future racist or separatist
movements by conceding to the inha:bitants of various p.rurts of the
country dlifferential status" (p. 116).

Mr. Graham somehow conveniently forgot that Cze-

�SLOVAKIA

63

cho--Slovia;kia was supposed to be a federation, patterned after the United States or Switzerland. Nevertheless, he knew
the "intent" of the "Czechoslorvak" founding fathers! Mr.
Graham fouled UJP on the false premise of "unity" of the
"Ozechoslovak" nation, which his fertile imagination traced
all the way ibaok to the "medieval Bohemian State."
(More Coming)

•

•

•

CASTLES OF SLOVAKIIA

THE NEW CASTLE OF LIPTOV
Beneath the Slovak Tatras, under the ibowed head of
Krivaii, in the valley of the serpentine Vah river, lies the
hidden town of Liiptovsky Hradok (the Little Castle of
Lipto,v) . :Lt is oompletely encircled by mountains and the
red roofs of the dwellings are shariply contrasted iby the fresh
green of the surrounding forests. The town has its name
from the castle there which today is in ruins, its walls increasing the romanticism of the reigion. The fortress, situated on a plain and surrounded 1by a moat, was built by
Magistrate Done, son of iDominic, at the ibeginning of the
14th century. It took twenty years to build. Novy Hrad
(New Castle), as Liptovsky Hradok is called, is near the
river Bela and behind it rises the cliff Skalka.
The vicinity of Hradok was once an ancient forest;
even today many forests exist there, the source of much
of the wood which can be seen on rafts ,p lying the Vah
during most of the year. The castle itself was a twowinged affair with a small courtyard with a well. The
center of the northern wall is ,completely demolished; the
western part resembles a wide bastion in which is pre~
served a vaulted room.
Done, the original occwpant of the castle, did not
enjoy it very long; he was followed hy many others. In 1398,
the Moravian warrior Procopius s'eiized it and held it for
a · short time; in 143·3 L:iiptovs:ky Hradok was ta:ken by
the Hussites and held several months. When they were
evicted in 141,1, the management of the castle was taken
over 'by magistrate Ladislaus z .u:baie Riikolf; the latter had

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1278">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA

55

Kerner's "Czechoslovakia" (Cont'd.)
HISTORY OR PROPAGANDA?
P.A. HROBAK

ORAPTER V - "What Woodrow Wilson and America Meant to Czechoslovakia" - rb y Her:bert Adolphus Miller, .Ph.D., "Lecturer on Social Economy, Bryn Mawr College; Professor of Sociology; Oberlin College (1'914-1925),
and Ohio State Universi,ty (1924-,1931) ; chief, Division of
Immigrant !Heritages, Carnegie Cor,poration; director, MidEuropean Union; president, Masaryk Institut,e," etc.
•~in the year 1914 the number of non-Czech and non-Slovak Americans who had intimate know,l edge of the Czechoslova,ks and their
aspirations could almost 1h,ave been counted on the fingers or one
hMlld. ,E ven up to 1M,ay, 1918, iwhen Thomas Garrigue !Masaryk came
to Amer.lea, the New York Times •h ad not carried a single serious
editorial on the Czec•hoslov,aks. When he left in December of that
year, he was one of the acknowledged g;reat men of the war period
and also president-e,l ect of a country soon to become of recognized
importance in the family of nations" (p. 71).
"lln the face of such ,a complete la,ck of information it waa imposs.ilble for the Ameri= people to give any help to a nationa:l
cause. There w,as a traditional predisposition for Americans to be
interested in ,freedom but it was necessary for the Czechs and
Slovaks in the United States to estahlish their rigiht to freedom"
(p. 72).

This chapter confirms the story that "Czecho-Slovakia" was a state 'born out of propaganda. Masaryk, the un.
known "even up to May 1918," became a celebrated rpoJitical figure 1by DecemJber 1918. it all happened !because Masaryk got to know the "right" people, who in turn got
the U. 1S. Army, the YlMCA and the YWCA, the New York
'l'imes, Woodrow Wilson, the ivarious sectarian churches,
etc., to push the estrublishment of the state proposed by
Masaryk ,a nd Benes. lgnorance of the facts, as usual in
such cases, ,p layed a very, if not the most important role.
"As often hruppens in such cases, the less knowledge, the
greater the enthusioom," M:asary,k himself wrote in his
"The M81king of a 1State" (rS vetova revoluce). Professor
Miller unlblu:.shingly describes the role he played to put
Masaryk's ideas across to the American pulblic and the
American Government.

�56

SLOVAKIA

This chapter should have been titled "What Woodro,w
Wilson and America Meant to· Masaryk, Benes and the
Czechs." True, without Wilson and America Ozecho-Sloivakia would not have been born, lbut the fact nevertheless is
that Ozecho-Slo,vaikia served the interests of the Masaryik
and Benes Ozechs more than it did the interests of the vast
mrujority of the population of that Republic. When MajooGenera1 E. F. Glenn, commander of the iDivision invited
Mr. iMiHer "again to discuss what oould be done rubout reestablishing an eastern front through revolutionary activity," Mr. Miller arranged 1a meeting of the "leaders of the
various g;roups of central Europe' (p. 76). And who, do
you suppose, represented the .Slovaiks? '.Dwo Ozechs to
whom Mr. 'Miller does not refer as Czechs, lbut simply
states: "Charles Pergler and Professor Pisecky reipresented
the Czecho-1Slovaik1s." With Miller, much like most of the
other writers on Czecho-:Slovakia, just albout everything
is "Czech," and "Slovak" is only casually mentioned. An
illustration:
"Att·ention then was turn-ed to the education of public opinion.
The story was told to the !Committee on 'Public ,Information, and immediately the national aspirations of the Czechs, Poles, and Jugoslavs began to get space in the new,s,papers. . . Americ,a n public
opiruion wa;s stimulated, first, by what the Czechs themselves did
in America fr.om the very beginning of the war, ,a nd then later in
Europe; and, secondly, through the immediate acceptance of Professor Masaryk (pp. 76-77) . . . . The ,Czech colonies in Chicago, Cle~land, Cedar Rap'ids, and many other pl:aces had Jon,g b een organized
and respected. At the outbreak of the war they got into action. The
Czech National Alliance w,as formed on August 18, 1914, with the
purpos-e of informing the people of America and Europe of the just
demands of the Czech nation for independence. Very soon the conflicting elements of ,Oa;tholics and anti-Catholics that had long divided the Czechs wer,e ,brought together, and soon afterwards the
Slovaks came in" (p. 73).

The :Slovak League of America, which rp layed just as
active, if not a more active part than the Czech organizations for the estaJblishment of the Ozecho-SloivaJk (Republic,
simply was ignored by 'M;r. Miller. Slovak colonies and the
Slovak organi,z ations a:fifiliated with the iSlovak Lea,gue of
America meant nothing to Mr. Miller. The tendency is only
too obvious. Then, too,. Mr. Miller would have us believe that
Masaryk was spontaneously a:cclaimed and "immediaite1y

�57

SLOVAKIA

accepted" 1by Slovaks and Czechs everywhere in America.
The fact is that he was not. Czech and Slovruk Catholic
leader~ in America knew how Masaryk felt aibout Catholicism (Rome must lbe tried and convicted! Away f:rom
Rome!) and &lt;killed him at length about the status of religion in the !proposed Czecho-:Slovak Republic. The Slovaks
were not satisfied with Masarylk's oral picture of the status of ·Slovakia within the iRepulblic ; to win them over he
met with them, drafted and signed the Pittsburgh Agreement, !May 30, 1918, which ,g uaranteed the SlOIVaks autonomy (IState.s' rights) ,w ithin the framework o,f OzechoSlova!kia. The artificial sibate, created by ipropaganda, fell
apart li:ke a house .o f cards when it faced its fkst crisis.
Miller and others, who rpushed the principles. of self-&lt;letermination for the Ozechs, did not follow through to apply
the principle to other nations. What followed was inevitable.
OH.APTER VI - "The Historical Roots of Czech Democracy" - /by Hans Kohn, J.D. , "professo;z- of Modern
European History, Smith College; J.D., German University
of Prague; visiting Lecturer on Internationia;l Relations,
Harvard University (19317-1938) ; Guggenheim ·F ellow (19401941); author of numerous 'boo~s and articles, among
them: A History of NaJtionalisim in the East (192,9); Na-tiona:lism and Imperialism in the Hither East (1932); Na-,
tionalism in the !Soviet Union (1933) ; Orient and Occident (1934); West(ern Civilization in the Near East
(1936); iForce of Reason (1937); Revolutions and -DictaJtorships (1939) ."
This is strictly another Czech chapter. In it Professor
Kohn does not concern himself with the "historical roots of
'SlovaJk [)emocracy." How this cha,pter lbecaime a 1part of the
history of Ozecho-Slovakia, without a corresponding Slovak
cha!pter might best be expf.ained by Kerner, who sought out
the authors of the chapters of the lbook he edited and published. Kerner ,p robably could not find a Czech to do it.
The whole narrative rrevol,ves around 1F rantisek P,a l,a cky,
"who was much more than the first great Czech historian." PalMky, "the father of modern Czech nationalism,"
gave to the Czechs the "sense of a mission, a raison d'etre
1

�58

SLOVAKIA

for the aspiration to take anew their place o,n the field of
history"; his interpretat ion of the Czech i)ast "created the
secure foundation for Czech democracy " and became a
"living intellectual tradition, ,v italizing all manifestati ons.
of Czech life."
'Palaoky "deeply steeped in the moral philosoiphy of
Kant," set himself to the task of "reinterpre ting" Czech
history, so that he might make "the Czech Reformatio n the
culminatio n and the meaning of Czech history, the decisive
.period of which ,b egan with Jan Hus and the Hussite movement and experience d its last and most sUJblime flowering
on the Czech Brethren."
T. G. Masaryk, Palacky's "great disciple," Mr. Kohn
tells us, "saw rightly not only that Palacky had educated
the Czech people .to democracy , but that he had established in the eyes of Europe the Hussite refonnatio n as
the most valid Czech title to recognition" (p. 104). But he
tells us that "T. G. Masaryk points out rightly in his Palackeho idea naroda ceskeho (Prague, 1926; pp. 42 f.) 'the
conviction that the Czech people cannot become politically
independent is one of the fundament al political conceptions
of Palacky'." The Palacky-Ma sary;k conception of Czech
history is adhered to lby Mr. Kohn, even though it was
criticized by the eminent Czech historian, Josef 'Pekar, as
a falsificatio n of Czech history. The chapter by Mr. Kohn
he1ps prove that Czecho-Slo vakia was a political mon_,
strosity.
OHA!PTER V!III - "Constitutional and Political Structure" - By iMalbone W. Graham, Ph.D., "Professor of Political :Science, University of California, Los Angeles; member, Advisory Committee, Institute of Czechoslovak Studies, Columbia University (1925); member, European Con•
ference of American tProfessors of Internation al Law and
Relations (1926); member of numecrous American learned
societies; author of New Governmen ts of Central :Eiurope
(1924) ; New Governmen ts of Eastern Europe (1927) ; The
Soviet 1S ecurity System (1929); The League of Nations and
the Recognitio n of States (1933); In Quest of a Law of
Recognitio n (1933); The Soviet Union and Peace (1935) ,"
etc.

�SLOVAKIA

59

"The medieval Bohemian State, whose overthrow at the hands
of the iHabsburgs closed a long chapter in Czechoslovak national development and opened a darker one of subjugation, was, if only by
(p. 106).
its historical origins, essenti-ally a feudal structure" -

The very first sentence of Mr. Graham's chapter reveals what is coming. What is the connection !between the
"Bohemian" State and the ISlava:ks? 1Since there is none,
how could the destruction o,f the "Bohemian" !State close
"a long ,c hapter in CZECHOSLOVAK national development"? ·F or what purpo,s e did Mr. Graham resort to this
falsification of history? To us it is quite obvious that here
"Czechoslova k" means "Czech." 'But, Mr. Graham, apparently was more interested in building up the "antiquity" of
the "Czechoslovak " business of chauvinistic ~echs (political reconstruction of the Czechoslo:vak State) than he was
in relating historical facts.
"In its
ent from its
strument of
constituent

•

genesis, the Constitution of Czochoslovakia was differcompeers of the postwar period. Whereas every other ingovernment was the -product of a democratically elected
assembly, the Czechoslovak Constitution was brought

into being without elections, by a strictly national assembly created

through a distinctive cooperative process. This apparently anti-democratic procedure was occasioned by the necessity of having availab le for the country from the outset a body with plen,a ry authority
and full responsibility for its actions. At the moment the future
boundaries of the new state were undecided, and elections could not
be held lawfully in unassigned territory. Moreover, the institutional
flux accompanying the wholesale liquidation of the Habsburg Monarchy ,c alled for the prompt creation of _a. substitute authority - stable,
definite and unchallenged. This the Czechoslovak National Assembly
supplied. It was a unicameral ·body made up of the Reichsrat representatives from the Bohemian, Moravian, and .Silesian Crown
Lands, ai;; .el ected in 1911. Taking this prewar standard of political
normalcy as a point of departure, in accordance with the prescriptions of Emperor Oharles's Federalization Manifesto of October 10,
1938, the Czech leaders awaited the formal adhesion of the Slovaks
to tire new state, by the [)oclaration of Turciansky Sv. Martin of
October 31, 1918, then coopted a bloc of fifty-five Slovaks into the
body to give fundamental represe&lt;ntation to that part of the Czechoslovak nation which, under Hungarian rule, had been deprived of
virtually all means of political self-exvression. Later, when the definite boundaries of the country had been laid down in the draft treaty
of Trianon with Hungary, addit'ional representatives were allotted to
Slovakia" - (p. 109).

Simple was it not? The "democracy" of Masaryk and
Benes was given a Constitution about which the peoples of

�60

SLOVAKIA

Czecho ..Slova:kia had nothing to say. The new "democratic"
State was just ,b orn and already "undemocratic" methods
were resorted to. It is significant .that Professor Graham
should try to excuse it or act as an apologist for it. That
is not the task of a true historian. What does he mean by
saying that the Czecho-1Slova:k Constitution was brought
into being "by a strictly natlonal assembly created through
a distinctive cooperative process"? I,f Mr. Graham did not
know the details of how the Czecho-SlovaJk Constitution was
brought into 1b eing, why did he attempt to write about it?
Who were the Slovaks coopted by the Czech leaders into
the "Czechoslovak National Assembly" to give fundamental
representation TO THE PART OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK Nation ... m:ider Hungarian rule"? Did not Mr.
G:mhaim 1know that Benes and other Czechs presumed to
represent the Slovaks? It should ibe significant, too, that
the Slovaks declared their "formal adhesion to the new
State" on October 31, 1918, that is, three days after the
independence of Czecho-Slovakia was proclaimed, by the
Czech •Mruffia in Prague. There was no "Czechoslo,vaik nation" - ethnically or politically s:peaking - before the
b.irth of Ozecho-:Slorvaikia, so how could the Slo,va!ks be a
part of it? The implication seems to be that the run.democratic "Czechoslo1vaJk Constitution" created such a nation.
"AH formal aspects aside, however," continues Mr.
Graham (,p. 11), "the assemlbly which adopted lboth the
provisional and deifinibve constitutions for the Czechoslovak StaJte was decidedly national, that is, fully representative of the political currents at work in the prewar life of
the nation . .."
But the historical fact is that the "lawful" represen.
tatives, who prepared. and voted the Czecho-'Slova:k Constitution, were anything but lawful. We know that the members of the National Assembly, the first Czecho-Slovak Parliament, were not elected, but handpicked by the political
clique headed lby Masaryk and Benes, who came into po:wer
only with the help of the AHies. When the Constitution of
Czecho ..SlovaJkia was approved on February 29, 1920, Slovakia was occupied by the Czech army and Andrew HJinka,
leader of the Slovaks in their fight for freedom and inde-

�SLOVAKIA

61

pendence, was still in a Czech prison at Mirov in -Moraivia.
The Germans and Hungarians, as well as people of other
nations in the new Czecho-!Slovak State, did not haive a
single representative in this ',undemocratic" National Assemlbly, the Masaryk and Benes Ozechs ignoring all claims
on their ibehalf.
Furthermore, so that no aimendrments might be made
to the Constitution against the will o.f the Ozechs, it was
decreed that a two-thirds majority would be required to
amend it. After the National Assemfbly, picked lby Masaryk
and Benes, ,r atified the Constitution, the .A!ssembly was
&lt;lissolved, ,a nd four weeks Jater new parliaimentary elections were held. Hlinka was elected while he was stiH in
prison; after his election he was released. At the first session Hilir.uka and other Slovaik members of Parliament de-·
mantled the implemtcntation of the Pittsburgh Pact, but
were told that it was contrary to the Ozecho-S'lovak Constitution. Masaryk and Benes had control of everything.
The few !Slovaks who went along with them - called Judas
Slovaks ~v 'Slova;k patriots - were given highly paid po-·
sitions in the !State administration, and the fiction of "Czechoslovak" unity was 1pushed in all corners of the earth .

•

Stating that "it is unnecessary to recount the details
of the actual enactment of the Constitution," because today its temporary or transitional stipulations have lost their
significance and do not require consideration," !Mr. Gra-·
ham says (p. 114) : "Rather is it of interest to discern how
the basic ideolo,gy underlying the repubHcan. regime was
translated into fundamental law." And that ideology, continues Mr. Graham, "is admirably eX!pressed in the preamble of the Constitution, whose phraseology, strongly
redolent of that of the .A!rnerican Constitution, is also in
itself a synthesis of the political philosophy of Masaryk
and Benes." Be that as- Mr. Graham says it is, hut it certainly is not a synthesis of the ,political philosophy of the
Czech and 'Slovak nations. The preamble to the OzechoSlova'k Constitution reads:
"We, the Czechoslovak nation, desiring to consolidate the perfect
unity of our people, to establish t,he reign of justi ce in the Republic,

�SLOVAKIA

62

to assure the peac,e ful development of our native Czechoslovak land,
to con tribute to the common welfare of all citizens of this State, and
to secure the blessings of. freedom to coming generations, have in
our National A,ssembly adopted the following Cons titution for the
Czechoslovak Republic and in doing so we decla.re that it will be
our endeavor to s ee that this Constitution, to·g et•h er with all the laiws
of our land, be carried out in the spirit of our history, as well as in
the spkit of those modern principles embodied in the idea of selfdetermination, for we desir.e to take our place in the Family of Nations as a member at once cultured, peace-loving, democratic and
progressive."

To compare the "eX!act degree of American influence on
the ideology," expressed in the foggy, intellectual tripe
above, Mr. Graham footnotes the American preamble,
which reads as follows:
"WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, i n order to form a
more perfect Union, establish justice, -insure domestic tranquility,
p:rovide for the common Defense, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the blessirngs of Liberty to ourselves ·a nd our Posterity, do
ordain and establish this ,Constitution for the United States of
America."

Now, the American preamble makes sense and reads
like a song, but not so the Czecho-Slovak preamible. What is
"perfect unity" if not perfect consolidation? And why
should "We, the Czechoslovak nation" mean anything lbut
"our people"? Or did the handpicked National Asse:mibly
presume its.elf, and not "our people," to be the "Czechoslovalk nation"? It is significant that the Masaryk-B~nes
constitution makers did not start the preamlble with "'WE
THE PEOBLE oif the Czech0-:Sio,v ak 'State," or with "We
the 1people of the Bohemian Crown Lands and 1Slo'Vakia,"
instead of with :the fiction "We, the OzechosloJVak nation"!
Mr. Graham explains the Czecho-'Slovak preamlble in this
manner:
"The primorcliat principle enunciated is that of the unity of the
nation, not as a goal to be attained, and therefore executory, but, so
far as the Czechs ,and Slovaks were concerned, as an achievement to
be consolidated. W•hat is important in this affirmation o.f achieved constitutional ml'ity is not only its validation of the acts of th€ October
revolution . . . but particularly its absolute rejection of all separatist
tendencies (,p. 115) __ . '1t w,a s not the, intent of the Czechoslovak founding fathers to create legal pediments for future racist or separatist
movements by conceding to the inha:bitants of various p.rurts of the
country dlifferential status" (p. 116).

Mr. Graham somehow conveniently forgot that Cze-

�SLOVAKIA

63

cho--Slovia;kia was supposed to be a federation, patterned after the United States or Switzerland. Nevertheless, he knew
the "intent" of the "Czechoslorvak" founding fathers! Mr.
Graham fouled UJP on the false premise of "unity" of the
"Ozechoslovak" nation, which his fertile imagination traced
all the way ibaok to the "medieval Bohemian State."
(More Coming)

•

•

•

CASTLES OF SLOVAKIIA

THE NEW CASTLE OF LIPTOV
Beneath the Slovak Tatras, under the ibowed head of
Krivaii, in the valley of the serpentine Vah river, lies the
hidden town of Liiptovsky Hradok (the Little Castle of
Lipto,v) . :Lt is oompletely encircled by mountains and the
red roofs of the dwellings are shariply contrasted iby the fresh
green of the surrounding forests. The town has its name
from the castle there which today is in ruins, its walls increasing the romanticism of the reigion. The fortress, situated on a plain and surrounded 1by a moat, was built by
Magistrate Done, son of iDominic, at the ibeginning of the
14th century. It took twenty years to build. Novy Hrad
(New Castle), as Liptovsky Hradok is called, is near the
river Bela and behind it rises the cliff Skalka.
The vicinity of Hradok was once an ancient forest;
even today many forests exist there, the source of much
of the wood which can be seen on rafts ,p lying the Vah
during most of the year. The castle itself was a twowinged affair with a small courtyard with a well. The
center of the northern wall is ,completely demolished; the
western part resembles a wide bastion in which is pre~
served a vaulted room.
Done, the original occwpant of the castle, did not
enjoy it very long; he was followed hy many others. In 1398,
the Moravian warrior Procopius s'eiized it and held it for
a · short time; in 143·3 L:iiptovs:ky Hradok was ta:ken by
the Hussites and held several months. When they were
evicted in 141,1, the management of the castle was taken
over 'by magistrate Ladislaus z .u:baie Riikolf; the latter had

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                  <text>1955, Vol. 5</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
55&#13;
&#13;
Kerner's "Czechoslovakia" (Cont'd.)&#13;
HISTORY OR PROPAGANDA?&#13;
P.A. HROBAK&#13;
&#13;
ORAPTER V - "What Woodrow Wilson and America Meant to Czechoslovakia" - rb y Her:bert Adolphus Miller, .Ph.D., "Lecturer on Social Economy, Bryn Mawr College; Professor of Sociology; Oberlin College (1'914-1925),&#13;
and Ohio State Universi,ty (1924-,1931) ; chief, Division of&#13;
Immigrant !Heritages, Carnegie Cor,poration; director, MidEuropean Union; president, Masaryk Institut,e," etc.&#13;
•~in the year 1914 the number of non-Czech and non-Slovak Americans who had intimate know,l edge of the Czechoslova,ks and their&#13;
aspirations could almost 1h,ave been counted on the fingers or one&#13;
hMlld. ,E ven up to 1M,ay, 1918, iwhen Thomas Garrigue !Masaryk came&#13;
to Amer.lea, the New York Times •h ad not carried a single serious&#13;
editorial on the Czec•hoslov,aks. When he left in December of that&#13;
year, he was one of the acknowledged g;reat men of the war period&#13;
and also president-e,l ect of a country soon to become of recognized&#13;
importance in the family of nations" (p. 71).&#13;
"lln the face of such ,a complete la,ck of information it waa imposs.ilble for the Ameri= people to give any help to a nationa:l&#13;
cause. There w,as a traditional predisposition for Americans to be&#13;
interested in ,freedom but it was necessary for the Czechs and&#13;
Slovaks in the United States to estahlish their rigiht to freedom"&#13;
(p. 72).&#13;
&#13;
This chapter confirms the story that "Czecho-Slovakia" was a state 'born out of propaganda. Masaryk, the un.&#13;
known "even up to May 1918," became a celebrated rpoJitical figure 1by DecemJber 1918. it all happened !because Masaryk got to know the "right" people, who in turn got&#13;
the U. 1S. Army, the YlMCA and the YWCA, the New York&#13;
'l'imes, Woodrow Wilson, the ivarious sectarian churches,&#13;
etc., to push the estrublishment of the state proposed by&#13;
Masaryk ,a nd Benes. lgnorance of the facts, as usual in&#13;
such cases, ,p layed a very, if not the most important role.&#13;
"As often hruppens in such cases, the less knowledge, the&#13;
greater the enthusioom," M:asary,k himself wrote in his&#13;
"The M81king of a 1State" (rS vetova revoluce). Professor&#13;
Miller unlblu:.shingly describes the role he played to put&#13;
Masaryk's ideas across to the American pulblic and the&#13;
American Government.&#13;
&#13;
56&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
This chapter should have been titled "What Woodro,w&#13;
Wilson and America Meant to· Masaryk, Benes and the&#13;
Czechs." True, without Wilson and America Ozecho-Sloivakia would not have been born, lbut the fact nevertheless is&#13;
that Ozecho-Slo,vaikia served the interests of the Masaryik&#13;
and Benes Ozechs more than it did the interests of the vast&#13;
mrujority of the population of that Republic. When MajooGenera1 E. F. Glenn, commander of the iDivision invited&#13;
Mr. iMiHer "again to discuss what oould be done rubout reestablishing an eastern front through revolutionary activity," Mr. Miller arranged 1a meeting of the "leaders of the&#13;
various g;roups of central Europe' (p. 76). And who, do&#13;
you suppose, represented the .Slovaiks? '.Dwo Ozechs to&#13;
whom Mr. 'Miller does not refer as Czechs, lbut simply&#13;
states: "Charles Pergler and Professor Pisecky reipresented&#13;
the Czecho-1Slovaik1s." With Miller, much like most of the&#13;
other writers on Czecho-:Slovakia, just albout everything&#13;
is "Czech," and "Slovak" is only casually mentioned. An&#13;
illustration:&#13;
"Att·ention then was turn-ed to the education of public opinion.&#13;
The story was told to the !Committee on 'Public ,Information, and immediately the national aspirations of the Czechs, Poles, and Jugoslavs began to get space in the new,s,papers. . . Americ,a n public&#13;
opiruion wa;s stimulated, first, by what the Czechs themselves did&#13;
in America fr.om the very beginning of the war, ,a nd then later in&#13;
Europe; and, secondly, through the immediate acceptance of Professor Masaryk (pp. 76-77) . . . . The ,Czech colonies in Chicago, Cle~land, Cedar Rap'ids, and many other pl:aces had Jon,g b een organized&#13;
and respected. At the outbreak of the war they got into action. The&#13;
Czech National Alliance w,as formed on August 18, 1914, with the&#13;
purpos-e of informing the people of America and Europe of the just&#13;
demands of the Czech nation for independence. Very soon the conflicting elements of ,Oa;tholics and anti-Catholics that had long divided the Czechs wer,e ,brought together, and soon afterwards the&#13;
Slovaks came in" (p. 73).&#13;
&#13;
The :Slovak League of America, which rp layed just as&#13;
active, if not a more active part than the Czech organizations for the estaJblishment of the Ozecho-SloivaJk (Republic,&#13;
simply was ignored by 'M;r. Miller. Slovak colonies and the&#13;
Slovak organi,z ations a:fifiliated with the iSlovak Lea,gue of&#13;
America meant nothing to Mr. Miller. The tendency is only&#13;
too obvious. Then, too,. Mr. Miller would have us believe that&#13;
Masaryk was spontaneously a:cclaimed and "immediaite1y&#13;
&#13;
57&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
accepted" 1by Slovaks and Czechs everywhere in America.&#13;
The fact is that he was not. Czech and Slovruk Catholic&#13;
leader~ in America knew how Masaryk felt aibout Catholicism (Rome must lbe tried and convicted! Away f:rom&#13;
Rome!) and &lt;killed him at length about the status of religion in the !proposed Czecho-:Slovak Republic. The Slovaks&#13;
were not satisfied with Masarylk's oral picture of the status of ·Slovakia within the iRepulblic ; to win them over he&#13;
met with them, drafted and signed the Pittsburgh Agreement, !May 30, 1918, which ,g uaranteed the SlOIVaks autonomy (IState.s' rights) ,w ithin the framework o,f OzechoSlova!kia. The artificial sibate, created by ipropaganda, fell&#13;
apart li:ke a house .o f cards when it faced its fkst crisis.&#13;
Miller and others, who rpushed the principles. of self-&lt;letermination for the Ozechs, did not follow through to apply&#13;
the principle to other nations. What followed was inevitable.&#13;
OH.APTER VI - "The Historical Roots of Czech Democracy" - /by Hans Kohn, J.D. , "professo;z- of Modern&#13;
European History, Smith College; J.D., German University&#13;
of Prague; visiting Lecturer on Internationia;l Relations,&#13;
Harvard University (19317-1938) ; Guggenheim ·F ellow (19401941); author of numerous 'boo~s and articles, among&#13;
them: A History of NaJtionalisim in the East (192,9); Na-tiona:lism and Imperialism in the Hither East (1932); Na-,&#13;
tionalism in the !Soviet Union (1933) ; Orient and Occident (1934); West(ern Civilization in the Near East&#13;
(1936); iForce of Reason (1937); Revolutions and -DictaJtorships (1939) ."&#13;
This is strictly another Czech chapter. In it Professor&#13;
Kohn does not concern himself with the "historical roots of&#13;
'SlovaJk [)emocracy." How this cha,pter lbecaime a 1part of the&#13;
history of Ozecho-Slovakia, without a corresponding Slovak&#13;
cha!pter might best be expf.ained by Kerner, who sought out&#13;
the authors of the chapters of the lbook he edited and published. Kerner ,p robably could not find a Czech to do it.&#13;
The whole narrative rrevol,ves around 1F rantisek P,a l,a cky,&#13;
"who was much more than the first great Czech historian." PalMky, "the father of modern Czech nationalism,"&#13;
gave to the Czechs the "sense of a mission, a raison d'etre&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
58&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
for the aspiration to take anew their place o,n the field of&#13;
history"; his interpretat ion of the Czech i)ast "created the&#13;
secure foundation for Czech democracy " and became a&#13;
"living intellectual tradition, ,v italizing all manifestati ons.&#13;
of Czech life."&#13;
'Palaoky "deeply steeped in the moral philosoiphy of&#13;
Kant," set himself to the task of "reinterpre ting" Czech&#13;
history, so that he might make "the Czech Reformatio n the&#13;
culminatio n and the meaning of Czech history, the decisive&#13;
.period of which ,b egan with Jan Hus and the Hussite movement and experience d its last and most sUJblime flowering&#13;
on the Czech Brethren."&#13;
T. G. Masaryk, Palacky's "great disciple," Mr. Kohn&#13;
tells us, "saw rightly not only that Palacky had educated&#13;
the Czech people .to democracy , but that he had established in the eyes of Europe the Hussite refonnatio n as&#13;
the most valid Czech title to recognition" (p. 104). But he&#13;
tells us that "T. G. Masaryk points out rightly in his Palackeho idea naroda ceskeho (Prague, 1926; pp. 42 f.) 'the&#13;
conviction that the Czech people cannot become politically&#13;
independent is one of the fundament al political conceptions&#13;
of Palacky'." The Palacky-Ma sary;k conception of Czech&#13;
history is adhered to lby Mr. Kohn, even though it was&#13;
criticized by the eminent Czech historian, Josef 'Pekar, as&#13;
a falsificatio n of Czech history. The chapter by Mr. Kohn&#13;
he1ps prove that Czecho-Slo vakia was a political mon_,&#13;
strosity.&#13;
OHA!PTER V!III - "Constitutional and Political Structure" - By iMalbone W. Graham, Ph.D., "Professor of Political :Science, University of California, Los Angeles; member, Advisory Committee, Institute of Czechoslovak Studies, Columbia University (1925); member, European Con•&#13;
ference of American tProfessors of Internation al Law and&#13;
Relations (1926); member of numecrous American learned&#13;
societies; author of New Governmen ts of Central :Eiurope&#13;
(1924) ; New Governmen ts of Eastern Europe (1927) ; The&#13;
Soviet 1S ecurity System (1929); The League of Nations and&#13;
the Recognitio n of States (1933); In Quest of a Law of&#13;
Recognitio n (1933); The Soviet Union and Peace (1935) ,"&#13;
etc.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
59&#13;
&#13;
"The medieval Bohemian State, whose overthrow at the hands&#13;
of the iHabsburgs closed a long chapter in Czechoslovak national development and opened a darker one of subjugation, was, if only by&#13;
(p. 106).&#13;
its historical origins, essenti-ally a feudal structure" -&#13;
&#13;
The very first sentence of Mr. Graham's chapter reveals what is coming. What is the connection !between the&#13;
"Bohemian" State and the ISlava:ks? 1Since there is none,&#13;
how could the destruction o,f the "Bohemian" !State close&#13;
"a long ,c hapter in CZECHOSLOVAK national development"? ·F or what purpo,s e did Mr. Graham resort to this&#13;
falsification of history? To us it is quite obvious that here&#13;
"Czechoslova k" means "Czech." 'But, Mr. Graham, apparently was more interested in building up the "antiquity" of&#13;
the "Czechoslovak " business of chauvinistic ~echs (political reconstruction of the Czechoslo:vak State) than he was&#13;
in relating historical facts.&#13;
"In its&#13;
ent from its&#13;
strument of&#13;
constituent&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
genesis, the Constitution of Czochoslovakia was differcompeers of the postwar period. Whereas every other ingovernment was the -product of a democratically elected&#13;
assembly, the Czechoslovak Constitution was brought&#13;
&#13;
into being without elections, by a strictly national assembly created&#13;
&#13;
through a distinctive cooperative process. This apparently anti-democratic procedure was occasioned by the necessity of having availab le for the country from the outset a body with plen,a ry authority&#13;
and full responsibility for its actions. At the moment the future&#13;
boundaries of the new state were undecided, and elections could not&#13;
be held lawfully in unassigned territory. Moreover, the institutional&#13;
flux accompanying the wholesale liquidation of the Habsburg Monarchy ,c alled for the prompt creation of _a. substitute authority - stable,&#13;
definite and unchallenged. This the Czechoslovak National Assembly&#13;
supplied. It was a unicameral ·body made up of the Reichsrat representatives from the Bohemian, Moravian, and .Silesian Crown&#13;
Lands, ai;; .el ected in 1911. Taking this prewar standard of political&#13;
normalcy as a point of departure, in accordance with the prescriptions of Emperor Oharles's Federalization Manifesto of October 10,&#13;
1938, the Czech leaders awaited the formal adhesion of the Slovaks&#13;
to tire new state, by the [)oclaration of Turciansky Sv. Martin of&#13;
October 31, 1918, then coopted a bloc of fifty-five Slovaks into the&#13;
body to give fundamental represe&lt;ntation to that part of the Czechoslovak nation which, under Hungarian rule, had been deprived of&#13;
virtually all means of political self-exvression. Later, when the definite boundaries of the country had been laid down in the draft treaty&#13;
of Trianon with Hungary, addit'ional representatives were allotted to&#13;
Slovakia" - (p. 109).&#13;
&#13;
Simple was it not? The "democracy" of Masaryk and&#13;
Benes was given a Constitution about which the peoples of&#13;
&#13;
60&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
Czecho ..Slova:kia had nothing to say. The new "democratic"&#13;
State was just ,b orn and already "undemocratic" methods&#13;
were resorted to. It is significant .that Professor Graham&#13;
should try to excuse it or act as an apologist for it. That&#13;
is not the task of a true historian. What does he mean by&#13;
saying that the Czecho-1Slova:k Constitution was brought&#13;
into being "by a strictly natlonal assembly created through&#13;
a distinctive cooperative process"? I,f Mr. Graham did not&#13;
know the details of how the Czecho-SlovaJk Constitution was&#13;
brought into 1b eing, why did he attempt to write about it?&#13;
Who were the Slovaks coopted by the Czech leaders into&#13;
the "Czechoslovak National Assembly" to give fundamental&#13;
representation TO THE PART OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK Nation ... m:ider Hungarian rule"? Did not Mr.&#13;
G:mhaim 1know that Benes and other Czechs presumed to&#13;
represent the Slovaks? It should ibe significant, too, that&#13;
the Slovaks declared their "formal adhesion to the new&#13;
State" on October 31, 1918, that is, three days after the&#13;
independence of Czecho-Slovakia was proclaimed, by the&#13;
Czech •Mruffia in Prague. There was no "Czechoslo,vaik nation" - ethnically or politically s:peaking - before the&#13;
b.irth of Ozecho-:Slorvaikia, so how could the Slo,va!ks be a&#13;
part of it? The implication seems to be that the run.democratic "Czechoslo1vaJk Constitution" created such a nation.&#13;
"AH formal aspects aside, however," continues Mr.&#13;
Graham (,p. 11), "the assemlbly which adopted lboth the&#13;
provisional and deifinibve constitutions for the Czechoslovak StaJte was decidedly national, that is, fully representative of the political currents at work in the prewar life of&#13;
the nation . .."&#13;
But the historical fact is that the "lawful" represen.&#13;
tatives, who prepared. and voted the Czecho-'Slova:k Constitution, were anything but lawful. We know that the members of the National Assembly, the first Czecho-Slovak Parliament, were not elected, but handpicked by the political&#13;
clique headed lby Masaryk and Benes, who came into po:wer&#13;
only with the help of the AHies. When the Constitution of&#13;
Czecho ..SlovaJkia was approved on February 29, 1920, Slovakia was occupied by the Czech army and Andrew HJinka,&#13;
leader of the Slovaks in their fight for freedom and inde-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
61&#13;
&#13;
pendence, was still in a Czech prison at Mirov in -Moraivia.&#13;
The Germans and Hungarians, as well as people of other&#13;
nations in the new Czecho-!Slovak State, did not haive a&#13;
single representative in this ',undemocratic" National Assemlbly, the Masaryk and Benes Ozechs ignoring all claims&#13;
on their ibehalf.&#13;
Furthermore, so that no aimendrments might be made&#13;
to the Constitution against the will o.f the Ozechs, it was&#13;
decreed that a two-thirds majority would be required to&#13;
amend it. After the National Assemfbly, picked lby Masaryk&#13;
and Benes, ,r atified the Constitution, the .A!ssembly was&#13;
&lt;lissolved, ,a nd four weeks Jater new parliaimentary elections were held. Hlinka was elected while he was stiH in&#13;
prison; after his election he was released. At the first session Hilir.uka and other Slovaik members of Parliament de-·&#13;
mantled the implemtcntation of the Pittsburgh Pact, but&#13;
were told that it was contrary to the Ozecho-S'lovak Constitution. Masaryk and Benes had control of everything.&#13;
The few !Slovaks who went along with them - called Judas&#13;
Slovaks ~v 'Slova;k patriots - were given highly paid po-·&#13;
sitions in the !State administration, and the fiction of "Czechoslovak" unity was 1pushed in all corners of the earth .&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
Stating that "it is unnecessary to recount the details&#13;
of the actual enactment of the Constitution," because today its temporary or transitional stipulations have lost their&#13;
significance and do not require consideration," !Mr. Gra-·&#13;
ham says (p. 114) : "Rather is it of interest to discern how&#13;
the basic ideolo,gy underlying the repubHcan. regime was&#13;
translated into fundamental law." And that ideology, continues Mr. Graham, "is admirably eX!pressed in the preamble of the Constitution, whose phraseology, strongly&#13;
redolent of that of the .A!rnerican Constitution, is also in&#13;
itself a synthesis of the political philosophy of Masaryk&#13;
and Benes." Be that as- Mr. Graham says it is, hut it certainly is not a synthesis of the ,political philosophy of the&#13;
Czech and 'Slovak nations. The preamble to the OzechoSlova'k Constitution reads:&#13;
"We, the Czechoslovak nation, desiring to consolidate the perfect&#13;
unity of our people, to establish t,he reign of justi ce in the Republic,&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
62&#13;
&#13;
to assure the peac,e ful development of our native Czechoslovak land,&#13;
to con tribute to the common welfare of all citizens of this State, and&#13;
to secure the blessings of. freedom to coming generations, have in&#13;
our National A,ssembly adopted the following Cons titution for the&#13;
Czechoslovak Republic and in doing so we decla.re that it will be&#13;
our endeavor to s ee that this Constitution, to·g et•h er with all the laiws&#13;
of our land, be carried out in the spirit of our history, as well as in&#13;
the spkit of those modern principles embodied in the idea of selfdetermination, for we desir.e to take our place in the Family of Nations as a member at once cultured, peace-loving, democratic and&#13;
progressive."&#13;
&#13;
To compare the "eX!act degree of American influence on&#13;
the ideology," expressed in the foggy, intellectual tripe&#13;
above, Mr. Graham footnotes the American preamble,&#13;
which reads as follows:&#13;
"WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, i n order to form a&#13;
more perfect Union, establish justice, -insure domestic tranquility,&#13;
p:rovide for the common Defense, promote the general Welfare, and&#13;
secure the blessirngs of Liberty to ourselves ·a nd our Posterity, do&#13;
ordain and establish this ,Constitution for the United States of&#13;
America."&#13;
&#13;
Now, the American preamble makes sense and reads&#13;
like a song, but not so the Czecho-Slovak preamible. What is&#13;
"perfect unity" if not perfect consolidation? And why&#13;
should "We, the Czechoslovak nation" mean anything lbut&#13;
"our people"? Or did the handpicked National Asse:mibly&#13;
presume its.elf, and not "our people," to be the "Czechoslovalk nation"? It is significant that the Masaryk-B~nes&#13;
constitution makers did not start the preamlble with "'WE&#13;
THE PEOBLE oif the Czech0-:Sio,v ak 'State," or with "We&#13;
the 1people of the Bohemian Crown Lands and 1Slo'Vakia,"&#13;
instead of with :the fiction "We, the OzechosloJVak nation"!&#13;
Mr. Graham explains the Czecho-'Slovak preamlble in this&#13;
manner:&#13;
"The primorcliat principle enunciated is that of the unity of the&#13;
nation, not as a goal to be attained, and therefore executory, but, so&#13;
far as the Czechs ,and Slovaks were concerned, as an achievement to&#13;
be consolidated. W•hat is important in this affirmation o.f achieved constitutional ml'ity is not only its validation of the acts of th€ October&#13;
revolution . . . but particularly its absolute rejection of all separatist&#13;
tendencies (,p. 115) __ . '1t w,a s not the, intent of the Czechoslovak founding fathers to create legal pediments for future racist or separatist&#13;
movements by conceding to the inha:bitants of various p.rurts of the&#13;
country dlifferential status" (p. 116).&#13;
&#13;
Mr. Graham somehow conveniently forgot that Cze-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
63&#13;
&#13;
cho--Slovia;kia was supposed to be a federation, patterned after the United States or Switzerland. Nevertheless, he knew&#13;
the "intent" of the "Czechoslorvak" founding fathers! Mr.&#13;
Graham fouled UJP on the false premise of "unity" of the&#13;
"Ozechoslovak" nation, which his fertile imagination traced&#13;
all the way ibaok to the "medieval Bohemian State."&#13;
(More Coming)&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIIA&#13;
&#13;
THE NEW CASTLE OF LIPTOV&#13;
Beneath the Slovak Tatras, under the ibowed head of&#13;
Krivaii, in the valley of the serpentine Vah river, lies the&#13;
hidden town of Liiptovsky Hradok (the Little Castle of&#13;
Lipto,v) . :Lt is oompletely encircled by mountains and the&#13;
red roofs of the dwellings are shariply contrasted iby the fresh&#13;
green of the surrounding forests. The town has its name&#13;
from the castle there which today is in ruins, its walls increasing the romanticism of the reigion. The fortress, situated on a plain and surrounded 1by a moat, was built by&#13;
Magistrate Done, son of iDominic, at the ibeginning of the&#13;
14th century. It took twenty years to build. Novy Hrad&#13;
(New Castle), as Liptovsky Hradok is called, is near the&#13;
river Bela and behind it rises the cliff Skalka.&#13;
The vicinity of Hradok was once an ancient forest;&#13;
even today many forests exist there, the source of much&#13;
of the wood which can be seen on rafts ,p lying the Vah&#13;
during most of the year. The castle itself was a twowinged affair with a small courtyard with a well. The&#13;
center of the northern wall is ,completely demolished; the&#13;
western part resembles a wide bastion in which is pre~&#13;
served a vaulted room.&#13;
Done, the original occwpant of the castle, did not&#13;
enjoy it very long; he was followed hy many others. In 1398,&#13;
the Moravian warrior Procopius s'eiized it and held it for&#13;
a · short time; in 143·3 L:iiptovs:ky Hradok was ta:ken by&#13;
the Hussites and held several months. When they were&#13;
evicted in 141,1, the management of the castle was taken&#13;
over 'by magistrate Ladislaus z .u:baie Riikolf; the latter had&#13;
&#13;
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                <text>Professor Kerner's "CZECHOSLOVAKIA": History or Propaganda? (2/8)</text>
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                <text>P. A. Hrobak&#13;
Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17), December 1955&#13;
pp. 55-63</text>
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                <text>Hrobak, Philip Anthony, 1904-1964</text>
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                <text>December 1955</text>
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                <text>continued from &lt;a href="/items/show/186"&gt;Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), pp. 38-62&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;continues in &lt;a href="/items/show/222"&gt;Vol. 6, No. 1 (18), pp. 57-64&lt;/a&gt;</text>
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

