11 50 763 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/17b7ca1d231920a27cc633036a53e854.pdf 299806ede12f42cac45ebfcebe34b2b3 PDF Text Text 36 SLOVAKIA Phiiip A. Hrobak (1904-1964) Generally the biographical facts of a man's life can be assembled without great difficulty. Cold facts of this kind, however, do not give us the complete or satisfying image of an individual. They lack the true lineaments of his character, the appreciable measure of his stature and the contributions of his lifetime of striving and achieving. Simplistically we can gather the key dates that marked the life span of Philip A. Hrobak, one of our American Slovak "greats" who would have reached his seventieth birthday in 1974 had not death cut him down in his life's prime. The bare data would include these statistics: Philip Anthony Hrobak was born in Cleveland, Ohio on May 1, 1904. Michael and Mary Hrobak, his parents, were Slovak immigrants from the Spis region who had sought and found a kindlier way of life in the American mid-West. On May 6, 1914, just a few days after Philip's tenth birthday, his widowed mother brought Philip and his four year old sister Mary to the Immaculate Conception Home in Middletown, Pa. They were the first children received into the newly established home for children which the Jednota organization founded under the guiding spirit of Father Furdek. The children had lost their father in February of that year and their mother was concerned about providing for their care, for she too was in poor health. When a merciless blood malady ended her life a few months later, the Hrobak children had no one to look after them but the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius to whose care the Jednota had entrusted this home. Philip continued the studies that he had begun in St. Wendelin's parochial school in Cleveland and as soon as she was ready for school, Mary also attended classes. On completing his elementary education at Jednota Home, Philip went on to high school and college at St. �SLOVAKIA 37 Procopius in Lisle, Ill. From 1924 to 1927 he taught at St. Procopius and then accepted an assistantship as he pursued advanced studies in the department of chemistry at New York University. By the fall of 1929 he was again in his native city Cleveland where he taught a varied program of classes and coached the football team at the flourishing Benedictine High. For nine years he was a very successful teacher here, distinguishing himself especially in his chemistry, history and language classes as well as in his relationship with high school students. From all appearances, he seemed to be destined for a brilliant carrer as an educator. In August 1931 he married Rose Jasko and they became the devoted parents of nine children. His school work and parental cares could have absorbed all his time and talent yet his eager mind together with his vital interest in life and in his fellow man prompted him to cultivate an active concern in the issues and problems of those around him as well as the world at large. From time to time he gave expression to some of his thinking through contributions to various publications. Problems of youth and education as well as Slovak history ranked among his prime interests. In the matter of Slovak history he found not merely a static record of the past but also an on-going chain of direction and a development of history in his own day. He could not look upon man's interaction with man or nation with nation and remain a detached spectator. He was both an observer and a maker of history. Out of his experiences as a teacher, Philip Hrobak came to the realization that he could do more than just use books as tools of learning; he authored a practical and comprehensive Slovak grammar for the use of English speaking persons. He also compiled a sizable English-Slovak dictionary. Both served as important adjuncts in learning the Slovak language. Even today there are many who value his revised dictionary as a very useful reference. In 1937 when Joseph Husek yielded his Jednota editorship in order to seek the presidency of the Jednota organization, Philip Hrobak was elected editor of the weekly organ. No better replacement could have been made. From �38 SLOVAKIA this time on, Hrobak became a formidable force in Slovak and Slovak-American public life. His position was further strengthened when he became vice president of the Slovak League of America in 1949, and it was additionally confirmed when he assumed the presidency of Slovak League of America in 1950. For twelve years he gave this office distinctively dynamic force and singular meaningfulness. Hrobak's role in public life as well as the magnetism of his gifts and personality brought him into close contact and association with distinguished expatriated Slovak leaders and intellectuals. One of his closest co-workers was Dr. Joseph Pauco who continues to work in the same editorial office that he once shared with Philip Hrobak. Among other notable associates from abroad were Constantine Culen, Francis Hrusovsky, Joseph Kirschbaum, Joseph Mikus and Karol Sidor. An outstanding achievement of Hrobak's career in the Slovak League of America was the establishment of a highly desirable and eminently successful Office of Information functioning in Washington, D. C. under the distinguished chairmanship of the Slovak diplomat Dr. Joseph Mikus. This professional department became a vital public relations center as well as a liason agency in American-Slovak life. The journalistic genius of Philip Hrobak expressed itself not only through the Jednota weekly and the Jednota annual almanac which are the official publications of the Jednota organization and which even then served the need for both information and inspiration on behalf of its membership but he further initiated and sponsored other valuable publications as well. In 1949, for example, he began the Slovak Newsletter, a bulletin for public information. In 1951 he undertook a Slovak politico-cultural quarterly Slovakia, the voice of the Slovak League of America. In 1961 he launched another project, Furdek, an annual which became an English counterpart to the long established Jednota Kalendar. He gave this new work a content and style of its own, directing its appeal largely to readers who were not able to read the Slovak Kalendar. When Father Lach entrusted in 1959 the newspaper Slovak v Amerike to Philip Hrobak, the new publisher �39 SLOVAKIA collaborated on this weekly with Dr. Joseph Pauco and expanded his publishing scope to include the annual Literdrny Almanach Slovdka v Amerike as well as an affiliated series of book publications through which he often provided a public to well seasoned writers as well as to capable aspiring novices in journalism. With unbounded vigor and zeal Philip Hrobak worked from his Middletown office, serving the cause of God and man to his dying day. When illness struck him down it was hard to accept the fact that this was a mortal ailment. Although those who were close to him hoped against hope that he would recover, he ended his life on January 10, 1964 in Harrisburg, Pa. and was buried in Cleveland, Ohio. These are some of the essential facts in the life story of Philip Hrobak. * * When one undertakes the task of evaluating the stature of this leader Philip Hrobak and his literary output, the impressive factor becomes not only the quantity of his excellent published writings but also the quality of the man that shows through his works and the temper of his thought. Hrobak was above all a writer with a message. He was purposeful and dedicated, for he had a cause that was rooted in conscience. His personal integrity and Christian philosophy of life inspired him with a profound sense of honesty and justice which could not be confined to private life but clamored for redress even in the market place and public forum. With him morality and the full impact of the Ten Commandments had a place before God and man. For this reason he was intolerant of oppression and he championed the rights of man. This included basic justice and freedom in private life, within all levels of the social structure and within national and international relationships. Hrobak was gifted with a clarity of inner vision that penetrated surface appearances and subtle diplomatic maneuverings. He had an inborn alertness that was adroit and discriminating in dealing with political smooth talk, long standing inequities that tried to stay covered up, and outward niceties. He was not one to be easily deceived. And he had the courage of his convictions as well as the �40 SLOVAKIA ability to deal incisively with critical issues and difficult problems. He not only propagated the slogan Za Boha a ndrod! he lived the ideal, for all his life and energy, all his purpose and dedication was to translate into real life the spirit of devotion to God and abiding patriotism to the United States as well as to Slovakia, the ancestral homeland of American Slovaks. And as he set himself to these tasks, he was fully conscious of the duty that, as an officer and a leader in American Slovak fraternalism, he was to inspire others with a zeal for truth and right action. Circumscribi ng this study to a close review of the first fourteen volumes of Slovakia (1951-1964) which Philip Hrobak compiled and edited, we find even within this representativ e range of his work enough tangibles to assess the caliber of Hrobak's journalism, Christian philosophy and leadership. Like much of his journalistic output, these volumes of Hrobak's Slovakia were devoted largely to political content. We see in them Philip Hrobak the American patriot, the champion of Slovak statehood and a first class editor. His objective is truth and justice. For this reason he is a persistent and merciless fact-finder and incidentally he becomes an ideal publicist. He does not avoid issues or pretend that he does not see them and he does not feel that he can afford to be an overly fastidious respecter of persons. He was not an unfeeling individual and he knew how to cherish and express profound deference for constituted authority and public office but when he sensed that "Something is rotten in the state ... " he was relentless in uncovering the festering realities that were lurking under misleading outward appearances. His Christian uprightness, his idealism and sense of fairness bound him to flay inequity and to denounce oppression of every kind. Hrobak did not produce his 35 issues of Slovakia singlehandedl y. He opened his colums to Slovak diplomats, statesmen, historians and leaders as well as to thinking Americans who also championed the cause of freedom, justice and truth, especially the concept of historical truth. His formal objective was openly published in a number of issues of Slovakia: �SLOVAKIA 41 The chief purpose of Slovakia is to promote a better under standing and appreciation of the Slovak nation and its long struggle for freedom and independence. As Americans, members of the Slovak League of America believe that the Slovak nation, like all nations, has an interest and God-given right to freedom and independence. They are dedicated to the cause of the American way of life, Slovak freedom and world peace, and are determined to oppose the plague of communism and all other totalitarian political systems. Because this periodical was a vehicle of information to both a Slovak and a non-Slovak readership of serious intent, especially to American scholars, public officials, diplomats and university people, Hrobak made every effort to give it the widest possible dissemination into the homes and offices of American and foreign diplomats, politicians and public leaders as well as the libraries and departments of history and political science in many American colleges and universities. Of course, many average readers who sought to be well-informed also subscribed to it. Under Hrobak's gifted editorship and management, the circulation of Slovakia increased steadily. To provide the information and understanding that he had in mind, Hrobak attracted the most highly qualified of contributors to bring their works to Slovakia. Some of them were expatriated Slovak leaders and makers of Slovak history; some of them were scholars and historians of Slovak as well as non-Slovak origin; some were critics and analysts of political thought and nationalism; some were American legislators. Dr. Joseph M. Kirschbaum, a Slavistic scholar who taught and lectured at the University of Montreal in Canada produced a substantial article for practically every issue (30 articles in 37 issues, to be precise) . In the main, he examines the historical theses that warrant the existence of an autonomous Slovak state, basic principles and circumstances on which federation could be structured in central Europe, the subject of Slovakia and international relationships, the underlying causes of incompatability with Czech pretensions, the matter of Czech duplicity and oppressive arrogance, and Slovak politics past and present. His gifts, however, are multifaceted and out of the diversity of his �42 SLOVAKIA broad interests he also prepared papers on cultural topics such as: Slovak literature under the Soviet impact (VI, 2/ 19, pp. 34-51) , Mickiewicz in Slovak poetry and translations (VII, 1/22, pp. 32-41) , Universi ty traditions in Slovakia (VIII, 2/ 27, pp. 18-30), Contemporary tendencies in Slovak philology (X, 7/ 32, pp. 25-32) , The Canadian translator of Slovak poetry: Professor Watson Kirkconnell (XIV, 37, pp. 9-18). Dr. Kirschbaum consistently provided book reviews as well. Dr. Joseph Pauco has always been a faithful contributor also. He is a professional writer with a rich background in publishing and journalism. For a number of years he was editor-in-chief of the daily Slovak published in Bratislava. He lived through many a promising and too many a tragic experience in Slovak national life. He has tasted prosperity and good fortune as well as much disappointment at home and abroad. He is a journalist with the conviction that the editor, the reporter, the columnist is called to serve the people by illuminating facts, defending truth, and inspiring to action. These principles are embodied throughout his articles in Slovakia, most of which are devoted to political analysis and historical report; e.g. The practical aspect of federation (III, 2, pp. 26-36), The failures of communist politics in Slovakia (V, 4/ 17, pp. 3-20), The 1944 communist rebellion in Slovakia (VII, 3-4, 24/ 25, pp. 28-34) , and Slovakia under communism--which was serialized in three issues (IX, 30; X, 31 ; XI, 33 ). Among other significant contributors who brought enrichment to the early issues of Slovakia these must be mentioned: culen, Hrusovsky, Vnuk, Mikus, Sidor, Grebert, Cieker, t>urcansky, Murin, Rekem and Kruzliak. Their works are marked with the authority of those who had witnessed this history of Slovakia in the making and with the conviction of those who knew only too well what absolutes and what cause they were defending. Contributions on the scholarly level are thoroughly researched and documented; they are singularly important for their cultural value. With the aid of national figures like these, Philip Hrobak made of Slovakia a unique journal that analyzed �SLOVAKIA 43 Slovak and Czech politics and exposed the truth and the falsity behind the facade of the Czecho-Slovak state. Still other contributors also expressed themselves in Slovakia. We meet on its pages, for example, a critical examination which Kurt Glaser made of Radio Free Europe: How free is Radio Free Europe-The Voice of Doubletalk? (II, 2, pp. 25-28) and The " Russia First" Boys in Radio Free Europe. (III, I, pp. 31-38) as well as several of his other articles. Edward L. Delaney also wrote incisively and perceptively on The Betrayal of Slovakia (I, 2, pp. 1-7), on Tiso, Horthy and Benes as well as his personal experiences I was in Slovakia (II, 1, pp. 25-45). Hrobak further drew upon American public officials to express their views in Slovakia also. He published their patriotic addresses and expressions of concern and sympathy for minority groups as well as related matters from diplomatic circles for the interest of readers of Slovakia. As one reviews back issues, one cannot help noting the contributions of congressmen and persons like Michael A. Feighan, Edward J. Bonin, Charles J. Kersten, B. Carroll Reece, Lieut. Col. F. 0. Miksche, Ray J. Madden. In volume one, no. two, we find some thoughts of Prince Adolf zu Schwarzenberg, head of one of the oldest families of Bohemia. Interestingly, his contribution is on Czech Double Dealing. By way of balancing this heavy concentration on political fare, Hrobak took pains to offer other reading matter too. Occasionally he would publish something as different as the English translation of a treasured Slovak folk tale. He also ran a series on castles in Slovakia as well as occasional articles on other cultural topics like Slovak museums, the natural beauty of the Slovak countryside, the national folk hero Janosik, a study in contrasting ~vejk vs. Janosik, the natural springs and the spas of Slovakia, considerations on semantics and philology, Slovak university life and traditions, insights into Slovak church music, various types of Slovak customs, historical essays, thumbnail biographies. He also presented a serialization of Slovak history that he himself wrote and a serious study Slovak Nationalism which was researched by B. S. Bue. Applicable excerpts from American journalism were �SLOVAKIA 44 intended to provoke thought or reaction, and for this kind of prodding Hrobak quoted from The Washington Post, New York Times, the Cleveland Press, The Chicago Sun, the Brooklyn Daily Eagle, The Slavonic Monthly. He also culled from the Osservatore Romano, the Eudovy dennik of Chicago, cas (the official organ of Lettrich's Democratic Party and the Benes mouthpiece) as well as from other likely and unlikely sources. The personal trademark of Hrobak in these earlier issues of Slovakia was the filler feature titled Who Said It? Invariably these items were either ironic or revealing or they were couched in the full glow of patriotic ardor, depending on their portent. Hrobak felt that as a journalist he could not afford to be blandly genteel. He was dealing with subject matter that made demands on him to be ruthless rather that ineffectively mild. He knew that he had to be uncompromising rather than deferential. He was committed to the consideration of callous inequities and rank duplicity, and he needed the keenest of scalpels directed to the root of the issue. The Who Said It? feature was especially effective in quoting from Masaryk and Benes, Stransky and Lettrich, Peroutka and Ripka, Sramek and Gottwald. It held a full beam of light up to their pronouncements and exposed their ideas to re-evaluation. On the other hand, Hrobak also featured positive thinking from persons like Senator Robert A. Taft, Edward R. Murrow, H. W. Kaltenborn as well as from Dean Acheson, R. W. Seton-Watson, Congressman Daniel Flood and Alvin E. O'Konski. Readers found the material quoted in these fillers very apt, rather questionable, witty, thought-provoking or bitter. It was meant to be entertaining although an element of entertainment might sometimes develop out of it as a kind of byproduct. We present some samplings: "Some pussy-footing ostriches criticize the treaty between Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia. Our close collaboration with the Soviet Union needs no explanation. We do not want anything from the Russians except protection from the Germans, and the Russians want nothing whatsoever from us." - Jan Masaryk in Business Week, May 13, 1944. (Slovakia vn, 2, p. 64). "The Slovak nation, one of the oldest Christian nations in �SLOVAKIA 45 central Europe is distinct ethnic unit. Just as the Czechs are and want to remain Czechs, just so the Slovaks are and want to remain Slovaks. The history, culture and national traditions of the Slovak nation are distinct from the history, culture and national traditions of the Czechs. The Slovaks never were, nor are they now, a part of the Czech nation. Slovaks here and abroad resent being called Czechoslovaks." - P.A. Hrobak, Detroit, Mich., November 18, 1951 ( Slovakia IV, 3-4, p. 58) . RED GEOGRAPHY: The news service of the Central Slovak Catholic Bureau in Rome recently published a story about a certain school inspector of the Trnava district in Slovakia who gave directives to teachers on how to teach. Among other things he said that if nuns we:re able to interest children in a non-existe nt being, God, then the teachers certainly should be able to interest children in Stalin who actually exists. "The Marx-Lenin doctrines of our Stalin," he continued, "must be applied in all classes. For example, in geog:raphy you teach the children about the East and the West. Now you could say: The sun rises in the East; there is our g:reat Stalin, the sun of all the nations which enlightens all nations with his knowledge. The sun sets in the West; thel'le you find decayed capitalism, the treacherous bourgeoisie and murderous imperialism." -But most of the Slovak teachers and pupils prefer the advice of Horace Gre eley: Go West, young man! (Slovakia II, 2, p. 19) . No assignment that came to Philip Hrobak was too demanding or time consuming. As a journalist and as an American Slovak leader, Philip Hrobak was a fully committed person. After the University of California Press released a new printing of a 504 page book Czechoslovakia, edited by Robert J . Kerner, which was represented as "an honest, unprejudiced, and frank appraisal of the important contribution which the Czechoslovak nation made to the history of our time in its two decades of independence between two world wars," Philip Hrobak took the book under close scrutiny in order to examine its merits. Characteristically, he read it with balanced judgment and undertook a detailed search into the allegations that were made in the volume by the twenty collaborators who wrote their ideas into it. He made pertinent notes, comments and a record of his explanations and refutations. Subsequently, every issue of Slovakia from v. V., 2-3 (15-16) June-Sept. 1955 to v. VII, 3-4 (24-25) Sept.-Dec 1957 carried part of Hrobak's chapter by chapter analysis (through all 23 chapters) under the heading: "Professor �46 SLOVAKIA Kerner's CZECHOSLOVAKIA: History or Propaganda?" He granted, in all fairness, that the twenty writers who had contributed to the composite work were not necessarily dishonest or prejudiced but he did not yield the point that they had become Czech propagandists exporting established Masaryk-Benes theories at the expense of the Slovaks and their national history. In pointing out the errors and misconceptions of these writers and in refuting their specious theses, Hrobak could hardly help becoming occasionally vehement. It was in his very nature to be less than tolerant of that long standing tendency to relegate the Slovaks to second place or to no place at all, and this bias had again appeared through the pages of Kerner's work. It was part of Hrobak's scholarly conditioning that made him at least impatient with inept history that distorted authentic records and shaped a narrative fashioned to its own devising. In his refutations of error, both in this case and on other occasions, Hrobak set the record right by controverting claims that were all too easily made for an easy and ready acceptance. He did this by tracing his facts to prime sources for reference and documentation: He was especially skillful in drawing upon arguments and statements from Czech sources and authorities and he was often able to use this matter in order to substantiate his arguments and to confound some contemporary writers of history who had a way of misrepresentating facts. Nor was he above ridicule when the conditions were patently offered to invite ridicule. He had an instinct for examining promises made and conditions underscoring events that transpired in order to contrast them with promises honored and promises forgotten as well as with the aftermath of events that were shaped by the hard realities of circumstances. Summing it all up, he was a fearless and formidable adversary in the arena of fact vs. fiction, truth vs. deception. And in this encounter he did not shrink from handling the rhetoric and the claims of an entire collective force of writers not merely a single author. This was his consistent line of action. When it came to dealing with a denial of truth or with historic distortions, he did not stop to assess the odds. With him there were no �SLOVAKIA 47 prohibitive odds when truth and justice were to be vindicated. There was only a matter of conscience and professional ethics to be heeded. Fired with this spirit and singlemindedness of purpose, Hrobak worked on tirelessly. From his editorial office in Middletown he steadfastly waged his crusade in the press. One can see why he indefatigably set out to flay injustice and denounce "the synthetic Czechoslovak state," why he castigated the execution of President Tiso as political murder and judicial murder, why he was preoccupied with the cause "history or propaganda?" as well as with the futility of efforts to fuse the Slovak and the Czech nations into one impossible amalgam, why he was concerned with matters of Church and state. Very often the choice of expression that appears either in his own work or in the writing of his contributors reflects the depth of his own feeling and betrays its real measure of intensity. Note these phrases by way of example: Benes "King of political cheats;" the " Russia first" boys in RFE; how the Czechs deceived us; intrigues and t he entrapment of individuals; Czechoslovak pseudo-democracy; the machinations of Czech Socialists . . . But Hrobak was by no means a hidden away recluse of some kind bound to his editorial desk. Besides being a gifted journalist and editor, he was also a dynamic fraternalist and a forceful lecturer. Through outstanding personal participation he became the soul of many a significant national movement especially through the Slovak League of America, the Matica Skolskd (Foundation to promote schooling and education) and the Priatelia slovenskej slobody (Friends of Slovak freedom). He distinguished himself as the motivating force in the Slovak League and, if figures are telling indicators of any kind, it is worth noting that within two years after he accepted the presidency of this organization, its membership increased by two thousand. After the guiding leadership of Hrobak had succeeded in establishing the Washington Office of Information, Dr. Joseph Mikus, the talented diplomat who headed this agency, made of it an invaluable department for public relations. Further, a notable program of sixty film showings �48 SLOVAKIA was received with widespread appreciation. More importantly still, various committees of the U.S. Congress charged with investigating the denial of rights under totalitarian aggression heard the testimony and an exposition of Slovak history from Philip Hrobak and gave attentive hearing to the testimony.of a number of Slovak witnesses who appealed against the situation behind the iron curtain. This series of sessions gave American officials in Washington a realistic representation of the sufferings to which a number of countries were being subjected in central Europe. It also provided a formal documentation of tactics that were enslaving the Slovak people. There was a special American subcommittee before which depositions were made about conditions in Slovakia and after these hearings, the full reports were printed in a publication titled Investigation of Communist Takeover and Occupation of Poland, Lithuania and Slovakia. Through the Washington Office of Information and the dynamism of Philip Hrobak excellent rapport was established with a number of American congressmen and statesmen who came to understand and feel for the plight of the Slovak people in their homeland. In 1954 Congressmen Kersten and Bentley openly manifested their interest in the Slovak cause. In 1955 Vice President Nixon expressed the sympathetic feeling of the administration in a written message that was addressed to the 34th congress of the Slovak League of America. In 1956 Secretary of State Dulles received an eight-member delegation of the Slovak League led by Philip Hrobak and engaged in animated discussion of vital topics with them. Philip Hrobak worked on and on with boundless devotion. It was very fitting then, that this dedication and wholehearted service was recognized when a public presentation of honor was made to him in 1957 in the course of the golden jubilee of the founding of the League. A special committee of Slovak leaders singled him out for the award designated as the Hlinka Cup. This was an unusually high honor, for the Hlinka Cup was a trophy which had never before been bestowed upon American soil. The address of presentation was made by Dr. Joseph M. Kirschbaum in recognition of Hrobak's merits as president �SLOVAKIA 49 of the Slovak League of America, as an eminent and intrepid editor of Jednota and Slovakia, as an outstanding champion in American Slovak life, as the compiler of a grammar and a dictionary and "because with his aggressive elan, his perseverance and fearlessness both as a journalist and as an organizer, he personifies the finest qualities that had endowed not only :Cudovit stur (a leading patriot), but also the first recipient of the cup, Andrew Hlinka." In 1961 another public honor was conferred on Philip Hrobak. This was the Charles IV Award or Karl's Prize that was presented to him by the Sudeten German Council of West Germany. It is a recognition that is awarded annually to a political leader, scientist or publicist who has made an outstanding contribution to the concept of a United Europe. The ceremonies were held in Cologne on Sudeten German Day, May 20, with over 200,000 Sudeten German expellees participating. Mr. Hrobak responded to the honor with a glowing address titled "Self Determination for All." His words bespoke the aspirations and the innermost feelings of Sudeten Germans as well as of the Slovak people and other victims of self-rule denied under the crushing force of communism. Among other Americans who participated in this observance were U.S. Congressmen Morgan D. Moulder, Gordon H. Scherer, Roy A. Taylor, and Henry C. Schadeberg. Willy Brandt, the mayor of Berlin, and several other Sudeten German leaders also delivered addresses. In these numberless events and situations we cannot fail to see the greatness of Philip Hrobak as an American and Slovak patriot, as a man of ideals and of forceful action, as a fraternalist and an organizer but we must not overlook his stature as a man of God also. It must never be forgotten that Hrobak served God at least as well as he served his nation and his fellow man. Religious principles and obligations had first place in his life and his life style. All his zeal and purpose was rooted in the law and the love of God; his spending of self on behalf of others was within the Christian concept. He was as ready to promote and defend Christian virtue and idealism as he was to crusade for national honor and welfare. Although his days were incredibly crowded with constant activity, �50 SLOVAKIA he did not put God in second place in his personal life. As a teacher and educator, he was aware of the importance of Catholic schools. As a parent, he was solicitous about a genuinely Christian atmosphere in the home and true religious training in the family. As a journalist, he faithfully promoted the interests of the Church and ethical principles. That was the reason why he combated the atheistic and the Away-from-Rome! attitude that was being sponsored by some leaders in Czecho-Slovakia. As 1963 was moving in on the calendar, Philip Hrobak prepared copy for a special issue of Slovakia and for the Jednota publications that he managed and edited. Out of regard for the Christian heritage of the Slovak people, he began to prepare to honor the 1100th anniversary of the mission of SS. Cyril and Methodius to Great Moravia and the Christianization of the Slovak nation. The annuals that he prepared for this occasion became a kind of crown of excellence that climaxed his literary and scholarly output and gave singular expression to his religious devotion as well. Truly, as we review the life and the accomplishments of Philip Hrobak who would have been seventy years old this year, we have reason to thank God for his idealism and example, and we are impressed and inspired by this great man's patriotism, his scholarship, his leadership and his personal dynamism. Sr. Martina Tybor, SS.C.M. THE FAMOUS Slovak folk-dance group, "Lucnica," from Bratislava returned from a 6-weeks' tour of several South American. countries. The 47-member company represented the current silver jubilee ensemble. Lucnica was organized in 1948. THE HIGH TATRAS in Slovakia last year attracted 2 and ½ million tourists. An even larger number was expected in 1974. � 36 SLOVAKIA Phiiip A. Hrobak (1904-1964) Generally the biographical facts of a man's life can be assembled without great difficulty. Cold facts of this kind, however, do not give us the complete or satisfying image of an individual. They lack the true lineaments of his character, the appreciable measure of his stature and the contributions of his lifetime of striving and achieving. Simplistically we can gather the key dates that marked the life span of Philip A. Hrobak, one of our American Slovak "greats" who would have reached his seventieth birthday in 1974 had not death cut him down in his life's prime. The bare data would include these statistics: Philip Anthony Hrobak was born in Cleveland, Ohio on May 1, 1904. Michael and Mary Hrobak, his parents, were Slovak immigrants from the Spis region who had sought and found a kindlier way of life in the American mid-West. On May 6, 1914, just a few days after Philip's tenth birthday, his widowed mother brought Philip and his four year old sister Mary to the Immaculate Conception Home in Middletown, Pa. They were the first children received into the newly established home for children which the Jednota organization founded under the guiding spirit of Father Furdek. The children had lost their father in February of that year and their mother was concerned about providing for their care, for she too was in poor health. When a merciless blood malady ended her life a few months later, the Hrobak children had no one to look after them but the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius to whose care the Jednota had entrusted this home. Philip continued the studies that he had begun in St. Wendelin's parochial school in Cleveland and as soon as she was ready for school, Mary also attended classes. On completing his elementary education at Jednota Home, Philip went on to high school and college at St. �SLOVAKIA 37 Procopius in Lisle, Ill. From 1924 to 1927 he taught at St. Procopius and then accepted an assistantship as he pursued advanced studies in the department of chemistry at New York University. By the fall of 1929 he was again in his native city Cleveland where he taught a varied program of classes and coached the football team at the flourishing Benedictine High. For nine years he was a very successful teacher here, distinguishing himself especially in his chemistry, history and language classes as well as in his relationship with high school students. From all appearances, he seemed to be destined for a brilliant carrer as an educator. In August 1931 he married Rose Jasko and they became the devoted parents of nine children. His school work and parental cares could have absorbed all his time and talent yet his eager mind together with his vital interest in life and in his fellow man prompted him to cultivate an active concern in the issues and problems of those around him as well as the world at large. From time to time he gave expression to some of his thinking through contributions to various publications. Problems of youth and education as well as Slovak history ranked among his prime interests. In the matter of Slovak history he found not merely a static record of the past but also an on-going chain of direction and a development of history in his own day. He could not look upon man's interaction with man or nation with nation and remain a detached spectator. He was both an observer and a maker of history. Out of his experiences as a teacher, Philip Hrobak came to the realization that he could do more than just use books as tools of learning; he authored a practical and comprehensive Slovak grammar for the use of English speaking persons. He also compiled a sizable English-Slovak dictionary. Both served as important adjuncts in learning the Slovak language. Even today there are many who value his revised dictionary as a very useful reference. In 1937 when Joseph Husek yielded his Jednota editorship in order to seek the presidency of the Jednota organization, Philip Hrobak was elected editor of the weekly organ. No better replacement could have been made. From �38 SLOVAKIA this time on, Hrobak became a formidable force in Slovak and Slovak-American public life. His position was further strengthened when he became vice president of the Slovak League of America in 1949, and it was additionally confirmed when he assumed the presidency of Slovak League of America in 1950. For twelve years he gave this office distinctively dynamic force and singular meaningfulness. Hrobak's role in public life as well as the magnetism of his gifts and personality brought him into close contact and association with distinguished expatriated Slovak leaders and intellectuals. One of his closest co-workers was Dr. Joseph Pauco who continues to work in the same editorial office that he once shared with Philip Hrobak. Among other notable associates from abroad were Constantine Culen, Francis Hrusovsky, Joseph Kirschbaum, Joseph Mikus and Karol Sidor. An outstanding achievement of Hrobak's career in the Slovak League of America was the establishment of a highly desirable and eminently successful Office of Information functioning in Washington, D. C. under the distinguished chairmanship of the Slovak diplomat Dr. Joseph Mikus. This professional department became a vital public relations center as well as a liason agency in American-Slovak life. The journalistic genius of Philip Hrobak expressed itself not only through the Jednota weekly and the Jednota annual almanac which are the official publications of the Jednota organization and which even then served the need for both information and inspiration on behalf of its membership but he further initiated and sponsored other valuable publications as well. In 1949, for example, he began the Slovak Newsletter, a bulletin for public information. In 1951 he undertook a Slovak politico-cultural quarterly Slovakia, the voice of the Slovak League of America. In 1961 he launched another project, Furdek, an annual which became an English counterpart to the long established Jednota Kalendar. He gave this new work a content and style of its own, directing its appeal largely to readers who were not able to read the Slovak Kalendar. When Father Lach entrusted in 1959 the newspaper Slovak v Amerike to Philip Hrobak, the new publisher �39 SLOVAKIA collaborated on this weekly with Dr. Joseph Pauco and expanded his publishing scope to include the annual Literdrny Almanach Slovdka v Amerike as well as an affiliated series of book publications through which he often provided a public to well seasoned writers as well as to capable aspiring novices in journalism. With unbounded vigor and zeal Philip Hrobak worked from his Middletown office, serving the cause of God and man to his dying day. When illness struck him down it was hard to accept the fact that this was a mortal ailment. Although those who were close to him hoped against hope that he would recover, he ended his life on January 10, 1964 in Harrisburg, Pa. and was buried in Cleveland, Ohio. These are some of the essential facts in the life story of Philip Hrobak. * * When one undertakes the task of evaluating the stature of this leader Philip Hrobak and his literary output, the impressive factor becomes not only the quantity of his excellent published writings but also the quality of the man that shows through his works and the temper of his thought. Hrobak was above all a writer with a message. He was purposeful and dedicated, for he had a cause that was rooted in conscience. His personal integrity and Christian philosophy of life inspired him with a profound sense of honesty and justice which could not be confined to private life but clamored for redress even in the market place and public forum. With him morality and the full impact of the Ten Commandments had a place before God and man. For this reason he was intolerant of oppression and he championed the rights of man. This included basic justice and freedom in private life, within all levels of the social structure and within national and international relationships. Hrobak was gifted with a clarity of inner vision that penetrated surface appearances and subtle diplomatic maneuverings. He had an inborn alertness that was adroit and discriminating in dealing with political smooth talk, long standing inequities that tried to stay covered up, and outward niceties. He was not one to be easily deceived. And he had the courage of his convictions as well as the �40 SLOVAKIA ability to deal incisively with critical issues and difficult problems. He not only propagated the slogan Za Boha a ndrod! he lived the ideal, for all his life and energy, all his purpose and dedication was to translate into real life the spirit of devotion to God and abiding patriotism to the United States as well as to Slovakia, the ancestral homeland of American Slovaks. And as he set himself to these tasks, he was fully conscious of the duty that, as an officer and a leader in American Slovak fraternalism, he was to inspire others with a zeal for truth and right action. Circumscribi ng this study to a close review of the first fourteen volumes of Slovakia (1951-1964) which Philip Hrobak compiled and edited, we find even within this representativ e range of his work enough tangibles to assess the caliber of Hrobak's journalism, Christian philosophy and leadership. Like much of his journalistic output, these volumes of Hrobak's Slovakia were devoted largely to political content. We see in them Philip Hrobak the American patriot, the champion of Slovak statehood and a first class editor. His objective is truth and justice. For this reason he is a persistent and merciless fact-finder and incidentally he becomes an ideal publicist. He does not avoid issues or pretend that he does not see them and he does not feel that he can afford to be an overly fastidious respecter of persons. He was not an unfeeling individual and he knew how to cherish and express profound deference for constituted authority and public office but when he sensed that "Something is rotten in the state ... " he was relentless in uncovering the festering realities that were lurking under misleading outward appearances. His Christian uprightness, his idealism and sense of fairness bound him to flay inequity and to denounce oppression of every kind. Hrobak did not produce his 35 issues of Slovakia singlehandedl y. He opened his colums to Slovak diplomats, statesmen, historians and leaders as well as to thinking Americans who also championed the cause of freedom, justice and truth, especially the concept of historical truth. His formal objective was openly published in a number of issues of Slovakia: �SLOVAKIA 41 The chief purpose of Slovakia is to promote a better under standing and appreciation of the Slovak nation and its long struggle for freedom and independence. As Americans, members of the Slovak League of America believe that the Slovak nation, like all nations, has an interest and God-given right to freedom and independence. They are dedicated to the cause of the American way of life, Slovak freedom and world peace, and are determined to oppose the plague of communism and all other totalitarian political systems. Because this periodical was a vehicle of information to both a Slovak and a non-Slovak readership of serious intent, especially to American scholars, public officials, diplomats and university people, Hrobak made every effort to give it the widest possible dissemination into the homes and offices of American and foreign diplomats, politicians and public leaders as well as the libraries and departments of history and political science in many American colleges and universities. Of course, many average readers who sought to be well-informed also subscribed to it. Under Hrobak's gifted editorship and management, the circulation of Slovakia increased steadily. To provide the information and understanding that he had in mind, Hrobak attracted the most highly qualified of contributors to bring their works to Slovakia. Some of them were expatriated Slovak leaders and makers of Slovak history; some of them were scholars and historians of Slovak as well as non-Slovak origin; some were critics and analysts of political thought and nationalism; some were American legislators. Dr. Joseph M. Kirschbaum, a Slavistic scholar who taught and lectured at the University of Montreal in Canada produced a substantial article for practically every issue (30 articles in 37 issues, to be precise) . In the main, he examines the historical theses that warrant the existence of an autonomous Slovak state, basic principles and circumstances on which federation could be structured in central Europe, the subject of Slovakia and international relationships, the underlying causes of incompatability with Czech pretensions, the matter of Czech duplicity and oppressive arrogance, and Slovak politics past and present. His gifts, however, are multifaceted and out of the diversity of his �42 SLOVAKIA broad interests he also prepared papers on cultural topics such as: Slovak literature under the Soviet impact (VI, 2/ 19, pp. 34-51) , Mickiewicz in Slovak poetry and translations (VII, 1/22, pp. 32-41) , Universi ty traditions in Slovakia (VIII, 2/ 27, pp. 18-30), Contemporary tendencies in Slovak philology (X, 7/ 32, pp. 25-32) , The Canadian translator of Slovak poetry: Professor Watson Kirkconnell (XIV, 37, pp. 9-18). Dr. Kirschbaum consistently provided book reviews as well. Dr. Joseph Pauco has always been a faithful contributor also. He is a professional writer with a rich background in publishing and journalism. For a number of years he was editor-in-chief of the daily Slovak published in Bratislava. He lived through many a promising and too many a tragic experience in Slovak national life. He has tasted prosperity and good fortune as well as much disappointment at home and abroad. He is a journalist with the conviction that the editor, the reporter, the columnist is called to serve the people by illuminating facts, defending truth, and inspiring to action. These principles are embodied throughout his articles in Slovakia, most of which are devoted to political analysis and historical report; e.g. The practical aspect of federation (III, 2, pp. 26-36), The failures of communist politics in Slovakia (V, 4/ 17, pp. 3-20), The 1944 communist rebellion in Slovakia (VII, 3-4, 24/ 25, pp. 28-34) , and Slovakia under communism--which was serialized in three issues (IX, 30; X, 31 ; XI, 33 ). Among other significant contributors who brought enrichment to the early issues of Slovakia these must be mentioned: culen, Hrusovsky, Vnuk, Mikus, Sidor, Grebert, Cieker, t>urcansky, Murin, Rekem and Kruzliak. Their works are marked with the authority of those who had witnessed this history of Slovakia in the making and with the conviction of those who knew only too well what absolutes and what cause they were defending. Contributions on the scholarly level are thoroughly researched and documented; they are singularly important for their cultural value. With the aid of national figures like these, Philip Hrobak made of Slovakia a unique journal that analyzed �SLOVAKIA 43 Slovak and Czech politics and exposed the truth and the falsity behind the facade of the Czecho-Slovak state. Still other contributors also expressed themselves in Slovakia. We meet on its pages, for example, a critical examination which Kurt Glaser made of Radio Free Europe: How free is Radio Free Europe-The Voice of Doubletalk? (II, 2, pp. 25-28) and The " Russia First" Boys in Radio Free Europe. (III, I, pp. 31-38) as well as several of his other articles. Edward L. Delaney also wrote incisively and perceptively on The Betrayal of Slovakia (I, 2, pp. 1-7), on Tiso, Horthy and Benes as well as his personal experiences I was in Slovakia (II, 1, pp. 25-45). Hrobak further drew upon American public officials to express their views in Slovakia also. He published their patriotic addresses and expressions of concern and sympathy for minority groups as well as related matters from diplomatic circles for the interest of readers of Slovakia. As one reviews back issues, one cannot help noting the contributions of congressmen and persons like Michael A. Feighan, Edward J. Bonin, Charles J. Kersten, B. Carroll Reece, Lieut. Col. F. 0. Miksche, Ray J. Madden. In volume one, no. two, we find some thoughts of Prince Adolf zu Schwarzenberg, head of one of the oldest families of Bohemia. Interestingly, his contribution is on Czech Double Dealing. By way of balancing this heavy concentration on political fare, Hrobak took pains to offer other reading matter too. Occasionally he would publish something as different as the English translation of a treasured Slovak folk tale. He also ran a series on castles in Slovakia as well as occasional articles on other cultural topics like Slovak museums, the natural beauty of the Slovak countryside, the national folk hero Janosik, a study in contrasting ~vejk vs. Janosik, the natural springs and the spas of Slovakia, considerations on semantics and philology, Slovak university life and traditions, insights into Slovak church music, various types of Slovak customs, historical essays, thumbnail biographies. He also presented a serialization of Slovak history that he himself wrote and a serious study Slovak Nationalism which was researched by B. S. Bue. Applicable excerpts from American journalism were �SLOVAKIA 44 intended to provoke thought or reaction, and for this kind of prodding Hrobak quoted from The Washington Post, New York Times, the Cleveland Press, The Chicago Sun, the Brooklyn Daily Eagle, The Slavonic Monthly. He also culled from the Osservatore Romano, the Eudovy dennik of Chicago, cas (the official organ of Lettrich's Democratic Party and the Benes mouthpiece) as well as from other likely and unlikely sources. The personal trademark of Hrobak in these earlier issues of Slovakia was the filler feature titled Who Said It? Invariably these items were either ironic or revealing or they were couched in the full glow of patriotic ardor, depending on their portent. Hrobak felt that as a journalist he could not afford to be blandly genteel. He was dealing with subject matter that made demands on him to be ruthless rather that ineffectively mild. He knew that he had to be uncompromising rather than deferential. He was committed to the consideration of callous inequities and rank duplicity, and he needed the keenest of scalpels directed to the root of the issue. The Who Said It? feature was especially effective in quoting from Masaryk and Benes, Stransky and Lettrich, Peroutka and Ripka, Sramek and Gottwald. It held a full beam of light up to their pronouncements and exposed their ideas to re-evaluation. On the other hand, Hrobak also featured positive thinking from persons like Senator Robert A. Taft, Edward R. Murrow, H. W. Kaltenborn as well as from Dean Acheson, R. W. Seton-Watson, Congressman Daniel Flood and Alvin E. O'Konski. Readers found the material quoted in these fillers very apt, rather questionable, witty, thought-provoking or bitter. It was meant to be entertaining although an element of entertainment might sometimes develop out of it as a kind of byproduct. We present some samplings: "Some pussy-footing ostriches criticize the treaty between Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia. Our close collaboration with the Soviet Union needs no explanation. We do not want anything from the Russians except protection from the Germans, and the Russians want nothing whatsoever from us." - Jan Masaryk in Business Week, May 13, 1944. (Slovakia vn, 2, p. 64). "The Slovak nation, one of the oldest Christian nations in �SLOVAKIA 45 central Europe is distinct ethnic unit. Just as the Czechs are and want to remain Czechs, just so the Slovaks are and want to remain Slovaks. The history, culture and national traditions of the Slovak nation are distinct from the history, culture and national traditions of the Czechs. The Slovaks never were, nor are they now, a part of the Czech nation. Slovaks here and abroad resent being called Czechoslovaks." - P.A. Hrobak, Detroit, Mich., November 18, 1951 ( Slovakia IV, 3-4, p. 58) . RED GEOGRAPHY: The news service of the Central Slovak Catholic Bureau in Rome recently published a story about a certain school inspector of the Trnava district in Slovakia who gave directives to teachers on how to teach. Among other things he said that if nuns we:re able to interest children in a non-existe nt being, God, then the teachers certainly should be able to interest children in Stalin who actually exists. "The Marx-Lenin doctrines of our Stalin," he continued, "must be applied in all classes. For example, in geog:raphy you teach the children about the East and the West. Now you could say: The sun rises in the East; there is our g:reat Stalin, the sun of all the nations which enlightens all nations with his knowledge. The sun sets in the West; thel'le you find decayed capitalism, the treacherous bourgeoisie and murderous imperialism." -But most of the Slovak teachers and pupils prefer the advice of Horace Gre eley: Go West, young man! (Slovakia II, 2, p. 19) . No assignment that came to Philip Hrobak was too demanding or time consuming. As a journalist and as an American Slovak leader, Philip Hrobak was a fully committed person. After the University of California Press released a new printing of a 504 page book Czechoslovakia, edited by Robert J . Kerner, which was represented as "an honest, unprejudiced, and frank appraisal of the important contribution which the Czechoslovak nation made to the history of our time in its two decades of independence between two world wars," Philip Hrobak took the book under close scrutiny in order to examine its merits. Characteristically, he read it with balanced judgment and undertook a detailed search into the allegations that were made in the volume by the twenty collaborators who wrote their ideas into it. He made pertinent notes, comments and a record of his explanations and refutations. Subsequently, every issue of Slovakia from v. V., 2-3 (15-16) June-Sept. 1955 to v. VII, 3-4 (24-25) Sept.-Dec 1957 carried part of Hrobak's chapter by chapter analysis (through all 23 chapters) under the heading: "Professor �46 SLOVAKIA Kerner's CZECHOSLOVAKIA: History or Propaganda?" He granted, in all fairness, that the twenty writers who had contributed to the composite work were not necessarily dishonest or prejudiced but he did not yield the point that they had become Czech propagandists exporting established Masaryk-Benes theories at the expense of the Slovaks and their national history. In pointing out the errors and misconceptions of these writers and in refuting their specious theses, Hrobak could hardly help becoming occasionally vehement. It was in his very nature to be less than tolerant of that long standing tendency to relegate the Slovaks to second place or to no place at all, and this bias had again appeared through the pages of Kerner's work. It was part of Hrobak's scholarly conditioning that made him at least impatient with inept history that distorted authentic records and shaped a narrative fashioned to its own devising. In his refutations of error, both in this case and on other occasions, Hrobak set the record right by controverting claims that were all too easily made for an easy and ready acceptance. He did this by tracing his facts to prime sources for reference and documentation: He was especially skillful in drawing upon arguments and statements from Czech sources and authorities and he was often able to use this matter in order to substantiate his arguments and to confound some contemporary writers of history who had a way of misrepresentating facts. Nor was he above ridicule when the conditions were patently offered to invite ridicule. He had an instinct for examining promises made and conditions underscoring events that transpired in order to contrast them with promises honored and promises forgotten as well as with the aftermath of events that were shaped by the hard realities of circumstances. Summing it all up, he was a fearless and formidable adversary in the arena of fact vs. fiction, truth vs. deception. And in this encounter he did not shrink from handling the rhetoric and the claims of an entire collective force of writers not merely a single author. This was his consistent line of action. When it came to dealing with a denial of truth or with historic distortions, he did not stop to assess the odds. With him there were no �SLOVAKIA 47 prohibitive odds when truth and justice were to be vindicated. There was only a matter of conscience and professional ethics to be heeded. Fired with this spirit and singlemindedness of purpose, Hrobak worked on tirelessly. From his editorial office in Middletown he steadfastly waged his crusade in the press. One can see why he indefatigably set out to flay injustice and denounce "the synthetic Czechoslovak state," why he castigated the execution of President Tiso as political murder and judicial murder, why he was preoccupied with the cause "history or propaganda?" as well as with the futility of efforts to fuse the Slovak and the Czech nations into one impossible amalgam, why he was concerned with matters of Church and state. Very often the choice of expression that appears either in his own work or in the writing of his contributors reflects the depth of his own feeling and betrays its real measure of intensity. Note these phrases by way of example: Benes "King of political cheats;" the " Russia first" boys in RFE; how the Czechs deceived us; intrigues and t he entrapment of individuals; Czechoslovak pseudo-democracy; the machinations of Czech Socialists . . . But Hrobak was by no means a hidden away recluse of some kind bound to his editorial desk. Besides being a gifted journalist and editor, he was also a dynamic fraternalist and a forceful lecturer. Through outstanding personal participation he became the soul of many a significant national movement especially through the Slovak League of America, the Matica Skolskd (Foundation to promote schooling and education) and the Priatelia slovenskej slobody (Friends of Slovak freedom). He distinguished himself as the motivating force in the Slovak League and, if figures are telling indicators of any kind, it is worth noting that within two years after he accepted the presidency of this organization, its membership increased by two thousand. After the guiding leadership of Hrobak had succeeded in establishing the Washington Office of Information, Dr. Joseph Mikus, the talented diplomat who headed this agency, made of it an invaluable department for public relations. Further, a notable program of sixty film showings �48 SLOVAKIA was received with widespread appreciation. More importantly still, various committees of the U.S. Congress charged with investigating the denial of rights under totalitarian aggression heard the testimony and an exposition of Slovak history from Philip Hrobak and gave attentive hearing to the testimony.of a number of Slovak witnesses who appealed against the situation behind the iron curtain. This series of sessions gave American officials in Washington a realistic representation of the sufferings to which a number of countries were being subjected in central Europe. It also provided a formal documentation of tactics that were enslaving the Slovak people. There was a special American subcommittee before which depositions were made about conditions in Slovakia and after these hearings, the full reports were printed in a publication titled Investigation of Communist Takeover and Occupation of Poland, Lithuania and Slovakia. Through the Washington Office of Information and the dynamism of Philip Hrobak excellent rapport was established with a number of American congressmen and statesmen who came to understand and feel for the plight of the Slovak people in their homeland. In 1954 Congressmen Kersten and Bentley openly manifested their interest in the Slovak cause. In 1955 Vice President Nixon expressed the sympathetic feeling of the administration in a written message that was addressed to the 34th congress of the Slovak League of America. In 1956 Secretary of State Dulles received an eight-member delegation of the Slovak League led by Philip Hrobak and engaged in animated discussion of vital topics with them. Philip Hrobak worked on and on with boundless devotion. It was very fitting then, that this dedication and wholehearted service was recognized when a public presentation of honor was made to him in 1957 in the course of the golden jubilee of the founding of the League. A special committee of Slovak leaders singled him out for the award designated as the Hlinka Cup. This was an unusually high honor, for the Hlinka Cup was a trophy which had never before been bestowed upon American soil. The address of presentation was made by Dr. Joseph M. Kirschbaum in recognition of Hrobak's merits as president �SLOVAKIA 49 of the Slovak League of America, as an eminent and intrepid editor of Jednota and Slovakia, as an outstanding champion in American Slovak life, as the compiler of a grammar and a dictionary and "because with his aggressive elan, his perseverance and fearlessness both as a journalist and as an organizer, he personifies the finest qualities that had endowed not only :Cudovit stur (a leading patriot), but also the first recipient of the cup, Andrew Hlinka." In 1961 another public honor was conferred on Philip Hrobak. This was the Charles IV Award or Karl's Prize that was presented to him by the Sudeten German Council of West Germany. It is a recognition that is awarded annually to a political leader, scientist or publicist who has made an outstanding contribution to the concept of a United Europe. The ceremonies were held in Cologne on Sudeten German Day, May 20, with over 200,000 Sudeten German expellees participating. Mr. Hrobak responded to the honor with a glowing address titled "Self Determination for All." His words bespoke the aspirations and the innermost feelings of Sudeten Germans as well as of the Slovak people and other victims of self-rule denied under the crushing force of communism. Among other Americans who participated in this observance were U.S. Congressmen Morgan D. Moulder, Gordon H. Scherer, Roy A. Taylor, and Henry C. Schadeberg. Willy Brandt, the mayor of Berlin, and several other Sudeten German leaders also delivered addresses. In these numberless events and situations we cannot fail to see the greatness of Philip Hrobak as an American and Slovak patriot, as a man of ideals and of forceful action, as a fraternalist and an organizer but we must not overlook his stature as a man of God also. It must never be forgotten that Hrobak served God at least as well as he served his nation and his fellow man. Religious principles and obligations had first place in his life and his life style. All his zeal and purpose was rooted in the law and the love of God; his spending of self on behalf of others was within the Christian concept. He was as ready to promote and defend Christian virtue and idealism as he was to crusade for national honor and welfare. Although his days were incredibly crowded with constant activity, �50 SLOVAKIA he did not put God in second place in his personal life. As a teacher and educator, he was aware of the importance of Catholic schools. As a parent, he was solicitous about a genuinely Christian atmosphere in the home and true religious training in the family. As a journalist, he faithfully promoted the interests of the Church and ethical principles. That was the reason why he combated the atheistic and the Away-from-Rome! attitude that was being sponsored by some leaders in Czecho-Slovakia. As 1963 was moving in on the calendar, Philip Hrobak prepared copy for a special issue of Slovakia and for the Jednota publications that he managed and edited. Out of regard for the Christian heritage of the Slovak people, he began to prepare to honor the 1100th anniversary of the mission of SS. Cyril and Methodius to Great Moravia and the Christianization of the Slovak nation. The annuals that he prepared for this occasion became a kind of crown of excellence that climaxed his literary and scholarly output and gave singular expression to his religious devotion as well. Truly, as we review the life and the accomplishments of Philip Hrobak who would have been seventy years old this year, we have reason to thank God for his idealism and example, and we are impressed and inspired by this great man's patriotism, his scholarship, his leadership and his personal dynamism. Sr. Martina Tybor, SS.C.M. THE FAMOUS Slovak folk-dance group, "Lucnica," from Bratislava returned from a 6-weeks' tour of several South American. countries. The 47-member company represented the current silver jubilee ensemble. Lucnica was organized in 1948. THE HIGH TATRAS in Slovakia last year attracted 2 and ½ million tourists. An even larger number was expected in 1974. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1974, Vol. 24 Description An account of the resource Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 36 SLOVAKIA Phiiip A. Hrobak (1904-1964) Generally the biographical facts of a man's life can be assembled without great difficulty. Cold facts of this kind, however, do not give us the complete or satisfying image of an individual. They lack the true lineaments of his character, the appreciable measure of his stature and the contributions of his lifetime of striving and achieving. Simplistically we can gather the key dates that marked the life span of Philip A. Hrobak, one of our American Slovak "greats" who would have reached his seventieth birthday in 1974 had not death cut him down in his life's prime. The bare data would include these statistics: Philip Anthony Hrobak was born in Cleveland, Ohio on May 1, 1904. Michael and Mary Hrobak, his parents, were Slovak immigrants from the Spis region who had sought and found a kindlier way of life in the American mid-West. On May 6, 1914, just a few days after Philip's tenth birthday, his widowed mother brought Philip and his four year old sister Mary to the Immaculate Conception Home in Middletown, Pa. They were the first children received into the newly established home for children which the Jednota organization founded under the guiding spirit of Father Furdek. The children had lost their father in February of that year and their mother was concerned about providing for their care, for she too was in poor health. When a merciless blood malady ended her life a few months later, the Hrobak children had no one to look after them but the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius to whose care the Jednota had entrusted this home. Philip continued the studies that he had begun in St. Wendelin's parochial school in Cleveland and as soon as she was ready for school, Mary also attended classes. On completing his elementary education at Jednota Home, Philip went on to high school and college at St. SLOVAKIA 37 Procopius in Lisle, Ill. From 1924 to 1927 he taught at St. Procopius and then accepted an assistantship as he pursued advanced studies in the department of chemistry at New York University. By the fall of 1929 he was again in his native city Cleveland where he taught a varied program of classes and coached the football team at the flourishing Benedictine High. For nine years he was a very successful teacher here, distinguishing himself especially in his chemistry, history and language classes as well as in his relationship with high school students. From all appearances, he seemed to be destined for a brilliant carrer as an educator. In August 1931 he married Rose Jasko and they became the devoted parents of nine children. His school work and parental cares could have absorbed all his time and talent yet his eager mind together with his vital interest in life and in his fellow man prompted him to cultivate an active concern in the issues and problems of those around him as well as the world at large. From time to time he gave expression to some of his thinking through contributions to various publications. Problems of youth and education as well as Slovak history ranked among his prime interests. In the matter of Slovak history he found not merely a static record of the past but also an on-going chain of direction and a development of history in his own day. He could not look upon man's interaction with man or nation with nation and remain a detached spectator. He was both an observer and a maker of history. Out of his experiences as a teacher, Philip Hrobak came to the realization that he could do more than just use books as tools of learning; he authored a practical and comprehensive Slovak grammar for the use of English speaking persons. He also compiled a sizable English-Slovak dictionary. Both served as important adjuncts in learning the Slovak language. Even today there are many who value his revised dictionary as a very useful reference. In 1937 when Joseph Husek yielded his Jednota editorship in order to seek the presidency of the Jednota organization, Philip Hrobak was elected editor of the weekly organ. No better replacement could have been made. From 38 SLOVAKIA this time on, Hrobak became a formidable force in Slovak and Slovak-American public life. His position was further strengthened when he became vice president of the Slovak League of America in 1949, and it was additionally confirmed when he assumed the presidency of Slovak League of America in 1950. For twelve years he gave this office distinctively dynamic force and singular meaningfulness. Hrobak's role in public life as well as the magnetism of his gifts and personality brought him into close contact and association with distinguished expatriated Slovak leaders and intellectuals. One of his closest co-workers was Dr. Joseph Pauco who continues to work in the same editorial office that he once shared with Philip Hrobak. Among other notable associates from abroad were Constantine Culen, Francis Hrusovsky, Joseph Kirschbaum, Joseph Mikus and Karol Sidor. An outstanding achievement of Hrobak's career in the Slovak League of America was the establishment of a highly desirable and eminently successful Office of Information functioning in Washington, D. C. under the distinguished chairmanship of the Slovak diplomat Dr. Joseph Mikus. This professional department became a vital public relations center as well as a liason agency in American-Slovak life. The journalistic genius of Philip Hrobak expressed itself not only through the Jednota weekly and the Jednota annual almanac which are the official publications of the Jednota organization and which even then served the need for both information and inspiration on behalf of its membership but he further initiated and sponsored other valuable publications as well. In 1949, for example, he began the Slovak Newsletter, a bulletin for public information. In 1951 he undertook a Slovak politico-cultural quarterly Slovakia, the voice of the Slovak League of America. In 1961 he launched another project, Furdek, an annual which became an English counterpart to the long established Jednota Kalendar. He gave this new work a content and style of its own, directing its appeal largely to readers who were not able to read the Slovak Kalendar. When Father Lach entrusted in 1959 the newspaper Slovak v Amerike to Philip Hrobak, the new publisher 39 SLOVAKIA collaborated on this weekly with Dr. Joseph Pauco and expanded his publishing scope to include the annual Literdrny Almanach Slovdka v Amerike as well as an affiliated series of book publications through which he often provided a public to well seasoned writers as well as to capable aspiring novices in journalism. With unbounded vigor and zeal Philip Hrobak worked from his Middletown office, serving the cause of God and man to his dying day. When illness struck him down it was hard to accept the fact that this was a mortal ailment. Although those who were close to him hoped against hope that he would recover, he ended his life on January 10, 1964 in Harrisburg, Pa. and was buried in Cleveland, Ohio. These are some of the essential facts in the life story of Philip Hrobak. * * When one undertakes the task of evaluating the stature of this leader Philip Hrobak and his literary output, the impressive factor becomes not only the quantity of his excellent published writings but also the quality of the man that shows through his works and the temper of his thought. Hrobak was above all a writer with a message. He was purposeful and dedicated, for he had a cause that was rooted in conscience. His personal integrity and Christian philosophy of life inspired him with a profound sense of honesty and justice which could not be confined to private life but clamored for redress even in the market place and public forum. With him morality and the full impact of the Ten Commandments had a place before God and man. For this reason he was intolerant of oppression and he championed the rights of man. This included basic justice and freedom in private life, within all levels of the social structure and within national and international relationships. Hrobak was gifted with a clarity of inner vision that penetrated surface appearances and subtle diplomatic maneuverings. He had an inborn alertness that was adroit and discriminating in dealing with political smooth talk, long standing inequities that tried to stay covered up, and outward niceties. He was not one to be easily deceived. And he had the courage of his convictions as well as the 40 SLOVAKIA ability to deal incisively with critical issues and difficult problems. He not only propagated the slogan Za Boha a ndrod! he lived the ideal, for all his life and energy, all his purpose and dedication was to translate into real life the spirit of devotion to God and abiding patriotism to the United States as well as to Slovakia, the ancestral homeland of American Slovaks. And as he set himself to these tasks, he was fully conscious of the duty that, as an officer and a leader in American Slovak fraternalism, he was to inspire others with a zeal for truth and right action. Circumscribi ng this study to a close review of the first fourteen volumes of Slovakia (1951-1964) which Philip Hrobak compiled and edited, we find even within this representativ e range of his work enough tangibles to assess the caliber of Hrobak's journalism, Christian philosophy and leadership. Like much of his journalistic output, these volumes of Hrobak's Slovakia were devoted largely to political content. We see in them Philip Hrobak the American patriot, the champion of Slovak statehood and a first class editor. His objective is truth and justice. For this reason he is a persistent and merciless fact-finder and incidentally he becomes an ideal publicist. He does not avoid issues or pretend that he does not see them and he does not feel that he can afford to be an overly fastidious respecter of persons. He was not an unfeeling individual and he knew how to cherish and express profound deference for constituted authority and public office but when he sensed that "Something is rotten in the state ... " he was relentless in uncovering the festering realities that were lurking under misleading outward appearances. His Christian uprightness, his idealism and sense of fairness bound him to flay inequity and to denounce oppression of every kind. Hrobak did not produce his 35 issues of Slovakia singlehandedl y. He opened his colums to Slovak diplomats, statesmen, historians and leaders as well as to thinking Americans who also championed the cause of freedom, justice and truth, especially the concept of historical truth. His formal objective was openly published in a number of issues of Slovakia: SLOVAKIA 41 The chief purpose of Slovakia is to promote a better under standing and appreciation of the Slovak nation and its long struggle for freedom and independence. As Americans, members of the Slovak League of America believe that the Slovak nation, like all nations, has an interest and God-given right to freedom and independence. They are dedicated to the cause of the American way of life, Slovak freedom and world peace, and are determined to oppose the plague of communism and all other totalitarian political systems. Because this periodical was a vehicle of information to both a Slovak and a non-Slovak readership of serious intent, especially to American scholars, public officials, diplomats and university people, Hrobak made every effort to give it the widest possible dissemination into the homes and offices of American and foreign diplomats, politicians and public leaders as well as the libraries and departments of history and political science in many American colleges and universities. Of course, many average readers who sought to be well-informed also subscribed to it. Under Hrobak's gifted editorship and management, the circulation of Slovakia increased steadily. To provide the information and understanding that he had in mind, Hrobak attracted the most highly qualified of contributors to bring their works to Slovakia. Some of them were expatriated Slovak leaders and makers of Slovak history; some of them were scholars and historians of Slovak as well as non-Slovak origin; some were critics and analysts of political thought and nationalism; some were American legislators. Dr. Joseph M. Kirschbaum, a Slavistic scholar who taught and lectured at the University of Montreal in Canada produced a substantial article for practically every issue (30 articles in 37 issues, to be precise) . In the main, he examines the historical theses that warrant the existence of an autonomous Slovak state, basic principles and circumstances on which federation could be structured in central Europe, the subject of Slovakia and international relationships, the underlying causes of incompatability with Czech pretensions, the matter of Czech duplicity and oppressive arrogance, and Slovak politics past and present. His gifts, however, are multifaceted and out of the diversity of his 42 SLOVAKIA broad interests he also prepared papers on cultural topics such as: Slovak literature under the Soviet impact (VI, 2/ 19, pp. 34-51) , Mickiewicz in Slovak poetry and translations (VII, 1/22, pp. 32-41) , Universi ty traditions in Slovakia (VIII, 2/ 27, pp. 18-30), Contemporary tendencies in Slovak philology (X, 7/ 32, pp. 25-32) , The Canadian translator of Slovak poetry: Professor Watson Kirkconnell (XIV, 37, pp. 9-18). Dr. Kirschbaum consistently provided book reviews as well. Dr. Joseph Pauco has always been a faithful contributor also. He is a professional writer with a rich background in publishing and journalism. For a number of years he was editor-in-chief of the daily Slovak published in Bratislava. He lived through many a promising and too many a tragic experience in Slovak national life. He has tasted prosperity and good fortune as well as much disappointment at home and abroad. He is a journalist with the conviction that the editor, the reporter, the columnist is called to serve the people by illuminating facts, defending truth, and inspiring to action. These principles are embodied throughout his articles in Slovakia, most of which are devoted to political analysis and historical report; e.g. The practical aspect of federation (III, 2, pp. 26-36), The failures of communist politics in Slovakia (V, 4/ 17, pp. 3-20), The 1944 communist rebellion in Slovakia (VII, 3-4, 24/ 25, pp. 28-34) , and Slovakia under communism--which was serialized in three issues (IX, 30; X, 31 ; XI, 33 ). Among other significant contributors who brought enrichment to the early issues of Slovakia these must be mentioned: culen, Hrusovsky, Vnuk, Mikus, Sidor, Grebert, Cieker, t>urcansky, Murin, Rekem and Kruzliak. Their works are marked with the authority of those who had witnessed this history of Slovakia in the making and with the conviction of those who knew only too well what absolutes and what cause they were defending. Contributions on the scholarly level are thoroughly researched and documented; they are singularly important for their cultural value. With the aid of national figures like these, Philip Hrobak made of Slovakia a unique journal that analyzed SLOVAKIA 43 Slovak and Czech politics and exposed the truth and the falsity behind the facade of the Czecho-Slovak state. Still other contributors also expressed themselves in Slovakia. We meet on its pages, for example, a critical examination which Kurt Glaser made of Radio Free Europe: How free is Radio Free Europe-The Voice of Doubletalk? (II, 2, pp. 25-28) and The " Russia First" Boys in Radio Free Europe. (III, I, pp. 31-38) as well as several of his other articles. Edward L. Delaney also wrote incisively and perceptively on The Betrayal of Slovakia (I, 2, pp. 1-7), on Tiso, Horthy and Benes as well as his personal experiences I was in Slovakia (II, 1, pp. 25-45). Hrobak further drew upon American public officials to express their views in Slovakia also. He published their patriotic addresses and expressions of concern and sympathy for minority groups as well as related matters from diplomatic circles for the interest of readers of Slovakia. As one reviews back issues, one cannot help noting the contributions of congressmen and persons like Michael A. Feighan, Edward J. Bonin, Charles J. Kersten, B. Carroll Reece, Lieut. Col. F. 0. Miksche, Ray J. Madden. In volume one, no. two, we find some thoughts of Prince Adolf zu Schwarzenberg, head of one of the oldest families of Bohemia. Interestingly, his contribution is on Czech Double Dealing. By way of balancing this heavy concentration on political fare, Hrobak took pains to offer other reading matter too. Occasionally he would publish something as different as the English translation of a treasured Slovak folk tale. He also ran a series on castles in Slovakia as well as occasional articles on other cultural topics like Slovak museums, the natural beauty of the Slovak countryside, the national folk hero Janosik, a study in contrasting ~vejk vs. Janosik, the natural springs and the spas of Slovakia, considerations on semantics and philology, Slovak university life and traditions, insights into Slovak church music, various types of Slovak customs, historical essays, thumbnail biographies. He also presented a serialization of Slovak history that he himself wrote and a serious study Slovak Nationalism which was researched by B. S. Bue. Applicable excerpts from American journalism were SLOVAKIA 44 intended to provoke thought or reaction, and for this kind of prodding Hrobak quoted from The Washington Post, New York Times, the Cleveland Press, The Chicago Sun, the Brooklyn Daily Eagle, The Slavonic Monthly. He also culled from the Osservatore Romano, the Eudovy dennik of Chicago, cas (the official organ of Lettrich's Democratic Party and the Benes mouthpiece) as well as from other likely and unlikely sources. The personal trademark of Hrobak in these earlier issues of Slovakia was the filler feature titled Who Said It? Invariably these items were either ironic or revealing or they were couched in the full glow of patriotic ardor, depending on their portent. Hrobak felt that as a journalist he could not afford to be blandly genteel. He was dealing with subject matter that made demands on him to be ruthless rather that ineffectively mild. He knew that he had to be uncompromising rather than deferential. He was committed to the consideration of callous inequities and rank duplicity, and he needed the keenest of scalpels directed to the root of the issue. The Who Said It? feature was especially effective in quoting from Masaryk and Benes, Stransky and Lettrich, Peroutka and Ripka, Sramek and Gottwald. It held a full beam of light up to their pronouncements and exposed their ideas to re-evaluation. On the other hand, Hrobak also featured positive thinking from persons like Senator Robert A. Taft, Edward R. Murrow, H. W. Kaltenborn as well as from Dean Acheson, R. W. Seton-Watson, Congressman Daniel Flood and Alvin E. O'Konski. Readers found the material quoted in these fillers very apt, rather questionable, witty, thought-provoking or bitter. It was meant to be entertaining although an element of entertainment might sometimes develop out of it as a kind of byproduct. We present some samplings: "Some pussy-footing ostriches criticize the treaty between Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia. Our close collaboration with the Soviet Union needs no explanation. We do not want anything from the Russians except protection from the Germans, and the Russians want nothing whatsoever from us." - Jan Masaryk in Business Week, May 13, 1944. (Slovakia vn, 2, p. 64). "The Slovak nation, one of the oldest Christian nations in SLOVAKIA 45 central Europe is distinct ethnic unit. Just as the Czechs are and want to remain Czechs, just so the Slovaks are and want to remain Slovaks. The history, culture and national traditions of the Slovak nation are distinct from the history, culture and national traditions of the Czechs. The Slovaks never were, nor are they now, a part of the Czech nation. Slovaks here and abroad resent being called Czechoslovaks." - P.A. Hrobak, Detroit, Mich., November 18, 1951 ( Slovakia IV, 3-4, p. 58) . RED GEOGRAPHY: The news service of the Central Slovak Catholic Bureau in Rome recently published a story about a certain school inspector of the Trnava district in Slovakia who gave directives to teachers on how to teach. Among other things he said that if nuns we:re able to interest children in a non-existe nt being, God, then the teachers certainly should be able to interest children in Stalin who actually exists. "The Marx-Lenin doctrines of our Stalin," he continued, "must be applied in all classes. For example, in geog:raphy you teach the children about the East and the West. Now you could say: The sun rises in the East; there is our g:reat Stalin, the sun of all the nations which enlightens all nations with his knowledge. The sun sets in the West; thel'le you find decayed capitalism, the treacherous bourgeoisie and murderous imperialism." -But most of the Slovak teachers and pupils prefer the advice of Horace Gre eley: Go West, young man! (Slovakia II, 2, p. 19) . No assignment that came to Philip Hrobak was too demanding or time consuming. As a journalist and as an American Slovak leader, Philip Hrobak was a fully committed person. After the University of California Press released a new printing of a 504 page book Czechoslovakia, edited by Robert J . Kerner, which was represented as "an honest, unprejudiced, and frank appraisal of the important contribution which the Czechoslovak nation made to the history of our time in its two decades of independence between two world wars," Philip Hrobak took the book under close scrutiny in order to examine its merits. Characteristically, he read it with balanced judgment and undertook a detailed search into the allegations that were made in the volume by the twenty collaborators who wrote their ideas into it. He made pertinent notes, comments and a record of his explanations and refutations. Subsequently, every issue of Slovakia from v. V., 2-3 (15-16) June-Sept. 1955 to v. VII, 3-4 (24-25) Sept.-Dec 1957 carried part of Hrobak's chapter by chapter analysis (through all 23 chapters) under the heading: "Professor 46 SLOVAKIA Kerner's CZECHOSLOVAKIA: History or Propaganda?" He granted, in all fairness, that the twenty writers who had contributed to the composite work were not necessarily dishonest or prejudiced but he did not yield the point that they had become Czech propagandists exporting established Masaryk-Benes theories at the expense of the Slovaks and their national history. In pointing out the errors and misconceptions of these writers and in refuting their specious theses, Hrobak could hardly help becoming occasionally vehement. It was in his very nature to be less than tolerant of that long standing tendency to relegate the Slovaks to second place or to no place at all, and this bias had again appeared through the pages of Kerner's work. It was part of Hrobak's scholarly conditioning that made him at least impatient with inept history that distorted authentic records and shaped a narrative fashioned to its own devising. In his refutations of error, both in this case and on other occasions, Hrobak set the record right by controverting claims that were all too easily made for an easy and ready acceptance. He did this by tracing his facts to prime sources for reference and documentation: He was especially skillful in drawing upon arguments and statements from Czech sources and authorities and he was often able to use this matter in order to substantiate his arguments and to confound some contemporary writers of history who had a way of misrepresentating facts. Nor was he above ridicule when the conditions were patently offered to invite ridicule. He had an instinct for examining promises made and conditions underscoring events that transpired in order to contrast them with promises honored and promises forgotten as well as with the aftermath of events that were shaped by the hard realities of circumstances. Summing it all up, he was a fearless and formidable adversary in the arena of fact vs. fiction, truth vs. deception. And in this encounter he did not shrink from handling the rhetoric and the claims of an entire collective force of writers not merely a single author. This was his consistent line of action. When it came to dealing with a denial of truth or with historic distortions, he did not stop to assess the odds. With him there were no SLOVAKIA 47 prohibitive odds when truth and justice were to be vindicated. There was only a matter of conscience and professional ethics to be heeded. Fired with this spirit and singlemindedness of purpose, Hrobak worked on tirelessly. From his editorial office in Middletown he steadfastly waged his crusade in the press. One can see why he indefatigably set out to flay injustice and denounce "the synthetic Czechoslovak state," why he castigated the execution of President Tiso as political murder and judicial murder, why he was preoccupied with the cause "history or propaganda?" as well as with the futility of efforts to fuse the Slovak and the Czech nations into one impossible amalgam, why he was concerned with matters of Church and state. Very often the choice of expression that appears either in his own work or in the writing of his contributors reflects the depth of his own feeling and betrays its real measure of intensity. Note these phrases by way of example: Benes "King of political cheats;" the " Russia first" boys in RFE; how the Czechs deceived us; intrigues and t he entrapment of individuals; Czechoslovak pseudo-democracy; the machinations of Czech Socialists . . . But Hrobak was by no means a hidden away recluse of some kind bound to his editorial desk. Besides being a gifted journalist and editor, he was also a dynamic fraternalist and a forceful lecturer. Through outstanding personal participation he became the soul of many a significant national movement especially through the Slovak League of America, the Matica Skolskd (Foundation to promote schooling and education) and the Priatelia slovenskej slobody (Friends of Slovak freedom). He distinguished himself as the motivating force in the Slovak League and, if figures are telling indicators of any kind, it is worth noting that within two years after he accepted the presidency of this organization, its membership increased by two thousand. After the guiding leadership of Hrobak had succeeded in establishing the Washington Office of Information, Dr. Joseph Mikus, the talented diplomat who headed this agency, made of it an invaluable department for public relations. Further, a notable program of sixty film showings 48 SLOVAKIA was received with widespread appreciation. More importantly still, various committees of the U.S. Congress charged with investigating the denial of rights under totalitarian aggression heard the testimony and an exposition of Slovak history from Philip Hrobak and gave attentive hearing to the testimony.of a number of Slovak witnesses who appealed against the situation behind the iron curtain. This series of sessions gave American officials in Washington a realistic representation of the sufferings to which a number of countries were being subjected in central Europe. It also provided a formal documentation of tactics that were enslaving the Slovak people. There was a special American subcommittee before which depositions were made about conditions in Slovakia and after these hearings, the full reports were printed in a publication titled Investigation of Communist Takeover and Occupation of Poland, Lithuania and Slovakia. Through the Washington Office of Information and the dynamism of Philip Hrobak excellent rapport was established with a number of American congressmen and statesmen who came to understand and feel for the plight of the Slovak people in their homeland. In 1954 Congressmen Kersten and Bentley openly manifested their interest in the Slovak cause. In 1955 Vice President Nixon expressed the sympathetic feeling of the administration in a written message that was addressed to the 34th congress of the Slovak League of America. In 1956 Secretary of State Dulles received an eight-member delegation of the Slovak League led by Philip Hrobak and engaged in animated discussion of vital topics with them. Philip Hrobak worked on and on with boundless devotion. It was very fitting then, that this dedication and wholehearted service was recognized when a public presentation of honor was made to him in 1957 in the course of the golden jubilee of the founding of the League. A special committee of Slovak leaders singled him out for the award designated as the Hlinka Cup. This was an unusually high honor, for the Hlinka Cup was a trophy which had never before been bestowed upon American soil. The address of presentation was made by Dr. Joseph M. Kirschbaum in recognition of Hrobak's merits as president SLOVAKIA 49 of the Slovak League of America, as an eminent and intrepid editor of Jednota and Slovakia, as an outstanding champion in American Slovak life, as the compiler of a grammar and a dictionary and "because with his aggressive elan, his perseverance and fearlessness both as a journalist and as an organizer, he personifies the finest qualities that had endowed not only :Cudovit stur (a leading patriot), but also the first recipient of the cup, Andrew Hlinka." In 1961 another public honor was conferred on Philip Hrobak. This was the Charles IV Award or Karl's Prize that was presented to him by the Sudeten German Council of West Germany. It is a recognition that is awarded annually to a political leader, scientist or publicist who has made an outstanding contribution to the concept of a United Europe. The ceremonies were held in Cologne on Sudeten German Day, May 20, with over 200,000 Sudeten German expellees participating. Mr. Hrobak responded to the honor with a glowing address titled "Self Determination for All." His words bespoke the aspirations and the innermost feelings of Sudeten Germans as well as of the Slovak people and other victims of self-rule denied under the crushing force of communism. Among other Americans who participated in this observance were U.S. Congressmen Morgan D. Moulder, Gordon H. Scherer, Roy A. Taylor, and Henry C. Schadeberg. Willy Brandt, the mayor of Berlin, and several other Sudeten German leaders also delivered addresses. In these numberless events and situations we cannot fail to see the greatness of Philip Hrobak as an American and Slovak patriot, as a man of ideals and of forceful action, as a fraternalist and an organizer but we must not overlook his stature as a man of God also. It must never be forgotten that Hrobak served God at least as well as he served his nation and his fellow man. Religious principles and obligations had first place in his life and his life style. All his zeal and purpose was rooted in the law and the love of God; his spending of self on behalf of others was within the Christian concept. He was as ready to promote and defend Christian virtue and idealism as he was to crusade for national honor and welfare. Although his days were incredibly crowded with constant activity, 50 SLOVAKIA he did not put God in second place in his personal life. As a teacher and educator, he was aware of the importance of Catholic schools. As a parent, he was solicitous about a genuinely Christian atmosphere in the home and true religious training in the family. As a journalist, he faithfully promoted the interests of the Church and ethical principles. That was the reason why he combated the atheistic and the Away-from-Rome! attitude that was being sponsored by some leaders in Czecho-Slovakia. As 1963 was moving in on the calendar, Philip Hrobak prepared copy for a special issue of Slovakia and for the Jednota publications that he managed and edited. Out of regard for the Christian heritage of the Slovak people, he began to prepare to honor the 1100th anniversary of the mission of SS. Cyril and Methodius to Great Moravia and the Christianization of the Slovak nation. The annuals that he prepared for this occasion became a kind of crown of excellence that climaxed his literary and scholarly output and gave singular expression to his religious devotion as well. Truly, as we review the life and the accomplishments of Philip Hrobak who would have been seventy years old this year, we have reason to thank God for his idealism and example, and we are impressed and inspired by this great man's patriotism, his scholarship, his leadership and his personal dynamism. Sr. Martina Tybor, SS.C.M. THE FAMOUS Slovak folk-dance group, "Lucnica," from Bratislava returned from a 6-weeks' tour of several South American. countries. The 47-member company represented the current silver jubilee ensemble. Lucnica was organized in 1948. THE HIGH TATRAS in Slovakia last year attracted 2 and ½ million tourists. An even larger number was expected in 1974.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Philip A. Hrobak (1907-1964) Description An account of the resource Sr. Martina Tybor, SS.C.M. Slovakia, Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974 pp. 36-50 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Tybor, Sister M. Martina, SS.C.M. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/cd097d77bb364356e1484c3c8e2503bd.pdf 967b63980e85bd86edd8d53a5c90cddd PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still �52 SLOVAKIA unknown to the public, and a general anxiety as to tbe future o[ Europe was bound to arlse among those nations concerned. Mo•cow made the firat move which revealed that •he had been able to galn a free hand in Central Europe, when she concluded a Treaty with Dr. Benea, a■ "Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia." lt was evldent by thls that tbe Kremlin was taklng over the States within its sphere of innuence as tbelr "protector and guarantor." The Czecha (a small nation numbering over seven mllllon) had 1iro-Russlan sympathles on the whole and were conaidered a■ the out. post of RuHian imperialiam in Europe and as reactlonaries supportlng 'ľsarist absolutism. Durlng the First Great War, they (the Czechs) had divided their loyalty. Soldiers in the Austrlan Army deserted en masse to the Rus• ;,ians, whlle at home they conducted the same policy as durlng thls Second Oreat War by pro!esslng loyalty to the occupant. Kenneth de Courcey, wrltlng in the REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS. Aprll 28, 1944, said: "There is, in fact, almost no reslstance movement at all in Ruthenia, Slovakia, Mora via and Bohemia. The Rutheniana are ... anti-Ru• sian. The maHea in Slovakia are anti-Czech and anti-Ruaaian. The attitude of the Czech population ia curioua. Quite a number are now actually serving in the German forcea, viz., in the 5th and 8th Jaeger Divisiona, the 18th Motorized Oivialon, and the 81st, 122nd, 226th and 290th lnfantry Dlviaion. Czech induatry ia moat effectively aupporting the German war effort and many workers seem very much to dislike the idea of riaking the conaequencea of reaiatance. The Czech· clergy is largely supporUng Presldent Hacha, partly because of lts antl-Russian vlews and partly because it fears anti-clerlcalism from the radlcals abroad. AII theae facta are everywhere well-known on the Continent, and it cauaea a■toniahment to many frienda of the Alliea that they should be so little known In Britain and America. War-Time Ra• tioning and Conaumption, published by the Secretarlat ot the League of Natlons, Geneva, 1942, <itates that the inhabltants of Bol:jemia had t)le same ration as Germany (pp. 22-23)." · As the favored child of the Versallles Treaty, they (lhe; Czechs) were presented with Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia, aÍthough these countrles had neither previously belonged to, nor were united with Bohemia. Despite the extension towards the East, there was stlll no possiblllty of the Czechs achlevlng a common frontier with Russla. In thls Second Great War, Dr. Benes, the Czech's representative in the Allied camp, began bis politlcal campaign by acting in accord• 11nce with the Britlsh program for the recoostruction ot Europe. but when Moacow became one of the Alliea, he ehanged the cour1e of his policy to flow along Soviet linea. The Czech's federatioo with ]'oland, which had been patronlzed by Brltain, wa.s thrown lnto the waste paper bask~t. Dr. nenes a.nnounced bis lntentlon of shortly t oncluding a post-war pact wlth the Soviet Union, which meant tbat he was leaving the camp of the Western world and hitcblng his wagon to the Russlan star. It was a policy whlch compllcated the future sltuatlon !or Centra) Europe. and Britaln of 1942- 1943 showed herself to be !ar from satlsfled with the premature polltlcal solutlon to thl~ point on the part or Russla. London wa.s lert wlth two alternatlves; elther to allow Dr. nenes to go to Moscow and set up resldence �SLOVAKIA there, and so lose t hls pawn on its chessboard, or to hold a resentful <;:zech "Provisional Government" In London untll the war should further clarlfy the sltuation. lt was indeed soon to become clear, but In ravor Qf Russia. After the conference in Moacow, there aeemed no longer. any point in holdlng Dr. Benea in Eng land when he waa ao anxioua to offer hi• country aa a vaaaal to Stalin. On December 12, Moscow announced t he Treaty wlth Dr. Benes, In whlch the "close and frlendly collaboratlon after the re-establishmen t of peace ..." was mentloned. This Treaty had put Czecho-Slovakla at the mercy of Moscow to such a degree that the Russlans dld not even argue over the fate of the 700,000 Carpathlan Ruthenians in the frame of the Czecho-Slovakian State. Moscow, who had claimed the Polish Rut henians on racia! grounds as the kin of the Ukranians in the U.S.S .R., was apparently indlfferen t to thls group of Ruthenlan people, although the threat of tbe annexatlon of Carpatblan Ruthenla was later to prove useful wben the Czecbs showed a reluctance to carry out the orders of the Kremlin. The "union" of Carpathlan Ruthenla wltb the Soviets 1!eemed hardly necessary at this point, when Dr. Benes had, in fact, subordlnated all Czecho·Slovakia to Russia. The policy of Dr. Benes' Government was a repetltion on a larger scale of its pollcy during t he Flrst Great War, the most extreme polnts belng more strongly underllned beneath the lnfluence of a s trenger Russla. Dr. Benes lnterpreted this policy in connectlon wlth Poland in bis book "Smyal Ceskoalovenske Revoluce" (The Sense or ihe Czecho-Slovak 'Revolution) Prague 1924: "In a war against tbe Centra! P owers (Germany and Austria) we need the Poles, and the reason for thls war has compelled us to recog• nlze Polanďs rights. Endeavoring to have our rlght:, ackno wledged. we must acknowledge tbe rlghts of the Poles le!!t we ourselves morally !ose our own. But, to gíve proof of our loyalty to our frienda (viz., the Ru1alan1) we had to oppoae their eaaential, antl-Ruaalan policy. 'ľhere were moments when Russia because of Poland, adopted a dangerous attitude towards the Allles. Briand had had to tear the first concession for Poland and Russia. In a short. Ume, because of Poland é\lld interna! polltlcal reasons, the danger arose that Russia would even conclude a separate peace with Germany, I state impartlally, that the Allles were lncllned to solve certain questlons in a manner which was bound not to satlsfy t he Poles." The Russo-Benes Treaty, veiled in its vague clauses, gave little away. Afterwards In hls message to the Czecho-Slovak State Council on February 3, 1944, Dr. Benes sald that the time had not yet come to " examlne concretely tbe matters" which were negotlated at l\foscow, matters about whlch a "mutual understandlng" had been reacbed. Amongf!J: these "matters" was an agreement ampllfylng Artlcle 4 or the Treaty, which had stipulated that the two Powers "shall develop their economic relations on the largest posslble scale." The CzeehoSlovak lnduatrles, mine, and sourcea of hydraulie energy were to be nationallzed; the Czech war induatrles were to work for tt,e Ruaaian and Czecho-Slovak armiea ; war production waa , to be atandardized ao that it would conform wlth the Ruaalan war production; a new Czeeho-Slovak Army waa to be rai1ed and, "In the future interesta of Czecho-Slovakia," organized, trajned and equipped after the Red Army 0 �54 SLOVAK.IA standards. "In the interests of democracy and ror the extirpatlon of German lnfluences," educatlonal (political) oftlcers were to be lntroduced lnto all units. The Czecho-Stovak currency was to be atabilized in conformity with Russia. Their railway, motor-roada and air lines were to be constructed to meet the economic ne eda of both cou ntriea. Thia Czecho-Slovakia of Dr. Benes, was to be nothing lesa, therefore, than the outpost of Ruaaia in the center of Europe, atretching practically as far as Bavaria. In the above Treaty, Moscow was also clearly expresslng its intentions towards Poland. The Protocol to thls pact contained the clause: The U.S.S.R. and the Czecho-Slovak Republic agree that, in the event of any third State which has common frontiera wlth the U. S. S. R., or with the Czecho-Slovak Republic ... de■i rlng to become a pa rty to this agreement ... it could be a tri partite agreement." Moscow had no desire to make a direct proposal to the Pollsh Government, but the Soviet Press, together wlth the ins-plred World Press, were to publlsh many hints In thls dlrectlon. On December 17, 1943, "Dziennik Polakl" in London gave a semlofflclal comment on the Pollsh Governmenťs attltude towards tbe Soviet-Benes Treaty, statlng that: "Poland had not, so far, been invited to partlc!pate. She attached rundamental importance to havlng frlendly relatlons wlth Russla and regarded them a.s a vltal element towards a broader solutlon and a system of general securlty. The prlnclples or mutual recognltlon of State soverelgnty and of non-lntervention In the State's atralrs ľormed a basis for good neighborly relatlons. Prlnclples no less important for Poland should, bowever, be added to them. There were 1. liberty, independence, and Integrity of the State; 2. general securlty; 3. loyalty to the alllances already concluded; 4. good-ne!ghborly relations with Russla; 5. cooperatlon between the smaller Európean State!I, to protect them trom German hegemony." ' Poiish reluctance to become part of so vaguely worded a Pact wbich, in subsequent agreements, was to mean the absorptlÓn of the weaker partner, met a wave or dissatlsfactlon trom Moscow'. · Dr. Beneľ Provisional Government was t o be remolded according to the designs of the Kremlin, and Communist Ministera were to be in tro. duced into the most prominent positíons. In Bobemia, tbe concluded Treaty encountered protests, not only from tbe constltutional Government of Hacha. whlch stíll exlsted, but from those people who did not want to change thelr present system of life lnto the Soviet order Slovakia quite simply recorded that Dr. Benes did not represent their nation and had no right to conclude any agreement on her behalf. Such was the Statement of the Slovakian Government and analogous wlth lt was the oplnion of the Slovak National Council in London, as expressed in their open letter to Hls Majesty"s Secretarjof State for Foreign Affalrs. Anthony Eden (January, 1944). They stated: "lt ia against justice and against the spirit and letter of the Atlantic Charter to bind the Slovak people by iŕlternational treatiea concluded in their names and on thelr behalf by unauthorized negotiators whose chief aim is to get domination over Slovakla again. In view ôf alt these facts the Slovak people cannot feel themselves to be bound by the Treaty signed in Mosc!ow on December 12, 1943." · ' � SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still �52 SLOVAKIA unknown to the public, and a general anxiety as to tbe future o[ Europe was bound to arlse among those nations concerned. Mo•cow made the firat move which revealed that •he had been able to galn a free hand in Central Europe, when she concluded a Treaty with Dr. Benea, a■ "Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia." lt was evldent by thls that tbe Kremlin was taklng over the States within its sphere of innuence as tbelr "protector and guarantor." The Czecha (a small nation numbering over seven mllllon) had 1iro-Russlan sympathles on the whole and were conaidered a■ the out. post of RuHian imperialiam in Europe and as reactlonaries supportlng 'ľsarist absolutism. Durlng the First Great War, they (the Czechs) had divided their loyalty. Soldiers in the Austrlan Army deserted en masse to the Rus• ;,ians, whlle at home they conducted the same policy as durlng thls Second Oreat War by pro!esslng loyalty to the occupant. Kenneth de Courcey, wrltlng in the REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS. Aprll 28, 1944, said: "There is, in fact, almost no reslstance movement at all in Ruthenia, Slovakia, Mora via and Bohemia. The Rutheniana are ... anti-Ru• sian. The maHea in Slovakia are anti-Czech and anti-Ruaaian. The attitude of the Czech population ia curioua. Quite a number are now actually serving in the German forcea, viz., in the 5th and 8th Jaeger Divisiona, the 18th Motorized Oivialon, and the 81st, 122nd, 226th and 290th lnfantry Dlviaion. Czech induatry ia moat effectively aupporting the German war effort and many workers seem very much to dislike the idea of riaking the conaequencea of reaiatance. The Czech· clergy is largely supporUng Presldent Hacha, partly because of lts antl-Russian vlews and partly because it fears anti-clerlcalism from the radlcals abroad. AII theae facta are everywhere well-known on the Continent, and it cauaea a■toniahment to many frienda of the Alliea that they should be so little known In Britain and America. War-Time Ra• tioning and Conaumption, published by the Secretarlat ot the League of Natlons, Geneva, 1942, <itates that the inhabltants of Bol:jemia had t)le same ration as Germany (pp. 22-23)." · As the favored child of the Versallles Treaty, they (lhe; Czechs) were presented with Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia, aÍthough these countrles had neither previously belonged to, nor were united with Bohemia. Despite the extension towards the East, there was stlll no possiblllty of the Czechs achlevlng a common frontier with Russla. In thls Second Great War, Dr. Benes, the Czech's representative in the Allied camp, began bis politlcal campaign by acting in accord• 11nce with the Britlsh program for the recoostruction ot Europe. but when Moacow became one of the Alliea, he ehanged the cour1e of his policy to flow along Soviet linea. The Czech's federatioo with ]'oland, which had been patronlzed by Brltain, wa.s thrown lnto the waste paper bask~t. Dr. nenes a.nnounced bis lntentlon of shortly t oncluding a post-war pact wlth the Soviet Union, which meant tbat he was leaving the camp of the Western world and hitcblng his wagon to the Russlan star. It was a policy whlch compllcated the future sltuatlon !or Centra) Europe. and Britaln of 1942- 1943 showed herself to be !ar from satlsfled with the premature polltlcal solutlon to thl~ point on the part or Russla. London wa.s lert wlth two alternatlves; elther to allow Dr. nenes to go to Moscow and set up resldence �SLOVAKIA there, and so lose t hls pawn on its chessboard, or to hold a resentful <;:zech "Provisional Government" In London untll the war should further clarlfy the sltuation. lt was indeed soon to become clear, but In ravor Qf Russia. After the conference in Moacow, there aeemed no longer. any point in holdlng Dr. Benea in Eng land when he waa ao anxioua to offer hi• country aa a vaaaal to Stalin. On December 12, Moscow announced t he Treaty wlth Dr. Benes, In whlch the "close and frlendly collaboratlon after the re-establishmen t of peace ..." was mentloned. This Treaty had put Czecho-Slovakla at the mercy of Moscow to such a degree that the Russlans dld not even argue over the fate of the 700,000 Carpathlan Ruthenians in the frame of the Czecho-Slovakian State. Moscow, who had claimed the Polish Rut henians on racia! grounds as the kin of the Ukranians in the U.S.S .R., was apparently indlfferen t to thls group of Ruthenlan people, although the threat of tbe annexatlon of Carpatblan Ruthenla was later to prove useful wben the Czecbs showed a reluctance to carry out the orders of the Kremlin. The "union" of Carpathlan Ruthenla wltb the Soviets 1!eemed hardly necessary at this point, when Dr. Benes had, in fact, subordlnated all Czecho·Slovakia to Russia. The policy of Dr. Benes' Government was a repetltion on a larger scale of its pollcy during t he Flrst Great War, the most extreme polnts belng more strongly underllned beneath the lnfluence of a s trenger Russla. Dr. Benes lnterpreted this policy in connectlon wlth Poland in bis book "Smyal Ceskoalovenske Revoluce" (The Sense or ihe Czecho-Slovak 'Revolution) Prague 1924: "In a war against tbe Centra! P owers (Germany and Austria) we need the Poles, and the reason for thls war has compelled us to recog• nlze Polanďs rights. Endeavoring to have our rlght:, ackno wledged. we must acknowledge tbe rlghts of the Poles le!!t we ourselves morally !ose our own. But, to gíve proof of our loyalty to our frienda (viz., the Ru1alan1) we had to oppoae their eaaential, antl-Ruaalan policy. 'ľhere were moments when Russia because of Poland, adopted a dangerous attitude towards the Allles. Briand had had to tear the first concession for Poland and Russia. In a short. Ume, because of Poland é\lld interna! polltlcal reasons, the danger arose that Russia would even conclude a separate peace with Germany, I state impartlally, that the Allles were lncllned to solve certain questlons in a manner which was bound not to satlsfy t he Poles." The Russo-Benes Treaty, veiled in its vague clauses, gave little away. Afterwards In hls message to the Czecho-Slovak State Council on February 3, 1944, Dr. Benes sald that the time had not yet come to " examlne concretely tbe matters" which were negotlated at l\foscow, matters about whlch a "mutual understandlng" had been reacbed. Amongf!J: these "matters" was an agreement ampllfylng Artlcle 4 or the Treaty, which had stipulated that the two Powers "shall develop their economic relations on the largest posslble scale." The CzeehoSlovak lnduatrles, mine, and sourcea of hydraulie energy were to be nationallzed; the Czech war induatrles were to work for tt,e Ruaaian and Czecho-Slovak armiea ; war production waa , to be atandardized ao that it would conform wlth the Ruaalan war production; a new Czeeho-Slovak Army waa to be rai1ed and, "In the future interesta of Czecho-Slovakia," organized, trajned and equipped after the Red Army 0 �54 SLOVAK.IA standards. "In the interests of democracy and ror the extirpatlon of German lnfluences," educatlonal (political) oftlcers were to be lntroduced lnto all units. The Czecho-Stovak currency was to be atabilized in conformity with Russia. Their railway, motor-roada and air lines were to be constructed to meet the economic ne eda of both cou ntriea. Thia Czecho-Slovakia of Dr. Benes, was to be nothing lesa, therefore, than the outpost of Ruaaia in the center of Europe, atretching practically as far as Bavaria. In the above Treaty, Moscow was also clearly expresslng its intentions towards Poland. The Protocol to thls pact contained the clause: The U.S.S.R. and the Czecho-Slovak Republic agree that, in the event of any third State which has common frontiera wlth the U. S. S. R., or with the Czecho-Slovak Republic ... de■i rlng to become a pa rty to this agreement ... it could be a tri partite agreement." Moscow had no desire to make a direct proposal to the Pollsh Government, but the Soviet Press, together wlth the ins-plred World Press, were to publlsh many hints In thls dlrectlon. On December 17, 1943, "Dziennik Polakl" in London gave a semlofflclal comment on the Pollsh Governmenťs attltude towards tbe Soviet-Benes Treaty, statlng that: "Poland had not, so far, been invited to partlc!pate. She attached rundamental importance to havlng frlendly relatlons wlth Russla and regarded them a.s a vltal element towards a broader solutlon and a system of general securlty. The prlnclples or mutual recognltlon of State soverelgnty and of non-lntervention In the State's atralrs ľormed a basis for good neighborly relatlons. Prlnclples no less important for Poland should, bowever, be added to them. There were 1. liberty, independence, and Integrity of the State; 2. general securlty; 3. loyalty to the alllances already concluded; 4. good-ne!ghborly relations with Russla; 5. cooperatlon between the smaller Európean State!I, to protect them trom German hegemony." ' Poiish reluctance to become part of so vaguely worded a Pact wbich, in subsequent agreements, was to mean the absorptlÓn of the weaker partner, met a wave or dissatlsfactlon trom Moscow'. · Dr. Beneľ Provisional Government was t o be remolded according to the designs of the Kremlin, and Communist Ministera were to be in tro. duced into the most prominent positíons. In Bobemia, tbe concluded Treaty encountered protests, not only from tbe constltutional Government of Hacha. whlch stíll exlsted, but from those people who did not want to change thelr present system of life lnto the Soviet order Slovakia quite simply recorded that Dr. Benes did not represent their nation and had no right to conclude any agreement on her behalf. Such was the Statement of the Slovakian Government and analogous wlth lt was the oplnion of the Slovak National Council in London, as expressed in their open letter to Hls Majesty"s Secretarjof State for Foreign Affalrs. Anthony Eden (January, 1944). They stated: "lt ia against justice and against the spirit and letter of the Atlantic Charter to bind the Slovak people by iŕlternational treatiea concluded in their names and on thelr behalf by unauthorized negotiators whose chief aim is to get domination over Slovakla again. In view ôf alt these facts the Slovak people cannot feel themselves to be bound by the Treaty signed in Mosc!ow on December 12, 1943." · ' � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still 52 SLOVAKIA unknown to the public, and a general anxiety as to tbe future o[ Europe was bound to arlse among those nations concerned. Mo•cow made the firat move which revealed that •he had been able to galn a free hand in Central Europe, when she concluded a Treaty with Dr. Benea, a■ "Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia." lt was evldent by thls that tbe Kremlin was taklng over the States within its sphere of innuence as tbelr "protector and guarantor." The Czecha (a small nation numbering over seven mllllon) had 1iro-Russlan sympathles on the whole and were conaidered a■ the out. post of RuHian imperialiam in Europe and as reactlonaries supportlng 'ľsarist absolutism. Durlng the First Great War, they (the Czechs) had divided their loyalty. Soldiers in the Austrlan Army deserted en masse to the Rus• ;,ians, whlle at home they conducted the same policy as durlng thls Second Oreat War by pro!esslng loyalty to the occupant. Kenneth de Courcey, wrltlng in the REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS. Aprll 28, 1944, said: "There is, in fact, almost no reslstance movement at all in Ruthenia, Slovakia, Mora via and Bohemia. The Rutheniana are ... anti-Ru• sian. The maHea in Slovakia are anti-Czech and anti-Ruaaian. The attitude of the Czech population ia curioua. Quite a number are now actually serving in the German forcea, viz., in the 5th and 8th Jaeger Divisiona, the 18th Motorized Oivialon, and the 81st, 122nd, 226th and 290th lnfantry Dlviaion. Czech induatry ia moat effectively aupporting the German war effort and many workers seem very much to dislike the idea of riaking the conaequencea of reaiatance. The Czech· clergy is largely supporUng Presldent Hacha, partly because of lts antl-Russian vlews and partly because it fears anti-clerlcalism from the radlcals abroad. AII theae facta are everywhere well-known on the Continent, and it cauaea a■toniahment to many frienda of the Alliea that they should be so little known In Britain and America. War-Time Ra• tioning and Conaumption, published by the Secretarlat ot the League of Natlons, Geneva, 1942, <itates that the inhabltants of Bol:jemia had t)le same ration as Germany (pp. 22-23)." · As the favored child of the Versallles Treaty, they (lhe; Czechs) were presented with Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia, aÍthough these countrles had neither previously belonged to, nor were united with Bohemia. Despite the extension towards the East, there was stlll no possiblllty of the Czechs achlevlng a common frontier with Russla. In thls Second Great War, Dr. Benes, the Czech's representative in the Allied camp, began bis politlcal campaign by acting in accord• 11nce with the Britlsh program for the recoostruction ot Europe. but when Moacow became one of the Alliea, he ehanged the cour1e of his policy to flow along Soviet linea. The Czech's federatioo with ]'oland, which had been patronlzed by Brltain, wa.s thrown lnto the waste paper bask~t. Dr. nenes a.nnounced bis lntentlon of shortly t oncluding a post-war pact wlth the Soviet Union, which meant tbat he was leaving the camp of the Western world and hitcblng his wagon to the Russlan star. It was a policy whlch compllcated the future sltuatlon !or Centra) Europe. and Britaln of 1942- 1943 showed herself to be !ar from satlsfled with the premature polltlcal solutlon to thl~ point on the part or Russla. London wa.s lert wlth two alternatlves; elther to allow Dr. nenes to go to Moscow and set up resldence SLOVAKIA there, and so lose t hls pawn on its chessboard, or to hold a resentful <;:zech "Provisional Government" In London untll the war should further clarlfy the sltuation. lt was indeed soon to become clear, but In ravor Qf Russia. After the conference in Moacow, there aeemed no longer. any point in holdlng Dr. Benea in Eng land when he waa ao anxioua to offer hi• country aa a vaaaal to Stalin. On December 12, Moscow announced t he Treaty wlth Dr. Benes, In whlch the "close and frlendly collaboratlon after the re-establishmen t of peace ..." was mentloned. This Treaty had put Czecho-Slovakla at the mercy of Moscow to such a degree that the Russlans dld not even argue over the fate of the 700,000 Carpathlan Ruthenians in the frame of the Czecho-Slovakian State. Moscow, who had claimed the Polish Rut henians on racia! grounds as the kin of the Ukranians in the U.S.S .R., was apparently indlfferen t to thls group of Ruthenlan people, although the threat of tbe annexatlon of Carpatblan Ruthenla was later to prove useful wben the Czecbs showed a reluctance to carry out the orders of the Kremlin. The "union" of Carpathlan Ruthenla wltb the Soviets 1!eemed hardly necessary at this point, when Dr. Benes had, in fact, subordlnated all Czecho·Slovakia to Russia. The policy of Dr. Benes' Government was a repetltion on a larger scale of its pollcy during t he Flrst Great War, the most extreme polnts belng more strongly underllned beneath the lnfluence of a s trenger Russla. Dr. Benes lnterpreted this policy in connectlon wlth Poland in bis book "Smyal Ceskoalovenske Revoluce" (The Sense or ihe Czecho-Slovak 'Revolution) Prague 1924: "In a war against tbe Centra! P owers (Germany and Austria) we need the Poles, and the reason for thls war has compelled us to recog• nlze Polanďs rights. Endeavoring to have our rlght:, ackno wledged. we must acknowledge tbe rlghts of the Poles le!!t we ourselves morally !ose our own. But, to gíve proof of our loyalty to our frienda (viz., the Ru1alan1) we had to oppoae their eaaential, antl-Ruaalan policy. 'ľhere were moments when Russia because of Poland, adopted a dangerous attitude towards the Allles. Briand had had to tear the first concession for Poland and Russia. In a short. Ume, because of Poland é\lld interna! polltlcal reasons, the danger arose that Russia would even conclude a separate peace with Germany, I state impartlally, that the Allles were lncllned to solve certain questlons in a manner which was bound not to satlsfy t he Poles." The Russo-Benes Treaty, veiled in its vague clauses, gave little away. Afterwards In hls message to the Czecho-Slovak State Council on February 3, 1944, Dr. Benes sald that the time had not yet come to " examlne concretely tbe matters" which were negotlated at l\foscow, matters about whlch a "mutual understandlng" had been reacbed. Amongf!J: these "matters" was an agreement ampllfylng Artlcle 4 or the Treaty, which had stipulated that the two Powers "shall develop their economic relations on the largest posslble scale." The CzeehoSlovak lnduatrles, mine, and sourcea of hydraulie energy were to be nationallzed; the Czech war induatrles were to work for tt,e Ruaaian and Czecho-Slovak armiea ; war production waa , to be atandardized ao that it would conform wlth the Ruaalan war production; a new Czeeho-Slovak Army waa to be rai1ed and, "In the future interesta of Czecho-Slovakia," organized, trajned and equipped after the Red Army 0 54 SLOVAK.IA standards. "In the interests of democracy and ror the extirpatlon of German lnfluences," educatlonal (political) oftlcers were to be lntroduced lnto all units. The Czecho-Stovak currency was to be atabilized in conformity with Russia. Their railway, motor-roada and air lines were to be constructed to meet the economic ne eda of both cou ntriea. Thia Czecho-Slovakia of Dr. Benes, was to be nothing lesa, therefore, than the outpost of Ruaaia in the center of Europe, atretching practically as far as Bavaria. In the above Treaty, Moscow was also clearly expresslng its intentions towards Poland. The Protocol to thls pact contained the clause: The U.S.S.R. and the Czecho-Slovak Republic agree that, in the event of any third State which has common frontiera wlth the U. S. S. R., or with the Czecho-Slovak Republic ... de■i rlng to become a pa rty to this agreement ... it could be a tri partite agreement." Moscow had no desire to make a direct proposal to the Pollsh Government, but the Soviet Press, together wlth the ins-plred World Press, were to publlsh many hints In thls dlrectlon. On December 17, 1943, "Dziennik Polakl" in London gave a semlofflclal comment on the Pollsh Governmenťs attltude towards tbe Soviet-Benes Treaty, statlng that: "Poland had not, so far, been invited to partlc!pate. She attached rundamental importance to havlng frlendly relatlons wlth Russla and regarded them a.s a vltal element towards a broader solutlon and a system of general securlty. The prlnclples or mutual recognltlon of State soverelgnty and of non-lntervention In the State's atralrs ľormed a basis for good neighborly relatlons. Prlnclples no less important for Poland should, bowever, be added to them. There were 1. liberty, independence, and Integrity of the State; 2. general securlty; 3. loyalty to the alllances already concluded; 4. good-ne!ghborly relations with Russla; 5. cooperatlon between the smaller Európean State!I, to protect them trom German hegemony." ' Poiish reluctance to become part of so vaguely worded a Pact wbich, in subsequent agreements, was to mean the absorptlÓn of the weaker partner, met a wave or dissatlsfactlon trom Moscow'. · Dr. Beneľ Provisional Government was t o be remolded according to the designs of the Kremlin, and Communist Ministera were to be in tro. duced into the most prominent positíons. In Bobemia, tbe concluded Treaty encountered protests, not only from tbe constltutional Government of Hacha. whlch stíll exlsted, but from those people who did not want to change thelr present system of life lnto the Soviet order Slovakia quite simply recorded that Dr. Benes did not represent their nation and had no right to conclude any agreement on her behalf. Such was the Statement of the Slovakian Government and analogous wlth lt was the oplnion of the Slovak National Council in London, as expressed in their open letter to Hls Majesty"s Secretarjof State for Foreign Affalrs. Anthony Eden (January, 1944). They stated: "lt ia against justice and against the spirit and letter of the Atlantic Charter to bind the Slovak people by iŕlternational treatiea concluded in their names and on thelr behalf by unauthorized negotiators whose chief aim is to get domination over Slovakla again. In view ôf alt these facts the Slovak people cannot feel themselves to be bound by the Treaty signed in Mosc!ow on December 12, 1943." · '  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Beneš Sold Out to the Kremlin Description An account of the resource R. Umiastowski Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 51-54 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Umiastowski, R. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/1d5cb84a7f17e3373754833b4495dba0.pdf 2ba3da7f17378068460166b0be921a69 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 93 CENSORSHIP POLICIES IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA 1918-1938 WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON SLOVAKIA Eugene Urban ABSTRACT By means of clever propaganda, the Czecho-Slovak Republic became known as an exemplary democratic State and the ethnic groups living within her boundaries were enjoying a personal, cultural, political and economic freedom. But the reality was exactly the opposite. The CzechoSlovak Republic was nothing but a big concentration camp for four million Slovaks, three and half million Germans, seven hundred thousand Ukrainians, six hundred thousand Magyars, one hundred fifty thousand Poles, etc., the Czechs enjoying the privileged position of guards. The real objective of the Czecho-Slovak Republic was to deprive the different ethnic groups of their national identity and, at their expense, to enlarge herself to the point of becoming a power among the others of Europe. The Slovaks, a very nationally selfconscious group, differing from the Czechs in language, traditions, culture, customs, and character, were guaranteed 1918 that the new Republic would be a confederation of two States: the Slovak and the Czech. But the Czechs failed to keep their promises and pacts and instead they treated Slovakia as a colony. One of the weapons used to suppress the desire of the Slovaks to be again a free and independent nation was the censorship of the press, the most effective medium of communication. The aim was to blot out all remembrance of Slovqk historical traditions, and to suppress the individuality and evidence of an oid cultural nation in the very heart. of Europe - a nation which has made its contributions to the building up of Western Christian culture and civilization. And, although the Czecho-Slovak Constitution had guaranteed freedom of the press, several laws were later enacted to make censorship legal. But the Slovaks defended them- �94 SLOVAKIA selves as well as they could in Parliament and with "underground" means of communication. Czecho-Slovak Laws Concerning Freedom of Press, Speech, and Association. Theory and Practice The freedoms of press and association in the CzechoSlovak Republic were guaranteed in paragraph 113, (1) of the Constitution accepted by the Revolutionary National Assembly on the 29th of February, 1920: Freedom of the press as well as the right to assemble peaceably and without arms and to form associations is guaranteed. It is therefore in principle inadmissible to place the press under preliminary censorship.I Paragraph 117 guaranteed the freedom of expression of opinion: Every person may within the limits of the law express his or h er opinion by word, in writing, in print, by picture, etc. The same applies to legal persons within the limits of their competence. No one shall suffer in the ,sphere of his work or emloyment for excercising this right.2 According to these articles of the C o n s t i t u t i o n, Czecho-Slovakia had no press law of its own. The press was supposed to be free of Government interference and to serve the genuine interests of the various ethnical groups living in Czecho-Slovakia. It was supposed, also, that they would be free to assemble in political, cultural, religious, economical, etc. organizations and to secure through them their rights. Except for the Czechs, all other ethnical groups were integrated in Czecho-Slovakia without being given opportunity to express their will freely. With regard to the Slovaks, the Constitution was in direct contradiction to the spirit and letter of the Cleveland and Pjttsburgh Pacts signed by the Slovaks and Czechs in Cleveland, Ohio, October 5, 1915 and in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, May 30, 1918. 3 This latter was signed moreover by President Tomas G. Masaryk. According to these two pacts, Czecho-Slovakia was supposed to be a federation of both the Slovak and the Czech States. 4 But these pacts were not included in the Constitution. �SLOVAKIA !)5 The representatives for Slovakia who voted in Parliament for the acceptance of this anti-Slovak Constitution were not elected by the people, but appointed by the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Prague from a minority group advocating integration with the Czech nation. The Constitution was in flagrant contradiction to the spirit and the principles on which Czecho-Slovakia had been created. In the first years of her existence, the discontent of the Slovaks and of the other minorities with Czech imperialism and centralism early started to manifest itself, and this particularly in the periodical press and at the meetings of the political parties. The Czechs did not delay in their retaliation. They replaced the guarantees of paragraph 113 of the Constitution with a series of laws by which the freedom of the press was practically nullified. Not having a press law of their own, the Czech majority in the Prague Parliament made use of the old Austrian press law No. 119/ 1873 (May 23) and No. 142/ 1868 (October 15) of the Austrian Code, and the Hungarian law No. XIV /1914 to suppress freedom of the press. These were the oppressive laws of the old Au.stro-Hungarian regime against which both Slovaks and Czechs fought in the Parliaments of Vienna and Budapest. It has been said repeatedly that Czecho-Slovakia was created to liberate the Czechs and Slovaks from the Austro-Hungarian yoke. It is an ironic fact that Dr. Tomas G. Masaryk, the first President of Czecho-Slovakia, who as deputy for Bohemia, had condemned these laws in the Parliament of Vienna, now signed and approved them as the laws of the land, as law No 50/1923 (March 19), paragraph 34.5 The co-founder of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and her second President, Dr. Eduard Benes, who was also theoretically a defender of the freedom of the press, also signed law No. 50/1923. The same law No. 50/ 1923 provided for the defense of the Republic, and paragraph 34 stipulated the conditions under which the publication of periodicals might be prohibited. Law No. 3006 was drawn up on April 14, 1920; it was later supplemented by law No. 125/ 1933 (July 10)7, according to which the State's Security Bureau, without a judicial order could demand the c o n f i s c a t i o n and opening of letters �96 SLOVAKIA and other items transported by mail. It could prohibit public meetings and it could impose special conditions upon the activities of associations or prohibit them. Paragraph 10 was concerned with the press. The State's Security Bureau could limit or impose special conditions for the publication and distribution of periodicals, or prohibit their publication. It could order the editor of a periodical to present, two hours before its publication, copies for preventive censorship. The same Bureau could put under surveillance or prohibit the activities of printing shops, of distributing companies, and of press agencies. It could also prohibit possession of printing presses and other means of reproducing writings and illustrations by private persons. Law No. 50/1923, for the defense of the Republic, was enacted in a period when Czecho-Slovakia was fully recognized and her existence insured by International Peace Treaties. This law was not addressed against her enemies from abroad, but to deal with the growing dissatisfaction from inside. Especially in Slovakia the discontent was alarming. The fact that the Czechs violated the Pacts of Cleveland and Pittsburgh were the most powerful reasons for this discontent. Law 50/1923 was enacted in order to give the Czechs a weapon to terrorize the dissatisfied Slovaks and the other minorities. It fixed the penalty for military treason, for violation of State secrets, for offence to the President of the Republic, for any challenge to commit penal acts or not to fulfill legal obligations, for approving the crime, for associating against the State, for the spread of false reports, etc. All the paragraphs of this law were appliable also to the periodical press. Directly concerned with the periodical press was paragraph 34 of this law. It gave the Government's ooreaus power to prohibit the publication of periodicals. The period of suspension of publication was established as one month for periodicals published at least five times a week, two months for those published at least three times a week, and six months for those purlished less than this. But this law seemed not to be strict enough for the Czech Government. Ten years larer, law No. 50/1923 was completed and changed by the law No. 124/ 1933 (July 10).8 This new law extended the list of "crimes and offences" �SLOVAKIA 97 for which the publication of a periodical could be suspended and gave the Government the right to enlarge the validity of paragraph 34 by a simple government decree. The suspension period of periodicals was enlarged from one to three months and from two to six months. Not even that was enough for the Government of CzechoSlovakia. The Governmental Decree No. 150/1933 (July 18),9 published ten days later, again increased the number of paragraphs which could be violated by the press and added to the number of crimes and offences also the infringements of these laws. One year later a new law No. 140/ 1934 was drawn up. (July 10), 10 which changed and completed the law No 50/ 1923, the law No. 124/ 1933 and the Government Decree No. 150/ 1933. The number of possible penal acts was increased again. The Government was empowered to prolong the validity of these laws for another two years. The distribution of transgressing periodicals could be prohibited in all stores which sold the products of the State's monopoly (tobacco, stamps, salt, etc.) or in the buildings and stations of the State owned railways (there were only State owned railways in Czecho-Slovakia). These periodicals could be also deprived of the right to use special tariffs and of the right of transportation by mail or by railroads. The same law compelled all periodicals to publish free, without change or comment, on their first or second page, by usual types of letters, and in the largest edition, official declarations of the President, the Vice-President, the Prime-Minister, members of the Government, etc., appealing to this law. A new Government Decree No. 163/ 1934 (July 16) 11 further extended the number of "crimes, offences and infringements" for which the publication of a periodical could be suspended. Two other government decrees, No. 157 / 1935 (July 13) 12 and No. 165/ 1937 (July 24) 13 , prolonged the validity of the paragraph 34 of the law No. 50/ 1923 and the subsequent laws until the 13th July 1939. Another law, No. 126/ 1933 (July 10) 14 was concerood with the distribution (col portage) of periodicals. The distribution of periodicals which directly or indirectly subvert or put blame on the independence, Constitutional unity, the �98 SLOVAKIA integrity and the democratic and republican form of the State or the democratic order in the Czecho-Slovak Republiccould be prohibited. This right could also be taken away from those periodicals which "menace the public peace and order, especially by publishing false news and news which distort the truth". The distribution in Czecho-Slovakia of periodicals published abroad could be also prohibited. It was prohibited to distribute periodicals in the schools and in the military quarters. The Regional Office was entitled to prohibit the distribution of periodicals published in Czecho-Slovakia, while the Ministry of Interior in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could prohibit the distribution of periodicals published in foreign countries. Paragraph II of this law required publication of any correction asked by a person who felt that the content of some article published by the periodical was offensive to him or that information given was untrue. And finally the law No. 130/ 1936 (May 13)15 was enacted, which completed the previous National Defense laws for the defense of the Republic. This law established capital punishment for many crimes against law No. 50/ 1923. It also prohibited the publication of news regarding military treason if not approved previously by the Ministry of National . Defense. All these laws and Government Decrees were climaxed by • National Defense Law No. 131/ 1936 (May 13)16 for the defense of the State. This law gave the Government absolute power in a national emergency to suspend all laws, all rights and liberties. It gave the Government the right to censor the press, films, telegrams, telephone conversations, letters, packages sent by mail, phonographs records, etc. It established preventive censorship and gave the State's Security Bureau the power to prohibit the publication and distribution of periodicals. The importation of periodicals from abro.ad ·could be also prohibited. The law provided for the establishment of a commission which would direct and carry out the censorship policy. The Government was given in fact dictatorial powers: and this law was generally considered as the last nail in the coffin of democracy in Czecho-Slovakia. �SLOVAKIA 99 Objectives and Methods of Czechoslovak Censorship Policies From the analysis of censored material it is possible to learn much about the objectives pursued by the Czech Government in the case of Slovakia. Previous mention has been made of the profound antagonism developed between the Slovaks and Czechs as a result of the Czech violation of the Cleveland and Pittsburgh pacts. The Czech wanted to denationalize the Slovaks by forcing them to accept the false claim that Slovaks are Czechs and that the Slovak language is a Czech dialect. To obtain this aim, the Czechs made use of various means. They created a wave of terrorism, using the armed forces, police, gendarmery and the C z e ch national organizations, especially "Sokol" known for both its atheism and chauvinism. They also sent hundreds of thousands of Czech teachers and Czech Government officials into Slovakia, thereby forcing the Slovaks, who were denied jobs in their own country, to emigrate because of hunger and unemployment. They further contributed to the economic impaverishrnent of Slovakia by dismantling its heavy industry and transporting the productive machinery to Bohemia. In this way production was stopped and the enterprises were forced to dose. Many factory buildings were purposely demolished .and many mines flooded.17 The steel, chemica:l, glass and leather industries suffered most cruelly. When the workers, deprived of their jobs demonstrated to prevent the dismantling of the factories and machinery, the Czech soldiers and the gendarmery killed many of them. 18 In the period from 1918 to 1932, 261 enterprises were closed down in Slovakia. From 1933 to 1937 another 425 enterprises were dismantled, bringing the total number to 686. 19 Meanwhile, new industries were founded in Bohemia which logically belonged in Slovakia, since Slovakia provided the raw materials used in them.20 The transportation tariffs in Slovakia were about 40 percent higher than in Bohemia and Moravia. Consequently the Slovak coal was more expensive than coal imported from Bohemia. 21 Further discrimination was manifest in the field of housing construction. 22 �100 SLOVAKIA From 1921 to 1923 Slovakia received only 6 per cent of the State's subsidies for the unemployed, although the unemployment in Slovakia was higher than in Bohemia. 23 From the sum assigned by the Government for the construction and maintenance of schools of higher education and Universities, Slovakia received 10 per cent, while the educational institutions in Slovakia were to be built up almost entirely. 24 The result: Slovakia had only one incomplete University and no Polytechnical Institute, while the Czechs had several, and the German minority had two Universities and two Polytechnical Institutes. Further, the Slovak University was practically a Czech University, because the professors named by the Government were all Czechs. Salaries for the Slovaks were about 20 per cent lower than for the Czechs. While Slovakia abounded in natural resources, especially for the production of energy, the petroleum lamp was the usual source of light. The combined savings of five Slovak citizens were equal to the savings of a single Czech. Czech capital absorbed whatever Slovak industry still remained after its dismantling. Slovak banks were engulfed by Czech banks, and foreign capital was allowed to supplant the remaining Slovak capital. 25 When agrarian reform was inaugurated in Slovakia, only 21 per cent of the land was sold to Slovak peasants, while the rest was distributed free to the Czechs. 26 The discrimination against Slovak peasants in transportation tariffs and taxes resulted in frequent strikes. Instead of offering to improve their desperate condition, the Government gave the order to fire at the strikers.27 Their hopeless situation led them to emigrate in large numbers to the U.S.A., Canada, Argentina, France, Germany and Belgiurn. 28 Slovakia was treated like a colony by the Czechs. They regarded Slovakia only as an object of exploitation, a reservoir of cheap labor and a market for the products of Czech industries. The Czech Government aimed to keep Slovakia as an underdeveloped agricultural country. 29 Practically all the administrative positions in Slovakia were filled by Czechs, whose salaries also were double those of the Slovaks. 30 In Slovakia political oppression worked hand in hand with economic injustice. Aware of Czech chauvinism, the Slovaks began early �SLOVAKIA \'yd»od1 denne ~rem pondelk.a Zdkladafel' a YO!ICA ; Andrei ffllnka 101 Br611slava,. slreda 6. m11e. t9H 1Grecki povsfalci chysfaju illok na Affleny Rozvral na Balk6ne, alebo vffllZSlvo greckel vl6dy - Bulbarsko vyslela voJsko na grkke brank:e ·• •11>1 ••• ~-••U ,.....,n,&aJ-.. ,.,,..,., .. ~i,---iol,f . .•• ~ ~ - : . • ~ ,• :'" .:.:.•\.:=: tf~i~~l~~t;~~~ ~fiff;[f~!~1f[~tt¥.Jlf§ l{if;}~t~¥.K~~ The whitewashed newspapers had to be presented in a new form: A corrected issue was printed after the confiscation to organize politically. The great Slovak patriot Msgr. Andrej Hlinka founded the Catholic and nationalist Slovak People's Party. Its program aimed at autonomy for Slovakia in accordance with the decrees of the Pittsburgh Pact (1918). The Protestant leader, poet, and writer, Rev. Martin Razus, restored the Slovak National Party. In order to hinder Slovak political association, the Czechs established branches of their own parties in Slovakia. By means of political intrigue and corruption they attained a measure of success, but the majority of Slovaks resolutely opposed them. Because of �102 SLOVAKIA the forced intergration of Slovakia with Bohemia, and the denial of Slovakia's right to self-determination, the fiftyfive Slovak deputies were invariably outvoted by the Czech majority in the Prague Parliament. The Czechs employed terrorist tactics also against Slovak political parties, imposing on them a relentless censorship of the press and disruption of their public meetings. By such means they strove to impede direct communication between the Slovak people and their political leaders. The press was a high-powered tool in the hands of the Slovak political parties. It introduced new ideas, it taught the people to recognize and support their own national interest, it pointed out the injustices committed against the Slovak nation by the Government and it suggested ways to remedy the situation. Public meetings served the same purpose, demonstrating by enthusiastic attendance the growing strength of the Slovak nation. Consequently, public meetings were dissolved by government agents whenever the speaker criticized the government, and troops and police were ordered to charge against the protesting Slovaks. Many Slovaks were killed and wounded by Czech bullets. The censor deleted from the press every criticism of Government officials and legislative bodies, in order to cover their misdeeds and keep the people uninformed. The second purpose was to hinder opposition parties from communicating with their readers and voters. In the hope of keeping such ideas in the background and forcing on the Slovaks the false notion of a "Czechoslovak nation and people", the Czech censor confiscated articles dealing with Slovakia's national identity and its right to self determination. The Czech determination to eradicate religion from Slovak public life must remain under cover, hence the censor suppressed all articles and reports of the desecration of churches by the Czechs and the removal of crosses from schools. In the eyes of the Czechs it was a most serious crime for the Slovak press to publicize the struggle of the Slovak people for autonomy, for the right to govern themselves, to run their own schools; in short, to enjoy all the rights of nationhood belonging to them as a nation. The Czechs seem �SLOVAKIA 103 to have naively thought that without the press to remind them of their rights the Slovaks would drop the issue. The Slovaks were not allowed to read reports on CzechoSlovakia in press. The Czech Government feared that this would more profoundly motiviate their political aspirations. Practically all the statements and resolutions of the Slovak political parties were censored in order to stifle opposition and prevent the natural political development of the Slovak nation. Reports of the activity of Slovak organizations in the United States of America were yet another object of the censor's displeasure, because these organizations were strongly in favor of autonomy for Slovakia. The two presidents of Czecho-Slovakia, Masaryk and Bene~, were unassailable in the press. The slightest criticism, whether by Czechs or by Slovaks, was taboo and automatically censored out. A legend was built up around these two men, making them untouchable as if they were the apex of perfection. To perpetuate it no criticism of their many human foibles and moral lapses was tolerated. The real objective of Czech cenzorship was to suppress the facts of Slovak history with their underlying appeal to self-respect and to strike out these glorious moments of the past which could fortify the Slovak political and national fight for the realization of their ideal of freedom and independence. Censorship was thorough. It made impossible any attempt by the Slovaks and other minority groups to charge the Czech government with undemocratic practices. Meanwhile the Czechs were using it to create a "great Czech nation" at the expense of the other ethnic groups living in Czecho-Slovakia and disregarding their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Their ultimate goal was to achieve a dominant position among the small States in Central Europe. In a word, Czech censorship was a tool of Czech imperialism and its faithful servant. It was the ruthless Czech antidote to the self-determination and national development of the Slovak nation and the other minorities in the CzechoSlovak Republic. As such, Czech censorship was diametrically opposed to the principles of democracy, freedom, and human progress. �104 SLOVAKIA "Authority is conservative ... freedom is progressive .. . conflict between the two is inevitable", says Lucy Maynard Salmon, 31 in reference to freedom of the press. Since Czech censorship was directed against human progress, freedom, and democracy, the means it employed could only have been wicked. It stopped at nothing to attain its objectives. Nothing was immoral if it served the Czech goal of domination. Czech post office and railway employees often seized entire editions of the opposition's periodicals and destroyed them. Soldiers were often ordered to raid newspaper and party offices to confiscate mailing lists and manuscripts. This happened in Trnava, Leopoldov, Bratislava, and elsewhere. Sometimes the soldiers reduced the place to shambles. Consequently, readers in the capital city itself were often deprived of their papers. Karol Sidor reported in the March 22, 1919 issue of the Slovak: " Orders have been given (,b y Czech officials) to destroy the SLOVAK. Revorts have been pouring in from all parts of Slovakia that the SLOVAK, ofl!!c!al PU!bl!cation of the Slovak 'People's Party, has been seized by scoundrels and its sale and dlstriburtion prohibited."32 Kon~tantin Culen wrote: "In the early yea,rs the SLOVAK was subjected to as many as three censorsihips: political, military, and economic. Some issues of the newspaper ,bore the inscription, "Thrice censored and corrected edition". Even these multi-censored copies were sometimes thrown out of trains en route by Czech mailmen. Slovak employees who dared to subscribe to the Sl.lOVAK endangered their livelihood. And when even this did not dauRt them, they were personally terrorized by the police and government of!lclals .33 Oftentimes newspapers were deprived of the right of distribution (colportage). Post offices were instructed to refuse money orders sent to the opposition newspapers. Persons who subscribed to these newspapers were harassed and many were dismissed from government jobs. 34 Court action was taken against editors of newspapers which printed articles unwelcome to the censor. The editors 111.sually assumed responsibility for unsigned articles; hence, many of them were in and out of jail. In a censored article entitled "We protest" Msgr. Andrej Hlinka wrote these bitter words: �SLOVAKIA 105 "We a re involved in doz ens, even hundreds of cour-t ca-ses. Hereafter I will assume full responsibility for every news article, whether written by the editor or by Paul or Saul. J will appear before the judge, I will answer the charges. And when I have been deprived of freedom, when the iron door of my prison has dosed behind me, when I am locked up and begin to burn like an expiatory candle on the a ltar of the fa,therl and, then I will charge you, friends, deputies. and leaders of the P eople's Party: •F ollow me! Let each of you shoulder r esoonsibility for one, two, ten articles, an d all of us will become involved with the courts. But no. I am wrong. Let us not get so involved. Not of our own volition will we become entangled with the courts. We will yield only to brutal compulsion. You Czechs will have to drag us into the courts. And when my right hand has become still and my mortal remains have decomposed, I tell you that a great line will form behind me, eager as I for the glory that is sure to follow. 7ou cannot silence us. You can only massacre us. But one tiling I ask: Do not go on deceiving the world that you are our brothers tsons of the same nation). Never will we consent to be Czechos lovaks ... Slova kia is ours an d we will defend our country against you as we defended it against the Magyars. The more you incriminate ns, the more you imprison us, the more forcef ully will we fight against you." As the representative and chairman of the People's Party, Msgr. Andrej Hlinka spoke out boldly on this subject in Parliament. In June 1922, in the debate arising from his interpellation No. 3584 on the raid of the offices of the Slovak and Eudove noviny, he described the attack as initiated and engineered by government agents. Not only did the assailants wreck office equipment and furniture and destroy books, but they were aided in their orgy of destruction by the police, who should have been maintaining order. The chief of police of Bratislava, Dr. Slavicek, a Czech, declared that he had been unable to check the raid because the majority of his men were hostile to the Slovak People's Party. Andrej Hlinka rightly demanded to know when the Slovaks might expect to have the protection of law and order. 35 Karol Sidor described the demolition and plundering of the offices of the Slovak as follows: On :!\fay 25, 1922 a huge rally was orga nized in Bratislava -to protest. Several Slovak legiona ries and Slovak university students were present. At one 'POint a Czech speaker railed against the SLOVAK. dem <tndlnr; that it be placed under the strictest censorship. An aroused Slovak legionary shouted: "Your aim is to cripple the Catholic press; you would do better to suppress your own anti-Catholic and antiSlovak press." The legionary paid for these words with a cruel beating ... A Slovak university student r eceived th e same treatment, bis �106 SLOVAKIA clothes torn and covered with blood, after he had called out to an abusive Czech speaker, "Please, talk to us in Slovak!" ... ·The speeches continued until 12: 30 p.m. At 1: 00 p.m. the first group of demonstrators appeared in front of the editorial offices or the SLOV.AK . . . Some 1,500 Czech legionaries escorted the demonstrators. Awaiting them was a group of 150-200 men and women who had assembled from the villages to defend SLOVAK property. A fight ensued, but the Czech legionaries with the aid of some 10(} policemen, invaded the editorial offices and broke tables and chairs, flung books, bound journals, manuscripts etc. out the windows. (Czech) legionaries piled •the items into ca,r s and drove away. Other (Czech) legionaries r aided the ,SLOV.AK's administrative offices and worked havoc there also. They carried off valuaibles, including shares and mailing lists. The yard outside ,w as littered with papers. These raids were permitted, even abetted by the police, who together with the legionaries received praise and commendation in the Czech press for their acts of des,truction.36 During the night of March 31, 1920, a certain Czech army major Ludevit Palounek by name, placed a bomb in the Lev printery in Ruzomberok in the hope of destroying the voice of the People's Party and its organ of free discussion. 37 Even the mails were misused: derisive pamphlets were inserted in the bundles of the Slovak, 38 as they were being shipped to their destination. With the growing tension in the relations between the· Slovaks and Czechs, the censorship became more and more despotic. After 1932, there were almost daily confiscations of the Slovak press. The censor received his instructions from the Ministry of the Interior. If the censor found in the piece examined something he considered inadmissible, he deleted it; the· Attorney General then ordered the police to confiscate the publication. The police seized the entire edition and burned it. The publishing house or the editors could make an appeal in court, or a board of representatives in Parliament could protest to the Minister of the Interior, or of Justice, or both. If the censorship was found unfair, the editors or publishers could demand reimbursement for damages. But in most cases they lost the appeal. After confiscation, a newspaper, book, or journal was printed in a new edition with the censored areas left blank. It bore the inscription "Following confiscation, a new and corrected edition" in the upper left corner of the front page of the periodical, or on the cover of the book. �SLOVAKIA 107 After Slovakia achieved independence on March 14, 1939, government officials found in the archives of the Attorney General confidential orders issued by the Czech Government with instructions to the censor as to how many times a week certain newspapers were to be confiscated. After a stated number of confiscations, the periodical could be suspended for three or six months, and after repeated confiscations, it could be suspended indefinitely at the discretion of the censor. This was a most powerful weapon in the hands of the Government, and it was effectively used during the visit of President Edward Benes in Slovakia in 1933. Under the pretex of repeated confiscations, the newspapers Slovak, Slovenska pravda, Narodne noviny and the political review Nastup were suspended, so as to prevent any criticism of Benes's speeches in the press. It was on this visit that he angered the Slovaks by declaring that they must become Czechs. The actions of the censor were despotic because he knew that the Government would not fail to support him. The Slovak and Slovenska pravda were confiscated almost every day. The humoristic weeklies Osa and Kocur were also confiscated, along with the cultural monthlies Pero , Slovenske pohl'ady and Elan. Almanacs, books, poetry collections, and placards were not exempt. Sometimes periodicals were confiscated because of articles reprinted from other non-censored newspapers. For example a periodical was confiscated because it contained a poem originally published in the Slovak-American almanac Jednota. An editorial containing quotations from a book by President Thomas G. Masaryk was also confiscated. An article by the great Slovak writer, Svatozar Hurban Vajansky, published in Hungary at the ~md of the 19th century, was censored when reprinted in Slovak after World War I. Newspapers were confiscated for using the hyphen in the name of the Republic "CzechoSlovakia" although early peace treaties carry the name in this form. 39 On several specific occasions the Czechs declared that it would be dangerous for the future of the Republic if freedom of speech and press were permitted in Slovakia.40 With confiscation being an almost daily occurence, periodicals suffered very heavy losses. It is pertinent to point out that while the Czech party press subsisted on �SLOVAKIA 108 government funds, the Slovak press depended entirely upon the voluntary support of party members, together with subscription fees. The Slovak people understood perfectly the great importance of the press and supported it generously. Only in this way was the Slovak opposition press able to survive such continuous economic strangulation by the Czech Government. Characteristic of the situation are words like the following: " . .. we must perforce decline to publish original articles on topics banned by the government and must limit ourselves to those which have already passed the censor." 41 This is not all. When Slovak representatives protested in Parliament against the policies of the Government and its agencies, their speeches in Parliament were censored and denied publication in the parliamentary record Tisky Poslaneck e Snemovny Nar odniho Shromazdeni Ceskoslovensk e. The bimonthly Nastup wrote: Republiky " Instead of aick now ledging the human righ t to fr eedom of di scussion, th e Czechs pr oh ibited a utonomist meetings a nd r estricted their publications. Now they have resorted to oth er meas ures. "Th e P r esi de nt of th e Senate su ppressed a portion of Dr . Joseph Buday's speech i n ·P a rlia men t. The Presidents of both C hambers of Parl iamen t confiscated a major portion of the statement pr esented by th e representatives of the Slovak People's Party. "An exten ded (95 pages) and repo r tedly objective in ter pellation of th e r epresentatives of the Slovak People's Par ty was als o censored by the Presidents of Par liament and denied publicati on. " T his action was t a ken at a time w h en press censorshi p was so stringent that no politician or political party could f r eely and publicly express a dissenting opinion as far as the Government was concerned. "Ju Slovakia the natio na li st press is pres ently s ubjected to continuous sharp criticism a nd s uppression .. . In view of this we mus t behold with a s tonishment the a d ditional measures taken in Parlia m ent ·to silence the autonomists who are already so effectively silenced by press cens orship . Meanwhile •Slova k centr alists (i.e., Czech p a r tisans ) without hindrance flood Slovakia wit h their uncensored public_ations ."42 The newspaper Nar odne Noviny reported in its November 27, 1936 issue: Statistics show that the number of confiscated publications in Czecho-Slovakia for the given years was as follows~ 1929 1930 1934 Newspapers and periodicals ______ 3,370 Books ___ ______________ __________ 918 2,533 2,138 846 Confiscations 718 �109 SLOVAKIA Foreign books and periodicals _____ 255 Total ______ ________ 4,543 183 3,434 329 3,313 Of these confiscations, 60 to 70% involved Slovak books and periodicals. Censorship of Books Writing under the pseudonym Andrej Zarnov, a student at the University of Bratislava, named Frantisek Subik, made his literary debut in 1925 with the publication of a book of poems which already then showed the promise that was to make him a leading Slovak poet. The title of the book was Straz pri Morave (Sentry at the Morava River) . Finding it too nationalistic, the censor ordered the entire edition confiscated and had it burned at police headquarters. The representatives of the Slovak People's Party challenged this action in the Parliament. They asked the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Justice: 1) Whether they were aware of the confiscation of these poems; 2) Whether they approved; 3) Whether both Ministers were disposed to secure the validity of the Constitution which guarantees freedom of the press; 4) Whether they were disposed to take appropriate disciplinary action against the censor in Bratislava; 5) Whether they were ready to guarantee freedom of the press in Slovakia equal to that in Bohemia. Needless to say, the Czech majority refused to discuss this urgent interpellation in Parliament. 43 On the occasion of Msgr. Andrej Hlinka's seventieth birthday, Karol Sidor, representative in Parliament and editor of the Slovak, published his biography, covering the years 1864-1926. A great admirer and loyal follower of Hlinka, Sidor presented his hero as the key figure in the Slovak political and national struggle for freedom and independence. This 554-page biography suffered 31 deletions totaling some 295 lines, equal to seven pages of the book. It was issued with the customary caption on the cover: "Po konfiskacii nove opravene vydanie" (After confiscation a new and �110 SLOVAKIA corrected edition) and with blankspaces to show where the censor had disapproved. The following lines were deleted on pages 368-369, from Sidor's description of the Czech attack on the meeting of the Slovak People's Party in Zilina, August 17, 1919: With draiwn bayonets, soldiers charged upon the people In the square and scenes of horror ensued. Andrej Hlinka saw hi,s people struck with rifl e 1butts and carried a,way as prisoners to the barracks. Women from Kysuce exposed thei,r breasts to the bayonets and shouted: "Strike here, you curs, and touch not Hlinka ! " On October 10, 1920 Czech military units once more dispersed a meeting of the Slovak People's Party in Namestovo and fired into the crowd, killing two Slovak peasants and seriously wounding ten. On page 442 the description of this savage act was deleted: Bedfich Danek, a Czech lieutenant, scornfully asked a young man weeping over the body of his slain father: "Why do you weep? It ,w as Hlinka who killed him!" Namestovo came to ,be regarded a-s a second Cernova. The Czech press and the Government Press Agency CTK wished to place the blame for this bloodshed on Hlinka. They charged Hlinka with inciting the Slovaks against the Czechs. Hlinka answered in the October 16, 1920 issue of the Slovak. This portion of the article was deleted from the biography: Yes, I did incite the people. I incited them and will continue to Incite •them . My very presence incites them. So much so that it stirs your murky conscience, stained with a ·b rother's blood. I have incited and will continue to incite them to oppose t:he •b ase t,raud you perpetrated against •the !Slovak n ation. W,e •w ill rise up to oppose every injustice. Why should we not be aroused against you, who seized me a year ago in the dead of night and held me captive for six months at Mirov, iBrodek, Podolie, to afford you an opportunity to demoralize and dis• rupt .Slovakia? Should I have danced to your music when you placed bombs in our "Lev" printery, •which had •been established with owhard•earned savin~s? I would be a cowardly traitor If I did not raise my voice, if J did not search for a remedy and seek help. We have incited and lest we be despised by Slovakia, we will not stop inciting our people until w,e win autonomy from you. On page 490 the censor deleted a reference to discrimination against the Slovaks in assigning government jobs: The •Slovaks were unable to procure even the cheapest loaf or government bread in Slovakia; (referring to jobs) their applications were answered with a curt: "Impossible to grant", while t he Czech people, often without qualification, were given the best paid jobs in Slovakia. �SLOVAKIA 111 That is how the newspapers SLOVAK, NARODNIE NOVINY, and the magazine, NASTUP, looked after censorship A quotation on p. 506 from an "Appeal of the Representatives of the Slovak People's Party to the Minister of the Interior" in Prague, September 4, 1923, was confiscated: The authorities spread terror every-where. Civil servants planned the disruption of meetings by force and public safety agencies did nothing to -defend the victims; on the contrary, they cooperated with the agressors. Holle, Nove Zamky, and ,t he riot at Brezova make it clear as day that groups of assailants were organized to incHe rioting and to damage private property. Very heavily censored was the chapter in which Sidor described Hlinka's arrest at midnight. The occasion was his return from the Peace Conference in Paris, where he had delivered to the delegates a Memorandum in which he demanded in the name of the Slovak nation that the Slovaks be given national and civic freedom and their autonomy guaranteed. Hlinka's words to one of his chaplains were censored on page 385. "Proclaim abroad to the wide world the kind of freedom we enjoy in Slovakia. They have come to carry me off like a criminal In the middle of the night when everybody is asleep ... The press reported that I trembled. On the contrary, I felt like a lion. I cared not whether they killed me or jailed me. My blood �112 SLOVAKIA boiled. Indescribable feelings struggled within me. I could not tell which was stronger: my love for my oppress-ed nation or my contempt of the intruders ... " Following Hlinka's deportation, an account of the rebellions of the students and citizens of his parish town, Ruzomberok, was variously deleted as on pages 387, 392 and 393. The description of the terrorism of the Czech soldiers and employees in Slovakia was censored on page 444: November 6, 1920 he (Rev. Frantisek Klein) reported in the SLOVAK that he was traveling by train •with soldiers who insulted him because he was reading the .SIJOV AK. One of ,them asked in Czech: "Why doesn't someone kill tH!inka ?" On pages 458-459 the account of the murderous attack on Hlinka's life in Krupina, June 12, 1921, by a Czech, and the insult to which he was subjected in Sahy two days later by Czech railroadmen was expunged: The following day, June 13, Hlinka set out with companions to Sahy to report the Krupina incident to the "Zupan", [)r. Victor Ravasz. As he was passing through the square a railroadman, named S<tu~hlik and the school inspector, Bartolom/lj Krpelec, both Czechs, confronted him with curses, calling him "bandit" and "agitator". Later at the "zupan's" office, Stuchlik, with 60 co-workers, delivered the following ultimatum: The "zupan" must expel Andrej iHlinka at once from ,the 1Hont "zupa" or suffer the consequences. The railroadmen (all Czechs) also declared that they would not permit Hlinka's train to leave the Sahy station. ·T he "zupan", after appealing to the Ministry in BraJtislava for instructions, assured Blinka that the culprits in both Krupina and Sahy •w ould ,be penalized as an example to others. In the a,fternoon IHlinka ,boarded •the train at Sahy. The station wa,s filled with people, waiting to see the outcome of the contest. The rallroadmen held to their purpose. After a long while the zupan arrive6l at ,t he station. The railroadmen demanded that -he order Hlinka out of the train. Lenghty nego tiations followed. Meanwhile Hlinka waited patiently within ... Finally the "zupan" announced that the ,train was about to depart. At that moment a line of railroadmen formed below the windO'W of Hlinka's compartment. They gave vent to their haitred -b y spitting at Hlinka, cursing and maligning ·h im until the train moved out oE sight. Another incident which occurred in the railroad station Trencianske Teplice, July 5, 1921, was deleted from page 459: A Czech in the station, recogmzmg Hlinka, called out, "Hang Hlinka ! " Andrej IHlinka stepped forward and asked him to identify himself. The Czech continued to shout, but did not give his name ... And a few lines further on the same page: �SLOVAKIA 113 Another •Czech took up the cry, shouting, "Hang Hllnka". The p eople attacked h im, although ,Hlinka- made an effort to calm them. Mea nwhil e the train arrived and he boarded it ,w ith his secretary Ramaj . :Bishop Kmeeko a nd tMsgr. Tiso remained in the station, bu t they were unable to quiet the p eople. Several Czechs were severely beaten . Other subjects censored in Sidor's book were: criticism ·o f President Masaryk's anti-Catholic attitude (page 286) ; daims of job discrimination that while hundreds of thousands of Czechs were given the best paid jobs in Slovakia, often without qualification, more than 300,000 Slovaks were forced to emigrate because of the discrimination against them (pages 345 and 490). Also censored were references to organized Czech terror against the Slovaks, to agression against Hlinka and his followers, to denial of government protection in the exercise of freedom of speech and association, and any account of the formation of defense groups of the Slovak People's Party for the protection of its meetings .against Czech terrorists. Among the deletions were several lines about the general anti-Catholic attitude of the Czech people (page 471). Another censored book was Vo vazeni, written by a young editor of the Slovak, Alexander Mach. 46 The author had been jailed on a charge of conspiracy with Professor Dr. Vojtech Tuka against the integrity of Czecho-Slovakia. After serving part of the sentence, he was exonerated from complicity in the "plot" and released. A year later he published his book about his term in prison. In a manifestly unjust trial Dr. Vojtech Tuka was sentenced to 15 years and liberated after 10 years, when Slovakia won her autonomy on October ·6, 1938. From Mach's book the censor confiscated some 520 lines, totaling 13 pages, or 7 per cent of the 198 pages of the book. Unfortunately, I do not know of any uncensored copy of the book and can therefore quote nothing from it. To illustrate the mental climate in which the author wrote his book, I will cite some lines of his epilogue "Po roku" (After one year): I was in prisoa on charges which cannot at present be freely and sincerely dis cussed. In preparing this accoun t I was hemmed in by restrairut lest I again find myself rb ehind prison bars . I was obliged to limit my remarks lest the censor fo11bid their publication. Difficulties in the selection of material abounded. It was not easy for me to decide what to eliminate, what to omit ... Thus as I prepared �114 SLOVAKIA my narrative rhe penal code was before me. Yet I have remained completely frank; I did not change what I had •w ritten as a prisoner. I preferred only .to eliminate the sensitive issues ... Another example of the censorship of books is furnished by the interpellation presented in the Prague Parliament by the representative Msgr. Dr. Jozef Tiso, concerning the confiscation of the Kalendar Hlinkovej Slovenskej Eudovej Strany na rok 1934 (Almanac of the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party for the year 1934). Two articles which appeared over the name of Msgr. Andrej Hlinka, chairman of the Party, were confiscated. In these articles Hlinka warned the Czechs to stop persecuting the Slovaks for claiming autonomy. Even Czech authors, whom Hlinka quoted to illustrate his articles, were censored. The title of the first article was "Za ~t'astne Slovensko" (For a prosperous Slovakia). In the second article "Uprimne slovo o Nitre" (A frank comment on Nitra) Hlinka analyzed the spontaneous explosion of Slovak discontent at the festivities commemorating the 1,l00th anniversary of the first Christian church on Slovak territory, created in Nitra by Prince Pribina in about 831 A. D. It was, Hlinka declared, a display of resistance to the Prague Government, intent on exploiting these eminently Slovak festivities for their own purposes. Andrej Hlinka, who had been refused the right to speak on the program, was carried up to the stage and backed by his 200,000 followers, he read a statement in which he solemnly affirmed Slovakia's adherence to its eleven hundred years-old Christian traditions and proclaimed Slovakia's right to territorial sovereignity. This demonstration of outraged Slovak national pride was observed by foreign diplomats and news reporters, who were thus witnesses of the true will of the Slovak nation to be free and the chauvinistic aim of the Czechs as expressed in the Ottuv Obchodni Slovnik (Otta's Commercial Dictionary, 1921) volume 2, page 1217: "Slovakia shall be a colony to us. It is an error to suppose that a colony cannot have common frontiers with the mother country. An example of this is Russia and Siberia." Several lines from a poem by Ignac Grebac Orlov were· also censored. Partially censored was the article entitled "Narodna jednota" (National unity), by Dr. Jozef Tiso on the· necessity of national unity for the Slovaks. . �SLOVAKIA 115 From the article "K sedemdesiatke Andreja Hlinku" (On the 70th anniversary of Andrej Hlinka) by Karol Sidor this paragraph was deleted: What occured in 11919, ,w hen 'Hlinka and other Slovak leaders were jailed, the ISiLOVAK suspended, and terrorism unleashed everywhere, was now repeated on a larger scale. In .September 193131 the 1SIJOVAK was suspended -f or 3 months ... lik,ewise the .S'.liOVAiK TYZDENNIK (1Slovak Weekly) and the T!AT·•RA:N,SKY SLOVAK (Tatra Slovak). We were left without a voice ... We were not permitted to w,rite, the people had nothing to read. And the prisons were daily being filled with objectors. Hundreds of Slovaks were suJbjected ,to investigations about their participation In the Nitra festivities ... Dr. Karol Mederly's article "Obec a politika" (Community and politics) was also confiscated, for its insistence on the right of the Slovaks to vote according to their conscience. Pictures of Hlinka carried on the shoulders of University students to the Nitra stage, the procession of 200,000 Slovaks in Nitra, and even articles of comic and satiric content were censored. The interpellation contains a complete rescript of the articles confiscated in the almanac. 47 In conclusion the writer would like to mention here that printed works of other minorities and political parties were also confiscated by the censor. CENSORSHIP OF PERIODICALS The periodicals in Slovakia have a long tradition. The oldest periodical published on Slovak territory was Schemnitzer N ewszeitung edited in Banska Stiavnica in German, in 1540-1541. Latin periodicals also had their day. The first periodical in the Slovak language was Presspurske noviny (Bratislava News - Pressburg is German for :Bratislava,), published from 1783 to 17 87. Following World War I, newspapers, reviews, and magazines promised to become more plentiful. This was especially welcome to Slovakia, where publications in the Slovak language had been prohibited by Hungarian oppressors. Under the Czecho-Slovak republic the Slovaks were prepared to -enjoy the democratic freedom promised by the Pittsburgh .P act and especially freedom of the press, speech, and association. Alas, they soon came to realize that the promises, �116 SLOVAKIA as far as Slovakia was concerned, were empty words and nothing more. In Czecho-Slovakia, the newspapers were usually owned and operated by political parties. There were very few socalled "independent newspapers". Yet even though labeled "independent", some of these were nevertheless the tool of a financial group, a political party or a governmental coalition. The newspapers in Slovakia were of two kinds: government and so-called opposition. Under opposition came the publication of the Slovak People's Party, the Slovak National Party and the Communist Party. The Hungarian and German minorities had a similar classification of newspapers. All these newspapers were characterized by their adherence to an ideology and the effort to propagate it. They were interested in social and political problems, and they never evaded any controversial issue. Their influence on the formation of public opinion was considerable. The rapid political evolution and maturation of the Slovak nation was due chiefly to the efforts of the political press of the Slovak People's Party and the Slovak National Party. The obstacles with the Czech administration plac~d in their path by means of censorship, economic and political pressure, by corruption and terrorism, by political trials and murder in its effort to suppress the Slovak drive for in-dependence, only helped to accelerate and strenghten this process. In their 20 years of forced cohabitation with the· Czechs, the Slovaks achieved a rapid political evolution, thanks to their press and they were thus prepared in the international crisis of 1938-1939 to proceed prudently toward the realization of their national aspirations. The press of the opposition encountered paralyzing difficulties in Czecho-Slovakia. In a debate before Parliament Msgr. Andrej Hlinka, chairman of the Slovak People's Party declared that under Hungary and Austria, unjustly as they had been treated, the Slovaks and the Czechs had enjoyed greater freedom of the press than in the new "brotherly" State. of Czecho-Slovakia. 48 A resolution issued by the 14th Convention of the Social Democratic Party in 1922 protested against the practice of confiscation of the press. 49 �SLOVAKIA 117 Jozef Vr ab e c, representative of the Slovak People's Party, protested against the confiscation of the March 13, 1921 issue of Slovensky krest'ansky socialista, for its article "Za more, za ocean" (Beyond the Sea, beyond the Ocean). 50 In this article the Czech Government was held responsible for the emigration of thousands of Slovaks through its policy of job discrimination and its dismantling of Slovak industries. Slovenske Eudove Noviny was confiscated because it criticized the discriminatory policy against Slovak construction workers by a Czech construction enterprise, which led to a bloody fight between the Slovak jobless workers and the imported Czech workers. The police arrested the Slovaks. 51 In a parliamentary debate on Novembre 24, 1920, representative A. Bobok complained about the "terrible restriction of the press and opinion" in Czecho-Slovakia and claimed the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. 52 In a debate in the House of Representatives, June 21, 1922 Msgr. Andrej Hlinka declared: Each issue of the SLOVAK ts censored . . . ,I will show you a startling example of freedom of the press. Here it is. (He shows censored issues of the ,S1L OVAK, rwith their blank columns). Everything is censored from t he first word to the last. That is suppo,sed to be freedom of the -press, freedom to express an opinion . .. iSee, here is the S1LOVEN,S,KA. JEIDNOTA ... here, SIJOVENSKA. POLITl!KA. Here you see the freedom of the press for which I spent 4 years in jail. Here is 1SlJOViIDNSKA. PRAVDA. Notice what has been deleted. (He reads): "What Czech statistics s-h ow about •S lovak schools." And mention of "Teaching the Slovak language" was eradicated. Such freedom of the press do we enjoy in Slovakia! This has been going on now since Mairch 25 - we are systematically criticized and censored. And they tell the world we have freedom of the -press in this Republic! In Interpellation No. XXI/4226, April 26, 1923, representative Rev. Florian Tomanek interpellated the Minister of Justice on the confiscation of the Slovak, April 25, 1923, because it reprinted the article "Zapredana Orava a Spi§" (Orava and Spis Betrayed) from the newspaper Denny hlas (Daily voice) published in Cleveland, Ohio, April 3, 1923. In this article the Czech diplomat Dr. Karel Pergler, who had also signed the Pittsburgh Pact (1918), accused the CzechoSlovak Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Edvard Bene~ of �118 SLOVAKIA having sold to the Poles the Slovak territories of Orava and Spg for the coal districts of Karvina in Silesia, inhabited by Poles. 54 The Slovak, December 11, 1923, was censored for declaring inaccurate and false the statement of President Dr. T. G. Masaryk that the Slovaks and the Czechs were one and the same nation and that Slovak is a dialect of the Czech language. Representative Rev. Pavol Machacek wrote as follows in the article "Kati sa raduju" (The executioners rejoice) in the August 10, 1922 issue of Slovenske l'udove noviny: Heavy -f ines were imposed on the peasants. Financial burdens forced artisans to close their shops . . . !Government officia1's confiscated articles reprinted from Czech newspapers ... They issued the directive to destroy us at any cost. And they succeeded. ·Since the first or Januwry our daily S'LOVAK has been confiscated 45 times and the SLOVENiSIKE Im.DOVE NOWNY almost as many. Every confiscation meant a loss of 3,5004,000 crowns in damages. In thi-s brief period we were in arrears 1'70,000 crowns. The financial burden became .so greait that the S,J,;{}VAK was forced to cease publication. In an interpellation to the Minister of Interior, representative Rev. Florian Tomanek declared: The coalition government is not content to pass a cruel law, which empowers the Attorney General to confiscate newspapers before distribution. It did not hesitate to permit the violation of the secrecy of registered mail in 'Slovakia without a court order. The Plenipotentiary ordered the confiscation or an Open Letter addre!ised to the !President of the Republic, sent •b y :registered mail from Americans of .Slovak extraction. ,I ndeed, the Minister, •D r. Kallay, has empowered not only the post offices, but also the gendarmery and the police to confiscate letters without notifying the addressee.55 The Slovak in its August 19, 1933 issue complained that it had been confiscated six times in the previous week. The only reason it was not seven times is that the paper is issued only six times a week. The same paper in its August 26, 1933 issue notes: Yesterday's SLOVAK carried news of the confiscation of the TATRA!NSKY SLIOV.AK. But the 1SLIOVAK, SDOVAK TYZDENNIK, SLOVENS<KA BRAVDA, and the fortnightly tSLOVAK NA STRAZI of Zilina suffered a similar fate. In the later paper, seven columns were en<tirely deleted, so that it was issued •with two or its four pages blank. In the article56 "Nedorozumenie medzi autonomistickou tlacou a bratislavskym cenzorom" (A misunderstanding between �SLOVAKIA 119 the autonomist press and the censor of Bratislava), the author -ks- (who is probably Karol Sidor, editor-in-chief of the Slovak) wrote that in the previous week an issue of the Slovak had been confiscated because it reprinted in the Slovak language an article about Slovakia written by a Frenchman, Ebray, and published in the Pester Lloyd, a newspaper permitted in Czecho-Slovakia and available in the coffeehouses of Bratislava to anybody who could read German. In a parliamentary debate on the proposal of a new press law, June 9, 1933, Representative Jozef Sivak declared: I would venture to assert ,t hat the development and evolution of d emocracy is best achieved by a ,f ree press ... ,I t is true that article 113 of our Constitution guarantees freedom of the press ... but it is nothing ,but a pa per guairantee, as are all th e guarantees in this Republic. You know that by the Pit tsburgh !Pact the Slovaks were guarantP.ed autonomy, but again this is only a paper guarantee . . . The feverish zeal of the censor knows no limits. The Attorney General confiscates everything. It is not possible in this day and age to w.rite the truth about Czech discriminrution of the !Slovak laborer, to say anything about the rights of •Slovak peasants, !Slovak workers, ,S lovak artisans and shop-keepers. No one is, allowed to criticize the ,government or individual officers. ·All is censored... even the statements of the Board of Representatives of the Slovak \People's iParty ... The following appeared in the article "Neustale habanie Slovaka" (The constant harassment of the Slovak) in its August 22, 1933 issue: Readers of the SLOVAK received the !Sunday edition with dismay. The front page, with six deletions, showed how heavily the hand of the censor had struck. On no account are we p ermitted to criticize ithe government. An article in which Msgr. Andrej Hlinka ,s et forth the significance of the Nitra centennary celebration on August 13, 1933 and praised the Slovaks tfor itheir participation in it, was censored. Confiscated also was an article by 1S enator Andrej Janecek, in which he assumed responsibility for (his part in) the Nltra episode. A report on the investigation of several partici pants in the Nltra festivities was confiscaited, although the government had encouraged attendance. Other confiscations were: Part of the report on the fiasco perpetrated by government parties in Nitra who, although a minority in the district, had convened to protest · the €Vents of August 13, 1933 ; · Slav repor ts on •t he Nitra centenary; ·Reflections on the Pittsburgh Pact. It is not unusual for us to b e subjected to confiscations - evea dally. But what the censor did with our !Sunday edition outrageously surpass·e s anything ever attempted before. Our party will adopt -s uitable measures to defend our consti- �120 SLOVAKIA t uti onal r igh t to free dom of th e press, denied us by th e " lords" i n the governm ent. W e will e m ploy a ll possible means to r each on r read er s. On its anniversary the Slovak was confiscated for the editorial "Patnast' rokov Slovaka" (Fifteen years of the Slovak), which conveyed the impressions of its readers on the reappearance of the Slovak after three months' suspension by the Attorney General. The same issue was confiscated for its information about the activities of Americans of Slovak descent in the United States, a reprint from Osadne hlasy (Parish News ), a Slovak weekly in Chicago, Illinois, and one part of an article by a Czech signatary of the Pittsburgh Pact. 57 Interpellation No. 1193/ IX, November 10, 1937, proffered by representatives Karol Sidor and Dr. Martin Sokol was motiviated by the confiscation of two articles in Slov enska pravda and Slovak, November 10 and 11, 1937. The title of the two articles was "Zakony demonstracii". They included a report on the spirited demonstrations of the studets of Bratislava University, demanding the slovakization of the University, of government bureaus, and of the army and police in Slovakia, under the slogan "Slovakia for the Slovaks". It carried an account of the brutal intervention of Czech police, who severely beat the students with sabres and clubs. An illustration showing a hand brandishing a club (used by the police ) was also confiscated. The headline "Demand plebiscite for Slovak autonomy!" was deleted from the February 10, 1938 issue of the Slovak, but the same line was left by the censor in the text of the article. Such inconsistencies in the practice of censorship were frequent. For this reason the Czech journalist Dr. Benes (not the President Dr. Benes) could declare in the organ of the Union of Czecho-Slovakia Journalists: The pr ess is practically ou tlawed in Czechoslovakia . .. a nd fr ee• dom of the press •has become degenerated by confisca tions .58 Such a statement, naturally, could not have been published in Slovakia. In an evening discussion at the Czechoslovak National Council, the Czech editor Jan· Hrabanek declared that the articles of the Constitution concerning freedom of the press were not respected, that a permit for printing newspapers �SLOVAKIA 121 was required, that the publication of periodicals was too often suspended and the right of distribution forfeited on the basis of a mere suspicion, without any conviction of a penal act. 59 After 1932, when young Slovak members of government parties were more attuned to the ideas and attitudes of the majority of the Slovak nation, the governmental press in the Slovak language also began to appear with blank pages. In the May 5, 1939 issue (page 90) of Zem (Soil) a political magazine of young Agrarians, the editor wrote an article entitled "Komu osozi cenzura?" (Who Benefits from censorship?) Among other things he said: Newspapers with blank pages ... that is a product of the censor. The author sees thi.s miscarrriage of his intellectual effort and loses heart. Readers are cheated by receiving blank newspapers . . . Jn recent times the censor is busier than ever before. Formerly only newspapers which habHually pabl!shed a rticles sharply criticizing the government were censored. These were chiefly the papers of the opposition. •B ut that is a. thing of the past. Nowadays even the newsp a pers of government pal'ties are censored and they appear now with the familiar blank spaces. What was most offensive to the Slovaks was the confiscation of the literary magazine Slovenske Pohl'ady, No. l0A, 1932, published with the date of October 28, the "Day of Freedom", the official national festivity of the CzechoSlovak Republic. Slovenske Pohl'ady, founded in 1846, had never been confiscated before. It had always stood as a symbol of the independent cultural life of the Slovaks and was dear to the heart of every Slovak. Why was this revered non-political periodical censored? Its editor Dr. Stefan Krcmery, submitted to criticism the Czechs in Slovakia, because they did not read or buy Slovak books and despised Slovak literature. In the other censored article he reviewed very favorably a new volume of poems Hlas krvi (The Voice of blood), published by Andrej Zarnov, author of the confiscated volume of poems Straz pri Morave, mentioned on page 53. The cultural magazines Pero (Pen), Pramen (Source), Elan (Impetus) and DAV (The Masses) and the humoristic periodical Osa (Wasp) and Kocur (Cat) were also confiscated several times. �122 SLOVAKIA CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS OF OTHER NATIONALITIES LIVING IN CZECHO-SLOV AKIA The Slovak press was not alone in the battle for freedom of the press. Other ethnical groups living in CzechoSlovakia were also hindered in the free expression of ideas. It is true that the Czech Government was much more lenient toward the Germans and Magyars, who were favorably situated and could appeal to the German Reich and Hungary for moral and financial support. But the case of the Ukrainians living in the territory of "Subcarpathian Russia" was similar to that of the Slovaks. By the Peace Treaties of Saint Germain-en-Laye, France, on October 10, 1919, this territory which had belonged to Hungary before World War I was incorporated in Czecho-Slovakia as an autonomous entity. Its position in the Czecho-Slovak Republic was to be that of a federated state. But, as in the Slovak case, the Czechs failed to honor their obligations and the Ruthenians were treated as another Czech colony. Its political and economic exploitation was in open contradiction to the terms of the St. Germain-en-Laye treaties. The po:.. sition of the Subcarpathian Ruthenians was as hopeless as that of the Slovaks. But this poor and exploited nation was also aware of its national origin and of the Czech aims of domination. Its representatives in the Prague Parliament and its periodicals followed generally the same line as that of the Slovaks. They demanded their rights, guaranteed by the peace treaties, especially the right of national self-determination. · The Czech methods of domination in Subcarpathian Russia were similar to those employed in Slovakia: military and political terrorism, economic exploitation and impoverishment, political corruption and censorship, combined with the curtailing of freedom of speech and association. In Parliament the Ruthenians reacted in the same way as the Slovaks. The January. 31, 1926 issue of the newspaper Karpatska pravda (Carpathian truth), published in Uzgorod, was censor·ed in its editorial "Continuous Oppression" for this statement: The cup is full to overflowing. ·T he poor people of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, ruthl essly oppressed ·by the Czech bourgeoisie, suffers cold, �SLOVAKIA 123 unemploy men t, hu nger, pove r ty a nd e ndles·s mis,ery. Eig-h teen years we h ave lived in "fr ater nal" union with Czecho,S lovak ia, but nothing h as ·been do ne to improve social cond Hions .. .so On April 8, 1937 Representative Dr. S. A. Fencik interpellated the Minister of the Interior on the confiscation of issue No. 216 of Na§ put (Our way ), published in Uzgorod. The periodical was confiscated on the pretex that the censored article might disturb the public peace. It was entitled "Voice of a Slovak" and included a quotation from the daily Slovak, March 19, 1937, stating that the establishment by Prague of a "Gubernatorial Council" for Subcarpathian Russia is but a surrogate for the autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution. The article was not confiscated in the Slovak, but the Na§ put was confiscated for informing its readers .a bout the Slovak' s views. The No. 212 issue of Na§ put, 1937 was confiscated on the same pretex, i. e. that it might disturb the public peace. The article "Autonomy" was confiscated for the lines: " ... this a utonomy is guaranteed only on paper . To this day it h as not been r ealized. In eighteen yea.rs no effort has been made to b egi n to put it into effect."61 The press of the Czech opposition also shared the fate of that of the other nationalities. Only a very insignificant percentage of Czechs however, voted for their opposition parties. The others were generally satisfied with their privileged position and had no desire to change it. On September 16, 1930 the representatives of the Czech National Democracy, Dr. Karel Pergler and Ji.ti Sti'ibrny interpellated the Minister of Justice on the confisc ation of the periodical Franta, vol. III. No. 21 , March 6, 1930: Despite the guarantees of freedom or speech and press contained i n the Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak •Republic, o ur legislative bodies have not checked or even improved the preventive censorship inconsistent with democracy, especially in peacetime. Under a r egi me li k e ours one wou ld not expect a censor.s hip and confiscation policy which ·r enders impossible a decent and desirable criticism of ideas and political principles h el d by government functionaries. But the exact opposite is the ca,se. In this Repu1blic it is not permitted to discuss people in the government and their views on any topic. As a proo1' of my assertion, I have here several periodicals that suf·fered con fiscation. The classic example of the confiscation policy adopted by the government in contradiction to the most basic concepts of freedom of the press and discussion, was the confiscation of the March 6, 19·30 issue of F'RQ)l''DA. The article "Two Concepts" by F. Schwartz was the offender ... �124 SLOVAKIA This article contained criticism of Dr. Tomas G. Masaryk, President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. Another article "Co je vice nez 7. marec" (What is more significant than March 7) written by Josef Vodracka and published in the same issue, was also confiscated, because of its criticism of Masaryk's philosophy of Czech statehood. (March 7 was Masaryk's birthday and a national holiday.) In the article "Napoleonsky rys" (Napoleonic feature), published in the same issue, a description of Masaryk's charact€r was also censored. Another article "Muz Bible" (Biblical man) by Kamil Masin was censored for its designation of Masaryk as a "messianist" (man of Providence). In the same issue also F. Petrik's article "Rozsevac a znec" (Sower and harvester) on the ideological inconsequence of Masaryk's philosophy and F. Schwarz's article "Souhlasime s Masarykem" (We agree with Masaryk) along with several other articles were censored. The interpellation continued: The press wa·s at one time the principal means of maintaining freedom and national consciousness. In the Czecho,Slovak Republic, the press has become the .frightening destroyer of every freedom because an honest and independent press has been annihilated. It serves now as ~ blindfold for the people ...62 This example shows that censorship in Czecho-Slovakia was like an octopus which extended its arms into all areas of public life and impeded the march of democracy and the natural evolution of the various ethnical groups. SLOVAK DEFENSE AGAINST THE EFFECTS OF CENSORSHIP A direct result of the systematic violation of freedom of the press by governmental censorship was that Slovak political parties were denied normal communication with their members. At the disposal of the Government were the police, the army, the gendarmry and about 300,000 privileged Czech functionaries in Slovakia, whose task it was to hinder the activity of Slovak political forces, working and fighting for the freedom and independence of Slovakia. The people of Slovakia, deprived of the most effective means of communication, the press, which was constantly, almost daily, confiscated, the radio was State-owned and controlled, and never at the disposal of opposition parties, �SLOVAKIA 125 were more and more interested in knowing, what new injustice was committed against the Slovak nation. Several methods of rendering the censorship less effective were developed by the political parties. These political parties, who owned many of the newspapers, constantly challenged the respective Ministers in Parliament by interpellations. Their interpellations were always published, together with the censored articles, in the Tisky Poslanecke Snemovny N<irodniho Shromazdeni Repub liky Ceskoslovenske (a publication comparable to the U.S. Congressional Record) and this procedure gave them immunity and the right to be reprinted in the newspapers. But it was not unusual for the censor to confiscate even these immunized articles and interpellations. The interpellation had to be signed by at least twenty representatives. Small parties, which lacked this number, obtained the necessary signatures from the representatives of other opposition parties. The interpellations were addressed to the Minister of the Interior, or the Minister of Justice. The reply of the Government to the interpellation, which also requested that the matter be discussed, was usually negative.If a written answer was requested, the Minister almost invariably approved the procedure of the censor. Here is an example: Reply of the Government to the interpellation of representative Andrej Hlinka and associates concerning .the confiscation of the dally SLOVAK, No. 105, May 9, 1934 (No. 2712/VII). - The confiscation of the portions adduced In the lnterpellatlon . . . executed by the office -of the Attorney General in Bratislava, •w as exa mined by the regional court In Bratislava and approved In full. The complaint challenging this decision was rejected by the 1Prlme Minister: J. Malypetr.63 If nothing was found wrong in the censored article, the reply to the interpellation was: .. . I find that some portions adduced in interpellation No. 3610/· XIV were confiscated without a legal r eason. I informed the office of the Attorney General in Nitra that thes e articles ... are nothini;: more than poli,tical r eflections and attacks and their suppression cannot be justified by law. I hope that similar cases will not be repeated .. ,64 But the censorship policy was not modified by a few decisions in favor of the opposition's press. Another procedure used by the opposition press to �126 SLOVAKIA counteract the effects of censorship was to send the first printed copy to the censor's office and simultaneously to deliver several hundred copies to the public vendors. The Bratislava readers were usually waiting and so at least some of them were able to obtain uncensored copies, which passed clandestinely from hand to hand. The procedure was the same for the towns and villages near the capital city of Bratislava. Workers, employees, railroadmen and occasional travelers, women from the villages selling vegetables in the market, all cooperated in smuggling the uncensored copies of newspapers out of Bratislava. Most helpful in this distribution of uncensored copies were the Slovak railroadmen. Each town in which the train stopped, had its copy of the uncensored newspaper. This was done with the utmost caution, since those involved could have been charged with a criminal act against the security of the State at the risk of imprisonment or loss of job. After the censor completed his job, the Attorney-General ordered the police to confiscate the newspaper. The policemen seized the unsold uncensored copies from the news-stands. In coffeehouses they seized uncensored copies from the hands of readers, who had not reali21ed in good time the presence of the officers and failed to hide their copies. Articles from confiscated political, social and cultural periodicals, were typed and distributed among interested people, chiefly university students and graduates, who formed little clubs to discuss them. The same was done with confiscated books or volumes of poetry. The writer recalls how, after the publication of Sidor's and Mach's books, mentioned previously, he was given one typewritten copy of the censored parts of the books, and was required to type at least fiV'e new copies and distribute them among five other persons. Such distribution was possible only among persons who were trustworthy and of the same political convictions. The result was that almost everybody in Slovakia could have his own copy of the censored parts of the books. The secretariats of the political parties cooperated with students, workers and peasants in this underground press and the solidarity of the nation as a whole was wonderful. It is true that many people were caught and penalized, but that was the risk. �SLOVAKIA 127 Students in foreign countries supplied information about the views of the foreign press on the Slovak problem and themselves published the Slovak viewpoint in foreign newspapers. They smuggled into the country articles about Slovakia from the foreign press. The customs examination of Slovak students traveling abroad or returning from foreign countries was viery thorough. The clandestine importing of news reports from abroad was even more dangerous than the distribution of censored articles in Slovakia. If caught in possession of any news item unfavorable to Czecho-Slovakia, a person could be prosecuted for "association with the enemies of the State", for espionage, or for plotting against the State. Information brought from abroad was discussed only in small confidential groups of students and intellectuals, and secret reports were given to certain leaders of political parties. The Czechs were not generally able to identify the persons responsible for this smuggling of information. But they never forgot. During his studies in Zagreb (Croatia) in 1937 or 1938, one of my friends wrote several articles about the oppression of the Slovaks in Czecho-Slovakia. For these and other articles written for the Croatian press ten years later in 1947 he was sentenced by a Czech Communist "people's court" to eight years in prison. CONCLUSION Freedom of the press consist~ in the free gathering of information, in free communication, in the free publication of information, in the free printing and distribution of published information and in the free subscription and free reading of published information. In Czecho-Slovakia these freedoms were very limited and in Slovakia they were practically non-existent. If one succeeded in gathering information, it became impossible to communicate it if the Czechs felt that it criticized or threatened their hegemony. To publish such information signified sure intervention of the censor and meant the consequent confiscation of the entire edition of the book or periodical, in which it was published. To diffuse information confiscated by the censor was �128 SLOVAKIA considered by the Czechs as an act against the security of the State. The freedom to subscribe to and to read published information was also very limited. Anyone found to be in possession of censored information was ,exposed to the danger of being arrested and penalized. From pertinent material available to the writer and from his own experiences in Czecho-Slovakia in the years 1918-1938, he has reached the conclusion that despite the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, censorship in its most drastic form was widely employed against the opposition and the minorities in direct contradiction to the Constitution and the so-called "democratic" system which it guaranteed. Public opinion in Slovakia could not manifest itself freely in the press and information was diffused chiefly through the channels generally resorted to by underground organizations. The people of Slovakia learned to read and interpret the blank spaces of the censored newspapers and what they "read" this way was much more unfavorable to the Czech system than the impression the censored words would have provoked. The impossibility of frank discussion had created an atmosphere of hatred in which the Slovaks renounced once and for all any discussion with the Czechs. They began to take their own course which led logically to the unanimous declaration of the independent Slovak Republic, March 14, 1939, by the autonomous Slovak Parliament. Censorship applied against the Slovaks proved that freedom cannot be suppressed indefinitely, because it is a part of the condition of our life, our development, and our progress. In its essence our soul is free. Whoever suppresses the freedom of others, will himself lose freedom. The Czechs lost their freedom on the very day when the Slovaks declared their independence. Bohemia became a Protectorate of Germany. When with the aid of the Soviet army and through the indifference of the Western world, the Czechs enslaved the Slovaks a second time after World War II, they lost their freedom too, and became a satelite of Soviet Russia. In order �SLOVAKIA 129 to keep the Slovaks in Czech slavery, they sold their own freedom to the Muscowite tyrant, exposing to Red danger the entire Central and Occidental Europe. The words of the great Slovak poet Jan Kollar (17931852) are most appropriate here: Whoever respects the freedom of others Is himself worthy of freedom. Whoever enslaves with handcuffs Is himself a slave ! 65 FOOTNOTES 1. "The Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic", with introduction by Ji:ri Hoetzl and V. Joachim, American Association for International Conciliation, Pt,blications, No. 179 (October 1922), 2. 3. Ibid., p. 443. Karl Falk, "Strife in Czechoslovakia: The German Minority Question", Foreign Policy Reports, XIV, (March 15, 1938), p. 4. The Cleveland Pact stipulated that the Slovaks and Czechs would form II federative union of states. Slovakia was to enjoy complete national autonomy, including its own Parliament and government administration, its own political and financial institutions, complete freedom to develop culturally and the right to use Slovak as its official language. The form of government was to be democratic, operating in a union of two autonomous states. The Pittsburgh Pact guaranteed that "Slovakia shall have its own administration, its own tribunals and its own Parliament. Slovak shall be the official language in schools, in government offices and in public life in general." Sbirka zakonu a narizeni statu ceskoslovenskeho. Part 23 (March 31, 1923), pp. 207-218. Sbirka zakonu a nafizen£ statu ceskoslovenskeho. (1920) . Ibid. Part 44 (July 15, 1933) pp. 708-709. Sbirka zakonu a nafizeni statu ceskoslovenskeho. Part 44 (July p. 441. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8 15, 1933), p. 707. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. Ibid. ( 1933) p. 771. Ibid. Part 56 (July 7, 1934) pp. 513-516. Sbirka zakonu a nafizeni statu ceskoslovenskeho. (1934), p. 598. Ibid. (1935), p. 527. Ibid. (1937), p. 786. Ibid. Part 44 (July 15, 1933) pp. 709-714. Sbirka zakonu a narizeni statu ceskoslovenskeho. Part 35, (May 23, 19i6) pp. 477-479. I!Jid. pp. 479-541. Imrich Stanek, Zrada a pad. (Praha: Statnf Nakladatelstvf Politicke Literatury, 1958), p. 33. �SLOVAKIA 130 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. Imrich Stanek, Op. cit., p. 41. Ibid., p. 33. Ibid., p. 34. Imrich Stanek, Op. cit., p. 34. Ibid., p. 35. loc. cit. loc. cit. loc. cit. Ibid., pp. 38-39. Ibid., p. 39. Ibid., p. 40. Ibid., p. 32. Ibid., pp. 41-43. Lucy Maynard Salmon, The newspaper and authority. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1923), p. 3. Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka (1864-1926), Bratislava: Knihtlaciaren Sv. Andrej a, 1934), p. 359. Culen, Konstantin. "Sloboda tlace v CSR", Bratstvo, (May 23, 1951). Machacek, Pavol. "Katovia sa raduju", Slovenske .l!udove Novi· ny", (August 10, 1923). pp. 1-2. Ceskoslovenska Republika, Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, No. 150, (1922). Karol Sidor, Op. cit., pp. 487-488. Ibid., p. _426. Ibid., p. 425. Culen, Konstantin, "Slaboda tlace v CSR", Bratstvo, (May 23, 1951). C. A. Macartney, Hungary and her successors, pp. 137-139. "Azda takto", Nastup, (November 1, 1933), p. 163. "Nerovny boj", Nastup, (November 1, 1933), p. 162. Ceskoslovenska Republika, Niirodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, No. 5280, (1925). Head of a region. Administrative region of Slovakia. Sano Mach, Vo viheni, (Bratislava: Jednota, 1930). Ceskoslovenska Republika, Niirodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, 'l)sky, No. 2799, (1934). Culen, Konstantin. "Slaboda tlace v CSR", Bratstvo, (May 23, 1951). Ceskoslovenska Socialne demokraticka strana. Protokol sjazdu z 12. a 22. aprila 1922, p. 203. Ceskoslovenska Republika. Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka· Snemovna, Tisky, 1. volebni obdobi, 2. zasedani, No. 1882, 1921. Op. cit., No. IV/4098, 1923. (;ulen, Kon~tantin, "Slcboda tlace v CSR", Bratstvo, (May 23, 1951). �SLOVAKIA 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. fi3. 64. 65. 131 ceskoslovenska Republika, Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, No. 3584, (June 21, 1922.). ceskoslovenska Republika, Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, No. XXI/4226, (April 26, 1923). ceskoslovenska Republika, Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, No. VI/4636, (May 27, 1924). Slovak, July 23, 1933. Slovak, J anuary 26, 1934. Tisk a novinari, XII, No. 5, (1938). Druhy kruh diskusnich vecerii Narodni Rady ceskoslovenske", Cechoslovak a nase zahranici. Vsenarodni mesicnik. Vol. XV, No. 4-5, (April-May, 1935), p. 100. ceskoslovenska Republika, Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, 1937, VI. volebne obdobi, 5 zasedani, No. 876/ VI, April 8. Ibid, XV/4226, (May 25, 1923). ceskoslovenska Republika. Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, 628/IX, (September 16, 1930). ceskoslovenska Republika. Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, No. 2951, (1934). ceskoslovenska Republika. Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, I. volebni obdobi, 5. zasedani, No. 2591, (July 28, 1922), pp. 10-11. Jan Kollar, Slavy dcera. 1824. BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS <::incik, Joseph G. Anglo-Saxon and Slovak-Avar Patterns of the Cuthbert Gospel. Series Cyrilomethodiana, v. 1. Cleveland: Slovak Institute, 1958. Delaney, Edward L. False freedom . Los Angeles: Sequoia University Press, 1954. Diplomaticus. The Czechs and their minorities. London, Thornton Butterworth, (1938). Durcansky, Ferdinand. Pohl'ad na slovensku politicku minitlost'. Bratislava: Ludotypia, 1943. Hrusovsky, Frantisek. Slovenske dejiny. 6th ed. Turciansky Sv. Martin: Matica Slovenska, 1940. Kerr, Walter. Criticism and censorship. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1956. Kimball, Young and Lawrence, Raymond D. Bibliography on censorship and propaganda. University of Oregon publications, v. 1, 1928. Journalism series, No. 1. Eugene: University Press, 1928. Mach, Sano. Vo viizeni. Censored ed. Bratislava: Jednota, 1930. Macartney, C. A. Hungary and her successors. The treaty of Trianon and its consequences, 1919-1937. New York, Oxford University Press, 1937. McKean, Richard et al. The freedom to read. Perspective and program. New York: R. R. Bowker, 1957. �SLOVAKIA 132 Miskovic, Alojz and Pisut, Milan. Dejiny slovenskej literatury pre VI. triedu slovenskych gymnazii a pre ucitel'ske akademie. Bratislava: Statne nakladatel'stvo, 1941. Mraz, Andrej. Die Literatur der Slovaken. Berlin: Volk und Reich Verlag, n. d. Salmon, Lucy Maynard. The newspaper and authority. New York: Oxford University Press, 1923. Seton-Watson, R. W. A history of the Czechs and Slovaks. New York: Hutchinson and Co., 1943. Sidor, Karol. Andrej Hlinka (1864-1926). Censored ed. Bratislava: Knihtlaciareii Sv. Andreja, 1934. -Andrej Hlinka (1864-1926). Uncensored ed. Bratislava: Knihtlaciarer1 Sv. Andreja, 1934. - Slovcici v zahranicnom odboji. Bratislava: Jednota, 1928. Slovensky Oslobodzovaci vybor. Prcivo Slovcikov na samostatnost' vo svet• le dokumentov. Sv. 1: Biela kniha. By Ferdinand Durcansky. Buenos Aires: Dorrego, 1954. Stanislav, Jan. Slovanski apostoli Cyril a Metod • ich cinnost' vo Vel'ko• moravskej risi. Bratislava: Academia Scientiarum et Artium Slovaca, 1945. Thomas, S. Harris. Czechoslovakia in European history. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. Zubek, Theodoric J., O.F.M., S.T.D. The Church of silence in Slovakia. Published by John J. Lach, 1956. PAMPHLETS Comite d'action Slovaque. Aide-memoire sur la necessite de plebiscite en Slovaquie. Paris: 1946. Comite d'action Slovaque. Aide-memoire sur l'existence de la Republique Slovaque et sur la necessite de conclure le traite de paix avec elle. Paris: 1946. Durcansky, Ferdinand. The international asp zct of the Slovak question. New York: Slovak Liberation Committee, 1954. Jakobson. R. Slavic languages. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. Slovak Action Committee, Slovak National Council in London, Slovak League of America and Canadian Slovak League of Canada. Memorandum presented to the Peace Conference concerning the rationality of existence of Czecho-Slovakia. Paris: 1946. Th e Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact. (Chi cago) : The Slovak Catholic Federation of America, 1934. Stewart, John F. Slovakia, its people and right to sovereign independence and freedom. Information leaflets, No. 7. Edinburgh: Scottish League for European Fre<>dom, n. d. PERIODICALS AND ARTICLES "Azda takto," Ncistup (Nove.' llber 1, 1933). ceskoslovensko a na.se zahrar,;i:i, XV, No. 4-5 (April-May, 1935). "The Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic", with introduction �SLOVAKIA 133 by Jiri Hoetzl and V. Joachim. American Association for International Conciliation, Publications, No. 179) (October, 1922). culen, Konstantin. "Sloboda tlace v cSR", Bratstvo (May 23, 1951). Falk, Karl. "Strife in Czechoslovakia", Foreign Policy Reports, XIV (March 15, 1938). Hlinka, Andrej. "Protestujeme", Slovak (December 22, 1921). "Komu osozi cenzura?", Zem, III, No. 9 (May 5, 1937). Machacek, Pavel "Katovia sa raduju", Slovenske l'udove noviny, (August 10, 1923). "Nedorozumenie medzi autonomistickou tlacou a bratislavskym cenzorom", Slovak, (August 27, 1933). "Nerovny boj", Nastup (November 1, 1933) . "Neustale habanie Slovaka", Slovak (August 27, 1933). " O cenzure", Slovak (May 16, 1934). "Pracuje cenzura pre stat alebo pre politicke strany?", Slovak (September 15, 1933). "Preco nas cenzurovali", Slovak (April 29, 1934). "150 rocna cenzura rakuska platna este aj v republike", Slovak (June 11, 1933). Slovak (June 11, 1933). Slovak (September 15, 1933). Slovak (January 26, 1934). Slovak (June 13, 1934). Taylor, Paul B. "Partition of Czechoslovakia", Foreign Policy Reports, (November 15, 1938). - "Germany's expansion in Eastern Europe", Foreign Policy Reports, XV (May 15, 1939). Tisk a novinai'i, XII, No. 5 (1938). PUBLIC DOCUMENTS ceskoslovenska Republika. Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna. Tisky. Years: 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924. 1925, 1926, 1929, 1930, 1934, 1935. Sbirka zakonu a narizeni statu ceskoslovenskeho. Years: 1920, 1922, 1923, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1~37. THESIS Woytko, Sister Mary Gabrielle, 0.P. Slovakia's road to statehood. A Study of the efforts of Slovakia to secure national independence. Thesis submitted to the Graduate School of Duquesne University as a thesis under the title "A study of the efforts of Slovakia to secure national independence" in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts. (Published by John Lach, 1957). � SLOVAKIA 93 CENSORSHIP POLICIES IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA 1918-1938 WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON SLOVAKIA Eugene Urban ABSTRACT By means of clever propaganda, the Czecho-Slovak Republic became known as an exemplary democratic State and the ethnic groups living within her boundaries were enjoying a personal, cultural, political and economic freedom. But the reality was exactly the opposite. The CzechoSlovak Republic was nothing but a big concentration camp for four million Slovaks, three and half million Germans, seven hundred thousand Ukrainians, six hundred thousand Magyars, one hundred fifty thousand Poles, etc., the Czechs enjoying the privileged position of guards. The real objective of the Czecho-Slovak Republic was to deprive the different ethnic groups of their national identity and, at their expense, to enlarge herself to the point of becoming a power among the others of Europe. The Slovaks, a very nationally selfconscious group, differing from the Czechs in language, traditions, culture, customs, and character, were guaranteed 1918 that the new Republic would be a confederation of two States: the Slovak and the Czech. But the Czechs failed to keep their promises and pacts and instead they treated Slovakia as a colony. One of the weapons used to suppress the desire of the Slovaks to be again a free and independent nation was the censorship of the press, the most effective medium of communication. The aim was to blot out all remembrance of Slovqk historical traditions, and to suppress the individuality and evidence of an oid cultural nation in the very heart. of Europe - a nation which has made its contributions to the building up of Western Christian culture and civilization. And, although the Czecho-Slovak Constitution had guaranteed freedom of the press, several laws were later enacted to make censorship legal. But the Slovaks defended them- �94 SLOVAKIA selves as well as they could in Parliament and with "underground" means of communication. Czecho-Slovak Laws Concerning Freedom of Press, Speech, and Association. Theory and Practice The freedoms of press and association in the CzechoSlovak Republic were guaranteed in paragraph 113, (1) of the Constitution accepted by the Revolutionary National Assembly on the 29th of February, 1920: Freedom of the press as well as the right to assemble peaceably and without arms and to form associations is guaranteed. It is therefore in principle inadmissible to place the press under preliminary censorship.I Paragraph 117 guaranteed the freedom of expression of opinion: Every person may within the limits of the law express his or h er opinion by word, in writing, in print, by picture, etc. The same applies to legal persons within the limits of their competence. No one shall suffer in the ,sphere of his work or emloyment for excercising this right.2 According to these articles of the C o n s t i t u t i o n, Czecho-Slovakia had no press law of its own. The press was supposed to be free of Government interference and to serve the genuine interests of the various ethnical groups living in Czecho-Slovakia. It was supposed, also, that they would be free to assemble in political, cultural, religious, economical, etc. organizations and to secure through them their rights. Except for the Czechs, all other ethnical groups were integrated in Czecho-Slovakia without being given opportunity to express their will freely. With regard to the Slovaks, the Constitution was in direct contradiction to the spirit and letter of the Cleveland and Pjttsburgh Pacts signed by the Slovaks and Czechs in Cleveland, Ohio, October 5, 1915 and in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, May 30, 1918. 3 This latter was signed moreover by President Tomas G. Masaryk. According to these two pacts, Czecho-Slovakia was supposed to be a federation of both the Slovak and the Czech States. 4 But these pacts were not included in the Constitution. �SLOVAKIA !)5 The representatives for Slovakia who voted in Parliament for the acceptance of this anti-Slovak Constitution were not elected by the people, but appointed by the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Prague from a minority group advocating integration with the Czech nation. The Constitution was in flagrant contradiction to the spirit and the principles on which Czecho-Slovakia had been created. In the first years of her existence, the discontent of the Slovaks and of the other minorities with Czech imperialism and centralism early started to manifest itself, and this particularly in the periodical press and at the meetings of the political parties. The Czechs did not delay in their retaliation. They replaced the guarantees of paragraph 113 of the Constitution with a series of laws by which the freedom of the press was practically nullified. Not having a press law of their own, the Czech majority in the Prague Parliament made use of the old Austrian press law No. 119/ 1873 (May 23) and No. 142/ 1868 (October 15) of the Austrian Code, and the Hungarian law No. XIV /1914 to suppress freedom of the press. These were the oppressive laws of the old Au.stro-Hungarian regime against which both Slovaks and Czechs fought in the Parliaments of Vienna and Budapest. It has been said repeatedly that Czecho-Slovakia was created to liberate the Czechs and Slovaks from the Austro-Hungarian yoke. It is an ironic fact that Dr. Tomas G. Masaryk, the first President of Czecho-Slovakia, who as deputy for Bohemia, had condemned these laws in the Parliament of Vienna, now signed and approved them as the laws of the land, as law No 50/1923 (March 19), paragraph 34.5 The co-founder of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and her second President, Dr. Eduard Benes, who was also theoretically a defender of the freedom of the press, also signed law No. 50/1923. The same law No. 50/ 1923 provided for the defense of the Republic, and paragraph 34 stipulated the conditions under which the publication of periodicals might be prohibited. Law No. 3006 was drawn up on April 14, 1920; it was later supplemented by law No. 125/ 1933 (July 10)7, according to which the State's Security Bureau, without a judicial order could demand the c o n f i s c a t i o n and opening of letters �96 SLOVAKIA and other items transported by mail. It could prohibit public meetings and it could impose special conditions upon the activities of associations or prohibit them. Paragraph 10 was concerned with the press. The State's Security Bureau could limit or impose special conditions for the publication and distribution of periodicals, or prohibit their publication. It could order the editor of a periodical to present, two hours before its publication, copies for preventive censorship. The same Bureau could put under surveillance or prohibit the activities of printing shops, of distributing companies, and of press agencies. It could also prohibit possession of printing presses and other means of reproducing writings and illustrations by private persons. Law No. 50/1923, for the defense of the Republic, was enacted in a period when Czecho-Slovakia was fully recognized and her existence insured by International Peace Treaties. This law was not addressed against her enemies from abroad, but to deal with the growing dissatisfaction from inside. Especially in Slovakia the discontent was alarming. The fact that the Czechs violated the Pacts of Cleveland and Pittsburgh were the most powerful reasons for this discontent. Law 50/1923 was enacted in order to give the Czechs a weapon to terrorize the dissatisfied Slovaks and the other minorities. It fixed the penalty for military treason, for violation of State secrets, for offence to the President of the Republic, for any challenge to commit penal acts or not to fulfill legal obligations, for approving the crime, for associating against the State, for the spread of false reports, etc. All the paragraphs of this law were appliable also to the periodical press. Directly concerned with the periodical press was paragraph 34 of this law. It gave the Government's ooreaus power to prohibit the publication of periodicals. The period of suspension of publication was established as one month for periodicals published at least five times a week, two months for those published at least three times a week, and six months for those purlished less than this. But this law seemed not to be strict enough for the Czech Government. Ten years larer, law No. 50/1923 was completed and changed by the law No. 124/ 1933 (July 10).8 This new law extended the list of "crimes and offences" �SLOVAKIA 97 for which the publication of a periodical could be suspended and gave the Government the right to enlarge the validity of paragraph 34 by a simple government decree. The suspension period of periodicals was enlarged from one to three months and from two to six months. Not even that was enough for the Government of CzechoSlovakia. The Governmental Decree No. 150/1933 (July 18),9 published ten days later, again increased the number of paragraphs which could be violated by the press and added to the number of crimes and offences also the infringements of these laws. One year later a new law No. 140/ 1934 was drawn up. (July 10), 10 which changed and completed the law No 50/ 1923, the law No. 124/ 1933 and the Government Decree No. 150/ 1933. The number of possible penal acts was increased again. The Government was empowered to prolong the validity of these laws for another two years. The distribution of transgressing periodicals could be prohibited in all stores which sold the products of the State's monopoly (tobacco, stamps, salt, etc.) or in the buildings and stations of the State owned railways (there were only State owned railways in Czecho-Slovakia). These periodicals could be also deprived of the right to use special tariffs and of the right of transportation by mail or by railroads. The same law compelled all periodicals to publish free, without change or comment, on their first or second page, by usual types of letters, and in the largest edition, official declarations of the President, the Vice-President, the Prime-Minister, members of the Government, etc., appealing to this law. A new Government Decree No. 163/ 1934 (July 16) 11 further extended the number of "crimes, offences and infringements" for which the publication of a periodical could be suspended. Two other government decrees, No. 157 / 1935 (July 13) 12 and No. 165/ 1937 (July 24) 13 , prolonged the validity of the paragraph 34 of the law No. 50/ 1923 and the subsequent laws until the 13th July 1939. Another law, No. 126/ 1933 (July 10) 14 was concerood with the distribution (col portage) of periodicals. The distribution of periodicals which directly or indirectly subvert or put blame on the independence, Constitutional unity, the �98 SLOVAKIA integrity and the democratic and republican form of the State or the democratic order in the Czecho-Slovak Republiccould be prohibited. This right could also be taken away from those periodicals which "menace the public peace and order, especially by publishing false news and news which distort the truth". The distribution in Czecho-Slovakia of periodicals published abroad could be also prohibited. It was prohibited to distribute periodicals in the schools and in the military quarters. The Regional Office was entitled to prohibit the distribution of periodicals published in Czecho-Slovakia, while the Ministry of Interior in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could prohibit the distribution of periodicals published in foreign countries. Paragraph II of this law required publication of any correction asked by a person who felt that the content of some article published by the periodical was offensive to him or that information given was untrue. And finally the law No. 130/ 1936 (May 13)15 was enacted, which completed the previous National Defense laws for the defense of the Republic. This law established capital punishment for many crimes against law No. 50/ 1923. It also prohibited the publication of news regarding military treason if not approved previously by the Ministry of National . Defense. All these laws and Government Decrees were climaxed by • National Defense Law No. 131/ 1936 (May 13)16 for the defense of the State. This law gave the Government absolute power in a national emergency to suspend all laws, all rights and liberties. It gave the Government the right to censor the press, films, telegrams, telephone conversations, letters, packages sent by mail, phonographs records, etc. It established preventive censorship and gave the State's Security Bureau the power to prohibit the publication and distribution of periodicals. The importation of periodicals from abro.ad ·could be also prohibited. The law provided for the establishment of a commission which would direct and carry out the censorship policy. The Government was given in fact dictatorial powers: and this law was generally considered as the last nail in the coffin of democracy in Czecho-Slovakia. �SLOVAKIA 99 Objectives and Methods of Czechoslovak Censorship Policies From the analysis of censored material it is possible to learn much about the objectives pursued by the Czech Government in the case of Slovakia. Previous mention has been made of the profound antagonism developed between the Slovaks and Czechs as a result of the Czech violation of the Cleveland and Pittsburgh pacts. The Czech wanted to denationalize the Slovaks by forcing them to accept the false claim that Slovaks are Czechs and that the Slovak language is a Czech dialect. To obtain this aim, the Czechs made use of various means. They created a wave of terrorism, using the armed forces, police, gendarmery and the C z e ch national organizations, especially "Sokol" known for both its atheism and chauvinism. They also sent hundreds of thousands of Czech teachers and Czech Government officials into Slovakia, thereby forcing the Slovaks, who were denied jobs in their own country, to emigrate because of hunger and unemployment. They further contributed to the economic impaverishrnent of Slovakia by dismantling its heavy industry and transporting the productive machinery to Bohemia. In this way production was stopped and the enterprises were forced to dose. Many factory buildings were purposely demolished .and many mines flooded.17 The steel, chemica:l, glass and leather industries suffered most cruelly. When the workers, deprived of their jobs demonstrated to prevent the dismantling of the factories and machinery, the Czech soldiers and the gendarmery killed many of them. 18 In the period from 1918 to 1932, 261 enterprises were closed down in Slovakia. From 1933 to 1937 another 425 enterprises were dismantled, bringing the total number to 686. 19 Meanwhile, new industries were founded in Bohemia which logically belonged in Slovakia, since Slovakia provided the raw materials used in them.20 The transportation tariffs in Slovakia were about 40 percent higher than in Bohemia and Moravia. Consequently the Slovak coal was more expensive than coal imported from Bohemia. 21 Further discrimination was manifest in the field of housing construction. 22 �100 SLOVAKIA From 1921 to 1923 Slovakia received only 6 per cent of the State's subsidies for the unemployed, although the unemployment in Slovakia was higher than in Bohemia. 23 From the sum assigned by the Government for the construction and maintenance of schools of higher education and Universities, Slovakia received 10 per cent, while the educational institutions in Slovakia were to be built up almost entirely. 24 The result: Slovakia had only one incomplete University and no Polytechnical Institute, while the Czechs had several, and the German minority had two Universities and two Polytechnical Institutes. Further, the Slovak University was practically a Czech University, because the professors named by the Government were all Czechs. Salaries for the Slovaks were about 20 per cent lower than for the Czechs. While Slovakia abounded in natural resources, especially for the production of energy, the petroleum lamp was the usual source of light. The combined savings of five Slovak citizens were equal to the savings of a single Czech. Czech capital absorbed whatever Slovak industry still remained after its dismantling. Slovak banks were engulfed by Czech banks, and foreign capital was allowed to supplant the remaining Slovak capital. 25 When agrarian reform was inaugurated in Slovakia, only 21 per cent of the land was sold to Slovak peasants, while the rest was distributed free to the Czechs. 26 The discrimination against Slovak peasants in transportation tariffs and taxes resulted in frequent strikes. Instead of offering to improve their desperate condition, the Government gave the order to fire at the strikers.27 Their hopeless situation led them to emigrate in large numbers to the U.S.A., Canada, Argentina, France, Germany and Belgiurn. 28 Slovakia was treated like a colony by the Czechs. They regarded Slovakia only as an object of exploitation, a reservoir of cheap labor and a market for the products of Czech industries. The Czech Government aimed to keep Slovakia as an underdeveloped agricultural country. 29 Practically all the administrative positions in Slovakia were filled by Czechs, whose salaries also were double those of the Slovaks. 30 In Slovakia political oppression worked hand in hand with economic injustice. Aware of Czech chauvinism, the Slovaks began early �SLOVAKIA \'yd»od1 denne ~rem pondelk.a Zdkladafel' a YO!ICA ; Andrei ffllnka 101 Br611slava,. slreda 6. m11e. t9H 1Grecki povsfalci chysfaju illok na Affleny Rozvral na Balk6ne, alebo vffllZSlvo greckel vl6dy - Bulbarsko vyslela voJsko na grkke brank:e ·• •11>1 ••• ~-••U ,.....,n,&aJ-.. ,.,,..,., .. ~i,---iol,f . .•• ~ ~ - : . • ~ ,• :'" .:.:.•\.:=: tf~i~~l~~t;~~~ ~fiff;[f~!~1f[~tt¥.Jlf§ l{if;}~t~¥.K~~ The whitewashed newspapers had to be presented in a new form: A corrected issue was printed after the confiscation to organize politically. The great Slovak patriot Msgr. Andrej Hlinka founded the Catholic and nationalist Slovak People's Party. Its program aimed at autonomy for Slovakia in accordance with the decrees of the Pittsburgh Pact (1918). The Protestant leader, poet, and writer, Rev. Martin Razus, restored the Slovak National Party. In order to hinder Slovak political association, the Czechs established branches of their own parties in Slovakia. By means of political intrigue and corruption they attained a measure of success, but the majority of Slovaks resolutely opposed them. Because of �102 SLOVAKIA the forced intergration of Slovakia with Bohemia, and the denial of Slovakia's right to self-determination, the fiftyfive Slovak deputies were invariably outvoted by the Czech majority in the Prague Parliament. The Czechs employed terrorist tactics also against Slovak political parties, imposing on them a relentless censorship of the press and disruption of their public meetings. By such means they strove to impede direct communication between the Slovak people and their political leaders. The press was a high-powered tool in the hands of the Slovak political parties. It introduced new ideas, it taught the people to recognize and support their own national interest, it pointed out the injustices committed against the Slovak nation by the Government and it suggested ways to remedy the situation. Public meetings served the same purpose, demonstrating by enthusiastic attendance the growing strength of the Slovak nation. Consequently, public meetings were dissolved by government agents whenever the speaker criticized the government, and troops and police were ordered to charge against the protesting Slovaks. Many Slovaks were killed and wounded by Czech bullets. The censor deleted from the press every criticism of Government officials and legislative bodies, in order to cover their misdeeds and keep the people uninformed. The second purpose was to hinder opposition parties from communicating with their readers and voters. In the hope of keeping such ideas in the background and forcing on the Slovaks the false notion of a "Czechoslovak nation and people", the Czech censor confiscated articles dealing with Slovakia's national identity and its right to self determination. The Czech determination to eradicate religion from Slovak public life must remain under cover, hence the censor suppressed all articles and reports of the desecration of churches by the Czechs and the removal of crosses from schools. In the eyes of the Czechs it was a most serious crime for the Slovak press to publicize the struggle of the Slovak people for autonomy, for the right to govern themselves, to run their own schools; in short, to enjoy all the rights of nationhood belonging to them as a nation. The Czechs seem �SLOVAKIA 103 to have naively thought that without the press to remind them of their rights the Slovaks would drop the issue. The Slovaks were not allowed to read reports on CzechoSlovakia in press. The Czech Government feared that this would more profoundly motiviate their political aspirations. Practically all the statements and resolutions of the Slovak political parties were censored in order to stifle opposition and prevent the natural political development of the Slovak nation. Reports of the activity of Slovak organizations in the United States of America were yet another object of the censor's displeasure, because these organizations were strongly in favor of autonomy for Slovakia. The two presidents of Czecho-Slovakia, Masaryk and Bene~, were unassailable in the press. The slightest criticism, whether by Czechs or by Slovaks, was taboo and automatically censored out. A legend was built up around these two men, making them untouchable as if they were the apex of perfection. To perpetuate it no criticism of their many human foibles and moral lapses was tolerated. The real objective of Czech cenzorship was to suppress the facts of Slovak history with their underlying appeal to self-respect and to strike out these glorious moments of the past which could fortify the Slovak political and national fight for the realization of their ideal of freedom and independence. Censorship was thorough. It made impossible any attempt by the Slovaks and other minority groups to charge the Czech government with undemocratic practices. Meanwhile the Czechs were using it to create a "great Czech nation" at the expense of the other ethnic groups living in Czecho-Slovakia and disregarding their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Their ultimate goal was to achieve a dominant position among the small States in Central Europe. In a word, Czech censorship was a tool of Czech imperialism and its faithful servant. It was the ruthless Czech antidote to the self-determination and national development of the Slovak nation and the other minorities in the CzechoSlovak Republic. As such, Czech censorship was diametrically opposed to the principles of democracy, freedom, and human progress. �104 SLOVAKIA "Authority is conservative ... freedom is progressive .. . conflict between the two is inevitable", says Lucy Maynard Salmon, 31 in reference to freedom of the press. Since Czech censorship was directed against human progress, freedom, and democracy, the means it employed could only have been wicked. It stopped at nothing to attain its objectives. Nothing was immoral if it served the Czech goal of domination. Czech post office and railway employees often seized entire editions of the opposition's periodicals and destroyed them. Soldiers were often ordered to raid newspaper and party offices to confiscate mailing lists and manuscripts. This happened in Trnava, Leopoldov, Bratislava, and elsewhere. Sometimes the soldiers reduced the place to shambles. Consequently, readers in the capital city itself were often deprived of their papers. Karol Sidor reported in the March 22, 1919 issue of the Slovak: " Orders have been given (,b y Czech officials) to destroy the SLOVAK. Revorts have been pouring in from all parts of Slovakia that the SLOVAK, ofl!!c!al PU!bl!cation of the Slovak 'People's Party, has been seized by scoundrels and its sale and dlstriburtion prohibited."32 Kon~tantin Culen wrote: "In the early yea,rs the SLOVAK was subjected to as many as three censorsihips: political, military, and economic. Some issues of the newspaper ,bore the inscription, "Thrice censored and corrected edition". Even these multi-censored copies were sometimes thrown out of trains en route by Czech mailmen. Slovak employees who dared to subscribe to the Sl.lOVAK endangered their livelihood. And when even this did not dauRt them, they were personally terrorized by the police and government of!lclals .33 Oftentimes newspapers were deprived of the right of distribution (colportage). Post offices were instructed to refuse money orders sent to the opposition newspapers. Persons who subscribed to these newspapers were harassed and many were dismissed from government jobs. 34 Court action was taken against editors of newspapers which printed articles unwelcome to the censor. The editors 111.sually assumed responsibility for unsigned articles; hence, many of them were in and out of jail. In a censored article entitled "We protest" Msgr. Andrej Hlinka wrote these bitter words: �SLOVAKIA 105 "We a re involved in doz ens, even hundreds of cour-t ca-ses. Hereafter I will assume full responsibility for every news article, whether written by the editor or by Paul or Saul. J will appear before the judge, I will answer the charges. And when I have been deprived of freedom, when the iron door of my prison has dosed behind me, when I am locked up and begin to burn like an expiatory candle on the a ltar of the fa,therl and, then I will charge you, friends, deputies. and leaders of the P eople's Party: •F ollow me! Let each of you shoulder r esoonsibility for one, two, ten articles, an d all of us will become involved with the courts. But no. I am wrong. Let us not get so involved. Not of our own volition will we become entangled with the courts. We will yield only to brutal compulsion. You Czechs will have to drag us into the courts. And when my right hand has become still and my mortal remains have decomposed, I tell you that a great line will form behind me, eager as I for the glory that is sure to follow. 7ou cannot silence us. You can only massacre us. But one tiling I ask: Do not go on deceiving the world that you are our brothers tsons of the same nation). Never will we consent to be Czechos lovaks ... Slova kia is ours an d we will defend our country against you as we defended it against the Magyars. The more you incriminate ns, the more you imprison us, the more forcef ully will we fight against you." As the representative and chairman of the People's Party, Msgr. Andrej Hlinka spoke out boldly on this subject in Parliament. In June 1922, in the debate arising from his interpellation No. 3584 on the raid of the offices of the Slovak and Eudove noviny, he described the attack as initiated and engineered by government agents. Not only did the assailants wreck office equipment and furniture and destroy books, but they were aided in their orgy of destruction by the police, who should have been maintaining order. The chief of police of Bratislava, Dr. Slavicek, a Czech, declared that he had been unable to check the raid because the majority of his men were hostile to the Slovak People's Party. Andrej Hlinka rightly demanded to know when the Slovaks might expect to have the protection of law and order. 35 Karol Sidor described the demolition and plundering of the offices of the Slovak as follows: On :!\fay 25, 1922 a huge rally was orga nized in Bratislava -to protest. Several Slovak legiona ries and Slovak university students were present. At one 'POint a Czech speaker railed against the SLOVAK. dem <tndlnr; that it be placed under the strictest censorship. An aroused Slovak legionary shouted: "Your aim is to cripple the Catholic press; you would do better to suppress your own anti-Catholic and antiSlovak press." The legionary paid for these words with a cruel beating ... A Slovak university student r eceived th e same treatment, bis �106 SLOVAKIA clothes torn and covered with blood, after he had called out to an abusive Czech speaker, "Please, talk to us in Slovak!" ... ·The speeches continued until 12: 30 p.m. At 1: 00 p.m. the first group of demonstrators appeared in front of the editorial offices or the SLOV.AK . . . Some 1,500 Czech legionaries escorted the demonstrators. Awaiting them was a group of 150-200 men and women who had assembled from the villages to defend SLOVAK property. A fight ensued, but the Czech legionaries with the aid of some 10(} policemen, invaded the editorial offices and broke tables and chairs, flung books, bound journals, manuscripts etc. out the windows. (Czech) legionaries piled •the items into ca,r s and drove away. Other (Czech) legionaries r aided the ,SLOV.AK's administrative offices and worked havoc there also. They carried off valuaibles, including shares and mailing lists. The yard outside ,w as littered with papers. These raids were permitted, even abetted by the police, who together with the legionaries received praise and commendation in the Czech press for their acts of des,truction.36 During the night of March 31, 1920, a certain Czech army major Ludevit Palounek by name, placed a bomb in the Lev printery in Ruzomberok in the hope of destroying the voice of the People's Party and its organ of free discussion. 37 Even the mails were misused: derisive pamphlets were inserted in the bundles of the Slovak, 38 as they were being shipped to their destination. With the growing tension in the relations between the· Slovaks and Czechs, the censorship became more and more despotic. After 1932, there were almost daily confiscations of the Slovak press. The censor received his instructions from the Ministry of the Interior. If the censor found in the piece examined something he considered inadmissible, he deleted it; the· Attorney General then ordered the police to confiscate the publication. The police seized the entire edition and burned it. The publishing house or the editors could make an appeal in court, or a board of representatives in Parliament could protest to the Minister of the Interior, or of Justice, or both. If the censorship was found unfair, the editors or publishers could demand reimbursement for damages. But in most cases they lost the appeal. After confiscation, a newspaper, book, or journal was printed in a new edition with the censored areas left blank. It bore the inscription "Following confiscation, a new and corrected edition" in the upper left corner of the front page of the periodical, or on the cover of the book. �SLOVAKIA 107 After Slovakia achieved independence on March 14, 1939, government officials found in the archives of the Attorney General confidential orders issued by the Czech Government with instructions to the censor as to how many times a week certain newspapers were to be confiscated. After a stated number of confiscations, the periodical could be suspended for three or six months, and after repeated confiscations, it could be suspended indefinitely at the discretion of the censor. This was a most powerful weapon in the hands of the Government, and it was effectively used during the visit of President Edward Benes in Slovakia in 1933. Under the pretex of repeated confiscations, the newspapers Slovak, Slovenska pravda, Narodne noviny and the political review Nastup were suspended, so as to prevent any criticism of Benes's speeches in the press. It was on this visit that he angered the Slovaks by declaring that they must become Czechs. The actions of the censor were despotic because he knew that the Government would not fail to support him. The Slovak and Slovenska pravda were confiscated almost every day. The humoristic weeklies Osa and Kocur were also confiscated, along with the cultural monthlies Pero , Slovenske pohl'ady and Elan. Almanacs, books, poetry collections, and placards were not exempt. Sometimes periodicals were confiscated because of articles reprinted from other non-censored newspapers. For example a periodical was confiscated because it contained a poem originally published in the Slovak-American almanac Jednota. An editorial containing quotations from a book by President Thomas G. Masaryk was also confiscated. An article by the great Slovak writer, Svatozar Hurban Vajansky, published in Hungary at the ~md of the 19th century, was censored when reprinted in Slovak after World War I. Newspapers were confiscated for using the hyphen in the name of the Republic "CzechoSlovakia" although early peace treaties carry the name in this form. 39 On several specific occasions the Czechs declared that it would be dangerous for the future of the Republic if freedom of speech and press were permitted in Slovakia.40 With confiscation being an almost daily occurence, periodicals suffered very heavy losses. It is pertinent to point out that while the Czech party press subsisted on �SLOVAKIA 108 government funds, the Slovak press depended entirely upon the voluntary support of party members, together with subscription fees. The Slovak people understood perfectly the great importance of the press and supported it generously. Only in this way was the Slovak opposition press able to survive such continuous economic strangulation by the Czech Government. Characteristic of the situation are words like the following: " . .. we must perforce decline to publish original articles on topics banned by the government and must limit ourselves to those which have already passed the censor." 41 This is not all. When Slovak representatives protested in Parliament against the policies of the Government and its agencies, their speeches in Parliament were censored and denied publication in the parliamentary record Tisky Poslaneck e Snemovny Nar odniho Shromazdeni Ceskoslovensk e. The bimonthly Nastup wrote: Republiky " Instead of aick now ledging the human righ t to fr eedom of di scussion, th e Czechs pr oh ibited a utonomist meetings a nd r estricted their publications. Now they have resorted to oth er meas ures. "Th e P r esi de nt of th e Senate su ppressed a portion of Dr . Joseph Buday's speech i n ·P a rlia men t. The Presidents of both C hambers of Parl iamen t confiscated a major portion of the statement pr esented by th e representatives of the Slovak People's Party. "An exten ded (95 pages) and repo r tedly objective in ter pellation of th e r epresentatives of the Slovak People's Par ty was als o censored by the Presidents of Par liament and denied publicati on. " T his action was t a ken at a time w h en press censorshi p was so stringent that no politician or political party could f r eely and publicly express a dissenting opinion as far as the Government was concerned. "Ju Slovakia the natio na li st press is pres ently s ubjected to continuous sharp criticism a nd s uppression .. . In view of this we mus t behold with a s tonishment the a d ditional measures taken in Parlia m ent ·to silence the autonomists who are already so effectively silenced by press cens orship . Meanwhile •Slova k centr alists (i.e., Czech p a r tisans ) without hindrance flood Slovakia wit h their uncensored public_ations ."42 The newspaper Nar odne Noviny reported in its November 27, 1936 issue: Statistics show that the number of confiscated publications in Czecho-Slovakia for the given years was as follows~ 1929 1930 1934 Newspapers and periodicals ______ 3,370 Books ___ ______________ __________ 918 2,533 2,138 846 Confiscations 718 �109 SLOVAKIA Foreign books and periodicals _____ 255 Total ______ ________ 4,543 183 3,434 329 3,313 Of these confiscations, 60 to 70% involved Slovak books and periodicals. Censorship of Books Writing under the pseudonym Andrej Zarnov, a student at the University of Bratislava, named Frantisek Subik, made his literary debut in 1925 with the publication of a book of poems which already then showed the promise that was to make him a leading Slovak poet. The title of the book was Straz pri Morave (Sentry at the Morava River) . Finding it too nationalistic, the censor ordered the entire edition confiscated and had it burned at police headquarters. The representatives of the Slovak People's Party challenged this action in the Parliament. They asked the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Justice: 1) Whether they were aware of the confiscation of these poems; 2) Whether they approved; 3) Whether both Ministers were disposed to secure the validity of the Constitution which guarantees freedom of the press; 4) Whether they were disposed to take appropriate disciplinary action against the censor in Bratislava; 5) Whether they were ready to guarantee freedom of the press in Slovakia equal to that in Bohemia. Needless to say, the Czech majority refused to discuss this urgent interpellation in Parliament. 43 On the occasion of Msgr. Andrej Hlinka's seventieth birthday, Karol Sidor, representative in Parliament and editor of the Slovak, published his biography, covering the years 1864-1926. A great admirer and loyal follower of Hlinka, Sidor presented his hero as the key figure in the Slovak political and national struggle for freedom and independence. This 554-page biography suffered 31 deletions totaling some 295 lines, equal to seven pages of the book. It was issued with the customary caption on the cover: "Po konfiskacii nove opravene vydanie" (After confiscation a new and �110 SLOVAKIA corrected edition) and with blankspaces to show where the censor had disapproved. The following lines were deleted on pages 368-369, from Sidor's description of the Czech attack on the meeting of the Slovak People's Party in Zilina, August 17, 1919: With draiwn bayonets, soldiers charged upon the people In the square and scenes of horror ensued. Andrej Hlinka saw hi,s people struck with rifl e 1butts and carried a,way as prisoners to the barracks. Women from Kysuce exposed thei,r breasts to the bayonets and shouted: "Strike here, you curs, and touch not Hlinka ! " On October 10, 1920 Czech military units once more dispersed a meeting of the Slovak People's Party in Namestovo and fired into the crowd, killing two Slovak peasants and seriously wounding ten. On page 442 the description of this savage act was deleted: Bedfich Danek, a Czech lieutenant, scornfully asked a young man weeping over the body of his slain father: "Why do you weep? It ,w as Hlinka who killed him!" Namestovo came to ,be regarded a-s a second Cernova. The Czech press and the Government Press Agency CTK wished to place the blame for this bloodshed on Hlinka. They charged Hlinka with inciting the Slovaks against the Czechs. Hlinka answered in the October 16, 1920 issue of the Slovak. This portion of the article was deleted from the biography: Yes, I did incite the people. I incited them and will continue to Incite •them . My very presence incites them. So much so that it stirs your murky conscience, stained with a ·b rother's blood. I have incited and will continue to incite them to oppose t:he •b ase t,raud you perpetrated against •the !Slovak n ation. W,e •w ill rise up to oppose every injustice. Why should we not be aroused against you, who seized me a year ago in the dead of night and held me captive for six months at Mirov, iBrodek, Podolie, to afford you an opportunity to demoralize and dis• rupt .Slovakia? Should I have danced to your music when you placed bombs in our "Lev" printery, •which had •been established with owhard•earned savin~s? I would be a cowardly traitor If I did not raise my voice, if J did not search for a remedy and seek help. We have incited and lest we be despised by Slovakia, we will not stop inciting our people until w,e win autonomy from you. On page 490 the censor deleted a reference to discrimination against the Slovaks in assigning government jobs: The •Slovaks were unable to procure even the cheapest loaf or government bread in Slovakia; (referring to jobs) their applications were answered with a curt: "Impossible to grant", while t he Czech people, often without qualification, were given the best paid jobs in Slovakia. �SLOVAKIA 111 That is how the newspapers SLOVAK, NARODNIE NOVINY, and the magazine, NASTUP, looked after censorship A quotation on p. 506 from an "Appeal of the Representatives of the Slovak People's Party to the Minister of the Interior" in Prague, September 4, 1923, was confiscated: The authorities spread terror every-where. Civil servants planned the disruption of meetings by force and public safety agencies did nothing to -defend the victims; on the contrary, they cooperated with the agressors. Holle, Nove Zamky, and ,t he riot at Brezova make it clear as day that groups of assailants were organized to incHe rioting and to damage private property. Very heavily censored was the chapter in which Sidor described Hlinka's arrest at midnight. The occasion was his return from the Peace Conference in Paris, where he had delivered to the delegates a Memorandum in which he demanded in the name of the Slovak nation that the Slovaks be given national and civic freedom and their autonomy guaranteed. Hlinka's words to one of his chaplains were censored on page 385. "Proclaim abroad to the wide world the kind of freedom we enjoy in Slovakia. They have come to carry me off like a criminal In the middle of the night when everybody is asleep ... The press reported that I trembled. On the contrary, I felt like a lion. I cared not whether they killed me or jailed me. My blood �112 SLOVAKIA boiled. Indescribable feelings struggled within me. I could not tell which was stronger: my love for my oppress-ed nation or my contempt of the intruders ... " Following Hlinka's deportation, an account of the rebellions of the students and citizens of his parish town, Ruzomberok, was variously deleted as on pages 387, 392 and 393. The description of the terrorism of the Czech soldiers and employees in Slovakia was censored on page 444: November 6, 1920 he (Rev. Frantisek Klein) reported in the SLOVAK that he was traveling by train •with soldiers who insulted him because he was reading the .SIJOV AK. One of ,them asked in Czech: "Why doesn't someone kill tH!inka ?" On pages 458-459 the account of the murderous attack on Hlinka's life in Krupina, June 12, 1921, by a Czech, and the insult to which he was subjected in Sahy two days later by Czech railroadmen was expunged: The following day, June 13, Hlinka set out with companions to Sahy to report the Krupina incident to the "Zupan", [)r. Victor Ravasz. As he was passing through the square a railroadman, named S<tu~hlik and the school inspector, Bartolom/lj Krpelec, both Czechs, confronted him with curses, calling him "bandit" and "agitator". Later at the "zupan's" office, Stuchlik, with 60 co-workers, delivered the following ultimatum: The "zupan" must expel Andrej iHlinka at once from ,the 1Hont "zupa" or suffer the consequences. The railroadmen (all Czechs) also declared that they would not permit Hlinka's train to leave the Sahy station. ·T he "zupan", after appealing to the Ministry in BraJtislava for instructions, assured Blinka that the culprits in both Krupina and Sahy •w ould ,be penalized as an example to others. In the a,fternoon IHlinka ,boarded •the train at Sahy. The station wa,s filled with people, waiting to see the outcome of the contest. The rallroadmen held to their purpose. After a long while the zupan arrive6l at ,t he station. The railroadmen demanded that -he order Hlinka out of the train. Lenghty nego tiations followed. Meanwhile Hlinka waited patiently within ... Finally the "zupan" announced that the ,train was about to depart. At that moment a line of railroadmen formed below the windO'W of Hlinka's compartment. They gave vent to their haitred -b y spitting at Hlinka, cursing and maligning ·h im until the train moved out oE sight. Another incident which occurred in the railroad station Trencianske Teplice, July 5, 1921, was deleted from page 459: A Czech in the station, recogmzmg Hlinka, called out, "Hang Hlinka ! " Andrej IHlinka stepped forward and asked him to identify himself. The Czech continued to shout, but did not give his name ... And a few lines further on the same page: �SLOVAKIA 113 Another •Czech took up the cry, shouting, "Hang Hllnka". The p eople attacked h im, although ,Hlinka- made an effort to calm them. Mea nwhil e the train arrived and he boarded it ,w ith his secretary Ramaj . :Bishop Kmeeko a nd tMsgr. Tiso remained in the station, bu t they were unable to quiet the p eople. Several Czechs were severely beaten . Other subjects censored in Sidor's book were: criticism ·o f President Masaryk's anti-Catholic attitude (page 286) ; daims of job discrimination that while hundreds of thousands of Czechs were given the best paid jobs in Slovakia, often without qualification, more than 300,000 Slovaks were forced to emigrate because of the discrimination against them (pages 345 and 490). Also censored were references to organized Czech terror against the Slovaks, to agression against Hlinka and his followers, to denial of government protection in the exercise of freedom of speech and association, and any account of the formation of defense groups of the Slovak People's Party for the protection of its meetings .against Czech terrorists. Among the deletions were several lines about the general anti-Catholic attitude of the Czech people (page 471). Another censored book was Vo vazeni, written by a young editor of the Slovak, Alexander Mach. 46 The author had been jailed on a charge of conspiracy with Professor Dr. Vojtech Tuka against the integrity of Czecho-Slovakia. After serving part of the sentence, he was exonerated from complicity in the "plot" and released. A year later he published his book about his term in prison. In a manifestly unjust trial Dr. Vojtech Tuka was sentenced to 15 years and liberated after 10 years, when Slovakia won her autonomy on October ·6, 1938. From Mach's book the censor confiscated some 520 lines, totaling 13 pages, or 7 per cent of the 198 pages of the book. Unfortunately, I do not know of any uncensored copy of the book and can therefore quote nothing from it. To illustrate the mental climate in which the author wrote his book, I will cite some lines of his epilogue "Po roku" (After one year): I was in prisoa on charges which cannot at present be freely and sincerely dis cussed. In preparing this accoun t I was hemmed in by restrairut lest I again find myself rb ehind prison bars . I was obliged to limit my remarks lest the censor fo11bid their publication. Difficulties in the selection of material abounded. It was not easy for me to decide what to eliminate, what to omit ... Thus as I prepared �114 SLOVAKIA my narrative rhe penal code was before me. Yet I have remained completely frank; I did not change what I had •w ritten as a prisoner. I preferred only .to eliminate the sensitive issues ... Another example of the censorship of books is furnished by the interpellation presented in the Prague Parliament by the representative Msgr. Dr. Jozef Tiso, concerning the confiscation of the Kalendar Hlinkovej Slovenskej Eudovej Strany na rok 1934 (Almanac of the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party for the year 1934). Two articles which appeared over the name of Msgr. Andrej Hlinka, chairman of the Party, were confiscated. In these articles Hlinka warned the Czechs to stop persecuting the Slovaks for claiming autonomy. Even Czech authors, whom Hlinka quoted to illustrate his articles, were censored. The title of the first article was "Za ~t'astne Slovensko" (For a prosperous Slovakia). In the second article "Uprimne slovo o Nitre" (A frank comment on Nitra) Hlinka analyzed the spontaneous explosion of Slovak discontent at the festivities commemorating the 1,l00th anniversary of the first Christian church on Slovak territory, created in Nitra by Prince Pribina in about 831 A. D. It was, Hlinka declared, a display of resistance to the Prague Government, intent on exploiting these eminently Slovak festivities for their own purposes. Andrej Hlinka, who had been refused the right to speak on the program, was carried up to the stage and backed by his 200,000 followers, he read a statement in which he solemnly affirmed Slovakia's adherence to its eleven hundred years-old Christian traditions and proclaimed Slovakia's right to territorial sovereignity. This demonstration of outraged Slovak national pride was observed by foreign diplomats and news reporters, who were thus witnesses of the true will of the Slovak nation to be free and the chauvinistic aim of the Czechs as expressed in the Ottuv Obchodni Slovnik (Otta's Commercial Dictionary, 1921) volume 2, page 1217: "Slovakia shall be a colony to us. It is an error to suppose that a colony cannot have common frontiers with the mother country. An example of this is Russia and Siberia." Several lines from a poem by Ignac Grebac Orlov were· also censored. Partially censored was the article entitled "Narodna jednota" (National unity), by Dr. Jozef Tiso on the· necessity of national unity for the Slovaks. . �SLOVAKIA 115 From the article "K sedemdesiatke Andreja Hlinku" (On the 70th anniversary of Andrej Hlinka) by Karol Sidor this paragraph was deleted: What occured in 11919, ,w hen 'Hlinka and other Slovak leaders were jailed, the ISiLOVAK suspended, and terrorism unleashed everywhere, was now repeated on a larger scale. In .September 193131 the 1SIJOVAK was suspended -f or 3 months ... lik,ewise the .S'.liOVAiK TYZDENNIK (1Slovak Weekly) and the T!AT·•RA:N,SKY SLOVAK (Tatra Slovak). We were left without a voice ... We were not permitted to w,rite, the people had nothing to read. And the prisons were daily being filled with objectors. Hundreds of Slovaks were suJbjected ,to investigations about their participation In the Nitra festivities ... Dr. Karol Mederly's article "Obec a politika" (Community and politics) was also confiscated, for its insistence on the right of the Slovaks to vote according to their conscience. Pictures of Hlinka carried on the shoulders of University students to the Nitra stage, the procession of 200,000 Slovaks in Nitra, and even articles of comic and satiric content were censored. The interpellation contains a complete rescript of the articles confiscated in the almanac. 47 In conclusion the writer would like to mention here that printed works of other minorities and political parties were also confiscated by the censor. CENSORSHIP OF PERIODICALS The periodicals in Slovakia have a long tradition. The oldest periodical published on Slovak territory was Schemnitzer N ewszeitung edited in Banska Stiavnica in German, in 1540-1541. Latin periodicals also had their day. The first periodical in the Slovak language was Presspurske noviny (Bratislava News - Pressburg is German for :Bratislava,), published from 1783 to 17 87. Following World War I, newspapers, reviews, and magazines promised to become more plentiful. This was especially welcome to Slovakia, where publications in the Slovak language had been prohibited by Hungarian oppressors. Under the Czecho-Slovak republic the Slovaks were prepared to -enjoy the democratic freedom promised by the Pittsburgh .P act and especially freedom of the press, speech, and association. Alas, they soon came to realize that the promises, �116 SLOVAKIA as far as Slovakia was concerned, were empty words and nothing more. In Czecho-Slovakia, the newspapers were usually owned and operated by political parties. There were very few socalled "independent newspapers". Yet even though labeled "independent", some of these were nevertheless the tool of a financial group, a political party or a governmental coalition. The newspapers in Slovakia were of two kinds: government and so-called opposition. Under opposition came the publication of the Slovak People's Party, the Slovak National Party and the Communist Party. The Hungarian and German minorities had a similar classification of newspapers. All these newspapers were characterized by their adherence to an ideology and the effort to propagate it. They were interested in social and political problems, and they never evaded any controversial issue. Their influence on the formation of public opinion was considerable. The rapid political evolution and maturation of the Slovak nation was due chiefly to the efforts of the political press of the Slovak People's Party and the Slovak National Party. The obstacles with the Czech administration plac~d in their path by means of censorship, economic and political pressure, by corruption and terrorism, by political trials and murder in its effort to suppress the Slovak drive for in-dependence, only helped to accelerate and strenghten this process. In their 20 years of forced cohabitation with the· Czechs, the Slovaks achieved a rapid political evolution, thanks to their press and they were thus prepared in the international crisis of 1938-1939 to proceed prudently toward the realization of their national aspirations. The press of the opposition encountered paralyzing difficulties in Czecho-Slovakia. In a debate before Parliament Msgr. Andrej Hlinka, chairman of the Slovak People's Party declared that under Hungary and Austria, unjustly as they had been treated, the Slovaks and the Czechs had enjoyed greater freedom of the press than in the new "brotherly" State. of Czecho-Slovakia. 48 A resolution issued by the 14th Convention of the Social Democratic Party in 1922 protested against the practice of confiscation of the press. 49 �SLOVAKIA 117 Jozef Vr ab e c, representative of the Slovak People's Party, protested against the confiscation of the March 13, 1921 issue of Slovensky krest'ansky socialista, for its article "Za more, za ocean" (Beyond the Sea, beyond the Ocean). 50 In this article the Czech Government was held responsible for the emigration of thousands of Slovaks through its policy of job discrimination and its dismantling of Slovak industries. Slovenske Eudove Noviny was confiscated because it criticized the discriminatory policy against Slovak construction workers by a Czech construction enterprise, which led to a bloody fight between the Slovak jobless workers and the imported Czech workers. The police arrested the Slovaks. 51 In a parliamentary debate on Novembre 24, 1920, representative A. Bobok complained about the "terrible restriction of the press and opinion" in Czecho-Slovakia and claimed the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. 52 In a debate in the House of Representatives, June 21, 1922 Msgr. Andrej Hlinka declared: Each issue of the SLOVAK ts censored . . . ,I will show you a startling example of freedom of the press. Here it is. (He shows censored issues of the ,S1L OVAK, rwith their blank columns). Everything is censored from t he first word to the last. That is suppo,sed to be freedom of the -press, freedom to express an opinion . .. iSee, here is the S1LOVEN,S,KA. JEIDNOTA ... here, SIJOVENSKA. POLITl!KA. Here you see the freedom of the press for which I spent 4 years in jail. Here is 1SlJOViIDNSKA. PRAVDA. Notice what has been deleted. (He reads): "What Czech statistics s-h ow about •S lovak schools." And mention of "Teaching the Slovak language" was eradicated. Such freedom of the press do we enjoy in Slovakia! This has been going on now since Mairch 25 - we are systematically criticized and censored. And they tell the world we have freedom of the -press in this Republic! In Interpellation No. XXI/4226, April 26, 1923, representative Rev. Florian Tomanek interpellated the Minister of Justice on the confiscation of the Slovak, April 25, 1923, because it reprinted the article "Zapredana Orava a Spi§" (Orava and Spis Betrayed) from the newspaper Denny hlas (Daily voice) published in Cleveland, Ohio, April 3, 1923. In this article the Czech diplomat Dr. Karel Pergler, who had also signed the Pittsburgh Pact (1918), accused the CzechoSlovak Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Edvard Bene~ of �118 SLOVAKIA having sold to the Poles the Slovak territories of Orava and Spg for the coal districts of Karvina in Silesia, inhabited by Poles. 54 The Slovak, December 11, 1923, was censored for declaring inaccurate and false the statement of President Dr. T. G. Masaryk that the Slovaks and the Czechs were one and the same nation and that Slovak is a dialect of the Czech language. Representative Rev. Pavol Machacek wrote as follows in the article "Kati sa raduju" (The executioners rejoice) in the August 10, 1922 issue of Slovenske l'udove noviny: Heavy -f ines were imposed on the peasants. Financial burdens forced artisans to close their shops . . . !Government officia1's confiscated articles reprinted from Czech newspapers ... They issued the directive to destroy us at any cost. And they succeeded. ·Since the first or Januwry our daily S'LOVAK has been confiscated 45 times and the SLOVENiSIKE Im.DOVE NOWNY almost as many. Every confiscation meant a loss of 3,5004,000 crowns in damages. In thi-s brief period we were in arrears 1'70,000 crowns. The financial burden became .so greait that the S,J,;{}VAK was forced to cease publication. In an interpellation to the Minister of Interior, representative Rev. Florian Tomanek declared: The coalition government is not content to pass a cruel law, which empowers the Attorney General to confiscate newspapers before distribution. It did not hesitate to permit the violation of the secrecy of registered mail in 'Slovakia without a court order. The Plenipotentiary ordered the confiscation or an Open Letter addre!ised to the !President of the Republic, sent •b y :registered mail from Americans of .Slovak extraction. ,I ndeed, the Minister, •D r. Kallay, has empowered not only the post offices, but also the gendarmery and the police to confiscate letters without notifying the addressee.55 The Slovak in its August 19, 1933 issue complained that it had been confiscated six times in the previous week. The only reason it was not seven times is that the paper is issued only six times a week. The same paper in its August 26, 1933 issue notes: Yesterday's SLOVAK carried news of the confiscation of the TATRA!NSKY SLIOV.AK. But the 1SLIOVAK, SDOVAK TYZDENNIK, SLOVENS<KA BRAVDA, and the fortnightly tSLOVAK NA STRAZI of Zilina suffered a similar fate. In the later paper, seven columns were en<tirely deleted, so that it was issued •with two or its four pages blank. In the article56 "Nedorozumenie medzi autonomistickou tlacou a bratislavskym cenzorom" (A misunderstanding between �SLOVAKIA 119 the autonomist press and the censor of Bratislava), the author -ks- (who is probably Karol Sidor, editor-in-chief of the Slovak) wrote that in the previous week an issue of the Slovak had been confiscated because it reprinted in the Slovak language an article about Slovakia written by a Frenchman, Ebray, and published in the Pester Lloyd, a newspaper permitted in Czecho-Slovakia and available in the coffeehouses of Bratislava to anybody who could read German. In a parliamentary debate on the proposal of a new press law, June 9, 1933, Representative Jozef Sivak declared: I would venture to assert ,t hat the development and evolution of d emocracy is best achieved by a ,f ree press ... ,I t is true that article 113 of our Constitution guarantees freedom of the press ... but it is nothing ,but a pa per guairantee, as are all th e guarantees in this Republic. You know that by the Pit tsburgh !Pact the Slovaks were guarantP.ed autonomy, but again this is only a paper guarantee . . . The feverish zeal of the censor knows no limits. The Attorney General confiscates everything. It is not possible in this day and age to w.rite the truth about Czech discriminrution of the !Slovak laborer, to say anything about the rights of •Slovak peasants, !Slovak workers, ,S lovak artisans and shop-keepers. No one is, allowed to criticize the ,government or individual officers. ·All is censored... even the statements of the Board of Representatives of the Slovak \People's iParty ... The following appeared in the article "Neustale habanie Slovaka" (The constant harassment of the Slovak) in its August 22, 1933 issue: Readers of the SLOVAK received the !Sunday edition with dismay. The front page, with six deletions, showed how heavily the hand of the censor had struck. On no account are we p ermitted to criticize ithe government. An article in which Msgr. Andrej Hlinka ,s et forth the significance of the Nitra centennary celebration on August 13, 1933 and praised the Slovaks tfor itheir participation in it, was censored. Confiscated also was an article by 1S enator Andrej Janecek, in which he assumed responsibility for (his part in) the Nltra episode. A report on the investigation of several partici pants in the Nltra festivities was confiscaited, although the government had encouraged attendance. Other confiscations were: Part of the report on the fiasco perpetrated by government parties in Nitra who, although a minority in the district, had convened to protest · the €Vents of August 13, 1933 ; · Slav repor ts on •t he Nitra centenary; ·Reflections on the Pittsburgh Pact. It is not unusual for us to b e subjected to confiscations - evea dally. But what the censor did with our !Sunday edition outrageously surpass·e s anything ever attempted before. Our party will adopt -s uitable measures to defend our consti- �120 SLOVAKIA t uti onal r igh t to free dom of th e press, denied us by th e " lords" i n the governm ent. W e will e m ploy a ll possible means to r each on r read er s. On its anniversary the Slovak was confiscated for the editorial "Patnast' rokov Slovaka" (Fifteen years of the Slovak), which conveyed the impressions of its readers on the reappearance of the Slovak after three months' suspension by the Attorney General. The same issue was confiscated for its information about the activities of Americans of Slovak descent in the United States, a reprint from Osadne hlasy (Parish News ), a Slovak weekly in Chicago, Illinois, and one part of an article by a Czech signatary of the Pittsburgh Pact. 57 Interpellation No. 1193/ IX, November 10, 1937, proffered by representatives Karol Sidor and Dr. Martin Sokol was motiviated by the confiscation of two articles in Slov enska pravda and Slovak, November 10 and 11, 1937. The title of the two articles was "Zakony demonstracii". They included a report on the spirited demonstrations of the studets of Bratislava University, demanding the slovakization of the University, of government bureaus, and of the army and police in Slovakia, under the slogan "Slovakia for the Slovaks". It carried an account of the brutal intervention of Czech police, who severely beat the students with sabres and clubs. An illustration showing a hand brandishing a club (used by the police ) was also confiscated. The headline "Demand plebiscite for Slovak autonomy!" was deleted from the February 10, 1938 issue of the Slovak, but the same line was left by the censor in the text of the article. Such inconsistencies in the practice of censorship were frequent. For this reason the Czech journalist Dr. Benes (not the President Dr. Benes) could declare in the organ of the Union of Czecho-Slovakia Journalists: The pr ess is practically ou tlawed in Czechoslovakia . .. a nd fr ee• dom of the press •has become degenerated by confisca tions .58 Such a statement, naturally, could not have been published in Slovakia. In an evening discussion at the Czechoslovak National Council, the Czech editor Jan· Hrabanek declared that the articles of the Constitution concerning freedom of the press were not respected, that a permit for printing newspapers �SLOVAKIA 121 was required, that the publication of periodicals was too often suspended and the right of distribution forfeited on the basis of a mere suspicion, without any conviction of a penal act. 59 After 1932, when young Slovak members of government parties were more attuned to the ideas and attitudes of the majority of the Slovak nation, the governmental press in the Slovak language also began to appear with blank pages. In the May 5, 1939 issue (page 90) of Zem (Soil) a political magazine of young Agrarians, the editor wrote an article entitled "Komu osozi cenzura?" (Who Benefits from censorship?) Among other things he said: Newspapers with blank pages ... that is a product of the censor. The author sees thi.s miscarrriage of his intellectual effort and loses heart. Readers are cheated by receiving blank newspapers . . . Jn recent times the censor is busier than ever before. Formerly only newspapers which habHually pabl!shed a rticles sharply criticizing the government were censored. These were chiefly the papers of the opposition. •B ut that is a. thing of the past. Nowadays even the newsp a pers of government pal'ties are censored and they appear now with the familiar blank spaces. What was most offensive to the Slovaks was the confiscation of the literary magazine Slovenske Pohl'ady, No. l0A, 1932, published with the date of October 28, the "Day of Freedom", the official national festivity of the CzechoSlovak Republic. Slovenske Pohl'ady, founded in 1846, had never been confiscated before. It had always stood as a symbol of the independent cultural life of the Slovaks and was dear to the heart of every Slovak. Why was this revered non-political periodical censored? Its editor Dr. Stefan Krcmery, submitted to criticism the Czechs in Slovakia, because they did not read or buy Slovak books and despised Slovak literature. In the other censored article he reviewed very favorably a new volume of poems Hlas krvi (The Voice of blood), published by Andrej Zarnov, author of the confiscated volume of poems Straz pri Morave, mentioned on page 53. The cultural magazines Pero (Pen), Pramen (Source), Elan (Impetus) and DAV (The Masses) and the humoristic periodical Osa (Wasp) and Kocur (Cat) were also confiscated several times. �122 SLOVAKIA CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS OF OTHER NATIONALITIES LIVING IN CZECHO-SLOV AKIA The Slovak press was not alone in the battle for freedom of the press. Other ethnical groups living in CzechoSlovakia were also hindered in the free expression of ideas. It is true that the Czech Government was much more lenient toward the Germans and Magyars, who were favorably situated and could appeal to the German Reich and Hungary for moral and financial support. But the case of the Ukrainians living in the territory of "Subcarpathian Russia" was similar to that of the Slovaks. By the Peace Treaties of Saint Germain-en-Laye, France, on October 10, 1919, this territory which had belonged to Hungary before World War I was incorporated in Czecho-Slovakia as an autonomous entity. Its position in the Czecho-Slovak Republic was to be that of a federated state. But, as in the Slovak case, the Czechs failed to honor their obligations and the Ruthenians were treated as another Czech colony. Its political and economic exploitation was in open contradiction to the terms of the St. Germain-en-Laye treaties. The po:.. sition of the Subcarpathian Ruthenians was as hopeless as that of the Slovaks. But this poor and exploited nation was also aware of its national origin and of the Czech aims of domination. Its representatives in the Prague Parliament and its periodicals followed generally the same line as that of the Slovaks. They demanded their rights, guaranteed by the peace treaties, especially the right of national self-determination. · The Czech methods of domination in Subcarpathian Russia were similar to those employed in Slovakia: military and political terrorism, economic exploitation and impoverishment, political corruption and censorship, combined with the curtailing of freedom of speech and association. In Parliament the Ruthenians reacted in the same way as the Slovaks. The January. 31, 1926 issue of the newspaper Karpatska pravda (Carpathian truth), published in Uzgorod, was censor·ed in its editorial "Continuous Oppression" for this statement: The cup is full to overflowing. ·T he poor people of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, ruthl essly oppressed ·by the Czech bourgeoisie, suffers cold, �SLOVAKIA 123 unemploy men t, hu nger, pove r ty a nd e ndles·s mis,ery. Eig-h teen years we h ave lived in "fr ater nal" union with Czecho,S lovak ia, but nothing h as ·been do ne to improve social cond Hions .. .so On April 8, 1937 Representative Dr. S. A. Fencik interpellated the Minister of the Interior on the confiscation of issue No. 216 of Na§ put (Our way ), published in Uzgorod. The periodical was confiscated on the pretex that the censored article might disturb the public peace. It was entitled "Voice of a Slovak" and included a quotation from the daily Slovak, March 19, 1937, stating that the establishment by Prague of a "Gubernatorial Council" for Subcarpathian Russia is but a surrogate for the autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution. The article was not confiscated in the Slovak, but the Na§ put was confiscated for informing its readers .a bout the Slovak' s views. The No. 212 issue of Na§ put, 1937 was confiscated on the same pretex, i. e. that it might disturb the public peace. The article "Autonomy" was confiscated for the lines: " ... this a utonomy is guaranteed only on paper . To this day it h as not been r ealized. In eighteen yea.rs no effort has been made to b egi n to put it into effect."61 The press of the Czech opposition also shared the fate of that of the other nationalities. Only a very insignificant percentage of Czechs however, voted for their opposition parties. The others were generally satisfied with their privileged position and had no desire to change it. On September 16, 1930 the representatives of the Czech National Democracy, Dr. Karel Pergler and Ji.ti Sti'ibrny interpellated the Minister of Justice on the confisc ation of the periodical Franta, vol. III. No. 21 , March 6, 1930: Despite the guarantees of freedom or speech and press contained i n the Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak •Republic, o ur legislative bodies have not checked or even improved the preventive censorship inconsistent with democracy, especially in peacetime. Under a r egi me li k e ours one wou ld not expect a censor.s hip and confiscation policy which ·r enders impossible a decent and desirable criticism of ideas and political principles h el d by government functionaries. But the exact opposite is the ca,se. In this Repu1blic it is not permitted to discuss people in the government and their views on any topic. As a proo1' of my assertion, I have here several periodicals that suf·fered con fiscation. The classic example of the confiscation policy adopted by the government in contradiction to the most basic concepts of freedom of the press and discussion, was the confiscation of the March 6, 19·30 issue of F'RQ)l''DA. The article "Two Concepts" by F. Schwartz was the offender ... �124 SLOVAKIA This article contained criticism of Dr. Tomas G. Masaryk, President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. Another article "Co je vice nez 7. marec" (What is more significant than March 7) written by Josef Vodracka and published in the same issue, was also confiscated, because of its criticism of Masaryk's philosophy of Czech statehood. (March 7 was Masaryk's birthday and a national holiday.) In the article "Napoleonsky rys" (Napoleonic feature), published in the same issue, a description of Masaryk's charact€r was also censored. Another article "Muz Bible" (Biblical man) by Kamil Masin was censored for its designation of Masaryk as a "messianist" (man of Providence). In the same issue also F. Petrik's article "Rozsevac a znec" (Sower and harvester) on the ideological inconsequence of Masaryk's philosophy and F. Schwarz's article "Souhlasime s Masarykem" (We agree with Masaryk) along with several other articles were censored. The interpellation continued: The press wa·s at one time the principal means of maintaining freedom and national consciousness. In the Czecho,Slovak Republic, the press has become the .frightening destroyer of every freedom because an honest and independent press has been annihilated. It serves now as ~ blindfold for the people ...62 This example shows that censorship in Czecho-Slovakia was like an octopus which extended its arms into all areas of public life and impeded the march of democracy and the natural evolution of the various ethnical groups. SLOVAK DEFENSE AGAINST THE EFFECTS OF CENSORSHIP A direct result of the systematic violation of freedom of the press by governmental censorship was that Slovak political parties were denied normal communication with their members. At the disposal of the Government were the police, the army, the gendarmry and about 300,000 privileged Czech functionaries in Slovakia, whose task it was to hinder the activity of Slovak political forces, working and fighting for the freedom and independence of Slovakia. The people of Slovakia, deprived of the most effective means of communication, the press, which was constantly, almost daily, confiscated, the radio was State-owned and controlled, and never at the disposal of opposition parties, �SLOVAKIA 125 were more and more interested in knowing, what new injustice was committed against the Slovak nation. Several methods of rendering the censorship less effective were developed by the political parties. These political parties, who owned many of the newspapers, constantly challenged the respective Ministers in Parliament by interpellations. Their interpellations were always published, together with the censored articles, in the Tisky Poslanecke Snemovny N<irodniho Shromazdeni Repub liky Ceskoslovenske (a publication comparable to the U.S. Congressional Record) and this procedure gave them immunity and the right to be reprinted in the newspapers. But it was not unusual for the censor to confiscate even these immunized articles and interpellations. The interpellation had to be signed by at least twenty representatives. Small parties, which lacked this number, obtained the necessary signatures from the representatives of other opposition parties. The interpellations were addressed to the Minister of the Interior, or the Minister of Justice. The reply of the Government to the interpellation, which also requested that the matter be discussed, was usually negative.If a written answer was requested, the Minister almost invariably approved the procedure of the censor. Here is an example: Reply of the Government to the interpellation of representative Andrej Hlinka and associates concerning .the confiscation of the dally SLOVAK, No. 105, May 9, 1934 (No. 2712/VII). - The confiscation of the portions adduced In the lnterpellatlon . . . executed by the office -of the Attorney General in Bratislava, •w as exa mined by the regional court In Bratislava and approved In full. The complaint challenging this decision was rejected by the 1Prlme Minister: J. Malypetr.63 If nothing was found wrong in the censored article, the reply to the interpellation was: .. . I find that some portions adduced in interpellation No. 3610/· XIV were confiscated without a legal r eason. I informed the office of the Attorney General in Nitra that thes e articles ... are nothini;: more than poli,tical r eflections and attacks and their suppression cannot be justified by law. I hope that similar cases will not be repeated .. ,64 But the censorship policy was not modified by a few decisions in favor of the opposition's press. Another procedure used by the opposition press to �126 SLOVAKIA counteract the effects of censorship was to send the first printed copy to the censor's office and simultaneously to deliver several hundred copies to the public vendors. The Bratislava readers were usually waiting and so at least some of them were able to obtain uncensored copies, which passed clandestinely from hand to hand. The procedure was the same for the towns and villages near the capital city of Bratislava. Workers, employees, railroadmen and occasional travelers, women from the villages selling vegetables in the market, all cooperated in smuggling the uncensored copies of newspapers out of Bratislava. Most helpful in this distribution of uncensored copies were the Slovak railroadmen. Each town in which the train stopped, had its copy of the uncensored newspaper. This was done with the utmost caution, since those involved could have been charged with a criminal act against the security of the State at the risk of imprisonment or loss of job. After the censor completed his job, the Attorney-General ordered the police to confiscate the newspaper. The policemen seized the unsold uncensored copies from the news-stands. In coffeehouses they seized uncensored copies from the hands of readers, who had not reali21ed in good time the presence of the officers and failed to hide their copies. Articles from confiscated political, social and cultural periodicals, were typed and distributed among interested people, chiefly university students and graduates, who formed little clubs to discuss them. The same was done with confiscated books or volumes of poetry. The writer recalls how, after the publication of Sidor's and Mach's books, mentioned previously, he was given one typewritten copy of the censored parts of the books, and was required to type at least fiV'e new copies and distribute them among five other persons. Such distribution was possible only among persons who were trustworthy and of the same political convictions. The result was that almost everybody in Slovakia could have his own copy of the censored parts of the books. The secretariats of the political parties cooperated with students, workers and peasants in this underground press and the solidarity of the nation as a whole was wonderful. It is true that many people were caught and penalized, but that was the risk. �SLOVAKIA 127 Students in foreign countries supplied information about the views of the foreign press on the Slovak problem and themselves published the Slovak viewpoint in foreign newspapers. They smuggled into the country articles about Slovakia from the foreign press. The customs examination of Slovak students traveling abroad or returning from foreign countries was viery thorough. The clandestine importing of news reports from abroad was even more dangerous than the distribution of censored articles in Slovakia. If caught in possession of any news item unfavorable to Czecho-Slovakia, a person could be prosecuted for "association with the enemies of the State", for espionage, or for plotting against the State. Information brought from abroad was discussed only in small confidential groups of students and intellectuals, and secret reports were given to certain leaders of political parties. The Czechs were not generally able to identify the persons responsible for this smuggling of information. But they never forgot. During his studies in Zagreb (Croatia) in 1937 or 1938, one of my friends wrote several articles about the oppression of the Slovaks in Czecho-Slovakia. For these and other articles written for the Croatian press ten years later in 1947 he was sentenced by a Czech Communist "people's court" to eight years in prison. CONCLUSION Freedom of the press consist~ in the free gathering of information, in free communication, in the free publication of information, in the free printing and distribution of published information and in the free subscription and free reading of published information. In Czecho-Slovakia these freedoms were very limited and in Slovakia they were practically non-existent. If one succeeded in gathering information, it became impossible to communicate it if the Czechs felt that it criticized or threatened their hegemony. To publish such information signified sure intervention of the censor and meant the consequent confiscation of the entire edition of the book or periodical, in which it was published. To diffuse information confiscated by the censor was �128 SLOVAKIA considered by the Czechs as an act against the security of the State. The freedom to subscribe to and to read published information was also very limited. Anyone found to be in possession of censored information was ,exposed to the danger of being arrested and penalized. From pertinent material available to the writer and from his own experiences in Czecho-Slovakia in the years 1918-1938, he has reached the conclusion that despite the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, censorship in its most drastic form was widely employed against the opposition and the minorities in direct contradiction to the Constitution and the so-called "democratic" system which it guaranteed. Public opinion in Slovakia could not manifest itself freely in the press and information was diffused chiefly through the channels generally resorted to by underground organizations. The people of Slovakia learned to read and interpret the blank spaces of the censored newspapers and what they "read" this way was much more unfavorable to the Czech system than the impression the censored words would have provoked. The impossibility of frank discussion had created an atmosphere of hatred in which the Slovaks renounced once and for all any discussion with the Czechs. They began to take their own course which led logically to the unanimous declaration of the independent Slovak Republic, March 14, 1939, by the autonomous Slovak Parliament. Censorship applied against the Slovaks proved that freedom cannot be suppressed indefinitely, because it is a part of the condition of our life, our development, and our progress. In its essence our soul is free. Whoever suppresses the freedom of others, will himself lose freedom. The Czechs lost their freedom on the very day when the Slovaks declared their independence. Bohemia became a Protectorate of Germany. When with the aid of the Soviet army and through the indifference of the Western world, the Czechs enslaved the Slovaks a second time after World War II, they lost their freedom too, and became a satelite of Soviet Russia. In order �SLOVAKIA 129 to keep the Slovaks in Czech slavery, they sold their own freedom to the Muscowite tyrant, exposing to Red danger the entire Central and Occidental Europe. The words of the great Slovak poet Jan Kollar (17931852) are most appropriate here: Whoever respects the freedom of others Is himself worthy of freedom. Whoever enslaves with handcuffs Is himself a slave ! 65 FOOTNOTES 1. "The Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic", with introduction by Ji:ri Hoetzl and V. Joachim, American Association for International Conciliation, Pt,blications, No. 179 (October 1922), 2. 3. Ibid., p. 443. Karl Falk, "Strife in Czechoslovakia: The German Minority Question", Foreign Policy Reports, XIV, (March 15, 1938), p. 4. The Cleveland Pact stipulated that the Slovaks and Czechs would form II federative union of states. Slovakia was to enjoy complete national autonomy, including its own Parliament and government administration, its own political and financial institutions, complete freedom to develop culturally and the right to use Slovak as its official language. The form of government was to be democratic, operating in a union of two autonomous states. The Pittsburgh Pact guaranteed that "Slovakia shall have its own administration, its own tribunals and its own Parliament. Slovak shall be the official language in schools, in government offices and in public life in general." Sbirka zakonu a narizeni statu ceskoslovenskeho. Part 23 (March 31, 1923), pp. 207-218. Sbirka zakonu a nafizen£ statu ceskoslovenskeho. (1920) . Ibid. Part 44 (July 15, 1933) pp. 708-709. Sbirka zakonu a nafizeni statu ceskoslovenskeho. Part 44 (July p. 441. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8 15, 1933), p. 707. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. Ibid. ( 1933) p. 771. Ibid. Part 56 (July 7, 1934) pp. 513-516. Sbirka zakonu a nafizeni statu ceskoslovenskeho. (1934), p. 598. Ibid. (1935), p. 527. Ibid. (1937), p. 786. Ibid. Part 44 (July 15, 1933) pp. 709-714. Sbirka zakonu a narizeni statu ceskoslovenskeho. Part 35, (May 23, 19i6) pp. 477-479. I!Jid. pp. 479-541. Imrich Stanek, Zrada a pad. (Praha: Statnf Nakladatelstvf Politicke Literatury, 1958), p. 33. �SLOVAKIA 130 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. Imrich Stanek, Op. cit., p. 41. Ibid., p. 33. Ibid., p. 34. Imrich Stanek, Op. cit., p. 34. Ibid., p. 35. loc. cit. loc. cit. loc. cit. Ibid., pp. 38-39. Ibid., p. 39. Ibid., p. 40. Ibid., p. 32. Ibid., pp. 41-43. Lucy Maynard Salmon, The newspaper and authority. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1923), p. 3. Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka (1864-1926), Bratislava: Knihtlaciaren Sv. Andrej a, 1934), p. 359. Culen, Konstantin. "Sloboda tlace v CSR", Bratstvo, (May 23, 1951). Machacek, Pavol. "Katovia sa raduju", Slovenske .l!udove Novi· ny", (August 10, 1923). pp. 1-2. Ceskoslovenska Republika, Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, No. 150, (1922). Karol Sidor, Op. cit., pp. 487-488. Ibid., p. _426. Ibid., p. 425. Culen, Konstantin, "Slaboda tlace v CSR", Bratstvo, (May 23, 1951). C. A. Macartney, Hungary and her successors, pp. 137-139. "Azda takto", Nastup, (November 1, 1933), p. 163. "Nerovny boj", Nastup, (November 1, 1933), p. 162. Ceskoslovenska Republika, Niirodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, No. 5280, (1925). Head of a region. Administrative region of Slovakia. Sano Mach, Vo viheni, (Bratislava: Jednota, 1930). Ceskoslovenska Republika, Niirodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, 'l)sky, No. 2799, (1934). Culen, Konstantin. "Slaboda tlace v CSR", Bratstvo, (May 23, 1951). Ceskoslovenska Socialne demokraticka strana. Protokol sjazdu z 12. a 22. aprila 1922, p. 203. Ceskoslovenska Republika. Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka· Snemovna, Tisky, 1. volebni obdobi, 2. zasedani, No. 1882, 1921. Op. cit., No. IV/4098, 1923. (;ulen, Kon~tantin, "Slcboda tlace v CSR", Bratstvo, (May 23, 1951). �SLOVAKIA 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. fi3. 64. 65. 131 ceskoslovenska Republika, Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, No. 3584, (June 21, 1922.). ceskoslovenska Republika, Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, No. XXI/4226, (April 26, 1923). ceskoslovenska Republika, Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, No. VI/4636, (May 27, 1924). Slovak, July 23, 1933. Slovak, J anuary 26, 1934. Tisk a novinari, XII, No. 5, (1938). Druhy kruh diskusnich vecerii Narodni Rady ceskoslovenske", Cechoslovak a nase zahranici. Vsenarodni mesicnik. Vol. XV, No. 4-5, (April-May, 1935), p. 100. ceskoslovenska Republika, Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, 1937, VI. volebne obdobi, 5 zasedani, No. 876/ VI, April 8. Ibid, XV/4226, (May 25, 1923). ceskoslovenska Republika. Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, 628/IX, (September 16, 1930). ceskoslovenska Republika. Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, No. 2951, (1934). ceskoslovenska Republika. Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, I. volebni obdobi, 5. zasedani, No. 2591, (July 28, 1922), pp. 10-11. Jan Kollar, Slavy dcera. 1824. BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS <::incik, Joseph G. Anglo-Saxon and Slovak-Avar Patterns of the Cuthbert Gospel. Series Cyrilomethodiana, v. 1. Cleveland: Slovak Institute, 1958. Delaney, Edward L. False freedom . Los Angeles: Sequoia University Press, 1954. Diplomaticus. The Czechs and their minorities. London, Thornton Butterworth, (1938). Durcansky, Ferdinand. Pohl'ad na slovensku politicku minitlost'. Bratislava: Ludotypia, 1943. Hrusovsky, Frantisek. Slovenske dejiny. 6th ed. Turciansky Sv. Martin: Matica Slovenska, 1940. Kerr, Walter. Criticism and censorship. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1956. Kimball, Young and Lawrence, Raymond D. Bibliography on censorship and propaganda. University of Oregon publications, v. 1, 1928. Journalism series, No. 1. Eugene: University Press, 1928. Mach, Sano. Vo viizeni. Censored ed. Bratislava: Jednota, 1930. Macartney, C. A. Hungary and her successors. The treaty of Trianon and its consequences, 1919-1937. New York, Oxford University Press, 1937. McKean, Richard et al. The freedom to read. Perspective and program. New York: R. R. Bowker, 1957. �SLOVAKIA 132 Miskovic, Alojz and Pisut, Milan. Dejiny slovenskej literatury pre VI. triedu slovenskych gymnazii a pre ucitel'ske akademie. Bratislava: Statne nakladatel'stvo, 1941. Mraz, Andrej. Die Literatur der Slovaken. Berlin: Volk und Reich Verlag, n. d. Salmon, Lucy Maynard. The newspaper and authority. New York: Oxford University Press, 1923. Seton-Watson, R. W. A history of the Czechs and Slovaks. New York: Hutchinson and Co., 1943. Sidor, Karol. Andrej Hlinka (1864-1926). Censored ed. Bratislava: Knihtlaciareii Sv. Andreja, 1934. -Andrej Hlinka (1864-1926). Uncensored ed. Bratislava: Knihtlaciarer1 Sv. Andreja, 1934. - Slovcici v zahranicnom odboji. Bratislava: Jednota, 1928. Slovensky Oslobodzovaci vybor. Prcivo Slovcikov na samostatnost' vo svet• le dokumentov. Sv. 1: Biela kniha. By Ferdinand Durcansky. Buenos Aires: Dorrego, 1954. Stanislav, Jan. Slovanski apostoli Cyril a Metod • ich cinnost' vo Vel'ko• moravskej risi. Bratislava: Academia Scientiarum et Artium Slovaca, 1945. Thomas, S. Harris. Czechoslovakia in European history. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. Zubek, Theodoric J., O.F.M., S.T.D. The Church of silence in Slovakia. Published by John J. Lach, 1956. PAMPHLETS Comite d'action Slovaque. Aide-memoire sur la necessite de plebiscite en Slovaquie. Paris: 1946. Comite d'action Slovaque. Aide-memoire sur l'existence de la Republique Slovaque et sur la necessite de conclure le traite de paix avec elle. Paris: 1946. Durcansky, Ferdinand. The international asp zct of the Slovak question. New York: Slovak Liberation Committee, 1954. Jakobson. R. Slavic languages. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. Slovak Action Committee, Slovak National Council in London, Slovak League of America and Canadian Slovak League of Canada. Memorandum presented to the Peace Conference concerning the rationality of existence of Czecho-Slovakia. Paris: 1946. Th e Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact. (Chi cago) : The Slovak Catholic Federation of America, 1934. Stewart, John F. Slovakia, its people and right to sovereign independence and freedom. Information leaflets, No. 7. Edinburgh: Scottish League for European Fre<>dom, n. d. PERIODICALS AND ARTICLES "Azda takto," Ncistup (Nove.' llber 1, 1933). ceskoslovensko a na.se zahrar,;i:i, XV, No. 4-5 (April-May, 1935). "The Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic", with introduction �SLOVAKIA 133 by Jiri Hoetzl and V. Joachim. American Association for International Conciliation, Publications, No. 179) (October, 1922). culen, Konstantin. "Sloboda tlace v cSR", Bratstvo (May 23, 1951). Falk, Karl. "Strife in Czechoslovakia", Foreign Policy Reports, XIV (March 15, 1938). Hlinka, Andrej. "Protestujeme", Slovak (December 22, 1921). "Komu osozi cenzura?", Zem, III, No. 9 (May 5, 1937). Machacek, Pavel "Katovia sa raduju", Slovenske l'udove noviny, (August 10, 1923). "Nedorozumenie medzi autonomistickou tlacou a bratislavskym cenzorom", Slovak, (August 27, 1933). "Nerovny boj", Nastup (November 1, 1933) . "Neustale habanie Slovaka", Slovak (August 27, 1933). " O cenzure", Slovak (May 16, 1934). "Pracuje cenzura pre stat alebo pre politicke strany?", Slovak (September 15, 1933). "Preco nas cenzurovali", Slovak (April 29, 1934). "150 rocna cenzura rakuska platna este aj v republike", Slovak (June 11, 1933). Slovak (June 11, 1933). Slovak (September 15, 1933). Slovak (January 26, 1934). Slovak (June 13, 1934). Taylor, Paul B. "Partition of Czechoslovakia", Foreign Policy Reports, (November 15, 1938). - "Germany's expansion in Eastern Europe", Foreign Policy Reports, XV (May 15, 1939). Tisk a novinai'i, XII, No. 5 (1938). PUBLIC DOCUMENTS ceskoslovenska Republika. Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna. Tisky. Years: 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924. 1925, 1926, 1929, 1930, 1934, 1935. Sbirka zakonu a narizeni statu ceskoslovenskeho. Years: 1920, 1922, 1923, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1~37. THESIS Woytko, Sister Mary Gabrielle, 0.P. Slovakia's road to statehood. A Study of the efforts of Slovakia to secure national independence. Thesis submitted to the Graduate School of Duquesne University as a thesis under the title "A study of the efforts of Slovakia to secure national independence" in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts. (Published by John Lach, 1957). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1965, Vol. 15 Description An account of the resource Vol. 15 (No. 38), 1965. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1965 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 93 CENSORSHIP POLICIES IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA 1918-1938 WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON SLOVAKIA Eugene Urban ABSTRACT By means of clever propaganda, the Czecho-Slovak Republic became known as an exemplary democratic State and the ethnic groups living within her boundaries were enjoying a personal, cultural, political and economic freedom. But the reality was exactly the opposite. The CzechoSlovak Republic was nothing but a big concentration camp for four million Slovaks, three and half million Germans, seven hundred thousand Ukrainians, six hundred thousand Magyars, one hundred fifty thousand Poles, etc., the Czechs enjoying the privileged position of guards. The real objective of the Czecho-Slovak Republic was to deprive the different ethnic groups of their national identity and, at their expense, to enlarge herself to the point of becoming a power among the others of Europe. The Slovaks, a very nationally selfconscious group, differing from the Czechs in language, traditions, culture, customs, and character, were guaranteed 1918 that the new Republic would be a confederation of two States: the Slovak and the Czech. But the Czechs failed to keep their promises and pacts and instead they treated Slovakia as a colony. One of the weapons used to suppress the desire of the Slovaks to be again a free and independent nation was the censorship of the press, the most effective medium of communication. The aim was to blot out all remembrance of Slovqk historical traditions, and to suppress the individuality and evidence of an oid cultural nation in the very heart. of Europe - a nation which has made its contributions to the building up of Western Christian culture and civilization. And, although the Czecho-Slovak Constitution had guaranteed freedom of the press, several laws were later enacted to make censorship legal. But the Slovaks defended them- 94 SLOVAKIA selves as well as they could in Parliament and with "underground" means of communication. Czecho-Slovak Laws Concerning Freedom of Press, Speech, and Association. Theory and Practice The freedoms of press and association in the CzechoSlovak Republic were guaranteed in paragraph 113, (1) of the Constitution accepted by the Revolutionary National Assembly on the 29th of February, 1920: Freedom of the press as well as the right to assemble peaceably and without arms and to form associations is guaranteed. It is therefore in principle inadmissible to place the press under preliminary censorship.I Paragraph 117 guaranteed the freedom of expression of opinion: Every person may within the limits of the law express his or h er opinion by word, in writing, in print, by picture, etc. The same applies to legal persons within the limits of their competence. No one shall suffer in the ,sphere of his work or emloyment for excercising this right.2 According to these articles of the C o n s t i t u t i o n, Czecho-Slovakia had no press law of its own. The press was supposed to be free of Government interference and to serve the genuine interests of the various ethnical groups living in Czecho-Slovakia. It was supposed, also, that they would be free to assemble in political, cultural, religious, economical, etc. organizations and to secure through them their rights. Except for the Czechs, all other ethnical groups were integrated in Czecho-Slovakia without being given opportunity to express their will freely. With regard to the Slovaks, the Constitution was in direct contradiction to the spirit and letter of the Cleveland and Pjttsburgh Pacts signed by the Slovaks and Czechs in Cleveland, Ohio, October 5, 1915 and in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, May 30, 1918. 3 This latter was signed moreover by President Tomas G. Masaryk. According to these two pacts, Czecho-Slovakia was supposed to be a federation of both the Slovak and the Czech States. 4 But these pacts were not included in the Constitution. SLOVAKIA !)5 The representatives for Slovakia who voted in Parliament for the acceptance of this anti-Slovak Constitution were not elected by the people, but appointed by the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Prague from a minority group advocating integration with the Czech nation. The Constitution was in flagrant contradiction to the spirit and the principles on which Czecho-Slovakia had been created. In the first years of her existence, the discontent of the Slovaks and of the other minorities with Czech imperialism and centralism early started to manifest itself, and this particularly in the periodical press and at the meetings of the political parties. The Czechs did not delay in their retaliation. They replaced the guarantees of paragraph 113 of the Constitution with a series of laws by which the freedom of the press was practically nullified. Not having a press law of their own, the Czech majority in the Prague Parliament made use of the old Austrian press law No. 119/ 1873 (May 23) and No. 142/ 1868 (October 15) of the Austrian Code, and the Hungarian law No. XIV /1914 to suppress freedom of the press. These were the oppressive laws of the old Au.stro-Hungarian regime against which both Slovaks and Czechs fought in the Parliaments of Vienna and Budapest. It has been said repeatedly that Czecho-Slovakia was created to liberate the Czechs and Slovaks from the Austro-Hungarian yoke. It is an ironic fact that Dr. Tomas G. Masaryk, the first President of Czecho-Slovakia, who as deputy for Bohemia, had condemned these laws in the Parliament of Vienna, now signed and approved them as the laws of the land, as law No 50/1923 (March 19), paragraph 34.5 The co-founder of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and her second President, Dr. Eduard Benes, who was also theoretically a defender of the freedom of the press, also signed law No. 50/1923. The same law No. 50/ 1923 provided for the defense of the Republic, and paragraph 34 stipulated the conditions under which the publication of periodicals might be prohibited. Law No. 3006 was drawn up on April 14, 1920; it was later supplemented by law No. 125/ 1933 (July 10)7, according to which the State's Security Bureau, without a judicial order could demand the c o n f i s c a t i o n and opening of letters 96 SLOVAKIA and other items transported by mail. It could prohibit public meetings and it could impose special conditions upon the activities of associations or prohibit them. Paragraph 10 was concerned with the press. The State's Security Bureau could limit or impose special conditions for the publication and distribution of periodicals, or prohibit their publication. It could order the editor of a periodical to present, two hours before its publication, copies for preventive censorship. The same Bureau could put under surveillance or prohibit the activities of printing shops, of distributing companies, and of press agencies. It could also prohibit possession of printing presses and other means of reproducing writings and illustrations by private persons. Law No. 50/1923, for the defense of the Republic, was enacted in a period when Czecho-Slovakia was fully recognized and her existence insured by International Peace Treaties. This law was not addressed against her enemies from abroad, but to deal with the growing dissatisfaction from inside. Especially in Slovakia the discontent was alarming. The fact that the Czechs violated the Pacts of Cleveland and Pittsburgh were the most powerful reasons for this discontent. Law 50/1923 was enacted in order to give the Czechs a weapon to terrorize the dissatisfied Slovaks and the other minorities. It fixed the penalty for military treason, for violation of State secrets, for offence to the President of the Republic, for any challenge to commit penal acts or not to fulfill legal obligations, for approving the crime, for associating against the State, for the spread of false reports, etc. All the paragraphs of this law were appliable also to the periodical press. Directly concerned with the periodical press was paragraph 34 of this law. It gave the Government's ooreaus power to prohibit the publication of periodicals. The period of suspension of publication was established as one month for periodicals published at least five times a week, two months for those published at least three times a week, and six months for those purlished less than this. But this law seemed not to be strict enough for the Czech Government. Ten years larer, law No. 50/1923 was completed and changed by the law No. 124/ 1933 (July 10).8 This new law extended the list of "crimes and offences" SLOVAKIA 97 for which the publication of a periodical could be suspended and gave the Government the right to enlarge the validity of paragraph 34 by a simple government decree. The suspension period of periodicals was enlarged from one to three months and from two to six months. Not even that was enough for the Government of CzechoSlovakia. The Governmental Decree No. 150/1933 (July 18),9 published ten days later, again increased the number of paragraphs which could be violated by the press and added to the number of crimes and offences also the infringements of these laws. One year later a new law No. 140/ 1934 was drawn up. (July 10), 10 which changed and completed the law No 50/ 1923, the law No. 124/ 1933 and the Government Decree No. 150/ 1933. The number of possible penal acts was increased again. The Government was empowered to prolong the validity of these laws for another two years. The distribution of transgressing periodicals could be prohibited in all stores which sold the products of the State's monopoly (tobacco, stamps, salt, etc.) or in the buildings and stations of the State owned railways (there were only State owned railways in Czecho-Slovakia). These periodicals could be also deprived of the right to use special tariffs and of the right of transportation by mail or by railroads. The same law compelled all periodicals to publish free, without change or comment, on their first or second page, by usual types of letters, and in the largest edition, official declarations of the President, the Vice-President, the Prime-Minister, members of the Government, etc., appealing to this law. A new Government Decree No. 163/ 1934 (July 16) 11 further extended the number of "crimes, offences and infringements" for which the publication of a periodical could be suspended. Two other government decrees, No. 157 / 1935 (July 13) 12 and No. 165/ 1937 (July 24) 13 , prolonged the validity of the paragraph 34 of the law No. 50/ 1923 and the subsequent laws until the 13th July 1939. Another law, No. 126/ 1933 (July 10) 14 was concerood with the distribution (col portage) of periodicals. The distribution of periodicals which directly or indirectly subvert or put blame on the independence, Constitutional unity, the 98 SLOVAKIA integrity and the democratic and republican form of the State or the democratic order in the Czecho-Slovak Republiccould be prohibited. This right could also be taken away from those periodicals which "menace the public peace and order, especially by publishing false news and news which distort the truth". The distribution in Czecho-Slovakia of periodicals published abroad could be also prohibited. It was prohibited to distribute periodicals in the schools and in the military quarters. The Regional Office was entitled to prohibit the distribution of periodicals published in Czecho-Slovakia, while the Ministry of Interior in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could prohibit the distribution of periodicals published in foreign countries. Paragraph II of this law required publication of any correction asked by a person who felt that the content of some article published by the periodical was offensive to him or that information given was untrue. And finally the law No. 130/ 1936 (May 13)15 was enacted, which completed the previous National Defense laws for the defense of the Republic. This law established capital punishment for many crimes against law No. 50/ 1923. It also prohibited the publication of news regarding military treason if not approved previously by the Ministry of National . Defense. All these laws and Government Decrees were climaxed by • National Defense Law No. 131/ 1936 (May 13)16 for the defense of the State. This law gave the Government absolute power in a national emergency to suspend all laws, all rights and liberties. It gave the Government the right to censor the press, films, telegrams, telephone conversations, letters, packages sent by mail, phonographs records, etc. It established preventive censorship and gave the State's Security Bureau the power to prohibit the publication and distribution of periodicals. The importation of periodicals from abro.ad ·could be also prohibited. The law provided for the establishment of a commission which would direct and carry out the censorship policy. The Government was given in fact dictatorial powers: and this law was generally considered as the last nail in the coffin of democracy in Czecho-Slovakia. SLOVAKIA 99 Objectives and Methods of Czechoslovak Censorship Policies From the analysis of censored material it is possible to learn much about the objectives pursued by the Czech Government in the case of Slovakia. Previous mention has been made of the profound antagonism developed between the Slovaks and Czechs as a result of the Czech violation of the Cleveland and Pittsburgh pacts. The Czech wanted to denationalize the Slovaks by forcing them to accept the false claim that Slovaks are Czechs and that the Slovak language is a Czech dialect. To obtain this aim, the Czechs made use of various means. They created a wave of terrorism, using the armed forces, police, gendarmery and the C z e ch national organizations, especially "Sokol" known for both its atheism and chauvinism. They also sent hundreds of thousands of Czech teachers and Czech Government officials into Slovakia, thereby forcing the Slovaks, who were denied jobs in their own country, to emigrate because of hunger and unemployment. They further contributed to the economic impaverishrnent of Slovakia by dismantling its heavy industry and transporting the productive machinery to Bohemia. In this way production was stopped and the enterprises were forced to dose. Many factory buildings were purposely demolished .and many mines flooded.17 The steel, chemica:l, glass and leather industries suffered most cruelly. When the workers, deprived of their jobs demonstrated to prevent the dismantling of the factories and machinery, the Czech soldiers and the gendarmery killed many of them. 18 In the period from 1918 to 1932, 261 enterprises were closed down in Slovakia. From 1933 to 1937 another 425 enterprises were dismantled, bringing the total number to 686. 19 Meanwhile, new industries were founded in Bohemia which logically belonged in Slovakia, since Slovakia provided the raw materials used in them.20 The transportation tariffs in Slovakia were about 40 percent higher than in Bohemia and Moravia. Consequently the Slovak coal was more expensive than coal imported from Bohemia. 21 Further discrimination was manifest in the field of housing construction. 22 100 SLOVAKIA From 1921 to 1923 Slovakia received only 6 per cent of the State's subsidies for the unemployed, although the unemployment in Slovakia was higher than in Bohemia. 23 From the sum assigned by the Government for the construction and maintenance of schools of higher education and Universities, Slovakia received 10 per cent, while the educational institutions in Slovakia were to be built up almost entirely. 24 The result: Slovakia had only one incomplete University and no Polytechnical Institute, while the Czechs had several, and the German minority had two Universities and two Polytechnical Institutes. Further, the Slovak University was practically a Czech University, because the professors named by the Government were all Czechs. Salaries for the Slovaks were about 20 per cent lower than for the Czechs. While Slovakia abounded in natural resources, especially for the production of energy, the petroleum lamp was the usual source of light. The combined savings of five Slovak citizens were equal to the savings of a single Czech. Czech capital absorbed whatever Slovak industry still remained after its dismantling. Slovak banks were engulfed by Czech banks, and foreign capital was allowed to supplant the remaining Slovak capital. 25 When agrarian reform was inaugurated in Slovakia, only 21 per cent of the land was sold to Slovak peasants, while the rest was distributed free to the Czechs. 26 The discrimination against Slovak peasants in transportation tariffs and taxes resulted in frequent strikes. Instead of offering to improve their desperate condition, the Government gave the order to fire at the strikers.27 Their hopeless situation led them to emigrate in large numbers to the U.S.A., Canada, Argentina, France, Germany and Belgiurn. 28 Slovakia was treated like a colony by the Czechs. They regarded Slovakia only as an object of exploitation, a reservoir of cheap labor and a market for the products of Czech industries. The Czech Government aimed to keep Slovakia as an underdeveloped agricultural country. 29 Practically all the administrative positions in Slovakia were filled by Czechs, whose salaries also were double those of the Slovaks. 30 In Slovakia political oppression worked hand in hand with economic injustice. Aware of Czech chauvinism, the Slovaks began early SLOVAKIA \'yd»od1 denne ~rem pondelk.a Zdkladafel' a YO!ICA ; Andrei ffllnka 101 Br611slava,. slreda 6. m11e. t9H 1Grecki povsfalci chysfaju illok na Affleny Rozvral na Balk6ne, alebo vffllZSlvo greckel vl6dy - Bulbarsko vyslela voJsko na grkke brank:e ·• •11>1 ••• ~-••U ,.....,n,&aJ-.. ,.,,..,., .. ~i,---iol,f . .•• ~ ~ - : . • ~ ,• :'" .:.:.•\.:=: tf~i~~l~~t;~~~ ~fiff;[f~!~1f[~tt¥.Jlf§ l{if;}~t~¥.K~~ The whitewashed newspapers had to be presented in a new form: A corrected issue was printed after the confiscation to organize politically. The great Slovak patriot Msgr. Andrej Hlinka founded the Catholic and nationalist Slovak People's Party. Its program aimed at autonomy for Slovakia in accordance with the decrees of the Pittsburgh Pact (1918). The Protestant leader, poet, and writer, Rev. Martin Razus, restored the Slovak National Party. In order to hinder Slovak political association, the Czechs established branches of their own parties in Slovakia. By means of political intrigue and corruption they attained a measure of success, but the majority of Slovaks resolutely opposed them. Because of 102 SLOVAKIA the forced intergration of Slovakia with Bohemia, and the denial of Slovakia's right to self-determination, the fiftyfive Slovak deputies were invariably outvoted by the Czech majority in the Prague Parliament. The Czechs employed terrorist tactics also against Slovak political parties, imposing on them a relentless censorship of the press and disruption of their public meetings. By such means they strove to impede direct communication between the Slovak people and their political leaders. The press was a high-powered tool in the hands of the Slovak political parties. It introduced new ideas, it taught the people to recognize and support their own national interest, it pointed out the injustices committed against the Slovak nation by the Government and it suggested ways to remedy the situation. Public meetings served the same purpose, demonstrating by enthusiastic attendance the growing strength of the Slovak nation. Consequently, public meetings were dissolved by government agents whenever the speaker criticized the government, and troops and police were ordered to charge against the protesting Slovaks. Many Slovaks were killed and wounded by Czech bullets. The censor deleted from the press every criticism of Government officials and legislative bodies, in order to cover their misdeeds and keep the people uninformed. The second purpose was to hinder opposition parties from communicating with their readers and voters. In the hope of keeping such ideas in the background and forcing on the Slovaks the false notion of a "Czechoslovak nation and people", the Czech censor confiscated articles dealing with Slovakia's national identity and its right to self determination. The Czech determination to eradicate religion from Slovak public life must remain under cover, hence the censor suppressed all articles and reports of the desecration of churches by the Czechs and the removal of crosses from schools. In the eyes of the Czechs it was a most serious crime for the Slovak press to publicize the struggle of the Slovak people for autonomy, for the right to govern themselves, to run their own schools; in short, to enjoy all the rights of nationhood belonging to them as a nation. The Czechs seem SLOVAKIA 103 to have naively thought that without the press to remind them of their rights the Slovaks would drop the issue. The Slovaks were not allowed to read reports on CzechoSlovakia in press. The Czech Government feared that this would more profoundly motiviate their political aspirations. Practically all the statements and resolutions of the Slovak political parties were censored in order to stifle opposition and prevent the natural political development of the Slovak nation. Reports of the activity of Slovak organizations in the United States of America were yet another object of the censor's displeasure, because these organizations were strongly in favor of autonomy for Slovakia. The two presidents of Czecho-Slovakia, Masaryk and Bene~, were unassailable in the press. The slightest criticism, whether by Czechs or by Slovaks, was taboo and automatically censored out. A legend was built up around these two men, making them untouchable as if they were the apex of perfection. To perpetuate it no criticism of their many human foibles and moral lapses was tolerated. The real objective of Czech cenzorship was to suppress the facts of Slovak history with their underlying appeal to self-respect and to strike out these glorious moments of the past which could fortify the Slovak political and national fight for the realization of their ideal of freedom and independence. Censorship was thorough. It made impossible any attempt by the Slovaks and other minority groups to charge the Czech government with undemocratic practices. Meanwhile the Czechs were using it to create a "great Czech nation" at the expense of the other ethnic groups living in Czecho-Slovakia and disregarding their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Their ultimate goal was to achieve a dominant position among the small States in Central Europe. In a word, Czech censorship was a tool of Czech imperialism and its faithful servant. It was the ruthless Czech antidote to the self-determination and national development of the Slovak nation and the other minorities in the CzechoSlovak Republic. As such, Czech censorship was diametrically opposed to the principles of democracy, freedom, and human progress. 104 SLOVAKIA "Authority is conservative ... freedom is progressive .. . conflict between the two is inevitable", says Lucy Maynard Salmon, 31 in reference to freedom of the press. Since Czech censorship was directed against human progress, freedom, and democracy, the means it employed could only have been wicked. It stopped at nothing to attain its objectives. Nothing was immoral if it served the Czech goal of domination. Czech post office and railway employees often seized entire editions of the opposition's periodicals and destroyed them. Soldiers were often ordered to raid newspaper and party offices to confiscate mailing lists and manuscripts. This happened in Trnava, Leopoldov, Bratislava, and elsewhere. Sometimes the soldiers reduced the place to shambles. Consequently, readers in the capital city itself were often deprived of their papers. Karol Sidor reported in the March 22, 1919 issue of the Slovak: " Orders have been given (,b y Czech officials) to destroy the SLOVAK. Revorts have been pouring in from all parts of Slovakia that the SLOVAK, ofl!!c!al PU!bl!cation of the Slovak 'People's Party, has been seized by scoundrels and its sale and dlstriburtion prohibited."32 Kon~tantin Culen wrote: "In the early yea,rs the SLOVAK was subjected to as many as three censorsihips: political, military, and economic. Some issues of the newspaper ,bore the inscription, "Thrice censored and corrected edition". Even these multi-censored copies were sometimes thrown out of trains en route by Czech mailmen. Slovak employees who dared to subscribe to the Sl.lOVAK endangered their livelihood. And when even this did not dauRt them, they were personally terrorized by the police and government of!lclals .33 Oftentimes newspapers were deprived of the right of distribution (colportage). Post offices were instructed to refuse money orders sent to the opposition newspapers. Persons who subscribed to these newspapers were harassed and many were dismissed from government jobs. 34 Court action was taken against editors of newspapers which printed articles unwelcome to the censor. The editors 111.sually assumed responsibility for unsigned articles; hence, many of them were in and out of jail. In a censored article entitled "We protest" Msgr. Andrej Hlinka wrote these bitter words: SLOVAKIA 105 "We a re involved in doz ens, even hundreds of cour-t ca-ses. Hereafter I will assume full responsibility for every news article, whether written by the editor or by Paul or Saul. J will appear before the judge, I will answer the charges. And when I have been deprived of freedom, when the iron door of my prison has dosed behind me, when I am locked up and begin to burn like an expiatory candle on the a ltar of the fa,therl and, then I will charge you, friends, deputies. and leaders of the P eople's Party: •F ollow me! Let each of you shoulder r esoonsibility for one, two, ten articles, an d all of us will become involved with the courts. But no. I am wrong. Let us not get so involved. Not of our own volition will we become entangled with the courts. We will yield only to brutal compulsion. You Czechs will have to drag us into the courts. And when my right hand has become still and my mortal remains have decomposed, I tell you that a great line will form behind me, eager as I for the glory that is sure to follow. 7ou cannot silence us. You can only massacre us. But one tiling I ask: Do not go on deceiving the world that you are our brothers tsons of the same nation). Never will we consent to be Czechos lovaks ... Slova kia is ours an d we will defend our country against you as we defended it against the Magyars. The more you incriminate ns, the more you imprison us, the more forcef ully will we fight against you." As the representative and chairman of the People's Party, Msgr. Andrej Hlinka spoke out boldly on this subject in Parliament. In June 1922, in the debate arising from his interpellation No. 3584 on the raid of the offices of the Slovak and Eudove noviny, he described the attack as initiated and engineered by government agents. Not only did the assailants wreck office equipment and furniture and destroy books, but they were aided in their orgy of destruction by the police, who should have been maintaining order. The chief of police of Bratislava, Dr. Slavicek, a Czech, declared that he had been unable to check the raid because the majority of his men were hostile to the Slovak People's Party. Andrej Hlinka rightly demanded to know when the Slovaks might expect to have the protection of law and order. 35 Karol Sidor described the demolition and plundering of the offices of the Slovak as follows: On :!\fay 25, 1922 a huge rally was orga nized in Bratislava -to protest. Several Slovak legiona ries and Slovak university students were present. At one 'POint a Czech speaker railed against the SLOVAK. dem <tndlnr; that it be placed under the strictest censorship. An aroused Slovak legionary shouted: "Your aim is to cripple the Catholic press; you would do better to suppress your own anti-Catholic and antiSlovak press." The legionary paid for these words with a cruel beating ... A Slovak university student r eceived th e same treatment, bis 106 SLOVAKIA clothes torn and covered with blood, after he had called out to an abusive Czech speaker, "Please, talk to us in Slovak!" ... ·The speeches continued until 12: 30 p.m. At 1: 00 p.m. the first group of demonstrators appeared in front of the editorial offices or the SLOV.AK . . . Some 1,500 Czech legionaries escorted the demonstrators. Awaiting them was a group of 150-200 men and women who had assembled from the villages to defend SLOVAK property. A fight ensued, but the Czech legionaries with the aid of some 10(} policemen, invaded the editorial offices and broke tables and chairs, flung books, bound journals, manuscripts etc. out the windows. (Czech) legionaries piled •the items into ca,r s and drove away. Other (Czech) legionaries r aided the ,SLOV.AK's administrative offices and worked havoc there also. They carried off valuaibles, including shares and mailing lists. The yard outside ,w as littered with papers. These raids were permitted, even abetted by the police, who together with the legionaries received praise and commendation in the Czech press for their acts of des,truction.36 During the night of March 31, 1920, a certain Czech army major Ludevit Palounek by name, placed a bomb in the Lev printery in Ruzomberok in the hope of destroying the voice of the People's Party and its organ of free discussion. 37 Even the mails were misused: derisive pamphlets were inserted in the bundles of the Slovak, 38 as they were being shipped to their destination. With the growing tension in the relations between the· Slovaks and Czechs, the censorship became more and more despotic. After 1932, there were almost daily confiscations of the Slovak press. The censor received his instructions from the Ministry of the Interior. If the censor found in the piece examined something he considered inadmissible, he deleted it; the· Attorney General then ordered the police to confiscate the publication. The police seized the entire edition and burned it. The publishing house or the editors could make an appeal in court, or a board of representatives in Parliament could protest to the Minister of the Interior, or of Justice, or both. If the censorship was found unfair, the editors or publishers could demand reimbursement for damages. But in most cases they lost the appeal. After confiscation, a newspaper, book, or journal was printed in a new edition with the censored areas left blank. It bore the inscription "Following confiscation, a new and corrected edition" in the upper left corner of the front page of the periodical, or on the cover of the book. SLOVAKIA 107 After Slovakia achieved independence on March 14, 1939, government officials found in the archives of the Attorney General confidential orders issued by the Czech Government with instructions to the censor as to how many times a week certain newspapers were to be confiscated. After a stated number of confiscations, the periodical could be suspended for three or six months, and after repeated confiscations, it could be suspended indefinitely at the discretion of the censor. This was a most powerful weapon in the hands of the Government, and it was effectively used during the visit of President Edward Benes in Slovakia in 1933. Under the pretex of repeated confiscations, the newspapers Slovak, Slovenska pravda, Narodne noviny and the political review Nastup were suspended, so as to prevent any criticism of Benes's speeches in the press. It was on this visit that he angered the Slovaks by declaring that they must become Czechs. The actions of the censor were despotic because he knew that the Government would not fail to support him. The Slovak and Slovenska pravda were confiscated almost every day. The humoristic weeklies Osa and Kocur were also confiscated, along with the cultural monthlies Pero , Slovenske pohl'ady and Elan. Almanacs, books, poetry collections, and placards were not exempt. Sometimes periodicals were confiscated because of articles reprinted from other non-censored newspapers. For example a periodical was confiscated because it contained a poem originally published in the Slovak-American almanac Jednota. An editorial containing quotations from a book by President Thomas G. Masaryk was also confiscated. An article by the great Slovak writer, Svatozar Hurban Vajansky, published in Hungary at the ~md of the 19th century, was censored when reprinted in Slovak after World War I. Newspapers were confiscated for using the hyphen in the name of the Republic "CzechoSlovakia" although early peace treaties carry the name in this form. 39 On several specific occasions the Czechs declared that it would be dangerous for the future of the Republic if freedom of speech and press were permitted in Slovakia.40 With confiscation being an almost daily occurence, periodicals suffered very heavy losses. It is pertinent to point out that while the Czech party press subsisted on SLOVAKIA 108 government funds, the Slovak press depended entirely upon the voluntary support of party members, together with subscription fees. The Slovak people understood perfectly the great importance of the press and supported it generously. Only in this way was the Slovak opposition press able to survive such continuous economic strangulation by the Czech Government. Characteristic of the situation are words like the following: " . .. we must perforce decline to publish original articles on topics banned by the government and must limit ourselves to those which have already passed the censor." 41 This is not all. When Slovak representatives protested in Parliament against the policies of the Government and its agencies, their speeches in Parliament were censored and denied publication in the parliamentary record Tisky Poslaneck e Snemovny Nar odniho Shromazdeni Ceskoslovensk e. The bimonthly Nastup wrote: Republiky " Instead of aick now ledging the human righ t to fr eedom of di scussion, th e Czechs pr oh ibited a utonomist meetings a nd r estricted their publications. Now they have resorted to oth er meas ures. "Th e P r esi de nt of th e Senate su ppressed a portion of Dr . Joseph Buday's speech i n ·P a rlia men t. The Presidents of both C hambers of Parl iamen t confiscated a major portion of the statement pr esented by th e representatives of the Slovak People's Party. "An exten ded (95 pages) and repo r tedly objective in ter pellation of th e r epresentatives of the Slovak People's Par ty was als o censored by the Presidents of Par liament and denied publicati on. " T his action was t a ken at a time w h en press censorshi p was so stringent that no politician or political party could f r eely and publicly express a dissenting opinion as far as the Government was concerned. "Ju Slovakia the natio na li st press is pres ently s ubjected to continuous sharp criticism a nd s uppression .. . In view of this we mus t behold with a s tonishment the a d ditional measures taken in Parlia m ent ·to silence the autonomists who are already so effectively silenced by press cens orship . Meanwhile •Slova k centr alists (i.e., Czech p a r tisans ) without hindrance flood Slovakia wit h their uncensored public_ations ."42 The newspaper Nar odne Noviny reported in its November 27, 1936 issue: Statistics show that the number of confiscated publications in Czecho-Slovakia for the given years was as follows~ 1929 1930 1934 Newspapers and periodicals ______ 3,370 Books ___ ______________ __________ 918 2,533 2,138 846 Confiscations 718 109 SLOVAKIA Foreign books and periodicals _____ 255 Total ______ ________ 4,543 183 3,434 329 3,313 Of these confiscations, 60 to 70% involved Slovak books and periodicals. Censorship of Books Writing under the pseudonym Andrej Zarnov, a student at the University of Bratislava, named Frantisek Subik, made his literary debut in 1925 with the publication of a book of poems which already then showed the promise that was to make him a leading Slovak poet. The title of the book was Straz pri Morave (Sentry at the Morava River) . Finding it too nationalistic, the censor ordered the entire edition confiscated and had it burned at police headquarters. The representatives of the Slovak People's Party challenged this action in the Parliament. They asked the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Justice: 1) Whether they were aware of the confiscation of these poems; 2) Whether they approved; 3) Whether both Ministers were disposed to secure the validity of the Constitution which guarantees freedom of the press; 4) Whether they were disposed to take appropriate disciplinary action against the censor in Bratislava; 5) Whether they were ready to guarantee freedom of the press in Slovakia equal to that in Bohemia. Needless to say, the Czech majority refused to discuss this urgent interpellation in Parliament. 43 On the occasion of Msgr. Andrej Hlinka's seventieth birthday, Karol Sidor, representative in Parliament and editor of the Slovak, published his biography, covering the years 1864-1926. A great admirer and loyal follower of Hlinka, Sidor presented his hero as the key figure in the Slovak political and national struggle for freedom and independence. This 554-page biography suffered 31 deletions totaling some 295 lines, equal to seven pages of the book. It was issued with the customary caption on the cover: "Po konfiskacii nove opravene vydanie" (After confiscation a new and 110 SLOVAKIA corrected edition) and with blankspaces to show where the censor had disapproved. The following lines were deleted on pages 368-369, from Sidor's description of the Czech attack on the meeting of the Slovak People's Party in Zilina, August 17, 1919: With draiwn bayonets, soldiers charged upon the people In the square and scenes of horror ensued. Andrej Hlinka saw hi,s people struck with rifl e 1butts and carried a,way as prisoners to the barracks. Women from Kysuce exposed thei,r breasts to the bayonets and shouted: "Strike here, you curs, and touch not Hlinka ! " On October 10, 1920 Czech military units once more dispersed a meeting of the Slovak People's Party in Namestovo and fired into the crowd, killing two Slovak peasants and seriously wounding ten. On page 442 the description of this savage act was deleted: Bedfich Danek, a Czech lieutenant, scornfully asked a young man weeping over the body of his slain father: "Why do you weep? It ,w as Hlinka who killed him!" Namestovo came to ,be regarded a-s a second Cernova. The Czech press and the Government Press Agency CTK wished to place the blame for this bloodshed on Hlinka. They charged Hlinka with inciting the Slovaks against the Czechs. Hlinka answered in the October 16, 1920 issue of the Slovak. This portion of the article was deleted from the biography: Yes, I did incite the people. I incited them and will continue to Incite •them . My very presence incites them. So much so that it stirs your murky conscience, stained with a ·b rother's blood. I have incited and will continue to incite them to oppose t:he •b ase t,raud you perpetrated against •the !Slovak n ation. W,e •w ill rise up to oppose every injustice. Why should we not be aroused against you, who seized me a year ago in the dead of night and held me captive for six months at Mirov, iBrodek, Podolie, to afford you an opportunity to demoralize and dis• rupt .Slovakia? Should I have danced to your music when you placed bombs in our "Lev" printery, •which had •been established with owhard•earned savin~s? I would be a cowardly traitor If I did not raise my voice, if J did not search for a remedy and seek help. We have incited and lest we be despised by Slovakia, we will not stop inciting our people until w,e win autonomy from you. On page 490 the censor deleted a reference to discrimination against the Slovaks in assigning government jobs: The •Slovaks were unable to procure even the cheapest loaf or government bread in Slovakia; (referring to jobs) their applications were answered with a curt: "Impossible to grant", while t he Czech people, often without qualification, were given the best paid jobs in Slovakia. SLOVAKIA 111 That is how the newspapers SLOVAK, NARODNIE NOVINY, and the magazine, NASTUP, looked after censorship A quotation on p. 506 from an "Appeal of the Representatives of the Slovak People's Party to the Minister of the Interior" in Prague, September 4, 1923, was confiscated: The authorities spread terror every-where. Civil servants planned the disruption of meetings by force and public safety agencies did nothing to -defend the victims; on the contrary, they cooperated with the agressors. Holle, Nove Zamky, and ,t he riot at Brezova make it clear as day that groups of assailants were organized to incHe rioting and to damage private property. Very heavily censored was the chapter in which Sidor described Hlinka's arrest at midnight. The occasion was his return from the Peace Conference in Paris, where he had delivered to the delegates a Memorandum in which he demanded in the name of the Slovak nation that the Slovaks be given national and civic freedom and their autonomy guaranteed. Hlinka's words to one of his chaplains were censored on page 385. "Proclaim abroad to the wide world the kind of freedom we enjoy in Slovakia. They have come to carry me off like a criminal In the middle of the night when everybody is asleep ... The press reported that I trembled. On the contrary, I felt like a lion. I cared not whether they killed me or jailed me. My blood 112 SLOVAKIA boiled. Indescribable feelings struggled within me. I could not tell which was stronger: my love for my oppress-ed nation or my contempt of the intruders ... " Following Hlinka's deportation, an account of the rebellions of the students and citizens of his parish town, Ruzomberok, was variously deleted as on pages 387, 392 and 393. The description of the terrorism of the Czech soldiers and employees in Slovakia was censored on page 444: November 6, 1920 he (Rev. Frantisek Klein) reported in the SLOVAK that he was traveling by train •with soldiers who insulted him because he was reading the .SIJOV AK. One of ,them asked in Czech: "Why doesn't someone kill tH!inka ?" On pages 458-459 the account of the murderous attack on Hlinka's life in Krupina, June 12, 1921, by a Czech, and the insult to which he was subjected in Sahy two days later by Czech railroadmen was expunged: The following day, June 13, Hlinka set out with companions to Sahy to report the Krupina incident to the "Zupan", [)r. Victor Ravasz. As he was passing through the square a railroadman, named S<tu~hlik and the school inspector, Bartolom/lj Krpelec, both Czechs, confronted him with curses, calling him "bandit" and "agitator". Later at the "zupan's" office, Stuchlik, with 60 co-workers, delivered the following ultimatum: The "zupan" must expel Andrej iHlinka at once from ,the 1Hont "zupa" or suffer the consequences. The railroadmen (all Czechs) also declared that they would not permit Hlinka's train to leave the Sahy station. ·T he "zupan", after appealing to the Ministry in BraJtislava for instructions, assured Blinka that the culprits in both Krupina and Sahy •w ould ,be penalized as an example to others. In the a,fternoon IHlinka ,boarded •the train at Sahy. The station wa,s filled with people, waiting to see the outcome of the contest. The rallroadmen held to their purpose. After a long while the zupan arrive6l at ,t he station. The railroadmen demanded that -he order Hlinka out of the train. Lenghty nego tiations followed. Meanwhile Hlinka waited patiently within ... Finally the "zupan" announced that the ,train was about to depart. At that moment a line of railroadmen formed below the windO'W of Hlinka's compartment. They gave vent to their haitred -b y spitting at Hlinka, cursing and maligning ·h im until the train moved out oE sight. Another incident which occurred in the railroad station Trencianske Teplice, July 5, 1921, was deleted from page 459: A Czech in the station, recogmzmg Hlinka, called out, "Hang Hlinka ! " Andrej IHlinka stepped forward and asked him to identify himself. The Czech continued to shout, but did not give his name ... And a few lines further on the same page: SLOVAKIA 113 Another •Czech took up the cry, shouting, "Hang Hllnka". The p eople attacked h im, although ,Hlinka- made an effort to calm them. Mea nwhil e the train arrived and he boarded it ,w ith his secretary Ramaj . :Bishop Kmeeko a nd tMsgr. Tiso remained in the station, bu t they were unable to quiet the p eople. Several Czechs were severely beaten . Other subjects censored in Sidor's book were: criticism ·o f President Masaryk's anti-Catholic attitude (page 286) ; daims of job discrimination that while hundreds of thousands of Czechs were given the best paid jobs in Slovakia, often without qualification, more than 300,000 Slovaks were forced to emigrate because of the discrimination against them (pages 345 and 490). Also censored were references to organized Czech terror against the Slovaks, to agression against Hlinka and his followers, to denial of government protection in the exercise of freedom of speech and association, and any account of the formation of defense groups of the Slovak People's Party for the protection of its meetings .against Czech terrorists. Among the deletions were several lines about the general anti-Catholic attitude of the Czech people (page 471). Another censored book was Vo vazeni, written by a young editor of the Slovak, Alexander Mach. 46 The author had been jailed on a charge of conspiracy with Professor Dr. Vojtech Tuka against the integrity of Czecho-Slovakia. After serving part of the sentence, he was exonerated from complicity in the "plot" and released. A year later he published his book about his term in prison. In a manifestly unjust trial Dr. Vojtech Tuka was sentenced to 15 years and liberated after 10 years, when Slovakia won her autonomy on October ·6, 1938. From Mach's book the censor confiscated some 520 lines, totaling 13 pages, or 7 per cent of the 198 pages of the book. Unfortunately, I do not know of any uncensored copy of the book and can therefore quote nothing from it. To illustrate the mental climate in which the author wrote his book, I will cite some lines of his epilogue "Po roku" (After one year): I was in prisoa on charges which cannot at present be freely and sincerely dis cussed. In preparing this accoun t I was hemmed in by restrairut lest I again find myself rb ehind prison bars . I was obliged to limit my remarks lest the censor fo11bid their publication. Difficulties in the selection of material abounded. It was not easy for me to decide what to eliminate, what to omit ... Thus as I prepared 114 SLOVAKIA my narrative rhe penal code was before me. Yet I have remained completely frank; I did not change what I had •w ritten as a prisoner. I preferred only .to eliminate the sensitive issues ... Another example of the censorship of books is furnished by the interpellation presented in the Prague Parliament by the representative Msgr. Dr. Jozef Tiso, concerning the confiscation of the Kalendar Hlinkovej Slovenskej Eudovej Strany na rok 1934 (Almanac of the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party for the year 1934). Two articles which appeared over the name of Msgr. Andrej Hlinka, chairman of the Party, were confiscated. In these articles Hlinka warned the Czechs to stop persecuting the Slovaks for claiming autonomy. Even Czech authors, whom Hlinka quoted to illustrate his articles, were censored. The title of the first article was "Za ~t'astne Slovensko" (For a prosperous Slovakia). In the second article "Uprimne slovo o Nitre" (A frank comment on Nitra) Hlinka analyzed the spontaneous explosion of Slovak discontent at the festivities commemorating the 1,l00th anniversary of the first Christian church on Slovak territory, created in Nitra by Prince Pribina in about 831 A. D. It was, Hlinka declared, a display of resistance to the Prague Government, intent on exploiting these eminently Slovak festivities for their own purposes. Andrej Hlinka, who had been refused the right to speak on the program, was carried up to the stage and backed by his 200,000 followers, he read a statement in which he solemnly affirmed Slovakia's adherence to its eleven hundred years-old Christian traditions and proclaimed Slovakia's right to territorial sovereignity. This demonstration of outraged Slovak national pride was observed by foreign diplomats and news reporters, who were thus witnesses of the true will of the Slovak nation to be free and the chauvinistic aim of the Czechs as expressed in the Ottuv Obchodni Slovnik (Otta's Commercial Dictionary, 1921) volume 2, page 1217: "Slovakia shall be a colony to us. It is an error to suppose that a colony cannot have common frontiers with the mother country. An example of this is Russia and Siberia." Several lines from a poem by Ignac Grebac Orlov were· also censored. Partially censored was the article entitled "Narodna jednota" (National unity), by Dr. Jozef Tiso on the· necessity of national unity for the Slovaks. . SLOVAKIA 115 From the article "K sedemdesiatke Andreja Hlinku" (On the 70th anniversary of Andrej Hlinka) by Karol Sidor this paragraph was deleted: What occured in 11919, ,w hen 'Hlinka and other Slovak leaders were jailed, the ISiLOVAK suspended, and terrorism unleashed everywhere, was now repeated on a larger scale. In .September 193131 the 1SIJOVAK was suspended -f or 3 months ... lik,ewise the .S'.liOVAiK TYZDENNIK (1Slovak Weekly) and the T!AT·•RA:N,SKY SLOVAK (Tatra Slovak). We were left without a voice ... We were not permitted to w,rite, the people had nothing to read. And the prisons were daily being filled with objectors. Hundreds of Slovaks were suJbjected ,to investigations about their participation In the Nitra festivities ... Dr. Karol Mederly's article "Obec a politika" (Community and politics) was also confiscated, for its insistence on the right of the Slovaks to vote according to their conscience. Pictures of Hlinka carried on the shoulders of University students to the Nitra stage, the procession of 200,000 Slovaks in Nitra, and even articles of comic and satiric content were censored. The interpellation contains a complete rescript of the articles confiscated in the almanac. 