63

cho--Slovia;kia was supposed to be a federation, patterned after the United States or Switzerland. Nevertheless, he knew
the "intent" of the "Czechoslorvak" founding fathers! Mr.
Graham fouled UJP on the false premise of "unity" of the
"Ozechoslovak" nation, which his fertile imagination traced
all the way ibaok to the "medieval Bohemian State."
(More Coming)

•

•

•

CASTLES OF SLOVAKIIA

THE NEW CASTLE OF LIPTOV
Beneath the Slovak Tatras, under the ibowed head of
Krivaii, in the valley of the serpentine Vah river, lies the
hidden town of Liiptovsky Hradok (the Little Castle of
Lipto,v) . :Lt is oompletely encircled by mountains and the
red roofs of the dwellings are shariply contrasted iby the fresh
green of the surrounding forests. The town has its name
from the castle there which today is in ruins, its walls increasing the romanticism of the reigion. The fortress, situated on a plain and surrounded 1by a moat, was built by
Magistrate Done, son of iDominic, at the ibeginning of the
14th century. It took twenty years to build. Novy Hrad
(New Castle), as Liptovsky Hradok is called, is near the
river Bela and behind it rises the cliff Skalka.
The vicinity of Hradok was once an ancient forest;
even today many forests exist there, the source of much
of the wood which can be seen on rafts ,p lying the Vah
during most of the year. The castle itself was a twowinged affair with a small courtyard with a well. The
center of the northern wall is ,completely demolished; the
western part resembles a wide bastion in which is pre~
served a vaulted room.
Done, the original occwpant of the castle, did not
enjoy it very long; he was followed hy many others. In 1398,
the Moravian warrior Procopius s'eiized it and held it for
a · short time; in 143·3 L:iiptovs:ky Hradok was ta:ken by
the Hussites and held several months. When they were
evicted in 141,1, the management of the castle was taken
over 'by magistrate Ladislaus z .u:baie Riikolf; the latter had

�64

SLOVAKIA

it only nine years, when he was thrown out of it in 1450
by Peter Komorovsky, one of John Jiskra's commanders.
King Mathias donated the castle to· the Pan:krac clan of
Llptovsky Svaty M~kulas; but Komo,11ovsky would not gi,ve
11; up . .Pankrac attaciked Liptovsky Hradok but could not
ta,ke it. King Mathias intervened, stormed the castle with
his army in 1'474 and forced Komorov,s ky to surrender it.
In 1485 the castle passed into the hands of the ·z apol'sky
clan who held it until 1'527, when it was seized by the imperial army under the command orf G€nera:l Katzianer.
The historic castle was then held :b y various magnates
until 1600, when Nicholas Sandorfi b,ecame the owner. He
it was who made additions to, the Liptovsky Hra,dok, lby
building a one-story renaissance structure around three
sides of the original structure. This part of the castle is
completely preserved and today is the home of the district court. In 1623, 'Stephen Ost:rosich bought the castle:
he lost it to the army of George Rakoczy in 1644. When
Rakoczy concluded 1peace with Ferdinand II[, Liptovsky
Hradok passed into the hands of Nicholas Ostrosich, who
held it to his death in 1660. The Ostrosich family held it
another ten years, G€neral Spork of the imperial army seizing it in 1670. Thereafter, the residents of Liiptovsky
Hradok changed often; rebellions. plagued the country;
when Francis Rakoczy II rebelled, the castle was practically ruined. !Prince Lichtenstein owned the castle from
1709 to 1731, when it_ was !bought from him by the state .
.Since the time it has been under state management and
now is controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture.
Because of its location, Liptovsky Hradok is called a
paradise. Its scenic 'beauty attracts many visitors; it is a
verita)ble vacationla.nd. Thousands of visitors come to Liptovisky Hradok to make excursions into the High 'Datras,
the plateaus of Liptov, the Demauc;v Caverns, the Va-•
zec Cave, and the Lower Tatras .

•

•

•

'DRE SLOVAKS by Peter P. Yurchak, should be in
every plliblic libra:ry, in every college ·a nd university, in the
home of every American oif Slovak descent. Get your copy
NOW. Paper bound copy-· $2.00; in cloth $3.00.

�</text>
                  </elementText>
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

63

cho--Slovia;kia was supposed to be a federation, patterned after the United States or Switzerland. Nevertheless, he knew
the "intent" of the "Czechoslorvak" founding fathers! Mr.
Graham fouled UJP on the false premise of "unity" of the
"Ozechoslovak" nation, which his fertile imagination traced
all the way ibaok to the "medieval Bohemian State."
(More Coming)

•

•

•

CASTLES OF SLOVAKIIA

THE NEW CASTLE OF LIPTOV
Beneath the Slovak Tatras, under the ibowed head of
Krivaii, in the valley of the serpentine Vah river, lies the
hidden town of Liiptovsky Hradok (the Little Castle of
Lipto,v) . :Lt is oompletely encircled by mountains and the
red roofs of the dwellings are shariply contrasted iby the fresh
green of the surrounding forests. The town has its name
from the castle there which today is in ruins, its walls increasing the romanticism of the reigion. The fortress, situated on a plain and surrounded 1by a moat, was built by
Magistrate Done, son of iDominic, at the ibeginning of the
14th century. It took twenty years to build. Novy Hrad
(New Castle), as Liptovsky Hradok is called, is near the
river Bela and behind it rises the cliff Skalka.
The vicinity of Hradok was once an ancient forest;
even today many forests exist there, the source of much
of the wood which can be seen on rafts ,p lying the Vah
during most of the year. The castle itself was a twowinged affair with a small courtyard with a well. The
center of the northern wall is ,completely demolished; the
western part resembles a wide bastion in which is pre~
served a vaulted room.
Done, the original occwpant of the castle, did not
enjoy it very long; he was followed hy many others. In 1398,
the Moravian warrior Procopius s'eiized it and held it for
a · short time; in 143·3 L:iiptovs:ky Hradok was ta:ken by
the Hussites and held several months. When they were
evicted in 141,1, the management of the castle was taken
over 'by magistrate Ladislaus z .u:baie Riikolf; the latter had

�64

SLOVAKIA

it only nine years, when he was thrown out of it in 1450
by Peter Komorovsky, one of John Jiskra's commanders.
King Mathias donated the castle to· the Pan:krac clan of
Llptovsky Svaty M~kulas; but Komo,11ovsky would not gi,ve
11; up . .Pankrac attaciked Liptovsky Hradok but could not
ta,ke it. King Mathias intervened, stormed the castle with
his army in 1'474 and forced Komorov,s ky to surrender it.
In 1485 the castle passed into the hands of the ·z apol'sky
clan who held it until 1'527, when it was seized by the imperial army under the command orf G€nera:l Katzianer.
The historic castle was then held :b y various magnates
until 1600, when Nicholas Sandorfi b,ecame the owner. He
it was who made additions to, the Liptovsky Hra,dok, lby
building a one-story renaissance structure around three
sides of the original structure. This part of the castle is
completely preserved and today is the home of the district court. In 1623, 'Stephen Ost:rosich bought the castle:
he lost it to the army of George Rakoczy in 1644. When
Rakoczy concluded 1peace with Ferdinand II[, Liptovsky
Hradok passed into the hands of Nicholas Ostrosich, who
held it to his death in 1660. The Ostrosich family held it
another ten years, G€neral Spork of the imperial army seizing it in 1670. Thereafter, the residents of Liiptovsky
Hradok changed often; rebellions. plagued the country;
when Francis Rakoczy II rebelled, the castle was practically ruined. !Prince Lichtenstein owned the castle from
1709 to 1731, when it_ was !bought from him by the state .
.Since the time it has been under state management and
now is controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture.
Because of its location, Liptovsky Hradok is called a
paradise. Its scenic 'beauty attracts many visitors; it is a
verita)ble vacationla.nd. Thousands of visitors come to Liptovisky Hradok to make excursions into the High 'Datras,
the plateaus of Liptov, the Demauc;v Caverns, the Va-•
zec Cave, and the Lower Tatras .

•

•

•

'DRE SLOVAKS by Peter P. Yurchak, should be in
every plliblic libra:ry, in every college ·a nd university, in the
home of every American oif Slovak descent. Get your copy
NOW. Paper bound copy-· $2.00; in cloth $3.00.

�</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.&lt;/li&gt;
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
63&#13;
&#13;
cho--Slovia;kia was supposed to be a federation, patterned after the United States or Switzerland. Nevertheless, he knew&#13;
the "intent" of the "Czechoslorvak" founding fathers! Mr.&#13;
Graham fouled UJP on the false premise of "unity" of the&#13;
"Ozechoslovak" nation, which his fertile imagination traced&#13;
all the way ibaok to the "medieval Bohemian State."&#13;
(More Coming)&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIIA&#13;
&#13;
THE NEW CASTLE OF LIPTOV&#13;
Beneath the Slovak Tatras, under the ibowed head of&#13;
Krivaii, in the valley of the serpentine Vah river, lies the&#13;
hidden town of Liiptovsky Hradok (the Little Castle of&#13;
Lipto,v) . :Lt is oompletely encircled by mountains and the&#13;
red roofs of the dwellings are shariply contrasted iby the fresh&#13;
green of the surrounding forests. The town has its name&#13;
from the castle there which today is in ruins, its walls increasing the romanticism of the reigion. The fortress, situated on a plain and surrounded 1by a moat, was built by&#13;
Magistrate Done, son of iDominic, at the ibeginning of the&#13;
14th century. It took twenty years to build. Novy Hrad&#13;
(New Castle), as Liptovsky Hradok is called, is near the&#13;
river Bela and behind it rises the cliff Skalka.&#13;
The vicinity of Hradok was once an ancient forest;&#13;
even today many forests exist there, the source of much&#13;
of the wood which can be seen on rafts ,p lying the Vah&#13;
during most of the year. The castle itself was a twowinged affair with a small courtyard with a well. The&#13;
center of the northern wall is ,completely demolished; the&#13;
western part resembles a wide bastion in which is pre~&#13;
served a vaulted room.&#13;
Done, the original occwpant of the castle, did not&#13;
enjoy it very long; he was followed hy many others. In 1398,&#13;
the Moravian warrior Procopius s'eiized it and held it for&#13;
a · short time; in 143·3 L:iiptovs:ky Hradok was ta:ken by&#13;
the Hussites and held several months. When they were&#13;
evicted in 141,1, the management of the castle was taken&#13;
over 'by magistrate Ladislaus z .u:baie Riikolf; the latter had&#13;
&#13;
64&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
it only nine years, when he was thrown out of it in 1450&#13;
by Peter Komorovsky, one of John Jiskra's commanders.&#13;
King Mathias donated the castle to· the Pan:krac clan of&#13;
Llptovsky Svaty M~kulas; but Komo,11ovsky would not gi,ve&#13;
11; up . .Pankrac attaciked Liptovsky Hradok but could not&#13;
ta,ke it. King Mathias intervened, stormed the castle with&#13;
his army in 1'474 and forced Komorov,s ky to surrender it.&#13;
In 1485 the castle passed into the hands of the ·z apol'sky&#13;
clan who held it until 1'527, when it was seized by the imperial army under the command orf G€nera:l Katzianer.&#13;
The historic castle was then held :b y various magnates&#13;
until 1600, when Nicholas Sandorfi b,ecame the owner. He&#13;
it was who made additions to, the Liptovsky Hra,dok, lby&#13;
building a one-story renaissance structure around three&#13;
sides of the original structure. This part of the castle is&#13;
completely preserved and today is the home of the district court. In 1623, 'Stephen Ost:rosich bought the castle:&#13;
he lost it to the army of George Rakoczy in 1644. When&#13;
Rakoczy concluded 1peace with Ferdinand II[, Liptovsky&#13;
Hradok passed into the hands of Nicholas Ostrosich, who&#13;
held it to his death in 1660. The Ostrosich family held it&#13;
another ten years, G€neral Spork of the imperial army seizing it in 1670. Thereafter, the residents of Liiptovsky&#13;
Hradok changed often; rebellions. plagued the country;&#13;
when Francis Rakoczy II rebelled, the castle was practically ruined. !Prince Lichtenstein owned the castle from&#13;
1709 to 1731, when it_ was !bought from him by the state .&#13;
.Since the time it has been under state management and&#13;
now is controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture.&#13;
Because of its location, Liptovsky Hradok is called a&#13;
paradise. Its scenic 'beauty attracts many visitors; it is a&#13;
verita)ble vacationla.nd. Thousands of visitors come to Liptovisky Hradok to make excursions into the High 'Datras,&#13;
the plateaus of Liptov, the Demauc;v Caverns, the Va-•&#13;
zec Cave, and the Lower Tatras .&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
'DRE SLOVAKS by Peter P. Yurchak, should be in&#13;
every plliblic libra:ry, in every college ·a nd university, in the&#13;
home of every American oif Slovak descent. Get your copy&#13;
NOW. Paper bound copy-· $2.00; in cloth $3.00.&#13;
&#13;
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                    <text>Officers of the Slovak League of America
(Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Obio

•
Frances L. Mizenko

Honorary President

3756 Lee Road
Cleveland 28, Ohio

Dr. Peter P. H letko

1~ 13 W. -18th Street
Chicago 9, Ill inois

Stephen J. Tkach

173 N. Main Street
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.

!'resident
A.

Philip

Hrobak

P. 0. Dox 150, Middletown, Pa.

Andrew J. Hamrock

61 Woodland Avenu e
Campbell, Ohio

Vice-President
Jacob Kocis

ADVISORY COUNCIL
Michael J . Vargovich

1547 -- 167th Street
Hammond, Ind.

National President
Firs t Catholi c Slovak

Vice-President
Julia Krajcovic

Helen Kocan

1648 W. 18th St., Chicago 8, Ill.

National President
First Catholi c S lovak
Ladies Union

Recording Secretary
Francis

nion

H rusovsky

Fran k

2900 East Boulevard
Cleveland 4, Ohio

Sobus

National Preside nt
Slovak Catholic Sokol

Secretary-Treasu rer

Stephen J . Tka ch

Milan V. Blaz ek

National President
nion
Penna. Slovak

-1922 S. Leclaire Avenue
Chicago 38, Ill.
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Gabriela E. Vavrek

National President
Ladies Pennsylvania
Slovak Union

Paul P. Jamriska

810 Montooth Street
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.

John Rozboril

Joseph Prusa

205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J.

National President
Slovak Catholic Cadet Union

SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affiliated with the Slovak League of America )
JEDNOTA

SLOVENSKA OBRANA

ZENSKA JEDNOTA

Middletown, Pa.

Scranton, Pa.

Cleveland, Ohio

BRATSTVO

SLOVENSKE

NOVINY

ZORNICKA

Cleveland, Ohio

Chicago, Ill.

KATOLICKY SOKOL

SVORNOST

OSADN E H LASY

Passaic, N. J.

Whitaker, Pa.

Chicago, Ill.

Wilkes-Barre, Pa.

SLOVAK V AMERIKE

Whiting, Ind.

�~

N:ddaa:«.w , ......... ~

~

~XL

,.&lt;l♦ &gt;&lt;«V;!o,o.;.

k 6 - "·

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'""""'"'J,,,A

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'-&lt;j ,..,,, ,x,lk). &gt;&gt;.folj ~I&gt;! ~~ 4
--.fl♦lo;·:,:,,.(.&gt;·,, .. ,.11,#lt&lt;P.~&lt;I
&gt;&lt;&gt; _, ~tl\okll. l&gt;llt. ~~- •~ ' fl-"'

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-~.,.~

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!I,

; !!l-'4"f~n n:.Ut.~, ~---~"'~"

!.

Nebudeme sa pred nikym exkuzo·rcti'!

I
j

We heard and read that freedom of the press was guaranteed in the "Czecho-Slovak" democracy of T. G. Masaryk
and Dr. Edward Benes. This front page of Sept. 14, 1938,
is a typical example of the freedom the Slovaks enjoyed.
In the upper left hand corner we see "After confiscation a
new, corrected issue." In 1922 alone Slovak newspapers
suffered 1498 instances of censorship and confiscation.

�</text>
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                    <text>Officers of the Slovak League of America
(Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Obio

•
Frances L. Mizenko

Honorary President

3756 Lee Road
Cleveland 28, Ohio

Dr. Peter P. H letko

1~ 13 W. -18th Street
Chicago 9, Ill inois

Stephen J. Tkach

173 N. Main Street
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.

!'resident
A.

Philip

Hrobak

P. 0. Dox 150, Middletown, Pa.

Andrew J. Hamrock

61 Woodland Avenu e
Campbell, Ohio

Vice-President
Jacob Kocis

ADVISORY COUNCIL
Michael J . Vargovich

1547 -- 167th Street
Hammond, Ind.

National President
Firs t Catholi c Slovak

Vice-President
Julia Krajcovic

Helen Kocan

1648 W. 18th St., Chicago 8, Ill.

National President
First Catholi c S lovak
Ladies Union

Recording Secretary
Francis

nion

H rusovsky

Fran k

2900 East Boulevard
Cleveland 4, Ohio

Sobus

National Preside nt
Slovak Catholic Sokol

Secretary-Treasu rer

Stephen J . Tka ch

Milan V. Blaz ek

National President
nion
Penna. Slovak

-1922 S. Leclaire Avenue
Chicago 38, Ill.
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Gabriela E. Vavrek

National President
Ladies Pennsylvania
Slovak Union

Paul P. Jamriska

810 Montooth Street
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.

John Rozboril

Joseph Prusa

205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J.

National President
Slovak Catholic Cadet Union

SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affiliated with the Slovak League of America )
JEDNOTA

SLOVENSKA OBRANA

ZENSKA JEDNOTA

Middletown, Pa.

Scranton, Pa.

Cleveland, Ohio

BRATSTVO

SLOVENSKE

NOVINY

ZORNICKA

Cleveland, Ohio

Chicago, Ill.

KATOLICKY SOKOL

SVORNOST

OSADN E H LASY

Passaic, N. J.

Whitaker, Pa.

Chicago, Ill.

Wilkes-Barre, Pa.

SLOVAK V AMERIKE

Whiting, Ind.

�~

N:ddaa:«.w , ......... ~

~

~XL

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k 6 - "·

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,.( .. 4,,'"i, ~.......

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\,,-:4.?,1
,i ~&lt;-W.«·:. . .,
lw'♦,-.i:,.j&gt;&gt;"l"''"'-"'i-!ml♦ h•&lt;&lt;f~l'I:♦,
'-&lt;j ,..,,, ,x,lk). &gt;&gt;.folj ~I&gt;! ~~ 4
--.fl♦lo;·:,:,,.(.&gt;·,, .. ,.11,#lt&lt;P.~&lt;I
&gt;&lt;&gt; _, ~tl\okll. l&gt;llt. ~~- •~ ' fl-"'

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-~.,.~

~y

~""'l, ,-N:4•

!I,

; !!l-'4"f~n n:.Ut.~, ~---~"'~"

!.

Nebudeme sa pred nikym exkuzo·rcti'!

I
j

We heard and read that freedom of the press was guaranteed in the "Czecho-Slovak" democracy of T. G. Masaryk
and Dr. Edward Benes. This front page of Sept. 14, 1938,
is a typical example of the freedom the Slovaks enjoyed.
In the upper left hand corner we see "After confiscation a
new, corrected issue." In 1922 alone Slovak newspapers
suffered 1498 instances of censorship and confiscation.

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              <text>Officers of the Slovak League of America&#13;
(Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Obio&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
Frances L. Mizenko&#13;
&#13;
Honorary President&#13;
&#13;
3756 Lee Road&#13;
Cleveland 28, Ohio&#13;
&#13;
Dr. Peter P. H letko&#13;
&#13;
1~ 13 W. -18th Street&#13;
Chicago 9, Ill inois&#13;
&#13;
Stephen J. Tkach&#13;
&#13;
173 N. Main Street&#13;
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
!'resident&#13;
A.&#13;
&#13;
Philip&#13;
&#13;
Hrobak&#13;
&#13;
P. 0. Dox 150, Middletown, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
Andrew J. Hamrock&#13;
&#13;
61 Woodland Avenu e&#13;
Campbell, Ohio&#13;
&#13;
Vice-President&#13;
Jacob Kocis&#13;
&#13;
ADVISORY COUNCIL&#13;
Michael J . Vargovich&#13;
&#13;
1547 -- 167th Street&#13;
Hammond, Ind.&#13;
&#13;
National President&#13;
Firs t Catholi c Slovak&#13;
&#13;
Vice-President&#13;
Julia Krajcovic&#13;
&#13;
Helen Kocan&#13;
&#13;
1648 W. 18th St., Chicago 8, Ill.&#13;
&#13;
National President&#13;
First Catholi c S lovak&#13;
Ladies Union&#13;
&#13;
Recording Secretary&#13;
Francis&#13;
&#13;
nion&#13;
&#13;
H rusovsky&#13;
&#13;
Fran k&#13;
&#13;
2900 East Boulevard&#13;
Cleveland 4, Ohio&#13;
&#13;
Sobus&#13;
&#13;
National Preside nt&#13;
Slovak Catholic Sokol&#13;
&#13;
Secretary-Treasu rer&#13;
&#13;
Stephen J . Tka ch&#13;
&#13;
Milan V. Blaz ek&#13;
&#13;
National President&#13;
nion&#13;
Penna. Slovak&#13;
&#13;
-1922 S. Leclaire Avenue&#13;
Chicago 38, Ill.&#13;
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE&#13;
&#13;
Gabriela E. Vavrek&#13;
&#13;
National President&#13;
Ladies Pennsylvania&#13;
Slovak Union&#13;
&#13;
Paul P. Jamriska&#13;
&#13;
810 Montooth Street&#13;
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
John Rozboril&#13;
&#13;
Joseph Prusa&#13;
&#13;
205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J.&#13;
&#13;
National President&#13;
Slovak Catholic Cadet Union&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS&#13;
( Affiliated with the Slovak League of America )&#13;
JEDNOTA&#13;
&#13;
SLOVENSKA OBRANA&#13;
&#13;
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&#13;
Middletown, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
Scranton, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
Cleveland, Ohio&#13;
&#13;
BRATSTVO&#13;
&#13;
SLOVENSKE&#13;
&#13;
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&#13;
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&#13;
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&#13;
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&#13;
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&#13;
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&#13;
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&#13;
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&#13;
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&#13;
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&#13;
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&#13;
!:S~ s.11&gt;»,,.,. «&lt;+~&#13;
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&#13;
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&#13;
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&#13;
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&#13;
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&#13;
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&#13;
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&#13;
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!.&#13;
&#13;
Nebudeme sa pred nikym exkuzo·rcti'!&#13;
&#13;
I&#13;
j&#13;
&#13;
We heard and read that freedom of the press was guaranteed in the "Czecho-Slovak" democracy of T. G. Masaryk&#13;
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is a typical example of the freedom the Slovaks enjoyed.&#13;
In the upper left hand corner we see "After confiscation a&#13;
new, corrected issue." In 1922 alone Slovak newspapers&#13;
suffered 1498 instances of censorship and confiscation.&#13;
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                    <text>VOL . IV

MARCH 1954

NO. 1 (10)

IN THiJS ISSUE:
SLOVAKIA'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.
PUBLIC LAW IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AFTER 1945
AMERICAN SLOVAKS AND MARCH 14, 1939
HISTORICAL TRUTH AND FALSE LEGENDS
THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF SLOVAKIA' S DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE
MILAN RASTISLAV STEF.ANIK
SLOVAK FOLKLORE: GOLDILOCKS
DR. STE PH EN OSUSKY AND THE SLOVAKS
CASTLES OF S L OVAKIA : LIETAVA
WHITE MOUNTAIN -

HISTORICAL FORGERY

WHO SAID I T? -- PP. 16, 32, 54, 59, 64

. .
Edit ed a nd co mpile d by
PHILIP A . HROBAK

Published by
T H E SLOVA K LE A GUE OF AMERICA

�SLOV AKlA is µublished periodically by the Slovak League of America,
a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOV AKI.A
1s to promote a better understanding

and appreciation of the Slovak nation
and its long struggle for freedom and
independence.
As Americans, members of the
Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
right to freedom and independence.
They are dedicated to the cause of the
American way of life, Slovak freedom
and world peace and are determined to
oppose the plague of Communism and
all other totalitarian political systems.
Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per
year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to :
SLOVAKIA
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.

Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA PRESS

Middletown. Pa.

�SLOV AKIA
Publ ish ed

V OL. IV

q ua rterly

by

th e S lov a k

MARCH 1954

With this issu e SLOVAKIA is
beginning its tounth year. Thus
far it has appeared ten times:
twice the first year, three the
next, four times in 1Jl53, and once
this year. The total number of
issues ap·pears parentheticalliy
on the cover alongside the current number.
DR. HUBERT RIPKA , one of
the leading lights of the so-called
"Counci l of Free Czechoslovakia"
and former member oJ' the Communist-dominated
"Nation al
Front " government o.f Benes and
Gottwald, is all fury, because a
certain Senate sub-Commiittee
had dared to call him to Washington for qu estioning. His lamentations are published by the
" New Yorkske Listy" in Czech
and the " New Yorksky Dennik"
in Slovak, the very sheets which
just some years back featured
edito.rials 1by such Red worthies
as llja Ehrenburg, Zdenek NejedJy, Dezider Benau, Elo Sandor,
Joseph S oltesz, Vlado Clemerutiis,
Karol Schmidke, ·Alex 'Bogomolov, Gustav Husak, Ladislav Novomesky, Rudolph Slansky, Marek CuJen, A. Hoffineister, Karel
Leitner, etc., etc. Ripka certain·
ly -h as the connections - and has
had them in tbe past. He a lone
is responsible for them, and especially for his actions.
JAMES B. CAREY, secretarytreasurer of the Gl'O, took UJP the
caus-e of Mr. Rirpka and wrote a
letiter to Vice-,President Richard
Nixon, a.ocusing Senator Herman
Welker oJ' smearing the Czeclls
organized in the "Council of Free
Czechoslovakia," especially Dr.
Hwbert Ripka, former Minister

L ea gue

of

Americ a
NO. 1 ( 10)

of Fore i,g n Trade in the BenesGottwald regime. What made Mr.
Carey, one of the leading figures
of a great Labor organization,
exipose his neck and embarrass
the CIO for a man like Ripka
about whom he knew littl e or nothing_ It is obvious that Ripka
has connections; s ome one c lose
to Carey and the CLO, pro!balbly a
representative of some international labor outfit, used his infmence.
On e of the " A ces" of the Czech
National Soci alists of 'Dr. Edward Benes, Ripka o,penly admits that he collaborated with
the C-ze-ch Reds of Czecho-Slovakia and the Soviet Union. but
he deeply resen ts bein.g questioned on it by any congressional
committee, or anyone else. Of
course, there are many people
who, for obvious reasons, resent
being questioned today. If any of
our readers, and especially members of our Congress and the
Executive branch of our Government are interested in knowing
just how Mr. Ripka felt about the
Soviet Union. we recommend
that they read Ripka's "EAST
AND WESff" (Lincolns..Prage.r
Ltd., iLondon, 19,44). An avowed
Communist could hardly have
given the USSR a 1better plug!
THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE
FOR A FREE EUROPE, which

sponsors Radio Free Europe and
other ,projects, took Ripka and
other Czech 'Socialists in s01Veral
years ago. ff/he NlOFE Is supposed
to operate on the money contr~buted by Ameri cans during the
annual "Crus.a de for Freedoon"
drives; and it has 1the blessing

�SLOVAKIA

2

of our State Department. Why
did the NCFE use this money
to pay Czech 1Socialis-ts, who
were members o.f the Communistdominatoo Ben-e.s•Gottr.vald gove r n m e n t of Czecho..Slovakia,
when Ameri-cans contriJburtie&lt;l the
money to fight Communism? Another "GzechoslQlVak" hoax? Or
is the N0FE itself a socialist
venture? The people who voluntariJy contrilbute money to the
Crusad,e for Freed,om ha,ve a
right to ask ,that question. It's
time we knew who and what
rnake.s the NOFE tick.
JOHN
HVASTA, ex-GI, who
es,c aped from 1Czecho..Slovakia
some time ago and returned
home recently, is of SLOVAK
parentage. Willen he -escaped
fro m prison he hid out in Slovakia with various Slovak families,
not with Czech or ''Czechoslovak" peo,ple. The Czechs ar,e not
Slovaks, and 1\!he Slovaks are not
Czechs. Let's keep the records
straight.

" GET

McCARTH Y

N OW !"

seems to be th,e new 1,h,eme song
of the DAILY WORKIDR and
even others who call themselves
Aimerican.s but" are dds:satiSifioo
with 1the Senator's methods in
ferretting out \Reds and 1&gt;roSoviets in Government and govel"hmental agencies. But it reailly
is ,nothing new, •exicept that it
mighb 1be a new version oif an old
Red theme: stop any one and
every one wlho dares to investigate Reds and pro,Soviets ! The
fact, ,however, remains that Communist agents in ,g overnment
still 1&gt;resent ·a definite d,anger.
We .s hould spare no effort to unmask and eliminate them without regard for the pel.'sonal and
political stock of any individual.
The welfare and security of

America oversha,dows all parties,
all individuals, all political ofifices. McCarthy is doing the jo'b
he was assigned to do, is doing
it conscientiously a,nd as well as
mi,g ht be exipected under the circumstances, He, tlh-er€&lt;fore, deserves help from all parties and
individuals primarily interested
in the welfare and security of
our c ountry. Let's not lose sight
of the main issue.
CZECHS and so-ea ll ed " Czech oslova ks"
(Slovak renegades

in the pay O'f the Czechs)
celebrated Masaryk Day March
Hh. Slovaks, how ever, did not;
they remember Masaryk as the
man who broke faiith with the
Slo:r,1k nation, -wh-en he repudiated the Pitt~bu11gh Pa;ct of May
30, 1918, W'.hich he drafted and
signed to gain the Slovaks in
AmeTica for the establishment ·
of a oommon Czecho..Slovak
State. T. G. Masaryk !belongs to
11lhe
"progressive" Ozechs, who
call ,th,e,mselves the nation of Masaryk, Hus and Zi~ka - some·
thing the Slovaks never were,
nor shall •be. And they can have
a ll of him.
March 14th marked the fif.
teenth anniversary O'f the procla•
mation of the ind®eindence of
Slovakia. It was on Mareh 14,
1939, that the duly elected re1&gt;·
resentaitives of the S,lovak· nation
unanimously declared :their country an independent R•e11mb1ic.
Slovaks everywhere comm emorate March 14 as one of tne great
milestones in their history. Their
struggle for freooom and ind&amp;
'J}endence is without .parallel.
Through no rfault of their own
they were lbetrayed to the Reds
and the Kremlin in 194'5, but are
determined to !fight to the last
man for the most precious of all
God's gifts: freedom.

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1259">
                    <text>VOL . IV

MARCH 1954

NO. 1 (10)

IN THiJS ISSUE:
SLOVAKIA'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.
PUBLIC LAW IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AFTER 1945
AMERICAN SLOVAKS AND MARCH 14, 1939
HISTORICAL TRUTH AND FALSE LEGENDS
THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF SLOVAKIA' S DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE
MILAN RASTISLAV STEF.ANIK
SLOVAK FOLKLORE: GOLDILOCKS
DR. STE PH EN OSUSKY AND THE SLOVAKS
CASTLES OF S L OVAKIA : LIETAVA
WHITE MOUNTAIN -

HISTORICAL FORGERY

WHO SAID I T? -- PP. 16, 32, 54, 59, 64

. .
Edit ed a nd co mpile d by
PHILIP A . HROBAK

Published by
T H E SLOVA K LE A GUE OF AMERICA

�SLOV AKlA is µublished periodically by the Slovak League of America,
a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOV AKI.A
1s to promote a better understanding

and appreciation of the Slovak nation
and its long struggle for freedom and
independence.
As Americans, members of the
Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
right to freedom and independence.
They are dedicated to the cause of the
American way of life, Slovak freedom
and world peace and are determined to
oppose the plague of Communism and
all other totalitarian political systems.
Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per
year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to :
SLOVAKIA
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.

Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA PRESS

Middletown. Pa.

�SLOV AKIA
Publ ish ed

V OL. IV

q ua rterly

by

th e S lov a k

MARCH 1954

With this issu e SLOVAKIA is
beginning its tounth year. Thus
far it has appeared ten times:
twice the first year, three the
next, four times in 1Jl53, and once
this year. The total number of
issues ap·pears parentheticalliy
on the cover alongside the current number.
DR. HUBERT RIPKA , one of
the leading lights of the so-called
"Counci l of Free Czechoslovakia"
and former member oJ' the Communist-dominated
"Nation al
Front " government o.f Benes and
Gottwald, is all fury, because a
certain Senate sub-Commiittee
had dared to call him to Washington for qu estioning. His lamentations are published by the
" New Yorkske Listy" in Czech
and the " New Yorksky Dennik"
in Slovak, the very sheets which
just some years back featured
edito.rials 1by such Red worthies
as llja Ehrenburg, Zdenek NejedJy, Dezider Benau, Elo Sandor,
Joseph S oltesz, Vlado Clemerutiis,
Karol Schmidke, ·Alex 'Bogomolov, Gustav Husak, Ladislav Novomesky, Rudolph Slansky, Marek CuJen, A. Hoffineister, Karel
Leitner, etc., etc. Ripka certain·
ly -h as the connections - and has
had them in tbe past. He a lone
is responsible for them, and especially for his actions.
JAMES B. CAREY, secretarytreasurer of the Gl'O, took UJP the
caus-e of Mr. Rirpka and wrote a
letiter to Vice-,President Richard
Nixon, a.ocusing Senator Herman
Welker oJ' smearing the Czeclls
organized in the "Council of Free
Czechoslovakia," especially Dr.
Hwbert Ripka, former Minister

L ea gue

of

Americ a
NO. 1 ( 10)

of Fore i,g n Trade in the BenesGottwald regime. What made Mr.
Carey, one of the leading figures
of a great Labor organization,
exipose his neck and embarrass
the CIO for a man like Ripka
about whom he knew littl e or nothing_ It is obvious that Ripka
has connections; s ome one c lose
to Carey and the CLO, pro!balbly a
representative of some international labor outfit, used his infmence.
On e of the " A ces" of the Czech
National Soci alists of 'Dr. Edward Benes, Ripka o,penly admits that he collaborated with
the C-ze-ch Reds of Czecho-Slovakia and the Soviet Union. but
he deeply resen ts bein.g questioned on it by any congressional
committee, or anyone else. Of
course, there are many people
who, for obvious reasons, resent
being questioned today. If any of
our readers, and especially members of our Congress and the
Executive branch of our Government are interested in knowing
just how Mr. Ripka felt about the
Soviet Union. we recommend
that they read Ripka's "EAST
AND WESff" (Lincolns..Prage.r
Ltd., iLondon, 19,44). An avowed
Communist could hardly have
given the USSR a 1better plug!
THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE
FOR A FREE EUROPE, which

sponsors Radio Free Europe and
other ,projects, took Ripka and
other Czech 'Socialists in s01Veral
years ago. ff/he NlOFE Is supposed
to operate on the money contr~buted by Ameri cans during the
annual "Crus.a de for Freedoon"
drives; and it has 1the blessing

�SLOVAKIA

2

of our State Department. Why
did the NCFE use this money
to pay Czech 1Socialis-ts, who
were members o.f the Communistdominatoo Ben-e.s•Gottr.vald gove r n m e n t of Czecho..Slovakia,
when Ameri-cans contriJburtie&lt;l the
money to fight Communism? Another "GzechoslQlVak" hoax? Or
is the N0FE itself a socialist
venture? The people who voluntariJy contrilbute money to the
Crusad,e for Freed,om ha,ve a
right to ask ,that question. It's
time we knew who and what
rnake.s the NOFE tick.
JOHN
HVASTA, ex-GI, who
es,c aped from 1Czecho..Slovakia
some time ago and returned
home recently, is of SLOVAK
parentage. Willen he -escaped
fro m prison he hid out in Slovakia with various Slovak families,
not with Czech or ''Czechoslovak" peo,ple. The Czechs ar,e not
Slovaks, and 1\!he Slovaks are not
Czechs. Let's keep the records
straight.

" GET

McCARTH Y

N OW !"

seems to be th,e new 1,h,eme song
of the DAILY WORKIDR and
even others who call themselves
Aimerican.s but" are dds:satiSifioo
with 1the Senator's methods in
ferretting out \Reds and 1&gt;roSoviets in Government and govel"hmental agencies. But it reailly
is ,nothing new, •exicept that it
mighb 1be a new version oif an old
Red theme: stop any one and
every one wlho dares to investigate Reds and pro,Soviets ! The
fact, ,however, remains that Communist agents in ,g overnment
still 1&gt;resent ·a definite d,anger.
We .s hould spare no effort to unmask and eliminate them without regard for the pel.'sonal and
political stock of any individual.
The welfare and security of

America oversha,dows all parties,
all individuals, all political ofifices. McCarthy is doing the jo'b
he was assigned to do, is doing
it conscientiously a,nd as well as
mi,g ht be exipected under the circumstances, He, tlh-er€&lt;fore, deserves help from all parties and
individuals primarily interested
in the welfare and security of
our c ountry. Let's not lose sight
of the main issue.
CZECHS and so-ea ll ed " Czech oslova ks"
(Slovak renegades

in the pay O'f the Czechs)
celebrated Masaryk Day March
Hh. Slovaks, how ever, did not;
they remember Masaryk as the
man who broke faiith with the
Slo:r,1k nation, -wh-en he repudiated the Pitt~bu11gh Pa;ct of May
30, 1918, W'.hich he drafted and
signed to gain the Slovaks in
AmeTica for the establishment ·
of a oommon Czecho..Slovak
State. T. G. Masaryk !belongs to
11lhe
"progressive" Ozechs, who
call ,th,e,mselves the nation of Masaryk, Hus and Zi~ka - some·
thing the Slovaks never were,
nor shall •be. And they can have
a ll of him.
March 14th marked the fif.
teenth anniversary O'f the procla•
mation of the ind®eindence of
Slovakia. It was on Mareh 14,
1939, that the duly elected re1&gt;·
resentaitives of the S,lovak· nation
unanimously declared :their country an independent R•e11mb1ic.
Slovaks everywhere comm emorate March 14 as one of tne great
milestones in their history. Their
struggle for freooom and ind&amp;
'J}endence is without .parallel.
Through no rfault of their own
they were lbetrayed to the Reds
and the Kremlin in 194'5, but are
determined to !fight to the last
man for the most precious of all
God's gifts: freedom.

�</text>
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                  <text>1954, Vol. 4</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;</text>
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            <elementText elementTextId="1257">
              <text>VOL . IV&#13;
&#13;
MARCH 1954&#13;
&#13;
NO. 1 (10)&#13;
&#13;
IN THiJS ISSUE:&#13;
SLOVAKIA'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.&#13;
PUBLIC LAW IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AFTER 1945&#13;
AMERICAN SLOVAKS AND MARCH 14, 1939&#13;
HISTORICAL TRUTH AND FALSE LEGENDS&#13;
THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF SLOVAKIA' S DECLARATION&#13;
OF INDEPENDENCE&#13;
MILAN RASTISLAV STEF.ANIK&#13;
SLOVAK FOLKLORE: GOLDILOCKS&#13;
DR. STE PH EN OSUSKY AND THE SLOVAKS&#13;
CASTLES OF S L OVAKIA : LIETAVA&#13;
WHITE MOUNTAIN -&#13;
&#13;
HISTORICAL FORGERY&#13;
&#13;
WHO SAID I T? -- PP. 16, 32, 54, 59, 64&#13;
&#13;
. .&#13;
Edit ed a nd co mpile d by&#13;
PHILIP A . HROBAK&#13;
&#13;
Published by&#13;
T H E SLOVA K LE A GUE OF AMERICA&#13;
&#13;
SLOV AKlA is µublished periodically by the Slovak League of America,&#13;
a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent.&#13;
The chief purpose of SLOV AKI.A&#13;
1s to promote a better understanding&#13;
&#13;
and appreciation of the Slovak nation&#13;
and its long struggle for freedom and&#13;
independence.&#13;
As Americans, members of the&#13;
Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all&#13;
nations, has an inherent and God-given&#13;
right to freedom and independence.&#13;
They are dedicated to the cause of the&#13;
American way of life, Slovak freedom&#13;
and world peace and are determined to&#13;
oppose the plague of Communism and&#13;
all other totalitarian political systems.&#13;
Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per&#13;
year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.&#13;
Send subscriptions to :&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
Box 150&#13;
Middletown, Pa.&#13;
&#13;
Printed in the U. S. A.&#13;
JEDNOTA PRESS&#13;
&#13;
Middletown. Pa.&#13;
&#13;
SLOV AKIA&#13;
Publ ish ed&#13;
&#13;
V OL. IV&#13;
&#13;
q ua rterly&#13;
&#13;
by&#13;
&#13;
th e S lov a k&#13;
&#13;
MARCH 1954&#13;
&#13;
With this issu e SLOVAKIA is&#13;
beginning its tounth year. Thus&#13;
far it has appeared ten times:&#13;
twice the first year, three the&#13;
next, four times in 1Jl53, and once&#13;
this year. The total number of&#13;
issues ap·pears parentheticalliy&#13;
on the cover alongside the current number.&#13;
DR. HUBERT RIPKA , one of&#13;
the leading lights of the so-called&#13;
"Counci l of Free Czechoslovakia"&#13;
and former member oJ' the Communist-dominated&#13;
"Nation al&#13;
Front " government o.f Benes and&#13;
Gottwald, is all fury, because a&#13;
certain Senate sub-Commiittee&#13;
had dared to call him to Washington for qu estioning. His lamentations are published by the&#13;
" New Yorkske Listy" in Czech&#13;
and the " New Yorksky Dennik"&#13;
in Slovak, the very sheets which&#13;
just some years back featured&#13;
edito.rials 1by such Red worthies&#13;
as llja Ehrenburg, Zdenek NejedJy, Dezider Benau, Elo Sandor,&#13;
Joseph S oltesz, Vlado Clemerutiis,&#13;
Karol Schmidke, ·Alex 'Bogomolov, Gustav Husak, Ladislav Novomesky, Rudolph Slansky, Marek CuJen, A. Hoffineister, Karel&#13;
Leitner, etc., etc. Ripka certain·&#13;
ly -h as the connections - and has&#13;
had them in tbe past. He a lone&#13;
is responsible for them, and especially for his actions.&#13;
JAMES B. CAREY, secretarytreasurer of the Gl'O, took UJP the&#13;
caus-e of Mr. Rirpka and wrote a&#13;
letiter to Vice-,President Richard&#13;
Nixon, a.ocusing Senator Herman&#13;
Welker oJ' smearing the Czeclls&#13;
organized in the "Council of Free&#13;
Czechoslovakia," especially Dr.&#13;
Hwbert Ripka, former Minister&#13;
&#13;
L ea gue&#13;
&#13;
of&#13;
&#13;
Americ a&#13;
NO. 1 ( 10)&#13;
&#13;
of Fore i,g n Trade in the BenesGottwald regime. What made Mr.&#13;
Carey, one of the leading figures&#13;
of a great Labor organization,&#13;
exipose his neck and embarrass&#13;
the CIO for a man like Ripka&#13;
about whom he knew littl e or nothing_ It is obvious that Ripka&#13;
has connections; s ome one c lose&#13;
to Carey and the CLO, pro!balbly a&#13;
representative of some international labor outfit, used his infmence.&#13;
On e of the " A ces" of the Czech&#13;
National Soci alists of 'Dr. Edward Benes, Ripka o,penly admits that he collaborated with&#13;
the C-ze-ch Reds of Czecho-Slovakia and the Soviet Union. but&#13;
he deeply resen ts bein.g questioned on it by any congressional&#13;
committee, or anyone else. Of&#13;
course, there are many people&#13;
who, for obvious reasons, resent&#13;
being questioned today. If any of&#13;
our readers, and especially members of our Congress and the&#13;
Executive branch of our Government are interested in knowing&#13;
just how Mr. Ripka felt about the&#13;
Soviet Union. we recommend&#13;
that they read Ripka's "EAST&#13;
AND WESff" (Lincolns..Prage.r&#13;
Ltd., iLondon, 19,44). An avowed&#13;
Communist could hardly have&#13;
given the USSR a 1better plug!&#13;
THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE&#13;
FOR A FREE EUROPE, which&#13;
&#13;
sponsors Radio Free Europe and&#13;
other ,projects, took Ripka and&#13;
other Czech 'Socialists in s01Veral&#13;
years ago. ff/he NlOFE Is supposed&#13;
to operate on the money contr~buted by Ameri cans during the&#13;
annual "Crus.a de for Freedoon"&#13;
drives; and it has 1the blessing&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
2&#13;
&#13;
of our State Department. Why&#13;
did the NCFE use this money&#13;
to pay Czech 1Socialis-ts, who&#13;
were members o.f the Communistdominatoo Ben-e.s•Gottr.vald gove r n m e n t of Czecho..Slovakia,&#13;
when Ameri-cans contriJburtie&lt;l the&#13;
money to fight Communism? Another "GzechoslQlVak" hoax? Or&#13;
is the N0FE itself a socialist&#13;
venture? The people who voluntariJy contrilbute money to the&#13;
Crusad,e for Freed,om ha,ve a&#13;
right to ask ,that question. It's&#13;
time we knew who and what&#13;
rnake.s the NOFE tick.&#13;
JOHN&#13;
HVASTA, ex-GI, who&#13;
es,c aped from 1Czecho..Slovakia&#13;
some time ago and returned&#13;
home recently, is of SLOVAK&#13;
parentage. Willen he -escaped&#13;
fro m prison he hid out in Slovakia with various Slovak families,&#13;
not with Czech or ''Czechoslovak" peo,ple. The Czechs ar,e not&#13;
Slovaks, and 1\!he Slovaks are not&#13;
Czechs. Let's keep the records&#13;
straight.&#13;
&#13;
" GET&#13;
&#13;
McCARTH Y&#13;
&#13;
N OW !"&#13;
&#13;
seems to be th,e new 1,h,eme song&#13;
of the DAILY WORKIDR and&#13;
even others who call themselves&#13;
Aimerican.s but" are dds:satiSifioo&#13;
with 1the Senator's methods in&#13;
ferretting out \Reds and 1&gt;roSoviets in Government and govel"hmental agencies. But it reailly&#13;
is ,nothing new, •exicept that it&#13;
mighb 1be a new version oif an old&#13;
Red theme: stop any one and&#13;
every one wlho dares to investigate Reds and pro,Soviets ! The&#13;
fact, ,however, remains that Communist agents in ,g overnment&#13;
still 1&gt;resent ·a definite d,anger.&#13;
We .s hould spare no effort to unmask and eliminate them without regard for the pel.'sonal and&#13;
political stock of any individual.&#13;
The welfare and security of&#13;
&#13;
America oversha,dows all parties,&#13;
all individuals, all political ofifices. McCarthy is doing the jo'b&#13;
he was assigned to do, is doing&#13;
it conscientiously a,nd as well as&#13;
mi,g ht be exipected under the circumstances, He, tlh-er€&lt;fore, deserves help from all parties and&#13;
individuals primarily interested&#13;
in the welfare and security of&#13;
our c ountry. Let's not lose sight&#13;
of the main issue.&#13;
CZECHS and so-ea ll ed " Czech oslova ks"&#13;
(Slovak renegades&#13;
&#13;
in the pay O'f the Czechs)&#13;
celebrated Masaryk Day March&#13;
Hh. Slovaks, how ever, did not;&#13;
they remember Masaryk as the&#13;
man who broke faiith with the&#13;
Slo:r,1k nation, -wh-en he repudiated the Pitt~bu11gh Pa;ct of May&#13;
30, 1918, W'.hich he drafted and&#13;
signed to gain the Slovaks in&#13;
AmeTica for the establishment ·&#13;
of a oommon Czecho..Slovak&#13;
State. T. G. Masaryk !belongs to&#13;
11lhe&#13;
"progressive" Ozechs, who&#13;
call ,th,e,mselves the nation of Masaryk, Hus and Zi~ka - some·&#13;
thing the Slovaks never were,&#13;
nor shall •be. And they can have&#13;
a ll of him.&#13;
March 14th marked the fif.&#13;
teenth anniversary O'f the procla•&#13;
mation of the ind®eindence of&#13;
Slovakia. It was on Mareh 14,&#13;
1939, that the duly elected re1&gt;·&#13;
resentaitives of the S,lovak· nation&#13;
unanimously declared :their country an independent R•e11mb1ic.&#13;
Slovaks everywhere comm emorate March 14 as one of tne great&#13;
milestones in their history. Their&#13;
struggle for freooom and ind&amp;&#13;
'J}endence is without .parallel.&#13;
Through no rfault of their own&#13;
they were lbetrayed to the Reds&#13;
and the Kremlin in 194'5, but are&#13;
determined to !fight to the last&#13;
man for the most precious of all&#13;
God's gifts: freedom.&#13;
&#13;
</text>
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                <text>March 1954</text>
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                    <text>SLOYAKI A

3

DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS ON

SLOVA~'S DECLARATION OF lL"VDEPENDENCE
JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM

A verry interesting Olbserwation was made ,b y E. H.
Carr, weH-lknown EngJiJSh scfuolar,. ,i n regard to CentraJEurorpe8ill m01Vernents for ind€1I)en:dence based on the right
of self-determination, when he said: "The ,s ettlement of the
fust World War can ,by no means be regarded as fin!al and
defmi'tiJVe. National ·s e1f.;determination becrum.e a standing
iniv1tation to secession. The morvemeint wh!icll di'.Smembered
Austria-&lt;HUil'gary and created Yugioslia via and Czecho..,Slovakia was bound to be succeeded by mo.vements for the dismemberment of Yugosilavia and ~eicho-Sioivakia. Given the
premtlses of nation18Jlism, the pro!Cess was naturnil and legitimate, and no end could be set to it" (1).
From the his'tiorical point oif view, Slovakia's declaration
of independence on March 14, 1939, did nothing else but folLow the cOIUI'se indicated lby Profe.ssor Carr. In 1918, when
Cenbral Europe was formed acoordfung to President Wilson's prinrci:ple of self-determination, the SflO;vaJr people at
home and abroa&lt;l agreed to apply the new doctrine in common with the Czech people. In the given circumstances, it
seemed to be the bes t solution for a people, who, after a
brilliant history-&lt;:reating e:poch o,f s ome 80 years in the
ninth century, was fo11ced to fight for its ba.re exiSlten.ce and
s urvi:va.1 du ring the following t en centuries.
In 19·1 8, the trend o,f Europe's evolution towards democracy was quite general. The democratic idea unle,a shed
the moral and biological forces of the Slo;v'cl;k people as
well. Despite a,U the attempts of the Prague regime to bralke
the cultural and economic development of Slnivrukia, the Slova'ks made ~urprisinig progre!?s in all fields of national endeavor and became possessed with a r eal national selfconfidence and &lt;pride. Czech politicians were quite aware
of the chiange, but did not take appropriate mea·s ures to deal
with Slovak demands for more rights and less Ce:ech inter(1) Nati onalis m and After, London, 1945; P. 2~ .

�SLOVAKIA

f~rcnce in Slovakia's internal affairs. On t!J.e contrary,
Prague's regime showed less under.standing for the desires
and jw,t claims of the Slovak people in 1938 than it did
in 1918. 'Dhe anti-Slovak policy of the Czech regime in
Prague w~s bound to lbaC!kfire with a vengeance. The Slowtk people, leadered by a new, se[f~conscious and courageous intelligentsia decided to take advantage of the political
situation in 1938-39 and declared its sepamtion from the
Czechs, establiishing its own state, the Slovak Republic.
In wew oif the fact that au chamges in Central Europe
presupposed at least the tacit consent of Ge-rmany, which
later became invohed in a total war against the democratic
powers of the western world, many American and British
statesmen, diplomats, politicians and publicists adopted a
very hostile attitude to,w aros the Sl,ovak StJate. Without
hearing and weighing the Sfovak side of the story, they
regiaTded SlovaJk politiJ0ians as docile instruments cf (',.er,man
e}G!)ansion and presented the cir,oumstances which led to
. the declaration of SloiVaJkia's indeipeindence in the Hght of the
anti-,Slovalk propaganda hatched by Dr. Edward Benes and
other Czech exiles, W:h'O wished to assure their domination
over Slovakia after the war wias ended.
1

Now, what do diplomatic documents, pub~ished by the
American and Briitilsh Govern!!Ilents, hruve to say rubout the
matter of Slovakia's decltaration of independence?

The Germans and Slovakia
Independent Slorvakia, as one of the solutions of the
Slovruk problem, is mentioned for the first time in the Gernrnn cHp1'omatic documents, which were prepared by the
Chief of the Political Devartment for Chancellor Hitler, on
Octo'ber 7, 1938. Three days earlier, on October 4, 1938,
Wei1z sacker told AtoJico, the ltaAian aJinlba.ssador, that Germany "in regard to Slovakia had not yeit any absolutely
fixed line of policy." In the memorandum for Hi't:ler, there
are mentioned "four possibilities in theory: 1. Independenll:
S1ovakia; 2 . Slovruk autonomy within the framework of the
Ozecho-Slovak State; 3. 3,utonomous Slow.kfa orientated
toward Hungary, which might 'develop from an alliance into

�SLOVAKIA

5

incorporation; 4. autonomous Slovalkia orientated toward
Poiand."
The Genman Miinistry of Fore,ign Afmirs exipressed
itself for t.lie continuance of Sloivalkia within Ozeoho-1Slovakia and held to t!he opini'On that this '"even rpres.ents certain
advantages compared with an independent Sio:va.kia." And
Hitler himself, we learn, tl1'ought it "opportJune to support
the Sillein (Zi.'lina) resolution" (autonomy and orientation
toward Prague). The General Staff o;f the Wehrmacht (German Defense Porwer) , on October 6, 1938, held that "it is in
our (German) miilitJary interest that Slovakia s!hould not be
sepa'r ated from the Ozecho-1Slrovak Union, but should remain with Ozooho-1Sl0iVa:kia under strong German influence''
(Doc . No. 39).
When the Germans wanted to annex Devin, Dr. F&amp;dinand :Dwcansky went to Berlin in Navember 11, 1932,
and appealed to Goering not to fuke Devin. At that time
Goering wa·s of the oipinion that "the SlOVlalk and the Ukrainian questions could be derult with o.nl;y withrin the framework of the Czecho--1Slovruk State."
At the end of 1938, when the fate o;f the Ozecho-Slorvalk
Republic was completely ,i n ,tfue hands o;f Germany, representatives ,o f Hitler's regime were definitely for the continuance of Ozecho-Silorvalkia. F1urlhenmore, o:fifi:cilal documents telrl us that they not only were a,gamst the independence of Slovalkia, but that on Noveimlber 17, 1938, Ri:bbenrtro,p issued an order fmibiddmg to speaJk albout the question
with Slovalks, iand Goeriillg, who mentioned independent
Slovakia as a question Oif the future in his talk with :DurcanSlky, wa:s swpposed to be notified that "at the moment,
political negotiations wii.th tlhe Sl ova.ks were not opportune"
and that the Fuhrer had deicided "tha.t at the present
time, the question of .sepairation of Slovalkila ShouJ.d not be
touched U1pon either in a positive or in a neigaitive sense"
(Doc. Nos. 26, 39, 45, 46).
1

Such, then, was the stand taken by Berlin on the question Oif .Slovalk independence, despite the fact that, 01ccordmg to doooments, the German Charge d' Affaires in Prague,
Heneike, told Berlin as early a,s Octdber 4th that "according

�b

S LOVAKIA

to reports here, the independence movement in Slovauda
is gain.mg ground steadily. F'ar-&lt;rea:ohing autonomy is now
demanded by poHtioal circles in Slova,kfa whiich formerly
were loyal to Pra:gue." And as late as February 12, 1939,
Hitler told Professor Tl.lika that "up to six months ago he
had 'been under the impression that Slovalkia desired reunion
with Hll:Illgary."

Did the Slovaks Want Independence?
Ofifidal Gemnan dooUIIIlen.ts definitely disprove the
clai!rns of propaganda that Germany wanted Slovakia to be
independent before 1939. But they a!so show that the Slovaks considered that poss~bility al-ready in 1938.
When representa:tiJVes of SlQlVaJkia, Dr. Joseph Tiso and
Dr. F. Durlca.nsky, visited Miniister Riibbentroip on Oc'bolber
19, 1938, to defend Slova'kia against the territorial claims
·o f the Maigyars, Dr. Tiso, we read, "el1aJborated at length
his ami of an a:utonomoos SlovaJkia coUaJborabing with an
autonomous Cat1patho-Ulkraine under Prague." Dr. Duircansky, however, aC'cording to the record, "seemed .to be striving rather for the complete independence of Sloivalkia, perhaps in union with Canpatho-.Ukraine." Indepen'dence of
Slova,kia i's also mentioned in the document wlhich recoros
the meeting of Duircansky with Miarshall Goering on Novemer 11, 1938. And 'Dulka told Hitler, February 12, 1939, that
"it was oibivious that for the Slovaks continn.led coexistence
with the Czechs had ibeoome impossiible from a psyicholog,ica:l
as we'll as an economic point of v,iew" (Doc. No. 168).
But the docUIIIlents, in a;ocord with reality, also show
that this opinion was not held by tJhe entire Slovak Government, even tholJlgh the idea of Slova!k independence was
gaining ground among the Sl01Vaks, esipecially among the
younger Slovaks, w'here Czech influence was fast losing its
hold. Even though Dr. Vojtech Tuka was one of the most
learned politicians, yet he was only a priV\ate individual at
that time. True, he was quite popular in SloiVa:kia bec~use
he had served so mue'h time in jail at the hands of the
Czech government; but he had no influence on the decisions
of the autonomous Sloviaik Government which was headed
1

�SLOVAKIA

7

by Dr. Joseph 'l'iso. That is why, even as. late as March 7,
1939, we read in the documents tha;t when "the Central
Government in Prague had told the SiJ.ovak Miniisltern that
they were at HJberty to procla,im the independeillCe of Slovakfa, if they thought this possi:ble and desirable for their
country, t!he SlO!Vall{ Ministers in reply again e,cpressed Slovakia's wish to remain in the joint Rep,u;blic."
According to the dooument orf Marich 9, 1939, "'l'iso and
Sidor are said to be more indmed r~ently to a;greement
than to breaikinig away." A doc,ument dated the same day,
howe'Ver, says that the Prime Minister of the Pra;gue Government, Dr. Chrvalkovsky, informed the German diiplorrnatk:
representati've in Prague, Hencike, that "ta!lks held last
night between Tiso and Sidor, the SlOIVruk Ministers, and the
Central Goivemment in Prague had broken down because
the SlovaJks were not willing to g~ve any assurance tJhat they
would refrain from proclaiming the in.d~ndence of Slovakia - if they would think thi-s necessary - nor were they
prepared to ~ve assurances that propaganda actirvity for
Slo-vak independence in tJhe country would be suppressed.
President Ha.cha, theTeifore, had decided to dismiss Prime
Minister Tiso, Miniister :Durcans'ky and Minister Prulzinsky
from their posts" (Doc. Nos. 184, 186).

Declaration of Slovak Independence
The deposition of Dr. Joseph Tiso and the am.tonomous
Slova:k Government by Prague - whioh was aJ~companied
by a de0laration of Martial Law, the incarcerati'On of over
three hundred Slovak po'1d.ti:ciiains and the mH.it•a ry oocupation of Slovakiia by the Ozeich army - was responsible, according to avail1aible doouiments, for the following events:
1. the preparation of an u[timatum for tJhe Czechs on the
part of Germany; 2. a concentration of the Magyar army on
the eastern boU111daries of Slorvrukia and Sulb-Ca:npathoUkraine; 3. the demand of the SloJVaks to, parrt: with the
Ozechs, W'hiich resounded not only throughout ~ovailria, but
aiJ.so - throug;h Dr. :Dureansky, who had esooiped arrest by
fleeing to Vienna throug,hout the whole of Europe
through the medium of the V~enna radio.

�8

SLOVAKIA

In the documents it says that "the illegal measures
taken by Prague in Slorvrukia against raurtonomy have resulted
in a declaration of the independen ce o;f the SlO!Vruk State by
the Slovak Diet." But this did not come rubout so suddenly
and simpl,y, as some woU!ld haive us .believe. SlOVlalkia undoubtecily was stirred up by the unconstitut ional regulations of Prague, and es:peciall,y by the arrest oif some 300 po.
litical factors. When the latter were taken out o&lt;f Slovrukia ,
the people of Slavia!kia demanded a definlite ~aration from
the Czechs. The situation, however, did change to a certain
extent, when, on the motion of the presidi'U!Ill of the autonomous Slovak Governmen t and the Hlinka Slovruk People's
Party, Prag,ue narrned minister Charles Sidor as Premier of
the SlovaJk Governmen t, and when Sidor asked the people
to preserve peace and order and promised the release of
political priisoner.s. Alocord'ing to the documents the situation
became "somewhat jammed," and tlhe German representat:ives, who visited Sidor in the hope of coming to some
agreement with him, announced amgr-ily in Berlin that "Sidor had ruwrurently been bribed by the Czechs and nothing
couild be done with him" (2).
The same day that Pmgue had named Sidor premier of
the Slovak Governmen t, Berl~n sent messengers to Dr. Tiso
with an inivitation to come to Berlin for a conference . Tiso
wias removed from tJhe premiership unconstitut ionally and
the Germans stil'l regarded him as pre:mier of the Slovruk
Governmen t. After the presidium of the SloV13!k Diet, Hlinka's Party and Sidor's Governmen t concurred in the matter of the wsi.Jt, Dr. Tiso flew from Vienna to Berlin on
March 13, 19·39, acc01mpanie d by Dr. :Du11cansky and another
memiber of 1:Jhe Slovak Diet.
According to the extensive record about the conference
of Dr. Tiso and his ,party with Chancellor Hitler, the Slovak
representatiive:s were received 'b y Hitler at 6 :40 P. M. in the
presence of the 'highest German functionari es. In a lengthy
I

(2 ) Sidor lat.er e~pl ained th at he r efused to promise the Germans
to proclaim th e indepen de nce of Slo vaki a because he did no t fee l
compete.rut to do so inasmuch as this qu estion could b e decided only
by 't he SloYak Assembly.

�SLOVAKIA

9

monologue, Hitler at first sipOike a.bout the o.bstinacy of the
Czechs who, he said, failed to understand the .situation and
were sitilil tryiing to continue the policies of Dr. Edward Be_nes so that "conditions became intoJeralble" and, consequently, he stated that "Germany could no longer tolerate these
conditions.''
Hitler, however, was not satisfied even with Sl01Va1kia.
"Our second disaippointment had been the attitude of Slovakia," he told Tiso and his companions, and added tlhat in
1938 he "had 'been faced with a difficult decision as to whether or not to aHow Slova,kia to be occupied by the Hung8.'rians." Because he had accepted the ethnic principle as
the basis of Murach discussions, Hitler said he thereby had
alienated the friends/hip of Hungary. Hitler contioo.ed that
now he had called Tiso to clarify the situation in as short
a time as possilble. "Gennamy had no interests east of the
Car,pat!hians," Hitler said, and "it was a matter of complete indifference to him what haipipened there." But Hitler did want to know whether "SlO!Vakia did want to lead
an independent existence or not." F1u.rthermore, he said that
·he wanted "nothing from Slovakia," but, at the same time,
"he did not wamt Hungary to reproach him for preserving
something that did not want to be preserved."
Then Hitler told Tiso that the question had to be decided not in da)'is, but m hours. "1f Slovrulda resisted or refused to be separated from Prague, Hitler would leaJVe the
fate of Slovaikia to events for which he was no longer responsible. Then he would look after German interests only,
and they diid not extend east od: tlhe Carpatlhians. Germany
had nothmg to do with Slovalk,i a. She had never belonged
to Germany."
The document further states that Hitler "asked Ribbentrop if he had anything more to add. The Reich Foreign
Mill.lister emphasized that hours not daYIS were concerned
and handed Hitler a report just received from Regent Horthy rubout Hungarian troop movements on the Slova.!k frontier. Hitler read the report, told Tiso of its contents and expressed the hope that Slovakia woudd reach a decision
quickly" (Doc. No. 202).

�10

SLOVAKIA

How did Dr. Joseiph T1so act in the presence of Hitler
during this historiool moment? We might reca:J..l here just
how a few mlOnths beifore the Prime Minister of the British
Empire, Mr. Oharrnlberlain, and the Premier of France, Daladli.er, had acted. Mso the visit of Dr. E. Haicha and Dr.
Chva:JJw:vsky of the Prague Goverillment the day after 'Diso's
visit, March 14, 193·9. According to the record, "Tiso
thanlked the Flihrer for his words. He had long desired to
hear from the 1-i,ps of the Flihrer his attitude toward the
Siovak people and their country, and how he looked upon
problems. The FlihTer would pardon him if, under the impact of the Flihrer's words, he couitl not immeillately m~ke
a definite statement, let alone render a decision. He woukl
r.eti•r e with his colleague and consider the whole question
calmly."
Dr. Tiso and Dr. Durcanslky ructuaUy did retire 8Jlld,
after a short time, announced to Hitler that they had come
to the con'Olusion tJhat the decision really ibeloniged to the
S'1o1VaJk Parliament. BecaUJSe tihe situation was very grave
and tense, they immediately contaJCted Bresident Ha:cha f,r om
BerJin and requested him to cOillVOke the Slo;viak Parliament on Mwch 14th - proceeding, therefore, according to
the Czecho-SlOIVruk Constitutfon. Dr. Ha.cha complied. After
Dr. Tiso !Presented the report albout his Berlin vii.sit, the Slovak Parliament unanimolUSly proclaimed the independence
of ~ova1ki•a - the SlOIV•a k Republic (3).

The Czechs and Slovakia's Indepenaence
The SlOIVaJk Repulbliie was quicld.~ recognized by its
neiighlbors: Hungary, Poland, Genmany. Then by tlhe Balkan
countriies, and, sever-a1 months laiter, by Great Britain,
Fran'Ce and the USSR, and the neutra~ states - Switzerland, the Vatican, Sweden and Spain. Slova!kia was recog(3) This historical session has been faithfully recorded in the
oilfucial Minutes of the meeting, as well as on recording tape, the
original of the latter still exis.ts, and these refute all falsehoods of
Czech propaganda which·· would have the world believe tha,t the Slovak deputies were hesitant a•b out proclaiming the independence of
their countcy and that the text of the proclamation was prepared by
the Germans. The document was published in the Slovak press of
t he Us.A.