47 In conclusion the writer would like to mention here that printed works of other minorities and political parties were also confiscated by the censor. CENSORSHIP OF PERIODICALS The periodicals in Slovakia have a long tradition. The oldest periodical published on Slovak territory was Schemnitzer N ewszeitung edited in Banska Stiavnica in German, in 1540-1541. Latin periodicals also had their day. The first periodical in the Slovak language was Presspurske noviny (Bratislava News - Pressburg is German for :Bratislava,), published from 1783 to 17 87. Following World War I, newspapers, reviews, and magazines promised to become more plentiful. This was especially welcome to Slovakia, where publications in the Slovak language had been prohibited by Hungarian oppressors. Under the Czecho-Slovak republic the Slovaks were prepared to -enjoy the democratic freedom promised by the Pittsburgh .P act and especially freedom of the press, speech, and association. Alas, they soon came to realize that the promises, 116 SLOVAKIA as far as Slovakia was concerned, were empty words and nothing more. In Czecho-Slovakia, the newspapers were usually owned and operated by political parties. There were very few socalled "independent newspapers". Yet even though labeled "independent", some of these were nevertheless the tool of a financial group, a political party or a governmental coalition. The newspapers in Slovakia were of two kinds: government and so-called opposition. Under opposition came the publication of the Slovak People's Party, the Slovak National Party and the Communist Party. The Hungarian and German minorities had a similar classification of newspapers. All these newspapers were characterized by their adherence to an ideology and the effort to propagate it. They were interested in social and political problems, and they never evaded any controversial issue. Their influence on the formation of public opinion was considerable. The rapid political evolution and maturation of the Slovak nation was due chiefly to the efforts of the political press of the Slovak People's Party and the Slovak National Party. The obstacles with the Czech administration plac~d in their path by means of censorship, economic and political pressure, by corruption and terrorism, by political trials and murder in its effort to suppress the Slovak drive for in-dependence, only helped to accelerate and strenghten this process. In their 20 years of forced cohabitation with the· Czechs, the Slovaks achieved a rapid political evolution, thanks to their press and they were thus prepared in the international crisis of 1938-1939 to proceed prudently toward the realization of their national aspirations. The press of the opposition encountered paralyzing difficulties in Czecho-Slovakia. In a debate before Parliament Msgr. Andrej Hlinka, chairman of the Slovak People's Party declared that under Hungary and Austria, unjustly as they had been treated, the Slovaks and the Czechs had enjoyed greater freedom of the press than in the new "brotherly" State. of Czecho-Slovakia. 48 A resolution issued by the 14th Convention of the Social Democratic Party in 1922 protested against the practice of confiscation of the press. 49 SLOVAKIA 117 Jozef Vr ab e c, representative of the Slovak People's Party, protested against the confiscation of the March 13, 1921 issue of Slovensky krest'ansky socialista, for its article "Za more, za ocean" (Beyond the Sea, beyond the Ocean). 50 In this article the Czech Government was held responsible for the emigration of thousands of Slovaks through its policy of job discrimination and its dismantling of Slovak industries. Slovenske Eudove Noviny was confiscated because it criticized the discriminatory policy against Slovak construction workers by a Czech construction enterprise, which led to a bloody fight between the Slovak jobless workers and the imported Czech workers. The police arrested the Slovaks. 51 In a parliamentary debate on Novembre 24, 1920, representative A. Bobok complained about the "terrible restriction of the press and opinion" in Czecho-Slovakia and claimed the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. 52 In a debate in the House of Representatives, June 21, 1922 Msgr. Andrej Hlinka declared: Each issue of the SLOVAK ts censored . . . ,I will show you a startling example of freedom of the press. Here it is. (He shows censored issues of the ,S1L OVAK, rwith their blank columns). Everything is censored from t he first word to the last. That is suppo,sed to be freedom of the -press, freedom to express an opinion . .. iSee, here is the S1LOVEN,S,KA. JEIDNOTA ... here, SIJOVENSKA. POLITl!KA. Here you see the freedom of the press for which I spent 4 years in jail. Here is 1SlJOViIDNSKA. PRAVDA. Notice what has been deleted. (He reads): "What Czech statistics s-h ow about •S lovak schools." And mention of "Teaching the Slovak language" was eradicated. Such freedom of the press do we enjoy in Slovakia! This has been going on now since Mairch 25 - we are systematically criticized and censored. And they tell the world we have freedom of the -press in this Republic! In Interpellation No. XXI/4226, April 26, 1923, representative Rev. Florian Tomanek interpellated the Minister of Justice on the confiscation of the Slovak, April 25, 1923, because it reprinted the article "Zapredana Orava a Spi§" (Orava and Spis Betrayed) from the newspaper Denny hlas (Daily voice) published in Cleveland, Ohio, April 3, 1923. In this article the Czech diplomat Dr. Karel Pergler, who had also signed the Pittsburgh Pact (1918), accused the CzechoSlovak Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Edvard Bene~ of 118 SLOVAKIA having sold to the Poles the Slovak territories of Orava and Spg for the coal districts of Karvina in Silesia, inhabited by Poles. 54 The Slovak, December 11, 1923, was censored for declaring inaccurate and false the statement of President Dr. T. G. Masaryk that the Slovaks and the Czechs were one and the same nation and that Slovak is a dialect of the Czech language. Representative Rev. Pavol Machacek wrote as follows in the article "Kati sa raduju" (The executioners rejoice) in the August 10, 1922 issue of Slovenske l'udove noviny: Heavy -f ines were imposed on the peasants. Financial burdens forced artisans to close their shops . . . !Government officia1's confiscated articles reprinted from Czech newspapers ... They issued the directive to destroy us at any cost. And they succeeded. ·Since the first or Januwry our daily S'LOVAK has been confiscated 45 times and the SLOVENiSIKE Im.DOVE NOWNY almost as many. Every confiscation meant a loss of 3,5004,000 crowns in damages. In thi-s brief period we were in arrears 1'70,000 crowns. The financial burden became .so greait that the S,J,;{}VAK was forced to cease publication. In an interpellation to the Minister of Interior, representative Rev. Florian Tomanek declared: The coalition government is not content to pass a cruel law, which empowers the Attorney General to confiscate newspapers before distribution. It did not hesitate to permit the violation of the secrecy of registered mail in 'Slovakia without a court order. The Plenipotentiary ordered the confiscation or an Open Letter addre!ised to the !President of the Republic, sent •b y :registered mail from Americans of .Slovak extraction. ,I ndeed, the Minister, •D r. Kallay, has empowered not only the post offices, but also the gendarmery and the police to confiscate letters without notifying the addressee.55 The Slovak in its August 19, 1933 issue complained that it had been confiscated six times in the previous week. The only reason it was not seven times is that the paper is issued only six times a week. The same paper in its August 26, 1933 issue notes: Yesterday's SLOVAK carried news of the confiscation of the TATRA!NSKY SLIOV.AK. But the 1SLIOVAK, SDOVAK TYZDENNIK, SLOVENS<KA BRAVDA, and the fortnightly tSLOVAK NA STRAZI of Zilina suffered a similar fate. In the later paper, seven columns were en<tirely deleted, so that it was issued •with two or its four pages blank. In the article56 "Nedorozumenie medzi autonomistickou tlacou a bratislavskym cenzorom" (A misunderstanding between SLOVAKIA 119 the autonomist press and the censor of Bratislava), the author -ks- (who is probably Karol Sidor, editor-in-chief of the Slovak) wrote that in the previous week an issue of the Slovak had been confiscated because it reprinted in the Slovak language an article about Slovakia written by a Frenchman, Ebray, and published in the Pester Lloyd, a newspaper permitted in Czecho-Slovakia and available in the coffeehouses of Bratislava to anybody who could read German. In a parliamentary debate on the proposal of a new press law, June 9, 1933, Representative Jozef Sivak declared: I would venture to assert ,t hat the development and evolution of d emocracy is best achieved by a ,f ree press ... ,I t is true that article 113 of our Constitution guarantees freedom of the press ... but it is nothing ,but a pa per guairantee, as are all th e guarantees in this Republic. You know that by the Pit tsburgh !Pact the Slovaks were guarantP.ed autonomy, but again this is only a paper guarantee . . . The feverish zeal of the censor knows no limits. The Attorney General confiscates everything. It is not possible in this day and age to w.rite the truth about Czech discriminrution of the !Slovak laborer, to say anything about the rights of •Slovak peasants, !Slovak workers, ,S lovak artisans and shop-keepers. No one is, allowed to criticize the ,government or individual officers. ·All is censored... even the statements of the Board of Representatives of the Slovak \People's iParty ... The following appeared in the article "Neustale habanie Slovaka" (The constant harassment of the Slovak) in its August 22, 1933 issue: Readers of the SLOVAK received the !Sunday edition with dismay. The front page, with six deletions, showed how heavily the hand of the censor had struck. On no account are we p ermitted to criticize ithe government. An article in which Msgr. Andrej Hlinka ,s et forth the significance of the Nitra centennary celebration on August 13, 1933 and praised the Slovaks tfor itheir participation in it, was censored. Confiscated also was an article by 1S enator Andrej Janecek, in which he assumed responsibility for (his part in) the Nltra episode. A report on the investigation of several partici pants in the Nltra festivities was confiscaited, although the government had encouraged attendance. Other confiscations were: Part of the report on the fiasco perpetrated by government parties in Nitra who, although a minority in the district, had convened to protest · the €Vents of August 13, 1933 ; · Slav repor ts on •t he Nitra centenary; ·Reflections on the Pittsburgh Pact. It is not unusual for us to b e subjected to confiscations - evea dally. But what the censor did with our !Sunday edition outrageously surpass·e s anything ever attempted before. Our party will adopt -s uitable measures to defend our consti- 120 SLOVAKIA t uti onal r igh t to free dom of th e press, denied us by th e " lords" i n the governm ent. W e will e m ploy a ll possible means to r each on r read er s. On its anniversary the Slovak was confiscated for the editorial "Patnast' rokov Slovaka" (Fifteen years of the Slovak), which conveyed the impressions of its readers on the reappearance of the Slovak after three months' suspension by the Attorney General. The same issue was confiscated for its information about the activities of Americans of Slovak descent in the United States, a reprint from Osadne hlasy (Parish News ), a Slovak weekly in Chicago, Illinois, and one part of an article by a Czech signatary of the Pittsburgh Pact. 57 Interpellation No. 1193/ IX, November 10, 1937, proffered by representatives Karol Sidor and Dr. Martin Sokol was motiviated by the confiscation of two articles in Slov enska pravda and Slovak, November 10 and 11, 1937. The title of the two articles was "Zakony demonstracii". They included a report on the spirited demonstrations of the studets of Bratislava University, demanding the slovakization of the University, of government bureaus, and of the army and police in Slovakia, under the slogan "Slovakia for the Slovaks". It carried an account of the brutal intervention of Czech police, who severely beat the students with sabres and clubs. An illustration showing a hand brandishing a club (used by the police ) was also confiscated. The headline "Demand plebiscite for Slovak autonomy!" was deleted from the February 10, 1938 issue of the Slovak, but the same line was left by the censor in the text of the article. Such inconsistencies in the practice of censorship were frequent. For this reason the Czech journalist Dr. Benes (not the President Dr. Benes) could declare in the organ of the Union of Czecho-Slovakia Journalists: The pr ess is practically ou tlawed in Czechoslovakia . .. a nd fr ee• dom of the press •has become degenerated by confisca tions .58 Such a statement, naturally, could not have been published in Slovakia. In an evening discussion at the Czechoslovak National Council, the Czech editor Jan· Hrabanek declared that the articles of the Constitution concerning freedom of the press were not respected, that a permit for printing newspapers SLOVAKIA 121 was required, that the publication of periodicals was too often suspended and the right of distribution forfeited on the basis of a mere suspicion, without any conviction of a penal act. 59 After 1932, when young Slovak members of government parties were more attuned to the ideas and attitudes of the majority of the Slovak nation, the governmental press in the Slovak language also began to appear with blank pages. In the May 5, 1939 issue (page 90) of Zem (Soil) a political magazine of young Agrarians, the editor wrote an article entitled "Komu osozi cenzura?" (Who Benefits from censorship?) Among other things he said: Newspapers with blank pages ... that is a product of the censor. The author sees thi.s miscarrriage of his intellectual effort and loses heart. Readers are cheated by receiving blank newspapers . . . Jn recent times the censor is busier than ever before. Formerly only newspapers which habHually pabl!shed a rticles sharply criticizing the government were censored. These were chiefly the papers of the opposition. •B ut that is a. thing of the past. Nowadays even the newsp a pers of government pal'ties are censored and they appear now with the familiar blank spaces. What was most offensive to the Slovaks was the confiscation of the literary magazine Slovenske Pohl'ady, No. l0A, 1932, published with the date of October 28, the "Day of Freedom", the official national festivity of the CzechoSlovak Republic. Slovenske Pohl'ady, founded in 1846, had never been confiscated before. It had always stood as a symbol of the independent cultural life of the Slovaks and was dear to the heart of every Slovak. Why was this revered non-political periodical censored? Its editor Dr. Stefan Krcmery, submitted to criticism the Czechs in Slovakia, because they did not read or buy Slovak books and despised Slovak literature. In the other censored article he reviewed very favorably a new volume of poems Hlas krvi (The Voice of blood), published by Andrej Zarnov, author of the confiscated volume of poems Straz pri Morave, mentioned on page 53. The cultural magazines Pero (Pen), Pramen (Source), Elan (Impetus) and DAV (The Masses) and the humoristic periodical Osa (Wasp) and Kocur (Cat) were also confiscated several times. 122 SLOVAKIA CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS OF OTHER NATIONALITIES LIVING IN CZECHO-SLOV AKIA The Slovak press was not alone in the battle for freedom of the press. Other ethnical groups living in CzechoSlovakia were also hindered in the free expression of ideas. It is true that the Czech Government was much more lenient toward the Germans and Magyars, who were favorably situated and could appeal to the German Reich and Hungary for moral and financial support. But the case of the Ukrainians living in the territory of "Subcarpathian Russia" was similar to that of the Slovaks. By the Peace Treaties of Saint Germain-en-Laye, France, on October 10, 1919, this territory which had belonged to Hungary before World War I was incorporated in Czecho-Slovakia as an autonomous entity. Its position in the Czecho-Slovak Republic was to be that of a federated state. But, as in the Slovak case, the Czechs failed to honor their obligations and the Ruthenians were treated as another Czech colony. Its political and economic exploitation was in open contradiction to the terms of the St. Germain-en-Laye treaties. The po:.. sition of the Subcarpathian Ruthenians was as hopeless as that of the Slovaks. But this poor and exploited nation was also aware of its national origin and of the Czech aims of domination. Its representatives in the Prague Parliament and its periodicals followed generally the same line as that of the Slovaks. They demanded their rights, guaranteed by the peace treaties, especially the right of national self-determination. · The Czech methods of domination in Subcarpathian Russia were similar to those employed in Slovakia: military and political terrorism, economic exploitation and impoverishment, political corruption and censorship, combined with the curtailing of freedom of speech and association. In Parliament the Ruthenians reacted in the same way as the Slovaks. The January. 31, 1926 issue of the newspaper Karpatska pravda (Carpathian truth), published in Uzgorod, was censor·ed in its editorial "Continuous Oppression" for this statement: The cup is full to overflowing. ·T he poor people of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, ruthl essly oppressed ·by the Czech bourgeoisie, suffers cold, SLOVAKIA 123 unemploy men t, hu nger, pove r ty a nd e ndles·s mis,ery. Eig-h teen years we h ave lived in "fr ater nal" union with Czecho,S lovak ia, but nothing h as ·been do ne to improve social cond Hions .. .so On April 8, 1937 Representative Dr. S. A. Fencik interpellated the Minister of the Interior on the confiscation of issue No. 216 of Na§ put (Our way ), published in Uzgorod. The periodical was confiscated on the pretex that the censored article might disturb the public peace. It was entitled "Voice of a Slovak" and included a quotation from the daily Slovak, March 19, 1937, stating that the establishment by Prague of a "Gubernatorial Council" for Subcarpathian Russia is but a surrogate for the autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution. The article was not confiscated in the Slovak, but the Na§ put was confiscated for informing its readers .a bout the Slovak' s views. The No. 212 issue of Na§ put, 1937 was confiscated on the same pretex, i. e. that it might disturb the public peace. The article "Autonomy" was confiscated for the lines: " ... this a utonomy is guaranteed only on paper . To this day it h as not been r ealized. In eighteen yea.rs no effort has been made to b egi n to put it into effect."61 The press of the Czech opposition also shared the fate of that of the other nationalities. Only a very insignificant percentage of Czechs however, voted for their opposition parties. The others were generally satisfied with their privileged position and had no desire to change it. On September 16, 1930 the representatives of the Czech National Democracy, Dr. Karel Pergler and Ji.ti Sti'ibrny interpellated the Minister of Justice on the confisc ation of the periodical Franta, vol. III. No. 21 , March 6, 1930: Despite the guarantees of freedom or speech and press contained i n the Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak •Republic, o ur legislative bodies have not checked or even improved the preventive censorship inconsistent with democracy, especially in peacetime. Under a r egi me li k e ours one wou ld not expect a censor.s hip and confiscation policy which ·r enders impossible a decent and desirable criticism of ideas and political principles h el d by government functionaries. But the exact opposite is the ca,se. In this Repu1blic it is not permitted to discuss people in the government and their views on any topic. As a proo1' of my assertion, I have here several periodicals that suf·fered con fiscation. The classic example of the confiscation policy adopted by the government in contradiction to the most basic concepts of freedom of the press and discussion, was the confiscation of the March 6, 19·30 issue of F'RQ)l''DA. The article "Two Concepts" by F. Schwartz was the offender ... 124 SLOVAKIA This article contained criticism of Dr. Tomas G. Masaryk, President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. Another article "Co je vice nez 7. marec" (What is more significant than March 7) written by Josef Vodracka and published in the same issue, was also confiscated, because of its criticism of Masaryk's philosophy of Czech statehood. (March 7 was Masaryk's birthday and a national holiday.) In the article "Napoleonsky rys" (Napoleonic feature), published in the same issue, a description of Masaryk's charact€r was also censored. Another article "Muz Bible" (Biblical man) by Kamil Masin was censored for its designation of Masaryk as a "messianist" (man of Providence). In the same issue also F. Petrik's article "Rozsevac a znec" (Sower and harvester) on the ideological inconsequence of Masaryk's philosophy and F. Schwarz's article "Souhlasime s Masarykem" (We agree with Masaryk) along with several other articles were censored. The interpellation continued: The press wa·s at one time the principal means of maintaining freedom and national consciousness. In the Czecho,Slovak Republic, the press has become the .frightening destroyer of every freedom because an honest and independent press has been annihilated. It serves now as ~ blindfold for the people ...62 This example shows that censorship in Czecho-Slovakia was like an octopus which extended its arms into all areas of public life and impeded the march of democracy and the natural evolution of the various ethnical groups. SLOVAK DEFENSE AGAINST THE EFFECTS OF CENSORSHIP A direct result of the systematic violation of freedom of the press by governmental censorship was that Slovak political parties were denied normal communication with their members. At the disposal of the Government were the police, the army, the gendarmry and about 300,000 privileged Czech functionaries in Slovakia, whose task it was to hinder the activity of Slovak political forces, working and fighting for the freedom and independence of Slovakia. The people of Slovakia, deprived of the most effective means of communication, the press, which was constantly, almost daily, confiscated, the radio was State-owned and controlled, and never at the disposal of opposition parties, SLOVAKIA 125 were more and more interested in knowing, what new injustice was committed against the Slovak nation. Several methods of rendering the censorship less effective were developed by the political parties. These political parties, who owned many of the newspapers, constantly challenged the respective Ministers in Parliament by interpellations. Their interpellations were always published, together with the censored articles, in the Tisky Poslanecke Snemovny N<irodniho Shromazdeni Repub liky Ceskoslovenske (a publication comparable to the U.S. Congressional Record) and this procedure gave them immunity and the right to be reprinted in the newspapers. But it was not unusual for the censor to confiscate even these immunized articles and interpellations. The interpellation had to be signed by at least twenty representatives. Small parties, which lacked this number, obtained the necessary signatures from the representatives of other opposition parties. The interpellations were addressed to the Minister of the Interior, or the Minister of Justice. The reply of the Government to the interpellation, which also requested that the matter be discussed, was usually negative.If a written answer was requested, the Minister almost invariably approved the procedure of the censor. Here is an example: Reply of the Government to the interpellation of representative Andrej Hlinka and associates concerning .the confiscation of the dally SLOVAK, No. 105, May 9, 1934 (No. 2712/VII). - The confiscation of the portions adduced In the lnterpellatlon . . . executed by the office -of the Attorney General in Bratislava, •w as exa mined by the regional court In Bratislava and approved In full. The complaint challenging this decision was rejected by the 1Prlme Minister: J. Malypetr.63 If nothing was found wrong in the censored article, the reply to the interpellation was: .. . I find that some portions adduced in interpellation No. 3610/· XIV were confiscated without a legal r eason. I informed the office of the Attorney General in Nitra that thes e articles ... are nothini;: more than poli,tical r eflections and attacks and their suppression cannot be justified by law. I hope that similar cases will not be repeated .. ,64 But the censorship policy was not modified by a few decisions in favor of the opposition's press. Another procedure used by the opposition press to 126 SLOVAKIA counteract the effects of censorship was to send the first printed copy to the censor's office and simultaneously to deliver several hundred copies to the public vendors. The Bratislava readers were usually waiting and so at least some of them were able to obtain uncensored copies, which passed clandestinely from hand to hand. The procedure was the same for the towns and villages near the capital city of Bratislava. Workers, employees, railroadmen and occasional travelers, women from the villages selling vegetables in the market, all cooperated in smuggling the uncensored copies of newspapers out of Bratislava. Most helpful in this distribution of uncensored copies were the Slovak railroadmen. Each town in which the train stopped, had its copy of the uncensored newspaper. This was done with the utmost caution, since those involved could have been charged with a criminal act against the security of the State at the risk of imprisonment or loss of job. After the censor completed his job, the Attorney-General ordered the police to confiscate the newspaper. The policemen seized the unsold uncensored copies from the news-stands. In coffeehouses they seized uncensored copies from the hands of readers, who had not reali21ed in good time the presence of the officers and failed to hide their copies. Articles from confiscated political, social and cultural periodicals, were typed and distributed among interested people, chiefly university students and graduates, who formed little clubs to discuss them. The same was done with confiscated books or volumes of poetry. The writer recalls how, after the publication of Sidor's and Mach's books, mentioned previously, he was given one typewritten copy of the censored parts of the books, and was required to type at least fiV'e new copies and distribute them among five other persons. Such distribution was possible only among persons who were trustworthy and of the same political convictions. The result was that almost everybody in Slovakia could have his own copy of the censored parts of the books. The secretariats of the political parties cooperated with students, workers and peasants in this underground press and the solidarity of the nation as a whole was wonderful. It is true that many people were caught and penalized, but that was the risk. SLOVAKIA 127 Students in foreign countries supplied information about the views of the foreign press on the Slovak problem and themselves published the Slovak viewpoint in foreign newspapers. They smuggled into the country articles about Slovakia from the foreign press. The customs examination of Slovak students traveling abroad or returning from foreign countries was viery thorough. The clandestine importing of news reports from abroad was even more dangerous than the distribution of censored articles in Slovakia. If caught in possession of any news item unfavorable to Czecho-Slovakia, a person could be prosecuted for "association with the enemies of the State", for espionage, or for plotting against the State. Information brought from abroad was discussed only in small confidential groups of students and intellectuals, and secret reports were given to certain leaders of political parties. The Czechs were not generally able to identify the persons responsible for this smuggling of information. But they never forgot. During his studies in Zagreb (Croatia) in 1937 or 1938, one of my friends wrote several articles about the oppression of the Slovaks in Czecho-Slovakia. For these and other articles written for the Croatian press ten years later in 1947 he was sentenced by a Czech Communist "people's court" to eight years in prison. CONCLUSION Freedom of the press consist~ in the free gathering of information, in free communication, in the free publication of information, in the free printing and distribution of published information and in the free subscription and free reading of published information. In Czecho-Slovakia these freedoms were very limited and in Slovakia they were practically non-existent. If one succeeded in gathering information, it became impossible to communicate it if the Czechs felt that it criticized or threatened their hegemony. To publish such information signified sure intervention of the censor and meant the consequent confiscation of the entire edition of the book or periodical, in which it was published. To diffuse information confiscated by the censor was 128 SLOVAKIA considered by the Czechs as an act against the security of the State. The freedom to subscribe to and to read published information was also very limited. Anyone found to be in possession of censored information was ,exposed to the danger of being arrested and penalized. From pertinent material available to the writer and from his own experiences in Czecho-Slovakia in the years 1918-1938, he has reached the conclusion that despite the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, censorship in its most drastic form was widely employed against the opposition and the minorities in direct contradiction to the Constitution and the so-called "democratic" system which it guaranteed. Public opinion in Slovakia could not manifest itself freely in the press and information was diffused chiefly through the channels generally resorted to by underground organizations. The people of Slovakia learned to read and interpret the blank spaces of the censored newspapers and what they "read" this way was much more unfavorable to the Czech system than the impression the censored words would have provoked. The impossibility of frank discussion had created an atmosphere of hatred in which the Slovaks renounced once and for all any discussion with the Czechs. They began to take their own course which led logically to the unanimous declaration of the independent Slovak Republic, March 14, 1939, by the autonomous Slovak Parliament. Censorship applied against the Slovaks proved that freedom cannot be suppressed indefinitely, because it is a part of the condition of our life, our development, and our progress. In its essence our soul is free. Whoever suppresses the freedom of others, will himself lose freedom. The Czechs lost their freedom on the very day when the Slovaks declared their independence. Bohemia became a Protectorate of Germany. When with the aid of the Soviet army and through the indifference of the Western world, the Czechs enslaved the Slovaks a second time after World War II, they lost their freedom too, and became a satelite of Soviet Russia. In order SLOVAKIA 129 to keep the Slovaks in Czech slavery, they sold their own freedom to the Muscowite tyrant, exposing to Red danger the entire Central and Occidental Europe. The words of the great Slovak poet Jan Kollar (17931852) are most appropriate here: Whoever respects the freedom of others Is himself worthy of freedom. Whoever enslaves with handcuffs Is himself a slave ! 65 FOOTNOTES 1. "The Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic", with introduction by Ji:ri Hoetzl and V. Joachim, American Association for International Conciliation, Pt,blications, No. 179 (October 1922), 2. 3. Ibid., p. 443. Karl Falk, "Strife in Czechoslovakia: The German Minority Question", Foreign Policy Reports, XIV, (March 15, 1938), p. 4. The Cleveland Pact stipulated that the Slovaks and Czechs would form II federative union of states. Slovakia was to enjoy complete national autonomy, including its own Parliament and government administration, its own political and financial institutions, complete freedom to develop culturally and the right to use Slovak as its official language. The form of government was to be democratic, operating in a union of two autonomous states. The Pittsburgh Pact guaranteed that "Slovakia shall have its own administration, its own tribunals and its own Parliament. Slovak shall be the official language in schools, in government offices and in public life in general." Sbirka zakonu a narizeni statu ceskoslovenskeho. Part 23 (March 31, 1923), pp. 207-218. Sbirka zakonu a nafizen£ statu ceskoslovenskeho. (1920) . Ibid. Part 44 (July 15, 1933) pp. 708-709. Sbirka zakonu a nafizeni statu ceskoslovenskeho. Part 44 (July p. 441. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8 15, 1933), p. 707. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. Ibid. ( 1933) p. 771. Ibid. Part 56 (July 7, 1934) pp. 513-516. Sbirka zakonu a nafizeni statu ceskoslovenskeho. (1934), p. 598. Ibid. (1935), p. 527. Ibid. (1937), p. 786. Ibid. Part 44 (July 15, 1933) pp. 709-714. Sbirka zakonu a narizeni statu ceskoslovenskeho. Part 35, (May 23, 19i6) pp. 477-479. I!Jid. pp. 479-541. Imrich Stanek, Zrada a pad. (Praha: Statnf Nakladatelstvf Politicke Literatury, 1958), p. 33. SLOVAKIA 130 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. Imrich Stanek, Op. cit., p. 41. Ibid., p. 33. Ibid., p. 34. Imrich Stanek, Op. cit., p. 34. Ibid., p. 35. loc. cit. loc. cit. loc. cit. Ibid., pp. 38-39. Ibid., p. 39. Ibid., p. 40. Ibid., p. 32. Ibid., pp. 41-43. Lucy Maynard Salmon, The newspaper and authority. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1923), p. 3. Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka (1864-1926), Bratislava: Knihtlaciaren Sv. Andrej a, 1934), p. 359. Culen, Konstantin. "Sloboda tlace v CSR", Bratstvo, (May 23, 1951). Machacek, Pavol. "Katovia sa raduju", Slovenske .l!udove Novi· ny", (August 10, 1923). pp. 1-2. Ceskoslovenska Republika, Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, No. 150, (1922). Karol Sidor, Op. cit., pp. 487-488. Ibid., p. _426. Ibid., p. 425. Culen, Konstantin, "Slaboda tlace v CSR", Bratstvo, (May 23, 1951). C. A. Macartney, Hungary and her successors, pp. 137-139. "Azda takto", Nastup, (November 1, 1933), p. 163. "Nerovny boj", Nastup, (November 1, 1933), p. 162. Ceskoslovenska Republika, Niirodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, No. 5280, (1925). Head of a region. Administrative region of Slovakia. Sano Mach, Vo viheni, (Bratislava: Jednota, 1930). Ceskoslovenska Republika, Niirodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, 'l)sky, No. 2799, (1934). Culen, Konstantin. "Slaboda tlace v CSR", Bratstvo, (May 23, 1951). Ceskoslovenska Socialne demokraticka strana. Protokol sjazdu z 12. a 22. aprila 1922, p. 203. Ceskoslovenska Republika. Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka· Snemovna, Tisky, 1. volebni obdobi, 2. zasedani, No. 1882, 1921. Op. cit., No. IV/4098, 1923. (;ulen, Kon~tantin, "Slcboda tlace v CSR", Bratstvo, (May 23, 1951). SLOVAKIA 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. fi3. 64. 65. 131 ceskoslovenska Republika, Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, No. 3584, (June 21, 1922.). ceskoslovenska Republika, Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, No. XXI/4226, (April 26, 1923). ceskoslovenska Republika, Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, No. VI/4636, (May 27, 1924). Slovak, July 23, 1933. Slovak, J anuary 26, 1934. Tisk a novinari, XII, No. 5, (1938). Druhy kruh diskusnich vecerii Narodni Rady ceskoslovenske", Cechoslovak a nase zahranici. Vsenarodni mesicnik. Vol. XV, No. 4-5, (April-May, 1935), p. 100. ceskoslovenska Republika, Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, 1937, VI. volebne obdobi, 5 zasedani, No. 876/ VI, April 8. Ibid, XV/4226, (May 25, 1923). ceskoslovenska Republika. Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, 628/IX, (September 16, 1930). ceskoslovenska Republika. Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, No. 2951, (1934). ceskoslovenska Republika. Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna, Tisky, I. volebni obdobi, 5. zasedani, No. 2591, (July 28, 1922), pp. 10-11. Jan Kollar, Slavy dcera. 1824. BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS <::incik, Joseph G. Anglo-Saxon and Slovak-Avar Patterns of the Cuthbert Gospel. Series Cyrilomethodiana, v. 1. Cleveland: Slovak Institute, 1958. Delaney, Edward L. False freedom . Los Angeles: Sequoia University Press, 1954. Diplomaticus. The Czechs and their minorities. London, Thornton Butterworth, (1938). Durcansky, Ferdinand. Pohl'ad na slovensku politicku minitlost'. Bratislava: Ludotypia, 1943. Hrusovsky, Frantisek. Slovenske dejiny. 6th ed. Turciansky Sv. Martin: Matica Slovenska, 1940. Kerr, Walter. Criticism and censorship. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1956. Kimball, Young and Lawrence, Raymond D. Bibliography on censorship and propaganda. University of Oregon publications, v. 1, 1928. Journalism series, No. 1. Eugene: University Press, 1928. Mach, Sano. Vo viizeni. Censored ed. Bratislava: Jednota, 1930. Macartney, C. A. Hungary and her successors. The treaty of Trianon and its consequences, 1919-1937. New York, Oxford University Press, 1937. McKean, Richard et al. The freedom to read. Perspective and program. New York: R. R. Bowker, 1957. SLOVAKIA 132 Miskovic, Alojz and Pisut, Milan. Dejiny slovenskej literatury pre VI. triedu slovenskych gymnazii a pre ucitel'ske akademie. Bratislava: Statne nakladatel'stvo, 1941. Mraz, Andrej. Die Literatur der Slovaken. Berlin: Volk und Reich Verlag, n. d. Salmon, Lucy Maynard. The newspaper and authority. New York: Oxford University Press, 1923. Seton-Watson, R. W. A history of the Czechs and Slovaks. New York: Hutchinson and Co., 1943. Sidor, Karol. Andrej Hlinka (1864-1926). Censored ed. Bratislava: Knihtlaciareii Sv. Andreja, 1934. -Andrej Hlinka (1864-1926). Uncensored ed. Bratislava: Knihtlaciarer1 Sv. Andreja, 1934. - Slovcici v zahranicnom odboji. Bratislava: Jednota, 1928. Slovensky Oslobodzovaci vybor. Prcivo Slovcikov na samostatnost' vo svet• le dokumentov. Sv. 1: Biela kniha. By Ferdinand Durcansky. Buenos Aires: Dorrego, 1954. Stanislav, Jan. Slovanski apostoli Cyril a Metod • ich cinnost' vo Vel'ko• moravskej risi. Bratislava: Academia Scientiarum et Artium Slovaca, 1945. Thomas, S. Harris. Czechoslovakia in European history. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. Zubek, Theodoric J., O.F.M., S.T.D. The Church of silence in Slovakia. Published by John J. Lach, 1956. PAMPHLETS Comite d'action Slovaque. Aide-memoire sur la necessite de plebiscite en Slovaquie. Paris: 1946. Comite d'action Slovaque. Aide-memoire sur l'existence de la Republique Slovaque et sur la necessite de conclure le traite de paix avec elle. Paris: 1946. Durcansky, Ferdinand. The international asp zct of the Slovak question. New York: Slovak Liberation Committee, 1954. Jakobson. R. Slavic languages. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. Slovak Action Committee, Slovak National Council in London, Slovak League of America and Canadian Slovak League of Canada. Memorandum presented to the Peace Conference concerning the rationality of existence of Czecho-Slovakia. Paris: 1946. Th e Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact. (Chi cago) : The Slovak Catholic Federation of America, 1934. Stewart, John F. Slovakia, its people and right to sovereign independence and freedom. Information leaflets, No. 7. Edinburgh: Scottish League for European Fre<>dom, n. d. PERIODICALS AND ARTICLES "Azda takto," Ncistup (Nove.' llber 1, 1933). ceskoslovensko a na.se zahrar,;i:i, XV, No. 4-5 (April-May, 1935). "The Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic", with introduction SLOVAKIA 133 by Jiri Hoetzl and V. Joachim. American Association for International Conciliation, Publications, No. 179) (October, 1922). culen, Konstantin. "Sloboda tlace v cSR", Bratstvo (May 23, 1951). Falk, Karl. "Strife in Czechoslovakia", Foreign Policy Reports, XIV (March 15, 1938). Hlinka, Andrej. "Protestujeme", Slovak (December 22, 1921). "Komu osozi cenzura?", Zem, III, No. 9 (May 5, 1937). Machacek, Pavel "Katovia sa raduju", Slovenske l'udove noviny, (August 10, 1923). "Nedorozumenie medzi autonomistickou tlacou a bratislavskym cenzorom", Slovak, (August 27, 1933). "Nerovny boj", Nastup (November 1, 1933) . "Neustale habanie Slovaka", Slovak (August 27, 1933). " O cenzure", Slovak (May 16, 1934). "Pracuje cenzura pre stat alebo pre politicke strany?", Slovak (September 15, 1933). "Preco nas cenzurovali", Slovak (April 29, 1934). "150 rocna cenzura rakuska platna este aj v republike", Slovak (June 11, 1933). Slovak (June 11, 1933). Slovak (September 15, 1933). Slovak (January 26, 1934). Slovak (June 13, 1934). Taylor, Paul B. "Partition of Czechoslovakia", Foreign Policy Reports, (November 15, 1938). - "Germany's expansion in Eastern Europe", Foreign Policy Reports, XV (May 15, 1939). Tisk a novinai'i, XII, No. 5 (1938). PUBLIC DOCUMENTS ceskoslovenska Republika. Narodni Shromazdeni, Poslanecka Snemovna. Tisky. Years: 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924. 1925, 1926, 1929, 1930, 1934, 1935. Sbirka zakonu a narizeni statu ceskoslovenskeho. Years: 1920, 1922, 1923, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1~37. THESIS Woytko, Sister Mary Gabrielle, 0.P. Slovakia's road to statehood. A Study of the efforts of Slovakia to secure national independence. Thesis submitted to the Graduate School of Duquesne University as a thesis under the title "A study of the efforts of Slovakia to secure national independence" in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts. (Published by John Lach, 1957).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Censorship Policies in Czecho-Slovakia 1918-1938 Description An account of the resource Eugene Urban Slovakia, Vol. 15 (No. 38), 1965 pp. 93-133 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Urban, Eugen A., 1914-1972 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1965 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9d27e4c968c910c638982af71ec340fe.pdf a82a5dc86909659fac1e351a8a65c7e2 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 51 The Influence of Juraj Tranovsky's Cithara Sanctorum in Slovakia Jaroslav J. Vajda If not a landmark, Juraj Tranovsky's hymnal and prayerbook, Cithara Sanctorum, Pfsne duchovnf stare i nave (The Lyre of the Saints, Spiritual Songs Old and New, 1636), is at least a high point in Slovakia's devotional literature, especially when one includes with it Tranovsky's collection of formal liturgical prayers, Phiala Odoramentorum , Modlitby kfest'anske (A Vial of Fragrances, Christian Prayers , 1635) . Having been reprinted in more than 150 editions at home and abroad since its publication in Levoca in 1636 , the Cithara Sanctorum ranks high in popularity, usage and influence, being probably the most reprinted literary work produced in Slovakia. Our interest is in the place and impact of this book, affectionately known by Tranovsky's Latin name as the Tranoscius, in Slovak devotional literature. The Cithara, like other influential books, is the result of events and forces operating in the 16th and 17th centuries in Central Europe. Juraj Tranovsky was born on March 27, 1592 in the city of Tesfn in Silesia, of Polish parents of the Lutheran faith. 1 His earliest schooling was in a Latin grammar school in Tesfn , from which at the age of 12 he was sent to the German school in Hubin in Lower Lusatia, and from there to a humanist academy in Kolberg, Pomerania, two years later. At the age of 16 he matriculated at the University of Wittenberg, made famous by Luther and his successors. For two years young Tranovsky tutored a family at Trebon castle in southern Bohemia; he taught one year in Prague , and then accepted a position as rector of a school in Holesov, in eastern Moravia. The first traces of his poetic talents appeared in a Latin poem he wrote on the Nativity for St. Nicholas' Church in Prague , at the age of 20. In 1615 he married Anna Polan , with whom he had nine children, five sons and four daughters. Upon his ordina- �52 SLOVAKIA tio n into th e Lutheran mini stry he wa s called to be rector of the school in V alasske M ez irici, n ear H olesov in Moravia. When the local p as tor died , Tra n ovsky was called to take his place, and thu s began hi s 10-year p astor a te in M ezirici . Imm edia tely upo n his assumption of pa ri sh duties , T ran ovsk y embarked on a produ ctive p astoral a nd lite rary career. H e rebuilt the local lite rary socie ty, whi ch also included a choir , wrote a commentary and se ries of se rm o n s o n the Book of R evela tion , and wo rked on a Czech tran sla tion of the Au gsburg Confession of 1530 , a m aj or production which was pu blished in 162 0 . 2 The publication o f T ra n ovsky's tra n sla tion of thi s fo und a ti on al Lutheran symbol coincided with the defeat of the Protesta nts at the Ba ttle of White M ounta in , which effectively ended the free course of P rotestantism in Au stri a. Thou sand s of Luther a n s a nd Bohemi an Brethren fl ed before the wave of victo riou s Catholi c forces ea stward , in to Moravia, then into Slovakia a nd Hun gary, findin g re fu ge for a numbe r of years in central and eastern Slovakia . Amon g those caught in this refugee tide we re Tra novsky , hi s famil y, a nd hi s congregation in M eziri ci. The Lutheran cluster fl ed fro m pl ace to pl ace, u sually seekin g a nd findin g refuge a m o n g Hun ga ri a n Luthe ran n obility and gentry fi ghtin g a rearguard action . In the three years from 162 1 to 1624, Tran ovsky lost three children and was bri efl y imprisoned . F orced to leave M o ravia o n orders of Fe rdin a nd II , T ranovsky fl ed to Bielsko near T esfn , where he found employm ent as court preach er with hi s future p a tro n , Baron J an Szunyogh. T his reprieve la sted two years . In 1627 , with but ten year s of hi s life before him , h e took refu ge fro m furth e r per secutio n in the castles of Buda tfn a nd O rava, wh ere h e also se rved as court preache r for G abriel Illeshazy. Ju st as Luther ' s W artburg refu ge permitted him to transla te the Bible, T ranovsky's castle exil e resulted in th e produ ctio n of a L a tin h ymn collectio n e ntitl ed Odarum sacrarum sive H ym norum . .. libri tres (Three Books of Sac red Odes o r H ymn s, 1629) . By 1632 Tra n ovsky h ad assum ed the pastorate of the church in Liptovsky Sv . Mikul as , whi ch h e se rved until his death five year s la ter. A s if co n sciou s of a n early d emise, Tra novsky wo rked assi du ou sly to fini sh hi s collectio n of fo rm al liturgical p raye rs, the Phiala Odoram entorum , w hi ch a ppeared a year befo re the publi cation of hi s monumental work , the h ymnal Cithara Sanctorum in 1636 , both printed in L evoca. �SLOVAKIA 53 Tranovsky's brief but productive life cam e to an end on M ay 29 , 163 7 at the age of 45, but the results of his work continue to exe rt their influence to this day. Jozef Min arik has pointed out that the Cithara Sanctorum served in the past as a textbook of versification and prosody, and also as a " well spring of na tional consciou sn ess," besides being the '' first step in the creation of national mu sic.'' 3 Its primary impact , however , was and has rem a ined upo n the spiritual life of Slovak Christians. I emphasize Slovak Christians without regard to d enomin ation, for Tranovsky's work was ecumenical in nature and left its mark on Roman Catholic worship life as well. The Cithara was published in Levoca by V avrinec Brewer in 1636 as the answer to a growing need since the battle a t White M ounta in had stopped the production and shipment of C zech hymnals into Slovakia. It and its co mpa nion, the Phiala, were born of necessity . Slovak Lutherans, who comprised some 80 % of the Slovak popula tion a hund red years after the R eform ation ,4 did not have to p rodu ce their own devotional mate rials , since they understood the Czech language and could u se the hymn als of the Bohemian Brethren and C zech Lutheran s, eve n thou gh their theology was not totally in agreem ent with the Hu ssites and Calvinists. In the early R eformati on years , befo re th e edu cation of the laity becam e widespread , the local pastors were in co ntrol of the worship m aterials and u sed loose sheets of pa per to rep roduce the hymns which they considered appropriate for their congregational worship , the hymns being lined out for the congregation by the cantor or choir director. In thi s way a sizable repertory of hymns was developed in local co ngregations, resultin g in m an y ha ndwritten hymn accompanim en t edi tion s, or partitury, as each large Lutheran center p roduced or ad a pted its own . Al so b y this rote system of learnin g, the faithful (prima rily illiterate) acquired a growing devotional treasure, for the hymns were form s of praye r serving the C hri stian s as inspiration , com fo rt , and chall en ge, as did -the P salms of D avid. Those who we re •still illitera te could a m ass a litera ry and d evotional treasu re in a lan gu age they could unders tand , and thus their faith need s were supplied until the Slovak Lutherans could fo rm all y print p rayer books and hymn als of their ow n. T he hym ns we re not u sed alo ne, of cou rse, and we mu st pa use to mention the impo rtance of Luther ' s Sm all Ca techism in the spiritual and devotional life of the Lutheran laity. All children we re required to m emorize this brief exposition of the chief ar ticles of the C hristian faith , �54 SLOVAKIA and it became for many a daily review and anchoring of their faith as they repeated its simple explanations in their morning and evening devotions. In fact, the first printed collections of domestically composed Slovak hymns were appended to translations or reprintings of Luther 's Small Catechism. Thus , the only extant sizeable collection of hymns prior to Tranovsky' s hymnal is that of Daniel Pribis, a contemporary of Tranovsky, who collected and published 116 hymns in 1635, a year before the Cithara appeared. 5 Pribis's hymns did not come out as a separate book, as did Tranovsky's , but as an appendage to a revised translation of Luther's Catechism. This trilogy of books has been the foundation of Lutheran piety since the early years of the Reformation: the Bible , the Catechism, and the hymnal with its prayers. There would have been no such hymnal as the Tranoscius, or later the Catholic hymnal, had it not been for the Reformation and its universal impact on education, worship, and literature; or at least if the Reformation we know had not occurred, there would have had to develop a similar movement toward use of vernacular tongues . But even the Lutheran Reformation did not originate the basic conditions for use of the vernacular in the church and eventually in educational and professional areas. The first step in the eventual production of devotional literature in Slovakia was the introduction of the vernacular among the Slavs in the 9th century. For that major historical contribution, credit must be given to the patron saints of all the Slavs, the Macedonian missionary brothers, Cyril and Methodius, whose invention of the Slavonic alphabet and their translation of the scriptures into a language understandable to the Slavs, as well as their use of the vernacular in the liturgy, were all basic essentials in the ultimate production of vernacular devotional literature . 6 The n ext decisive development was the Hussite reform movement in Bohemia, challenging the dominance of Latin in the Western Church, and capturing the support of the populace by not only appealing to their nationalistic loyalties over against the Roman curia, but by proclaiming the Gospel in the language of the people and giving the faithful hymns to sing in their own tongue . The Reform movement would have died without the subsequent successful Reformation of Martin Luther, who like his Slavic forerunners, insisted on the vernacular in his Deutsche Messe, translated the Scrip- �SLOVAKIA 55 tures into German to make them accessible to the people, and then sang the Reformation into the hearts of the people with his hymns, many of which were set to popular tunes. A century later, Juraj Tranovsky found himself heir of Cyril and Method, Hus, and Luther. He provided the church with devotional literature that answered the needs of the people so well that when the Counter-Reformation set about reclaiming its huge losses, it resorted to the same means . It also used the vernacular and produced a counterpart to the Cithara Sanctorum in the Cantus Catholici, Pisne katholicke latinske a slovenske (Catholic Songs, Latin and Slovak Catholic Songs, 1655) . 7 We can say that the Cantus validated the ecumenical nature of the Cithara and of Pribis's collection by including one-fourth of the hymns in the Cithara and one-third of those in the Pribis collection. The favor was then returned by adding to the Cithara some songs from the Cantus, especially in the edition of 1674, which also carried more native songs of Slovak origin. Finally , the two hymnals had more than a hundred hymns in common. 8 What was the Cithara Sanctorum that made it influential for so many generations of Slovaks, Lutheran and Catholic? It was a product of extraordinary skill and devotion . Tranovsky came well-prepared to the task by both education, native ability, and experience. The quality of his original hymns and translations marks him as a trend-setter and standard-maker for other hymnwriters and compilers of hymnals . His revisions and selections of extant hymns demonstrate his critical ability, and his scholarly approach provides us with the first hymnal that attempts to document the sources of the hymns - except his own , which modesty caused him to offer anonymously in many instances. 9 The very size and quality of the h ymnal advances it decades beyond the normal d evelopment of hymnody. Tranovsky's approach being ecumenical and objective, he included representatives of the earliest church hymnody from the Latin a nd Greek, the contributions of Gregory the Great, the classic h ymns of St. Bernard of Clairvaux, and the prayers of a similar common heritage from David through Augustine to Gregory. The 414-hymn Cithara was organized systematically according to the church year and the elements of the " Mass. " Tranovsky suppl ied the church with introits , antiphons, Kyries, Credos , Glorias , and doxologies, as well as hymns for the sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist, �56 SLOVAKIA for co nfession and a bsolution , fo r fest ival s and regular Sunday s of the church year , and fo r variou s spiritu al and temporal need s - in short , an all-purpose, free-s tandin g h ymnal that provided a core of essential worship m aterial s for congregational u se, as contrasted with Pribis's collection of 116 h ymn s designated for u se in schools. In the Cithara Tranovsky drew upon fo ur sources. C omprising onehalf of th e content s, 206 h ymn s are fro m tran sm oravian hymn od y, derived m ostl y from old Czech Lutheran h ymnals by Kunvald sky (1576) and Zavo rka ( 1602). Two-thirds of th ese Tra novsky left almost intact; the rem a ining third he edi ted m ore or less thorou ghly, in som e cases leavin g onl y the openin g line untouched . F rom these sources he also included m elodies. A rich heritage of hi storic Czech K yries and C redos is preserved in th e C ith ara . The second source of h ymns fo r the Cithara was German hymnody . A la rge repertory of class ic R eform ation h ymn s has been saved fo r posteri ty in the C ith ara since they no lon ger a ppear in G erm an hym nals , nor a re they still sun g. The first edition of the Cithara offered 74 tran slati ons of G erm an hymn s, 58 of them by Tranovsky. The third source, dom esti c h ymn od y by Slovak authors in strongly Slovaki zed C zech , was weakl y represented in the C ithara, numberin g only 33. Earlier , Pribis h ad gathered 68 , most of which found their way into later editi on s of the Cith ara . Tranovsky's own contribution to the hymnal was substantial . Some 161 of the 4 14 hymn s have been traced to him , numberin g 93 original composition s, 10 tran slati on s from the L atin , and 58 from the G erm an . This porti on of th e h ymn al alone is large r than m an y h ymn als of th at d ay. Tranovsky regarded hymn s as a fo rm of p rayer . In hi s int rodu ction ot th e Cithara , he said , " H e who sin gs prays twice." T he prima ry purpose of h ymn ody was to glorify G od . ext it had a d idacti c pu r: pose , to establish and nurtu re fa ith . For this reason T ranovsky u sed simple and direct la ngu age and thu s his hymn als were adopted by the people as ex pressions of their fa ith in fa miliar term s, thou gh he employed polished poeti c skill s and a wide variety of forms. T he Phial a Odoramen toru m , the prayer po rtion of Tranovsky's work , provided th e church wi th litu rgical p raye rs as well as prayers th at co uld d oubl e as hom e devotional praye rs, for u se at mornin g and evenin g services and devotions , prayers for u se with the C atechism , fo r regular di vin e services, a nd for festivals of the church years. There were �SLOVAKIA 57 prayers for all so rts and condition s of m en , penitential p salm s, a nd collects. It was a liturgicall y constru cted instrument , refl ectin g the tradition al skeleton of the m ass, as Luther 's M esse did . Th e Phiala served its readers for several editio ns of the Cithara . It was reprinted in 1685 , th en again in the cen ten a ry editio n of 1736 . It was twi ce reprinted in the late 1890's, and in 1898 was tran slated into P olish , but it was replaced in m ost edition s of th e Cith ara by the prayers of K aspa r Neum a nn transla ted fro m the G erm an . In the end , the Phiala p rov ided a m odel for subsequ ent liturgical p rayer books a nd agendas, su ch as H rabovsky's, Krm a n 's, J a kobei's, d own to B raxatori s's. L ater editors of th e Tran osciu s exp a nded the conten ts of th e h ymn al with tra n sla ti o n s of later G erma n h ym nwrite rs, su ch as P a ul G er ha rd , Benj amin Schmolck , and with original hymn s. D efiniti ve edition s were those produ ced by D a ni el Sin a piu s-H o rcicka ( 1684) a nd Sa muel Hru skovic ( 1745), kn own as th e "second Tra n ovsky." H owever , T ran ovsky's influ en ce o n th e church of hi s d ay a nd of subsequ ent generatio ns mu st n ot be rest ri cted to the liturgical and devot ion al resources he provided for the church in the Cithara. His tran sla tion of the Au gsburg C o nfess io n a nd his in sisten ce on doctrin al con fo rmi ty to th e Scriptures a nd the Lutheran Co nfessio n s did as mu ch as a n y oth e r effort to preserve orth od oxy in Slovakia. In thi s respect h e deserved to b e called the " Lu ther of Slovakia." 10 Especiall y hi s C ithara stood as a bulwark of o rthodoxy fo r som e two centuri es again st th e influ en ces of Piet ism and R atio n ali sm whi ch res ul ted in th e p u b lication of the Zpevnfk of 1842 and nu m erou s oth er attempts to d ilu te the doctrin al integrity of Lu theran hymn od y in Slovaki a. C hi efl y two edito rs of the C ith ara, Sa mu el Hru skovic ( 1745) and J an Mocko ( 1895), re-established th e doctrin al norms whi ch had suffered at the h ands of revisio nists of in terve nin g editi o n s.11 As m ent ioned earli er, Tranovsky' s Cith ara was welcomed en thu sias ticall y by Slovak Lu th eran s, a nd its a utho r was adopted as th eir coun trym a n , even th ou gh h e was a P ole by birth a nd li ved m os t of hi s life in Silesia a nd Morav ia. Tranovsky has been faulted for writing in Czech , rather tha n in Slovak . Bu t th at was th e result of th e h istorical co nd itio n s of hi s tim e, a nd h e was sim ply followin g th e practice prevale n t in th e L u theran chu rch , where th e K ralice Bible was the a u thorized ve rsio n of the Luthera n s fo r m a n y years. H oweve r , both P r ibi s's coll ect ion and the Can tus Ca th olici of 1655 were closer to the langu age �58 SLOVAKIA of the people than Tranovsky's Cithara, chiefly because they both adopted many hymns from the folk tradition and were written in a strongly Slovakized Czech. Later editions o f the Cithara incorporated hymns from the Cantus, and subsequ ent editors of the Cithara more and more Slovakized the Czech-language h ymns . Eventually, in this century, Slovak-lan guage suppleme nts were added to the Lutheran h ymnals in Slovakia, and now the entire collection of hymns selected for the newest edition , slated for publication in 1984 , is totally translated into Slovak. In the process of doing so, some of the qualities of the original hymns and tran slations will be lost , just as they are when American and English hymnodists update the King James language of classic English h y mns . Like the Bible, the Tranoscius has continued to exert an influence on Slovak devotional life , congregational a nd private, Lutheran and Catholic. This is shown, for example, in the poet Ivan Krasko 's d escription of his aged mother and h e r piety in his famous poem Vesper dominicae ( 1909) . 12 The Cithara continues to b e a living spiritual force for Slovaks and their descendants. 13 NOTES ' Older biographical sources give April 9, 159 1 as Tranovsky's birthdate , following th e Juli an calendar. According to the Gregorian calendar, the date is March 27, 1592. J an Durovic explains the discrepancy in his Zivotopisjuraja Tranovsk eho (Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas: Tranoscius , 1942), p. 8; see also Jozef Minarik , ed. , Slovenska renesan cna lutn a: Antol6gia zo slovenskej renesancnej poezie (Bratislava: Tatran, 1982), p . 344. ' The Prologus in apocalipsin Divijohannis Apostoli, t.j. Wyklad na zgeweni Swateho J ana Aposstola .. . , thou gh written in 1617 , was not published at the tim e . The manusc ript was tran scribed by M a tej Spratek in 1701 and again by K . Bujok in 1821 ; see Durovic, pp. 89-93 . The Augustana Confessio rursus in Sla vicum versa et m eliorata (The Augsburg C onfession) was published under the C zech title Konfessy Augsspursk a, bud'to W yznanj Wjry swa re ewangelistske .. . in Olomouc, 1620. This is th e di stin cti ve confession of Lutherans since 1530 , to which all churches and pastors mu st subsc ribe as th e tru e and fai thful exposition of doctrin e . 3 M inarik , " Hl'ad ani e pram ei\a zivej vod y ," op . cit ., p . 15 . P eter Brock also emph asizes th at th e Z p evnfk of 1842 helped the Slovaks of the 19th ce ntury keep their na ti on al iden ti ty , in Th e Slovak N ation al Awak ening (Uni vers it y of To ronto Press , 1976) , pp . 76-77 , note 20. 4 David P . D a n iel has an excellent summ ary in En glish of thi s pe riod : " The P rates- �SLOVAKIA 5 ' ' ' ' ' 0 '' " " 59 ta nt R eformati on in Slovak Ethnic Consciousness, " Slovakia, XXVIII ( 1978-79) , 49-65. See also Daniel, The Historiograph y of th e R eformation in Slovakia (No. 10 , Sixtee nth Century Bibliography Seri es, St. Louis: Center for Reform at ion R esearch , 1977 ), 50 pp . D an iel Pribi s, Pisne du ch ovnf, in K atechismus D . H . Luth era z nemeckeho jazyku na slovensk y preloien y od trech superattendencu v roku 16 12 (Levoca, 1634) . For a description , see Minarik, pp. 44-47 and 33 1, who says it is written in " mimoriadne silne slovakizovanymjazykom " (p. 47), i.e. in strongly Slovakized Czech. The word slovensky did not always mean th e Slovak language in the modern sense, though it plainly identified th e people a nd the location. Lutherans have valued the legacy of Cyril and M ethod as much as the R oman Catholics, who regard them as saints . Pavel Safarik, in his definiti ve history of th e Slavs in German in 1823, gives the M acedonian brothers their due, as did J an Kollar , a not her Slovak gia nt , in his schola rl y and poetic works, as well as in all 11 -s tanza h ymns dedica ted to th e memory of Cyril and Method , Pam atajm ei, kfest'ane, No . 32 4 in the Zpevnfk and No . 128 in the Supplement (Pridavok) of the Tran oscius ( 197 1 editions). Ackn owledgm ent of the Saints ' use of the vernacul ar in worship is also mad e in the Latin prolog to th e Catholic hym nal published in 1655. See below and note 7 fo r this Catholic hym nal. Cantus ca th olici was collec ted by the J esu it Benedikt Szolozi ( 1609- 1656) a nd publi shed in Levoca, then reprinted in 1700 in Trnava; see also Mina rik , p. 5 1. H ere too slovenske does not mean the pure Slovak language, thou gh th e Czech is here ve ry strongly Slovakized . Mina rik , p. 51. Therefore schola rs' interpretations and attributions of authorship , whether original or as a translation , do not entirely agree ; e.g. Minarik' s numbers (p. 47) are slightly different from mine given below. D a niel , "Protestant R eformation ," op. cit. , pp. 52-54, has a summ a ry of some of the doctrinal differen ces amo ng Lutherans conce rnin g the Kniha svorn osti (Book of Concord) . The Zpevnfk of 1842, though undertaken with the in tenti on of culling the best hymns from the C ith ara and add ing more hymns from contemporary hymn writers , as well as fillin g in gaps with conce rn s of the 19th ce ntury, aroused the suspi cions a nd resentment of those who found a deliberate toning down of the supernatural, th e miraculous, and otherworldly elements of the C ithara. In many cases·of abbreviated hymns , th e typical 17th ce ntury look heave n wa rd is deleted , the human nat ure of C hrist is stressed above the divin e, and the termino logy of th e J ena University gradua tes replaced that of the ea rli er co nservati ve (and orthodox) Wittenberg schola rs. Some of the Zpevnfk 's positive elements, such as hymns of social conce rn , have been retained in the for m of a suppl ement in the 1971 edition , with some previously om itted classic hymns from the C ith ara . Ivan Krasko, Nox et solitudo (M artin, 1909; rpt. Basn e , M a rtin 1948), pp . 40-41. M y translation into English is give n in An Anthology of Slovak Literature , compiled by Andrew C incura (Ri verside, 19 76), pp . 2 1-22 . Both of my grandmothers were R oman Catholi c, and my mother 's mother , though �60 SLOVAKIA she remained a Catholic all her life, daily used the Cithara for her private devotions and knew ma ny of the hym ns b y heart. In my own pastoral experience, I have tended m a n y a n elderl y Slovak parishioner with little more than a grammar sc hool edu cati on , but whose daily companion , the Tranoscius, had become threadbare from constant use. Also, it was a m oving ex perience on m y last visit to Slova ki a to attend church in Liptovsky Mikulas, where Tranovsky served and died , and to worship with the congregation wh ich dates back to Tra novsky' s tim e. The faithful gathered 15 minutes to a half hour befo re the service began, a nd the members cond ucted an impromptu hymn sing, one beginning a hymn and the others pickin g it up from memory . Th roughout the worship se rvi ces, ma ny did not need to open their hym nals. The nex t evenin g I sat at the table with a pastor and his wife in Bratislava and two laym en in their mid-thirties , beginning the meal with the trad itional mealtime h ymn , and closing the evenin g with a classic h ym n from the first edition of the C ithara . Similar scenes occur among contemporary Slovak Catholics whose hymns remain a livin g part of th eir heritage. Presented in Panel 99, " Devotional Literature in Seventee nth Century Slova ki a ," at the AAASS conve nti on in Washington, D .C. on 17 October 1982. � SLOVAKIA 51 The Influence of Juraj Tranovsky's Cithara Sanctorum in Slovakia Jaroslav J. Vajda If not a landmark, Juraj Tranovsky's hymnal and prayerbook, Cithara Sanctorum, Pfsne duchovnf stare i nave (The Lyre of the Saints, Spiritual Songs Old and New, 1636), is at least a high point in Slovakia's devotional literature, especially when one includes with it Tranovsky's collection of formal liturgical prayers, Phiala Odoramentorum , Modlitby kfest'anske (A Vial of Fragrances, Christian Prayers , 1635) . Having been reprinted in more than 150 editions at home and abroad since its publication in Levoca in 1636 , the Cithara Sanctorum ranks high in popularity, usage and influence, being probably the most reprinted literary work produced in Slovakia. Our interest is in the place and impact of this book, affectionately known by Tranovsky's Latin name as the Tranoscius, in Slovak devotional literature. The Cithara, like other influential books, is the result of events and forces operating in the 16th and 17th centuries in Central Europe. Juraj Tranovsky was born on March 27, 1592 in the city of Tesfn in Silesia, of Polish parents of the Lutheran faith. 1 His earliest schooling was in a Latin grammar school in Tesfn , from which at the age of 12 he was sent to the German school in Hubin in Lower Lusatia, and from there to a humanist academy in Kolberg, Pomerania, two years later. At the age of 16 he matriculated at the University of Wittenberg, made famous by Luther and his successors. For two years young Tranovsky tutored a family at Trebon castle in southern Bohemia; he taught one year in Prague , and then accepted a position as rector of a school in Holesov, in eastern Moravia. The first traces of his poetic talents appeared in a Latin poem he wrote on the Nativity for St. Nicholas' Church in Prague , at the age of 20. In 1615 he married Anna Polan , with whom he had nine children, five sons and four daughters. Upon his ordina- �52 SLOVAKIA tio n into th e Lutheran mini stry he wa s called to be rector of the school in V alasske M ez irici, n ear H olesov in Moravia. When the local p as tor died , Tra n ovsky was called to take his place, and thu s began hi s 10-year p astor a te in M ezirici . Imm edia tely upo n his assumption of pa ri sh duties , T ran ovsk y embarked on a produ ctive p astoral a nd lite rary career. H e rebuilt the local lite rary socie ty, whi ch also included a choir , wrote a commentary and se ries of se rm o n s o n the Book of R evela tion , and wo rked on a Czech tran sla tion of the Au gsburg Confession of 1530 , a m aj or production which was pu blished in 162 0 . 2 The publication o f T ra n ovsky's tra n sla tion of thi s fo und a ti on al Lutheran symbol coincided with the defeat of the Protesta nts at the Ba ttle of White M ounta in , which effectively ended the free course of P rotestantism in Au stri a. Thou sand s of Luther a n s a nd Bohemi an Brethren fl ed before the wave of victo riou s Catholi c forces ea stward , in to Moravia, then into Slovakia a nd Hun gary, findin g re fu ge for a numbe r of years in central and eastern Slovakia . Amon g those caught in this refugee tide we re Tra novsky , hi s famil y, a nd hi s congregation in M eziri ci. The Lutheran cluster fl ed fro m pl ace to pl ace, u sually seekin g a nd findin g refuge a m o n g Hun ga ri a n Luthe ran n obility and gentry fi ghtin g a rearguard action . In the three years from 162 1 to 1624, Tran ovsky lost three children and was bri efl y imprisoned . F orced to leave M o ravia o n orders of Fe rdin a nd II , T ranovsky fl ed to Bielsko near T esfn , where he found employm ent as court preach er with hi s future p a tro n , Baron J an Szunyogh. T his reprieve la sted two years . In 1627 , with but ten year s of hi s life before him , h e took refu ge fro m furth e r per secutio n in the castles of Buda tfn a nd O rava, wh ere h e also se rved as court preache r for G abriel Illeshazy. Ju st as Luther ' s W artburg refu ge permitted him to transla te the Bible, T ranovsky's castle exil e resulted in th e produ ctio n of a L a tin h ymn collectio n e ntitl ed Odarum sacrarum sive H ym norum . .. libri tres (Three Books of Sac red Odes o r H ymn s, 1629) . By 1632 Tra n ovsky h ad assum ed the pastorate of the church in Liptovsky Sv . Mikul as , whi ch h e se rved until his death five year s la ter. A s if co n sciou s of a n early d emise, Tra novsky wo rked assi du ou sly to fini sh hi s collectio n of fo rm al liturgical p raye rs, the Phiala Odoram entorum , w hi ch a ppeared a year befo re the publi cation of hi s monumental work , the h ymnal Cithara Sanctorum in 1636 , both printed in L evoca. �SLOVAKIA 53 Tranovsky's brief but productive life cam e to an end on M ay 29 , 163 7 at the age of 45, but the results of his work continue to exe rt their influence to this day. Jozef Min arik has pointed out that the Cithara Sanctorum served in the past as a textbook of versification and prosody, and also as a " well spring of na tional consciou sn ess," besides being the '' first step in the creation of national mu sic.'' 3 Its primary impact , however , was and has rem a ined upo n the spiritual life of Slovak Christians. I emphasize Slovak Christians without regard to d enomin ation, for Tranovsky's work was ecumenical in nature and left its mark on Roman Catholic worship life as well. The Cithara was published in Levoca by V avrinec Brewer in 1636 as the answer to a growing need since the battle a t White M ounta in had stopped the production and shipment of C zech hymnals into Slovakia. It and its co mpa nion, the Phiala, were born of necessity . Slovak Lutherans, who comprised some 80 % of the Slovak popula tion a hund red years after the R eform ation ,4 did not have to p rodu ce their own devotional mate rials , since they understood the Czech language and could u se the hymn als of the Bohemian Brethren and C zech Lutheran s, eve n thou gh their theology was not totally in agreem ent with the Hu ssites and Calvinists. In the early R eformati on years , befo re th e edu cation of the laity becam e widespread , the local pastors were in co ntrol of the worship m aterials and u sed loose sheets of pa per to rep roduce the hymns which they considered appropriate for their congregational worship , the hymns being lined out for the congregation by the cantor or choir director. In thi s way a sizable repertory of hymns was developed in local co ngregations, resultin g in m an y ha ndwritten hymn accompanim en t edi tion s, or partitury, as each large Lutheran center p roduced or ad a pted its own . Al so b y this rote system of learnin g, the faithful (prima rily illiterate) acquired a growing devotional treasure, for the hymns were form s of praye r serving the C hri stian s as inspiration , com fo rt , and chall en ge, as did -the P salms of D avid. Those who we re •still illitera te could a m ass a litera ry and d evotional treasu re in a lan gu age they could unders tand , and thus their faith need s were supplied until the Slovak Lutherans could fo rm all y print p rayer books and hymn als of their ow n. T he hym ns we re not u sed alo ne, of cou rse, and we mu st pa use to mention the impo rtance of Luther ' s Sm all Ca techism in the spiritual and devotional life of the Lutheran laity. All children we re required to m emorize this brief exposition of the chief ar ticles of the C hristian faith , �54 SLOVAKIA and it became for many a daily review and anchoring of their faith as they repeated its simple explanations in their morning and evening devotions. In fact, the first printed collections of domestically composed Slovak hymns were appended to translations or reprintings of Luther 's Small Catechism. Thus , the only extant sizeable collection of hymns prior to Tranovsky' s hymnal is that of Daniel Pribis, a contemporary of Tranovsky, who collected and published 116 hymns in 1635, a year before the Cithara appeared. 5 Pribis's hymns did not come out as a separate book, as did Tranovsky's , but as an appendage to a revised translation of Luther's Catechism. This trilogy of books has been the foundation of Lutheran piety since the early years of the Reformation: the Bible , the Catechism, and the hymnal with its prayers. There would have been no such hymnal as the Tranoscius, or later the Catholic hymnal, had it not been for the Reformation and its universal impact on education, worship, and literature; or at least if the Reformation we know had not occurred, there would have had to develop a similar movement toward use of vernacular tongues . But even the Lutheran Reformation did not originate the basic conditions for use of the vernacular in the church and eventually in educational and professional areas. The first step in the eventual production of devotional literature in Slovakia was the introduction of the vernacular among the Slavs in the 9th century. For that major historical contribution, credit must be given to the patron saints of all the Slavs, the Macedonian missionary brothers, Cyril and Methodius, whose invention of the Slavonic alphabet and their translation of the scriptures into a language understandable to the Slavs, as well as their use of the vernacular in the liturgy, were all basic essentials in the ultimate production of vernacular devotional literature . 6 The n ext decisive development was the Hussite reform movement in Bohemia, challenging the dominance of Latin in the Western Church, and capturing the support of the populace by not only appealing to their nationalistic loyalties over against the Roman curia, but by proclaiming the Gospel in the language of the people and giving the faithful hymns to sing in their own tongue . The Reform movement would have died without the subsequent successful Reformation of Martin Luther, who like his Slavic forerunners, insisted on the vernacular in his Deutsche Messe, translated the Scrip- �SLOVAKIA 55 tures into German to make them accessible to the people, and then sang the Reformation into the hearts of the people with his hymns, many of which were set to popular tunes. A century later, Juraj Tranovsky found himself heir of Cyril and Method, Hus, and Luther. He provided the church with devotional literature that answered the needs of the people so well that when the Counter-Reformation set about reclaiming its huge losses, it resorted to the same means . It also used the vernacular and produced a counterpart to the Cithara Sanctorum in the Cantus Catholici, Pisne katholicke latinske a slovenske (Catholic Songs, Latin and Slovak Catholic Songs, 1655) . 7 We can say that the Cantus validated the ecumenical nature of the Cithara and of Pribis's collection by including one-fourth of the hymns in the Cithara and one-third of those in the Pribis collection. The favor was then returned by adding to the Cithara some songs from the Cantus, especially in the edition of 1674, which also carried more native songs of Slovak origin. Finally , the two hymnals had more than a hundred hymns in common. 8 What was the Cithara Sanctorum that made it influential for so many generations of Slovaks, Lutheran and Catholic? It was a product of extraordinary skill and devotion . Tranovsky came well-prepared to the task by both education, native ability, and experience. The quality of his original hymns and translations marks him as a trend-setter and standard-maker for other hymnwriters and compilers of hymnals . His revisions and selections of extant hymns demonstrate his critical ability, and his scholarly approach provides us with the first hymnal that attempts to document the sources of the hymns - except his own , which modesty caused him to offer anonymously in many instances. 9 The very size and quality of the h ymnal advances it decades beyond the normal d evelopment of hymnody. Tranovsky's approach being ecumenical and objective, he included representatives of the earliest church hymnody from the Latin a nd Greek, the contributions of Gregory the Great, the classic h ymns of St. Bernard of Clairvaux, and the prayers of a similar common heritage from David through Augustine to Gregory. The 414-hymn Cithara was organized systematically according to the church year and the elements of the " Mass. " Tranovsky suppl ied the church with introits , antiphons, Kyries, Credos , Glorias , and doxologies, as well as hymns for the sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist, �56 SLOVAKIA for co nfession and a bsolution , fo r fest ival s and regular Sunday s of the church year , and fo r variou s spiritu al and temporal need s - in short , an all-purpose, free-s tandin g h ymnal that provided a core of essential worship m aterial s for congregational u se, as contrasted with Pribis's collection of 116 h ymn s designated for u se in schools. In the Cithara Tranovsky drew upon fo ur sources. C omprising onehalf of th e content s, 206 h ymn s are fro m tran sm oravian hymn od y, derived m ostl y from old Czech Lutheran h ymnals by Kunvald sky (1576) and Zavo rka ( 1602). Two-thirds of th ese Tra novsky left almost intact; the rem a ining third he edi ted m ore or less thorou ghly, in som e cases leavin g onl y the openin g line untouched . F rom these sources he also included m elodies. A rich heritage of hi storic Czech K yries and C redos is preserved in th e C ith ara . The second source of h ymns fo r the Cithara was German hymnody . A la rge repertory of class ic R eform ation h ymn s has been saved fo r posteri ty in the C ith ara since they no lon ger a ppear in G erm an hym nals , nor a re they still sun g. The first edition of the Cithara offered 74 tran slati ons of G erm an hymn s, 58 of them by Tranovsky. The third source, dom esti c h ymn od y by Slovak authors in strongly Slovaki zed C zech , was weakl y represented in the C ithara, numberin g only 33. Earlier , Pribis h ad gathered 68 , most of which found their way into later editi on s of the Cith ara . Tranovsky's own contribution to the hymnal was substantial . Some 161 of the 4 14 hymn s have been traced to him , numberin g 93 original composition s, 10 tran slati on s from the L atin , and 58 from the G erm an . This porti on of th e h ymn al alone is large r than m an y h ymn als of th at d ay. Tranovsky regarded hymn s as a fo rm of p rayer . In hi s int rodu ction ot th e Cithara , he said , " H e who sin gs prays twice." T he prima ry purpose of h ymn ody was to glorify G od . ext it had a d idacti c pu r: pose , to establish and nurtu re fa ith . For this reason T ranovsky u sed simple and direct la ngu age and thu s his hymn als were adopted by the people as ex pressions of their fa ith in fa miliar term s, thou gh he employed polished poeti c skill s and a wide variety of forms. T he Phial a Odoramen toru m , the prayer po rtion of Tranovsky's work , provided th e church wi th litu rgical p raye rs as well as prayers th at co uld d oubl e as hom e devotional praye rs, for u se at mornin g and evenin g services and devotions , prayers for u se with the C atechism , fo r regular di vin e services, a nd for festivals of the church years. There were �SLOVAKIA 57 prayers for all so rts and condition s of m en , penitential p salm s, a nd collects. It was a liturgicall y constru cted instrument , refl ectin g the tradition al skeleton of the m ass, as Luther 's M esse did . Th e Phiala served its readers for several editio ns of the Cithara . It was reprinted in 1685 , th en again in the cen ten a ry editio n of 1736 . It was twi ce reprinted in the late 1890's, and in 1898 was tran slated into P olish , but it was replaced in m ost edition s of th e Cith ara by the prayers of K aspa r Neum a nn transla ted fro m the G erm an . In the end , the Phiala p rov ided a m odel for subsequ ent liturgical p rayer books a nd agendas, su ch as H rabovsky's, Krm a n 's, J a kobei's, d own to B raxatori s's. L ater editors of th e Tran osciu s exp a nded the conten ts of th e h ymn al with tra n sla ti o n s of later G erma n h ym nwrite rs, su ch as P a ul G er ha rd , Benj amin Schmolck , and with original hymn s. D efiniti ve edition s were those produ ced by D a ni el Sin a piu s-H o rcicka ( 1684) a nd Sa muel Hru skovic ( 1745), kn own as th e "second Tra n ovsky." H owever , T ran ovsky's influ en ce o n th e church of hi s d ay a nd of subsequ ent generatio ns mu st n ot be rest ri cted to the liturgical and devot ion al resources he provided for the church in the Cithara. His tran sla tion of the Au gsburg C o nfess io n a nd his in sisten ce on doctrin al con fo rmi ty to th e Scriptures a nd the Lutheran Co nfessio n s did as mu ch as a n y oth e r effort to preserve orth od oxy in Slovakia. In thi s respect h e deserved to b e called the " Lu ther of Slovakia." 10 Especiall y hi s C ithara stood as a bulwark of o rthodoxy fo r som e two centuri es again st th e influ en ces of Piet ism and R atio n ali sm whi ch res ul ted in th e p u b lication of the Zpevnfk of 1842 and nu m erou s oth er attempts to d ilu te the doctrin al integrity of Lu theran hymn od y in Slovaki a. C hi efl y two edito rs of the C ith ara, Sa mu el Hru skovic ( 1745) and J an Mocko ( 1895), re-established th e doctrin al norms whi ch had suffered at the h ands of revisio nists of in terve nin g editi o n s.11 As m ent ioned earli er, Tranovsky' s Cith ara was welcomed en thu sias ticall y by Slovak Lu th eran s, a nd its a utho r was adopted as th eir coun trym a n , even th ou gh h e was a P ole by birth a nd li ved m os t of hi s life in Silesia a nd Morav ia. Tranovsky has been faulted for writing in Czech , rather tha n in Slovak . Bu t th at was th e result of th e h istorical co nd itio n s of hi s tim e, a nd h e was sim ply followin g th e practice prevale n t in th e L u theran chu rch , where th e K ralice Bible was the a u thorized ve rsio n of the Luthera n s fo r m a n y years. H oweve r , both P r ibi s's coll ect ion and the Can tus Ca th olici of 1655 were closer to the langu age �58 SLOVAKIA of the people than Tranovsky's Cithara, chiefly because they both adopted many hymns from the folk tradition and were written in a strongly Slovakized Czech. Later editions o f the Cithara incorporated hymns from the Cantus, and subsequ ent editors of the Cithara more and more Slovakized the Czech-language h ymns . Eventually, in this century, Slovak-lan guage suppleme nts were added to the Lutheran h ymnals in Slovakia, and now the entire collection of hymns selected for the newest edition , slated for publication in 1984 , is totally translated into Slovak. In the process of doing so, some of the qualities of the original hymns and tran slations will be lost , just as they are when American and English hymnodists update the King James language of classic English h y mns . Like the Bible, the Tranoscius has continued to exert an influence on Slovak devotional life , congregational a nd private, Lutheran and Catholic. This is shown, for example, in the poet Ivan Krasko 's d escription of his aged mother and h e r piety in his famous poem Vesper dominicae ( 1909) . 12 The Cithara continues to b e a living spiritual force for Slovaks and their descendants. 13 NOTES ' Older biographical sources give April 9, 159 1 as Tranovsky's birthdate , following th e Juli an calendar. According to the Gregorian calendar, the date is March 27, 1592. J an Durovic explains the discrepancy in his Zivotopisjuraja Tranovsk eho (Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas: Tranoscius , 1942), p. 8; see also Jozef Minarik , ed. , Slovenska renesan cna lutn a: Antol6gia zo slovenskej renesancnej poezie (Bratislava: Tatran, 1982), p . 344. ' The Prologus in apocalipsin Divijohannis Apostoli, t.j. Wyklad na zgeweni Swateho J ana Aposstola .. . , thou gh written in 1617 , was not published at the tim e . The manusc ript was tran scribed by M a tej Spratek in 1701 and again by K . Bujok in 1821 ; see Durovic, pp. 89-93 . The Augustana Confessio rursus in Sla vicum versa et m eliorata (The Augsburg C onfession) was published under the C zech title Konfessy Augsspursk a, bud'to W yznanj Wjry swa re ewangelistske .. . in Olomouc, 1620. This is th e di stin cti ve confession of Lutherans since 1530 , to which all churches and pastors mu st subsc ribe as th e tru e and fai thful exposition of doctrin e . 3 M inarik , " Hl'ad ani e pram ei\a zivej vod y ," op . cit ., p . 15 . P eter Brock also emph asizes th at th e Z p evnfk of 1842 helped the Slovaks of the 19th ce ntury keep their na ti on al iden ti ty , in Th e Slovak N ation al Awak ening (Uni vers it y of To ronto Press , 1976) , pp . 76-77 , note 20. 4 David P . D a n iel has an excellent summ ary in En glish of thi s pe riod : " The P rates- �SLOVAKIA 5 ' ' ' ' ' 0 '' " " 59 ta nt R eformati on in Slovak Ethnic Consciousness, " Slovakia, XXVIII ( 1978-79) , 49-65. See also Daniel, The Historiograph y of th e R eformation in Slovakia (No. 10 , Sixtee nth Century Bibliography Seri es, St. Louis: Center for Reform at ion R esearch , 1977 ), 50 pp . D an iel Pribi s, Pisne du ch ovnf, in K atechismus D . H . Luth era z nemeckeho jazyku na slovensk y preloien y od trech superattendencu v roku 16 12 (Levoca, 1634) . For a description , see Minarik, pp. 44-47 and 33 1, who says it is written in " mimoriadne silne slovakizovanymjazykom " (p. 47), i.e. in strongly Slovakized Czech. The word slovensky did not always mean th e Slovak language in the modern sense, though it plainly identified th e people a nd the location. Lutherans have valued the legacy of Cyril and M ethod as much as the R oman Catholics, who regard them as saints . Pavel Safarik, in his definiti ve history of th e Slavs in German in 1823, gives the M acedonian brothers their due, as did J an Kollar , a not her Slovak gia nt , in his schola rl y and poetic works, as well as in all 11 -s tanza h ymns dedica ted to th e memory of Cyril and Method , Pam atajm ei, kfest'ane, No . 32 4 in the Zpevnfk and No . 128 in the Supplement (Pridavok) of the Tran oscius ( 197 1 editions). Ackn owledgm ent of the Saints ' use of the vernacul ar in worship is also mad e in the Latin prolog to th e Catholic hym nal published in 1655. See below and note 7 fo r this Catholic hym nal. Cantus ca th olici was collec ted by the J esu it Benedikt Szolozi ( 1609- 1656) a nd publi shed in Levoca, then reprinted in 1700 in Trnava; see also Mina rik , p. 5 1. H ere too slovenske does not mean the pure Slovak language, thou gh th e Czech is here ve ry strongly Slovakized . Mina rik , p. 51. Therefore schola rs' interpretations and attributions of authorship , whether original or as a translation , do not entirely agree ; e.g. Minarik' s numbers (p. 47) are slightly different from mine given below. D a niel , "Protestant R eformation ," op. cit. , pp. 52-54, has a summ a ry of some of the doctrinal differen ces amo ng Lutherans conce rnin g the Kniha svorn osti (Book of Concord) . The Zpevnfk of 1842, though undertaken with the in tenti on of culling the best hymns from the C ith ara and add ing more hymns from contemporary hymn writers , as well as fillin g in gaps with conce rn s of the 19th ce ntury, aroused the suspi cions a nd resentment of those who found a deliberate toning down of the supernatural, th e miraculous, and otherworldly elements of the C ithara. In many cases·of abbreviated hymns , th e typical 17th ce ntury look heave n wa rd is deleted , the human nat ure of C hrist is stressed above the divin e, and the termino logy of th e J ena University gradua tes replaced that of the ea rli er co nservati ve (and orthodox) Wittenberg schola rs. Some of the Zpevnfk 's positive elements, such as hymns of social conce rn , have been retained in the for m of a suppl ement in the 1971 edition , with some previously om itted classic hymns from the C ith ara . Ivan Krasko, Nox et solitudo (M artin, 1909; rpt. Basn e , M a rtin 1948), pp . 40-41. M y translation into English is give n in An Anthology of Slovak Literature , compiled by Andrew C incura (Ri verside, 19 76), pp . 2 1-22 . Both of my grandmothers were R oman Catholi c, and my mother 's mother , though �60 SLOVAKIA she remained a Catholic all her life, daily used the Cithara for her private devotions and knew ma ny of the hym ns b y heart. In my own pastoral experience, I have tended m a n y a n elderl y Slovak parishioner with little more than a grammar sc hool edu cati on , but whose daily companion , the Tranoscius, had become threadbare from constant use. Also, it was a m oving ex perience on m y last visit to Slova ki a to attend church in Liptovsky Mikulas, where Tranovsky served and died , and to worship with the congregation wh ich dates back to Tra novsky' s tim e. The faithful gathered 15 minutes to a half hour befo re the service began, a nd the members cond ucted an impromptu hymn sing, one beginning a hymn and the others pickin g it up from memory . Th roughout the worship se rvi ces, ma ny did not need to open their hym nals. The nex t evenin g I sat at the table with a pastor and his wife in Bratislava and two laym en in their mid-thirties , beginning the meal with the trad itional mealtime h ymn , and closing the evenin g with a classic h ym n from the first edition of the C ithara . Similar scenes occur among contemporary Slovak Catholics whose hymns remain a livin g part of th eir heritage. Presented in Panel 99, " Devotional Literature in Seventee nth Century Slova ki a ," at the AAASS conve nti on in Washington, D .C. on 17 October 1982. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1982-83, Vol. 30 Description An account of the resource Vol. 30 (No. 55-56), 1982-83. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1982-83 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 51 The Influence of Juraj Tranovsky's Cithara Sanctorum in Slovakia Jaroslav J. Vajda If not a landmark, Juraj Tranovsky's hymnal and prayerbook, Cithara Sanctorum, Pfsne duchovnf stare i nave (The Lyre of the Saints, Spiritual Songs Old and New, 1636), is at least a high point in Slovakia's devotional literature, especially when one includes with it Tranovsky's collection of formal liturgical prayers, Phiala Odoramentorum , Modlitby kfest'anske (A Vial of Fragrances, Christian Prayers , 1635) . Having been reprinted in more than 150 editions at home and abroad since its publication in Levoca in 1636 , the Cithara Sanctorum ranks high in popularity, usage and influence, being probably the most reprinted literary work produced in Slovakia. Our interest is in the place and impact of this book, affectionately known by Tranovsky's Latin name as the Tranoscius, in Slovak devotional literature. The Cithara, like other influential books, is the result of events and forces operating in the 16th and 17th centuries in Central Europe. Juraj Tranovsky was born on March 27, 1592 in the city of Tesfn in Silesia, of Polish parents of the Lutheran faith. 1 His earliest schooling was in a Latin grammar school in Tesfn , from which at the age of 12 he was sent to the German school in Hubin in Lower Lusatia, and from there to a humanist academy in Kolberg, Pomerania, two years later. At the age of 16 he matriculated at the University of Wittenberg, made famous by Luther and his successors. For two years young Tranovsky tutored a family at Trebon castle in southern Bohemia; he taught one year in Prague , and then accepted a position as rector of a school in Holesov, in eastern Moravia. The first traces of his poetic talents appeared in a Latin poem he wrote on the Nativity for St. Nicholas' Church in Prague , at the age of 20. In 1615 he married Anna Polan , with whom he had nine children, five sons and four daughters. Upon his ordina- 52 SLOVAKIA tio n into th e Lutheran mini stry he wa s called to be rector of the school in V alasske M ez irici, n ear H olesov in Moravia. When the local p as tor died , Tra n ovsky was called to take his place, and thu s began hi s 10-year p astor a te in M ezirici . Imm edia tely upo n his assumption of pa ri sh duties , T ran ovsk y embarked on a produ ctive p astoral a nd lite rary career. H e rebuilt the local lite rary socie ty, whi ch also included a choir , wrote a commentary and se ries of se rm o n s o n the Book of R evela tion , and wo rked on a Czech tran sla tion of the Au gsburg Confession of 1530 , a m aj or production which was pu blished in 162 0 . 2 The publication o f T ra n ovsky's tra n sla tion of thi s fo und a ti on al Lutheran symbol coincided with the defeat of the Protesta nts at the Ba ttle of White M ounta in , which effectively ended the free course of P rotestantism in Au stri a. Thou sand s of Luther a n s a nd Bohemi an Brethren fl ed before the wave of victo riou s Catholi c forces ea stward , in to Moravia, then into Slovakia a nd Hun gary, findin g re fu ge for a numbe r of years in central and eastern Slovakia . Amon g those caught in this refugee tide we re Tra novsky , hi s famil y, a nd hi s congregation in M eziri ci. The Lutheran cluster fl ed fro m pl ace to pl ace, u sually seekin g a nd findin g refuge a m o n g Hun ga ri a n Luthe ran n obility and gentry fi ghtin g a rearguard action . In the three years from 162 1 to 1624, Tran ovsky lost three children and was bri efl y imprisoned . F orced to leave M o ravia o n orders of Fe rdin a nd II , T ranovsky fl ed to Bielsko near T esfn , where he found employm ent as court preach er with hi s future p a tro n , Baron J an Szunyogh. T his reprieve la sted two years . In 1627 , with but ten year s of hi s life before him , h e took refu ge fro m furth e r per secutio n in the castles of Buda tfn a nd O rava, wh ere h e also se rved as court preache r for G abriel Illeshazy. Ju st as Luther ' s W artburg refu ge permitted him to transla te the Bible, T ranovsky's castle exil e resulted in th e produ ctio n of a L a tin h ymn collectio n e ntitl ed Odarum sacrarum sive H ym norum . .. libri tres (Three Books of Sac red Odes o r H ymn s, 1629) . By 1632 Tra n ovsky h ad assum ed the pastorate of the church in Liptovsky Sv . Mikul as , whi ch h e se rved until his death five year s la ter. A s if co n sciou s of a n early d emise, Tra novsky wo rked assi du ou sly to fini sh hi s collectio n of fo rm al liturgical p raye rs, the Phiala Odoram entorum , w hi ch a ppeared a year befo re the publi cation of hi s monumental work , the h ymnal Cithara Sanctorum in 1636 , both printed in L evoca. SLOVAKIA 53 Tranovsky's brief but productive life cam e to an end on M ay 29 , 163 7 at the age of 45, but the results of his work continue to exe rt their influence to this day. Jozef Min arik has pointed out that the Cithara Sanctorum served in the past as a textbook of versification and prosody, and also as a " well spring of na tional consciou sn ess," besides being the '' first step in the creation of national mu sic.'' 3 Its primary impact , however , was and has rem a ined upo n the spiritual life of Slovak Christians. I emphasize Slovak Christians without regard to d enomin ation, for Tranovsky's work was ecumenical in nature and left its mark on Roman Catholic worship life as well. The Cithara was published in Levoca by V avrinec Brewer in 1636 as the answer to a growing need since the battle a t White M ounta in had stopped the production and shipment of C zech hymnals into Slovakia. It and its co mpa nion, the Phiala, were born of necessity . Slovak Lutherans, who comprised some 80 % of the Slovak popula tion a hund red years after the R eform ation ,4 did not have to p rodu ce their own devotional mate rials , since they understood the Czech language and could u se the hymn als of the Bohemian Brethren and C zech Lutheran s, eve n thou gh their theology was not totally in agreem ent with the Hu ssites and Calvinists. In the early R eformati on years , befo re th e edu cation of the laity becam e widespread , the local pastors were in co ntrol of the worship m aterials and u sed loose sheets of pa per to rep roduce the hymns which they considered appropriate for their congregational worship , the hymns being lined out for the congregation by the cantor or choir director. In thi s way a sizable repertory of hymns was developed in local co ngregations, resultin g in m an y ha ndwritten hymn accompanim en t edi tion s, or partitury, as each large Lutheran center p roduced or ad a pted its own . Al so b y this rote system of learnin g, the faithful (prima rily illiterate) acquired a growing devotional treasure, for the hymns were form s of praye r serving the C hri stian s as inspiration , com fo rt , and chall en ge, as did -the P salms of D avid. Those who we re •still illitera te could a m ass a litera ry and d evotional treasu re in a lan gu age they could unders tand , and thus their faith need s were supplied until the Slovak Lutherans could fo rm all y print p rayer books and hymn als of their ow n. T he hym ns we re not u sed alo ne, of cou rse, and we mu st pa use to mention the impo rtance of Luther ' s Sm all Ca techism in the spiritual and devotional life of the Lutheran laity. All children we re required to m emorize this brief exposition of the chief ar ticles of the C hristian faith , 54 SLOVAKIA and it became for many a daily review and anchoring of their faith as they repeated its simple explanations in their morning and evening devotions. In fact, the first printed collections of domestically composed Slovak hymns were appended to translations or reprintings of Luther 's Small Catechism. Thus , the only extant sizeable collection of hymns prior to Tranovsky' s hymnal is that of Daniel Pribis, a contemporary of Tranovsky, who collected and published 116 hymns in 1635, a year before the Cithara appeared. 5 Pribis's hymns did not come out as a separate book, as did Tranovsky's , but as an appendage to a revised translation of Luther's Catechism. This trilogy of books has been the foundation of Lutheran piety since the early years of the Reformation: the Bible , the Catechism, and the hymnal with its prayers. There would have been no such hymnal as the Tranoscius, or later the Catholic hymnal, had it not been for the Reformation and its universal impact on education, worship, and literature; or at least if the Reformation we know had not occurred, there would have had to develop a similar movement toward use of vernacular tongues . But even the Lutheran Reformation did not originate the basic conditions for use of the vernacular in the church and eventually in educational and professional areas. The first step in the eventual production of devotional literature in Slovakia was the introduction of the vernacular among the Slavs in the 9th century. For that major historical contribution, credit must be given to the patron saints of all the Slavs, the Macedonian missionary brothers, Cyril and Methodius, whose invention of the Slavonic alphabet and their translation of the scriptures into a language understandable to the Slavs, as well as their use of the vernacular in the liturgy, were all basic essentials in the ultimate production of vernacular devotional literature . 6 The n ext decisive development was the Hussite reform movement in Bohemia, challenging the dominance of Latin in the Western Church, and capturing the support of the populace by not only appealing to their nationalistic loyalties over against the Roman curia, but by proclaiming the Gospel in the language of the people and giving the faithful hymns to sing in their own tongue . The Reform movement would have died without the subsequent successful Reformation of Martin Luther, who like his Slavic forerunners, insisted on the vernacular in his Deutsche Messe, translated the Scrip- SLOVAKIA 55 tures into German to make them accessible to the people, and then sang the Reformation into the hearts of the people with his hymns, many of which were set to popular tunes. A century later, Juraj Tranovsky found himself heir of Cyril and Method, Hus, and Luther. He provided the church with devotional literature that answered the needs of the people so well that when the Counter-Reformation set about reclaiming its huge losses, it resorted to the same means . It also used the vernacular and produced a counterpart to the Cithara Sanctorum in the Cantus Catholici, Pisne katholicke latinske a slovenske (Catholic Songs, Latin and Slovak Catholic Songs, 1655) . 7 We can say that the Cantus validated the ecumenical nature of the Cithara and of Pribis's collection by including one-fourth of the hymns in the Cithara and one-third of those in the Pribis collection. The favor was then returned by adding to the Cithara some songs from the Cantus, especially in the edition of 1674, which also carried more native songs of Slovak origin. Finally , the two hymnals had more than a hundred hymns in common. 8 What was the Cithara Sanctorum that made it influential for so many generations of Slovaks, Lutheran and Catholic? It was a product of extraordinary skill and devotion . Tranovsky came well-prepared to the task by both education, native ability, and experience. The quality of his original hymns and translations marks him as a trend-setter and standard-maker for other hymnwriters and compilers of hymnals . His revisions and selections of extant hymns demonstrate his critical ability, and his scholarly approach provides us with the first hymnal that attempts to document the sources of the hymns - except his own , which modesty caused him to offer anonymously in many instances. 9 The very size and quality of the h ymnal advances it decades beyond the normal d evelopment of hymnody. Tranovsky's approach being ecumenical and objective, he included representatives of the earliest church hymnody from the Latin a nd Greek, the contributions of Gregory the Great, the classic h ymns of St. Bernard of Clairvaux, and the prayers of a similar common heritage from David through Augustine to Gregory. The 414-hymn Cithara was organized systematically according to the church year and the elements of the " Mass. " Tranovsky suppl ied the church with introits , antiphons, Kyries, Credos , Glorias , and doxologies, as well as hymns for the sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist, 56 SLOVAKIA for co nfession and a bsolution , fo r fest ival s and regular Sunday s of the church year , and fo r variou s spiritu al and temporal need s - in short , an all-purpose, free-s tandin g h ymnal that provided a core of essential worship m aterial s for congregational u se, as contrasted with Pribis's collection of 116 h ymn s designated for u se in schools. In the Cithara Tranovsky drew upon fo ur sources. C omprising onehalf of th e content s, 206 h ymn s are fro m tran sm oravian hymn od y, derived m ostl y from old Czech Lutheran h ymnals by Kunvald sky (1576) and Zavo rka ( 1602). Two-thirds of th ese Tra novsky left almost intact; the rem a ining third he edi ted m ore or less thorou ghly, in som e cases leavin g onl y the openin g line untouched . F rom these sources he also included m elodies. A rich heritage of hi storic Czech K yries and C redos is preserved in th e C ith ara . The second source of h ymns fo r the Cithara was German hymnody . A la rge repertory of class ic R eform ation h ymn s has been saved fo r posteri ty in the C ith ara since they no lon ger a ppear in G erm an hym nals , nor a re they still sun g. The first edition of the Cithara offered 74 tran slati ons of G erm an hymn s, 58 of them by Tranovsky. The third source, dom esti c h ymn od y by Slovak authors in strongly Slovaki zed C zech , was weakl y represented in the C ithara, numberin g only 33. Earlier , Pribis h ad gathered 68 , most of which found their way into later editi on s of the Cith ara . Tranovsky's own contribution to the hymnal was substantial . Some 161 of the 4 14 hymn s have been traced to him , numberin g 93 original composition s, 10 tran slati on s from the L atin , and 58 from the G erm an . This porti on of th e h ymn al alone is large r than m an y h ymn als of th at d ay. Tranovsky regarded hymn s as a fo rm of p rayer . In hi s int rodu ction ot th e Cithara , he said , " H e who sin gs prays twice." T he prima ry purpose of h ymn ody was to glorify G od . ext it had a d idacti c pu r: pose , to establish and nurtu re fa ith . For this reason T ranovsky u sed simple and direct la ngu age and thu s his hymn als were adopted by the people as ex pressions of their fa ith in fa miliar term s, thou gh he employed polished poeti c skill s and a wide variety of forms. T he Phial a Odoramen toru m , the prayer po rtion of Tranovsky's work , provided th e church wi th litu rgical p raye rs as well as prayers th at co uld d oubl e as hom e devotional praye rs, for u se at mornin g and evenin g services and devotions , prayers for u se with the C atechism , fo r regular di vin e services, a nd for festivals of the church years. There were SLOVAKIA 57 prayers for all so rts and condition s of m en , penitential p salm s, a nd collects. It was a liturgicall y constru cted instrument , refl ectin g the tradition al skeleton of the m ass, as Luther 's M esse did . Th e Phiala served its readers for several editio ns of the Cithara . It was reprinted in 1685 , th en again in the cen ten a ry editio n of 1736 . It was twi ce reprinted in the late 1890's, and in 1898 was tran slated into P olish , but it was replaced in m ost edition s of th e Cith ara by the prayers of K aspa r Neum a nn transla ted fro m the G erm an . In the end , the Phiala p rov ided a m odel for subsequ ent liturgical p rayer books a nd agendas, su ch as H rabovsky's, Krm a n 's, J a kobei's, d own to B raxatori s's. L ater editors of th e Tran osciu s exp a nded the conten ts of th e h ymn al with tra n sla ti o n s of later G erma n h ym nwrite rs, su ch as P a ul G er ha rd , Benj amin Schmolck , and with original hymn s. D efiniti ve edition s were those produ ced by D a ni el Sin a piu s-H o rcicka ( 1684) a nd Sa muel Hru skovic ( 1745), kn own as th e "second Tra n ovsky." H owever , T ran ovsky's influ en ce o n th e church of hi s d ay a nd of subsequ ent generatio ns mu st n ot be rest ri cted to the liturgical and devot ion al resources he provided for the church in the Cithara. His tran sla tion of the Au gsburg C o nfess io n a nd his in sisten ce on doctrin al con fo rmi ty to th e Scriptures a nd the Lutheran Co nfessio n s did as mu ch as a n y oth e r effort to preserve orth od oxy in Slovakia. In thi s respect h e deserved to b e called the " Lu ther of Slovakia." 10 Especiall y hi s C ithara stood as a bulwark of o rthodoxy fo r som e two centuri es again st th e influ en ces of Piet ism and R atio n ali sm whi ch res ul ted in th e p u b lication of the Zpevnfk of 1842 and nu m erou s oth er attempts to d ilu te the doctrin al integrity of Lu theran hymn od y in Slovaki a. C hi efl y two edito rs of the C ith ara, Sa mu el Hru skovic ( 1745) and J an Mocko ( 1895), re-established th e doctrin al norms whi ch had suffered at the h ands of revisio nists of in terve nin g editi o n s.11 As m ent ioned earli er, Tranovsky' s Cith ara was welcomed en thu sias ticall y by Slovak Lu th eran s, a nd its a utho r was adopted as th eir coun trym a n , even th ou gh h e was a P ole by birth a nd li ved m os t of hi s life in Silesia a nd Morav ia. Tranovsky has been faulted for writing in Czech , rather tha n in Slovak . Bu t th at was th e result of th e h istorical co nd itio n s of hi s tim e, a nd h e was sim ply followin g th e practice prevale n t in th e L u theran chu rch , where th e K ralice Bible was the a u thorized ve rsio n of the Luthera n s fo r m a n y years. H oweve r , both P r ibi s's coll ect ion and the Can tus Ca th olici of 1655 were closer to the langu age 58 SLOVAKIA of the people than Tranovsky's Cithara, chiefly because they both adopted many hymns from the folk tradition and were written in a strongly Slovakized Czech. Later editions o f the Cithara incorporated hymns from the Cantus, and subsequ ent editors of the Cithara more and more Slovakized the Czech-language h ymns . Eventually, in this century, Slovak-lan guage suppleme nts were added to the Lutheran h ymnals in Slovakia, and now the entire collection of hymns selected for the newest edition , slated for publication in 1984 , is totally translated into Slovak. In the process of doing so, some of the qualities of the original hymns and tran slations will be lost , just as they are when American and English hymnodists update the King James language of classic English h y mns . Like the Bible, the Tranoscius has continued to exert an influence on Slovak devotional life , congregational a nd private, Lutheran and Catholic. This is shown, for example, in the poet Ivan Krasko 's d escription of his aged mother and h e r piety in his famous poem Vesper dominicae ( 1909) . 12 The Cithara continues to b e a living spiritual force for Slovaks and their descendants. 13 NOTES ' Older biographical sources give April 9, 159 1 as Tranovsky's birthdate , following th e Juli an calendar. According to the Gregorian calendar, the date is March 27, 1592. J an Durovic explains the discrepancy in his Zivotopisjuraja Tranovsk eho (Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas: Tranoscius , 1942), p. 8; see also Jozef Minarik , ed. , Slovenska renesan cna lutn a: Antol6gia zo slovenskej renesancnej poezie (Bratislava: Tatran, 1982), p . 344. ' The Prologus in apocalipsin Divijohannis Apostoli, t.j. Wyklad na zgeweni Swateho J ana Aposstola .. . , thou gh written in 1617 , was not published at the tim e . The manusc ript was tran scribed by M a tej Spratek in 1701 and again by K . Bujok in 1821 ; see Durovic, pp. 89-93 . The Augustana Confessio rursus in Sla vicum versa et m eliorata (The Augsburg C onfession) was published under the C zech title Konfessy Augsspursk a, bud'to W yznanj Wjry swa re ewangelistske .. . in Olomouc, 1620. This is th e di stin cti ve confession of Lutherans since 1530 , to which all churches and pastors mu st subsc ribe as th e tru e and fai thful exposition of doctrin e . 3 M inarik , " Hl'ad ani e pram ei\a zivej vod y ," op . cit ., p . 15 . P eter Brock also emph asizes th at th e Z p evnfk of 1842 helped the Slovaks of the 19th ce ntury keep their na ti on al iden ti ty , in Th e Slovak N ation al Awak ening (Uni vers it y of To ronto Press , 1976) , pp . 76-77 , note 20. 4 David P . D a n iel has an excellent summ ary in En glish of thi s pe riod : " The P rates- SLOVAKIA 5 ' ' ' ' ' 0 '' " " 59 ta nt R eformati on in Slovak Ethnic Consciousness, " Slovakia, XXVIII ( 1978-79) , 49-65. See also Daniel, The Historiograph y of th e R eformation in Slovakia (No. 10 , Sixtee nth Century Bibliography Seri es, St. Louis: Center for Reform at ion R esearch , 1977 ), 50 pp . D an iel Pribi s, Pisne du ch ovnf, in K atechismus D . H . Luth era z nemeckeho jazyku na slovensk y preloien y od trech superattendencu v roku 16 12 (Levoca, 1634) . For a description , see Minarik, pp. 44-47 and 33 1, who says it is written in " mimoriadne silne slovakizovanymjazykom " (p. 47), i.e. in strongly Slovakized Czech. The word slovensky did not always mean th e Slovak language in the modern sense, though it plainly identified th e people a nd the location. Lutherans have valued the legacy of Cyril and M ethod as much as the R oman Catholics, who regard them as saints . Pavel Safarik, in his definiti ve history of th e Slavs in German in 1823, gives the M acedonian brothers their due, as did J an Kollar , a not her Slovak gia nt , in his schola rl y and poetic works, as well as in all 11 -s tanza h ymns dedica ted to th e memory of Cyril and Method , Pam atajm ei, kfest'ane, No . 32 4 in the Zpevnfk and No . 128 in the Supplement (Pridavok) of the Tran oscius ( 197 1 editions). Ackn owledgm ent of the Saints ' use of the vernacul ar in worship is also mad e in the Latin prolog to th e Catholic hym nal published in 1655. See below and note 7 fo r this Catholic hym nal. Cantus ca th olici was collec ted by the J esu it Benedikt Szolozi ( 1609- 1656) a nd publi shed in Levoca, then reprinted in 1700 in Trnava; see also Mina rik , p. 5 1. H ere too slovenske does not mean the pure Slovak language, thou gh th e Czech is here ve ry strongly Slovakized . Mina rik , p. 51. Therefore schola rs' interpretations and attributions of authorship , whether original or as a translation , do not entirely agree ; e.g. Minarik' s numbers (p. 47) are slightly different from mine given below. D a niel , "Protestant R eformation ," op. cit. , pp. 52-54, has a summ a ry of some of the doctrinal differen ces amo ng Lutherans conce rnin g the Kniha svorn osti (Book of Concord) . The Zpevnfk of 1842, though undertaken with the in tenti on of culling the best hymns from the C ith ara and add ing more hymns from contemporary hymn writers , as well as fillin g in gaps with conce rn s of the 19th ce ntury, aroused the suspi cions a nd resentment of those who found a deliberate toning down of the supernatural, th e miraculous, and otherworldly elements of the C ithara. In many cases·of abbreviated hymns , th e typical 17th ce ntury look heave n wa rd is deleted , the human nat ure of C hrist is stressed above the divin e, and the termino logy of th e J ena University gradua tes replaced that of the ea rli er co nservati ve (and orthodox) Wittenberg schola rs. Some of the Zpevnfk 's positive elements, such as hymns of social conce rn , have been retained in the for m of a suppl ement in the 1971 edition , with some previously om itted classic hymns from the C ith ara . Ivan Krasko, Nox et solitudo (M artin, 1909; rpt. Basn e , M a rtin 1948), pp . 40-41. M y translation into English is give n in An Anthology of Slovak Literature , compiled by Andrew C incura (Ri verside, 19 76), pp . 2 1-22 . Both of my grandmothers were R oman Catholi c, and my mother 's mother , though 60 SLOVAKIA she remained a Catholic all her life, daily used the Cithara for her private devotions and knew ma ny of the hym ns b y heart. In my own pastoral experience, I have tended m a n y a n elderl y Slovak parishioner with little more than a grammar sc hool edu cati on , but whose daily companion , the Tranoscius, had become threadbare from constant use. Also, it was a m oving ex perience on m y last visit to Slova ki a to attend church in Liptovsky Mikulas, where Tranovsky served and died , and to worship with the congregation wh ich dates back to Tra novsky' s tim e. The faithful gathered 15 minutes to a half hour befo re the service began, a nd the members cond ucted an impromptu hymn sing, one beginning a hymn and the others pickin g it up from memory . Th roughout the worship se rvi ces, ma ny did not need to open their hym nals. The nex t evenin g I sat at the table with a pastor and his wife in Bratislava and two laym en in their mid-thirties , beginning the meal with the trad itional mealtime h ymn , and closing the evenin g with a classic h ym n from the first edition of the C ithara . Similar scenes occur among contemporary Slovak Catholics whose hymns remain a livin g part of th eir heritage. Presented in Panel 99, " Devotional Literature in Seventee nth Century Slova ki a ," at the AAASS conve nti on in Washington, D .C. on 17 October 1982.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Influence of Juraj Tranovský's Cithara Sanctorum in Slovakia Description An account of the resource Jaroslav J. Vajda Slovakia, Vol. 30 (No. 55-56), 1982-83 pp. 51-60 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vajda, Jaroslav J., 1919-2008 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1982-83 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9d6bfbe96479556cd018597efcd96afa.pdf 31bb9a054f4b02976b6e9d17f0409a01 PDF Text Text 28 SLOVAKIA Slovaks Have Repaid Their Adopted Country Well (The following is the address of the Honorable John T. Van Sant, Senator of Pennsylvania and the Majority Whip, presented at the Reception and Luncheon of the Board of Directors of the First Catholic Slovak Union, Sunday, February 22, 1970, at the George Washington Motor Lodge, Allentown, Pa.) By John T. Van Sant Somehow it is most appropriate that we should meet together on this day in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. For here we have h!istoTic traditions of being "the Ho1y Experiment, a co1ony established on the guiding principle of freedom for all mankind." As OTdained in the "Declaration of Rights," every man has the right to worship according to the dictates o,f his own conscience. It is this spiritual basis and our belief in God which has guided us through the stormy sea of rebellion to nationhood. It is this freedom which has beckoned to the oppressed people of the world who have made their home h€re. As we meet today it is especially fitting thait we join in special tribute on this national holiday to our first president, George Washington. Washington has been described as "more than a general ... as the embodiment of everything fine in the American chairacter .. . with no illusions of grandeur ... he answered ev•ery responsibility thrust upon him and fulfilled it . . . he brought something more to the cause than military ability and statesmanship -to us he brought the priceless gift of character. " It was his leadership that guided and maintained the little band of thirteen colonies into the course of nationhood; welding them together into the union of states we have today. In 1831 the French aristocrat, Alexis De Tocqueville, came to America to study our experiment in Democracy. Fascinated by the fusion of people reaching our country, he remarked that the immigrants came with two elements �SLOVAKIA 29 essential to the development of a democracy-"no notion of superi()lfity, one over another, and poverty and misfortune." What Alexis De TocqueviHe saw here was a society of immigrants, each of whom had begun life anew, a nation of people with fresh memories of old traditions who dared to explore new frontiers, people eager to build lives for themselves in a society that did not restrict their freedom of choice. In just over 350 years our nation of nearly 200 million people has grown up, popul ated almost entirely by persons who came from other lands or whose forefathers came from other lands. 1 The interaction of these disparate cultures, the belief in the ideals that led the immigrants here, the opportunity for a new life, all gave America a flavor and character that distinguishes our land today. Immigrants have enriched the fabric of American lifethe American poet, Walt Whitman said: "These states are the amplest poem-here is not merely a nation but a teeming nartion of nations." Victims of oppression have always looked upon migration to a new land with a promise of freedom and equal opportunity. The Slovak of the 19bh century was no exception. Subject to the insidious pressures of Magyarization, longing to be free of social injustice, economic serfdom and the threat of national liquidation, literally thousands of Slovak famiHes sought refuge in the New World. They were among the countless thousands of oppressed peoples from Southern, Central and Eastern Europe who came to dwell here in the last qua!fter of the 19th century. The uprooting of these countless families was not without its pain and hea,r tbreak-although sure that he was headed for a "better lifo" for himse-1£ and his family, the Slovak immig,rant left his ancestral home and aH its romantic traditions f()lf a strange new lif·e in the stone and asphalt deserts of industrial and mining America . For the poor Slovak peasant, for centuries the tiller of someone's soil, the change was never an easy one. Always close �30 SLOVAKIA to the land the Slovak immigrant now found himself working in the mil:ls of America or mining in the darkness of its coal mines. Life was not easy-only the menial tasks were open to him. City living was strang,e and often frightening. The language made huddling tog-ether a necessityBut there was freedom , freedom to think, write and worshlp as one wishes-There was opportunity to grow and to prosper. The late Car-dinal Francis J . Spellman said "I think the story, the traditions and the lives of the Slovak people are one of the most glorious stories in history. It is hard to find any greater story of any people, for more than one thousand years, were deprived of liberty, nationality and subjected to national and religious persecution. The Slovaks have given aN the world a lesson in what it means to be devoted to ideals. During the crucial period of their history, these brothers, sisters and children of that noble race came to the United States, which has been a sanctuary and a home of persecuted people." Slovaks have repaid their adopted country well. Major John L. Polerecky served with George Washlngton . Colonel Gejza Mihal6tzy recrnited a company of riflemen in Chicago and then wrote for and received permission from President Lincoln to call the group "The Lincoln Riflemen of Slovak origin". Sergeant Matej Kocak, w1nnier of two Congressiol'l!al Medails of Honor, died on a French baittlefi:eld druving World Warr I, and one of the men who raised 'the £fag art Iwo J,ima was named Stralllk and hailed rrom Franklin Boro, Pa. These are to name only a few of the soldiers who have fought bravely for the United States. In World War II alone moTe than 50,000 Americans of Slovak descent served and of these more than 3,000 gave their lives. But the Slovak people have served this state, and this nation, in peace as weH as war; and they have been doing it for a long time. Prince Demetrius Augustine Gallitzin, the "Apostle orf the Alleghenies, " came to Pennsylvania before 1800 as Father Gallitzin. And in his footsteps have followed clergymen like the Reverend Father Stephen Furdek; the Reverend Father John Marrtvon; Father Joseph Murgas; Father Gregory Vaniscak: And the Right Reverend Stanislaus Gmuca. �SLOVAKIA 31 And, as good Americans as they are, they have managed to maintain the color and warmth of the Slovak tradition. But as the immigrants settled in the eastern cities of this country, in Wilkes-Ba:rre, Pittsburgh, Scranton, Hazleton and Philadelph ia-there was scarcely a mill, factory or mine where they could not be f.ound . It was these haTdworking, hardy, heroic folks who stoked the furnaces of our steel mills, dug the coal from the seams of the earth and embedded railroad ties. Everywhere they went they were motivated by the drive to Americanize and to win social acceptance and yet still longing for a homeland across the ocean. The founding of the First Catholic Slovak Union for Slovaks and their families by Father Stephen Furdek was one means, and a very successful one, which assisted new immigrants by providing financial security against incapacitation by serious illness and death. From this early beginning the members of your organization are to be commended for their phenomena l success. The la,test information I have received indicates an excess of 117,500 insurance certificates were issued at a value of $121.5 million in 1968. But even more significant is the outgrowth of a truly farseeing benevolent and protective program for your members of whom some 59,000 make their home here in Pennsylvania. The naitional home for orphaned children in Middletown, Outside of Harrisburg, (1909), and the first Slovak high school for girls at St. Cyril's Academy in Danville, now named for both great missionaTies among the Slovak people, (1919) are only a few of the notewodhy achievements of your organization here in Pennsylvania. And your college scholw-ship program should not be overlooked, for in an age when the costs of education are so great, these scho,l arships provide incentive as well as financial aid to worthy boys and girls to continue their education. But I marvel even more at the leader and founderr of this great movement. Surely Father Stephen Furdek had a special vision in mind 1 �32 SLOVAKIA for the Slovak people when he founded your organization, a vision which if he were heire today would please him. Arriving here early in the spring of 1882 he completed his studies in the diocesan seminary and was o,rdained. As he wo,rked and preached among the Slovak people he recognized •the great need which had to be met. The founding of your organization (1890) as well as the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Unio,n (1892), the Slovenska Matica (Slovak Institute) (1893), ,the National Fund, later the Fund ,t o P,veserv,e our Na,tional Hwtage ·and Slovak League of America (1907) present 1the keys to the £utwe ,educational and cultural accomp'Hshments for the Slovak people. "Za Boha a za narod" . "For God and for the Nation" was his lifo's slogan. What mo•r e worthy goal is there than this one! And though Father Furdek is not the only Slovak to leave his mark on our histo,r y-he does represent, in every sense, the qualities of leadership which distinguish him above all others. As George Wa,shington is revered and hono·red as the Father of Our Country-so Father Furdek is to be remembered and honored as the Father of the First Catholic Slovak Union. There is one other impression I have of Father Furdek on which I would like to comment. As he toiled among the early immigrants he recognized that there were common bonds necessary to hold his people together. They were the urgent need for education, the continuation of cultural ties and customs and above all-faith. ReaHzing that most of the immigrants had sought opportunity in America because they had been held in bondage in their native land, one of the most important ingredients to succeed in the new land was to be educated, for without an education they could not be accepted in the new society. MeanwhHe, to provide for his family , the Slovak immigrant took any job he could find. Everyone in the family worked at something, as they struggled to survive, and they did. Schools where Slovak was taught and churches where Slova·k wa,s spoken and which kept the faith rooted in the young received the time and wha,tever financial resources the family �SLOVAKIA 33 had left aiter sending weekly stipends to the family back in the old country. But it was mainta-ining his Catholic faith that the Slovak devo,ted the major po·rtion of his efforts. The first Catholic parish was founded in HazJeton in 1882 and the rkst Evangelical {LutJheran) in Streart:oir, Illino,is, iii 1884. ·• Slovak priests were enlisted from the old country to serve heire 1n the churches where the native tongue was spoken. lh 1909 the Congregation of bhe Sisters of SS. Cyriil ,a nd Methodius was founded by Father Matthew Jankofa, and in 1922 th e Slova,k Benedictine Fathers were established. These two ord&s have as one of thei!l' principal aims the preservation and promulgation of the Slovak national culture. But Father Furdek went futher, knowing that in order to preserve a language one must read and speak it, through his effoirts, the official newspaper JEDNOTA was founded, edited and published by him until his death . While the framework of culture, 1anguag,e and church organizations were helpful to the Slovak people in retaining theiir national identity, the real spirit of the homeland was kept aili\11e in the family. Slo·vak was spoken at home, in school and in church. Eveiryday customs of prayers, food and dress were continued with modification. Even dance and chornl groups helped keep al!ive the coilorful historic traditions. The "melting pot" symbol of America is not yet dead. The process of blending many strains into a single nationality need not mean the end of particular ethnic identities or traditions. Groups such as yours is a prime example of how one nationality can retain its culture and cus ~oms and still become a corutiributor to the national identity. Rededication to the American philosophy or equality means much more than the restatement of the Decfairation of Independence . 1 It means a reunifica,tion of spirit and energy to build · a strong economy, it means conquering the massive frontier and a virgin continent, shaping and reshaping the structure of government and influencing the American a,ttitude towaird the outside world. �34 SLOVAKIA The second generation, and the thi.Td, and the fourth, are inheriting the fruits of the geneTation. Let us hope that we, the members of generations which inheriited American citizenship instead of winning it, prize our freedom as highly as those who founded our families in this -great land. For if we do, the United States will grow stronger and better as its years increase. Let us a:lso welcome the men and women of other lands who still seek, and who wm continue to seek, sanctuary from oppression, and hope for a better life, in America. Whether they come from Calaiis or Bratislava, from Bremen or Naples, t his nation has always welcomed them. For in the fresh air of freedom they f1omish: to their own, and our own, inestimable benefits. In New York Harbor the Statue of Liberty awaits them, symbolizing the welcome we always have ex;tended in the land of 1mmigrants and immigraruts' sons and daughters. And on the base of that statue, these words are written for all to see and all to live by: "Give me your tired, your poor, "You!l' hudd1ed masses yearning to breathe free , "The wretched ref use of your teemmg shore, "Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me: "I 1ift my lamp beside the golden door." The coming of new immigrants to the country serves as a continual reminder to all Americans, old and new-that change is the essence of Hfe, and thait the American society is a process, not a conclusion. The abundant resources of this nation provided the founda·tion for our nation, but only people could marke the opportunity a reality. Immigrants pvovide the human resource and more than -thart--infused the nation with a commitment to new frontiers. They have kept the spirit of equality and hope always alive and strong. Herman Melville the American author, wrote "We are the heirs of al!l time and with all nations we divide our inherita,nce. '' To my fellow countrymen and especia lliy to you of Slovak descent I say, thank you for sharing with us your customs and your culture. 1 � 28 SLOVAKIA Slovaks Have Repaid Their Adopted Country Well (The following is the address of the Honorable John T. Van Sant, Senator of Pennsylvania and the Majority Whip, presented at the Reception and Luncheon of the Board of Directors of the First Catholic Slovak Union, Sunday, February 22, 1970, at the George Washington Motor Lodge, Allentown, Pa.) By John T. Van Sant Somehow it is most appropriate that we should meet together on this day in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. For here we have h!istoTic traditions of being "the Ho1y Experiment, a co1ony established on the guiding principle of freedom for all mankind." As OTdained in the "Declaration of Rights," every man has the right to worship according to the dictates o,f his own conscience. It is this spiritual basis and our belief in God which has guided us through the stormy sea of rebellion to nationhood. It is this freedom which has beckoned to the oppressed people of the world who have made their home h€re. As we meet today it is especially fitting thait we join in special tribute on this national holiday to our first president, George Washington. Washington has been described as "more than a general ... as the embodiment of everything fine in the American chairacter .. . with no illusions of grandeur ... he answered ev•ery responsibility thrust upon him and fulfilled it . . . he brought something more to the cause than military ability and statesmanship -to us he brought the priceless gift of character. " It was his leadership that guided and maintained the little band of thirteen colonies into the course of nationhood; welding them together into the union of states we have today. In 1831 the French aristocrat, Alexis De Tocqueville, came to America to study our experiment in Democracy. Fascinated by the fusion of people reaching our country, he remarked that the immigrants came with two elements �SLOVAKIA 29 essential to the development of a democracy-"no notion of superi()lfity, one over another, and poverty and misfortune." What Alexis De TocqueviHe saw here was a society of immigrants, each of whom had begun life anew, a nation of people with fresh memories of old traditions who dared to explore new frontiers, people eager to build lives for themselves in a society that did not restrict their freedom of choice. In just over 350 years our nation of nearly 200 million people has grown up, popul ated almost entirely by persons who came from other lands or whose forefathers came from other lands. 1 The interaction of these disparate cultures, the belief in the ideals that led the immigrants here, the opportunity for a new life, all gave America a flavor and character that distinguishes our land today. Immigrants have enriched the fabric of American lifethe American poet, Walt Whitman said: "These states are the amplest poem-here is not merely a nation but a teeming nartion of nations." Victims of oppression have always looked upon migration to a new land with a promise of freedom and equal opportunity. The Slovak of the 19bh century was no exception. Subject to the insidious pressures of Magyarization, longing to be free of social injustice, economic serfdom and the threat of national liquidation, literally thousands of Slovak famiHes sought refuge in the New World. They were among the countless thousands of oppressed peoples from Southern, Central and Eastern Europe who came to dwell here in the last qua!fter of the 19th century. The uprooting of these countless families was not without its pain and hea,r tbreak-although sure that he was headed for a "better lifo" for himse-1£ and his family, the Slovak immig,rant left his ancestral home and aH its romantic traditions f()lf a strange new lif·e in the stone and asphalt deserts of industrial and mining America . For the poor Slovak peasant, for centuries the tiller of someone's soil, the change was never an easy one. Always close �30 SLOVAKIA to the land the Slovak immigrant now found himself working in the mil:ls of America or mining in the darkness of its coal mines. Life was not easy-only the menial tasks were open to him. City living was strang,e and often frightening. The language made huddling tog-ether a necessityBut there was freedom , freedom to think, write and worshlp as one wishes-There was opportunity to grow and to prosper. The late Car-dinal Francis J . Spellman said "I think the story, the traditions and the lives of the Slovak people are one of the most glorious stories in history. It is hard to find any greater story of any people, for more than one thousand years, were deprived of liberty, nationality and subjected to national and religious persecution. The Slovaks have given aN the world a lesson in what it means to be devoted to ideals. During the crucial period of their history, these brothers, sisters and children of that noble race came to the United States, which has been a sanctuary and a home of persecuted people." Slovaks have repaid their adopted country well. Major John L. Polerecky served with George Washlngton . Colonel Gejza Mihal6tzy recrnited a company of riflemen in Chicago and then wrote for and received permission from President Lincoln to call the group "The Lincoln Riflemen of Slovak origin". Sergeant Matej Kocak, w1nnier of two Congressiol'l!al Medails of Honor, died on a French baittlefi:eld druving World Warr I, and one of the men who raised 'the £fag art Iwo J,ima was named Stralllk and hailed rrom Franklin Boro, Pa. These are to name only a few of the soldiers who have fought bravely for the United States. In World War II alone moTe than 50,000 Americans of Slovak descent served and of these more than 3,000 gave their lives. But the Slovak people have served this state, and this nation, in peace as weH as war; and they have been doing it for a long time. Prince Demetrius Augustine Gallitzin, the "Apostle orf the Alleghenies, " came to Pennsylvania before 1800 as Father Gallitzin. And in his footsteps have followed clergymen like the Reverend Father Stephen Furdek; the Reverend Father John Marrtvon; Father Joseph Murgas; Father Gregory Vaniscak: And the Right Reverend Stanislaus Gmuca. �SLOVAKIA 31 And, as good Americans as they are, they have managed to maintain the color and warmth of the Slovak tradition. But as the immigrants settled in the eastern cities of this country, in Wilkes-Ba:rre, Pittsburgh, Scranton, Hazleton and Philadelph ia-there was scarcely a mill, factory or mine where they could not be f.ound . It was these haTdworking, hardy, heroic folks who stoked the furnaces of our steel mills, dug the coal from the seams of the earth and embedded railroad ties. Everywhere they went they were motivated by the drive to Americanize and to win social acceptance and yet still longing for a homeland across the ocean. The founding of the First Catholic Slovak Union for Slovaks and their families by Father Stephen Furdek was one means, and a very successful one, which assisted new immigrants by providing financial security against incapacitation by serious illness and death. From this early beginning the members of your organization are to be commended for their phenomena l success. The la,test information I have received indicates an excess of 117,500 insurance certificates were issued at a value of $121.5 million in 1968. But even more significant is the outgrowth of a truly farseeing benevolent and protective program for your members of whom some 59,000 make their home here in Pennsylvania. The naitional home for orphaned children in Middletown, Outside of Harrisburg, (1909), and the first Slovak high school for girls at St. Cyril's Academy in Danville, now named for both great missionaTies among the Slovak people, (1919) are only a few of the notewodhy achievements of your organization here in Pennsylvania. And your college scholw-ship program should not be overlooked, for in an age when the costs of education are so great, these scho,l arships provide incentive as well as financial aid to worthy boys and girls to continue their education. But I marvel even more at the leader and founderr of this great movement. Surely Father Stephen Furdek had a special vision in mind 1 �32 SLOVAKIA for the Slovak people when he founded your organization, a vision which if he were heire today would please him. Arriving here early in the spring of 1882 he completed his studies in the diocesan seminary and was o,rdained. As he wo,rked and preached among the Slovak people he recognized •the great need which had to be met. The founding of your organization (1890) as well as the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Unio,n (1892), the Slovenska Matica (Slovak Institute) (1893), ,the National Fund, later the Fund ,t o P,veserv,e our Na,tional Hwtage ·and Slovak League of America (1907) present 1the keys to the £utwe ,educational and cultural accomp'Hshments for the Slovak people. "Za Boha a za narod" . "For God and for the Nation" was his lifo's slogan. What mo•r e worthy goal is there than this one! And though Father Furdek is not the only Slovak to leave his mark on our histo,r y-he does represent, in every sense, the qualities of leadership which distinguish him above all others. As George Wa,shington is revered and hono·red as the Father of Our Country-so Father Furdek is to be remembered and honored as the Father of the First Catholic Slovak Union. There is one other impression I have of Father Furdek on which I would like to comment. As he toiled among the early immigrants he recognized that there were common bonds necessary to hold his people together. They were the urgent need for education, the continuation of cultural ties and customs and above all-faith. ReaHzing that most of the immigrants had sought opportunity in America because they had been held in bondage in their native land, one of the most important ingredients to succeed in the new land was to be educated, for without an education they could not be accepted in the new society. MeanwhHe, to provide for his family , the Slovak immigrant took any job he could find. Everyone in the family worked at something, as they struggled to survive, and they did. Schools where Slovak was taught and churches where Slova·k wa,s spoken and which kept the faith rooted in the young received the time and wha,tever financial resources the family �SLOVAKIA 33 had left aiter sending weekly stipends to the family back in the old country. But it was mainta-ining his Catholic faith that the Slovak devo,ted the major po·rtion of his efforts. The first Catholic parish was founded in HazJeton in 1882 and the rkst Evangelical {LutJheran) in Streart:oir, Illino,is, iii 1884. ·• Slovak priests were enlisted from the old country to serve heire 1n the churches where the native tongue was spoken. lh 1909 the Congregation of bhe Sisters of SS. Cyriil ,a nd Methodius was founded by Father Matthew Jankofa, and in 1922 th e Slova,k Benedictine Fathers were established. These two ord&s have as one of thei!l' principal aims the preservation and promulgation of the Slovak national culture. But Father Furdek went futher, knowing that in order to preserve a language one must read and speak it, through his effoirts, the official newspaper JEDNOTA was founded, edited and published by him until his death . While the framework of culture, 1anguag,e and church organizations were helpful to the Slovak people in retaining theiir national identity, the real spirit of the homeland was kept aili\11e in the family. Slo·vak was spoken at home, in school and in church. Eveiryday customs of prayers, food and dress were continued with modification. Even dance and chornl groups helped keep al!ive the coilorful historic traditions. The "melting pot" symbol of America is not yet dead. The process of blending many strains into a single nationality need not mean the end of particular ethnic identities or traditions. Groups such as yours is a prime example of how one nationality can retain its culture and cus ~oms and still become a corutiributor to the national identity. Rededication to the American philosophy or equality means much more than the restatement of the Decfairation of Independence . 1 It means a reunifica,tion of spirit and energy to build · a strong economy, it means conquering the massive frontier and a virgin continent, shaping and reshaping the structure of government and influencing the American a,ttitude towaird the outside world. �34 SLOVAKIA The second generation, and the thi.Td, and the fourth, are inheriting the fruits of the geneTation. Let us hope that we, the members of generations which inheriited American citizenship instead of winning it, prize our freedom as highly as those who founded our families in this -great land. For if we do, the United States will grow stronger and better as its years increase. Let us a:lso welcome the men and women of other lands who still seek, and who wm continue to seek, sanctuary from oppression, and hope for a better life, in America. Whether they come from Calaiis or Bratislava, from Bremen or Naples, t his nation has always welcomed them. For in the fresh air of freedom they f1omish: to their own, and our own, inestimable benefits. In New York Harbor the Statue of Liberty awaits them, symbolizing the welcome we always have ex;tended in the land of 1mmigrants and immigraruts' sons and daughters. And on the base of that statue, these words are written for all to see and all to live by: "Give me your tired, your poor, "You!l' hudd1ed masses yearning to breathe free , "The wretched ref use of your teemmg shore, "Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me: "I 1ift my lamp beside the golden door." The coming of new immigrants to the country serves as a continual reminder to all Americans, old and new-that change is the essence of Hfe, and thait the American society is a process, not a conclusion. The abundant resources of this nation provided the founda·tion for our nation, but only people could marke the opportunity a reality. Immigrants pvovide the human resource and more than -thart--infused the nation with a commitment to new frontiers. They have kept the spirit of equality and hope always alive and strong. Herman Melville the American author, wrote "We are the heirs of al!l time and with all nations we divide our inherita,nce. '' To my fellow countrymen and especia lliy to you of Slovak descent I say, thank you for sharing with us your customs and your culture. 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1970, Vol. 20 Description An account of the resource Vol. 20 (No. 43), 1970. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1970 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 28 SLOVAKIA Slovaks Have Repaid Their Adopted Country Well (The following is the address of the Honorable John T. Van Sant, Senator of Pennsylvania and the Majority Whip, presented at the Reception and Luncheon of the Board of Directors of the First Catholic Slovak Union, Sunday, February 22, 1970, at the George Washington Motor Lodge, Allentown, Pa.) By John T. Van Sant Somehow it is most appropriate that we should meet together on this day in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. For here we have h!istoTic traditions of being "the Ho1y Experiment, a co1ony established on the guiding principle of freedom for all mankind." As OTdained in the "Declaration of Rights," every man has the right to worship according to the dictates o,f his own conscience. It is this spiritual basis and our belief in God which has guided us through the stormy sea of rebellion to nationhood. It is this freedom which has beckoned to the oppressed people of the world who have made their home h€re. As we meet today it is especially fitting thait we join in special tribute on this national holiday to our first president, George Washington. Washington has been described as "more than a general ... as the embodiment of everything fine in the American chairacter .. . with no illusions of grandeur ... he answered ev•ery responsibility thrust upon him and fulfilled it . . . he brought something more to the cause than military ability and statesmanship -to us he brought the priceless gift of character. " It was his leadership that guided and maintained the little band of thirteen colonies into the course of nationhood; welding them together into the union of states we have today. In 1831 the French aristocrat, Alexis De Tocqueville, came to America to study our experiment in Democracy. Fascinated by the fusion of people reaching our country, he remarked that the immigrants came with two elements SLOVAKIA 29 essential to the development of a democracy-"no notion of superi()lfity, one over another, and poverty and misfortune." What Alexis De TocqueviHe saw here was a society of immigrants, each of whom had begun life anew, a nation of people with fresh memories of old traditions who dared to explore new frontiers, people eager to build lives for themselves in a society that did not restrict their freedom of choice. In just over 350 years our nation of nearly 200 million people has grown up, popul ated almost entirely by persons who came from other lands or whose forefathers came from other lands. 1 The interaction of these disparate cultures, the belief in the ideals that led the immigrants here, the opportunity for a new life, all gave America a flavor and character that distinguishes our land today. Immigrants have enriched the fabric of American lifethe American poet, Walt Whitman said: "These states are the amplest poem-here is not merely a nation but a teeming nartion of nations." Victims of oppression have always looked upon migration to a new land with a promise of freedom and equal opportunity. The Slovak of the 19bh century was no exception. Subject to the insidious pressures of Magyarization, longing to be free of social injustice, economic serfdom and the threat of national liquidation, literally thousands of Slovak famiHes sought refuge in the New World. They were among the countless thousands of oppressed peoples from Southern, Central and Eastern Europe who came to dwell here in the last qua!fter of the 19th century. The uprooting of these countless families was not without its pain and hea,r tbreak-although sure that he was headed for a "better lifo" for himse-1£ and his family, the Slovak immig,rant left his ancestral home and aH its romantic traditions f()lf a strange new lif·e in the stone and asphalt deserts of industrial and mining America . For the poor Slovak peasant, for centuries the tiller of someone's soil, the change was never an easy one. Always close 30 SLOVAKIA to the land the Slovak immigrant now found himself working in the mil:ls of America or mining in the darkness of its coal mines. Life was not easy-only the menial tasks were open to him. City living was strang,e and often frightening. The language made huddling tog-ether a necessityBut there was freedom , freedom to think, write and worshlp as one wishes-There was opportunity to grow and to prosper. The late Car-dinal Francis J . Spellman said "I think the story, the traditions and the lives of the Slovak people are one of the most glorious stories in history. It is hard to find any greater story of any people, for more than one thousand years, were deprived of liberty, nationality and subjected to national and religious persecution. The Slovaks have given aN the world a lesson in what it means to be devoted to ideals. During the crucial period of their history, these brothers, sisters and children of that noble race came to the United States, which has been a sanctuary and a home of persecuted people." Slovaks have repaid their adopted country well. Major John L. Polerecky served with George Washlngton . Colonel Gejza Mihal6tzy recrnited a company of riflemen in Chicago and then wrote for and received permission from President Lincoln to call the group "The Lincoln Riflemen of Slovak origin". Sergeant Matej Kocak, w1nnier of two Congressiol'l!al Medails of Honor, died on a French baittlefi:eld druving World Warr I, and one of the men who raised 'the £fag art Iwo J,ima was named Stralllk and hailed rrom Franklin Boro, Pa. These are to name only a few of the soldiers who have fought bravely for the United States. In World War II alone moTe than 50,000 Americans of Slovak descent served and of these more than 3,000 gave their lives. But the Slovak people have served this state, and this nation, in peace as weH as war; and they have been doing it for a long time. Prince Demetrius Augustine Gallitzin, the "Apostle orf the Alleghenies, " came to Pennsylvania before 1800 as Father Gallitzin. And in his footsteps have followed clergymen like the Reverend Father Stephen Furdek; the Reverend Father John Marrtvon; Father Joseph Murgas; Father Gregory Vaniscak: And the Right Reverend Stanislaus Gmuca. SLOVAKIA 31 And, as good Americans as they are, they have managed to maintain the color and warmth of the Slovak tradition. But as the immigrants settled in the eastern cities of this country, in Wilkes-Ba:rre, Pittsburgh, Scranton, Hazleton and Philadelph ia-there was scarcely a mill, factory or mine where they could not be f.ound . It was these haTdworking, hardy, heroic folks who stoked the furnaces of our steel mills, dug the coal from the seams of the earth and embedded railroad ties. Everywhere they went they were motivated by the drive to Americanize and to win social acceptance and yet still longing for a homeland across the ocean. The founding of the First Catholic Slovak Union for Slovaks and their families by Father Stephen Furdek was one means, and a very successful one, which assisted new immigrants by providing financial security against incapacitation by serious illness and death. From this early beginning the members of your organization are to be commended for their phenomena l success. The la,test information I have received indicates an excess of 117,500 insurance certificates were issued at a value of $121.5 million in 1968. But even more significant is the outgrowth of a truly farseeing benevolent and protective program for your members of whom some 59,000 make their home here in Pennsylvania. The naitional home for orphaned children in Middletown, Outside of Harrisburg, (1909), and the first Slovak high school for girls at St. Cyril's Academy in Danville, now named for both great missionaTies among the Slovak people, (1919) are only a few of the notewodhy achievements of your organization here in Pennsylvania. And your college scholw-ship program should not be overlooked, for in an age when the costs of education are so great, these scho,l arships provide incentive as well as financial aid to worthy boys and girls to continue their education. But I marvel even more at the leader and founderr of this great movement. Surely Father Stephen Furdek had a special vision in mind 1 32 SLOVAKIA for the Slovak people when he founded your organization, a vision which if he were heire today would please him. Arriving here early in the spring of 1882 he completed his studies in the diocesan seminary and was o,rdained. As he wo,rked and preached among the Slovak people he recognized •the great need which had to be met. The founding of your organization (1890) as well as the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Unio,n (1892), the Slovenska Matica (Slovak Institute) (1893), ,the National Fund, later the Fund ,t o P,veserv,e our Na,tional Hwtage ·and Slovak League of America (1907) present 1the keys to the £utwe ,educational and cultural accomp'Hshments for the Slovak people. "Za Boha a za narod" . "For God and for the Nation" was his lifo's slogan. What mo•r e worthy goal is there than this one! And though Father Furdek is not the only Slovak to leave his mark on our histo,r y-he does represent, in every sense, the qualities of leadership which distinguish him above all others. As George Wa,shington is revered and hono·red as the Father of Our Country-so Father Furdek is to be remembered and honored as the Father of the First Catholic Slovak Union. There is one other impression I have of Father Furdek on which I would like to comment. As he toiled among the early immigrants he recognized that there were common bonds necessary to hold his people together. They were the urgent need for education, the continuation of cultural ties and customs and above all-faith. ReaHzing that most of the immigrants had sought opportunity in America because they had been held in bondage in their native land, one of the most important ingredients to succeed in the new land was to be educated, for without an education they could not be accepted in the new society. MeanwhHe, to provide for his family , the Slovak immigrant took any job he could find. Everyone in the family worked at something, as they struggled to survive, and they did. Schools where Slovak was taught and churches where Slova·k wa,s spoken and which kept the faith rooted in the young received the time and wha,tever financial resources the family SLOVAKIA 33 had left aiter sending weekly stipends to the family back in the old country. But it was mainta-ining his Catholic faith that the Slovak devo,ted the major po·rtion of his efforts. The first Catholic parish was founded in HazJeton in 1882 and the rkst Evangelical {LutJheran) in Streart:oir, Illino,is, iii 1884. ·• Slovak priests were enlisted from the old country to serve heire 1n the churches where the native tongue was spoken. lh 1909 the Congregation of bhe Sisters of SS. Cyriil ,a nd Methodius was founded by Father Matthew Jankofa, and in 1922 th e Slova,k Benedictine Fathers were established. These two ord&s have as one of thei!l' principal aims the preservation and promulgation of the Slovak national culture. But Father Furdek went futher, knowing that in order to preserve a language one must read and speak it, through his effoirts, the official newspaper JEDNOTA was founded, edited and published by him until his death . While the framework of culture, 1anguag,e and church organizations were helpful to the Slovak people in retaining theiir national identity, the real spirit of the homeland was kept aili\11e in the family. Slo·vak was spoken at home, in school and in church. Eveiryday customs of prayers, food and dress were continued with modification. Even dance and chornl groups helped keep al!ive the coilorful historic traditions. The "melting pot" symbol of America is not yet dead. The process of blending many strains into a single nationality need not mean the end of particular ethnic identities or traditions. Groups such as yours is a prime example of how one nationality can retain its culture and cus ~oms and still become a corutiributor to the national identity. Rededication to the American philosophy or equality means much more than the restatement of the Decfairation of Independence . 1 It means a reunifica,tion of spirit and energy to build · a strong economy, it means conquering the massive frontier and a virgin continent, shaping and reshaping the structure of government and influencing the American a,ttitude towaird the outside world. 34 SLOVAKIA The second generation, and the thi.Td, and the fourth, are inheriting the fruits of the geneTation. Let us hope that we, the members of generations which inheriited American citizenship instead of winning it, prize our freedom as highly as those who founded our families in this -great land. For if we do, the United States will grow stronger and better as its years increase. Let us a:lso welcome the men and women of other lands who still seek, and who wm continue to seek, sanctuary from oppression, and hope for a better life, in America. Whether they come from Calaiis or Bratislava, from Bremen or Naples, t his nation has always welcomed them. For in the fresh air of freedom they f1omish: to their own, and our own, inestimable benefits. In New York Harbor the Statue of Liberty awaits them, symbolizing the welcome we always have ex;tended in the land of 1mmigrants and immigraruts' sons and daughters. And on the base of that statue, these words are written for all to see and all to live by: "Give me your tired, your poor, "You!l' hudd1ed masses yearning to breathe free , "The wretched ref use of your teemmg shore, "Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me: "I 1ift my lamp beside the golden door." The coming of new immigrants to the country serves as a continual reminder to all Americans, old and new-that change is the essence of Hfe, and thait the American society is a process, not a conclusion. The abundant resources of this nation provided the founda·tion for our nation, but only people could marke the opportunity a reality. Immigrants pvovide the human resource and more than -thart--infused the nation with a commitment to new frontiers. They have kept the spirit of equality and hope always alive and strong. Herman Melville the American author, wrote "We are the heirs of al!l time and with all nations we divide our inherita,nce. '' To my fellow countrymen and especia lliy to you of Slovak descent I say, thank you for sharing with us your customs and your culture. 1  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovaks Have Repaid Their Adopted Country Well Description An account of the resource Address of the Honorable John T. Van Sant, Senator of Pennsylvania and the Majority Whip, presented at the Reception and Luncheon of the Board of Directors of the First Catholic Slovak Union, Sunday, February 22, 1970, at the George Washington Motor Lodge, Allentown, Pa. Slovakia, Vol. 20 (No. 43), 1970 pp. 28-34 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Van Sant, John T. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1970 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4dd10926a6ce50c231f5404ea182979f.pdf 93b506172dcb7b0a52c73b83924d8be1 PDF Text Text 146 SLOVAKIA Why Our Melting Pot Cooled Off Rudolph J. V e c o l i A policeman called me the other day about a "missing person" case. It turned out that he was the missing person. He was trying to find out where his ancestors came from . He had a Slavic name and knew that his grandparents had emigrated from Austria-Hungary, but there he lost the trail. "I want to know who I am, and to be able to tell my two sons who they are," my caller explained. Luckily we were able to locate the policeman's grandfather in the records of a Slovak church in Minneapolis. This told us the village in Slovakia from which his family had come. Our policeman was overjoyed; now he knew who he was and he was going to try to locate relatives in Slovakia. This search for grandparents was not an isolated case. "Who am I?" has become an urgent question for many Americans, for the middle-aged as well as the young. We appear to be going through a collective identity crisis. One manifestation of the crisis has been the widespread affirmation of group identities. Young people, especially children of the middle class, have created the "counter-culture" with its distinctive lifestyle, dress, and language. Women's liberation provides a new positive sense of collective identity for many of what was once known as the "gentle sex." But, for most Americans, race, religion, and national origin continue to provide the basis for group identity today-as they have historically. Not only are Black Americans, Indians, and Chicanos asserting a new-found pride in their heritage, but Croatian Americans, Finnish Americans, and Slovak Americans, among others, are declaring that they are beautiful as well. An editorial in Christian Century, pointing out that even old-stock white Americans had particularistic identities, declared: "We are all ethnics now." �SLOVAKIA 147 It seems that everyone needs an ethnic label these days. At a recent conference on cross-cultural education there was a workshop on "The Problem of the Non-Ethnic"! Presumably these are individuals of such mixed ancestry that they do not fit neatly into an ethnic category. But as anthropologist Margaret Mead said, this is nonsense, since everyone has grandparents and a heritage, even if it cannot be precisely labeled. The extraordinary resurgence of ethnic consciousness is not easily explained. Clearly the traumatic events of the sixties shattered the illusion of an American consensus. The civil rights movement, black nationalism, the Vietnam War, the student movement-all demonstrated that Americans were not of one mind about basic principles and values. Watts, Cicero, My Lai, Kent State, Chicago, elicited very different responses among different segments of the American people. We became polarized over the basic issues of racial justice, war and peace, lifestyles, the very meaning of democracy; polarized along lines of race, age, and social class. Perhaps it was the loss of a shared sense of the national purpose which caused persons to seek psychological and social security with "their own kind." In the face of this fragmentation, the myth of the "melting pot" was revealed to be transparent fiction. The mysterious process whereby peoples of diverse racial and cultural origins were to be assimilated into an "all-American" middle-class society obviously had not worked its magic. Blacks, by their words and actions, most aggressively challenged the "melting pot" ideal. Not only had they not been melted, but they made it clear they did not wish to be melted into some nondescript American type. Confronted with "black identity," other Americans were compelled to define their own particularistic identities. Not only Indians, Chicanos, and Orientals, but white ethnic groups reacted with a heightened group consciousness. "Black power" was echoed by the slogans of "Polish power" and "Italian power." It surprised many that these white ethnics who were supposed to have been assimilated long ago remained selfconscious elements in the body politic. But the census of 1960 had reported over 34 million as "foreign-stock," i. e., foreign-born or with at least one parent foreign-born. These �148 SLOVAKIA immigrants and their children constituted almost 20 percent of the American population. In addition, many of the third generation and beyond retained some degree of ethnic identity. However, their presence had been ignored by the mass media, the schools and other institutions. Because of pressures to Americanize, these descendants of European immigrants had publicly suppressed their ethnicity, though many continued to cultivate their cultural heritages in the privacy of their families, churches and organizations. Now the lid is off; the stigma of shame of being a "hyphenate," is being rejected. A new pride is being asserted in one's identity as a Ukrainian-American or a Greek-American, to give just two examples. Labeled the "forgotten American," the "middle Americans," or the "silent majority," white ethnics have come in for a good deal of attention of late. For the most part they have been portrayed as backlashing racists, potential recruits for the politics of reaction. In the mass media they have been stereotyped as Joe, the homicidal psychotic, or as Archie, the "lovable bigot." This has intensified their anger and resentment. As Barbara Mikulski, a Polish-American leader, protested: "The ethnic American is sick of being stereotyped as a racist and dullard by phony white liberals, pseudo black militants, and patronizing bureaucrats." Recently, writers such as Andrew M. Greeley and Murray Friedman have been providing us with more sympathetic analyses of lower middle-class ethnic Americans. As bluecollar workers, the bulk of them are either poor (two of every three poor people in this country are white) or "near-poor." Hard-pressed by inflation, heavy taxes, and job insecurity, they do not feel a part of the "Affluent Society." Their sons, like those of black and brown Americans, have fought and died in Vietnam, because many fewer of them go to college. Another stereotype of the ethnic American is that he is a hawk; actually many of them are strongly opposed to the war, but they do pride themselves on being patriotic Americans. They bitterly resent the class and ethnic snobbery which puts them down because of their immigrant and working-class backgrounds. In part this explains their �SLOVAKIA 149 hostility toward the educated elite and the universities . No wonder they cheer Spiro Agnew when he attacks intellectuals as "effete snobs." Like the blacks, the white ethnics are oppressed by a sense of powerlessness and exploitation; like them, they suffer from poor or inadequate schools and municipal services; like them, they are cynical about politics and politicians. As the bulk of the white population of the northern cities, the ethnics endure many of the same urban problems as do the blacks. Frustrated and insecure, they have projected their fears and anger against the blacks, Puerto Ricans, and other groups whom they regard as threats to their own marginal status. They are convicted that it is their jobs, their neighborhoods, their schools, that these newcomers are after. From the ethnics' point of view the blacks have received preferential treatment in federal programs, while their needs have been neglected. As Msgr. Geno C. Baroni, director of the Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs, put it: "Little attention has been given to the anguish of the socially and politically alienated middle American." To indulge in accusations of "white racism" is a futile exercise of moral indignation. A more positive response, as Irving Levine, director of the National Project on Ethnic America has argued, is "to identify the real problems of lower middle-class ethnic groups and speak creatively to their deepest needs." The "New Pluralism" is thus not simply a psychological aberration that can be treated by exhortations to brotherhood and tolerance. Rather it is rooted in the very social and economic structure of this society. It reflects the injustices and inequities which that structure inflicts upon large numbers of Americans because of their social class and ethnic-racial character. What has happened is that many groups heretofore inarticulate have found their voices. They are demanding often in angry tones full and equal participation in all areas of American life. Pluralism is a two-edged sword. If our institutions are unresponsive to the legitimate needs and aspirations of all groups, this can lead to increasing group conflict and further polarization. However, if those institutions are responsive, the thrust of the "New Pluralism" can carry �150 SLOVAK.IA us far toward the realization of a more democratic society. This applies to the private sector as well as the public, to business, corporations as well as governmental agencies, to the churches as well as to the schools. Decision-makers at all levels must become more sensitive to group differences, aultural as well as racial. Politicians by the nature of their trade have been most responsive to ethnic pressures, though too often they have manipulated them to serve political ends. But professionals and bureaucrats in the "mainstream" institutions have usually subscribed to a universalistic model of the "typical American." They have typically displayed an insensitivity and ignorance, even arrogance, toward the cultural and social differences among their students, patients, employees, and clients. The sphere of education exemplifies this lack of sensitivity in classic fashion. It is needed a paradox that the educational system of a multicultural, multiracial, and multilingual society such as ours has been dominated by an Anglo-American model, both in curriculum and format. This can only be understood in terms of the grip of an assimilationist ideology upon administrators and teachers alike. Historically the schools were designed to serve as agencies of the " Melting Pot." It was to be their function to transform the children of the immigrants (including internal migrants ) into "good, little, middle-class Americans. '' As one educator stated it: "Our task is to assimilate or amalgamate these people as part of the American race, and to implant in their children, so far as can be done, the Anglo-Saxon conception of righteousness, law, order, and popular government." Although this statement was made over a half century ago, it continued to serve as an accurate description of educational policy until recent times. Rather than building upon the linguistic and cultural backgrounds of the students, the schools sought to purify them of their "foreign" traits. The results often were, as sociologist Milton Gordon has observed, "ethnic self-hatred, family disorganization, and juvenile delinquency." Again it was the "black revolution" that initially challenged the monocultural model of American education. �SLOVAKIA 151 In most cases, efforts to adapt schools to special needs of black children have been only partially successful. However, this small beginning has called into question the basic assumptions upon which American educational philosophy and practice has rested for many decades. More and more, educators and parents are seeking a pluralistic way of teaching children which will mirror the pluralistic society in which they live. The principle that formal education should respect and reinforce the cultural and ethnic identity of the child rather than seeking to eradicate it is gaining ground. "Ethnic studies" have emerged as a major response to this need. Because American history as taught in the past was "white history," Afro-American studies was incorporated into the curriculum at the demand of the black community. But blacks have not been the only "invisible men" in American history, Indians, Hispanos, and immigrants have also been ignored or treated disparagingly in most textbooks. Hence the need to revise the course content so that the role of all the many different ethnic elements in American society may be appropriately represented. This is a large task, and resources have been inadequate. Many were encouraged by the introduction of a bill in the Congress that would have provided federal funds in support of "Ethnic Heritage Studies." While the bill was passed unanimously by the Senate, it was rejected in the House of Representatives. There is still hope that it may be revived in the current session. Ethnic studies may, of course, degenerate into tokenism, the placing of a few pictures on the wall and the adding of a few pages to a textbook. To be successful they must permeate the curriculum, not only of history, but language, literature and the social studies. Of crucial importance will be the attitudes of teachers. First, they must be convinced of the value of all cultures as equally valid expressions of the human spirit. This is the most difficult task, to overcome our own ethnocentricity. For the child, ethnic studies should serve two functions . They must foster within him a sense of his worth and dignity based on his identification with his own ancestors. Second, they must provide him with a capacity for an appreciation and acceptance of the cultural differences of �152 SLOVAKIA others. Free of a sense of either superiority or inferiority, he would be well equipped to live in a pluralistic society. We need to experiment with the format for teaching ethnic studies. Just as ecology may best be studied in a natural environment, so the ethnic communities with their rich cultural resources may be the most appropriate setting for learning about ethnic heritages. The "New Pluralism" is not limited to the East, nor to the troubled cities of New York and Chicago; it is a phenomenon that more or less pervades all of America. Bemused by the legend of Scandinavian predominance, we sometimes lose sight of the ethnic complexity of Minnesota. Certainly the racial groups of this state, blacks, chicanes, Indians, and orientals, are a smaller proportion of the total population than in many other states. But their militancy in recent years has made them conspicuous. Less visible have been the white ethnic groups, although the discerning observer might perceive their stirrings as well. Yet in 1960, more than 25 percent of the state of Minnesota population was of foreign stock, which meant that probably more than half of all Minnesotans had grandfathers born in another country. Although Norwegians, Germans, and Swedes were by far the largest groups, there were also significant numbers of British, Canadians, Czechs, Croatians, East European Jews, Finns, Italians, Irish, Poles, Slovaks, and Slovenes, as well as a scattering of other groups. Nor is pluralism in Minnesota only an urban phenomenon. Small towns on he Iron Range and in rural counties have a complex mixture of ethnic groups. To explore ethnicity in Minnesota, to initiate an inquiry into the state of the "New Pluralism" here, a conference was held recently at the International Institute in St. Paul. The Minnesota Project on Ethnic America, with the assistance of the National Project on Ethnic America of the American Jewish Committee and with the cosponsorship of various organizations and institutions, sponsored the sessions. The conference provided a forum in which perceptions, feelings, and judgments regarding social issues were offered from a variety of ethnic perspectives. Discovery of common ground may provide the means for moving Minnesota toward a "New Pluralism" based upon mutual respect and shared goals . - ( Minneapolis Tribune.) � 146 SLOVAKIA Why Our Melting Pot Cooled Off Rudolph J. V e c o l i A policeman called me the other day about a "missing person" case. It turned out that he was the missing person. He was trying to find out where his ancestors came from . He had a Slavic name and knew that his grandparents had emigrated from Austria-Hungary, but there he lost the trail. "I want to know who I am, and to be able to tell my two sons who they are," my caller explained. Luckily we were able to locate the policeman's grandfather in the records of a Slovak church in Minneapolis. This told us the village in Slovakia from which his family had come. Our policeman was overjoyed; now he knew who he was and he was going to try to locate relatives in Slovakia. This search for grandparents was not an isolated case. "Who am I?" has become an urgent question for many Americans, for the middle-aged as well as the young. We appear to be going through a collective identity crisis. One manifestation of the crisis has been the widespread affirmation of group identities. Young people, especially children of the middle class, have created the "counter-culture" with its distinctive lifestyle, dress, and language. Women's liberation provides a new positive sense of collective identity for many of what was once known as the "gentle sex." But, for most Americans, race, religion, and national origin continue to provide the basis for group identity today-as they have historically. Not only are Black Americans, Indians, and Chicanos asserting a new-found pride in their heritage, but Croatian Americans, Finnish Americans, and Slovak Americans, among others, are declaring that they are beautiful as well. An editorial in Christian Century, pointing out that even old-stock white Americans had particularistic identities, declared: "We are all ethnics now." �SLOVAKIA 147 It seems that everyone needs an ethnic label these days. At a recent conference on cross-cultural education there was a workshop on "The Problem of the Non-Ethnic"! Presumably these are individuals of such mixed ancestry that they do not fit neatly into an ethnic category. But as anthropologist Margaret Mead said, this is nonsense, since everyone has grandparents and a heritage, even if it cannot be precisely labeled. The extraordinary resurgence of ethnic consciousness is not easily explained. Clearly the traumatic events of the sixties shattered the illusion of an American consensus. The civil rights movement, black nationalism, the Vietnam War, the student movement-all demonstrated that Americans were not of one mind about basic principles and values. Watts, Cicero, My Lai, Kent State, Chicago, elicited very different responses among different segments of the American people. We became polarized over the basic issues of racial justice, war and peace, lifestyles, the very meaning of democracy; polarized along lines of race, age, and social class. Perhaps it was the loss of a shared sense of the national purpose which caused persons to seek psychological and social security with "their own kind." In the face of this fragmentation, the myth of the "melting pot" was revealed to be transparent fiction. The mysterious process whereby peoples of diverse racial and cultural origins were to be assimilated into an "all-American" middle-class society obviously had not worked its magic. Blacks, by their words and actions, most aggressively challenged the "melting pot" ideal. Not only had they not been melted, but they made it clear they did not wish to be melted into some nondescript American type. Confronted with "black identity," other Americans were compelled to define their own particularistic identities. Not only Indians, Chicanos, and Orientals, but white ethnic groups reacted with a heightened group consciousness. "Black power" was echoed by the slogans of "Polish power" and "Italian power." It surprised many that these white ethnics who were supposed to have been assimilated long ago remained selfconscious elements in the body politic. But the census of 1960 had reported over 34 million as "foreign-stock," i. e., foreign-born or with at least one parent foreign-born. These �148 SLOVAKIA immigrants and their children constituted almost 20 percent of the American population. In addition, many of the third generation and beyond retained some degree of ethnic identity. However, their presence had been ignored by the mass media, the schools and other institutions. Because of pressures to Americanize, these descendants of European immigrants had publicly suppressed their ethnicity, though many continued to cultivate their cultural heritages in the privacy of their families, churches and organizations. Now the lid is off; the stigma of shame of being a "hyphenate," is being rejected. A new pride is being asserted in one's identity as a Ukrainian-American or a Greek-American, to give just two examples. Labeled the "forgotten American," the "middle Americans," or the "silent majority," white ethnics have come in for a good deal of attention of late. For the most part they have been portrayed as backlashing racists, potential recruits for the politics of reaction. In the mass media they have been stereotyped as Joe, the homicidal psychotic, or as Archie, the "lovable bigot." This has intensified their anger and resentment. As Barbara Mikulski, a Polish-American leader, protested: "The ethnic American is sick of being stereotyped as a racist and dullard by phony white liberals, pseudo black militants, and patronizing bureaucrats." Recently, writers such as Andrew M. Greeley and Murray Friedman have been providing us with more sympathetic analyses of lower middle-class ethnic Americans. As bluecollar workers, the bulk of them are either poor (two of every three poor people in this country are white) or "near-poor." Hard-pressed by inflation, heavy taxes, and job insecurity, they do not feel a part of the "Affluent Society." Their sons, like those of black and brown Americans, have fought and died in Vietnam, because many fewer of them go to college. Another stereotype of the ethnic American is that he is a hawk; actually many of them are strongly opposed to the war, but they do pride themselves on being patriotic Americans. They bitterly resent the class and ethnic snobbery which puts them down because of their immigrant and working-class backgrounds. In part this explains their �SLOVAKIA 149 hostility toward the educated elite and the universities . No wonder they cheer Spiro Agnew when he attacks intellectuals as "effete snobs." Like the blacks, the white ethnics are oppressed by a sense of powerlessness and exploitation; like them, they suffer from poor or inadequate schools and municipal services; like them, they are cynical about politics and politicians. As the bulk of the white population of the northern cities, the ethnics endure many of the same urban problems as do the blacks. Frustrated and insecure, they have projected their fears and anger against the blacks, Puerto Ricans, and other groups whom they regard as threats to their own marginal status. They are convicted that it is their jobs, their neighborhoods, their schools, that these newcomers are after. From the ethnics' point of view the blacks have received preferential treatment in federal programs, while their needs have been neglected. As Msgr. Geno C. Baroni, director of the Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs, put it: "Little attention has been given to the anguish of the socially and politically alienated middle American." To indulge in accusations of "white racism" is a futile exercise of moral indignation. A more positive response, as Irving Levine, director of the National Project on Ethnic America has argued, is "to identify the real problems of lower middle-class ethnic groups and speak creatively to their deepest needs." The "New Pluralism" is thus not simply a psychological aberration that can be treated by exhortations to brotherhood and tolerance. Rather it is rooted in the very social and economic structure of this society. It reflects the injustices and inequities which that structure inflicts upon large numbers of Americans because of their social class and ethnic-racial character. What has happened is that many groups heretofore inarticulate have found their voices. They are demanding often in angry tones full and equal participation in all areas of American life. Pluralism is a two-edged sword. If our institutions are unresponsive to the legitimate needs and aspirations of all groups, this can lead to increasing group conflict and further polarization. However, if those institutions are responsive, the thrust of the "New Pluralism" can carry �150 SLOVAK.IA us far toward the realization of a more democratic society. This applies to the private sector as well as the public, to business, corporations as well as governmental agencies, to the churches as well as to the schools. Decision-makers at all levels must become more sensitive to group differences, aultural as well as racial. Politicians by the nature of their trade have been most responsive to ethnic pressures, though too often they have manipulated them to serve political ends. But professionals and bureaucrats in the "mainstream" institutions have usually subscribed to a universalistic model of the "typical American." They have typically displayed an insensitivity and ignorance, even arrogance, toward the cultural and social differences among their students, patients, employees, and clients. The sphere of education exemplifies this lack of sensitivity in classic fashion. It is needed a paradox that the educational system of a multicultural, multiracial, and multilingual society such as ours has been dominated by an Anglo-American model, both in curriculum and format. This can only be understood in terms of the grip of an assimilationist ideology upon administrators and teachers alike. Historically the schools were designed to serve as agencies of the " Melting Pot." It was to be their function to transform the children of the immigrants (including internal migrants ) into "good, little, middle-class Americans. '' As one educator stated it: "Our task is to assimilate or amalgamate these people as part of the American race, and to implant in their children, so far as can be done, the Anglo-Saxon conception of righteousness, law, order, and popular government." Although this statement was made over a half century ago, it continued to serve as an accurate description of educational policy until recent times. Rather than building upon the linguistic and cultural backgrounds of the students, the schools sought to purify them of their "foreign" traits. The results often were, as sociologist Milton Gordon has observed, "ethnic self-hatred, family disorganization, and juvenile delinquency." Again it was the "black revolution" that initially challenged the monocultural model of American education. �SLOVAKIA 151 In most cases, efforts to adapt schools to special needs of black children have been only partially successful. However, this small beginning has called into question the basic assumptions upon which American educational philosophy and practice has rested for many decades. More and more, educators and parents are seeking a pluralistic way of teaching children which will mirror the pluralistic society in which they live. The principle that formal education should respect and reinforce the cultural and ethnic identity of the child rather than seeking to eradicate it is gaining ground. "Ethnic studies" have emerged as a major response to this need. Because American history as taught in the past was "white history," Afro-American studies was incorporated into the curriculum at the demand of the black community. But blacks have not been the only "invisible men" in American history, Indians, Hispanos, and immigrants have also been ignored or treated disparagingly in most textbooks. Hence the need to revise the course content so that the role of all the many different ethnic elements in American society may be appropriately represented. This is a large task, and resources have been inadequate. Many were encouraged by the introduction of a bill in the Congress that would have provided federal funds in support of "Ethnic Heritage Studies." While the bill was passed unanimously by the Senate, it was rejected in the House of Representatives. There is still hope that it may be revived in the current session. Ethnic studies may, of course, degenerate into tokenism, the placing of a few pictures on the wall and the adding of a few pages to a textbook. To be successful they must permeate the curriculum, not only of history, but language, literature and the social studies. Of crucial importance will be the attitudes of teachers. First, they must be convinced of the value of all cultures as equally valid expressions of the human spirit. This is the most difficult task, to overcome our own ethnocentricity. For the child, ethnic studies should serve two functions . They must foster within him a sense of his worth and dignity based on his identification with his own ancestors. Second, they must provide him with a capacity for an appreciation and acceptance of the cultural differences of �152 SLOVAKIA others. Free of a sense of either superiority or inferiority, he would be well equipped to live in a pluralistic society. We need to experiment with the format for teaching ethnic studies. Just as ecology may best be studied in a natural environment, so the ethnic communities with their rich cultural resources may be the most appropriate setting for learning about ethnic heritages. The "New Pluralism" is not limited to the East, nor to the troubled cities of New York and Chicago; it is a phenomenon that more or less pervades all of America. Bemused by the legend of Scandinavian predominance, we sometimes lose sight of the ethnic complexity of Minnesota. Certainly the racial groups of this state, blacks, chicanes, Indians, and orientals, are a smaller proportion of the total population than in many other states. But their militancy in recent years has made them conspicuous. Less visible have been the white ethnic groups, although the discerning observer might perceive their stirrings as well. Yet in 1960, more than 25 percent of the state of Minnesota population was of foreign stock, which meant that probably more than half of all Minnesotans had grandfathers born in another country. Although Norwegians, Germans, and Swedes were by far the largest groups, there were also significant numbers of British, Canadians, Czechs, Croatians, East European Jews, Finns, Italians, Irish, Poles, Slovaks, and Slovenes, as well as a scattering of other groups. Nor is pluralism in Minnesota only an urban phenomenon. Small towns on he Iron Range and in rural counties have a complex mixture of ethnic groups. To explore ethnicity in Minnesota, to initiate an inquiry into the state of the "New Pluralism" here, a conference was held recently at the International Institute in St. Paul. The Minnesota Project on Ethnic America, with the assistance of the National Project on Ethnic America of the American Jewish Committee and with the cosponsorship of various organizations and institutions, sponsored the sessions. The conference provided a forum in which perceptions, feelings, and judgments regarding social issues were offered from a variety of ethnic perspectives. Discovery of common ground may provide the means for moving Minnesota toward a "New Pluralism" based upon mutual respect and shared goals . - ( Minneapolis Tribune.) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1972, Vol. 22 Description An account of the resource Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 146 SLOVAKIA Why Our Melting Pot Cooled Off Rudolph J. V e c o l i A policeman called me the other day about a "missing person" case. It turned out that he was the missing person. He was trying to find out where his ancestors came from . He had a Slavic name and knew that his grandparents had emigrated from Austria-Hungary, but there he lost the trail. "I want to know who I am, and to be able to tell my two sons who they are," my caller explained. Luckily we were able to locate the policeman's grandfather in the records of a Slovak church in Minneapolis. This told us the village in Slovakia from which his family had come. Our policeman was overjoyed; now he knew who he was and he was going to try to locate relatives in Slovakia. This search for grandparents was not an isolated case. "Who am I?" has become an urgent question for many Americans, for the middle-aged as well as the young. We appear to be going through a collective identity crisis. One manifestation of the crisis has been the widespread affirmation of group identities. Young people, especially children of the middle class, have created the "counter-culture" with its distinctive lifestyle, dress, and language. Women's liberation provides a new positive sense of collective identity for many of what was once known as the "gentle sex." But, for most Americans, race, religion, and national origin continue to provide the basis for group identity today-as they have historically. Not only are Black Americans, Indians, and Chicanos asserting a new-found pride in their heritage, but Croatian Americans, Finnish Americans, and Slovak Americans, among others, are declaring that they are beautiful as well. An editorial in Christian Century, pointing out that even old-stock white Americans had particularistic identities, declared: "We are all ethnics now." SLOVAKIA 147 It seems that everyone needs an ethnic label these days. At a recent conference on cross-cultural education there was a workshop on "The Problem of the Non-Ethnic"! Presumably these are individuals of such mixed ancestry that they do not fit neatly into an ethnic category. But as anthropologist Margaret Mead said, this is nonsense, since everyone has grandparents and a heritage, even if it cannot be precisely labeled. The extraordinary resurgence of ethnic consciousness is not easily explained. Clearly the traumatic events of the sixties shattered the illusion of an American consensus. The civil rights movement, black nationalism, the Vietnam War, the student movement-all demonstrated that Americans were not of one mind about basic principles and values. Watts, Cicero, My Lai, Kent State, Chicago, elicited very different responses among different segments of the American people. We became polarized over the basic issues of racial justice, war and peace, lifestyles, the very meaning of democracy; polarized along lines of race, age, and social class. Perhaps it was the loss of a shared sense of the national purpose which caused persons to seek psychological and social security with "their own kind." In the face of this fragmentation, the myth of the "melting pot" was revealed to be transparent fiction. The mysterious process whereby peoples of diverse racial and cultural origins were to be assimilated into an "all-American" middle-class society obviously had not worked its magic. Blacks, by their words and actions, most aggressively challenged the "melting pot" ideal. Not only had they not been melted, but they made it clear they did not wish to be melted into some nondescript American type. Confronted with "black identity," other Americans were compelled to define their own particularistic identities. Not only Indians, Chicanos, and Orientals, but white ethnic groups reacted with a heightened group consciousness. "Black power" was echoed by the slogans of "Polish power" and "Italian power." It surprised many that these white ethnics who were supposed to have been assimilated long ago remained selfconscious elements in the body politic. But the census of 1960 had reported over 34 million as "foreign-stock," i. e., foreign-born or with at least one parent foreign-born. These 148 SLOVAKIA immigrants and their children constituted almost 20 percent of the American population. In addition, many of the third generation and beyond retained some degree of ethnic identity. However, their presence had been ignored by the mass media, the schools and other institutions. Because of pressures to Americanize, these descendants of European immigrants had publicly suppressed their ethnicity, though many continued to cultivate their cultural heritages in the privacy of their families, churches and organizations. Now the lid is off; the stigma of shame of being a "hyphenate," is being rejected. A new pride is being asserted in one's identity as a Ukrainian-American or a Greek-American, to give just two examples. Labeled the "forgotten American," the "middle Americans," or the "silent majority," white ethnics have come in for a good deal of attention of late. For the most part they have been portrayed as backlashing racists, potential recruits for the politics of reaction. In the mass media they have been stereotyped as Joe, the homicidal psychotic, or as Archie, the "lovable bigot." This has intensified their anger and resentment. As Barbara Mikulski, a Polish-American leader, protested: "The ethnic American is sick of being stereotyped as a racist and dullard by phony white liberals, pseudo black militants, and patronizing bureaucrats." Recently, writers such as Andrew M. Greeley and Murray Friedman have been providing us with more sympathetic analyses of lower middle-class ethnic Americans. As bluecollar workers, the bulk of them are either poor (two of every three poor people in this country are white) or "near-poor." Hard-pressed by inflation, heavy taxes, and job insecurity, they do not feel a part of the "Affluent Society." Their sons, like those of black and brown Americans, have fought and died in Vietnam, because many fewer of them go to college. Another stereotype of the ethnic American is that he is a hawk; actually many of them are strongly opposed to the war, but they do pride themselves on being patriotic Americans. They bitterly resent the class and ethnic snobbery which puts them down because of their immigrant and working-class backgrounds. In part this explains their SLOVAKIA 149 hostility toward the educated elite and the universities . No wonder they cheer Spiro Agnew when he attacks intellectuals as "effete snobs." Like the blacks, the white ethnics are oppressed by a sense of powerlessness and exploitation; like them, they suffer from poor or inadequate schools and municipal services; like them, they are cynical about politics and politicians. As the bulk of the white population of the northern cities, the ethnics endure many of the same urban problems as do the blacks. Frustrated and insecure, they have projected their fears and anger against the blacks, Puerto Ricans, and other groups whom they regard as threats to their own marginal status. They are convicted that it is their jobs, their neighborhoods, their schools, that these newcomers are after. From the ethnics' point of view the blacks have received preferential treatment in federal programs, while their needs have been neglected. As Msgr. Geno C. Baroni, director of the Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs, put it: "Little attention has been given to the anguish of the socially and politically alienated middle American." To indulge in accusations of "white racism" is a futile exercise of moral indignation. A more positive response, as Irving Levine, director of the National Project on Ethnic America has argued, is "to identify the real problems of lower middle-class ethnic groups and speak creatively to their deepest needs." The "New Pluralism" is thus not simply a psychological aberration that can be treated by exhortations to brotherhood and tolerance. Rather it is rooted in the very social and economic structure of this society. It reflects the injustices and inequities which that structure inflicts upon large numbers of Americans because of their social class and ethnic-racial character. What has happened is that many groups heretofore inarticulate have found their voices. They are demanding often in angry tones full and equal participation in all areas of American life. Pluralism is a two-edged sword. If our institutions are unresponsive to the legitimate needs and aspirations of all groups, this can lead to increasing group conflict and further polarization. However, if those institutions are responsive, the thrust of the "New Pluralism" can carry 150 SLOVAK.IA us far toward the realization of a more democratic society. This applies to the private sector as well as the public, to business, corporations as well as governmental agencies, to the churches as well as to the schools. Decision-makers at all levels must become more sensitive to group differences, aultural as well as racial. Politicians by the nature of their trade have been most responsive to ethnic pressures, though too often they have manipulated them to serve political ends. But professionals and bureaucrats in the "mainstream" institutions have usually subscribed to a universalistic model of the "typical American." They have typically displayed an insensitivity and ignorance, even arrogance, toward the cultural and social differences among their students, patients, employees, and clients. The sphere of education exemplifies this lack of sensitivity in classic fashion. It is needed a paradox that the educational system of a multicultural, multiracial, and multilingual society such as ours has been dominated by an Anglo-American model, both in curriculum and format. This can only be understood in terms of the grip of an assimilationist ideology upon administrators and teachers alike. Historically the schools were designed to serve as agencies of the " Melting Pot." It was to be their function to transform the children of the immigrants (including internal migrants ) into "good, little, middle-class Americans. '' As one educator stated it: "Our task is to assimilate or amalgamate these people as part of the American race, and to implant in their children, so far as can be done, the Anglo-Saxon conception of righteousness, law, order, and popular government." Although this statement was made over a half century ago, it continued to serve as an accurate description of educational policy until recent times. Rather than building upon the linguistic and cultural backgrounds of the students, the schools sought to purify them of their "foreign" traits. The results often were, as sociologist Milton Gordon has observed, "ethnic self-hatred, family disorganization, and juvenile delinquency." Again it was the "black revolution" that initially challenged the monocultural model of American education. SLOVAKIA 151 In most cases, efforts to adapt schools to special needs of black children have been only partially successful. However, this small beginning has called into question the basic assumptions upon which American educational philosophy and practice has rested for many decades. More and more, educators and parents are seeking a pluralistic way of teaching children which will mirror the pluralistic society in which they live. The principle that formal education should respect and reinforce the cultural and ethnic identity of the child rather than seeking to eradicate it is gaining ground. "Ethnic studies" have emerged as a major response to this need. Because American history as taught in the past was "white history," Afro-American studies was incorporated into the curriculum at the demand of the black community. But blacks have not been the only "invisible men" in American history, Indians, Hispanos, and immigrants have also been ignored or treated disparagingly in most textbooks. Hence the need to revise the course content so that the role of all the many different ethnic elements in American society may be appropriately represented. This is a large task, and resources have been inadequate. Many were encouraged by the introduction of a bill in the Congress that would have provided federal funds in support of "Ethnic Heritage Studies." While the bill was passed unanimously by the Senate, it was rejected in the House of Representatives. There is still hope that it may be revived in the current session. Ethnic studies may, of course, degenerate into tokenism, the placing of a few pictures on the wall and the adding of a few pages to a textbook. To be successful they must permeate the curriculum, not only of history, but language, literature and the social studies. Of crucial importance will be the attitudes of teachers. First, they must be convinced of the value of all cultures as equally valid expressions of the human spirit. This is the most difficult task, to overcome our own ethnocentricity. For the child, ethnic studies should serve two functions . They must foster within him a sense of his worth and dignity based on his identification with his own ancestors. Second, they must provide him with a capacity for an appreciation and acceptance of the cultural differences of 152 SLOVAKIA others. Free of a sense of either superiority or inferiority, he would be well equipped to live in a pluralistic society. We need to experiment with the format for teaching ethnic studies. Just as ecology may best be studied in a natural environment, so the ethnic communities with their rich cultural resources may be the most appropriate setting for learning about ethnic heritages. The "New Pluralism" is not limited to the East, nor to the troubled cities of New York and Chicago; it is a phenomenon that more or less pervades all of America. Bemused by the legend of Scandinavian predominance, we sometimes lose sight of the ethnic complexity of Minnesota. Certainly the racial groups of this state, blacks, chicanes, Indians, and orientals, are a smaller proportion of the total population than in many other states. But their militancy in recent years has made them conspicuous. Less visible have been the white ethnic groups, although the discerning observer might perceive their stirrings as well. Yet in 1960, more than 25 percent of the state of Minnesota population was of foreign stock, which meant that probably more than half of all Minnesotans had grandfathers born in another country. Although Norwegians, Germans, and Swedes were by far the largest groups, there were also significant numbers of British, Canadians, Czechs, Croatians, East European Jews, Finns, Italians, Irish, Poles, Slovaks, and Slovenes, as well as a scattering of other groups. Nor is pluralism in Minnesota only an urban phenomenon. Small towns on he Iron Range and in rural counties have a complex mixture of ethnic groups. To explore ethnicity in Minnesota, to initiate an inquiry into the state of the "New Pluralism" here, a conference was held recently at the International Institute in St. Paul. The Minnesota Project on Ethnic America, with the assistance of the National Project on Ethnic America of the American Jewish Committee and with the cosponsorship of various organizations and institutions, sponsored the sessions. The conference provided a forum in which perceptions, feelings, and judgments regarding social issues were offered from a variety of ethnic perspectives. Discovery of common ground may provide the means for moving Minnesota toward a "New Pluralism" based upon mutual respect and shared goals . - ( Minneapolis Tribune.)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Why Our Melting Pot Cooled Off Description An account of the resource Rudolph J. Vecoli Slovakia, Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972 pp. 146-152 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vecoli, Rudolph J. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/495398a0345e07ca444c3d58e165ef2f.pdf 39aabc0d058087af2fa9cc120558c3f4 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 105 The Slovak Dilemma Ln Austria-Hungary* Gabor V e r m e s Rutgers University, Dept. of History At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the educated middle class Slovak in Austria-Hungary found himself enmeshed in a multiple identity crisis. He could remain a Slovak and thus limit his chance for any meaningful participation in the Hungarian Establishment; he could ally himself with the Czechs as a junior partner; he could indulge in an illusionary alliance with Russia; or he could abandon his Slovak identity and become a Magyar. This dilemma weighed most heavily upon members of the Slovak intelligentsia because their status in Hungarian society was contingent upon the choice they made. Yet, the survival of the entire Slovak nation was thought to be in question. Almost all the Slovak and pro-Slovak literati declaimed inevitable doom and prophesized the gradual extinction of the Slovaks. Robert Seton-Watson spoke of the virtual destruction of Slovak nationality, and concluded, " ... especially after the notorious Education Act of Count Albert Apponyi in 1907, the process of Magyarization was advancing by leaps and bounds, in particular along the Southern linguistic frontier ... The victim was rescued just in time." 1 The question arises then: Can an entire people vanish, in modern times, by the superimposition of powerful outside forces? Was the feeling of doom justified as far as ,:, NOTE: We are publishing this article on the recommendation of Prof. J . M. Kirschbaum, concerning an exchange of views on the Slovak question in Austria-Hungary as a precondition for preparing a better future for all nations of Central Europe. Professor Vermes' conclusions are not identical with Slovak views but he presents a serious and well documented attempt at an objective analysis from the Hungarian point of view. The editor �106 SLOVAKIA the Slovaks were concerned? The statistics are inexorable, and they do se6m to indicate a gradual erosion in the number of Slovaks still maintaining their national identity.2 The pull of Magyarization was especially strong among the Slovak educated middle class; very understandably, this caused the gravest concern to the nationalist Slovaks. The nationalist group was also greatly concerned over the large scale emigration of Slovak peasants who left the Tatra Mountains to settle in the adjoining territories which were inhabited by the Magyars or by a mixed population. The peasants also migrated to the big cities, to Budapest in particular, and a considerable number emigrated to America. Yet a revealing comparison between the number of Slovaks who could speak only their native tongue in 1900 and the same category in 1910 shows that a sizable segment remained Slovak.3 In the isolated hamlets and villages of the Tatra, the population remained Slovak, not because of any conscious or deliberate effort to assert themselves as such, but because they lived in homogeneous compact groups. Magyar power reached them only through various types of county officials, and through the school teachers, but even if the little pupil learned to mutter a few sentences in Hungarian, most likely he disposed of them at home with a natural sense of relief. The anticipated diminution of the intellectual elite, therefore, did not seem to conflict with the simultaneous preservation of a less sophisticated stratum of society much less exposed to alien influences. Thus, the usage of the term extinction becomes somewhat exaggerated and overly pessimistic. The Slovak peasantry, provided they were ignorant and indifferent to any kind of cause, including that of Slovak nationalism, could still be considered a bulwark against national self-annihilation and perhaps even as a reservoir of a future Slovak national renaissance. The reasons for the Slovak predicament are fairly well-known. 4 The two basic factors were their early loss of independence to the Hungarians in the 9th-10th centuries A.D. and their sparse expansion over their poor and mountainous terrain. Beginning in the mid-19th century, two additional components were added. One was the disadvantage resulting from the absence of an independent Czech or ~lovak state. (This was a disadvantage in comparison �SLOVAKIA 107 with the Austro-Rumanian and Austro-Serbian position, strengthened by the existence of an independent Rumania and Serbia) . The other factor in the Slovaks' plight was the clash between two adverse national egos, the Magyar and the Slovak. As long as the Monarchy lasted, Magyar nationalism gained the upper hand, not because of any inherent superior quality but as a natural consequence of a superior power, superior in the political, social, and economic sense, and even in the psychological sphere of self-assurance. Hungary had much to be proud of by the second half of the 19th century. It had grown from a backward agricultural country into a relatively advanced agricultural-industrial state. After an unsuccessful revolution in 1848-1849, astute negotiations aided by fortuitous circumstances led to equal partnership with Austria in 1867. Hungary became an integral part of a dualist system which maintained its great power status up to the very end of its existence, in spite of its inner weaknesses . In 1896, prosperity, though unevenly shared, and optimism, though not unanimous, exploded into the pageantry of the Milleneum, the one-thousandth anniversary of Hungary's existence. The country-gentry was the major conveyor of this festive spirit. In their patriotic fervor they were supported by an urban middle class, consisting partly of their own kin, partly of the remnants of the old German burgher class, and partly by a growing number of Jews . Quite often members of these two latter groups turned into more zealous Magyars than the Magyars themselves . Jeno Rakosi, of German origin, was the wellknown editor of the Budapest Hirlap; he coined the slogan of "A Great Hungary of 30 million Magyars," 5 and his Jewish journalist colleagues backed him up with unfaltering ardor. The gentry, however, though deeply entrenched in their strongholds, the administrations of state and counties, was no longer the liberal generation of 1848. As Oszkar Jaszi pointed out, this gentry, by losing its economic power, and somewhat bewildered by the complexities of a new emerging urban-commercial-industrial society, compensated for its growing insecurity with an ever strengthening assertion of national superiority .6 In order to justify this superiority and persevere in it, the gentry stubbornly �108 SLOVAKIA maintained its traditional, legal-political arguments, to the point of referring to the "Law" even when actual injustice was admitted. 7 The Fundamental Law, to which constant reference was made, was considered historical by the Magyar ruling classes, and was based on their rights by virtue of the Magyar conquest. Even such a recognized moderate as Kalman Szell (Prime Minister of Hungary, 1899-1903) asserted, "The Magyars have conquered this country for themselves and not for others. The supremacy and hegemony of the Magyars is fully justified." 8 No one would deny the exceptions to this rule. The impact of Ferenc Deak and Baron J6zsef Eotvos, the great Hungarian liberal statesmen, was still evident upon the creation of the Nationality Law of 1868, which granted extensive cultural rights to the non-Magyar nationalities, though it stopped short of acknowledging their existence as separate legal-political entities. In his exile, Lajos Kossuth changed from an intolerant chauvinist into the champion of a Danubian Federation, and he had a faithful disciple in Hungary in the person of Lajos Mocsary. In later years, preceding World War I, Ozskar Jaszi, a sociologist and politician of radical-leftist leanings, was sympathetically inclined to the course providing genuine equality between Magyars and non-Magyars. These and several other exceptions notwithstanding, most Magyars were indifferent at best, and outrightly hostile at worst, to the national aspirations, demands, and needs of their fellow non-Magyar citizens. The consequences of such attitudes were examined even by the conservative school of Hungarian historians. Count Pal Teleki recognized the impossibility of creating a unified Hungarian nation through enforced assimilation,9 and in addition he blamed the innumerable blunders of the Magyarization efforts on Magyar inconsistency and Magyar administrative inefficiency. 10 Accordin'5 to Gyula Szekfu, the process of Magyarization was detrimental because it corroded the Hungarian nation's moral fibre, yet it was not the "fearsome and bloodthirsty monster of Jaszi and Seton-Watson, but a childish construction, a plaything, and an unrealizable and overly emotional postulate, doing more harm to the Magyars, than to their nationalities." 11 Thus, behind the apparently rigid and legal pedantry �SLOVAKIA 109 of the Magyar public, it has not been hard to discover the emotional content, reflecting frustrations and childlike wishful thinking. To be sure, these elements were of considerable weight. However, at least equal stress should be laid on other factors as well, such as anxiety and fear of being encircled and outnumbered and consequently, of being eventually engulfed and annihilated. That fear and anxiety were never expressed in these pessimistic terms, but rather in their psychological reverse: The Hungarian nation would never perish, because of its power, its eagerness to grow from 10 to 30 million if possible, and because of its readiness to absorb all non-Magyars by all means available. Yet behind this fagade of self-confidence, fear and anxiety lurked, often in near paranoic dimensions. Lajos Steier, a Hungarian "expert" on the Slovaks, sounded the alarm hysterically, " ... Magyar hegemony, national unity, and our Fatherland are in mortal danger!" 12 Regardless of the validity of his anxiety, his proficiency in the affairs of Slovak-Magyar relations provided him with enough foresight to see the "danger" in a Czech-Slovak rapprochement. 13 Most Hungarians, however, were content to release their fear and anxiety in their ch~se of an all-encompassing yet amorphous scarecrow, Pan-Slavism, which was not understood properly at all, but was used as a charge both against bomb-throwing anarchists and totally harmless literati, attributing dark conspiratorial machinations to both. Hungarian gendarmes killed and wounded several Slovaks at the village of cernova, on October 27, 1907. The reason for the unrest was the punitive actions taken against cernova's Slovak nationalist priest, Father Andrej Hlinka by his Magyarone superiors in the Catholic hierarchy. The massacre was followed by stormy sessions in the Hungarian Parliament. Milan Hodza, one of the seven nationalist Slovak members, was accused of paving the way for the massacre through his agitation, and some of his Magyar colleagues called him "Assassin! ... rotten agitator!" 14 The Magyar representative from the district of cernova, bdon Beni9zky, painted a picture of Slovak agitation, a picture, which could have taken a rightful place in Dante's Inferno. He talked of the once pious Slovaks throwing rocks at every coach owned by Hungarian gentlemen, about Slovak agitators going around the villages, spreading news of �110 SLOVAKIA Hungarians taking Slovak children away during the night and taking them down to the Great Hungarian Plain in order to make good Magyars out of them; he conveyed the impression that Slovak peasants were ready to grab an axe and resort to unbridled violence. Hodza demanded proof, but none was forthcoming. The entire Hungarian Parliament sat in stunned silence, but in evident concurrence with the speaker. 15 The purpose of delving into these two factors, fear and anxiety, it not to overplay their role at the expense of the other components already mentioned, but rather, to point toward the substance of the Hungarian gentry and middle class mentality: Being alone, feeling isolated in the midst of "aliens"--Germans, Slavs, Rumanians-was a source of both real pride and real fear, but fear could never be openly confessed, specifically because of the accompanying sense of pride. This lack of balance, therefore, created an unhealthy atmosphere of irrationality and arrogance, which in turn provoked an equally irrational and arrogant response from the representatives of the nationalities; thus, gradually and tragically, all the bridges were burned. The Slovak "deviation" from Magyar patriotism perhaps hurt the Hungarians the most, because, in spite of the bitter experience of 1848, when many Slovaks sided with the Habsburgs against the Hungarians, the Slovak people were still trusted as the "simple, guileless, and pious little brother" of the "sturdy and powerful" Magyar nation. Treason might well be expected from the "fierce Rae" (Serb), or the "crafty Olah" (Rumanian), but not from a "T6t" (A condescending Magyar word for Slovak). There was no viciousness in the general Hungarian view of the Slovaks, but rather a sense of patronizing benevolence, so charmingly popularized in the novels and short stories of Kalman Mikszath. The alleged Pan-Slav agitation aroused such a great fury exactly because it seemed to disrupt the "idyllic harmony" between Magyar and Slovak which was so deeply rooted in historical tradition and friendly coexistence. There was another side to the coin of benevolent patronization, however. The "T6t" was liked perhaps, but obviously not respected as an equal of the Magyar. Count J6szef Mailath remarked in an otherwise strongly chauvinistic rebuttal to H. W. V. Temperley, the famous British �SLOVAKIA 111 historian, "We must confess that the depreciation of Slovakism, whether in lower or higher circles is 2. thing to which everybody is accustomed in Hungary. There is a saying, a Slovak is no man." 16 What was the response of young educated Slovaks to this general Magyar attitude toward them? Jozef Skultety, a well-known Slovak writer wants us to believe " . .. the Slovak remains true to himself ... he most frequently preserves his soul. He will sooner squeeze another than yield17 ••. the Slovak does not imitate." 18 The facts and figures squarely contradict Skultety: According to one estimate, shortly before World War I, the number of the educated Slovak-oriented families did not exceed five hundred in number. 19 However, should we blame the average Slovak for his eagerness to become a Magyar when all the economic and social advantages were on the Magyar side? The Magyar attitude towards the national minorities in general and towards the Slovaks in particular was racial only in a limited or qualified sense. The Magyar was considered superior and the Slovak inferior, but as soon as the Slovak decided to become a Magyar, he seemingly underwent a miraculous metamorphosis and was accepted 2.:; 2, fuE-fledged member of the Hungarian nation. In Magyar eyes, by his conversion, this neophyte Magyar manifested his maturity and wisdom and acquired all the higher qualities attributed to the Magyars. This belief served then as the foundation for pursuing Magyarization through the schools and churches. Albert Einstein could have never graduated into Nazi Germany's "Herrenvolk," but the son of a nationalist Slovak Lutheran pastor, Pavo! Hojc, could become Pal Hojtsy, a recognized historian, who published a book in 1902, under the title of Great Hungary, the Future Centuries of Hungarian History. Not every "new" Hungarian bothered to change his name even. A famous Catholic bishop Ottokar Prohaszka did not. However, it was not necessarily the sound of the name but the spirit that really counted. Bishop Prohaszka, though progressive in many respects, became one of the leading intellectual and spiritual leaders of the ultra chauvinistic counter-revolutionary movements in Hungary during the 1920's. The following excerpts is from a speech he held before a rightist audience in Budapest, "Beneath the national idea we have �112 SLOVAKIA to sense Magyar Reality, Magyar Blood, Magyar Land, and Magyar Life. But we ought not only to sense all of these -we have to live Magyar destiny." 20 Were these people happy and satisfied with their choice ? We cannot read their minds in retrospect, but there is no reason to assume that they were not. Magyar nationalistic policies could be harsh even brutal at times, but they did not demand an open or public renunciation of the old abandoned language, and an open or public pledge for the new one. Quite surely, thousands and thousands of Slovaks turned into Magyars without the flourish of trumpets and worked quietly and diligently. To call them opportunists would be to expect too much from human nature. For the average Slovak high school graduate, with an absolute proficiency in the Magyar language, the appeal of being accepted as an "adult," and also, of course, of securing positions in the church, schools, civil service, etc., was hard to resist. Perhaps some of the "super-converts" who wished to out-Magyar the most bigoted Magyars could be put out of countenance at times if they-as it always happens with this type-were keen on not only asserting the new but denying and hiding the old. Gyorgy Szmrecsanyi, a member of the Parliament, sounded quite embarrassed when after reading long quotes from Slovak newspapers he was questioned about his ethnic origin by Milan Hodza. 21 Who were the members of the minority, the nationally minded Slovaks? They too were graduates of the Magyar high schools, thus proving, at least partially, the self-defeating nature of Magyarization through education. Out of every hundred "converts" perhaps only a few became "rebels," but these latter could potentially cause a great deal of trouble-as they did in fact-to the idea and practices of a one and only Magyar National State. The commonly shared goal of the Slovak nationalists was not an independent Slovakia or Czecho-Slovakia, but broad Slovak autonomy within Hungary. Matyas Bella, one of the Slovak nationalist representatives in the Hungarian Parliament said, "Should all the national minorities be able to assert themselves within the State of Hungary, then I will welcome that State." 22 In this sense, the members of this group were the Slovak counterparts of the Czech Austro-Slavs. The �SLOVAKIA 113 dominant character of the Slovak nationalist movement in Hungary was conservative and Catholic. The main reason for this trend lay in the fact that most Slovak nationalist leaders emerged from a conservative Catholic background, the religious preference for about two-thirds of the Slovaks, and the major aim of these leaders was to win over the fundamentally conservative and religious peasant masses. Ccnservatism, therefore, functioned both as a source and a purpose. The goal of Slovak autonomy was of such paramount importance that it seemed to override all other ideological considerations, even to the point of apparent inconsistency. Milan Hodza was more than eager to strike a simultaneous alliance with all opposition groups outside the Parliament, the radicals and the socialists, and with the Heir to the Crown, Archduke Francis Ferdinand. There was also heavy E.mphasis laid on cooperation with leaders of other national minorities, especially with the Rumanians, who had more elected representatives in the Hungarian Parliament and had a longer tradition and greater experience in their "battle" against Magyar chauvinism ("The roots of the Little Entente") .23 This Magyar chauvinism was eventually countered by Slovak chauvinism, and it is quite evident that Hodza and his fellow Slovak nationalists spoke one language to their colleagues in the Hungarian Parliament, and another one to their Slovak constituents and reading public. The Parliament was filled with complaints over the "duplicity" of the Slovak nationalists, supported by direct quotes from Budapest-based Slovak newspapers. 24 To what extent was the "dilemma" solved for those who chose the Slovak road? It again could be assumed that the reward of fighting for a cause was satisfying on a personal level. However, it was a frustrating fight, not only because it did not seem to bring substantial results, but also because it was beset by a lack of broad support and by a sense of inner insecurity. One had to prove himself a Slovak in his own right, and this task was most difficult in the midst of an environment, where almost every particle of the atmosphere was saturated with condescension for the "Tot" and suspicion of the Slovak. In this antagonistic atmosphere. emotional attachment �114 SLOVAKIA to all brother Slavs and to "Mother Russia" in particular was an aid to some who declined to succumb to Magyar pressure. The roots of this romantic sentiment reach back to the early-middle 19th century, to Jan Kollar and to :Cudovit sttlr. With the passing of romanticism, cultural Slavophilism turned into political Pan-Slavism, which was frequently a barely concealed instrument of Russian foreign policy. Russia's attention, however, was focused on the Balkans. Thus, Slovak-Russian relations suffered more because of the Russians' lack of interest, rather than from the handicap of geographical barriers. A voice of near fatalistic resignation was struck by the leader of the russophi!e Martin group, Svetozar Hurban-Vajansky in a letter to a Russian friend, " ... ir there is no chance for the Slovaks to live under Russian hegemony, then it would be better for them to vanish altogether." 25 In the eyes of the Martin group, Tsarist Russia could do no wrong. Yet, although most educated Slovaks, with the exception of the Magyarones, shared a vague sense of brotherhood with all other Slavs, active russophilism encountered several stumbling blocks. The oppressive character of the Tsarist regime alienated the Slovak liberals and democrats, while the orthodox zeal of Tsarist officialdom estranged the Slovak Catholic conservatives. Both camps were infuriated by Russia's anti-Polish policy. The liberals and democrats were incensed because the rights of a fellow Slav nation were being violated; the Catholics resented the anti-Catholic policy of the Tsarist government. Consequently, the number of russophiles was limited and their emotional, neo-romantic movement reached an impasse by the early 20th century. There was another alternative left for the young educated Slovak: to turn to the Czechs. Liberals and democrats among the Slovak intelligentsia, clustering around the founders of the journal Hlas, Vavro srobar and Pavol Blaho, were inclined to do so. Yet, the "czechophile" group among the Slovak intellectuals was also relatively small26 and without considerable influence, " ... the main reason why we were so powerless and submissive was that during those long decades we did not look to Czech culture and the idea of Czechoslovak unity as in 1848." 27 - these were the bitter words of Ivan Markovic, a Slovak politician, and �SLOVAKIA 115 a member of several Czecho-Slovak cabinets after 1918. I have used this quote for a very important reason: My contention is that though the logic of the quote is entirely correct, it could and should be used in a reverse sense as well. Certainly, the Slovaks could have learned a great deal of self-assurance and a sense of strength from the Czechs, but one reason why the Slovaks were so reluctant to do so was precisely because of their relative weakness and backwardness. The Slovaks were caught in a vicious circle. A "pilgrimage" to Prague was a sensible thing to do; there was so much to learn there. Such a journey, however, concurred with an open admission of inferiority; one often had to swallow one's pride, and the Czechs did not make this cooperation easy. They too had developed a patronizing attitude towards the Slovaks, the implication of which was mere complex than was the case between Magyar and Slo-• vak. A Slovak, by his own will, could become a full-fledged member of a ruling nation, the Magyars, and an "adult" in lVIagyar society. A Slovak in Prague would most likely remain a Slovak who was not expected to abandon his people but was asked to affiliate. On paper, this latter proposition appears to be_much more humane and democratic. Yet, if an alliance is not maintained as between equals, then being relegated to a subordinate position is worse than not being included in one at all. Perhaps the young educated Slovaks had a foreboding of this predicament, and most of them chose the "easy way" to Budapest, even if that resulted in Pal dropping Pavel and Janos shedding Jan. Had there then ever been any hope for the Slovak intelligentsia in Austria-Hungary? Could they in any way have guided the destiny of Slovakia before 1918? Was there any realistic solution to their dilemma? For some of them yes, but at a price. One group of realists joined the Magyars, at the price of assimilation. Another group of realists associated itself with the Czechs, at the price of a new though more subtle form of subordination. For the russophiles, entrapped by their phantasies, the solution was more a matter of heart than of mind. The ones remaining on the "Slovak path" were thrown back to their own resources, intense in their enthusiasm and faith but incapable of overcoming the heavy odds against them. Therefore, the Slovaks in �116 SLOVAKIA Austria-Hungary had no chance whatever to ignore or cast aside the available options in favor of a universal Slovak solution. Their dilemma weighed on them as their historical heritage, present predicament, and a portent of difficult times to come. FOOTNOTES 1) R. W. Seton-Watson, Slovakia Then and Now (London, 1931), pp. 2526. 2) Jan Sveton, Die Slowaken in Ungarn (Bratislava, 1943). Steph en Janak, "The Land Question in Slovakia," The Slavonic Review, VIII (1930). 3) Ar.nuaire Statistique Hongrois, Budapest, L'Office Central De Statistique Du Royaume de Hongrie, 1915. 4) Robert Kann, The Multinational Empire (New York, 1969), I, 271. 5) Oszkar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago, 1931), p. 323. 6) Ibid. , p. 319. 7 ) In this regard , the views of Count J6zsef Mailath, a Magyar artistocrat, were characteristic of the general Hungarian public opinion. M, ilath contended that ,e ven if the changes of forced Magyarization were true, they would really l:le invalid, since the Law acknowledged only one Hungarian national state, and not the existence of Slovak, Rumanian, Serbian, and Ruthenian nations within the borders of Hungary. Joseph Graf Mailath, Hungarica Res (Berlin, 1908), p. 22. 8) Quoted by Jaszi, op. cit., p. 321. 9) Paul Teleki, Count, The Evolution of Hungary and its Place in History (New York, 1923), pp. 155-156. 10) Ibid., p. 161 and p. 173. 11) Guyla Szekfti, Harom Nemzedek (The Three Generations), (Budapest, 1920), p. 261. 12) Lajos Steier, A T6t Ker-des (The Slovak Problem) (Lipt6szentmikl6s, 1912), I, 1. 13) Ibid., p. 160. 14) Orszaggyules-Nyomtatvanyai-Kepviselohaz-Napl6 (The Stenographic Proceedings of the Hungarian Parliament) XIII, 102. October 30, 1907. 15) Ibid., pp. 111-112. 16) " Racial Strife in Hungary" - a Reply to H. W. V. Temperley by Count Joseph Mailath. The Westminster Review, CLXX (1908), 30. 17 ) Joseph Skultety, Sketches from Slovak History (Middletown, 1930), p. 160. 18) Ibid. , p . 193. 19) Th. J. G. Locher, Die Nationale Differenzierung und Integrierung der Slowaken und Tschechen in Ihren Geschichtlichen Verlauf bis 1848 (Haarlem, 1931), p. 197. �SLOVAKIA 117 20 ) Ottokar Prohaszka , A Nacionalizmusr6l (About Nationalism) (Budapest, 1925), p. 61. 21) Orszaggyiiles-Nyomtatvanyai-Kepvise l5h6.z-Napl6, VII, 424, February 18, 1907. 22) Ibid., I, 284. July 7, 1906. 23) Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe (New York, 1942), p. 40. 24 ) One example: Speech by Gyorgy Szmrecsanyi. Orszaggyules-Nyomtatvanyai-Kepvisel5h6.z-Napl6, VII, 411-417. February 16, 1907. 25 ) Vladislav Stastny, ed., Slovanstvi v narodnim zivote techu a Slovaku (Praha , 1968), p. 328. 26 ) Ludwig vo n Gogolak, Beitriige zur Geschichte des slowakischen Volkes (Mtinchen, 1963 ), p. 98. 27 ) Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 93. * * * Centennial of Slovak Health Spas in the Tatra Mountains Rev. Andrew V. Pier, O.S.B. This year (1975) marks the 100th anniversary of public establishment of the now famous health centers in two High Tatra regions, namely, Novy Smokovec and strbske Pleso, and at Lucivna, located at the northern end of the Low Tatra mountains in Slovakia. At Novy Smokovec located at the foot of the forested slope leading upward to the Slavkovsky peak was the first Slovak health resort set aside for tuberculosis patients a hundred years ago. The low humidity, year-round sunshine and intense ultra-violet radiation, crisp atmosphere at the high altitude of some 8,000 feet, low atmospheric pressure .. . these health factors lend themselves to a natural center for the relief and cure of not only pulmonary ailments and chronic respiratory troubles, but contribute greatly to the cure of diseases of the thyroid gland and various neuroses. For the healthy Novy Smokovec is a natural winter sports' resort and a tourist attraction the rest of the year. Accommodations are modest but adequate. � SLOVAKIA 105 The Slovak Dilemma Ln Austria-Hungary* Gabor V e r m e s Rutgers University, Dept. of History At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the educated middle class Slovak in Austria-Hungary found himself enmeshed in a multiple identity crisis. He could remain a Slovak and thus limit his chance for any meaningful participation in the Hungarian Establishment; he could ally himself with the Czechs as a junior partner; he could indulge in an illusionary alliance with Russia; or he could abandon his Slovak identity and become a Magyar. This dilemma weighed most heavily upon members of the Slovak intelligentsia because their status in Hungarian society was contingent upon the choice they made. Yet, the survival of the entire Slovak nation was thought to be in question. Almost all the Slovak and pro-Slovak literati declaimed inevitable doom and prophesized the gradual extinction of the Slovaks. Robert Seton-Watson spoke of the virtual destruction of Slovak nationality, and concluded, " ... especially after the notorious Education Act of Count Albert Apponyi in 1907, the process of Magyarization was advancing by leaps and bounds, in particular along the Southern linguistic frontier ... The victim was rescued just in time." 1 The question arises then: Can an entire people vanish, in modern times, by the superimposition of powerful outside forces? Was the feeling of doom justified as far as ,:, NOTE: We are publishing this article on the recommendation of Prof. J . M. Kirschbaum, concerning an exchange of views on the Slovak question in Austria-Hungary as a precondition for preparing a better future for all nations of Central Europe. Professor Vermes' conclusions are not identical with Slovak views but he presents a serious and well documented attempt at an objective analysis from the Hungarian point of view. The editor �106 SLOVAKIA the Slovaks were concerned? The statistics are inexorable, and they do se6m to indicate a gradual erosion in the number of Slovaks still maintaining their national identity.2 The pull of Magyarization was especially strong among the Slovak educated middle class; very understandably, this caused the gravest concern to the nationalist Slovaks. The nationalist group was also greatly concerned over the large scale emigration of Slovak peasants who left the Tatra Mountains to settle in the adjoining territories which were inhabited by the Magyars or by a mixed population. The peasants also migrated to the big cities, to Budapest in particular, and a considerable number emigrated to America. Yet a revealing comparison between the number of Slovaks who could speak only their native tongue in 1900 and the same category in 1910 shows that a sizable segment remained Slovak.3 In the isolated hamlets and villages of the Tatra, the population remained Slovak, not because of any conscious or deliberate effort to assert themselves as such, but because they lived in homogeneous compact groups. Magyar power reached them only through various types of county officials, and through the school teachers, but even if the little pupil learned to mutter a few sentences in Hungarian, most likely he disposed of them at home with a natural sense of relief. The anticipated diminution of the intellectual elite, therefore, did not seem to conflict with the simultaneous preservation of a less sophisticated stratum of society much less exposed to alien influences. Thus, the usage of the term extinction becomes somewhat exaggerated and overly pessimistic. The Slovak peasantry, provided they were ignorant and indifferent to any kind of cause, including that of Slovak nationalism, could still be considered a bulwark against national self-annihilation and perhaps even as a reservoir of a future Slovak national renaissance. The reasons for the Slovak predicament are fairly well-known. 4 The two basic factors were their early loss of independence to the Hungarians in the 9th-10th centuries A.D. and their sparse expansion over their poor and mountainous terrain. Beginning in the mid-19th century, two additional components were added. One was the disadvantage resulting from the absence of an independent Czech or ~lovak state. (This was a disadvantage in comparison �SLOVAKIA 107 with the Austro-Rumanian and Austro-Serbian position, strengthened by the existence of an independent Rumania and Serbia) . The other factor in the Slovaks' plight was the clash between two adverse national egos, the Magyar and the Slovak. As long as the Monarchy lasted, Magyar nationalism gained the upper hand, not because of any inherent superior quality but as a natural consequence of a superior power, superior in the political, social, and economic sense, and even in the psychological sphere of self-assurance. Hungary had much to be proud of by the second half of the 19th century. It had grown from a backward agricultural country into a relatively advanced agricultural-industrial state. After an unsuccessful revolution in 1848-1849, astute negotiations aided by fortuitous circumstances led to equal partnership with Austria in 1867. Hungary became an integral part of a dualist system which maintained its great power status up to the very end of its existence, in spite of its inner weaknesses . In 1896, prosperity, though unevenly shared, and optimism, though not unanimous, exploded into the pageantry of the Milleneum, the one-thousandth anniversary of Hungary's existence. The country-gentry was the major conveyor of this festive spirit. In their patriotic fervor they were supported by an urban middle class, consisting partly of their own kin, partly of the remnants of the old German burgher class, and partly by a growing number of Jews . Quite often members of these two latter groups turned into more zealous Magyars than the Magyars themselves . Jeno Rakosi, of German origin, was the wellknown editor of the Budapest Hirlap; he coined the slogan of "A Great Hungary of 30 million Magyars," 5 and his Jewish journalist colleagues backed him up with unfaltering ardor. The gentry, however, though deeply entrenched in their strongholds, the administrations of state and counties, was no longer the liberal generation of 1848. As Oszkar Jaszi pointed out, this gentry, by losing its economic power, and somewhat bewildered by the complexities of a new emerging urban-commercial-industrial society, compensated for its growing insecurity with an ever strengthening assertion of national superiority .6 In order to justify this superiority and persevere in it, the gentry stubbornly �108 SLOVAKIA maintained its traditional, legal-political arguments, to the point of referring to the "Law" even when actual injustice was admitted. 7 The Fundamental Law, to which constant reference was made, was considered historical by the Magyar ruling classes, and was based on their rights by virtue of the Magyar conquest. Even such a recognized moderate as Kalman Szell (Prime Minister of Hungary, 1899-1903) asserted, "The Magyars have conquered this country for themselves and not for others. The supremacy and hegemony of the Magyars is fully justified." 8 No one would deny the exceptions to this rule. The impact of Ferenc Deak and Baron J6zsef Eotvos, the great Hungarian liberal statesmen, was still evident upon the creation of the Nationality Law of 1868, which granted extensive cultural rights to the non-Magyar nationalities, though it stopped short of acknowledging their existence as separate legal-political entities. In his exile, Lajos Kossuth changed from an intolerant chauvinist into the champion of a Danubian Federation, and he had a faithful disciple in Hungary in the person of Lajos Mocsary. In later years, preceding World War I, Ozskar Jaszi, a sociologist and politician of radical-leftist leanings, was sympathetically inclined to the course providing genuine equality between Magyars and non-Magyars. These and several other exceptions notwithstanding, most Magyars were indifferent at best, and outrightly hostile at worst, to the national aspirations, demands, and needs of their fellow non-Magyar citizens. The consequences of such attitudes were examined even by the conservative school of Hungarian historians. Count Pal Teleki recognized the impossibility of creating a unified Hungarian nation through enforced assimilation,9 and in addition he blamed the innumerable blunders of the Magyarization efforts on Magyar inconsistency and Magyar administrative inefficiency. 10 Accordin'5 to Gyula Szekfu, the process of Magyarization was detrimental because it corroded the Hungarian nation's moral fibre, yet it was not the "fearsome and bloodthirsty monster of Jaszi and Seton-Watson, but a childish construction, a plaything, and an unrealizable and overly emotional postulate, doing more harm to the Magyars, than to their nationalities." 11 Thus, behind the apparently rigid and legal pedantry �SLOVAKIA 109 of the Magyar public, it has not been hard to discover the emotional content, reflecting frustrations and childlike wishful thinking. To be sure, these elements were of considerable weight. However, at least equal stress should be laid on other factors as well, such as anxiety and fear of being encircled and outnumbered and consequently, of being eventually engulfed and annihilated. That fear and anxiety were never expressed in these pessimistic terms, but rather in their psychological reverse: The Hungarian nation would never perish, because of its power, its eagerness to grow from 10 to 30 million if possible, and because of its readiness to absorb all non-Magyars by all means available. Yet behind this fagade of self-confidence, fear and anxiety lurked, often in near paranoic dimensions. Lajos Steier, a Hungarian "expert" on the Slovaks, sounded the alarm hysterically, " ... Magyar hegemony, national unity, and our Fatherland are in mortal danger!" 12 Regardless of the validity of his anxiety, his proficiency in the affairs of Slovak-Magyar relations provided him with enough foresight to see the "danger" in a Czech-Slovak rapprochement. 13 Most Hungarians, however, were content to release their fear and anxiety in their ch~se of an all-encompassing yet amorphous scarecrow, Pan-Slavism, which was not understood properly at all, but was used as a charge both against bomb-throwing anarchists and totally harmless literati, attributing dark conspiratorial machinations to both. Hungarian gendarmes killed and wounded several Slovaks at the village of cernova, on October 27, 1907. The reason for the unrest was the punitive actions taken against cernova's Slovak nationalist priest, Father Andrej Hlinka by his Magyarone superiors in the Catholic hierarchy. The massacre was followed by stormy sessions in the Hungarian Parliament. Milan Hodza, one of the seven nationalist Slovak members, was accused of paving the way for the massacre through his agitation, and some of his Magyar colleagues called him "Assassin! ... rotten agitator!" 14 The Magyar representative from the district of cernova, bdon Beni9zky, painted a picture of Slovak agitation, a picture, which could have taken a rightful place in Dante's Inferno. He talked of the once pious Slovaks throwing rocks at every coach owned by Hungarian gentlemen, about Slovak agitators going around the villages, spreading news of �110 SLOVAKIA Hungarians taking Slovak children away during the night and taking them down to the Great Hungarian Plain in order to make good Magyars out of them; he conveyed the impression that Slovak peasants were ready to grab an axe and resort to unbridled violence. Hodza demanded proof, but none was forthcoming. The entire Hungarian Parliament sat in stunned silence, but in evident concurrence with the speaker. 15 The purpose of delving into these two factors, fear and anxiety, it not to overplay their role at the expense of the other components already mentioned, but rather, to point toward the substance of the Hungarian gentry and middle class mentality: Being alone, feeling isolated in the midst of "aliens"--Germans, Slavs, Rumanians-was a source of both real pride and real fear, but fear could never be openly confessed, specifically because of the accompanying sense of pride. This lack of balance, therefore, created an unhealthy atmosphere of irrationality and arrogance, which in turn provoked an equally irrational and arrogant response from the representatives of the nationalities; thus, gradually and tragically, all the bridges were burned. The Slovak "deviation" from Magyar patriotism perhaps hurt the Hungarians the most, because, in spite of the bitter experience of 1848, when many Slovaks sided with the Habsburgs against the Hungarians, the Slovak people were still trusted as the "simple, guileless, and pious little brother" of the "sturdy and powerful" Magyar nation. Treason might well be expected from the "fierce Rae" (Serb), or the "crafty Olah" (Rumanian), but not from a "T6t" (A condescending Magyar word for Slovak). There was no viciousness in the general Hungarian view of the Slovaks, but rather a sense of patronizing benevolence, so charmingly popularized in the novels and short stories of Kalman Mikszath. The alleged Pan-Slav agitation aroused such a great fury exactly because it seemed to disrupt the "idyllic harmony" between Magyar and Slovak which was so deeply rooted in historical tradition and friendly coexistence. There was another side to the coin of benevolent patronization, however. The "T6t" was liked perhaps, but obviously not respected as an equal of the Magyar. Count J6szef Mailath remarked in an otherwise strongly chauvinistic rebuttal to H. W. V. Temperley, the famous British �SLOVAKIA 111 historian, "We must confess that the depreciation of Slovakism, whether in lower or higher circles is 2. thing to which everybody is accustomed in Hungary. There is a saying, a Slovak is no man." 16 What was the response of young educated Slovaks to this general Magyar attitude toward them? Jozef Skultety, a well-known Slovak writer wants us to believe " . .. the Slovak remains true to himself ... he most frequently preserves his soul. He will sooner squeeze another than yield17 ••. the Slovak does not imitate." 18 The facts and figures squarely contradict Skultety: According to one estimate, shortly before World War I, the number of the educated Slovak-oriented families did not exceed five hundred in number. 19 However, should we blame the average Slovak for his eagerness to become a Magyar when all the economic and social advantages were on the Magyar side? The Magyar attitude towards the national minorities in general and towards the Slovaks in particular was racial only in a limited or qualified sense. The Magyar was considered superior and the Slovak inferior, but as soon as the Slovak decided to become a Magyar, he seemingly underwent a miraculous metamorphosis and was accepted 2.:; 2, fuE-fledged member of the Hungarian nation. In Magyar eyes, by his conversion, this neophyte Magyar manifested his maturity and wisdom and acquired all the higher qualities attributed to the Magyars. This belief served then as the foundation for pursuing Magyarization through the schools and churches. Albert Einstein could have never graduated into Nazi Germany's "Herrenvolk," but the son of a nationalist Slovak Lutheran pastor, Pavo! Hojc, could become Pal Hojtsy, a recognized historian, who published a book in 1902, under the title of Great Hungary, the Future Centuries of Hungarian History. Not every "new" Hungarian bothered to change his name even. A famous Catholic bishop Ottokar Prohaszka did not. However, it was not necessarily the sound of the name but the spirit that really counted. Bishop Prohaszka, though progressive in many respects, became one of the leading intellectual and spiritual leaders of the ultra chauvinistic counter-revolutionary movements in Hungary during the 1920's. The following excerpts is from a speech he held before a rightist audience in Budapest, "Beneath the national idea we have �112 SLOVAKIA to sense Magyar Reality, Magyar Blood, Magyar Land, and Magyar Life. But we ought not only to sense all of these -we have to live Magyar destiny." 20 Were these people happy and satisfied with their choice ? We cannot read their minds in retrospect, but there is no reason to assume that they were not. Magyar nationalistic policies could be harsh even brutal at times, but they did not demand an open or public renunciation of the old abandoned language, and an open or public pledge for the new one. Quite surely, thousands and thousands of Slovaks turned into Magyars without the flourish of trumpets and worked quietly and diligently. To call them opportunists would be to expect too much from human nature. For the average Slovak high school graduate, with an absolute proficiency in the Magyar language, the appeal of being accepted as an "adult," and also, of course, of securing positions in the church, schools, civil service, etc., was hard to resist. Perhaps some of the "super-converts" who wished to out-Magyar the most bigoted Magyars could be put out of countenance at times if they-as it always happens with this type-were keen on not only asserting the new but denying and hiding the old. Gyorgy Szmrecsanyi, a member of the Parliament, sounded quite embarrassed when after reading long quotes from Slovak newspapers he was questioned about his ethnic origin by Milan Hodza. 21 Who were the members of the minority, the nationally minded Slovaks? They too were graduates of the Magyar high schools, thus proving, at least partially, the self-defeating nature of Magyarization through education. Out of every hundred "converts" perhaps only a few became "rebels," but these latter could potentially cause a great deal of trouble-as they did in fact-to the idea and practices of a one and only Magyar National State. The commonly shared goal of the Slovak nationalists was not an independent Slovakia or Czecho-Slovakia, but broad Slovak autonomy within Hungary. Matyas Bella, one of the Slovak nationalist representatives in the Hungarian Parliament said, "Should all the national minorities be able to assert themselves within the State of Hungary, then I will welcome that State." 22 In this sense, the members of this group were the Slovak counterparts of the Czech Austro-Slavs. The �SLOVAKIA 113 dominant character of the Slovak nationalist movement in Hungary was conservative and Catholic. The main reason for this trend lay in the fact that most Slovak nationalist leaders emerged from a conservative Catholic background, the religious preference for about two-thirds of the Slovaks, and the major aim of these leaders was to win over the fundamentally conservative and religious peasant masses. Ccnservatism, therefore, functioned both as a source and a purpose. The goal of Slovak autonomy was of such paramount importance that it seemed to override all other ideological considerations, even to the point of apparent inconsistency. Milan Hodza was more than eager to strike a simultaneous alliance with all opposition groups outside the Parliament, the radicals and the socialists, and with the Heir to the Crown, Archduke Francis Ferdinand. There was also heavy E.mphasis laid on cooperation with leaders of other national minorities, especially with the Rumanians, who had more elected representatives in the Hungarian Parliament and had a longer tradition and greater experience in their "battle" against Magyar chauvinism ("The roots of the Little Entente") .23 This Magyar chauvinism was eventually countered by Slovak chauvinism, and it is quite evident that Hodza and his fellow Slovak nationalists spoke one language to their colleagues in the Hungarian Parliament, and another one to their Slovak constituents and reading public. The Parliament was filled with complaints over the "duplicity" of the Slovak nationalists, supported by direct quotes from Budapest-based Slovak newspapers. 24 To what extent was the "dilemma" solved for those who chose the Slovak road? It again could be assumed that the reward of fighting for a cause was satisfying on a personal level. However, it was a frustrating fight, not only because it did not seem to bring substantial results, but also because it was beset by a lack of broad support and by a sense of inner insecurity. One had to prove himself a Slovak in his own right, and this task was most difficult in the midst of an environment, where almost every particle of the atmosphere was saturated with condescension for the "Tot" and suspicion of the Slovak. In this antagonistic atmosphere. emotional attachment �114 SLOVAKIA to all brother Slavs and to "Mother Russia" in particular was an aid to some who declined to succumb to Magyar pressure. The roots of this romantic sentiment reach back to the early-middle 19th century, to Jan Kollar and to :Cudovit sttlr. With the passing of romanticism, cultural Slavophilism turned into political Pan-Slavism, which was frequently a barely concealed instrument of Russian foreign policy. Russia's attention, however, was focused on the Balkans. Thus, Slovak-Russian relations suffered more because of the Russians' lack of interest, rather than from the handicap of geographical barriers. A voice of near fatalistic resignation was struck by the leader of the russophi!e Martin group, Svetozar Hurban-Vajansky in a letter to a Russian friend, " ... ir there is no chance for the Slovaks to live under Russian hegemony, then it would be better for them to vanish altogether." 25 In the eyes of the Martin group, Tsarist Russia could do no wrong. Yet, although most educated Slovaks, with the exception of the Magyarones, shared a vague sense of brotherhood with all other Slavs, active russophilism encountered several stumbling blocks. The oppressive character of the Tsarist regime alienated the Slovak liberals and democrats, while the orthodox zeal of Tsarist officialdom estranged the Slovak Catholic conservatives. Both camps were infuriated by Russia's anti-Polish policy. The liberals and democrats were incensed because the rights of a fellow Slav nation were being violated; the Catholics resented the anti-Catholic policy of the Tsarist government. Consequently, the number of russophiles was limited and their emotional, neo-romantic movement reached an impasse by the early 20th century. There was another alternative left for the young educated Slovak: to turn to the Czechs. Liberals and democrats among the Slovak intelligentsia, clustering around the founders of the journal Hlas, Vavro srobar and Pavol Blaho, were inclined to do so. Yet, the "czechophile" group among the Slovak intellectuals was also relatively small26 and without considerable influence, " ... the main reason why we were so powerless and submissive was that during those long decades we did not look to Czech culture and the idea of Czechoslovak unity as in 1848." 27 - these were the bitter words of Ivan Markovic, a Slovak politician, and �SLOVAKIA 115 a member of several Czecho-Slovak cabinets after 1918. I have used this quote for a very important reason: My contention is that though the logic of the quote is entirely correct, it could and should be used in a reverse sense as well. Certainly, the Slovaks could have learned a great deal of self-assurance and a sense of strength from the Czechs, but one reason why the Slovaks were so reluctant to do so was precisely because of their relative weakness and backwardness. The Slovaks were caught in a vicious circle. A "pilgrimage" to Prague was a sensible thing to do; there was so much to learn there. Such a journey, however, concurred with an open admission of inferiority; one often had to swallow one's pride, and the Czechs did not make this cooperation easy. They too had developed a patronizing attitude towards the Slovaks, the implication of which was mere complex than was the case between Magyar and Slo-• vak. A Slovak, by his own will, could become a full-fledged member of a ruling nation, the Magyars, and an "adult" in lVIagyar society. A Slovak in Prague would most likely remain a Slovak who was not expected to abandon his people but was asked to affiliate. On paper, this latter proposition appears to be_much more humane and democratic. Yet, if an alliance is not maintained as between equals, then being relegated to a subordinate position is worse than not being included in one at all. Perhaps the young educated Slovaks had a foreboding of this predicament, and most of them chose the "easy way" to Budapest, even if that resulted in Pal dropping Pavel and Janos shedding Jan. Had there then ever been any hope for the Slovak intelligentsia in Austria-Hungary? Could they in any way have guided the destiny of Slovakia before 1918? Was there any realistic solution to their dilemma? For some of them yes, but at a price. One group of realists joined the Magyars, at the price of assimilation. Another group of realists associated itself with the Czechs, at the price of a new though more subtle form of subordination. For the russophiles, entrapped by their phantasies, the solution was more a matter of heart than of mind. The ones remaining on the "Slovak path" were thrown back to their own resources, intense in their enthusiasm and faith but incapable of overcoming the heavy odds against them. Therefore, the Slovaks in �116 SLOVAKIA Austria-Hungary had no chance whatever to ignore or cast aside the available options in favor of a universal Slovak solution. Their dilemma weighed on them as their historical heritage, present predicament, and a portent of difficult times to come. FOOTNOTES 1) R. W. Seton-Watson, Slovakia Then and Now (London, 1931), pp. 2526. 2) Jan Sveton, Die Slowaken in Ungarn (Bratislava, 1943). Steph en Janak, "The Land Question in Slovakia," The Slavonic Review, VIII (1930). 3) Ar.nuaire Statistique Hongrois, Budapest, L'Office Central De Statistique Du Royaume de Hongrie, 1915. 4) Robert Kann, The Multinational Empire (New York, 1969), I, 271. 5) Oszkar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago, 1931), p. 323. 6) Ibid. , p. 319. 7 ) In this regard , the views of Count J6zsef Mailath, a Magyar artistocrat, were characteristic of the general Hungarian public opinion. M, ilath contended that ,e ven if the changes of forced Magyarization were true, they would really l:le invalid, since the Law acknowledged only one Hungarian national state, and not the existence of Slovak, Rumanian, Serbian, and Ruthenian nations within the borders of Hungary. Joseph Graf Mailath, Hungarica Res (Berlin, 1908), p. 22. 8) Quoted by Jaszi, op. cit., p. 321. 9) Paul Teleki, Count, The Evolution of Hungary and its Place in History (New York, 1923), pp. 155-156. 10) Ibid., p. 161 and p. 173. 11) Guyla Szekfti, Harom Nemzedek (The Three Generations), (Budapest, 1920), p. 261. 12) Lajos Steier, A T6t Ker-des (The Slovak Problem) (Lipt6szentmikl6s, 1912), I, 1. 13) Ibid., p. 160. 14) Orszaggyules-Nyomtatvanyai-Kepviselohaz-Napl6 (The Stenographic Proceedings of the Hungarian Parliament) XIII, 102. October 30, 1907. 15) Ibid., pp. 111-112. 16) " Racial Strife in Hungary" - a Reply to H. W. V. Temperley by Count Joseph Mailath. The Westminster Review, CLXX (1908), 30. 17 ) Joseph Skultety, Sketches from Slovak History (Middletown, 1930), p. 160. 18) Ibid. , p . 193. 19) Th. J. G. Locher, Die Nationale Differenzierung und Integrierung der Slowaken und Tschechen in Ihren Geschichtlichen Verlauf bis 1848 (Haarlem, 1931), p. 197. �SLOVAKIA 117 20 ) Ottokar Prohaszka , A Nacionalizmusr6l (About Nationalism) (Budapest, 1925), p. 61. 21) Orszaggyiiles-Nyomtatvanyai-Kepvise l5h6.z-Napl6, VII, 424, February 18, 1907. 22) Ibid., I, 284. July 7, 1906. 23) Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe (New York, 1942), p. 40. 24 ) One example: Speech by Gyorgy Szmrecsanyi. Orszaggyules-Nyomtatvanyai-Kepvisel5h6.z-Napl6, VII, 411-417. February 16, 1907. 25 ) Vladislav Stastny, ed., Slovanstvi v narodnim zivote techu a Slovaku (Praha , 1968), p. 328. 26 ) Ludwig vo n Gogolak, Beitriige zur Geschichte des slowakischen Volkes (Mtinchen, 1963 ), p. 98. 27 ) Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 93. * * * Centennial of Slovak Health Spas in the Tatra Mountains Rev. Andrew V. Pier, O.S.B. This year (1975) marks the 100th anniversary of public establishment of the now famous health centers in two High Tatra regions, namely, Novy Smokovec and strbske Pleso, and at Lucivna, located at the northern end of the Low Tatra mountains in Slovakia. At Novy Smokovec located at the foot of the forested slope leading upward to the Slavkovsky peak was the first Slovak health resort set aside for tuberculosis patients a hundred years ago. The low humidity, year-round sunshine and intense ultra-violet radiation, crisp atmosphere at the high altitude of some 8,000 feet, low atmospheric pressure .. . these health factors lend themselves to a natural center for the relief and cure of not only pulmonary ailments and chronic respiratory troubles, but contribute greatly to the cure of diseases of the thyroid gland and various neuroses. For the healthy Novy Smokovec is a natural winter sports' resort and a tourist attraction the rest of the year. Accommodations are modest but adequate. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1975, Vol. 25 Description An account of the resource Vol. 25 (No. 48), 1975. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1975 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 105 The Slovak Dilemma Ln Austria-Hungary* Gabor V e r m e s Rutgers University, Dept. of History At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the educated middle class Slovak in Austria-Hungary found himself enmeshed in a multiple identity crisis. He could remain a Slovak and thus limit his chance for any meaningful participation in the Hungarian Establishment; he could ally himself with the Czechs as a junior partner; he could indulge in an illusionary alliance with Russia; or he could abandon his Slovak identity and become a Magyar. This dilemma weighed most heavily upon members of the Slovak intelligentsia because their status in Hungarian society was contingent upon the choice they made. Yet, the survival of the entire Slovak nation was thought to be in question. Almost all the Slovak and pro-Slovak literati declaimed inevitable doom and prophesized the gradual extinction of the Slovaks. Robert Seton-Watson spoke of the virtual destruction of Slovak nationality, and concluded, " ... especially after the notorious Education Act of Count Albert Apponyi in 1907, the process of Magyarization was advancing by leaps and bounds, in particular along the Southern linguistic frontier ... The victim was rescued just in time." 1 The question arises then: Can an entire people vanish, in modern times, by the superimposition of powerful outside forces? Was the feeling of doom justified as far as ,:, NOTE: We are publishing this article on the recommendation of Prof. J . M. Kirschbaum, concerning an exchange of views on the Slovak question in Austria-Hungary as a precondition for preparing a better future for all nations of Central Europe. Professor Vermes' conclusions are not identical with Slovak views but he presents a serious and well documented attempt at an objective analysis from the Hungarian point of view. The editor 106 SLOVAKIA the Slovaks were concerned? The statistics are inexorable, and they do se6m to indicate a gradual erosion in the number of Slovaks still maintaining their national identity.2 The pull of Magyarization was especially strong among the Slovak educated middle class; very understandably, this caused the gravest concern to the nationalist Slovaks. The nationalist group was also greatly concerned over the large scale emigration of Slovak peasants who left the Tatra Mountains to settle in the adjoining territories which were inhabited by the Magyars or by a mixed population. The peasants also migrated to the big cities, to Budapest in particular, and a considerable number emigrated to America. Yet a revealing comparison between the number of Slovaks who could speak only their native tongue in 1900 and the same category in 1910 shows that a sizable segment remained Slovak.3 In the isolated hamlets and villages of the Tatra, the population remained Slovak, not because of any conscious or deliberate effort to assert themselves as such, but because they lived in homogeneous compact groups. Magyar power reached them only through various types of county officials, and through the school teachers, but even if the little pupil learned to mutter a few sentences in Hungarian, most likely he disposed of them at home with a natural sense of relief. The anticipated diminution of the intellectual elite, therefore, did not seem to conflict with the simultaneous preservation of a less sophisticated stratum of society much less exposed to alien influences. Thus, the usage of the term extinction becomes somewhat exaggerated and overly pessimistic. The Slovak peasantry, provided they were ignorant and indifferent to any kind of cause, including that of Slovak nationalism, could still be considered a bulwark against national self-annihilation and perhaps even as a reservoir of a future Slovak national renaissance. The reasons for the Slovak predicament are fairly well-known. 4 The two basic factors were their early loss of independence to the Hungarians in the 9th-10th centuries A.D. and their sparse expansion over their poor and mountainous terrain. Beginning in the mid-19th century, two additional components were added. One was the disadvantage resulting from the absence of an independent Czech or ~lovak state. (This was a disadvantage in comparison SLOVAKIA 107 with the Austro-Rumanian and Austro-Serbian position, strengthened by the existence of an independent Rumania and Serbia) . The other factor in the Slovaks' plight was the clash between two adverse national egos, the Magyar and the Slovak. As long as the Monarchy lasted, Magyar nationalism gained the upper hand, not because of any inherent superior quality but as a natural consequence of a superior power, superior in the political, social, and economic sense, and even in the psychological sphere of self-assurance. Hungary had much to be proud of by the second half of the 19th century. It had grown from a backward agricultural country into a relatively advanced agricultural-industrial state. After an unsuccessful revolution in 1848-1849, astute negotiations aided by fortuitous circumstances led to equal partnership with Austria in 1867. Hungary became an integral part of a dualist system which maintained its great power status up to the very end of its existence, in spite of its inner weaknesses . In 1896, prosperity, though unevenly shared, and optimism, though not unanimous, exploded into the pageantry of the Milleneum, the one-thousandth anniversary of Hungary's existence. The country-gentry was the major conveyor of this festive spirit. In their patriotic fervor they were supported by an urban middle class, consisting partly of their own kin, partly of the remnants of the old German burgher class, and partly by a growing number of Jews . Quite often members of these two latter groups turned into more zealous Magyars than the Magyars themselves . Jeno Rakosi, of German origin, was the wellknown editor of the Budapest Hirlap; he coined the slogan of "A Great Hungary of 30 million Magyars," 5 and his Jewish journalist colleagues backed him up with unfaltering ardor. The gentry, however, though deeply entrenched in their strongholds, the administrations of state and counties, was no longer the liberal generation of 1848. As Oszkar Jaszi pointed out, this gentry, by losing its economic power, and somewhat bewildered by the complexities of a new emerging urban-commercial-industrial society, compensated for its growing insecurity with an ever strengthening assertion of national superiority .6 In order to justify this superiority and persevere in it, the gentry stubbornly 108 SLOVAKIA maintained its traditional, legal-political arguments, to the point of referring to the "Law" even when actual injustice was admitted. 7 The Fundamental Law, to which constant reference was made, was considered historical by the Magyar ruling classes, and was based on their rights by virtue of the Magyar conquest. Even such a recognized moderate as Kalman Szell (Prime Minister of Hungary, 1899-1903) asserted, "The Magyars have conquered this country for themselves and not for others. The supremacy and hegemony of the Magyars is fully justified." 8 No one would deny the exceptions to this rule. The impact of Ferenc Deak and Baron J6zsef Eotvos, the great Hungarian liberal statesmen, was still evident upon the creation of the Nationality Law of 1868, which granted extensive cultural rights to the non-Magyar nationalities, though it stopped short of acknowledging their existence as separate legal-political entities. In his exile, Lajos Kossuth changed from an intolerant chauvinist into the champion of a Danubian Federation, and he had a faithful disciple in Hungary in the person of Lajos Mocsary. In later years, preceding World War I, Ozskar Jaszi, a sociologist and politician of radical-leftist leanings, was sympathetically inclined to the course providing genuine equality between Magyars and non-Magyars. These and several other exceptions notwithstanding, most Magyars were indifferent at best, and outrightly hostile at worst, to the national aspirations, demands, and needs of their fellow non-Magyar citizens. The consequences of such attitudes were examined even by the conservative school of Hungarian historians. Count Pal Teleki recognized the impossibility of creating a unified Hungarian nation through enforced assimilation,9 and in addition he blamed the innumerable blunders of the Magyarization efforts on Magyar inconsistency and Magyar administrative inefficiency. 10 Accordin'5 to Gyula Szekfu, the process of Magyarization was detrimental because it corroded the Hungarian nation's moral fibre, yet it was not the "fearsome and bloodthirsty monster of Jaszi and Seton-Watson, but a childish construction, a plaything, and an unrealizable and overly emotional postulate, doing more harm to the Magyars, than to their nationalities." 11 Thus, behind the apparently rigid and legal pedantry SLOVAKIA 109 of the Magyar public, it has not been hard to discover the emotional content, reflecting frustrations and childlike wishful thinking. To be sure, these elements were of considerable weight. However, at least equal stress should be laid on other factors as well, such as anxiety and fear of being encircled and outnumbered and consequently, of being eventually engulfed and annihilated. That fear and anxiety were never expressed in these pessimistic terms, but rather in their psychological reverse: The Hungarian nation would never perish, because of its power, its eagerness to grow from 10 to 30 million if possible, and because of its readiness to absorb all non-Magyars by all means available. Yet behind this fagade of self-confidence, fear and anxiety lurked, often in near paranoic dimensions. Lajos Steier, a Hungarian "expert" on the Slovaks, sounded the alarm hysterically, " ... Magyar hegemony, national unity, and our Fatherland are in mortal danger!" 12 Regardless of the validity of his anxiety, his proficiency in the affairs of Slovak-Magyar relations provided him with enough foresight to see the "danger" in a Czech-Slovak rapprochement. 13 Most Hungarians, however, were content to release their fear and anxiety in their ch~se of an all-encompassing yet amorphous scarecrow, Pan-Slavism, which was not understood properly at all, but was used as a charge both against bomb-throwing anarchists and totally harmless literati, attributing dark conspiratorial machinations to both. Hungarian gendarmes killed and wounded several Slovaks at the village of cernova, on October 27, 1907. The reason for the unrest was the punitive actions taken against cernova's Slovak nationalist priest, Father Andrej Hlinka by his Magyarone superiors in the Catholic hierarchy. The massacre was followed by stormy sessions in the Hungarian Parliament. Milan Hodza, one of the seven nationalist Slovak members, was accused of paving the way for the massacre through his agitation, and some of his Magyar colleagues called him "Assassin! ... rotten agitator!" 14 The Magyar representative from the district of cernova, bdon Beni9zky, painted a picture of Slovak agitation, a picture, which could have taken a rightful place in Dante's Inferno. He talked of the once pious Slovaks throwing rocks at every coach owned by Hungarian gentlemen, about Slovak agitators going around the villages, spreading news of 110 SLOVAKIA Hungarians taking Slovak children away during the night and taking them down to the Great Hungarian Plain in order to make good Magyars out of them; he conveyed the impression that Slovak peasants were ready to grab an axe and resort to unbridled violence. Hodza demanded proof, but none was forthcoming. The entire Hungarian Parliament sat in stunned silence, but in evident concurrence with the speaker. 15 The purpose of delving into these two factors, fear and anxiety, it not to overplay their role at the expense of the other components already mentioned, but rather, to point toward the substance of the Hungarian gentry and middle class mentality: Being alone, feeling isolated in the midst of "aliens"--Germans, Slavs, Rumanians-was a source of both real pride and real fear, but fear could never be openly confessed, specifically because of the accompanying sense of pride. This lack of balance, therefore, created an unhealthy atmosphere of irrationality and arrogance, which in turn provoked an equally irrational and arrogant response from the representatives of the nationalities; thus, gradually and tragically, all the bridges were burned. The Slovak "deviation" from Magyar patriotism perhaps hurt the Hungarians the most, because, in spite of the bitter experience of 1848, when many Slovaks sided with the Habsburgs against the Hungarians, the Slovak people were still trusted as the "simple, guileless, and pious little brother" of the "sturdy and powerful" Magyar nation. Treason might well be expected from the "fierce Rae" (Serb), or the "crafty Olah" (Rumanian), but not from a "T6t" (A condescending Magyar word for Slovak). There was no viciousness in the general Hungarian view of the Slovaks, but rather a sense of patronizing benevolence, so charmingly popularized in the novels and short stories of Kalman Mikszath. The alleged Pan-Slav agitation aroused such a great fury exactly because it seemed to disrupt the "idyllic harmony" between Magyar and Slovak which was so deeply rooted in historical tradition and friendly coexistence. There was another side to the coin of benevolent patronization, however. The "T6t" was liked perhaps, but obviously not respected as an equal of the Magyar. Count J6szef Mailath remarked in an otherwise strongly chauvinistic rebuttal to H. W. V. Temperley, the famous British SLOVAKIA 111 historian, "We must confess that the depreciation of Slovakism, whether in lower or higher circles is 2. thing to which everybody is accustomed in Hungary. There is a saying, a Slovak is no man." 16 What was the response of young educated Slovaks to this general Magyar attitude toward them? Jozef Skultety, a well-known Slovak writer wants us to believe " . .. the Slovak remains true to himself ... he most frequently preserves his soul. He will sooner squeeze another than yield17 ••. the Slovak does not imitate." 18 The facts and figures squarely contradict Skultety: According to one estimate, shortly before World War I, the number of the educated Slovak-oriented families did not exceed five hundred in number. 19 However, should we blame the average Slovak for his eagerness to become a Magyar when all the economic and social advantages were on the Magyar side? The Magyar attitude towards the national minorities in general and towards the Slovaks in particular was racial only in a limited or qualified sense. The Magyar was considered superior and the Slovak inferior, but as soon as the Slovak decided to become a Magyar, he seemingly underwent a miraculous metamorphosis and was accepted 2.:; 2, fuE-fledged member of the Hungarian nation. In Magyar eyes, by his conversion, this neophyte Magyar manifested his maturity and wisdom and acquired all the higher qualities attributed to the Magyars. This belief served then as the foundation for pursuing Magyarization through the schools and churches. Albert Einstein could have never graduated into Nazi Germany's "Herrenvolk," but the son of a nationalist Slovak Lutheran pastor, Pavo! Hojc, could become Pal Hojtsy, a recognized historian, who published a book in 1902, under the title of Great Hungary, the Future Centuries of Hungarian History. Not every "new" Hungarian bothered to change his name even. A famous Catholic bishop Ottokar Prohaszka did not. However, it was not necessarily the sound of the name but the spirit that really counted. Bishop Prohaszka, though progressive in many respects, became one of the leading intellectual and spiritual leaders of the ultra chauvinistic counter-revolutionary movements in Hungary during the 1920's. The following excerpts is from a speech he held before a rightist audience in Budapest, "Beneath the national idea we have 112 SLOVAKIA to sense Magyar Reality, Magyar Blood, Magyar Land, and Magyar Life. But we ought not only to sense all of these -we have to live Magyar destiny." 20 Were these people happy and satisfied with their choice ? We cannot read their minds in retrospect, but there is no reason to assume that they were not. Magyar nationalistic policies could be harsh even brutal at times, but they did not demand an open or public renunciation of the old abandoned language, and an open or public pledge for the new one. Quite surely, thousands and thousands of Slovaks turned into Magyars without the flourish of trumpets and worked quietly and diligently. To call them opportunists would be to expect too much from human nature. For the average Slovak high school graduate, with an absolute proficiency in the Magyar language, the appeal of being accepted as an "adult," and also, of course, of securing positions in the church, schools, civil service, etc., was hard to resist. Perhaps some of the "super-converts" who wished to out-Magyar the most bigoted Magyars could be put out of countenance at times if they-as it always happens with this type-were keen on not only asserting the new but denying and hiding the old. Gyorgy Szmrecsanyi, a member of the Parliament, sounded quite embarrassed when after reading long quotes from Slovak newspapers he was questioned about his ethnic origin by Milan Hodza. 21 Who were the members of the minority, the nationally minded Slovaks? They too were graduates of the Magyar high schools, thus proving, at least partially, the self-defeating nature of Magyarization through education. Out of every hundred "converts" perhaps only a few became "rebels," but these latter could potentially cause a great deal of trouble-as they did in fact-to the idea and practices of a one and only Magyar National State. The commonly shared goal of the Slovak nationalists was not an independent Slovakia or Czecho-Slovakia, but broad Slovak autonomy within Hungary. Matyas Bella, one of the Slovak nationalist representatives in the Hungarian Parliament said, "Should all the national minorities be able to assert themselves within the State of Hungary, then I will welcome that State." 22 In this sense, the members of this group were the Slovak counterparts of the Czech Austro-Slavs. The SLOVAKIA 113 dominant character of the Slovak nationalist movement in Hungary was conservative and Catholic. The main reason for this trend lay in the fact that most Slovak nationalist leaders emerged from a conservative Catholic background, the religious preference for about two-thirds of the Slovaks, and the major aim of these leaders was to win over the fundamentally conservative and religious peasant masses. Ccnservatism, therefore, functioned both as a source and a purpose. The goal of Slovak autonomy was of such paramount importance that it seemed to override all other ideological considerations, even to the point of apparent inconsistency. Milan Hodza was more than eager to strike a simultaneous alliance with all opposition groups outside the Parliament, the radicals and the socialists, and with the Heir to the Crown, Archduke Francis Ferdinand. There was also heavy E.mphasis laid on cooperation with leaders of other national minorities, especially with the Rumanians, who had more elected representatives in the Hungarian Parliament and had a longer tradition and greater experience in their "battle" against Magyar chauvinism ("The roots of the Little Entente") .23 This Magyar chauvinism was eventually countered by Slovak chauvinism, and it is quite evident that Hodza and his fellow Slovak nationalists spoke one language to their colleagues in the Hungarian Parliament, and another one to their Slovak constituents and reading public. The Parliament was filled with complaints over the "duplicity" of the Slovak nationalists, supported by direct quotes from Budapest-based Slovak newspapers. 24 To what extent was the "dilemma" solved for those who chose the Slovak road? It again could be assumed that the reward of fighting for a cause was satisfying on a personal level. However, it was a frustrating fight, not only because it did not seem to bring substantial results, but also because it was beset by a lack of broad support and by a sense of inner insecurity. One had to prove himself a Slovak in his own right, and this task was most difficult in the midst of an environment, where almost every particle of the atmosphere was saturated with condescension for the "Tot" and suspicion of the Slovak. In this antagonistic atmosphere. emotional attachment 114 SLOVAKIA to all brother Slavs and to "Mother Russia" in particular was an aid to some who declined to succumb to Magyar pressure. The roots of this romantic sentiment reach back to the early-middle 19th century, to Jan Kollar and to :Cudovit sttlr. With the passing of romanticism, cultural Slavophilism turned into political Pan-Slavism, which was frequently a barely concealed instrument of Russian foreign policy. Russia's attention, however, was focused on the Balkans. Thus, Slovak-Russian relations suffered more because of the Russians' lack of interest, rather than from the handicap of geographical barriers. A voice of near fatalistic resignation was struck by the leader of the russophi!e Martin group, Svetozar Hurban-Vajansky in a letter to a Russian friend, " ... ir there is no chance for the Slovaks to live under Russian hegemony, then it would be better for them to vanish altogether." 25 In the eyes of the Martin group, Tsarist Russia could do no wrong. Yet, although most educated Slovaks, with the exception of the Magyarones, shared a vague sense of brotherhood with all other Slavs, active russophilism encountered several stumbling blocks. The oppressive character of the Tsarist regime alienated the Slovak liberals and democrats, while the orthodox zeal of Tsarist officialdom estranged the Slovak Catholic conservatives. Both camps were infuriated by Russia's anti-Polish policy. The liberals and democrats were incensed because the rights of a fellow Slav nation were being violated; the Catholics resented the anti-Catholic policy of the Tsarist government. Consequently, the number of russophiles was limited and their emotional, neo-romantic movement reached an impasse by the early 20th century. There was another alternative left for the young educated Slovak: to turn to the Czechs. Liberals and democrats among the Slovak intelligentsia, clustering around the founders of the journal Hlas, Vavro srobar and Pavol Blaho, were inclined to do so. Yet, the "czechophile" group among the Slovak intellectuals was also relatively small26 and without considerable influence, " ... the main reason why we were so powerless and submissive was that during those long decades we did not look to Czech culture and the idea of Czechoslovak unity as in 1848." 27 - these were the bitter words of Ivan Markovic, a Slovak politician, and SLOVAKIA 115 a member of several Czecho-Slovak cabinets after 1918. I have used this quote for a very important reason: My contention is that though the logic of the quote is entirely correct, it could and should be used in a reverse sense as well. Certainly, the Slovaks could have learned a great deal of self-assurance and a sense of strength from the Czechs, but one reason why the Slovaks were so reluctant to do so was precisely because of their relative weakness and backwardness. The Slovaks were caught in a vicious circle. A "pilgrimage" to Prague was a sensible thing to do; there was so much to learn there. Such a journey, however, concurred with an open admission of inferiority; one often had to swallow one's pride, and the Czechs did not make this cooperation easy. They too had developed a patronizing attitude towards the Slovaks, the implication of which was mere complex than was the case between Magyar and Slo-• vak. A Slovak, by his own will, could become a full-fledged member of a ruling nation, the Magyars, and an "adult" in lVIagyar society. A Slovak in Prague would most likely remain a Slovak who was not expected to abandon his people but was asked to affiliate. On paper, this latter proposition appears to be_much more humane and democratic. Yet, if an alliance is not maintained as between equals, then being relegated to a subordinate position is worse than not being included in one at all. Perhaps the young educated Slovaks had a foreboding of this predicament, and most of them chose the "easy way" to Budapest, even if that resulted in Pal dropping Pavel and Janos shedding Jan. Had there then ever been any hope for the Slovak intelligentsia in Austria-Hungary? Could they in any way have guided the destiny of Slovakia before 1918? Was there any realistic solution to their dilemma? For some of them yes, but at a price. One group of realists joined the Magyars, at the price of assimilation. Another group of realists associated itself with the Czechs, at the price of a new though more subtle form of subordination. For the russophiles, entrapped by their phantasies, the solution was more a matter of heart than of mind. The ones remaining on the "Slovak path" were thrown back to their own resources, intense in their enthusiasm and faith but incapable of overcoming the heavy odds against them. Therefore, the Slovaks in 116 SLOVAKIA Austria-Hungary had no chance whatever to ignore or cast aside the available options in favor of a universal Slovak solution. Their dilemma weighed on them as their historical heritage, present predicament, and a portent of difficult times to come. FOOTNOTES 1) R. W. Seton-Watson, Slovakia Then and Now (London, 1931), pp. 2526. 2) Jan Sveton, Die Slowaken in Ungarn (Bratislava, 1943). Steph en Janak, "The Land Question in Slovakia," The Slavonic Review, VIII (1930). 3) Ar.nuaire Statistique Hongrois, Budapest, L'Office Central De Statistique Du Royaume de Hongrie, 1915. 4) Robert Kann, The Multinational Empire (New York, 1969), I, 271. 5) Oszkar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago, 1931), p. 323. 6) Ibid. , p. 319. 7 ) In this regard , the views of Count J6zsef Mailath, a Magyar artistocrat, were characteristic of the general Hungarian public opinion. M, ilath contended that ,e ven if the changes of forced Magyarization were true, they would really l:le invalid, since the Law acknowledged only one Hungarian national state, and not the existence of Slovak, Rumanian, Serbian, and Ruthenian nations within the borders of Hungary. Joseph Graf Mailath, Hungarica Res (Berlin, 1908), p. 22. 8) Quoted by Jaszi, op. cit., p. 321. 9) Paul Teleki, Count, The Evolution of Hungary and its Place in History (New York, 1923), pp. 155-156. 10) Ibid., p. 161 and p. 173. 11) Guyla Szekfti, Harom Nemzedek (The Three Generations), (Budapest, 1920), p. 261. 12) Lajos Steier, A T6t Ker-des (The Slovak Problem) (Lipt6szentmikl6s, 1912), I, 1. 13) Ibid., p. 160. 14) Orszaggyules-Nyomtatvanyai-Kepviselohaz-Napl6 (The Stenographic Proceedings of the Hungarian Parliament) XIII, 102. October 30, 1907. 15) Ibid., pp. 111-112. 16) " Racial Strife in Hungary" - a Reply to H. W. V. Temperley by Count Joseph Mailath. The Westminster Review, CLXX (1908), 30. 17 ) Joseph Skultety, Sketches from Slovak History (Middletown, 1930), p. 160. 18) Ibid. , p . 193. 19) Th. J. G. Locher, Die Nationale Differenzierung und Integrierung der Slowaken und Tschechen in Ihren Geschichtlichen Verlauf bis 1848 (Haarlem, 1931), p. 197. SLOVAKIA 117 20 ) Ottokar Prohaszka , A Nacionalizmusr6l (About Nationalism) (Budapest, 1925), p. 61. 21) Orszaggyiiles-Nyomtatvanyai-Kepvise l5h6.z-Napl6, VII, 424, February 18, 1907. 22) Ibid., I, 284. July 7, 1906. 23) Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe (New York, 1942), p. 40. 24 ) One example: Speech by Gyorgy Szmrecsanyi. Orszaggyules-Nyomtatvanyai-Kepvisel5h6.z-Napl6, VII, 411-417. February 16, 1907. 25 ) Vladislav Stastny, ed., Slovanstvi v narodnim zivote techu a Slovaku (Praha , 1968), p. 328. 26 ) Ludwig vo n Gogolak, Beitriige zur Geschichte des slowakischen Volkes (Mtinchen, 1963 ), p. 98. 27 ) Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 93. * * * Centennial of Slovak Health Spas in the Tatra Mountains Rev. Andrew V. Pier, O.S.B. This year (1975) marks the 100th anniversary of public establishment of the now famous health centers in two High Tatra regions, namely, Novy Smokovec and strbske Pleso, and at Lucivna, located at the northern end of the Low Tatra mountains in Slovakia. At Novy Smokovec located at the foot of the forested slope leading upward to the Slavkovsky peak was the first Slovak health resort set aside for tuberculosis patients a hundred years ago. The low humidity, year-round sunshine and intense ultra-violet radiation, crisp atmosphere at the high altitude of some 8,000 feet, low atmospheric pressure .. . these health factors lend themselves to a natural center for the relief and cure of not only pulmonary ailments and chronic respiratory troubles, but contribute greatly to the cure of diseases of the thyroid gland and various neuroses. For the healthy Novy Smokovec is a natural winter sports' resort and a tourist attraction the rest of the year. Accommodations are modest but adequate.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Slovak Dilemma in Austria-Hungary Description An account of the resource Gabor Vermes Slovakia, Vol. 25 (No. 48), 1975 pp. 105-117 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vermes, Gábor Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1975 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a2b785ff29172bb25725fc31a56885d4.pdf 6c84b656505739b67f12330875b66208 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 45 POLITICAL REFUGEES OK RED AGENTS? OR. JOHN VLK OLIN SKÝ The large number of Czech politicos, members of parliament, officers and soldiers who fled to Germany in 1940 raised the 11uestion: Could this possibly have happened without the assent of the Prague communist regime? The boundary between Bavaria and Bohemia is only several kilometers long, and already in the summer of 1948 - just several mon-ths ai~ter Beneš and ·his followers su1•rEmdered the government to tbe communists - Dr. Rlpka announced in Parls that some 18,000 Czecbs had fled to other countrles. rt is slgnificant that all the aces or Dr. Beneš's National Socialist Party - The Czech Nazi Party - began leavlng the country as if under orders. And all got away without incidents or accidents. After them, we flnd a stream of soldiers - tbose who enjoyed the sympatby or the wes-tern allies - "escaping" into the U. S. Zone of Germany. But who escaped from SLOVAKIA? Only members of certain families and a few persona wbo swore to promote the "Czechoslovak" program and had family ties with the Lettrlchites, ·the Hodžas, Palkos, etc. Many of them departed in luxurlous limouslnes, wlth diplomatlc passes and devlces, wlth visas for European and other countries. All those "little things" had been taken care of in Prague before their "mlraculous" escape. It is not at all strange, then, if some one asks how these '"enemles" of communism could have "escaped" so easlly without the consent of Gottwald? Robert Ingrim - author of the successful book " After Hitler Stalln ?" - wrote on the subject in 1948. His article " A Secret Czech 'ľreaty?" was published in the Swiss "VATERLANO" September 25, 1948. He wrote: "Thirteen generals, eight ministers, the Mayor of Prague - this is but a smalt group of the Czech emigrants that has crossed over to the west to date. "They have one thing in common: AII were leading members of the National Socialist Party of Dr. Beneš. Their famllies are with lhem, as well as a goodly number of diplomats and consuls, who jolned them. They have no financial difflcu lties. Tney are working energetically in Washington, London and Paris to establlsh a new exile government. After America beats up the Soviet Union, this exile government would be called to lead Bohemia 'back to Beneš.' "The interestjng thlng a bout all this is the fact that all these gentlemen had succeeded in crossing the Czech border without difficulty and wlthout incident. "The <Statement or Peter Zenkl, former Mayor of Ptrag,ue, that he was saved by some one wbo had blindrotded bim so that he could not see bis rescuers. is somethlng for political children of whom tbere are more In America tban in Europe. "Wberever the communists seizect power, tbere the leading opponent.s of communism were carefully watched, if not arrested. But �46 SLOVAKIA in this case, it seems that the Czech commun!st police failed completely. . . . ! "But other extraordlnary and strange things happened before ihat tlme. Why did not Beneš res!gn lmmedlately as a sign of protest agalnst the communlst putsch? Why dld he recognlze the new rulers and defend them? Why did he tbus glve them the signlClcant appearance of legltlmacy? "Besldes Beneš's trustworthies, there are in exile several of his politlcal opponents. In the past weeks I have read reports from varlous parts that motlvate the conjecture that there was a secret treaty concluded between Beneš and bis successor Gottwald before he declded to instalľ Zápotockťs government. Thls agreemen( is su pposed to embrace the following polnts: 1. War between America and the Soviet Union is inev!table; 2. but the outcome of thls war ls uncertaln; 3. when the war ends, the Czechs must be on the right side; 4. they must, therefore, be on both sides before the war; 5. the communlsts wlll enable the departure of the leadlng generals and clvllians of the Qzech Natlonal Socialist Party; and 6. In 1,eturn the Czeoh Nat!onal Soclal!sts, when they return to Czechoslovakla as victors, promi.se to spare the leadlng commun!sts. "Such an agreement would make many thlngs, wh!ch otherwise appear puzzllng, lntelligible. In reality the new exlles never openly attack Gottwald. Conversely they want lt felt that he is moderate and thlnks nat!onalistlcally. "Sucb genUemen as Rlpka, Zenkl, etc. - who now offer themselves to the west as the future government and already now are trying to direct the war aims of Amerlcan politics to their side count on, to be sure, tbe great ignorance and forgetfulness or tbe west. "lt was these very National Socialista who prepared the way for communist dictatorship. During the war they deserted the west for the east. They demanded that their country be ' liberateď by the Red army, because Ameríca did not want to consent to the expulsion of ' minorities.' They were responslble for the terrible murders and the expulsion of Sudeten Germans and so made their own natlon entirely dependent on the Soviets. lt was they who had already In 1946 made Bohemia the most socialist country outside of Russla. lt was Beneš who, after his return, outlawed the Agrarian Party, the National Democratic Party and the Slovak Populist Party so that he could assure a majority for the leftlst partles, by means of whlch the communists became the strongest group in Parliament. "These parties were outlawed, we were told, because they had 'collaborateď with the Nazis but lt is no secret that very many leading National Socialista collaborated no less wlth the Nazls! "The motto 'back to Beneš' - as a basls of any exile pol!tlcs can therefore hardly sound entlclng to the ears of the west. Tbis apparently inevitable alllance with communlsm agalnst nazlsm the west bas expiated heavlly. It does not want to repeat the same error. Witb chauvlnists one can bardly bulld a better Europe, and Bohemla and Moravla can be thought of as politlcal unlts only when the raclsts sball be excluded trom lnfluence. In the mouths of the Ripkas and the �SLOVAKIA 47 Zenkls the words •democracy' and 'freedom' sound the same as they do in the mo ut ha of Gottwald a nd Zápotocky." Ingrim's article showed that he fully understood the problems of Europe - especially those of centra! Europe. He is one of the very few writers who has solved the "Czechoslovak" riddle, the political emplre that Beneš built to destroy the Slovak nation and enslave other national "minorlties" to further the aims of Czech Natlonal Socialism and lmperialism. The men ,about whom lngrlm wrote in September 1948, formed the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" in Washington in February 1949. They are the persons who collaborated with the communlsts of the Kremlin and Czechoslovakla and are re.s•p onsible for the terror and tyranny that reign in Czechoslovakia today. These "polltical roartyrs" wa.nt to fight ·the communist government in Prague from America, London and France, we are told. Another "Czechoslovak" fable! They had thelr great chance to fight the Reds ait home after the war, but failed miserably. Nay, they collaborated wlth the Reds and sold out the Czech and the Slo• vak nations to the Kremlin. And these same polltical opportunists and pseudodemocrats are telling the Slovaks at home and In exile that the United States and the other democratlc countries of the world are not interested in Slo• vak freedom and independence, in fact that they are oppO.'led to it. lf that were not so, they say, then "official" Washington, the Voice of America, and Radlo Free Europe would not recognize them and employ them. Imaglne: traitors representing the peoples they betrayed ! • • • • WHO SAID IT ? "The Czechosfovak government, from the beginning, maintained the rlght ot the people at home to decide the Republic's future. The governmenťs task abroad has been to ensure the freedom of this declsion and to take care tha4 the isola.ted home country does not lose the opportunities ensulng from the polltical and economic collaboratlon with the Allles. T he Czechoalovak gover nment achieved th is through t he st ron g, invio la ble SOVIET PACT, and the friendly relatlons with the greait western Allles. Thus the country is safeguarded BETT ER than ever before." - Msgr. Ján Šrámek, Prime Minister, Broadcast to Czechoslovakia, London, Jan. 1, 1945) . • "How far does Russla influence Czechoslovakia today? For some two years the Germans assured us that Czechoslovakia would be enslaved as soon as the Russian army came. Now, one year 1ater, we can see whether they were right. Our relations with Russfa are very coroial. WE ARE AN INDEPENDENT STATE, and our democratlc system has been re-established. The promise or Soviet Russia NO'ľ TO INTERFERE In our lnner struoture has been kept, The Russian army left our terrltory on the very day they had promised. The administration of the country ia In CZECHOSLOVAK hands." - (Prof. F. Bednár, D86n ot the Hus Theolog!cal Faculty, Prague, in the ~'SLOVAK SOKOL," Passa!c, N. J., September 26, 1946). � SLOVAKIA 45 POLITICAL REFUGEES OK RED AGENTS? OR. JOHN VLK OLIN SKÝ The large number of Czech politicos, members of parliament, officers and soldiers who fled to Germany in 1940 raised the 11uestion: Could this possibly have happened without the assent of the Prague communist regime? The boundary between Bavaria and Bohemia is only several kilometers long, and already in the summer of 1948 - just several mon-ths ai~ter Beneš and ·his followers su1•rEmdered the government to tbe communists - Dr. Rlpka announced in Parls that some 18,000 Czecbs had fled to other countrles. rt is slgnificant that all the aces or Dr. Beneš's National Socialist Party - The Czech Nazi Party - began leavlng the country as if under orders. And all got away without incidents or accidents. After them, we flnd a stream of soldiers - tbose who enjoyed the sympatby or the wes-tern allies - "escaping" into the U. S. Zone of Germany. But who escaped from SLOVAKIA? Only members of certain families and a few persona wbo swore to promote the "Czechoslovak" program and had family ties with the Lettrlchites, ·the Hodžas, Palkos, etc. Many of them departed in luxurlous limouslnes, wlth diplomatlc passes and devlces, wlth visas for European and other countries. All those "little things" had been taken care of in Prague before their "mlraculous" escape. It is not at all strange, then, if some one asks how these '"enemles" of communism could have "escaped" so easlly without the consent of Gottwald? Robert Ingrim - author of the successful book " After Hitler Stalln ?" - wrote on the subject in 1948. His article " A Secret Czech 'ľreaty?" was published in the Swiss "VATERLANO" September 25, 1948. He wrote: "Thirteen generals, eight ministers, the Mayor of Prague - this is but a smalt group of the Czech emigrants that has crossed over to the west to date. "They have one thing in common: AII were leading members of the National Socialist Party of Dr. Beneš. Their famllies are with lhem, as well as a goodly number of diplomats and consuls, who jolned them. They have no financial difflcu lties. Tney are working energetically in Washington, London and Paris to establlsh a new exile government. After America beats up the Soviet Union, this exile government would be called to lead Bohemia 'back to Beneš.' "The interestjng thlng a bout all this is the fact that all these gentlemen had succeeded in crossing the Czech border without difficulty and wlthout incident. "The <Statement or Peter Zenkl, former Mayor of Ptrag,ue, that he was saved by some one wbo had blindrotded bim so that he could not see bis rescuers. is somethlng for political children of whom tbere are more In America tban in Europe. "Wberever the communists seizect power, tbere the leading opponent.s of communism were carefully watched, if not arrested. But �46 SLOVAKIA in this case, it seems that the Czech commun!st police failed completely. . . . ! "But other extraordlnary and strange things happened before ihat tlme. Why did not Beneš res!gn lmmedlately as a sign of protest agalnst the communlst putsch? Why dld he recognlze the new rulers and defend them? Why did he tbus glve them the signlClcant appearance of legltlmacy? "Besldes Beneš's trustworthies, there are in exile several of his politlcal opponents. In the past weeks I have read reports from varlous parts that motlvate the conjecture that there was a secret treaty concluded between Beneš and bis successor Gottwald before he declded to instalľ Zápotockťs government. Thls agreemen( is su pposed to embrace the following polnts: 1. War between America and the Soviet Union is inev!table; 2. but the outcome of thls war ls uncertaln; 3. when the war ends, the Czechs must be on the right side; 4. they must, therefore, be on both sides before the war; 5. the communlsts wlll enable the departure of the leadlng generals and clvllians of the Qzech Natlonal Socialist Party; and 6. In 1,eturn the Czeoh Nat!onal Soclal!sts, when they return to Czechoslovakla as victors, promi.se to spare the leadlng commun!sts. "Such an agreement would make many thlngs, wh!ch otherwise appear puzzllng, lntelligible. In reality the new exlles never openly attack Gottwald. Conversely they want lt felt that he is moderate and thlnks nat!onalistlcally. "Sucb genUemen as Rlpka, Zenkl, etc. - who now offer themselves to the west as the future government and already now are trying to direct the war aims of Amerlcan politics to their side count on, to be sure, tbe great ignorance and forgetfulness or tbe west. "lt was these very National Socialista who prepared the way for communist dictatorship. During the war they deserted the west for the east. They demanded that their country be ' liberateď by the Red army, because Ameríca did not want to consent to the expulsion of ' minorities.' They were responslble for the terrible murders and the expulsion of Sudeten Germans and so made their own natlon entirely dependent on the Soviets. lt was they who had already In 1946 made Bohemia the most socialist country outside of Russla. lt was Beneš who, after his return, outlawed the Agrarian Party, the National Democratic Party and the Slovak Populist Party so that he could assure a majority for the leftlst partles, by means of whlch the communists became the strongest group in Parliament. "These parties were outlawed, we were told, because they had 'collaborateď with the Nazis but lt is no secret that very many leading National Socialista collaborated no less wlth the Nazls! "The motto 'back to Beneš' - as a basls of any exile pol!tlcs can therefore hardly sound entlclng to the ears of the west. Tbis apparently inevitable alllance with communlsm agalnst nazlsm the west bas expiated heavlly. It does not want to repeat the same error. Witb chauvlnists one can bardly bulld a better Europe, and Bohemla and Moravla can be thought of as politlcal unlts only when the raclsts sball be excluded trom lnfluence. In the mouths of the Ripkas and the �SLOVAKIA 47 Zenkls the words •democracy' and 'freedom' sound the same as they do in the mo ut ha of Gottwald a nd Zápotocky." Ingrim's article showed that he fully understood the problems of Europe - especially those of centra! Europe. He is one of the very few writers who has solved the "Czechoslovak" riddle, the political emplre that Beneš built to destroy the Slovak nation and enslave other national "minorlties" to further the aims of Czech Natlonal Socialism and lmperialism. The men ,about whom lngrlm wrote in September 1948, formed the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" in Washington in February 1949. They are the persons who collaborated with the communlsts of the Kremlin and Czechoslovakla and are re.s•p onsible for the terror and tyranny that reign in Czechoslovakia today. These "polltical roartyrs" wa.nt to fight ·the communist government in Prague from America, London and France, we are told. Another "Czechoslovak" fable! They had thelr great chance to fight the Reds ait home after the war, but failed miserably. Nay, they collaborated wlth the Reds and sold out the Czech and the Slo• vak nations to the Kremlin. And these same polltical opportunists and pseudodemocrats are telling the Slovaks at home and In exile that the United States and the other democratlc countries of the world are not interested in Slo• vak freedom and independence, in fact that they are oppO.'led to it. lf that were not so, they say, then "official" Washington, the Voice of America, and Radlo Free Europe would not recognize them and employ them. Imaglne: traitors representing the peoples they betrayed ! • • • • WHO SAID IT ? "The Czechosfovak government, from the beginning, maintained the rlght ot the people at home to decide the Republic's future. The governmenťs task abroad has been to ensure the freedom of this declsion and to take care tha4 the isola.ted home country does not lose the opportunities ensulng from the polltical and economic collaboratlon with the Allles. T he Czechoalovak gover nment achieved th is through t he st ron g, invio la ble SOVIET PACT, and the friendly relatlons with the greait western Allles. Thus the country is safeguarded BETT ER than ever before." - Msgr. Ján Šrámek, Prime Minister, Broadcast to Czechoslovakia, London, Jan. 1, 1945) . • "How far does Russla influence Czechoslovakia today? For some two years the Germans assured us that Czechoslovakia would be enslaved as soon as the Russian army came. Now, one year 1ater, we can see whether they were right. Our relations with Russfa are very coroial. WE ARE AN INDEPENDENT STATE, and our democratlc system has been re-established. The promise or Soviet Russia NO'ľ TO INTERFERE In our lnner struoture has been kept, The Russian army left our terrltory on the very day they had promised. The administration of the country ia In CZECHOSLOVAK hands." - (Prof. F. Bednár, D86n ot the Hus Theolog!cal Faculty, Prague, in the ~'SLOVAK SOKOL," Passa!c, N. J., September 26, 1946). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 45 POLITICAL REFUGEES OK RED AGENTS? OR. JOHN VLK OLIN SKÝ The large number of Czech politicos, members of parliament, officers and soldiers who fled to Germany in 1940 raised the 11uestion: Could this possibly have happened without the assent of the Prague communist regime? The boundary between Bavaria and Bohemia is only several kilometers long, and already in the summer of 1948 - just several mon-ths ai~ter Beneš and ·his followers su1•rEmdered the government to tbe communists - Dr. Rlpka announced in Parls that some 18,000 Czecbs had fled to other countrles. rt is slgnificant that all the aces or Dr. Beneš's National Socialist Party - The Czech Nazi Party - began leavlng the country as if under orders. And all got away without incidents or accidents. After them, we flnd a stream of soldiers - tbose who enjoyed the sympatby or the wes-tern allies - "escaping" into the U. S. Zone of Germany. But who escaped from SLOVAKIA? Only members of certain families and a few persona wbo swore to promote the "Czechoslovak" program and had family ties with the Lettrlchites, ·the Hodžas, Palkos, etc. Many of them departed in luxurlous limouslnes, wlth diplomatlc passes and devlces, wlth visas for European and other countries. All those "little things" had been taken care of in Prague before their "mlraculous" escape. It is not at all strange, then, if some one asks how these '"enemles" of communism could have "escaped" so easlly without the consent of Gottwald? Robert Ingrim - author of the successful book " After Hitler Stalln ?" - wrote on the subject in 1948. His article " A Secret Czech 'ľreaty?" was published in the Swiss "VATERLANO" September 25, 1948. He wrote: "Thirteen generals, eight ministers, the Mayor of Prague - this is but a smalt group of the Czech emigrants that has crossed over to the west to date. "They have one thing in common: AII were leading members of the National Socialist Party of Dr. Beneš. Their famllies are with lhem, as well as a goodly number of diplomats and consuls, who jolned them. They have no financial difflcu lties. Tney are working energetically in Washington, London and Paris to establlsh a new exile government. After America beats up the Soviet Union, this exile government would be called to lead Bohemia 'back to Beneš.' "The interestjng thlng a bout all this is the fact that all these gentlemen had succeeded in crossing the Czech border without difficulty and wlthout incident. "The <Statement or Peter Zenkl, former Mayor of Ptrag,ue, that he was saved by some one wbo had blindrotded bim so that he could not see bis rescuers. is somethlng for political children of whom tbere are more In America tban in Europe. "Wberever the communists seizect power, tbere the leading opponent.s of communism were carefully watched, if not arrested. But 46 SLOVAKIA in this case, it seems that the Czech commun!st police failed completely. . . . ! "But other extraordlnary and strange things happened before ihat tlme. Why did not Beneš res!gn lmmedlately as a sign of protest agalnst the communlst putsch? Why dld he recognlze the new rulers and defend them? Why did he tbus glve them the signlClcant appearance of legltlmacy? "Besldes Beneš's trustworthies, there are in exile several of his politlcal opponents. In the past weeks I have read reports from varlous parts that motlvate the conjecture that there was a secret treaty concluded between Beneš and bis successor Gottwald before he declded to instalľ Zápotockťs government. Thls agreemen( is su pposed to embrace the following polnts: 1. War between America and the Soviet Union is inev!table; 2. but the outcome of thls war ls uncertaln; 3. when the war ends, the Czechs must be on the right side; 4. they must, therefore, be on both sides before the war; 5. the communlsts wlll enable the departure of the leadlng generals and clvllians of the Qzech Natlonal Socialist Party; and 6. In 1,eturn the Czeoh Nat!onal Soclal!sts, when they return to Czechoslovakla as victors, promi.se to spare the leadlng commun!sts. "Such an agreement would make many thlngs, wh!ch otherwise appear puzzllng, lntelligible. In reality the new exlles never openly attack Gottwald. Conversely they want lt felt that he is moderate and thlnks nat!onalistlcally. "Sucb genUemen as Rlpka, Zenkl, etc. - who now offer themselves to the west as the future government and already now are trying to direct the war aims of Amerlcan politics to their side count on, to be sure, tbe great ignorance and forgetfulness or tbe west. "lt was these very National Socialista who prepared the way for communist dictatorship. During the war they deserted the west for the east. They demanded that their country be ' liberateď by the Red army, because Ameríca did not want to consent to the expulsion of ' minorities.' They were responslble for the terrible murders and the expulsion of Sudeten Germans and so made their own natlon entirely dependent on the Soviets. lt was they who had already In 1946 made Bohemia the most socialist country outside of Russla. lt was Beneš who, after his return, outlawed the Agrarian Party, the National Democratic Party and the Slovak Populist Party so that he could assure a majority for the leftlst partles, by means of whlch the communists became the strongest group in Parliament. "These parties were outlawed, we were told, because they had 'collaborateď with the Nazis but lt is no secret that very many leading National Socialista collaborated no less wlth the Nazls! "The motto 'back to Beneš' - as a basls of any exile pol!tlcs can therefore hardly sound entlclng to the ears of the west. Tbis apparently inevitable alllance with communlsm agalnst nazlsm the west bas expiated heavlly. It does not want to repeat the same error. Witb chauvlnists one can bardly bulld a better Europe, and Bohemla and Moravla can be thought of as politlcal unlts only when the raclsts sball be excluded trom lnfluence. In the mouths of the Ripkas and the SLOVAKIA 47 Zenkls the words •democracy' and 'freedom' sound the same as they do in the mo ut ha of Gottwald a nd Zápotocky." Ingrim's article showed that he fully understood the problems of Europe - especially those of centra! Europe. He is one of the very few writers who has solved the "Czechoslovak" riddle, the political emplre that Beneš built to destroy the Slovak nation and enslave other national "minorlties" to further the aims of Czech Natlonal Socialism and lmperialism. The men ,about whom lngrlm wrote in September 1948, formed the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" in Washington in February 1949. They are the persons who collaborated with the communlsts of the Kremlin and Czechoslovakla and are re.s•p onsible for the terror and tyranny that reign in Czechoslovakia today. These "polltical roartyrs" wa.nt to fight ·the communist government in Prague from America, London and France, we are told. Another "Czechoslovak" fable! They had thelr great chance to fight the Reds ait home after the war, but failed miserably. Nay, they collaborated wlth the Reds and sold out the Czech and the Slo• vak nations to the Kremlin. And these same polltical opportunists and pseudodemocrats are telling the Slovaks at home and In exile that the United States and the other democratlc countries of the world are not interested in Slo• vak freedom and independence, in fact that they are oppO.'led to it. lf that were not so, they say, then "official" Washington, the Voice of America, and Radlo Free Europe would not recognize them and employ them. Imaglne: traitors representing the peoples they betrayed ! • • • • WHO SAID IT ? "The Czechosfovak government, from the beginning, maintained the rlght ot the people at home to decide the Republic's future. The governmenťs task abroad has been to ensure the freedom of this declsion and to take care tha4 the isola.ted home country does not lose the opportunities ensulng from the polltical and economic collaboratlon with the Allles. T he Czechoalovak gover nment achieved th is through t he st ron g, invio la ble SOVIET PACT, and the friendly relatlons with the greait western Allles. Thus the country is safeguarded BETT ER than ever before." - Msgr. Ján Šrámek, Prime Minister, Broadcast to Czechoslovakia, London, Jan. 1, 1945) . • "How far does Russla influence Czechoslovakia today? For some two years the Germans assured us that Czechoslovakia would be enslaved as soon as the Russian army came. Now, one year 1ater, we can see whether they were right. Our relations with Russfa are very coroial. WE ARE AN INDEPENDENT STATE, and our democratlc system has been re-established. The promise or Soviet Russia NO'ľ TO INTERFERE In our lnner struoture has been kept, The Russian army left our terrltory on the very day they had promised. The administration of the country ia In CZECHOSLOVAK hands." - (Prof. F. Bednár, D86n ot the Hus Theolog!cal Faculty, Prague, in the ~'SLOVAK SOKOL," Passa!c, N. J., September 26, 1946).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Political Refugees or Red Agents? Description An account of the resource Dr. John Vlkolinský Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 pp. 45-47 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vlkolinský, John Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/460e5a702ebd3ed54ba269409452a768.pdf d6fd783faf2ed8f1b10456590990fb51 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 65 STEPHEN OSUSKY AND MARCH 1939 Francis Vnuk The same day that German divisions entered Bohemia and Moravia (:M arch 15) and Hitler parked himself in the Hradcany, Weizsaeker, German State Secretary, sent a circular to all German foreign missions in countries, in which Czecho-:Slovakia had diplomatic representation, to be ready to take over Prague diplomatic services. Particularly, the persons concerned were to see to it that all political and secret material was safeguarded. Hitler made the matter public on March 16, 1939, and the Czec:h Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky issued instructions the same afternoon to the effect that all foreign offices of the Czecho-Slovak Republic ceased to function as such and were to ibe surrendered to the German foreign offices in the respective countries. We know that not all foreign representations of Prague followed Chvalkovsky's directive. The deciding factor here was not Chvalkovsky's order (after all he was only doing what the Germans wanted him to do), but the stand taken toward Germany by the respective countries. In neutral countries and those which sympathized with Germany, the order was carried out without complications. Not so, however, where the mood was anti-German. Chvalkovsky's order was thus ignored in Washington, London, Paris, Moscow, Warsaw, and in Santiago. In three instances the diplomats were of Slovak origin: V,l adimir Hurban in Washington, George Slavik in Warsaw, and Stephen Osusky in Paris. 'Dhe case of Stephen Osusky is most interesting and perhaps least known. We know what had happened in Warsaw and in Washington. But little or nothing about what had transpired in Paris at the time. Perhaps because of Osusky' s influence. Now, what did happen in Paris at the time? Welczek, the German Ambassador in Paris, did try to contact Osusky, though unsuccessfully, after he had received Weizsaecker's directive. Late in the afternoon of 1 �66 SLOVAKIA March 16th, however, a member of the German Embassy (Braeuer) did contact Cerny of the Czecho-Slovak Embassy and explained the implication of Hitler's decree. Cerny was satisfied with Braeuer's explanation, but informed him - though he and the rest of the staff were ready to do what was asked of them - they could do nothing without Osusky, who, they said, still had no made up his mind on the matter. In the evening the Germans finaHy did get to Osusky by phone. Quirring, the German Embassy's legal counsel, first talked to him and later Welczek himself. Osusky took the stand that preliminarily he could not surrender the Embassy because he had learned about Hitler's proclamation, he said, only from the newspapers and officially he had nothing from Prague. Furthermore, he added that he needed a certain amount of time to let the French Government know in an appropriate manner what had happened. Welczek took cognizance of this but reminded Osusky, in order that there be no doubt about the matter, that the situation is completely clear and that Osusky bears full responsibility for his rejective attitude to surrender the embassy and its contents. Osusky, however , took exception and denied the accusation that he had taken a rejective stand on the matter. For the reason mentioned, he said, he simply could not surrender the embassy. On the second day (March 17), Welczek again contacted Osusky. This time Osusky admitted that he had received the directive from Prague but that he would have to discuss the situation with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs which still regarded him as the responsible he.ad of the Czecho-Slovak :Ennbassy because it had not been informed about the new situation. Welczek retorted that he had informed the French Government in writing about the new situation and, therefore, Osusky should know what he is supposed to do. Osusky replied that he would go to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then let the German Embassy know about the matter of surrendering his post. Dusk turned into darkness, but no report came from Osusky. Naturally, the Germans were becoming impatient. �SLOVAKIA 67 When they called Osusky' s office, they were told he was not in. Neither was his secretary. They decided then to visit Osusky's office. When they came to the building and found that it was heavily guarded by the French police, they left without further pursuing their mission. In the meantime, Cerny (the Czech Embassy's legal counsel) made an appearance at the German Embassy to report that he and the other personnel of the CzechoSlovak Embassy did not identify themselves with Osusky and that they told Osusky openly they did not agree with his position. Furthermore, when he told Osusky that he would let the Germans know how the personnel felt about the matter, Osusky replied that he could not prevent him needed time ( 1Cerny) from doing so, but that he (Osusky) to arrange his affairs before he surrendered the office. After that, according to Cerny, Osusky would be indifferent to what would happen. Cerny also assured the Germans that "tomorrow (March 18) , he would again tell Osusky that the embassy personnel urgently requests that he surrender the embassy to the Germans. But the Germans knew that Cerny meant little in the situation. If the French authorities are back of Osusky, the latter certainly would not be guided by what Cerny and the Czech Embassy personnel recommended. And there were signs that Osusky did have the backing of the French for his stand. Welczek r ecalled that the position of the French Foreign Ministry heralded nothing good when it was handed the notification of Hitler's decree. At that time C h a r v e r i a t, head of the political division of the French Foreign Ministry indicated that French official circles did not rgeard the situation as clear and consistent. Complications arose, Charveriat said, because the CzechoSlovak Embassy also represented Slovakia and Ruthenia, while the Germans made a Protectorate only of Bohemia and Moravia. The French Government, continued Charveriat, wishes therefore to carefully look into all the implications and devote proper attention to the position of the Czecho-.Slovak Embassy. Rushing matters would only increase the suspicion of the French, Charveriat concluded. The Germans answered that the French have no business �68 SLOVAKIA investigating this matter, because it concerns exclusively only Osusky and Welczek as the only representative of Germany. Encouraged by French assurances, Osusky stubbornly stood his ground. German hopes to take over the Czech Embassy faded. However, after (March 23) the 'DEMPS published a telegram in whioh Osusky sought the help of Herriot. It was obvious that the telegram was inspired by French circles. Osusky then told journalists (and the French press ga,ve this wide publicity) that he was remaining in the embassy to continue to represent the interests of his countrymen in France. The French Government then assured Osusky that it would continue to recogni2e him as tJhe accredited ambassador so that he could keep on looking after the interests of Czecho-,Slovakia. These interests, however, could not re 1 ate to the Czecho-S1ovak Republic which factually did not exist. 0susky could hold his position because there were some 50,000 former Czecho../Slovak citizens in France, the overwhelming majority of whom were Slovaks. They were concentrated in the environs of Paris, Strassburg, and Lille. How did Osusky protect their interests? By forcing them to join the Czecho-Slovak Legion! As a result of French action, the Germans were not even able to take over the Czech consulates in France. What happened with Cerny and the embassy personnel for whom he spoke? He changed his "line" after the publication of Osusky's telegram in the French press, so that everything and everybody at the Czecho-Slovak Embassy came into line with Osusky. • • • WHO SAID IT? "The Peace Policy of the USSR - Our Alliance," is the theme of the lecture which will be delivered by Minister Dr. Hubert Ripka in the Prague Central Li:brary on Friday, October 31, 1947, at 7:30 P. M. The lecture is being sponsored by the Committee for the Celebration of the 30th Annirversary of the Revolution." (The Czech SVOBODNE SLOVO, 10-30-47). � SLOVAKIA 65 STEPHEN OSUSKY AND MARCH 1939 Francis Vnuk The same day that German divisions entered Bohemia and Moravia (:M arch 15) and Hitler parked himself in the Hradcany, Weizsaeker, German State Secretary, sent a circular to all German foreign missions in countries, in which Czecho-:Slovakia had diplomatic representation, to be ready to take over Prague diplomatic services. Particularly, the persons concerned were to see to it that all political and secret material was safeguarded. Hitler made the matter public on March 16, 1939, and the Czec:h Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky issued instructions the same afternoon to the effect that all foreign offices of the Czecho-Slovak Republic ceased to function as such and were to ibe surrendered to the German foreign offices in the respective countries. We know that not all foreign representations of Prague followed Chvalkovsky's directive. The deciding factor here was not Chvalkovsky's order (after all he was only doing what the Germans wanted him to do), but the stand taken toward Germany by the respective countries. In neutral countries and those which sympathized with Germany, the order was carried out without complications. Not so, however, where the mood was anti-German. Chvalkovsky's order was thus ignored in Washington, London, Paris, Moscow, Warsaw, and in Santiago. In three instances the diplomats were of Slovak origin: V,l adimir Hurban in Washington, George Slavik in Warsaw, and Stephen Osusky in Paris. 'Dhe case of Stephen Osusky is most interesting and perhaps least known. We know what had happened in Warsaw and in Washington. But little or nothing about what had transpired in Paris at the time. Perhaps because of Osusky' s influence. Now, what did happen in Paris at the time? Welczek, the German Ambassador in Paris, did try to contact Osusky, though unsuccessfully, after he had received Weizsaecker's directive. Late in the afternoon of 1 �66 SLOVAKIA March 16th, however, a member of the German Embassy (Braeuer) did contact Cerny of the Czecho-Slovak Embassy and explained the implication of Hitler's decree. Cerny was satisfied with Braeuer's explanation, but informed him - though he and the rest of the staff were ready to do what was asked of them - they could do nothing without Osusky, who, they said, still had no made up his mind on the matter. In the evening the Germans finaHy did get to Osusky by phone. Quirring, the German Embassy's legal counsel, first talked to him and later Welczek himself. Osusky took the stand that preliminarily he could not surrender the Embassy because he had learned about Hitler's proclamation, he said, only from the newspapers and officially he had nothing from Prague. Furthermore, he added that he needed a certain amount of time to let the French Government know in an appropriate manner what had happened. Welczek took cognizance of this but reminded Osusky, in order that there be no doubt about the matter, that the situation is completely clear and that Osusky bears full responsibility for his rejective attitude to surrender the embassy and its contents. Osusky, however , took exception and denied the accusation that he had taken a rejective stand on the matter. For the reason mentioned, he said, he simply could not surrender the embassy. On the second day (March 17), Welczek again contacted Osusky. This time Osusky admitted that he had received the directive from Prague but that he would have to discuss the situation with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs which still regarded him as the responsible he.ad of the Czecho-Slovak :Ennbassy because it had not been informed about the new situation. Welczek retorted that he had informed the French Government in writing about the new situation and, therefore, Osusky should know what he is supposed to do. Osusky replied that he would go to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then let the German Embassy know about the matter of surrendering his post. Dusk turned into darkness, but no report came from Osusky. Naturally, the Germans were becoming impatient. �SLOVAKIA 67 When they called Osusky' s office, they were told he was not in. Neither was his secretary. They decided then to visit Osusky's office. When they came to the building and found that it was heavily guarded by the French police, they left without further pursuing their mission. In the meantime, Cerny (the Czech Embassy's legal counsel) made an appearance at the German Embassy to report that he and the other personnel of the CzechoSlovak Embassy did not identify themselves with Osusky and that they told Osusky openly they did not agree with his position. Furthermore, when he told Osusky that he would let the Germans know how the personnel felt about the matter, Osusky replied that he could not prevent him needed time ( 1Cerny) from doing so, but that he (Osusky) to arrange his affairs before he surrendered the office. After that, according to Cerny, Osusky would be indifferent to what would happen. Cerny also assured the Germans that "tomorrow (March 18) , he would again tell Osusky that the embassy personnel urgently requests that he surrender the embassy to the Germans. But the Germans knew that Cerny meant little in the situation. If the French authorities are back of Osusky, the latter certainly would not be guided by what Cerny and the Czech Embassy personnel recommended. And there were signs that Osusky did have the backing of the French for his stand. Welczek r ecalled that the position of the French Foreign Ministry heralded nothing good when it was handed the notification of Hitler's decree. At that time C h a r v e r i a t, head of the political division of the French Foreign Ministry indicated that French official circles did not rgeard the situation as clear and consistent. Complications arose, Charveriat said, because the CzechoSlovak Embassy also represented Slovakia and Ruthenia, while the Germans made a Protectorate only of Bohemia and Moravia. The French Government, continued Charveriat, wishes therefore to carefully look into all the implications and devote proper attention to the position of the Czecho-.Slovak Embassy. Rushing matters would only increase the suspicion of the French, Charveriat concluded. The Germans answered that the French have no business �68 SLOVAKIA investigating this matter, because it concerns exclusively only Osusky and Welczek as the only representative of Germany. Encouraged by French assurances, Osusky stubbornly stood his ground. German hopes to take over the Czech Embassy faded. However, after (March 23) the 'DEMPS published a telegram in whioh Osusky sought the help of Herriot. It was obvious that the telegram was inspired by French circles. Osusky then told journalists (and the French press ga,ve this wide publicity) that he was remaining in the embassy to continue to represent the interests of his countrymen in France. The French Government then assured Osusky that it would continue to recogni2e him as tJhe accredited ambassador so that he could keep on looking after the interests of Czecho-,Slovakia. These interests, however, could not re 1 ate to the Czecho-S1ovak Republic which factually did not exist. 0susky could hold his position because there were some 50,000 former Czecho../Slovak citizens in France, the overwhelming majority of whom were Slovaks. They were concentrated in the environs of Paris, Strassburg, and Lille. How did Osusky protect their interests? By forcing them to join the Czecho-Slovak Legion! As a result of French action, the Germans were not even able to take over the Czech consulates in France. What happened with Cerny and the embassy personnel for whom he spoke? He changed his "line" after the publication of Osusky's telegram in the French press, so that everything and everybody at the Czecho-Slovak Embassy came into line with Osusky. • • • WHO SAID IT? "The Peace Policy of the USSR - Our Alliance," is the theme of the lecture which will be delivered by Minister Dr. Hubert Ripka in the Prague Central Li:brary on Friday, October 31, 1947, at 7:30 P. M. The lecture is being sponsored by the Committee for the Celebration of the 30th Annirversary of the Revolution." (The Czech SVOBODNE SLOVO, 10-30-47). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 65 STEPHEN OSUSKY AND MARCH 1939 Francis Vnuk The same day that German divisions entered Bohemia and Moravia (:M arch 15) and Hitler parked himself in the Hradcany, Weizsaeker, German State Secretary, sent a circular to all German foreign missions in countries, in which Czecho-:Slovakia had diplomatic representation, to be ready to take over Prague diplomatic services. Particularly, the persons concerned were to see to it that all political and secret material was safeguarded. Hitler made the matter public on March 16, 1939, and the Czec:h Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky issued instructions the same afternoon to the effect that all foreign offices of the Czecho-Slovak Republic ceased to function as such and were to ibe surrendered to the German foreign offices in the respective countries. We know that not all foreign representations of Prague followed Chvalkovsky's directive. The deciding factor here was not Chvalkovsky's order (after all he was only doing what the Germans wanted him to do), but the stand taken toward Germany by the respective countries. In neutral countries and those which sympathized with Germany, the order was carried out without complications. Not so, however, where the mood was anti-German. Chvalkovsky's order was thus ignored in Washington, London, Paris, Moscow, Warsaw, and in Santiago. In three instances the diplomats were of Slovak origin: V,l adimir Hurban in Washington, George Slavik in Warsaw, and Stephen Osusky in Paris. 'Dhe case of Stephen Osusky is most interesting and perhaps least known. We know what had happened in Warsaw and in Washington. But little or nothing about what had transpired in Paris at the time. Perhaps because of Osusky' s influence. Now, what did happen in Paris at the time? Welczek, the German Ambassador in Paris, did try to contact Osusky, though unsuccessfully, after he had received Weizsaecker's directive. Late in the afternoon of 1 66 SLOVAKIA March 16th, however, a member of the German Embassy (Braeuer) did contact Cerny of the Czecho-Slovak Embassy and explained the implication of Hitler's decree. Cerny was satisfied with Braeuer's explanation, but informed him - though he and the rest of the staff were ready to do what was asked of them - they could do nothing without Osusky, who, they said, still had no made up his mind on the matter. In the evening the Germans finaHy did get to Osusky by phone. Quirring, the German Embassy's legal counsel, first talked to him and later Welczek himself. Osusky took the stand that preliminarily he could not surrender the Embassy because he had learned about Hitler's proclamation, he said, only from the newspapers and officially he had nothing from Prague. Furthermore, he added that he needed a certain amount of time to let the French Government know in an appropriate manner what had happened. Welczek took cognizance of this but reminded Osusky, in order that there be no doubt about the matter, that the situation is completely clear and that Osusky bears full responsibility for his rejective attitude to surrender the embassy and its contents. Osusky, however , took exception and denied the accusation that he had taken a rejective stand on the matter. For the reason mentioned, he said, he simply could not surrender the embassy. On the second day (March 17), Welczek again contacted Osusky. This time Osusky admitted that he had received the directive from Prague but that he would have to discuss the situation with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs which still regarded him as the responsible he.ad of the Czecho-Slovak :Ennbassy because it had not been informed about the new situation. Welczek retorted that he had informed the French Government in writing about the new situation and, therefore, Osusky should know what he is supposed to do. Osusky replied that he would go to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then let the German Embassy know about the matter of surrendering his post. Dusk turned into darkness, but no report came from Osusky. Naturally, the Germans were becoming impatient. SLOVAKIA 67 When they called Osusky' s office, they were told he was not in. Neither was his secretary. They decided then to visit Osusky's office. When they came to the building and found that it was heavily guarded by the French police, they left without further pursuing their mission. In the meantime, Cerny (the Czech Embassy's legal counsel) made an appearance at the German Embassy to report that he and the other personnel of the CzechoSlovak Embassy did not identify themselves with Osusky and that they told Osusky openly they did not agree with his position. Furthermore, when he told Osusky that he would let the Germans know how the personnel felt about the matter, Osusky replied that he could not prevent him needed time ( 1Cerny) from doing so, but that he (Osusky) to arrange his affairs before he surrendered the office. After that, according to Cerny, Osusky would be indifferent to what would happen. Cerny also assured the Germans that "tomorrow (March 18) , he would again tell Osusky that the embassy personnel urgently requests that he surrender the embassy to the Germans. But the Germans knew that Cerny meant little in the situation. If the French authorities are back of Osusky, the latter certainly would not be guided by what Cerny and the Czech Embassy personnel recommended. And there were signs that Osusky did have the backing of the French for his stand. Welczek r ecalled that the position of the French Foreign Ministry heralded nothing good when it was handed the notification of Hitler's decree. At that time C h a r v e r i a t, head of the political division of the French Foreign Ministry indicated that French official circles did not rgeard the situation as clear and consistent. Complications arose, Charveriat said, because the CzechoSlovak Embassy also represented Slovakia and Ruthenia, while the Germans made a Protectorate only of Bohemia and Moravia. The French Government, continued Charveriat, wishes therefore to carefully look into all the implications and devote proper attention to the position of the Czecho-.Slovak Embassy. Rushing matters would only increase the suspicion of the French, Charveriat concluded. The Germans answered that the French have no business 68 SLOVAKIA investigating this matter, because it concerns exclusively only Osusky and Welczek as the only representative of Germany. Encouraged by French assurances, Osusky stubbornly stood his ground. German hopes to take over the Czech Embassy faded. However, after (March 23) the 'DEMPS published a telegram in whioh Osusky sought the help of Herriot. It was obvious that the telegram was inspired by French circles. Osusky then told journalists (and the French press ga,ve this wide publicity) that he was remaining in the embassy to continue to represent the interests of his countrymen in France. The French Government then assured Osusky that it would continue to recogni2e him as tJhe accredited ambassador so that he could keep on looking after the interests of Czecho-,Slovakia. These interests, however, could not re 1 ate to the Czecho-S1ovak Republic which factually did not exist. 0susky could hold his position because there were some 50,000 former Czecho../Slovak citizens in France, the overwhelming majority of whom were Slovaks. They were concentrated in the environs of Paris, Strassburg, and Lille. How did Osusky protect their interests? By forcing them to join the Czecho-Slovak Legion! As a result of French action, the Germans were not even able to take over the Czech consulates in France. What happened with Cerny and the embassy personnel for whom he spoke? He changed his "line" after the publication of Osusky's telegram in the French press, so that everything and everybody at the Czecho-Slovak Embassy came into line with Osusky. • • • WHO SAID IT? "The Peace Policy of the USSR - Our Alliance," is the theme of the lecture which will be delivered by Minister Dr. Hubert Ripka in the Prague Central Li:brary on Friday, October 31, 1947, at 7:30 P. M. The lecture is being sponsored by the Committee for the Celebration of the 30th Annirversary of the Revolution." (The Czech SVOBODNE SLOVO, 10-30-47).