�SLOVAKIA

11

ni1zed 1and had diiplomatic conta:cts with altogether 27 different countries.
How did the Czechs act under the ci-~cum stances?
As soon as tJhe cry for independence ~an to be heard
m Slovaikia, the Ozeichs, according to documents, were
without a definite, fil1ffi stand, necessary V'iision and poliHcaI
adroitness. They acted quite senselessilry. A,s we haJVe seen,
on March 7, 1939, the Prague GovernimenJt "had Wld the
Slovak Minri:sters that they were at liberty to prO!C'laim the
independence of Sl~vakia if they thought this pos:si'ble and
desiraible for thcir country." Aind even though the Slo,vaik
Miini,sters at that time had again expressed ":S1'ovaikia's
wish to reima.iin in the joint Republic," Dr. Chwlko:vsky,
the Min~ster of Foreign Atffa,irs visited the diplomatic representatirve of Ge:rman,y in Brague to :ftind out whether Germ8.Illy wanted Slovakia to be i:indeipendent. He learned that
"if Berlin wanted an independent Slovak[a, then Prague
wOU!ld somethow haJVe to reconcile itse1f to this solution. He
was a:Iso man enough to accept this difficult solJU.tion
calmly."
But despite all tJhis, the Prague Government, headed by
President Hacha, not only deposed the autonomoU!S Sloiv;ak
Government ll'Ilconstitutionalliy on March 10, 1939, but also
sent mi1itary units to ooc'll'py Sl&lt;Wiailcia. The Prague Gwernment had hundreds of Slovak political leaders arrested many regardless of parliamentary immun:i.ty~had the anny
occupy puJbl,ic bll!i,l dings and proclaimed Mlartia:I Law in Slovalkia. When this act brolke the Slovak camel's back and
led to the prod1amation of independence, Dr. Ha.cha . toiJ.d
Hitler that "he was not shedding any tears over SloivaJkia"
and that "he had no need to deplore what had haJPpened
in SlO'V'rukia. He had long boon conivinJCed," coillt:Jinrued Ha.cha,
"that the different nation:ai,ities in thi,s bod~ politic (Ozecho.,SJ.oviaJda) could not li,v e together. Despite siimilariity of
speech, they had deiveloiped very differently, and Ozechia
wa:s more alkin to Germiany than to Slovakia, whli.ch inclined
more to the Magyars. They (tihe Oz~chs) had had relatio!IlS
only with the EvangeHcal Slo~s. whi1le tihe CathoJi'cs had
been rejected by the Czechs (there are-aJbout 80 per cent Ca1

�12

SLOVAKIA

tholics in Slovrukia and some 14 per cent Protestants. Ekl.). Those were the reasons why they had never been able
to arrive at a satisfiaotory l1Ilidetstandiing, and he wrus glad
that developments had taken this coUTse. He was not a:lone
in tlris opinion, :f.or certainly 80 ,p er cent o;f the Czech population shared it with him."
Ha.cha added that "he thought that the Fli:hrer's experiences wirth the Sl0V1aks would be none too good,'' and
conicluded his requested conference with Hitler sa:yinig that
hls decision to aic1c ept the Ge11man Proteotoraite "woulJ.d probrubliy be regarded as a blessing fifty years hence" (Doc.
No. 228).
Shortly after the estaJbl~shment of the Sloivak Repulblic,
cliplomatiic relations were estaJblished with the Ozeichs; a
genera:l consulate was opened in Prague. More Czech students coonpleted thcir studies at the Bratislava Unii,veirsity
in firve years of the SlovaJk RepuJb1ic, than Sloviak students
thereto had graduated in Prague. lit seemed, therefore, that
the Czeoh nation-had 'become reconciled to the idea that the
SIJ.ovaks, too, had the inherent right to be free and independent.
But the situation was not accepted by the Czech exiles
headed by Dr. Ediwaro Benes. Retiurning in 1945 behind
the Red Ar.my, Benes and his goverrunenrt-in-eocille, wit:h the
aid of Communti:srts, nort only annexed SlO!ViaJkia to Czech
lands and made it subordinate to Prague again a,g,a.inst the
will of the SIJ.ovaJks, but also had SOl:me of the leaJding SlovaJk politici1a ns, who stood for Slovak independence and
failed to. escrupe, hung and shot.
The new Czech group of exiiles, excepting several honora;ble exceptions, is stHi continuing the ruinous rpolicy of
Dr. Ediwaro Benes and is morally exeouting every Slovruk
who dares to work for the independence oif his nation.
After the sad exiperience of t:he past, these so-.calied Benes
"OzoohoslovaJks" and Ozeichs have learned nothing. Theiy
talk democracy and friendly relations, but flout the basic
principles of true democracy and spread hatred for democratic Slovak,s. The stand of the Czechs, therefore, is by no
means without bizarreness.

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1254">
                    <text>SLOYAKI A

3

DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS ON

SLOVA~'S DECLARATION OF lL"VDEPENDENCE
JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM

A verry interesting Olbserwation was made ,b y E. H.
Carr, weH-lknown EngJiJSh scfuolar,. ,i n regard to CentraJEurorpe8ill m01Vernents for ind€1I)en:dence based on the right
of self-determination, when he said: "The ,s ettlement of the
fust World War can ,by no means be regarded as fin!al and
defmi'tiJVe. National ·s e1f.;determination becrum.e a standing
iniv1tation to secession. The morvemeint wh!icll di'.Smembered
Austria-&lt;HUil'gary and created Yugioslia via and Czecho..,Slovakia was bound to be succeeded by mo.vements for the dismemberment of Yugosilavia and ~eicho-Sioivakia. Given the
premtlses of nation18Jlism, the pro!Cess was naturnil and legitimate, and no end could be set to it" (1).
From the his'tiorical point oif view, Slovakia's declaration
of independence on March 14, 1939, did nothing else but folLow the cOIUI'se indicated lby Profe.ssor Carr. In 1918, when
Cenbral Europe was formed acoordfung to President Wilson's prinrci:ple of self-determination, the SflO;vaJr people at
home and abroa&lt;l agreed to apply the new doctrine in common with the Czech people. In the given circumstances, it
seemed to be the bes t solution for a people, who, after a
brilliant history-&lt;:reating e:poch o,f s ome 80 years in the
ninth century, was fo11ced to fight for its ba.re exiSlten.ce and
s urvi:va.1 du ring the following t en centuries.
In 19·1 8, the trend o,f Europe's evolution towards democracy was quite general. The democratic idea unle,a shed
the moral and biological forces of the Slo;v'cl;k people as
well. Despite a,U the attempts of the Prague regime to bralke
the cultural and economic development of Slnivrukia, the Slova'ks made ~urprisinig progre!?s in all fields of national endeavor and became possessed with a r eal national selfconfidence and &lt;pride. Czech politicians were quite aware
of the chiange, but did not take appropriate mea·s ures to deal
with Slovak demands for more rights and less Ce:ech inter(1) Nati onalis m and After, London, 1945; P. 2~ .

�SLOVAKIA

f~rcnce in Slovakia's internal affairs. On t!J.e contrary,
Prague's regime showed less under.standing for the desires
and jw,t claims of the Slovak people in 1938 than it did
in 1918. 'Dhe anti-Slovak policy of the Czech regime in
Prague w~s bound to lbaC!kfire with a vengeance. The Slowtk people, leadered by a new, se[f~conscious and courageous intelligentsia decided to take advantage of the political
situation in 1938-39 and declared its sepamtion from the
Czechs, establiishing its own state, the Slovak Republic.
In wew oif the fact that au chamges in Central Europe
presupposed at least the tacit consent of Ge-rmany, which
later became invohed in a total war against the democratic
powers of the western world, many American and British
statesmen, diplomats, politicians and publicists adopted a
very hostile attitude to,w aros the Sl,ovak StJate. Without
hearing and weighing the Sfovak side of the story, they
regiaTded SlovaJk politiJ0ians as docile instruments cf (',.er,man
e}G!)ansion and presented the cir,oumstances which led to
. the declaration of SloiVaJkia's indeipeindence in the Hght of the
anti-,Slovalk propaganda hatched by Dr. Edward Benes and
other Czech exiles, W:h'O wished to assure their domination
over Slovakia after the war wias ended.
1

Now, what do diplomatic documents, pub~ished by the
American and Briitilsh Govern!!Ilents, hruve to say rubout the
matter of Slovakia's decltaration of independence?

The Germans and Slovakia
Independent Slorvakia, as one of the solutions of the
Slovruk problem, is mentioned for the first time in the Gernrnn cHp1'omatic documents, which were prepared by the
Chief of the Political Devartment for Chancellor Hitler, on
Octo'ber 7, 1938. Three days earlier, on October 4, 1938,
Wei1z sacker told AtoJico, the ltaAian aJinlba.ssador, that Germany "in regard to Slovakia had not yeit any absolutely
fixed line of policy." In the memorandum for Hi't:ler, there
are mentioned "four possibilities in theory: 1. Independenll:
S1ovakia; 2 . Slovruk autonomy within the framework of the
Ozecho-Slovak State; 3. 3,utonomous Slow.kfa orientated
toward Hungary, which might 'develop from an alliance into

�SLOVAKIA

5

incorporation; 4. autonomous Slovalkia orientated toward
Poiand."
The Genman Miinistry of Fore,ign Afmirs exipressed
itself for t.lie continuance of Sloivalkia within Ozeoho-1Slovakia and held to t!he opini'On that this '"even rpres.ents certain
advantages compared with an independent Sio:va.kia." And
Hitler himself, we learn, tl1'ought it "opportJune to support
the Sillein (Zi.'lina) resolution" (autonomy and orientation
toward Prague). The General Staff o;f the Wehrmacht (German Defense Porwer) , on October 6, 1938, held that "it is in
our (German) miilitJary interest that Slovakia s!hould not be
sepa'r ated from the Ozecho-1Slrovak Union, but should remain with Ozooho-1Sl0iVa:kia under strong German influence''
(Doc . No. 39).
When the Germans wanted to annex Devin, Dr. F&amp;dinand :Dwcansky went to Berlin in Navember 11, 1932,
and appealed to Goering not to fuke Devin. At that time
Goering wa·s of the oipinion that "the SlOVlalk and the Ukrainian questions could be derult with o.nl;y withrin the framework of the Czecho--1Slovruk State."
At the end of 1938, when the fate o;f the Ozecho-Slorvalk
Republic was completely ,i n ,tfue hands o;f Germany, representatives ,o f Hitler's regime were definitely for the continuance of Ozecho-Silorvalkia. F1urlhenmore, o:fifi:cilal documents telrl us that they not only were a,gamst the independence of Slovalkia, but that on Noveimlber 17, 1938, Ri:bbenrtro,p issued an order fmibiddmg to speaJk albout the question
with Slovalks, iand Goeriillg, who mentioned independent
Slovakia as a question Oif the future in his talk with :DurcanSlky, wa:s swpposed to be notified that "at the moment,
political negotiations wii.th tlhe Sl ova.ks were not opportune"
and that the Fuhrer had deicided "tha.t at the present
time, the question of .sepairation of Slovalkila ShouJ.d not be
touched U1pon either in a positive or in a neigaitive sense"
(Doc. Nos. 26, 39, 45, 46).
1

Such, then, was the stand taken by Berlin on the question Oif .Slovalk independence, despite the fact that, 01ccordmg to doooments, the German Charge d' Affaires in Prague,
Heneike, told Berlin as early a,s Octdber 4th that "according

�b

S LOVAKIA

to reports here, the independence movement in Slovauda
is gain.mg ground steadily. F'ar-&lt;rea:ohing autonomy is now
demanded by poHtioal circles in Slova,kfa whiich formerly
were loyal to Pra:gue." And as late as February 12, 1939,
Hitler told Professor Tl.lika that "up to six months ago he
had 'been under the impression that Slovalkia desired reunion
with Hll:Illgary."

Did the Slovaks Want Independence?
Ofifidal Gemnan dooUIIIlen.ts definitely disprove the
clai!rns of propaganda that Germany wanted Slovakia to be
independent before 1939. But they a!so show that the Slovaks considered that poss~bility al-ready in 1938.
When representa:tiJVes of SlQlVaJkia, Dr. Joseph Tiso and
Dr. F. Durlca.nsky, visited Miniister Riibbentroip on Oc'bolber
19, 1938, to defend Slova'kia against the territorial claims
·o f the Maigyars, Dr. Tiso, we read, "el1aJborated at length
his ami of an a:utonomoos SlovaJkia coUaJborabing with an
autonomous Cat1patho-Ulkraine under Prague." Dr. Duircansky, however, aC'cording to the record, "seemed .to be striving rather for the complete independence of Sloivalkia, perhaps in union with Canpatho-.Ukraine." Indepen'dence of
Slova,kia i's also mentioned in the document wlhich recoros
the meeting of Duircansky with Miarshall Goering on Novemer 11, 1938. And 'Dulka told Hitler, February 12, 1939, that
"it was oibivious that for the Slovaks continn.led coexistence
with the Czechs had ibeoome impossiible from a psyicholog,ica:l
as we'll as an economic point of v,iew" (Doc. No. 168).
But the docUIIIlents, in a;ocord with reality, also show
that this opinion was not held by tJhe entire Slovak Government, even tholJlgh the idea of Slova!k independence was
gaining ground among the Sl01Vaks, esipecially among the
younger Slovaks, w'here Czech influence was fast losing its
hold. Even though Dr. Vojtech Tuka was one of the most
learned politicians, yet he was only a priV\ate individual at
that time. True, he was quite popular in SloiVa:kia bec~use
he had served so mue'h time in jail at the hands of the
Czech government; but he had no influence on the decisions
of the autonomous Sloviaik Government which was headed
1

�SLOVAKIA

7

by Dr. Joseph 'l'iso. That is why, even as. late as March 7,
1939, we read in the documents tha;t when "the Central
Government in Prague had told the SiJ.ovak Miniisltern that
they were at HJberty to procla,im the independeillCe of Slovakfa, if they thought this possi:ble and desirable for their
country, t!he SlO!Vall{ Ministers in reply again e,cpressed Slovakia's wish to remain in the joint Rep,u;blic."
According to the dooument orf Marich 9, 1939, "'l'iso and
Sidor are said to be more indmed r~ently to a;greement
than to breaikinig away." A doc,ument dated the same day,
howe'Ver, says that the Prime Minister of the Pra;gue Government, Dr. Chrvalkovsky, informed the German diiplorrnatk:
representati've in Prague, Hencike, that "ta!lks held last
night between Tiso and Sidor, the SlOIVruk Ministers, and the
Central Goivemment in Prague had broken down because
the SlovaJks were not willing to g~ve any assurance tJhat they
would refrain from proclaiming the in.d~ndence of Slovakia - if they would think thi-s necessary - nor were they
prepared to ~ve assurances that propaganda actirvity for
Slo-vak independence in tJhe country would be suppressed.
President Ha.cha, theTeifore, had decided to dismiss Prime
Minister Tiso, Miniister :Durcans'ky and Minister Prulzinsky
from their posts" (Doc. Nos. 184, 186).

Declaration of Slovak Independence
The deposition of Dr. Joseph Tiso and the am.tonomous
Slova:k Government by Prague - whioh was aJ~companied
by a de0laration of Martial Law, the incarcerati'On of over
three hundred Slovak po'1d.ti:ciiains and the mH.it•a ry oocupation of Slovakiia by the Ozeich army - was responsible, according to avail1aible doouiments, for the following events:
1. the preparation of an u[timatum for tJhe Czechs on the
part of Germany; 2. a concentration of the Magyar army on
the eastern boU111daries of Slorvrukia and Sulb-Ca:npathoUkraine; 3. the demand of the SloJVaks to, parrt: with the
Ozechs, W'hiich resounded not only throughout ~ovailria, but
aiJ.so - throug;h Dr. :Dureansky, who had esooiped arrest by
fleeing to Vienna throug,hout the whole of Europe
through the medium of the V~enna radio.

�8

SLOVAKIA

In the documents it says that "the illegal measures
taken by Prague in Slorvrukia against raurtonomy have resulted
in a declaration of the independen ce o;f the SlO!Vruk State by
the Slovak Diet." But this did not come rubout so suddenly
and simpl,y, as some woU!ld haive us .believe. SlOVlalkia undoubtecily was stirred up by the unconstitut ional regulations of Prague, and es:peciall,y by the arrest oif some 300 po.
litical factors. When the latter were taken out o&lt;f Slovrukia ,
the people of Slavia!kia demanded a definlite ~aration from
the Czechs. The situation, however, did change to a certain
extent, when, on the motion of the presidi'U!Ill of the autonomous Slovak Governmen t and the Hlinka Slovruk People's
Party, Prag,ue narrned minister Charles Sidor as Premier of
the SlovaJk Governmen t, and when Sidor asked the people
to preserve peace and order and promised the release of
political priisoner.s. Alocord'ing to the documents the situation
became "somewhat jammed," and tlhe German representat:ives, who visited Sidor in the hope of coming to some
agreement with him, announced amgr-ily in Berlin that "Sidor had ruwrurently been bribed by the Czechs and nothing
couild be done with him" (2).
The same day that Pmgue had named Sidor premier of
the Slovak Governmen t, Berl~n sent messengers to Dr. Tiso
with an inivitation to come to Berlin for a conference . Tiso
wias removed from tJhe premiership unconstitut ionally and
the Germans stil'l regarded him as pre:mier of the Slovruk
Governmen t. After the presidium of the SloV13!k Diet, Hlinka's Party and Sidor's Governmen t concurred in the matter of the wsi.Jt, Dr. Tiso flew from Vienna to Berlin on
March 13, 19·39, acc01mpanie d by Dr. :Du11cansky and another
memiber of 1:Jhe Slovak Diet.
According to the extensive record about the conference
of Dr. Tiso and his ,party with Chancellor Hitler, the Slovak
representatiive:s were received 'b y Hitler at 6 :40 P. M. in the
presence of the 'highest German functionari es. In a lengthy
I

(2 ) Sidor lat.er e~pl ained th at he r efused to promise the Germans
to proclaim th e indepen de nce of Slo vaki a because he did no t fee l
compete.rut to do so inasmuch as this qu estion could b e decided only
by 't he SloYak Assembly.

�SLOVAKIA

9

monologue, Hitler at first sipOike a.bout the o.bstinacy of the
Czechs who, he said, failed to understand the .situation and
were sitilil tryiing to continue the policies of Dr. Edward Be_nes so that "conditions became intoJeralble" and, consequently, he stated that "Germany could no longer tolerate these
conditions.''
Hitler, however, was not satisfied even with Sl01Va1kia.
"Our second disaippointment had been the attitude of Slovakia," he told Tiso and his companions, and added tlhat in
1938 he "had 'been faced with a difficult decision as to whether or not to aHow Slova,kia to be occupied by the Hung8.'rians." Because he had accepted the ethnic principle as
the basis of Murach discussions, Hitler said he thereby had
alienated the friends/hip of Hungary. Hitler contioo.ed that
now he had called Tiso to clarify the situation in as short
a time as possilble. "Gennamy had no interests east of the
Car,pat!hians," Hitler said, and "it was a matter of complete indifference to him what haipipened there." But Hitler did want to know whether "SlO!Vakia did want to lead
an independent existence or not." F1u.rthermore, he said that
·he wanted "nothing from Slovakia," but, at the same time,
"he did not wamt Hungary to reproach him for preserving
something that did not want to be preserved."
Then Hitler told Tiso that the question had to be decided not in da)'is, but m hours. "1f Slovrulda resisted or refused to be separated from Prague, Hitler would leaJVe the
fate of Slovaikia to events for which he was no longer responsible. Then he would look after German interests only,
and they diid not extend east od: tlhe Carpatlhians. Germany
had nothmg to do with Slovalk,i a. She had never belonged
to Germany."
The document further states that Hitler "asked Ribbentrop if he had anything more to add. The Reich Foreign
Mill.lister emphasized that hours not daYIS were concerned
and handed Hitler a report just received from Regent Horthy rubout Hungarian troop movements on the Slova.!k frontier. Hitler read the report, told Tiso of its contents and expressed the hope that Slovakia woudd reach a decision
quickly" (Doc. No. 202).

�10

SLOVAKIA

How did Dr. Joseiph T1so act in the presence of Hitler
during this historiool moment? We might reca:J..l here just
how a few mlOnths beifore the Prime Minister of the British
Empire, Mr. Oharrnlberlain, and the Premier of France, Daladli.er, had acted. Mso the visit of Dr. E. Haicha and Dr.
Chva:JJw:vsky of the Prague Goverillment the day after 'Diso's
visit, March 14, 193·9. According to the record, "Tiso
thanlked the Flihrer for his words. He had long desired to
hear from the 1-i,ps of the Flihrer his attitude toward the
Siovak people and their country, and how he looked upon
problems. The FlihTer would pardon him if, under the impact of the Flihrer's words, he couitl not immeillately m~ke
a definite statement, let alone render a decision. He woukl
r.eti•r e with his colleague and consider the whole question
calmly."
Dr. Tiso and Dr. Durcanslky ructuaUy did retire 8Jlld,
after a short time, announced to Hitler that they had come
to the con'Olusion tJhat the decision really ibeloniged to the
S'1o1VaJk Parliament. BecaUJSe tihe situation was very grave
and tense, they immediately contaJCted Bresident Ha:cha f,r om
BerJin and requested him to cOillVOke the Slo;viak Parliament on Mwch 14th - proceeding, therefore, according to
the Czecho-SlOIVruk Constitutfon. Dr. Ha.cha complied. After
Dr. Tiso !Presented the report albout his Berlin vii.sit, the Slovak Parliament unanimolUSly proclaimed the independence
of ~ova1ki•a - the SlOIV•a k Republic (3).

The Czechs and Slovakia's Indepenaence
The SlOIVaJk Repulbliie was quicld.~ recognized by its
neiighlbors: Hungary, Poland, Genmany. Then by tlhe Balkan
countriies, and, sever-a1 months laiter, by Great Britain,
Fran'Ce and the USSR, and the neutra~ states - Switzerland, the Vatican, Sweden and Spain. Slova!kia was recog(3) This historical session has been faithfully recorded in the
oilfucial Minutes of the meeting, as well as on recording tape, the
original of the latter still exis.ts, and these refute all falsehoods of
Czech propaganda which·· would have the world believe tha,t the Slovak deputies were hesitant a•b out proclaiming the independence of
their countcy and that the text of the proclamation was prepared by
the Germans. The document was published in the Slovak press of
t he Us.A.

�SLOVAKIA

11

ni1zed 1and had diiplomatic conta:cts with altogether 27 different countries.
How did the Czechs act under the ci-~cum stances?
As soon as tJhe cry for independence ~an to be heard
m Slovaikia, the Ozeichs, according to documents, were
without a definite, fil1ffi stand, necessary V'iision and poliHcaI
adroitness. They acted quite senselessilry. A,s we haJVe seen,
on March 7, 1939, the Prague GovernimenJt "had Wld the
Slovak Minri:sters that they were at liberty to prO!C'laim the
independence of Sl~vakia if they thought this pos:si'ble and
desiraible for thcir country." Aind even though the Slo,vaik
Miini,sters at that time had again expressed ":S1'ovaikia's
wish to reima.iin in the joint Republic," Dr. Chwlko:vsky,
the Min~ster of Foreign Atffa,irs visited the diplomatic representatirve of Ge:rman,y in Brague to :ftind out whether Germ8.Illy wanted Slovakia to be i:indeipendent. He learned that
"if Berlin wanted an independent Slovak[a, then Prague
wOU!ld somethow haJVe to reconcile itse1f to this solution. He
was a:Iso man enough to accept this difficult solJU.tion
calmly."
But despite all tJhis, the Prague Government, headed by
President Hacha, not only deposed the autonomoU!S Sloiv;ak
Government ll'Ilconstitutionalliy on March 10, 1939, but also
sent mi1itary units to ooc'll'py Sl&lt;Wiailcia. The Prague Gwernment had hundreds of Slovak political leaders arrested many regardless of parliamentary immun:i.ty~had the anny
occupy puJbl,ic bll!i,l dings and proclaimed Mlartia:I Law in Slovalkia. When this act brolke the Slovak camel's back and
led to the prod1amation of independence, Dr. Ha.cha . toiJ.d
Hitler that "he was not shedding any tears over SloivaJkia"
and that "he had no need to deplore what had haJPpened
in SlO'V'rukia. He had long boon conivinJCed," coillt:Jinrued Ha.cha,
"that the different nation:ai,ities in thi,s bod~ politic (Ozecho.,SJ.oviaJda) could not li,v e together. Despite siimilariity of
speech, they had deiveloiped very differently, and Ozechia
wa:s more alkin to Germiany than to Slovakia, whli.ch inclined
more to the Magyars. They (tihe Oz~chs) had had relatio!IlS
only with the EvangeHcal Slo~s. whi1le tihe CathoJi'cs had
been rejected by the Czechs (there are-aJbout 80 per cent Ca1

�12

SLOVAKIA

tholics in Slovrukia and some 14 per cent Protestants. Ekl.). Those were the reasons why they had never been able
to arrive at a satisfiaotory l1Ilidetstandiing, and he wrus glad
that developments had taken this coUTse. He was not a:lone
in tlris opinion, :f.or certainly 80 ,p er cent o;f the Czech population shared it with him."
Ha.cha added that "he thought that the Fli:hrer's experiences wirth the Sl0V1aks would be none too good,'' and
conicluded his requested conference with Hitler sa:yinig that
hls decision to aic1c ept the Ge11man Proteotoraite "woulJ.d probrubliy be regarded as a blessing fifty years hence" (Doc.
No. 228).
Shortly after the estaJbl~shment of the Sloivak Repulblic,
cliplomatiic relations were estaJblished with the Ozeichs; a
genera:l consulate was opened in Prague. More Czech students coonpleted thcir studies at the Bratislava Unii,veirsity
in firve years of the SlovaJk RepuJb1ic, than Sloviak students
thereto had graduated in Prague. lit seemed, therefore, that
the Czeoh nation-had 'become reconciled to the idea that the
SIJ.ovaks, too, had the inherent right to be free and independent.
But the situation was not accepted by the Czech exiles
headed by Dr. Ediwaro Benes. Retiurning in 1945 behind
the Red Ar.my, Benes and his goverrunenrt-in-eocille, wit:h the
aid of Communti:srts, nort only annexed SlO!ViaJkia to Czech
lands and made it subordinate to Prague again a,g,a.inst the
will of the SIJ.ovaJks, but also had SOl:me of the leaJding SlovaJk politici1a ns, who stood for Slovak independence and
failed to. escrupe, hung and shot.
The new Czech group of exiiles, excepting several honora;ble exceptions, is stHi continuing the ruinous rpolicy of
Dr. Ediwaro Benes and is morally exeouting every Slovruk
who dares to work for the independence oif his nation.
After the sad exiperience of t:he past, these so-.calied Benes
"OzoohoslovaJks" and Ozeichs have learned nothing. Theiy
talk democracy and friendly relations, but flout the basic
principles of true democracy and spread hatred for democratic Slovak,s. The stand of the Czechs, therefore, is by no
means without bizarreness.

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              <text>SLOYAKI A&#13;
&#13;
3&#13;
&#13;
DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS ON&#13;
&#13;
SLOVA~'S DECLARATION OF lL"VDEPENDENCE&#13;
JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM&#13;
&#13;
A verry interesting Olbserwation was made ,b y E. H.&#13;
Carr, weH-lknown EngJiJSh scfuolar,. ,i n regard to CentraJEurorpe8ill m01Vernents for ind€1I)en:dence based on the right&#13;
of self-determination, when he said: "The ,s ettlement of the&#13;
fust World War can ,by no means be regarded as fin!al and&#13;
defmi'tiJVe. National ·s e1f.;determination becrum.e a standing&#13;
iniv1tation to secession. The morvemeint wh!icll di'.Smembered&#13;
Austria-&lt;HUil'gary and created Yugioslia via and Czecho..,Slovakia was bound to be succeeded by mo.vements for the dismemberment of Yugosilavia and ~eicho-Sioivakia. Given the&#13;
premtlses of nation18Jlism, the pro!Cess was naturnil and legitimate, and no end could be set to it" (1).&#13;
From the his'tiorical point oif view, Slovakia's declaration&#13;
of independence on March 14, 1939, did nothing else but folLow the cOIUI'se indicated lby Profe.ssor Carr. In 1918, when&#13;
Cenbral Europe was formed acoordfung to President Wilson's prinrci:ple of self-determination, the SflO;vaJr people at&#13;
home and abroa&lt;l agreed to apply the new doctrine in common with the Czech people. In the given circumstances, it&#13;
seemed to be the bes t solution for a people, who, after a&#13;
brilliant history-&lt;:reating e:poch o,f s ome 80 years in the&#13;
ninth century, was fo11ced to fight for its ba.re exiSlten.ce and&#13;
s urvi:va.1 du ring the following t en centuries.&#13;
In 19·1 8, the trend o,f Europe's evolution towards democracy was quite general. The democratic idea unle,a shed&#13;
the moral and biological forces of the Slo;v'cl;k people as&#13;
well. Despite a,U the attempts of the Prague regime to bralke&#13;
the cultural and economic development of Slnivrukia, the Slova'ks made ~urprisinig progre!?s in all fields of national endeavor and became possessed with a r eal national selfconfidence and &lt;pride. Czech politicians were quite aware&#13;
of the chiange, but did not take appropriate mea·s ures to deal&#13;
with Slovak demands for more rights and less Ce:ech inter(1) Nati onalis m and After, London, 1945; P. 2~ .&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
f~rcnce in Slovakia's internal affairs. On t!J.e contrary,&#13;
Prague's regime showed less under.standing for the desires&#13;
and jw,t claims of the Slovak people in 1938 than it did&#13;
in 1918. 'Dhe anti-Slovak policy of the Czech regime in&#13;
Prague w~s bound to lbaC!kfire with a vengeance. The Slowtk people, leadered by a new, se[f~conscious and courageous intelligentsia decided to take advantage of the political&#13;
situation in 1938-39 and declared its sepamtion from the&#13;
Czechs, establiishing its own state, the Slovak Republic.&#13;
In wew oif the fact that au chamges in Central Europe&#13;
presupposed at least the tacit consent of Ge-rmany, which&#13;
later became invohed in a total war against the democratic&#13;
powers of the western world, many American and British&#13;
statesmen, diplomats, politicians and publicists adopted a&#13;
very hostile attitude to,w aros the Sl,ovak StJate. Without&#13;
hearing and weighing the Sfovak side of the story, they&#13;
regiaTded SlovaJk politiJ0ians as docile instruments cf (',.er,man&#13;
e}G!)ansion and presented the cir,oumstances which led to&#13;
. the declaration of SloiVaJkia's indeipeindence in the Hght of the&#13;
anti-,Slovalk propaganda hatched by Dr. Edward Benes and&#13;
other Czech exiles, W:h'O wished to assure their domination&#13;
over Slovakia after the war wias ended.&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
Now, what do diplomatic documents, pub~ished by the&#13;
American and Briitilsh Govern!!Ilents, hruve to say rubout the&#13;
matter of Slovakia's decltaration of independence?&#13;
&#13;
The Germans and Slovakia&#13;
Independent Slorvakia, as one of the solutions of the&#13;
Slovruk problem, is mentioned for the first time in the Gernrnn cHp1'omatic documents, which were prepared by the&#13;
Chief of the Political Devartment for Chancellor Hitler, on&#13;
Octo'ber 7, 1938. Three days earlier, on October 4, 1938,&#13;
Wei1z sacker told AtoJico, the ltaAian aJinlba.ssador, that Germany "in regard to Slovakia had not yeit any absolutely&#13;
fixed line of policy." In the memorandum for Hi't:ler, there&#13;
are mentioned "four possibilities in theory: 1. Independenll:&#13;
S1ovakia; 2 . Slovruk autonomy within the framework of the&#13;
Ozecho-Slovak State; 3. 3,utonomous Slow.kfa orientated&#13;
toward Hungary, which might 'develop from an alliance into&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
5&#13;
&#13;
incorporation; 4. autonomous Slovalkia orientated toward&#13;
Poiand."&#13;
The Genman Miinistry of Fore,ign Afmirs exipressed&#13;
itself for t.lie continuance of Sloivalkia within Ozeoho-1Slovakia and held to t!he opini'On that this '"even rpres.ents certain&#13;
advantages compared with an independent Sio:va.kia." And&#13;
Hitler himself, we learn, tl1'ought it "opportJune to support&#13;
the Sillein (Zi.'lina) resolution" (autonomy and orientation&#13;
toward Prague). The General Staff o;f the Wehrmacht (German Defense Porwer) , on October 6, 1938, held that "it is in&#13;
our (German) miilitJary interest that Slovakia s!hould not be&#13;
sepa'r ated from the Ozecho-1Slrovak Union, but should remain with Ozooho-1Sl0iVa:kia under strong German influence''&#13;
(Doc . No. 39).&#13;
When the Germans wanted to annex Devin, Dr. F&amp;dinand :Dwcansky went to Berlin in Navember 11, 1932,&#13;
and appealed to Goering not to fuke Devin. At that time&#13;
Goering wa·s of the oipinion that "the SlOVlalk and the Ukrainian questions could be derult with o.nl;y withrin the framework of the Czecho--1Slovruk State."&#13;
At the end of 1938, when the fate o;f the Ozecho-Slorvalk&#13;
Republic was completely ,i n ,tfue hands o;f Germany, representatives ,o f Hitler's regime were definitely for the continuance of Ozecho-Silorvalkia. F1urlhenmore, o:fifi:cilal documents telrl us that they not only were a,gamst the independence of Slovalkia, but that on Noveimlber 17, 1938, Ri:bbenrtro,p issued an order fmibiddmg to speaJk albout the question&#13;
with Slovalks, iand Goeriillg, who mentioned independent&#13;
Slovakia as a question Oif the future in his talk with :DurcanSlky, wa:s swpposed to be notified that "at the moment,&#13;
political negotiations wii.th tlhe Sl ova.ks were not opportune"&#13;
and that the Fuhrer had deicided "tha.t at the present&#13;
time, the question of .sepairation of Slovalkila ShouJ.d not be&#13;
touched U1pon either in a positive or in a neigaitive sense"&#13;
(Doc. Nos. 26, 39, 45, 46).&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
Such, then, was the stand taken by Berlin on the question Oif .Slovalk independence, despite the fact that, 01ccordmg to doooments, the German Charge d' Affaires in Prague,&#13;
Heneike, told Berlin as early a,s Octdber 4th that "according&#13;
&#13;
b&#13;
&#13;
S LOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
to reports here, the independence movement in Slovauda&#13;
is gain.mg ground steadily. F'ar-&lt;rea:ohing autonomy is now&#13;
demanded by poHtioal circles in Slova,kfa whiich formerly&#13;
were loyal to Pra:gue." And as late as February 12, 1939,&#13;
Hitler told Professor Tl.lika that "up to six months ago he&#13;
had 'been under the impression that Slovalkia desired reunion&#13;
with Hll:Illgary."&#13;
&#13;
Did the Slovaks Want Independence?&#13;
Ofifidal Gemnan dooUIIIlen.ts definitely disprove the&#13;
clai!rns of propaganda that Germany wanted Slovakia to be&#13;
independent before 1939. But they a!so show that the Slovaks considered that poss~bility al-ready in 1938.&#13;
When representa:tiJVes of SlQlVaJkia, Dr. Joseph Tiso and&#13;
Dr. F. Durlca.nsky, visited Miniister Riibbentroip on Oc'bolber&#13;
19, 1938, to defend Slova'kia against the territorial claims&#13;
·o f the Maigyars, Dr. Tiso, we read, "el1aJborated at length&#13;
his ami of an a:utonomoos SlovaJkia coUaJborabing with an&#13;
autonomous Cat1patho-Ulkraine under Prague." Dr. Duircansky, however, aC'cording to the record, "seemed .to be striving rather for the complete independence of Sloivalkia, perhaps in union with Canpatho-.Ukraine." Indepen'dence of&#13;
Slova,kia i's also mentioned in the document wlhich recoros&#13;
the meeting of Duircansky with Miarshall Goering on Novemer 11, 1938. And 'Dulka told Hitler, February 12, 1939, that&#13;
"it was oibivious that for the Slovaks continn.led coexistence&#13;
with the Czechs had ibeoome impossiible from a psyicholog,ica:l&#13;
as we'll as an economic point of v,iew" (Doc. No. 168).&#13;
But the docUIIIlents, in a;ocord with reality, also show&#13;
that this opinion was not held by tJhe entire Slovak Government, even tholJlgh the idea of Slova!k independence was&#13;
gaining ground among the Sl01Vaks, esipecially among the&#13;
younger Slovaks, w'here Czech influence was fast losing its&#13;
hold. Even though Dr. Vojtech Tuka was one of the most&#13;
learned politicians, yet he was only a priV\ate individual at&#13;
that time. True, he was quite popular in SloiVa:kia bec~use&#13;
he had served so mue'h time in jail at the hands of the&#13;
Czech government; but he had no influence on the decisions&#13;
of the autonomous Sloviaik Government which was headed&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
7&#13;
&#13;
by Dr. Joseph 'l'iso. That is why, even as. late as March 7,&#13;
1939, we read in the documents tha;t when "the Central&#13;
Government in Prague had told the SiJ.ovak Miniisltern that&#13;
they were at HJberty to procla,im the independeillCe of Slovakfa, if they thought this possi:ble and desirable for their&#13;
country, t!he SlO!Vall{ Ministers in reply again e,cpressed Slovakia's wish to remain in the joint Rep,u;blic."&#13;
According to the dooument orf Marich 9, 1939, "'l'iso and&#13;
Sidor are said to be more indmed r~ently to a;greement&#13;
than to breaikinig away." A doc,ument dated the same day,&#13;
howe'Ver, says that the Prime Minister of the Pra;gue Government, Dr. Chrvalkovsky, informed the German diiplorrnatk:&#13;
representati've in Prague, Hencike, that "ta!lks held last&#13;
night between Tiso and Sidor, the SlOIVruk Ministers, and the&#13;
Central Goivemment in Prague had broken down because&#13;
the SlovaJks were not willing to g~ve any assurance tJhat they&#13;
would refrain from proclaiming the in.d~ndence of Slovakia - if they would think thi-s necessary - nor were they&#13;
prepared to ~ve assurances that propaganda actirvity for&#13;
Slo-vak independence in tJhe country would be suppressed.&#13;
President Ha.cha, theTeifore, had decided to dismiss Prime&#13;
Minister Tiso, Miniister :Durcans'ky and Minister Prulzinsky&#13;
from their posts" (Doc. Nos. 184, 186).&#13;
&#13;
Declaration of Slovak Independence&#13;
The deposition of Dr. Joseph Tiso and the am.tonomous&#13;
Slova:k Government by Prague - whioh was aJ~companied&#13;
by a de0laration of Martial Law, the incarcerati'On of over&#13;
three hundred Slovak po'1d.ti:ciiains and the mH.it•a ry oocupation of Slovakiia by the Ozeich army - was responsible, according to avail1aible doouiments, for the following events:&#13;
1. the preparation of an u[timatum for tJhe Czechs on the&#13;
part of Germany; 2. a concentration of the Magyar army on&#13;
the eastern boU111daries of Slorvrukia and Sulb-Ca:npathoUkraine; 3. the demand of the SloJVaks to, parrt: with the&#13;
Ozechs, W'hiich resounded not only throughout ~ovailria, but&#13;
aiJ.so - throug;h Dr. :Dureansky, who had esooiped arrest by&#13;
fleeing to Vienna throug,hout the whole of Europe&#13;
through the medium of the V~enna radio.&#13;
&#13;
8&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
In the documents it says that "the illegal measures&#13;
taken by Prague in Slorvrukia against raurtonomy have resulted&#13;
in a declaration of the independen ce o;f the SlO!Vruk State by&#13;
the Slovak Diet." But this did not come rubout so suddenly&#13;
and simpl,y, as some woU!ld haive us .believe. SlOVlalkia undoubtecily was stirred up by the unconstitut ional regulations of Prague, and es:peciall,y by the arrest oif some 300 po.&#13;
litical factors. When the latter were taken out o&lt;f Slovrukia ,&#13;
the people of Slavia!kia demanded a definlite ~aration from&#13;
the Czechs. The situation, however, did change to a certain&#13;
extent, when, on the motion of the presidi'U!Ill of the autonomous Slovak Governmen t and the Hlinka Slovruk People's&#13;
Party, Prag,ue narrned minister Charles Sidor as Premier of&#13;
the SlovaJk Governmen t, and when Sidor asked the people&#13;
to preserve peace and order and promised the release of&#13;
political priisoner.s. Alocord'ing to the documents the situation&#13;
became "somewhat jammed," and tlhe German representat:ives, who visited Sidor in the hope of coming to some&#13;
agreement with him, announced amgr-ily in Berlin that "Sidor had ruwrurently been bribed by the Czechs and nothing&#13;
couild be done with him" (2).&#13;
The same day that Pmgue had named Sidor premier of&#13;
the Slovak Governmen t, Berl~n sent messengers to Dr. Tiso&#13;
with an inivitation to come to Berlin for a conference . Tiso&#13;
wias removed from tJhe premiership unconstitut ionally and&#13;
the Germans stil'l regarded him as pre:mier of the Slovruk&#13;
Governmen t. After the presidium of the SloV13!k Diet, Hlinka's Party and Sidor's Governmen t concurred in the matter of the wsi.Jt, Dr. Tiso flew from Vienna to Berlin on&#13;
March 13, 19·39, acc01mpanie d by Dr. :Du11cansky and another&#13;
memiber of 1:Jhe Slovak Diet.&#13;
According to the extensive record about the conference&#13;
of Dr. Tiso and his ,party with Chancellor Hitler, the Slovak&#13;
representatiive:s were received 'b y Hitler at 6 :40 P. M. in the&#13;
presence of the 'highest German functionari es. In a lengthy&#13;
I&#13;
&#13;
(2 ) Sidor lat.er e~pl ained th at he r efused to promise the Germans&#13;
to proclaim th e indepen de nce of Slo vaki a because he did no t fee l&#13;
compete.rut to do so inasmuch as this qu estion could b e decided only&#13;
by 't he SloYak Assembly.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
9&#13;
&#13;
monologue, Hitler at first sipOike a.bout the o.bstinacy of the&#13;
Czechs who, he said, failed to understand the .situation and&#13;
were sitilil tryiing to continue the policies of Dr. Edward Be_nes so that "conditions became intoJeralble" and, consequently, he stated that "Germany could no longer tolerate these&#13;
conditions.''&#13;
Hitler, however, was not satisfied even with Sl01Va1kia.&#13;
"Our second disaippointment had been the attitude of Slovakia," he told Tiso and his companions, and added tlhat in&#13;
1938 he "had 'been faced with a difficult decision as to whether or not to aHow Slova,kia to be occupied by the Hung8.'rians." Because he had accepted the ethnic principle as&#13;
the basis of Murach discussions, Hitler said he thereby had&#13;
alienated the friends/hip of Hungary. Hitler contioo.ed that&#13;
now he had called Tiso to clarify the situation in as short&#13;
a time as possilble. "Gennamy had no interests east of the&#13;
Car,pat!hians," Hitler said, and "it was a matter of complete indifference to him what haipipened there." But Hitler did want to know whether "SlO!Vakia did want to lead&#13;
an independent existence or not." F1u.rthermore, he said that&#13;
·he wanted "nothing from Slovakia," but, at the same time,&#13;
"he did not wamt Hungary to reproach him for preserving&#13;
something that did not want to be preserved."&#13;
Then Hitler told Tiso that the question had to be decided not in da)'is, but m hours. "1f Slovrulda resisted or refused to be separated from Prague, Hitler would leaJVe the&#13;
fate of Slovaikia to events for which he was no longer responsible. Then he would look after German interests only,&#13;
and they diid not extend east od: tlhe Carpatlhians. Germany&#13;
had nothmg to do with Slovalk,i a. She had never belonged&#13;
to Germany."&#13;
The document further states that Hitler "asked Ribbentrop if he had anything more to add. The Reich Foreign&#13;
Mill.lister emphasized that hours not daYIS were concerned&#13;
and handed Hitler a report just received from Regent Horthy rubout Hungarian troop movements on the Slova.!k frontier. Hitler read the report, told Tiso of its contents and expressed the hope that Slovakia woudd reach a decision&#13;
quickly" (Doc. No. 202).&#13;
&#13;
10&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
How did Dr. Joseiph T1so act in the presence of Hitler&#13;
during this historiool moment? We might reca:J..l here just&#13;
how a few mlOnths beifore the Prime Minister of the British&#13;
Empire, Mr. Oharrnlberlain, and the Premier of France, Daladli.er, had acted. Mso the visit of Dr. E. Haicha and Dr.&#13;
Chva:JJw:vsky of the Prague Goverillment the day after 'Diso's&#13;
visit, March 14, 193·9. According to the record, "Tiso&#13;
thanlked the Flihrer for his words. He had long desired to&#13;
hear from the 1-i,ps of the Flihrer his attitude toward the&#13;
Siovak people and their country, and how he looked upon&#13;
problems. The FlihTer would pardon him if, under the impact of the Flihrer's words, he couitl not immeillately m~ke&#13;
a definite statement, let alone render a decision. He woukl&#13;
r.eti•r e with his colleague and consider the whole question&#13;
calmly."&#13;
Dr. Tiso and Dr. Durcanslky ructuaUy did retire 8Jlld,&#13;
after a short time, announced to Hitler that they had come&#13;
to the con'Olusion tJhat the decision really ibeloniged to the&#13;
S'1o1VaJk Parliament. BecaUJSe tihe situation was very grave&#13;
and tense, they immediately contaJCted Bresident Ha:cha f,r om&#13;
BerJin and requested him to cOillVOke the Slo;viak Parliament on Mwch 14th - proceeding, therefore, according to&#13;
the Czecho-SlOIVruk Constitutfon. Dr. Ha.cha complied. After&#13;
Dr. Tiso !Presented the report albout his Berlin vii.sit, the Slovak Parliament unanimolUSly proclaimed the independence&#13;
of ~ova1ki•a - the SlOIV•a k Republic (3).&#13;
&#13;
The Czechs and Slovakia's Indepenaence&#13;
The SlOIVaJk Repulbliie was quicld.~ recognized by its&#13;
neiighlbors: Hungary, Poland, Genmany. Then by tlhe Balkan&#13;
countriies, and, sever-a1 months laiter, by Great Britain,&#13;
Fran'Ce and the USSR, and the neutra~ states - Switzerland, the Vatican, Sweden and Spain. Slova!kia was recog(3) This historical session has been faithfully recorded in the&#13;
oilfucial Minutes of the meeting, as well as on recording tape, the&#13;
original of the latter still exis.ts, and these refute all falsehoods of&#13;
Czech propaganda which·· would have the world believe tha,t the Slovak deputies were hesitant a•b out proclaiming the independence of&#13;
their countcy and that the text of the proclamation was prepared by&#13;
the Germans. The document was published in the Slovak press of&#13;
t he Us.A.&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
11&#13;
&#13;
ni1zed 1and had diiplomatic conta:cts with altogether 27 different countries.&#13;
How did the Czechs act under the ci-~cum stances?&#13;
As soon as tJhe cry for independence ~an to be heard&#13;
m Slovaikia, the Ozeichs, according to documents, were&#13;
without a definite, fil1ffi stand, necessary V'iision and poliHcaI&#13;
adroitness. They acted quite senselessilry. A,s we haJVe seen,&#13;
on March 7, 1939, the Prague GovernimenJt "had Wld the&#13;
Slovak Minri:sters that they were at liberty to prO!C'laim the&#13;
independence of Sl~vakia if they thought this pos:si'ble and&#13;
desiraible for thcir country." Aind even though the Slo,vaik&#13;
Miini,sters at that time had again expressed ":S1'ovaikia's&#13;
wish to reima.iin in the joint Republic," Dr. Chwlko:vsky,&#13;
the Min~ster of Foreign Atffa,irs visited the diplomatic representatirve of Ge:rman,y in Brague to :ftind out whether Germ8.Illy wanted Slovakia to be i:indeipendent. He learned that&#13;
"if Berlin wanted an independent Slovak[a, then Prague&#13;
wOU!ld somethow haJVe to reconcile itse1f to this solution. He&#13;
was a:Iso man enough to accept this difficult solJU.tion&#13;
calmly."&#13;
But despite all tJhis, the Prague Government, headed by&#13;
President Hacha, not only deposed the autonomoU!S Sloiv;ak&#13;
Government ll'Ilconstitutionalliy on March 10, 1939, but also&#13;
sent mi1itary units to ooc'll'py Sl&lt;Wiailcia. The Prague Gwernment had hundreds of Slovak political leaders arrested many regardless of parliamentary immun:i.ty~had the anny&#13;
occupy puJbl,ic bll!i,l dings and proclaimed Mlartia:I Law in Slovalkia. When this act brolke the Slovak camel's back and&#13;
led to the prod1amation of independence, Dr. Ha.cha . toiJ.d&#13;
Hitler that "he was not shedding any tears over SloivaJkia"&#13;
and that "he had no need to deplore what had haJPpened&#13;
in SlO'V'rukia. He had long boon conivinJCed," coillt:Jinrued Ha.cha,&#13;
"that the different nation:ai,ities in thi,s bod~ politic (Ozecho.,SJ.oviaJda) could not li,v e together. Despite siimilariity of&#13;
speech, they had deiveloiped very differently, and Ozechia&#13;
wa:s more alkin to Germiany than to Slovakia, whli.ch inclined&#13;
more to the Magyars. They (tihe Oz~chs) had had relatio!IlS&#13;
only with the EvangeHcal Slo~s. whi1le tihe CathoJi'cs had&#13;
been rejected by the Czechs (there are-aJbout 80 per cent Ca1&#13;
&#13;
12&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
tholics in Slovrukia and some 14 per cent Protestants. Ekl.). Those were the reasons why they had never been able&#13;
to arrive at a satisfiaotory l1Ilidetstandiing, and he wrus glad&#13;
that developments had taken this coUTse. He was not a:lone&#13;
in tlris opinion, :f.or certainly 80 ,p er cent o;f the Czech population shared it with him."&#13;
Ha.cha added that "he thought that the Fli:hrer's experiences wirth the Sl0V1aks would be none too good,'' and&#13;
conicluded his requested conference with Hitler sa:yinig that&#13;
hls decision to aic1c ept the Ge11man Proteotoraite "woulJ.d probrubliy be regarded as a blessing fifty years hence" (Doc.&#13;
No. 228).&#13;
Shortly after the estaJbl~shment of the Sloivak Repulblic,&#13;
cliplomatiic relations were estaJblished with the Ozeichs; a&#13;
genera:l consulate was opened in Prague. More Czech students coonpleted thcir studies at the Bratislava Unii,veirsity&#13;
in firve years of the SlovaJk RepuJb1ic, than Sloviak students&#13;
thereto had graduated in Prague. lit seemed, therefore, that&#13;
the Czeoh nation-had 'become reconciled to the idea that the&#13;
SIJ.ovaks, too, had the inherent right to be free and independent.&#13;
But the situation was not accepted by the Czech exiles&#13;
headed by Dr. Ediwaro Benes. Retiurning in 1945 behind&#13;
the Red Ar.my, Benes and his goverrunenrt-in-eocille, wit:h the&#13;
aid of Communti:srts, nort only annexed SlO!ViaJkia to Czech&#13;
lands and made it subordinate to Prague again a,g,a.inst the&#13;
will of the SIJ.ovaJks, but also had SOl:me of the leaJding SlovaJk politici1a ns, who stood for Slovak independence and&#13;
failed to. escrupe, hung and shot.&#13;
The new Czech group of exiiles, excepting several honora;ble exceptions, is stHi continuing the ruinous rpolicy of&#13;
Dr. Ediwaro Benes and is morally exeouting every Slovruk&#13;
who dares to work for the independence oif his nation.&#13;
After the sad exiperience of t:he past, these so-.calied Benes&#13;
"OzoohoslovaJks" and Ozeichs have learned nothing. Theiy&#13;
talk democracy and friendly relations, but flout the basic&#13;
principles of true democracy and spread hatred for democratic Slovak,s. The stand of the Czechs, therefore, is by no&#13;
means without bizarreness.&#13;
&#13;
</text>
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Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10), March 1954&#13;
pp. 3-12</text>
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

13

PUBLIC LAW IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AFrER 1945
Joseph A. Mikus
(A rev ised text of the lecture d elivered July 29, 1952, a t the In.ternational Congress of Juri sts in W est Berlin, Germany.)
"Between law and discipline the Judge must, without
any hesitation, choose tlhe second, since law is but a
form of the Party discipline." Andrey Wishinsky_

Prelitninary Observations
The recent evolution in PU!blic Law of the oountries
behind the Iron Ourta~n is insipired by ideas and directives
.o f theorebcians of the Socia1list State. Lenin, who in his
book "State and Revolution" laid down the fundamental
ideas of the Communist State, does not believe in the fun~tion of integration anid coordination of interests the State
nomnally exercises in the framework of a certain community. In contradistinction to tlhe teaching O!f the democratic
state, Communism does concei!Ve the State as a power organized by the "elite" which brings aibout the ends fixed for
the society in advance by hii.storical materialism. The idea of
the Communist Stale corresponds, therefore, to that of a
power imposed on the majority of the population, which is
little or not at all oonsd01Us of its own 001rnmon interests,
hy a highly dlisciplined minority which knowns iJ&gt;erlfectly all
the steps to be taJken toward those pre-determined ends.
Conquest of ,p ower is, therefore, the main aim of Communism and successful attainment of it the unique criterion of
its legitimity.
t
If the primary ta-sk of Communism is to seize power,
its further arim is to maintain it by all means, even at the
price of a complete s111ppression of all individual liiberties.
Therefore, the separation of the Sibate powers, as it is
known by tlhe Constituti•o ns orf some classical Democracies,
such_ as the United States, France, and Great Britain, has no
place in a totalitarian State.
In the perspecUve orf these general ideas, estalblishing a
clear distinction between a Communist and a Democratic
State, I shall try to explain how Communism seized power
in Czecho-Slovakia and how - through the instrumentality

�14

~LOVAKIA

of the Oonstitution of May 9, 1948, and other successive
laws - it could consolidate its victory. I shall show just
hoiw t!he Czecho-lSI-ovak State, after 1950, in practical policy
went beyond the Constitution itself, repudiating its "natiooail" character to become simply one of the numerous
sociaHst repuibhcs of the Soviet orfuit.
I. The policy of accomplished facts of the Czecho-Slovak
Government before the ConstitutJion of 1948.

The first Ozecho.,Slovak Constitution of February 29,
1920, was voted by a "Parliament" which had been nominated by a sel!f-a.ppointed Go1Vernment. That was a "Oonstitu~
tion" granting ind!i;viidual rights to the -citizens, .b ut ignoring
entirely the fundamental proiblem of the Republic: its heterogeneo1Us ethnic charncter. It requested the same lo,y alty
from all citizens, hut all those who were of tlhe non-Ozech
nationality were regarded, by the official poliicy, as. citizens
of second: rank only. Deprived. of the sipontameous consent
of alb.out half its population, this heterogeneous State could
exist only by its system of international alliances and a
police regime whreh came into being by the Internal Security Act of 1923, whi1cih pradi'Cally suspended the validity
of all individual rights.

It was only after Munich, in 1938, when her system had
coUrupsed, that Ozeciho-Slorvrukia changed her unrealistic Constitution. From a strictly unifarian State, she finally became what she should have been in 1918: a tri-ipartite federation c01InJposed of Czechia, Slorvakia and the Carpathian
Ukraine (Ruthenia). Six months after the "death bloiw" CID.
Benes) recei1Ved at Munich, Czecho-SlorvaJkia disintegrated
into her constituents parts. Thus Ozechia became a German
Protecto,r ate and SlovaJkia a free State.
During World War II, Dr. Ed.ward Benes ·managed
to convince the Allies of the necessity of reestaJblisthing the
status quo ante Munich and recreating on~e mo.re the Czecho-S:lovaJk State. Because of the stubborn and deternnined
opposition of the Siovaks, he pla!ced the destiny of the future Ozecho.- Slovakia in the hands of Sta1in. He did so by
concluding, as a sel!f-wppointed Presideillt of a non-existing

�SLOVAKIA

15

State, on December 12, 1943, in Moscow, a Treaty of Amity
and OollaJboration with the Soviet Union. Decei;ved as. he
was by his alHance with France before Munich, Benes
thought that the Czech peqple, surrounded ,by Genmany on
its west f.rontiier, could be saved from another German embrace onJ..y by rel,yi:ng closely on the So,v iet Union. MoscOIW
and the Czech Corm1munist refugees in Soviet Rllissia congratulated themselves on this aiccomplishiment of Benes and
aiwaited the moment when they wou:ld reap the political harvest of this immoral b.etrayaiJ. oif the prospective CzechoSlO!Vaik State to Moscow. Thus, the agreements Benes concluded in MoSico,w in DecemibeT, 194'3, and in February, 1945,
assured to the Ozech Communists the -key ,positions in the
government of Ozecho-Slovakia and faciiitated considerarbly
their struggle for aibso[ute po,wer..
Edward Benes cooifesses in his "Memoirs" (Pra:gue, 1947,
pp. 409-419) that already in 1943 he admitted the principle
of the so.called "National Front Government," an anti001I1:Stitutional organism standing above both the Parliament and Government and controHing a:11 the life in the
State. According to this principle, the Communists had a
veto power aJg8!inst any project of law which would haive
been contrary to their politics. "Not'hinlg without the Communists, nothing against them and nothing aibo:ve them!"
- that wa•s the !political ;pledge given by Edward Benes
to Gottwald in Moscow, ·already in 1943.
This principle had been put into practice from the
beginning of the reconstructed Czecho-Slol\7lakia in May
1945. The Communist Party salbotaged all legislatirve ,p rojects or executive measures of other parties which could
have coooteracted their political aims.
At the sam.e tirm.e, a!ter haMing recognized and installed
various cle~g,ymen who had been e~ommunicated ,by Rome,
the Pra;gue Government is pushing the Catholic population
into schism. The final .g oal of this policy is the extension.
of the Orthodox religion in Czecho~Slovakia and subordinating it to the supreme spiritual direction of the Moscow
Red MetrQPOlitan.
As to the "autonomous position of SlovaJkia, granted
by the Kosice agreement on Apr~l 5, 1945,.it recei.Jved a hard

�16

SLO VAKIA

b'lo:w by the new organization oif the State into, regions
(~upy), which are under the direct suiperivision of the Ministry of Interior in Prague. Slovruk territorial autonomy was
ipracticaHy aJbolished completely in the Spring of 1950,
whoo Pragrue created the new Miruistry of State Security, a
higMy centraliized ruge.ncy with unlimited power oiver Slovrukia. Since that time, no,t orilly anti-Com!murust forces of
Sloivakia, but eiven the leading Slovak Communist memibeirs of
Parliament or Government, have become victims orf purges
of this Ministry: Mr. CJementis, former Minister of Foreign
Affairs; Mr. Husalk, for.mer Chieif of the regional Government of SlovaJkia; Mr. Schmidtke, former · Chaimran of the
S'lov,a,k regional Diet of Bratislaiva ; Mr. Noiv·o mesky, former Minister of Ed'lllcation in the Slovak regionaJl Government,. and many other leading members of the Slovak Communist Party. Most reicently the Prrugue Government apipointed a Czech Commuruist, Anton Nedved, as Chief of the
regional Government of SlovaJkia.
The Praig;ue Government cannot countenance · a really
j'U!ridi:cal State system whicrh would be able to, limit its
omnipotence. Law is being pushed aside more and more by
aroitrary decisions. The Constitutions of the "People's Democracies" harve something in common with the windowdressing in the countries .behind the Iron Curtain. They
present a good-loolking arrangement of different articles
attractiive to the eyes of the pulblffic, but t!hose articles are
not for sale . .

•

•

•

WHO SAID IT?

"We aspired to achieve collaboration with the East
since 1922.. .. We never changed our ideas or our plans, we
never participated in any political combination directed
· against the Soviet Union and we always worked against any
attempts to isolate Russia in Europe. . . . In 1935 our
treaty of alliance was signed .. : . Our fight for collaboration
with the east was systematic and it was the natural expression of our Slav sentiment." - (Dr Edward Benes, UV AHY
0 SLOVANSTVi (Thoughts on Slavism), pg. 8; LincolnsPrager Publishers, London, 1945) .

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1247">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA

13

PUBLIC LAW IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AFrER 1945
Joseph A. Mikus
(A rev ised text of the lecture d elivered July 29, 1952, a t the In.ternational Congress of Juri sts in W est Berlin, Germany.)
"Between law and discipline the Judge must, without
any hesitation, choose tlhe second, since law is but a
form of the Party discipline." Andrey Wishinsky_

Prelitninary Observations
The recent evolution in PU!blic Law of the oountries
behind the Iron Ourta~n is insipired by ideas and directives
.o f theorebcians of the Socia1list State. Lenin, who in his
book "State and Revolution" laid down the fundamental
ideas of the Communist State, does not believe in the fun~tion of integration anid coordination of interests the State
nomnally exercises in the framework of a certain community. In contradistinction to tlhe teaching O!f the democratic
state, Communism does concei!Ve the State as a power organized by the "elite" which brings aibout the ends fixed for
the society in advance by hii.storical materialism. The idea of
the Communist Stale corresponds, therefore, to that of a
power imposed on the majority of the population, which is
little or not at all oonsd01Us of its own 001rnmon interests,
hy a highly dlisciplined minority which knowns iJ&gt;erlfectly all
the steps to be taJken toward those pre-determined ends.
Conquest of ,p ower is, therefore, the main aim of Communism and successful attainment of it the unique criterion of
its legitimity.
t
If the primary ta-sk of Communism is to seize power,
its further arim is to maintain it by all means, even at the
price of a complete s111ppression of all individual liiberties.
Therefore, the separation of the Sibate powers, as it is
known by tlhe Constituti•o ns orf some classical Democracies,
such_ as the United States, France, and Great Britain, has no
place in a totalitarian State.
In the perspecUve orf these general ideas, estalblishing a
clear distinction between a Communist and a Democratic
State, I shall try to explain how Communism seized power
in Czecho-Slovakia and how - through the instrumentality

�14

~LOVAKIA

of the Oonstitution of May 9, 1948, and other successive
laws - it could consolidate its victory. I shall show just
hoiw t!he Czecho-lSI-ovak State, after 1950, in practical policy
went beyond the Constitution itself, repudiating its "natiooail" character to become simply one of the numerous
sociaHst repuibhcs of the Soviet orfuit.
I. The policy of accomplished facts of the Czecho-Slovak
Government before the ConstitutJion of 1948.

The first Ozecho.,Slovak Constitution of February 29,
1920, was voted by a "Parliament" which had been nominated by a sel!f-a.ppointed Go1Vernment. That was a "Oonstitu~
tion" granting ind!i;viidual rights to the -citizens, .b ut ignoring
entirely the fundamental proiblem of the Republic: its heterogeneo1Us ethnic charncter. It requested the same lo,y alty
from all citizens, hut all those who were of tlhe non-Ozech
nationality were regarded, by the official poliicy, as. citizens
of second: rank only. Deprived. of the sipontameous consent
of alb.out half its population, this heterogeneous State could
exist only by its system of international alliances and a
police regime whreh came into being by the Internal Security Act of 1923, whi1cih pradi'Cally suspended the validity
of all individual rights.

It was only after Munich, in 1938, when her system had
coUrupsed, that Ozeciho-Slorvrukia changed her unrealistic Constitution. From a strictly unifarian State, she finally became what she should have been in 1918: a tri-ipartite federation c01InJposed of Czechia, Slorvakia and the Carpathian
Ukraine (Ruthenia). Six months after the "death bloiw" CID.
Benes) recei1Ved at Munich, Czecho-SlorvaJkia disintegrated
into her constituents parts. Thus Ozechia became a German
Protecto,r ate and SlovaJkia a free State.
During World War II, Dr. Ed.ward Benes ·managed
to convince the Allies of the necessity of reestaJblisthing the
status quo ante Munich and recreating on~e mo.re the Czecho-S:lovaJk State. Because of the stubborn and deternnined
opposition of the Siovaks, he pla!ced the destiny of the future Ozecho.- Slovakia in the hands of Sta1in. He did so by
concluding, as a sel!f-wppointed Presideillt of a non-existing

�SLOVAKIA

15

State, on December 12, 1943, in Moscow, a Treaty of Amity
and OollaJboration with the Soviet Union. Decei;ved as. he
was by his alHance with France before Munich, Benes
thought that the Czech peqple, surrounded ,by Genmany on
its west f.rontiier, could be saved from another German embrace onJ..y by rel,yi:ng closely on the So,v iet Union. MoscOIW
and the Czech Corm1munist refugees in Soviet Rllissia congratulated themselves on this aiccomplishiment of Benes and
aiwaited the moment when they wou:ld reap the political harvest of this immoral b.etrayaiJ. oif the prospective CzechoSlO!Vaik State to Moscow. Thus, the agreements Benes concluded in MoSico,w in DecemibeT, 194'3, and in February, 1945,
assured to the Ozech Communists the -key ,positions in the
government of Ozecho-Slovakia and faciiitated considerarbly
their struggle for aibso[ute po,wer..
Edward Benes cooifesses in his "Memoirs" (Pra:gue, 1947,
pp. 409-419) that already in 1943 he admitted the principle
of the so.called "National Front Government," an anti001I1:Stitutional organism standing above both the Parliament and Government and controHing a:11 the life in the
State. According to this principle, the Communists had a
veto power aJg8!inst any project of law which would haive
been contrary to their politics. "Not'hinlg without the Communists, nothing against them and nothing aibo:ve them!"
- that wa•s the !political ;pledge given by Edward Benes
to Gottwald in Moscow, ·already in 1943.
This principle had been put into practice from the
beginning of the reconstructed Czecho-Slol\7lakia in May
1945. The Communist Party salbotaged all legislatirve ,p rojects or executive measures of other parties which could
have coooteracted their political aims.
At the sam.e tirm.e, a!ter haMing recognized and installed
various cle~g,ymen who had been e~ommunicated ,by Rome,
the Pra;gue Government is pushing the Catholic population
into schism. The final .g oal of this policy is the extension.
of the Orthodox religion in Czecho~Slovakia and subordinating it to the supreme spiritual direction of the Moscow
Red MetrQPOlitan.
As to the "autonomous position of SlovaJkia, granted
by the Kosice agreement on Apr~l 5, 1945,.it recei.Jved a hard

�16

SLO VAKIA

b'lo:w by the new organization oif the State into, regions
(~upy), which are under the direct suiperivision of the Ministry of Interior in Prague. Slovruk territorial autonomy was
ipracticaHy aJbolished completely in the Spring of 1950,
whoo Pragrue created the new Miruistry of State Security, a
higMy centraliized ruge.ncy with unlimited power oiver Slovrukia. Since that time, no,t orilly anti-Com!murust forces of
Sloivakia, but eiven the leading Slovak Communist memibeirs of
Parliament or Government, have become victims orf purges
of this Ministry: Mr. CJementis, former Minister of Foreign
Affairs; Mr. Husalk, for.mer Chieif of the regional Government of SlovaJkia; Mr. Schmidtke, former · Chaimran of the
S'lov,a,k regional Diet of Bratislaiva ; Mr. Noiv·o mesky, former Minister of Ed'lllcation in the Slovak regionaJl Government,. and many other leading members of the Slovak Communist Party. Most reicently the Prrugue Government apipointed a Czech Commuruist, Anton Nedved, as Chief of the
regional Government of SlovaJkia.
The Praig;ue Government cannot countenance · a really
j'U!ridi:cal State system whicrh would be able to, limit its
omnipotence. Law is being pushed aside more and more by
aroitrary decisions. The Constitutions of the "People's Democracies" harve something in common with the windowdressing in the countries .behind the Iron Curtain. They
present a good-loolking arrangement of different articles
attractiive to the eyes of the pulblffic, but t!hose articles are
not for sale . .

•

•

•

WHO SAID IT?

"We aspired to achieve collaboration with the East
since 1922.. .. We never changed our ideas or our plans, we
never participated in any political combination directed
· against the Soviet Union and we always worked against any
attempts to isolate Russia in Europe. . . . In 1935 our
treaty of alliance was signed .. : . Our fight for collaboration
with the east was systematic and it was the natural expression of our Slav sentiment." - (Dr Edward Benes, UV AHY
0 SLOVANSTVi (Thoughts on Slavism), pg. 8; LincolnsPrager Publishers, London, 1945) .

�</text>
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            <element elementId="50">
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                  <text>1954, Vol. 4</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;</text>
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
13&#13;
&#13;
PUBLIC LAW IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AFrER 1945&#13;
Joseph A. Mikus&#13;
(A rev ised text of the lecture d elivered July 29, 1952, a t the In.ternational Congress of Juri sts in W est Berlin, Germany.)&#13;
"Between law and discipline the Judge must, without&#13;
any hesitation, choose tlhe second, since law is but a&#13;
form of the Party discipline." Andrey Wishinsky_&#13;
&#13;
Prelitninary Observations&#13;
The recent evolution in PU!blic Law of the oountries&#13;
behind the Iron Ourta~n is insipired by ideas and directives&#13;
.o f theorebcians of the Socia1list State. Lenin, who in his&#13;
book "State and Revolution" laid down the fundamental&#13;
ideas of the Communist State, does not believe in the fun~tion of integration anid coordination of interests the State&#13;
nomnally exercises in the framework of a certain community. In contradistinction to tlhe teaching O!f the democratic&#13;
state, Communism does concei!Ve the State as a power organized by the "elite" which brings aibout the ends fixed for&#13;
the society in advance by hii.storical materialism. The idea of&#13;
the Communist Stale corresponds, therefore, to that of a&#13;
power imposed on the majority of the population, which is&#13;
little or not at all oonsd01Us of its own 001rnmon interests,&#13;
hy a highly dlisciplined minority which knowns iJ&gt;erlfectly all&#13;
the steps to be taJken toward those pre-determined ends.&#13;
Conquest of ,p ower is, therefore, the main aim of Communism and successful attainment of it the unique criterion of&#13;
its legitimity.&#13;
t&#13;
If the primary ta-sk of Communism is to seize power,&#13;
its further arim is to maintain it by all means, even at the&#13;
price of a complete s111ppression of all individual liiberties.&#13;
Therefore, the separation of the Sibate powers, as it is&#13;
known by tlhe Constituti•o ns orf some classical Democracies,&#13;
such_ as the United States, France, and Great Britain, has no&#13;
place in a totalitarian State.&#13;
In the perspecUve orf these general ideas, estalblishing a&#13;
clear distinction between a Communist and a Democratic&#13;
State, I shall try to explain how Communism seized power&#13;
in Czecho-Slovakia and how - through the instrumentality&#13;
&#13;
14&#13;
&#13;
~LOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
of the Oonstitution of May 9, 1948, and other successive&#13;
laws - it could consolidate its victory. I shall show just&#13;
hoiw t!he Czecho-lSI-ovak State, after 1950, in practical policy&#13;
went beyond the Constitution itself, repudiating its "natiooail" character to become simply one of the numerous&#13;
sociaHst repuibhcs of the Soviet orfuit.&#13;
I. The policy of accomplished facts of the Czecho-Slovak&#13;
Government before the ConstitutJion of 1948.&#13;
&#13;
The first Ozecho.,Slovak Constitution of February 29,&#13;
1920, was voted by a "Parliament" which had been nominated by a sel!f-a.ppointed Go1Vernment. That was a "Oonstitu~&#13;
tion" granting ind!i;viidual rights to the -citizens, .b ut ignoring&#13;
entirely the fundamental proiblem of the Republic: its heterogeneo1Us ethnic charncter. It requested the same lo,y alty&#13;
from all citizens, hut all those who were of tlhe non-Ozech&#13;
nationality were regarded, by the official poliicy, as. citizens&#13;
of second: rank only. Deprived. of the sipontameous consent&#13;
of alb.out half its population, this heterogeneous State could&#13;
exist only by its system of international alliances and a&#13;
police regime whreh came into being by the Internal Security Act of 1923, whi1cih pradi'Cally suspended the validity&#13;
of all individual rights.&#13;
&#13;
It was only after Munich, in 1938, when her system had&#13;
coUrupsed, that Ozeciho-Slorvrukia changed her unrealistic Constitution. From a strictly unifarian State, she finally became what she should have been in 1918: a tri-ipartite federation c01InJposed of Czechia, Slorvakia and the Carpathian&#13;
Ukraine (Ruthenia). Six months after the "death bloiw" CID.&#13;
Benes) recei1Ved at Munich, Czecho-SlorvaJkia disintegrated&#13;
into her constituents parts. Thus Ozechia became a German&#13;
Protecto,r ate and SlovaJkia a free State.&#13;
During World War II, Dr. Ed.ward Benes ·managed&#13;
to convince the Allies of the necessity of reestaJblisthing the&#13;
status quo ante Munich and recreating on~e mo.re the Czecho-S:lovaJk State. Because of the stubborn and deternnined&#13;
opposition of the Siovaks, he pla!ced the destiny of the future Ozecho.- Slovakia in the hands of Sta1in. He did so by&#13;
concluding, as a sel!f-wppointed Presideillt of a non-existing&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
15&#13;
&#13;
State, on December 12, 1943, in Moscow, a Treaty of Amity&#13;
and OollaJboration with the Soviet Union. Decei;ved as. he&#13;
was by his alHance with France before Munich, Benes&#13;
thought that the Czech peqple, surrounded ,by Genmany on&#13;
its west f.rontiier, could be saved from another German embrace onJ..y by rel,yi:ng closely on the So,v iet Union. MoscOIW&#13;
and the Czech Corm1munist refugees in Soviet Rllissia congratulated themselves on this aiccomplishiment of Benes and&#13;
aiwaited the moment when they wou:ld reap the political harvest of this immoral b.etrayaiJ. oif the prospective CzechoSlO!Vaik State to Moscow. Thus, the agreements Benes concluded in MoSico,w in DecemibeT, 194'3, and in February, 1945,&#13;
assured to the Ozech Communists the -key ,positions in the&#13;
government of Ozecho-Slovakia and faciiitated considerarbly&#13;
their struggle for aibso[ute po,wer..&#13;
Edward Benes cooifesses in his "Memoirs" (Pra:gue, 1947,&#13;
pp. 409-419) that already in 1943 he admitted the principle&#13;
of the so.called "National Front Government," an anti001I1:Stitutional organism standing above both the Parliament and Government and controHing a:11 the life in the&#13;
State. According to this principle, the Communists had a&#13;
veto power aJg8!inst any project of law which would haive&#13;
been contrary to their politics. "Not'hinlg without the Communists, nothing against them and nothing aibo:ve them!"&#13;
- that wa•s the !political ;pledge given by Edward Benes&#13;
to Gottwald in Moscow, ·already in 1943.&#13;
This principle had been put into practice from the&#13;
beginning of the reconstructed Czecho-Slol\7lakia in May&#13;
1945. The Communist Party salbotaged all legislatirve ,p rojects or executive measures of other parties which could&#13;
have coooteracted their political aims.&#13;
At the sam.e tirm.e, a!ter haMing recognized and installed&#13;
various cle~g,ymen who had been e~ommunicated ,by Rome,&#13;
the Pra;gue Government is pushing the Catholic population&#13;
into schism. The final .g oal of this policy is the extension.&#13;
of the Orthodox religion in Czecho~Slovakia and subordinating it to the supreme spiritual direction of the Moscow&#13;
Red MetrQPOlitan.&#13;
As to the "autonomous position of SlovaJkia, granted&#13;
by the Kosice agreement on Apr~l 5, 1945,.it recei.Jved a hard&#13;
&#13;
16&#13;
&#13;
SLO VAKIA&#13;
&#13;
b'lo:w by the new organization oif the State into, regions&#13;
(~upy), which are under the direct suiperivision of the Ministry of Interior in Prague. Slovruk territorial autonomy was&#13;
ipracticaHy aJbolished completely in the Spring of 1950,&#13;
whoo Pragrue created the new Miruistry of State Security, a&#13;
higMy centraliized ruge.ncy with unlimited power oiver Slovrukia. Since that time, no,t orilly anti-Com!murust forces of&#13;
Sloivakia, but eiven the leading Slovak Communist memibeirs of&#13;
Parliament or Government, have become victims orf purges&#13;
of this Ministry: Mr. CJementis, former Minister of Foreign&#13;
Affairs; Mr. Husalk, for.mer Chieif of the regional Government of SlovaJkia; Mr. Schmidtke, former · Chaimran of the&#13;
S'lov,a,k regional Diet of Bratislaiva ; Mr. Noiv·o mesky, former Minister of Ed'lllcation in the Slovak regionaJl Government,. and many other leading members of the Slovak Communist Party. Most reicently the Prrugue Government apipointed a Czech Commuruist, Anton Nedved, as Chief of the&#13;
regional Government of SlovaJkia.&#13;
The Praig;ue Government cannot countenance · a really&#13;
j'U!ridi:cal State system whicrh would be able to, limit its&#13;
omnipotence. Law is being pushed aside more and more by&#13;
aroitrary decisions. The Constitutions of the "People's Democracies" harve something in common with the windowdressing in the countries .behind the Iron Curtain. They&#13;
present a good-loolking arrangement of different articles&#13;
attractiive to the eyes of the pulblffic, but t!hose articles are&#13;
not for sale . .&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
WHO SAID IT?&#13;
&#13;
"We aspired to achieve collaboration with the East&#13;
since 1922.. .. We never changed our ideas or our plans, we&#13;
never participated in any political combination directed&#13;
· against the Soviet Union and we always worked against any&#13;
attempts to isolate Russia in Europe. . . . In 1935 our&#13;
treaty of alliance was signed .. : . Our fight for collaboration&#13;
with the east was systematic and it was the natural expression of our Slav sentiment." - (Dr Edward Benes, UV AHY&#13;
0 SLOVANSTVi (Thoughts on Slavism), pg. 8; LincolnsPrager Publishers, London, 1945) .&#13;
&#13;
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                <text>Joseph A. Mikus&#13;
Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10), March 1954&#13;
pp. 13-16</text>
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                    <text>SLOVAKIA

17

AMERICAN SLOVAKS AND MARCH 14, 1939
Joseph Pauco
Americans of Slovak descent participated honorably
and in no small measure in the struggle for 'SlovaJk independerl'ce. The foundation of the program of the aurtonlOmistic
movement in Slova;kia cannot be imagined without them.
In fact, they were responsiJble for its structure with the
prin:::i;ples contained in the Pittsburgh Pact of May 30, 1918,
the same princiiples which some American Slovaks defended
more consistently than did the Hlinka Slovaik Peo.p le's
Party itself.
One need not ,b e surprised, therefore, at the great joy
evinced by American Slovaks when the autonomy of Sloivakia was 1proclaimed at Zilina on October 6, 1938, after iit was
granted by the Czecho-,Slovak go.vernment at Prague. The
Slovak League of America not only eX!pre.ssed its congratulations, but also hurried to help the autonomous government of Slovrukia financially with a gift of $10,000.
The government of Dr. Joseph Tiso was aware of the
role played by American Slovruks in rthe l~beration movement. At the very first opportunity it wanted to greet a
delegation in free Bratislaiva, so Premier Tiso sent an invitation to the Sloivak Lea;gue on December 16, 1938, to be
present at rthe opening of the Slovak Srtate Assembly. In
his letter of invitation, Dr. Tiso said among other things:
"Your coming here will be a holiday of infinite joy over the
victorious concllIBion of the struggle for the rights of the
sovereign Slovak naition and a holiday of cmr sincere gratitude for eveeything .that you ha'Ve done in the United
States to ccmtrilbute either ideologically or financially to
the vi:ictOlry of the SlovaJk nation."
Dr. Tiso sent a similar message to ,t he Supreme Office
of the Catholiic Slovalk Federation, in'Virting "our entiTe fraternal America" to Bratisl:wa.