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Stephen Osuský and March 1939 Description An account of the resource Francis Vnuk Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 5 (30), June-December 1959 pp. 65-68 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-December 1959 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/181a4f66019df58bee489bbf12571e20.pdf 3b6d4dd15c1e3e7264337d94b791a387 PDF Text Text 6 SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA'S ACCESSION TO THE TRIPARTITE PACT Fnmcis Vnuk On September 27, 1940, at the New Chancellery in Berlin, the German-Italian-Japanese Tripartite Pact was signed. "The ceremony of signing" - noted Shirer "was carried through with typical Axis talent for the theatrical." (1) The German and satellite press greeted the occasion as an event of far-reaching importance, a "Magna Charta" of the New Order, which was going to bring about exactly what had been promised in the preamble to the Pact, namely, "world peace" . . . and "prosperity and welfare of the peoples" in Europe and Greater East Asia(2). After the ceremonial signing, Hitler entered the hall to honor the occasion by his presence. Then followed the adulatory speeches of Ribbentrop, Ciano, and Kurusu. In the course of his speech Ribbentrop stated: "The purpose of the Pact is, a:bove an things, to help restore peace to the world as quickly as possible. Therefore, any otherstate, which wishes to adhere to this bloc with the intention of contributing to the restoration of peaceful conditions, will be sincerely and gratefully made welcome and will participate in the economic and political reorganization" (3) In response to this rather blunt hint, the nations of Central Europe, tied to Germany by geopolitical conditions, duly applied for admittance. Hungary was the first in the field, the others following her more or less reluctantly. It was clear to the 'Slovaks and Rumanians that they could not afford to stand aside, even if they wished. They had to rank at least as high in Hitler's esteem as Hungary which still hrad unfulfilled territorial claims against them. And thus towards the end of November, 1940, Hungarian, Rumanian, and Slovak delegations in close succession went to Vienna or Berlin ( 4) to sign the Protocol of adherence to the Tripartitie Pact. Hungary did so on the 20th, Rumania on the 22nd, and Slovakia on the 24th of November, 1940(5). Slovakia's accession to the Tripartite Pact followed the proclamation of the "spiritual adherence" a few weeks �SLOVAKIA 7 previously. Though Ciano sneered at the event as "a useless bit of ersatz diplomacy" (6) , the Germans made it into a spectacular State visit which was arranged for Tuka and his entourage. State visits had a strange fascination for Turoa. Nothing appealed to him more than to be a centre of attention, surrounded by high officials, and facing the flashlights of official photographers and reporters. He did not -conceal his disappointment when the Germans advised him against his proposed visit to Rumania, or when the Italians asked him to postpone his offered visit of Italy till "after the war." The signing of the Protocol of Accession enabled him to taste the cherished moments of ceremonial courtesies and at the same time to demonstrate his devotion to Germany. Apart from these rather personal considerations, there were also quite a few important political, economic, and cultural problems to be discussed, new poUcies outlined, and achievements and failures reported. SIGNATURES The German preparations for Tuka's State visit were very detailed and thorough. Tuka was to be received with all the honors and courtesies due to the head of a friendly government. In the captured documents of the former German Foreign Ministry, there is a special file (7) dealing exclusively with various aspects of the visit and this is the principal source of all relevant information. The Slov,ak delegation(8), which consisted of Tuka, Murgas, Mracna, Radlinsky and Farkas, left Bratislava by auto on the afternoon of November 23, 1940. They crossed the bridge to Petrfalka and proceeded to Vienna where ,a special train was awaiting them. The reception there was very austere. There were no guards of honor to inspect, no speeches of welcome; just one representative of the Protocol to accompany them on their night journey to Berlin. '.Dhe train left West Bahnhof at 7:32 P. M. and took them through Linz, Passau, Regensburg, Hof, and Leipzig to the Anhalter Bahnhof, Berlin, where they arrived on Sunday morning at 10 :40 A. M. - just 20 minutes after the Rumanian delegation, its mission accomplished, left Berlin on its return journey (9). �8 SLOVAKIA At the Anhalter Bahnhof everything was pompous, well-organized, and impressive. Welcoming personalities were grouped in four parties. The first party, headed by the Slovak charge d'affaires, consisted of foreign diploma:ts ·and the heads of missions in Berlin. Specially invited German representatives of the Party and the Army were in the second, the members of the Slovak Legation in the third, and the personnel of the German Foreign Ministry in the fourth group. Tuka, as he alighted from his salon-car, was welcomed by Ribbentrop and Matthew Cernak, and introduced by them to the other members of the welcoming parties on the platform. Then followed the inspection of the Guard of Honor. Tuka, in the uniform of the Hlinka Guards and accompanied by Ribbentrop, was trying his unsoldierly best to make his gait and mien look soldier-like. From the station the procession of cars went to Schloss Bellevue which was going to be Tuka's residence during his two-day stay in Berlin. There he was welcomed by Meissner who acted as master of the house (Hausherr). At 11 :30 Tuka paid a visit to Ribbentrop at the latter's office, 73 Wilhelmstrasse, where they spent about an hour in discussion. The great moment came at 1:00 P. M. In the Grand Reception Hall of the New Chancellery stood a huge massive signature table. The representatives of the Press had already taken their places: the foreign correspondents at the window-side, the Germans at the door. At 12:58 P. M., the great door opened and an impressive procession entered. It was led by the Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol. He was followed by Tuka and Ribbentrop, the Japanese Ambassador, the Italian Ambassador and Charge d'Affaires, the Hungarian and Rumanian Ministers, State Secretary Weizsaecker, and State Under-Secretary Gaus. Ribbentrop sat at the center of the table, Tuka at his right and, next to him, the Italian Ambassador and the Rumanian Minister. At Ribbentrop's left were seated the Japanese Ambassador and the Hungarian Minister. Everything went without a hitch like a well-rehearsed drama. The Protocol of Accession (10) was signed amidst �SLOVAKIA 9 the flashes of light and rustle of reporter's notebooks, short speeches were solemnly read out and courteous applause resounded in the spacious hall. In the afternoon Ribbentrop gave a reception at the Hotel Adlon for the Slovak Delegation and the members of the Slovak Legation in Berlin. In the morning of the next day (Monday, November 25) Tuka took part in the wreath-laying ceremony at the Ehrenmahl (The War Memorial at the famous Unter den Linden). Another reception was given by Cernak in the afternoon at the Hotel Esplanade. At 5:30 P. M. Tuka had his great and memorable moment. He was taken to the Work Room of the New Chancellery where he was received by Hitler. That was the climax of Tuka's State visit. Shortly before 7 P. M., the Slovak Delegation was again on the Anhalter Bahnhof. With the German and foreign guests to bid them farewell, guards of honor to inspect, hands to shake or raise in Nazi salute, the parting ceremony was as imposing as the welcoming one. At 7:05 P. M., the special train with the Slovak Delegation left Berlin on its return journey to Vienna, where they arrived on November 26, at 10:54 A. M. The Slovak Parliament gave its approval to the Protocol of Accession to the Tripartite Pact on February 6, 1941(11). DISCUSSIONS The records of discussions between Ribbentrop and Tuka were not found. But it is possible to gauge their nature and content from numerous memoranda passed between Ribbentrop and his advisers shortly before Tuka's visit. Some of these memoranda are very sketchy, others go into great details. They deal with subjects which Tuka outlined to Consul-General Wuester (on November 11, 1940) as the topics he would like to discuss perisonally with Ribbentrop on the occasion of his State visit. And even if the discussions did not follow the proposed course exactly, they could not have departed far from it. These memoranda are thus of interest to every student of Slovak affairs. They certainly cast some light on the Slovak scene as it was set in November, 1940, and provide a �10 SLOVAKIA guileless cross-section of the Slovak political, economic, and cultural life. The problems were grouped under four headings and each division had further subsections. The same pattern will be followed in this study. The subject matter for discussion was to proceed along the following lines: A. Political Problems. 1. Internal Policy: Internally Slovakia was in the middle of a political crisis and Woermann and Killinger briefed Ribbentrop about its extent. They informed him that Tuka and Mach were working on the establishment of the Nazi system in Slovakia ("nazionalsozialistische Staatsfuehrung"), in the spirit of the Salzburg conversations. In this attempt they had to wage a struggle against the opposing forces centered around President Tiso. Tiso',s camp consisted of in Killinger's terminology - clericals, former :Durcansky hangers-on and four members of the government. Tuka demanded dismissal of these ministers, but Tiso ref used to comply with his request. Tuka then decided to fight it out with Tiso, and, according to Killinger, there were forces at work striving for a complete elimination of Tiso from the Slovak political life ( eine vollige Auschaltung Tisos aus dem politischen Leben"). In discussing this question with Tuka, Ribbentrop was advised to recommend that Tuka should apply his measures in such a way as not to affect the position of President Tiso. There was no objection to the eventual removal of the uncooperative ministers, but as far as Tiso was concerned, his removal would only deteriorate and not improve the internal situation in Slovakia. "Tiso" - runs Woermann's recommendation to Ribbentrop - "as Hlinka's successor and the co-founder of the Slovak State, is a very popular personality in Slovakia" ("eine durchhaus volkstuemliche Personlichkeit"), and, therefore, the elimination of the clerical influence should be carried out carefully and possibly by evolutionary means. The conversion of Slovakia into a Christian state according to Schusch- �SLOVAKIA 11 nigg's model ("Staendestatt'), as contemplated by Tiso and his friends, could be prevented even without the removal of Tiso. On the other hand Tuka should be commended for his fight for the Nazi reorientation of Slovakia. 2. Territorial demands: 'rhe second problem Tuka wanted to discuss was the territorial cession of the eastern part of the Protektorat to Slovakia (the region of Moravske Slovacko). In this respect several memoranda were passed to the German Foreign Ministry outlying the reason and justification of this demand. But the Germans were not happy about the proposition. Ribbentrop was advised to tell Tuka that the idea of the frontier rectification in favor of Slovakia could not be considered ("keine Folge gegeben werden koenne" ). 3. Slovak-Hungarian Relations: The Slovak-Hungarian relations were by far the most important point of the discussions. The Vienna Award by which Slovakia was forced to cede part of her territories to Hungary - was a source of constant Slovak grievances and was genuinely detested by all Slovaks, whether they were pro-Nazi, anti-Nazi, or just sitting on the fence. Tuka was convinced that the Salzburg conversations meant a step towards a more acceptable solution. At Salzburg (July 1940) Tiso wrenched from Ribbentrop a somewhat vague and non-committal promise that the question of the frontier rectification between Slovakia and Hungary though unsuitable for settlement at that time - cou~d be considered later ("dass in Augenblick nicht an die Regelung dieser Frage zu denken sei, dass vielleicht spaeter einmal der Augenblick kommen duerfe"). On the basis of this promise the Slovak Foreign Ministry forwarded to Berlin a number of Aide-Memoires, maps and statistical material and wanted them to be examined by the Auslandsinstitut in Stuttgart. Tuka was to ask Ribbentrop for the official German attitude towards these Slovak requests. It was proposed to tell Tuka that the moment for the settlement of the disputed boundary issue was still inap- �12 SLOVAKIA propriate ("Es waere unzeitmaessig diese slowakische Ansprueche jetzt geltent zu machen"). With regard to the examination of the Slovak documentary material by the Auslandsinstitut in Stutgart - since the Germans did not want the Hungarians to get wind that something was going on - it was suggested that this request should be declined. Tuka should be told that the German Foreign Ministry would examine the pertinent Slovak material, but it did not think it expedient to pass such things on to the Auslandsinstitut. 4. Ruthene Question: Then there was the question of the Ruthene minority. This group, about 50,000 strong, was subjected to intense communistic propaganda inciting it to demand the same privileges as those granted to the German ethnic group. The solution of this question required a precarious balance in counteracting the communist propaganda without arousing the suspicions of being hostile towards the USSR which at that time was being courted by the Germans into joining the Tripartite Pact. Tuka was to be told that the Slovak Government would have to try to win the sympathies of the Ruthenes even if it involved the offer of a guarantee of cultural autonomy. But the communist intrigues would have to be suppressed just the same ("Kommunistische Umtriebe unter ihnen waeren zu unterdruecken") . 5. Attitude towards the Croats: It was expected that Tuka, who had just learned about the German attitude towards the Croats, would make an offer to influence the Croats through Slovak propaganda. It was suggested that his declaration should be merely noted and any discussion of his proposal should be declined. B. Economic Problems: The economic topics for the discussions are of equal importance. In spite, or, perhaps because of the war, the Slovak economy was developing very favorably. The Ger- �SLOVAKIA 13 mans were taking 75 per cent of Slovak exports and, contrary to the general belief, were providing valuable expert and material assistance. Nevertheless, there were points of friction even in this sphere, especially with regard to the direction in which the development should proceed. The Germans pressed for projects like the improved facilities of the Bratislava Danube harbor, raising of the level of agricultural economy, erection of family houses for workers, etc., whereas the Slovaks were for industrial development, new factories, improved local communications, etc. At the time of Tuka's visit the Slovak grievances concerned the price increases, tourist trade, and employment of Czech skilled workers. 1. Price Question: The Slovak government was afraid that the price increases might create unwanted social reactions which, in turn, could be exploited by the communists. But the Germans maintained that, since rising prices were a general phenomenon in all Southeast Europe, and also in the Protektorat whose economy was closely bound with Slovakia's, it was desirable for them to go up in Slovakia as well. It was proposed to point out to Tuka that the price increases would, in the long run, increase Slovakia's national income through expansion in exports to Germany and through the wage transfer of the 80,000 Slovak laborers working there. The Germans would try to mitigate the effect of price increases by such measures, for example, as lowering the prices of goods imported from the Protektorat. Likewise - in spite of the recent increases in the price of coal - the export prices of German coal delivered to Slovakia were not increased, but were retained at the level fixed in April, 1940, and would stay there. 2. Tourist Trade: in the mater of the Slovak complaint concerning the rapid decrease in the tourist trade, it was to be stated that there was not much the Germans could do about it. It was, however, to be expected that after the war Slovakia would enjoy an unprecedented tourist activity. �14 SLOVAKIA 3. Employment of Czech Workers: For Tuka this represented another thorny problem. There were still many Czechs working in industrial establishments in Slovakia, mainly as skilled workers. Tuka pressed for their removal, since he saw in them a constant element of unrest ("Unruheherde"). The Germans promised to cooperate, saying that some Czechs had already been transferred. RilJbentrop, however, would have to advise Tuka that those Czechs working in the armament industry could be removed only when satisfactory replacements by skilled Slovak workers had been found. C. Resettlement Problems: 1. Czechs in Slovakia: Tuka strove to rid Slovakia of all Czechs (approximat ely 25,000 in number), as well as t o bring bac 1c to Slovakia all Slovaks living in the Protektorat. Since the negotiations ("Auseinandersetzungverhandlungen") with the Germans were ominously dragging on, Tuka wanted to ask Ribbentrop about the German view on the matter. Ribbentrop was advised to instruct Tuka that the proposal would be examined in due time, but, on the other hand, not to give any prospect for fulfillment of this wish ("Keine Aussicht auf Erfuellung des Wuensches za machen" ). 2. Slovaks in the German POW Camps: After the military collapse of France, several unfortunate Slovaks found themselves as POWs in German captivity. In most cases they were Slovak workers from Paris and from the Northern French coalfields who were mobilized into "Czecho-Slovak" army units to fight for the restoration of the defunct Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Slovak Foreign Ministry had been demanding their release since the end of the Franco-German hostilities, but the German authorities were not very quick in answering. Tuka was to be assured that their release was pending. 3. Slovaks in France: With equal commendable zeal the Slovak Government �SLOVAKIA 15 tried to obtain the release of all Slovaks in the French Army Service, in both occupied and unoccupied France, and pleaded for the repatriation of those who desired it. Tuka was to be told that the Germans looked upon the request with understanding and would give it their support. D. Cultural and Other Problems: In the cultural field there was complete satisfaction on both sides. The Slovak-German cultural relations were very friendly and prepartions for the signing of a Cultural Agreement ("Kultur-Abkomm en") were on the way. Similarly there were no complaints about the treatment of the German ethnic group in Slovakia. IV CONCLUSION Looking at the event after almost 20 years' interval, when one has the benefit of seeing what was back of the German mind, and when one knows all the answers to what were then the annoying questions of the day, it is only too easy to be critical, cynical, or even malicious. Was Tuka really the villain of the drama? Was he really responsible for all subsequent Slovak misfortunes? Was his signature on the Protocol the death-warrant of the Slovak State as some of his critics want us to believe? Or, was he just an innocent victim of circumstances from which there was no way out? Did he merely carry out the inevitable and inescapable steps to save the nation from a much worse disaster, as his admirers try to convince us? Unfortunately there is no straightforward answer to either of these views. Tuka's personality was of a far more complex nature than to be an object of a clear-cut judgment. It would be futile and out of place to argue about this. However, to make the picture as complete as possible, it seems only just to add the following notes by way of a postscript. It is undeniable now, as it was conclusive then, that. the Tripartite Pact was directed against the USA (12) ,, where, as it happened, lived almost a third of the Slovak �16 SLOVAKIA nation. And there is no doubt about Tuka's willingness to have Slovakia bound to Germany lock, stock, and barrel. But the personal ambition of a sick man was not the only why and wherefore behind Tuka's move. There were also political motives and these were by no means insignificant: to gain for Slovakia an honorable place in the New Europe - which at that time was not just a remote phantasy; to ward off the Hungarian danger - as menacing and ubiquitous as ever. It is not always realized that the fear of being swallowed by Hungary had a hand not only at the birth of the Slovak State, but was present in the background of practically every action of subsequent Slovak foreign policy. The political and military situation - at the time of Slovakia's accession to the Pact - strongly favored the German position. Germany was the undisputed master of Europe, and with the USSR she had a Treaty of NonAggression. The USA was keeping out of the war and was likely to stay out. For Hitler and his gang "the war was already won." This thought, however, was not shared by all. There were many who did concede (though they have less courage to admit it now) that the war might finish in a draw Such a situation would have curbed Hitler's ambitions for world domination, but it would leave the nations of Central Europe at his mercy. And it is better to be left at the mercy of a benign than an irate master. Then the question arises as to what would have happened if Tuka "per impossiblile" would have chosen to resist German prompting and decided not to join the bloc. The problem may be highly academic, but the answer to it is less so. In fact, an eloquent reply was provided about three months after Slovakia's accession to the Pact by the adherence of Bulgaria. To the Western way of thinking, Bulgaria was the best of the bad satellites of Hitler. She saved most of her Jewish population from extermination, she did not declare war on the USSR (though the USSR found it expedient to declare war on her). In the face of German pressure she yielded the bare minimum - and this included the accession to the Pact. It is hardly to be expected that Slovak opposition could have been more ef- �SLOVAKIA 17 fective. With no friends and no guarantees in the West, Slovakia could not behave the way Yugoslavia did. REFERENCES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. W. Shirer: A Berlin Diary, Hamilton, London, 1941,. For the text of the Tripartite Pact see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. V, pp. 355-6, or Int. Affairs, 193946, Vol. III, OUP, 1954, pp. 81-82. C. A. Macartney: October Fifteenth, EdinJburgh Univ. Press, 1956, Vol. I, p. 439. The Hrungarians, went to Vienna, the Rumaniallls and Slovaks to Berlin. Other countries followed suit: Spain secretly in November 1940; Bulgaria on March 1, 1941; Yugoslavia on March 25, 194'1; Croatia, on June 115, 1941'. The USSR nearly joined the Pact, too (See Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 248--9, 258-9). Ciano's Diary 1939-43, Heinemann, London, 1947. Ent ry ·of November 20, 11)40: " ... I do not attach much importance to the adherence of these states (Hungary, Rumania and Slovakia) which are vassais of Germany, or almost so. In £act they weaken the Tripartite Agreement itseltf, and s,eem to be useless bits of ersatz diplomacy. " Auswartiges Amt, Buero St. Sekretaer, Besuch Tuka, 610/ 248742-818. 8. For the Delegation's "Who's Who" see Alppendix II. 9. "He (Antonescu) had bairely left Berlin . .. when Dr. Tuka, the Slovak Prime Minister, arrived to sign his counrtry's adhesion to the Pact. The document was ready and his signature was prompt" - Dipl. correspond,e nt of the London "Times". In fact, the s igning took place less than two and ·a halif hours after Tukas' arrival. 1-0. For the text of the Brotocol see Alppendix I. 11. Joseph Lettrich: History of Modern Slovakia, Atlantic Press, London, 1956, p. 167. 12. Ar.ticle 3 of the Pact runs: (The three Contracti!Ilg Parties) "further undertake to assist one another with all political, econemic and military means, if one of them is attacked by a Poweir at present not involved in the European war or in the Chiinese..Jarpanese conflict." This could have meant only the USA or the USSR. But Article 5 stated that the iterms of the Pact did not "in any way aifilieot the politica'l strutus which exists between each of the three Contraicting Parties and Soviet Russiia." APPENDIX I The Protocol of Slovakia's Accession to the Tripartite Pact The Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, on the one hand, and the Government of Slovakia, on the other hand, represented by the signa,to:ries to the documenrt, declare as follows: 1. Slovakia joins the Tripartite Pact sig.n ed at Berlin on September 27, 1940. 2. As far as the joint technical commissions provided under Article 4 of the Tripartite Pact concern matters affecting Slovak �18 SLOVAKIA interests, Slovakia. will be represented ait the discussions of these committees. 3. The text o;f the Tr.iipartite Pact is atltached to the present Protocol, which is drawn up in the German, Italian, Japanese, and Slovak languages, each text to ha1Ve the validity of the original. The Protocol comes into effect on the da~ of signature . .AIPPENDIX II The Slovak Delegation - Who Was Who: Dr. Vojtech Tuka - Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign A1ff.airs. Born on July 4, 1880, at P.i-argy, Tuka was, before 1918, a Professor of Internationa,l Law at the then Hungarian University at Bratislava. After the first World Wa r he played a leading role in the Slovak autonomist movement of the Hlinka Party. Accused of treason by the Czech Brague, he wa•s involved in the notorious "Tuka Trial." On flimsy and rigged evid'ence he was found guiity of espiona•ge and p:l,,Oltting a,ga,inst the Repuiblic and sentenced to 15 years in ja11. After havi,ng been imprisoned at Pankrac in Prague for more than seven years, sick and nearly blind, he was pardoned by Presidental amnesty, and the remainder of his sentence he was to spend in custody at Plzen. Released in October, 1938, he pr-0mptly resumed his political activity. In the first Slovak independent goviermnent ~March 1J939) he became the deputy Prime Minister and laiter, after the retirement of Sidor. ,also the acting Minfater of Interior. On the election ·of Dr. Joseph Tiso as Presiident o:f Slovakia, Tuka became Brime Minister. Mter the Sal2Jburg Conference (July 1940) Tuka not only retained his post, but a'lso took over the Foreign Ministry. Tuka was executed by the Prague Government in Bratislava August 20, 1946. Slovak Minister in Berlin. A high school Matul Cernak teacher by profession, Cernak had a long record of continuous activity in the ranks of the Hlinka Party. In Septem,ber, 1<938, he was appointed a minister in the Czecho-Slovak Government. He immediately demanded autonomy for Slovakia. This not granted, he resigned in protest. In the first Sloviak autonomous governmenit he was given the post of the Ministry of Educaiti001 (October 11938) and in addition was entrusted with the lead,ership of the Youth Organization (Hlinka's Youth). Being openly for a complete secession, he was imprisoned by the Czechs (March 1939) and treated raither brutaUy. After the Declaration of Slovak Independence he was sent to Germany as the Slovak diplomatic representative. He was killed by a bomb sent through the mail in Munich, July 5, 1955. Karo• Murgal - Ohief of the Propaganda Bureau. A joumaHsit, Murga§ came into prominence in the hectic days of October 1938 Ma!l"Ch 1939. After the Salzburg Oond'eroo.ce· he was made the Chie!f of the Propaganda Bureau as the only suifable ohoice (h,e was the on1y person of irutelligence and aibility ready to toiw the German line). Ing. Jozef Mracna - Ohief of the Political Division of the Slovak Foreign Ministry. Mraona was born on February 21, 1900. He was a career diplomat of the Czooho..Slovak diplomatic service. At the time of the declaration of Slovak independence (March 1939) he was the Cze:cho..Slovak Consul in New York, but immediately offered his services to the Slovak State. Gifted, honest and exiperieru:ed, he was 1 �SLOVAKIA 19 the most caiplllble and authoritative personality in the Slovak Foreig111 Ministry, but later he became rather passive. He enjoyed Tuka's full confidence and in return was his loyal, but not uncritica'l, co-worker. ,or. Raduz Radlinsky - Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol at the Slovak Foreign Miinistry. Former employee of the Czecho-61ovak Foreign Ministry, where he held a minor position in the Protocol. On the basis of this activity he was entrusted with the position of Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol in Bratislava. '11he Germans constantly objected to his position. Lieutenant-Colonel ~tefan Tata.rko Military Aittache at the Slovak Legaition in Berlin. A professional soldier of some ability, Tatarko created practically out of nothing the Sfovak Military Secret Service. Later he was apointed military -atta:che to Berlin. Ait one time he was not trusted by the Germans because of his in:cautiously expressed d'oulbts about final German vietory. But he must have corrected himself, because later he was promoted to the Chief of Cabinet at the Slovak Ministry of defense. Jan Belnay - Commercial Atta:che at the Slovak Legation in Berlin. He was born on Oct-Ober 23, 1900. Mosit of his study-years (in Chemistry) were spent in Germany, the remainder in Prague. He worked at the Czecho-Slovak Economic Academy, a111d Ia1ter at the Czecho-Slovak EX1pOrt Institute. In MaTCh, 11939, he joined the staff of the Slovak Foreign Ministry and s·oon was appointed a commercial attaohe to Berlin. His professional eicperien:ce and fluent knowledge of German served him in good stead and in 1941 he was promoted to the position of Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol. Jan Farkal - Tuka's Adjutant . .A,s a comparnion in T~a's tribulations (he figured in the "Tuka Trial") Fark'as claimed also a share in Tuka's honors. He devoutly followed Tuka's footsteps and parroted his pronoun:cements aholllt the introduction of Nazism into Slovakia, but was not particularly giiited to make a higher grade. A,t one stage Tuka insisted on his appointment as a Minister of Finance, but was rebuff.ed. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Since, in the new situation, it was impossilble to coHa-borate oifficiaHy with the Soviet Union, we . . . d~d nothing which might prejudike or ipre.vent the removal of co-operation at the earliest posstble moment; I need 0I11ly recall how strongly our attitude contrasted with that of many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in that period, there was no interruption of the personal contacts and exchange of information between ourse1ves rund important Soviet representatives in London, Paris, Washington and elsewhere." - Dr. Hubert Ripka, EAST AND WEST, London. 1944. � 6 SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA'S ACCESSION TO THE TRIPARTITE PACT Fnmcis Vnuk On September 27, 1940, at the New Chancellery in Berlin, the German-Italian-Japanese Tripartite Pact was signed. "The ceremony of signing" - noted Shirer "was carried through with typical Axis talent for the theatrical." (1) The German and satellite press greeted the occasion as an event of far-reaching importance, a "Magna Charta" of the New Order, which was going to bring about exactly what had been promised in the preamble to the Pact, namely, "world peace" . . . and "prosperity and welfare of the peoples" in Europe and Greater East Asia(2). After the ceremonial signing, Hitler entered the hall to honor the occasion by his presence. Then followed the adulatory speeches of Ribbentrop, Ciano, and Kurusu. In the course of his speech Ribbentrop stated: "The purpose of the Pact is, a:bove an things, to help restore peace to the world as quickly as possible. Therefore, any otherstate, which wishes to adhere to this bloc with the intention of contributing to the restoration of peaceful conditions, will be sincerely and gratefully made welcome and will participate in the economic and political reorganization" (3) In response to this rather blunt hint, the nations of Central Europe, tied to Germany by geopolitical conditions, duly applied for admittance. Hungary was the first in the field, the others following her more or less reluctantly. It was clear to the 'Slovaks and Rumanians that they could not afford to stand aside, even if they wished. They had to rank at least as high in Hitler's esteem as Hungary which still hrad unfulfilled territorial claims against them. And thus towards the end of November, 1940, Hungarian, Rumanian, and Slovak delegations in close succession went to Vienna or Berlin ( 4) to sign the Protocol of adherence to the Tripartitie Pact. Hungary did so on the 20th, Rumania on the 22nd, and Slovakia on the 24th of November, 1940(5). Slovakia's accession to the Tripartite Pact followed the proclamation of the "spiritual adherence" a few weeks �SLOVAKIA 7 previously. Though Ciano sneered at the event as "a useless bit of ersatz diplomacy" (6) , the Germans made it into a spectacular State visit which was arranged for Tuka and his entourage. State visits had a strange fascination for Turoa. Nothing appealed to him more than to be a centre of attention, surrounded by high officials, and facing the flashlights of official photographers and reporters. He did not -conceal his disappointment when the Germans advised him against his proposed visit to Rumania, or when the Italians asked him to postpone his offered visit of Italy till "after the war." The signing of the Protocol of Accession enabled him to taste the cherished moments of ceremonial courtesies and at the same time to demonstrate his devotion to Germany. Apart from these rather personal considerations, there were also quite a few important political, economic, and cultural problems to be discussed, new poUcies outlined, and achievements and failures reported. SIGNATURES The German preparations for Tuka's State visit were very detailed and thorough. Tuka was to be received with all the honors and courtesies due to the head of a friendly government. In the captured documents of the former German Foreign Ministry, there is a special file (7) dealing exclusively with various aspects of the visit and this is the principal source of all relevant information. The Slov,ak delegation(8), which consisted of Tuka, Murgas, Mracna, Radlinsky and Farkas, left Bratislava by auto on the afternoon of November 23, 1940. They crossed the bridge to Petrfalka and proceeded to Vienna where ,a special train was awaiting them. The reception there was very austere. There were no guards of honor to inspect, no speeches of welcome; just one representative of the Protocol to accompany them on their night journey to Berlin. '.Dhe train left West Bahnhof at 7:32 P. M. and took them through Linz, Passau, Regensburg, Hof, and Leipzig to the Anhalter Bahnhof, Berlin, where they arrived on Sunday morning at 10 :40 A. M. - just 20 minutes after the Rumanian delegation, its mission accomplished, left Berlin on its return journey (9). �8 SLOVAKIA At the Anhalter Bahnhof everything was pompous, well-organized, and impressive. Welcoming personalities were grouped in four parties. The first party, headed by the Slovak charge d'affaires, consisted of foreign diploma:ts ·and the heads of missions in Berlin. Specially invited German representatives of the Party and the Army were in the second, the members of the Slovak Legation in the third, and the personnel of the German Foreign Ministry in the fourth group. Tuka, as he alighted from his salon-car, was welcomed by Ribbentrop and Matthew Cernak, and introduced by them to the other members of the welcoming parties on the platform. Then followed the inspection of the Guard of Honor. Tuka, in the uniform of the Hlinka Guards and accompanied by Ribbentrop, was trying his unsoldierly best to make his gait and mien look soldier-like. From the station the procession of cars went to Schloss Bellevue which was going to be Tuka's residence during his two-day stay in Berlin. There he was welcomed by Meissner who acted as master of the house (Hausherr). At 11 :30 Tuka paid a visit to Ribbentrop at the latter's office, 73 Wilhelmstrasse, where they spent about an hour in discussion. The great moment came at 1:00 P. M. In the Grand Reception Hall of the New Chancellery stood a huge massive signature table. The representatives of the Press had already taken their places: the foreign correspondents at the window-side, the Germans at the door. At 12:58 P. M., the great door opened and an impressive procession entered. It was led by the Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol. He was followed by Tuka and Ribbentrop, the Japanese Ambassador, the Italian Ambassador and Charge d'Affaires, the Hungarian and Rumanian Ministers, State Secretary Weizsaecker, and State Under-Secretary Gaus. Ribbentrop sat at the center of the table, Tuka at his right and, next to him, the Italian Ambassador and the Rumanian Minister. At Ribbentrop's left were seated the Japanese Ambassador and the Hungarian Minister. Everything went without a hitch like a well-rehearsed drama. The Protocol of Accession (10) was signed amidst �SLOVAKIA 9 the flashes of light and rustle of reporter's notebooks, short speeches were solemnly read out and courteous applause resounded in the spacious hall. In the afternoon Ribbentrop gave a reception at the Hotel Adlon for the Slovak Delegation and the members of the Slovak Legation in Berlin. In the morning of the next day (Monday, November 25) Tuka took part in the wreath-laying ceremony at the Ehrenmahl (The War Memorial at the famous Unter den Linden). Another reception was given by Cernak in the afternoon at the Hotel Esplanade. At 5:30 P. M. Tuka had his great and memorable moment. He was taken to the Work Room of the New Chancellery where he was received by Hitler. That was the climax of Tuka's State visit. Shortly before 7 P. M., the Slovak Delegation was again on the Anhalter Bahnhof. With the German and foreign guests to bid them farewell, guards of honor to inspect, hands to shake or raise in Nazi salute, the parting ceremony was as imposing as the welcoming one. At 7:05 P. M., the special train with the Slovak Delegation left Berlin on its return journey to Vienna, where they arrived on November 26, at 10:54 A. M. The Slovak Parliament gave its approval to the Protocol of Accession to the Tripartite Pact on February 6, 1941(11). DISCUSSIONS The records of discussions between Ribbentrop and Tuka were not found. But it is possible to gauge their nature and content from numerous memoranda passed between Ribbentrop and his advisers shortly before Tuka's visit. Some of these memoranda are very sketchy, others go into great details. They deal with subjects which Tuka outlined to Consul-General Wuester (on November 11, 1940) as the topics he would like to discuss perisonally with Ribbentrop on the occasion of his State visit. And even if the discussions did not follow the proposed course exactly, they could not have departed far from it. These memoranda are thus of interest to every student of Slovak affairs. They certainly cast some light on the Slovak scene as it was set in November, 1940, and provide a �10 SLOVAKIA guileless cross-section of the Slovak political, economic, and cultural life. The problems were grouped under four headings and each division had further subsections. The same pattern will be followed in this study. The subject matter for discussion was to proceed along the following lines: A. Political Problems. 1. Internal Policy: Internally Slovakia was in the middle of a political crisis and Woermann and Killinger briefed Ribbentrop about its extent. They informed him that Tuka and Mach were working on the establishment of the Nazi system in Slovakia ("nazionalsozialistische Staatsfuehrung"), in the spirit of the Salzburg conversations. In this attempt they had to wage a struggle against the opposing forces centered around President Tiso. Tiso',s camp consisted of in Killinger's terminology - clericals, former :Durcansky hangers-on and four members of the government. Tuka demanded dismissal of these ministers, but Tiso ref used to comply with his request. Tuka then decided to fight it out with Tiso, and, according to Killinger, there were forces at work striving for a complete elimination of Tiso from the Slovak political life ( eine vollige Auschaltung Tisos aus dem politischen Leben"). In discussing this question with Tuka, Ribbentrop was advised to recommend that Tuka should apply his measures in such a way as not to affect the position of President Tiso. There was no objection to the eventual removal of the uncooperative ministers, but as far as Tiso was concerned, his removal would only deteriorate and not improve the internal situation in Slovakia. "Tiso" - runs Woermann's recommendation to Ribbentrop - "as Hlinka's successor and the co-founder of the Slovak State, is a very popular personality in Slovakia" ("eine durchhaus volkstuemliche Personlichkeit"), and, therefore, the elimination of the clerical influence should be carried out carefully and possibly by evolutionary means. The conversion of Slovakia into a Christian state according to Schusch- �SLOVAKIA 11 nigg's model ("Staendestatt'), as contemplated by Tiso and his friends, could be prevented even without the removal of Tiso. On the other hand Tuka should be commended for his fight for the Nazi reorientation of Slovakia. 2. Territorial demands: 'rhe second problem Tuka wanted to discuss was the territorial cession of the eastern part of the Protektorat to Slovakia (the region of Moravske Slovacko). In this respect several memoranda were passed to the German Foreign Ministry outlying the reason and justification of this demand. But the Germans were not happy about the proposition. Ribbentrop was advised to tell Tuka that the idea of the frontier rectification in favor of Slovakia could not be considered ("keine Folge gegeben werden koenne" ). 3. Slovak-Hungarian Relations: The Slovak-Hungarian relations were by far the most important point of the discussions. The Vienna Award by which Slovakia was forced to cede part of her territories to Hungary - was a source of constant Slovak grievances and was genuinely detested by all Slovaks, whether they were pro-Nazi, anti-Nazi, or just sitting on the fence. Tuka was convinced that the Salzburg conversations meant a step towards a more acceptable solution. At Salzburg (July 1940) Tiso wrenched from Ribbentrop a somewhat vague and non-committal promise that the question of the frontier rectification between Slovakia and Hungary though unsuitable for settlement at that time - cou~d be considered later ("dass in Augenblick nicht an die Regelung dieser Frage zu denken sei, dass vielleicht spaeter einmal der Augenblick kommen duerfe"). On the basis of this promise the Slovak Foreign Ministry forwarded to Berlin a number of Aide-Memoires, maps and statistical material and wanted them to be examined by the Auslandsinstitut in Stuttgart. Tuka was to ask Ribbentrop for the official German attitude towards these Slovak requests. It was proposed to tell Tuka that the moment for the settlement of the disputed boundary issue was still inap- �12 SLOVAKIA propriate ("Es waere unzeitmaessig diese slowakische Ansprueche jetzt geltent zu machen"). With regard to the examination of the Slovak documentary material by the Auslandsinstitut in Stutgart - since the Germans did not want the Hungarians to get wind that something was going on - it was suggested that this request should be declined. Tuka should be told that the German Foreign Ministry would examine the pertinent Slovak material, but it did not think it expedient to pass such things on to the Auslandsinstitut. 4. Ruthene Question: Then there was the question of the Ruthene minority. This group, about 50,000 strong, was subjected to intense communistic propaganda inciting it to demand the same privileges as those granted to the German ethnic group. The solution of this question required a precarious balance in counteracting the communist propaganda without arousing the suspicions of being hostile towards the USSR which at that time was being courted by the Germans into joining the Tripartite Pact. Tuka was to be told that the Slovak Government would have to try to win the sympathies of the Ruthenes even if it involved the offer of a guarantee of cultural autonomy. But the communist intrigues would have to be suppressed just the same ("Kommunistische Umtriebe unter ihnen waeren zu unterdruecken") . 5. Attitude towards the Croats: It was expected that Tuka, who had just learned about the German attitude towards the Croats, would make an offer to influence the Croats through Slovak propaganda. It was suggested that his declaration should be merely noted and any discussion of his proposal should be declined. B. Economic Problems: The economic topics for the discussions are of equal importance. In spite, or, perhaps because of the war, the Slovak economy was developing very favorably. The Ger- �SLOVAKIA 13 mans were taking 75 per cent of Slovak exports and, contrary to the general belief, were providing valuable expert and material assistance. Nevertheless, there were points of friction even in this sphere, especially with regard to the direction in which the development should proceed. The Germans pressed for projects like the improved facilities of the Bratislava Danube harbor, raising of the level of agricultural economy, erection of family houses for workers, etc., whereas the Slovaks were for industrial development, new factories, improved local communications, etc. At the time of Tuka's visit the Slovak grievances concerned the price increases, tourist trade, and employment of Czech skilled workers. 1. Price Question: The Slovak government was afraid that the price increases might create unwanted social reactions which, in turn, could be exploited by the communists. But the Germans maintained that, since rising prices were a general phenomenon in all Southeast Europe, and also in the Protektorat whose economy was closely bound with Slovakia's, it was desirable for them to go up in Slovakia as well. It was proposed to point out to Tuka that the price increases would, in the long run, increase Slovakia's national income through expansion in exports to Germany and through the wage transfer of the 80,000 Slovak laborers working there. The Germans would try to mitigate the effect of price increases by such measures, for example, as lowering the prices of goods imported from the Protektorat. Likewise - in spite of the recent increases in the price of coal - the export prices of German coal delivered to Slovakia were not increased, but were retained at the level fixed in April, 1940, and would stay there. 2. Tourist Trade: in the mater of the Slovak complaint concerning the rapid decrease in the tourist trade, it was to be stated that there was not much the Germans could do about it. It was, however, to be expected that after the war Slovakia would enjoy an unprecedented tourist activity. �14 SLOVAKIA 3. Employment of Czech Workers: For Tuka this represented another thorny problem. There were still many Czechs working in industrial establishments in Slovakia, mainly as skilled workers. Tuka pressed for their removal, since he saw in them a constant element of unrest ("Unruheherde"). The Germans promised to cooperate, saying that some Czechs had already been transferred. RilJbentrop, however, would have to advise Tuka that those Czechs working in the armament industry could be removed only when satisfactory replacements by skilled Slovak workers had been found. C. Resettlement Problems: 1. Czechs in Slovakia: Tuka strove to rid Slovakia of all Czechs (approximat ely 25,000 in number), as well as t o bring bac 1c to Slovakia all Slovaks living in the Protektorat. Since the negotiations ("Auseinandersetzungverhandlungen") with the Germans were ominously dragging on, Tuka wanted to ask Ribbentrop about the German view on the matter. Ribbentrop was advised to instruct Tuka that the proposal would be examined in due time, but, on the other hand, not to give any prospect for fulfillment of this wish ("Keine Aussicht auf Erfuellung des Wuensches za machen" ). 2. Slovaks in the German POW Camps: After the military collapse of France, several unfortunate Slovaks found themselves as POWs in German captivity. In most cases they were Slovak workers from Paris and from the Northern French coalfields who were mobilized into "Czecho-Slovak" army units to fight for the restoration of the defunct Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Slovak Foreign Ministry had been demanding their release since the end of the Franco-German hostilities, but the German authorities were not very quick in answering. Tuka was to be assured that their release was pending. 3. Slovaks in France: With equal commendable zeal the Slovak Government �SLOVAKIA 15 tried to obtain the release of all Slovaks in the French Army Service, in both occupied and unoccupied France, and pleaded for the repatriation of those who desired it. Tuka was to be told that the Germans looked upon the request with understanding and would give it their support. D. Cultural and Other Problems: In the cultural field there was complete satisfaction on both sides. The Slovak-German cultural relations were very friendly and prepartions for the signing of a Cultural Agreement ("Kultur-Abkomm en") were on the way. Similarly there were no complaints about the treatment of the German ethnic group in Slovakia. IV CONCLUSION Looking at the event after almost 20 years' interval, when one has the benefit of seeing what was back of the German mind, and when one knows all the answers to what were then the annoying questions of the day, it is only too easy to be critical, cynical, or even malicious. Was Tuka really the villain of the drama? Was he really responsible for all subsequent Slovak misfortunes? Was his signature on the Protocol the death-warrant of the Slovak State as some of his critics want us to believe? Or, was he just an innocent victim of circumstances from which there was no way out? Did he merely carry out the inevitable and inescapable steps to save the nation from a much worse disaster, as his admirers try to convince us? Unfortunately there is no straightforward answer to either of these views. Tuka's personality was of a far more complex nature than to be an object of a clear-cut judgment. It would be futile and out of place to argue about this. However, to make the picture as complete as possible, it seems only just to add the following notes by way of a postscript. It is undeniable now, as it was conclusive then, that. the Tripartite Pact was directed against the USA (12) ,, where, as it happened, lived almost a third of the Slovak �16 SLOVAKIA nation. And there is no doubt about Tuka's willingness to have Slovakia bound to Germany lock, stock, and barrel. But the personal ambition of a sick man was not the only why and wherefore behind Tuka's move. There were also political motives and these were by no means insignificant: to gain for Slovakia an honorable place in the New Europe - which at that time was not just a remote phantasy; to ward off the Hungarian danger - as menacing and ubiquitous as ever. It is not always realized that the fear of being swallowed by Hungary had a hand not only at the birth of the Slovak State, but was present in the background of practically every action of subsequent Slovak foreign policy. The political and military situation - at the time of Slovakia's accession to the Pact - strongly favored the German position. Germany was the undisputed master of Europe, and with the USSR she had a Treaty of NonAggression. The USA was keeping out of the war and was likely to stay out. For Hitler and his gang "the war was already won." This thought, however, was not shared by all. There were many who did concede (though they have less courage to admit it now) that the war might finish in a draw Such a situation would have curbed Hitler's ambitions for world domination, but it would leave the nations of Central Europe at his mercy. And it is better to be left at the mercy of a benign than an irate master. Then the question arises as to what would have happened if Tuka "per impossiblile" would have chosen to resist German prompting and decided not to join the bloc. The problem may be highly academic, but the answer to it is less so. In fact, an eloquent reply was provided about three months after Slovakia's accession to the Pact by the adherence of Bulgaria. To the Western way of thinking, Bulgaria was the best of the bad satellites of Hitler. She saved most of her Jewish population from extermination, she did not declare war on the USSR (though the USSR found it expedient to declare war on her). In the face of German pressure she yielded the bare minimum - and this included the accession to the Pact. It is hardly to be expected that Slovak opposition could have been more ef- �SLOVAKIA 17 fective. With no friends and no guarantees in the West, Slovakia could not behave the way Yugoslavia did. REFERENCES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. W. Shirer: A Berlin Diary, Hamilton, London, 1941,. For the text of the Tripartite Pact see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. V, pp. 355-6, or Int. Affairs, 193946, Vol. III, OUP, 1954, pp. 81-82. C. A. Macartney: October Fifteenth, EdinJburgh Univ. Press, 1956, Vol. I, p. 439. The Hrungarians, went to Vienna, the Rumaniallls and Slovaks to Berlin. Other countries followed suit: Spain secretly in November 1940; Bulgaria on March 1, 1941; Yugoslavia on March 25, 194'1; Croatia, on June 115, 1941'. The USSR nearly joined the Pact, too (See Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 248--9, 258-9). Ciano's Diary 1939-43, Heinemann, London, 1947. Ent ry ·of November 20, 11)40: " ... I do not attach much importance to the adherence of these states (Hungary, Rumania and Slovakia) which are vassais of Germany, or almost so. In £act they weaken the Tripartite Agreement itseltf, and s,eem to be useless bits of ersatz diplomacy. " Auswartiges Amt, Buero St. Sekretaer, Besuch Tuka, 610/ 248742-818. 8. For the Delegation's "Who's Who" see Alppendix II. 9. "He (Antonescu) had bairely left Berlin . .. when Dr. Tuka, the Slovak Prime Minister, arrived to sign his counrtry's adhesion to the Pact. The document was ready and his signature was prompt" - Dipl. correspond,e nt of the London "Times". In fact, the s igning took place less than two and ·a halif hours after Tukas' arrival. 1-0. For the text of the Brotocol see Alppendix I. 11. Joseph Lettrich: History of Modern Slovakia, Atlantic Press, London, 1956, p. 167. 12. Ar.ticle 3 of the Pact runs: (The three Contracti!Ilg Parties) "further undertake to assist one another with all political, econemic and military means, if one of them is attacked by a Poweir at present not involved in the European war or in the Chiinese..Jarpanese conflict." This could have meant only the USA or the USSR. But Article 5 stated that the iterms of the Pact did not "in any way aifilieot the politica'l strutus which exists between each of the three Contraicting Parties and Soviet Russiia." APPENDIX I The Protocol of Slovakia's Accession to the Tripartite Pact The Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, on the one hand, and the Government of Slovakia, on the other hand, represented by the signa,to:ries to the documenrt, declare as follows: 1. Slovakia joins the Tripartite Pact sig.n ed at Berlin on September 27, 1940. 2. As far as the joint technical commissions provided under Article 4 of the Tripartite Pact concern matters affecting Slovak �18 SLOVAKIA interests, Slovakia. will be represented ait the discussions of these committees. 3. The text o;f the Tr.iipartite Pact is atltached to the present Protocol, which is drawn up in the German, Italian, Japanese, and Slovak languages, each text to ha1Ve the validity of the original. The Protocol comes into effect on the da~ of signature . .AIPPENDIX II The Slovak Delegation - Who Was Who: Dr. Vojtech Tuka - Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign A1ff.airs. Born on July 4, 1880, at P.i-argy, Tuka was, before 1918, a Professor of Internationa,l Law at the then Hungarian University at Bratislava. After the first World Wa r he played a leading role in the Slovak autonomist movement of the Hlinka Party. Accused of treason by the Czech Brague, he wa•s involved in the notorious "Tuka Trial." On flimsy and rigged evid'ence he was found guiity of espiona•ge and p:l,,Oltting a,ga,inst the Repuiblic and sentenced to 15 years in ja11. After havi,ng been imprisoned at Pankrac in Prague for more than seven years, sick and nearly blind, he was pardoned by Presidental amnesty, and the remainder of his sentence he was to spend in custody at Plzen. Released in October, 1938, he pr-0mptly resumed his political activity. In the first Slovak independent goviermnent ~March 1J939) he became the deputy Prime Minister and laiter, after the retirement of Sidor. ,also the acting Minfater of Interior. On the election ·of Dr. Joseph Tiso as Presiident o:f Slovakia, Tuka became Brime Minister. Mter the Sal2Jburg Conference (July 1940) Tuka not only retained his post, but a'lso took over the Foreign Ministry. Tuka was executed by the Prague Government in Bratislava August 20, 1946. Slovak Minister in Berlin. A high school Matul Cernak teacher by profession, Cernak had a long record of continuous activity in the ranks of the Hlinka Party. In Septem,ber, 1<938, he was appointed a minister in the Czecho-Slovak Government. He immediately demanded autonomy for Slovakia. This not granted, he resigned in protest. In the first Sloviak autonomous governmenit he was given the post of the Ministry of Educaiti001 (October 11938) and in addition was entrusted with the lead,ership of the Youth Organization (Hlinka's Youth). Being openly for a complete secession, he was imprisoned by the Czechs (March 1939) and treated raither brutaUy. After the Declaration of Slovak Independence he was sent to Germany as the Slovak diplomatic representative. He was killed by a bomb sent through the mail in Munich, July 5, 1955. Karo• Murgal - Ohief of the Propaganda Bureau. A joumaHsit, Murga§ came into prominence in the hectic days of October 1938 Ma!l"Ch 1939. After the Salzburg Oond'eroo.ce· he was made the Chie!f of the Propaganda Bureau as the only suifable ohoice (h,e was the on1y person of irutelligence and aibility ready to toiw the German line). Ing. Jozef Mracna - Ohief of the Political Division of the Slovak Foreign Ministry. Mraona was born on February 21, 1900. He was a career diplomat of the Czooho..Slovak diplomatic service. At the time of the declaration of Slovak independence (March 1939) he was the Cze:cho..Slovak Consul in New York, but immediately offered his services to the Slovak State. Gifted, honest and exiperieru:ed, he was 1 �SLOVAKIA 19 the most caiplllble and authoritative personality in the Slovak Foreig111 Ministry, but later he became rather passive. He enjoyed Tuka's full confidence and in return was his loyal, but not uncritica'l, co-worker. ,or. Raduz Radlinsky - Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol at the Slovak Foreign Miinistry. Former employee of the Czecho-61ovak Foreign Ministry, where he held a minor position in the Protocol. On the basis of this activity he was entrusted with the position of Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol in Bratislava. '11he Germans constantly objected to his position. Lieutenant-Colonel ~tefan Tata.rko Military Aittache at the Slovak Legaition in Berlin. A professional soldier of some ability, Tatarko created practically out of nothing the Sfovak Military Secret Service. Later he was apointed military -atta:che to Berlin. Ait one time he was not trusted by the Germans because of his in:cautiously expressed d'oulbts about final German vietory. But he must have corrected himself, because later he was promoted to the Chief of Cabinet at the Slovak Ministry of defense. Jan Belnay - Commercial Atta:che at the Slovak Legation in Berlin. He was born on Oct-Ober 23, 1900. Mosit of his study-years (in Chemistry) were spent in Germany, the remainder in Prague. He worked at the Czecho-Slovak Economic Academy, a111d Ia1ter at the Czecho-Slovak EX1pOrt Institute. In MaTCh, 11939, he joined the staff of the Slovak Foreign Ministry and s·oon was appointed a commercial attaohe to Berlin. His professional eicperien:ce and fluent knowledge of German served him in good stead and in 1941 he was promoted to the position of Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol. Jan Farkal - Tuka's Adjutant . .A,s a comparnion in T~a's tribulations (he figured in the "Tuka Trial") Fark'as claimed also a share in Tuka's honors. He devoutly followed Tuka's footsteps and parroted his pronoun:cements aholllt the introduction of Nazism into Slovakia, but was not particularly giiited to make a higher grade. A,t one stage Tuka insisted on his appointment as a Minister of Finance, but was rebuff.ed. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Since, in the new situation, it was impossilble to coHa-borate oifficiaHy with the Soviet Union, we . . . d~d nothing which might prejudike or ipre.vent the removal of co-operation at the earliest posstble moment; I need 0I11ly recall how strongly our attitude contrasted with that of many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in that period, there was no interruption of the personal contacts and exchange of information between ourse1ves rund important Soviet representatives in London, Paris, Washington and elsewhere." - Dr. Hubert Ripka, EAST AND WEST, London. 1944. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 6 SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA'S ACCESSION TO THE TRIPARTITE PACT Fnmcis Vnuk On September 27, 1940, at the New Chancellery in Berlin, the German-Italian-Japanese Tripartite Pact was signed. "The ceremony of signing" - noted Shirer "was carried through with typical Axis talent for the theatrical." (1) The German and satellite press greeted the occasion as an event of far-reaching importance, a "Magna Charta" of the New Order, which was going to bring about exactly what had been promised in the preamble to the Pact, namely, "world peace" . . . and "prosperity and welfare of the peoples" in Europe and Greater East Asia(2). After the ceremonial signing, Hitler entered the hall to honor the occasion by his presence. Then followed the adulatory speeches of Ribbentrop, Ciano, and Kurusu. In the course of his speech Ribbentrop stated: "The purpose of the Pact is, a:bove an things, to help restore peace to the world as quickly as possible. Therefore, any otherstate, which wishes to adhere to this bloc with the intention of contributing to the restoration of peaceful conditions, will be sincerely and gratefully made welcome and will participate in the economic and political reorganization" (3) In response to this rather blunt hint, the nations of Central Europe, tied to Germany by geopolitical conditions, duly applied for admittance. Hungary was the first in the field, the others following her more or less reluctantly. It was clear to the 'Slovaks and Rumanians that they could not afford to stand aside, even if they wished. They had to rank at least as high in Hitler's esteem as Hungary which still hrad unfulfilled territorial claims against them. And thus towards the end of November, 1940, Hungarian, Rumanian, and Slovak delegations in close succession went to Vienna or Berlin ( 4) to sign the Protocol of adherence to the Tripartitie Pact. Hungary did so on the 20th, Rumania on the 22nd, and Slovakia on the 24th of November, 1940(5). Slovakia's accession to the Tripartite Pact followed the proclamation of the "spiritual adherence" a few weeks SLOVAKIA 7 previously. Though Ciano sneered at the event as "a useless bit of ersatz diplomacy" (6) , the Germans made it into a spectacular State visit which was arranged for Tuka and his entourage. State visits had a strange fascination for Turoa. Nothing appealed to him more than to be a centre of attention, surrounded by high officials, and facing the flashlights of official photographers and reporters. He did not -conceal his disappointment when the Germans advised him against his proposed visit to Rumania, or when the Italians asked him to postpone his offered visit of Italy till "after the war." The signing of the Protocol of Accession enabled him to taste the cherished moments of ceremonial courtesies and at the same time to demonstrate his devotion to Germany. Apart from these rather personal considerations, there were also quite a few important political, economic, and cultural problems to be discussed, new poUcies outlined, and achievements and failures reported. SIGNATURES The German preparations for Tuka's State visit were very detailed and thorough. Tuka was to be received with all the honors and courtesies due to the head of a friendly government. In the captured documents of the former German Foreign Ministry, there is a special file (7) dealing exclusively with various aspects of the visit and this is the principal source of all relevant information. The Slov,ak delegation(8), which consisted of Tuka, Murgas, Mracna, Radlinsky and Farkas, left Bratislava by auto on the afternoon of November 23, 1940. They crossed the bridge to Petrfalka and proceeded to Vienna where ,a special train was awaiting them. The reception there was very austere. There were no guards of honor to inspect, no speeches of welcome; just one representative of the Protocol to accompany them on their night journey to Berlin. '.Dhe train left West Bahnhof at 7:32 P. M. and took them through Linz, Passau, Regensburg, Hof, and Leipzig to the Anhalter Bahnhof, Berlin, where they arrived on Sunday morning at 10 :40 A. M. - just 20 minutes after the Rumanian delegation, its mission accomplished, left Berlin on its return journey (9). 8 SLOVAKIA At the Anhalter Bahnhof everything was pompous, well-organized, and impressive. Welcoming personalities were grouped in four parties. The first party, headed by the Slovak charge d'affaires, consisted of foreign diploma:ts ·and the heads of missions in Berlin. Specially invited German representatives of the Party and the Army were in the second, the members of the Slovak Legation in the third, and the personnel of the German Foreign Ministry in the fourth group. Tuka, as he alighted from his salon-car, was welcomed by Ribbentrop and Matthew Cernak, and introduced by them to the other members of the welcoming parties on the platform. Then followed the inspection of the Guard of Honor. Tuka, in the uniform of the Hlinka Guards and accompanied by Ribbentrop, was trying his unsoldierly best to make his gait and mien look soldier-like. From the station the procession of cars went to Schloss Bellevue which was going to be Tuka's residence during his two-day stay in Berlin. There he was welcomed by Meissner who acted as master of the house (Hausherr). At 11 :30 Tuka paid a visit to Ribbentrop at the latter's office, 73 Wilhelmstrasse, where they spent about an hour in discussion. The great moment came at 1:00 P. M. In the Grand Reception Hall of the New Chancellery stood a huge massive signature table. The representatives of the Press had already taken their places: the foreign correspondents at the window-side, the Germans at the door. At 12:58 P. M., the great door opened and an impressive procession entered. It was led by the Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol. He was followed by Tuka and Ribbentrop, the Japanese Ambassador, the Italian Ambassador and Charge d'Affaires, the Hungarian and Rumanian Ministers, State Secretary Weizsaecker, and State Under-Secretary Gaus. Ribbentrop sat at the center of the table, Tuka at his right and, next to him, the Italian Ambassador and the Rumanian Minister. At Ribbentrop's left were seated the Japanese Ambassador and the Hungarian Minister. Everything went without a hitch like a well-rehearsed drama. The Protocol of Accession (10) was signed amidst SLOVAKIA 9 the flashes of light and rustle of reporter's notebooks, short speeches were solemnly read out and courteous applause resounded in the spacious hall. In the afternoon Ribbentrop gave a reception at the Hotel Adlon for the Slovak Delegation and the members of the Slovak Legation in Berlin. In the morning of the next day (Monday, November 25) Tuka took part in the wreath-laying ceremony at the Ehrenmahl (The War Memorial at the famous Unter den Linden). Another reception was given by Cernak in the afternoon at the Hotel Esplanade. At 5:30 P. M. Tuka had his great and memorable moment. He was taken to the Work Room of the New Chancellery where he was received by Hitler. That was the climax of Tuka's State visit. Shortly before 7 P. M., the Slovak Delegation was again on the Anhalter Bahnhof. With the German and foreign guests to bid them farewell, guards of honor to inspect, hands to shake or raise in Nazi salute, the parting ceremony was as imposing as the welcoming one. At 7:05 P. M., the special train with the Slovak Delegation left Berlin on its return journey to Vienna, where they arrived on November 26, at 10:54 A. M. The Slovak Parliament gave its approval to the Protocol of Accession to the Tripartite Pact on February 6, 1941(11). DISCUSSIONS The records of discussions between Ribbentrop and Tuka were not found. But it is possible to gauge their nature and content from numerous memoranda passed between Ribbentrop and his advisers shortly before Tuka's visit. Some of these memoranda are very sketchy, others go into great details. They deal with subjects which Tuka outlined to Consul-General Wuester (on November 11, 1940) as the topics he would like to discuss perisonally with Ribbentrop on the occasion of his State visit. And even if the discussions did not follow the proposed course exactly, they could not have departed far from it. These memoranda are thus of interest to every student of Slovak affairs. They certainly cast some light on the Slovak scene as it was set in November, 1940, and provide a 10 SLOVAKIA guileless cross-section of the Slovak political, economic, and cultural life. The problems were grouped under four headings and each division had further subsections. The same pattern will be followed in this study. The subject matter for discussion was to proceed along the following lines: A. Political Problems. 1. Internal Policy: Internally Slovakia was in the middle of a political crisis and Woermann and Killinger briefed Ribbentrop about its extent. They informed him that Tuka and Mach were working on the establishment of the Nazi system in Slovakia ("nazionalsozialistische Staatsfuehrung"), in the spirit of the Salzburg conversations. In this attempt they had to wage a struggle against the opposing forces centered around President Tiso. Tiso',s camp consisted of in Killinger's terminology - clericals, former :Durcansky hangers-on and four members of the government. Tuka demanded dismissal of these ministers, but Tiso ref used to comply with his request. Tuka then decided to fight it out with Tiso, and, according to Killinger, there were forces at work striving for a complete elimination of Tiso from the Slovak political life ( eine vollige Auschaltung Tisos aus dem politischen Leben"). In discussing this question with Tuka, Ribbentrop was advised to recommend that Tuka should apply his measures in such a way as not to affect the position of President Tiso. There was no objection to the eventual removal of the uncooperative ministers, but as far as Tiso was concerned, his removal would only deteriorate and not improve the internal situation in Slovakia. "Tiso" - runs Woermann's recommendation to Ribbentrop - "as Hlinka's successor and the co-founder of the Slovak State, is a very popular personality in Slovakia" ("eine durchhaus volkstuemliche Personlichkeit"), and, therefore, the elimination of the clerical influence should be carried out carefully and possibly by evolutionary means. The conversion of Slovakia into a Christian state according to Schusch- SLOVAKIA 11 nigg's model ("Staendestatt'), as contemplated by Tiso and his friends, could be prevented even without the removal of Tiso. On the other hand Tuka should be commended for his fight for the Nazi reorientation of Slovakia. 2. Territorial demands: 'rhe second problem Tuka wanted to discuss was the territorial cession of the eastern part of the Protektorat to Slovakia (the region of Moravske Slovacko). In this respect several memoranda were passed to the German Foreign Ministry outlying the reason and justification of this demand. But the Germans were not happy about the proposition. Ribbentrop was advised to tell Tuka that the idea of the frontier rectification in favor of Slovakia could not be considered ("keine Folge gegeben werden koenne" ). 3. Slovak-Hungarian Relations: The Slovak-Hungarian relations were by far the most important point of the discussions. The Vienna Award by which Slovakia was forced to cede part of her territories to Hungary - was a source of constant Slovak grievances and was genuinely detested by all Slovaks, whether they were pro-Nazi, anti-Nazi, or just sitting on the fence. Tuka was convinced that the Salzburg conversations meant a step towards a more acceptable solution. At Salzburg (July 1940) Tiso wrenched from Ribbentrop a somewhat vague and non-committal promise that the question of the frontier rectification between Slovakia and Hungary though unsuitable for settlement at that time - cou~d be considered later ("dass in Augenblick nicht an die Regelung dieser Frage zu denken sei, dass vielleicht spaeter einmal der Augenblick kommen duerfe"). On the basis of this promise the Slovak Foreign Ministry forwarded to Berlin a number of Aide-Memoires, maps and statistical material and wanted them to be examined by the Auslandsinstitut in Stuttgart. Tuka was to ask Ribbentrop for the official German attitude towards these Slovak requests. It was proposed to tell Tuka that the moment for the settlement of the disputed boundary issue was still inap- 12 SLOVAKIA propriate ("Es waere unzeitmaessig diese slowakische Ansprueche jetzt geltent zu machen"). With regard to the examination of the Slovak documentary material by the Auslandsinstitut in Stutgart - since the Germans did not want the Hungarians to get wind that something was going on - it was suggested that this request should be declined. Tuka should be told that the German Foreign Ministry would examine the pertinent Slovak material, but it did not think it expedient to pass such things on to the Auslandsinstitut. 4. Ruthene Question: Then there was the question of the Ruthene minority. This group, about 50,000 strong, was subjected to intense communistic propaganda inciting it to demand the same privileges as those granted to the German ethnic group. The solution of this question required a precarious balance in counteracting the communist propaganda without arousing the suspicions of being hostile towards the USSR which at that time was being courted by the Germans into joining the Tripartite Pact. Tuka was to be told that the Slovak Government would have to try to win the sympathies of the Ruthenes even if it involved the offer of a guarantee of cultural autonomy. But the communist intrigues would have to be suppressed just the same ("Kommunistische Umtriebe unter ihnen waeren zu unterdruecken") . 5. Attitude towards the Croats: It was expected that Tuka, who had just learned about the German attitude towards the Croats, would make an offer to influence the Croats through Slovak propaganda. It was suggested that his declaration should be merely noted and any discussion of his proposal should be declined. B. Economic Problems: The economic topics for the discussions are of equal importance. In spite, or, perhaps because of the war, the Slovak economy was developing very favorably. The Ger- SLOVAKIA 13 mans were taking 75 per cent of Slovak exports and, contrary to the general belief, were providing valuable expert and material assistance. Nevertheless, there were points of friction even in this sphere, especially with regard to the direction in which the development should proceed. The Germans pressed for projects like the improved facilities of the Bratislava Danube harbor, raising of the level of agricultural economy, erection of family houses for workers, etc., whereas the Slovaks were for industrial development, new factories, improved local communications, etc. At the time of Tuka's visit the Slovak grievances concerned the price increases, tourist trade, and employment of Czech skilled workers. 1. Price Question: The Slovak government was afraid that the price increases might create unwanted social reactions which, in turn, could be exploited by the communists. But the Germans maintained that, since rising prices were a general phenomenon in all Southeast Europe, and also in the Protektorat whose economy was closely bound with Slovakia's, it was desirable for them to go up in Slovakia as well. It was proposed to point out to Tuka that the price increases would, in the long run, increase Slovakia's national income through expansion in exports to Germany and through the wage transfer of the 80,000 Slovak laborers working there. The Germans would try to mitigate the effect of price increases by such measures, for example, as lowering the prices of goods imported from the Protektorat. Likewise - in spite of the recent increases in the price of coal - the export prices of German coal delivered to Slovakia were not increased, but were retained at the level fixed in April, 1940, and would stay there. 2. Tourist Trade: in the mater of the Slovak complaint concerning the rapid decrease in the tourist trade, it was to be stated that there was not much the Germans could do about it. It was, however, to be expected that after the war Slovakia would enjoy an unprecedented tourist activity. 14 SLOVAKIA 3. Employment of Czech Workers: For Tuka this represented another thorny problem. There were still many Czechs working in industrial establishments in Slovakia, mainly as skilled workers. Tuka pressed for their removal, since he saw in them a constant element of unrest ("Unruheherde"). The Germans promised to cooperate, saying that some Czechs had already been transferred. RilJbentrop, however, would have to advise Tuka that those Czechs working in the armament industry could be removed only when satisfactory replacements by skilled Slovak workers had been found. C. Resettlement Problems: 1. Czechs in Slovakia: Tuka strove to rid Slovakia of all Czechs (approximat ely 25,000 in number), as well as t o bring bac 1c to Slovakia all Slovaks living in the Protektorat. Since the negotiations ("Auseinandersetzungverhandlungen") with the Germans were ominously dragging on, Tuka wanted to ask Ribbentrop about the German view on the matter. Ribbentrop was advised to instruct Tuka that the proposal would be examined in due time, but, on the other hand, not to give any prospect for fulfillment of this wish ("Keine Aussicht auf Erfuellung des Wuensches za machen" ). 2. Slovaks in the German POW Camps: After the military collapse of France, several unfortunate Slovaks found themselves as POWs in German captivity. In most cases they were Slovak workers from Paris and from the Northern French coalfields who were mobilized into "Czecho-Slovak" army units to fight for the restoration of the defunct Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Slovak Foreign Ministry had been demanding their release since the end of the Franco-German hostilities, but the German authorities were not very quick in answering. Tuka was to be assured that their release was pending. 3. Slovaks in France: With equal commendable zeal the Slovak Government SLOVAKIA 15 tried to obtain the release of all Slovaks in the French Army Service, in both occupied and unoccupied France, and pleaded for the repatriation of those who desired it. Tuka was to be told that the Germans looked upon the request with understanding and would give it their support. D. Cultural and Other Problems: In the cultural field there was complete satisfaction on both sides. The Slovak-German cultural relations were very friendly and prepartions for the signing of a Cultural Agreement ("Kultur-Abkomm en") were on the way. Similarly there were no complaints about the treatment of the German ethnic group in Slovakia. IV CONCLUSION Looking at the event after almost 20 years' interval, when one has the benefit of seeing what was back of the German mind, and when one knows all the answers to what were then the annoying questions of the day, it is only too easy to be critical, cynical, or even malicious. Was Tuka really the villain of the drama? Was he really responsible for all subsequent Slovak misfortunes? Was his signature on the Protocol the death-warrant of the Slovak State as some of his critics want us to believe? Or, was he just an innocent victim of circumstances from which there was no way out? Did he merely carry out the inevitable and inescapable steps to save the nation from a much worse disaster, as his admirers try to convince us? Unfortunately there is no straightforward answer to either of these views. Tuka's personality was of a far more complex nature than to be an object of a clear-cut judgment. It would be futile and out of place to argue about this. However, to make the picture as complete as possible, it seems only just to add the following notes by way of a postscript. It is undeniable now, as it was conclusive then, that. the Tripartite Pact was directed against the USA (12) ,, where, as it happened, lived almost a third of the Slovak 16 SLOVAKIA nation. And there is no doubt about Tuka's willingness to have Slovakia bound to Germany lock, stock, and barrel. But the personal ambition of a sick man was not the only why and wherefore behind Tuka's move. There were also political motives and these were by no means insignificant: to gain for Slovakia an honorable place in the New Europe - which at that time was not just a remote phantasy; to ward off the Hungarian danger - as menacing and ubiquitous as ever. It is not always realized that the fear of being swallowed by Hungary had a hand not only at the birth of the Slovak State, but was present in the background of practically every action of subsequent Slovak foreign policy. The political and military situation - at the time of Slovakia's accession to the Pact - strongly favored the German position. Germany was the undisputed master of Europe, and with the USSR she had a Treaty of NonAggression. The USA was keeping out of the war and was likely to stay out. For Hitler and his gang "the war was already won." This thought, however, was not shared by all. There were many who did concede (though they have less courage to admit it now) that the war might finish in a draw Such a situation would have curbed Hitler's ambitions for world domination, but it would leave the nations of Central Europe at his mercy. And it is better to be left at the mercy of a benign than an irate master. Then the question arises as to what would have happened if Tuka "per impossiblile" would have chosen to resist German prompting and decided not to join the bloc. The problem may be highly academic, but the answer to it is less so. In fact, an eloquent reply was provided about three months after Slovakia's accession to the Pact by the adherence of Bulgaria. To the Western way of thinking, Bulgaria was the best of the bad satellites of Hitler. She saved most of her Jewish population from extermination, she did not declare war on the USSR (though the USSR found it expedient to declare war on her). In the face of German pressure she yielded the bare minimum - and this included the accession to the Pact. It is hardly to be expected that Slovak opposition could have been more ef- SLOVAKIA 17 fective. With no friends and no guarantees in the West, Slovakia could not behave the way Yugoslavia did. REFERENCES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. W. Shirer: A Berlin Diary, Hamilton, London, 1941,. For the text of the Tripartite Pact see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. V, pp. 355-6, or Int. Affairs, 193946, Vol. III, OUP, 1954, pp. 81-82. C. A. Macartney: October Fifteenth, EdinJburgh Univ. Press, 1956, Vol. I, p. 439. The Hrungarians, went to Vienna, the Rumaniallls and Slovaks to Berlin. Other countries followed suit: Spain secretly in November 1940; Bulgaria on March 1, 1941; Yugoslavia on March 25, 194'1; Croatia, on June 115, 1941'. The USSR nearly joined the Pact, too (See Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 248--9, 258-9). Ciano's Diary 1939-43, Heinemann, London, 1947. Ent ry ·of November 20, 11)40: " ... I do not attach much importance to the adherence of these states (Hungary, Rumania and Slovakia) which are vassais of Germany, or almost so. In £act they weaken the Tripartite Agreement itseltf, and s,eem to be useless bits of ersatz diplomacy. " Auswartiges Amt, Buero St. Sekretaer, Besuch Tuka, 610/ 248742-818. 8. For the Delegation's "Who's Who" see Alppendix II. 9. "He (Antonescu) had bairely left Berlin . .. when Dr. Tuka, the Slovak Prime Minister, arrived to sign his counrtry's adhesion to the Pact. The document was ready and his signature was prompt" - Dipl. correspond,e nt of the London "Times". In fact, the s igning took place less than two and ·a halif hours after Tukas' arrival. 1-0. For the text of the Brotocol see Alppendix I. 11. Joseph Lettrich: History of Modern Slovakia, Atlantic Press, London, 1956, p. 167. 12. Ar.ticle 3 of the Pact runs: (The three Contracti!Ilg Parties) "further undertake to assist one another with all political, econemic and military means, if one of them is attacked by a Poweir at present not involved in the European war or in the Chiinese..Jarpanese conflict." This could have meant only the USA or the USSR. But Article 5 stated that the iterms of the Pact did not "in any way aifilieot the politica'l strutus which exists between each of the three Contraicting Parties and Soviet Russiia." APPENDIX I The Protocol of Slovakia's Accession to the Tripartite Pact The Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, on the one hand, and the Government of Slovakia, on the other hand, represented by the signa,to:ries to the documenrt, declare as follows: 1. Slovakia joins the Tripartite Pact sig.n ed at Berlin on September 27, 1940. 2. As far as the joint technical commissions provided under Article 4 of the Tripartite Pact concern matters affecting Slovak 18 SLOVAKIA interests, Slovakia. will be represented ait the discussions of these committees. 3. The text o;f the Tr.iipartite Pact is atltached to the present Protocol, which is drawn up in the German, Italian, Japanese, and Slovak languages, each text to ha1Ve the validity of the original. The Protocol comes into effect on the da~ of signature . .AIPPENDIX II The Slovak Delegation - Who Was Who: Dr. Vojtech Tuka - Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign A1ff.airs. Born on July 4, 1880, at P.i-argy, Tuka was, before 1918, a Professor of Internationa,l Law at the then Hungarian University at Bratislava. After the first World Wa r he played a leading role in the Slovak autonomist movement of the Hlinka Party. Accused of treason by the Czech Brague, he wa•s involved in the notorious "Tuka Trial." On flimsy and rigged evid'ence he was found guiity of espiona•ge and p:l,,Oltting a,ga,inst the Repuiblic and sentenced to 15 years in ja11. After havi,ng been imprisoned at Pankrac in Prague for more than seven years, sick and nearly blind, he was pardoned by Presidental amnesty, and the remainder of his sentence he was to spend in custody at Plzen. Released in October, 1938, he pr-0mptly resumed his political activity. In the first Slovak independent goviermnent ~March 1J939) he became the deputy Prime Minister and laiter, after the retirement of Sidor. ,also the acting Minfater of Interior. On the election ·of Dr. Joseph Tiso as Presiident o:f Slovakia, Tuka became Brime Minister. Mter the Sal2Jburg Conference (July 1940) Tuka not only retained his post, but a'lso took over the Foreign Ministry. Tuka was executed by the Prague Government in Bratislava August 20, 1946. Slovak Minister in Berlin. A high school Matul Cernak teacher by profession, Cernak had a long record of continuous activity in the ranks of the Hlinka Party. In Septem,ber, 1<938, he was appointed a minister in the Czecho-Slovak Government. He immediately demanded autonomy for Slovakia. This not granted, he resigned in protest. In the first Sloviak autonomous governmenit he was given the post of the Ministry of Educaiti001 (October 11938) and in addition was entrusted with the lead,ership of the Youth Organization (Hlinka's Youth). Being openly for a complete secession, he was imprisoned by the Czechs (March 1939) and treated raither brutaUy. After the Declaration of Slovak Independence he was sent to Germany as the Slovak diplomatic representative. He was killed by a bomb sent through the mail in Munich, July 5, 1955. Karo• Murgal - Ohief of the Propaganda Bureau. A joumaHsit, Murga§ came into prominence in the hectic days of October 1938 Ma!l"Ch 1939. After the Salzburg Oond'eroo.ce· he was made the Chie!f of the Propaganda Bureau as the only suifable ohoice (h,e was the on1y person of irutelligence and aibility ready to toiw the German line). Ing. Jozef Mracna - Ohief of the Political Division of the Slovak Foreign Ministry. Mraona was born on February 21, 1900. He was a career diplomat of the Czooho..Slovak diplomatic service. At the time of the declaration of Slovak independence (March 1939) he was the Cze:cho..Slovak Consul in New York, but immediately offered his services to the Slovak State. Gifted, honest and exiperieru:ed, he was 1 SLOVAKIA 19 the most caiplllble and authoritative personality in the Slovak Foreig111 Ministry, but later he became rather passive. He enjoyed Tuka's full confidence and in return was his loyal, but not uncritica'l, co-worker. ,or. Raduz Radlinsky - Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol at the Slovak Foreign Miinistry. Former employee of the Czecho-61ovak Foreign Ministry, where he held a minor position in the Protocol. On the basis of this activity he was entrusted with the position of Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol in Bratislava. '11he Germans constantly objected to his position. Lieutenant-Colonel ~tefan Tata.rko Military Aittache at the Slovak Legaition in Berlin. A professional soldier of some ability, Tatarko created practically out of nothing the Sfovak Military Secret Service. Later he was apointed military -atta:che to Berlin. Ait one time he was not trusted by the Germans because of his in:cautiously expressed d'oulbts about final German vietory. But he must have corrected himself, because later he was promoted to the Chief of Cabinet at the Slovak Ministry of defense. Jan Belnay - Commercial Atta:che at the Slovak Legation in Berlin. He was born on Oct-Ober 23, 1900. Mosit of his study-years (in Chemistry) were spent in Germany, the remainder in Prague. He worked at the Czecho-Slovak Economic Academy, a111d Ia1ter at the Czecho-Slovak EX1pOrt Institute. In MaTCh, 11939, he joined the staff of the Slovak Foreign Ministry and s·oon was appointed a commercial attaohe to Berlin. His professional eicperien:ce and fluent knowledge of German served him in good stead and in 1941 he was promoted to the position of Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol. Jan Farkal - Tuka's Adjutant . .A,s a comparnion in T~a's tribulations (he figured in the "Tuka Trial") Fark'as claimed also a share in Tuka's honors. He devoutly followed Tuka's footsteps and parroted his pronoun:cements aholllt the introduction of Nazism into Slovakia, but was not particularly giiited to make a higher grade. A,t one stage Tuka insisted on his appointment as a Minister of Finance, but was rebuff.ed. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Since, in the new situation, it was impossilble to coHa-borate oifficiaHy with the Soviet Union, we . . . d~d nothing which might prejudike or ipre.vent the removal of co-operation at the earliest posstble moment; I need 0I11ly recall how strongly our attitude contrasted with that of many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in that period, there was no interruption of the personal contacts and exchange of information between ourse1ves rund important Soviet representatives in London, Paris, Washington and elsewhere." - Dr. Hubert Ripka, EAST AND WEST, London. 1944.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia's Accession to the Tripartite Pact Description An account of the resource Francis Vnuk Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 5 (30), June-December 1959 pp. 6-19 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-December 1959 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/44dea4db73a2cba7053fc15fdcff2cab.pdf 18d19ff1faa43e1fbf52876c80522a5e PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 7 The news of Dr. Tiso's departure caused the t ension in Bratislava and in all of Slovakia to grow. There was now not only fear of Hungarian occupation, if Dr. Tiso's mission were to fail but also fear of occupation by the Germans whose troops were stationed on the banks of the Danube on the Austrian side. At the same time there was, however , also a strong hope that Slovakia finally would become an independent state and that the dreams, desires and wishes of many Slovak generations would come true. 1. T h e writer was vice-presiden t of Pax R oma na and Slavia Catholi ca a nd, for ma ny year s, pr esiden t of th e Catholic Fed e ration of Slovak Stud en ts. 2. Cfr. Sidor's: Poznamky k historickym dnom r. 1939 p u blish ed by Lettri ch's R egime, Br atislava, 1946, a nd a lso accounts in Slovenska Obrana, October , 1939. 3. T h e Governm en t was composed as follows : Presiden t - Dr . Joseph T iso ; Prime Minister K. Sid or ; For e ig n Affairs - D r . Durcansky; E du cation - M. Cerna k ; F ina n ce - A. Mederly; Economy - Dr . Pru'.ii ns ky; Communica tions - Dr. Kir schba um ; Nationa l Defense - Gen. ,C atlos; 1Propaganda - A. Mach ; Justice - D r . V. T uka. - See de ta ils in Slovenska Obrana, October 17, 1939 . 4. 'T h e minu tes of th e Slovak Diet. Als o S idor's r em a rks on the historic days (ma nuscr ip ts, no t th e excerpts p ublis h ed b y th e Comm u nists in order to cond emn Dr. Tiso) . • • • THE GERMAN ZONE OF PROTECTION IN SLOVAK.IA (A study in Slovak-German relations in March-August 1939) Frantisek Vnuk On March 14, 1939, the independence of Slovakia was proclaimed by the Slovak Assembly. Two days later Baron von Weizsiicker wired a circular to all German diplomatic missions informing them that Slovak Prime Minister Dr. Tiso had transmitted the following r equest to the Fuhrer by telegram: With full trust in you, the Flihrer and Chancellor of the Gret er German Reich, the Slovak State places itself under your protection. The 'Slovak State asks you to take over this protection (1). Hitler acknowledged the receipt of the telegram and complied with the request. For this purpose a treaty of protection between Germany and Slovakia was drawn up (2) . Article 2 of the treaty stipulated that "the German Wehrmacht shall at all times have the right to set up �8 SLOVAKIA military installations in a zone bounded on the west by the frontier of the Slovak State and on the east by the general line of the eastern edge of the Little Carpathians, the eastern edge of the White Carpathians and the eastern edge of Javorniky, and to man these installations with such forces as the German Wehrmacht consider necessary ... Military sovereign rights (Hoheitsrechts) will be exercised by the German Wehrmacht (in this zone)" (3) . The establishment of this zone ( 4) represents in many respects an interesting aspect of Slovak-German relations. It casts a favorable light on a well-conceived but less successful attempt to extricate Slovak foreign policy from the agreed upon Slovak-German coordination in this field. This praiseworthy attempt and the subsequent unyielding behavior of Slovak politicians in the face of Hitler's demands contrast sharply with the charges of vassalage and servile obedience. In fact, the Slovaks resisted and contradicted Hitler's wishes (and with some success, too ) when powerful nations yielded and were advising others to yield. The negotiations concerning the zone were initiated on the night of March 17-18, 1939, in Vienna. At this time the occupation of Western Slovakia was already an accomplished fact (5) and - since possession is nine points of the law - the position of the ISlovak negotiators was noticeably weakened and by no means enviable. Nevertheless Dr. Joseph Tiso, Durcansky, Tuka, and Mach, the principal Slovak representatives, were determined to save could be saved. Preliminary negotiations started at Biirckel's flat at 5 p. m. Afterwards the Slovaks met SeyssInquart, then Keitel, and finally, at 1 a . m., on the 18th, in the Hotel Imperial they faced Hitler. Each stop represented more humiliation and more pressing demands and brought home one thing: Hitler was going to exact a high price for his protection ; much higher than he ever hinted at in Berlin on March 13th. Tiso was so disappointed at what he rightly considered - being let down that h e wanted to return to Bratislava without even seeing Hitler. Only his companions persuaded him to stay, arguing that in front of the Germans they all ought to show a united �SLOVAKIA 9 determination not to give up even an inch of sacred Slovak soil (6). When Hitler, in the presence of Ribbentrop and Keitel, met the Slovaks, he told them - according to the testimony of Tiso - that the 'Shutzvertrag' could be realized only if Germany were given far-reaching concessions to build up a zone in Western Slovakia. The extent of these concessions - as Tiso clearly saw - left the Slovaks practically without any rights to exercise their sovereignty in that territory. It was more than he could bear. At 2 :45 A. M. he got up and was at the point of departure. Hitler, it must be said, in spite of his many shortcommings had a soft spot for the Slovaks and, apparently moved by the pathetic sight of the hardpressed protegees, stopped Tiso with a very assuring piece of oratory. He said: "I do not want even an inch of Slovak ground. In Slovakia the Slovaks alone will develop their own national, cultural, and economic life. I shall guarantee the full independence and territorial integrity of Slovakia. The historical frontiers of Slovakia are and remain forever unchanged. I shall hold my protective hand over ,S lovakia and nobody will reach with stealthy hand for the Slovak State, where the Slovaks will live their own full life" (7). This rhetorical outburst pacified the Slovaks; the rest of the discussion was carried on in a much happier mood. The Slovaks ceded the Germans the right to build and man fortifications in the zone "so as to enable the German Wehrmacht, in the event of war, to take up such positions as are most advantageous to it" (8). The Slovak delegation left Vienna with the impression that the zone remained within the legal structure of the Slovak State. No treaty was formulated or signed that night. Formal negotiations were conducted on the afternoon of March 18. Tiso did not take part in these conversations. The Slovaks were represented by Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky, Tuka a Zvrskovec; the Germans by Keppler and Gaus, the legal adviser to the Foreign Minister. The Treaty of Protection ( Schutzvertrag) was signed in Vienna the same day by :Durcansky and Tuka who also pledged to obtain Tiso's signature to the Treaty by noon of March 19, in re-1 �10 SLOVAKIA turn for which Keppl er undert ook to get Ribbe ntrop's signature within 24 hours. :Durcansky, Tuka, and Veesenmayer broug ht the Treaty to Tiso for signat ure the evening March 18; he signed it and appear ed to be satisfi ed · with its formu lation (9). Ribben trop, on the other hand, did not sign the Treaty within the stipula ted time limit. All in all, the Germa ns were in no partic ular hurry with respec t to the Slovaks. The reason for their procra stinati on, which was so frustra ting and inexpl icable to the Slovak s then (10), is seen clearly now: they hoped to come to terms with the Poles and Hunga rians. The Polish White Book gives an accoun t of Ribbentrop's propos als to Lipski on March 21 (11), namely , that German-lPolish discus sions "would be possib le on this subject" (i. e., on the questi on of Slovak ia). But the Germa ns must have consid ered the Polish attitud e discou raging , and Ribbe ntrop put his signat ure on the Treaty on -March 23, in Berlin (12), but not before Article 3 of the Treaty was modifi ed and the words "in order to defend Slovak State agains t any possib le extern al attack s" were omitte d. Once the Treaty was signed, the execut ion of Article 2 proved to be more difficu lt than anticip ated. Appar ently the Germa n milita ry author ities were not very happy with what, after all, was a politic al settlem ent. Their behavi or left much to be desire d and Slovak protes ts were very soon pourin g in. At first, the surpri sed Slovak s asked for an explan ation, but later protes ted very vigorio usly. On March 25, the .Slovak Foreig n ·M inistry in a 'note verbal e" called for a more definit e determ ination of the probable durati on and charac ter in intern ationa l law of the Germa n occupa tion of Slovak territo ry. The note also protested a•g ainst the exerci se of sovere ign rights "beyon d those of milita ry necess ity" and agains t the remov al of milita ry materi al which - they claime d - by the secess ion of Slovak ia, had leg-ally become Slovak 'State proper ty (13). It was inevita ble that the occupa tion would cause considera ble frictio n betwee n the Slovak popula tion and the Germa n troops , and that this frictio n would projec t unfavora bly into Slovak -Germ an relatio ns. But the amoun t �SLOVAKIA 11 of misunderstanding surpassed every expectation. The Slovaks in their optimistic enthusiasm were determined to enjoy their newly-gained independence to the fullest extent and consequently found the German presence in the zone very annoying and did not even try to hide their displeasure. The Germans, on the other hand, especially the military, did not bother to adjust their behavior in respect to the Slovaks. An ordinary German soldier and officer, fresh from victorious entries into Austria, the Sudetenland, and Bohemia, was hardly expected to be less arrogant towards Slovaks than he was towards Czechs; superiority was after all the essential part of his make-up. There were many instances of discontent, misunderstanding, and small incidents, and their existence could be best gauged by the frequent apologies and assurances which the 'Slovak Press Bureau was issuing in the newspapers and on the air. Under pressure of Slovak protests and complaints, the German representatives of General Staff and Foreign Ministry, at a meeting on March 28, agreed on a unified attitude towards the question of the zone. Their conclusions, though still by no means modest, represent in many respects retreat in the face of the Slovak protests, and can be briefly summarized as follows: 1. Withdrawal of the German Custom Frontier Protection Force to the Slovak-Moravian frontier. 2. The Vah fixed as the line of military occupation. 3. Appointment of a staff officer to the Consul General to act as liaison between the Slovak Army and the Wehrmacht. 4. The German troops east of the Vah to be recalled. 5. German claim to the entire war material of the former Czecho~Slovak army. 6. No removal of war material east of the occupied zone. 7. Decision as to size of the Slovak army. 8. Creation of s e p a r ate military formation for the Volksdeutche (14). Negotiations on the above topics took place on April 4 and were reported by Pares. Unfortunately no details concerning conversations are available, but it is known that �12 SLOVAKIA the Slovaks were represented by Dr. Tiso and the Ministers of War, Finance, and Economics, and the chief subject was the removal of war material "purchased by the German Government from the Czecho-!S lovak Government which had been stored in Slovakia" (15). As a result of these conversations, in addition to a German military adviser to be sent to Bratislava, a mixed Slovak-German commission was to be appointed to settle any controversial issue. At about the same time Tuka in his broadcast promised that the German army would leave when it was no longer needed. On April 15, the High Command of the Wehrmacht submitted a list of requirements, the fulfilment of which was expected from the Slovak Government under the Treaty of Protection. The demands, even in their "more lenient" form, were very exacting: 1. The High Command intended to maintain its military forces east of the Vah until the removal of "Czech arms and Czech war material" was completed. 2. Among the sovereign rights they claimed the right to occupy military and also public and private buildings, to use all forms and means of transport, to have at their disposal the factories concerned with war economy, duty-free import and export, postal services, telecommunications and Intelligence Service (Abwehrdienst). 3. The zone to include also Trencin, Krupa, Zilina, and Povazska Bystrica. 4. The size of Slovak army to be completed at one per cent of the population. 5. No units of the Slovak army to be garrisoned within the zone, but para-military formations (Hlinka Guards) to be allowed. 6. Export and import of war material to and from Slovakia to be refused or permitted by the Slovak Government only in agreement with the Reich Government or the High Command of the Wehrmacht (16). When these requirements were communicated by Druffel to Tiso, the latter declared that the Slovak Government did not wish to make difficulties, but asked for discussions with the German authorities on the highest level before �SLOVAKIA 13 making any definite commitments. The Germans consented and, as a result, a conference took place in Berlin on April 19. Slovak representatives included Tiso, :Durcansky, and Tuka, the Ministry of Defense was represented by Catlos and Schneider, and also present were Cernak and Szathmary from the Slovak Legation in Berlin. The German delegation consisted of top-ranking experts, both political and military, but conspicious by their absence were the policy making personalities of the Reich. Its members were: Weissacker, Keppler, Wormann, Gaus, Altenburg, Tippelskirsch, HeydenRynsch, and Becker. Slovak grievances were numerous. To start with, Tiso mentioned the occupation by German troops of the aerodrome of Malacky and the demand by a German armored formation for transit through Bratislava. Then he complained of the severity of the demands of the German Wehrmacht, stating that "extension of the zone to Trencin and Zilina was hardly bearable for the Slovak Government"; of the behaviour of the German troops who in some villages occupied schools and thus made school attendance impossible, and employed Czech workers in preference to Slovaks. Furthermore, he claimed a share in the ownership of the former Czecho-Slovak arms factories and clamored for the return of a number of aircraft. German answers were either non-commital or asked to extend negotiations to clarify the application of the Treaty. Apparently the Slovaks demanded more than the German representatives were empowered to grant. Meanwhile the joint Slovak~German Commission was negotiating the treaty on the Zone of Protection but it did not seem to make any noticeable progress. On June 12, the Slovaks submitted another "note verbale'' which contained a number of Slovak views on the interpretation of the text of the Treaty. Arguments advanced by Slovaks were discussed at the conference on June 19 (17), where Tiso expressed the wish to draw up a memorandum and to discuss it personally with Hitler in hopeful expectation that the Slovaks might get more favorable treatment at the hands of the Fuhrer, than they were getting from his representatives. Hitler, however, declined to see Tiso and refused to consider the various points of the Slovak memorandum. �14 SLOVAKIA On June 21 this memorandum, in the form of an "aide memoire", was submitted to the German Foreign Ministry (18). It represented a voluminous list of complaints and expressed an outburst of accumulated Slovak indi,gnation about the German injustices. It questioned German rights to exclude Slovak garrisons from the zonal area, the interpretation of "sovereign rights", and claimed as Slovak the former Cecho..!Slovak military installations which were taken over by the Wehnnacht (such as the artillery range at Malacky); furthermore, it also questioned the wisdom of maintaining German ,garrisons outside the zone (e. g., in .Zilina, Trencin, Nove Mesto nad Va.horn) and criticised excursions of German troops to Bratislava and other places outside the zone. With regard to military material, the Slovak memorandum complained about the removal of war material from Pezinok, Modra, Malacky, Plavecke Podhradie, Hlboke, Turecky Vrch, Senica, Nemcova, Nove Mesto nad Va.horn, Trencin, Istebnik, Skalka, and .Zilina in a manner which "transgressed the bounds of an amicable atmosphere". Furthermore, it objected to occupation of munition factories and factories producing various types of war material at Dubnica, Povazska IBystrica, Stara Tura, Myjava, and .Zilina; to taking over of the stocks and installations of the airports at Novy Dvor and .Zilina; and it sadly commented that proceedings connected with the removal of war material were often conducted "as though Slovakia were an enemy country and not a State whose political and territorial independence had been guaranted by the Flihrer and Chancellor". The memorandum concluded a few more grievances against the military authorities whose attitude caused "administrative and economic uncertainty". The matter was then brought to Hitler's attention. This is evident from a statement made by Keitel on June 20, according to which Hitler's decision on the subject at the conference held by him amounted to the following: "The Flihrer said that he wished the negotiations to be conducted energetically and resolutely which, together with our concrete offers, must lead to early success. The prerequisite for the proposed support of Slovakia is the complete accep- �SLOVAKIA 15 tance of our demeands, the more so as Slovakia is dependent on our military, economic, and financial aid." This authoritative pronouncement meant that all the subsequent attempts of the ,Slovaks for better terms encountered the adamant attitude of the German authorities. Thus, when, on June 22, the Slovak Minister in 'Berlin (Matus Cernak) saw Wormann at the German Foreign Ministry, he was brusquely told that the Germans disagreed with the Slovak Foreign Ministry's attempts to establish inconsistencies between the demands of the German Military Delegation and the assurances given by leading German statesmen regarding the conclusion of the Treaty of Protection. He was asked to make it clear in Bratislava that "the Military Delegation was among these demands in the name of the German Government". Cernak sugested that concessions be made by both parties and thought that this would make it possible to reach an agreement which would "not only maintain, but arouse sympathy for Germany" among the Slovak poulation. But Wormann had little understanding for the Slovak point of view and berated the Slovaks because several of the demands expressed in the memorandum of June 19 were in contradiction to the Treaty of Protection (19). On July 3, Cernak again called on the German Foreign Ministry, where he saw Weizsa.cker. He pleaded with him for moderation of the German demands, arguing that "Tiso's ... pro-German policy would be shaken, if it were not supported. In case of emergency, Slovakia would, of course, be completely at the disposal of German Armed Forces, but in peace-time one ought to remain within the scope of the terms of the Treaty. But again Cerna.k's arguments were of no avail and were, one by one, refuted by Weizsa.cker. Faced with such an uncooperative attitude, Cernak asked to be allowed to speak to Ribbentrop personally, but was told that the Foreign Minister was not available (20). The Slovaks, ignorant of Hitler's decision and trusting in his words with hopeful optimism, left no stone unturned in their attempts to secure more favorable terms. Their representatives were untiring in demanding interviews with Hitler and Ribbentrop who, as the chief architects of the 1 �16 SLOVAKIA Slovak-German Treaty, could be made, they thought, to stand up to their promises. In this, however, they wer e unsuccessful. But they could get only to Weizsacker; and he, after trying to persuade them that the German negotiators "were acting on the instructions issued to them by the authoritative persons in the Reich", admonished the Slovaks that they should look at them as such and "conduct themselves accordingly" (21). As time went by, the Germans were getting progressively more and more anxious to have the whole issue about the interpretation of the Treaty finally settled and were apparently annoyed by the delay caused by the stubborness of the Slovaks. In view of the approaching German~olish conflict it was paramont for them to have their stand in Slovakia precisely determined and legalized. Their activity (often on the verge of nervousness) was in sharp contrast with the patient and determined attitude of the Slovaks who were unwilling to retreat. The situation was provided with a real touch of comedy when the Slovak statesmen went on their summer holidays (Tiso left for Topofcianky, Durcansky for the High Tatras) while German couriers were flying between and Bratislava. On July 19, Druffel was shown a report from Cernak according to which Eisenlohr and Weizsacker had expressed themselves in favour of token Slovak garrisons in the protected zone. On the strength of this report, Durcansky urged Catlos to dispatch some troops into the zone. On July 2:1, Catlos ordered one batallion to move in and, at the same time, informed the German military mission of his action. From the Germans came a vehement protest, coupled with threats, and the order was recalled. This move displeased Durcansky immensely. He maintained that Catlos should have created a "fait accompli" without regard for the German military mission and their feelings. The argument went so far that Catlos threatened to resign (22). Whether Catlos's action was right or wrong is open to question. It may be recalled, however, that at that time, the German military authorities were resolutely against ·any Slovak troops in that zone, and the same view was shared by Hitler. �SLOVAKIA 17 On July 17, the German Foreign Ministry sent to their representative in Bratislava a letter of instructions with an enclosed draft of the Treaty on the Zone of Protection (23). With this draft as a basis, new negotiations ensued. Unfortunately no records were found concerning their course. From the report of tH. Bernard (new German Minister to Slovakia who replaced Druffel), we learn that they were concluded by July 31 and the Slovak representatives (again, we do not know, who they were; Tuka was probably one of them; Tiso and :Durcansky were vacationing) accepted the draft of the treaty with small amendments (24). Barckhausen then took this modified version of the Treaty to Berlin and, on August 7, brought it to Bratislava to Tuka, who then forwarded it to Tiso and :Durcansky (on their vacation) with a request for their approval (25 ). But the Treaty in its new form did not appeal either to Tiso or :Durcansky. Rejecting various points of the draft, they again upset the German applecart. On August 10, a new series of discussions was initiated, this time with :Durcansky present. These discussions finally brought concrete results. On Saturday evening, August 12, 1939, the Treaty on the Zone of Protection was signed at Bratislava by Minister Bernard and Lt. General Barckhausen on behalf of the German Reich, and by the Slovak Premier Tiso. The Treaty consisted of four Sections. Section I delimitated its extent. ,S ection II defined military sovereign rights of the German Wehrmacht and the sovereign rights of the Slovak State; German military sovereign rights included the right to requisition public and private premises, to use all means and lines of transportation, and to supervise armament factories working for the Reich; Germany was also given jurisdiction over her nationals; this Section also provided for Slovak garrisions within the zone. Section 1',III laid down rules regarding the employment of the personnel and material in, and on the payment for, the construction of fortifications. Section IV contained provisions for settlement of differences arising from the application of the Treaty. 1 �SLOVAKIA: 16 Verbatim German Text of Treaty (.From Photostat) Abschrift. Schutzzonenvert rag Zur Regelung der sich aus dem Schutzvertrage vom 18./23. Marz 1939 ergebenden Fragen ist zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und der Slowakischen Republik durch die unterzeichneten Bevollmachtigten beider Regierungen folgendes vereinbart worden. Abschnitt I): Abgrenzung der Schutzzone. Artikel 1: Die Ausdehnung der in Artikel 2 des deutsch-slowakis chen Vertrages vom 18./ 23. Marz 1939 genannten Zone in folgendem mit ''Schutzzone" bezeichnet - ergibt sich aus der diesem Vertrage als Bestandteil angehefteten Landkarte in Masstabe 1: 7·5,000. Die Schutzzone erstreckt sich von Westen her bis zu der dieser Landkarte eingezeichneten roten Linie, und sie schliesst den von dieser Linie bedecken Tei! des slowakischen Gebietes ein. Eine Bez·e ichnung der ostwartigen Schutzzonenbeg renzungslinie im Gelande durch Tafeln oder Grenzsteine erfolgt nicht. lnnerhalb dieser Schutzzone wird das Deutsche Reich die ihm im Schutzvertrage vom 18-/ 23. Marz 1939 von dem Slowakischen Staat iibertragenen Aufgaben nach Massgabe der Bestimmungen dieses Vertrages durchfiihren. Abschnitt II): Rechtsverhaltni sse in der Schutzzone. Artikel 2: Mit den militarischen IHoheitsrechten, deren Ausiibung der deutschen Wehrmacht in Arti~el 2 des Vertrages vom 18./23. Marz iibertragen worden ist, hat sie das Recht erhalten, im Sinne der fiir die Verteidigung des Slowakischen Staates im allgemeinen bestehenden Gesetze Leistungen im gleichen Masse wie die slowakische Wehrmacht in lFriedenszeiten zu fordern (ohne die ,B estimmungen, die in dem slowakischen Gesetz Nr. 131/36 enthalten sind). Bei Aufwendungen, die iiber den Rahmen normaler Manciverleistung en auch zeitlich hinausgehen, sind die hierfiir zu zahlenden Entschadigungen nach den ortsiiblichen Tagespreisen zu bemessen. Die deutsche Wehrmacht haftet fiir Schaden in gleichem Ausmass wie die slowakische Wehrmacht in tlbungszeiten. Demzufolge hat die deutsche Wehrmacht insbesondere folgende Rechte: a) (Das Recht, jederzeit in der Schutzzone militarische Anlagen zu errichten und im 'Benehmen mit den slowakischen Behcirden tiffentliche Gebaude, Grundstiicke and Anlagen fiir militarische Zwecke in Anspruch zu nehmen und private Gebaude und Grundstiicke in Benutzun_ zu nehmen, ohne die Durchfiihrung des Enteignungsverfahrens oder des Verfahrens zur voriibergehende n Entziehung der Benutzung abzuwarten, jedoch unbeschadet ,e iner spateren Regelung der Entschadigung. Die Entschadigung wird unter Mitwirkun,g deutscher Beauftragter im Wege giitlicher Verhandlun,gen mit den Betroffenen festigesetzt. IKommt eine giitliche Eintgung nicht zustande, so bleibt es den Betroffenen vorbehalten, die Festsetzung der Entschadig-ung nach den slowakischen Gesetzen zu betragen. In diesem Falle bleibt im �SLOVAKIA 19 Verhaltnis zu dem Deutschen Reich die Hohe der Entschadigung einer Vereinbarung mit der Slowakischen Regierung vorbehalten. b) Das Recht zur Benutzung der in der Schutzzone vorhanden,en Transportmittel und Transportwege unter moglichster Berucksichtigung der wirtschaftlichen Jnteressen der Slowakischen Republik. Ausserdem kann bei Vorliegen besonderer militarischer Notwendigkeiten die Bahn Pressburg-Ty,r nau-Pistyan-Trencin'8 illeinJCadca und die Strassen Pressburg-Modern-Na das-Trencin and Pressburg-Tyrnau-Pis tyan-Trencin,Sillein>C adca, von Trencin aus bis Cadca auch auf dem ostwartigen Waag-und Kysucaufer benutzt werden. Ferner erhalt die deutsche Wehrmacht das Recht, alle Orte zwischen Pressburg (ausschliesslich) and Cadca an den oben genannten Strassen bei Vorliegen militarischer Griinde vorubergehend zur Einquartierung zu benutzen. Die Slowakische Regierung ist hiervon in Kenntnis zu setzen. Die Benutzung der Eisenbahnlinien wird durch Sondertarifabmachun gen geregelt. Bei der Benutzung anderer slowakischer Verkehrsmittel sind die ortsiiblichen Tarifsatze zu zahlen, wenn nicht im Wege der Vereinbarung ein anderweitiger Entgelt fur die Benutzung festgesetzt wird. c) Das Recht, Riistungsbetriebe, die Auftrage vom Deutschen Reich erhalten, zu beaufsichtigen und auszunutzen unter BeriicksichUgung der Bediirfnisse der slowakischen Wehrmacht. Hieriiber wird eine besondere Vereinbarung zwischen den zustandigen Stellen der Deutschen Regierung und der Regierung des Slowakischen iStaates abgeschlossen werden. d) iDas Recht, in der Schutzzone alle erforderlichen Massnahmen des militarischen Abwehrdienstes zu treffen und von den Behorden des Slowakischen Staates die Anordnung und Durchfiihrung aller hierfiir erforderlichen Exekutivmassnahmen zu verlangen. !Die Deutsche Wehrmacht hat das !Recht, gegeniiber deutschen Wehrmachtangehori<g en und den fiir Wehrmachtzwecke in der Schutzzone tatigen reichsdeutschen Beamten, An-gestellten und Arbeitern deutsche militarische Exekutivorgane einzusetzen. Diese diirfen ,g egentiber Personen, die nicht die Staatsangehorigkeit im Deutschen Reich besitzen, nur in dringenden •Fallen, sofern slowakische Sicherheitsorgane nicht errechbar sind, Exekutivmassnahmen treffen. Festgenommene sind den zustandigen slowakischen Behorden unverziiglich, spatestens binnen 24 Stunden, zu ubergeben. e) Das Recht zur zollfreien Versor,g ung der deutschen Truppen und zur zollfreien Belieferung der militarischen Anlrugen aus dem Reich. Hieriiber wird eine Sondervereinbarung getroffen. Die Slowakische Regierung wird in engsten Einvernehmen mit der deutschen Wehrmacht alle Massnahmen treffen, die erforderlich sind, um der deutschen Wehrmacht die Durchfiihrung der ihr zum Schutz des Slowakischen S·taates, der Schutzzone und der darin befindlichen Truppen und militarischen Anlagen ubertragenen Aufgaben im Sinne des Vertrages vom 18./23. Marz 1939 zu ermoglichen und zu erleichtern. Artikel 3: Alie Hoheitsrechte in der Schutzzone ubt, soweit nicht im Vertrage vom 18. /2:3. Marz 1939 und in diesem Vertrage anders vereinbart, der Slowakische Staat aus. Hinsichtlich der Hoheitsrechte des Slowakischen Staates ist inbesondere folgendes vereinbart: a) Die Geltung aller jetzt und kiinftig gultigen rechtlichen Vor- �20 SLOVAKIA schriften der Slowakischen Republik erstreckt sich auf das Gebiet der Schutzzone, wenn dies nicht ausdriicklich ausgenommen wird, oder dem Sinne dieses Vertraiges und des Vertrages vom 18./23. Marz 1939 widerspricht. b) ,Die slowakischen Behorden in der Schutzzone iiben ihren Dienst weiterhin aus und unterliegen weiterhin uneingeschrankt der Aufsich t der ihnen vorgesetzten Behorden des Slowakischen Staates. c) Die Ausnutzung und Belegung der in der Schutzzone befindlichen militarischen Anlagen durch die slowakische Wehrmacht, das Uberliegen der Schutzzone durch slowakische Militarflugzeu.ge soiwie das Betraten der Schutzzone durch einzelne Angehorige der slowakischen Wehrmacht wird durch besondere Vereinbarung geregelt. d) In der Schutzzone kann der Zutrtt zu militarisch wichtigen Gebietsteilen, Befestigungsarbeiten and -anlagen von der deutschen Wehrmacht verhindert werden. Das Betretungsverbot wird von den zustandigen slowakischen Behorden auf Veranlassung der deutschen Wehrmachtstellen und in beiderseitigem Einvernehmen erlassen und der Bevolkerung in ortsiiblichen Weise bekanntgegeben werden. e) Die Einrichtung von Uberfluigzonen in der Schutzzone zur Ermoglichen des gegenseitiigen zivilen Flugverkehrs wird einer besonderen Vereinbarung vorbehalten. f) Deutsche Wehrmachtangehorig e diirfen das slowakische Staatsgebiet ausserhalb der Schutzzone nur betreten 1) aus dienstlichem Anlass mit Bewilligung der slowakischen zustandigen Behorden (Ausnahme Art. 2c) 2) bei Urlaub nur gemass den deutschen Bestimmungen iiber Auslandsurlaub. Artikel 4: Deutsche Wehrmachtsangehorig e, die sich auf Grund des Schutzvertragen vom 18./23. Marz 1939 in der Schutzzone befinden, sind den deutschen Strafgesetzen unterworfen und unterstehen wegen aller in der Schutzzone begangenen strafbaren Handlungen der deutschen Strafgerich tsbarkeit. Sonstige deutsche Staatsangehorige, die bei den Befestigungsarbeiten beschaftigt sind, sind wegen strafbarer Handlungen, die in der Schutzzone begangen sind und sich gegen das Deutsche Reich richten, allein der deutschen Strafgerichtsbarkeit unterworfen. Deutsche Reichsangehoriige sowie reichsdeutsche Handelsgesellschaften, Erwerbs- und Wirtschaftsgenossens chaften, die auf Grund eines privaten Vertragsverhaltnisses mit der Errichtung militarischer Anlagen in der Schutzzone befasst sind, konnen aus ihrem gegen-seitigen Rechtsverhaltnis sowie aus ihrem Rechtsverhaltnis zum Deutschen Reich wegen eines Anspruchs aus ihren iRechtsverhaltnissen, namentlich aus Arbeits-, Dienst-- und Lieferungsverhaltnissen oder wegen einer unerlaubten Handlung, die mit der Tatigkeit zur Errichtung der militarischen AnlaJgen unmittelbar in Zusammenhang steht, nur vor deutschen Gerichten verklagt werden. Klagen wegen dieser Anspriiche konnen bei dem Amts- oder Landgericht Briinn erhoben werden. Es bleibt der Reichsregierung vorbehalten, auch andere Gerichte zu bestimmen. Artikel 5: In den vor die deutschen Gerichte gehorigen Strafsachen sind die Sicherheitsbehorden des Slowakischn Staates befugt, bei Gefahr im Verzuge nach den fiir sie geltenden Verfahrengesetzten �SLOVAKIA 21 die ;\-lassnahmen zu treffen, die zur Aufklii.rung des Sachverhalts, zur Festhaltung des Beschuldigten oder zur Sicherung von Gegen-stii.nden notwendig sind, die z1ir Begehung strafbarer Handlungen gebraucht oder bestimmt sind. Von dem Veranlassten haben die Sicherheitsbehiirden des Slowakischen Staates unverziiglich den nii.chsten Gerichtsherrn (Divisionskommander) in Kenntnis zu setzen und ihm einen festgenommen Beschuldigten zuzufahren. Deutsche Wehrmachtsan:gehiirige sowie die fiir Wehrmacht21wecke in der ,s chutzzone tii.ti1g en deutschen •Reichsangehorigen haben stii.ndig einen giiltigen Personenausweis bei sich zu fiihren, mit dem sie sich gegeniiber slowakischen Sicherheitsorganen auf Aufforderung ausweisen konnen. A r t ikel 6 : Die Slowakischen Behiirden werden Handlungen, die ,g egen die in diesem Vertrag festgelegten Interessen des Deutschen Reichs gerichtet sind, so verfol•g en als ob sie gegen den Slowakischen Staat gerichtet wii.ren. Die Slowakische Regierung wird dafiir Sorge tragen, dass das Deutsch e Reich die Miiglichkeit erhii.lt, den deutschen Interessen Geltung zu verschaffen, wenn es sich in Strafverfahren vor slowakischen Justizbehorden um Fragen handelt, die das gemeinsame Interesse des Deutschen Reichs und des Slowakischen Staates beriihren. Die Slowakische Regierung wird ferner im Einvernehmen mit der Reichsregierung Vorkehrungen treffen, dass den in Artikel 4 bezeichneten Personen in Verfahren vor slowakischen Justizbehiirden in sprachlicher Hinsicht weitestgehende Erleichterungen zuteil werden. Absch nitt 111 ) : Befestigung.sarbeiten. A r t ike l 7: Militii.rische Bauten and -Anlagen innerhalb der Schutzzone werden vom Reich auf eigene Kosten hergestellt. Artike l 8 : Die Deutsche Wehrmacht wird das fiir die Arbeiten und Anlagen in der Schutzzone erforderliche Material nach Miiglichkeit aus dem slowakischen Staatsgebiet beziehen. Soweit Preise hierfiir niclrt im Wege der Ausschreibun,g und freien Vereinbarung festJgelegt werden, sind die iiblichen Ta,g espreisen zu zahlen . Artike l 9 : Die Deutsche Wehrmacht wird bei der Ausfiihrung d er Arbeiten und Anlagen vorzugsweise Arbeits krii.fte aus der Slowakei anstellen. Eine Abweichung hiervon kommt insbesondere in Frage, wenn militii.rische Griinde die Einstellung bestimmter anderer Arbeitskrii.fte, z. B. gelernter Fach- und Spezialarbeiter erforderlich machen. Arbeitskrii.fte aus der Slowakei werden in slowakischer Wii.hrung entlohnt. Bei der Einstellung von Arbeitern wird nach einem allgemeinen, im Benehmen mit d er Slowakischen iRegierung aufgestellten Vertrage formular vorfabren. A r t ike l 10: Nach den slowakischen Gesetzen ist zu verfahren, wenn bei Arbeiten and Anlagen der deutschen Wehrmacht in der Schutzzone historisch wichtige 1Funde gemacht werden, oder wenn dabei Mineral- und Erzlager, oder andere Bodenschii.tze entdeckt werden. Art ike l 11 : Die deutsche Wehrmacht ,w ird bei den in der Schutzzone durchzufiihrenden Arbeiten und Anlagen mit besonderer Sor,g falt auf historische Denkmii.ler und auf die fiir den Slowakischen Staat und die slowakische Nation bedeutsamen Oiits Riicksicht nehmen. Abschnitt IV ) : Schlussbestimm ungen. Artike l 12 : Alie Meinungsverchiedenheiten, die sich aus der Durchfiihrung dieses Vertrages ergeben, werden, soweit sie nicht zur Zu- �22 SLOVAKIA stiindigkeit anderer O11gane gehoren, einer Kommission unterbreitet, die aus 2 deutschen und 2 slo.wakischen Mitgliedern bestehen soil, die im Bedarfsfalle zusammen tritt und das Recht hat, Sachvers·tiindige hinzuzuziehen und nach Bedarf auch ein fiinftes Mitglied zu bestellen. Kommt eine Einigung iiber das fiinfte Mitglied nicht zustande, so ist die Angelegenheit auf dem iiblichen diplomatischen Wege bei den 1Regierungen anhangig zu machen. Die Anrufunig der Kommission hat keine aufschiebende Wirkung. Dieser Vertra;g wird in doppelter Urschrift, in deutscher und in slowakischer Sprache ausgefertigt. Er tritt am Tage nach der Unterzeichnung in Kraft. Pressburg, den 12. August 1939. Fiir das Deutsche Reich: a. o. Gesandter und bevollmachtigter Minister des Deutschen Reichs in Pressburg Generalleu tnant 1. Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, (hereafter as D. G. F. P.) Volume Vil, pp. 10-11. 2. For the Treaty and the Confidential -P rotocol on economic and financial cooperation see D. G. F. P. V[, pp. 42-4-5. 3. D. G. F. P. VJ, p. 43 - The Academic Guard played an out~ standing role since October 1938, but its participation on the struggle for independence was of great importance especially in the decisive days of March 10-14, 1939. It was a paramilitary organization of university students, led by Dr. J. Kirschbaum as supreme command er. After March 14, it supplied the Slovak Republic with many outstanding workers in the Slovak public life, namely in Party organization, press, diplomacy, cultural associations etc. Among the leaders of the Academic Guard who played an important part in March 1939, are now in exile Dr. Joseph ,P auco, Dr. Joseph Mikula, Koloman Murgas, Dr. G. Danihel, Dr. L . Jankovic, etc. In 1940 the Academic Guard was dissolved by the order of the Ministry of Jnternal Affairs because it opposed introduction of National Socialist ideology in 1Slovakia. Dr. Kirschbaum was first called to arms and then sent abroad. No Slovak newspaper was allowed to mention his nam e for two following years. See Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1939-1945. 4. The origin of this zone can be traced back to Berlin where Hitler, talking to Tiso on March 13, told him among other things tha,t not only Hungarians and Poles were mobilizing, but "the Czechs also want to occcupy the western part of Slovakia up to the Vah." Tiso in his defense hinted at this ominous suggestion which is also ,supported by the 0 . K. W. Memorandum of March 24, (R 100 (see: Nazi Conspiracy and Agression, VJII, p. 83) according to which, if Slovakia is k ept independent, the military Schutzzone is to extend up to the Vah; but if Slovakia is divided between Poles and Hungarians, the whole area up to the Nitra is to be incorporated in the Protectorate ("Sollte Slowakei aufigeteilet werden, soil die Ostwest [Neutra-linie] Grenze werden und Pressburg einbezogen werden"). 5. According to the report of the British Consul in •B ratislava on iMarch 15, the German troops had reached Malacky by mid.day of that day and Trencfn by evening (D. Brit. F. P .. 3rd Series. Vol. IV, �SLOVAKIA 23 p. 287). On March 17, the Slovak Foreign Ministry lodged in a "note verbale" several complaints on the behaviour of the German troops in the occupied territory. 6. Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe, Joseph Pauco, Passaic, 1952, p. 232. 7. ibid. pp. ,233-4. 8. D. G. F. P., VJ, p. 756. 9. Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe, p. 234, footnote. 10. Tiso, Tuka and f>urcansky were invited to Berlin, where the latter two arrived on March 21. ,Ribbentrop kept them waiti.Il!g in complete uncertainty for three full days and then on March 23, at 12: 30 P. M., in their presence si,gned the Schutzvertrag. 11. The Polish White Book, pp. 62-3. 12. The offer to the Poles was, nevertheless, still open, and Hitler would have waived the .g uarantee if the ·Poles had been more cooperative (Cf. Doc. R 100 of March 24. How long the Fueh·rer considers himself bound to the 'T reaty concluded with Slovakia is open to doubt. It seems that he will use Slovakia as an asset to bargain between himself, Poland, and Hungary). On March 26, Ribbentrop a•g ain suggest-ed to Lipski "that the Slovak problem might still be discussed within the framework of a general Ausgleich" (see: Polish White Book, p. 67.), but the Poles now rejected the offer definitely. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. D. G. F. P., VI, pp. 114-115. ibid. p. 146. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. D. G. F. P., V[, pp. 7-56-762. ibid. p. 774. ibid. pp. 840-841. ibid. p. 916. ibid. pp. 9·52-953. ibid. p. 840, footnote. ibid. p. 1025. D. G F. P., Third Series, Vol. V, p. 89. D. G. F. P., Vil, pp. 254-255. At this conference, Tiso, Tuka, f>urcansky, and Mach negotiated with Barckhausen, Drufiel, Becker, and Hoffmann. The Slovaks advanced every argument imaiginable. if>urcansky thought that the presence of the German troops in the zone and outside it was generally interpreted as lack of trust on the part of the German Government in the Slovak Government. Tuka pointed out that the Slovak State should not be protected in the same manner as one would protect a flock of sheep, but that it should contribute to its own protection by having its own army, and this army must not be deprived of its equipment. Tiso and f>urcansky expressed the fea•r that, in case of the outbreak of Polish-!German hostilities, Hungary would invade Slovakia and, hence, Slovakia must be prepared for every eventuality. As for the Slovak desiderata, ihey were centered about these three points: (i) Establishment of two garrisons in the zone and the free use of the Malacky artillery range. (ii) Withdrawal of German military and other uniformed units (police, gendarmerie) from Zilina, Trencin, and Nove Mesto nad Vahom. (iii) Approval to keep nine tons of poisonous war gas ('Yperit'). D. G. F. P., VII, p. 2. � SLOVAKIA 7 The news of Dr. Tiso's departure caused the t ension in Bratislava and in all of Slovakia to grow. There was now not only fear of Hungarian occupation, if Dr. Tiso's mission were to fail but also fear of occupation by the Germans whose troops were stationed on the banks of the Danube on the Austrian side. At the same time there was, however , also a strong hope that Slovakia finally would become an independent state and that the dreams, desires and wishes of many Slovak generations would come true. 1. T h e writer was vice-presiden t of Pax R oma na and Slavia Catholi ca a nd, for ma ny year s, pr esiden t of th e Catholic Fed e ration of Slovak Stud en ts. 2. Cfr. Sidor's: Poznamky k historickym dnom r. 1939 p u blish ed by Lettri ch's R egime, Br atislava, 1946, a nd a lso accounts in Slovenska Obrana, October , 1939. 3. T h e Governm en t was composed as follows : Presiden t - Dr . Joseph T iso ; Prime Minister K. Sid or ; For e ig n Affairs - D r . Durcansky; E du cation - M. Cerna k ; F ina n ce - A. Mederly; Economy - Dr . Pru'.ii ns ky; Communica tions - Dr. Kir schba um ; Nationa l Defense - Gen. ,C atlos; 1Propaganda - A. Mach ; Justice - D r . V. T uka. - See de ta ils in Slovenska Obrana, October 17, 1939 . 4. 'T h e minu tes of th e Slovak Diet. Als o S idor's r em a rks on the historic days (ma nuscr ip ts, no t th e excerpts p ublis h ed b y th e Comm u nists in order to cond emn Dr. Tiso) . • • • THE GERMAN ZONE OF PROTECTION IN SLOVAK.IA (A study in Slovak-German relations in March-August 1939) Frantisek Vnuk On March 14, 1939, the independence of Slovakia was proclaimed by the Slovak Assembly. Two days later Baron von Weizsiicker wired a circular to all German diplomatic missions informing them that Slovak Prime Minister Dr. Tiso had transmitted the following r equest to the Fuhrer by telegram: With full trust in you, the Flihrer and Chancellor of the Gret er German Reich, the Slovak State places itself under your protection. The 'Slovak State asks you to take over this protection (1). Hitler acknowledged the receipt of the telegram and complied with the request. For this purpose a treaty of protection between Germany and Slovakia was drawn up (2) . Article 2 of the treaty stipulated that "the German Wehrmacht shall at all times have the right to set up �8 SLOVAKIA military installations in a zone bounded on the west by the frontier of the Slovak State and on the east by the general line of the eastern edge of the Little Carpathians, the eastern edge of the White Carpathians and the eastern edge of Javorniky, and to man these installations with such forces as the German Wehrmacht consider necessary ... Military sovereign rights (Hoheitsrechts) will be exercised by the German Wehrmacht (in this zone)" (3) . The establishment of this zone ( 4) represents in many respects an interesting aspect of Slovak-German relations. It casts a favorable light on a well-conceived but less successful attempt to extricate Slovak foreign policy from the agreed upon Slovak-German coordination in this field. This praiseworthy attempt and the subsequent unyielding behavior of Slovak politicians in the face of Hitler's demands contrast sharply with the charges of vassalage and servile obedience. In fact, the Slovaks resisted and contradicted Hitler's wishes (and with some success, too ) when powerful nations yielded and were advising others to yield. The negotiations concerning the zone were initiated on the night of March 17-18, 1939, in Vienna. At this time the occupation of Western Slovakia was already an accomplished fact (5) and - since possession is nine points of the law - the position of the ISlovak negotiators was noticeably weakened and by no means enviable. Nevertheless Dr. Joseph Tiso, Durcansky, Tuka, and Mach, the principal Slovak representatives, were determined to save could be saved. Preliminary negotiations started at Biirckel's flat at 5 p. m. Afterwards the Slovaks met SeyssInquart, then Keitel, and finally, at 1 a . m., on the 18th, in the Hotel Imperial they faced Hitler. Each stop represented more humiliation and more pressing demands and brought home one thing: Hitler was going to exact a high price for his protection ; much higher than he ever hinted at in Berlin on March 13th. Tiso was so disappointed at what he rightly considered - being let down that h e wanted to return to Bratislava without even seeing Hitler. Only his companions persuaded him to stay, arguing that in front of the Germans they all ought to show a united �SLOVAKIA 9 determination not to give up even an inch of sacred Slovak soil (6). When Hitler, in the presence of Ribbentrop and Keitel, met the Slovaks, he told them - according to the testimony of Tiso - that the 'Shutzvertrag' could be realized only if Germany were given far-reaching concessions to build up a zone in Western Slovakia. The extent of these concessions - as Tiso clearly saw - left the Slovaks practically without any rights to exercise their sovereignty in that territory. It was more than he could bear. At 2 :45 A. M. he got up and was at the point of departure. Hitler, it must be said, in spite of his many shortcommings had a soft spot for the Slovaks and, apparently moved by the pathetic sight of the hardpressed protegees, stopped Tiso with a very assuring piece of oratory. He said: "I do not want even an inch of Slovak ground. In Slovakia the Slovaks alone will develop their own national, cultural, and economic life. I shall guarantee the full independence and territorial integrity of Slovakia. The historical frontiers of Slovakia are and remain forever unchanged. I shall hold my protective hand over ,S lovakia and nobody will reach with stealthy hand for the Slovak State, where the Slovaks will live their own full life" (7). This rhetorical outburst pacified the Slovaks; the rest of the discussion was carried on in a much happier mood. The Slovaks ceded the Germans the right to build and man fortifications in the zone "so as to enable the German Wehrmacht, in the event of war, to take up such positions as are most advantageous to it" (8). The Slovak delegation left Vienna with the impression that the zone remained within the legal structure of the Slovak State. No treaty was formulated or signed that night. Formal negotiations were conducted on the afternoon of March 18. Tiso did not take part in these conversations. The Slovaks were represented by Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky, Tuka a Zvrskovec; the Germans by Keppler and Gaus, the legal adviser to the Foreign Minister. The Treaty of Protection ( Schutzvertrag) was signed in Vienna the same day by :Durcansky and Tuka who also pledged to obtain Tiso's signature to the Treaty by noon of March 19, in re-1 �10 SLOVAKIA turn for which Keppl er undert ook to get Ribbe ntrop's signature within 24 hours. :Durcansky, Tuka, and Veesenmayer broug ht the Treaty to Tiso for signat ure the evening March 18; he signed it and appear ed to be satisfi ed · with its formu lation (9). Ribben trop, on the other hand, did not sign the Treaty within the stipula ted time limit. All in all, the Germa ns were in no partic ular hurry with respec t to the Slovaks. The reason for their procra stinati on, which was so frustra ting and inexpl icable to the Slovak s then (10), is seen clearly now: they hoped to come to terms with the Poles and Hunga rians. The Polish White Book gives an accoun t of Ribbentrop's propos als to Lipski on March 21 (11), namely , that German-lPolish discus sions "would be possib le on this subject" (i. e., on the questi on of Slovak ia). But the Germa ns must have consid ered the Polish attitud e discou raging , and Ribbe ntrop put his signat ure on the Treaty on -March 23, in Berlin (12), but not before Article 3 of the Treaty was modifi ed and the words "in order to defend Slovak State agains t any possib le extern al attack s" were omitte d. Once the Treaty was signed, the execut ion of Article 2 proved to be more difficu lt than anticip ated. Appar ently the Germa n milita ry author ities were not very happy with what, after all, was a politic al settlem ent. Their behavi or left much to be desire d and Slovak protes ts were very soon pourin g in. At first, the surpri sed Slovak s asked for an explan ation, but later protes ted very vigorio usly. On March 25, the .Slovak Foreig n ·M inistry in a 'note verbal e" called for a more definit e determ ination of the probable durati on and charac ter in intern ationa l law of the Germa n occupa tion of Slovak territo ry. The note also protested a•g ainst the exerci se of sovere ign rights "beyon d those of milita ry necess ity" and agains t the remov al of milita ry materi al which - they claime d - by the secess ion of Slovak ia, had leg-ally become Slovak 'State proper ty (13). It was inevita ble that the occupa tion would cause considera ble frictio n betwee n the Slovak popula tion and the Germa n troops , and that this frictio n would projec t unfavora bly into Slovak -Germ an relatio ns. But the amoun t �SLOVAKIA 11 of misunderstanding surpassed every expectation. The Slovaks in their optimistic enthusiasm were determined to enjoy their newly-gained independence to the fullest extent and consequently found the German presence in the zone very annoying and did not even try to hide their displeasure. The Germans, on the other hand, especially the military, did not bother to adjust their behavior in respect to the Slovaks. An ordinary German soldier and officer, fresh from victorious entries into Austria, the Sudetenland, and Bohemia, was hardly expected to be less arrogant towards Slovaks than he was towards Czechs; superiority was after all the essential part of his make-up. There were many instances of discontent, misunderstanding, and small incidents, and their existence could be best gauged by the frequent apologies and assurances which the 'Slovak Press Bureau was issuing in the newspapers and on the air. Under pressure of Slovak protests and complaints, the German representatives of General Staff and Foreign Ministry, at a meeting on March 28, agreed on a unified attitude towards the question of the zone. Their conclusions, though still by no means modest, represent in many respects retreat in the face of the Slovak protests, and can be briefly summarized as follows: 1. Withdrawal of the German Custom Frontier Protection Force to the Slovak-Moravian frontier. 2. The Vah fixed as the line of military occupation. 3. Appointment of a staff officer to the Consul General to act as liaison between the Slovak Army and the Wehrmacht. 4. The German troops east of the Vah to be recalled. 5. German claim to the entire war material of the former Czecho~Slovak army. 6. No removal of war material east of the occupied zone. 7. Decision as to size of the Slovak army. 8. Creation of s e p a r ate military formation for the Volksdeutche (14). Negotiations on the above topics took place on April 4 and were reported by Pares. Unfortunately no details concerning conversations are available, but it is known that �12 SLOVAKIA the Slovaks were represented by Dr. Tiso and the Ministers of War, Finance, and Economics, and the chief subject was the removal of war material "purchased by the German Government from the Czecho-!S lovak Government which had been stored in Slovakia" (15). As a result of these conversations, in addition to a German military adviser to be sent to Bratislava, a mixed Slovak-German commission was to be appointed to settle any controversial issue. At about the same time Tuka in his broadcast promised that the German army would leave when it was no longer needed. On April 15, the High Command of the Wehrmacht submitted a list of requirements, the fulfilment of which was expected from the Slovak Government under the Treaty of Protection. The demands, even in their "more lenient" form, were very exacting: 1. The High Command intended to maintain its military forces east of the Vah until the removal of "Czech arms and Czech war material" was completed. 2. Among the sovereign rights they claimed the right to occupy military and also public and private buildings, to use all forms and means of transport, to have at their disposal the factories concerned with war economy, duty-free import and export, postal services, telecommunications and Intelligence Service (Abwehrdienst). 3. The zone to include also Trencin, Krupa, Zilina, and Povazska Bystrica. 4. The size of Slovak army to be completed at one per cent of the population. 5. No units of the Slovak army to be garrisoned within the zone, but para-military formations (Hlinka Guards) to be allowed. 6. Export and import of war material to and from Slovakia to be refused or permitted by the Slovak Government only in agreement with the Reich Government or the High Command of the Wehrmacht (16). When these requirements were communicated by Druffel to Tiso, the latter declared that the Slovak Government did not wish to make difficulties, but asked for discussions with the German authorities on the highest level before �SLOVAKIA 13 making any definite commitments. The Germans consented and, as a result, a conference took place in Berlin on April 19. Slovak representatives included Tiso, :Durcansky, and Tuka, the Ministry of Defense was represented by Catlos and Schneider, and also present were Cernak and Szathmary from the Slovak Legation in Berlin. The German delegation consisted of top-ranking experts, both political and military, but conspicious by their absence were the policy making personalities of the Reich. Its members were: Weissacker, Keppler, Wormann, Gaus, Altenburg, Tippelskirsch, HeydenRynsch, and Becker. Slovak grievances were numerous. To start with, Tiso mentioned the occupation by German troops of the aerodrome of Malacky and the demand by a German armored formation for transit through Bratislava. Then he complained of the severity of the demands of the German Wehrmacht, stating that "extension of the zone to Trencin and Zilina was hardly bearable for the Slovak Government"; of the behaviour of the German troops who in some villages occupied schools and thus made school attendance impossible, and employed Czech workers in preference to Slovaks. Furthermore, he claimed a share in the ownership of the former Czecho-Slovak arms factories and clamored for the return of a number of aircraft. German answers were either non-commital or asked to extend negotiations to clarify the application of the Treaty. Apparently the Slovaks demanded more than the German representatives were empowered to grant. Meanwhile the joint Slovak~German Commission was negotiating the treaty on the Zone of Protection but it did not seem to make any noticeable progress. On June 12, the Slovaks submitted another "note verbale'' which contained a number of Slovak views on the interpretation of the text of the Treaty. Arguments advanced by Slovaks were discussed at the conference on June 19 (17), where Tiso expressed the wish to draw up a memorandum and to discuss it personally with Hitler in hopeful expectation that the Slovaks might get more favorable treatment at the hands of the Fuhrer, than they were getting from his representatives. Hitler, however, declined to see Tiso and refused to consider the various points of the Slovak memorandum. �14 SLOVAKIA On June 21 this memorandum, in the form of an "aide memoire", was submitted to the German Foreign Ministry (18). It represented a voluminous list of complaints and expressed an outburst of accumulated Slovak indi,gnation about the German injustices. It questioned German rights to exclude Slovak garrisons from the zonal area, the interpretation of "sovereign rights", and claimed as Slovak the former Cecho..!Slovak military installations which were taken over by the Wehnnacht (such as the artillery range at Malacky); furthermore, it also questioned the wisdom of maintaining German ,garrisons outside the zone (e. g., in .Zilina, Trencin, Nove Mesto nad Va.horn) and criticised excursions of German troops to Bratislava and other places outside the zone. With regard to military material, the Slovak memorandum complained about the removal of war material from Pezinok, Modra, Malacky, Plavecke Podhradie, Hlboke, Turecky Vrch, Senica, Nemcova, Nove Mesto nad Va.horn, Trencin, Istebnik, Skalka, and .Zilina in a manner which "transgressed the bounds of an amicable atmosphere". Furthermore, it objected to occupation of munition factories and factories producing various types of war material at Dubnica, Povazska IBystrica, Stara Tura, Myjava, and .Zilina; to taking over of the stocks and installations of the airports at Novy Dvor and .Zilina; and it sadly commented that proceedings connected with the removal of war material were often conducted "as though Slovakia were an enemy country and not a State whose political and territorial independence had been guaranted by the Flihrer and Chancellor". The memorandum concluded a few more grievances against the military authorities whose attitude caused "administrative and economic uncertainty". The matter was then brought to Hitler's attention. This is evident from a statement made by Keitel on June 20, according to which Hitler's decision on the subject at the conference held by him amounted to the following: "The Flihrer said that he wished the negotiations to be conducted energetically and resolutely which, together with our concrete offers, must lead to early success. The prerequisite for the proposed support of Slovakia is the complete accep- �SLOVAKIA 15 tance of our demeands, the more so as Slovakia is dependent on our military, economic, and financial aid." This authoritative pronouncement meant that all the subsequent attempts of the ,Slovaks for better terms encountered the adamant attitude of the German authorities. Thus, when, on June 22, the Slovak Minister in 'Berlin (Matus Cernak) saw Wormann at the German Foreign Ministry, he was brusquely told that the Germans disagreed with the Slovak Foreign Ministry's attempts to establish inconsistencies between the demands of the German Military Delegation and the assurances given by leading German statesmen regarding the conclusion of the Treaty of Protection. He was asked to make it clear in Bratislava that "the Military Delegation was among these demands in the name of the German Government". Cernak sugested that concessions be made by both parties and thought that this would make it possible to reach an agreement which would "not only maintain, but arouse sympathy for Germany" among the Slovak poulation. But Wormann had little understanding for the Slovak point of view and berated the Slovaks because several of the demands expressed in the memorandum of June 19 were in contradiction to the Treaty of Protection (19). On July 3, Cernak again called on the German Foreign Ministry, where he saw Weizsa.cker. He pleaded with him for moderation of the German demands, arguing that "Tiso's ... pro-German policy would be shaken, if it were not supported. In case of emergency, Slovakia would, of course, be completely at the disposal of German Armed Forces, but in peace-time one ought to remain within the scope of the terms of the Treaty. But again Cerna.k's arguments were of no avail and were, one by one, refuted by Weizsa.cker. Faced with such an uncooperative attitude, Cernak asked to be allowed to speak to Ribbentrop personally, but was told that the Foreign Minister was not available (20). The Slovaks, ignorant of Hitler's decision and trusting in his words with hopeful optimism, left no stone unturned in their attempts to secure more favorable terms. Their representatives were untiring in demanding interviews with Hitler and Ribbentrop who, as the chief architects of the 1 �16 SLOVAKIA Slovak-German Treaty, could be made, they thought, to stand up to their promises. In this, however, they wer e unsuccessful. But they could get only to Weizsacker; and he, after trying to persuade them that the German negotiators "were acting on the instructions issued to them by the authoritative persons in the Reich", admonished the Slovaks that they should look at them as such and "conduct themselves accordingly" (21). As time went by, the Germans were getting progressively more and more anxious to have the whole issue about the interpretation of the Treaty finally settled and were apparently annoyed by the delay caused by the stubborness of the Slovaks. In view of the approaching German~olish conflict it was paramont for them to have their stand in Slovakia precisely determined and legalized. Their activity (often on the verge of nervousness) was in sharp contrast with the patient and determined attitude of the Slovaks who were unwilling to retreat. The situation was provided with a real touch of comedy when the Slovak statesmen went on their summer holidays (Tiso left for Topofcianky, Durcansky for the High Tatras) while German couriers were flying between and Bratislava. On July 19, Druffel was shown a report from Cernak according to which Eisenlohr and Weizsacker had expressed themselves in favour of token Slovak garrisons in the protected zone. On the strength of this report, Durcansky urged Catlos to dispatch some troops into the zone. On July 2:1, Catlos ordered one batallion to move in and, at the same time, informed the German military mission of his action. From the Germans came a vehement protest, coupled with threats, and the order was recalled. This move displeased Durcansky immensely. He maintained that Catlos should have created a "fait accompli" without regard for the German military mission and their feelings. The argument went so far that Catlos threatened to resign (22). Whether Catlos's action was right or wrong is open to question. It may be recalled, however, that at that time, the German military authorities were resolutely against ·any Slovak troops in that zone, and the same view was shared by Hitler. �SLOVAKIA 17 On July 17, the German Foreign Ministry sent to their representative in Bratislava a letter of instructions with an enclosed draft of the Treaty on the Zone of Protection (23). With this draft as a basis, new negotiations ensued. Unfortunately no records were found concerning their course. From the report of tH. Bernard (new German Minister to Slovakia who replaced Druffel), we learn that they were concluded by July 31 and the Slovak representatives (again, we do not know, who they were; Tuka was probably one of them; Tiso and :Durcansky were vacationing) accepted the draft of the treaty with small amendments (24). Barckhausen then took this modified version of the Treaty to Berlin and, on August 7, brought it to Bratislava to Tuka, who then forwarded it to Tiso and :Durcansky (on their vacation) with a request for their approval (25 ). But the Treaty in its new form did not appeal either to Tiso or :Durcansky. Rejecting various points of the draft, they again upset the German applecart. On August 10, a new series of discussions was initiated, this time with :Durcansky present. These discussions finally brought concrete results. On Saturday evening, August 12, 1939, the Treaty on the Zone of Protection was signed at Bratislava by Minister Bernard and Lt. General Barckhausen on behalf of the German Reich, and by the Slovak Premier Tiso. The Treaty consisted of four Sections. Section I delimitated its extent. ,S ection II defined military sovereign rights of the German Wehrmacht and the sovereign rights of the Slovak State; German military sovereign rights included the right to requisition public and private premises, to use all means and lines of transportation, and to supervise armament factories working for the Reich; Germany was also given jurisdiction over her nationals; this Section also provided for Slovak garrisions within the zone. Section 1',III laid down rules regarding the employment of the personnel and material in, and on the payment for, the construction of fortifications. Section IV contained provisions for settlement of differences arising from the application of the Treaty. 1 �SLOVAKIA: 16 Verbatim German Text of Treaty (.From Photostat) Abschrift. Schutzzonenvert rag Zur Regelung der sich aus dem Schutzvertrage vom 18./23. Marz 1939 ergebenden Fragen ist zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und der Slowakischen Republik durch die unterzeichneten Bevollmachtigten beider Regierungen folgendes vereinbart worden. Abschnitt I): Abgrenzung der Schutzzone. Artikel 1: Die Ausdehnung der in Artikel 2 des deutsch-slowakis chen Vertrages vom 18./ 23. Marz 1939 genannten Zone in folgendem mit ''Schutzzone" bezeichnet - ergibt sich aus der diesem Vertrage als Bestandteil angehefteten Landkarte in Masstabe 1: 7·5,000. Die Schutzzone erstreckt sich von Westen her bis zu der dieser Landkarte eingezeichneten roten Linie, und sie schliesst den von dieser Linie bedecken Tei! des slowakischen Gebietes ein. Eine Bez·e ichnung der ostwartigen Schutzzonenbeg renzungslinie im Gelande durch Tafeln oder Grenzsteine erfolgt nicht. lnnerhalb dieser Schutzzone wird das Deutsche Reich die ihm im Schutzvertrage vom 18-/ 23. Marz 1939 von dem Slowakischen Staat iibertragenen Aufgaben nach Massgabe der Bestimmungen dieses Vertrages durchfiihren. Abschnitt II): Rechtsverhaltni sse in der Schutzzone. Artikel 2: Mit den militarischen IHoheitsrechten, deren Ausiibung der deutschen Wehrmacht in Arti~el 2 des Vertrages vom 18./23. Marz iibertragen worden ist, hat sie das Recht erhalten, im Sinne der fiir die Verteidigung des Slowakischen Staates im allgemeinen bestehenden Gesetze Leistungen im gleichen Masse wie die slowakische Wehrmacht in lFriedenszeiten zu fordern (ohne die ,B estimmungen, die in dem slowakischen Gesetz Nr. 131/36 enthalten sind). Bei Aufwendungen, die iiber den Rahmen normaler Manciverleistung en auch zeitlich hinausgehen, sind die hierfiir zu zahlenden Entschadigungen nach den ortsiiblichen Tagespreisen zu bemessen. Die deutsche Wehrmacht haftet fiir Schaden in gleichem Ausmass wie die slowakische Wehrmacht in tlbungszeiten. Demzufolge hat die deutsche Wehrmacht insbesondere folgende Rechte: a) (Das Recht, jederzeit in der Schutzzone militarische Anlagen zu errichten und im 'Benehmen mit den slowakischen Behcirden tiffentliche Gebaude, Grundstiicke and Anlagen fiir militarische Zwecke in Anspruch zu nehmen und private Gebaude und Grundstiicke in Benutzun_ zu nehmen, ohne die Durchfiihrung des Enteignungsverfahrens oder des Verfahrens zur voriibergehende n Entziehung der Benutzung abzuwarten, jedoch unbeschadet ,e iner spateren Regelung der Entschadigung. Die Entschadigung wird unter Mitwirkun,g deutscher Beauftragter im Wege giitlicher Verhandlun,gen mit den Betroffenen festigesetzt. IKommt eine giitliche Eintgung nicht zustande, so bleibt es den Betroffenen vorbehalten, die Festsetzung der Entschadig-ung nach den slowakischen Gesetzen zu betragen. In diesem Falle bleibt im �SLOVAKIA 19 Verhaltnis zu dem Deutschen Reich die Hohe der Entschadigung einer Vereinbarung mit der Slowakischen Regierung vorbehalten. b) Das Recht zur Benutzung der in der Schutzzone vorhanden,en Transportmittel und Transportwege unter moglichster Berucksichtigung der wirtschaftlichen Jnteressen der Slowakischen Republik. Ausserdem kann bei Vorliegen besonderer militarischer Notwendigkeiten die Bahn Pressburg-Ty,r nau-Pistyan-Trencin'8 illeinJCadca und die Strassen Pressburg-Modern-Na das-Trencin and Pressburg-Tyrnau-Pis tyan-Trencin,Sillein>C adca, von Trencin aus bis Cadca auch auf dem ostwartigen Waag-und Kysucaufer benutzt werden. Ferner erhalt die deutsche Wehrmacht das Recht, alle Orte zwischen Pressburg (ausschliesslich) and Cadca an den oben genannten Strassen bei Vorliegen militarischer Griinde vorubergehend zur Einquartierung zu benutzen. Die Slowakische Regierung ist hiervon in Kenntnis zu setzen. Die Benutzung der Eisenbahnlinien wird durch Sondertarifabmachun gen geregelt. Bei der Benutzung anderer slowakischer Verkehrsmittel sind die ortsiiblichen Tarifsatze zu zahlen, wenn nicht im Wege der Vereinbarung ein anderweitiger Entgelt fur die Benutzung festgesetzt wird. c) Das Recht, Riistungsbetriebe, die Auftrage vom Deutschen Reich erhalten, zu beaufsichtigen und auszunutzen unter BeriicksichUgung der Bediirfnisse der slowakischen Wehrmacht. Hieriiber wird eine besondere Vereinbarung zwischen den zustandigen Stellen der Deutschen Regierung und der Regierung des Slowakischen iStaates abgeschlossen werden. d) iDas Recht, in der Schutzzone alle erforderlichen Massnahmen des militarischen Abwehrdienstes zu treffen und von den Behorden des Slowakischen Staates die Anordnung und Durchfiihrung aller hierfiir erforderlichen Exekutivmassnahmen zu verlangen. !Die Deutsche Wehrmacht hat das !Recht, gegeniiber deutschen Wehrmachtangehori<g en und den fiir Wehrmachtzwecke in der Schutzzone tatigen reichsdeutschen Beamten, An-gestellten und Arbeitern deutsche militarische Exekutivorgane einzusetzen. Diese diirfen ,g egentiber Personen, die nicht die Staatsangehorigkeit im Deutschen Reich besitzen, nur in dringenden •Fallen, sofern slowakische Sicherheitsorgane nicht errechbar sind, Exekutivmassnahmen treffen. Festgenommene sind den zustandigen slowakischen Behorden unverziiglich, spatestens binnen 24 Stunden, zu ubergeben. e) Das Recht zur zollfreien Versor,g ung der deutschen Truppen und zur zollfreien Belieferung der militarischen Anlrugen aus dem Reich. Hieriiber wird eine Sondervereinbarung getroffen. Die Slowakische Regierung wird in engsten Einvernehmen mit der deutschen Wehrmacht alle Massnahmen treffen, die erforderlich sind, um der deutschen Wehrmacht die Durchfiihrung der ihr zum Schutz des Slowakischen S·taates, der Schutzzone und der darin befindlichen Truppen und militarischen Anlagen ubertragenen Aufgaben im Sinne des Vertrages vom 18./23. Marz 1939 zu ermoglichen und zu erleichtern. Artikel 3: Alie Hoheitsrechte in der Schutzzone ubt, soweit nicht im Vertrage vom 18. /2:3. Marz 1939 und in diesem Vertrage anders vereinbart, der Slowakische Staat aus. Hinsichtlich der Hoheitsrechte des Slowakischen Staates ist inbesondere folgendes vereinbart: a) Die Geltung aller jetzt und kiinftig gultigen rechtlichen Vor- �20 SLOVAKIA schriften der Slowakischen Republik erstreckt sich auf das Gebiet der Schutzzone, wenn dies nicht ausdriicklich ausgenommen wird, oder dem Sinne dieses Vertraiges und des Vertrages vom 18./23. Marz 1939 widerspricht. b) ,Die slowakischen Behorden in der Schutzzone iiben ihren Dienst weiterhin aus und unterliegen weiterhin uneingeschrankt der Aufsich t der ihnen vorgesetzten Behorden des Slowakischen Staates. c) Die Ausnutzung und Belegung der in der Schutzzone befindlichen militarischen Anlagen durch die slowakische Wehrmacht, das Uberliegen der Schutzzone durch slowakische Militarflugzeu.ge soiwie das Betraten der Schutzzone durch einzelne Angehorige der slowakischen Wehrmacht wird durch besondere Vereinbarung geregelt. d) In der Schutzzone kann der Zutrtt zu militarisch wichtigen Gebietsteilen, Befestigungsarbeiten and -anlagen von der deutschen Wehrmacht verhindert werden. Das Betretungsverbot wird von den zustandigen slowakischen Behorden auf Veranlassung der deutschen Wehrmachtstellen und in beiderseitigem Einvernehmen erlassen und der Bevolkerung in ortsiiblichen Weise bekanntgegeben werden. e) Die Einrichtung von Uberfluigzonen in der Schutzzone zur Ermoglichen des gegenseitiigen zivilen Flugverkehrs wird einer besonderen Vereinbarung vorbehalten. f) Deutsche Wehrmachtangehorig e diirfen das slowakische Staatsgebiet ausserhalb der Schutzzone nur betreten 1) aus dienstlichem Anlass mit Bewilligung der slowakischen zustandigen Behorden (Ausnahme Art. 2c) 2) bei Urlaub nur gemass den deutschen Bestimmungen iiber Auslandsurlaub. Artikel 4: Deutsche Wehrmachtsangehorig e, die sich auf Grund des Schutzvertragen vom 18./23. Marz 1939 in der Schutzzone befinden, sind den deutschen Strafgesetzen unterworfen und unterstehen wegen aller in der Schutzzone begangenen strafbaren Handlungen der deutschen Strafgerich tsbarkeit. Sonstige deutsche Staatsangehorige, die bei den Befestigungsarbeiten beschaftigt sind, sind wegen strafbarer Handlungen, die in der Schutzzone begangen sind und sich gegen das Deutsche Reich richten, allein der deutschen Strafgerichtsbarkeit unterworfen. Deutsche Reichsangehoriige sowie reichsdeutsche Handelsgesellschaften, Erwerbs- und Wirtschaftsgenossens chaften, die auf Grund eines privaten Vertragsverhaltnisses mit der Errichtung militarischer Anlagen in der Schutzzone befasst sind, konnen aus ihrem gegen-seitigen Rechtsverhaltnis sowie aus ihrem Rechtsverhaltnis zum Deutschen Reich wegen eines Anspruchs aus ihren iRechtsverhaltnissen, namentlich aus Arbeits-, Dienst-- und Lieferungsverhaltnissen oder wegen einer unerlaubten Handlung, die mit der Tatigkeit zur Errichtung der militarischen AnlaJgen unmittelbar in Zusammenhang steht, nur vor deutschen Gerichten verklagt werden. Klagen wegen dieser Anspriiche konnen bei dem Amts- oder Landgericht Briinn erhoben werden. Es bleibt der Reichsregierung vorbehalten, auch andere Gerichte zu bestimmen. Artikel 5: In den vor die deutschen Gerichte gehorigen Strafsachen sind die Sicherheitsbehorden des Slowakischn Staates befugt, bei Gefahr im Verzuge nach den fiir sie geltenden Verfahrengesetzten �SLOVAKIA 21 die ;\-lassnahmen zu treffen, die zur Aufklii.rung des Sachverhalts, zur Festhaltung des Beschuldigten oder zur Sicherung von Gegen-stii.nden notwendig sind, die z1ir Begehung strafbarer Handlungen gebraucht oder bestimmt sind. Von dem Veranlassten haben die Sicherheitsbehiirden des Slowakischen Staates unverziiglich den nii.chsten Gerichtsherrn (Divisionskommander) in Kenntnis zu setzen und ihm einen festgenommen Beschuldigten zuzufahren. Deutsche Wehrmachtsan:gehiirige sowie die fiir Wehrmacht21wecke in der ,s chutzzone tii.ti1g en deutschen •Reichsangehorigen haben stii.ndig einen giiltigen Personenausweis bei sich zu fiihren, mit dem sie sich gegeniiber slowakischen Sicherheitsorganen auf Aufforderung ausweisen konnen. A r t ikel 6 : Die Slowakischen Behiirden werden Handlungen, die ,g egen die in diesem Vertrag festgelegten Interessen des Deutschen Reichs gerichtet sind, so verfol•g en als ob sie gegen den Slowakischen Staat gerichtet wii.ren. Die Slowakische Regierung wird dafiir Sorge tragen, dass das Deutsch e Reich die Miiglichkeit erhii.lt, den deutschen Interessen Geltung zu verschaffen, wenn es sich in Strafverfahren vor slowakischen Justizbehorden um Fragen handelt, die das gemeinsame Interesse des Deutschen Reichs und des Slowakischen Staates beriihren. Die Slowakische Regierung wird ferner im Einvernehmen mit der Reichsregierung Vorkehrungen treffen, dass den in Artikel 4 bezeichneten Personen in Verfahren vor slowakischen Justizbehiirden in sprachlicher Hinsicht weitestgehende Erleichterungen zuteil werden. Absch nitt 111 ) : Befestigung.sarbeiten. A r t ike l 7: Militii.rische Bauten and -Anlagen innerhalb der Schutzzone werden vom Reich auf eigene Kosten hergestellt. Artike l 8 : Die Deutsche Wehrmacht wird das fiir die Arbeiten und Anlagen in der Schutzzone erforderliche Material nach Miiglichkeit aus dem slowakischen Staatsgebiet beziehen. Soweit Preise hierfiir niclrt im Wege der Ausschreibun,g und freien Vereinbarung festJgelegt werden, sind die iiblichen Ta,g espreisen zu zahlen . Artike l 9 : Die Deutsche Wehrmacht wird bei der Ausfiihrung d er Arbeiten und Anlagen vorzugsweise Arbeits krii.fte aus der Slowakei anstellen. Eine Abweichung hiervon kommt insbesondere in Frage, wenn militii.rische Griinde die Einstellung bestimmter anderer Arbeitskrii.fte, z. B. gelernter Fach- und Spezialarbeiter erforderlich machen. Arbeitskrii.fte aus der Slowakei werden in slowakischer Wii.hrung entlohnt. Bei der Einstellung von Arbeitern wird nach einem allgemeinen, im Benehmen mit d er Slowakischen iRegierung aufgestellten Vertrage formular vorfabren. A r t ike l 10: Nach den slowakischen Gesetzen ist zu verfahren, wenn bei Arbeiten and Anlagen der deutschen Wehrmacht in der Schutzzone historisch wichtige 1Funde gemacht werden, oder wenn dabei Mineral- und Erzlager, oder andere Bodenschii.tze entdeckt werden. Art ike l 11 : Die deutsche Wehrmacht ,w ird bei den in der Schutzzone durchzufiihrenden Arbeiten und Anlagen mit besonderer Sor,g falt auf historische Denkmii.ler und auf die fiir den Slowakischen Staat und die slowakische Nation bedeutsamen Oiits Riicksicht nehmen. Abschnitt IV ) : Schlussbestimm ungen. Artike l 12 : Alie Meinungsverchiedenheiten, die sich aus der Durchfiihrung dieses Vertrages ergeben, werden, soweit sie nicht zur Zu- �22 SLOVAKIA stiindigkeit anderer O11gane gehoren, einer Kommission unterbreitet, die aus 2 deutschen und 2 slo.wakischen Mitgliedern bestehen soil, die im Bedarfsfalle zusammen tritt und das Recht hat, Sachvers·tiindige hinzuzuziehen und nach Bedarf auch ein fiinftes Mitglied zu bestellen. Kommt eine Einigung iiber das fiinfte Mitglied nicht zustande, so ist die Angelegenheit auf dem iiblichen diplomatischen Wege bei den 1Regierungen anhangig zu machen. Die Anrufunig der Kommission hat keine aufschiebende Wirkung. Dieser Vertra;g wird in doppelter Urschrift, in deutscher und in slowakischer Sprache ausgefertigt. Er tritt am Tage nach der Unterzeichnung in Kraft. Pressburg, den 12. August 1939. Fiir das Deutsche Reich: a. o. Gesandter und bevollmachtigter Minister des Deutschen Reichs in Pressburg Generalleu tnant 1. Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, (hereafter as D. G. F. P.) Volume Vil, pp. 10-11. 2. For the Treaty and the Confidential -P rotocol on economic and financial cooperation see D. G. F. P. V[, pp. 42-4-5. 3. D. G. F. P. VJ, p. 43 - The Academic Guard played an out~ standing role since October 1938, but its participation on the struggle for independence was of great importance especially in the decisive days of March 10-14, 1939. It was a paramilitary organization of university students, led by Dr. J. Kirschbaum as supreme command er. After March 14, it supplied the Slovak Republic with many outstanding workers in the Slovak public life, namely in Party organization, press, diplomacy, cultural associations etc. Among the leaders of the Academic Guard who played an important part in March 1939, are now in exile Dr. Joseph ,P auco, Dr. Joseph Mikula, Koloman Murgas, Dr. G. Danihel, Dr. L . Jankovic, etc. In 1940 the Academic Guard was dissolved by the order of the Ministry of Jnternal Affairs because it opposed introduction of National Socialist ideology in 1Slovakia. Dr. Kirschbaum was first called to arms and then sent abroad. No Slovak newspaper was allowed to mention his nam e for two following years. See Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1939-1945. 4. The origin of this zone can be traced back to Berlin where Hitler, talking to Tiso on March 13, told him among other things tha,t not only Hungarians and Poles were mobilizing, but "the Czechs also want to occcupy the western part of Slovakia up to the Vah." Tiso in his defense hinted at this ominous suggestion which is also ,supported by the 0 . K. W. Memorandum of March 24, (R 100 (see: Nazi Conspiracy and Agression, VJII, p. 83) according to which, if Slovakia is k ept independent, the military Schutzzone is to extend up to the Vah; but if Slovakia is divided between Poles and Hungarians, the whole area up to the Nitra is to be incorporated in the Protectorate ("Sollte Slowakei aufigeteilet werden, soil die Ostwest [Neutra-linie] Grenze werden und Pressburg einbezogen werden"). 5. According to the report of the British Consul in •B ratislava on iMarch 15, the German troops had reached Malacky by mid.day of that day and Trencfn by evening (D. Brit. F. P .. 3rd Series. Vol. IV, �SLOVAKIA 23 p. 287). On March 17, the Slovak Foreign Ministry lodged in a "note verbale" several complaints on the behaviour of the German troops in the occupied territory. 6. Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe, Joseph Pauco, Passaic, 1952, p. 232. 7. ibid. pp. ,233-4. 8. D. G. F. P., VJ, p. 756. 9. Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe, p. 234, footnote. 10. Tiso, Tuka and f>urcansky were invited to Berlin, where the latter two arrived on March 21. ,Ribbentrop kept them waiti.Il!g in complete uncertainty for three full days and then on March 23, at 12: 30 P. M., in their presence si,gned the Schutzvertrag. 11. The Polish White Book, pp. 62-3. 12. The offer to the Poles was, nevertheless, still open, and Hitler would have waived the .g uarantee if the ·Poles had been more cooperative (Cf. Doc. R 100 of March 24. How long the Fueh·rer considers himself bound to the 'T reaty concluded with Slovakia is open to doubt. It seems that he will use Slovakia as an asset to bargain between himself, Poland, and Hungary). On March 26, Ribbentrop a•g ain suggest-ed to Lipski "that the Slovak problem might still be discussed within the framework of a general Ausgleich" (see: Polish White Book, p. 67.), but the Poles now rejected the offer definitely. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. D. G. F. P., VI, pp. 114-115. ibid. p. 146. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. D. G. F. P., V[, pp. 7-56-762. ibid. p. 774. ibid. pp. 840-841. ibid. p. 916. ibid. pp. 9·52-953. ibid. p. 840, footnote. ibid. p. 1025. D. G F. P., Third Series, Vol. V, p. 89. D. G. F. P., Vil, pp. 254-255. At this conference, Tiso, Tuka, f>urcansky, and Mach negotiated with Barckhausen, Drufiel, Becker, and Hoffmann. The Slovaks advanced every argument imaiginable. if>urcansky thought that the presence of the German troops in the zone and outside it was generally interpreted as lack of trust on the part of the German Government in the Slovak Government. Tuka pointed out that the Slovak State should not be protected in the same manner as one would protect a flock of sheep, but that it should contribute to its own protection by having its own army, and this army must not be deprived of its equipment. Tiso and f>urcansky expressed the fea•r that, in case of the outbreak of Polish-!German hostilities, Hungary would invade Slovakia and, hence, Slovakia must be prepared for every eventuality. As for the Slovak desiderata, ihey were centered about these three points: (i) Establishment of two garrisons in the zone and the free use of the Malacky artillery range. (ii) Withdrawal of German military and other uniformed units (police, gendarmerie) from Zilina, Trencin, and Nove Mesto nad Vahom. (iii) Approval to keep nine tons of poisonous war gas ('Yperit'). D. G. F. P., VII, p. 2. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 7 The news of Dr. Tiso's departure caused the t ension in Bratislava and in all of Slovakia to grow. There was now not only fear of Hungarian occupation, if Dr. Tiso's mission were to fail but also fear of occupation by the Germans whose troops were stationed on the banks of the Danube on the Austrian side. At the same time there was, however , also a strong hope that Slovakia finally would become an independent state and that the dreams, desires and wishes of many Slovak generations would come true. 1. T h e writer was vice-presiden t of Pax R oma na and Slavia Catholi ca a nd, for ma ny year s, pr esiden t of th e Catholic Fed e ration of Slovak Stud en ts. 2. Cfr. Sidor's: Poznamky k historickym dnom r. 1939 p u blish ed by Lettri ch's R egime, Br atislava, 1946, a nd a lso accounts in Slovenska Obrana, October , 1939. 3. T h e Governm en t was composed as follows : Presiden t - Dr . Joseph T iso ; Prime Minister K. Sid or ; For e ig n Affairs - D r . Durcansky; E du cation - M. Cerna k ; F ina n ce - A. Mederly; Economy - Dr . Pru'.ii ns ky; Communica tions - Dr. Kir schba um ; Nationa l Defense - Gen. ,C atlos; 1Propaganda - A. Mach ; Justice - D r . V. T uka. - See de ta ils in Slovenska Obrana, October 17, 1939 . 4. 'T h e minu tes of th e Slovak Diet. Als o S idor's r em a rks on the historic days (ma nuscr ip ts, no t th e excerpts p ublis h ed b y th e Comm u nists in order to cond emn Dr. Tiso) . • • • THE GERMAN ZONE OF PROTECTION IN SLOVAK.IA (A study in Slovak-German relations in March-August 1939) Frantisek Vnuk On March 14, 1939, the independence of Slovakia was proclaimed by the Slovak Assembly. Two days later Baron von Weizsiicker wired a circular to all German diplomatic missions informing them that Slovak Prime Minister Dr. Tiso had transmitted the following r equest to the Fuhrer by telegram: With full trust in you, the Flihrer and Chancellor of the Gret er German Reich, the Slovak State places itself under your protection. The 'Slovak State asks you to take over this protection (1). Hitler acknowledged the receipt of the telegram and complied with the request. For this purpose a treaty of protection between Germany and Slovakia was drawn up (2) . Article 2 of the treaty stipulated that "the German Wehrmacht shall at all times have the right to set up 8 SLOVAKIA military installations in a zone bounded on the west by the frontier of the Slovak State and on the east by the general line of the eastern edge of the Little Carpathians, the eastern edge of the White Carpathians and the eastern edge of Javorniky, and to man these installations with such forces as the German Wehrmacht consider necessary ... Military sovereign rights (Hoheitsrechts) will be exercised by the German Wehrmacht (in this zone)" (3) . The establishment of this zone ( 4) represents in many respects an interesting aspect of Slovak-German relations. It casts a favorable light on a well-conceived but less successful attempt to extricate Slovak foreign policy from the agreed upon Slovak-German coordination in this field. This praiseworthy attempt and the subsequent unyielding behavior of Slovak politicians in the face of Hitler's demands contrast sharply with the charges of vassalage and servile obedience. In fact, the Slovaks resisted and contradicted Hitler's wishes (and with some success, too ) when powerful nations yielded and were advising others to yield. The negotiations concerning the zone were initiated on the night of March 17-18, 1939, in Vienna. At this time the occupation of Western Slovakia was already an accomplished fact (5) and - since possession is nine points of the law - the position of the ISlovak negotiators was noticeably weakened and by no means enviable. Nevertheless Dr. Joseph Tiso, Durcansky, Tuka, and Mach, the principal Slovak representatives, were determined to save could be saved. Preliminary negotiations started at Biirckel's flat at 5 p. m. Afterwards the Slovaks met SeyssInquart, then Keitel, and finally, at 1 a . m., on the 18th, in the Hotel Imperial they faced Hitler. Each stop represented more humiliation and more pressing demands and brought home one thing: Hitler was going to exact a high price for his protection ; much higher than he ever hinted at in Berlin on March 13th. Tiso was so disappointed at what he rightly considered - being let down that h e wanted to return to Bratislava without even seeing Hitler. Only his companions persuaded him to stay, arguing that in front of the Germans they all ought to show a united SLOVAKIA 9 determination not to give up even an inch of sacred Slovak soil (6). When Hitler, in the presence of Ribbentrop and Keitel, met the Slovaks, he told them - according to the testimony of Tiso - that the 'Shutzvertrag' could be realized only if Germany were given far-reaching concessions to build up a zone in Western Slovakia. The extent of these concessions - as Tiso clearly saw - left the Slovaks practically without any rights to exercise their sovereignty in that territory. It was more than he could bear. At 2 :45 A. M. he got up and was at the point of departure. Hitler, it must be said, in spite of his many shortcommings had a soft spot for the Slovaks and, apparently moved by the pathetic sight of the hardpressed protegees, stopped Tiso with a very assuring piece of oratory. He said: "I do not want even an inch of Slovak ground. In Slovakia the Slovaks alone will develop their own national, cultural, and economic life. I shall guarantee the full independence and territorial integrity of Slovakia. The historical frontiers of Slovakia are and remain forever unchanged. I shall hold my protective hand over ,S lovakia and nobody will reach with stealthy hand for the Slovak State, where the Slovaks will live their own full life" (7). This rhetorical outburst pacified the Slovaks; the rest of the discussion was carried on in a much happier mood. The Slovaks ceded the Germans the right to build and man fortifications in the zone "so as to enable the German Wehrmacht, in the event of war, to take up such positions as are most advantageous to it" (8). The Slovak delegation left Vienna with the impression that the zone remained within the legal structure of the Slovak State. No treaty was formulated or signed that night. Formal negotiations were conducted on the afternoon of March 18. Tiso did not take part in these conversations. The Slovaks were represented by Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky, Tuka a Zvrskovec; the Germans by Keppler and Gaus, the legal adviser to the Foreign Minister. The Treaty of Protection ( Schutzvertrag) was signed in Vienna the same day by :Durcansky and Tuka who also pledged to obtain Tiso's signature to the Treaty by noon of March 19, in re-1 10 SLOVAKIA turn for which Keppl er undert ook to get Ribbe ntrop's signature within 24 hours. :Durcansky, Tuka, and Veesenmayer broug ht the Treaty to Tiso for signat ure the evening March 18; he signed it and appear ed to be satisfi ed · with its formu lation (9). Ribben trop, on the other hand, did not sign the Treaty within the stipula ted time limit. All in all, the Germa ns were in no partic ular hurry with respec t to the Slovaks. The reason for their procra stinati on, which was so frustra ting and inexpl icable to the Slovak s then (10), is seen clearly now: they hoped to come to terms with the Poles and Hunga rians. The Polish White Book gives an accoun t of Ribbentrop's propos als to Lipski on March 21 (11), namely , that German-lPolish discus sions "would be possib le on this subject" (i. e., on the questi on of Slovak ia). But the Germa ns must have consid ered the Polish attitud e discou raging , and Ribbe ntrop put his signat ure on the Treaty on -March 23, in Berlin (12), but not before Article 3 of the Treaty was modifi ed and the words "in order to defend Slovak State agains t any possib le extern al attack s" were omitte d. Once the Treaty was signed, the execut ion of Article 2 proved to be more difficu lt than anticip ated. Appar ently the Germa n milita ry author ities were not very happy with what, after all, was a politic al settlem ent. Their behavi or left much to be desire d and Slovak protes ts were very soon pourin g in. At first, the surpri sed Slovak s asked for an explan ation, but later protes ted very vigorio usly. On March 25, the .Slovak Foreig n ·M inistry in a 'note verbal e" called for a more definit e determ ination of the probable durati on and charac ter in intern ationa l law of the Germa n occupa tion of Slovak territo ry. The note also protested a•g ainst the exerci se of sovere ign rights "beyon d those of milita ry necess ity" and agains t the remov al of milita ry materi al which - they claime d - by the secess ion of Slovak ia, had leg-ally become Slovak 'State proper ty (13). It was inevita ble that the occupa tion would cause considera ble frictio n betwee n the Slovak popula tion and the Germa n troops , and that this frictio n would projec t unfavora bly into Slovak -Germ an relatio ns. But the amoun t SLOVAKIA 11 of misunderstanding surpassed every expectation. The Slovaks in their optimistic enthusiasm were determined to enjoy their newly-gained independence to the fullest extent and consequently found the German presence in the zone very annoying and did not even try to hide their displeasure. The Germans, on the other hand, especially the military, did not bother to adjust their behavior in respect to the Slovaks. An ordinary German soldier and officer, fresh from victorious entries into Austria, the Sudetenland, and Bohemia, was hardly expected to be less arrogant towards Slovaks than he was towards Czechs; superiority was after all the essential part of his make-up. There were many instances of discontent, misunderstanding, and small incidents, and their existence could be best gauged by the frequent apologies and assurances which the 'Slovak Press Bureau was issuing in the newspapers and on the air. Under pressure of Slovak protests and complaints, the German representatives of General Staff and Foreign Ministry, at a meeting on March 28, agreed on a unified attitude towards the question of the zone. Their conclusions, though still by no means modest, represent in many respects retreat in the face of the Slovak protests, and can be briefly summarized as follows: 1. Withdrawal of the German Custom Frontier Protection Force to the Slovak-Moravian frontier. 2. The Vah fixed as the line of military occupation. 3. Appointment of a staff officer to the Consul General to act as liaison between the Slovak Army and the Wehrmacht. 4. The German troops east of the Vah to be recalled. 5. German claim to the entire war material of the former Czecho~Slovak army. 6. No removal of war material east of the occupied zone. 7. Decision as to size of the Slovak army. 8. Creation of s e p a r ate military formation for the Volksdeutche (14). Negotiations on the above topics took place on April 4 and were reported by Pares. Unfortunately no details concerning conversations are available, but it is known that 12 SLOVAKIA the Slovaks were represented by Dr. Tiso and the Ministers of War, Finance, and Economics, and the chief subject was the removal of war material "purchased by the German Government from the Czecho-!S lovak Government which had been stored in Slovakia" (15). As a result of these conversations, in addition to a German military adviser to be sent to Bratislava, a mixed Slovak-German commission was to be appointed to settle any controversial issue. At about the same time Tuka in his broadcast promised that the German army would leave when it was no longer needed. On April 15, the High Command of the Wehrmacht submitted a list of requirements, the fulfilment of which was expected from the Slovak Government under the Treaty of Protection. The demands, even in their "more lenient" form, were very exacting: 1. The High Command intended to maintain its military forces east of the Vah until the removal of "Czech arms and Czech war material" was completed. 2. Among the sovereign rights they claimed the right to occupy military and also public and private buildings, to use all forms and means of transport, to have at their disposal the factories concerned with war economy, duty-free import and export, postal services, telecommunications and Intelligence Service (Abwehrdienst). 3. The zone to include also Trencin, Krupa, Zilina, and Povazska Bystrica. 4. The size of Slovak army to be completed at one per cent of the population. 5. No units of the Slovak army to be garrisoned within the zone, but para-military formations (Hlinka Guards) to be allowed. 6. Export and import of war material to and from Slovakia to be refused or permitted by the Slovak Government only in agreement with the Reich Government or the High Command of the Wehrmacht (16). When these requirements were communicated by Druffel to Tiso, the latter declared that the Slovak Government did not wish to make difficulties, but asked for discussions with the German authorities on the highest level before SLOVAKIA 13 making any definite commitments. The Germans consented and, as a result, a conference took place in Berlin on April 19. Slovak representatives included Tiso, :Durcansky, and Tuka, the Ministry of Defense was represented by Catlos and Schneider, and also present were Cernak and Szathmary from the Slovak Legation in Berlin. The German delegation consisted of top-ranking experts, both political and military, but conspicious by their absence were the policy making personalities of the Reich. Its members were: Weissacker, Keppler, Wormann, Gaus, Altenburg, Tippelskirsch, HeydenRynsch, and Becker. Slovak grievances were numerous. To start with, Tiso mentioned the occupation by German troops of the aerodrome of Malacky and the demand by a German armored formation for transit through Bratislava. Then he complained of the severity of the demands of the German Wehrmacht, stating that "extension of the zone to Trencin and Zilina was hardly bearable for the Slovak Government"; of the behaviour of the German troops who in some villages occupied schools and thus made school attendance impossible, and employed Czech workers in preference to Slovaks. Furthermore, he claimed a share in the ownership of the former Czecho-Slovak arms factories and clamored for the return of a number of aircraft. German answers were either non-commital or asked to extend negotiations to clarify the application of the Treaty. Apparently the Slovaks demanded more than the German representatives were empowered to grant. Meanwhile the joint Slovak~German Commission was negotiating the treaty on the Zone of Protection but it did not seem to make any noticeable progress. On June 12, the Slovaks submitted another "note verbale'' which contained a number of Slovak views on the interpretation of the text of the Treaty. Arguments advanced by Slovaks were discussed at the conference on June 19 (17), where Tiso expressed the wish to draw up a memorandum and to discuss it personally with Hitler in hopeful expectation that the Slovaks might get more favorable treatment at the hands of the Fuhrer, than they were getting from his representatives. Hitler, however, declined to see Tiso and refused to consider the various points of the Slovak memorandum. 14 SLOVAKIA On June 21 this memorandum, in the form of an "aide memoire", was submitted to the German Foreign Ministry (18). It represented a voluminous list of complaints and expressed an outburst of accumulated Slovak indi,gnation about the German injustices. It questioned German rights to exclude Slovak garrisons from the zonal area, the interpretation of "sovereign rights", and claimed as Slovak the former Cecho..!Slovak military installations which were taken over by the Wehnnacht (such as the artillery range at Malacky); furthermore, it also questioned the wisdom of maintaining German ,garrisons outside the zone (e. g., in .Zilina, Trencin, Nove Mesto nad Va.horn) and criticised excursions of German troops to Bratislava and other places outside the zone. With regard to military material, the Slovak memorandum complained about the removal of war material from Pezinok, Modra, Malacky, Plavecke Podhradie, Hlboke, Turecky Vrch, Senica, Nemcova, Nove Mesto nad Va.horn, Trencin, Istebnik, Skalka, and .Zilina in a manner which "transgressed the bounds of an amicable atmosphere". Furthermore, it objected to occupation of munition factories and factories producing various types of war material at Dubnica, Povazska IBystrica, Stara Tura, Myjava, and .Zilina; to taking over of the stocks and installations of the airports at Novy Dvor and .Zilina; and it sadly commented that proceedings connected with the removal of war material were often conducted "as though Slovakia were an enemy country and not a State whose political and territorial independence had been guaranted by the Flihrer and Chancellor". The memorandum concluded a few more grievances against the military authorities whose attitude caused "administrative and economic uncertainty". The matter was then brought to Hitler's attention. This is evident from a statement made by Keitel on June 20, according to which Hitler's decision on the subject at the conference held by him amounted to the following: "The Flihrer said that he wished the negotiations to be conducted energetically and resolutely which, together with our concrete offers, must lead to early success. The prerequisite for the proposed support of Slovakia is the complete accep- SLOVAKIA 15 tance of our demeands, the more so as Slovakia is dependent on our military, economic, and financial aid." This authoritative pronouncement meant that all the subsequent attempts of the ,Slovaks for better terms encountered the adamant attitude of the German authorities. Thus, when, on June 22, the Slovak Minister in 'Berlin (Matus Cernak) saw Wormann at the German Foreign Ministry, he was brusquely told that the Germans disagreed with the Slovak Foreign Ministry's attempts to establish inconsistencies between the demands of the German Military Delegation and the assurances given by leading German statesmen regarding the conclusion of the Treaty of Protection. He was asked to make it clear in Bratislava that "the Military Delegation was among these demands in the name of the German Government". Cernak sugested that concessions be made by both parties and thought that this would make it possible to reach an agreement which would "not only maintain, but arouse sympathy for Germany" among the Slovak poulation. But Wormann had little understanding for the Slovak point of view and berated the Slovaks because several of the demands expressed in the memorandum of June 19 were in contradiction to the Treaty of Protection (19). On July 3, Cernak again called on the German Foreign Ministry, where he saw Weizsa.cker. He pleaded with him for moderation of the German demands, arguing that "Tiso's ... pro-German policy would be shaken, if it were not supported. In case of emergency, Slovakia would, of course, be completely at the disposal of German Armed Forces, but in peace-time one ought to remain within the scope of the terms of the Treaty. But again Cerna.k's arguments were of no avail and were, one by one, refuted by Weizsa.cker. Faced with such an uncooperative attitude, Cernak asked to be allowed to speak to Ribbentrop personally, but was told that the Foreign Minister was not available (20). The Slovaks, ignorant of Hitler's decision and trusting in his words with hopeful optimism, left no stone unturned in their attempts to secure more favorable terms. Their representatives were untiring in demanding interviews with Hitler and Ribbentrop who, as the chief architects of the 1 16 SLOVAKIA Slovak-German Treaty, could be made, they thought, to stand up to their promises. In this, however, they wer e unsuccessful. But they could get only to Weizsacker; and he, after trying to persuade them that the German negotiators "were acting on the instructions issued to them by the authoritative persons in the Reich", admonished the Slovaks that they should look at them as such and "conduct themselves accordingly" (21). As time went by, the Germans were getting progressively more and more anxious to have the whole issue about the interpretation of the Treaty finally settled and were apparently annoyed by the delay caused by the stubborness of the Slovaks. In view of the approaching German~olish conflict it was paramont for them to have their stand in Slovakia precisely determined and legalized. Their activity (often on the verge of nervousness) was in sharp contrast with the patient and determined attitude of the Slovaks who were unwilling to retreat. The situation was provided with a real touch of comedy when the Slovak statesmen went on their summer holidays (Tiso left for Topofcianky, Durcansky for the High Tatras) while German couriers were flying between and Bratislava. On July 19, Druffel was shown a report from Cernak according to which Eisenlohr and Weizsacker had expressed themselves in favour of token Slovak garrisons in the protected zone. On the strength of this report, Durcansky urged Catlos to dispatch some troops into the zone. On July 2:1, Catlos ordered one batallion to move in and, at the same time, informed the German military mission of his action. From the Germans came a vehement protest, coupled with threats, and the order was recalled. This move displeased Durcansky immensely. He maintained that Catlos should have created a "fait accompli" without regard for the German military mission and their feelings. The argument went so far that Catlos threatened to resign (22). Whether Catlos's action was right or wrong is open to question. It may be recalled, however, that at that time, the German military authorities were resolutely against ·any Slovak troops in that zone, and the same view was shared by Hitler. SLOVAKIA 17 On July 17, the German Foreign Ministry sent to their representative in Bratislava a letter of instructions with an enclosed draft of the Treaty on the Zone of Protection (23). With this draft as a basis, new negotiations ensued. Unfortunately no records were found concerning their course. From the report of tH. Bernard (new German Minister to Slovakia who replaced Druffel), we learn that they were concluded by July 31 and the Slovak representatives (again, we do not know, who they were; Tuka was probably one of them; Tiso and :Durcansky were vacationing) accepted the draft of the treaty with small amendments (24). Barckhausen then took this modified version of the Treaty to Berlin and, on August 7, brought it to Bratislava to Tuka, who then forwarded it to Tiso and :Durcansky (on their vacation) with a request for their approval (25 ). But the Treaty in its new form did not appeal either to Tiso or :Durcansky. Rejecting various points of the draft, they again upset the German applecart. On August 10, a new series of discussions was initiated, this time with :Durcansky present. These discussions finally brought concrete results. On Saturday evening, August 12, 1939, the Treaty on the Zone of Protection was signed at Bratislava by Minister Bernard and Lt. General Barckhausen on behalf of the German Reich, and by the Slovak Premier Tiso. The Treaty consisted of four Sections. Section I delimitated its extent. ,S ection II defined military sovereign rights of the German Wehrmacht and the sovereign rights of the Slovak State; German military sovereign rights included the right to requisition public and private premises, to use all means and lines of transportation, and to supervise armament factories working for the Reich; Germany was also given jurisdiction over her nationals; this Section also provided for Slovak garrisions within the zone. Section 1',III laid down rules regarding the employment of the personnel and material in, and on the payment for, the construction of fortifications. Section IV contained provisions for settlement of differences arising from the application of the Treaty. 1 SLOVAKIA: 16 Verbatim German Text of Treaty (.From Photostat) Abschrift. Schutzzonenvert rag Zur Regelung der sich aus dem Schutzvertrage vom 18./23. Marz 1939 ergebenden Fragen ist zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und der Slowakischen Republik durch die unterzeichneten Bevollmachtigten beider Regierungen folgendes vereinbart worden. Abschnitt I): Abgrenzung der Schutzzone. Artikel 1: Die Ausdehnung der in Artikel 2 des deutsch-slowakis chen Vertrages vom 18./ 23. Marz 1939 genannten Zone in folgendem mit ''Schutzzone" bezeichnet - ergibt sich aus der diesem Vertrage als Bestandteil angehefteten Landkarte in Masstabe 1: 7·5,000. Die Schutzzone erstreckt sich von Westen her bis zu der dieser Landkarte eingezeichneten roten Linie, und sie schliesst den von dieser Linie bedecken Tei! des slowakischen Gebietes ein. Eine Bez·e ichnung der ostwartigen Schutzzonenbeg renzungslinie im Gelande durch Tafeln oder Grenzsteine erfolgt nicht. lnnerhalb dieser Schutzzone wird das Deutsche Reich die ihm im Schutzvertrage vom 18-/ 23. Marz 1939 von dem Slowakischen Staat iibertragenen Aufgaben nach Massgabe der Bestimmungen dieses Vertrages durchfiihren. Abschnitt II): Rechtsverhaltni sse in der Schutzzone. Artikel 2: Mit den militarischen IHoheitsrechten, deren Ausiibung der deutschen Wehrmacht in Arti~el 2 des Vertrages vom 18./23. Marz iibertragen worden ist, hat sie das Recht erhalten, im Sinne der fiir die Verteidigung des Slowakischen Staates im allgemeinen bestehenden Gesetze Leistungen im gleichen Masse wie die slowakische Wehrmacht in lFriedenszeiten zu fordern (ohne die ,B estimmungen, die in dem slowakischen Gesetz Nr. 131/36 enthalten sind). Bei Aufwendungen, die iiber den Rahmen normaler Manciverleistung en auch zeitlich hinausgehen, sind die hierfiir zu zahlenden Entschadigungen nach den ortsiiblichen Tagespreisen zu bemessen. Die deutsche Wehrmacht haftet fiir Schaden in gleichem Ausmass wie die slowakische Wehrmacht in tlbungszeiten. Demzufolge hat die deutsche Wehrmacht insbesondere folgende Rechte: a) (Das Recht, jederzeit in der Schutzzone militarische Anlagen zu errichten und im 'Benehmen mit den slowakischen Behcirden tiffentliche Gebaude, Grundstiicke and Anlagen fiir militarische Zwecke in Anspruch zu nehmen und private Gebaude und Grundstiicke in Benutzun_ zu nehmen, ohne die Durchfiihrung des Enteignungsverfahrens oder des Verfahrens zur voriibergehende n Entziehung der Benutzung abzuwarten, jedoch unbeschadet ,e iner spateren Regelung der Entschadigung. Die Entschadigung wird unter Mitwirkun,g deutscher Beauftragter im Wege giitlicher Verhandlun,gen mit den Betroffenen festigesetzt. IKommt eine giitliche Eintgung nicht zustande, so bleibt es den Betroffenen vorbehalten, die Festsetzung der Entschadig-ung nach den slowakischen Gesetzen zu betragen. In diesem Falle bleibt im SLOVAKIA 19 Verhaltnis zu dem Deutschen Reich die Hohe der Entschadigung einer Vereinbarung mit der Slowakischen Regierung vorbehalten. b) Das Recht zur Benutzung der in der Schutzzone vorhanden,en Transportmittel und Transportwege unter moglichster Berucksichtigung der wirtschaftlichen Jnteressen der Slowakischen Republik. Ausserdem kann bei Vorliegen besonderer militarischer Notwendigkeiten die Bahn Pressburg-Ty,r nau-Pistyan-Trencin'8 illeinJCadca und die Strassen Pressburg-Modern-Na das-Trencin and Pressburg-Tyrnau-Pis tyan-Trencin,Sillein>C adca, von Trencin aus bis Cadca auch auf dem ostwartigen Waag-und Kysucaufer benutzt werden. Ferner erhalt die deutsche Wehrmacht das Recht, alle Orte zwischen Pressburg (ausschliesslich) and Cadca an den oben genannten Strassen bei Vorliegen militarischer Griinde vorubergehend zur Einquartierung zu benutzen. Die Slowakische Regierung ist hiervon in Kenntnis zu setzen. Die Benutzung der Eisenbahnlinien wird durch Sondertarifabmachun gen geregelt. Bei der Benutzung anderer slowakischer Verkehrsmittel sind die ortsiiblichen Tarifsatze zu zahlen, wenn nicht im Wege der Vereinbarung ein anderweitiger Entgelt fur die Benutzung festgesetzt wird. c) Das Recht, Riistungsbetriebe, die Auftrage vom Deutschen Reich erhalten, zu beaufsichtigen und auszunutzen unter BeriicksichUgung der Bediirfnisse der slowakischen Wehrmacht. Hieriiber wird eine besondere Vereinbarung zwischen den zustandigen Stellen der Deutschen Regierung und der Regierung des Slowakischen iStaates abgeschlossen werden. d) iDas Recht, in der Schutzzone alle erforderlichen Massnahmen des militarischen Abwehrdienstes zu treffen und von den Behorden des Slowakischen Staates die Anordnung und Durchfiihrung aller hierfiir erforderlichen Exekutivmassnahmen zu verlangen. !Die Deutsche Wehrmacht hat das !Recht, gegeniiber deutschen Wehrmachtangehori<g en und den fiir Wehrmachtzwecke in der Schutzzone tatigen reichsdeutschen Beamten, An-gestellten und Arbeitern deutsche militarische Exekutivorgane einzusetzen. Diese diirfen ,g egentiber Personen, die nicht die Staatsangehorigkeit im Deutschen Reich besitzen, nur in dringenden •Fallen, sofern slowakische Sicherheitsorgane nicht errechbar sind, Exekutivmassnahmen treffen. Festgenommene sind den zustandigen slowakischen Behorden unverziiglich, spatestens binnen 24 Stunden, zu ubergeben. e) Das Recht zur zollfreien Versor,g ung der deutschen Truppen und zur zollfreien Belieferung der militarischen Anlrugen aus dem Reich. Hieriiber wird eine Sondervereinbarung getroffen. Die Slowakische Regierung wird in engsten Einvernehmen mit der deutschen Wehrmacht alle Massnahmen treffen, die erforderlich sind, um der deutschen Wehrmacht die Durchfiihrung der ihr zum Schutz des Slowakischen S·taates, der Schutzzone und der darin befindlichen Truppen und militarischen Anlagen ubertragenen Aufgaben im Sinne des Vertrages vom 18./23. Marz 1939 zu ermoglichen und zu erleichtern. Artikel 3: Alie Hoheitsrechte in der Schutzzone ubt, soweit nicht im Vertrage vom 18. /2:3. Marz 1939 und in diesem Vertrage anders vereinbart, der Slowakische Staat aus. Hinsichtlich der Hoheitsrechte des Slowakischen Staates ist inbesondere folgendes vereinbart: a) Die Geltung aller jetzt und kiinftig gultigen rechtlichen Vor- 20 SLOVAKIA schriften der Slowakischen Republik erstreckt sich auf das Gebiet der Schutzzone, wenn dies nicht ausdriicklich ausgenommen wird, oder dem Sinne dieses Vertraiges und des Vertrages vom 18./23. Marz 1939 widerspricht. b) ,Die slowakischen Behorden in der Schutzzone iiben ihren Dienst weiterhin aus und unterliegen weiterhin uneingeschrankt der Aufsich t der ihnen vorgesetzten Behorden des Slowakischen Staates. c) Die Ausnutzung und Belegung der in der Schutzzone befindlichen militarischen Anlagen durch die slowakische Wehrmacht, das Uberliegen der Schutzzone durch slowakische Militarflugzeu.ge soiwie das Betraten der Schutzzone durch einzelne Angehorige der slowakischen Wehrmacht wird durch besondere Vereinbarung geregelt. d) In der Schutzzone kann der Zutrtt zu militarisch wichtigen Gebietsteilen, Befestigungsarbeiten and -anlagen von der deutschen Wehrmacht verhindert werden. Das Betretungsverbot wird von den zustandigen slowakischen Behorden auf Veranlassung der deutschen Wehrmachtstellen und in beiderseitigem Einvernehmen erlassen und der Bevolkerung in ortsiiblichen Weise bekanntgegeben werden. e) Die Einrichtung von Uberfluigzonen in der Schutzzone zur Ermoglichen des gegenseitiigen zivilen Flugverkehrs wird einer besonderen Vereinbarung vorbehalten. f) Deutsche Wehrmachtangehorig e diirfen das slowakische Staatsgebiet ausserhalb der Schutzzone nur betreten 1) aus dienstlichem Anlass mit Bewilligung der slowakischen zustandigen Behorden (Ausnahme Art. 2c) 2) bei Urlaub nur gemass den deutschen Bestimmungen iiber Auslandsurlaub. Artikel 4: Deutsche Wehrmachtsangehorig e, die sich auf Grund des Schutzvertragen vom 18./23. Marz 1939 in der Schutzzone befinden, sind den deutschen Strafgesetzen unterworfen und unterstehen wegen aller in der Schutzzone begangenen strafbaren Handlungen der deutschen Strafgerich tsbarkeit. Sonstige deutsche Staatsangehorige, die bei den Befestigungsarbeiten beschaftigt sind, sind wegen strafbarer Handlungen, die in der Schutzzone begangen sind und sich gegen das Deutsche Reich richten, allein der deutschen Strafgerichtsbarkeit unterworfen. Deutsche Reichsangehoriige sowie reichsdeutsche Handelsgesellschaften, Erwerbs- und Wirtschaftsgenossens chaften, die auf Grund eines privaten Vertragsverhaltnisses mit der Errichtung militarischer Anlagen in der Schutzzone befasst sind, konnen aus ihrem gegen-seitigen Rechtsverhaltnis sowie aus ihrem Rechtsverhaltnis zum Deutschen Reich wegen eines Anspruchs aus ihren iRechtsverhaltnissen, namentlich aus Arbeits-, Dienst-- und Lieferungsverhaltnissen oder wegen einer unerlaubten Handlung, die mit der Tatigkeit zur Errichtung der militarischen AnlaJgen unmittelbar in Zusammenhang steht, nur vor deutschen Gerichten verklagt werden. Klagen wegen dieser Anspriiche konnen bei dem Amts- oder Landgericht Briinn erhoben werden. Es bleibt der Reichsregierung vorbehalten, auch andere Gerichte zu bestimmen. Artikel 5: In den vor die deutschen Gerichte gehorigen Strafsachen sind die Sicherheitsbehorden des Slowakischn Staates befugt, bei Gefahr im Verzuge nach den fiir sie geltenden Verfahrengesetzten SLOVAKIA 21 die ;\-lassnahmen zu treffen, die zur Aufklii.rung des Sachverhalts, zur Festhaltung des Beschuldigten oder zur Sicherung von Gegen-stii.nden notwendig sind, die z1ir Begehung strafbarer Handlungen gebraucht oder bestimmt sind. Von dem Veranlassten haben die Sicherheitsbehiirden des Slowakischen Staates unverziiglich den nii.chsten Gerichtsherrn (Divisionskommander) in Kenntnis zu setzen und ihm einen festgenommen Beschuldigten zuzufahren. Deutsche Wehrmachtsan:gehiirige sowie die fiir Wehrmacht21wecke in der ,s chutzzone tii.ti1g en deutschen •Reichsangehorigen haben stii.ndig einen giiltigen Personenausweis bei sich zu fiihren, mit dem sie sich gegeniiber slowakischen Sicherheitsorganen auf Aufforderung ausweisen konnen. A r t ikel 6 : Die Slowakischen Behiirden werden Handlungen, die ,g egen die in diesem Vertrag festgelegten Interessen des Deutschen Reichs gerichtet sind, so verfol•g en als ob sie gegen den Slowakischen Staat gerichtet wii.ren. Die Slowakische Regierung wird dafiir Sorge tragen, dass das Deutsch e Reich die Miiglichkeit erhii.lt, den deutschen Interessen Geltung zu verschaffen, wenn es sich in Strafverfahren vor slowakischen Justizbehorden um Fragen handelt, die das gemeinsame Interesse des Deutschen Reichs und des Slowakischen Staates beriihren. Die Slowakische Regierung wird ferner im Einvernehmen mit der Reichsregierung Vorkehrungen treffen, dass den in Artikel 4 bezeichneten Personen in Verfahren vor slowakischen Justizbehiirden in sprachlicher Hinsicht weitestgehende Erleichterungen zuteil werden. Absch nitt 111 ) : Befestigung.sarbeiten. A r t ike l 7: Militii.rische Bauten and -Anlagen innerhalb der Schutzzone werden vom Reich auf eigene Kosten hergestellt. Artike l 8 : Die Deutsche Wehrmacht wird das fiir die Arbeiten und Anlagen in der Schutzzone erforderliche Material nach Miiglichkeit aus dem slowakischen Staatsgebiet beziehen. Soweit Preise hierfiir niclrt im Wege der Ausschreibun,g und freien Vereinbarung festJgelegt werden, sind die iiblichen Ta,g espreisen zu zahlen . Artike l 9 : Die Deutsche Wehrmacht wird bei der Ausfiihrung d er Arbeiten und Anlagen vorzugsweise Arbeits krii.fte aus der Slowakei anstellen. Eine Abweichung hiervon kommt insbesondere in Frage, wenn militii.rische Griinde die Einstellung bestimmter anderer Arbeitskrii.fte, z. B. gelernter Fach- und Spezialarbeiter erforderlich machen. Arbeitskrii.fte aus der Slowakei werden in slowakischer Wii.hrung entlohnt. Bei der Einstellung von Arbeitern wird nach einem allgemeinen, im Benehmen mit d er Slowakischen iRegierung aufgestellten Vertrage formular vorfabren. A r t ike l 10: Nach den slowakischen Gesetzen ist zu verfahren, wenn bei Arbeiten and Anlagen der deutschen Wehrmacht in der Schutzzone historisch wichtige 1Funde gemacht werden, oder wenn dabei Mineral- und Erzlager, oder andere Bodenschii.tze entdeckt werden. Art ike l 11 : Die deutsche Wehrmacht ,w ird bei den in der Schutzzone durchzufiihrenden Arbeiten und Anlagen mit besonderer Sor,g falt auf historische Denkmii.ler und auf die fiir den Slowakischen Staat und die slowakische Nation bedeutsamen Oiits Riicksicht nehmen. Abschnitt IV ) : Schlussbestimm ungen. Artike l 12 : Alie Meinungsverchiedenheiten, die sich aus der Durchfiihrung dieses Vertrages ergeben, werden, soweit sie nicht zur Zu- 22 SLOVAKIA stiindigkeit anderer O11gane gehoren, einer Kommission unterbreitet, die aus 2 deutschen und 2 slo.wakischen Mitgliedern bestehen soil, die im Bedarfsfalle zusammen tritt und das Recht hat, Sachvers·tiindige hinzuzuziehen und nach Bedarf auch ein fiinftes Mitglied zu bestellen. Kommt eine Einigung iiber das fiinfte Mitglied nicht zustande, so ist die Angelegenheit auf dem iiblichen diplomatischen Wege bei den 1Regierungen anhangig zu machen. Die Anrufunig der Kommission hat keine aufschiebende Wirkung. Dieser Vertra;g wird in doppelter Urschrift, in deutscher und in slowakischer Sprache ausgefertigt. Er tritt am Tage nach der Unterzeichnung in Kraft. Pressburg, den 12. August 1939. Fiir das Deutsche Reich: a. o. Gesandter und bevollmachtigter Minister des Deutschen Reichs in Pressburg Generalleu tnant 1. Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, (hereafter as D. G. F. P.) Volume Vil, pp. 10-11. 2. For the Treaty and the Confidential -P rotocol on economic and financial cooperation see D. G. F. P. V[, pp. 42-4-5. 3. D. G. F. P. VJ, p. 43 - The Academic Guard played an out~ standing role since October 1938, but its participation on the struggle for independence was of great importance especially in the decisive days of March 10-14, 1939. It was a paramilitary organization of university students, led by Dr. J. Kirschbaum as supreme command er. After March 14, it supplied the Slovak Republic with many outstanding workers in the Slovak public life, namely in Party organization, press, diplomacy, cultural associations etc. Among the leaders of the Academic Guard who played an important part in March 1939, are now in exile Dr. Joseph ,P auco, Dr. Joseph Mikula, Koloman Murgas, Dr. G. Danihel, Dr. L . Jankovic, etc. In 1940 the Academic Guard was dissolved by the order of the Ministry of Jnternal Affairs because it opposed introduction of National Socialist ideology in 1Slovakia. Dr. Kirschbaum was first called to arms and then sent abroad. No Slovak newspaper was allowed to mention his nam e for two following years. See Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1939-1945. 4. The origin of this zone can be traced back to Berlin where Hitler, talking to Tiso on March 13, told him among other things tha,t not only Hungarians and Poles were mobilizing, but "the Czechs also want to occcupy the western part of Slovakia up to the Vah." Tiso in his defense hinted at this ominous suggestion which is also ,supported by the 0 . K. W. Memorandum of March 24, (R 100 (see: Nazi Conspiracy and Agression, VJII, p. 83) according to which, if Slovakia is k ept independent, the military Schutzzone is to extend up to the Vah; but if Slovakia is divided between Poles and Hungarians, the whole area up to the Nitra is to be incorporated in the Protectorate ("Sollte Slowakei aufigeteilet werden, soil die Ostwest [Neutra-linie] Grenze werden und Pressburg einbezogen werden"). 5. According to the report of the British Consul in •B ratislava on iMarch 15, the German troops had reached Malacky by mid.day of that day and Trencfn by evening (D. Brit. F. P .. 3rd Series. Vol. IV, SLOVAKIA 23 p. 287). On March 17, the Slovak Foreign Ministry lodged in a "note verbale" several complaints on the behaviour of the German troops in the occupied territory. 6. Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe, Joseph Pauco, Passaic, 1952, p. 232. 7. ibid. pp. ,233-4. 8. D. G. F. P., VJ, p. 756. 9. Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe, p. 234, footnote. 10. Tiso, Tuka and f>urcansky were invited to Berlin, where the latter two arrived on March 21. ,Ribbentrop kept them waiti.Il!g in complete uncertainty for three full days and then on March 23, at 12: 30 P. M., in their presence si,gned the Schutzvertrag. 11. The Polish White Book, pp. 62-3. 12. The offer to the Poles was, nevertheless, still open, and Hitler would have waived the .g uarantee if the ·Poles had been more cooperative (Cf. Doc. R 100 of March 24. How long the Fueh·rer considers himself bound to the 'T reaty concluded with Slovakia is open to doubt. It seems that he will use Slovakia as an asset to bargain between himself, Poland, and Hungary). On March 26, Ribbentrop a•g ain suggest-ed to Lipski "that the Slovak problem might still be discussed within the framework of a general Ausgleich" (see: Polish White Book, p. 67.), but the Poles now rejected the offer definitely. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. D. G. F. P., VI, pp. 114-115. ibid. p. 146. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. D. G. F. P., V[, pp. 7-56-762. ibid. p. 774. ibid. pp. 840-841. ibid. p. 916. ibid. pp. 9·52-953. ibid. p. 840, footnote. ibid. p. 1025. D. G F. P., Third Series, Vol. V, p. 89. D. G. F. P., Vil, pp. 254-255. At this conference, Tiso, Tuka, f>urcansky, and Mach negotiated with Barckhausen, Drufiel, Becker, and Hoffmann. The Slovaks advanced every argument imaiginable. if>urcansky thought that the presence of the German troops in the zone and outside it was generally interpreted as lack of trust on the part of the German Government in the Slovak Government. Tuka pointed out that the Slovak State should not be protected in the same manner as one would protect a flock of sheep, but that it should contribute to its own protection by having its own army, and this army must not be deprived of its equipment. Tiso and f>urcansky expressed the fea•r that, in case of the outbreak of Polish-!German hostilities, Hungary would invade Slovakia and, hence, Slovakia must be prepared for every eventuality. As for the Slovak desiderata, ihey were centered about these three points: (i) Establishment of two garrisons in the zone and the free use of the Malacky artillery range. (ii) Withdrawal of German military and other uniformed units (police, gendarmerie) from Zilina, Trencin, and Nove Mesto nad Vahom. (iii) Approval to keep nine tons of poisonous war gas ('Yperit'). D. G. F. P., VII, p. 2.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The German Zone of Protection in Slovakia Description An account of the resource František Vnuk Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 4 (29), March 1959 pp. 7-23 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1959 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2108696922e63094b9a5ce63d48e0a5d.pdf 5c904d52b3f1c6cfafcffbc7f3d73fe4 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 21 STATISTICS AND POLITICS Francis Vnuk I. On November 2, 1938, in Vienna, by an arbitrary award of Germany and Italy, Czecho-Slova kia was forced to cede to Hungary 10,432 km2 of Slovak territory in which there lived according to Slovak statistics: (1) 276,287 Slovaks, 505,808 Magyars, and 75,688 others (Germans, Jews, Ruthenes, etc.) and according to Magyar-Hung arian claims: (2) 727,297 Magyars, 121,890 Slovaks and 12,456 others (mostly Germans). The loss was considered by the Slovaks to be an utter disregard of justice and an improper application of ethnic principles. As such it was intensely resented and was a cause of constant friction between Slovakia and Hungary during the war period. Every student of modern European history must b struck by the tremendous discrepancies in statistical data claimed as correct by both contesting parties. It seems that in politica..l statistics even mathematics cease to be an "exact" science. In Vienna the Magyars had the advantage (which was a serious setback to the Slovaks) of demanding and then obtaining application of those rules which were used by the Germans in the solution of the Sudeten question. The Germans took the 1910 census as the guiding principle of "ethnic" r,atification of the "Versailles-Di ktait." Due to this most unfortunaite precedent the Magyars obtained at Vienna far more favorable treatment than they would have received if the actual ethnographic aspects were taken into account. The Slovaks contested the validity of the Hungarian statistics of 1910 on several grounds. They maintained that the statistics were not reliable since they did not consider nationality as such and that they were obtained by Magyar or pro-Magyar census takers at the peak of Magyarization to the subsequent detriment of the non-Ma- �22 SLOVAKIA gyar nationalities. (3) These arguments are worthy of a brief analysis. II. The concept of nationaUty in Magyar eyes had some puzzling and even contradictory features. The existence of nationality was admitted; its rights were legalized in one of the best nationality laws ever drafted.(4) Yet the law was an abysmal failure. It was never put into practice, but remained a dead letter. Normally where there is a nationality there is also a nation. But in Hungary, whi,le there was a Slovak nationality, according to S. Tisza "there was no such thing as the Slovak na:tion." In Magy,ar terminology one oould not be a Slovak, German or a Rumanian, but only a Slovak-, German-, or Rumani'an-speaking Hungarian. Consequently the census questionnaires did not inquire into one's nationality, but they wanted to know what language was used. (5) If a person spoke several languages and one of them was Magyar, that was a satisfactory qualificaition to classify him as a Magyar. It was left to Tiso to point out this unusual fact to the Hungarian negotiators in Komarno in Ootober 1938. When they ins1sted that the statistics of 1910 should be taken as a basis for discussion, Tiso told them bluntly: "That would be a blatant denial of justice. You know very we11 how these figures were arrived at. You never asked us what was our nationality. You simply said to us: 'You can speak Magyar, ergo you are Magyars.' In this manner I was counted as a Magyar 81gainst my wishes and feelings." (6) This is, in a nutshell, an eloquent example of "reliability" of the Hungarian statistics, but unfurtunately rut .that time such arguments did not carry much weight with the Germans whose opinion was to be decisive. (7) Bureaucratically trained German minds were still obsessed with the sanctity of written records and subconsciously sentimental about the Magyars as co-victims of a similar treatment to that imposed on the Germans in Versailles. Ill A close look at the official Hungarian statistics of the 1900-1910 decade reveals a very serious weakening of �SLOVAKIA 23 the Slov:ak element. Nowhere else in Hungary was the magyarization process making such inroads as in Slovakia (8) (which the Magyars preferred to call "Felvidek") 1-900 11910 Papula,tilOn Charuge I Total I % ·I 11dtal I % !Iner.ease !!Decrease I % Magyars 8,651,520j51.4 9,944,627•154.5111,293,'10711 + 14.9 GerJ'lj.ans 1,999,060111.9 11',903,357 )10.4 95.703 - 4.8 Srovaks 55,808- 2.8 12,002,16511.91,94'6,357,lll0.7 Rumanians 2,798,55916.6 2,>94!8,100 116.1 149,627 + 5.4 Yugoslaivs 629;169 3.7 656,324 3.6 39,496 + 6.3 R'll!thenes 4124,774 2.5 4164,270 2.5 27,155 + 6.4 Othe~s 33•3 ,308 2 .0 401,4'12 2.2 68,404 1+ 20.5 ------N ation,ality According to the above table the net population increase in 1900-1910 amounted to 1,426,278, which, however, included numerical decreases of two nationalities (Slovaks and Germans), small increases in other non-Magyar nationalities and an unpropor.tionaUy big increase in the dominant Magyar nationality. The figure becomes even more striking when one considers that out of each 1000 peI'sons in the 1900-1910 population increase 907 were Magyars and only 93 non-Magyars. The Magyar nationality increased by 14.9 per cent while the total increase of nonMagyar nationalities was only 1.6 per cent. The extent of the denationaHzation policy pursued by the Hungarian government becomes very revealing when the national increase, due to the difference between births and deaths and the migratory factors is considered. The number of births and the mortality figures .per 1,000 population are given in the following table for the years 1900 and 1910: YEAR 1900 Nati:onality Magyars Germans Slovaks Rumanians Ruthenes Yugoslavs - I •B om I Died 39.1 36.7 43.9 37.7 42.3 42.6 25.7 25.0 29.7 28.8 27.5 34.4 - -- YEAR 1910 ID.ised I Increase I Incre ase I !Bom I 13.4 11.7 14.2 8.9 14.8 8.2 -· I I 35.1 32.0 38.4 35.7 39.5 38.9 - ---- - I 22.0 I I 21.5 24.7 27.4 24.8 28.3 13.1 10.5 13.7 8.3 14.7 10.6 The table shows an even increase of various nationalities, and it is · interesting to note that on the birth and �SLOVAKIA 24 death basis the Ruthenes and Slovaks were the fastest growing nationalities of pre-war Hungary. There is, of course, another factor of significant importance which in the first decade of this century played an important part in the population structure of old Hungary, namely emigration. For simplicity's sake the year 1910 is taken as typical. The emigration figures per 1,000 population are as follows: Nationality I I Emigrat ion !balance Number •o f / Returned emigrants emigra,ruts -1.8 -6.8 -6.7 -4.1 -5.9 -2.5 0.8 2.0 2.5 1.0 2.3 1.3 2.6 8.8 9.3 5.1 8.2 3.8 Magyars Germans Slovaks Rumanians Ruthenes Yugoslavs The population increase per 1,000 population in the census year 1910 should, therefore, be: increa,se per i IINet 1000 (derived I from, death a•nd Nationality Magyars Germans Slovaks Rumanians Ruthenes Yugoslavs I emi,g ration data) I 11.3 3.7 7.0 4.2 8.8 8.1 . . Percentual mcrea:se As estimated Actual from statistrcs 1.13 0.37 0.70 0.42 0.88 0.81 I I + 1.49 -0.48 -0.28 + 0.54 + 0.64 + 0.63 For the Slovaks these figures have a tragic significance. It was no empty threat that the Slovak nation was faced with its own extinction. The statistics show this. The decline of the Slovak nationality was catastrophically rapid. In the decade 1900-19100 the SloV1ak population should have increased by about 160,000; instead it decreased by more than 55,000. This represents a loss of about 215,000, i.e., nearly 11 per cent. The figures are really staggering. (9) The Slovaks contested that this out-of-all-proporti ons decrease cannot be explained otherwise than by contribut- �SLOVAKIA ing it to the falsification of results by the Hungarian census takers and/or .s tatisticians. They argued that even the forcible and tempting means which the Mo-gyars a:s the dominant nationality had at their disposal could not account for this terrifying decrease. There is ample evidencrthat Slovak resistance to magyarization was at least as good as that of the Rumani1a ns and better than that of the Ruthenes. And yet the latter two nationalities recorded an increase where the Slovaks showed unparalleled losses. Assimilation and denationalization are responsible for some, fals-ifiers for the rest, so run the Slovak arguments. The Slovak,s requested that the arbitrators in the Slovak-Magyar di-spute should rely on the Czecho-Slovak statistics of 1930 which, being of more recent date, give a more realistic picture of the actua:1 state of affairs. The Magyars, however, refused most steadfastly to accept the official Czecho-Slovak statistics, giving very much the same reasons as advanced by the Sloveks against the Magyar statistics. Apparently what was sauce for the goose was not sauce for the gander. IV. It must be admitted that the Czecho-Slov,ak statistics were not favorable to the Magyar minority in Slovakia, or at least not as generous as the Magyars would have liked them to be. Census returns show a considerable drop in numerical strength of the Magy,ar minority: 634,827 in 1921, 571,988 in 1930, a decrease of 9.9 per cent. It must, however, be remembered that in the same time the Slovak minority in Trianon Hungary decreased from 142,000 to 104,000 which represents a decrease of 26.78 per cent. And finally one has to look for the cause of statisti<!al discrepancies also in the population. There the question of nationa:lity is quite frequently motivated by utilitarian and opportunist as much as national sentiments. This is especially so with the bilingual section of the population and such indigenous groups as Jews and Gypsies who would inva,r iably be loyal to the regime of the day. In the old Hungarian statistics Jews and Gypsies were never considered as separate ethnic groups. On t·h e other hand they �26 SLOVAKIA were treated as such by Czecho-Slovak authorities. According to some estimates, this fact alone accounts for a numerical "decrease" of the Magyar minority in Slovakia, before and after World War I, by about 80,000. The Vienna arbitration was carried out in the atmosphere of "the spirit of the Munich Agreement." Magyar wrongdoing faded away in the distant past, while Czech wrongdoings - alleged or real - were still the order of the day. All the paraphernalia of the Czech-German dispute formed the background against which the SlovakMagyar settlement was projected. Due to the ethnographical complex of the issue it would have been impossible to fix the Slovak-Magyar boundary to the satisfaction of both parties were the arbitrator Solomon himself. It was very much easier to draw it to the dissatisfaction of both sides. But the arbitra,tors decided to satisfy one and wrong the other. The fateful concentration of circumstances was unfavorable to the Slovaks. Tiso, in his broadcast on November 2, 1938, announcing the results of the Vienna Award, poured out his countrymen's sorrow and bitterness; "We have become the victims of injustice. . . Our people, through no fault of its own, has been treated as an object and has come into a situaition which disposed of it as a defeated enemy, without its participation and therefore against it, and often in contradiction to the ethnic principle. 'l'he "Great Powers" have decided, there is nothing else to do but to bow our heads and to work; but no one can prevent us from proclaiming to the whole world that a great injustice has been done to the Slovak people. Under the dictated peace of Trianon, hardly 6 per cent of the Magyar people had to live in Slovakia, whereas under the new settlement of the Slovak frontiers nearly 20 per cent of the Slovak people will have to live in Hungary." (10) APPENDIX In the tables given below the ethnical evolution of ten towns of the Slovak-Magyar linguistic boundary is recorded. In all cases the Magyar element was on the increase in the period 1880-1910, at the expense of the Slovak and �27 SLOVAKIA German component. After 1919 the process was reversen. The rapid increase of the Slovak popufation was mostly due to the influx of rural population to towns, the newcomers being mostly exclusively of Slovak nationality. :POPULATION STRJUCTU'RE Tow.n and c,e nsus year Slovaks Total % Magyars Total % Germans Total % Bratislava 1857 1880 1890 1900 1910 1930 4,600 7,273 a,709 10,7115 U,67G 60,013 14.5 15.7 17,2 16.7 15.3 5'8.7 2,500 7,270 10,4-S3 20;102 31,705 18,'890 7.8 15.7 20.6 31.4 41.7 16.9 .24!,732 30,440 311,404' 33,202 32,790 32,801 77.7 65.6 62.2 51.9 43.0 29.4 4,3719 10,3,1,1 9,7113 9,244 6,5417 42,24;5 39.2 40.9 40.4 23.9 15.4 74.0 2,500 10,007 10,4'21 25,996 33,350 111,504 22.5 3'9.8 43 .4 67.0 77.2 20.1 4,200 4,218 3•,891 3,'189 3,354 37.8 16.8 16.0 8.9 7.4 5.2 3,403' 5,538 4,929 Ul,462 40. 7 36.9 30.'l 92:.4 2,990 7,'2119 9,754 96'1 35. 7 47.8 59.7 4.8 1,969 2,3'12 1,636 5'1>'8 23.6 15.3 10.2 2.8 1,41'9 ·565 449 2,781 54.3 20.4 16.2 ·86.0 1;127 2,167 2:,289 255 43.3 78.5 82.3 7.9 55 3'1 4'2 197 2.4 1.1 1.5 6,1 3,403 3,381 2,181 6,027 89,2 73•,8 ~-0 97.0 200 l •,1 07 2,300 5.2 24.2 2:15 15'8 51.>1 2.5 4'2 32 T78 785 5,106 7,449 8,7512: 4,974 81'.0 88.3 91.7 44.6 423 688 5,956 12.3 9.3 7.2 53.5 856 1,000 1,,6 75 8,71•5 18.0 10.4 13Jl 64.L 3,,6 09 8,1'87 10,634: 4,007 75.0 87.0 83.6 29.4 333 249 428 889 ------------ Kol;ic,e ''' 1857 1880 1890 1900 1<910 1930 3,446 "Ruthenes omitted Nitra 1880 1900 1910 1930 Jelsava 1880 1900 1910 H~30 Trebisov 1880 1900 1910 11930 88 5.6 2.0 0.9 0.5 Levice 1880 1900 11910 1930 198 199 214 6.7 2.4 2.,1 1..9 Lucenec 1880 1900 1910 1930 7.0 2.6 3.3 6.5 �SLOVAKIA 28 Rimavska Sobota 1:880 1900 1910 1930 443 322 468 2,939 9.5 5.3 6.9 44.8 4,102 5,424' 6,1199 3,504 ,88.0 '93.5 91.8 53.4 124 Roznava lr880 1900 1910 1930 400 233 406 2,506 9.9 4.5 6.3 42.7 3,884' 4,7,68 5,886 3,211 83,.8 92.2 9lr.2 54.4 Nove Zamky 1880 1900 1'910 1930 1,466 822 964 9,561 14.3 6.2 6.1 47.8 7,189 12,1,97 14,838 10,193 77.7 91.3 91.6 51.0 1 69 2.5 .1.2 91 116 1.8 259 173 159 170 6.3 3.3 2.5 2.9 813 8.0 2.5 2.3 1.2 340 3'77 256 u REFERENCE S: 1 Documents British Foreign Policy, Third Series, Vol. III, p . 225. 2 Survey of International Afifairs rn38, Vol. Ill p. 105. 3 Cf. Tiso's conversation with Ribbentrop on October 19, 1~38, where Tiso said, "The Sl'ovarks hav,e determined and could pr,ove that the 1910 sta'tistks were incorrect a,n d t'hat they even had been falsified ." (Doc. Ger. F1or. Pol. D., Vol. IV, p. 87.) 4 The Law of Nati-onaiities (Act 44/ 1864) is rerpr:oduiced in R. W. Seton-Watson: Racial Problems in Hungary (Consrtahle, London, 1908), p. 4'299-4'33. Pr:ofessor Seton-Watson gives also a penetrating a,nd· scholarly a,na.lysis of this Act. poin'ting out the differences between lofty t,h eories a;nd l ow practices. 5 This practi,ce was followed till 1941, when for the first time in Magyar history the nationalirty of the inhaibi'tants otf Hurugary was ascertained. 6 A story was told in those days (most priolbalbly apocryiphal) that after th.is point,blank-Jired reminder of Tiso, a memlber c:,f the Hungarian delegation stood up an'd, instead of a long reply, answered in Magyar: "Igazad, s6g,or, de senrki sem .sLszi" (Y:ou are righit, brother, rbu't rnJlbody will believe you). 7 The litalians were eager to placarte the Magyars at somebody else's e~pense. The Slovaks knew v,e ry ,w ell tha t they could no t expect any und,erstanding for their point c:,f view fr:om the cynical Ciano. Jin their efforts to assure bett er terms they concenitr<ated exclusively on Ribbentrop. Unforituna-tely 'he had more will than skill to help them. 8 StaHstical data for this part oif the article come mostly from "Magyar s:zlta:tisztikai kozlemenyek" and "Annuaire statistique de la Repu blique Tchecoslorvaque." 9 The advance of magyarization in 1'880-1910 and the tur.n o,f the tide after 1'919 are best soon from the sta'tistical data taJbulated in .Aippen<lix. 10 "Prager Presse," November 4, 1938. - No need to say that Tiso was basing his statement on Czecho-Slovak ofific'ial statistics. 1 1 1 � SLOVAKIA 21 STATISTICS AND POLITICS Francis Vnuk I. On November 2, 1938, in Vienna, by an arbitrary award of Germany and Italy, Czecho-Slova kia was forced to cede to Hungary 10,432 km2 of Slovak territory in which there lived according to Slovak statistics: (1) 276,287 Slovaks, 505,808 Magyars, and 75,688 others (Germans, Jews, Ruthenes, etc.) and according to Magyar-Hung arian claims: (2) 727,297 Magyars, 121,890 Slovaks and 12,456 others (mostly Germans). The loss was considered by the Slovaks to be an utter disregard of justice and an improper application of ethnic principles. As such it was intensely resented and was a cause of constant friction between Slovakia and Hungary during the war period. Every student of modern European history must b struck by the tremendous discrepancies in statistical data claimed as correct by both contesting parties. It seems that in politica..l statistics even mathematics cease to be an "exact" science. In Vienna the Magyars had the advantage (which was a serious setback to the Slovaks) of demanding and then obtaining application of those rules which were used by the Germans in the solution of the Sudeten question. The Germans took the 1910 census as the guiding principle of "ethnic" r,atification of the "Versailles-Di ktait." Due to this most unfortunaite precedent the Magyars obtained at Vienna far more favorable treatment than they would have received if the actual ethnographic aspects were taken into account. The Slovaks contested the validity of the Hungarian statistics of 1910 on several grounds. They maintained that the statistics were not reliable since they did not consider nationality as such and that they were obtained by Magyar or pro-Magyar census takers at the peak of Magyarization to the subsequent detriment of the non-Ma- �22 SLOVAKIA gyar nationalities. (3) These arguments are worthy of a brief analysis. II. The concept of nationaUty in Magyar eyes had some puzzling and even contradictory features. The existence of nationality was admitted; its rights were legalized in one of the best nationality laws ever drafted.(4) Yet the law was an abysmal failure. It was never put into practice, but remained a dead letter. Normally where there is a nationality there is also a nation. But in Hungary, whi,le there was a Slovak nationality, according to S. Tisza "there was no such thing as the Slovak na:tion." In Magy,ar terminology one oould not be a Slovak, German or a Rumanian, but only a Slovak-, German-, or Rumani'an-speaking Hungarian. Consequently the census questionnaires did not inquire into one's nationality, but they wanted to know what language was used. (5) If a person spoke several languages and one of them was Magyar, that was a satisfactory qualificaition to classify him as a Magyar. It was left to Tiso to point out this unusual fact to the Hungarian negotiators in Komarno in Ootober 1938. When they ins1sted that the statistics of 1910 should be taken as a basis for discussion, Tiso told them bluntly: "That would be a blatant denial of justice. You know very we11 how these figures were arrived at. You never asked us what was our nationality. You simply said to us: 'You can speak Magyar, ergo you are Magyars.' In this manner I was counted as a Magyar 81gainst my wishes and feelings." (6) This is, in a nutshell, an eloquent example of "reliability" of the Hungarian statistics, but unfurtunately rut .that time such arguments did not carry much weight with the Germans whose opinion was to be decisive. (7) Bureaucratically trained German minds were still obsessed with the sanctity of written records and subconsciously sentimental about the Magyars as co-victims of a similar treatment to that imposed on the Germans in Versailles. Ill A close look at the official Hungarian statistics of the 1900-1910 decade reveals a very serious weakening of �SLOVAKIA 23 the Slov:ak element. Nowhere else in Hungary was the magyarization process making such inroads as in Slovakia (8) (which the Magyars preferred to call "Felvidek") 1-900 11910 Papula,tilOn Charuge I Total I % ·I 11dtal I % !Iner.ease !!Decrease I % Magyars 8,651,520j51.4 9,944,627•154.5111,293,'10711 + 14.9 GerJ'lj.ans 1,999,060111.9 11',903,357 )10.4 95.703 - 4.8 Srovaks 55,808- 2.8 12,002,16511.91,94'6,357,lll0.7 Rumanians 2,798,55916.6 2,>94!8,100 116.1 149,627 + 5.4 Yugoslaivs 629;169 3.7 656,324 3.6 39,496 + 6.3 R'll!thenes 4124,774 2.5 4164,270 2.5 27,155 + 6.4 Othe~s 33•3 ,308 2 .0 401,4'12 2.2 68,404 1+ 20.5 ------N ation,ality According to the above table the net population increase in 1900-1910 amounted to 1,426,278, which, however, included numerical decreases of two nationalities (Slovaks and Germans), small increases in other non-Magyar nationalities and an unpropor.tionaUy big increase in the dominant Magyar nationality. The figure becomes even more striking when one considers that out of each 1000 peI'sons in the 1900-1910 population increase 907 were Magyars and only 93 non-Magyars. The Magyar nationality increased by 14.9 per cent while the total increase of nonMagyar nationalities was only 1.6 per cent. The extent of the denationaHzation policy pursued by the Hungarian government becomes very revealing when the national increase, due to the difference between births and deaths and the migratory factors is considered. The number of births and the mortality figures .per 1,000 population are given in the following table for the years 1900 and 1910: YEAR 1900 Nati:onality Magyars Germans Slovaks Rumanians Ruthenes Yugoslavs - I •B om I Died 39.1 36.7 43.9 37.7 42.3 42.6 25.7 25.0 29.7 28.8 27.5 34.4 - -- YEAR 1910 ID.ised I Increase I Incre ase I !Bom I 13.4 11.7 14.2 8.9 14.8 8.2 -· I I 35.1 32.0 38.4 35.7 39.5 38.9 - ---- - I 22.0 I I 21.5 24.7 27.4 24.8 28.3 13.1 10.5 13.7 8.3 14.7 10.6 The table shows an even increase of various nationalities, and it is · interesting to note that on the birth and �SLOVAKIA 24 death basis the Ruthenes and Slovaks were the fastest growing nationalities of pre-war Hungary. There is, of course, another factor of significant importance which in the first decade of this century played an important part in the population structure of old Hungary, namely emigration. For simplicity's sake the year 1910 is taken as typical. The emigration figures per 1,000 population are as follows: Nationality I I Emigrat ion !balance Number •o f / Returned emigrants emigra,ruts -1.8 -6.8 -6.7 -4.1 -5.9 -2.5 0.8 2.0 2.5 1.0 2.3 1.3 2.6 8.8 9.3 5.1 8.2 3.8 Magyars Germans Slovaks Rumanians Ruthenes Yugoslavs The population increase per 1,000 population in the census year 1910 should, therefore, be: increa,se per i IINet 1000 (derived I from, death a•nd Nationality Magyars Germans Slovaks Rumanians Ruthenes Yugoslavs I emi,g ration data) I 11.3 3.7 7.0 4.2 8.8 8.1 . . Percentual mcrea:se As estimated Actual from statistrcs 1.13 0.37 0.70 0.42 0.88 0.81 I I + 1.49 -0.48 -0.28 + 0.54 + 0.64 + 0.63 For the Slovaks these figures have a tragic significance. It was no empty threat that the Slovak nation was faced with its own extinction. The statistics show this. The decline of the Slovak nationality was catastrophically rapid. In the decade 1900-19100 the SloV1ak population should have increased by about 160,000; instead it decreased by more than 55,000. This represents a loss of about 215,000, i.e., nearly 11 per cent. The figures are really staggering. (9) The Slovaks contested that this out-of-all-proporti ons decrease cannot be explained otherwise than by contribut- �SLOVAKIA ing it to the falsification of results by the Hungarian census takers and/or .s tatisticians. They argued that even the forcible and tempting means which the Mo-gyars a:s the dominant nationality had at their disposal could not account for this terrifying decrease. There is ample evidencrthat Slovak resistance to magyarization was at least as good as that of the Rumani1a ns and better than that of the Ruthenes. And yet the latter two nationalities recorded an increase where the Slovaks showed unparalleled losses. Assimilation and denationalization are responsible for some, fals-ifiers for the rest, so run the Slovak arguments. The Slovak,s requested that the arbitrators in the Slovak-Magyar di-spute should rely on the Czecho-Slovak statistics of 1930 which, being of more recent date, give a more realistic picture of the actua:1 state of affairs. The Magyars, however, refused most steadfastly to accept the official Czecho-Slovak statistics, giving very much the same reasons as advanced by the Sloveks against the Magyar statistics. Apparently what was sauce for the goose was not sauce for the gander. IV. It must be admitted that the Czecho-Slov,ak statistics were not favorable to the Magyar minority in Slovakia, or at least not as generous as the Magyars would have liked them to be. Census returns show a considerable drop in numerical strength of the Magy,ar minority: 634,827 in 1921, 571,988 in 1930, a decrease of 9.9 per cent. It must, however, be remembered that in the same time the Slovak minority in Trianon Hungary decreased from 142,000 to 104,000 which represents a decrease of 26.78 per cent. And finally one has to look for the cause of statisti<!al discrepancies also in the population. There the question of nationa:lity is quite frequently motivated by utilitarian and opportunist as much as national sentiments. This is especially so with the bilingual section of the population and such indigenous groups as Jews and Gypsies who would inva,r iably be loyal to the regime of the day. In the old Hungarian statistics Jews and Gypsies were never considered as separate ethnic groups. On t·h e other hand they �26 SLOVAKIA were treated as such by Czecho-Slovak authorities. According to some estimates, this fact alone accounts for a numerical "decrease" of the Magyar minority in Slovakia, before and after World War I, by about 80,000. The Vienna arbitration was carried out in the atmosphere of "the spirit of the Munich Agreement." Magyar wrongdoing faded away in the distant past, while Czech wrongdoings - alleged or real - were still the order of the day. All the paraphernalia of the Czech-German dispute formed the background against which the SlovakMagyar settlement was projected. Due to the ethnographical complex of the issue it would have been impossible to fix the Slovak-Magyar boundary to the satisfaction of both parties were the arbitrator Solomon himself. It was very much easier to draw it to the dissatisfaction of both sides. But the arbitra,tors decided to satisfy one and wrong the other. The fateful concentration of circumstances was unfavorable to the Slovaks. Tiso, in his broadcast on November 2, 1938, announcing the results of the Vienna Award, poured out his countrymen's sorrow and bitterness; "We have become the victims of injustice. . . Our people, through no fault of its own, has been treated as an object and has come into a situaition which disposed of it as a defeated enemy, without its participation and therefore against it, and often in contradiction to the ethnic principle. 'l'he "Great Powers" have decided, there is nothing else to do but to bow our heads and to work; but no one can prevent us from proclaiming to the whole world that a great injustice has been done to the Slovak people. Under the dictated peace of Trianon, hardly 6 per cent of the Magyar people had to live in Slovakia, whereas under the new settlement of the Slovak frontiers nearly 20 per cent of the Slovak people will have to live in Hungary." (10) APPENDIX In the tables given below the ethnical evolution of ten towns of the Slovak-Magyar linguistic boundary is recorded. In all cases the Magyar element was on the increase in the period 1880-1910, at the expense of the Slovak and �27 SLOVAKIA German component. After 1919 the process was reversen. The rapid increase of the Slovak popufation was mostly due to the influx of rural population to towns, the newcomers being mostly exclusively of Slovak nationality. :POPULATION STRJUCTU'RE Tow.n and c,e nsus year Slovaks Total % Magyars Total % Germans Total % Bratislava 1857 1880 1890 1900 1910 1930 4,600 7,273 a,709 10,7115 U,67G 60,013 14.5 15.7 17,2 16.7 15.3 5'8.7 2,500 7,270 10,4-S3 20;102 31,705 18,'890 7.8 15.7 20.6 31.4 41.7 16.9 .24!,732 30,440 311,404' 33,202 32,790 32,801 77.7 65.6 62.2 51.9 43.0 29.4 4,3719 10,3,1,1 9,7113 9,244 6,5417 42,24;5 39.2 40.9 40.4 23.9 15.4 74.0 2,500 10,007 10,4'21 25,996 33,350 111,504 22.5 3'9.8 43 .4 67.0 77.2 20.1 4,200 4,218 3•,891 3,'189 3,354 37.8 16.8 16.0 8.9 7.4 5.2 3,403' 5,538 4,929 Ul,462 40. 7 36.9 30.'l 92:.4 2,990 7,'2119 9,754 96'1 35. 7 47.8 59.7 4.8 1,969 2,3'12 1,636 5'1>'8 23.6 15.3 10.2 2.8 1,41'9 ·565 449 2,781 54.3 20.4 16.2 ·86.0 1;127 2,167 2:,289 255 43.3 78.5 82.3 7.9 55 3'1 4'2 197 2.4 1.1 1.5 6,1 3,403 3,381 2,181 6,027 89,2 73•,8 ~-0 97.0 200 l •,1 07 2,300 5.2 24.2 2:15 15'8 51.>1 2.5 4'2 32 T78 785 5,106 7,449 8,7512: 4,974 81'.0 88.3 91.7 44.6 423 688 5,956 12.3 9.3 7.2 53.5 856 1,000 1,,6 75 8,71•5 18.0 10.4 13Jl 64.L 3,,6 09 8,1'87 10,634: 4,007 75.0 87.0 83.6 29.4 333 249 428 889 ------------ Kol;ic,e ''' 1857 1880 1890 1900 1<910 1930 3,446 "Ruthenes omitted Nitra 1880 1900 1910 1930 Jelsava 1880 1900 1910 H~30 Trebisov 1880 1900 1910 11930 88 5.6 2.0 0.9 0.5 Levice 1880 1900 11910 1930 198 199 214 6.7 2.4 2.,1 1..9 Lucenec 1880 1900 1910 1930 7.0 2.6 3.3 6.5 �SLOVAKIA 28 Rimavska Sobota 1:880 1900 1910 1930 443 322 468 2,939 9.5 5.3 6.9 44.8 4,102 5,424' 6,1199 3,504 ,88.0 '93.5 91.8 53.4 124 Roznava lr880 1900 1910 1930 400 233 406 2,506 9.9 4.5 6.3 42.7 3,884' 4,7,68 5,886 3,211 83,.8 92.2 9lr.2 54.4 Nove Zamky 1880 1900 1'910 1930 1,466 822 964 9,561 14.3 6.2 6.1 47.8 7,189 12,1,97 14,838 10,193 77.7 91.3 91.6 51.0 1 69 2.5 .1.2 91 116 1.8 259 173 159 170 6.3 3.3 2.5 2.9 813 8.0 2.5 2.3 1.2 340 3'77 256 u REFERENCE S: 1 Documents British Foreign Policy, Third Series, Vol. III, p . 225. 2 Survey of International Afifairs rn38, Vol. Ill p. 105. 3 Cf. Tiso's conversation with Ribbentrop on October 19, 1~38, where Tiso said, "The Sl'ovarks hav,e determined and could pr,ove that the 1910 sta'tistks were incorrect a,n d t'hat they even had been falsified ." (Doc. Ger. F1or. Pol. D., Vol. IV, p. 87.) 4 The Law of Nati-onaiities (Act 44/ 1864) is rerpr:oduiced in R. W. Seton-Watson: Racial Problems in Hungary (Consrtahle, London, 1908), p. 4'299-4'33. Pr:ofessor Seton-Watson gives also a penetrating a,nd· scholarly a,na.lysis of this Act. poin'ting out the differences between lofty t,h eories a;nd l ow practices. 5 This practi,ce was followed till 1941, when for the first time in Magyar history the nationalirty of the inhaibi'tants otf Hurugary was ascertained. 6 A story was told in those days (most priolbalbly apocryiphal) that after th.is point,blank-Jired reminder of Tiso, a memlber c:,f the Hungarian delegation stood up an'd, instead of a long reply, answered in Magyar: "Igazad, s6g,or, de senrki sem .sLszi" (Y:ou are righit, brother, rbu't rnJlbody will believe you). 7 The litalians were eager to placarte the Magyars at somebody else's e~pense. The Slovaks knew v,e ry ,w ell tha t they could no t expect any und,erstanding for their point c:,f view fr:om the cynical Ciano. Jin their efforts to assure bett er terms they concenitr<ated exclusively on Ribbentrop. Unforituna-tely 'he had more will than skill to help them. 8 StaHstical data for this part oif the article come mostly from "Magyar s:zlta:tisztikai kozlemenyek" and "Annuaire statistique de la Repu blique Tchecoslorvaque." 9 The advance of magyarization in 1'880-1910 and the tur.n o,f the tide after 1'919 are best soon from the sta'tistical data taJbulated in .Aippen<lix. 10 "Prager Presse," November 4, 1938. - No need to say that Tiso was basing his statement on Czecho-Slovak ofific'ial statistics. 1 1 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1960, Vol. 10 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 6 [sic] (No. 31), March-June 1960.</li> <li>Issue 7 [sic] (No. 32), September-December 1960.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1960 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 21 STATISTICS AND POLITICS Francis Vnuk I. On November 2, 1938, in Vienna, by an arbitrary award of Germany and Italy, Czecho-Slova kia was forced to cede to Hungary 10,432 km2 of Slovak territory in which there lived according to Slovak statistics: (1) 276,287 Slovaks, 505,808 Magyars, and 75,688 others (Germans, Jews, Ruthenes, etc.) and according to Magyar-Hung arian claims: (2) 727,297 Magyars, 121,890 Slovaks and 12,456 others (mostly Germans). The loss was considered by the Slovaks to be an utter disregard of justice and an improper application of ethnic principles. As such it was intensely resented and was a cause of constant friction between Slovakia and Hungary during the war period. Every student of modern European history must b struck by the tremendous discrepancies in statistical data claimed as correct by both contesting parties. It seems that in politica..l statistics even mathematics cease to be an "exact" science. In Vienna the Magyars had the advantage (which was a serious setback to the Slovaks) of demanding and then obtaining application of those rules which were used by the Germans in the solution of the Sudeten question. The Germans took the 1910 census as the guiding principle of "ethnic" r,atification of the "Versailles-Di ktait." Due to this most unfortunaite precedent the Magyars obtained at Vienna far more favorable treatment than they would have received if the actual ethnographic aspects were taken into account. The Slovaks contested the validity of the Hungarian statistics of 1910 on several grounds. They maintained that the statistics were not reliable since they did not consider nationality as such and that they were obtained by Magyar or pro-Magyar census takers at the peak of Magyarization to the subsequent detriment of the non-Ma- 22 SLOVAKIA gyar nationalities. (3) These arguments are worthy of a brief analysis. II. The concept of nationaUty in Magyar eyes had some puzzling and even contradictory features. The existence of nationality was admitted; its rights were legalized in one of the best nationality laws ever drafted.(4) Yet the law was an abysmal failure. It was never put into practice, but remained a dead letter. Normally where there is a nationality there is also a nation. But in Hungary, whi,le there was a Slovak nationality, according to S. Tisza "there was no such thing as the Slovak na:tion." In Magy,ar terminology one oould not be a Slovak, German or a Rumanian, but only a Slovak-, German-, or Rumani'an-speaking Hungarian. Consequently the census questionnaires did not inquire into one's nationality, but they wanted to know what language was used. (5) If a person spoke several languages and one of them was Magyar, that was a satisfactory qualificaition to classify him as a Magyar. It was left to Tiso to point out this unusual fact to the Hungarian negotiators in Komarno in Ootober 1938. When they ins1sted that the statistics of 1910 should be taken as a basis for discussion, Tiso told them bluntly: "That would be a blatant denial of justice. You know very we11 how these figures were arrived at. You never asked us what was our nationality. You simply said to us: 'You can speak Magyar, ergo you are Magyars.' In this manner I was counted as a Magyar 81gainst my wishes and feelings." (6) This is, in a nutshell, an eloquent example of "reliability" of the Hungarian statistics, but unfurtunately rut .that time such arguments did not carry much weight with the Germans whose opinion was to be decisive. (7) Bureaucratically trained German minds were still obsessed with the sanctity of written records and subconsciously sentimental about the Magyars as co-victims of a similar treatment to that imposed on the Germans in Versailles. Ill A close look at the official Hungarian statistics of the 1900-1910 decade reveals a very serious weakening of SLOVAKIA 23 the Slov:ak element. Nowhere else in Hungary was the magyarization process making such inroads as in Slovakia (8) (which the Magyars preferred to call "Felvidek") 1-900 11910 Papula,tilOn Charuge I Total I % ·I 11dtal I % !Iner.ease !!Decrease I % Magyars 8,651,520j51.4 9,944,627•154.5111,293,'10711 + 14.9 GerJ'lj.ans 1,999,060111.9 11',903,357 )10.4 95.703 - 4.8 Srovaks 55,808- 2.8 12,002,16511.91,94'6,357,lll0.7 Rumanians 2,798,55916.6 2,>94!8,100 116.1 149,627 + 5.4 Yugoslaivs 629;169 3.7 656,324 3.6 39,496 + 6.3 R'll!thenes 4124,774 2.5 4164,270 2.5 27,155 + 6.4 Othe~s 33•3 ,308 2 .0 401,4'12 2.2 68,404 1+ 20.5 ------N ation,ality According to the above table the net population increase in 1900-1910 amounted to 1,426,278, which, however, included numerical decreases of two nationalities (Slovaks and Germans), small increases in other non-Magyar nationalities and an unpropor.tionaUy big increase in the dominant Magyar nationality. The figure becomes even more striking when one considers that out of each 1000 peI'sons in the 1900-1910 population increase 907 were Magyars and only 93 non-Magyars. The Magyar nationality increased by 14.9 per cent while the total increase of nonMagyar nationalities was only 1.6 per cent. The extent of the denationaHzation policy pursued by the Hungarian government becomes very revealing when the national increase, due to the difference between births and deaths and the migratory factors is considered. The number of births and the mortality figures .per 1,000 population are given in the following table for the years 1900 and 1910: YEAR 1900 Nati:onality Magyars Germans Slovaks Rumanians Ruthenes Yugoslavs - I •B om I Died 39.1 36.7 43.9 37.7 42.3 42.6 25.7 25.0 29.7 28.8 27.5 34.4 - -- YEAR 1910 ID.ised I Increase I Incre ase I !Bom I 13.4 11.7 14.2 8.9 14.8 8.2 -· I I 35.1 32.0 38.4 35.7 39.5 38.9 - ---- - I 22.0 I I 21.5 24.7 27.4 24.8 28.3 13.1 10.5 13.7 8.3 14.7 10.6 The table shows an even increase of various nationalities, and it is · interesting to note that on the birth and SLOVAKIA 24 death basis the Ruthenes and Slovaks were the fastest growing nationalities of pre-war Hungary. There is, of course, another factor of significant importance which in the first decade of this century played an important part in the population structure of old Hungary, namely emigration. For simplicity's sake the year 1910 is taken as typical. The emigration figures per 1,000 population are as follows: Nationality I I Emigrat ion !balance Number •o f / Returned emigrants emigra,ruts -1.8 -6.8 -6.7 -4.1 -5.9 -2.5 0.8 2.0 2.5 1.0 2.3 1.3 2.6 8.8 9.3 5.1 8.2 3.8 Magyars Germans Slovaks Rumanians Ruthenes Yugoslavs The population increase per 1,000 population in the census year 1910 should, therefore, be: increa,se per i IINet 1000 (derived I from, death a•nd Nationality Magyars Germans Slovaks Rumanians Ruthenes Yugoslavs I emi,g ration data) I 11.3 3.7 7.0 4.2 8.8 8.1 . . Percentual mcrea:se As estimated Actual from statistrcs 1.13 0.37 0.70 0.42 0.88 0.81 I I + 1.49 -0.48 -0.28 + 0.54 + 0.64 + 0.63 For the Slovaks these figures have a tragic significance. It was no empty threat that the Slovak nation was faced with its own extinction. The statistics show this. The decline of the Slovak nationality was catastrophically rapid. In the decade 1900-19100 the SloV1ak population should have increased by about 160,000; instead it decreased by more than 55,000. This represents a loss of about 215,000, i.e., nearly 11 per cent. The figures are really staggering. (9) The Slovaks contested that this out-of-all-proporti ons decrease cannot be explained otherwise than by contribut- SLOVAKIA ing it to the falsification of results by the Hungarian census takers and/or .s tatisticians. They argued that even the forcible and tempting means which the Mo-gyars a:s the dominant nationality had at their disposal could not account for this terrifying decrease. There is ample evidencrthat Slovak resistance to magyarization was at least as good as that of the Rumani1a ns and better than that of the Ruthenes. And yet the latter two nationalities recorded an increase where the Slovaks showed unparalleled losses. Assimilation and denationalization are responsible for some, fals-ifiers for the rest, so run the Slovak arguments. The Slovak,s requested that the arbitrators in the Slovak-Magyar di-spute should rely on the Czecho-Slovak statistics of 1930 which, being of more recent date, give a more realistic picture of the actua:1 state of affairs. The Magyars, however, refused most steadfastly to accept the official Czecho-Slovak statistics, giving very much the same reasons as advanced by the Sloveks against the Magyar statistics. Apparently what was sauce for the goose was not sauce for the gander. IV. It must be admitted that the Czecho-Slov,ak statistics were not favorable to the Magyar minority in Slovakia, or at least not as generous as the Magyars would have liked them to be. Census returns show a considerable drop in numerical strength of the Magy,ar minority: 634,827 in 1921, 571,988 in 1930, a decrease of 9.9 per cent. It must, however, be remembered that in the same time the Slovak minority in Trianon Hungary decreased from 142,000 to 104,000 which represents a decrease of 26.78 per cent. And finally one has to look for the cause of statisti<!al discrepancies also in the population. There the question of nationa:lity is quite frequently motivated by utilitarian and opportunist as much as national sentiments. This is especially so with the bilingual section of the population and such indigenous groups as Jews and Gypsies who would inva,r iably be loyal to the regime of the day. In the old Hungarian statistics Jews and Gypsies were never considered as separate ethnic groups. On t·h e other hand they 26 SLOVAKIA were treated as such by Czecho-Slovak authorities. According to some estimates, this fact alone accounts for a numerical "decrease" of the Magyar minority in Slovakia, before and after World War I, by about 80,000. The Vienna arbitration was carried out in the atmosphere of "the spirit of the Munich Agreement." Magyar wrongdoing faded away in the distant past, while Czech wrongdoings - alleged or real - were still the order of the day. All the paraphernalia of the Czech-German dispute formed the background against which the SlovakMagyar settlement was projected. Due to the ethnographical complex of the issue it would have been impossible to fix the Slovak-Magyar boundary to the satisfaction of both parties were the arbitrator Solomon himself. It was very much easier to draw it to the dissatisfaction of both sides. But the arbitra,tors decided to satisfy one and wrong the other. The fateful concentration of circumstances was unfavorable to the Slovaks. Tiso, in his broadcast on November 2, 1938, announcing the results of the Vienna Award, poured out his countrymen's sorrow and bitterness; "We have become the victims of injustice. . . Our people, through no fault of its own, has been treated as an object and has come into a situaition which disposed of it as a defeated enemy, without its participation and therefore against it, and often in contradiction to the ethnic principle. 'l'he "Great Powers" have decided, there is nothing else to do but to bow our heads and to work; but no one can prevent us from proclaiming to the whole world that a great injustice has been done to the Slovak people. Under the dictated peace of Trianon, hardly 6 per cent of the Magyar people had to live in Slovakia, whereas under the new settlement of the Slovak frontiers nearly 20 per cent of the Slovak people will have to live in Hungary." (10) APPENDIX In the tables given below the ethnical evolution of ten towns of the Slovak-Magyar linguistic boundary is recorded. In all cases the Magyar element was on the increase in the period 1880-1910, at the expense of the Slovak and 27 SLOVAKIA German component. After 1919 the process was reversen. The rapid increase of the Slovak popufation was mostly due to the influx of rural population to towns, the newcomers being mostly exclusively of Slovak nationality. :POPULATION STRJUCTU'RE Tow.n and c,e nsus year Slovaks Total % Magyars Total % Germans Total % Bratislava 1857 1880 1890 1900 1910 1930 4,600 7,273 a,709 10,7115 U,67G 60,013 14.5 15.7 17,2 16.7 15.3 5'8.7 2,500 7,270 10,4-S3 20;102 31,705 18,'890 7.8 15.7 20.6 31.4 41.7 16.9 .24!,732 30,440 311,404' 33,202 32,790 32,801 77.7 65.6 62.2 51.9 43.0 29.4 4,3719 10,3,1,1 9,7113 9,244 6,5417 42,24;5 39.2 40.9 40.4 23.9 15.4 74.0 2,500 10,007 10,4'21 25,996 33,350 111,504 22.5 3'9.8 43 .4 67.0 77.2 20.1 4,200 4,218 3•,891 3,'189 3,354 37.8 16.8 16.0 8.9 7.4 5.2 3,403' 5,538 4,929 Ul,462 40. 7 36.9 30.'l 92:.4 2,990 7,'2119 9,754 96'1 35. 7 47.8 59.7 4.8 1,969 2,3'12 1,636 5'1>'8 23.6 15.3 10.2 2.8 1,41'9 ·565 449 2,781 54.3 20.4 16.2 ·86.0 1;127 2,167 2:,289 255 43.3 78.5 82.3 7.9 55 3'1 4'2 197 2.4 1.1 1.5 6,1 3,403 3,381 2,181 6,027 89,2 73•,8 ~-0 97.0 200 l •,1 07 2,300 5.2 24.2 2:15 15'8 51.>1 2.5 4'2 32 T78 785 5,106 7,449 8,7512: 4,974 81'.0 88.3 91.7 44.6 423 688 5,956 12.3 9.3 7.2 53.5 856 1,000 1,,6 75 8,71•5 18.0 10.4 13Jl 64.L 3,,6 09 8,1'87 10,634: 4,007 75.0 87.0 83.6 29.4 333 249 428 889 ------------ Kol;ic,e ''' 1857 1880 1890 1900 1<910 1930 3,446 "Ruthenes omitted Nitra 1880 1900 1910 1930 Jelsava 1880 1900 1910 H~30 Trebisov 1880 1900 1910 11930 88 5.6 2.0 0.9 0.5 Levice 1880 1900 11910 1930 198 199 214 6.7 2.4 2.,1 1..9 Lucenec 1880 1900 1910 1930 7.0 2.6 3.3 6.5 SLOVAKIA 28 Rimavska Sobota 1:880 1900 1910 1930 443 322 468 2,939 9.5 5.3 6.9 44.8 4,102 5,424' 6,1199 3,504 ,88.0 '93.5 91.8 53.4 124 Roznava lr880 1900 1910 1930 400 233 406 2,506 9.9 4.5 6.3 42.7 3,884' 4,7,68 5,886 3,211 83,.8 92.2 9lr.2 54.4 Nove Zamky 1880 1900 1'910 1930 1,466 822 964 9,561 14.3 6.2 6.1 47.8 7,189 12,1,97 14,838 10,193 77.7 91.3 91.6 51.0 1 69 2.5 .1.2 91 116 1.8 259 173 159 170 6.3 3.3 2.5 2.9 813 8.0 2.5 2.3 1.2 340 3'77 256 u REFERENCE S: 1 Documents British Foreign Policy, Third Series, Vol. III, p . 225. 2 Survey of International Afifairs rn38, Vol. Ill p. 105. 3 Cf. Tiso's conversation with Ribbentrop on October 19, 1~38, where Tiso said, "The Sl'ovarks hav,e determined and could pr,ove that the 1910 sta'tistks were incorrect a,n d t'hat they even had been falsified ." (Doc. Ger. F1or. Pol. D., Vol. IV, p. 87.) 4 The Law of Nati-onaiities (Act 44/ 1864) is rerpr:oduiced in R. W. Seton-Watson: Racial Problems in Hungary (Consrtahle, London, 1908), p. 4'299-4'33. Pr:ofessor Seton-Watson gives also a penetrating a,nd· scholarly a,na.lysis of this Act. poin'ting out the differences between lofty t,h eories a;nd l ow practices. 5 This practi,ce was followed till 1941, when for the first time in Magyar history the nationalirty of the inhaibi'tants otf Hurugary was ascertained. 6 A story was told in those days (most priolbalbly apocryiphal) that after th.is point,blank-Jired reminder of Tiso, a memlber c:,f the Hungarian delegation stood up an'd, instead of a long reply, answered in Magyar: "Igazad, s6g,or, de senrki sem .sLszi" (Y:ou are righit, brother, rbu't rnJlbody will believe you). 7 The litalians were eager to placarte the Magyars at somebody else's e~pense. The Slovaks knew v,e ry ,w ell tha t they could no t expect any und,erstanding for their point c:,f view fr:om the cynical Ciano. Jin their efforts to assure bett er terms they concenitr<ated exclusively on Ribbentrop. Unforituna-tely 'he had more will than skill to help them. 8 StaHstical data for this part oif the article come mostly from "Magyar s:zlta:tisztikai kozlemenyek" and "Annuaire statistique de la Repu blique Tchecoslorvaque." 9 The advance of magyarization in 1'880-1910 and the tur.n o,f the tide after 1'919 are best soon from the sta'tistical data taJbulated in .Aippen<lix. 10 "Prager Presse," November 4, 1938. - No need to say that Tiso was basing his statement on Czecho-Slovak ofific'ial statistics. 1 1 1  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Statistics and Politics Description An account of the resource Francis Vnuk Slovakia, Vol. 10, No. 6 (31), March-June 1960 pp. 21-28 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March-June 1960 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/27e8b60d7b9f2ba11d4fdce8935748e6.pdf b838bf0abdc32a21c4559929a382b47f PDF Text Text 40 SLOVAKIA AN INCREDIBLE CONSPffiACY In the last days of August 1944, Slovakia, a peaceful island in war-ravaged Europe, suddenly became a theatre of war. There occurred an armed rebellion against the Slovak Republic sponsored by Czech-leaning politicians, ambitious army officers and communists. On the pages of the world press the incident passed almost unnoticed ; if it appeared it was completely lost alongside such events as the gallant stand of the Poles in the Warsaw rising (Aug.-Sept.), the Allied landing on the south coast of France (Aug. 15) , the fall of Paris (Aug. 23) , the capitulation of Rumania (Aug. 23), the Finnish withdrawal from the war (Sept. 2) , the Soviet declaration of war on Bulgaria (Sept. 5), etc. while on a world scale the Slovak uprising was an insignificent development (e. g. there is no reference to it in the 'Chronology of the Second World War' published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs) , on the Slovak scale it was an undertaking of vast dimensions. It started spectacularly; in the first days it spread over more than a half of Slovak territory and by the time it was liquidated with the help of the German troops at the end of October 1944 it had cost Slovakia some 40,000 dead, immense material losses and irreparable losses in terms of human suffering. It failed largely because of its untimely start, confused leadership and lack of popular appeal. There are many puzzling features concerning this affair which to an outside observer must be without parallel in history: Here is a nation which takes up arms to fight against its own state, to sink its political individuality into a synthetic agglomerate state, to renounce its national birthright for a second-rate citizenship. However, beyond these absurd appearances lie more fundamental reasons which, .if not more logical, are at least more plausible. The emergence of independent Slovakia in March 1939 was an epoch-making event in the life of the Slovak nation. It was enthusiastically greated by Slovaks of all political shadess and there was definitely no active opposition either by the Communists or the pro-Czech elements. Unfortunately, but inevitably, the state was born with German assistance, it asked for and was promptly granted German pro- �SLOVAKIA 41 tection and was only six months old when World War II broke out. Yet in this short space of time (March-Sept. 1939) it secured recognition not only from its neighbours (Germany, Poland, Hungary) but also from the neutrals (Switzerland, Sweden, the Vatican) from and England, Italy and the Soviet Union. The war and Slovakia's inescapable geography put the state into the Axis camp. With the approaching defeat of Germany its existance was placed in jeopardy. Dr. Benes, the self-exiled president of pre-Munich Czechoslovakia, had no difficulty in convincing the western Allies and the Soviet Union that the Slovak problem was an internal problem of post-war Czechoslovakia which would be best solved by the restoration of the status quo ante 1938. Thi~ development led to a profound soul-searching among those politicians of pro-Czech orientation who in 1939 - expecting that the new state woulcl. outlast at lea;;\, their life span - renounced and denounced their previous centralist past. When in 1943 they belatedly discovered that their appraisal of the situation was wrong, they cast their r~morseful eyes towards Benes. But they were somehow afraid to approach him empty-handed and decided to undo their former betrayal of pro-Czech sentimen t by a new treason towards their own state. Dr. Benes then conceived the idea of a Slovak uprising in his name and for the restoration of the British advice - signed with the Soviet Union a state treaty of mutual assistance and post-war cooperation. Within a fortnight the Slovak liberal-agrarian politicians concluded an agreemen t with the Slovak Communist underground. In this fateful alliance - called the Christmas Agreement they vowed to take over the political, legislative, military and administrative power in Slovakia "at the first suitable opportunity" and to restore Czechoslovakia as a common state of the Slovaks and Czechs. For the Communists this step was a radical departure from their earlier political program. When in the spring of 1939 the Komintern approved an independ ent Communist Party of Slovakia, the party vehemently and persistently advocated a free and independ ent Soviet Slovakia. In a similar vein the Czech Communist leadership in Moscow in March 1940 informed the Czech Communist underground: "We are �42 SLOVAKIA fighting for complete sovereignty of the present Slovak state . . . The old conceptions concerning Slovakia are being abandoned. The Slovak state is a given basis in the struggle for the full freedom of the Slovaks." This attitude was changed in the summer of 1941. Then the Soviet Union recognized Benes as the president of Czechoslovakia and the Slovak Communists were ordered to twist their political line accordingly. With some reluctance they obeyed, since "their.; was not to reason why .... " The Communist and liberal-agrarian conspirators found helpful allies among the army generals and officers, some of whom were of Czech origin and most of whom were trained in the old Czech schools and in the robust czechoslovakism. It must also be said that the war against Russia was unpopular even while the Germans were winning. After the Stalingrad debacle its unpopularity among the people and soldiers only increased. In April 1944 Dr. Benes sent to Slovakia his special emissary Mjr. J. Kratky. The plans of the military uprising soon took a concrete form . It was decided to open the Carpathian passes to the advancing Red army. The key role in this operation was assigned to two Slovak divisions (about 25,000 men) in Eastern Slovakia under Gen. A. Malar. Other military personalities involved in the preparation of this plan were: the Minister of National Defense Gen. F. Catlos, the Chief of the General Staff Col. J. Golian, Col. Talsky and a host of colonels, majors, captains, etc. It was said about them that "they were opposed by the burden of their iron Crosses, Knight Crosses and other German medals, impressed by the performance of the Allied and Red armies and depressed by the grim outlook concerning their future employment." The plan was well designed but it took too much for granted. The Russians to whom the plan was submitted by two special envoys early in August did not like the idea of an uprising which was burgeois-conceived and sponsored and refused to commit themselves to any coordinated action. Instead, in July and August they dropped over Central Slovakia several groups of trained partisans. These found Slovakia a fertile soil for subversive activity. The Slovak government was afraid to publicize their presence by a bold, energetic and large scale action. The small army units and police patrols �SLOVAKIA 43 - geared by their officers for a general uprising - when sent to fight the partisans were ineffective and in many cases even joined them. Late in August there were some 3,000 partisans (according to the Communist count 8,000) roaming the mountainous terrain of Central Slovakia. Their terror was aimed primarily against the Germans. But since there were no German troops in Slovakia, they looted and terrorized the indigenous German population (Volksdeutsche). On Aug. 28 the partisans and the soldiers of the Turciansky Svaty Martin garrison stopped the international express and massacred the Gertnan military mission on its way from Budapest to Cracow. On Aug. 29 Gen. Catlos announced over the radio that the Slovak Government had called the German army to restore law and order. This call on German military assistance, triggered off by the provocations of the Soviet partisans, was later declared to be the beginning of "the glorious Slovak national uprising". On Aug. 30 Col. J. Golian indeed issued an order for a general rising, but it was obvious that the day was neither of his choosing nor to his liking. The untimely start caught the military leaders off-guard. One of them, Gen. Malar, spoke over the Slovak radio and denounced the action as suicidal and premature. As a result the two well-equipped divisions in the East did not join the uprising and were disarmed by the Germans early in September. Likewise the military garrisons in West Slovakia were willing to listen to Catlos or Malar but not to Golian and thus in this crucial moment they did not join in. (The following West Slovak garrisons refused to join in : Nitra, Bratislava, Sered', Trencin, Hlohovec, Novc Mesto n/ V. The men of the Trnava garrison and some of those of Piest'any obeyed Golia.n's call, but they did not fight as expected of them. Instead they rapidly retreated towards the centre of the uprising. The uprising spread only over those districts of Central Slovakia which were infested by the partisan infiltration. In the beginning the military leadership had at its disposal some 10,000 men under arms (16 batallions and 10 companies of infantry, 13 batteries of artillery) whose number was increased by military conscription to 60,000. (The number of partisans increased in the same time from 4,500 to 13,000 ) There was no lack of light arms and ammunition, but heavy �44 SLOVAKIA weapons and aircraft were in short supply. (Altogether 26 aircraft and 12 tanks. On Aug. 13, 38 aircraft flew from East Slovakia to the Russians and these were never returned.) But what the uprising lacked most was an able and united leadership. It was directed from at least three centers: London, Moscow and Banska Bystrica. In addition the soldiers did not see eye to eye with the partisans, who formed an army of their own. The partisans had their own Soviet commanders, received their orders and directives from Kiev and refused to coordinate their actions with those of the army unless it suited their own interest. They saw in the army a tool of the bourgeoisie and thus a class enemy - only a degree better than the political enemy, the Fascists. The partisans claimed for themselves all the equipment flown in or dropped over Slovakia by the Russians. Originally the Communists shared the political power with the Democrats (the liberal-agrarian group) on a fiftyfifty basis. But by clever manipulation and aggressive action on their part and inexperience on the part of their partners they soon made themselves the dominating factor in the whole venture. With this development Moscow ceased to look at the Slovak revolt as it did at the Warsaw rising and started to provide some help. In military terms it was only a token help, often misplaced and ineffective (they sent some 150 bazookas which were of no use against the German medium and heavy tanks; the Czechoslovak fighter regiment of 21 planes after its arrival from the Soviet union was mostly grounded for the lack of fuel, spares and ammunition which the Soviets failed to provide), but on the political side they flew in the top Czech Communists operators (Slansky and Sverma) who were to help their Slovak comrades to get rid of the liberal-agrarian Kerenskys. After the Red army failed to force its way into Slovakia through the Dukla pass the Soviets allowed the transfer of the decimated 2nd Czechoslovak paratroop brigade (2,000 men) from the Carpathian battlefield into Central Slovakia. But it was too little, too late and was to no avail. The uprising was liquidated in less than two months, on Oct. 27, with the Russian front 140 miles and 150 days away from Banska Bystrica. The German troops, invited to restore law and order, set about liquidating the rebellion in their efficient, methodi- �SLOVAKIA 45 cal and ruthless manner. The Reichsfiihrer-SS, H. Himmler, entrusted SS-Obergruppenftihrer G. Berger with the task. Berger started the operation with 2,800 men, 9 light field guns and with an arrogant optimism ("Ich hoffe, dass in 4 Tagen die Anglegenheit beendet ist" - he wrote to his chief). The insurgents put up some tough resistance, especially the French partisans at Strecno (Sept. 28-4) and the Slovak army units at Telgart (Sept. 5-7). The Germans were forced to involve more and more troops. At the end of September SSObergruppenfiihrer H. Hoffle (who replaced Berger) was in command of some 18,000 troops. Towards the end of October this number was finally increased to 32,000. In the pacification of Central Slovakia the following German army and SS units participated: Tatra Panzerdivision (178th), 14th SS-division ("Galizien"), 18th SS-division ("Horst Wessel"), 20th SS-division (regiment "Schill"), parts of the 19th the 108th divisions, the brigade "Dirlewanger", and some smaller units of the police and mountain troops. It is, however, important to note that these troops were not all used simultaneously and continuously and that, being undermanned, understaffed and underequipped, they were divisions in name only ("Schattendivisionen"). They moved in three directions - from west, east and south - towards the strategic center of the uprising - the triangle B. Bystrica - Zvolen Brezno n/ Hr. In spite of at least threefold numerical superiority and excellent defensive terrain the insurgents yielded one position after the other: some fell after hard fighting (Cremosne, Bat'ovany, B. Stiavnica), others were abandoned in panic. After the liquidation of the armed rebellion the army units were either captured or dispersed. The partisans, led by more experienced Soviet officers, managed to retreat into the mountains in more or less coherent groups, leaving behind their heavy weapons, transport vehicles and ammunition. Their subsequent hibernation in the deep and often inaccesible forests of Central Slovakia was largely of a defensive nature and till January 1945 it did not interfere with the German war effort to any appreciable extent. The complete collapse of the military uprising in the midst of favorable circumstances cannot but remind one of the words of F. Engels written about the Slovak uprising of 1848: Die Slowaken �46 SLOVAKIA die die Gebirgpasse innenhaben, wiirden bei ihren zum Parteigangerkriege vortrefflichen Gegenden gefahrliche Gegner sei, wenn sie veniger gleichgiiltig gestimmt waren. (Neue Rheinische Zeitung, No. 194, Jan. 13, 1849). The uprising was not the affair of the Slovak people. It was the concern of a small group of short-sighted politicians, mercenary officers and Communists. It lacked the spontaneity with which it was posthumously so generously credited. Apart from some sincere single-minded Communists most of its Slovak participants were either misled or forcibly conscribed into it. Cries like "Death to the German occupants!" sounded hollow, because the German occupation was the result and not the cause of the partisan activity. Catchphrases like "For free Czechoslovakia!" were uninspiring since even the simplest Slovak know that - as far as freedom was concerned no Czechoslovakia could ever be a substitute for Slovakia. The Slovak state of 1939-44 with all its drawbacks and limitations was still the richest form of freedom and independence within the memory of all Slovaks. To an ordinary Slovak the fruits of independence were real and tangible, the horrors of fascism hardly perceptible. Any attempts to make him rise against his own state in the name of antifascism were bound to fall flat. Nobody with sense pours out the baby with the bath water. Yet that was what the selfappointed leaders of the armed rebellion against the Slovak state actually did. Twenty years later one may ask: To what good? Definitely not to the benefit of their nation. And as for their own vain glory and mercenary rewards, these were all of very short duration. As for "dramatis personae" of a Greek tragedy, the men of 29th August one by one fell in disgrace or worse at the hands of those to whose voice they had listened when conspiring against their own state. In 1948 the Communists got rid of their liberal-agrarian partners (Lettrich, Josko, etc.) and in the subsequent Communist purges of 1949-54 everybody who was anybody in the uprising (Zingor, Husak, Smidke, Novomesky, etc.) was shot, imprisoned or degraded. Fr ancis Vnuk � 40 SLOVAKIA AN INCREDIBLE CONSPffiACY In the last days of August 1944, Slovakia, a peaceful island in war-ravaged Europe, suddenly became a theatre of war. There occurred an armed rebellion against the Slovak Republic sponsored by Czech-leaning politicians, ambitious army officers and communists. On the pages of the world press the incident passed almost unnoticed ; if it appeared it was completely lost alongside such events as the gallant stand of the Poles in the Warsaw rising (Aug.-Sept.), the Allied landing on the south coast of France (Aug. 15) , the fall of Paris (Aug. 23) , the capitulation of Rumania (Aug. 23), the Finnish withdrawal from the war (Sept. 2) , the Soviet declaration of war on Bulgaria (Sept. 5), etc. while on a world scale the Slovak uprising was an insignificent development (e. g. there is no reference to it in the 'Chronology of the Second World War' published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs) , on the Slovak scale it was an undertaking of vast dimensions. It started spectacularly; in the first days it spread over more than a half of Slovak territory and by the time it was liquidated with the help of the German troops at the end of October 1944 it had cost Slovakia some 40,000 dead, immense material losses and irreparable losses in terms of human suffering. It failed largely because of its untimely start, confused leadership and lack of popular appeal. There are many puzzling features concerning this affair which to an outside observer must be without parallel in history: Here is a nation which takes up arms to fight against its own state, to sink its political individuality into a synthetic agglomerate state, to renounce its national birthright for a second-rate citizenship. However, beyond these absurd appearances lie more fundamental reasons which, .if not more logical, are at least more plausible. The emergence of independent Slovakia in March 1939 was an epoch-making event in the life of the Slovak nation. It was enthusiastically greated by Slovaks of all political shadess and there was definitely no active opposition either by the Communists or the pro-Czech elements. Unfortunately, but inevitably, the state was born with German assistance, it asked for and was promptly granted German pro- �SLOVAKIA 41 tection and was only six months old when World War II broke out. Yet in this short space of time (March-Sept. 1939) it secured recognition not only from its neighbours (Germany, Poland, Hungary) but also from the neutrals (Switzerland, Sweden, the Vatican) from and England, Italy and the Soviet Union. The war and Slovakia's inescapable geography put the state into the Axis camp. With the approaching defeat of Germany its existance was placed in jeopardy. Dr. Benes, the self-exiled president of pre-Munich Czechoslovakia, had no difficulty in convincing the western Allies and the Soviet Union that the Slovak problem was an internal problem of post-war Czechoslovakia which would be best solved by the restoration of the status quo ante 1938. Thi~ development led to a profound soul-searching among those politicians of pro-Czech orientation who in 1939 - expecting that the new state woulcl. outlast at lea;;\, their life span - renounced and denounced their previous centralist past. When in 1943 they belatedly discovered that their appraisal of the situation was wrong, they cast their r~morseful eyes towards Benes. But they were somehow afraid to approach him empty-handed and decided to undo their former betrayal of pro-Czech sentimen t by a new treason towards their own state. Dr. Benes then conceived the idea of a Slovak uprising in his name and for the restoration of the British advice - signed with the Soviet Union a state treaty of mutual assistance and post-war cooperation. Within a fortnight the Slovak liberal-agrarian politicians concluded an agreemen t with the Slovak Communist underground. In this fateful alliance - called the Christmas Agreement they vowed to take over the political, legislative, military and administrative power in Slovakia "at the first suitable opportunity" and to restore Czechoslovakia as a common state of the Slovaks and Czechs. For the Communists this step was a radical departure from their earlier political program. When in the spring of 1939 the Komintern approved an independ ent Communist Party of Slovakia, the party vehemently and persistently advocated a free and independ ent Soviet Slovakia. In a similar vein the Czech Communist leadership in Moscow in March 1940 informed the Czech Communist underground: "We are �42 SLOVAKIA fighting for complete sovereignty of the present Slovak state . . . The old conceptions concerning Slovakia are being abandoned. The Slovak state is a given basis in the struggle for the full freedom of the Slovaks." This attitude was changed in the summer of 1941. Then the Soviet Union recognized Benes as the president of Czechoslovakia and the Slovak Communists were ordered to twist their political line accordingly. With some reluctance they obeyed, since "their.; was not to reason why .... " The Communist and liberal-agrarian conspirators found helpful allies among the army generals and officers, some of whom were of Czech origin and most of whom were trained in the old Czech schools and in the robust czechoslovakism. It must also be said that the war against Russia was unpopular even while the Germans were winning. After the Stalingrad debacle its unpopularity among the people and soldiers only increased. In April 1944 Dr. Benes sent to Slovakia his special emissary Mjr. J. Kratky. The plans of the military uprising soon took a concrete form . It was decided to open the Carpathian passes to the advancing Red army. The key role in this operation was assigned to two Slovak divisions (about 25,000 men) in Eastern Slovakia under Gen. A. Malar. Other military personalities involved in the preparation of this plan were: the Minister of National Defense Gen. F. Catlos, the Chief of the General Staff Col. J. Golian, Col. Talsky and a host of colonels, majors, captains, etc. It was said about them that "they were opposed by the burden of their iron Crosses, Knight Crosses and other German medals, impressed by the performance of the Allied and Red armies and depressed by the grim outlook concerning their future employment." The plan was well designed but it took too much for granted. The Russians to whom the plan was submitted by two special envoys early in August did not like the idea of an uprising which was burgeois-conceived and sponsored and refused to commit themselves to any coordinated action. Instead, in July and August they dropped over Central Slovakia several groups of trained partisans. These found Slovakia a fertile soil for subversive activity. The Slovak government was afraid to publicize their presence by a bold, energetic and large scale action. The small army units and police patrols �SLOVAKIA 43 - geared by their officers for a general uprising - when sent to fight the partisans were ineffective and in many cases even joined them. Late in August there were some 3,000 partisans (according to the Communist count 8,000) roaming the mountainous terrain of Central Slovakia. Their terror was aimed primarily against the Germans. But since there were no German troops in Slovakia, they looted and terrorized the indigenous German population (Volksdeutsche). On Aug. 28 the partisans and the soldiers of the Turciansky Svaty Martin garrison stopped the international express and massacred the Gertnan military mission on its way from Budapest to Cracow. On Aug. 29 Gen. Catlos announced over the radio that the Slovak Government had called the German army to restore law and order. This call on German military assistance, triggered off by the provocations of the Soviet partisans, was later declared to be the beginning of "the glorious Slovak national uprising". On Aug. 30 Col. J. Golian indeed issued an order for a general rising, but it was obvious that the day was neither of his choosing nor to his liking. The untimely start caught the military leaders off-guard. One of them, Gen. Malar, spoke over the Slovak radio and denounced the action as suicidal and premature. As a result the two well-equipped divisions in the East did not join the uprising and were disarmed by the Germans early in September. Likewise the military garrisons in West Slovakia were willing to listen to Catlos or Malar but not to Golian and thus in this crucial moment they did not join in. (The following West Slovak garrisons refused to join in : Nitra, Bratislava, Sered', Trencin, Hlohovec, Novc Mesto n/ V. The men of the Trnava garrison and some of those of Piest'any obeyed Golia.n's call, but they did not fight as expected of them. Instead they rapidly retreated towards the centre of the uprising. The uprising spread only over those districts of Central Slovakia which were infested by the partisan infiltration. In the beginning the military leadership had at its disposal some 10,000 men under arms (16 batallions and 10 companies of infantry, 13 batteries of artillery) whose number was increased by military conscription to 60,000. (The number of partisans increased in the same time from 4,500 to 13,000 ) There was no lack of light arms and ammunition, but heavy �44 SLOVAKIA weapons and aircraft were in short supply. (Altogether 26 aircraft and 12 tanks. On Aug. 13, 38 aircraft flew from East Slovakia to the Russians and these were never returned.) But what the uprising lacked most was an able and united leadership. It was directed from at least three centers: London, Moscow and Banska Bystrica. In addition the soldiers did not see eye to eye with the partisans, who formed an army of their own. The partisans had their own Soviet commanders, received their orders and directives from Kiev and refused to coordinate their actions with those of the army unless it suited their own interest. They saw in the army a tool of the bourgeoisie and thus a class enemy - only a degree better than the political enemy, the Fascists. The partisans claimed for themselves all the equipment flown in or dropped over Slovakia by the Russians. Originally the Communists shared the political power with the Democrats (the liberal-agrarian group) on a fiftyfifty basis. But by clever manipulation and aggressive action on their part and inexperience on the part of their partners they soon made themselves the dominating factor in the whole venture. With this development Moscow ceased to look at the Slovak revolt as it did at the Warsaw rising and started to provide some help. In military terms it was only a token help, often misplaced and ineffective (they sent some 150 bazookas which were of no use against the German medium and heavy tanks; the Czechoslovak fighter regiment of 21 planes after its arrival from the Soviet union was mostly grounded for the lack of fuel, spares and ammunition which the Soviets failed to provide), but on the political side they flew in the top Czech Communists operators (Slansky and Sverma) who were to help their Slovak comrades to get rid of the liberal-agrarian Kerenskys. After the Red army failed to force its way into Slovakia through the Dukla pass the Soviets allowed the transfer of the decimated 2nd Czechoslovak paratroop brigade (2,000 men) from the Carpathian battlefield into Central Slovakia. But it was too little, too late and was to no avail. The uprising was liquidated in less than two months, on Oct. 27, with the Russian front 140 miles and 150 days away from Banska Bystrica. The German troops, invited to restore law and order, set about liquidating the rebellion in their efficient, methodi- �SLOVAKIA 45 cal and ruthless manner. The Reichsfiihrer-SS, H. Himmler, entrusted SS-Obergruppenftihrer G. Berger with the task. Berger started the operation with 2,800 men, 9 light field guns and with an arrogant optimism ("Ich hoffe, dass in 4 Tagen die Anglegenheit beendet ist" - he wrote to his chief). The insurgents put up some tough resistance, especially the French partisans at Strecno (Sept. 28-4) and the Slovak army units at Telgart (Sept. 5-7). The Germans were forced to involve more and more troops. At the end of September SSObergruppenfiihrer H. Hoffle (who replaced Berger) was in command of some 18,000 troops. Towards the end of October this number was finally increased to 32,000. In the pacification of Central Slovakia the following German army and SS units participated: Tatra Panzerdivision (178th), 14th SS-division ("Galizien"), 18th SS-division ("Horst Wessel"), 20th SS-division (regiment "Schill"), parts of the 19th the 108th divisions, the brigade "Dirlewanger", and some smaller units of the police and mountain troops. It is, however, important to note that these troops were not all used simultaneously and continuously and that, being undermanned, understaffed and underequipped, they were divisions in name only ("Schattendivisionen"). They moved in three directions - from west, east and south - towards the strategic center of the uprising - the triangle B. Bystrica - Zvolen Brezno n/ Hr. In spite of at least threefold numerical superiority and excellent defensive terrain the insurgents yielded one position after the other: some fell after hard fighting (Cremosne, Bat'ovany, B. Stiavnica), others were abandoned in panic. After the liquidation of the armed rebellion the army units were either captured or dispersed. The partisans, led by more experienced Soviet officers, managed to retreat into the mountains in more or less coherent groups, leaving behind their heavy weapons, transport vehicles and ammunition. Their subsequent hibernation in the deep and often inaccesible forests of Central Slovakia was largely of a defensive nature and till January 1945 it did not interfere with the German war effort to any appreciable extent. The complete collapse of the military uprising in the midst of favorable circumstances cannot but remind one of the words of F. Engels written about the Slovak uprising of 1848: Die Slowaken �46 SLOVAKIA die die Gebirgpasse innenhaben, wiirden bei ihren zum Parteigangerkriege vortrefflichen Gegenden gefahrliche Gegner sei, wenn sie veniger gleichgiiltig gestimmt waren. (Neue Rheinische Zeitung, No. 194, Jan. 13, 1849). The uprising was not the affair of the Slovak people. It was the concern of a small group of short-sighted politicians, mercenary officers and Communists. It lacked the spontaneity with which it was posthumously so generously credited. Apart from some sincere single-minded Communists most of its Slovak participants were either misled or forcibly conscribed into it. Cries like "Death to the German occupants!" sounded hollow, because the German occupation was the result and not the cause of the partisan activity. Catchphrases like "For free Czechoslovakia!" were uninspiring since even the simplest Slovak know that - as far as freedom was concerned no Czechoslovakia could ever be a substitute for Slovakia. The Slovak state of 1939-44 with all its drawbacks and limitations was still the richest form of freedom and independence within the memory of all Slovaks. To an ordinary Slovak the fruits of independence were real and tangible, the horrors of fascism hardly perceptible. Any attempts to make him rise against his own state in the name of antifascism were bound to fall flat. Nobody with sense pours out the baby with the bath water. Yet that was what the selfappointed leaders of the armed rebellion against the Slovak state actually did. Twenty years later one may ask: To what good? Definitely not to the benefit of their nation. And as for their own vain glory and mercenary rewards, these were all of very short duration. As for "dramatis personae" of a Greek tragedy, the men of 29th August one by one fell in disgrace or worse at the hands of those to whose voice they had listened when conspiring against their own state. In 1948 the Communists got rid of their liberal-agrarian partners (Lettrich, Josko, etc.) and in the subsequent Communist purges of 1949-54 everybody who was anybody in the uprising (Zingor, Husak, Smidke, Novomesky, etc.) was shot, imprisoned or degraded. Fr ancis Vnuk � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1964, Vol. 14 Description An account of the resource Vol. 14 (No. 37), 1964. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1964 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 40 SLOVAKIA AN INCREDIBLE CONSPffiACY In the last days of August 1944, Slovakia, a peaceful island in war-ravaged Europe, suddenly became a theatre of war. There occurred an armed rebellion against the Slovak Republic sponsored by Czech-leaning politicians, ambitious army officers and communists. On the pages of the world press the incident passed almost unnoticed ; if it appeared it was completely lost alongside such events as the gallant stand of the Poles in the Warsaw rising (Aug.-Sept.), the Allied landing on the south coast of France (Aug. 15) , the fall of Paris (Aug. 23) , the capitulation of Rumania (Aug. 23), the Finnish withdrawal from the war (Sept. 2) , the Soviet declaration of war on Bulgaria (Sept. 5), etc. while on a world scale the Slovak uprising was an insignificent development (e. g. there is no reference to it in the 'Chronology of the Second World War' published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs) , on the Slovak scale it was an undertaking of vast dimensions. It started spectacularly; in the first days it spread over more than a half of Slovak territory and by the time it was liquidated with the help of the German troops at the end of October 1944 it had cost Slovakia some 40,000 dead, immense material losses and irreparable losses in terms of human suffering. It failed largely because of its untimely start, confused leadership and lack of popular appeal. There are many puzzling features concerning this affair which to an outside observer must be without parallel in history: Here is a nation which takes up arms to fight against its own state, to sink its political individuality into a synthetic agglomerate state, to renounce its national birthright for a second-rate citizenship. However, beyond these absurd appearances lie more fundamental reasons which, .if not more logical, are at least more plausible. The emergence of independent Slovakia in March 1939 was an epoch-making event in the life of the Slovak nation. It was enthusiastically greated by Slovaks of all political shadess and there was definitely no active opposition either by the Communists or the pro-Czech elements. Unfortunately, but inevitably, the state was born with German assistance, it asked for and was promptly granted German pro- SLOVAKIA 41 tection and was only six months old when World War II broke out. Yet in this short space of time (March-Sept. 1939) it secured recognition not only from its neighbours (Germany, Poland, Hungary) but also from the neutrals (Switzerland, Sweden, the Vatican) from and England, Italy and the Soviet Union. The war and Slovakia's inescapable geography put the state into the Axis camp. With the approaching defeat of Germany its existance was placed in jeopardy. Dr. Benes, the self-exiled president of pre-Munich Czechoslovakia, had no difficulty in convincing the western Allies and the Soviet Union that the Slovak problem was an internal problem of post-war Czechoslovakia which would be best solved by the restoration of the status quo ante 1938. Thi~ development led to a profound soul-searching among those politicians of pro-Czech orientation who in 1939 - expecting that the new state woulcl. outlast at lea;;\, their life span - renounced and denounced their previous centralist past. When in 1943 they belatedly discovered that their appraisal of the situation was wrong, they cast their r~morseful eyes towards Benes. But they were somehow afraid to approach him empty-handed and decided to undo their former betrayal of pro-Czech sentimen t by a new treason towards their own state. Dr. Benes then conceived the idea of a Slovak uprising in his name and for the restoration of the British advice - signed with the Soviet Union a state treaty of mutual assistance and post-war cooperation. Within a fortnight the Slovak liberal-agrarian politicians concluded an agreemen t with the Slovak Communist underground. In this fateful alliance - called the Christmas Agreement they vowed to take over the political, legislative, military and administrative power in Slovakia "at the first suitable opportunity" and to restore Czechoslovakia as a common state of the Slovaks and Czechs. For the Communists this step was a radical departure from their earlier political program. When in the spring of 1939 the Komintern approved an independ ent Communist Party of Slovakia, the party vehemently and persistently advocated a free and independ ent Soviet Slovakia. In a similar vein the Czech Communist leadership in Moscow in March 1940 informed the Czech Communist underground: "We are 42 SLOVAKIA fighting for complete sovereignty of the present Slovak state . . . The old conceptions concerning Slovakia are being abandoned. The Slovak state is a given basis in the struggle for the full freedom of the Slovaks." This attitude was changed in the summer of 1941. Then the Soviet Union recognized Benes as the president of Czechoslovakia and the Slovak Communists were ordered to twist their political line accordingly. With some reluctance they obeyed, since "their.; was not to reason why .... " The Communist and liberal-agrarian conspirators found helpful allies among the army generals and officers, some of whom were of Czech origin and most of whom were trained in the old Czech schools and in the robust czechoslovakism. It must also be said that the war against Russia was unpopular even while the Germans were winning. After the Stalingrad debacle its unpopularity among the people and soldiers only increased. In April 1944 Dr. Benes sent to Slovakia his special emissary Mjr. J. Kratky. The plans of the military uprising soon took a concrete form . It was decided to open the Carpathian passes to the advancing Red army. The key role in this operation was assigned to two Slovak divisions (about 25,000 men) in Eastern Slovakia under Gen. A. Malar. Other military personalities involved in the preparation of this plan were: the Minister of National Defense Gen. F. Catlos, the Chief of the General Staff Col. J. Golian, Col. Talsky and a host of colonels, majors, captains, etc. It was said about them that "they were opposed by the burden of their iron Crosses, Knight Crosses and other German medals, impressed by the performance of the Allied and Red armies and depressed by the grim outlook concerning their future employment." The plan was well designed but it took too much for granted. The Russians to whom the plan was submitted by two special envoys early in August did not like the idea of an uprising which was burgeois-conceived and sponsored and refused to commit themselves to any coordinated action. Instead, in July and August they dropped over Central Slovakia several groups of trained partisans. These found Slovakia a fertile soil for subversive activity. The Slovak government was afraid to publicize their presence by a bold, energetic and large scale action. The small army units and police patrols SLOVAKIA 43 - geared by their officers for a general uprising - when sent to fight the partisans were ineffective and in many cases even joined them. Late in August there were some 3,000 partisans (according to the Communist count 8,000) roaming the mountainous terrain of Central Slovakia. Their terror was aimed primarily against the Germans. But since there were no German troops in Slovakia, they looted and terrorized the indigenous German population (Volksdeutsche). On Aug. 28 the partisans and the soldiers of the Turciansky Svaty Martin garrison stopped the international express and massacred the Gertnan military mission on its way from Budapest to Cracow. On Aug. 29 Gen. Catlos announced over the radio that the Slovak Government had called the German army to restore law and order. This call on German military assistance, triggered off by the provocations of the Soviet partisans, was later declared to be the beginning of "the glorious Slovak national uprising". On Aug. 30 Col. J. Golian indeed issued an order for a general rising, but it was obvious that the day was neither of his choosing nor to his liking. The untimely start caught the military leaders off-guard. One of them, Gen. Malar, spoke over the Slovak radio and denounced the action as suicidal and premature. As a result the two well-equipped divisions in the East did not join the uprising and were disarmed by the Germans early in September. Likewise the military garrisons in West Slovakia were willing to listen to Catlos or Malar but not to Golian and thus in this crucial moment they did not join in. (The following West Slovak garrisons refused to join in : Nitra, Bratislava, Sered', Trencin, Hlohovec, Novc Mesto n/ V. The men of the Trnava garrison and some of those of Piest'any obeyed Golia.n's call, but they did not fight as expected of them. Instead they rapidly retreated towards the centre of the uprising. The uprising spread only over those districts of Central Slovakia which were infested by the partisan infiltration. In the beginning the military leadership had at its disposal some 10,000 men under arms (16 batallions and 10 companies of infantry, 13 batteries of artillery) whose number was increased by military conscription to 60,000. (The number of partisans increased in the same time from 4,500 to 13,000 ) There was no lack of light arms and ammunition, but heavy 44 SLOVAKIA weapons and aircraft were in short supply. (Altogether 26 aircraft and 12 tanks. On Aug. 13, 38 aircraft flew from East Slovakia to the Russians and these were never returned.) But what the uprising lacked most was an able and united leadership. It was directed from at least three centers: London, Moscow and Banska Bystrica. In addition the soldiers did not see eye to eye with the partisans, who formed an army of their own. The partisans had their own Soviet commanders, received their orders and directives from Kiev and refused to coordinate their actions with those of the army unless it suited their own interest. They saw in the army a tool of the bourgeoisie and thus a class enemy - only a degree better than the political enemy, the Fascists. The partisans claimed for themselves all the equipment flown in or dropped over Slovakia by the Russians. Originally the Communists shared the political power with the Democrats (the liberal-agrarian group) on a fiftyfifty basis. But by clever manipulation and aggressive action on their part and inexperience on the part of their partners they soon made themselves the dominating factor in the whole venture. With this development Moscow ceased to look at the Slovak revolt as it did at the Warsaw rising and started to provide some help. In military terms it was only a token help, often misplaced and ineffective (they sent some 150 bazookas which were of no use against the German medium and heavy tanks; the Czechoslovak fighter regiment of 21 planes after its arrival from the Soviet union was mostly grounded for the lack of fuel, spares and ammunition which the Soviets failed to provide), but on the political side they flew in the top Czech Communists operators (Slansky and Sverma) who were to help their Slovak comrades to get rid of the liberal-agrarian Kerenskys. After the Red army failed to force its way into Slovakia through the Dukla pass the Soviets allowed the transfer of the decimated 2nd Czechoslovak paratroop brigade (2,000 men) from the Carpathian battlefield into Central Slovakia. But it was too little, too late and was to no avail. The uprising was liquidated in less than two months, on Oct. 27, with the Russian front 140 miles and 150 days away from Banska Bystrica. The German troops, invited to restore law and order, set about liquidating the rebellion in their efficient, methodi- SLOVAKIA 45 cal and ruthless manner. The Reichsfiihrer-SS, H. Himmler, entrusted SS-Obergruppenftihrer G. Berger with the task. Berger started the operation with 2,800 men, 9 light field guns and with an arrogant optimism ("Ich hoffe, dass in 4 Tagen die Anglegenheit beendet ist" - he wrote to his chief). The insurgents put up some tough resistance, especially the French partisans at Strecno (Sept. 28-4) and the Slovak army units at Telgart (Sept. 5-7). The Germans were forced to involve more and more troops. At the end of September SSObergruppenfiihrer H. Hoffle (who replaced Berger) was in command of some 18,000 troops. Towards the end of October this number was finally increased to 32,000. In the pacification of Central Slovakia the following German army and SS units participated: Tatra Panzerdivision (178th), 14th SS-division ("Galizien"), 18th SS-division ("Horst Wessel"), 20th SS-division (regiment "Schill"), parts of the 19th the 108th divisions, the brigade "Dirlewanger", and some smaller units of the police and mountain troops. It is, however, important to note that these troops were not all used simultaneously and continuously and that, being undermanned, understaffed and underequipped, they were divisions in name only ("Schattendivisionen"). They moved in three directions - from west, east and south - towards the strategic center of the uprising - the triangle B. Bystrica - Zvolen Brezno n/ Hr. In spite of at least threefold numerical superiority and excellent defensive terrain the insurgents yielded one position after the other: some fell after hard fighting (Cremosne, Bat'ovany, B. Stiavnica), others were abandoned in panic. After the liquidation of the armed rebellion the army units were either captured or dispersed. The partisans, led by more experienced Soviet officers, managed to retreat into the mountains in more or less coherent groups, leaving behind their heavy weapons, transport vehicles and ammunition. Their subsequent hibernation in the deep and often inaccesible forests of Central Slovakia was largely of a defensive nature and till January 1945 it did not interfere with the German war effort to any appreciable extent. The complete collapse of the military uprising in the midst of favorable circumstances cannot but remind one of the words of F. Engels written about the Slovak uprising of 1848: Die Slowaken 46 SLOVAKIA die die Gebirgpasse innenhaben, wiirden bei ihren zum Parteigangerkriege vortrefflichen Gegenden gefahrliche Gegner sei, wenn sie veniger gleichgiiltig gestimmt waren. (Neue Rheinische Zeitung, No. 194, Jan. 13, 1849). The uprising was not the affair of the Slovak people. It was the concern of a small group of short-sighted politicians, mercenary officers and Communists. It lacked the spontaneity with which it was posthumously so generously credited. Apart from some sincere single-minded Communists most of its Slovak participants were either misled or forcibly conscribed into it. Cries like "Death to the German occupants!" sounded hollow, because the German occupation was the result and not the cause of the partisan activity. Catchphrases like "For free Czechoslovakia!" were uninspiring since even the simplest Slovak know that - as far as freedom was concerned no Czechoslovakia could ever be a substitute for Slovakia. The Slovak state of 1939-44 with all its drawbacks and limitations was still the richest form of freedom and independence within the memory of all Slovaks. To an ordinary Slovak the fruits of independence were real and tangible, the horrors of fascism hardly perceptible. Any attempts to make him rise against his own state in the name of antifascism were bound to fall flat. Nobody with sense pours out the baby with the bath water. Yet that was what the selfappointed leaders of the armed rebellion against the Slovak state actually did. Twenty years later one may ask: To what good? Definitely not to the benefit of their nation. And as for their own vain glory and mercenary rewards, these were all of very short duration. As for "dramatis personae" of a Greek tragedy, the men of 29th August one by one fell in disgrace or worse at the hands of those to whose voice they had listened when conspiring against their own state. In 1948 the Communists got rid of their liberal-agrarian partners (Lettrich, Josko, etc.) and in the subsequent Communist purges of 1949-54 everybody who was anybody in the uprising (Zingor, Husak, Smidke, Novomesky, etc.) was shot, imprisoned or degraded. Fr ancis Vnuk  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource An Incredible Conspiracy Description An account of the resource Francis Vnuk Slovakia, Vol. 14 (No. 37), 1964 pp. 40-46 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1964 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d0ba71173f7bdf164123c28566e4b847.pdf 3ba09f4a3837ff3d89e456901053d0a6 PDF Text Text SLO VA KI A Published by the Slovak League of America VOL. XIV 1964 NO. 37 Francis Vnuk: THE CENTENARY OF ANDREJ HLINKA Born: September 27, 1864 Died: August 16, 1938 From the beginning of the 10th century Slovakia was an integral part of the multilingual, multinational kingdom of Hungary. Then at the beginning of the 19th century the Magyars, as the dominant racial group of the kingdom, in sharp contrast to the explicit wishes of the saitly king Stephen - Regnum unius linguae, unius moris imbecile et fragile est (a kingdom where only one language and one custom prevails is weak and fragile) - launched an all-out drive for a unilingual national state. This could, of course, happen only at the expense of the national minorities, of which the Slovaks were affected the most severely. In 1818 the Magyar revolutionary leader, L. Kossuth, wrote in 'Pesti Hirlap': ·" Amen, amen I say unto you, there never was and cannot be a Slovak nation in Hungary." Another outstanding Magyar politician, K. Tisza, uttered in a Parliamentary debate on December 15, 1875 his notoriously famous statement: "There is no Slovak nation." The words were followed by actions; the Magyars did all that was humanly possible to deprive the Slovaks of their 111ationality. Into this oppressive and all-prevading era of magyarlzation entered Hlinka, as a young student and young priest. The pastoral duties gave him plenty of opportunities to s ee the abysmal injustice wrought by magyarization on his own peoples as well as the reckless immorality of the perpetrators of this denationalization policy. To free the village people from the economic grip of foreign inn- and shopkeepers - the frontline Magyarizators - he founded Christian temperance societies and cooperative associations. He fought corrupticn and exploitation trough newspaper articles, public speeches and addresses. In or der to carry this struggle on to the flcor of the Parliament he entered t he �2 SLOVAKIA electoral contest in the 1898 election but was defeated by 150 votes. HilS fearless defense of ,p eople's rights and his determined struggle with the state authorities made him soon a national hero and at t'he same time brought him into sharp <!onflict with the oppressors. After many threats and smaller punishmentJs, heavy blows started to fall in 1906. For his support of the Slovak candidate (V. Srobar) in the 1906 election (Srobar lost by 104 votes) he was suspended by his bishop A. Parvy "ab ordine et officio" and then arrested. After five months in prison he was sentenced at a well-publicized trial on November 26th, 1906 to two years' imprisonment and a fine of 1500 crowns. Wh....,on he returned from prison he was condemned to a further 18 months' imprisonment and a fine of 200 crowns on a charge of "incitement". This charge was based on two farewell articles written before his entry into the Szeged prison. It was obvious that these vindictive sentences, as well rus the unjust suspension by his bishop, were aimed at breaking Hlinka's spirit, to strike terror among the Slovak leaders and to deprive the whole nation of its ablest spokesmen and fighters. But it was just this treatment that transformed Hlinka in the minds of people into a national figure. Very sC'on his name outgrew the local Slovak scene and outside his enslaved •c ountry it became synonymous with the unjust oppression meted out on the hapless Slovaks by the chauvinist Magyar government. In Moravia and Bohemia especially Hlinka found many ·ardent friends and supporters. It was largely due to the Moravia:n Catholic clergy that in the delicate matter of Hlinka's suspension the Vatican decided in Hlinka's favour and against his bishop. But in the meantime there occurred on October 27th, 1907 a bloody incident at Hlinka's birthplace, Cernova. Here the villageris with Hlinka's help built a church. Naturally they wanted Hlinka at its consecration. But since Hlinka was under suspension, t'he bishop ordered that the church be consecrated by another priest. This priest came to Cernova with an armed escort of gendarmes. When the village crowd blocked their entry, the gendarmes fired without warning, killing nine people and wounding some 50 ( of whom six subsequently died). �SLOVAKIA 3 This massacre enraged the whole civilized world. Among the advocates of the Slovak cause were such prominent intellectual personalities of the time as B. BJornson, L. N. Tolstoy, but the most effective was the voice of R. W. Se·trin-Watsan. In his book "Racial problems in Hungary" (1908) - where he placed Hlinka's portrait as the frontiispiece - Seton-Watson meticulously and dispassionately exposed the chauvinist Magyar policies and made a powerful plea for better treatment of the national minorities in Hungary. His admiration for Hlinka was sincere and wellmeri1ted. "I held then - wrote Seton-Watson in 'The new Slovakia' (1924) - and still hold, the Hlinka was at that moment in mainy ways the most characteristic figure in the struggle of the Slovak nation against magyarization. He stood among other things for that devotion to religion as they conceived it, for that outraged moral sense which have characterised the Slovaks in modern times." The situation of the Slovaks in Hungary was indeed desperate. Looking for help Hlinka cast his eyes first and foremost at the Moravians and the Czechs who - though under Austrian rule - were enjoying incomparably wider freedom. Union with the Czedhs figured prominently in his thinking. He defiantly declared before the court of Bratislava (on i.fay 4th, 1908): "Whether our Magyar brothers like it or not, the fact remains eternally true that we Slovaks form with the Czechs a single race, a single culture, a single nation." On the other hand it must be mentioned that Hlinka strongly opposed the influence of the Czech freethinkers, liberals and socialists and made this stand very clear in his vehement attack,s on the Hlasists - Masaryk's followers in Slovakia. Then came the first world war and at its end Slovakia experienced the most revolutionary change in its history. When it came to the vital question as to what was going to happen to the Slovaks, Hlinka knew the answer and was most outspoken about it. With his enthusiasm he converted to the idea of a Czecho-Slovak state the hesitant and doub ting. At the meeting of Slovak leaders on October 30th, 1918 he declared: "This i!S the time to act ... Let us state it plainly that �4 SLOVAKIA we stand for the Czecho-Slovak solution. Our thousand year old marriage with the Magyars was a failure and our roads must now part." IIlinka's bold action and the weight of his authority, more than anything else, swayed public opinion in Slovakia towards the general acceptance of a political union with the Czechs in one state. . In the collapse of Magyar domination over Slovakia IIlinka saw the victory of the martyred Slovak truth. As he repeatedly stated, he saw in the political upheaval of 191819 the finger of God who in His eternal justice "depo3uit potentes de sede et exaltavit humiles" (hath put down the mighty from their seat and exalted the humble). Yet the dawn of the new era did not fulfill IIlinka's expectattons. From the beginning the rule of Slovakia passed into the hands of a close circle of men who enjoyed not so much the confidence of the Slovak people as the confidence of the authorities in Prague. They excluded IIlinka from any share of power and responsibility, though he was without question the best known, most respected and most severely persecuted fighter for the Slovak cause. Equally disappointing were the Czech officials, legionaries and administrato'rs who poured intk> Slovakia in 1918·19 to take over the positions vacated by the Magyar officialdom. In their dealings with the Slovaks the Czech newcomers were very tactless, arrogant and offensive. The British Minister to Prague, Cecil Gosling, visited Slovakia in November 1919 and had this to report to his government : The Czech administration of the Slovaks has been on·e o.f harsh and, in ·s ome cases, ·b rutal domina.tion with a result that thra po,l itical situation is preca,rious and there is a conside.:rable party in favour of complete autonomy •aind .t he -estabLtshment of a Slovakia P:arJiament. Th·e following are .t he main errors of Czech administration: l. Hostility to the Roman Catholic Church •evin~ed by Czech soldiers and offi'Ciials and which includes the desecratiion and mutilation of crucifixes and holy images, in.te,r ruption of marria,ges and stmilar offenses :ag.ain:st the principles of culture a,nd d•ecency. 2. The country has been flooded with Czech officials and the Slovaks dismissed, or if ,employed, they receive kom onre half to two thirds les·s pa,y .than the Czechs. 3. Corruption in t•h e public offices. 4. Attempts to subs•t itute the Czech for .the Slo%k •language. On my return. I s&w Moin:sdeur Bene§, the Foreign Minister (in the abs•en~ of the President who i:s indisposed), and I represented these facts to him. �SLOVAKiA , 5 The Minister replied without equi'Vocation that he was aware that my statements were perfectly correct; ,and that: I. S teps would be ~mmedi,ately taken for the cessation in S ovakia of all religio,us hostility .and intoler,ance and the S!,ovaks should be at once informed ,t hat his Government had opened irelations witih the Vatican, acknowledged the appointme·n t of the new Arehib1shop o.f Prague, and we,r,e sending within the ne,xt few days a repr,esentative to the Holy See. Il. 'l1hat airr,a,ngements would be made to sto,p ,the transmission to Slovakia of fresh Chech officials and that all officials salaries, whether paid to Czec<hs or Slovaks, would be on an equal footing. m. That asS'U:l'anee shoiU.ld be defini,tely ma,d,e ,t hat tihe Government had no inte-nti:o,n of imposing t>h-e Czech language in ,th,e p'ace of the ancient Slov,ak tongue . . . Hlinka recognized these facts much earlier than Gosling natl was genuinely grieved by this unexpected development. He sensed that the Slovaks had only exchanged the Magyar rule for the Czech one. Then in the summer of 1919 he learned that President Masaryk had concluded during the war an agreement with the Slovaks in America in which full autonomy for Slovakia was guaranteed. Edged on by his associates, especially Dr. F. Jehlicka, Hlinka travelled to Paris (on a Polish passport and under an assumed name) and submitted a memorandum to the Peace Conference there, protesting against the Cze<!h injustices and seeking to secure autonomy for the Slovak nation. ("Le droit a !'existence nous a ete accorde par le Createur; noUJS esperons que la glorieuse Conference de la Paix nous le garan tira contre !'injustice des hommes" - he pleaded.) But he was not heard, and what is more, he and his companions were expelled from Paris. After his unsuccessful venture Hlinka returned in Oct. 1919 to Slovakia (his associat~s dispersed to Poland, Hungary and the USA) where he was arrested by the Prague authorities. This step met with violent disapproval from the Slovak population and demonstrated (if such a demonstration , was necessary) how high Hlinka's standing and ,p opularity were among the Slovaks. The British Minister reported in his dispatch: PRAGUE, Octoboc 20, 1919 My Laird, Fatihe-r Hlinka, a Slovak P,riest, whose •alll,ti-Czech policy has been referl.'ed to by me in previous despatches, was arrested lby order of the Government on the 13th instant. �6 SLOVAKIA Following this event, <rioting occocred in Slovakia, as well as some ho.stil demonstrations ,a,gainst the French officers on duty there. The situation was regard,ed as serious by the Governme<nt and, at a Cabinet Council it wais decid,ed to invoke the assista,noe ·O,f Dr. Kordac, the Arc-hbisho,p of Pra-gue to cairn the people who a<re incensed by the ,a•nti,cl-erical policy of thie, Czechs and the unsympathetic rule of their authoritiies. The A<rehibisihop ,p romised to give all the assistance in his power and ,i t is hoped that the authority of ,t he Church will haive a good effect in quelling disordier. It is S'igmificant that a Government which .hars coosistently shown itself anti-cleTical, should now invoke the a1ssistance of the body it has hosti:lized a.nd -points, j,ndeed, to gravity of the s-Ltuation. T,h,,e President and his Ministers •h ave asked me to 9l'·oceed to Slovakiia to meet and cornver.s,e with the leading S1oivaks, ,a,n d I am a,ccoI"dingly ,proc-eedhng to B~artislava tomo,r row, a,c companied by Colonel Goulso-n , ·t he Milita~y Atta,che. I have, &,c., OEOliL GOSLING Hlinka stayed in a Czech prison six months. But he was never tried. Upon his election to the Parliament in 1920 the Czech government released him from custody. The first free election in Slovakia, in the spring of 1920, brought sweeping victory to the Social Democrats. On his return from prison Hlinka vowed: "I will not stop work ing till red Slovakia becomes white Slovakia again.'' Into this fight he threw the whole weight of his magnetic personality, his unique gift of eloquence and his crusading zeal. The inept r:ile of the Social Democrats and internal strife within their party (leading in 1921 to a split which subsequently gave birth to the Communist party) made his task so much easier. The Prague government imposed on Slovak,s a harsh rule of rigid centralism. The economic discrimination against the Slovaks resulted in the ruining of Slovak industry, unemployment, mass emigration and the relegation of Slovakia to the status of a colony. It provoked an upsurge of intense nationalism and Hlinka skillfully channelled these feelings into a forceful popular movement. In November 1921 Hlinka dissociated his party from the Sramek's People's Party and under the na1.n e of Hlinka's P eople's Party entered the 1925 election. The party emerged victorious, capturing some 50% of the total votes cast. By this convincing victory Hlinka redeemed his promise "to �SLOVAKIA 7 v;hiten red Slovakia." His party became the strongest Slovak political party and retained this primacy till the end of the first Czecho-Slovak Republic. Hlinka's pensonality loomed large over the Slovak political scene in the interwar period. Few of Hlinka's many adversaries would concede him the status of a mature politician, but none could deny his indisputable leadership of the Slovak masses who followed him with confidence and dedication. Hlinka knew now to appeal to the elementary instincts of the Slovak peasantry and intelligentsia and in his program he embodied their nationalist feelings and jus tified demands. His followers came from all walks of life; it was often said that his organization was not a political pairty but a broad popular movement. By temperament Hlinka was a man of moods and passk ns and his impulsive character was proverbial. His tactics were very often erratic and incomprehensible, but in matters of principle he was uncompromising. He summed up the whole program of his movement in a simple motto: For God and nation. He saw himself as a defender of Slovak Christiam tradition against the flood of modern antireligious curr ents of thought and ,s ocialist materialism - which led one critic to write cf him: He is first and foremost a churchman, and his many high qualities are far better suited to an ecclesiastical than to a political career - and secondly a fighter for Slovak autonomy which was promised in the Pittsburgh Agreement. In the pursuit of these two cornerstones of his progiram Hlinka was most resolute and unyielding. Though he possessed the rare ability of winning the trust and support of a large section of the Slovak population he was not always happy in the selectfon of and in working with his closest comrades-at-arms. U1I1worthy individuals like Jehlicka, Tuka, Machacek rose high in the party ranks and manipulated at times even Hlinka himself. At other times Hlinka authoritatively ca~t out of the party personalities like Juriga, Koza-Matejov, Kolisek who definitely deserved better treatment and a more sympathetic hearing. When all is said and done Hlinka's greatnes did not lie in the field of high politics and diplomacy but in his close and intimate ties with the people. The whole nation was al- �R SLOVAKIA ways ready to follow him through thick and thi!n. There was the strength of Hlinka's movemen t. No political party could have possibly survived unscathe d such blows as the Tuka affair, ,s uch political blunders as the fruitless and fru ~trating entry into a coalition governme nt, such defection -, and expulsion s of its leading members, so many attempts at fragment ation and such a loose and haphaz8JI'd administr ation. Hilnka's People's Party managed to pass through these crises and emerge unbroken , though not unshaken. By the early 1930's Hlinka had become a father-f:g ure of the Slovak people; his popularit y was there for the whole world to see. When in 1933 the Prague governme nt tried to by-pass Hlinka during a national celebratio n at Nitra, a hundred- thousand strong crowd on the verge of revolt successfu lly demande d to be addressed by Hlinka. The struggle for autonomy still continued , but now it was further enhanced and more ably executed by the infusion of new blood from the growing ranks of the young Slovak intelligentsia. In the summer of 1938 the Slovak nation in a spectacular manifesta tion at Bratislav a demanded the realizat!o n of their promised autonomy . The greatest mass of people in Slovak history spontane ously and enthusias tically greeted Hlinka as its leader in grateful recogniti0n of his selfless fight for autonomy . Moved to t ear s Hlinka answered in a short speech which was to be his farewell address. On August 16th, 1938 Hlinka died. Less than two months later, on October 6th, 1938, Slovak autonom y was solemnly proclaime d at Zilina and on March 14th, 1939 an independ ant Slovak state was declared by the Slovak Parliame nt. At an early imposing session of this National Assembly a law was passed (No. 83 of April 25th, 1939) which gratefully acknowle dged Hlinka's meTits in the struggle for the common good of the Slovak people: ANDREJ HLINKA SA ZASLUZ IL O SLOVEN SKY NAROD. � SLO VA KI A Published by the Slovak League of America VOL. XIV 1964 NO. 37 Francis Vnuk: THE CENTENARY OF ANDREJ HLINKA Born: September 27, 1864 Died: August 16, 1938 From the beginning of the 10th century Slovakia was an integral part of the multilingual, multinational kingdom of Hungary. Then at the beginning of the 19th century the Magyars, as the dominant racial group of the kingdom, in sharp contrast to the explicit wishes of the saitly king Stephen - Regnum unius linguae, unius moris imbecile et fragile est (a kingdom where only one language and one custom prevails is weak and fragile) - launched an all-out drive for a unilingual national state. This could, of course, happen only at the expense of the national minorities, of which the Slovaks were affected the most severely. In 1818 the Magyar revolutionary leader, L. Kossuth, wrote in 'Pesti Hirlap': ·" Amen, amen I say unto you, there never was and cannot be a Slovak nation in Hungary." Another outstanding Magyar politician, K. Tisza, uttered in a Parliamentary debate on December 15, 1875 his notoriously famous statement: "There is no Slovak nation." The words were followed by actions; the Magyars did all that was humanly possible to deprive the Slovaks of their 111ationality. Into this oppressive and all-prevading era of magyarlzation entered Hlinka, as a young student and young priest. The pastoral duties gave him plenty of opportunities to s ee the abysmal injustice wrought by magyarization on his own peoples as well as the reckless immorality of the perpetrators of this denationalization policy. To free the village people from the economic grip of foreign inn- and shopkeepers - the frontline Magyarizators - he founded Christian temperance societies and cooperative associations. He fought corrupticn and exploitation trough newspaper articles, public speeches and addresses. In or der to carry this struggle on to the flcor of the Parliament he entered t he �2 SLOVAKIA electoral contest in the 1898 election but was defeated by 150 votes. HilS fearless defense of ,p eople's rights and his determined struggle with the state authorities made him soon a national hero and at t'he same time brought him into sharp <!onflict with the oppressors. After many threats and smaller punishmentJs, heavy blows started to fall in 1906. For his support of the Slovak candidate (V. Srobar) in the 1906 election (Srobar lost by 104 votes) he was suspended by his bishop A. Parvy "ab ordine et officio" and then arrested. After five months in prison he was sentenced at a well-publicized trial on November 26th, 1906 to two years' imprisonment and a fine of 1500 crowns. Wh....,on he returned from prison he was condemned to a further 18 months' imprisonment and a fine of 200 crowns on a charge of "incitement". This charge was based on two farewell articles written before his entry into the Szeged prison. It was obvious that these vindictive sentences, as well rus the unjust suspension by his bishop, were aimed at breaking Hlinka's spirit, to strike terror among the Slovak leaders and to deprive the whole nation of its ablest spokesmen and fighters. But it was just this treatment that transformed Hlinka in the minds of people into a national figure. Very sC'on his name outgrew the local Slovak scene and outside his enslaved •c ountry it became synonymous with the unjust oppression meted out on the hapless Slovaks by the chauvinist Magyar government. In Moravia and Bohemia especially Hlinka found many ·ardent friends and supporters. It was largely due to the Moravia:n Catholic clergy that in the delicate matter of Hlinka's suspension the Vatican decided in Hlinka's favour and against his bishop. But in the meantime there occurred on October 27th, 1907 a bloody incident at Hlinka's birthplace, Cernova. Here the villageris with Hlinka's help built a church. Naturally they wanted Hlinka at its consecration. But since Hlinka was under suspension, t'he bishop ordered that the church be consecrated by another priest. This priest came to Cernova with an armed escort of gendarmes. When the village crowd blocked their entry, the gendarmes fired without warning, killing nine people and wounding some 50 ( of whom six subsequently died). �SLOVAKIA 3 This massacre enraged the whole civilized world. Among the advocates of the Slovak cause were such prominent intellectual personalities of the time as B. BJornson, L. N. Tolstoy, but the most effective was the voice of R. W. Se·trin-Watsan. In his book "Racial problems in Hungary" (1908) - where he placed Hlinka's portrait as the frontiispiece - Seton-Watson meticulously and dispassionately exposed the chauvinist Magyar policies and made a powerful plea for better treatment of the national minorities in Hungary. His admiration for Hlinka was sincere and wellmeri1ted. "I held then - wrote Seton-Watson in 'The new Slovakia' (1924) - and still hold, the Hlinka was at that moment in mainy ways the most characteristic figure in the struggle of the Slovak nation against magyarization. He stood among other things for that devotion to religion as they conceived it, for that outraged moral sense which have characterised the Slovaks in modern times." The situation of the Slovaks in Hungary was indeed desperate. Looking for help Hlinka cast his eyes first and foremost at the Moravians and the Czechs who - though under Austrian rule - were enjoying incomparably wider freedom. Union with the Czedhs figured prominently in his thinking. He defiantly declared before the court of Bratislava (on i.fay 4th, 1908): "Whether our Magyar brothers like it or not, the fact remains eternally true that we Slovaks form with the Czechs a single race, a single culture, a single nation." On the other hand it must be mentioned that Hlinka strongly opposed the influence of the Czech freethinkers, liberals and socialists and made this stand very clear in his vehement attack,s on the Hlasists - Masaryk's followers in Slovakia. Then came the first world war and at its end Slovakia experienced the most revolutionary change in its history. When it came to the vital question as to what was going to happen to the Slovaks, Hlinka knew the answer and was most outspoken about it. With his enthusiasm he converted to the idea of a Czecho-Slovak state the hesitant and doub ting. At the meeting of Slovak leaders on October 30th, 1918 he declared: "This i!S the time to act ... Let us state it plainly that �4 SLOVAKIA we stand for the Czecho-Slovak solution. Our thousand year old marriage with the Magyars was a failure and our roads must now part." IIlinka's bold action and the weight of his authority, more than anything else, swayed public opinion in Slovakia towards the general acceptance of a political union with the Czechs in one state. . In the collapse of Magyar domination over Slovakia IIlinka saw the victory of the martyred Slovak truth. As he repeatedly stated, he saw in the political upheaval of 191819 the finger of God who in His eternal justice "depo3uit potentes de sede et exaltavit humiles" (hath put down the mighty from their seat and exalted the humble). Yet the dawn of the new era did not fulfill IIlinka's expectattons. From the beginning the rule of Slovakia passed into the hands of a close circle of men who enjoyed not so much the confidence of the Slovak people as the confidence of the authorities in Prague. They excluded IIlinka from any share of power and responsibility, though he was without question the best known, most respected and most severely persecuted fighter for the Slovak cause. Equally disappointing were the Czech officials, legionaries and administrato'rs who poured intk> Slovakia in 1918·19 to take over the positions vacated by the Magyar officialdom. In their dealings with the Slovaks the Czech newcomers were very tactless, arrogant and offensive. The British Minister to Prague, Cecil Gosling, visited Slovakia in November 1919 and had this to report to his government : The Czech administration of the Slovaks has been on·e o.f harsh and, in ·s ome cases, ·b rutal domina.tion with a result that thra po,l itical situation is preca,rious and there is a conside.:rable party in favour of complete autonomy •aind .t he -estabLtshment of a Slovakia P:arJiament. Th·e following are .t he main errors of Czech administration: l. Hostility to the Roman Catholic Church •evin~ed by Czech soldiers and offi'Ciials and which includes the desecratiion and mutilation of crucifixes and holy images, in.te,r ruption of marria,ges and stmilar offenses :ag.ain:st the principles of culture a,nd d•ecency. 2. The country has been flooded with Czech officials and the Slovaks dismissed, or if ,employed, they receive kom onre half to two thirds les·s pa,y .than the Czechs. 3. Corruption in t•h e public offices. 4. Attempts to subs•t itute the Czech for .the Slo%k •language. On my return. I s&w Moin:sdeur Bene§, the Foreign Minister (in the abs•en~ of the President who i:s indisposed), and I represented these facts to him. �SLOVAKiA , 5 The Minister replied without equi'Vocation that he was aware that my statements were perfectly correct; ,and that: I. S teps would be ~mmedi,ately taken for the cessation in S ovakia of all religio,us hostility .and intoler,ance and the S!,ovaks should be at once informed ,t hat his Government had opened irelations witih the Vatican, acknowledged the appointme·n t of the new Arehib1shop o.f Prague, and we,r,e sending within the ne,xt few days a repr,esentative to the Holy See. Il. 'l1hat airr,a,ngements would be made to sto,p ,the transmission to Slovakia of fresh Chech officials and that all officials salaries, whether paid to Czec<hs or Slovaks, would be on an equal footing. m. That asS'U:l'anee shoiU.ld be defini,tely ma,d,e ,t hat tihe Government had no inte-nti:o,n of imposing t>h-e Czech language in ,th,e p'ace of the ancient Slov,ak tongue . . . Hlinka recognized these facts much earlier than Gosling natl was genuinely grieved by this unexpected development. He sensed that the Slovaks had only exchanged the Magyar rule for the Czech one. Then in the summer of 1919 he learned that President Masaryk had concluded during the war an agreement with the Slovaks in America in which full autonomy for Slovakia was guaranteed. Edged on by his associates, especially Dr. F. Jehlicka, Hlinka travelled to Paris (on a Polish passport and under an assumed name) and submitted a memorandum to the Peace Conference there, protesting against the Cze<!h injustices and seeking to secure autonomy for the Slovak nation. ("Le droit a !'existence nous a ete accorde par le Createur; noUJS esperons que la glorieuse Conference de la Paix nous le garan tira contre !'injustice des hommes" - he pleaded.) But he was not heard, and what is more, he and his companions were expelled from Paris. After his unsuccessful venture Hlinka returned in Oct. 1919 to Slovakia (his associat~s dispersed to Poland, Hungary and the USA) where he was arrested by the Prague authorities. This step met with violent disapproval from the Slovak population and demonstrated (if such a demonstration , was necessary) how high Hlinka's standing and ,p opularity were among the Slovaks. The British Minister reported in his dispatch: PRAGUE, Octoboc 20, 1919 My Laird, Fatihe-r Hlinka, a Slovak P,riest, whose •alll,ti-Czech policy has been referl.'ed to by me in previous despatches, was arrested lby order of the Government on the 13th instant. �6 SLOVAKIA Following this event, <rioting occocred in Slovakia, as well as some ho.stil demonstrations ,a,gainst the French officers on duty there. The situation was regard,ed as serious by the Governme<nt and, at a Cabinet Council it wais decid,ed to invoke the assista,noe ·O,f Dr. Kordac, the Arc-hbisho,p of Pra-gue to cairn the people who a<re incensed by the ,a•nti,cl-erical policy of thie, Czechs and the unsympathetic rule of their authoritiies. The A<rehibisihop ,p romised to give all the assistance in his power and ,i t is hoped that the authority of ,t he Church will haive a good effect in quelling disordier. It is S'igmificant that a Government which .hars coosistently shown itself anti-cleTical, should now invoke the a1ssistance of the body it has hosti:lized a.nd -points, j,ndeed, to gravity of the s-Ltuation. T,h,,e President and his Ministers •h ave asked me to 9l'·oceed to Slovakiia to meet and cornver.s,e with the leading S1oivaks, ,a,n d I am a,ccoI"dingly ,proc-eedhng to B~artislava tomo,r row, a,c companied by Colonel Goulso-n , ·t he Milita~y Atta,che. I have, &,c., OEOliL GOSLING Hlinka stayed in a Czech prison six months. But he was never tried. Upon his election to the Parliament in 1920 the Czech government released him from custody. The first free election in Slovakia, in the spring of 1920, brought sweeping victory to the Social Democrats. On his return from prison Hlinka vowed: "I will not stop work ing till red Slovakia becomes white Slovakia again.'' Into this fight he threw the whole weight of his magnetic personality, his unique gift of eloquence and his crusading zeal. The inept r:ile of the Social Democrats and internal strife within their party (leading in 1921 to a split which subsequently gave birth to the Communist party) made his task so much easier. The Prague government imposed on Slovak,s a harsh rule of rigid centralism. The economic discrimination against the Slovaks resulted in the ruining of Slovak industry, unemployment, mass emigration and the relegation of Slovakia to the status of a colony. It provoked an upsurge of intense nationalism and Hlinka skillfully channelled these feelings into a forceful popular movement. In November 1921 Hlinka dissociated his party from the Sramek's People's Party and under the na1.n e of Hlinka's P eople's Party entered the 1925 election. The party emerged victorious, capturing some 50% of the total votes cast. By this convincing victory Hlinka redeemed his promise "to �SLOVAKIA 7 v;hiten red Slovakia." His party became the strongest Slovak political party and retained this primacy till the end of the first Czecho-Slovak Republic. Hlinka's pensonality loomed large over the Slovak political scene in the interwar period. Few of Hlinka's many adversaries would concede him the status of a mature politician, but none could deny his indisputable leadership of the Slovak masses who followed him with confidence and dedication. Hlinka knew now to appeal to the elementary instincts of the Slovak peasantry and intelligentsia and in his program he embodied their nationalist feelings and jus tified demands. His followers came from all walks of life; it was often said that his organization was not a political pairty but a broad popular movement. By temperament Hlinka was a man of moods and passk ns and his impulsive character was proverbial. His tactics were very often erratic and incomprehensible, but in matters of principle he was uncompromising. He summed up the whole program of his movement in a simple motto: For God and nation. He saw himself as a defender of Slovak Christiam tradition against the flood of modern antireligious curr ents of thought and ,s ocialist materialism - which led one critic to write cf him: He is first and foremost a churchman, and his many high qualities are far better suited to an ecclesiastical than to a political career - and secondly a fighter for Slovak autonomy which was promised in the Pittsburgh Agreement. In the pursuit of these two cornerstones of his progiram Hlinka was most resolute and unyielding. Though he possessed the rare ability of winning the trust and support of a large section of the Slovak population he was not always happy in the selectfon of and in working with his closest comrades-at-arms. U1I1worthy individuals like Jehlicka, Tuka, Machacek rose high in the party ranks and manipulated at times even Hlinka himself. At other times Hlinka authoritatively ca~t out of the party personalities like Juriga, Koza-Matejov, Kolisek who definitely deserved better treatment and a more sympathetic hearing. When all is said and done Hlinka's greatnes did not lie in the field of high politics and diplomacy but in his close and intimate ties with the people. The whole nation was al- �R SLOVAKIA ways ready to follow him through thick and thi!n. There was the strength of Hlinka's movemen t. No political party could have possibly survived unscathe d such blows as the Tuka affair, ,s uch political blunders as the fruitless and fru ~trating entry into a coalition governme nt, such defection -, and expulsion s of its leading members, so many attempts at fragment ation and such a loose and haphaz8JI'd administr ation. Hilnka's People's Party managed to pass through these crises and emerge unbroken , though not unshaken. By the early 1930's Hlinka had become a father-f:g ure of the Slovak people; his popularit y was there for the whole world to see. When in 1933 the Prague governme nt tried to by-pass Hlinka during a national celebratio n at Nitra, a hundred- thousand strong crowd on the verge of revolt successfu lly demande d to be addressed by Hlinka. The struggle for autonomy still continued , but now it was further enhanced and more ably executed by the infusion of new blood from the growing ranks of the young Slovak intelligentsia. In the summer of 1938 the Slovak nation in a spectacular manifesta tion at Bratislav a demanded the realizat!o n of their promised autonomy . The greatest mass of people in Slovak history spontane ously and enthusias tically greeted Hlinka as its leader in grateful recogniti0n of his selfless fight for autonomy . Moved to t ear s Hlinka answered in a short speech which was to be his farewell address. On August 16th, 1938 Hlinka died. Less than two months later, on October 6th, 1938, Slovak autonom y was solemnly proclaime d at Zilina and on March 14th, 1939 an independ ant Slovak state was declared by the Slovak Parliame nt. At an early imposing session of this National Assembly a law was passed (No. 83 of April 25th, 1939) which gratefully acknowle dged Hlinka's meTits in the struggle for the common good of the Slovak people: ANDREJ HLINKA SA ZASLUZ IL O SLOVEN SKY NAROD. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1964, Vol. 14 Description An account of the resource Vol. 14 (No. 37), 1964. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1964 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLO VA KI A Published by the Slovak League of America VOL. XIV 1964 NO. 37 Francis Vnuk: THE CENTENARY OF ANDREJ HLINKA Born: September 27, 1864 Died: August 16, 1938 From the beginning of the 10th century Slovakia was an integral part of the multilingual, multinational kingdom of Hungary. Then at the beginning of the 19th century the Magyars, as the dominant racial group of the kingdom, in sharp contrast to the explicit wishes of the saitly king Stephen - Regnum unius linguae, unius moris imbecile et fragile est (a kingdom where only one language and one custom prevails is weak and fragile) - launched an all-out drive for a unilingual national state. This could, of course, happen only at the expense of the national minorities, of which the Slovaks were affected the most severely. In 1818 the Magyar revolutionary leader, L. Kossuth, wrote in 'Pesti Hirlap': ·" Amen, amen I say unto you, there never was and cannot be a Slovak nation in Hungary." Another outstanding Magyar politician, K. Tisza, uttered in a Parliamentary debate on December 15, 1875 his notoriously famous statement: "There is no Slovak nation." The words were followed by actions; the Magyars did all that was humanly possible to deprive the Slovaks of their 111ationality. Into this oppressive and all-prevading era of magyarlzation entered Hlinka, as a young student and young priest. The pastoral duties gave him plenty of opportunities to s ee the abysmal injustice wrought by magyarization on his own peoples as well as the reckless immorality of the perpetrators of this denationalization policy. To free the village people from the economic grip of foreign inn- and shopkeepers - the frontline Magyarizators - he founded Christian temperance societies and cooperative associations. He fought corrupticn and exploitation trough newspaper articles, public speeches and addresses. In or der to carry this struggle on to the flcor of the Parliament he entered t he 2 SLOVAKIA electoral contest in the 1898 election but was defeated by 150 votes. HilS fearless defense of ,p eople's rights and his determined struggle with the state authorities made him soon a national hero and at t'he same time brought him into sharp <!onflict with the oppressors. After many threats and smaller punishmentJs, heavy blows started to fall in 1906. For his support of the Slovak candidate (V. Srobar) in the 1906 election (Srobar lost by 104 votes) he was suspended by his bishop A. Parvy "ab ordine et officio" and then arrested. After five months in prison he was sentenced at a well-publicized trial on November 26th, 1906 to two years' imprisonment and a fine of 1500 crowns. Wh....,on he returned from prison he was condemned to a further 18 months' imprisonment and a fine of 200 crowns on a charge of "incitement". This charge was based on two farewell articles written before his entry into the Szeged prison. It was obvious that these vindictive sentences, as well rus the unjust suspension by his bishop, were aimed at breaking Hlinka's spirit, to strike terror among the Slovak leaders and to deprive the whole nation of its ablest spokesmen and fighters. But it was just this treatment that transformed Hlinka in the minds of people into a national figure. Very sC'on his name outgrew the local Slovak scene and outside his enslaved •c ountry it became synonymous with the unjust oppression meted out on the hapless Slovaks by the chauvinist Magyar government. In Moravia and Bohemia especially Hlinka found many ·ardent friends and supporters. It was largely due to the Moravia:n Catholic clergy that in the delicate matter of Hlinka's suspension the Vatican decided in Hlinka's favour and against his bishop. But in the meantime there occurred on October 27th, 1907 a bloody incident at Hlinka's birthplace, Cernova. Here the villageris with Hlinka's help built a church. Naturally they wanted Hlinka at its consecration. But since Hlinka was under suspension, t'he bishop ordered that the church be consecrated by another priest. This priest came to Cernova with an armed escort of gendarmes. When the village crowd blocked their entry, the gendarmes fired without warning, killing nine people and wounding some 50 ( of whom six subsequently died). SLOVAKIA 3 This massacre enraged the whole civilized world. Among the advocates of the Slovak cause were such prominent intellectual personalities of the time as B. BJornson, L. N. Tolstoy, but the most effective was the voice of R. W. Se·trin-Watsan. In his book "Racial problems in Hungary" (1908) - where he placed Hlinka's portrait as the frontiispiece - Seton-Watson meticulously and dispassionately exposed the chauvinist Magyar policies and made a powerful plea for better treatment of the national minorities in Hungary. His admiration for Hlinka was sincere and wellmeri1ted. "I held then - wrote Seton-Watson in 'The new Slovakia' (1924) - and still hold, the Hlinka was at that moment in mainy ways the most characteristic figure in the struggle of the Slovak nation against magyarization. He stood among other things for that devotion to religion as they conceived it, for that outraged moral sense which have characterised the Slovaks in modern times." The situation of the Slovaks in Hungary was indeed desperate. Looking for help Hlinka cast his eyes first and foremost at the Moravians and the Czechs who - though under Austrian rule - were enjoying incomparably wider freedom. Union with the Czedhs figured prominently in his thinking. He defiantly declared before the court of Bratislava (on i.fay 4th, 1908): "Whether our Magyar brothers like it or not, the fact remains eternally true that we Slovaks form with the Czechs a single race, a single culture, a single nation." On the other hand it must be mentioned that Hlinka strongly opposed the influence of the Czech freethinkers, liberals and socialists and made this stand very clear in his vehement attack,s on the Hlasists - Masaryk's followers in Slovakia. Then came the first world war and at its end Slovakia experienced the most revolutionary change in its history. When it came to the vital question as to what was going to happen to the Slovaks, Hlinka knew the answer and was most outspoken about it. With his enthusiasm he converted to the idea of a Czecho-Slovak state the hesitant and doub ting. At the meeting of Slovak leaders on October 30th, 1918 he declared: "This i!S the time to act ... Let us state it plainly that 4 SLOVAKIA we stand for the Czecho-Slovak solution. Our thousand year old marriage with the Magyars was a failure and our roads must now part." IIlinka's bold action and the weight of his authority, more than anything else, swayed public opinion in Slovakia towards the general acceptance of a political union with the Czechs in one state. . In the collapse of Magyar domination over Slovakia IIlinka saw the victory of the martyred Slovak truth. As he repeatedly stated, he saw in the political upheaval of 191819 the finger of God who in His eternal justice "depo3uit potentes de sede et exaltavit humiles" (hath put down the mighty from their seat and exalted the humble). Yet the dawn of the new era did not fulfill IIlinka's expectattons. From the beginning the rule of Slovakia passed into the hands of a close circle of men who enjoyed not so much the confidence of the Slovak people as the confidence of the authorities in Prague. They excluded IIlinka from any share of power and responsibility, though he was without question the best known, most respected and most severely persecuted fighter for the Slovak cause. Equally disappointing were the Czech officials, legionaries and administrato'rs who poured intk> Slovakia in 1918·19 to take over the positions vacated by the Magyar officialdom. In their dealings with the Slovaks the Czech newcomers were very tactless, arrogant and offensive. The British Minister to Prague, Cecil Gosling, visited Slovakia in November 1919 and had this to report to his government : The Czech administration of the Slovaks has been on·e o.f harsh and, in ·s ome cases, ·b rutal domina.tion with a result that thra po,l itical situation is preca,rious and there is a conside.:rable party in favour of complete autonomy •aind .t he -estabLtshment of a Slovakia P:arJiament. Th·e following are .t he main errors of Czech administration: l. Hostility to the Roman Catholic Church •evin~ed by Czech soldiers and offi'Ciials and which includes the desecratiion and mutilation of crucifixes and holy images, in.te,r ruption of marria,ges and stmilar offenses :ag.ain:st the principles of culture a,nd d•ecency. 