On March 14, 1939, when the belJ.s of freedom resounded throughout the whole of Slovakia, the Slovak Government again was mindful of the American Slovalks. At

�18

SLOVAKIA

that time Dr. Joseph Tiso sent the following telegram to
the Slovak Lea:gue of Amevka :
"Today we have founded the independent Slovaik
State, not only to preserive Slovak tradition, but also to
guarantee bread and soil for the Slova.Jks. We are basing our nuture on our independence. In ,this tense politiJcal situaition, in wh~ch states and nations are changing
their forms, we can presenve oursel;ves only if we become an independent state.
"Therefore, beloved brothers and sisters in the
United States, stand by us and rejoice with us. Today
you can rest aissured ,t hat Slovaikia is no longer a suffered aippendaige, hut is everywhere the master in its
own home and is able to present itself to the world
under its very own name.
"For you, beloved 1brothers and sistevs in the
United States, this iis very important, rbec-ause we shall
be able to ma,ke contaots with yOIU direotlry without
having to go in a circuitous way thvough diplomatic
,connections. May God protect you and 1b e with us so
that the Slovaik nati!on might f1ourish in what has b een
initiated today."

1

Dr. Tiso sent an eX1tensive messaige to .the American
Slovaks, .i n which he explained in detail how the proclamation of the independence of Slovakia had come aibout and
sketichoo especia:Uy the politkal principles by which the Slovak Government would guide itself. This message is such
a penm.rating and serious dommnent of Slovak history that
it will be necessary to devote indiviidual attention to it
some time.
It is necessary to note that the Slovaik Leaigue of America, which stood at the head of the movement for autono-mous SlovaJkia, was ag,a inst the dismembe:mnent of OzechoSlovakia up to Mav~h 14, 1939. In those .s tirring Mavch days,
when President Hrucha dismissed Tiso as premier of the
antonomous Slova,k · Government and appointed Karol -Sidor
in his pla,ce, the Slovak League of Almeri,ca sent Sidor this
caiblegra,m: "Advise strong stand rugai:nst secession. Slo-

�SLOVAKIA

19

v.ak League is for federation with Czechs on an equal
basis."
This stand of the League need not surprise us. U;p to the
day when the SlovaJk League sent the caiblegram to Sidor,
not even responsible Slovak circles were for any other political program. 'Ilhe ffi1I1Jka SlovaJk People's Pal'ty honootl,y
sought a peaceful solution of mutual relationship with the
Ozechs. It did not find such a solution and, therefore, after
the aruned putsch of the Czech Genera1's on Ma·r ch 10, 1939,
and at the same time fully aiware of the internaitional situation as a whole, it chase ,s ecession despite the fact that
Americans of Slova;k descent advised against it. But even
American S1'ovaks did not ta!ke the situation literally as expressed in the cablegram. Its autho,r, the president of the
Slovalk League at that time, Joseph Husek, comrrnentmg on
the events transpiring in Bratishwa and quoting the crublegram of the Leaigue, explained: "This stand ( against secession) was accepted by the last Congress of the Slovak
Leaigue. We stand upon our word. But whatever the result
of this conflict, we shall stand loyally by SlovaJkia and the
Slovak nation. Prague committed not only a mistake, but in
fact has committed an hostile act against the Slovak nation.
This, in its own drastic intervention, it cannot justify. For
the consequences thereof it alone is respons~ble."
That is how Joseph Husek wrote when he still did not
have any reports of what had happened in BraitiisJ.,a va on
March 14, 1939. It was iprobably only a few houra lbeifore or
after that the Slovak Assemlbly unanimously declared the
independence of SlovaJkia and the founding of the independent SlovaJk Republic.
When the telegram of Dr. Joseph Tiso arrived in the
USA, Husek ipublidy congratulated and greeted the government of the Slovak Repuibli:c in the Slorvak press of America. Among o.ther things, he stated: "The Slova!k League
was against secession. But si,nce the Slovaks at home have
proclaime!d their independence, we greeted independent Slovakia and wished her a hearty 'Good Luok' ."
Immediately after March 14, 1939, the SlovaJk League of
America staunchly defended Slova;k statehood and in prin-

�20

SLOVAKIA

ciple backed the SlovaJk Republic. In this regard we must
mention the letteT which the ,pres1dent of the Slovak League
of .America, Joseiph HU!sek, sent ,to President F. D. Roosevelt on .AJPril 24, 1939. The letter, requesting recognition of
the Slovak RepuJblic •b y the United States of America, contained also the following:
"T'he secession of Slovatlcia from the Cze,cho...Sloviak Rep'l.llblic was not the result of intrigues between
the Slovak leadern and Germany, not for a desire for
annexation to Hungary. The Slovaks proved by recent
srucri:fice Of hll!ITlan life and their present firm resistance to the unjust territorial demands of H'UJilgaory how
4ounded this accusation, made frequently during the
.past twenty years by the proponents of the Ozechoslo'Vak theory, has .b een. The secession of Slovakia was,
at least, as much the result of intolerable condi:tions
within the Repwblic, cu1minating in the unjustifiable
military occupation of its capi,tol of Slovaikia, Bratislava, and the arrest of the pri:me minister, Dr. Joseph
Tiso, b;y orde r c.f the Prague government, as of the existing conditions outside of the small country over
which, naturally, the Slovaikis had no control. There
was, and is, perhrups, no nation which has been so wilfully misrepresented to the world as has, and is even
today, Slovakia. Explo,i ted by non-4Slovak g c-vernments,
·h er le aders silenced by foreign masters, p ersecuted and
often incarcerated, her people have s uffered national
oppression for more than a hundred years; first , under
the Magyars, later under the Czechs, who, under the
gui.se of 'democr.aicy' made of Slovakia a Czech colony.
Today, an autonomous state, her fate lies entirely in
the hands of those who haive, or shall have, the power
to determine the futUTe of Europe and the world at
large. "
At the same time the president of the Slova:k League
expressed this request :
"It is the fer.vent desire of the Slovak Americans that
the -,United States will be one of the first to recognize the
R~pulblic of Slovalkia, ther~by giving its people. courage and

�SLOVAKIA

21

faith with which to. meet the future and strengthening the
spirit of democrrucy, already so firmly imlbedded in the
hearts of Slovak people.."
On May 12, 1939, the Central Committee of the Slovak
league of America met in Pittsiburgh, Pa., and declared officially that "the Slova;k League of America stands and
shall stand intrepidly behind Slo1vaJkra, sympathizes with
her, shall he1p her and in every way defend her against all
eneimies, whether internal or external."
At that session, the sixth point of the resolution passed
at that meeting of the league read: "The Slovak Lea·gue
shall make the necessary steps to get a hear:ing before the
Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate in Washington
so that it could ,p resent its arguments why the United
States, following the example od: another great democracy
- Britain, should at least give de facto recognition to the
Slovak State."
The Catholic Slovak Federation of America reacted
just as favorrubly to the Sloiva!k State as diid the Slovak
League. Immediately after March 14, 1939, the Rt. Rev.
Msgr. Stephen Kocis and Mr. John Lesko, president and se:cretary of the CSF respectively, issued a declaration in which
they defended the honor and good name of the Slovak
leaders and forcefully answered all attacks of enemies of
the Slovak cause. In the declaration we read: " . . .personally
we know Dr. Joseph Tiso, his Sloivak patriotism and his
noble character; therefore, we cannot believe, and do not
believe that he has committed the base betray;al against his
Slovak nation and Slovakia which certain people accuse
him of today."
The late Rt. Rev. Msgr. John E. Rura of Perth Amboy,
N. J., who was very a;ctive in the OSF in the east, wrote an
article for the Slovak press prior to the meeting of Slovaik Catholi'c priests in New Yoi,k on April 19, 1939, condemning those who slandered and viilified Slovruk leaders in
Slovakia. In that artide he said that for certiain people
"October 6, 1938, was fatal, because the Pittsburgh Pact
was then incor,porated in the life of the history of the Slovak nation. And now aigain March 14, 1939, that mortal

�22

SLOVAKIA

wownd was adm1nistered anew, when a free and independent
Slow.Ilda was born. They are squirnl.in,g like a wounded
snaJke and wd:11 not recognize the truth that there was no
other way out for the .sa1viation of the Slovak nation, except that wMch the ,present lead~s in Slovakia had
taken . . . . "
Amedcans of .Slovffik descent kneiw the meaning o.f freedom and independence. They enjoyed the bJess,i ngs of the
American way of life. As tTue Ameniicans they CO'llld not
wish less to the nation they descended from. It is to their
everliasting oredit that the,y ruoted as manfully as they did
when the Slovak Republic wrus born on March 14, 1939. God
bles,s Amerioa, God 1bless and protect the Slovak nation in
this darkest period of its history!

•

•

•

HISTORICAL TRUTH AND :F ALSE LEGENDS
Francis Hrusovsky
Theil'e rure people who are not bl1nd, b1u t do not want
to see the true face of reality. They aTe not deaif, but their
ears are not a;c,cessi:ble to the voice of truth. Nor are they
inteHectuaUy so dull as nOlt to ,be aJble to comprehend a matter in its .sulbstance, :if they only wanted to. Such people
distort even the s1mplest matter and enravel it with a veil
of confusion oocording to their o,w n conceptions and their
own selfish interests. The,y are cowardly to kno,w and confess the truth and PTefer to deceive themse1ves and ha;ve
suf:fiicient courage to deceive others.
In this manner it is possiible to charructerize the ,p eople
who present the historical fact of the proclamation of the
state independence of Slovrukia in a false light and then with
consistent stubbornness endeavo,r to 1present in a false light
everything that is connected with the Slovak Republic.
The utterly simple historical fact is that on March 14,
1939, the Slovak Assembliy declared Slovakia an independent Slovruk State This historical fact was acknowledged by
many states (27), which recognized the SlovaJk Republic
either de jure or de facto and esta:blished drplomaUc rela-

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1240">
                    <text>SLOVAKIA

17

AMERICAN SLOVAKS AND MARCH 14, 1939
Joseph Pauco
Americans of Slovak descent participated honorably
and in no small measure in the struggle for 'SlovaJk independerl'ce. The foundation of the program of the aurtonlOmistic
movement in Slova;kia cannot be imagined without them.
In fact, they were responsiJble for its structure with the
prin:::i;ples contained in the Pittsburgh Pact of May 30, 1918,
the same princiiples which some American Slovaks defended
more consistently than did the Hlinka Slovaik Peo.p le's
Party itself.
One need not ,b e surprised, therefore, at the great joy
evinced by American Slovaks when the autonomy of Sloivakia was 1proclaimed at Zilina on October 6, 1938, after iit was
granted by the Czecho-,Slovak go.vernment at Prague. The
Slovak League of America not only eX!pre.ssed its congratulations, but also hurried to help the autonomous government of Slovrukia financially with a gift of $10,000.
The government of Dr. Joseph Tiso was aware of the
role played by American Slovruks in rthe l~beration movement. At the very first opportunity it wanted to greet a
delegation in free Bratislaiva, so Premier Tiso sent an invitation to the Sloivak Lea;gue on December 16, 1938, to be
present at rthe opening of the Slovak Srtate Assembly. In
his letter of invitation, Dr. Tiso said among other things:
"Your coming here will be a holiday of infinite joy over the
victorious concllIBion of the struggle for the rights of the
sovereign Slovak naition and a holiday of cmr sincere gratitude for eveeything .that you ha'Ve done in the United
States to ccmtrilbute either ideologically or financially to
the vi:ictOlry of the SlovaJk nation."
Dr. Tiso sent a similar message to ,t he Supreme Office
of the Catholiic Slovalk Federation, in'Virting "our entiTe fraternal America" to Bratisl:wa.

On March 14, 1939, when the belJ.s of freedom resounded throughout the whole of Slovakia, the Slovak Government again was mindful of the American Slovalks. At

�18

SLOVAKIA

that time Dr. Joseph Tiso sent the following telegram to
the Slovak Lea:gue of Amevka :
"Today we have founded the independent Slovaik
State, not only to preserive Slovak tradition, but also to
guarantee bread and soil for the Slova.Jks. We are basing our nuture on our independence. In ,this tense politiJcal situaition, in wh~ch states and nations are changing
their forms, we can presenve oursel;ves only if we become an independent state.
"Therefore, beloved brothers and sisters in the
United States, stand by us and rejoice with us. Today
you can rest aissured ,t hat Slovaikia is no longer a suffered aippendaige, hut is everywhere the master in its
own home and is able to present itself to the world
under its very own name.
"For you, beloved 1brothers and sistevs in the
United States, this iis very important, rbec-ause we shall
be able to ma,ke contaots with yOIU direotlry without
having to go in a circuitous way thvough diplomatic
,connections. May God protect you and 1b e with us so
that the Slovaik nati!on might f1ourish in what has b een
initiated today."

1

Dr. Tiso sent an eX1tensive messaige to .the American
Slovaks, .i n which he explained in detail how the proclamation of the independence of Slovakia had come aibout and
sketichoo especia:Uy the politkal principles by which the Slovak Government would guide itself. This message is such
a penm.rating and serious dommnent of Slovak history that
it will be necessary to devote indiviidual attention to it
some time.
It is necessary to note that the Slovaik Leaigue of America, which stood at the head of the movement for autono-mous SlovaJkia, was ag,a inst the dismembe:mnent of OzechoSlovakia up to Mav~h 14, 1939. In those .s tirring Mavch days,
when President Hrucha dismissed Tiso as premier of the
antonomous Slova,k · Government and appointed Karol -Sidor
in his pla,ce, the Slovak League of Almeri,ca sent Sidor this
caiblegra,m: "Advise strong stand rugai:nst secession. Slo-

�SLOVAKIA

19

v.ak League is for federation with Czechs on an equal
basis."
This stand of the League need not surprise us. U;p to the
day when the SlovaJk League sent the caiblegram to Sidor,
not even responsible Slovak circles were for any other political program. 'Ilhe ffi1I1Jka SlovaJk People's Pal'ty honootl,y
sought a peaceful solution of mutual relationship with the
Ozechs. It did not find such a solution and, therefore, after
the aruned putsch of the Czech Genera1's on Ma·r ch 10, 1939,
and at the same time fully aiware of the internaitional situation as a whole, it chase ,s ecession despite the fact that
Americans of Slova;k descent advised against it. But even
American S1'ovaks did not ta!ke the situation literally as expressed in the cablegram. Its autho,r, the president of the
Slovalk League at that time, Joseph Husek, comrrnentmg on
the events transpiring in Bratishwa and quoting the crublegram of the Leaigue, explained: "This stand ( against secession) was accepted by the last Congress of the Slovak
Leaigue. We stand upon our word. But whatever the result
of this conflict, we shall stand loyally by SlovaJkia and the
Slovak nation. Prague committed not only a mistake, but in
fact has committed an hostile act against the Slovak nation.
This, in its own drastic intervention, it cannot justify. For
the consequences thereof it alone is respons~ble."
That is how Joseph Husek wrote when he still did not
have any reports of what had happened in BraitiisJ.,a va on
March 14, 1939. It was iprobably only a few houra lbeifore or
after that the Slovak Assemlbly unanimously declared the
independence of SlovaJkia and the founding of the independent SlovaJk Republic.
When the telegram of Dr. Joseph Tiso arrived in the
USA, Husek ipublidy congratulated and greeted the government of the Slovak Repuibli:c in the Slorvak press of America. Among o.ther things, he stated: "The Slova!k League
was against secession. But si,nce the Slovaks at home have
proclaime!d their independence, we greeted independent Slovakia and wished her a hearty 'Good Luok' ."
Immediately after March 14, 1939, the SlovaJk League of
America staunchly defended Slova;k statehood and in prin-

�20

SLOVAKIA

ciple backed the SlovaJk Republic. In this regard we must
mention the letteT which the ,pres1dent of the Slovak League
of .America, Joseiph HU!sek, sent ,to President F. D. Roosevelt on .AJPril 24, 1939. The letter, requesting recognition of
the Slovak RepuJblic •b y the United States of America, contained also the following:
"T'he secession of Slovatlcia from the Cze,cho...Sloviak Rep'l.llblic was not the result of intrigues between
the Slovak leadern and Germany, not for a desire for
annexation to Hungary. The Slovaks proved by recent
srucri:fice Of hll!ITlan life and their present firm resistance to the unjust territorial demands of H'UJilgaory how
4ounded this accusation, made frequently during the
.past twenty years by the proponents of the Ozechoslo'Vak theory, has .b een. The secession of Slovakia was,
at least, as much the result of intolerable condi:tions
within the Repwblic, cu1minating in the unjustifiable
military occupation of its capi,tol of Slovaikia, Bratislava, and the arrest of the pri:me minister, Dr. Joseph
Tiso, b;y orde r c.f the Prague government, as of the existing conditions outside of the small country over
which, naturally, the Slovaikis had no control. There
was, and is, perhrups, no nation which has been so wilfully misrepresented to the world as has, and is even
today, Slovakia. Explo,i ted by non-4Slovak g c-vernments,
·h er le aders silenced by foreign masters, p ersecuted and
often incarcerated, her people have s uffered national
oppression for more than a hundred years; first , under
the Magyars, later under the Czechs, who, under the
gui.se of 'democr.aicy' made of Slovakia a Czech colony.
Today, an autonomous state, her fate lies entirely in
the hands of those who haive, or shall have, the power
to determine the futUTe of Europe and the world at
large. "
At the same time the president of the Slova:k League
expressed this request :
"It is the fer.vent desire of the Slovak Americans that
the -,United States will be one of the first to recognize the
R~pulblic of Slovalkia, ther~by giving its people. courage and

�SLOVAKIA

21

faith with which to. meet the future and strengthening the
spirit of democrrucy, already so firmly imlbedded in the
hearts of Slovak people.."
On May 12, 1939, the Central Committee of the Slovak
league of America met in Pittsiburgh, Pa., and declared officially that "the Slova;k League of America stands and
shall stand intrepidly behind Slo1vaJkra, sympathizes with
her, shall he1p her and in every way defend her against all
eneimies, whether internal or external."
At that session, the sixth point of the resolution passed
at that meeting of the league read: "The Slovak Lea·gue
shall make the necessary steps to get a hear:ing before the
Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate in Washington
so that it could ,p resent its arguments why the United
States, following the example od: another great democracy
- Britain, should at least give de facto recognition to the
Slovak State."
The Catholic Slovak Federation of America reacted
just as favorrubly to the Sloiva!k State as diid the Slovak
League. Immediately after March 14, 1939, the Rt. Rev.
Msgr. Stephen Kocis and Mr. John Lesko, president and se:cretary of the CSF respectively, issued a declaration in which
they defended the honor and good name of the Slovak
leaders and forcefully answered all attacks of enemies of
the Slovak cause. In the declaration we read: " . . .personally
we know Dr. Joseph Tiso, his Sloivak patriotism and his
noble character; therefore, we cannot believe, and do not
believe that he has committed the base betray;al against his
Slovak nation and Slovakia which certain people accuse
him of today."
The late Rt. Rev. Msgr. John E. Rura of Perth Amboy,
N. J., who was very a;ctive in the OSF in the east, wrote an
article for the Slovak press prior to the meeting of Slovaik Catholi'c priests in New Yoi,k on April 19, 1939, condemning those who slandered and viilified Slovruk leaders in
Slovakia. In that artide he said that for certiain people
"October 6, 1938, was fatal, because the Pittsburgh Pact
was then incor,porated in the life of the history of the Slovak nation. And now aigain March 14, 1939, that mortal

�22

SLOVAKIA

wownd was adm1nistered anew, when a free and independent
Slow.Ilda was born. They are squirnl.in,g like a wounded
snaJke and wd:11 not recognize the truth that there was no
other way out for the .sa1viation of the Slovak nation, except that wMch the ,present lead~s in Slovakia had
taken . . . . "
Amedcans of .Slovffik descent kneiw the meaning o.f freedom and independence. They enjoyed the bJess,i ngs of the
American way of life. As tTue Ameniicans they CO'llld not
wish less to the nation they descended from. It is to their
everliasting oredit that the,y ruoted as manfully as they did
when the Slovak Republic wrus born on March 14, 1939. God
bles,s Amerioa, God 1bless and protect the Slovak nation in
this darkest period of its history!

•

•

•

HISTORICAL TRUTH AND :F ALSE LEGENDS
Francis Hrusovsky
Theil'e rure people who are not bl1nd, b1u t do not want
to see the true face of reality. They aTe not deaif, but their
ears are not a;c,cessi:ble to the voice of truth. Nor are they
inteHectuaUy so dull as nOlt to ,be aJble to comprehend a matter in its .sulbstance, :if they only wanted to. Such people
distort even the s1mplest matter and enravel it with a veil
of confusion oocording to their o,w n conceptions and their
own selfish interests. The,y are cowardly to kno,w and confess the truth and PTefer to deceive themse1ves and ha;ve
suf:fiicient courage to deceive others.
In this manner it is possiible to charructerize the ,p eople
who present the historical fact of the proclamation of the
state independence of Slovrukia in a false light and then with
consistent stubbornness endeavo,r to 1present in a false light
everything that is connected with the Slovak Republic.
The utterly simple historical fact is that on March 14,
1939, the Slovak Assembliy declared Slovakia an independent Slovruk State This historical fact was acknowledged by
many states (27), which recognized the SlovaJk Republic
either de jure or de facto and esta:blished drplomaUc rela-

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                  <text>1954, Vol. 4</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.&lt;/li&gt;
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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              <text>SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
17&#13;
&#13;
AMERICAN SLOVAKS AND MARCH 14, 1939&#13;
Joseph Pauco&#13;
Americans of Slovak descent participated honorably&#13;
and in no small measure in the struggle for 'SlovaJk independerl'ce. The foundation of the program of the aurtonlOmistic&#13;
movement in Slova;kia cannot be imagined without them.&#13;
In fact, they were responsiJble for its structure with the&#13;
prin:::i;ples contained in the Pittsburgh Pact of May 30, 1918,&#13;
the same princiiples which some American Slovaks defended&#13;
more consistently than did the Hlinka Slovaik Peo.p le's&#13;
Party itself.&#13;
One need not ,b e surprised, therefore, at the great joy&#13;
evinced by American Slovaks when the autonomy of Sloivakia was 1proclaimed at Zilina on October 6, 1938, after iit was&#13;
granted by the Czecho-,Slovak go.vernment at Prague. The&#13;
Slovak League of America not only eX!pre.ssed its congratulations, but also hurried to help the autonomous government of Slovrukia financially with a gift of $10,000.&#13;
The government of Dr. Joseph Tiso was aware of the&#13;
role played by American Slovruks in rthe l~beration movement. At the very first opportunity it wanted to greet a&#13;
delegation in free Bratislaiva, so Premier Tiso sent an invitation to the Sloivak Lea;gue on December 16, 1938, to be&#13;
present at rthe opening of the Slovak Srtate Assembly. In&#13;
his letter of invitation, Dr. Tiso said among other things:&#13;
"Your coming here will be a holiday of infinite joy over the&#13;
victorious concllIBion of the struggle for the rights of the&#13;
sovereign Slovak naition and a holiday of cmr sincere gratitude for eveeything .that you ha'Ve done in the United&#13;
States to ccmtrilbute either ideologically or financially to&#13;
the vi:ictOlry of the SlovaJk nation."&#13;
Dr. Tiso sent a similar message to ,t he Supreme Office&#13;
of the Catholiic Slovalk Federation, in'Virting "our entiTe fraternal America" to Bratisl:wa.&#13;
&#13;
On March 14, 1939, when the belJ.s of freedom resounded throughout the whole of Slovakia, the Slovak Government again was mindful of the American Slovalks. At&#13;
&#13;
18&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
that time Dr. Joseph Tiso sent the following telegram to&#13;
the Slovak Lea:gue of Amevka :&#13;
"Today we have founded the independent Slovaik&#13;
State, not only to preserive Slovak tradition, but also to&#13;
guarantee bread and soil for the Slova.Jks. We are basing our nuture on our independence. In ,this tense politiJcal situaition, in wh~ch states and nations are changing&#13;
their forms, we can presenve oursel;ves only if we become an independent state.&#13;
"Therefore, beloved brothers and sisters in the&#13;
United States, stand by us and rejoice with us. Today&#13;
you can rest aissured ,t hat Slovaikia is no longer a suffered aippendaige, hut is everywhere the master in its&#13;
own home and is able to present itself to the world&#13;
under its very own name.&#13;
"For you, beloved 1brothers and sistevs in the&#13;
United States, this iis very important, rbec-ause we shall&#13;
be able to ma,ke contaots with yOIU direotlry without&#13;
having to go in a circuitous way thvough diplomatic&#13;
,connections. May God protect you and 1b e with us so&#13;
that the Slovaik nati!on might f1ourish in what has b een&#13;
initiated today."&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
Dr. Tiso sent an eX1tensive messaige to .the American&#13;
Slovaks, .i n which he explained in detail how the proclamation of the independence of Slovakia had come aibout and&#13;
sketichoo especia:Uy the politkal principles by which the Slovak Government would guide itself. This message is such&#13;
a penm.rating and serious dommnent of Slovak history that&#13;
it will be necessary to devote indiviidual attention to it&#13;
some time.&#13;
It is necessary to note that the Slovaik Leaigue of America, which stood at the head of the movement for autono-mous SlovaJkia, was ag,a inst the dismembe:mnent of OzechoSlovakia up to Mav~h 14, 1939. In those .s tirring Mavch days,&#13;
when President Hrucha dismissed Tiso as premier of the&#13;
antonomous Slova,k · Government and appointed Karol -Sidor&#13;
in his pla,ce, the Slovak League of Almeri,ca sent Sidor this&#13;
caiblegra,m: "Advise strong stand rugai:nst secession. Slo-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
19&#13;
&#13;
v.ak League is for federation with Czechs on an equal&#13;
basis."&#13;
This stand of the League need not surprise us. U;p to the&#13;
day when the SlovaJk League sent the caiblegram to Sidor,&#13;
not even responsible Slovak circles were for any other political program. 'Ilhe ffi1I1Jka SlovaJk People's Pal'ty honootl,y&#13;
sought a peaceful solution of mutual relationship with the&#13;
Ozechs. It did not find such a solution and, therefore, after&#13;
the aruned putsch of the Czech Genera1's on Ma·r ch 10, 1939,&#13;
and at the same time fully aiware of the internaitional situation as a whole, it chase ,s ecession despite the fact that&#13;
Americans of Slova;k descent advised against it. But even&#13;
American S1'ovaks did not ta!ke the situation literally as expressed in the cablegram. Its autho,r, the president of the&#13;
Slovalk League at that time, Joseph Husek, comrrnentmg on&#13;
the events transpiring in Bratishwa and quoting the crublegram of the Leaigue, explained: "This stand ( against secession) was accepted by the last Congress of the Slovak&#13;
Leaigue. We stand upon our word. But whatever the result&#13;
of this conflict, we shall stand loyally by SlovaJkia and the&#13;
Slovak nation. Prague committed not only a mistake, but in&#13;
fact has committed an hostile act against the Slovak nation.&#13;
This, in its own drastic intervention, it cannot justify. For&#13;
the consequences thereof it alone is respons~ble."&#13;
That is how Joseph Husek wrote when he still did not&#13;
have any reports of what had happened in BraitiisJ.,a va on&#13;
March 14, 1939. It was iprobably only a few houra lbeifore or&#13;
after that the Slovak Assemlbly unanimously declared the&#13;
independence of SlovaJkia and the founding of the independent SlovaJk Republic.&#13;
When the telegram of Dr. Joseph Tiso arrived in the&#13;
USA, Husek ipublidy congratulated and greeted the government of the Slovak Repuibli:c in the Slorvak press of America. Among o.ther things, he stated: "The Slova!k League&#13;
was against secession. But si,nce the Slovaks at home have&#13;
proclaime!d their independence, we greeted independent Slovakia and wished her a hearty 'Good Luok' ."&#13;
Immediately after March 14, 1939, the SlovaJk League of&#13;
America staunchly defended Slova;k statehood and in prin-&#13;
&#13;
20&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
ciple backed the SlovaJk Republic. In this regard we must&#13;
mention the letteT which the ,pres1dent of the Slovak League&#13;
of .America, Joseiph HU!sek, sent ,to President F. D. Roosevelt on .AJPril 24, 1939. The letter, requesting recognition of&#13;
the Slovak RepuJblic •b y the United States of America, contained also the following:&#13;
"T'he secession of Slovatlcia from the Cze,cho...Sloviak Rep'l.llblic was not the result of intrigues between&#13;
the Slovak leadern and Germany, not for a desire for&#13;
annexation to Hungary. The Slovaks proved by recent&#13;
srucri:fice Of hll!ITlan life and their present firm resistance to the unjust territorial demands of H'UJilgaory how&#13;
4ounded this accusation, made frequently during the&#13;
.past twenty years by the proponents of the Ozechoslo'Vak theory, has .b een. The secession of Slovakia was,&#13;
at least, as much the result of intolerable condi:tions&#13;
within the Repwblic, cu1minating in the unjustifiable&#13;
military occupation of its capi,tol of Slovaikia, Bratislava, and the arrest of the pri:me minister, Dr. Joseph&#13;
Tiso, b;y orde r c.f the Prague government, as of the existing conditions outside of the small country over&#13;
which, naturally, the Slovaikis had no control. There&#13;
was, and is, perhrups, no nation which has been so wilfully misrepresented to the world as has, and is even&#13;
today, Slovakia. Explo,i ted by non-4Slovak g c-vernments,&#13;
·h er le aders silenced by foreign masters, p ersecuted and&#13;
often incarcerated, her people have s uffered national&#13;
oppression for more than a hundred years; first , under&#13;
the Magyars, later under the Czechs, who, under the&#13;
gui.se of 'democr.aicy' made of Slovakia a Czech colony.&#13;
Today, an autonomous state, her fate lies entirely in&#13;
the hands of those who haive, or shall have, the power&#13;
to determine the futUTe of Europe and the world at&#13;
large. "&#13;
At the same time the president of the Slova:k League&#13;
expressed this request :&#13;
"It is the fer.vent desire of the Slovak Americans that&#13;
the -,United States will be one of the first to recognize the&#13;
R~pulblic of Slovalkia, ther~by giving its people. courage and&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
21&#13;
&#13;
faith with which to. meet the future and strengthening the&#13;
spirit of democrrucy, already so firmly imlbedded in the&#13;
hearts of Slovak people.."&#13;
On May 12, 1939, the Central Committee of the Slovak&#13;
league of America met in Pittsiburgh, Pa., and declared officially that "the Slova;k League of America stands and&#13;
shall stand intrepidly behind Slo1vaJkra, sympathizes with&#13;
her, shall he1p her and in every way defend her against all&#13;
eneimies, whether internal or external."&#13;
At that session, the sixth point of the resolution passed&#13;
at that meeting of the league read: "The Slovak Lea·gue&#13;
shall make the necessary steps to get a hear:ing before the&#13;
Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate in Washington&#13;
so that it could ,p resent its arguments why the United&#13;
States, following the example od: another great democracy&#13;
- Britain, should at least give de facto recognition to the&#13;
Slovak State."&#13;
The Catholic Slovak Federation of America reacted&#13;
just as favorrubly to the Sloiva!k State as diid the Slovak&#13;
League. Immediately after March 14, 1939, the Rt. Rev.&#13;
Msgr. Stephen Kocis and Mr. John Lesko, president and se:cretary of the CSF respectively, issued a declaration in which&#13;
they defended the honor and good name of the Slovak&#13;
leaders and forcefully answered all attacks of enemies of&#13;
the Slovak cause. In the declaration we read: " . . .personally&#13;
we know Dr. Joseph Tiso, his Sloivak patriotism and his&#13;
noble character; therefore, we cannot believe, and do not&#13;
believe that he has committed the base betray;al against his&#13;
Slovak nation and Slovakia which certain people accuse&#13;
him of today."&#13;
The late Rt. Rev. Msgr. John E. Rura of Perth Amboy,&#13;
N. J., who was very a;ctive in the OSF in the east, wrote an&#13;
article for the Slovak press prior to the meeting of Slovaik Catholi'c priests in New Yoi,k on April 19, 1939, condemning those who slandered and viilified Slovruk leaders in&#13;
Slovakia. In that artide he said that for certiain people&#13;
"October 6, 1938, was fatal, because the Pittsburgh Pact&#13;
was then incor,porated in the life of the history of the Slovak nation. And now aigain March 14, 1939, that mortal&#13;
&#13;
22&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
wownd was adm1nistered anew, when a free and independent&#13;
Slow.Ilda was born. They are squirnl.in,g like a wounded&#13;
snaJke and wd:11 not recognize the truth that there was no&#13;
other way out for the .sa1viation of the Slovak nation, except that wMch the ,present lead~s in Slovakia had&#13;
taken . . . . "&#13;
Amedcans of .Slovffik descent kneiw the meaning o.f freedom and independence. They enjoyed the bJess,i ngs of the&#13;
American way of life. As tTue Ameniicans they CO'llld not&#13;
wish less to the nation they descended from. It is to their&#13;
everliasting oredit that the,y ruoted as manfully as they did&#13;
when the Slovak Republic wrus born on March 14, 1939. God&#13;
bles,s Amerioa, God 1bless and protect the Slovak nation in&#13;
this darkest period of its history!&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
HISTORICAL TRUTH AND :F ALSE LEGENDS&#13;
Francis Hrusovsky&#13;
Theil'e rure people who are not bl1nd, b1u t do not want&#13;
to see the true face of reality. They aTe not deaif, but their&#13;
ears are not a;c,cessi:ble to the voice of truth. Nor are they&#13;
inteHectuaUy so dull as nOlt to ,be aJble to comprehend a matter in its .sulbstance, :if they only wanted to. Such people&#13;
distort even the s1mplest matter and enravel it with a veil&#13;
of confusion oocording to their o,w n conceptions and their&#13;
own selfish interests. The,y are cowardly to kno,w and confess the truth and PTefer to deceive themse1ves and ha;ve&#13;
suf:fiicient courage to deceive others.&#13;
In this manner it is possiible to charructerize the ,p eople&#13;
who present the historical fact of the proclamation of the&#13;
state independence of Slovrukia in a false light and then with&#13;
consistent stubbornness endeavo,r to 1present in a false light&#13;
everything that is connected with the Slovak Republic.&#13;
The utterly simple historical fact is that on March 14,&#13;
1939, the Slovak Assembliy declared Slovakia an independent Slovruk State This historical fact was acknowledged by&#13;
many states (27), which recognized the SlovaJk Republic&#13;
either de jure or de facto and esta:blished drplomaUc rela-&#13;
&#13;
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                <text>Joseph Paučo&#13;
Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10), March 1954&#13;
pp. 17-22</text>
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                    <text>22

SLOVAKIA

wownd was adm1nistered anew, when a free and independent
Slow.Ilda was born. They are squirnl.in,g like a wounded
snaJke and wd:11 not recognize the truth that there was no
other way out for the .sa1viation of the Slovak nation, except that wMch the ,present lead~s in Slovakia had
taken . . . . "
Amedcans of .Slovffik descent kneiw the meaning o.f freedom and independence. They enjoyed the bJess,i ngs of the
American way of life. As tTue Ameniicans they CO'llld not
wish less to the nation they descended from. It is to their
everliasting oredit that the,y ruoted as manfully as they did
when the Slovak Republic wrus born on March 14, 1939. God
bles,s Amerioa, God 1bless and protect the Slovak nation in
this darkest period of its history!