2. The country has been flooded with Czech officials and the Slovaks dismissed, or if ,employed, they receive kom onre half to two thirds les·s pa,y .than the Czechs. 3. Corruption in t•h e public offices. 4. Attempts to subs•t itute the Czech for .the Slo%k •language. On my return. I s&w Moin:sdeur Bene§, the Foreign Minister (in the abs•en~ of the President who i:s indisposed), and I represented these facts to him. SLOVAKiA , 5 The Minister replied without equi'Vocation that he was aware that my statements were perfectly correct; ,and that: I. S teps would be ~mmedi,ately taken for the cessation in S ovakia of all religio,us hostility .and intoler,ance and the S!,ovaks should be at once informed ,t hat his Government had opened irelations witih the Vatican, acknowledged the appointme·n t of the new Arehib1shop o.f Prague, and we,r,e sending within the ne,xt few days a repr,esentative to the Holy See. Il. 'l1hat airr,a,ngements would be made to sto,p ,the transmission to Slovakia of fresh Chech officials and that all officials salaries, whether paid to Czec<hs or Slovaks, would be on an equal footing. m. That asS'U:l'anee shoiU.ld be defini,tely ma,d,e ,t hat tihe Government had no inte-nti:o,n of imposing t>h-e Czech language in ,th,e p'ace of the ancient Slov,ak tongue . . . Hlinka recognized these facts much earlier than Gosling natl was genuinely grieved by this unexpected development. He sensed that the Slovaks had only exchanged the Magyar rule for the Czech one. Then in the summer of 1919 he learned that President Masaryk had concluded during the war an agreement with the Slovaks in America in which full autonomy for Slovakia was guaranteed. Edged on by his associates, especially Dr. F. Jehlicka, Hlinka travelled to Paris (on a Polish passport and under an assumed name) and submitted a memorandum to the Peace Conference there, protesting against the Cze<!h injustices and seeking to secure autonomy for the Slovak nation. ("Le droit a !'existence nous a ete accorde par le Createur; noUJS esperons que la glorieuse Conference de la Paix nous le garan tira contre !'injustice des hommes" - he pleaded.) But he was not heard, and what is more, he and his companions were expelled from Paris. After his unsuccessful venture Hlinka returned in Oct. 1919 to Slovakia (his associat~s dispersed to Poland, Hungary and the USA) where he was arrested by the Prague authorities. This step met with violent disapproval from the Slovak population and demonstrated (if such a demonstration , was necessary) how high Hlinka's standing and ,p opularity were among the Slovaks. The British Minister reported in his dispatch: PRAGUE, Octoboc 20, 1919 My Laird, Fatihe-r Hlinka, a Slovak P,riest, whose •alll,ti-Czech policy has been referl.'ed to by me in previous despatches, was arrested lby order of the Government on the 13th instant. 6 SLOVAKIA Following this event, <rioting occocred in Slovakia, as well as some ho.stil demonstrations ,a,gainst the French officers on duty there. The situation was regard,ed as serious by the Governme<nt and, at a Cabinet Council it wais decid,ed to invoke the assista,noe ·O,f Dr. Kordac, the Arc-hbisho,p of Pra-gue to cairn the people who a<re incensed by the ,a•nti,cl-erical policy of thie, Czechs and the unsympathetic rule of their authoritiies. The A<rehibisihop ,p romised to give all the assistance in his power and ,i t is hoped that the authority of ,t he Church will haive a good effect in quelling disordier. It is S'igmificant that a Government which .hars coosistently shown itself anti-cleTical, should now invoke the a1ssistance of the body it has hosti:lized a.nd -points, j,ndeed, to gravity of the s-Ltuation. T,h,,e President and his Ministers •h ave asked me to 9l'·oceed to Slovakiia to meet and cornver.s,e with the leading S1oivaks, ,a,n d I am a,ccoI"dingly ,proc-eedhng to B~artislava tomo,r row, a,c companied by Colonel Goulso-n , ·t he Milita~y Atta,che. I have, &,c., OEOliL GOSLING Hlinka stayed in a Czech prison six months. But he was never tried. Upon his election to the Parliament in 1920 the Czech government released him from custody. The first free election in Slovakia, in the spring of 1920, brought sweeping victory to the Social Democrats. On his return from prison Hlinka vowed: "I will not stop work ing till red Slovakia becomes white Slovakia again.'' Into this fight he threw the whole weight of his magnetic personality, his unique gift of eloquence and his crusading zeal. The inept r:ile of the Social Democrats and internal strife within their party (leading in 1921 to a split which subsequently gave birth to the Communist party) made his task so much easier. The Prague government imposed on Slovak,s a harsh rule of rigid centralism. The economic discrimination against the Slovaks resulted in the ruining of Slovak industry, unemployment, mass emigration and the relegation of Slovakia to the status of a colony. It provoked an upsurge of intense nationalism and Hlinka skillfully channelled these feelings into a forceful popular movement. In November 1921 Hlinka dissociated his party from the Sramek's People's Party and under the na1.n e of Hlinka's P eople's Party entered the 1925 election. The party emerged victorious, capturing some 50% of the total votes cast. By this convincing victory Hlinka redeemed his promise "to SLOVAKIA 7 v;hiten red Slovakia." His party became the strongest Slovak political party and retained this primacy till the end of the first Czecho-Slovak Republic. Hlinka's pensonality loomed large over the Slovak political scene in the interwar period. Few of Hlinka's many adversaries would concede him the status of a mature politician, but none could deny his indisputable leadership of the Slovak masses who followed him with confidence and dedication. Hlinka knew now to appeal to the elementary instincts of the Slovak peasantry and intelligentsia and in his program he embodied their nationalist feelings and jus tified demands. His followers came from all walks of life; it was often said that his organization was not a political pairty but a broad popular movement. By temperament Hlinka was a man of moods and passk ns and his impulsive character was proverbial. His tactics were very often erratic and incomprehensible, but in matters of principle he was uncompromising. He summed up the whole program of his movement in a simple motto: For God and nation. He saw himself as a defender of Slovak Christiam tradition against the flood of modern antireligious curr ents of thought and ,s ocialist materialism - which led one critic to write cf him: He is first and foremost a churchman, and his many high qualities are far better suited to an ecclesiastical than to a political career - and secondly a fighter for Slovak autonomy which was promised in the Pittsburgh Agreement. In the pursuit of these two cornerstones of his progiram Hlinka was most resolute and unyielding. Though he possessed the rare ability of winning the trust and support of a large section of the Slovak population he was not always happy in the selectfon of and in working with his closest comrades-at-arms. U1I1worthy individuals like Jehlicka, Tuka, Machacek rose high in the party ranks and manipulated at times even Hlinka himself. At other times Hlinka authoritatively ca~t out of the party personalities like Juriga, Koza-Matejov, Kolisek who definitely deserved better treatment and a more sympathetic hearing. When all is said and done Hlinka's greatnes did not lie in the field of high politics and diplomacy but in his close and intimate ties with the people. The whole nation was al- R SLOVAKIA ways ready to follow him through thick and thi!n. There was the strength of Hlinka's movemen t. No political party could have possibly survived unscathe d such blows as the Tuka affair, ,s uch political blunders as the fruitless and fru ~trating entry into a coalition governme nt, such defection -, and expulsion s of its leading members, so many attempts at fragment ation and such a loose and haphaz8JI'd administr ation. Hilnka's People's Party managed to pass through these crises and emerge unbroken , though not unshaken. By the early 1930's Hlinka had become a father-f:g ure of the Slovak people; his popularit y was there for the whole world to see. When in 1933 the Prague governme nt tried to by-pass Hlinka during a national celebratio n at Nitra, a hundred- thousand strong crowd on the verge of revolt successfu lly demande d to be addressed by Hlinka. The struggle for autonomy still continued , but now it was further enhanced and more ably executed by the infusion of new blood from the growing ranks of the young Slovak intelligentsia. In the summer of 1938 the Slovak nation in a spectacular manifesta tion at Bratislav a demanded the realizat!o n of their promised autonomy . The greatest mass of people in Slovak history spontane ously and enthusias tically greeted Hlinka as its leader in grateful recogniti0n of his selfless fight for autonomy . Moved to t ear s Hlinka answered in a short speech which was to be his farewell address. On August 16th, 1938 Hlinka died. Less than two months later, on October 6th, 1938, Slovak autonom y was solemnly proclaime d at Zilina and on March 14th, 1939 an independ ant Slovak state was declared by the Slovak Parliame nt. At an early imposing session of this National Assembly a law was passed (No. 83 of April 25th, 1939) which gratefully acknowle dged Hlinka's meTits in the struggle for the common good of the Slovak people: ANDREJ HLINKA SA ZASLUZ IL O SLOVEN SKY NAROD.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Centenary of Andrej Hlinka Description An account of the resource Francis Vnuk Slovakia, Vol. 14 (No. 37), 1964 pp. 1-8 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1964 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b80238ed3d420a548ce4f6fce8bf66f3.pdf 2c3f01504ad68773fb6965012fd1cc1a PDF Text Text 134 SLOVAKIA THE HANDMAID OF IDEOLOGY (Slovak literature since 1945) Among the Slovaks, literature always played a leading r ole in the national life. The writers were the foremost fighters for the national rights before 1918, and fearless critics of the political and social wrongs in the post-war years. They were looked upon as the conscience of the nation and one can hardly think of a more dignified title bestowed by a people on its writers. It was a convincing sign of a mutual trust; in a sense Slovak literature was not only a collection of novels, books of poems and stories, but a faithful chronicle of Slovak strivings, fights, defeats and victories. The years after the First World War were in fact the golden years of Slovak literature. Freed and uninhibited it blossomed into maturity and was gradually catching up with the modern western literary currents. The years of national independence, 1939-45, in spite of the fact that they coincided with the war years, were on the whole the most fruitful period in the history of Slovak literature. The fall of the Slovak Republic and the restoration of Czecho-Slovakia in 1945 was a matter of great concern for the Slovak writers. Many of them fled before the advancing Red army (Hronsky, Ga~par, Urban, Zarnov, Dilong, Strmen, etc.) and even those who stayed behind faced the new situation with grave apprehension. Officially the liquidation of Slovak independence was celebrated as an act of liberation by the Red army and of joyful reunification with the fraternal Czech nation, but there is no sign of festive mood in the contemporary literary publications. The bards of the nation failed to express gratitude to the liberators. Even those writers who tried hard to please the new regime could only produce works completely lacking in joy, jubilation or any exulted feeling of a liberated nation. Jan Kostra (who was editor of the cultural section of the Communist daily "Pravda") published a collection of f>Oems entitled "Preponderance of sadness". Other books of poems published at the same time bore titles (and had contents cor- �SLOVAKIA 135 responding to their titles) such as "The mountain of hopelessness", "The age of lepers", "Stars-the wreakers of cruelty", etc. This obviously was not the way to welcome the dawn of liberation. Similar uneasiness was predominant in the Slovak post-war prose. Instead of a joyous present the authors wrote of a legendary past or tried to escape to unreal imaginary worlds of their own creation. Those few writers who listened to the voices of the cultural commissars and attempted to depict the problem of contemporary life achieved very disappointing results (J. Ponican, F. Kral', J. Horak, A. Plavka). The attitude of the Slovak writers was displayed clearly and unmistakably. This attitude of passive contempt was embarrassing to the new regime. The change in it came in 1948/ 9 when the Communists by clever manipulation outwitted their Democratic partners in the National Front and usurped all power in Slovakia. Immediately they set about to dominate and subsequently exploited the Slovak literary community. In April 1948 K. Gottwald declared "nationalization ef culture in general and of literature in particular". Literature was given its definite "constructive tasks". All the creative artistic methods were outlawed as "decadent, formalist, reactionary", etc., except the socialist realism which from the year 1948 on was to reign supreme. Literature became a concern of politicians, parliamentarians, party ideologists and party congresses. Those who would not toe the party line were mercilessly dealt with. The government soon had complete control over the press and publishing houses, and became the only employer of the writers. In their turn the writers were degraded to being "the engineers of human souls" and entrusted with problems corresponding to their profession. In March 1949 the Czechoslovak Writers Union was formed to which 220 Czech and 60 Slovak authors were admitted. The Union absorbed the existing Slovak Writers Association. Not only did the Slovak writers lost their national identity by this step but also the best and most promising of them were excluded from Union membership (V. Beniak, E. B. Lukac, J. Silan, J. Motulko, etc., etc.) and thus forcibly silenced and materially ruined. Subsequent purges further decimated the thin line of the Slovak men of letters. In April 1951 there occurred another �136 SLOVAKIA heavy-handed purge in which the victims were old-time Communist writers accused of bourgeois nationalist deviations, namely Novomesky, D. Okali and I. Horvath. (After expulsion from the Writers Union they were imprisoned and given heavy sentences.) Attacks were hurled also at D. Tatarka, V. Minac, A. Matuska, M. Chorvath and others. In that period of trial and tribulation when the revolution was devouring its own children the literary output was extremely low (altogether 17 new books appeared in 1951, as compared with the average output in the 1939-44 period of 142 new books yearly) and its artistic standard almost nonexistent. The books of poems became political speeches in verse, the prose writing was indistinguishable from political journalism. The progressive character of the poetry is obvious from the titles: "The Ode on Stalin" (J. Kostra, 1949), "Comrade my country" (M. Lajciak, 1949), "The song of peaceloving hands" (J. Rak, 1949), "The song of steel ingots" (L. Miiacko, 1950), "The song of love to new China" (J. Brezina, 1950), "The song of great (i.e. Slovak-Soviet) friendship" (M. Lajciak, 1951), "The song of May" (M. Prochazka 1952), "The spring song of a collective farmer" (C. Stitnicky, 1950), "People, be vigilant!" (F. Citovsky, 1951), "Peace- my love" (P. Gajdos, 1951), "The guardians of peace" (M. Krno, 1951), "The banners of peace", etc. The nebulous and never properly defined concept of socialist realism, the inspiration dictated by ideological expediency and the frontal attack on all formalist tendencies, were fertile soil for the so-called "schematism". The poems of different authors were monotonously alike with no relation to the realities of life. The prose writers composed works which were encyclopedical compilations of Marxist axioms with the positive and negative heroes engaged in a class struggle which predictably ended with the victory of the working class. The popular themes of novels and stories were the collectivization of the villages ("The wooden village" of F. Hecko, 1951 ; "The wasps' nest" of K. Lazarova, 1953, etc.) the Slovak uprising of 1944 (novels and short stories of Krno, Minac, Jilemnicky, Karvas, Plavka, etc.), the industrialization of Slovakia (Hora.k's "Blast furnace", Mina.e's "Blue waves", Miiacko's "The waters of Orava", Tatarka's "Comradely years", etc.). The literary thaw which set in after Stalin's death (1953) �SLOVAKIA 137 made a belated entry into Slovakia in the winter of 1955-6. It provoked some heated exchanges of opinions between the more liberal wing of the literary community on the one hand (I. Kupec, D. Tatarka) and the hardened stalinists (especially F. Hecko) on the other. The spirit of the thaw period found its fullest expression at the second congress of the Czecho-Slovak writers (April 1956) which followed at the heels of the 20th congress of the Soviet Communist Party (February, 1956). The outspoken criticism of the drabness of contemporary literature enunciated in the unscheduled speeches of the Czech writers Seifert and Hrubin (and echoed by D. Tatarka) pointedly demonstrated an unprecedented decay in artistic values brought about by the ruthless subjection of literature to ideology. The writers rebelled against their humiliating roles of soul-engineers and declared themselves to be the conscience of the nation. The spirit of the Writer's Congress was, alas, short-lived. Soviet intervention in Poland and Hungary put a sudden stop to all liberalizing undercurrents in the socialist camp and the Czech.o-Slovak Communist leaders were none too slow to restore the status quo ante 1953. Thus-apart from a few magazine articles-the literary thaw hardly left any sign in the literary production of the time. The only significant book of the thaw period was A. Bednar's "Hours and minutes" (1956) which soon became a target for concentrated attacks by official critics, trade unionists, partisans and other spokesmen -0£ the working class. The Czecho-Slovak Communist leaders succeeded in the following years (1956-62) in restoring the rigorous control of the stalinist er~. Under the slogan of "struggle against revisionism" they devised an ingenious strategy which was then applied by L. Stoll to combat various manifestations of revi.sionism in literature. By threats and promise the writers were forced to abandon the ideas promulgated at the Writers' Congress and to return to the old days of blind obedience to the party's bidding. But only a few writers were willing to follow unconditionally the new twist in the party line. Others tried to escape the rigors of neostalinism by self-imposed silence by writing literature for children or turning back in reminiscences to their own childhood and youth. The group of young writerf'l �138 SLOVAKIA gathered around the literary monthly "Mlada tvorba" showed initially some youthful elan, but lacking a firm program and able leadership on the one hand and facing insurmountable obstructions of the hardened party line on the other, it gradually slipped into restive passivity. (Their Czech counterparts around "Kveten" showed more aggressiveness and in turn were disbanded.) As it was revealed in 1963 the Sfovak Writers Union vetoed the publication of a number of books by young authors (Feldek, Stacho, Hykisch and others) because of alleged lack of ideological clarity, because of objectionable experimenting with modernism or playing up to revisionism. The years 1956-62 (now remorsefully called "the lost years" ) were almost a repetition of the years 1949-54 with the same writers (Minac, Tatarka, Lazarova, Mihalik, Karvas, etc.) enriching Slovak socialist realist literature by books on the same old themes (collectivization, industrialization, the Slovak uprising of 1944 ... but minus the "personality cult"} with the same outworn cliches. But these lost years were not as irreparably lost as the years 1949-53. An almost unnoticed development took place during this oppressive period: the emergence of a new literary generation. These young writers whose past was not tarnished by the sins of the cult era were not attracted by the literary models offered at home (Drda, Minac, Hecko) or in the Soviet Union (Fadeyev, Sholochov} but were casting their . eyes towards the literary achievements in the West. Hem- • mingway, Salinger, Steinbeck were their idols and secretly they admired and studied such proscribed decadents and formalists as Joyce, Kafka, Proust. .. The young poets were shows · ing interest in the works of Aragon and Eluard of the surrealist period and alongside them they were exploring the modern poetry of Rilke, St. John Perse, T. S. Eliot and the Amen-· can beatnik poets. The influences of this search for new poetry are visible in the poetical writings of M. Valek, M. Feldek, J. Sfacho and_ V. Turcany. The new prose made its unobtrusive appearance in the works of J . Blazkova, A. Hykisch and others. The young writers were· permitted to publish ·their books only from 1961 onward, when the change in the political climate ushered in a new liter2ry thaw. Under the impact of the : Sino-Soviet conflict and renewed attacks on Stalin at the 22nd �SLOVAKIA 139 Soviet Communist Party Congress gradually crumbled the tenets of stalinism even in Czecho-Slovakia. This was symbolically represented by the demolition of the gigantic statue of Stalin overlooking Prague. In the wake of the new thaw, several Slovak writers were rehabilitated (Novomesky, Okali and - posthumously - I. Horvath), some prohibited books of bourgeois nationalist authors (Razus, Urban) were reprinted, a number of forcibly silenced authors were given the opportunity to publish_in literary journals (V. Beniak, E. B. Lukac) and even some unmentionable emigre writers (Hronsky) were mentioned without malice. A new look at the Slovak literary past caused the postponement (already the third time since 1957) of the publication of the History of Slovak literature. But there is still no escape from the ideological straitjacket. The party has an all-pervading control over cultural activities, it arbitrarily deposes inconvenient and outspoken critics of its methods. (E.g. it sent to diplomatic exile in Paris L . Mnacko, the author of the notorious "Belated reports". There he repented so thoroughly that the party saw fit to put him as the editor-in-chief of the "Kulturny zivot" to replace the uncomfortably critical P. Stevcek.) It seems that the controversy, criticism and discussion which were so daring in 1963 are now (in 1965) largerly a thing of the past. And the literary development is faring accordingly. F . Vnuk Jozef Ciger Hr on s 1k y, a great Slovak novelist, died J,uly 13, 1960 in Lujan, Argentina. He was the author of some 40 books � 134 SLOVAKIA THE HANDMAID OF IDEOLOGY (Slovak literature since 1945) Among the Slovaks, literature always played a leading r ole in the national life. The writers were the foremost fighters for the national rights before 1918, and fearless critics of the political and social wrongs in the post-war years. They were looked upon as the conscience of the nation and one can hardly think of a more dignified title bestowed by a people on its writers. It was a convincing sign of a mutual trust; in a sense Slovak literature was not only a collection of novels, books of poems and stories, but a faithful chronicle of Slovak strivings, fights, defeats and victories. The years after the First World War were in fact the golden years of Slovak literature. Freed and uninhibited it blossomed into maturity and was gradually catching up with the modern western literary currents. The years of national independence, 1939-45, in spite of the fact that they coincided with the war years, were on the whole the most fruitful period in the history of Slovak literature. The fall of the Slovak Republic and the restoration of Czecho-Slovakia in 1945 was a matter of great concern for the Slovak writers. Many of them fled before the advancing Red army (Hronsky, Ga~par, Urban, Zarnov, Dilong, Strmen, etc.) and even those who stayed behind faced the new situation with grave apprehension. Officially the liquidation of Slovak independence was celebrated as an act of liberation by the Red army and of joyful reunification with the fraternal Czech nation, but there is no sign of festive mood in the contemporary literary publications. The bards of the nation failed to express gratitude to the liberators. Even those writers who tried hard to please the new regime could only produce works completely lacking in joy, jubilation or any exulted feeling of a liberated nation. Jan Kostra (who was editor of the cultural section of the Communist daily "Pravda") published a collection of f>Oems entitled "Preponderance of sadness". Other books of poems published at the same time bore titles (and had contents cor- �SLOVAKIA 135 responding to their titles) such as "The mountain of hopelessness", "The age of lepers", "Stars-the wreakers of cruelty", etc. This obviously was not the way to welcome the dawn of liberation. Similar uneasiness was predominant in the Slovak post-war prose. Instead of a joyous present the authors wrote of a legendary past or tried to escape to unreal imaginary worlds of their own creation. Those few writers who listened to the voices of the cultural commissars and attempted to depict the problem of contemporary life achieved very disappointing results (J. Ponican, F. Kral', J. Horak, A. Plavka). The attitude of the Slovak writers was displayed clearly and unmistakably. This attitude of passive contempt was embarrassing to the new regime. The change in it came in 1948/ 9 when the Communists by clever manipulation outwitted their Democratic partners in the National Front and usurped all power in Slovakia. Immediately they set about to dominate and subsequently exploited the Slovak literary community. In April 1948 K. Gottwald declared "nationalization ef culture in general and of literature in particular". Literature was given its definite "constructive tasks". All the creative artistic methods were outlawed as "decadent, formalist, reactionary", etc., except the socialist realism which from the year 1948 on was to reign supreme. Literature became a concern of politicians, parliamentarians, party ideologists and party congresses. Those who would not toe the party line were mercilessly dealt with. The government soon had complete control over the press and publishing houses, and became the only employer of the writers. In their turn the writers were degraded to being "the engineers of human souls" and entrusted with problems corresponding to their profession. In March 1949 the Czechoslovak Writers Union was formed to which 220 Czech and 60 Slovak authors were admitted. The Union absorbed the existing Slovak Writers Association. Not only did the Slovak writers lost their national identity by this step but also the best and most promising of them were excluded from Union membership (V. Beniak, E. B. Lukac, J. Silan, J. Motulko, etc., etc.) and thus forcibly silenced and materially ruined. Subsequent purges further decimated the thin line of the Slovak men of letters. In April 1951 there occurred another �136 SLOVAKIA heavy-handed purge in which the victims were old-time Communist writers accused of bourgeois nationalist deviations, namely Novomesky, D. Okali and I. Horvath. (After expulsion from the Writers Union they were imprisoned and given heavy sentences.) Attacks were hurled also at D. Tatarka, V. Minac, A. Matuska, M. Chorvath and others. In that period of trial and tribulation when the revolution was devouring its own children the literary output was extremely low (altogether 17 new books appeared in 1951, as compared with the average output in the 1939-44 period of 142 new books yearly) and its artistic standard almost nonexistent. The books of poems became political speeches in verse, the prose writing was indistinguishable from political journalism. The progressive character of the poetry is obvious from the titles: "The Ode on Stalin" (J. Kostra, 1949), "Comrade my country" (M. Lajciak, 1949), "The song of peaceloving hands" (J. Rak, 1949), "The song of steel ingots" (L. Miiacko, 1950), "The song of love to new China" (J. Brezina, 1950), "The song of great (i.e. Slovak-Soviet) friendship" (M. Lajciak, 1951), "The song of May" (M. Prochazka 1952), "The spring song of a collective farmer" (C. Stitnicky, 1950), "People, be vigilant!" (F. Citovsky, 1951), "Peace- my love" (P. Gajdos, 1951), "The guardians of peace" (M. Krno, 1951), "The banners of peace", etc. The nebulous and never properly defined concept of socialist realism, the inspiration dictated by ideological expediency and the frontal attack on all formalist tendencies, were fertile soil for the so-called "schematism". The poems of different authors were monotonously alike with no relation to the realities of life. The prose writers composed works which were encyclopedical compilations of Marxist axioms with the positive and negative heroes engaged in a class struggle which predictably ended with the victory of the working class. The popular themes of novels and stories were the collectivization of the villages ("The wooden village" of F. Hecko, 1951 ; "The wasps' nest" of K. Lazarova, 1953, etc.) the Slovak uprising of 1944 (novels and short stories of Krno, Minac, Jilemnicky, Karvas, Plavka, etc.), the industrialization of Slovakia (Hora.k's "Blast furnace", Mina.e's "Blue waves", Miiacko's "The waters of Orava", Tatarka's "Comradely years", etc.). The literary thaw which set in after Stalin's death (1953) �SLOVAKIA 137 made a belated entry into Slovakia in the winter of 1955-6. It provoked some heated exchanges of opinions between the more liberal wing of the literary community on the one hand (I. Kupec, D. Tatarka) and the hardened stalinists (especially F. Hecko) on the other. The spirit of the thaw period found its fullest expression at the second congress of the Czecho-Slovak writers (April 1956) which followed at the heels of the 20th congress of the Soviet Communist Party (February, 1956). The outspoken criticism of the drabness of contemporary literature enunciated in the unscheduled speeches of the Czech writers Seifert and Hrubin (and echoed by D. Tatarka) pointedly demonstrated an unprecedented decay in artistic values brought about by the ruthless subjection of literature to ideology. The writers rebelled against their humiliating roles of soul-engineers and declared themselves to be the conscience of the nation. The spirit of the Writer's Congress was, alas, short-lived. Soviet intervention in Poland and Hungary put a sudden stop to all liberalizing undercurrents in the socialist camp and the Czech.o-Slovak Communist leaders were none too slow to restore the status quo ante 1953. Thus-apart from a few magazine articles-the literary thaw hardly left any sign in the literary production of the time. The only significant book of the thaw period was A. Bednar's "Hours and minutes" (1956) which soon became a target for concentrated attacks by official critics, trade unionists, partisans and other spokesmen -0£ the working class. The Czecho-Slovak Communist leaders succeeded in the following years (1956-62) in restoring the rigorous control of the stalinist er~. Under the slogan of "struggle against revisionism" they devised an ingenious strategy which was then applied by L. Stoll to combat various manifestations of revi.sionism in literature. By threats and promise the writers were forced to abandon the ideas promulgated at the Writers' Congress and to return to the old days of blind obedience to the party's bidding. But only a few writers were willing to follow unconditionally the new twist in the party line. Others tried to escape the rigors of neostalinism by self-imposed silence by writing literature for children or turning back in reminiscences to their own childhood and youth. The group of young writerf'l �138 SLOVAKIA gathered around the literary monthly "Mlada tvorba" showed initially some youthful elan, but lacking a firm program and able leadership on the one hand and facing insurmountable obstructions of the hardened party line on the other, it gradually slipped into restive passivity. (Their Czech counterparts around "Kveten" showed more aggressiveness and in turn were disbanded.) As it was revealed in 1963 the Sfovak Writers Union vetoed the publication of a number of books by young authors (Feldek, Stacho, Hykisch and others) because of alleged lack of ideological clarity, because of objectionable experimenting with modernism or playing up to revisionism. The years 1956-62 (now remorsefully called "the lost years" ) were almost a repetition of the years 1949-54 with the same writers (Minac, Tatarka, Lazarova, Mihalik, Karvas, etc.) enriching Slovak socialist realist literature by books on the same old themes (collectivization, industrialization, the Slovak uprising of 1944 ... but minus the "personality cult"} with the same outworn cliches. But these lost years were not as irreparably lost as the years 1949-53. An almost unnoticed development took place during this oppressive period: the emergence of a new literary generation. These young writers whose past was not tarnished by the sins of the cult era were not attracted by the literary models offered at home (Drda, Minac, Hecko) or in the Soviet Union (Fadeyev, Sholochov} but were casting their . eyes towards the literary achievements in the West. Hem- • mingway, Salinger, Steinbeck were their idols and secretly they admired and studied such proscribed decadents and formalists as Joyce, Kafka, Proust. .. The young poets were shows · ing interest in the works of Aragon and Eluard of the surrealist period and alongside them they were exploring the modern poetry of Rilke, St. John Perse, T. S. Eliot and the Amen-· can beatnik poets. The influences of this search for new poetry are visible in the poetical writings of M. Valek, M. Feldek, J. Sfacho and_ V. Turcany. The new prose made its unobtrusive appearance in the works of J . Blazkova, A. Hykisch and others. The young writers were· permitted to publish ·their books only from 1961 onward, when the change in the political climate ushered in a new liter2ry thaw. Under the impact of the : Sino-Soviet conflict and renewed attacks on Stalin at the 22nd �SLOVAKIA 139 Soviet Communist Party Congress gradually crumbled the tenets of stalinism even in Czecho-Slovakia. This was symbolically represented by the demolition of the gigantic statue of Stalin overlooking Prague. In the wake of the new thaw, several Slovak writers were rehabilitated (Novomesky, Okali and - posthumously - I. Horvath), some prohibited books of bourgeois nationalist authors (Razus, Urban) were reprinted, a number of forcibly silenced authors were given the opportunity to publish_in literary journals (V. Beniak, E. B. Lukac) and even some unmentionable emigre writers (Hronsky) were mentioned without malice. A new look at the Slovak literary past caused the postponement (already the third time since 1957) of the publication of the History of Slovak literature. But there is still no escape from the ideological straitjacket. The party has an all-pervading control over cultural activities, it arbitrarily deposes inconvenient and outspoken critics of its methods. (E.g. it sent to diplomatic exile in Paris L . Mnacko, the author of the notorious "Belated reports". There he repented so thoroughly that the party saw fit to put him as the editor-in-chief of the "Kulturny zivot" to replace the uncomfortably critical P. Stevcek.) It seems that the controversy, criticism and discussion which were so daring in 1963 are now (in 1965) largerly a thing of the past. And the literary development is faring accordingly. F . Vnuk Jozef Ciger Hr on s 1k y, a great Slovak novelist, died J,uly 13, 1960 in Lujan, Argentina. He was the author of some 40 books � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1965, Vol. 15 Description An account of the resource Vol. 15 (No. 38), 1965. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1965 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 134 SLOVAKIA THE HANDMAID OF IDEOLOGY (Slovak literature since 1945) Among the Slovaks, literature always played a leading r ole in the national life. The writers were the foremost fighters for the national rights before 1918, and fearless critics of the political and social wrongs in the post-war years. They were looked upon as the conscience of the nation and one can hardly think of a more dignified title bestowed by a people on its writers. It was a convincing sign of a mutual trust; in a sense Slovak literature was not only a collection of novels, books of poems and stories, but a faithful chronicle of Slovak strivings, fights, defeats and victories. The years after the First World War were in fact the golden years of Slovak literature. Freed and uninhibited it blossomed into maturity and was gradually catching up with the modern western literary currents. The years of national independence, 1939-45, in spite of the fact that they coincided with the war years, were on the whole the most fruitful period in the history of Slovak literature. The fall of the Slovak Republic and the restoration of Czecho-Slovakia in 1945 was a matter of great concern for the Slovak writers. Many of them fled before the advancing Red army (Hronsky, Ga~par, Urban, Zarnov, Dilong, Strmen, etc.) and even those who stayed behind faced the new situation with grave apprehension. Officially the liquidation of Slovak independence was celebrated as an act of liberation by the Red army and of joyful reunification with the fraternal Czech nation, but there is no sign of festive mood in the contemporary literary publications. The bards of the nation failed to express gratitude to the liberators. Even those writers who tried hard to please the new regime could only produce works completely lacking in joy, jubilation or any exulted feeling of a liberated nation. Jan Kostra (who was editor of the cultural section of the Communist daily "Pravda") published a collection of f>Oems entitled "Preponderance of sadness". Other books of poems published at the same time bore titles (and had contents cor- SLOVAKIA 135 responding to their titles) such as "The mountain of hopelessness", "The age of lepers", "Stars-the wreakers of cruelty", etc. This obviously was not the way to welcome the dawn of liberation. Similar uneasiness was predominant in the Slovak post-war prose. Instead of a joyous present the authors wrote of a legendary past or tried to escape to unreal imaginary worlds of their own creation. Those few writers who listened to the voices of the cultural commissars and attempted to depict the problem of contemporary life achieved very disappointing results (J. Ponican, F. Kral', J. Horak, A. Plavka). The attitude of the Slovak writers was displayed clearly and unmistakably. This attitude of passive contempt was embarrassing to the new regime. The change in it came in 1948/ 9 when the Communists by clever manipulation outwitted their Democratic partners in the National Front and usurped all power in Slovakia. Immediately they set about to dominate and subsequently exploited the Slovak literary community. In April 1948 K. Gottwald declared "nationalization ef culture in general and of literature in particular". Literature was given its definite "constructive tasks". All the creative artistic methods were outlawed as "decadent, formalist, reactionary", etc., except the socialist realism which from the year 1948 on was to reign supreme. Literature became a concern of politicians, parliamentarians, party ideologists and party congresses. Those who would not toe the party line were mercilessly dealt with. The government soon had complete control over the press and publishing houses, and became the only employer of the writers. In their turn the writers were degraded to being "the engineers of human souls" and entrusted with problems corresponding to their profession. In March 1949 the Czechoslovak Writers Union was formed to which 220 Czech and 60 Slovak authors were admitted. The Union absorbed the existing Slovak Writers Association. Not only did the Slovak writers lost their national identity by this step but also the best and most promising of them were excluded from Union membership (V. Beniak, E. B. Lukac, J. Silan, J. Motulko, etc., etc.) and thus forcibly silenced and materially ruined. Subsequent purges further decimated the thin line of the Slovak men of letters. In April 1951 there occurred another 136 SLOVAKIA heavy-handed purge in which the victims were old-time Communist writers accused of bourgeois nationalist deviations, namely Novomesky, D. Okali and I. Horvath. (After expulsion from the Writers Union they were imprisoned and given heavy sentences.) Attacks were hurled also at D. Tatarka, V. Minac, A. Matuska, M. Chorvath and others. In that period of trial and tribulation when the revolution was devouring its own children the literary output was extremely low (altogether 17 new books appeared in 1951, as compared with the average output in the 1939-44 period of 142 new books yearly) and its artistic standard almost nonexistent. The books of poems became political speeches in verse, the prose writing was indistinguishable from political journalism. The progressive character of the poetry is obvious from the titles: "The Ode on Stalin" (J. Kostra, 1949), "Comrade my country" (M. Lajciak, 1949), "The song of peaceloving hands" (J. Rak, 1949), "The song of steel ingots" (L. Miiacko, 1950), "The song of love to new China" (J. Brezina, 1950), "The song of great (i.e. Slovak-Soviet) friendship" (M. Lajciak, 1951), "The song of May" (M. Prochazka 1952), "The spring song of a collective farmer" (C. Stitnicky, 1950), "People, be vigilant!" (F. Citovsky, 1951), "Peace- my love" (P. Gajdos, 1951), "The guardians of peace" (M. Krno, 1951), "The banners of peace", etc. The nebulous and never properly defined concept of socialist realism, the inspiration dictated by ideological expediency and the frontal attack on all formalist tendencies, were fertile soil for the so-called "schematism". The poems of different authors were monotonously alike with no relation to the realities of life. The prose writers composed works which were encyclopedical compilations of Marxist axioms with the positive and negative heroes engaged in a class struggle which predictably ended with the victory of the working class. The popular themes of novels and stories were the collectivization of the villages ("The wooden village" of F. Hecko, 1951 ; "The wasps' nest" of K. Lazarova, 1953, etc.) the Slovak uprising of 1944 (novels and short stories of Krno, Minac, Jilemnicky, Karvas, Plavka, etc.), the industrialization of Slovakia (Hora.k's "Blast furnace", Mina.e's "Blue waves", Miiacko's "The waters of Orava", Tatarka's "Comradely years", etc.). The literary thaw which set in after Stalin's death (1953) SLOVAKIA 137 made a belated entry into Slovakia in the winter of 1955-6. It provoked some heated exchanges of opinions between the more liberal wing of the literary community on the one hand (I. Kupec, D. Tatarka) and the hardened stalinists (especially F. Hecko) on the other. The spirit of the thaw period found its fullest expression at the second congress of the Czecho-Slovak writers (April 1956) which followed at the heels of the 20th congress of the Soviet Communist Party (February, 1956). The outspoken criticism of the drabness of contemporary literature enunciated in the unscheduled speeches of the Czech writers Seifert and Hrubin (and echoed by D. Tatarka) pointedly demonstrated an unprecedented decay in artistic values brought about by the ruthless subjection of literature to ideology. The writers rebelled against their humiliating roles of soul-engineers and declared themselves to be the conscience of the nation. The spirit of the Writer's Congress was, alas, short-lived. Soviet intervention in Poland and Hungary put a sudden stop to all liberalizing undercurrents in the socialist camp and the Czech.o-Slovak Communist leaders were none too slow to restore the status quo ante 1953. Thus-apart from a few magazine articles-the literary thaw hardly left any sign in the literary production of the time. The only significant book of the thaw period was A. Bednar's "Hours and minutes" (1956) which soon became a target for concentrated attacks by official critics, trade unionists, partisans and other spokesmen -0£ the working class. The Czecho-Slovak Communist leaders succeeded in the following years (1956-62) in restoring the rigorous control of the stalinist er~. Under the slogan of "struggle against revisionism" they devised an ingenious strategy which was then applied by L. Stoll to combat various manifestations of revi.sionism in literature. By threats and promise the writers were forced to abandon the ideas promulgated at the Writers' Congress and to return to the old days of blind obedience to the party's bidding. But only a few writers were willing to follow unconditionally the new twist in the party line. Others tried to escape the rigors of neostalinism by self-imposed silence by writing literature for children or turning back in reminiscences to their own childhood and youth. The group of young writerf'l 138 SLOVAKIA gathered around the literary monthly "Mlada tvorba" showed initially some youthful elan, but lacking a firm program and able leadership on the one hand and facing insurmountable obstructions of the hardened party line on the other, it gradually slipped into restive passivity. (Their Czech counterparts around "Kveten" showed more aggressiveness and in turn were disbanded.) As it was revealed in 1963 the Sfovak Writers Union vetoed the publication of a number of books by young authors (Feldek, Stacho, Hykisch and others) because of alleged lack of ideological clarity, because of objectionable experimenting with modernism or playing up to revisionism. The years 1956-62 (now remorsefully called "the lost years" ) were almost a repetition of the years 1949-54 with the same writers (Minac, Tatarka, Lazarova, Mihalik, Karvas, etc.) enriching Slovak socialist realist literature by books on the same old themes (collectivization, industrialization, the Slovak uprising of 1944 ... but minus the "personality cult"} with the same outworn cliches. But these lost years were not as irreparably lost as the years 1949-53. An almost unnoticed development took place during this oppressive period: the emergence of a new literary generation. These young writers whose past was not tarnished by the sins of the cult era were not attracted by the literary models offered at home (Drda, Minac, Hecko) or in the Soviet Union (Fadeyev, Sholochov} but were casting their . eyes towards the literary achievements in the West. Hem- • mingway, Salinger, Steinbeck were their idols and secretly they admired and studied such proscribed decadents and formalists as Joyce, Kafka, Proust. .. The young poets were shows · ing interest in the works of Aragon and Eluard of the surrealist period and alongside them they were exploring the modern poetry of Rilke, St. John Perse, T. S. Eliot and the Amen-· can beatnik poets. The influences of this search for new poetry are visible in the poetical writings of M. Valek, M. Feldek, J. Sfacho and_ V. Turcany. The new prose made its unobtrusive appearance in the works of J . Blazkova, A. Hykisch and others. The young writers were· permitted to publish ·their books only from 1961 onward, when the change in the political climate ushered in a new liter2ry thaw. Under the impact of the : Sino-Soviet conflict and renewed attacks on Stalin at the 22nd SLOVAKIA 139 Soviet Communist Party Congress gradually crumbled the tenets of stalinism even in Czecho-Slovakia. This was symbolically represented by the demolition of the gigantic statue of Stalin overlooking Prague. In the wake of the new thaw, several Slovak writers were rehabilitated (Novomesky, Okali and - posthumously - I. Horvath), some prohibited books of bourgeois nationalist authors (Razus, Urban) were reprinted, a number of forcibly silenced authors were given the opportunity to publish_in literary journals (V. Beniak, E. B. Lukac) and even some unmentionable emigre writers (Hronsky) were mentioned without malice. A new look at the Slovak literary past caused the postponement (already the third time since 1957) of the publication of the History of Slovak literature. But there is still no escape from the ideological straitjacket. The party has an all-pervading control over cultural activities, it arbitrarily deposes inconvenient and outspoken critics of its methods. (E.g. it sent to diplomatic exile in Paris L . Mnacko, the author of the notorious "Belated reports". There he repented so thoroughly that the party saw fit to put him as the editor-in-chief of the "Kulturny zivot" to replace the uncomfortably critical P. Stevcek.) It seems that the controversy, criticism and discussion which were so daring in 1963 are now (in 1965) largerly a thing of the past. And the literary development is faring accordingly. F . Vnuk Jozef Ciger Hr on s 1k y, a great Slovak novelist, died J,uly 13, 1960 in Lujan, Argentina. He was the author of some 40 books  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Handmaid of Ideology (Slovak literature since 1945) Description An account of the resource F. Vnuk Slovakia, Vol. 15 (No. 38), 1965 pp. 134-139 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1965 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/fdb93e6ed9406306d8954d1dc629e5c0.pdf 24d8a956f6cc031275dec34b129b38c8 PDF Text Text 144 SLOVAKIA A POET IN EXILE ( Msgr. M . K. Mlynarovic celebrates his 80th birthday on October 11, 1967) Milos Klement Mlyna.rovic is a unique phenomenon of Slovak literature 1 in more than one respect. First of all, he is the oldest living Slovak poet. His literary contemporaries ( I. Grebac-Orlov, M. Razus, V. Roy, P. Kompis, K. F. Urbanovic ) have now all died and their work has been a closed chapter for the last two or three decades. Mlynarovic, on the other hand, has established himself as a mature and productive writer mainly in the last two decades. Secondly, all his literary output (amounting to 15 books of poetry, novels and religious writing) has been produced in exile, away from his native land. In spite of this physical and geographical separation Mlynarovic has maintained close and unbroken ties with the country of his birth. And finally, his poetry, as if untouched by the fashions and vicissitudes of the day, remains faithful to his three-pronged love: God, Church and nation. In this sense Mlynarovic is a traditional poet and a true son of his nation. These three themes (God, Church and nation) have dominated Slovak poetry since the time of the National Awakening (end of the 18th century) but never more intensely than in the time of national oppression which befell the Slovak nation after the Austro-Hungarian 'Ausgleich' (1867 ) and did not cease until 1918. For the generations of Slovak writers and poets living on hope and trusting in God's justice these three themes comprised a programme to which they faithfully adhered. Thus Andrej Truchly-Sytniansky proclaimed in the poem, "Kto som?": P<in Bah, cirkev, rod slovensky; srdca m6jho vz<icny predmet. Tymto tram ze vzdycky zijem, nedal by ch sa za eel'!} svet. 2 (God, Church and Slovak nation/ are precious themes of my heart./ I always live for these three/ and would not give them up for the whole world.) These three themes were passed on as a historical �SLOVAKIA 145 message from fathers to sons. The form may have changed, but the content did not. Kraska, Roy, Razus - the pioneer of modern Slovak poetry - were echoing them in their verses on the eve of the First World War, 3 when the young Franciscan priest, Father Benedict Mlynarovic, OFM, left Slovakia for the U.S.A. In the strange new world, among a sizable Slovak emigration which he came to serve, these three themes acquired a new meaning and became the cornerstone of his pastoral, fraternalistic and literary activities. The new environment in which the young priest-poet found himself in the U.S .A. differed drastically from that which he had left behind. Back in old Hungary ( of which Slovakia was then a part) the aspiring poet and young priest-lecturer had moved in the intellectual milieu of Magyar culture. Towards the end of the 19th century Magyar culture and literature caught up with the West, while the oppressed and struggling Slovak literature was still lagging behind. For young ambitious intellectuals the adoption of the culture of the dominating Magyar nation had much more to offer not only intellectually but also materially. It required a strong conviction and even stronger devotion to one's own nation to resist Magyar lures, enticements and ever-mounting pressure. Many Slovak intellectuals were thus lost to their own nation. It was a doubly tragic loss since it strengthened and enriched the ranks of the oppressors of the Slovak nation. Even the greatest Slovak poet, Hviezdoslav, succumbed initially to these temptations and began to write his verses in Magyar. 4 In a similar way we find the first literary contributions of M. K. Mlynarovic in Magyar language periodicals ( Religio, Alkotmdny, etc.) . The poet has left us an autobiographic record of his struggle and victory. 5 A tempting voice called him : Pis bdsne mad'arsky a nie viac zobrdcky! (Write Magyar poems/ and nothing more of this beggar's language!) . But he overcame the temptation. He realized his indebtedness to his family, to his native village �146 SLOVAKIA and to his nation suffering under the lashes of the tyrant's whip. No, he would not "kiss the whip": Oprety o stip bulvdra hl'add si chlapec cestu spat a slzou si ju otvdra. (Leaning against the column of Budapest's boulevard/ the young lad looks for a road which will take him back/ and unlocks it with a tear.) At an important cross-road of his life the poet listened to the voice of his heart and made his irrevocable choice which was soon to bear precious fruit. During the war-years 1914-1918 the Slovaks in America were the most active section of the Slovak national community and it was largely through their efforts that in the postwar rearrangement of Central Europe Slovaks opted for a common state with the Czechs. The striving, sacrifices and other heroic deeds and splendid achievements of Slovak people in a free - though foreign - country were an eloquent testimony of the capabilities inherent in the Slovak nation. Through their accomplishments and experiences in the U.S.A. Slovaks were shedding their national inferiority complex and becoming confident and conscious citizens. And here among them the patriotism of a young priest-poet acquired a new dimension. His devotion to the Slovak national heritage deepened. Deprived of opportunities to study his native language and culture at home (where during his school-years the education was offered only in the Magyar language and spirit), he made up for it in America. Painstakingly and steadfastly he studied Slovak grammar, Slovak history and Slovak literature. From among the Slovak poets he developed a special affection for Hviezdoslav and Krasko, two of the brightest stars in the Slovak literary firmament. In 1919 he published his first book of verse, Sldvia. It was a small volume of warm patriotic poetry, expressing joy over the liberation of Slovakia, welcoming the new dawn of the freed nation and thanking God for the favours in which the dreams of generations had materialized. By its content the book fitted into the pattern of the poetical �SLOVAKIA 147 production appearing in those days in Slovakia,6 but artistically the verse still lacked the force and refinement appropriate to the festive and hymnic message it tried to convey. In the following years Mlynarovic wrote several prose works and only occasionally published a poem here and there in Slovak journals and magazines. Then in 1934 there appeared his second book of poetry, Veliky Boh malych. (Great God of the little ones) It contained mainly meditative and religious poems of intense sincerity and Franciscan humility. In the lines one could detect the strong influence of Krasko, 7 but the poems bore the unmistakable imprint of Mlynarovic's individuality. Spiritual depth and heartfelt intimacy rank these poems with the best religious poetry written in the Slovak language. Especially moving is the poem, Vel' ky piatok, (Good Friday) the opening verses of which run: Beyond the stars now He doth dwell And I below, a shattered bell, Unworthy to ring out His name. Age-old, my heart cried out in pain, When my tongue moved, but all in vain To turn the evil when He came. Good Friday once again is here. The cross looks down from everywhere As Son unto His Father dies .. .8 The next volume of Mlynarovic's poetry, Boha hl'addm,9 was published in Slovakia shortly after the Second World War (1948). In a way it was a revelation: it was not only a voice from the other side of the Ocean but also from another era. In the immediate post-war years mankind was taking account of its misery and self-inflicted suffering. The Slovak poetry of the day was full of sadness, nostalgia, remorse and dissonant voices. Then in its unobtrusive whisper entered Mlynarovic's poetry to remind one of the overlooked honesty in human action, of the purposefulness of human life, and of the human heart's everlasting search for God: �148 SLOVAKIA Tisic rdz nasiel som 1'a, tisic rdz stratil, Veen'!}, bludickou budem v priestore kruzit' tulavym behom vzd'alovat' sa, blizit', a vzdy 1'a ndjdem, jak vtdk svoje hniezdo, ja maly prach Tvoj, satelit. 10 A thousand times I have found You, A thousand times I have lost You again, Everlasting One! As an errant star I will soar through the space, In roving course I get further, closer, But always I find You As a bird finds its nest, I, Your little speck of dust, Your satellite. It was indeed a tender, deeply human and humanistic kind of poetry. In delicate verses the poet records the reminiscences of his youth, identifies himself with the humble, suffering and downtrodden, pays homage to the memory of Father Damien de Veuster ( the missionary of the lepers' colony at Molokai) and meditates upon God's goodness and eternity: Chcem den. co neznd rdna, vecera nie, Zen poludnie; chcem vecne slnka Pdna, ziariace do mna, do studne. 11 I wish for a day which has no sunrise and no sunset, only a lasting noon; I crave for the Lord's sun which never sets but radiates into me as into a well. Prayer clothed in poetry was the central theme of Mlynarovic's book of poems, Testament krdl'a sfdc. 12 In meditative lyrical poetry the author "looks into secrets, investigates the world behind the veil, searches into mysteries of human existence." 13 It is, in a way, a continuation of the search for God undertaken in an earlier book, but this time the intensity of the spiritual quest is even more emphasized in reflective monologues of prayer-like sin- �SLOVAKIA 149 cerity. The poems are grouped into five cycles: Broken Rhythm, Meditations at Holy Mass, Sayings of the Word Made Flesh, Seven Words and At the Sepulchre. Many poems are introduced with appropriate quotations taken from the Scriptures - not unlike antiphons preceding psalms in the Divine Office. The value of this poetry of pure spirituality is even more enhanced when one places it alongside the versifications produced at the same time in the poet's native count ry. There, under the compulsive guidance of the Communist Party, poetry and all arts were harnessed into the service of "the cause of Socialism." Only a "functional" poetry, that is a poetry helping the masses to build up Communism, was permitted; and what was not explicitly permitted was virtually outlawed. In those lean years of Slovak literature the good name and the artistic honour of Slovak poetry were saved by the writings of the emigre poets, Milos K. Mlynarovic being foremost among them. While in the previous books of verse Mlynarovic had repeatedly proclaimed his soaring devotion to God, in the book, z l'udu - za l'ud,14 he comes down to earth and the object of his inspiration is man. His warm sympathy extends to all people everywhere, but in particular two sections of mankind lie deep in his heart: the hard-pressed Slovak nation in Communist captivity and the struggling negro race both in Africa and the U.S.A. Eud a ja . . . zijem si s nim vzdy povedomy ja, diet'a domca, svatych prdv a borieb a dnes sa zakolisat', Boze m6j, nedaj mi! 15 My people and I . . . As a child of humble abode I live with them, constantly aware of their sacred rights and struggles; Do not ever let me, o my God, waver in this conviction. Here again - even more frequently than in the previous book - each poem is prefaced by one or more quotations. A brief glance at these quotations is a convenient key to the inspirational sources of Mlynarovic's poetry. They range from the Bible, classical authors and Slovak �150 SLOVAKIA poets to Shakespeare, Petofi, Mada.ch, Keats, Masefield, etc. The last poetical work of M. K. Mlynarovic is a slim volume of verse, entitled Dejiny srdca. 16 Some of the poems in this collection had been published earlier and here they reappear in a somewhat modified form. Some poems were written as early as 1911, others in the autum of the poet's fruitful life. Arranged in chronological order they represent a concise cross-section of Mlynarovic's creative activity and the poetical manifesto of a writer in exile. The poet equates himself to a tree transplanted to new ground, but the soil of the new environment failed "to change the tune of his heart" .17 In the last poem of the collection, Vlak (the Train), the poet with calm and resignation writes the last chapter of the history of his heart. The train of his life is approaching its terminus and he is preparing to alight. He sings in a melancholy strain: Pride tci stanica a vlak m6j pozastane; padne mi pero, stichne hlas a svetlo dohori. Vtedy mi bratia-sestry, zrobte po v6li : na mna si spomente, jak ja na vcis spominam/ 18 The station where my train will stop is already in sight; then the pen will fall from my fingers, my voice will be silenced, my light will go out. At that time, my brothers and sisters, grant me this wish: Remember me, as I am now remembering you! Difficult is the life of a poet in exile. The separation from his native soil - and especially when he is separated by an Iron Curtain - may be a source of nostalgic inspiration but then it denies the poet everything else: favourable working conditions, publishing opportunities, and above all - a sizable and appreciative audience. In spite of these difficulties the creative spark in the poet's bosom makes it "impossible not to write". And thanks to this compelling and driving force Slovak literature has been enriched by verses of lasting beauty. The creator of this �SLOVAKIA 151 poetry never intended to be modern or fashionable yet he succeeded in making his presence in the Slovak literary field vividly felt and wrote his name across the pages of the histories of Slovak literature. F. Vnuk, Australia FOOTNOTES 1. Milos K. Mlynarovic was born on October 11, 1887 at Hasprunka (now called Studienka), near Malacky in West Slovakia. He attended High School at Trnava. Later he entered the Franciscan order and accepted the name Benedict. His theological studies were completed at Bratislava and in 1910 he was ordained. Shortly after his ordination he was appointed to lecture in Rhetoric and Biblical studies at a Franciscan seminary. In 1914 he left his native country and emigrated to the U.S.A. hoping to join the Slovak Franciscan Commissariate and to work among the Slovak settlers in the U.S.A. But owing <to the political pressure exercised by the anti-Slovak Magyars even within the monastic orders, he was prevented from realizing his youthful dreams. In order to stay in the U.S.A. and to work among the Slovak emigrants he had to become a secular priest. As an administrator of the Slovak Catholic parish of the Assumption of Our Lady at Indiana Harbor (now East Chicago), Ind., he spent 35 years in active pastoral service. He built a beautiful church, presbytery, school and convent. In addition to his parochial duties he took an active part in numerous Slovak fraternalistic associations. In 1950 he retired and since then he has lived with the Slovak Franciscan community (Seven Dolors Shrine) at Valparaiso, Indiana. This essay attempts to give a brief outline of his poetical work, leaving aside his prose writing, religious books and occasional journalistic activity. For a more comprehensive treatment of Mlynarovic's life and literary work the reader is advised <to consult J. E. Bor: Msgr. Milos K. Mlynarovic; osobnost', dielo a posolstvo (Whiting, Ind., 1957). 2. Sokol (literary monthly) , No. 7, 1869. 3. Of these only Kraska published his poems in two slim volumes of verse. The others contributed to various Slovak journals and periodicals such as Prudy (Roy, Razus) , Narodne noviny (Razus, GrebacOrlov), 13udove noviny ( Grebac-Orlov). 4. This lapse later led Hviezdoslav to a rhapsodic ode on the Slovak language: Mn.a kedys' zvadzal svet, mi hovoriac: Rec, ktoru z domu vies, o, jak je licha . .. 0, mojej matky rec je krasota, je milota, je rozko~, laska svata .. . (The world once tried to seduce me, saying: The language you learned at home, oh, how base it is .. ./ To which the poet makes this noble reply: / Oh, the language taught by my mother is loveliness, is tenderness, is delight and holy love ... ) �152 SLOVAKIA 5. See his poem Budapest', jun 1914 in Dejiny srdca (Story of a heart, Middletown, Pa., 1964, pp. 5-6) from which account of the poet's decision is reconstructed. 6. e.g. Martin Razus : Hoj, zem dralui (1919), Vladimir Roy: Ked' miznu hmly (1920), Stefan Krcmery: Ked' sa sloboda rodila (1920), Ignac Grebac-Orlov: V povichrici (1922), etc. 7. Even the title of Mlynarovic's book of verse, Vel'kiJ Boh malych, reminds one of the famous verses of I. Krasko: 0, Boze ubohych a ponizenych, modlitbu moju milosrdne prijmi! Ty vel'kiJ, pretoze Si Bohom malych ... (Oh God of poor and humble ones,/ graciously accept my prayer./ You the great One, because You deign to be the God of little ones .. . ) 8. Translation by Ivan J . Kramoris, published in his "Anthology of Slovak Poetry" (Scranton, Pa., 1947), p. 131. 9. Boha hl'adam (In search of God, Trnava 1948), 62 pages. 10. Boha hl'adam, p. 35. 11. Boha hl'adam, p . 50. 12. Testament kral'a sfdc (Testament of the King of Human Hearts, Buenos Aires, n.d.), 78 pages. 13. T estament kral'a sfdc, p. 9. 14. Z l'udu - za l'ud (From the People ,vhiting, Ind., 1956) , 67 pages. 15. Z l'udu - For the People, za l'ud, p. 12. 16. Dejiny srdca (Story of a Heart, Middletown, Pa., 1964), 39 pages. 17. Dejiny srdca, p. 11. 18. Dejiny srdca, p . 39. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA as a Christian and democratic organization, is resolutely against the domination and exploitation of the Slovak nation by any other nation or political state; the Slovaks did not want to be ruled over by the Magyars and, today, do not want to be subservient to the Czech nation. � 144 SLOVAKIA A POET IN EXILE ( Msgr. M . K. Mlynarovic celebrates his 80th birthday on October 11, 1967) Milos Klement Mlyna.rovic is a unique phenomenon of Slovak literature 1 in more than one respect. First of all, he is the oldest living Slovak poet. His literary contemporaries ( I. Grebac-Orlov, M. Razus, V. Roy, P. Kompis, K. F. Urbanovic ) have now all died and their work has been a closed chapter for the last two or three decades. Mlynarovic, on the other hand, has established himself as a mature and productive writer mainly in the last two decades. Secondly, all his literary output (amounting to 15 books of poetry, novels and religious writing) has been produced in exile, away from his native land. In spite of this physical and geographical separation Mlynarovic has maintained close and unbroken ties with the country of his birth. And finally, his poetry, as if untouched by the fashions and vicissitudes of the day, remains faithful to his three-pronged love: God, Church and nation. In this sense Mlynarovic is a traditional poet and a true son of his nation. These three themes (God, Church and nation) have dominated Slovak poetry since the time of the National Awakening (end of the 18th century) but never more intensely than in the time of national oppression which befell the Slovak nation after the Austro-Hungarian 'Ausgleich' (1867 ) and did not cease until 1918. For the generations of Slovak writers and poets living on hope and trusting in God's justice these three themes comprised a programme to which they faithfully adhered. Thus Andrej Truchly-Sytniansky proclaimed in the poem, "Kto som?": P<in Bah, cirkev, rod slovensky; srdca m6jho vz<icny predmet. Tymto tram ze vzdycky zijem, nedal by ch sa za eel'!} svet. 2 (God, Church and Slovak nation/ are precious themes of my heart./ I always live for these three/ and would not give them up for the whole world.) These three themes were passed on as a historical �SLOVAKIA 145 message from fathers to sons. The form may have changed, but the content did not. Kraska, Roy, Razus - the pioneer of modern Slovak poetry - were echoing them in their verses on the eve of the First World War, 3 when the young Franciscan priest, Father Benedict Mlynarovic, OFM, left Slovakia for the U.S.A. In the strange new world, among a sizable Slovak emigration which he came to serve, these three themes acquired a new meaning and became the cornerstone of his pastoral, fraternalistic and literary activities. The new environment in which the young priest-poet found himself in the U.S .A. differed drastically from that which he had left behind. Back in old Hungary ( of which Slovakia was then a part) the aspiring poet and young priest-lecturer had moved in the intellectual milieu of Magyar culture. Towards the end of the 19th century Magyar culture and literature caught up with the West, while the oppressed and struggling Slovak literature was still lagging behind. For young ambitious intellectuals the adoption of the culture of the dominating Magyar nation had much more to offer not only intellectually but also materially. It required a strong conviction and even stronger devotion to one's own nation to resist Magyar lures, enticements and ever-mounting pressure. Many Slovak intellectuals were thus lost to their own nation. It was a doubly tragic loss since it strengthened and enriched the ranks of the oppressors of the Slovak nation. Even the greatest Slovak poet, Hviezdoslav, succumbed initially to these temptations and began to write his verses in Magyar. 4 In a similar way we find the first literary contributions of M. K. Mlynarovic in Magyar language periodicals ( Religio, Alkotmdny, etc.) . The poet has left us an autobiographic record of his struggle and victory. 5 A tempting voice called him : Pis bdsne mad'arsky a nie viac zobrdcky! (Write Magyar poems/ and nothing more of this beggar's language!) . But he overcame the temptation. He realized his indebtedness to his family, to his native village �146 SLOVAKIA and to his nation suffering under the lashes of the tyrant's whip. No, he would not "kiss the whip": Oprety o stip bulvdra hl'add si chlapec cestu spat a slzou si ju otvdra. (Leaning against the column of Budapest's boulevard/ the young lad looks for a road which will take him back/ and unlocks it with a tear.) At an important cross-road of his life the poet listened to the voice of his heart and made his irrevocable choice which was soon to bear precious fruit. During the war-years 1914-1918 the Slovaks in America were the most active section of the Slovak national community and it was largely through their efforts that in the postwar rearrangement of Central Europe Slovaks opted for a common state with the Czechs. The striving, sacrifices and other heroic deeds and splendid achievements of Slovak people in a free - though foreign - country were an eloquent testimony of the capabilities inherent in the Slovak nation. Through their accomplishments and experiences in the U.S.A. Slovaks were shedding their national inferiority complex and becoming confident and conscious citizens. And here among them the patriotism of a young priest-poet acquired a new dimension. His devotion to the Slovak national heritage deepened. Deprived of opportunities to study his native language and culture at home (where during his school-years the education was offered only in the Magyar language and spirit), he made up for it in America. Painstakingly and steadfastly he studied Slovak grammar, Slovak history and Slovak literature. From among the Slovak poets he developed a special affection for Hviezdoslav and Krasko, two of the brightest stars in the Slovak literary firmament. In 1919 he published his first book of verse, Sldvia. It was a small volume of warm patriotic poetry, expressing joy over the liberation of Slovakia, welcoming the new dawn of the freed nation and thanking God for the favours in which the dreams of generations had materialized. By its content the book fitted into the pattern of the poetical �SLOVAKIA 147 production appearing in those days in Slovakia,6 but artistically the verse still lacked the force and refinement appropriate to the festive and hymnic message it tried to convey. In the following years Mlynarovic wrote several prose works and only occasionally published a poem here and there in Slovak journals and magazines. Then in 1934 there appeared his second book of poetry, Veliky Boh malych. (Great God of the little ones) It contained mainly meditative and religious poems of intense sincerity and Franciscan humility. In the lines one could detect the strong influence of Krasko, 7 but the poems bore the unmistakable imprint of Mlynarovic's individuality. Spiritual depth and heartfelt intimacy rank these poems with the best religious poetry written in the Slovak language. Especially moving is the poem, Vel' ky piatok, (Good Friday) the opening verses of which run: Beyond the stars now He doth dwell And I below, a shattered bell, Unworthy to ring out His name. Age-old, my heart cried out in pain, When my tongue moved, but all in vain To turn the evil when He came. Good Friday once again is here. The cross looks down from everywhere As Son unto His Father dies .. .8 The next volume of Mlynarovic's poetry, Boha hl'addm,9 was published in Slovakia shortly after the Second World War (1948). In a way it was a revelation: it was not only a voice from the other side of the Ocean but also from another era. In the immediate post-war years mankind was taking account of its misery and self-inflicted suffering. The Slovak poetry of the day was full of sadness, nostalgia, remorse and dissonant voices. Then in its unobtrusive whisper entered Mlynarovic's poetry to remind one of the overlooked honesty in human action, of the purposefulness of human life, and of the human heart's everlasting search for God: �148 SLOVAKIA Tisic rdz nasiel som 1'a, tisic rdz stratil, Veen'!}, bludickou budem v priestore kruzit' tulavym behom vzd'alovat' sa, blizit', a vzdy 1'a ndjdem, jak vtdk svoje hniezdo, ja maly prach Tvoj, satelit. 10 A thousand times I have found You, A thousand times I have lost You again, Everlasting One! As an errant star I will soar through the space, In roving course I get further, closer, But always I find You As a bird finds its nest, I, Your little speck of dust, Your satellite. It was indeed a tender, deeply human and humanistic kind of poetry. In delicate verses the poet records the reminiscences of his youth, identifies himself with the humble, suffering and downtrodden, pays homage to the memory of Father Damien de Veuster ( the missionary of the lepers' colony at Molokai) and meditates upon God's goodness and eternity: Chcem den. co neznd rdna, vecera nie, Zen poludnie; chcem vecne slnka Pdna, ziariace do mna, do studne. 11 I wish for a day which has no sunrise and no sunset, only a lasting noon; I crave for the Lord's sun which never sets but radiates into me as into a well. Prayer clothed in poetry was the central theme of Mlynarovic's book of poems, Testament krdl'a sfdc. 12 In meditative lyrical poetry the author "looks into secrets, investigates the world behind the veil, searches into mysteries of human existence." 13 It is, in a way, a continuation of the search for God undertaken in an earlier book, but this time the intensity of the spiritual quest is even more emphasized in reflective monologues of prayer-like sin- �SLOVAKIA 149 cerity. The poems are grouped into five cycles: Broken Rhythm, Meditations at Holy Mass, Sayings of the Word Made Flesh, Seven Words and At the Sepulchre. Many poems are introduced with appropriate quotations taken from the Scriptures - not unlike antiphons preceding psalms in the Divine Office. The value of this poetry of pure spirituality is even more enhanced when one places it alongside the versifications produced at the same time in the poet's native count ry. There, under the compulsive guidance of the Communist Party, poetry and all arts were harnessed into the service of "the cause of Socialism." Only a "functional" poetry, that is a poetry helping the masses to build up Communism, was permitted; and what was not explicitly permitted was virtually outlawed. In those lean years of Slovak literature the good name and the artistic honour of Slovak poetry were saved by the writings of the emigre poets, Milos K. Mlynarovic being foremost among them. While in the previous books of verse Mlynarovic had repeatedly proclaimed his soaring devotion to God, in the book, z l'udu - za l'ud,14 he comes down to earth and the object of his inspiration is man. His warm sympathy extends to all people everywhere, but in particular two sections of mankind lie deep in his heart: the hard-pressed Slovak nation in Communist captivity and the struggling negro race both in Africa and the U.S.A. Eud a ja . . . zijem si s nim vzdy povedomy ja, diet'a domca, svatych prdv a borieb a dnes sa zakolisat', Boze m6j, nedaj mi! 15 My people and I . . . As a child of humble abode I live with them, constantly aware of their sacred rights and struggles; Do not ever let me, o my God, waver in this conviction. Here again - even more frequently than in the previous book - each poem is prefaced by one or more quotations. A brief glance at these quotations is a convenient key to the inspirational sources of Mlynarovic's poetry. They range from the Bible, classical authors and Slovak �150 SLOVAKIA poets to Shakespeare, Petofi, Mada.ch, Keats, Masefield, etc. The last poetical work of M. K. Mlynarovic is a slim volume of verse, entitled Dejiny srdca. 16 Some of the poems in this collection had been published earlier and here they reappear in a somewhat modified form. Some poems were written as early as 1911, others in the autum of the poet's fruitful life. Arranged in chronological order they represent a concise cross-section of Mlynarovic's creative activity and the poetical manifesto of a writer in exile. The poet equates himself to a tree transplanted to new ground, but the soil of the new environment failed "to change the tune of his heart" .17 In the last poem of the collection, Vlak (the Train), the poet with calm and resignation writes the last chapter of the history of his heart. The train of his life is approaching its terminus and he is preparing to alight. He sings in a melancholy strain: Pride tci stanica a vlak m6j pozastane; padne mi pero, stichne hlas a svetlo dohori. Vtedy mi bratia-sestry, zrobte po v6li : na mna si spomente, jak ja na vcis spominam/ 18 The station where my train will stop is already in sight; then the pen will fall from my fingers, my voice will be silenced, my light will go out. At that time, my brothers and sisters, grant me this wish: Remember me, as I am now remembering you! Difficult is the life of a poet in exile. The separation from his native soil - and especially when he is separated by an Iron Curtain - may be a source of nostalgic inspiration but then it denies the poet everything else: favourable working conditions, publishing opportunities, and above all - a sizable and appreciative audience. In spite of these difficulties the creative spark in the poet's bosom makes it "impossible not to write". And thanks to this compelling and driving force Slovak literature has been enriched by verses of lasting beauty. The creator of this �SLOVAKIA 151 poetry never intended to be modern or fashionable yet he succeeded in making his presence in the Slovak literary field vividly felt and wrote his name across the pages of the histories of Slovak literature. F. Vnuk, Australia FOOTNOTES 1. Milos K. Mlynarovic was born on October 11, 1887 at Hasprunka (now called Studienka), near Malacky in West Slovakia. He attended High School at Trnava. Later he entered the Franciscan order and accepted the name Benedict. His theological studies were completed at Bratislava and in 1910 he was ordained. Shortly after his ordination he was appointed to lecture in Rhetoric and Biblical studies at a Franciscan seminary. In 1914 he left his native country and emigrated to the U.S.A. hoping to join the Slovak Franciscan Commissariate and to work among the Slovak settlers in the U.S.A. But owing <to the political pressure exercised by the anti-Slovak Magyars even within the monastic orders, he was prevented from realizing his youthful dreams. In order to stay in the U.S.A. and to work among the Slovak emigrants he had to become a secular priest. As an administrator of the Slovak Catholic parish of the Assumption of Our Lady at Indiana Harbor (now East Chicago), Ind., he spent 35 years in active pastoral service. He built a beautiful church, presbytery, school and convent. In addition to his parochial duties he took an active part in numerous Slovak fraternalistic associations. In 1950 he retired and since then he has lived with the Slovak Franciscan community (Seven Dolors Shrine) at Valparaiso, Indiana. This essay attempts to give a brief outline of his poetical work, leaving aside his prose writing, religious books and occasional journalistic activity. For a more comprehensive treatment of Mlynarovic's life and literary work the reader is advised <to consult J. E. Bor: Msgr. Milos K. Mlynarovic; osobnost', dielo a posolstvo (Whiting, Ind., 1957). 2. Sokol (literary monthly) , No. 7, 1869. 3. Of these only Kraska published his poems in two slim volumes of verse. The others contributed to various Slovak journals and periodicals such as Prudy (Roy, Razus) , Narodne noviny (Razus, GrebacOrlov), 13udove noviny ( Grebac-Orlov). 4. This lapse later led Hviezdoslav to a rhapsodic ode on the Slovak language: Mn.a kedys' zvadzal svet, mi hovoriac: Rec, ktoru z domu vies, o, jak je licha . .. 0, mojej matky rec je krasota, je milota, je rozko~, laska svata .. . (The world once tried to seduce me, saying: The language you learned at home, oh, how base it is .. ./ To which the poet makes this noble reply: / Oh, the language taught by my mother is loveliness, is tenderness, is delight and holy love ... ) �152 SLOVAKIA 5. See his poem Budapest', jun 1914 in Dejiny srdca (Story of a heart, Middletown, Pa., 1964, pp. 5-6) from which account of the poet's decision is reconstructed. 6. e.g. Martin Razus : Hoj, zem dralui (1919), Vladimir Roy: Ked' miznu hmly (1920), Stefan Krcmery: Ked' sa sloboda rodila (1920), Ignac Grebac-Orlov: V povichrici (1922), etc. 7. Even the title of Mlynarovic's book of verse, Vel'kiJ Boh malych, reminds one of the famous verses of I. Krasko: 0, Boze ubohych a ponizenych, modlitbu moju milosrdne prijmi! Ty vel'kiJ, pretoze Si Bohom malych ... (Oh God of poor and humble ones,/ graciously accept my prayer./ You the great One, because You deign to be the God of little ones .. . ) 8. Translation by Ivan J . Kramoris, published in his "Anthology of Slovak Poetry" (Scranton, Pa., 1947), p. 131. 9. Boha hl'adam (In search of God, Trnava 1948), 62 pages. 10. Boha hl'adam, p. 35. 11. Boha hl'adam, p . 50. 12. Testament kral'a sfdc (Testament of the King of Human Hearts, Buenos Aires, n.d.), 78 pages. 13. T estament kral'a sfdc, p. 9. 14. Z l'udu - za l'ud (From the People ,vhiting, Ind., 1956) , 67 pages. 15. Z l'udu - For the People, za l'ud, p. 12. 16. Dejiny srdca (Story of a Heart, Middletown, Pa., 1964), 39 pages. 17. Dejiny srdca, p. 11. 18. Dejiny srdca, p . 39. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA as a Christian and democratic organization, is resolutely against the domination and exploitation of the Slovak nation by any other nation or political state; the Slovaks did not want to be ruled over by the Magyars and, today, do not want to be subservient to the Czech nation. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1967, Vol. 17 Description An account of the resource Special Issue: Sixty Years of the Slovak League of America Vol. 17 (No. 40), 1967. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1967 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 144 SLOVAKIA A POET IN EXILE ( Msgr. M . K. Mlynarovic celebrates his 80th birthday on October 11, 1967) Milos Klement Mlyna.rovic is a unique phenomenon of Slovak literature 1 in more than one respect. First of all, he is the oldest living Slovak poet. His literary contemporaries ( I. Grebac-Orlov, M. Razus, V. Roy, P. Kompis, K. F. Urbanovic ) have now all died and their work has been a closed chapter for the last two or three decades. Mlynarovic, on the other hand, has established himself as a mature and productive writer mainly in the last two decades. Secondly, all his literary output (amounting to 15 books of poetry, novels and religious writing) has been produced in exile, away from his native land. In spite of this physical and geographical separation Mlynarovic has maintained close and unbroken ties with the country of his birth. And finally, his poetry, as if untouched by the fashions and vicissitudes of the day, remains faithful to his three-pronged love: God, Church and nation. In this sense Mlynarovic is a traditional poet and a true son of his nation. These three themes (God, Church and nation) have dominated Slovak poetry since the time of the National Awakening (end of the 18th century) but never more intensely than in the time of national oppression which befell the Slovak nation after the Austro-Hungarian 'Ausgleich' (1867 ) and did not cease until 1918. For the generations of Slovak writers and poets living on hope and trusting in God's justice these three themes comprised a programme to which they faithfully adhered. Thus Andrej Truchly-Sytniansky proclaimed in the poem, "Kto som?": P<in Bah, cirkev, rod slovensky; srdca m6jho vz<icny predmet. Tymto tram ze vzdycky zijem, nedal by ch sa za eel'!} svet. 2 (God, Church and Slovak nation/ are precious themes of my heart./ I always live for these three/ and would not give them up for the whole world.) These three themes were passed on as a historical SLOVAKIA 145 message from fathers to sons. The form may have changed, but the content did not. Kraska, Roy, Razus - the pioneer of modern Slovak poetry - were echoing them in their verses on the eve of the First World War, 3 when the young Franciscan priest, Father Benedict Mlynarovic, OFM, left Slovakia for the U.S.A. In the strange new world, among a sizable Slovak emigration which he came to serve, these three themes acquired a new meaning and became the cornerstone of his pastoral, fraternalistic and literary activities. The new environment in which the young priest-poet found himself in the U.S .A. differed drastically from that which he had left behind. Back in old Hungary ( of which Slovakia was then a part) the aspiring poet and young priest-lecturer had moved in the intellectual milieu of Magyar culture. Towards the end of the 19th century Magyar culture and literature caught up with the West, while the oppressed and struggling Slovak literature was still lagging behind. For young ambitious intellectuals the adoption of the culture of the dominating Magyar nation had much more to offer not only intellectually but also materially. It required a strong conviction and even stronger devotion to one's own nation to resist Magyar lures, enticements and ever-mounting pressure. Many Slovak intellectuals were thus lost to their own nation. It was a doubly tragic loss since it strengthened and enriched the ranks of the oppressors of the Slovak nation. Even the greatest Slovak poet, Hviezdoslav, succumbed initially to these temptations and began to write his verses in Magyar. 4 In a similar way we find the first literary contributions of M. K. Mlynarovic in Magyar language periodicals ( Religio, Alkotmdny, etc.) . The poet has left us an autobiographic record of his struggle and victory. 5 A tempting voice called him : Pis bdsne mad'arsky a nie viac zobrdcky! (Write Magyar poems/ and nothing more of this beggar's language!) . But he overcame the temptation. He realized his indebtedness to his family, to his native village 146 SLOVAKIA and to his nation suffering under the lashes of the tyrant's whip. No, he would not "kiss the whip": Oprety o stip bulvdra hl'add si chlapec cestu spat a slzou si ju otvdra. (Leaning against the column of Budapest's boulevard/ the young lad looks for a road which will take him back/ and unlocks it with a tear.) At an important cross-road of his life the poet listened to the voice of his heart and made his irrevocable choice which was soon to bear precious fruit. During the war-years 1914-1918 the Slovaks in America were the most active section of the Slovak national community and it was largely through their efforts that in the postwar rearrangement of Central Europe Slovaks opted for a common state with the Czechs. The striving, sacrifices and other heroic deeds and splendid achievements of Slovak people in a free - though foreign - country were an eloquent testimony of the capabilities inherent in the Slovak nation. Through their accomplishments and experiences in the U.S.A. Slovaks were shedding their national inferiority complex and becoming confident and conscious citizens. And here among them the patriotism of a young priest-poet acquired a new dimension. His devotion to the Slovak national heritage deepened. Deprived of opportunities to study his native language and culture at home (where during his school-years the education was offered only in the Magyar language and spirit), he made up for it in America. Painstakingly and steadfastly he studied Slovak grammar, Slovak history and Slovak literature. From among the Slovak poets he developed a special affection for Hviezdoslav and Krasko, two of the brightest stars in the Slovak literary firmament. In 1919 he published his first book of verse, Sldvia. It was a small volume of warm patriotic poetry, expressing joy over the liberation of Slovakia, welcoming the new dawn of the freed nation and thanking God for the favours in which the dreams of generations had materialized. By its content the book fitted into the pattern of the poetical SLOVAKIA 147 production appearing in those days in Slovakia,6 but artistically the verse still lacked the force and refinement appropriate to the festive and hymnic message it tried to convey. In the following years Mlynarovic wrote several prose works and only occasionally published a poem here and there in Slovak journals and magazines. Then in 1934 there appeared his second book of poetry, Veliky Boh malych. (Great God of the little ones) It contained mainly meditative and religious poems of intense sincerity and Franciscan humility. In the lines one could detect the strong influence of Krasko, 7 but the poems bore the unmistakable imprint of Mlynarovic's individuality. Spiritual depth and heartfelt intimacy rank these poems with the best religious poetry written in the Slovak language. Especially moving is the poem, Vel' ky piatok, (Good Friday) the opening verses of which run: Beyond the stars now He doth dwell And I below, a shattered bell, Unworthy to ring out His name. Age-old, my heart cried out in pain, When my tongue moved, but all in vain To turn the evil when He came. Good Friday once again is here. The cross looks down from everywhere As Son unto His Father dies .. .8 The next volume of Mlynarovic's poetry, Boha hl'addm,9 was published in Slovakia shortly after the Second World War (1948). In a way it was a revelation: it was not only a voice from the other side of the Ocean but also from another era. In the immediate post-war years mankind was taking account of its misery and self-inflicted suffering. The Slovak poetry of the day was full of sadness, nostalgia, remorse and dissonant voices. Then in its unobtrusive whisper entered Mlynarovic's poetry to remind one of the overlooked honesty in human action, of the purposefulness of human life, and of the human heart's everlasting search for God: 148 SLOVAKIA Tisic rdz nasiel som 1'a, tisic rdz stratil, Veen'!}, bludickou budem v priestore kruzit' tulavym behom vzd'alovat' sa, blizit', a vzdy 1'a ndjdem, jak vtdk svoje hniezdo, ja maly prach Tvoj, satelit. 10 A thousand times I have found You, A thousand times I have lost You again, Everlasting One! As an errant star I will soar through the space, In roving course I get further, closer, But always I find You As a bird finds its nest, I, Your little speck of dust, Your satellite. It was indeed a tender, deeply human and humanistic kind of poetry. In delicate verses the poet records the reminiscences of his youth, identifies himself with the humble, suffering and downtrodden, pays homage to the memory of Father Damien de Veuster ( the missionary of the lepers' colony at Molokai) and meditates upon God's goodness and eternity: Chcem den. co neznd rdna, vecera nie, Zen poludnie; chcem vecne slnka Pdna, ziariace do mna, do studne. 11 I wish for a day which has no sunrise and no sunset, only a lasting noon; I crave for the Lord's sun which never sets but radiates into me as into a well. Prayer clothed in poetry was the central theme of Mlynarovic's book of poems, Testament krdl'a sfdc. 12 In meditative lyrical poetry the author "looks into secrets, investigates the world behind the veil, searches into mysteries of human existence." 13 It is, in a way, a continuation of the search for God undertaken in an earlier book, but this time the intensity of the spiritual quest is even more emphasized in reflective monologues of prayer-like sin- SLOVAKIA 149 cerity. The poems are grouped into five cycles: Broken Rhythm, Meditations at Holy Mass, Sayings of the Word Made Flesh, Seven Words and At the Sepulchre. Many poems are introduced with appropriate quotations taken from the Scriptures - not unlike antiphons preceding psalms in the Divine Office. The value of this poetry of pure spirituality is even more enhanced when one places it alongside the versifications produced at the same time in the poet's native count ry. There, under the compulsive guidance of the Communist Party, poetry and all arts were harnessed into the service of "the cause of Socialism." Only a "functional" poetry, that is a poetry helping the masses to build up Communism, was permitted; and what was not explicitly permitted was virtually outlawed. In those lean years of Slovak literature the good name and the artistic honour of Slovak poetry were saved by the writings of the emigre poets, Milos K. Mlynarovic being foremost among them. While in the previous books of verse Mlynarovic had repeatedly proclaimed his soaring devotion to God, in the book, z l'udu - za l'ud,14 he comes down to earth and the object of his inspiration is man. His warm sympathy extends to all people everywhere, but in particular two sections of mankind lie deep in his heart: the hard-pressed Slovak nation in Communist captivity and the struggling negro race both in Africa and the U.S.A. Eud a ja . . . zijem si s nim vzdy povedomy ja, diet'a domca, svatych prdv a borieb a dnes sa zakolisat', Boze m6j, nedaj mi! 15 My people and I . . . As a child of humble abode I live with them, constantly aware of their sacred rights and struggles; Do not ever let me, o my God, waver in this conviction. Here again - even more frequently than in the previous book - each poem is prefaced by one or more quotations. A brief glance at these quotations is a convenient key to the inspirational sources of Mlynarovic's poetry. They range from the Bible, classical authors and Slovak 150 SLOVAKIA poets to Shakespeare, Petofi, Mada.ch, Keats, Masefield, etc. The last poetical work of M. K. Mlynarovic is a slim volume of verse, entitled Dejiny srdca. 16 Some of the poems in this collection had been published earlier and here they reappear in a somewhat modified form. Some poems were written as early as 1911, others in the autum of the poet's fruitful life. Arranged in chronological order they represent a concise cross-section of Mlynarovic's creative activity and the poetical manifesto of a writer in exile. The poet equates himself to a tree transplanted to new ground, but the soil of the new environment failed "to change the tune of his heart" .17 In the last poem of the collection, Vlak (the Train), the poet with calm and resignation writes the last chapter of the history of his heart. The train of his life is approaching its terminus and he is preparing to alight. He sings in a melancholy strain: Pride tci stanica a vlak m6j pozastane; padne mi pero, stichne hlas a svetlo dohori. Vtedy mi bratia-sestry, zrobte po v6li : na mna si spomente, jak ja na vcis spominam/ 18 The station where my train will stop is already in sight; then the pen will fall from my fingers, my voice will be silenced, my light will go out. At that time, my brothers and sisters, grant me this wish: Remember me, as I am now remembering you! Difficult is the life of a poet in exile. The separation from his native soil - and especially when he is separated by an Iron Curtain - may be a source of nostalgic inspiration but then it denies the poet everything else: favourable working conditions, publishing opportunities, and above all - a sizable and appreciative audience. In spite of these difficulties the creative spark in the poet's bosom makes it "impossible not to write". And thanks to this compelling and driving force Slovak literature has been enriched by verses of lasting beauty. The creator of this SLOVAKIA 151 poetry never intended to be modern or fashionable yet he succeeded in making his presence in the Slovak literary field vividly felt and wrote his name across the pages of the histories of Slovak literature. F. Vnuk, Australia FOOTNOTES 1. Milos K. Mlynarovic was born on October 11, 1887 at Hasprunka (now called Studienka), near Malacky in West Slovakia. He attended High School at Trnava. Later he entered the Franciscan order and accepted the name Benedict. His theological studies were completed at Bratislava and in 1910 he was ordained. Shortly after his ordination he was appointed to lecture in Rhetoric and Biblical studies at a Franciscan seminary. In 1914 he left his native country and emigrated to the U.S.A. hoping to join the Slovak Franciscan Commissariate and to work among the Slovak settlers in the U.S.A. But owing <to the political pressure exercised by the anti-Slovak Magyars even within the monastic orders, he was prevented from realizing his youthful dreams. In order to stay in the U.S.A. and to work among the Slovak emigrants he had to become a secular priest. As an administrator of the Slovak Catholic parish of the Assumption of Our Lady at Indiana Harbor (now East Chicago), Ind., he spent 35 years in active pastoral service. He built a beautiful church, presbytery, school and convent. In addition to his parochial duties he took an active part in numerous Slovak fraternalistic associations. In 1950 he retired and since then he has lived with the Slovak Franciscan community (Seven Dolors Shrine) at Valparaiso, Indiana. This essay attempts to give a brief outline of his poetical work, leaving aside his prose writing, religious books and occasional journalistic activity. For a more comprehensive treatment of Mlynarovic's life and literary work the reader is advised <to consult J. E. Bor: Msgr. Milos K. Mlynarovic; osobnost', dielo a posolstvo (Whiting, Ind., 1957). 2. Sokol (literary monthly) , No. 7, 1869. 3. Of these only Kraska published his poems in two slim volumes of verse. The others contributed to various Slovak journals and periodicals such as Prudy (Roy, Razus) , Narodne noviny (Razus, GrebacOrlov), 13udove noviny ( Grebac-Orlov). 4. This lapse later led Hviezdoslav to a rhapsodic ode on the Slovak language: Mn.a kedys' zvadzal svet, mi hovoriac: Rec, ktoru z domu vies, o, jak je licha . .. 0, mojej matky rec je krasota, je milota, je rozko~, laska svata .. . (The world once tried to seduce me, saying: The language you learned at home, oh, how base it is .. ./ To which the poet makes this noble reply: / Oh, the language taught by my mother is loveliness, is tenderness, is delight and holy love ... ) 152 SLOVAKIA 5. See his poem Budapest', jun 1914 in Dejiny srdca (Story of a heart, Middletown, Pa., 1964, pp. 5-6) from which account of the poet's decision is reconstructed. 6. e.g. Martin Razus : Hoj, zem dralui (1919), Vladimir Roy: Ked' miznu hmly (1920), Stefan Krcmery: Ked' sa sloboda rodila (1920), Ignac Grebac-Orlov: V povichrici (1922), etc. 7. Even the title of Mlynarovic's book of verse, Vel'kiJ Boh malych, reminds one of the famous verses of I. Krasko: 0, Boze ubohych a ponizenych, modlitbu moju milosrdne prijmi! Ty vel'kiJ, pretoze Si Bohom malych ... (Oh God of poor and humble ones,/ graciously accept my prayer./ You the great One, because You deign to be the God of little ones .. . ) 8. Translation by Ivan J . Kramoris, published in his "Anthology of Slovak Poetry" (Scranton, Pa., 1947), p. 131. 9. Boha hl'adam (In search of God, Trnava 1948), 62 pages. 10. Boha hl'adam, p. 35. 11. Boha hl'adam, p . 50. 12. Testament kral'a sfdc (Testament of the King of Human Hearts, Buenos Aires, n.d.), 78 pages. 13. T estament kral'a sfdc, p. 9. 14. Z l'udu - za l'ud (From the People ,vhiting, Ind., 1956) , 67 pages. 15. Z l'udu - For the People, za l'ud, p. 12. 16. Dejiny srdca (Story of a Heart, Middletown, Pa., 1964), 39 pages. 17. Dejiny srdca, p. 11. 18. Dejiny srdca, p . 39. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA as a Christian and democratic organization, is resolutely against the domination and exploitation of the Slovak nation by any other nation or political state; the Slovaks did not want to be ruled over by the Magyars and, today, do not want to be subservient to the Czech nation.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource A Poet in Exile Description An account of the resource Msgr. M. K. Mlynarovič celebrates his 80th birthday on October 11, 1967 F. Vnuk Slovakia, Vol. 17 (No. 40), 1967 pp. 144-152 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1967 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5d7d83191ff3756fa07719e9931ff0c6.pdf 0787d759935b60ff7d0ae7a59471c828 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 125 F. Vnuk: Fifty Years of Comn1unist Party of Slovakia (1918-1968) The first notable Slovak commentary on Communism was made by Marx's contemporary, :Cudovit stur. His assessment of Communism was an outright condemnation: "Communism, in spite of all efforts and false pretences to win for mankind its rights, only brings about its degradation, since it has no sound knowledge of mankind. Because of its insistence on principles which are impractical and unattainable Communism is one of the maddest figments ever originating in the human brain." 1 In the past forty years stur was much abused by the Slovak Communist intellectuals because of his alleged reactionary thinking. 2 Yet Stu.r's rejection of Communism seems to epitomize the Slovak attitude more fittingly than all the recent attempts by Communist historians to present Communism as a progressive ideology destined to uplift and enrich the Slovak nation. The inescapable geography which put Slovakia in Central Europe exposed the Slovaks to direct contact with political Communism as far back as 1918-19. Since then the Slovak nation has undergone the complete range of relations which can exist between a nation trying to assert its political identity and an aggressive ideology. These relations, full of drama, paradox and tragedy, are briefly outlined in this short history of the Communist Patry of Slovakia ( KSS). I. 1918-1921 The very beginning of the KSS is characteristic. The Party started its existence outside Slovakia, in Budapest. 1) In his major work, Slawentum imd die Welt der Zukunft, Quoted by D. Okali in Dav; spomienky a studie (Bratislava, 1965), p. 284. 2) e.g. L. Novomesky, in his pamphlet, Marx a slovensky narod (Mala kniznica Davu, 1933) and in his article, Karol Marx reviduje hist6riu Slovakov (Dav, 2/ 1933, pp. 18-19). �126 SLOVAKIA There in November 1918 Erno P6r, Minister for Foreign Propaganda in the Communist Government of Hungary, was entrusted by Bela Kun and Tibor Szamuely to organize the Slovak Communist Party as a section of the Communist Party of Hungary. 3 The Party conscripted into its ranks Slovak workers, apprentices and soldiers living in those days in defeated Hungary (particularly in Budapest, Ostrihom-Esztergom, Bekes-Csaba, etc. ). On March 27th, 1919 it began publication of its own daily, "Cervene noviny" (Red News ). 4 But the Party ran into difficulties when it had to find leaders for the conscripted Slovak proletarian masses. There was hardly a single Slovak of rank and stature to lend his name to the movement. Thus the reins were initially given into the hands of Jewish Socialist and Communist organizers in Budapest who could speak Slovak. To overcome this deficiency Bela Kun requested Lenin to send him some able Slovak Communist leaders from Russia, where a "Czecho-Slovak" Communist Party formed from the Czech and Slovak prisoners of war had been functioning since May 1918.5 But since there were no prominent Slovak personalities among these either, Lenin sent to Budapest the next best thing: the Czechs. Among these the most dynamic was one Antonin Janousek who arrived in Budapest in January 1919.6 After some disagreement with B. Kun (Janousek wanted to lead a Czecho-Slovak section; Kun and his advisors were strongly against it, seeing in it implicit recognition of the imperialistic policies of the Entente ) he 3 ) M. Vietor, Slovenska soviets/ca r epub lika (Bratislava, 1959), p. 53. 4) P. A. Toma, Slovak Soviet Repu blic of 1919 (The American Slavic and East European Review, 17/ 1958, p. 203 ). 5 ) D ej iny K SC (P raha, 1961 ), p. 17. 6) See: Z. Horeni, Antonin Jan ousek, predseda revolucnej v lady Slovenskej r epubliky rad (Bratislava, 1964). This accoun t of t he Slovak Soviet Republic is abstracted from the following books: K. A. Medvecky: Slovensk y prevrat I -IV (Trnava , 1930-31 ); Vpad bol'sevikov na Slov ensko ro ku 1919 (Trnava, 1936) : M. Vietor, Slovenskci soviet ska r epu bli ka 1919 (Bratislava, 1955); C. Holotik, 0 Slovenskej repub like rad r . 1919 (Historicky casopi s 2/ 1959); V. Kr al, lntervencni val ka cs. burzoazie proti mad'arske sovetske r epublice r . 1919 (Praha, 1954); K. Culen, 0 Slovenskej soviet ske j republike z ro ku 1919 (Kanadsky Slovak, May 19-June 9, 1956); P. A. Toma , Slovak Soviet Republic of 1919 (The American Slavic and East European Review, 17/ 1958, pp. 203-215 ). �SLOVAKIA 127 was made head of the Czech section of the Communist Party of Hungary on April 12, 1919. Towards the end of April the Slovak and the Czech sections were brought under common leadership but it was plainly stated that the Slovak section was to maintain its independence and individuality. There was never a Czecho-Slovak section of the Communist Party of Hungary. The most important .went in the life of this Slovak section was thf, proclamation of the Slovak Soviet Republic which lasted only two weeks but which has become a source of confused pride and political embarrassment to the contemporary Czech and Slovak socialist historiographers. On May 20th, 1919 the Hungarian Communist government, accusing the Czecho-Slovak armed forces of violation of the Paris Agreement, ordered its Red Army to invade Slovakia. Carried on the wave of proud Magyar national ism, humiliated by the 1918 defeat, the Magyar troops swept the southern and eastern plains of Slovakia. They took Lucenec on May 30th, Levice on June 1st, Nove Zamky on June 2nd, Kosice and Banska stiavnica on June 6th, Presov on June 8th, Bardejov on June 11th and penetrated as far into Central Slovakia as Zvolen. On June 3rd, 1919 "Oervene noviny" wrote exultantly: "The dictatorship of the proletariat is being established in Slovakia." The actual proclamation of the Slovak Soviet Republic took place at Presov on June 16th, 1919. It was ruled by the Provisional Revolutionary Executive Committee made up largely of Magyar-Jewish and Czech left-wingers. The only Slovak member of some significance was Stefan Stehlik. On June 20th, 1919 the Committee elected a Slovak Revolutionary governmem headed by Antonin Janousek. To T. G. Masaryk, who was residing in Prague as the elected President of Czecho-Slovakia, Janousek sent this challenging message: "We explicitly declare that from now on Slovakia belongs exclusively to the Slovak working class." 7 The donstitutional status of this short-lived Slovak Soviet Republic was obscure, but one thing was beyond doubt: it was violently anti-Czech and fiercely pro-Magyar. It aimed at the breaking up of Czecho-Slovakia and was 7) Quoted by. K. culen in Kanadsky Slovak (of May 26, 1956), p . 3. �128 SLOVAKIA openly and aggressively separatist. Both Kun and Lenin considered Czecho-Slovakia as a wilful creation of capitalist Powers and as a tool of imperialist policies in Central Europe. Czecho-Slovakia was alleged to deny the Slovak people "its inalienable right of self-determination" and the Communists in establishing the Slovak Soviet Republic were rectifying this injustice. 8 In spite of all its revolutionary zeal the Communistsponsored separatism did not strike roots among the Slovak masses. They were not only apathetic but manifestly hostile to the venture in which they saw only an ill-disguised attempt of the moribund Hungary to save its territorial integrity. The withdrawal of the Hungarian Red Army from Slovakia (June 28-July 4, 1919) spelled the inevitable end of both the Slovak Soviet Republic and the Slovak section of the Communist-Socialist Party of Hungary. The Slovak decision in 1918 to exchange their hopeless life tinder the Magyars for a hopeful life with the Czechs was final and irreversible. 9 But it was a decision fraught with problems and difficulties. Slovakia entered the newly formed Czecho-Slovakia as a land of poor peasants with practically no Slovak urban proletariat. The adherents and disseminators of the Socialist ideas were largely the German and Magyar ( or magyarized) workers who were as contemptuous of their Slovak comrades as Marx and Engels had been of the Czechs and Russians. This antipathy was 8) Stefan Stehlik wrote in Cervene noviny (of July 7, 1919) : " On Slovak soil, freed from imperialism, today there was created an independent Slovak Soviet Republic. The first impulsive action of the proletariat liberated from t he yoke of Czech imperialism was to realize the right of self-determination which is being exhorted by the oppressors with such a great glory; in reality however, it is being perverted by them . . . Slovak Soviet Republic turns its weapons ... against all who threaten this real unpe rverted democracy, this inallienable right of self-determination" (by which at that time they could have meant only the Prague Government). Quoted by P . A. Toma , op. cit. pp. 208-209. 9) The first years of the Slovak-Czech relationship and its reflection in Slovak political, social and economic life, are described at length in several authoritative works, e.g.: F . Peroutka, Budovani statu I -IV ( Praha 1933-36 ) ; J . Opocensky, Konec monarchie rakousko -tihorske ( Praha, 1928) . V. Chaloupecky, Zapas o Slovensko (Praha, 1930 ), I. Derer, siovensko v prevrate a po nom (Bratislava, 1924) ; K. Sidor, Andrej Hiinka 1864-1926 (Bratislava, 1936) . �SLOVAKIA 129 mutual and in their anti-Magyar feelings the leaders of the Slovak Social Democrats (Derer, Lehotsky, Markovic) were indistinguisha ble from their bourgeois counterparts (Hlinka, srobar, Hodza). Thus in the political sense the parties contesting the first post-war elections in Slovakia offered very much the same program. It was only in the field of social reform that they differed. Here the Social Democrats surpassed everybody in generosity, promising to implement many far-reaching social and economic measures. Their radical policies appealed to the people dissatisfied with the prevailing conditions. Thus in the general election of April, 1920 the Slovak people gave their votes to the Social Democratic Party led by Ivan Derer. 10 The Magyars and Germans of Slovakia who refused to join Derer's political platform founded a Social Democratic Party of their own. 11 After its electoral victory the Slovak Social Democratic Party lost much of its fighting spirit, adopted many right-wing policies of moderation and even passivity while the Magyar and German Social Democratic Party moved further to the left towards radicalism and turbulent activities. It was led by an able group of ruthless leaders (most of them Jews, several served as Commissars in the Hungarian Soviet Republic of Bela Kun) who were constantly harassing "the reformist Social Democratic government" of V. Tusar by fomenting strikes, unrests and other forms of trouble. 12 Their activities 13 became fatal to the Slovak Social Democratic Party which was rapidly sliding under Czech control and soon became identical with all the unpopular measures of the Government. The Slovak Social Democratic Party's inability to fulfil its pre-election promises or to prevent the economic ruination of Slovakia, and the subsequent wholesale unemploymen t, brought about a massive 10) The Social Democratic Party polled 510,341 out of 1,341,191 valid votes and obtained 23 deputies in the Prague National Assembly. 11) They received 108,546 votes and obtained 4 deputies. 12) J. Mlynarik, Robotnicke hn•itie na Slovensku roku 1920 (od parla• mentnych volieb do decembroveho genercilneho strajku). Historick)' casopis, I/ 1960, pp. 26-27) . 13) Their strongholds were four population centres in the Slovak-Magyar borderland: Bratislava, where the German-languag e, "Volksstimme" was published, Komarno, Gelnica and Ko~ice, where the Magyarlanguage, "Kassai Munkas", was published. �130 SLOVAKIA desertion of the rank anc'l file members within months after the election. 14 In the meantime the Magyar Social Democratic Party at Kosice joined (in May 1920) the Third International and invited the other proletarian parties of Slovakia to follow suit. This proclamation was eagerly listened to by many Social Democratic leaders dissatisfied with Derer's weak and inept leadership. 15 In September 1920 at the Party Congress at Turciansky Svaty Martin Derer failed to win a vote of confidence ( out of 132 delegates only 15 voted for him). Unwilling to accept defeat he proclaimed the handful of his followers to be the only true Slovaks and true Social Democrats by which he drove the dissidents into a coalition with the Magyar and German left-wing radicals. The fruits of this coalition ripened rapidly. On January 16-17, 1920 the left-wingers of the Slovak, Magyar and German Social Democracy, as well as the Jewish Poale Sion, met at ~ubochna and founded the Communist Party of Slovakia in everything but name. 16 It is interesting to look at the national composition of the delegates participating at this Congress. Out of 149 delegates with voting rights 88 were Slovaks, 36 Magyars, 15 Germans, 6 Ruthenes, 4 Jews. 17 The omission to register under its own name proved a very serious one for the future destinies of the KSS. Against 14 ) M. Strhan, Kriza priemyslu na Slov ensku v rokoch 1921-23 (Bratislava , 1960, pp. 15-80), J . Kramer, K dejinam priemyslu na Slovensku za prvej CSR (Bratislava, 1955). 15 ) ~- Holotik, Sjazd socialno-demokratickej strany (l'avice) na Slov ensku v januciri 1921 (Historicky casopis, 3/ 1963) , pp. 340-341. 16 ) 1921. Spomienky na vznik KS(: (Bratislava, 1962). The Czech dele gate at the Congress, I. Olbracht, requested the assembled repre- sentatives of the Slovak Left to postpone the adoption of the name " Communist Party of Slovakia" in order to be able to adopt the name " Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia" later on. See also Dejiny KS(: (Praha, 1961), pp. 165-166. 17 ) From the report of the voting commission, as quoted by M. Dzvonik 0 istom zakladajucom sjazde (Kulturny zivot, 7/ 1966, p. 6) . See also H. Gordon Skilling, The Formation of a Communist Party in Czechoslovakia (Slavic Review, 14/ 1955, p. 353). Skilling gives slightly different figures, viz. 92 Slovaks. However, it must be mentioned that these numbers are somewhat misleading, especially with regard to the Jews who were present in every national group, and the Magyars, many of whom were counted as Slovaks. �SLOVAKIA 131 the opposition of the Magyar delegates the Congress agreed to keep the question of the Party's name in abeyance. They decided to wait for developments in the Czech lands where the situation was ripening at a less r~pid rate. Finally at its XIVth Congress (in May 1921) the Czech Social Democratic Party formally accepted the ideological split in its ranks. Its left wing reconstituted itself as the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia ( KSc) immediately absorbing the Slovak section which, nameless and unaffiliated, had been waiting for four months for this moment.18 By this process the KSS lost its identity, becoming an anonymous partner in an unequal partnership. II. 1921-1929 The newly constituted KSC was from its beginning dominated by Czech-German leadership and looking largely after Czech national interest. Slovakia-because of the lack of native leading cadres-soon became a battlefield where the Czech and Magyar elements were fighting for influence . The Czechs were trying to woo the Slovak electorate by defending the existence of Czecho-Slovakia and the integrity of its territories. Already in September 1921 Klement Gottwald had become editor of a Slovak language Party paper, "Hlas l'udu" (People's Voice), and later in 1923 editor-inchief of another Commun.ist paper, "Pravda chudoby" (Poor Man's Truth). Other prominent Czech Party organizers who came to Slovakia in the early twenties included Karel Bacilek, Karel Schmidke and others. 19 While the Czechs concentrated mainly on the Slovak electorate, the Magyars tried to hold together a sizeable portion of the Magyar electorate by advocating revisionism, self-determination for ethnic minorities, etc. In the meantime Slovakia was becoming restive and in18) Dejiny KS(; (Praha , 1961) , pp. 170-172. While the Communist Party of Slovakia fused into the KSC smoothly and without murmur, the Communist Party of the Sudeten Germans (formed in March 1921 ) refused to amalgamate with the KSC . Its resistance was broken in November 1921 but only after Lenin's intervention. 19) Gottwald's activities in Slovakia, adorned with the socialist glamou;: of the cult era, are the object of a book by Z. Holotikova, Kl ement Gottwald na Slovensku v rokoch 1921-24 (Bratislava, 1953). Karel Schmidtke began to write his name as Karol Smidke only after 1945. �13l2 SLOVAKIA creasingly discontented with Czech administrative methods. economic and social discrimination and especially with the crude disregard of the Prague Government for the political aspirations of the Slovak natibn. The Slovaks were putting forward their demands for the promised autonomy but no one would listen. Even the KSC, dominated at the time by Czech nationalists, had only scorn for the Slovak demands. At its First Congress it declared: "Slovak autonomy is only a disguise to mask the tendencies aiming at the separation of the Slovak people from the cultural community and from national unity with the Czech nation." 20 This mistaken and unrealistic attitude was severely censured at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern in Moscow (June-July 1924) where the following resolution was adopted: 1. The Congress affirms that in Czecho-Slovakia there does not exist a single Czechoslovak nation and that the Czechoslovak state, in addition to the Czech nationality, consist of the following nationali ties: Slovak, German, Magyar, Ukrainian and Polish. 2. The Congress considers it necessary for the KSC, in connection with these national minorities, to proclaim and to follow the slogan of the right of a nation to self-determination, including the right to secession. In particular the KSC must support the struggle of the Slovaks for their independence and it must strive continuously to wrest this movement for independence out of the control of the nationalist bourgeoisie and to bring it into a common struggle of the working class against capitalism ... 21 For the Czech Communists it was a bitter pill to swallow. Under its impact the Czecho-Slovak delegation in Moscow was split into a majority and minority, the majori20) Protokol I. radneho sjezdu KSC (Praha, 1923 ), p. 14. In practice the KSC plainly demonstrated its Czechoslovakist and centralized tendencies. On January 1st, 1922 the KSC abolished the provincial Party structure in Slovakia, splitting the country into four regions directly subordinated to the Central Executive Committee in Prague. Shortly afterwards it abolished Slovak trade union organizations. Such moves seriously hindered the Party activities in Slovakia and antagonized many honest and sincere Slovak left-winge rs. These either left in disgust (like J . Schiffel, who returned to the U.S.A.) or were expelled as agents of the nationalist bourgeoisie (like Culen, Vercik and others ). 21) Pjatyj vsemirnyj kongress komunisticeskogo intenacionala, 17. ijuna - 8. ijttlia 1924 g. Stenografisceskij otcot, Cast' II. (Prilozenija) , ( Moskva, 1925 ), p. 129. �SLOVAKIA 133 ty refusing to accept the resolution of the Comintern. Among the ranks of the KSC the interference of the Comintern produced a serious crisis. The Second Congress of the KS(; was hurriedly convened in November 1924 to deal with the issue. The Congress met in the presence of a leading Comintern official, D. Z. Manuilskij. It was mainly due to his presence that the resolution issued at the end of the Congress proclaimed: "The Party cannot accept the bourgeois lie about the official Czechoslovak nation. By this ruse the Czech bourgeoisie wants to hide its colonial exploitation and bloody oppression of Ruthenia and Slovakia as well as other national minorities". 21 a But as it turned out even he was powerless to shake the dominating influence of the Czech nationalist right-wingers who in complete disregard of their own resolution continued in the old-style policies of ignoring the legitimate demands of the national minorities even within the Party.22 A dramatic development took place in March 1925. The Czech rightists and their arrogant attitude towards other nationalities, especially towards the Slovaks, were openly critized on the pages of "Pravda" by the Soviet expert on the nationalities problem, J. V. Stalin. Stalin saw the narrow-minded and selfish Czech nationalism as the roots of the right-wing deviationism in the KSC. He wrote: The Czechoslovak state is a state that marks the national victory of the Czechs. The Czechs have already acquired their national state as a dominant nation ... And it is here that we must look for the reason why the divergence between the Right and Left took place along national lines, why the Slovaks and the Germans (oppressed nations) are on the left flank, and the Czechs are on the opposite flank . .. Such division is quite understandable, if we bear in mind the above-mentioned specific national features of the Czechoslovak state and the dominant position of the Czechs.23 Stalin's arguments were further developed by D. Z. Manuilskij who quoted, among others, such flagrant examples of national discrimination as the composition of the Politburo of the KSC which consisted of seven Czechs 21a) Protokol II. fadneho sjezdu KSt, (Praha, 1925) , p. 8. 22) Dejiny KSt (Praha, 1961), pp. 213-216. 23) J. V. Stalin, Works (Moscow, 1954), Vol. VII., p. 61. See also H. Gordon Skilling, The Comintern and Czechoslovak Communism 1921-1929 (Slavic Review, 19/ 1960, pp. 238-239 ). �134 SLOVAKIA and two Germans but no Slovaks, Magyars, Poles or Ruthenes. 24 The elections in 1925 were the first real test of the Party's hold on the masses. On the whole the Party did not score badly: it emerged as the second strongest party in Czecho-Slovakia. In Slovakia the election results were a telling commentary on the existing situation. The Social Democratic Party practically disappeared (from 510,341 votes in 1920 to 60,581 votes in 1925). But its voters joined mainly the Hlinka People's Party which captured 489,027 votes (2 35,389 in 1920), i.e. 34.3 % of the Slovak electorate thus becoming the largest Slovak party.25 The Communist Party gained 198,212 votes in Slovakia but its support came mostly from the non-Slovak voters as can be seen from a closer look at the districts which voted for the Communists and at the men who were elected into the Parliament26 ( out of 8 deputies 3 were of Magyar nationality: Kopasz, Major and Steiner). The failure to capture the masses of the Slovak rural proletariat was openly admitted in Moscow and was attributed to the Party's omission to adopt the correct position towards the nationalities problem in Czecho-Slovakia and in particular towards the Slovaks: In Slovakia . .. under the influence of the revolution, in 1920 the peasant masses moved strongly to the left, but in the course of the last four years, owing to the passivity of the Communist P arty in the national question, 200,000 peasants passed from the Socialist 24) D. Z. Manuilskij, Uroki ceskogo krizisa, (Moskva, 1925) . It was the Politburo elected by the Central Committee at the IIIrd Party Congress (Sept. 1925) which consisted of: K. Gottwald, J . Hais, J . Haken ( President) , J . Harus, B. Jilek, A. Neurath, V. Stern, B. Smeral and A. Zapotocky. 25) Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka 1864-1926 ( Bratislava, 1936), pp. 535-538. 26) El•ectoral Corn. % % % d is trict vote of •totail :Mandates :.\1:agy ars German5 1. ove Zamky 2 20.0 61 ,577 62.3 6.8 2. Ko§ice 20.9 40,095 2 41.6 9.9 3. Trnava 28,606 13.9 2.3 1 1.8 4. Banska Bystrica 17,694 11.0 2.2 1 5.6 5. Turc. Sv. Martin 22,355 1 9.5 0.5 5.1 6. Lipt. Sv. Mikula§ 15,697 1 7.4 1.4 1.7 7. Prefov 6.2 12,206 2.6 0 0.7 �SLOVAKIA 135 Party into a party, which, although it is clerical, fight for the autonomy.27 In spite of the impressive overall election results the Party was torn internally by rival factions. After ridding itself of the right wing (Bubnik) a new struggle developed between the so-called "ultraleft" (B. Jilek and V. Bolen) and "centre" (B. t5meral, K. Kreibich, A. Zapotocky). 28 These ideological conflicts touched the Party's life in Slovakia only marginally and even then the Czech leaders of the KSc in Slovakia (K. Gottwald in particular) were supporting the "centre" aginst the "left". In Slovakia the burning issues were not of ideological but of political and economic character. The continuous closing down of factories and industrial plants, growing unemployment, agricultural crisis, emigration, etc. were leaving little time for ideological disputes. 29 After 1926, when the Hlinka People's Party decided to join the government benches, the Communists tried hard to be the spokesmen of the Slovak people against the political wrongs and social injustices of the Czech bourgeoisie. Complete independence of Slovakia was advocated, Czecho-Slovakia was denounced as the offspring of an imperialist war. 30 In January 1927 the Party 27) G. Volkov, Ugnetennaja Prikarpatskaja Rus (Krestjanskij International, 3-5/ 1926, p. 126). ( Quoted in G. D. Jackson's Comintern and Peasant) (London, 1966), p. 288. 28) Dejiny KS(: (Praha, 1961), pp. 249-269. 29) The economic situation of this period has been extensively studied by socialist historians, e. g. J . Mlynarik, Strajkove hnutie na Slovenska II. Zemerobotnici v obdobi 1919 az 1929 (Bratislava, 1961) ; P. Rapos, Priemysel Slovenska za kapitalizmu (Bratislava, 1957) ; J . Mlynarik, N ezamestnanost' na Slovensku (Bratislava, 1964) ; V. Plevza, K niektorym otazkam agrarnej krizy v rokoch 1924-34 na Slovensku (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1966, pp. 203-233); etc. 30) At this time the KSC in Slovakia at its National Conference at 2ilina (on July 25th, 1925) , launched, on Gottwald's instigation a massive campaign aimed at the expulsion of the Czechs from Slovakia. The battle-cry of the Communist propagandists became : " Vypracte Slovensko! " ( Clea;: out of Slovakia!) . The full wording of the slogan was, "Vypracte Slovensko od potlacovacieho aparatu ceskej burzoazie", according to V. Plevza (Historicky casopis, 4/ 1965, p. 510) and "Vypracte Slovensko od nasilnickeho aparatu", according to J. Kramer and .J. Mlynarik (Historicky casopis, 3/ 1965, p. 438). Though there was no doubt about Gottwald's authorship of this slogan, the blame for the embarrassing "mistake" was put later �136 SLOVAKIA convoked a regional conference at Plesivec where it attempted to lead a nation-wide protest against the industrial decline of Slovakia. 31 But all with little success. In February 1929 the Fifth Congress of the KSC met. It passed into Party history as the final battleground where the splinter-groups of the Party dissidents were defeated and the "true bolshevist nucleus" of the Party came out victorious. But in spite of the intense ideological wrangle the Slovak question did appear on the agenda. The Slovak cause was defend by none less than K. Gottwald ( who was to emerge as the new leader of the Party) proclaiming before the Congress: "The !Ind Congress of the KSC declared null and void the theses of the Ist Party Congress (i.e. concerning the unitary "Czechoslovak" nation) but this was in words only . . . The ratification of the First Party Congress theses was only on paper, a mere formality".31a By promising new corrective measures Gottwald (who--it should be remembered-in those days was acting for the Party in Slovakia and was the spokesman for the Slovaks) swayed the overwhelming majority of the Slovak section of the KSC to the side of the victorious "bolshevist on J. Vercik, "the agent of nationalist bourgeoisie" (e.g. M. Gosiorovsky, Slovensko a V. sjazd KS(; ( ceskoslovensky casopis historicky), 1/ 1954, p. 4-15) . While attacking the Czech bourgeoisie for its oppression of the Slovak masses, the KSC leaders did not relax their centralist hold on their Slovak comrades. At each Party Congress the Slovak delegates complained about this unsatisfactory state of affairs (See : Protokol III. fadneho sjezdu KSc [Praha, 1925] , pp. 41 and 73 ; Protokol IV. fadneho sjezdu KS(; [Praha, 1927], p. 33 ; Protokol V . f<idneho sjezdu KS(; [Praha, 1929] , pp. 40 and 50) , but in vain. This aspect of the Party history has been neglected by the socialist historians except a brief and restrained comment by J . Kramer and .J. Mlynarik, Revolucne hnutie a narodnostna ot<izka na Slovensku v dvadsiatych rokoch (Historicky casopis, 3/ 1965, pp. 423-443). For more recent writings on the theme see: Z. Holotikova, 0 rieseni narodnostnej otazky v KSc (Referat na konferencii Hist. ustavu SAV a ustavu dejin KSS, jun 1966) and J. Mlynarik, Dr. B. Smeml a slovensk<i n<irodnostn<i otazka v pociatkoch komunistickeho hnutia (Cs. casopis historicky, 5/ 1967, pp. 653-666 ). 31 ) J . Pleva, Vy znam Plesiveckej konferencie v januari 1927 (Bratislava, 1958) . According to Kramer and Mlynarik (loc. cit. , p. 442, footnote 32 ) the importance of this conference was disproportio n ately inflated because of Gottwald's participation at it. 31a) Protokol V. f<idneho sjezdu KS(; (Praha, 1929) , p. 12. �SLOVAK.IA 137 faction". 32 However, one point is worth noting: while the "bolshevist nucleus of the Party in Slovakia was made up of Bacilek, Siroky, Steiner, Urx" 33 (i.e. two Czechs and two Magyars), the dissidents ("nationalists and liquidators") who were expelled from the Party amidst a storm of abuse ( culen, Felcan, Vercik) were Slovaks. 34 III. 1929-1938 The internal struggle inside the Party was fought bitterly and not always behind closed doors . Inevitably it undermined the Party's image in the voters' eyes. In the 1929 elections it gained 152,242 votes ( 10.55 % ) in Slovakia, a considerable decline in voting strength when compared with the 1925 election results ( 13.41 % ) .35 Yet in Parliament the new "bolshevist cadres" displayed fierce and sanguinary pugnacity epitomized in the words of the new Party leader, K. Gottwald, addressed in December 1929 to the coalition benches: We are the revolutionary Party of Czechoslovak proletariat and in Moscow we have, indeed, our revolutionary General Staff. Yes we go to Moscow in order to learn. Would you like to know what we learn"! We go to Moscow to learn from the Russian bolsheviks how to break your necks. And you must admit that the Russian bolsheviks are very good at it.36 32) Z. Holotikova, Bol"sevizacny proces KS(; v rokoch 1924-29 (Historicky casopis 2/1957, pp. 204-210); M. Gosiorovsky, Slovensko a V. sjazd KS(; (Cs. casopis historicky, 1/ 1954, pp. 4-15). 33) Dejiny KS(; (Praha, 1961), p. 256. 34) Vercik, Mlynarik, Koren, etc. were branded as "nationalists" and expelled; Culen, Felcan, Kolarikova, etc. were branded as "liquidators" and expelled also. The latter were the authors of the so-called "Hlohovecke memorandum" (of December 1928) in which they requested the reorganization of the Party structure in Slovakia and complete freedom of action in specifically Slov~k matters. (See : Pravda of January 31, and February 7th, 1929). In 1930 the KSC finally consented to a limited decentralization and a Slovak province ("celoslovensky kraj") of the KS(; was instituted. S. Major (of Magyar nationality) and K. Bacilek (of Czech nationality) were put in charge. See: V. Plevza, Vytvorenie celoslovenskeho kraja a revolucne hnutie na Slovensku na zaciatku tridsiatych rokov (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1962, p. 184). 35) For an interesting statistical analysis of the 1929 election results see: R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern E urope (Princeton, N. J ., 1961 ), pp. 150-158 and 216-219. 36) K. Gottwald , Spisy I (Praha, 1953), p. 322. �138 SLOVAK.IA During the severe economic depression which swept the Western world in the late twenties and early thirties and which caused acute unemployment in Slovakia (some 250,000 in 1933) 37 the Communists organized hunger marches, protest meetings and strikes. A meeting in May 1931 at a small village in southern Slovakia, Kosuty, ended with a shooting fray resulting in the death of three demonstrators. The Party skilfully exploited the incident to advertize the social plight of rural workers in the Slovak countryside. 38 In the years 1929-33 the Communist press paid much attention to the political solution of the Slovak question and Slovak grievances were repeatedly aired on its pages. But as V. Kopecky confessed at the Vrth Party Congress (1931) it was more in the nature of lip service than anything else: "The decisions of the Vth Party Congress concerning the solution of the nationalities problem remained on paper only and in spite of repeated emphasizing of their importance by the central leadership of the Party there was no practical indication that we were fighting for the right of self-determination of the nations." 38a This national inequality was demonstrated even in the Party hierarchy. The higher Party ranks were-as beforean almost exclusive monopoly of the Czech and German comrades. The Presidium constituted at the Vrth Party 37) Pfehled ceskoslovenskych ilejin III (1918-1945) (Praha , 1960) , p. 325. The gravity of the situation is reflected in the emigration figures which were considerably greater for Slovakia (where only about 25 % of the total population lived) than for the Czech lands: Emigration from C-SR: from Slovakia: 1928 24,540 13,544 1929 30,715 19,401 1930 25,712 16,682 1931 9,567 4,527 1932 5,165 2,222 1933 4,735 3,099 38) The shooting at Kosuty has attracted unusually great attention from Communist propagandists and publicists, e.g. the pamphlet, Nyn·i je v Kosv,tech pofcidek a klid (1931); V. Plevza, Kosutska trag edia (Prispevky k dejinam KSC, 8/ 1959, pp. 91-107) ; E. Pauliny, Kosutske udalosti v maji 1931 (Bratislava-Martin, 1961) ; E. Kadnar, Krvave Kosuty ( Bratislava, 1963) . It is perhaps worthwhile to note that the inhabitants of Kosuty were of Magyar nationality and so was S. Major, the convicted instigator of the disturbance. 38a ) Protokol VI. fcidneho sjezdn KSC, (Praha , 1931), p. 143. �SLOVAKIA 139 Congress had only one representative from Slovakia among its 15 members. 39 This omission was quite a serious matter, because by the midthirties the Communist Party of Slovakia was already producing its own native leaders. The young Slovak Communist students who in 1924 grouped in Prague around the quarterly Oater monthly), "Dav" (1924-1937), were growing up in stature and outlook and were ready and eager to take over from the Czech, Magyar and Jewish spokesmen of the Slovak proletariat. 40 Unfortunately they were striving for power at a time when the Party was purging itself of intellectual and other non-proletarian ballast, so that their hopes and expectations were frustrated.41 Other important changes in the Party line were also in the offing. The Party was directed by the Comintern to adopt new attitudes to a number of political issues. Up to 1933 the Communists considered democracy (i.e. bourgeois democracy) and fascism as "the children of the same mother, the bourgeoisie". 42 Masaryk, Benes, Hlinka, Kramaf were all Fascists of the same brand as Hitler and Mussolini. But by the summer of 1933 Stalin realized that Hitler was a much greater evil. Looking for new allies Stalin selected two of the most likely states worried by the growing power of Hitler's Germany: France and CzechoSlovakia. The KSc was instructed to take a more positive stand towards the official Czech foreign and domestic 39) It was E. Fried of Magyar-Jewish origin. Accordind to H. G. Skilling the ethnic composition of the 60-member Central Committee was as follows: 37 Czechs, 10 Germans, 8 Slovaks (and Magyars ), 4 Ukrainians and 1 Pole. See : H. Gordon Skilling, Gottwald and the Bolshevisation of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 1929-39 (Slavic Review, 20/ 1961, pp. 644-645) . The inadequate representation of Slovaks in the top P,0verning bodies of the Party apparatus (i.e. Presidium-Politburo and Secretariat-Orgburo) is statistically summed up in Appendix I. 40) These young Communist intellectuals of the early twenties had their hey-day in the late forties and met a tragic fate in the early fifties. In the years 1950-54 they became the victims of purges and their rehabilitation began ,mly in 1963. For a post-rehabilitation view of the Dav-group see: S. Drug, Dav a davisti (Bratislava, 1965). 41) V. Plevza, Prispevok o cinnosti davistov v revolucnom hnuti za predmnichovskej CSR (Historicky casopis, 1/1964), pp. 20-21. 42) K. Gottwald , Spisy IV (Praha, 1951) , p. 212. �140 SLOVAKIA policies. This, of course, meant that the Slovak guestion and the nationalities problem in general had to be played down and the Party soon nodded its appproval where only a few months ago it used to voice its sharp criticism. 43 The signing of the Soviet-Czecho-Slovak Treaty in May 1935 marked a milestone in the Party's policy. The Party put on a mask of loyal respectability and replaced its internationalism by a newly-discovered patriotism. It conveniently forgot its past hostilities to "the imperialist agent Benes" and supported him in the presidential election in December 1935. At the Seventh Congress of the KSc (April 1936) the Party took a firm position "to defend CzechoSlovakia against Hitler". It became a zealous exponent of the Popular Front against Fascism and reaction, and the Slovak grievances once so prominent in its program were now hardly mentioned. The militant cry for "self-determination including the right to secede" was now replaced with much softer demands voiced by Gottwald at the VIIth Party Congress: "The Party will strive to achieve the realization of minimal requirements for normal coexistence of all nationalities in Czecho-Slovakia by insisting on a democratic policy towards nationalities and on equal rights for all nations ( of Czecho-Slovakia) in all spheres of public life." 44 The approaching municipal elections made the Party somewhat wary and hurriedly it came forward with a "plan for the economic, social and cultural advancement of Slovakia" announced at Banska Bystrica in May 1937.45 But the plan did not excite anybody. It was unrealistic and was looked upon as one of the many grandiose schemes which the Party submitted with monotonous regularity year after 43) A somewhat confused picture of the situation can be found in V. Plevza's KSC a revolucne hnutie na Slovensku 1929-1 938 (Bratislava, 1965), pp. 237-420. 44 ) K. Gottwald, Spisy VIII (Bratislava, 1953) , p. 167. This phase of Party activities is discussed at length in a number of publications such as Na obranu republiky proti fasizmu a v ojne (Bratislava, 1955) ; M . Filo, Boj KSC na Slovensku na obranu republiky (Bratislava, 1960) ; I. Kolesar, Otazka obnovy demokracie a demokratickych prciv i slobod proti fasizmu ( od VII. kongresu Kominterny r . 1935 ) Sbornik FFUK, 10/ 1959, pp. 163-181). 45 ) Deji11y KSc (Praha, 1961) , p. 359. Also V . Siroky, Za st'astne Slove nsko v socialistickom Ceslcoslovensku (Bratislava, 1952). �141 SLOVAKIA year, knowing well that it would never be called upon to implement them. The turns and twists in the Party line could not pos• sibly impress the Slovak electorate. In the municipal elections (May 1938) the Party found itself deserted by its erstwhile supporters. Its advocacy of pro-Benes and antiautonomist policies46 estranged it from the Slovak voters, while its noisy denunciations of the revisionist claims by Hungary, Germany and Poland antagonized its non-Slovak voters. The overwhelming electoral defeat in Slovakia (in the Czech lands the Party maintained its support) alarmed the Slovak Party leaders who clearly read the writing on the wall. 47 And thus on the eve of Czecho-Slovakia's disintegration the Party attempted another somersault and tried to sponsor the autonomistic cause, even if it meant forming a common front with Hlinka's Party. But it was now too late. No party in Slovakia cared for partnership with the Communists and Hlinka's Party least of all. The speed with which events marched by-passed the Party altogether. 46) J. U§iak, Boj KS(: s Hlinkovou slovenskou l'udovou stranou a vplyv na masy v obdobi ndstupu fasizmu (Pfispevky k dejindm KSC, 5/ 1963, pp. 710-29). Also V. Plevza, KSC a revolucne hnutie na Slovensku 1929-1938 (Bratislava, 1965), pp. 462-474. 47 ) The Communist historians merely record the electoral defeat without going into details, without drawing any conclusion (e. g. Plevza, op. cit., p. 471 ). In many small towns the Communist vote virtually disappeared and in bigger towns it was severely reduced. On the whole the proportion of those who voted Communist dropped from 14% in 1935 to something like 8.9 % in 1938. No comprehensive results have been compiled so far; the Party historians carefully avoid this area. A brief glance at the election results in a few Slovak cities shows convincingly how the Party fared at the polls. (The results are compared with those of the Hlinka People's Party, the main beneficiary of the Communist loss. Figures are taken from Slovensky dennik of June 12, 1938): People's Party votes KSS votes Gain in% --19_3_5_[1938 ' ....Jl % _in--'l .... _L_o_s_s I _1_93_8__,_ 1 __,__1_93_5_ _ _ _T_o_w_n_ 2,493 I 44.3 j 1 8,133 5,640 45,7 2,399 1 2,856 i 5,255 Bratislava 333 I 37.91 910 1,243 88 13.5 554 Nove Mesto n / V I 642 44 I 607 I 563 I 1098 76 I 167 68.8 I 243 Snina 1 849 I 363 62.0I 586 4,658 2,098 I 2,560 55.0 Star11. !>ala I 1,064 1 ? 64 I ? Modra I 1,253 j ? 79 I ? Michalovce I 3,471 1 ? 777 I ? Trebgov (dist. ) I I I I I 1 �142 SLOVAKIA The collapse of Czecho-Slovakia found the Party's fortunes in Slovakia at their lowest ebb. This was openly acknowledged by the Party leadership in its report to the Executive of the Comintern in December 1938. With a remorseful self-criticism V. Siroky confessed: We Comm un ists represe nted in Slovakia the national interests of the Czech nation, while the Slovak national interests were furth er represented by Hlinka's Party ... Only at the last moment as the Czechoslovak crisis was reaching its climax did we put forward a demand for the democratic solution of the Slovak problem, i. e. the granting of full autonomy.48 IV. 1938-1944 The declaration of autonomy on October 6th, 1938 was shortly followed by the suppression of Party activities and in January 1939 the Party was disbanded. The Party leaders escaped abroad and with regard to Party leadership in Slovakia, it is interesting to note that the Slovak nationals, if they got away at all, fled mainly to the West (Valo, Clementis ), while the non-Slovak leaders sought their refuge in the Soviet Union (smidke, Bacilek, Major. Siroky went first to Paris, then to Moscow) .49 Drawing conclusions from the rejection of the Party policies by the Slovak people and facing the new situation fairly and squarely, the Comintern decided on the last and long-delayed step : it gave its approval to the founding of an independent ( albeit illegal) Communist Party of Slovakia ( in May 1939 ). 50 Its leadership was entrusted to three relatively minor and unknown functionaries: J. Duris, L. Benada, J. Osoha. Of these the ablest and most dynamic was Jan Osoha, a Czech by birth. The leadership faced a tremendous task of building a network of illegal cells from the fragments and remains of what once was a Party organization in Slovakia. Traditional Party strongholds went to Hungary by the Vienna Award of November 1938.50 a The 48 ) Deji~nii krizov atka (Bratislava, 1964), pp. 27-28. 49 ) Slovak Studies IV (Rome, 1964) , p. 30. 50) Dejiny KS(; (Praha, 1961 ), p. 399. 50a) Interesting evidence of the solid support the Party received from t he Magyar-speaking population of Slovakia can be found in the recently published bibliography, Zoznam komunistickych novin a casopisov marxi.stickej l' avice z rokov 1919-38 (Martin, 1961). The bibliography lists 125 separate newspapers and periodicals of which �SLOVAKIA 143 newly-acquired independence of Slovakia (in March 1939) was a powerful stabilizing factor on the political scene leaving very little scope for the subversive activities of the Communists.51 For the Communists the situation was further aggravated by the Nazi-Soviet Pact (August 1939), the Soviet participation in the Fourth partition of Poland and the Soviet recognition, both 'de facto' and 'de jure', of the independent Slovak state. Under the impact of these events the Slovak Communist leadership in the West (Paris) disintegrated.52 At home the Party leaders were even more confused and completely at a loss. The illegal handbills and propaganda pamphlets betray the prevalent mood of perplexity and obvious embarrassment of the underground Party organizers in their desperate attempts to explain away the things they could not comprehend. In the Soviet attitude towards the Slovak state they saw a sure sign of Soviet approval of the new geographicopolitical reorganization of Central Europe. In response to it they drew up, sometime in October 1939, a new political program, the key-note of which was: "The free and independent Soviet Slovakia." 53 This program became a dominant feature of all the illegal Communist activities in Slovakia up to 1944. It was only natural for an independent Party to sponsor such a policy in an independent state. But the scheme did not pass 71 were published in the Slovak language, 50 (i. e. 40 %) in Magyar, 3 in German and 1 in Ukrainian. 51) A. Huckova-Stvrtecka, cinnost' prveho ilegalneho Ostredneho vyboru KSS (Bratislava, 1959). 52) Clementis denounced the Nazi-Soviet pact for which he was expelled from the Pai ty, Siroky rapidly departed to Moscow and Valo retired into neutral passivity. About the impact of this infamous alliance on the Slovak (and Czech ) Communists in Paris, see Theo. I-I. Florin, S Vladom Clementisom v Parizi a v Lon.dyne (Dav, spomienky a studie, [Brati~ava, 1965), p. 467) . 53) Confiscated Communist propaganda handbills in the Archives of the German F'oreign Ministry, 56/ 38606-15. These documents help to pinpoint the beginning of the campaign for an independent Soviet Slovakia which was not later than in October 1939. At that time the Communists went to considerable trouble to explain that the Soviet Union had not exchanged Communism for the National Socialism of Hitler. �144 SLOVAKIA by unchallenged. The first to protest against this line was-as might have been expected-the illegal Communist Party in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia lead by Edo Urx who as a Party functionary had spent a number of years in Slovakia. The Party in the Protectorate continued to call itself the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. It claimed to be the direct successor of the banned Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia and a parent organization of the Communist Party of Slovakia. It advocated the restoration of the pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia and objected to any policy promulgation which was not consistent with its current Party line. The Slovaks on the other hand were rejecting any kind of affiliation and insisted on equality and independence. After prolonged disagreement the dispute was referred to Moscow for arbitration 54 and there Gottwald issued a ruling completely vindicating the stand of the Slovak Communists. He sent the following message to Urx (in March 1940): Your pre-war pattern of thinking must change. Behind the slogan "Restoration of Czecho-Slovakia" are hidden imperialistic and antiSoviet schemes . .. We expressly emphasize that our Party fully accepts the right of self-determination both for the Czechs and fo r the Slovaks. This right of self-detevmination implies the right to live in an independent state. We fight for the restoration of the national freedom and territorial independence of the Czechs. As far as the Slovaks are concerned we fight for the complete sovereignity of the present-day Slovak state. It is this struggle for the right of self-determination which differentiates our road from that of Benes a nd world imperialism. The relation between the Czechs and Slovaks stand now on a new footing. Slovak separatism plays today a different role. That is why we are giving up the old slogans concerning Slovakia.ss Encouraged by this message the Slovak Communists tried to outdo in nationalist zeal everybody including the official Slovak propaganda. The only criticism they received from Moscow was the advice not to stress too much the Soviet character of their "independent Soviet Slovakia" program.56 54 ) The dispute is summarized in D ejinna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964) , pp. 63-88. 55) Deji nna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964) , p. 61. 56 ) S. Falt'an, Ku Kral'ov ej recenzii trochu inak (Historicky casopis, 4/ 1966, p. 58S. �SLOVAKIA 145 The idea of national independence being at the root of the Party's illegal activities was not given up even when the Soviet Union gave its official recognition to Benes and his government then in exile in London. The clandestine journal, "Hlas l'udu" (Voice of the people ), commented on the resumption of diplomatic relations between Benes and the Kremlin: The pact between the Soviet Union and the Czecho-Slovak government in exile is not seen by the Communist Party of Slovakia as a pact with the government of a future state which has its established boundaries, its established regime. The (Czecho-Slovak) government in London was created without the participation and without the will of the working people in Slovakia . . . The question of an independent (Slovak) state, or autonomy, or federation with the fraternal Czech nation is now of secondary importance and it will be settled after the defeat and destruction of German imperialism.56a Slovak police and security organs who had infiltrated the illegal Communist organizations57 watched this development with keen interest. When the Soviet-German conflict broke out (June, 1941) the Slovak police within a few hours arrested all the members of the illegal Central Committee (except J. Osoha) and some 1,100 illegal Party activists. 58 Most of these were released from detention after three or four weeks and lost no time in regrouping and starting again. A new Central Committee was set up by J . Osoha and this in turn was broken up by the police in April 1942. J. Osoha again eluded the dragnet and at56a) Quoted by M. Gosiorovsky in Historicky casopis, No. 3/ 1968, p. 371. 57) In this connection it is worth quoting from a report of the German Minister to Slovakia, M. v. Killinger (of August 19th, 1940): "Die ... in die kommunistische Zellen geschickten Leute bewiihren sich sehr gut, so dass der Erfolg der Arbeit gesichert und alle Zellen der hier, wieder erstehenden kommunistischen Organisationen erfasst werden. Die inzwischen festgestellten kommunistische Funktioniire werden listenmiissig geftihrt und laufend ergiinzt" (2276/ 47987684). 58) German documents 610/ 248627. At this time the Russians parachuted into Slovakia V. Siroky and V. Skrabala. But they were discovered very soon after their arrival and put in prison where Siroky stayed until 1945. When in 1949 Siroky emerged as the most powerful man in Slovakia trusted by both Moscow and Prague, legendary stories were written about his underground and illegal activities which lasted-when all said and done-some fi ve weeks. �146 SLOVAKIA tempted to organize the third Central Committee of the KSS. But in July he was caught and imprisoned together with the other members of the Committee. 59 These police actions deprived the illegal Party organization in Slovakia of all its old leaders trained in the Stalinist mould of blind and unquestioning obedience. Continuity with the pre-war Party politics was thus broken and the way was cleared for new men to emerge at the top. As it happened they were almost without exception the younger generation of the Party intellectuals, recruited and groomed by Vlado Clemen tis ( then in London). They lacked the rugged working-class background but they possessed the self-assertive spirit of intense national pride. One of them, Stefan Bast'ovansky, tried to continue (against his better judgement) with the illegal activities in the old traditional style (handbills and pamphlets read by very few, incitement to sabotage obeyed by nobody) only to find himself in prison by May 1943.60 The leadership of the demoralized and decimated ranks now passed into the hands of G. Husak and L. Novomesky, who disagreed with those tactics and methods which were costing the Party so much and achieved nothing. As the men on the spot they proposed a more subtle and unorthodox approach which took into account the political and social conditions in Slovakia, the mentality and sentiments of the masses and the weakness of Slovak war-time administration. The Party really went underground and the outward signs of activities almost disappeared. Moscow, disturbed by the apparent lack of fighting spirit, decided to send to Slovakia two trusted emissaries to revive the dormant proletarian masses. They were K. smidke and K. Bacilek. Neither of them was Slovak but both had worked in Slovakia in the interwar period. smidke, the more experienced of the two, listened with interest to the suggestions of the Slovak intellectuals and to their amazement he agreed with them. 61 smidke set up a new Central Committee of the KSS 59) 0 . Krajnak, Protifasisticke hnutie na Slovensku. (Nova mys! , 8/ 1964, pp. 695-703); G. Husak, Svedectvo o SNP (Bratislava, 1964 ), pp. 33-36; Dejinna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964) , pp. 122-126. 60) Dejinna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964), p. 126. 61) G. Husak, Svedectvo o SNP (Bratislava, 1964) , pp. 51-56. �SLOVAKIA 147 (which included himself, Husak and Novomesky) re-established and revived the network of illegal Party organizations and directed their activities along a new and more realistic path. He entered into close collaboration with the bourgeois illegal groups (and, through them, with the army) and did not scruple to exploit to the full the nationalist sentiments and aspirations of the Slovaks. 62 The last thing was, of course, not an easy task, because in the meantime the Soviet Union had promised Benes to restore pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia. And not only that. As revealed recently, Benes was given by Stalin, in December 1943, virtually a free hand in his dealings with the Slovaks. According to Fierlinger (Czecho-Slovak Ambassador in Moscow) Stalin allegedly told Benes "to keep the Slovaks firmly in hand.''62 a By these tactics of exploiting nationalistic feeling in the country and with the military defeat of Germany looming larger and closer every day, the Communists and their bourgeois allies were preparing an armed uprising in Slovakia. Their conspiratory efforts were partly frustrated by an untimely start, triggered off by Soviet partisans, which doomed the venture to failure. But while it lasted (August-October 1944) "the Slovak national uprising" (as this revolt became officially known after 1945) was a remarkable achievement in several respects. 63 Its effect on the future political development of Slovakia was to be farreaching and lasting. Right at the beginning of the uprising the Communist Party of Slovakia came into the open and published ( on September 2nd, 1944) its proclamation in which it implied that Slovakia--though a part of Czechoslovakia-would have a very broad autonomy which would include even a sepa62) Slovenske ruirodne povstanie 1944 (Bratislava 1965), pp. 191-221. 62a) J. Barto, Riesenie vzt'ahu cechov a Slovakov (Bratislava, 1968) . p. 11. 63) This event is by far the most written-about subject in modern Slovak history. For a critical review of bibliography on this theme see: F . Vnuk, Neuveritel'ne sprisahanie (Middletown, Pa., 1964) , pp. 181-191. Also S. Falt'an, Niektore otazky okolo hodnotenia SNP (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1964, pp. 161-185) . A complete bibliography of books and articles on the subject in 1963-64 was compiled by A. Kociska (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1965, pp. 309-328) . �148 SLOVAKIA rate army. 64 On September 9, 1944 the KSS began to publish the daily, "Pravda", proudly branded as "the official organ of the Communist Party of Slovakia".65 On September 17th, 1944 it arranged a joint Party Congress with the Social Democratic Party at which the Social Democratic Party merged into the KSS. It elected its own Central Committee with smidke as President, Husak and cech (Social Democrat) as Vice-Presidents. The Party displayed vigour and independence to a degree which both the Czech and the Soviet commissars found disquieting. The Czech Communists who were spending the war years in Moscow thought it necessary to reaffirm their primacy before it was too late and promptly dispatched to Slovakia two "experienced comrades", R. Slansky and J. sverma, to see that the Party line was correctly drawn and properly applied. After their arrival ( September 28th, 1944) the Slovak Communist leadership had to do as it was told. As a result there followed a great deal of retracting especially in those fields where exuberant nationalism had carried the home-grown leaders too far. The uprising revealed with startling clarity the secondary role and subordinate position to which the KSS was now relegated. In proclaiming their allegiance to the Czecho-Slovak Republic the Slovak Communists were negating the only positive asset of their political program so loudly advertised in 1939-44 under the slogan of an independent Soviet Slovakia. The blow was shattering not only to the Slovak people at large but also to the less doctrinaire Party members.66 In order to make the best of a bad job the Communists kept on assuring the people that the new Czecho-Slovak Republic would be incomparably better than the old one, 64) The proclamation persistently talks about " our Slovak (not Czechoslovak) army". For the full text of the document see: G. Husak, Svedectvo o SNP (Bratislava, 1964), pp. 257-258. 65) The daily, "Pravda", as it appeared during the uprising (September - October 1944) was recently reprinted and is available in a convenient form , Pravda v obdobi SNP (Bratislava, 1964) . 66) There were reports that workers at several places proclaimed a Slovak Soviet Republic (e.g. at Nemecke Pravno) ; in other places (Podbrezova) there was strong agitation for the proclamation of Soviet Slovakia. This unwillingness of the working class to return to a common state with the Czechs is most telling. �SLOVAKIA 149 that the excesses of the Czech administration would not be repeated, that the Slovak national individuality would be unquestionably accepted, etc. In other words they were posing as the guarantors of all those rights and achievements which the Hlinka People's Party had secured for the Slovak nation when declaring autonomy (October 1938). They openly advocated a federated Czecho-Slovakia.67 Unfortunately for them in 1944-45 the Slovaks were past the autonomy stage and were thinking in terms of state independence. Against the opposition of many Czech politicians, including Benes himself, the Slovak Communists succeeded in retrieving from the wreckage of the Slovak independence some of those prerequisites which gave post-war Slovakia a quasi-autonomous status.68 What is even more surprising, they were able to preserve their own independence. And thus one finds in post-war Czecho-Slovakia a somewhat anomalous situation. Alongside the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia there existed a Communist Party of Slovakia (with no regional equivalent in the Czech lands ) which to all intents and purposes was treated as a separate political party. As it happened it was a most expedient arrangement because it enabled the Communists in the critical post-war months (April 1945-May 1946) to have two Deputy Prime Ministers in the Provisional Government (instead of one) and almost twice as many ministers, parliamentarians, etc. as any other political party. V. 1945-1949 In the years 1945-6 the KSS was without doubt the most nationalistic party ever to enter the Slovak political scene. It was vehemently anti-German and anti-Magyar, and there seemed to be no limits to its nationalistic ex cesses. It lured into its camp Slovak voters by the promise of agrarian and wide-spread social reforms, it appealed 67) Thus spoke G. Husak at Kosice on February 28th, 1945: "We wan t to have a federated state ... in which each nation will be master in his own house."- See: G. Husak, Za narodnu a l'udovu demo kraciu (Kosice, 1945), p. 14. Also J. Jablonicky, Slovensko na prelome (Bratislava, 1965) , pp. 248-296. 68 ) Program prvej dorruicej vlady narodneho frontu cechov a Slovcikov (Kosice, 1945) . �150 SLOVAKIA to the nationalist and even the religious feeling of the people, it was willing to overlook anybody's past, no matter how compromising.69 Outwardly the KSS was united, but, as it transpired later, inside it was torn with internal jealousies which very soon decomposed its ranks and paralysed its strength as an independent political force. The old-guard leaders ( Siroky, Duris, etc.) who spent their war years in prison did not see eye to eye with the leadership which had been put together during the 1944 uprising (Husak, smidke, etc.). The Siroky-group intrigued against the smidke-Husakgroup and in their schemes they had the support of the Czech Communist leadership. In May 1945 at the joint session of both Party Presidia the Slovaks were compelled to adopt a common policy with their Czech comrades on all public issues of the day. The role of the KSS was defined as being "a part of a unitary KSC with a united leadership".70 In practice it meant a complete subjugation of the KSS to the dictatorial authority of the KSC. This was the end of the short-lived independence of the KSS (19391945). One of the first moves of Gottwald was to impose on the KSS a more amenable leadership to replace the smidkeHusak-group. In July 1945 Gottwald delegated Siroky to take over the Party affairs in Slovakia. 71 Siroky hurriedly convened a Party conference at Zilina (Aug. 11-12, 1945) where he was confirmed in his position as the Party President. Siroky saw to it that the top Party positions were filled with his men. Thus he had become, already in Aug. 1945, the undisputed authority in Party matters in Slovakia. "Siroky concentrated in his own hands and in the hands of his own group of collaborators in the apparatus of the KSS Central Committee factual decisions about Party 69) This is again another neglected chapter of the Party history. The nationalist excesses, especially against the Magyar minority, formed a part of the accusation levelled at the " bourgeois nationalists" in 1950-54. An oblique reference to the nationalist policies of the KSS has been made recently in the book of J. Zvara, A magyar nemzetisegi kerdes melogdasa Szlovakuiban (Bratislava, 1965), pp. 22-69. Also J . Jablonicky in Slovensko na prelome (Bratislava, 1965) pp . 396-409. 70) J. Barto, Riesenie vzt'ahu Cechov a Slovakov (Bratislava 1968) , p. 55. 71 ) ib., p. 99. �SLOVAKIA 151 policies, about the Party itself and about its leading cadres. These men were selected by Siroky himself according to his own personal likings", complained G. Husak recently. 72 Out of 9 men in the Party Presidium Husak identified these as the members of the Siroky group: Siroky, Duris, Bast'ovansky, Valachovic, Holdos. This leaves on the other side Husak, soltesz, smidke and Zupka. While acting as a strong man of the KSS, Siroky realized that he owed his position to the Czech Communists and consequently he was an ever-obedient executor of their wishes. In this way the policy of the KSS became divorced from the current needs and realities of the Slovaks. The policies of the KSc were designed to attract the Czech masses and paid very little attention to the Slovak national interests. The Party faced the first post-war electoral contest in a state of internal disunity, with a program which lacked conviction, realism and electoral appeal. Its only competitor for the allegiance of the Slovak electorate was the Democratic Party (heir and successor of the old Agrarian Party of M. Hodza) dominated almost exclusively by the Slovak Protestant bourgeoisie of proBenes sympathies. The Hlinka People's Party being banned, the Catholic section of the Slovak people ( the support of which was to decide the general election scheduled on May 26th, 1946) had no party of its own. To win these vital votes the leaders of the Democratic Party concluded an agreement with the representatives of the Slovak Catholics ("April Agreement") promising considerable concessions in exchange for the Catholic vote. 73 As a result of this solid backing of the Catholic majority the Democratic Party emerged victorious from the electoral contest polling 62.0 % of the total vote (999,622 votes), while the Communist Party gained only 30.4 % (489,596 votes), the remaining 7 ,6 % went to two minor parties or represented "white ticket" and informal votes. 74 While the electorate in the Czech lands overwhelmingly 72) G. Husak, Barnabitky a co im predchadzalo, in Nove slovo, No. 8/ 1968. 73) V. Precan, Slov ensky katolicizmus pred februarom 1948 (Bratislava , 1961), pp. 85-108. 74) Dejiny KSc (Praha, 1961), p . 504. �152 SLOVAKIA endorsed the Marxist policies 75 in Slovakia the Communist Party (which-it should be remembered-was already then a united party of both the Communist and the Social Democrats) came second best in what was actually a twoparty contest. This massive rejection of the Marxist policies led to deep soul-searching in the Central Committee in Prague and Bratislava. The Party now tempered (at least partly) its reckless nationalism and started to attack the Democratic Party for harbouring fascist and reactionary elements. 76 Though nominally both Communist and Democratic Parties were partners in the so-called United National Front they were soon fighting and abusing each other with fury and passion reminiscent of the interwar years. In spite of their electoral defeat the Communists, by clever and daring manipulation of their own and due to the ineptness, timidity and inexperience of the Democratic politicians were able to exert a decisive influence on the course of political events in Slovakia. They still retained the control of powerful organizations and pressure groups ( trade unions, farmers' organizations, partisans, etc.). Thus they were able to frustrate almost any attempt of the Democratic Party to honour its promises given to the Catholic voters.77 By their bullying tactics they brought about the estrangement between the leadership and membership of the Democratic Party. They accused many Democratic Party leaders of fascist conspiracy and subversive activity, demanded and got their removal from office and subsequent imprisonment (Kempny, Bugar, Stasko, Ursiny, etc.). Then in November 1947 they attacked the governmental positions of the Democratic Party, compelling it to give up 75) In the Czech lands the Communists received 38.9 % and the Social Democrats 15.8 % of the votes. The Marxist parties thus obtained 54.7 % . 76 ) M. Vartikova, Roky rozhodnutia. K dejiruim politickeho boja pred febriuirom 1948 (Bratislava, 1962); J . Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, 1955), pp. 247-253. 77 ) They engineered-with the help of their Czech comrades and colleagues-the sentencing and execution of the former President of Slovakia, Dr. Jozef Tiso. By this they completely discredited the Democratic Party in the eyes of its voters, fully revealing its impotency and helplessness as a political force . See: F . Vnuk, Dr. Jozef Tiso , President of the Slovak Repitblic (Sydney, 1967 ), pp. 37-40. �SLOVAKIA 153 its majority in such administrative bodies as the Slovak National Council, the Board of Commissioners, etc.78 By this victory the Communists effectively undermined the morale of the non-Communist forces and the stage was set for a complete take-over. The notorious 'coup d'etat', by which the Communists came to power in Czecho-Slovakia in February 1948, was largely a Czech affair. The resignation of the non-Communist ministers and the ensuing governmental crisis were confined to Prague. The confrontation was staged and the struggle was lost by the Czechs in the Czech lands. 79 As far as Slovakia was concerned there the issue was solved almost inaudibly in a matter of hours (long before the crisis was over in Prague). The Communist chairman of the Board of Commissioners, G. Husak, took over the main Post Office building in Bratislava on February 23rd, 1948 and was in complete control of all postal services, especially the vital telecommunication links between Bratislava and. Prague. To all Democratic Commissioners he dispatched letters of dismissal and to make sure that they took notice, he requested the Commissioner of the Interior, M. Feriencik (nominally a non-party member of the Board), to post police guards at their offices, to keep the "dismissed'' Commissioners out. 80 Then the Communists reconstituted a new Board allocating to themselves 10 (out of 15) positions, giving the remaining ones to their fellow-travellers.81 This moment signified the zenith of the KSS. What followed afterwards was a steeply descending road leading to the unenviable position of the next two decades(1948-68). 78 ) In the reconstructed Board of Commissioners the Democratic Party had to share the chairmanship with a Communist and its majority of nine on the Board of 15 Commissioners was reduced to a minor ity of six. 79) There are many accounts of this "parliamentary take-over" of governmental powers by the Communists. For the losing party's version see e.g. H. Ripka's Le Coup de Prague (Paris, 1949), for the winning-side versio n see e.g. J . Vesely's Kronika unorovych dnti 1948 (Praha, 1958) . 80) V. Vagassky, Komunisticka strana ceskoslovenska (New York, 1953roneoed) p. 8. 81) J. Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, 1955), pp. 259-260. �li4 SLOVAKIA VI. 1948-1962 With the elimination of the non-Communist opposition there was no longer a need for two Communist Parties in one country. Steps towards the abolition of the KSS were taken on July 26th, 1948, when the Presidium of the KSc (consisting entirely of Czech Communists) decided: 1. The next meeting of the Central Committee of the KSS shall rule that the KSS ceases to exist as an independent party and become an integral part of the KSc. 2. The Party organization in Slovakia will still carry the name of KSS . 3. The Central Committee of the KSS shall be subordinated to the Central Committee of the KSc, it shall act according to its directives and it will implement the policy of the KSc in Slovakia. 82 This decision was proptly implemented on September 28, 1948 when the KSS, obeying the resolution of the Presidium of the KSc agreed to become "the territorial organization of the unitary KSC. 83 The merger was officially represented as a voluntary act mutually desired by both, and enthusiastically greeted by the Party press as such. But now it is admitted what has been generally known from the start that the Slovak Communists were most unwilling to give up their independence, to take up the status of an unprivileged minority destined to wait for the hand-outs of the senior and none-too-generous partner. Their fears were well justified but they could do nothing to prevent the inevitable. Thus they became the first victims of the renewed centralism with which the Communist rulers of Czecho-Slovakia were pursuing their new "socialist" policies. Gottwald, Kopecky and their accomplices, the authors and erstwhile advocates of Slovak selfgovernment, almost overnight forgot their earlier pledges. Robust and aggresive centralism was menacingly reflected in the new "Constitution of May 9th" (1948). In it the Slovaks were treated badly, 84 yet worse was still to come. 82) K. Kaplan, Utvcifeni genercilni linie vystavby socialismu v Ceskoslovensku (Pra ha, 1965) , p. 103. 83) Dejiny KSC (Praha, 1961) , p. 540. 84) While in 1945 the Commissioners were chosen by the Slovak National Council and responsible to it, in 1948 they were appointed by �SLOVAKIA 155 Most of those political and national rights which-as claimed by the KSS-were secured by the Slovak uprising in 1944 and saved by the victory of the working-class in 1948 were gradually removed one by one by the same people who once fought for them. With incredible, even gleeful, outward obedience the Slovak Communists were curtailing their own rights, restricting their own freedom of action. This subordinate relationship which now existed between the KSS and KSC was subsequently written into the Party Statutes for everybody to see. According to these approved rules "the KSS directs its activities by the decisions of the Congress of the KSC and the decisions of the Central Committee of the KSC ... The KSS convokes its congress after agreement with the Central Committee of the KSC ... The Central Committee of the KSS carries out the decisions of the Central Committee of the KSc and with the approval of the Central Committee of the KSC it solves the political and organizational Party questions in Slovakia". 85 Committed to these rules and bound by Party discipline the Communists in Slovakia ruthlessly applied the general Party line as drawn up in Prague by the Central Committee of the KSc, and including such unpopular measures as collectivization of farming, nationalization of all sectors of private enterprise, down to small shops and one-man businesses, wholesale purge of public life of all real and imaginary opponents of Communism, cruel persecution of the Catholic Church, its clergy and religious, victimization the Prague Government. The protective measures introduced in 1945 to safeguard the rights of the Slovak against the Czech majority were all removed in 1948. To pass or amend legislation a mere three-fifths majority of deputies was required. The Czech majority in the Parliament was always higher than this. (In 1954 there were only 98 Slovaks among 368 deputies). 85) The Statutes of the KSc , paragraphs 40, 42 and 47. See : Pravda of December 20th, 1952. Numerically the Party drew noticeably less strength from Slovakia than from the Czech lands. Shortly after the 1948 merger statistics were issued showing that in 1949 out of 2,311,066 members and candidates of the KSC only 236,432 were from Slovakia, i.e. 10.3%. ( Rude pravo of May 27th, 1950) . This disparity continued into the fiities and at the Tenth Congress of the KSC (1954) the Slovak delegates formed a 10,2% minority (Pravda of June 16th, 1954) . At that time 28% of the population lived in Slovakia. �156 SLOVAKIA of the intellectuals, adulation of Stalin and Gottwald, indiscriminate application of "superior Soviet methods" in all walks of life, etc.86 And when they did all these repugnant and hate-fometing tasks their Czech masters struck them with a wave of bloody purges. In the years 1949-54 (and especially after the Ninth Congress of the KSS in May 1950) the ranks of the Slovak Communists were decimated with a fury of terror which in its scope and horror surpassed all the blows ever inflicted by their class enemy. The purges form the most tragic and most neglected chapter in the history of the KSS.B 7 Within five years (1949-54) the KSS lost in purges seven out of 13 members of its Presidium (Clementis, Husak, Novomesky, ~midke, Bast'ovansky, Falt'an and Moskovic), some 30 % of its 60members Central Committee and thousands of Party members in diplomatic and administrative service, in the army, political bodies, institutions and other sectors of public life. They were removed from their posts amid the curses of their own comrades and comrades-in-arms and, having previously antagonized the masses of the Slovak people, they found themselves unpitied and friendless in their gravest hour. They were declared "enemies of the people", their work was debased, their publications banned, their past exorcised from the pages of the Party history.BB The principal guilt of which all the Slovak victims of the purges were accused was the unpardonable sin of "bourgeois nationalism", the very thing in which they were so much encouraged by their Czech comrades in 1945-6. It is generally not realized that the bulk of the victims of the 1949-54 purges were "bourgeois nationalists" (i.e. 86) In the writings of contemporary Communist historians all these measures were described as being socialist, progressive and to the benefit of the masses. Only now, after 15 years, some "mistakes" are being admitted for which the personality cult is blamed. 87) The purges were strictly taboo to the socialist historians until January 1968. Only in the field of literature a cautious attempt has been made to deal with this touchy subject, e. g. in Mnacko's Oneskorene reportaze, in Karvas's Jazva, etc. 88) More about the purges can be found in D. A. Schmidt's Anotomy of a Satelite ( Boston, 1952), in Vnuk's cistky - nezahojitel'ne rany KSS (Slovak v Amerike, November 9th,-30th, 1966); also Der Slansky-Prozess und seine Folgen (Recht im Ost und West, 5/ 1964, pp. 196-203. �SLOVAKIA 157 Slovaks) in Slovakia and "zionists" (i.e. Jews) in the Czech lands, though these two groups did not account for more than 13 ¼- of the KSc membership. It is no wonder then that the purges permanently poisoned the already strained Slovak-Czech relations beyond any hope of reconciliation. After the elimination of the Slovak element the Central Committee of the KSc entrusted the reins of the KSS to people of its own choice: Siroky, Bacilek, Duris, David, Dubcek, Rais, Branik, sefranek, Mauer, etc. As in the early twenties most of these were of non-Slovak origin ( Czechs and Jews) and a few of them were even Soviet citizens (David, Mauer). In March 1953 Stalin died and shortly after him K. Gottwald. The presidency of the Republic passed on to A. Zapotocky, while a well-known Slovakophobe, A. Novotny, became the first Party secretary. Novotny soon concentrated in his hands immense power and, assisted by V. Kopecky, was able to suppress all the liberalising tendencies of the post-Stalin thaw. 89 Having thus delayed destalinization which was sweeping through Poland, Hungary and the Soviet Union, Novotny paid increased attention to Slovakia where the dangers to his policies were greatest. In an attempt to subdue the passive resistance of the Slovaks and to break the nationalist spirit pulsating there in spite of purges, expulsions and bolshevist vigilance, Novotny further tightened the screw of Czech centralism. He introduced new administrative steps aimed at a more thorough control and reorganized the existing economic, cultural and social structure of the country. In this reorganization several Slovak industrial enterprises and cultural associations lost even their nominal independence and were integrated with their Czech counterparts into more compact "Czechoslovak" bodies.90 89) Kopecky's version of how the Party fought and defeated "revisionism" among the intellectuals is graphically, though one-sidedly, described in his book, CSR a KS(; (Praha, 1960), pp. 467-470. 90 ) These moves were allegedly designed for reasons of higher efficiency but the uneasy reluctance with which they were accepted in Slovakia indicates their insidious nature. Their implementation led to the dismissal of the President of the Slovak National Council, S. Sebesta, anct to renewed attacks on Slovak separatism by Bacilek, Kopecky, David, etc. �158 SLOVAKIA With regard to the Slovak political and administrative organs these were doomed to wither away by a devious method of ignoring their very existence. In spite of the fact that the Slovak regional organs were staffed by trusted Party members they were gradually reduced to complete inactivity. Though the Government was constitutionally obliged to appoint a Commissioner when new ministeries were created, this provision was, as a rule, ignored. 91 Under the mask of "Czechoslovak socialist patriotism" a new brand of undiluted Czech nationalism was superimposed on these centralist tendencies. Any opposition to this socialist Czechoslovakism was decried as bourgeois nationalism and one can see how often these accusations were levelled against the Slovaks after 1954.92 In an arrogant disregard of Slovak national aspirations the constitution which in May 1960 proclaimed CzechoSlovakia "a socialist country" further stripped the power of Slovakia's provincial government organs subordinating them completely to the Central Government. 93 This outrageous arrangement was presented as a final and satisfactory solution of the Slovak problem and the Party boasted in its official history that it had accomplished what the old capitalist system had found insoluble.94 However, the Slovak feelings about the situation are more aptly 91) E. Taborsk)', Communism in Czechoslov akia 1948-1960 (Princeton , N. J. , 1961), pp. 340-344. 92) V. ~iroky complained about it at the Tenth Congress of the KSS in April 1955; it was deplored in a leading article in Pravda of May 1st, 1956; in the aftermath of the Budapest revolt it was ruefully admitted "one of the weakest sectors of our ideological struggle is the struggle against bourgeois nationalism", Pravda of December 14th, 1956); in January 1958 it was violently denounced by K. Bacilek as having penetrated "into various fields of our cultural, political and scientific life, sports, state apparatus, economic organs, etc." Pravda of January 10th and 11th, 1958) ; again by K. Bacilek and V. Kopecky at the Eleventh Congress of the KSS in April 1958; etc. See also: Slovak Nationalism Revisited (Radio Free Europe Papers of November 11, 1965). 93) The Slovak Commissioners must "attend to further tasks in the economic and cultural construction of Slovakia to the extent determined by the central government" (Taborsky, Communism in Czechoslovakia 1948-1960 [Princeton, N. J., 1961], p. 339) . 94) Dejiny KS(; (Praha, 1961), pp. 697-698. �SLOVAKIA 159 summed up in the words of the former member of the Secretariat of the KSS and Party historian, M. Gosiorovsky: By the new adjustments of the Slovak national organs (which led to the aboli5hment of the Board of Commissioners, to the sub ordination of Slovak national offices directly to the Ministeries in Prague, etc.) the Slovak nation found itself in the position of the only nation in the entire Socialist camp which on its own ethnic territory lacked such organs of the Socialist governmental administration which would correspond to its development, its present living standard, its numerical strength and, above all, to its indispensability to become really and in every respect an equal partner with the brotherly Czech nation.95 VII. 1962-1967 Misruled and unrepresented, the Slovak Communists resented the continuos Czech interference, the Socialist brand of "Czechoslovakism" and above all the persistence of Stalinist methods and Stalinist leadership to which they were subjected. But there was little they could do about it while the Party was strong and enjoyed Krushchev's support. 96 But in 1961-62 the Party's grip on the overall control started to slacken. There were several factors which contributed to this: the stagnation of the country's economy, the Sino-Soviet dispute which now broke into the open, renewed attacks on Stalin at the XXIInd Soviet Party Congress (October 1961). In the ideological split the KSc had no choice but to side with Moscow. Thus circumstances compelled it to do more than pay lip service to the cause of destalinization. Destalinization finally reached Czecho-Slovakia in 1962-3 and its advent was symbolically ushered in by the demolition of the huge statue of Stalin overlooking Prague (November 1962). The year 1962, the year of the XIIth Congress of the KSC, was also a year of intense ferment, especially in 95) M. Gosiorovsky, K niektorym otazkam vzt'ahu cechov a siovakov v poiitike KSc, in Historicky casopis, No. 3/ 1968, p. 391. 96 Khrushchev's endorsement of the Party's Stalinist policies in 1957 was a very serious drawback for the opposing forces in the KSS who disliked Kopecky and Novotny's stiff measures against the Slovaks. Khrushchev on the occasion of his visit to Czecho-Slovakia declared (on July 11th, 1957): "The cause of Leninism in CzechoSlovakia is in good hands." (East Europe, 9/1957, p.41) . �160 SLOVAKIA Slovakia where the pent-up grievances gave rise to outspoken criticism of the excesses of the Stalinist era and of their perpetrators. The loudest critics of these abuses of naked power were the Slovak writers, journalists, scientists and other representatives of the intelligentsia. 97 The foremost task of destalinization was to rehabilitate the victims of the 1949-54 purges. Those bourgeois nationalists who were still alive were quietly released from prisons, but Novotny and his clique were most relucant to admit that the accusations of bourgeois nationalism were fabricated. Such an admission would make fabricators of Novotny, Siroky and most of the power-holders in CzechoSlovakia. Subjected to mounting pressure the Party allowed the released prisoners to apply for re-admission to Party membership. Many of them did and their applications for re-admission read like the most savage condemnation of Communist tyranny ever written. 98 These were widely cir97) The mouthpiece of the discontented and critical voice was the official organ of the Slovak Writers' Association , Kulturny zivot, which in 1963 published an impressive number of critical articles. An open forum at which many abuses and horrors of the past and of the present were exposed was the Conference of Slovak Writers in Bratislava (April 21-22nd, 1963). At the First Congress of the Association of Slovak Journalists (May 28-29th, 1963) the wrongs and injustices of the era were bitterly denounced by M. Hysko , who publicly attacked the then Prime Minister, V. Siroky, as the prime mover behind the false accusations of the "bourgeois nanationalist" comrades, (Pravda of June 3rd 1963). 98) Some of them (e.g. Husak's) found their way abroad, where extracts from them were pub!ished in the emigre press. For English translation of parts from Husak's application see: News Digest International (Sydney) 3/ 1966, pp. 55-57. In 1968 a large number of rehabilited Party officials (as well as many non-Party men ) described their experiences at the hands of their jailers. Husak's account was serialized in a weekly, Nove slovo, Holdos's in the daily, Smena, but the most graphic expose of the inhuman treatment to which the victims of the cult era were subjected is in E. Loebl's book Svedectvo o procese s vedenim protistatneho sprisahaneckeho centra na cele s Rudolfom Slanskym (Bratislava, 1968) . From among the non-Communist prisoners there is the account by playwright I. Stodola in Kulturny zivot and that of military officer D. Viest in Slovenske Pohl'ady. Different organizations and institutions started to publish grim statistics about the era of lawlessness. According to various calculations there were 160 death sentences in 1948-53. The Association of Anti-Fascist Fighters claimed that 30,000-40,000 of its members became victims �SLOVAKIA 161 culated in Slovakia and their impact was enormous. At one stage they caused an open rebellion against Czech rule. Novotny tried to counteract these outbursts of discontent and criticism but his voice was drowned in an ever-growing protest. 99 To save his own skin he had to sacrifice his most valuable accomplices (and the most hated men in Slovakia) namely K. Bacilek (in March 1963), and when that did not suffice, V. Siroky and J . Duris (in September 1963). Of course the situation was far more serious than could be rectified by the removal of a few compromised Party officials. The main culprit, A. Novotny, and his group weathered the storm of criticism by sheer perseverance and stubbornness and with Moscow's backing retained their monopoly of power. At the end of 1963 the situation in the KSS differed only very little from that before the XIIth Party Congress. The leadership of the KSS was entirely in the hands of Novotny's men, like Bil'ak, Chudik, Sabolcik, Lenart, salgovic, Barbirek, Dvorsky, Cvik, Daubner, etc. In his selection Novotny was particularly careful to pick for his service people whose only qualification was blind following of the official Party line.No person of independent views or strong personal conviction made his way up the Party ladder. The most pathetic group in the Slovak political scene were the rehabilitated bourgeois nationalists. Though exonerated from their alleged crimes and officially "fully of judical and political persecution. The unlawfully sentenced citizens even founded their own organization "K 231". But the most moving (and damning) indictment of the cruelty of the Communist regime was the Resolution of the members of various religious orders presented to the Ministry of Culture and Information on April 17, 1968. It was signed by 6,174 religious who spent altogether 32,016 years in prison. (See Katoiicke noviny, May 5, 1968). 99) Novotny replied to the criticism of the Slovak Communist intellectuals on June 12th, 1963 at Kosice. He defended Siroky, maintaining that the accusations of bourgeois nationalism were " substantially right" ( Prav da of June 13th, 1963). He sharply reprimanded and vilified two Slovak critics of his policies, M. Hysko and R. Kalisky, branding them as "irresponsible scribblers" (pisalkove ). R. Kalisky replied in kind and his long letter (of 30 pages) to "comrade President" lists a comprehensive catalogue of Czech wrongdoings towards the Slovaks. This letter was also widely read in Slovakia and heartily approved by all sections of the community. �162 SLOVAKIA rehabilitated" they still were doomed to remain in a political wilderness, hoping against hope for some miracle which would restore their earlier status. Their hopes could not have been realized without a major upheavel within the Party. They were, after all, striving and clamouring after positions which were held by their former judges and jailers, by men who had advanced literally over their "dead bodies". These men knew only too well to whom they owed their posts and what was expected of them in return. This state of affairs could not have been without impact on the Party's membership. Headed by uninspiring and subservient leaders, the KSS had become a living mockery of Lenin's conception of a Communist Party. The solution of the Slovak problem in 1962-67 advanced very little, if at all. The request of the Slovak intellectuals to federate Czecho-Slovakia according to the Soviet or Yugoslav model was rejected outright. 100 The Czechs were the dominant nation in a state "of two brotherly nations of equal rights" (as it is solemnly written in the 1960 Constitution) and continued to enjoy a disproportionately high number of prestige-bearing positions in the Party organs, State administration, diplomatic service, army, etc. The dissatisfaction in all strata of the Slovak community was there for everybody to see. If any concessions were made, these were only formal and completely unsatisfactory. Thus in 1964 the term "poverenik" (Commissioner), abolished in 1960, was reintroduced and in a common declaration of the Central Committee of both Parties (i.e. KS(:; and KSS) of May 7, 1964 it was announced that the Slovak National Council would participate "more fully" in all spheres of Slovak public life. 101 But there was no visible improvement, no advancement towards a fuller participation of regional organs in Slovakia's administration. In spite of all this crude nationalistic discrimination, in spite of obvious economic, political and cultural failures, 100) This proposal, the authorship of which is attributed to an erstwhile Party historian, M. Gosiorovsky, was rejected by Prague through its Slovak mouthpiece, M. Chudik (President of the Slovak National Council. According to Chudik the Slovak people did not wish any federation (Rude pravo of November 13th, 1965). 101 ) Za plnsie uplatnenie Slovenskej narodnej rady, (Bratislava, 1964). �SLOVAKIA 163 Novotny somehow managed to retain and even consolidate his personal power at the XIIIth Party Congress (MayJune, 1966). The Congress was a rather dull and uneventful affair: only those speakers were admitted who endorsed Novotny's policies. A lengthy and critical report on the economic situation and the much talked-about "new economic model" was to be delivered by Prof. 0. sik, but what finally emerged was a very mild substitute. The Central Committee elected a 10-man Party Presidium, in which there were three Slovaks (Dubcek, Lenart, Chudik). Among the Presidium candidates there were two more Slovaks ( Sabolcik and Sadovsky). The promised and expected reform which was to put Slovak-Czech relations on an entirely new basis did not materialize .102 VIII. 1967-1968 The situation had become unbearable by 1967. The forces of discontent were gathering momentum. Up to 1966-7 the main source of opposition to the Novotny regime was in Slovakia, where his treatment of the Slovak peoples and institutions provoked almost universal hatred. This resentment was gradually percolating into the all-state Party leadership. In 1967 Novotny's obstinacy to the "new economic model" caused further polarization of the leadership into the "dogmatists" and the "liberals". The economic reform could succeed only if coupled with decentralization and with a loosening of the tight dictatorial regime. Any relaxation on the political front immediately brought forward a demand for a thorough-going rehabilitation and undoing of the "mistakes of the cult era". The combined impact of these factors (i.e. the Slovak question, economy and uneasy liberalization) eventually led to the fall of A. Novotny. These grumblings came first to the attention of the outside world in June 1967, when the writers used their IVth Congress as a tribunal for a passionate denunciation 102) The Slovak writer, V. Mihalik ( member of the Central Committee of the KSS ) revealed (in Kulturny zivot 8/1966, p. 1) that the Party was preparing "an important document" aimed at the improvem1mt in Slovak-Czech relations. The document was to be tabled at the Thirteenth Congress of the KSc (May, 1966 ). Bu t it was not, and nothing has been heard about it since. �164 SLOVAKIA of naked power and for a bitter condemnation of the Party's performance in the last two decades. 103 The Party-always very sensitive to criticism-hit back hard in Oct. 1967. The principal culprits were expelled from the Party, dismissed from their professional posts, and their official journal, "Literarni noviny", was taken away from them. An attempt was made to exploit the existing difference between the Slovak and Czech writers and to play both groups against each other. But the Slovaks, at their meeting with the Slovak Party leaders on Oct. 16, 1967, briskly declined the honour of being the Party's favourites at the expense of their Czech colleagues. 104 Another indication of the stresses and strains at the top was the criticism at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the KSc in Sept. 1967 of the implementation of the new economic model. It was, perhaps, symptomatic that the Slovak Party Secretary, A. Dubcek, accused the government 9f discriminatory policies towards Slovakia. He charged that "the results for the first half of 1967 show that investments in Slovak industry totalled 21.9 1/r of the state investments and not 28 % as was laid in the directives of the XIIIth Party Congress". 105 The struggle for power was now on and manifested itself again at the Central Committee meeting in Oct. 1967, where the Slovak Party leaders in an unheard-of move demanded that Novotny abandon one of the two top functions he held (i.e. the First Party Secretary and the President of the State) . Novotny sensed the gravity of the 103) See IV. Sjezd Svazu ceskoslovenskych spisovatelti, Praha 27. - 29. cervna 1967, (Praha, 1968), especially the speeches by M. Kundera (pp. 22-27) , P . Kohout (pp. 39-43), A. J. Liehm (pp. 99-204) and, above all, that of L. Vaculik ( pp. 141-150). The Slovak writers played a rather passive role at this gathering and their over-all performance was to become a source of serious embarrassment in the subsequent months. A heated dispute about the action of some Slovak writers (Mihalik, Spitzer, Valek, Minac, Kostra, Matu~ka, Rosenbaum , Egri, Luknar, Ponican as well as 9 Czech writers) who in their letter supported the party's policies in the cultural sphere (pp. 157-159 ) eventually led (in December 1968) to the collapse of the Slovak Writers' Union. See M. Resutik Rozlomeny svaz in Nove slovo No. 1/ 1969, p. 11. 104 ) Svedectvi (Paris) No. 32-33 / 1968, pp. 89-116. 105 ) Pravda (Bratislava), Sept. 29, 1967. �SLOVAKIA 165 situation and in December he invited Brezhnev to come to Prague to bolster his position. But Brezhnev's visit (Dec. 8 )-if anything-made the situation worse . The next meeting of the Central Committee (Dec. 19-21, 1967) dealt Novotny the final blow and made his position untenable. At the following meeting of the Central Committee, a fortnight later, Novotny was finally voted out of office and replaced by Alexander Dubcek, who till then was considered N ovotny's man in Slovakia. Outside his native Slovakia Dubcek was a completely unknown personality .106 The key role-and this should be stressed again and again-in N ovotny's downfall was played by the Slovaks who found themselves in their socialist homeland economically exploited, nationally humiliated, culturally neglected and ruled as a colony by their Czech partners. Novotny, in his last speech as Party Secretary (New Year's speech, 1968) , tried to placate the Slovaks with the promise of a more generous economic consideration for Slovakia: " The need of nationwide industrial development must not obscure the important task of priority development of Slovakia which still has not reached the average economic level of the Czech regions". 107 But the offer was "too little too late". The new leadership of the KSc put the question of Slovakia as the number one problem to be tackled by them. Prague radio said on Jan. 5, 1968: "The Central Committee took note of the fact that the government and the Presidium of the Slovak National Council will submit to the Party organs, on the basis of thorough situation analyses, specific proposals for perfecting their activities." The activities of the Slovak National Council being almost non-existent needed much more than perfecting. In his speech at the 20th anniversary of the Communist coup of February 1948, Dubcek spelt out the current difficulties which were troubling his leadership: "Many faults 106) For backgro und to Dubcek's personality see, e. g. F . Vnuk, Alexander Dubcek - tragedia poctiv eho komunistu in Kalendar Jednota 1969 (Middletown, Pa. , 1968), pp. 173-181. Also T. Szulc, A loo/c at Alexander Dubcek - the aparatchik who made a revoluti on in N . Y . Times (Weekly Review) , Jan. 12, 1969. 107) Pravda (Bratislava), Jan. 2, 1968. �166 SLOVAKIA have occured in internal Party life ... (where) the struggle between the progressive and conservative forces has not yet been concluded . . . ( There are) serious difficulties in the economy ... In our relations with the Slovak national organs we must rectify what was wrongfully violated after 1960 and things must be rearranged in such a way as to bring them in line with the contemporary stage of development of the state as a whole." 108 After this admission from the highest Party official things in Slovakia started to happen. M. Chudik (member of the Presidium of the KSc), N ovotny's stooge in Slovakia who was acting as Chairman of the Slovak National Council, hurriedly submitted his resignation. But he was not to be allowed to bow out as gracefully as that; he was dismissed in ignominy instead, on March 14, 1968. Having discarded its incompetent boss the Slovak National Council immediately published a resolution demanding that CzechoSlovakia become a federation. A new constitution to replace the one of 1960 was to give full legislative power to the Slovak National Council in all except foreign affairs, defense and state finances. Slovakia was to have a separate government. 109 In March the so-called "Czecho-Slovak spring" really started and the whole country was undergoing radical changes. Novotny's Party apparatus was falling to pieces. There was the defection to the West of Major-General Jan sejna; the resignation of the Trade Unions leader Pastytik; the dismissal of Chudik; the removal from office of the Interior Minister Kudrna and Prosecutor-General Bartuska; the suicide of Deputy Defense Minister V. Janko and Vice-President of the Supreme Court J. Brest'ansky; ousting of the chief Party ideologue J. Hendrych and the fall from the Presidency of Novotny himself. All this happened in the space of four weeks and had tremendous impact on the people. These events necessitated a new reorganization of the Party and the government. The five-day session of the Central Committee of the KSc named a new Presidium on April 1, 1968, in which Slovakia was given the largest 108 ) Pravda (Bratislava) , Feb. 23 , 1968. 109) Pravda (Bratislava), March 15, 1968. �SLOVAKIA 167 representation ever : 4 in 11. 110 In the Secretariat there were 3 Slovaks out of 9 members (Dubcek-the First Secretary, Lenart, Sadovsky). On April 9 a new Cabinet was sworn in by Novotny's successor in the Presidency, General L. Svoboda. At the head of the new government stood 0. cernik. There were 5 deputy Prime Ministers and 23 Ministers. Here too the Slovaks were treated much more generously than ever before: 2 deputy Prime Ministers and 6 Ministers were from Slovakia. One of the deputy Prime Ministers was Gustav Husak, a rehabilitated Slovak "bourgeois nationalist". On April 10, 1968 the Party published its " Action Program",111 an ambitious document setting out " CzechoSlovakia's road towards socialism" and outlining the political and economic reforms by which it was to achieve one-party rule, mollified by the active participation of the non-party sections of the population. The Slovak question again figured prominently in the Program. A new symmetric federative arrangement of the state was proposed and the Slovaks were promised: 1. Slovak National Council and Council of Ministers (instead of the old Board of Commissioners), 2. Slovak national committees, 3. Autonomy in planning and budgeting for Slovakia, 4. State secretaries in those central ministerial departments where Ministers were Czechs, 5. Guarantee of Slovak rights against the Czech majority, 6. Adequate Slovak representation in the army, diplomatic service, etc. 112 In the less oppressive atmosphere of the day and in the absence of overt censorship public opinion soon started to exert pressure from below. This resulted first of all in the resignation or removal from the scene of those men who were closely linked with Novotny and his• dictatorial policies. To purge Novotny's followers from the Central llO ) They were Dubcek, Rigo, Bil'ak and Barbirek. Their nomina tion was accepted in Slovakia with some scepticism and their credentials as Slovaks were immediately questioned. It was pointed out that Rigo was a Gypsy, Bil'ak was a Ruthenian and Barbirek though born in Bratislava- was a Czech. And, of course, everybody knew that Dubcek had spent his childhood and adolescence (192438 ) in the Soviet Union. 111 ) A kcni Program KS(: pfijaty na p leruirni zasedani OV KS(: dne 5. du bna 1968, Praha 1968. ll 2 ) Akcni Program ...", pp. 27-28. �168 SLOVAKIA Committee of the KSc the masses demanded an extraordinary Party congress. Under the effect of ever-mounting pressure the Party leaders with some reluctance consented at last to convene it in September 1968. In Slovakia the burning question was that of federation. Obcession with this issue was so intense that little room was left for anything else. There was a minor controversy between two groups of Slovak intellectuals as to whether it was more correct to insist on federation before democratization or vice versa. This was, however, only a question of emphasis: the demand for federalization was almost unanimous. In the Czech lands the problem of federalization was hardly mentioned, and if at all, then not in a manner encouraging for the Slovaks. A public opinion poll revealed that 95 % of Slovaks were for federation and 90 ';c of Czechs against it. 113 The Czechs did not like to be reminded that federation was something the Slovaks were promised more than once in the past 50 years and hence long overdue. They preferred to dismiss the whole thing as an unrealistic and untimely affair of no concern to themselves. The famous "2000 words Manifesto" even suggested that in Slovakia the federation issue would be used as a shield by many old conservatives who would thus survive the democratization process: "Federation alone will not provide better living standards for either the Czechs or Slovaks, neither will it solve their economic and social problems. The rule of the Party-state bureaucracy may still survive especially in Slovakia, because there it could claim a victory in the fight by which greater freedom was gained (for the Slovaks) ."114 113) There were several surveys of public opinion on this issue. Obrana l'udu (June 1, 1968) cites the results of another survey, according to which the Slovaks were for federation "almost 100%", while in the Czech lands federation was favored by only 5% of those questioned! 114) For the full text of this Manifesto see Literarni Listy (June 27, 1968). The Soviet press called "2000 words" an "action program for the counter-revolution" (Literaturnaya Gazeta, July 10, 1968) , Dubcek deplored it as a "very serious obstacle to the further development of socialist democracy and society" (Rude pravo , June 29, 1968), S. Kodaj (Party official in East Slovakia) denounced it as "an open call for counter-revolution". In fact it was a call for pressure from below to get the Party to purge from �SLOVAKIA 169 This unkind remark in a document which so outraged the Soviet leaders and embarrassed the Communist leaders in Czecho-Slovakia, elicited a reply in the form of an open letter signed by over 200 Slovak intellectuals and intitled, "A word to the Czechs, and also Slovaks, who are worthy of it". In this response the Slovaks complained bitterly about the outrageous distortion of Slovak history by Czech officialdom ("From Shir's followers down to the men who led the uprising of 1944 nobody was good enough if he was a good Slovak first") and then defended their insistence on "federation without delay": "In today's democratization process the present inferior position of Slovakia is simply no longer tenable".11 5 No prominent political personality figured among those who signed the letter, yet the Czechs suspected that its instigator was Dr. Gustav Husak. The Deputy Prime Minister G. Husak was the most dynamic personality in the reactivated life of the KSS. 116 He re-emerged (after being sentenced to life inprisonment as a "bourgeois nationalist" in 1954) as a sworn enemy of Novotny and all his hangers-on in Slovakia. At the same time he was resolved to reassert as much an independent Slovak voice in the state and Party politics as possible. He still remained what he always had been, an orthodox and autocratic Communist at heart, but his hatred of Novotny put him in the one camp with the liberals. His uncompromising stand on immediate and comprehensive federalization assured him of a strong following in Slovakia. He was not even a member of the Central Committee of the KSS, yet his political influence in Slovakia was second to none. Early in July he swayed the regional Party conference in Bratislava to press for the KSS congress to be held in August 1968 (i.e. before the scheduled KSc Congress ) so that the Slovaks would come to the XIVth extraordinary Congress of the KSc with their own specific all positions of power the men who had been responsible for the country's political, economic, moral and cultural decline. For the English translation of the whole document see East Europe No. 8/ 1968, pp. 25-28. 115) Slovo cechom aj Slovakom sucim na slovo in Nove slovo, No. 11/ 1968, pp. 1-3. 116) For a short biography of G. Husak read F. Vnuk's O Husakovi zrwva a v iacej in Kalendcir Jednota 1968, (Middletown, Pa., 1967, pp. 87-98). �170 SLOVAKIA proposals ( already approved by the KSS Congress) of the federalization scheme. 117 The internal development in Czecho-Slovakia since January and especially since March 1968 was a cause of serious concern in the Soviet Union and neighbouring people's democracies. The events in Czecho-Slovakia were directly connected with the students' demonstrations in Poland which produced a crisis in the Polish Party leadership. Afraid of similar consequences in East Germany Ulbricht imposed a ban on the German-language newspaper from Czecho-Slovakia. The Ukrainian-language broadcast from Presov found keen listeners in the south-western part of the Soviet Union and caused uneasiness and discomfort to the Soviet Party leaders, to Ukrainian Party boss Shelest in particular. Dubcek and his colleagues were repeatedly summoned to Moscow, Dresden, Warsaw, while their counterparts from the other Socialist countries were arriving in Prague trying their best to stop the process which in Dubcek's eyes was democratic and humanizing, in theirs counter-revolutionary and revisionist. Then on July 15, 1968 the Central Committee of the KSc received a common letter from the "fraternal" Parties of the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria. They found the situation in Czecho-Slovakia "absolutely unacceptable for a socialist country". The catalogue of errors and faults was long and comprehensive and reflected their own fears and apprehensions. Only one aspect of the post-January development in the country was condoned without disapproval: "We welcome the rectification in the relations between the Czechs and Slovaks on a sound basis of brotherly collaboration within the framework of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic". 118 The recipients of this "Warsaw letter" did not leave these accusations unanswered and refuted them one by one. In their written reply they stated emphatically: "We do not see any realistic reasons which would entitle you to assert that our present situation should be branded as counter-revolutionary."119 The Party Secretary Dubcek went 117) Pravda (Bratislava), July 7, 1968. 118) Prav da (Bratislava) , Special edition, July 18, 1968. 119) ib. �SLOVAKIA 171 on the air to reassure his countrymen (on July 18, 1968): "We do not want to abandon anything at all from our principles." The outcome of this correspondence was the confrontation between the 11-man Soviet Politburo and the entire 11-man KSc Presidium at cierna nad Tisou (July 29-Aug. 1, 1968), and afterwards the multilateral "comradely" meeting at Bratislava on Aug. 3. The official communique was inconclusive and the whole outcome of the conference was rather dubious. 120 Both participants ( i. e. the KSC on the one hand and the Communist Parties of the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria on the other) were convinced that they had successfully defended their own tenets of socialism. In a nationwide broadcast Dubcek again attempted to calm his fellow citizens: "You can be fully satisfied with the results and the spirit of the talks. We have kept our promises (i.e. not to deviate from the post-January course)." It sounded too good to be true. For the next 18 days Czecho-Slovakia lived in a fool's paradise, while the Red Army, under the pretext of largescale manoeuvres, was preparing the invasion of CzechoSlovakia. On Aug. 20-21, 1968, in defiance of their solemn promises to respect the national independence of every Socialist country, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces of five Communist countries invaded Czecho-Slovakia and put a sudden end to the great democratization experiment. In this gesture of Cain-like brotherhood Communism displayed its fear of democratization, its abhorrence of freedom, its inability to satisfy even the most elementary of human desires. It demonstrated that Communism cannot be liberalized without ceasing to be Communism. During that fateful night of Aug. 20-21 the progressive leaders of the KSc were kidnapped and taken in chains to Russia. This high-handed action of the Socialist allies 121 provoked a loud and indignant outcry all over the world, and-most unexpectedly-a resolute condemnation by the majority of the world Communist Parties, including those of China, Yugoslavia, Rumania, France, Italy, Great Britain, 120) Pravda (Bratislava), Aug. 4, 1968. 121) A Chronology of Occupation in East Europe, No. 10/ 1968,pp. 38-46. �172 SLOVAKIA Australia, etc. But by far the most effective was the reaction the Soviets encountered in the occupied country. It is impossible to describe in detail the ingenious methods of the passive and less passive resistance by which the Slovaks and Czechs frustrated the occupiers' efforts to "normalize the situation". The invasion united the Czech and Slovak nation in their opposition to this cruel act. But it appears that there was much less unity of action in the Party ranks. The KSS refused to back unconditionally the activities of the KSc in the first post-invasion days. The XIVth extraordinary Congress of the KSc, scheduled for Sept. 9 was hurriedly convened and took place during the night of Aug. 22 under the very nose of the occupying troops in a big Prague factory ( cKD plant) . The delegates (1095 out of 1543 expected to attend) elected a new Committee of 144 members. Of these 118 were new members and only 26 belonged to the old Central Committee. The representation from Slovakia amounted to 42 members, an unprecedented proportion, and there were 8 Slovaks in the 28-man Presidium: Dubcek, Husak, Zrak, 1'azky, Sadovsky, Colotka, Turcek, Pavlenda, Samel (?). 122 This should have satisfied the Slovaks, but it did not. The Soviets denounced the XIVth Congress in the most violent terms and did their utmost to undo it. According to Western reports the secret protocol drawn-up at the conclusion of the Czechoslovak-Soviet "negotiations" (sit venia verbi) on Aug. 28, 1968 contained 14 demands, one of which asked for the invalidation of the XIVth congress . As it happened this was the first thing the Russians succeeded in obtaining. A key role in making this congress into an "unevent" was played by G. Husak who was one of the negotiators in Moscow. While he was abroad the extraordinary Congress of the KSS started ( on Aug. 26 ). Husak returned just in time to deliver his address on the last day of the session. In his speech he questioned the legality of the XIVth Congress of the KSc and advised the delegates to the KSS Congress to reverse their stand taken three days earlier and to disavow the XIVth extraordinary Congress of the KSc. Husak argued that at the XIVth congress the Slovak representatives to the Party 122) Prav da (Bratislava ), Special edition, Aug. 25, 1968. �SLOVAKIA 173 organs were elected "illegally" ... "undemocratically", that "out of 300 Slovak delegates selected to attend the congress proceedings only 4, later 22, and towards the end about 40 were present". 123 In complete disregard of the fact that it was the Russians who had prevented the Slovak delegates from participating at the Congress Husak addressed his indignant reproaches at those who elected him to the Party Presidium: "Nobody can impose on a sovereign nation and its party its will in a way we have witnessed, namely that a little group of people entrusted by nobody should determine the nation's political representation."124 Of course Husak's anger and fury would have been even greater if the XIVth Congress had failed to nominate him or some of his close associates to the position in the top Party hierarchy. His rhetoric was just a clumsy display of the heads-I-win-tails-you-lose tactics. In sharp contrast to the XIVth Congress of the KSC, the Congress of the KSS was allowed to proceed undisturbed. It was attended by 607 of the 638 choosen delegates. It elected a 131-man Central Committee and a 12-member Presidium composed of Husak, Bod'a, Falt'an, Harencar, Klokoc, Luptak, Novomesky, Pavlenda, Sadovsky, Sedlakova, 'l'azky and Zrak. The 7-man Secretariat consisted of G. Husak (First Secretary) , L. Abraham, B . Graca (ideological spokesman ) , V. Pavlenda, S . Sadovsky, J. Turcek and J . Zrak. This was an entirely new team personally hand-picked by Husak. All of Novotny's men and Husak's opponents were either ousted (Bil'ak, Sabolcik, Pecha, Riga, Kriz, Hruskovic, Dvorsky, etc.) or demoted to ordinary Central Committee membership (Janik, Barbirek, Zupka, etc.). In the resolution of the Congress the Plenum took a stand on a number of current issues created by the presence of Warsaw Pact troops in Slovakia, but the only problem it tackled with determination and vigour was that of federation. Husak said in his concluding address: "I recommend that we approve . . . our insistence on the federative rearangement of our state on the basis of principles outlined earlier and it should be enacted by Oct. 28 this year." 125 In the subsequent weeks the Slovak Communists pursued this 123 ) Pravda (Bratislava) , Aug. 30, 1968. 124) Smena, Aug. 30, 1968. 125) Pravda (Bratislava) , Aug. 30, 1968. �174 SLOVAKIA point of their program forcefully and relentlessly to its logical conclusion. The federation was indeed enacted on Oct. 27, 1968 and put into practice on Jan. 1, 1969. Today's Czecho-Slovakia consist of two Socialist republics, the Czech and the Slovak, with three governments, Czech, Slovak and Central. It can be said that federation is the only paragraph salvaged from the ambitious Action program of Dubcek's leadership. The draft of the new Party statutes was published for discussion early in April 1968 and it proposed that the Party too should be reorganized on federal lines. 126 It envisaged the Communist Party of the Czech lands and the Communist Party of Slovakia to deal with internal and domestic matters; for international representation and in matters which exceeded the limits of national competence there was to be a single representative of the two national parties, i. e. the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. This proposition was politely forgotten after August, 1968; the Russians apparently did not like it. (Of course there were many other things the Russians would loathe to see in.practice, such as the new concept of democratic centralism, election of all party organs by secret ballot, limited terms of service on regional and national party committees, etc.). Thus whilst the KSS achieved a funda• mental alteration in the structure of the state, it was unable to adjust the structural pattern of the Party to fit the new political situation. The KSS is still without counterpart in the Czech lands 127 However, under Husak's new leadership the KSS has undergone a remarkable revival. In its relation to the KSc it has become more aggressive and self-assertive. The days of blind obedience of the Party line drawn up in Prague have been replaced by an avowed and dedicated service 126) Rude pravo, Supplement, Aug. 10, 1968. 127) At the plenary session of the Central Committee of the KSCS on Nov. 14-17, 1968 a substitute-counterwei ght to the Central Committee and Presidium of the KSS was set up: the so-called Party's Bureau for the Czech regions. It functions within the framework of the Central Committee of the KSCS, consists of 11 men and is headed by L. Strougal, assisted by two Secretaries (V. Hula and J . Kozel). The weekly journal "Tribuna" is its official organ. The only better known personality in the Bureau (beside L. Strougal) is the Prime-Minister Cernik. �SLOVAKIA 175 to the needs of the nation. At least that was what G. Husak proclaimed at the KSS Congress: "Let this Party rid itself of everything which is irresolute, everything which is opportunistic, let endure in it all that is firm, noble and prepared to struggle for the rights of this nation. 128 It remains to be seen to what extent the KSS will be able to realize this resolve. The strongman Husak was known to have made similar speeches in 1945-48, but after 1948 he was gradually silenced, removed from his Party posts and eventually imprisoned. So far he has succeeded in bringing about federalization of the state, but in the process he has antagonized a few influential groups in Slovakia (liberal writers, journalists, intellectuals) and the majority of the Czech population. He is being depicted in the Western press as a man who enjoys the trust of the Russians, as the man who annulled the XIVth Congress of the KSc, as the man who was instrumental in the removal of Smrkovsky, etc. 129 The conflict and dialectical contradictions between the Czechs and Slovaks are at present as acute as ever. Federation solved one old problem but generated at least a dozen new ones. The part played by the KSS in Slovak national history shows too much on the debit side and very little on the credit side. In the years 1948-67 the KSS was without doubt the most powerful single factor in shaping Slovakia's history. Yet in most instances it was a force which, with cynicism and arrogance, stood as a stumbling-block between the nation and its freedom, between the people and their political and cultural self-expression. In those years the KSS was just a tool of terror and intimidation wielded by a foreign oppressor over the Slovak masses. These things were openly stated in many sensational revelations 128) Smena, Aug. 30, 1968. A question can be asked at this point as to how much the Party membership will drop if it is going to rid itself of everything which is opportunistic and irresolute and retain only that which is firm and noble. In 1968, just before the Soviet invasion the Party had in Slovakia 220,000 organized members, i. e. less than 6% of the population. If Husiik's criteria are applied this number can only decrease. 129) See e.g. the article of L. Vlasic: Pohyb s cudnym pozadim in Nove slovo, No. 1/ 1969, pp. 3 and 14. Also Husiik's speech at the Plenary session of the Central Committee KSC-S (Rude pravo, Jan. 21 , 1969, p. 7) . �SLOVAKIA 176 which appeared in the censorship-free press during the March-August period of the Dubcek era. The new leadership of the KSS has repeatedly stated that the return of the old days is out of the question. Yet (apart from federation) one witnesses almost daily a gradual retreat from the gains and achievements of the liberalization process. The presence of Red Army units in the country (now sanctioned by a treaty) makes certain that the conditions imposed on the KSC leadership on Aug. 28, 1968 are being implemented. How-under these circumstances-will the KSS safeguard the interests of the nation? Time alone will tell. Appendix I. N umerical representation from Slovakia in the Central Committee. Presidium-Politburo and Secretariat-Orgburo of the KS(: (including candidates) in 1921-1968. Members in Members in Members in KSC. Seer. C. Committee KS(: Presid. Party Congress - -- Merger-Congress (1921) I 36 6 16.6 I. Congress ( 1923) I 26 5 19.4 II. Congress ( 1924) 50 6 12.0 52 III. Congress ( 1925) 6 11.5 52 IV. Congress ( 1927) 5 from Nov. 1928 I ? I ? 9/ V. Congress ( 1929) 52 1 4 7.7 4 7.8 51 VI. Congress (1931) 8 16.0 50 VII. Congress (1936) ? ? Exile KS(: (Mose., '38) ? ? ? Exile KS(: Paris, 1939) ? ? ? ? Exile KS(: (Mose., '43) Post-war KSC (Ko~ .• '45) I 21 10 47.7 VIII. Congress ( 1946 ) I 101 0 0.0 170? 32 18.8 from July 1948 108 22 20.2 IX. Congress ( 1949) 112 23 20.3 X. Congress (1954) 147 33 22.5 XI. Congress (1958) 147 30 20.4 XII. Congress ( 1962) 166 28 16.8 XIII. Congress ( 1966 ) ? ? ? from Jan. 1968 XIV. extraordinary ('68) I 144 42 29.2 1921-1968 ll485j 254 j 17.8 II I i I 12 8 9 9 11 15 17 10 12 7 3 7 7 14 18 21 11 15 12 15 19 28 270 I - -- - - 0 0.0 -- --0 0.0 -- --7 1 11.0 0 0.0 1 14.6 7 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 0 0.0 2 33.3 6 3 20.0 1 20.0 5 1 5.9 ? ? ? 1 10.0 4 1 8.3 1 25.0 0 0.0 No 1 33.3 Secretariat 0 0.0 2 28.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 elected 2 9.5 1 14.6 7 2 18.2 0 0.0 6 1 12.5 4 26.6 8 1 12.5 4 33.3 8 0 0.0 8 5 33.3 0 0.0 6 31.5 ? ? 8 28.6 41 j 15.2 jj 79 j 8 I 10.1 /I �SLOVAKIA 177 Append.ix II. The Leadership of the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) . (The office holders of the top Party positions in 1939-1969) A. ILLEGAL KSS. First Committee (March 1939-Aug. 1941): I;, Benada, J. Duris, J. Osoha. Second Committee (Sept. 1941- April 1942): 0. Krajnak, J . Osoha, V. Skrabala. Third Committee (June 1942- July 1942) : S. Dubcek, J. Lietavec, J. Osoha. Fourth Committee (July 1942- March 1943) : S. Bas t'ovansky, M. Hrusov- sky. Fifth Committee (Aug. 1943- Sept. 1944): G. Husak, L. Novomesky, K. Smidke. B. KSS IN POWER. M erger-Congress (Sept. 1944) President: K. Smidke. Vice-Presidents: G. Husak, J. Cech. Committee members : K. Bacilek, R. Balco, R. Blazovsky, F . cap, K. Dolinsky, D. Ertl, I. Frlicka, 0. Jelen, J. Lietavec, J . Mazur, L. Novomesky, J . Pull, J . Soltesz, M. Smida, J . Sziics, L. Viktorin. Nati onal Conference at Zilina (Aug. 1945) Presidium - President: V. Siroky. Vice-President: K. Smidke. Members : S. Bast'ovansky, J. :i'.>uris, L. Holdos, G. Husak, J . Soltesz, F . Zupka , M. Valachovic. Secretariat: K. Bacilek, S. Bast'ovansky, L. Holdos, E . FrR From Apr. 1946: K. Moskovic. IX Congress of the KSS (May 1950). Presidium - President: V. Siroky. First Secretary: S. Bast'ovansky. Members: K. Bacilek, I;. Benada, J. Branik, M. culen, J . :i'.>uris, M. Falt'an, K. Moskovic, J. Pull, S. Rais, E. Sykora, F . Zupka. Secretariat ( established in Oct. 1951) : V. Siroky, S. Bast'ovansky, J . Pull, K. Moskovic, M. Gosiorovsky. From Dec. 1951 also : P . David and I;. Benada. Xth Congress of the KSS (June 1953 ) . Presidium: K. Bacilek, I;. Benada, J . Branik, M. culen, P. David, M. Falt'an, J . Kriz, A. Michalicka, 0 . Pavlik, J . Pull, R. Strechaj , V. Siroky, F. Zupka. Secretariat: I;_ Benada, P . David, J . Kriz, A. Michalicka, J . Pull. ? Congress of the KSS (April 1955). Presidium: K. Bacilek, M. Bakula, I;. Benada, V. Daubner, P. David, 0. Jelen, P . Majling, R. Strechaj, J . Valo. Secretariat: K. Bacilek (First Secretary) , P . David, J . Kriz, A. Michalicka. �178 SLOVAKIA Extraordinary Con gress of the KSS (April 1957) . Presidium: K. Bacilek, ~- Benada, V. Daubner, P. David, M. Chudik, 0. Jelen , P. Majling, R. Strechaj, J . Valo. Xlth Congress of the KSS (May 1958). Presidium: K. Bacilek, ~- Benada, V. Daubner, P. David, M. Chudik, 0. Jelen , J . Kriz, P. Majling, J . Valo. Secretariat: K. Bacilek (First Secretary) , P. David, F . Dvorsky, J. Kriz, J . Lenart. Xllth Party Congress (Nov. 1962). Presidium: K. Bacilek, ~- Benada, V. Bil'ak, V. Daubner, P. David , M. Chudik, J . Lenart, M. Sabolcik. Secretariat: K. Bacilek (First Secretary till April 1963, when replaced by A. Dubcek) , V. Bil'ak, F . Dvorsky, J . Kriz, J. Lenart. Xlllth Congress of the KSS (May 1966). Presidium: F . Barbirek, V. Bil'ak, V. Daubner, A. Dubcek, H. :t'.lurkovic, M. Chudik, J . Janik, J. Lorine, M . Sabolcik. From Jan. 1968 also M. Hruskovic, R. Harencar, M. Pecho. Secretariat: A. Dubcek (First Secretary till Jan. 1968, when replaced by V. Bil'ak), J . Janik, M . Sabolcik, J. Zrak. XIVth Extraordinary Congress of the KSS (Aug. 1968). Presidium: G. Husak, K. Bod'a, S. Falt'an, R. Harencar, 0. Klokoc, s. Luptak, L . Novomesky, V. Pavlenda, s. Sadovsky, M. Sedlakova, A. 1'azky, J . Zrak. Secretariat: G. Husak (First Secretary), L. Abraham, B. Graca, V. Pavlenda, S. Sadovsky, J. Turcek, J. Zrak. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA as a Christian and democratic organization, is resolutely against the domination and exploitation of the Slovak nation by any other nation or political state; the Slovaks did not want to be ruled over by the Magyars and, today, do not want to be subservient to the Czech nation. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA is a CULTURAL and CIVIC organization of Americans of Slovak descent. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA wants to help Americans of Slovak descent in American political life, in business or professions, in social standing, and along educational lines. � SLOVAKIA 125 F. Vnuk: Fifty Years of Comn1unist Party of Slovakia (1918-1968) The first notable Slovak commentary on Communism was made by Marx's contemporary, :Cudovit stur. His assessment of Communism was an outright condemnation: "Communism, in spite of all efforts and false pretences to win for mankind its rights, only brings about its degradation, since it has no sound knowledge of mankind. Because of its insistence on principles which are impractical and unattainable Communism is one of the maddest figments ever originating in the human brain." 1 In the past forty years stur was much abused by the Slovak Communist intellectuals because of his alleged reactionary thinking. 2 Yet Stu.r's rejection of Communism seems to epitomize the Slovak attitude more fittingly than all the recent attempts by Communist historians to present Communism as a progressive ideology destined to uplift and enrich the Slovak nation. The inescapable geography which put Slovakia in Central Europe exposed the Slovaks to direct contact with political Communism as far back as 1918-19. Since then the Slovak nation has undergone the complete range of relations which can exist between a nation trying to assert its political identity and an aggressive ideology. These relations, full of drama, paradox and tragedy, are briefly outlined in this short history of the Communist Patry of Slovakia ( KSS). I. 1918-1921 The very beginning of the KSS is characteristic. The Party started its existence outside Slovakia, in Budapest. 1) In his major work, Slawentum imd die Welt der Zukunft, Quoted by D. Okali in Dav; spomienky a studie (Bratislava, 1965), p. 284. 2) e.g. L. Novomesky, in his pamphlet, Marx a slovensky narod (Mala kniznica Davu, 1933) and in his article, Karol Marx reviduje hist6riu Slovakov (Dav, 2/ 1933, pp. 18-19). �126 SLOVAKIA There in November 1918 Erno P6r, Minister for Foreign Propaganda in the Communist Government of Hungary, was entrusted by Bela Kun and Tibor Szamuely to organize the Slovak Communist Party as a section of the Communist Party of Hungary. 3 The Party conscripted into its ranks Slovak workers, apprentices and soldiers living in those days in defeated Hungary (particularly in Budapest, Ostrihom-Esztergom, Bekes-Csaba, etc. ). On March 27th, 1919 it began publication of its own daily, "Cervene noviny" (Red News ). 4 But the Party ran into difficulties when it had to find leaders for the conscripted Slovak proletarian masses. There was hardly a single Slovak of rank and stature to lend his name to the movement. Thus the reins were initially given into the hands of Jewish Socialist and Communist organizers in Budapest who could speak Slovak. To overcome this deficiency Bela Kun requested Lenin to send him some able Slovak Communist leaders from Russia, where a "Czecho-Slovak" Communist Party formed from the Czech and Slovak prisoners of war had been functioning since May 1918.5 But since there were no prominent Slovak personalities among these either, Lenin sent to Budapest the next best thing: the Czechs. Among these the most dynamic was one Antonin Janousek who arrived in Budapest in January 1919.6 After some disagreement with B. Kun (Janousek wanted to lead a Czecho-Slovak section; Kun and his advisors were strongly against it, seeing in it implicit recognition of the imperialistic policies of the Entente ) he 3 ) M. Vietor, Slovenska soviets/ca r epub lika (Bratislava, 1959), p. 53. 4) P. A. Toma, Slovak Soviet Repu blic of 1919 (The American Slavic and East European Review, 17/ 1958, p. 203 ). 5 ) D ej iny K SC (P raha, 1961 ), p. 17. 6) See: Z. Horeni, Antonin Jan ousek, predseda revolucnej v lady Slovenskej r epubliky rad (Bratislava, 1964). This accoun t of t he Slovak Soviet Republic is abstracted from the following books: K. A. Medvecky: Slovensk y prevrat I -IV (Trnava , 1930-31 ); Vpad bol'sevikov na Slov ensko ro ku 1919 (Trnava, 1936) : M. Vietor, Slovenskci soviet ska r epu bli ka 1919 (Bratislava, 1955); C. Holotik, 0 Slovenskej repub like rad r . 1919 (Historicky casopi s 2/ 1959); V. Kr al, lntervencni val ka cs. burzoazie proti mad'arske sovetske r epublice r . 1919 (Praha, 1954); K. Culen, 0 Slovenskej soviet ske j republike z ro ku 1919 (Kanadsky Slovak, May 19-June 9, 1956); P. A. Toma , Slovak Soviet Republic of 1919 (The American Slavic and East European Review, 17/ 1958, pp. 203-215 ). �SLOVAKIA 127 was made head of the Czech section of the Communist Party of Hungary on April 12, 1919. Towards the end of April the Slovak and the Czech sections were brought under common leadership but it was plainly stated that the Slovak section was to maintain its independence and individuality. There was never a Czecho-Slovak section of the Communist Party of Hungary. The most important .went in the life of this Slovak section was thf, proclamation of the Slovak Soviet Republic which lasted only two weeks but which has become a source of confused pride and political embarrassment to the contemporary Czech and Slovak socialist historiographers. On May 20th, 1919 the Hungarian Communist government, accusing the Czecho-Slovak armed forces of violation of the Paris Agreement, ordered its Red Army to invade Slovakia. Carried on the wave of proud Magyar national ism, humiliated by the 1918 defeat, the Magyar troops swept the southern and eastern plains of Slovakia. They took Lucenec on May 30th, Levice on June 1st, Nove Zamky on June 2nd, Kosice and Banska stiavnica on June 6th, Presov on June 8th, Bardejov on June 11th and penetrated as far into Central Slovakia as Zvolen. On June 3rd, 1919 "Oervene noviny" wrote exultantly: "The dictatorship of the proletariat is being established in Slovakia." The actual proclamation of the Slovak Soviet Republic took place at Presov on June 16th, 1919. It was ruled by the Provisional Revolutionary Executive Committee made up largely of Magyar-Jewish and Czech left-wingers. The only Slovak member of some significance was Stefan Stehlik. On June 20th, 1919 the Committee elected a Slovak Revolutionary governmem headed by Antonin Janousek. To T. G. Masaryk, who was residing in Prague as the elected President of Czecho-Slovakia, Janousek sent this challenging message: "We explicitly declare that from now on Slovakia belongs exclusively to the Slovak working class." 7 The donstitutional status of this short-lived Slovak Soviet Republic was obscure, but one thing was beyond doubt: it was violently anti-Czech and fiercely pro-Magyar. It aimed at the breaking up of Czecho-Slovakia and was 7) Quoted by. K. culen in Kanadsky Slovak (of May 26, 1956), p . 3. �128 SLOVAKIA openly and aggressively separatist. Both Kun and Lenin considered Czecho-Slovakia as a wilful creation of capitalist Powers and as a tool of imperialist policies in Central Europe. Czecho-Slovakia was alleged to deny the Slovak people "its inalienable right of self-determination" and the Communists in establishing the Slovak Soviet Republic were rectifying this injustice. 8 In spite of all its revolutionary zeal the Communistsponsored separatism did not strike roots among the Slovak masses. They were not only apathetic but manifestly hostile to the venture in which they saw only an ill-disguised attempt of the moribund Hungary to save its territorial integrity. The withdrawal of the Hungarian Red Army from Slovakia (June 28-July 4, 1919) spelled the inevitable end of both the Slovak Soviet Republic and the Slovak section of the Communist-Socialist Party of Hungary. The Slovak decision in 1918 to exchange their hopeless life tinder the Magyars for a hopeful life with the Czechs was final and irreversible. 9 But it was a decision fraught with problems and difficulties. Slovakia entered the newly formed Czecho-Slovakia as a land of poor peasants with practically no Slovak urban proletariat. The adherents and disseminators of the Socialist ideas were largely the German and Magyar ( or magyarized) workers who were as contemptuous of their Slovak comrades as Marx and Engels had been of the Czechs and Russians. This antipathy was 8) Stefan Stehlik wrote in Cervene noviny (of July 7, 1919) : " On Slovak soil, freed from imperialism, today there was created an independent Slovak Soviet Republic. The first impulsive action of the proletariat liberated from t he yoke of Czech imperialism was to realize the right of self-determination which is being exhorted by the oppressors with such a great glory; in reality however, it is being perverted by them . . . Slovak Soviet Republic turns its weapons ... against all who threaten this real unpe rverted democracy, this inallienable right of self-determination" (by which at that time they could have meant only the Prague Government). Quoted by P . A. Toma , op. cit. pp. 208-209. 9) The first years of the Slovak-Czech relationship and its reflection in Slovak political, social and economic life, are described at length in several authoritative works, e.g.: F . Peroutka, Budovani statu I -IV ( Praha 1933-36 ) ; J . Opocensky, Konec monarchie rakousko -tihorske ( Praha, 1928) . V. Chaloupecky, Zapas o Slovensko (Praha, 1930 ), I. Derer, siovensko v prevrate a po nom (Bratislava, 1924) ; K. Sidor, Andrej Hiinka 1864-1926 (Bratislava, 1936) . �SLOVAKIA 129 mutual and in their anti-Magyar feelings the leaders of the Slovak Social Democrats (Derer, Lehotsky, Markovic) were indistinguisha ble from their bourgeois counterparts (Hlinka, srobar, Hodza). Thus in the political sense the parties contesting the first post-war elections in Slovakia offered very much the same program. It was only in the field of social reform that they differed. Here the Social Democrats surpassed everybody in generosity, promising to implement many far-reaching social and economic measures. Their radical policies appealed to the people dissatisfied with the prevailing conditions. Thus in the general election of April, 1920 the Slovak people gave their votes to the Social Democratic Party led by Ivan Derer. 10 The Magyars and Germans of Slovakia who refused to join Derer's political platform founded a Social Democratic Party of their own. 11 After its electoral victory the Slovak Social Democratic Party lost much of its fighting spirit, adopted many right-wing policies of moderation and even passivity while the Magyar and German Social Democratic Party moved further to the left towards radicalism and turbulent activities. It was led by an able group of ruthless leaders (most of them Jews, several served as Commissars in the Hungarian Soviet Republic of Bela Kun) who were constantly harassing "the reformist Social Democratic government" of V. Tusar by fomenting strikes, unrests and other forms of trouble. 12 Their activities 13 became fatal to the Slovak Social Democratic Party which was rapidly sliding under Czech control and soon became identical with all the unpopular measures of the Government. The Slovak Social Democratic Party's inability to fulfil its pre-election promises or to prevent the economic ruination of Slovakia, and the subsequent wholesale unemploymen t, brought about a massive 10) The Social Democratic Party polled 510,341 out of 1,341,191 valid votes and obtained 23 deputies in the Prague National Assembly. 11) They received 108,546 votes and obtained 4 deputies. 12) J. Mlynarik, Robotnicke hn•itie na Slovensku roku 1920 (od parla• mentnych volieb do decembroveho genercilneho strajku). Historick)' casopis, I/ 1960, pp. 26-27) . 13) Their strongholds were four population centres in the Slovak-Magyar borderland: Bratislava, where the German-languag e, "Volksstimme" was published, Komarno, Gelnica and Ko~ice, where the Magyarlanguage, "Kassai Munkas", was published. �130 SLOVAKIA desertion of the rank anc'l file members within months after the election. 14 In the meantime the Magyar Social Democratic Party at Kosice joined (in May 1920) the Third International and invited the other proletarian parties of Slovakia to follow suit. This proclamation was eagerly listened to by many Social Democratic leaders dissatisfied with Derer's weak and inept leadership. 15 In September 1920 at the Party Congress at Turciansky Svaty Martin Derer failed to win a vote of confidence ( out of 132 delegates only 15 voted for him). Unwilling to accept defeat he proclaimed the handful of his followers to be the only true Slovaks and true Social Democrats by which he drove the dissidents into a coalition with the Magyar and German left-wing radicals. The fruits of this coalition ripened rapidly. On January 16-17, 1920 the left-wingers of the Slovak, Magyar and German Social Democracy, as well as the Jewish Poale Sion, met at ~ubochna and founded the Communist Party of Slovakia in everything but name. 16 It is interesting to look at the national composition of the delegates participating at this Congress. Out of 149 delegates with voting rights 88 were Slovaks, 36 Magyars, 15 Germans, 6 Ruthenes, 4 Jews. 17 The omission to register under its own name proved a very serious one for the future destinies of the KSS. Against 14 ) M. Strhan, Kriza priemyslu na Slov ensku v rokoch 1921-23 (Bratislava , 1960, pp. 15-80), J . Kramer, K dejinam priemyslu na Slovensku za prvej CSR (Bratislava, 1955). 15 ) ~- Holotik, Sjazd socialno-demokratickej strany (l'avice) na Slov ensku v januciri 1921 (Historicky casopis, 3/ 1963) , pp. 340-341. 16 ) 1921. Spomienky na vznik KS(: (Bratislava, 1962). The Czech dele gate at the Congress, I. Olbracht, requested the assembled repre- sentatives of the Slovak Left to postpone the adoption of the name " Communist Party of Slovakia" in order to be able to adopt the name " Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia" later on. See also Dejiny KS(: (Praha, 1961), pp. 165-166. 17 ) From the report of the voting commission, as quoted by M. Dzvonik 0 istom zakladajucom sjazde (Kulturny zivot, 7/ 1966, p. 6) . See also H. Gordon Skilling, The Formation of a Communist Party in Czechoslovakia (Slavic Review, 14/ 1955, p. 353). Skilling gives slightly different figures, viz. 92 Slovaks. However, it must be mentioned that these numbers are somewhat misleading, especially with regard to the Jews who were present in every national group, and the Magyars, many of whom were counted as Slovaks. �SLOVAKIA 131 the opposition of the Magyar delegates the Congress agreed to keep the question of the Party's name in abeyance. They decided to wait for developments in the Czech lands where the situation was ripening at a less r~pid rate. Finally at its XIVth Congress (in May 1921) the Czech Social Democratic Party formally accepted the ideological split in its ranks. Its left wing reconstituted itself as the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia ( KSc) immediately absorbing the Slovak section which, nameless and unaffiliated, had been waiting for four months for this moment.18 By this process the KSS lost its identity, becoming an anonymous partner in an unequal partnership. II. 1921-1929 The newly constituted KSC was from its beginning dominated by Czech-German leadership and looking largely after Czech national interest. Slovakia-because of the lack of native leading cadres-soon became a battlefield where the Czech and Magyar elements were fighting for influence . The Czechs were trying to woo the Slovak electorate by defending the existence of Czecho-Slovakia and the integrity of its territories. Already in September 1921 Klement Gottwald had become editor of a Slovak language Party paper, "Hlas l'udu" (People's Voice), and later in 1923 editor-inchief of another Commun.ist paper, "Pravda chudoby" (Poor Man's Truth). Other prominent Czech Party organizers who came to Slovakia in the early twenties included Karel Bacilek, Karel Schmidke and others. 19 While the Czechs concentrated mainly on the Slovak electorate, the Magyars tried to hold together a sizeable portion of the Magyar electorate by advocating revisionism, self-determination for ethnic minorities, etc. In the meantime Slovakia was becoming restive and in18) Dejiny KS(; (Praha , 1961) , pp. 170-172. While the Communist Party of Slovakia fused into the KSC smoothly and without murmur, the Communist Party of the Sudeten Germans (formed in March 1921 ) refused to amalgamate with the KSC . Its resistance was broken in November 1921 but only after Lenin's intervention. 19) Gottwald's activities in Slovakia, adorned with the socialist glamou;: of the cult era, are the object of a book by Z. Holotikova, Kl ement Gottwald na Slovensku v rokoch 1921-24 (Bratislava, 1953). Karel Schmidtke began to write his name as Karol Smidke only after 1945. �13l2 SLOVAKIA creasingly discontented with Czech administrative methods. economic and social discrimination and especially with the crude disregard of the Prague Government for the political aspirations of the Slovak natibn. The Slovaks were putting forward their demands for the promised autonomy but no one would listen. Even the KSC, dominated at the time by Czech nationalists, had only scorn for the Slovak demands. At its First Congress it declared: "Slovak autonomy is only a disguise to mask the tendencies aiming at the separation of the Slovak people from the cultural community and from national unity with the Czech nation." 20 This mistaken and unrealistic attitude was severely censured at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern in Moscow (June-July 1924) where the following resolution was adopted: 1. The Congress affirms that in Czecho-Slovakia there does not exist a single Czechoslovak nation and that the Czechoslovak state, in addition to the Czech nationality, consist of the following nationali ties: Slovak, German, Magyar, Ukrainian and Polish. 2. The Congress considers it necessary for the KSC, in connection with these national minorities, to proclaim and to follow the slogan of the right of a nation to self-determination, including the right to secession. In particular the KSC must support the struggle of the Slovaks for their independence and it must strive continuously to wrest this movement for independence out of the control of the nationalist bourgeoisie and to bring it into a common struggle of the working class against capitalism ... 21 For the Czech Communists it was a bitter pill to swallow. Under its impact the Czecho-Slovak delegation in Moscow was split into a majority and minority, the majori20) Protokol I. radneho sjezdu KSC (Praha, 1923 ), p. 14. In practice the KSC plainly demonstrated its Czechoslovakist and centralized tendencies. On January 1st, 1922 the KSC abolished the provincial Party structure in Slovakia, splitting the country into four regions directly subordinated to the Central Executive Committee in Prague. Shortly afterwards it abolished Slovak trade union organizations. Such moves seriously hindered the Party activities in Slovakia and antagonized many honest and sincere Slovak left-winge rs. These either left in disgust (like J . Schiffel, who returned to the U.S.A.) or were expelled as agents of the nationalist bourgeoisie (like Culen, Vercik and others ). 21) Pjatyj vsemirnyj kongress komunisticeskogo intenacionala, 17. ijuna - 8. ijttlia 1924 g. Stenografisceskij otcot, Cast' II. (Prilozenija) , ( Moskva, 1925 ), p. 129. �SLOVAKIA 133 ty refusing to accept the resolution of the Comintern. Among the ranks of the KSC the interference of the Comintern produced a serious crisis. The Second Congress of the KS(; was hurriedly convened in November 1924 to deal with the issue. The Congress met in the presence of a leading Comintern official, D. Z. Manuilskij. It was mainly due to his presence that the resolution issued at the end of the Congress proclaimed: "The Party cannot accept the bourgeois lie about the official Czechoslovak nation. By this ruse the Czech bourgeoisie wants to hide its colonial exploitation and bloody oppression of Ruthenia and Slovakia as well as other national minorities". 21 a But as it turned out even he was powerless to shake the dominating influence of the Czech nationalist right-wingers who in complete disregard of their own resolution continued in the old-style policies of ignoring the legitimate demands of the national minorities even within the Party.22 A dramatic development took place in March 1925. The Czech rightists and their arrogant attitude towards other nationalities, especially towards the Slovaks, were openly critized on the pages of "Pravda" by the Soviet expert on the nationalities problem, J. V. Stalin. Stalin saw the narrow-minded and selfish Czech nationalism as the roots of the right-wing deviationism in the KSC. He wrote: The Czechoslovak state is a state that marks the national victory of the Czechs. The Czechs have already acquired their national state as a dominant nation ... And it is here that we must look for the reason why the divergence between the Right and Left took place along national lines, why the Slovaks and the Germans (oppressed nations) are on the left flank, and the Czechs are on the opposite flank . .. Such division is quite understandable, if we bear in mind the above-mentioned specific national features of the Czechoslovak state and the dominant position of the Czechs.23 Stalin's arguments were further developed by D. Z. Manuilskij who quoted, among others, such flagrant examples of national discrimination as the composition of the Politburo of the KSC which consisted of seven Czechs 21a) Protokol II. fadneho sjezdu KSt, (Praha, 1925) , p. 8. 22) Dejiny KSt (Praha, 1961), pp. 213-216. 23) J. V. Stalin, Works (Moscow, 1954), Vol. VII., p. 61. See also H. Gordon Skilling, The Comintern and Czechoslovak Communism 1921-1929 (Slavic Review, 19/ 1960, pp. 238-239 ). �134 SLOVAKIA and two Germans but no Slovaks, Magyars, Poles or Ruthenes. 24 The elections in 1925 were the first real test of the Party's hold on the masses. On the whole the Party did not score badly: it emerged as the second strongest party in Czecho-Slovakia. In Slovakia the election results were a telling commentary on the existing situation. The Social Democratic Party practically disappeared (from 510,341 votes in 1920 to 60,581 votes in 1925). But its voters joined mainly the Hlinka People's Party which captured 489,027 votes (2 35,389 in 1920), i.e. 34.3 % of the Slovak electorate thus becoming the largest Slovak party.25 The Communist Party gained 198,212 votes in Slovakia but its support came mostly from the non-Slovak voters as can be seen from a closer look at the districts which voted for the Communists and at the men who were elected into the Parliament26 ( out of 8 deputies 3 were of Magyar nationality: Kopasz, Major and Steiner). The failure to capture the masses of the Slovak rural proletariat was openly admitted in Moscow and was attributed to the Party's omission to adopt the correct position towards the nationalities problem in Czecho-Slovakia and in particular towards the Slovaks: In Slovakia . .. under the influence of the revolution, in 1920 the peasant masses moved strongly to the left, but in the course of the last four years, owing to the passivity of the Communist P arty in the national question, 200,000 peasants passed from the Socialist 24) D. Z. Manuilskij, Uroki ceskogo krizisa, (Moskva, 1925) . It was the Politburo elected by the Central Committee at the IIIrd Party Congress (Sept. 1925) which consisted of: K. Gottwald, J . Hais, J . Haken ( President) , J . Harus, B. Jilek, A. Neurath, V. Stern, B. Smeral and A. Zapotocky. 25) Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka 1864-1926 ( Bratislava, 1936), pp. 535-538. 26) El•ectoral Corn. % % % d is trict vote of •totail :Mandates :.\1:agy ars German5 1. ove Zamky 2 20.0 61 ,577 62.3 6.8 2. Ko§ice 20.9 40,095 2 41.6 9.9 3. Trnava 28,606 13.9 2.3 1 1.8 4. Banska Bystrica 17,694 11.0 2.2 1 5.6 5. Turc. Sv. Martin 22,355 1 9.5 0.5 5.1 6. Lipt. Sv. Mikula§ 15,697 1 7.4 1.4 1.7 7. Prefov 6.2 12,206 2.6 0 0.7 �SLOVAKIA 135 Party into a party, which, although it is clerical, fight for the autonomy.27 In spite of the impressive overall election results the Party was torn internally by rival factions. After ridding itself of the right wing (Bubnik) a new struggle developed between the so-called "ultraleft" (B. Jilek and V. Bolen) and "centre" (B. t5meral, K. Kreibich, A. Zapotocky). 28 These ideological conflicts touched the Party's life in Slovakia only marginally and even then the Czech leaders of the KSc in Slovakia (K. Gottwald in particular) were supporting the "centre" aginst the "left". In Slovakia the burning issues were not of ideological but of political and economic character. The continuous closing down of factories and industrial plants, growing unemployment, agricultural crisis, emigration, etc. were leaving little time for ideological disputes. 29 After 1926, when the Hlinka People's Party decided to join the government benches, the Communists tried hard to be the spokesmen of the Slovak people against the political wrongs and social injustices of the Czech bourgeoisie. Complete independence of Slovakia was advocated, Czecho-Slovakia was denounced as the offspring of an imperialist war. 30 In January 1927 the Party 27) G. Volkov, Ugnetennaja Prikarpatskaja Rus (Krestjanskij International, 3-5/ 1926, p. 126). ( Quoted in G. D. Jackson's Comintern and Peasant) (London, 1966), p. 288. 28) Dejiny KS(: (Praha, 1961), pp. 249-269. 29) The economic situation of this period has been extensively studied by socialist historians, e. g. J . Mlynarik, Strajkove hnutie na Slovenska II. Zemerobotnici v obdobi 1919 az 1929 (Bratislava, 1961) ; P. Rapos, Priemysel Slovenska za kapitalizmu (Bratislava, 1957) ; J . Mlynarik, N ezamestnanost' na Slovensku (Bratislava, 1964) ; V. Plevza, K niektorym otazkam agrarnej krizy v rokoch 1924-34 na Slovensku (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1966, pp. 203-233); etc. 30) At this time the KSC in Slovakia at its National Conference at 2ilina (on July 25th, 1925) , launched, on Gottwald's instigation a massive campaign aimed at the expulsion of the Czechs from Slovakia. The battle-cry of the Communist propagandists became : " Vypracte Slovensko! " ( Clea;: out of Slovakia!) . The full wording of the slogan was, "Vypracte Slovensko od potlacovacieho aparatu ceskej burzoazie", according to V. Plevza (Historicky casopis, 4/ 1965, p. 510) and "Vypracte Slovensko od nasilnickeho aparatu", according to J. Kramer and .J. Mlynarik (Historicky casopis, 3/ 1965, p. 438). Though there was no doubt about Gottwald's authorship of this slogan, the blame for the embarrassing "mistake" was put later �136 SLOVAKIA convoked a regional conference at Plesivec where it attempted to lead a nation-wide protest against the industrial decline of Slovakia. 31 But all with little success. In February 1929 the Fifth Congress of the KSC met. It passed into Party history as the final battleground where the splinter-groups of the Party dissidents were defeated and the "true bolshevist nucleus" of the Party came out victorious. But in spite of the intense ideological wrangle the Slovak question did appear on the agenda. The Slovak cause was defend by none less than K. Gottwald ( who was to emerge as the new leader of the Party) proclaiming before the Congress: "The !Ind Congress of the KSC declared null and void the theses of the Ist Party Congress (i.e. concerning the unitary "Czechoslovak" nation) but this was in words only . . . The ratification of the First Party Congress theses was only on paper, a mere formality".31a By promising new corrective measures Gottwald (who--it should be remembered-in those days was acting for the Party in Slovakia and was the spokesman for the Slovaks) swayed the overwhelming majority of the Slovak section of the KSC to the side of the victorious "bolshevist on J. Vercik, "the agent of nationalist bourgeoisie" (e.g. M. Gosiorovsky, Slovensko a V. sjazd KS(; ( ceskoslovensky casopis historicky), 1/ 1954, p. 4-15) . While attacking the Czech bourgeoisie for its oppression of the Slovak masses, the KSC leaders did not relax their centralist hold on their Slovak comrades. At each Party Congress the Slovak delegates complained about this unsatisfactory state of affairs (See : Protokol III. fadneho sjezdu KSc [Praha, 1925] , pp. 41 and 73 ; Protokol IV. fadneho sjezdu KS(; [Praha, 1927], p. 33 ; Protokol V . f<idneho sjezdu KS(; [Praha, 1929] , pp. 40 and 50) , but in vain. This aspect of the Party history has been neglected by the socialist historians except a brief and restrained comment by J . Kramer and .J. Mlynarik, Revolucne hnutie a narodnostna ot<izka na Slovensku v dvadsiatych rokoch (Historicky casopis, 3/ 1965, pp. 423-443). For more recent writings on the theme see: Z. Holotikova, 0 rieseni narodnostnej otazky v KSc (Referat na konferencii Hist. ustavu SAV a ustavu dejin KSS, jun 1966) and J. Mlynarik, Dr. B. Smeml a slovensk<i n<irodnostn<i otazka v pociatkoch komunistickeho hnutia (Cs. casopis historicky, 5/ 1967, pp. 653-666 ). 31 ) J . Pleva, Vy znam Plesiveckej konferencie v januari 1927 (Bratislava, 1958) . According to Kramer and Mlynarik (loc. cit. , p. 442, footnote 32 ) the importance of this conference was disproportio n ately inflated because of Gottwald's participation at it. 31a) Protokol V. f<idneho sjezdu KS(; (Praha, 1929) , p. 12. �SLOVAK.IA 137 faction". 32 However, one point is worth noting: while the "bolshevist nucleus of the Party in Slovakia was made up of Bacilek, Siroky, Steiner, Urx" 33 (i.e. two Czechs and two Magyars), the dissidents ("nationalists and liquidators") who were expelled from the Party amidst a storm of abuse ( culen, Felcan, Vercik) were Slovaks. 34 III. 1929-1938 The internal struggle inside the Party was fought bitterly and not always behind closed doors . Inevitably it undermined the Party's image in the voters' eyes. In the 1929 elections it gained 152,242 votes ( 10.55 % ) in Slovakia, a considerable decline in voting strength when compared with the 1925 election results ( 13.41 % ) .35 Yet in Parliament the new "bolshevist cadres" displayed fierce and sanguinary pugnacity epitomized in the words of the new Party leader, K. Gottwald, addressed in December 1929 to the coalition benches: We are the revolutionary Party of Czechoslovak proletariat and in Moscow we have, indeed, our revolutionary General Staff. Yes we go to Moscow in order to learn. Would you like to know what we learn"! We go to Moscow to learn from the Russian bolsheviks how to break your necks. And you must admit that the Russian bolsheviks are very good at it.36 32) Z. Holotikova, Bol"sevizacny proces KS(; v rokoch 1924-29 (Historicky casopis 2/1957, pp. 204-210); M. Gosiorovsky, Slovensko a V. sjazd KS(; (Cs. casopis historicky, 1/ 1954, pp. 4-15). 33) Dejiny KS(; (Praha, 1961), p. 256. 34) Vercik, Mlynarik, Koren, etc. were branded as "nationalists" and expelled; Culen, Felcan, Kolarikova, etc. were branded as "liquidators" and expelled also. The latter were the authors of the so-called "Hlohovecke memorandum" (of December 1928) in which they requested the reorganization of the Party structure in Slovakia and complete freedom of action in specifically Slov~k matters. (See : Pravda of January 31, and February 7th, 1929). In 1930 the KSC finally consented to a limited decentralization and a Slovak province ("celoslovensky kraj") of the KS(; was instituted. S. Major (of Magyar nationality) and K. Bacilek (of Czech nationality) were put in charge. See: V. Plevza, Vytvorenie celoslovenskeho kraja a revolucne hnutie na Slovensku na zaciatku tridsiatych rokov (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1962, p. 184). 35) For an interesting statistical analysis of the 1929 election results see: R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern E urope (Princeton, N. J ., 1961 ), pp. 150-158 and 216-219. 36) K. Gottwald , Spisy I (Praha, 1953), p. 322. �138 SLOVAK.IA During the severe economic depression which swept the Western world in the late twenties and early thirties and which caused acute unemployment in Slovakia (some 250,000 in 1933) 37 the Communists organized hunger marches, protest meetings and strikes. A meeting in May 1931 at a small village in southern Slovakia, Kosuty, ended with a shooting fray resulting in the death of three demonstrators. The Party skilfully exploited the incident to advertize the social plight of rural workers in the Slovak countryside. 38 In the years 1929-33 the Communist press paid much attention to the political solution of the Slovak question and Slovak grievances were repeatedly aired on its pages. But as V. Kopecky confessed at the Vrth Party Congress (1931) it was more in the nature of lip service than anything else: "The decisions of the Vth Party Congress concerning the solution of the nationalities problem remained on paper only and in spite of repeated emphasizing of their importance by the central leadership of the Party there was no practical indication that we were fighting for the right of self-determination of the nations." 38a This national inequality was demonstrated even in the Party hierarchy. The higher Party ranks were-as beforean almost exclusive monopoly of the Czech and German comrades. The Presidium constituted at the Vrth Party 37) Pfehled ceskoslovenskych ilejin III (1918-1945) (Praha , 1960) , p. 325. The gravity of the situation is reflected in the emigration figures which were considerably greater for Slovakia (where only about 25 % of the total population lived) than for the Czech lands: Emigration from C-SR: from Slovakia: 1928 24,540 13,544 1929 30,715 19,401 1930 25,712 16,682 1931 9,567 4,527 1932 5,165 2,222 1933 4,735 3,099 38) The shooting at Kosuty has attracted unusually great attention from Communist propagandists and publicists, e.g. the pamphlet, Nyn·i je v Kosv,tech pofcidek a klid (1931); V. Plevza, Kosutska trag edia (Prispevky k dejinam KSC, 8/ 1959, pp. 91-107) ; E. Pauliny, Kosutske udalosti v maji 1931 (Bratislava-Martin, 1961) ; E. Kadnar, Krvave Kosuty ( Bratislava, 1963) . It is perhaps worthwhile to note that the inhabitants of Kosuty were of Magyar nationality and so was S. Major, the convicted instigator of the disturbance. 38a ) Protokol VI. fcidneho sjezdn KSC, (Praha , 1931), p. 143. �SLOVAKIA 139 Congress had only one representative from Slovakia among its 15 members. 39 This omission was quite a serious matter, because by the midthirties the Communist Party of Slovakia was already producing its own native leaders. The young Slovak Communist students who in 1924 grouped in Prague around the quarterly Oater monthly), "Dav" (1924-1937), were growing up in stature and outlook and were ready and eager to take over from the Czech, Magyar and Jewish spokesmen of the Slovak proletariat. 40 Unfortunately they were striving for power at a time when the Party was purging itself of intellectual and other non-proletarian ballast, so that their hopes and expectations were frustrated.41 Other important changes in the Party line were also in the offing. The Party was directed by the Comintern to adopt new attitudes to a number of political issues. Up to 1933 the Communists considered democracy (i.e. bourgeois democracy) and fascism as "the children of the same mother, the bourgeoisie". 42 Masaryk, Benes, Hlinka, Kramaf were all Fascists of the same brand as Hitler and Mussolini. But by the summer of 1933 Stalin realized that Hitler was a much greater evil. Looking for new allies Stalin selected two of the most likely states worried by the growing power of Hitler's Germany: France and CzechoSlovakia. The KSc was instructed to take a more positive stand towards the official Czech foreign and domestic 39) It was E. Fried of Magyar-Jewish origin. Accordind to H. G. Skilling the ethnic composition of the 60-member Central Committee was as follows: 37 Czechs, 10 Germans, 8 Slovaks (and Magyars ), 4 Ukrainians and 1 Pole. See : H. Gordon Skilling, Gottwald and the Bolshevisation of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 1929-39 (Slavic Review, 20/ 1961, pp. 644-645) . The inadequate representation of Slovaks in the top P,0verning bodies of the Party apparatus (i.e. Presidium-Politburo and Secretariat-Orgburo) is statistically summed up in Appendix I. 40) These young Communist intellectuals of the early twenties had their hey-day in the late forties and met a tragic fate in the early fifties. In the years 1950-54 they became the victims of purges and their rehabilitation began ,mly in 1963. For a post-rehabilitation view of the Dav-group see: S. Drug, Dav a davisti (Bratislava, 1965). 41) V. Plevza, Prispevok o cinnosti davistov v revolucnom hnuti za predmnichovskej CSR (Historicky casopis, 1/1964), pp. 20-21. 42) K. Gottwald , Spisy IV (Praha, 1951) , p. 212. �140 SLOVAKIA policies. This, of course, meant that the Slovak guestion and the nationalities problem in general had to be played down and the Party soon nodded its appproval where only a few months ago it used to voice its sharp criticism. 43 The signing of the Soviet-Czecho-Slovak Treaty in May 1935 marked a milestone in the Party's policy. The Party put on a mask of loyal respectability and replaced its internationalism by a newly-discovered patriotism. It conveniently forgot its past hostilities to "the imperialist agent Benes" and supported him in the presidential election in December 1935. At the Seventh Congress of the KSc (April 1936) the Party took a firm position "to defend CzechoSlovakia against Hitler". It became a zealous exponent of the Popular Front against Fascism and reaction, and the Slovak grievances once so prominent in its program were now hardly mentioned. The militant cry for "self-determination including the right to secede" was now replaced with much softer demands voiced by Gottwald at the VIIth Party Congress: "The Party will strive to achieve the realization of minimal requirements for normal coexistence of all nationalities in Czecho-Slovakia by insisting on a democratic policy towards nationalities and on equal rights for all nations ( of Czecho-Slovakia) in all spheres of public life." 44 The approaching municipal elections made the Party somewhat wary and hurriedly it came forward with a "plan for the economic, social and cultural advancement of Slovakia" announced at Banska Bystrica in May 1937.45 But the plan did not excite anybody. It was unrealistic and was looked upon as one of the many grandiose schemes which the Party submitted with monotonous regularity year after 43) A somewhat confused picture of the situation can be found in V. Plevza's KSC a revolucne hnutie na Slovensku 1929-1 938 (Bratislava, 1965), pp. 237-420. 44 ) K. Gottwald, Spisy VIII (Bratislava, 1953) , p. 167. This phase of Party activities is discussed at length in a number of publications such as Na obranu republiky proti fasizmu a v ojne (Bratislava, 1955) ; M . Filo, Boj KSC na Slovensku na obranu republiky (Bratislava, 1960) ; I. Kolesar, Otazka obnovy demokracie a demokratickych prciv i slobod proti fasizmu ( od VII. kongresu Kominterny r . 1935 ) Sbornik FFUK, 10/ 1959, pp. 163-181). 45 ) Deji11y KSc (Praha, 1961) , p. 359. Also V . Siroky, Za st'astne Slove nsko v socialistickom Ceslcoslovensku (Bratislava, 1952). �141 SLOVAKIA year, knowing well that it would never be called upon to implement them. The turns and twists in the Party line could not pos• sibly impress the Slovak electorate. In the municipal elections (May 1938) the Party found itself deserted by its erstwhile supporters. Its advocacy of pro-Benes and antiautonomist policies46 estranged it from the Slovak voters, while its noisy denunciations of the revisionist claims by Hungary, Germany and Poland antagonized its non-Slovak voters. The overwhelming electoral defeat in Slovakia (in the Czech lands the Party maintained its support) alarmed the Slovak Party leaders who clearly read the writing on the wall. 47 And thus on the eve of Czecho-Slovakia's disintegration the Party attempted another somersault and tried to sponsor the autonomistic cause, even if it meant forming a common front with Hlinka's Party. But it was now too late. No party in Slovakia cared for partnership with the Communists and Hlinka's Party least of all. The speed with which events marched by-passed the Party altogether. 46) J. U§iak, Boj KS(: s Hlinkovou slovenskou l'udovou stranou a vplyv na masy v obdobi ndstupu fasizmu (Pfispevky k dejindm KSC, 5/ 1963, pp. 710-29). Also V. Plevza, KSC a revolucne hnutie na Slovensku 1929-1938 (Bratislava, 1965), pp. 462-474. 47 ) The Communist historians merely record the electoral defeat without going into details, without drawing any conclusion (e. g. Plevza, op. cit., p. 471 ). In many small towns the Communist vote virtually disappeared and in bigger towns it was severely reduced. On the whole the proportion of those who voted Communist dropped from 14% in 1935 to something like 8.9 % in 1938. No comprehensive results have been compiled so far; the Party historians carefully avoid this area. A brief glance at the election results in a few Slovak cities shows convincingly how the Party fared at the polls. (The results are compared with those of the Hlinka People's Party, the main beneficiary of the Communist loss. Figures are taken from Slovensky dennik of June 12, 1938): People's Party votes KSS votes Gain in% --19_3_5_[1938 ' ....Jl % _in--'l .... _L_o_s_s I _1_93_8__,_ 1 __,__1_93_5_ _ _ _T_o_w_n_ 2,493 I 44.3 j 1 8,133 5,640 45,7 2,399 1 2,856 i 5,255 Bratislava 333 I 37.91 910 1,243 88 13.5 554 Nove Mesto n / V I 642 44 I 607 I 563 I 1098 76 I 167 68.8 I 243 Snina 1 849 I 363 62.0I 586 4,658 2,098 I 2,560 55.0 Star11. !>ala I 1,064 1 ? 64 I ? Modra I 1,253 j ? 79 I ? Michalovce I 3,471 1 ? 777 I ? Trebgov (dist. ) I I I I I 1 �142 SLOVAKIA The collapse of Czecho-Slovakia found the Party's fortunes in Slovakia at their lowest ebb. This was openly acknowledged by the Party leadership in its report to the Executive of the Comintern in December 1938. With a remorseful self-criticism V. Siroky confessed: We Comm un ists represe nted in Slovakia the national interests of the Czech nation, while the Slovak national interests were furth er represented by Hlinka's Party ... Only at the last moment as the Czechoslovak crisis was reaching its climax did we put forward a demand for the democratic solution of the Slovak problem, i. e. the granting of full autonomy.48 IV. 1938-1944 The declaration of autonomy on October 6th, 1938 was shortly followed by the suppression of Party activities and in January 1939 the Party was disbanded. The Party leaders escaped abroad and with regard to Party leadership in Slovakia, it is interesting to note that the Slovak nationals, if they got away at all, fled mainly to the West (Valo, Clementis ), while the non-Slovak leaders sought their refuge in the Soviet Union (smidke, Bacilek, Major. Siroky went first to Paris, then to Moscow) .49 Drawing conclusions from the rejection of the Party policies by the Slovak people and facing the new situation fairly and squarely, the Comintern decided on the last and long-delayed step : it gave its approval to the founding of an independent ( albeit illegal) Communist Party of Slovakia ( in May 1939 ). 50 Its leadership was entrusted to three relatively minor and unknown functionaries: J. Duris, L. Benada, J. Osoha. Of these the ablest and most dynamic was Jan Osoha, a Czech by birth. The leadership faced a tremendous task of building a network of illegal cells from the fragments and remains of what once was a Party organization in Slovakia. Traditional Party strongholds went to Hungary by the Vienna Award of November 1938.50 a The 48 ) Deji~nii krizov atka (Bratislava, 1964), pp. 27-28. 49 ) Slovak Studies IV (Rome, 1964) , p. 30. 50) Dejiny KS(; (Praha, 1961 ), p. 399. 50a) Interesting evidence of the solid support the Party received from t he Magyar-speaking population of Slovakia can be found in the recently published bibliography, Zoznam komunistickych novin a casopisov marxi.stickej l' avice z rokov 1919-38 (Martin, 1961). The bibliography lists 125 separate newspapers and periodicals of which �SLOVAKIA 143 newly-acquired independence of Slovakia (in March 1939) was a powerful stabilizing factor on the political scene leaving very little scope for the subversive activities of the Communists.51 For the Communists the situation was further aggravated by the Nazi-Soviet Pact (August 1939), the Soviet participation in the Fourth partition of Poland and the Soviet recognition, both 'de facto' and 'de jure', of the independent Slovak state. Under the impact of these events the Slovak Communist leadership in the West (Paris) disintegrated.52 At home the Party leaders were even more confused and completely at a loss. The illegal handbills and propaganda pamphlets betray the prevalent mood of perplexity and obvious embarrassment of the underground Party organizers in their desperate attempts to explain away the things they could not comprehend. In the Soviet attitude towards the Slovak state they saw a sure sign of Soviet approval of the new geographicopolitical reorganization of Central Europe. In response to it they drew up, sometime in October 1939, a new political program, the key-note of which was: "The free and independent Soviet Slovakia." 53 This program became a dominant feature of all the illegal Communist activities in Slovakia up to 1944. It was only natural for an independent Party to sponsor such a policy in an independent state. But the scheme did not pass 71 were published in the Slovak language, 50 (i. e. 40 %) in Magyar, 3 in German and 1 in Ukrainian. 51) A. Huckova-Stvrtecka, cinnost' prveho ilegalneho Ostredneho vyboru KSS (Bratislava, 1959). 52) Clementis denounced the Nazi-Soviet pact for which he was expelled from the Pai ty, Siroky rapidly departed to Moscow and Valo retired into neutral passivity. About the impact of this infamous alliance on the Slovak (and Czech ) Communists in Paris, see Theo. I-I. Florin, S Vladom Clementisom v Parizi a v Lon.dyne (Dav, spomienky a studie, [Brati~ava, 1965), p. 467) . 53) Confiscated Communist propaganda handbills in the Archives of the German F'oreign Ministry, 56/ 38606-15. These documents help to pinpoint the beginning of the campaign for an independent Soviet Slovakia which was not later than in October 1939. At that time the Communists went to considerable trouble to explain that the Soviet Union had not exchanged Communism for the National Socialism of Hitler. �144 SLOVAKIA by unchallenged. The first to protest against this line was-as might have been expected-the illegal Communist Party in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia lead by Edo Urx who as a Party functionary had spent a number of years in Slovakia. The Party in the Protectorate continued to call itself the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. It claimed to be the direct successor of the banned Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia and a parent organization of the Communist Party of Slovakia. It advocated the restoration of the pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia and objected to any policy promulgation which was not consistent with its current Party line. The Slovaks on the other hand were rejecting any kind of affiliation and insisted on equality and independence. After prolonged disagreement the dispute was referred to Moscow for arbitration 54 and there Gottwald issued a ruling completely vindicating the stand of the Slovak Communists. He sent the following message to Urx (in March 1940): Your pre-war pattern of thinking must change. Behind the slogan "Restoration of Czecho-Slovakia" are hidden imperialistic and antiSoviet schemes . .. We expressly emphasize that our Party fully accepts the right of self-determination both for the Czechs and fo r the Slovaks. This right of self-detevmination implies the right to live in an independent state. We fight for the restoration of the national freedom and territorial independence of the Czechs. As far as the Slovaks are concerned we fight for the complete sovereignity of the present-day Slovak state. It is this struggle for the right of self-determination which differentiates our road from that of Benes a nd world imperialism. The relation between the Czechs and Slovaks stand now on a new footing. Slovak separatism plays today a different role. That is why we are giving up the old slogans concerning Slovakia.ss Encouraged by this message the Slovak Communists tried to outdo in nationalist zeal everybody including the official Slovak propaganda. The only criticism they received from Moscow was the advice not to stress too much the Soviet character of their "independent Soviet Slovakia" program.56 54 ) The dispute is summarized in D ejinna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964) , pp. 63-88. 55) Deji nna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964) , p. 61. 56 ) S. Falt'an, Ku Kral'ov ej recenzii trochu inak (Historicky casopis, 4/ 1966, p. 58S. �SLOVAKIA 145 The idea of national independence being at the root of the Party's illegal activities was not given up even when the Soviet Union gave its official recognition to Benes and his government then in exile in London. The clandestine journal, "Hlas l'udu" (Voice of the people ), commented on the resumption of diplomatic relations between Benes and the Kremlin: The pact between the Soviet Union and the Czecho-Slovak government in exile is not seen by the Communist Party of Slovakia as a pact with the government of a future state which has its established boundaries, its established regime. The (Czecho-Slovak) government in London was created without the participation and without the will of the working people in Slovakia . . . The question of an independent (Slovak) state, or autonomy, or federation with the fraternal Czech nation is now of secondary importance and it will be settled after the defeat and destruction of German imperialism.56a Slovak police and security organs who had infiltrated the illegal Communist organizations57 watched this development with keen interest. When the Soviet-German conflict broke out (June, 1941) the Slovak police within a few hours arrested all the members of the illegal Central Committee (except J. Osoha) and some 1,100 illegal Party activists. 58 Most of these were released from detention after three or four weeks and lost no time in regrouping and starting again. A new Central Committee was set up by J . Osoha and this in turn was broken up by the police in April 1942. J. Osoha again eluded the dragnet and at56a) Quoted by M. Gosiorovsky in Historicky casopis, No. 3/ 1968, p. 371. 57) In this connection it is worth quoting from a report of the German Minister to Slovakia, M. v. Killinger (of August 19th, 1940): "Die ... in die kommunistische Zellen geschickten Leute bewiihren sich sehr gut, so dass der Erfolg der Arbeit gesichert und alle Zellen der hier, wieder erstehenden kommunistischen Organisationen erfasst werden. Die inzwischen festgestellten kommunistische Funktioniire werden listenmiissig geftihrt und laufend ergiinzt" (2276/ 47987684). 58) German documents 610/ 248627. At this time the Russians parachuted into Slovakia V. Siroky and V. Skrabala. But they were discovered very soon after their arrival and put in prison where Siroky stayed until 1945. When in 1949 Siroky emerged as the most powerful man in Slovakia trusted by both Moscow and Prague, legendary stories were written about his underground and illegal activities which lasted-when all said and done-some fi ve weeks. �146 SLOVAKIA tempted to organize the third Central Committee of the KSS. But in July he was caught and imprisoned together with the other members of the Committee. 59 These police actions deprived the illegal Party organization in Slovakia of all its old leaders trained in the Stalinist mould of blind and unquestioning obedience. Continuity with the pre-war Party politics was thus broken and the way was cleared for new men to emerge at the top. As it happened they were almost without exception the younger generation of the Party intellectuals, recruited and groomed by Vlado Clemen tis ( then in London). They lacked the rugged working-class background but they possessed the self-assertive spirit of intense national pride. One of them, Stefan Bast'ovansky, tried to continue (against his better judgement) with the illegal activities in the old traditional style (handbills and pamphlets read by very few, incitement to sabotage obeyed by nobody) only to find himself in prison by May 1943.60 The leadership of the demoralized and decimated ranks now passed into the hands of G. Husak and L. Novomesky, who disagreed with those tactics and methods which were costing the Party so much and achieved nothing. As the men on the spot they proposed a more subtle and unorthodox approach which took into account the political and social conditions in Slovakia, the mentality and sentiments of the masses and the weakness of Slovak war-time administration. The Party really went underground and the outward signs of activities almost disappeared. Moscow, disturbed by the apparent lack of fighting spirit, decided to send to Slovakia two trusted emissaries to revive the dormant proletarian masses. They were K. smidke and K. Bacilek. Neither of them was Slovak but both had worked in Slovakia in the interwar period. smidke, the more experienced of the two, listened with interest to the suggestions of the Slovak intellectuals and to their amazement he agreed with them. 61 smidke set up a new Central Committee of the KSS 59) 0 . Krajnak, Protifasisticke hnutie na Slovensku. (Nova mys! , 8/ 1964, pp. 695-703); G. Husak, Svedectvo o SNP (Bratislava, 1964 ), pp. 33-36; Dejinna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964) , pp. 122-126. 60) Dejinna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964), p. 126. 61) G. Husak, Svedectvo o SNP (Bratislava, 1964) , pp. 51-56. �SLOVAKIA 147 (which included himself, Husak and Novomesky) re-established and revived the network of illegal Party organizations and directed their activities along a new and more realistic path. He entered into close collaboration with the bourgeois illegal groups (and, through them, with the army) and did not scruple to exploit to the full the nationalist sentiments and aspirations of the Slovaks. 62 The last thing was, of course, not an easy task, because in the meantime the Soviet Union had promised Benes to restore pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia. And not only that. As revealed recently, Benes was given by Stalin, in December 1943, virtually a free hand in his dealings with the Slovaks. According to Fierlinger (Czecho-Slovak Ambassador in Moscow) Stalin allegedly told Benes "to keep the Slovaks firmly in hand.''62 a By these tactics of exploiting nationalistic feeling in the country and with the military defeat of Germany looming larger and closer every day, the Communists and their bourgeois allies were preparing an armed uprising in Slovakia. Their conspiratory efforts were partly frustrated by an untimely start, triggered off by Soviet partisans, which doomed the venture to failure. But while it lasted (August-October 1944) "the Slovak national uprising" (as this revolt became officially known after 1945) was a remarkable achievement in several respects. 63 Its effect on the future political development of Slovakia was to be farreaching and lasting. Right at the beginning of the uprising the Communist Party of Slovakia came into the open and published ( on September 2nd, 1944) its proclamation in which it implied that Slovakia--though a part of Czechoslovakia-would have a very broad autonomy which would include even a sepa62) Slovenske ruirodne povstanie 1944 (Bratislava 1965), pp. 191-221. 62a) J. Barto, Riesenie vzt'ahu cechov a Slovakov (Bratislava, 1968) . p. 11. 63) This event is by far the most written-about subject in modern Slovak history. For a critical review of bibliography on this theme see: F . Vnuk, Neuveritel'ne sprisahanie (Middletown, Pa., 1964) , pp. 181-191. Also S. Falt'an, Niektore otazky okolo hodnotenia SNP (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1964, pp. 161-185) . A complete bibliography of books and articles on the subject in 1963-64 was compiled by A. Kociska (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1965, pp. 309-328) . �148 SLOVAKIA rate army. 64 On September 9, 1944 the KSS began to publish the daily, "Pravda", proudly branded as "the official organ of the Communist Party of Slovakia".65 On September 17th, 1944 it arranged a joint Party Congress with the Social Democratic Party at which the Social Democratic Party merged into the KSS. It elected its own Central Committee with smidke as President, Husak and cech (Social Democrat) as Vice-Presidents. The Party displayed vigour and independence to a degree which both the Czech and the Soviet commissars found disquieting. The Czech Communists who were spending the war years in Moscow thought it necessary to reaffirm their primacy before it was too late and promptly dispatched to Slovakia two "experienced comrades", R. Slansky and J. sverma, to see that the Party line was correctly drawn and properly applied. After their arrival ( September 28th, 1944) the Slovak Communist leadership had to do as it was told. As a result there followed a great deal of retracting especially in those fields where exuberant nationalism had carried the home-grown leaders too far. The uprising revealed with startling clarity the secondary role and subordinate position to which the KSS was now relegated. In proclaiming their allegiance to the Czecho-Slovak Republic the Slovak Communists were negating the only positive asset of their political program so loudly advertised in 1939-44 under the slogan of an independent Soviet Slovakia. The blow was shattering not only to the Slovak people at large but also to the less doctrinaire Party members.66 In order to make the best of a bad job the Communists kept on assuring the people that the new Czecho-Slovak Republic would be incomparably better than the old one, 64) The proclamation persistently talks about " our Slovak (not Czechoslovak) army". For the full text of the document see: G. Husak, Svedectvo o SNP (Bratislava, 1964), pp. 257-258. 65) The daily, "Pravda", as it appeared during the uprising (September - October 1944) was recently reprinted and is available in a convenient form , Pravda v obdobi SNP (Bratislava, 1964) . 66) There were reports that workers at several places proclaimed a Slovak Soviet Republic (e.g. at Nemecke Pravno) ; in other places (Podbrezova) there was strong agitation for the proclamation of Soviet Slovakia. This unwillingness of the working class to return to a common state with the Czechs is most telling. �SLOVAKIA 149 that the excesses of the Czech administration would not be repeated, that the Slovak national individuality would be unquestionably accepted, etc. In other words they were posing as the guarantors of all those rights and achievements which the Hlinka People's Party had secured for the Slovak nation when declaring autonomy (October 1938). They openly advocated a federated Czecho-Slovakia.67 Unfortunately for them in 1944-45 the Slovaks were past the autonomy stage and were thinking in terms of state independence. Against the opposition of many Czech politicians, including Benes himself, the Slovak Communists succeeded in retrieving from the wreckage of the Slovak independence some of those prerequisites which gave post-war Slovakia a quasi-autonomous status.68 What is even more surprising, they were able to preserve their own independence. And thus one finds in post-war Czecho-Slovakia a somewhat anomalous situation. Alongside the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia there existed a Communist Party of Slovakia (with no regional equivalent in the Czech lands ) which to all intents and purposes was treated as a separate political party. As it happened it was a most expedient arrangement because it enabled the Communists in the critical post-war months (April 1945-May 1946) to have two Deputy Prime Ministers in the Provisional Government (instead of one) and almost twice as many ministers, parliamentarians, etc. as any other political party. V. 1945-1949 In the years 1945-6 the KSS was without doubt the most nationalistic party ever to enter the Slovak political scene. It was vehemently anti-German and anti-Magyar, and there seemed to be no limits to its nationalistic ex cesses. It lured into its camp Slovak voters by the promise of agrarian and wide-spread social reforms, it appealed 67) Thus spoke G. Husak at Kosice on February 28th, 1945: "We wan t to have a federated state ... in which each nation will be master in his own house."- See: G. Husak, Za narodnu a l'udovu demo kraciu (Kosice, 1945), p. 14. Also J. Jablonicky, Slovensko na prelome (Bratislava, 1965) , pp. 248-296. 68 ) Program prvej dorruicej vlady narodneho frontu cechov a Slovcikov (Kosice, 1945) . �150 SLOVAKIA to the nationalist and even the religious feeling of the people, it was willing to overlook anybody's past, no matter how compromising.69 Outwardly the KSS was united, but, as it transpired later, inside it was torn with internal jealousies which very soon decomposed its ranks and paralysed its strength as an independent political force. The old-guard leaders ( Siroky, Duris, etc.) who spent their war years in prison did not see eye to eye with the leadership which had been put together during the 1944 uprising (Husak, smidke, etc.). The Siroky-group intrigued against the smidke-Husakgroup and in their schemes they had the support of the Czech Communist leadership. In May 1945 at the joint session of both Party Presidia the Slovaks were compelled to adopt a common policy with their Czech comrades on all public issues of the day. The role of the KSS was defined as being "a part of a unitary KSC with a united leadership".70 In practice it meant a complete subjugation of the KSS to the dictatorial authority of the KSC. This was the end of the short-lived independence of the KSS (19391945). One of the first moves of Gottwald was to impose on the KSS a more amenable leadership to replace the smidkeHusak-group. In July 1945 Gottwald delegated Siroky to take over the Party affairs in Slovakia. 71 Siroky hurriedly convened a Party conference at Zilina (Aug. 11-12, 1945) where he was confirmed in his position as the Party President. Siroky saw to it that the top Party positions were filled with his men. Thus he had become, already in Aug. 1945, the undisputed authority in Party matters in Slovakia. "Siroky concentrated in his own hands and in the hands of his own group of collaborators in the apparatus of the KSS Central Committee factual decisions about Party 69) This is again another neglected chapter of the Party history. The nationalist excesses, especially against the Magyar minority, formed a part of the accusation levelled at the " bourgeois nationalists" in 1950-54. An oblique reference to the nationalist policies of the KSS has been made recently in the book of J. Zvara, A magyar nemzetisegi kerdes melogdasa Szlovakuiban (Bratislava, 1965), pp. 22-69. Also J . Jablonicky in Slovensko na prelome (Bratislava, 1965) pp . 396-409. 70) J. Barto, Riesenie vzt'ahu Cechov a Slovakov (Bratislava 1968) , p. 55. 71 ) ib., p. 99. �SLOVAKIA 151 policies, about the Party itself and about its leading cadres. These men were selected by Siroky himself according to his own personal likings", complained G. Husak recently. 72 Out of 9 men in the Party Presidium Husak identified these as the members of the Siroky group: Siroky, Duris, Bast'ovansky, Valachovic, Holdos. This leaves on the other side Husak, soltesz, smidke and Zupka. While acting as a strong man of the KSS, Siroky realized that he owed his position to the Czech Communists and consequently he was an ever-obedient executor of their wishes. In this way the policy of the KSS became divorced from the current needs and realities of the Slovaks. The policies of the KSc were designed to attract the Czech masses and paid very little attention to the Slovak national interests. The Party faced the first post-war electoral contest in a state of internal disunity, with a program which lacked conviction, realism and electoral appeal. Its only competitor for the allegiance of the Slovak electorate was the Democratic Party (heir and successor of the old Agrarian Party of M. Hodza) dominated almost exclusively by the Slovak Protestant bourgeoisie of proBenes sympathies. The Hlinka People's Party being banned, the Catholic section of the Slovak people ( the support of which was to decide the general election scheduled on May 26th, 1946) had no party of its own. To win these vital votes the leaders of the Democratic Party concluded an agreement with the representatives of the Slovak Catholics ("April Agreement") promising considerable concessions in exchange for the Catholic vote. 73 As a result of this solid backing of the Catholic majority the Democratic Party emerged victorious from the electoral contest polling 62.0 % of the total vote (999,622 votes), while the Communist Party gained only 30.4 % (489,596 votes), the remaining 7 ,6 % went to two minor parties or represented "white ticket" and informal votes. 74 While the electorate in the Czech lands overwhelmingly 72) G. Husak, Barnabitky a co im predchadzalo, in Nove slovo, No. 8/ 1968. 73) V. Precan, Slov ensky katolicizmus pred februarom 1948 (Bratislava , 1961), pp. 85-108. 74) Dejiny KSc (Praha, 1961), p . 504. �152 SLOVAKIA endorsed the Marxist policies 75 in Slovakia the Communist Party (which-it should be remembered-was already then a united party of both the Communist and the Social Democrats) came second best in what was actually a twoparty contest. This massive rejection of the Marxist policies led to deep soul-searching in the Central Committee in Prague and Bratislava. The Party now tempered (at least partly) its reckless nationalism and started to attack the Democratic Party for harbouring fascist and reactionary elements. 76 Though nominally both Communist and Democratic Parties were partners in the so-called United National Front they were soon fighting and abusing each other with fury and passion reminiscent of the interwar years. In spite of their electoral defeat the Communists, by clever and daring manipulation of their own and due to the ineptness, timidity and inexperience of the Democratic politicians were able to exert a decisive influence on the course of political events in Slovakia. They still retained the control of powerful organizations and pressure groups ( trade unions, farmers' organizations, partisans, etc.). Thus they were able to frustrate almost any attempt of the Democratic Party to honour its promises given to the Catholic voters.77 By their bullying tactics they brought about the estrangement between the leadership and membership of the Democratic Party. They accused many Democratic Party leaders of fascist conspiracy and subversive activity, demanded and got their removal from office and subsequent imprisonment (Kempny, Bugar, Stasko, Ursiny, etc.). Then in November 1947 they attacked the governmental positions of the Democratic Party, compelling it to give up 75) In the Czech lands the Communists received 38.9 % and the Social Democrats 15.8 % of the votes. The Marxist parties thus obtained 54.7 % . 76 ) M. Vartikova, Roky rozhodnutia. K dejiruim politickeho boja pred febriuirom 1948 (Bratislava, 1962); J . Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, 1955), pp. 247-253. 77 ) They engineered-with the help of their Czech comrades and colleagues-the sentencing and execution of the former President of Slovakia, Dr. Jozef Tiso. By this they completely discredited the Democratic Party in the eyes of its voters, fully revealing its impotency and helplessness as a political force . See: F . Vnuk, Dr. Jozef Tiso , President of the Slovak Repitblic (Sydney, 1967 ), pp. 37-40. �SLOVAKIA 153 its majority in such administrative bodies as the Slovak National Council, the Board of Commissioners, etc.78 By this victory the Communists effectively undermined the morale of the non-Communist forces and the stage was set for a complete take-over. The notorious 'coup d'etat', by which the Communists came to power in Czecho-Slovakia in February 1948, was largely a Czech affair. The resignation of the non-Communist ministers and the ensuing governmental crisis were confined to Prague. The confrontation was staged and the struggle was lost by the Czechs in the Czech lands. 79 As far as Slovakia was concerned there the issue was solved almost inaudibly in a matter of hours (long before the crisis was over in Prague). The Communist chairman of the Board of Commissioners, G. Husak, took over the main Post Office building in Bratislava on February 23rd, 1948 and was in complete control of all postal services, especially the vital telecommunication links between Bratislava and. Prague. To all Democratic Commissioners he dispatched letters of dismissal and to make sure that they took notice, he requested the Commissioner of the Interior, M. Feriencik (nominally a non-party member of the Board), to post police guards at their offices, to keep the "dismissed'' Commissioners out. 80 Then the Communists reconstituted a new Board allocating to themselves 10 (out of 15) positions, giving the remaining ones to their fellow-travellers.81 This moment signified the zenith of the KSS. What followed afterwards was a steeply descending road leading to the unenviable position of the next two decades(1948-68). 78 ) In the reconstructed Board of Commissioners the Democratic Party had to share the chairmanship with a Communist and its majority of nine on the Board of 15 Commissioners was reduced to a minor ity of six. 79) There are many accounts of this "parliamentary take-over" of governmental powers by the Communists. For the losing party's version see e.g. H. Ripka's Le Coup de Prague (Paris, 1949), for the winning-side versio n see e.g. J . Vesely's Kronika unorovych dnti 1948 (Praha, 1958) . 80) V. Vagassky, Komunisticka strana ceskoslovenska (New York, 1953roneoed) p. 8. 81) J. Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, 1955), pp. 259-260. �li4 SLOVAKIA VI. 1948-1962 With the elimination of the non-Communist opposition there was no longer a need for two Communist Parties in one country. Steps towards the abolition of the KSS were taken on July 26th, 1948, when the Presidium of the KSc (consisting entirely of Czech Communists) decided: 1. The next meeting of the Central Committee of the KSS shall rule that the KSS ceases to exist as an independent party and become an integral part of the KSc. 2. The Party organization in Slovakia will still carry the name of KSS . 3. The Central Committee of the KSS shall be subordinated to the Central Committee of the KSc, it shall act according to its directives and it will implement the policy of the KSc in Slovakia. 82 This decision was proptly implemented on September 28, 1948 when the KSS, obeying the resolution of the Presidium of the KSc agreed to become "the territorial organization of the unitary KSC. 83 The merger was officially represented as a voluntary act mutually desired by both, and enthusiastically greeted by the Party press as such. But now it is admitted what has been generally known from the start that the Slovak Communists were most unwilling to give up their independence, to take up the status of an unprivileged minority destined to wait for the hand-outs of the senior and none-too-generous partner. Their fears were well justified but they could do nothing to prevent the inevitable. Thus they became the first victims of the renewed centralism with which the Communist rulers of Czecho-Slovakia were pursuing their new "socialist" policies. Gottwald, Kopecky and their accomplices, the authors and erstwhile advocates of Slovak selfgovernment, almost overnight forgot their earlier pledges. Robust and aggresive centralism was menacingly reflected in the new "Constitution of May 9th" (1948). In it the Slovaks were treated badly, 84 yet worse was still to come. 82) K. Kaplan, Utvcifeni genercilni linie vystavby socialismu v Ceskoslovensku (Pra ha, 1965) , p. 103. 83) Dejiny KSC (Praha, 1961) , p. 540. 84) While in 1945 the Commissioners were chosen by the Slovak National Council and responsible to it, in 1948 they were appointed by �SLOVAKIA 155 Most of those political and national rights which-as claimed by the KSS-were secured by the Slovak uprising in 1944 and saved by the victory of the working-class in 1948 were gradually removed one by one by the same people who once fought for them. With incredible, even gleeful, outward obedience the Slovak Communists were curtailing their own rights, restricting their own freedom of action. This subordinate relationship which now existed between the KSS and KSC was subsequently written into the Party Statutes for everybody to see. According to these approved rules "the KSS directs its activities by the decisions of the Congress of the KSC and the decisions of the Central Committee of the KSC ... The KSS convokes its congress after agreement with the Central Committee of the KSC ... The Central Committee of the KSS carries out the decisions of the Central Committee of the KSc and with the approval of the Central Committee of the KSC it solves the political and organizational Party questions in Slovakia". 85 Committed to these rules and bound by Party discipline the Communists in Slovakia ruthlessly applied the general Party line as drawn up in Prague by the Central Committee of the KSc, and including such unpopular measures as collectivization of farming, nationalization of all sectors of private enterprise, down to small shops and one-man businesses, wholesale purge of public life of all real and imaginary opponents of Communism, cruel persecution of the Catholic Church, its clergy and religious, victimization the Prague Government. The protective measures introduced in 1945 to safeguard the rights of the Slovak against the Czech majority were all removed in 1948. To pass or amend legislation a mere three-fifths majority of deputies was required. The Czech majority in the Parliament was always higher than this. (In 1954 there were only 98 Slovaks among 368 deputies). 85) The Statutes of the KSc , paragraphs 40, 42 and 47. See : Pravda of December 20th, 1952. Numerically the Party drew noticeably less strength from Slovakia than from the Czech lands. Shortly after the 1948 merger statistics were issued showing that in 1949 out of 2,311,066 members and candidates of the KSC only 236,432 were from Slovakia, i.e. 10.3%. ( Rude pravo of May 27th, 1950) . This disparity continued into the fiities and at the Tenth Congress of the KSC (1954) the Slovak delegates formed a 10,2% minority (Pravda of June 16th, 1954) . At that time 28% of the population lived in Slovakia. �156 SLOVAKIA of the intellectuals, adulation of Stalin and Gottwald, indiscriminate application of "superior Soviet methods" in all walks of life, etc.86 And when they did all these repugnant and hate-fometing tasks their Czech masters struck them with a wave of bloody purges. In the years 1949-54 (and especially after the Ninth Congress of the KSS in May 1950) the ranks of the Slovak Communists were decimated with a fury of terror which in its scope and horror surpassed all the blows ever inflicted by their class enemy. The purges form the most tragic and most neglected chapter in the history of the KSS.B 7 Within five years (1949-54) the KSS lost in purges seven out of 13 members of its Presidium (Clementis, Husak, Novomesky, ~midke, Bast'ovansky, Falt'an and Moskovic), some 30 % of its 60members Central Committee and thousands of Party members in diplomatic and administrative service, in the army, political bodies, institutions and other sectors of public life. They were removed from their posts amid the curses of their own comrades and comrades-in-arms and, having previously antagonized the masses of the Slovak people, they found themselves unpitied and friendless in their gravest hour. They were declared "enemies of the people", their work was debased, their publications banned, their past exorcised from the pages of the Party history.BB The principal guilt of which all the Slovak victims of the purges were accused was the unpardonable sin of "bourgeois nationalism", the very thing in which they were so much encouraged by their Czech comrades in 1945-6. It is generally not realized that the bulk of the victims of the 1949-54 purges were "bourgeois nationalists" (i.e. 86) In the writings of contemporary Communist historians all these measures were described as being socialist, progressive and to the benefit of the masses. Only now, after 15 years, some "mistakes" are being admitted for which the personality cult is blamed. 87) The purges were strictly taboo to the socialist historians until January 1968. Only in the field of literature a cautious attempt has been made to deal with this touchy subject, e. g. in Mnacko's Oneskorene reportaze, in Karvas's Jazva, etc. 88) More about the purges can be found in D. A. Schmidt's Anotomy of a Satelite ( Boston, 1952), in Vnuk's cistky - nezahojitel'ne rany KSS (Slovak v Amerike, November 9th,-30th, 1966); also Der Slansky-Prozess und seine Folgen (Recht im Ost und West, 5/ 1964, pp. 196-203. �SLOVAKIA 157 Slovaks) in Slovakia and "zionists" (i.e. Jews) in the Czech lands, though these two groups did not account for more than 13 ¼- of the KSc membership. It is no wonder then that the purges permanently poisoned the already strained Slovak-Czech relations beyond any hope of reconciliation. After the elimination of the Slovak element the Central Committee of the KSc entrusted the reins of the KSS to people of its own choice: Siroky, Bacilek, Duris, David, Dubcek, Rais, Branik, sefranek, Mauer, etc. As in the early twenties most of these were of non-Slovak origin ( Czechs and Jews) and a few of them were even Soviet citizens (David, Mauer). In March 1953 Stalin died and shortly after him K. Gottwald. The presidency of the Republic passed on to A. Zapotocky, while a well-known Slovakophobe, A. Novotny, became the first Party secretary. Novotny soon concentrated in his hands immense power and, assisted by V. Kopecky, was able to suppress all the liberalising tendencies of the post-Stalin thaw. 89 Having thus delayed destalinization which was sweeping through Poland, Hungary and the Soviet Union, Novotny paid increased attention to Slovakia where the dangers to his policies were greatest. In an attempt to subdue the passive resistance of the Slovaks and to break the nationalist spirit pulsating there in spite of purges, expulsions and bolshevist vigilance, Novotny further tightened the screw of Czech centralism. He introduced new administrative steps aimed at a more thorough control and reorganized the existing economic, cultural and social structure of the country. In this reorganization several Slovak industrial enterprises and cultural associations lost even their nominal independence and were integrated with their Czech counterparts into more compact "Czechoslovak" bodies.90 89) Kopecky's version of how the Party fought and defeated "revisionism" among the intellectuals is graphically, though one-sidedly, described in his book, CSR a KS(; (Praha, 1960), pp. 467-470. 90 ) These moves were allegedly designed for reasons of higher efficiency but the uneasy reluctance with which they were accepted in Slovakia indicates their insidious nature. Their implementation led to the dismissal of the President of the Slovak National Council, S. Sebesta, anct to renewed attacks on Slovak separatism by Bacilek, Kopecky, David, etc. �158 SLOVAKIA With regard to the Slovak political and administrative organs these were doomed to wither away by a devious method of ignoring their very existence. In spite of the fact that the Slovak regional organs were staffed by trusted Party members they were gradually reduced to complete inactivity. Though the Government was constitutionally obliged to appoint a Commissioner when new ministeries were created, this provision was, as a rule, ignored. 91 Under the mask of "Czechoslovak socialist patriotism" a new brand of undiluted Czech nationalism was superimposed on these centralist tendencies. Any opposition to this socialist Czechoslovakism was decried as bourgeois nationalism and one can see how often these accusations were levelled against the Slovaks after 1954.92 In an arrogant disregard of Slovak national aspirations the constitution which in May 1960 proclaimed CzechoSlovakia "a socialist country" further stripped the power of Slovakia's provincial government organs subordinating them completely to the Central Government. 93 This outrageous arrangement was presented as a final and satisfactory solution of the Slovak problem and the Party boasted in its official history that it had accomplished what the old capitalist system had found insoluble.94 However, the Slovak feelings about the situation are more aptly 91) E. Taborsk)', Communism in Czechoslov akia 1948-1960 (Princeton , N. J. , 1961), pp. 340-344. 92) V. ~iroky complained about it at the Tenth Congress of the KSS in April 1955; it was deplored in a leading article in Pravda of May 1st, 1956; in the aftermath of the Budapest revolt it was ruefully admitted "one of the weakest sectors of our ideological struggle is the struggle against bourgeois nationalism", Pravda of December 14th, 1956); in January 1958 it was violently denounced by K. Bacilek as having penetrated "into various fields of our cultural, political and scientific life, sports, state apparatus, economic organs, etc." Pravda of January 10th and 11th, 1958) ; again by K. Bacilek and V. Kopecky at the Eleventh Congress of the KSS in April 1958; etc. See also: Slovak Nationalism Revisited (Radio Free Europe Papers of November 11, 1965). 93) The Slovak Commissioners must "attend to further tasks in the economic and cultural construction of Slovakia to the extent determined by the central government" (Taborsky, Communism in Czechoslovakia 1948-1960 [Princeton, N. J., 1961], p. 339) . 94) Dejiny KS(; (Praha, 1961), pp. 697-698. �SLOVAKIA 159 summed up in the words of the former member of the Secretariat of the KSS and Party historian, M. Gosiorovsky: By the new adjustments of the Slovak national organs (which led to the aboli5hment of the Board of Commissioners, to the sub ordination of Slovak national offices directly to the Ministeries in Prague, etc.) the Slovak nation found itself in the position of the only nation in the entire Socialist camp which on its own ethnic territory lacked such organs of the Socialist governmental administration which would correspond to its development, its present living standard, its numerical strength and, above all, to its indispensability to become really and in every respect an equal partner with the brotherly Czech nation.95 VII. 1962-1967 Misruled and unrepresented, the Slovak Communists resented the continuos Czech interference, the Socialist brand of "Czechoslovakism" and above all the persistence of Stalinist methods and Stalinist leadership to which they were subjected. But there was little they could do about it while the Party was strong and enjoyed Krushchev's support. 96 But in 1961-62 the Party's grip on the overall control started to slacken. There were several factors which contributed to this: the stagnation of the country's economy, the Sino-Soviet dispute which now broke into the open, renewed attacks on Stalin at the XXIInd Soviet Party Congress (October 1961). In the ideological split the KSc had no choice but to side with Moscow. Thus circumstances compelled it to do more than pay lip service to the cause of destalinization. Destalinization finally reached Czecho-Slovakia in 1962-3 and its advent was symbolically ushered in by the demolition of the huge statue of Stalin overlooking Prague (November 1962). The year 1962, the year of the XIIth Congress of the KSC, was also a year of intense ferment, especially in 95) M. Gosiorovsky, K niektorym otazkam vzt'ahu cechov a siovakov v poiitike KSc, in Historicky casopis, No. 3/ 1968, p. 391. 96 Khrushchev's endorsement of the Party's Stalinist policies in 1957 was a very serious drawback for the opposing forces in the KSS who disliked Kopecky and Novotny's stiff measures against the Slovaks. Khrushchev on the occasion of his visit to Czecho-Slovakia declared (on July 11th, 1957): "The cause of Leninism in CzechoSlovakia is in good hands." (East Europe, 9/1957, p.41) . �160 SLOVAKIA Slovakia where the pent-up grievances gave rise to outspoken criticism of the excesses of the Stalinist era and of their perpetrators. The loudest critics of these abuses of naked power were the Slovak writers, journalists, scientists and other representatives of the intelligentsia. 97 The foremost task of destalinization was to rehabilitate the victims of the 1949-54 purges. Those bourgeois nationalists who were still alive were quietly released from prisons, but Novotny and his clique were most relucant to admit that the accusations of bourgeois nationalism were fabricated. Such an admission would make fabricators of Novotny, Siroky and most of the power-holders in CzechoSlovakia. Subjected to mounting pressure the Party allowed the released prisoners to apply for re-admission to Party membership. Many of them did and their applications for re-admission read like the most savage condemnation of Communist tyranny ever written. 98 These were widely cir97) The mouthpiece of the discontented and critical voice was the official organ of the Slovak Writers' Association , Kulturny zivot, which in 1963 published an impressive number of critical articles. An open forum at which many abuses and horrors of the past and of the present were exposed was the Conference of Slovak Writers in Bratislava (April 21-22nd, 1963). At the First Congress of the Association of Slovak Journalists (May 28-29th, 1963) the wrongs and injustices of the era were bitterly denounced by M. Hysko , who publicly attacked the then Prime Minister, V. Siroky, as the prime mover behind the false accusations of the "bourgeois nanationalist" comrades, (Pravda of June 3rd 1963). 98) Some of them (e.g. Husak's) found their way abroad, where extracts from them were pub!ished in the emigre press. For English translation of parts from Husak's application see: News Digest International (Sydney) 3/ 1966, pp. 55-57. In 1968 a large number of rehabilited Party officials (as well as many non-Party men ) described their experiences at the hands of their jailers. Husak's account was serialized in a weekly, Nove slovo, Holdos's in the daily, Smena, but the most graphic expose of the inhuman treatment to which the victims of the cult era were subjected is in E. Loebl's book Svedectvo o procese s vedenim protistatneho sprisahaneckeho centra na cele s Rudolfom Slanskym (Bratislava, 1968) . From among the non-Communist prisoners there is the account by playwright I. Stodola in Kulturny zivot and that of military officer D. Viest in Slovenske Pohl'ady. Different organizations and institutions started to publish grim statistics about the era of lawlessness. According to various calculations there were 160 death sentences in 1948-53. The Association of Anti-Fascist Fighters claimed that 30,000-40,000 of its members became victims �SLOVAKIA 161 culated in Slovakia and their impact was enormous. At one stage they caused an open rebellion against Czech rule. Novotny tried to counteract these outbursts of discontent and criticism but his voice was drowned in an ever-growing protest. 99 To save his own skin he had to sacrifice his most valuable accomplices (and the most hated men in Slovakia) namely K. Bacilek (in March 1963), and when that did not suffice, V. Siroky and J . Duris (in September 1963). Of course the situation was far more serious than could be rectified by the removal of a few compromised Party officials. The main culprit, A. Novotny, and his group weathered the storm of criticism by sheer perseverance and stubbornness and with Moscow's backing retained their monopoly of power. At the end of 1963 the situation in the KSS differed only very little from that before the XIIth Party Congress. The leadership of the KSS was entirely in the hands of Novotny's men, like Bil'ak, Chudik, Sabolcik, Lenart, salgovic, Barbirek, Dvorsky, Cvik, Daubner, etc. In his selection Novotny was particularly careful to pick for his service people whose only qualification was blind following of the official Party line.No person of independent views or strong personal conviction made his way up the Party ladder. The most pathetic group in the Slovak political scene were the rehabilitated bourgeois nationalists. Though exonerated from their alleged crimes and officially "fully of judical and political persecution. The unlawfully sentenced citizens even founded their own organization "K 231". But the most moving (and damning) indictment of the cruelty of the Communist regime was the Resolution of the members of various religious orders presented to the Ministry of Culture and Information on April 17, 1968. It was signed by 6,174 religious who spent altogether 32,016 years in prison. (See Katoiicke noviny, May 5, 1968). 99) Novotny replied to the criticism of the Slovak Communist intellectuals on June 12th, 1963 at Kosice. He defended Siroky, maintaining that the accusations of bourgeois nationalism were " substantially right" ( Prav da of June 13th, 1963). He sharply reprimanded and vilified two Slovak critics of his policies, M. Hysko and R. Kalisky, branding them as "irresponsible scribblers" (pisalkove ). R. Kalisky replied in kind and his long letter (of 30 pages) to "comrade President" lists a comprehensive catalogue of Czech wrongdoings towards the Slovaks. This letter was also widely read in Slovakia and heartily approved by all sections of the community. �162 SLOVAKIA rehabilitated" they still were doomed to remain in a political wilderness, hoping against hope for some miracle which would restore their earlier status. Their hopes could not have been realized without a major upheavel within the Party. They were, after all, striving and clamouring after positions which were held by their former judges and jailers, by men who had advanced literally over their "dead bodies". These men knew only too well to whom they owed their posts and what was expected of them in return. This state of affairs could not have been without impact on the Party's membership. Headed by uninspiring and subservient leaders, the KSS had become a living mockery of Lenin's conception of a Communist Party. The solution of the Slovak problem in 1962-67 advanced very little, if at all. The request of the Slovak intellectuals to federate Czecho-Slovakia according to the Soviet or Yugoslav model was rejected outright. 100 The Czechs were the dominant nation in a state "of two brotherly nations of equal rights" (as it is solemnly written in the 1960 Constitution) and continued to enjoy a disproportionately high number of prestige-bearing positions in the Party organs, State administration, diplomatic service, army, etc. The dissatisfaction in all strata of the Slovak community was there for everybody to see. If any concessions were made, these were only formal and completely unsatisfactory. Thus in 1964 the term "poverenik" (Commissioner), abolished in 1960, was reintroduced and in a common declaration of the Central Committee of both Parties (i.e. KS(:; and KSS) of May 7, 1964 it was announced that the Slovak National Council would participate "more fully" in all spheres of Slovak public life. 101 But there was no visible improvement, no advancement towards a fuller participation of regional organs in Slovakia's administration. In spite of all this crude nationalistic discrimination, in spite of obvious economic, political and cultural failures, 100) This proposal, the authorship of which is attributed to an erstwhile Party historian, M. Gosiorovsky, was rejected by Prague through its Slovak mouthpiece, M. Chudik (President of the Slovak National Council. According to Chudik the Slovak people did not wish any federation (Rude pravo of November 13th, 1965). 101 ) Za plnsie uplatnenie Slovenskej narodnej rady, (Bratislava, 1964). �SLOVAKIA 163 Novotny somehow managed to retain and even consolidate his personal power at the XIIIth Party Congress (MayJune, 1966). The Congress was a rather dull and uneventful affair: only those speakers were admitted who endorsed Novotny's policies. A lengthy and critical report on the economic situation and the much talked-about "new economic model" was to be delivered by Prof. 0. sik, but what finally emerged was a very mild substitute. The Central Committee elected a 10-man Party Presidium, in which there were three Slovaks (Dubcek, Lenart, Chudik). Among the Presidium candidates there were two more Slovaks ( Sabolcik and Sadovsky). The promised and expected reform which was to put Slovak-Czech relations on an entirely new basis did not materialize .102 VIII. 1967-1968 The situation had become unbearable by 1967. The forces of discontent were gathering momentum. Up to 1966-7 the main source of opposition to the Novotny regime was in Slovakia, where his treatment of the Slovak peoples and institutions provoked almost universal hatred. This resentment was gradually percolating into the all-state Party leadership. In 1967 Novotny's obstinacy to the "new economic model" caused further polarization of the leadership into the "dogmatists" and the "liberals". The economic reform could succeed only if coupled with decentralization and with a loosening of the tight dictatorial regime. Any relaxation on the political front immediately brought forward a demand for a thorough-going rehabilitation and undoing of the "mistakes of the cult era". The combined impact of these factors (i.e. the Slovak question, economy and uneasy liberalization) eventually led to the fall of A. Novotny. These grumblings came first to the attention of the outside world in June 1967, when the writers used their IVth Congress as a tribunal for a passionate denunciation 102) The Slovak writer, V. Mihalik ( member of the Central Committee of the KSS ) revealed (in Kulturny zivot 8/1966, p. 1) that the Party was preparing "an important document" aimed at the improvem1mt in Slovak-Czech relations. The document was to be tabled at the Thirteenth Congress of the KSc (May, 1966 ). Bu t it was not, and nothing has been heard about it since. �164 SLOVAKIA of naked power and for a bitter condemnation of the Party's performance in the last two decades. 103 The Party-always very sensitive to criticism-hit back hard in Oct. 1967. The principal culprits were expelled from the Party, dismissed from their professional posts, and their official journal, "Literarni noviny", was taken away from them. An attempt was made to exploit the existing difference between the Slovak and Czech writers and to play both groups against each other. But the Slovaks, at their meeting with the Slovak Party leaders on Oct. 16, 1967, briskly declined the honour of being the Party's favourites at the expense of their Czech colleagues. 104 Another indication of the stresses and strains at the top was the criticism at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the KSc in Sept. 1967 of the implementation of the new economic model. It was, perhaps, symptomatic that the Slovak Party Secretary, A. Dubcek, accused the government 9f discriminatory policies towards Slovakia. He charged that "the results for the first half of 1967 show that investments in Slovak industry totalled 21.9 1/r of the state investments and not 28 % as was laid in the directives of the XIIIth Party Congress". 105 The struggle for power was now on and manifested itself again at the Central Committee meeting in Oct. 1967, where the Slovak Party leaders in an unheard-of move demanded that Novotny abandon one of the two top functions he held (i.e. the First Party Secretary and the President of the State) . Novotny sensed the gravity of the 103) See IV. Sjezd Svazu ceskoslovenskych spisovatelti, Praha 27. - 29. cervna 1967, (Praha, 1968), especially the speeches by M. Kundera (pp. 22-27) , P . Kohout (pp. 39-43), A. J. Liehm (pp. 99-204) and, above all, that of L. Vaculik ( pp. 141-150). The Slovak writers played a rather passive role at this gathering and their over-all performance was to become a source of serious embarrassment in the subsequent months. A heated dispute about the action of some Slovak writers (Mihalik, Spitzer, Valek, Minac, Kostra, Matu~ka, Rosenbaum , Egri, Luknar, Ponican as well as 9 Czech writers) who in their letter supported the party's policies in the cultural sphere (pp. 157-159 ) eventually led (in December 1968) to the collapse of the Slovak Writers' Union. See M. Resutik Rozlomeny svaz in Nove slovo No. 1/ 1969, p. 11. 104 ) Svedectvi (Paris) No. 32-33 / 1968, pp. 89-116. 105 ) Pravda (Bratislava), Sept. 29, 1967. �SLOVAKIA 165 situation and in December he invited Brezhnev to come to Prague to bolster his position. But Brezhnev's visit (Dec. 8 )-if anything-made the situation worse . The next meeting of the Central Committee (Dec. 19-21, 1967) dealt Novotny the final blow and made his position untenable. At the following meeting of the Central Committee, a fortnight later, Novotny was finally voted out of office and replaced by Alexander Dubcek, who till then was considered N ovotny's man in Slovakia. Outside his native Slovakia Dubcek was a completely unknown personality .106 The key role-and this should be stressed again and again-in N ovotny's downfall was played by the Slovaks who found themselves in their socialist homeland economically exploited, nationally humiliated, culturally neglected and ruled as a colony by their Czech partners. Novotny, in his last speech as Party Secretary (New Year's speech, 1968) , tried to placate the Slovaks with the promise of a more generous economic consideration for Slovakia: " The need of nationwide industrial development must not obscure the important task of priority development of Slovakia which still has not reached the average economic level of the Czech regions". 107 But the offer was "too little too late". The new leadership of the KSc put the question of Slovakia as the number one problem to be tackled by them. Prague radio said on Jan. 5, 1968: "The Central Committee took note of the fact that the government and the Presidium of the Slovak National Council will submit to the Party organs, on the basis of thorough situation analyses, specific proposals for perfecting their activities." The activities of the Slovak National Council being almost non-existent needed much more than perfecting. In his speech at the 20th anniversary of the Communist coup of February 1948, Dubcek spelt out the current difficulties which were troubling his leadership: "Many faults 106) For backgro und to Dubcek's personality see, e. g. F . Vnuk, Alexander Dubcek - tragedia poctiv eho komunistu in Kalendar Jednota 1969 (Middletown, Pa. , 1968), pp. 173-181. Also T. Szulc, A loo/c at Alexander Dubcek - the aparatchik who made a revoluti on in N . Y . Times (Weekly Review) , Jan. 12, 1969. 107) Pravda (Bratislava), Jan. 2, 1968. �166 SLOVAKIA have occured in internal Party life ... (where) the struggle between the progressive and conservative forces has not yet been concluded . . . ( There are) serious difficulties in the economy ... In our relations with the Slovak national organs we must rectify what was wrongfully violated after 1960 and things must be rearranged in such a way as to bring them in line with the contemporary stage of development of the state as a whole." 108 After this admission from the highest Party official things in Slovakia started to happen. M. Chudik (member of the Presidium of the KSc), N ovotny's stooge in Slovakia who was acting as Chairman of the Slovak National Council, hurriedly submitted his resignation. But he was not to be allowed to bow out as gracefully as that; he was dismissed in ignominy instead, on March 14, 1968. Having discarded its incompetent boss the Slovak National Council immediately published a resolution demanding that CzechoSlovakia become a federation. A new constitution to replace the one of 1960 was to give full legislative power to the Slovak National Council in all except foreign affairs, defense and state finances. Slovakia was to have a separate government. 109 In March the so-called "Czecho-Slovak spring" really started and the whole country was undergoing radical changes. Novotny's Party apparatus was falling to pieces. There was the defection to the West of Major-General Jan sejna; the resignation of the Trade Unions leader Pastytik; the dismissal of Chudik; the removal from office of the Interior Minister Kudrna and Prosecutor-General Bartuska; the suicide of Deputy Defense Minister V. Janko and Vice-President of the Supreme Court J. Brest'ansky; ousting of the chief Party ideologue J. Hendrych and the fall from the Presidency of Novotny himself. All this happened in the space of four weeks and had tremendous impact on the people. These events necessitated a new reorganization of the Party and the government. The five-day session of the Central Committee of the KSc named a new Presidium on April 1, 1968, in which Slovakia was given the largest 108 ) Pravda (Bratislava) , Feb. 23 , 1968. 109) Pravda (Bratislava), March 15, 1968. �SLOVAKIA 167 representation ever : 4 in 11. 110 In the Secretariat there were 3 Slovaks out of 9 members (Dubcek-the First Secretary, Lenart, Sadovsky). On April 9 a new Cabinet was sworn in by Novotny's successor in the Presidency, General L. Svoboda. At the head of the new government stood 0. cernik. There were 5 deputy Prime Ministers and 23 Ministers. Here too the Slovaks were treated much more generously than ever before: 2 deputy Prime Ministers and 6 Ministers were from Slovakia. One of the deputy Prime Ministers was Gustav Husak, a rehabilitated Slovak "bourgeois nationalist". On April 10, 1968 the Party published its " Action Program",111 an ambitious document setting out " CzechoSlovakia's road towards socialism" and outlining the political and economic reforms by which it was to achieve one-party rule, mollified by the active participation of the non-party sections of the population. The Slovak question again figured prominently in the Program. A new symmetric federative arrangement of the state was proposed and the Slovaks were promised: 1. Slovak National Council and Council of Ministers (instead of the old Board of Commissioners), 2. Slovak national committees, 3. Autonomy in planning and budgeting for Slovakia, 4. State secretaries in those central ministerial departments where Ministers were Czechs, 5. Guarantee of Slovak rights against the Czech majority, 6. Adequate Slovak representation in the army, diplomatic service, etc. 112 In the less oppressive atmosphere of the day and in the absence of overt censorship public opinion soon started to exert pressure from below. This resulted first of all in the resignation or removal from the scene of those men who were closely linked with Novotny and his• dictatorial policies. To purge Novotny's followers from the Central llO ) They were Dubcek, Rigo, Bil'ak and Barbirek. Their nomina tion was accepted in Slovakia with some scepticism and their credentials as Slovaks were immediately questioned. It was pointed out that Rigo was a Gypsy, Bil'ak was a Ruthenian and Barbirek though born in Bratislava- was a Czech. And, of course, everybody knew that Dubcek had spent his childhood and adolescence (192438 ) in the Soviet Union. 111 ) A kcni Program KS(: pfijaty na p leruirni zasedani OV KS(: dne 5. du bna 1968, Praha 1968. ll 2 ) Akcni Program ...", pp. 27-28. �168 SLOVAKIA Committee of the KSc the masses demanded an extraordinary Party congress. Under the effect of ever-mounting pressure the Party leaders with some reluctance consented at last to convene it in September 1968. In Slovakia the burning question was that of federation. Obcession with this issue was so intense that little room was left for anything else. There was a minor controversy between two groups of Slovak intellectuals as to whether it was more correct to insist on federation before democratization or vice versa. This was, however, only a question of emphasis: the demand for federalization was almost unanimous. In the Czech lands the problem of federalization was hardly mentioned, and if at all, then not in a manner encouraging for the Slovaks. A public opinion poll revealed that 95 % of Slovaks were for federation and 90 ';c of Czechs against it. 113 The Czechs did not like to be reminded that federation was something the Slovaks were promised more than once in the past 50 years and hence long overdue. They preferred to dismiss the whole thing as an unrealistic and untimely affair of no concern to themselves. The famous "2000 words Manifesto" even suggested that in Slovakia the federation issue would be used as a shield by many old conservatives who would thus survive the democratization process: "Federation alone will not provide better living standards for either the Czechs or Slovaks, neither will it solve their economic and social problems. The rule of the Party-state bureaucracy may still survive especially in Slovakia, because there it could claim a victory in the fight by which greater freedom was gained (for the Slovaks) ."114 113) There were several surveys of public opinion on this issue. Obrana l'udu (June 1, 1968) cites the results of another survey, according to which the Slovaks were for federation "almost 100%", while in the Czech lands federation was favored by only 5% of those questioned! 114) For the full text of this Manifesto see Literarni Listy (June 27, 1968). The Soviet press called "2000 words" an "action program for the counter-revolution" (Literaturnaya Gazeta, July 10, 1968) , Dubcek deplored it as a "very serious obstacle to the further development of socialist democracy and society" (Rude pravo , June 29, 1968), S. Kodaj (Party official in East Slovakia) denounced it as "an open call for counter-revolution". In fact it was a call for pressure from below to get the Party to purge from �SLOVAKIA 169 This unkind remark in a document which so outraged the Soviet leaders and embarrassed the Communist leaders in Czecho-Slovakia, elicited a reply in the form of an open letter signed by over 200 Slovak intellectuals and intitled, "A word to the Czechs, and also Slovaks, who are worthy of it". In this response the Slovaks complained bitterly about the outrageous distortion of Slovak history by Czech officialdom ("From Shir's followers down to the men who led the uprising of 1944 nobody was good enough if he was a good Slovak first") and then defended their insistence on "federation without delay": "In today's democratization process the present inferior position of Slovakia is simply no longer tenable".11 5 No prominent political personality figured among those who signed the letter, yet the Czechs suspected that its instigator was Dr. Gustav Husak. The Deputy Prime Minister G. Husak was the most dynamic personality in the reactivated life of the KSS. 116 He re-emerged (after being sentenced to life inprisonment as a "bourgeois nationalist" in 1954) as a sworn enemy of Novotny and all his hangers-on in Slovakia. At the same time he was resolved to reassert as much an independent Slovak voice in the state and Party politics as possible. He still remained what he always had been, an orthodox and autocratic Communist at heart, but his hatred of Novotny put him in the one camp with the liberals. His uncompromising stand on immediate and comprehensive federalization assured him of a strong following in Slovakia. He was not even a member of the Central Committee of the KSS, yet his political influence in Slovakia was second to none. Early in July he swayed the regional Party conference in Bratislava to press for the KSS congress to be held in August 1968 (i.e. before the scheduled KSc Congress ) so that the Slovaks would come to the XIVth extraordinary Congress of the KSc with their own specific all positions of power the men who had been responsible for the country's political, economic, moral and cultural decline. For the English translation of the whole document see East Europe No. 8/ 1968, pp. 25-28. 115) Slovo cechom aj Slovakom sucim na slovo in Nove slovo, No. 11/ 1968, pp. 1-3. 116) For a short biography of G. Husak read F. Vnuk's O Husakovi zrwva a v iacej in Kalendcir Jednota 1968, (Middletown, Pa., 1967, pp. 87-98). �170 SLOVAKIA proposals ( already approved by the KSS Congress) of the federalization scheme. 117 The internal development in Czecho-Slovakia since January and especially since March 1968 was a cause of serious concern in the Soviet Union and neighbouring people's democracies. The events in Czecho-Slovakia were directly connected with the students' demonstrations in Poland which produced a crisis in the Polish Party leadership. Afraid of similar consequences in East Germany Ulbricht imposed a ban on the German-language newspaper from Czecho-Slovakia. The Ukrainian-language broadcast from Presov found keen listeners in the south-western part of the Soviet Union and caused uneasiness and discomfort to the Soviet Party leaders, to Ukrainian Party boss Shelest in particular. Dubcek and his colleagues were repeatedly summoned to Moscow, Dresden, Warsaw, while their counterparts from the other Socialist countries were arriving in Prague trying their best to stop the process which in Dubcek's eyes was democratic and humanizing, in theirs counter-revolutionary and revisionist. Then on July 15, 1968 the Central Committee of the KSc received a common letter from the "fraternal" Parties of the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria. They found the situation in Czecho-Slovakia "absolutely unacceptable for a socialist country". The catalogue of errors and faults was long and comprehensive and reflected their own fears and apprehensions. Only one aspect of the post-January development in the country was condoned without disapproval: "We welcome the rectification in the relations between the Czechs and Slovaks on a sound basis of brotherly collaboration within the framework of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic". 118 The recipients of this "Warsaw letter" did not leave these accusations unanswered and refuted them one by one. In their written reply they stated emphatically: "We do not see any realistic reasons which would entitle you to assert that our present situation should be branded as counter-revolutionary."119 The Party Secretary Dubcek went 117) Pravda (Bratislava), July 7, 1968. 118) Prav da (Bratislava) , Special edition, July 18, 1968. 119) ib. �SLOVAKIA 171 on the air to reassure his countrymen (on July 18, 1968): "We do not want to abandon anything at all from our principles." The outcome of this correspondence was the confrontation between the 11-man Soviet Politburo and the entire 11-man KSc Presidium at cierna nad Tisou (July 29-Aug. 1, 1968), and afterwards the multilateral "comradely" meeting at Bratislava on Aug. 3. The official communique was inconclusive and the whole outcome of the conference was rather dubious. 120 Both participants ( i. e. the KSC on the one hand and the Communist Parties of the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria on the other) were convinced that they had successfully defended their own tenets of socialism. In a nationwide broadcast Dubcek again attempted to calm his fellow citizens: "You can be fully satisfied with the results and the spirit of the talks. We have kept our promises (i.e. not to deviate from the post-January course)." It sounded too good to be true. For the next 18 days Czecho-Slovakia lived in a fool's paradise, while the Red Army, under the pretext of largescale manoeuvres, was preparing the invasion of CzechoSlovakia. On Aug. 20-21, 1968, in defiance of their solemn promises to respect the national independence of every Socialist country, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces of five Communist countries invaded Czecho-Slovakia and put a sudden end to the great democratization experiment. In this gesture of Cain-like brotherhood Communism displayed its fear of democratization, its abhorrence of freedom, its inability to satisfy even the most elementary of human desires. It demonstrated that Communism cannot be liberalized without ceasing to be Communism. During that fateful night of Aug. 20-21 the progressive leaders of the KSc were kidnapped and taken in chains to Russia. This high-handed action of the Socialist allies 121 provoked a loud and indignant outcry all over the world, and-most unexpectedly-a resolute condemnation by the majority of the world Communist Parties, including those of China, Yugoslavia, Rumania, France, Italy, Great Britain, 120) Pravda (Bratislava), Aug. 4, 1968. 121) A Chronology of Occupation in East Europe, No. 10/ 1968,pp. 38-46. �172 SLOVAKIA Australia, etc. But by far the most effective was the reaction the Soviets encountered in the occupied country. It is impossible to describe in detail the ingenious methods of the passive and less passive resistance by which the Slovaks and Czechs frustrated the occupiers' efforts to "normalize the situation". The invasion united the Czech and Slovak nation in their opposition to this cruel act. But it appears that there was much less unity of action in the Party ranks. The KSS refused to back unconditionally the activities of the KSc in the first post-invasion days. The XIVth extraordinary Congress of the KSc, scheduled for Sept. 9 was hurriedly convened and took place during the night of Aug. 22 under the very nose of the occupying troops in a big Prague factory ( cKD plant) . The delegates (1095 out of 1543 expected to attend) elected a new Committee of 144 members. Of these 118 were new members and only 26 belonged to the old Central Committee. The representation from Slovakia amounted to 42 members, an unprecedented proportion, and there were 8 Slovaks in the 28-man Presidium: Dubcek, Husak, Zrak, 1'azky, Sadovsky, Colotka, Turcek, Pavlenda, Samel (?). 122 This should have satisfied the Slovaks, but it did not. The Soviets denounced the XIVth Congress in the most violent terms and did their utmost to undo it. According to Western reports the secret protocol drawn-up at the conclusion of the Czechoslovak-Soviet "negotiations" (sit venia verbi) on Aug. 28, 1968 contained 14 demands, one of which asked for the invalidation of the XIVth congress . As it happened this was the first thing the Russians succeeded in obtaining. A key role in making this congress into an "unevent" was played by G. Husak who was one of the negotiators in Moscow. While he was abroad the extraordinary Congress of the KSS started ( on Aug. 26 ). Husak returned just in time to deliver his address on the last day of the session. In his speech he questioned the legality of the XIVth Congress of the KSc and advised the delegates to the KSS Congress to reverse their stand taken three days earlier and to disavow the XIVth extraordinary Congress of the KSc. Husak argued that at the XIVth congress the Slovak representatives to the Party 122) Prav da (Bratislava ), Special edition, Aug. 25, 1968. �SLOVAKIA 173 organs were elected "illegally" ... "undemocratically", that "out of 300 Slovak delegates selected to attend the congress proceedings only 4, later 22, and towards the end about 40 were present". 123 In complete disregard of the fact that it was the Russians who had prevented the Slovak delegates from participating at the Congress Husak addressed his indignant reproaches at those who elected him to the Party Presidium: "Nobody can impose on a sovereign nation and its party its will in a way we have witnessed, namely that a little group of people entrusted by nobody should determine the nation's political representation."124 Of course Husak's anger and fury would have been even greater if the XIVth Congress had failed to nominate him or some of his close associates to the position in the top Party hierarchy. His rhetoric was just a clumsy display of the heads-I-win-tails-you-lose tactics. In sharp contrast to the XIVth Congress of the KSC, the Congress of the KSS was allowed to proceed undisturbed. It was attended by 607 of the 638 choosen delegates. It elected a 131-man Central Committee and a 12-member Presidium composed of Husak, Bod'a, Falt'an, Harencar, Klokoc, Luptak, Novomesky, Pavlenda, Sadovsky, Sedlakova, 'l'azky and Zrak. The 7-man Secretariat consisted of G. Husak (First Secretary) , L. Abraham, B . Graca (ideological spokesman ) , V. Pavlenda, S . Sadovsky, J. Turcek and J . Zrak. This was an entirely new team personally hand-picked by Husak. All of Novotny's men and Husak's opponents were either ousted (Bil'ak, Sabolcik, Pecha, Riga, Kriz, Hruskovic, Dvorsky, etc.) or demoted to ordinary Central Committee membership (Janik, Barbirek, Zupka, etc.). In the resolution of the Congress the Plenum took a stand on a number of current issues created by the presence of Warsaw Pact troops in Slovakia, but the only problem it tackled with determination and vigour was that of federation. Husak said in his concluding address: "I recommend that we approve . . . our insistence on the federative rearangement of our state on the basis of principles outlined earlier and it should be enacted by Oct. 28 this year." 125 In the subsequent weeks the Slovak Communists pursued this 123 ) Pravda (Bratislava) , Aug. 30, 1968. 124) Smena, Aug. 30, 1968. 125) Pravda (Bratislava) , Aug. 30, 1968. �174 SLOVAKIA point of their program forcefully and relentlessly to its logical conclusion. The federation was indeed enacted on Oct. 27, 1968 and put into practice on Jan. 1, 1969. Today's Czecho-Slovakia consist of two Socialist republics, the Czech and the Slovak, with three governments, Czech, Slovak and Central. It can be said that federation is the only paragraph salvaged from the ambitious Action program of Dubcek's leadership. The draft of the new Party statutes was published for discussion early in April 1968 and it proposed that the Party too should be reorganized on federal lines. 126 It envisaged the Communist Party of the Czech lands and the Communist Party of Slovakia to deal with internal and domestic matters; for international representation and in matters which exceeded the limits of national competence there was to be a single representative of the two national parties, i. e. the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. This proposition was politely forgotten after August, 1968; the Russians apparently did not like it. (Of course there were many other things the Russians would loathe to see in.practice, such as the new concept of democratic centralism, election of all party organs by secret ballot, limited terms of service on regional and national party committees, etc.). Thus whilst the KSS achieved a funda• mental alteration in the structure of the state, it was unable to adjust the structural pattern of the Party to fit the new political situation. The KSS is still without counterpart in the Czech lands 127 However, under Husak's new leadership the KSS has undergone a remarkable revival. In its relation to the KSc it has become more aggressive and self-assertive. The days of blind obedience of the Party line drawn up in Prague have been replaced by an avowed and dedicated service 126) Rude pravo, Supplement, Aug. 10, 1968. 127) At the plenary session of the Central Committee of the KSCS on Nov. 14-17, 1968 a substitute-counterwei ght to the Central Committee and Presidium of the KSS was set up: the so-called Party's Bureau for the Czech regions. It functions within the framework of the Central Committee of the KSCS, consists of 11 men and is headed by L. Strougal, assisted by two Secretaries (V. Hula and J . Kozel). The weekly journal "Tribuna" is its official organ. The only better known personality in the Bureau (beside L. Strougal) is the Prime-Minister Cernik. �SLOVAKIA 175 to the needs of the nation. At least that was what G. Husak proclaimed at the KSS Congress: "Let this Party rid itself of everything which is irresolute, everything which is opportunistic, let endure in it all that is firm, noble and prepared to struggle for the rights of this nation. 128 It remains to be seen to what extent the KSS will be able to realize this resolve. The strongman Husak was known to have made similar speeches in 1945-48, but after 1948 he was gradually silenced, removed from his Party posts and eventually imprisoned. So far he has succeeded in bringing about federalization of the state, but in the process he has antagonized a few influential groups in Slovakia (liberal writers, journalists, intellectuals) and the majority of the Czech population. He is being depicted in the Western press as a man who enjoys the trust of the Russians, as the man who annulled the XIVth Congress of the KSc, as the man who was instrumental in the removal of Smrkovsky, etc. 129 The conflict and dialectical contradictions between the Czechs and Slovaks are at present as acute as ever. Federation solved one old problem but generated at least a dozen new ones. The part played by the KSS in Slovak national history shows too much on the debit side and very little on the credit side. In the years 1948-67 the KSS was without doubt the most powerful single factor in shaping Slovakia's history. Yet in most instances it was a force which, with cynicism and arrogance, stood as a stumbling-block between the nation and its freedom, between the people and their political and cultural self-expression. In those years the KSS was just a tool of terror and intimidation wielded by a foreign oppressor over the Slovak masses. These things were openly stated in many sensational revelations 128) Smena, Aug. 30, 1968. A question can be asked at this point as to how much the Party membership will drop if it is going to rid itself of everything which is opportunistic and irresolute and retain only that which is firm and noble. In 1968, just before the Soviet invasion the Party had in Slovakia 220,000 organized members, i. e. less than 6% of the population. If Husiik's criteria are applied this number can only decrease. 129) See e.g. the article of L. Vlasic: Pohyb s cudnym pozadim in Nove slovo, No. 1/ 1969, pp. 3 and 14. Also Husiik's speech at the Plenary session of the Central Committee KSC-S (Rude pravo, Jan. 21 , 1969, p. 7) . �SLOVAKIA 176 which appeared in the censorship-free press during the March-August period of the Dubcek era. The new leadership of the KSS has repeatedly stated that the return of the old days is out of the question. Yet (apart from federation) one witnesses almost daily a gradual retreat from the gains and achievements of the liberalization process. The presence of Red Army units in the country (now sanctioned by a treaty) makes certain that the conditions imposed on the KSC leadership on Aug. 28, 1968 are being implemented. How-under these circumstances-will the KSS safeguard the interests of the nation? Time alone will tell. Appendix I. N umerical representation from Slovakia in the Central Committee. Presidium-Politburo and Secretariat-Orgburo of the KS(: (including candidates) in 1921-1968. Members in Members in Members in KSC. Seer. C. Committee KS(: Presid. Party Congress - -- Merger-Congress (1921) I 36 6 16.6 I. Congress ( 1923) I 26 5 19.4 II. Congress ( 1924) 50 6 12.0 52 III. Congress ( 1925) 6 11.5 52 IV. Congress ( 1927) 5 from Nov. 1928 I ? I ? 9/ V. Congress ( 1929) 52 1 4 7.7 4 7.8 51 VI. Congress (1931) 8 16.0 50 VII. Congress (1936) ? ? Exile KS(: (Mose., '38) ? ? ? Exile KS(: Paris, 1939) ? ? ? ? Exile KS(: (Mose., '43) Post-war KSC (Ko~ .• '45) I 21 10 47.7 VIII. Congress ( 1946 ) I 101 0 0.0 170? 32 18.8 from July 1948 108 22 20.2 IX. Congress ( 1949) 112 23 20.3 X. Congress (1954) 147 33 22.5 XI. Congress (1958) 147 30 20.4 XII. Congress ( 1962) 166 28 16.8 XIII. Congress ( 1966 ) ? ? ? from Jan. 1968 XIV. extraordinary ('68) I 144 42 29.2 1921-1968 ll485j 254 j 17.8 II I i I 12 8 9 9 11 15 17 10 12 7 3 7 7 14 18 21 11 15 12 15 19 28 270 I - -- - - 0 0.0 -- --0 0.0 -- --7 1 11.0 0 0.0 1 14.6 7 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 0 0.0 2 33.3 6 3 20.0 1 20.0 5 1 5.9 ? ? ? 1 10.0 4 1 8.3 1 25.0 0 0.0 No 1 33.3 Secretariat 0 0.0 2 28.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 elected 2 9.5 1 14.6 7 2 18.2 0 0.0 6 1 12.5 4 26.6 8 1 12.5 4 33.3 8 0 0.0 8 5 33.3 0 0.0 6 31.5 ? ? 8 28.6 41 j 15.2 jj 79 j 8 I 10.1 /I �SLOVAKIA 177 Append.ix II. The Leadership of the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) . (The office holders of the top Party positions in 1939-1969) A. ILLEGAL KSS. First Committee (March 1939-Aug. 1941): I;, Benada, J. Duris, J. Osoha. Second Committee (Sept. 1941- April 1942): 0. Krajnak, J . Osoha, V. Skrabala. Third Committee (June 1942- July 1942) : S. Dubcek, J. Lietavec, J. Osoha. Fourth Committee (July 1942- March 1943) : S. Bas t'ovansky, M. Hrusov- sky. Fifth Committee (Aug. 1943- Sept. 1944): G. Husak, L. Novomesky, K. Smidke. B. KSS IN POWER. M erger-Congress (Sept. 1944) President: K. Smidke. Vice-Presidents: G. Husak, J. Cech. Committee members : K. Bacilek, R. Balco, R. Blazovsky, F . cap, K. Dolinsky, D. Ertl, I. Frlicka, 0. Jelen, J. Lietavec, J . Mazur, L. Novomesky, J . Pull, J . Soltesz, M. Smida, J . Sziics, L. Viktorin. Nati onal Conference at Zilina (Aug. 1945) Presidium - President: V. Siroky. Vice-President: K. Smidke. Members : S. Bast'ovansky, J. :i'.>uris, L. Holdos, G. Husak, J . Soltesz, F . Zupka , M. Valachovic. Secretariat: K. Bacilek, S. Bast'ovansky, L. Holdos, E . FrR From Apr. 1946: K. Moskovic. IX Congress of the KSS (May 1950). Presidium - President: V. Siroky. First Secretary: S. Bast'ovansky. Members: K. Bacilek, I;. Benada, J. Branik, M. culen, J . :i'.>uris, M. Falt'an, K. Moskovic, J. Pull, S. Rais, E. Sykora, F . Zupka. Secretariat ( established in Oct. 1951) : V. Siroky, S. Bast'ovansky, J . Pull, K. Moskovic, M. Gosiorovsky. From Dec. 1951 also : P . David and I;. Benada. Xth Congress of the KSS (June 1953 ) . Presidium: K. Bacilek, I;. Benada, J . Branik, M. culen, P. David, M. Falt'an, J . Kriz, A. Michalicka, 0 . Pavlik, J . Pull, R. Strechaj , V. Siroky, F. Zupka. Secretariat: I;_ Benada, P . David, J . Kriz, A. Michalicka, J . Pull. ? Congress of the KSS (April 1955). Presidium: K. Bacilek, M. Bakula, I;. Benada, V. Daubner, P. David, 0. Jelen, P . Majling, R. Strechaj, J . Valo. Secretariat: K. Bacilek (First Secretary) , P . David, J . Kriz, A. Michalicka. �178 SLOVAKIA Extraordinary Con gress of the KSS (April 1957) . Presidium: K. Bacilek, ~- Benada, V. Daubner, P. David, M. Chudik, 0. Jelen , P. Majling, R. Strechaj, J . Valo. Xlth Congress of the KSS (May 1958). Presidium: K. Bacilek, ~- Benada, V. Daubner, P. David, M. Chudik, 0. Jelen , J . Kriz, P. Majling, J . Valo. Secretariat: K. Bacilek (First Secretary) , P. David, F . Dvorsky, J. Kriz, J . Lenart. Xllth Party Congress (Nov. 1962). Presidium: K. Bacilek, ~- Benada, V. Bil'ak, V. Daubner, P. David , M. Chudik, J . Lenart, M. Sabolcik. Secretariat: K. Bacilek (First Secretary till April 1963, when replaced by A. Dubcek) , V. Bil'ak, F . Dvorsky, J . Kriz, J. Lenart. Xlllth Congress of the KSS (May 1966). Presidium: F . Barbirek, V. Bil'ak, V. Daubner, A. Dubcek, H. :t'.lurkovic, M. Chudik, J . Janik, J. Lorine, M . Sabolcik. From Jan. 1968 also M. Hruskovic, R. Harencar, M. Pecho. Secretariat: A. Dubcek (First Secretary till Jan. 1968, when replaced by V. Bil'ak), J . Janik, M . Sabolcik, J. Zrak. XIVth Extraordinary Congress of the KSS (Aug. 1968). Presidium: G. Husak, K. Bod'a, S. Falt'an, R. Harencar, 0. Klokoc, s. Luptak, L . Novomesky, V. Pavlenda, s. Sadovsky, M. Sedlakova, A. 1'azky, J . Zrak. Secretariat: G. Husak (First Secretary), L. Abraham, B. Graca, V. Pavlenda, S. Sadovsky, J. Turcek, J. Zrak. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA as a Christian and democratic organization, is resolutely against the domination and exploitation of the Slovak nation by any other nation or political state; the Slovaks did not want to be ruled over by the Magyars and, today, do not want to be subservient to the Czech nation. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA is a CULTURAL and CIVIC organization of Americans of Slovak descent. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA wants to help Americans of Slovak descent in American political life, in business or professions, in social standing, and along educational lines. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1969, Vol. 19 Description An account of the resource Vol. 19 (No. 42), 1969. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1969 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 125 F. Vnuk: Fifty Years of Comn1unist Party of Slovakia (1918-1968) The first notable Slovak commentary on Communism was made by Marx's contemporary, :Cudovit stur. His assessment of Communism was an outright condemnation: "Communism, in spite of all efforts and false pretences to win for mankind its rights, only brings about its degradation, since it has no sound knowledge of mankind. Because of its insistence on principles which are impractical and unattainable Communism is one of the maddest figments ever originating in the human brain." 1 In the past forty years stur was much abused by the Slovak Communist intellectuals because of his alleged reactionary thinking. 2 Yet Stu.r's rejection of Communism seems to epitomize the Slovak attitude more fittingly than all the recent attempts by Communist historians to present Communism as a progressive ideology destined to uplift and enrich the Slovak nation. The inescapable geography which put Slovakia in Central Europe exposed the Slovaks to direct contact with political Communism as far back as 1918-19. Since then the Slovak nation has undergone the complete range of relations which can exist between a nation trying to assert its political identity and an aggressive ideology. These relations, full of drama, paradox and tragedy, are briefly outlined in this short history of the Communist Patry of Slovakia ( KSS). I. 1918-1921 The very beginning of the KSS is characteristic. The Party started its existence outside Slovakia, in Budapest. 1) In his major work, Slawentum imd die Welt der Zukunft, Quoted by D. Okali in Dav; spomienky a studie (Bratislava, 1965), p. 284. 2) e.g. L. Novomesky, in his pamphlet, Marx a slovensky narod (Mala kniznica Davu, 1933) and in his article, Karol Marx reviduje hist6riu Slovakov (Dav, 2/ 1933, pp. 18-19). 126 SLOVAKIA There in November 1918 Erno P6r, Minister for Foreign Propaganda in the Communist Government of Hungary, was entrusted by Bela Kun and Tibor Szamuely to organize the Slovak Communist Party as a section of the Communist Party of Hungary. 3 The Party conscripted into its ranks Slovak workers, apprentices and soldiers living in those days in defeated Hungary (particularly in Budapest, Ostrihom-Esztergom, Bekes-Csaba, etc. ). On March 27th, 1919 it began publication of its own daily, "Cervene noviny" (Red News ). 4 But the Party ran into difficulties when it had to find leaders for the conscripted Slovak proletarian masses. There was hardly a single Slovak of rank and stature to lend his name to the movement. Thus the reins were initially given into the hands of Jewish Socialist and Communist organizers in Budapest who could speak Slovak. To overcome this deficiency Bela Kun requested Lenin to send him some able Slovak Communist leaders from Russia, where a "Czecho-Slovak" Communist Party formed from the Czech and Slovak prisoners of war had been functioning since May 1918.5 But since there were no prominent Slovak personalities among these either, Lenin sent to Budapest the next best thing: the Czechs. Among these the most dynamic was one Antonin Janousek who arrived in Budapest in January 1919.6 After some disagreement with B. Kun (Janousek wanted to lead a Czecho-Slovak section; Kun and his advisors were strongly against it, seeing in it implicit recognition of the imperialistic policies of the Entente ) he 3 ) M. Vietor, Slovenska soviets/ca r epub lika (Bratislava, 1959), p. 53. 4) P. A. Toma, Slovak Soviet Repu blic of 1919 (The American Slavic and East European Review, 17/ 1958, p. 203 ). 5 ) D ej iny K SC (P raha, 1961 ), p. 17. 6) See: Z. Horeni, Antonin Jan ousek, predseda revolucnej v lady Slovenskej r epubliky rad (Bratislava, 1964). This accoun t of t he Slovak Soviet Republic is abstracted from the following books: K. A. Medvecky: Slovensk y prevrat I -IV (Trnava , 1930-31 ); Vpad bol'sevikov na Slov ensko ro ku 1919 (Trnava, 1936) : M. Vietor, Slovenskci soviet ska r epu bli ka 1919 (Bratislava, 1955); C. Holotik, 0 Slovenskej repub like rad r . 1919 (Historicky casopi s 2/ 1959); V. Kr al, lntervencni val ka cs. burzoazie proti mad'arske sovetske r epublice r . 1919 (Praha, 1954); K. Culen, 0 Slovenskej soviet ske j republike z ro ku 1919 (Kanadsky Slovak, May 19-June 9, 1956); P. A. Toma , Slovak Soviet Republic of 1919 (The American Slavic and East European Review, 17/ 1958, pp. 203-215 ). SLOVAKIA 127 was made head of the Czech section of the Communist Party of Hungary on April 12, 1919. Towards the end of April the Slovak and the Czech sections were brought under common leadership but it was plainly stated that the Slovak section was to maintain its independence and individuality. There was never a Czecho-Slovak section of the Communist Party of Hungary. The most important .went in the life of this Slovak section was thf, proclamation of the Slovak Soviet Republic which lasted only two weeks but which has become a source of confused pride and political embarrassment to the contemporary Czech and Slovak socialist historiographers. On May 20th, 1919 the Hungarian Communist government, accusing the Czecho-Slovak armed forces of violation of the Paris Agreement, ordered its Red Army to invade Slovakia. Carried on the wave of proud Magyar national ism, humiliated by the 1918 defeat, the Magyar troops swept the southern and eastern plains of Slovakia. They took Lucenec on May 30th, Levice on June 1st, Nove Zamky on June 2nd, Kosice and Banska stiavnica on June 6th, Presov on June 8th, Bardejov on June 11th and penetrated as far into Central Slovakia as Zvolen. On June 3rd, 1919 "Oervene noviny" wrote exultantly: "The dictatorship of the proletariat is being established in Slovakia." The actual proclamation of the Slovak Soviet Republic took place at Presov on June 16th, 1919. It was ruled by the Provisional Revolutionary Executive Committee made up largely of Magyar-Jewish and Czech left-wingers. The only Slovak member of some significance was Stefan Stehlik. On June 20th, 1919 the Committee elected a Slovak Revolutionary governmem headed by Antonin Janousek. To T. G. Masaryk, who was residing in Prague as the elected President of Czecho-Slovakia, Janousek sent this challenging message: "We explicitly declare that from now on Slovakia belongs exclusively to the Slovak working class." 7 The donstitutional status of this short-lived Slovak Soviet Republic was obscure, but one thing was beyond doubt: it was violently anti-Czech and fiercely pro-Magyar. It aimed at the breaking up of Czecho-Slovakia and was 7) Quoted by. K. culen in Kanadsky Slovak (of May 26, 1956), p . 3. 128 SLOVAKIA openly and aggressively separatist. Both Kun and Lenin considered Czecho-Slovakia as a wilful creation of capitalist Powers and as a tool of imperialist policies in Central Europe. Czecho-Slovakia was alleged to deny the Slovak people "its inalienable right of self-determination" and the Communists in establishing the Slovak Soviet Republic were rectifying this injustice. 8 In spite of all its revolutionary zeal the Communistsponsored separatism did not strike roots among the Slovak masses. They were not only apathetic but manifestly hostile to the venture in which they saw only an ill-disguised attempt of the moribund Hungary to save its territorial integrity. The withdrawal of the Hungarian Red Army from Slovakia (June 28-July 4, 1919) spelled the inevitable end of both the Slovak Soviet Republic and the Slovak section of the Communist-Socialist Party of Hungary. The Slovak decision in 1918 to exchange their hopeless life tinder the Magyars for a hopeful life with the Czechs was final and irreversible. 9 But it was a decision fraught with problems and difficulties. Slovakia entered the newly formed Czecho-Slovakia as a land of poor peasants with practically no Slovak urban proletariat. The adherents and disseminators of the Socialist ideas were largely the German and Magyar ( or magyarized) workers who were as contemptuous of their Slovak comrades as Marx and Engels had been of the Czechs and Russians. This antipathy was 8) Stefan Stehlik wrote in Cervene noviny (of July 7, 1919) : " On Slovak soil, freed from imperialism, today there was created an independent Slovak Soviet Republic. The first impulsive action of the proletariat liberated from t he yoke of Czech imperialism was to realize the right of self-determination which is being exhorted by the oppressors with such a great glory; in reality however, it is being perverted by them . . . Slovak Soviet Republic turns its weapons ... against all who threaten this real unpe rverted democracy, this inallienable right of self-determination" (by which at that time they could have meant only the Prague Government). Quoted by P . A. Toma , op. cit. pp. 208-209. 9) The first years of the Slovak-Czech relationship and its reflection in Slovak political, social and economic life, are described at length in several authoritative works, e.g.: F . Peroutka, Budovani statu I -IV ( Praha 1933-36 ) ; J . Opocensky, Konec monarchie rakousko -tihorske ( Praha, 1928) . V. Chaloupecky, Zapas o Slovensko (Praha, 1930 ), I. Derer, siovensko v prevrate a po nom (Bratislava, 1924) ; K. Sidor, Andrej Hiinka 1864-1926 (Bratislava, 1936) . SLOVAKIA 129 mutual and in their anti-Magyar feelings the leaders of the Slovak Social Democrats (Derer, Lehotsky, Markovic) were indistinguisha ble from their bourgeois counterparts (Hlinka, srobar, Hodza). Thus in the political sense the parties contesting the first post-war elections in Slovakia offered very much the same program. It was only in the field of social reform that they differed. Here the Social Democrats surpassed everybody in generosity, promising to implement many far-reaching social and economic measures. Their radical policies appealed to the people dissatisfied with the prevailing conditions. Thus in the general election of April, 1920 the Slovak people gave their votes to the Social Democratic Party led by Ivan Derer. 10 The Magyars and Germans of Slovakia who refused to join Derer's political platform founded a Social Democratic Party of their own. 11 After its electoral victory the Slovak Social Democratic Party lost much of its fighting spirit, adopted many right-wing policies of moderation and even passivity while the Magyar and German Social Democratic Party moved further to the left towards radicalism and turbulent activities. It was led by an able group of ruthless leaders (most of them Jews, several served as Commissars in the Hungarian Soviet Republic of Bela Kun) who were constantly harassing "the reformist Social Democratic government" of V. Tusar by fomenting strikes, unrests and other forms of trouble. 12 Their activities 13 became fatal to the Slovak Social Democratic Party which was rapidly sliding under Czech control and soon became identical with all the unpopular measures of the Government. The Slovak Social Democratic Party's inability to fulfil its pre-election promises or to prevent the economic ruination of Slovakia, and the subsequent wholesale unemploymen t, brought about a massive 10) The Social Democratic Party polled 510,341 out of 1,341,191 valid votes and obtained 23 deputies in the Prague National Assembly. 11) They received 108,546 votes and obtained 4 deputies. 12) J. Mlynarik, Robotnicke hn•itie na Slovensku roku 1920 (od parla• mentnych volieb do decembroveho genercilneho strajku). Historick)' casopis, I/ 1960, pp. 26-27) . 13) Their strongholds were four population centres in the Slovak-Magyar borderland: Bratislava, where the German-languag e, "Volksstimme" was published, Komarno, Gelnica and Ko~ice, where the Magyarlanguage, "Kassai Munkas", was published. 130 SLOVAKIA desertion of the rank anc'l file members within months after the election. 14 In the meantime the Magyar Social Democratic Party at Kosice joined (in May 1920) the Third International and invited the other proletarian parties of Slovakia to follow suit. This proclamation was eagerly listened to by many Social Democratic leaders dissatisfied with Derer's weak and inept leadership. 15 In September 1920 at the Party Congress at Turciansky Svaty Martin Derer failed to win a vote of confidence ( out of 132 delegates only 15 voted for him). Unwilling to accept defeat he proclaimed the handful of his followers to be the only true Slovaks and true Social Democrats by which he drove the dissidents into a coalition with the Magyar and German left-wing radicals. The fruits of this coalition ripened rapidly. On January 16-17, 1920 the left-wingers of the Slovak, Magyar and German Social Democracy, as well as the Jewish Poale Sion, met at ~ubochna and founded the Communist Party of Slovakia in everything but name. 16 It is interesting to look at the national composition of the delegates participating at this Congress. Out of 149 delegates with voting rights 88 were Slovaks, 36 Magyars, 15 Germans, 6 Ruthenes, 4 Jews. 17 The omission to register under its own name proved a very serious one for the future destinies of the KSS. Against 14 ) M. Strhan, Kriza priemyslu na Slov ensku v rokoch 1921-23 (Bratislava , 1960, pp. 15-80), J . Kramer, K dejinam priemyslu na Slovensku za prvej CSR (Bratislava, 1955). 15 ) ~- Holotik, Sjazd socialno-demokratickej strany (l'avice) na Slov ensku v januciri 1921 (Historicky casopis, 3/ 1963) , pp. 340-341. 16 ) 1921. Spomienky na vznik KS(: (Bratislava, 1962). The Czech dele gate at the Congress, I. Olbracht, requested the assembled repre- sentatives of the Slovak Left to postpone the adoption of the name " Communist Party of Slovakia" in order to be able to adopt the name " Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia" later on. See also Dejiny KS(: (Praha, 1961), pp. 165-166. 17 ) From the report of the voting commission, as quoted by M. Dzvonik 0 istom zakladajucom sjazde (Kulturny zivot, 7/ 1966, p. 6) . See also H. Gordon Skilling, The Formation of a Communist Party in Czechoslovakia (Slavic Review, 14/ 1955, p. 353). Skilling gives slightly different figures, viz. 92 Slovaks. However, it must be mentioned that these numbers are somewhat misleading, especially with regard to the Jews who were present in every national group, and the Magyars, many of whom were counted as Slovaks. SLOVAKIA 131 the opposition of the Magyar delegates the Congress agreed to keep the question of the Party's name in abeyance. They decided to wait for developments in the Czech lands where the situation was ripening at a less r~pid rate. Finally at its XIVth Congress (in May 1921) the Czech Social Democratic Party formally accepted the ideological split in its ranks. Its left wing reconstituted itself as the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia ( KSc) immediately absorbing the Slovak section which, nameless and unaffiliated, had been waiting for four months for this moment.18 By this process the KSS lost its identity, becoming an anonymous partner in an unequal partnership. II. 1921-1929 The newly constituted KSC was from its beginning dominated by Czech-German leadership and looking largely after Czech national interest. Slovakia-because of the lack of native leading cadres-soon became a battlefield where the Czech and Magyar elements were fighting for influence . The Czechs were trying to woo the Slovak electorate by defending the existence of Czecho-Slovakia and the integrity of its territories. Already in September 1921 Klement Gottwald had become editor of a Slovak language Party paper, "Hlas l'udu" (People's Voice), and later in 1923 editor-inchief of another Commun.ist paper, "Pravda chudoby" (Poor Man's Truth). Other prominent Czech Party organizers who came to Slovakia in the early twenties included Karel Bacilek, Karel Schmidke and others. 19 While the Czechs concentrated mainly on the Slovak electorate, the Magyars tried to hold together a sizeable portion of the Magyar electorate by advocating revisionism, self-determination for ethnic minorities, etc. In the meantime Slovakia was becoming restive and in18) Dejiny KS(; (Praha , 1961) , pp. 170-172. While the Communist Party of Slovakia fused into the KSC smoothly and without murmur, the Communist Party of the Sudeten Germans (formed in March 1921 ) refused to amalgamate with the KSC . Its resistance was broken in November 1921 but only after Lenin's intervention. 19) Gottwald's activities in Slovakia, adorned with the socialist glamou;: of the cult era, are the object of a book by Z. Holotikova, Kl ement Gottwald na Slovensku v rokoch 1921-24 (Bratislava, 1953). Karel Schmidtke began to write his name as Karol Smidke only after 1945. 13l2 SLOVAKIA creasingly discontented with Czech administrative methods. economic and social discrimination and especially with the crude disregard of the Prague Government for the political aspirations of the Slovak natibn. The Slovaks were putting forward their demands for the promised autonomy but no one would listen. Even the KSC, dominated at the time by Czech nationalists, had only scorn for the Slovak demands. At its First Congress it declared: "Slovak autonomy is only a disguise to mask the tendencies aiming at the separation of the Slovak people from the cultural community and from national unity with the Czech nation." 20 This mistaken and unrealistic attitude was severely censured at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern in Moscow (June-July 1924) where the following resolution was adopted: 1. The Congress affirms that in Czecho-Slovakia there does not exist a single Czechoslovak nation and that the Czechoslovak state, in addition to the Czech nationality, consist of the following nationali ties: Slovak, German, Magyar, Ukrainian and Polish. 2. The Congress considers it necessary for the KSC, in connection with these national minorities, to proclaim and to follow the slogan of the right of a nation to self-determination, including the right to secession. In particular the KSC must support the struggle of the Slovaks for their independence and it must strive continuously to wrest this movement for independence out of the control of the nationalist bourgeoisie and to bring it into a common struggle of the working class against capitalism ... 21 For the Czech Communists it was a bitter pill to swallow. Under its impact the Czecho-Slovak delegation in Moscow was split into a majority and minority, the majori20) Protokol I. radneho sjezdu KSC (Praha, 1923 ), p. 14. In practice the KSC plainly demonstrated its Czechoslovakist and centralized tendencies. On January 1st, 1922 the KSC abolished the provincial Party structure in Slovakia, splitting the country into four regions directly subordinated to the Central Executive Committee in Prague. Shortly afterwards it abolished Slovak trade union organizations. Such moves seriously hindered the Party activities in Slovakia and antagonized many honest and sincere Slovak left-winge rs. These either left in disgust (like J . Schiffel, who returned to the U.S.A.) or were expelled as agents of the nationalist bourgeoisie (like Culen, Vercik and others ). 21) Pjatyj vsemirnyj kongress komunisticeskogo intenacionala, 17. ijuna - 8. ijttlia 1924 g. Stenografisceskij otcot, Cast' II. (Prilozenija) , ( Moskva, 1925 ), p. 129. SLOVAKIA 133 ty refusing to accept the resolution of the Comintern. Among the ranks of the KSC the interference of the Comintern produced a serious crisis. The Second Congress of the KS(; was hurriedly convened in November 1924 to deal with the issue. The Congress met in the presence of a leading Comintern official, D. Z. Manuilskij. It was mainly due to his presence that the resolution issued at the end of the Congress proclaimed: "The Party cannot accept the bourgeois lie about the official Czechoslovak nation. By this ruse the Czech bourgeoisie wants to hide its colonial exploitation and bloody oppression of Ruthenia and Slovakia as well as other national minorities". 21 a But as it turned out even he was powerless to shake the dominating influence of the Czech nationalist right-wingers who in complete disregard of their own resolution continued in the old-style policies of ignoring the legitimate demands of the national minorities even within the Party.22 A dramatic development took place in March 1925. The Czech rightists and their arrogant attitude towards other nationalities, especially towards the Slovaks, were openly critized on the pages of "Pravda" by the Soviet expert on the nationalities problem, J. V. Stalin. Stalin saw the narrow-minded and selfish Czech nationalism as the roots of the right-wing deviationism in the KSC. He wrote: The Czechoslovak state is a state that marks the national victory of the Czechs. The Czechs have already acquired their national state as a dominant nation ... And it is here that we must look for the reason why the divergence between the Right and Left took place along national lines, why the Slovaks and the Germans (oppressed nations) are on the left flank, and the Czechs are on the opposite flank . .. Such division is quite understandable, if we bear in mind the above-mentioned specific national features of the Czechoslovak state and the dominant position of the Czechs.23 Stalin's arguments were further developed by D. Z. Manuilskij who quoted, among others, such flagrant examples of national discrimination as the composition of the Politburo of the KSC which consisted of seven Czechs 21a) Protokol II. fadneho sjezdu KSt, (Praha, 1925) , p. 8. 22) Dejiny KSt (Praha, 1961), pp. 213-216. 23) J. V. Stalin, Works (Moscow, 1954), Vol. VII., p. 61. See also H. Gordon Skilling, The Comintern and Czechoslovak Communism 1921-1929 (Slavic Review, 19/ 1960, pp. 238-239 ). 134 SLOVAKIA and two Germans but no Slovaks, Magyars, Poles or Ruthenes. 24 The elections in 1925 were the first real test of the Party's hold on the masses. On the whole the Party did not score badly: it emerged as the second strongest party in Czecho-Slovakia. In Slovakia the election results were a telling commentary on the existing situation. The Social Democratic Party practically disappeared (from 510,341 votes in 1920 to 60,581 votes in 1925). But its voters joined mainly the Hlinka People's Party which captured 489,027 votes (2 35,389 in 1920), i.e. 34.3 % of the Slovak electorate thus becoming the largest Slovak party.25 The Communist Party gained 198,212 votes in Slovakia but its support came mostly from the non-Slovak voters as can be seen from a closer look at the districts which voted for the Communists and at the men who were elected into the Parliament26 ( out of 8 deputies 3 were of Magyar nationality: Kopasz, Major and Steiner). The failure to capture the masses of the Slovak rural proletariat was openly admitted in Moscow and was attributed to the Party's omission to adopt the correct position towards the nationalities problem in Czecho-Slovakia and in particular towards the Slovaks: In Slovakia . .. under the influence of the revolution, in 1920 the peasant masses moved strongly to the left, but in the course of the last four years, owing to the passivity of the Communist P arty in the national question, 200,000 peasants passed from the Socialist 24) D. Z. Manuilskij, Uroki ceskogo krizisa, (Moskva, 1925) . It was the Politburo elected by the Central Committee at the IIIrd Party Congress (Sept. 1925) which consisted of: K. Gottwald, J . Hais, J . Haken ( President) , J . Harus, B. Jilek, A. Neurath, V. Stern, B. Smeral and A. Zapotocky. 25) Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka 1864-1926 ( Bratislava, 1936), pp. 535-538. 26) El•ectoral Corn. % % % d is trict vote of •totail :Mandates :.\1:agy ars German5 1. ove Zamky 2 20.0 61 ,577 62.3 6.8 2. Ko§ice 20.9 40,095 2 41.6 9.9 3. Trnava 28,606 13.9 2.3 1 1.8 4. Banska Bystrica 17,694 11.0 2.2 1 5.6 5. Turc. Sv. Martin 22,355 1 9.5 0.5 5.1 6. Lipt. Sv. Mikula§ 15,697 1 7.4 1.4 1.7 7. Prefov 6.2 12,206 2.6 0 0.7 SLOVAKIA 135 Party into a party, which, although it is clerical, fight for the autonomy.27 In spite of the impressive overall election results the Party was torn internally by rival factions. After ridding itself of the right wing (Bubnik) a new struggle developed between the so-called "ultraleft" (B. Jilek and V. Bolen) and "centre" (B. t5meral, K. Kreibich, A. Zapotocky). 28 These ideological conflicts touched the Party's life in Slovakia only marginally and even then the Czech leaders of the KSc in Slovakia (K. Gottwald in particular) were supporting the "centre" aginst the "left". In Slovakia the burning issues were not of ideological but of political and economic character. The continuous closing down of factories and industrial plants, growing unemployment, agricultural crisis, emigration, etc. were leaving little time for ideological disputes. 29 After 1926, when the Hlinka People's Party decided to join the government benches, the Communists tried hard to be the spokesmen of the Slovak people against the political wrongs and social injustices of the Czech bourgeoisie. Complete independence of Slovakia was advocated, Czecho-Slovakia was denounced as the offspring of an imperialist war. 30 In January 1927 the Party 27) G. Volkov, Ugnetennaja Prikarpatskaja Rus (Krestjanskij International, 3-5/ 1926, p. 126). ( Quoted in G. D. Jackson's Comintern and Peasant) (London, 1966), p. 288. 28) Dejiny KS(: (Praha, 1961), pp. 249-269. 29) The economic situation of this period has been extensively studied by socialist historians, e. g. J . Mlynarik, Strajkove hnutie na Slovenska II. Zemerobotnici v obdobi 1919 az 1929 (Bratislava, 1961) ; P. Rapos, Priemysel Slovenska za kapitalizmu (Bratislava, 1957) ; J . Mlynarik, N ezamestnanost' na Slovensku (Bratislava, 1964) ; V. Plevza, K niektorym otazkam agrarnej krizy v rokoch 1924-34 na Slovensku (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1966, pp. 203-233); etc. 30) At this time the KSC in Slovakia at its National Conference at 2ilina (on July 25th, 1925) , launched, on Gottwald's instigation a massive campaign aimed at the expulsion of the Czechs from Slovakia. The battle-cry of the Communist propagandists became : " Vypracte Slovensko! " ( Clea;: out of Slovakia!) . The full wording of the slogan was, "Vypracte Slovensko od potlacovacieho aparatu ceskej burzoazie", according to V. Plevza (Historicky casopis, 4/ 1965, p. 510) and "Vypracte Slovensko od nasilnickeho aparatu", according to J. Kramer and .J. Mlynarik (Historicky casopis, 3/ 1965, p. 438). Though there was no doubt about Gottwald's authorship of this slogan, the blame for the embarrassing "mistake" was put later 136 SLOVAKIA convoked a regional conference at Plesivec where it attempted to lead a nation-wide protest against the industrial decline of Slovakia. 31 But all with little success. In February 1929 the Fifth Congress of the KSC met. It passed into Party history as the final battleground where the splinter-groups of the Party dissidents were defeated and the "true bolshevist nucleus" of the Party came out victorious. But in spite of the intense ideological wrangle the Slovak question did appear on the agenda. The Slovak cause was defend by none less than K. Gottwald ( who was to emerge as the new leader of the Party) proclaiming before the Congress: "The !Ind Congress of the KSC declared null and void the theses of the Ist Party Congress (i.e. concerning the unitary "Czechoslovak" nation) but this was in words only . . . The ratification of the First Party Congress theses was only on paper, a mere formality".31a By promising new corrective measures Gottwald (who--it should be remembered-in those days was acting for the Party in Slovakia and was the spokesman for the Slovaks) swayed the overwhelming majority of the Slovak section of the KSC to the side of the victorious "bolshevist on J. Vercik, "the agent of nationalist bourgeoisie" (e.g. M. Gosiorovsky, Slovensko a V. sjazd KS(; ( ceskoslovensky casopis historicky), 1/ 1954, p. 4-15) . While attacking the Czech bourgeoisie for its oppression of the Slovak masses, the KSC leaders did not relax their centralist hold on their Slovak comrades. At each Party Congress the Slovak delegates complained about this unsatisfactory state of affairs (See : Protokol III. fadneho sjezdu KSc [Praha, 1925] , pp. 41 and 73 ; Protokol IV. fadneho sjezdu KS(; [Praha, 1927], p. 33 ; Protokol V . f<idneho sjezdu KS(; [Praha, 1929] , pp. 40 and 50) , but in vain. This aspect of the Party history has been neglected by the socialist historians except a brief and restrained comment by J . Kramer and .J. Mlynarik, Revolucne hnutie a narodnostna ot<izka na Slovensku v dvadsiatych rokoch (Historicky casopis, 3/ 1965, pp. 423-443). For more recent writings on the theme see: Z. Holotikova, 0 rieseni narodnostnej otazky v KSc (Referat na konferencii Hist. ustavu SAV a ustavu dejin KSS, jun 1966) and J. Mlynarik, Dr. B. Smeml a slovensk<i n<irodnostn<i otazka v pociatkoch komunistickeho hnutia (Cs. casopis historicky, 5/ 1967, pp. 653-666 ). 31 ) J . Pleva, Vy znam Plesiveckej konferencie v januari 1927 (Bratislava, 1958) . According to Kramer and Mlynarik (loc. cit. , p. 442, footnote 32 ) the importance of this conference was disproportio n ately inflated because of Gottwald's participation at it. 31a) Protokol V. f<idneho sjezdu KS(; (Praha, 1929) , p. 12. SLOVAK.IA 137 faction". 32 However, one point is worth noting: while the "bolshevist nucleus of the Party in Slovakia was made up of Bacilek, Siroky, Steiner, Urx" 33 (i.e. two Czechs and two Magyars), the dissidents ("nationalists and liquidators") who were expelled from the Party amidst a storm of abuse ( culen, Felcan, Vercik) were Slovaks. 34 III. 1929-1938 The internal struggle inside the Party was fought bitterly and not always behind closed doors . Inevitably it undermined the Party's image in the voters' eyes. In the 1929 elections it gained 152,242 votes ( 10.55 % ) in Slovakia, a considerable decline in voting strength when compared with the 1925 election results ( 13.41 % ) .35 Yet in Parliament the new "bolshevist cadres" displayed fierce and sanguinary pugnacity epitomized in the words of the new Party leader, K. Gottwald, addressed in December 1929 to the coalition benches: We are the revolutionary Party of Czechoslovak proletariat and in Moscow we have, indeed, our revolutionary General Staff. Yes we go to Moscow in order to learn. Would you like to know what we learn"! We go to Moscow to learn from the Russian bolsheviks how to break your necks. And you must admit that the Russian bolsheviks are very good at it.36 32) Z. Holotikova, Bol"sevizacny proces KS(; v rokoch 1924-29 (Historicky casopis 2/1957, pp. 204-210); M. Gosiorovsky, Slovensko a V. sjazd KS(; (Cs. casopis historicky, 1/ 1954, pp. 4-15). 33) Dejiny KS(; (Praha, 1961), p. 256. 34) Vercik, Mlynarik, Koren, etc. were branded as "nationalists" and expelled; Culen, Felcan, Kolarikova, etc. were branded as "liquidators" and expelled also. The latter were the authors of the so-called "Hlohovecke memorandum" (of December 1928) in which they requested the reorganization of the Party structure in Slovakia and complete freedom of action in specifically Slov~k matters. (See : Pravda of January 31, and February 7th, 1929). In 1930 the KSC finally consented to a limited decentralization and a Slovak province ("celoslovensky kraj") of the KS(; was instituted. S. Major (of Magyar nationality) and K. Bacilek (of Czech nationality) were put in charge. See: V. Plevza, Vytvorenie celoslovenskeho kraja a revolucne hnutie na Slovensku na zaciatku tridsiatych rokov (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1962, p. 184). 35) For an interesting statistical analysis of the 1929 election results see: R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern E urope (Princeton, N. J ., 1961 ), pp. 150-158 and 216-219. 36) K. Gottwald , Spisy I (Praha, 1953), p. 322. 138 SLOVAK.IA During the severe economic depression which swept the Western world in the late twenties and early thirties and which caused acute unemployment in Slovakia (some 250,000 in 1933) 37 the Communists organized hunger marches, protest meetings and strikes. A meeting in May 1931 at a small village in southern Slovakia, Kosuty, ended with a shooting fray resulting in the death of three demonstrators. The Party skilfully exploited the incident to advertize the social plight of rural workers in the Slovak countryside. 38 In the years 1929-33 the Communist press paid much attention to the political solution of the Slovak question and Slovak grievances were repeatedly aired on its pages. But as V. Kopecky confessed at the Vrth Party Congress (1931) it was more in the nature of lip service than anything else: "The decisions of the Vth Party Congress concerning the solution of the nationalities problem remained on paper only and in spite of repeated emphasizing of their importance by the central leadership of the Party there was no practical indication that we were fighting for the right of self-determination of the nations." 38a This national inequality was demonstrated even in the Party hierarchy. The higher Party ranks were-as beforean almost exclusive monopoly of the Czech and German comrades. The Presidium constituted at the Vrth Party 37) Pfehled ceskoslovenskych ilejin III (1918-1945) (Praha , 1960) , p. 325. The gravity of the situation is reflected in the emigration figures which were considerably greater for Slovakia (where only about 25 % of the total population lived) than for the Czech lands: Emigration from C-SR: from Slovakia: 1928 24,540 13,544 1929 30,715 19,401 1930 25,712 16,682 1931 9,567 4,527 1932 5,165 2,222 1933 4,735 3,099 38) The shooting at Kosuty has attracted unusually great attention from Communist propagandists and publicists, e.g. the pamphlet, Nyn·i je v Kosv,tech pofcidek a klid (1931); V. Plevza, Kosutska trag edia (Prispevky k dejinam KSC, 8/ 1959, pp. 91-107) ; E. Pauliny, Kosutske udalosti v maji 1931 (Bratislava-Martin, 1961) ; E. Kadnar, Krvave Kosuty ( Bratislava, 1963) . It is perhaps worthwhile to note that the inhabitants of Kosuty were of Magyar nationality and so was S. Major, the convicted instigator of the disturbance. 38a ) Protokol VI. fcidneho sjezdn KSC, (Praha , 1931), p. 143. SLOVAKIA 139 Congress had only one representative from Slovakia among its 15 members. 39 This omission was quite a serious matter, because by the midthirties the Communist Party of Slovakia was already producing its own native leaders. The young Slovak Communist students who in 1924 grouped in Prague around the quarterly Oater monthly), "Dav" (1924-1937), were growing up in stature and outlook and were ready and eager to take over from the Czech, Magyar and Jewish spokesmen of the Slovak proletariat. 40 Unfortunately they were striving for power at a time when the Party was purging itself of intellectual and other non-proletarian ballast, so that their hopes and expectations were frustrated.41 Other important changes in the Party line were also in the offing. The Party was directed by the Comintern to adopt new attitudes to a number of political issues. Up to 1933 the Communists considered democracy (i.e. bourgeois democracy) and fascism as "the children of the same mother, the bourgeoisie". 42 Masaryk, Benes, Hlinka, Kramaf were all Fascists of the same brand as Hitler and Mussolini. But by the summer of 1933 Stalin realized that Hitler was a much greater evil. Looking for new allies Stalin selected two of the most likely states worried by the growing power of Hitler's Germany: France and CzechoSlovakia. The KSc was instructed to take a more positive stand towards the official Czech foreign and domestic 39) It was E. Fried of Magyar-Jewish origin. Accordind to H. G. Skilling the ethnic composition of the 60-member Central Committee was as follows: 37 Czechs, 10 Germans, 8 Slovaks (and Magyars ), 4 Ukrainians and 1 Pole. See : H. Gordon Skilling, Gottwald and the Bolshevisation of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 1929-39 (Slavic Review, 20/ 1961, pp. 644-645) . The inadequate representation of Slovaks in the top P,0verning bodies of the Party apparatus (i.e. Presidium-Politburo and Secretariat-Orgburo) is statistically summed up in Appendix I. 40) These young Communist intellectuals of the early twenties had their hey-day in the late forties and met a tragic fate in the early fifties. In the years 1950-54 they became the victims of purges and their rehabilitation began ,mly in 1963. For a post-rehabilitation view of the Dav-group see: S. Drug, Dav a davisti (Bratislava, 1965). 41) V. Plevza, Prispevok o cinnosti davistov v revolucnom hnuti za predmnichovskej CSR (Historicky casopis, 1/1964), pp. 20-21. 42) K. Gottwald , Spisy IV (Praha, 1951) , p. 212. 140 SLOVAKIA policies. This, of course, meant that the Slovak guestion and the nationalities problem in general had to be played down and the Party soon nodded its appproval where only a few months ago it used to voice its sharp criticism. 43 The signing of the Soviet-Czecho-Slovak Treaty in May 1935 marked a milestone in the Party's policy. The Party put on a mask of loyal respectability and replaced its internationalism by a newly-discovered patriotism. It conveniently forgot its past hostilities to "the imperialist agent Benes" and supported him in the presidential election in December 1935. At the Seventh Congress of the KSc (April 1936) the Party took a firm position "to defend CzechoSlovakia against Hitler". It became a zealous exponent of the Popular Front against Fascism and reaction, and the Slovak grievances once so prominent in its program were now hardly mentioned. The militant cry for "self-determination including the right to secede" was now replaced with much softer demands voiced by Gottwald at the VIIth Party Congress: "The Party will strive to achieve the realization of minimal requirements for normal coexistence of all nationalities in Czecho-Slovakia by insisting on a democratic policy towards nationalities and on equal rights for all nations ( of Czecho-Slovakia) in all spheres of public life." 44 The approaching municipal elections made the Party somewhat wary and hurriedly it came forward with a "plan for the economic, social and cultural advancement of Slovakia" announced at Banska Bystrica in May 1937.45 But the plan did not excite anybody. It was unrealistic and was looked upon as one of the many grandiose schemes which the Party submitted with monotonous regularity year after 43) A somewhat confused picture of the situation can be found in V. Plevza's KSC a revolucne hnutie na Slovensku 1929-1 938 (Bratislava, 1965), pp. 237-420. 44 ) K. Gottwald, Spisy VIII (Bratislava, 1953) , p. 167. This phase of Party activities is discussed at length in a number of publications such as Na obranu republiky proti fasizmu a v ojne (Bratislava, 1955) ; M . Filo, Boj KSC na Slovensku na obranu republiky (Bratislava, 1960) ; I. Kolesar, Otazka obnovy demokracie a demokratickych prciv i slobod proti fasizmu ( od VII. kongresu Kominterny r . 1935 ) Sbornik FFUK, 10/ 1959, pp. 163-181). 45 ) Deji11y KSc (Praha, 1961) , p. 359. Also V . Siroky, Za st'astne Slove nsko v socialistickom Ceslcoslovensku (Bratislava, 1952). 141 SLOVAKIA year, knowing well that it would never be called upon to implement them. The turns and twists in the Party line could not pos• sibly impress the Slovak electorate. In the municipal elections (May 1938) the Party found itself deserted by its erstwhile supporters. Its advocacy of pro-Benes and antiautonomist policies46 estranged it from the Slovak voters, while its noisy denunciations of the revisionist claims by Hungary, Germany and Poland antagonized its non-Slovak voters. The overwhelming electoral defeat in Slovakia (in the Czech lands the Party maintained its support) alarmed the Slovak Party leaders who clearly read the writing on the wall. 47 And thus on the eve of Czecho-Slovakia's disintegration the Party attempted another somersault and tried to sponsor the autonomistic cause, even if it meant forming a common front with Hlinka's Party. But it was now too late. No party in Slovakia cared for partnership with the Communists and Hlinka's Party least of all. The speed with which events marched by-passed the Party altogether. 46) J. U§iak, Boj KS(: s Hlinkovou slovenskou l'udovou stranou a vplyv na masy v obdobi ndstupu fasizmu (Pfispevky k dejindm KSC, 5/ 1963, pp. 710-29). Also V. Plevza, KSC a revolucne hnutie na Slovensku 1929-1938 (Bratislava, 1965), pp. 462-474. 47 ) The Communist historians merely record the electoral defeat without going into details, without drawing any conclusion (e. g. Plevza, op. cit., p. 471 ). In many small towns the Communist vote virtually disappeared and in bigger towns it was severely reduced. On the whole the proportion of those who voted Communist dropped from 14% in 1935 to something like 8.9 % in 1938. No comprehensive results have been compiled so far; the Party historians carefully avoid this area. A brief glance at the election results in a few Slovak cities shows convincingly how the Party fared at the polls. (The results are compared with those of the Hlinka People's Party, the main beneficiary of the Communist loss. Figures are taken from Slovensky dennik of June 12, 1938): People's Party votes KSS votes Gain in% --19_3_5_[1938 ' ....Jl % _in--'l .... _L_o_s_s I _1_93_8__,_ 1 __,__1_93_5_ _ _ _T_o_w_n_ 2,493 I 44.3 j 1 8,133 5,640 45,7 2,399 1 2,856 i 5,255 Bratislava 333 I 37.91 910 1,243 88 13.5 554 Nove Mesto n / V I 642 44 I 607 I 563 I 1098 76 I 167 68.8 I 243 Snina 1 849 I 363 62.0I 586 4,658 2,098 I 2,560 55.0 Star11. !>ala I 1,064 1 ? 64 I ? Modra I 1,253 j ? 79 I ? Michalovce I 3,471 1 ? 777 I ? Trebgov (dist. ) I I I I I 1 142 SLOVAKIA The collapse of Czecho-Slovakia found the Party's fortunes in Slovakia at their lowest ebb. This was openly acknowledged by the Party leadership in its report to the Executive of the Comintern in December 1938. With a remorseful self-criticism V. Siroky confessed: We Comm un ists represe nted in Slovakia the national interests of the Czech nation, while the Slovak national interests were furth er represented by Hlinka's Party ... Only at the last moment as the Czechoslovak crisis was reaching its climax did we put forward a demand for the democratic solution of the Slovak problem, i. e. the granting of full autonomy.48 IV. 1938-1944 The declaration of autonomy on October 6th, 1938 was shortly followed by the suppression of Party activities and in January 1939 the Party was disbanded. The Party leaders escaped abroad and with regard to Party leadership in Slovakia, it is interesting to note that the Slovak nationals, if they got away at all, fled mainly to the West (Valo, Clementis ), while the non-Slovak leaders sought their refuge in the Soviet Union (smidke, Bacilek, Major. Siroky went first to Paris, then to Moscow) .49 Drawing conclusions from the rejection of the Party policies by the Slovak people and facing the new situation fairly and squarely, the Comintern decided on the last and long-delayed step : it gave its approval to the founding of an independent ( albeit illegal) Communist Party of Slovakia ( in May 1939 ). 50 Its leadership was entrusted to three relatively minor and unknown functionaries: J. Duris, L. Benada, J. Osoha. Of these the ablest and most dynamic was Jan Osoha, a Czech by birth. The leadership faced a tremendous task of building a network of illegal cells from the fragments and remains of what once was a Party organization in Slovakia. Traditional Party strongholds went to Hungary by the Vienna Award of November 1938.50 a The 48 ) Deji~nii krizov atka (Bratislava, 1964), pp. 27-28. 49 ) Slovak Studies IV (Rome, 1964) , p. 30. 50) Dejiny KS(; (Praha, 1961 ), p. 399. 50a) Interesting evidence of the solid support the Party received from t he Magyar-speaking population of Slovakia can be found in the recently published bibliography, Zoznam komunistickych novin a casopisov marxi.stickej l' avice z rokov 1919-38 (Martin, 1961). The bibliography lists 125 separate newspapers and periodicals of which SLOVAKIA 143 newly-acquired independence of Slovakia (in March 1939) was a powerful stabilizing factor on the political scene leaving very little scope for the subversive activities of the Communists.51 For the Communists the situation was further aggravated by the Nazi-Soviet Pact (August 1939), the Soviet participation in the Fourth partition of Poland and the Soviet recognition, both 'de facto' and 'de jure', of the independent Slovak state. Under the impact of these events the Slovak Communist leadership in the West (Paris) disintegrated.52 At home the Party leaders were even more confused and completely at a loss. The illegal handbills and propaganda pamphlets betray the prevalent mood of perplexity and obvious embarrassment of the underground Party organizers in their desperate attempts to explain away the things they could not comprehend. In the Soviet attitude towards the Slovak state they saw a sure sign of Soviet approval of the new geographicopolitical reorganization of Central Europe. In response to it they drew up, sometime in October 1939, a new political program, the key-note of which was: "The free and independent Soviet Slovakia." 53 This program became a dominant feature of all the illegal Communist activities in Slovakia up to 1944. It was only natural for an independent Party to sponsor such a policy in an independent state. But the scheme did not pass 71 were published in the Slovak language, 50 (i. e. 40 %) in Magyar, 3 in German and 1 in Ukrainian. 51) A. Huckova-Stvrtecka, cinnost' prveho ilegalneho Ostredneho vyboru KSS (Bratislava, 1959). 52) Clementis denounced the Nazi-Soviet pact for which he was expelled from the Pai ty, Siroky rapidly departed to Moscow and Valo retired into neutral passivity. About the impact of this infamous alliance on the Slovak (and Czech ) Communists in Paris, see Theo. I-I. Florin, S Vladom Clementisom v Parizi a v Lon.dyne (Dav, spomienky a studie, [Brati~ava, 1965), p. 467) . 53) Confiscated Communist propaganda handbills in the Archives of the German F'oreign Ministry, 56/ 38606-15. These documents help to pinpoint the beginning of the campaign for an independent Soviet Slovakia which was not later than in October 1939. At that time the Communists went to considerable trouble to explain that the Soviet Union had not exchanged Communism for the National Socialism of Hitler. 144 SLOVAKIA by unchallenged. The first to protest against this line was-as might have been expected-the illegal Communist Party in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia lead by Edo Urx who as a Party functionary had spent a number of years in Slovakia. The Party in the Protectorate continued to call itself the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. It claimed to be the direct successor of the banned Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia and a parent organization of the Communist Party of Slovakia. It advocated the restoration of the pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia and objected to any policy promulgation which was not consistent with its current Party line. The Slovaks on the other hand were rejecting any kind of affiliation and insisted on equality and independence. After prolonged disagreement the dispute was referred to Moscow for arbitration 54 and there Gottwald issued a ruling completely vindicating the stand of the Slovak Communists. He sent the following message to Urx (in March 1940): Your pre-war pattern of thinking must change. Behind the slogan "Restoration of Czecho-Slovakia" are hidden imperialistic and antiSoviet schemes . .. We expressly emphasize that our Party fully accepts the right of self-determination both for the Czechs and fo r the Slovaks. This right of self-detevmination implies the right to live in an independent state. We fight for the restoration of the national freedom and territorial independence of the Czechs. As far as the Slovaks are concerned we fight for the complete sovereignity of the present-day Slovak state. It is this struggle for the right of self-determination which differentiates our road from that of Benes a nd world imperialism. The relation between the Czechs and Slovaks stand now on a new footing. Slovak separatism plays today a different role. That is why we are giving up the old slogans concerning Slovakia.ss Encouraged by this message the Slovak Communists tried to outdo in nationalist zeal everybody including the official Slovak propaganda. The only criticism they received from Moscow was the advice not to stress too much the Soviet character of their "independent Soviet Slovakia" program.56 54 ) The dispute is summarized in D ejinna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964) , pp. 63-88. 55) Deji nna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964) , p. 61. 56 ) S. Falt'an, Ku Kral'ov ej recenzii trochu inak (Historicky casopis, 4/ 1966, p. 58S. SLOVAKIA 145 The idea of national independence being at the root of the Party's illegal activities was not given up even when the Soviet Union gave its official recognition to Benes and his government then in exile in London. The clandestine journal, "Hlas l'udu" (Voice of the people ), commented on the resumption of diplomatic relations between Benes and the Kremlin: The pact between the Soviet Union and the Czecho-Slovak government in exile is not seen by the Communist Party of Slovakia as a pact with the government of a future state which has its established boundaries, its established regime. The (Czecho-Slovak) government in London was created without the participation and without the will of the working people in Slovakia . . . The question of an independent (Slovak) state, or autonomy, or federation with the fraternal Czech nation is now of secondary importance and it will be settled after the defeat and destruction of German imperialism.56a Slovak police and security organs who had infiltrated the illegal Communist organizations57 watched this development with keen interest. When the Soviet-German conflict broke out (June, 1941) the Slovak police within a few hours arrested all the members of the illegal Central Committee (except J. Osoha) and some 1,100 illegal Party activists. 58 Most of these were released from detention after three or four weeks and lost no time in regrouping and starting again. A new Central Committee was set up by J . Osoha and this in turn was broken up by the police in April 1942. J. Osoha again eluded the dragnet and at56a) Quoted by M. Gosiorovsky in Historicky casopis, No. 3/ 1968, p. 371. 57) In this connection it is worth quoting from a report of the German Minister to Slovakia, M. v. Killinger (of August 19th, 1940): "Die ... in die kommunistische Zellen geschickten Leute bewiihren sich sehr gut, so dass der Erfolg der Arbeit gesichert und alle Zellen der hier, wieder erstehenden kommunistischen Organisationen erfasst werden. Die inzwischen festgestellten kommunistische Funktioniire werden listenmiissig geftihrt und laufend ergiinzt" (2276/ 47987684). 58) German documents 610/ 248627. At this time the Russians parachuted into Slovakia V. Siroky and V. Skrabala. But they were discovered very soon after their arrival and put in prison where Siroky stayed until 1945. When in 1949 Siroky emerged as the most powerful man in Slovakia trusted by both Moscow and Prague, legendary stories were written about his underground and illegal activities which lasted-when all said and done-some fi ve weeks. 146 SLOVAKIA tempted to organize the third Central Committee of the KSS. But in July he was caught and imprisoned together with the other members of the Committee. 59 These police actions deprived the illegal Party organization in Slovakia of all its old leaders trained in the Stalinist mould of blind and unquestioning obedience. Continuity with the pre-war Party politics was thus broken and the way was cleared for new men to emerge at the top. As it happened they were almost without exception the younger generation of the Party intellectuals, recruited and groomed by Vlado Clemen tis ( then in London). They lacked the rugged working-class background but they possessed the self-assertive spirit of intense national pride. One of them, Stefan Bast'ovansky, tried to continue (against his better judgement) with the illegal activities in the old traditional style (handbills and pamphlets read by very few, incitement to sabotage obeyed by nobody) only to find himself in prison by May 1943.60 The leadership of the demoralized and decimated ranks now passed into the hands of G. Husak and L. Novomesky, who disagreed with those tactics and methods which were costing the Party so much and achieved nothing. As the men on the spot they proposed a more subtle and unorthodox approach which took into account the political and social conditions in Slovakia, the mentality and sentiments of the masses and the weakness of Slovak war-time administration. The Party really went underground and the outward signs of activities almost disappeared. Moscow, disturbed by the apparent lack of fighting spirit, decided to send to Slovakia two trusted emissaries to revive the dormant proletarian masses. They were K. smidke and K. Bacilek. Neither of them was Slovak but both had worked in Slovakia in the interwar period. smidke, the more experienced of the two, listened with interest to the suggestions of the Slovak intellectuals and to their amazement he agreed with them. 61 smidke set up a new Central Committee of the KSS 59) 0 . Krajnak, Protifasisticke hnutie na Slovensku. (Nova mys! , 8/ 1964, pp. 695-703); G. Husak, Svedectvo o SNP (Bratislava, 1964 ), pp. 33-36; Dejinna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964) , pp. 122-126. 60) Dejinna krizovatka (Bratislava, 1964), p. 126. 61) G. Husak, Svedectvo o SNP (Bratislava, 1964) , pp. 51-56. SLOVAKIA 147 (which included himself, Husak and Novomesky) re-established and revived the network of illegal Party organizations and directed their activities along a new and more realistic path. He entered into close collaboration with the bourgeois illegal groups (and, through them, with the army) and did not scruple to exploit to the full the nationalist sentiments and aspirations of the Slovaks. 62 The last thing was, of course, not an easy task, because in the meantime the Soviet Union had promised Benes to restore pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia. And not only that. As revealed recently, Benes was given by Stalin, in December 1943, virtually a free hand in his dealings with the Slovaks. According to Fierlinger (Czecho-Slovak Ambassador in Moscow) Stalin allegedly told Benes "to keep the Slovaks firmly in hand.''62 a By these tactics of exploiting nationalistic feeling in the country and with the military defeat of Germany looming larger and closer every day, the Communists and their bourgeois allies were preparing an armed uprising in Slovakia. Their conspiratory efforts were partly frustrated by an untimely start, triggered off by Soviet partisans, which doomed the venture to failure. But while it lasted (August-October 1944) "the Slovak national uprising" (as this revolt became officially known after 1945) was a remarkable achievement in several respects. 63 Its effect on the future political development of Slovakia was to be farreaching and lasting. Right at the beginning of the uprising the Communist Party of Slovakia came into the open and published ( on September 2nd, 1944) its proclamation in which it implied that Slovakia--though a part of Czechoslovakia-would have a very broad autonomy which would include even a sepa62) Slovenske ruirodne povstanie 1944 (Bratislava 1965), pp. 191-221. 62a) J. Barto, Riesenie vzt'ahu cechov a Slovakov (Bratislava, 1968) . p. 11. 63) This event is by far the most written-about subject in modern Slovak history. For a critical review of bibliography on this theme see: F . Vnuk, Neuveritel'ne sprisahanie (Middletown, Pa., 1964) , pp. 181-191. Also S. Falt'an, Niektore otazky okolo hodnotenia SNP (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1964, pp. 161-185) . A complete bibliography of books and articles on the subject in 1963-64 was compiled by A. Kociska (Historicky casopis, 2/ 1965, pp. 309-328) . 148 SLOVAKIA rate army. 64 On September 9, 1944 the KSS began to publish the daily, "Pravda", proudly branded as "the official organ of the Communist Party of Slovakia".65 On September 17th, 1944 it arranged a joint Party Congress with the Social Democratic Party at which the Social Democratic Party merged into the KSS. It elected its own Central Committee with smidke as President, Husak and cech (Social Democrat) as Vice-Presidents. The Party displayed vigour and independence to a degree which both the Czech and the Soviet commissars found disquieting. The Czech Communists who were spending the war years in Moscow thought it necessary to reaffirm their primacy before it was too late and promptly dispatched to Slovakia two "experienced comrades", R. Slansky and J. sverma, to see that the Party line was correctly drawn and properly applied. After their arrival ( September 28th, 1944) the Slovak Communist leadership had to do as it was told. As a result there followed a great deal of retracting especially in those fields where exuberant nationalism had carried the home-grown leaders too far. The uprising revealed with startling clarity the secondary role and subordinate position to which the KSS was now relegated. In proclaiming their allegiance to the Czecho-Slovak Republic the Slovak Communists were negating the only positive asset of their political program so loudly advertised in 1939-44 under the slogan of an independent Soviet Slovakia. The blow was shattering not only to the Slovak people at large but also to the less doctrinaire Party members.66 In order to make the best of a bad job the Communists kept on assuring the people that the new Czecho-Slovak Republic would be incomparably better than the old one, 64) The proclamation persistently talks about " our Slovak (not Czechoslovak) army". For the full text of the document see: G. Husak, Svedectvo o SNP (Bratislava, 1964), pp. 257-258. 65) The daily, "Pravda", as it appeared during the uprising (September - October 1944) was recently reprinted and is available in a convenient form , Pravda v obdobi SNP (Bratislava, 1964) . 66) There were reports that workers at several places proclaimed a Slovak Soviet Republic (e.g. at Nemecke Pravno) ; in other places (Podbrezova) there was strong agitation for the proclamation of Soviet Slovakia. This unwillingness of the working class to return to a common state with the Czechs is most telling. SLOVAKIA 149 that the excesses of the Czech administration would not be repeated, that the Slovak national individuality would be unquestionably accepted, etc. In other words they were posing as the guarantors of all those rights and achievements which the Hlinka People's Party had secured for the Slovak nation when declaring autonomy (October 1938). They openly advocated a federated Czecho-Slovakia.67 Unfortunately for them in 1944-45 the Slovaks were past the autonomy stage and were thinking in terms of state independence. Against the opposition of many Czech politicians, including Benes himself, the Slovak Communists succeeded in retrieving from the wreckage of the Slovak independence some of those prerequisites which gave post-war Slovakia a quasi-autonomous status.68 What is even more surprising, they were able to preserve their own independence. And thus one finds in post-war Czecho-Slovakia a somewhat anomalous situation. Alongside the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia there existed a Communist Party of Slovakia (with no regional equivalent in the Czech lands ) which to all intents and purposes was treated as a separate political party. As it happened it was a most expedient arrangement because it enabled the Communists in the critical post-war months (April 1945-May 1946) to have two Deputy Prime Ministers in the Provisional Government (instead of one) and almost twice as many ministers, parliamentarians, etc. as any other political party. V. 1945-1949 In the years 1945-6 the KSS was without doubt the most nationalistic party ever to enter the Slovak political scene. It was vehemently anti-German and anti-Magyar, and there seemed to be no limits to its nationalistic ex cesses. It lured into its camp Slovak voters by the promise of agrarian and wide-spread social reforms, it appealed 67) Thus spoke G. Husak at Kosice on February 28th, 1945: "We wan t to have a federated state ... in which each nation will be master in his own house."- See: G. Husak, Za narodnu a l'udovu demo kraciu (Kosice, 1945), p. 14. Also J. Jablonicky, Slovensko na prelome (Bratislava, 1965) , pp. 248-296. 68 ) Program prvej dorruicej vlady narodneho frontu cechov a Slovcikov (Kosice, 1945) . 150 SLOVAKIA to the nationalist and even the religious feeling of the people, it was willing to overlook anybody's past, no matter how compromising.69 Outwardly the KSS was united, but, as it transpired later, inside it was torn with internal jealousies which very soon decomposed its ranks and paralysed its strength as an independent political force. The old-guard leaders ( Siroky, Duris, etc.) who spent their war years in prison did not see eye to eye with the leadership which had been put together during the 1944 uprising (Husak, smidke, etc.). The Siroky-group intrigued against the smidke-Husakgroup and in their schemes they had the support of the Czech Communist leadership. In May 1945 at the joint session of both Party Presidia the Slovaks were compelled to adopt a common policy with their Czech comrades on all public issues of the day. The role of the KSS was defined as being "a part of a unitary KSC with a united leadership".70 In practice it meant a complete subjugation of the KSS to the dictatorial authority of the KSC. This was the end of the short-lived independence of the KSS (19391945). One of the first moves of Gottwald was to impose on the KSS a more amenable leadership to replace the smidkeHusak-group. In July 1945 Gottwald delegated Siroky to take over the Party affairs in Slovakia. 71 Siroky hurriedly convened a Party conference at Zilina (Aug. 11-12, 1945) where he was confirmed in his position as the Party President. Siroky saw to it that the top Party positions were filled with his men. Thus he had become, already in Aug. 1945, the undisputed authority in Party matters in Slovakia. "Siroky concentrated in his own hands and in the hands of his own group of collaborators in the apparatus of the KSS Central Committee factual decisions about Party 69) This is again another neglected chapter of the Party history. The nationalist excesses, especially against the Magyar minority, formed a part of the accusation levelled at the " bourgeois nationalists" in 1950-54. An oblique reference to the nationalist policies of the KSS has been made recently in the book of J. Zvara, A magyar nemzetisegi kerdes melogdasa Szlovakuiban (Bratislava, 1965), pp. 22-69. Also J . Jablonicky in Slovensko na prelome (Bratislava, 1965) pp . 396-409. 70) J. Barto, Riesenie vzt'ahu Cechov a Slovakov (Bratislava 1968) , p. 55. 71 ) ib., p. 99. SLOVAKIA 151 policies, about the Party itself and about its leading cadres. These men were selected by Siroky himself according to his own personal likings", complained G. Husak recently. 72 Out of 9 men in the Party Presidium Husak identified these as the members of the Siroky group: Siroky, Duris, Bast'ovansky, Valachovic, Holdos. This leaves on the other side Husak, soltesz, smidke and Zupka. While acting as a strong man of the KSS, Siroky realized that he owed his position to the Czech Communists and consequently he was an ever-obedient executor of their wishes. In this way the policy of the KSS became divorced from the current needs and realities of the Slovaks. The policies of the KSc were designed to attract the Czech masses and paid very little attention to the Slovak national interests. The Party faced the first post-war electoral contest in a state of internal disunity, with a program which lacked conviction, realism and electoral appeal. Its only competitor for the allegiance of the Slovak electorate was the Democratic Party (heir and successor of the old Agrarian Party of M. Hodza) dominated almost exclusively by the Slovak Protestant bourgeoisie of proBenes sympathies. The Hlinka People's Party being banned, the Catholic section of the Slovak people ( the support of which was to decide the general election scheduled on May 26th, 1946) had no party of its own. To win these vital votes the leaders of the Democratic Party concluded an agreement with the representatives of the Slovak Catholics ("April Agreement") promising considerable concessions in exchange for the Catholic vote. 73 As a result of this solid backing of the Catholic majority the Democratic Party emerged victorious from the electoral contest polling 62.0 % of the total vote (999,622 votes), while the Communist Party gained only 30.4 % (489,596 votes), the remaining 7 ,6 % went to two minor parties or represented "white ticket" and informal votes. 74 While the electorate in the Czech lands overwhelmingly 72) G. Husak, Barnabitky a co im predchadzalo, in Nove slovo, No. 8/ 1968. 73) V. Precan, Slov ensky katolicizmus pred februarom 1948 (Bratislava , 1961), pp. 85-108. 74) Dejiny KSc (Praha, 1961), p . 504. 152 SLOVAKIA endorsed the Marxist policies 75 in Slovakia the Communist Party (which-it should be remembered-was already then a united party of both the Communist and the Social Democrats) came second best in what was actually a twoparty contest. This massive rejection of the Marxist policies led to deep soul-searching in the Central Committee in Prague and Bratislava. The Party now tempered (at least partly) its reckless nationalism and started to attack the Democratic Party for harbouring fascist and reactionary elements. 76 Though nominally both Communist and Democratic Parties were partners in the so-called United National Front they were soon fighting and abusing each other with fury and passion reminiscent of the interwar years. In spite of their electoral defeat the Communists, by clever and daring manipulation of their own and due to the ineptness, timidity and inexperience of the Democratic politicians were able to exert a decisive influence on the course of political events in Slovakia. They still retained the control of powerful organizations and pressure groups ( trade unions, farmers' organizations, partisans, etc.). Thus they were able to frustrate almost any attempt of the Democratic Party to honour its promises given to the Catholic voters.77 By their bullying tactics they brought about the estrangement between the leadership and membership of the Democratic Party. They accused many Democratic Party leaders of fascist conspiracy and subversive activity, demanded and got their removal from office and subsequent imprisonment (Kempny, Bugar, Stasko, Ursiny, etc.). Then in November 1947 they attacked the governmental positions of the Democratic Party, compelling it to give up 75) In the Czech lands the Communists received 38.9 % and the Social Democrats 15.8 % of the votes. The Marxist parties thus obtained 54.7 % . 76 ) M. Vartikova, Roky rozhodnutia. K dejiruim politickeho boja pred febriuirom 1948 (Bratislava, 1962); J . Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, 1955), pp. 247-253. 77 ) They engineered-with the help of their Czech comrades and colleagues-the sentencing and execution of the former President of Slovakia, Dr. Jozef Tiso. By this they completely discredited the Democratic Party in the eyes of its voters, fully revealing its impotency and helplessness as a political force . See: F . Vnuk, Dr. Jozef Tiso , President of the Slovak Repitblic (Sydney, 1967 ), pp. 37-40. SLOVAKIA 153 its majority in such administrative bodies as the Slovak National Council, the Board of Commissioners, etc.78 By this victory the Communists effectively undermined the morale of the non-Communist forces and the stage was set for a complete take-over. The notorious 'coup d'etat', by which the Communists came to power in Czecho-Slovakia in February 1948, was largely a Czech affair. The resignation of the non-Communist ministers and the ensuing governmental crisis were confined to Prague. The confrontation was staged and the struggle was lost by the Czechs in the Czech lands. 79 As far as Slovakia was concerned there the issue was solved almost inaudibly in a matter of hours (long before the crisis was over in Prague). The Communist chairman of the Board of Commissioners, G. Husak, took over the main Post Office building in Bratislava on February 23rd, 1948 and was in complete control of all postal services, especially the vital telecommunication links between Bratislava and. Prague. To all Democratic Commissioners he dispatched letters of dismissal and to make sure that they took notice, he requested the Commissioner of the Interior, M. Feriencik (nominally a non-party member of the Board), to post police guards at their offices, to keep the "dismissed'' Commissioners out. 80 Then the Communists reconstituted a new Board allocating to themselves 10 (out of 15) positions, giving the remaining ones to their fellow-travellers.81 This moment signified the zenith of the KSS. What followed afterwards was a steeply descending road leading to the unenviable position of the next two decades(1948-68). 78 ) In the reconstructed Board of Commissioners the Democratic Party had to share the chairmanship with a Communist and its majority of nine on the Board of 15 Commissioners was reduced to a minor ity of six. 79) There are many accounts of this "parliamentary take-over" of governmental powers by the Communists. For the losing party's version see e.g. H. Ripka's Le Coup de Prague (Paris, 1949), for the winning-side versio n see e.g. J . Vesely's Kronika unorovych dnti 1948 (Praha, 1958) . 80) V. Vagassky, Komunisticka strana ceskoslovenska (New York, 1953roneoed) p. 8. 81) J. Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, 1955), pp. 259-260. li4 SLOVAKIA VI. 1948-1962 With the elimination of the non-Communist opposition there was no longer a need for two Communist Parties in one country. Steps towards the abolition of the KSS were taken on July 26th, 1948, when the Presidium of the KSc (consisting entirely of Czech Communists) decided: 1. The next meeting of the Central Committee of the KSS shall rule that the KSS ceases to exist as an independent party and become an integral part of the KSc. 2. The Party organization in Slovakia will still carry the name of KSS . 3. The Central Committee of the KSS shall be subordinated to the Central Committee of the KSc, it shall act according to its directives and it will implement the policy of the KSc in Slovakia. 82 This decision was proptly implemented on September 28, 1948 when the KSS, obeying the resolution of the Presidium of the KSc agreed to become "the territorial organization of the unitary KSC. 83 The merger was officially represented as a voluntary act mutually desired by both, and enthusiastically greeted by the Party press as such. But now it is admitted what has been generally known from the start that the Slovak Communists were most unwilling to give up their independence, to take up the status of an unprivileged minority destined to wait for the hand-outs of the senior and none-too-generous partner. Their fears were well justified but they could do nothing to prevent the inevitable. Thus they became the first victims of the renewed centralism with which the Communist rulers of Czecho-Slovakia were pursuing their new "socialist" policies. Gottwald, Kopecky and their accomplices, the authors and erstwhile advocates of Slovak selfgovernment, almost overnight forgot their earlier pledges. Robust and aggresive centralism was menacingly reflected in the new "Constitution of May 9th" (1948). In it the Slovaks were treated badly, 84 yet worse was still to come. 82) K. Kaplan, Utvcifeni genercilni linie vystavby socialismu v Ceskoslovensku (Pra ha, 1965) , p. 103. 83) Dejiny KSC (Praha, 1961) , p. 540. 84) While in 1945 the Commissioners were chosen by the Slovak National Council and responsible to it, in 1948 they were appointed by SLOVAKIA 155 Most of those political and national rights which-as claimed by the KSS-were secured by the Slovak uprising in 1944 and saved by the victory of the working-class in 1948 were gradually removed one by one by the same people who once fought for them. With incredible, even gleeful, outward obedience the Slovak Communists were curtailing their own rights, restricting their own freedom of action. This subordinate relationship which now existed between the KSS and KSC was subsequently written into the Party Statutes for everybody to see. According to these approved rules "the KSS directs its activities by the decisions of the Congress of the KSC and the decisions of the Central Committee of the KSC ... The KSS convokes its congress after agreement with the Central Committee of the KSC ... The Central Committee of the KSS carries out the decisions of the Central Committee of the KSc and with the approval of the Central Committee of the KSC it solves the political and organizational Party questions in Slovakia". 85 Committed to these rules and bound by Party discipline the Communists in Slovakia ruthlessly applied the general Party line as drawn up in Prague by the Central Committee of the KSc, and including such unpopular measures as collectivization of farming, nationalization of all sectors of private enterprise, down to small shops and one-man businesses, wholesale purge of public life of all real and imaginary opponents of Communism, cruel persecution of the Catholic Church, its clergy and religious, victimization the Prague Government. The protective measures introduced in 1945 to safeguard the rights of the Slovak against the Czech majority were all removed in 1948. To pass or amend legislation a mere three-fifths majority of deputies was required. The Czech majority in the Parliament was always higher than this. (In 1954 there were only 98 Slovaks among 368 deputies). 85) The Statutes of the KSc , paragraphs 40, 42 and 47. See : Pravda of December 20th, 1952. Numerically the Party drew noticeably less strength from Slovakia than from the Czech lands. Shortly after the 1948 merger statistics were issued showing that in 1949 out of 2,311,066 members and candidates of the KSC only 236,432 were from Slovakia, i.e. 10.3%. ( Rude pravo of May 27th, 1950) . This disparity continued into the fiities and at the Tenth Congress of the KSC (1954) the Slovak delegates formed a 10,2% minority (Pravda of June 16th, 1954) . At that time 28% of the population lived in Slovakia. 156 SLOVAKIA of the intellectuals, adulation of Stalin and Gottwald, indiscriminate application of "superior Soviet methods" in all walks of life, etc.86 And when they did all these repugnant and hate-fometing tasks their Czech masters struck them with a wave of bloody purges. In the years 1949-54 (and especially after the Ninth Congress of the KSS in May 1950) the ranks of the Slovak Communists were decimated with a fury of terror which in its scope and horror surpassed all the blows ever inflicted by their class enemy. The purges form the most tragic and most neglected chapter in the history of the KSS.B 7 Within five years (1949-54) the KSS lost in purges seven out of 13 members of its Presidium (Clementis, Husak, Novomesky, ~midke, Bast'ovansky, Falt'an and Moskovic), some 30 % of its 60members Central Committee and thousands of Party members in diplomatic and administrative service, in the army, political bodies, institutions and other sectors of public life. They were removed from their posts amid the curses of their own comrades and comrades-in-arms and, having previously antagonized the masses of the Slovak people, they found themselves unpitied and friendless in their gravest hour. They were declared "enemies of the people", their work was debased, their publications banned, their past exorcised from the pages of the Party history.BB The principal guilt of which all the Slovak victims of the purges were accused was the unpardonable sin of "bourgeois nationalism", the very thing in which they were so much encouraged by their Czech comrades in 1945-6. It is generally not realized that the bulk of the victims of the 1949-54 purges were "bourgeois nationalists" (i.e. 86) In the writings of contemporary Communist historians all these measures were described as being socialist, progressive and to the benefit of the masses. Only now, after 15 years, some "mistakes" are being admitted for which the personality cult is blamed. 87) The purges were strictly taboo to the socialist historians until January 1968. Only in the field of literature a cautious attempt has been made to deal with this touchy subject, e. g. in Mnacko's Oneskorene reportaze, in Karvas's Jazva, etc. 88) More about the purges can be found in D. A. Schmidt's Anotomy of a Satelite ( Boston, 1952), in Vnuk's cistky - nezahojitel'ne rany KSS (Slovak v Amerike, November 9th,-30th, 1966); also Der Slansky-Prozess und seine Folgen (Recht im Ost und West, 5/ 1964, pp. 196-203. SLOVAKIA 157 Slovaks) in Slovakia and "zionists" (i.e. Jews) in the Czech lands, though these two groups did not account for more than 13 ¼- of the KSc membership. It is no wonder then that the purges permanently poisoned the already strained Slovak-Czech relations beyond any hope of reconciliation. After the elimination of the Slovak element the Central Committee of the KSc entrusted the reins of the KSS to people of its own choice: Siroky, Bacilek, Duris, David, Dubcek, Rais, Branik, sefranek, Mauer, etc. As in the early twenties most of these were of non-Slovak origin ( Czechs and Jews) and a few of them were even Soviet citizens (David, Mauer). In March 1953 Stalin died and shortly after him K. Gottwald. The presidency of the Republic passed on to A. Zapotocky, while a well-known Slovakophobe, A. Novotny, became the first Party secretary. Novotny soon concentrated in his hands immense power and, assisted by V. Kopecky, was able to suppress all the liberalising tendencies of the post-Stalin thaw. 89 Having thus delayed destalinization which was sweeping through Poland, Hungary and the Soviet Union, Novotny paid increased attention to Slovakia where the dangers to his policies were greatest. In an attempt to subdue the passive resistance of the Slovaks and to break the nationalist spirit pulsating there in spite of purges, expulsions and bolshevist vigilance, Novotny further tightened the screw of Czech centralism. He introduced new administrative steps aimed at a more thorough control and reorganized the existing economic, cultural and social structure of the country. In this reorganization several Slovak industrial enterprises and cultural associations lost even their nominal independence and were integrated with their Czech counterparts into more compact "Czechoslovak" bodies.90 89) Kopecky's version of how the Party fought and defeated "revisionism" among the intellectuals is graphically, though one-sidedly, described in his book, CSR a KS(; (Praha, 1960), pp. 467-470. 90 ) These moves were allegedly designed for reasons of higher efficiency but the uneasy reluctance with which they were accepted in Slovakia indicates their insidious nature. Their implementation led to the dismissal of the President of the Slovak National Council, S. Sebesta, anct to renewed attacks on Slovak separatism by Bacilek, Kopecky, David, etc. 158 SLOVAKIA With regard to the Slovak political and administrative organs these were doomed to wither away by a devious method of ignoring their very existence. In spite of the fact that the Slovak regional organs were staffed by trusted Party members they were gradually reduced to complete inactivity. Though the Government was constitutionally obliged to appoint a Commissioner when new ministeries were created, this provision was, as a rule, ignored. 91 Under the mask of "Czechoslovak socialist patriotism" a new brand of undiluted Czech nationalism was superimposed on these centralist tendencies. Any opposition to this socialist Czechoslovakism was decried as bourgeois nationalism and one can see how often these accusations were levelled against the Slovaks after 1954.92 In an arrogant disregard of Slovak national aspirations the constitution which in May 1960 proclaimed CzechoSlovakia "a socialist country" further stripped the power of Slovakia's provincial government organs subordinating them completely to the Central Government. 93 This outrageous arrangement was presented as a final and satisfactory solution of the Slovak problem and the Party boasted in its official history that it had accomplished what the old capitalist system had found insoluble.94 However, the Slovak feelings about the situation are more aptly 91) E. Taborsk)', Communism in Czechoslov akia 1948-1960 (Princeton , N. J. , 1961), pp. 340-344. 92) V. ~iroky complained about it at the Tenth Congress of the KSS in April 1955; it was deplored in a leading article in Pravda of May 1st, 1956; in the aftermath of the Budapest revolt it was ruefully admitted "one of the weakest sectors of our ideological struggle is the struggle against bourgeois nationalism", Pravda of December 14th, 1956); in January 1958 it was violently denounced by K. Bacilek as having penetrated "into various fields of our cultural, political and scientific life, sports, state apparatus, economic organs, etc." Pravda of January 10th and 11th, 1958) ; again by K. Bacilek and V. Kopecky at the Eleventh Congress of the KSS in April 1958; etc. See also: Slovak Nationalism Revisited (Radio Free Europe Papers of November 11, 1965). 93) The Slovak Commissioners must "attend to further tasks in the economic and cultural construction of Slovakia to the extent determined by the central government" (Taborsky, Communism in Czechoslovakia 1948-1960 [Princeton, N. J., 1961], p. 339) . 94) Dejiny KS(; (Praha, 1961), pp. 697-698. SLOVAKIA 159 summed up in the words of the former member of the Secretariat of the KSS and Party historian, M. Gosiorovsky: By the new adjustments of the Slovak national organs (which led to the aboli5hment of the Board of Commissioners, to the sub ordination of Slovak national offices directly to the Ministeries in Prague, etc.) the Slovak nation found itself in the position of the only nation in the entire Socialist camp which on its own ethnic territory lacked such organs of the Socialist governmental administration which would correspond to its development, its present living standard, its numerical strength and, above all, to its indispensability to become really and in every respect an equal partner with the brotherly Czech nation.95 VII. 1962-1967 Misruled and unrepresented, the Slovak Communists resented the continuos Czech interference, the Socialist brand of "Czechoslovakism" and above all the persistence of Stalinist methods and Stalinist leadership to which they were subjected. But there was little they could do about it while the Party was strong and enjoyed Krushchev's support. 96 But in 1961-62 the Party's grip on the overall control started to slacken. There were several factors which contributed to this: the stagnation of the country's economy, the Sino-Soviet dispute which now broke into the open, renewed attacks on Stalin at the XXIInd Soviet Party Congress (October 1961). In the ideological split the KSc had no choice but to side with Moscow. Thus circumstances compelled it to do more than pay lip service to the cause of destalinization. Destalinization finally reached Czecho-Slovakia in 1962-3 and its advent was symbolically ushered in by the demolition of the huge statue of Stalin overlooking Prague (November 1962). The year 1962, the year of the XIIth Congress of the KSC, was also a year of intense ferment, especially in 95) M. Gosiorovsky, K niektorym otazkam vzt'ahu cechov a siovakov v poiitike KSc, in Historicky casopis, No. 3/ 1968, p. 391. 96 Khrushchev's endorsement of the Party's Stalinist policies in 1957 was a very serious drawback for the opposing forces in the KSS who disliked Kopecky and Novotny's stiff measures against the Slovaks. Khrushchev on the occasion of his visit to Czecho-Slovakia declared (on July 11th, 1957): "The cause of Leninism in CzechoSlovakia is in good hands." (East Europe, 9/1957, p.41) . 160 SLOVAKIA Slovakia where the pent-up grievances gave rise to outspoken criticism of the excesses of the Stalinist era and of their perpetrators. The loudest critics of these abuses of naked power were the Slovak writers, journalists, scientists and other representatives of the intelligentsia. 97 The foremost task of destalinization was to rehabilitate the victims of the 1949-54 purges. Those bourgeois nationalists who were still alive were quietly released from prisons, but Novotny and his clique were most relucant to admit that the accusations of bourgeois nationalism were fabricated. Such an admission would make fabricators of Novotny, Siroky and most of the power-holders in CzechoSlovakia. Subjected to mounting pressure the Party allowed the released prisoners to apply for re-admission to Party membership. Many of them did and their applications for re-admission read like the most savage condemnation of Communist tyranny ever written. 98 These were widely cir97) The mouthpiece of the discontented and critical voice was the official organ of the Slovak Writers' Association , Kulturny zivot, which in 1963 published an impressive number of critical articles. An open forum at which many abuses and horrors of the past and of the present were exposed was the Conference of Slovak Writers in Bratislava (April 21-22nd, 1963). At the First Congress of the Association of Slovak Journalists (May 28-29th, 1963) the wrongs and injustices of the era were bitterly denounced by M. Hysko , who publicly attacked the then Prime Minister, V. Siroky, as the prime mover behind the false accusations of the "bourgeois nanationalist" comrades, (Pravda of June 3rd 1963). 98) Some of them (e.g. Husak's) found their way abroad, where extracts from them were pub!ished in the emigre press. For English translation of parts from Husak's application see: News Digest International (Sydney) 3/ 1966, pp. 55-57. In 1968 a large number of rehabilited Party officials (as well as many non-Party men ) described their experiences at the hands of their jailers. Husak's account was serialized in a weekly, Nove slovo, Holdos's in the daily, Smena, but the most graphic expose of the inhuman treatment to which the victims of the cult era were subjected is in E. Loebl's book Svedectvo o procese s vedenim protistatneho sprisahaneckeho centra na cele s Rudolfom Slanskym (Bratislava, 1968) . From among the non-Communist prisoners there is the account by playwright I. Stodola in Kulturny zivot and that of military officer D. Viest in Slovenske Pohl'ady. Different organizations and institutions started to publish grim statistics about the era of lawlessness. According to various calculations there were 160 death sentences in 1948-53. The Association of Anti-Fascist Fighters claimed that 30,000-40,000 of its members became victims SLOVAKIA 161 culated in Slovakia and their impact was enormous. At one stage they caused an open rebellion against Czech rule. Novotny tried to counteract these outbursts of discontent and criticism but his voice was drowned in an ever-growing protest. 99 To save his own skin he had to sacrifice his most valuable accomplices (and the most hated men in Slovakia) namely K. Bacilek (in March 1963), and when that did not suffice, V. Siroky and J . Duris (in September 1963). Of course the situation was far more serious than could be rectified by the removal of a few compromised Party officials. The main culprit, A. Novotny, and his group weathered the storm of criticism by sheer perseverance and stubbornness and with Moscow's backing retained their monopoly of power. At the end of 1963 the situation in the KSS differed only very little from that before the XIIth Party Congress. The leadership of the KSS was entirely in the hands of Novotny's men, like Bil'ak, Chudik, Sabolcik, Lenart, salgovic, Barbirek, Dvorsky, Cvik, Daubner, etc. In his selection Novotny was particularly careful to pick for his service people whose only qualification was blind following of the official Party line.No person of independent views or strong personal conviction made his way up the Party ladder. The most pathetic group in the Slovak political scene were the rehabilitated bourgeois nationalists. Though exonerated from their alleged crimes and officially "fully of judical and political persecution. The unlawfully sentenced citizens even founded their own organization "K 231". But the most moving (and damning) indictment of the cruelty of the Communist regime was the Resolution of the members of various religious orders presented to the Ministry of Culture and Information on April 17, 1968. It was signed by 6,174 religious who spent altogether 32,016 years in prison. (See Katoiicke noviny, May 5, 1968). 99) Novotny replied to the criticism of the Slovak Communist intellectuals on June 12th, 1963 at Kosice. He defended Siroky, maintaining that the accusations of bourgeois nationalism were " substantially right" ( Prav da of June 13th, 1963). He sharply reprimanded and vilified two Slovak critics of his policies, M. Hysko and R. Kalisky, branding them as "irresponsible scribblers" (pisalkove ). R. Kalisky replied in kind and his long letter (of 30 pages) to "comrade President" lists a comprehensive catalogue of Czech wrongdoings towards the Slovaks. This letter was also widely read in Slovakia and heartily approved by all sections of the community. 162 SLOVAKIA rehabilitated" they still were doomed to remain in a political wilderness, hoping against hope for some miracle which would restore their earlier status. Their hopes could not have been realized without a major upheavel within the Party. They were, after all, striving and clamouring after positions which were held by their former judges and jailers, by men who had advanced literally over their "dead bodies". These men knew only too well to whom they owed their posts and what was expected of them in return. This state of affairs could not have been without impact on the Party's membership. Headed by uninspiring and subservient leaders, the KSS had become a living mockery of Lenin's conception of a Communist Party. The solution of the Slovak problem in 1962-67 advanced very little, if at all. The request of the Slovak intellectuals to federate Czecho-Slovakia according to the Soviet or Yugoslav model was rejected outright. 100 The Czechs were the dominant nation in a state "of two brotherly nations of equal rights" (as it is solemnly written in the 1960 Constitution) and continued to enjoy a disproportionately high number of prestige-bearing positions in the Party organs, State administration, diplomatic service, army, etc. The dissatisfaction in all strata of the Slovak community was there for everybody to see. If any concessions were made, these were only formal and completely unsatisfactory. Thus in 1964 the term "poverenik" (Commissioner), abolished in 1960, was reintroduced and in a common declaration of the Central Committee of both Parties (i.e. KS(:; and KSS) of May 7, 1964 it was announced that the Slovak National Council would participate "more fully" in all spheres of Slovak public life. 101 But there was no visible improvement, no advancement towards a fuller participation of regional organs in Slovakia's administration. In spite of all this crude nationalistic discrimination, in spite of obvious economic, political and cultural failures, 100) This proposal, the authorship of which is attributed to an erstwhile Party historian, M. Gosiorovsky, was rejected by Prague through its Slovak mouthpiece, M. Chudik (President of the Slovak National Council. According to Chudik the Slovak people did not wish any federation (Rude pravo of November 13th, 1965). 101 ) Za plnsie uplatnenie Slovenskej narodnej rady, (Bratislava, 1964). SLOVAKIA 163 Novotny somehow managed to retain and even consolidate his personal power at the XIIIth Party Congress (MayJune, 1966). The Congress was a rather dull and uneventful affair: only those speakers were admitted who endorsed Novotny's policies. A lengthy and critical report on the economic situation and the much talked-about "new economic model" was to be delivered by Prof. 0. sik, but what finally emerged was a very mild substitute. The Central Committee elected a 10-man Party Presidium, in which there were three Slovaks (Dubcek, Lenart, Chudik). Among the Presidium candidates there were two more Slovaks ( Sabolcik and Sadovsky). The promised and expected reform which was to put Slovak-Czech relations on an entirely new basis did not materialize .102 VIII. 1967-1968 The situation had become unbearable by 1967. The forces of discontent were gathering momentum. Up to 1966-7 the main source of opposition to the Novotny regime was in Slovakia, where his treatment of the Slovak peoples and institutions provoked almost universal hatred. This resentment was gradually percolating into the all-state Party leadership. In 1967 Novotny's obstinacy to the "new economic model" caused further polarization of the leadership into the "dogmatists" and the "liberals". The economic reform could succeed only if coupled with decentralization and with a loosening of the tight dictatorial regime. Any relaxation on the political front immediately brought forward a demand for a thorough-going rehabilitation and undoing of the "mistakes of the cult era". The combined impact of these factors (i.e. the Slovak question, economy and uneasy liberalization) eventually led to the fall of A. Novotny. These grumblings came first to the attention of the outside world in June 1967, when the writers used their IVth Congress as a tribunal for a passionate denunciation 102) The Slovak writer, V. Mihalik ( member of the Central Committee of the KSS ) revealed (in Kulturny zivot 8/1966, p. 1) that the Party was preparing "an important document" aimed at the improvem1mt in Slovak-Czech relations. The document was to be tabled at the Thirteenth Congress of the KSc (May, 1966 ). Bu t it was not, and nothing has been heard about it since. 164 SLOVAKIA of naked power and for a bitter condemnation of the Party's performance in the last two decades. 103 The Party-always very sensitive to criticism-hit back hard in Oct. 1967. The principal culprits were expelled from the Party, dismissed from their professional posts, and their official journal, "Literarni noviny", was taken away from them. An attempt was made to exploit the existing difference between the Slovak and Czech writers and to play both groups against each other. But the Slovaks, at their meeting with the Slovak Party leaders on Oct. 16, 1967, briskly declined the honour of being the Party's favourites at the expense of their Czech colleagues. 104 Another indication of the stresses and strains at the top was the criticism at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the KSc in Sept. 1967 of the implementation of the new economic model. It was, perhaps, symptomatic that the Slovak Party Secretary, A. Dubcek, accused the government 9f discriminatory policies towards Slovakia. He charged that "the results for the first half of 1967 show that investments in Slovak industry totalled 21.9 1/r of the state investments and not 28 % as was laid in the directives of the XIIIth Party Congress". 105 The struggle for power was now on and manifested itself again at the Central Committee meeting in Oct. 1967, where the Slovak Party leaders in an unheard-of move demanded that Novotny abandon one of the two top functions he held (i.e. the First Party Secretary and the President of the State) . Novotny sensed the gravity of the 103) See IV. Sjezd Svazu ceskoslovenskych spisovatelti, Praha 27. - 29. cervna 1967, (Praha, 1968), especially the speeches by M. Kundera (pp. 22-27) , P . Kohout (pp. 39-43), A. J. Liehm (pp. 99-204) and, above all, that of L. Vaculik ( pp. 141-150). The Slovak writers played a rather passive role at this gathering and their over-all performance was to become a source of serious embarrassment in the subsequent months. A heated dispute about the action of some Slovak writers (Mihalik, Spitzer, Valek, Minac, Kostra, Matu~ka, Rosenbaum , Egri, Luknar, Ponican as well as 9 Czech writers) who in their letter supported the party's policies in the cultural sphere (pp. 157-159 ) eventually led (in December 1968) to the collapse of the Slovak Writers' Union. See M. Resutik Rozlomeny svaz in Nove slovo No. 1/ 1969, p. 11. 104 ) Svedectvi (Paris) No. 32-33 / 1968, pp. 89-116. 105 ) Pravda (Bratislava), Sept. 29, 1967. SLOVAKIA 165 situation and in December he invited Brezhnev to come to Prague to bolster his position. But Brezhnev's visit (Dec. 8 )-if anything-made the situation worse . The next meeting of the Central Committee (Dec. 19-21, 1967) dealt Novotny the final blow and made his position untenable. At the following meeting of the Central Committee, a fortnight later, Novotny was finally voted out of office and replaced by Alexander Dubcek, who till then was considered N ovotny's man in Slovakia. Outside his native Slovakia Dubcek was a completely unknown personality .106 The key role-and this should be stressed again and again-in N ovotny's downfall was played by the Slovaks who found themselves in their socialist homeland economically exploited, nationally humiliated, culturally neglected and ruled as a colony by their Czech partners. Novotny, in his last speech as Party Secretary (New Year's speech, 1968) , tried to placate the Slovaks with the promise of a more generous economic consideration for Slovakia: " The need of nationwide industrial development must not obscure the important task of priority development of Slovakia which still has not reached the average economic level of the Czech regions". 107 But the offer was "too little too late". The new leadership of the KSc put the question of Slovakia as the number one problem to be tackled by them. Prague radio said on Jan. 5, 1968: "The Central Committee took note of the fact that the government and the Presidium of the Slovak National Council will submit to the Party organs, on the basis of thorough situation analyses, specific proposals for perfecting their activities." The activities of the Slovak National Council being almost non-existent needed much more than perfecting. In his speech at the 20th anniversary of the Communist coup of February 1948, Dubcek spelt out the current difficulties which were troubling his leadership: "Many faults 106) For backgro und to Dubcek's personality see, e. g. F . Vnuk, Alexander Dubcek - tragedia poctiv eho komunistu in Kalendar Jednota 1969 (Middletown, Pa. , 1968), pp. 173-181. Also T. Szulc, A loo/c at Alexander Dubcek - the aparatchik who made a revoluti on in N . Y . Times (Weekly Review) , Jan. 12, 1969. 107) Pravda (Bratislava), Jan. 2, 1968. 166 SLOVAKIA have occured in internal Party life ... (where) the struggle between the progressive and conservative forces has not yet been concluded . . . ( There are) serious difficulties in the economy ... In our relations with the Slovak national organs we must rectify what was wrongfully violated after 1960 and things must be rearranged in such a way as to bring them in line with the contemporary stage of development of the state as a whole." 108 After this admission from the highest Party official things in Slovakia started to happen. M. Chudik (member of the Presidium of the KSc), N ovotny's stooge in Slovakia who was acting as Chairman of the Slovak National Council, hurriedly submitted his resignation. But he was not to be allowed to bow out as gracefully as that; he was dismissed in ignominy instead, on March 14, 1968. Having discarded its incompetent boss the Slovak National Council immediately published a resolution demanding that CzechoSlovakia become a federation. A new constitution to replace the one of 1960 was to give full legislative power to the Slovak National Council in all except foreign affairs, defense and state finances. Slovakia was to have a separate government. 109 In March the so-called "Czecho-Slovak spring" really started and the whole country was undergoing radical changes. Novotny's Party apparatus was falling to pieces. There was the defection to the West of Major-General Jan sejna; the resignation of the Trade Unions leader Pastytik; the dismissal of Chudik; the removal from office of the Interior Minister Kudrna and Prosecutor-General Bartuska; the suicide of Deputy Defense Minister V. Janko and Vice-President of the Supreme Court J. Brest'ansky; ousting of the chief Party ideologue J. Hendrych and the fall from the Presidency of Novotny himself. All this happened in the space of four weeks and had tremendous impact on the people. These events necessitated a new reorganization of the Party and the government. The five-day session of the Central Committee of the KSc named a new Presidium on April 1, 1968, in which Slovakia was given the largest 108 ) Pravda (Bratislava) , Feb. 23 , 1968. 109) Pravda (Bratislava), March 15, 1968. SLOVAKIA 167 representation ever : 4 in 11. 110 In the Secretariat there were 3 Slovaks out of 9 members (Dubcek-the First Secretary, Lenart, Sadovsky). On April 9 a new Cabinet was sworn in by Novotny's successor in the Presidency, General L. Svoboda. At the head of the new government stood 0. cernik. There were 5 deputy Prime Ministers and 23 Ministers. Here too the Slovaks were treated much more generously than ever before: 2 deputy Prime Ministers and 6 Ministers were from Slovakia. One of the deputy Prime Ministers was Gustav Husak, a rehabilitated Slovak "bourgeois nationalist". On April 10, 1968 the Party published its " Action Program",111 an ambitious document setting out " CzechoSlovakia's road towards socialism" and outlining the political and economic reforms by which it was to achieve one-party rule, mollified by the active participation of the non-party sections of the population. The Slovak question again figured prominently in the Program. A new symmetric federative arrangement of the state was proposed and the Slovaks were promised: 1. Slovak National Council and Council of Ministers (instead of the old Board of Commissioners), 2. Slovak national committees, 3. Autonomy in planning and budgeting for Slovakia, 4. State secretaries in those central ministerial departments where Ministers were Czechs, 5. Guarantee of Slovak rights against the Czech majority, 6. Adequate Slovak representation in the army, diplomatic service, etc. 112 In the less oppressive atmosphere of the day and in the absence of overt censorship public opinion soon started to exert pressure from below. This resulted first of all in the resignation or removal from the scene of those men who were closely linked with Novotny and his• dictatorial policies. To purge Novotny's followers from the Central llO ) They were Dubcek, Rigo, Bil'ak and Barbirek. Their nomina tion was accepted in Slovakia with some scepticism and their credentials as Slovaks were immediately questioned. It was pointed out that Rigo was a Gypsy, Bil'ak was a Ruthenian and Barbirek though born in Bratislava- was a Czech. And, of course, everybody knew that Dubcek had spent his childhood and adolescence (192438 ) in the Soviet Union. 111 ) A kcni Program KS(: pfijaty na p leruirni zasedani OV KS(: dne 5. du bna 1968, Praha 1968. ll 2 ) Akcni Program ...", pp. 27-28. 168 SLOVAKIA Committee of the KSc the masses demanded an extraordinary Party congress. Under the effect of ever-mounting pressure the Party leaders with some reluctance consented at last to convene it in September 1968. In Slovakia the burning question was that of federation. Obcession with this issue was so intense that little room was left for anything else. There was a minor controversy between two groups of Slovak intellectuals as to whether it was more correct to insist on federation before democratization or vice versa. This was, however, only a question of emphasis: the demand for federalization was almost unanimous. In the Czech lands the problem of federalization was hardly mentioned, and if at all, then not in a manner encouraging for the Slovaks. A public opinion poll revealed that 95 % of Slovaks were for federation and 90 ';c of Czechs against it. 113 The Czechs did not like to be reminded that federation was something the Slovaks were promised more than once in the past 50 years and hence long overdue. They preferred to dismiss the whole thing as an unrealistic and untimely affair of no concern to themselves. The famous "2000 words Manifesto" even suggested that in Slovakia the federation issue would be used as a shield by many old conservatives who would thus survive the democratization process: "Federation alone will not provide better living standards for either the Czechs or Slovaks, neither will it solve their economic and social problems. The rule of the Party-state bureaucracy may still survive especially in Slovakia, because there it could claim a victory in the fight by which greater freedom was gained (for the Slovaks) ."114 113) There were several surveys of public opinion on this issue. Obrana l'udu (June 1, 1968) cites the results of another survey, according to which the Slovaks were for federation "almost 100%", while in the Czech lands federation was favored by only 5% of those questioned! 114) For the full text of this Manifesto see Literarni Listy (June 27, 1968). The Soviet press called "2000 words" an "action program for the counter-revolution" (Literaturnaya Gazeta, July 10, 1968) , Dubcek deplored it as a "very serious obstacle to the further development of socialist democracy and society" (Rude pravo , June 29, 1968), S. Kodaj (Party official in East Slovakia) denounced it as "an open call for counter-revolution". In fact it was a call for pressure from below to get the Party to purge from SLOVAKIA 169 This unkind remark in a document which so outraged the Soviet leaders and embarrassed the Communist leaders in Czecho-Slovakia, elicited a reply in the form of an open letter signed by over 200 Slovak intellectuals and intitled, "A word to the Czechs, and also Slovaks, who are worthy of it". In this response the Slovaks complained bitterly about the outrageous distortion of Slovak history by Czech officialdom ("From Shir's followers down to the men who led the uprising of 1944 nobody was good enough if he was a good Slovak first") and then defended their insistence on "federation without delay": "In today's democratization process the present inferior position of Slovakia is simply no longer tenable".11 5 No prominent political personality figured among those who signed the letter, yet the Czechs suspected that its instigator was Dr. Gustav Husak. The Deputy Prime Minister G. Husak was the most dynamic personality in the reactivated life of the KSS. 116 He re-emerged (after being sentenced to life inprisonment as a "bourgeois nationalist" in 1954) as a sworn enemy of Novotny and all his hangers-on in Slovakia. At the same time he was resolved to reassert as much an independent Slovak voice in the state and Party politics as possible. He still remained what he always had been, an orthodox and autocratic Communist at heart, but his hatred of Novotny put him in the one camp with the liberals. His uncompromising stand on immediate and comprehensive federalization assured him of a strong following in Slovakia. He was not even a member of the Central Committee of the KSS, yet his political influence in Slovakia was second to none. Early in July he swayed the regional Party conference in Bratislava to press for the KSS congress to be held in August 1968 (i.e. before the scheduled KSc Congress ) so that the Slovaks would come to the XIVth extraordinary Congress of the KSc with their own specific all positions of power the men who had been responsible for the country's political, economic, moral and cultural decline. For the English translation of the whole document see East Europe No. 8/ 1968, pp. 25-28. 115) Slovo cechom aj Slovakom sucim na slovo in Nove slovo, No. 11/ 1968, pp. 1-3. 116) For a short biography of G. Husak read F. Vnuk's O Husakovi zrwva a v iacej in Kalendcir Jednota 1968, (Middletown, Pa., 1967, pp. 87-98). 170 SLOVAKIA proposals ( already approved by the KSS Congress) of the federalization scheme. 117 The internal development in Czecho-Slovakia since January and especially since March 1968 was a cause of serious concern in the Soviet Union and neighbouring people's democracies. The events in Czecho-Slovakia were directly connected with the students' demonstrations in Poland which produced a crisis in the Polish Party leadership. Afraid of similar consequences in East Germany Ulbricht imposed a ban on the German-language newspaper from Czecho-Slovakia. The Ukrainian-language broadcast from Presov found keen listeners in the south-western part of the Soviet Union and caused uneasiness and discomfort to the Soviet Party leaders, to Ukrainian Party boss Shelest in particular. Dubcek and his colleagues were repeatedly summoned to Moscow, Dresden, Warsaw, while their counterparts from the other Socialist countries were arriving in Prague trying their best to stop the process which in Dubcek's eyes was democratic and humanizing, in theirs counter-revolutionary and revisionist. Then on July 15, 1968 the Central Committee of the KSc received a common letter from the "fraternal" Parties of the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria. They found the situation in Czecho-Slovakia "absolutely unacceptable for a socialist country". The catalogue of errors and faults was long and comprehensive and reflected their own fears and apprehensions. Only one aspect of the post-January development in the country was condoned without disapproval: "We welcome the rectification in the relations between the Czechs and Slovaks on a sound basis of brotherly collaboration within the framework of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic". 118 The recipients of this "Warsaw letter" did not leave these accusations unanswered and refuted them one by one. In their written reply they stated emphatically: "We do not see any realistic reasons which would entitle you to assert that our present situation should be branded as counter-revolutionary."119 The Party Secretary Dubcek went 117) Pravda (Bratislava), July 7, 1968. 118) Prav da (Bratislava) , Special edition, July 18, 1968. 119) ib. SLOVAKIA 171 on the air to reassure his countrymen (on July 18, 1968): "We do not want to abandon anything at all from our principles." The outcome of this correspondence was the confrontation between the 11-man Soviet Politburo and the entire 11-man KSc Presidium at cierna nad Tisou (July 29-Aug. 1, 1968), and afterwards the multilateral "comradely" meeting at Bratislava on Aug. 3. The official communique was inconclusive and the whole outcome of the conference was rather dubious. 120 Both participants ( i. e. the KSC on the one hand and the Communist Parties of the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria on the other) were convinced that they had successfully defended their own tenets of socialism. In a nationwide broadcast Dubcek again attempted to calm his fellow citizens: "You can be fully satisfied with the results and the spirit of the talks. We have kept our promises (i.e. not to deviate from the post-January course)." It sounded too good to be true. For the next 18 days Czecho-Slovakia lived in a fool's paradise, while the Red Army, under the pretext of largescale manoeuvres, was preparing the invasion of CzechoSlovakia. On Aug. 20-21, 1968, in defiance of their solemn promises to respect the national independence of every Socialist country, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces of five Communist countries invaded Czecho-Slovakia and put a sudden end to the great democratization experiment. In this gesture of Cain-like brotherhood Communism displayed its fear of democratization, its abhorrence of freedom, its inability to satisfy even the most elementary of human desires. It demonstrated that Communism cannot be liberalized without ceasing to be Communism. During that fateful night of Aug. 20-21 the progressive leaders of the KSc were kidnapped and taken in chains to Russia. This high-handed action of the Socialist allies 121 provoked a loud and indignant outcry all over the world, and-most unexpectedly-a resolute condemnation by the majority of the world Communist Parties, including those of China, Yugoslavia, Rumania, France, Italy, Great Britain, 120) Pravda (Bratislava), Aug. 4, 1968. 121) A Chronology of Occupation in East Europe, No. 10/ 1968,pp. 38-46. 172 SLOVAKIA Australia, etc. But by far the most effective was the reaction the Soviets encountered in the occupied country. It is impossible to describe in detail the ingenious methods of the passive and less passive resistance by which the Slovaks and Czechs frustrated the occupiers' efforts to "normalize the situation". The invasion united the Czech and Slovak nation in their opposition to this cruel act. But it appears that there was much less unity of action in the Party ranks. The KSS refused to back unconditionally the activities of the KSc in the first post-invasion days. The XIVth extraordinary Congress of the KSc, scheduled for Sept. 9 was hurriedly convened and took place during the night of Aug. 22 under the very nose of the occupying troops in a big Prague factory ( cKD plant) . The delegates (1095 out of 1543 expected to attend) elected a new Committee of 144 members. Of these 118 were new members and only 26 belonged to the old Central Committee. The representation from Slovakia amounted to 42 members, an unprecedented proportion, and there were 8 Slovaks in the 28-man Presidium: Dubcek, Husak, Zrak, 1'azky, Sadovsky, Colotka, Turcek, Pavlenda, Samel (?). 122 This should have satisfied the Slovaks, but it did not. The Soviets denounced the XIVth Congress in the most violent terms and did their utmost to undo it. According to Western reports the secret protocol drawn-up at the conclusion of the Czechoslovak-Soviet "negotiations" (sit venia verbi) on Aug. 28, 1968 contained 14 demands, one of which asked for the invalidation of the XIVth congress . As it happened this was the first thing the Russians succeeded in obtaining. A key role in making this congress into an "unevent" was played by G. Husak who was one of the negotiators in Moscow. While he was abroad the extraordinary Congress of the KSS started ( on Aug. 26 ). Husak returned just in time to deliver his address on the last day of the session. In his speech he questioned the legality of the XIVth Congress of the KSc and advised the delegates to the KSS Congress to reverse their stand taken three days earlier and to disavow the XIVth extraordinary Congress of the KSc. Husak argued that at the XIVth congress the Slovak representatives to the Party 122) Prav da (Bratislava ), Special edition, Aug. 25, 1968. SLOVAKIA 173 organs were elected "illegally" ... "undemocratically", that "out of 300 Slovak delegates selected to attend the congress proceedings only 4, later 22, and towards the end about 40 were present". 123 In complete disregard of the fact that it was the Russians who had prevented the Slovak delegates from participating at the Congress Husak addressed his indignant reproaches at those who elected him to the Party Presidium: "Nobody can impose on a sovereign nation and its party its will in a way we have witnessed, namely that a little group of people entrusted by nobody should determine the nation's political representation."124 Of course Husak's anger and fury would have been even greater if the XIVth Congress had failed to nominate him or some of his close associates to the position in the top Party hierarchy. His rhetoric was just a clumsy display of the heads-I-win-tails-you-lose tactics. In sharp contrast to the XIVth Congress of the KSC, the Congress of the KSS was allowed to proceed undisturbed. It was attended by 607 of the 638 choosen delegates. It elected a 131-man Central Committee and a 12-member Presidium composed of Husak, Bod'a, Falt'an, Harencar, Klokoc, Luptak, Novomesky, Pavlenda, Sadovsky, Sedlakova, 'l'azky and Zrak. The 7-man Secretariat consisted of G. Husak (First Secretary) , L. Abraham, B . Graca (ideological spokesman ) , V. Pavlenda, S . Sadovsky, J. Turcek and J . Zrak. This was an entirely new team personally hand-picked by Husak. All of Novotny's men and Husak's opponents were either ousted (Bil'ak, Sabolcik, Pecha, Riga, Kriz, Hruskovic, Dvorsky, etc.) or demoted to ordinary Central Committee membership (Janik, Barbirek, Zupka, etc.). In the resolution of the Congress the Plenum took a stand on a number of current issues created by the presence of Warsaw Pact troops in Slovakia, but the only problem it tackled with determination and vigour was that of federation. Husak said in his concluding address: "I recommend that we approve . . . our insistence on the federative rearangement of our state on the basis of principles outlined earlier and it should be enacted by Oct. 28 this year." 125 In the subsequent weeks the Slovak Communists pursued this 123 ) Pravda (Bratislava) , Aug. 30, 1968. 124) Smena, Aug. 30, 1968. 125) Pravda (Bratislava) , Aug. 30, 1968. 174 SLOVAKIA point of their program forcefully and relentlessly to its logical conclusion. The federation was indeed enacted on Oct. 27, 1968 and put into practice on Jan. 1, 1969. Today's Czecho-Slovakia consist of two Socialist republics, the Czech and the Slovak, with three governments, Czech, Slovak and Central. It can be said that federation is the only paragraph salvaged from the ambitious Action program of Dubcek's leadership. The draft of the new Party statutes was published for discussion early in April 1968 and it proposed that the Party too should be reorganized on federal lines. 126 It envisaged the Communist Party of the Czech lands and the Communist Party of Slovakia to deal with internal and domestic matters; for international representation and in matters which exceeded the limits of national competence there was to be a single representative of the two national parties, i. e. the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. This proposition was politely forgotten after August, 1968; the Russians apparently did not like it. (Of course there were many other things the Russians would loathe to see in.practice, such as the new concept of democratic centralism, election of all party organs by secret ballot, limited terms of service on regional and national party committees, etc.). Thus whilst the KSS achieved a funda• mental alteration in the structure of the state, it was unable to adjust the structural pattern of the Party to fit the new political situation. The KSS is still without counterpart in the Czech lands 127 However, under Husak's new leadership the KSS has undergone a remarkable revival. In its relation to the KSc it has become more aggressive and self-assertive. The days of blind obedience of the Party line drawn up in Prague have been replaced by an avowed and dedicated service 126) Rude pravo, Supplement, Aug. 10, 1968. 127) At the plenary session of the Central Committee of the KSCS on Nov. 14-17, 1968 a substitute-counterwei ght to the Central Committee and Presidium of the KSS was set up: the so-called Party's Bureau for the Czech regions. It functions within the framework of the Central Committee of the KSCS, consists of 11 men and is headed by L. Strougal, assisted by two Secretaries (V. Hula and J . Kozel). The weekly journal "Tribuna" is its official organ. The only better known personality in the Bureau (beside L. Strougal) is the Prime-Minister Cernik. SLOVAKIA 175 to the needs of the nation. At least that was what G. Husak proclaimed at the KSS Congress: "Let this Party rid itself of everything which is irresolute, everything which is opportunistic, let endure in it all that is firm, noble and prepared to struggle for the rights of this nation. 128 It remains to be seen to what extent the KSS will be able to realize this resolve. The strongman Husak was known to have made similar speeches in 1945-48, but after 1948 he was gradually silenced, removed from his Party posts and eventually imprisoned. So far he has succeeded in bringing about federalization of the state, but in the process he has antagonized a few influential groups in Slovakia (liberal writers, journalists, intellectuals) and the majority of the Czech population. He is being depicted in the Western press as a man who enjoys the trust of the Russians, as the man who annulled the XIVth Congress of the KSc, as the man who was instrumental in the removal of Smrkovsky, etc. 129 The conflict and dialectical contradictions between the Czechs and Slovaks are at present as acute as ever. Federation solved one old problem but generated at least a dozen new ones. The part played by the KSS in Slovak national history shows too much on the debit side and very little on the credit side. In the years 1948-67 the KSS was without doubt the most powerful single factor in shaping Slovakia's history. Yet in most instances it was a force which, with cynicism and arrogance, stood as a stumbling-block between the nation and its freedom, between the people and their political and cultural self-expression. In those years the KSS was just a tool of terror and intimidation wielded by a foreign oppressor over the Slovak masses. These things were openly stated in many sensational revelations 128) Smena, Aug. 30, 1968. A question can be asked at this point as to how much the Party membership will drop if it is going to rid itself of everything which is opportunistic and irresolute and retain only that which is firm and noble. In 1968, just before the Soviet invasion the Party had in Slovakia 220,000 organized members, i. e. less than 6% of the population. If Husiik's criteria are applied this number can only decrease. 129) See e.g. the article of L. Vlasic: Pohyb s cudnym pozadim in Nove slovo, No. 1/ 1969, pp. 3 and 14. Also Husiik's speech at the Plenary session of the Central Committee KSC-S (Rude pravo, Jan. 21 , 1969, p. 7) . SLOVAKIA 176 which appeared in the censorship-free press during the March-August period of the Dubcek era. The new leadership of the KSS has repeatedly stated that the return of the old days is out of the question. Yet (apart from federation) one witnesses almost daily a gradual retreat from the gains and achievements of the liberalization process. The presence of Red Army units in the country (now sanctioned by a treaty) makes certain that the conditions imposed on the KSC leadership on Aug. 28, 1968 are being implemented. How-under these circumstances-will the KSS safeguard the interests of the nation? Time alone will tell. Appendix I. N umerical representation from Slovakia in the Central Committee. Presidium-Politburo and Secretariat-Orgburo of the KS(: (including candidates) in 1921-1968. Members in Members in Members in KSC. Seer. C. Committee KS(: Presid. Party Congress - -- Merger-Congress (1921) I 36 6 16.6 I. Congress ( 1923) I 26 5 19.4 II. Congress ( 1924) 50 6 12.0 52 III. Congress ( 1925) 6 11.5 52 IV. Congress ( 1927) 5 from Nov. 1928 I ? I ? 9/ V. Congress ( 1929) 52 1 4 7.7 4 7.8 51 VI. Congress (1931) 8 16.0 50 VII. Congress (1936) ? ? Exile KS(: (Mose., '38) ? ? ? Exile KS(: Paris, 1939) ? ? ? ? Exile KS(: (Mose., '43) Post-war KSC (Ko~ .• '45) I 21 10 47.7 VIII. Congress ( 1946 ) I 101 0 0.0 170? 32 18.8 from July 1948 108 22 20.2 IX. Congress ( 1949) 112 23 20.3 X. Congress (1954) 147 33 22.5 XI. Congress (1958) 147 30 20.4 XII. Congress ( 1962) 166 28 16.8 XIII. Congress ( 1966 ) ? ? ? from Jan. 1968 XIV. extraordinary ('68) I 144 42 29.2 1921-1968 ll485j 254 j 17.8 II I i I 12 8 9 9 11 15 17 10 12 7 3 7 7 14 18 21 11 15 12 15 19 28 270 I - -- - - 0 0.0 -- --0 0.0 -- --7 1 11.0 0 0.0 1 14.6 7 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 0 0.0 2 33.3 6 3 20.0 1 20.0 5 1 5.9 ? ? ? 1 10.0 4 1 8.3 1 25.0 0 0.0 No 1 33.3 Secretariat 0 0.0 2 28.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 elected 2 9.5 1 14.6 7 2 18.2 0 0.0 6 1 12.5 4 26.6 8 1 12.5 4 33.3 8 0 0.0 8 5 33.3 0 0.0 6 31.5 ? ? 8 28.6 41 j 15.2 jj 79 j 8 I 10.1 /I SLOVAKIA 177 Append.ix II. The Leadership of the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) . (The office holders of the top Party positions in 1939-1969) A. ILLEGAL KSS. First Committee (March 1939-Aug. 1941): I;, Benada, J. Duris, J. Osoha. Second Committee (Sept. 1941- April 1942): 0. Krajnak, J . Osoha, V. Skrabala. Third Committee (June 1942- July 1942) : S. Dubcek, J. Lietavec, J. Osoha. Fourth Committee (July 1942- March 1943) : S. Bas t'ovansky, M. Hrusov- sky. Fifth Committee (Aug. 1943- Sept. 1944): G. Husak, L. Novomesky, K. Smidke. B. KSS IN POWER. M erger-Congress (Sept. 1944) President: K. Smidke. Vice-Presidents: G. Husak, J. Cech. Committee members : K. Bacilek, R. Balco, R. Blazovsky, F . cap, K. Dolinsky, D. Ertl, I. Frlicka, 0. Jelen, J. Lietavec, J . Mazur, L. Novomesky, J . Pull, J . Soltesz, M. Smida, J . Sziics, L. Viktorin. Nati onal Conference at Zilina (Aug. 1945) Presidium - President: V. Siroky. Vice-President: K. Smidke. Members : S. Bast'ovansky, J. :i'.>uris, L. Holdos, G. Husak, J . Soltesz, F . Zupka , M. Valachovic. Secretariat: K. Bacilek, S. Bast'ovansky, L. Holdos, E . FrR From Apr. 1946: K. Moskovic. IX Congress of the KSS (May 1950). Presidium - President: V. Siroky. First Secretary: S. Bast'ovansky. Members: K. Bacilek, I;. Benada, J. Branik, M. culen, J . :i'.>uris, M. Falt'an, K. Moskovic, J. Pull, S. Rais, E. Sykora, F . Zupka. Secretariat ( established in Oct. 1951) : V. Siroky, S. Bast'ovansky, J . Pull, K. Moskovic, M. Gosiorovsky. From Dec. 1951 also : P . David and I;. Benada. Xth Congress of the KSS (June 1953 ) . Presidium: K. Bacilek, I;. Benada, J . Branik, M. culen, P. David, M. Falt'an, J . Kriz, A. Michalicka, 0 . Pavlik, J . Pull, R. Strechaj , V. Siroky, F. Zupka. Secretariat: I;_ Benada, P . David, J . Kriz, A. Michalicka, J . Pull. ? Congress of the KSS (April 1955). Presidium: K. Bacilek, M. Bakula, I;. Benada, V. Daubner, P. David, 0. Jelen, P . Majling, R. Strechaj, J . Valo. Secretariat: K. Bacilek (First Secretary) , P . David, J . Kriz, A. Michalicka. 178 SLOVAKIA Extraordinary Con gress of the KSS (April 1957) . Presidium: K. Bacilek, ~- Benada, V. Daubner, P. David, M. Chudik, 0. Jelen , P. Majling, R. Strechaj, J . Valo. Xlth Congress of the KSS (May 1958). Presidium: K. Bacilek, ~- Benada, V. Daubner, P. David, M. Chudik, 0. Jelen , J . Kriz, P. Majling, J . Valo. Secretariat: K. Bacilek (First Secretary) , P. David, F . Dvorsky, J. Kriz, J . Lenart. Xllth Party Congress (Nov. 1962). Presidium: K. Bacilek, ~- Benada, V. Bil'ak, V. Daubner, P. David , M. Chudik, J . Lenart, M. Sabolcik. Secretariat: K. Bacilek (First Secretary till April 1963, when replaced by A. Dubcek) , V. Bil'ak, F . Dvorsky, J . Kriz, J. Lenart. Xlllth Congress of the KSS (May 1966). Presidium: F . Barbirek, V. Bil'ak, V. Daubner, A. Dubcek, H. :t'.lurkovic, M. Chudik, J . Janik, J. Lorine, M . Sabolcik. From Jan. 1968 also M. Hruskovic, R. Harencar, M. Pecho. Secretariat: A. Dubcek (First Secretary till Jan. 1968, when replaced by V. Bil'ak), J . Janik, M . Sabolcik, J. Zrak. XIVth Extraordinary Congress of the KSS (Aug. 1968). Presidium: G. Husak, K. Bod'a, S. Falt'an, R. Harencar, 0. Klokoc, s. Luptak, L . Novomesky, V. Pavlenda, s. Sadovsky, M. Sedlakova, A. 1'azky, J . Zrak. Secretariat: G. Husak (First Secretary), L. Abraham, B. Graca, V. Pavlenda, S. Sadovsky, J. Turcek, J. Zrak. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA as a Christian and democratic organization, is resolutely against the domination and exploitation of the Slovak nation by any other nation or political state; the Slovaks did not want to be ruled over by the Magyars and, today, do not want to be subservient to the Czech nation. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA is a CULTURAL and CIVIC organization of Americans of Slovak descent. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA wants to help Americans of Slovak descent in American political life, in business or professions, in social standing, and along educational lines.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Fifty Years of Communist Party of Slovakia (1918-1968) Description An account of the resource Francis Vnuk Slovakia, Vol. 19 (No. 42), 1969 pp. 125-178 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1969 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/79e6f7cc0cfc9f2755b01fc0f2f8c215.pdf e8d9971cc9195b43fa1ca9625bfe5654 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 3 F. Vnuk: Slovak Language and Literature A BRIEF SURVEY The Slovak language, one of the 13 Slavonic languages, belongs to the Western group of Slavonic languages. It developed from the old Slavonic language which in the 8th century was a common tongue for all Slavonic tribes. For this language the holy brothers Constantine ( d. 869) and M ethodius ( d. 885) devised a new alphabet ( the Glagolitic). They also translated the Bible and liturgical texts and thus laid the foundation of not only Slovak but all Slavonic literatures. In the 10th century the use of this language (known as Old Church Slavonic) in Slovakia came to an abrupt end and in the 11th century was completely replaced by Latin. The Slovak language, along with the German and Czech, was degraded to a secondary role and hence only very few written Slovak records survived, the oldest one being the "Spis Sermon" ("Spisskci. kdzeii, " circa 1480) . At the time of the Protestant Reformation the language spoken by the Slovaks had no written grammar and no established norms. Instead of making a laborious codification of their own language, the Slovak Protestants adopted as their literary language the Czech, which had been perfected and codified by John Hus (1369-1415) and was very close to the Slovak. The best known book in this language was the "Bible of Kralice" (1579-93) and thus the language came later to be known as 'biblictina'. The Catholics did not follow suit. They wrote in a language which bore many marks of the Czech but also unmistakeable Slovak characteristics. (S. Szollosi in " Cantus Catholici", 1655, writes 'u' instead of Czech 'ou', uses prefix 'naj-' instead of 'nej-', leaves out such Czech characters as 'f', etc.). This trend continued also in the 18th century, as can be seen in the works of Mdcsay, Gavlovic, Bajza and others. The first successful attempt to codify the Slovak �4 SLOVAKIA language was carried out by a Catholic priest, A. Bernol<ik 0762-1813). By his theoretical treatise ("De litteris Slavorum", " Orthographia," 1787) , grammar ("Grammatica Slavica", 1790) and dictionary (published posthumously 1825-7) Bernolak laid the foundations of a literary Slovak based on a western dialect ('bernolacina'). The Protestants viewed the step with open dislike and continued to use the Czech. But after Dobrovsky's reform of the Czech language in 1809 they found themselves -with their 'biblictina'-isolated. This led a young Protestant publicist, E. stur (1815-56), to devise in the mid-forties a new literary language, based on the central dialect and acceptable to both the Catholics and Protestants. stur explained his step in a theoretical work, "The Slovak Dialect and the Need to write in that Dialect" ("Narecja slovenskuo a potreba pisania v tomto n<ireci, " 1846) and gave the language its grammar ("N<iuka reci slovenskej", 1846) . In spite of some opposition the new language-known as 'sturovcina'-was accepted. Some modifications by M . M. Hodza ( Epigenes Slovenicus, 1847) and M. Hattala (Grammatica Linguae Slavonicae, 1850) who replaced stur's phonemiq system by an etymological one, gave the language its present form. SLOVAK LITERATURE Period of Old Church Slavonic. The old Slavonic inhabitants of Slovakia had their own songs, proverbs, myths, etc. Of these only fragments are left, since the old ancestors of present-day Slovaks did not have an alphabet of their own. In 863 the Byzantine missionaries Constantine-Cyril and Methodius arrived in Slovakia. They brought with them the translations of the Scriptures and liturgical and canonical texts. Their missionary activity led to the conversion of the Slav tribes of the Danube basin. Hand in hand with the spread of the Gospel went an extensive cultural and literary activity to which several religious legends and hagiographical texts bear eloquent witness ("Life of St. Constantine", "Life of St. Methodius", etc.) Period of Latin. After Methodius' death (885) King, Svatopluk (870-894) expelled Methodius' students and disciples from the Great Moravian kingdom. Then at the �SLOVAKIA 5 beginning of the 10th century Great Moravia fell with the onslaught of the Magyars and for the next 1000 years Slovakia became a part of Hungary. The Hungarian king Stephen (997-1038), following the pattern of medieval Western Europe, imposed Latin as a liturgical language and the administrative language of his kingdom. Books were written in Latin and were predominantly religious and didactic in content. Renaissance. Secular motives appeared more frequently in the Renaissance period which came to Hungary in the 15th and 16th centuries. Some writers of the period reached world fame: Johannes Sambucus of Trnava (15341584), Martin Rakovsky 0532-79), z. Rohoznik-Mosovsky 0542-87) the bishop of Nitra, etc. A university was opened at Bratislava (Academia Istropolitana) but it did not last long ( 1467-91). Reformation and Baroque. The Reformation of 1517 reached Slovakia through the German population of the Slovak towns. It came in the wake of a disastrous defeat of the Hungarians by the Turks at Mohacs (1526). The imminent Turkish peril was a source of many historical songs (most by authors unknown), e.g. " Siladi a Hadmazy" (1560). The Reformation had a profound effect on the development of Slovak literature. It was a period of prolific literary activity. The books were polemic or homiletic in character, but they were directed primarily to thei middle class. Thus they had to be written in the language of the people and the people had to be taught to read. Among the Protestant writers were many able composers of spiritual hymns and songs: J. Silvan (1493-1572) , J. Pruno-Frastacky (d. 1586), Elias Lani (1570-1618), J. Kalinka (1601-78). Many of their hymns found a way into the well-known and still used hymn-book of the Slovak Protestants-the " Tranoscius." The compiler and publisher of the book (originally called "Cithara Sanctorum", 1635 ) was Jirik Tranovsky (1592-1637) a native of Teschen (Silesia). At approximately the same time there appeared a hymnal "Cantus Catholici" ( 1655) edited by a Slovak Jezuit Benedikt Szollosi (1609-56). It contains 290 hymns of �6 SLOVAKIA which some 100 can be found both in the " Cantus" and in the "Tranoscius ." In the Latin introduction the author proudly recalled the old Slavonic and Cyrillo-Methodian tradition of Slovak Catholicism. Other Catholic authors published apologies (M. Thanuissy's "First Catholic Handbook", 1691), prayer books ( J. Abraham/fy 's " H olocaustum quotidianum', 1695), didactic works ( B . Smrtnik's " Ars bene moriendi", 1697) , polemic writings ( $. Dubnicsay's " Eductus coluber tortu osus", 1723 ), etc. Of unusual interest-both linguistically and thematically- are the writings of the Franciscan friar H. Gavlovic, especially his " Valasskd skola"("The mountainshepherds' school, the storehouse of virtues", 1755). Other Protestant writers who excelled were: $ . Pilldrik 0615-93) the author of spiritual songs and of an interesting autobiography in verse " Sors Pilarikiana", (1666), D . Sina p i us-Horcicka (1640-88 ), T . Masnik (1 640-97 ), D . Krman (1663-1740 ), etc . Drama also made its entry during the Reformation. Foreign plays were gradually supplemented by those of native authors such as P. Kyrmezer (d. 1589 ), J. TesdkMosovsk'J} (1545-1617 ) , E . Ladiver (1633-86). Scientific works emanated mainly from Trnava, where in 1635 Peter Cardinal Pazmdny (1570-1637) founded a university. One of its professors, the Jesuit M . Szentivdnyi (1633-1705 ), published a comprehensive six-volume encyclopedia ("Curiosiora et selectiora variarum scientarium miscelanea", 1686-1702 ). I . Caban, lecturer at the Protestant lyceum at Presov, was the author of " Existentia atomorum'' (1667 ). Historico-geographical works were written by S . Timon (1675-1736) and especially by M. Bel (1684-1749) . M. Rotarides is known as a literary historian. An 'Apologia' ( 1728 ) directed against the slanderers of the Slovak past was written by J. B. Magin (1682-1735), a Catholic priest. Enlightenment . The Toleration Edict of 1781 officially terminated the religious strifes and polemics of the past 150 years. Instead there appeared nationality and national sentiment as the new keynotes of the literary activity. J . Sklenar (1745-91) and J . Papdnek (1738-1802 ) wrote popular histories of Great Moravia. Learned societies were founded of which 'Tovarisstvo' ( Slovak Learned Society, �SLOVAKIA 7 founded 1792) was the largest ( 452 members, some 350 of them Catholic clergymen). The first Slovak novel "Adventures and Experiences of a young man Rene" ("Rene mladenca prihody a skusenosti", 1783) was published by J. I. Bajza (1755-1836). Bernolak's codification of literary Slovak proved to have a very beneficial effect on the national and literary revival. Around Bernolak grouped about 100 writers, the most prominent among them J. Holly (1785-1849), creator of the national epio ("Sviitopluk", 1833, "Slav", 1839) and a capable translator of the classical poets. Canon J. Palkovic (1763-1835) translated the Bible (1829-33). J. Fandly (17501811) wrote practical books for the instruction and education of the people. Apart from the Bernolak group, and even against it, stood the Protestant writers: B. Tablic (1769-1832) translator from the English. A. Dolezal (1737-1802) author of a "holy novel" ("The Fall of the First Parents Described in Verse ", 1791), Jifi Palkovic (1769-1850), J. Ribay 07541812). Romanticism. The new focus of Slovak literary life concentrated round the chair of Slovak language and literature at the Bratislava Lyceum. Its spiritus mavens was E. stur (1815-56) who after his return from Germany was accepted as a leader of the Slovak youth studying at Bratislava. Influenced by Herder, Hegel and German romanticism stur's followers became zealous admirers ( and collectors) of folklore and modelled their poetry on simple folk songs. Their achievements were remarkable, particularly the poetry of J. Kral' ( 1822-76), J. Botto (1829-81) and S. Chalupka (1812-83). The most outstanding success of the new literary Slovak was "Marina" (1846) a masterpiece of intimate lyricism by A. Sladkovic(1820-72) . The best prose writer of the group was J. Kalinciak (1822-71). Dramatic works were composed mainly by J . Chalupka (1791-1871), J. Zaborsky (1812-76) and J. Paldrik (1822-70). Among the opponents of the stur circle, the protagonists of the Panslavist movement, J. Kollar (1793-1852) and P. J. Safarik (1795-1861), deserve mentioning. Realism. Th~ 60's and 70's are often called "the years �8 SLOVAKIA of Slovak hopes and disappointments." Liberal currents in the Habsburg Empire created favourable conditions for the rapid growth of literary and cultural life. Several literary annuals and periodicals started their publication and in 1863 a national cultural organization "Matica Slovenskd', was founded. The cultural awakening moved hand in hand with the political one. This movement was frowned upon by the Magyar state authorities who countered it with the idea of a unitary Hungarian nation. In 1875 the Matica was closed. Yet in this oppressive atmosphere Slovak literature reached its classical age. Slovak poetry was brought to its zenith in the perfect verse of P. 0. Hviezdoslav (1849-1921) who successfully exploited all the beauty and flexibility of the language in delightful lyrical poems, ballads, epics. S. H. Vajansky (1847-1916), besides being a distinguished poet, novelist and literary critic, was also an acknowledged national leader. The third star of this bright constellation was M. Kukucin (1860-1928), who spent half of his life in voluntary exile. In spite of his long separation from his native land he created masterly short stories and novels. Other significant writers of the period included: J. G. Tajovsky (1874-1940), J. cajak (1863-1943), Jege (18661938), and G. M. Petrovsky (1862-1916) who lived in the USA. Several women-writers made their debut also. E . M. Soltesov<i (1855-1939), T . Vansov<i (1857-1941, Timrava (1867-1951) and a fine poetess E. Podjavorinskd (1872-1951) . While the older literary generation looked mainly toward Russia for artistic guidance and political salvation, there arose in Slovakia at the beginning of the 20th century a new literary schools the 'Moderna'. Centred around the literary magazine " Prudy" ("The Currents, " 1909-14), they were looking for their inspiration more in the West than in the East and opposed the passive political attitude of their Russophile fathers . The most prominent representative of the school was I. Kraska (1876-1958) , author of two slender books of poems ("Nox et solitudo," 1909, " Verses," 1912) which were destined to have a lasting influence on the further development of Slovak lyrical poetry. Other modernists were: J. Jesensky (1874-1945), V. Roy (1885-1935), M. Rdzus (1888-1937). Interwar Years (1918-45). The post-war years witness- �SLOVAKIA 9 ed an unprecedented activity in the literary field. The poet and critic s. Krcmery (1892-1955)' dubbed the period "the years of the untying tongues". The young poets of the pre-war era reached their maturity. Their ranks were soon joined by new arrivals such as J. Smrek (b. 1892), E. B. Lukac <b. 1900), v. Beniak (b. 1894), s. Krcmery (1892-1935) to mention the best known. There emerged also some talented prose writers: T. J. Gaspar (b . 1893 ), J. C. Bronsky (1896-1960), G. Vamos (1901-46) and especially M. Urban (b. 1904) the creator of "ziv'J} bic" ('The living whip', 1927) the most successful Slovak novel so far. The writers were grouped around several literary reviews. The Catholic writers around "Vatra" ("The Bonfire", 1919-25) included M. Urban, K . Sidor (1902-56), A. zarnov (b . 1903), J. Nizn<insky (b. 1903), A. N. Borin (b. 1903). Out of this group later grew a second generation of co-called "Catholic modernists": P. G. Hlbina (b. 1908), R. Dilong (b. 1905), J. Silan (b. 1918), K. Strmen (b. 1921) , J . Haranta (b. 1909), S. Veigl (b. 1915) and others. In the second group around "Mlade Slovensko" ("The Young Slovakia». 1919-29) we find E. B. Lukac, M. Halamova (b. 1908), I. Horvath 0904-59), G. Vamos. The left-oriented writers gathered around " Dav" ("The Mob", 1924-37) and included J . Ponican (b. 1902), L. Novomesk'J} (b. 1904) , F. Kral' (1903-55). Slovak surrealists made their appearance rather belatedly, in the late 1920's. They included: s. zary (b . 1918, V. Reisel (b. 1915), J. Brezina (b. 1917). The leading playwrights of the period were: F. Urbanek (1859-1934), V. Hurban (1884-?), I. Stodola (b. 1888) , J. Bare-Ivan (1909-1955). Literary criticism and literary history found their exponents in A. Mraz (1904-1964), P. Bujn<ik (1882-1932),L. Hanus (b. 1907), J. Ambrus (b.1914), Post-1945 Development. In 1945, and particularly after 1948, Slovak literature was dealt a heavy blow from which it still has not recovered. Many prominent writers sought freedom in escape to the West (Hronsky, Dilong, zarnov, Urban, Gaspar; the last two were later forcibly repatriated), others were gradually silenced (Beniak, Lukac, Graf, the Catholic modernists). The surrealists farcically "dissolved" their group and offered their services to the Communists. Under the guidance of the commissars the rule of "socialist realism" was proclaimed and in the process �10 SLOVAKIA even the erstwhile Communist writers were purged (Novomesky, Horvath, Oka.Ii). Many gifted writers degenerated into versifiers parroting party-slogans in rhymes: J. Kostra (b. 1910) wrote a long rhapsodic poem "On Stalin" (1949), J. Brezina entitled his book of poems "The Song of Love the New China" (1950), etc. The officially-approved "socialist realism" precisely prescribed and strictly enforced the theme, style and content of all work. As a result of this imposition all literary output of the 1950-60 period is uniformly marked with mediocrity and dullness in which all the artistic individuality of a writer is debased or completely lost. The writers made several attempts to shake off the Party's guidance and solicitude over their creative activity: in 1956, in 1962 and again in 1967-8; but each time with little success. As demonstrated by the recent Soviet invasion of Czecho-Slovakia (Aug. 1968 ) the Party views artistic liberty as an inadmissible challenge to its power monopoly. From among the writers labouring under these depressing and degrading circumstances one could single out the following: D. Tatarka (b. 1912), M. Figuli (b. 1910), A. Bednar (b . 1914), P. Karvas (b. 1920), V . Mihalik (b . 1926), M. Rufus (b . 1928), J. Blazkovci (b . 1929), A. Hykisch (b. 1930), J. Johanides (b. 1934). Literary critics and historians of some originality include A. Matuska (b. 1910), J. Felix (b. 1913), M. Pisut (b. 1908), M . Hamada and P. Stevcek (b . 1932) . Slovak Exile Literature. Since 1945 Slovak literature had a sizeable group of exile writers who left their enslaved country in 1945 and after. They continue to publish even under increasingly difficult conditions of emigre life. Poetry is well represented by such fine artists as K. Strmeii, R. Dilong, M. Sprinc (b. 1914), G. Zvonicky (b. 1913), M. Ziar (b, 1914), J. Okcil' (b. 1915), E. Vesnin (b. 1913) . Dramatic writing is being pursued by J. Dorcinsky (b . 1911), J. Zvoncir-Tieii (b. 1919). Noteworthy prose works have been written by M. K. Mlynarovic (b. 1887), J. C. Bronsky, P. Hrtus-Jurina (b. 1919), Draga Divinska (b. 1922). In the field of literary history and criticism one meets the names of J.E. Bor (b. 1907), S. Meciar (b. 1910), J. Rekem (b. 1917), J.M. Kirschbaum (b. 1913), J. Mest'ancik (b. 1908), F . Vnuk (b. 1926). � SLOVAKIA 3 F. Vnuk: Slovak Language and Literature A BRIEF SURVEY The Slovak language, one of the 13 Slavonic languages, belongs to the Western group of Slavonic languages. It developed from the old Slavonic language which in the 8th century was a common tongue for all Slavonic tribes. For this language the holy brothers Constantine ( d. 869) and M ethodius ( d. 885) devised a new alphabet ( the Glagolitic). They also translated the Bible and liturgical texts and thus laid the foundation of not only Slovak but all Slavonic literatures. In the 10th century the use of this language (known as Old Church Slavonic) in Slovakia came to an abrupt end and in the 11th century was completely replaced by Latin. The Slovak language, along with the German and Czech, was degraded to a secondary role and hence only very few written Slovak records survived, the oldest one being the "Spis Sermon" ("Spisskci. kdzeii, " circa 1480) . At the time of the Protestant Reformation the language spoken by the Slovaks had no written grammar and no established norms. Instead of making a laborious codification of their own language, the Slovak Protestants adopted as their literary language the Czech, which had been perfected and codified by John Hus (1369-1415) and was very close to the Slovak. The best known book in this language was the "Bible of Kralice" (1579-93) and thus the language came later to be known as 'biblictina'. The Catholics did not follow suit. They wrote in a language which bore many marks of the Czech but also unmistakeable Slovak characteristics. (S. Szollosi in " Cantus Catholici", 1655, writes 'u' instead of Czech 'ou', uses prefix 'naj-' instead of 'nej-', leaves out such Czech characters as 'f', etc.). This trend continued also in the 18th century, as can be seen in the works of Mdcsay, Gavlovic, Bajza and others. The first successful attempt to codify the Slovak �4 SLOVAKIA language was carried out by a Catholic priest, A. Bernol<ik 0762-1813). By his theoretical treatise ("De litteris Slavorum", " Orthographia," 1787) , grammar ("Grammatica Slavica", 1790) and dictionary (published posthumously 1825-7) Bernolak laid the foundations of a literary Slovak based on a western dialect ('bernolacina'). The Protestants viewed the step with open dislike and continued to use the Czech. But after Dobrovsky's reform of the Czech language in 1809 they found themselves -with their 'biblictina'-isolated. This led a young Protestant publicist, E. stur (1815-56), to devise in the mid-forties a new literary language, based on the central dialect and acceptable to both the Catholics and Protestants. stur explained his step in a theoretical work, "The Slovak Dialect and the Need to write in that Dialect" ("Narecja slovenskuo a potreba pisania v tomto n<ireci, " 1846) and gave the language its grammar ("N<iuka reci slovenskej", 1846) . In spite of some opposition the new language-known as 'sturovcina'-was accepted. Some modifications by M . M. Hodza ( Epigenes Slovenicus, 1847) and M. Hattala (Grammatica Linguae Slavonicae, 1850) who replaced stur's phonemiq system by an etymological one, gave the language its present form. SLOVAK LITERATURE Period of Old Church Slavonic. The old Slavonic inhabitants of Slovakia had their own songs, proverbs, myths, etc. Of these only fragments are left, since the old ancestors of present-day Slovaks did not have an alphabet of their own. In 863 the Byzantine missionaries Constantine-Cyril and Methodius arrived in Slovakia. They brought with them the translations of the Scriptures and liturgical and canonical texts. Their missionary activity led to the conversion of the Slav tribes of the Danube basin. Hand in hand with the spread of the Gospel went an extensive cultural and literary activity to which several religious legends and hagiographical texts bear eloquent witness ("Life of St. Constantine", "Life of St. Methodius", etc.) Period of Latin. After Methodius' death (885) King, Svatopluk (870-894) expelled Methodius' students and disciples from the Great Moravian kingdom. Then at the �SLOVAKIA 5 beginning of the 10th century Great Moravia fell with the onslaught of the Magyars and for the next 1000 years Slovakia became a part of Hungary. The Hungarian king Stephen (997-1038), following the pattern of medieval Western Europe, imposed Latin as a liturgical language and the administrative language of his kingdom. Books were written in Latin and were predominantly religious and didactic in content. Renaissance. Secular motives appeared more frequently in the Renaissance period which came to Hungary in the 15th and 16th centuries. Some writers of the period reached world fame: Johannes Sambucus of Trnava (15341584), Martin Rakovsky 0532-79), z. Rohoznik-Mosovsky 0542-87) the bishop of Nitra, etc. A university was opened at Bratislava (Academia Istropolitana) but it did not last long ( 1467-91). Reformation and Baroque. The Reformation of 1517 reached Slovakia through the German population of the Slovak towns. It came in the wake of a disastrous defeat of the Hungarians by the Turks at Mohacs (1526). The imminent Turkish peril was a source of many historical songs (most by authors unknown), e.g. " Siladi a Hadmazy" (1560). The Reformation had a profound effect on the development of Slovak literature. It was a period of prolific literary activity. The books were polemic or homiletic in character, but they were directed primarily to thei middle class. Thus they had to be written in the language of the people and the people had to be taught to read. Among the Protestant writers were many able composers of spiritual hymns and songs: J. Silvan (1493-1572) , J. Pruno-Frastacky (d. 1586), Elias Lani (1570-1618), J. Kalinka (1601-78). Many of their hymns found a way into the well-known and still used hymn-book of the Slovak Protestants-the " Tranoscius." The compiler and publisher of the book (originally called "Cithara Sanctorum", 1635 ) was Jirik Tranovsky (1592-1637) a native of Teschen (Silesia). At approximately the same time there appeared a hymnal "Cantus Catholici" ( 1655) edited by a Slovak Jezuit Benedikt Szollosi (1609-56). It contains 290 hymns of �6 SLOVAKIA which some 100 can be found both in the " Cantus" and in the "Tranoscius ." In the Latin introduction the author proudly recalled the old Slavonic and Cyrillo-Methodian tradition of Slovak Catholicism. Other Catholic authors published apologies (M. Thanuissy's "First Catholic Handbook", 1691), prayer books ( J. Abraham/fy 's " H olocaustum quotidianum', 1695), didactic works ( B . Smrtnik's " Ars bene moriendi", 1697) , polemic writings ( $. Dubnicsay's " Eductus coluber tortu osus", 1723 ), etc. Of unusual interest-both linguistically and thematically- are the writings of the Franciscan friar H. Gavlovic, especially his " Valasskd skola"("The mountainshepherds' school, the storehouse of virtues", 1755). Other Protestant writers who excelled were: $ . Pilldrik 0615-93) the author of spiritual songs and of an interesting autobiography in verse " Sors Pilarikiana", (1666), D . Sina p i us-Horcicka (1640-88 ), T . Masnik (1 640-97 ), D . Krman (1663-1740 ), etc . Drama also made its entry during the Reformation. Foreign plays were gradually supplemented by those of native authors such as P. Kyrmezer (d. 1589 ), J. TesdkMosovsk'J} (1545-1617 ) , E . Ladiver (1633-86). Scientific works emanated mainly from Trnava, where in 1635 Peter Cardinal Pazmdny (1570-1637) founded a university. One of its professors, the Jesuit M . Szentivdnyi (1633-1705 ), published a comprehensive six-volume encyclopedia ("Curiosiora et selectiora variarum scientarium miscelanea", 1686-1702 ). I . Caban, lecturer at the Protestant lyceum at Presov, was the author of " Existentia atomorum'' (1667 ). Historico-geographical works were written by S . Timon (1675-1736) and especially by M. Bel (1684-1749) . M. Rotarides is known as a literary historian. An 'Apologia' ( 1728 ) directed against the slanderers of the Slovak past was written by J. B. Magin (1682-1735), a Catholic priest. Enlightenment . The Toleration Edict of 1781 officially terminated the religious strifes and polemics of the past 150 years. Instead there appeared nationality and national sentiment as the new keynotes of the literary activity. J . Sklenar (1745-91) and J . Papdnek (1738-1802 ) wrote popular histories of Great Moravia. Learned societies were founded of which 'Tovarisstvo' ( Slovak Learned Society, �SLOVAKIA 7 founded 1792) was the largest ( 452 members, some 350 of them Catholic clergymen). The first Slovak novel "Adventures and Experiences of a young man Rene" ("Rene mladenca prihody a skusenosti", 1783) was published by J. I. Bajza (1755-1836). Bernolak's codification of literary Slovak proved to have a very beneficial effect on the national and literary revival. Around Bernolak grouped about 100 writers, the most prominent among them J. Holly (1785-1849), creator of the national epio ("Sviitopluk", 1833, "Slav", 1839) and a capable translator of the classical poets. Canon J. Palkovic (1763-1835) translated the Bible (1829-33). J. Fandly (17501811) wrote practical books for the instruction and education of the people. Apart from the Bernolak group, and even against it, stood the Protestant writers: B. Tablic (1769-1832) translator from the English. A. Dolezal (1737-1802) author of a "holy novel" ("The Fall of the First Parents Described in Verse ", 1791), Jifi Palkovic (1769-1850), J. Ribay 07541812). Romanticism. The new focus of Slovak literary life concentrated round the chair of Slovak language and literature at the Bratislava Lyceum. Its spiritus mavens was E. stur (1815-56) who after his return from Germany was accepted as a leader of the Slovak youth studying at Bratislava. Influenced by Herder, Hegel and German romanticism stur's followers became zealous admirers ( and collectors) of folklore and modelled their poetry on simple folk songs. Their achievements were remarkable, particularly the poetry of J. Kral' ( 1822-76), J. Botto (1829-81) and S. Chalupka (1812-83). The most outstanding success of the new literary Slovak was "Marina" (1846) a masterpiece of intimate lyricism by A. Sladkovic(1820-72) . The best prose writer of the group was J. Kalinciak (1822-71). Dramatic works were composed mainly by J . Chalupka (1791-1871), J. Zaborsky (1812-76) and J. Paldrik (1822-70). Among the opponents of the stur circle, the protagonists of the Panslavist movement, J. Kollar (1793-1852) and P. J. Safarik (1795-1861), deserve mentioning. Realism. Th~ 60's and 70's are often called "the years �8 SLOVAKIA of Slovak hopes and disappointments." Liberal currents in the Habsburg Empire created favourable conditions for the rapid growth of literary and cultural life. Several literary annuals and periodicals started their publication and in 1863 a national cultural organization "Matica Slovenskd', was founded. The cultural awakening moved hand in hand with the political one. This movement was frowned upon by the Magyar state authorities who countered it with the idea of a unitary Hungarian nation. In 1875 the Matica was closed. Yet in this oppressive atmosphere Slovak literature reached its classical age. Slovak poetry was brought to its zenith in the perfect verse of P. 0. Hviezdoslav (1849-1921) who successfully exploited all the beauty and flexibility of the language in delightful lyrical poems, ballads, epics. S. H. Vajansky (1847-1916), besides being a distinguished poet, novelist and literary critic, was also an acknowledged national leader. The third star of this bright constellation was M. Kukucin (1860-1928), who spent half of his life in voluntary exile. In spite of his long separation from his native land he created masterly short stories and novels. Other significant writers of the period included: J. G. Tajovsky (1874-1940), J. cajak (1863-1943), Jege (18661938), and G. M. Petrovsky (1862-1916) who lived in the USA. Several women-writers made their debut also. E . M. Soltesov<i (1855-1939), T . Vansov<i (1857-1941, Timrava (1867-1951) and a fine poetess E. Podjavorinskd (1872-1951) . While the older literary generation looked mainly toward Russia for artistic guidance and political salvation, there arose in Slovakia at the beginning of the 20th century a new literary schools the 'Moderna'. Centred around the literary magazine " Prudy" ("The Currents, " 1909-14), they were looking for their inspiration more in the West than in the East and opposed the passive political attitude of their Russophile fathers . The most prominent representative of the school was I. Kraska (1876-1958) , author of two slender books of poems ("Nox et solitudo," 1909, " Verses," 1912) which were destined to have a lasting influence on the further development of Slovak lyrical poetry. Other modernists were: J. Jesensky (1874-1945), V. Roy (1885-1935), M. Rdzus (1888-1937). Interwar Years (1918-45). The post-war years witness- �SLOVAKIA 9 ed an unprecedented activity in the literary field. The poet and critic s. Krcmery (1892-1955)' dubbed the period "the years of the untying tongues". The young poets of the pre-war era reached their maturity. Their ranks were soon joined by new arrivals such as J. Smrek (b. 1892), E. B. Lukac <b. 1900), v. Beniak (b. 1894), s. Krcmery (1892-1935) to mention the best known. There emerged also some talented prose writers: T. J. Gaspar (b . 1893 ), J. C. Bronsky (1896-1960), G. Vamos (1901-46) and especially M. Urban (b. 1904) the creator of "ziv'J} bic" ('The living whip', 1927) the most successful Slovak novel so far. The writers were grouped around several literary reviews. The Catholic writers around "Vatra" ("The Bonfire", 1919-25) included M. Urban, K . Sidor (1902-56), A. zarnov (b . 1903), J. Nizn<insky (b. 1903), A. N. Borin (b. 1903). Out of this group later grew a second generation of co-called "Catholic modernists": P. G. Hlbina (b. 1908), R. Dilong (b. 1905), J. Silan (b. 1918), K. Strmen (b. 1921) , J . Haranta (b. 1909), S. Veigl (b. 1915) and others. In the second group around "Mlade Slovensko" ("The Young Slovakia». 1919-29) we find E. B. Lukac, M. Halamova (b. 1908), I. Horvath 0904-59), G. Vamos. The left-oriented writers gathered around " Dav" ("The Mob", 1924-37) and included J . Ponican (b. 1902), L. Novomesk'J} (b. 1904) , F. Kral' (1903-55). Slovak surrealists made their appearance rather belatedly, in the late 1920's. They included: s. zary (b . 1918, V. Reisel (b. 1915), J. Brezina (b. 1917). The leading playwrights of the period were: F. Urbanek (1859-1934), V. Hurban (1884-?), I. Stodola (b. 1888) , J. Bare-Ivan (1909-1955). Literary criticism and literary history found their exponents in A. Mraz (1904-1964), P. Bujn<ik (1882-1932),L. Hanus (b. 1907), J. Ambrus (b.1914), Post-1945 Development. In 1945, and particularly after 1948, Slovak literature was dealt a heavy blow from which it still has not recovered. Many prominent writers sought freedom in escape to the West (Hronsky, Dilong, zarnov, Urban, Gaspar; the last two were later forcibly repatriated), others were gradually silenced (Beniak, Lukac, Graf, the Catholic modernists). The surrealists farcically "dissolved" their group and offered their services to the Communists. Under the guidance of the commissars the rule of "socialist realism" was proclaimed and in the process �10 SLOVAKIA even the erstwhile Communist writers were purged (Novomesky, Horvath, Oka.Ii). Many gifted writers degenerated into versifiers parroting party-slogans in rhymes: J. Kostra (b. 1910) wrote a long rhapsodic poem "On Stalin" (1949), J. Brezina entitled his book of poems "The Song of Love the New China" (1950), etc. The officially-approved "socialist realism" precisely prescribed and strictly enforced the theme, style and content of all work. As a result of this imposition all literary output of the 1950-60 period is uniformly marked with mediocrity and dullness in which all the artistic individuality of a writer is debased or completely lost. The writers made several attempts to shake off the Party's guidance and solicitude over their creative activity: in 1956, in 1962 and again in 1967-8; but each time with little success. As demonstrated by the recent Soviet invasion of Czecho-Slovakia (Aug. 1968 ) the Party views artistic liberty as an inadmissible challenge to its power monopoly. From among the writers labouring under these depressing and degrading circumstances one could single out the following: D. Tatarka (b. 1912), M. Figuli (b. 1910), A. Bednar (b . 1914), P. Karvas (b. 1920), V . Mihalik (b . 1926), M. Rufus (b . 1928), J. Blazkovci (b . 1929), A. Hykisch (b. 1930), J. Johanides (b. 1934). Literary critics and historians of some originality include A. Matuska (b. 1910), J. Felix (b. 1913), M. Pisut (b. 1908), M . Hamada and P. Stevcek (b . 1932) . Slovak Exile Literature. Since 1945 Slovak literature had a sizeable group of exile writers who left their enslaved country in 1945 and after. They continue to publish even under increasingly difficult conditions of emigre life. Poetry is well represented by such fine artists as K. Strmeii, R. Dilong, M. Sprinc (b. 1914), G. Zvonicky (b. 1913), M. Ziar (b, 1914), J. Okcil' (b. 1915), E. Vesnin (b. 1913) . Dramatic writing is being pursued by J. Dorcinsky (b . 1911), J. Zvoncir-Tieii (b. 1919). Noteworthy prose works have been written by M. K. Mlynarovic (b. 1887), J. C. Bronsky, P. Hrtus-Jurina (b. 1919), Draga Divinska (b. 1922). In the field of literary history and criticism one meets the names of J.E. Bor (b. 1907), S. Meciar (b. 1910), J. Rekem (b. 1917), J.M. Kirschbaum (b. 1913), J. Mest'ancik (b. 1908), F . Vnuk (b. 1926). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1970, Vol. 20 Description An account of the resource Vol. 20 (No. 43), 1970. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1970 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 3 F. Vnuk: Slovak Language and Literature A BRIEF SURVEY The Slovak language, one of the 13 Slavonic languages, belongs to the Western group of Slavonic languages. It developed from the old Slavonic language which in the 8th century was a common tongue for all Slavonic tribes. For this language the holy brothers Constantine ( d. 869) and M ethodius ( d. 885) devised a new alphabet ( the Glagolitic). They also translated the Bible and liturgical texts and thus laid the foundation of not only Slovak but all Slavonic literatures. In the 10th century the use of this language (known as Old Church Slavonic) in Slovakia came to an abrupt end and in the 11th century was completely replaced by Latin. The Slovak language, along with the German and Czech, was degraded to a secondary role and hence only very few written Slovak records survived, the oldest one being the "Spis Sermon" ("Spisskci. kdzeii, " circa 1480) . At the time of the Protestant Reformation the language spoken by the Slovaks had no written grammar and no established norms. Instead of making a laborious codification of their own language, the Slovak Protestants adopted as their literary language the Czech, which had been perfected and codified by John Hus (1369-1415) and was very close to the Slovak. The best known book in this language was the "Bible of Kralice" (1579-93) and thus the language came later to be known as 'biblictina'. The Catholics did not follow suit. They wrote in a language which bore many marks of the Czech but also unmistakeable Slovak characteristics. (S. Szollosi in " Cantus Catholici", 1655, writes 'u' instead of Czech 'ou', uses prefix 'naj-' instead of 'nej-', leaves out such Czech characters as 'f', etc.). This trend continued also in the 18th century, as can be seen in the works of Mdcsay, Gavlovic, Bajza and others. The first successful attempt to codify the Slovak 4 SLOVAKIA language was carried out by a Catholic priest, A. Bernol<ik 0762-1813). By his theoretical treatise ("De litteris Slavorum", " Orthographia," 1787) , grammar ("Grammatica Slavica", 1790) and dictionary (published posthumously 1825-7) Bernolak laid the foundations of a literary Slovak based on a western dialect ('bernolacina'). The Protestants viewed the step with open dislike and continued to use the Czech. But after Dobrovsky's reform of the Czech language in 1809 they found themselves -with their 'biblictina'-isolated. This led a young Protestant publicist, E. stur (1815-56), to devise in the mid-forties a new literary language, based on the central dialect and acceptable to both the Catholics and Protestants. stur explained his step in a theoretical work, "The Slovak Dialect and the Need to write in that Dialect" ("Narecja slovenskuo a potreba pisania v tomto n<ireci, " 1846) and gave the language its grammar ("N<iuka reci slovenskej", 1846) . In spite of some opposition the new language-known as 'sturovcina'-was accepted. Some modifications by M . M. Hodza ( Epigenes Slovenicus, 1847) and M. Hattala (Grammatica Linguae Slavonicae, 1850) who replaced stur's phonemiq system by an etymological one, gave the language its present form. SLOVAK LITERATURE Period of Old Church Slavonic. The old Slavonic inhabitants of Slovakia had their own songs, proverbs, myths, etc. Of these only fragments are left, since the old ancestors of present-day Slovaks did not have an alphabet of their own. In 863 the Byzantine missionaries Constantine-Cyril and Methodius arrived in Slovakia. They brought with them the translations of the Scriptures and liturgical and canonical texts. Their missionary activity led to the conversion of the Slav tribes of the Danube basin. Hand in hand with the spread of the Gospel went an extensive cultural and literary activity to which several religious legends and hagiographical texts bear eloquent witness ("Life of St. Constantine", "Life of St. Methodius", etc.) Period of Latin. After Methodius' death (885) King, Svatopluk (870-894) expelled Methodius' students and disciples from the Great Moravian kingdom. Then at the SLOVAKIA 5 beginning of the 10th century Great Moravia fell with the onslaught of the Magyars and for the next 1000 years Slovakia became a part of Hungary. The Hungarian king Stephen (997-1038), following the pattern of medieval Western Europe, imposed Latin as a liturgical language and the administrative language of his kingdom. Books were written in Latin and were predominantly religious and didactic in content. Renaissance. Secular motives appeared more frequently in the Renaissance period which came to Hungary in the 15th and 16th centuries. Some writers of the period reached world fame: Johannes Sambucus of Trnava (15341584), Martin Rakovsky 0532-79), z. Rohoznik-Mosovsky 0542-87) the bishop of Nitra, etc. A university was opened at Bratislava (Academia Istropolitana) but it did not last long ( 1467-91). Reformation and Baroque. The Reformation of 1517 reached Slovakia through the German population of the Slovak towns. It came in the wake of a disastrous defeat of the Hungarians by the Turks at Mohacs (1526). The imminent Turkish peril was a source of many historical songs (most by authors unknown), e.g. " Siladi a Hadmazy" (1560). The Reformation had a profound effect on the development of Slovak literature. It was a period of prolific literary activity. The books were polemic or homiletic in character, but they were directed primarily to thei middle class. Thus they had to be written in the language of the people and the people had to be taught to read. Among the Protestant writers were many able composers of spiritual hymns and songs: J. Silvan (1493-1572) , J. Pruno-Frastacky (d. 1586), Elias Lani (1570-1618), J. Kalinka (1601-78). Many of their hymns found a way into the well-known and still used hymn-book of the Slovak Protestants-the " Tranoscius." The compiler and publisher of the book (originally called "Cithara Sanctorum", 1635 ) was Jirik Tranovsky (1592-1637) a native of Teschen (Silesia). At approximately the same time there appeared a hymnal "Cantus Catholici" ( 1655) edited by a Slovak Jezuit Benedikt Szollosi (1609-56). It contains 290 hymns of 6 SLOVAKIA which some 100 can be found both in the " Cantus" and in the "Tranoscius ." In the Latin introduction the author proudly recalled the old Slavonic and Cyrillo-Methodian tradition of Slovak Catholicism. Other Catholic authors published apologies (M. Thanuissy's "First Catholic Handbook", 1691), prayer books ( J. Abraham/fy 's " H olocaustum quotidianum', 1695), didactic works ( B . Smrtnik's " Ars bene moriendi", 1697) , polemic writings ( $. Dubnicsay's " Eductus coluber tortu osus", 1723 ), etc. Of unusual interest-both linguistically and thematically- are the writings of the Franciscan friar H. Gavlovic, especially his " Valasskd skola"("The mountainshepherds' school, the storehouse of virtues", 1755). Other Protestant writers who excelled were: $ . Pilldrik 0615-93) the author of spiritual songs and of an interesting autobiography in verse " Sors Pilarikiana", (1666), D . Sina p i us-Horcicka (1640-88 ), T . Masnik (1 640-97 ), D . Krman (1663-1740 ), etc . Drama also made its entry during the Reformation. Foreign plays were gradually supplemented by those of native authors such as P. Kyrmezer (d. 1589 ), J. TesdkMosovsk'J} (1545-1617 ) , E . Ladiver (1633-86). Scientific works emanated mainly from Trnava, where in 1635 Peter Cardinal Pazmdny (1570-1637) founded a university. One of its professors, the Jesuit M . Szentivdnyi (1633-1705 ), published a comprehensive six-volume encyclopedia ("Curiosiora et selectiora variarum scientarium miscelanea", 1686-1702 ). I . Caban, lecturer at the Protestant lyceum at Presov, was the author of " Existentia atomorum'' (1667 ). Historico-geographical works were written by S . Timon (1675-1736) and especially by M. Bel (1684-1749) . M. Rotarides is known as a literary historian. An 'Apologia' ( 1728 ) directed against the slanderers of the Slovak past was written by J. B. Magin (1682-1735), a Catholic priest. Enlightenment . The Toleration Edict of 1781 officially terminated the religious strifes and polemics of the past 150 years. Instead there appeared nationality and national sentiment as the new keynotes of the literary activity. J . Sklenar (1745-91) and J . Papdnek (1738-1802 ) wrote popular histories of Great Moravia. Learned societies were founded of which 'Tovarisstvo' ( Slovak Learned Society, SLOVAKIA 7 founded 1792) was the largest ( 452 members, some 350 of them Catholic clergymen). The first Slovak novel "Adventures and Experiences of a young man Rene" ("Rene mladenca prihody a skusenosti", 1783) was published by J. I. Bajza (1755-1836). Bernolak's codification of literary Slovak proved to have a very beneficial effect on the national and literary revival. Around Bernolak grouped about 100 writers, the most prominent among them J. Holly (1785-1849), creator of the national epio ("Sviitopluk", 1833, "Slav", 1839) and a capable translator of the classical poets. Canon J. Palkovic (1763-1835) translated the Bible (1829-33). J. Fandly (17501811) wrote practical books for the instruction and education of the people. Apart from the Bernolak group, and even against it, stood the Protestant writers: B. Tablic (1769-1832) translator from the English. A. Dolezal (1737-1802) author of a "holy novel" ("The Fall of the First Parents Described in Verse ", 1791), Jifi Palkovic (1769-1850), J. Ribay 07541812). Romanticism. The new focus of Slovak literary life concentrated round the chair of Slovak language and literature at the Bratislava Lyceum. Its spiritus mavens was E. stur (1815-56) who after his return from Germany was accepted as a leader of the Slovak youth studying at Bratislava. Influenced by Herder, Hegel and German romanticism stur's followers became zealous admirers ( and collectors) of folklore and modelled their poetry on simple folk songs. Their achievements were remarkable, particularly the poetry of J. Kral' ( 1822-76), J. Botto (1829-81) and S. Chalupka (1812-83). The most outstanding success of the new literary Slovak was "Marina" (1846) a masterpiece of intimate lyricism by A. Sladkovic(1820-72) . The best prose writer of the group was J. Kalinciak (1822-71). Dramatic works were composed mainly by J . Chalupka (1791-1871), J. Zaborsky (1812-76) and J. Paldrik (1822-70). Among the opponents of the stur circle, the protagonists of the Panslavist movement, J. Kollar (1793-1852) and P. J. Safarik (1795-1861), deserve mentioning. Realism. Th~ 60's and 70's are often called "the years 8 SLOVAKIA of Slovak hopes and disappointments." Liberal currents in the Habsburg Empire created favourable conditions for the rapid growth of literary and cultural life. Several literary annuals and periodicals started their publication and in 1863 a national cultural organization "Matica Slovenskd', was founded. The cultural awakening moved hand in hand with the political one. This movement was frowned upon by the Magyar state authorities who countered it with the idea of a unitary Hungarian nation. In 1875 the Matica was closed. Yet in this oppressive atmosphere Slovak literature reached its classical age. Slovak poetry was brought to its zenith in the perfect verse of P. 0. Hviezdoslav (1849-1921) who successfully exploited all the beauty and flexibility of the language in delightful lyrical poems, ballads, epics. S. H. Vajansky (1847-1916), besides being a distinguished poet, novelist and literary critic, was also an acknowledged national leader. The third star of this bright constellation was M. Kukucin (1860-1928), who spent half of his life in voluntary exile. In spite of his long separation from his native land he created masterly short stories and novels. Other significant writers of the period included: J. G. Tajovsky (1874-1940), J. cajak (1863-1943), Jege (18661938), and G. M. Petrovsky (1862-1916) who lived in the USA. Several women-writers made their debut also. E . M. Soltesov<i (1855-1939), T . Vansov<i (1857-1941, Timrava (1867-1951) and a fine poetess E. Podjavorinskd (1872-1951) . While the older literary generation looked mainly toward Russia for artistic guidance and political salvation, there arose in Slovakia at the beginning of the 20th century a new literary schools the 'Moderna'. Centred around the literary magazine " Prudy" ("The Currents, " 1909-14), they were looking for their inspiration more in the West than in the East and opposed the passive political attitude of their Russophile fathers . The most prominent representative of the school was I. Kraska (1876-1958) , author of two slender books of poems ("Nox et solitudo," 1909, " Verses," 1912) which were destined to have a lasting influence on the further development of Slovak lyrical poetry. Other modernists were: J. Jesensky (1874-1945), V. Roy (1885-1935), M. Rdzus (1888-1937). Interwar Years (1918-45). The post-war years witness- SLOVAKIA 9 ed an unprecedented activity in the literary field. The poet and critic s. Krcmery (1892-1955)' dubbed the period "the years of the untying tongues". The young poets of the pre-war era reached their maturity. Their ranks were soon joined by new arrivals such as J. Smrek (b. 1892), E. B. Lukac <b. 1900), v. Beniak (b. 1894), s. Krcmery (1892-1935) to mention the best known. There emerged also some talented prose writers: T. J. Gaspar (b . 1893 ), J. C. Bronsky (1896-1960), G. Vamos (1901-46) and especially M. Urban (b. 1904) the creator of "ziv'J} bic" ('The living whip', 1927) the most successful Slovak novel so far. The writers were grouped around several literary reviews. The Catholic writers around "Vatra" ("The Bonfire", 1919-25) included M. Urban, K . Sidor (1902-56), A. zarnov (b . 1903), J. Nizn<insky (b. 1903), A. N. Borin (b. 1903). Out of this group later grew a second generation of co-called "Catholic modernists": P. G. Hlbina (b. 1908), R. Dilong (b. 1905), J. Silan (b. 1918), K. Strmen (b. 1921) , J . Haranta (b. 1909), S. Veigl (b. 1915) and others. In the second group around "Mlade Slovensko" ("The Young Slovakia». 1919-29) we find E. B. Lukac, M. Halamova (b. 1908), I. Horvath 0904-59), G. Vamos. The left-oriented writers gathered around " Dav" ("The Mob", 1924-37) and included J . Ponican (b. 1902), L. Novomesk'J} (b. 1904) , F. Kral' (1903-55). Slovak surrealists made their appearance rather belatedly, in the late 1920's. They included: s. zary (b . 1918, V. Reisel (b. 1915), J. Brezina (b. 1917). The leading playwrights of the period were: F. Urbanek (1859-1934), V. Hurban (1884-?), I. Stodola (b. 1888) , J. Bare-Ivan (1909-1955). Literary criticism and literary history found their exponents in A. Mraz (1904-1964), P. Bujn<ik (1882-1932),L. Hanus (b. 1907), J. Ambrus (b.1914), Post-1945 Development. In 1945, and particularly after 1948, Slovak literature was dealt a heavy blow from which it still has not recovered. Many prominent writers sought freedom in escape to the West (Hronsky, Dilong, zarnov, Urban, Gaspar; the last two were later forcibly repatriated), others were gradually silenced (Beniak, Lukac, Graf, the Catholic modernists). The surrealists farcically "dissolved" their group and offered their services to the Communists. Under the guidance of the commissars the rule of "socialist realism" was proclaimed and in the process 10 SLOVAKIA even the erstwhile Communist writers were purged (Novomesky, Horvath, Oka.Ii). Many gifted writers degenerated into versifiers parroting party-slogans in rhymes: J. Kostra (b. 1910) wrote a long rhapsodic poem "On Stalin" (1949), J. Brezina entitled his book of poems "The Song of Love the New China" (1950), etc. The officially-approved "socialist realism" precisely prescribed and strictly enforced the theme, style and content of all work. As a result of this imposition all literary output of the 1950-60 period is uniformly marked with mediocrity and dullness in which all the artistic individuality of a writer is debased or completely lost. The writers made several attempts to shake off the Party's guidance and solicitude over their creative activity: in 1956, in 1962 and again in 1967-8; but each time with little success. As demonstrated by the recent Soviet invasion of Czecho-Slovakia (Aug. 1968 ) the Party views artistic liberty as an inadmissible challenge to its power monopoly. From among the writers labouring under these depressing and degrading circumstances one could single out the following: D. Tatarka (b. 1912), M. Figuli (b. 1910), A. Bednar (b . 1914), P. Karvas (b. 1920), V . Mihalik (b . 1926), M. Rufus (b . 1928), J. Blazkovci (b . 1929), A. Hykisch (b. 1930), J. Johanides (b. 1934). Literary critics and historians of some originality include A. Matuska (b. 1910), J. Felix (b. 1913), M. Pisut (b. 1908), M . Hamada and P. Stevcek (b . 1932) . Slovak Exile Literature. Since 1945 Slovak literature had a sizeable group of exile writers who left their enslaved country in 1945 and after. They continue to publish even under increasingly difficult conditions of emigre life. Poetry is well represented by such fine artists as K. Strmeii, R. Dilong, M. Sprinc (b. 1914), G. Zvonicky (b. 1913), M. Ziar (b, 1914), J. Okcil' (b. 1915), E. Vesnin (b. 1913) . Dramatic writing is being pursued by J. Dorcinsky (b . 1911), J. Zvoncir-Tieii (b. 1919). Noteworthy prose works have been written by M. K. Mlynarovic (b. 1887), J. C. Bronsky, P. Hrtus-Jurina (b. 1919), Draga Divinska (b. 1922). In the field of literary history and criticism one meets the names of J.E. Bor (b. 1907), S. Meciar (b. 1910), J. Rekem (b. 1917), J.M. Kirschbaum (b. 1913), J. Mest'ancik (b. 1908), F . Vnuk (b. 1926).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovak Language and Literature Description An account of the resource F. Vnuk Slovakia, Vol. 20 (No. 43), 1970 pp. 3-10 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1970 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7b797658c21c19dc38340fafae2270d7.pdf 3ed8d2faa58e42cbc0f41b61acb00067 PDF Text Text 180 SLOVAKIA F. Vnuk : Karol Sidor (1901-1953) The life-span of Karol Sidor was short, but so full of many-sided activities that it can only inspire admiration and respect. He entered on the Slovak political scene as a young 18-year old student and from his first appearance till the untimely death in 1953 he was almost continuously in the thick of the fight. All his adult life was completely devoted to the cause of his nation. In this struggle he was to experience some of the supreme triumphs as well as deepest humiliations which befall the Slovak nation during his life-time. Karol Sidor was born in Ruzomberok on July 16th, 1901. As a young student he came under the powerful influence of Andrej Hlinka who was the parish priest of Ruzomberok and at that time already a fearless, charismatic and acknowledged leader of the Slovak people oppressed by the Magyar rule. The Magyar oppression was ruthless, systematic and in its denationalizing process so successful that the Slovak leaders had resignedly steadied themselves for national extinction in the very near future. Into this pessimistic and hopeless atmosphere the youth of Hlinka's entourage injected a new and much needed hope. On the pages of "Narodnie noviny", the most influential journal of the day, K . Sidor published in January 1918 his clarion-like call: "Let us restore sttir's epoch!" He was referring to the 1840's and 1850's when the young Slovak enthusiasts around I'... sttir rallied the Slovak national spirit and actively asserted Slovak political and cultural aspirations. At the end of World War I Slovakia breathed a sigh of relief. The suffocating link with the old Hungary was finally and irrevocably broken and the Slovaks entered into a hopeful union with the Czechs in a common state: Czecho-Slovakia. The magyarization of the Slovak nation was arrested and the way was opened for the free and unhindered development of its national needs and desires. �SLOVAKIA 181 However, serious difficulties arose soon after liberation. The Czechs, who were more numerous and more advanced both economically and culturally, looked on the Slovaks at best as their poor relations. Their arrogant and patronizing treatment of the Slovaks very quickly led to disenchantment, created a lot of bitterness and dangerously strained Slovak-Czech relations. The majority of Slovaks felt deceived, betrayed in their trust, dispossessed of their rightful due. At the head of these discontented masses stood Andrej Hlinka, who in the autumn of 1919 undertook a journey to Paris to protest against the unequal partnership to which his countrymen in Czecho-Slovakia had been relegated in spite of the solemn promises given in writing by President Masaryk when signing the Pittsburgh Agreement. After his return from an unsuccessful mission in Paris Hlinka was put in prison. Karol Sidor immediately organized a student ·protest strike. For the leading part in this venture Sidor was expelled from his school and could complete his high school studies only as an external student. As a young student Sidor was attracted to literary and journalistic pursuits. In 1919 he was a co-founder of the literary-cultural magazine, "Vatra" ('Bonfire'), in which he published his first short stories and plays with a strong social undertone. But it was the ever-changing and challenging world of journalism which finally absorbed his full attention. Initially Sidor's work in the editorial office of "Slovak" ( official organ of the Hlinka People's Party l was just occasional and more or less accidental. But Hlinka soon realized taat his party must possess a modern popular daily with a high journalistic standard of reporting, informing and commenting. He entrusted Tuka and Sidor with this demanding and responsible task and when in 1929 Tuka was put on trial (and subsequently imprisoned ), Sidor took over. With Sidor as editor-in-chief the party daily "Slovak" became a powerful weapon in the fight for Slovak autonomy. In the meantime Sidor grew up both physically and politically. He became Hlinka's right hand, his indispensable and highly-valued helper. His name and reputation �182 SLOVAKIA reached every corner of Slovakia and among the Slovak masses he enjoyed a popularity seoond to Hlinka. In 1935 he was elected a deputy of the Prague parliament where his alertness, fiery speeches and searching questions earned him the reputation of the stormy petrel of this assembly. He was considered a radical politician, a tough fighter and an uncompromising autonomist. All this Sidor indeed was, but these characteristics were not. inherent in his nature. He had developed them in the service of the Slovak cause. It is a great pity that he and his contemporaries had to spend their talents and energies in a fight which was not of their choice. Had the Czechs granted the Slovaks autonomy as they had promised, treated them: as equals, as they should have, all these energies could have been constructively chanelled into a common effort to build Czecho-Slovakia into a happy homeland of two brotherly nations: the Slovaks and the Czechs. The Czechs, and indeed many Slovaks, thought Sidor to be a Czech-hater and a separatist. On account of his Polonophil attitude he was frequently accused by his opponents of wanting to break up Czecho-Slovakia in order to unite Slovakia with Poland. It was an injust accusation. Sidor's friendly disposition towards Poland was a part of his Slavophil sentiments which, incidentally, included the Czechs also. Sidor's hope and dream was a strong Slavic central European federation, poised between Germany and Russia, yet independent of both. It was his and our tragedy that this hope was not realized and that the Czechs, whom Sidor would have liked to have seen with the Slovaks and Poles opposing the German and Russian expansionist tendencies, were his most persistent political opponents. Sidor's activities in the eventful months October 1938 to March 1939 must be considered in the light of these realities. At the beginning of 1938 Sidor issued to his followers the signal to intensify the struggle for autonomy. After twenty years of frustration this was to be a year of decision and on October 6th, 1938 the Hlinka People's party achieved its long-fought goal: autonomy. Czechoslovakia became a federated state, Czecho-Slovakia, and within its framework Slovakia obtained its own parliament and its own government led by Dr. Jozef Tiso. Karol Sidor was made a Deputy �SLOVAKIA 183 Prime Minister in the central government. At the same time he assumed the leadership of the newly-formed paramilitary Hlinka guards. As an avowed autonomist Sidor strove very hard to make autonomy workable and mutually advantageous to both sides. It was not an easy task and it was made even more difficult by the intransigence of Czech bureaucracy and by the mounting radicalism of a growing number of dissatisfied Slovaks. In Slovakia it was mainly the University students and the Hlinka guards who became the torch-bearers of aggressive and vociferous radicalism demanding the full independence of Slovakia. In the Czech lands there was a general reluctance to accept the Slovaks as equal partners. The Slovaks were implicitly and even openly accused of having obtained their autonomy by stealth and blackmail. The Czech political, military and administrative leaders tried their hardest to make autonomy as unpalatable and cumbersome as possible and even to undo it by a military coup. Early in 1939 a military plot initiated by General Alois Elias was hatched in Prague. It was later sanctioned by the highest members of the central government and boldly put into operation during the night of 9th/10th March 1939. The Czech military coup caught everybody in Slovakia by surprise. Sidor, who was staying in Prague, was not only surprised, he was profoundly shocked. He was dismayed by the heavyhanded action of the Prague government and saw in it not only a direct threat to Slovak autonomy, but also a potential danger to the further existence of Czecho-Slovakia. In dismissing Tiso's government in Slovakia and sending military units to occupy Slovak cities and towns the Czechs were unwittingly playing Hitler's political game . This became plain to them almost immediately when their occupation evoked complete rejection and bitter resentment in Slovakia. Instead of solving a minor problem they had created a major one. There was not a single Slovak politician worthy of the name who was willing to go along with the Czech plans to subdue Slovakia by force. To get out of this mess of their own making (which �184 SLOVAKIA in the meantime provided Hitler with a welcome opportunity to set into motion his plans for the liquidation of Czecho-Slovakia ) the Czechs now turned to Sidor. Ever afraid of German intentions and considering Hitler far the greater of two evils, Sidor, after some hesitation, concluded that it would be in the interests of the Slovak nation to preserve Czecho-Slovakia in its federated form. It was a decision which found little understanding among the more radical of the Slovak politicians and caused considerable confusion even among the rank and file of the Hlinka guards. Sidor was weighing not only the immediate short-time advantages which were obvious to everybody, but also the long-range consequences of the steps to be undertaken. With the approval of the Presidium of the Hlinka People's party Sidor accepted the Premiership of the Slovak autonomous government. Having assumed responsible office he did his utmost to calm the situation, to restore order and to revive mutual confidence. But the crisis was now beyond his power. The Germans, determined to liquidate Czecho-Slovakia, saw in the Czech coup a suitable pretext to start the ball rolling. They expected that the Slovaks would not need much prompting where separation from the Czechs was concerned. They chose Sidor as a man of stature and authority to carry out the proclamation of Slovak independence. This Sidor resolutely refused to do, arguing that this was not the appropriate time and he was not authorized person to initiate such a far-reaching step. The same answer he gave also to W. Keppler, Hitler's special emissary, who came to see him in Bratislava in the small hours of March 12th, 1939. Sidor's dignified and determined refusal to assist Hitler in his dismembering of CzechoSlovakia was a brave and gallant gesture which would not have been lost in the age of chivalry. But in the brutal world of Hitler's 'Realpolitik' its moral strength was lost. Hitler contemptuously branded Sidor as "a soldier of Prague" and them went on in his anti-Czech campaign as if nothing had happened. Yet Sidor's actions were not lost among Slovak politicians. His solitary stand, his insistence on legality and �SLOVAKIA 185 correct procedures made all the Slovak leaders cautious and alert in their actions and dealings. Thus one finds that the proclamation of Slovak independence, when it did take place, was carried out with strict observance of legal procedures, i.e. independence was proclaimed, not by an unauthorized individual, but by the Slovak parliament constitutionally convened by the President of Czecho-Slovakia, by a free vote of its deputies and without any direct pressure or interference. In the first Slovak government Sidor was made Minister of the Interior. As Sidor said later, he accepted the position against his will, after lengthy persuation, and resigned from his office two days later. Events seemed to have conspired against him and he was visibly embarrassed by the new course and development of Slovak politics. His "error of judgment"-as it was seen then by many of his colleagues-cost him his political career but brought him an unexpected flood of popularity from ordinary people who sympathized with him in his predicament. Unfortunately this newly-found popularity became also a shield for the enemies of Slovak independence. Using Sidor's name and his anti-German sentiment they tried to drive a wedge between Slovak-German relations. For a new state which could exist only under German protection it was vital to keep these relations neighborly and without any provocative gestures. Others tried to exploit personal differences between Sidor on the one hand and Tiso, 1'.>urcansky, etc. on the other, and transplanting them into a political sphere tried to split national and ideological unity so essential at that time. It seems that Sidor did not quite see that among his sympathizers and newly-acquired supporters were many of his former enemies and slanderers. The Slovak government watched the situation with apprehension. They concluded that Sidor-though unknowingly-had become an obstruction to a speedy consolidation of the political situation in Slovakia. When the Germans objected to his further stay in Slovakia, Sidor was asked to take a diplomatic appointment at the Vatican as the Slovak Minister to the Holy See. He was most reluctant to accept this offer �186 SLOVAKIA which he rightly viewed as an attempt to exclude him from domestic politics. But eventually he agreed and in June 1939 he went to the Vatican where he served as a diplomatic representative of the Slovak Republic for six years. Sidor himself gave an account of his activities in a book "Six years at the Vatican" ( sest' rokov pri Vatikane, Obrana Press, Scranton, Pa., 1947). In Rome he quickly settled into his new job. He found it not only new and interesting, but also challenging and demanding, especially after the outbreak of the World War II. After September 1939 he was repeatedly approached by dissident Slovak politicians and diplomats (Hodfa, Pauliny-T6th, Harminc, Szatmary, etc.) to join them in forming an anti-Nazi Slovak group in exile. But he declined. This decision did not come easy and in making it Sidor was guided by the Slovak national interests. The Western powers (namely England and France) in spite of their "de facto" recognition of Slovakia were mot inclined to continue in this recognition after the outbreak of war. They were unwilling to support any Slovak exile group advocating an independent Slovakia and switched their support to Benes and his followers. Benes's aim was the restoration of pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia. Yet Sidor knew only too well how deeply the Slovak nation was attached to its own state. Any action against independent Slovakia would be tantamount to a betrayal of Slovak history and tradition. Sidor knew that Germany would lose the war, but he was also convinced in his mind that the Western allies would not go against the wishes of the Slovak nation in depriving it of its independence. He saw the future of Slovakia in a loose Slovak-Polish-Czech federation and he was continuously striving for this ambitious ideal. In Kazimierz Papee, Polish Minister at the Vatican, he found a helpful colleague and sincere friend. Through him Sidor submitted several proposals about the future Slovak-PolishCzech cooperation in the post-war years. These suggestions and propositions were seriously and attentively treated by the Polish government-in-exile in London. Unfortunately for the Slovaks and the whole Central Europe the Allies at Yalta abandoned Central Europe to �SLOVAKIA 187 the Russians as the Soviet zone of interest. The tragic result of this political barter was the Iron curtain with Slovakia, Poland and many other proud nations of Europe on the wrong side of it. With complete disregard for the wishes of the people Soviet Russia imposed communist regimes, drew new frontiers, introduced its totalitarian rule into this part of Europe. In the process independent Slovakia was liquidated, it leaders murdered or jailed, the nation enslaved, Sidor too was sentenced 'in absentia' to a 20-year imprisonment. In 1945, having been granted political asylum, Sidor became an exile in the Vatican. But even in this position - using his influence and connections at the Vatican and in Rome-he was able to do much for the Slovak refugees who were fleeing the Red Army. In December 1948 he founded the Slovak National Council Abroad and as its President did his utmost to advance the cause of Slovakia in the post-war world. In 1950 he emigrated to Montreal, Canada, where he died on October 20th, 1953. A PP E iN DIX WHY AND HOW THE SLOVAKS SEPARATED FROM THE CZECHS? An explanatory memorandum wais submitted by Karol Sidor to the State Secretary of the Holy See and to Pope Pius XII personally in sommer 1943. In the document Sidor outlined a short history of the Slovak struggle for autonomy, promised to them by the President Masaryk in 1918, but denied in the subsequent years 1918-38. This mistaken policy of the Prague government towards Slovak legitimate aims and aspirations as well as others injustices and wrongdoings of the Czech administration created an atmosphere of mistrust and bitterness and considerably weakened the foundations of the common state. The Czechs tried to justify their centralist and oppressive policies towards the Slovaks by three completely erroneous arguments : 1. They maintained that the Slovaks did not have their �188 SLOVAKIA own educated class of able administrators to run Slovak affairs in Slovakia; 2. That Slovakia was too poor and, without Czech financial help and know-how, it would collapse economically; 3. That the Czechs and Slovaks formed but one nation and hence there was no need for two separate administrative organizations in one state. It was only after the Munich crisis, in October 1938, that the Czechs reluctantly agreed to the establishment of an autonomous Slovak government. Unfortunately this arrangement did not last long. Hitler-as he confessed in his book "Mein Kampf"-felt an intense dislike towards the Czechs. In 1939 he decided to liquidate Czecho-Slovakia. First he tried to exploit the existing Slovak-Czech antagonism. He approached K . Sidor, asking him to declare Slovak independence. When Sidor refused, Hitler invited to Berlin Dr. J. Tiso and explained to him that Slovakia had only two options open: ( i) to stay in Czecho-Slovakia and share the lot of the Czechs who were singled out by Hitler for political liquidation; or (ii) to declare their own independence and thus prevent national subjugation and humiliation. Dr. Tiso explained this proposition to the Slovak deputies at the special meeting of the Slovak Diet on March 14, 1939. They voted freely and unanimously for Slovak independence. The world acknowledged the legality and propriety of their action by extending diplomatic recognition to the new state. The Vatican was among the first to give Slovakia both 'de facto' and 'de jure' recognition. The separation of Slovakia from the Czech lands was an act of self-preservation. "The Slovaks could not have done otherwise. Any other move would have been tantamount to national suicide", writes K. Sidor in the concluding paragraphs in this memorandum. � 180 SLOVAKIA F. Vnuk : Karol Sidor (1901-1953) The life-span of Karol Sidor was short, but so full of many-sided activities that it can only inspire admiration and respect. He entered on the Slovak political scene as a young 18-year old student and from his first appearance till the untimely death in 1953 he was almost continuously in the thick of the fight. All his adult life was completely devoted to the cause of his nation. In this struggle he was to experience some of the supreme triumphs as well as deepest humiliations which befall the Slovak nation during his life-time. Karol Sidor was born in Ruzomberok on July 16th, 1901. As a young student he came under the powerful influence of Andrej Hlinka who was the parish priest of Ruzomberok and at that time already a fearless, charismatic and acknowledged leader of the Slovak people oppressed by the Magyar rule. The Magyar oppression was ruthless, systematic and in its denationalizing process so successful that the Slovak leaders had resignedly steadied themselves for national extinction in the very near future. Into this pessimistic and hopeless atmosphere the youth of Hlinka's entourage injected a new and much needed hope. On the pages of "Narodnie noviny", the most influential journal of the day, K . Sidor published in January 1918 his clarion-like call: "Let us restore sttir's epoch!" He was referring to the 1840's and 1850's when the young Slovak enthusiasts around I'... sttir rallied the Slovak national spirit and actively asserted Slovak political and cultural aspirations. At the end of World War I Slovakia breathed a sigh of relief. The suffocating link with the old Hungary was finally and irrevocably broken and the Slovaks entered into a hopeful union with the Czechs in a common state: Czecho-Slovakia. The magyarization of the Slovak nation was arrested and the way was opened for the free and unhindered development of its national needs and desires. �SLOVAKIA 181 However, serious difficulties arose soon after liberation. The Czechs, who were more numerous and more advanced both economically and culturally, looked on the Slovaks at best as their poor relations. Their arrogant and patronizing treatment of the Slovaks very quickly led to disenchantment, created a lot of bitterness and dangerously strained Slovak-Czech relations. The majority of Slovaks felt deceived, betrayed in their trust, dispossessed of their rightful due. At the head of these discontented masses stood Andrej Hlinka, who in the autumn of 1919 undertook a journey to Paris to protest against the unequal partnership to which his countrymen in Czecho-Slovakia had been relegated in spite of the solemn promises given in writing by President Masaryk when signing the Pittsburgh Agreement. After his return from an unsuccessful mission in Paris Hlinka was put in prison. Karol Sidor immediately organized a student ·protest strike. For the leading part in this venture Sidor was expelled from his school and could complete his high school studies only as an external student. As a young student Sidor was attracted to literary and journalistic pursuits. In 1919 he was a co-founder of the literary-cultural magazine, "Vatra" ('Bonfire'), in which he published his first short stories and plays with a strong social undertone. But it was the ever-changing and challenging world of journalism which finally absorbed his full attention. Initially Sidor's work in the editorial office of "Slovak" ( official organ of the Hlinka People's Party l was just occasional and more or less accidental. But Hlinka soon realized taat his party must possess a modern popular daily with a high journalistic standard of reporting, informing and commenting. He entrusted Tuka and Sidor with this demanding and responsible task and when in 1929 Tuka was put on trial (and subsequently imprisoned ), Sidor took over. With Sidor as editor-in-chief the party daily "Slovak" became a powerful weapon in the fight for Slovak autonomy. In the meantime Sidor grew up both physically and politically. He became Hlinka's right hand, his indispensable and highly-valued helper. His name and reputation �182 SLOVAKIA reached every corner of Slovakia and among the Slovak masses he enjoyed a popularity seoond to Hlinka. In 1935 he was elected a deputy of the Prague parliament where his alertness, fiery speeches and searching questions earned him the reputation of the stormy petrel of this assembly. He was considered a radical politician, a tough fighter and an uncompromising autonomist. All this Sidor indeed was, but these characteristics were not. inherent in his nature. He had developed them in the service of the Slovak cause. It is a great pity that he and his contemporaries had to spend their talents and energies in a fight which was not of their choice. Had the Czechs granted the Slovaks autonomy as they had promised, treated them: as equals, as they should have, all these energies could have been constructively chanelled into a common effort to build Czecho-Slovakia into a happy homeland of two brotherly nations: the Slovaks and the Czechs. The Czechs, and indeed many Slovaks, thought Sidor to be a Czech-hater and a separatist. On account of his Polonophil attitude he was frequently accused by his opponents of wanting to break up Czecho-Slovakia in order to unite Slovakia with Poland. It was an injust accusation. Sidor's friendly disposition towards Poland was a part of his Slavophil sentiments which, incidentally, included the Czechs also. Sidor's hope and dream was a strong Slavic central European federation, poised between Germany and Russia, yet independent of both. It was his and our tragedy that this hope was not realized and that the Czechs, whom Sidor would have liked to have seen with the Slovaks and Poles opposing the German and Russian expansionist tendencies, were his most persistent political opponents. Sidor's activities in the eventful months October 1938 to March 1939 must be considered in the light of these realities. At the beginning of 1938 Sidor issued to his followers the signal to intensify the struggle for autonomy. After twenty years of frustration this was to be a year of decision and on October 6th, 1938 the Hlinka People's party achieved its long-fought goal: autonomy. Czechoslovakia became a federated state, Czecho-Slovakia, and within its framework Slovakia obtained its own parliament and its own government led by Dr. Jozef Tiso. Karol Sidor was made a Deputy �SLOVAKIA 183 Prime Minister in the central government. At the same time he assumed the leadership of the newly-formed paramilitary Hlinka guards. As an avowed autonomist Sidor strove very hard to make autonomy workable and mutually advantageous to both sides. It was not an easy task and it was made even more difficult by the intransigence of Czech bureaucracy and by the mounting radicalism of a growing number of dissatisfied Slovaks. In Slovakia it was mainly the University students and the Hlinka guards who became the torch-bearers of aggressive and vociferous radicalism demanding the full independence of Slovakia. In the Czech lands there was a general reluctance to accept the Slovaks as equal partners. The Slovaks were implicitly and even openly accused of having obtained their autonomy by stealth and blackmail. The Czech political, military and administrative leaders tried their hardest to make autonomy as unpalatable and cumbersome as possible and even to undo it by a military coup. Early in 1939 a military plot initiated by General Alois Elias was hatched in Prague. It was later sanctioned by the highest members of the central government and boldly put into operation during the night of 9th/10th March 1939. The Czech military coup caught everybody in Slovakia by surprise. Sidor, who was staying in Prague, was not only surprised, he was profoundly shocked. He was dismayed by the heavyhanded action of the Prague government and saw in it not only a direct threat to Slovak autonomy, but also a potential danger to the further existence of Czecho-Slovakia. In dismissing Tiso's government in Slovakia and sending military units to occupy Slovak cities and towns the Czechs were unwittingly playing Hitler's political game . This became plain to them almost immediately when their occupation evoked complete rejection and bitter resentment in Slovakia. Instead of solving a minor problem they had created a major one. There was not a single Slovak politician worthy of the name who was willing to go along with the Czech plans to subdue Slovakia by force. To get out of this mess of their own making (which �184 SLOVAKIA in the meantime provided Hitler with a welcome opportunity to set into motion his plans for the liquidation of Czecho-Slovakia ) the Czechs now turned to Sidor. Ever afraid of German intentions and considering Hitler far the greater of two evils, Sidor, after some hesitation, concluded that it would be in the interests of the Slovak nation to preserve Czecho-Slovakia in its federated form. It was a decision which found little understanding among the more radical of the Slovak politicians and caused considerable confusion even among the rank and file of the Hlinka guards. Sidor was weighing not only the immediate short-time advantages which were obvious to everybody, but also the long-range consequences of the steps to be undertaken. With the approval of the Presidium of the Hlinka People's party Sidor accepted the Premiership of the Slovak autonomous government. Having assumed responsible office he did his utmost to calm the situation, to restore order and to revive mutual confidence. But the crisis was now beyond his power. The Germans, determined to liquidate Czecho-Slovakia, saw in the Czech coup a suitable pretext to start the ball rolling. They expected that the Slovaks would not need much prompting where separation from the Czechs was concerned. They chose Sidor as a man of stature and authority to carry out the proclamation of Slovak independence. This Sidor resolutely refused to do, arguing that this was not the appropriate time and he was not authorized person to initiate such a far-reaching step. The same answer he gave also to W. Keppler, Hitler's special emissary, who came to see him in Bratislava in the small hours of March 12th, 1939. Sidor's dignified and determined refusal to assist Hitler in his dismembering of CzechoSlovakia was a brave and gallant gesture which would not have been lost in the age of chivalry. But in the brutal world of Hitler's 'Realpolitik' its moral strength was lost. Hitler contemptuously branded Sidor as "a soldier of Prague" and them went on in his anti-Czech campaign as if nothing had happened. Yet Sidor's actions were not lost among Slovak politicians. His solitary stand, his insistence on legality and �SLOVAKIA 185 correct procedures made all the Slovak leaders cautious and alert in their actions and dealings. Thus one finds that the proclamation of Slovak independence, when it did take place, was carried out with strict observance of legal procedures, i.e. independence was proclaimed, not by an unauthorized individual, but by the Slovak parliament constitutionally convened by the President of Czecho-Slovakia, by a free vote of its deputies and without any direct pressure or interference. In the first Slovak government Sidor was made Minister of the Interior. As Sidor said later, he accepted the position against his will, after lengthy persuation, and resigned from his office two days later. Events seemed to have conspired against him and he was visibly embarrassed by the new course and development of Slovak politics. His "error of judgment"-as it was seen then by many of his colleagues-cost him his political career but brought him an unexpected flood of popularity from ordinary people who sympathized with him in his predicament. Unfortunately this newly-found popularity became also a shield for the enemies of Slovak independence. Using Sidor's name and his anti-German sentiment they tried to drive a wedge between Slovak-German relations. For a new state which could exist only under German protection it was vital to keep these relations neighborly and without any provocative gestures. Others tried to exploit personal differences between Sidor on the one hand and Tiso, 1'.>urcansky, etc. on the other, and transplanting them into a political sphere tried to split national and ideological unity so essential at that time. It seems that Sidor did not quite see that among his sympathizers and newly-acquired supporters were many of his former enemies and slanderers. The Slovak government watched the situation with apprehension. They concluded that Sidor-though unknowingly-had become an obstruction to a speedy consolidation of the political situation in Slovakia. When the Germans objected to his further stay in Slovakia, Sidor was asked to take a diplomatic appointment at the Vatican as the Slovak Minister to the Holy See. He was most reluctant to accept this offer �186 SLOVAKIA which he rightly viewed as an attempt to exclude him from domestic politics. But eventually he agreed and in June 1939 he went to the Vatican where he served as a diplomatic representative of the Slovak Republic for six years. Sidor himself gave an account of his activities in a book "Six years at the Vatican" ( sest' rokov pri Vatikane, Obrana Press, Scranton, Pa., 1947). In Rome he quickly settled into his new job. He found it not only new and interesting, but also challenging and demanding, especially after the outbreak of the World War II. After September 1939 he was repeatedly approached by dissident Slovak politicians and diplomats (Hodfa, Pauliny-T6th, Harminc, Szatmary, etc.) to join them in forming an anti-Nazi Slovak group in exile. But he declined. This decision did not come easy and in making it Sidor was guided by the Slovak national interests. The Western powers (namely England and France) in spite of their "de facto" recognition of Slovakia were mot inclined to continue in this recognition after the outbreak of war. They were unwilling to support any Slovak exile group advocating an independent Slovakia and switched their support to Benes and his followers. Benes's aim was the restoration of pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia. Yet Sidor knew only too well how deeply the Slovak nation was attached to its own state. Any action against independent Slovakia would be tantamount to a betrayal of Slovak history and tradition. Sidor knew that Germany would lose the war, but he was also convinced in his mind that the Western allies would not go against the wishes of the Slovak nation in depriving it of its independence. He saw the future of Slovakia in a loose Slovak-Polish-Czech federation and he was continuously striving for this ambitious ideal. In Kazimierz Papee, Polish Minister at the Vatican, he found a helpful colleague and sincere friend. Through him Sidor submitted several proposals about the future Slovak-PolishCzech cooperation in the post-war years. These suggestions and propositions were seriously and attentively treated by the Polish government-in-exile in London. Unfortunately for the Slovaks and the whole Central Europe the Allies at Yalta abandoned Central Europe to �SLOVAKIA 187 the Russians as the Soviet zone of interest. The tragic result of this political barter was the Iron curtain with Slovakia, Poland and many other proud nations of Europe on the wrong side of it. With complete disregard for the wishes of the people Soviet Russia imposed communist regimes, drew new frontiers, introduced its totalitarian rule into this part of Europe. In the process independent Slovakia was liquidated, it leaders murdered or jailed, the nation enslaved, Sidor too was sentenced 'in absentia' to a 20-year imprisonment. In 1945, having been granted political asylum, Sidor became an exile in the Vatican. But even in this position - using his influence and connections at the Vatican and in Rome-he was able to do much for the Slovak refugees who were fleeing the Red Army. In December 1948 he founded the Slovak National Council Abroad and as its President did his utmost to advance the cause of Slovakia in the post-war world. In 1950 he emigrated to Montreal, Canada, where he died on October 20th, 1953. A PP E iN DIX WHY AND HOW THE SLOVAKS SEPARATED FROM THE CZECHS? An explanatory memorandum wais submitted by Karol Sidor to the State Secretary of the Holy See and to Pope Pius XII personally in sommer 1943. In the document Sidor outlined a short history of the Slovak struggle for autonomy, promised to them by the President Masaryk in 1918, but denied in the subsequent years 1918-38. This mistaken policy of the Prague government towards Slovak legitimate aims and aspirations as well as others injustices and wrongdoings of the Czech administration created an atmosphere of mistrust and bitterness and considerably weakened the foundations of the common state. The Czechs tried to justify their centralist and oppressive policies towards the Slovaks by three completely erroneous arguments : 1. They maintained that the Slovaks did not have their �188 SLOVAKIA own educated class of able administrators to run Slovak affairs in Slovakia; 2. That Slovakia was too poor and, without Czech financial help and know-how, it would collapse economically; 3. That the Czechs and Slovaks formed but one nation and hence there was no need for two separate administrative organizations in one state. It was only after the Munich crisis, in October 1938, that the Czechs reluctantly agreed to the establishment of an autonomous Slovak government. Unfortunately this arrangement did not last long. Hitler-as he confessed in his book "Mein Kampf"-felt an intense dislike towards the Czechs. In 1939 he decided to liquidate Czecho-Slovakia. First he tried to exploit the existing Slovak-Czech antagonism. He approached K . Sidor, asking him to declare Slovak independence. When Sidor refused, Hitler invited to Berlin Dr. J. Tiso and explained to him that Slovakia had only two options open: ( i) to stay in Czecho-Slovakia and share the lot of the Czechs who were singled out by Hitler for political liquidation; or (ii) to declare their own independence and thus prevent national subjugation and humiliation. Dr. Tiso explained this proposition to the Slovak deputies at the special meeting of the Slovak Diet on March 14, 1939. They voted freely and unanimously for Slovak independence. The world acknowledged the legality and propriety of their action by extending diplomatic recognition to the new state. The Vatican was among the first to give Slovakia both 'de facto' and 'de jure' recognition. The separation of Slovakia from the Czech lands was an act of self-preservation. "The Slovaks could not have done otherwise. Any other move would have been tantamount to national suicide", writes K. Sidor in the concluding paragraphs in this memorandum. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1971, Vol. 21 Description An account of the resource Vol. 21 (No. 44), 1971. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1971 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 180 SLOVAKIA F. Vnuk : Karol Sidor (1901-1953) The life-span of Karol Sidor was short, but so full of many-sided activities that it can only inspire admiration and respect. He entered on the Slovak political scene as a young 18-year old student and from his first appearance till the untimely death in 1953 he was almost continuously in the thick of the fight. All his adult life was completely devoted to the cause of his nation. In this struggle he was to experience some of the supreme triumphs as well as deepest humiliations which befall the Slovak nation during his life-time. Karol Sidor was born in Ruzomberok on July 16th, 1901. As a young student he came under the powerful influence of Andrej Hlinka who was the parish priest of Ruzomberok and at that time already a fearless, charismatic and acknowledged leader of the Slovak people oppressed by the Magyar rule. The Magyar oppression was ruthless, systematic and in its denationalizing process so successful that the Slovak leaders had resignedly steadied themselves for national extinction in the very near future. Into this pessimistic and hopeless atmosphere the youth of Hlinka's entourage injected a new and much needed hope. On the pages of "Narodnie noviny", the most influential journal of the day, K . Sidor published in January 1918 his clarion-like call: "Let us restore sttir's epoch!" He was referring to the 1840's and 1850's when the young Slovak enthusiasts around I'... sttir rallied the Slovak national spirit and actively asserted Slovak political and cultural aspirations. At the end of World War I Slovakia breathed a sigh of relief. The suffocating link with the old Hungary was finally and irrevocably broken and the Slovaks entered into a hopeful union with the Czechs in a common state: Czecho-Slovakia. The magyarization of the Slovak nation was arrested and the way was opened for the free and unhindered development of its national needs and desires. SLOVAKIA 181 However, serious difficulties arose soon after liberation. The Czechs, who were more numerous and more advanced both economically and culturally, looked on the Slovaks at best as their poor relations. Their arrogant and patronizing treatment of the Slovaks very quickly led to disenchantment, created a lot of bitterness and dangerously strained Slovak-Czech relations. The majority of Slovaks felt deceived, betrayed in their trust, dispossessed of their rightful due. At the head of these discontented masses stood Andrej Hlinka, who in the autumn of 1919 undertook a journey to Paris to protest against the unequal partnership to which his countrymen in Czecho-Slovakia had been relegated in spite of the solemn promises given in writing by President Masaryk when signing the Pittsburgh Agreement. After his return from an unsuccessful mission in Paris Hlinka was put in prison. Karol Sidor immediately organized a student ·protest strike. For the leading part in this venture Sidor was expelled from his school and could complete his high school studies only as an external student. As a young student Sidor was attracted to literary and journalistic pursuits. In 1919 he was a co-founder of the literary-cultural magazine, "Vatra" ('Bonfire'), in which he published his first short stories and plays with a strong social undertone. But it was the ever-changing and challenging world of journalism which finally absorbed his full attention. Initially Sidor's work in the editorial office of "Slovak" ( official organ of the Hlinka People's Party l was just occasional and more or less accidental. But Hlinka soon realized taat his party must possess a modern popular daily with a high journalistic standard of reporting, informing and commenting. He entrusted Tuka and Sidor with this demanding and responsible task and when in 1929 Tuka was put on trial (and subsequently imprisoned ), Sidor took over. With Sidor as editor-in-chief the party daily "Slovak" became a powerful weapon in the fight for Slovak autonomy. In the meantime Sidor grew up both physically and politically. He became Hlinka's right hand, his indispensable and highly-valued helper. His name and reputation 182 SLOVAKIA reached every corner of Slovakia and among the Slovak masses he enjoyed a popularity seoond to Hlinka. In 1935 he was elected a deputy of the Prague parliament where his alertness, fiery speeches and searching questions earned him the reputation of the stormy petrel of this assembly. He was considered a radical politician, a tough fighter and an uncompromising autonomist. All this Sidor indeed was, but these characteristics were not. inherent in his nature. He had developed them in the service of the Slovak cause. It is a great pity that he and his contemporaries had to spend their talents and energies in a fight which was not of their choice. Had the Czechs granted the Slovaks autonomy as they had promised, treated them: as equals, as they should have, all these energies could have been constructively chanelled into a common effort to build Czecho-Slovakia into a happy homeland of two brotherly nations: the Slovaks and the Czechs. The Czechs, and indeed many Slovaks, thought Sidor to be a Czech-hater and a separatist. On account of his Polonophil attitude he was frequently accused by his opponents of wanting to break up Czecho-Slovakia in order to unite Slovakia with Poland. It was an injust accusation. Sidor's friendly disposition towards Poland was a part of his Slavophil sentiments which, incidentally, included the Czechs also. Sidor's hope and dream was a strong Slavic central European federation, poised between Germany and Russia, yet independent of both. It was his and our tragedy that this hope was not realized and that the Czechs, whom Sidor would have liked to have seen with the Slovaks and Poles opposing the German and Russian expansionist tendencies, were his most persistent political opponents. Sidor's activities in the eventful months October 1938 to March 1939 must be considered in the light of these realities. At the beginning of 1938 Sidor issued to his followers the signal to intensify the struggle for autonomy. After twenty years of frustration this was to be a year of decision and on October 6th, 1938 the Hlinka People's party achieved its long-fought goal: autonomy. Czechoslovakia became a federated state, Czecho-Slovakia, and within its framework Slovakia obtained its own parliament and its own government led by Dr. Jozef Tiso. Karol Sidor was made a Deputy SLOVAKIA 183 Prime Minister in the central government. At the same time he assumed the leadership of the newly-formed paramilitary Hlinka guards. As an avowed autonomist Sidor strove very hard to make autonomy workable and mutually advantageous to both sides. It was not an easy task and it was made even more difficult by the intransigence of Czech bureaucracy and by the mounting radicalism of a growing number of dissatisfied Slovaks. In Slovakia it was mainly the University students and the Hlinka guards who became the torch-bearers of aggressive and vociferous radicalism demanding the full independence of Slovakia. In the Czech lands there was a general reluctance to accept the Slovaks as equal partners. The Slovaks were implicitly and even openly accused of having obtained their autonomy by stealth and blackmail. The Czech political, military and administrative leaders tried their hardest to make autonomy as unpalatable and cumbersome as possible and even to undo it by a military coup. Early in 1939 a military plot initiated by General Alois Elias was hatched in Prague. It was later sanctioned by the highest members of the central government and boldly put into operation during the night of 9th/10th March 1939. The Czech military coup caught everybody in Slovakia by surprise. Sidor, who was staying in Prague, was not only surprised, he was profoundly shocked. He was dismayed by the heavyhanded action of the Prague government and saw in it not only a direct threat to Slovak autonomy, but also a potential danger to the further existence of Czecho-Slovakia. In dismissing Tiso's government in Slovakia and sending military units to occupy Slovak cities and towns the Czechs were unwittingly playing Hitler's political game . This became plain to them almost immediately when their occupation evoked complete rejection and bitter resentment in Slovakia. Instead of solving a minor problem they had created a major one. There was not a single Slovak politician worthy of the name who was willing to go along with the Czech plans to subdue Slovakia by force. To get out of this mess of their own making (which 184 SLOVAKIA in the meantime provided Hitler with a welcome opportunity to set into motion his plans for the liquidation of Czecho-Slovakia ) the Czechs now turned to Sidor. Ever afraid of German intentions and considering Hitler far the greater of two evils, Sidor, after some hesitation, concluded that it would be in the interests of the Slovak nation to preserve Czecho-Slovakia in its federated form. It was a decision which found little understanding among the more radical of the Slovak politicians and caused considerable confusion even among the rank and file of the Hlinka guards. Sidor was weighing not only the immediate short-time advantages which were obvious to everybody, but also the long-range consequences of the steps to be undertaken. With the approval of the Presidium of the Hlinka People's party Sidor accepted the Premiership of the Slovak autonomous government. Having assumed responsible office he did his utmost to calm the situation, to restore order and to revive mutual confidence. But the crisis was now beyond his power. The Germans, determined to liquidate Czecho-Slovakia, saw in the Czech coup a suitable pretext to start the ball rolling. They expected that the Slovaks would not need much prompting where separation from the Czechs was concerned. They chose Sidor as a man of stature and authority to carry out the proclamation of Slovak independence. This Sidor resolutely refused to do, arguing that this was not the appropriate time and he was not authorized person to initiate such a far-reaching step. The same answer he gave also to W. Keppler, Hitler's special emissary, who came to see him in Bratislava in the small hours of March 12th, 1939. Sidor's dignified and determined refusal to assist Hitler in his dismembering of CzechoSlovakia was a brave and gallant gesture which would not have been lost in the age of chivalry. But in the brutal world of Hitler's 'Realpolitik' its moral strength was lost. Hitler contemptuously branded Sidor as "a soldier of Prague" and them went on in his anti-Czech campaign as if nothing had happened. Yet Sidor's actions were not lost among Slovak politicians. His solitary stand, his insistence on legality and SLOVAKIA 185 correct procedures made all the Slovak leaders cautious and alert in their actions and dealings. Thus one finds that the proclamation of Slovak independence, when it did take place, was carried out with strict observance of legal procedures, i.e. independence was proclaimed, not by an unauthorized individual, but by the Slovak parliament constitutionally convened by the President of Czecho-Slovakia, by a free vote of its deputies and without any direct pressure or interference. In the first Slovak government Sidor was made Minister of the Interior. As Sidor said later, he accepted the position against his will, after lengthy persuation, and resigned from his office two days later. Events seemed to have conspired against him and he was visibly embarrassed by the new course and development of Slovak politics. His "error of judgment"-as it was seen then by many of his colleagues-cost him his political career but brought him an unexpected flood of popularity from ordinary people who sympathized with him in his predicament. Unfortunately this newly-found popularity became also a shield for the enemies of Slovak independence. Using Sidor's name and his anti-German sentiment they tried to drive a wedge between Slovak-German relations. For a new state which could exist only under German protection it was vital to keep these relations neighborly and without any provocative gestures. Others tried to exploit personal differences between Sidor on the one hand and Tiso, 1'.>urcansky, etc. on the other, and transplanting them into a political sphere tried to split national and ideological unity so essential at that time. It seems that Sidor did not quite see that among his sympathizers and newly-acquired supporters were many of his former enemies and slanderers. The Slovak government watched the situation with apprehension. They concluded that Sidor-though unknowingly-had become an obstruction to a speedy consolidation of the political situation in Slovakia. When the Germans objected to his further stay in Slovakia, Sidor was asked to take a diplomatic appointment at the Vatican as the Slovak Minister to the Holy See. He was most reluctant to accept this offer 186 SLOVAKIA which he rightly viewed as an attempt to exclude him from domestic politics. But eventually he agreed and in June 1939 he went to the Vatican where he served as a diplomatic representative of the Slovak Republic for six years. Sidor himself gave an account of his activities in a book "Six years at the Vatican" ( sest' rokov pri Vatikane, Obrana Press, Scranton, Pa., 1947). In Rome he quickly settled into his new job. He found it not only new and interesting, but also challenging and demanding, especially after the outbreak of the World War II. After September 1939 he was repeatedly approached by dissident Slovak politicians and diplomats (Hodfa, Pauliny-T6th, Harminc, Szatmary, etc.) to join them in forming an anti-Nazi Slovak group in exile. But he declined. This decision did not come easy and in making it Sidor was guided by the Slovak national interests. The Western powers (namely England and France) in spite of their "de facto" recognition of Slovakia were mot inclined to continue in this recognition after the outbreak of war. They were unwilling to support any Slovak exile group advocating an independent Slovakia and switched their support to Benes and his followers. Benes's aim was the restoration of pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia. Yet Sidor knew only too well how deeply the Slovak nation was attached to its own state. Any action against independent Slovakia would be tantamount to a betrayal of Slovak history and tradition. Sidor knew that Germany would lose the war, but he was also convinced in his mind that the Western allies would not go against the wishes of the Slovak nation in depriving it of its independence. He saw the future of Slovakia in a loose Slovak-Polish-Czech federation and he was continuously striving for this ambitious ideal. In Kazimierz Papee, Polish Minister at the Vatican, he found a helpful colleague and sincere friend. Through him Sidor submitted several proposals about the future Slovak-PolishCzech cooperation in the post-war years. These suggestions and propositions were seriously and attentively treated by the Polish government-in-exile in London. Unfortunately for the Slovaks and the whole Central Europe the Allies at Yalta abandoned Central Europe to SLOVAKIA 187 the Russians as the Soviet zone of interest. The tragic result of this political barter was the Iron curtain with Slovakia, Poland and many other proud nations of Europe on the wrong side of it. With complete disregard for the wishes of the people Soviet Russia imposed communist regimes, drew new frontiers, introduced its totalitarian rule into this part of Europe. In the process independent Slovakia was liquidated, it leaders murdered or jailed, the nation enslaved, Sidor too was sentenced 'in absentia' to a 20-year imprisonment. In 1945, having been granted political asylum, Sidor became an exile in the Vatican. But even in this position - using his influence and connections at the Vatican and in Rome-he was able to do much for the Slovak refugees who were fleeing the Red Army. In December 1948 he founded the Slovak National Council Abroad and as its President did his utmost to advance the cause of Slovakia in the post-war world. In 1950 he emigrated to Montreal, Canada, where he died on October 20th, 1953. A PP E iN DIX WHY AND HOW THE SLOVAKS SEPARATED FROM THE CZECHS? An explanatory memorandum wais submitted by Karol Sidor to the State Secretary of the Holy See and to Pope Pius XII personally in sommer 1943. In the document Sidor outlined a short history of the Slovak struggle for autonomy, promised to them by the President Masaryk in 1918, but denied in the subsequent years 1918-38. This mistaken policy of the Prague government towards Slovak legitimate aims and aspirations as well as others injustices and wrongdoings of the Czech administration created an atmosphere of mistrust and bitterness and considerably weakened the foundations of the common state. The Czechs tried to justify their centralist and oppressive policies towards the Slovaks by three completely erroneous arguments : 1. They maintained that the Slovaks did not have their 188 SLOVAKIA own educated class of able administrators to run Slovak affairs in Slovakia; 2. That Slovakia was too poor and, without Czech financial help and know-how, it would collapse economically; 3. That the Czechs and Slovaks formed but one nation and hence there was no need for two separate administrative organizations in one state. It was only after the Munich crisis, in October 1938, that the Czechs reluctantly agreed to the establishment of an autonomous Slovak government. Unfortunately this arrangement did not last long. Hitler-as he confessed in his book "Mein Kampf"-felt an intense dislike towards the Czechs. In 1939 he decided to liquidate Czecho-Slovakia. First he tried to exploit the existing Slovak-Czech antagonism. He approached K . Sidor, asking him to declare Slovak independence. When Sidor refused, Hitler invited to Berlin Dr. J. Tiso and explained to him that Slovakia had only two options open: ( i) to stay in Czecho-Slovakia and share the lot of the Czechs who were singled out by Hitler for political liquidation; or (ii) to declare their own independence and thus prevent national subjugation and humiliation. Dr. Tiso explained this proposition to the Slovak deputies at the special meeting of the Slovak Diet on March 14, 1939. They voted freely and unanimously for Slovak independence. The world acknowledged the legality and propriety of their action by extending diplomatic recognition to the new state. The Vatican was among the first to give Slovakia both 'de facto' and 'de jure' recognition. The separation of Slovakia from the Czech lands was an act of self-preservation. "The Slovaks could not have done otherwise. Any other move would have been tantamount to national suicide", writes K. Sidor in the concluding paragraphs in this memorandum.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Karol Sidor (1901-1953) Description An account of the resource F. Vnuk includes "Why and How the Slovaks Separated from the Czechs?" explanatory memorandum submitted by Karol Sidor to the State Secretary of the Holy See and to Pope Pius XII, 1943 Slovakia, Vol. 21 (No. 44), 1971 pp. 180-188 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1971 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/215285e5c6ce7625141c324686d0b91c.pdf 08d3cb514f45501653b2b41544812895 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 65 British Attitude Towards Independent Slovakia in 19 3 9 I. In Munich, in September 1938, the Western Powers abandoned Central and Eastern Europe to Germany (in the same manner as they were to abandon her in Yalta and Potsdam in 1944-5 to Soviet Russia) and the small countries of this region were compelled to do their best to accommodate themselves to this new change in the balance of power. Mr. Churchill (as he was then) stated this fact quite eloquently in his speech to the House of Commons on October 5th, 1939: "It must now be accepted that all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will make the best terms they can with the triumphant Nazi power." There is always some good which comes from every catastrophe. The Slovaks - though victims of the territorial aggrandizement of their neighbors (Hungary, Poland and Germany) - succeeded in the post-Munich period in their 20-year struggle for autonomy which was proclaimed on October 6th, 1938. By asserting their national identity through their own government and their own Diet the Slovaks finally overcame the arrogant and dangerous theory of a unitary "Czechoslovak" nation. The centralized pre-Munich Czechoslovakia became the federated state (hyphenated Czecho-Slovakia) of two equal nations. The Czechs had to admit the futility of their misplaced megalomania: they recognized the Slovaks as a separate nation, their language as a separate language. The rest of the world took notice of both the external and the internal changes which befell Czecho-Slovakia. The old myths, fostered and sustained by clever Czech propaganda, were demolished and a more sober political thinking was setting in. It was interesting and quite refreshing to read in the British press (in an article by G. B. Shaw at that) about "the entirely imaginary race called Czechoslovaks'',1 because that's what "Czechoslo- �66 SLOVAKIA vaks" in fact were: a figment of political imagination aimed at the absorption of the Slovak nation into the Czech nation. The subsequent events - which are now judged as the prologue to World War II - were in their day accepted as inevitable facts of life. After Munich Hitler's supremacy over Central Europe was unchallenged, his expansionist moves - even if occasionally condemned and disapproved of - were tacitly and implicitly acquiesced in. Even the disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia and the emergence of an independent Slovak state did not produce that wave of indignation and outrage with which it was to be treated later. The leader article in the "Daily Express" on March 15th , 1939 summed up the general sentiments in the following words : "Why are our heads cooler ( than they were a year ago - F . V.) ? Not because our hearts are hardened. Not because we have no sympathy with the Czechs. No. But we are not shocked by stale news. Munich decided that Germany was the boss in Eastern Europe." 2 In this frame of mind did the British people at large and the British Government view the new situation. II. The British foreign policy approach towards the new territorial and political rearrangement followed two distinct lines. Though reluctant to recognize the German " Protektorat " over Bohemia and Moravia, they saw the position of Slovakia in a different and more acceptable light.3 In a memorandum dated April 17th, 1939 the Foreign Office Central Europe expert, R. M. Makins, summarized the result of long deliberations which led to the following conclusions: "The position of Slovakia is different from that of Bohemia and Moravia and a number of practical questions have rendered it advisable for us to regularise the position of our Consul at Bratislava and to give the new state de facto recognition." 4 Shortly afterwards on May 4th, 1939 the British Consul in Bratislava notified the Slovak Foreign Minister (Dr. F. �SLOVAKIA 67 nurcansky) that the British Government had decided to grant the Slovak state a de facto recognition. The act of recognition was followed by the opening of a Slovak Consulate-General in London with Milan P. Harminc in charge. 5 This happy and promising development was suddenly arrested by the outbreak of the Second World War, in September 1939. Because of Slovakia's geographical position and treaty relations she had with her protecting power, Germany, Slovakia herself became marginally involved in the German attack on Poland. The situation was further aggravated by the defection of the Slovak Minister in Warsaw, L. Szatmary, and the Slovak Consul in London, M. Harminc. Both issued indignant proclamations - as it happened quite incorrect - alleging that Slovakia was occupied by German troops and deprived of every vestige of national independence.6 At the same time the Czech emigres in the West, led by ex-President Benes, launched their propaganda campaign for the restoration of CzechoSlovakia in its pre-Munich form. The Slovak cause in the West was at a great disadvantage. There was no one to defend it and the lies and intrigues of the adversaries of Slovak independence could go on almost unhindered. Yet it must be said in all fairness that the British attitude towards Slovakia was marked by a measure of consideration and understanding of which the Slovaks were only too infrequently the recipients. The British viewed the position of Slovakia with sensitive appreciation for the problems of a small country in the shadow of a great power. The allegations of emigre politicians - both Czechs and Slovaks - were taken with more than the proverbial grain of salt and were frequently checked against the opinions of knowledgeable experts and men-on-the-spot such as former British Consul in Bratislava Mr. P. Pares. In the British Consul the Slovaks had a severe critic but at the same time a sincere, shrewd and sympathetic observer. His deep knowledge of Slovak affairs enabled him to evaluate the moves and actions of the Slovak Government in their overall context. Already in May 1939 he had pointed out the difficult dilemma facing the Slovak leaders and their efforts to find a solution to their prob- �68 SLOVAKIA lems. Having heard rumors about their clandestine approaches to the Slovak emigres in the West (particularly towards Dr. s. Osusky in Paris), he wrote: "The object of these manoeuvres seems to be to maintain contact with the Western powers whilst pursuing a policy of cooperating with the Germans for as long as is necessary - in other words, the policy of the Czechs before and during the Great War. The Slovaks are growing very apprehensive now about the possibility of war. They do not expect Germany to win, but realize that they are powerless to refuse anything she might ask in the event of war. So they are trying to ensure the good will of the Western powers in advance by secretly approving the plans of the exiles." 7 III. Two days before Britain entered the Second World War the British Foreign Ministry issued an internal memorandum entitled "Our Attitude towards Czechs and Slovaks in Time of War." With respect to Slovaks (in spite of some unflattering remarks about their leadership ) the memorandum stated: "However true it may be that the final defection of the Slovaks last March was the result of German machination and menace and that the present Slovak Government is acting under force majeure in allowing Slovakia to be used as an assembly ground for the German attack on Poland, nevertheless the fact remains that the union of Czechs and Slovaks was not a success and it would be rash to act on the presumption that the Slovaks are now anxious to restore it ... By proclaiming the restoration of Czecho-Slovakia as a war aim, we should be assuming that the Slovaks had repented of their errors and were eager for the reunion with the Czechs. That may be so, but there are yet insufficient grounds for assurance on the point and we should not take at their face value any statements of Slovak emigres on the subject." 8 With regard to ex-President Benes the memorandum had this to say: "The question then arises what recognition we �SLOVAKIA 69 should give to Dr. Benes, if, as is only too likely, he proclaims himself leader of the Czechoslovaks. The question is not an easy one. In the first place it must be admitted that he is far and away the most outstanding Czech figure in the world. His supporters say that Czechs and Slovaks both at home and abroad are now unanimously behind him. So far as those resident abroad are concerned he might be able to produce some adequate proof, but no proof could possibly be forthcoming from those resident in their own countries. All that can be said is that he was not a popular figure in large circles in Slovakia during his presidency, and that the Czechs who assumed power in the Protectorate after his departure made no secret of their condemnation of him and his policy. It may be that they have now changed their minds, but it is difficult to see what proof can be had of the fact, and it is after all the Czechs in the Protectorate and not the emigres who matter most. A further consideration is that Dr . Benes is personally abhorrent in several other states, particularly in Poland and Hungary. All these considerations suggest that we should be wise to walk warily about any official recognition of Dr. Benes, whether as leader of the Czechs or the Czechoslovaks, though in view of his outstanding position we should presumably have no option but to accept him as their de facto spokesman". 9 As the memorandum anticipated Benes spoke out on the very day Britain entered the armed conflict. On September 3rd he wired the following telegram to the British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain: "At this moment in which the British people are obliged to wage a war imposed upon Poland, Great Britain and France by Nazi Germany I wish to express to Your Excellency with the deep and inalterable feeling of sympathy the desire and the decision of the Czechs and Slovaks to join without hesitation your people in this struggle for a free Europe. Our country is invaded and occupied by armed forces of Nazism and the whole nation is suffering under inhuman terror and oppression, its forces, however, both �70 SLOVAKIA moral and physical remain intact. We Czechoslovak citizens consider ourselves as being also in war with the German military forces and we shall march with your people till the final victory and the liberation of our fatherland. Edward Benes, former President of Czechoslovakia." 10 This telegram was carefully studied by its British recipients for hidden claims and pretensions. None was found, but it was noted that Benes spoke on behalf of "the Czechs and the Slovaks" as well as "Czechoslovak citizens". The reply (which was despatched with a six-day delay) carefully avoided any reference to either Slovaks or "Czechoslovaks" and with a studied deliberation indicated to Benes the attitude of the British Government towards him and indirectly toward Slovakia also. It read : " I gratefully acknowledge Your Excellency's generous message of sympathy and support in this grave hour. The sufferings of the Czech nation are not forgotten and we look forwards through the triumph of the principles for which we have taken up arms to the release of the Czech people from foreign domination. Neville Chamberlain." 11 This public exchange of telegrams was to demonstrate urbi et orbi that the British Government did not recognize Benes's claim to speak on behalf of the Slovaks nor were they particularly keen to restore Czecho-Slovakia. This was made explicitly clear in an explanatory letter of September 26th, 1939, sent to the Britiish Minister in Budapest (Mr. 0. St. C. O'Malley) by Sir Orme Sargent who wrote: " ... we are taking care to avoid committing ourselves to anything in the nature of a reconstitution of the old Czecho-Slovak state. In confirmation of this I would draw your attention to the answer, of which I enclose a copy, sel'lt by the Prime Minister on the 9th September to Benes's message of sympathy and support. The Prime Minister was careful to speak only of the future of the Czech people." 12 �SLOVAKIA 71 IV. This public rebuke to Dr. Benes reactivated another emigre politician, Dr. Milan Hodza, former Prime Minister of Czecho-Slovakia and a bitter antagonist of Dr. Benes. M. Hodza was a Slovak by birth. In his political outlook he was inconsistent and in his political actions unpredictable. Immediately after 1918 he was an ardent exponent of "Czechoslovak unity" and an active opponent of the Slovak autonomists ( whom he used to mock that they did not know the difference between "autonomy" and "automobile") .13 But gradually he realized the futile emptiness of the Czech centralist policies and advocated some measure of autonomy for Slovakia. In the summer of 1938 his proposals were almost identical with those of Andrej Hlinka. 14 But Benes put a stop to Hodza's autonomist plans and schemes and forbade him any further steps in this direction. At the height of the Munich crisis Benes made Hodza a convenient scapegoat for previous Czech mistakes and omissions and on September 22nd, 1938 forced him and his government to resign. Physically and mentally broken M. Hodza retired to France and then to Switzerland. It seemed that he had left politics for good. Unlike Benes he made no pronouncements issued no proclamations when Hitler dismembered Czecho-Slovakia. In the summer of 1939 he moved to London. Here he very quickly realized that official British circles considered the Czecho-Slovak interwar experiment as a mistake which they would be loath to repeat. The exchange of telegrams between Benes and Chamberlain indicated to him very plainly that the British viewed Slovakia not as a political accident but as a permanent feature of the Central European scene. In 1938-9 the British policy-makers realized that the Versailles settlement imposed on Central Europe in 1919 was not satisfactory and created as many new problems as it was supposed to solve. Consequently they were unwilling to advocate any schemes which took no notice of past mistakes. In effect it meant that the Slovaks were not to be forced into any union with the Czechs against their will. The British official circles did their best to clear up the terminological confusion concerning such expressions as Czechs, Slovaks, Czechoslovaks, Czecho- �72 SLOVAKIA Slovaks, nation, people, etc. It is interesting to note that even Mr. Churchill - a tough and consistent opponent of Munich - carefully chose his nouns and adjectives in his speech of November 12th, 1939, when he spoke of "the Polish, Czech and Slovak people". In his original draft he mentioned "the Polish and Czechoslovak nations", but on the advice of a Foreign Office official he accepted the more correct and less offensive terminology .15 V. At the outbreak of World War II the British considered it important to clarify their attitude towards Slovakia. In a message sent to Budapest on September 14th, 1939 we read: "Notification has been issued that Slovakia is to be regarded as territory in German occupation. Effect of this is that Slovakia will be treated as enemy territory for purpose of trading with the enemy, etc., but state of war does not exist between the United Kingdom and Slovakia and Slovaks are not at present to be regarded as enemy nationals in the United Kingdom." 16 But contrary to what was asserted by the defecting Slovak diplomats, Szatmary and Harminc, and apparently believed by the British, Slovakia was not occupied by German troops. Unfortunately after the recall of the British Consul from Bratislava and the defection of the Slovak Consul in London there were no channels of communication between Britain and Slovakia to find out what really went on. On the other hand the enemies of Slovakia and the emigre pretenders of "the oppressed Slovak people" had their field day. By intrigues, half-truths and outright lies they tried to blacken the Slovak record and discredit the idea of Slovak independence. Initially the British Foreign Office did not accept these emigre confidences at face value but passed them for comment to the British Consul P. Pares. Pares' comments and corrections (from Budapest where he had resided from September 1939) are most remarkable documents because it was not often that the Slovak cause found a judicious and objective commentator in a complete foreigner. �SLOVAKIA 73 The type of material forwarded to Mr. Pares for comment consisted mainly of "Weekly summaries" issued by the Political Intelligence Department. The information was collected mainly by R. H. Bruce Lockhart who was a willing and polite listener to many emigre accounts, stories, etc. 17 As a long-standing friend of Jan Masaryk18 and Dr. Benes Bruce Lockhart did more than anybody else towards the promotion of the Czech (i. e. anti-Slovak) interests and towards the acceptance of Dr. Benes as the spokesman for all the "Czechoslovaks". Bruce Lockhart acted in good faith and with sincere conviction but there is no doubt that his credulity was taken for a ride and his official position exploited. Dr. J . Smutny, Benes's secretary and his closest collaborator in London, wrote quite frankly (in March 1940): "Benes is unwilling to participate in the Czech emigre activities except as some sort of 'President' ... As a practical politician he knows that it is not enough for him alone to be of this opinion, but this opinion must be shared by others too. The British Government in particular must accept this view. For this reason every person who comes from the Protectorate and says that the nation stands behind Benes, is carefully put into contact with British circles to give them authentic confirmation. He (the new arrival) does not know about this game, it is all done very cleverly. Every written or verbal message which states the same (i.e. that the nation stands behind Benes) is passed on to the Foreign Office through Mr. Bruce Lockhart." 19 Material "passed on to the Foreign Office through Mr. Bruce Lockhart" formed then the bulk of these "Weekly summaries". But apart from Benes and his hard working staff of informants there were also other intelligence harbingers, such as M. Hodza. Milan Hodza tried his utmost to cast himself in the role of the sole and rightful spokesman for the Slovaks. Benes and Hodza did not see eye to eye with each other but they were of one mind when it came to denouncing and condemning everything which had happened in Slovakia since their inglorious exit. The "Summaries" regularly reported about "the grow- �74 SLOVAKIA ing disillusionment of Slovaks with their 'autonomy'". The British Consul (P. Pares) in his comments refutes this allegation. He points out that the informants and their sources represent but a small discontented group and their views are at variance with those of the majority. And then he singles out an important fact: "The use of the term 'disillusionment' is in itself misleading since from the moment when independence was declared the Slovaks never had any illusions about the difficulties and risks of their situation as a nation of two million people in the centre of Europe. Popular enthusiasm for the declaration of independence was noticeably lacking last March and if there had been any it would have been quickly dispelled by the small war with Hungary which immediately followed. One solid cause for satisfaction still remains in spite of Slovakia's need for dependence on one or other of the stronger neighbouring nations and that is the fact that after one thousand years the internal political administration has at last passed exclusively into the hands of Slovaks. Economic and political dependence on either Germany, the Czechs or Hungary is inevitable so long as Slovakia remains an independent state but the right of full self-administration is a pure gain which is entirely due to the establishment of the Re-public ( of Slovakia) and goes far towards reconciling the Slovaks with the drawbacks of their political position." 20 The "Summaries" invariably harped upon reduced living standards in Slovakia since March 1939. Mr. Pares again was able to point out that the standard of living of the peasantry had not been reduced, while there were "solid (economic) gains of the majority of the middle class". He also refuted the false claims regarding the remittance of the Slovak workers' savings from Germany. Where the Czech-inspired "Summaries" report "that most members of the (Slovak) Government are looked upon as gangsters", Mr. Pares jumps to their defence: "Of the seven ministers, three, namely M. Stano, M. Sivak and M. Pruzinsky are Czechophil moderates belonging to the Hlinka party (M. Sivak was head of �SLOVAKIA 75 the government installed by the Czechs on March 9th when Dr. Tiso was deposed) and all three were members of M. Sidor's Czechophil government which succeeded Sivak's. Of the other three, two (Fritz and Medricky) occupy minor posts, and Dr. Durcansky has travelled far politically since the days when he broadcast against the Czechs over the Vienna wireless.21 All these facts are very well known to Slovaks and it is inconceivable that they should hold the view ascribed to them in the Summary. The general attitude towards Dr. Tuka, the present Prime Minister, is indeed hostile but there is no reason to suppose that this unpopularity extends to the members of his cabinet." Drawing on his local knowledge of the Slovak scene Mr. Pares makes penetrating observations about the end of the Protestant predominance in Slovak political and public affairs: "The Protestant predominance of 1918 has gone for ever and it is useless to seek any sort of accord between Slovaks and Czechs which was opposed to the wishes of the Slovak Catholics. Yet there are no signs that the Czecho-Slovak National Council (i. e. Committee established on November 17th, 1939 in Paris ) has made any progress towards winning over their (i.e. Catholic ) support up to the present." Commenting on the composition of the Czecho-Slovak National Committee,22 Mr. Pares expresses his doubts about the credentials of the three Slovak representatives on this body. He writes that the creators of this Committee either neglected to take into account the Catholic majority "or have been unsuccessful in their negotiations with the Catholic leaders." And he continues: "The three Slovak members of the Committee are not only Protestants but have not and never have had any political following. M. Osusky and M. Slavik are career diplomats and have lived for a long time abroad, whilst General Viest is a professional soldier. Though there is evidence to show that they are regarded with sympathy by the Slovak Protestants, it seem doubtful whether they can really claim to represent the political views of the whole Slovak people." �76 SLOVAKIA VI. Early in November 1939 the British Consul in Slovakia (Mr. P. Pares) was asked to comment on a memorandum submitted earlier by B. H. Bruce Lockhart and referring to discussions Mr. Bruce Lockhart had with Dr. Hodfa. In this conversation Hodfa stated that the Slovak population was almost unanimously behind him. He advocated a federalist solution for Slovakia which would keep the Czechs and Slovaks in one state but would grant the Slovaks that degree of autonomy which was secured by the zilina Agreement of October 6th, 1938.23 Hodfa told Bruce Lockhart that independence was virtually forced on the Slovaks and that there was an overwhelming desire for the return to old Czecho-Slovakia. 24 Mr. Pares disagreed with this view almost completely and gave a remarkably accurate interpretation of what had actually happened in March 1939. He mentions the real fears among Slovak politicians "at the end of February 1939 that the Czechs might soon take some opportunity of setting aside the spirit if not the letter of the Slovak autonomy law of October 1938". "Later these fears proved to be justified - writes Mr. Pares - when the Czech Government carried out its coup d 'e tat in Slovakia on March 9th. The effect of this coup was that, at the moment when Dr. Tiso was notified in Berlin that unless Slovakia declared her independence she would be divided between Hungary and Poland after Germany had taken what she needed, the Slovaks were in no mood to risk anything for the sake of the Czechs and therefore agreed to the German demand. Thus the opinion of the majority of people in Slovakia at the time of the declaration of independence was dominated by two main ideas: satisfaction at being rid at least of the Czech bugbear and relief at having saved the Slovak people from a partition which might have led to its complete disappearance as a nation." 25 The claims that the Slovaks were dissatisfied with their state are contradicted by the British Consul who sees the situation in its real and realistic context: �SLOVAKIA 77 "There are . . . good reasons why the Slovaks should be satisfied with this situation despite its drawbacks. Germany's authority is not excercised entirely without regard for Slovak feelings or interests. For instance, the new German Minister who arrived recently is far better liked than his predecessor ( who was removed at Dr. Durcansky's request). . . The conclusion of trade agreements with Poland, Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia and other countries during the summer ( of 1939) has assured the necessary supply of commodities such as coal, textiles, fruit, lard, coffee, etc. and the exchange of goods with the Protectorate which constituted fourfifths of Slovakia's total export trade was proceeding almost up to the outbreak of war." Mr. Pares also disputes the claims about the German occupation of Slovakia and the allegations of the arrogant behavior of the German soldiers towards native people: "The relations between the Slovak population and the German troops of occupation in the small strip of territory which constituted the military zone, were described to me as excellent by an impartial and reliable American observer as late as the beginning of August. So far as I know German soldiers - except for some deputations of officers who toured the country examining strategic roads, railways and the possibility of requisitioning local supplies - did not move outside the military zone until late in August." The British Consul ridicules the suggestions of M. Hodza that "the Slovak Government functions at the bidding of its German masters and with the support of German bayonets" and that "the Slovaks who are not prepared to accept German money have resigned from their posts" . Mr. Pares comments: "This sort of charge sounds like the kind of generalized accusations which one hears rather frequently from a Central European when he is speaking about his political opponents." In one respect, however, Mr. Pares agrees with the emigre informants: concerning the pro-Czech sentiments among the officers of the Slovak army. And here he makes an astute and surprisingly accurate prediction: "These (pro-Czech) sympathies can be discounted �78 SLOVAKIA for the present, and only when the time comes, and Germany's hold over the Czechs and Slovaks weakens, will this factor assume a real political importance." VII. At the end of 1939 there was already a noticeable shift in the British attitude towards the Slovaks. The earlier signs of a favorable disposition towards Slovakia were gradually corroded away by a conjoint action of three mutually interrelated factors: (i) The continuous stream of vicious anti-Slovak propaganda emanating from the Czech emigre groups around Dr. Benes. (ii) A powerful pro-Czech lobby among British parliamentarians, politicians and influential public figures. (iii) The contagious example of France where on October 2nd, 1939 a military agreement was concluded between the French Government and Minister Dr. E:';. Osusky who signed the agreement "on behalf of the provisional government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic". This act was followed on November 15th, 1939 by the French recognition of the Czecho-Slovak National Committee "as qualified to represent the Czecho-Slovak people and in particular to execute the agreement of October 2nd." Invoking the French precedent Dr. Benes was pressing hard for a similar concession from the British. After a prolonged negotiation he obtained on December 20th, 1939 British recognition of the Czecho-Slovak National Committee "as qualified to represent the Czecho-Slovak people". At the same time, however, it was made very plain to Dr. Benes and all concerned that "no commitments were made at this stage regarding the future of the former territories of the Czecho-Slovak Republic." 26 The fall of France in summer 1940 considerably strengthened Benes's position in London where his Committee was eventually recognized as "the provisional government" (on July 21st, 1940). From this time on if the British attitude towards the Czechs showed some restraint, it was not for the sake of the Slovaks but primarily out of consideration for the feelings of the Poles and Hungarians who too were against the restoration of the pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia and against Dr. Benes personally. In December 1940 Viscount Halifax left the position �SLOVAKIA 79 of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and his place was taken by Mr. Anthony Eden (now Earl of Avon) . Mr. Eden was a close personal friend of Jan Masaryk and Dr. Benes and was known as an outspoken antagonist of the whole appeasement policies of the Chamberlain Government. With him a new spirit-highly favorable to Czech political aspirations and ambitions-moved into the corridors of the Foreign Ministry. As the hatred and abhorrence of Hitler and his Nazism grew, so did the sympathy towards the Czechs, and the Czech emigres were quick and clever to exploit it fully. No one is going to dispute the fact that the Czechs were victims of the Munich decision, but one is taken aback by the agility with which they made themselves into poor innocent victims of Munich which they certainly were not. By branding the Munich Agreement a 'dictate' they were making dictators not only of Germany and Italy but also of France and Britain. By transferring these semantics into practical politics they shifted their blame for Munich and all the subsequent events on others, including the Western allies. The simple truth is that in the autumn of 1938 the Czech accepted the Munich Agreement with nothing more than a verbal protest when they could and should have opposed Hitler with arms. But by 1940-41 they were able to elevate their shameless capitulation into an act of supreme heroism and noble sacrifice, for which the Western powers owed them a living - Czech style. So one-sided and uncritical was the British support of Benes and his policies that they actively assisted him in the elimination of his political opponents (who had equally impressive records of both democratic tradition and anti-Nazi fighting as Benes himself) such as the Slovaks s. Osusky and M. Hodza, Czechs as L. Prchala, Sudeten Germans as W. Jaksch and many more less-known but not less meritorious antiNazis. In July 1943 Benes's secretary, J . Smutny, wrote with an air of victorious satisfaction: "Morally the greatest success of Dr. Benes lies in the fact that he managed to change Munich and our decision not to fight there and then into a victory of Czechoslovak moral strength and foresight; he was able to throw at the heads of our present allies the responsibility for OUR decision . . ." 27 �80 SLOVAKIA In the light of all this it is not difficult to see Dr. Benes succeeded in making Slovak leaders willing accomplices and in convincing the Western powers the Slovak nation desired nothing more than reunion the Czechs and himself as their president. F. V how Nazi that with n u k, Australia FOOTNOTES 1) "Daily Herald", March 3rd, 1939. 2) "Daily Express", March 15th, 1939, p. 12. 3) F. Vnuk, British Recognition of Independent Slovakia in 1939, in "Slovak Studies (Historica)", Vol. VIII, (Rome, in press). 4) The Foreign Office Archives, Political Correspondence (CzechoSlovakia) 1939-40, No. 371 / 22898/Doc. 17. In following references only volume and document numbers will be given (e. g 22896/ 47) . 5) Dr. J . M. Kirschbaum, Postoj Vel' kej Britanie k Slovenskej Republike, in "Literarny Almanach Slovaka v Amerike" (Middletown, Pa., 1960) , pp. 63-71. 6) The proclamation handed by Dr. L. Szatmary to the Polish Foreign Ministry and subsequently released to the press on September 2nd , 1939 reads: "In the name of the Slovak people and its representatives who, under the pressure of the Third Reich, have been reduced to silence and have been reproached for penetrations exclusively in the interest of Germany, I protest as the representative of the State of Slovakia in Poland against the brutal disarmament of the Slovak army, against the arbitrary occupation of Slovakia by the troops of the Third Reich, against the use of Slovakia as a base for warlike action against the brotherly Polish people. "The Slovak people, whether they be at home or abroad, will never submit to the violence of the Third Reich. "It associates itself with armed resistance against the aggressor to regain the freedom in collaboration with the civilized nations of the world, and in order that it may freely decide its own destiny. "I would be very obliged to your Excellency if the Polish Government would please acknowledge my present communication and if it would support by all its resources and those of its Allies the fight of the Slovak people to save its national honour and fatherland as well as to win true independence." Mr. Harminc's proclamation, published in the British press on September 24th, 1939 has the following to say: "The whole of Slovakia is occupied by Nazi armed forces. The voice of the Slovak people has been temporarily silenced by the ruthless abrogation of all treaties and agreements. "In the name of Slovakia I solemnly protest against this shameful betrayal, and declare that the aims and ideals of Great Britain and France are identical with those of my sorely-tried people. Milan Harminc �SLOVAKIA 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 12) 13) 14) 15) 16) 17) 18) 81 22803/ 338-9 22899/ 14-15 22899/ 17-18 "The Times" (London), Sepember 5th, 1939. "The Times" (London), September 11th, 1939. 22899/ 191-3 To which a Slovak journalist and politician, J . Mudroii, provided the following repartee: "Oh yes, they do know, Mr. Hodui. The automobile is a mechanical instrument which enables the Czechs to move into Slovakia, autonomy is a political instrument which will make them move out of Slovakia." ("Slovak", February 22nd , 1920) . Dr. Michal Mudry, Milan Hodza v Amerike, Chicago, Ill. , 1949, p. 58. 22900/ 27 22900/ 273 Mr. R. H. Bruce Lockhart gives an interesting account of his work at the Political Intelligence Department in his book, Comes the Reckoning, (London, 1947). He is the author of a sympathetic biographical sketch, Jan Masaryk: a personal memoir, (London, 1951). 19) "Acta Occiipationis Bohemiae et Moraviae", Vol. I. (Pra ha, 1966 ), p. 92. 20) This and the following quotations are taken from a memorandum 24290/79-84 which is reprinted in full in Appendix III. 21) In this memorandum Mr. Pares mentions only six out of seven ministers who ,c omprised the Slovak Government. The seventh man, who is left out, is General F. Catlos, the Minister of National Defense. 22) This Czecho-Slovak National Committee consisted of eight members : iDr. E. Benes, Dr. J . Sramek, Gen. S. Ingr, Dr. E. Outrata, Dr. H. Ripka, Dr. S. Osusky, Dr. J . Slavik, Gen. R. Viest. The last three members were Slovaks, but they were pitifully unrepresentative of the Slovak nation. Not only were they all Protestants - as Mr. Pares points out - but one of them, J. Slavik, summed up his nationalist sentiments in a self-revealing phrase: 'I am an unhyphenated Czechoslovak. " 23) In the West M. Hodza liked to put himself forward as a great and dedicated federalist. In 1941 he even published in London a book. " Federation in Central Europe." But a sad fact remains that back home, when he was the second most powerful politician in CzechoSlovakia, he did not try hard enough to implement his federalist ideas within the Czecho-Slovak framework. 24) Dr. Hodfa was asked to put his views down in writing. He did so and his memorandum (22900/ 66-70) is reproduced in full in Appendix I. 25) Mr. Pares' commentaries on Hodfa's accounts of the situation in Slovakia can be found in 22900/74-81 and are given in full in Appendix II. This and the following four quotations are taken from Mr. Pares' comments. �SLOVAKIA 82 26 ) 24288/ 60 27 ) Acta occu.pationis Bohemiae et Moraviae, Vol. I., (Praha, 1966), p. 222. Appendix I. MEMORANDUM BY DR. HODZA ON THE SITUATION IN SLOVAKIA In October 1939 Dr. Milan Hod.fa, former Prime Minister of Czecho-Slovakia, had a lengthy discussion about the political situation in Slovakia with Mr. Robert H. Bruce Lockhart of the British Foreign Office. The summary of this discussion was passed for comment to the former British Consul in Bratislava (Mr. Peter Pares) while Dr. Hodza was requested to put his view:s on paper in the form of a memorandum. In his written submission, handed to Mr. Bruce Lockhart on November 14th 1939, Dr. Hodza was less outspoken especially in his references to Dr. Benes. Even so his memorandum is an unusual document of some historical interest, particularly in its allegation - hitherto not mentioned anywhere - about the new political balance in Slovakia in the autumn of 1939. Dr. Hodza claims here the allegiance of 30 out of 49 Slovak deputies elected in 1935 (and including K. Sidor and M. Sokol). But one has to be sceptical about his mathematics . Hodza's memorandum was prefaced by a letter of Mr. Bruce Lockhart: My dear Roberts, I send you herewith a memorandum which has been given me by Dr. Hodza. It gives a picture of the alleged political line-up among l!he Slovaks. You will see that, as I predicted, the old gentleman has been careful not to put his anti-Benes and antiCzech sentiments on paper. R. H. Bruce Lockhart Yours sincerely, MEMORANDUM BY DR. HOD2A The position in Slovakia is now becoming clearer. Except for a small opportunist minority, Slovakia has never wished for separation from Bohemia and Moravia, and even the Slovak Parliament, elected in the Nazi fashion in December 1938, refused to adopt a resolution to pronounce complete separation from them. This resolution, which at the same time called upon Germany for protection, was only passed after Dr. Tiso and his four friends, who had the full support of the German S . S. and S. A., had declared that, if i,t were not accepted, Slovakia would be occupied by German troops. Up to last August Germany treated Slovakia very tactfully, not only politically but also commercially, so that even the moderate Federalists agreed that there were many advantages in being an �SLOVAK.IA 83 independent country. It was not until the preparations for war were begun in July that the situation suddenly changed, and it became obvious that Germany regarded the Slovak Government merely as a means for forcing upon Slovakia any measure, no matter how un popular. The declaration of war finally opened Slovak eyes. The present political position in Slovakia is as follows: After the cession of territory to Hungary there remained forty-nine of the sixty-four Slovak seats in the former Parliament. After the last free elections twenty-six of these were held by the parties led by Dr. Hodza ( 15), Dr. Sokol, President of the Slovak Parliament and a leader of the Catholic Federalist Group , (8) , and Dr. Jan Pauliny-Toth, leade r of the Federalist Slovak National Party, (2) . On October 3 Dr. Pauliny came to Paris and offered Dr. Hodza the co-operation of his party and of Dr. Sokol and his Catholic Federalists in the reconstitution of the Czechoslovak Republic on a federal basis. In the present ciTcumstances, of course, the co-operation of these groups must be secret. On October 10 a special envoy arrived in Paris with a similar message from M. Sidor, another Catholic Federalist and a former advocate of co-operation with the Germans. He had to resign from the Slovak Government soon after March 10, when he had opposed the German effort to establish a separate Slovakia instead of a federal Republic. His party consists of four deputies. It is thus clear that out of a total of forty-nine, thirty former Slovak deputies are in favour of a federal Republic. The nineteen remaining deputies are: i) six members of the Catholic Federalist Party who possibly still recognise Dr. Tiso as their leader; ii) five Socialist deputies, who although differing from the majority in preferring the restitution of the former semi-centralized Government to the establishment of federal methods, also support the Republic; iii) seven Slovak Communist deputies, two of whose leaders are now in Paris, and who are also in favour of the federal system : and iv) one Hungarian deputy, whose views are not known. II. At a meeting in Paris on October 12, representatives of the thirty deputies decided that the federal Republic should, from the international point of view, be a single political entity. Thus there would be one Head of the Federal State and a central Parliament and Government, with powers over foreign policy, the army, economic reconstruction, communications, and international trade and finance. Local parliaments and local governments would be in charge of education, public works, social welfare, hygiene, housing, interior administration and the police, and, in fact, of all economic problems not dealt with by the central Government and Parliament (agriculture, industry, trade, etc. ). It is desirable that federalisation should not only be the programme of the Slovak majority, but also of the Czechs abroad. If, however, the latter refuse to adopt it, this need not prevent co-operation between the Czechs and Slovaks abroad. The Slovak majority are convinced that in the restored Republic there will always be a Czecho-Slovak majority �84 SLOVAKIA in favour of a federal structure, as was the case in October 1938. The Slovak majority therefore offers to co-operate with the Czechs. There is no doubt about the importance of this collaboration. Geographically Slovakia is of the g reatest importance to Bohemia and Moravia, since it connects them with Central and Danubian Europe. Without this connection they would always be the helpless victims of the German pincers. This co-operation is equally important to Slovaks, as so-called i ndependence would always be fraught with danger for her. Co-operation between the Czech and Slovak representatives in the action abroad has now a quite special importance, as the Czechoslovak army which is to be formed in France will comprise 55, if not 60 % of Slovak agricultural labourers and industrial workers domiciled in France for years. III. The Slovak political representatives have always been unanimous in their conviction that the Czechoslovak Republic will at all times be obliged to work in very close co-operation with Poland and the neighbouring Danubian countries. The Slovaks visualise the future structure of central Europe as a confederation of sovereign states prepared to sacrifice complete sovereignty sufficiently to guarantee them independe nce and security. The basis of this scheme for federalisation may be found partly in pre vious Home Rule schemes of the Slovak Federalists and partly in a scheme which Dr. Hodza, then Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, put forward in Ma y and June 1938. This scheme, finally adopted by several leaders of the parliamentary majority, aimed at the setting up of a local Pa rliament and Government for Slovakia within the framework of a general reconstruction of the Czechoslovak political system. Up to •the end of August, some of the leading officers in the Slovak Army kept in touch with Dr. Benes and some with Dr. Hodza , through the medium of special envoys. Thus the overwhelming majority of the Slovak arm y maintained their Czechoslovak orientation. Among those abroad the former Inspector of the Slovak Army, General Viest, is a non-political soldier. The former chief of the Slovak Air Force, Major Ambrus, is, together with the vast majority of his brother-officers, in favour of Czeoho-Slovak federalism . The minutes attached to Hodza's memorandum(signed by Mr. Roberts) are of some importance as they show what kind of credibility rating Dr. Hodza enjoyed with the British Foreign Office. Mr. Roberts writes: "Dr. Hodza is not only an emigre but he was never really popular in Slovakia, where he was considered to be too closely associated with the Czech Central Government at Prague. This memorandum also clearly shows that he is still thinking in terms of the old political parties which - as Mr. Lockhart has assured me - are now completely discredited. I therefore think that we should not accept Dr. Hodza's views too readily ... " �SLOVAKIA 85 Appendix 11. Comments by Mr. P. Pares on the Bruce Lockhart account of discussions with Dr. M. Hodza. The comments were written at the British Legation in Budapest, where Mr. Pares stayed after his recall from Bratislava in September 1939. In the covering letter the Briti!sh Minister to Hungary (Mr. O'Malley) wrote to Mr. I. Kirkpatrick in London: Dear Kirkpatrick, With reference to your letter of October 19 C 16390/ 12 I enclose a memorandum by Pares commenting on Lockhart's memorandum . As I have not been much in Slovakia I will not add any remarks of my own except to say that on almost every point of which I have any knowledge I must venture to differ from Lockhart. Another golden age for emigres of all descriptions is I suppose about to dawn. It is a pity. Their political views are rarely sound. MEMORANDUM The conclusions reached in the memorandum seem to be on the whole over-simplified. The line of argument appears to be that because the independence of Slovakia was dictated by Germany and because German control of the country has increased since the Slovak State came into existence, the present Slovak government has become unpopular and the majority of Slovaks now wish for a restoration of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. This is perhaps the impression which might be derived from contacts restricted to Slovak emigres, such as General Viest, whose name is mentioned several times in the memorandum. Incidentally General Viest was on the retired list last March and at the time of my arrival in Bratislava during December 1938, the opinion of him in centralist "Czechoslovak" circles there was that he was a mediocrity in spite of the fact that he enjoyed the distinction of being the only Slovak general in the Czechoslovak army. But this interpretation of developments in Slovakia does not place sufficient emphasis on the growing apprehension felt by Dr. Tiso's autonomous Slovak provincial government at the end of February 1939, that the Czechs might soon take some opportunity of setting aside the spirit if not the letter of the Slovak autonomy law of October 1938. Dr. Tiso's opening speech at the first working session of the Slovak Diet in the middle of February made known these feelings quite clearly. Later they were proved to be justified when the Czech government carried out its coup d'etat in Slovakia on March 9. The effect of this coup was that, ait the moment when Dr. Tiso was notified in Berlin that unless Slovakia declared her independence she would be divided between Hungary and Poland after Germany had taken what she needed , the Slovaks were in no mood to risk anything for the sake of the Czechs and therefore agreed to the German demand. Thus the opinion of the majority of people in Slovakia at the time of the declaration of independence was dominated by two main ideas, �86 SLOVAKJA satisfaction at being rid at last of the Czech bugbear and relief at having saved the Slovak people from a partition which might have led to its complete disappearence as a nation. Nobody had any illusion about the difficulties and dangers of the situation and there were hardly any public displays of enthusiasm. The attitude of the middle classes and intelligentsia was either depressed or optimistic. In the first Slovak cabinet constituted afiter March 14, the names of M. Sidor and those of M. Stano and M. Pruzinsky, members of M. Sidor's former provincial government, were included and even that of Sivak, the head of the government installed by Prague after its military coup of March 9. This indicates clearly that the new government was a concentration of all the national political groups and did not represent only the successful pro-German group which ·had carried out the revolution. These points are all worth mentioning because they show that the Slovak people as a whole and their leaders even in March had no illusions about the position. Nothing appears to have occurred since then which could cause any alteration in their estimate of their position or their attitude toward the government of Dr. Tiso. There are on the other hand good reasons why the Slovaks should be satisfied with this situation despite its drawbacks. Germany's authority is not exercised entirely without regard for Slovak feelings or interests. For instance the new German Minister who arrived recently is far better liked than his predecessor (who was removed •a t Dr_ Durcansky's request) and does not make a habit of making frequent peremptory demarches on all manner of non-essential subjects and without the instructions of his government. The conclusion of trade agreements with Poland, Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia and other countries during the summer has assured the necessary supply of commodities such as coal, textiles, fruit, lard, coffee, etc., and the exchange of goods with the Protectorate which constituted four-fifths of Slovakia's total export trade, was proceeding almost normally up to the outbreak of war. The only economic problems of importance were the accumulation on a relatively large scale of frozen credits in Germany (500 million ct-owns) * and the Protectorate (200 million crowns)* due to the difficulty of obtaining manufactured goods in exchange for deliveries from Slovakia. The midle-classes are now satisfied because employment in Government offices has been opened to them on a large scale. The peasants in Eastern Slovakia have also been conciliated by increased prices for their grain this year and by the prospect of cheaper freight rates for their produce when the construction of the new railway line through Vranov in East Slovakia has been completed. A typical instance of German methods of exploitation in Slovakia is pmvided by the agreement reached between the Slovak and German governments regarding the construction of strategic roads. The Slovak programme was planned to cost 60 million crowns and was to last for two years. The Germans estimated that the cost would be doubled if the work were carried out in three months ,as they wanted, and therefore agreed with ,the Slovaks to give the contracts to German firms who would receive the difference between the Slovak estimate and the • Up to the end of August �SLOVAKIA 87 German estimate in Reichsmarks from the German Government. The labor and also such raw materials as could be supplied by Slovakia were paid for in Slovak currency whilst the machinery and tar were provided by the German contractors and paid for in Germany. The relations between the Slovaik population and the German troops of occupation in the small strip of territory which constituted the military zone, were described to me as excellent by an impartial and reliable American observer as late as the beginning of August. So far as I know German soldiers - except for some deputations of officers who toured the country examining strategic roads, railways and the possibility of requisitioning local supplies - did not move outside the military zone until late in August. When I visited the district of Orava on the Polish frontier, in the middle of May, I stayed with Slovaks and ·h eard no talk of German soldiers in the neighbourhood, though the Orava area lies next door to the Jablunkau district (which was in the military zone) and was actually used by German troops for their advance into Poland in September. The description in the memorandum of the "so-called autonomous government exercising its functions solely at the bidding of its German masters and with the support of German bayonets" does not tally with the account of the state of affairs given above. Nor is it correct, in my experience, •that the Slovaks who are not ,p repared to accept German money have resigned from their posts. I knew very many hard-working and honest officials whilst I was in Bratislava, not one of whom ever received any German money, to judge by their manner of living, or seemed likely to have accepted it, if it had been offered. This sort of charge sounds like the kind of generalized accusation which one hears rather frequently from a Central European when he is speaking about his political opponents. The political administration in Slovakia, though based on authoritarian models was generally reputed to be less stringent than in Germany owing to the easy-going temperament of the Slovaks. Dr. Pauliny Toth, the Slovak Nationalist leader whose name is mentioned in the memorandum, spent some weeks in the detention camp for political prisoners in Ilava and can testify that conditions there are Jess severe than they are said to be in Dachau or other German camps. The delay of punishing the mutinous Slovak regiments last September is another proof of the German willingness to yield to Slovak feelings on questions in which these feelings are really roused and do not conflict with any essential German interest. After the Hlinka party the most powerful single political factor in the Slovak state is perhaps the army and it is definitely "Czechoslovak" in sentiment. This is intelligible since the policy of the CzechoSlovak republic was to use the system of compulsory military service as a means of cementing the union between the two halves of the country which, although closely related from a linguistic point of view, had had no common tradition for a thousand years. In pursuit of this policy Slovak soldiers were sent to serve in Bohemia and Moravia and Czech soldiers were given a taste of the primitive conditions on the Slovak and Ruthenian borders. It is natural therefore that the Czechoslovak tradition should still be strong in the Slovak army. These �88 SLOVAKIA sympathies can be discounted for the present, and only when the time comes, and Germany's hold over the Czechs and Slo•v aks weakens, will this factor assume a real political importance. Summing up, I should say that the situation in Slovakia has not changed very much since the beginning of the country's existence as an independent state and that with the exception of the army, and some of the Lutherans, the people are not violently discontented with German control. They never had many illusions about their international position and after all the country enjoys a fair measure of autonomy with full self-administration. The attitude of the Slovak intelligentsia is on the whole one of passive disap:proV1al but not of active revolt, with the exception of a section of the Lutheran community, which was the great source of strength of the former centralists or "Czechoslovaks" and has suffered with their eclipse. In this case it is sectarian feeling rather than loss of political power which created bitter antagonism to the existing government of Catholic priests. So :fiar as I know the political influence of the Catholic priests has not diminished and I have never heard of anything which proved that they were opposed to Dr. Tiso's government. 'Dhe Slovaks are still rather suspicious of the Czechs but are beginning to see from experience that they are no worse than any other of their neighbours and also to realize that the Czech regime brought considerable benefits to the country. This is certainly a positive development, but it is a long way from this to a desire for the restoration of the Czecho-Slovak State. In my opinion the restoration depends almost entirely on the manner in which the present Czech leaders set about conciliating the proper quarters in Slovakia. By this I mean the rather bigoted Catholic element embodied in the Hlinka Party and not the arrogant Lutheran minority who were formerly the Czechs' supporters and proteges. The conditions for such an attempt are not unfavourable now but a beginning must be made soon or it may be too late. Political revenge will have to be foregone and much patience and tole:riance will be required on the Czech side. It may be asked why, if the majority of Slovaks are satisfied with their independence thus far, should they be ready to help restore the Czecho-Slovak republic. The answer is that they are aware of the dangers which surround them and might therefore be prepared on certain terms to accept union with the .Czechs as a stronger Slav power. Proof of this uneasiness is to be found in the rather maladroit advances of Dr. Durcansky to the Slovak emig:rants in Paris during the summer. More than once I have observed that Slovak officials are perturbed by the fear that Slovakia may find herself on the wrong side at the end of the war and they therefore attempt to ingratiate themselves simultaneously with Germany and with the representatives of the Wes tern powers. The entry of Russia on the Central European scene has introduced a new factor. It is not out of the question that if the Czechs do not come to terms with the Slovaks. quickly, the situation may change so that the rapprochement would no longer be considered desirable by the Slovaks. P. Pares �SLOVAKIA 89 Appendix Ill. MEMORANDUM OF MR. P. PARES ON "WEEKLY SUMMARIES" NO. 10. (These "Weekly Summaries" were surveys of politically significant events in the Protectorate and Slovakia prepared by the Political Intelligence Department of the British Foreign Office and based on information obtained from Czech and Slovak emigres, recent arrivals, press and radio news, etc. In this memorandum Mr. Pares refutes much of the emigre information as biased and unreliable.) Almost every issue of the Weekly Summary has contained reference to the griowing disillusionment of Slovaks with their "autonomy" ( presumably Slovak independence is meant) yet this tendency is not confirmed by the information available here. It must be admitted however that members of the Legation staff have not had opportunities of making contact with Slovaks during the last six weeks owing to Slovaks' fears of falling under the suspicion of the Gestapo. A possible explanation of this differences is that many of the reports reaching London directly may come through the Slovak political emigrants who are nearly all Protestants and not only are opposed to the present Slovak regime themselves but draw their information from Protestant sources in Slovakia which are also in bitter opposition. The number of Catholic Slovaks who have been obliged to go into exile is very small for the obvious reason that the revolution of October 1938 brought the Catholic majority into ;p ower. The use of the term "disillusionment" is in itself misleading since from the moment when independence was declared the Slovaks never had any illusions about the difficulties and risks of their situation as a nation of two million ipeople in the centre of Europe. Popular enthusiasm for the declaratiion of independence was noticeably lacking last March and if ,t here had been ,a ny it would have been quickly dispelled by the small war with Hungary which immediately followed. One solid cause for satisfaction still remains in spite of Slovakia's need for dependence on one or other of the stronger neighbouring nations and that is the fact that after one thousand years the internal political administi,ation has at last passed exclusively into the hands of Slovaks. Economic and political dependence on either Germany, the Czechs or Hungary is inevitable so long as Slovakia remains an independent state but the right of full self-administration is a pure gain which is entirely due to the establishment of the Republic and goes far towards reconciling the Slovaks with the drawbacks of their political position. It is doubtful whether, as the Summary of December 5 (No. 10) suggests, the general standard of living has been reduced. During the summer cost of living bonuses were paid to workers whilst employment and conditions of pay among the "white collar" cl.ass appeared to have improved. The standard of living of the Slovak peasant has always been near the minimum necessary for existence and there have been no signs so far thait it has been reduced. On the contrary prices fixed by the grain monopoly this season were in some districts better than these offered last year under the Czecho-Slovak republic. Among the �90 SLOVAKIA middle class there has been a large transference of wealth due to the laws against Jews and the discriminatory practices against Czechs. Government service has been opened to the Slovak middle class and what this means may be inferred from the fact that even at the end of December 1938 when many Czechs had already returned to Bohemia there were still 36,000 of them in government employment in Slovakia. Slovaks were now also able to assert their predominance in the profession such as the Jaw, medicine etc. Thus there is little reason why the average member of the Slovak middle class should complain. If anybody has suffered through the recent changes it is the comparatively small body of well-to-do landowners and businessmen who have sold large quantities of goods to Germany, and the Protectorate, without being able to get their money owing to Germany's inability to pay cash for what she buys. But the losses of these people are insignificant compared with the solid gains of the majority of the middle class. The statement contained in Summary No. 10 rega1·ding the remittance of Slovak workers' sa vings from Germany is incorrect. According to a recent official announcement the Slovak National Bank has alread y advanced over 90 million crowns to the relatives of Slovak workers employed in Germany and although this arrangement has only shifted the burden of inconvenience from the Slovak workers to the Bank, the former are presumably quite satisfied with it. Only in a few cases have workmen returning from Germany attempted to disregard the regulation by bringing their earnings with them instead of depositing them to a German bank, but so far as I know the Slovak National Bank has been able to smooth out the difficulties which have arisen in their way. There appears to be some exaggeration in the opinion ( page 5 of No. 10 ) that most members of the government are looked upon as gangsters. Of the seven ministers, three, namely M. Stano, M. Sivak and M. Pruzinsky are Czechophil moderates belonging to the Hlinka party (M. Sivak was head of the government installed by the Czechs on March 9 when Dr. Tiso was deposed) and all three were members of M. Sidor's Czechophil government which succeeded Sivak's. Of the other three two occupy minor posts and Dr. Durcansky has travelled far politically since the days when he broadcast against the Czechs over the Viennese wireless. All these facts are very well known to Slovaks and it is inconceivable that they should hold the view ascribed to them in the Summary. The general attitude towards Dr. Tuka, the present Prime Minister, is indeed hostile but there is no reason to suppose that his unpopularity extends to the members of his cabinet. The Summaries do not offer any precise infonnation regarding the attitude of the Slovaks to the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris but on page 5 of No. 10 appears the statement that "were Slovakia free to exercise her choice, there is little doubt that a combination of forces headed by Dr. Hodza and M. Sidor, backed by a small but influential Protestant autonomy party, would command the votes of the vast majority of Slovakia." It is quite true that such a combination would be overwhelming. It is equally true that the support of some of the Catholic leaders of the Hlinka party must be enlisted by the Czecho-Slovak National Council before it can fully establish its claim to represent the Slovak people. The Protestants in Slovakia do not number more than 300,000 and �91 SLOVAKIA though the influence of their community in the economic and cultural life of Slovakia is out of all proportion to the total number of its members, the growing self-consciousness and power of one and a half million Catholics now make the most imrpo:rtant political factor in the Slovak State. The Protestant predominance of 1918 has gone for ever and it is useless to seek any sort of accord between Slovaks and Czechs which was opposed to the wishes of the Slovak Catholics. Yet there are no signs that the Czecho-Slov,a k National Council has made any progress towards winning over their support up to the present. The composition of the present National Council seems to show that its creators have either neglected ·t his point or have been unsuccessful in their negotiations with the Catholic leaders. The three Slovak members of the Council are not only Protestants but have not and never have had any ,p olitical following. M. Osusky and M . Slavik are career diplomats and have lived for a long time abroad whilst General Viest is a professional soldier. Though there is evidence to show that they are regarded with sympathy by the Slovak Protestants, it seems doubtful whether they can really claim to represent the political views of the whole Slovak people. The real political leader of ,t he Slovaks is M. Sidor. He is a good political orator and a good writer on national-political subjects; but his pre-eminence among the Slovak Catholic leaders is assured not only by his personality but by the fact that he stood extremely close to Father Hlinka and is said to be his political heir. The demonstrations in his favour, which continue to occur from time to time although they embarrass him and are dangerous for his supporters, are the best proof of his great popularity. He has remained loyal to the government but is definitely dissatisfied with the present German domination which has forced him and his closest friends to abandon temrporarily their political activities. If a moment ever came when it would be safe for Slovakia to abandon her policy of subservience to Germany, it would be he who would assume the political leadership rather then anyone else. It is therefore •interesting that, according to information derived from one of his personal friends, until recently at least the CzechoSlovak leaders in Paris had been unable to reach any agreement with him. He received friendly overtures from M. Osusky last summer to which he did not reply since (in his words) "he was unwilling to go the road to Canossa." One envoy coming to him from Dr. Hodza early in October was detained by the Hungarian police in Hungary and failed to arrive. Up to this time M. Sidor was not even convinced of the necessity for reviving a federal Czecho-Slovak State, although he was not in principle opposed to it. His precise attitude appeared to be that he preferred the existing state of affairs but would accerpt a federal solution if that was the pdlicy adopted by the Western Powers. So far as is known here then it cannot be said that great progress has been made up to the present ,t owards a solution of the problem of the future relations between Czechs and Slovaks. But if collaboration could be arranged between Dr. Hodza and the Czecho-Slovak National Council on the one hand and M. Sidor and the anti-German group of the Hlinkas paiity on the other, there would be good prospects of arranging a settlement which would be lasting and satisfactory to both p_ Pares sides. 1 � SLOVAKIA 65 British Attitude Towards Independent Slovakia in 19 3 9 I. In Munich, in September 1938, the Western Powers abandoned Central and Eastern Europe to Germany (in the same manner as they were to abandon her in Yalta and Potsdam in 1944-5 to Soviet Russia) and the small countries of this region were compelled to do their best to accommodate themselves to this new change in the balance of power. Mr. Churchill (as he was then) stated this fact quite eloquently in his speech to the House of Commons on October 5th, 1939: "It must now be accepted that all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will make the best terms they can with the triumphant Nazi power." There is always some good which comes from every catastrophe. The Slovaks - though victims of the territorial aggrandizement of their neighbors (Hungary, Poland and Germany) - succeeded in the post-Munich period in their 20-year struggle for autonomy which was proclaimed on October 6th, 1938. By asserting their national identity through their own government and their own Diet the Slovaks finally overcame the arrogant and dangerous theory of a unitary "Czechoslovak" nation. The centralized pre-Munich Czechoslovakia became the federated state (hyphenated Czecho-Slovakia) of two equal nations. The Czechs had to admit the futility of their misplaced megalomania: they recognized the Slovaks as a separate nation, their language as a separate language. The rest of the world took notice of both the external and the internal changes which befell Czecho-Slovakia. The old myths, fostered and sustained by clever Czech propaganda, were demolished and a more sober political thinking was setting in. It was interesting and quite refreshing to read in the British press (in an article by G. B. Shaw at that) about "the entirely imaginary race called Czechoslovaks'',1 because that's what "Czechoslo- �66 SLOVAKIA vaks" in fact were: a figment of political imagination aimed at the absorption of the Slovak nation into the Czech nation. The subsequent events - which are now judged as the prologue to World War II - were in their day accepted as inevitable facts of life. After Munich Hitler's supremacy over Central Europe was unchallenged, his expansionist moves - even if occasionally condemned and disapproved of - were tacitly and implicitly acquiesced in. Even the disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia and the emergence of an independent Slovak state did not produce that wave of indignation and outrage with which it was to be treated later. The leader article in the "Daily Express" on March 15th , 1939 summed up the general sentiments in the following words : "Why are our heads cooler ( than they were a year ago - F . V.) ? Not because our hearts are hardened. Not because we have no sympathy with the Czechs. No. But we are not shocked by stale news. Munich decided that Germany was the boss in Eastern Europe." 2 In this frame of mind did the British people at large and the British Government view the new situation. II. The British foreign policy approach towards the new territorial and political rearrangement followed two distinct lines. Though reluctant to recognize the German " Protektorat " over Bohemia and Moravia, they saw the position of Slovakia in a different and more acceptable light.3 In a memorandum dated April 17th, 1939 the Foreign Office Central Europe expert, R. M. Makins, summarized the result of long deliberations which led to the following conclusions: "The position of Slovakia is different from that of Bohemia and Moravia and a number of practical questions have rendered it advisable for us to regularise the position of our Consul at Bratislava and to give the new state de facto recognition." 4 Shortly afterwards on May 4th, 1939 the British Consul in Bratislava notified the Slovak Foreign Minister (Dr. F. �SLOVAKIA 67 nurcansky) that the British Government had decided to grant the Slovak state a de facto recognition. The act of recognition was followed by the opening of a Slovak Consulate-General in London with Milan P. Harminc in charge. 5 This happy and promising development was suddenly arrested by the outbreak of the Second World War, in September 1939. Because of Slovakia's geographical position and treaty relations she had with her protecting power, Germany, Slovakia herself became marginally involved in the German attack on Poland. The situation was further aggravated by the defection of the Slovak Minister in Warsaw, L. Szatmary, and the Slovak Consul in London, M. Harminc. Both issued indignant proclamations - as it happened quite incorrect - alleging that Slovakia was occupied by German troops and deprived of every vestige of national independence.6 At the same time the Czech emigres in the West, led by ex-President Benes, launched their propaganda campaign for the restoration of CzechoSlovakia in its pre-Munich form. The Slovak cause in the West was at a great disadvantage. There was no one to defend it and the lies and intrigues of the adversaries of Slovak independence could go on almost unhindered. Yet it must be said in all fairness that the British attitude towards Slovakia was marked by a measure of consideration and understanding of which the Slovaks were only too infrequently the recipients. The British viewed the position of Slovakia with sensitive appreciation for the problems of a small country in the shadow of a great power. The allegations of emigre politicians - both Czechs and Slovaks - were taken with more than the proverbial grain of salt and were frequently checked against the opinions of knowledgeable experts and men-on-the-spot such as former British Consul in Bratislava Mr. P. Pares. In the British Consul the Slovaks had a severe critic but at the same time a sincere, shrewd and sympathetic observer. His deep knowledge of Slovak affairs enabled him to evaluate the moves and actions of the Slovak Government in their overall context. Already in May 1939 he had pointed out the difficult dilemma facing the Slovak leaders and their efforts to find a solution to their prob- �68 SLOVAKIA lems. Having heard rumors about their clandestine approaches to the Slovak emigres in the West (particularly towards Dr. s. Osusky in Paris), he wrote: "The object of these manoeuvres seems to be to maintain contact with the Western powers whilst pursuing a policy of cooperating with the Germans for as long as is necessary - in other words, the policy of the Czechs before and during the Great War. The Slovaks are growing very apprehensive now about the possibility of war. They do not expect Germany to win, but realize that they are powerless to refuse anything she might ask in the event of war. So they are trying to ensure the good will of the Western powers in advance by secretly approving the plans of the exiles." 7 III. Two days before Britain entered the Second World War the British Foreign Ministry issued an internal memorandum entitled "Our Attitude towards Czechs and Slovaks in Time of War." With respect to Slovaks (in spite of some unflattering remarks about their leadership ) the memorandum stated: "However true it may be that the final defection of the Slovaks last March was the result of German machination and menace and that the present Slovak Government is acting under force majeure in allowing Slovakia to be used as an assembly ground for the German attack on Poland, nevertheless the fact remains that the union of Czechs and Slovaks was not a success and it would be rash to act on the presumption that the Slovaks are now anxious to restore it ... By proclaiming the restoration of Czecho-Slovakia as a war aim, we should be assuming that the Slovaks had repented of their errors and were eager for the reunion with the Czechs. That may be so, but there are yet insufficient grounds for assurance on the point and we should not take at their face value any statements of Slovak emigres on the subject." 8 With regard to ex-President Benes the memorandum had this to say: "The question then arises what recognition we �SLOVAKIA 69 should give to Dr. Benes, if, as is only too likely, he proclaims himself leader of the Czechoslovaks. The question is not an easy one. In the first place it must be admitted that he is far and away the most outstanding Czech figure in the world. His supporters say that Czechs and Slovaks both at home and abroad are now unanimously behind him. So far as those resident abroad are concerned he might be able to produce some adequate proof, but no proof could possibly be forthcoming from those resident in their own countries. All that can be said is that he was not a popular figure in large circles in Slovakia during his presidency, and that the Czechs who assumed power in the Protectorate after his departure made no secret of their condemnation of him and his policy. It may be that they have now changed their minds, but it is difficult to see what proof can be had of the fact, and it is after all the Czechs in the Protectorate and not the emigres who matter most. A further consideration is that Dr . Benes is personally abhorrent in several other states, particularly in Poland and Hungary. All these considerations suggest that we should be wise to walk warily about any official recognition of Dr. Benes, whether as leader of the Czechs or the Czechoslovaks, though in view of his outstanding position we should presumably have no option but to accept him as their de facto spokesman". 9 As the memorandum anticipated Benes spoke out on the very day Britain entered the armed conflict. On September 3rd he wired the following telegram to the British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain: "At this moment in which the British people are obliged to wage a war imposed upon Poland, Great Britain and France by Nazi Germany I wish to express to Your Excellency with the deep and inalterable feeling of sympathy the desire and the decision of the Czechs and Slovaks to join without hesitation your people in this struggle for a free Europe. Our country is invaded and occupied by armed forces of Nazism and the whole nation is suffering under inhuman terror and oppression, its forces, however, both �70 SLOVAKIA moral and physical remain intact. We Czechoslovak citizens consider ourselves as being also in war with the German military forces and we shall march with your people till the final victory and the liberation of our fatherland. Edward Benes, former President of Czechoslovakia." 10 This telegram was carefully studied by its British recipients for hidden claims and pretensions. None was found, but it was noted that Benes spoke on behalf of "the Czechs and the Slovaks" as well as "Czechoslovak citizens". The reply (which was despatched with a six-day delay) carefully avoided any reference to either Slovaks or "Czechoslovaks" and with a studied deliberation indicated to Benes the attitude of the British Government towards him and indirectly toward Slovakia also. It read : " I gratefully acknowledge Your Excellency's generous message of sympathy and support in this grave hour. The sufferings of the Czech nation are not forgotten and we look forwards through the triumph of the principles for which we have taken up arms to the release of the Czech people from foreign domination. Neville Chamberlain." 11 This public exchange of telegrams was to demonstrate urbi et orbi that the British Government did not recognize Benes's claim to speak on behalf of the Slovaks nor were they particularly keen to restore Czecho-Slovakia. This was made explicitly clear in an explanatory letter of September 26th, 1939, sent to the Britiish Minister in Budapest (Mr. 0. St. C. O'Malley) by Sir Orme Sargent who wrote: " ... we are taking care to avoid committing ourselves to anything in the nature of a reconstitution of the old Czecho-Slovak state. In confirmation of this I would draw your attention to the answer, of which I enclose a copy, sel'lt by the Prime Minister on the 9th September to Benes's message of sympathy and support. The Prime Minister was careful to speak only of the future of the Czech people." 12 �SLOVAKIA 71 IV. This public rebuke to Dr. Benes reactivated another emigre politician, Dr. Milan Hodza, former Prime Minister of Czecho-Slovakia and a bitter antagonist of Dr. Benes. M. Hodza was a Slovak by birth. In his political outlook he was inconsistent and in his political actions unpredictable. Immediately after 1918 he was an ardent exponent of "Czechoslovak unity" and an active opponent of the Slovak autonomists ( whom he used to mock that they did not know the difference between "autonomy" and "automobile") .13 But gradually he realized the futile emptiness of the Czech centralist policies and advocated some measure of autonomy for Slovakia. In the summer of 1938 his proposals were almost identical with those of Andrej Hlinka. 14 But Benes put a stop to Hodza's autonomist plans and schemes and forbade him any further steps in this direction. At the height of the Munich crisis Benes made Hodza a convenient scapegoat for previous Czech mistakes and omissions and on September 22nd, 1938 forced him and his government to resign. Physically and mentally broken M. Hodza retired to France and then to Switzerland. It seemed that he had left politics for good. Unlike Benes he made no pronouncements issued no proclamations when Hitler dismembered Czecho-Slovakia. In the summer of 1939 he moved to London. Here he very quickly realized that official British circles considered the Czecho-Slovak interwar experiment as a mistake which they would be loath to repeat. The exchange of telegrams between Benes and Chamberlain indicated to him very plainly that the British viewed Slovakia not as a political accident but as a permanent feature of the Central European scene. In 1938-9 the British policy-makers realized that the Versailles settlement imposed on Central Europe in 1919 was not satisfactory and created as many new problems as it was supposed to solve. Consequently they were unwilling to advocate any schemes which took no notice of past mistakes. In effect it meant that the Slovaks were not to be forced into any union with the Czechs against their will. The British official circles did their best to clear up the terminological confusion concerning such expressions as Czechs, Slovaks, Czechoslovaks, Czecho- �72 SLOVAKIA Slovaks, nation, people, etc. It is interesting to note that even Mr. Churchill - a tough and consistent opponent of Munich - carefully chose his nouns and adjectives in his speech of November 12th, 1939, when he spoke of "the Polish, Czech and Slovak people". In his original draft he mentioned "the Polish and Czechoslovak nations", but on the advice of a Foreign Office official he accepted the more correct and less offensive terminology .15 V. At the outbreak of World War II the British considered it important to clarify their attitude towards Slovakia. In a message sent to Budapest on September 14th, 1939 we read: "Notification has been issued that Slovakia is to be regarded as territory in German occupation. Effect of this is that Slovakia will be treated as enemy territory for purpose of trading with the enemy, etc., but state of war does not exist between the United Kingdom and Slovakia and Slovaks are not at present to be regarded as enemy nationals in the United Kingdom." 16 But contrary to what was asserted by the defecting Slovak diplomats, Szatmary and Harminc, and apparently believed by the British, Slovakia was not occupied by German troops. Unfortunately after the recall of the British Consul from Bratislava and the defection of the Slovak Consul in London there were no channels of communication between Britain and Slovakia to find out what really went on. On the other hand the enemies of Slovakia and the emigre pretenders of "the oppressed Slovak people" had their field day. By intrigues, half-truths and outright lies they tried to blacken the Slovak record and discredit the idea of Slovak independence. Initially the British Foreign Office did not accept these emigre confidences at face value but passed them for comment to the British Consul P. Pares. Pares' comments and corrections (from Budapest where he had resided from September 1939) are most remarkable documents because it was not often that the Slovak cause found a judicious and objective commentator in a complete foreigner. �SLOVAKIA 73 The type of material forwarded to Mr. Pares for comment consisted mainly of "Weekly summaries" issued by the Political Intelligence Department. The information was collected mainly by R. H. Bruce Lockhart who was a willing and polite listener to many emigre accounts, stories, etc. 17 As a long-standing friend of Jan Masaryk18 and Dr. Benes Bruce Lockhart did more than anybody else towards the promotion of the Czech (i. e. anti-Slovak) interests and towards the acceptance of Dr. Benes as the spokesman for all the "Czechoslovaks". Bruce Lockhart acted in good faith and with sincere conviction but there is no doubt that his credulity was taken for a ride and his official position exploited. Dr. J . Smutny, Benes's secretary and his closest collaborator in London, wrote quite frankly (in March 1940): "Benes is unwilling to participate in the Czech emigre activities except as some sort of 'President' ... As a practical politician he knows that it is not enough for him alone to be of this opinion, but this opinion must be shared by others too. The British Government in particular must accept this view. For this reason every person who comes from the Protectorate and says that the nation stands behind Benes, is carefully put into contact with British circles to give them authentic confirmation. He (the new arrival) does not know about this game, it is all done very cleverly. Every written or verbal message which states the same (i.e. that the nation stands behind Benes) is passed on to the Foreign Office through Mr. Bruce Lockhart." 19 Material "passed on to the Foreign Office through Mr. Bruce Lockhart" formed then the bulk of these "Weekly summaries". But apart from Benes and his hard working staff of informants there were also other intelligence harbingers, such as M. Hodza. Milan Hodza tried his utmost to cast himself in the role of the sole and rightful spokesman for the Slovaks. Benes and Hodza did not see eye to eye with each other but they were of one mind when it came to denouncing and condemning everything which had happened in Slovakia since their inglorious exit. The "Summaries" regularly reported about "the grow- �74 SLOVAKIA ing disillusionment of Slovaks with their 'autonomy'". The British Consul (P. Pares) in his comments refutes this allegation. He points out that the informants and their sources represent but a small discontented group and their views are at variance with those of the majority. And then he singles out an important fact: "The use of the term 'disillusionment' is in itself misleading since from the moment when independence was declared the Slovaks never had any illusions about the difficulties and risks of their situation as a nation of two million people in the centre of Europe. Popular enthusiasm for the declaration of independence was noticeably lacking last March and if there had been any it would have been quickly dispelled by the small war with Hungary which immediately followed. One solid cause for satisfaction still remains in spite of Slovakia's need for dependence on one or other of the stronger neighbouring nations and that is the fact that after one thousand years the internal political administration has at last passed exclusively into the hands of Slovaks. Economic and political dependence on either Germany, the Czechs or Hungary is inevitable so long as Slovakia remains an independent state but the right of full self-administration is a pure gain which is entirely due to the establishment of the Re-public ( of Slovakia) and goes far towards reconciling the Slovaks with the drawbacks of their political position." 20 The "Summaries" invariably harped upon reduced living standards in Slovakia since March 1939. Mr. Pares again was able to point out that the standard of living of the peasantry had not been reduced, while there were "solid (economic) gains of the majority of the middle class". He also refuted the false claims regarding the remittance of the Slovak workers' savings from Germany. Where the Czech-inspired "Summaries" report "that most members of the (Slovak) Government are looked upon as gangsters", Mr. Pares jumps to their defence: "Of the seven ministers, three, namely M. Stano, M. Sivak and M. Pruzinsky are Czechophil moderates belonging to the Hlinka party (M. Sivak was head of �SLOVAKIA 75 the government installed by the Czechs on March 9th when Dr. Tiso was deposed) and all three were members of M. Sidor's Czechophil government which succeeded Sivak's. Of the other three, two (Fritz and Medricky) occupy minor posts, and Dr. Durcansky has travelled far politically since the days when he broadcast against the Czechs over the Vienna wireless.21 All these facts are very well known to Slovaks and it is inconceivable that they should hold the view ascribed to them in the Summary. The general attitude towards Dr. Tuka, the present Prime Minister, is indeed hostile but there is no reason to suppose that this unpopularity extends to the members of his cabinet." Drawing on his local knowledge of the Slovak scene Mr. Pares makes penetrating observations about the end of the Protestant predominance in Slovak political and public affairs: "The Protestant predominance of 1918 has gone for ever and it is useless to seek any sort of accord between Slovaks and Czechs which was opposed to the wishes of the Slovak Catholics. Yet there are no signs that the Czecho-Slovak National Council (i. e. Committee established on November 17th, 1939 in Paris ) has made any progress towards winning over their (i.e. Catholic ) support up to the present." Commenting on the composition of the Czecho-Slovak National Committee,22 Mr. Pares expresses his doubts about the credentials of the three Slovak representatives on this body. He writes that the creators of this Committee either neglected to take into account the Catholic majority "or have been unsuccessful in their negotiations with the Catholic leaders." And he continues: "The three Slovak members of the Committee are not only Protestants but have not and never have had any political following. M. Osusky and M. Slavik are career diplomats and have lived for a long time abroad, whilst General Viest is a professional soldier. Though there is evidence to show that they are regarded with sympathy by the Slovak Protestants, it seem doubtful whether they can really claim to represent the political views of the whole Slovak people." �76 SLOVAKIA VI. Early in November 1939 the British Consul in Slovakia (Mr. P. Pares) was asked to comment on a memorandum submitted earlier by B. H. Bruce Lockhart and referring to discussions Mr. Bruce Lockhart had with Dr. Hodfa. In this conversation Hodfa stated that the Slovak population was almost unanimously behind him. He advocated a federalist solution for Slovakia which would keep the Czechs and Slovaks in one state but would grant the Slovaks that degree of autonomy which was secured by the zilina Agreement of October 6th, 1938.23 Hodfa told Bruce Lockhart that independence was virtually forced on the Slovaks and that there was an overwhelming desire for the return to old Czecho-Slovakia. 24 Mr. Pares disagreed with this view almost completely and gave a remarkably accurate interpretation of what had actually happened in March 1939. He mentions the real fears among Slovak politicians "at the end of February 1939 that the Czechs might soon take some opportunity of setting aside the spirit if not the letter of the Slovak autonomy law of October 1938". "Later these fears proved to be justified - writes Mr. Pares - when the Czech Government carried out its coup d 'e tat in Slovakia on March 9th. The effect of this coup was that, at the moment when Dr. Tiso was notified in Berlin that unless Slovakia declared her independence she would be divided between Hungary and Poland after Germany had taken what she needed, the Slovaks were in no mood to risk anything for the sake of the Czechs and therefore agreed to the German demand. Thus the opinion of the majority of people in Slovakia at the time of the declaration of independence was dominated by two main ideas: satisfaction at being rid at least of the Czech bugbear and relief at having saved the Slovak people from a partition which might have led to its complete disappearance as a nation." 25 The claims that the Slovaks were dissatisfied with their state are contradicted by the British Consul who sees the situation in its real and realistic context: �SLOVAKIA 77 "There are . . . good reasons why the Slovaks should be satisfied with this situation despite its drawbacks. Germany's authority is not excercised entirely without regard for Slovak feelings or interests. For instance, the new German Minister who arrived recently is far better liked than his predecessor ( who was removed at Dr. Durcansky's request). . . The conclusion of trade agreements with Poland, Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia and other countries during the summer ( of 1939) has assured the necessary supply of commodities such as coal, textiles, fruit, lard, coffee, etc. and the exchange of goods with the Protectorate which constituted fourfifths of Slovakia's total export trade was proceeding almost up to the outbreak of war." Mr. Pares also disputes the claims about the German occupation of Slovakia and the allegations of the arrogant behavior of the German soldiers towards native people: "The relations between the Slovak population and the German troops of occupation in the small strip of territory which constituted the military zone, were described to me as excellent by an impartial and reliable American observer as late as the beginning of August. So far as I know German soldiers - except for some deputations of officers who toured the country examining strategic roads, railways and the possibility of requisitioning local supplies - did not move outside the military zone until late in August." The British Consul ridicules the suggestions of M. Hodza that "the Slovak Government functions at the bidding of its German masters and with the support of German bayonets" and that "the Slovaks who are not prepared to accept German money have resigned from their posts" . Mr. Pares comments: "This sort of charge sounds like the kind of generalized accusations which one hears rather frequently from a Central European when he is speaking about his political opponents." In one respect, however, Mr. Pares agrees with the emigre informants: concerning the pro-Czech sentiments among the officers of the Slovak army. And here he makes an astute and surprisingly accurate prediction: "These (pro-Czech) sympathies can be discounted �78 SLOVAKIA for the present, and only when the time comes, and Germany's hold over the Czechs and Slovaks weakens, will this factor assume a real political importance." VII. At the end of 1939 there was already a noticeable shift in the British attitude towards the Slovaks. The earlier signs of a favorable disposition towards Slovakia were gradually corroded away by a conjoint action of three mutually interrelated factors: (i) The continuous stream of vicious anti-Slovak propaganda emanating from the Czech emigre groups around Dr. Benes. (ii) A powerful pro-Czech lobby among British parliamentarians, politicians and influential public figures. (iii) The contagious example of France where on October 2nd, 1939 a military agreement was concluded between the French Government and Minister Dr. E:';. Osusky who signed the agreement "on behalf of the provisional government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic". This act was followed on November 15th, 1939 by the French recognition of the Czecho-Slovak National Committee "as qualified to represent the Czecho-Slovak people and in particular to execute the agreement of October 2nd." Invoking the French precedent Dr. Benes was pressing hard for a similar concession from the British. After a prolonged negotiation he obtained on December 20th, 1939 British recognition of the Czecho-Slovak National Committee "as qualified to represent the Czecho-Slovak people". At the same time, however, it was made very plain to Dr. Benes and all concerned that "no commitments were made at this stage regarding the future of the former territories of the Czecho-Slovak Republic." 26 The fall of France in summer 1940 considerably strengthened Benes's position in London where his Committee was eventually recognized as "the provisional government" (on July 21st, 1940). From this time on if the British attitude towards the Czechs showed some restraint, it was not for the sake of the Slovaks but primarily out of consideration for the feelings of the Poles and Hungarians who too were against the restoration of the pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia and against Dr. Benes personally. In December 1940 Viscount Halifax left the position �SLOVAKIA 79 of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and his place was taken by Mr. Anthony Eden (now Earl of Avon) . Mr. Eden was a close personal friend of Jan Masaryk and Dr. Benes and was known as an outspoken antagonist of the whole appeasement policies of the Chamberlain Government. With him a new spirit-highly favorable to Czech political aspirations and ambitions-moved into the corridors of the Foreign Ministry. As the hatred and abhorrence of Hitler and his Nazism grew, so did the sympathy towards the Czechs, and the Czech emigres were quick and clever to exploit it fully. No one is going to dispute the fact that the Czechs were victims of the Munich decision, but one is taken aback by the agility with which they made themselves into poor innocent victims of Munich which they certainly were not. By branding the Munich Agreement a 'dictate' they were making dictators not only of Germany and Italy but also of France and Britain. By transferring these semantics into practical politics they shifted their blame for Munich and all the subsequent events on others, including the Western allies. The simple truth is that in the autumn of 1938 the Czech accepted the Munich Agreement with nothing more than a verbal protest when they could and should have opposed Hitler with arms. But by 1940-41 they were able to elevate their shameless capitulation into an act of supreme heroism and noble sacrifice, for which the Western powers owed them a living - Czech style. So one-sided and uncritical was the British support of Benes and his policies that they actively assisted him in the elimination of his political opponents (who had equally impressive records of both democratic tradition and anti-Nazi fighting as Benes himself) such as the Slovaks s. Osusky and M. Hodza, Czechs as L. Prchala, Sudeten Germans as W. Jaksch and many more less-known but not less meritorious antiNazis. In July 1943 Benes's secretary, J . Smutny, wrote with an air of victorious satisfaction: "Morally the greatest success of Dr. Benes lies in the fact that he managed to change Munich and our decision not to fight there and then into a victory of Czechoslovak moral strength and foresight; he was able to throw at the heads of our present allies the responsibility for OUR decision . . ." 27 �80 SLOVAKIA In the light of all this it is not difficult to see Dr. Benes succeeded in making Slovak leaders willing accomplices and in convincing the Western powers the Slovak nation desired nothing more than reunion the Czechs and himself as their president. F. V how Nazi that with n u k, Australia FOOTNOTES 1) "Daily Herald", March 3rd, 1939. 2) "Daily Express", March 15th, 1939, p. 12. 3) F. Vnuk, British Recognition of Independent Slovakia in 1939, in "Slovak Studies (Historica)", Vol. VIII, (Rome, in press). 4) The Foreign Office Archives, Political Correspondence (CzechoSlovakia) 1939-40, No. 371 / 22898/Doc. 17. In following references only volume and document numbers will be given (e. g 22896/ 47) . 5) Dr. J . M. Kirschbaum, Postoj Vel' kej Britanie k Slovenskej Republike, in "Literarny Almanach Slovaka v Amerike" (Middletown, Pa., 1960) , pp. 63-71. 6) The proclamation handed by Dr. L. Szatmary to the Polish Foreign Ministry and subsequently released to the press on September 2nd , 1939 reads: "In the name of the Slovak people and its representatives who, under the pressure of the Third Reich, have been reduced to silence and have been reproached for penetrations exclusively in the interest of Germany, I protest as the representative of the State of Slovakia in Poland against the brutal disarmament of the Slovak army, against the arbitrary occupation of Slovakia by the troops of the Third Reich, against the use of Slovakia as a base for warlike action against the brotherly Polish people. "The Slovak people, whether they be at home or abroad, will never submit to the violence of the Third Reich. "It associates itself with armed resistance against the aggressor to regain the freedom in collaboration with the civilized nations of the world, and in order that it may freely decide its own destiny. "I would be very obliged to your Excellency if the Polish Government would please acknowledge my present communication and if it would support by all its resources and those of its Allies the fight of the Slovak people to save its national honour and fatherland as well as to win true independence." Mr. Harminc's proclamation, published in the British press on September 24th, 1939 has the following to say: "The whole of Slovakia is occupied by Nazi armed forces. The voice of the Slovak people has been temporarily silenced by the ruthless abrogation of all treaties and agreements. "In the name of Slovakia I solemnly protest against this shameful betrayal, and declare that the aims and ideals of Great Britain and France are identical with those of my sorely-tried people. Milan Harminc �SLOVAKIA 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 12) 13) 14) 15) 16) 17) 18) 81 22803/ 338-9 22899/ 14-15 22899/ 17-18 "The Times" (London), Sepember 5th, 1939. "The Times" (London), September 11th, 1939. 22899/ 191-3 To which a Slovak journalist and politician, J . Mudroii, provided the following repartee: "Oh yes, they do know, Mr. Hodui. The automobile is a mechanical instrument which enables the Czechs to move into Slovakia, autonomy is a political instrument which will make them move out of Slovakia." ("Slovak", February 22nd , 1920) . Dr. Michal Mudry, Milan Hodza v Amerike, Chicago, Ill. , 1949, p. 58. 22900/ 27 22900/ 273 Mr. R. H. Bruce Lockhart gives an interesting account of his work at the Political Intelligence Department in his book, Comes the Reckoning, (London, 1947). He is the author of a sympathetic biographical sketch, Jan Masaryk: a personal memoir, (London, 1951). 19) "Acta Occiipationis Bohemiae et Moraviae", Vol. I. (Pra ha, 1966 ), p. 92. 20) This and the following quotations are taken from a memorandum 24290/79-84 which is reprinted in full in Appendix III. 21) In this memorandum Mr. Pares mentions only six out of seven ministers who ,c omprised the Slovak Government. The seventh man, who is left out, is General F. Catlos, the Minister of National Defense. 22) This Czecho-Slovak National Committee consisted of eight members : iDr. E. Benes, Dr. J . Sramek, Gen. S. Ingr, Dr. E. Outrata, Dr. H. Ripka, Dr. S. Osusky, Dr. J . Slavik, Gen. R. Viest. The last three members were Slovaks, but they were pitifully unrepresentative of the Slovak nation. Not only were they all Protestants - as Mr. Pares points out - but one of them, J. Slavik, summed up his nationalist sentiments in a self-revealing phrase: 'I am an unhyphenated Czechoslovak. " 23) In the West M. Hodza liked to put himself forward as a great and dedicated federalist. In 1941 he even published in London a book. " Federation in Central Europe." But a sad fact remains that back home, when he was the second most powerful politician in CzechoSlovakia, he did not try hard enough to implement his federalist ideas within the Czecho-Slovak framework. 24) Dr. Hodfa was asked to put his views down in writing. He did so and his memorandum (22900/ 66-70) is reproduced in full in Appendix I. 25) Mr. Pares' commentaries on Hodfa's accounts of the situation in Slovakia can be found in 22900/74-81 and are given in full in Appendix II. This and the following four quotations are taken from Mr. Pares' comments. �SLOVAKIA 82 26 ) 24288/ 60 27 ) Acta occu.pationis Bohemiae et Moraviae, Vol. I., (Praha, 1966), p. 222. Appendix I. MEMORANDUM BY DR. HODZA ON THE SITUATION IN SLOVAKIA In October 1939 Dr. Milan Hod.fa, former Prime Minister of Czecho-Slovakia, had a lengthy discussion about the political situation in Slovakia with Mr. Robert H. Bruce Lockhart of the British Foreign Office. The summary of this discussion was passed for comment to the former British Consul in Bratislava (Mr. Peter Pares) while Dr. Hodza was requested to put his view:s on paper in the form of a memorandum. In his written submission, handed to Mr. Bruce Lockhart on November 14th 1939, Dr. Hodza was less outspoken especially in his references to Dr. Benes. Even so his memorandum is an unusual document of some historical interest, particularly in its allegation - hitherto not mentioned anywhere - about the new political balance in Slovakia in the autumn of 1939. Dr. Hodza claims here the allegiance of 30 out of 49 Slovak deputies elected in 1935 (and including K. Sidor and M. Sokol). But one has to be sceptical about his mathematics . Hodza's memorandum was prefaced by a letter of Mr. Bruce Lockhart: My dear Roberts, I send you herewith a memorandum which has been given me by Dr. Hodza. It gives a picture of the alleged political line-up among l!he Slovaks. You will see that, as I predicted, the old gentleman has been careful not to put his anti-Benes and antiCzech sentiments on paper. R. H. Bruce Lockhart Yours sincerely, MEMORANDUM BY DR. HOD2A The position in Slovakia is now becoming clearer. Except for a small opportunist minority, Slovakia has never wished for separation from Bohemia and Moravia, and even the Slovak Parliament, elected in the Nazi fashion in December 1938, refused to adopt a resolution to pronounce complete separation from them. This resolution, which at the same time called upon Germany for protection, was only passed after Dr. Tiso and his four friends, who had the full support of the German S . S. and S. A., had declared that, if i,t were not accepted, Slovakia would be occupied by German troops. Up to last August Germany treated Slovakia very tactfully, not only politically but also commercially, so that even the moderate Federalists agreed that there were many advantages in being an �SLOVAK.IA 83 independent country. It was not until the preparations for war were begun in July that the situation suddenly changed, and it became obvious that Germany regarded the Slovak Government merely as a means for forcing upon Slovakia any measure, no matter how un popular. The declaration of war finally opened Slovak eyes. The present political position in Slovakia is as follows: After the cession of territory to Hungary there remained forty-nine of the sixty-four Slovak seats in the former Parliament. After the last free elections twenty-six of these were held by the parties led by Dr. Hodza ( 15), Dr. Sokol, President of the Slovak Parliament and a leader of the Catholic Federalist Group , (8) , and Dr. Jan Pauliny-Toth, leade r of the Federalist Slovak National Party, (2) . On October 3 Dr. Pauliny came to Paris and offered Dr. Hodza the co-operation of his party and of Dr. Sokol and his Catholic Federalists in the reconstitution of the Czechoslovak Republic on a federal basis. In the present ciTcumstances, of course, the co-operation of these groups must be secret. On October 10 a special envoy arrived in Paris with a similar message from M. Sidor, another Catholic Federalist and a former advocate of co-operation with the Germans. He had to resign from the Slovak Government soon after March 10, when he had opposed the German effort to establish a separate Slovakia instead of a federal Republic. His party consists of four deputies. It is thus clear that out of a total of forty-nine, thirty former Slovak deputies are in favour of a federal Republic. The nineteen remaining deputies are: i) six members of the Catholic Federalist Party who possibly still recognise Dr. Tiso as their leader; ii) five Socialist deputies, who although differing from the majority in preferring the restitution of the former semi-centralized Government to the establishment of federal methods, also support the Republic; iii) seven Slovak Communist deputies, two of whose leaders are now in Paris, and who are also in favour of the federal system : and iv) one Hungarian deputy, whose views are not known. II. At a meeting in Paris on October 12, representatives of the thirty deputies decided that the federal Republic should, from the international point of view, be a single political entity. Thus there would be one Head of the Federal State and a central Parliament and Government, with powers over foreign policy, the army, economic reconstruction, communications, and international trade and finance. Local parliaments and local governments would be in charge of education, public works, social welfare, hygiene, housing, interior administration and the police, and, in fact, of all economic problems not dealt with by the central Government and Parliament (agriculture, industry, trade, etc. ). It is desirable that federalisation should not only be the programme of the Slovak majority, but also of the Czechs abroad. If, however, the latter refuse to adopt it, this need not prevent co-operation between the Czechs and Slovaks abroad. The Slovak majority are convinced that in the restored Republic there will always be a Czecho-Slovak majority �84 SLOVAKIA in favour of a federal structure, as was the case in October 1938. The Slovak majority therefore offers to co-operate with the Czechs. There is no doubt about the importance of this collaboration. Geographically Slovakia is of the g reatest importance to Bohemia and Moravia, since it connects them with Central and Danubian Europe. Without this connection they would always be the helpless victims of the German pincers. This co-operation is equally important to Slovaks, as so-called i ndependence would always be fraught with danger for her. Co-operation between the Czech and Slovak representatives in the action abroad has now a quite special importance, as the Czechoslovak army which is to be formed in France will comprise 55, if not 60 % of Slovak agricultural labourers and industrial workers domiciled in France for years. III. The Slovak political representatives have always been unanimous in their conviction that the Czechoslovak Republic will at all times be obliged to work in very close co-operation with Poland and the neighbouring Danubian countries. The Slovaks visualise the future structure of central Europe as a confederation of sovereign states prepared to sacrifice complete sovereignty sufficiently to guarantee them independe nce and security. The basis of this scheme for federalisation may be found partly in pre vious Home Rule schemes of the Slovak Federalists and partly in a scheme which Dr. Hodza, then Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, put forward in Ma y and June 1938. This scheme, finally adopted by several leaders of the parliamentary majority, aimed at the setting up of a local Pa rliament and Government for Slovakia within the framework of a general reconstruction of the Czechoslovak political system. Up to •the end of August, some of the leading officers in the Slovak Army kept in touch with Dr. Benes and some with Dr. Hodza , through the medium of special envoys. Thus the overwhelming majority of the Slovak arm y maintained their Czechoslovak orientation. Among those abroad the former Inspector of the Slovak Army, General Viest, is a non-political soldier. The former chief of the Slovak Air Force, Major Ambrus, is, together with the vast majority of his brother-officers, in favour of Czeoho-Slovak federalism . The minutes attached to Hodza's memorandum(signed by Mr. Roberts) are of some importance as they show what kind of credibility rating Dr. Hodza enjoyed with the British Foreign Office. Mr. Roberts writes: "Dr. Hodza is not only an emigre but he was never really popular in Slovakia, where he was considered to be too closely associated with the Czech Central Government at Prague. This memorandum also clearly shows that he is still thinking in terms of the old political parties which - as Mr. Lockhart has assured me - are now completely discredited. I therefore think that we should not accept Dr. Hodza's views too readily ... " �SLOVAKIA 85 Appendix 11. Comments by Mr. P. Pares on the Bruce Lockhart account of discussions with Dr. M. Hodza. The comments were written at the British Legation in Budapest, where Mr. Pares stayed after his recall from Bratislava in September 1939. In the covering letter the Briti!sh Minister to Hungary (Mr. O'Malley) wrote to Mr. I. Kirkpatrick in London: Dear Kirkpatrick, With reference to your letter of October 19 C 16390/ 12 I enclose a memorandum by Pares commenting on Lockhart's memorandum . As I have not been much in Slovakia I will not add any remarks of my own except to say that on almost every point of which I have any knowledge I must venture to differ from Lockhart. Another golden age for emigres of all descriptions is I suppose about to dawn. It is a pity. Their political views are rarely sound. MEMORANDUM The conclusions reached in the memorandum seem to be on the whole over-simplified. The line of argument appears to be that because the independence of Slovakia was dictated by Germany and because German control of the country has increased since the Slovak State came into existence, the present Slovak government has become unpopular and the majority of Slovaks now wish for a restoration of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. This is perhaps the impression which might be derived from contacts restricted to Slovak emigres, such as General Viest, whose name is mentioned several times in the memorandum. Incidentally General Viest was on the retired list last March and at the time of my arrival in Bratislava during December 1938, the opinion of him in centralist "Czechoslovak" circles there was that he was a mediocrity in spite of the fact that he enjoyed the distinction of being the only Slovak general in the Czechoslovak army. But this interpretation of developments in Slovakia does not place sufficient emphasis on the growing apprehension felt by Dr. Tiso's autonomous Slovak provincial government at the end of February 1939, that the Czechs might soon take some opportunity of setting aside the spirit if not the letter of the Slovak autonomy law of October 1938. Dr. Tiso's opening speech at the first working session of the Slovak Diet in the middle of February made known these feelings quite clearly. Later they were proved to be justified when the Czech government carried out its coup d'etat in Slovakia on March 9. The effect of this coup was that, ait the moment when Dr. Tiso was notified in Berlin that unless Slovakia declared her independence she would be divided between Hungary and Poland after Germany had taken what she needed , the Slovaks were in no mood to risk anything for the sake of the Czechs and therefore agreed to the German demand. Thus the opinion of the majority of people in Slovakia at the time of the declaration of independence was dominated by two main ideas, �86 SLOVAKJA satisfaction at being rid at last of the Czech bugbear and relief at having saved the Slovak people from a partition which might have led to its complete disappearence as a nation. Nobody had any illusion about the difficulties and dangers of the situation and there were hardly any public displays of enthusiasm. The attitude of the middle classes and intelligentsia was either depressed or optimistic. In the first Slovak cabinet constituted afiter March 14, the names of M. Sidor and those of M. Stano and M. Pruzinsky, members of M. Sidor's former provincial government, were included and even that of Sivak, the head of the government installed by Prague after its military coup of March 9. This indicates clearly that the new government was a concentration of all the national political groups and did not represent only the successful pro-German group which ·had carried out the revolution. These points are all worth mentioning because they show that the Slovak people as a whole and their leaders even in March had no illusions about the position. Nothing appears to have occurred since then which could cause any alteration in their estimate of their position or their attitude toward the government of Dr. Tiso. There are on the other hand good reasons why the Slovaks should be satisfied with this situation despite its drawbacks. Germany's authority is not exercised entirely without regard for Slovak feelings or interests. For instance the new German Minister who arrived recently is far better liked than his predecessor (who was removed •a t Dr_ Durcansky's request) and does not make a habit of making frequent peremptory demarches on all manner of non-essential subjects and without the instructions of his government. The conclusion of trade agreements with Poland, Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia and other countries during the summer has assured the necessary supply of commodities such as coal, textiles, fruit, lard, coffee, etc., and the exchange of goods with the Protectorate which constituted four-fifths of Slovakia's total export trade, was proceeding almost normally up to the outbreak of war. The only economic problems of importance were the accumulation on a relatively large scale of frozen credits in Germany (500 million ct-owns) * and the Protectorate (200 million crowns)* due to the difficulty of obtaining manufactured goods in exchange for deliveries from Slovakia. The midle-classes are now satisfied because employment in Government offices has been opened to them on a large scale. The peasants in Eastern Slovakia have also been conciliated by increased prices for their grain this year and by the prospect of cheaper freight rates for their produce when the construction of the new railway line through Vranov in East Slovakia has been completed. A typical instance of German methods of exploitation in Slovakia is pmvided by the agreement reached between the Slovak and German governments regarding the construction of strategic roads. The Slovak programme was planned to cost 60 million crowns and was to last for two years. The Germans estimated that the cost would be doubled if the work were carried out in three months ,as they wanted, and therefore agreed with ,the Slovaks to give the contracts to German firms who would receive the difference between the Slovak estimate and the • Up to the end of August �SLOVAKIA 87 German estimate in Reichsmarks from the German Government. The labor and also such raw materials as could be supplied by Slovakia were paid for in Slovak currency whilst the machinery and tar were provided by the German contractors and paid for in Germany. The relations between the Slovaik population and the German troops of occupation in the small strip of territory which constituted the military zone, were described to me as excellent by an impartial and reliable American observer as late as the beginning of August. So far as I know German soldiers - except for some deputations of officers who toured the country examining strategic roads, railways and the possibility of requisitioning local supplies - did not move outside the military zone until late in August. When I visited the district of Orava on the Polish frontier, in the middle of May, I stayed with Slovaks and ·h eard no talk of German soldiers in the neighbourhood, though the Orava area lies next door to the Jablunkau district (which was in the military zone) and was actually used by German troops for their advance into Poland in September. The description in the memorandum of the "so-called autonomous government exercising its functions solely at the bidding of its German masters and with the support of German bayonets" does not tally with the account of the state of affairs given above. Nor is it correct, in my experience, •that the Slovaks who are not ,p repared to accept German money have resigned from their posts. I knew very many hard-working and honest officials whilst I was in Bratislava, not one of whom ever received any German money, to judge by their manner of living, or seemed likely to have accepted it, if it had been offered. This sort of charge sounds like the kind of generalized accusation which one hears rather frequently from a Central European when he is speaking about his political opponents. The political administration in Slovakia, though based on authoritarian models was generally reputed to be less stringent than in Germany owing to the easy-going temperament of the Slovaks. Dr. Pauliny Toth, the Slovak Nationalist leader whose name is mentioned in the memorandum, spent some weeks in the detention camp for political prisoners in Ilava and can testify that conditions there are Jess severe than they are said to be in Dachau or other German camps. The delay of punishing the mutinous Slovak regiments last September is another proof of the German willingness to yield to Slovak feelings on questions in which these feelings are really roused and do not conflict with any essential German interest. After the Hlinka party the most powerful single political factor in the Slovak state is perhaps the army and it is definitely "Czechoslovak" in sentiment. This is intelligible since the policy of the CzechoSlovak republic was to use the system of compulsory military service as a means of cementing the union between the two halves of the country which, although closely related from a linguistic point of view, had had no common tradition for a thousand years. In pursuit of this policy Slovak soldiers were sent to serve in Bohemia and Moravia and Czech soldiers were given a taste of the primitive conditions on the Slovak and Ruthenian borders. It is natural therefore that the Czechoslovak tradition should still be strong in the Slovak army. These �88 SLOVAKIA sympathies can be discounted for the present, and only when the time comes, and Germany's hold over the Czechs and Slo•v aks weakens, will this factor assume a real political importance. Summing up, I should say that the situation in Slovakia has not changed very much since the beginning of the country's existence as an independent state and that with the exception of the army, and some of the Lutherans, the people are not violently discontented with German control. They never had many illusions about their international position and after all the country enjoys a fair measure of autonomy with full self-administration. The attitude of the Slovak intelligentsia is on the whole one of passive disap:proV1al but not of active revolt, with the exception of a section of the Lutheran community, which was the great source of strength of the former centralists or "Czechoslovaks" and has suffered with their eclipse. In this case it is sectarian feeling rather than loss of political power which created bitter antagonism to the existing government of Catholic priests. So :fiar as I know the political influence of the Catholic priests has not diminished and I have never heard of anything which proved that they were opposed to Dr. Tiso's government. 'Dhe Slovaks are still rather suspicious of the Czechs but are beginning to see from experience that they are no worse than any other of their neighbours and also to realize that the Czech regime brought considerable benefits to the country. This is certainly a positive development, but it is a long way from this to a desire for the restoration of the Czecho-Slovak State. In my opinion the restoration depends almost entirely on the manner in which the present Czech leaders set about conciliating the proper quarters in Slovakia. By this I mean the rather bigoted Catholic element embodied in the Hlinka Party and not the arrogant Lutheran minority who were formerly the Czechs' supporters and proteges. The conditions for such an attempt are not unfavourable now but a beginning must be made soon or it may be too late. Political revenge will have to be foregone and much patience and tole:riance will be required on the Czech side. It may be asked why, if the majority of Slovaks are satisfied with their independence thus far, should they be ready to help restore the Czecho-Slovak republic. The answer is that they are aware of the dangers which surround them and might therefore be prepared on certain terms to accept union with the .Czechs as a stronger Slav power. Proof of this uneasiness is to be found in the rather maladroit advances of Dr. Durcansky to the Slovak emig:rants in Paris during the summer. More than once I have observed that Slovak officials are perturbed by the fear that Slovakia may find herself on the wrong side at the end of the war and they therefore attempt to ingratiate themselves simultaneously with Germany and with the representatives of the Wes tern powers. The entry of Russia on the Central European scene has introduced a new factor. It is not out of the question that if the Czechs do not come to terms with the Slovaks. quickly, the situation may change so that the rapprochement would no longer be considered desirable by the Slovaks. P. Pares �SLOVAKIA 89 Appendix Ill. MEMORANDUM OF MR. P. PARES ON "WEEKLY SUMMARIES" NO. 10. (These "Weekly Summaries" were surveys of politically significant events in the Protectorate and Slovakia prepared by the Political Intelligence Department of the British Foreign Office and based on information obtained from Czech and Slovak emigres, recent arrivals, press and radio news, etc. In this memorandum Mr. Pares refutes much of the emigre information as biased and unreliable.) Almost every issue of the Weekly Summary has contained reference to the griowing disillusionment of Slovaks with their "autonomy" ( presumably Slovak independence is meant) yet this tendency is not confirmed by the information available here. It must be admitted however that members of the Legation staff have not had opportunities of making contact with Slovaks during the last six weeks owing to Slovaks' fears of falling under the suspicion of the Gestapo. A possible explanation of this differences is that many of the reports reaching London directly may come through the Slovak political emigrants who are nearly all Protestants and not only are opposed to the present Slovak regime themselves but draw their information from Protestant sources in Slovakia which are also in bitter opposition. The number of Catholic Slovaks who have been obliged to go into exile is very small for the obvious reason that the revolution of October 1938 brought the Catholic majority into ;p ower. The use of the term "disillusionment" is in itself misleading since from the moment when independence was declared the Slovaks never had any illusions about the difficulties and risks of their situation as a nation of two million ipeople in the centre of Europe. Popular enthusiasm for the declaratiion of independence was noticeably lacking last March and if ,t here had been ,a ny it would have been quickly dispelled by the small war with Hungary which immediately followed. One solid cause for satisfaction still remains in spite of Slovakia's need for dependence on one or other of the stronger neighbouring nations and that is the fact that after one thousand years the internal political administi,ation has at last passed exclusively into the hands of Slovaks. Economic and political dependence on either Germany, the Czechs or Hungary is inevitable so long as Slovakia remains an independent state but the right of full self-administration is a pure gain which is entirely due to the establishment of the Republic and goes far towards reconciling the Slovaks with the drawbacks of their political position. It is doubtful whether, as the Summary of December 5 (No. 10) suggests, the general standard of living has been reduced. During the summer cost of living bonuses were paid to workers whilst employment and conditions of pay among the "white collar" cl.ass appeared to have improved. The standard of living of the Slovak peasant has always been near the minimum necessary for existence and there have been no signs so far thait it has been reduced. On the contrary prices fixed by the grain monopoly this season were in some districts better than these offered last year under the Czecho-Slovak republic. Among the �90 SLOVAKIA middle class there has been a large transference of wealth due to the laws against Jews and the discriminatory practices against Czechs. Government service has been opened to the Slovak middle class and what this means may be inferred from the fact that even at the end of December 1938 when many Czechs had already returned to Bohemia there were still 36,000 of them in government employment in Slovakia. Slovaks were now also able to assert their predominance in the profession such as the Jaw, medicine etc. Thus there is little reason why the average member of the Slovak middle class should complain. If anybody has suffered through the recent changes it is the comparatively small body of well-to-do landowners and businessmen who have sold large quantities of goods to Germany, and the Protectorate, without being able to get their money owing to Germany's inability to pay cash for what she buys. But the losses of these people are insignificant compared with the solid gains of the majority of the middle class. The statement contained in Summary No. 10 rega1·ding the remittance of Slovak workers' sa vings from Germany is incorrect. According to a recent official announcement the Slovak National Bank has alread y advanced over 90 million crowns to the relatives of Slovak workers employed in Germany and although this arrangement has only shifted the burden of inconvenience from the Slovak workers to the Bank, the former are presumably quite satisfied with it. Only in a few cases have workmen returning from Germany attempted to disregard the regulation by bringing their earnings with them instead of depositing them to a German bank, but so far as I know the Slovak National Bank has been able to smooth out the difficulties which have arisen in their way. There appears to be some exaggeration in the opinion ( page 5 of No. 10 ) that most members of the government are looked upon as gangsters. Of the seven ministers, three, namely M. Stano, M. Sivak and M. Pruzinsky are Czechophil moderates belonging to the Hlinka party (M. Sivak was head of the government installed by the Czechs on March 9 when Dr. Tiso was deposed) and all three were members of M. Sidor's Czechophil government which succeeded Sivak's. Of the other three two occupy minor posts and Dr. Durcansky has travelled far politically since the days when he broadcast against the Czechs over the Viennese wireless. All these facts are very well known to Slovaks and it is inconceivable that they should hold the view ascribed to them in the Summary. The general attitude towards Dr. Tuka, the present Prime Minister, is indeed hostile but there is no reason to suppose that his unpopularity extends to the members of his cabinet. The Summaries do not offer any precise infonnation regarding the attitude of the Slovaks to the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris but on page 5 of No. 10 appears the statement that "were Slovakia free to exercise her choice, there is little doubt that a combination of forces headed by Dr. Hodza and M. Sidor, backed by a small but influential Protestant autonomy party, would command the votes of the vast majority of Slovakia." It is quite true that such a combination would be overwhelming. It is equally true that the support of some of the Catholic leaders of the Hlinka party must be enlisted by the Czecho-Slovak National Council before it can fully establish its claim to represent the Slovak people. The Protestants in Slovakia do not number more than 300,000 and �91 SLOVAKIA though the influence of their community in the economic and cultural life of Slovakia is out of all proportion to the total number of its members, the growing self-consciousness and power of one and a half million Catholics now make the most imrpo:rtant political factor in the Slovak State. The Protestant predominance of 1918 has gone for ever and it is useless to seek any sort of accord between Slovaks and Czechs which was opposed to the wishes of the Slovak Catholics. Yet there are no signs that the Czecho-Slov,a k National Council has made any progress towards winning over their support up to the present. The composition of the present National Council seems to show that its creators have either neglected ·t his point or have been unsuccessful in their negotiations with the Catholic leaders. The three Slovak members of the Council are not only Protestants but have not and never have had any ,p olitical following. M. Osusky and M . Slavik are career diplomats and have lived for a long time abroad whilst General Viest is a professional soldier. Though there is evidence to show that they are regarded with sympathy by the Slovak Protestants, it seems doubtful whether they can really claim to represent the political views of the whole Slovak people. The real political leader of ,t he Slovaks is M. Sidor. He is a good political orator and a good writer on national-political subjects; but his pre-eminence among the Slovak Catholic leaders is assured not only by his personality but by the fact that he stood extremely close to Father Hlinka and is said to be his political heir. The demonstrations in his favour, which continue to occur from time to time although they embarrass him and are dangerous for his supporters, are the best proof of his great popularity. He has remained loyal to the government but is definitely dissatisfied with the present German domination which has forced him and his closest friends to abandon temrporarily their political activities. If a moment ever came when it would be safe for Slovakia to abandon her policy of subservience to Germany, it would be he who would assume the political leadership rather then anyone else. It is therefore •interesting that, according to information derived from one of his personal friends, until recently at least the CzechoSlovak leaders in Paris had been unable to reach any agreement with him. He received friendly overtures from M. Osusky last summer to which he did not reply since (in his words) "he was unwilling to go the road to Canossa." One envoy coming to him from Dr. Hodza early in October was detained by the Hungarian police in Hungary and failed to arrive. Up to this time M. Sidor was not even convinced of the necessity for reviving a federal Czecho-Slovak State, although he was not in principle opposed to it. His precise attitude appeared to be that he preferred the existing state of affairs but would accerpt a federal solution if that was the pdlicy adopted by the Western Powers. So far as is known here then it cannot be said that great progress has been made up to the present ,t owards a solution of the problem of the future relations between Czechs and Slovaks. But if collaboration could be arranged between Dr. Hodza and the Czecho-Slovak National Council on the one hand and M. Sidor and the anti-German group of the Hlinkas paiity on the other, there would be good prospects of arranging a settlement which would be lasting and satisfactory to both p_ Pares sides. 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1972, Vol. 22 Description An account of the resource Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 65 British Attitude Towards Independent Slovakia in 19 3 9 I. In Munich, in September 1938, the Western Powers abandoned Central and Eastern Europe to Germany (in the same manner as they were to abandon her in Yalta and Potsdam in 1944-5 to Soviet Russia) and the small countries of this region were compelled to do their best to accommodate themselves to this new change in the balance of power. Mr. Churchill (as he was then) stated this fact quite eloquently in his speech to the House of Commons on October 5th, 1939: "It must now be accepted that all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will make the best terms they can with the triumphant Nazi power." There is always some good which comes from every catastrophe. The Slovaks - though victims of the territorial aggrandizement of their neighbors (Hungary, Poland and Germany) - succeeded in the post-Munich period in their 20-year struggle for autonomy which was proclaimed on October 6th, 1938. By asserting their national identity through their own government and their own Diet the Slovaks finally overcame the arrogant and dangerous theory of a unitary "Czechoslovak" nation. The centralized pre-Munich Czechoslovakia became the federated state (hyphenated Czecho-Slovakia) of two equal nations. The Czechs had to admit the futility of their misplaced megalomania: they recognized the Slovaks as a separate nation, their language as a separate language. The rest of the world took notice of both the external and the internal changes which befell Czecho-Slovakia. The old myths, fostered and sustained by clever Czech propaganda, were demolished and a more sober political thinking was setting in. It was interesting and quite refreshing to read in the British press (in an article by G. B. Shaw at that) about "the entirely imaginary race called Czechoslovaks'',1 because that's what "Czechoslo- 66 SLOVAKIA vaks" in fact were: a figment of political imagination aimed at the absorption of the Slovak nation into the Czech nation. The subsequent events - which are now judged as the prologue to World War II - were in their day accepted as inevitable facts of life. After Munich Hitler's supremacy over Central Europe was unchallenged, his expansionist moves - even if occasionally condemned and disapproved of - were tacitly and implicitly acquiesced in. Even the disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia and the emergence of an independent Slovak state did not produce that wave of indignation and outrage with which it was to be treated later. The leader article in the "Daily Express" on March 15th , 1939 summed up the general sentiments in the following words : "Why are our heads cooler ( than they were a year ago - F . V.) ? Not because our hearts are hardened. Not because we have no sympathy with the Czechs. No. But we are not shocked by stale news. Munich decided that Germany was the boss in Eastern Europe." 2 In this frame of mind did the British people at large and the British Government view the new situation. II. The British foreign policy approach towards the new territorial and political rearrangement followed two distinct lines. Though reluctant to recognize the German " Protektorat " over Bohemia and Moravia, they saw the position of Slovakia in a different and more acceptable light.3 In a memorandum dated April 17th, 1939 the Foreign Office Central Europe expert, R. M. Makins, summarized the result of long deliberations which led to the following conclusions: "The position of Slovakia is different from that of Bohemia and Moravia and a number of practical questions have rendered it advisable for us to regularise the position of our Consul at Bratislava and to give the new state de facto recognition." 4 Shortly afterwards on May 4th, 1939 the British Consul in Bratislava notified the Slovak Foreign Minister (Dr. F. SLOVAKIA 67 nurcansky) that the British Government had decided to grant the Slovak state a de facto recognition. The act of recognition was followed by the opening of a Slovak Consulate-General in London with Milan P. Harminc in charge. 5 This happy and promising development was suddenly arrested by the outbreak of the Second World War, in September 1939. Because of Slovakia's geographical position and treaty relations she had with her protecting power, Germany, Slovakia herself became marginally involved in the German attack on Poland. The situation was further aggravated by the defection of the Slovak Minister in Warsaw, L. Szatmary, and the Slovak Consul in London, M. Harminc. Both issued indignant proclamations - as it happened quite incorrect - alleging that Slovakia was occupied by German troops and deprived of every vestige of national independence.6 At the same time the Czech emigres in the West, led by ex-President Benes, launched their propaganda campaign for the restoration of CzechoSlovakia in its pre-Munich form. The Slovak cause in the West was at a great disadvantage. There was no one to defend it and the lies and intrigues of the adversaries of Slovak independence could go on almost unhindered. Yet it must be said in all fairness that the British attitude towards Slovakia was marked by a measure of consideration and understanding of which the Slovaks were only too infrequently the recipients. The British viewed the position of Slovakia with sensitive appreciation for the problems of a small country in the shadow of a great power. The allegations of emigre politicians - both Czechs and Slovaks - were taken with more than the proverbial grain of salt and were frequently checked against the opinions of knowledgeable experts and men-on-the-spot such as former British Consul in Bratislava Mr. P. Pares. In the British Consul the Slovaks had a severe critic but at the same time a sincere, shrewd and sympathetic observer. His deep knowledge of Slovak affairs enabled him to evaluate the moves and actions of the Slovak Government in their overall context. Already in May 1939 he had pointed out the difficult dilemma facing the Slovak leaders and their efforts to find a solution to their prob- 68 SLOVAKIA lems. Having heard rumors about their clandestine approaches to the Slovak emigres in the West (particularly towards Dr. s. Osusky in Paris), he wrote: "The object of these manoeuvres seems to be to maintain contact with the Western powers whilst pursuing a policy of cooperating with the Germans for as long as is necessary - in other words, the policy of the Czechs before and during the Great War. The Slovaks are growing very apprehensive now about the possibility of war. They do not expect Germany to win, but realize that they are powerless to refuse anything she might ask in the event of war. So they are trying to ensure the good will of the Western powers in advance by secretly approving the plans of the exiles." 7 III. Two days before Britain entered the Second World War the British Foreign Ministry issued an internal memorandum entitled "Our Attitude towards Czechs and Slovaks in Time of War." With respect to Slovaks (in spite of some unflattering remarks about their leadership ) the memorandum stated: "However true it may be that the final defection of the Slovaks last March was the result of German machination and menace and that the present Slovak Government is acting under force majeure in allowing Slovakia to be used as an assembly ground for the German attack on Poland, nevertheless the fact remains that the union of Czechs and Slovaks was not a success and it would be rash to act on the presumption that the Slovaks are now anxious to restore it ... By proclaiming the restoration of Czecho-Slovakia as a war aim, we should be assuming that the Slovaks had repented of their errors and were eager for the reunion with the Czechs. That may be so, but there are yet insufficient grounds for assurance on the point and we should not take at their face value any statements of Slovak emigres on the subject." 8 With regard to ex-President Benes the memorandum had this to say: "The question then arises what recognition we SLOVAKIA 69 should give to Dr. Benes, if, as is only too likely, he proclaims himself leader of the Czechoslovaks. The question is not an easy one. In the first place it must be admitted that he is far and away the most outstanding Czech figure in the world. His supporters say that Czechs and Slovaks both at home and abroad are now unanimously behind him. So far as those resident abroad are concerned he might be able to produce some adequate proof, but no proof could possibly be forthcoming from those resident in their own countries. All that can be said is that he was not a popular figure in large circles in Slovakia during his presidency, and that the Czechs who assumed power in the Protectorate after his departure made no secret of their condemnation of him and his policy. It may be that they have now changed their minds, but it is difficult to see what proof can be had of the fact, and it is after all the Czechs in the Protectorate and not the emigres who matter most. A further consideration is that Dr . Benes is personally abhorrent in several other states, particularly in Poland and Hungary. All these considerations suggest that we should be wise to walk warily about any official recognition of Dr. Benes, whether as leader of the Czechs or the Czechoslovaks, though in view of his outstanding position we should presumably have no option but to accept him as their de facto spokesman". 9 As the memorandum anticipated Benes spoke out on the very day Britain entered the armed conflict. On September 3rd he wired the following telegram to the British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain: "At this moment in which the British people are obliged to wage a war imposed upon Poland, Great Britain and France by Nazi Germany I wish to express to Your Excellency with the deep and inalterable feeling of sympathy the desire and the decision of the Czechs and Slovaks to join without hesitation your people in this struggle for a free Europe. Our country is invaded and occupied by armed forces of Nazism and the whole nation is suffering under inhuman terror and oppression, its forces, however, both 70 SLOVAKIA moral and physical remain intact. We Czechoslovak citizens consider ourselves as being also in war with the German military forces and we shall march with your people till the final victory and the liberation of our fatherland. Edward Benes, former President of Czechoslovakia." 10 This telegram was carefully studied by its British recipients for hidden claims and pretensions. None was found, but it was noted that Benes spoke on behalf of "the Czechs and the Slovaks" as well as "Czechoslovak citizens". The reply (which was despatched with a six-day delay) carefully avoided any reference to either Slovaks or "Czechoslovaks" and with a studied deliberation indicated to Benes the attitude of the British Government towards him and indirectly toward Slovakia also. It read : " I gratefully acknowledge Your Excellency's generous message of sympathy and support in this grave hour. The sufferings of the Czech nation are not forgotten and we look forwards through the triumph of the principles for which we have taken up arms to the release of the Czech people from foreign domination. Neville Chamberlain." 11 This public exchange of telegrams was to demonstrate urbi et orbi that the British Government did not recognize Benes's claim to speak on behalf of the Slovaks nor were they particularly keen to restore Czecho-Slovakia. This was made explicitly clear in an explanatory letter of September 26th, 1939, sent to the Britiish Minister in Budapest (Mr. 0. St. C. O'Malley) by Sir Orme Sargent who wrote: " ... we are taking care to avoid committing ourselves to anything in the nature of a reconstitution of the old Czecho-Slovak state. In confirmation of this I would draw your attention to the answer, of which I enclose a copy, sel'lt by the Prime Minister on the 9th September to Benes's message of sympathy and support. The Prime Minister was careful to speak only of the future of the Czech people." 12 SLOVAKIA 71 IV. This public rebuke to Dr. Benes reactivated another emigre politician, Dr. Milan Hodza, former Prime Minister of Czecho-Slovakia and a bitter antagonist of Dr. Benes. M. Hodza was a Slovak by birth. In his political outlook he was inconsistent and in his political actions unpredictable. Immediately after 1918 he was an ardent exponent of "Czechoslovak unity" and an active opponent of the Slovak autonomists ( whom he used to mock that they did not know the difference between "autonomy" and "automobile") .13 But gradually he realized the futile emptiness of the Czech centralist policies and advocated some measure of autonomy for Slovakia. In the summer of 1938 his proposals were almost identical with those of Andrej Hlinka. 14 But Benes put a stop to Hodza's autonomist plans and schemes and forbade him any further steps in this direction. At the height of the Munich crisis Benes made Hodza a convenient scapegoat for previous Czech mistakes and omissions and on September 22nd, 1938 forced him and his government to resign. Physically and mentally broken M. Hodza retired to France and then to Switzerland. It seemed that he had left politics for good. Unlike Benes he made no pronouncements issued no proclamations when Hitler dismembered Czecho-Slovakia. In the summer of 1939 he moved to London. Here he very quickly realized that official British circles considered the Czecho-Slovak interwar experiment as a mistake which they would be loath to repeat. The exchange of telegrams between Benes and Chamberlain indicated to him very plainly that the British viewed Slovakia not as a political accident but as a permanent feature of the Central European scene. In 1938-9 the British policy-makers realized that the Versailles settlement imposed on Central Europe in 1919 was not satisfactory and created as many new problems as it was supposed to solve. Consequently they were unwilling to advocate any schemes which took no notice of past mistakes. In effect it meant that the Slovaks were not to be forced into any union with the Czechs against their will. The British official circles did their best to clear up the terminological confusion concerning such expressions as Czechs, Slovaks, Czechoslovaks, Czecho- 72 SLOVAKIA Slovaks, nation, people, etc. It is interesting to note that even Mr. Churchill - a tough and consistent opponent of Munich - carefully chose his nouns and adjectives in his speech of November 12th, 1939, when he spoke of "the Polish, Czech and Slovak people". In his original draft he mentioned "the Polish and Czechoslovak nations", but on the advice of a Foreign Office official he accepted the more correct and less offensive terminology .15 V. At the outbreak of World War II the British considered it important to clarify their attitude towards Slovakia. In a message sent to Budapest on September 14th, 1939 we read: "Notification has been issued that Slovakia is to be regarded as territory in German occupation. Effect of this is that Slovakia will be treated as enemy territory for purpose of trading with the enemy, etc., but state of war does not exist between the United Kingdom and Slovakia and Slovaks are not at present to be regarded as enemy nationals in the United Kingdom." 16 But contrary to what was asserted by the defecting Slovak diplomats, Szatmary and Harminc, and apparently believed by the British, Slovakia was not occupied by German troops. Unfortunately after the recall of the British Consul from Bratislava and the defection of the Slovak Consul in London there were no channels of communication between Britain and Slovakia to find out what really went on. On the other hand the enemies of Slovakia and the emigre pretenders of "the oppressed Slovak people" had their field day. By intrigues, half-truths and outright lies they tried to blacken the Slovak record and discredit the idea of Slovak independence. Initially the British Foreign Office did not accept these emigre confidences at face value but passed them for comment to the British Consul P. Pares. Pares' comments and corrections (from Budapest where he had resided from September 1939) are most remarkable documents because it was not often that the Slovak cause found a judicious and objective commentator in a complete foreigner. SLOVAKIA 73 The type of material forwarded to Mr. Pares for comment consisted mainly of "Weekly summaries" issued by the Political Intelligence Department. The information was collected mainly by R. H. Bruce Lockhart who was a willing and polite listener to many emigre accounts, stories, etc. 17 As a long-standing friend of Jan Masaryk18 and Dr. Benes Bruce Lockhart did more than anybody else towards the promotion of the Czech (i. e. anti-Slovak) interests and towards the acceptance of Dr. Benes as the spokesman for all the "Czechoslovaks". Bruce Lockhart acted in good faith and with sincere conviction but there is no doubt that his credulity was taken for a ride and his official position exploited. Dr. J . Smutny, Benes's secretary and his closest collaborator in London, wrote quite frankly (in March 1940): "Benes is unwilling to participate in the Czech emigre activities except as some sort of 'President' ... As a practical politician he knows that it is not enough for him alone to be of this opinion, but this opinion must be shared by others too. The British Government in particular must accept this view. For this reason every person who comes from the Protectorate and says that the nation stands behind Benes, is carefully put into contact with British circles to give them authentic confirmation. He (the new arrival) does not know about this game, it is all done very cleverly. Every written or verbal message which states the same (i.e. that the nation stands behind Benes) is passed on to the Foreign Office through Mr. Bruce Lockhart." 19 Material "passed on to the Foreign Office through Mr. Bruce Lockhart" formed then the bulk of these "Weekly summaries". But apart from Benes and his hard working staff of informants there were also other intelligence harbingers, such as M. Hodza. Milan Hodza tried his utmost to cast himself in the role of the sole and rightful spokesman for the Slovaks. Benes and Hodza did not see eye to eye with each other but they were of one mind when it came to denouncing and condemning everything which had happened in Slovakia since their inglorious exit. The "Summaries" regularly reported about "the grow- 74 SLOVAKIA ing disillusionment of Slovaks with their 'autonomy'". The British Consul (P. Pares) in his comments refutes this allegation. He points out that the informants and their sources represent but a small discontented group and their views are at variance with those of the majority. And then he singles out an important fact: "The use of the term 'disillusionment' is in itself misleading since from the moment when independence was declared the Slovaks never had any illusions about the difficulties and risks of their situation as a nation of two million people in the centre of Europe. Popular enthusiasm for the declaration of independence was noticeably lacking last March and if there had been any it would have been quickly dispelled by the small war with Hungary which immediately followed. One solid cause for satisfaction still remains in spite of Slovakia's need for dependence on one or other of the stronger neighbouring nations and that is the fact that after one thousand years the internal political administration has at last passed exclusively into the hands of Slovaks. Economic and political dependence on either Germany, the Czechs or Hungary is inevitable so long as Slovakia remains an independent state but the right of full self-administration is a pure gain which is entirely due to the establishment of the Re-public ( of Slovakia) and goes far towards reconciling the Slovaks with the drawbacks of their political position." 20 The "Summaries" invariably harped upon reduced living standards in Slovakia since March 1939. Mr. Pares again was able to point out that the standard of living of the peasantry had not been reduced, while there were "solid (economic) gains of the majority of the middle class". He also refuted the false claims regarding the remittance of the Slovak workers' savings from Germany. Where the Czech-inspired "Summaries" report "that most members of the (Slovak) Government are looked upon as gangsters", Mr. Pares jumps to their defence: "Of the seven ministers, three, namely M. Stano, M. Sivak and M. Pruzinsky are Czechophil moderates belonging to the Hlinka party (M. Sivak was head of SLOVAKIA 75 the government installed by the Czechs on March 9th when Dr. Tiso was deposed) and all three were members of M. Sidor's Czechophil government which succeeded Sivak's. Of the other three, two (Fritz and Medricky) occupy minor posts, and Dr. Durcansky has travelled far politically since the days when he broadcast against the Czechs over the Vienna wireless.21 All these facts are very well known to Slovaks and it is inconceivable that they should hold the view ascribed to them in the Summary. The general attitude towards Dr. Tuka, the present Prime Minister, is indeed hostile but there is no reason to suppose that this unpopularity extends to the members of his cabinet." Drawing on his local knowledge of the Slovak scene Mr. Pares makes penetrating observations about the end of the Protestant predominance in Slovak political and public affairs: "The Protestant predominance of 1918 has gone for ever and it is useless to seek any sort of accord between Slovaks and Czechs which was opposed to the wishes of the Slovak Catholics. Yet there are no signs that the Czecho-Slovak National Council (i. e. Committee established on November 17th, 1939 in Paris ) has made any progress towards winning over their (i.e. Catholic ) support up to the present." Commenting on the composition of the Czecho-Slovak National Committee,22 Mr. Pares expresses his doubts about the credentials of the three Slovak representatives on this body. He writes that the creators of this Committee either neglected to take into account the Catholic majority "or have been unsuccessful in their negotiations with the Catholic leaders." And he continues: "The three Slovak members of the Committee are not only Protestants but have not and never have had any political following. M. Osusky and M. Slavik are career diplomats and have lived for a long time abroad, whilst General Viest is a professional soldier. Though there is evidence to show that they are regarded with sympathy by the Slovak Protestants, it seem doubtful whether they can really claim to represent the political views of the whole Slovak people." 76 SLOVAKIA VI. Early in November 1939 the British Consul in Slovakia (Mr. P. Pares) was asked to comment on a memorandum submitted earlier by B. H. Bruce Lockhart and referring to discussions Mr. Bruce Lockhart had with Dr. Hodfa. In this conversation Hodfa stated that the Slovak population was almost unanimously behind him. He advocated a federalist solution for Slovakia which would keep the Czechs and Slovaks in one state but would grant the Slovaks that degree of autonomy which was secured by the zilina Agreement of October 6th, 1938.23 Hodfa told Bruce Lockhart that independence was virtually forced on the Slovaks and that there was an overwhelming desire for the return to old Czecho-Slovakia. 24 Mr. Pares disagreed with this view almost completely and gave a remarkably accurate interpretation of what had actually happened in March 1939. He mentions the real fears among Slovak politicians "at the end of February 1939 that the Czechs might soon take some opportunity of setting aside the spirit if not the letter of the Slovak autonomy law of October 1938". "Later these fears proved to be justified - writes Mr. Pares - when the Czech Government carried out its coup d 'e tat in Slovakia on March 9th. The effect of this coup was that, at the moment when Dr. Tiso was notified in Berlin that unless Slovakia declared her independence she would be divided between Hungary and Poland after Germany had taken what she needed, the Slovaks were in no mood to risk anything for the sake of the Czechs and therefore agreed to the German demand. Thus the opinion of the majority of people in Slovakia at the time of the declaration of independence was dominated by two main ideas: satisfaction at being rid at least of the Czech bugbear and relief at having saved the Slovak people from a partition which might have led to its complete disappearance as a nation." 25 The claims that the Slovaks were dissatisfied with their state are contradicted by the British Consul who sees the situation in its real and realistic context: SLOVAKIA 77 "There are . . . good reasons why the Slovaks should be satisfied with this situation despite its drawbacks. Germany's authority is not excercised entirely without regard for Slovak feelings or interests. For instance, the new German Minister who arrived recently is far better liked than his predecessor ( who was removed at Dr. Durcansky's request). . . The conclusion of trade agreements with Poland, Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia and other countries during the summer ( of 1939) has assured the necessary supply of commodities such as coal, textiles, fruit, lard, coffee, etc. and the exchange of goods with the Protectorate which constituted fourfifths of Slovakia's total export trade was proceeding almost up to the outbreak of war." Mr. Pares also disputes the claims about the German occupation of Slovakia and the allegations of the arrogant behavior of the German soldiers towards native people: "The relations between the Slovak population and the German troops of occupation in the small strip of territory which constituted the military zone, were described to me as excellent by an impartial and reliable American observer as late as the beginning of August. So far as I know German soldiers - except for some deputations of officers who toured the country examining strategic roads, railways and the possibility of requisitioning local supplies - did not move outside the military zone until late in August." The British Consul ridicules the suggestions of M. Hodza that "the Slovak Government functions at the bidding of its German masters and with the support of German bayonets" and that "the Slovaks who are not prepared to accept German money have resigned from their posts" . Mr. Pares comments: "This sort of charge sounds like the kind of generalized accusations which one hears rather frequently from a Central European when he is speaking about his political opponents." In one respect, however, Mr. Pares agrees with the emigre informants: concerning the pro-Czech sentiments among the officers of the Slovak army. And here he makes an astute and surprisingly accurate prediction: "These (pro-Czech) sympathies can be discounted 78 SLOVAKIA for the present, and only when the time comes, and Germany's hold over the Czechs and Slovaks weakens, will this factor assume a real political importance." VII. At the end of 1939 there was already a noticeable shift in the British attitude towards the Slovaks. The earlier signs of a favorable disposition towards Slovakia were gradually corroded away by a conjoint action of three mutually interrelated factors: (i) The continuous stream of vicious anti-Slovak propaganda emanating from the Czech emigre groups around Dr. Benes. (ii) A powerful pro-Czech lobby among British parliamentarians, politicians and influential public figures. (iii) The contagious example of France where on October 2nd, 1939 a military agreement was concluded between the French Government and Minister Dr. E:';. Osusky who signed the agreement "on behalf of the provisional government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic". This act was followed on November 15th, 1939 by the French recognition of the Czecho-Slovak National Committee "as qualified to represent the Czecho-Slovak people and in particular to execute the agreement of October 2nd." Invoking the French precedent Dr. Benes was pressing hard for a similar concession from the British. After a prolonged negotiation he obtained on December 20th, 1939 British recognition of the Czecho-Slovak National Committee "as qualified to represent the Czecho-Slovak people". At the same time, however, it was made very plain to Dr. Benes and all concerned that "no commitments were made at this stage regarding the future of the former territories of the Czecho-Slovak Republic." 26 The fall of France in summer 1940 considerably strengthened Benes's position in London where his Committee was eventually recognized as "the provisional government" (on July 21st, 1940). From this time on if the British attitude towards the Czechs showed some restraint, it was not for the sake of the Slovaks but primarily out of consideration for the feelings of the Poles and Hungarians who too were against the restoration of the pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia and against Dr. Benes personally. In December 1940 Viscount Halifax left the position SLOVAKIA 79 of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and his place was taken by Mr. Anthony Eden (now Earl of Avon) . Mr. Eden was a close personal friend of Jan Masaryk and Dr. Benes and was known as an outspoken antagonist of the whole appeasement policies of the Chamberlain Government. With him a new spirit-highly favorable to Czech political aspirations and ambitions-moved into the corridors of the Foreign Ministry. As the hatred and abhorrence of Hitler and his Nazism grew, so did the sympathy towards the Czechs, and the Czech emigres were quick and clever to exploit it fully. No one is going to dispute the fact that the Czechs were victims of the Munich decision, but one is taken aback by the agility with which they made themselves into poor innocent victims of Munich which they certainly were not. By branding the Munich Agreement a 'dictate' they were making dictators not only of Germany and Italy but also of France and Britain. By transferring these semantics into practical politics they shifted their blame for Munich and all the subsequent events on others, including the Western allies. The simple truth is that in the autumn of 1938 the Czech accepted the Munich Agreement with nothing more than a verbal protest when they could and should have opposed Hitler with arms. But by 1940-41 they were able to elevate their shameless capitulation into an act of supreme heroism and noble sacrifice, for which the Western powers owed them a living - Czech style. So one-sided and uncritical was the British support of Benes and his policies that they actively assisted him in the elimination of his political opponents (who had equally impressive records of both democratic tradition and anti-Nazi fighting as Benes himself) such as the Slovaks s. Osusky and M. Hodza, Czechs as L. Prchala, Sudeten Germans as W. Jaksch and many more less-known but not less meritorious antiNazis. In July 1943 Benes's secretary, J . Smutny, wrote with an air of victorious satisfaction: "Morally the greatest success of Dr. Benes lies in the fact that he managed to change Munich and our decision not to fight there and then into a victory of Czechoslovak moral strength and foresight; he was able to throw at the heads of our present allies the responsibility for OUR decision . . ." 27 80 SLOVAKIA In the light of all this it is not difficult to see Dr. Benes succeeded in making Slovak leaders willing accomplices and in convincing the Western powers the Slovak nation desired nothing more than reunion the Czechs and himself as their president. F. V how Nazi that with n u k, Australia FOOTNOTES 1) "Daily Herald", March 3rd, 1939. 2) "Daily Express", March 15th, 1939, p. 12. 3) F. Vnuk, British Recognition of Independent Slovakia in 1939, in "Slovak Studies (Historica)", Vol. VIII, (Rome, in press). 4) The Foreign Office Archives, Political Correspondence (CzechoSlovakia) 1939-40, No. 371 / 22898/Doc. 17. In following references only volume and document numbers will be given (e. g 22896/ 47) . 5) Dr. J . M. Kirschbaum, Postoj Vel' kej Britanie k Slovenskej Republike, in "Literarny Almanach Slovaka v Amerike" (Middletown, Pa., 1960) , pp. 63-71. 6) The proclamation handed by Dr. L. Szatmary to the Polish Foreign Ministry and subsequently released to the press on September 2nd , 1939 reads: "In the name of the Slovak people and its representatives who, under the pressure of the Third Reich, have been reduced to silence and have been reproached for penetrations exclusively in the interest of Germany, I protest as the representative of the State of Slovakia in Poland against the brutal disarmament of the Slovak army, against the arbitrary occupation of Slovakia by the troops of the Third Reich, against the use of Slovakia as a base for warlike action against the brotherly Polish people. "The Slovak people, whether they be at home or abroad, will never submit to the violence of the Third Reich. "It associates itself with armed resistance against the aggressor to regain the freedom in collaboration with the civilized nations of the world, and in order that it may freely decide its own destiny. "I would be very obliged to your Excellency if the Polish Government would please acknowledge my present communication and if it would support by all its resources and those of its Allies the fight of the Slovak people to save its national honour and fatherland as well as to win true independence." Mr. Harminc's proclamation, published in the British press on September 24th, 1939 has the following to say: "The whole of Slovakia is occupied by Nazi armed forces. The voice of the Slovak people has been temporarily silenced by the ruthless abrogation of all treaties and agreements. "In the name of Slovakia I solemnly protest against this shameful betrayal, and declare that the aims and ideals of Great Britain and France are identical with those of my sorely-tried people. Milan Harminc SLOVAKIA 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 12) 13) 14) 15) 16) 17) 18) 81 22803/ 338-9 22899/ 14-15 22899/ 17-18 "The Times" (London), Sepember 5th, 1939. "The Times" (London), September 11th, 1939. 22899/ 191-3 To which a Slovak journalist and politician, J . Mudroii, provided the following repartee: "Oh yes, they do know, Mr. Hodui. The automobile is a mechanical instrument which enables the Czechs to move into Slovakia, autonomy is a political instrument which will make them move out of Slovakia." ("Slovak", February 22nd , 1920) . Dr. Michal Mudry, Milan Hodza v Amerike, Chicago, Ill. , 1949, p. 58. 22900/ 27 22900/ 273 Mr. R. H. Bruce Lockhart gives an interesting account of his work at the Political Intelligence Department in his book, Comes the Reckoning, (London, 1947). He is the author of a sympathetic biographical sketch, Jan Masaryk: a personal memoir, (London, 1951). 19) "Acta Occiipationis Bohemiae et Moraviae", Vol. I. (Pra ha, 1966 ), p. 92. 20) This and the following quotations are taken from a memorandum 24290/79-84 which is reprinted in full in Appendix III. 21) In this memorandum Mr. Pares mentions only six out of seven ministers who ,c omprised the Slovak Government. The seventh man, who is left out, is General F. Catlos, the Minister of National Defense. 22) This Czecho-Slovak National Committee consisted of eight members : iDr. E. Benes, Dr. J . Sramek, Gen. S. Ingr, Dr. E. Outrata, Dr. H. Ripka, Dr. S. Osusky, Dr. J . Slavik, Gen. R. Viest. The last three members were Slovaks, but they were pitifully unrepresentative of the Slovak nation. Not only were they all Protestants - as Mr. Pares points out - but one of them, J. Slavik, summed up his nationalist sentiments in a self-revealing phrase: 'I am an unhyphenated Czechoslovak. " 23) In the West M. Hodza liked to put himself forward as a great and dedicated federalist. In 1941 he even published in London a book. " Federation in Central Europe." But a sad fact remains that back home, when he was the second most powerful politician in CzechoSlovakia, he did not try hard enough to implement his federalist ideas within the Czecho-Slovak framework. 24) Dr. Hodfa was asked to put his views down in writing. He did so and his memorandum (22900/ 66-70) is reproduced in full in Appendix I. 25) Mr. Pares' commentaries on Hodfa's accounts of the situation in Slovakia can be found in 22900/74-81 and are given in full in Appendix II. This and the following four quotations are taken from Mr. Pares' comments. SLOVAKIA 82 26 ) 24288/ 60 27 ) Acta occu.pationis Bohemiae et Moraviae, Vol. I., (Praha, 1966), p. 222. Appendix I. MEMORANDUM BY DR. HODZA ON THE SITUATION IN SLOVAKIA In October 1939 Dr. Milan Hod.fa, former Prime Minister of Czecho-Slovakia, had a lengthy discussion about the political situation in Slovakia with Mr. Robert H. Bruce Lockhart of the British Foreign Office. The summary of this discussion was passed for comment to the former British Consul in Bratislava (Mr. Peter Pares) while Dr. Hodza was requested to put his view:s on paper in the form of a memorandum. In his written submission, handed to Mr. Bruce Lockhart on November 14th 1939, Dr. Hodza was less outspoken especially in his references to Dr. Benes. Even so his memorandum is an unusual document of some historical interest, particularly in its allegation - hitherto not mentioned anywhere - about the new political balance in Slovakia in the autumn of 1939. Dr. Hodza claims here the allegiance of 30 out of 49 Slovak deputies elected in 1935 (and including K. Sidor and M. Sokol). But one has to be sceptical about his mathematics . Hodza's memorandum was prefaced by a letter of Mr. Bruce Lockhart: My dear Roberts, I send you herewith a memorandum which has been given me by Dr. Hodza. It gives a picture of the alleged political line-up among l!he Slovaks. You will see that, as I predicted, the old gentleman has been careful not to put his anti-Benes and antiCzech sentiments on paper. R. H. Bruce Lockhart Yours sincerely, MEMORANDUM BY DR. HOD2A The position in Slovakia is now becoming clearer. Except for a small opportunist minority, Slovakia has never wished for separation from Bohemia and Moravia, and even the Slovak Parliament, elected in the Nazi fashion in December 1938, refused to adopt a resolution to pronounce complete separation from them. This resolution, which at the same time called upon Germany for protection, was only passed after Dr. Tiso and his four friends, who had the full support of the German S . S. and S. A., had declared that, if i,t were not accepted, Slovakia would be occupied by German troops. Up to last August Germany treated Slovakia very tactfully, not only politically but also commercially, so that even the moderate Federalists agreed that there were many advantages in being an SLOVAK.IA 83 independent country. It was not until the preparations for war were begun in July that the situation suddenly changed, and it became obvious that Germany regarded the Slovak Government merely as a means for forcing upon Slovakia any measure, no matter how un popular. The declaration of war finally opened Slovak eyes. The present political position in Slovakia is as follows: After the cession of territory to Hungary there remained forty-nine of the sixty-four Slovak seats in the former Parliament. After the last free elections twenty-six of these were held by the parties led by Dr. Hodza ( 15), Dr. Sokol, President of the Slovak Parliament and a leader of the Catholic Federalist Group , (8) , and Dr. Jan Pauliny-Toth, leade r of the Federalist Slovak National Party, (2) . On October 3 Dr. Pauliny came to Paris and offered Dr. Hodza the co-operation of his party and of Dr. Sokol and his Catholic Federalists in the reconstitution of the Czechoslovak Republic on a federal basis. In the present ciTcumstances, of course, the co-operation of these groups must be secret. On October 10 a special envoy arrived in Paris with a similar message from M. Sidor, another Catholic Federalist and a former advocate of co-operation with the Germans. He had to resign from the Slovak Government soon after March 10, when he had opposed the German effort to establish a separate Slovakia instead of a federal Republic. His party consists of four deputies. It is thus clear that out of a total of forty-nine, thirty former Slovak deputies are in favour of a federal Republic. The nineteen remaining deputies are: i) six members of the Catholic Federalist Party who possibly still recognise Dr. Tiso as their leader; ii) five Socialist deputies, who although differing from the majority in preferring the restitution of the former semi-centralized Government to the establishment of federal methods, also support the Republic; iii) seven Slovak Communist deputies, two of whose leaders are now in Paris, and who are also in favour of the federal system : and iv) one Hungarian deputy, whose views are not known. II. At a meeting in Paris on October 12, representatives of the thirty deputies decided that the federal Republic should, from the international point of view, be a single political entity. Thus there would be one Head of the Federal State and a central Parliament and Government, with powers over foreign policy, the army, economic reconstruction, communications, and international trade and finance. Local parliaments and local governments would be in charge of education, public works, social welfare, hygiene, housing, interior administration and the police, and, in fact, of all economic problems not dealt with by the central Government and Parliament (agriculture, industry, trade, etc. ). It is desirable that federalisation should not only be the programme of the Slovak majority, but also of the Czechs abroad. If, however, the latter refuse to adopt it, this need not prevent co-operation between the Czechs and Slovaks abroad. The Slovak majority are convinced that in the restored Republic there will always be a Czecho-Slovak majority 84 SLOVAKIA in favour of a federal structure, as was the case in October 1938. The Slovak majority therefore offers to co-operate with the Czechs. There is no doubt about the importance of this collaboration. Geographically Slovakia is of the g reatest importance to Bohemia and Moravia, since it connects them with Central and Danubian Europe. Without this connection they would always be the helpless victims of the German pincers. This co-operation is equally important to Slovaks, as so-called i ndependence would always be fraught with danger for her. Co-operation between the Czech and Slovak representatives in the action abroad has now a quite special importance, as the Czechoslovak army which is to be formed in France will comprise 55, if not 60 % of Slovak agricultural labourers and industrial workers domiciled in France for years. III. The Slovak political representatives have always been unanimous in their conviction that the Czechoslovak Republic will at all times be obliged to work in very close co-operation with Poland and the neighbouring Danubian countries. The Slovaks visualise the future structure of central Europe as a confederation of sovereign states prepared to sacrifice complete sovereignty sufficiently to guarantee them independe nce and security. The basis of this scheme for federalisation may be found partly in pre vious Home Rule schemes of the Slovak Federalists and partly in a scheme which Dr. Hodza, then Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, put forward in Ma y and June 1938. This scheme, finally adopted by several leaders of the parliamentary majority, aimed at the setting up of a local Pa rliament and Government for Slovakia within the framework of a general reconstruction of the Czechoslovak political system. Up to •the end of August, some of the leading officers in the Slovak Army kept in touch with Dr. Benes and some with Dr. Hodza , through the medium of special envoys. Thus the overwhelming majority of the Slovak arm y maintained their Czechoslovak orientation. Among those abroad the former Inspector of the Slovak Army, General Viest, is a non-political soldier. The former chief of the Slovak Air Force, Major Ambrus, is, together with the vast majority of his brother-officers, in favour of Czeoho-Slovak federalism . The minutes attached to Hodza's memorandum(signed by Mr. Roberts) are of some importance as they show what kind of credibility rating Dr. Hodza enjoyed with the British Foreign Office. Mr. Roberts writes: "Dr. Hodza is not only an emigre but he was never really popular in Slovakia, where he was considered to be too closely associated with the Czech Central Government at Prague. This memorandum also clearly shows that he is still thinking in terms of the old political parties which - as Mr. Lockhart has assured me - are now completely discredited. I therefore think that we should not accept Dr. Hodza's views too readily ... " SLOVAKIA 85 Appendix 11. Comments by Mr. P. Pares on the Bruce Lockhart account of discussions with Dr. M. Hodza. The comments were written at the British Legation in Budapest, where Mr. Pares stayed after his recall from Bratislava in September 1939. In the covering letter the Briti!sh Minister to Hungary (Mr. O'Malley) wrote to Mr. I. Kirkpatrick in London: Dear Kirkpatrick, With reference to your letter of October 19 C 16390/ 12 I enclose a memorandum by Pares commenting on Lockhart's memorandum . As I have not been much in Slovakia I will not add any remarks of my own except to say that on almost every point of which I have any knowledge I must venture to differ from Lockhart. Another golden age for emigres of all descriptions is I suppose about to dawn. It is a pity. Their political views are rarely sound. MEMORANDUM The conclusions reached in the memorandum seem to be on the whole over-simplified. The line of argument appears to be that because the independence of Slovakia was dictated by Germany and because German control of the country has increased since the Slovak State came into existence, the present Slovak government has become unpopular and the majority of Slovaks now wish for a restoration of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. This is perhaps the impression which might be derived from contacts restricted to Slovak emigres, such as General Viest, whose name is mentioned several times in the memorandum. Incidentally General Viest was on the retired list last March and at the time of my arrival in Bratislava during December 1938, the opinion of him in centralist "Czechoslovak" circles there was that he was a mediocrity in spite of the fact that he enjoyed the distinction of being the only Slovak general in the Czechoslovak army. But this interpretation of developments in Slovakia does not place sufficient emphasis on the growing apprehension felt by Dr. Tiso's autonomous Slovak provincial government at the end of February 1939, that the Czechs might soon take some opportunity of setting aside the spirit if not the letter of the Slovak autonomy law of October 1938. Dr. Tiso's opening speech at the first working session of the Slovak Diet in the middle of February made known these feelings quite clearly. Later they were proved to be justified when the Czech government carried out its coup d'etat in Slovakia on March 9. The effect of this coup was that, ait the moment when Dr. Tiso was notified in Berlin that unless Slovakia declared her independence she would be divided between Hungary and Poland after Germany had taken what she needed , the Slovaks were in no mood to risk anything for the sake of the Czechs and therefore agreed to the German demand. Thus the opinion of the majority of people in Slovakia at the time of the declaration of independence was dominated by two main ideas, 86 SLOVAKJA satisfaction at being rid at last of the Czech bugbear and relief at having saved the Slovak people from a partition which might have led to its complete disappearence as a nation. Nobody had any illusion about the difficulties and dangers of the situation and there were hardly any public displays of enthusiasm. The attitude of the middle classes and intelligentsia was either depressed or optimistic. In the first Slovak cabinet constituted afiter March 14, the names of M. Sidor and those of M. Stano and M. Pruzinsky, members of M. Sidor's former provincial government, were included and even that of Sivak, the head of the government installed by Prague after its military coup of March 9. This indicates clearly that the new government was a concentration of all the national political groups and did not represent only the successful pro-German group which ·had carried out the revolution. These points are all worth mentioning because they show that the Slovak people as a whole and their leaders even in March had no illusions about the position. Nothing appears to have occurred since then which could cause any alteration in their estimate of their position or their attitude toward the government of Dr. Tiso. There are on the other hand good reasons why the Slovaks should be satisfied with this situation despite its drawbacks. Germany's authority is not exercised entirely without regard for Slovak feelings or interests. For instance the new German Minister who arrived recently is far better liked than his predecessor (who was removed •a t Dr_ Durcansky's request) and does not make a habit of making frequent peremptory demarches on all manner of non-essential subjects and without the instructions of his government. The conclusion of trade agreements with Poland, Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia and other countries during the summer has assured the necessary supply of commodities such as coal, textiles, fruit, lard, coffee, etc., and the exchange of goods with the Protectorate which constituted four-fifths of Slovakia's total export trade, was proceeding almost normally up to the outbreak of war. The only economic problems of importance were the accumulation on a relatively large scale of frozen credits in Germany (500 million ct-owns) * and the Protectorate (200 million crowns)* due to the difficulty of obtaining manufactured goods in exchange for deliveries from Slovakia. The midle-classes are now satisfied because employment in Government offices has been opened to them on a large scale. The peasants in Eastern Slovakia have also been conciliated by increased prices for their grain this year and by the prospect of cheaper freight rates for their produce when the construction of the new railway line through Vranov in East Slovakia has been completed. A typical instance of German methods of exploitation in Slovakia is pmvided by the agreement reached between the Slovak and German governments regarding the construction of strategic roads. The Slovak programme was planned to cost 60 million crowns and was to last for two years. The Germans estimated that the cost would be doubled if the work were carried out in three months ,as they wanted, and therefore agreed with ,the Slovaks to give the contracts to German firms who would receive the difference between the Slovak estimate and the • Up to the end of August SLOVAKIA 87 German estimate in Reichsmarks from the German Government. The labor and also such raw materials as could be supplied by Slovakia were paid for in Slovak currency whilst the machinery and tar were provided by the German contractors and paid for in Germany. The relations between the Slovaik population and the German troops of occupation in the small strip of territory which constituted the military zone, were described to me as excellent by an impartial and reliable American observer as late as the beginning of August. So far as I know German soldiers - except for some deputations of officers who toured the country examining strategic roads, railways and the possibility of requisitioning local supplies - did not move outside the military zone until late in August. When I visited the district of Orava on the Polish frontier, in the middle of May, I stayed with Slovaks and ·h eard no talk of German soldiers in the neighbourhood, though the Orava area lies next door to the Jablunkau district (which was in the military zone) and was actually used by German troops for their advance into Poland in September. The description in the memorandum of the "so-called autonomous government exercising its functions solely at the bidding of its German masters and with the support of German bayonets" does not tally with the account of the state of affairs given above. Nor is it correct, in my experience, •that the Slovaks who are not ,p repared to accept German money have resigned from their posts. I knew very many hard-working and honest officials whilst I was in Bratislava, not one of whom ever received any German money, to judge by their manner of living, or seemed likely to have accepted it, if it had been offered. This sort of charge sounds like the kind of generalized accusation which one hears rather frequently from a Central European when he is speaking about his political opponents. The political administration in Slovakia, though based on authoritarian models was generally reputed to be less stringent than in Germany owing to the easy-going temperament of the Slovaks. Dr. Pauliny Toth, the Slovak Nationalist leader whose name is mentioned in the memorandum, spent some weeks in the detention camp for political prisoners in Ilava and can testify that conditions there are Jess severe than they are said to be in Dachau or other German camps. The delay of punishing the mutinous Slovak regiments last September is another proof of the German willingness to yield to Slovak feelings on questions in which these feelings are really roused and do not conflict with any essential German interest. After the Hlinka party the most powerful single political factor in the Slovak state is perhaps the army and it is definitely "Czechoslovak" in sentiment. This is intelligible since the policy of the CzechoSlovak republic was to use the system of compulsory military service as a means of cementing the union between the two halves of the country which, although closely related from a linguistic point of view, had had no common tradition for a thousand years. In pursuit of this policy Slovak soldiers were sent to serve in Bohemia and Moravia and Czech soldiers were given a taste of the primitive conditions on the Slovak and Ruthenian borders. It is natural therefore that the Czechoslovak tradition should still be strong in the Slovak army. These 88 SLOVAKIA sympathies can be discounted for the present, and only when the time comes, and Germany's hold over the Czechs and Slo•v aks weakens, will this factor assume a real political importance. Summing up, I should say that the situation in Slovakia has not changed very much since the beginning of the country's existence as an independent state and that with the exception of the army, and some of the Lutherans, the people are not violently discontented with German control. They never had many illusions about their international position and after all the country enjoys a fair measure of autonomy with full self-administration. The attitude of the Slovak intelligentsia is on the whole one of passive disap:proV1al but not of active revolt, with the exception of a section of the Lutheran community, which was the great source of strength of the former centralists or "Czechoslovaks" and has suffered with their eclipse. In this case it is sectarian feeling rather than loss of political power which created bitter antagonism to the existing government of Catholic priests. So :fiar as I know the political influence of the Catholic priests has not diminished and I have never heard of anything which proved that they were opposed to Dr. Tiso's government. 'Dhe Slovaks are still rather suspicious of the Czechs but are beginning to see from experience that they are no worse than any other of their neighbours and also to realize that the Czech regime brought considerable benefits to the country. This is certainly a positive development, but it is a long way from this to a desire for the restoration of the Czecho-Slovak State. In my opinion the restoration depends almost entirely on the manner in which the present Czech leaders set about conciliating the proper quarters in Slovakia. By this I mean the rather bigoted Catholic element embodied in the Hlinka Party and not the arrogant Lutheran minority who were formerly the Czechs' supporters and proteges. The conditions for such an attempt are not unfavourable now but a beginning must be made soon or it may be too late. Political revenge will have to be foregone and much patience and tole:riance will be required on the Czech side. It may be asked why, if the majority of Slovaks are satisfied with their independence thus far, should they be ready to help restore the Czecho-Slovak republic. The answer is that they are aware of the dangers which surround them and might therefore be prepared on certain terms to accept union with the .Czechs as a stronger Slav power. Proof of this uneasiness is to be found in the rather maladroit advances of Dr. Durcansky to the Slovak emig:rants in Paris during the summer. More than once I have observed that Slovak officials are perturbed by the fear that Slovakia may find herself on the wrong side at the end of the war and they therefore attempt to ingratiate themselves simultaneously with Germany and with the representatives of the Wes tern powers. The entry of Russia on the Central European scene has introduced a new factor. It is not out of the question that if the Czechs do not come to terms with the Slovaks. quickly, the situation may change so that the rapprochement would no longer be considered desirable by the Slovaks. P. Pares SLOVAKIA 89 Appendix Ill. MEMORANDUM OF MR. P. PARES ON "WEEKLY SUMMARIES" NO. 10. (These "Weekly Summaries" were surveys of politically significant events in the Protectorate and Slovakia prepared by the Political Intelligence Department of the British Foreign Office and based on information obtained from Czech and Slovak emigres, recent arrivals, press and radio news, etc. In this memorandum Mr. Pares refutes much of the emigre information as biased and unreliable.) Almost every issue of the Weekly Summary has contained reference to the griowing disillusionment of Slovaks with their "autonomy" ( presumably Slovak independence is meant) yet this tendency is not confirmed by the information available here. It must be admitted however that members of the Legation staff have not had opportunities of making contact with Slovaks during the last six weeks owing to Slovaks' fears of falling under the suspicion of the Gestapo. A possible explanation of this differences is that many of the reports reaching London directly may come through the Slovak political emigrants who are nearly all Protestants and not only are opposed to the present Slovak regime themselves but draw their information from Protestant sources in Slovakia which are also in bitter opposition. The number of Catholic Slovaks who have been obliged to go into exile is very small for the obvious reason that the revolution of October 1938 brought the Catholic majority into ;p ower. The use of the term "disillusionment" is in itself misleading since from the moment when independence was declared the Slovaks never had any illusions about the difficulties and risks of their situation as a nation of two million ipeople in the centre of Europe. Popular enthusiasm for the declaratiion of independence was noticeably lacking last March and if ,t here had been ,a ny it would have been quickly dispelled by the small war with Hungary which immediately followed. One solid cause for satisfaction still remains in spite of Slovakia's need for dependence on one or other of the stronger neighbouring nations and that is the fact that after one thousand years the internal political administi,ation has at last passed exclusively into the hands of Slovaks. Economic and political dependence on either Germany, the Czechs or Hungary is inevitable so long as Slovakia remains an independent state but the right of full self-administration is a pure gain which is entirely due to the establishment of the Republic and goes far towards reconciling the Slovaks with the drawbacks of their political position. It is doubtful whether, as the Summary of December 5 (No. 10) suggests, the general standard of living has been reduced. During the summer cost of living bonuses were paid to workers whilst employment and conditions of pay among the "white collar" cl.ass appeared to have improved. The standard of living of the Slovak peasant has always been near the minimum necessary for existence and there have been no signs so far thait it has been reduced. On the contrary prices fixed by the grain monopoly this season were in some districts better than these offered last year under the Czecho-Slovak republic. Among the 90 SLOVAKIA middle class there has been a large transference of wealth due to the laws against Jews and the discriminatory practices against Czechs. Government service has been opened to the Slovak middle class and what this means may be inferred from the fact that even at the end of December 1938 when many Czechs had already returned to Bohemia there were still 36,000 of them in government employment in Slovakia. Slovaks were now also able to assert their predominance in the profession such as the Jaw, medicine etc. Thus there is little reason why the average member of the Slovak middle class should complain. If anybody has suffered through the recent changes it is the comparatively small body of well-to-do landowners and businessmen who have sold large quantities of goods to Germany, and the Protectorate, without being able to get their money owing to Germany's inability to pay cash for what she buys. But the losses of these people are insignificant compared with the solid gains of the majority of the middle class. The statement contained in Summary No. 10 rega1·ding the remittance of Slovak workers' sa vings from Germany is incorrect. According to a recent official announcement the Slovak National Bank has alread y advanced over 90 million crowns to the relatives of Slovak workers employed in Germany and although this arrangement has only shifted the burden of inconvenience from the Slovak workers to the Bank, the former are presumably quite satisfied with it. Only in a few cases have workmen returning from Germany attempted to disregard the regulation by bringing their earnings with them instead of depositing them to a German bank, but so far as I know the Slovak National Bank has been able to smooth out the difficulties which have arisen in their way. There appears to be some exaggeration in the opinion ( page 5 of No. 10 ) that most members of the government are looked upon as gangsters. Of the seven ministers, three, namely M. Stano, M. Sivak and M. Pruzinsky are Czechophil moderates belonging to the Hlinka party (M. Sivak was head of the government installed by the Czechs on March 9 when Dr. Tiso was deposed) and all three were members of M. Sidor's Czechophil government which succeeded Sivak's. Of the other three two occupy minor posts and Dr. Durcansky has travelled far politically since the days when he broadcast against the Czechs over the Viennese wireless. All these facts are very well known to Slovaks and it is inconceivable that they should hold the view ascribed to them in the Summary. The general attitude towards Dr. Tuka, the present Prime Minister, is indeed hostile but there is no reason to suppose that his unpopularity extends to the members of his cabinet. The Summaries do not offer any precise infonnation regarding the attitude of the Slovaks to the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris but on page 5 of No. 10 appears the statement that "were Slovakia free to exercise her choice, there is little doubt that a combination of forces headed by Dr. Hodza and M. Sidor, backed by a small but influential Protestant autonomy party, would command the votes of the vast majority of Slovakia." It is quite true that such a combination would be overwhelming. It is equally true that the support of some of the Catholic leaders of the Hlinka party must be enlisted by the Czecho-Slovak National Council before it can fully establish its claim to represent the Slovak people. The Protestants in Slovakia do not number more than 300,000 and 91 SLOVAKIA though the influence of their community in the economic and cultural life of Slovakia is out of all proportion to the total number of its members, the growing self-consciousness and power of one and a half million Catholics now make the most imrpo:rtant political factor in the Slovak State. The Protestant predominance of 1918 has gone for ever and it is useless to seek any sort of accord between Slovaks and Czechs which was opposed to the wishes of the Slovak Catholics. Yet there are no signs that the Czecho-Slov,a k National Council has made any progress towards winning over their support up to the present. The composition of the present National Council seems to show that its creators have either neglected ·t his point or have been unsuccessful in their negotiations with the Catholic leaders. The three Slovak members of the Council are not only Protestants but have not and never have had any ,p olitical following. M. Osusky and M . Slavik are career diplomats and have lived for a long time abroad whilst General Viest is a professional soldier. Though there is evidence to show that they are regarded with sympathy by the Slovak Protestants, it seems doubtful whether they can really claim to represent the political views of the whole Slovak people. The real political leader of ,t he Slovaks is M. Sidor. He is a good political orator and a good writer on national-political subjects; but his pre-eminence among the Slovak Catholic leaders is assured not only by his personality but by the fact that he stood extremely close to Father Hlinka and is said to be his political heir. The demonstrations in his favour, which continue to occur from time to time although they embarrass him and are dangerous for his supporters, are the best proof of his great popularity. He has remained loyal to the government but is definitely dissatisfied with the present German domination which has forced him and his closest friends to abandon temrporarily their political activities. If a moment ever came when it would be safe for Slovakia to abandon her policy of subservience to Germany, it would be he who would assume the political leadership rather then anyone else. It is therefore •interesting that, according to information derived from one of his personal friends, until recently at least the CzechoSlovak leaders in Paris had been unable to reach any agreement with him. He received friendly overtures from M. Osusky last summer to which he did not reply since (in his words) "he was unwilling to go the road to Canossa." One envoy coming to him from Dr. Hodza early in October was detained by the Hungarian police in Hungary and failed to arrive. Up to this time M. Sidor was not even convinced of the necessity for reviving a federal Czecho-Slovak State, although he was not in principle opposed to it. His precise attitude appeared to be that he preferred the existing state of affairs but would accerpt a federal solution if that was the pdlicy adopted by the Western Powers. So far as is known here then it cannot be said that great progress has been made up to the present ,t owards a solution of the problem of the future relations between Czechs and Slovaks. But if collaboration could be arranged between Dr. Hodza and the Czecho-Slovak National Council on the one hand and M. Sidor and the anti-German group of the Hlinkas paiity on the other, there would be good prospects of arranging a settlement which would be lasting and satisfactory to both p_ Pares sides. 1  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource British Attitude Towards Independent Slovakia in 1939 Description An account of the resource F. Vnuk Slovakia, Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972 pp. 65-91 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/059505bcecbc9634e3e95e4d84db947b.pdf 52881f07457f6b0188c03df90b9f30c9 PDF Text Text 82 SLOVAKIA Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ON THE OCCASION OF HIS SIXTIETH BIRTHDAY It is next to impossible to condense into a short biographical essay a life of such many-sided activity, so rich in events and experiences as that of Dr. J.M. Kirschbaum. It can be said of him and many of his contemporaries that their lives epitomise the Slovak history of the past half century in both its triumphant and tragic aspects. But nowhere is this symbolism so obvious and so clearly reflected as in the work and achievements of Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum. All his adult life has been spent in a dedicated service of the Slovak cause which, in turn, has in him its most ardent and articulate advocate. He was born on March 25th, 1913 in Dolne Vestenice, a well-known fruit-growing district of Central Slovakia. His father fought for the liberation of Slovakia in the Czecho-Slovak Legion during the First World War and returned from Siberia only in 1920. The years of fighting and deprivation sapped his health and he died in 1923 when the boy was ten years old. As a student of great promise and intellectual ability young Jozef Kirschbaum was sent to continue his schooling at the Lyceum (High School) in Nitra. I may add that at that time it was unusual for a village boy to pursue higher studies since the course was quite costly and demanding. Straight from the beginning J. Kirschbaum was an outstanding student whether at the Nitra Lyceum (1923-25) or later at the famous Jesuit college "Stanislavov" in Ruzomberok. In the days of Kirschbaum's stay at Ruzomberok the town had in the minds of most of the Slovak countryfolk the aura of a true capital city of Slovakia. Here resided as parish priest Fr. Andrej Hlinka, the leader of the Slovak People's Party and a fearless tribune of his people. Not even young students could escape the political atmosphere �SLOVAKIA 83 and the powerful influence of Hlinka's dynamic personality. For a young idealistic Slovak man Hlinka's political aims in their forceful simplicity must have been an irresistible attraction. There is no doubt that there and then was planted the seed of his future political commitments and involvements. After completion of his high school studies (at Kosice in 1933) Jozef Kirschbaum enrolled in the Law Faculty of the Bratislava University. Here he found himself right from the start in the thick of feverish political activities. The University halls and colleges were recruiting grounds and battle arenas where the new generation of political leaders were testing their skills and sharpening their tools. Kirschbaum and his contemporaries represented the first generation which grew up and was educated in the post-war Slovakia and was not exposed to the humiliating experiences of magyarization. They were the proud products of their teachers and professors (largely the Czechs) but in one respect they were to disappoint their tutors. They boldly asserted their Slovak nationality and refused to accept the hints and insinuations that they should consider themselves as a new breed of "Czechoslovaks". The youth of Slovakia (e.g. at their massive gathering at Trencianske Teplice in summer of 1932) even more vigorously than their fathers claimed for the Slovak nation those rights and privileges which every free nation should enjoy and which the Slovaks were once promised but since denied. In particular they demanded a fair deal for themselves and their countrymen: that the country's economy would pass into Slovak hands; that the Slovaks would get a proportional number of jobs in the Army, in the State and Public Service; that the Slovak language would be recognized and respected as the official language in Slovakia, etc. In the forefront of this struggle was the Slovak People's Party and one of its most energetic detachments was the academic youth where J. Kirschbaum was soon to play a leading role. His extensive involvement in politics-which inevitably had anti-Czech connotations-was frowned upon his Czech professors and the University authorities who would not allow him to graduate even though he had fulfilled all the �84 SLOVAKIA academic requirements with great distinction. Eventually he was awarded his Doctor of Law degree at a private ceremony in the summer of 1938. By this time Dr. J. Kirschbaum was already a wellknown public figure. His name frequently appeared in the Slovak press not only in connection with his activities but also as that of author of many articles, comments and penetrating observations. He was a regular contributor to several dailies and periodical of the time. The years 1938-39 passed into Slovak national history as the year of Slovakia's encounter with destiny. The evergrowing determination of the Slovak nation to be master in its own house manifested itself so patently that the further denial of political justice was no longer possible. The artificial edifice of "czechoslovakism " crumbled and the rigid centralist form of government was replaced by a federalist system. The post-Munich Czecho-Slovakia became a federated state and within its framework Slovakia obtained its overdue autonomy. The Slovak People's Party as the biggest political party in Slovakia and the most consistent advocate of autonomy assumed political responsibility for the future development of Slovakia. The first Slovak autonomous government formed in October 1938 consisted of two Hlinka followers (Dr. Jozef Tiso and Dr. Ferdinand !>urcansky), two Agrarians (Jan Lichner and Pavo! Teplansky) and one Nationalist (Matus cernak). These three parties represented-acco rding to the 1935 election results-almost two thirds of the Slovak electorate. The subsequent political activity of Dr. J. Kirschbaum must be viewed against this background. From the University lecture rooms he stepped straight into the turmoil of high-level politics. The situation facing the Slovak leaders was critical and very demanding. The People's Party had just lost its leader (Andrej Hlinka died in August 1938). Immediately after it had been granted autonomy Slovakia had to fight for its survival. Its greedy neighbors staked their territorial claims and Slovakia was forced to cede large portions of its territory to Hungary and 5maller ones to Poland and Germany. Truncated and harassed the country was even more determined to prove its vitality in spite of all threats and �SLOVAKIA 85 drawbacks. To achieve this, national unity was necessary. The political leaders thought that such a unity could be accomplished ( and convincingly demonstrated to outsiders) by the formation of a united political party for all Slovaks. This coalition-like party was formed in November 1938. It bore the dual name, Hlinka Slovak People's Party-The Party of Slovak National Unity and soon it was to be the real testing ground of the young Kirschbaum's abilities. But before this happened Dr. Kirschbaum had to prove his skill elsewhere. In the first months of Slovak autonomy he served as secretary of Minister f>urcansky (at the Ministry of Transport), and at the same time was the commandant of the Academic Hlinka Guards and the Editor-in-Chief of the radical fortnightly, "Nastup". In addition he was frequently seen and heard at many public meetings and demonstrations and his articles-which appeared regularly in "Nastup" and the daily press-were widely read. In the historic days of March 1939 when the Czechs by a military 'putsch' tried to quash Slovak autonomy and the future of Slovakia again hung in the balance, Dr. J. Kirschbaum-like his chief Dr. !>urcansky-considered the declaration of independence as the only viable solution. With fearless courage (the Czech military authorities issued an order for his arrest) he commuted between Dr. t>ucansky in Vienna and the Slovak political leaders in Bratislava (Karol Sidor and the deposed Prime Minister Dr. Jozef Tiso) in an attempt to arrange some coordinated political action. In these days of uncertainties he calmly organized-in defiance of Czech military orders--an impressive and welldisciplined march of University students through the streets of Bratislava. The authorities did not dare interfere and the demonstration turned out to be a significant moral booster for the suspense-packed hours preceding the declaration of independence. It is not surprising that in spite of his youth (he was barely 26) he figured on the list of the first Slovak government as proposed by Dr. t>urcansky, where he was allotted the Transport portfolio. But when-in the wake of the Slovak declaration of independence--the new government of Slovakia was an- �86 SLOVAKIA nounced, Kirschbaum's name was not included. But it was not because of his age. It is more probable that Dr. J. Tiso-the new Prime Minister and the leader of the Party of the Slovak National Unity - had for him a more challenging and exacting task. He appointed Dr. J . Kirschbaum the Secretary-General of the Party. The work imposed on his young shoulders by this appointment was enormous. The Slovak People's Party of the pre-1938 period was administered very haphazardly. Fr. Hlinka as the undisputed leader of a widespread popular movement did not see any great need and hence paid little attention to the organizational and bureaucratic details of the Party's day-to-day existence. This could do while the Party was in opposition and Hlinka's word was law. But after Hlinka's death the Party became the dominating influence in the government of the country and in addition was swelled by the influx of new members (including former members of those parties which united with it in November 1938) it was necessary for the Party to have its own statutes, modern organizational structure and an effective administrative machinery. By the Constitutional Law of July 1939 the Party was assigned a new and important role in the political, cultural and social life of independent Slovakia. The constructive implementation of this role was the job of the General Secretariat where Dr. J. Kirschbaum and an able team of dedicated and enthusiastic helpers were hard at work. At the Party Congress in Trencin (September 30thOctober 1st, 1939) Dr. J. Kirschbaum presented the new proposals for the organizational changes in the structure and administration of the Party. They were unanimously approved by the Congress and even his jealous critics had to admit that Dr. Kirschbaum and his team had done a thorough and creditable job. The Congress confirmed (also unanimously) Dr. Kirschbaum in the position of the Party's Secretary-General. As the Secretary-General of the Party Dr. J. Kirschbaum displayed not only zeal and agility but also a vision and sense of judgment so important in such a responsible job. Under his able administration the rejuvenated Party was launched on its new course under the new social and political conditions. �SLOVAKIA 87 Unfortunately Dr. Kirschbaum did not stay long in his Party post. In the first half of 1940 Slovak political life underwent dramatic changes due to the polarization of political thinking among the leaders of Slovakia. There were some who claimed that the present, as well as the future, of Slovakia must be linked with that of Germany in all respects. These close ties would postulate even the ideological remoulding of the Slovak life and outlook in the National Socialist pattern. This group, headed by Prime Minister Dr. Vojtech Tuka and the Commandant of the Hlinka Guards Alexander Mach, was resolutely opposed not only by President Dr. Tiso and the rest of the ministers but also by the overwhelming majority of ranli::. and file Party members and the people. The Party Secretariat stood solidly behind the President who insisted that Slovak politics must not slavishly imitate foreign examples but should be rooted in native traditions. Tuk.a and his followers called for German assistance which was soon forthcoming in the shape of the notorious "Salzburg consultations". In August 1940 Hitler and Ribbentrop forced President Tiso to dismiss from their positions of power the two men whom they considered as the chief trouble-makers and major obstructions to the spread of the Nazi ideology in Slovakia, namely Dr. F. nurcansky (Foreign and Interior Minister) and Dr. J. Kirschbaum (Secretary-General of the Party). After his dismissal from the Party job Dr. J. Kirschbaum was called up to do his military service in the Slovak Army (1940-41). A ban was imposed on his further participation in the domestic politics of Slovakia. And so after completion of his military duties he entered the Slovak diplomatic service. He started his diplomatic career as the Legation Counsellor at the Slovak Legation in Rome. After a short apprenticeship in Rome he assumed (in 1942) the position of Slovak Charge d'Affaires in Bern, where he stayed till the end of World War II. On the soil of neutral Switzerland he did his utmost to safeguard Slovak interests in the realm of international politics. Through personal contacts -both official and unofficial-and by all means available �88 SLOVAKIA to him he defended Slovakia's case for independence in the post-war territorial rearrangement of Central Europe. But the enemies of Slovak independence had at their side the victorious Western Powers and the Soviet Union and again it was the case of the "might-is-right" solution. With total disregard for the wishes of the small indigenous peoples it was decided to reimpose the discredited Versailles settlement on the nations of Central Europe. The Slovaks found themselves in an unwilling partnership with the Czechs in the reconstituted Czecho-Slovakia. As a result Dr. J. Kirschbaum like thousands of his countrymen stood face to face with the bitter reality of life in exile. The first years of his life as a political exile he spent in Switzerland where he worked for a short period ( 19461948) as an accredited representative of the Slovak League to the International Refugee Organization in Geneva. He was in continuous contact with the Slovak political leaders in exile and with Slovak organizations in America and elsewhere. It was obvious to them that the struggle for the restoration of Slovak independence must start there and then, no matter how hopeless the situation might look. To assure the maximum effectiveness of this struggle an organized and coordinated action was required. Thus in the summer of 1948 the foundations were laid for a Slovak political representation-The Slovak National Council A· broad-which took upon itself to carry on the struggle for the just and inalienable demands of the Slovak nation. Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum was one of the principal architects of this organization. It included such well-known personalities as Sidor, Pridavok, Culen, Mondok, Cieker, Pauco, Mikus, etc., but-most regretably-not Dr. F. !>urcansky. Dr. J. Kirschbaum stood at the head of the Committee in charge of foreign affairs. For this task he was indeed suitably prepared and equipped. He had the background of diplomatic experience and a deep and intimate knowledge of Slovak politics. His knowledge of the Western world was based on close observations and supplemented by his studies at several Western universities: Paris (Political Science, 1938), Rome (Political Science, 1941-42), Geneva (International Relations, 1946-48) and Montreal (1951-54). �SLOVAKIA 89 In 1949 he emigrated with his family (he married Magdalena Danihel in 1941 and by this time they had three children) to Montreal in Canada. In spite of the difficulties which are the lot of every immigrant in a new country he quickly settled down and resumed his work where he had left off in Europe, including his university studies. In 1952 he obtained an M.A. and in 1954 a Ph.D. degree at the Universite de Montreal. But even at this time his involvement in university activities went far deeper than a simple studentship. In 1951 he started to give a course of lectures at the Universite de Montreal and later at the Universite d'Ottawa and the University of Toronto. His lectures dealt with the broad spectrum of the history of the Western Slavs ('Slavia Occidentalis') and also with specific Slovak topics. As time went by he became even more deeply concerned with Slovak emigre politics. After 1950 the centre of Slovak p olitical activities shifted from Europe across the Atlantic and Montreal became their focal point. Here resided K . Sidor, K. culen, F. Tiso, F. Mondok, K. Murin and J . Kirschbaum who in 1952 was elected the chairman of the Political Committee of the Slovak National Council Abroad. One worrying feature of the Slovak political life in exile was its bifurcation into two organizations struggling for the same aims but in bitter rivalry against each other. For a man like Dr. J. Kirschbaum it was a particularly heart-breaking experience since the rival organization was led by his former chief and friend, Dr. F. !>urcansky. I t took many years of patience and endurance to heal this split. Major credit for this achievement should go to Dr. J. Kirschbaum. It was largely through his effort that in 1960 the Slovak community both at home and abroad learned with satisfaction about the formation of a joint organization-The Slovak Liberation Council. Dr. !>urcansky became the President of the Council's E xecutive Committee and Dr. J . Kirschbaum became the President of its Assembly. On purpose I have not said anything about the journalistic and literary activities of Dr. J . Kirschbaum. They would form an extensive chapter all by themselves and one cannot do them justice within the framework of this �90 SLOVAKIA brief biographical sketch. I only wish to remind the reader that on top of all the accomplishments recorded in the preceding paragraphs he should superimpose an impressive literary and journalistic output. This activity began when Dr. J. Kirschbaum was 14 years old and it is still continuing. In the period of the past 45 years Dr. Kirschbaum wrote (by a modest estimate) something like 1200 articles on a wide variety of topics (political commentaries, editorials. literary criticism and history, Slavic studies, linguistics. political science) in five languages (Slovak, French, English, German, Spanish) as well as four scholarly books, two of them in English ('Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe', 1960, and 'Slovaks in Canada', 1967). In the last few years Dr. Kirschbaum has expended much of his time and energy in organizing and promoting the work of the Slovak World Congress. This relatively new body (founded in 1970) embraces all Slovak political, cultural, fraternal and other organizations and societies to speak on their behalf for the Slovak cause in the free world. Dr. J. Kirschbaum is one of the Vice Presidents of the Slovak World Congress and at the moment is putting the finishing editorial touches to a Symposium on Slovak history and culture. The book will contain the lectures and discussions which were delivered at the special conference successfully arranged by Dr. Kirschbaum to coincide with the General Assembly of the Slovak World Congress in Toronto (June 1971). Karl Marx who knew vastly more about life in exile than he knew about world revolution once wrote that emigre life is "a school of scandal and of meanness". Dr. Kirschbaum would probably agree with him. More than once he became an innocent victim of vicious attacks, intrigues and malicious gossip from the enemies of Slovak independence (who wanted to eliminate him from Slovak politics for obvious reasons) as well as from jealous and frustrated compatriots (who had no obvious reasons at all). But all this "sound and fury"-unpleasant and distractful as it must have been-did not sway Dr. Kirschbaum from his firm determination to work selflessly and untiringly for the just Slovak cause. Which only confirms my personal conviction about life in exile, namely that �91 SLOVAKIA exile brings out the best in a noble and purposeful man and the worst in those who are weak and insecure. Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum can look back on his past years, and in particular the years in exile, with contentment and satisfaction. We who watched his efforts and striving at a close distance and followed them with good wishes and admiration, we know he tried his utmost and did his best. His achievements when measured against a background of harrowing and unfavorable circumstances will irritate his detractors but will inspire many of his countrymen both at home and abroad, at present and in the future. AD MULTOS ANNOS! F. V n u k, Australia • • • SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA - - - supports freedom and independence of Slovakia; promotes a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation, its history, culture, traditions, and desires; makes America better known to Slovakia and Slovakia better known to America in the interest of world peace, freedom and security; has a scholarship program for college and university students; promotes cooperation among all American-Slovak organizations and publications for the promulgations of Slovak ethnic heritage. is a charter member of the Slovak World Congress. Life membership: $100.00 For further information, write to: Slovak League of America 313 Ridge Avenue Middletown, Pa. 17057 � 82 SLOVAKIA Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ON THE OCCASION OF HIS SIXTIETH BIRTHDAY It is next to impossible to condense into a short biographical essay a life of such many-sided activity, so rich in events and experiences as that of Dr. J.M. Kirschbaum. It can be said of him and many of his contemporaries that their lives epitomise the Slovak history of the past half century in both its triumphant and tragic aspects. But nowhere is this symbolism so obvious and so clearly reflected as in the work and achievements of Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum. All his adult life has been spent in a dedicated service of the Slovak cause which, in turn, has in him its most ardent and articulate advocate. He was born on March 25th, 1913 in Dolne Vestenice, a well-known fruit-growing district of Central Slovakia. His father fought for the liberation of Slovakia in the Czecho-Slovak Legion during the First World War and returned from Siberia only in 1920. The years of fighting and deprivation sapped his health and he died in 1923 when the boy was ten years old. As a student of great promise and intellectual ability young Jozef Kirschbaum was sent to continue his schooling at the Lyceum (High School) in Nitra. I may add that at that time it was unusual for a village boy to pursue higher studies since the course was quite costly and demanding. Straight from the beginning J. Kirschbaum was an outstanding student whether at the Nitra Lyceum (1923-25) or later at the famous Jesuit college "Stanislavov" in Ruzomberok. In the days of Kirschbaum's stay at Ruzomberok the town had in the minds of most of the Slovak countryfolk the aura of a true capital city of Slovakia. Here resided as parish priest Fr. Andrej Hlinka, the leader of the Slovak People's Party and a fearless tribune of his people. Not even young students could escape the political atmosphere �SLOVAKIA 83 and the powerful influence of Hlinka's dynamic personality. For a young idealistic Slovak man Hlinka's political aims in their forceful simplicity must have been an irresistible attraction. There is no doubt that there and then was planted the seed of his future political commitments and involvements. After completion of his high school studies (at Kosice in 1933) Jozef Kirschbaum enrolled in the Law Faculty of the Bratislava University. Here he found himself right from the start in the thick of feverish political activities. The University halls and colleges were recruiting grounds and battle arenas where the new generation of political leaders were testing their skills and sharpening their tools. Kirschbaum and his contemporaries represented the first generation which grew up and was educated in the post-war Slovakia and was not exposed to the humiliating experiences of magyarization. They were the proud products of their teachers and professors (largely the Czechs) but in one respect they were to disappoint their tutors. They boldly asserted their Slovak nationality and refused to accept the hints and insinuations that they should consider themselves as a new breed of "Czechoslovaks". The youth of Slovakia (e.g. at their massive gathering at Trencianske Teplice in summer of 1932) even more vigorously than their fathers claimed for the Slovak nation those rights and privileges which every free nation should enjoy and which the Slovaks were once promised but since denied. In particular they demanded a fair deal for themselves and their countrymen: that the country's economy would pass into Slovak hands; that the Slovaks would get a proportional number of jobs in the Army, in the State and Public Service; that the Slovak language would be recognized and respected as the official language in Slovakia, etc. In the forefront of this struggle was the Slovak People's Party and one of its most energetic detachments was the academic youth where J. Kirschbaum was soon to play a leading role. His extensive involvement in politics-which inevitably had anti-Czech connotations-was frowned upon his Czech professors and the University authorities who would not allow him to graduate even though he had fulfilled all the �84 SLOVAKIA academic requirements with great distinction. Eventually he was awarded his Doctor of Law degree at a private ceremony in the summer of 1938. By this time Dr. J. Kirschbaum was already a wellknown public figure. His name frequently appeared in the Slovak press not only in connection with his activities but also as that of author of many articles, comments and penetrating observations. He was a regular contributor to several dailies and periodical of the time. The years 1938-39 passed into Slovak national history as the year of Slovakia's encounter with destiny. The evergrowing determination of the Slovak nation to be master in its own house manifested itself so patently that the further denial of political justice was no longer possible. The artificial edifice of "czechoslovakism " crumbled and the rigid centralist form of government was replaced by a federalist system. The post-Munich Czecho-Slovakia became a federated state and within its framework Slovakia obtained its overdue autonomy. The Slovak People's Party as the biggest political party in Slovakia and the most consistent advocate of autonomy assumed political responsibility for the future development of Slovakia. The first Slovak autonomous government formed in October 1938 consisted of two Hlinka followers (Dr. Jozef Tiso and Dr. Ferdinand !>urcansky), two Agrarians (Jan Lichner and Pavo! Teplansky) and one Nationalist (Matus cernak). These three parties represented-acco rding to the 1935 election results-almost two thirds of the Slovak electorate. The subsequent political activity of Dr. J. Kirschbaum must be viewed against this background. From the University lecture rooms he stepped straight into the turmoil of high-level politics. The situation facing the Slovak leaders was critical and very demanding. The People's Party had just lost its leader (Andrej Hlinka died in August 1938). Immediately after it had been granted autonomy Slovakia had to fight for its survival. Its greedy neighbors staked their territorial claims and Slovakia was forced to cede large portions of its territory to Hungary and 5maller ones to Poland and Germany. Truncated and harassed the country was even more determined to prove its vitality in spite of all threats and �SLOVAKIA 85 drawbacks. To achieve this, national unity was necessary. The political leaders thought that such a unity could be accomplished ( and convincingly demonstrated to outsiders) by the formation of a united political party for all Slovaks. This coalition-like party was formed in November 1938. It bore the dual name, Hlinka Slovak People's Party-The Party of Slovak National Unity and soon it was to be the real testing ground of the young Kirschbaum's abilities. But before this happened Dr. Kirschbaum had to prove his skill elsewhere. In the first months of Slovak autonomy he served as secretary of Minister f>urcansky (at the Ministry of Transport), and at the same time was the commandant of the Academic Hlinka Guards and the Editor-in-Chief of the radical fortnightly, "Nastup". In addition he was frequently seen and heard at many public meetings and demonstrations and his articles-which appeared regularly in "Nastup" and the daily press-were widely read. In the historic days of March 1939 when the Czechs by a military 'putsch' tried to quash Slovak autonomy and the future of Slovakia again hung in the balance, Dr. J. Kirschbaum-like his chief Dr. !>urcansky-considered the declaration of independence as the only viable solution. With fearless courage (the Czech military authorities issued an order for his arrest) he commuted between Dr. t>ucansky in Vienna and the Slovak political leaders in Bratislava (Karol Sidor and the deposed Prime Minister Dr. Jozef Tiso) in an attempt to arrange some coordinated political action. In these days of uncertainties he calmly organized-in defiance of Czech military orders--an impressive and welldisciplined march of University students through the streets of Bratislava. The authorities did not dare interfere and the demonstration turned out to be a significant moral booster for the suspense-packed hours preceding the declaration of independence. It is not surprising that in spite of his youth (he was barely 26) he figured on the list of the first Slovak government as proposed by Dr. t>urcansky, where he was allotted the Transport portfolio. But when-in the wake of the Slovak declaration of independence--the new government of Slovakia was an- �86 SLOVAKIA nounced, Kirschbaum's name was not included. But it was not because of his age. It is more probable that Dr. J. Tiso-the new Prime Minister and the leader of the Party of the Slovak National Unity - had for him a more challenging and exacting task. He appointed Dr. J . Kirschbaum the Secretary-General of the Party. The work imposed on his young shoulders by this appointment was enormous. The Slovak People's Party of the pre-1938 period was administered very haphazardly. Fr. Hlinka as the undisputed leader of a widespread popular movement did not see any great need and hence paid little attention to the organizational and bureaucratic details of the Party's day-to-day existence. This could do while the Party was in opposition and Hlinka's word was law. But after Hlinka's death the Party became the dominating influence in the government of the country and in addition was swelled by the influx of new members (including former members of those parties which united with it in November 1938) it was necessary for the Party to have its own statutes, modern organizational structure and an effective administrative machinery. By the Constitutional Law of July 1939 the Party was assigned a new and important role in the political, cultural and social life of independent Slovakia. The constructive implementation of this role was the job of the General Secretariat where Dr. J. Kirschbaum and an able team of dedicated and enthusiastic helpers were hard at work. At the Party Congress in Trencin (September 30thOctober 1st, 1939) Dr. J. Kirschbaum presented the new proposals for the organizational changes in the structure and administration of the Party. They were unanimously approved by the Congress and even his jealous critics had to admit that Dr. Kirschbaum and his team had done a thorough and creditable job. The Congress confirmed (also unanimously) Dr. Kirschbaum in the position of the Party's Secretary-General. As the Secretary-General of the Party Dr. J. Kirschbaum displayed not only zeal and agility but also a vision and sense of judgment so important in such a responsible job. Under his able administration the rejuvenated Party was launched on its new course under the new social and political conditions. �SLOVAKIA 87 Unfortunately Dr. Kirschbaum did not stay long in his Party post. In the first half of 1940 Slovak political life underwent dramatic changes due to the polarization of political thinking among the leaders of Slovakia. There were some who claimed that the present, as well as the future, of Slovakia must be linked with that of Germany in all respects. These close ties would postulate even the ideological remoulding of the Slovak life and outlook in the National Socialist pattern. This group, headed by Prime Minister Dr. Vojtech Tuka and the Commandant of the Hlinka Guards Alexander Mach, was resolutely opposed not only by President Dr. Tiso and the rest of the ministers but also by the overwhelming majority of ranli::. and file Party members and the people. The Party Secretariat stood solidly behind the President who insisted that Slovak politics must not slavishly imitate foreign examples but should be rooted in native traditions. Tuk.a and his followers called for German assistance which was soon forthcoming in the shape of the notorious "Salzburg consultations". In August 1940 Hitler and Ribbentrop forced President Tiso to dismiss from their positions of power the two men whom they considered as the chief trouble-makers and major obstructions to the spread of the Nazi ideology in Slovakia, namely Dr. F. nurcansky (Foreign and Interior Minister) and Dr. J. Kirschbaum (Secretary-General of the Party). After his dismissal from the Party job Dr. J. Kirschbaum was called up to do his military service in the Slovak Army (1940-41). A ban was imposed on his further participation in the domestic politics of Slovakia. And so after completion of his military duties he entered the Slovak diplomatic service. He started his diplomatic career as the Legation Counsellor at the Slovak Legation in Rome. After a short apprenticeship in Rome he assumed (in 1942) the position of Slovak Charge d'Affaires in Bern, where he stayed till the end of World War II. On the soil of neutral Switzerland he did his utmost to safeguard Slovak interests in the realm of international politics. Through personal contacts -both official and unofficial-and by all means available �88 SLOVAKIA to him he defended Slovakia's case for independence in the post-war territorial rearrangement of Central Europe. But the enemies of Slovak independence had at their side the victorious Western Powers and the Soviet Union and again it was the case of the "might-is-right" solution. With total disregard for the wishes of the small indigenous peoples it was decided to reimpose the discredited Versailles settlement on the nations of Central Europe. The Slovaks found themselves in an unwilling partnership with the Czechs in the reconstituted Czecho-Slovakia. As a result Dr. J. Kirschbaum like thousands of his countrymen stood face to face with the bitter reality of life in exile. The first years of his life as a political exile he spent in Switzerland where he worked for a short period ( 19461948) as an accredited representative of the Slovak League to the International Refugee Organization in Geneva. He was in continuous contact with the Slovak political leaders in exile and with Slovak organizations in America and elsewhere. It was obvious to them that the struggle for the restoration of Slovak independence must start there and then, no matter how hopeless the situation might look. To assure the maximum effectiveness of this struggle an organized and coordinated action was required. Thus in the summer of 1948 the foundations were laid for a Slovak political representation-The Slovak National Council A· broad-which took upon itself to carry on the struggle for the just and inalienable demands of the Slovak nation. Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum was one of the principal architects of this organization. It included such well-known personalities as Sidor, Pridavok, Culen, Mondok, Cieker, Pauco, Mikus, etc., but-most regretably-not Dr. F. !>urcansky. Dr. J. Kirschbaum stood at the head of the Committee in charge of foreign affairs. For this task he was indeed suitably prepared and equipped. He had the background of diplomatic experience and a deep and intimate knowledge of Slovak politics. His knowledge of the Western world was based on close observations and supplemented by his studies at several Western universities: Paris (Political Science, 1938), Rome (Political Science, 1941-42), Geneva (International Relations, 1946-48) and Montreal (1951-54). �SLOVAKIA 89 In 1949 he emigrated with his family (he married Magdalena Danihel in 1941 and by this time they had three children) to Montreal in Canada. In spite of the difficulties which are the lot of every immigrant in a new country he quickly settled down and resumed his work where he had left off in Europe, including his university studies. In 1952 he obtained an M.A. and in 1954 a Ph.D. degree at the Universite de Montreal. But even at this time his involvement in university activities went far deeper than a simple studentship. In 1951 he started to give a course of lectures at the Universite de Montreal and later at the Universite d'Ottawa and the University of Toronto. His lectures dealt with the broad spectrum of the history of the Western Slavs ('Slavia Occidentalis') and also with specific Slovak topics. As time went by he became even more deeply concerned with Slovak emigre politics. After 1950 the centre of Slovak p olitical activities shifted from Europe across the Atlantic and Montreal became their focal point. Here resided K . Sidor, K. culen, F. Tiso, F. Mondok, K. Murin and J . Kirschbaum who in 1952 was elected the chairman of the Political Committee of the Slovak National Council Abroad. One worrying feature of the Slovak political life in exile was its bifurcation into two organizations struggling for the same aims but in bitter rivalry against each other. For a man like Dr. J. Kirschbaum it was a particularly heart-breaking experience since the rival organization was led by his former chief and friend, Dr. F. !>urcansky. I t took many years of patience and endurance to heal this split. Major credit for this achievement should go to Dr. J. Kirschbaum. It was largely through his effort that in 1960 the Slovak community both at home and abroad learned with satisfaction about the formation of a joint organization-The Slovak Liberation Council. Dr. !>urcansky became the President of the Council's E xecutive Committee and Dr. J . Kirschbaum became the President of its Assembly. On purpose I have not said anything about the journalistic and literary activities of Dr. J . Kirschbaum. They would form an extensive chapter all by themselves and one cannot do them justice within the framework of this �90 SLOVAKIA brief biographical sketch. I only wish to remind the reader that on top of all the accomplishments recorded in the preceding paragraphs he should superimpose an impressive literary and journalistic output. This activity began when Dr. J. Kirschbaum was 14 years old and it is still continuing. In the period of the past 45 years Dr. Kirschbaum wrote (by a modest estimate) something like 1200 articles on a wide variety of topics (political commentaries, editorials. literary criticism and history, Slavic studies, linguistics. political science) in five languages (Slovak, French, English, German, Spanish) as well as four scholarly books, two of them in English ('Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe', 1960, and 'Slovaks in Canada', 1967). In the last few years Dr. Kirschbaum has expended much of his time and energy in organizing and promoting the work of the Slovak World Congress. This relatively new body (founded in 1970) embraces all Slovak political, cultural, fraternal and other organizations and societies to speak on their behalf for the Slovak cause in the free world. Dr. J. Kirschbaum is one of the Vice Presidents of the Slovak World Congress and at the moment is putting the finishing editorial touches to a Symposium on Slovak history and culture. The book will contain the lectures and discussions which were delivered at the special conference successfully arranged by Dr. Kirschbaum to coincide with the General Assembly of the Slovak World Congress in Toronto (June 1971). Karl Marx who knew vastly more about life in exile than he knew about world revolution once wrote that emigre life is "a school of scandal and of meanness". Dr. Kirschbaum would probably agree with him. More than once he became an innocent victim of vicious attacks, intrigues and malicious gossip from the enemies of Slovak independence (who wanted to eliminate him from Slovak politics for obvious reasons) as well as from jealous and frustrated compatriots (who had no obvious reasons at all). But all this "sound and fury"-unpleasant and distractful as it must have been-did not sway Dr. Kirschbaum from his firm determination to work selflessly and untiringly for the just Slovak cause. Which only confirms my personal conviction about life in exile, namely that �91 SLOVAKIA exile brings out the best in a noble and purposeful man and the worst in those who are weak and insecure. Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum can look back on his past years, and in particular the years in exile, with contentment and satisfaction. We who watched his efforts and striving at a close distance and followed them with good wishes and admiration, we know he tried his utmost and did his best. His achievements when measured against a background of harrowing and unfavorable circumstances will irritate his detractors but will inspire many of his countrymen both at home and abroad, at present and in the future. AD MULTOS ANNOS! F. V n u k, Australia • • • SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA - - - supports freedom and independence of Slovakia; promotes a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation, its history, culture, traditions, and desires; makes America better known to Slovakia and Slovakia better known to America in the interest of world peace, freedom and security; has a scholarship program for college and university students; promotes cooperation among all American-Slovak organizations and publications for the promulgations of Slovak ethnic heritage. is a charter member of the Slovak World Congress. Life membership: $100.00 For further information, write to: Slovak League of America 313 Ridge Avenue Middletown, Pa. 17057 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1973, Vol. 23 Description An account of the resource Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 82 SLOVAKIA Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ON THE OCCASION OF HIS SIXTIETH BIRTHDAY It is next to impossible to condense into a short biographical essay a life of such many-sided activity, so rich in events and experiences as that of Dr. J.M. Kirschbaum. It can be said of him and many of his contemporaries that their lives epitomise the Slovak history of the past half century in both its triumphant and tragic aspects. But nowhere is this symbolism so obvious and so clearly reflected as in the work and achievements of Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum. All his adult life has been spent in a dedicated service of the Slovak cause which, in turn, has in him its most ardent and articulate advocate. He was born on March 25th, 1913 in Dolne Vestenice, a well-known fruit-growing district of Central Slovakia. His father fought for the liberation of Slovakia in the Czecho-Slovak Legion during the First World War and returned from Siberia only in 1920. The years of fighting and deprivation sapped his health and he died in 1923 when the boy was ten years old. As a student of great promise and intellectual ability young Jozef Kirschbaum was sent to continue his schooling at the Lyceum (High School) in Nitra. I may add that at that time it was unusual for a village boy to pursue higher studies since the course was quite costly and demanding. Straight from the beginning J. Kirschbaum was an outstanding student whether at the Nitra Lyceum (1923-25) or later at the famous Jesuit college "Stanislavov" in Ruzomberok. In the days of Kirschbaum's stay at Ruzomberok the town had in the minds of most of the Slovak countryfolk the aura of a true capital city of Slovakia. Here resided as parish priest Fr. Andrej Hlinka, the leader of the Slovak People's Party and a fearless tribune of his people. Not even young students could escape the political atmosphere SLOVAKIA 83 and the powerful influence of Hlinka's dynamic personality. For a young idealistic Slovak man Hlinka's political aims in their forceful simplicity must have been an irresistible attraction. There is no doubt that there and then was planted the seed of his future political commitments and involvements. After completion of his high school studies (at Kosice in 1933) Jozef Kirschbaum enrolled in the Law Faculty of the Bratislava University. Here he found himself right from the start in the thick of feverish political activities. The University halls and colleges were recruiting grounds and battle arenas where the new generation of political leaders were testing their skills and sharpening their tools. Kirschbaum and his contemporaries represented the first generation which grew up and was educated in the post-war Slovakia and was not exposed to the humiliating experiences of magyarization. They were the proud products of their teachers and professors (largely the Czechs) but in one respect they were to disappoint their tutors. They boldly asserted their Slovak nationality and refused to accept the hints and insinuations that they should consider themselves as a new breed of "Czechoslovaks". The youth of Slovakia (e.g. at their massive gathering at Trencianske Teplice in summer of 1932) even more vigorously than their fathers claimed for the Slovak nation those rights and privileges which every free nation should enjoy and which the Slovaks were once promised but since denied. In particular they demanded a fair deal for themselves and their countrymen: that the country's economy would pass into Slovak hands; that the Slovaks would get a proportional number of jobs in the Army, in the State and Public Service; that the Slovak language would be recognized and respected as the official language in Slovakia, etc. In the forefront of this struggle was the Slovak People's Party and one of its most energetic detachments was the academic youth where J. Kirschbaum was soon to play a leading role. His extensive involvement in politics-which inevitably had anti-Czech connotations-was frowned upon his Czech professors and the University authorities who would not allow him to graduate even though he had fulfilled all the 84 SLOVAKIA academic requirements with great distinction. Eventually he was awarded his Doctor of Law degree at a private ceremony in the summer of 1938. By this time Dr. J. Kirschbaum was already a wellknown public figure. His name frequently appeared in the Slovak press not only in connection with his activities but also as that of author of many articles, comments and penetrating observations. He was a regular contributor to several dailies and periodical of the time. The years 1938-39 passed into Slovak national history as the year of Slovakia's encounter with destiny. The evergrowing determination of the Slovak nation to be master in its own house manifested itself so patently that the further denial of political justice was no longer possible. The artificial edifice of "czechoslovakism " crumbled and the rigid centralist form of government was replaced by a federalist system. The post-Munich Czecho-Slovakia became a federated state and within its framework Slovakia obtained its overdue autonomy. The Slovak People's Party as the biggest political party in Slovakia and the most consistent advocate of autonomy assumed political responsibility for the future development of Slovakia. The first Slovak autonomous government formed in October 1938 consisted of two Hlinka followers (Dr. Jozef Tiso and Dr. Ferdinand !>urcansky), two Agrarians (Jan Lichner and Pavo! Teplansky) and one Nationalist (Matus cernak). These three parties represented-acco rding to the 1935 election results-almost two thirds of the Slovak electorate. The subsequent political activity of Dr. J. Kirschbaum must be viewed against this background. From the University lecture rooms he stepped straight into the turmoil of high-level politics. The situation facing the Slovak leaders was critical and very demanding. The People's Party had just lost its leader (Andrej Hlinka died in August 1938). Immediately after it had been granted autonomy Slovakia had to fight for its survival. Its greedy neighbors staked their territorial claims and Slovakia was forced to cede large portions of its territory to Hungary and 5maller ones to Poland and Germany. Truncated and harassed the country was even more determined to prove its vitality in spite of all threats and SLOVAKIA 85 drawbacks. To achieve this, national unity was necessary. The political leaders thought that such a unity could be accomplished ( and convincingly demonstrated to outsiders) by the formation of a united political party for all Slovaks. This coalition-like party was formed in November 1938. It bore the dual name, Hlinka Slovak People's Party-The Party of Slovak National Unity and soon it was to be the real testing ground of the young Kirschbaum's abilities. But before this happened Dr. Kirschbaum had to prove his skill elsewhere. In the first months of Slovak autonomy he served as secretary of Minister f>urcansky (at the Ministry of Transport), and at the same time was the commandant of the Academic Hlinka Guards and the Editor-in-Chief of the radical fortnightly, "Nastup". In addition he was frequently seen and heard at many public meetings and demonstrations and his articles-which appeared regularly in "Nastup" and the daily press-were widely read. In the historic days of March 1939 when the Czechs by a military 'putsch' tried to quash Slovak autonomy and the future of Slovakia again hung in the balance, Dr. J. Kirschbaum-like his chief Dr. !>urcansky-considered the declaration of independence as the only viable solution. With fearless courage (the Czech military authorities issued an order for his arrest) he commuted between Dr. t>ucansky in Vienna and the Slovak political leaders in Bratislava (Karol Sidor and the deposed Prime Minister Dr. Jozef Tiso) in an attempt to arrange some coordinated political action. In these days of uncertainties he calmly organized-in defiance of Czech military orders--an impressive and welldisciplined march of University students through the streets of Bratislava. The authorities did not dare interfere and the demonstration turned out to be a significant moral booster for the suspense-packed hours preceding the declaration of independence. It is not surprising that in spite of his youth (he was barely 26) he figured on the list of the first Slovak government as proposed by Dr. t>urcansky, where he was allotted the Transport portfolio. But when-in the wake of the Slovak declaration of independence--the new government of Slovakia was an- 86 SLOVAKIA nounced, Kirschbaum's name was not included. But it was not because of his age. It is more probable that Dr. J. Tiso-the new Prime Minister and the leader of the Party of the Slovak National Unity - had for him a more challenging and exacting task. He appointed Dr. J . Kirschbaum the Secretary-General of the Party. The work imposed on his young shoulders by this appointment was enormous. The Slovak People's Party of the pre-1938 period was administered very haphazardly. Fr. Hlinka as the undisputed leader of a widespread popular movement did not see any great need and hence paid little attention to the organizational and bureaucratic details of the Party's day-to-day existence. This could do while the Party was in opposition and Hlinka's word was law. But after Hlinka's death the Party became the dominating influence in the government of the country and in addition was swelled by the influx of new members (including former members of those parties which united with it in November 1938) it was necessary for the Party to have its own statutes, modern organizational structure and an effective administrative machinery. By the Constitutional Law of July 1939 the Party was assigned a new and important role in the political, cultural and social life of independent Slovakia. The constructive implementation of this role was the job of the General Secretariat where Dr. J. Kirschbaum and an able team of dedicated and enthusiastic helpers were hard at work. At the Party Congress in Trencin (September 30thOctober 1st, 1939) Dr. J. Kirschbaum presented the new proposals for the organizational changes in the structure and administration of the Party. They were unanimously approved by the Congress and even his jealous critics had to admit that Dr. Kirschbaum and his team had done a thorough and creditable job. The Congress confirmed (also unanimously) Dr. Kirschbaum in the position of the Party's Secretary-General. As the Secretary-General of the Party Dr. J. Kirschbaum displayed not only zeal and agility but also a vision and sense of judgment so important in such a responsible job. Under his able administration the rejuvenated Party was launched on its new course under the new social and political conditions. SLOVAKIA 87 Unfortunately Dr. Kirschbaum did not stay long in his Party post. In the first half of 1940 Slovak political life underwent dramatic changes due to the polarization of political thinking among the leaders of Slovakia. There were some who claimed that the present, as well as the future, of Slovakia must be linked with that of Germany in all respects. These close ties would postulate even the ideological remoulding of the Slovak life and outlook in the National Socialist pattern. This group, headed by Prime Minister Dr. Vojtech Tuka and the Commandant of the Hlinka Guards Alexander Mach, was resolutely opposed not only by President Dr. Tiso and the rest of the ministers but also by the overwhelming majority of ranli::. and file Party members and the people. The Party Secretariat stood solidly behind the President who insisted that Slovak politics must not slavishly imitate foreign examples but should be rooted in native traditions. Tuk.a and his followers called for German assistance which was soon forthcoming in the shape of the notorious "Salzburg consultations". In August 1940 Hitler and Ribbentrop forced President Tiso to dismiss from their positions of power the two men whom they considered as the chief trouble-makers and major obstructions to the spread of the Nazi ideology in Slovakia, namely Dr. F. nurcansky (Foreign and Interior Minister) and Dr. J. Kirschbaum (Secretary-General of the Party). After his dismissal from the Party job Dr. J. Kirschbaum was called up to do his military service in the Slovak Army (1940-41). A ban was imposed on his further participation in the domestic politics of Slovakia. And so after completion of his military duties he entered the Slovak diplomatic service. He started his diplomatic career as the Legation Counsellor at the Slovak Legation in Rome. After a short apprenticeship in Rome he assumed (in 1942) the position of Slovak Charge d'Affaires in Bern, where he stayed till the end of World War II. On the soil of neutral Switzerland he did his utmost to safeguard Slovak interests in the realm of international politics. Through personal contacts -both official and unofficial-and by all means available 88 SLOVAKIA to him he defended Slovakia's case for independence in the post-war territorial rearrangement of Central Europe. But the enemies of Slovak independence had at their side the victorious Western Powers and the Soviet Union and again it was the case of the "might-is-right" solution. With total disregard for the wishes of the small indigenous peoples it was decided to reimpose the discredited Versailles settlement on the nations of Central Europe. The Slovaks found themselves in an unwilling partnership with the Czechs in the reconstituted Czecho-Slovakia. As a result Dr. J. Kirschbaum like thousands of his countrymen stood face to face with the bitter reality of life in exile. The first years of his life as a political exile he spent in Switzerland where he worked for a short period ( 19461948) as an accredited representative of the Slovak League to the International Refugee Organization in Geneva. He was in continuous contact with the Slovak political leaders in exile and with Slovak organizations in America and elsewhere. It was obvious to them that the struggle for the restoration of Slovak independence must start there and then, no matter how hopeless the situation might look. To assure the maximum effectiveness of this struggle an organized and coordinated action was required. Thus in the summer of 1948 the foundations were laid for a Slovak political representation-The Slovak National Council A· broad-which took upon itself to carry on the struggle for the just and inalienable demands of the Slovak nation. Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum was one of the principal architects of this organization. It included such well-known personalities as Sidor, Pridavok, Culen, Mondok, Cieker, Pauco, Mikus, etc., but-most regretably-not Dr. F. !>urcansky. Dr. J. Kirschbaum stood at the head of the Committee in charge of foreign affairs. For this task he was indeed suitably prepared and equipped. He had the background of diplomatic experience and a deep and intimate knowledge of Slovak politics. His knowledge of the Western world was based on close observations and supplemented by his studies at several Western universities: Paris (Political Science, 1938), Rome (Political Science, 1941-42), Geneva (International Relations, 1946-48) and Montreal (1951-54). SLOVAKIA 89 In 1949 he emigrated with his family (he married Magdalena Danihel in 1941 and by this time they had three children) to Montreal in Canada. In spite of the difficulties which are the lot of every immigrant in a new country he quickly settled down and resumed his work where he had left off in Europe, including his university studies. In 1952 he obtained an M.A. and in 1954 a Ph.D. degree at the Universite de Montreal. But even at this time his involvement in university activities went far deeper than a simple studentship. In 1951 he started to give a course of lectures at the Universite de Montreal and later at the Universite d'Ottawa and the University of Toronto. His lectures dealt with the broad spectrum of the history of the Western Slavs ('Slavia Occidentalis') and also with specific Slovak topics. As time went by he became even more deeply concerned with Slovak emigre politics. After 1950 the centre of Slovak p olitical activities shifted from Europe across the Atlantic and Montreal became their focal point. Here resided K . Sidor, K. culen, F. Tiso, F. Mondok, K. Murin and J . Kirschbaum who in 1952 was elected the chairman of the Political Committee of the Slovak National Council Abroad. One worrying feature of the Slovak political life in exile was its bifurcation into two organizations struggling for the same aims but in bitter rivalry against each other. For a man like Dr. J. Kirschbaum it was a particularly heart-breaking experience since the rival organization was led by his former chief and friend, Dr. F. !>urcansky. I t took many years of patience and endurance to heal this split. Major credit for this achievement should go to Dr. J. Kirschbaum. It was largely through his effort that in 1960 the Slovak community both at home and abroad learned with satisfaction about the formation of a joint organization-The Slovak Liberation Council. Dr. !>urcansky became the President of the Council's E xecutive Committee and Dr. J . Kirschbaum became the President of its Assembly. On purpose I have not said anything about the journalistic and literary activities of Dr. J . Kirschbaum. They would form an extensive chapter all by themselves and one cannot do them justice within the framework of this 90 SLOVAKIA brief biographical sketch. I only wish to remind the reader that on top of all the accomplishments recorded in the preceding paragraphs he should superimpose an impressive literary and journalistic output. This activity began when Dr. J. Kirschbaum was 14 years old and it is still continuing. In the period of the past 45 years Dr. Kirschbaum wrote (by a modest estimate) something like 1200 articles on a wide variety of topics (political commentaries, editorials. literary criticism and history, Slavic studies, linguistics. political science) in five languages (Slovak, French, English, German, Spanish) as well as four scholarly books, two of them in English ('Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe', 1960, and 'Slovaks in Canada', 1967). In the last few years Dr. Kirschbaum has expended much of his time and energy in organizing and promoting the work of the Slovak World Congress. This relatively new body (founded in 1970) embraces all Slovak political, cultural, fraternal and other organizations and societies to speak on their behalf for the Slovak cause in the free world. Dr. J. Kirschbaum is one of the Vice Presidents of the Slovak World Congress and at the moment is putting the finishing editorial touches to a Symposium on Slovak history and culture. The book will contain the lectures and discussions which were delivered at the special conference successfully arranged by Dr. Kirschbaum to coincide with the General Assembly of the Slovak World Congress in Toronto (June 1971). Karl Marx who knew vastly more about life in exile than he knew about world revolution once wrote that emigre life is "a school of scandal and of meanness". Dr. Kirschbaum would probably agree with him. More than once he became an innocent victim of vicious attacks, intrigues and malicious gossip from the enemies of Slovak independence (who wanted to eliminate him from Slovak politics for obvious reasons) as well as from jealous and frustrated compatriots (who had no obvious reasons at all). But all this "sound and fury"-unpleasant and distractful as it must have been-did not sway Dr. Kirschbaum from his firm determination to work selflessly and untiringly for the just Slovak cause. Which only confirms my personal conviction about life in exile, namely that 91 SLOVAKIA exile brings out the best in a noble and purposeful man and the worst in those who are weak and insecure. Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum can look back on his past years, and in particular the years in exile, with contentment and satisfaction. We who watched his efforts and striving at a close distance and followed them with good wishes and admiration, we know he tried his utmost and did his best. His achievements when measured against a background of harrowing and unfavorable circumstances will irritate his detractors but will inspire many of his countrymen both at home and abroad, at present and in the future. AD MULTOS ANNOS! F. V n u k, Australia • • • SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA - - - supports freedom and independence of Slovakia; promotes a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation, its history, culture, traditions, and desires; makes America better known to Slovakia and Slovakia better known to America in the interest of world peace, freedom and security; has a scholarship program for college and university students; promotes cooperation among all American-Slovak organizations and publications for the promulgations of Slovak ethnic heritage. is a charter member of the Slovak World Congress. Life membership: $100.00 For further information, write to: Slovak League of America 313 Ridge Avenue Middletown, Pa. 17057  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. J. M. Kirschbaum: A biographical sketch on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday Description An account of the resource F. Vnuk Slovakia, Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973 pp. 82-91 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6376f63cc018b9fe9d80cf8807fc3bfc.pdf 1fa2404f2402048916991549b5b05250 PDF Text Text 203 SLOVAKIA REVIEWS OF PAUCO'S WRITINGS IN LEADING PERIODICALS MOST co po komunizme? (I, 1, 1954, p . 44) Tisov odkaz (I, 2, 1954, p. 39-40. Dr. Karol Murin) Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe (I, 3, 1954, p. 41-43. F. Hrusovsky) Stefan Furdek a slovenske prist'ahovalectvo (II, 2, 1955, p. 136-137) Mest'ancik) Slovcici a komunizmus (IV, 3, 1957, p. 132-133. Unconquerables (VI, 1-2, 1959, p. 83-85. Andrew Pier, O.S.B.) Christian Slovakia Under Communism (VI, 3, 1959, p. 186-187. Andrew Jan Pier, O.S.B. ) Pi:it'desiatnik Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum (XI, 3-4, 1964, p. 181) Slovakia (XI, 3-4, 1964, p. 182-183) Litercirny Almanach Slovcika v Amerike na rok 1965 (XII, 1-2, 1965, p. 82-83) Slovakia (XII, 3-4, 1965, p. 189) SLOVAKIA 75 rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty (XV, 38, 1965, p . 152-155. Mother M. Emerentia, SS.C.M.) Litercirny Almanach Slovcika v Amerike 1967 (XVII, 40, 1967, p. 190-192. Sister M. Tarcisia Gregorovic, SS.C.M.) Tak sme sa poznali (XVIII, 41, 1968, p . 159-164. Sister M. Tarcisia, SS. C.M.) Slovenski priekopnici v Amerike ( XXIII , 46, 1973, p. 196-197. Joseph C. Krajsa) F URD EK All writings by Dr. Pauco on the history of American Slovaks are evaluated by J . M. Kirschbaum in his article Dr. Pauco' s W ritings and the History of American Slovaks (Furdek, 1974, p. 75-80) . Francis V n u k : A BIOGRAPHICAL VALEDICTION In spite of the fact that the Slovaks are among the oldest inhabitants of the Central European region their efforts to secure a fully independent life has been seldom appreciated and rarely understood. But frustrations and disappointments can never deter a nation from its ultimate aim, and where one generation fails another will rise to continue the struggle. The natural aspirations of a nature and self-respecting nation cannot be suppressed by terror, nor silenced by bribes, nor extinguished by an apparent �204 SLOVAKIA lack of success. In all its history - and especially in the last 200 years - the Slovak nation has always had selfless and dedicated sons who in the struggle for national independence - not unlike Tennyson's Ulysses - were "strong in will to strive, to seek, to find and not to yield." One of these indefatigable fighters is Dr. Jozef Pauco who on February 26th was celebrating his 60th birthday. This memorable occasion makes one pause a moment and look into the past in order to reconstruct a brief outline of his life-career with all its notable moments and achievements. As a man in the forefront of Slovak public activities Dr. Pauco has many friends and admirers and not a few enemies. But - no matter what their feeling towards him are - they would all be unanimous in admitting that the name of Dr. Pauco has become a synonym of hard and continuous work in the cause of his nation. The beginnings of his involvement in this kind of work go back to his student days; the seeds, however, were sown much earlier, in the years of his childhood. Born on February 26th, 1914 (at Pila, near Lucenec) of Slovak peasant stock, young Pauco grew up in a typical Central European village environment where life was harsh, shortages common and rewards only very modest. This situation was further aggravated by the outbreak of World War I, when all able-bodied men were called up and the heavy burden of daily life had.to be carried by the women and old people. Pauco's father had to go too and he never came back. He died as a conscript in the service of those who denied the very existence of the Slovak nation and were seeking its physical extinction. This powerful traumatic experience, combined with the gentle influence of his widowed mother, imbued the young boy with a strong sense of justice, and with a fighting spirit to undo wrongs and to see that one received what was due to him. In Czecho-Slovakia which came into being in October 1918 the Slovaks were faring much better than in the prewar Hungary, but they still were treated by their Czech brethren as minor partners in an unequal Czecho-Slovak partnership. As a young high school student at Nitra (where �SLOVAKIA 205 - according to his mother's wishes - he was preparing for the priesthood) J. Pauco could see this inequality which was both humiliating and insulting. His teachers (as well as other public servants and State employees) were Czechs, while Slovaks were without jobs. Not only did these Czechs occupy jobs and posts which belonged to the Slovaks but they also abused their positions by denigrating the Slovak language, culture, history and way of life. The outcome of this haughty and unsparing attitude towards the Slovak people was quite predictible. A general disenchantment soon gave way to discontent and these sentiments eventually crystallized out as a massive opposition movement led by Andrej Hlinka. Under Hlinka's charismatic leadership Slovakia launched a campaign for administrative self-government (autonomy) which- incidentallyhad been guaranteed to Slovaks back in 1918 by President T. G. Masaryk in the well-known Pittsburgh Agreement. · Hlinka's massive following came from all strata of Slovak society but the most significant support came from the enthusiastic followers among the young people. They provided the Hlinka People's Party with the most convincing arguments vis-a-vis Prague's centralist "Czechoslovak" policies. The young Slovak generation was autonomist in its outlook almost to a man, as was demonstrated at Trencianske Teplice in 1932. J. Pauco soon translated into action his admiration for Hlinka's valiant struggle for Slovak autonomy. His contributions to this common national effort were more and more substantial as he grew older and when in 1936 he came to Bratislava to study Philosophy at the Slovak University he was already a fully-fledged and highly-valued activist within the ranks of the Slovak autonomist movement. In Bratislava he became involved in the affairs of the busy campus life, where at that time the political issues were fought and argued in the most radical manner. (One of Dr. Pauco's ideological opponents was a fellow-student from the Law Faculty, G. Husak, today's Communist boss of Czecho-Slovakia). In addition to the campus activities J . Pauco was a regular contributor to the People's Party dailies and periodicals. This part-time collaboration with �206 SLOVAKIA the press was destined to become the enduring attachmen t of his life. In 1938 the struggle for Slovak autonomy took on a dramatic turn. The artificial facade of "Czechoslo vak" unity could not withstand the combined pressure of internal and external factors and collapsed completely , as predicted by those Slovak politicians whose warnings were never heeded. In the hectic three months September -November 1938 the Czecho-Slovakia of Masaryk and Benes changed beyond recognition . It had to cede the Sudeten territories to Germany, Southern Slovakia to the Magyars, the Teschen region to Poland and internally to grant autonomy to Slovaks and Ruthenians . Slovak autonomy, declared by all the Slovak political parties ( except the Socialists and Communis ts) on October 6th, 1938, was long overdue, but its arrival at this critical time (as an aftermath of the Munich crisis) made its realization easily misinterpr eted. For the Slovaks, however, it was a most welcome developme nt in which they saw the culminatio n of their long political struggle. For the Slovak People's Party (led since the death of A. Hlinka - in August 1938 - by Dr. Jozef Tiso, who became Premier of the Slovak autonomou s governmen t) autonomy was a challenge to show the world around us that we could manage our affairs with skill and responsibil ity. In communic ating its aims and ideals to the people the governmen t required a reliable and prompt press service. Consequen tly J. Pauco was asked to concentrat e his activities mainly in this direction. In March 1939 the Slovaks declared their independen ce and a new state appeared on the map of Europe: the Slovak Republic. The transition from autonomy to independence was rapid and the road to independen ce was somewhat steep. But the Slovaks knew that in the given situation theirs was not to argue and ponder about the road behind, but to do something about the road ahead. They grasped eagerly the historic opportunit y which independence offered and set out to make Slovakia as happy and prosperous a place for all Slovaks as was possible under the given circumstan ces. In this challenging and unique period of Slovak history �SLOVAKIA 207 Dr. Jozef Pauco played a major and politically significant role. Apart from administrative responsibilities (he was acting as a district secretary of the People's Party at Nitra) he steadily maintained his journalistic and editorial connections with numerous political dailies and weeklies. In 1942 Dr. Jozef Tiso, the President of the Slovak Republic, appointed him as Editor-in-Chief of the principal national daily, Slovak. Slovak was the official press organ of the People's Party and of the Slovak government. It is an eloquent testimony to Pauco's journalistic abilities and political maturity that President Tiso placed such an important function on the shoulders of such a youthful (28 years old ) man. Dr. J . Pauco reciprocated this trust and served Dr. Tiso faithfully in the subsequent years. It was his concern to explain and popularize the current governmental policies, to provide ideological guidance, to maintain and foster proud nationalistic sentiments among the people and to instil hope and optimism when the situation became grim and critical. It is a tragic aspect of Slovak history that during the global conflict of 1939-45 Slovakia - unable to escape its geography - was politically under German protection and influence. The enemies of Slovak independence exploited this unfortunate situation and persuaded both the Western Allies and the Soviet Union that in the post-war settlement Slovakia should be again annexed to the Czech lands and that the pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia should be restored. The Slovak patriots who had fought for and defended the independent Slovak state were branded as fascists, traitors and even criminals and were threatened with severe punishments and retribution. To escape the advancing Red Army Slovak political leaders, administrators, intellectuals and even ordinary citizens fled in thousands to the West where they hoped to find sympathy and understanding for their cause. Dr. J. Pauco and his family (his wife Draga whom he had married in 1942 and infant-son Svatopluk) were among them. The last issue of the daily, Slovak was published in Bratislava on April 1st, 1945 and it sadly signified the end of an era. The bulk of Slovak political refugees eventually sur· �208 SLOVAKIA rendered to the Americans. But the American military, starry-eyed about "the gallant Soviet ally," and having swallowed all the Communist lies about the refugees unthinkingly handed them over to their Communist jailers and executioners. To escape death or a fate worse than death the refugees had to scatter and go into hiding in the hope the West would soon wake up and cease this inhuman practice. Gradually the Western statesmen realized their folly and refused to comply with the bloodthirsty Soviet wishes. The refugees could now breathe relief, but their troubles were far from over. And what was even more tragic for hundreds and thousands of them it was already too late. Dr. J. Pauco was among the lucky ones. Moving from place to place in Austria and Bavaria he finally settled in Munich. During this trying period his son Svatopluk died and many of his close friends and colleagues were forcibly "repatriated" to Slovakia where they faced the vengeance of the so-called "people's tribunals." President Tiso and most of the members of the Slovak government were among them. But these tremendous losses and blows failed to break Pauco's spirit. Believing in justice and convinced that truth would ultimately triumph, he refused to accept defeat. As soon as it was possible (in April 1946) he started the publication of Slobodne Slovensko (Free Slovakia) in war-torn Munich. Though modest in appearance this mimeographed journal was the very embodiment of ardent Slovak nationalism. The journal was a great moral and psychological boost for the hard-pressed and frightened Slovak refugees . To explain the Slovak position to foreigners Dr. Paufo published bulletins in the German and Ukrainian languages. Dr. Pauco's stay in West Germany lasted five years. They were years of extreme hardship and at the same time years of very intense activity. Many events and happenings of this period are recorded in his autobiographical novel The Flight to Wonderland. The "Wonderland" to him was America which since the 1870's has become the adopted country to almost one million Slovaks. He settled in a small provincial township, Middletown, Pa., where a major Slovak fraternalistic society has its printery and where the largest Slovak-English weekly, Jednota is published. He took up the position of �SLOVAKIA 209 associate editor of this paper and has remained there till now. But the editorial work could not possibly absorb all his energies. Soon after his arrival in the USA he was deeply involved in all the aspects of Slovak communal activities. One cannot go through them in detail, but even a simple enumeration of them is impressive enough to confirm what was said at the beginning, i.e . that Pauco's name is synonymous with continuous work in the service of his nation. He participates actively in several Slovak associations and societies: in the Slovak League of America (where he serves as secretary-general and editor of its English language annual, Slovakia) , in the First Catholic Slovak Union, in the Slovak Catholic Federation, etc. He plays a leading role in Slovak political organizations such as the Slovak National Council Abroad, Slovak Liberation Council, Slovak World Congress (as the chairman of its Information Committee. ) He takes a keen interest in the history of the Slovak immigrants in the USA and in this field he has produced five books (including a comprehensive history of the First Catholic Slovak Union, 1890-1965) and a large number of articles. He is owner-publisher of a popular weekly Slovak v Amerike and editor of its prestigious annual Literdrny Almanach. As a writer Dr. Pauco has to his credit two books of fictionalized autobiography (Unconquerables, 1958 and The Flight to Wonderland , 1963), a volume of reminiscences concerning famous people he met ( Tak sme sa poznali, 1966) and several books and pamphlets of political writing (e.g. Slovdci a komunizmus, 1957; co po komunizme?, 1952; Tisov odkaz, 1953; etc.). It is indeed a life rich in achievements and, what is more, one can say without fear of contradiction that - as in the past so in the future - Dr. J. Pauco will certainly enrich it further with many valuable additions in every sphere of his many-sided activity. We, his friends and colleagues, greet him warmly at this momentous milestone of his life and ask the Almighty to grant him health and strength not only to continue in his work but also to reap a justly deserved reward for his efforts. Ad multos annos! � 203 SLOVAKIA REVIEWS OF PAUCO'S WRITINGS IN LEADING PERIODICALS MOST co po komunizme? (I, 1, 1954, p . 44) Tisov odkaz (I, 2, 1954, p. 39-40. Dr. Karol Murin) Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe (I, 3, 1954, p. 41-43. F. Hrusovsky) Stefan Furdek a slovenske prist'ahovalectvo (II, 2, 1955, p. 136-137) Mest'ancik) Slovcici a komunizmus (IV, 3, 1957, p. 132-133. Unconquerables (VI, 1-2, 1959, p. 83-85. Andrew Pier, O.S.B.) Christian Slovakia Under Communism (VI, 3, 1959, p. 186-187. Andrew Jan Pier, O.S.B. ) Pi:it'desiatnik Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum (XI, 3-4, 1964, p. 181) Slovakia (XI, 3-4, 1964, p. 182-183) Litercirny Almanach Slovcika v Amerike na rok 1965 (XII, 1-2, 1965, p. 82-83) Slovakia (XII, 3-4, 1965, p. 189) SLOVAKIA 75 rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty (XV, 38, 1965, p . 152-155. Mother M. Emerentia, SS.C.M.) Litercirny Almanach Slovcika v Amerike 1967 (XVII, 40, 1967, p. 190-192. Sister M. Tarcisia Gregorovic, SS.C.M.) Tak sme sa poznali (XVIII, 41, 1968, p . 159-164. Sister M. Tarcisia, SS. C.M.) Slovenski priekopnici v Amerike ( XXIII , 46, 1973, p. 196-197. Joseph C. Krajsa) F URD EK All writings by Dr. Pauco on the history of American Slovaks are evaluated by J . M. Kirschbaum in his article Dr. Pauco' s W ritings and the History of American Slovaks (Furdek, 1974, p. 75-80) . Francis V n u k : A BIOGRAPHICAL VALEDICTION In spite of the fact that the Slovaks are among the oldest inhabitants of the Central European region their efforts to secure a fully independent life has been seldom appreciated and rarely understood. But frustrations and disappointments can never deter a nation from its ultimate aim, and where one generation fails another will rise to continue the struggle. The natural aspirations of a nature and self-respecting nation cannot be suppressed by terror, nor silenced by bribes, nor extinguished by an apparent �204 SLOVAKIA lack of success. In all its history - and especially in the last 200 years - the Slovak nation has always had selfless and dedicated sons who in the struggle for national independence - not unlike Tennyson's Ulysses - were "strong in will to strive, to seek, to find and not to yield." One of these indefatigable fighters is Dr. Jozef Pauco who on February 26th was celebrating his 60th birthday. This memorable occasion makes one pause a moment and look into the past in order to reconstruct a brief outline of his life-career with all its notable moments and achievements. As a man in the forefront of Slovak public activities Dr. Pauco has many friends and admirers and not a few enemies. But - no matter what their feeling towards him are - they would all be unanimous in admitting that the name of Dr. Pauco has become a synonym of hard and continuous work in the cause of his nation. The beginnings of his involvement in this kind of work go back to his student days; the seeds, however, were sown much earlier, in the years of his childhood. Born on February 26th, 1914 (at Pila, near Lucenec) of Slovak peasant stock, young Pauco grew up in a typical Central European village environment where life was harsh, shortages common and rewards only very modest. This situation was further aggravated by the outbreak of World War I, when all able-bodied men were called up and the heavy burden of daily life had.to be carried by the women and old people. Pauco's father had to go too and he never came back. He died as a conscript in the service of those who denied the very existence of the Slovak nation and were seeking its physical extinction. This powerful traumatic experience, combined with the gentle influence of his widowed mother, imbued the young boy with a strong sense of justice, and with a fighting spirit to undo wrongs and to see that one received what was due to him. In Czecho-Slovakia which came into being in October 1918 the Slovaks were faring much better than in the prewar Hungary, but they still were treated by their Czech brethren as minor partners in an unequal Czecho-Slovak partnership. As a young high school student at Nitra (where �SLOVAKIA 205 - according to his mother's wishes - he was preparing for the priesthood) J. Pauco could see this inequality which was both humiliating and insulting. His teachers (as well as other public servants and State employees) were Czechs, while Slovaks were without jobs. Not only did these Czechs occupy jobs and posts which belonged to the Slovaks but they also abused their positions by denigrating the Slovak language, culture, history and way of life. The outcome of this haughty and unsparing attitude towards the Slovak people was quite predictible. A general disenchantment soon gave way to discontent and these sentiments eventually crystallized out as a massive opposition movement led by Andrej Hlinka. Under Hlinka's charismatic leadership Slovakia launched a campaign for administrative self-government (autonomy) which- incidentallyhad been guaranteed to Slovaks back in 1918 by President T. G. Masaryk in the well-known Pittsburgh Agreement. · Hlinka's massive following came from all strata of Slovak society but the most significant support came from the enthusiastic followers among the young people. They provided the Hlinka People's Party with the most convincing arguments vis-a-vis Prague's centralist "Czechoslovak" policies. The young Slovak generation was autonomist in its outlook almost to a man, as was demonstrated at Trencianske Teplice in 1932. J. Pauco soon translated into action his admiration for Hlinka's valiant struggle for Slovak autonomy. His contributions to this common national effort were more and more substantial as he grew older and when in 1936 he came to Bratislava to study Philosophy at the Slovak University he was already a fully-fledged and highly-valued activist within the ranks of the Slovak autonomist movement. In Bratislava he became involved in the affairs of the busy campus life, where at that time the political issues were fought and argued in the most radical manner. (One of Dr. Pauco's ideological opponents was a fellow-student from the Law Faculty, G. Husak, today's Communist boss of Czecho-Slovakia). In addition to the campus activities J . Pauco was a regular contributor to the People's Party dailies and periodicals. This part-time collaboration with �206 SLOVAKIA the press was destined to become the enduring attachmen t of his life. In 1938 the struggle for Slovak autonomy took on a dramatic turn. The artificial facade of "Czechoslo vak" unity could not withstand the combined pressure of internal and external factors and collapsed completely , as predicted by those Slovak politicians whose warnings were never heeded. In the hectic three months September -November 1938 the Czecho-Slovakia of Masaryk and Benes changed beyond recognition . It had to cede the Sudeten territories to Germany, Southern Slovakia to the Magyars, the Teschen region to Poland and internally to grant autonomy to Slovaks and Ruthenians . Slovak autonomy, declared by all the Slovak political parties ( except the Socialists and Communis ts) on October 6th, 1938, was long overdue, but its arrival at this critical time (as an aftermath of the Munich crisis) made its realization easily misinterpr eted. For the Slovaks, however, it was a most welcome developme nt in which they saw the culminatio n of their long political struggle. For the Slovak People's Party (led since the death of A. Hlinka - in August 1938 - by Dr. Jozef Tiso, who became Premier of the Slovak autonomou s governmen t) autonomy was a challenge to show the world around us that we could manage our affairs with skill and responsibil ity. In communic ating its aims and ideals to the people the governmen t required a reliable and prompt press service. Consequen tly J. Pauco was asked to concentrat e his activities mainly in this direction. In March 1939 the Slovaks declared their independen ce and a new state appeared on the map of Europe: the Slovak Republic. The transition from autonomy to independence was rapid and the road to independen ce was somewhat steep. But the Slovaks knew that in the given situation theirs was not to argue and ponder about the road behind, but to do something about the road ahead. They grasped eagerly the historic opportunit y which independence offered and set out to make Slovakia as happy and prosperous a place for all Slovaks as was possible under the given circumstan ces. In this challenging and unique period of Slovak history �SLOVAKIA 207 Dr. Jozef Pauco played a major and politically significant role. Apart from administrative responsibilities (he was acting as a district secretary of the People's Party at Nitra) he steadily maintained his journalistic and editorial connections with numerous political dailies and weeklies. In 1942 Dr. Jozef Tiso, the President of the Slovak Republic, appointed him as Editor-in-Chief of the principal national daily, Slovak. Slovak was the official press organ of the People's Party and of the Slovak government. It is an eloquent testimony to Pauco's journalistic abilities and political maturity that President Tiso placed such an important function on the shoulders of such a youthful (28 years old ) man. Dr. J . Pauco reciprocated this trust and served Dr. Tiso faithfully in the subsequent years. It was his concern to explain and popularize the current governmental policies, to provide ideological guidance, to maintain and foster proud nationalistic sentiments among the people and to instil hope and optimism when the situation became grim and critical. It is a tragic aspect of Slovak history that during the global conflict of 1939-45 Slovakia - unable to escape its geography - was politically under German protection and influence. The enemies of Slovak independence exploited this unfortunate situation and persuaded both the Western Allies and the Soviet Union that in the post-war settlement Slovakia should be again annexed to the Czech lands and that the pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia should be restored. The Slovak patriots who had fought for and defended the independent Slovak state were branded as fascists, traitors and even criminals and were threatened with severe punishments and retribution. To escape the advancing Red Army Slovak political leaders, administrators, intellectuals and even ordinary citizens fled in thousands to the West where they hoped to find sympathy and understanding for their cause. Dr. J. Pauco and his family (his wife Draga whom he had married in 1942 and infant-son Svatopluk) were among them. The last issue of the daily, Slovak was published in Bratislava on April 1st, 1945 and it sadly signified the end of an era. The bulk of Slovak political refugees eventually sur· �208 SLOVAKIA rendered to the Americans. But the American military, starry-eyed about "the gallant Soviet ally," and having swallowed all the Communist lies about the refugees unthinkingly handed them over to their Communist jailers and executioners. To escape death or a fate worse than death the refugees had to scatter and go into hiding in the hope the West would soon wake up and cease this inhuman practice. Gradually the Western statesmen realized their folly and refused to comply with the bloodthirsty Soviet wishes. The refugees could now breathe relief, but their troubles were far from over. And what was even more tragic for hundreds and thousands of them it was already too late. Dr. J. Pauco was among the lucky ones. Moving from place to place in Austria and Bavaria he finally settled in Munich. During this trying period his son Svatopluk died and many of his close friends and colleagues were forcibly "repatriated" to Slovakia where they faced the vengeance of the so-called "people's tribunals." President Tiso and most of the members of the Slovak government were among them. But these tremendous losses and blows failed to break Pauco's spirit. Believing in justice and convinced that truth would ultimately triumph, he refused to accept defeat. As soon as it was possible (in April 1946) he started the publication of Slobodne Slovensko (Free Slovakia) in war-torn Munich. Though modest in appearance this mimeographed journal was the very embodiment of ardent Slovak nationalism. The journal was a great moral and psychological boost for the hard-pressed and frightened Slovak refugees . To explain the Slovak position to foreigners Dr. Paufo published bulletins in the German and Ukrainian languages. Dr. Pauco's stay in West Germany lasted five years. They were years of extreme hardship and at the same time years of very intense activity. Many events and happenings of this period are recorded in his autobiographical novel The Flight to Wonderland. The "Wonderland" to him was America which since the 1870's has become the adopted country to almost one million Slovaks. He settled in a small provincial township, Middletown, Pa., where a major Slovak fraternalistic society has its printery and where the largest Slovak-English weekly, Jednota is published. He took up the position of �SLOVAKIA 209 associate editor of this paper and has remained there till now. But the editorial work could not possibly absorb all his energies. Soon after his arrival in the USA he was deeply involved in all the aspects of Slovak communal activities. One cannot go through them in detail, but even a simple enumeration of them is impressive enough to confirm what was said at the beginning, i.e . that Pauco's name is synonymous with continuous work in the service of his nation. He participates actively in several Slovak associations and societies: in the Slovak League of America (where he serves as secretary-general and editor of its English language annual, Slovakia) , in the First Catholic Slovak Union, in the Slovak Catholic Federation, etc. He plays a leading role in Slovak political organizations such as the Slovak National Council Abroad, Slovak Liberation Council, Slovak World Congress (as the chairman of its Information Committee. ) He takes a keen interest in the history of the Slovak immigrants in the USA and in this field he has produced five books (including a comprehensive history of the First Catholic Slovak Union, 1890-1965) and a large number of articles. He is owner-publisher of a popular weekly Slovak v Amerike and editor of its prestigious annual Literdrny Almanach. As a writer Dr. Pauco has to his credit two books of fictionalized autobiography (Unconquerables, 1958 and The Flight to Wonderland , 1963), a volume of reminiscences concerning famous people he met ( Tak sme sa poznali, 1966) and several books and pamphlets of political writing (e.g. Slovdci a komunizmus, 1957; co po komunizme?, 1952; Tisov odkaz, 1953; etc.). It is indeed a life rich in achievements and, what is more, one can say without fear of contradiction that - as in the past so in the future - Dr. J. Pauco will certainly enrich it further with many valuable additions in every sphere of his many-sided activity. We, his friends and colleagues, greet him warmly at this momentous milestone of his life and ask the Almighty to grant him health and strength not only to continue in his work but also to reap a justly deserved reward for his efforts. Ad multos annos! � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1974, Vol. 24 Description An account of the resource Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 203 SLOVAKIA REVIEWS OF PAUCO'S WRITINGS IN LEADING PERIODICALS MOST co po komunizme? (I, 1, 1954, p . 44) Tisov odkaz (I, 2, 1954, p. 39-40. Dr. Karol Murin) Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe (I, 3, 1954, p. 41-43. F. Hrusovsky) Stefan Furdek a slovenske prist'ahovalectvo (II, 2, 1955, p. 136-137) Mest'ancik) Slovcici a komunizmus (IV, 3, 1957, p. 132-133. Unconquerables (VI, 1-2, 1959, p. 83-85. Andrew Pier, O.S.B.) Christian Slovakia Under Communism (VI, 3, 1959, p. 186-187. Andrew Jan Pier, O.S.B. ) Pi:it'desiatnik Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum (XI, 3-4, 1964, p. 181) Slovakia (XI, 3-4, 1964, p. 182-183) Litercirny Almanach Slovcika v Amerike na rok 1965 (XII, 1-2, 1965, p. 82-83) Slovakia (XII, 3-4, 1965, p. 189) SLOVAKIA 75 rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty (XV, 38, 1965, p . 152-155. Mother M. Emerentia, SS.C.M.) Litercirny Almanach Slovcika v Amerike 1967 (XVII, 40, 1967, p. 190-192. Sister M. Tarcisia Gregorovic, SS.C.M.) Tak sme sa poznali (XVIII, 41, 1968, p . 159-164. Sister M. Tarcisia, SS. C.M.) Slovenski priekopnici v Amerike ( XXIII , 46, 1973, p. 196-197. Joseph C. Krajsa) F URD EK All writings by Dr. Pauco on the history of American Slovaks are evaluated by J . M. Kirschbaum in his article Dr. Pauco' s W ritings and the History of American Slovaks (Furdek, 1974, p. 75-80) . Francis V n u k : A BIOGRAPHICAL VALEDICTION In spite of the fact that the Slovaks are among the oldest inhabitants of the Central European region their efforts to secure a fully independent life has been seldom appreciated and rarely understood. But frustrations and disappointments can never deter a nation from its ultimate aim, and where one generation fails another will rise to continue the struggle. The natural aspirations of a nature and self-respecting nation cannot be suppressed by terror, nor silenced by bribes, nor extinguished by an apparent 204 SLOVAKIA lack of success. In all its history - and especially in the last 200 years - the Slovak nation has always had selfless and dedicated sons who in the struggle for national independence - not unlike Tennyson's Ulysses - were "strong in will to strive, to seek, to find and not to yield." One of these indefatigable fighters is Dr. Jozef Pauco who on February 26th was celebrating his 60th birthday. This memorable occasion makes one pause a moment and look into the past in order to reconstruct a brief outline of his life-career with all its notable moments and achievements. As a man in the forefront of Slovak public activities Dr. Pauco has many friends and admirers and not a few enemies. But - no matter what their feeling towards him are - they would all be unanimous in admitting that the name of Dr. Pauco has become a synonym of hard and continuous work in the cause of his nation. The beginnings of his involvement in this kind of work go back to his student days; the seeds, however, were sown much earlier, in the years of his childhood. Born on February 26th, 1914 (at Pila, near Lucenec) of Slovak peasant stock, young Pauco grew up in a typical Central European village environment where life was harsh, shortages common and rewards only very modest. This situation was further aggravated by the outbreak of World War I, when all able-bodied men were called up and the heavy burden of daily life had.to be carried by the women and old people. Pauco's father had to go too and he never came back. He died as a conscript in the service of those who denied the very existence of the Slovak nation and were seeking its physical extinction. This powerful traumatic experience, combined with the gentle influence of his widowed mother, imbued the young boy with a strong sense of justice, and with a fighting spirit to undo wrongs and to see that one received what was due to him. In Czecho-Slovakia which came into being in October 1918 the Slovaks were faring much better than in the prewar Hungary, but they still were treated by their Czech brethren as minor partners in an unequal Czecho-Slovak partnership. As a young high school student at Nitra (where SLOVAKIA 205 - according to his mother's wishes - he was preparing for the priesthood) J. Pauco could see this inequality which was both humiliating and insulting. His teachers (as well as other public servants and State employees) were Czechs, while Slovaks were without jobs. Not only did these Czechs occupy jobs and posts which belonged to the Slovaks but they also abused their positions by denigrating the Slovak language, culture, history and way of life. The outcome of this haughty and unsparing attitude towards the Slovak people was quite predictible. A general disenchantment soon gave way to discontent and these sentiments eventually crystallized out as a massive opposition movement led by Andrej Hlinka. Under Hlinka's charismatic leadership Slovakia launched a campaign for administrative self-government (autonomy) which- incidentallyhad been guaranteed to Slovaks back in 1918 by President T. G. Masaryk in the well-known Pittsburgh Agreement. · Hlinka's massive following came from all strata of Slovak society but the most significant support came from the enthusiastic followers among the young people. They provided the Hlinka People's Party with the most convincing arguments vis-a-vis Prague's centralist "Czechoslovak" policies. The young Slovak generation was autonomist in its outlook almost to a man, as was demonstrated at Trencianske Teplice in 1932. J. Pauco soon translated into action his admiration for Hlinka's valiant struggle for Slovak autonomy. His contributions to this common national effort were more and more substantial as he grew older and when in 1936 he came to Bratislava to study Philosophy at the Slovak University he was already a fully-fledged and highly-valued activist within the ranks of the Slovak autonomist movement. In Bratislava he became involved in the affairs of the busy campus life, where at that time the political issues were fought and argued in the most radical manner. (One of Dr. Pauco's ideological opponents was a fellow-student from the Law Faculty, G. Husak, today's Communist boss of Czecho-Slovakia). In addition to the campus activities J . Pauco was a regular contributor to the People's Party dailies and periodicals. This part-time collaboration with 206 SLOVAKIA the press was destined to become the enduring attachmen t of his life. In 1938 the struggle for Slovak autonomy took on a dramatic turn. The artificial facade of "Czechoslo vak" unity could not withstand the combined pressure of internal and external factors and collapsed completely , as predicted by those Slovak politicians whose warnings were never heeded. In the hectic three months September -November 1938 the Czecho-Slovakia of Masaryk and Benes changed beyond recognition . It had to cede the Sudeten territories to Germany, Southern Slovakia to the Magyars, the Teschen region to Poland and internally to grant autonomy to Slovaks and Ruthenians . Slovak autonomy, declared by all the Slovak political parties ( except the Socialists and Communis ts) on October 6th, 1938, was long overdue, but its arrival at this critical time (as an aftermath of the Munich crisis) made its realization easily misinterpr eted. For the Slovaks, however, it was a most welcome developme nt in which they saw the culminatio n of their long political struggle. For the Slovak People's Party (led since the death of A. Hlinka - in August 1938 - by Dr. Jozef Tiso, who became Premier of the Slovak autonomou s governmen t) autonomy was a challenge to show the world around us that we could manage our affairs with skill and responsibil ity. In communic ating its aims and ideals to the people the governmen t required a reliable and prompt press service. Consequen tly J. Pauco was asked to concentrat e his activities mainly in this direction. In March 1939 the Slovaks declared their independen ce and a new state appeared on the map of Europe: the Slovak Republic. The transition from autonomy to independence was rapid and the road to independen ce was somewhat steep. But the Slovaks knew that in the given situation theirs was not to argue and ponder about the road behind, but to do something about the road ahead. They grasped eagerly the historic opportunit y which independence offered and set out to make Slovakia as happy and prosperous a place for all Slovaks as was possible under the given circumstan ces. In this challenging and unique period of Slovak history SLOVAKIA 207 Dr. Jozef Pauco played a major and politically significant role. Apart from administrative responsibilities (he was acting as a district secretary of the People's Party at Nitra) he steadily maintained his journalistic and editorial connections with numerous political dailies and weeklies. In 1942 Dr. Jozef Tiso, the President of the Slovak Republic, appointed him as Editor-in-Chief of the principal national daily, Slovak. Slovak was the official press organ of the People's Party and of the Slovak government. It is an eloquent testimony to Pauco's journalistic abilities and political maturity that President Tiso placed such an important function on the shoulders of such a youthful (28 years old ) man. Dr. J . Pauco reciprocated this trust and served Dr. Tiso faithfully in the subsequent years. It was his concern to explain and popularize the current governmental policies, to provide ideological guidance, to maintain and foster proud nationalistic sentiments among the people and to instil hope and optimism when the situation became grim and critical. It is a tragic aspect of Slovak history that during the global conflict of 1939-45 Slovakia - unable to escape its geography - was politically under German protection and influence. The enemies of Slovak independence exploited this unfortunate situation and persuaded both the Western Allies and the Soviet Union that in the post-war settlement Slovakia should be again annexed to the Czech lands and that the pre-Munich Czecho-Slovakia should be restored. The Slovak patriots who had fought for and defended the independent Slovak state were branded as fascists, traitors and even criminals and were threatened with severe punishments and retribution. To escape the advancing Red Army Slovak political leaders, administrators, intellectuals and even ordinary citizens fled in thousands to the West where they hoped to find sympathy and understanding for their cause. Dr. J. Pauco and his family (his wife Draga whom he had married in 1942 and infant-son Svatopluk) were among them. The last issue of the daily, Slovak was published in Bratislava on April 1st, 1945 and it sadly signified the end of an era. The bulk of Slovak political refugees eventually sur· 208 SLOVAKIA rendered to the Americans. But the American military, starry-eyed about "the gallant Soviet ally," and having swallowed all the Communist lies about the refugees unthinkingly handed them over to their Communist jailers and executioners. To escape death or a fate worse than death the refugees had to scatter and go into hiding in the hope the West would soon wake up and cease this inhuman practice. Gradually the Western statesmen realized their folly and refused to comply with the bloodthirsty Soviet wishes. The refugees could now breathe relief, but their troubles were far from over. And what was even more tragic for hundreds and thousands of them it was already too late. Dr. J. Pauco was among the lucky ones. Moving from place to place in Austria and Bavaria he finally settled in Munich. During this trying period his son Svatopluk died and many of his close friends and colleagues were forcibly "repatriated" to Slovakia where they faced the vengeance of the so-called "people's tribunals." President Tiso and most of the members of the Slovak government were among them. But these tremendous losses and blows failed to break Pauco's spirit. Believing in justice and convinced that truth would ultimately triumph, he refused to accept defeat. As soon as it was possible (in April 1946) he started the publication of Slobodne Slovensko (Free Slovakia) in war-torn Munich. Though modest in appearance this mimeographed journal was the very embodiment of ardent Slovak nationalism. The journal was a great moral and psychological boost for the hard-pressed and frightened Slovak refugees . To explain the Slovak position to foreigners Dr. Paufo published bulletins in the German and Ukrainian languages. Dr. Pauco's stay in West Germany lasted five years. They were years of extreme hardship and at the same time years of very intense activity. Many events and happenings of this period are recorded in his autobiographical novel The Flight to Wonderland. The "Wonderland" to him was America which since the 1870's has become the adopted country to almost one million Slovaks. He settled in a small provincial township, Middletown, Pa., where a major Slovak fraternalistic society has its printery and where the largest Slovak-English weekly, Jednota is published. He took up the position of SLOVAKIA 209 associate editor of this paper and has remained there till now. But the editorial work could not possibly absorb all his energies. Soon after his arrival in the USA he was deeply involved in all the aspects of Slovak communal activities. One cannot go through them in detail, but even a simple enumeration of them is impressive enough to confirm what was said at the beginning, i.e . that Pauco's name is synonymous with continuous work in the service of his nation. He participates actively in several Slovak associations and societies: in the Slovak League of America (where he serves as secretary-general and editor of its English language annual, Slovakia) , in the First Catholic Slovak Union, in the Slovak Catholic Federation, etc. He plays a leading role in Slovak political organizations such as the Slovak National Council Abroad, Slovak Liberation Council, Slovak World Congress (as the chairman of its Information Committee. ) He takes a keen interest in the history of the Slovak immigrants in the USA and in this field he has produced five books (including a comprehensive history of the First Catholic Slovak Union, 1890-1965) and a large number of articles. He is owner-publisher of a popular weekly Slovak v Amerike and editor of its prestigious annual Literdrny Almanach. As a writer Dr. Pauco has to his credit two books of fictionalized autobiography (Unconquerables, 1958 and The Flight to Wonderland , 1963), a volume of reminiscences concerning famous people he met ( Tak sme sa poznali, 1966) and several books and pamphlets of political writing (e.g. Slovdci a komunizmus, 1957; co po komunizme?, 1952; Tisov odkaz, 1953; etc.). It is indeed a life rich in achievements and, what is more, one can say without fear of contradiction that - as in the past so in the future - Dr. J. Pauco will certainly enrich it further with many valuable additions in every sphere of his many-sided activity. We, his friends and colleagues, greet him warmly at this momentous milestone of his life and ask the Almighty to grant him health and strength not only to continue in his work but also to reap a justly deserved reward for his efforts. Ad multos annos!  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource A Biographical Valediction Description An account of the resource Francis Vnuk Slovakia, Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974 pp. 203-209 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/e671f9a0729587476aa87bdf6b89fe1d.pdf df8a30534e23f2d62470a780e171cea0 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 63 IT'S HISTORY NOW - CZECHO-SLOV AKIA F. A. VOIGHT The submissive nature of the Czechs, which has made them collaborate almost as closely with the Germans as they are now collaborating with the Russians, has promoted the delusion that, unlike the Poles and Yugoslavs, they have recovered their national independence. The truth is that they have as little independence under the Russians as they had under the Germans, perhaps even less, for German domination, ruthless as it was, did not go as deep as Russian and was not so comprehensive. The Czecho-Slovak Government in Prague is but a fiction. The country is administered, in effect, by the National Committees, which are controlled by the Communists who, like Communists everywhere, are but Russian agents. By 'the country' we mean Bohemia and Moravia, for Czecho-Slovakia has ceased to exist. Poland exists, though she is mutilated and a vassal, but Czecho-Slovakia does not exist. Carpathian-Ruthenia has been annexed by Russia (without a ·p rotest from anyone), and Slovakia, though not independent of Moscow, is independent from Prague. It is hardly conceivable that Czecho-Slovakia will ever be restored - not even when Europe will at last have been liberated. When that happens, the Sudetenlanders will surely return to their own country and the Slovaks will surely proclaim their independence. But the liberation of Europe, which will surely include the liberation of the Czechs, can but perpetuate the extinction of Czecho-Slovakia. There is no failure in Europe so complete and so enduring as the failure of Dr. Benes. • "To-day all Slavs are being forced into unity by Russia." She dominates all North-Eastern, Eastern, Central, and South-Eastern Europe (except for Greece and a part of Austria). Karl Marx himself was highly critical of the PanSlav movement as an instrument of Russia imperialism. He maintained that unless the Slav nations enjoyed complete independence, Russia's western frontier would run 'from Danzig or Stettin to Trieste'. This is almost exactly what �64 SLOV.AXIA has come to pass. Russia's European conquests can mean much, even now - far more than is realized in this country. But they mean even more for the future, seeing that they are a base, a hinterland, a glacis, a.ind a source of supply, from which Russia can advance westwards towards further conquests. Her control over the countries she has conquered is absolute. Their populations number 130,000,000 or 140,000,000 in all ( death through war, hunger, and disease, deportations and 'transfers' make it impossible to give a .p recise figure), their fighting forces, their skilled labour, their experts _a nd technicians, their science, art, and literature, their natural resources, their trade and industry, their canals, roads, and railways, their strategic advantages, and so on, are all at the disposal of Russia. AH these countries are severally and collectively a means to her ends - not one of them can live for itself, no one person in them can live for himself, or for his country, or for Europe, for mankind, for science, art, or religion, but only .for Russia. And yet, save for a few zealots, there are none who wish to live for Russia - ninetynine out of a hundred at least have the wish that the Russians may leave Europe, never to return. But, for the time being at least, Russia. is omnipotent in the countries she has conquered. Legally they are independent - that is so, even of the Baltic States which have been i,;icorpo-r ated in the Soviet Union. But even those which have not been incorporated are being forced into one political and economic order which approximates more and more closely to that of the Soviet Union. In all of them, the Russians are hated by the entire population, except for that small minority of ·p ersons who derive some advantage - office, a job, money, or influence - from the new Russian order. If there were to be free elections, and the issue were for or against the withdrawal of the Russians, the majority for withdrawal would· be overwhelming. If the Russians were to withdraw, their instniments - Tito, Bierut, Groza, Benes, and so on, would be swept out of existence. The ,R ussians would have to take -the Communists along with them to save (The Nineteenth Century and them from massacre." After, April 1946.) � SLOVAKIA 63 IT'S HISTORY NOW - CZECHO-SLOV AKIA F. A. VOIGHT The submissive nature of the Czechs, which has made them collaborate almost as closely with the Germans as they are now collaborating with the Russians, has promoted the delusion that, unlike the Poles and Yugoslavs, they have recovered their national independence. The truth is that they have as little independence under the Russians as they had under the Germans, perhaps even less, for German domination, ruthless as it was, did not go as deep as Russian and was not so comprehensive. The Czecho-Slovak Government in Prague is but a fiction. The country is administered, in effect, by the National Committees, which are controlled by the Communists who, like Communists everywhere, are but Russian agents. By 'the country' we mean Bohemia and Moravia, for Czecho-Slovakia has ceased to exist. Poland exists, though she is mutilated and a vassal, but Czecho-Slovakia does not exist. Carpathian-Ruthenia has been annexed by Russia (without a ·p rotest from anyone), and Slovakia, though not independent of Moscow, is independent from Prague. It is hardly conceivable that Czecho-Slovakia will ever be restored - not even when Europe will at last have been liberated. When that happens, the Sudetenlanders will surely return to their own country and the Slovaks will surely proclaim their independence. But the liberation of Europe, which will surely include the liberation of the Czechs, can but perpetuate the extinction of Czecho-Slovakia. There is no failure in Europe so complete and so enduring as the failure of Dr. Benes. • "To-day all Slavs are being forced into unity by Russia." She dominates all North-Eastern, Eastern, Central, and South-Eastern Europe (except for Greece and a part of Austria). Karl Marx himself was highly critical of the PanSlav movement as an instrument of Russia imperialism. He maintained that unless the Slav nations enjoyed complete independence, Russia's western frontier would run 'from Danzig or Stettin to Trieste'. This is almost exactly what �64 SLOV.AXIA has come to pass. Russia's European conquests can mean much, even now - far more than is realized in this country. But they mean even more for the future, seeing that they are a base, a hinterland, a glacis, a.ind a source of supply, from which Russia can advance westwards towards further conquests. Her control over the countries she has conquered is absolute. Their populations number 130,000,000 or 140,000,000 in all ( death through war, hunger, and disease, deportations and 'transfers' make it impossible to give a .p recise figure), their fighting forces, their skilled labour, their experts _a nd technicians, their science, art, and literature, their natural resources, their trade and industry, their canals, roads, and railways, their strategic advantages, and so on, are all at the disposal of Russia. AH these countries are severally and collectively a means to her ends - not one of them can live for itself, no one person in them can live for himself, or for his country, or for Europe, for mankind, for science, art, or religion, but only .for Russia. And yet, save for a few zealots, there are none who wish to live for Russia - ninetynine out of a hundred at least have the wish that the Russians may leave Europe, never to return. But, for the time being at least, Russia. is omnipotent in the countries she has conquered. Legally they are independent - that is so, even of the Baltic States which have been i,;icorpo-r ated in the Soviet Union. But even those which have not been incorporated are being forced into one political and economic order which approximates more and more closely to that of the Soviet Union. In all of them, the Russians are hated by the entire population, except for that small minority of ·p ersons who derive some advantage - office, a job, money, or influence - from the new Russian order. If there were to be free elections, and the issue were for or against the withdrawal of the Russians, the majority for withdrawal would· be overwhelming. If the Russians were to withdraw, their instniments - Tito, Bierut, Groza, Benes, and so on, would be swept out of existence. The ,R ussians would have to take -the Communists along with them to save (The Nineteenth Century and them from massacre." After, April 1946.) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 63 IT'S HISTORY NOW - CZECHO-SLOV AKIA F. A. VOIGHT The submissive nature of the Czechs, which has made them collaborate almost as closely with the Germans as they are now collaborating with the Russians, has promoted the delusion that, unlike the Poles and Yugoslavs, they have recovered their national independence. The truth is that they have as little independence under the Russians as they had under the Germans, perhaps even less, for German domination, ruthless as it was, did not go as deep as Russian and was not so comprehensive. The Czecho-Slovak Government in Prague is but a fiction. The country is administered, in effect, by the National Committees, which are controlled by the Communists who, like Communists everywhere, are but Russian agents. By 'the country' we mean Bohemia and Moravia, for Czecho-Slovakia has ceased to exist. Poland exists, though she is mutilated and a vassal, but Czecho-Slovakia does not exist. Carpathian-Ruthenia has been annexed by Russia (without a ·p rotest from anyone), and Slovakia, though not independent of Moscow, is independent from Prague. It is hardly conceivable that Czecho-Slovakia will ever be restored - not even when Europe will at last have been liberated. When that happens, the Sudetenlanders will surely return to their own country and the Slovaks will surely proclaim their independence. But the liberation of Europe, which will surely include the liberation of the Czechs, can but perpetuate the extinction of Czecho-Slovakia. There is no failure in Europe so complete and so enduring as the failure of Dr. Benes. • "To-day all Slavs are being forced into unity by Russia." She dominates all North-Eastern, Eastern, Central, and South-Eastern Europe (except for Greece and a part of Austria). Karl Marx himself was highly critical of the PanSlav movement as an instrument of Russia imperialism. He maintained that unless the Slav nations enjoyed complete independence, Russia's western frontier would run 'from Danzig or Stettin to Trieste'. This is almost exactly what 64 SLOV.AXIA has come to pass. Russia's European conquests can mean much, even now - far more than is realized in this country. But they mean even more for the future, seeing that they are a base, a hinterland, a glacis, a.ind a source of supply, from which Russia can advance westwards towards further conquests. Her control over the countries she has conquered is absolute. Their populations number 130,000,000 or 140,000,000 in all ( death through war, hunger, and disease, deportations and 'transfers' make it impossible to give a .p recise figure), their fighting forces, their skilled labour, their experts _a nd technicians, their science, art, and literature, their natural resources, their trade and industry, their canals, roads, and railways, their strategic advantages, and so on, are all at the disposal of Russia. AH these countries are severally and collectively a means to her ends - not one of them can live for itself, no one person in them can live for himself, or for his country, or for Europe, for mankind, for science, art, or religion, but only .for Russia. And yet, save for a few zealots, there are none who wish to live for Russia - ninetynine out of a hundred at least have the wish that the Russians may leave Europe, never to return. But, for the time being at least, Russia. is omnipotent in the countries she has conquered. Legally they are independent - that is so, even of the Baltic States which have been i,;icorpo-r ated in the Soviet Union. But even those which have not been incorporated are being forced into one political and economic order which approximates more and more closely to that of the Soviet Union. In all of them, the Russians are hated by the entire population, except for that small minority of ·p ersons who derive some advantage - office, a job, money, or influence - from the new Russian order. If there were to be free elections, and the issue were for or against the withdrawal of the Russians, the majority for withdrawal would· be overwhelming. If the Russians were to withdraw, their instniments - Tito, Bierut, Groza, Benes, and so on, would be swept out of existence. The ,R ussians would have to take -the Communists along with them to save (The Nineteenth Century and them from massacre." After, April 1946.)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource It's History Now - Czecho-Slovakia Description An account of the resource F. A. Voight Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 1 (6), April 1953 pp. 63-64 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Voight, F. A. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1953 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4ed4d7dcdf0a45d96faf6421fb49f590.pdf 0329af3b400ed22655aa5339538259ca PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 71 Trends in 20th Century Slovak Filmmaking Martin Votruba The transition from the rule of censorship to the rule of the free market after the collapse of Communism thirteen years ago has been more painful for Slovak filmmakers than for other artists. Filmmaking requires a substantially higher initial investment than other performing and fine arts. People are ready to pay much less for a movie ticket or rental than to buy a book or painting. This puts small countries like Slovakia at a great disadvantage. In a world where feature films in a language other than English have difficulty finding an audience outside their own language areas, even if they are in French, German or Spanish, the same-language audience for films in Slovak is the size of a single frame. A film in the Slovak language costs as much as a comparable film in any other language, but the chances that it will recoup its costs are minimal. Yet, several dedicated filmmakers have managed to find institutional and private support, perhaps resigned to the fact that profits will remain elusive, while hoping to make a statement, push the envelope, create Art. Filmmaking began in Slovakia while it was still part of Hungary in the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. According to film historians, the first motion picture shows in the Slovak counties took place in Kosice in December, 1896 and a few days later in Bratislava (then called Presporok by the Slovaks, Pressburg by the Germans). That was only a year after . the Lumiere brothers' first-ever public picture show in Paris and just six months after a similar showing in New York. The early shows were organized by �SLOVAKIA 72 traveling entrepreneurs, often in cafes or similar venues, but also under tents. People's visual perceptions of the world were being changed forever and those making and showing the films knew it. A show in Nitra in 1903 still touted the advent of the modern world, when it was advertised as "Hungary's 1st Scientific Electrical Theater Modeled on the Grand American Bioscope Awarded the Grand Prix at the World Fair in Paris." At that time, a linguistic barrier was not crucial to the films' distribution in the multinational Kingdom of Hungary. Silent movies were largely self-explanatory and most people would have been able to understand the few captions in Magyar or German, the two dominant languages in the Kingdom, or have them translated by other viewers. The shows consisted of several separate films, some colorized by hand, each of which were about two minutes long. For example, the first show in Kosice was a series of twelve such very, very brief films with titles like "The Arrival of a Train," "The Czar Arrives in Paris," "The Training of the French Infantry," "Four Ladies Dancing the French Cancan" and "An Interrupted Date." Clearly, foreign films dominated Central Europe from the start. The first title was the kind of film intended to create a spectacle - similar to some of the uses of special effects today: the engine would rush towards the camera, scaring an audience not accustomed to viewing images of moving trains at that angle and at such close quarters. The next two titles played a role similar to later newsreels shown before the main feature , or to contemporary world news and documentaries on, say, CNN or the Discovery Chanel. The last two titles were of the kind that - the filmmakers found - attracted the largest number of viewers: entertainment, fun and a rudimentary story. The proportion of such shorts quickly grew. �SLOVAKIA 73 The first permanent movie theater in Bratislava, Elektro Bioskop, was opened in a remodeled fencing hall in September, 1905. It had about 200 seats. The site is still in business. After a hiatus, an arts movie theater was opened in the same hall in the 1970s and is still in operation, now called Mladost' ("Youth"), on Hviezdoslav Square opposite the US Embassy. Theaters, hotel halls, storage buildings and other premises were remodeled in other towns, to become permanent movie theaters. In the absence of hi-fi sound and hi-tech projection systems, the competition often relied on interior decoration. An advertisement for the Bratislava movie theatre Fidelio (later Urania and now Hviezda) lured the audience thus: "427 upholstered seats in 3 colors , Alhambrastyle walls decorated with Oriental landscapes, live and man-made flowers." The fact that the theater showed two new releases a week was relegated to the bottom of the page. Attendance at traditional theater performances dropped after the introduction of motion pictures. Theater directors appealed to the authorities to disallow movie shows during the time of regular plays. In 1901 , the Ministry of the Interior (in charge of police and local government in Central Europe) issued a decree meeting their demands . The Viscount of Nitra went so far as to ban movie shows during the whole theater season , but the local movie-theater operators successfully appealed his decision. For a time, film producers thought they could benefit from a symbiosis of film and theater in "cinema-sketches." Actors would play on the stage, then the story would be picked up on the screen with the same actors and the conclusion would be played by live actors again. One such cinema-sketch from 1909 depicted night life in Kosice "The Kosice Promenade on the Screen." Walking on Main Street in one's Sunday best was a common pastime before the advent of TV and mass entertainment. It was among the few early �SLOVAKIA 74 motion pictures linked with Slovak territory. The limited production of cinema-sketches did not survive World War I and did not continue after the creation of Czecho-Slovakia (later renamed Czechoslovakia) in l 9 l 8 . Rather than cinema-sketches or story-based films , most of the early films linked to Slovakia were travel specials with titles like "The High Tatras," "Skiing in Tatranska Lomnica," "Traveling through the Vah Valley," or "The Kosice Institute of Corrections for Children," "Testing the Police Dogs in Bratislava," and news . Movies proved successful. The number of movie theaters in Slovakia reached about 100 by the end of World War I and two schools - the Mining Academy in Banska Stiavnica and a high school in Lucenec - had already used film as a teaching tool. When movies were still shown by traveling entrepreneurs, a copy of the film was bought and owned by them. With the establishment of permanent movie theaters, film distributors appeared, as well as a kind of 'film exchange' where copies of film were traded as on the stock market. The advent of copyright problems and foreign competition was heralded in 1913, in the first published complaint about illegal importation of foreign films , especially from France. As elsewhere in Central Europe, French films dominated the market. Legal power to regulate what movies were screened in Hungary was invested in the hands of the local authorities by a law from l 90 l , which required the traveling movie entrepreneurs to obtain permits for their shows . On the whole, a license was issued to anyone who applied for it. Local bans and complaints surfaced for a variety of reasons, including some familiar today. A city councilor in Kosice worried that worthless caper movies had a bad influence on boys, while dramas about sex ruined girls, be cause such movies extinguished their sense of morality and made �SLOVAKIA 75 them vulnerable to unconscionable seducers. In 1912, a priest and principal of a Roman Catholic boys' school in Nitra threatened his students with a bad grade in behavior if they went to the movies, even if accompanied by their parents. His ban extended to traditional theater performances as well. Censorship was also exercised by the authorities in Budapest, the capital of the Kingdom, who were able to ban individual titles from being shown all over Hungary , including the Slovak counties. In line with the traditions of Central European monarchies, politics was among the reasons for censorship. Among the banned titles were "King Ludwig II," depicting a story too similar to the life and mysterious death of Ludwig II of Bavaria and a film offensive to the prime minister of Hungary. However, the Kingdom did not follow suit when the rest of the Habsburg monarchy introduced formal film censorship in 1912. Among other things, it required that a license to open a movie theater be issued to individuals and institutions that would secure a respectable use of the profits. Its intent was to support charities and various associations. Budapest adopted the law in Apri l of 1918, half a year be fore the defeat and collapse of Austria-Hungary and the founding of Czec ho-Slovakia. The law empowered the censors to ban films offending patriotic interests, public order and morality. Children under sixteen were allowed to see only movies designated as suitable for them and only when accompanied by an adult. Despite a variety of problems , Czecho-S lovakia proved to be more democratic than the former Kingdom of Hungary and the whole Habsburg monarchy. But the new freedom , which benefited other forms of Slovak culture, proved even more difficult for Slovak film than the post-communist period after 1989. The film industry developed in Prague, which had been an important German-Czech cultural center, a university town and capital of the �76 SLOVAKIA Holy Roman Empire's Kingdom of Bohemia for centuries, attracting business and artistic talent. By comparison, Slovakia's new capital and largest city, Bratislava, was much smaller; moreover, it was only forty miles from the former Habsburg monarchy's large, vibrant and influential capital of Vienna. Given that artists and entrepreneurs flocked to it from all over the monarchy, Vienna must have created a degree of artistic brain-drain in its immediate vicinity. As with the Pittsburgh Agreement of 1918, which was a key document in the separation of the Slovak counties from the Habsburg monarchy, Slovak-Americans had an impact on Slovakia's nascent film industry. Andrej Sustek from Chicago founded the Selig Company with the intent to make historical films in Slovakia. It was subsequently incorporated in the new Slovak-American Tatra Film Corporation with a capital of about $30,000 from US investors . Their first and only film was Janosfk. It captured the legend of an 18th-century highwayman from Terchova in the northern Slovak County of Orava who gave rise to Carpathian legends comparable to those about Robin Hood in England. In 1919 Tatra Film's Daniel and Jaroslav Siakel' arrived in Slovakia to start filming in their native village of Blatnica near Martin in Central Slovakia, where they also built sets, and in the castle of Stiavnicka near Ruzomberok. The leading role was given to popular Theodor Pistek, who starred in nine other films that year. Maria Fabryova, an amateur actress from Martin, played Anka, Janosfk's girlfriend. The film was finished in the A-B studios in Prague . The screenplay by Jozef Zak-Marusiak was to be based on a novel by Slovak-American author and editor of the popular Amerikansko-Slovcnske Noviny "(American-Slovak News)", Gustav Marsall-Petrovsky (1862-1916). But it was much closer to the ac- �SLOVAKIA 77 tual local legends , which also inspired Slovak Romantic poets in the 19th century. Moreover, the play Janosfk - premiered in Brno in 1910 and written by Moravian playwright, poet and journalist Jiri Mahen - was well known by the l 920s and may have been a major source for the film's story . Janosfk was shown to the filmmakers' team in November 1921 in the city of Vrutky . It opened a few days later in Zilina and in December 1921 in Chicago - to be more specific , in Cicero, IL, then with a large Slovak-American population , at the Atlantic movie theater, now replaced by the Atlantic Mall at W. 26th St. and S. Pulaski Rd . The screenplay relied on the folk motif of ' taking from the rich and giving to the poor,' and greatly reinforced the hints present in 19th-century Slovak Romantic poems about Janosfk : the film fused feudal exploitation in the more distant past with the drive by the Magyar-speaking government in Budapest in the 19th century to suppress the Kingdom' s other languages and cultures . The latter became particularly forceful during the last decades of the Kingdom's existence and ultimately contributed to its demise. Unlike feudalism , that experience was still very fresh in people's memories and was among the reasons why Slovaks immigrated to the United States. By comparison to Czech films preserved from the early Czecho-Slovak period, Janosfk showed the authors' experience with American movies : in camera work, in the use of parallel narratives, as well as in shots inspired by Westerns . It had two directors of photography with two cameras: Oldrich Benes with a European camera and Daniel Siakel', who used a camera made by Andrej Sustek's company in Chicago. In effect, the two cameramen shot two parallel films - scenes were acted separately for each camera and the difference between the "Slovak" and "American" versions increased after separate editing. But the film's handling of the eth- �78 SLOVAKIA nic motif may have been too didactic, or the issue too recent to be successfully mythologized as entertainment on the silver screen. Janosik did not recover its costs and remained Tatra Film's only product, as well as Slovakia' s first preserved silent movie. It was thought to have been lost, but in 1975 it was discovered and restored from both versions by Ivan Rumanovsky in Bratislava. Until after World War II, attempts to set up film companies, occasionally with Slovak-American involvement, followed the same path. One film would be made and then the company folded, because the film was not profitable and the company lacked sufficient capital to sustain it through a few flops. The situation did not change after the emergence of sound in the movies. While about 30-50 sound films were made each year in Czechoslovakia between 1933 - 1938, fewer than one a year was in Slovak. Czech films occasionally featured Slovak actors. Among them, with eleven musicals to his credit, was Frantisek Kristof Vesely, who reached the level of stardom in Czechoslovakia. Documentaries fared better: partly because the costs were lower and partly thanks to occasional government funding for shorts featuring its officials. For example, Kvetna nedela vo Vajnoroch (Palm Sunday in Yajnory) recorded a folkloristic celebration of the holiday attended by Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia, Vavro Srobar. A potentially steady source of funding opened up in 1935 when Prague decided that each newsreel commonly shown before the main feature had to devote at least 20% of its length to items about Czechoslovakia. But this so urce remained untapped by Slovak filmmakers : most of the reports came from Bohemia and Moravia. However, government or institutional funding and fascination with village life proved to be a mix that worked for filmmakers in Slovakia on more than one occasion, right through the present. �SLOVAKIA 79 The first Slovak film to reach international acclaim relied on both. The potential of the Slovak countryside as a backdrop had already been discovered by non-native filmmakers and at least two of their films have become classics of world cinema. The early German horror Nosferatu, eine Symphonie des Grauens (Nosferatu the Vampire) directed by Friedrich Wilhelm Murnau was filmed at Orava Castle and in the High Tatras in 1922, and Czech director Gustav Machaty chose Slovakia as a location for his daring exploration of sexuality Extase (Ecstasy) in 1932. The second one propelled the career of Hedy Lamarr (born Hedwig Eva Maria Kiester), who became one of the most successful Hollywood stars. The Matica slovenska (by that time an eminent, mostly government-sponsored cultural, academic and archival institution) employed Karel Plicka (1894-1987) as its ethnographer, who was able to make documentary shorts from about 1926. He obtained funding from the President's Office in 1928 to produce an hourlong documentary about village life Po horach, po dolach (Through Mountains and Valleys). It was awarded a Gold Medal at the International Exposition of Photographic Art in Florence and received an Honorable Mention at the International Venice Film Festival in 1932. The favorable reception of his production, along with more funding from both the Matica slovenska and the President's Office, enabled Plicka to make Zem spieva (The Earth Sings) in 1933, a romanticized semi-documentary panorama of selected folk customs through the four seasons. Unlike Slovak feature movies of that period, Zem spieva struck a chord with the audience and topped it with another award at the International Venice Film Festival as part of a collection of films from Czechoslovakia that included Extase, mentioned above. But after this success, the Matica s/ovcnska was unable to raise sufficient funding and Plicka's hopes that he was laying the foundations of �80 SLOVAKIA Slovakia' s film industry were thwarted. He went on to make a documentary in the United States Za Slovakmi od New Yorku po Mississippi (Tracing Slovaks from New York to the Mississippi) in 1937 and then became a professor in the first Department of Film in Czechoslovakia and the third such department in Europe, at the School of Artistic Crafts in Bratislava in 1938. But the Department's potential for Slovak cinema was lost when the College was closed after Slovakia became a separate country in 19 39 . Plicka then resettled permanently in Prague, Bohemia, which was incorporated into the Third Reich during World War II. Czechoslovakia's only other Slovak-language blockbuster before World War II was a new Janosfk in 1935, funded from Prague and directed by the Czech Martin Frie (1902-1968). It was indicative of the volume of Czech film production that Frie finished three other films during the same year, having previously directed 23. Frie and Plicka were two of the authors of the screenplay based on the same play by Mahen, mentioned earlier, on which the first Janosfk may have been based. Plicka also found a policeman and amateur actor, Pal'o Bielik (1910-1983), in the village of Senica for the leading role. The film combined idealized images of villagers with action scenes to show their and Jan osik ' s resistance against Hungarian landlords. In spite of Budapest's protestations, it was screened at the International Venice Film Festival and was successfully released in Germany . During the existence of the Slovak Republic ( 1939-1945), movie theaters grew by more than 60% but no feature films were made. The government sponsored the film company Nastup (Line-up), which produced short films and weekly newsreels . The authorities, who described their own rule as "authoritarian and totalitarian," mandated that a newsreel be shown before every feature film and tightened censorship and ideological supervision of �SLOVAKIA 81 their production. The newsreel was customarily followed by a short film, a pattern that was picked up by the communist authorities after the war and survived through the collapse of Communism. The government's alliance with Germany meant that it became Slovakia's main source of films even before the war changed world trade patterns. At the same time, the number of imports dropped from about 400 a year in the former CzechoSlovakia (whose original hyphenated name was restored in 1938) to less than 150 after independence. In 1940, Slovakia still imported 15 "cultural-educational" films from the U.S., and a few more from countries other than Germany, but then German feature films were supplemented by just about a dozen films from Italy and Romania, and several Czech "oldies" from before the war. The film company Nastup was conscientious about training its employees, among whom was Pal'o Bielik, and sent them regularly to several studios in Germany as interns - including to neighboring Vienna and formerly Czechoslovak Prague, which were now ruled from Berlin. After World War II, Slovakia was re-joined with the Czechspeaking lands and Czech director Martin Frie returned to make Vanij. .. ! (Beware ... !) with folkloristic highlights similar to his successful Janosfk from 1935. The film was based on Ivan Stodola' s popular play Bacova iena (The Shepherd's Wife) and Palo Bielik played the leading role again . Things changed dramatically after Czechoslovakia became communist in 1948. The government nationalized all but the tiniest companies, including the film studios. It saw film as an important medium to indoctrinate the population and ideological control - under strict financed film production in the Slovak, as well as in the Czech part of the country. Directors, screenwriters, actors and other people connected with film production became �SLOVAKIA 82 state employees as everyone else, with a regular salary regardless of how many films were produced and whether they earned any profits or not - a concept born out of communist accounting. Although the authorities paid the salaried filmmakers more money for the films they made - separate contracts were signed for each one - from the American perspective, this was closer to bonuses than anything known in Hollywood today. The "bonuses" were higher for films considered particularly effective in showing the communist rule as benefiting the population and had nothing to do with ticket sales. The authorities mandated that the method used in all art be socialist realism. In general, its goal was to educate people to the benefits of communism and, before it was reached , socialism, which was what they called their existing political system. This was strictly enforced, especially in fiction and film, because these mediums reached the widest audience. The topics were to emphasize the need to work for the good of the 'collective,' i.e., communist society. Topics focusing on the individual and on personal feelings and concerns were deemed harmful, as was depicting anything negative about society. Love was considered such a topic: not only because it was personal and, therefore, did not educate the audience about the benefits of working on behalf of the collective, but also because it may have brought sex into the story, a definite 'no' in socialist realism. The official support of socialist-realist art and the transformation of filmmakers into salaried employees meant that a steady stream of feature films began to appear in the newly-established studios in Bratislava. Pal'o Bielik, the former star of Janosfk, who expanded his moviemaking experience in the newsreel studios during World War II, directed Vicic dicry (Wolves' Lairs), one of the first two films made after the communist takeover in 1948. It �SLOVAKIA 83 was the beginning of a succession of films about the 1944 antiGerman uprising in Slovakia, but because it was made so early during the Communist Party ' s drive to establish ideological dominance, the film still managed to include 'negative,' as well as 'positive' characters among both the Slovak insurgents and the German soldiers suppressing the uprising - something that did not get past the censors again for more than a decade. Bielik, as director, leaned away from the folkloristic style of the films in which he starred: the style of V/cie diery was inspired by early Italian neo-realism. After two feature films in 1948 and another two in 1949, the yearly output grew to 3-6 per year in the 1950s. 'Negative' characters could not be central in the plots, and the story had to prove them wrong. Central characters had to be 'positive' from the start or be seen discovering Marxist-Leninist solutions to any problems they encountered. Such problems had to be few and marginal, the general view of society had to be happy. If the central characters were not Communists from the start, a 'tutor' and Communist Party member would often be present, who helped them find the Marxist-Leninist way. Topics commonly dealt with World War II and the defeat of Nazi Germany, or with the imposition of Communism - the 'collectivization' of farms, i.e., the abolition of private ownership of most land larger than the immediate surroundings of one's house and garden. Farmers were to be shown as opening their eyes to the fact that this was actually good for them. The Communists proclaimed a classless society, which meant that everyone would eventually become a 'worker.' The three recognized social groups were the laborers, the farmers, and the intelligentsia, i.e., white-collar workers and college-educated people, but the Communist Party officials, although working in offices, classified themselves as laborers. The bourgeoisie, �84 SLOVAKIA i.e. , the private entrepreneurs, disappeared by virtue of their property being 'nationalized,' i.e., taken over by the government, but the - now former - bourgeoisie were persecuted never- theless . The intelligentsia was often suspected of harboring bourgeois ideas and persecuted, too . Since the bourgeoisie were often described as incapable of shedding their reactionary, i.e. anti-Communist skins, films about contemporary life generally focused on the villages and farmers. Marxism-Leninism saw in them the ' next best class' after the laborers, on their way to becoming agricultural laborers . Their initial qualms about any benefits of collectivization provided some meager source of conflict for the plots. The films about the past often returned to the uprising in Slovakia during World War II, which was depicted as organized by the Communists and aided by the Soviet Union. Plots that concerned the communist period had to end on an optimistic note. Since a former entrepreneur always remained at least suspect, their joyful transformation into a group auxiliary to the working class was essentially unacceptable as a topic, which - in effect - also kept town s and cities away from most of the scripts. Even socialist-realist authors felt that a ccnflict drives a story, but avoided settings that did not provide for politically acceptable conflicts . Socialist realism was strongly enforced during the first 10-15 years of communism . Unlike neighboring Poland and Hungary, communist Czechoslovakia saw little of the ideological thaw triggered by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalinism in February of l 956. The thaw did not reach Czechoslovakia until the early l 960s, during which time Bratislava produced 6- l O feature film s per year, and the first manifestations of the thaw in literature and film came from Slovakia. After more than a decade of socialist- �85 SLOVAKIA realist filmmaking, Sinko v sieti (The Sun in a Net) directed by Stefan Uher (1930-1993) in 1962 became a milestone in both Slovak and Czech filmmaking. It inspired a whole generation of students at the Film Academy in Prague, who soon followed with a series of films which attained international recognition as the "Czech New Wave." Sinko v sieti was Stefan Uher's second film . His first was about the life of a group of fifteen year-old students and their school My z deviate) A (We from Grade 9, Study Group A; 1961). The screenwriter, Alfonz Bednar (1914-1989), was a successful writer who published mildly non-conformist fiction somewhat earlier than most other authors. The film is based on his three short stories Fajolov prfspevok (Fajolo's Contribution), Pon- t6novy deii (Pontoon Day) and Zlata brana (Golden Gate). Uher's film depicted a number of hitherto unacceptable social and political themes : distant - perhaps uncaring - parents, a philandering husband, teenagers changing partners, an attempt at suicide, a poorly-run collectivized farm , and the requirement that a child attend summer 'voluntary work camps ' to make up for his parents belonging to the intelligentsia. Moreover, none of these issues were resolved in a 'positive' manner. The ending was rather somber, if not depressing, with the barest hint of optimism found only in the last sentence and possibly on the film's symbolic level, which was handled rather unevenly. It attempted a complex interplay of sun and clouds, vision and blindness, truth and lies, centered around a solar eclipse (Central Europe actually experienced a 95% solar eclipse on the morning of February 15, 196 l ). Contemporary critics found the symbolism difficult to decipher, and much of it was probably lost on the viewers. But the core story line - the ups and downs in the relationship of two teenagers - the realism and novelty of its urban setting, and the �86 SLOVAKIA hints at some social and political taboos were not lost on the audience and cannot have been lost on the censors. Sinko v sieti not only pushed the envelope, but also established for other artists and showed to the Slovaks and Czechs at large what the authorities could now be pushed to permit. According to Uher, Karol Bacflek, the head of the Communist Party in Slovakia at that time, attacked the film, saying it contained coded messages that conspirators were able to decipher precisely. For example, Bacflek thought the solar eclipse . was to indicate the twilight of communism and the pontoon on the dried-up riverbed stood for the state of communist rule in Czechoslovakia at that time. Communist officials believed that the blind mother was supposed to symbolize the blindness of their Party, which did not see the realities of life under communism. Because a political thaw had begun in Slovakia, other communist officials with enough influence dared to differ and the film was released. Besides Stefan Uher's efforts to get past the strict requirements of socialist realism, the director was inspired by some of the trends current in Western European cinema and culture in the 1950s. Among them was his focus on the symbolism of light and darkness, adherence to a low-key style, a hint of fashi0nablc quasi-existentialism in Fajolo's dialogues with Bela, and an attempt at serious cinema-verite: in the beer-drinking scenes in .1 tavern, the background soundtrack includes taped unscripted conversations of real villagers. Uher mostly chose inexperienced actors or nonactors. Only one of them, I.:,ubo Roman in a supporting role (b . 1944, then a student of acting), became a successful actor, theater administrator, and ultimately a politician - Member of Parlia- ment, Minister of Culture, and since 2001, County Chief of Bratislava. Actual music in the film included Western rock played on �SLOVAKIA 87 the radio. The film's score was by llja Zeljenka, an avant-garde composer of 'concrete music.' While Slnko v sieti became a prologue to the first minimalist, quasi-realist, and eventually more experimental Czechoslovak New Wave made by film students in Prague, in Slovakia the film was followed by several increasingly critical social commentaries by established filmmakers , by more films about contemporary urban life, and by increasingly intellectual and abstract films seen as Art. The most daring among the films that replaced socialist realism with social criticism was Peter Solan's Prfpad Barnabas Kos (The Case of Barnabas Kos; 1964), which removed the veil from arbitrary decision-making in communist society. Among contemporary topics, a potential for an approachable and successful film was lost with Nylonovy mesiac (Nylon Moon; 1965) directed by Eduard Greener. Its story, as well as the title came from a novel by Jaroslava Blazkova published in 1960, the first best-seller about contemporary life since the communist takeover. But there was entertainment in film , too, none more popular than Janosik II directed in 1963 by Pal'o Bielik, the star in the previous version of the story. In spite of its title, it was not a sequel: the film re-told the centuries-old legend. The theme of the brigand hero retains its attraction through the present day. Slovakia 's most successful producer, Rudolf Bierman, is currently producing The True Story al Janosfk and Uhorcfk, directed by the success[ul Polish filmmaker Agnieszka Holland and her daughter Kasia Adamik with an estimated budget of $2.4 million, $800,000 of which came from the Slovak Parliament and the Ministry of Culture. The first film to earn an Oscar for Czechoslovakia was Obchod na korze (The Shop on Main Street; 1965; Academy Award for Best Foreign Film in 1966; Special Mention for Acting �88 SLOVAKIA Performance, Cannes Film Festival 1965; New York Film Critics Circle A ward for Best Foreign Film in 1966). It was co-directed by Slovak Jan Kadar and Czech Elmar Klos , who had directed films together since the 1950s. Their earlier film was the groundbreaking Smrt' sa vola Engelchen (Death is Called Engelchen, 1963) based on a novel by Ladislav Mnacko, which diverted from the communist interpretation of the 1944 uprising in Slovakia as infallibly glorious and showed some aspects that brought about human tragedy. Along similar lines, Obchod na korze placed the politics of World War II in the background and focused on the dead-end street faced by many in Central Europe during the deportations of the Jews to German concentration camps . After the introduction of anti-Jewish laws in Slovakia, a simple carpenter named Tona is made the owner of a tiny haberdashery, until then owned by an old, almost deaf Jewish woman named Rozalia who has no comprehension of the contemporary political developments. After a crisis, the local Jewish community begins to pay Tono not to surrender his ownership, to prevent Rozalia 's store from being passed on to a ruthless Aryanizer. A tender friendship develops between Tono and Rozalia: she keeps selling buttons without realizing Tana's legal status, and he becomes her man about the house. When deportations begin, Roz.ilia remains oblivious of real life, and Tona is faced with the choice between sending her off, or probably facing his own and his wife ' s death, if he were discovered trying to hide a person incapable of understanding why she should live in hiding. The film starred Slovak Jozef Kroner ( 1924-1998) and Polish Ida Kaminska ( 1899-1980) with a Slovak cast and was shot on location in the town of Trebisov, Eastern Slovakia, and in the Prague studios. The film presents its captivating, morally complex story in a straightforward style, with a sprinkling of symbolism and dream �SLOVAKIA 89 sequences. It was an indication of changes in the political climate that Obchod na korze was able to get away without the mandated focus on criticism of the Slovak authorities during World War II , previously an inevitable feature of socialist realist work about that period, as well as without highlighting a central, resolute procommunist character. It has remained the most awarded and internationally successful Slovak film to the present day . The late l 960s reflected the direction filmmaking may take with little censorship and steady funding . An increasing number of - especially younger - filmmakers took advantage of the situation to experiment without concern about a need to target a specific audience or about how large their audience was going to be. They enjoyed the same creative luxury as the writers or painters convinced of the significance of their work, who manage to earn their living elsewhere. In a democratic society, this is rarely the case in cinema because of the extraordinary amounts of money even a low-budget film requires. But during the occasional relaxation of control in communist countries while the principles of the system remained in place, filmmakers were given substantial fund s to make films relatively free from prescription , as well as of a need to bring in profit. An early nonconformist film seen mostly by students in art theaters was Stefan Uher's Panna zazracnica (The Miraculous Virgin, 1966), soon followed by Juraj Jakubisko's (b. 1938) Kristove roky ("Christ's Years" or "Crucial Years," 1967), Elo Havetta's Slavnost' v botanickej zahrade (A Celebration in the Botanical Garden, 1969), and Dusan Hanak's 322 (the number identifying cancer in medical statistics of diseases, l 969). During this period (however brief) of almost total collapse of communist control, the Koliba Film Studio in Bratislava co-produced films with avantgarde filmmakers from abroad. Jerzy Skolimowski from Poland, �90 SLOVAKIA whose government was then significantly more repressive than Czechoslovakia, directed one story in Dialog 20-40-60, along with Czech Zbynek Brynych and Slovak Peter Solan in 1968 . Frenchman Alain Robbe-Grillet directed two films, including Mui, ktory Jute (The Man Who Lies, L 'homme qui ment; codirected with Martin Holly in 1968) with a Slovak and French cast. And 1969 saw the release of Juraj Jakubisko's Vtackovia, siroty a blazni (Birds, Orphans and Fools), considered by most Slovaks to be the best Slovak film. Jakubisko's preferences bounce between experiment, abstraction and ambitious intellectualism, as in this film , and less numerous popular crowd-pleasers. "Birds, Orphans and Fools" had the briefest of theater run s, not because of the audience, but because of the authorities. Conceived when communist control was at its weakest in Czechoslovakia, it was completed well after the Soviet-led invasion in August of 1968, by which time many of the mechanisms of authoritarian rule were at work again. Vtackovia, siroty a blazni takes place in an apparent historical vacuum in a desolate world with war raging somewhere outside the camera's field of vision and the director's focus. The two male and one female central characters , not unlike some of the hippies in the U.S.A. <1.t that time, live in a decrepit apartment, go through a series of bizarre encounters, sexual experiences and discuss a range of topics. When their lives begin to appear closer to normalcy, one of them murders the girl and commits suicide. The film is deliberately ex perimental in its style: it varies screen sizes, shots are taken at awkward angles with a hand-held or agitated camera, distortion lenses alter screen images, filmmakers ' equipment remains in the frame, characters talk to the camera. The adjectives surrealist and post-apocalyptic are perhaps representative of the filmmakers' intent. �SLOVAKIA The 1970s witnessed a re-introduction 91 of strict communist control in Czechoslovakia, called normalization . People were demoted at work or fired, if they had expressly supported the relaxation in the late 1960s or denounced the Soviet-led invasion in 1968, and their children often suffered, too. In an effort to a void repercussions, many repudiated their past views. Although persecution was somewhat milder in Slovakia than in the Czech-speaking areas, it had a stifling effect on art. Gone were the efforts of the 1960s to push the envelope of what was allowed. The population at large had learned its lesson : with the help of the Soviet Union, the Communists were able to pull the whole country back from unprecedented freedom of expression and the brink of a multi-party system in 1968 to a situation more reminiscent of the late 1950s, and those who resisted were punished. This repression lasted at least through the late 1970s, and Czechoslovakia remained more politically backward , although with a better standard of living, than Communist Poland or Hungary until the collapse of communism in 1989 . Cinema was affected like the rest of society, while the number of film releases grew. Slovakia produced 8-12 films per year throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Jakubisko still managed to finish Dovidenia v pek/e, priatelia (See You in Hell, Friends) in 1970, but hardly anyone saw it. The film was banned and Jakubisko was not allowed to make another feature film until 1979 . Although the early 1970s are sometimes compared to the 1950s, the authorities did not demand that Slovak filmmakers make socialist-realist films critical of the period of relaxation - the way films in the 1950s tried to discredit private enterprise and democracy which were abolished in 1948. Only one film was made about 1968, Honicka (Fever) directed by Martin Holly, Jr. (b. 1931) and based on a novel by Jozef Kot. In a country with �92 SLOVAKIA freedom of expression, the film could have been perceived as just focusing on a relatively plausible plot from 1968 and pushing a particular point of view - there indeed were people who did not support the pro-democratic reforms, or saw many flaws among the reformers. But under totalitarian control, which did not allow opposing points of view, it was impossible to distinguish the touting of the official view in film from just propaganda. Regardless, Honicka shared the destiny of the overwhelming majority of Slovak and Czech films produced during the forty years of Communism: after a couple of weeks in mostly empty theaters, it was not seen again . While the 1960s witnessed a desire to bring contemporary and urban themes to film, the 1970s began to solidify an inclination among a segment of the Slovak critics and filmmakers to emulate the centuries-old urban fashion in Europe of the 'return to nature:' well educated intellectuals living in Bratislava make and admire films with images of the countryside and villagers whose lives appear to be somehow more authentic than in towns. The trend-setter was the still admired hour-long documentary Obrazy stareho sveta (Pictures of the Old World, 1972) directed by Dusan Hanak who, suspicious to the authorities because of his films from the 1960s, found an early refuge in a topic sufficiently removed from big politics to survive in the margins of official production and yet, sufficiently non-conforn1ist and enamored with village life to please especially the chic audiences. Part of its additional attraction within the context of Communist Czechoslovakia rested in the fact that it offered snapshots from the lives of several highlanders, whose very existence belied the official claims of equal wealth for everyone. But Obrazy stareho sveta has a much more universal appeal and has received critical acclaim from Slovakia, Switzerland and France to Toronto and Los Angeles. �SLOVAKIA 93 A singular exception among about 90 domestic feature films that briefly flickered in Slovak theaters in the 1970s was Dusan Hanak's Ruto ve sny (Rosy Dreams, 1976). Although its style was poetic, it may have been the first film in the communist bloc with a de-romanticized portrayal of the Roma (Gypsies). It dove into the cultural barriers between them and the non-Romany population - an issue that, twenty years later, proved to be one of the key problems of post-communist societies in Central Europe. Two teenagers - a young Slovak postman and a Romany girl - fall in love. The film tells the viewers that it will not work due to different cultural expectations each of the two have of their budding relationship. Its imaginative filmmaking and affecting, slightly sentimental story might have been easy to understand and appreciate by a wider audience, but Rutove sny was shown only in limited release at the order of the authorities. The most popular film in that decade was yet another variation on the legend about a heroic highwayman Pacho, hybskf z bojnfk (Pacho, the Highwayman of Hybe; 1975) directed by Martin Tapak. In 1980, the authorities shelved fa milujem, ty milujes (I Love, You Love) directed by Dusan Hanak because of its focus on marginal social groups and eroticism. When it was released shortly before the collapse of communism, it received the highest international recognition for a Slovak film since The Shop on Main Street, including the Silver Bear at the Berlin Film Festival. However, the strict Communist control typical of the 1970s began to relax slowly, and the early 1980s brought two domestic blockbusters whose role in Slovak culture finally matched that of some of the films in the l 960s. In 1982 Stefan Uher directed Pas/a kone na bet6ne ("She. Grazed Horses on Concrete," or "A Ticket to Heaven"). The title used the first few words from an irreverent tune with just a few verses depicting impossible acti- �94 SLOVAKIA vities - the song continues " ... she bathed in razor blades." The story is about a single mother fending for herself in an East Slovak village, determined not to allow her teenaged daughter to follow in her footsteps . Partly a comedy and partly a candid portrayal of contemporary village life, it oscillates between humorous depictions of social customs and ceremonies, and the more serious issues of a woman's capacity to hold her own in a small community, and of abortion. Although co-written and directed by Uher, the film is largely the work of Milka Zirnkova, an author and actress, who wrote the original story, worked with Uher on the script, and starred in the leading role. Among the novelties in Slovak moviemaking was an extensive use of the East Slovak dialect in the film. Although Slovak has several highly recognizable regional accents, filmmakers - before and after this film - have the actors speak the standard, neutral variety of Slovak common in the news media, regardless of where in Slovakia the story of their film takes place. A success comparable to the handful of foreign blockbusters permitted by the authorities each year was Juraj Jakubisko's Tisfcrocna vce/a (A Thousand-Year Old Bee;l983). It is a 162-minute long saga of the life of a farmer's family covering three generations from the late 1800s through the early 1900s. It picked up on and reinforced a myth recurrent in Slovak cinema for several decades, in films from both popular and artsy filmmakers . Villagers are mostly good, while those who live in or move to town (perhaps the screenwriters and directors bowed to communist authorities) become entrepreneurial and tum out to be cold and corrupt. It was the first Slovak film with a comprehensive narrative that a large number of viewers were ready to perceive as their national, as well as local and family past, because it echoed themes they had encountered in literature and history classes at school. �SLOVAKIA 95 Moreover, it was a comforting past. The title was a parable, overplayed in the film with brief expensive special effects with a gigantic honey-bee created in the Bavarian Film Studios in Munich . Those sequences hammered in the symbolic thread in the storyline. They could have been be richer and more content, the film gave the viewers to understand, were it not for the cumulative effects of past injustice: the fruits of their hard-working ancestors' labor was periodically taken away from them for a thousand years, like honey from the bees. But as long as they stayed in the villages, they were an honest, sometimes whimsical bunch doing as well as they could . It helped that several popular actors starred in the film, including Jozef Kr6ner (Tona in The Shop on Main Street). Tisicrosmi vce/a received a Gold Phoenix for art and cinematography from the Cultural Center of the City of Venice awarded in tandem with the prestigious International Venice Film Festival. After decades of government-funded and censored production, Bratislava still produced twelve films in 1990, the year after the collapse of Communism. With no censorship, but also hardly any funding, the number of feature films ranged between one and three for most of the 1990s. Slovakia's theaters are now flooded with foreign , especially American, films and while the population might be ready for a domestic production addressing them specifically, perhaps along the lines of A Thousand-Year Old Bee, there is not enough money for a film on that scale, and perhaps even less interest on the part of the filmmakers . With one exception, the films made in the 1990s generally follow one of two thematic lines . The most successful film was Fontana pre Zuzanu 2 (A Fountain for Susan 2; 1993) directed by Dusan Rapos as a sequel to his more sedate Fontana pre Zuzanu from 1985, still limited by communist censorship. He released Fontana pre Zuza- �96 SLOVAKIA nu 3 in 1999. Both fall in the group of films with contemporary themes and are obviously interested in generating ticket sales. They rely on sex and crime to achieve that. Although it remained behind major foreign blockbusters , Fontana pre Zuzanu 2 sold 380,000 tickets in a country with 5.4 million inhabitants, which is comparable to a film that brings in over $130 million in the U.S.A. Titanic sold about 550,000 tickets in Slovakia and The Matrix 130,000. Another film with a contemporary theme is indicative of how times have changed since the collapse of communism. Rivers of Babylon (the tile is in English) directed by Vladimir Balco in 1998 was based on the first post-communist bestseller in l 990 by Peter Pistanek. Sequels of the novel had lower sales, because the novelty of the topic - Bratislava's underworld - and expressive presentation wore off, and because they had to compete with a growing number of translated foreign bestsellers. However, the filmmakers picked up on a particular aspect of the sequels vitriolic political commentary . The story of the rise of a skillful stoker and wheeler-dealer to political power was seen as a parable of the government in Bratislava at that time. Only about eight years earlier, a release of such a strongly critical film would have been either unthinkable, or a major event attracting huge crowds . Yet, Rivers of Babylon sold only 50,000 tickets and met with a lukewarm reception abroad. The other thematic line in contemporary Slovak cinema is the 'return to nature. ' Its main protagonist is director Martin Sulfk (b . 1962) whose films generally attract fewer viewers at home than Rivers of Babylon, but are favored by critics and have attained a degree of viewers' acclaim at film festivals organized by European cities. His most successful Zahrada (Garden; l 995), the earlier Neha (Tenderness ; 199 l ), as well as the more recent Orbis �SLOVAKIA 97 Pictus (Latin title, 1997) and Krajinka ("Landscape" or "A Small piece of the Country," 2000) are intellectualized continuations of the theme of the desirability of a return to, journey through, or life in a rural setting. Krajinka is the most accessible of Sulfk ' s films . Although it may be based on memories, as the opening sequence suggests, the discrete stories are not made to gel into a cohesive sequence for the audience. But each is readable on its own. Zahrada, the first Slovak film since the collapse of communism to be released abroad , and especially Orbis Pictus, break with traditional story-telling and show the main characters - a rather passive adult man living with his parents in Zahrada and a young girl released from a boarding school , perhaps for abandoned teenagers, in Orbis Pictus - find education in nature and disappointment in urban settings . With surreal scenes, philosophizing scripts, and a dedication to the filmmaker's expressive whim, Sulfk 's films re-package the theme of national rural bliss, recurrent in Slovak culture and education , in a form palatable for trendy audiences. The theme has had an incessant, powerful attraction for a segment of directors since the beginnings of filmmaking in Slovakia, whether they have leaned towards the popular and mythologizing approach from The Earth Sings 1933, through the decades of films about Janosik and similar productions, to The Thousand-Year Old Bee - or whether they take the approach aimed at art theaters, traceable to Organ directed by Stefan Uher in 1964. Due to the general drop in film production and to Martin Sulik ' s capacity to attract funding, films for art theatres have become more prevalent in the 1990s than in the earlier decades . �SLOVAKIA 98 Bibliography Author's interview with film producer Marian Urban, July 12, 2000. "Bandit pie to shoot." Daily Variety, March 7, 2002, p. 48. Bartosek, L.: Nas film - Kapitoly z dejin (1896-1945). Praha: Mlada fronta, 1985. Grega, A. : Prfspevok k dejinam slovenskej kinematografie, M.A. thesis at the FAMU in Prague,1968 . Havelka, J.: Kronika naseho filmu. Praha: Filmovy ustav, 1967. Macek, V.: Stefan Uher 1930-1993. Bratislava: Slovensky filmovy ustav, 1994. Macek, V. and J. Pastekova: Dejiny slovenskej kinematografie. Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo Osveta, 1997. Mihalik, P. : Vznik slovenskej narodnej kinematografie 1896- 1948. Bratislava: Kabinet divadla a filmu SA V, 1994 . Rumanovsky, I.: "Z najstar.sfch dejfn kinematografie na Slovensku. " Panorama, #3, 1977. Janosik 21 a filmove podnikanie na Slovensku. Kinema, #3, 1982 . Slivka, M.: Karol Plicka - basnik obrazu. Martin: Vydavatel'stvo Osveta, 1982. Smatlakova, Renata: Katal6g slovenskych celovecemych filmov 1921-1999. Bratislava: Slovensky filmovy ustav, l 999. Young, C.: The films of Hedy Lamarr. Secaucus, N.J. : Citadel Press, 1978. �DOCUMENTATION �� SLOVAKIA 71 Trends in 20th Century Slovak Filmmaking Martin Votruba The transition from the rule of censorship to the rule of the free market after the collapse of Communism thirteen years ago has been more painful for Slovak filmmakers than for other artists. Filmmaking requires a substantially higher initial investment than other performing and fine arts. People are ready to pay much less for a movie ticket or rental than to buy a book or painting. This puts small countries like Slovakia at a great disadvantage. In a world where feature films in a language other than English have difficulty finding an audience outside their own language areas, even if they are in French, German or Spanish, the same-language audience for films in Slovak is the size of a single frame. A film in the Slovak language costs as much as a comparable film in any other language, but the chances that it will recoup its costs are minimal. Yet, several dedicated filmmakers have managed to find institutional and private support, perhaps resigned to the fact that profits will remain elusive, while hoping to make a statement, push the envelope, create Art. Filmmaking began in Slovakia while it was still part of Hungary in the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. According to film historians, the first motion picture shows in the Slovak counties took place in Kosice in December, 1896 and a few days later in Bratislava (then called Presporok by the Slovaks, Pressburg by the Germans). That was only a year after . the Lumiere brothers' first-ever public picture show in Paris and just six months after a similar showing in New York. The early shows were organized by �SLOVAKIA 72 traveling entrepreneurs, often in cafes or similar venues, but also under tents. People's visual perceptions of the world were being changed forever and those making and showing the films knew it. A show in Nitra in 1903 still touted the advent of the modern world, when it was advertised as "Hungary's 1st Scientific Electrical Theater Modeled on the Grand American Bioscope Awarded the Grand Prix at the World Fair in Paris." At that time, a linguistic barrier was not crucial to the films' distribution in the multinational Kingdom of Hungary. Silent movies were largely self-explanatory and most people would have been able to understand the few captions in Magyar or German, the two dominant languages in the Kingdom, or have them translated by other viewers. The shows consisted of several separate films, some colorized by hand, each of which were about two minutes long. For example, the first show in Kosice was a series of twelve such very, very brief films with titles like "The Arrival of a Train," "The Czar Arrives in Paris," "The Training of the French Infantry," "Four Ladies Dancing the French Cancan" and "An Interrupted Date." Clearly, foreign films dominated Central Europe from the start. The first title was the kind of film intended to create a spectacle - similar to some of the uses of special effects today: the engine would rush towards the camera, scaring an audience not accustomed to viewing images of moving trains at that angle and at such close quarters. The next two titles played a role similar to later newsreels shown before the main feature , or to contemporary world news and documentaries on, say, CNN or the Discovery Chanel. The last two titles were of the kind that - the filmmakers found - attracted the largest number of viewers: entertainment, fun and a rudimentary story. The proportion of such shorts quickly grew. �SLOVAKIA 73 The first permanent movie theater in Bratislava, Elektro Bioskop, was opened in a remodeled fencing hall in September, 1905. It had about 200 seats. The site is still in business. After a hiatus, an arts movie theater was opened in the same hall in the 1970s and is still in operation, now called Mladost' ("Youth"), on Hviezdoslav Square opposite the US Embassy. Theaters, hotel halls, storage buildings and other premises were remodeled in other towns, to become permanent movie theaters. In the absence of hi-fi sound and hi-tech projection systems, the competition often relied on interior decoration. An advertisement for the Bratislava movie theatre Fidelio (later Urania and now Hviezda) lured the audience thus: "427 upholstered seats in 3 colors , Alhambrastyle walls decorated with Oriental landscapes, live and man-made flowers." The fact that the theater showed two new releases a week was relegated to the bottom of the page. Attendance at traditional theater performances dropped after the introduction of motion pictures. Theater directors appealed to the authorities to disallow movie shows during the time of regular plays. In 1901 , the Ministry of the Interior (in charge of police and local government in Central Europe) issued a decree meeting their demands . The Viscount of Nitra went so far as to ban movie shows during the whole theater season , but the local movie-theater operators successfully appealed his decision. For a time, film producers thought they could benefit from a symbiosis of film and theater in "cinema-sketches." Actors would play on the stage, then the story would be picked up on the screen with the same actors and the conclusion would be played by live actors again. One such cinema-sketch from 1909 depicted night life in Kosice "The Kosice Promenade on the Screen." Walking on Main Street in one's Sunday best was a common pastime before the advent of TV and mass entertainment. It was among the few early �SLOVAKIA 74 motion pictures linked with Slovak territory. The limited production of cinema-sketches did not survive World War I and did not continue after the creation of Czecho-Slovakia (later renamed Czechoslovakia) in l 9 l 8 . Rather than cinema-sketches or story-based films , most of the early films linked to Slovakia were travel specials with titles like "The High Tatras," "Skiing in Tatranska Lomnica," "Traveling through the Vah Valley," or "The Kosice Institute of Corrections for Children," "Testing the Police Dogs in Bratislava," and news . Movies proved successful. The number of movie theaters in Slovakia reached about 100 by the end of World War I and two schools - the Mining Academy in Banska Stiavnica and a high school in Lucenec - had already used film as a teaching tool. When movies were still shown by traveling entrepreneurs, a copy of the film was bought and owned by them. With the establishment of permanent movie theaters, film distributors appeared, as well as a kind of 'film exchange' where copies of film were traded as on the stock market. The advent of copyright problems and foreign competition was heralded in 1913, in the first published complaint about illegal importation of foreign films , especially from France. As elsewhere in Central Europe, French films dominated the market. Legal power to regulate what movies were screened in Hungary was invested in the hands of the local authorities by a law from l 90 l , which required the traveling movie entrepreneurs to obtain permits for their shows . On the whole, a license was issued to anyone who applied for it. Local bans and complaints surfaced for a variety of reasons, including some familiar today. A city councilor in Kosice worried that worthless caper movies had a bad influence on boys, while dramas about sex ruined girls, be cause such movies extinguished their sense of morality and made �SLOVAKIA 75 them vulnerable to unconscionable seducers. In 1912, a priest and principal of a Roman Catholic boys' school in Nitra threatened his students with a bad grade in behavior if they went to the movies, even if accompanied by their parents. His ban extended to traditional theater performances as well. Censorship was also exercised by the authorities in Budapest, the capital of the Kingdom, who were able to ban individual titles from being shown all over Hungary , including the Slovak counties. In line with the traditions of Central European monarchies, politics was among the reasons for censorship. Among the banned titles were "King Ludwig II," depicting a story too similar to the life and mysterious death of Ludwig II of Bavaria and a film offensive to the prime minister of Hungary. However, the Kingdom did not follow suit when the rest of the Habsburg monarchy introduced formal film censorship in 1912. Among other things, it required that a license to open a movie theater be issued to individuals and institutions that would secure a respectable use of the profits. Its intent was to support charities and various associations. Budapest adopted the law in Apri l of 1918, half a year be fore the defeat and collapse of Austria-Hungary and the founding of Czec ho-Slovakia. The law empowered the censors to ban films offending patriotic interests, public order and morality. Children under sixteen were allowed to see only movies designated as suitable for them and only when accompanied by an adult. Despite a variety of problems , Czecho-S lovakia proved to be more democratic than the former Kingdom of Hungary and the whole Habsburg monarchy. But the new freedom , which benefited other forms of Slovak culture, proved even more difficult for Slovak film than the post-communist period after 1989. The film industry developed in Prague, which had been an important German-Czech cultural center, a university town and capital of the �76 SLOVAKIA Holy Roman Empire's Kingdom of Bohemia for centuries, attracting business and artistic talent. By comparison, Slovakia's new capital and largest city, Bratislava, was much smaller; moreover, it was only forty miles from the former Habsburg monarchy's large, vibrant and influential capital of Vienna. Given that artists and entrepreneurs flocked to it from all over the monarchy, Vienna must have created a degree of artistic brain-drain in its immediate vicinity. As with the Pittsburgh Agreement of 1918, which was a key document in the separation of the Slovak counties from the Habsburg monarchy, Slovak-Americans had an impact on Slovakia's nascent film industry. Andrej Sustek from Chicago founded the Selig Company with the intent to make historical films in Slovakia. It was subsequently incorporated in the new Slovak-American Tatra Film Corporation with a capital of about $30,000 from US investors . Their first and only film was Janosfk. It captured the legend of an 18th-century highwayman from Terchova in the northern Slovak County of Orava who gave rise to Carpathian legends comparable to those about Robin Hood in England. In 1919 Tatra Film's Daniel and Jaroslav Siakel' arrived in Slovakia to start filming in their native village of Blatnica near Martin in Central Slovakia, where they also built sets, and in the castle of Stiavnicka near Ruzomberok. The leading role was given to popular Theodor Pistek, who starred in nine other films that year. Maria Fabryova, an amateur actress from Martin, played Anka, Janosfk's girlfriend. The film was finished in the A-B studios in Prague . The screenplay by Jozef Zak-Marusiak was to be based on a novel by Slovak-American author and editor of the popular Amerikansko-Slovcnske Noviny "(American-Slovak News)", Gustav Marsall-Petrovsky (1862-1916). But it was much closer to the ac- �SLOVAKIA 77 tual local legends , which also inspired Slovak Romantic poets in the 19th century. Moreover, the play Janosfk - premiered in Brno in 1910 and written by Moravian playwright, poet and journalist Jiri Mahen - was well known by the l 920s and may have been a major source for the film's story . Janosfk was shown to the filmmakers' team in November 1921 in the city of Vrutky . It opened a few days later in Zilina and in December 1921 in Chicago - to be more specific , in Cicero, IL, then with a large Slovak-American population , at the Atlantic movie theater, now replaced by the Atlantic Mall at W. 26th St. and S. Pulaski Rd . The screenplay relied on the folk motif of ' taking from the rich and giving to the poor,' and greatly reinforced the hints present in 19th-century Slovak Romantic poems about Janosfk : the film fused feudal exploitation in the more distant past with the drive by the Magyar-speaking government in Budapest in the 19th century to suppress the Kingdom' s other languages and cultures . The latter became particularly forceful during the last decades of the Kingdom's existence and ultimately contributed to its demise. Unlike feudalism , that experience was still very fresh in people's memories and was among the reasons why Slovaks immigrated to the United States. By comparison to Czech films preserved from the early Czecho-Slovak period, Janosfk showed the authors' experience with American movies : in camera work, in the use of parallel narratives, as well as in shots inspired by Westerns . It had two directors of photography with two cameras: Oldrich Benes with a European camera and Daniel Siakel', who used a camera made by Andrej Sustek's company in Chicago. In effect, the two cameramen shot two parallel films - scenes were acted separately for each camera and the difference between the "Slovak" and "American" versions increased after separate editing. But the film's handling of the eth- �78 SLOVAKIA nic motif may have been too didactic, or the issue too recent to be successfully mythologized as entertainment on the silver screen. Janosik did not recover its costs and remained Tatra Film's only product, as well as Slovakia' s first preserved silent movie. It was thought to have been lost, but in 1975 it was discovered and restored from both versions by Ivan Rumanovsky in Bratislava. Until after World War II, attempts to set up film companies, occasionally with Slovak-American involvement, followed the same path. One film would be made and then the company folded, because the film was not profitable and the company lacked sufficient capital to sustain it through a few flops. The situation did not change after the emergence of sound in the movies. While about 30-50 sound films were made each year in Czechoslovakia between 1933 - 1938, fewer than one a year was in Slovak. Czech films occasionally featured Slovak actors. Among them, with eleven musicals to his credit, was Frantisek Kristof Vesely, who reached the level of stardom in Czechoslovakia. Documentaries fared better: partly because the costs were lower and partly thanks to occasional government funding for shorts featuring its officials. For example, Kvetna nedela vo Vajnoroch (Palm Sunday in Yajnory) recorded a folkloristic celebration of the holiday attended by Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia, Vavro Srobar. A potentially steady source of funding opened up in 1935 when Prague decided that each newsreel commonly shown before the main feature had to devote at least 20% of its length to items about Czechoslovakia. But this so urce remained untapped by Slovak filmmakers : most of the reports came from Bohemia and Moravia. However, government or institutional funding and fascination with village life proved to be a mix that worked for filmmakers in Slovakia on more than one occasion, right through the present. �SLOVAKIA 79 The first Slovak film to reach international acclaim relied on both. The potential of the Slovak countryside as a backdrop had already been discovered by non-native filmmakers and at least two of their films have become classics of world cinema. The early German horror Nosferatu, eine Symphonie des Grauens (Nosferatu the Vampire) directed by Friedrich Wilhelm Murnau was filmed at Orava Castle and in the High Tatras in 1922, and Czech director Gustav Machaty chose Slovakia as a location for his daring exploration of sexuality Extase (Ecstasy) in 1932. The second one propelled the career of Hedy Lamarr (born Hedwig Eva Maria Kiester), who became one of the most successful Hollywood stars. The Matica slovenska (by that time an eminent, mostly government-sponsored cultural, academic and archival institution) employed Karel Plicka (1894-1987) as its ethnographer, who was able to make documentary shorts from about 1926. He obtained funding from the President's Office in 1928 to produce an hourlong documentary about village life Po horach, po dolach (Through Mountains and Valleys). It was awarded a Gold Medal at the International Exposition of Photographic Art in Florence and received an Honorable Mention at the International Venice Film Festival in 1932. The favorable reception of his production, along with more funding from both the Matica slovenska and the President's Office, enabled Plicka to make Zem spieva (The Earth Sings) in 1933, a romanticized semi-documentary panorama of selected folk customs through the four seasons. Unlike Slovak feature movies of that period, Zem spieva struck a chord with the audience and topped it with another award at the International Venice Film Festival as part of a collection of films from Czechoslovakia that included Extase, mentioned above. But after this success, the Matica s/ovcnska was unable to raise sufficient funding and Plicka's hopes that he was laying the foundations of �80 SLOVAKIA Slovakia' s film industry were thwarted. He went on to make a documentary in the United States Za Slovakmi od New Yorku po Mississippi (Tracing Slovaks from New York to the Mississippi) in 1937 and then became a professor in the first Department of Film in Czechoslovakia and the third such department in Europe, at the School of Artistic Crafts in Bratislava in 1938. But the Department's potential for Slovak cinema was lost when the College was closed after Slovakia became a separate country in 19 39 . Plicka then resettled permanently in Prague, Bohemia, which was incorporated into the Third Reich during World War II. Czechoslovakia's only other Slovak-language blockbuster before World War II was a new Janosfk in 1935, funded from Prague and directed by the Czech Martin Frie (1902-1968). It was indicative of the volume of Czech film production that Frie finished three other films during the same year, having previously directed 23. Frie and Plicka were two of the authors of the screenplay based on the same play by Mahen, mentioned earlier, on which the first Janosfk may have been based. Plicka also found a policeman and amateur actor, Pal'o Bielik (1910-1983), in the village of Senica for the leading role. The film combined idealized images of villagers with action scenes to show their and Jan osik ' s resistance against Hungarian landlords. In spite of Budapest's protestations, it was screened at the International Venice Film Festival and was successfully released in Germany . During the existence of the Slovak Republic ( 1939-1945), movie theaters grew by more than 60% but no feature films were made. The government sponsored the film company Nastup (Line-up), which produced short films and weekly newsreels . The authorities, who described their own rule as "authoritarian and totalitarian," mandated that a newsreel be shown before every feature film and tightened censorship and ideological supervision of �SLOVAKIA 81 their production. The newsreel was customarily followed by a short film, a pattern that was picked up by the communist authorities after the war and survived through the collapse of Communism. The government's alliance with Germany meant that it became Slovakia's main source of films even before the war changed world trade patterns. At the same time, the number of imports dropped from about 400 a year in the former CzechoSlovakia (whose original hyphenated name was restored in 1938) to less than 150 after independence. In 1940, Slovakia still imported 15 "cultural-educational" films from the U.S., and a few more from countries other than Germany, but then German feature films were supplemented by just about a dozen films from Italy and Romania, and several Czech "oldies" from before the war. The film company Nastup was conscientious about training its employees, among whom was Pal'o Bielik, and sent them regularly to several studios in Germany as interns - including to neighboring Vienna and formerly Czechoslovak Prague, which were now ruled from Berlin. After World War II, Slovakia was re-joined with the Czechspeaking lands and Czech director Martin Frie returned to make Vanij. .. ! (Beware ... !) with folkloristic highlights similar to his successful Janosfk from 1935. The film was based on Ivan Stodola' s popular play Bacova iena (The Shepherd's Wife) and Palo Bielik played the leading role again . Things changed dramatically after Czechoslovakia became communist in 1948. The government nationalized all but the tiniest companies, including the film studios. It saw film as an important medium to indoctrinate the population and ideological control - under strict financed film production in the Slovak, as well as in the Czech part of the country. Directors, screenwriters, actors and other people connected with film production became �SLOVAKIA 82 state employees as everyone else, with a regular salary regardless of how many films were produced and whether they earned any profits or not - a concept born out of communist accounting. Although the authorities paid the salaried filmmakers more money for the films they made - separate contracts were signed for each one - from the American perspective, this was closer to bonuses than anything known in Hollywood today. The "bonuses" were higher for films considered particularly effective in showing the communist rule as benefiting the population and had nothing to do with ticket sales. The authorities mandated that the method used in all art be socialist realism. In general, its goal was to educate people to the benefits of communism and, before it was reached , socialism, which was what they called their existing political system. This was strictly enforced, especially in fiction and film, because these mediums reached the widest audience. The topics were to emphasize the need to work for the good of the 'collective,' i.e., communist society. Topics focusing on the individual and on personal feelings and concerns were deemed harmful, as was depicting anything negative about society. Love was considered such a topic: not only because it was personal and, therefore, did not educate the audience about the benefits of working on behalf of the collective, but also because it may have brought sex into the story, a definite 'no' in socialist realism. The official support of socialist-realist art and the transformation of filmmakers into salaried employees meant that a steady stream of feature films began to appear in the newly-established studios in Bratislava. Pal'o Bielik, the former star of Janosfk, who expanded his moviemaking experience in the newsreel studios during World War II, directed Vicic dicry (Wolves' Lairs), one of the first two films made after the communist takeover in 1948. It �SLOVAKIA 83 was the beginning of a succession of films about the 1944 antiGerman uprising in Slovakia, but because it was made so early during the Communist Party ' s drive to establish ideological dominance, the film still managed to include 'negative,' as well as 'positive' characters among both the Slovak insurgents and the German soldiers suppressing the uprising - something that did not get past the censors again for more than a decade. Bielik, as director, leaned away from the folkloristic style of the films in which he starred: the style of V/cie diery was inspired by early Italian neo-realism. After two feature films in 1948 and another two in 1949, the yearly output grew to 3-6 per year in the 1950s. 'Negative' characters could not be central in the plots, and the story had to prove them wrong. Central characters had to be 'positive' from the start or be seen discovering Marxist-Leninist solutions to any problems they encountered. Such problems had to be few and marginal, the general view of society had to be happy. If the central characters were not Communists from the start, a 'tutor' and Communist Party member would often be present, who helped them find the Marxist-Leninist way. Topics commonly dealt with World War II and the defeat of Nazi Germany, or with the imposition of Communism - the 'collectivization' of farms, i.e., the abolition of private ownership of most land larger than the immediate surroundings of one's house and garden. Farmers were to be shown as opening their eyes to the fact that this was actually good for them. The Communists proclaimed a classless society, which meant that everyone would eventually become a 'worker.' The three recognized social groups were the laborers, the farmers, and the intelligentsia, i.e., white-collar workers and college-educated people, but the Communist Party officials, although working in offices, classified themselves as laborers. The bourgeoisie, �84 SLOVAKIA i.e. , the private entrepreneurs, disappeared by virtue of their property being 'nationalized,' i.e., taken over by the government, but the - now former - bourgeoisie were persecuted never- theless . The intelligentsia was often suspected of harboring bourgeois ideas and persecuted, too . Since the bourgeoisie were often described as incapable of shedding their reactionary, i.e. anti-Communist skins, films about contemporary life generally focused on the villages and farmers. Marxism-Leninism saw in them the ' next best class' after the laborers, on their way to becoming agricultural laborers . Their initial qualms about any benefits of collectivization provided some meager source of conflict for the plots. The films about the past often returned to the uprising in Slovakia during World War II, which was depicted as organized by the Communists and aided by the Soviet Union. Plots that concerned the communist period had to end on an optimistic note. Since a former entrepreneur always remained at least suspect, their joyful transformation into a group auxiliary to the working class was essentially unacceptable as a topic, which - in effect - also kept town s and cities away from most of the scripts. Even socialist-realist authors felt that a ccnflict drives a story, but avoided settings that did not provide for politically acceptable conflicts . Socialist realism was strongly enforced during the first 10-15 years of communism . Unlike neighboring Poland and Hungary, communist Czechoslovakia saw little of the ideological thaw triggered by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalinism in February of l 956. The thaw did not reach Czechoslovakia until the early l 960s, during which time Bratislava produced 6- l O feature film s per year, and the first manifestations of the thaw in literature and film came from Slovakia. After more than a decade of socialist- �85 SLOVAKIA realist filmmaking, Sinko v sieti (The Sun in a Net) directed by Stefan Uher (1930-1993) in 1962 became a milestone in both Slovak and Czech filmmaking. It inspired a whole generation of students at the Film Academy in Prague, who soon followed with a series of films which attained international recognition as the "Czech New Wave." Sinko v sieti was Stefan Uher's second film . His first was about the life of a group of fifteen year-old students and their school My z deviate) A (We from Grade 9, Study Group A; 1961). The screenwriter, Alfonz Bednar (1914-1989), was a successful writer who published mildly non-conformist fiction somewhat earlier than most other authors. The film is based on his three short stories Fajolov prfspevok (Fajolo's Contribution), Pon- t6novy deii (Pontoon Day) and Zlata brana (Golden Gate). Uher's film depicted a number of hitherto unacceptable social and political themes : distant - perhaps uncaring - parents, a philandering husband, teenagers changing partners, an attempt at suicide, a poorly-run collectivized farm , and the requirement that a child attend summer 'voluntary work camps ' to make up for his parents belonging to the intelligentsia. Moreover, none of these issues were resolved in a 'positive' manner. The ending was rather somber, if not depressing, with the barest hint of optimism found only in the last sentence and possibly on the film's symbolic level, which was handled rather unevenly. It attempted a complex interplay of sun and clouds, vision and blindness, truth and lies, centered around a solar eclipse (Central Europe actually experienced a 95% solar eclipse on the morning of February 15, 196 l ). Contemporary critics found the symbolism difficult to decipher, and much of it was probably lost on the viewers. But the core story line - the ups and downs in the relationship of two teenagers - the realism and novelty of its urban setting, and the �86 SLOVAKIA hints at some social and political taboos were not lost on the audience and cannot have been lost on the censors. Sinko v sieti not only pushed the envelope, but also established for other artists and showed to the Slovaks and Czechs at large what the authorities could now be pushed to permit. According to Uher, Karol Bacflek, the head of the Communist Party in Slovakia at that time, attacked the film, saying it contained coded messages that conspirators were able to decipher precisely. For example, Bacflek thought the solar eclipse . was to indicate the twilight of communism and the pontoon on the dried-up riverbed stood for the state of communist rule in Czechoslovakia at that time. Communist officials believed that the blind mother was supposed to symbolize the blindness of their Party, which did not see the realities of life under communism. Because a political thaw had begun in Slovakia, other communist officials with enough influence dared to differ and the film was released. Besides Stefan Uher's efforts to get past the strict requirements of socialist realism, the director was inspired by some of the trends current in Western European cinema and culture in the 1950s. Among them was his focus on the symbolism of light and darkness, adherence to a low-key style, a hint of fashi0nablc quasi-existentialism in Fajolo's dialogues with Bela, and an attempt at serious cinema-verite: in the beer-drinking scenes in .1 tavern, the background soundtrack includes taped unscripted conversations of real villagers. Uher mostly chose inexperienced actors or nonactors. Only one of them, I.:,ubo Roman in a supporting role (b . 1944, then a student of acting), became a successful actor, theater administrator, and ultimately a politician - Member of Parlia- ment, Minister of Culture, and since 2001, County Chief of Bratislava. Actual music in the film included Western rock played on �SLOVAKIA 87 the radio. The film's score was by llja Zeljenka, an avant-garde composer of 'concrete music.' While Slnko v sieti became a prologue to the first minimalist, quasi-realist, and eventually more experimental Czechoslovak New Wave made by film students in Prague, in Slovakia the film was followed by several increasingly critical social commentaries by established filmmakers , by more films about contemporary urban life, and by increasingly intellectual and abstract films seen as Art. The most daring among the films that replaced socialist realism with social criticism was Peter Solan's Prfpad Barnabas Kos (The Case of Barnabas Kos; 1964), which removed the veil from arbitrary decision-making in communist society. Among contemporary topics, a potential for an approachable and successful film was lost with Nylonovy mesiac (Nylon Moon; 1965) directed by Eduard Greener. Its story, as well as the title came from a novel by Jaroslava Blazkova published in 1960, the first best-seller about contemporary life since the communist takeover. But there was entertainment in film , too, none more popular than Janosik II directed in 1963 by Pal'o Bielik, the star in the previous version of the story. In spite of its title, it was not a sequel: the film re-told the centuries-old legend. The theme of the brigand hero retains its attraction through the present day. Slovakia 's most successful producer, Rudolf Bierman, is currently producing The True Story al Janosfk and Uhorcfk, directed by the success[ul Polish filmmaker Agnieszka Holland and her daughter Kasia Adamik with an estimated budget of $2.4 million, $800,000 of which came from the Slovak Parliament and the Ministry of Culture. The first film to earn an Oscar for Czechoslovakia was Obchod na korze (The Shop on Main Street; 1965; Academy Award for Best Foreign Film in 1966; Special Mention for Acting �88 SLOVAKIA Performance, Cannes Film Festival 1965; New York Film Critics Circle A ward for Best Foreign Film in 1966). It was co-directed by Slovak Jan Kadar and Czech Elmar Klos , who had directed films together since the 1950s. Their earlier film was the groundbreaking Smrt' sa vola Engelchen (Death is Called Engelchen, 1963) based on a novel by Ladislav Mnacko, which diverted from the communist interpretation of the 1944 uprising in Slovakia as infallibly glorious and showed some aspects that brought about human tragedy. Along similar lines, Obchod na korze placed the politics of World War II in the background and focused on the dead-end street faced by many in Central Europe during the deportations of the Jews to German concentration camps . After the introduction of anti-Jewish laws in Slovakia, a simple carpenter named Tona is made the owner of a tiny haberdashery, until then owned by an old, almost deaf Jewish woman named Rozalia who has no comprehension of the contemporary political developments. After a crisis, the local Jewish community begins to pay Tono not to surrender his ownership, to prevent Rozalia 's store from being passed on to a ruthless Aryanizer. A tender friendship develops between Tono and Rozalia: she keeps selling buttons without realizing Tana's legal status, and he becomes her man about the house. When deportations begin, Roz.ilia remains oblivious of real life, and Tona is faced with the choice between sending her off, or probably facing his own and his wife ' s death, if he were discovered trying to hide a person incapable of understanding why she should live in hiding. The film starred Slovak Jozef Kroner ( 1924-1998) and Polish Ida Kaminska ( 1899-1980) with a Slovak cast and was shot on location in the town of Trebisov, Eastern Slovakia, and in the Prague studios. The film presents its captivating, morally complex story in a straightforward style, with a sprinkling of symbolism and dream �SLOVAKIA 89 sequences. It was an indication of changes in the political climate that Obchod na korze was able to get away without the mandated focus on criticism of the Slovak authorities during World War II , previously an inevitable feature of socialist realist work about that period, as well as without highlighting a central, resolute procommunist character. It has remained the most awarded and internationally successful Slovak film to the present day . The late l 960s reflected the direction filmmaking may take with little censorship and steady funding . An increasing number of - especially younger - filmmakers took advantage of the situation to experiment without concern about a need to target a specific audience or about how large their audience was going to be. They enjoyed the same creative luxury as the writers or painters convinced of the significance of their work, who manage to earn their living elsewhere. In a democratic society, this is rarely the case in cinema because of the extraordinary amounts of money even a low-budget film requires. But during the occasional relaxation of control in communist countries while the principles of the system remained in place, filmmakers were given substantial fund s to make films relatively free from prescription , as well as of a need to bring in profit. An early nonconformist film seen mostly by students in art theaters was Stefan Uher's Panna zazracnica (The Miraculous Virgin, 1966), soon followed by Juraj Jakubisko's (b. 1938) Kristove roky ("Christ's Years" or "Crucial Years," 1967), Elo Havetta's Slavnost' v botanickej zahrade (A Celebration in the Botanical Garden, 1969), and Dusan Hanak's 322 (the number identifying cancer in medical statistics of diseases, l 969). During this period (however brief) of almost total collapse of communist control, the Koliba Film Studio in Bratislava co-produced films with avantgarde filmmakers from abroad. Jerzy Skolimowski from Poland, �90 SLOVAKIA whose government was then significantly more repressive than Czechoslovakia, directed one story in Dialog 20-40-60, along with Czech Zbynek Brynych and Slovak Peter Solan in 1968 . Frenchman Alain Robbe-Grillet directed two films, including Mui, ktory Jute (The Man Who Lies, L 'homme qui ment; codirected with Martin Holly in 1968) with a Slovak and French cast. And 1969 saw the release of Juraj Jakubisko's Vtackovia, siroty a blazni (Birds, Orphans and Fools), considered by most Slovaks to be the best Slovak film. Jakubisko's preferences bounce between experiment, abstraction and ambitious intellectualism, as in this film , and less numerous popular crowd-pleasers. "Birds, Orphans and Fools" had the briefest of theater run s, not because of the audience, but because of the authorities. Conceived when communist control was at its weakest in Czechoslovakia, it was completed well after the Soviet-led invasion in August of 1968, by which time many of the mechanisms of authoritarian rule were at work again. Vtackovia, siroty a blazni takes place in an apparent historical vacuum in a desolate world with war raging somewhere outside the camera's field of vision and the director's focus. The two male and one female central characters , not unlike some of the hippies in the U.S.A. <1.t that time, live in a decrepit apartment, go through a series of bizarre encounters, sexual experiences and discuss a range of topics. When their lives begin to appear closer to normalcy, one of them murders the girl and commits suicide. The film is deliberately ex perimental in its style: it varies screen sizes, shots are taken at awkward angles with a hand-held or agitated camera, distortion lenses alter screen images, filmmakers ' equipment remains in the frame, characters talk to the camera. The adjectives surrealist and post-apocalyptic are perhaps representative of the filmmakers' intent. �SLOVAKIA The 1970s witnessed a re-introduction 91 of strict communist control in Czechoslovakia, called normalization . People were demoted at work or fired, if they had expressly supported the relaxation in the late 1960s or denounced the Soviet-led invasion in 1968, and their children often suffered, too. In an effort to a void repercussions, many repudiated their past views. Although persecution was somewhat milder in Slovakia than in the Czech-speaking areas, it had a stifling effect on art. Gone were the efforts of the 1960s to push the envelope of what was allowed. The population at large had learned its lesson : with the help of the Soviet Union, the Communists were able to pull the whole country back from unprecedented freedom of expression and the brink of a multi-party system in 1968 to a situation more reminiscent of the late 1950s, and those who resisted were punished. This repression lasted at least through the late 1970s, and Czechoslovakia remained more politically backward , although with a better standard of living, than Communist Poland or Hungary until the collapse of communism in 1989 . Cinema was affected like the rest of society, while the number of film releases grew. Slovakia produced 8-12 films per year throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Jakubisko still managed to finish Dovidenia v pek/e, priatelia (See You in Hell, Friends) in 1970, but hardly anyone saw it. The film was banned and Jakubisko was not allowed to make another feature film until 1979 . Although the early 1970s are sometimes compared to the 1950s, the authorities did not demand that Slovak filmmakers make socialist-realist films critical of the period of relaxation - the way films in the 1950s tried to discredit private enterprise and democracy which were abolished in 1948. Only one film was made about 1968, Honicka (Fever) directed by Martin Holly, Jr. (b. 1931) and based on a novel by Jozef Kot. In a country with �92 SLOVAKIA freedom of expression, the film could have been perceived as just focusing on a relatively plausible plot from 1968 and pushing a particular point of view - there indeed were people who did not support the pro-democratic reforms, or saw many flaws among the reformers. But under totalitarian control, which did not allow opposing points of view, it was impossible to distinguish the touting of the official view in film from just propaganda. Regardless, Honicka shared the destiny of the overwhelming majority of Slovak and Czech films produced during the forty years of Communism: after a couple of weeks in mostly empty theaters, it was not seen again . While the 1960s witnessed a desire to bring contemporary and urban themes to film, the 1970s began to solidify an inclination among a segment of the Slovak critics and filmmakers to emulate the centuries-old urban fashion in Europe of the 'return to nature:' well educated intellectuals living in Bratislava make and admire films with images of the countryside and villagers whose lives appear to be somehow more authentic than in towns. The trend-setter was the still admired hour-long documentary Obrazy stareho sveta (Pictures of the Old World, 1972) directed by Dusan Hanak who, suspicious to the authorities because of his films from the 1960s, found an early refuge in a topic sufficiently removed from big politics to survive in the margins of official production and yet, sufficiently non-conforn1ist and enamored with village life to please especially the chic audiences. Part of its additional attraction within the context of Communist Czechoslovakia rested in the fact that it offered snapshots from the lives of several highlanders, whose very existence belied the official claims of equal wealth for everyone. But Obrazy stareho sveta has a much more universal appeal and has received critical acclaim from Slovakia, Switzerland and France to Toronto and Los Angeles. �SLOVAKIA 93 A singular exception among about 90 domestic feature films that briefly flickered in Slovak theaters in the 1970s was Dusan Hanak's Ruto ve sny (Rosy Dreams, 1976). Although its style was poetic, it may have been the first film in the communist bloc with a de-romanticized portrayal of the Roma (Gypsies). It dove into the cultural barriers between them and the non-Romany population - an issue that, twenty years later, proved to be one of the key problems of post-communist societies in Central Europe. Two teenagers - a young Slovak postman and a Romany girl - fall in love. The film tells the viewers that it will not work due to different cultural expectations each of the two have of their budding relationship. Its imaginative filmmaking and affecting, slightly sentimental story might have been easy to understand and appreciate by a wider audience, but Rutove sny was shown only in limited release at the order of the authorities. The most popular film in that decade was yet another variation on the legend about a heroic highwayman Pacho, hybskf z bojnfk (Pacho, the Highwayman of Hybe; 1975) directed by Martin Tapak. In 1980, the authorities shelved fa milujem, ty milujes (I Love, You Love) directed by Dusan Hanak because of its focus on marginal social groups and eroticism. When it was released shortly before the collapse of communism, it received the highest international recognition for a Slovak film since The Shop on Main Street, including the Silver Bear at the Berlin Film Festival. However, the strict Communist control typical of the 1970s began to relax slowly, and the early 1980s brought two domestic blockbusters whose role in Slovak culture finally matched that of some of the films in the l 960s. In 1982 Stefan Uher directed Pas/a kone na bet6ne ("She. Grazed Horses on Concrete," or "A Ticket to Heaven"). The title used the first few words from an irreverent tune with just a few verses depicting impossible acti- �94 SLOVAKIA vities - the song continues " ... she bathed in razor blades." The story is about a single mother fending for herself in an East Slovak village, determined not to allow her teenaged daughter to follow in her footsteps . Partly a comedy and partly a candid portrayal of contemporary village life, it oscillates between humorous depictions of social customs and ceremonies, and the more serious issues of a woman's capacity to hold her own in a small community, and of abortion. Although co-written and directed by Uher, the film is largely the work of Milka Zirnkova, an author and actress, who wrote the original story, worked with Uher on the script, and starred in the leading role. Among the novelties in Slovak moviemaking was an extensive use of the East Slovak dialect in the film. Although Slovak has several highly recognizable regional accents, filmmakers - before and after this film - have the actors speak the standard, neutral variety of Slovak common in the news media, regardless of where in Slovakia the story of their film takes place. A success comparable to the handful of foreign blockbusters permitted by the authorities each year was Juraj Jakubisko's Tisfcrocna vce/a (A Thousand-Year Old Bee;l983). It is a 162-minute long saga of the life of a farmer's family covering three generations from the late 1800s through the early 1900s. It picked up on and reinforced a myth recurrent in Slovak cinema for several decades, in films from both popular and artsy filmmakers . Villagers are mostly good, while those who live in or move to town (perhaps the screenwriters and directors bowed to communist authorities) become entrepreneurial and tum out to be cold and corrupt. It was the first Slovak film with a comprehensive narrative that a large number of viewers were ready to perceive as their national, as well as local and family past, because it echoed themes they had encountered in literature and history classes at school. �SLOVAKIA 95 Moreover, it was a comforting past. The title was a parable, overplayed in the film with brief expensive special effects with a gigantic honey-bee created in the Bavarian Film Studios in Munich . Those sequences hammered in the symbolic thread in the storyline. They could have been be richer and more content, the film gave the viewers to understand, were it not for the cumulative effects of past injustice: the fruits of their hard-working ancestors' labor was periodically taken away from them for a thousand years, like honey from the bees. But as long as they stayed in the villages, they were an honest, sometimes whimsical bunch doing as well as they could . It helped that several popular actors starred in the film, including Jozef Kr6ner (Tona in The Shop on Main Street). Tisicrosmi vce/a received a Gold Phoenix for art and cinematography from the Cultural Center of the City of Venice awarded in tandem with the prestigious International Venice Film Festival. After decades of government-funded and censored production, Bratislava still produced twelve films in 1990, the year after the collapse of Communism. With no censorship, but also hardly any funding, the number of feature films ranged between one and three for most of the 1990s. Slovakia's theaters are now flooded with foreign , especially American, films and while the population might be ready for a domestic production addressing them specifically, perhaps along the lines of A Thousand-Year Old Bee, there is not enough money for a film on that scale, and perhaps even less interest on the part of the filmmakers . With one exception, the films made in the 1990s generally follow one of two thematic lines . The most successful film was Fontana pre Zuzanu 2 (A Fountain for Susan 2; 1993) directed by Dusan Rapos as a sequel to his more sedate Fontana pre Zuzanu from 1985, still limited by communist censorship. He released Fontana pre Zuza- �96 SLOVAKIA nu 3 in 1999. Both fall in the group of films with contemporary themes and are obviously interested in generating ticket sales. They rely on sex and crime to achieve that. Although it remained behind major foreign blockbusters , Fontana pre Zuzanu 2 sold 380,000 tickets in a country with 5.4 million inhabitants, which is comparable to a film that brings in over $130 million in the U.S.A. Titanic sold about 550,000 tickets in Slovakia and The Matrix 130,000. Another film with a contemporary theme is indicative of how times have changed since the collapse of communism. Rivers of Babylon (the tile is in English) directed by Vladimir Balco in 1998 was based on the first post-communist bestseller in l 990 by Peter Pistanek. Sequels of the novel had lower sales, because the novelty of the topic - Bratislava's underworld - and expressive presentation wore off, and because they had to compete with a growing number of translated foreign bestsellers. However, the filmmakers picked up on a particular aspect of the sequels vitriolic political commentary . The story of the rise of a skillful stoker and wheeler-dealer to political power was seen as a parable of the government in Bratislava at that time. Only about eight years earlier, a release of such a strongly critical film would have been either unthinkable, or a major event attracting huge crowds . Yet, Rivers of Babylon sold only 50,000 tickets and met with a lukewarm reception abroad. The other thematic line in contemporary Slovak cinema is the 'return to nature. ' Its main protagonist is director Martin Sulfk (b . 1962) whose films generally attract fewer viewers at home than Rivers of Babylon, but are favored by critics and have attained a degree of viewers' acclaim at film festivals organized by European cities. His most successful Zahrada (Garden; l 995), the earlier Neha (Tenderness ; 199 l ), as well as the more recent Orbis �SLOVAKIA 97 Pictus (Latin title, 1997) and Krajinka ("Landscape" or "A Small piece of the Country," 2000) are intellectualized continuations of the theme of the desirability of a return to, journey through, or life in a rural setting. Krajinka is the most accessible of Sulfk ' s films . Although it may be based on memories, as the opening sequence suggests, the discrete stories are not made to gel into a cohesive sequence for the audience. But each is readable on its own. Zahrada, the first Slovak film since the collapse of communism to be released abroad , and especially Orbis Pictus, break with traditional story-telling and show the main characters - a rather passive adult man living with his parents in Zahrada and a young girl released from a boarding school , perhaps for abandoned teenagers, in Orbis Pictus - find education in nature and disappointment in urban settings . With surreal scenes, philosophizing scripts, and a dedication to the filmmaker's expressive whim, Sulfk 's films re-package the theme of national rural bliss, recurrent in Slovak culture and education , in a form palatable for trendy audiences. The theme has had an incessant, powerful attraction for a segment of directors since the beginnings of filmmaking in Slovakia, whether they have leaned towards the popular and mythologizing approach from The Earth Sings 1933, through the decades of films about Janosik and similar productions, to The Thousand-Year Old Bee - or whether they take the approach aimed at art theaters, traceable to Organ directed by Stefan Uher in 1964. Due to the general drop in film production and to Martin Sulik ' s capacity to attract funding, films for art theatres have become more prevalent in the 1990s than in the earlier decades . �SLOVAKIA 98 Bibliography Author's interview with film producer Marian Urban, July 12, 2000. "Bandit pie to shoot." Daily Variety, March 7, 2002, p. 48. Bartosek, L.: Nas film - Kapitoly z dejin (1896-1945). Praha: Mlada fronta, 1985. Grega, A. : Prfspevok k dejinam slovenskej kinematografie, M.A. thesis at the FAMU in Prague,1968 . Havelka, J.: Kronika naseho filmu. Praha: Filmovy ustav, 1967. Macek, V.: Stefan Uher 1930-1993. Bratislava: Slovensky filmovy ustav, 1994. Macek, V. and J. Pastekova: Dejiny slovenskej kinematografie. Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo Osveta, 1997. Mihalik, P. : Vznik slovenskej narodnej kinematografie 1896- 1948. Bratislava: Kabinet divadla a filmu SA V, 1994 . Rumanovsky, I.: "Z najstar.sfch dejfn kinematografie na Slovensku. " Panorama, #3, 1977. Janosik 21 a filmove podnikanie na Slovensku. Kinema, #3, 1982 . Slivka, M.: Karol Plicka - basnik obrazu. Martin: Vydavatel'stvo Osveta, 1982. Smatlakova, Renata: Katal6g slovenskych celovecemych filmov 1921-1999. Bratislava: Slovensky filmovy ustav, l 999. Young, C.: The films of Hedy Lamarr. Secaucus, N.J. : Citadel Press, 1978. �DOCUMENTATION �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2003, Vol. 37 Description An account of the resource Vol. 37 (No. 68-69), 2003. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 71 Trends in 20th Century Slovak Filmmaking Martin Votruba The transition from the rule of censorship to the rule of the free market after the collapse of Communism thirteen years ago has been more painful for Slovak filmmakers than for other artists. Filmmaking requires a substantially higher initial investment than other performing and fine arts. People are ready to pay much less for a movie ticket or rental than to buy a book or painting. This puts small countries like Slovakia at a great disadvantage. In a world where feature films in a language other than English have difficulty finding an audience outside their own language areas, even if they are in French, German or Spanish, the same-language audience for films in Slovak is the size of a single frame. A film in the Slovak language costs as much as a comparable film in any other language, but the chances that it will recoup its costs are minimal. Yet, several dedicated filmmakers have managed to find institutional and private support, perhaps resigned to the fact that profits will remain elusive, while hoping to make a statement, push the envelope, create Art. Filmmaking began in Slovakia while it was still part of Hungary in the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. According to film historians, the first motion picture shows in the Slovak counties took place in Kosice in December, 1896 and a few days later in Bratislava (then called Presporok by the Slovaks, Pressburg by the Germans). That was only a year after . the Lumiere brothers' first-ever public picture show in Paris and just six months after a similar showing in New York. The early shows were organized by SLOVAKIA 72 traveling entrepreneurs, often in cafes or similar venues, but also under tents. People's visual perceptions of the world were being changed forever and those making and showing the films knew it. A show in Nitra in 1903 still touted the advent of the modern world, when it was advertised as "Hungary's 1st Scientific Electrical Theater Modeled on the Grand American Bioscope Awarded the Grand Prix at the World Fair in Paris." At that time, a linguistic barrier was not crucial to the films' distribution in the multinational Kingdom of Hungary. Silent movies were largely self-explanatory and most people would have been able to understand the few captions in Magyar or German, the two dominant languages in the Kingdom, or have them translated by other viewers. The shows consisted of several separate films, some colorized by hand, each of which were about two minutes long. For example, the first show in Kosice was a series of twelve such very, very brief films with titles like "The Arrival of a Train," "The Czar Arrives in Paris," "The Training of the French Infantry," "Four Ladies Dancing the French Cancan" and "An Interrupted Date." Clearly, foreign films dominated Central Europe from the start. The first title was the kind of film intended to create a spectacle - similar to some of the uses of special effects today: the engine would rush towards the camera, scaring an audience not accustomed to viewing images of moving trains at that angle and at such close quarters. The next two titles played a role similar to later newsreels shown before the main feature , or to contemporary world news and documentaries on, say, CNN or the Discovery Chanel. The last two titles were of the kind that - the filmmakers found - attracted the largest number of viewers: entertainment, fun and a rudimentary story. The proportion of such shorts quickly grew. SLOVAKIA 73 The first permanent movie theater in Bratislava, Elektro Bioskop, was opened in a remodeled fencing hall in September, 1905. It had about 200 seats. The site is still in business. After a hiatus, an arts movie theater was opened in the same hall in the 1970s and is still in operation, now called Mladost' ("Youth"), on Hviezdoslav Square opposite the US Embassy. Theaters, hotel halls, storage buildings and other premises were remodeled in other towns, to become permanent movie theaters. In the absence of hi-fi sound and hi-tech projection systems, the competition often relied on interior decoration. An advertisement for the Bratislava movie theatre Fidelio (later Urania and now Hviezda) lured the audience thus: "427 upholstered seats in 3 colors , Alhambrastyle walls decorated with Oriental landscapes, live and man-made flowers." The fact that the theater showed two new releases a week was relegated to the bottom of the page. Attendance at traditional theater performances dropped after the introduction of motion pictures. Theater directors appealed to the authorities to disallow movie shows during the time of regular plays. In 1901 , the Ministry of the Interior (in charge of police and local government in Central Europe) issued a decree meeting their demands . The Viscount of Nitra went so far as to ban movie shows during the whole theater season , but the local movie-theater operators successfully appealed his decision. For a time, film producers thought they could benefit from a symbiosis of film and theater in "cinema-sketches." Actors would play on the stage, then the story would be picked up on the screen with the same actors and the conclusion would be played by live actors again. One such cinema-sketch from 1909 depicted night life in Kosice "The Kosice Promenade on the Screen." Walking on Main Street in one's Sunday best was a common pastime before the advent of TV and mass entertainment. It was among the few early SLOVAKIA 74 motion pictures linked with Slovak territory. The limited production of cinema-sketches did not survive World War I and did not continue after the creation of Czecho-Slovakia (later renamed Czechoslovakia) in l 9 l 8 . Rather than cinema-sketches or story-based films , most of the early films linked to Slovakia were travel specials with titles like "The High Tatras," "Skiing in Tatranska Lomnica," "Traveling through the Vah Valley," or "The Kosice Institute of Corrections for Children," "Testing the Police Dogs in Bratislava," and news . Movies proved successful. The number of movie theaters in Slovakia reached about 100 by the end of World War I and two schools - the Mining Academy in Banska Stiavnica and a high school in Lucenec - had already used film as a teaching tool. When movies were still shown by traveling entrepreneurs, a copy of the film was bought and owned by them. With the establishment of permanent movie theaters, film distributors appeared, as well as a kind of 'film exchange' where copies of film were traded as on the stock market. The advent of copyright problems and foreign competition was heralded in 1913, in the first published complaint about illegal importation of foreign films , especially from France. As elsewhere in Central Europe, French films dominated the market. Legal power to regulate what movies were screened in Hungary was invested in the hands of the local authorities by a law from l 90 l , which required the traveling movie entrepreneurs to obtain permits for their shows . On the whole, a license was issued to anyone who applied for it. Local bans and complaints surfaced for a variety of reasons, including some familiar today. A city councilor in Kosice worried that worthless caper movies had a bad influence on boys, while dramas about sex ruined girls, be cause such movies extinguished their sense of morality and made SLOVAKIA 75 them vulnerable to unconscionable seducers. In 1912, a priest and principal of a Roman Catholic boys' school in Nitra threatened his students with a bad grade in behavior if they went to the movies, even if accompanied by their parents. His ban extended to traditional theater performances as well. Censorship was also exercised by the authorities in Budapest, the capital of the Kingdom, who were able to ban individual titles from being shown all over Hungary , including the Slovak counties. In line with the traditions of Central European monarchies, politics was among the reasons for censorship. Among the banned titles were "King Ludwig II," depicting a story too similar to the life and mysterious death of Ludwig II of Bavaria and a film offensive to the prime minister of Hungary. However, the Kingdom did not follow suit when the rest of the Habsburg monarchy introduced formal film censorship in 1912. Among other things, it required that a license to open a movie theater be issued to individuals and institutions that would secure a respectable use of the profits. Its intent was to support charities and various associations. Budapest adopted the law in Apri l of 1918, half a year be fore the defeat and collapse of Austria-Hungary and the founding of Czec ho-Slovakia. The law empowered the censors to ban films offending patriotic interests, public order and morality. Children under sixteen were allowed to see only movies designated as suitable for them and only when accompanied by an adult. Despite a variety of problems , Czecho-S lovakia proved to be more democratic than the former Kingdom of Hungary and the whole Habsburg monarchy. But the new freedom , which benefited other forms of Slovak culture, proved even more difficult for Slovak film than the post-communist period after 1989. The film industry developed in Prague, which had been an important German-Czech cultural center, a university town and capital of the 76 SLOVAKIA Holy Roman Empire's Kingdom of Bohemia for centuries, attracting business and artistic talent. By comparison, Slovakia's new capital and largest city, Bratislava, was much smaller; moreover, it was only forty miles from the former Habsburg monarchy's large, vibrant and influential capital of Vienna. Given that artists and entrepreneurs flocked to it from all over the monarchy, Vienna must have created a degree of artistic brain-drain in its immediate vicinity. As with the Pittsburgh Agreement of 1918, which was a key document in the separation of the Slovak counties from the Habsburg monarchy, Slovak-Americans had an impact on Slovakia's nascent film industry. Andrej Sustek from Chicago founded the Selig Company with the intent to make historical films in Slovakia. It was subsequently incorporated in the new Slovak-American Tatra Film Corporation with a capital of about $30,000 from US investors . Their first and only film was Janosfk. It captured the legend of an 18th-century highwayman from Terchova in the northern Slovak County of Orava who gave rise to Carpathian legends comparable to those about Robin Hood in England. In 1919 Tatra Film's Daniel and Jaroslav Siakel' arrived in Slovakia to start filming in their native village of Blatnica near Martin in Central Slovakia, where they also built sets, and in the castle of Stiavnicka near Ruzomberok. The leading role was given to popular Theodor Pistek, who starred in nine other films that year. Maria Fabryova, an amateur actress from Martin, played Anka, Janosfk's girlfriend. The film was finished in the A-B studios in Prague . The screenplay by Jozef Zak-Marusiak was to be based on a novel by Slovak-American author and editor of the popular Amerikansko-Slovcnske Noviny "(American-Slovak News)", Gustav Marsall-Petrovsky (1862-1916). But it was much closer to the ac- SLOVAKIA 77 tual local legends , which also inspired Slovak Romantic poets in the 19th century. Moreover, the play Janosfk - premiered in Brno in 1910 and written by Moravian playwright, poet and journalist Jiri Mahen - was well known by the l 920s and may have been a major source for the film's story . Janosfk was shown to the filmmakers' team in November 1921 in the city of Vrutky . It opened a few days later in Zilina and in December 1921 in Chicago - to be more specific , in Cicero, IL, then with a large Slovak-American population , at the Atlantic movie theater, now replaced by the Atlantic Mall at W. 26th St. and S. Pulaski Rd . The screenplay relied on the folk motif of ' taking from the rich and giving to the poor,' and greatly reinforced the hints present in 19th-century Slovak Romantic poems about Janosfk : the film fused feudal exploitation in the more distant past with the drive by the Magyar-speaking government in Budapest in the 19th century to suppress the Kingdom' s other languages and cultures . The latter became particularly forceful during the last decades of the Kingdom's existence and ultimately contributed to its demise. Unlike feudalism , that experience was still very fresh in people's memories and was among the reasons why Slovaks immigrated to the United States. By comparison to Czech films preserved from the early Czecho-Slovak period, Janosfk showed the authors' experience with American movies : in camera work, in the use of parallel narratives, as well as in shots inspired by Westerns . It had two directors of photography with two cameras: Oldrich Benes with a European camera and Daniel Siakel', who used a camera made by Andrej Sustek's company in Chicago. In effect, the two cameramen shot two parallel films - scenes were acted separately for each camera and the difference between the "Slovak" and "American" versions increased after separate editing. But the film's handling of the eth- 78 SLOVAKIA nic motif may have been too didactic, or the issue too recent to be successfully mythologized as entertainment on the silver screen. Janosik did not recover its costs and remained Tatra Film's only product, as well as Slovakia' s first preserved silent movie. It was thought to have been lost, but in 1975 it was discovered and restored from both versions by Ivan Rumanovsky in Bratislava. Until after World War II, attempts to set up film companies, occasionally with Slovak-American involvement, followed the same path. One film would be made and then the company folded, because the film was not profitable and the company lacked sufficient capital to sustain it through a few flops. The situation did not change after the emergence of sound in the movies. While about 30-50 sound films were made each year in Czechoslovakia between 1933 - 1938, fewer than one a year was in Slovak. Czech films occasionally featured Slovak actors. Among them, with eleven musicals to his credit, was Frantisek Kristof Vesely, who reached the level of stardom in Czechoslovakia. Documentaries fared better: partly because the costs were lower and partly thanks to occasional government funding for shorts featuring its officials. For example, Kvetna nedela vo Vajnoroch (Palm Sunday in Yajnory) recorded a folkloristic celebration of the holiday attended by Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia, Vavro Srobar. A potentially steady source of funding opened up in 1935 when Prague decided that each newsreel commonly shown before the main feature had to devote at least 20% of its length to items about Czechoslovakia. But this so urce remained untapped by Slovak filmmakers : most of the reports came from Bohemia and Moravia. However, government or institutional funding and fascination with village life proved to be a mix that worked for filmmakers in Slovakia on more than one occasion, right through the present. SLOVAKIA 79 The first Slovak film to reach international acclaim relied on both. The potential of the Slovak countryside as a backdrop had already been discovered by non-native filmmakers and at least two of their films have become classics of world cinema. The early German horror Nosferatu, eine Symphonie des Grauens (Nosferatu the Vampire) directed by Friedrich Wilhelm Murnau was filmed at Orava Castle and in the High Tatras in 1922, and Czech director Gustav Machaty chose Slovakia as a location for his daring exploration of sexuality Extase (Ecstasy) in 1932. The second one propelled the career of Hedy Lamarr (born Hedwig Eva Maria Kiester), who became one of the most successful Hollywood stars. The Matica slovenska (by that time an eminent, mostly government-sponsored cultural, academic and archival institution) employed Karel Plicka (1894-1987) as its ethnographer, who was able to make documentary shorts from about 1926. He obtained funding from the President's Office in 1928 to produce an hourlong documentary about village life Po horach, po dolach (Through Mountains and Valleys). It was awarded a Gold Medal at the International Exposition of Photographic Art in Florence and received an Honorable Mention at the International Venice Film Festival in 1932. The favorable reception of his production, along with more funding from both the Matica slovenska and the President's Office, enabled Plicka to make Zem spieva (The Earth Sings) in 1933, a romanticized semi-documentary panorama of selected folk customs through the four seasons. Unlike Slovak feature movies of that period, Zem spieva struck a chord with the audience and topped it with another award at the International Venice Film Festival as part of a collection of films from Czechoslovakia that included Extase, mentioned above. But after this success, the Matica s/ovcnska was unable to raise sufficient funding and Plicka's hopes that he was laying the foundations of 80 SLOVAKIA Slovakia' s film industry were thwarted. He went on to make a documentary in the United States Za Slovakmi od New Yorku po Mississippi (Tracing Slovaks from New York to the Mississippi) in 1937 and then became a professor in the first Department of Film in Czechoslovakia and the third such department in Europe, at the School of Artistic Crafts in Bratislava in 1938. But the Department's potential for Slovak cinema was lost when the College was closed after Slovakia became a separate country in 19 39 . Plicka then resettled permanently in Prague, Bohemia, which was incorporated into the Third Reich during World War II. Czechoslovakia's only other Slovak-language blockbuster before World War II was a new Janosfk in 1935, funded from Prague and directed by the Czech Martin Frie (1902-1968). It was indicative of the volume of Czech film production that Frie finished three other films during the same year, having previously directed 23. Frie and Plicka were two of the authors of the screenplay based on the same play by Mahen, mentioned earlier, on which the first Janosfk may have been based. Plicka also found a policeman and amateur actor, Pal'o Bielik (1910-1983), in the village of Senica for the leading role. The film combined idealized images of villagers with action scenes to show their and Jan osik ' s resistance against Hungarian landlords. In spite of Budapest's protestations, it was screened at the International Venice Film Festival and was successfully released in Germany . During the existence of the Slovak Republic ( 1939-1945), movie theaters grew by more than 60% but no feature films were made. The government sponsored the film company Nastup (Line-up), which produced short films and weekly newsreels . The authorities, who described their own rule as "authoritarian and totalitarian," mandated that a newsreel be shown before every feature film and tightened censorship and ideological supervision of SLOVAKIA 81 their production. The newsreel was customarily followed by a short film, a pattern that was picked up by the communist authorities after the war and survived through the collapse of Communism. The government's alliance with Germany meant that it became Slovakia's main source of films even before the war changed world trade patterns. At the same time, the number of imports dropped from about 400 a year in the former CzechoSlovakia (whose original hyphenated name was restored in 1938) to less than 150 after independence. In 1940, Slovakia still imported 15 "cultural-educational" films from the U.S., and a few more from countries other than Germany, but then German feature films were supplemented by just about a dozen films from Italy and Romania, and several Czech "oldies" from before the war. The film company Nastup was conscientious about training its employees, among whom was Pal'o Bielik, and sent them regularly to several studios in Germany as interns - including to neighboring Vienna and formerly Czechoslovak Prague, which were now ruled from Berlin. After World War II, Slovakia was re-joined with the Czechspeaking lands and Czech director Martin Frie returned to make Vanij. .. ! (Beware ... !) with folkloristic highlights similar to his successful Janosfk from 1935. The film was based on Ivan Stodola' s popular play Bacova iena (The Shepherd's Wife) and Palo Bielik played the leading role again . Things changed dramatically after Czechoslovakia became communist in 1948. The government nationalized all but the tiniest companies, including the film studios. It saw film as an important medium to indoctrinate the population and ideological control - under strict financed film production in the Slovak, as well as in the Czech part of the country. Directors, screenwriters, actors and other people connected with film production became SLOVAKIA 82 state employees as everyone else, with a regular salary regardless of how many films were produced and whether they earned any profits or not - a concept born out of communist accounting. Although the authorities paid the salaried filmmakers more money for the films they made - separate contracts were signed for each one - from the American perspective, this was closer to bonuses than anything known in Hollywood today. The "bonuses" were higher for films considered particularly effective in showing the communist rule as benefiting the population and had nothing to do with ticket sales. The authorities mandated that the method used in all art be socialist realism. In general, its goal was to educate people to the benefits of communism and, before it was reached , socialism, which was what they called their existing political system. This was strictly enforced, especially in fiction and film, because these mediums reached the widest audience. The topics were to emphasize the need to work for the good of the 'collective,' i.e., communist society. Topics focusing on the individual and on personal feelings and concerns were deemed harmful, as was depicting anything negative about society. Love was considered such a topic: not only because it was personal and, therefore, did not educate the audience about the benefits of working on behalf of the collective, but also because it may have brought sex into the story, a definite 'no' in socialist realism. The official support of socialist-realist art and the transformation of filmmakers into salaried employees meant that a steady stream of feature films began to appear in the newly-established studios in Bratislava. Pal'o Bielik, the former star of Janosfk, who expanded his moviemaking experience in the newsreel studios during World War II, directed Vicic dicry (Wolves' Lairs), one of the first two films made after the communist takeover in 1948. It SLOVAKIA 83 was the beginning of a succession of films about the 1944 antiGerman uprising in Slovakia, but because it was made so early during the Communist Party ' s drive to establish ideological dominance, the film still managed to include 'negative,' as well as 'positive' characters among both the Slovak insurgents and the German soldiers suppressing the uprising - something that did not get past the censors again for more than a decade. Bielik, as director, leaned away from the folkloristic style of the films in which he starred: the style of V/cie diery was inspired by early Italian neo-realism. After two feature films in 1948 and another two in 1949, the yearly output grew to 3-6 per year in the 1950s. 'Negative' characters could not be central in the plots, and the story had to prove them wrong. Central characters had to be 'positive' from the start or be seen discovering Marxist-Leninist solutions to any problems they encountered. Such problems had to be few and marginal, the general view of society had to be happy. If the central characters were not Communists from the start, a 'tutor' and Communist Party member would often be present, who helped them find the Marxist-Leninist way. Topics commonly dealt with World War II and the defeat of Nazi Germany, or with the imposition of Communism - the 'collectivization' of farms, i.e., the abolition of private ownership of most land larger than the immediate surroundings of one's house and garden. Farmers were to be shown as opening their eyes to the fact that this was actually good for them. The Communists proclaimed a classless society, which meant that everyone would eventually become a 'worker.' The three recognized social groups were the laborers, the farmers, and the intelligentsia, i.e., white-collar workers and college-educated people, but the Communist Party officials, although working in offices, classified themselves as laborers. The bourgeoisie, 84 SLOVAKIA i.e. , the private entrepreneurs, disappeared by virtue of their property being 'nationalized,' i.e., taken over by the government, but the - now former - bourgeoisie were persecuted never- theless . The intelligentsia was often suspected of harboring bourgeois ideas and persecuted, too . Since the bourgeoisie were often described as incapable of shedding their reactionary, i.e. anti-Communist skins, films about contemporary life generally focused on the villages and farmers. Marxism-Leninism saw in them the ' next best class' after the laborers, on their way to becoming agricultural laborers . Their initial qualms about any benefits of collectivization provided some meager source of conflict for the plots. The films about the past often returned to the uprising in Slovakia during World War II, which was depicted as organized by the Communists and aided by the Soviet Union. Plots that concerned the communist period had to end on an optimistic note. Since a former entrepreneur always remained at least suspect, their joyful transformation into a group auxiliary to the working class was essentially unacceptable as a topic, which - in effect - also kept town s and cities away from most of the scripts. Even socialist-realist authors felt that a ccnflict drives a story, but avoided settings that did not provide for politically acceptable conflicts . Socialist realism was strongly enforced during the first 10-15 years of communism . Unlike neighboring Poland and Hungary, communist Czechoslovakia saw little of the ideological thaw triggered by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalinism in February of l 956. The thaw did not reach Czechoslovakia until the early l 960s, during which time Bratislava produced 6- l O feature film s per year, and the first manifestations of the thaw in literature and film came from Slovakia. After more than a decade of socialist- 85 SLOVAKIA realist filmmaking, Sinko v sieti (The Sun in a Net) directed by Stefan Uher (1930-1993) in 1962 became a milestone in both Slovak and Czech filmmaking. It inspired a whole generation of students at the Film Academy in Prague, who soon followed with a series of films which attained international recognition as the "Czech New Wave." Sinko v sieti was Stefan Uher's second film . His first was about the life of a group of fifteen year-old students and their school My z deviate) A (We from Grade 9, Study Group A; 1961). The screenwriter, Alfonz Bednar (1914-1989), was a successful writer who published mildly non-conformist fiction somewhat earlier than most other authors. The film is based on his three short stories Fajolov prfspevok (Fajolo's Contribution), Pon- t6novy deii (Pontoon Day) and Zlata brana (Golden Gate). Uher's film depicted a number of hitherto unacceptable social and political themes : distant - perhaps uncaring - parents, a philandering husband, teenagers changing partners, an attempt at suicide, a poorly-run collectivized farm , and the requirement that a child attend summer 'voluntary work camps ' to make up for his parents belonging to the intelligentsia. Moreover, none of these issues were resolved in a 'positive' manner. The ending was rather somber, if not depressing, with the barest hint of optimism found only in the last sentence and possibly on the film's symbolic level, which was handled rather unevenly. It attempted a complex interplay of sun and clouds, vision and blindness, truth and lies, centered around a solar eclipse (Central Europe actually experienced a 95% solar eclipse on the morning of February 15, 196 l ). Contemporary critics found the symbolism difficult to decipher, and much of it was probably lost on the viewers. But the core story line - the ups and downs in the relationship of two teenagers - the realism and novelty of its urban setting, and the 86 SLOVAKIA hints at some social and political taboos were not lost on the audience and cannot have been lost on the censors. Sinko v sieti not only pushed the envelope, but also established for other artists and showed to the Slovaks and Czechs at large what the authorities could now be pushed to permit. According to Uher, Karol Bacflek, the head of the Communist Party in Slovakia at that time, attacked the film, saying it contained coded messages that conspirators were able to decipher precisely. For example, Bacflek thought the solar eclipse . was to indicate the twilight of communism and the pontoon on the dried-up riverbed stood for the state of communist rule in Czechoslovakia at that time. Communist officials believed that the blind mother was supposed to symbolize the blindness of their Party, which did not see the realities of life under communism. Because a political thaw had begun in Slovakia, other communist officials with enough influence dared to differ and the film was released. Besides Stefan Uher's efforts to get past the strict requirements of socialist realism, the director was inspired by some of the trends current in Western European cinema and culture in the 1950s. Among them was his focus on the symbolism of light and darkness, adherence to a low-key style, a hint of fashi0nablc quasi-existentialism in Fajolo's dialogues with Bela, and an attempt at serious cinema-verite: in the beer-drinking scenes in .1 tavern, the background soundtrack includes taped unscripted conversations of real villagers. Uher mostly chose inexperienced actors or nonactors. Only one of them, I.:,ubo Roman in a supporting role (b . 1944, then a student of acting), became a successful actor, theater administrator, and ultimately a politician - Member of Parlia- ment, Minister of Culture, and since 2001, County Chief of Bratislava. Actual music in the film included Western rock played on SLOVAKIA 87 the radio. The film's score was by llja Zeljenka, an avant-garde composer of 'concrete music.' While Slnko v sieti became a prologue to the first minimalist, quasi-realist, and eventually more experimental Czechoslovak New Wave made by film students in Prague, in Slovakia the film was followed by several increasingly critical social commentaries by established filmmakers , by more films about contemporary urban life, and by increasingly intellectual and abstract films seen as Art. The most daring among the films that replaced socialist realism with social criticism was Peter Solan's Prfpad Barnabas Kos (The Case of Barnabas Kos; 1964), which removed the veil from arbitrary decision-making in communist society. Among contemporary topics, a potential for an approachable and successful film was lost with Nylonovy mesiac (Nylon Moon; 1965) directed by Eduard Greener. Its story, as well as the title came from a novel by Jaroslava Blazkova published in 1960, the first best-seller about contemporary life since the communist takeover. But there was entertainment in film , too, none more popular than Janosik II directed in 1963 by Pal'o Bielik, the star in the previous version of the story. In spite of its title, it was not a sequel: the film re-told the centuries-old legend. The theme of the brigand hero retains its attraction through the present day. Slovakia 's most successful producer, Rudolf Bierman, is currently producing The True Story al Janosfk and Uhorcfk, directed by the success[ul Polish filmmaker Agnieszka Holland and her daughter Kasia Adamik with an estimated budget of $2.4 million, $800,000 of which came from the Slovak Parliament and the Ministry of Culture. The first film to earn an Oscar for Czechoslovakia was Obchod na korze (The Shop on Main Street; 1965; Academy Award for Best Foreign Film in 1966; Special Mention for Acting 88 SLOVAKIA Performance, Cannes Film Festival 1965; New York Film Critics Circle A ward for Best Foreign Film in 1966). It was co-directed by Slovak Jan Kadar and Czech Elmar Klos , who had directed films together since the 1950s. Their earlier film was the groundbreaking Smrt' sa vola Engelchen (Death is Called Engelchen, 1963) based on a novel by Ladislav Mnacko, which diverted from the communist interpretation of the 1944 uprising in Slovakia as infallibly glorious and showed some aspects that brought about human tragedy. Along similar lines, Obchod na korze placed the politics of World War II in the background and focused on the dead-end street faced by many in Central Europe during the deportations of the Jews to German concentration camps . After the introduction of anti-Jewish laws in Slovakia, a simple carpenter named Tona is made the owner of a tiny haberdashery, until then owned by an old, almost deaf Jewish woman named Rozalia who has no comprehension of the contemporary political developments. After a crisis, the local Jewish community begins to pay Tono not to surrender his ownership, to prevent Rozalia 's store from being passed on to a ruthless Aryanizer. A tender friendship develops between Tono and Rozalia: she keeps selling buttons without realizing Tana's legal status, and he becomes her man about the house. When deportations begin, Roz.ilia remains oblivious of real life, and Tona is faced with the choice between sending her off, or probably facing his own and his wife ' s death, if he were discovered trying to hide a person incapable of understanding why she should live in hiding. The film starred Slovak Jozef Kroner ( 1924-1998) and Polish Ida Kaminska ( 1899-1980) with a Slovak cast and was shot on location in the town of Trebisov, Eastern Slovakia, and in the Prague studios. The film presents its captivating, morally complex story in a straightforward style, with a sprinkling of symbolism and dream SLOVAKIA 89 sequences. It was an indication of changes in the political climate that Obchod na korze was able to get away without the mandated focus on criticism of the Slovak authorities during World War II , previously an inevitable feature of socialist realist work about that period, as well as without highlighting a central, resolute procommunist character. It has remained the most awarded and internationally successful Slovak film to the present day . The late l 960s reflected the direction filmmaking may take with little censorship and steady funding . An increasing number of - especially younger - filmmakers took advantage of the situation to experiment without concern about a need to target a specific audience or about how large their audience was going to be. They enjoyed the same creative luxury as the writers or painters convinced of the significance of their work, who manage to earn their living elsewhere. In a democratic society, this is rarely the case in cinema because of the extraordinary amounts of money even a low-budget film requires. But during the occasional relaxation of control in communist countries while the principles of the system remained in place, filmmakers were given substantial fund s to make films relatively free from prescription , as well as of a need to bring in profit. An early nonconformist film seen mostly by students in art theaters was Stefan Uher's Panna zazracnica (The Miraculous Virgin, 1966), soon followed by Juraj Jakubisko's (b. 1938) Kristove roky ("Christ's Years" or "Crucial Years," 1967), Elo Havetta's Slavnost' v botanickej zahrade (A Celebration in the Botanical Garden, 1969), and Dusan Hanak's 322 (the number identifying cancer in medical statistics of diseases, l 969). During this period (however brief) of almost total collapse of communist control, the Koliba Film Studio in Bratislava co-produced films with avantgarde filmmakers from abroad. Jerzy Skolimowski from Poland, 90 SLOVAKIA whose government was then significantly more repressive than Czechoslovakia, directed one story in Dialog 20-40-60, along with Czech Zbynek Brynych and Slovak Peter Solan in 1968 . Frenchman Alain Robbe-Grillet directed two films, including Mui, ktory Jute (The Man Who Lies, L 'homme qui ment; codirected with Martin Holly in 1968) with a Slovak and French cast. And 1969 saw the release of Juraj Jakubisko's Vtackovia, siroty a blazni (Birds, Orphans and Fools), considered by most Slovaks to be the best Slovak film. Jakubisko's preferences bounce between experiment, abstraction and ambitious intellectualism, as in this film , and less numerous popular crowd-pleasers. "Birds, Orphans and Fools" had the briefest of theater run s, not because of the audience, but because of the authorities. Conceived when communist control was at its weakest in Czechoslovakia, it was completed well after the Soviet-led invasion in August of 1968, by which time many of the mechanisms of authoritarian rule were at work again. Vtackovia, siroty a blazni takes place in an apparent historical vacuum in a desolate world with war raging somewhere outside the camera's field of vision and the director's focus. The two male and one female central characters , not unlike some of the hippies in the U.S.A. <1.t that time, live in a decrepit apartment, go through a series of bizarre encounters, sexual experiences and discuss a range of topics. When their lives begin to appear closer to normalcy, one of them murders the girl and commits suicide. The film is deliberately ex perimental in its style: it varies screen sizes, shots are taken at awkward angles with a hand-held or agitated camera, distortion lenses alter screen images, filmmakers ' equipment remains in the frame, characters talk to the camera. The adjectives surrealist and post-apocalyptic are perhaps representative of the filmmakers' intent. SLOVAKIA The 1970s witnessed a re-introduction 91 of strict communist control in Czechoslovakia, called normalization . People were demoted at work or fired, if they had expressly supported the relaxation in the late 1960s or denounced the Soviet-led invasion in 1968, and their children often suffered, too. In an effort to a void repercussions, many repudiated their past views. Although persecution was somewhat milder in Slovakia than in the Czech-speaking areas, it had a stifling effect on art. Gone were the efforts of the 1960s to push the envelope of what was allowed. The population at large had learned its lesson : with the help of the Soviet Union, the Communists were able to pull the whole country back from unprecedented freedom of expression and the brink of a multi-party system in 1968 to a situation more reminiscent of the late 1950s, and those who resisted were punished. This repression lasted at least through the late 1970s, and Czechoslovakia remained more politically backward , although with a better standard of living, than Communist Poland or Hungary until the collapse of communism in 1989 . Cinema was affected like the rest of society, while the number of film releases grew. Slovakia produced 8-12 films per year throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Jakubisko still managed to finish Dovidenia v pek/e, priatelia (See You in Hell, Friends) in 1970, but hardly anyone saw it. The film was banned and Jakubisko was not allowed to make another feature film until 1979 . Although the early 1970s are sometimes compared to the 1950s, the authorities did not demand that Slovak filmmakers make socialist-realist films critical of the period of relaxation - the way films in the 1950s tried to discredit private enterprise and democracy which were abolished in 1948. Only one film was made about 1968, Honicka (Fever) directed by Martin Holly, Jr. (b. 1931) and based on a novel by Jozef Kot. In a country with 92 SLOVAKIA freedom of expression, the film could have been perceived as just focusing on a relatively plausible plot from 1968 and pushing a particular point of view - there indeed were people who did not support the pro-democratic reforms, or saw many flaws among the reformers. But under totalitarian control, which did not allow opposing points of view, it was impossible to distinguish the touting of the official view in film from just propaganda. Regardless, Honicka shared the destiny of the overwhelming majority of Slovak and Czech films produced during the forty years of Communism: after a couple of weeks in mostly empty theaters, it was not seen again . While the 1960s witnessed a desire to bring contemporary and urban themes to film, the 1970s began to solidify an inclination among a segment of the Slovak critics and filmmakers to emulate the centuries-old urban fashion in Europe of the 'return to nature:' well educated intellectuals living in Bratislava make and admire films with images of the countryside and villagers whose lives appear to be somehow more authentic than in towns. The trend-setter was the still admired hour-long documentary Obrazy stareho sveta (Pictures of the Old World, 1972) directed by Dusan Hanak who, suspicious to the authorities because of his films from the 1960s, found an early refuge in a topic sufficiently removed from big politics to survive in the margins of official production and yet, sufficiently non-conforn1ist and enamored with village life to please especially the chic audiences. Part of its additional attraction within the context of Communist Czechoslovakia rested in the fact that it offered snapshots from the lives of several highlanders, whose very existence belied the official claims of equal wealth for everyone. But Obrazy stareho sveta has a much more universal appeal and has received critical acclaim from Slovakia, Switzerland and France to Toronto and Los Angeles. SLOVAKIA 93 A singular exception among about 90 domestic feature films that briefly flickered in Slovak theaters in the 1970s was Dusan Hanak's Ruto ve sny (Rosy Dreams, 1976). Although its style was poetic, it may have been the first film in the communist bloc with a de-romanticized portrayal of the Roma (Gypsies). It dove into the cultural barriers between them and the non-Romany population - an issue that, twenty years later, proved to be one of the key problems of post-communist societies in Central Europe. Two teenagers - a young Slovak postman and a Romany girl - fall in love. The film tells the viewers that it will not work due to different cultural expectations each of the two have of their budding relationship. Its imaginative filmmaking and affecting, slightly sentimental story might have been easy to understand and appreciate by a wider audience, but Rutove sny was shown only in limited release at the order of the authorities. The most popular film in that decade was yet another variation on the legend about a heroic highwayman Pacho, hybskf z bojnfk (Pacho, the Highwayman of Hybe; 1975) directed by Martin Tapak. In 1980, the authorities shelved fa milujem, ty milujes (I Love, You Love) directed by Dusan Hanak because of its focus on marginal social groups and eroticism. When it was released shortly before the collapse of communism, it received the highest international recognition for a Slovak film since The Shop on Main Street, including the Silver Bear at the Berlin Film Festival. However, the strict Communist control typical of the 1970s began to relax slowly, and the early 1980s brought two domestic blockbusters whose role in Slovak culture finally matched that of some of the films in the l 960s. In 1982 Stefan Uher directed Pas/a kone na bet6ne ("She. Grazed Horses on Concrete," or "A Ticket to Heaven"). The title used the first few words from an irreverent tune with just a few verses depicting impossible acti- 94 SLOVAKIA vities - the song continues " ... she bathed in razor blades." The story is about a single mother fending for herself in an East Slovak village, determined not to allow her teenaged daughter to follow in her footsteps . Partly a comedy and partly a candid portrayal of contemporary village life, it oscillates between humorous depictions of social customs and ceremonies, and the more serious issues of a woman's capacity to hold her own in a small community, and of abortion. Although co-written and directed by Uher, the film is largely the work of Milka Zirnkova, an author and actress, who wrote the original story, worked with Uher on the script, and starred in the leading role. Among the novelties in Slovak moviemaking was an extensive use of the East Slovak dialect in the film. Although Slovak has several highly recognizable regional accents, filmmakers - before and after this film - have the actors speak the standard, neutral variety of Slovak common in the news media, regardless of where in Slovakia the story of their film takes place. A success comparable to the handful of foreign blockbusters permitted by the authorities each year was Juraj Jakubisko's Tisfcrocna vce/a (A Thousand-Year Old Bee;l983). It is a 162-minute long saga of the life of a farmer's family covering three generations from the late 1800s through the early 1900s. It picked up on and reinforced a myth recurrent in Slovak cinema for several decades, in films from both popular and artsy filmmakers . Villagers are mostly good, while those who live in or move to town (perhaps the screenwriters and directors bowed to communist authorities) become entrepreneurial and tum out to be cold and corrupt. It was the first Slovak film with a comprehensive narrative that a large number of viewers were ready to perceive as their national, as well as local and family past, because it echoed themes they had encountered in literature and history classes at school. SLOVAKIA 95 Moreover, it was a comforting past. The title was a parable, overplayed in the film with brief expensive special effects with a gigantic honey-bee created in the Bavarian Film Studios in Munich . Those sequences hammered in the symbolic thread in the storyline. They could have been be richer and more content, the film gave the viewers to understand, were it not for the cumulative effects of past injustice: the fruits of their hard-working ancestors' labor was periodically taken away from them for a thousand years, like honey from the bees. But as long as they stayed in the villages, they were an honest, sometimes whimsical bunch doing as well as they could . It helped that several popular actors starred in the film, including Jozef Kr6ner (Tona in The Shop on Main Street). Tisicrosmi vce/a received a Gold Phoenix for art and cinematography from the Cultural Center of the City of Venice awarded in tandem with the prestigious International Venice Film Festival. After decades of government-funded and censored production, Bratislava still produced twelve films in 1990, the year after the collapse of Communism. With no censorship, but also hardly any funding, the number of feature films ranged between one and three for most of the 1990s. Slovakia's theaters are now flooded with foreign , especially American, films and while the population might be ready for a domestic production addressing them specifically, perhaps along the lines of A Thousand-Year Old Bee, there is not enough money for a film on that scale, and perhaps even less interest on the part of the filmmakers . With one exception, the films made in the 1990s generally follow one of two thematic lines . The most successful film was Fontana pre Zuzanu 2 (A Fountain for Susan 2; 1993) directed by Dusan Rapos as a sequel to his more sedate Fontana pre Zuzanu from 1985, still limited by communist censorship. He released Fontana pre Zuza- 96 SLOVAKIA nu 3 in 1999. Both fall in the group of films with contemporary themes and are obviously interested in generating ticket sales. They rely on sex and crime to achieve that. Although it remained behind major foreign blockbusters , Fontana pre Zuzanu 2 sold 380,000 tickets in a country with 5.4 million inhabitants, which is comparable to a film that brings in over $130 million in the U.S.A. Titanic sold about 550,000 tickets in Slovakia and The Matrix 130,000. Another film with a contemporary theme is indicative of how times have changed since the collapse of communism. Rivers of Babylon (the tile is in English) directed by Vladimir Balco in 1998 was based on the first post-communist bestseller in l 990 by Peter Pistanek. Sequels of the novel had lower sales, because the novelty of the topic - Bratislava's underworld - and expressive presentation wore off, and because they had to compete with a growing number of translated foreign bestsellers. However, the filmmakers picked up on a particular aspect of the sequels vitriolic political commentary . The story of the rise of a skillful stoker and wheeler-dealer to political power was seen as a parable of the government in Bratislava at that time. Only about eight years earlier, a release of such a strongly critical film would have been either unthinkable, or a major event attracting huge crowds . Yet, Rivers of Babylon sold only 50,000 tickets and met with a lukewarm reception abroad. The other thematic line in contemporary Slovak cinema is the 'return to nature. ' Its main protagonist is director Martin Sulfk (b . 