•

•

•

HISTORICAL TRUTH AND :F ALSE LEGENDS
Francis Hrusovsky
Theil'e rure people who are not bl1nd, b1u t do not want
to see the true face of reality. They aTe not deaif, but their
ears are not a;c,cessi:ble to the voice of truth. Nor are they
inteHectuaUy so dull as nOlt to ,be aJble to comprehend a matter in its .sulbstance, :if they only wanted to. Such people
distort even the s1mplest matter and enravel it with a veil
of confusion oocording to their o,w n conceptions and their
own selfish interests. The,y are cowardly to kno,w and confess the truth and PTefer to deceive themse1ves and ha;ve
suf:fiicient courage to deceive others.
In this manner it is possiible to charructerize the ,p eople
who present the historical fact of the proclamation of the
state independence of Slovrukia in a false light and then with
consistent stubbornness endeavo,r to 1present in a false light
everything that is connected with the Slovak Republic.
The utterly simple historical fact is that on March 14,
1939, the Slovak Assembliy declared Slovakia an independent Slovruk State This historical fact was acknowledged by
many states (27), which recognized the SlovaJk Republic
either de jure or de facto and esta:blished drplomaUc rela-

�SLOVAKIA

23

tions with it. And not-even the worst distortion oif the truth
can deny the incontrovertible reality that the Sloivak nation
accepted the decision of the Slovruk Ass,emlbly spontaneously,
but even with sincere enthusiasm. Whoever obsevved the internail developmelllt of the Sloivak Republic with open eyes
and without prejudice, and whoever wanted to see how bhe
relationship of the Slovak nation to Slo,vaik independence
was being for.med, very easily could have convinced himself
that their relationship was always positive and was constantly becoming more ardent. It was really and truly
only a natural developcnent.
Even though the historical facts were and still are
easily ascertainaJble, some people, nevertheless. did not and
still do not like the simple and plain truth and, therefore,
dress the historical e,v ent in garments orf false legends. The
gist o,f the matter is lost to them in a flood of details, and
by stressing secondary, frequently insignificaint phenomena,
the,y stun or cover up the real sUJbSitance. Of cours z, they
know what they are doing; they know what they wish to
attain by doing so.
When e,v aluating a historical fact, such as the declaration o,,f the state independence of Slovakia, the only question
of real s,i:gnifiicance is whether the SloiVruk nation had the
rrght to declare its country an independent state. It may
be interesting, .but utterly secondary, whether this historical
dedsion of the Slovak Assembly was made under this or
that international situation which, aifter all, fol'med only the
outer frame for March 14, 1939.
The Slovak nation itself never doubted arbout its inherent right to. freedom and state independernJCe. And it
will not debate about this right with aruy one. '.Dhe incontr01Vertible truth is that it does possess this right in the
same measure as do other nations of the earth. The people
who created and are still creating false legends rubout March
14, 1939, do not have the courage to openly denry the Slovak nation the r:ght to state inclepe,n dence: in fact, b principle they recognize this right_ and th€1oretiically hruve no
objections a:gainst it. Nevertheless, for reasons olbvious and
best known to themselves, they present the very event of

�24

SLOVAKIA

the declaration of the independence of the Slov,ak State in a
fal:se light. Into the forefront of the historical scene they
are pushing per.sons who did not have a deciding role in the
issue and are magnifying phenomena whi'ch were only secondary ~isodes. Even though they know that Dr. Joseph Tiso
and Karol Sidor repudiated Hitler's proposition, and even
though they know that neither Hitler nor his people had
any influence on the members of the Slovak Assembly,
nevertheless they maintain and continue to ~peat that the
decl·a ration of the state independence of Slovakia was dictated to the Slovalks from the outside.
This is a conscious and intentional falsification of a
historical fact. Such a presentation o.f the matter is proof
of not comprehending historical development and is an insult for the Slovak nation which is thereby pre,se,nted as a
child without its own will. They created this false legend
so that they might devaluate the state independence of SlovaJkia and validate their own interests .
.Am,other false legend is the story that by declaring the
ind~ndence cxf Slovakia the Slovaiks committed treason
against the state, the state which during 1ts entire existence
never fol.!f,Bled the dghteous demands of the Slovalk nation
and with its political ideo.Jogy and its internal management stood in opposition to the ,vital interests of Slovakia.
Allegations of "treason" against the. Sl01Va)k nation are
proof that, a:ccording to such- an opinion, the SlOIVak nation
was db1rged to r emain until the end of time in union with a
state whrch did not satisfy the needs of a free Sl01Vaik way
of life. That Js, the SJ01VaJks, even though theoretically the
right to independence was not denied them, were not to be
allowed to use this right in practice, nay, even had to surrend&lt;eT it.
The ,p eople who .talik about the "treason" of the Slovak
nation in thts fashion naturally would have to see even a
greater treason in the declaration olf independence of the
United S'tates and would have to condemp. the course of
every nation whi!ch has already declared the independence
of its country or which is still endeavori.I.J:g- to attain_its in-

�SLOVAKIA

25

dependence. Of course, ithey are wise eno1UJgh not to mention
any such nonsense.
The srume ,people - the Benes Czeohs ( Czech Socialists
and pro-1Soviet Czechs) and the so-ica11ed "Czechoslovaks"
(Slovak renegades in the pay oif the Benes Czechs) - talJked
long and loudly alboiut the "treason" of the Slovak nation
against Slavdom. But this legend lasted only as long as
coonmtmist Moscow appeared in a Slovruk mamtie so thait it
might thereby more effectiively realize its own designs in the
ensl·a ved .SlOV1anic (1Shwic) countries. When Ml()SICow discarded this imam.tle., these people immediately ceased talking
about Slawdom, 1because the legend lost tts attraictiveness.
Perhrups the greatest inconsistency and confused contriadiction was found in ,tJhe legend aJbout SlOIVak "fascism,"
whiich stated that by declaring its independence Slovakiia
had ,t hrwst herself into the embrace. of nruzism. If the authors of this legend really were interested in the truth, they
would necessarily have to adrmit and give pulblic testimony
to the fact that the Slovak Reipubl.ic, mana;ged in ,t he spirit
of the slogan "loyal to ourselrves . . ." by President J oseiph
Tiso,, was the most secure iprotection of SlovaJk lilfe against
the influence of German nruzism.
The legend, whiich was farthest from historical truth
and is the crown of a}ll falsehoods and misrepresentations
about the Slwak RepU!blic, is the legend aJbout tilie SO'-lealled
"national uprising" and its "great a·chievemeruts," which the
"CzechoslovaJks" invented in their fantasy and described. in
such glowing teI'lmS, declaring that in the union oif the
Comm'UI1ist-dominated National Front "the Sl'OIVruks were
governing themselves." As shameful as was the content of
this legend with all its details, so just as shamel:f.trl and inglorious was also its end.
All these legends, blown wp beyond credi!ble dimensions
by the fanfare of irresistible propaganda, were dispelied li!ke
a dirty, ma}odorous mist. There remained onil.y lbare rea}lity
and historical triuth. And suich a reality and clerur, undenia;ble
and unaltera'b le histoTiical truth is the fact that the Slovalk
nation did have its -own indepernderut staite and that in this
state. even .with all its faults and shortcomings, the Slo-

�26

SLOVAKIA

vruks soon became cOiIWinoed that Slova;kia was self-suffie,ient
economically and that they were mature enough politically
to live a free and independent life.
After the false legends, the puripose of which it was to
stupefy the Slovak naition and stifle in it the yearning for
independence, there came a period of suffering, misery and
enslavement. But the burden of this sad fate only strengthened in the Slovak nation the consciousness of its ri ght to
fz:eedom and fo11tified its desire for the restoration of the
state independence of Slovrukia. The Slovaik nation, ooe of
the oldest Christian nruti ons o,f central Europe, will never
rest satisfied until it is free of all tyranny and all foreign
domrinatioo..
1

1

•

•

•

THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF

SLOVAKIA'S DECLARATI ON OF INDEPENDE NCE
N3 citiizens of the democraitic Republic of the United
States of America, we firimly hold to the beLief that all nations without exception. have the inherent, God-given right
the right to establish
to freedom and independence to- freely elect a
right
the
and
state
their own ,p olitical
government of their orwn choice.
On March 14, 1939, after centuries of alien domination,
the 1peo.ple of Slovrukia exercised their inherenit right when
their druly elected representative s in the autonomous Slovak Asseimlbly proclaimed the independence of their country and estaJblished the Republic of Slovakia. Of course,
the:re are people in Amen-ca even today who present this
historical fact in a false light and endeavor to debase and
vilify everything connected with it. Nevertheless, the utterly .s imple historical truth is that the Slovak Asse:m!bly unanimously declared the land of the Slovaks an independent
repulblic - the Republic of Slovakia.
The Slova'k Repll!blic, the dream of Slovak generations,
became a reality and was recogmzed by twenty-seven countries, ilncluili.ng the governments of Great Britain, France
and the Soviet Union. After Slovakia was declared inde-

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1233">
                    <text>22

SLOVAKIA

wownd was adm1nistered anew, when a free and independent
Slow.Ilda was born. They are squirnl.in,g like a wounded
snaJke and wd:11 not recognize the truth that there was no
other way out for the .sa1viation of the Slovak nation, except that wMch the ,present lead~s in Slovakia had
taken . . . . "
Amedcans of .Slovffik descent kneiw the meaning o.f freedom and independence. They enjoyed the bJess,i ngs of the
American way of life. As tTue Ameniicans they CO'llld not
wish less to the nation they descended from. It is to their
everliasting oredit that the,y ruoted as manfully as they did
when the Slovak Republic wrus born on March 14, 1939. God
bles,s Amerioa, God 1bless and protect the Slovak nation in
this darkest period of its history!

•

•

•

HISTORICAL TRUTH AND :F ALSE LEGENDS
Francis Hrusovsky
Theil'e rure people who are not bl1nd, b1u t do not want
to see the true face of reality. They aTe not deaif, but their
ears are not a;c,cessi:ble to the voice of truth. Nor are they
inteHectuaUy so dull as nOlt to ,be aJble to comprehend a matter in its .sulbstance, :if they only wanted to. Such people
distort even the s1mplest matter and enravel it with a veil
of confusion oocording to their o,w n conceptions and their
own selfish interests. The,y are cowardly to kno,w and confess the truth and PTefer to deceive themse1ves and ha;ve
suf:fiicient courage to deceive others.
In this manner it is possiible to charructerize the ,p eople
who present the historical fact of the proclamation of the
state independence of Slovrukia in a false light and then with
consistent stubbornness endeavo,r to 1present in a false light
everything that is connected with the Slovak Republic.
The utterly simple historical fact is that on March 14,
1939, the Slovak Assembliy declared Slovakia an independent Slovruk State This historical fact was acknowledged by
many states (27), which recognized the SlovaJk Republic
either de jure or de facto and esta:blished drplomaUc rela-

�SLOVAKIA

23

tions with it. And not-even the worst distortion oif the truth
can deny the incontrovertible reality that the Sloivak nation
accepted the decision of the Slovruk Ass,emlbly spontaneously,
but even with sincere enthusiasm. Whoever obsevved the internail developmelllt of the Sloivak Republic with open eyes
and without prejudice, and whoever wanted to see how bhe
relationship of the Slovak nation to Slo,vaik independence
was being for.med, very easily could have convinced himself
that their relationship was always positive and was constantly becoming more ardent. It was really and truly
only a natural developcnent.
Even though the historical facts were and still are
easily ascertainaJble, some people, nevertheless. did not and
still do not like the simple and plain truth and, therefore,
dress the historical e,v ent in garments orf false legends. The
gist o,f the matter is lost to them in a flood of details, and
by stressing secondary, frequently insignificaint phenomena,
the,y stun or cover up the real sUJbSitance. Of cours z, they
know what they are doing; they know what they wish to
attain by doing so.
When e,v aluating a historical fact, such as the declaration o,,f the state independence of Slovakia, the only question
of real s,i:gnifiicance is whether the SloiVruk nation had the
rrght to declare its country an independent state. It may
be interesting, .but utterly secondary, whether this historical
dedsion of the Slovak Assembly was made under this or
that international situation which, aifter all, fol'med only the
outer frame for March 14, 1939.
The Slovak nation itself never doubted arbout its inherent right to. freedom and state independernJCe. And it
will not debate about this right with aruy one. '.Dhe incontr01Vertible truth is that it does possess this right in the
same measure as do other nations of the earth. The people
who created and are still creating false legends rubout March
14, 1939, do not have the courage to openly denry the Slovak nation the r:ght to state inclepe,n dence: in fact, b principle they recognize this right_ and th€1oretiically hruve no
objections a:gainst it. Nevertheless, for reasons olbvious and
best known to themselves, they present the very event of

�24

SLOVAKIA

the declaration of the independence of the Slov,ak State in a
fal:se light. Into the forefront of the historical scene they
are pushing per.sons who did not have a deciding role in the
issue and are magnifying phenomena whi'ch were only secondary ~isodes. Even though they know that Dr. Joseph Tiso
and Karol Sidor repudiated Hitler's proposition, and even
though they know that neither Hitler nor his people had
any influence on the members of the Slovak Assembly,
nevertheless they maintain and continue to ~peat that the
decl·a ration of the state independence of Slovakia was dictated to the Slovalks from the outside.
This is a conscious and intentional falsification of a
historical fact. Such a presentation o.f the matter is proof
of not comprehending historical development and is an insult for the Slovak nation which is thereby pre,se,nted as a
child without its own will. They created this false legend
so that they might devaluate the state independence of SlovaJkia and validate their own interests .
.Am,other false legend is the story that by declaring the
ind~ndence cxf Slovakia the Slovaiks committed treason
against the state, the state which during 1ts entire existence
never fol.!f,Bled the dghteous demands of the Slovalk nation
and with its political ideo.Jogy and its internal management stood in opposition to the ,vital interests of Slovakia.
Allegations of "treason" against the. Sl01Va)k nation are
proof that, a:ccording to such- an opinion, the SlOIVak nation
was db1rged to r emain until the end of time in union with a
state whrch did not satisfy the needs of a free Sl01Vaik way
of life. That Js, the SJ01VaJks, even though theoretically the
right to independence was not denied them, were not to be
allowed to use this right in practice, nay, even had to surrend&lt;eT it.
The ,p eople who .talik about the "treason" of the Slovak
nation in thts fashion naturally would have to see even a
greater treason in the declaration olf independence of the
United S'tates and would have to condemp. the course of
every nation whi!ch has already declared the independence
of its country or which is still endeavori.I.J:g- to attain_its in-

�SLOVAKIA

25

dependence. Of course, ithey are wise eno1UJgh not to mention
any such nonsense.
The srume ,people - the Benes Czeohs ( Czech Socialists
and pro-1Soviet Czechs) and the so-ica11ed "Czechoslovaks"
(Slovak renegades in the pay oif the Benes Czechs) - talJked
long and loudly alboiut the "treason" of the Slovak nation
against Slavdom. But this legend lasted only as long as
coonmtmist Moscow appeared in a Slovruk mamtie so thait it
might thereby more effectiively realize its own designs in the
ensl·a ved .SlOV1anic (1Shwic) countries. When Ml()SICow discarded this imam.tle., these people immediately ceased talking
about Slawdom, 1because the legend lost tts attraictiveness.
Perhrups the greatest inconsistency and confused contriadiction was found in ,tJhe legend aJbout SlOIVak "fascism,"
whiich stated that by declaring its independence Slovakiia
had ,t hrwst herself into the embrace. of nruzism. If the authors of this legend really were interested in the truth, they
would necessarily have to adrmit and give pulblic testimony
to the fact that the Slovak Reipubl.ic, mana;ged in ,t he spirit
of the slogan "loyal to ourselrves . . ." by President J oseiph
Tiso,, was the most secure iprotection of SlovaJk lilfe against
the influence of German nruzism.
The legend, whiich was farthest from historical truth
and is the crown of a}ll falsehoods and misrepresentations
about the Slwak RepU!blic, is the legend aJbout tilie SO'-lealled
"national uprising" and its "great a·chievemeruts," which the
"CzechoslovaJks" invented in their fantasy and described. in
such glowing teI'lmS, declaring that in the union oif the
Comm'UI1ist-dominated National Front "the Sl'OIVruks were
governing themselves." As shameful as was the content of
this legend with all its details, so just as shamel:f.trl and inglorious was also its end.
All these legends, blown wp beyond credi!ble dimensions
by the fanfare of irresistible propaganda, were dispelied li!ke
a dirty, ma}odorous mist. There remained onil.y lbare rea}lity
and historical triuth. And suich a reality and clerur, undenia;ble
and unaltera'b le histoTiical truth is the fact that the Slovalk
nation did have its -own indepernderut staite and that in this
state. even .with all its faults and shortcomings, the Slo-

�26

SLOVAKIA

vruks soon became cOiIWinoed that Slova;kia was self-suffie,ient
economically and that they were mature enough politically
to live a free and independent life.
After the false legends, the puripose of which it was to
stupefy the Slovak naition and stifle in it the yearning for
independence, there came a period of suffering, misery and
enslavement. But the burden of this sad fate only strengthened in the Slovak nation the consciousness of its ri ght to
fz:eedom and fo11tified its desire for the restoration of the
state independence of Slovrukia. The Slovaik nation, ooe of
the oldest Christian nruti ons o,f central Europe, will never
rest satisfied until it is free of all tyranny and all foreign
domrinatioo..
1

1

•

•

•

THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF

SLOVAKIA'S DECLARATI ON OF INDEPENDE NCE
N3 citiizens of the democraitic Republic of the United
States of America, we firimly hold to the beLief that all nations without exception. have the inherent, God-given right
the right to establish
to freedom and independence to- freely elect a
right
the
and
state
their own ,p olitical
government of their orwn choice.
On March 14, 1939, after centuries of alien domination,
the 1peo.ple of Slovrukia exercised their inherenit right when
their druly elected representative s in the autonomous Slovak Asseimlbly proclaimed the independence of their country and estaJblished the Republic of Slovakia. Of course,
the:re are people in Amen-ca even today who present this
historical fact in a false light and endeavor to debase and
vilify everything connected with it. Nevertheless, the utterly .s imple historical truth is that the Slovak Asse:m!bly unanimously declared the land of the Slovaks an independent
repulblic - the Republic of Slovakia.
The Slova'k Repll!blic, the dream of Slovak generations,
became a reality and was recogmzed by twenty-seven countries, ilncluili.ng the governments of Great Britain, France
and the Soviet Union. After Slovakia was declared inde-

�</text>
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                  <text>1954, Vol. 4</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.&lt;/li&gt;
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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            <elementText elementTextId="1231">
              <text>22&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
wownd was adm1nistered anew, when a free and independent&#13;
Slow.Ilda was born. They are squirnl.in,g like a wounded&#13;
snaJke and wd:11 not recognize the truth that there was no&#13;
other way out for the .sa1viation of the Slovak nation, except that wMch the ,present lead~s in Slovakia had&#13;
taken . . . . "&#13;
Amedcans of .Slovffik descent kneiw the meaning o.f freedom and independence. They enjoyed the bJess,i ngs of the&#13;
American way of life. As tTue Ameniicans they CO'llld not&#13;
wish less to the nation they descended from. It is to their&#13;
everliasting oredit that the,y ruoted as manfully as they did&#13;
when the Slovak Republic wrus born on March 14, 1939. God&#13;
bles,s Amerioa, God 1bless and protect the Slovak nation in&#13;
this darkest period of its history!&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
HISTORICAL TRUTH AND :F ALSE LEGENDS&#13;
Francis Hrusovsky&#13;
Theil'e rure people who are not bl1nd, b1u t do not want&#13;
to see the true face of reality. They aTe not deaif, but their&#13;
ears are not a;c,cessi:ble to the voice of truth. Nor are they&#13;
inteHectuaUy so dull as nOlt to ,be aJble to comprehend a matter in its .sulbstance, :if they only wanted to. Such people&#13;
distort even the s1mplest matter and enravel it with a veil&#13;
of confusion oocording to their o,w n conceptions and their&#13;
own selfish interests. The,y are cowardly to kno,w and confess the truth and PTefer to deceive themse1ves and ha;ve&#13;
suf:fiicient courage to deceive others.&#13;
In this manner it is possiible to charructerize the ,p eople&#13;
who present the historical fact of the proclamation of the&#13;
state independence of Slovrukia in a false light and then with&#13;
consistent stubbornness endeavo,r to 1present in a false light&#13;
everything that is connected with the Slovak Republic.&#13;
The utterly simple historical fact is that on March 14,&#13;
1939, the Slovak Assembliy declared Slovakia an independent Slovruk State This historical fact was acknowledged by&#13;
many states (27), which recognized the SlovaJk Republic&#13;
either de jure or de facto and esta:blished drplomaUc rela-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
23&#13;
&#13;
tions with it. And not-even the worst distortion oif the truth&#13;
can deny the incontrovertible reality that the Sloivak nation&#13;
accepted the decision of the Slovruk Ass,emlbly spontaneously,&#13;
but even with sincere enthusiasm. Whoever obsevved the internail developmelllt of the Sloivak Republic with open eyes&#13;
and without prejudice, and whoever wanted to see how bhe&#13;
relationship of the Slovak nation to Slo,vaik independence&#13;
was being for.med, very easily could have convinced himself&#13;
that their relationship was always positive and was constantly becoming more ardent. It was really and truly&#13;
only a natural developcnent.&#13;
Even though the historical facts were and still are&#13;
easily ascertainaJble, some people, nevertheless. did not and&#13;
still do not like the simple and plain truth and, therefore,&#13;
dress the historical e,v ent in garments orf false legends. The&#13;
gist o,f the matter is lost to them in a flood of details, and&#13;
by stressing secondary, frequently insignificaint phenomena,&#13;
the,y stun or cover up the real sUJbSitance. Of cours z, they&#13;
know what they are doing; they know what they wish to&#13;
attain by doing so.&#13;
When e,v aluating a historical fact, such as the declaration o,,f the state independence of Slovakia, the only question&#13;
of real s,i:gnifiicance is whether the SloiVruk nation had the&#13;
rrght to declare its country an independent state. It may&#13;
be interesting, .but utterly secondary, whether this historical&#13;
dedsion of the Slovak Assembly was made under this or&#13;
that international situation which, aifter all, fol'med only the&#13;
outer frame for March 14, 1939.&#13;
The Slovak nation itself never doubted arbout its inherent right to. freedom and state independernJCe. And it&#13;
will not debate about this right with aruy one. '.Dhe incontr01Vertible truth is that it does possess this right in the&#13;
same measure as do other nations of the earth. The people&#13;
who created and are still creating false legends rubout March&#13;
14, 1939, do not have the courage to openly denry the Slovak nation the r:ght to state inclepe,n dence: in fact, b principle they recognize this right_ and th€1oretiically hruve no&#13;
objections a:gainst it. Nevertheless, for reasons olbvious and&#13;
best known to themselves, they present the very event of&#13;
&#13;
24&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
the declaration of the independence of the Slov,ak State in a&#13;
fal:se light. Into the forefront of the historical scene they&#13;
are pushing per.sons who did not have a deciding role in the&#13;
issue and are magnifying phenomena whi'ch were only secondary ~isodes. Even though they know that Dr. Joseph Tiso&#13;
and Karol Sidor repudiated Hitler's proposition, and even&#13;
though they know that neither Hitler nor his people had&#13;
any influence on the members of the Slovak Assembly,&#13;
nevertheless they maintain and continue to ~peat that the&#13;
decl·a ration of the state independence of Slovakia was dictated to the Slovalks from the outside.&#13;
This is a conscious and intentional falsification of a&#13;
historical fact. Such a presentation o.f the matter is proof&#13;
of not comprehending historical development and is an insult for the Slovak nation which is thereby pre,se,nted as a&#13;
child without its own will. They created this false legend&#13;
so that they might devaluate the state independence of SlovaJkia and validate their own interests .&#13;
.Am,other false legend is the story that by declaring the&#13;
ind~ndence cxf Slovakia the Slovaiks committed treason&#13;
against the state, the state which during 1ts entire existence&#13;
never fol.!f,Bled the dghteous demands of the Slovalk nation&#13;
and with its political ideo.Jogy and its internal management stood in opposition to the ,vital interests of Slovakia.&#13;
Allegations of "treason" against the. Sl01Va)k nation are&#13;
proof that, a:ccording to such- an opinion, the SlOIVak nation&#13;
was db1rged to r emain until the end of time in union with a&#13;
state whrch did not satisfy the needs of a free Sl01Vaik way&#13;
of life. That Js, the SJ01VaJks, even though theoretically the&#13;
right to independence was not denied them, were not to be&#13;
allowed to use this right in practice, nay, even had to surrend&lt;eT it.&#13;
The ,p eople who .talik about the "treason" of the Slovak&#13;
nation in thts fashion naturally would have to see even a&#13;
greater treason in the declaration olf independence of the&#13;
United S'tates and would have to condemp. the course of&#13;
every nation whi!ch has already declared the independence&#13;
of its country or which is still endeavori.I.J:g- to attain_its in-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
25&#13;
&#13;
dependence. Of course, ithey are wise eno1UJgh not to mention&#13;
any such nonsense.&#13;
The srume ,people - the Benes Czeohs ( Czech Socialists&#13;
and pro-1Soviet Czechs) and the so-ica11ed "Czechoslovaks"&#13;
(Slovak renegades in the pay oif the Benes Czechs) - talJked&#13;
long and loudly alboiut the "treason" of the Slovak nation&#13;
against Slavdom. But this legend lasted only as long as&#13;
coonmtmist Moscow appeared in a Slovruk mamtie so thait it&#13;
might thereby more effectiively realize its own designs in the&#13;
ensl·a ved .SlOV1anic (1Shwic) countries. When Ml()SICow discarded this imam.tle., these people immediately ceased talking&#13;
about Slawdom, 1because the legend lost tts attraictiveness.&#13;
Perhrups the greatest inconsistency and confused contriadiction was found in ,tJhe legend aJbout SlOIVak "fascism,"&#13;
whiich stated that by declaring its independence Slovakiia&#13;
had ,t hrwst herself into the embrace. of nruzism. If the authors of this legend really were interested in the truth, they&#13;
would necessarily have to adrmit and give pulblic testimony&#13;
to the fact that the Slovak Reipubl.ic, mana;ged in ,t he spirit&#13;
of the slogan "loyal to ourselrves . . ." by President J oseiph&#13;
Tiso,, was the most secure iprotection of SlovaJk lilfe against&#13;
the influence of German nruzism.&#13;
The legend, whiich was farthest from historical truth&#13;
and is the crown of a}ll falsehoods and misrepresentations&#13;
about the Slwak RepU!blic, is the legend aJbout tilie SO'-lealled&#13;
"national uprising" and its "great a·chievemeruts," which the&#13;
"CzechoslovaJks" invented in their fantasy and described. in&#13;
such glowing teI'lmS, declaring that in the union oif the&#13;
Comm'UI1ist-dominated National Front "the Sl'OIVruks were&#13;
governing themselves." As shameful as was the content of&#13;
this legend with all its details, so just as shamel:f.trl and inglorious was also its end.&#13;
All these legends, blown wp beyond credi!ble dimensions&#13;
by the fanfare of irresistible propaganda, were dispelied li!ke&#13;
a dirty, ma}odorous mist. There remained onil.y lbare rea}lity&#13;
and historical triuth. And suich a reality and clerur, undenia;ble&#13;
and unaltera'b le histoTiical truth is the fact that the Slovalk&#13;
nation did have its -own indepernderut staite and that in this&#13;
state. even .with all its faults and shortcomings, the Slo-&#13;
&#13;
26&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
vruks soon became cOiIWinoed that Slova;kia was self-suffie,ient&#13;
economically and that they were mature enough politically&#13;
to live a free and independent life.&#13;
After the false legends, the puripose of which it was to&#13;
stupefy the Slovak naition and stifle in it the yearning for&#13;
independence, there came a period of suffering, misery and&#13;
enslavement. But the burden of this sad fate only strengthened in the Slovak nation the consciousness of its ri ght to&#13;
fz:eedom and fo11tified its desire for the restoration of the&#13;
state independence of Slovrukia. The Slovaik nation, ooe of&#13;
the oldest Christian nruti ons o,f central Europe, will never&#13;
rest satisfied until it is free of all tyranny and all foreign&#13;
domrinatioo..&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA'S DECLARATI ON OF INDEPENDE NCE&#13;
N3 citiizens of the democraitic Republic of the United&#13;
States of America, we firimly hold to the beLief that all nations without exception. have the inherent, God-given right&#13;
the right to establish&#13;
to freedom and independence to- freely elect a&#13;
right&#13;
the&#13;
and&#13;
state&#13;
their own ,p olitical&#13;
government of their orwn choice.&#13;
On March 14, 1939, after centuries of alien domination,&#13;
the 1peo.ple of Slovrukia exercised their inherenit right when&#13;
their druly elected representative s in the autonomous Slovak Asseimlbly proclaimed the independence of their country and estaJblished the Republic of Slovakia. Of course,&#13;
the:re are people in Amen-ca even today who present this&#13;
historical fact in a false light and endeavor to debase and&#13;
vilify everything connected with it. Nevertheless, the utterly .s imple historical truth is that the Slovak Asse:m!bly unanimously declared the land of the Slovaks an independent&#13;
repulblic - the Republic of Slovakia.&#13;
The Slova'k Repll!blic, the dream of Slovak generations,&#13;
became a reality and was recogmzed by twenty-seven countries, ilncluili.ng the governments of Great Britain, France&#13;
and the Soviet Union. After Slovakia was declared inde-&#13;
&#13;
</text>
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                <text>Historical Truth and False Legends</text>
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                <text>Francis Hrušovský&#13;
Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10), March 1954&#13;
pp. 22-26</text>
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                    <text>26

SLOVAKIA

vruks soon became cOiIWinoed that Slova;kia was self-suffie,ient
economically and that they were mature enough politically
to live a free and independent life.
After the false legends, the puripose of which it was to
stupefy the Slovak naition and stifle in it the yearning for
independence, there came a period of suffering, misery and
enslavement. But the burden of this sad fate only strengthened in the Slovak nation the consciousness of its ri ght to
fz:eedom and fo11tified its desire for the restoration of the
state independence of Slovrukia. The Slovaik nation, ooe of
the oldest Christian nruti ons o,f central Europe, will never
rest satisfied until it is free of all tyranny and all foreign
domrinatioo..
1

1

•

•

•

THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF

SLOVAKIA'S DECLARATI ON OF INDEPENDE NCE
N3 citiizens of the democraitic Republic of the United
States of America, we firimly hold to the beLief that all nations without exception. have the inherent, God-given right
the right to establish
to freedom and independence to- freely elect a
right
the
and
state
their own ,p olitical
government of their orwn choice.
On March 14, 1939, after centuries of alien domination,
the 1peo.ple of Slovrukia exercised their inherenit right when
their druly elected representative s in the autonomous Slovak Asseimlbly proclaimed the independence of their country and estaJblished the Republic of Slovakia. Of course,
the:re are people in Amen-ca even today who present this
historical fact in a false light and endeavor to debase and
vilify everything connected with it. Nevertheless, the utterly .s imple historical truth is that the Slovak Asse:m!bly unanimously declared the land of the Slovaks an independent
repulblic - the Republic of Slovakia.
The Slova'k Repll!blic, the dream of Slovak generations,
became a reality and was recogmzed by twenty-seven countries, ilncluili.ng the governments of Great Britain, France
and the Soviet Union. After Slovakia was declared inde-

�SLOVAKIA

27

pendent, the enemies of Slovak freedom and independence
began to howl, naturally. Speculating on their circumstances
under which the .SlovaJks gained their indeipenden:ce, the
followers of Dr. Edward Benes - the so-called Bein.es Czechs
(Socialists) and "CzechosiovaJks" {!SlovaJk renegades in the
pay of the Benes Czechs) - smeared and vilified true Slo~
v,aJk pat11iots who dared to speak up for what was rightfully
theirs. But no matter what the circumstances under which
the SlovaJks gained their independence, we as Americans
must contend that the Repwblic af Slovakia never should
have been destroyed against the will of the Slo.vaJk nation.
By what law of God or man was the Slovak Repulblic
destroyed? Certainly its destrlllCtion cannot 'be justified
by or reconciled with our poHtical beliefs. Its destruction
was cont11ary to 8Jll Christian and democratic principles in short., it was irnm&lt;Yrail and criminal. And let us not f&lt;Yrget that SlovaJkia was destro,yed: by the victorious United
Nations u;nder the guise of liiberation!
The present ter!1iible plight of the Slovak nation, like
that oif the other nations of central Europe which had been
"lilberated" in 1945, is due to the blundering, undemocratic
policy pursued and the secret agreements negotiated in the
name of expediency hy men of democrati'C governments.
In a way, therefore, we are all resp&lt;;msiible for the Red enslavement of the nations behind the Iron Curtain and the
inhumanities suififered by them. Definitely, we should do
something aJbout it. Let us at least be honest with ourselves and the world amd admit th8Jt it was morally wrong
and contrary to every democratic and Chri'Sti8Jn principle
to surrender the SlovaJk nation and the other nations of
central and eastern Europe to the men of the Kremlin.
Today much is being said and written rubout crises, crucial days ahead, human rights and man's inhumanity to
man. The struggle a-gain.st tyranny, however, is nothing
new to the Slovaks. The history of the Slovak nation is a
history replete wi:th thrald:om and ex;ploitation. For over ten
centuries the Slovak nation - one of the oldest Christian
nations of central Europe - has been a pawn in the . hands
of alien rulers. Its econ01IDy, freedom, security and territo-

�28

SLOVAKIA

rial integrity haive a:lways been determined by foreigners.
The SlOIV'a'k s have suf.fered longer under alien domination
than any other nation Olf Europe. No other nation has been
so thoroughly misunders tood, misr~presented, degraded, maligned and vilified - at times even by the veJ"y people who
were supposed to represent it and protect its interests, by
men who prOlfessed to be and were g~o,r ified as the very
epitome of the democratic way of life.
Many of us thought, as did many SlovaJks at home, that
the trials anxl trilbulations of the Slovak nation were at an
end with the estaJblishment of the Cze:cho...Sl01Va'k Repulblic
in 1918, which the Slovaks and the Ozeichs were to govern
as equal partners. But we were mistaken, badly mistaiken.
It soon became evident that the Prague government, headed
by T. G. Masarylk, did not regard the SlovaJk,s as equal partners, but only as a colony to be e:x:ploited for the benefit
of the Czech nation. The Slovaks soon realized that they
had rid themselves of the Magyar despot only to be ruled
over by i.miperialistk Czechs, who sought to destroy them
eventually as a nation.
The Slovaiks, however, outlived the tyranny of the past
and today are more dete.I"mined than ever to outlive the presoot scourge of Ozecho.-Oommunist terror and violence and
to continue on their way to complete ·p olitical freedom and
independence. Despite the many 'bitter memories of injustices suffered from ruling groU!ps of neiighlboring nations,
some of whreh blatantly claimed to the exemplary democracies, the SlovaJks are fully consdous of the fact that
a free Poland, a free Ukraine, a free Bohemia, and even a
free Russia are also necessary to form a better, free and
more just order in EJurrope. The SlovaJks know that the
stru,ggle for freedom and independeil!ce cannot and must not
be waiged in isolation; the goal of Uberation from communist tyranny and all foreign domination must be the unified aiim of all ensl:wed nations and Of all fri~ds of all the
oppressed peoples.
The Slovaik nation has proven itself one of the greatest small natiOillS of Europe. The Slov.alks are healthy of
mind and body, intelligent, industrious, intensely religious,

�SLOVAKIA

29

tolerant, and devoted to the pe,ace£ul development of their
national life and culture. As a nation they committed no
aggression against their neighbors, nor did they violate the
rights of others. It is a matter of record that they are always staunchly loyal to the countries of their adoption,
contributing handsomely, in proportion to their numbers,
to their material and spiritual growth. This is attested to
by our own America, the true friend of the perse&lt;mited and
the oppressed. To Slovaks everyiwhere, at home and in
exile, America is looked upon as the living symbol of freedom, tolerance, and justice. More than that, the Slovaks
look to America as their salvation; they expect to be truly
Hbemted by the land of Washington and Lincoln. Let us
pray God that we do not disruppoint them .
The descendants of the Slovak na:tion in America
should be hruppy amd proud to stress the fact that the
SlovaJk nation has fought the plague of materialistic Comm'UIIlism consistently and resolutely for over a hundTed
years. It is a matter of record that Louis Srur, Slovak
writer and champion of Slova'k freedom, repudiated the
godless philosophy of Marx in 1849 and warned his people against it; the political party of Monsignor Andrew
Hlilllka, the Slovaik Poipulist Party, repudiated Communism at its very first session in 1905; in 1919 General Milan
R. Stefanik, Sl01VaJk war hero and one of the founders of
the Czecho-1Slov.aJk Repulblic, cautioned T. G. Masaryk and
Edward Benes to maike no compromises with Bolshevism;
and Dr. Joseph Tiso, first president of the SlOIVaJk Republic, begged his peoiple to persevere in its fight against the
dread plague of Communism even as he was being led to
the gallows iby order of the Communist-dominated National
Front g01Vernment of Dr. Edward Benes on Arpril 18, 1947.
Indeed, it is a matter of record that the Slovalk people
fought Communism, the implacable foe of democracy, in
and out of season. And they are deter.mined to fight it until
it is w1ped off the face of the earth.
And what after Communism? Are the SlorvaJks willing
to be exploited by another form of Czeicho-iSlovaJkia? Certainly not! The Slovaks want only what rightfuUy belongs

�30

SLOVAKIA

to them. No more, no less. They want the United States of
America and the rest of the free world to reco:grtIBe and
respect their inherent ri1g ht to freedom and inde:pendence.
The Slov8Jks seek onl~ the opportunity to play a useful role
in the struiggle for freedom. And it is the responsiibility. of
the free democrat:iic world to afford them this opportiunity.
The S1'ovruks want the demO'cratJic world to recogni.!ze at long
last a s,imple truth which the Czechs and Slovaks have
knoiwn for many cenbITies past, that is, that the Czechs
are not and do not want to be SlovaJks, and that the Sl0iva:ks
are n!Ot and do not want to be Ozechs. This fact has been
clearly demonstrated by both the Czechs and the Slova;ks
during the past forty years, that is, ever since the start of
World War I.
The Slovaks do not want anything tha&gt;l is not rightfully theirs; they do not c&lt;1Vet the spiritual and material
wealth of the O.zech nation; they do not make any claims to
Ozooh history, national traditions and customs; they have
rubsolutely no desire for Ozech lMlds; and they do not ask
the Czechs to represent them in any field of endeavor,
whether spiritual, cultural or political.
And, of course, the Slovak nation did not and does not
make any claim to the criminal acts committed by the
post-iwar Communist-0ominated Czech National Front government of Dr. Edward Benes and Clement Gottwald. The
Slo,v,aks had nothing to do with the criminal exipulsion of
Ge.rnnans from Ozeicho-1SLovakia, o,r the brutal persecution
and swppression Of all anti-Communist opposition in that
hrupless country. Flor the betrayal of the Czech and Slovruk
nations to the Communists and Red Moscow, the Slo'V'aks
shall give full credit to. Dr. ffidward Benes and his socialist
foHawera, who a1w:ays 1promoted .pro-1Soviet policy.
The Slovruks respeot the r,i ght of the Czech nation to
c~lete freedom and politi·c al independence, ·b ut they also
eX!peot leaders of the Czech nation to realiize that the Slova:k nation, too, possesses that right. The Slovaks do not
intend to surrender their right to freedom and indeipendence; they are not willing to comirn:it national suicide.
A-nd it would be immoral for us even to surggest that they do

�SLOVAKIA

31

so. Why then should any governmen ts, especially governments of democratic countries, insist that the SlovaJks and
the territory they have inhabited for at lea.st the past 1500
years must continue to be exploited by another nation?
Let us .e ver be mindful of the farct that we are the
apostles of the true democratic way of life. As such, we
must always be willing and ready to share the blessings
of our democ11acy with the less fortunaJte and oppressed
peoples of the earth. 1it is our sacred duty to spread the
gospel and share the blessings of ,t he deanocraJtic way of
life which gives so much to so many for so little. True, at
times it is a diftfiimtlrt and unigrateful task, but it is one
which we must do for the sake of our country, for the cause
of freedom to wh:itch we are dedicated as a nation, the cause
which is common even to the nation the American Slovaks
are descended from.
America,ns of Slova!k descent must tell the story of the
long, enduring struggle of the Slovak nation for freedom
and ind~nden ce to all democratic peoples of the earth and
their governmen ts. Unfortunat el,y, many poople in governn:ient, particularl y in our own American Governmen t, hruve
allowed themse1ves to be influenced and corufused by the
slanderous, villainous and vicious anti-1Slovak campaign.
waged by the enemies of SlovaJk freedom and independen ce.
It is the duty of every true American, especially Americans
of SlOIViak descent, to expose and embarrass all streh pseudodemocratic elements and disamn them completel,y, because
the enemies of Slovak freedom amd independen ce are in fact
the enemies of the democraJtic way of life itself.
Naturally, the Slovia. ks cannot stand idly ·b y while sucll
people pe11petmte the destrwction of the nation they rure descended from. We must tell this story to om duly elected
representat ives in Washingto n and insist tihat they, in turn,
as our representrutiives, see to it thait our Governmen t adopts
a more realistic and just policy toward the Sl01Va!k nation
and its representat ives. It is, after all, in the intersts of
America and all other democratic coU'Iltries that the Slo;vaiks,
too, be free and independen t, that even they be allowed to
1

�32

SLOVAKIA

determine by their own free choice the state or form of
political organfaation under which they wish to li,v e.
History has taught us this one great lesson: no nation
can have a monopoly on freedom. Freedom is the grandest
of all of God',s gifts to manhnd; freedom is the universal
heritage of all the aiges. The more we ,p romote and share it,
the more aJbundant are its fruits. Of comse, peace without
freedom is unthink:ruble. If we li1re tru1y interested in a permanent and just -peace, let us not deny freedom to any
nation.
When evalll.l'ating the historical fact of the declaration
orf independence of the Slovak nation, let us bear in mind
thait the only question of real sig.nificance is whether the
Slova!k nation had the right to declare its country an independent repUJblic. Believing as Americans do, we know they
did and committed neither crime nor treason in exercising it.
Let people say what they will about MM'ch 14, 1939 Slovak Independence Day - or the circumstances that led
to it, Slova·k s at home and abroad stiH claim that it was the
most beautiful and joyous day in the history of the Slovak
nation. Today all SlOIVaks are storming the heruvens with
prayers that :Sloiva!kia's independence might soon be restored. And Americans believe that it will be. - P. A. Hrobak .

•

•

•

WHO SAID IT?
"Our alliance with Russia was accepted UNANIMOUSLY BY ALL
OF US, not only by our Communists and Socialists, BUT BY ALL
THE PARTIES - and there are four of them in the government by Catholics and Protestants alike . . . . Any American or foreign cor.
respondent will tell you that WE HAVE NO CENSORSHIP on foreign news from the leading world agencies, including the Associated
Press and United Press. • . . WE are the ONLY Slav country which
has diplomatic and friendly relations with the Vatican. I have an
ambassador at the Holy See and there is a Nuncio In Prague." (Jan Masaryk, Address at the 15th Annual New York Herald Trf.bune
Forum on Current Problems, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, N . Y., October
30, 1946, 4th session) .

•

•

•

"Just as Munk·h was undone and does not exist, Just so there is
no Slovakia and it does not exist internationally as a state! There is
no Slovak problem, the Slovak problem is our Internal pro·blem and
It is reeognize&lt;I as such even by our allies." - (Dr. Benes, 5-22-43).

�</text>
                  </elementText>
                  <elementText elementTextId="1226">
                    <text>26

SLOVAKIA

vruks soon became cOiIWinoed that Slova;kia was self-suffie,ient
economically and that they were mature enough politically
to live a free and independent life.
After the false legends, the puripose of which it was to
stupefy the Slovak naition and stifle in it the yearning for
independence, there came a period of suffering, misery and
enslavement. But the burden of this sad fate only strengthened in the Slovak nation the consciousness of its ri ght to
fz:eedom and fo11tified its desire for the restoration of the
state independence of Slovrukia. The Slovaik nation, ooe of
the oldest Christian nruti ons o,f central Europe, will never
rest satisfied until it is free of all tyranny and all foreign
domrinatioo..
1

1

•

•

•

THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF

SLOVAKIA'S DECLARATI ON OF INDEPENDE NCE
N3 citiizens of the democraitic Republic of the United
States of America, we firimly hold to the beLief that all nations without exception. have the inherent, God-given right
the right to establish
to freedom and independence to- freely elect a
right
the
and
state
their own ,p olitical
government of their orwn choice.
On March 14, 1939, after centuries of alien domination,
the 1peo.ple of Slovrukia exercised their inherenit right when
their druly elected representative s in the autonomous Slovak Asseimlbly proclaimed the independence of their country and estaJblished the Republic of Slovakia. Of course,
the:re are people in Amen-ca even today who present this
historical fact in a false light and endeavor to debase and
vilify everything connected with it. Nevertheless, the utterly .s imple historical truth is that the Slovak Asse:m!bly unanimously declared the land of the Slovaks an independent
repulblic - the Republic of Slovakia.
The Slova'k Repll!blic, the dream of Slovak generations,
became a reality and was recogmzed by twenty-seven countries, ilncluili.ng the governments of Great Britain, France
and the Soviet Union. After Slovakia was declared inde-

�SLOVAKIA

27

pendent, the enemies of Slovak freedom and independence
began to howl, naturally. Speculating on their circumstances
under which the .SlovaJks gained their indeipenden:ce, the
followers of Dr. Edward Benes - the so-called Bein.es Czechs
(Socialists) and "CzechosiovaJks" {!SlovaJk renegades in the
pay of the Benes Czechs) - smeared and vilified true Slo~
v,aJk pat11iots who dared to speak up for what was rightfully
theirs. But no matter what the circumstances under which
the SlovaJks gained their independence, we as Americans
must contend that the Repwblic af Slovakia never should
have been destroyed against the will of the Slo.vaJk nation.
By what law of God or man was the Slovak Repulblic
destroyed? Certainly its destrlllCtion cannot 'be justified
by or reconciled with our poHtical beliefs. Its destruction
was cont11ary to 8Jll Christian and democratic principles in short., it was irnm&lt;Yrail and criminal. And let us not f&lt;Yrget that SlovaJkia was destro,yed: by the victorious United
Nations u;nder the guise of liiberation!
The present ter!1iible plight of the Slovak nation, like
that oif the other nations of central Europe which had been
"lilberated" in 1945, is due to the blundering, undemocratic
policy pursued and the secret agreements negotiated in the
name of expediency hy men of democrati'C governments.
In a way, therefore, we are all resp&lt;;msiible for the Red enslavement of the nations behind the Iron Curtain and the
inhumanities suififered by them. Definitely, we should do
something aJbout it. Let us at least be honest with ourselves and the world amd admit th8Jt it was morally wrong
and contrary to every democratic and Chri'Sti8Jn principle
to surrender the SlovaJk nation and the other nations of
central and eastern Europe to the men of the Kremlin.
Today much is being said and written rubout crises, crucial days ahead, human rights and man's inhumanity to
man. The struggle a-gain.st tyranny, however, is nothing
new to the Slovaks. The history of the Slovak nation is a
history replete wi:th thrald:om and ex;ploitation. For over ten
centuries the Slovak nation - one of the oldest Christian
nations of central Europe - has been a pawn in the . hands
of alien rulers. Its econ01IDy, freedom, security and territo-

�28

SLOVAKIA

rial integrity haive a:lways been determined by foreigners.
The SlOIV'a'k s have suf.fered longer under alien domination
than any other nation Olf Europe. No other nation has been
so thoroughly misunders tood, misr~presented, degraded, maligned and vilified - at times even by the veJ"y people who
were supposed to represent it and protect its interests, by
men who prOlfessed to be and were g~o,r ified as the very
epitome of the democratic way of life.
Many of us thought, as did many SlovaJks at home, that
the trials anxl trilbulations of the Slovak nation were at an
end with the estaJblishment of the Cze:cho...Sl01Va'k Repulblic
in 1918, which the Slovaks and the Ozeichs were to govern
as equal partners. But we were mistaken, badly mistaiken.
It soon became evident that the Prague government, headed
by T. G. Masarylk, did not regard the SlovaJk,s as equal partners, but only as a colony to be e:x:ploited for the benefit
of the Czech nation. The Slovaks soon realized that they
had rid themselves of the Magyar despot only to be ruled
over by i.miperialistk Czechs, who sought to destroy them
eventually as a nation.
The Slovaiks, however, outlived the tyranny of the past
and today are more dete.I"mined than ever to outlive the presoot scourge of Ozecho.-Oommunist terror and violence and
to continue on their way to complete ·p olitical freedom and
independence. Despite the many 'bitter memories of injustices suffered from ruling groU!ps of neiighlboring nations,
some of whreh blatantly claimed to the exemplary democracies, the SlovaJks are fully consdous of the fact that
a free Poland, a free Ukraine, a free Bohemia, and even a
free Russia are also necessary to form a better, free and
more just order in EJurrope. The SlovaJks know that the
stru,ggle for freedom and independeil!ce cannot and must not
be waiged in isolation; the goal of Uberation from communist tyranny and all foreign domination must be the unified aiim of all ensl:wed nations and Of all fri~ds of all the
oppressed peoples.
The Slovaik nation has proven itself one of the greatest small natiOillS of Europe. The Slov.alks are healthy of
mind and body, intelligent, industrious, intensely religious,

�SLOVAKIA

29

tolerant, and devoted to the pe,ace£ul development of their
national life and culture. As a nation they committed no
aggression against their neighbors, nor did they violate the
rights of others. It is a matter of record that they are always staunchly loyal to the countries of their adoption,
contributing handsomely, in proportion to their numbers,
to their material and spiritual growth. This is attested to
by our own America, the true friend of the perse&lt;mited and
the oppressed. To Slovaks everyiwhere, at home and in
exile, America is looked upon as the living symbol of freedom, tolerance, and justice. More than that, the Slovaks
look to America as their salvation; they expect to be truly
Hbemted by the land of Washington and Lincoln. Let us
pray God that we do not disruppoint them .
The descendants of the Slovak na:tion in America
should be hruppy amd proud to stress the fact that the
SlovaJk nation has fought the plague of materialistic Comm'UIIlism consistently and resolutely for over a hundTed
years. It is a matter of record that Louis Srur, Slovak
writer and champion of Slova'k freedom, repudiated the
godless philosophy of Marx in 1849 and warned his people against it; the political party of Monsignor Andrew
Hlilllka, the Slovaik Poipulist Party, repudiated Communism at its very first session in 1905; in 1919 General Milan
R. Stefanik, Sl01VaJk war hero and one of the founders of
the Czecho-1Slov.aJk Repulblic, cautioned T. G. Masaryk and
Edward Benes to maike no compromises with Bolshevism;
and Dr. Joseph Tiso, first president of the SlOIVaJk Republic, begged his peoiple to persevere in its fight against the
dread plague of Communism even as he was being led to
the gallows iby order of the Communist-dominated National
Front g01Vernment of Dr. Edward Benes on Arpril 18, 1947.
Indeed, it is a matter of record that the Slovalk people
fought Communism, the implacable foe of democracy, in
and out of season. And they are deter.mined to fight it until
it is w1ped off the face of the earth.
And what after Communism? Are the SlorvaJks willing
to be exploited by another form of Czeicho-iSlovaJkia? Certainly not! The Slovaks want only what rightfuUy belongs

�30

SLOVAKIA

to them. No more, no less. They want the United States of
America and the rest of the free world to reco:grtIBe and
respect their inherent ri1g ht to freedom and inde:pendence.
The Slov8Jks seek onl~ the opportunity to play a useful role
in the struiggle for freedom. And it is the responsiibility. of
the free democrat:iic world to afford them this opportiunity.
The S1'ovruks want the demO'cratJic world to recogni.!ze at long
last a s,imple truth which the Czechs and Slovaks have
knoiwn for many cenbITies past, that is, that the Czechs
are not and do not want to be SlovaJks, and that the Sl0iva:ks
are n!Ot and do not want to be Ozechs. This fact has been
clearly demonstrated by both the Czechs and the Slova;ks
during the past forty years, that is, ever since the start of
World War I.
The Slovaks do not want anything tha&gt;l is not rightfully theirs; they do not c&lt;1Vet the spiritual and material
wealth of the O.zech nation; they do not make any claims to
Ozooh history, national traditions and customs; they have
rubsolutely no desire for Ozech lMlds; and they do not ask
the Czechs to represent them in any field of endeavor,
whether spiritual, cultural or political.
And, of course, the Slovak nation did not and does not
make any claim to the criminal acts committed by the
post-iwar Communist-0ominated Czech National Front government of Dr. Edward Benes and Clement Gottwald. The
Slo,v,aks had nothing to do with the criminal exipulsion of
Ge.rnnans from Ozeicho-1SLovakia, o,r the brutal persecution
and swppression Of all anti-Communist opposition in that
hrupless country. Flor the betrayal of the Czech and Slovruk
nations to the Communists and Red Moscow, the Slo'V'aks
shall give full credit to. Dr. ffidward Benes and his socialist
foHawera, who a1w:ays 1promoted .pro-1Soviet policy.
The Slovruks respeot the r,i ght of the Czech nation to
c~lete freedom and politi·c al independence, ·b ut they also
eX!peot leaders of the Czech nation to realiize that the Slova:k nation, too, possesses that right. The Slovaks do not
intend to surrender their right to freedom and indeipendence; they are not willing to comirn:it national suicide.
A-nd it would be immoral for us even to surggest that they do

�SLOVAKIA

31

so. Why then should any governmen ts, especially governments of democratic countries, insist that the SlovaJks and
the territory they have inhabited for at lea.st the past 1500
years must continue to be exploited by another nation?
Let us .e ver be mindful of the farct that we are the
apostles of the true democratic way of life. As such, we
must always be willing and ready to share the blessings
of our democ11acy with the less fortunaJte and oppressed
peoples of the earth. 1it is our sacred duty to spread the
gospel and share the blessings of ,t he deanocraJtic way of
life which gives so much to so many for so little. True, at
times it is a diftfiimtlrt and unigrateful task, but it is one
which we must do for the sake of our country, for the cause
of freedom to wh:itch we are dedicated as a nation, the cause
which is common even to the nation the American Slovaks
are descended from.
America,ns of Slova!k descent must tell the story of the
long, enduring struggle of the Slovak nation for freedom
and ind~nden ce to all democratic peoples of the earth and
their governmen ts. Unfortunat el,y, many poople in governn:ient, particularl y in our own American Governmen t, hruve
allowed themse1ves to be influenced and corufused by the
slanderous, villainous and vicious anti-1Slovak campaign.
waged by the enemies of SlovaJk freedom and independen ce.
It is the duty of every true American, especially Americans
of SlOIViak descent, to expose and embarrass all streh pseudodemocratic elements and disamn them completel,y, because
the enemies of Slovak freedom amd independen ce are in fact
the enemies of the democraJtic way of life itself.
Naturally, the Slovia. ks cannot stand idly ·b y while sucll
people pe11petmte the destrwction of the nation they rure descended from. We must tell this story to om duly elected
representat ives in Washingto n and insist tihat they, in turn,
as our representrutiives, see to it thait our Governmen t adopts
a more realistic and just policy toward the Sl01Va!k nation
and its representat ives. It is, after all, in the intersts of
America and all other democratic coU'Iltries that the Slo;vaiks,
too, be free and independen t, that even they be allowed to
1

�32

SLOVAKIA

determine by their own free choice the state or form of
political organfaation under which they wish to li,v e.
History has taught us this one great lesson: no nation
can have a monopoly on freedom. Freedom is the grandest
of all of God',s gifts to manhnd; freedom is the universal
heritage of all the aiges. The more we ,p romote and share it,
the more aJbundant are its fruits. Of comse, peace without
freedom is unthink:ruble. If we li1re tru1y interested in a permanent and just -peace, let us not deny freedom to any
nation.
When evalll.l'ating the historical fact of the declaration
orf independence of the Slovak nation, let us bear in mind
thait the only question of real sig.nificance is whether the
Slova!k nation had the right to declare its country an independent repUJblic. Believing as Americans do, we know they
did and committed neither crime nor treason in exercising it.
Let people say what they will about MM'ch 14, 1939 Slovak Independence Day - or the circumstances that led
to it, Slova·k s at home and abroad stiH claim that it was the
most beautiful and joyous day in the history of the Slovak
nation. Today all SlOIVaks are storming the heruvens with
prayers that :Sloiva!kia's independence might soon be restored. And Americans believe that it will be. - P. A. Hrobak .

•

•

•

WHO SAID IT?
"Our alliance with Russia was accepted UNANIMOUSLY BY ALL
OF US, not only by our Communists and Socialists, BUT BY ALL
THE PARTIES - and there are four of them in the government by Catholics and Protestants alike . . . . Any American or foreign cor.
respondent will tell you that WE HAVE NO CENSORSHIP on foreign news from the leading world agencies, including the Associated
Press and United Press. • . . WE are the ONLY Slav country which
has diplomatic and friendly relations with the Vatican. I have an
ambassador at the Holy See and there is a Nuncio In Prague." (Jan Masaryk, Address at the 15th Annual New York Herald Trf.bune
Forum on Current Problems, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, N . Y., October
30, 1946, 4th session) .

•

•

•

"Just as Munk·h was undone and does not exist, Just so there is
no Slovakia and it does not exist internationally as a state! There is
no Slovak problem, the Slovak problem is our Internal pro·blem and
It is reeognize&lt;I as such even by our allies." - (Dr. Benes, 5-22-43).

�</text>
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                  <text>1954, Vol. 4</text>
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                  <text>&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.&lt;/li&gt;
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                  <text>The Slovak League of America</text>
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            <elementText elementTextId="1224">
              <text>26&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
vruks soon became cOiIWinoed that Slova;kia was self-suffie,ient&#13;
economically and that they were mature enough politically&#13;
to live a free and independent life.&#13;
After the false legends, the puripose of which it was to&#13;
stupefy the Slovak naition and stifle in it the yearning for&#13;
independence, there came a period of suffering, misery and&#13;
enslavement. But the burden of this sad fate only strengthened in the Slovak nation the consciousness of its ri ght to&#13;
fz:eedom and fo11tified its desire for the restoration of the&#13;
state independence of Slovrukia. The Slovaik nation, ooe of&#13;
the oldest Christian nruti ons o,f central Europe, will never&#13;
rest satisfied until it is free of all tyranny and all foreign&#13;
domrinatioo..&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA'S DECLARATI ON OF INDEPENDE NCE&#13;
N3 citiizens of the democraitic Republic of the United&#13;
States of America, we firimly hold to the beLief that all nations without exception. have the inherent, God-given right&#13;
the right to establish&#13;
to freedom and independence to- freely elect a&#13;
right&#13;
the&#13;
and&#13;
state&#13;
their own ,p olitical&#13;
government of their orwn choice.&#13;
On March 14, 1939, after centuries of alien domination,&#13;
the 1peo.ple of Slovrukia exercised their inherenit right when&#13;
their druly elected representative s in the autonomous Slovak Asseimlbly proclaimed the independence of their country and estaJblished the Republic of Slovakia. Of course,&#13;
the:re are people in Amen-ca even today who present this&#13;
historical fact in a false light and endeavor to debase and&#13;
vilify everything connected with it. Nevertheless, the utterly .s imple historical truth is that the Slovak Asse:m!bly unanimously declared the land of the Slovaks an independent&#13;
repulblic - the Republic of Slovakia.&#13;
The Slova'k Repll!blic, the dream of Slovak generations,&#13;
became a reality and was recogmzed by twenty-seven countries, ilncluili.ng the governments of Great Britain, France&#13;
and the Soviet Union. After Slovakia was declared inde-&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
27&#13;
&#13;
pendent, the enemies of Slovak freedom and independence&#13;
began to howl, naturally. Speculating on their circumstances&#13;
under which the .SlovaJks gained their indeipenden:ce, the&#13;
followers of Dr. Edward Benes - the so-called Bein.es Czechs&#13;
(Socialists) and "CzechosiovaJks" {!SlovaJk renegades in the&#13;
pay of the Benes Czechs) - smeared and vilified true Slo~&#13;
v,aJk pat11iots who dared to speak up for what was rightfully&#13;
theirs. But no matter what the circumstances under which&#13;
the SlovaJks gained their independence, we as Americans&#13;
must contend that the Repwblic af Slovakia never should&#13;
have been destroyed against the will of the Slo.vaJk nation.&#13;
By what law of God or man was the Slovak Repulblic&#13;
destroyed? Certainly its destrlllCtion cannot 'be justified&#13;
by or reconciled with our poHtical beliefs. Its destruction&#13;
was cont11ary to 8Jll Christian and democratic principles in short., it was irnm&lt;Yrail and criminal. And let us not f&lt;Yrget that SlovaJkia was destro,yed: by the victorious United&#13;
Nations u;nder the guise of liiberation!&#13;
The present ter!1iible plight of the Slovak nation, like&#13;
that oif the other nations of central Europe which had been&#13;
"lilberated" in 1945, is due to the blundering, undemocratic&#13;
policy pursued and the secret agreements negotiated in the&#13;
name of expediency hy men of democrati'C governments.&#13;
In a way, therefore, we are all resp&lt;;msiible for the Red enslavement of the nations behind the Iron Curtain and the&#13;
inhumanities suififered by them. Definitely, we should do&#13;
something aJbout it. Let us at least be honest with ourselves and the world amd admit th8Jt it was morally wrong&#13;
and contrary to every democratic and Chri'Sti8Jn principle&#13;
to surrender the SlovaJk nation and the other nations of&#13;
central and eastern Europe to the men of the Kremlin.&#13;
Today much is being said and written rubout crises, crucial days ahead, human rights and man's inhumanity to&#13;
man. The struggle a-gain.st tyranny, however, is nothing&#13;
new to the Slovaks. The history of the Slovak nation is a&#13;
history replete wi:th thrald:om and ex;ploitation. For over ten&#13;
centuries the Slovak nation - one of the oldest Christian&#13;
nations of central Europe - has been a pawn in the . hands&#13;
of alien rulers. Its econ01IDy, freedom, security and territo-&#13;
&#13;
28&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
rial integrity haive a:lways been determined by foreigners.&#13;
The SlOIV'a'k s have suf.fered longer under alien domination&#13;
than any other nation Olf Europe. No other nation has been&#13;
so thoroughly misunders tood, misr~presented, degraded, maligned and vilified - at times even by the veJ"y people who&#13;
were supposed to represent it and protect its interests, by&#13;
men who prOlfessed to be and were g~o,r ified as the very&#13;
epitome of the democratic way of life.&#13;
Many of us thought, as did many SlovaJks at home, that&#13;
the trials anxl trilbulations of the Slovak nation were at an&#13;
end with the estaJblishment of the Cze:cho...Sl01Va'k Repulblic&#13;
in 1918, which the Slovaks and the Ozeichs were to govern&#13;
as equal partners. But we were mistaken, badly mistaiken.&#13;
It soon became evident that the Prague government, headed&#13;
by T. G. Masarylk, did not regard the SlovaJk,s as equal partners, but only as a colony to be e:x:ploited for the benefit&#13;
of the Czech nation. The Slovaks soon realized that they&#13;
had rid themselves of the Magyar despot only to be ruled&#13;
over by i.miperialistk Czechs, who sought to destroy them&#13;
eventually as a nation.&#13;
The Slovaiks, however, outlived the tyranny of the past&#13;
and today are more dete.I"mined than ever to outlive the presoot scourge of Ozecho.-Oommunist terror and violence and&#13;
to continue on their way to complete ·p olitical freedom and&#13;
independence. Despite the many 'bitter memories of injustices suffered from ruling groU!ps of neiighlboring nations,&#13;
some of whreh blatantly claimed to the exemplary democracies, the SlovaJks are fully consdous of the fact that&#13;
a free Poland, a free Ukraine, a free Bohemia, and even a&#13;
free Russia are also necessary to form a better, free and&#13;
more just order in EJurrope. The SlovaJks know that the&#13;
stru,ggle for freedom and independeil!ce cannot and must not&#13;
be waiged in isolation; the goal of Uberation from communist tyranny and all foreign domination must be the unified aiim of all ensl:wed nations and Of all fri~ds of all the&#13;
oppressed peoples.&#13;
The Slovaik nation has proven itself one of the greatest small natiOillS of Europe. The Slov.alks are healthy of&#13;
mind and body, intelligent, industrious, intensely religious,&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
29&#13;
&#13;
tolerant, and devoted to the pe,ace£ul development of their&#13;
national life and culture. As a nation they committed no&#13;
aggression against their neighbors, nor did they violate the&#13;
rights of others. It is a matter of record that they are always staunchly loyal to the countries of their adoption,&#13;
contributing handsomely, in proportion to their numbers,&#13;
to their material and spiritual growth. This is attested to&#13;
by our own America, the true friend of the perse&lt;mited and&#13;
the oppressed. To Slovaks everyiwhere, at home and in&#13;
exile, America is looked upon as the living symbol of freedom, tolerance, and justice. More than that, the Slovaks&#13;
look to America as their salvation; they expect to be truly&#13;
Hbemted by the land of Washington and Lincoln. Let us&#13;
pray God that we do not disruppoint them .&#13;
The descendants of the Slovak na:tion in America&#13;
should be hruppy amd proud to stress the fact that the&#13;
SlovaJk nation has fought the plague of materialistic Comm'UIIlism consistently and resolutely for over a hundTed&#13;
years. It is a matter of record that Louis Srur, Slovak&#13;
writer and champion of Slova'k freedom, repudiated the&#13;
godless philosophy of Marx in 1849 and warned his people against it; the political party of Monsignor Andrew&#13;
Hlilllka, the Slovaik Poipulist Party, repudiated Communism at its very first session in 1905; in 1919 General Milan&#13;
R. Stefanik, Sl01VaJk war hero and one of the founders of&#13;
the Czecho-1Slov.aJk Repulblic, cautioned T. G. Masaryk and&#13;
Edward Benes to maike no compromises with Bolshevism;&#13;
and Dr. Joseph Tiso, first president of the SlOIVaJk Republic, begged his peoiple to persevere in its fight against the&#13;
dread plague of Communism even as he was being led to&#13;
the gallows iby order of the Communist-dominated National&#13;
Front g01Vernment of Dr. Edward Benes on Arpril 18, 1947.&#13;
Indeed, it is a matter of record that the Slovalk people&#13;
fought Communism, the implacable foe of democracy, in&#13;
and out of season. And they are deter.mined to fight it until&#13;
it is w1ped off the face of the earth.&#13;
And what after Communism? Are the SlorvaJks willing&#13;
to be exploited by another form of Czeicho-iSlovaJkia? Certainly not! The Slovaks want only what rightfuUy belongs&#13;
&#13;
30&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
to them. No more, no less. They want the United States of&#13;
America and the rest of the free world to reco:grtIBe and&#13;
respect their inherent ri1g ht to freedom and inde:pendence.&#13;
The Slov8Jks seek onl~ the opportunity to play a useful role&#13;
in the struiggle for freedom. And it is the responsiibility. of&#13;
the free democrat:iic world to afford them this opportiunity.&#13;
The S1'ovruks want the demO'cratJic world to recogni.!ze at long&#13;
last a s,imple truth which the Czechs and Slovaks have&#13;
knoiwn for many cenbITies past, that is, that the Czechs&#13;
are not and do not want to be SlovaJks, and that the Sl0iva:ks&#13;
are n!Ot and do not want to be Ozechs. This fact has been&#13;
clearly demonstrated by both the Czechs and the Slova;ks&#13;
during the past forty years, that is, ever since the start of&#13;
World War I.&#13;
The Slovaks do not want anything tha&gt;l is not rightfully theirs; they do not c&lt;1Vet the spiritual and material&#13;
wealth of the O.zech nation; they do not make any claims to&#13;
Ozooh history, national traditions and customs; they have&#13;
rubsolutely no desire for Ozech lMlds; and they do not ask&#13;
the Czechs to represent them in any field of endeavor,&#13;
whether spiritual, cultural or political.&#13;
And, of course, the Slovak nation did not and does not&#13;
make any claim to the criminal acts committed by the&#13;
post-iwar Communist-0ominated Czech National Front government of Dr. Edward Benes and Clement Gottwald. The&#13;
Slo,v,aks had nothing to do with the criminal exipulsion of&#13;
Ge.rnnans from Ozeicho-1SLovakia, o,r the brutal persecution&#13;
and swppression Of all anti-Communist opposition in that&#13;
hrupless country. Flor the betrayal of the Czech and Slovruk&#13;
nations to the Communists and Red Moscow, the Slo'V'aks&#13;
shall give full credit to. Dr. ffidward Benes and his socialist&#13;
foHawera, who a1w:ays 1promoted .pro-1Soviet policy.&#13;
The Slovruks respeot the r,i ght of the Czech nation to&#13;
c~lete freedom and politi·c al independence, ·b ut they also&#13;
eX!peot leaders of the Czech nation to realiize that the Slova:k nation, too, possesses that right. The Slovaks do not&#13;
intend to surrender their right to freedom and indeipendence; they are not willing to comirn:it national suicide.&#13;
A-nd it would be immoral for us even to surggest that they do&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
31&#13;
&#13;
so. Why then should any governmen ts, especially governments of democratic countries, insist that the SlovaJks and&#13;
the territory they have inhabited for at lea.st the past 1500&#13;
years must continue to be exploited by another nation?&#13;
Let us .e ver be mindful of the farct that we are the&#13;
apostles of the true democratic way of life. As such, we&#13;
must always be willing and ready to share the blessings&#13;
of our democ11acy with the less fortunaJte and oppressed&#13;
peoples of the earth. 1it is our sacred duty to spread the&#13;
gospel and share the blessings of ,t he deanocraJtic way of&#13;
life which gives so much to so many for so little. True, at&#13;
times it is a diftfiimtlrt and unigrateful task, but it is one&#13;
which we must do for the sake of our country, for the cause&#13;
of freedom to wh:itch we are dedicated as a nation, the cause&#13;
which is common even to the nation the American Slovaks&#13;
are descended from.&#13;
America,ns of Slova!k descent must tell the story of the&#13;
long, enduring struggle of the Slovak nation for freedom&#13;
and ind~nden ce to all democratic peoples of the earth and&#13;
their governmen ts. Unfortunat el,y, many poople in governn:ient, particularl y in our own American Governmen t, hruve&#13;
allowed themse1ves to be influenced and corufused by the&#13;
slanderous, villainous and vicious anti-1Slovak campaign.&#13;
waged by the enemies of SlovaJk freedom and independen ce.&#13;
It is the duty of every true American, especially Americans&#13;
of SlOIViak descent, to expose and embarrass all streh pseudodemocratic elements and disamn them completel,y, because&#13;
the enemies of Slovak freedom amd independen ce are in fact&#13;
the enemies of the democraJtic way of life itself.&#13;
Naturally, the Slovia. ks cannot stand idly ·b y while sucll&#13;
people pe11petmte the destrwction of the nation they rure descended from. We must tell this story to om duly elected&#13;
representat ives in Washingto n and insist tihat they, in turn,&#13;
as our representrutiives, see to it thait our Governmen t adopts&#13;
a more realistic and just policy toward the Sl01Va!k nation&#13;
and its representat ives. It is, after all, in the intersts of&#13;
America and all other democratic coU'Iltries that the Slo;vaiks,&#13;
too, be free and independen t, that even they be allowed to&#13;
1&#13;
&#13;
32&#13;
&#13;
SLOVAKIA&#13;
&#13;
determine by their own free choice the state or form of&#13;
political organfaation under which they wish to li,v e.&#13;
History has taught us this one great lesson: no nation&#13;
can have a monopoly on freedom. Freedom is the grandest&#13;
of all of God',s gifts to manhnd; freedom is the universal&#13;
heritage of all the aiges. The more we ,p romote and share it,&#13;
the more aJbundant are its fruits. Of comse, peace without&#13;
freedom is unthink:ruble. If we li1re tru1y interested in a permanent and just -peace, let us not deny freedom to any&#13;
nation.&#13;
When evalll.l'ating the historical fact of the declaration&#13;
orf independence of the Slovak nation, let us bear in mind&#13;
thait the only question of real sig.nificance is whether the&#13;
Slova!k nation had the right to declare its country an independent repUJblic. Believing as Americans do, we know they&#13;
did and committed neither crime nor treason in exercising it.&#13;
Let people say what they will about MM'ch 14, 1939 Slovak Independence Day - or the circumstances that led&#13;
to it, Slova·k s at home and abroad stiH claim that it was the&#13;
most beautiful and joyous day in the history of the Slovak&#13;
nation. Today all SlOIVaks are storming the heruvens with&#13;
prayers that :Sloiva!kia's independence might soon be restored. And Americans believe that it will be. - P. A. Hrobak .&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
WHO SAID IT?&#13;
"Our alliance with Russia was accepted UNANIMOUSLY BY ALL&#13;
OF US, not only by our Communists and Socialists, BUT BY ALL&#13;
THE PARTIES - and there are four of them in the government by Catholics and Protestants alike . . . . Any American or foreign cor.&#13;
respondent will tell you that WE HAVE NO CENSORSHIP on foreign news from the leading world agencies, including the Associated&#13;
Press and United Press. • . . WE are the ONLY Slav country which&#13;
has diplomatic and friendly relations with the Vatican. I have an&#13;
ambassador at the Holy See and there is a Nuncio In Prague." (Jan Masaryk, Address at the 15th Annual New York Herald Trf.bune&#13;
Forum on Current Problems, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, N . Y., October&#13;
30, 1946, 4th session) .&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
•&#13;
&#13;
"Just as Munk·h was undone and does not exist, Just so there is&#13;
no Slovakia and it does not exist internationally as a state! There is&#13;
no Slovak problem, the Slovak problem is our Internal pro·blem and&#13;
It is reeognize&lt;I as such even by our allies." - (Dr. Benes, 5-22-43).&#13;
&#13;
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                <text>The Fifteenth Anniversary of Slovakia's Declaration of Independence</text>
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                <text>Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10), March 1954&#13;
pp. 26-32</text>
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                <text>March 1954</text>
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