1962) whose films generally attract fewer viewers at home than Rivers of Babylon, but are favored by critics and have attained a degree of viewers' acclaim at film festivals organized by European cities. His most successful Zahrada (Garden; l 995), the earlier Neha (Tenderness ; 199 l ), as well as the more recent Orbis SLOVAKIA 97 Pictus (Latin title, 1997) and Krajinka ("Landscape" or "A Small piece of the Country," 2000) are intellectualized continuations of the theme of the desirability of a return to, journey through, or life in a rural setting. Krajinka is the most accessible of Sulfk ' s films . Although it may be based on memories, as the opening sequence suggests, the discrete stories are not made to gel into a cohesive sequence for the audience. But each is readable on its own. Zahrada, the first Slovak film since the collapse of communism to be released abroad , and especially Orbis Pictus, break with traditional story-telling and show the main characters - a rather passive adult man living with his parents in Zahrada and a young girl released from a boarding school , perhaps for abandoned teenagers, in Orbis Pictus - find education in nature and disappointment in urban settings . With surreal scenes, philosophizing scripts, and a dedication to the filmmaker's expressive whim, Sulfk 's films re-package the theme of national rural bliss, recurrent in Slovak culture and education , in a form palatable for trendy audiences. The theme has had an incessant, powerful attraction for a segment of directors since the beginnings of filmmaking in Slovakia, whether they have leaned towards the popular and mythologizing approach from The Earth Sings 1933, through the decades of films about Janosik and similar productions, to The Thousand-Year Old Bee - or whether they take the approach aimed at art theaters, traceable to Organ directed by Stefan Uher in 1964. Due to the general drop in film production and to Martin Sulik ' s capacity to attract funding, films for art theatres have become more prevalent in the 1990s than in the earlier decades . SLOVAKIA 98 Bibliography Author's interview with film producer Marian Urban, July 12, 2000. "Bandit pie to shoot." Daily Variety, March 7, 2002, p. 48. Bartosek, L.: Nas film - Kapitoly z dejin (1896-1945). Praha: Mlada fronta, 1985. Grega, A. : Prfspevok k dejinam slovenskej kinematografie, M.A. thesis at the FAMU in Prague,1968 . Havelka, J.: Kronika naseho filmu. Praha: Filmovy ustav, 1967. Macek, V.: Stefan Uher 1930-1993. Bratislava: Slovensky filmovy ustav, 1994. Macek, V. and J. Pastekova: Dejiny slovenskej kinematografie. Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo Osveta, 1997. Mihalik, P. : Vznik slovenskej narodnej kinematografie 1896- 1948. Bratislava: Kabinet divadla a filmu SA V, 1994 . Rumanovsky, I.: "Z najstar.sfch dejfn kinematografie na Slovensku. " Panorama, #3, 1977. Janosik 21 a filmove podnikanie na Slovensku. Kinema, #3, 1982 . Slivka, M.: Karol Plicka - basnik obrazu. Martin: Vydavatel'stvo Osveta, 1982. Smatlakova, Renata: Katal6g slovenskych celovecemych filmov 1921-1999. Bratislava: Slovensky filmovy ustav, l 999. Young, C.: The films of Hedy Lamarr. Secaucus, N.J. : Citadel Press, 1978. DOCUMENTATION  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Trends in 20th Century Slovak Filmmaking Description An account of the resource Martin Votruba Slovakia, Vol. 37 (No. 68-69), 2003 pp. 71-98 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Votruba, Martin Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/e483d453a2b5c628bd44e309c2e5d189.pdf 1247a703bb9bba36d0cc0c5f129e0491 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 81 A HIGHWAYMAN'S LIFE: EXTANT DOCUMENTS v~ ABOUT JANOSIK ~ Martin Votruba "Our salvation can come only from Janosik," lamented a Czech blogger over the budget proposals in Prague. 1 In Poland, a group of developers has been working on recalcitrant software intended to undermine the program called Platnik ("Payer"), which is mandatory for employers to handle social security payments and works only with Microsoft Windows. The leader of the developers named their open-source software Janosik.2 Both of these people invoked the name of a brigand who robbed three hundred years ago in the northern and central predominantly Slovak counties in the Habsburg monarchy, was caught, tried and hanged. About a century after Janosfk's execution, his image began to emerge as the local embodiment of the pervasive myth of a hero who takes from the rich and gives to the poor. The folk stories, Romantic poems, and the more recent films ascribe 3 to him other quite universally idolized trappings, the ones that, for example, helped to generate Hollywood 's legendary rebel stars - he was good looking, single, made a stash of money, lived wild, and died young. 4 All of this is contained in Janosfk's modern Slovak, Czech, and Polish mythology. Practically none of that, however, finds any support in the existing evidence about the actual brigand 's life. 1 Hana Fonminkova, I Oct. 2003 , http: //www neraweb cz/index. php?stype-all&id=632. 2 Danuta Frey, "Janosik chce rozgryzc program Ptatnik." Rzeczpospolita, 6-7 Dec. 2004. 3 Dozens of books, thousands of stories, and popular and academic articles, at least nine plays, six films, one TV series, several classical compositions, and one opera th have been dedicated to Janosfk since the 19 century. His legend was discussed in this journal by Patricia A. Krafcik, "Janosik: Unraveling the Man from the Legend." Slovakia 33, no. 60-6 1 (1987-1988): 7-22. 4 Martin Votruba, " Hang Him High: The Elevation of Janosfk to an Ethnic Icon ." Slavic Review, vol. 56, no. I, Spring 2006, pp. 24-44. �82 SLOVAKIA Name variations There was a historical figure whose name was close or identical to Juraj Janosfk,5 who was sentenced for highway robbery and executed at the age of 25 in 1713. The limited sources about his actual life are the proceedings from his trial and an earlier interrogation, the proceedings from the trial with hi s friend and accomplice Tomas Uhorcfk, whom Janosik replaced as the leader of his band, and several brief records maintained by landlords. The trial proceedings were edited and published by several authors before most of them appeared together for the first time as an appendix to a book on Janosik in 1952. 6 The proceedings from his trial gave three versions of his last name: Janosik, Janosiak and Janosak. There are variations in the records of Uhorcfk ' s name, too. For instance, Janosik referred to him as Uhnk during his trial. Each spelling of Janosfk's name indicates a slightly different pronunciation, but that was not unusual at that time. Historically , people had only one - given - name, and what we know as the last name developed gradually, along with bureaucratic record-keeping, from attributes used to distinguish persons with the same given name, or from various nicknames. The bureaucratic effort to standardize people 's last (and first) names started in Catholic Europe with the Vatican-sponsored Council of Trent (1545-1563). Although the practice of maintaining the same last name within a family became quite common in the Habsburg 7 monarchy, where the Slovaks lived, by the I 600s, it was not formalized until the Imperial and Royal 8 Edict on Family Names was issued in 1787 - perhaps 5 [YOUray YAHnosheek] Ju raj is the Slovak version of George, the nicknames are Jura, Jurko, Dura. 6 Andrej Melichercfk, Janosikovska tradfcia na Slovensku Bratislava: Nakladatel'stvo Slovenskej akademie vied a umenf, 1952, pp. 165-176. 7 Often spelled Hapsburg in English history books. 8 "Imperi al and Royal" were standard attributes of a host of ' federal' institutions in the Habsburg monarchy. They indicated that the ruling monarch was the hereditary king of several kingdoms-provinces th at compri sed the Habsburgs' personal possessions, including the Kingdom of Hungary , and at the same time the emperor of a looser association of German states. The terms Habsburg monarchy and Austrian Empire usually refer only to the Habsburgs' personal possessions whose core were the Kingdom of Hungary (today: Slovakia, Hungary , Croatia), Kingdom of Bohemia, Margravi ate of Moravia (together today : the Czec h Republic) , Austria, and �SLOVAKIA 83 the first law on names in Europe. The three pronunciations of Janosfk 's last name during his trial are not indicative of any confusion about the captive' s identity. Birth date and place According to the trial proceedings, Juraj Janosfk came from the north-west Slovak village of Terchova. 9 Birth and death records were rare, or non-existent in the more distant past, but the maintenance of baptismal and burial records by parishes was among the guidelines set forth by the Council of Trent and became widely practiced by both the Slovak Catholic and Lutheran Churches. A governmentsponsored law on recording births and deaths was not adopted in the Habsburg monarchy until 1828. Baptismal records from the Varin parish that comprised Terchova contain the names of five babies christened in 1687-1688 that could have grown up to be the Juraj Janosfk sentenced in 1713. '0 Without discussing their choice, authors mostly give one of the dates as his true entry - commonly 25 February 1688, father Martin and mother Anna Czisznek or Czisznik, occasionally 16 May 1688, father Michal and mother Barbara Cingel. Only one, not particularly reliable, source makes an argument why the entry of 25 February is to be seen as more likely than the others: when Juraj's father bought his son out of military service in 1710, the father's name was apparently recorded as Martin Janosik. 11 However, if Juraj Janosfk, the brigand executed in March 1713, were baptized on 25 February, other entries in the baptismal records would show him as having a younger brother Jan. That would appear to be at odds with the record of a trial with Jan Janosik in December 1713 during which Jan was identified as an older brother of the executed brigand Juraj . The issue is complicated because the existing baptismal records are not sufficiently consistent and complete, because the name Jan, introduced to Europe through which also incorporated parts of their modern neighboring countries - Italy, Poland, Romania and others. 9 [TERkhova] 10 Rudo Brian, "Na tropie Janosika i polskich zb6jnik6w." Pam(:tnik Slowianski, vo l. 18, 1968, pp. I 67-186; and Rudo Brian, " Pat' Janosikov - ktory je ten pravy?" Nede/ha pravda, 3 Feb. 1978, p. 18. 11 The llles hazy archives, Strecno estate, Vol. 19, No. 15 as referenced in Jozef Kocis, Neznamy Janos1k, Bratislava: Yydavatel'stvo Osveta, l 986, p. 47 . �84 SLOVAKIA the New Testament, has historicall y been the most co mmon given name in Slovak (like its Anglicized version John in English), and the family name Janosfk 12 was, and still is, common in Terchova and vicinity (67 listings in the telephone directory) . It al so occurs elsewhere in Slovakia, and spread even to the United States where its frequency ranks as the 35,524 th most common name. 13 There is some inconsistency in the reading of the last name of Janosik 's mother among those who opt for 25 February as the date of his baptism. Many modem authors transcribe the recorded old spelling of Anna 's last name (Czisznek or Czisznik), without further explanation, as Cesnek, a few others as Cfsnik. Cesnek is a probable reading because such last names are still common in the area (29 telephone directory listings), while Cfsnik or other plausible modernized versions of the old spelling are absent there. Nothing is known about Janosfk 's life until he was between 15 and 21 years old - the time of the Francis Rak6czi uprising, which Janosik joined at an unknown age and for an unknown period of time according to the trial proceedings. Folk tales, as well as the first two film s about him, 14 depict him as a former seminary student who turned to brigandage after his parents were abused by the landlord. The earliest written reference to the legend of Janosfk 's schooling comes from 1809. 15 It says that he was popularly believed to have been a student of the humanities, not of theology. However, no preserved document and nothing in the trial proceedings suggests an educated Janosik. 12 It originated as a Slovak variation on Janos - the Hungarian version of the Biblical name John in English, Jan in Slovak. Janos was occas ionall y used as a ni ckname fo r persons named Jan by the Slovaks , too, and sometimes appeared instead of the th Slovak Jan in the Kingdom' s records. But durin g the 17 century, Janosik and its variations had become established Slovak fa mily names . 13 U.S. Census Burea u, Population Divi sio n, Population Anal ys is and Evaluati on Staff as quoted by Rhett A. Butler in "Most Common Names and Surnames in the U.S." at mongabay com. 14 Jan osfk directed by Jaros lav Jerry Siake l', Tatra Film, Chi cago, 192 1; Janostk directed by Martin Frie, A- B Studio, Praha [Prague] , I935. 15 Bohuslav Tablic, a 3-page unnumbered foo tnote to "Janossjk Liptowsky Laupeznjk ," in S/owensstj W ersso wcy. Collecta revirescunt. S wazek druhf. We Wacove [Yac]: v Antonjna Gotljba pry wil. Knehtlac itele, 1809, pp. 120-1 23 . �SLOVAKIA 85 The Kingdom's situation The trial proceedings begin to reveal glimpses of Janosfk 's life with him taking part in the Franci s Rak6czi 16 uprising of 1703-1711. It was a massive religious and separatist movement in the Kingdom of Hungary aga inst the Habsburg dynasty, which ruled it from Vienna (A ustria). The Slovaks were the majority inhabitants of the north-western , mostl y mountainous counties of the multi-ethnic 17 Kingdom. The Kingdom , established around the year 1000, was defeated and lost its sovereignty in the 1500s, and was incorporated as a province in the expanding Habsburg monarchy. The Kingdom was 90% Protestant (Lutheran in the Slovak areas) in the early 1600s, but by the mid- l 600s, the Vatican-allied Habsburgs began forcibly to reCatholicize it, and also increased their efforts to further reduce the Kingdom 's remaining limited self-government. The uprising led by nobleman Franci s Rak6czi II was the last of a series of substantial , but economically destructive armed attempts in the Kingdom to reverse that course. 18 He was Catholic, but in favor of the Kingdom 's independence and religious freedom. Janosik the insurgent It is not known when and under what circumstances Janosik joined Rak6czi 's rebel troops. It is not known , either, how he became a soldier in the Habsburg army later. The Rak6czi rebels suffered a crushing defeat in the Battle of Trencfn 19 (about 60 miles south-west 16 [RAHkotsee], Francis Rak:6czi II, Prince of Transylvani a, born on 27 March I 676. After his fin al defeat, he and some of his supporters initially defected to Poland. He eventu all y died in exi le in Turkey on 8 April 1735. 17 The country's language of admi nistration and education from high school up was Latin , which was no one ' s mother ton gue. The languages of individual ethnic groups, most of whom li ved in their majority areas, were used in everyday life, local businesses, emerging literatures, etc. The ethni c gro ups of the Kingdom of Hungary inc luded the Slovaks, Magyars ([MAHdars] often called Hungarians), Croats, Romani ans, Germans, Ru syns, Roma (Gypsies), and others. The Slovaks were in the majority in about 15 counties in the Kingdom ' s mountainous north-west (today's Slovakia) customari ly called the "Upper Co untry" in the Kingdo m, which is usuall y rendered as Upper Hungary in English. 1 8The major anti-Habsburg insurgenc ies that affected the Slovak counti es extensive ly were (the year of inception and leader): 1604 Stephen Bocskay, 16 19 Gabriel Bethlen, 1644 George Rak:6czi, 1678 Emerich Thokoly, 1703 Francis Rak:6czi II . 19 [TRENtsheen); in West Slovakia on the Yah River �86 SLOVAKIA of Terc hova) the actual fightin g took pl ace at Hamre, a haml et and originall y a forge site two miles south of Trencfn) on 3 August 1708. The Habsburgs had taken full control of the Kingdom by the time of Janosfk's tri al. It therefore needs to be taken with a grai n of salt that hi s defen se lawyer Baltazar Palugyay portrayed Janosik as the Emperor's loyal subj ect at hi s tri al, and insisted that Janosik had eage rl y and willingly enlisted in the Habsburg army during the upri sing. Authors mostly speculate that Janosfk first left the Rak6czi rebe ls, returned to Terchova, and was subsequentl y drafted by the Imperial and Royal Army. Another possibility put forward is that he was captured during the Battle of Trencfn and turned into a soldier, 20 which was what happe ned to hundreds of insurge nts on th at occasion. No records document either ass umption. Janosik the loyalist and a brigand's assistant Once in the Imperial and Royal Army, Janosik was stationed at Bytca Castle, 25 miles from his home. He was made a prison guard . During hi s trial, Janosik admitted providing unspecified services to Tomas Uhorcfk,2 1 a brigand leader he ld in the castle's dungeons. Uhorcik managed to escape in the fa ll of 1710 while Janosik still served at Bytca. Janosik 's father bought Ju raj out of military service a month later. This seq uence of events that emanates from the trial proceedings gave ri se to later spec ul ation s that Janosik may have actu ally he lped Uhorcfk to escape. Family background The statement from Janosik's trial that hi s father had bought him out of military service, for which he had to have enough spare money, appears to contrad ict the co mmon, but undoc umented , assertions that Janosik came fro m a particul arl y poor farmer's famil y. The existing records from the landlord of Terchova ' s estate around 1700 do not li st the Janosfk famil y among those obligated to work for a day or two each week in the landlord ' s field s22 - a common duty of fe ud al subj ects. It could mean that members of the Janosik fa mil y °Koc is, Neznamy ... 2 21 [TOmahsh OOhortsheek], from the village of Predmi er near Turzovka. Andrej Melichercfk, Janosikovska tradfcia na Slovensku. Brati slava: Nakladatel'stvo SAY , 1952. 22 �SLOVAKIA 87 were still obligated to work, but were among the poorest, almost landless families and therefore not entered in the records of households with farms; or it could be due to a contract between some of the original settlers of the village and a past landlord. Numerous Slovak villages originated as contractual settlements of a landlord's unimproved property in earlier centuries. Finally, Janosfk 's family could have been prosperous enough to be able to pay the landlord instead of providing labor services. Besides these historical reasons, the absence of an entry for the Janosfks in the landlord 's records could also be due to deficient record-keeping, or to lost documents. If the Janosfks could be shown to have been a particularly poor family, it would increase the likelihood that the money they used to buy Juraj out was not theirs, and that the Janosfks may have received it for that purpose from Uhorcfk who was grateful for Juraj's unspecified services in the dungeons (possibly including his escape). By the fall of 1710, Uhorcfk had had about eight robbing seasons behind him , which would have allowed him to accumulate some disposable cash. Highwaymen Other court records show the inhabitants of Terchova to have been fervent supporters of brigands. 23 That ties in with Uhorcfk's testimony, according to which Janosik sometimes stayed with the teacher at Terchova, and the local tavern-keeper would bring him food. Juraj Janosfk's brother Jan was hanged for highway robbery ten months after Juraj. 24 Highway robbery was common in Europe until the advent of modern times, which brought about increased policing, personal record-tracing, education, perhaps honesty, and new, less arduous forms of crime. The first mention of brigands in the Slovak region comes from the Legend of Saints Zoerardus and Benedict recorded in 1064. Two ancient north-south trade routes from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean passed through eastern Slovakia. The merchants' caravans were among the earliest lucrative targets for highway robbery. Legal records of highway robberies and 23 Stefan Kazimfr, "O novych dokumentoch k janosikovskej legende." Cudove cftanie Vol. 3, No. 6, 1957. 24 Stanistaw Sroka, Janosik: Pra wdziwa historia karpackiego zb6jnika. Krakow [Cracow]: Wydawnictwo Homini, 2004, p. 41; Kocis, Neznamy .. . p. 86. �88 SLOVAKIA trials with brigands begin to accumulate in the late 15 th century and do not start to dwindle until the mid-19 th century. One of the first known brigand bands in the Slovak counties, led by Fedor Hlavaty, operated in the north-east (Saris County). Its 50 members included Slovaks, Poles, and Rusyns.25 In 1493, Hlavaty sent a ransom letter to the town of Bardejov threatening to burn it down unless the Town Council paid a hefty compensation for the execution of four of Hlavaty's highwaymen. Incentives to rob in the 1600s The religious-cum-separatist wars of the 1i" century caused a great deal of destruction in the Kingdom already harmed by decades of attacks by the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire from the south. 26 Highway robbery must have appeared to be a way out to some of those impoverished by the developments. The brigands' ranks were also increased by displaced soldiers made redundant by both the insurgent and the Habsburg armies after the resolution of each rebellion. With the reduced, or periodicall y absent authority of the monarch, some noblemen, too, turned their hill-top castles to brigands' nests, armed large bands and in addition to highway robbery, raided villages, as well as their peers' residences. The Kingdom therefore saw a jump in highway robberies in the 17 th century.2 7 25 The Rusyns, also called Ruthenians, are an East Slav ic ethni c group (as opposed to the West Slavic Slovaks and Poles) who li ve as a recogni zed minority in the north-eastern parts of Slovakia, as well as in so uth-eastern Poland - often called L emkos there. Their acti vists call for a recognition of their much more substantial numbers in south- western Ukraine where the authorities insist they are Ukrainians. 26 The Slovak counties never fell to the Turks, but es peciall y the southern ones were continuall y harassed and attacked. The fac t that the mostl y Magyar/Hungarian counties (today's Hungary) fell under the Ottoman rule and became their prov ince of Ma1,aristan fo r about l 50 years added to the disruption of the economy of the Slovak counties and brought in some ethni c Hungari ans, especiall y noblemen, who ran away north fro m the encroaching Turks. 27 Although just a pass ing reference has been preserved about him , the name of briga nd leader Adamcik survived from the 1630s in fo lklore, and was later added to the list of Janosik 's band members in fo lk tales. The name Ilcfk - another of Janosik's comrades in fo lk stories - has a similar, albeit somewhat later origin. �SLOVAKIA 89 Highwaymen's seasons In the Kingdom , and in Central Europe in general, the brigands' season was limited by the climate. Late summer and early fall was the time when seasonal sheepfolds in mountain pastures were abandoned and the flocks were dri ven back to villages. These shepherds played an important role in hi ghwaymen 's support networks. Cold winters made clandestine surviva l in the Slovak mountai ns almost impossible. Moreover, Europe was at the height of its Little Ice Age (l 560-1850). The deciduous forests at the lower elevations lose leaves and provide less cover, and while the higher elevations have spruce and fir trees that do not lose their needles, they are also colder and therefore even less suitable for winter subsistence 28 . Snow tracks made the brigands easily traceable. But brigands needed villagers ' support year-round. In the winter, they needed farmers to accept them as hired hands, and even their help to cover up their identities and summer acti vity. In the summer, the brigands needed to obtain food , sell their loot, and learn about the police searches for them, not to mention their less operative desires to show off, party, booze and flirt. Some of the villagers in turn , made welcome profit on the services and goods rendered to the brigands, since they were paid for their silence as well. Moreover, the vi llagers were paid by people with periodic windfalls who are generall y inclined to overspending. According to the court records, the Janosiks were among Terchova 's notorious rowdy , thieving fa milies. Jano~fk' s participation During his trial , Janosik confessed that he joined Tomas Uhorcfk ' s band of brigands " around Michaelmas" 29 in 1711. Brigand bands in the Western Carpathians would traditionall y di sperse on or not long after Michaelmas and agree to reassemble on St. Adalbert's Feast-George mas (23-24 April). Numero us saints' days were associated with a variety of far m works and festivities , and were used to identify periods of the year in the same manner that months and parts of months are used today (" late September"). Michae lmas was a typical day of post-harvest fa irs. Janosik claimed that he had 28 Some mountains aro und Terchova reach over 5,000 ft, some mountain ridges around Liptov County rise to 7,000 ft. 29 September 29, St. Michael' s Day. �90 SLOVAKIA joined the brigands at Uhorcik's insistence. It was customary that a new member would swear allegiance to the band leader°. The group he joined may have had about two to three dozen members, but that was always in a state of flux with highwaymen. Some were disabled or killed during robberies and chases, so me were caught, some dropped out, temporarily , or for good, and aspiring highwaymen joined. Janosfk's confession that Uhorcik handed the leadership of the band to him soon afterwards indicates that it was hardly as simple as Uhorcik looking up Janosik almost a year after the latter provided him with some incidental assistance in prison. Uhorcik had to have great tru st in Janosik in order to persuade his band of thugs that a rel ati ve newcomer should take over after him . That, in turn , suggests that Janosik's assistance at Bytca Castle may have extended to Uhorcik ' s escape, that they maintained contacts afterwards, that Uhorcfk 's band had already seen Janosik in action, and it opens to speculation the source of the money that his father used to buy Juraj out of military service. It is also poss ible that the members of Uhorcik's band already knew Janosik because he became involved with them earlier. The highwaymen's logistics Limited circumstantial evidence contradicts Janosfk's testimony that he did not meet with Uhorcik until a year after Uhorcik's escape and that he simply talked Janosik into joining his band on that single occasion. A court record hints that there could have been rather a pressing incentive for Janosik to turn from initially a brigands' assistant and perhaps a subsequent incidental brigand into a regular member of Uhorcik's band. On 30 September 1711 , a day after Michaelmas, the confessed time of Janosik's pledge to Uhorcfk, three of the Janosfks of Terchova were brought to court and charged with assault 30 In contrast with their life of crime, the pledge could appear quite pious - an indication that they perceived Christianity as part of a flexible set of beliefs in the supernatural rather than the strict doctrine with a specific moral code preached by the Church. A documented pledge in the band of Jakub Surovec from the 1730s said: " I swear to God eternal, the Holy Trinity, the Virgin Mary and all the divine saints that I shall neither betray, nor cheat, nor yet abandon my companions in fortu ne, or misfortune. Thus help me God the Lord." �SLOVAKIA 91 and robbery .31 If they were Juraj Janosik' s family, and moreover, if he was among the suspects (and guilty), he might have preferred to remove himself from the village rather than face the charges and possibly be forced to reveal more of his recent past. The Habsburgs did not ban torture as an investi gati ve method until 1776. J ano~ik' s season Soon after 23-year old Janosik became the band 's leader, Uhorcfk , after nine seasons as a highwayman, retired to Klenovec in south-central Slovakia under the adopted name Martin Mravec. He married and became the village's hired shepherd and occasional musician (he also managed briefly to serve as the village's policeman). Janosfk's band robbed mainly in the north-central Slovak counties of Orava, Liptov, and Spis, sometimes to the south of them, and occasionally - still in the Habsburg monarchy - across the Kingdom 's north -western border in parts of Silesia and the Margrav iate of Moravia (both now in the Czech Republic). All of the three Slovak counties border Poland in the north , and Janosik identified several members of his band as coming from Poland, but no document has surfaced to confirm legends about his raids into the Kingdom of Poland. Simple economics may have played a role: while Moravia and Silesia were relatively wealthy, the Polish Podhale region north of Slovakia was poorer than the Slovak counties and with fewer noblemen 's residences, and therefore less attractive, especially since the border follows a rel atively high mountain ridge in Liptov and in parts of Spis and Orava, which was a substanti al obstacle to bringing back any loot except money. On the other hand, the Podhale folklore occasionally depicted the Slovak counties as desirable targets of Polish brigands. The expected higher return may have made the climb somewhat more worthwhile. However, Janosik was questioned specifically during hi s tri al whether he had also robbed in Poland : an indication that the border was crossed by hi ghwaymen from both sides, but also of the authorities' concern about possible contacts with leaders of the Rak6cz i upri sing who defected to Pol and after their final defeat in 1711. 31 Rudo Brtan "Na tropie Janosika i polskich zb6jnik6w." Pami~tnik Slowiariski 18, pp. 167-186. �92 SLOVAKIA Janosik:' s victims and spoils While the list was certainly not complete, Janosik's trial revealed rather meager, and some bizarre spoils from hi s only full-time robbing season from the spring to the fall of 1712: several guns, including a "valuable" one, unimpressive amounts of cash, some jewelry, as well as two ladies' wigs and elegant ladies' clothing impossible to be worn by villagers and therefore awkward to sell or donate in those days. However, Uhorcfk said Janosfk's highway robberies yielded more. Among other things, he apparently accumulated almost two bushels of coins, enough cloth to dress 300 men, and maintained a stash of weapons in another hiding place. Although cloth may appear to be an unlikely booty, it was among the brigands' prized possessions. It was needed to repair their clothing, which was more prone to wear and tear, yet less readily replaceable in case of damage than the clothes of law-abiding subjects. 32 Rolls of cloth, not ready-made clothes, were loaded in merchants' wagons that were attacked by brigands. Cloth was also among the more durable goods in their loot, but not as easy to exchange as money, jewelry, or guns, so the brigands were likely to have a surplus of cloth in their hiding places. 33 Uhorcfk also spoke of Janosfk's attacks on small detachments of the Imperial and Royal Army which yielded weapons, ammunition, and on one occasion a carriage. Janosfk admitted robbing men and women, commoners as well as three noblemen , a clergyman, another clergyman's wife, a blacksmith (he did not respond to this charge), a goldsmith, a butcher, a cloth trader, and wine traders. He robbed them on the road, in their homes, in the woods, even on the Vah River (see below), emphasized the prosecutor. Of all the regional authorities, Liptov County was probably the most bitter about Janosfk's actions because of his assault on Imperial and Royal Officer Rudolf Schardon's wife and her retinue. Slovak and Polish sources commonly say she was Officer Schardon 's widow. One author contradicts thi s without giving his 32 John S. Koliopoulos, Brigands with a Cause, Brigandage and Irredentism in Mo- dem Greece /821-1912. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. 33 Jozef Kocis, Neznamy ... creates a weighty narrative about Janosfk's apparent revolutionary intentions from a historical report that guns and substantial amounts of cloth were discovered in some of his hiding places. �SLOVAKIA 93 reasons. 34 The trial proceedings refer to her as Schardonka (the ending -ka indicates that she was a woman) and as vojenskeho oficfra pani, which means "a military officer's lady [wife]" without any indication of her being a widow. Because her husband was employed by the Crown and the robbery took place while she was passing through Liptov, the law obligated the County to pay the Lady the damages, which must have been higher than usual due to her rank. Throughout his trial, Janosik maintained that he had not killed anyone, but the court still considered him a guilty party when a priest from Domaniza was "shot through" by two brigands from his band during a robbery. The priest, 58-year old Juraj Yrtik (also spelled Yertik), died a month later. Janosik was also accused of sacrilege target-shooting at a host (the Eucharistic bread) attached to a treetrunk. He neither denied, nor confirmed this charge. While it is not clear why so many authors call Lady Schardon a widow rather than a wife, some of the counterfactual information in modern writing about Janosik ' s robberies and victims stems from cross-linguistic confusion by Polish authors reading Slovak sources, which is then repeated by others. Thus, for example, one author has Janosik rob a magnate on his way to Turkey (do Turcji in Polish), while the person, John Radvanszky, County Lieutenant of Zvolen, was actually on his way to Turiec County (do Turca in Slovak) in north-central Slovakia. 35 Another author says that Janosik robbed a pastor' s wife as she was fetching water (po wodf! in Polish) from the Yah River. 36 It is not only unlikely for geographic and historical reasons because her village was not on the V ah and people used wells as their source of water, not the river. It is mistaken factually because the trial proceedings say that she was robbed about a half-day's journey from her home, while traveling down the Vah (po vode in Slovak) on a raft - a common means of transport provided comercially at that time. Such confusion about language and geography happens with some regularity and can affect the authors' arguments. For instance, Stanislaw Sroka believes that the village of Klenovec where Janosik was captured was in Liptov County , a mere geogra34 Jozef Kocis, Neznamy .. . Jace k Kotbu szewski , "Janosik ni eznany?" Literatura Judowa, vol. 3 1, no. 4-6, Jul y- December 1987, pp. 108-11 2, - p. 110. 36 Sroka, Janosik ... p. 50. 35 �SLOVAKIA 94 phic error, but the error then becomes Sroka's explanation of why Janosik was tried by Liptov County. Klenovec, however, was in Malohont County. The real reason for the location of Janosik's trial was that he was captured in Klenovec by the Liptov police (see below). Cross-linguistic confusion can lead to much farther-reaching fallacious conclusions. Jacek Kolbuszewski, the author who believes that Janosik robbed John Radvanszky on his way to Turkey, then 37 assumes that he was going to the funeral of Stephen Petrycy [sic], a former general in the Kuruc army, according to Kolbuszewski, who took refuge in Turkey in order to avoid persec ution by the Habsburgs. Kolbuszewski subsequently presents his conjecture as evidence to disprove a point made by another author, Jozef Koci s, 38 and accuses him of "keeping silent" about that apparent fact. Yet, Radvanszky was robbed in 1712 while traveling from Zvolen County to Turiec County in order to attend the funeral of Stephen Petr6czy de Petr6cz et Kaszavar (villages near Trencfn : the name could be Stefan Petrovicky of Petrovice and Koseca in modern Slovak spelling), sonin-law of the late Turiec County Chief Emerich Revay - not to Turkey to a conjectured funeral of Baron Stephen Petr6czy, born around 1620, a commander in the Kuruc insurgencies in the l 670- l 680s who sought refuge in Turkey after their failure . Baron Petr6czy would have to have been in his 90s had he died, as Kotbuszewski concludes, in 1712 when Radvanszky was robbed by Janosfk (the date of his death is actually unknown). Janosik, s capture Janosik was first caught, along with Uhorcfk, about a year after he joined Uhorcik's former band and became its leader. They were detained by Malohont County authorities in Klenovec in south37 Kotbuszewski , "Janosik ... " p. 110. Kocis, Neznamy ... Kotbuszewski's goal was to disprove Kocis's claims about Janosfk's sym pathies for the anti-Habsburg rebels by showing that Janosfk actually robbed a nobleman presumably supportive of the rebellion since he went to a former rebel ' s and political defector' s funeral. If Polish scholars had not misread the Slovak sources, which was the starting point for Kotbuszewski's disoriented conclusions about the historical figures, Kotbuszewski could have made the same argument without any reference to Petr6czy, because Janosfk ' s victim John Radvanszky, Zvolen County Lieutenant and minor poet born in 1666, was himself a former influential supporter of the Kuruc rebellion, Thokoly, as well as Francis Rak6czi. 38 �SLOVAKIA 95 central Slovakia, where Uhorcik had settled as Martin Mravec, on 26 October 1712 - around the end of the robbing season. Janosik probably came to spend the winter with his comrade under an assumed identity . They were put in jail in the Mansion of Hrachov but were released after they "proved" their innocence. Janosik's subsequent trial revealed that the proof rested mainly in fox furs and cheese passed on to the detaining authorities. Moreover, the County Lieutenant of Malohont 39 who testified on their behalf had earlier received a prized rifle from Uhorcik. The historical, decorated weapon came from Janosik's loot when his band ambushed Baron Paul Revay. Janosik was arrested again while still in Klenovec before he had a chance to start his next robbing season, and so was "Mravec" for giving him shelter for the winter. Although in another county, this time he was traced and captured by the Liptov police put on special alert after the robbery of Lady Schardon. They were transferred to Svaty Mikulas, 40 the seat of Liptov County, where Uhorcik 's identity was eventually discovered. JaI1osik's sentence Janosik's trial took place on 16-17 March 1713. The Kingdom ' s main statutes were contained in the Tripartitum of 1514,41 and two subsequent royal decrees. Chapter I, Titulus XV, Paragraph I of the Tripartitum mandated that highwaymen be hanged, broken upon the wheel, impaled, or beheaded, as a warning to others. When the Habsburgs added the Kingdom to their lands, they tried to limit various laws contained in the Tripartitum, especially those that gave more privileges to its nobles and greater self-government to its counties and some municipalities than were granted in other Habsburg lands, but they reinforced some other laws including those against brigandage. Emperor Ferdinand II iss ued a decree in 1625 "On pillaging vagabonds and highwaymen and on ways of handling them," whose 39 Pal Lan yi/Pavol Lani (1670-1733) was a prominent supporter of the Rak6czi insurgency. 40 Now called Liptovsky Mikulas. 41 Tripartitum opus iuris consuetudinarii incly ti regni Hungariae partiumque annexarum , by Stephen Werboczy (1460-1541), presented to the Diet in 1514 and published by the author in Vienna in 1517. Although not a fo rmall y adopted document, it was used as the authoritati ve compend ium of the Kingdom's customary law. �96 SLOVAKIA Article XIII mandated that hi ghwaymen and similar criminals be tortured if their testimonies were not comprehensive and convincing. The decision to apply torture was regulated in the Kingdom by a widely used book of comments on the Tripartitum from 1619,42 whose Article 8, Section 6 required that the defendant be rel eased without torture if the preliminary proceedings did not raise sufficient suspicions about the truthfulness of his denial of guilt. Emperor Ferdinand Ill 's decree from 1655 contained Article XXVI , which prohibited any leniency or pardon in such trials. Additionally , Emperor Leopold I decreed in Article XVII in 1659 that those providing shelter to brigands be executed as well. Janosik's assigned defense lawyer Palugyay described him as a former victim of Francis Rak6czi 's insurgents and played up his loyalty to the Crown demonstrated by his apparent eagerness to join the Imperial and Royal Army. Palugyay also stressed that although submitted to both the light and severe levels of torture, Janosik denied having been guilty of the murder of the Reverend Yrtik. Under the Kingdom 's legislation it meant that the defendant (called the "accused" then) was to be seen as innocent of the crime. Although people submitted to torture did not normally survive for more than three days - if for no additional injuries, then due to the internal hemorrhage and other damage to the joints pulled out of their sockets during stretching - the county was obligated to pay an annual allowance to the family of the accused who failed to admit guilt under torture. Janosfk's defense lawyer called for his release because, according to Palugay, he certainly regretted his actions and would mend his ways. Yet, Janosik did admit to highway robbery, and the court still considered him an accomplice in the priest' s murder. He was sentenced to death. As usual in those days , it was a public execution. In Janosfk' s case, a hook was threaded through his left side, and he was left dangling on the gallows to die - a fairly common execution then especially for brigand leaders, although this was the only instance of its implementation by Liptov County between 1700 and 1715.43 42 Directio methodica processus judiciarii; Juris consuetudinarii lnclyti Regni Hun gariae .. . , by Johannes Kitonich de Koztanicza [Ivan Kitonic/Janos Kaszony i of Kostajnica] , Tymavia: [Tmava] : Anno Domini MDCXIX. 43 Stanistaw Dzieciolowski in an interview with Zdena Sisova "Odpocfva Janosfk na dne Liptovskej Mary?" Slovenske dotyky Maj 2002, p. 7. �SLOVAKIA 97 Uhorcik's identity was not discovered until after the first day of his trial during which he was still taken to be a Martin Mravec. He was sentenced more than a month after Janosik, on 21 April 1713 . He was broken upon the wheel, another common form of execution. As an act of benevolence, perhaps obtained by the County Lieutenant of Malohont who testified on Janosik ' s and Uhorcik's behalf at their trials, the court ordered that his neck be broken first. The burial place of either of the brigands is unknown. Corpses were often left hanging or otherwise exposed as a warning for a period of time after the criminals' execution and then di sposed of unceremoniously. Conclusion The trial proceedings, effectively the only extant source of information about Janosik, offer a meager picture of his life because he disclosed very little before or under torture. Most questions posed by the interrogators remained unanswered. All that transpires from the proceedings besides some of his robberies is that he was loyal to his fellow-criminals, that he remained so under severe torture, and that he proved to be a cunning liar before severe torture more-or-less silenced him. When he gave answers, they were often misleading or quite untrue, crafted to protect his accomplices. For example, while Uhorcik, still known to the authorities only as Martin Mravec, was awaiting his trial in the same building, Janosik was telling the interrogators that Uhorcik had been killed by another brigand several years earlier. Most of the accomplices Janosik divulged were already dead or believed to be dead. He claimed not to know the whereabouts of the others whose names came up during the interrogation. He did not di sclose the names of those who gave him shelter. Uhorcfk's testimony a month later revealed that Janosik had withheld the names of at least a half of his fellow brigands. Even without the strict Imperial and Royal decrees on brigandage, several factors would have probably contributed to Janosik's harsh punishment by Liptov County anyway: the damages that the county had to pay to Lady Schardon; the blame it probably received from the monarc hy's central authorities and the county 's subsequent increased efforts to eradicate hi ghway robbery; Janosik's origin in Terchova known for its support to highwaymen ; Janosik 's participation in the Francis Rak6czi uprising against the Habsburgs, which �98 SLOVAKIA the judge reiterated before reading his sentence; and finally , susp icions of anti-Catholic and heretic sentiments reflected in hi s insurgent past and in the alleged target-shooting at hosts augmented by his presence at the killing of a priest. In a broader context, the existence of the enormous gap between what is documented about Juraj Janosfk and his modern myth is unremarkable. Discrepancies, elevations or degradations, are common, universal features of historical mythology. Equally pervasive are folk legends about characters from the feudal past who "took from the rich and gave to the poor" and defended the commoners from the injustices of the masters. Such tales dot the Eurasian continent from English Robin Hood at its north-western periphery all the way to Korean Hong Kildong and Japanese Oyake Akahachi at its south-eastern edge. What makes Janosfk 's myth in Slovakia special (which applies only partly in the Czech Republic and decidedly less so in Poland) is the manner in which it was first embraced and molded by the intellectuals around the middle of the 19 th century44 and then by academia from around the middle of the 20 th century, and the degree to which his intellectualized and academic myth incorporated the notion that it is not talking merely about folk mythology (whose modern shape has actually been largely formed by Janosfk' s myth created in high culture), but that it is also talking about a real hi storical character. 44 Yotruba, " Hang Him Hi gh .. ." � SLOVAKIA 81 A HIGHWAYMAN'S LIFE: EXTANT DOCUMENTS v~ ABOUT JANOSIK ~ Martin Votruba "Our salvation can come only from Janosik," lamented a Czech blogger over the budget proposals in Prague. 1 In Poland, a group of developers has been working on recalcitrant software intended to undermine the program called Platnik ("Payer"), which is mandatory for employers to handle social security payments and works only with Microsoft Windows. The leader of the developers named their open-source software Janosik.2 Both of these people invoked the name of a brigand who robbed three hundred years ago in the northern and central predominantly Slovak counties in the Habsburg monarchy, was caught, tried and hanged. About a century after Janosfk's execution, his image began to emerge as the local embodiment of the pervasive myth of a hero who takes from the rich and gives to the poor. The folk stories, Romantic poems, and the more recent films ascribe 3 to him other quite universally idolized trappings, the ones that, for example, helped to generate Hollywood 's legendary rebel stars - he was good looking, single, made a stash of money, lived wild, and died young. 4 All of this is contained in Janosfk's modern Slovak, Czech, and Polish mythology. Practically none of that, however, finds any support in the existing evidence about the actual brigand 's life. 1 Hana Fonminkova, I Oct. 2003 , http: //www neraweb cz/index. php?stype-all&id=632. 2 Danuta Frey, "Janosik chce rozgryzc program Ptatnik." Rzeczpospolita, 6-7 Dec. 2004. 3 Dozens of books, thousands of stories, and popular and academic articles, at least nine plays, six films, one TV series, several classical compositions, and one opera th have been dedicated to Janosfk since the 19 century. His legend was discussed in this journal by Patricia A. Krafcik, "Janosik: Unraveling the Man from the Legend." Slovakia 33, no. 60-6 1 (1987-1988): 7-22. 4 Martin Votruba, " Hang Him High: The Elevation of Janosfk to an Ethnic Icon ." Slavic Review, vol. 56, no. I, Spring 2006, pp. 24-44. �82 SLOVAKIA Name variations There was a historical figure whose name was close or identical to Juraj Janosfk,5 who was sentenced for highway robbery and executed at the age of 25 in 1713. The limited sources about his actual life are the proceedings from his trial and an earlier interrogation, the proceedings from the trial with hi s friend and accomplice Tomas Uhorcfk, whom Janosik replaced as the leader of his band, and several brief records maintained by landlords. The trial proceedings were edited and published by several authors before most of them appeared together for the first time as an appendix to a book on Janosik in 1952. 6 The proceedings from his trial gave three versions of his last name: Janosik, Janosiak and Janosak. There are variations in the records of Uhorcfk ' s name, too. For instance, Janosik referred to him as Uhnk during his trial. Each spelling of Janosfk's name indicates a slightly different pronunciation, but that was not unusual at that time. Historically , people had only one - given - name, and what we know as the last name developed gradually, along with bureaucratic record-keeping, from attributes used to distinguish persons with the same given name, or from various nicknames. The bureaucratic effort to standardize people 's last (and first) names started in Catholic Europe with the Vatican-sponsored Council of Trent (1545-1563). Although the practice of maintaining the same last name within a family became quite common in the Habsburg 7 monarchy, where the Slovaks lived, by the I 600s, it was not formalized until the Imperial and Royal 8 Edict on Family Names was issued in 1787 - perhaps 5 [YOUray YAHnosheek] Ju raj is the Slovak version of George, the nicknames are Jura, Jurko, Dura. 6 Andrej Melichercfk, Janosikovska tradfcia na Slovensku Bratislava: Nakladatel'stvo Slovenskej akademie vied a umenf, 1952, pp. 165-176. 7 Often spelled Hapsburg in English history books. 8 "Imperi al and Royal" were standard attributes of a host of ' federal' institutions in the Habsburg monarchy. They indicated that the ruling monarch was the hereditary king of several kingdoms-provinces th at compri sed the Habsburgs' personal possessions, including the Kingdom of Hungary , and at the same time the emperor of a looser association of German states. The terms Habsburg monarchy and Austrian Empire usually refer only to the Habsburgs' personal possessions whose core were the Kingdom of Hungary (today: Slovakia, Hungary , Croatia), Kingdom of Bohemia, Margravi ate of Moravia (together today : the Czec h Republic) , Austria, and �SLOVAKIA 83 the first law on names in Europe. The three pronunciations of Janosfk 's last name during his trial are not indicative of any confusion about the captive' s identity. Birth date and place According to the trial proceedings, Juraj Janosfk came from the north-west Slovak village of Terchova. 9 Birth and death records were rare, or non-existent in the more distant past, but the maintenance of baptismal and burial records by parishes was among the guidelines set forth by the Council of Trent and became widely practiced by both the Slovak Catholic and Lutheran Churches. A governmentsponsored law on recording births and deaths was not adopted in the Habsburg monarchy until 1828. Baptismal records from the Varin parish that comprised Terchova contain the names of five babies christened in 1687-1688 that could have grown up to be the Juraj Janosfk sentenced in 1713. '0 Without discussing their choice, authors mostly give one of the dates as his true entry - commonly 25 February 1688, father Martin and mother Anna Czisznek or Czisznik, occasionally 16 May 1688, father Michal and mother Barbara Cingel. Only one, not particularly reliable, source makes an argument why the entry of 25 February is to be seen as more likely than the others: when Juraj's father bought his son out of military service in 1710, the father's name was apparently recorded as Martin Janosik. 11 However, if Juraj Janosfk, the brigand executed in March 1713, were baptized on 25 February, other entries in the baptismal records would show him as having a younger brother Jan. That would appear to be at odds with the record of a trial with Jan Janosik in December 1713 during which Jan was identified as an older brother of the executed brigand Juraj . The issue is complicated because the existing baptismal records are not sufficiently consistent and complete, because the name Jan, introduced to Europe through which also incorporated parts of their modern neighboring countries - Italy, Poland, Romania and others. 9 [TERkhova] 10 Rudo Brian, "Na tropie Janosika i polskich zb6jnik6w." Pam(:tnik Slowianski, vo l. 18, 1968, pp. I 67-186; and Rudo Brian, " Pat' Janosikov - ktory je ten pravy?" Nede/ha pravda, 3 Feb. 1978, p. 18. 11 The llles hazy archives, Strecno estate, Vol. 19, No. 15 as referenced in Jozef Kocis, Neznamy Janos1k, Bratislava: Yydavatel'stvo Osveta, l 986, p. 47 . �84 SLOVAKIA the New Testament, has historicall y been the most co mmon given name in Slovak (like its Anglicized version John in English), and the family name Janosfk 12 was, and still is, common in Terchova and vicinity (67 listings in the telephone directory) . It al so occurs elsewhere in Slovakia, and spread even to the United States where its frequency ranks as the 35,524 th most common name. 13 There is some inconsistency in the reading of the last name of Janosik 's mother among those who opt for 25 February as the date of his baptism. Many modem authors transcribe the recorded old spelling of Anna 's last name (Czisznek or Czisznik), without further explanation, as Cesnek, a few others as Cfsnik. Cesnek is a probable reading because such last names are still common in the area (29 telephone directory listings), while Cfsnik or other plausible modernized versions of the old spelling are absent there. Nothing is known about Janosfk 's life until he was between 15 and 21 years old - the time of the Francis Rak6czi uprising, which Janosik joined at an unknown age and for an unknown period of time according to the trial proceedings. Folk tales, as well as the first two film s about him, 14 depict him as a former seminary student who turned to brigandage after his parents were abused by the landlord. The earliest written reference to the legend of Janosfk 's schooling comes from 1809. 15 It says that he was popularly believed to have been a student of the humanities, not of theology. However, no preserved document and nothing in the trial proceedings suggests an educated Janosik. 12 It originated as a Slovak variation on Janos - the Hungarian version of the Biblical name John in English, Jan in Slovak. Janos was occas ionall y used as a ni ckname fo r persons named Jan by the Slovaks , too, and sometimes appeared instead of the th Slovak Jan in the Kingdom' s records. But durin g the 17 century, Janosik and its variations had become established Slovak fa mily names . 13 U.S. Census Burea u, Population Divi sio n, Population Anal ys is and Evaluati on Staff as quoted by Rhett A. Butler in "Most Common Names and Surnames in the U.S." at mongabay com. 14 Jan osfk directed by Jaros lav Jerry Siake l', Tatra Film, Chi cago, 192 1; Janostk directed by Martin Frie, A- B Studio, Praha [Prague] , I935. 15 Bohuslav Tablic, a 3-page unnumbered foo tnote to "Janossjk Liptowsky Laupeznjk ," in S/owensstj W ersso wcy. Collecta revirescunt. S wazek druhf. We Wacove [Yac]: v Antonjna Gotljba pry wil. Knehtlac itele, 1809, pp. 120-1 23 . �SLOVAKIA 85 The Kingdom's situation The trial proceedings begin to reveal glimpses of Janosfk 's life with him taking part in the Franci s Rak6czi 16 uprising of 1703-1711. It was a massive religious and separatist movement in the Kingdom of Hungary aga inst the Habsburg dynasty, which ruled it from Vienna (A ustria). The Slovaks were the majority inhabitants of the north-western , mostl y mountainous counties of the multi-ethnic 17 Kingdom. The Kingdom , established around the year 1000, was defeated and lost its sovereignty in the 1500s, and was incorporated as a province in the expanding Habsburg monarchy. The Kingdom was 90% Protestant (Lutheran in the Slovak areas) in the early 1600s, but by the mid- l 600s, the Vatican-allied Habsburgs began forcibly to reCatholicize it, and also increased their efforts to further reduce the Kingdom 's remaining limited self-government. The uprising led by nobleman Franci s Rak6czi II was the last of a series of substantial , but economically destructive armed attempts in the Kingdom to reverse that course. 18 He was Catholic, but in favor of the Kingdom 's independence and religious freedom. Janosik the insurgent It is not known when and under what circumstances Janosik joined Rak6czi 's rebel troops. It is not known , either, how he became a soldier in the Habsburg army later. The Rak6czi rebels suffered a crushing defeat in the Battle of Trencfn 19 (about 60 miles south-west 16 [RAHkotsee], Francis Rak:6czi II, Prince of Transylvani a, born on 27 March I 676. After his fin al defeat, he and some of his supporters initially defected to Poland. He eventu all y died in exi le in Turkey on 8 April 1735. 17 The country's language of admi nistration and education from high school up was Latin , which was no one ' s mother ton gue. The languages of individual ethnic groups, most of whom li ved in their majority areas, were used in everyday life, local businesses, emerging literatures, etc. The ethni c gro ups of the Kingdom of Hungary inc luded the Slovaks, Magyars ([MAHdars] often called Hungarians), Croats, Romani ans, Germans, Ru syns, Roma (Gypsies), and others. The Slovaks were in the majority in about 15 counties in the Kingdom ' s mountainous north-west (today's Slovakia) customari ly called the "Upper Co untry" in the Kingdo m, which is usuall y rendered as Upper Hungary in English. 1 8The major anti-Habsburg insurgenc ies that affected the Slovak counti es extensive ly were (the year of inception and leader): 1604 Stephen Bocskay, 16 19 Gabriel Bethlen, 1644 George Rak:6czi, 1678 Emerich Thokoly, 1703 Francis Rak:6czi II . 19 [TRENtsheen); in West Slovakia on the Yah River �86 SLOVAKIA of Terc hova) the actual fightin g took pl ace at Hamre, a haml et and originall y a forge site two miles south of Trencfn) on 3 August 1708. The Habsburgs had taken full control of the Kingdom by the time of Janosfk's tri al. It therefore needs to be taken with a grai n of salt that hi s defen se lawyer Baltazar Palugyay portrayed Janosik as the Emperor's loyal subj ect at hi s tri al, and insisted that Janosik had eage rl y and willingly enlisted in the Habsburg army during the upri sing. Authors mostly speculate that Janosfk first left the Rak6czi rebe ls, returned to Terchova, and was subsequentl y drafted by the Imperial and Royal Army. Another possibility put forward is that he was captured during the Battle of Trencfn and turned into a soldier, 20 which was what happe ned to hundreds of insurge nts on th at occasion. No records document either ass umption. Janosik the loyalist and a brigand's assistant Once in the Imperial and Royal Army, Janosik was stationed at Bytca Castle, 25 miles from his home. He was made a prison guard . During hi s trial, Janosik admitted providing unspecified services to Tomas Uhorcfk,2 1 a brigand leader he ld in the castle's dungeons. Uhorcik managed to escape in the fa ll of 1710 while Janosik still served at Bytca. Janosik 's father bought Ju raj out of military service a month later. This seq uence of events that emanates from the trial proceedings gave ri se to later spec ul ation s that Janosik may have actu ally he lped Uhorcfk to escape. Family background The statement from Janosik's trial that hi s father had bought him out of military service, for which he had to have enough spare money, appears to contrad ict the co mmon, but undoc umented , assertions that Janosik came fro m a particul arl y poor farmer's famil y. The existing records from the landlord of Terchova ' s estate around 1700 do not li st the Janosfk famil y among those obligated to work for a day or two each week in the landlord ' s field s22 - a common duty of fe ud al subj ects. It could mean that members of the Janosik fa mil y °Koc is, Neznamy ... 2 21 [TOmahsh OOhortsheek], from the village of Predmi er near Turzovka. Andrej Melichercfk, Janosikovska tradfcia na Slovensku. Brati slava: Nakladatel'stvo SAY , 1952. 22 �SLOVAKIA 87 were still obligated to work, but were among the poorest, almost landless families and therefore not entered in the records of households with farms; or it could be due to a contract between some of the original settlers of the village and a past landlord. Numerous Slovak villages originated as contractual settlements of a landlord's unimproved property in earlier centuries. Finally, Janosfk 's family could have been prosperous enough to be able to pay the landlord instead of providing labor services. Besides these historical reasons, the absence of an entry for the Janosfks in the landlord 's records could also be due to deficient record-keeping, or to lost documents. If the Janosfks could be shown to have been a particularly poor family, it would increase the likelihood that the money they used to buy Juraj out was not theirs, and that the Janosfks may have received it for that purpose from Uhorcfk who was grateful for Juraj's unspecified services in the dungeons (possibly including his escape). By the fall of 1710, Uhorcfk had had about eight robbing seasons behind him , which would have allowed him to accumulate some disposable cash. Highwaymen Other court records show the inhabitants of Terchova to have been fervent supporters of brigands. 23 That ties in with Uhorcfk's testimony, according to which Janosik sometimes stayed with the teacher at Terchova, and the local tavern-keeper would bring him food. Juraj Janosfk's brother Jan was hanged for highway robbery ten months after Juraj. 24 Highway robbery was common in Europe until the advent of modern times, which brought about increased policing, personal record-tracing, education, perhaps honesty, and new, less arduous forms of crime. The first mention of brigands in the Slovak region comes from the Legend of Saints Zoerardus and Benedict recorded in 1064. Two ancient north-south trade routes from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean passed through eastern Slovakia. The merchants' caravans were among the earliest lucrative targets for highway robbery. Legal records of highway robberies and 23 Stefan Kazimfr, "O novych dokumentoch k janosikovskej legende." Cudove cftanie Vol. 3, No. 6, 1957. 24 Stanistaw Sroka, Janosik: Pra wdziwa historia karpackiego zb6jnika. Krakow [Cracow]: Wydawnictwo Homini, 2004, p. 41; Kocis, Neznamy .. . p. 86. �88 SLOVAKIA trials with brigands begin to accumulate in the late 15 th century and do not start to dwindle until the mid-19 th century. One of the first known brigand bands in the Slovak counties, led by Fedor Hlavaty, operated in the north-east (Saris County). Its 50 members included Slovaks, Poles, and Rusyns.25 In 1493, Hlavaty sent a ransom letter to the town of Bardejov threatening to burn it down unless the Town Council paid a hefty compensation for the execution of four of Hlavaty's highwaymen. Incentives to rob in the 1600s The religious-cum-separatist wars of the 1i" century caused a great deal of destruction in the Kingdom already harmed by decades of attacks by the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire from the south. 26 Highway robbery must have appeared to be a way out to some of those impoverished by the developments. The brigands' ranks were also increased by displaced soldiers made redundant by both the insurgent and the Habsburg armies after the resolution of each rebellion. With the reduced, or periodicall y absent authority of the monarch, some noblemen, too, turned their hill-top castles to brigands' nests, armed large bands and in addition to highway robbery, raided villages, as well as their peers' residences. The Kingdom therefore saw a jump in highway robberies in the 17 th century.2 7 25 The Rusyns, also called Ruthenians, are an East Slav ic ethni c group (as opposed to the West Slavic Slovaks and Poles) who li ve as a recogni zed minority in the north-eastern parts of Slovakia, as well as in so uth-eastern Poland - often called L emkos there. Their acti vists call for a recognition of their much more substantial numbers in south- western Ukraine where the authorities insist they are Ukrainians. 26 The Slovak counties never fell to the Turks, but es peciall y the southern ones were continuall y harassed and attacked. The fac t that the mostl y Magyar/Hungarian counties (today's Hungary) fell under the Ottoman rule and became their prov ince of Ma1,aristan fo r about l 50 years added to the disruption of the economy of the Slovak counties and brought in some ethni c Hungari ans, especiall y noblemen, who ran away north fro m the encroaching Turks. 27 Although just a pass ing reference has been preserved about him , the name of briga nd leader Adamcik survived from the 1630s in fo lklore, and was later added to the list of Janosik 's band members in fo lk tales. The name Ilcfk - another of Janosik's comrades in fo lk stories - has a similar, albeit somewhat later origin. �SLOVAKIA 89 Highwaymen's seasons In the Kingdom , and in Central Europe in general, the brigands' season was limited by the climate. Late summer and early fall was the time when seasonal sheepfolds in mountain pastures were abandoned and the flocks were dri ven back to villages. These shepherds played an important role in hi ghwaymen 's support networks. Cold winters made clandestine surviva l in the Slovak mountai ns almost impossible. Moreover, Europe was at the height of its Little Ice Age (l 560-1850). The deciduous forests at the lower elevations lose leaves and provide less cover, and while the higher elevations have spruce and fir trees that do not lose their needles, they are also colder and therefore even less suitable for winter subsistence 28 . Snow tracks made the brigands easily traceable. But brigands needed villagers ' support year-round. In the winter, they needed farmers to accept them as hired hands, and even their help to cover up their identities and summer acti vity. In the summer, the brigands needed to obtain food , sell their loot, and learn about the police searches for them, not to mention their less operative desires to show off, party, booze and flirt. Some of the villagers in turn , made welcome profit on the services and goods rendered to the brigands, since they were paid for their silence as well. Moreover, the vi llagers were paid by people with periodic windfalls who are generall y inclined to overspending. According to the court records, the Janosiks were among Terchova 's notorious rowdy , thieving fa milies. Jano~fk' s participation During his trial , Janosik confessed that he joined Tomas Uhorcfk ' s band of brigands " around Michaelmas" 29 in 1711. Brigand bands in the Western Carpathians would traditionall y di sperse on or not long after Michaelmas and agree to reassemble on St. Adalbert's Feast-George mas (23-24 April). Numero us saints' days were associated with a variety of far m works and festivities , and were used to identify periods of the year in the same manner that months and parts of months are used today (" late September"). Michae lmas was a typical day of post-harvest fa irs. Janosik claimed that he had 28 Some mountains aro und Terchova reach over 5,000 ft, some mountain ridges around Liptov County rise to 7,000 ft. 29 September 29, St. Michael' s Day. �90 SLOVAKIA joined the brigands at Uhorcik's insistence. It was customary that a new member would swear allegiance to the band leader°. The group he joined may have had about two to three dozen members, but that was always in a state of flux with highwaymen. Some were disabled or killed during robberies and chases, so me were caught, some dropped out, temporarily , or for good, and aspiring highwaymen joined. Janosfk's confession that Uhorcik handed the leadership of the band to him soon afterwards indicates that it was hardly as simple as Uhorcik looking up Janosik almost a year after the latter provided him with some incidental assistance in prison. Uhorcik had to have great tru st in Janosik in order to persuade his band of thugs that a rel ati ve newcomer should take over after him . That, in turn , suggests that Janosik's assistance at Bytca Castle may have extended to Uhorcik ' s escape, that they maintained contacts afterwards, that Uhorcfk 's band had already seen Janosik in action, and it opens to speculation the source of the money that his father used to buy Juraj out of military service. It is also poss ible that the members of Uhorcik's band already knew Janosik because he became involved with them earlier. The highwaymen's logistics Limited circumstantial evidence contradicts Janosfk's testimony that he did not meet with Uhorcik until a year after Uhorcik's escape and that he simply talked Janosik into joining his band on that single occasion. A court record hints that there could have been rather a pressing incentive for Janosik to turn from initially a brigands' assistant and perhaps a subsequent incidental brigand into a regular member of Uhorcik's band. On 30 September 1711 , a day after Michaelmas, the confessed time of Janosik's pledge to Uhorcfk, three of the Janosfks of Terchova were brought to court and charged with assault 30 In contrast with their life of crime, the pledge could appear quite pious - an indication that they perceived Christianity as part of a flexible set of beliefs in the supernatural rather than the strict doctrine with a specific moral code preached by the Church. A documented pledge in the band of Jakub Surovec from the 1730s said: " I swear to God eternal, the Holy Trinity, the Virgin Mary and all the divine saints that I shall neither betray, nor cheat, nor yet abandon my companions in fortu ne, or misfortune. Thus help me God the Lord." �SLOVAKIA 91 and robbery .31 If they were Juraj Janosik' s family, and moreover, if he was among the suspects (and guilty), he might have preferred to remove himself from the village rather than face the charges and possibly be forced to reveal more of his recent past. The Habsburgs did not ban torture as an investi gati ve method until 1776. J ano~ik' s season Soon after 23-year old Janosik became the band 's leader, Uhorcfk , after nine seasons as a highwayman, retired to Klenovec in south-central Slovakia under the adopted name Martin Mravec. He married and became the village's hired shepherd and occasional musician (he also managed briefly to serve as the village's policeman). Janosfk's band robbed mainly in the north-central Slovak counties of Orava, Liptov, and Spis, sometimes to the south of them, and occasionally - still in the Habsburg monarchy - across the Kingdom 's north -western border in parts of Silesia and the Margrav iate of Moravia (both now in the Czech Republic). All of the three Slovak counties border Poland in the north , and Janosik identified several members of his band as coming from Poland, but no document has surfaced to confirm legends about his raids into the Kingdom of Poland. Simple economics may have played a role: while Moravia and Silesia were relatively wealthy, the Polish Podhale region north of Slovakia was poorer than the Slovak counties and with fewer noblemen 's residences, and therefore less attractive, especially since the border follows a rel atively high mountain ridge in Liptov and in parts of Spis and Orava, which was a substanti al obstacle to bringing back any loot except money. On the other hand, the Podhale folklore occasionally depicted the Slovak counties as desirable targets of Polish brigands. The expected higher return may have made the climb somewhat more worthwhile. However, Janosik was questioned specifically during hi s tri al whether he had also robbed in Poland : an indication that the border was crossed by hi ghwaymen from both sides, but also of the authorities' concern about possible contacts with leaders of the Rak6cz i upri sing who defected to Pol and after their final defeat in 1711. 31 Rudo Brtan "Na tropie Janosika i polskich zb6jnik6w." Pami~tnik Slowiariski 18, pp. 167-186. �92 SLOVAKIA Janosik:' s victims and spoils While the list was certainly not complete, Janosik's trial revealed rather meager, and some bizarre spoils from hi s only full-time robbing season from the spring to the fall of 1712: several guns, including a "valuable" one, unimpressive amounts of cash, some jewelry, as well as two ladies' wigs and elegant ladies' clothing impossible to be worn by villagers and therefore awkward to sell or donate in those days. However, Uhorcfk said Janosfk's highway robberies yielded more. Among other things, he apparently accumulated almost two bushels of coins, enough cloth to dress 300 men, and maintained a stash of weapons in another hiding place. Although cloth may appear to be an unlikely booty, it was among the brigands' prized possessions. It was needed to repair their clothing, which was more prone to wear and tear, yet less readily replaceable in case of damage than the clothes of law-abiding subjects. 32 Rolls of cloth, not ready-made clothes, were loaded in merchants' wagons that were attacked by brigands. Cloth was also among the more durable goods in their loot, but not as easy to exchange as money, jewelry, or guns, so the brigands were likely to have a surplus of cloth in their hiding places. 33 Uhorcfk also spoke of Janosfk's attacks on small detachments of the Imperial and Royal Army which yielded weapons, ammunition, and on one occasion a carriage. Janosfk admitted robbing men and women, commoners as well as three noblemen , a clergyman, another clergyman's wife, a blacksmith (he did not respond to this charge), a goldsmith, a butcher, a cloth trader, and wine traders. He robbed them on the road, in their homes, in the woods, even on the Vah River (see below), emphasized the prosecutor. Of all the regional authorities, Liptov County was probably the most bitter about Janosfk's actions because of his assault on Imperial and Royal Officer Rudolf Schardon's wife and her retinue. Slovak and Polish sources commonly say she was Officer Schardon 's widow. One author contradicts thi s without giving his 32 John S. Koliopoulos, Brigands with a Cause, Brigandage and Irredentism in Mo- dem Greece /821-1912. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. 33 Jozef Kocis, Neznamy ... creates a weighty narrative about Janosfk's apparent revolutionary intentions from a historical report that guns and substantial amounts of cloth were discovered in some of his hiding places. �SLOVAKIA 93 reasons. 34 The trial proceedings refer to her as Schardonka (the ending -ka indicates that she was a woman) and as vojenskeho oficfra pani, which means "a military officer's lady [wife]" without any indication of her being a widow. Because her husband was employed by the Crown and the robbery took place while she was passing through Liptov, the law obligated the County to pay the Lady the damages, which must have been higher than usual due to her rank. Throughout his trial, Janosik maintained that he had not killed anyone, but the court still considered him a guilty party when a priest from Domaniza was "shot through" by two brigands from his band during a robbery. The priest, 58-year old Juraj Yrtik (also spelled Yertik), died a month later. Janosik was also accused of sacrilege target-shooting at a host (the Eucharistic bread) attached to a treetrunk. He neither denied, nor confirmed this charge. While it is not clear why so many authors call Lady Schardon a widow rather than a wife, some of the counterfactual information in modern writing about Janosik ' s robberies and victims stems from cross-linguistic confusion by Polish authors reading Slovak sources, which is then repeated by others. Thus, for example, one author has Janosik rob a magnate on his way to Turkey (do Turcji in Polish), while the person, John Radvanszky, County Lieutenant of Zvolen, was actually on his way to Turiec County (do Turca in Slovak) in north-central Slovakia. 35 Another author says that Janosik robbed a pastor' s wife as she was fetching water (po wodf! in Polish) from the Yah River. 36 It is not only unlikely for geographic and historical reasons because her village was not on the V ah and people used wells as their source of water, not the river. It is mistaken factually because the trial proceedings say that she was robbed about a half-day's journey from her home, while traveling down the Vah (po vode in Slovak) on a raft - a common means of transport provided comercially at that time. Such confusion about language and geography happens with some regularity and can affect the authors' arguments. For instance, Stanislaw Sroka believes that the village of Klenovec where Janosik was captured was in Liptov County , a mere geogra34 Jozef Kocis, Neznamy .. . Jace k Kotbu szewski , "Janosik ni eznany?" Literatura Judowa, vol. 3 1, no. 4-6, Jul y- December 1987, pp. 108-11 2, - p. 110. 36 Sroka, Janosik ... p. 50. 35 �SLOVAKIA 94 phic error, but the error then becomes Sroka's explanation of why Janosik was tried by Liptov County. Klenovec, however, was in Malohont County. The real reason for the location of Janosik's trial was that he was captured in Klenovec by the Liptov police (see below). Cross-linguistic confusion can lead to much farther-reaching fallacious conclusions. Jacek Kolbuszewski, the author who believes that Janosik robbed John Radvanszky on his way to Turkey, then 37 assumes that he was going to the funeral of Stephen Petrycy [sic], a former general in the Kuruc army, according to Kolbuszewski, who took refuge in Turkey in order to avoid persec ution by the Habsburgs. Kolbuszewski subsequently presents his conjecture as evidence to disprove a point made by another author, Jozef Koci s, 38 and accuses him of "keeping silent" about that apparent fact. Yet, Radvanszky was robbed in 1712 while traveling from Zvolen County to Turiec County in order to attend the funeral of Stephen Petr6czy de Petr6cz et Kaszavar (villages near Trencfn : the name could be Stefan Petrovicky of Petrovice and Koseca in modern Slovak spelling), sonin-law of the late Turiec County Chief Emerich Revay - not to Turkey to a conjectured funeral of Baron Stephen Petr6czy, born around 1620, a commander in the Kuruc insurgencies in the l 670- l 680s who sought refuge in Turkey after their failure . Baron Petr6czy would have to have been in his 90s had he died, as Kotbuszewski concludes, in 1712 when Radvanszky was robbed by Janosfk (the date of his death is actually unknown). Janosik, s capture Janosik was first caught, along with Uhorcfk, about a year after he joined Uhorcik's former band and became its leader. They were detained by Malohont County authorities in Klenovec in south37 Kotbuszewski , "Janosik ... " p. 110. Kocis, Neznamy ... Kotbuszewski's goal was to disprove Kocis's claims about Janosfk's sym pathies for the anti-Habsburg rebels by showing that Janosfk actually robbed a nobleman presumably supportive of the rebellion since he went to a former rebel ' s and political defector' s funeral. If Polish scholars had not misread the Slovak sources, which was the starting point for Kotbuszewski's disoriented conclusions about the historical figures, Kotbuszewski could have made the same argument without any reference to Petr6czy, because Janosfk ' s victim John Radvanszky, Zvolen County Lieutenant and minor poet born in 1666, was himself a former influential supporter of the Kuruc rebellion, Thokoly, as well as Francis Rak6czi. 38 �SLOVAKIA 95 central Slovakia, where Uhorcik had settled as Martin Mravec, on 26 October 1712 - around the end of the robbing season. Janosik probably came to spend the winter with his comrade under an assumed identity . They were put in jail in the Mansion of Hrachov but were released after they "proved" their innocence. Janosik's subsequent trial revealed that the proof rested mainly in fox furs and cheese passed on to the detaining authorities. Moreover, the County Lieutenant of Malohont 39 who testified on their behalf had earlier received a prized rifle from Uhorcik. The historical, decorated weapon came from Janosik's loot when his band ambushed Baron Paul Revay. Janosik was arrested again while still in Klenovec before he had a chance to start his next robbing season, and so was "Mravec" for giving him shelter for the winter. Although in another county, this time he was traced and captured by the Liptov police put on special alert after the robbery of Lady Schardon. They were transferred to Svaty Mikulas, 40 the seat of Liptov County, where Uhorcik 's identity was eventually discovered. JaI1osik's sentence Janosik's trial took place on 16-17 March 1713. The Kingdom ' s main statutes were contained in the Tripartitum of 1514,41 and two subsequent royal decrees. Chapter I, Titulus XV, Paragraph I of the Tripartitum mandated that highwaymen be hanged, broken upon the wheel, impaled, or beheaded, as a warning to others. When the Habsburgs added the Kingdom to their lands, they tried to limit various laws contained in the Tripartitum, especially those that gave more privileges to its nobles and greater self-government to its counties and some municipalities than were granted in other Habsburg lands, but they reinforced some other laws including those against brigandage. Emperor Ferdinand II iss ued a decree in 1625 "On pillaging vagabonds and highwaymen and on ways of handling them," whose 39 Pal Lan yi/Pavol Lani (1670-1733) was a prominent supporter of the Rak6czi insurgency. 40 Now called Liptovsky Mikulas. 41 Tripartitum opus iuris consuetudinarii incly ti regni Hungariae partiumque annexarum , by Stephen Werboczy (1460-1541), presented to the Diet in 1514 and published by the author in Vienna in 1517. Although not a fo rmall y adopted document, it was used as the authoritati ve compend ium of the Kingdom's customary law. �96 SLOVAKIA Article XIII mandated that hi ghwaymen and similar criminals be tortured if their testimonies were not comprehensive and convincing. The decision to apply torture was regulated in the Kingdom by a widely used book of comments on the Tripartitum from 1619,42 whose Article 8, Section 6 required that the defendant be rel eased without torture if the preliminary proceedings did not raise sufficient suspicions about the truthfulness of his denial of guilt. Emperor Ferdinand Ill 's decree from 1655 contained Article XXVI , which prohibited any leniency or pardon in such trials. Additionally , Emperor Leopold I decreed in Article XVII in 1659 that those providing shelter to brigands be executed as well. Janosik's assigned defense lawyer Palugyay described him as a former victim of Francis Rak6czi 's insurgents and played up his loyalty to the Crown demonstrated by his apparent eagerness to join the Imperial and Royal Army. Palugyay also stressed that although submitted to both the light and severe levels of torture, Janosik denied having been guilty of the murder of the Reverend Yrtik. Under the Kingdom 's legislation it meant that the defendant (called the "accused" then) was to be seen as innocent of the crime. Although people submitted to torture did not normally survive for more than three days - if for no additional injuries, then due to the internal hemorrhage and other damage to the joints pulled out of their sockets during stretching - the county was obligated to pay an annual allowance to the family of the accused who failed to admit guilt under torture. Janosfk's defense lawyer called for his release because, according to Palugay, he certainly regretted his actions and would mend his ways. Yet, Janosik did admit to highway robbery, and the court still considered him an accomplice in the priest' s murder. He was sentenced to death. As usual in those days , it was a public execution. In Janosfk' s case, a hook was threaded through his left side, and he was left dangling on the gallows to die - a fairly common execution then especially for brigand leaders, although this was the only instance of its implementation by Liptov County between 1700 and 1715.43 42 Directio methodica processus judiciarii; Juris consuetudinarii lnclyti Regni Hun gariae .. . , by Johannes Kitonich de Koztanicza [Ivan Kitonic/Janos Kaszony i of Kostajnica] , Tymavia: [Tmava] : Anno Domini MDCXIX. 43 Stanistaw Dzieciolowski in an interview with Zdena Sisova "Odpocfva Janosfk na dne Liptovskej Mary?" Slovenske dotyky Maj 2002, p. 7. �SLOVAKIA 97 Uhorcik's identity was not discovered until after the first day of his trial during which he was still taken to be a Martin Mravec. He was sentenced more than a month after Janosik, on 21 April 1713 . He was broken upon the wheel, another common form of execution. As an act of benevolence, perhaps obtained by the County Lieutenant of Malohont who testified on Janosik ' s and Uhorcik's behalf at their trials, the court ordered that his neck be broken first. The burial place of either of the brigands is unknown. Corpses were often left hanging or otherwise exposed as a warning for a period of time after the criminals' execution and then di sposed of unceremoniously. Conclusion The trial proceedings, effectively the only extant source of information about Janosik, offer a meager picture of his life because he disclosed very little before or under torture. Most questions posed by the interrogators remained unanswered. All that transpires from the proceedings besides some of his robberies is that he was loyal to his fellow-criminals, that he remained so under severe torture, and that he proved to be a cunning liar before severe torture more-or-less silenced him. When he gave answers, they were often misleading or quite untrue, crafted to protect his accomplices. For example, while Uhorcik, still known to the authorities only as Martin Mravec, was awaiting his trial in the same building, Janosik was telling the interrogators that Uhorcik had been killed by another brigand several years earlier. Most of the accomplices Janosik divulged were already dead or believed to be dead. He claimed not to know the whereabouts of the others whose names came up during the interrogation. He did not di sclose the names of those who gave him shelter. Uhorcfk's testimony a month later revealed that Janosik had withheld the names of at least a half of his fellow brigands. Even without the strict Imperial and Royal decrees on brigandage, several factors would have probably contributed to Janosik's harsh punishment by Liptov County anyway: the damages that the county had to pay to Lady Schardon; the blame it probably received from the monarc hy's central authorities and the county 's subsequent increased efforts to eradicate hi ghway robbery; Janosik's origin in Terchova known for its support to highwaymen ; Janosik 's participation in the Francis Rak6czi uprising against the Habsburgs, which �98 SLOVAKIA the judge reiterated before reading his sentence; and finally , susp icions of anti-Catholic and heretic sentiments reflected in hi s insurgent past and in the alleged target-shooting at hosts augmented by his presence at the killing of a priest. In a broader context, the existence of the enormous gap between what is documented about Juraj Janosfk and his modern myth is unremarkable. Discrepancies, elevations or degradations, are common, universal features of historical mythology. Equally pervasive are folk legends about characters from the feudal past who "took from the rich and gave to the poor" and defended the commoners from the injustices of the masters. Such tales dot the Eurasian continent from English Robin Hood at its north-western periphery all the way to Korean Hong Kildong and Japanese Oyake Akahachi at its south-eastern edge. What makes Janosfk 's myth in Slovakia special (which applies only partly in the Czech Republic and decidedly less so in Poland) is the manner in which it was first embraced and molded by the intellectuals around the middle of the 19 th century44 and then by academia from around the middle of the 20 th century, and the degree to which his intellectualized and academic myth incorporated the notion that it is not talking merely about folk mythology (whose modern shape has actually been largely formed by Janosfk' s myth created in high culture), but that it is also talking about a real hi storical character. 44 Yotruba, " Hang Him Hi gh .. ." � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2007, Vol. 39 Description An account of the resource Vol. 39 (No. 72-73), 2007. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2007 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 81 A HIGHWAYMAN'S LIFE: EXTANT DOCUMENTS v~ ABOUT JANOSIK ~ Martin Votruba "Our salvation can come only from Janosik," lamented a Czech blogger over the budget proposals in Prague. 1 In Poland, a group of developers has been working on recalcitrant software intended to undermine the program called Platnik ("Payer"), which is mandatory for employers to handle social security payments and works only with Microsoft Windows. The leader of the developers named their open-source software Janosik.2 Both of these people invoked the name of a brigand who robbed three hundred years ago in the northern and central predominantly Slovak counties in the Habsburg monarchy, was caught, tried and hanged. About a century after Janosfk's execution, his image began to emerge as the local embodiment of the pervasive myth of a hero who takes from the rich and gives to the poor. The folk stories, Romantic poems, and the more recent films ascribe 3 to him other quite universally idolized trappings, the ones that, for example, helped to generate Hollywood 's legendary rebel stars - he was good looking, single, made a stash of money, lived wild, and died young. 4 All of this is contained in Janosfk's modern Slovak, Czech, and Polish mythology. Practically none of that, however, finds any support in the existing evidence about the actual brigand 's life. 1 Hana Fonminkova, I Oct. 2003 , http: //www neraweb cz/index. php?stype-all&id=632. 2 Danuta Frey, "Janosik chce rozgryzc program Ptatnik." Rzeczpospolita, 6-7 Dec. 2004. 3 Dozens of books, thousands of stories, and popular and academic articles, at least nine plays, six films, one TV series, several classical compositions, and one opera th have been dedicated to Janosfk since the 19 century. His legend was discussed in this journal by Patricia A. Krafcik, "Janosik: Unraveling the Man from the Legend." Slovakia 33, no. 60-6 1 (1987-1988): 7-22. 4 Martin Votruba, " Hang Him High: The Elevation of Janosfk to an Ethnic Icon ." Slavic Review, vol. 56, no. I, Spring 2006, pp. 24-44. 82 SLOVAKIA Name variations There was a historical figure whose name was close or identical to Juraj Janosfk,5 who was sentenced for highway robbery and executed at the age of 25 in 1713. The limited sources about his actual life are the proceedings from his trial and an earlier interrogation, the proceedings from the trial with hi s friend and accomplice Tomas Uhorcfk, whom Janosik replaced as the leader of his band, and several brief records maintained by landlords. The trial proceedings were edited and published by several authors before most of them appeared together for the first time as an appendix to a book on Janosik in 1952. 6 The proceedings from his trial gave three versions of his last name: Janosik, Janosiak and Janosak. There are variations in the records of Uhorcfk ' s name, too. For instance, Janosik referred to him as Uhnk during his trial. Each spelling of Janosfk's name indicates a slightly different pronunciation, but that was not unusual at that time. Historically , people had only one - given - name, and what we know as the last name developed gradually, along with bureaucratic record-keeping, from attributes used to distinguish persons with the same given name, or from various nicknames. The bureaucratic effort to standardize people 's last (and first) names started in Catholic Europe with the Vatican-sponsored Council of Trent (1545-1563). Although the practice of maintaining the same last name within a family became quite common in the Habsburg 7 monarchy, where the Slovaks lived, by the I 600s, it was not formalized until the Imperial and Royal 8 Edict on Family Names was issued in 1787 - perhaps 5 [YOUray YAHnosheek] Ju raj is the Slovak version of George, the nicknames are Jura, Jurko, Dura. 6 Andrej Melichercfk, Janosikovska tradfcia na Slovensku Bratislava: Nakladatel'stvo Slovenskej akademie vied a umenf, 1952, pp. 165-176. 7 Often spelled Hapsburg in English history books. 8 "Imperi al and Royal" were standard attributes of a host of ' federal' institutions in the Habsburg monarchy. They indicated that the ruling monarch was the hereditary king of several kingdoms-provinces th at compri sed the Habsburgs' personal possessions, including the Kingdom of Hungary , and at the same time the emperor of a looser association of German states. The terms Habsburg monarchy and Austrian Empire usually refer only to the Habsburgs' personal possessions whose core were the Kingdom of Hungary (today: Slovakia, Hungary , Croatia), Kingdom of Bohemia, Margravi ate of Moravia (together today : the Czec h Republic) , Austria, and SLOVAKIA 83 the first law on names in Europe. The three pronunciations of Janosfk 's last name during his trial are not indicative of any confusion about the captive' s identity. Birth date and place According to the trial proceedings, Juraj Janosfk came from the north-west Slovak village of Terchova. 9 Birth and death records were rare, or non-existent in the more distant past, but the maintenance of baptismal and burial records by parishes was among the guidelines set forth by the Council of Trent and became widely practiced by both the Slovak Catholic and Lutheran Churches. A governmentsponsored law on recording births and deaths was not adopted in the Habsburg monarchy until 1828. Baptismal records from the Varin parish that comprised Terchova contain the names of five babies christened in 1687-1688 that could have grown up to be the Juraj Janosfk sentenced in 1713. '0 Without discussing their choice, authors mostly give one of the dates as his true entry - commonly 25 February 1688, father Martin and mother Anna Czisznek or Czisznik, occasionally 16 May 1688, father Michal and mother Barbara Cingel. Only one, not particularly reliable, source makes an argument why the entry of 25 February is to be seen as more likely than the others: when Juraj's father bought his son out of military service in 1710, the father's name was apparently recorded as Martin Janosik. 11 However, if Juraj Janosfk, the brigand executed in March 1713, were baptized on 25 February, other entries in the baptismal records would show him as having a younger brother Jan. That would appear to be at odds with the record of a trial with Jan Janosik in December 1713 during which Jan was identified as an older brother of the executed brigand Juraj . The issue is complicated because the existing baptismal records are not sufficiently consistent and complete, because the name Jan, introduced to Europe through which also incorporated parts of their modern neighboring countries - Italy, Poland, Romania and others. 9 [TERkhova] 10 Rudo Brian, "Na tropie Janosika i polskich zb6jnik6w." Pam(:tnik Slowianski, vo l. 18, 1968, pp. I 67-186; and Rudo Brian, " Pat' Janosikov - ktory je ten pravy?" Nede/ha pravda, 3 Feb. 1978, p. 18. 11 The llles hazy archives, Strecno estate, Vol. 19, No. 15 as referenced in Jozef Kocis, Neznamy Janos1k, Bratislava: Yydavatel'stvo Osveta, l 986, p. 47 . 84 SLOVAKIA the New Testament, has historicall y been the most co mmon given name in Slovak (like its Anglicized version John in English), and the family name Janosfk 12 was, and still is, common in Terchova and vicinity (67 listings in the telephone directory) . It al so occurs elsewhere in Slovakia, and spread even to the United States where its frequency ranks as the 35,524 th most common name. 13 There is some inconsistency in the reading of the last name of Janosik 's mother among those who opt for 25 February as the date of his baptism. Many modem authors transcribe the recorded old spelling of Anna 's last name (Czisznek or Czisznik), without further explanation, as Cesnek, a few others as Cfsnik. Cesnek is a probable reading because such last names are still common in the area (29 telephone directory listings), while Cfsnik or other plausible modernized versions of the old spelling are absent there. Nothing is known about Janosfk 's life until he was between 15 and 21 years old - the time of the Francis Rak6czi uprising, which Janosik joined at an unknown age and for an unknown period of time according to the trial proceedings. Folk tales, as well as the first two film s about him, 14 depict him as a former seminary student who turned to brigandage after his parents were abused by the landlord. The earliest written reference to the legend of Janosfk 's schooling comes from 1809. 15 It says that he was popularly believed to have been a student of the humanities, not of theology. However, no preserved document and nothing in the trial proceedings suggests an educated Janosik. 12 It originated as a Slovak variation on Janos - the Hungarian version of the Biblical name John in English, Jan in Slovak. Janos was occas ionall y used as a ni ckname fo r persons named Jan by the Slovaks , too, and sometimes appeared instead of the th Slovak Jan in the Kingdom' s records. But durin g the 17 century, Janosik and its variations had become established Slovak fa mily names . 13 U.S. Census Burea u, Population Divi sio n, Population Anal ys is and Evaluati on Staff as quoted by Rhett A. Butler in "Most Common Names and Surnames in the U.S." at mongabay com. 14 Jan osfk directed by Jaros lav Jerry Siake l', Tatra Film, Chi cago, 192 1; Janostk directed by Martin Frie, A- B Studio, Praha [Prague] , I935. 15 Bohuslav Tablic, a 3-page unnumbered foo tnote to "Janossjk Liptowsky Laupeznjk ," in S/owensstj W ersso wcy. Collecta revirescunt. S wazek druhf. We Wacove [Yac]: v Antonjna Gotljba pry wil. Knehtlac itele, 1809, pp. 120-1 23 . SLOVAKIA 85 The Kingdom's situation The trial proceedings begin to reveal glimpses of Janosfk 's life with him taking part in the Franci s Rak6czi 16 uprising of 1703-1711. It was a massive religious and separatist movement in the Kingdom of Hungary aga inst the Habsburg dynasty, which ruled it from Vienna (A ustria). The Slovaks were the majority inhabitants of the north-western , mostl y mountainous counties of the multi-ethnic 17 Kingdom. The Kingdom , established around the year 1000, was defeated and lost its sovereignty in the 1500s, and was incorporated as a province in the expanding Habsburg monarchy. The Kingdom was 90% Protestant (Lutheran in the Slovak areas) in the early 1600s, but by the mid- l 600s, the Vatican-allied Habsburgs began forcibly to reCatholicize it, and also increased their efforts to further reduce the Kingdom 's remaining limited self-government. The uprising led by nobleman Franci s Rak6czi II was the last of a series of substantial , but economically destructive armed attempts in the Kingdom to reverse that course. 18 He was Catholic, but in favor of the Kingdom 's independence and religious freedom. Janosik the insurgent It is not known when and under what circumstances Janosik joined Rak6czi 's rebel troops. It is not known , either, how he became a soldier in the Habsburg army later. The Rak6czi rebels suffered a crushing defeat in the Battle of Trencfn 19 (about 60 miles south-west 16 [RAHkotsee], Francis Rak:6czi II, Prince of Transylvani a, born on 27 March I 676. After his fin al defeat, he and some of his supporters initially defected to Poland. He eventu all y died in exi le in Turkey on 8 April 1735. 17 The country's language of admi nistration and education from high school up was Latin , which was no one ' s mother ton gue. The languages of individual ethnic groups, most of whom li ved in their majority areas, were used in everyday life, local businesses, emerging literatures, etc. The ethni c gro ups of the Kingdom of Hungary inc luded the Slovaks, Magyars ([MAHdars] often called Hungarians), Croats, Romani ans, Germans, Ru syns, Roma (Gypsies), and others. The Slovaks were in the majority in about 15 counties in the Kingdom ' s mountainous north-west (today's Slovakia) customari ly called the "Upper Co untry" in the Kingdo m, which is usuall y rendered as Upper Hungary in English. 1 8The major anti-Habsburg insurgenc ies that affected the Slovak counti es extensive ly were (the year of inception and leader): 1604 Stephen Bocskay, 16 19 Gabriel Bethlen, 1644 George Rak:6czi, 1678 Emerich Thokoly, 1703 Francis Rak:6czi II . 19 [TRENtsheen); in West Slovakia on the Yah River 86 SLOVAKIA of Terc hova) the actual fightin g took pl ace at Hamre, a haml et and originall y a forge site two miles south of Trencfn) on 3 August 1708. The Habsburgs had taken full control of the Kingdom by the time of Janosfk's tri al. It therefore needs to be taken with a grai n of salt that hi s defen se lawyer Baltazar Palugyay portrayed Janosik as the Emperor's loyal subj ect at hi s tri al, and insisted that Janosik had eage rl y and willingly enlisted in the Habsburg army during the upri sing. Authors mostly speculate that Janosfk first left the Rak6czi rebe ls, returned to Terchova, and was subsequentl y drafted by the Imperial and Royal Army. Another possibility put forward is that he was captured during the Battle of Trencfn and turned into a soldier, 20 which was what happe ned to hundreds of insurge nts on th at occasion. No records document either ass umption. Janosik the loyalist and a brigand's assistant Once in the Imperial and Royal Army, Janosik was stationed at Bytca Castle, 25 miles from his home. He was made a prison guard . During hi s trial, Janosik admitted providing unspecified services to Tomas Uhorcfk,2 1 a brigand leader he ld in the castle's dungeons. Uhorcik managed to escape in the fa ll of 1710 while Janosik still served at Bytca. Janosik 's father bought Ju raj out of military service a month later. This seq uence of events that emanates from the trial proceedings gave ri se to later spec ul ation s that Janosik may have actu ally he lped Uhorcfk to escape. Family background The statement from Janosik's trial that hi s father had bought him out of military service, for which he had to have enough spare money, appears to contrad ict the co mmon, but undoc umented , assertions that Janosik came fro m a particul arl y poor farmer's famil y. The existing records from the landlord of Terchova ' s estate around 1700 do not li st the Janosfk famil y among those obligated to work for a day or two each week in the landlord ' s field s22 - a common duty of fe ud al subj ects. It could mean that members of the Janosik fa mil y °Koc is, Neznamy ... 2 21 [TOmahsh OOhortsheek], from the village of Predmi er near Turzovka. Andrej Melichercfk, Janosikovska tradfcia na Slovensku. Brati slava: Nakladatel'stvo SAY , 1952. 22 SLOVAKIA 87 were still obligated to work, but were among the poorest, almost landless families and therefore not entered in the records of households with farms; or it could be due to a contract between some of the original settlers of the village and a past landlord. Numerous Slovak villages originated as contractual settlements of a landlord's unimproved property in earlier centuries. Finally, Janosfk 's family could have been prosperous enough to be able to pay the landlord instead of providing labor services. Besides these historical reasons, the absence of an entry for the Janosfks in the landlord 's records could also be due to deficient record-keeping, or to lost documents. If the Janosfks could be shown to have been a particularly poor family, it would increase the likelihood that the money they used to buy Juraj out was not theirs, and that the Janosfks may have received it for that purpose from Uhorcfk who was grateful for Juraj's unspecified services in the dungeons (possibly including his escape). By the fall of 1710, Uhorcfk had had about eight robbing seasons behind him , which would have allowed him to accumulate some disposable cash. Highwaymen Other court records show the inhabitants of Terchova to have been fervent supporters of brigands. 23 That ties in with Uhorcfk's testimony, according to which Janosik sometimes stayed with the teacher at Terchova, and the local tavern-keeper would bring him food. Juraj Janosfk's brother Jan was hanged for highway robbery ten months after Juraj. 24 Highway robbery was common in Europe until the advent of modern times, which brought about increased policing, personal record-tracing, education, perhaps honesty, and new, less arduous forms of crime. The first mention of brigands in the Slovak region comes from the Legend of Saints Zoerardus and Benedict recorded in 1064. Two ancient north-south trade routes from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean passed through eastern Slovakia. The merchants' caravans were among the earliest lucrative targets for highway robbery. Legal records of highway robberies and 23 Stefan Kazimfr, "O novych dokumentoch k janosikovskej legende." Cudove cftanie Vol. 3, No. 6, 1957. 24 Stanistaw Sroka, Janosik: Pra wdziwa historia karpackiego zb6jnika. Krakow [Cracow]: Wydawnictwo Homini, 2004, p. 41; Kocis, Neznamy .. . p. 86. 88 SLOVAKIA trials with brigands begin to accumulate in the late 15 th century and do not start to dwindle until the mid-19 th century. One of the first known brigand bands in the Slovak counties, led by Fedor Hlavaty, operated in the north-east (Saris County). Its 50 members included Slovaks, Poles, and Rusyns.25 In 1493, Hlavaty sent a ransom letter to the town of Bardejov threatening to burn it down unless the Town Council paid a hefty compensation for the execution of four of Hlavaty's highwaymen. Incentives to rob in the 1600s The religious-cum-separatist wars of the 1i" century caused a great deal of destruction in the Kingdom already harmed by decades of attacks by the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire from the south. 26 Highway robbery must have appeared to be a way out to some of those impoverished by the developments. The brigands' ranks were also increased by displaced soldiers made redundant by both the insurgent and the Habsburg armies after the resolution of each rebellion. With the reduced, or periodicall y absent authority of the monarch, some noblemen, too, turned their hill-top castles to brigands' nests, armed large bands and in addition to highway robbery, raided villages, as well as their peers' residences. The Kingdom therefore saw a jump in highway robberies in the 17 th century.2 7 25 The Rusyns, also called Ruthenians, are an East Slav ic ethni c group (as opposed to the West Slavic Slovaks and Poles) who li ve as a recogni zed minority in the north-eastern parts of Slovakia, as well as in so uth-eastern Poland - often called L emkos there. Their acti vists call for a recognition of their much more substantial numbers in south- western Ukraine where the authorities insist they are Ukrainians. 26 The Slovak counties never fell to the Turks, but es peciall y the southern ones were continuall y harassed and attacked. The fac t that the mostl y Magyar/Hungarian counties (today's Hungary) fell under the Ottoman rule and became their prov ince of Ma1,aristan fo r about l 50 years added to the disruption of the economy of the Slovak counties and brought in some ethni c Hungari ans, especiall y noblemen, who ran away north fro m the encroaching Turks. 27 Although just a pass ing reference has been preserved about him , the name of briga nd leader Adamcik survived from the 1630s in fo lklore, and was later added to the list of Janosik 's band members in fo lk tales. The name Ilcfk - another of Janosik's comrades in fo lk stories - has a similar, albeit somewhat later origin. SLOVAKIA 89 Highwaymen's seasons In the Kingdom , and in Central Europe in general, the brigands' season was limited by the climate. Late summer and early fall was the time when seasonal sheepfolds in mountain pastures were abandoned and the flocks were dri ven back to villages. These shepherds played an important role in hi ghwaymen 's support networks. Cold winters made clandestine surviva l in the Slovak mountai ns almost impossible. Moreover, Europe was at the height of its Little Ice Age (l 560-1850). The deciduous forests at the lower elevations lose leaves and provide less cover, and while the higher elevations have spruce and fir trees that do not lose their needles, they are also colder and therefore even less suitable for winter subsistence 28 . Snow tracks made the brigands easily traceable. But brigands needed villagers ' support year-round. In the winter, they needed farmers to accept them as hired hands, and even their help to cover up their identities and summer acti vity. In the summer, the brigands needed to obtain food , sell their loot, and learn about the police searches for them, not to mention their less operative desires to show off, party, booze and flirt. Some of the villagers in turn , made welcome profit on the services and goods rendered to the brigands, since they were paid for their silence as well. Moreover, the vi llagers were paid by people with periodic windfalls who are generall y inclined to overspending. According to the court records, the Janosiks were among Terchova 's notorious rowdy , thieving fa milies. Jano~fk' s participation During his trial , Janosik confessed that he joined Tomas Uhorcfk ' s band of brigands " around Michaelmas" 29 in 1711. Brigand bands in the Western Carpathians would traditionall y di sperse on or not long after Michaelmas and agree to reassemble on St. Adalbert's Feast-George mas (23-24 April). Numero us saints' days were associated with a variety of far m works and festivities , and were used to identify periods of the year in the same manner that months and parts of months are used today (" late September"). Michae lmas was a typical day of post-harvest fa irs. Janosik claimed that he had 28 Some mountains aro und Terchova reach over 5,000 ft, some mountain ridges around Liptov County rise to 7,000 ft. 29 September 29, St. Michael' s Day. 90 SLOVAKIA joined the brigands at Uhorcik's insistence. It was customary that a new member would swear allegiance to the band leader°. The group he joined may have had about two to three dozen members, but that was always in a state of flux with highwaymen. Some were disabled or killed during robberies and chases, so me were caught, some dropped out, temporarily , or for good, and aspiring highwaymen joined. Janosfk's confession that Uhorcik handed the leadership of the band to him soon afterwards indicates that it was hardly as simple as Uhorcik looking up Janosik almost a year after the latter provided him with some incidental assistance in prison. Uhorcik had to have great tru st in Janosik in order to persuade his band of thugs that a rel ati ve newcomer should take over after him . That, in turn , suggests that Janosik's assistance at Bytca Castle may have extended to Uhorcik ' s escape, that they maintained contacts afterwards, that Uhorcfk 's band had already seen Janosik in action, and it opens to speculation the source of the money that his father used to buy Juraj out of military service. It is also poss ible that the members of Uhorcik's band already knew Janosik because he became involved with them earlier. The highwaymen's logistics Limited circumstantial evidence contradicts Janosfk's testimony that he did not meet with Uhorcik until a year after Uhorcik's escape and that he simply talked Janosik into joining his band on that single occasion. A court record hints that there could have been rather a pressing incentive for Janosik to turn from initially a brigands' assistant and perhaps a subsequent incidental brigand into a regular member of Uhorcik's band. On 30 September 1711 , a day after Michaelmas, the confessed time of Janosik's pledge to Uhorcfk, three of the Janosfks of Terchova were brought to court and charged with assault 30 In contrast with their life of crime, the pledge could appear quite pious - an indication that they perceived Christianity as part of a flexible set of beliefs in the supernatural rather than the strict doctrine with a specific moral code preached by the Church. A documented pledge in the band of Jakub Surovec from the 1730s said: " I swear to God eternal, the Holy Trinity, the Virgin Mary and all the divine saints that I shall neither betray, nor cheat, nor yet abandon my companions in fortu ne, or misfortune. Thus help me God the Lord." SLOVAKIA 91 and robbery .31 If they were Juraj Janosik' s family, and moreover, if he was among the suspects (and guilty), he might have preferred to remove himself from the village rather than face the charges and possibly be forced to reveal more of his recent past. The Habsburgs did not ban torture as an investi gati ve method until 1776. J ano~ik' s season Soon after 23-year old Janosik became the band 's leader, Uhorcfk , after nine seasons as a highwayman, retired to Klenovec in south-central Slovakia under the adopted name Martin Mravec. He married and became the village's hired shepherd and occasional musician (he also managed briefly to serve as the village's policeman). Janosfk's band robbed mainly in the north-central Slovak counties of Orava, Liptov, and Spis, sometimes to the south of them, and occasionally - still in the Habsburg monarchy - across the Kingdom 's north -western border in parts of Silesia and the Margrav iate of Moravia (both now in the Czech Republic). All of the three Slovak counties border Poland in the north , and Janosik identified several members of his band as coming from Poland, but no document has surfaced to confirm legends about his raids into the Kingdom of Poland. Simple economics may have played a role: while Moravia and Silesia were relatively wealthy, the Polish Podhale region north of Slovakia was poorer than the Slovak counties and with fewer noblemen 's residences, and therefore less attractive, especially since the border follows a rel atively high mountain ridge in Liptov and in parts of Spis and Orava, which was a substanti al obstacle to bringing back any loot except money. On the other hand, the Podhale folklore occasionally depicted the Slovak counties as desirable targets of Polish brigands. The expected higher return may have made the climb somewhat more worthwhile. However, Janosik was questioned specifically during hi s tri al whether he had also robbed in Poland : an indication that the border was crossed by hi ghwaymen from both sides, but also of the authorities' concern about possible contacts with leaders of the Rak6cz i upri sing who defected to Pol and after their final defeat in 1711. 31 Rudo Brtan "Na tropie Janosika i polskich zb6jnik6w." Pami~tnik Slowiariski 18, pp. 167-186. 92 SLOVAKIA Janosik:' s victims and spoils While the list was certainly not complete, Janosik's trial revealed rather meager, and some bizarre spoils from hi s only full-time robbing season from the spring to the fall of 1712: several guns, including a "valuable" one, unimpressive amounts of cash, some jewelry, as well as two ladies' wigs and elegant ladies' clothing impossible to be worn by villagers and therefore awkward to sell or donate in those days. However, Uhorcfk said Janosfk's highway robberies yielded more. Among other things, he apparently accumulated almost two bushels of coins, enough cloth to dress 300 men, and maintained a stash of weapons in another hiding place. Although cloth may appear to be an unlikely booty, it was among the brigands' prized possessions. It was needed to repair their clothing, which was more prone to wear and tear, yet less readily replaceable in case of damage than the clothes of law-abiding subjects. 32 Rolls of cloth, not ready-made clothes, were loaded in merchants' wagons that were attacked by brigands. Cloth was also among the more durable goods in their loot, but not as easy to exchange as money, jewelry, or guns, so the brigands were likely to have a surplus of cloth in their hiding places. 33 Uhorcfk also spoke of Janosfk's attacks on small detachments of the Imperial and Royal Army which yielded weapons, ammunition, and on one occasion a carriage. Janosfk admitted robbing men and women, commoners as well as three noblemen , a clergyman, another clergyman's wife, a blacksmith (he did not respond to this charge), a goldsmith, a butcher, a cloth trader, and wine traders. He robbed them on the road, in their homes, in the woods, even on the Vah River (see below), emphasized the prosecutor. Of all the regional authorities, Liptov County was probably the most bitter about Janosfk's actions because of his assault on Imperial and Royal Officer Rudolf Schardon's wife and her retinue. Slovak and Polish sources commonly say she was Officer Schardon 's widow. One author contradicts thi s without giving his 32 John S. Koliopoulos, Brigands with a Cause, Brigandage and Irredentism in Mo- dem Greece /821-1912. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. 33 Jozef Kocis, Neznamy ... creates a weighty narrative about Janosfk's apparent revolutionary intentions from a historical report that guns and substantial amounts of cloth were discovered in some of his hiding places. SLOVAKIA 93 reasons. 34 The trial proceedings refer to her as Schardonka (the ending -ka indicates that she was a woman) and as vojenskeho oficfra pani, which means "a military officer's lady [wife]" without any indication of her being a widow. Because her husband was employed by the Crown and the robbery took place while she was passing through Liptov, the law obligated the County to pay the Lady the damages, which must have been higher than usual due to her rank. Throughout his trial, Janosik maintained that he had not killed anyone, but the court still considered him a guilty party when a priest from Domaniza was "shot through" by two brigands from his band during a robbery. The priest, 58-year old Juraj Yrtik (also spelled Yertik), died a month later. Janosik was also accused of sacrilege target-shooting at a host (the Eucharistic bread) attached to a treetrunk. He neither denied, nor confirmed this charge. While it is not clear why so many authors call Lady Schardon a widow rather than a wife, some of the counterfactual information in modern writing about Janosik ' s robberies and victims stems from cross-linguistic confusion by Polish authors reading Slovak sources, which is then repeated by others. Thus, for example, one author has Janosik rob a magnate on his way to Turkey (do Turcji in Polish), while the person, John Radvanszky, County Lieutenant of Zvolen, was actually on his way to Turiec County (do Turca in Slovak) in north-central Slovakia. 35 Another author says that Janosik robbed a pastor' s wife as she was fetching water (po wodf! in Polish) from the Yah River. 36 It is not only unlikely for geographic and historical reasons because her village was not on the V ah and people used wells as their source of water, not the river. It is mistaken factually because the trial proceedings say that she was robbed about a half-day's journey from her home, while traveling down the Vah (po vode in Slovak) on a raft - a common means of transport provided comercially at that time. Such confusion about language and geography happens with some regularity and can affect the authors' arguments. For instance, Stanislaw Sroka believes that the village of Klenovec where Janosik was captured was in Liptov County , a mere geogra34 Jozef Kocis, Neznamy .. . Jace k Kotbu szewski , "Janosik ni eznany?" Literatura Judowa, vol. 3 1, no. 4-6, Jul y- December 1987, pp. 108-11 2, - p. 110. 36 Sroka, Janosik ... p. 50. 35 SLOVAKIA 94 phic error, but the error then becomes Sroka's explanation of why Janosik was tried by Liptov County. Klenovec, however, was in Malohont County. The real reason for the location of Janosik's trial was that he was captured in Klenovec by the Liptov police (see below). Cross-linguistic confusion can lead to much farther-reaching fallacious conclusions. Jacek Kolbuszewski, the author who believes that Janosik robbed John Radvanszky on his way to Turkey, then 37 assumes that he was going to the funeral of Stephen Petrycy [sic], a former general in the Kuruc army, according to Kolbuszewski, who took refuge in Turkey in order to avoid persec ution by the Habsburgs. Kolbuszewski subsequently presents his conjecture as evidence to disprove a point made by another author, Jozef Koci s, 38 and accuses him of "keeping silent" about that apparent fact. Yet, Radvanszky was robbed in 1712 while traveling from Zvolen County to Turiec County in order to attend the funeral of Stephen Petr6czy de Petr6cz et Kaszavar (villages near Trencfn : the name could be Stefan Petrovicky of Petrovice and Koseca in modern Slovak spelling), sonin-law of the late Turiec County Chief Emerich Revay - not to Turkey to a conjectured funeral of Baron Stephen Petr6czy, born around 1620, a commander in the Kuruc insurgencies in the l 670- l 680s who sought refuge in Turkey after their failure . Baron Petr6czy would have to have been in his 90s had he died, as Kotbuszewski concludes, in 1712 when Radvanszky was robbed by Janosfk (the date of his death is actually unknown). Janosik, s capture Janosik was first caught, along with Uhorcfk, about a year after he joined Uhorcik's former band and became its leader. They were detained by Malohont County authorities in Klenovec in south37 Kotbuszewski , "Janosik ... " p. 110. Kocis, Neznamy ... Kotbuszewski's goal was to disprove Kocis's claims about Janosfk's sym pathies for the anti-Habsburg rebels by showing that Janosfk actually robbed a nobleman presumably supportive of the rebellion since he went to a former rebel ' s and political defector' s funeral. If Polish scholars had not misread the Slovak sources, which was the starting point for Kotbuszewski's disoriented conclusions about the historical figures, Kotbuszewski could have made the same argument without any reference to Petr6czy, because Janosfk ' s victim John Radvanszky, Zvolen County Lieutenant and minor poet born in 1666, was himself a former influential supporter of the Kuruc rebellion, Thokoly, as well as Francis Rak6czi. 38 SLOVAKIA 95 central Slovakia, where Uhorcik had settled as Martin Mravec, on 26 October 1712 - around the end of the robbing season. Janosik probably came to spend the winter with his comrade under an assumed identity . They were put in jail in the Mansion of Hrachov but were released after they "proved" their innocence. Janosik's subsequent trial revealed that the proof rested mainly in fox furs and cheese passed on to the detaining authorities. Moreover, the County Lieutenant of Malohont 39 who testified on their behalf had earlier received a prized rifle from Uhorcik. The historical, decorated weapon came from Janosik's loot when his band ambushed Baron Paul Revay. Janosik was arrested again while still in Klenovec before he had a chance to start his next robbing season, and so was "Mravec" for giving him shelter for the winter. Although in another county, this time he was traced and captured by the Liptov police put on special alert after the robbery of Lady Schardon. They were transferred to Svaty Mikulas, 40 the seat of Liptov County, where Uhorcik 's identity was eventually discovered. JaI1osik's sentence Janosik's trial took place on 16-17 March 1713. The Kingdom ' s main statutes were contained in the Tripartitum of 1514,41 and two subsequent royal decrees. Chapter I, Titulus XV, Paragraph I of the Tripartitum mandated that highwaymen be hanged, broken upon the wheel, impaled, or beheaded, as a warning to others. When the Habsburgs added the Kingdom to their lands, they tried to limit various laws contained in the Tripartitum, especially those that gave more privileges to its nobles and greater self-government to its counties and some municipalities than were granted in other Habsburg lands, but they reinforced some other laws including those against brigandage. Emperor Ferdinand II iss ued a decree in 1625 "On pillaging vagabonds and highwaymen and on ways of handling them," whose 39 Pal Lan yi/Pavol Lani (1670-1733) was a prominent supporter of the Rak6czi insurgency. 40 Now called Liptovsky Mikulas. 41 Tripartitum opus iuris consuetudinarii incly ti regni Hungariae partiumque annexarum , by Stephen Werboczy (1460-1541), presented to the Diet in 1514 and published by the author in Vienna in 1517. Although not a fo rmall y adopted document, it was used as the authoritati ve compend ium of the Kingdom's customary law. 96 SLOVAKIA Article XIII mandated that hi ghwaymen and similar criminals be tortured if their testimonies were not comprehensive and convincing. The decision to apply torture was regulated in the Kingdom by a widely used book of comments on the Tripartitum from 1619,42 whose Article 8, Section 6 required that the defendant be rel eased without torture if the preliminary proceedings did not raise sufficient suspicions about the truthfulness of his denial of guilt. Emperor Ferdinand Ill 's decree from 1655 contained Article XXVI , which prohibited any leniency or pardon in such trials. Additionally , Emperor Leopold I decreed in Article XVII in 1659 that those providing shelter to brigands be executed as well. Janosik's assigned defense lawyer Palugyay described him as a former victim of Francis Rak6czi 's insurgents and played up his loyalty to the Crown demonstrated by his apparent eagerness to join the Imperial and Royal Army. Palugyay also stressed that although submitted to both the light and severe levels of torture, Janosik denied having been guilty of the murder of the Reverend Yrtik. Under the Kingdom 's legislation it meant that the defendant (called the "accused" then) was to be seen as innocent of the crime. Although people submitted to torture did not normally survive for more than three days - if for no additional injuries, then due to the internal hemorrhage and other damage to the joints pulled out of their sockets during stretching - the county was obligated to pay an annual allowance to the family of the accused who failed to admit guilt under torture. Janosfk's defense lawyer called for his release because, according to Palugay, he certainly regretted his actions and would mend his ways. Yet, Janosik did admit to highway robbery, and the court still considered him an accomplice in the priest' s murder. He was sentenced to death. As usual in those days , it was a public execution. In Janosfk' s case, a hook was threaded through his left side, and he was left dangling on the gallows to die - a fairly common execution then especially for brigand leaders, although this was the only instance of its implementation by Liptov County between 1700 and 1715.43 42 Directio methodica processus judiciarii; Juris consuetudinarii lnclyti Regni Hun gariae .. . , by Johannes Kitonich de Koztanicza [Ivan Kitonic/Janos Kaszony i of Kostajnica] , Tymavia: [Tmava] : Anno Domini MDCXIX. 43 Stanistaw Dzieciolowski in an interview with Zdena Sisova "Odpocfva Janosfk na dne Liptovskej Mary?" Slovenske dotyky Maj 2002, p. 7. SLOVAKIA 97 Uhorcik's identity was not discovered until after the first day of his trial during which he was still taken to be a Martin Mravec. He was sentenced more than a month after Janosik, on 21 April 1713 . He was broken upon the wheel, another common form of execution. As an act of benevolence, perhaps obtained by the County Lieutenant of Malohont who testified on Janosik ' s and Uhorcik's behalf at their trials, the court ordered that his neck be broken first. The burial place of either of the brigands is unknown. Corpses were often left hanging or otherwise exposed as a warning for a period of time after the criminals' execution and then di sposed of unceremoniously. Conclusion The trial proceedings, effectively the only extant source of information about Janosik, offer a meager picture of his life because he disclosed very little before or under torture. Most questions posed by the interrogators remained unanswered. All that transpires from the proceedings besides some of his robberies is that he was loyal to his fellow-criminals, that he remained so under severe torture, and that he proved to be a cunning liar before severe torture more-or-less silenced him. When he gave answers, they were often misleading or quite untrue, crafted to protect his accomplices. For example, while Uhorcik, still known to the authorities only as Martin Mravec, was awaiting his trial in the same building, Janosik was telling the interrogators that Uhorcik had been killed by another brigand several years earlier. Most of the accomplices Janosik divulged were already dead or believed to be dead. He claimed not to know the whereabouts of the others whose names came up during the interrogation. He did not di sclose the names of those who gave him shelter. Uhorcfk's testimony a month later revealed that Janosik had withheld the names of at least a half of his fellow brigands. Even without the strict Imperial and Royal decrees on brigandage, several factors would have probably contributed to Janosik's harsh punishment by Liptov County anyway: the damages that the county had to pay to Lady Schardon; the blame it probably received from the monarc hy's central authorities and the county 's subsequent increased efforts to eradicate hi ghway robbery; Janosik's origin in Terchova known for its support to highwaymen ; Janosik 's participation in the Francis Rak6czi uprising against the Habsburgs, which 98 SLOVAKIA the judge reiterated before reading his sentence; and finally , susp icions of anti-Catholic and heretic sentiments reflected in hi s insurgent past and in the alleged target-shooting at hosts augmented by his presence at the killing of a priest. In a broader context, the existence of the enormous gap between what is documented about Juraj Janosfk and his modern myth is unremarkable. Discrepancies, elevations or degradations, are common, universal features of historical mythology. Equally pervasive are folk legends about characters from the feudal past who "took from the rich and gave to the poor" and defended the commoners from the injustices of the masters. Such tales dot the Eurasian continent from English Robin Hood at its north-western periphery all the way to Korean Hong Kildong and Japanese Oyake Akahachi at its south-eastern edge. What makes Janosfk 's myth in Slovakia special (which applies only partly in the Czech Republic and decidedly less so in Poland) is the manner in which it was first embraced and molded by the intellectuals around the middle of the 19 th century44 and then by academia from around the middle of the 20 th century, and the degree to which his intellectualized and academic myth incorporated the notion that it is not talking merely about folk mythology (whose modern shape has actually been largely formed by Janosfk' s myth created in high culture), but that it is also talking about a real hi storical character. 44 Yotruba, " Hang Him Hi gh .. ."  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource A Highwayman's Life: Extant Documents About Jánošík Description An account of the resource Martin Votruba Slovakia, Vol. 39 (No. 72-73), 2007 pp. 81-98 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Votruba, Martin Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2007 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8f351efb370a1007cadd2031f7e772b0.pdf 764e880de0cf3d7b93aa2c077163b3f3 PDF Text Text 132 SLOVAKIA William W a g n e r : The Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius and the Preservation of Slovak Culture in America The research involved in writing the history of an ethnic teaching community presented me with two problems. First, there are relatively few works completed on American ethnic groups, including the Slovak Americans. Secondly, the past of this particular teaching Community, the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius, has been largely recorded only by the Sisters of that Community. Therefore, my research on the Slovak past ( still predominantly written in the Slovak tongue) and my compiling of the Community's history were very dependent on the writings of the Sisters of the Community. I believe my work is objective, because of the limitation of my knowledge of the Community's religious life, thus removing me from a biased influence. All in all, I attempted to deal with this subject in such a manner as to present an honest view of the history and purpose surrounding the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. My appreciation is extended to Reverend Mother M. Valeria Romanchek and special thanks are expressed to the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius for their helpful cooperation and endless assistance and guidance throughout the researching of this paper. I dedicate this history to Reverend Mother M. Emerentia Petrasek, former Community historian, upon whose research of the Slovak past and the tracing of the Community's growth I so heavily relied. THE ROOTS OF SLOVAK CULTURE ARE CENTURIES OLD The United States is the most important immigrant receiving country in the world. Between 1850 and 1930 no less than thirty-eight million people settled within our borders. 1 Although early in this immigration period many �SLOVAKIA 133 newcomers strove to sever ties with the old world, a sizeable portion continued to look reverently upon their past. The Slovak American, who journeyed to this country primarily in the later wave of European immigration, were such a group. The Slovaks feared the loss of their native culture to a new growing American culture because their past history consisted of repeated attempts at such assimilation. But also in America the Slovak hoped for the chance and the right to have his own life. The Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius are a teaching community dedicated to preserving and promoting this American Slovak culture. Because one-third of all Slovaks live in America,2 the Sisters' preservation of their culture is extremely important to the overall existence of the Slovak people as a national entity. The Slovak people are a small part of the Slavic family found on the European continent. Ethnologists place the Slovaks in the Western Slavic group, which also includes Poles, Czechs and Moravians. Commonly but erroneously the Slovaks are considered only a part of the "Czechoslovak Nation," but during the ten centuries of Slovak history, the Slovaks did not live in a common state with the Czechs until 1918. Little is known of the early Slavs. Ancient Greeks and Romans made contact, but left few records. Early recorded Slovak history tells of struggles with Asiatic tribes, particularly the Avari to whom the Slovaks were subjected for almost a century. The subjection was followed by the influence and reign of the Franks. 3 The early Slovak was pagan and war-like. He had many customs but few laws. He was chiefly agricultural and believed in various superstitions. This type of religion held fast until the ninth century when Prince Pribina, the first direct Slovak ruler of Slavic birth, established the first Slavic Christian church. Pribina's efforts to christianize his people met with little success, largely because he was dependent on Frankish missionaries whose language his people could not understand. 4 In 846 Pribina's court surrendered to Rastislav, a skillful warrior, who succeeded in winning independence from the Franks. Rastislav sought religious as well as political freedom. In the year 863 Prince Rastislav invited the two �134 SLOVAKIA holy brothers, Constantine and Methodius, to come from Constantinople and work among the Slovak people. These Byzantine missionaries found it necessary to invent an alphabet for the Slavs, so that the Holy Scriptures could be given to them in their own tongue. After having the use of the Slavonic tongue in Western Liturgy sanctioned by the Roman Pope, Methodius returned to Slovakia as a bishop. Constantine meanwhile had died in Rome in 869 , after entering a monastery there and assuming the name of Cyril. By means of their translations of the Holy Scriptures Constantine and Methodius laid the foundations of Slavic literature. The introduction of schools went hand in hand with this introduction and spread of Christianity in Slovakia.5 Archbishop Methodius continued his teaching and missionary activity until his death in 885. That period of political independence for Slovakia lasted but a short time. Slovakia was soon incorporated into the State of Hungary, which during medieval times consisted of various nations. During this period known as 'The Thousand Years of Oppression', the Slovaks' civil life declined and thus their national consciousness was under a cloud. The Lutheran Reformation, the Turkish invasion of Hungary in 1526 and the Counter-Reformation led by the Jesuits all had varying effects on Slovak education. But it was not until the suppression of the Jesuit Order in 1773 and the state control of education under Empress Maria Theresa, that the Slovak education was directed by any one source. The State of Hungary considered it its duty to provide for the education of its people, hoping to make the power of the state felt in every phase of life.6 The reigns of Maria Theresa and Joseph II saw an expansion of education and also an attempt at Germanization of the Slovaks. Joseph's attempt at Germanization was significantly challenged in 1847 and replaced by Hungarian Magyarization. Whether Germanization or Magyarization the NonHungarian Nationalities' interests were ignored. In 1867 the 'Austro-Hungarian Compromise' touched off rapid action to create a unitary Hungary by Magyarizing all departments of public life, especially the schools. The aim of this policy was the complete assimilation and �SLOVAKIA 135 conversion of Slovakia into a purely Magyar Province of Hungary. Since language is the chief symbol of nationality, the Slovak language was suppressed. Poor economically and having their national ideals and traditions submerged, the Slovaks began seeking a new way to improve their life. U.S. SHINES WITH HOPE FOR SLOVAK IMMIGRANTS Immigration held the dream of a better life. The heaviest immigration of the Slovaks occurred between 1890 and 1900.7 It must be stressed that the majority of immigrants came to America for economic reasons, few peasants ever left East Europe during this period due to political reasons, though politics did cause many not to return. 8 The first immigrants were usually the fathers of the Slovak families, hoping for quick economic gain, and a subsequent return to their native land and families. But once in America few immigrants returned. They found employment that significantly raised their living standard. Though in a strange, sometimes hostile land, the immigrant recognized the ideals of freedom that he was denied in his homeland. As thoughts of returning to their native land diminished, the pioneering immigrants sent for their families to join them in their adopted country. 9 Once the immigrant families had situated themselves in this new land, they were faced with problems of adjustment. The majority of the Slovak immigrants settled in the industrial East, seeking employment with the mining industries, particularly in Pennsylvania. Since the closing of the American frontier the greatest means of livelihood for new immigrants was in these rising industrial areas.10 As the economic necessity of making a living diminished, the new Americans turned to their social needs. Subsequently as the new settlements became more permanent, these Slovak immigrants turned to their religious needs. They began by building community parishes, while searching for Slovak priests who were few in number in this time of early immigration.11 The churches provided a common bond upon which were built beneficial organizations, such as the organizations of the First Catholic Slovak Union known as Jednota. It was the purpose of these beneficial groups to locate and unite the scattered elements �136 SLOVAKIA of American Slovaks. Unity was usually provided through the weekly Slovak newspapers. EDUCATION AL ASPIRATIONS OF AMERICAN SLOVAKS Upon completion of the drive to build parishes the Slovaks had finished with what they call the Church Age of their settlement in America. 12 Having established themselves within their own community, they were faced with the task of joining the larger American community. Obviously, they needed to learn the English language and familiarize themselves with American customs. It was over this need for education that friction developed. On the one hand the immigrant desired to be accepted in this new environment; yet on the other, he also desired to preserve his own cultural past. The first generation immigrant was taught English usually by his employer and did not have his culture challenged, thus resisting assimilation. 13 It was the education of successive generations that presented the problem of cultural alienation. The apparent choice in education was to enroll their offsprings in public schools in order to help them adjust to this new American Life. But education in the public schools posed severe cultural hazards. The public school taught American subjects with American values. The foreign children were judged by American cultural standards of conduct. In this position the foreign children were caught between their old culture and the new American culture. This had definite results: A limited number abandoned their embarrassing heritage-to accept American standards; a larger number sought to forget their traditional background regarding them as inferior-lead ing to family disruption and disintegration . Finally, the largest group failed to adjust to school and left feeling disregarded, discouraged and inferior .14 The public school encouraged the disintegration of Slovak families. The Slovaks had successfully resisted attempts of assimilation by stronger cultures in the past, but now they faced the task of resisting assimilation in a foreign land. To be assimilated meant the destruction of their culture. The chief means of assimilation was through education, as was attempted in their past history. Though it was largely an unconscious process by which America imposed its own standard of ideals on the new- �SLOVAKIA 137 comers, the public schools were succeeding in imposing a common English culture upon the children of many nationalities. 15 By treating the immigrant as a native the public school disregarded his culture and background. What was needed was a means to hand down a suitable portion of his native culture in order to provide a past, thus avoiding an identity crisis. The public school system could not provide this necessity in full. What was needed was a new system that could teach their children good American citizenship and preserve in them a profitable appreciation of the language, culture and tradition of their forefathers, while still providing a sufficient academic education. Fearing further disintegration of their culture, the Slovaks began searching and discussing alternatives in the development of Slovak America. REV. MATTHEW JANKOLA ASSUMES LEADERSHIP A leader in this search for a solution to the American Slovak's educational needs was Father Matthew Jankola. He spent much time studying his fellow Slovaks in their new surroundings. Early in his life he wrote: "We have a serious problem, the problem of educating our children according to American methods, and for American citizenship, without, however, destroying their cultural character and their cultural traditions." 16 With this attitude Father Jankola formed an Association of Priests in 1903 to consider the question of providing for the Catholic education of Slovak youth. Father Jankola began his studies for the priesthood in his native Slovakia. But under pressure from both the Hungarian civil and ecclesiastical authorities, which frowned apon Slovak devotion to Saints Cyril and Methodius, and the fostering of Slovak nationalism, Father Jankola sought refuge in America. 17 He arrived in 1893, and finished his studies at Saint Bonaventure's Seminary in Allegheny, New York. As a priest Father Jankola dedicated himself to the problem of cultural disintegration of his people, begun in Hungary and now continuing in America. It was on behalf of this couse that Father Jankola directed his early writings. When considering education, Father Jankola looked to its broader meaning of culture, rather than its narrow sense of formal schooling. He felt �138 SLOVAKIA that next to the parish church must be a school, because without Catholic schools the Catholic Church had no future, no assured existence. Father Jankola saw the parish church alone and unaided by a Catholic school as but a "feeble barrier" against the rapid onrush of worldliness and a too sudden Americanization for Slovak youth. Further, to preserve the Slovak national character, the children must be educated in Slovak schools with religious principles. Father Jankola held the schools as helpful for religious training, and necessary also to preserve nationality. In Father Jankola's mind the church directed religion, not language; for the teaching of language, which fosters the national spirit, teachers and schools were needed.18 In this spirit Father Jankola called for the establishment of schools, staffed by Slovak Sisters. His initial contact with the Slovak people on this project was done through the newspapers, such as the weekly Jednota. Many attempts were made · to secure Slavic Sisters, but to no avail. This was a time of heavy immigration causing the demand for Sisters in America to be very great. Confronted with the problem of no available Sisters for his project, Father Jankola suggested the possibility of founding a Religious Community for the education of Slovak youth. The suggestion was received favorably, so Father Jankola sought Slovak candidates to train in an American Sisterhood, which would later branch off into an independent congregation as their numbers grew. A Czech Benedictine Community of Sisters expressed willingness to receive and educate Slovak girls. Father Jankola secured three aspirants who were sent to the Czech Sisters in Chicago. But this project failed when the girls became discontented and wished to return to Pennsylvania. Their return was hard on Father Jankola, but their young age and the great distances they had traveled made him sympathetic. 19 Father Jankola did not abandon his project. Instead, upon further study he came in contact with Mother Mary Cyril at Mount St. Mary's Seminary in Scranton, Penna. After considering Father Jankola's plan for a parochial school system under Slovak Sisters, Mother Mary Cyril agreed to accept the young girls. The girls entered Mount Saint Mary's Seminary in November of 1903, to learn the �SLOVAKIA 139 principles of religious life and live according to its Rules. 20 While preparing the Slovak girls for religious teaching and guidance under Mother Mary Cyril and the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, Father Jankola began a fund to further his project. He established "St. Anthony's Treasury" which received donations from parishes, societies and individuals. A TEACHING COMMUNITY OF SLOVAK SISTERS IS BORN On September 11, 1909, the first Slovak girls pronounced their religious vows, 21 marking the birth of the Sisters of Saints Cyril and Methodius, honoring the Saints who gave Slovakia its faith and culture. Father Jankola noted that this was the founding of the first Slovak religious sisterhood that the Slovaks ever had, either in Europe or America. At the birth of this new Order Father Jankola set down four principal reasons for its conception: 1) Educate Slovak children 2) Care for Slovak orphans and aged 3) Preserve Slovak culture 4) Pray for the return of Slav schismatics.22 Father Jankola's first principle has been the primary apostolate of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. The parish school has always constituted the particular vocation of the Sisters. The Sisters set themselves the traditional objective of education in a Christian spirit to develop and train to the fullest the powers and capacities of a young student's mind and body. They also strove to inculcate principles of true patriotism and citizenship in order to develop enlightened, conscientious American citizens, imbued with Christian attitudes of justice and charity, peace and order, which they feel are the main components for social living. As Slovak American teachers, they endeavored to preserve some of the traditions and the cultural heritage of the Slovak people among the students of Slovak parentage, and to foster in all students an interest and respect for the varied cultures and attitudes that make up the Brotherhood of Man. 23 Through such recognition and acceptance of foreign natures, characteristics, and personalities built from a different culture, the Sisters sought to achieve cultural democracy. To accept cultural democracy means to accept �140 SLOVAKIA a technique of social adjustment that will make possible the preservation of the best of all cultures. 24 This was the desire of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. To accept, as well as to be accepted, is the condition for effective pluralism in a nation. Cultural pluralism in the American educational system has existed because we are a multi-cultural, multi-racial, and multi-lingual nation. It was thought that the public school system would Americanize these foreign elements into the melting pot of uniform American culture. The concept of American culture as a mosaic has been the reason for, and the challenge of, the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. For six years this newly established Community of Sisters continued under the guidance of the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary. It was on August 4, 1915, that the Community had its first elections in which Sister Mary (Mihalik) was elected the first Superior General. During this period the Sisters opened their first school to educate children in the Sacred Heart of Jesus Parish in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, marking the beginning of the educational work of the Community. Before this group could be firmly established Mother Mary died in 1916. Her successor was Mother M. Emmanuel whose greatest achievement involved the establishment of a suitable, permanent Motherhouse.25 MOTHER M. EMMANUEL, SS.C.M. (1916-1922) The Sisters had been temporarily situated in Middletown, Pennsylvania. While in this location, Mother M. Emmanuel sought a permanent Motherhouse. She was informed by Reverend Julius Foin about a large tract of land with an old mansion in Danville. Through Bishop Philip R. McDevitt, Mother M. Emmanuel made contact with a local attorney, Ralph Kisner, and was informed that the 'Castle Grove' property was for sale. The Mansion site proper, containing thirteen acres-forty rooms, eleven bathrooms-finished throughout with hardwood, was a relic of the passing iron industry in Danville. There was also an adjoining farm with one hundred thirty-three acres and numerous outbuildings. This enormous dwelling was perfect for Mother M. Emmanuel's aims, but the price was beyond the Community's ability to pay. Upon inspection of this property, Mother M. Emmanuel found that the Mansion had stood �SLOVAKIA 141 vacant for fourteen years, needing numerous repairs. With this in mind she made a meager offer. The actual owner was in France, causing slow communication. Price remained the hindrance as Mother M. Emmanuel would not raise her offer. In March of 1919, Attorney Kisner informed the Sisters that the owner had agreed to drastically reduce his price to meet the Community's needs. Now that the Community's prayers for a Motherhouse had been answered, only the necessary funds for purchase remained an obstacle. The Sisters had saved about half of the required amount, but had discouraging experiences in acquiring the rest. This was the critical period during World War I, causing excess funds to be scarce.26 After futile appeals to the citizens and banks of the Wilkes-Barre area, a heavily populated Slovak community, Mother M. Emmanuel turned to the Danville National Bank for a loan. This bank considered the risk minimal and granted the loan at low interest. With payment secured, the Sisters concluded the 'Castle Grove' deal in June of 1919, and began preparations for the transfer of the Motherhouse from Middletown to its permanent home in Danville. Throughout the summer months in 1919, the Sisters worked to put the house and grounds in order. Within this new convent the Community prepared for the continuance of religious training for its Sisters and converted one of the two ballrooms into a chapel. Holy Mass was first celebrated on Sunday morning, July 6, 1919. With the approach of Autumn all but the Sisters in training took leave of 'Sacred Heart Villa,' as the grounds had been named, to resume their duties in the parish schools. During the War Years the demand for Sisters in parochial schools became very great. The war and the influenza epidemic strongly limited the work of the Sisters.27 As this situation relaxed in the summer of 1920, Mother M. Emmanuel arranged classes for the Sisters to improve their educational resources. The educational progress of the Community was under the direction of the Sisters from Marywood. This was being continued by Mother M. Emmanuel who sought also to further the Community's material progress. She was engaged in soliciting funds from the homes of Slovaks to pay off the Sister's bank loan. Mother M. Emmanuel promoted thrift within her �142 SLOVAKIA Community because she felt the Community would be more secure in the American culture when free from debt. Mother M. Emmanuel's term expired in 1922. She had directed this young Sisterhood through its pioneering days, giving it shelter, resources and existence through the war years. Mother M. Emmanuel's main contribution was, of course, the establishment of the Motherhouse that was to become the center of Slovak culture in America. MOTHER M. PIUS, SS.C.M. OPENS ST. CYRIL ACADEMY IN 1922 By the choice of the Sisters, Sister M. Pius was elected the third Superior General. Bishop McDevitt, who supervised the election, also commented on the importance of the Sisters' studies because someday the civil authorities would require that every teacher must be certified by the State of Pennsylvania. Certification would be important in having the Community accepted as a competent educational institution in American society. Now that they had an established center, the Sisters could begin to focus their educational mission with greater assurance. The Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius had always wished for the establishment of a high school and boarding school for girls. Presently, they were only employed in elementary education. This idea for an institution of higher education for their own children was popular among the Slovaks. In addition to the regularly prescribed American branches, they wanted their offsprings to be taught the mother tongue and trained to appreciate the historical and cultural traditions of their nation. 28 To this wish Mother M. Pius responded. Mother M. Pius expressed a desire to have an official from the Department of Public Instruction in Harrisburg come to Danville to give a lecture on the requirements of the State, regarding the equipment and function of a high school and its accreditation. In August of 1922, Doctor Edward Hoban arrived from Harrisburg and explained such subjects as extension courses, summer school, teacher certificates, teaching of foreign languages, importance of teaching citizenship, the teaching of historical and social studies, and the necessity of physical education. This lecture assured the commencement of preparation for a high school on American terms. �SLOVAKIA 143 The following week an advertisement appeared in the Slovak newspapers stating that the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius had equipped part of their convent at Danville as a boarding school for girls. To conform to American standards the equipment of the high school called for two very important departments -the Library and the Laboratory for the Sciences. Both of these were begun with the opening of the school. Books acquired were those recommended by the Department o! Education. Also a large selection of Catholic and Slovak books supplemented the Community's aim of a multicultural education. In all, nineteen pupils attended the first year of the First Catholic Slovak Girls High School, indicating a desire on the part of the Slovaks to have their children educated in a Slovak, as well as an American atmosphere. Towards the close of the first year in the spring of 1923, a small group of students ventured into the school's first extra-curricular activity. These girls formed a Literary Society in which they compiled a little booklet of essays, stories, and poems. Under Mother M. Pius' encouragement this activity continued, resulting in the first issue of the bi-lingual (Slovak and American) school magazine, Fialky (Violets). The Fialky were thereafter issued semi-annually until 1940 and then annually until 1970, when it ceased publication. During the summer vacation Mother M. Pius encouraged the Sisters toward further studies, hoping to improve their competence as teachers. She was anxious to secure state certification for as many Sisters as could qualify. Now that the Community was engaged in all levels of education, Mother M. Pius wished to secure them within the American educational system through accreditation. The Academy's opening in the second year exposed space problems as enrollment grew. Mother Pius expressed the need for a strong building fund and enacted new collection drives among the Slovak people. The number of students steadily increased into the third and fourth year.• With the fourth year the need for accredition increased as the first graduation approached. The school was informed that the State Representatives would make an official inspection at the school year's end. That June, just a week before graduation, the State �144 SLOVAKIA Inspector arrived and spent a day inspecting the school, interviewing both the staff and the students. The State Representative, Doctor Pentz, found the Slovak students being educated and trained in all that the modern high schools offered, and in their Religion and mother tongue as well. To this he expressed his satisfaction, commenting on the orderly and methodological way in which the different departments were being conducted. 29 After Dr. Pentz reported the Academy as "first class" in both arrangement and curriculum, the school received a telegram, congratulating teachers and students on receiving accreditation from the State. This good news arrived just days before the first graduation, much to the Sisters' delight. While preparations for this first commencement progressed, another great event was in prospect, namely, the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago. This event made a great impact on the first commencement of the First Catholic Slovak Girls High School. Accreditation from the State of Pennsylvania proved the Sisters' ability to provide their students with a fitting education in their new society, but what remained to be seen was whether or not the Sisters could live up to the task of preserving Slovak culture in America. Slovak American culture was to receive a fresh impetus by the Eucharistic Congress held in Chicago. Due to attend the Congress were four bishops from Slovakia. The presence of these Slovak bishops greatly excited the Slovak Americans and especially the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius, since through the influence of Bishop McDevitt arrangements were made to have these four bishops attend the Academy's first graduation. The date of the festivity was June 14, 1926. Under the guidance of Bishop McDevitt, who presided at the First Graduation ceremony, the entire Community and students assembled at the Convent's gate to welcome the visiting bishops. Upon the arrival of the Slovak bishops, who were traveling in European fashion, clad in cassock and purple cincture, the commencement proceeded with prayers, songs, and speeches. The speeches were delivered in Slovak, calling for a continuance of Catholic education. Bishop McDevitt's address underscored the advantages which the �SLOVAKIA 145 Slovak people can derive from a solid Catholic education. He also pointed out that this could be done because the American government stood to protect the religious rights of all American citizens. The theme of religious pluralism in America was carried further by the Senior Bishop from Slovakia in a speech that noted how this American government respects, upholds, and protects the religious liberty of the people who found refuge under her banner. Bishop Marian Blaha further cited the great accomplishments of the American Slovaks. Their ability to provide a Catholic education while preserving their mother tongue greatly impressed him. Then as an old Slovak proverb states, "Every perfect day must end even as the sweetest song" -this first commencement was no exception; it was concluded by a student chorale of inspirational Slovak songs.30 The first graduation was a significant milestone in the history of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. It was their first public manifestation of their educational standards and traditions. The graduation exercise presented a new phase in the mission of the Slovak Sisters. Their people realized that Danville would not only house a Convent and an Academy, but would be the center of genuine culture for the Slovaks in America. To attain a status combining a true Americanism with an appreciation of the spirit and traditions of their native land was the Community's desire.31 With this spirit of appreciation, encouraged by the sharp increase of applicants, new thoughts of building were entertained. But unlike before, the Slovak people, organizations and individuals alike, urged this step. These groups advised a general benefit drive for funds, alleging the time was ripe for such a movement since industrial conditions were favorable and the people were willing to donate.32 In the spring of 1927 Mother M. Pius presented a letter of the officers of the First Catholic Slovak Ladies' Union, another element of Slovak-American culture, announcing the drive for a building fund. When Mother M. Pius asked for their contribution, she was immediately promised five thousand dollars. The response elsewhere was the same. The Slovak newspapers pushed the drive and local groups competed in fund raising. This favorable reaction illustrates the Slovak-Americans' desire for an enlarged Slovak cultural center in America. �146 SLOVAKIA With the building fund well under way, Mother M. Pius contracted Architect Bernard Starr of Harrisburg, who in turn sought the assistance of Harry Sternfeld of Philadelphia. A spot for the new building was selected on the Villa Sacred Heart campus, and Mr. Sternfeld sketched a building dominated by a central tower. This initial plan brought eriticism for its "needless extravagance," but Mother M. Pius retained the plan as the answer to the needs of the Community, plus the cultural, educational and religious needs of the Slovak-American people. The Community wasted no time in beginning the new building. Ground was broken on May 23, 1929, in a ceremony which the local Danville Morning News described as an event to go down in Slovak history. 33 The speakers' program included representatives of the church, state, and Slovak national life. As the building progressed, the country entered the depression of the 1930's. By the time the building was completed, economic tension was beginning to be felt everywhere.34 With this in mind, Mother M. Pius avoided any elaborate dedication ceremony. This new building was made to catch the spirit of the past and to intepret it with a contemporaneous point of view in order to make it fit actual conditions.35 Its design was in accord with the ideals of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius, who hoped to blend the past into a new, usable present. In a more practical manner the new building provided an institution solely devoted to the education of the Slovak people and the preserving of their culture. It was viewed as a national work, one that provided b roader limits and better accommodations which would produce greater results. 36 The local paper saw the building as a monument to the Slovak people of America, and considered it one of the local community's finest aspects.37 The Sisters moved into their new building in September of 1931. The following three years were quiet, filled with earnest activity toward the educational goals of the Community. This period ended with the significant year of 1934, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Community's existence. In those twenty-five years the Community developed and established itself in a permanent Motherhouse, which in turn had developed the First Catholic Slovak Girls' High �SLOVAKIA 147 School, crowned by the magnificent new building. This had been done under three Superiors General-Mother Mary, Mother M. Emmanuel, Mother M. Pius-all of whom promoted the cultivation of the Slovak language and history, which, with religion, constitute the two outstanding characteristics of the Slovak Academy. Extra-curricular activities, like Fialky and Cyrilika-a society for fostering interest in Slovak journalism-as well as customs established for the practical study of Slovak, such as speaking Slovak all day every Saturday, and the annual observance of Slovak Week, acquired notice and approval. The observance of Slovak tradition gave this Academy a unique position in the field of American education.38 With a high spirit of celebration the Silver Jubilee of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius commenced. The Jubilee marked still another turning point in the Community's history as it came at the close of Mother M. Pius' long administration. Her work finished laying a firm foundation which became the base for a promising era of new growth. MOTHER M. EMERENTIA, SS.C.M. (1934-1946) In this new period of the Community's history the work of the Academy advanced quietly, with gratifying results in the field of Slovak-American culture. When Mother M. Emerentia was elected Superior General in 1934, she encouraged Slovak interests and cultural projects like formal programs, dramatic productions, Slovak readings, folk song festivals and, above all, research and creative writing on Slovak topics. Mother M. Emerentia was also responsible for the compilation of Slovak language texts and hymnals used widely in Slovak elementary schools and parishes in America. The early years of Mother M. Emerentia's administration coincided with the greatest period of the depression. Though there was no drop in student enrollment, neither was there the marked increase that would have normally been the case.• These drawbacks, however, had advantages. The subdued quiet of the interval was conducive to a greater concentration on school work, both regular and extracurricular. Correspondence with students in Slovakia '' See enrollment figures; Table I. �148 SLOVAKIA was an activity greatly enjoyed by the students of St. Cyril Academy. It was also during these years that the school was favored by a number of distinguished visitors from Slovakia, including a delegation from the Slovak Institute of Arts and Sciences, a group of students from the Slovak unit of Pax Romana, plus numerous distinguished scholars, writers, and statesmen, including the Slovak martyr, Msgr. Joseph Tiso.39 When our country was drawn into war on December 8, 1941, the first care of the Motherhouse was directed toward the Sisters and their pupils in the parish schools. The Community placed its trust in God and His care of our country, and classes went on as usual. However, extracurricular activities were directed toward war needs. Beyond the prayers for peace, the Community and its students turned out quantities of knitted sweaters and helmets. They experienced the value of thrift by rationing food and collected all scraps such as fats, iron and paper. The Sisters also joined in relief efforts for their native land. An extensive relief project for the war sufferers in Slovakia was aided by the Community, which sent abroad numerous packages of relief materials. The motherhouse was a center for this organized relief work. The relief project continued in action even after the war, when Slovakia again was suppressed by a stronger force. Following a remarkably successful and flourishing six-year period of self-rule under the Presidency of Tiso, the Slovak government collapsed when victory came to Russia and the Allies. 40 With this victory Slovakia was overrun by the Communists. Their occupation of the country led to the execution of Msgr. Tiso, plus the silencing of many bishops and priests. The people of Slovakia remained in destitution; hence, the necessity for relief work to continue until the Iron Curtain cut off all communication. 41 The Communist occupation caused more refugees to seek freedom and sanctuary from Slovakia. As thousands came to America, the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius and their students enjoyed fresh contacts with persons of their fatherland. Priests and professional people willingly gave lectures to both the Sisters and the students, chiefly on conditions in Slovakia and on topics of Slovak history. �SLOVAKIA 149 Several high school students from Slovakia enrolled in the Academy, thus enriching the Slovak-American culture. MOTHER M. CRESCENTIA, SS.C.M. (1946-1958) While the Slovak-American tradition was being enriched during these post-war years, a new Superior General was elected, placing renewed importance on the educational aspects of the Academy. Mother M. Crescentia realized that during the earlier years the educational objectives could not be pursued as fully as desired since more urgent activities were at hand. In time, however, conditions improved, so that more and better organized work could be done in the field of teacher education. Mother M. Crescentia took advantage of this situation, arranging for more Sisters to take college courses in a greater variety of fields. With this renewed progress in the Sisters' personal educational ventures, activities in the Academy moved apace. The student enrollment at the Academy, which increased only to a minor extent after the depression, now began rapid growth. This growth of the Academy advanced steadily into the fifties, causing every available space within the Academy to be filled. It necessitated the building of Saint Philomena Hall to be used for students' living and classrooms. Also in the fifties, the Community worked for the founding of Father Jankola. They are Villa Saint Cyril in Highland Park, Illinois, and Maria Joseph Manor in Danville, Pennsylvania. By 1958 the Community had a new Superior General in the person of Mother M. Bernard. MOTHER M. BERNARD, SS.C.M. (1958-1970) The highlight of this decade was the observance of the Community's Golden Jubilee. It was climaxed by the celebration of a Roman-Slavonic Mass on the Villa campus in the presence of five thousand visitors from all parts of the country.42 It was the first Roman rite vernacular Mass ever offered on this continent. The increased enrollment and the large turnout for the Roman-Slavonic Mass indicates the strong support the Academy received from the Slovak-American people in its preserving of Slovak culture. The early sixties were also highlighted by a large celebration honoring another aspect of the Comunity's Slovak heritage. The year 1963 marked the eleven hundredth �150 SLOVAKIA anniversary of the arrival of SS. Cyril and Methodius among the Slovaks. In addition to the Community celebration in America, the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius participated in a week-long observance in Rome, involving numerous Slovak pilgrims, who had assembled there for the dedication of the Slovak Institute of SS. Cyril and Methodius, a seminary for the training of priests for Slovakia. THE JANKOLA LIBRARY The latter sixties and early seventies for St. Cyril Academy had been dominated by two cherished Slovak projects. First was the active cooperation with the Apostolate of the Slovak Institute of SS. Cyril and Methodius in Rome, begun during the 1963 pilgrimage. Second was the professional development of the Jankola Library at the Academy. This Library is a center of Slovak culture and learning for St. Cyril Academy and Slovak America. It is called Jankola Library in honor of the founder of the Community and promoter of Slovak-American culture, Father Matthew Jankola. The Library provides invaluable resources for study and research purposes, as well as literary works to enrich the Slovak spirit. Jankola Library contains over six thousand (6,000) fully catalogued items on its shelves with several hundred more reserved for further processing.43 Beyond just Slovak books this Library also promotes Slovak-American culture with its large collection of Slovak art. Included among its treasures are a large unusual map of Czecho-Slovakia, an artistically costumed mannequin representing the Slovak tradition, and a large, valuable collection of Slovak ceramic art, some embroidery and sizeable pieces of cutglass sent from Slovakia. This Library with its vast assortment of Slovak art is truly a tribute to Slovakia's culture. With Jankola Library as its Slovak center, SS. Cyril Academy still provides an excellent American education. It offers a wide range of courses, including four foreign languages.* Besides educating students for social living in America, the Academy can also train girls for a religious teaching life within its own Community. The Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius are presently teaching in parish schools and eight (8) high schools, including a boarding * Source listing of St. Cyril Academy. Table II. �151 SLOVAKIA school for girls. 0 Education of Slovak children continues to be the principal vocation of a Sister of SS. Cyril and Methodius. It is to these children that a Sister dedicates herseJf and hopes to preserve Slovakia's heritage. Today, the St. Cyril Academy is justifiably proud of tts accomplishments during the past fifty ( 50) years. Both the teaching Sisters and their students are fully educated in, and cognizant of, their dual heritage. The traditions and artifacts of Slovak culture have been preserved; while at the same time, each graduate is proud to be an American. St. Cyril Academy continues to revere its Slovak past. The Sisters continue to aid the suppressed people of Slovakia, but now this is done indirectly to the extent possible. It is the desire of the Sisters of the Academy to provide their countrymen with new hope of cultural freedom by showing them the accomplishments that have been possible in America. This Academy is rightly considered the center of Slovak culture in America. "" List of schools staffed by Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Table III. TABLE I Enrollment figures of St. Cyril Academy, Danville, Pa. Year 1925-26 1926-27 1927-28 1928-29 1929-30 1930-31 1931-32 1932-33 1933-34 1934-35 1935-36 1936-37 1937-38 1938-39 1939-40 1940-41 Total Number of Students 38 39 44 47 42 61 75 69 60 58 52 58 54 50 60 70 Year 1941-42 1942-43 1943-44 1944-45 1945-46 1946-47 1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-54 1954-55 1955-56 1956-57 Total Number of Students 66 55 55 69 91 96 90 107 112 109 123 138 148 153 157 180 Total Number Year of Students 1957-58 1958-59 1959-60 1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 181 175 162 182 202 195 202 171 156 178 120 108 104 101 108 106 �SLOVAKIA 152 TABLE II Curriculum of St. Cyril Academy FIRST YEAR Religion I English I Algebra I Intr. Physical Science Physical Education Chorus World Culture I Latin I Spanish I French I Slovak I Foods Art I Art Appreciation Music Appreciation Health Education Piano Interpretive Dance SECOND YEAR Religion II English II Geometry Biology Physical Education Chorus World Culture II Latin II French II Spanish II Slovak II Foods Clothing I Art II Piano Interpretive Dance THIRD YEAR Religion III English III Algebra II Chemistry Physical Education Chorus American Culture I Latin III Spanish III French III Slovak III Foods Advanced Clothing Art III Piano Interpretive Dance Typing I Stenography I �SLOVAKIA 153 FOURTH YEAR Religion IV English IV Business English Math 12 Advanced Biology Physical Education Chorus American Culture II Latin IV Spanish IV French IV Slovak IV Advanced Clothing Art IV Speech Piano Interpretive Dance Typing II Stenography II Bookkeeping Business Law TABLE III SCHOOLS STAFFED BY SIS'llEIBS OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS Berwick, Pa. Bloomsburg, Pa. Binghamton, N. Y. Binghamton, N. Y. Bridgeport, Conn. Bridgeport, Pa. Charleston, S. C. Charleston, S. C. Chicago, Ill. East Vandergrift, Pa. Endicott, N. Y. Gary, Indiana Hazleton, Pa. Jessup, Pa. Lebanon, Pa. Luzerne, Pa. Nanticoke, Pa. New York, N. Y. Olyphant, Pa. Perth Amboy, N. J. Phoenixville, Pa. Pittston, Pa. Plymouth, Pa. Stratford, Conn. Swoyersville, Pa. Torrington, Conn. St. Mary's School St. Columba School SS. Cyril and Methodius School St. Ann's School SS. Cyril and Methodius School Mother of Sorrows School Blessed Sacrament School Nativity School SS. Simon and Jude School Holy Trinity School St. Joseph School Holy Trinity School St. Joseph School St. Michael's School SS. Cyril and Methodius School St. John Nepomucene School St. Joseph School St. John Nepomucene School Holy Ghost School Holy Trinity School Sacred Heart of Jesus School St. John Baptist School St. Stephen School Sacred Name of Jesus School Holy Trinity School Sacred Heart of Jesus School �SLOVAKIA 154 Immaculate Conception School Sacred Heart of Jesus School Holy Trinity School Whiting, Ind. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Yonkers, N. Y. IDGH SCHOOLS Andrean High School Dunmore Catholic High School Lourdes H. S. Lebanon Catholic H. S. Kingston Catholic Central Catholic Central H. S. Catholic Central (St. Pius X) Blessed Sacrament Academy St. Cyril Academy 1. Gary, Ind. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Dunmore, Pa. Shamokin, Pa. Lebanon, Pa. Kingston, Pa. Charleston, S. C. Pottstown, Pa. Yonkers, N. Y. Danville, Pa. FOOTNOTES 1) David F . Bowers, "Social and Cultural Impact" in For eign Influences in American Life (Princeton, 1944) , p. 1. 2) Emily Balch, Our Slavic Fellow Citizens (New York, 1969), p. 86. 3) The Slovak Nation, Manuscript in Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius Community Archives, Danville, Pennsylvania. 4 ) Ibid. 5) Education in Slovakia, Manuscript in SS. C. M Community Archives, composition by M . I. Angelovic, pp. 88. 6) Ibid. 7) Ear liest Immigration, Ms. in SS. C. M. Community Archives. 8 ) Emily Balch, Our Slavic Fellow Citizens, p . 108. 9 ) Earliest Immigration Ms. 10) Francis Brown and Joseph Roucek, "Czechoslovak American" in One America (New York, 1946), p. 147. 11) In 1899, there were eight Slovak priests in America. Earliest Immigration Ms. 12) The Slovaks divide their settlement in America into three Ages: Church Age, School Age, and Institution Age. Ibid. 13) Daniel Tanzone, "The Slovak Experience in Contemporary America" in Slovakia (Middletown, Pa., 1972), p. 129. 14) Francis Brown and Joseph Roucek, Our Racial and National Minorities (New York, 1937), p. 602. 15) Timothy Smith, "New Approaches to the History of Immigration in 20th Century America", in The America Historical Review LXXI, (July 1966), p. 127. �155 SLOVAKIA 16) Contributions of Reverend Matthew Jankola to Slovak Catholic Education in the United States, Ms. in SS. C. M. Community Archives, composition by Sister M. Consuela Gregorovic, p. 14. 17) Ibid. , p. 3. 18 ) Earliest Plans, Ms. in SS. C. M. Community Archives. 19) Ibid . 20) Ibid. 21) The girls wer,e Mary Mihalik, Mary Bartek and Mary Pauly. 22) Father Jankola, Ms., pp. 38-46. 23) Philosophy of Saint Cyril Academy, Ms. 24) Francis Brown and Joseph Roucek, Our America, p. 501. 25) The Educational Activities of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius in the United States, Ms. in SS. C. M. C-Ommunity Archives, composition by Sister Maria Berchmans Teplicky, p. 4. 26) Danville, Ms. in SS. C. M. Community Archives. 27) Ibid. 28) Educational Expansion, Ms. in SS. C.M. Community Archives. 29) Josephine M. Marcinko, "A Little Historical Sketch" in Fialky (Danville, 1927), p. 23. 30) Edttcational Expansion, Ms. 31) Preparing to Build, Ms. in SS. C. M. Community Archives. 32) Ibid. 33) Morning News, (Danville, May 23, 1929), p. 6. 34 ) Brief History of the Congregation of the Sisters of Saints Cyril and Methodius, Ms. in SS. C. M. Community Archives, composition by Mother M. Emerentia Petrasek, p. 85. 35) Fialky, (Danville, 1931), p. 82. 36) Brief History, Ms., Petrasek, p. 85. 37) Morning News, (Danville, June 8, 1931), p. 4. 38) Brief History, Ms., Petrasek, pp. 88-90. 39 ) Ibid. , p. 108. 40 ) Joseph Pauco, Slovakia, pp. 26-28. 41) Brief History, Ms., Petrasek, p. 125. 42) Sisters of Saints Cyril and Methodius, Jankola Book, (Danville, 1972) , p. 90. 43) SS. C. M., Jankola Book, p. 108. � 132 SLOVAKIA William W a g n e r : The Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius and the Preservation of Slovak Culture in America The research involved in writing the history of an ethnic teaching community presented me with two problems. First, there are relatively few works completed on American ethnic groups, including the Slovak Americans. Secondly, the past of this particular teaching Community, the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius, has been largely recorded only by the Sisters of that Community. Therefore, my research on the Slovak past ( still predominantly written in the Slovak tongue) and my compiling of the Community's history were very dependent on the writings of the Sisters of the Community. I believe my work is objective, because of the limitation of my knowledge of the Community's religious life, thus removing me from a biased influence. All in all, I attempted to deal with this subject in such a manner as to present an honest view of the history and purpose surrounding the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. My appreciation is extended to Reverend Mother M. Valeria Romanchek and special thanks are expressed to the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius for their helpful cooperation and endless assistance and guidance throughout the researching of this paper. I dedicate this history to Reverend Mother M. Emerentia Petrasek, former Community historian, upon whose research of the Slovak past and the tracing of the Community's growth I so heavily relied. THE ROOTS OF SLOVAK CULTURE ARE CENTURIES OLD The United States is the most important immigrant receiving country in the world. Between 1850 and 1930 no less than thirty-eight million people settled within our borders. 1 Although early in this immigration period many �SLOVAKIA 133 newcomers strove to sever ties with the old world, a sizeable portion continued to look reverently upon their past. The Slovak American, who journeyed to this country primarily in the later wave of European immigration, were such a group. The Slovaks feared the loss of their native culture to a new growing American culture because their past history consisted of repeated attempts at such assimilation. But also in America the Slovak hoped for the chance and the right to have his own life. The Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius are a teaching community dedicated to preserving and promoting this American Slovak culture. Because one-third of all Slovaks live in America,2 the Sisters' preservation of their culture is extremely important to the overall existence of the Slovak people as a national entity. The Slovak people are a small part of the Slavic family found on the European continent. Ethnologists place the Slovaks in the Western Slavic group, which also includes Poles, Czechs and Moravians. Commonly but erroneously the Slovaks are considered only a part of the "Czechoslovak Nation," but during the ten centuries of Slovak history, the Slovaks did not live in a common state with the Czechs until 1918. Little is known of the early Slavs. Ancient Greeks and Romans made contact, but left few records. Early recorded Slovak history tells of struggles with Asiatic tribes, particularly the Avari to whom the Slovaks were subjected for almost a century. The subjection was followed by the influence and reign of the Franks. 3 The early Slovak was pagan and war-like. He had many customs but few laws. He was chiefly agricultural and believed in various superstitions. This type of religion held fast until the ninth century when Prince Pribina, the first direct Slovak ruler of Slavic birth, established the first Slavic Christian church. Pribina's efforts to christianize his people met with little success, largely because he was dependent on Frankish missionaries whose language his people could not understand. 4 In 846 Pribina's court surrendered to Rastislav, a skillful warrior, who succeeded in winning independence from the Franks. Rastislav sought religious as well as political freedom. In the year 863 Prince Rastislav invited the two �134 SLOVAKIA holy brothers, Constantine and Methodius, to come from Constantinople and work among the Slovak people. These Byzantine missionaries found it necessary to invent an alphabet for the Slavs, so that the Holy Scriptures could be given to them in their own tongue. After having the use of the Slavonic tongue in Western Liturgy sanctioned by the Roman Pope, Methodius returned to Slovakia as a bishop. Constantine meanwhile had died in Rome in 869 , after entering a monastery there and assuming the name of Cyril. By means of their translations of the Holy Scriptures Constantine and Methodius laid the foundations of Slavic literature. The introduction of schools went hand in hand with this introduction and spread of Christianity in Slovakia.5 Archbishop Methodius continued his teaching and missionary activity until his death in 885. That period of political independence for Slovakia lasted but a short time. Slovakia was soon incorporated into the State of Hungary, which during medieval times consisted of various nations. During this period known as 'The Thousand Years of Oppression', the Slovaks' civil life declined and thus their national consciousness was under a cloud. The Lutheran Reformation, the Turkish invasion of Hungary in 1526 and the Counter-Reformation led by the Jesuits all had varying effects on Slovak education. But it was not until the suppression of the Jesuit Order in 1773 and the state control of education under Empress Maria Theresa, that the Slovak education was directed by any one source. The State of Hungary considered it its duty to provide for the education of its people, hoping to make the power of the state felt in every phase of life.6 The reigns of Maria Theresa and Joseph II saw an expansion of education and also an attempt at Germanization of the Slovaks. Joseph's attempt at Germanization was significantly challenged in 1847 and replaced by Hungarian Magyarization. Whether Germanization or Magyarization the NonHungarian Nationalities' interests were ignored. In 1867 the 'Austro-Hungarian Compromise' touched off rapid action to create a unitary Hungary by Magyarizing all departments of public life, especially the schools. The aim of this policy was the complete assimilation and �SLOVAKIA 135 conversion of Slovakia into a purely Magyar Province of Hungary. Since language is the chief symbol of nationality, the Slovak language was suppressed. Poor economically and having their national ideals and traditions submerged, the Slovaks began seeking a new way to improve their life. U.S. SHINES WITH HOPE FOR SLOVAK IMMIGRANTS Immigration held the dream of a better life. The heaviest immigration of the Slovaks occurred between 1890 and 1900.7 It must be stressed that the majority of immigrants came to America for economic reasons, few peasants ever left East Europe during this period due to political reasons, though politics did cause many not to return. 8 The first immigrants were usually the fathers of the Slovak families, hoping for quick economic gain, and a subsequent return to their native land and families. But once in America few immigrants returned. They found employment that significantly raised their living standard. Though in a strange, sometimes hostile land, the immigrant recognized the ideals of freedom that he was denied in his homeland. As thoughts of returning to their native land diminished, the pioneering immigrants sent for their families to join them in their adopted country. 9 Once the immigrant families had situated themselves in this new land, they were faced with problems of adjustment. The majority of the Slovak immigrants settled in the industrial East, seeking employment with the mining industries, particularly in Pennsylvania. Since the closing of the American frontier the greatest means of livelihood for new immigrants was in these rising industrial areas.10 As the economic necessity of making a living diminished, the new Americans turned to their social needs. Subsequently as the new settlements became more permanent, these Slovak immigrants turned to their religious needs. They began by building community parishes, while searching for Slovak priests who were few in number in this time of early immigration.11 The churches provided a common bond upon which were built beneficial organizations, such as the organizations of the First Catholic Slovak Union known as Jednota. It was the purpose of these beneficial groups to locate and unite the scattered elements �136 SLOVAKIA of American Slovaks. Unity was usually provided through the weekly Slovak newspapers. EDUCATION AL ASPIRATIONS OF AMERICAN SLOVAKS Upon completion of the drive to build parishes the Slovaks had finished with what they call the Church Age of their settlement in America. 12 Having established themselves within their own community, they were faced with the task of joining the larger American community. Obviously, they needed to learn the English language and familiarize themselves with American customs. It was over this need for education that friction developed. On the one hand the immigrant desired to be accepted in this new environment; yet on the other, he also desired to preserve his own cultural past. The first generation immigrant was taught English usually by his employer and did not have his culture challenged, thus resisting assimilation. 13 It was the education of successive generations that presented the problem of cultural alienation. The apparent choice in education was to enroll their offsprings in public schools in order to help them adjust to this new American Life. But education in the public schools posed severe cultural hazards. The public school taught American subjects with American values. The foreign children were judged by American cultural standards of conduct. In this position the foreign children were caught between their old culture and the new American culture. This had definite results: A limited number abandoned their embarrassing heritage-to accept American standards; a larger number sought to forget their traditional background regarding them as inferior-lead ing to family disruption and disintegration . Finally, the largest group failed to adjust to school and left feeling disregarded, discouraged and inferior .14 The public school encouraged the disintegration of Slovak families. The Slovaks had successfully resisted attempts of assimilation by stronger cultures in the past, but now they faced the task of resisting assimilation in a foreign land. To be assimilated meant the destruction of their culture. The chief means of assimilation was through education, as was attempted in their past history. Though it was largely an unconscious process by which America imposed its own standard of ideals on the new- �SLOVAKIA 137 comers, the public schools were succeeding in imposing a common English culture upon the children of many nationalities. 15 By treating the immigrant as a native the public school disregarded his culture and background. What was needed was a means to hand down a suitable portion of his native culture in order to provide a past, thus avoiding an identity crisis. The public school system could not provide this necessity in full. What was needed was a new system that could teach their children good American citizenship and preserve in them a profitable appreciation of the language, culture and tradition of their forefathers, while still providing a sufficient academic education. Fearing further disintegration of their culture, the Slovaks began searching and discussing alternatives in the development of Slovak America. REV. MATTHEW JANKOLA ASSUMES LEADERSHIP A leader in this search for a solution to the American Slovak's educational needs was Father Matthew Jankola. He spent much time studying his fellow Slovaks in their new surroundings. Early in his life he wrote: "We have a serious problem, the problem of educating our children according to American methods, and for American citizenship, without, however, destroying their cultural character and their cultural traditions." 16 With this attitude Father Jankola formed an Association of Priests in 1903 to consider the question of providing for the Catholic education of Slovak youth. Father Jankola began his studies for the priesthood in his native Slovakia. But under pressure from both the Hungarian civil and ecclesiastical authorities, which frowned apon Slovak devotion to Saints Cyril and Methodius, and the fostering of Slovak nationalism, Father Jankola sought refuge in America. 17 He arrived in 1893, and finished his studies at Saint Bonaventure's Seminary in Allegheny, New York. As a priest Father Jankola dedicated himself to the problem of cultural disintegration of his people, begun in Hungary and now continuing in America. It was on behalf of this couse that Father Jankola directed his early writings. When considering education, Father Jankola looked to its broader meaning of culture, rather than its narrow sense of formal schooling. He felt �138 SLOVAKIA that next to the parish church must be a school, because without Catholic schools the Catholic Church had no future, no assured existence. Father Jankola saw the parish church alone and unaided by a Catholic school as but a "feeble barrier" against the rapid onrush of worldliness and a too sudden Americanization for Slovak youth. Further, to preserve the Slovak national character, the children must be educated in Slovak schools with religious principles. Father Jankola held the schools as helpful for religious training, and necessary also to preserve nationality. In Father Jankola's mind the church directed religion, not language; for the teaching of language, which fosters the national spirit, teachers and schools were needed.18 In this spirit Father Jankola called for the establishment of schools, staffed by Slovak Sisters. His initial contact with the Slovak people on this project was done through the newspapers, such as the weekly Jednota. Many attempts were made · to secure Slavic Sisters, but to no avail. This was a time of heavy immigration causing the demand for Sisters in America to be very great. Confronted with the problem of no available Sisters for his project, Father Jankola suggested the possibility of founding a Religious Community for the education of Slovak youth. The suggestion was received favorably, so Father Jankola sought Slovak candidates to train in an American Sisterhood, which would later branch off into an independent congregation as their numbers grew. A Czech Benedictine Community of Sisters expressed willingness to receive and educate Slovak girls. Father Jankola secured three aspirants who were sent to the Czech Sisters in Chicago. But this project failed when the girls became discontented and wished to return to Pennsylvania. Their return was hard on Father Jankola, but their young age and the great distances they had traveled made him sympathetic. 19 Father Jankola did not abandon his project. Instead, upon further study he came in contact with Mother Mary Cyril at Mount St. Mary's Seminary in Scranton, Penna. After considering Father Jankola's plan for a parochial school system under Slovak Sisters, Mother Mary Cyril agreed to accept the young girls. The girls entered Mount Saint Mary's Seminary in November of 1903, to learn the �SLOVAKIA 139 principles of religious life and live according to its Rules. 20 While preparing the Slovak girls for religious teaching and guidance under Mother Mary Cyril and the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, Father Jankola began a fund to further his project. He established "St. Anthony's Treasury" which received donations from parishes, societies and individuals. A TEACHING COMMUNITY OF SLOVAK SISTERS IS BORN On September 11, 1909, the first Slovak girls pronounced their religious vows, 21 marking the birth of the Sisters of Saints Cyril and Methodius, honoring the Saints who gave Slovakia its faith and culture. Father Jankola noted that this was the founding of the first Slovak religious sisterhood that the Slovaks ever had, either in Europe or America. At the birth of this new Order Father Jankola set down four principal reasons for its conception: 1) Educate Slovak children 2) Care for Slovak orphans and aged 3) Preserve Slovak culture 4) Pray for the return of Slav schismatics.22 Father Jankola's first principle has been the primary apostolate of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. The parish school has always constituted the particular vocation of the Sisters. The Sisters set themselves the traditional objective of education in a Christian spirit to develop and train to the fullest the powers and capacities of a young student's mind and body. They also strove to inculcate principles of true patriotism and citizenship in order to develop enlightened, conscientious American citizens, imbued with Christian attitudes of justice and charity, peace and order, which they feel are the main components for social living. As Slovak American teachers, they endeavored to preserve some of the traditions and the cultural heritage of the Slovak people among the students of Slovak parentage, and to foster in all students an interest and respect for the varied cultures and attitudes that make up the Brotherhood of Man. 23 Through such recognition and acceptance of foreign natures, characteristics, and personalities built from a different culture, the Sisters sought to achieve cultural democracy. To accept cultural democracy means to accept �140 SLOVAKIA a technique of social adjustment that will make possible the preservation of the best of all cultures. 24 This was the desire of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. To accept, as well as to be accepted, is the condition for effective pluralism in a nation. Cultural pluralism in the American educational system has existed because we are a multi-cultural, multi-racial, and multi-lingual nation. It was thought that the public school system would Americanize these foreign elements into the melting pot of uniform American culture. The concept of American culture as a mosaic has been the reason for, and the challenge of, the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. For six years this newly established Community of Sisters continued under the guidance of the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary. It was on August 4, 1915, that the Community had its first elections in which Sister Mary (Mihalik) was elected the first Superior General. During this period the Sisters opened their first school to educate children in the Sacred Heart of Jesus Parish in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, marking the beginning of the educational work of the Community. Before this group could be firmly established Mother Mary died in 1916. Her successor was Mother M. Emmanuel whose greatest achievement involved the establishment of a suitable, permanent Motherhouse.25 MOTHER M. EMMANUEL, SS.C.M. (1916-1922) The Sisters had been temporarily situated in Middletown, Pennsylvania. While in this location, Mother M. Emmanuel sought a permanent Motherhouse. She was informed by Reverend Julius Foin about a large tract of land with an old mansion in Danville. Through Bishop Philip R. McDevitt, Mother M. Emmanuel made contact with a local attorney, Ralph Kisner, and was informed that the 'Castle Grove' property was for sale. The Mansion site proper, containing thirteen acres-forty rooms, eleven bathrooms-finished throughout with hardwood, was a relic of the passing iron industry in Danville. There was also an adjoining farm with one hundred thirty-three acres and numerous outbuildings. This enormous dwelling was perfect for Mother M. Emmanuel's aims, but the price was beyond the Community's ability to pay. Upon inspection of this property, Mother M. Emmanuel found that the Mansion had stood �SLOVAKIA 141 vacant for fourteen years, needing numerous repairs. With this in mind she made a meager offer. The actual owner was in France, causing slow communication. Price remained the hindrance as Mother M. Emmanuel would not raise her offer. In March of 1919, Attorney Kisner informed the Sisters that the owner had agreed to drastically reduce his price to meet the Community's needs. Now that the Community's prayers for a Motherhouse had been answered, only the necessary funds for purchase remained an obstacle. The Sisters had saved about half of the required amount, but had discouraging experiences in acquiring the rest. This was the critical period during World War I, causing excess funds to be scarce.26 After futile appeals to the citizens and banks of the Wilkes-Barre area, a heavily populated Slovak community, Mother M. Emmanuel turned to the Danville National Bank for a loan. This bank considered the risk minimal and granted the loan at low interest. With payment secured, the Sisters concluded the 'Castle Grove' deal in June of 1919, and began preparations for the transfer of the Motherhouse from Middletown to its permanent home in Danville. Throughout the summer months in 1919, the Sisters worked to put the house and grounds in order. Within this new convent the Community prepared for the continuance of religious training for its Sisters and converted one of the two ballrooms into a chapel. Holy Mass was first celebrated on Sunday morning, July 6, 1919. With the approach of Autumn all but the Sisters in training took leave of 'Sacred Heart Villa,' as the grounds had been named, to resume their duties in the parish schools. During the War Years the demand for Sisters in parochial schools became very great. The war and the influenza epidemic strongly limited the work of the Sisters.27 As this situation relaxed in the summer of 1920, Mother M. Emmanuel arranged classes for the Sisters to improve their educational resources. The educational progress of the Community was under the direction of the Sisters from Marywood. This was being continued by Mother M. Emmanuel who sought also to further the Community's material progress. She was engaged in soliciting funds from the homes of Slovaks to pay off the Sister's bank loan. Mother M. Emmanuel promoted thrift within her �142 SLOVAKIA Community because she felt the Community would be more secure in the American culture when free from debt. Mother M. Emmanuel's term expired in 1922. She had directed this young Sisterhood through its pioneering days, giving it shelter, resources and existence through the war years. Mother M. Emmanuel's main contribution was, of course, the establishment of the Motherhouse that was to become the center of Slovak culture in America. MOTHER M. PIUS, SS.C.M. OPENS ST. CYRIL ACADEMY IN 1922 By the choice of the Sisters, Sister M. Pius was elected the third Superior General. Bishop McDevitt, who supervised the election, also commented on the importance of the Sisters' studies because someday the civil authorities would require that every teacher must be certified by the State of Pennsylvania. Certification would be important in having the Community accepted as a competent educational institution in American society. Now that they had an established center, the Sisters could begin to focus their educational mission with greater assurance. The Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius had always wished for the establishment of a high school and boarding school for girls. Presently, they were only employed in elementary education. This idea for an institution of higher education for their own children was popular among the Slovaks. In addition to the regularly prescribed American branches, they wanted their offsprings to be taught the mother tongue and trained to appreciate the historical and cultural traditions of their nation. 28 To this wish Mother M. Pius responded. Mother M. Pius expressed a desire to have an official from the Department of Public Instruction in Harrisburg come to Danville to give a lecture on the requirements of the State, regarding the equipment and function of a high school and its accreditation. In August of 1922, Doctor Edward Hoban arrived from Harrisburg and explained such subjects as extension courses, summer school, teacher certificates, teaching of foreign languages, importance of teaching citizenship, the teaching of historical and social studies, and the necessity of physical education. This lecture assured the commencement of preparation for a high school on American terms. �SLOVAKIA 143 The following week an advertisement appeared in the Slovak newspapers stating that the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius had equipped part of their convent at Danville as a boarding school for girls. To conform to American standards the equipment of the high school called for two very important departments -the Library and the Laboratory for the Sciences. Both of these were begun with the opening of the school. Books acquired were those recommended by the Department o! Education. Also a large selection of Catholic and Slovak books supplemented the Community's aim of a multicultural education. In all, nineteen pupils attended the first year of the First Catholic Slovak Girls High School, indicating a desire on the part of the Slovaks to have their children educated in a Slovak, as well as an American atmosphere. Towards the close of the first year in the spring of 1923, a small group of students ventured into the school's first extra-curricular activity. These girls formed a Literary Society in which they compiled a little booklet of essays, stories, and poems. Under Mother M. Pius' encouragement this activity continued, resulting in the first issue of the bi-lingual (Slovak and American) school magazine, Fialky (Violets). The Fialky were thereafter issued semi-annually until 1940 and then annually until 1970, when it ceased publication. During the summer vacation Mother M. Pius encouraged the Sisters toward further studies, hoping to improve their competence as teachers. She was anxious to secure state certification for as many Sisters as could qualify. Now that the Community was engaged in all levels of education, Mother M. Pius wished to secure them within the American educational system through accreditation. The Academy's opening in the second year exposed space problems as enrollment grew. Mother Pius expressed the need for a strong building fund and enacted new collection drives among the Slovak people. The number of students steadily increased into the third and fourth year.• With the fourth year the need for accredition increased as the first graduation approached. The school was informed that the State Representatives would make an official inspection at the school year's end. That June, just a week before graduation, the State �144 SLOVAKIA Inspector arrived and spent a day inspecting the school, interviewing both the staff and the students. The State Representative, Doctor Pentz, found the Slovak students being educated and trained in all that the modern high schools offered, and in their Religion and mother tongue as well. To this he expressed his satisfaction, commenting on the orderly and methodological way in which the different departments were being conducted. 29 After Dr. Pentz reported the Academy as "first class" in both arrangement and curriculum, the school received a telegram, congratulating teachers and students on receiving accreditation from the State. This good news arrived just days before the first graduation, much to the Sisters' delight. While preparations for this first commencement progressed, another great event was in prospect, namely, the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago. This event made a great impact on the first commencement of the First Catholic Slovak Girls High School. Accreditation from the State of Pennsylvania proved the Sisters' ability to provide their students with a fitting education in their new society, but what remained to be seen was whether or not the Sisters could live up to the task of preserving Slovak culture in America. Slovak American culture was to receive a fresh impetus by the Eucharistic Congress held in Chicago. Due to attend the Congress were four bishops from Slovakia. The presence of these Slovak bishops greatly excited the Slovak Americans and especially the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius, since through the influence of Bishop McDevitt arrangements were made to have these four bishops attend the Academy's first graduation. The date of the festivity was June 14, 1926. Under the guidance of Bishop McDevitt, who presided at the First Graduation ceremony, the entire Community and students assembled at the Convent's gate to welcome the visiting bishops. Upon the arrival of the Slovak bishops, who were traveling in European fashion, clad in cassock and purple cincture, the commencement proceeded with prayers, songs, and speeches. The speeches were delivered in Slovak, calling for a continuance of Catholic education. Bishop McDevitt's address underscored the advantages which the �SLOVAKIA 145 Slovak people can derive from a solid Catholic education. He also pointed out that this could be done because the American government stood to protect the religious rights of all American citizens. The theme of religious pluralism in America was carried further by the Senior Bishop from Slovakia in a speech that noted how this American government respects, upholds, and protects the religious liberty of the people who found refuge under her banner. Bishop Marian Blaha further cited the great accomplishments of the American Slovaks. Their ability to provide a Catholic education while preserving their mother tongue greatly impressed him. Then as an old Slovak proverb states, "Every perfect day must end even as the sweetest song" -this first commencement was no exception; it was concluded by a student chorale of inspirational Slovak songs.30 The first graduation was a significant milestone in the history of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. It was their first public manifestation of their educational standards and traditions. The graduation exercise presented a new phase in the mission of the Slovak Sisters. Their people realized that Danville would not only house a Convent and an Academy, but would be the center of genuine culture for the Slovaks in America. To attain a status combining a true Americanism with an appreciation of the spirit and traditions of their native land was the Community's desire.31 With this spirit of appreciation, encouraged by the sharp increase of applicants, new thoughts of building were entertained. But unlike before, the Slovak people, organizations and individuals alike, urged this step. These groups advised a general benefit drive for funds, alleging the time was ripe for such a movement since industrial conditions were favorable and the people were willing to donate.32 In the spring of 1927 Mother M. Pius presented a letter of the officers of the First Catholic Slovak Ladies' Union, another element of Slovak-American culture, announcing the drive for a building fund. When Mother M. Pius asked for their contribution, she was immediately promised five thousand dollars. The response elsewhere was the same. The Slovak newspapers pushed the drive and local groups competed in fund raising. This favorable reaction illustrates the Slovak-Americans' desire for an enlarged Slovak cultural center in America. �146 SLOVAKIA With the building fund well under way, Mother M. Pius contracted Architect Bernard Starr of Harrisburg, who in turn sought the assistance of Harry Sternfeld of Philadelphia. A spot for the new building was selected on the Villa Sacred Heart campus, and Mr. Sternfeld sketched a building dominated by a central tower. This initial plan brought eriticism for its "needless extravagance," but Mother M. Pius retained the plan as the answer to the needs of the Community, plus the cultural, educational and religious needs of the Slovak-American people. The Community wasted no time in beginning the new building. Ground was broken on May 23, 1929, in a ceremony which the local Danville Morning News described as an event to go down in Slovak history. 33 The speakers' program included representatives of the church, state, and Slovak national life. As the building progressed, the country entered the depression of the 1930's. By the time the building was completed, economic tension was beginning to be felt everywhere.34 With this in mind, Mother M. Pius avoided any elaborate dedication ceremony. This new building was made to catch the spirit of the past and to intepret it with a contemporaneous point of view in order to make it fit actual conditions.35 Its design was in accord with the ideals of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius, who hoped to blend the past into a new, usable present. In a more practical manner the new building provided an institution solely devoted to the education of the Slovak people and the preserving of their culture. It was viewed as a national work, one that provided b roader limits and better accommodations which would produce greater results. 36 The local paper saw the building as a monument to the Slovak people of America, and considered it one of the local community's finest aspects.37 The Sisters moved into their new building in September of 1931. The following three years were quiet, filled with earnest activity toward the educational goals of the Community. This period ended with the significant year of 1934, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Community's existence. In those twenty-five years the Community developed and established itself in a permanent Motherhouse, which in turn had developed the First Catholic Slovak Girls' High �SLOVAKIA 147 School, crowned by the magnificent new building. This had been done under three Superiors General-Mother Mary, Mother M. Emmanuel, Mother M. Pius-all of whom promoted the cultivation of the Slovak language and history, which, with religion, constitute the two outstanding characteristics of the Slovak Academy. Extra-curricular activities, like Fialky and Cyrilika-a society for fostering interest in Slovak journalism-as well as customs established for the practical study of Slovak, such as speaking Slovak all day every Saturday, and the annual observance of Slovak Week, acquired notice and approval. The observance of Slovak tradition gave this Academy a unique position in the field of American education.38 With a high spirit of celebration the Silver Jubilee of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius commenced. The Jubilee marked still another turning point in the Community's history as it came at the close of Mother M. Pius' long administration. Her work finished laying a firm foundation which became the base for a promising era of new growth. MOTHER M. EMERENTIA, SS.C.M. (1934-1946) In this new period of the Community's history the work of the Academy advanced quietly, with gratifying results in the field of Slovak-American culture. When Mother M. Emerentia was elected Superior General in 1934, she encouraged Slovak interests and cultural projects like formal programs, dramatic productions, Slovak readings, folk song festivals and, above all, research and creative writing on Slovak topics. Mother M. Emerentia was also responsible for the compilation of Slovak language texts and hymnals used widely in Slovak elementary schools and parishes in America. The early years of Mother M. Emerentia's administration coincided with the greatest period of the depression. Though there was no drop in student enrollment, neither was there the marked increase that would have normally been the case.• These drawbacks, however, had advantages. The subdued quiet of the interval was conducive to a greater concentration on school work, both regular and extracurricular. Correspondence with students in Slovakia '' See enrollment figures; Table I. �148 SLOVAKIA was an activity greatly enjoyed by the students of St. Cyril Academy. It was also during these years that the school was favored by a number of distinguished visitors from Slovakia, including a delegation from the Slovak Institute of Arts and Sciences, a group of students from the Slovak unit of Pax Romana, plus numerous distinguished scholars, writers, and statesmen, including the Slovak martyr, Msgr. Joseph Tiso.39 When our country was drawn into war on December 8, 1941, the first care of the Motherhouse was directed toward the Sisters and their pupils in the parish schools. The Community placed its trust in God and His care of our country, and classes went on as usual. However, extracurricular activities were directed toward war needs. Beyond the prayers for peace, the Community and its students turned out quantities of knitted sweaters and helmets. They experienced the value of thrift by rationing food and collected all scraps such as fats, iron and paper. The Sisters also joined in relief efforts for their native land. An extensive relief project for the war sufferers in Slovakia was aided by the Community, which sent abroad numerous packages of relief materials. The motherhouse was a center for this organized relief work. The relief project continued in action even after the war, when Slovakia again was suppressed by a stronger force. Following a remarkably successful and flourishing six-year period of self-rule under the Presidency of Tiso, the Slovak government collapsed when victory came to Russia and the Allies. 40 With this victory Slovakia was overrun by the Communists. Their occupation of the country led to the execution of Msgr. Tiso, plus the silencing of many bishops and priests. The people of Slovakia remained in destitution; hence, the necessity for relief work to continue until the Iron Curtain cut off all communication. 41 The Communist occupation caused more refugees to seek freedom and sanctuary from Slovakia. As thousands came to America, the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius and their students enjoyed fresh contacts with persons of their fatherland. Priests and professional people willingly gave lectures to both the Sisters and the students, chiefly on conditions in Slovakia and on topics of Slovak history. �SLOVAKIA 149 Several high school students from Slovakia enrolled in the Academy, thus enriching the Slovak-American culture. MOTHER M. CRESCENTIA, SS.C.M. (1946-1958) While the Slovak-American tradition was being enriched during these post-war years, a new Superior General was elected, placing renewed importance on the educational aspects of the Academy. Mother M. Crescentia realized that during the earlier years the educational objectives could not be pursued as fully as desired since more urgent activities were at hand. In time, however, conditions improved, so that more and better organized work could be done in the field of teacher education. Mother M. Crescentia took advantage of this situation, arranging for more Sisters to take college courses in a greater variety of fields. With this renewed progress in the Sisters' personal educational ventures, activities in the Academy moved apace. The student enrollment at the Academy, which increased only to a minor extent after the depression, now began rapid growth. This growth of the Academy advanced steadily into the fifties, causing every available space within the Academy to be filled. It necessitated the building of Saint Philomena Hall to be used for students' living and classrooms. Also in the fifties, the Community worked for the founding of Father Jankola. They are Villa Saint Cyril in Highland Park, Illinois, and Maria Joseph Manor in Danville, Pennsylvania. By 1958 the Community had a new Superior General in the person of Mother M. Bernard. MOTHER M. BERNARD, SS.C.M. (1958-1970) The highlight of this decade was the observance of the Community's Golden Jubilee. It was climaxed by the celebration of a Roman-Slavonic Mass on the Villa campus in the presence of five thousand visitors from all parts of the country.42 It was the first Roman rite vernacular Mass ever offered on this continent. The increased enrollment and the large turnout for the Roman-Slavonic Mass indicates the strong support the Academy received from the Slovak-American people in its preserving of Slovak culture. The early sixties were also highlighted by a large celebration honoring another aspect of the Comunity's Slovak heritage. The year 1963 marked the eleven hundredth �150 SLOVAKIA anniversary of the arrival of SS. Cyril and Methodius among the Slovaks. In addition to the Community celebration in America, the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius participated in a week-long observance in Rome, involving numerous Slovak pilgrims, who had assembled there for the dedication of the Slovak Institute of SS. Cyril and Methodius, a seminary for the training of priests for Slovakia. THE JANKOLA LIBRARY The latter sixties and early seventies for St. Cyril Academy had been dominated by two cherished Slovak projects. First was the active cooperation with the Apostolate of the Slovak Institute of SS. Cyril and Methodius in Rome, begun during the 1963 pilgrimage. Second was the professional development of the Jankola Library at the Academy. This Library is a center of Slovak culture and learning for St. Cyril Academy and Slovak America. It is called Jankola Library in honor of the founder of the Community and promoter of Slovak-American culture, Father Matthew Jankola. The Library provides invaluable resources for study and research purposes, as well as literary works to enrich the Slovak spirit. Jankola Library contains over six thousand (6,000) fully catalogued items on its shelves with several hundred more reserved for further processing.43 Beyond just Slovak books this Library also promotes Slovak-American culture with its large collection of Slovak art. Included among its treasures are a large unusual map of Czecho-Slovakia, an artistically costumed mannequin representing the Slovak tradition, and a large, valuable collection of Slovak ceramic art, some embroidery and sizeable pieces of cutglass sent from Slovakia. This Library with its vast assortment of Slovak art is truly a tribute to Slovakia's culture. With Jankola Library as its Slovak center, SS. Cyril Academy still provides an excellent American education. It offers a wide range of courses, including four foreign languages.* Besides educating students for social living in America, the Academy can also train girls for a religious teaching life within its own Community. The Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius are presently teaching in parish schools and eight (8) high schools, including a boarding * Source listing of St. Cyril Academy. Table II. �151 SLOVAKIA school for girls. 0 Education of Slovak children continues to be the principal vocation of a Sister of SS. Cyril and Methodius. It is to these children that a Sister dedicates herseJf and hopes to preserve Slovakia's heritage. Today, the St. Cyril Academy is justifiably proud of tts accomplishments during the past fifty ( 50) years. Both the teaching Sisters and their students are fully educated in, and cognizant of, their dual heritage. The traditions and artifacts of Slovak culture have been preserved; while at the same time, each graduate is proud to be an American. St. Cyril Academy continues to revere its Slovak past. The Sisters continue to aid the suppressed people of Slovakia, but now this is done indirectly to the extent possible. It is the desire of the Sisters of the Academy to provide their countrymen with new hope of cultural freedom by showing them the accomplishments that have been possible in America. This Academy is rightly considered the center of Slovak culture in America. "" List of schools staffed by Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Table III. TABLE I Enrollment figures of St. Cyril Academy, Danville, Pa. Year 1925-26 1926-27 1927-28 1928-29 1929-30 1930-31 1931-32 1932-33 1933-34 1934-35 1935-36 1936-37 1937-38 1938-39 1939-40 1940-41 Total Number of Students 38 39 44 47 42 61 75 69 60 58 52 58 54 50 60 70 Year 1941-42 1942-43 1943-44 1944-45 1945-46 1946-47 1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-54 1954-55 1955-56 1956-57 Total Number of Students 66 55 55 69 91 96 90 107 112 109 123 138 148 153 157 180 Total Number Year of Students 1957-58 1958-59 1959-60 1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 181 175 162 182 202 195 202 171 156 178 120 108 104 101 108 106 �SLOVAKIA 152 TABLE II Curriculum of St. Cyril Academy FIRST YEAR Religion I English I Algebra I Intr. Physical Science Physical Education Chorus World Culture I Latin I Spanish I French I Slovak I Foods Art I Art Appreciation Music Appreciation Health Education Piano Interpretive Dance SECOND YEAR Religion II English II Geometry Biology Physical Education Chorus World Culture II Latin II French II Spanish II Slovak II Foods Clothing I Art II Piano Interpretive Dance THIRD YEAR Religion III English III Algebra II Chemistry Physical Education Chorus American Culture I Latin III Spanish III French III Slovak III Foods Advanced Clothing Art III Piano Interpretive Dance Typing I Stenography I �SLOVAKIA 153 FOURTH YEAR Religion IV English IV Business English Math 12 Advanced Biology Physical Education Chorus American Culture II Latin IV Spanish IV French IV Slovak IV Advanced Clothing Art IV Speech Piano Interpretive Dance Typing II Stenography II Bookkeeping Business Law TABLE III SCHOOLS STAFFED BY SIS'llEIBS OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS Berwick, Pa. Bloomsburg, Pa. Binghamton, N. Y. Binghamton, N. Y. Bridgeport, Conn. Bridgeport, Pa. Charleston, S. C. Charleston, S. C. Chicago, Ill. East Vandergrift, Pa. Endicott, N. Y. Gary, Indiana Hazleton, Pa. Jessup, Pa. Lebanon, Pa. Luzerne, Pa. Nanticoke, Pa. New York, N. Y. Olyphant, Pa. Perth Amboy, N. J. Phoenixville, Pa. Pittston, Pa. Plymouth, Pa. Stratford, Conn. Swoyersville, Pa. Torrington, Conn. St. Mary's School St. Columba School SS. Cyril and Methodius School St. Ann's School SS. Cyril and Methodius School Mother of Sorrows School Blessed Sacrament School Nativity School SS. Simon and Jude School Holy Trinity School St. Joseph School Holy Trinity School St. Joseph School St. Michael's School SS. Cyril and Methodius School St. John Nepomucene School St. Joseph School St. John Nepomucene School Holy Ghost School Holy Trinity School Sacred Heart of Jesus School St. John Baptist School St. Stephen School Sacred Name of Jesus School Holy Trinity School Sacred Heart of Jesus School �SLOVAKIA 154 Immaculate Conception School Sacred Heart of Jesus School Holy Trinity School Whiting, Ind. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Yonkers, N. Y. IDGH SCHOOLS Andrean High School Dunmore Catholic High School Lourdes H. S. Lebanon Catholic H. S. Kingston Catholic Central Catholic Central H. S. Catholic Central (St. Pius X) Blessed Sacrament Academy St. Cyril Academy 1. Gary, Ind. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Dunmore, Pa. Shamokin, Pa. Lebanon, Pa. Kingston, Pa. Charleston, S. C. Pottstown, Pa. Yonkers, N. Y. Danville, Pa. FOOTNOTES 1) David F . Bowers, "Social and Cultural Impact" in For eign Influences in American Life (Princeton, 1944) , p. 1. 2) Emily Balch, Our Slavic Fellow Citizens (New York, 1969), p. 86. 3) The Slovak Nation, Manuscript in Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius Community Archives, Danville, Pennsylvania. 4 ) Ibid. 5) Education in Slovakia, Manuscript in SS. C. M Community Archives, composition by M . I. Angelovic, pp. 88. 6) Ibid. 7) Ear liest Immigration, Ms. in SS. C. M. Community Archives. 8 ) Emily Balch, Our Slavic Fellow Citizens, p . 108. 9 ) Earliest Immigration Ms. 10) Francis Brown and Joseph Roucek, "Czechoslovak American" in One America (New York, 1946), p. 147. 11) In 1899, there were eight Slovak priests in America. Earliest Immigration Ms. 12) The Slovaks divide their settlement in America into three Ages: Church Age, School Age, and Institution Age. Ibid. 13) Daniel Tanzone, "The Slovak Experience in Contemporary America" in Slovakia (Middletown, Pa., 1972), p. 129. 14) Francis Brown and Joseph Roucek, Our Racial and National Minorities (New York, 1937), p. 602. 15) Timothy Smith, "New Approaches to the History of Immigration in 20th Century America", in The America Historical Review LXXI, (July 1966), p. 127. �155 SLOVAKIA 16) Contributions of Reverend Matthew Jankola to Slovak Catholic Education in the United States, Ms. in SS. C. M. Community Archives, composition by Sister M. Consuela Gregorovic, p. 14. 17) Ibid. , p. 3. 18 ) Earliest Plans, Ms. in SS. C. M. Community Archives. 19) Ibid . 20) Ibid. 21) The girls wer,e Mary Mihalik, Mary Bartek and Mary Pauly. 22) Father Jankola, Ms., pp. 38-46. 23) Philosophy of Saint Cyril Academy, Ms. 24) Francis Brown and Joseph Roucek, Our America, p. 501. 25) The Educational Activities of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius in the United States, Ms. in SS. C. M. C-Ommunity Archives, composition by Sister Maria Berchmans Teplicky, p. 4. 26) Danville, Ms. in SS. C. M. Community Archives. 27) Ibid. 28) Educational Expansion, Ms. in SS. C.M. Community Archives. 29) Josephine M. Marcinko, "A Little Historical Sketch" in Fialky (Danville, 1927), p. 23. 30) Edttcational Expansion, Ms. 31) Preparing to Build, Ms. in SS. C. M. Community Archives. 32) Ibid. 33) Morning News, (Danville, May 23, 1929), p. 6. 34 ) Brief History of the Congregation of the Sisters of Saints Cyril and Methodius, Ms. in SS. C. M. Community Archives, composition by Mother M. Emerentia Petrasek, p. 85. 35) Fialky, (Danville, 1931), p. 82. 36) Brief History, Ms., Petrasek, p. 85. 37) Morning News, (Danville, June 8, 1931), p. 4. 38) Brief History, Ms., Petrasek, pp. 88-90. 39 ) Ibid. , p. 108. 40 ) Joseph Pauco, Slovakia, pp. 26-28. 41) Brief History, Ms., Petrasek, p. 125. 42) Sisters of Saints Cyril and Methodius, Jankola Book, (Danville, 1972) , p. 90. 43) SS. C. M., Jankola Book, p. 108. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1974, Vol. 24 Description An account of the resource Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 132 SLOVAKIA William W a g n e r : The Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius and the Preservation of Slovak Culture in America The research involved in writing the history of an ethnic teaching community presented me with two problems. First, there are relatively few works completed on American ethnic groups, including the Slovak Americans. Secondly, the past of this particular teaching Community, the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius, has been largely recorded only by the Sisters of that Community. Therefore, my research on the Slovak past ( still predominantly written in the Slovak tongue) and my compiling of the Community's history were very dependent on the writings of the Sisters of the Community. I believe my work is objective, because of the limitation of my knowledge of the Community's religious life, thus removing me from a biased influence. All in all, I attempted to deal with this subject in such a manner as to present an honest view of the history and purpose surrounding the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. My appreciation is extended to Reverend Mother M. Valeria Romanchek and special thanks are expressed to the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius for their helpful cooperation and endless assistance and guidance throughout the researching of this paper. I dedicate this history to Reverend Mother M. Emerentia Petrasek, former Community historian, upon whose research of the Slovak past and the tracing of the Community's growth I so heavily relied. THE ROOTS OF SLOVAK CULTURE ARE CENTURIES OLD The United States is the most important immigrant receiving country in the world. Between 1850 and 1930 no less than thirty-eight million people settled within our borders. 1 Although early in this immigration period many SLOVAKIA 133 newcomers strove to sever ties with the old world, a sizeable portion continued to look reverently upon their past. The Slovak American, who journeyed to this country primarily in the later wave of European immigration, were such a group. The Slovaks feared the loss of their native culture to a new growing American culture because their past history consisted of repeated attempts at such assimilation. But also in America the Slovak hoped for the chance and the right to have his own life. The Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius are a teaching community dedicated to preserving and promoting this American Slovak culture. Because one-third of all Slovaks live in America,2 the Sisters' preservation of their culture is extremely important to the overall existence of the Slovak people as a national entity. The Slovak people are a small part of the Slavic family found on the European continent. Ethnologists place the Slovaks in the Western Slavic group, which also includes Poles, Czechs and Moravians. Commonly but erroneously the Slovaks are considered only a part of the "Czechoslovak Nation," but during the ten centuries of Slovak history, the Slovaks did not live in a common state with the Czechs until 1918. Little is known of the early Slavs. Ancient Greeks and Romans made contact, but left few records. Early recorded Slovak history tells of struggles with Asiatic tribes, particularly the Avari to whom the Slovaks were subjected for almost a century. The subjection was followed by the influence and reign of the Franks. 3 The early Slovak was pagan and war-like. He had many customs but few laws. He was chiefly agricultural and believed in various superstitions. This type of religion held fast until the ninth century when Prince Pribina, the first direct Slovak ruler of Slavic birth, established the first Slavic Christian church. Pribina's efforts to christianize his people met with little success, largely because he was dependent on Frankish missionaries whose language his people could not understand. 4 In 846 Pribina's court surrendered to Rastislav, a skillful warrior, who succeeded in winning independence from the Franks. Rastislav sought religious as well as political freedom. In the year 863 Prince Rastislav invited the two 134 SLOVAKIA holy brothers, Constantine and Methodius, to come from Constantinople and work among the Slovak people. These Byzantine missionaries found it necessary to invent an alphabet for the Slavs, so that the Holy Scriptures could be given to them in their own tongue. After having the use of the Slavonic tongue in Western Liturgy sanctioned by the Roman Pope, Methodius returned to Slovakia as a bishop. Constantine meanwhile had died in Rome in 869 , after entering a monastery there and assuming the name of Cyril. By means of their translations of the Holy Scriptures Constantine and Methodius laid the foundations of Slavic literature. The introduction of schools went hand in hand with this introduction and spread of Christianity in Slovakia.5 Archbishop Methodius continued his teaching and missionary activity until his death in 885. That period of political independence for Slovakia lasted but a short time. Slovakia was soon incorporated into the State of Hungary, which during medieval times consisted of various nations. During this period known as 'The Thousand Years of Oppression', the Slovaks' civil life declined and thus their national consciousness was under a cloud. The Lutheran Reformation, the Turkish invasion of Hungary in 1526 and the Counter-Reformation led by the Jesuits all had varying effects on Slovak education. But it was not until the suppression of the Jesuit Order in 1773 and the state control of education under Empress Maria Theresa, that the Slovak education was directed by any one source. The State of Hungary considered it its duty to provide for the education of its people, hoping to make the power of the state felt in every phase of life.6 The reigns of Maria Theresa and Joseph II saw an expansion of education and also an attempt at Germanization of the Slovaks. Joseph's attempt at Germanization was significantly challenged in 1847 and replaced by Hungarian Magyarization. Whether Germanization or Magyarization the NonHungarian Nationalities' interests were ignored. In 1867 the 'Austro-Hungarian Compromise' touched off rapid action to create a unitary Hungary by Magyarizing all departments of public life, especially the schools. The aim of this policy was the complete assimilation and SLOVAKIA 135 conversion of Slovakia into a purely Magyar Province of Hungary. Since language is the chief symbol of nationality, the Slovak language was suppressed. Poor economically and having their national ideals and traditions submerged, the Slovaks began seeking a new way to improve their life. U.S. SHINES WITH HOPE FOR SLOVAK IMMIGRANTS Immigration held the dream of a better life. The heaviest immigration of the Slovaks occurred between 1890 and 1900.7 It must be stressed that the majority of immigrants came to America for economic reasons, few peasants ever left East Europe during this period due to political reasons, though politics did cause many not to return. 8 The first immigrants were usually the fathers of the Slovak families, hoping for quick economic gain, and a subsequent return to their native land and families. But once in America few immigrants returned. They found employment that significantly raised their living standard. Though in a strange, sometimes hostile land, the immigrant recognized the ideals of freedom that he was denied in his homeland. As thoughts of returning to their native land diminished, the pioneering immigrants sent for their families to join them in their adopted country. 9 Once the immigrant families had situated themselves in this new land, they were faced with problems of adjustment. The majority of the Slovak immigrants settled in the industrial East, seeking employment with the mining industries, particularly in Pennsylvania. Since the closing of the American frontier the greatest means of livelihood for new immigrants was in these rising industrial areas.10 As the economic necessity of making a living diminished, the new Americans turned to their social needs. Subsequently as the new settlements became more permanent, these Slovak immigrants turned to their religious needs. They began by building community parishes, while searching for Slovak priests who were few in number in this time of early immigration.11 The churches provided a common bond upon which were built beneficial organizations, such as the organizations of the First Catholic Slovak Union known as Jednota. It was the purpose of these beneficial groups to locate and unite the scattered elements 136 SLOVAKIA of American Slovaks. Unity was usually provided through the weekly Slovak newspapers. EDUCATION AL ASPIRATIONS OF AMERICAN SLOVAKS Upon completion of the drive to build parishes the Slovaks had finished with what they call the Church Age of their settlement in America. 12 Having established themselves within their own community, they were faced with the task of joining the larger American community. Obviously, they needed to learn the English language and familiarize themselves with American customs. It was over this need for education that friction developed. On the one hand the immigrant desired to be accepted in this new environment; yet on the other, he also desired to preserve his own cultural past. The first generation immigrant was taught English usually by his employer and did not have his culture challenged, thus resisting assimilation. 13 It was the education of successive generations that presented the problem of cultural alienation. The apparent choice in education was to enroll their offsprings in public schools in order to help them adjust to this new American Life. But education in the public schools posed severe cultural hazards. The public school taught American subjects with American values. The foreign children were judged by American cultural standards of conduct. In this position the foreign children were caught between their old culture and the new American culture. This had definite results: A limited number abandoned their embarrassing heritage-to accept American standards; a larger number sought to forget their traditional background regarding them as inferior-lead ing to family disruption and disintegration . Finally, the largest group failed to adjust to school and left feeling disregarded, discouraged and inferior .14 The public school encouraged the disintegration of Slovak families. The Slovaks had successfully resisted attempts of assimilation by stronger cultures in the past, but now they faced the task of resisting assimilation in a foreign land. To be assimilated meant the destruction of their culture. The chief means of assimilation was through education, as was attempted in their past history. Though it was largely an unconscious process by which America imposed its own standard of ideals on the new- SLOVAKIA 137 comers, the public schools were succeeding in imposing a common English culture upon the children of many nationalities. 15 By treating the immigrant as a native the public school disregarded his culture and background. What was needed was a means to hand down a suitable portion of his native culture in order to provide a past, thus avoiding an identity crisis. The public school system could not provide this necessity in full. What was needed was a new system that could teach their children good American citizenship and preserve in them a profitable appreciation of the language, culture and tradition of their forefathers, while still providing a sufficient academic education. Fearing further disintegration of their culture, the Slovaks began searching and discussing alternatives in the development of Slovak America. REV. MATTHEW JANKOLA ASSUMES LEADERSHIP A leader in this search for a solution to the American Slovak's educational needs was Father Matthew Jankola. He spent much time studying his fellow Slovaks in their new surroundings. Early in his life he wrote: "We have a serious problem, the problem of educating our children according to American methods, and for American citizenship, without, however, destroying their cultural character and their cultural traditions." 16 With this attitude Father Jankola formed an Association of Priests in 1903 to consider the question of providing for the Catholic education of Slovak youth. Father Jankola began his studies for the priesthood in his native Slovakia. But under pressure from both the Hungarian civil and ecclesiastical authorities, which frowned apon Slovak devotion to Saints Cyril and Methodius, and the fostering of Slovak nationalism, Father Jankola sought refuge in America. 17 He arrived in 1893, and finished his studies at Saint Bonaventure's Seminary in Allegheny, New York. As a priest Father Jankola dedicated himself to the problem of cultural disintegration of his people, begun in Hungary and now continuing in America. It was on behalf of this couse that Father Jankola directed his early writings. When considering education, Father Jankola looked to its broader meaning of culture, rather than its narrow sense of formal schooling. He felt 138 SLOVAKIA that next to the parish church must be a school, because without Catholic schools the Catholic Church had no future, no assured existence. Father Jankola saw the parish church alone and unaided by a Catholic school as but a "feeble barrier" against the rapid onrush of worldliness and a too sudden Americanization for Slovak youth. Further, to preserve the Slovak national character, the children must be educated in Slovak schools with religious principles. Father Jankola held the schools as helpful for religious training, and necessary also to preserve nationality. In Father Jankola's mind the church directed religion, not language; for the teaching of language, which fosters the national spirit, teachers and schools were needed.18 In this spirit Father Jankola called for the establishment of schools, staffed by Slovak Sisters. His initial contact with the Slovak people on this project was done through the newspapers, such as the weekly Jednota. Many attempts were made · to secure Slavic Sisters, but to no avail. This was a time of heavy immigration causing the demand for Sisters in America to be very great. Confronted with the problem of no available Sisters for his project, Father Jankola suggested the possibility of founding a Religious Community for the education of Slovak youth. The suggestion was received favorably, so Father Jankola sought Slovak candidates to train in an American Sisterhood, which would later branch off into an independent congregation as their numbers grew. A Czech Benedictine Community of Sisters expressed willingness to receive and educate Slovak girls. Father Jankola secured three aspirants who were sent to the Czech Sisters in Chicago. But this project failed when the girls became discontented and wished to return to Pennsylvania. Their return was hard on Father Jankola, but their young age and the great distances they had traveled made him sympathetic. 19 Father Jankola did not abandon his project. Instead, upon further study he came in contact with Mother Mary Cyril at Mount St. Mary's Seminary in Scranton, Penna. After considering Father Jankola's plan for a parochial school system under Slovak Sisters, Mother Mary Cyril agreed to accept the young girls. The girls entered Mount Saint Mary's Seminary in November of 1903, to learn the SLOVAKIA 139 principles of religious life and live according to its Rules. 20 While preparing the Slovak girls for religious teaching and guidance under Mother Mary Cyril and the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, Father Jankola began a fund to further his project. He established "St. Anthony's Treasury" which received donations from parishes, societies and individuals. A TEACHING COMMUNITY OF SLOVAK SISTERS IS BORN On September 11, 1909, the first Slovak girls pronounced their religious vows, 21 marking the birth of the Sisters of Saints Cyril and Methodius, honoring the Saints who gave Slovakia its faith and culture. Father Jankola noted that this was the founding of the first Slovak religious sisterhood that the Slovaks ever had, either in Europe or America. At the birth of this new Order Father Jankola set down four principal reasons for its conception: 1) Educate Slovak children 2) Care for Slovak orphans and aged 3) Preserve Slovak culture 4) Pray for the return of Slav schismatics.22 Father Jankola's first principle has been the primary apostolate of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. The parish school has always constituted the particular vocation of the Sisters. The Sisters set themselves the traditional objective of education in a Christian spirit to develop and train to the fullest the powers and capacities of a young student's mind and body. They also strove to inculcate principles of true patriotism and citizenship in order to develop enlightened, conscientious American citizens, imbued with Christian attitudes of justice and charity, peace and order, which they feel are the main components for social living. As Slovak American teachers, they endeavored to preserve some of the traditions and the cultural heritage of the Slovak people among the students of Slovak parentage, and to foster in all students an interest and respect for the varied cultures and attitudes that make up the Brotherhood of Man. 23 Through such recognition and acceptance of foreign natures, characteristics, and personalities built from a different culture, the Sisters sought to achieve cultural democracy. To accept cultural democracy means to accept 140 SLOVAKIA a technique of social adjustment that will make possible the preservation of the best of all cultures. 24 This was the desire of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. To accept, as well as to be accepted, is the condition for effective pluralism in a nation. Cultural pluralism in the American educational system has existed because we are a multi-cultural, multi-racial, and multi-lingual nation. It was thought that the public school system would Americanize these foreign elements into the melting pot of uniform American culture. The concept of American culture as a mosaic has been the reason for, and the challenge of, the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. For six years this newly established Community of Sisters continued under the guidance of the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary. It was on August 4, 1915, that the Community had its first elections in which Sister Mary (Mihalik) was elected the first Superior General. During this period the Sisters opened their first school to educate children in the Sacred Heart of Jesus Parish in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, marking the beginning of the educational work of the Community. Before this group could be firmly established Mother Mary died in 1916. Her successor was Mother M. Emmanuel whose greatest achievement involved the establishment of a suitable, permanent Motherhouse.25 MOTHER M. EMMANUEL, SS.C.M. (1916-1922) The Sisters had been temporarily situated in Middletown, Pennsylvania. While in this location, Mother M. Emmanuel sought a permanent Motherhouse. She was informed by Reverend Julius Foin about a large tract of land with an old mansion in Danville. Through Bishop Philip R. McDevitt, Mother M. Emmanuel made contact with a local attorney, Ralph Kisner, and was informed that the 'Castle Grove' property was for sale. The Mansion site proper, containing thirteen acres-forty rooms, eleven bathrooms-finished throughout with hardwood, was a relic of the passing iron industry in Danville. There was also an adjoining farm with one hundred thirty-three acres and numerous outbuildings. This enormous dwelling was perfect for Mother M. Emmanuel's aims, but the price was beyond the Community's ability to pay. Upon inspection of this property, Mother M. Emmanuel found that the Mansion had stood SLOVAKIA 141 vacant for fourteen years, needing numerous repairs. With this in mind she made a meager offer. The actual owner was in France, causing slow communication. Price remained the hindrance as Mother M. Emmanuel would not raise her offer. In March of 1919, Attorney Kisner informed the Sisters that the owner had agreed to drastically reduce his price to meet the Community's needs. Now that the Community's prayers for a Motherhouse had been answered, only the necessary funds for purchase remained an obstacle. The Sisters had saved about half of the required amount, but had discouraging experiences in acquiring the rest. This was the critical period during World War I, causing excess funds to be scarce.26 After futile appeals to the citizens and banks of the Wilkes-Barre area, a heavily populated Slovak community, Mother M. Emmanuel turned to the Danville National Bank for a loan. This bank considered the risk minimal and granted the loan at low interest. With payment secured, the Sisters concluded the 'Castle Grove' deal in June of 1919, and began preparations for the transfer of the Motherhouse from Middletown to its permanent home in Danville. Throughout the summer months in 1919, the Sisters worked to put the house and grounds in order. Within this new convent the Community prepared for the continuance of religious training for its Sisters and converted one of the two ballrooms into a chapel. Holy Mass was first celebrated on Sunday morning, July 6, 1919. With the approach of Autumn all but the Sisters in training took leave of 'Sacred Heart Villa,' as the grounds had been named, to resume their duties in the parish schools. During the War Years the demand for Sisters in parochial schools became very great. The war and the influenza epidemic strongly limited the work of the Sisters.27 As this situation relaxed in the summer of 1920, Mother M. Emmanuel arranged classes for the Sisters to improve their educational resources. The educational progress of the Community was under the direction of the Sisters from Marywood. This was being continued by Mother M. Emmanuel who sought also to further the Community's material progress. She was engaged in soliciting funds from the homes of Slovaks to pay off the Sister's bank loan. Mother M. Emmanuel promoted thrift within her 142 SLOVAKIA Community because she felt the Community would be more secure in the American culture when free from debt. Mother M. Emmanuel's term expired in 1922. She had directed this young Sisterhood through its pioneering days, giving it shelter, resources and existence through the war years. Mother M. Emmanuel's main contribution was, of course, the establishment of the Motherhouse that was to become the center of Slovak culture in America. MOTHER M. PIUS, SS.C.M. OPENS ST. CYRIL ACADEMY IN 1922 By the choice of the Sisters, Sister M. Pius was elected the third Superior General. Bishop McDevitt, who supervised the election, also commented on the importance of the Sisters' studies because someday the civil authorities would require that every teacher must be certified by the State of Pennsylvania. Certification would be important in having the Community accepted as a competent educational institution in American society. Now that they had an established center, the Sisters could begin to focus their educational mission with greater assurance. The Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius had always wished for the establishment of a high school and boarding school for girls. Presently, they were only employed in elementary education. This idea for an institution of higher education for their own children was popular among the Slovaks. In addition to the regularly prescribed American branches, they wanted their offsprings to be taught the mother tongue and trained to appreciate the historical and cultural traditions of their nation. 28 To this wish Mother M. Pius responded. Mother M. Pius expressed a desire to have an official from the Department of Public Instruction in Harrisburg come to Danville to give a lecture on the requirements of the State, regarding the equipment and function of a high school and its accreditation. In August of 1922, Doctor Edward Hoban arrived from Harrisburg and explained such subjects as extension courses, summer school, teacher certificates, teaching of foreign languages, importance of teaching citizenship, the teaching of historical and social studies, and the necessity of physical education. This lecture assured the commencement of preparation for a high school on American terms. SLOVAKIA 143 The following week an advertisement appeared in the Slovak newspapers stating that the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius had equipped part of their convent at Danville as a boarding school for girls. To conform to American standards the equipment of the high school called for two very important departments -the Library and the Laboratory for the Sciences. Both of these were begun with the opening of the school. Books acquired were those recommended by the Department o! Education. Also a large selection of Catholic and Slovak books supplemented the Community's aim of a multicultural education. In all, nineteen pupils attended the first year of the First Catholic Slovak Girls High School, indicating a desire on the part of the Slovaks to have their children educated in a Slovak, as well as an American atmosphere. Towards the close of the first year in the spring of 1923, a small group of students ventured into the school's first extra-curricular activity. These girls formed a Literary Society in which they compiled a little booklet of essays, stories, and poems. Under Mother M. Pius' encouragement this activity continued, resulting in the first issue of the bi-lingual (Slovak and American) school magazine, Fialky (Violets). The Fialky were thereafter issued semi-annually until 1940 and then annually until 1970, when it ceased publication. During the summer vacation Mother M. Pius encouraged the Sisters toward further studies, hoping to improve their competence as teachers. She was anxious to secure state certification for as many Sisters as could qualify. Now that the Community was engaged in all levels of education, Mother M. Pius wished to secure them within the American educational system through accreditation. The Academy's opening in the second year exposed space problems as enrollment grew. Mother Pius expressed the need for a strong building fund and enacted new collection drives among the Slovak people. The number of students steadily increased into the third and fourth year.• With the fourth year the need for accredition increased as the first graduation approached. The school was informed that the State Representatives would make an official inspection at the school year's end. That June, just a week before graduation, the State 144 SLOVAKIA Inspector arrived and spent a day inspecting the school, interviewing both the staff and the students. The State Representative, Doctor Pentz, found the Slovak students being educated and trained in all that the modern high schools offered, and in their Religion and mother tongue as well. To this he expressed his satisfaction, commenting on the orderly and methodological way in which the different departments were being conducted. 29 After Dr. Pentz reported the Academy as "first class" in both arrangement and curriculum, the school received a telegram, congratulating teachers and students on receiving accreditation from the State. This good news arrived just days before the first graduation, much to the Sisters' delight. While preparations for this first commencement progressed, another great event was in prospect, namely, the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago. This event made a great impact on the first commencement of the First Catholic Slovak Girls High School. Accreditation from the State of Pennsylvania proved the Sisters' ability to provide their students with a fitting education in their new society, but what remained to be seen was whether or not the Sisters could live up to the task of preserving Slovak culture in America. Slovak American culture was to receive a fresh impetus by the Eucharistic Congress held in Chicago. Due to attend the Congress were four bishops from Slovakia. The presence of these Slovak bishops greatly excited the Slovak Americans and especially the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius, since through the influence of Bishop McDevitt arrangements were made to have these four bishops attend the Academy's first graduation. The date of the festivity was June 14, 1926. Under the guidance of Bishop McDevitt, who presided at the First Graduation ceremony, the entire Community and students assembled at the Convent's gate to welcome the visiting bishops. Upon the arrival of the Slovak bishops, who were traveling in European fashion, clad in cassock and purple cincture, the commencement proceeded with prayers, songs, and speeches. The speeches were delivered in Slovak, calling for a continuance of Catholic education. Bishop McDevitt's address underscored the advantages which the SLOVAKIA 145 Slovak people can derive from a solid Catholic education. He also pointed out that this could be done because the American government stood to protect the religious rights of all American citizens. The theme of religious pluralism in America was carried further by the Senior Bishop from Slovakia in a speech that noted how this American government respects, upholds, and protects the religious liberty of the people who found refuge under her banner. Bishop Marian Blaha further cited the great accomplishments of the American Slovaks. Their ability to provide a Catholic education while preserving their mother tongue greatly impressed him. Then as an old Slovak proverb states, "Every perfect day must end even as the sweetest song" -this first commencement was no exception; it was concluded by a student chorale of inspirational Slovak songs.30 The first graduation was a significant milestone in the history of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. It was their first public manifestation of their educational standards and traditions. The graduation exercise presented a new phase in the mission of the Slovak Sisters. Their people realized that Danville would not only house a Convent and an Academy, but would be the center of genuine culture for the Slovaks in America. To attain a status combining a true Americanism with an appreciation of the spirit and traditions of their native land was the Community's desire.31 With this spirit of appreciation, encouraged by the sharp increase of applicants, new thoughts of building were entertained. But unlike before, the Slovak people, organizations and individuals alike, urged this step. These groups advised a general benefit drive for funds, alleging the time was ripe for such a movement since industrial conditions were favorable and the people were willing to donate.32 In the spring of 1927 Mother M. Pius presented a letter of the officers of the First Catholic Slovak Ladies' Union, another element of Slovak-American culture, announcing the drive for a building fund. When Mother M. Pius asked for their contribution, she was immediately promised five thousand dollars. The response elsewhere was the same. The Slovak newspapers pushed the drive and local groups competed in fund raising. This favorable reaction illustrates the Slovak-Americans' desire for an enlarged Slovak cultural center in America. 146 SLOVAKIA With the building fund well under way, Mother M. Pius contracted Architect Bernard Starr of Harrisburg, who in turn sought the assistance of Harry Sternfeld of Philadelphia. A spot for the new building was selected on the Villa Sacred Heart campus, and Mr. Sternfeld sketched a building dominated by a central tower. This initial plan brought eriticism for its "needless extravagance," but Mother M. Pius retained the plan as the answer to the needs of the Community, plus the cultural, educational and religious needs of the Slovak-American people. The Community wasted no time in beginning the new building. Ground was broken on May 23, 1929, in a ceremony which the local Danville Morning News described as an event to go down in Slovak history. 33 The speakers' program included representatives of the church, state, and Slovak national life. As the building progressed, the country entered the depression of the 1930's. By the time the building was completed, economic tension was beginning to be felt everywhere.34 With this in mind, Mother M. Pius avoided any elaborate dedication ceremony. This new building was made to catch the spirit of the past and to intepret it with a contemporaneous point of view in order to make it fit actual conditions.35 Its design was in accord with the ideals of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius, who hoped to blend the past into a new, usable present. In a more practical manner the new building provided an institution solely devoted to the education of the Slovak people and the preserving of their culture. It was viewed as a national work, one that provided b roader limits and better accommodations which would produce greater results. 36 The local paper saw the building as a monument to the Slovak people of America, and considered it one of the local community's finest aspects.37 The Sisters moved into their new building in September of 1931. The following three years were quiet, filled with earnest activity toward the educational goals of the Community. This period ended with the significant year of 1934, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Community's existence. In those twenty-five years the Community developed and established itself in a permanent Motherhouse, which in turn had developed the First Catholic Slovak Girls' High SLOVAKIA 147 School, crowned by the magnificent new building. This had been done under three Superiors General-Mother Mary, Mother M. Emmanuel, Mother M. Pius-all of whom promoted the cultivation of the Slovak language and history, which, with religion, constitute the two outstanding characteristics of the Slovak Academy. Extra-curricular activities, like Fialky and Cyrilika-a society for fostering interest in Slovak journalism-as well as customs established for the practical study of Slovak, such as speaking Slovak all day every Saturday, and the annual observance of Slovak Week, acquired notice and approval. The observance of Slovak tradition gave this Academy a unique position in the field of American education.38 With a high spirit of celebration the Silver Jubilee of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius commenced. The Jubilee marked still another turning point in the Community's history as it came at the close of Mother M. Pius' long administration. Her work finished laying a firm foundation which became the base for a promising era of new growth. MOTHER M. EMERENTIA, SS.C.M. (1934-1946) In this new period of the Community's history the work of the Academy advanced quietly, with gratifying results in the field of Slovak-American culture. When Mother M. Emerentia was elected Superior General in 1934, she encouraged Slovak interests and cultural projects like formal programs, dramatic productions, Slovak readings, folk song festivals and, above all, research and creative writing on Slovak topics. Mother M. Emerentia was also responsible for the compilation of Slovak language texts and hymnals used widely in Slovak elementary schools and parishes in America. The early years of Mother M. Emerentia's administration coincided with the greatest period of the depression. Though there was no drop in student enrollment, neither was there the marked increase that would have normally been the case.• These drawbacks, however, had advantages. The subdued quiet of the interval was conducive to a greater concentration on school work, both regular and extracurricular. Correspondence with students in Slovakia '' See enrollment figures; Table I. 148 SLOVAKIA was an activity greatly enjoyed by the students of St. Cyril Academy. It was also during these years that the school was favored by a number of distinguished visitors from Slovakia, including a delegation from the Slovak Institute of Arts and Sciences, a group of students from the Slovak unit of Pax Romana, plus numerous distinguished scholars, writers, and statesmen, including the Slovak martyr, Msgr. Joseph Tiso.39 When our country was drawn into war on December 8, 1941, the first care of the Motherhouse was directed toward the Sisters and their pupils in the parish schools. The Community placed its trust in God and His care of our country, and classes went on as usual. However, extracurricular activities were directed toward war needs. Beyond the prayers for peace, the Community and its students turned out quantities of knitted sweaters and helmets. They experienced the value of thrift by rationing food and collected all scraps such as fats, iron and paper. The Sisters also joined in relief efforts for their native land. An extensive relief project for the war sufferers in Slovakia was aided by the Community, which sent abroad numerous packages of relief materials. The motherhouse was a center for this organized relief work. The relief project continued in action even after the war, when Slovakia again was suppressed by a stronger force. Following a remarkably successful and flourishing six-year period of self-rule under the Presidency of Tiso, the Slovak government collapsed when victory came to Russia and the Allies. 40 With this victory Slovakia was overrun by the Communists. Their occupation of the country led to the execution of Msgr. Tiso, plus the silencing of many bishops and priests. The people of Slovakia remained in destitution; hence, the necessity for relief work to continue until the Iron Curtain cut off all communication. 41 The Communist occupation caused more refugees to seek freedom and sanctuary from Slovakia. As thousands came to America, the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius and their students enjoyed fresh contacts with persons of their fatherland. Priests and professional people willingly gave lectures to both the Sisters and the students, chiefly on conditions in Slovakia and on topics of Slovak history. SLOVAKIA 149 Several high school students from Slovakia enrolled in the Academy, thus enriching the Slovak-American culture. MOTHER M. CRESCENTIA, SS.C.M. (1946-1958) While the Slovak-American tradition was being enriched during these post-war years, a new Superior General was elected, placing renewed importance on the educational aspects of the Academy. Mother M. Crescentia realized that during the earlier years the educational objectives could not be pursued as fully as desired since more urgent activities were at hand. In time, however, conditions improved, so that more and better organized work could be done in the field of teacher education. Mother M. Crescentia took advantage of this situation, arranging for more Sisters to take college courses in a greater variety of fields. With this renewed progress in the Sisters' personal educational ventures, activities in the Academy moved apace. The student enrollment at the Academy, which increased only to a minor extent after the depression, now began rapid growth. This growth of the Academy advanced steadily into the fifties, causing every available space within the Academy to be filled. It necessitated the building of Saint Philomena Hall to be used for students' living and classrooms. Also in the fifties, the Community worked for the founding of Father Jankola. They are Villa Saint Cyril in Highland Park, Illinois, and Maria Joseph Manor in Danville, Pennsylvania. By 1958 the Community had a new Superior General in the person of Mother M. Bernard. MOTHER M. BERNARD, SS.C.M. (1958-1970) The highlight of this decade was the observance of the Community's Golden Jubilee. It was climaxed by the celebration of a Roman-Slavonic Mass on the Villa campus in the presence of five thousand visitors from all parts of the country.42 It was the first Roman rite vernacular Mass ever offered on this continent. The increased enrollment and the large turnout for the Roman-Slavonic Mass indicates the strong support the Academy received from the Slovak-American people in its preserving of Slovak culture. The early sixties were also highlighted by a large celebration honoring another aspect of the Comunity's Slovak heritage. The year 1963 marked the eleven hundredth 150 SLOVAKIA anniversary of the arrival of SS. Cyril and Methodius among the Slovaks. In addition to the Community celebration in America, the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius participated in a week-long observance in Rome, involving numerous Slovak pilgrims, who had assembled there for the dedication of the Slovak Institute of SS. Cyril and Methodius, a seminary for the training of priests for Slovakia. THE JANKOLA LIBRARY The latter sixties and early seventies for St. Cyril Academy had been dominated by two cherished Slovak projects. First was the active cooperation with the Apostolate of the Slovak Institute of SS. Cyril and Methodius in Rome, begun during the 1963 pilgrimage. Second was the professional development of the Jankola Library at the Academy. This Library is a center of Slovak culture and learning for St. Cyril Academy and Slovak America. It is called Jankola Library in honor of the founder of the Community and promoter of Slovak-American culture, Father Matthew Jankola. The Library provides invaluable resources for study and research purposes, as well as literary works to enrich the Slovak spirit. Jankola Library contains over six thousand (6,000) fully catalogued items on its shelves with several hundred more reserved for further processing.43 Beyond just Slovak books this Library also promotes Slovak-American culture with its large collection of Slovak art. Included among its treasures are a large unusual map of Czecho-Slovakia, an artistically costumed mannequin representing the Slovak tradition, and a large, valuable collection of Slovak ceramic art, some embroidery and sizeable pieces of cutglass sent from Slovakia. This Library with its vast assortment of Slovak art is truly a tribute to Slovakia's culture. With Jankola Library as its Slovak center, SS. Cyril Academy still provides an excellent American education. It offers a wide range of courses, including four foreign languages.* Besides educating students for social living in America, the Academy can also train girls for a religious teaching life within its own Community. The Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius are presently teaching in parish schools and eight (8) high schools, including a boarding * Source listing of St. Cyril Academy. Table II. 151 SLOVAKIA school for girls. 0 Education of Slovak children continues to be the principal vocation of a Sister of SS. Cyril and Methodius. It is to these children that a Sister dedicates herseJf and hopes to preserve Slovakia's heritage. Today, the St. Cyril Academy is justifiably proud of tts accomplishments during the past fifty ( 50) years. Both the teaching Sisters and their students are fully educated in, and cognizant of, their dual heritage. The traditions and artifacts of Slovak culture have been preserved; while at the same time, each graduate is proud to be an American. St. Cyril Academy continues to revere its Slovak past. The Sisters continue to aid the suppressed people of Slovakia, but now this is done indirectly to the extent possible. It is the desire of the Sisters of the Academy to provide their countrymen with new hope of cultural freedom by showing them the accomplishments that have been possible in America. This Academy is rightly considered the center of Slovak culture in America. "" List of schools staffed by Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Table III. TABLE I Enrollment figures of St. Cyril Academy, Danville, Pa. Year 1925-26 1926-27 1927-28 1928-29 1929-30 1930-31 1931-32 1932-33 1933-34 1934-35 1935-36 1936-37 1937-38 1938-39 1939-40 1940-41 Total Number of Students 38 39 44 47 42 61 75 69 60 58 52 58 54 50 60 70 Year 1941-42 1942-43 1943-44 1944-45 1945-46 1946-47 1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-54 1954-55 1955-56 1956-57 Total Number of Students 66 55 55 69 91 96 90 107 112 109 123 138 148 153 157 180 Total Number Year of Students 1957-58 1958-59 1959-60 1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 181 175 162 182 202 195 202 171 156 178 120 108 104 101 108 106 SLOVAKIA 152 TABLE II Curriculum of St. Cyril Academy FIRST YEAR Religion I English I Algebra I Intr. Physical Science Physical Education Chorus World Culture I Latin I Spanish I French I Slovak I Foods Art I Art Appreciation Music Appreciation Health Education Piano Interpretive Dance SECOND YEAR Religion II English II Geometry Biology Physical Education Chorus World Culture II Latin II French II Spanish II Slovak II Foods Clothing I Art II Piano Interpretive Dance THIRD YEAR Religion III English III Algebra II Chemistry Physical Education Chorus American Culture I Latin III Spanish III French III Slovak III Foods Advanced Clothing Art III Piano Interpretive Dance Typing I Stenography I SLOVAKIA 153 FOURTH YEAR Religion IV English IV Business English Math 12 Advanced Biology Physical Education Chorus American Culture II Latin IV Spanish IV French IV Slovak IV Advanced Clothing Art IV Speech Piano Interpretive Dance Typing II Stenography II Bookkeeping Business Law TABLE III SCHOOLS STAFFED BY SIS'llEIBS OF SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS Berwick, Pa. Bloomsburg, Pa. Binghamton, N. Y. Binghamton, N. Y. Bridgeport, Conn. Bridgeport, Pa. Charleston, S. C. Charleston, S. C. Chicago, Ill. East Vandergrift, Pa. Endicott, N. Y. Gary, Indiana Hazleton, Pa. Jessup, Pa. Lebanon, Pa. Luzerne, Pa. Nanticoke, Pa. New York, N. Y. Olyphant, Pa. Perth Amboy, N. J. Phoenixville, Pa. Pittston, Pa. Plymouth, Pa. Stratford, Conn. Swoyersville, Pa. Torrington, Conn. St. Mary's School St. Columba School SS. Cyril and Methodius School St. Ann's School SS. Cyril and Methodius School Mother of Sorrows School Blessed Sacrament School Nativity School SS. Simon and Jude School Holy Trinity School St. Joseph School Holy Trinity School St. Joseph School St. Michael's School SS. Cyril and Methodius School St. John Nepomucene School St. Joseph School St. John Nepomucene School Holy Ghost School Holy Trinity School Sacred Heart of Jesus School St. John Baptist School St. Stephen School Sacred Name of Jesus School Holy Trinity School Sacred Heart of Jesus School SLOVAKIA 154 Immaculate Conception School Sacred Heart of Jesus School Holy Trinity School Whiting, Ind. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Yonkers, N. Y. IDGH SCHOOLS Andrean High School Dunmore Catholic High School Lourdes H. S. Lebanon Catholic H. S. Kingston Catholic Central Catholic Central H. S. Catholic Central (St. Pius X) Blessed Sacrament Academy St. Cyril Academy 1. Gary, Ind. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Dunmore, Pa. Shamokin, Pa. Lebanon, Pa. Kingston, Pa. Charleston, S. C. Pottstown, Pa. Yonkers, N. Y. Danville, Pa. FOOTNOTES 1) David F . Bowers, "Social and Cultural Impact" in For eign Influences in American Life (Princeton, 1944) , p. 1. 2) Emily Balch, Our Slavic Fellow Citizens (New York, 1969), p. 86. 3) The Slovak Nation, Manuscript in Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius Community Archives, Danville, Pennsylvania. 4 ) Ibid. 5) Education in Slovakia, Manuscript in SS. C. M Community Archives, composition by M . I. Angelovic, pp. 88. 6) Ibid. 7) Ear liest Immigration, Ms. in SS. C. M. Community Archives. 8 ) Emily Balch, Our Slavic Fellow Citizens, p . 108. 9 ) Earliest Immigration Ms. 10) Francis Brown and Joseph Roucek, "Czechoslovak American" in One America (New York, 1946), p. 147. 11) In 1899, there were eight Slovak priests in America. Earliest Immigration Ms. 12) The Slovaks divide their settlement in America into three Ages: Church Age, School Age, and Institution Age. Ibid. 13) Daniel Tanzone, "The Slovak Experience in Contemporary America" in Slovakia (Middletown, Pa., 1972), p. 129. 14) Francis Brown and Joseph Roucek, Our Racial and National Minorities (New York, 1937), p. 602. 15) Timothy Smith, "New Approaches to the History of Immigration in 20th Century America", in The America Historical Review LXXI, (July 1966), p. 127. 155 SLOVAKIA 16) Contributions of Reverend Matthew Jankola to Slovak Catholic Education in the United States, Ms. in SS. C. M. Community Archives, composition by Sister M. Consuela Gregorovic, p. 14. 17) Ibid. , p. 3. 18 ) Earliest Plans, Ms. in SS. C. M. Community Archives. 19) Ibid . 20) Ibid. 21) The girls wer,e Mary Mihalik, Mary Bartek and Mary Pauly. 22) Father Jankola, Ms., pp. 38-46. 23) Philosophy of Saint Cyril Academy, Ms. 24) Francis Brown and Joseph Roucek, Our America, p. 501. 25) The Educational Activities of the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius in the United States, Ms. in SS. C. M. C-Ommunity Archives, composition by Sister Maria Berchmans Teplicky, p. 4. 26) Danville, Ms. in SS. C. M. Community Archives. 27) Ibid. 28) Educational Expansion, Ms. in SS. C.M. Community Archives. 29) Josephine M. Marcinko, "A Little Historical Sketch" in Fialky (Danville, 1927), p. 23. 30) Edttcational Expansion, Ms. 31) Preparing to Build, Ms. in SS. C. M. Community Archives. 32) Ibid. 33) Morning News, (Danville, May 23, 1929), p. 6. 34 ) Brief History of the Congregation of the Sisters of Saints Cyril and Methodius, Ms. in SS. C. M. Community Archives, composition by Mother M. Emerentia Petrasek, p. 85. 35) Fialky, (Danville, 1931), p. 82. 36) Brief History, Ms., Petrasek, p. 85. 37) Morning News, (Danville, June 8, 1931), p. 4. 38) Brief History, Ms., Petrasek, pp. 88-90. 39 ) Ibid. , p. 108. 40 ) Joseph Pauco, Slovakia, pp. 26-28. 41) Brief History, Ms., Petrasek, p. 125. 42) Sisters of Saints Cyril and Methodius, Jankola Book, (Danville, 1972) , p. 90. 43) SS. C. M., Jankola Book, p. 108.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius and the Preservation of Slovak Culture in America Description An account of the resource William Wagner Slovakia, Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974 pp. 132-155 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Wagner, William Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9e75abd003abc3f364941f32d76f7d27.pdf d90ab220358aea1a179c82526f49d9f1 PDF Text Text 52 SLOVAKIA •RICHARD WEISHAR THE ROOTS OF OOMMUNISM IN THE C-SR I,F ONE TAKES THE TROUBLE to examine events preceding the February, 1948, "coup d'etat" in Czecho-Slovakia, he will soon learn that the ratification of the Communist list of cabinet members by Benes was but the finishing touch to his signatures on two other documents: the Russian-Czech treaty of December 12, 1943, and Kosice Program of April 5, 1945, by means of which Benes and the other "democrats" marked out their post-war aims. Just as in 1919, Benes was again able to dupe the western foreign powers both during and after the second world war. They looked upon his state as the "lighthouse of democracy", which he himself praised as such, and were very much surprised when atop this lighthouse the red flag was hoisted. Had people but taken cognizance of Benes's statements, the awakening would not have been quite so rough. For no matter how little Benes's words from 1919 to 1938 dovetailed with the truth, there is one thing he cannot rightly be accused of. He and his associates never were ambiguous, in dealing with the West which granted them asylum, as to the direction in which they would steer the second Czech republic after an eventual German defeat. His allies, however, felt there was no reason to take serious interest in Benes's written and spoken statements. They were only too glad to find in him a fellow who was far out in front with respect to hating anything German. His hatred, in fact, found only one satisfying outlet: the expulsion of 3½ millions Sudeten Germans from their ancestral homesteads. To execute this deed he needed the agreement of the allies, who simply followed the example of Josef Stalin. The price for Stalin's consent was that "treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual aid in the post-war period between the USSR and C-SR" of December 12, 1943, in which the country was sold out to Russia. (Stalin was furthermore beholden to Benes for having - as an unconscious tool of Heydrich - handed over to him Marshal �SLOVAKIA 53 Tukachevski.) The late Hubert Ripka, a close associate of Benes, later minister of trade in the second Czech Republic, still later an exile in London, tried at the time to disperse the fears of the less attentive: "I know that in certain circles within the West it is feared that we could become Russian vassals, but the name of Dr. Benes is the best guarantee for the independence of the (>SR" (Central European Observer, 1943, p. 304). And Benes himself appealed as follows to his fellow-countrymen : "Don't let the Germans lead you astray when they speak to you of Bolshevist terror and dictatorship; the Soviet Union desires nothing more than to be our friend. Our State will be a democracy, naturally a people's democracy new style" (Central European Observer, 194'5, p. 194.) One can hardly say that Benes kept his aims secret. He knew at all times how to adapt himself to the mentality of those on whom he was dependent. If h e posed to the western statesmen at the peace conference of St. Germain in 1919 as a representative of a "middle-class government", which would be rejected by the "Marxist Sudeten Germans" , he went overboard in the other direction in 1943 and 1945 in displaying even more Communist zeal than the Czech emigres in Moscow. He states in his Memoirs (p. 126) that he feared he had not gone far enough in his talks with the Czech Communists in Moscow, until Fierlinger reassured him that the conference "had followed a most satisfying course and surpassed all expectations." The result alluded to in the latter statement showed itself in 19415, when Benes convoked the first Czech government in Kosice. The Communists put up two deputy premiers and received the important ministries of interior, education, information and agriculture. A Communist secretary of state was paired with non-partisan foreign minister, Jan Masaryk. In Kosice a "program of the new Czecho-Slovak Government of the National Front of Czech and Slovaks" was proclaimed, which began with the country's Bolshevization. This declaration is replete with expressions of "undying gratitude for the glorious and heroic Red Army, admiration for the unrivalled Soviet art of war," while the west- �54 SLOVAKIA ern allies were mentioned in only one sentence. Partially out of gratitude to the "glorious Soviet Union," Benes ceded the Carpatho-Ukraine - which had been a part of the first republic from 1919 to 1939 - to the Soviet Union, 'although he had always insisted on the pre- Munich boundaries, within which the Carpatho-Ukraine was situated. In the Kosice Program reference is again made to the fact that the country's foreign policy is "determined for all time" by the Moscow treaty of 1943. At the same time it was announced that the republic would maintain "close fraternal relations" with all the Slavic countries (all of which were under Bolshevist control). Even Hungary, looked upon as an arch-enemy during the period of the first Czech republic, was now received into this circle of friendships, meantime having become Bolshevist-dominated! Benes had thus foreseen Prague's entrance into the Cominform. In order to pave the way intellectually for central Muscovite rule, Benes appointed Communist Nejedly as minister of education and Communist Kopecky as minister of information. He gave them - in the Kosice Program - certain guidelines calling for a "revision of the relationship to German culture," which in plain language meant a clean break in a centuries old spiritual tie with the West. This also meant indoctrinating Czech and Slovak youth in the "creation, development, economy, and culture of the USSR" and the "disappearance from school books and youth education programs of anti-Soviet influences." Russian became the top priority foreign language in the schools; and replacing the humanistic education of former years was the requirement of "history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." All this took place within the initial stages of Benes's presidency, not under his successor Gottwald. The latter did not need to alter the set-up, because Benes made thorough preparations. Benes's minister of education declared: "Right now (1945) we must choose between Eeast and West. I do not think there is any question as far as the Czech people are concerned. We belong to the great Slavic family of nations led by the mighty Russian nation with the great leader Stalin as its head" ("Unity" June, 2, �SLOVAKIA 55 1945). Those who saw little to rejoice in at the Bolshevization of the country were lulled into submission by the .strains of Pan-Slavism. Hand in glove with a foreign-political adjustment to Russian plans and those of the satellites came a radical domestic political change. All elements of opposition were ,crushed. All parties not belonging to the "National l<ront" - and they were the strongest parties till 19·39 - were forbidden, to say nothing of the dispossession and expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and Magyars. Benes used the "people's courts" to get rid of his opponents, whom he threw into jail as "arch-traitors" and collaborators" or sent to the gallows. All regard for democratic or human rights was tossed to the four winds. "I am a real democrat," said Benes. "I know that in the development of nations and States there are times when violent revolutions are necessary" (-Memoirs, p. 285). This of course meant expelling of the Sudeten Germans (national revolution) which made rapid Bolshevization of the country much easier. From the wealth of these expelled a 'W'und of National Revival" was created and placed under State control. It was not just a question of robbing the Sudeten German population. This act of spoliage was but the first blow at the existing economic order. Benes's economic decrees of 1945 were to bear this out in crystal clarity. They called for certain factories to be dispossessed and nationalized in principle, and for all factories with more than 50 employees as well. By his decrees "on penal protection of national enterprises," "penal protection of the execution of the two-year economic plan," "measures for executing national mobilization of the labor force," the Communist economic system was introduced as early as 1945. Everything that smacked of compulsion, uncommnoly stringent economic penal law, were not just the achievements of the February Revolution, but the work of Benes and his team. The field of agriculture experienced like changes. The property stolen from the Germans was handed over to Communists who had served the government well. Care was taken to create socalled "midget" agricultural enterprises that were not long �56 SLOVAKIA self-supporting and of necessity led to forming of kholkhozes. There was not much left for Gottwald to do. From Benes he had inherited the Moscow political course, education based on a Bolshevist pattern, a "National Front" without opposition, liquidation of basic rights, and a Communist planned economy. All this continued according to plan. The parliamentary elections of 1'946 brought the Communists 38 % of the vote, and Benes appointed Gottwald premier supported ·b y eight other Communist ministers. The wheels were well oiled; the new machine functioned beautifully. The minister of information set about to prohibit all publications stemming from other-than-government parties, one of which had already been dissolved. When Czech-Slovakia began to ogle Marshall Plan funds, Moscow soon let it be known how the Russian-Czech treaty of 1943 was to be interpreted. Gott w a 1 d repeated Benes 's mouthings about C-SR being a "people's democracy", pointed out that this was no longer an "old-fashioned bourgeois republic" but a socialist republic based on a system of nationalized economy. And no doubt - in 1947 - he was right. The Communist minister of the interior armed his police force and cleansed it of "unreliable" elements. The Communists forced the few non-Communist ministers to resign. Benes for the second time put his name on a new list of ministers, 'headed by Klement Gottwald, and received still more Com;munists than had thus far been the case. A month later Masaryk the younger plunged from the third floor of the Czech foreign ministry in Czernin Palace. Benes abdicated in June, 194'8, for the second time within ten years and died shortly thereafter. 1 The so-called "February Putsch" is referred to as the "violent end of freedom-loving Czecho~Slovak democracy." But on February 25, 1948, little more occured than the Communists threw some non-Communists out of the government. The Communists were no longer in need of the further support of their collaborators. (Sudeten Bulletin) � 52 SLOVAKIA •RICHARD WEISHAR THE ROOTS OF OOMMUNISM IN THE C-SR I,F ONE TAKES THE TROUBLE to examine events preceding the February, 1948, "coup d'etat" in Czecho-Slovakia, he will soon learn that the ratification of the Communist list of cabinet members by Benes was but the finishing touch to his signatures on two other documents: the Russian-Czech treaty of December 12, 1943, and Kosice Program of April 5, 1945, by means of which Benes and the other "democrats" marked out their post-war aims. Just as in 1919, Benes was again able to dupe the western foreign powers both during and after the second world war. They looked upon his state as the "lighthouse of democracy", which he himself praised as such, and were very much surprised when atop this lighthouse the red flag was hoisted. Had people but taken cognizance of Benes's statements, the awakening would not have been quite so rough. For no matter how little Benes's words from 1919 to 1938 dovetailed with the truth, there is one thing he cannot rightly be accused of. He and his associates never were ambiguous, in dealing with the West which granted them asylum, as to the direction in which they would steer the second Czech republic after an eventual German defeat. His allies, however, felt there was no reason to take serious interest in Benes's written and spoken statements. They were only too glad to find in him a fellow who was far out in front with respect to hating anything German. His hatred, in fact, found only one satisfying outlet: the expulsion of 3½ millions Sudeten Germans from their ancestral homesteads. To execute this deed he needed the agreement of the allies, who simply followed the example of Josef Stalin. The price for Stalin's consent was that "treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual aid in the post-war period between the USSR and C-SR" of December 12, 1943, in which the country was sold out to Russia. (Stalin was furthermore beholden to Benes for having - as an unconscious tool of Heydrich - handed over to him Marshal �SLOVAKIA 53 Tukachevski.) The late Hubert Ripka, a close associate of Benes, later minister of trade in the second Czech Republic, still later an exile in London, tried at the time to disperse the fears of the less attentive: "I know that in certain circles within the West it is feared that we could become Russian vassals, but the name of Dr. Benes is the best guarantee for the independence of the (>SR" (Central European Observer, 1943, p. 304). And Benes himself appealed as follows to his fellow-countrymen : "Don't let the Germans lead you astray when they speak to you of Bolshevist terror and dictatorship; the Soviet Union desires nothing more than to be our friend. Our State will be a democracy, naturally a people's democracy new style" (Central European Observer, 194'5, p. 194.) One can hardly say that Benes kept his aims secret. He knew at all times how to adapt himself to the mentality of those on whom he was dependent. If h e posed to the western statesmen at the peace conference of St. Germain in 1919 as a representative of a "middle-class government", which would be rejected by the "Marxist Sudeten Germans" , he went overboard in the other direction in 1943 and 1945 in displaying even more Communist zeal than the Czech emigres in Moscow. He states in his Memoirs (p. 126) that he feared he had not gone far enough in his talks with the Czech Communists in Moscow, until Fierlinger reassured him that the conference "had followed a most satisfying course and surpassed all expectations." The result alluded to in the latter statement showed itself in 19415, when Benes convoked the first Czech government in Kosice. The Communists put up two deputy premiers and received the important ministries of interior, education, information and agriculture. A Communist secretary of state was paired with non-partisan foreign minister, Jan Masaryk. In Kosice a "program of the new Czecho-Slovak Government of the National Front of Czech and Slovaks" was proclaimed, which began with the country's Bolshevization. This declaration is replete with expressions of "undying gratitude for the glorious and heroic Red Army, admiration for the unrivalled Soviet art of war," while the west- �54 SLOVAKIA ern allies were mentioned in only one sentence. Partially out of gratitude to the "glorious Soviet Union," Benes ceded the Carpatho-Ukraine - which had been a part of the first republic from 1919 to 1939 - to the Soviet Union, 'although he had always insisted on the pre- Munich boundaries, within which the Carpatho-Ukraine was situated. In the Kosice Program reference is again made to the fact that the country's foreign policy is "determined for all time" by the Moscow treaty of 1943. At the same time it was announced that the republic would maintain "close fraternal relations" with all the Slavic countries (all of which were under Bolshevist control). Even Hungary, looked upon as an arch-enemy during the period of the first Czech republic, was now received into this circle of friendships, meantime having become Bolshevist-dominated! Benes had thus foreseen Prague's entrance into the Cominform. In order to pave the way intellectually for central Muscovite rule, Benes appointed Communist Nejedly as minister of education and Communist Kopecky as minister of information. He gave them - in the Kosice Program - certain guidelines calling for a "revision of the relationship to German culture," which in plain language meant a clean break in a centuries old spiritual tie with the West. This also meant indoctrinating Czech and Slovak youth in the "creation, development, economy, and culture of the USSR" and the "disappearance from school books and youth education programs of anti-Soviet influences." Russian became the top priority foreign language in the schools; and replacing the humanistic education of former years was the requirement of "history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." All this took place within the initial stages of Benes's presidency, not under his successor Gottwald. The latter did not need to alter the set-up, because Benes made thorough preparations. Benes's minister of education declared: "Right now (1945) we must choose between Eeast and West. I do not think there is any question as far as the Czech people are concerned. We belong to the great Slavic family of nations led by the mighty Russian nation with the great leader Stalin as its head" ("Unity" June, 2, �SLOVAKIA 55 1945). Those who saw little to rejoice in at the Bolshevization of the country were lulled into submission by the .strains of Pan-Slavism. Hand in glove with a foreign-political adjustment to Russian plans and those of the satellites came a radical domestic political change. All elements of opposition were ,crushed. All parties not belonging to the "National l<ront" - and they were the strongest parties till 19·39 - were forbidden, to say nothing of the dispossession and expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and Magyars. Benes used the "people's courts" to get rid of his opponents, whom he threw into jail as "arch-traitors" and collaborators" or sent to the gallows. All regard for democratic or human rights was tossed to the four winds. "I am a real democrat," said Benes. "I know that in the development of nations and States there are times when violent revolutions are necessary" (-Memoirs, p. 285). This of course meant expelling of the Sudeten Germans (national revolution) which made rapid Bolshevization of the country much easier. From the wealth of these expelled a 'W'und of National Revival" was created and placed under State control. It was not just a question of robbing the Sudeten German population. This act of spoliage was but the first blow at the existing economic order. Benes's economic decrees of 1945 were to bear this out in crystal clarity. They called for certain factories to be dispossessed and nationalized in principle, and for all factories with more than 50 employees as well. By his decrees "on penal protection of national enterprises," "penal protection of the execution of the two-year economic plan," "measures for executing national mobilization of the labor force," the Communist economic system was introduced as early as 1945. Everything that smacked of compulsion, uncommnoly stringent economic penal law, were not just the achievements of the February Revolution, but the work of Benes and his team. The field of agriculture experienced like changes. The property stolen from the Germans was handed over to Communists who had served the government well. Care was taken to create socalled "midget" agricultural enterprises that were not long �56 SLOVAKIA self-supporting and of necessity led to forming of kholkhozes. There was not much left for Gottwald to do. From Benes he had inherited the Moscow political course, education based on a Bolshevist pattern, a "National Front" without opposition, liquidation of basic rights, and a Communist planned economy. All this continued according to plan. The parliamentary elections of 1'946 brought the Communists 38 % of the vote, and Benes appointed Gottwald premier supported ·b y eight other Communist ministers. The wheels were well oiled; the new machine functioned beautifully. The minister of information set about to prohibit all publications stemming from other-than-government parties, one of which had already been dissolved. When Czech-Slovakia began to ogle Marshall Plan funds, Moscow soon let it be known how the Russian-Czech treaty of 1943 was to be interpreted. Gott w a 1 d repeated Benes 's mouthings about C-SR being a "people's democracy", pointed out that this was no longer an "old-fashioned bourgeois republic" but a socialist republic based on a system of nationalized economy. And no doubt - in 1947 - he was right. The Communist minister of the interior armed his police force and cleansed it of "unreliable" elements. The Communists forced the few non-Communist ministers to resign. Benes for the second time put his name on a new list of ministers, 'headed by Klement Gottwald, and received still more Com;munists than had thus far been the case. A month later Masaryk the younger plunged from the third floor of the Czech foreign ministry in Czernin Palace. Benes abdicated in June, 194'8, for the second time within ten years and died shortly thereafter. 1 The so-called "February Putsch" is referred to as the "violent end of freedom-loving Czecho~Slovak democracy." But on February 25, 1948, little more occured than the Communists threw some non-Communists out of the government. The Communists were no longer in need of the further support of their collaborators. (Sudeten Bulletin) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1958, Vol. 8 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 26), March 1958.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 27), June 1958.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 28), December 1958.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1958 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 52 SLOVAKIA •RICHARD WEISHAR THE ROOTS OF OOMMUNISM IN THE C-SR I,F ONE TAKES THE TROUBLE to examine events preceding the February, 1948, "coup d'etat" in Czecho-Slovakia, he will soon learn that the ratification of the Communist list of cabinet members by Benes was but the finishing touch to his signatures on two other documents: the Russian-Czech treaty of December 12, 1943, and Kosice Program of April 5, 1945, by means of which Benes and the other "democrats" marked out their post-war aims. Just as in 1919, Benes was again able to dupe the western foreign powers both during and after the second world war. They looked upon his state as the "lighthouse of democracy", which he himself praised as such, and were very much surprised when atop this lighthouse the red flag was hoisted. Had people but taken cognizance of Benes's statements, the awakening would not have been quite so rough. For no matter how little Benes's words from 1919 to 1938 dovetailed with the truth, there is one thing he cannot rightly be accused of. He and his associates never were ambiguous, in dealing with the West which granted them asylum, as to the direction in which they would steer the second Czech republic after an eventual German defeat. His allies, however, felt there was no reason to take serious interest in Benes's written and spoken statements. They were only too glad to find in him a fellow who was far out in front with respect to hating anything German. His hatred, in fact, found only one satisfying outlet: the expulsion of 3½ millions Sudeten Germans from their ancestral homesteads. To execute this deed he needed the agreement of the allies, who simply followed the example of Josef Stalin. The price for Stalin's consent was that "treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual aid in the post-war period between the USSR and C-SR" of December 12, 1943, in which the country was sold out to Russia. (Stalin was furthermore beholden to Benes for having - as an unconscious tool of Heydrich - handed over to him Marshal SLOVAKIA 53 Tukachevski.) The late Hubert Ripka, a close associate of Benes, later minister of trade in the second Czech Republic, still later an exile in London, tried at the time to disperse the fears of the less attentive: "I know that in certain circles within the West it is feared that we could become Russian vassals, but the name of Dr. Benes is the best guarantee for the independence of the (>SR" (Central European Observer, 1943, p. 304). And Benes himself appealed as follows to his fellow-countrymen : "Don't let the Germans lead you astray when they speak to you of Bolshevist terror and dictatorship; the Soviet Union desires nothing more than to be our friend. Our State will be a democracy, naturally a people's democracy new style" (Central European Observer, 194'5, p. 194.) One can hardly say that Benes kept his aims secret. He knew at all times how to adapt himself to the mentality of those on whom he was dependent. If h e posed to the western statesmen at the peace conference of St. Germain in 1919 as a representative of a "middle-class government", which would be rejected by the "Marxist Sudeten Germans" , he went overboard in the other direction in 1943 and 1945 in displaying even more Communist zeal than the Czech emigres in Moscow. He states in his Memoirs (p. 126) that he feared he had not gone far enough in his talks with the Czech Communists in Moscow, until Fierlinger reassured him that the conference "had followed a most satisfying course and surpassed all expectations." The result alluded to in the latter statement showed itself in 19415, when Benes convoked the first Czech government in Kosice. The Communists put up two deputy premiers and received the important ministries of interior, education, information and agriculture. A Communist secretary of state was paired with non-partisan foreign minister, Jan Masaryk. In Kosice a "program of the new Czecho-Slovak Government of the National Front of Czech and Slovaks" was proclaimed, which began with the country's Bolshevization. This declaration is replete with expressions of "undying gratitude for the glorious and heroic Red Army, admiration for the unrivalled Soviet art of war," while the west- 54 SLOVAKIA ern allies were mentioned in only one sentence. Partially out of gratitude to the "glorious Soviet Union," Benes ceded the Carpatho-Ukraine - which had been a part of the first republic from 1919 to 1939 - to the Soviet Union, 'although he had always insisted on the pre- Munich boundaries, within which the Carpatho-Ukraine was situated. In the Kosice Program reference is again made to the fact that the country's foreign policy is "determined for all time" by the Moscow treaty of 1943. At the same time it was announced that the republic would maintain "close fraternal relations" with all the Slavic countries (all of which were under Bolshevist control). Even Hungary, looked upon as an arch-enemy during the period of the first Czech republic, was now received into this circle of friendships, meantime having become Bolshevist-dominated! Benes had thus foreseen Prague's entrance into the Cominform. In order to pave the way intellectually for central Muscovite rule, Benes appointed Communist Nejedly as minister of education and Communist Kopecky as minister of information. He gave them - in the Kosice Program - certain guidelines calling for a "revision of the relationship to German culture," which in plain language meant a clean break in a centuries old spiritual tie with the West. This also meant indoctrinating Czech and Slovak youth in the "creation, development, economy, and culture of the USSR" and the "disappearance from school books and youth education programs of anti-Soviet influences." Russian became the top priority foreign language in the schools; and replacing the humanistic education of former years was the requirement of "history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." All this took place within the initial stages of Benes's presidency, not under his successor Gottwald. The latter did not need to alter the set-up, because Benes made thorough preparations. Benes's minister of education declared: "Right now (1945) we must choose between Eeast and West. I do not think there is any question as far as the Czech people are concerned. We belong to the great Slavic family of nations led by the mighty Russian nation with the great leader Stalin as its head" ("Unity" June, 2, SLOVAKIA 55 1945). Those who saw little to rejoice in at the Bolshevization of the country were lulled into submission by the .strains of Pan-Slavism. Hand in glove with a foreign-political adjustment to Russian plans and those of the satellites came a radical domestic political change. All elements of opposition were ,crushed. All parties not belonging to the "National l<ront" - and they were the strongest parties till 19·39 - were forbidden, to say nothing of the dispossession and expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and Magyars. Benes used the "people's courts" to get rid of his opponents, whom he threw into jail as "arch-traitors" and collaborators" or sent to the gallows. All regard for democratic or human rights was tossed to the four winds. "I am a real democrat," said Benes. "I know that in the development of nations and States there are times when violent revolutions are necessary" (-Memoirs, p. 285). This of course meant expelling of the Sudeten Germans (national revolution) which made rapid Bolshevization of the country much easier. From the wealth of these expelled a 'W'und of National Revival" was created and placed under State control. It was not just a question of robbing the Sudeten German population. This act of spoliage was but the first blow at the existing economic order. Benes's economic decrees of 1945 were to bear this out in crystal clarity. They called for certain factories to be dispossessed and nationalized in principle, and for all factories with more than 50 employees as well. By his decrees "on penal protection of national enterprises," "penal protection of the execution of the two-year economic plan," "measures for executing national mobilization of the labor force," the Communist economic system was introduced as early as 1945. Everything that smacked of compulsion, uncommnoly stringent economic penal law, were not just the achievements of the February Revolution, but the work of Benes and his team. The field of agriculture experienced like changes. The property stolen from the Germans was handed over to Communists who had served the government well. Care was taken to create socalled "midget" agricultural enterprises that were not long 56 SLOVAKIA self-supporting and of necessity led to forming of kholkhozes. There was not much left for Gottwald to do. From Benes he had inherited the Moscow political course, education based on a Bolshevist pattern, a "National Front" without opposition, liquidation of basic rights, and a Communist planned economy. All this continued according to plan. The parliamentary elections of 1'946 brought the Communists 38 % of the vote, and Benes appointed Gottwald premier supported ·b y eight other Communist ministers. The wheels were well oiled; the new machine functioned beautifully. The minister of information set about to prohibit all publications stemming from other-than-government parties, one of which had already been dissolved. When Czech-Slovakia began to ogle Marshall Plan funds, Moscow soon let it be known how the Russian-Czech treaty of 1943 was to be interpreted. Gott w a 1 d repeated Benes 's mouthings about C-SR being a "people's democracy", pointed out that this was no longer an "old-fashioned bourgeois republic" but a socialist republic based on a system of nationalized economy. And no doubt - in 1947 - he was right. The Communist minister of the interior armed his police force and cleansed it of "unreliable" elements. The Communists forced the few non-Communist ministers to resign. Benes for the second time put his name on a new list of ministers, 'headed by Klement Gottwald, and received still more Com;munists than had thus far been the case. A month later Masaryk the younger plunged from the third floor of the Czech foreign ministry in Czernin Palace. Benes abdicated in June, 194'8, for the second time within ten years and died shortly thereafter. 1 The so-called "February Putsch" is referred to as the "violent end of freedom-loving Czecho~Slovak democracy." But on February 25, 1948, little more occured than the Communists threw some non-Communists out of the government. The Communists were no longer in need of the further support of their collaborators. (Sudeten Bulletin)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Roots of Communism in the Č-SR Description An account of the resource Richard Weishar Slovakia, Vol. 8, No. 3 (28), December 1958 pp. 52-56 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Weishar, Richard Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1958 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8db2a792fb292ff3053ab1e8cca1b257.pdf e05652a9ced880bbf4115561a359e20f PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 87 Excerpt from In Due Season Paul Wilkes "Is ... is he home? Pan Vlasek?" '' No, no, in the field,'' Dusan replied impatiently, stuffing two huge loaves of bread into a sack . "Stara?" "Yes, yes. Matka moja, what you girls won't do ; you are the third one today.'' ''Oh,'' she breathed, as if by her late arrival she might already have lost out. "I won't stay long. I have a heap of washing to do. So high I can't even see over the top of it.' ' "They are good to you, those Magyars?" "Oh yes, Pan Vlasek. When they have roast, we have roast. And as many potatoes as you can eat." "So you are happy up there on the hill?" "For now." "And?" '' Someday I want to live again in the valley in my own house and raise children; eight, ten, maybe an even dozen . I do not want a fancy life. " "For such a family you need a strong back and a wealthy husband . " "Just one who works hard, Pan Vlasek. I already know the one. And I am strong, stronger than the other girls. I will make a good wife.'' "You children. So eager to grow up . If you only knew . Well, Kubo will be back soon and he should not find you here. He is not used to the ways of females . " Dusan put on his hat and tossed the bag to his shoulder. "By the way," he said, lowering his voice, "is it true what they do up there ; the drinking, the sins of the flesh , all that?" "My parents tell me little , but in the morning, cleaning up the great hall, there are signs, Pan Vlasek," she said, lowering her eyes in shame. �88 SLOVAKIA ''Terrible , awful,'' Dusan said, and passing through the d oor added , "and worse yet not be able to a fford it. Good lu ck, girl." The old woman was sitting on a b ench in the corner of the room, lost in the shadows beneath the holy pictures. A s the rosary bead s slipped throu gh her fingers , her wrinkled lips m oved quickly, giving off the sound of something sizzling, like w et wood add ed to a hot fire. Step b y step Zu zka Tavelcako va a pproach ed he r , lookin g for som e sign that the woman kn ew she was there. She h a d grown in the years she'd lived with he r family in the castle of Count Szepesy a nd was indeed n ot only stron ger but considerably larger than other girls of her age, which was fifteen . H er shoulders were broad , he r hands , already red and calloused from hours of scrubbing clothes a nd peeling vege ta bl es and h auling wood to the many fireplaces , were so able that even her older broth er s would call upon Zuzka when they needed to pull a balking cow into a stall or when the last sacks of fl our h ad to be stacked near the crossp iece of the hu ge sypanec. But , as much as God ha d blessed her with a n abundan ce of good h ealth a nd strength , H e had not bee n so gen erou s with he r appearance. H er forehead was too large, and a certain puffiness above her eyes m ade h er appear to be con sta ntly scowlin g. Although her mouth was full a nd well formed, her upper lip had a tendency to pu sh up the skin b eneath her nose, the force of which formed two d eep lines that curled ben eath her ch eeks . Zuzka Tavelcakova was a good-natured , ch eerful girl in her heart a nd in her actio n s, but her face did not represent her justly. " I have brought a forint, P ani Micekova," Zuzka said softly, bendin g at the knee in a quick curtsy before the old woman . The old woman ' s eyes did not open; her lip s moved more quickly, as if she would h ave to be furt her coaxed from her religious reverie. "Teta? " she said with greatest respect. " Y ou are the o nly one who can help .'' " Did yo u d o exactly as I told yo u ? " the old woman snapped, continuing w ith her rosary as she awaited the suppli can t's reply. " Oh, yes, everyth in g," Zuzka said excitedly. She began her reci ta tion, graspin g first he r sm allest fin ger, holdin g it tightly as she savored h er exact ness, her fervidness, as she un abash edly displayed her girl ish hope . "Last night, in the moonlight , the brightest moonlight - I waited - I picked zemezlce by the river. I picked a nd I picked until my zajda was filled. �SLOVAKIA 89 "A littl e is all tha t is n eed ed ." She dismissed h e r exuberance . " I didn ' t want to take chances; I didn ' t think it would hurt." '' Then ?'' She grasped the n ext finger . " Then I went to the fi eld of konope wi th the other girls and I rolled and rolled . Each of us put a stick with a different-colored ribbon in the ground so we would know wh ere we h ad been .'' She ra n her h ands over the front of her apron . '' The konope sta nd s straight ... well , almost straight , thi s m ornin g." " Better tha t it is n ot perfect; tha t would m ean you m a rry in a year. T oo youn g ." " And we all m ad e wreath s with branches of the willow , a nd when we threw them in the rive r , pani , mine was the first to reach th e great rock . The first!" '' So you will m a rry first , but n ot n ext year. '' She grasped h er fourth fin ge r , but h er h ands soon slid toge ther , locked in their own praye r. " I knelt befo re the Virgin a nd p romised that if she heard m y plea I would n ot let Kubo tou ch a n ythin g more tha n m y a rm until we we re m a n a nd wife. I vowed it, teta, under p ain of m ortal sin 1 " The old wom an ' s eyes fli ckered open , glistenin g in their d a rk sockets. Zu zka could not look into those eyes; sh e peered down , intentl y foll owin g a ha irline crack in the dirt floo r. " You mu st swear it again , Zu zka, swear tha t n o impure thou ghts will co m e into your mind. T h a t if Kubo so mu ch as tou ches you a bove here," she said , layin g h er gna rl ed h a nd on the opposite elbow , "you will sla p him as if he we re the d evil him self. '' " Oh , I do swear it! Unde r pa in of th e etern al fi res of hell 1" " You h ave th ose la r ge breas ts." The old wom a n n odded gravely towa rd Zu zka's blouse. " The boys will wa n t to touch them; even him ." " T eta, I have dedicated them to the Virgin ; they a re hers, n ot his," she said , takin g in h er breath a nd pullin g he r ves t ti ghtly against her body. " Oh , I a m so rry they h ave grown so." " I don ' t know wh y you want the b oy a nyh ow ," the old wom a n said . '' H e is neither b ig nor clever.'' " I am stron g," a n d Zu zka's vo ice becam e so ft e r , th at of a m other spea kin g to her in fa nt , "and h e is kind a nd ge ntl e, n ot like the other boys ." T he to ne aga in was firm. " And I can pu sh him , help him to be a m a n , sta nd up ." �90 SLOVAKIA The old woman's hands, the rosary still entwined in her fingers, disappeared beneath her threadbare shawl. Zuzka stood still, her heart pounding, her breath escaping from her mouth in a series of sharp, moist gasps. "Please, God, please . . . " she whispered. ''Through . . . the . .. Christ . . . bring . . . '' Zuzka leaned forward, straining to hear, but she could only understand a few words as they rasped forth from deep in the old woman's throat. '' . . . drawn to . . . let his . . . Holy Ghost, Amen.'' Zuzka took a step forward, the forint in hand. "From the drippings at Our Lady's altar. The most blessed wax at Our Lady's feet, ' ' the old woman said with a certain pride of craftsmanship . But when she saw the hand stretched out to her with the coin, her own hand snapped shut. "So, little foolish girl, you think you can buy this? Pay the bosorka and laugh to your friends about the old fool? You have your nerve!'' "No, no, teta," Zuzka pleaded. "I know that. Look. I place the coin here, on the bench. I do not give it to you. No, nothing this sacred can be bought.'' "Leave no doubt about it." The hand opened again. Squarely in the middle of the old woman's palm lay the figure of a man, no bigger than a thumball, fashioned from pale yellow beeswax. When Kubo returned from the fields he found the house empty, the ashes in the fireplace cool. He splashed water on his face, neck , and arms and dressed hurriedly, silently cursing the hundreds of tiny shoots that had virtually sprung up overnight among the potato plants. His father had drummed into his head the old saying, ''Cut the weed today and spare the plant tomorrow , " and Kubo, whose main task at this time of the year was weeding, sometimes had to be prodded to maintain his vigilance against the tiny green enemies that sapped the nourishment of the crops . But not on that day, for Kubo wanted to impress upon his father how responsible, how serious he was about work. Although his family left early Kubo remained behind and made sure that the field was clean, the soil broken with his hoe to receive whatever rain might fall. Kubo shoved his blouse into the clean white woolen britches with the thick black embroidery and reached up to the shelf above the bed �SLOVAKIA 91 to take down his ciapka. He looked at the foolish little brimless pillbox , the two silken ribbons that trailed behind . A boy' s cap. A child's. As he plopped it on the back of his head, the dismal thought came to his mind that it could still be on his head when St. John 's Day came next year. By the time Kubo arrived, out of breath from his run , the pasture to the north of the village was already filled with people, and the Feast of St. John 's had begun. The cows, Gizela among them, grazed peacefully in the afternoon light, with wreaths of daisies over their horns, which Anna and the girls her age had made. The older, unmarried girls had woven a long chain of daisies and took turns flinging it up into the tall oak . It was an important ritual, for the number of branches the chain covered would be the years each maiden would have to wait for marriage . Up to a certain age, young girls threw the chain of daisies with all their might, but the older maidens, like Justina Marusakova, now twenty-three, whose half-closed eyes and stuttering, dull speech had failed to attract a spouse, aimed for a single low branch and prayed that the superstition bore truth . Everyone got a turn , even Zuzka's oldest sister , Dorota, who was past forty but whose brain had remained that of a child's. As Kubo walked by the group of girls, Zuzka eagerly took the chain of daisies in her large hands and puffed out the chest she had sworn hours before would not be violated. But marriage and carnal thoughts were the farthest things from his mind , and he did not look as the daisies and her prayers fluttered toward heaven . He went directly to the huge , square stack of neatly cut logs and bent his head back to take in the dozens of small fir trees that had been placed on top. As the sun set on this, the longest day of the year, the day of Jana, the pagan god who was Christianized into the good St. John , the dry wood would burst into flame and the yearly pageant would be performed. At its end, Kubo well knew, a brave few, who up to this night had been called boys and treated as such, would henceforth walk the village streets as men. Kubo gulped and stooped down, stretching the muscles of his legs . Off to the side of the huge stack the V adasz brothers and other boys just a year or two younger than Kubo were playing a game he had played many times himself. And even with some of them . One boy would bend down and another would leap upon him like a frog , and be carried for �92 SLOVAKIA as long a di stance as youn g legs could hold up . Still other boys were imitating the cows grazin g, complete with mooin g sounds . The young C ernetsky boy had borrowed the d a isy wreath from their cow , Sargula , and the other boys cla pped with glee at the silly sigh t. " Kubo, come , com e , " they called to him , but Kubo acted as if he could not hear them. H e threw his shoulders back, strainin g his bod y to be as tall as he possibly could , and walked to a spot near the tables of food and drink where his fa ther was sta ndin g, hi s pipe in ha nd , talkin g to som e men . '' This is m y Kubo ,'' Du san said to a short m an wh o wore a long ostrich feather in his hat, " the best weed puller south of the High T atras. M eet P an Bozek and hi s boy P avel, " he said, m otionin g to a boy a bout Kubo's age . On th e boy's head was a ha t and feather similar to his father 's, a nd he nodded withou t say in g a word. It was another humilia tin g reminder. " W e were ju st talking a bout the first m arket in Bard ejov," Du san said. '' P an Bozek is a great landowner in M ala M aca and plans to sell mu ch . " " N o, no, not a great landowner ," P an Bozek said . " Ju st a simple peasant like yourself, blessed with a few m eters of God's precious earth , who works hi s fool head off. '' '' For yourself, a nd if a neighbor need s a hand ... '' ' ' ... well , thi s is our way, it is nothing to b rag .. . '' ' ' .. . D o you hear of su ch things from those who have gone to A m erika? Answe r m e tha t one.' ' Du san j abbed at the space in fron t of P an Bozek 's nose. " They all work for them selves, neve r help a friend to ha rvest or give a loaf of b read to one who need s it. You , Pan Bozek , are a fine exam pie to put in the face of all those vypasen f A m ericania. T ake notice of this m an , Kubo.'' " L ast year we took three wagonload s of wheat and l'an to Bardej ov and sold everything," Pavel said , putting his hands on his hips. " Our horse d anced all the way hom e.'' " Ju st forin ts and crowns to bring hom e," Du san said . "A ligh t load ." " W ell . .. " P a n Bozek said , tryin g to a ppear modest. " I have neve r seen you at the m arket," Pavel said to Kubo . " M y boy is not yet ready," Dusan said before Kubo could answer. " There is no hurry. Som e d ay . . . Now , som e p alenka, m y fri end , and �SLOVAKIA 93 some of the fine kolace from the village o f Zbudza. You boys run off a nd play. '' A s the sun linge red capri ciou sly in the sky, P avel a nd Kubo w alked a mon g the revelers , drank the sweet berry juices and a te hu ge hunks of the la mb tha t Banfk had brought only to h ave so m e villagers refuse to to uch it , calling it a "guilt offering." Whe n the two boys came close to the group of young girls who had started to d a n ce with each othe r , Eta Min arovicova and Julia Vadaszova looked toward Kubo , but he knew it was for a n introdu ction to the h a ndsom e stra nge r a nd not for him self. R egardless, Kubo was more inte res ted in P avel's stories of the market a t Bardejov, of the hu ge wheels of cheese that the shepherds m ad e, of the m agnifice nt church th a t could hold all the people from five la rge vill ages. Pavel did n ot do it in the boastful fashion of Fra nko Hruscak , who made boys just a year o r two younger than him self feel like mere b a bies because they had never been to Bardejov and he had . P avel talked quietly , directly, but almost reli giou sly about the la nd t hat hi s fa mil y owned in M ala Maca, a nd how som ed ay, as the eldest son , it would be hi s. " And I will h ave more each year ," he said with suren ess in hi s voice. "There is no thing I love more than work. " H e add ed with a smile, " And a little slivovica n ow and then when m y fa the r doesn't fini sh hi s gla ss. All these p eople going to Amerika! Hah , m y father is right , yours too . Wh at cou ld be a b etter life than we have?" As Kubo tried not to loo k envious, P avel went on to tell him that he was coming hom e late r a nd la ter a t ni ght , and so m et imes his parents were a lready in bed , so he slept in the barn . Kubo had slept in the barn o fte n o n hot summ er ni ghts , but th e idea of slee pin g there a fter spe ndin g a ni ght in the foothills, sm okin g cigarettes with hi s friends, or after makin g wolf call s a t a girl' s window, was a forbidden pleasure so swee t he co uld not believe it would ever ha ppen . " Who ' s that?" P a vel motioned . " The little o ne? M y sister, Anna. Why? " " I' ve n eve r seen ha ir like he rs ; stra n ge color. " '' Baby h a ir , just a streak . '' " H ow old is she a n yhow ?" P avel said , hi s eyes n o t leav ing Anna until she disappeared into the crowd that h ad gathered a round the stack of wood. '' Almost eleve n .'' �94 SLOVAKIA "Skinny legs." ''I guess. She's a dreamer.'' '' AAAHHHH ! '' The sound echoed over the meadow to the tall junipers, sending a flock of bluejays into the purple night air. "AAAHHHH!" It rumbled down the slope to where the river Laborec wound its way through the thickets ofreeds. "AAAHHHH!" the chorus of voices breathed as the flames licked at the neatly stacked logs and suddenly burst skyward in a mammoth orange ball as the sap-filled branches, the needles and cones of the fur trees caught fire . Kubo's throat went dry. Pavel put his arm over the shoulder of the boy he'd met just a short time before. "Not yet . It will die down. There is time to be a man." Other boys, some Kubo's age, like Franko Hruscak andjozefKralik also stood around the fire, carefully eyeing the flames and casting sidelong glances to see if anyone was ready to try . Cyril Gasparovic was also there, a frail boy already three years older than Kubo, who had never danced or jumped over the fire and whose mother was known to be making a novena to the Blessed Lady . The firs burned off quickly, leaving shimmering red skeletons, but flames from the logs were still at least as high as the top of his head as Kubo walked a slow circle around the fire, eyeing it with the intensity and dread of a baca faced with a hungry wolf. It was a delicate issue, one, down through the centuries that the tradition had been practiced, that required the judgment only a mature man would have . There was a point, just one point, when the flames receded enough to be traversed but when a boy could be seriously burned or, as the story was told of the arrogant richtar 's son many years ago, killed . There would always be one person who knew that point, took the chance, and the others who followed would go through life remembering his bravery and bemoaning their lack of it. It was sometimes better to wait until the next St. John ' s Day rather than risk the humiliation of being one of the last, the least brave . For as the fire died down , even the tiny boys of the village would jump over the embers in childish practice for the day some years away when they would risk painful burns to gain their manhood. The gypsy band struck up the first tunes, and it was mostly the older people, singing and clapping their hands, who began to flatten the thick grass with their dancing feet . The rest of the people from Zbud- �SLOVAKIA 95 za, those with young sons and those from Mala Maca and V el'ka Maca who had made a pilgrimage for the feast days stayed close to that fire, talking among themselves, waiting, but making no reference to the drama that was building moment by moment. Kubo had made a complete circle, and finally he stood before his father, his arms at his sides, like a soldier in ranks. "Otec," he said, using the formal address, "will you please hold my ciapka?" Dusan looked over his son's shoulder to the leaping yellow and red flames of the fire. He squinted so that he could see it better. Then he extended his hand without saying a word, either of encouragement or caution, and took the hat from his son, placing it under his arm. One by one, the people moved to the side, clearing a path. Except for a low, haunting gypsy love song and the crackling of dry wood, the meadow was quiet, and nothing stood between Kubo Vlasek and the state he so desired, nothing but the fire that had purged and proven men of Zbudza for countless generations. His heart pounding, his mouth full of cotton, Kubo made the sign of the cross. His first steps were almost his undoing as his krpce slipped on grass, moist from spilled beer. But then he lengthened his stride and by the time he had reached the edge of the crowd, he was running as fast as he could. Logs tumbled together at the fire's core and a huge tongue of flame leaped out, but it was too late . Kubo 's krpce had left the ground. "AAAHHHH," the sound - a cheer, a moan - rose up from the lips of men and women and children as a form, black against the bright flames, seemed to hang in the air. The gypsy band stopped in mid-song . "AAAHHHH ! " Women crossed themselves and men's lips tightened . The mouths of small children gaped open . "AAAAAAHHHHHH !" The fire crackled angrily, spitting hot sparks into the cool night air. Dusan fingered the ciapka beneath his arm, then grasped it firmly . His son stood before him, eyebrows vanished from his pink face, his hair a mass of tiny burnt and frizzy curls, one leg of his while trousers browned , like the top of a loaf of bread. Dusan could smell the hair , the cloth, the flesh that had passed through the St. John's fire . He extended the ciapka to his son , looking at it , turning it in his hand . "Perhaps a bit too small, Kubo . I think in Bardejov they might �96 SLOVAKIA have some bigge r ones ; more like . . " Whateve r words follow ed were lost in the deafening accolade rendered to J a kub Vlasek . After hi s awesome display of b ravery, Kubo could seemingl y d o nothing wrong as the sun set and the evenin g of dancin g began in earnest. His krpce kicked hi gh in the a ir but la nd ed with a feather's li ghtness so close to the fl asks of vino a nd borovicka th a t gasps were heard from the young girls who stood in a group eyeing the b oys who would somed ay be th eir hu sbands . Even Eta Min arovicova a nd Julia Vad aszova, b y far the pretti es t a nd most choosy girls in Zbudza on feas t days in th e pas t acted as if Kubo Vl ase k had some co n tagious disease, co uld n ot kee p their eyes off him . Their hands behind th eir backs, th eir hips swayin g ge ntly to the musi c, they waited, as did all their girl fri ends, for the m ost impor tant d a nce in the li fe of eve ry b oy who jumped ove r the fire on St. J ohn 's D ay. The gy psies kn ew it. Their gold tee th fl ashin g beneath bl ack mu staches, they would tease with th e first ba rs of a popula r tun e . But the n they would break into a nothe r so n g th at onl y the boys cou ld dan ce to, a nd display their prowess st ill more, d elay in g th e mom ent when the eager young girls and the proud young boys would have a dance together. The b a nd stru ck up a d a nce don e entirely on one foot. Boys shoved and j ostl ed, feinted a nd du cked , a nd th e less agil e we re se n t sprawling into th e grass . And , a t the da n ce's e nd , the re was ju st one who h ad not resorted to u sin g hi s oth er foot , who had not bee n kn ocked ove r. Kubo Vl asek twirl ed a round on the b all of hi s foot, with a n agilit y eve n his fath er had to applaud. Th e gypse husle pl aye r kept Kubo dan cin g , in creas in g the beat , but Ku bo, lost in the ecstasy of th e m agic ni ght , would not lose hi s bal a nce. Hi s mind was already in Ba rdej ov, hi s head already cove red in a fin e n ew hat. H e could feel the jin gle of co ins in hi s pocket , straw und er hi s b ack in th e b a rn. Th e bea t cha n ged so su b tl y that Kubo was not even awa re o f it. H e kept twirlin g a nd twirlin g. It was alread y pitch d a rk , but logs had bee n h eaped on th e fire, a nd as Kubo 's eyes, fogged with pe rspiration , took in the blur of faces standin g aro und the dan cin g a rea, fl ashes of color sta rted swirlin g a bout him , in th e opposite d irection . Lik e great red a nd yell ow and gree n eels sw immin g in a shall ow strea m , the o rnate p arta stream in g dow n from th e braided heads of th e un married �SLOVAKIA 97 girls shimmered in the fire's light , each offerin g the ni ght 's h ero th e m a iden of his choosin g. All the rituals h e h ad prepared for , jumping over the fire, the o n elegged dan ce, but Kubo Vlasek had not , up to that very moment, decided whi ch girl would have the h onor of hi s first dan ce as a man . H e twirled faster a nd became dizzie r in hi s deliciou s mom ent of triumph , in his hour of indecision . The parta flutte red by, the tip s flickering a t his nose. The gypsy band picked up the beat. Faster and faster. His a rm reached out to the fl ashing colors. And it was soundly m et. " Oh , thank you , I would be m ost honored ." The vill agers applauded still louder while Kubo 's frie nds hooted a nd whistled . And Zu zka Tavelcakova, her great eyebrows arched over a huge smile, her free arm s swin ging in wild exultation , her huge breasts threatening release from the rest of h er body, d a n ced about the circle. She held on to Kubo tightly a nd , as they n eared the fire, reached into her apron pocket a nd withdrew a clenched fist , with which she bl essed herself. Then th e h a nd fl ew o pe n - and a small obj ect disappeared into th e flam es. Around, around h e twirled Zuzka until finally the gypsy playing the cymbal ran th e soft felt hammers from the low notes to the high, signaling the n ext dan ce would begin . But , befor e they could launch into it , several pa irs of ha nds reached out to Kubo , and sudde nl y he was be ing ho isted into th e a ir. ' ']eden! " " D va! 1 " " Tri 11 ! " And with th e third toss the loud est chee r - fu eled b y boro vicka and bee r and tradition - rippl ed across the m eadow and down to the ri ver whe re a fl ock of tin y doves bolted from the reed s a nd fl ew towa rd th e d a rkne ss of th e hu ge junipe rs . '' Y AAA Y AA AAA Y AAAAAAAAA 1 ' ' " And now th e new m a n bu ys th e nex t bottle of pa.lenka," Mlad en shouted at Kubo, whose wet, sin ged ha ir was bein g tou sled by hi s young fri e nd s, whose ha nd s were be in g pressed with ha nd sh akes . One ha ndsh a ke was stronge r , lo n ger than the others, a nd as Kubo blink ed through the sweat a nd ash in hi s eyes, he co uld see th at it was hi s fat he r who stood befo re him. Whe n at least he was released , Kubo had a k orun ak in hi s ha nd . �98 SLOVAKIA " You a re a m an , m y son , a nd you will from thi s day be pa id wages," Du san said, talkin g slowing so as not to slur hi s words. " You will inherit the land , you will care for this fam ily ... but now, first things first. Buy the palenka!" The fire died down and was fed with fresh logs. Boys sneaked off with girls and nuzzled in the darkness. The gypsy band played and drank and played still more . The old woman , Micekova, nodded without sayin g a word when Zuzka's mother said that her d au ghter a nd the young Vlasek boy made a fine couple. The young teacher danced with some of the v ill age women, but only when they asked him . And a small boy, whose emerald eyes glistened when the flame s rose, stood a top the hill in the shadow of the giant lindens , his thumb s locked in hi s belt. When it came time to return home, Kubo eventually found his father lyin g on the ground , a n empty bottle in his ha nd, his head propped against the thick exposed roots of an oak tree, hi s eyes barely visible through sm all slits. H e motioned for hi s son to sit b y him . " I have only a year , perhaps two in this vale of tears, " Dusan began, we ighing each word somberly and pattin g hi s so n on the knee. "You mu st rem ain stron g, my so n , my only son , and believe in what is right and decent , what has bee n ha nded down from generation to generation. " His eyes fli ckered open wider. " Father , why this talk? You a re healthy; you will live to be one hundred ." " Place your hand on my heart." '' Father ?'' " Your ha nd ." Kubo did as he was told. Dusan pressed the boy's hand onto the fa ncy embroidery of hi s shirt , now soaked with sweat and borovicka, stain ed wi th berry wines and grease from the lamb, tainted as it was. '' R epeat afte r me . . . " I .. . Ku bo Vlasek ... vow on m y father's heart ... on the day I became a man ... to love this land . . . never to turn from it ... To listen to God and not the foo lish tal es of the world outs ide ... To care for children and a nimals ... because each co m es from God ever to strike my woman without good reason ... To kee p this sac red pledge ... as pledged on my father's heart ... that the cursed word 'Amerika ' wi ll never ... never . . . be heard in the house ... �SLOVAKIA 99 our esteem ed Milos Vlasek built . .. with his bare hands ... years and years ago.'' Dusan ' s voice became lower and lower as if he were ready to cry. " Do you promise all this my son, unde r pain of mortal sin, eternal damnation and the fires of hell ?" "I do, Father ," Kubo said evenly, " I promise this before God ." "Good ." Dusan slumped back onto the roots . " Now, fetch the wagon. Your father is too tired to be walking this night." �� SLOVAKIA 87 Excerpt from In Due Season Paul Wilkes "Is ... is he home? Pan Vlasek?" '' No, no, in the field,'' Dusan replied impatiently, stuffing two huge loaves of bread into a sack . "Stara?" "Yes, yes. Matka moja, what you girls won't do ; you are the third one today.'' ''Oh,'' she breathed, as if by her late arrival she might already have lost out. "I won't stay long. I have a heap of washing to do. So high I can't even see over the top of it.' ' "They are good to you, those Magyars?" "Oh yes, Pan Vlasek. When they have roast, we have roast. And as many potatoes as you can eat." "So you are happy up there on the hill?" "For now." "And?" '' Someday I want to live again in the valley in my own house and raise children; eight, ten, maybe an even dozen . I do not want a fancy life. " "For such a family you need a strong back and a wealthy husband . " "Just one who works hard, Pan Vlasek. I already know the one. And I am strong, stronger than the other girls. I will make a good wife.'' "You children. So eager to grow up . If you only knew . Well, Kubo will be back soon and he should not find you here. He is not used to the ways of females . " Dusan put on his hat and tossed the bag to his shoulder. "By the way," he said, lowering his voice, "is it true what they do up there ; the drinking, the sins of the flesh , all that?" "My parents tell me little , but in the morning, cleaning up the great hall, there are signs, Pan Vlasek," she said, lowering her eyes in shame. �88 SLOVAKIA ''Terrible , awful,'' Dusan said, and passing through the d oor added , "and worse yet not be able to a fford it. Good lu ck, girl." The old woman was sitting on a b ench in the corner of the room, lost in the shadows beneath the holy pictures. A s the rosary bead s slipped throu gh her fingers , her wrinkled lips m oved quickly, giving off the sound of something sizzling, like w et wood add ed to a hot fire. Step b y step Zu zka Tavelcako va a pproach ed he r , lookin g for som e sign that the woman kn ew she was there. She h a d grown in the years she'd lived with he r family in the castle of Count Szepesy a nd was indeed n ot only stron ger but considerably larger than other girls of her age, which was fifteen . H er shoulders were broad , he r hands , already red and calloused from hours of scrubbing clothes a nd peeling vege ta bl es and h auling wood to the many fireplaces , were so able that even her older broth er s would call upon Zuzka when they needed to pull a balking cow into a stall or when the last sacks of fl our h ad to be stacked near the crossp iece of the hu ge sypanec. But , as much as God ha d blessed her with a n abundan ce of good h ealth a nd strength , H e had not bee n so gen erou s with he r appearance. H er forehead was too large, and a certain puffiness above her eyes m ade h er appear to be con sta ntly scowlin g. Although her mouth was full a nd well formed, her upper lip had a tendency to pu sh up the skin b eneath her nose, the force of which formed two d eep lines that curled ben eath her ch eeks . Zuzka Tavelcakova was a good-natured , ch eerful girl in her heart a nd in her actio n s, but her face did not represent her justly. " I have brought a forint, P ani Micekova," Zuzka said softly, bendin g at the knee in a quick curtsy before the old woman . The old woman ' s eyes did not open; her lip s moved more quickly, as if she would h ave to be furt her coaxed from her religious reverie. "Teta? " she said with greatest respect. " Y ou are the o nly one who can help .'' " Did yo u d o exactly as I told yo u ? " the old woman snapped, continuing w ith her rosary as she awaited the suppli can t's reply. " Oh, yes, everyth in g," Zuzka said excitedly. She began her reci ta tion, graspin g first he r sm allest fin ger, holdin g it tightly as she savored h er exact ness, her fervidness, as she un abash edly displayed her girl ish hope . "Last night, in the moonlight , the brightest moonlight - I waited - I picked zemezlce by the river. I picked a nd I picked until my zajda was filled. �SLOVAKIA 89 "A littl e is all tha t is n eed ed ." She dismissed h e r exuberance . " I didn ' t want to take chances; I didn ' t think it would hurt." '' Then ?'' She grasped the n ext finger . " Then I went to the fi eld of konope wi th the other girls and I rolled and rolled . Each of us put a stick with a different-colored ribbon in the ground so we would know wh ere we h ad been .'' She ra n her h ands over the front of her apron . '' The konope sta nd s straight ... well , almost straight , thi s m ornin g." " Better tha t it is n ot perfect; tha t would m ean you m a rry in a year. T oo youn g ." " And we all m ad e wreath s with branches of the willow , a nd when we threw them in the rive r , pani , mine was the first to reach th e great rock . The first!" '' So you will m a rry first , but n ot n ext year. '' She grasped h er fourth fin ge r , but h er h ands soon slid toge ther , locked in their own praye r. " I knelt befo re the Virgin a nd p romised that if she heard m y plea I would n ot let Kubo tou ch a n ythin g more tha n m y a rm until we we re m a n a nd wife. I vowed it, teta, under p ain of m ortal sin 1 " The old wom an ' s eyes fli ckered open , glistenin g in their d a rk sockets. Zu zka could not look into those eyes; sh e peered down , intentl y foll owin g a ha irline crack in the dirt floo r. " You mu st swear it again , Zu zka, swear tha t n o impure thou ghts will co m e into your mind. T h a t if Kubo so mu ch as tou ches you a bove here," she said , layin g h er gna rl ed h a nd on the opposite elbow , "you will sla p him as if he we re the d evil him self. '' " Oh , I do swear it! Unde r pa in of th e etern al fi res of hell 1" " You h ave th ose la r ge breas ts." The old wom a n n odded gravely towa rd Zu zka's blouse. " The boys will wa n t to touch them; even him ." " T eta, I have dedicated them to the Virgin ; they a re hers, n ot his," she said , takin g in h er breath a nd pullin g he r ves t ti ghtly against her body. " Oh , I a m so rry they h ave grown so." " I don ' t know wh y you want the b oy a nyh ow ," the old wom a n said . '' H e is neither b ig nor clever.'' " I am stron g," a n d Zu zka's vo ice becam e so ft e r , th at of a m other spea kin g to her in fa nt , "and h e is kind a nd ge ntl e, n ot like the other boys ." T he to ne aga in was firm. " And I can pu sh him , help him to be a m a n , sta nd up ." �90 SLOVAKIA The old woman's hands, the rosary still entwined in her fingers, disappeared beneath her threadbare shawl. Zuzka stood still, her heart pounding, her breath escaping from her mouth in a series of sharp, moist gasps. "Please, God, please . . . " she whispered. ''Through . . . the . .. Christ . . . bring . . . '' Zuzka leaned forward, straining to hear, but she could only understand a few words as they rasped forth from deep in the old woman's throat. '' . . . drawn to . . . let his . . . Holy Ghost, Amen.'' Zuzka took a step forward, the forint in hand. "From the drippings at Our Lady's altar. The most blessed wax at Our Lady's feet, ' ' the old woman said with a certain pride of craftsmanship . But when she saw the hand stretched out to her with the coin, her own hand snapped shut. "So, little foolish girl, you think you can buy this? Pay the bosorka and laugh to your friends about the old fool? You have your nerve!'' "No, no, teta," Zuzka pleaded. "I know that. Look. I place the coin here, on the bench. I do not give it to you. No, nothing this sacred can be bought.'' "Leave no doubt about it." The hand opened again. Squarely in the middle of the old woman's palm lay the figure of a man, no bigger than a thumball, fashioned from pale yellow beeswax. When Kubo returned from the fields he found the house empty, the ashes in the fireplace cool. He splashed water on his face, neck , and arms and dressed hurriedly, silently cursing the hundreds of tiny shoots that had virtually sprung up overnight among the potato plants. His father had drummed into his head the old saying, ''Cut the weed today and spare the plant tomorrow , " and Kubo, whose main task at this time of the year was weeding, sometimes had to be prodded to maintain his vigilance against the tiny green enemies that sapped the nourishment of the crops . But not on that day, for Kubo wanted to impress upon his father how responsible, how serious he was about work. Although his family left early Kubo remained behind and made sure that the field was clean, the soil broken with his hoe to receive whatever rain might fall. Kubo shoved his blouse into the clean white woolen britches with the thick black embroidery and reached up to the shelf above the bed �SLOVAKIA 91 to take down his ciapka. He looked at the foolish little brimless pillbox , the two silken ribbons that trailed behind . A boy' s cap. A child's. As he plopped it on the back of his head, the dismal thought came to his mind that it could still be on his head when St. John 's Day came next year. By the time Kubo arrived, out of breath from his run , the pasture to the north of the village was already filled with people, and the Feast of St. John 's had begun. The cows, Gizela among them, grazed peacefully in the afternoon light, with wreaths of daisies over their horns, which Anna and the girls her age had made. The older, unmarried girls had woven a long chain of daisies and took turns flinging it up into the tall oak . It was an important ritual, for the number of branches the chain covered would be the years each maiden would have to wait for marriage . Up to a certain age, young girls threw the chain of daisies with all their might, but the older maidens, like Justina Marusakova, now twenty-three, whose half-closed eyes and stuttering, dull speech had failed to attract a spouse, aimed for a single low branch and prayed that the superstition bore truth . Everyone got a turn , even Zuzka's oldest sister , Dorota, who was past forty but whose brain had remained that of a child's. As Kubo walked by the group of girls, Zuzka eagerly took the chain of daisies in her large hands and puffed out the chest she had sworn hours before would not be violated. But marriage and carnal thoughts were the farthest things from his mind , and he did not look as the daisies and her prayers fluttered toward heaven . He went directly to the huge , square stack of neatly cut logs and bent his head back to take in the dozens of small fir trees that had been placed on top. As the sun set on this, the longest day of the year, the day of Jana, the pagan god who was Christianized into the good St. John , the dry wood would burst into flame and the yearly pageant would be performed. At its end, Kubo well knew, a brave few, who up to this night had been called boys and treated as such, would henceforth walk the village streets as men. Kubo gulped and stooped down, stretching the muscles of his legs . Off to the side of the huge stack the V adasz brothers and other boys just a year or two younger than Kubo were playing a game he had played many times himself. And even with some of them . One boy would bend down and another would leap upon him like a frog , and be carried for �92 SLOVAKIA as long a di stance as youn g legs could hold up . Still other boys were imitating the cows grazin g, complete with mooin g sounds . The young C ernetsky boy had borrowed the d a isy wreath from their cow , Sargula , and the other boys cla pped with glee at the silly sigh t. " Kubo, come , com e , " they called to him , but Kubo acted as if he could not hear them. H e threw his shoulders back, strainin g his bod y to be as tall as he possibly could , and walked to a spot near the tables of food and drink where his fa ther was sta ndin g, hi s pipe in ha nd , talkin g to som e men . '' This is m y Kubo ,'' Du san said to a short m an wh o wore a long ostrich feather in his hat, " the best weed puller south of the High T atras. M eet P an Bozek and hi s boy P avel, " he said, m otionin g to a boy a bout Kubo's age . On th e boy's head was a ha t and feather similar to his father 's, a nd he nodded withou t say in g a word. It was another humilia tin g reminder. " W e were ju st talking a bout the first m arket in Bard ejov," Du san said. '' P an Bozek is a great landowner in M ala M aca and plans to sell mu ch . " " N o, no, not a great landowner ," P an Bozek said . " Ju st a simple peasant like yourself, blessed with a few m eters of God's precious earth , who works hi s fool head off. '' '' For yourself, a nd if a neighbor need s a hand ... '' ' ' ... well , thi s is our way, it is nothing to b rag .. . '' ' ' .. . D o you hear of su ch things from those who have gone to A m erika? Answe r m e tha t one.' ' Du san j abbed at the space in fron t of P an Bozek 's nose. " They all work for them selves, neve r help a friend to ha rvest or give a loaf of b read to one who need s it. You , Pan Bozek , are a fine exam pie to put in the face of all those vypasen f A m ericania. T ake notice of this m an , Kubo.'' " L ast year we took three wagonload s of wheat and l'an to Bardej ov and sold everything," Pavel said , putting his hands on his hips. " Our horse d anced all the way hom e.'' " Ju st forin ts and crowns to bring hom e," Du san said . "A ligh t load ." " W ell . .. " P a n Bozek said , tryin g to a ppear modest. " I have neve r seen you at the m arket," Pavel said to Kubo . " M y boy is not yet ready," Dusan said before Kubo could answer. " There is no hurry. Som e d ay . . . Now , som e p alenka, m y fri end , and �SLOVAKIA 93 some of the fine kolace from the village o f Zbudza. You boys run off a nd play. '' A s the sun linge red capri ciou sly in the sky, P avel a nd Kubo w alked a mon g the revelers , drank the sweet berry juices and a te hu ge hunks of the la mb tha t Banfk had brought only to h ave so m e villagers refuse to to uch it , calling it a "guilt offering." Whe n the two boys came close to the group of young girls who had started to d a n ce with each othe r , Eta Min arovicova and Julia Vadaszova looked toward Kubo , but he knew it was for a n introdu ction to the h a ndsom e stra nge r a nd not for him self. R egardless, Kubo was more inte res ted in P avel's stories of the market a t Bardejov, of the hu ge wheels of cheese that the shepherds m ad e, of the m agnifice nt church th a t could hold all the people from five la rge vill ages. Pavel did n ot do it in the boastful fashion of Fra nko Hruscak , who made boys just a year o r two younger than him self feel like mere b a bies because they had never been to Bardejov and he had . P avel talked quietly , directly, but almost reli giou sly about the la nd t hat hi s fa mil y owned in M ala Maca, a nd how som ed ay, as the eldest son , it would be hi s. " And I will h ave more each year ," he said with suren ess in hi s voice. "There is no thing I love more than work. " H e add ed with a smile, " And a little slivovica n ow and then when m y fa the r doesn't fini sh hi s gla ss. All these p eople going to Amerika! Hah , m y father is right , yours too . Wh at cou ld be a b etter life than we have?" As Kubo tried not to loo k envious, P avel went on to tell him that he was coming hom e late r a nd la ter a t ni ght , and so m et imes his parents were a lready in bed , so he slept in the barn . Kubo had slept in the barn o fte n o n hot summ er ni ghts , but th e idea of slee pin g there a fter spe ndin g a ni ght in the foothills, sm okin g cigarettes with hi s friends, or after makin g wolf call s a t a girl' s window, was a forbidden pleasure so swee t he co uld not believe it would ever ha ppen . " Who ' s that?" P a vel motioned . " The little o ne? M y sister, Anna. Why? " " I' ve n eve r seen ha ir like he rs ; stra n ge color. " '' Baby h a ir , just a streak . '' " H ow old is she a n yhow ?" P avel said , hi s eyes n o t leav ing Anna until she disappeared into the crowd that h ad gathered a round the stack of wood. '' Almost eleve n .'' �94 SLOVAKIA "Skinny legs." ''I guess. She's a dreamer.'' '' AAAHHHH ! '' The sound echoed over the meadow to the tall junipers, sending a flock of bluejays into the purple night air. "AAAHHHH!" It rumbled down the slope to where the river Laborec wound its way through the thickets ofreeds. "AAAHHHH!" the chorus of voices breathed as the flames licked at the neatly stacked logs and suddenly burst skyward in a mammoth orange ball as the sap-filled branches, the needles and cones of the fur trees caught fire . Kubo's throat went dry. Pavel put his arm over the shoulder of the boy he'd met just a short time before. "Not yet . It will die down. There is time to be a man." Other boys, some Kubo's age, like Franko Hruscak andjozefKralik also stood around the fire, carefully eyeing the flames and casting sidelong glances to see if anyone was ready to try . Cyril Gasparovic was also there, a frail boy already three years older than Kubo, who had never danced or jumped over the fire and whose mother was known to be making a novena to the Blessed Lady . The firs burned off quickly, leaving shimmering red skeletons, but flames from the logs were still at least as high as the top of his head as Kubo walked a slow circle around the fire, eyeing it with the intensity and dread of a baca faced with a hungry wolf. It was a delicate issue, one, down through the centuries that the tradition had been practiced, that required the judgment only a mature man would have . There was a point, just one point, when the flames receded enough to be traversed but when a boy could be seriously burned or, as the story was told of the arrogant richtar 's son many years ago, killed . There would always be one person who knew that point, took the chance, and the others who followed would go through life remembering his bravery and bemoaning their lack of it. It was sometimes better to wait until the next St. John ' s Day rather than risk the humiliation of being one of the last, the least brave . For as the fire died down , even the tiny boys of the village would jump over the embers in childish practice for the day some years away when they would risk painful burns to gain their manhood. The gypsy band struck up the first tunes, and it was mostly the older people, singing and clapping their hands, who began to flatten the thick grass with their dancing feet . The rest of the people from Zbud- �SLOVAKIA 95 za, those with young sons and those from Mala Maca and V el'ka Maca who had made a pilgrimage for the feast days stayed close to that fire, talking among themselves, waiting, but making no reference to the drama that was building moment by moment. Kubo had made a complete circle, and finally he stood before his father, his arms at his sides, like a soldier in ranks. "Otec," he said, using the formal address, "will you please hold my ciapka?" Dusan looked over his son's shoulder to the leaping yellow and red flames of the fire. He squinted so that he could see it better. Then he extended his hand without saying a word, either of encouragement or caution, and took the hat from his son, placing it under his arm. One by one, the people moved to the side, clearing a path. Except for a low, haunting gypsy love song and the crackling of dry wood, the meadow was quiet, and nothing stood between Kubo Vlasek and the state he so desired, nothing but the fire that had purged and proven men of Zbudza for countless generations. His heart pounding, his mouth full of cotton, Kubo made the sign of the cross. His first steps were almost his undoing as his krpce slipped on grass, moist from spilled beer. But then he lengthened his stride and by the time he had reached the edge of the crowd, he was running as fast as he could. Logs tumbled together at the fire's core and a huge tongue of flame leaped out, but it was too late . Kubo 's krpce had left the ground. "AAAHHHH," the sound - a cheer, a moan - rose up from the lips of men and women and children as a form, black against the bright flames, seemed to hang in the air. The gypsy band stopped in mid-song . "AAAHHHH ! " Women crossed themselves and men's lips tightened . The mouths of small children gaped open . "AAAAAAHHHHHH !" The fire crackled angrily, spitting hot sparks into the cool night air. Dusan fingered the ciapka beneath his arm, then grasped it firmly . His son stood before him, eyebrows vanished from his pink face, his hair a mass of tiny burnt and frizzy curls, one leg of his while trousers browned , like the top of a loaf of bread. Dusan could smell the hair , the cloth, the flesh that had passed through the St. John's fire . He extended the ciapka to his son , looking at it , turning it in his hand . "Perhaps a bit too small, Kubo . I think in Bardejov they might �96 SLOVAKIA have some bigge r ones ; more like . . " Whateve r words follow ed were lost in the deafening accolade rendered to J a kub Vlasek . After hi s awesome display of b ravery, Kubo could seemingl y d o nothing wrong as the sun set and the evenin g of dancin g began in earnest. His krpce kicked hi gh in the a ir but la nd ed with a feather's li ghtness so close to the fl asks of vino a nd borovicka th a t gasps were heard from the young girls who stood in a group eyeing the b oys who would somed ay be th eir hu sbands . Even Eta Min arovicova a nd Julia Vad aszova, b y far the pretti es t a nd most choosy girls in Zbudza on feas t days in th e pas t acted as if Kubo Vl ase k had some co n tagious disease, co uld n ot kee p their eyes off him . Their hands behind th eir backs, th eir hips swayin g ge ntly to the musi c, they waited, as did all their girl fri ends, for the m ost impor tant d a nce in the li fe of eve ry b oy who jumped ove r the fire on St. J ohn 's D ay. The gy psies kn ew it. Their gold tee th fl ashin g beneath bl ack mu staches, they would tease with th e first ba rs of a popula r tun e . But the n they would break into a nothe r so n g th at onl y the boys cou ld dan ce to, a nd display their prowess st ill more, d elay in g th e mom ent when the eager young girls and the proud young boys would have a dance together. The b a nd stru ck up a d a nce don e entirely on one foot. Boys shoved and j ostl ed, feinted a nd du cked , a nd th e less agil e we re se n t sprawling into th e grass . And , a t the da n ce's e nd , the re was ju st one who h ad not resorted to u sin g hi s oth er foot , who had not bee n kn ocked ove r. Kubo Vl asek twirl ed a round on the b all of hi s foot, with a n agilit y eve n his fath er had to applaud. Th e gypse husle pl aye r kept Kubo dan cin g , in creas in g the beat , but Ku bo, lost in the ecstasy of th e m agic ni ght , would not lose hi s bal a nce. Hi s mind was already in Ba rdej ov, hi s head already cove red in a fin e n ew hat. H e could feel the jin gle of co ins in hi s pocket , straw und er hi s b ack in th e b a rn. Th e bea t cha n ged so su b tl y that Kubo was not even awa re o f it. H e kept twirlin g a nd twirlin g. It was alread y pitch d a rk , but logs had bee n h eaped on th e fire, a nd as Kubo 's eyes, fogged with pe rspiration , took in the blur of faces standin g aro und the dan cin g a rea, fl ashes of color sta rted swirlin g a bout him , in th e opposite d irection . Lik e great red a nd yell ow and gree n eels sw immin g in a shall ow strea m , the o rnate p arta stream in g dow n from th e braided heads of th e un married �SLOVAKIA 97 girls shimmered in the fire's light , each offerin g the ni ght 's h ero th e m a iden of his choosin g. All the rituals h e h ad prepared for , jumping over the fire, the o n elegged dan ce, but Kubo Vlasek had not , up to that very moment, decided whi ch girl would have the h onor of hi s first dan ce as a man . H e twirled faster a nd became dizzie r in hi s deliciou s mom ent of triumph , in his hour of indecision . The parta flutte red by, the tip s flickering a t his nose. The gypsy band picked up the beat. Faster and faster. His a rm reached out to the fl ashing colors. And it was soundly m et. " Oh , thank you , I would be m ost honored ." The vill agers applauded still louder while Kubo 's frie nds hooted a nd whistled . And Zu zka Tavelcakova, her great eyebrows arched over a huge smile, her free arm s swin ging in wild exultation , her huge breasts threatening release from the rest of h er body, d a n ced about the circle. She held on to Kubo tightly a nd , as they n eared the fire, reached into her apron pocket a nd withdrew a clenched fist , with which she bl essed herself. Then th e h a nd fl ew o pe n - and a small obj ect disappeared into th e flam es. Around, around h e twirled Zuzka until finally the gypsy playing the cymbal ran th e soft felt hammers from the low notes to the high, signaling the n ext dan ce would begin . But , befor e they could launch into it , several pa irs of ha nds reached out to Kubo , and sudde nl y he was be ing ho isted into th e a ir. ' ']eden! " " D va! 1 " " Tri 11 ! " And with th e third toss the loud est chee r - fu eled b y boro vicka and bee r and tradition - rippl ed across the m eadow and down to the ri ver whe re a fl ock of tin y doves bolted from the reed s a nd fl ew towa rd th e d a rkne ss of th e hu ge junipe rs . '' Y AAA Y AA AAA Y AAAAAAAAA 1 ' ' " And now th e new m a n bu ys th e nex t bottle of pa.lenka," Mlad en shouted at Kubo, whose wet, sin ged ha ir was bein g tou sled by hi s young fri e nd s, whose ha nd s were be in g pressed with ha nd sh akes . One ha ndsh a ke was stronge r , lo n ger than the others, a nd as Kubo blink ed through the sweat a nd ash in hi s eyes, he co uld see th at it was hi s fat he r who stood befo re him. Whe n at least he was released , Kubo had a k orun ak in hi s ha nd . �98 SLOVAKIA " You a re a m an , m y son , a nd you will from thi s day be pa id wages," Du san said, talkin g slowing so as not to slur hi s words. " You will inherit the land , you will care for this fam ily ... but now, first things first. Buy the palenka!" The fire died down and was fed with fresh logs. Boys sneaked off with girls and nuzzled in the darkness. The gypsy band played and drank and played still more . The old woman , Micekova, nodded without sayin g a word when Zuzka's mother said that her d au ghter a nd the young Vlasek boy made a fine couple. The young teacher danced with some of the v ill age women, but only when they asked him . And a small boy, whose emerald eyes glistened when the flame s rose, stood a top the hill in the shadow of the giant lindens , his thumb s locked in hi s belt. When it came time to return home, Kubo eventually found his father lyin g on the ground , a n empty bottle in his ha nd, his head propped against the thick exposed roots of an oak tree, hi s eyes barely visible through sm all slits. H e motioned for hi s son to sit b y him . " I have only a year , perhaps two in this vale of tears, " Dusan began, we ighing each word somberly and pattin g hi s so n on the knee. "You mu st rem ain stron g, my so n , my only son , and believe in what is right and decent , what has bee n ha nded down from generation to generation. " His eyes fli ckered open wider. " Father , why this talk? You a re healthy; you will live to be one hundred ." " Place your hand on my heart." '' Father ?'' " Your ha nd ." Kubo did as he was told. Dusan pressed the boy's hand onto the fa ncy embroidery of hi s shirt , now soaked with sweat and borovicka, stain ed wi th berry wines and grease from the lamb, tainted as it was. '' R epeat afte r me . . . " I .. . Ku bo Vlasek ... vow on m y father's heart ... on the day I became a man ... to love this land . . . never to turn from it ... To listen to God and not the foo lish tal es of the world outs ide ... To care for children and a nimals ... because each co m es from God ever to strike my woman without good reason ... To kee p this sac red pledge ... as pledged on my father's heart ... that the cursed word 'Amerika ' wi ll never ... never . . . be heard in the house ... �SLOVAKIA 99 our esteem ed Milos Vlasek built . .. with his bare hands ... years and years ago.'' Dusan ' s voice became lower and lower as if he were ready to cry. " Do you promise all this my son, unde r pain of mortal sin, eternal damnation and the fires of hell ?" "I do, Father ," Kubo said evenly, " I promise this before God ." "Good ." Dusan slumped back onto the roots . " Now, fetch the wagon. Your father is too tired to be walking this night." �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1984, Vol. 31 Description An account of the resource Vol. 31 (No. 57), 1984. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1984 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 87 Excerpt from In Due Season Paul Wilkes "Is ... is he home? Pan Vlasek?" '' No, no, in the field,'' Dusan replied impatiently, stuffing two huge loaves of bread into a sack . "Stara?" "Yes, yes. Matka moja, what you girls won't do ; you are the third one today.'' ''Oh,'' she breathed, as if by her late arrival she might already have lost out. "I won't stay long. I have a heap of washing to do. So high I can't even see over the top of it.' ' "They are good to you, those Magyars?" "Oh yes, Pan Vlasek. When they have roast, we have roast. And as many potatoes as you can eat." "So you are happy up there on the hill?" "For now." "And?" '' Someday I want to live again in the valley in my own house and raise children; eight, ten, maybe an even dozen . I do not want a fancy life. " "For such a family you need a strong back and a wealthy husband . " "Just one who works hard, Pan Vlasek. I already know the one. And I am strong, stronger than the other girls. I will make a good wife.'' "You children. So eager to grow up . If you only knew . Well, Kubo will be back soon and he should not find you here. He is not used to the ways of females . " Dusan put on his hat and tossed the bag to his shoulder. "By the way," he said, lowering his voice, "is it true what they do up there ; the drinking, the sins of the flesh , all that?" "My parents tell me little , but in the morning, cleaning up the great hall, there are signs, Pan Vlasek," she said, lowering her eyes in shame. 88 SLOVAKIA ''Terrible , awful,'' Dusan said, and passing through the d oor added , "and worse yet not be able to a fford it. Good lu ck, girl." The old woman was sitting on a b ench in the corner of the room, lost in the shadows beneath the holy pictures. A s the rosary bead s slipped throu gh her fingers , her wrinkled lips m oved quickly, giving off the sound of something sizzling, like w et wood add ed to a hot fire. Step b y step Zu zka Tavelcako va a pproach ed he r , lookin g for som e sign that the woman kn ew she was there. She h a d grown in the years she'd lived with he r family in the castle of Count Szepesy a nd was indeed n ot only stron ger but considerably larger than other girls of her age, which was fifteen . H er shoulders were broad , he r hands , already red and calloused from hours of scrubbing clothes a nd peeling vege ta bl es and h auling wood to the many fireplaces , were so able that even her older broth er s would call upon Zuzka when they needed to pull a balking cow into a stall or when the last sacks of fl our h ad to be stacked near the crossp iece of the hu ge sypanec. But , as much as God ha d blessed her with a n abundan ce of good h ealth a nd strength , H e had not bee n so gen erou s with he r appearance. H er forehead was too large, and a certain puffiness above her eyes m ade h er appear to be con sta ntly scowlin g. Although her mouth was full a nd well formed, her upper lip had a tendency to pu sh up the skin b eneath her nose, the force of which formed two d eep lines that curled ben eath her ch eeks . Zuzka Tavelcakova was a good-natured , ch eerful girl in her heart a nd in her actio n s, but her face did not represent her justly. " I have brought a forint, P ani Micekova," Zuzka said softly, bendin g at the knee in a quick curtsy before the old woman . The old woman ' s eyes did not open; her lip s moved more quickly, as if she would h ave to be furt her coaxed from her religious reverie. "Teta? " she said with greatest respect. " Y ou are the o nly one who can help .'' " Did yo u d o exactly as I told yo u ? " the old woman snapped, continuing w ith her rosary as she awaited the suppli can t's reply. " Oh, yes, everyth in g," Zuzka said excitedly. She began her reci ta tion, graspin g first he r sm allest fin ger, holdin g it tightly as she savored h er exact ness, her fervidness, as she un abash edly displayed her girl ish hope . "Last night, in the moonlight , the brightest moonlight - I waited - I picked zemezlce by the river. I picked a nd I picked until my zajda was filled. SLOVAKIA 89 "A littl e is all tha t is n eed ed ." She dismissed h e r exuberance . " I didn ' t want to take chances; I didn ' t think it would hurt." '' Then ?'' She grasped the n ext finger . " Then I went to the fi eld of konope wi th the other girls and I rolled and rolled . Each of us put a stick with a different-colored ribbon in the ground so we would know wh ere we h ad been .'' She ra n her h ands over the front of her apron . '' The konope sta nd s straight ... well , almost straight , thi s m ornin g." " Better tha t it is n ot perfect; tha t would m ean you m a rry in a year. T oo youn g ." " And we all m ad e wreath s with branches of the willow , a nd when we threw them in the rive r , pani , mine was the first to reach th e great rock . The first!" '' So you will m a rry first , but n ot n ext year. '' She grasped h er fourth fin ge r , but h er h ands soon slid toge ther , locked in their own praye r. " I knelt befo re the Virgin a nd p romised that if she heard m y plea I would n ot let Kubo tou ch a n ythin g more tha n m y a rm until we we re m a n a nd wife. I vowed it, teta, under p ain of m ortal sin 1 " The old wom an ' s eyes fli ckered open , glistenin g in their d a rk sockets. Zu zka could not look into those eyes; sh e peered down , intentl y foll owin g a ha irline crack in the dirt floo r. " You mu st swear it again , Zu zka, swear tha t n o impure thou ghts will co m e into your mind. T h a t if Kubo so mu ch as tou ches you a bove here," she said , layin g h er gna rl ed h a nd on the opposite elbow , "you will sla p him as if he we re the d evil him self. '' " Oh , I do swear it! Unde r pa in of th e etern al fi res of hell 1" " You h ave th ose la r ge breas ts." The old wom a n n odded gravely towa rd Zu zka's blouse. " The boys will wa n t to touch them; even him ." " T eta, I have dedicated them to the Virgin ; they a re hers, n ot his," she said , takin g in h er breath a nd pullin g he r ves t ti ghtly against her body. " Oh , I a m so rry they h ave grown so." " I don ' t know wh y you want the b oy a nyh ow ," the old wom a n said . '' H e is neither b ig nor clever.'' " I am stron g," a n d Zu zka's vo ice becam e so ft e r , th at of a m other spea kin g to her in fa nt , "and h e is kind a nd ge ntl e, n ot like the other boys ." T he to ne aga in was firm. " And I can pu sh him , help him to be a m a n , sta nd up ." 90 SLOVAKIA The old woman's hands, the rosary still entwined in her fingers, disappeared beneath her threadbare shawl. Zuzka stood still, her heart pounding, her breath escaping from her mouth in a series of sharp, moist gasps. "Please, God, please . . . " she whispered. ''Through . . . the . .. Christ . . . bring . . . '' Zuzka leaned forward, straining to hear, but she could only understand a few words as they rasped forth from deep in the old woman's throat. '' . . . drawn to . . . let his . . . Holy Ghost, Amen.'' Zuzka took a step forward, the forint in hand. "From the drippings at Our Lady's altar. The most blessed wax at Our Lady's feet, ' ' the old woman said with a certain pride of craftsmanship . But when she saw the hand stretched out to her with the coin, her own hand snapped shut. "So, little foolish girl, you think you can buy this? Pay the bosorka and laugh to your friends about the old fool? You have your nerve!'' "No, no, teta," Zuzka pleaded. "I know that. Look. I place the coin here, on the bench. I do not give it to you. No, nothing this sacred can be bought.'' "Leave no doubt about it." The hand opened again. Squarely in the middle of the old woman's palm lay the figure of a man, no bigger than a thumball, fashioned from pale yellow beeswax. When Kubo returned from the fields he found the house empty, the ashes in the fireplace cool. He splashed water on his face, neck , and arms and dressed hurriedly, silently cursing the hundreds of tiny shoots that had virtually sprung up overnight among the potato plants. His father had drummed into his head the old saying, ''Cut the weed today and spare the plant tomorrow , " and Kubo, whose main task at this time of the year was weeding, sometimes had to be prodded to maintain his vigilance against the tiny green enemies that sapped the nourishment of the crops . But not on that day, for Kubo wanted to impress upon his father how responsible, how serious he was about work. Although his family left early Kubo remained behind and made sure that the field was clean, the soil broken with his hoe to receive whatever rain might fall. Kubo shoved his blouse into the clean white woolen britches with the thick black embroidery and reached up to the shelf above the bed SLOVAKIA 91 to take down his ciapka. He looked at the foolish little brimless pillbox , the two silken ribbons that trailed behind . A boy' s cap. A child's. As he plopped it on the back of his head, the dismal thought came to his mind that it could still be on his head when St. John 's Day came next year. By the time Kubo arrived, out of breath from his run , the pasture to the north of the village was already filled with people, and the Feast of St. John 's had begun. The cows, Gizela among them, grazed peacefully in the afternoon light, with wreaths of daisies over their horns, which Anna and the girls her age had made. The older, unmarried girls had woven a long chain of daisies and took turns flinging it up into the tall oak . It was an important ritual, for the number of branches the chain covered would be the years each maiden would have to wait for marriage . Up to a certain age, young girls threw the chain of daisies with all their might, but the older maidens, like Justina Marusakova, now twenty-three, whose half-closed eyes and stuttering, dull speech had failed to attract a spouse, aimed for a single low branch and prayed that the superstition bore truth . Everyone got a turn , even Zuzka's oldest sister , Dorota, who was past forty but whose brain had remained that of a child's. As Kubo walked by the group of girls, Zuzka eagerly took the chain of daisies in her large hands and puffed out the chest she had sworn hours before would not be violated. But marriage and carnal thoughts were the farthest things from his mind , and he did not look as the daisies and her prayers fluttered toward heaven . He went directly to the huge , square stack of neatly cut logs and bent his head back to take in the dozens of small fir trees that had been placed on top. As the sun set on this, the longest day of the year, the day of Jana, the pagan god who was Christianized into the good St. John , the dry wood would burst into flame and the yearly pageant would be performed. At its end, Kubo well knew, a brave few, who up to this night had been called boys and treated as such, would henceforth walk the village streets as men. Kubo gulped and stooped down, stretching the muscles of his legs . Off to the side of the huge stack the V adasz brothers and other boys just a year or two younger than Kubo were playing a game he had played many times himself. And even with some of them . One boy would bend down and another would leap upon him like a frog , and be carried for 92 SLOVAKIA as long a di stance as youn g legs could hold up . Still other boys were imitating the cows grazin g, complete with mooin g sounds . The young C ernetsky boy had borrowed the d a isy wreath from their cow , Sargula , and the other boys cla pped with glee at the silly sigh t. " Kubo, come , com e , " they called to him , but Kubo acted as if he could not hear them. H e threw his shoulders back, strainin g his bod y to be as tall as he possibly could , and walked to a spot near the tables of food and drink where his fa ther was sta ndin g, hi s pipe in ha nd , talkin g to som e men . '' This is m y Kubo ,'' Du san said to a short m an wh o wore a long ostrich feather in his hat, " the best weed puller south of the High T atras. M eet P an Bozek and hi s boy P avel, " he said, m otionin g to a boy a bout Kubo's age . On th e boy's head was a ha t and feather similar to his father 's, a nd he nodded withou t say in g a word. It was another humilia tin g reminder. " W e were ju st talking a bout the first m arket in Bard ejov," Du san said. '' P an Bozek is a great landowner in M ala M aca and plans to sell mu ch . " " N o, no, not a great landowner ," P an Bozek said . " Ju st a simple peasant like yourself, blessed with a few m eters of God's precious earth , who works hi s fool head off. '' '' For yourself, a nd if a neighbor need s a hand ... '' ' ' ... well , thi s is our way, it is nothing to b rag .. . '' ' ' .. . D o you hear of su ch things from those who have gone to A m erika? Answe r m e tha t one.' ' Du san j abbed at the space in fron t of P an Bozek 's nose. " They all work for them selves, neve r help a friend to ha rvest or give a loaf of b read to one who need s it. You , Pan Bozek , are a fine exam pie to put in the face of all those vypasen f A m ericania. T ake notice of this m an , Kubo.'' " L ast year we took three wagonload s of wheat and l'an to Bardej ov and sold everything," Pavel said , putting his hands on his hips. " Our horse d anced all the way hom e.'' " Ju st forin ts and crowns to bring hom e," Du san said . "A ligh t load ." " W ell . .. " P a n Bozek said , tryin g to a ppear modest. " I have neve r seen you at the m arket," Pavel said to Kubo . " M y boy is not yet ready," Dusan said before Kubo could answer. " There is no hurry. Som e d ay . . . Now , som e p alenka, m y fri end , and SLOVAKIA 93 some of the fine kolace from the village o f Zbudza. You boys run off a nd play. '' A s the sun linge red capri ciou sly in the sky, P avel a nd Kubo w alked a mon g the revelers , drank the sweet berry juices and a te hu ge hunks of the la mb tha t Banfk had brought only to h ave so m e villagers refuse to to uch it , calling it a "guilt offering." Whe n the two boys came close to the group of young girls who had started to d a n ce with each othe r , Eta Min arovicova and Julia Vadaszova looked toward Kubo , but he knew it was for a n introdu ction to the h a ndsom e stra nge r a nd not for him self. R egardless, Kubo was more inte res ted in P avel's stories of the market a t Bardejov, of the hu ge wheels of cheese that the shepherds m ad e, of the m agnifice nt church th a t could hold all the people from five la rge vill ages. Pavel did n ot do it in the boastful fashion of Fra nko Hruscak , who made boys just a year o r two younger than him self feel like mere b a bies because they had never been to Bardejov and he had . P avel talked quietly , directly, but almost reli giou sly about the la nd t hat hi s fa mil y owned in M ala Maca, a nd how som ed ay, as the eldest son , it would be hi s. " And I will h ave more each year ," he said with suren ess in hi s voice. "There is no thing I love more than work. " H e add ed with a smile, " And a little slivovica n ow and then when m y fa the r doesn't fini sh hi s gla ss. All these p eople going to Amerika! Hah , m y father is right , yours too . Wh at cou ld be a b etter life than we have?" As Kubo tried not to loo k envious, P avel went on to tell him that he was coming hom e late r a nd la ter a t ni ght , and so m et imes his parents were a lready in bed , so he slept in the barn . Kubo had slept in the barn o fte n o n hot summ er ni ghts , but th e idea of slee pin g there a fter spe ndin g a ni ght in the foothills, sm okin g cigarettes with hi s friends, or after makin g wolf call s a t a girl' s window, was a forbidden pleasure so swee t he co uld not believe it would ever ha ppen . " Who ' s that?" P a vel motioned . " The little o ne? M y sister, Anna. Why? " " I' ve n eve r seen ha ir like he rs ; stra n ge color. " '' Baby h a ir , just a streak . '' " H ow old is she a n yhow ?" P avel said , hi s eyes n o t leav ing Anna until she disappeared into the crowd that h ad gathered a round the stack of wood. '' Almost eleve n .'' 94 SLOVAKIA "Skinny legs." ''I guess. She's a dreamer.'' '' AAAHHHH ! '' The sound echoed over the meadow to the tall junipers, sending a flock of bluejays into the purple night air. "AAAHHHH!" It rumbled down the slope to where the river Laborec wound its way through the thickets ofreeds. "AAAHHHH!" the chorus of voices breathed as the flames licked at the neatly stacked logs and suddenly burst skyward in a mammoth orange ball as the sap-filled branches, the needles and cones of the fur trees caught fire . Kubo's throat went dry. Pavel put his arm over the shoulder of the boy he'd met just a short time before. "Not yet . It will die down. There is time to be a man." Other boys, some Kubo's age, like Franko Hruscak andjozefKralik also stood around the fire, carefully eyeing the flames and casting sidelong glances to see if anyone was ready to try . Cyril Gasparovic was also there, a frail boy already three years older than Kubo, who had never danced or jumped over the fire and whose mother was known to be making a novena to the Blessed Lady . The firs burned off quickly, leaving shimmering red skeletons, but flames from the logs were still at least as high as the top of his head as Kubo walked a slow circle around the fire, eyeing it with the intensity and dread of a baca faced with a hungry wolf. It was a delicate issue, one, down through the centuries that the tradition had been practiced, that required the judgment only a mature man would have . There was a point, just one point, when the flames receded enough to be traversed but when a boy could be seriously burned or, as the story was told of the arrogant richtar 's son many years ago, killed . There would always be one person who knew that point, took the chance, and the others who followed would go through life remembering his bravery and bemoaning their lack of it. It was sometimes better to wait until the next St. John ' s Day rather than risk the humiliation of being one of the last, the least brave . For as the fire died down , even the tiny boys of the village would jump over the embers in childish practice for the day some years away when they would risk painful burns to gain their manhood. The gypsy band struck up the first tunes, and it was mostly the older people, singing and clapping their hands, who began to flatten the thick grass with their dancing feet . The rest of the people from Zbud- SLOVAKIA 95 za, those with young sons and those from Mala Maca and V el'ka Maca who had made a pilgrimage for the feast days stayed close to that fire, talking among themselves, waiting, but making no reference to the drama that was building moment by moment. Kubo had made a complete circle, and finally he stood before his father, his arms at his sides, like a soldier in ranks. "Otec," he said, using the formal address, "will you please hold my ciapka?" Dusan looked over his son's shoulder to the leaping yellow and red flames of the fire. He squinted so that he could see it better. Then he extended his hand without saying a word, either of encouragement or caution, and took the hat from his son, placing it under his arm. One by one, the people moved to the side, clearing a path. Except for a low, haunting gypsy love song and the crackling of dry wood, the meadow was quiet, and nothing stood between Kubo Vlasek and the state he so desired, nothing but the fire that had purged and proven men of Zbudza for countless generations. His heart pounding, his mouth full of cotton, Kubo made the sign of the cross. His first steps were almost his undoing as his krpce slipped on grass, moist from spilled beer. But then he lengthened his stride and by the time he had reached the edge of the crowd, he was running as fast as he could. Logs tumbled together at the fire's core and a huge tongue of flame leaped out, but it was too late . Kubo 's krpce had left the ground. "AAAHHHH," the sound - a cheer, a moan - rose up from the lips of men and women and children as a form, black against the bright flames, seemed to hang in the air. The gypsy band stopped in mid-song . "AAAHHHH ! " Women crossed themselves and men's lips tightened . The mouths of small children gaped open . "AAAAAAHHHHHH !" The fire crackled angrily, spitting hot sparks into the cool night air. Dusan fingered the ciapka beneath his arm, then grasped it firmly . His son stood before him, eyebrows vanished from his pink face, his hair a mass of tiny burnt and frizzy curls, one leg of his while trousers browned , like the top of a loaf of bread. Dusan could smell the hair , the cloth, the flesh that had passed through the St. John's fire . He extended the ciapka to his son , looking at it , turning it in his hand . "Perhaps a bit too small, Kubo . I think in Bardejov they might 96 SLOVAKIA have some bigge r ones ; more like . . " Whateve r words follow ed were lost in the deafening accolade rendered to J a kub Vlasek . After hi s awesome display of b ravery, Kubo could seemingl y d o nothing wrong as the sun set and the evenin g of dancin g began in earnest. His krpce kicked hi gh in the a ir but la nd ed with a feather's li ghtness so close to the fl asks of vino a nd borovicka th a t gasps were heard from the young girls who stood in a group eyeing the b oys who would somed ay be th eir hu sbands . Even Eta Min arovicova a nd Julia Vad aszova, b y far the pretti es t a nd most choosy girls in Zbudza on feas t days in th e pas t acted as if Kubo Vl ase k had some co n tagious disease, co uld n ot kee p their eyes off him . Their hands behind th eir backs, th eir hips swayin g ge ntly to the musi c, they waited, as did all their girl fri ends, for the m ost impor tant d a nce in the li fe of eve ry b oy who jumped ove r the fire on St. J ohn 's D ay. The gy psies kn ew it. Their gold tee th fl ashin g beneath bl ack mu staches, they would tease with th e first ba rs of a popula r tun e . But the n they would break into a nothe r so n g th at onl y the boys cou ld dan ce to, a nd display their prowess st ill more, d elay in g th e mom ent when the eager young girls and the proud young boys would have a dance together. The b a nd stru ck up a d a nce don e entirely on one foot. Boys shoved and j ostl ed, feinted a nd du cked , a nd th e less agil e we re se n t sprawling into th e grass . And , a t the da n ce's e nd , the re was ju st one who h ad not resorted to u sin g hi s oth er foot , who had not bee n kn ocked ove r. Kubo Vl asek twirl ed a round on the b all of hi s foot, with a n agilit y eve n his fath er had to applaud. Th e gypse husle pl aye r kept Kubo dan cin g , in creas in g the beat , but Ku bo, lost in the ecstasy of th e m agic ni ght , would not lose hi s bal a nce. Hi s mind was already in Ba rdej ov, hi s head already cove red in a fin e n ew hat. H e could feel the jin gle of co ins in hi s pocket , straw und er hi s b ack in th e b a rn. Th e bea t cha n ged so su b tl y that Kubo was not even awa re o f it. H e kept twirlin g a nd twirlin g. It was alread y pitch d a rk , but logs had bee n h eaped on th e fire, a nd as Kubo 's eyes, fogged with pe rspiration , took in the blur of faces standin g aro und the dan cin g a rea, fl ashes of color sta rted swirlin g a bout him , in th e opposite d irection . Lik e great red a nd yell ow and gree n eels sw immin g in a shall ow strea m , the o rnate p arta stream in g dow n from th e braided heads of th e un married SLOVAKIA 97 girls shimmered in the fire's light , each offerin g the ni ght 's h ero th e m a iden of his choosin g. All the rituals h e h ad prepared for , jumping over the fire, the o n elegged dan ce, but Kubo Vlasek had not , up to that very moment, decided whi ch girl would have the h onor of hi s first dan ce as a man . H e twirled faster a nd became dizzie r in hi s deliciou s mom ent of triumph , in his hour of indecision . The parta flutte red by, the tip s flickering a t his nose. The gypsy band picked up the beat. Faster and faster. His a rm reached out to the fl ashing colors. And it was soundly m et. " Oh , thank you , I would be m ost honored ." The vill agers applauded still louder while Kubo 's frie nds hooted a nd whistled . And Zu zka Tavelcakova, her great eyebrows arched over a huge smile, her free arm s swin ging in wild exultation , her huge breasts threatening release from the rest of h er body, d a n ced about the circle. She held on to Kubo tightly a nd , as they n eared the fire, reached into her apron pocket a nd withdrew a clenched fist , with which she bl essed herself. Then th e h a nd fl ew o pe n - and a small obj ect disappeared into th e flam es. Around, around h e twirled Zuzka until finally the gypsy playing the cymbal ran th e soft felt hammers from the low notes to the high, signaling the n ext dan ce would begin . But , befor e they could launch into it , several pa irs of ha nds reached out to Kubo , and sudde nl y he was be ing ho isted into th e a ir. ' ']eden! " " D va! 1 " " Tri 11 ! " And with th e third toss the loud est chee r - fu eled b y boro vicka and bee r and tradition - rippl ed across the m eadow and down to the ri ver whe re a fl ock of tin y doves bolted from the reed s a nd fl ew towa rd th e d a rkne ss of th e hu ge junipe rs . '' Y AAA Y AA AAA Y AAAAAAAAA 1 ' ' " And now th e new m a n bu ys th e nex t bottle of pa.lenka," Mlad en shouted at Kubo, whose wet, sin ged ha ir was bein g tou sled by hi s young fri e nd s, whose ha nd s were be in g pressed with ha nd sh akes . One ha ndsh a ke was stronge r , lo n ger than the others, a nd as Kubo blink ed through the sweat a nd ash in hi s eyes, he co uld see th at it was hi s fat he r who stood befo re him. Whe n at least he was released , Kubo had a k orun ak in hi s ha nd . 98 SLOVAKIA " You a re a m an , m y son , a nd you will from thi s day be pa id wages," Du san said, talkin g slowing so as not to slur hi s words. " You will inherit the land , you will care for this fam ily ... but now, first things first. Buy the palenka!" The fire died down and was fed with fresh logs. Boys sneaked off with girls and nuzzled in the darkness. The gypsy band played and drank and played still more . The old woman , Micekova, nodded without sayin g a word when Zuzka's mother said that her d au ghter a nd the young Vlasek boy made a fine couple. The young teacher danced with some of the v ill age women, but only when they asked him . And a small boy, whose emerald eyes glistened when the flame s rose, stood a top the hill in the shadow of the giant lindens , his thumb s locked in hi s belt. When it came time to return home, Kubo eventually found his father lyin g on the ground , a n empty bottle in his ha nd, his head propped against the thick exposed roots of an oak tree, hi s eyes barely visible through sm all slits. H e motioned for hi s son to sit b y him . " I have only a year , perhaps two in this vale of tears, " Dusan began, we ighing each word somberly and pattin g hi s so n on the knee. "You mu st rem ain stron g, my so n , my only son , and believe in what is right and decent , what has bee n ha nded down from generation to generation. " His eyes fli ckered open wider. " Father , why this talk? You a re healthy; you will live to be one hundred ." " Place your hand on my heart." '' Father ?'' " Your ha nd ." Kubo did as he was told. Dusan pressed the boy's hand onto the fa ncy embroidery of hi s shirt , now soaked with sweat and borovicka, stain ed wi th berry wines and grease from the lamb, tainted as it was. '' R epeat afte r me . . . " I .. . Ku bo Vlasek ... vow on m y father's heart ... on the day I became a man ... to love this land . . . never to turn from it ... To listen to God and not the foo lish tal es of the world outs ide ... To care for children and a nimals ... because each co m es from God ever to strike my woman without good reason ... To kee p this sac red pledge ... as pledged on my father's heart ... that the cursed word 'Amerika ' wi ll never ... never . . . be heard in the house ... SLOVAKIA 99 our esteem ed Milos Vlasek built . .. with his bare hands ... years and years ago.'' Dusan ' s voice became lower and lower as if he were ready to cry. " Do you promise all this my son, unde r pain of mortal sin, eternal damnation and the fires of hell ?" "I do, Father ," Kubo said evenly, " I promise this before God ." "Good ." Dusan slumped back onto the roots . " Now, fetch the wagon. Your father is too tired to be walking this night."  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Excerpt from "In Due Season" Description An account of the resource Paul Wilkes Slovakia, Vol. 31 (No. 57), 1984 pp. 87-99 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Wilkes, Paul, 1938- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1984 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a086bddb4a2d2ec3a4e99a8e97533558.pdf e57a8aff85949ef83f5a4101189c6652 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 73 Excerpt from In Due Season (II) BY PAUL WILKES (Author's note: The year is 1899, the setting is a tiny, poor village in Eastern Slovakia.) ©Copyright, 1985 Paul Wilkes Metod burst through the door. "Mama, Papa, Pan .. . Pan .. Pan Vadasz. He's dead! I saw it right through the window." he said breathlessly. "Quiet, son!" Kubo said, his finger in front of his mouth, "your brother is sleeping ." "Papa, Papa," the boy whispered , "Rezso said Pan Vadasz just got up from his bed and lay down on the floor . . . " "I want no t~lk of death in this house ," Kubo said sternly. "None!" In those days , Vadasz was not the only one in the village of Zbudza to " lie between the beams ," showing that they no longer hoped to be cured. They, who had come from the earth, in their fevered and aching state, wished to return, knowing that every day they lived they were a burden to those who hoped to survive. Every day they required tending - and there was precious little time for this - and they needed nourishment. In many houses the bread was already crumbly from too much bark. In the next five days the somber bells of St. Joseph's tolled nine times; on one day three times, as the twins of Pani Gasparoyicova 's daughters died , one with the sunrise, the other just after the Angelus had rung . And before the sun set, Banik fell from his stool at the front of his house, blood running from his mouth . �74 SLOVAKIA Although the villagers were not sure if Banik had died from the cholera, he was buried along with the others in a shallow gully, far to the side of the cemetery. It had been set aside not for any health reason but for fear that the curse would somehow seep through the ground to infect the souls of villagers who now slept in peace. In those five days Belo ate no food, drank no water, his eyes grew dry and sunken in his face, and his every breath was a struggle, as if some great hand were pressing on his chest. Kubo did not leave the boy's side and barely ate himself. Only on the sixth day, when Belo was too weak even to cry did Kubo leave , returning a short while later. He had borrowed Loebl's horse and was going to take the boy to the nearest doctor, in Plavnica , a trip of some ten hours. Loebl had a friend there, a rabbi, who kept the special medicines that Jews used, and he asked Kubo to bring something for someone in his house, sick with the croup . Dusan, clenched teeth holding his pipe, fixed his eyes on Kubo. "You don't even know the way. What is this 'doktor' business? What do they know that we don't?" The old woman moved her head slowly in assent. ''When God calls, sinful humans must not hold on; it is His will. And that little one could die outside his own house ... it is not right.'' Zuzka said nothing. She pulled down another worn lambswool guba from the shelf above the bed and then her extra shawl. Into a small hemp sack she placed half a loaf of bread and an apple she had hidden away for the day that Belo would be well enough to eat it. Still without saying a word, she helped her husband bundle the child into the first guba , then the second, and tied the shawl into a sling around his shoulders . Neither Dusan nor Helena , nor the old woman , would help him, nor even look in his direction . About to leave, he said to their turned backs , " I ask for your prayers. Because if this child dies , I die .'' Zuzka gasped , putting her hand to her mouth, and his mother made a sign of the cross, here eyes turned toward the heaven her son had just challenged . As the first pellets of a freezing rain rattled against the windowpanes, Kubo rode into the black, moonless night. At first he �SLOVAKIA 75 went slowly, to be sure the child was secure on his back, then he kicked at the sides of the brown mare. The rain stung his face, blinding him at times. In the cold damp air of the night he could smell the child, the sickly sour brown odor that covered Belo each time another issue of water gurgled from his trembling bottom. Kubo could barely hear his breathing, and once when he looked over his shoulder into the dark bundle, he could hear nothing. He pulled the horse to a halt and listened for the breathing . After ·a painful pause, Belo drew in some air. By the time they reached the turnoff beyond the village of Svinne, the horse 's nostrils were flared, its gait slowed to little more than a walk. On both sides of Kubo's neck the shawl had worn against his skin, leaving an angry red bruise , beginning to weep droplets of blood. As the first gray light of morning began to outline the foothills and mighty Tatras beyond Kubo could see that he was approaching a town , for houses were closer and closer together. In the pale light he could see a low, sand-colored wall , covered with red tiles. At an opening in the wall a huge gateway marked with wrought iron twisted into the shapes of huge pheasants and flying geese , Kubo saw the town's vartas. ''Plavnica?'' " Yes ." "Doktor Stofcik?" One of the old man's eyes was frosted over, sightless , but the other eye regarded this strange rider with a huge bundle at his back, the collar of his jacket now soaked with blood. " Past the church, on the right. " Kubo looked over his shoulder and finally, as faint as the whisper of a summer wind on a hot day , came the breath of the child. " Sick one? " "Yes ," said Kubo , urging the horse over the cobblestones. " From where ?" the man called after him . ' 'Zbudza. '' ''Jesus and Mary! Go away!'' he screamed. Zbudza! Oh my God!" Waving his hands , the man ran after the slowly moving horse . �76 SLOVAKIA He caught up with Kubo and ran alongside. " Go! Get out! You bring the plague. OUT!" Kubo kicked at the sides of the horse, but the mare would not move faster. The old man grabbed at the horse 's tail and yanked, ending up on the cobblestones with a handful of long hairs. Howling like a wounded animal, he rose and grabbed again, this time holding on as the horse pulled him along the bumpy street. Shutters banged open along the square and heads popped out into the damp morning air. The old horse plodded on, slowed still more by his additional burden, past the church, past a row of houses the same color as the walls, each with a red-tile roof, and some with wooden signs hanging from wrought-iron posts. The old man let go of the tail and ran ahead to a house where a sign hung, stating: "Doktor Stofcik." He stabbed at the air in Kubo's direction. " ZBUDZA! CHOLERA! '' His voice resounded with stark terror down the narrow alley. A man appeared, rubbed his eyes, then put a tiny pair of okuliare on his nose. His wife, a bonnet over her hair, a single long braid tumbling over her shoulders, tied to pull him back in. ''My son is ill,'' Kubo said calmly and with respect. ' ' Some say it is the fever." Lather dripped from the horse's mouth and steam rose from its back. Kubo , his wet hair plastered askew on his forehead, his hands trembling on the reins, painfully moved his neck to peer into the bundle and to listen once more . "Haven't you heard , you fool?" the doctor shouted down to him. " Your village is infected. Epidemia! It 's cholera! No one is to leave. Help is on the way, yes, go home. Get out, immediately.'' "Go away! Leave us! Plague!" Other voices rained down upon the rider whose face was turned from them , transfixed on the dark opening in the guba . The shouting became even louder, the curses stronger as the head of the rider slowly turned and looked up toward the doctor's window. It was only when the doctor put up his hands. "Quiet, everyone, stop it! Now you, go back; I cannot treat your child. You will spread the epidemia if you stay one instant longer. " �SLOVAKIA 77 Kubo's hands trembled uncontrollably. He dropped the reins and buried his face in the rain-soaked sleeve of his jacket. When he looked up to the window once again tears were streaming down his face. "There is no need ," he said , "any longer." Kubo did not take the bundle from his back when he knocked on the door of the Jew Teitlebaum, nor did he say what it contained. He took the small vial of liquid, tucked it into his trousers, and mounted the horse. The Jew asked him if he wanted food or some dry clothes , but Kubo shook his head , paid him with Loebl's money , and turned the horse toward the village gate. When Pani Spisakova came to the Vlasek house,,to prepare the child for burial , Kubo would not let her touch him . He asked for the special bowl used for bathing the dead and told her she could leave . His family watched in stunned silence as Kubo, saying no more, heated the water and with a soft linen cloth careful1y washed the emaciated body. He took the small door from the grain bin and laid it between two benches and made a mattress of dry, fragrant straw. He dressed Belo in a fine white linen shirt, whose cuffs and collar Zuzka had embroidered in swirls of reds and yellows and blues, and laid him upon the straw. He worked throughout the day and until the morning light to make the coffin, and when he brought it into the house the black lacquer and the dozens of tiny painted rosebuds and linden blossoms were still wet. He gently lifted the child, as if Belo were sleeping, and placed him within. He draped the fine lace coverlet, which had been made by his great-grandmother, over the boy, leaving only his arms and face , with neatly combed hair, showing. In the coffin, Kubo carefully arranged the animals he had carved for Belo . Near the boy' s face, three proud roosters , a pig, then a cow, a horse , a vag6nik. The plow with a tiny piece of metal for a blade was pulled by the muscular ox and from its halter Kubo led the piece of twine under the coverlet, and wrapped it around the boy' s cold, stiff hands . His task completed, Kubo pulled up a chair beside the coffin and sat, the flickering candle lighting his face. Mourners came and touched him on the shoulder and offered their sympathies , �78 SLOVAKIA but he neither looked up from the still form in the black casket, nor did he talk. When Father Slobodnik entered on the morning of the third day, Kubo rose , genuflected before the priest and kissed his hand . Then he stood back, chin and cheeks dark with four days of growth, his eyes red but dry, his face so stricken with grief that not even his wife stood close to him as the old priest intoned the Latin prayers . There was a soft rustle of wood against wood. Then the sharp metallic sound of Kubo's hammer on the iron nails pierced the silence. Again and again the hammer came down, sure and true , and the green wood squeaked as the nails penetrated it. Sniffles became sobs and sobs soon aching moans before the high-pitched wails of the women of Zbudza filled the room, mourning the child and venting the fear each had for his own life and soul. Kubo carried the coffin in his arms toward the door, where he placed it on the doorstep three times before hoisting it to his shoulder. Then, as tradition dictated , Belo Vlasek, aged 18 months , left his house for the last time , feet first. As Kubo had asked, Franko Hruscak had dug the grave at the farthest end of the area that had been marked off for the victims of the plague. Under a young linden tree , a freshly turned mound of the dark, damp soil, studded with the stones and rocks that were -the bane of farmers, sat waiting to be returned to its rightful place. The ropes slid on the muddy ground, barely leaving a mark as the slight, small box, no larger or heavier than a baby 's cradle , was lowered into the hole. And one by one the people of Zbudza, from the smallest child to the eldest stara matka took handfulls of the moist dirt and threw it upon the coffin, each with the same ancient farewell: " That the earth will be light on you." The last was Kubo. His hand reached to the mound and taking but a few granules of the soil , he stood above the dark hole. His hand trembled as it hovered over the grave, and slowly balled into a tight fist. The gumless lips of old mouths moved in prayer, sending puffs of white into the damp air, and children shuffled restlessly , looking at their parents for a sign they could leave. Zuzka's face was buried in her handkerchief, her muffled sobs closer and closer together, her shoulders shuddering. �SLOVAKIA 79 Kubo's hand slowly tilted forward, and the dirt trickled through his fingers, falling soundlessly in to the grave. He stood there as if carved from stone, his open hand pleadingly outstretched as the mourners turned and began to walk back toward the village. Soon everyone had left except Kubo and his family. Dusan placed his hands on his son's shoulder. "Come, they'll all be waiting at the krcma for us . Loebl's very thankful for what you, did. He pays for the wake." "Soon, Father," Kubo said in a hoarse voice, his first words in three days. "Don't linger, son, the soul must depart. If you stand here, it becomes as grief-stricken as you; the box will fill up with the child's tears and the ghost will return. The dead m~st bury the dead and life must go on. '' ''I want to be with him for just a little while yet.'' "He's in a better place than us; you should be celebrating. Just think, he is well and pink and warm with Jesus and ... '' Kubo looked up to his father with the bloodshot eyes , from which no more tears could be wrung, his face like ashes in the blacksmith's forge . Dusan gathered the family and started down the hill . By the time Kubo walked through the door of the krcma, voices were already loud and thick with palenka, and old adversaries had found a new battle to wage. "We must send word to Bardejov, to Presov; we need medicine , a doktor immediately," the rich tar said, his finger stabbing at the smoky air. "Soon we'll all be dead of this thing, snuffed out like a hill of ants in a forest fire." "We pay our taxes to you, you thief, and what the hell do we get when we need help?" said Dusan, as he downed a large glass of beer. " You go! Now!" "Don't call me a thief, Vlasek. If you . . . " "Father, I want to speak to you." Kubo's voice was firm and strong , louder then he normally spoke , and the men who were talking at the tables turned toward him. "Well, speak, son, we have no secrets here ." �80 SLOVAKIA Kubo's eyes moved from man to man, then rested on his father. " I made a decision at my son's grave. No more of my children are going to be buried on that hill. Belo is the last. '' " For generations this is our resting place; where else is there , son? Please, don't speak now , your heart is still top heavy. " "I'm going to Amerika." As if a gong had been sounded, silence descended on the krcma. Dusan rose to his feet. " Don't confront your father as you are doing , not even on a day so sad as this one." Kubo's eyes did not blink. He did not look down. " You 're my son, my heir, you share my roof. You will do my bidding.'' ' 'I'm an heir to sickness and death and hunger and I want none of them." A low murmur of voices rippled through the room. " This isn't the time, son; besides, there is a tax and they mean to collect it these days. And fare . They don't take you for free on the boat. " "There's no better time, Father. I'll get the money somehow. " " I, who gave you life; this is my thanks? To spit in my face in front of the whole village , to take away my pride like this?" " I thank you for my life and I thank all of you for every kindness to me , -to Zuzka, my children. I'm not going to this Amerika forever; I'll come back someday and we'll again have land and food and live like humans , not some animals scraping for every morsel of food.' ' "To Amerika, eh? " A bitter smile tugged at the corners of Dusan 's mouth. " Just like you went to Perun 's Wood with the cows. Reaching for too much. Remember what happened then?" Kubo's large brown eyes blinked. For an instant he had to turn from his father 's hard stare. " You hit below the belt, Father." He fingered the rim of his klobuk , which he held in his hands . "But I have to try ," he said, returning his father's look. Dusan 's body sagged, his chest heaved, and he sighed aloud. ''I asked but one thing , son, all my life, and that is for you to bury me on that hill. This is too much? As you loved your Belicko I loved you. And now, this , this . . . " �SLOVAKIA 81 "It's not too much to ask, but I have to go ." "Then who's going to bury me? Who is going to tend the graves of your children?' ' In the back of the krcma Anastazia's eyes were bright, expectant. She leaned forward on the bench so as not to miss a single word. " I must live, my family must live. In your own words and the words of the Holy Scripture, God will tend to the graves. And the dead will bury the dead. '' �� SLOVAKIA 73 Excerpt from In Due Season (II) BY PAUL WILKES (Author's note: The year is 1899, the setting is a tiny, poor village in Eastern Slovakia.) ©Copyright, 1985 Paul Wilkes Metod burst through the door. "Mama, Papa, Pan .. . Pan .. Pan Vadasz. He's dead! I saw it right through the window." he said breathlessly. "Quiet, son!" Kubo said, his finger in front of his mouth, "your brother is sleeping ." "Papa, Papa," the boy whispered , "Rezso said Pan Vadasz just got up from his bed and lay down on the floor . . . " "I want no t~lk of death in this house ," Kubo said sternly. "None!" In those days , Vadasz was not the only one in the village of Zbudza to " lie between the beams ," showing that they no longer hoped to be cured. They, who had come from the earth, in their fevered and aching state, wished to return, knowing that every day they lived they were a burden to those who hoped to survive. Every day they required tending - and there was precious little time for this - and they needed nourishment. In many houses the bread was already crumbly from too much bark. In the next five days the somber bells of St. Joseph's tolled nine times; on one day three times, as the twins of Pani Gasparoyicova 's daughters died , one with the sunrise, the other just after the Angelus had rung . And before the sun set, Banik fell from his stool at the front of his house, blood running from his mouth . �74 SLOVAKIA Although the villagers were not sure if Banik had died from the cholera, he was buried along with the others in a shallow gully, far to the side of the cemetery. It had been set aside not for any health reason but for fear that the curse would somehow seep through the ground to infect the souls of villagers who now slept in peace. In those five days Belo ate no food, drank no water, his eyes grew dry and sunken in his face, and his every breath was a struggle, as if some great hand were pressing on his chest. Kubo did not leave the boy's side and barely ate himself. Only on the sixth day, when Belo was too weak even to cry did Kubo leave , returning a short while later. He had borrowed Loebl's horse and was going to take the boy to the nearest doctor, in Plavnica , a trip of some ten hours. Loebl had a friend there, a rabbi, who kept the special medicines that Jews used, and he asked Kubo to bring something for someone in his house, sick with the croup . Dusan, clenched teeth holding his pipe, fixed his eyes on Kubo. "You don't even know the way. What is this 'doktor' business? What do they know that we don't?" The old woman moved her head slowly in assent. ''When God calls, sinful humans must not hold on; it is His will. And that little one could die outside his own house ... it is not right.'' Zuzka said nothing. She pulled down another worn lambswool guba from the shelf above the bed and then her extra shawl. Into a small hemp sack she placed half a loaf of bread and an apple she had hidden away for the day that Belo would be well enough to eat it. Still without saying a word, she helped her husband bundle the child into the first guba , then the second, and tied the shawl into a sling around his shoulders . Neither Dusan nor Helena , nor the old woman , would help him, nor even look in his direction . About to leave, he said to their turned backs , " I ask for your prayers. Because if this child dies , I die .'' Zuzka gasped , putting her hand to her mouth, and his mother made a sign of the cross, here eyes turned toward the heaven her son had just challenged . As the first pellets of a freezing rain rattled against the windowpanes, Kubo rode into the black, moonless night. At first he �SLOVAKIA 75 went slowly, to be sure the child was secure on his back, then he kicked at the sides of the brown mare. The rain stung his face, blinding him at times. In the cold damp air of the night he could smell the child, the sickly sour brown odor that covered Belo each time another issue of water gurgled from his trembling bottom. Kubo could barely hear his breathing, and once when he looked over his shoulder into the dark bundle, he could hear nothing. He pulled the horse to a halt and listened for the breathing . After ·a painful pause, Belo drew in some air. By the time they reached the turnoff beyond the village of Svinne, the horse 's nostrils were flared, its gait slowed to little more than a walk. On both sides of Kubo's neck the shawl had worn against his skin, leaving an angry red bruise , beginning to weep droplets of blood. As the first gray light of morning began to outline the foothills and mighty Tatras beyond Kubo could see that he was approaching a town , for houses were closer and closer together. In the pale light he could see a low, sand-colored wall , covered with red tiles. At an opening in the wall a huge gateway marked with wrought iron twisted into the shapes of huge pheasants and flying geese , Kubo saw the town's vartas. ''Plavnica?'' " Yes ." "Doktor Stofcik?" One of the old man's eyes was frosted over, sightless , but the other eye regarded this strange rider with a huge bundle at his back, the collar of his jacket now soaked with blood. " Past the church, on the right. " Kubo looked over his shoulder and finally, as faint as the whisper of a summer wind on a hot day , came the breath of the child. " Sick one? " "Yes ," said Kubo , urging the horse over the cobblestones. " From where ?" the man called after him . ' 'Zbudza. '' ''Jesus and Mary! Go away!'' he screamed. Zbudza! Oh my God!" Waving his hands , the man ran after the slowly moving horse . �76 SLOVAKIA He caught up with Kubo and ran alongside. " Go! Get out! You bring the plague. OUT!" Kubo kicked at the sides of the horse, but the mare would not move faster. The old man grabbed at the horse 's tail and yanked, ending up on the cobblestones with a handful of long hairs. Howling like a wounded animal, he rose and grabbed again, this time holding on as the horse pulled him along the bumpy street. Shutters banged open along the square and heads popped out into the damp morning air. The old horse plodded on, slowed still more by his additional burden, past the church, past a row of houses the same color as the walls, each with a red-tile roof, and some with wooden signs hanging from wrought-iron posts. The old man let go of the tail and ran ahead to a house where a sign hung, stating: "Doktor Stofcik." He stabbed at the air in Kubo's direction. " ZBUDZA! CHOLERA! '' His voice resounded with stark terror down the narrow alley. A man appeared, rubbed his eyes, then put a tiny pair of okuliare on his nose. His wife, a bonnet over her hair, a single long braid tumbling over her shoulders, tied to pull him back in. ''My son is ill,'' Kubo said calmly and with respect. ' ' Some say it is the fever." Lather dripped from the horse's mouth and steam rose from its back. Kubo , his wet hair plastered askew on his forehead, his hands trembling on the reins, painfully moved his neck to peer into the bundle and to listen once more . "Haven't you heard , you fool?" the doctor shouted down to him. " Your village is infected. Epidemia! It 's cholera! No one is to leave. Help is on the way, yes, go home. Get out, immediately.'' "Go away! Leave us! Plague!" Other voices rained down upon the rider whose face was turned from them , transfixed on the dark opening in the guba . The shouting became even louder, the curses stronger as the head of the rider slowly turned and looked up toward the doctor's window. It was only when the doctor put up his hands. "Quiet, everyone, stop it! Now you, go back; I cannot treat your child. You will spread the epidemia if you stay one instant longer. " �SLOVAKIA 77 Kubo's hands trembled uncontrollably. He dropped the reins and buried his face in the rain-soaked sleeve of his jacket. When he looked up to the window once again tears were streaming down his face. "There is no need ," he said , "any longer." Kubo did not take the bundle from his back when he knocked on the door of the Jew Teitlebaum, nor did he say what it contained. He took the small vial of liquid, tucked it into his trousers, and mounted the horse. The Jew asked him if he wanted food or some dry clothes , but Kubo shook his head , paid him with Loebl's money , and turned the horse toward the village gate. When Pani Spisakova came to the Vlasek house,,to prepare the child for burial , Kubo would not let her touch him . He asked for the special bowl used for bathing the dead and told her she could leave . His family watched in stunned silence as Kubo, saying no more, heated the water and with a soft linen cloth careful1y washed the emaciated body. He took the small door from the grain bin and laid it between two benches and made a mattress of dry, fragrant straw. He dressed Belo in a fine white linen shirt, whose cuffs and collar Zuzka had embroidered in swirls of reds and yellows and blues, and laid him upon the straw. He worked throughout the day and until the morning light to make the coffin, and when he brought it into the house the black lacquer and the dozens of tiny painted rosebuds and linden blossoms were still wet. He gently lifted the child, as if Belo were sleeping, and placed him within. He draped the fine lace coverlet, which had been made by his great-grandmother, over the boy, leaving only his arms and face , with neatly combed hair, showing. In the coffin, Kubo carefully arranged the animals he had carved for Belo . Near the boy' s face, three proud roosters , a pig, then a cow, a horse , a vag6nik. The plow with a tiny piece of metal for a blade was pulled by the muscular ox and from its halter Kubo led the piece of twine under the coverlet, and wrapped it around the boy' s cold, stiff hands . His task completed, Kubo pulled up a chair beside the coffin and sat, the flickering candle lighting his face. Mourners came and touched him on the shoulder and offered their sympathies , �78 SLOVAKIA but he neither looked up from the still form in the black casket, nor did he talk. When Father Slobodnik entered on the morning of the third day, Kubo rose , genuflected before the priest and kissed his hand . Then he stood back, chin and cheeks dark with four days of growth, his eyes red but dry, his face so stricken with grief that not even his wife stood close to him as the old priest intoned the Latin prayers . There was a soft rustle of wood against wood. Then the sharp metallic sound of Kubo's hammer on the iron nails pierced the silence. Again and again the hammer came down, sure and true , and the green wood squeaked as the nails penetrated it. Sniffles became sobs and sobs soon aching moans before the high-pitched wails of the women of Zbudza filled the room, mourning the child and venting the fear each had for his own life and soul. Kubo carried the coffin in his arms toward the door, where he placed it on the doorstep three times before hoisting it to his shoulder. Then, as tradition dictated , Belo Vlasek, aged 18 months , left his house for the last time , feet first. As Kubo had asked, Franko Hruscak had dug the grave at the farthest end of the area that had been marked off for the victims of the plague. Under a young linden tree , a freshly turned mound of the dark, damp soil, studded with the stones and rocks that were -the bane of farmers, sat waiting to be returned to its rightful place. The ropes slid on the muddy ground, barely leaving a mark as the slight, small box, no larger or heavier than a baby 's cradle , was lowered into the hole. And one by one the people of Zbudza, from the smallest child to the eldest stara matka took handfulls of the moist dirt and threw it upon the coffin, each with the same ancient farewell: " That the earth will be light on you." The last was Kubo. His hand reached to the mound and taking but a few granules of the soil , he stood above the dark hole. His hand trembled as it hovered over the grave, and slowly balled into a tight fist. The gumless lips of old mouths moved in prayer, sending puffs of white into the damp air, and children shuffled restlessly , looking at their parents for a sign they could leave. Zuzka's face was buried in her handkerchief, her muffled sobs closer and closer together, her shoulders shuddering. �SLOVAKIA 79 Kubo's hand slowly tilted forward, and the dirt trickled through his fingers, falling soundlessly in to the grave. He stood there as if carved from stone, his open hand pleadingly outstretched as the mourners turned and began to walk back toward the village. Soon everyone had left except Kubo and his family. Dusan placed his hands on his son's shoulder. "Come, they'll all be waiting at the krcma for us . Loebl's very thankful for what you, did. He pays for the wake." "Soon, Father," Kubo said in a hoarse voice, his first words in three days. "Don't linger, son, the soul must depart. If you stand here, it becomes as grief-stricken as you; the box will fill up with the child's tears and the ghost will return. The dead m~st bury the dead and life must go on. '' ''I want to be with him for just a little while yet.'' "He's in a better place than us; you should be celebrating. Just think, he is well and pink and warm with Jesus and ... '' Kubo looked up to his father with the bloodshot eyes , from which no more tears could be wrung, his face like ashes in the blacksmith's forge . Dusan gathered the family and started down the hill . By the time Kubo walked through the door of the krcma, voices were already loud and thick with palenka, and old adversaries had found a new battle to wage. "We must send word to Bardejov, to Presov; we need medicine , a doktor immediately," the rich tar said, his finger stabbing at the smoky air. "Soon we'll all be dead of this thing, snuffed out like a hill of ants in a forest fire." "We pay our taxes to you, you thief, and what the hell do we get when we need help?" said Dusan, as he downed a large glass of beer. " You go! Now!" "Don't call me a thief, Vlasek. If you . . . " "Father, I want to speak to you." Kubo's voice was firm and strong , louder then he normally spoke , and the men who were talking at the tables turned toward him. "Well, speak, son, we have no secrets here ." �80 SLOVAKIA Kubo's eyes moved from man to man, then rested on his father. " I made a decision at my son's grave. No more of my children are going to be buried on that hill. Belo is the last. '' " For generations this is our resting place; where else is there , son? Please, don't speak now , your heart is still top heavy. " "I'm going to Amerika." As if a gong had been sounded, silence descended on the krcma. Dusan rose to his feet. " Don't confront your father as you are doing , not even on a day so sad as this one." Kubo's eyes did not blink. He did not look down. " You 're my son, my heir, you share my roof. You will do my bidding.'' ' 'I'm an heir to sickness and death and hunger and I want none of them." A low murmur of voices rippled through the room. " This isn't the time, son; besides, there is a tax and they mean to collect it these days. And fare . They don't take you for free on the boat. " "There's no better time, Father. I'll get the money somehow. " " I, who gave you life; this is my thanks? To spit in my face in front of the whole village , to take away my pride like this?" " I thank you for my life and I thank all of you for every kindness to me , -to Zuzka, my children. I'm not going to this Amerika forever; I'll come back someday and we'll again have land and food and live like humans , not some animals scraping for every morsel of food.' ' "To Amerika, eh? " A bitter smile tugged at the corners of Dusan 's mouth. " Just like you went to Perun 's Wood with the cows. Reaching for too much. Remember what happened then?" Kubo's large brown eyes blinked. For an instant he had to turn from his father 's hard stare. " You hit below the belt, Father." He fingered the rim of his klobuk , which he held in his hands . "But I have to try ," he said, returning his father's look. Dusan 's body sagged, his chest heaved, and he sighed aloud. ''I asked but one thing , son, all my life, and that is for you to bury me on that hill. This is too much? As you loved your Belicko I loved you. And now, this , this . . . " �SLOVAKIA 81 "It's not too much to ask, but I have to go ." "Then who's going to bury me? Who is going to tend the graves of your children?' ' In the back of the krcma Anastazia's eyes were bright, expectant. She leaned forward on the bench so as not to miss a single word. " I must live, my family must live. In your own words and the words of the Holy Scripture, God will tend to the graves. And the dead will bury the dead. '' �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1985-86, Vol. 32 Description An account of the resource Vol. 32 (No. 58-59), 1985-86. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1985-86 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 73 Excerpt from In Due Season (II) BY PAUL WILKES (Author's note: The year is 1899, the setting is a tiny, poor village in Eastern Slovakia.) ©Copyright, 1985 Paul Wilkes Metod burst through the door. "Mama, Papa, Pan .. . Pan .. Pan Vadasz. He's dead! I saw it right through the window." he said breathlessly. "Quiet, son!" Kubo said, his finger in front of his mouth, "your brother is sleeping ." "Papa, Papa," the boy whispered , "Rezso said Pan Vadasz just got up from his bed and lay down on the floor . . . " "I want no t~lk of death in this house ," Kubo said sternly. "None!" In those days , Vadasz was not the only one in the village of Zbudza to " lie between the beams ," showing that they no longer hoped to be cured. They, who had come from the earth, in their fevered and aching state, wished to return, knowing that every day they lived they were a burden to those who hoped to survive. Every day they required tending - and there was precious little time for this - and they needed nourishment. In many houses the bread was already crumbly from too much bark. In the next five days the somber bells of St. Joseph's tolled nine times; on one day three times, as the twins of Pani Gasparoyicova 's daughters died , one with the sunrise, the other just after the Angelus had rung . And before the sun set, Banik fell from his stool at the front of his house, blood running from his mouth . 74 SLOVAKIA Although the villagers were not sure if Banik had died from the cholera, he was buried along with the others in a shallow gully, far to the side of the cemetery. It had been set aside not for any health reason but for fear that the curse would somehow seep through the ground to infect the souls of villagers who now slept in peace. In those five days Belo ate no food, drank no water, his eyes grew dry and sunken in his face, and his every breath was a struggle, as if some great hand were pressing on his chest. Kubo did not leave the boy's side and barely ate himself. Only on the sixth day, when Belo was too weak even to cry did Kubo leave , returning a short while later. He had borrowed Loebl's horse and was going to take the boy to the nearest doctor, in Plavnica , a trip of some ten hours. Loebl had a friend there, a rabbi, who kept the special medicines that Jews used, and he asked Kubo to bring something for someone in his house, sick with the croup . Dusan, clenched teeth holding his pipe, fixed his eyes on Kubo. "You don't even know the way. What is this 'doktor' business? What do they know that we don't?" The old woman moved her head slowly in assent. ''When God calls, sinful humans must not hold on; it is His will. And that little one could die outside his own house ... it is not right.'' Zuzka said nothing. She pulled down another worn lambswool guba from the shelf above the bed and then her extra shawl. Into a small hemp sack she placed half a loaf of bread and an apple she had hidden away for the day that Belo would be well enough to eat it. Still without saying a word, she helped her husband bundle the child into the first guba , then the second, and tied the shawl into a sling around his shoulders . Neither Dusan nor Helena , nor the old woman , would help him, nor even look in his direction . About to leave, he said to their turned backs , " I ask for your prayers. Because if this child dies , I die .'' Zuzka gasped , putting her hand to her mouth, and his mother made a sign of the cross, here eyes turned toward the heaven her son had just challenged . As the first pellets of a freezing rain rattled against the windowpanes, Kubo rode into the black, moonless night. At first he SLOVAKIA 75 went slowly, to be sure the child was secure on his back, then he kicked at the sides of the brown mare. The rain stung his face, blinding him at times. In the cold damp air of the night he could smell the child, the sickly sour brown odor that covered Belo each time another issue of water gurgled from his trembling bottom. Kubo could barely hear his breathing, and once when he looked over his shoulder into the dark bundle, he could hear nothing. He pulled the horse to a halt and listened for the breathing . After ·a painful pause, Belo drew in some air. By the time they reached the turnoff beyond the village of Svinne, the horse 's nostrils were flared, its gait slowed to little more than a walk. On both sides of Kubo's neck the shawl had worn against his skin, leaving an angry red bruise , beginning to weep droplets of blood. As the first gray light of morning began to outline the foothills and mighty Tatras beyond Kubo could see that he was approaching a town , for houses were closer and closer together. In the pale light he could see a low, sand-colored wall , covered with red tiles. At an opening in the wall a huge gateway marked with wrought iron twisted into the shapes of huge pheasants and flying geese , Kubo saw the town's vartas. ''Plavnica?'' " Yes ." "Doktor Stofcik?" One of the old man's eyes was frosted over, sightless , but the other eye regarded this strange rider with a huge bundle at his back, the collar of his jacket now soaked with blood. " Past the church, on the right. " Kubo looked over his shoulder and finally, as faint as the whisper of a summer wind on a hot day , came the breath of the child. " Sick one? " "Yes ," said Kubo , urging the horse over the cobblestones. " From where ?" the man called after him . ' 'Zbudza. '' ''Jesus and Mary! Go away!'' he screamed. Zbudza! Oh my God!" Waving his hands , the man ran after the slowly moving horse . 76 SLOVAKIA He caught up with Kubo and ran alongside. " Go! Get out! You bring the plague. OUT!" Kubo kicked at the sides of the horse, but the mare would not move faster. The old man grabbed at the horse 's tail and yanked, ending up on the cobblestones with a handful of long hairs. Howling like a wounded animal, he rose and grabbed again, this time holding on as the horse pulled him along the bumpy street. Shutters banged open along the square and heads popped out into the damp morning air. The old horse plodded on, slowed still more by his additional burden, past the church, past a row of houses the same color as the walls, each with a red-tile roof, and some with wooden signs hanging from wrought-iron posts. The old man let go of the tail and ran ahead to a house where a sign hung, stating: "Doktor Stofcik." He stabbed at the air in Kubo's direction. " ZBUDZA! CHOLERA! '' His voice resounded with stark terror down the narrow alley. A man appeared, rubbed his eyes, then put a tiny pair of okuliare on his nose. His wife, a bonnet over her hair, a single long braid tumbling over her shoulders, tied to pull him back in. ''My son is ill,'' Kubo said calmly and with respect. ' ' Some say it is the fever." Lather dripped from the horse's mouth and steam rose from its back. Kubo , his wet hair plastered askew on his forehead, his hands trembling on the reins, painfully moved his neck to peer into the bundle and to listen once more . "Haven't you heard , you fool?" the doctor shouted down to him. " Your village is infected. Epidemia! It 's cholera! No one is to leave. Help is on the way, yes, go home. Get out, immediately.'' "Go away! Leave us! Plague!" Other voices rained down upon the rider whose face was turned from them , transfixed on the dark opening in the guba . The shouting became even louder, the curses stronger as the head of the rider slowly turned and looked up toward the doctor's window. It was only when the doctor put up his hands. "Quiet, everyone, stop it! Now you, go back; I cannot treat your child. You will spread the epidemia if you stay one instant longer. " SLOVAKIA 77 Kubo's hands trembled uncontrollably. He dropped the reins and buried his face in the rain-soaked sleeve of his jacket. When he looked up to the window once again tears were streaming down his face. "There is no need ," he said , "any longer." Kubo did not take the bundle from his back when he knocked on the door of the Jew Teitlebaum, nor did he say what it contained. He took the small vial of liquid, tucked it into his trousers, and mounted the horse. The Jew asked him if he wanted food or some dry clothes , but Kubo shook his head , paid him with Loebl's money , and turned the horse toward the village gate. When Pani Spisakova came to the Vlasek house,,to prepare the child for burial , Kubo would not let her touch him . He asked for the special bowl used for bathing the dead and told her she could leave . His family watched in stunned silence as Kubo, saying no more, heated the water and with a soft linen cloth careful1y washed the emaciated body. He took the small door from the grain bin and laid it between two benches and made a mattress of dry, fragrant straw. He dressed Belo in a fine white linen shirt, whose cuffs and collar Zuzka had embroidered in swirls of reds and yellows and blues, and laid him upon the straw. He worked throughout the day and until the morning light to make the coffin, and when he brought it into the house the black lacquer and the dozens of tiny painted rosebuds and linden blossoms were still wet. He gently lifted the child, as if Belo were sleeping, and placed him within. He draped the fine lace coverlet, which had been made by his great-grandmother, over the boy, leaving only his arms and face , with neatly combed hair, showing. In the coffin, Kubo carefully arranged the animals he had carved for Belo . Near the boy' s face, three proud roosters , a pig, then a cow, a horse , a vag6nik. The plow with a tiny piece of metal for a blade was pulled by the muscular ox and from its halter Kubo led the piece of twine under the coverlet, and wrapped it around the boy' s cold, stiff hands . His task completed, Kubo pulled up a chair beside the coffin and sat, the flickering candle lighting his face. Mourners came and touched him on the shoulder and offered their sympathies , 78 SLOVAKIA but he neither looked up from the still form in the black casket, nor did he talk. When Father Slobodnik entered on the morning of the third day, Kubo rose , genuflected before the priest and kissed his hand . Then he stood back, chin and cheeks dark with four days of growth, his eyes red but dry, his face so stricken with grief that not even his wife stood close to him as the old priest intoned the Latin prayers . There was a soft rustle of wood against wood. Then the sharp metallic sound of Kubo's hammer on the iron nails pierced the silence. Again and again the hammer came down, sure and true , and the green wood squeaked as the nails penetrated it. Sniffles became sobs and sobs soon aching moans before the high-pitched wails of the women of Zbudza filled the room, mourning the child and venting the fear each had for his own life and soul. Kubo carried the coffin in his arms toward the door, where he placed it on the doorstep three times before hoisting it to his shoulder. Then, as tradition dictated , Belo Vlasek, aged 18 months , left his house for the last time , feet first. As Kubo had asked, Franko Hruscak had dug the grave at the farthest end of the area that had been marked off for the victims of the plague. Under a young linden tree , a freshly turned mound of the dark, damp soil, studded with the stones and rocks that were -the bane of farmers, sat waiting to be returned to its rightful place. The ropes slid on the muddy ground, barely leaving a mark as the slight, small box, no larger or heavier than a baby 's cradle , was lowered into the hole. And one by one the people of Zbudza, from the smallest child to the eldest stara matka took handfulls of the moist dirt and threw it upon the coffin, each with the same ancient farewell: " That the earth will be light on you." The last was Kubo. His hand reached to the mound and taking but a few granules of the soil , he stood above the dark hole. His hand trembled as it hovered over the grave, and slowly balled into a tight fist. The gumless lips of old mouths moved in prayer, sending puffs of white into the damp air, and children shuffled restlessly , looking at their parents for a sign they could leave. Zuzka's face was buried in her handkerchief, her muffled sobs closer and closer together, her shoulders shuddering. SLOVAKIA 79 Kubo's hand slowly tilted forward, and the dirt trickled through his fingers, falling soundlessly in to the grave. He stood there as if carved from stone, his open hand pleadingly outstretched as the mourners turned and began to walk back toward the village. Soon everyone had left except Kubo and his family. Dusan placed his hands on his son's shoulder. "Come, they'll all be waiting at the krcma for us . Loebl's very thankful for what you, did. He pays for the wake." "Soon, Father," Kubo said in a hoarse voice, his first words in three days. "Don't linger, son, the soul must depart. If you stand here, it becomes as grief-stricken as you; the box will fill up with the child's tears and the ghost will return. The dead m~st bury the dead and life must go on. '' ''I want to be with him for just a little while yet.'' "He's in a better place than us; you should be celebrating. Just think, he is well and pink and warm with Jesus and ... '' Kubo looked up to his father with the bloodshot eyes , from which no more tears could be wrung, his face like ashes in the blacksmith's forge . Dusan gathered the family and started down the hill . By the time Kubo walked through the door of the krcma, voices were already loud and thick with palenka, and old adversaries had found a new battle to wage. "We must send word to Bardejov, to Presov; we need medicine , a doktor immediately," the rich tar said, his finger stabbing at the smoky air. "Soon we'll all be dead of this thing, snuffed out like a hill of ants in a forest fire." "We pay our taxes to you, you thief, and what the hell do we get when we need help?" said Dusan, as he downed a large glass of beer. " You go! Now!" "Don't call me a thief, Vlasek. If you . . . " "Father, I want to speak to you." Kubo's voice was firm and strong , louder then he normally spoke , and the men who were talking at the tables turned toward him. "Well, speak, son, we have no secrets here ." 80 SLOVAKIA Kubo's eyes moved from man to man, then rested on his father. " I made a decision at my son's grave. No more of my children are going to be buried on that hill. Belo is the last. '' " For generations this is our resting place; where else is there , son? Please, don't speak now , your heart is still top heavy. " "I'm going to Amerika." As if a gong had been sounded, silence descended on the krcma. Dusan rose to his feet. " Don't confront your father as you are doing , not even on a day so sad as this one." Kubo's eyes did not blink. He did not look down. " You 're my son, my heir, you share my roof. You will do my bidding.'' ' 'I'm an heir to sickness and death and hunger and I want none of them." A low murmur of voices rippled through the room. " This isn't the time, son; besides, there is a tax and they mean to collect it these days. And fare . They don't take you for free on the boat. " "There's no better time, Father. I'll get the money somehow. " " I, who gave you life; this is my thanks? To spit in my face in front of the whole village , to take away my pride like this?" " I thank you for my life and I thank all of you for every kindness to me , -to Zuzka, my children. I'm not going to this Amerika forever; I'll come back someday and we'll again have land and food and live like humans , not some animals scraping for every morsel of food.' ' "To Amerika, eh? " A bitter smile tugged at the corners of Dusan 's mouth. " Just like you went to Perun 's Wood with the cows. Reaching for too much. Remember what happened then?" Kubo's large brown eyes blinked. For an instant he had to turn from his father 's hard stare. " You hit below the belt, Father." He fingered the rim of his klobuk , which he held in his hands . "But I have to try ," he said, returning his father's look. Dusan 's body sagged, his chest heaved, and he sighed aloud. ''I asked but one thing , son, all my life, and that is for you to bury me on that hill. This is too much? As you loved your Belicko I loved you. And now, this , this . . . " SLOVAKIA 81 "It's not too much to ask, but I have to go ." "Then who's going to bury me? Who is going to tend the graves of your children?' ' In the back of the krcma Anastazia's eyes were bright, expectant. She leaned forward on the bench so as not to miss a single word. " I must live, my family must live. In your own words and the words of the Holy Scripture, God will tend to the graves. And the dead will bury the dead. ''  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Excerpt from "In Due Season" (II) Description An account of the resource Paul Wilkes Slovakia, Vol. 32 (No. 58-59), 1985-86 pp. 73-81 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Wilkes, Paul, 1938- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1985-86 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7faee7d435be46044f656ffd9b992786.pdf 76d70870c601eca9b12c18063bd56be0 PDF Text Text 56 SLOVAKIA such limited training are already beginning to complain of their lack of ability. These young men report for work without knowing the most elementary techniques in their field nor is there much likelihood of improvement in the future. If unchanged, however, such conditions will reduce a population with a higher than average educrutional pot.e n-U-al to a generation of robots . • • • A POLICY OF GENOCIDE Anton F. Wuschek After the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans there remained approximately 170,000 to 200,000 Germans in the area that now embraces Czecho~Slovakia. Many of them are still residing in their old homes in ,the Sudetenland, others have been transferred to original Czech areas. Along with the Hungarian, Ukrainian and Polish minorities in the CSSR, the German element is one of the largest ethnic groups that do not belong to the official nation of the S,:ate of Czechs and Slovaks. Little has been said of the existence of this German group within the past years. Not unti'l last year did they become the subject of considera,ble discussion within Czecho~lovak Communist Party circles, when, in connection with the ini:roduction of the new Socialist constitution in the CSSR the new status of the ethnic minorities was decided on. Whereas the new constitution gives a minimum of cultural rights to the Ukrainian, Hungarian and Polish minorities, it deprives the German minority every right to an autonomous group life. State President Antonin Novotny justified this fact with the statement that ,the German question was settled by the expulsion from their homes of some three million Sudeten Germans. The remaining Germans would thus no longer be considered as a minority. The logic of this s tatement was by no means given unanimous approval. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czec'ho-Slovakia (CPC), Bruno Koh'ler, took the opportunity to discuss the Sudeten German issue in detail in the official organ of the CPC tivot Strany (Par:y Life, No. 16, 1960). Kohler justified the �SLOVAKIA 57 discrepancy in the minorities policy of the CPC with the remark, that according to the teachings of Leninism, a correct solution of the nationalities issue called for application of the principle of adjustment to ,the current political situations while giving consideration to the interests of Communism. During the first Czecho-Slovak Republic under Thomas Masaryk (1918-38) the Communists were the greatest proponents of a radical nationaliUes poli-cy in the CSR, aimed at the destruction of the Czecho-Slovak State. The Communists with KoMer as their spokesman vehemently condemned the attitude of the German parties in the CSR that were seeking a federative solwtion of the nationalities question within the scope of the existing State. Kohler criticized this stand on February 1, 1931, in an article in Roter Vorwarts (Red Forward), which reads as follows: " . .. The nat ional demagogy o.f au these Obour,g.eois German) parties climaxes in the demand for national self-administration and cultural autonomy' for the Ger1rnan ,people wi.thim, the Czooho-Slovak Stiate. . . . Na1tiona,l autonomy meanis, the recognition of ,t he CzechoSlo\naik State . .. means rejedion a priori of the self-determinat'ion right of the German ,people." Just how much Communist policy sought at that time ,~o make itse1f an advocate of the interests of the nonCzech ethnic groups in the OSR becomes evident from the address of the secretary of the Communist International, Dimitri Z. Manuilskij, before the second regular congress of the CPC : "Since the OPC recognizes the rig.hit of ,n ational seltfdetwminati,on, in'Cluding se•p ara,tion from the State, and combalts to keep nationa,l minorities wHhlin the fu-amework o;f State structure by means of force, it is obligated to demand·s posed ·by national minorities ag,ainst national ,by every possi'ble means." al~ attempts the pre-sent support the suppression But times have changed in the meanwhile and the interests of the Communist rulers in ,the CSSR are other than they were in Czecho-Slovakia during the period between the two world wars. The expulsion of the Su'Cleten Germans and the confiscation of their property were welcome conditions for complete communization of CzechoSlovakia. Bruno Kohler even admits this himself when he wriites, in the above-mentioned issue of Zivot strany: "The transfer of the Gernnan minority, t otalling mmions, did �58 SLOVAKIA not take plaice without difficulty, pa;rticul-arly for those a1ffocted ;b y the shidJt. . . . The consistent and timely solution of the problem of the Germain, minortiy proved to be especially advantageous dur.ing the glorious dayis of February 1'948 when the workers conJCentrated all their energies on achievling v,ictory over t-he reaction, on a victory tha1t finally made the road free for the estalblishment of SociaiJ.ism in our country." Today the CPC openly declares that the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans was a prerequisite for the victory -of Communism in the CSSR. In order to retain the fruits of this victory, the Red regime in Prague resists with all its might every ruttempt of the Sudeten Germans and the West to revise the expulsion of the rightful inhabitants of the Sudetenland. In trying to make permanent the injustice, the small minority of Germans still living in the CSSR today - because ,the authorities deny them permission to emigrate - are disregarded entirely. Not only are they disregarded, but systematic attempts are being made to do away with them altogether. At this point there begins a policy of genocide, a crime against international law. By conscious and deliberate action the Czech State leaders are trying to uproot an entire ethnic group by surrounding them by conditions that make it impossible for them to cultivate and perpetuate their native tongue and cultural attributes. Although international jurists may differ as to whether the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans as such, which took place in 1945-46, may be classified as genocide although expulsion measures were aimed at destruction of the entire Sudeten group - there may weH be unanimity of opinion as to the new measures in the CSSR with regard to the total extirpation of the German minority in the CSSR, thaJt this is planned anld systematicalfy organized genocide. Bruno Kohler already anticipates the outcome of this policy when, in the a:bove-cited article, he writes: "Due to the entirely different situation, the quesbion of the German minority had to be solved entirely differenltly from that of the Mlagyar, Ukrainian -and Po1ish minor,i<ty in the CSSR. This diltlference ,i s also evi'dent in the formulation of the republic's new constitution which legally crystallires an the important social changes we hav-e a!Mected. The constitutional text can con.tarn no stipulation as to something which no longer exiists, namely, a German minomty 1n, the CSSR." � 56 SLOVAKIA such limited training are already beginning to complain of their lack of ability. These young men report for work without knowing the most elementary techniques in their field nor is there much likelihood of improvement in the future. If unchanged, however, such conditions will reduce a population with a higher than average educrutional pot.e n-U-al to a generation of robots . • • • A POLICY OF GENOCIDE Anton F. Wuschek After the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans there remained approximately 170,000 to 200,000 Germans in the area that now embraces Czecho~Slovakia. Many of them are still residing in their old homes in ,the Sudetenland, others have been transferred to original Czech areas. Along with the Hungarian, Ukrainian and Polish minorities in the CSSR, the German element is one of the largest ethnic groups that do not belong to the official nation of the S,:ate of Czechs and Slovaks. Little has been said of the existence of this German group within the past years. Not unti'l last year did they become the subject of considera,ble discussion within Czecho~lovak Communist Party circles, when, in connection with the ini:roduction of the new Socialist constitution in the CSSR the new status of the ethnic minorities was decided on. Whereas the new constitution gives a minimum of cultural rights to the Ukrainian, Hungarian and Polish minorities, it deprives the German minority every right to an autonomous group life. State President Antonin Novotny justified this fact with the statement that ,the German question was settled by the expulsion from their homes of some three million Sudeten Germans. The remaining Germans would thus no longer be considered as a minority. The logic of this s tatement was by no means given unanimous approval. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czec'ho-Slovakia (CPC), Bruno Koh'ler, took the opportunity to discuss the Sudeten German issue in detail in the official organ of the CPC tivot Strany (Par:y Life, No. 16, 1960). Kohler justified the �SLOVAKIA 57 discrepancy in the minorities policy of the CPC with the remark, that according to the teachings of Leninism, a correct solution of the nationalities issue called for application of the principle of adjustment to ,the current political situations while giving consideration to the interests of Communism. During the first Czecho-Slovak Republic under Thomas Masaryk (1918-38) the Communists were the greatest proponents of a radical nationaliUes poli-cy in the CSR, aimed at the destruction of the Czecho-Slovak State. The Communists with KoMer as their spokesman vehemently condemned the attitude of the German parties in the CSR that were seeking a federative solwtion of the nationalities question within the scope of the existing State. Kohler criticized this stand on February 1, 1931, in an article in Roter Vorwarts (Red Forward), which reads as follows: " . .. The nat ional demagogy o.f au these Obour,g.eois German) parties climaxes in the demand for national self-administration and cultural autonomy' for the Ger1rnan ,people wi.thim, the Czooho-Slovak Stiate. . . . Na1tiona,l autonomy meanis, the recognition of ,t he CzechoSlo\naik State . .. means rejedion a priori of the self-determinat'ion right of the German ,people." Just how much Communist policy sought at that time ,~o make itse1f an advocate of the interests of the nonCzech ethnic groups in the OSR becomes evident from the address of the secretary of the Communist International, Dimitri Z. Manuilskij, before the second regular congress of the CPC : "Since the OPC recognizes the rig.hit of ,n ational seltfdetwminati,on, in'Cluding se•p ara,tion from the State, and combalts to keep nationa,l minorities wHhlin the fu-amework o;f State structure by means of force, it is obligated to demand·s posed ·by national minorities ag,ainst national ,by every possi'ble means." al~ attempts the pre-sent support the suppression But times have changed in the meanwhile and the interests of the Communist rulers in ,the CSSR are other than they were in Czecho-Slovakia during the period between the two world wars. The expulsion of the Su'Cleten Germans and the confiscation of their property were welcome conditions for complete communization of CzechoSlovakia. Bruno Kohler even admits this himself when he wriites, in the above-mentioned issue of Zivot strany: "The transfer of the Gernnan minority, t otalling mmions, did �58 SLOVAKIA not take plaice without difficulty, pa;rticul-arly for those a1ffocted ;b y the shidJt. . . . The consistent and timely solution of the problem of the Germain, minortiy proved to be especially advantageous dur.ing the glorious dayis of February 1'948 when the workers conJCentrated all their energies on achievling v,ictory over t-he reaction, on a victory tha1t finally made the road free for the estalblishment of SociaiJ.ism in our country." Today the CPC openly declares that the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans was a prerequisite for the victory -of Communism in the CSSR. In order to retain the fruits of this victory, the Red regime in Prague resists with all its might every ruttempt of the Sudeten Germans and the West to revise the expulsion of the rightful inhabitants of the Sudetenland. In trying to make permanent the injustice, the small minority of Germans still living in the CSSR today - because ,the authorities deny them permission to emigrate - are disregarded entirely. Not only are they disregarded, but systematic attempts are being made to do away with them altogether. At this point there begins a policy of genocide, a crime against international law. By conscious and deliberate action the Czech State leaders are trying to uproot an entire ethnic group by surrounding them by conditions that make it impossible for them to cultivate and perpetuate their native tongue and cultural attributes. Although international jurists may differ as to whether the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans as such, which took place in 1945-46, may be classified as genocide although expulsion measures were aimed at destruction of the entire Sudeten group - there may weH be unanimity of opinion as to the new measures in the CSSR with regard to the total extirpation of the German minority in the CSSR, thaJt this is planned anld systematicalfy organized genocide. Bruno Kohler already anticipates the outcome of this policy when, in the a:bove-cited article, he writes: "Due to the entirely different situation, the quesbion of the German minority had to be solved entirely differenltly from that of the Mlagyar, Ukrainian -and Po1ish minor,i<ty in the CSSR. This diltlference ,i s also evi'dent in the formulation of the republic's new constitution which legally crystallires an the important social changes we hav-e a!Mected. The constitutional text can con.tarn no stipulation as to something which no longer exiists, namely, a German minomty 1n, the CSSR." � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1961, Vol. 11 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 33), March-June 1961.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 34), September-December June 1961.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1961 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 56 SLOVAKIA such limited training are already beginning to complain of their lack of ability. These young men report for work without knowing the most elementary techniques in their field nor is there much likelihood of improvement in the future. If unchanged, however, such conditions will reduce a population with a higher than average educrutional pot.e n-U-al to a generation of robots . • • • A POLICY OF GENOCIDE Anton F. Wuschek After the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans there remained approximately 170,000 to 200,000 Germans in the area that now embraces Czecho~Slovakia. Many of them are still residing in their old homes in ,the Sudetenland, others have been transferred to original Czech areas. Along with the Hungarian, Ukrainian and Polish minorities in the CSSR, the German element is one of the largest ethnic groups that do not belong to the official nation of the S,:ate of Czechs and Slovaks. Little has been said of the existence of this German group within the past years. Not unti'l last year did they become the subject of considera,ble discussion within Czecho~lovak Communist Party circles, when, in connection with the ini:roduction of the new Socialist constitution in the CSSR the new status of the ethnic minorities was decided on. Whereas the new constitution gives a minimum of cultural rights to the Ukrainian, Hungarian and Polish minorities, it deprives the German minority every right to an autonomous group life. State President Antonin Novotny justified this fact with the statement that ,the German question was settled by the expulsion from their homes of some three million Sudeten Germans. The remaining Germans would thus no longer be considered as a minority. The logic of this s tatement was by no means given unanimous approval. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czec'ho-Slovakia (CPC), Bruno Koh'ler, took the opportunity to discuss the Sudeten German issue in detail in the official organ of the CPC tivot Strany (Par:y Life, No. 16, 1960). Kohler justified the SLOVAKIA 57 discrepancy in the minorities policy of the CPC with the remark, that according to the teachings of Leninism, a correct solution of the nationalities issue called for application of the principle of adjustment to ,the current political situations while giving consideration to the interests of Communism. During the first Czecho-Slovak Republic under Thomas Masaryk (1918-38) the Communists were the greatest proponents of a radical nationaliUes poli-cy in the CSR, aimed at the destruction of the Czecho-Slovak State. The Communists with KoMer as their spokesman vehemently condemned the attitude of the German parties in the CSR that were seeking a federative solwtion of the nationalities question within the scope of the existing State. Kohler criticized this stand on February 1, 1931, in an article in Roter Vorwarts (Red Forward), which reads as follows: " . .. The nat ional demagogy o.f au these Obour,g.eois German) parties climaxes in the demand for national self-administration and cultural autonomy' for the Ger1rnan ,people wi.thim, the Czooho-Slovak Stiate. . . . Na1tiona,l autonomy meanis, the recognition of ,t he CzechoSlo\naik State . .. means rejedion a priori of the self-determinat'ion right of the German ,people." Just how much Communist policy sought at that time ,~o make itse1f an advocate of the interests of the nonCzech ethnic groups in the OSR becomes evident from the address of the secretary of the Communist International, Dimitri Z. Manuilskij, before the second regular congress of the CPC : "Since the OPC recognizes the rig.hit of ,n ational seltfdetwminati,on, in'Cluding se•p ara,tion from the State, and combalts to keep nationa,l minorities wHhlin the fu-amework o;f State structure by means of force, it is obligated to demand·s posed ·by national minorities ag,ainst national ,by every possi'ble means." al~ attempts the pre-sent support the suppression But times have changed in the meanwhile and the interests of the Communist rulers in ,the CSSR are other than they were in Czecho-Slovakia during the period between the two world wars. The expulsion of the Su'Cleten Germans and the confiscation of their property were welcome conditions for complete communization of CzechoSlovakia. Bruno Kohler even admits this himself when he wriites, in the above-mentioned issue of Zivot strany: "The transfer of the Gernnan minority, t otalling mmions, did 58 SLOVAKIA not take plaice without difficulty, pa;rticul-arly for those a1ffocted ;b y the shidJt. . . . The consistent and timely solution of the problem of the Germain, minortiy proved to be especially advantageous dur.ing the glorious dayis of February 1'948 when the workers conJCentrated all their energies on achievling v,ictory over t-he reaction, on a victory tha1t finally made the road free for the estalblishment of SociaiJ.ism in our country." Today the CPC openly declares that the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans was a prerequisite for the victory -of Communism in the CSSR. In order to retain the fruits of this victory, the Red regime in Prague resists with all its might every ruttempt of the Sudeten Germans and the West to revise the expulsion of the rightful inhabitants of the Sudetenland. In trying to make permanent the injustice, the small minority of Germans still living in the CSSR today - because ,the authorities deny them permission to emigrate - are disregarded entirely. Not only are they disregarded, but systematic attempts are being made to do away with them altogether. At this point there begins a policy of genocide, a crime against international law. By conscious and deliberate action the Czech State leaders are trying to uproot an entire ethnic group by surrounding them by conditions that make it impossible for them to cultivate and perpetuate their native tongue and cultural attributes. Although international jurists may differ as to whether the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans as such, which took place in 1945-46, may be classified as genocide although expulsion measures were aimed at destruction of the entire Sudeten group - there may weH be unanimity of opinion as to the new measures in the CSSR with regard to the total extirpation of the German minority in the CSSR, thaJt this is planned anld systematicalfy organized genocide. Bruno Kohler already anticipates the outcome of this policy when, in the a:bove-cited article, he writes: "Due to the entirely different situation, the quesbion of the German minority had to be solved entirely differenltly from that of the Mlagyar, Ukrainian -and Po1ish minor,i<ty in the CSSR. This diltlference ,i s also evi'dent in the formulation of the republic's new constitution which legally crystallires an the important social changes we hav-e a!Mected. The constitutional text can con.tarn no stipulation as to something which no longer exiists, namely, a German minomty 1n, the CSSR."  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource A Policy of Genocide Description An account of the resource Anton F. Wuschek Slovakia, Vol. 11, No. 1 (33), March-June 1961 pp. 56-58 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Wuschek, Anton F. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March-June 1961 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2f05dc90d4670bd83739e6cc827e0a01.pdf 5134be387299ef85e300009574512554 PDF Text Text 88 SLOVAKIA cational level. Today industries that employ "engineers" with such limited training are already beginning to complain of their lack of ability. These young men report for work without . knowing the most elementary techniques in their field nor is there much likelihood of improvement in the future. If unchanged, however, such conditions will reduce a population with a higher than ·. average educational potential to a generation of robots. A POLICY OF GENOCIDE By Anton F. Wuschek After the expulsion of the Sudeten G€rmans there remained approximately 200,000 Germans in the area that now embraces Czecho-Slovakia. Many of them are still residing in their old homes in the Sudetenland, others have been transferred to original Czech areas. Along with the Hungarian, Ukrainian and Polish minorities in the CSR, the German element is one of the largest ethnic groups that do not belong to the official nation of the State of Czechs and Slovaks. Little has been said of the existence of this German group within the past years. Not until two years ago did they become the subject of considerable discussion within Czecho-Slovak Communist Party circles, when, in connection . with the introduction of the new Socialist constitution in the CSR the new status of the ethnic minorities was decided on. Whereas the new constitution gives a minimum of cultural rights to the Ukrainian, Hungarian and Polish minorities, it -deprives the German minority every right to an autonomous group life. State President Antonin Novotny justified this fact with the statement that the German question was settled by the expulsion from their homes of some three million Sudeten G€rmans. The remaining Germans would thus no longer be considered as a minority. The logic of this statement was by no means given unanimous aproval. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia (CPC), Bruno Kohler, took the . opportunity to discuss the Sudeten G€rman issue in detail in. the official 9rgan of the C:PC �SLOVAKIA 89 Zivot strany (No. 16, 1960). Kohler justified the discrepancy in the minorities policy of the CPC with the remark that, according to the teachings of Leninism, a correct solution of the nationalities issue called for application of the principle of adjustment to the current political situations while giving consideration to the interests of Communism. During ·the first Czecho-Slovak Republic under Thomas Masaryk (1918~38) the Communists were the greatest proponents of a radical nationalities policy in the CSR, aimed at the · destruction of the Czecho-Slovak State: The Communists with Kohler as their spokesman vehemently condemned the attitude of the German parties in the CSR that were seeking a federative solution of the nationalities question within the scope of the existing State. Kohler criticized this stand on February 1, 1931 in an article in R-Oter Vonvarts (Red Forward), which reads as follows: " . . . The national demagog,y cxf adl these Qbourgeois German) parties climaxes in the demand for 'national selif-d-etermination aind cultural autonomy' for the German people wtiltfuin the CzoohoSlovak State . . . National autonomy means the recOinition of the (::zecho-Slovak State .. . it means rejection a priori cxf the sellf-determi<nati>on ri-ght <Yf the Germw people." Just how much Communist policy sought at that time to make itself an advocate of the interests of the non-Czech ethnic groups in the CSR becomes evident from the address of the secretary of the Communist International, Dimitri Z. Manuilskij, before the second regular congress of the CPC: "Silnce the OPC recognizes the r ight of natii.onal self-determination, includilllg sepantion from the State, and combats all attempts to kwp national minorities within the framework of the present state structure by means of foree, it is obligated to support tJhe demainds posed by national mimorities against national swppress,ion . by every poss~ble means." But times have changed in the meanwhile and the interests of the Communist rulers in the CSR are other than they were in Czecho-Slovakia during the period between the two world wars. The expulsion of the Sudeten Gennahs and the confiscation of their property were welcome conditions for complete communization of CzechoSlovakia. Bruno K3hler even admits this himself when he writes, in the above-mentioned issue of Zivot strany: �90 SLOVAKIA ''The tnnsfer of the German minority, totalin<g millions, did not take place witihout dffli.cU!lty, particularly for those atffeoted by the shilft ... The consistent and timel,y solution of the proolem of the German minority proved to be especiallly advantageous during the .glorious days of Februaey 19418 when the workers conoontirated all th~ir energies on aehieving victory over the rea'dt.ion, on a victory tha/1: fina1Uy made -the rdad ifree for the esta!blishment of Sociahism in our country_" Today the CPC openly declares that the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans was a prerequisite for the victory of Communism in the CSR. In order to retain the fruits of this victory, the Red regime in Prague resists with all its might every attempt of the Sudeten Germans and the West to revise the expulsion of the rightful inhabitants of the Sudetenland. In trying to make permanent the injustice, the small minority of Germans still living in the CSR today - because the authorities deny them permission to emigrate - are disregarded entirely. Not only are they disregarded, but systematic attempts are being made to do away with them altogether. At this point there begins a policy of genocide, a crime against international law. By conscious and deliberate action the Czech State leaders are trying to uproot an entire ethnic group by surrounding them by conditions that make it impossible for them to cultivate and perpetuate their native tongue and cultural attributes. Although international jurists may differ as to whether the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans as such, which took place in 1945-46, may be classified as genocide although expulsion measures were aimed at destruction of the entire Sudeten group - there may well be unanimity of opinion as to the new measures in the CSR with regard to the total extirpation of the German minority in the CSR, that this is planned and systematically organized genocide. Bruno Kohler already anticipates the outcome of this policy when, in the above-cited article, he writes: "Due to the entirely different siituation, tlhe question Olf the German .minority had to be solved enitirel,y differently from that of the Ma,gyar, Ukrainian and Polish minorities in the CSR. This di1flf.erence is also evident >in the formulation of the repulblic's new consti.tution which legaUy orystaili1izes all the bmportant social changes we liave a:fireicted. The constitutional text can, contain no stipulation as to sometihing which no longer exists, a German minority in the CSR." � 88 SLOVAKIA cational level. Today industries that employ "engineers" with such limited training are already beginning to complain of their lack of ability. These young men report for work without . knowing the most elementary techniques in their field nor is there much likelihood of improvement in the future. If unchanged, however, such conditions will reduce a population with a higher than ·. average educational potential to a generation of robots. A POLICY OF GENOCIDE By Anton F. Wuschek After the expulsion of the Sudeten G€rmans there remained approximately 200,000 Germans in the area that now embraces Czecho-Slovakia. Many of them are still residing in their old homes in the Sudetenland, others have been transferred to original Czech areas. Along with the Hungarian, Ukrainian and Polish minorities in the CSR, the German element is one of the largest ethnic groups that do not belong to the official nation of the State of Czechs and Slovaks. Little has been said of the existence of this German group within the past years. Not until two years ago did they become the subject of considerable discussion within Czecho-Slovak Communist Party circles, when, in connection . with the introduction of the new Socialist constitution in the CSR the new status of the ethnic minorities was decided on. Whereas the new constitution gives a minimum of cultural rights to the Ukrainian, Hungarian and Polish minorities, it -deprives the German minority every right to an autonomous group life. State President Antonin Novotny justified this fact with the statement that the German question was settled by the expulsion from their homes of some three million Sudeten G€rmans. The remaining Germans would thus no longer be considered as a minority. The logic of this statement was by no means given unanimous aproval. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia (CPC), Bruno Kohler, took the . opportunity to discuss the Sudeten G€rman issue in detail in. the official 9rgan of the C:PC �SLOVAKIA 89 Zivot strany (No. 16, 1960). Kohler justified the discrepancy in the minorities policy of the CPC with the remark that, according to the teachings of Leninism, a correct solution of the nationalities issue called for application of the principle of adjustment to the current political situations while giving consideration to the interests of Communism. During ·the first Czecho-Slovak Republic under Thomas Masaryk (1918~38) the Communists were the greatest proponents of a radical nationalities policy in the CSR, aimed at the · destruction of the Czecho-Slovak State: The Communists with Kohler as their spokesman vehemently condemned the attitude of the German parties in the CSR that were seeking a federative solution of the nationalities question within the scope of the existing State. Kohler criticized this stand on February 1, 1931 in an article in R-Oter Vonvarts (Red Forward), which reads as follows: " . . . The national demagog,y cxf adl these Qbourgeois German) parties climaxes in the demand for 'national selif-d-etermination aind cultural autonomy' for the German people wtiltfuin the CzoohoSlovak State . . . National autonomy means the recOinition of the (::zecho-Slovak State .. . it means rejection a priori cxf the sellf-determi<nati>on ri-ght <Yf the Germw people." Just how much Communist policy sought at that time to make itself an advocate of the interests of the non-Czech ethnic groups in the CSR becomes evident from the address of the secretary of the Communist International, Dimitri Z. Manuilskij, before the second regular congress of the CPC: "Silnce the OPC recognizes the r ight of natii.onal self-determination, includilllg sepantion from the State, and combats all attempts to kwp national minorities within the framework of the present state structure by means of foree, it is obligated to support tJhe demainds posed by national mimorities against national swppress,ion . by every poss~ble means." But times have changed in the meanwhile and the interests of the Communist rulers in the CSR are other than they were in Czecho-Slovakia during the period between the two world wars. The expulsion of the Sudeten Gennahs and the confiscation of their property were welcome conditions for complete communization of CzechoSlovakia. Bruno K3hler even admits this himself when he writes, in the above-mentioned issue of Zivot strany: �90 SLOVAKIA ''The tnnsfer of the German minority, totalin<g millions, did not take place witihout dffli.cU!lty, particularly for those atffeoted by the shilft ... The consistent and timel,y solution of the proolem of the German minority proved to be especiallly advantageous during the .glorious days of Februaey 19418 when the workers conoontirated all th~ir energies on aehieving victory over the rea'dt.ion, on a victory tha/1: fina1Uy made -the rdad ifree for the esta!blishment of Sociahism in our country_" Today the CPC openly declares that the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans was a prerequisite for the victory of Communism in the CSR. In order to retain the fruits of this victory, the Red regime in Prague resists with all its might every attempt of the Sudeten Germans and the West to revise the expulsion of the rightful inhabitants of the Sudetenland. In trying to make permanent the injustice, the small minority of Germans still living in the CSR today - because the authorities deny them permission to emigrate - are disregarded entirely. Not only are they disregarded, but systematic attempts are being made to do away with them altogether. At this point there begins a policy of genocide, a crime against international law. By conscious and deliberate action the Czech State leaders are trying to uproot an entire ethnic group by surrounding them by conditions that make it impossible for them to cultivate and perpetuate their native tongue and cultural attributes. Although international jurists may differ as to whether the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans as such, which took place in 1945-46, may be classified as genocide although expulsion measures were aimed at destruction of the entire Sudeten group - there may well be unanimity of opinion as to the new measures in the CSR with regard to the total extirpation of the German minority in the CSR, that this is planned and systematically organized genocide. Bruno Kohler already anticipates the outcome of this policy when, in the above-cited article, he writes: "Due to the entirely different siituation, tlhe question Olf the German .minority had to be solved enitirel,y differently from that of the Ma,gyar, Ukrainian and Polish minorities in the CSR. This di1flf.erence is also evident >in the formulation of the repulblic's new consti.tution which legaUy orystaili1izes all the bmportant social changes we liave a:fireicted. The constitutional text can, contain no stipulation as to sometihing which no longer exists, a German minority in the CSR." � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1963, Vol. 13 Description An account of the resource Issue 1 (No. 36), March 1963. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1963 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 88 SLOVAKIA cational level. Today industries that employ "engineers" with such limited training are already beginning to complain of their lack of ability. These young men report for work without . knowing the most elementary techniques in their field nor is there much likelihood of improvement in the future. If unchanged, however, such conditions will reduce a population with a higher than ·. average educational potential to a generation of robots. A POLICY OF GENOCIDE By Anton F. Wuschek After the expulsion of the Sudeten G€rmans there remained approximately 200,000 Germans in the area that now embraces Czecho-Slovakia. Many of them are still residing in their old homes in the Sudetenland, others have been transferred to original Czech areas. Along with the Hungarian, Ukrainian and Polish minorities in the CSR, the German element is one of the largest ethnic groups that do not belong to the official nation of the State of Czechs and Slovaks. Little has been said of the existence of this German group within the past years. Not until two years ago did they become the subject of considerable discussion within Czecho-Slovak Communist Party circles, when, in connection . with the introduction of the new Socialist constitution in the CSR the new status of the ethnic minorities was decided on. Whereas the new constitution gives a minimum of cultural rights to the Ukrainian, Hungarian and Polish minorities, it -deprives the German minority every right to an autonomous group life. State President Antonin Novotny justified this fact with the statement that the German question was settled by the expulsion from their homes of some three million Sudeten G€rmans. The remaining Germans would thus no longer be considered as a minority. The logic of this statement was by no means given unanimous aproval. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia (CPC), Bruno Kohler, took the . opportunity to discuss the Sudeten G€rman issue in detail in. the official 9rgan of the C:PC SLOVAKIA 89 Zivot strany (No. 16, 1960). Kohler justified the discrepancy in the minorities policy of the CPC with the remark that, according to the teachings of Leninism, a correct solution of the nationalities issue called for application of the principle of adjustment to the current political situations while giving consideration to the interests of Communism. During ·the first Czecho-Slovak Republic under Thomas Masaryk (1918~38) the Communists were the greatest proponents of a radical nationalities policy in the CSR, aimed at the · destruction of the Czecho-Slovak State: The Communists with Kohler as their spokesman vehemently condemned the attitude of the German parties in the CSR that were seeking a federative solution of the nationalities question within the scope of the existing State. Kohler criticized this stand on February 1, 1931 in an article in R-Oter Vonvarts (Red Forward), which reads as follows: " . . . The national demagog,y cxf adl these Qbourgeois German) parties climaxes in the demand for 'national selif-d-etermination aind cultural autonomy' for the German people wtiltfuin the CzoohoSlovak State . . . National autonomy means the recOinition of the (::zecho-Slovak State .. . it means rejection a priori cxf the sellf-determi<nati>on ri-ght <Yf the Germw people." Just how much Communist policy sought at that time to make itself an advocate of the interests of the non-Czech ethnic groups in the CSR becomes evident from the address of the secretary of the Communist International, Dimitri Z. Manuilskij, before the second regular congress of the CPC: "Silnce the OPC recognizes the r ight of natii.onal self-determination, includilllg sepantion from the State, and combats all attempts to kwp national minorities within the framework of the present state structure by means of foree, it is obligated to support tJhe demainds posed by national mimorities against national swppress,ion . by every poss~ble means." But times have changed in the meanwhile and the interests of the Communist rulers in the CSR are other than they were in Czecho-Slovakia during the period between the two world wars. The expulsion of the Sudeten Gennahs and the confiscation of their property were welcome conditions for complete communization of CzechoSlovakia. Bruno K3hler even admits this himself when he writes, in the above-mentioned issue of Zivot strany: 90 SLOVAKIA ''The tnnsfer of the German minority, totalin<g millions, did not take place witihout dffli.cU!lty, particularly for those atffeoted by the shilft ... The consistent and timel,y solution of the proolem of the German minority proved to be especiallly advantageous during the .glorious days of Februaey 19418 when the workers conoontirated all th~ir energies on aehieving victory over the rea'dt.ion, on a victory tha/1: fina1Uy made -the rdad ifree for the esta!blishment of Sociahism in our country_" Today the CPC openly declares that the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans was a prerequisite for the victory of Communism in the CSR. In order to retain the fruits of this victory, the Red regime in Prague resists with all its might every attempt of the Sudeten Germans and the West to revise the expulsion of the rightful inhabitants of the Sudetenland. In trying to make permanent the injustice, the small minority of Germans still living in the CSR today - because the authorities deny them permission to emigrate - are disregarded entirely. Not only are they disregarded, but systematic attempts are being made to do away with them altogether. At this point there begins a policy of genocide, a crime against international law. By conscious and deliberate action the Czech State leaders are trying to uproot an entire ethnic group by surrounding them by conditions that make it impossible for them to cultivate and perpetuate their native tongue and cultural attributes. Although international jurists may differ as to whether the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans as such, which took place in 1945-46, may be classified as genocide although expulsion measures were aimed at destruction of the entire Sudeten group - there may well be unanimity of opinion as to the new measures in the CSR with regard to the total extirpation of the German minority in the CSR, that this is planned and systematically organized genocide. Bruno Kohler already anticipates the outcome of this policy when, in the above-cited article, he writes: "Due to the entirely different siituation, tlhe question Olf the German .minority had to be solved enitirel,y differently from that of the Ma,gyar, Ukrainian and Polish minorities in the CSR. This di1flf.erence is also evident >in the formulation of the repulblic's new consti.tution which legaUy orystaili1izes all the bmportant social changes we liave a:fireicted. The constitutional text can, contain no stipulation as to sometihing which no longer exists, a German minority in the CSR."  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource A Policy of Genocide Description An account of the resource Anton F. Wuschek Slovakia, Vol. 13, No. 1 (36), March 1963 pp. 88-90 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Wuschek, Anton F. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1963 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2747f933a62a7f150798c00cc4cb29e5.pdf 107816a44fd98f85db66c1f289bd1ab9 PDF Text Text 50 SLOVAKIA Dr. Jozef Tiso His Political Creed (EXCERPT FROM HIS DEFENSE SPEECH PRESENTED ON MARCH 17, 1947 IN THE POLITICAL TRIAL CONDUCTED BY THE· SO-CALLED SLOVAK NATIONAL COURT IN BRATISLAVA.) My political involvement cannot be examined or judged by the usual norms of political critique because essentially it was not governed by typically prevalent political techniques. I undertake this representation of the motivation and impelling force that prompted my political involvement because as a Catholic priest I feel bound to this formal deposition of testimony not only by the circumstance of my clerical status but also out of regard for a universal Christian outlook. Both of these considerations are cherished as top-ranking principles in my political life, but under some spurious forms of evaluation, my political endeavors could easily be fixed in a very misleading light. The estimable attitude with which the Slovak Catholic clergy is regarded and even more importantly, the exalted position of a universal Christian outlook rightfully expect that I shall make a public statement specifically directed to those who may very likely conclude that in my person they will also humiliate or confound those intrinsic values that always reside above and beyond the person of an individual; in this case, those values that exceed my very person or individual self. When I appeal or draw attention to the reality of my priestly rank and when I testify that all my political activity was guided solely by Christian principles which are always consonant with sound policy making in public affairs whether the active agent be a priest or a lay Christian statesman, I do so with no intent or need to extenuate a fault or disguise a failing. Just as I reprehend denying a priest the right to function in politics simply because of the fact that he is a priest, so do I not condone any theorizing that a priest's �SLOVAKIA . 51 responsibility in public affairs is other than that of any accountable citizen, for after all, that is just what a priest is-a responsible and accountable citizen who is entitled to all the rights of a citizen and is bound by the same sacred obligations and duties that bind every citizen in the land. My reference to the fact that I am a priest sterns from one desire only: let it ever be kept in mind that I engaged in politics as a priest active in politics and for that reason it is imperative that my position and my participation in politics at all times be grasped and assessed as a priest's conscious involvement. Consequently, there must be imputed to my public life that specific type of motivation that is invariably associated with the character of a priest committed to public interests and civic obligation. Open reference to my priestly status is, then, eminently desirable in order to open the way to the clear and only proper and authentic mode of understanding my part in politics. On the other hand, I am thoroughly convinced that a correct appraisal of my political career can never be made by anyone who does not first of all bring attention to bear this special priestly feature of mine, by anyone who does not admit the worthiness of priestly motivation on my part-these attributes ( especially when they are associated with one's public condu~t in matters of state) which can contribute clarification for a line of conduct that otherwise can be construed as incomprehensible or even less than favorable when judged in the light of the average scale of norms, and can focus it into a clearly understandable and acceptable program of responsible action. The life of a goal-conscious individual-and do pardon my saying without any smacking of arrogance or conceit that I consider myself such a one; I assert that I am a goal-conscious person because I know just what it is that I want-the life of such a one is much like a work of art executed with a definite point of view in mind. a given sighting angle for valid critical evaluation that will assure its total appreciation. If a specific work lacks this feature, we can stand before it as before a charmed castle to which we hold no key. There are artistic creations upon which we can look from several varying angles, estimate their merits with critical eye, and yet fail to appreciate them justly and honestly unless we approach �52 SLOVAKIA them from their given point of vantage. This kind of talisman for an unbiased understanding of my public life and activities is my priestly character with all its intrinsic dynamics and principles which have been appointed by the determinants of Christian doctrine on behalf of public service and public servants. It follows very naturally then, that one does not apply the same norms in evaluating the merits of a public minister or a politician who has never subscribed to these tenets. But the fact that such circumstances must be taken into account in judging a politician who does profess this adherence and evidences it in his conduct, this is an indispensable ingredient to that sense of objectivity on which every public court of justice prides itself. And this situation prevails even in cases where the law itself does not concur with given motivating factors or identity with the principles that enter into a specific case. Nevertheless, in the juridical trial of the accused, these circumstances must of necessity be taken into consideration and they must be examined as the intention which influenced and helped to coordinate the motives and the endeavors of the accused. Otherwise a commitment which is not marked with some form of self-interest or some element of redounding glory remains forever incomprehensible or forever doomed to false interpretation of some kind. This, of course, is wholly inadmissible in a totally objective approach to truth. My politics was politics of a unique kind precisely because it was undertaken by an individual who is a priest. All my life's training and preparation was for a career in the priesthood and not in politics. The goal of all my schooling-formal schooling as well as self-education-was directed to spiritual leadership. I dedicated myself to serve God, the Church and the people of whom I was born and among whom I hoped to bring my priestly vocation to fruition. The ringing principles: For God and Nation! With the people and for the people! were no hollow slogans that I had later acquired somehow, absorbed by magnetic acclaim, and appropriated as guiding mottoes in my life. They are and they have ever been universally valid fundamentals. Only by and through these concepts could I have hoped to attain the sublime ultimate objective of all my life: The glory of God first and foremost, and then the common good of the people. �SLOVAKIA 53 This outlook and focus of perspectives in my life was in no way conditioned by demagoguery or a political platform of any kind; it was rooted in my very life's commitment and in my pastoral ethics which mandates my identification with the faithful of my flock together with a complete negation of all self-interest and vain concerns. The logical sequel to such ministerial canons culminates in the moral conviction to represent the valid interests and needs of the people, to further what is of benefit for the people in general, and to support their common welfare. These are the basics which formulated the patent guidelines of all my priestly functioning, my official ministry which was never circumscribed merely to aspects of immediate church and school matters but which, by the ramification of its social and organizational commitments and as concomitant of these,. extended generally into the cultural, social and economic life of my people. I did, of course, further this rule of life theoretically also, acting in my capacity as educator and formation director of a younger priestly generation. In this office I sought to imbue every young cleric who came within the sphere of my influence with this ideal: With the people and on behalf of the people! Later on, in 1918, when the world of politics unmistakably summoned me into active participation, I further elaborated my philosophy of life on the basis of this fundamental principle and I oriented all my political involvement toward it. In this frame of mind and with this sense of dedication, I undertook a role in political service and this principle alone characterized my contribution to the building of the Czecho-Slovak republic. Here again it was concern for the people that urged me on, for by the very dictates of the natural law I reasoned that it will be far better for the Slovak people to co-exist in a federated union with the Czech brother-nation rather than to become allied in a foreign state with a non-Slavic nation, and I moved toward mature diplomatic functioning, especially after the Czechs repudiated any implementing of the Pittsburgh Agreement. After the harsh reality of the first experiences of disenchantment with this arrangement and the increasingly corrupt disregard of the Slovak people as public and state positions were being filled, the more the tempo of political �54 SLOVAKIA activity mounted, the more clearly did I delineate my own course of action in accord with sound norms of Christian ethics and the more readily did I gain acquaintance with state jurisprudence . Let no one be taken aback on realizing that I had had no formal academic schooling in law or diplomacy. I managed to compensate for this lack by relying on applicable theses from Christian doctrine-a practice which was very effective and rewarding. And it was a thoroughly correct procedure, for Christian truth is a fount of principles for public life, all drawn from that same natural law on which solid juristic political science is also founded . On the other hand, too, Christian doctrine with its tenets from the natural law, all precisely formulated, afforded me wholly reliable foundations for outlining and coordinating my line of conduct in my service on behalf of the Slovak state and its rights as well as for its welfare and progress. Christian doctrine advoc~tes that well-recognized hierarchy of values governing right order in matters of natural vital rank : the individual, the family, the nation. God has endowed all three with distinctive individuality and freedom so that each of these entities might within itself and for itself put its energies to good use in order to advance its own development. The duty not only to preserve intact the individuality and freedom of these three but even to secure for each whatever help may be needed that they might attain their life's objective devolves upon them as well as upon the public powers or authorities. Consequently , when Christian teaching develops the principles, rights and duties of these three agents, it likewise establishes norms for the discharge of public power whose responsibility it is to promote the development of all three agents rather than to suppress them in any way. It is from these teachings of Christian doctrine that I have drawn enlightenmen t on the true meaning of various elements in juridical terminology; e. g., the nation, the state, autonomy, concern for the whole; the concern of an individual or of a part, as well as sanctioned means and methods for realizing these principles-a ll this being both morally and politically commendable . Much of my thinking was consistently devoted to this topic and on July 5, 1939, I even chose it as the central theme of an address which I presented at the mass meeting of Slovak Catholic �SLOVAKIA 55 students' organization. And the more deeply I reached into the treasure store of Christian teaching on this score. the more satisfactory did I grasp the authentic concept of the words: nation, state, private and public interests , etc. With these developments I all the more tenaciously adhered to the outlined program for autonomy, for in it I saw clear fulfillment of the natural law. I perceived in it as well the lasting guarantee of peaceful coexistence on the part of the Czechs and the Slovaks within the totality of one state largely because this program which encompassed self-determination was intended to guarantee to the Slovak nation its own national individuality, its proper identity and its free right to regulate its life so that its cultural, social and economic evolvement would be in no way impeded by anyone or anything. The scope of Christian teaching, then, was for me not only an interpreter of the natural law but through its specialized directives for public affairs it became as well an effective moderating factor in my political endeavors, guiding me at all times to act with due regard for presciptions fixed by natural law. So it is no personal credit of mine that I advocated that type of political involvement that was characterized as moderate autonomous politics, for this way was distinctly marked out for me by Christian thought and principle under whose influence I was wholesomely indoctrinated to put the interests of the wholethat is, the interest of the entire nation-before any other less universal interest, for the general good can be effective only when the interests of the entire nation suffer no impairment of any kind. I chose to adopt a branch of political science founded on such principles, motivated as I was, by no personal interest or self-seeking, not looking for return in power or glory but rather endeavoring in every undertaking to attain and secure the general welfare of the Slovak nation. Working from the key points of an autonomy program, we set ourselves to formulate a state organism or structure of the kind which Christian principles regard as an instrument in the hands of a nation, a force under whose aegis it may work out its ultimate welfare and progress. It was this kind of distinctively Christian-founded politics �56 SLOVAKIA that I had in view both on March 14, 1939 and throughout the years of Slovak independent statehood. A change was brought about in the situation as the nation lived its life, moving from one segment of time to another. It was not our endeavors or doings that brought about crises or changes; the principles of natural claims or rights-or strictly speaking, the principles of Christian truth-remained unalterable and it was our bounden duty and the burden of our political position to make these norms very much alive and effective in every situation as it developed. We did not create the situation but we were conscience-charged on every occasion as it presented itself to us, to represent and to champion those immutable principles which are destined to come to the fore in the interests of a nation. Today it is this aspect of politics that stands before this legal bench, embodied in my person, though I am improperly charged, for politics is entirely out of place before this tribunal, especially that category of political activity to which I was dedicated in my public life. Translated by Sister M. Constance Yakubov , SS.C.M. Danville, Pennsylvania "Monsignor Tiso's execution was a travesty of justice. The fact that he could have remained president of the Slovak nation if he had only bent his knee to the communist tyrant makes him a martyr of the cause of freedom and religion. Although the Slovaks have suffered much from their political oppressors for centuries, this is the greatest crime against them in their historic struggle for national freedom. His tragic death cannot help but inspire SlovalG for centuries to come to defend their God-given political and religious rights."-Abbot Theodor e Kojis, O.S.B., Cleveland, Ohio, April 30, 1947. "Eduard Bene~, murderer of the freedom of the Slovak nation, kJ.lled a g,ood man, a zealous priest of Christ, a loyal Slovak patriot, the first president of the Slovak Republic elected by the Slovak nation. The crime of murderer Benes is worse, uglier and more wicked than ~e crime of Cain." - Peter Pridavok, President Slovak National Gouncil, London, England, April 30, 1947. � 50 SLOVAKIA Dr. Jozef Tiso His Political Creed (EXCERPT FROM HIS DEFENSE SPEECH PRESENTED ON MARCH 17, 1947 IN THE POLITICAL TRIAL CONDUCTED BY THE· SO-CALLED SLOVAK NATIONAL COURT IN BRATISLAVA.) My political involvement cannot be examined or judged by the usual norms of political critique because essentially it was not governed by typically prevalent political techniques. I undertake this representation of the motivation and impelling force that prompted my political involvement because as a Catholic priest I feel bound to this formal deposition of testimony not only by the circumstance of my clerical status but also out of regard for a universal Christian outlook. Both of these considerations are cherished as top-ranking principles in my political life, but under some spurious forms of evaluation, my political endeavors could easily be fixed in a very misleading light. The estimable attitude with which the Slovak Catholic clergy is regarded and even more importantly, the exalted position of a universal Christian outlook rightfully expect that I shall make a public statement specifically directed to those who may very likely conclude that in my person they will also humiliate or confound those intrinsic values that always reside above and beyond the person of an individual; in this case, those values that exceed my very person or individual self. When I appeal or draw attention to the reality of my priestly rank and when I testify that all my political activity was guided solely by Christian principles which are always consonant with sound policy making in public affairs whether the active agent be a priest or a lay Christian statesman, I do so with no intent or need to extenuate a fault or disguise a failing. Just as I reprehend denying a priest the right to function in politics simply because of the fact that he is a priest, so do I not condone any theorizing that a priest's �SLOVAKIA . 51 responsibility in public affairs is other than that of any accountable citizen, for after all, that is just what a priest is-a responsible and accountable citizen who is entitled to all the rights of a citizen and is bound by the same sacred obligations and duties that bind every citizen in the land. My reference to the fact that I am a priest sterns from one desire only: let it ever be kept in mind that I engaged in politics as a priest active in politics and for that reason it is imperative that my position and my participation in politics at all times be grasped and assessed as a priest's conscious involvement. Consequently, there must be imputed to my public life that specific type of motivation that is invariably associated with the character of a priest committed to public interests and civic obligation. Open reference to my priestly status is, then, eminently desirable in order to open the way to the clear and only proper and authentic mode of understanding my part in politics. On the other hand, I am thoroughly convinced that a correct appraisal of my political career can never be made by anyone who does not first of all bring attention to bear this special priestly feature of mine, by anyone who does not admit the worthiness of priestly motivation on my part-these attributes ( especially when they are associated with one's public condu~t in matters of state) which can contribute clarification for a line of conduct that otherwise can be construed as incomprehensible or even less than favorable when judged in the light of the average scale of norms, and can focus it into a clearly understandable and acceptable program of responsible action. The life of a goal-conscious individual-and do pardon my saying without any smacking of arrogance or conceit that I consider myself such a one; I assert that I am a goal-conscious person because I know just what it is that I want-the life of such a one is much like a work of art executed with a definite point of view in mind. a given sighting angle for valid critical evaluation that will assure its total appreciation. If a specific work lacks this feature, we can stand before it as before a charmed castle to which we hold no key. There are artistic creations upon which we can look from several varying angles, estimate their merits with critical eye, and yet fail to appreciate them justly and honestly unless we approach �52 SLOVAKIA them from their given point of vantage. This kind of talisman for an unbiased understanding of my public life and activities is my priestly character with all its intrinsic dynamics and principles which have been appointed by the determinants of Christian doctrine on behalf of public service and public servants. It follows very naturally then, that one does not apply the same norms in evaluating the merits of a public minister or a politician who has never subscribed to these tenets. But the fact that such circumstances must be taken into account in judging a politician who does profess this adherence and evidences it in his conduct, this is an indispensable ingredient to that sense of objectivity on which every public court of justice prides itself. And this situation prevails even in cases where the law itself does not concur with given motivating factors or identity with the principles that enter into a specific case. Nevertheless, in the juridical trial of the accused, these circumstances must of necessity be taken into consideration and they must be examined as the intention which influenced and helped to coordinate the motives and the endeavors of the accused. Otherwise a commitment which is not marked with some form of self-interest or some element of redounding glory remains forever incomprehensible or forever doomed to false interpretation of some kind. This, of course, is wholly inadmissible in a totally objective approach to truth. My politics was politics of a unique kind precisely because it was undertaken by an individual who is a priest. All my life's training and preparation was for a career in the priesthood and not in politics. The goal of all my schooling-formal schooling as well as self-education-was directed to spiritual leadership. I dedicated myself to serve God, the Church and the people of whom I was born and among whom I hoped to bring my priestly vocation to fruition. The ringing principles: For God and Nation! With the people and for the people! were no hollow slogans that I had later acquired somehow, absorbed by magnetic acclaim, and appropriated as guiding mottoes in my life. They are and they have ever been universally valid fundamentals. Only by and through these concepts could I have hoped to attain the sublime ultimate objective of all my life: The glory of God first and foremost, and then the common good of the people. �SLOVAKIA 53 This outlook and focus of perspectives in my life was in no way conditioned by demagoguery or a political platform of any kind; it was rooted in my very life's commitment and in my pastoral ethics which mandates my identification with the faithful of my flock together with a complete negation of all self-interest and vain concerns. The logical sequel to such ministerial canons culminates in the moral conviction to represent the valid interests and needs of the people, to further what is of benefit for the people in general, and to support their common welfare. These are the basics which formulated the patent guidelines of all my priestly functioning, my official ministry which was never circumscribed merely to aspects of immediate church and school matters but which, by the ramification of its social and organizational commitments and as concomitant of these,. extended generally into the cultural, social and economic life of my people. I did, of course, further this rule of life theoretically also, acting in my capacity as educator and formation director of a younger priestly generation. In this office I sought to imbue every young cleric who came within the sphere of my influence with this ideal: With the people and on behalf of the people! Later on, in 1918, when the world of politics unmistakably summoned me into active participation, I further elaborated my philosophy of life on the basis of this fundamental principle and I oriented all my political involvement toward it. In this frame of mind and with this sense of dedication, I undertook a role in political service and this principle alone characterized my contribution to the building of the Czecho-Slovak republic. Here again it was concern for the people that urged me on, for by the very dictates of the natural law I reasoned that it will be far better for the Slovak people to co-exist in a federated union with the Czech brother-nation rather than to become allied in a foreign state with a non-Slavic nation, and I moved toward mature diplomatic functioning, especially after the Czechs repudiated any implementing of the Pittsburgh Agreement. After the harsh reality of the first experiences of disenchantment with this arrangement and the increasingly corrupt disregard of the Slovak people as public and state positions were being filled, the more the tempo of political �54 SLOVAKIA activity mounted, the more clearly did I delineate my own course of action in accord with sound norms of Christian ethics and the more readily did I gain acquaintance with state jurisprudence . Let no one be taken aback on realizing that I had had no formal academic schooling in law or diplomacy. I managed to compensate for this lack by relying on applicable theses from Christian doctrine-a practice which was very effective and rewarding. And it was a thoroughly correct procedure, for Christian truth is a fount of principles for public life, all drawn from that same natural law on which solid juristic political science is also founded . On the other hand, too, Christian doctrine with its tenets from the natural law, all precisely formulated, afforded me wholly reliable foundations for outlining and coordinating my line of conduct in my service on behalf of the Slovak state and its rights as well as for its welfare and progress. Christian doctrine advoc~tes that well-recognized hierarchy of values governing right order in matters of natural vital rank : the individual, the family, the nation. God has endowed all three with distinctive individuality and freedom so that each of these entities might within itself and for itself put its energies to good use in order to advance its own development. The duty not only to preserve intact the individuality and freedom of these three but even to secure for each whatever help may be needed that they might attain their life's objective devolves upon them as well as upon the public powers or authorities. Consequently , when Christian teaching develops the principles, rights and duties of these three agents, it likewise establishes norms for the discharge of public power whose responsibility it is to promote the development of all three agents rather than to suppress them in any way. It is from these teachings of Christian doctrine that I have drawn enlightenmen t on the true meaning of various elements in juridical terminology; e. g., the nation, the state, autonomy, concern for the whole; the concern of an individual or of a part, as well as sanctioned means and methods for realizing these principles-a ll this being both morally and politically commendable . Much of my thinking was consistently devoted to this topic and on July 5, 1939, I even chose it as the central theme of an address which I presented at the mass meeting of Slovak Catholic �SLOVAKIA 55 students' organization. And the more deeply I reached into the treasure store of Christian teaching on this score. the more satisfactory did I grasp the authentic concept of the words: nation, state, private and public interests , etc. With these developments I all the more tenaciously adhered to the outlined program for autonomy, for in it I saw clear fulfillment of the natural law. I perceived in it as well the lasting guarantee of peaceful coexistence on the part of the Czechs and the Slovaks within the totality of one state largely because this program which encompassed self-determination was intended to guarantee to the Slovak nation its own national individuality, its proper identity and its free right to regulate its life so that its cultural, social and economic evolvement would be in no way impeded by anyone or anything. The scope of Christian teaching, then, was for me not only an interpreter of the natural law but through its specialized directives for public affairs it became as well an effective moderating factor in my political endeavors, guiding me at all times to act with due regard for presciptions fixed by natural law. So it is no personal credit of mine that I advocated that type of political involvement that was characterized as moderate autonomous politics, for this way was distinctly marked out for me by Christian thought and principle under whose influence I was wholesomely indoctrinated to put the interests of the wholethat is, the interest of the entire nation-before any other less universal interest, for the general good can be effective only when the interests of the entire nation suffer no impairment of any kind. I chose to adopt a branch of political science founded on such principles, motivated as I was, by no personal interest or self-seeking, not looking for return in power or glory but rather endeavoring in every undertaking to attain and secure the general welfare of the Slovak nation. Working from the key points of an autonomy program, we set ourselves to formulate a state organism or structure of the kind which Christian principles regard as an instrument in the hands of a nation, a force under whose aegis it may work out its ultimate welfare and progress. It was this kind of distinctively Christian-founded politics �56 SLOVAKIA that I had in view both on March 14, 1939 and throughout the years of Slovak independent statehood. A change was brought about in the situation as the nation lived its life, moving from one segment of time to another. It was not our endeavors or doings that brought about crises or changes; the principles of natural claims or rights-or strictly speaking, the principles of Christian truth-remained unalterable and it was our bounden duty and the burden of our political position to make these norms very much alive and effective in every situation as it developed. We did not create the situation but we were conscience-charged on every occasion as it presented itself to us, to represent and to champion those immutable principles which are destined to come to the fore in the interests of a nation. Today it is this aspect of politics that stands before this legal bench, embodied in my person, though I am improperly charged, for politics is entirely out of place before this tribunal, especially that category of political activity to which I was dedicated in my public life. Translated by Sister M. Constance Yakubov , SS.C.M. Danville, Pennsylvania "Monsignor Tiso's execution was a travesty of justice. The fact that he could have remained president of the Slovak nation if he had only bent his knee to the communist tyrant makes him a martyr of the cause of freedom and religion. Although the Slovaks have suffered much from their political oppressors for centuries, this is the greatest crime against them in their historic struggle for national freedom. His tragic death cannot help but inspire SlovalG for centuries to come to defend their God-given political and religious rights."-Abbot Theodor e Kojis, O.S.B., Cleveland, Ohio, April 30, 1947. "Eduard Bene~, murderer of the freedom of the Slovak nation, kJ.lled a g,ood man, a zealous priest of Christ, a loyal Slovak patriot, the first president of the Slovak Republic elected by the Slovak nation. The crime of murderer Benes is worse, uglier and more wicked than ~e crime of Cain." - Peter Pridavok, President Slovak National Gouncil, London, England, April 30, 1947. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1972, Vol. 22 Description An account of the resource Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 50 SLOVAKIA Dr. Jozef Tiso His Political Creed (EXCERPT FROM HIS DEFENSE SPEECH PRESENTED ON MARCH 17, 1947 IN THE POLITICAL TRIAL CONDUCTED BY THE· SO-CALLED SLOVAK NATIONAL COURT IN BRATISLAVA.) My political involvement cannot be examined or judged by the usual norms of political critique because essentially it was not governed by typically prevalent political techniques. I undertake this representation of the motivation and impelling force that prompted my political involvement because as a Catholic priest I feel bound to this formal deposition of testimony not only by the circumstance of my clerical status but also out of regard for a universal Christian outlook. Both of these considerations are cherished as top-ranking principles in my political life, but under some spurious forms of evaluation, my political endeavors could easily be fixed in a very misleading light. The estimable attitude with which the Slovak Catholic clergy is regarded and even more importantly, the exalted position of a universal Christian outlook rightfully expect that I shall make a public statement specifically directed to those who may very likely conclude that in my person they will also humiliate or confound those intrinsic values that always reside above and beyond the person of an individual; in this case, those values that exceed my very person or individual self. When I appeal or draw attention to the reality of my priestly rank and when I testify that all my political activity was guided solely by Christian principles which are always consonant with sound policy making in public affairs whether the active agent be a priest or a lay Christian statesman, I do so with no intent or need to extenuate a fault or disguise a failing. Just as I reprehend denying a priest the right to function in politics simply because of the fact that he is a priest, so do I not condone any theorizing that a priest's SLOVAKIA . 51 responsibility in public affairs is other than that of any accountable citizen, for after all, that is just what a priest is-a responsible and accountable citizen who is entitled to all the rights of a citizen and is bound by the same sacred obligations and duties that bind every citizen in the land. My reference to the fact that I am a priest sterns from one desire only: let it ever be kept in mind that I engaged in politics as a priest active in politics and for that reason it is imperative that my position and my participation in politics at all times be grasped and assessed as a priest's conscious involvement. Consequently, there must be imputed to my public life that specific type of motivation that is invariably associated with the character of a priest committed to public interests and civic obligation. Open reference to my priestly status is, then, eminently desirable in order to open the way to the clear and only proper and authentic mode of understanding my part in politics. On the other hand, I am thoroughly convinced that a correct appraisal of my political career can never be made by anyone who does not first of all bring attention to bear this special priestly feature of mine, by anyone who does not admit the worthiness of priestly motivation on my part-these attributes ( especially when they are associated with one's public condu~t in matters of state) which can contribute clarification for a line of conduct that otherwise can be construed as incomprehensible or even less than favorable when judged in the light of the average scale of norms, and can focus it into a clearly understandable and acceptable program of responsible action. The life of a goal-conscious individual-and do pardon my saying without any smacking of arrogance or conceit that I consider myself such a one; I assert that I am a goal-conscious person because I know just what it is that I want-the life of such a one is much like a work of art executed with a definite point of view in mind. a given sighting angle for valid critical evaluation that will assure its total appreciation. If a specific work lacks this feature, we can stand before it as before a charmed castle to which we hold no key. There are artistic creations upon which we can look from several varying angles, estimate their merits with critical eye, and yet fail to appreciate them justly and honestly unless we approach 52 SLOVAKIA them from their given point of vantage. This kind of talisman for an unbiased understanding of my public life and activities is my priestly character with all its intrinsic dynamics and principles which have been appointed by the determinants of Christian doctrine on behalf of public service and public servants. It follows very naturally then, that one does not apply the same norms in evaluating the merits of a public minister or a politician who has never subscribed to these tenets. But the fact that such circumstances must be taken into account in judging a politician who does profess this adherence and evidences it in his conduct, this is an indispensable ingredient to that sense of objectivity on which every public court of justice prides itself. And this situation prevails even in cases where the law itself does not concur with given motivating factors or identity with the principles that enter into a specific case. Nevertheless, in the juridical trial of the accused, these circumstances must of necessity be taken into consideration and they must be examined as the intention which influenced and helped to coordinate the motives and the endeavors of the accused. Otherwise a commitment which is not marked with some form of self-interest or some element of redounding glory remains forever incomprehensible or forever doomed to false interpretation of some kind. This, of course, is wholly inadmissible in a totally objective approach to truth. My politics was politics of a unique kind precisely because it was undertaken by an individual who is a priest. All my life's training and preparation was for a career in the priesthood and not in politics. The goal of all my schooling-formal schooling as well as self-education-was directed to spiritual leadership. I dedicated myself to serve God, the Church and the people of whom I was born and among whom I hoped to bring my priestly vocation to fruition. The ringing principles: For God and Nation! With the people and for the people! were no hollow slogans that I had later acquired somehow, absorbed by magnetic acclaim, and appropriated as guiding mottoes in my life. They are and they have ever been universally valid fundamentals. Only by and through these concepts could I have hoped to attain the sublime ultimate objective of all my life: The glory of God first and foremost, and then the common good of the people. SLOVAKIA 53 This outlook and focus of perspectives in my life was in no way conditioned by demagoguery or a political platform of any kind; it was rooted in my very life's commitment and in my pastoral ethics which mandates my identification with the faithful of my flock together with a complete negation of all self-interest and vain concerns. The logical sequel to such ministerial canons culminates in the moral conviction to represent the valid interests and needs of the people, to further what is of benefit for the people in general, and to support their common welfare. These are the basics which formulated the patent guidelines of all my priestly functioning, my official ministry which was never circumscribed merely to aspects of immediate church and school matters but which, by the ramification of its social and organizational commitments and as concomitant of these,. extended generally into the cultural, social and economic life of my people. I did, of course, further this rule of life theoretically also, acting in my capacity as educator and formation director of a younger priestly generation. In this office I sought to imbue every young cleric who came within the sphere of my influence with this ideal: With the people and on behalf of the people! Later on, in 1918, when the world of politics unmistakably summoned me into active participation, I further elaborated my philosophy of life on the basis of this fundamental principle and I oriented all my political involvement toward it. In this frame of mind and with this sense of dedication, I undertook a role in political service and this principle alone characterized my contribution to the building of the Czecho-Slovak republic. Here again it was concern for the people that urged me on, for by the very dictates of the natural law I reasoned that it will be far better for the Slovak people to co-exist in a federated union with the Czech brother-nation rather than to become allied in a foreign state with a non-Slavic nation, and I moved toward mature diplomatic functioning, especially after the Czechs repudiated any implementing of the Pittsburgh Agreement. After the harsh reality of the first experiences of disenchantment with this arrangement and the increasingly corrupt disregard of the Slovak people as public and state positions were being filled, the more the tempo of political 54 SLOVAKIA activity mounted, the more clearly did I delineate my own course of action in accord with sound norms of Christian ethics and the more readily did I gain acquaintance with state jurisprudence . Let no one be taken aback on realizing that I had had no formal academic schooling in law or diplomacy. I managed to compensate for this lack by relying on applicable theses from Christian doctrine-a practice which was very effective and rewarding. And it was a thoroughly correct procedure, for Christian truth is a fount of principles for public life, all drawn from that same natural law on which solid juristic political science is also founded . On the other hand, too, Christian doctrine with its tenets from the natural law, all precisely formulated, afforded me wholly reliable foundations for outlining and coordinating my line of conduct in my service on behalf of the Slovak state and its rights as well as for its welfare and progress. Christian doctrine advoc~tes that well-recognized hierarchy of values governing right order in matters of natural vital rank : the individual, the family, the nation. God has endowed all three with distinctive individuality and freedom so that each of these entities might within itself and for itself put its energies to good use in order to advance its own development. The duty not only to preserve intact the individuality and freedom of these three but even to secure for each whatever help may be needed that they might attain their life's objective devolves upon them as well as upon the public powers or authorities. Consequently , when Christian teaching develops the principles, rights and duties of these three agents, it likewise establishes norms for the discharge of public power whose responsibility it is to promote the development of all three agents rather than to suppress them in any way. It is from these teachings of Christian doctrine that I have drawn enlightenmen t on the true meaning of various elements in juridical terminology; e. g., the nation, the state, autonomy, concern for the whole; the concern of an individual or of a part, as well as sanctioned means and methods for realizing these principles-a ll this being both morally and politically commendable . Much of my thinking was consistently devoted to this topic and on July 5, 1939, I even chose it as the central theme of an address which I presented at the mass meeting of Slovak Catholic SLOVAKIA 55 students' organization. And the more deeply I reached into the treasure store of Christian teaching on this score. the more satisfactory did I grasp the authentic concept of the words: nation, state, private and public interests , etc. With these developments I all the more tenaciously adhered to the outlined program for autonomy, for in it I saw clear fulfillment of the natural law. I perceived in it as well the lasting guarantee of peaceful coexistence on the part of the Czechs and the Slovaks within the totality of one state largely because this program which encompassed self-determination was intended to guarantee to the Slovak nation its own national individuality, its proper identity and its free right to regulate its life so that its cultural, social and economic evolvement would be in no way impeded by anyone or anything. The scope of Christian teaching, then, was for me not only an interpreter of the natural law but through its specialized directives for public affairs it became as well an effective moderating factor in my political endeavors, guiding me at all times to act with due regard for presciptions fixed by natural law. So it is no personal credit of mine that I advocated that type of political involvement that was characterized as moderate autonomous politics, for this way was distinctly marked out for me by Christian thought and principle under whose influence I was wholesomely indoctrinated to put the interests of the wholethat is, the interest of the entire nation-before any other less universal interest, for the general good can be effective only when the interests of the entire nation suffer no impairment of any kind. I chose to adopt a branch of political science founded on such principles, motivated as I was, by no personal interest or self-seeking, not looking for return in power or glory but rather endeavoring in every undertaking to attain and secure the general welfare of the Slovak nation. Working from the key points of an autonomy program, we set ourselves to formulate a state organism or structure of the kind which Christian principles regard as an instrument in the hands of a nation, a force under whose aegis it may work out its ultimate welfare and progress. It was this kind of distinctively Christian-founded politics 56 SLOVAKIA that I had in view both on March 14, 1939 and throughout the years of Slovak independent statehood. A change was brought about in the situation as the nation lived its life, moving from one segment of time to another. It was not our endeavors or doings that brought about crises or changes; the principles of natural claims or rights-or strictly speaking, the principles of Christian truth-remained unalterable and it was our bounden duty and the burden of our political position to make these norms very much alive and effective in every situation as it developed. We did not create the situation but we were conscience-charged on every occasion as it presented itself to us, to represent and to champion those immutable principles which are destined to come to the fore in the interests of a nation. Today it is this aspect of politics that stands before this legal bench, embodied in my person, though I am improperly charged, for politics is entirely out of place before this tribunal, especially that category of political activity to which I was dedicated in my public life. Translated by Sister M. Constance Yakubov , SS.C.M. Danville, Pennsylvania "Monsignor Tiso's execution was a travesty of justice. The fact that he could have remained president of the Slovak nation if he had only bent his knee to the communist tyrant makes him a martyr of the cause of freedom and religion. Although the Slovaks have suffered much from their political oppressors for centuries, this is the greatest crime against them in their historic struggle for national freedom. His tragic death cannot help but inspire SlovalG for centuries to come to defend their God-given political and religious rights."-Abbot Theodor e Kojis, O.S.B., Cleveland, Ohio, April 30, 1947. "Eduard Bene~, murderer of the freedom of the Slovak nation, kJ.lled a g,ood man, a zealous priest of Christ, a loyal Slovak patriot, the first president of the Slovak Republic elected by the Slovak nation. The crime of murderer Benes is worse, uglier and more wicked than ~e crime of Cain." - Peter Pridavok, President Slovak National Gouncil, London, England, April 30, 1947.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Jozef Tiso - His Political Creed Description An account of the resource trans. Sister M. Constance Yakubov, SS.C.M. Slovakia, Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972 pp. 50-56 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Yakubov, Sister M. Constance, SS.C.M. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5a80af21bc4bdc2a0d8ebdf6a58b39d4.pdf 68a94f69423288d267fe8620b43373e6 PDF Text Text SLOV AKIA Pub lished by the Slovak League of America VOL XV 1965 NO. 38 EARLY BEGINNINGS OF THE SLOVAKS IN AMERICA By James J. Zatko, Ph.D. , University of Notre Dame Occupying the area enclosed by the Carpathian mountains, the Danube River, and the Theiss River, the Slovaks to the number of two million or 12% of the total population of Hungary, eked out a meagre existence between the two rivers and the mountains. Because the Slovaks had to struggle for a living, men and women were inured to hard work and to a very low standard of living. Their facial features form two general types: the round-faced with wide-set eyes, and the long-headed narrow face with a long nose. The people live in villages consisting of long, low brick or wood houses with hand-made shingles. The interiors were generally neat and tidy, even where there was an earthen floor. 1 Slovakia itself is a geographic unit, whose northern boundary runs along the Carpathian mountains, and whose southern boundary is the Danube River and the Theiss River, which cut deep valleys and ravines through the mountain ridges. The land is divided in the west by the streams flowing to the Danube, by those flowing to the Theiss in eastern Slovakia, with a central Slovak upland lying between. 2 The area consists of about 18,895 square miles of mostly agricultural land, but the land is not the best for cultivation, much of it being woodland and the rest not very fertile. Bratislava was the capital, the ancient coronation city of Hungarian Kings before Budapest, and a great Danubian river port at the cross-roads of Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary. Other important cities in Slovakia are: Trnava in western Slovakia, Nitra in west central Slovakia on the river Nitra, Zilina in northern Slovakia on the river Vah, Turciansky Sv. Martin in north central Slovakia, Zvolen in central Slovakia, and Kosice in eastern Slovakia. 3 Within Slovakia itself population shifted during the �2 SLOVAKIA fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, by occupying the northern highlands in Slovakia. The villagers of the central plain and the river valleys created new settlements especially in Orava in the north, Trencin in the west, Zvolen in the central portion; the new settlers on the Carpathian mountainsides began to engage in animal husbandry, especially sheep-raising. 4 At the end of the seventeenth century an emigration strictly so-called began. Only individuals and very small groups left the recently settled highlands at first. The saffron-dealers and dealers in medicinal oils from Turiec county in north central Slovakia carried their home products all over eastern Europe, crossed Asia, as far as the Pacific coast of Siberia. In the business they established in Russia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Siberia, they often employed their own countrymen. Weavers from Orava county in the north and lace makers from the Hron River region sold their wares in Hungary and central Europe generally. Menders with wire and glaziers from Trencin county in the northwest of Slovakia wandered throughout central Europe; the more enterprising settled in Germany and Russia. From the eighteenth century, after the Turk had been expelled from central and southern Hungary, the poverty stricken of Slovakia began to migrate into Hungary in quest of lands and helped to repopulate the area as well as to restore its economic productivity through agriculture. Thus did Slovak settlements originate in Hungary, Rumania, Yugo-Slavia, Bulgaria, and the Banat. 5 The poverty which accelerated this new shift in population was caused by a decline in economic and commercial activity in Slovakia itself. Early in the eighteenth century there had still been considerable export of cattle and wine from Nitra and Bratislava counties, production of cloth in Myjava, forestry and river traffic, mining and textile production. Although Maria Theresa favored Austrian industries against those of Hungary, only during the reign of Joseph II did non-Slovak manufacturers begin to compete effectively with native products; and the soil in Slovakia was insufficient to provide a livelihood for the Slovak masses. 6 A migration began from the Slovak counties across their southern borders into Hungary. In 1787 eleven counties in Hungary had a population of 1,537,969, whereas the counties in Slovakia had 1,535,480. Sixty years afterwards the Hun- �SLOVAKIA 3 garian counties had in 1848 a population of 2,844,830 and the counties of Slovakia had a population of 1,910,000. In 1787 Budin in Hungary had a population of 23,000 and Pest in Hungary, had only 16,000; Presporok in Slovakia had 29,000 and Banska Stiavnica in Slovakia had 24,000. After 83 years, in 1870, the population of Banska Stiavnica had declined to 12,000. 7 This decline in population, as the figures above indicate, extended to the period of the great exodus to America after 1873. As in the migration to Hungary, so in the modern migration to America economic conditions provided the main force that helped to empty Slovakia, but there were other causes, namely, political, social, and economic. The political ambitions of the Slovaks were closely linked with the rise of nationalism in Slovakia, which developed from three factors, contemporary trends of thought in Europe, outside pressure by the Magyars, and Slovak internal life itself. A conviction developed in the people that the country which they occupied was their own and that within it they had rights not to be contravened by any power. This thought was emphasized in a book by John Baltazar Magin who spoke in 1728 of the rights of the Slovak nation . Memories of Slovak antiquity began to be revived. George Papanek published Of Slovak Kings and K ingdoms in 1780; George Sklenar in 1783 wrote of the glories of Greater Moravia, and in 1793 George Fandli published a revision of Papanek's book. The Slovak poet John Holly portrayed the events of the Slovak past in an epic Sviitopluk (1833), in his book Slav (1834), and in Cyrilo-Methodi ada (1835)8 These writings prepared the ground for further studies in the Slovak language. During the Reformation the Czech language had spread in Slovakia among the Slovak Protestants ; but it remained a foreign language in Slovakia. This led to the cultivation of Slovak as the particular language of the Slovak nation. Matthew Bel-Funtik (1687-1749) wrote of the Slovak language that "in no respect does it fall behind the ponderousness of Spanish, the charm and smoothness of English, the richness and emphasis of German, the softness and tenderness of Italian or the imperious sternness of Magyar." Since the Slovaks had no national literary medium as late as the end of the eighteenth century, Anton Bernolak created a national literary language based on the western �4 SLOVAKIA or Trnava dialect. In 1787 he published a grammar of literary Slovak and later also published a six volume SlovakCzech-Latin-German-Magyar dictionary. 9 The greatest writer of the "Bernolakian" school was John Holly, who is described as "in the fullest sense the awakener of national consciousness by right of actualizing what others had planned and dreamed of." 10 Even though a considerable school of "Bernolakian" writers developed, the western Slovak dialect failed to become the national idiom. Uudovit Stur (1815-1856) together with the Lutheran pastors Joseph Miloslav Hurban (18171888) and Michael Miloslav Hurban established the definite form of literary Slovak, based upon a dialect spoken in the eight central counties. Together they founded a literary and publishing society, Tatrin (1844), and began to publish the political journal Slovenske narodnie noviny (1845), and the literary monthly, Slovenske pohl'ady (1846). The use of the Slovak language became an essential demand in Slovak political agitation. In May of 1848 the Slovak nationalist leaders met in the rectory of Michael Miloslav Hodza in Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas, where they drew up a political program for the Slovaks: "Petitions of the Slovak Nation." They expressed no desire to break away from the Hungarian state; they wanted defined boundaries for Slovak lands, social, political, cultural equality of Slovaks with Hungarians, and official recognition of the Slovak language. When the leaders planned to submit this program for the approval of the Slovak people, the Hungarian government forbade Slovak assemblies and imprisoned the Slovak leaders. 11 The hand of Eudovit Stur was obvious in the program. Already in 1847 he had listed these grievances: manorial courts, maldistribution of public offices, lack of uniform taxation, need of reform in the judicial system, insufficient freedom of the press and speech; he also demanded the use of the Slovak language in schools, churches, and courts. 1 z With the demands of Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas ignored and then repressed, the Slovaks took to revolutionary activity against the Hungarians. Since their only hope of relief lay with the central government at Vienna, they threw in their lot with the imperial forces of Habsburg against the �SLOVAKIA 5 revolution of Kossuth. After the prostration of Magyarism through Russian intervention in 1849, the Slovaks were prepared to accept a limited territorial sovereignty from the imperial government; but even though the assimilative policy of the Magyars was suspended, centralization, not autonomy, remained the order of the day. In the Spring of 1861 the Slovaks renewed their political activity. After their political principles had been published in the newspapers, an assembly was called to meet in Turciansky Sv. Martin. The prominent attorney Stephen Marko Daxner formulated the political program: recognition of the Slovak nation by imperial edict, the constitution of Slovakia as a distinct administrative unit in Hungary, the right of Slovaks to develop their own life without restriction. This "Memorandum of the Slovak People" was presented to the Emperor Franz Joseph; the only result was that the Slovaks were allowed to establish the cultural institution, the Matice, Slovenska. 14 Austria's defeat by Prussia in 1866 forced a settlement with the Magyars. Known as the Compromise of 1867, it granted Magyars internal independence and divided the Empire into two countries under one crown. The Compromise of 1867 and the dualistic sys.tern based on it, appeared before public opinion as the compromise of the Austrian Emperor with the Hungarian feudal classes which the liberal German high bourgeoisie accepted, though not without serious hesitation, in order to secure its own hegemony against tbe will of the Slav majority.15 Jaszi observes that this artificial dualistic system could be maintained only "by a corrupt and restricted electoral system, by open ballot, and by terroristic procedures in the administrative and military machine." 16 The political injustices after 1867 should therefore be considered not only against a background of Magyarization but also seen as a means used to preserve the structure of the dual monarchy. The electoral laws and improper representation in the Hungarian parliament were among the grievances. For instance, in the 58 electoral areas inhabited by Slovaks for the most part, these deputies were elected: �6 SLOVAKIA ELECTION OF DEPUTIES 1865-1881 Year Magyar Deputies 1865 1869 1872 1875 1878 1881 58 58 56 58 58 58 Slovak Deputies 0 0 2 0 0 0 Source: C. J. Street, HU GARY AND DEMOCRACY (London, 1923), PP. 57-58. The constituencies and polling stations were so arranged that Magyar communities were assured of easy access •to the poll, while non-Magyar communities had ,to travel great distances. It wa-s no uncommon trick for the local authorities to declare roads and bridges unsafe for traffic on the day of election, or for all the hors es in non-Magyar districts to be placed under veterinary supervision and forbidd en to move outside the commune.17 The Slovaks had grievances against the judicial system. Until 1871 the judicial and administrative spheres were not separated. In that year judicial reform was inaugurated. Criminal and civil cases were dealt with in the District and Sedrial courts as the first instance, the Tables as the second, and the Royal Curia in Budapest as the final one. 18 The Slovaks complained too that the nationality of the legal officers did not correspond to the national distribution of population. In 1910 there were 2,633 judges and official lawyers in Hungary; 2,601 were Magyars, 31 Germans, 1 Slovak. This was the proportion of legal officers in a country where the Slovaks formed 12 % of the population.19 Moreover, in spite of the fact that the law of Nationalities (1868) admitted other languages to court, 20 the law remained a dead letter, for summonses were issued in Magyar, and verdicts given in Magyar, and the need of an interpreter was disregarded. 21 Slovaks also called for freedom of the press. 22 Between 1905 and 1908 there were 43 court actions against fourteen Slovak newspapers ; sentences totaling eleven years and three months were imposed as well as fines totaling 11,000 crowns for Pan-Slavistic activities. 23 Besides these unsettling political factors, other social causes added to the sense of national frustration. �SLOVAKIA 7 At the basis of the cultural conflict was the idea of the Magyar state. The law of Hungary recognized only one nation in Hungary, and that was the Magyar. To be secure, Hungary had to be Magyar. The objective of political action became to create one nation, Magyar in sentiment and speech, from the multinational and polylingual Hungarian lands. 24 This ideal was pushed by every means: newspapers, the society for the Magyarization of Proper Names founded in 1880, and 1898 law to give all towns Magyar names; suppression of the Slovak language in rail, postal, and telegraph service. 25 As one reaction against the process of forcible assimilation, the Slovak sought comfort and national security in Pan-Slavism. Having become conscious of the larger Slav community, the Slovak nationalist leaders shook off their feeling of inferiority and began to place their hopes of realizing national ideals in the larger Slav group. 26 The Hungarians reacted by denouncing as Pan-Slav any Slovak who refused to renounce his nationality and language. 27 The chief means of transforming Slovaks into Magyars were to be the schools. After the Compromise of 1867, an attack was launched against German, Slovak, and Ruthenian schools. Bela Grunwald in 1873 began publishing Svornost', a bi-monthly, attacking the Slovak gymnasia as hot-beds of Pan-Slavism. 28 The gymnasium at Revuca was closed August 20, 1874; the one at Klastor pod Znievom, on September 21, 1874; and the one at Turciansky Sv. Martin, on December 30, 1874. 29 All Slovak elements were expelled from secondary and technical schools, and permission was refused to erect a chair of Slovak at the University of Budapest.30 The school statistics reveal this Magyarizing tendency: SCHOOLS IN SLOVAKIA 1910-1918 Schools Primary Grammar Indus., Comm., Agric. Teacher training Middle (High Schools) University Magyar Slovak German 3,777 101 118 419 20 39 �8 SLOVAKIA Source: Nicholas Timashe!f, PEDIA (1948), p. 262. "Education," SLAVONIC ENCYCW- The official statistics of the Hungarian government in 1914 reveal the extent of Magyarization. They list 256,020 children of Slovak language as attending school. Of these, 214,267 Slovak children were in purely Magyar elementary schools, and only 42,186 in 365 Slovak elementary schools. 31 Educational standards were low. Attendance was weakly enforced; in most villages the schools remained open for five or six months per year. In 1913, just before World War I, 32,700 Slovak children of school age were not enrolled.32 Naturally the results were bad. Those able to read and write averaged 63 per cent of the Slovak population; but individual counties had worse records. In the county of Saris, only 48.6 per cent, in Spis 58 per cent, in Zemplin 51.4 per cent, in Ung 43.5 per cent could read and write. 33 The Matica Slovenska or Slovak Institute, a national cultural society founded in 1863, was dissolved in 1875. The charges were unlawful political activity and mismanagement. The government seized not only money and property but also the library and museum. 34 Even the churches were made instruments of Magyarization. The religious history of the period 1867-1914 is dark, indeed. Bishop Parvy of Spis lived in Budapest for many years; Bishop Balasz of Roznava ignored everything Slovak as though it were non-existent. The Cardinal-Primate of Hungary, Czernoch, was of Slovak birth, but Magyar in thought and sentiment. 35 Often other priests felt their people's cultural humiliation and endeavoured to alleviate it, but were placed so that their influence was limited. The Lutheran General Assembly resolved against "Pan-Slavism" in 1882; in no district did the Slovak Lutherans have a majority.36 However, the chief reasons for Slovak emigration in the latter half of the nineteenth century seem to have been economic.37 The predominantly agricultural nature of the country's economy is best illustrated by the following chart on agriculture: �SLOVAKIA 9 POPULATION ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE 1910 Total Population in 1,000 Austrian Provinces Counties of Hungarian Crown Bosnia and Herzogovina Total Total engaged in Agriculture in 1,000 Agricultural Percentage 28,572 13,842 48.5 % 20,886 13,470 64.5% 1,932 1,674 86.6 % ----------------- - -- - -- - ----- --- - --51,390 28,982 Source: Oscar Ja,szi, THE DIS,SOLUTION MONARCHY (Chicago, 1929) p. 195. 56.4 % OF THE IHABSBUHG The soil was not of the best quality. Woodland averaged about 15 per cent of the total. In Turiec county 33 per cent was unfit for cultivation; in Orava, 30 per cent; in Zvolen, 32 per cent; in Liptov, 41 per cent; in Novohrad, 26 per cent; in Gerner, 47 per cent; Spis, 37 per cent; in Saris, 43 per cent. In Orava county there were 2761 farms that averaged one to five acres; of this land only 43 per cent was arable. 38 In addition to the problem of poor soil, there existed the problem of the great estates. Speaking of Hungary in general, Jaszi says that 40 per cent of the total area of Hungary was occupied in 1913 by a small number of large and very large estates. The medium sized farms of 142 to 1,420 acres embraced a smaller area, but with the greater estates covered 54.4 per cent of the total territory. Over 64.4 per cent of the country was possessed by small farmers holding less than 142 acres. Moreover, only 34.5 per cent of Hungarian territory belonged to those who actually cultivated the soil. 39 In Hungary proper, without !Croatia, there lived 2,280,000 farmer families. According to the most optimistic calculation only 460,000 families owned property on the average above 20 acres, guaranteeing an independent livelihood, whereas 1,820,000 families, that is to say four fifths of them possessed only so-called "dwarf" properties or no property at all.40 �10 SLOVAKIA If we consider the situation of Slovakia in particular, an equally cheerless picture presents itself. In Slovakia 1,000 persons owned 2,100,000 hectares, that is, about 8,000 square miles; 21.5 per cent of the holdings were less than a half hectare in size; 41 75 per cent of the land was held by the great landlords. 42 The agricultural areas compared unfavorably with the western and northwestern parts of the Habsburg Monarchy. The industrialized parts did not exceed three-tenths of the entire territory of the Monarchy, whereas over seven-tenths were populated by peasants, poor, almost on the level of slow starvation. 43 One way to raise the peasant's standard of living was to raise the productivity of agricultural labor and the growth of crops. Between 1850 and 1895 there was progress in agricultural production. Improvements were made in Hungary after 1848, e.g., the iron plow replaced the wooden. The great landlords led the advance and the peasants imitated them. These landlords in Hungary between 1850 and 1890 were deeply interested in improving agricultural production, chiefly because of the high price of wheat in the world market. They were anxious to increase wheat production for export. After 1885 the world market price began to decline and the landlords gradually lost interest. Indeed, they began to cut production. The strategy was to create a domestic scarcity so that wheat would have to be imported. The objective of the policy was to transform a grain exporting country into a grain importing one. This would enable the landlords to raise the price of domestic grain to the world price augmented by the tariff. By 1907 the tariffs began to have a constant effect. In this situation the lot of the agricultural worker grew steadily worse. Unemployment grew, wages decreased, and the cost of living rose. Jaszi observes that the heavy hand of the landlord-controlled economy pushed the Monarchy toward disaster. 44 The workers' wages in Hungary averaged the equivalent of sixty to a hundred dollars a year, while a woman's wages averaged yearly only between forty and fifty dollars. 45 In Slovakia the agricultural worker earned 25 cents a day.46 His staple food in winter was cabbage and potatoes. 47 To the low wages and the agricultural poverty we must �SLOVAKIA 11 add the difficulty of buying land in Slovakia. The price of land in Slovakia by 1906 had risen in some cases 100 percent; the amount of money sent from America helped cause this price rise. The Postal Bank of Kosice received in 1896 six and a half million florins from America. 48 Over and above these burdens, the poor peasant had to bear the load of usurious banking. In pre-war Slovakia almost every town had a little joint-stock institution; although this was called a bank, it did not carry on real banking operations, but was only a savings and loan bank. The majority of these banks dispersed capital which was not available where it was needed. The banks under Magyar control followed a policy of dividends, whereas the Slovak banks paid a lower rate of interest. 49 Virtually no institutions provided long term mortgage credits; in fact, only two banks, both unsound, engaged in this business in Slovakia. Besides these banks, there were cooperative societies which offered limited cr,edit facilities to the peasants. 50 The small farmer ended up borrowing at rates of 7 per cent to 8 per cent, and sometimes rates were as high as 14 per cent. On short term loans rates of 50 per cent were not unknown. Consequently the profits of the banks were high. One bank in Slovakia with a capitalization of 60,000 crowns and reserves of 18,000 profited one year to the amount of 22,000 crowns. The average profit of the banks in 1888 was 29.56 per cent on the capital invested; in 1894 the profit was 13.58 per cent. 51 The economic situation worsened by the national addiction to drink. On this all the sources seem agreed. Impoverishing effects of overindulgence in drink were a factor in driving the Slovaks to seek improved economic conditions in America. 52 This lack of economic opportunity and security led to the migration. The following figures, though somewhat suspect because of the tendency of Magyarization, still tell an eloquent story. This table is a modification of the original. NATIONALITIES IN HUNGARY Nationality Slovaks 1880 1,855,000 1890 1,897,000 1900 2,002,000 1910 1,946,000 �12 SLOVAKIA Source: Robert A. Kann, THE -MULTINATIONAL EJMP]RE: NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL REF1ORM IN THE HABSBURG MONAROHY 1848-1914 {New York, 19 50) I, 278. The Slovaks in considerable numbers migrated to America after 1880 as part of the "new immigration". Until 1880 the bulk of the new additions to American population by immigration was predominantly either English in speech or at least derived from the northern and western areas of Europe; this was the "old immigration." Thereafter newcomers from southern and eastern Europe arrived, representing peoples who were very different in language, customs, political experiences, and personal standards of living. Italian, Greek, and the confusion of Slavic languages sounded strange indeed to ears attuned to English or Germanic sounds. Invidious comparisons were made. The "Nordic" was more akin to the American in blood; the "new immigrants" had not the Anglo-Saxon training in self-government, and they were merely birds of passage. Besides the fact that he spoke a strange language, the "new immigrant" was more often than not a Catholic. All these things set him apart from the "old immigrant." 53 The year 1873 saw the beginning of the flood. Even though the political, cultural, social, and economic causes were ripe for emigration, other causes operated to bring America to the attention of the hardpressed Slovak immigrants. The steamship company agents urged the peasants to emigrate, for the companies derived a large part of their income from transport of immigrants. In most countries there were laws prohibiting advertisements of prosperous conditions in another country. Two leading steamship companies were reported to have five or six thousand agents in Galicia alone. In Hungary, Immigration Commission members saw letters written by agents instructing prospective immigrants on how to leave the country without the government's consent, what routes to follow, and other related information. 54 Other agents who increased emigration from Hungary after 1870 were labor contractors, who came to hire workers for the mines and steel mills. These agents promised everything. Archduke Rudolph, they said, was living in South America, establishing there a new ideal state; immigrants to, �SLOVAKIA 13 the United States were to receive grants of land and aid in buying equipment and in constructing necessary buildings.55 Many peasants who went with the agents wrote back letters reporting high wages. These lett'ers were undoubtedly one of the most powerful means of persuading the Slovak peasants to cross the ocean. 56 In the earlier phases of immigration many emigrants returned to their native country after they had laid by a sufficiency of this world's goods. The figures given by the Hungarian government for emigration and return for the year of 1905 show the extent of this return movement and suggest the breadth of influence exercised by returning emigrants. In 1905 the Magyar figures list 38,770 as leaving the country, while they give 4,038 as returning to Hungary.57 The news of work and wages certainly had an effect in stimulating further emigration. The Slovak emigrants moved generally westward by rail for German or Dutch ports. During the years 1881-1900 some 372,979 Slovaks were reported to have passed through the port of Hamburg, whereas only 9,501 embarked from Italian ports. 58 During 1886-1907 the German ports handled 348,808 emigrants from Hungary, Antwerp 57,170, Dutch ports 33,762, and Italian ports 3,785. 59 The low cost of steamship crossing attracted many to undertake the difficult journey. Passage from Hamburg on the way out was $20; the return journey as far as Oderburg, a station on the Hungarian frontier, was $23.60. The Hungarian Government granted the Cunard Line the monopoly of transporting emigrants from Hungary. So great was the rush to America that the Cunard Line called on other companies and formed the "Continental Pool" to handle the traffic. This "Pool" provided the worst accommodations, the worst diet, and the worst navigation. 61 The journey's length varied from fifteen to sixty days. The emigrants fortified themselves against sea-sickness with prunes and brought their own supplies of sausage, bacon, plum brandy, and gin. Water was distributed only at intervals, sometimes only once a day. The ventilation in the living quarters was bad. 62 One emigrant described his journey in these words: "It was in the year 1883 that, with three men, I set out from Trebis ov for America. We got on a wagon that took us to Obisovce, �14 SLOVAKIA where we boarded a train and rode to Vrutky. There we obtained travel permits for Bohumfn, and from Bohumin to Bremen, where we boug1hit our steamship tickets, for which we paid 53 ,gold pieces. A chill comes over me even now when I think of that ship of ours. We were afloat almost 18 days and twice the shi p was in danger of sinking. Everything on the deck rwas broken, a nd water poured into it. And as the boat rocked, one could feel that even in one's s-tomach."63 Among the ports of entry New York easily ranked first for the Slovak immigrants; then in order followed Baltimore, Philadelphia, New Orleans, Boston and Portland. 64 Nor did the ills of the immigrants cease when they landed in the United States. Often enough their meagre funds and they were quickly parted. One immigrant paid a fare of $60 for a ride from the harbor to the Lackawanna railroad station. Hotels deliberately detained the immigrants by telling them that the train to their destination made the trip only once a week. Other swindlers met the immigrants as they came ashore and offered to send a telegram to their relatives or friends for the price of twenty five cents ; needless to say, no telegram was sent, and the immigrants were only so much poorer. One porter kidnapped two young girls who ended in brothels.85 The Slovak immigrants of the 1880's were not the first Slovaks to set foot upon American soil. The very first Slovak to come to America, so far as we know, was Andrew Jelik, a tailor on a Dutch ship which sailed to America in 17541755. He did not remain in America and eventually died in Budin, Hungary, 1783.66 Another Slovak who had arrived in America in the eighteenth century was Count Maurice Benovsky who landed at Baltimore in 1775. He was but an adventurer whose later career took him to Madagascar where he became king and where he also perished. 67 In the year 1800 a Slovak dealer in oils surprised a Slovak Jesuit in Mexico City by making his confession in Slovak. 68 The first Slovak settlement was made in Philadelphia by drotari, wireworkers, in 1840 at 412-414 Front Street. 69 Martin Chalan landed in the United States in 1872, took out his first papers in 1876, and became a citizen in 1879. Making the trip back and forth across the ocean, he was h1 America twenty six times. He died in 1915. 70 In the wake of these individuals the larger numbers began to come, first, from eastern Slovakia, especially from the �SLOVAKIA 15 counties of Zemplin, Sari~, and Spis. 71 Between the years 18691890 the county of Spis lost 14% of her youths between 20 to 25 years of age, and 31 % of the men between 26 and 30; Saris lost 34% of those between 20 and 25, 44 % of the men between 26 and 30. 72 Only after the eastern counties did the western ones take to emigration. To give exact figures on Slovak immigration before 1899 is impossible because prior to 1899 the immigration authorities counted the immigrants according to country of last residence, and many Slovaks listed Hungary as their country of last residence. Since 1899 the immigrants are counted according to race or language. Therefore the figures before 1899 do not give us exact data on Slovak immigrants; but according to Emily Green Balch the earlier immigrants from Hungary may be presumed to be Slovaks with some Jews and Magyars included. 73 In 1873 immigrants from Hungary numbered 1,300; in 1880 4,000 entered the United States, and in 1884 the number rose to 15,000. 74 The following table shows the total number of Slovaks coming into this country in the years 1899 to 1909: SLOVAK IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES Year ending June 30 Number 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 15,838 29,243 29,343 36,934 34,427 27,940 52,368 38,221 42,041 16,170 Source: Emily Green Balch, OUR (New York, 1910), P. 103. 22,568 SLAVIC FELLOW CITI ZENS In the period 1899-1910 the total immigration to the United States numbered 9,555,673; in this number there were 337,527 Slovaks. 75 Consideration of Table 5 shows that �Hl SLOVAKIA 1905 was the peak year for the Slovaks in which 52,368 of them were admitted. Numerically in the twelve years ending June 30, 1910 Slovakia ranked eighth among the nations providing immigrant material. 76 The rate of emigration of Slovaks per 1,000 was 18.6; this was double that of any other race of people, except the Hebrews (18.3), Croatian-Slovenians (13.1), and South Italians (11.9). The rate was the highest of any group. 77 Having arrived in the United States, the Slovak immigrants began to look for a place to live and to work. The first areas to draw them were the coal mine centers; only in the second instance did the Slovaks settle in the factory cities.78 One focus of settlement was the hard-coal area of northeastern Pennsylvania where the center was Hazleton, Pennsylvania. Before World War I the mines in this district employed 75,000 to 100,000 men; of this group 12% were Slovaks. 79 In the soft coal area of southwestern Pennsylvania Mt. Pleasant was the center of dispersion. From there the Slovaks moved northward to Latrobe or Greensburg, southward to Connellsville and Uniontown. The chief centers of Slovak settlement were: Alice, Standard, Bessemer, Bridgeport, Mammouth, Old Hecla, New Hecla, Calumet, Old Tarrs, Donnelly, Buckeye, Moyer, Johnstown, Pittsburgh, Gayette City, Brownsville, Masontown, Fairchance, Point Marion, Cannonsburg, Perryopolis, Republic, and others. 80 Only later did pockets of immigrants form in Chicago, Cleveland, and Detroit. About the geographic dispersion of Slovaks an interesting note occurs in a letter sent to the Jednota in 1913 by a J . P. Kapas, who had been traveling in the west. He wrote: "There had been plenty of Slovak people in the west, but almost all returned to the eastern states, and only for this r eason that in the west the people were all foreigners and wild." 81 Alaska seems to have been the limit of immigration, at least as far as the group was concerned. John Miklas, writing from Alaska, recommended against coming and said that he had not found any Slovaks there as yet. He surmised, however, that after his return from the "Old Country", where he meant to go for a visit, he might settle in Alaska.82 By 1885 large groups of Slovaks had settled in the fol- �SLOVAKIA 17 lowing states: Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Illinois. 83 In the hard coal area in northeastern Pennsylvania a sub-employment system was used in which an operator hired the men who dug and loaded the coal; the mine company paid the operator and he paid off his hired men. The Slovaks, inexperienced in mine work and unskilled in language, worked merely as the hired men; this left them exposed to the wiles of unscrupulous operators who kept some of the pay from them. 84 In 1856 the Pennsylvania Railroad had reached Pittsburgh from Philadelphia; the Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railroad in 1871 built tracks to Pittsburgh, thus giving Pittsburgh an outlet to Baltimore. The demand for laborers in the mine fields of Westmoreland and Fayette Counties in Pennsylvania was answered by many Slovak men from the hard coal area and "the old country." But who the first Slovak was to enter the Pittsburgh area we do not know. When the agents of the Frick Company from the coke and coal region of southwestern Pennsylvania hired new immigrants · at Castle Garden, but for trivial exceptions the hired men were Slovaks. The company transported them by rail to Alverton, lying between Scottdale and Mt. Pleasant, Pa. Thence they walked to Morewood, Pa., where a company house awaited them. It is impossible to tell how many Slovaks there were in the coke region. We do know that in Morewood by 1893 there were four hundred men engaged in work, and how many Slovaks there were in this group we do not know. As early as 1880 John and Sophia Hvizdo~ had eighteen Slovak boarders in their house. 85 Until 1900 Slovaks worked mostly in the coal mines and at the coke ovens of Frick and Company. This firm had been organized in 1871 as Frick and Company, with about 300 acres of coal area and 50 coke ovens around Connellsville, Pa. By 1889 it had about 35,000 acres and 15,000 coke ovens. The lowest paid worker in 1890 was the "yard worker" who earned $1.40 for a ten hour day; the best wages were paid the "road man" who received $2.10 for nine hours of work. 86 At first the Slovaks worked beside the Czechs in the coal mines, while the Poles worked at the coke ovens; but gradually, the Slovaks too began to work their way up to jobs at the ovens. �18 SLOVAKIA Most Slovaks were satisfied with their wages, which varied from $16.00 to $25.00 every two weeks. Strange as it may seem, it was possible to live and also to lay something by from these wages. A pound of beef soup meat cost three cents; for six dollars a man could dress himself rather well; rent cost three or four dollars a month for a small four room house. Nevertheless, not all miners were satisfied; demands were made for more pay and less work. When the mine operators refused, there were strikes, often riotous and bloody. 87 The Slovaks were also employed in the Egdar Thompson Iron Works of Andrew Carnegie. Carnegie with Frick employed the greatest number of Slovaks; others, like Rainey, Oliver, and Jones and Laughlin also engaged considerable numbers of Slovaks, but the number cannot be exactly stated. However, until 1900 most of the Slovaks worked in the mines and at the coke ovens.88 When the Slovaks got jobs in the mines, they lived in "company houses ",which were built practically at the site of the mine. This was a settlement of large houses built by the company and rented to the worker, who had also to pay for water, gas and coal. 89 To buy his food and other necessities the miner had to patronize the company store. This made the dependence of the worker on the comp:.my complete; the threat of expulsion during a strike was a powerful weapon in keeping the miners submissive. 90 The company r ented a house to a married couple on condition that they take in "boarders," the usual number being ten, but in the larger houses the number varied upward to thirty or forty. 91 The cleanliness d 2p::!nded on the character, ability, or sheer physical strength of the housewife. Within the household food arrangements provided that except for meat, flour, and coffee, the food was purchased in common. One meal a day wa:; eaten together, on Sunday at noon and during the week in the evening. For the other meals the gazdina or housewife cooked individually for the men whatever they bought. Beer by the barrel was also bought in common; sometimes this ran to a hundred barrels per month. At the end of the month the common bill was divided: the housewife did not pay; the men including the husband, paid equally, and two children were counted as one adult. 92 Moreover, on pay day several barrels of beer would be bought as well as whiskey, �SLOVAKIA 19 and much meat was prepared for a gay evening. At first, dancing was the chief recreation. One man pulled out an accordion, and the dancing began, even men dancing with men because of the shortage of women partners; frequently this mixure of drink, food, and music led to drunken brawls sometimes over the excellence of their home towns in Slovakia, often enough over women. Dancing was not limited to pay day; any celebration of even slight importance had to be combined with dancing and shouting of the most vigorous sort. The Cardas was a universal favorite. Family life was injured by many men coming to America without their wives and families and by the dearth of marriageable Slovak girls. To find a wife many young men on week ends went to Passaic, New Jersey, where many Slovak girls worked in the textile mills, and the men watched the girls as they came from work and made their choice. On Sundays in Passaic there often were ten to twenty weddings. Difficult as family life was, the "boarding house," allowing for so little privacy, did not help very much; sometimes it led to the wife's running off with a boarder. 93 Organizational life among the Slovaks began in the lodges and societies so common in America after the Civil War. By 1914 in the United States principal organizations had 15,600,000 members. Economic and social need led the Slovaks to form lodges. Mine disasters often took the lives of husbands and fathers, leaving the family not only destitute, but even without the money for a funeral. In answer to the need of sickness and funeral benefits a large number of societies grew up in industrial and .mining towns. The first of these was the Persi Uhorszko-Slovenszky v nemoczi podporujuci Szpolek, established in New York, on March 3, 1883. In this society, which lasted for eight years, Slovak was made the official language. Fraternal and mutual benefit iocieties mushroomed in the Slovak settlements. The Spolok Sv. Stefana in Passaic, N. J. was organized 1884 and already in 1887 was calling for a unification with other Slovak fraternal organizations. Under the influence of a Polish organization whose constituti-on it used, the Cirkevny a v ntmoci pl!>dporujuci spolok arose in Hazleton, Pa., in 1884. The Slovaks in Houtzdale, Pa., organized the Bratstvo Najsvatejsieho Srdca Pana Jezisa, on November 14, 1886; on December 12, 1884 the Spolok Sv. Stefana in Plymouth, Pa., came �20 SLOVAKIA into existence. A touch of humor accompanied the difficulties of the lodge in Bayonne City, N. J., where the Spolok Princa Rudolfa, set up in 1887, had to change its name after the tragic death of Archduke Rudolph of Hapsburg at Mayerling, because the other Slovaks ridiculed the members for having lost their patron. Bayonne City, N. J., had one of the largest mutual benefit societies, the Prvy bednarsky vypomocny spolok, an organization of Coopers engaged in making barrels, staves, chests, boxes; it was organized in 1888 and acted also as a bargaining agent for the membership with their employees. They were the first to have their own flag, whereas the other groups used the Hungarian flag. The Spolok Sv. Cyrila a Methoda in Minneapolis, Minn., and the Slovensky Spolok Sv. Petra i Pavla of McKeesport, Pa., both came into existence in 1888; the Slovensky v nemoci podporujuci spolok in Braddock, Pa., arose in 1889. The chief purpose of these societies was help in need, especially providing an elaborate funeral. In these funerals all the local lodges took part with flags, uniforms, and mourning bands. The secondary purpose was to aid in the organization of parishes, the building of churches and schools and lodge halls. 94 In spite of the success of these lodges, financial problems arose from the system of assessment which they used. The system required a contribution of about fourteen cents a month to meet administrative costs; on the death or sickness of a member the others had to contribute as much as would be needed for the stipulated sum. A considerable number of deaths or cases of sickness within a month or a short time made the financial burden too great for the small lodges. 95 The first appeal for unification came from the Society of St. Stephen in Passaic, N. J., as early as 1887. Julius Schwartz-Markovic in Nova Vlast' (a periodical that lasted only from March to December, 1888) made appeals for consolidation; Peter Rovnianek repeated this appeal in the October issue, as did B. Lajciak in the December issue. The Rev. Joseph Kossalko, a Roman Catholic priest of proMagyar conviction, seeing the nationalist tendency of these lodges in their use of Slovak as the official language and their gradual abandonment of the Hungarian flag, opposed this movement in a new periodical, the Zastava. The consolidation did not come until the 1890's. 96 When the Slovak immigrants, of whom the bulk was �SLOVAKIA 21 Catholic, first came to the United States, they were financially unable to build churches for their own use. Before the Slovak Catholics had their own churches, they attended Polish, German, Czech, or Irish churches; if they happened to be regular attendants at a church where their languago was not understood, they often went a considerable distance to receive the sacraments, especially that of Penance, from someone who understood their language. In the southwestern Pennsylvania mining area the Slovaks were fortunate to have in their midst St. Vincent's Archabbey, a Benedictine institution, which took special care to provide priests who could understand the Slovak language. Priests from this archabbey went from settlement to settlement taking care of the spiritual needs of the Slovaks. The first to do "mission" work among the Slovaks was Rev. Nepomuk Yaeger, O.S.B., who for three years in southwestern Pennsylvania visited the mining camps, where often enough he had to offer the· Mass to the accompaniment of card-playing, drunken singing, swearing and quarreling. 97 First to organize on a religious basis were the Slovak Lutherans. The first Lutheran parish was established in Streator, Illinois, where the church was ready for services on October 5, 1884. Karol Horak, ordained in 1883, was the first minister, but he gave up ministerial work and became a real estate agent. While the parish was withouth a minister's services, the Slovak Lutherans met in the home of Mr. G. Kozlej, who read the Bible to them. A minister, Cyril Droppa, reached Streator on March 26, 1884 and stayed there until 1887; eventually his spiritual labors took him to Russia. This first Lutheran parish had 49 members; the pastor's salary was fixed at forty dollars a month. The name of the parish was the Parish of the Blessed Trinity. Lutheran parishes were organized in Freeland, Pa., and Nanticoke, Pa., in 1886, and Minneapolis, Minn., in 1888. 98 Almost simultaneously with the Lutherans, the Slovak Catholics organized themselves into parishes. However, before this could go on apace, priests able to speak Slovak were needed. Even among the first priests, 99 the division into Slo·vak nationalists and Madarones disturbed their relations with one another and their work among Slovaks, Protestant as _well as Catholics. In 1882 the Rev. Ignatius Jaskovic, who came to Hazle- �22 SLOVAKIA ton, Pa., was the first active Slovak Catholic priest in the United States. He built St. Joseph's church in Hazleton, where the first Mass was said on December 6, 1885. He stayed in Hazleton until 1890. The Rev. J. Kossalko, arriving in 1884, had his first parish in Streator, Ill.; he said the first Mass in the new church of St. Stephen on December 10, 1885, just four days after the first mass had been said in Hazleton, Pa. The Rev. Samuel Bella, also a Catholic priest, became the pastor of Nanticoke, Pa., and later of Bayonne City, N. J. These three priests were all Madarones, that is, Slovaks with pro-Magyar convictions, and firmly opposed to any Slovak nationalism. 100 This Madarone element introduced the first division of the Slovak group into the factions that played a part among the pre-World War Slovaks of America. In 1887 in Scranton, Pa., the Slovak Calvinists first organized as a religious group. The Slovak Calvinists of Jessup, Pa., had a chapel there since 1888, but the building of churches had to wait until the 189O's. To conduct services in their parishes the Calvinists hired Magyar and English ministers; the Slovaks and Magyars fought about the language to be used in the divine service, Slovak or Magyar. There was no general solution for these churches, but the language varied from church to church. 101 At first some Slovaks objected to building schools on the score of uselessness; these untutored peasants had to be taught that schools were important. Some Slovak immigrants had come to make money and were in America only temporarily. Schools meant permanence. Why should they contribute to the education of other people's chidren? However a beginning was made. St. Stephen's parish, Streator, Ill., built the first Slovak Catholic parochial school in 1889, a wooden structure, costing $4,500, a considerable sum for those days. From the very beginning the schools were not strictly Slovak, for there were not enough Slovak teachers; this led to many subjects being taught by "English" teachers and "Irish" nuns. Slovak nationalists were satisfied by having the pastor teach the children on Saturday afternoons, when they studied the Slovak language, Slovak history, and Slovak geography.102 The 11cattered Slovak settlements were brought in touch with one another by newspapers written in the Slovak language. John Slovensky, a trained teacher from Slovakia, had �SLOVAKIA 23 come to the United States in 1879, and had obtained a clerical job in the Austro-Hungarian consulate. This put him in contact with the Slovak immigrants, who came to the consulate often seeking information about conditions in the Monarchy, as for instance, was the Monarchy at war with the Turk? This suggested to Slovensky the idea of a Slovak periodical. In 1885 he launched a lithographed paper called Rulletin, which contained news from Europe and items about Slovak immigrants. Especially the tavern keepers subscribed to it for their taverns where Slovaks met to read it. Success prompted John Slovensky to embark on · a larger enterprise, the publication of Amerikanszko-Slovenszke Noviny. J. Schwartz-Markovic and the Rev. Erwin Gelhoff, a Catholic priest, published the Nova Vlast' in Streator, Illinois, in March 1888; this venture lasted only until December of that very year. The year 1889 saw the birth of two other newspapers, the Slovak v Amerike and Rev. J. Kossalko's Madarone newspaper, Zastava. 103 These newspapers became the sounding boards of popular opinion as well as a unifying force among the Slovaks. Discussion in the newspapers led to the consolidation of local lodges during the 1890's. With the beginning of the 1890's the Slovaks began to unify the many individual lodges into a federation for greater economic security. However, from the very start factions divided the Slovaks. The leaders of the Slovak immigrants disagreed on whether the principle of organization should be religious or nationalist. The Rev. Stephen Furdek, a Catholic priest, believed that the new national organization should be based upon religious uniformity within the organization; the Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists should each have their own organization. Peter Rovnianek, a Slovak nationalist, wanted nationality to be the principle of organization. Any Slovak, no matter what his religious convictions or lack of them, could be a member. 104 Because of this difference of principle, two separate, and in many ways rival, organizations arose. On February 16, 1890, Peter V. Rovnianek led in founding the National Slovak Society in Pittsburgh, Pa. All Slovaks, Catholics, Protestants, Freemasons, Freethinkers or indifferentists, were welcome. Openly nationalist, the National Slovak Society played down religious differences, emphas- �24 SLOVAKIA izing all Slovaks were one. The frank nationalism and liberalism antagonized the Madarone Slovaks and some Catholici. The Rev. J. Kossalko, the most outstanding Madarone, refused absolution to Catholic members of the National Slovak Society. 105 Others besides the Madarone element opposed the liberal National Slovak Society. The Rev. Stephen Furdek established a Catholic fraternal organization, the First Catholic Slovak Union, September 4, 1890. The objectives of this First Catholic Slovak Union were to preserve the Catholic Faith, to support fellow-members, widows, and orphans in need, to preserve and extend the use of the Slovak language and Slovak nationality. Conditions of membership were recognition of the bishop of Rome as head of the Catholic Church, faithful performance of religious duties, attendance of one's children at a Catholic school, support of parish and parochial school, no ridicule of religious ceremonies, and no writing against the Church and the clergy. 106 Slovak women felt that they, too, should have their own organizations independent of male control. They established the Zivena Beneficial Society in the year 1891. In 1892 the Slovak Catholic women organized a similar society, the First Catholic Slovak Ladies' Union. 107 The Slovak Lutherans organized their own beneficial society in 1893, the Slovak Evangelical Union; and soon afterwards the Slovak Calvinists formed the Slovak Calvinist Union. 108 For reasons that are not evident, almost all these groups felt the strain of internal strife. A split in the First Catholic Slovak Union provided members for a new organization, the Pennsylvania Roman and Greek Catholic Union in 1893. This society intended to encourage religion, temperance, and morality, to train its members in obedience and respect for civil law and in performance of civil duties, to collect funds to pay burial benefits.109 In Chicago the local lodge of the National Slovak Society left the national organization and formed the Slovak National Society. 110 Later a similar break occurred in the Slovak Evangelical Union. In 1890 P. V. Rovnianek and his associates published the First Slovak National Almanac. Almanacs were already a Slovak European tradition. The National Slovak Society first issued its own almanac in 1893; and the First Catholic �SLOVAKIA 25 Slovak Union began its series with the Kalendar Jednota in 1896. These almanacs provided the literary reading that most Slovaks did: short stories, political essays on conditions in the United States, reviews of the year's important events, religious essays, articles on the Indians and Negroes, moral essays on how to spend Sundays, counseling articles on marriage, and almost any subject useful to the Slovak readers. In these almanacs the best Slovak writers reached their limited Slovak American public; eventually the almanacs became so popular that ,twenty-nine were published. 111 Newspapers received the strongest impetus from the national societies. The Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny were the mouthpiece of the National Slovak Society; the First Catholic Slovak Union published an official organ, the Jednota. These were real newspapers with world news, reports from the domestic scene in America, and organization news in their columns. One feature distinguished these papers from the trend turning American newspapers into large business enterprises; the Slovak immigrant papers remained very much the voice of the individual editors. However, many Slovaks had no desire to read a newspaper. The editors, who usually combined editing with other work to earn their living, on Saturday and Sunday toured Slovak settlements to get subscriptions for their periodicals. 112 Very soon after the organization of the two fraternal societies the Slovaks learned how effective and necessary cooperation on a national level can be. When the price of steel billets began to fall, the Edgar Thompson Works in Braddock, Pa., announced a wage cut. This led to a strike late in 1890. On the night of January 1, 1891, Michael Quinn, a guard at the mill was slain. Many Slovaks were arrested, among them persons who had been strolling about after a pleasant evening in a tavern. The police arrested about sixty persons and charged them with being involved in the crime. Most of them received light sentences, but on April 8, 1891, Andrew Toth, Michael Sabol, and George Rusnak received the death sentence for the murder of Michael Quinn. Only by heroic efforts did the Slovak leaders and organizations secure on February 7, 1892 a commutation of sentence to life imprisonment. 113 The efforts of Rev. F. Wider, president of the First Catholic Slovak Union, Peter V. Rovnianek of the National �26 SLOVAKIA Slovak Society, Rev. Stephen Furdek, and Julius Wolf, won the release of Michael Sabol, suffering from tuberculosis, in 1895; he died ten days after leaving prison. Peter V. Rovnianek, engaging a lawyer, Clarence Burleigh, secured the freedom of George Rusnak in 1897; George Rusnak, too, had tuberculosis. Andrew Toth left prison only twenty years later, a man sixty two years old. After the efforts of the Slovak League had failed, Edward Goehring, an attorney, succeeded in showing that the evidence which convicted Toth was contradictory. Toth was freed in 1911. The Pennsylvania legislature rejected a motion to give Toth $300.00 for every year he had spent unjustly in jail. However, the Carnegie Foundation fixed a grant of $40 a month on him. 114 During February, 1891, a strike against the firm of Henry Clay Frick, Frick and Company, bec:;_me general in the Connellsville, Pa., area of coke ovens and soft coal. By 1889 Frick had acquired 35,000 acres of coal area and 15,000 coke ovens and employed about 30,000 workers. Andrew Virostek, a worker in the Tip Top Mine and member of the United Mine Workers of America, threatened miners who loaded more coal than union regulations permitted. Then the company fired him. The union fought the mine operators over the dismissal, and by February a strike flared throughout the region. On April 2, 1892 when about five hundred miners attacked the Southwest Company shops in Morewood, Pa., three Slovaks, three Poles, and one Italian were shot to death. The state militia came in to restore order, and some men drifted to work. Frick hired Pinkerton detectives to expel the remaining strikers from the company homes. During the week of April 18, 1892 these detectives were to oust seven hundred families in Fayette county alone. When the agents began the evictions, a Slovak man and woman perished in the violence in Leisenring No. 3, two Slovak women were wounded at Adelaide, and at Trotter, sixteen men and thirteen women were shot. Then in the following month Frick began hiring Negroes and Italians to replace the Slovaks. 115 Julius Wolf and Peter V. Rovnianek figured secretly in the settlement of the strike. The Frick company paid them sums of money for persuading the miners to return to the pits. Unwisely, the two men discussed the deal in letters, �SLOVAKIA 27 which their enemies subsequently published. Slovak immigrant writing has branded these letters as the "Four Letters of Betrayal. " 116 The Slovaks' preoccupation with wages, bad housing, and mine disasters seem to have led to a decline in religious fervor. Causes suggested to explain the decline varied: nonconfessional schools, public schools, neglect by religious authorities, too great preoccupation with earning a living. 117 Evidence exists to show that some Catholics fell away. A "Home Mission among the Slavic Immigrants" in 1885 supported a Congregational Church in Cleveland; it also provided a Presbyterian Church in New York. 118 The effectiveness of these efforts among the Slovaks, it is impossible to judge. In Mt. Pleasant, Pa., a Slovak preacher came to the "Church of God" and succeeded in bringing at least 7 SloYak Catholic families into it. 119 Higganum, Conn., had a Slovak colony of about 20 families; some Slovak Catholics went to church only to keep their benefits in the Jednota; others were entirely indifferent, so far gone that they married in the Lutheran church, even though a Catholic priest was always available. 120 The namecalling contest between P. V. Rovnianek and the Rev. Stephen Furdek, unedifying as it was, certainly spread anti-clericalism among the nationalist element. This apparent religious decline should not blind us to the extensive church building activities of the Slovak immigrants during the 1890's. Frequently the construction of a church or organization of a parish began in cooperation with another national group, Poles, Croatians, Irish, or Germans; sometimes many different nationalities cooperated, Lithuanians, Poles, Italians, and Irish. Often cooperation failed, because each group felt its rights were ignored. 121 Still, for instance, at least eight new Slovak parishes were opened in the Pittsburgh diocese; and in Cleveland from St. Ladislaus' parish St. Martin's was created in 1893. 122 A Slovak parish was organized in Kangley, Ill., as a mission of the Streator congregation, in 1892. 123 The Slovak Catholics of Chicago finally got their own parish in 1898, the Roman Catholic Church of St. Michael the Archangel. 214 Expansion was the keynote. Just after the decade ended, in 1903, there were 78 Roman Catholic Slovak churches. 125 However, the Slovaks failed to build parochial schools; this had to wait for the next decade. �28 SLOVAKIA The Slovak Lutherans of Chicago organized the Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Blessed Trinity in 1893; in 1894 the Rev. L. Boor became the pastor and in that very year began teaching the children of the parish the Slovak language. 126 Hand in hand with progress in organization appeared the elements of culture. Such efforts as the organization of the First Catholic Slovak Band in Johnstown, Pa., in 1892, were only straws in the wind. The Rev. S. Furdek in 1893 led in a move to establish a cultural organization to be called the Matica Slovenska in memory of the Slovak cultural institution disbanded by the Magyars in 1875. It held a convention in Chicago, September 26, 1893, and was incorporated in Columbus, Ohio, October 26, 1893. The Matica was to be a central organization to improve the cultural life of the Slovaks in Europe and America. On February 18, 1894 Peter V. Rovnianek, not to be behind hand, organized a Majak, literarne kola, that is, the Beacon Literary Circle, partly in opposition to the Matica, although he fervently disavowed any such a purpose. The Majak's objectives were encouragement of Slovak literature and culture, establishment of a Slovak cultural press, and nationalist agitation. The Literary Circle began publishing the first Slovak literary "journal, a forty page periodical, Majak, literary, political, and nationalist. It survived only six months. Both these organizations failed, partly through division of effort, partly through lack of interest among the Slovaks. 127 During this decade another society arose in Chicago, the First Slovak Sokol. The Sokol groups were gymnastic societies with a planned program of calisthenics, track events, and eventually all sports. Just when the first Sokol group was organized is doubtful; one source says that the First Slovak Sokol was organized in Chicago in 1892128 ; another gives the date as 1895. 129 Whatever be the case, the Sokol developed into a federation national in scope. The Slovak Catholic priests, divided though they were on the question of Slovak nationalism, united in an organization known as the Society of Roman Catholic Slovak Priests in 1896. Peter V. Rovnianek originated another club in the same year, the first Slavonic Political Club with 100 members, and its influence was soon felt in politics. 130 Both of these organizations were successful, in contrast to the cul- �SLOVAKIA 29 tural societies; it seems that the early Slovak immigrants were not sufficiently interested to support purely cultural groups. The cultural society and literary circle failed because labor conflicts occupied the Slovaks' attention. The Connellsville mine region was again the scene of a strike and violence that began in April, 1894. On April 4 a Slovak was slain; two days later Joseph Paddock, chief engineer of Frick's company in Davison, Pa., was killed. Blame for this crime fell on the Poles and Slovaks and over a hundred were thrown into the Uniontown jail. The court sentenced John Husar to twelve years and Michael Furin to three years in prison. Violence continued: one Slovak was killed on the main street of Connellsville and two others in the rioting at Stickle Hollow around the Washington Coal and Coke shops. At the beginning of August most of the Strikers had returned to work, but about 5,000 Slovaks remained on strike. These gradually drifted back to work or abandoned the Connellsville mines. The Rev. Orbach, a Lutheran minister, founded a Slovak colony in Wisconsin; on September 4 about 300 Slovaks set out for Wisconsin. Another farm settlement originated from the Connellsville strike. Industrial life was, after all, strange to the Slovak; he had either been a small farmer, peasant, or agricultural worker in Slovakia. His interest in acquiring a farm remained; but he did not become a farmer immediately after he landed simply because he did not have the money to invest in such a project. 131 Besides, the city gave him the companionship he would not find on the farm. Still the desire grew to place as many Slovaks as possible on the land. In the summer of 1894 Peter V. Rovnianek, Francis Pucher, Julius Tatraj, Rev. btephen Furdek, Rev. Vaclav Panu~ka, and Rev. Alexander Dzubaj examined land in Arkansas near Grand Prairie; they intended to settle Slovaks on some 40,000 acres of land. Peter Rovnianek and Francis Pucher received a charter for the Slovak Colonization Company of Pittsburgh on September 24, 1894, the land was bought, and sales began. After the prospective settlers had saved enough money, they bought forty or so acre farms from the Slovak Colonization Company. The cost of land was $2 to $3 an acre. 132 �30 SLOVAKIA Slovak settlers established a farm community near Stuttgart, Arkansas, and named their community Slovaktown. The settlers had been born in the "old country" but came to Arkansas chiefly from the coalfields of Pennsylvania and Illinois. The chief produce included corn, oats, hay, fruits, vegetables, and dairy products. The children attended the public schools. The settlers were mostly Catholics, but there were a few Lutherans. 133 The new farmers in Slovaktown were more than satisfied with their new lives; their letters continually encouraged their fellow Slovaks to flee from the factories and the mines; but only in the 1900's did anything like a movement to the farm begin. To publicize the project and success of Slovaktown the Slovak Colonization Company began publishing a periodical, Slovaktownske Hlasy, in Pittsburgh in 1896; but it lasted only six months. 134 It might indeed have been well for the Slovaks to leave the mines and go to the farms, for violence once again found them; this time it was in the anthracite region of northeastern Pennsylvania. One day in September, 1897 a group of strikers set out for Latimer. Sheriff Martin informed of the move, summoned his deputies and attempted to halt the men. Sharp words were exchanged, and Sheriff Martin ordered his deputies to fire upon the unarmed men. Twenty-one fell before the murderous gunfire and died; many others were wounded. Most of the victims were Slovaks. In spite of the unprovoked nature of the attack, the courts declared Sheriff Martin innocent, for he had ordered the shooting while performing his duty. The outcry against this verdict was most violent in the Slav press, but nothing further could be done. 135 Despite the internal dissensions among themselves and difficulties in the mines, a new interest appeared among the Slovaks during this decade; the most public manifestation of their nationalism came in 1899. Strange as it may seem, most Slovaks were not violent nationalists when they came to this country; the growth of nationalism was gradual and almost imperceptible. Slovak became the official language for the lodges; the societies abandoned the Hungarian flag. P. V. Rovnianek, joining the staff of the Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny in 1889, infused �31 SLOVAKIA a nationalist spirit into that paper; his National Slovak Society was nationalist in principle. Rev. S. Furdek, whose nationalism was of a very moderate kind, wanted American Slovaks to Americanize themselves; but he also felt it their duty to help the oppressed Slovaks overseas. 136 Under the force of this nationalism the Slovak immigrants gradually became more interested in the fate of Slovakia. In 1899 Father Furdek sent a lengthy memorandum to the Hungarian government, discussing the "Slovak question", but to no avail, except the publicity which such a memorandum aroused. It effected nothing practical; but it was the shadow of coming events; for the "Slovak question", was in the next decades to assume first place among the Slovaks. As the nineties passed, the Slovaks had made solid progress. Their economic and social life had improved through the national fraternal societies, which by 1899 had become important factors in Slovak life. Their membership stood as follows: THE FRATERNAL SOCIETIES Society Number of Members First Catholic Slovak Union __ _________ _ National Slovak Society _________ ___ ___ __ Pennsylvania Slovak Union ______ ___ ____ _ Evangelical Slovak Union ____ __ _______ _ First Catholic Slovak Ladies' Union _____ _ iivena --------- --- -------------- -- ---Source: "Slovenske (1899), IV, 38. pomery v Amerike", KALENDAR 11,000 9,450 1,727 909 1,600 1,000 JEDNOTA The religious life of the Slovaks had a chance to develop now that churches had been built. For the Roman Catholics there were now in America 33 priests, and for the Greek Catholics 32; and more were needed. 137 However, not all the picture was bright. Indeed, these were the things the Slovaks needed; but it was only after 1900 that the advance in education, the business world, political life, became pronounced. FOOTNOTES 1. Emily Green Balch, Our Slavic Fellow Citizens (New York, 1910), p. 86, pp. 88-89, p. 93. �32 SLOVAKIA 2. •F ranti§ek Hru§ovsky, Slovenske Dejiny (Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1939), p. 14. 3. Ibid., pp. 95-97. 4. I bid., p . 216. 5. Ibid., pp. 342-S43. 6. Joseph S,k ultety, Sketches from Slovak History (Middl etown, 1'930), pp. 106-109. 7. I bid., pp. 109-110. 8. Frantisek •Hrusovsky, This Is Slovakia (Scranton, 1953) , p . 40. 9. Ibid., pp. 40-41. 10. Peter P. Yurchak, The Slovaks: Their History and Traditions (Scranton, 1947), p. 28 . 11. Thomas Capek, The Slovaks of Hungary (New York, 1906), p . 108; 1Hrusovsky, This Is Slovakia, pp. 44-46. 12. Frantisek :J3okes, Dejiny Slovenska i Slovakov (;Bratislava, 1946), p . 158. 13. Robert A. ,Ka,nn, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National 'Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1914 (New York, 1950), I. 278. 14. Frantisek iHrusovsk y, This Is Slovakia, pp. ,47-48. 15. Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago, 1929), p. 107. 16. Ibid., p. 108. 17. Ibid., p. 59 . 18 . R. W. Seton-Watson, ed. , Slovakia Then and Now (London, 1931), pp. 244-245. 19. Street, Hungary and Democracy, p. ·65 . 20. Seton-Watson, Slovakia, p. 245. 21. Street, Hungary and Democracy, p . 64 . 22. Bokes, Deji ny Slovenska, p. 158. 23. C. J . Stree t, Slovakia: Past and Present (Westmins,ter, n.d .), p. 24. 24 . •Capek, Slovaks of Hungary, p. 96; Hrusovsky, Dejiny, p. 323. 25. ,Capek , Slovaks of Hungary, p. 166. 26 . Jirusovsky, Dejiny, p. 252. 27. Ibid., p. 325. 28. Ib i d., p. 319. 29. I bid., p. 319. 30. Seton-Watson, Slovakia, p. 117. 31. Seton•Watson, Slovakia, pp. 117-118. -3•2. I bid., p. 119. 33. I bid., p. 118. 34. Hrus ovsky, Dejiny, pp. 320-321; Bokes, Dejiny Slovenska, pp. 272-273 . 35. Seton-Watson, Slovakia, p. 176. 36 . Hrusovsky, Dejiny, p. -329 . 37. Bokes, Dejiny Slovenska, p. 276. 38 . Capek, Slovaks of Hungary, p. 150. 39. Jaszi, The Dissolution, p. 222. 40 . Ibid., p . 223 . 41. Street, •Slovakia: Past and Present, p. 56. 42. Harrison 'Thompson, Czechoslovakia in Europe (Princeton, 194-1) , p. 294. 43. Jaszi, The Dissolution, pp . 196-199. H. Ibid., p. 238. 45. Ibid., p. 231. �SLOVAKIA 33 46. F. J . Hask in s, The Immigrant: An Asset and a Liab ility (New York , 1913) , p . 35. 47. Capek, Slovaks of Hungary, p . 162. 48. I b id., p. 156. 49. Seton-Watso n , Slovakia, p. 275. 50. Ibid., p. 276. 51. Capek , Slovaks of Hungary, p. 152. 52. Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny, A u g u st 19, 1897. 53. Geor ge Stephen son , A H istory of American Immigrat ion 18201924 (New Yor k , 1926), P. 61; Carl W ittk e, We Who Built Amer ica (New York , 1939) , p. 405. 54. J eremiah J enk s a nd W. Jebt Lau ck , The Imm igration Problem: A Study of American Immigration Conditions and Needs (New York, 1922), pp. 21-22. 55 . Konstantin Culen, Dejiny Slovakov v Amerike (B r atislava, 1942), I , 38; Caspar Molch an, "Th e Developmen t of the S lovak Community in Pittsburgh 1880-1920", (Unpublished Master of Arts dissertation, U n iversity of Notr e Dame, 1948), p. 23. 56. Cul en, Deji ny, I, 38; Stephenson , History of Ame ri can I mm igrat ion , p. 89. 57. Balch , Slav ic Fellow Citizens, p . 102. 58. I bid., p. 25. 69. I b id., p. 437. 60. I bid., p. 101. 61. Culen, Dejiny, I, 60-61. 62. Ibid., I, 67. 63. Ibid., I, 67-68. ~4. Ibid., I, 60. 65. Na rodn e Noviny, Ap ril 9, 1914. 66. Cule n , Dejiny, I, 24-25. -67. Ibid., I , 26; Molchan, "Development of the S lovak Community" , p. 8. 6'8. Konsta'!lltfn Cu len, Slovenska Liga v Amerike styridsaf rocn a (Scr anton , 1947). p. 4. 69. Cul e n , Dej i ny , I, 28. 70. Ib id., I , 28-29. 71. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Comr;mnity", p. 25. 72 . Capek, Slovaks of Hunga r y , p. 156. 73. Balch, Sl a vic Fe ! low C itizens, p. 100. 74. Ibid , p. 100. 75 . William P. Dillingham, Reports of the Immigration Commision, Vol. I: Abs t racts of Reports of Immigration Commision (Washington, D . C., 1911), I, 97. 76. I b id., I, 215. 77. Ibid., I, 277. 78. J. A. F., "Nacrtok Dejin Slov. prist'ahovalectva v Amerike", Sborn ik Narodn e ho Slovenske ho Spolku (1915), I, 12. 79. Culen, Deji ny , I, 96. 80. Ib id ., I. 96; Jos e ph Kushn e r, Sl ov a c i ka tol ici pi t t sbu-rghsk e ho b is kupstv a (Passaic, 19 -16), pp. 16-17 ._ 81. J ednota , March 19, 1913. 82. Na rodn e Noviny, May 26, 1910. 83. Culen, Dejiny, I, 99. 84. Kushner, S lov a ci, p. 6. 85. Ibid., p. 12, p. 16. �34 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. l09. ll0. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. SLOVAKIA Ibid., p. 7. I bid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 7. Narodne Noviny, March 12, 19·1.!; April 27, 1911. Narodne Novlny, March 12, 1914. Culen, Dejiny, I, 82-83. Ibid., I, ·82-831; J. A. F., 'INe.crtok Dejin", Sbornik, (1915), I, 11. Culen, Dejiny, I , 82-83; "Jedno-druhe", Narodny Kalendar, (1908), XVIII, 154. Culen, DeJiny, I, 195-199. "Prorocke slova dp. Matusa Jankolu o novom systeme", Sbornik Slovenskeho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX, 81. Culen, Dejiny, I, 200. Kushner, Slov;ici, pp. 13-14; Jednota, July 15, 1914. Culen, Dejiny, I, 111-114. Culen, Dejiny, I, 108. I bid., I, 111. Ibid., I, 114-115. Ibid., 1, 115; Kon§tantin Culen, Slovaci v Amerike (Tur~lansk:r Sv. Martin, 11138), pp. 384-385. Culen, DeJlny, I, 213-214. Culen, Dejiny, I, 202. Ibid., I, 208-209. Ibid., I, 207-208. Souvenir Program: 19th Regular Convention, The National Slovak Society, (Young~town, 1946), p. i>4; P. V. Rovnianek, "Slovenslce organ!zacie v Amerike", World's Fair -Memorial of the Czechoslovak Group (,Chicago, 1933), p . 67 . IP. V. Rovnlanek, op. cit., pp . 67-68. Pennsylvanska Slovenaka Jednota (Wilkes-Barre), June 24, 1943. Jaroslav ·Pelikan, "Cesi a .Slovacl v Chicagu ", World's Fair Memorial of the Czechoslovak Group (Oh!cago,1933), p. 9•. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, p. 162. Culen, Dejiny, I, 214-215. Kushner, Slovaci, p . 10; Molchan, ''Development or the Slovak Community", p . 48. Kushner, Slovacl, pp. 10-11. Ibid., p. 8. Culen, Dejlny, I, 138-139. :Fr. Sasinek, "Mysllenky o stave nabozenstva medzi Slovakm!", Kalendar Jednota, (1,8 97), II, 139-140. Narodne Novlny, August 11, 1910. !Kushner, Slov;icl, p. 21. Jednota, March 4, 1914. Kushner, Slovacl, p . 22; Michael J . Hynes, History of the Dioceae of Cleveland (Cleveland, 1953), p. 1'53. Hynes, Diocese of Cleveland, p . 255. Kushner, Slovaci, p . 41. Kushner, Slovacl, p . 41. Kalendar J.ednota, (1903), VIII, 210-211. Jaromir Psenka a Jan Pelikan, "<'.:es! a Slovac! v Chicagu", World's Fair Memorial, p . 95 . <'.:ulen, DeJiny, I, 222-227. Pellkan a Paenka, "Cesl a Slovacl v Chicagu", World's Fair Memor ial", p. 94. �35 SLOVAKIA 1211. Joseph Cermak, "·Physical Education among the Czechs and SloTaks", World'• Fair Memorial, p. 44 . 130. Molchan, "Development o! the Slovak Community", p. 67. 131. 1Narodne Noviny, July 17, 1113. 132. Narodne Noviny, May 5, 1910. 133. Kushner, Slovaoi, p. 9; Balch, Slavic Fellow Citizens, pp. 337-33·8. 134. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, p . 115. 185. Culen, Dejlny, I, 162-18'3; Amerlkansk0-Slovenske Novlny, Feb· ruary 5, 1898. 136. Kalendar Jednota, (1899), IV, 37-41. 137. "Slovenske pomery v Amerike", Kalendar Jednota (1899), IV, 39-40. BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCES - PUBLIC DOCUMENTS U. S. Bureau o! Census Thirteenth Census of the United States: 1910, Population Statistics, Vol. I. Washington : Government Printing omce, 1913. U. S. Congress. Senate Documents. 61 Cong., 3 Session. Washington: Government Printing O!f!ce, 1911. Vols. XI and XX. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS Jednota (Middletown., Pa.), Vols. XXI-XXII (19113cl9H). Kalendar Jednota. Middletown: The First Cathol!c Slovak Union. Vols. I-XXI (1896-1915). Kalendar Narodneho Slovenekeho Spolku. Plit.ts·burgh: National Slovak Society. Vols. XX-XXIV (1912-1!116). Narodne Noviny (Pittsburgh, Pa.), Vols. I·V (1910-1914). SECONDARY SOURCES - BOOKS Abbot, Edith. Historical Aspects of the Immigration Problem. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1924. Balch, Emily Green. Our Slavic Fellow Citi.aiens. New York: Charities Publication Company, 11110. Bokes, Frantisek. Dejiny Slovenska t Slovakov. Bratislava: SloTenska Akademia Vied a Umeaii, 1946. Capek, Thomas. The Slovaks of Hrungary, Slavs and Panslavism. New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1,906. Culen, Konstantin. Dejiny Slovakov v Amerike. 2 vols. Bratislava: Matica Slovenskii., 19 42. Culen, Konstantin. Slovaci v Amerilc:e: Crty z kulturnych deJfn. Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1938. Culen, Konstantin. Slovenska Liga v Amerike styridsat'rocna. Scranton : Obrana Press, Lnc., 19,47. Eaton, A. H . Immigrant Gifts to American Life. New York: Russell Sage Foundati,m, 1933. Fairchild, Henry 0. (ed .). Immigrant Backgrounds. New York: Wiley and Sons, lnc., 1927. • Yairchild, Henry 0. (ed.). Immigration: A World Movement and its American Significance. New York: The Mcmillan Company, 1926. i'aulkner, Harold U. The Quest for Social Justice, 189-8-1914. Vol. XI or Hi-story o! America12 Life. Edited by Arthur M. Schlesinger �36 SLOVAKIA and· Dixon Ryan Fox, 13 vols . Ne1v York : Macmillan Company, 1931. Handlin, Oscar. The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that Made the American People. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951. Hansen, Marcus Lee. The Atlantic Migration, 1607-1860. Cam bri dge: . The H arvard Un iversity Press, 1940. Hansen, Marcus Lee. The Immigrant in American History. Cambridge : The Harvard Univer sity Press, 1940. Hrusovsky, F rantisek . Slovenske Dejiny. Turcian sky Sv. Martin: Matica Slove'nska, 1939. Hrusovsky, Frantisek. This is Slovakia. Scranton: Obrana Press, Inc., 1953. Hynes, Michael J. History of the Diocese of Cleveland. Cleveland : Diocese of •Cleveland, 1953. Jaszi, O'scar. The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1929. Jenks, Jeremiah W. and Lauck, W . Jett. The Immigration Problem . New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 19 22 . Kann, Robert A. The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918. 2 vols. New York: The Columbia U niversity Press, 1950. Kushner, Jos eph. Slovaci katolfci pittsburghskeho b iskup:::tva. P as saic: The Slovak Catholic Sokol, ·1946. Nev ins, Allan. The Emergence of Modern America, 1865-1878. Vol. VIII of A History of American Life. Edited by Ar t hur M. Schlesinger and Dixon Ryan Fox, 13 vols. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927. . Orth, Samuel P. Our Foreigners: A Chronicle of J).mericans in the Making . Vol. 35 of the .Chronicles of America. Edited by ;\llen Johnson, 56 vols. New Haven ·: Yale University Press, 1920. · Park, •Robert. The lmmigran_t Press an~ its Control. New York: Harper and Bro-thers, 1922. Pauco, J oseph. l.!.udovychova u Sturovcov: Obdobie Slovenskych Na rodnych Novin. Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1943. Purcell, William J. (ed.). Catholic Pittsburgh 's One Hundred Years. Chicago: Loyola U n iversity Press, 1943. Seton-Watson , R . W. Racial Problems in Hungary. London: Constable, 1908. Seton-Watson, R. W. (ed.). Slovakia Then and Now. Prague: Orb is Publishing Company, 1931. Shaugnessy, . Gerald. Has t he l.mmigrant Kept the Faith ? New York:: The Macmillan Company, 1925 . · Sidor, Karol. Andrej H linka, 1864-1926. Bratislava: St. Andrew's. Press, 1934. Skultety, Joseph. Sketches from Slovak History. Middletown: The First Catholic Slova~ Union, 1930. Stephenson, George M. A History of American Immigration, 18201924. Boston: Ginn Publishing Company, 1926. Street, C. J.C. Slovakia: Past and Present. Westminster: P . S. Kingston and Son, Ltd., n. d . Tarbell, Ida. The Nationalizing of Business, 1878-1898. V ol. IX of A 'History of Ameri can Life. Edited by Arthur -M. Schlesinger and Dixo~ Ryan Fox, 13 vols. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936. �SLOVAKIA 37 Thompson, S. Harrison. Czechoslovakia in European History. Princeton: The Princeton U niversity Press, 19-44. Wittke, Carl. We Who Bui It America: The Saga of the Immigrant. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940. Yurchak, Peter P. The Slovaks: Their History and Trad itions. Revised edition. Scranton: Obrana Press, Inc., 1947. ARTICLES F., J. A. "Nacrtok dejin s lov. prisfahovalectva v Amerike", Sbornik Narodneho Slovenskeho Spolku, I (1915), 20-39 . Jamar ik, Paul. "Zivot Americkych .Slovakov dakedy a teraz_" , Sbornik Na rodneho Slovenskeho Spolku, I (1915), 98-109. "Prorocke slova dp. Matusa Jankolu o novom systeme", Sborn ik Slovensk e ho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX. Shipman, Andr ew J . "Slavs ~-n America", The Catholic Encyclopedia, XIV (1913). 51-57. Stephenson, George M. "Immigration", Dictionary of American History, III (1940), 73-75. "The Slovak Sokol", Sborn ik S lovenske ho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX, 242-243. Timasheff, Nicholas. "Education", Slavonic Encyclopedia. Edited by Joseph .S. 1Roucek. New York: The Philosophical Library, Inc., 1949, pp. 261-269. Ware, Caroline. "Immigration", Encyclopedia of Soc ia l Sc iences, VII (1932), 587-595. World 's Fair Memorial of the Czechos lo va k Group. Chicago: Czechoslovak Group, 1933. Bradac, John S. "Slovenski Evanjelici-Luterani v Spojenych Statoch", pp. 81-83. Cermak, Joseph. "Physical Education among the Czechs and Slovaks in America", pp. 42-45. ·· Pelikan, J. and Psenka, R. Jaromir. "Cesi a Slovaci v Chicagu", pp. 89-97. Rovnianek, Peter V. "Slovenske organizacie v Amerike", pp. 66-68. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES Gregorovic, Sister M. Counsuela, SS.C.M . "Father Jankola's Con tribution t0 Catholic Education in America". Unpublis hed Master of Arts dissertation. History Department, Catholic University, 1943. Molchan, Caspar, C.S.C . "The Development of the Slovak Comqiunity in Pittsburgh, 1880-1920". Unp ub lished Master of Arts di sserta·,£ion. History Department, U niversity of Notre Dame, 1948. · Stefan, Sister M. Leocadia, SS.C .M. "The Reverend Stephen Furdek" . Unpublis-h ed Master of Arts dis se r tation. History Depar tment, Catholic University, _ 1952. Teplicky, Sister M. Berchmans, SS .C.M. "Educational Activities of the Sisters of SS. Cy,ril and Methodius". Unpublishe d Master of Arts diss ertation. Education Department, Marywood College, 1945. � SLOV AKIA Pub lished by the Slovak League of America VOL XV 1965 NO. 38 EARLY BEGINNINGS OF THE SLOVAKS IN AMERICA By James J. Zatko, Ph.D. , University of Notre Dame Occupying the area enclosed by the Carpathian mountains, the Danube River, and the Theiss River, the Slovaks to the number of two million or 12% of the total population of Hungary, eked out a meagre existence between the two rivers and the mountains. Because the Slovaks had to struggle for a living, men and women were inured to hard work and to a very low standard of living. Their facial features form two general types: the round-faced with wide-set eyes, and the long-headed narrow face with a long nose. The people live in villages consisting of long, low brick or wood houses with hand-made shingles. The interiors were generally neat and tidy, even where there was an earthen floor. 1 Slovakia itself is a geographic unit, whose northern boundary runs along the Carpathian mountains, and whose southern boundary is the Danube River and the Theiss River, which cut deep valleys and ravines through the mountain ridges. The land is divided in the west by the streams flowing to the Danube, by those flowing to the Theiss in eastern Slovakia, with a central Slovak upland lying between. 2 The area consists of about 18,895 square miles of mostly agricultural land, but the land is not the best for cultivation, much of it being woodland and the rest not very fertile. Bratislava was the capital, the ancient coronation city of Hungarian Kings before Budapest, and a great Danubian river port at the cross-roads of Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary. Other important cities in Slovakia are: Trnava in western Slovakia, Nitra in west central Slovakia on the river Nitra, Zilina in northern Slovakia on the river Vah, Turciansky Sv. Martin in north central Slovakia, Zvolen in central Slovakia, and Kosice in eastern Slovakia. 3 Within Slovakia itself population shifted during the �2 SLOVAKIA fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, by occupying the northern highlands in Slovakia. The villagers of the central plain and the river valleys created new settlements especially in Orava in the north, Trencin in the west, Zvolen in the central portion; the new settlers on the Carpathian mountainsides began to engage in animal husbandry, especially sheep-raising. 4 At the end of the seventeenth century an emigration strictly so-called began. Only individuals and very small groups left the recently settled highlands at first. The saffron-dealers and dealers in medicinal oils from Turiec county in north central Slovakia carried their home products all over eastern Europe, crossed Asia, as far as the Pacific coast of Siberia. In the business they established in Russia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Siberia, they often employed their own countrymen. Weavers from Orava county in the north and lace makers from the Hron River region sold their wares in Hungary and central Europe generally. Menders with wire and glaziers from Trencin county in the northwest of Slovakia wandered throughout central Europe; the more enterprising settled in Germany and Russia. From the eighteenth century, after the Turk had been expelled from central and southern Hungary, the poverty stricken of Slovakia began to migrate into Hungary in quest of lands and helped to repopulate the area as well as to restore its economic productivity through agriculture. Thus did Slovak settlements originate in Hungary, Rumania, Yugo-Slavia, Bulgaria, and the Banat. 5 The poverty which accelerated this new shift in population was caused by a decline in economic and commercial activity in Slovakia itself. Early in the eighteenth century there had still been considerable export of cattle and wine from Nitra and Bratislava counties, production of cloth in Myjava, forestry and river traffic, mining and textile production. Although Maria Theresa favored Austrian industries against those of Hungary, only during the reign of Joseph II did non-Slovak manufacturers begin to compete effectively with native products; and the soil in Slovakia was insufficient to provide a livelihood for the Slovak masses. 6 A migration began from the Slovak counties across their southern borders into Hungary. In 1787 eleven counties in Hungary had a population of 1,537,969, whereas the counties in Slovakia had 1,535,480. Sixty years afterwards the Hun- �SLOVAKIA 3 garian counties had in 1848 a population of 2,844,830 and the counties of Slovakia had a population of 1,910,000. In 1787 Budin in Hungary had a population of 23,000 and Pest in Hungary, had only 16,000; Presporok in Slovakia had 29,000 and Banska Stiavnica in Slovakia had 24,000. After 83 years, in 1870, the population of Banska Stiavnica had declined to 12,000. 7 This decline in population, as the figures above indicate, extended to the period of the great exodus to America after 1873. As in the migration to Hungary, so in the modern migration to America economic conditions provided the main force that helped to empty Slovakia, but there were other causes, namely, political, social, and economic. The political ambitions of the Slovaks were closely linked with the rise of nationalism in Slovakia, which developed from three factors, contemporary trends of thought in Europe, outside pressure by the Magyars, and Slovak internal life itself. A conviction developed in the people that the country which they occupied was their own and that within it they had rights not to be contravened by any power. This thought was emphasized in a book by John Baltazar Magin who spoke in 1728 of the rights of the Slovak nation . Memories of Slovak antiquity began to be revived. George Papanek published Of Slovak Kings and K ingdoms in 1780; George Sklenar in 1783 wrote of the glories of Greater Moravia, and in 1793 George Fandli published a revision of Papanek's book. The Slovak poet John Holly portrayed the events of the Slovak past in an epic Sviitopluk (1833), in his book Slav (1834), and in Cyrilo-Methodi ada (1835)8 These writings prepared the ground for further studies in the Slovak language. During the Reformation the Czech language had spread in Slovakia among the Slovak Protestants ; but it remained a foreign language in Slovakia. This led to the cultivation of Slovak as the particular language of the Slovak nation. Matthew Bel-Funtik (1687-1749) wrote of the Slovak language that "in no respect does it fall behind the ponderousness of Spanish, the charm and smoothness of English, the richness and emphasis of German, the softness and tenderness of Italian or the imperious sternness of Magyar." Since the Slovaks had no national literary medium as late as the end of the eighteenth century, Anton Bernolak created a national literary language based on the western �4 SLOVAKIA or Trnava dialect. In 1787 he published a grammar of literary Slovak and later also published a six volume SlovakCzech-Latin-German-Magyar dictionary. 9 The greatest writer of the "Bernolakian" school was John Holly, who is described as "in the fullest sense the awakener of national consciousness by right of actualizing what others had planned and dreamed of." 10 Even though a considerable school of "Bernolakian" writers developed, the western Slovak dialect failed to become the national idiom. Uudovit Stur (1815-1856) together with the Lutheran pastors Joseph Miloslav Hurban (18171888) and Michael Miloslav Hurban established the definite form of literary Slovak, based upon a dialect spoken in the eight central counties. Together they founded a literary and publishing society, Tatrin (1844), and began to publish the political journal Slovenske narodnie noviny (1845), and the literary monthly, Slovenske pohl'ady (1846). The use of the Slovak language became an essential demand in Slovak political agitation. In May of 1848 the Slovak nationalist leaders met in the rectory of Michael Miloslav Hodza in Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas, where they drew up a political program for the Slovaks: "Petitions of the Slovak Nation." They expressed no desire to break away from the Hungarian state; they wanted defined boundaries for Slovak lands, social, political, cultural equality of Slovaks with Hungarians, and official recognition of the Slovak language. When the leaders planned to submit this program for the approval of the Slovak people, the Hungarian government forbade Slovak assemblies and imprisoned the Slovak leaders. 11 The hand of Eudovit Stur was obvious in the program. Already in 1847 he had listed these grievances: manorial courts, maldistribution of public offices, lack of uniform taxation, need of reform in the judicial system, insufficient freedom of the press and speech; he also demanded the use of the Slovak language in schools, churches, and courts. 1 z With the demands of Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas ignored and then repressed, the Slovaks took to revolutionary activity against the Hungarians. Since their only hope of relief lay with the central government at Vienna, they threw in their lot with the imperial forces of Habsburg against the �SLOVAKIA 5 revolution of Kossuth. After the prostration of Magyarism through Russian intervention in 1849, the Slovaks were prepared to accept a limited territorial sovereignty from the imperial government; but even though the assimilative policy of the Magyars was suspended, centralization, not autonomy, remained the order of the day. In the Spring of 1861 the Slovaks renewed their political activity. After their political principles had been published in the newspapers, an assembly was called to meet in Turciansky Sv. Martin. The prominent attorney Stephen Marko Daxner formulated the political program: recognition of the Slovak nation by imperial edict, the constitution of Slovakia as a distinct administrative unit in Hungary, the right of Slovaks to develop their own life without restriction. This "Memorandum of the Slovak People" was presented to the Emperor Franz Joseph; the only result was that the Slovaks were allowed to establish the cultural institution, the Matice, Slovenska. 14 Austria's defeat by Prussia in 1866 forced a settlement with the Magyars. Known as the Compromise of 1867, it granted Magyars internal independence and divided the Empire into two countries under one crown. The Compromise of 1867 and the dualistic sys.tern based on it, appeared before public opinion as the compromise of the Austrian Emperor with the Hungarian feudal classes which the liberal German high bourgeoisie accepted, though not without serious hesitation, in order to secure its own hegemony against tbe will of the Slav majority.15 Jaszi observes that this artificial dualistic system could be maintained only "by a corrupt and restricted electoral system, by open ballot, and by terroristic procedures in the administrative and military machine." 16 The political injustices after 1867 should therefore be considered not only against a background of Magyarization but also seen as a means used to preserve the structure of the dual monarchy. The electoral laws and improper representation in the Hungarian parliament were among the grievances. For instance, in the 58 electoral areas inhabited by Slovaks for the most part, these deputies were elected: �6 SLOVAKIA ELECTION OF DEPUTIES 1865-1881 Year Magyar Deputies 1865 1869 1872 1875 1878 1881 58 58 56 58 58 58 Slovak Deputies 0 0 2 0 0 0 Source: C. J. Street, HU GARY AND DEMOCRACY (London, 1923), PP. 57-58. The constituencies and polling stations were so arranged that Magyar communities were assured of easy access •to the poll, while non-Magyar communities had ,to travel great distances. It wa-s no uncommon trick for the local authorities to declare roads and bridges unsafe for traffic on the day of election, or for all the hors es in non-Magyar districts to be placed under veterinary supervision and forbidd en to move outside the commune.17 The Slovaks had grievances against the judicial system. Until 1871 the judicial and administrative spheres were not separated. In that year judicial reform was inaugurated. Criminal and civil cases were dealt with in the District and Sedrial courts as the first instance, the Tables as the second, and the Royal Curia in Budapest as the final one. 18 The Slovaks complained too that the nationality of the legal officers did not correspond to the national distribution of population. In 1910 there were 2,633 judges and official lawyers in Hungary; 2,601 were Magyars, 31 Germans, 1 Slovak. This was the proportion of legal officers in a country where the Slovaks formed 12 % of the population.19 Moreover, in spite of the fact that the law of Nationalities (1868) admitted other languages to court, 20 the law remained a dead letter, for summonses were issued in Magyar, and verdicts given in Magyar, and the need of an interpreter was disregarded. 21 Slovaks also called for freedom of the press. 22 Between 1905 and 1908 there were 43 court actions against fourteen Slovak newspapers ; sentences totaling eleven years and three months were imposed as well as fines totaling 11,000 crowns for Pan-Slavistic activities. 23 Besides these unsettling political factors, other social causes added to the sense of national frustration. �SLOVAKIA 7 At the basis of the cultural conflict was the idea of the Magyar state. The law of Hungary recognized only one nation in Hungary, and that was the Magyar. To be secure, Hungary had to be Magyar. The objective of political action became to create one nation, Magyar in sentiment and speech, from the multinational and polylingual Hungarian lands. 24 This ideal was pushed by every means: newspapers, the society for the Magyarization of Proper Names founded in 1880, and 1898 law to give all towns Magyar names; suppression of the Slovak language in rail, postal, and telegraph service. 25 As one reaction against the process of forcible assimilation, the Slovak sought comfort and national security in Pan-Slavism. Having become conscious of the larger Slav community, the Slovak nationalist leaders shook off their feeling of inferiority and began to place their hopes of realizing national ideals in the larger Slav group. 26 The Hungarians reacted by denouncing as Pan-Slav any Slovak who refused to renounce his nationality and language. 27 The chief means of transforming Slovaks into Magyars were to be the schools. After the Compromise of 1867, an attack was launched against German, Slovak, and Ruthenian schools. Bela Grunwald in 1873 began publishing Svornost', a bi-monthly, attacking the Slovak gymnasia as hot-beds of Pan-Slavism. 28 The gymnasium at Revuca was closed August 20, 1874; the one at Klastor pod Znievom, on September 21, 1874; and the one at Turciansky Sv. Martin, on December 30, 1874. 29 All Slovak elements were expelled from secondary and technical schools, and permission was refused to erect a chair of Slovak at the University of Budapest.30 The school statistics reveal this Magyarizing tendency: SCHOOLS IN SLOVAKIA 1910-1918 Schools Primary Grammar Indus., Comm., Agric. Teacher training Middle (High Schools) University Magyar Slovak German 3,777 101 118 419 20 39 �8 SLOVAKIA Source: Nicholas Timashe!f, PEDIA (1948), p. 262. "Education," SLAVONIC ENCYCW- The official statistics of the Hungarian government in 1914 reveal the extent of Magyarization. They list 256,020 children of Slovak language as attending school. Of these, 214,267 Slovak children were in purely Magyar elementary schools, and only 42,186 in 365 Slovak elementary schools. 31 Educational standards were low. Attendance was weakly enforced; in most villages the schools remained open for five or six months per year. In 1913, just before World War I, 32,700 Slovak children of school age were not enrolled.32 Naturally the results were bad. Those able to read and write averaged 63 per cent of the Slovak population; but individual counties had worse records. In the county of Saris, only 48.6 per cent, in Spis 58 per cent, in Zemplin 51.4 per cent, in Ung 43.5 per cent could read and write. 33 The Matica Slovenska or Slovak Institute, a national cultural society founded in 1863, was dissolved in 1875. The charges were unlawful political activity and mismanagement. The government seized not only money and property but also the library and museum. 34 Even the churches were made instruments of Magyarization. The religious history of the period 1867-1914 is dark, indeed. Bishop Parvy of Spis lived in Budapest for many years; Bishop Balasz of Roznava ignored everything Slovak as though it were non-existent. The Cardinal-Primate of Hungary, Czernoch, was of Slovak birth, but Magyar in thought and sentiment. 35 Often other priests felt their people's cultural humiliation and endeavoured to alleviate it, but were placed so that their influence was limited. The Lutheran General Assembly resolved against "Pan-Slavism" in 1882; in no district did the Slovak Lutherans have a majority.36 However, the chief reasons for Slovak emigration in the latter half of the nineteenth century seem to have been economic.37 The predominantly agricultural nature of the country's economy is best illustrated by the following chart on agriculture: �SLOVAKIA 9 POPULATION ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE 1910 Total Population in 1,000 Austrian Provinces Counties of Hungarian Crown Bosnia and Herzogovina Total Total engaged in Agriculture in 1,000 Agricultural Percentage 28,572 13,842 48.5 % 20,886 13,470 64.5% 1,932 1,674 86.6 % ----------------- - -- - -- - ----- --- - --51,390 28,982 Source: Oscar Ja,szi, THE DIS,SOLUTION MONARCHY (Chicago, 1929) p. 195. 56.4 % OF THE IHABSBUHG The soil was not of the best quality. Woodland averaged about 15 per cent of the total. In Turiec county 33 per cent was unfit for cultivation; in Orava, 30 per cent; in Zvolen, 32 per cent; in Liptov, 41 per cent; in Novohrad, 26 per cent; in Gerner, 47 per cent; Spis, 37 per cent; in Saris, 43 per cent. In Orava county there were 2761 farms that averaged one to five acres; of this land only 43 per cent was arable. 38 In addition to the problem of poor soil, there existed the problem of the great estates. Speaking of Hungary in general, Jaszi says that 40 per cent of the total area of Hungary was occupied in 1913 by a small number of large and very large estates. The medium sized farms of 142 to 1,420 acres embraced a smaller area, but with the greater estates covered 54.4 per cent of the total territory. Over 64.4 per cent of the country was possessed by small farmers holding less than 142 acres. Moreover, only 34.5 per cent of Hungarian territory belonged to those who actually cultivated the soil. 39 In Hungary proper, without !Croatia, there lived 2,280,000 farmer families. According to the most optimistic calculation only 460,000 families owned property on the average above 20 acres, guaranteeing an independent livelihood, whereas 1,820,000 families, that is to say four fifths of them possessed only so-called "dwarf" properties or no property at all.40 �10 SLOVAKIA If we consider the situation of Slovakia in particular, an equally cheerless picture presents itself. In Slovakia 1,000 persons owned 2,100,000 hectares, that is, about 8,000 square miles; 21.5 per cent of the holdings were less than a half hectare in size; 41 75 per cent of the land was held by the great landlords. 42 The agricultural areas compared unfavorably with the western and northwestern parts of the Habsburg Monarchy. The industrialized parts did not exceed three-tenths of the entire territory of the Monarchy, whereas over seven-tenths were populated by peasants, poor, almost on the level of slow starvation. 43 One way to raise the peasant's standard of living was to raise the productivity of agricultural labor and the growth of crops. Between 1850 and 1895 there was progress in agricultural production. Improvements were made in Hungary after 1848, e.g., the iron plow replaced the wooden. The great landlords led the advance and the peasants imitated them. These landlords in Hungary between 1850 and 1890 were deeply interested in improving agricultural production, chiefly because of the high price of wheat in the world market. They were anxious to increase wheat production for export. After 1885 the world market price began to decline and the landlords gradually lost interest. Indeed, they began to cut production. The strategy was to create a domestic scarcity so that wheat would have to be imported. The objective of the policy was to transform a grain exporting country into a grain importing one. This would enable the landlords to raise the price of domestic grain to the world price augmented by the tariff. By 1907 the tariffs began to have a constant effect. In this situation the lot of the agricultural worker grew steadily worse. Unemployment grew, wages decreased, and the cost of living rose. Jaszi observes that the heavy hand of the landlord-controlled economy pushed the Monarchy toward disaster. 44 The workers' wages in Hungary averaged the equivalent of sixty to a hundred dollars a year, while a woman's wages averaged yearly only between forty and fifty dollars. 45 In Slovakia the agricultural worker earned 25 cents a day.46 His staple food in winter was cabbage and potatoes. 47 To the low wages and the agricultural poverty we must �SLOVAKIA 11 add the difficulty of buying land in Slovakia. The price of land in Slovakia by 1906 had risen in some cases 100 percent; the amount of money sent from America helped cause this price rise. The Postal Bank of Kosice received in 1896 six and a half million florins from America. 48 Over and above these burdens, the poor peasant had to bear the load of usurious banking. In pre-war Slovakia almost every town had a little joint-stock institution; although this was called a bank, it did not carry on real banking operations, but was only a savings and loan bank. The majority of these banks dispersed capital which was not available where it was needed. The banks under Magyar control followed a policy of dividends, whereas the Slovak banks paid a lower rate of interest. 49 Virtually no institutions provided long term mortgage credits; in fact, only two banks, both unsound, engaged in this business in Slovakia. Besides these banks, there were cooperative societies which offered limited cr,edit facilities to the peasants. 50 The small farmer ended up borrowing at rates of 7 per cent to 8 per cent, and sometimes rates were as high as 14 per cent. On short term loans rates of 50 per cent were not unknown. Consequently the profits of the banks were high. One bank in Slovakia with a capitalization of 60,000 crowns and reserves of 18,000 profited one year to the amount of 22,000 crowns. The average profit of the banks in 1888 was 29.56 per cent on the capital invested; in 1894 the profit was 13.58 per cent. 51 The economic situation worsened by the national addiction to drink. On this all the sources seem agreed. Impoverishing effects of overindulgence in drink were a factor in driving the Slovaks to seek improved economic conditions in America. 52 This lack of economic opportunity and security led to the migration. The following figures, though somewhat suspect because of the tendency of Magyarization, still tell an eloquent story. This table is a modification of the original. NATIONALITIES IN HUNGARY Nationality Slovaks 1880 1,855,000 1890 1,897,000 1900 2,002,000 1910 1,946,000 �12 SLOVAKIA Source: Robert A. Kann, THE -MULTINATIONAL EJMP]RE: NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL REF1ORM IN THE HABSBURG MONAROHY 1848-1914 {New York, 19 50) I, 278. The Slovaks in considerable numbers migrated to America after 1880 as part of the "new immigration". Until 1880 the bulk of the new additions to American population by immigration was predominantly either English in speech or at least derived from the northern and western areas of Europe; this was the "old immigration." Thereafter newcomers from southern and eastern Europe arrived, representing peoples who were very different in language, customs, political experiences, and personal standards of living. Italian, Greek, and the confusion of Slavic languages sounded strange indeed to ears attuned to English or Germanic sounds. Invidious comparisons were made. The "Nordic" was more akin to the American in blood; the "new immigrants" had not the Anglo-Saxon training in self-government, and they were merely birds of passage. Besides the fact that he spoke a strange language, the "new immigrant" was more often than not a Catholic. All these things set him apart from the "old immigrant." 53 The year 1873 saw the beginning of the flood. Even though the political, cultural, social, and economic causes were ripe for emigration, other causes operated to bring America to the attention of the hardpressed Slovak immigrants. The steamship company agents urged the peasants to emigrate, for the companies derived a large part of their income from transport of immigrants. In most countries there were laws prohibiting advertisements of prosperous conditions in another country. Two leading steamship companies were reported to have five or six thousand agents in Galicia alone. In Hungary, Immigration Commission members saw letters written by agents instructing prospective immigrants on how to leave the country without the government's consent, what routes to follow, and other related information. 54 Other agents who increased emigration from Hungary after 1870 were labor contractors, who came to hire workers for the mines and steel mills. These agents promised everything. Archduke Rudolph, they said, was living in South America, establishing there a new ideal state; immigrants to, �SLOVAKIA 13 the United States were to receive grants of land and aid in buying equipment and in constructing necessary buildings.55 Many peasants who went with the agents wrote back letters reporting high wages. These lett'ers were undoubtedly one of the most powerful means of persuading the Slovak peasants to cross the ocean. 56 In the earlier phases of immigration many emigrants returned to their native country after they had laid by a sufficiency of this world's goods. The figures given by the Hungarian government for emigration and return for the year of 1905 show the extent of this return movement and suggest the breadth of influence exercised by returning emigrants. In 1905 the Magyar figures list 38,770 as leaving the country, while they give 4,038 as returning to Hungary.57 The news of work and wages certainly had an effect in stimulating further emigration. The Slovak emigrants moved generally westward by rail for German or Dutch ports. During the years 1881-1900 some 372,979 Slovaks were reported to have passed through the port of Hamburg, whereas only 9,501 embarked from Italian ports. 58 During 1886-1907 the German ports handled 348,808 emigrants from Hungary, Antwerp 57,170, Dutch ports 33,762, and Italian ports 3,785. 59 The low cost of steamship crossing attracted many to undertake the difficult journey. Passage from Hamburg on the way out was $20; the return journey as far as Oderburg, a station on the Hungarian frontier, was $23.60. The Hungarian Government granted the Cunard Line the monopoly of transporting emigrants from Hungary. So great was the rush to America that the Cunard Line called on other companies and formed the "Continental Pool" to handle the traffic. This "Pool" provided the worst accommodations, the worst diet, and the worst navigation. 61 The journey's length varied from fifteen to sixty days. The emigrants fortified themselves against sea-sickness with prunes and brought their own supplies of sausage, bacon, plum brandy, and gin. Water was distributed only at intervals, sometimes only once a day. The ventilation in the living quarters was bad. 62 One emigrant described his journey in these words: "It was in the year 1883 that, with three men, I set out from Trebis ov for America. We got on a wagon that took us to Obisovce, �14 SLOVAKIA where we boarded a train and rode to Vrutky. There we obtained travel permits for Bohumfn, and from Bohumin to Bremen, where we boug1hit our steamship tickets, for which we paid 53 ,gold pieces. A chill comes over me even now when I think of that ship of ours. We were afloat almost 18 days and twice the shi p was in danger of sinking. Everything on the deck rwas broken, a nd water poured into it. And as the boat rocked, one could feel that even in one's s-tomach."63 Among the ports of entry New York easily ranked first for the Slovak immigrants; then in order followed Baltimore, Philadelphia, New Orleans, Boston and Portland. 64 Nor did the ills of the immigrants cease when they landed in the United States. Often enough their meagre funds and they were quickly parted. One immigrant paid a fare of $60 for a ride from the harbor to the Lackawanna railroad station. Hotels deliberately detained the immigrants by telling them that the train to their destination made the trip only once a week. Other swindlers met the immigrants as they came ashore and offered to send a telegram to their relatives or friends for the price of twenty five cents ; needless to say, no telegram was sent, and the immigrants were only so much poorer. One porter kidnapped two young girls who ended in brothels.85 The Slovak immigrants of the 1880's were not the first Slovaks to set foot upon American soil. The very first Slovak to come to America, so far as we know, was Andrew Jelik, a tailor on a Dutch ship which sailed to America in 17541755. He did not remain in America and eventually died in Budin, Hungary, 1783.66 Another Slovak who had arrived in America in the eighteenth century was Count Maurice Benovsky who landed at Baltimore in 1775. He was but an adventurer whose later career took him to Madagascar where he became king and where he also perished. 67 In the year 1800 a Slovak dealer in oils surprised a Slovak Jesuit in Mexico City by making his confession in Slovak. 68 The first Slovak settlement was made in Philadelphia by drotari, wireworkers, in 1840 at 412-414 Front Street. 69 Martin Chalan landed in the United States in 1872, took out his first papers in 1876, and became a citizen in 1879. Making the trip back and forth across the ocean, he was h1 America twenty six times. He died in 1915. 70 In the wake of these individuals the larger numbers began to come, first, from eastern Slovakia, especially from the �SLOVAKIA 15 counties of Zemplin, Sari~, and Spis. 71 Between the years 18691890 the county of Spis lost 14% of her youths between 20 to 25 years of age, and 31 % of the men between 26 and 30; Saris lost 34% of those between 20 and 25, 44 % of the men between 26 and 30. 72 Only after the eastern counties did the western ones take to emigration. To give exact figures on Slovak immigration before 1899 is impossible because prior to 1899 the immigration authorities counted the immigrants according to country of last residence, and many Slovaks listed Hungary as their country of last residence. Since 1899 the immigrants are counted according to race or language. Therefore the figures before 1899 do not give us exact data on Slovak immigrants; but according to Emily Green Balch the earlier immigrants from Hungary may be presumed to be Slovaks with some Jews and Magyars included. 73 In 1873 immigrants from Hungary numbered 1,300; in 1880 4,000 entered the United States, and in 1884 the number rose to 15,000. 74 The following table shows the total number of Slovaks coming into this country in the years 1899 to 1909: SLOVAK IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES Year ending June 30 Number 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 15,838 29,243 29,343 36,934 34,427 27,940 52,368 38,221 42,041 16,170 Source: Emily Green Balch, OUR (New York, 1910), P. 103. 22,568 SLAVIC FELLOW CITI ZENS In the period 1899-1910 the total immigration to the United States numbered 9,555,673; in this number there were 337,527 Slovaks. 75 Consideration of Table 5 shows that �Hl SLOVAKIA 1905 was the peak year for the Slovaks in which 52,368 of them were admitted. Numerically in the twelve years ending June 30, 1910 Slovakia ranked eighth among the nations providing immigrant material. 76 The rate of emigration of Slovaks per 1,000 was 18.6; this was double that of any other race of people, except the Hebrews (18.3), Croatian-Slovenians (13.1), and South Italians (11.9). The rate was the highest of any group. 77 Having arrived in the United States, the Slovak immigrants began to look for a place to live and to work. The first areas to draw them were the coal mine centers; only in the second instance did the Slovaks settle in the factory cities.78 One focus of settlement was the hard-coal area of northeastern Pennsylvania where the center was Hazleton, Pennsylvania. Before World War I the mines in this district employed 75,000 to 100,000 men; of this group 12% were Slovaks. 79 In the soft coal area of southwestern Pennsylvania Mt. Pleasant was the center of dispersion. From there the Slovaks moved northward to Latrobe or Greensburg, southward to Connellsville and Uniontown. The chief centers of Slovak settlement were: Alice, Standard, Bessemer, Bridgeport, Mammouth, Old Hecla, New Hecla, Calumet, Old Tarrs, Donnelly, Buckeye, Moyer, Johnstown, Pittsburgh, Gayette City, Brownsville, Masontown, Fairchance, Point Marion, Cannonsburg, Perryopolis, Republic, and others. 80 Only later did pockets of immigrants form in Chicago, Cleveland, and Detroit. About the geographic dispersion of Slovaks an interesting note occurs in a letter sent to the Jednota in 1913 by a J . P. Kapas, who had been traveling in the west. He wrote: "There had been plenty of Slovak people in the west, but almost all returned to the eastern states, and only for this r eason that in the west the people were all foreigners and wild." 81 Alaska seems to have been the limit of immigration, at least as far as the group was concerned. John Miklas, writing from Alaska, recommended against coming and said that he had not found any Slovaks there as yet. He surmised, however, that after his return from the "Old Country", where he meant to go for a visit, he might settle in Alaska.82 By 1885 large groups of Slovaks had settled in the fol- �SLOVAKIA 17 lowing states: Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Illinois. 83 In the hard coal area in northeastern Pennsylvania a sub-employment system was used in which an operator hired the men who dug and loaded the coal; the mine company paid the operator and he paid off his hired men. The Slovaks, inexperienced in mine work and unskilled in language, worked merely as the hired men; this left them exposed to the wiles of unscrupulous operators who kept some of the pay from them. 84 In 1856 the Pennsylvania Railroad had reached Pittsburgh from Philadelphia; the Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railroad in 1871 built tracks to Pittsburgh, thus giving Pittsburgh an outlet to Baltimore. The demand for laborers in the mine fields of Westmoreland and Fayette Counties in Pennsylvania was answered by many Slovak men from the hard coal area and "the old country." But who the first Slovak was to enter the Pittsburgh area we do not know. When the agents of the Frick Company from the coke and coal region of southwestern Pennsylvania hired new immigrants · at Castle Garden, but for trivial exceptions the hired men were Slovaks. The company transported them by rail to Alverton, lying between Scottdale and Mt. Pleasant, Pa. Thence they walked to Morewood, Pa., where a company house awaited them. It is impossible to tell how many Slovaks there were in the coke region. We do know that in Morewood by 1893 there were four hundred men engaged in work, and how many Slovaks there were in this group we do not know. As early as 1880 John and Sophia Hvizdo~ had eighteen Slovak boarders in their house. 85 Until 1900 Slovaks worked mostly in the coal mines and at the coke ovens of Frick and Company. This firm had been organized in 1871 as Frick and Company, with about 300 acres of coal area and 50 coke ovens around Connellsville, Pa. By 1889 it had about 35,000 acres and 15,000 coke ovens. The lowest paid worker in 1890 was the "yard worker" who earned $1.40 for a ten hour day; the best wages were paid the "road man" who received $2.10 for nine hours of work. 86 At first the Slovaks worked beside the Czechs in the coal mines, while the Poles worked at the coke ovens; but gradually, the Slovaks too began to work their way up to jobs at the ovens. �18 SLOVAKIA Most Slovaks were satisfied with their wages, which varied from $16.00 to $25.00 every two weeks. Strange as it may seem, it was possible to live and also to lay something by from these wages. A pound of beef soup meat cost three cents; for six dollars a man could dress himself rather well; rent cost three or four dollars a month for a small four room house. Nevertheless, not all miners were satisfied; demands were made for more pay and less work. When the mine operators refused, there were strikes, often riotous and bloody. 87 The Slovaks were also employed in the Egdar Thompson Iron Works of Andrew Carnegie. Carnegie with Frick employed the greatest number of Slovaks; others, like Rainey, Oliver, and Jones and Laughlin also engaged considerable numbers of Slovaks, but the number cannot be exactly stated. However, until 1900 most of the Slovaks worked in the mines and at the coke ovens.88 When the Slovaks got jobs in the mines, they lived in "company houses ",which were built practically at the site of the mine. This was a settlement of large houses built by the company and rented to the worker, who had also to pay for water, gas and coal. 89 To buy his food and other necessities the miner had to patronize the company store. This made the dependence of the worker on the comp:.my complete; the threat of expulsion during a strike was a powerful weapon in keeping the miners submissive. 90 The company r ented a house to a married couple on condition that they take in "boarders," the usual number being ten, but in the larger houses the number varied upward to thirty or forty. 91 The cleanliness d 2p::!nded on the character, ability, or sheer physical strength of the housewife. Within the household food arrangements provided that except for meat, flour, and coffee, the food was purchased in common. One meal a day wa:; eaten together, on Sunday at noon and during the week in the evening. For the other meals the gazdina or housewife cooked individually for the men whatever they bought. Beer by the barrel was also bought in common; sometimes this ran to a hundred barrels per month. At the end of the month the common bill was divided: the housewife did not pay; the men including the husband, paid equally, and two children were counted as one adult. 92 Moreover, on pay day several barrels of beer would be bought as well as whiskey, �SLOVAKIA 19 and much meat was prepared for a gay evening. At first, dancing was the chief recreation. One man pulled out an accordion, and the dancing began, even men dancing with men because of the shortage of women partners; frequently this mixure of drink, food, and music led to drunken brawls sometimes over the excellence of their home towns in Slovakia, often enough over women. Dancing was not limited to pay day; any celebration of even slight importance had to be combined with dancing and shouting of the most vigorous sort. The Cardas was a universal favorite. Family life was injured by many men coming to America without their wives and families and by the dearth of marriageable Slovak girls. To find a wife many young men on week ends went to Passaic, New Jersey, where many Slovak girls worked in the textile mills, and the men watched the girls as they came from work and made their choice. On Sundays in Passaic there often were ten to twenty weddings. Difficult as family life was, the "boarding house," allowing for so little privacy, did not help very much; sometimes it led to the wife's running off with a boarder. 93 Organizational life among the Slovaks began in the lodges and societies so common in America after the Civil War. By 1914 in the United States principal organizations had 15,600,000 members. Economic and social need led the Slovaks to form lodges. Mine disasters often took the lives of husbands and fathers, leaving the family not only destitute, but even without the money for a funeral. In answer to the need of sickness and funeral benefits a large number of societies grew up in industrial and .mining towns. The first of these was the Persi Uhorszko-Slovenszky v nemoczi podporujuci Szpolek, established in New York, on March 3, 1883. In this society, which lasted for eight years, Slovak was made the official language. Fraternal and mutual benefit iocieties mushroomed in the Slovak settlements. The Spolok Sv. Stefana in Passaic, N. J. was organized 1884 and already in 1887 was calling for a unification with other Slovak fraternal organizations. Under the influence of a Polish organization whose constituti-on it used, the Cirkevny a v ntmoci pl!>dporujuci spolok arose in Hazleton, Pa., in 1884. The Slovaks in Houtzdale, Pa., organized the Bratstvo Najsvatejsieho Srdca Pana Jezisa, on November 14, 1886; on December 12, 1884 the Spolok Sv. Stefana in Plymouth, Pa., came �20 SLOVAKIA into existence. A touch of humor accompanied the difficulties of the lodge in Bayonne City, N. J., where the Spolok Princa Rudolfa, set up in 1887, had to change its name after the tragic death of Archduke Rudolph of Hapsburg at Mayerling, because the other Slovaks ridiculed the members for having lost their patron. Bayonne City, N. J., had one of the largest mutual benefit societies, the Prvy bednarsky vypomocny spolok, an organization of Coopers engaged in making barrels, staves, chests, boxes; it was organized in 1888 and acted also as a bargaining agent for the membership with their employees. They were the first to have their own flag, whereas the other groups used the Hungarian flag. The Spolok Sv. Cyrila a Methoda in Minneapolis, Minn., and the Slovensky Spolok Sv. Petra i Pavla of McKeesport, Pa., both came into existence in 1888; the Slovensky v nemoci podporujuci spolok in Braddock, Pa., arose in 1889. The chief purpose of these societies was help in need, especially providing an elaborate funeral. In these funerals all the local lodges took part with flags, uniforms, and mourning bands. The secondary purpose was to aid in the organization of parishes, the building of churches and schools and lodge halls. 94 In spite of the success of these lodges, financial problems arose from the system of assessment which they used. The system required a contribution of about fourteen cents a month to meet administrative costs; on the death or sickness of a member the others had to contribute as much as would be needed for the stipulated sum. A considerable number of deaths or cases of sickness within a month or a short time made the financial burden too great for the small lodges. 95 The first appeal for unification came from the Society of St. Stephen in Passaic, N. J., as early as 1887. Julius Schwartz-Markovic in Nova Vlast' (a periodical that lasted only from March to December, 1888) made appeals for consolidation; Peter Rovnianek repeated this appeal in the October issue, as did B. Lajciak in the December issue. The Rev. Joseph Kossalko, a Roman Catholic priest of proMagyar conviction, seeing the nationalist tendency of these lodges in their use of Slovak as the official language and their gradual abandonment of the Hungarian flag, opposed this movement in a new periodical, the Zastava. The consolidation did not come until the 1890's. 96 When the Slovak immigrants, of whom the bulk was �SLOVAKIA 21 Catholic, first came to the United States, they were financially unable to build churches for their own use. Before the Slovak Catholics had their own churches, they attended Polish, German, Czech, or Irish churches; if they happened to be regular attendants at a church where their languago was not understood, they often went a considerable distance to receive the sacraments, especially that of Penance, from someone who understood their language. In the southwestern Pennsylvania mining area the Slovaks were fortunate to have in their midst St. Vincent's Archabbey, a Benedictine institution, which took special care to provide priests who could understand the Slovak language. Priests from this archabbey went from settlement to settlement taking care of the spiritual needs of the Slovaks. The first to do "mission" work among the Slovaks was Rev. Nepomuk Yaeger, O.S.B., who for three years in southwestern Pennsylvania visited the mining camps, where often enough he had to offer the· Mass to the accompaniment of card-playing, drunken singing, swearing and quarreling. 97 First to organize on a religious basis were the Slovak Lutherans. The first Lutheran parish was established in Streator, Illinois, where the church was ready for services on October 5, 1884. Karol Horak, ordained in 1883, was the first minister, but he gave up ministerial work and became a real estate agent. While the parish was withouth a minister's services, the Slovak Lutherans met in the home of Mr. G. Kozlej, who read the Bible to them. A minister, Cyril Droppa, reached Streator on March 26, 1884 and stayed there until 1887; eventually his spiritual labors took him to Russia. This first Lutheran parish had 49 members; the pastor's salary was fixed at forty dollars a month. The name of the parish was the Parish of the Blessed Trinity. Lutheran parishes were organized in Freeland, Pa., and Nanticoke, Pa., in 1886, and Minneapolis, Minn., in 1888. 98 Almost simultaneously with the Lutherans, the Slovak Catholics organized themselves into parishes. However, before this could go on apace, priests able to speak Slovak were needed. Even among the first priests, 99 the division into Slo·vak nationalists and Madarones disturbed their relations with one another and their work among Slovaks, Protestant as _well as Catholics. In 1882 the Rev. Ignatius Jaskovic, who came to Hazle- �22 SLOVAKIA ton, Pa., was the first active Slovak Catholic priest in the United States. He built St. Joseph's church in Hazleton, where the first Mass was said on December 6, 1885. He stayed in Hazleton until 1890. The Rev. J. Kossalko, arriving in 1884, had his first parish in Streator, Ill.; he said the first Mass in the new church of St. Stephen on December 10, 1885, just four days after the first mass had been said in Hazleton, Pa. The Rev. Samuel Bella, also a Catholic priest, became the pastor of Nanticoke, Pa., and later of Bayonne City, N. J. These three priests were all Madarones, that is, Slovaks with pro-Magyar convictions, and firmly opposed to any Slovak nationalism. 100 This Madarone element introduced the first division of the Slovak group into the factions that played a part among the pre-World War Slovaks of America. In 1887 in Scranton, Pa., the Slovak Calvinists first organized as a religious group. The Slovak Calvinists of Jessup, Pa., had a chapel there since 1888, but the building of churches had to wait until the 189O's. To conduct services in their parishes the Calvinists hired Magyar and English ministers; the Slovaks and Magyars fought about the language to be used in the divine service, Slovak or Magyar. There was no general solution for these churches, but the language varied from church to church. 101 At first some Slovaks objected to building schools on the score of uselessness; these untutored peasants had to be taught that schools were important. Some Slovak immigrants had come to make money and were in America only temporarily. Schools meant permanence. Why should they contribute to the education of other people's chidren? However a beginning was made. St. Stephen's parish, Streator, Ill., built the first Slovak Catholic parochial school in 1889, a wooden structure, costing $4,500, a considerable sum for those days. From the very beginning the schools were not strictly Slovak, for there were not enough Slovak teachers; this led to many subjects being taught by "English" teachers and "Irish" nuns. Slovak nationalists were satisfied by having the pastor teach the children on Saturday afternoons, when they studied the Slovak language, Slovak history, and Slovak geography.102 The 11cattered Slovak settlements were brought in touch with one another by newspapers written in the Slovak language. John Slovensky, a trained teacher from Slovakia, had �SLOVAKIA 23 come to the United States in 1879, and had obtained a clerical job in the Austro-Hungarian consulate. This put him in contact with the Slovak immigrants, who came to the consulate often seeking information about conditions in the Monarchy, as for instance, was the Monarchy at war with the Turk? This suggested to Slovensky the idea of a Slovak periodical. In 1885 he launched a lithographed paper called Rulletin, which contained news from Europe and items about Slovak immigrants. Especially the tavern keepers subscribed to it for their taverns where Slovaks met to read it. Success prompted John Slovensky to embark on · a larger enterprise, the publication of Amerikanszko-Slovenszke Noviny. J. Schwartz-Markovic and the Rev. Erwin Gelhoff, a Catholic priest, published the Nova Vlast' in Streator, Illinois, in March 1888; this venture lasted only until December of that very year. The year 1889 saw the birth of two other newspapers, the Slovak v Amerike and Rev. J. Kossalko's Madarone newspaper, Zastava. 103 These newspapers became the sounding boards of popular opinion as well as a unifying force among the Slovaks. Discussion in the newspapers led to the consolidation of local lodges during the 1890's. With the beginning of the 1890's the Slovaks began to unify the many individual lodges into a federation for greater economic security. However, from the very start factions divided the Slovaks. The leaders of the Slovak immigrants disagreed on whether the principle of organization should be religious or nationalist. The Rev. Stephen Furdek, a Catholic priest, believed that the new national organization should be based upon religious uniformity within the organization; the Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists should each have their own organization. Peter Rovnianek, a Slovak nationalist, wanted nationality to be the principle of organization. Any Slovak, no matter what his religious convictions or lack of them, could be a member. 104 Because of this difference of principle, two separate, and in many ways rival, organizations arose. On February 16, 1890, Peter V. Rovnianek led in founding the National Slovak Society in Pittsburgh, Pa. All Slovaks, Catholics, Protestants, Freemasons, Freethinkers or indifferentists, were welcome. Openly nationalist, the National Slovak Society played down religious differences, emphas- �24 SLOVAKIA izing all Slovaks were one. The frank nationalism and liberalism antagonized the Madarone Slovaks and some Catholici. The Rev. J. Kossalko, the most outstanding Madarone, refused absolution to Catholic members of the National Slovak Society. 105 Others besides the Madarone element opposed the liberal National Slovak Society. The Rev. Stephen Furdek established a Catholic fraternal organization, the First Catholic Slovak Union, September 4, 1890. The objectives of this First Catholic Slovak Union were to preserve the Catholic Faith, to support fellow-members, widows, and orphans in need, to preserve and extend the use of the Slovak language and Slovak nationality. Conditions of membership were recognition of the bishop of Rome as head of the Catholic Church, faithful performance of religious duties, attendance of one's children at a Catholic school, support of parish and parochial school, no ridicule of religious ceremonies, and no writing against the Church and the clergy. 106 Slovak women felt that they, too, should have their own organizations independent of male control. They established the Zivena Beneficial Society in the year 1891. In 1892 the Slovak Catholic women organized a similar society, the First Catholic Slovak Ladies' Union. 107 The Slovak Lutherans organized their own beneficial society in 1893, the Slovak Evangelical Union; and soon afterwards the Slovak Calvinists formed the Slovak Calvinist Union. 108 For reasons that are not evident, almost all these groups felt the strain of internal strife. A split in the First Catholic Slovak Union provided members for a new organization, the Pennsylvania Roman and Greek Catholic Union in 1893. This society intended to encourage religion, temperance, and morality, to train its members in obedience and respect for civil law and in performance of civil duties, to collect funds to pay burial benefits.109 In Chicago the local lodge of the National Slovak Society left the national organization and formed the Slovak National Society. 110 Later a similar break occurred in the Slovak Evangelical Union. In 1890 P. V. Rovnianek and his associates published the First Slovak National Almanac. Almanacs were already a Slovak European tradition. The National Slovak Society first issued its own almanac in 1893; and the First Catholic �SLOVAKIA 25 Slovak Union began its series with the Kalendar Jednota in 1896. These almanacs provided the literary reading that most Slovaks did: short stories, political essays on conditions in the United States, reviews of the year's important events, religious essays, articles on the Indians and Negroes, moral essays on how to spend Sundays, counseling articles on marriage, and almost any subject useful to the Slovak readers. In these almanacs the best Slovak writers reached their limited Slovak American public; eventually the almanacs became so popular that ,twenty-nine were published. 111 Newspapers received the strongest impetus from the national societies. The Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny were the mouthpiece of the National Slovak Society; the First Catholic Slovak Union published an official organ, the Jednota. These were real newspapers with world news, reports from the domestic scene in America, and organization news in their columns. One feature distinguished these papers from the trend turning American newspapers into large business enterprises; the Slovak immigrant papers remained very much the voice of the individual editors. However, many Slovaks had no desire to read a newspaper. The editors, who usually combined editing with other work to earn their living, on Saturday and Sunday toured Slovak settlements to get subscriptions for their periodicals. 112 Very soon after the organization of the two fraternal societies the Slovaks learned how effective and necessary cooperation on a national level can be. When the price of steel billets began to fall, the Edgar Thompson Works in Braddock, Pa., announced a wage cut. This led to a strike late in 1890. On the night of January 1, 1891, Michael Quinn, a guard at the mill was slain. Many Slovaks were arrested, among them persons who had been strolling about after a pleasant evening in a tavern. The police arrested about sixty persons and charged them with being involved in the crime. Most of them received light sentences, but on April 8, 1891, Andrew Toth, Michael Sabol, and George Rusnak received the death sentence for the murder of Michael Quinn. Only by heroic efforts did the Slovak leaders and organizations secure on February 7, 1892 a commutation of sentence to life imprisonment. 113 The efforts of Rev. F. Wider, president of the First Catholic Slovak Union, Peter V. Rovnianek of the National �26 SLOVAKIA Slovak Society, Rev. Stephen Furdek, and Julius Wolf, won the release of Michael Sabol, suffering from tuberculosis, in 1895; he died ten days after leaving prison. Peter V. Rovnianek, engaging a lawyer, Clarence Burleigh, secured the freedom of George Rusnak in 1897; George Rusnak, too, had tuberculosis. Andrew Toth left prison only twenty years later, a man sixty two years old. After the efforts of the Slovak League had failed, Edward Goehring, an attorney, succeeded in showing that the evidence which convicted Toth was contradictory. Toth was freed in 1911. The Pennsylvania legislature rejected a motion to give Toth $300.00 for every year he had spent unjustly in jail. However, the Carnegie Foundation fixed a grant of $40 a month on him. 114 During February, 1891, a strike against the firm of Henry Clay Frick, Frick and Company, bec:;_me general in the Connellsville, Pa., area of coke ovens and soft coal. By 1889 Frick had acquired 35,000 acres of coal area and 15,000 coke ovens and employed about 30,000 workers. Andrew Virostek, a worker in the Tip Top Mine and member of the United Mine Workers of America, threatened miners who loaded more coal than union regulations permitted. Then the company fired him. The union fought the mine operators over the dismissal, and by February a strike flared throughout the region. On April 2, 1892 when about five hundred miners attacked the Southwest Company shops in Morewood, Pa., three Slovaks, three Poles, and one Italian were shot to death. The state militia came in to restore order, and some men drifted to work. Frick hired Pinkerton detectives to expel the remaining strikers from the company homes. During the week of April 18, 1892 these detectives were to oust seven hundred families in Fayette county alone. When the agents began the evictions, a Slovak man and woman perished in the violence in Leisenring No. 3, two Slovak women were wounded at Adelaide, and at Trotter, sixteen men and thirteen women were shot. Then in the following month Frick began hiring Negroes and Italians to replace the Slovaks. 115 Julius Wolf and Peter V. Rovnianek figured secretly in the settlement of the strike. The Frick company paid them sums of money for persuading the miners to return to the pits. Unwisely, the two men discussed the deal in letters, �SLOVAKIA 27 which their enemies subsequently published. Slovak immigrant writing has branded these letters as the "Four Letters of Betrayal. " 116 The Slovaks' preoccupation with wages, bad housing, and mine disasters seem to have led to a decline in religious fervor. Causes suggested to explain the decline varied: nonconfessional schools, public schools, neglect by religious authorities, too great preoccupation with earning a living. 117 Evidence exists to show that some Catholics fell away. A "Home Mission among the Slavic Immigrants" in 1885 supported a Congregational Church in Cleveland; it also provided a Presbyterian Church in New York. 118 The effectiveness of these efforts among the Slovaks, it is impossible to judge. In Mt. Pleasant, Pa., a Slovak preacher came to the "Church of God" and succeeded in bringing at least 7 SloYak Catholic families into it. 119 Higganum, Conn., had a Slovak colony of about 20 families; some Slovak Catholics went to church only to keep their benefits in the Jednota; others were entirely indifferent, so far gone that they married in the Lutheran church, even though a Catholic priest was always available. 120 The namecalling contest between P. V. Rovnianek and the Rev. Stephen Furdek, unedifying as it was, certainly spread anti-clericalism among the nationalist element. This apparent religious decline should not blind us to the extensive church building activities of the Slovak immigrants during the 1890's. Frequently the construction of a church or organization of a parish began in cooperation with another national group, Poles, Croatians, Irish, or Germans; sometimes many different nationalities cooperated, Lithuanians, Poles, Italians, and Irish. Often cooperation failed, because each group felt its rights were ignored. 121 Still, for instance, at least eight new Slovak parishes were opened in the Pittsburgh diocese; and in Cleveland from St. Ladislaus' parish St. Martin's was created in 1893. 122 A Slovak parish was organized in Kangley, Ill., as a mission of the Streator congregation, in 1892. 123 The Slovak Catholics of Chicago finally got their own parish in 1898, the Roman Catholic Church of St. Michael the Archangel. 214 Expansion was the keynote. Just after the decade ended, in 1903, there were 78 Roman Catholic Slovak churches. 125 However, the Slovaks failed to build parochial schools; this had to wait for the next decade. �28 SLOVAKIA The Slovak Lutherans of Chicago organized the Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Blessed Trinity in 1893; in 1894 the Rev. L. Boor became the pastor and in that very year began teaching the children of the parish the Slovak language. 126 Hand in hand with progress in organization appeared the elements of culture. Such efforts as the organization of the First Catholic Slovak Band in Johnstown, Pa., in 1892, were only straws in the wind. The Rev. S. Furdek in 1893 led in a move to establish a cultural organization to be called the Matica Slovenska in memory of the Slovak cultural institution disbanded by the Magyars in 1875. It held a convention in Chicago, September 26, 1893, and was incorporated in Columbus, Ohio, October 26, 1893. The Matica was to be a central organization to improve the cultural life of the Slovaks in Europe and America. On February 18, 1894 Peter V. Rovnianek, not to be behind hand, organized a Majak, literarne kola, that is, the Beacon Literary Circle, partly in opposition to the Matica, although he fervently disavowed any such a purpose. The Majak's objectives were encouragement of Slovak literature and culture, establishment of a Slovak cultural press, and nationalist agitation. The Literary Circle began publishing the first Slovak literary "journal, a forty page periodical, Majak, literary, political, and nationalist. It survived only six months. Both these organizations failed, partly through division of effort, partly through lack of interest among the Slovaks. 127 During this decade another society arose in Chicago, the First Slovak Sokol. The Sokol groups were gymnastic societies with a planned program of calisthenics, track events, and eventually all sports. Just when the first Sokol group was organized is doubtful; one source says that the First Slovak Sokol was organized in Chicago in 1892128 ; another gives the date as 1895. 129 Whatever be the case, the Sokol developed into a federation national in scope. The Slovak Catholic priests, divided though they were on the question of Slovak nationalism, united in an organization known as the Society of Roman Catholic Slovak Priests in 1896. Peter V. Rovnianek originated another club in the same year, the first Slavonic Political Club with 100 members, and its influence was soon felt in politics. 130 Both of these organizations were successful, in contrast to the cul- �SLOVAKIA 29 tural societies; it seems that the early Slovak immigrants were not sufficiently interested to support purely cultural groups. The cultural society and literary circle failed because labor conflicts occupied the Slovaks' attention. The Connellsville mine region was again the scene of a strike and violence that began in April, 1894. On April 4 a Slovak was slain; two days later Joseph Paddock, chief engineer of Frick's company in Davison, Pa., was killed. Blame for this crime fell on the Poles and Slovaks and over a hundred were thrown into the Uniontown jail. The court sentenced John Husar to twelve years and Michael Furin to three years in prison. Violence continued: one Slovak was killed on the main street of Connellsville and two others in the rioting at Stickle Hollow around the Washington Coal and Coke shops. At the beginning of August most of the Strikers had returned to work, but about 5,000 Slovaks remained on strike. These gradually drifted back to work or abandoned the Connellsville mines. The Rev. Orbach, a Lutheran minister, founded a Slovak colony in Wisconsin; on September 4 about 300 Slovaks set out for Wisconsin. Another farm settlement originated from the Connellsville strike. Industrial life was, after all, strange to the Slovak; he had either been a small farmer, peasant, or agricultural worker in Slovakia. His interest in acquiring a farm remained; but he did not become a farmer immediately after he landed simply because he did not have the money to invest in such a project. 131 Besides, the city gave him the companionship he would not find on the farm. Still the desire grew to place as many Slovaks as possible on the land. In the summer of 1894 Peter V. Rovnianek, Francis Pucher, Julius Tatraj, Rev. btephen Furdek, Rev. Vaclav Panu~ka, and Rev. Alexander Dzubaj examined land in Arkansas near Grand Prairie; they intended to settle Slovaks on some 40,000 acres of land. Peter Rovnianek and Francis Pucher received a charter for the Slovak Colonization Company of Pittsburgh on September 24, 1894, the land was bought, and sales began. After the prospective settlers had saved enough money, they bought forty or so acre farms from the Slovak Colonization Company. The cost of land was $2 to $3 an acre. 132 �30 SLOVAKIA Slovak settlers established a farm community near Stuttgart, Arkansas, and named their community Slovaktown. The settlers had been born in the "old country" but came to Arkansas chiefly from the coalfields of Pennsylvania and Illinois. The chief produce included corn, oats, hay, fruits, vegetables, and dairy products. The children attended the public schools. The settlers were mostly Catholics, but there were a few Lutherans. 133 The new farmers in Slovaktown were more than satisfied with their new lives; their letters continually encouraged their fellow Slovaks to flee from the factories and the mines; but only in the 1900's did anything like a movement to the farm begin. To publicize the project and success of Slovaktown the Slovak Colonization Company began publishing a periodical, Slovaktownske Hlasy, in Pittsburgh in 1896; but it lasted only six months. 134 It might indeed have been well for the Slovaks to leave the mines and go to the farms, for violence once again found them; this time it was in the anthracite region of northeastern Pennsylvania. One day in September, 1897 a group of strikers set out for Latimer. Sheriff Martin informed of the move, summoned his deputies and attempted to halt the men. Sharp words were exchanged, and Sheriff Martin ordered his deputies to fire upon the unarmed men. Twenty-one fell before the murderous gunfire and died; many others were wounded. Most of the victims were Slovaks. In spite of the unprovoked nature of the attack, the courts declared Sheriff Martin innocent, for he had ordered the shooting while performing his duty. The outcry against this verdict was most violent in the Slav press, but nothing further could be done. 135 Despite the internal dissensions among themselves and difficulties in the mines, a new interest appeared among the Slovaks during this decade; the most public manifestation of their nationalism came in 1899. Strange as it may seem, most Slovaks were not violent nationalists when they came to this country; the growth of nationalism was gradual and almost imperceptible. Slovak became the official language for the lodges; the societies abandoned the Hungarian flag. P. V. Rovnianek, joining the staff of the Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny in 1889, infused �31 SLOVAKIA a nationalist spirit into that paper; his National Slovak Society was nationalist in principle. Rev. S. Furdek, whose nationalism was of a very moderate kind, wanted American Slovaks to Americanize themselves; but he also felt it their duty to help the oppressed Slovaks overseas. 136 Under the force of this nationalism the Slovak immigrants gradually became more interested in the fate of Slovakia. In 1899 Father Furdek sent a lengthy memorandum to the Hungarian government, discussing the "Slovak question", but to no avail, except the publicity which such a memorandum aroused. It effected nothing practical; but it was the shadow of coming events; for the "Slovak question", was in the next decades to assume first place among the Slovaks. As the nineties passed, the Slovaks had made solid progress. Their economic and social life had improved through the national fraternal societies, which by 1899 had become important factors in Slovak life. Their membership stood as follows: THE FRATERNAL SOCIETIES Society Number of Members First Catholic Slovak Union __ _________ _ National Slovak Society _________ ___ ___ __ Pennsylvania Slovak Union ______ ___ ____ _ Evangelical Slovak Union ____ __ _______ _ First Catholic Slovak Ladies' Union _____ _ iivena --------- --- -------------- -- ---Source: "Slovenske (1899), IV, 38. pomery v Amerike", KALENDAR 11,000 9,450 1,727 909 1,600 1,000 JEDNOTA The religious life of the Slovaks had a chance to develop now that churches had been built. For the Roman Catholics there were now in America 33 priests, and for the Greek Catholics 32; and more were needed. 137 However, not all the picture was bright. Indeed, these were the things the Slovaks needed; but it was only after 1900 that the advance in education, the business world, political life, became pronounced. FOOTNOTES 1. Emily Green Balch, Our Slavic Fellow Citizens (New York, 1910), p. 86, pp. 88-89, p. 93. �32 SLOVAKIA 2. •F ranti§ek Hru§ovsky, Slovenske Dejiny (Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1939), p. 14. 3. Ibid., pp. 95-97. 4. I bid., p . 216. 5. Ibid., pp. 342-S43. 6. Joseph S,k ultety, Sketches from Slovak History (Middl etown, 1'930), pp. 106-109. 7. I bid., pp. 109-110. 8. Frantisek •Hrusovsky, This Is Slovakia (Scranton, 1953) , p . 40. 9. Ibid., pp. 40-41. 10. Peter P. Yurchak, The Slovaks: Their History and Traditions (Scranton, 1947), p. 28 . 11. Thomas Capek, The Slovaks of Hungary (New York, 1906), p . 108; 1Hrusovsky, This Is Slovakia, pp. 44-46. 12. Frantisek :J3okes, Dejiny Slovenska i Slovakov (;Bratislava, 1946), p . 158. 13. Robert A. ,Ka,nn, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National 'Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1914 (New York, 1950), I. 278. 14. Frantisek iHrusovsk y, This Is Slovakia, pp. ,47-48. 15. Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago, 1929), p. 107. 16. Ibid., p. 108. 17. Ibid., p. 59 . 18 . R. W. Seton-Watson, ed. , Slovakia Then and Now (London, 1931), pp. 244-245. 19. Street, Hungary and Democracy, p. ·65 . 20. Seton-Watson, Slovakia, p. 245. 21. Street, Hungary and Democracy, p . 64 . 22. Bokes, Deji ny Slovenska, p. 158. 23. C. J . Stree t, Slovakia: Past and Present (Westmins,ter, n.d .), p. 24. 24 . •Capek, Slovaks of Hungary, p. 96; Hrusovsky, Dejiny, p. 323. 25. ,Capek , Slovaks of Hungary, p. 166. 26 . Jirusovsky, Dejiny, p. 252. 27. Ibid., p. 325. 28. Ib i d., p. 319. 29. I bid., p. 319. 30. Seton-Watson, Slovakia, p. 117. 31. Seton•Watson, Slovakia, pp. 117-118. -3•2. I bid., p. 119. 33. I bid., p. 118. 34. Hrus ovsky, Dejiny, pp. 320-321; Bokes, Dejiny Slovenska, pp. 272-273 . 35. Seton-Watson, Slovakia, p. 176. 36 . Hrusovsky, Dejiny, p. -329 . 37. Bokes, Dejiny Slovenska, p. 276. 38 . Capek, Slovaks of Hungary, p. 150. 39. Jaszi, The Dissolution, p. 222. 40 . Ibid., p . 223 . 41. Street, •Slovakia: Past and Present, p. 56. 42. Harrison 'Thompson, Czechoslovakia in Europe (Princeton, 194-1) , p. 294. 43. Jaszi, The Dissolution, pp . 196-199. H. Ibid., p. 238. 45. Ibid., p. 231. �SLOVAKIA 33 46. F. J . Hask in s, The Immigrant: An Asset and a Liab ility (New York , 1913) , p . 35. 47. Capek, Slovaks of Hungary, p . 162. 48. I b id., p. 156. 49. Seton-Watso n , Slovakia, p. 275. 50. Ibid., p. 276. 51. Capek , Slovaks of Hungary, p. 152. 52. Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny, A u g u st 19, 1897. 53. Geor ge Stephen son , A H istory of American Immigrat ion 18201924 (New Yor k , 1926), P. 61; Carl W ittk e, We Who Built Amer ica (New York , 1939) , p. 405. 54. J eremiah J enk s a nd W. Jebt Lau ck , The Imm igration Problem: A Study of American Immigration Conditions and Needs (New York, 1922), pp. 21-22. 55 . Konstantin Culen, Dejiny Slovakov v Amerike (B r atislava, 1942), I , 38; Caspar Molch an, "Th e Developmen t of the S lovak Community in Pittsburgh 1880-1920", (Unpublished Master of Arts dissertation, U n iversity of Notr e Dame, 1948), p. 23. 56. Cul en, Deji ny, I, 38; Stephenson , History of Ame ri can I mm igrat ion , p. 89. 57. Balch , Slav ic Fellow Citizens, p . 102. 58. I bid., p. 25. 69. I b id., p. 437. 60. I bid., p. 101. 61. Culen, Dejiny, I, 60-61. 62. Ibid., I, 67. 63. Ibid., I, 67-68. ~4. Ibid., I, 60. 65. Na rodn e Noviny, Ap ril 9, 1914. 66. Cule n , Dejiny, I, 24-25. -67. Ibid., I , 26; Molchan, "Development of the S lovak Community" , p. 8. 6'8. Konsta'!lltfn Cu len, Slovenska Liga v Amerike styridsaf rocn a (Scr anton , 1947). p. 4. 69. Cul e n , Dej i ny , I, 28. 70. Ib id., I , 28-29. 71. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Comr;mnity", p. 25. 72 . Capek, Slovaks of Hunga r y , p. 156. 73. Balch, Sl a vic Fe ! low C itizens, p. 100. 74. Ibid , p. 100. 75 . William P. Dillingham, Reports of the Immigration Commision, Vol. I: Abs t racts of Reports of Immigration Commision (Washington, D . C., 1911), I, 97. 76. I b id., I, 215. 77. Ibid., I, 277. 78. J. A. F., "Nacrtok Dejin Slov. prist'ahovalectva v Amerike", Sborn ik Narodn e ho Slovenske ho Spolku (1915), I, 12. 79. Culen, Deji ny , I, 96. 80. Ib id ., I. 96; Jos e ph Kushn e r, Sl ov a c i ka tol ici pi t t sbu-rghsk e ho b is kupstv a (Passaic, 19 -16), pp. 16-17 ._ 81. J ednota , March 19, 1913. 82. Na rodn e Noviny, May 26, 1910. 83. Culen, Dejiny, I, 99. 84. Kushner, S lov a ci, p. 6. 85. Ibid., p. 12, p. 16. �34 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. l09. ll0. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. SLOVAKIA Ibid., p. 7. I bid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 7. Narodne Noviny, March 12, 19·1.!; April 27, 1911. Narodne Novlny, March 12, 1914. Culen, Dejiny, I, 82-83. Ibid., I, ·82-831; J. A. F., 'INe.crtok Dejin", Sbornik, (1915), I, 11. Culen, Dejiny, I , 82-83; "Jedno-druhe", Narodny Kalendar, (1908), XVIII, 154. Culen, DeJiny, I, 195-199. "Prorocke slova dp. Matusa Jankolu o novom systeme", Sbornik Slovenskeho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX, 81. Culen, Dejiny, I, 200. Kushner, Slov;ici, pp. 13-14; Jednota, July 15, 1914. Culen, Dejiny, I, 111-114. Culen, Dejiny, I, 108. I bid., I, 111. Ibid., I, 114-115. Ibid., 1, 115; Kon§tantin Culen, Slovaci v Amerike (Tur~lansk:r Sv. Martin, 11138), pp. 384-385. Culen, DeJlny, I, 213-214. Culen, Dejiny, I, 202. Ibid., I, 208-209. Ibid., I, 207-208. Souvenir Program: 19th Regular Convention, The National Slovak Society, (Young~town, 1946), p. i>4; P. V. Rovnianek, "Slovenslce organ!zacie v Amerike", World's Fair -Memorial of the Czechoslovak Group (,Chicago, 1933), p . 67 . IP. V. Rovnlanek, op. cit., pp . 67-68. Pennsylvanska Slovenaka Jednota (Wilkes-Barre), June 24, 1943. Jaroslav ·Pelikan, "Cesi a .Slovacl v Chicagu ", World's Fair Memorial of the Czechoslovak Group (Oh!cago,1933), p. 9•. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, p. 162. Culen, Dejiny, I, 214-215. Kushner, Slovaci, p . 10; Molchan, ''Development or the Slovak Community", p . 48. Kushner, Slovacl, pp. 10-11. Ibid., p. 8. Culen, Dejlny, I, 138-139. :Fr. Sasinek, "Mysllenky o stave nabozenstva medzi Slovakm!", Kalendar Jednota, (1,8 97), II, 139-140. Narodne Novlny, August 11, 1910. !Kushner, Slov;icl, p. 21. Jednota, March 4, 1914. Kushner, Slovacl, p . 22; Michael J . Hynes, History of the Dioceae of Cleveland (Cleveland, 1953), p. 1'53. Hynes, Diocese of Cleveland, p . 255. Kushner, Slovaci, p . 41. Kushner, Slovacl, p . 41. Kalendar J.ednota, (1903), VIII, 210-211. Jaromir Psenka a Jan Pelikan, "<'.:es! a Slovac! v Chicagu", World's Fair Memorial, p . 95 . <'.:ulen, DeJiny, I, 222-227. Pellkan a Paenka, "Cesl a Slovacl v Chicagu", World's Fair Memor ial", p. 94. �35 SLOVAKIA 1211. Joseph Cermak, "·Physical Education among the Czechs and SloTaks", World'• Fair Memorial, p. 44 . 130. Molchan, "Development o! the Slovak Community", p. 67. 131. 1Narodne Noviny, July 17, 1113. 132. Narodne Noviny, May 5, 1910. 133. Kushner, Slovaoi, p. 9; Balch, Slavic Fellow Citizens, pp. 337-33·8. 134. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, p . 115. 185. Culen, Dejlny, I, 162-18'3; Amerlkansk0-Slovenske Novlny, Feb· ruary 5, 1898. 136. Kalendar Jednota, (1899), IV, 37-41. 137. "Slovenske pomery v Amerike", Kalendar Jednota (1899), IV, 39-40. BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCES - PUBLIC DOCUMENTS U. S. Bureau o! Census Thirteenth Census of the United States: 1910, Population Statistics, Vol. I. Washington : Government Printing omce, 1913. U. S. Congress. Senate Documents. 61 Cong., 3 Session. Washington: Government Printing O!f!ce, 1911. Vols. XI and XX. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS Jednota (Middletown., Pa.), Vols. XXI-XXII (19113cl9H). Kalendar Jednota. Middletown: The First Cathol!c Slovak Union. 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History of the Diocese of Cleveland. Cleveland : Diocese of •Cleveland, 1953. Jaszi, O'scar. The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1929. Jenks, Jeremiah W. and Lauck, W . Jett. The Immigration Problem . New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 19 22 . Kann, Robert A. The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918. 2 vols. New York: The Columbia U niversity Press, 1950. Kushner, Jos eph. Slovaci katolfci pittsburghskeho b iskup:::tva. P as saic: The Slovak Catholic Sokol, ·1946. Nev ins, Allan. The Emergence of Modern America, 1865-1878. Vol. VIII of A History of American Life. Edited by Ar t hur M. Schlesinger and Dixon Ryan Fox, 13 vols. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927. . Orth, Samuel P. Our Foreigners: A Chronicle of J).mericans in the Making . Vol. 35 of the .Chronicles of America. Edited by ;\llen Johnson, 56 vols. New Haven ·: Yale University Press, 1920. · Park, •Robert. The lmmigran_t Press an~ its Control. New York: Harper and Bro-thers, 1922. Pauco, J oseph. l.!.udovychova u Sturovcov: Obdobie Slovenskych Na rodnych Novin. Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1943. Purcell, William J. (ed.). Catholic Pittsburgh 's One Hundred Years. Chicago: Loyola U n iversity Press, 1943. Seton-Watson , R . W. Racial Problems in Hungary. London: Constable, 1908. Seton-Watson, R. W. (ed.). Slovakia Then and Now. Prague: Orb is Publishing Company, 1931. Shaugnessy, . Gerald. Has t he l.mmigrant Kept the Faith ? New York:: The Macmillan Company, 1925 . · Sidor, Karol. Andrej H linka, 1864-1926. Bratislava: St. Andrew's. Press, 1934. Skultety, Joseph. Sketches from Slovak History. Middletown: The First Catholic Slova~ Union, 1930. Stephenson, George M. A History of American Immigration, 18201924. Boston: Ginn Publishing Company, 1926. Street, C. J.C. Slovakia: Past and Present. Westminster: P . S. Kingston and Son, Ltd., n. d . Tarbell, Ida. The Nationalizing of Business, 1878-1898. V ol. IX of A 'History of Ameri can Life. Edited by Arthur -M. Schlesinger and Dixo~ Ryan Fox, 13 vols. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936. �SLOVAKIA 37 Thompson, S. Harrison. Czechoslovakia in European History. Princeton: The Princeton U niversity Press, 19-44. Wittke, Carl. We Who Bui It America: The Saga of the Immigrant. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940. Yurchak, Peter P. The Slovaks: Their History and Trad itions. Revised edition. Scranton: Obrana Press, Inc., 1947. ARTICLES F., J. A. "Nacrtok dejin s lov. prisfahovalectva v Amerike", Sbornik Narodneho Slovenskeho Spolku, I (1915), 20-39 . Jamar ik, Paul. "Zivot Americkych .Slovakov dakedy a teraz_" , Sbornik Na rodneho Slovenskeho Spolku, I (1915), 98-109. "Prorocke slova dp. Matusa Jankolu o novom systeme", Sborn ik Slovensk e ho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX. Shipman, Andr ew J . "Slavs ~-n America", The Catholic Encyclopedia, XIV (1913). 51-57. Stephenson, George M. "Immigration", Dictionary of American History, III (1940), 73-75. "The Slovak Sokol", Sborn ik S lovenske ho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX, 242-243. Timasheff, Nicholas. "Education", Slavonic Encyclopedia. Edited by Joseph .S. 1Roucek. New York: The Philosophical Library, Inc., 1949, pp. 261-269. Ware, Caroline. "Immigration", Encyclopedia of Soc ia l Sc iences, VII (1932), 587-595. World 's Fair Memorial of the Czechos lo va k Group. Chicago: Czechoslovak Group, 1933. Bradac, John S. "Slovenski Evanjelici-Luterani v Spojenych Statoch", pp. 81-83. Cermak, Joseph. "Physical Education among the Czechs and Slovaks in America", pp. 42-45. ·· Pelikan, J. and Psenka, R. Jaromir. "Cesi a Slovaci v Chicagu", pp. 89-97. Rovnianek, Peter V. "Slovenske organizacie v Amerike", pp. 66-68. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES Gregorovic, Sister M. Counsuela, SS.C.M . "Father Jankola's Con tribution t0 Catholic Education in America". Unpublis hed Master of Arts dissertation. History Department, Catholic University, 1943. Molchan, Caspar, C.S.C . "The Development of the Slovak Comqiunity in Pittsburgh, 1880-1920". Unp ub lished Master of Arts di sserta·,£ion. History Department, U niversity of Notre Dame, 1948. · Stefan, Sister M. Leocadia, SS.C .M. "The Reverend Stephen Furdek" . Unpublis-h ed Master of Arts dis se r tation. History Depar tment, Catholic University, _ 1952. Teplicky, Sister M. Berchmans, SS .C.M. "Educational Activities of the Sisters of SS. Cy,ril and Methodius". Unpublishe d Master of Arts diss ertation. Education Department, Marywood College, 1945. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1965, Vol. 15 Description An account of the resource Vol. 15 (No. 38), 1965. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1965 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOV AKIA Pub lished by the Slovak League of America VOL XV 1965 NO. 38 EARLY BEGINNINGS OF THE SLOVAKS IN AMERICA By James J. Zatko, Ph.D. , University of Notre Dame Occupying the area enclosed by the Carpathian mountains, the Danube River, and the Theiss River, the Slovaks to the number of two million or 12% of the total population of Hungary, eked out a meagre existence between the two rivers and the mountains. Because the Slovaks had to struggle for a living, men and women were inured to hard work and to a very low standard of living. Their facial features form two general types: the round-faced with wide-set eyes, and the long-headed narrow face with a long nose. The people live in villages consisting of long, low brick or wood houses with hand-made shingles. The interiors were generally neat and tidy, even where there was an earthen floor. 1 Slovakia itself is a geographic unit, whose northern boundary runs along the Carpathian mountains, and whose southern boundary is the Danube River and the Theiss River, which cut deep valleys and ravines through the mountain ridges. The land is divided in the west by the streams flowing to the Danube, by those flowing to the Theiss in eastern Slovakia, with a central Slovak upland lying between. 2 The area consists of about 18,895 square miles of mostly agricultural land, but the land is not the best for cultivation, much of it being woodland and the rest not very fertile. Bratislava was the capital, the ancient coronation city of Hungarian Kings before Budapest, and a great Danubian river port at the cross-roads of Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary. Other important cities in Slovakia are: Trnava in western Slovakia, Nitra in west central Slovakia on the river Nitra, Zilina in northern Slovakia on the river Vah, Turciansky Sv. Martin in north central Slovakia, Zvolen in central Slovakia, and Kosice in eastern Slovakia. 3 Within Slovakia itself population shifted during the 2 SLOVAKIA fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, by occupying the northern highlands in Slovakia. The villagers of the central plain and the river valleys created new settlements especially in Orava in the north, Trencin in the west, Zvolen in the central portion; the new settlers on the Carpathian mountainsides began to engage in animal husbandry, especially sheep-raising. 4 At the end of the seventeenth century an emigration strictly so-called began. Only individuals and very small groups left the recently settled highlands at first. The saffron-dealers and dealers in medicinal oils from Turiec county in north central Slovakia carried their home products all over eastern Europe, crossed Asia, as far as the Pacific coast of Siberia. In the business they established in Russia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Siberia, they often employed their own countrymen. Weavers from Orava county in the north and lace makers from the Hron River region sold their wares in Hungary and central Europe generally. Menders with wire and glaziers from Trencin county in the northwest of Slovakia wandered throughout central Europe; the more enterprising settled in Germany and Russia. From the eighteenth century, after the Turk had been expelled from central and southern Hungary, the poverty stricken of Slovakia began to migrate into Hungary in quest of lands and helped to repopulate the area as well as to restore its economic productivity through agriculture. Thus did Slovak settlements originate in Hungary, Rumania, Yugo-Slavia, Bulgaria, and the Banat. 5 The poverty which accelerated this new shift in population was caused by a decline in economic and commercial activity in Slovakia itself. Early in the eighteenth century there had still been considerable export of cattle and wine from Nitra and Bratislava counties, production of cloth in Myjava, forestry and river traffic, mining and textile production. Although Maria Theresa favored Austrian industries against those of Hungary, only during the reign of Joseph II did non-Slovak manufacturers begin to compete effectively with native products; and the soil in Slovakia was insufficient to provide a livelihood for the Slovak masses. 6 A migration began from the Slovak counties across their southern borders into Hungary. In 1787 eleven counties in Hungary had a population of 1,537,969, whereas the counties in Slovakia had 1,535,480. Sixty years afterwards the Hun- SLOVAKIA 3 garian counties had in 1848 a population of 2,844,830 and the counties of Slovakia had a population of 1,910,000. In 1787 Budin in Hungary had a population of 23,000 and Pest in Hungary, had only 16,000; Presporok in Slovakia had 29,000 and Banska Stiavnica in Slovakia had 24,000. After 83 years, in 1870, the population of Banska Stiavnica had declined to 12,000. 7 This decline in population, as the figures above indicate, extended to the period of the great exodus to America after 1873. As in the migration to Hungary, so in the modern migration to America economic conditions provided the main force that helped to empty Slovakia, but there were other causes, namely, political, social, and economic. The political ambitions of the Slovaks were closely linked with the rise of nationalism in Slovakia, which developed from three factors, contemporary trends of thought in Europe, outside pressure by the Magyars, and Slovak internal life itself. A conviction developed in the people that the country which they occupied was their own and that within it they had rights not to be contravened by any power. This thought was emphasized in a book by John Baltazar Magin who spoke in 1728 of the rights of the Slovak nation . Memories of Slovak antiquity began to be revived. George Papanek published Of Slovak Kings and K ingdoms in 1780; George Sklenar in 1783 wrote of the glories of Greater Moravia, and in 1793 George Fandli published a revision of Papanek's book. The Slovak poet John Holly portrayed the events of the Slovak past in an epic Sviitopluk (1833), in his book Slav (1834), and in Cyrilo-Methodi ada (1835)8 These writings prepared the ground for further studies in the Slovak language. During the Reformation the Czech language had spread in Slovakia among the Slovak Protestants ; but it remained a foreign language in Slovakia. This led to the cultivation of Slovak as the particular language of the Slovak nation. Matthew Bel-Funtik (1687-1749) wrote of the Slovak language that "in no respect does it fall behind the ponderousness of Spanish, the charm and smoothness of English, the richness and emphasis of German, the softness and tenderness of Italian or the imperious sternness of Magyar." Since the Slovaks had no national literary medium as late as the end of the eighteenth century, Anton Bernolak created a national literary language based on the western 4 SLOVAKIA or Trnava dialect. In 1787 he published a grammar of literary Slovak and later also published a six volume SlovakCzech-Latin-German-Magyar dictionary. 9 The greatest writer of the "Bernolakian" school was John Holly, who is described as "in the fullest sense the awakener of national consciousness by right of actualizing what others had planned and dreamed of." 10 Even though a considerable school of "Bernolakian" writers developed, the western Slovak dialect failed to become the national idiom. Uudovit Stur (1815-1856) together with the Lutheran pastors Joseph Miloslav Hurban (18171888) and Michael Miloslav Hurban established the definite form of literary Slovak, based upon a dialect spoken in the eight central counties. Together they founded a literary and publishing society, Tatrin (1844), and began to publish the political journal Slovenske narodnie noviny (1845), and the literary monthly, Slovenske pohl'ady (1846). The use of the Slovak language became an essential demand in Slovak political agitation. In May of 1848 the Slovak nationalist leaders met in the rectory of Michael Miloslav Hodza in Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas, where they drew up a political program for the Slovaks: "Petitions of the Slovak Nation." They expressed no desire to break away from the Hungarian state; they wanted defined boundaries for Slovak lands, social, political, cultural equality of Slovaks with Hungarians, and official recognition of the Slovak language. When the leaders planned to submit this program for the approval of the Slovak people, the Hungarian government forbade Slovak assemblies and imprisoned the Slovak leaders. 11 The hand of Eudovit Stur was obvious in the program. Already in 1847 he had listed these grievances: manorial courts, maldistribution of public offices, lack of uniform taxation, need of reform in the judicial system, insufficient freedom of the press and speech; he also demanded the use of the Slovak language in schools, churches, and courts. 1 z With the demands of Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas ignored and then repressed, the Slovaks took to revolutionary activity against the Hungarians. Since their only hope of relief lay with the central government at Vienna, they threw in their lot with the imperial forces of Habsburg against the SLOVAKIA 5 revolution of Kossuth. After the prostration of Magyarism through Russian intervention in 1849, the Slovaks were prepared to accept a limited territorial sovereignty from the imperial government; but even though the assimilative policy of the Magyars was suspended, centralization, not autonomy, remained the order of the day. In the Spring of 1861 the Slovaks renewed their political activity. After their political principles had been published in the newspapers, an assembly was called to meet in Turciansky Sv. Martin. The prominent attorney Stephen Marko Daxner formulated the political program: recognition of the Slovak nation by imperial edict, the constitution of Slovakia as a distinct administrative unit in Hungary, the right of Slovaks to develop their own life without restriction. This "Memorandum of the Slovak People" was presented to the Emperor Franz Joseph; the only result was that the Slovaks were allowed to establish the cultural institution, the Matice, Slovenska. 14 Austria's defeat by Prussia in 1866 forced a settlement with the Magyars. Known as the Compromise of 1867, it granted Magyars internal independence and divided the Empire into two countries under one crown. The Compromise of 1867 and the dualistic sys.tern based on it, appeared before public opinion as the compromise of the Austrian Emperor with the Hungarian feudal classes which the liberal German high bourgeoisie accepted, though not without serious hesitation, in order to secure its own hegemony against tbe will of the Slav majority.15 Jaszi observes that this artificial dualistic system could be maintained only "by a corrupt and restricted electoral system, by open ballot, and by terroristic procedures in the administrative and military machine." 16 The political injustices after 1867 should therefore be considered not only against a background of Magyarization but also seen as a means used to preserve the structure of the dual monarchy. The electoral laws and improper representation in the Hungarian parliament were among the grievances. For instance, in the 58 electoral areas inhabited by Slovaks for the most part, these deputies were elected: 6 SLOVAKIA ELECTION OF DEPUTIES 1865-1881 Year Magyar Deputies 1865 1869 1872 1875 1878 1881 58 58 56 58 58 58 Slovak Deputies 0 0 2 0 0 0 Source: C. J. Street, HU GARY AND DEMOCRACY (London, 1923), PP. 57-58. The constituencies and polling stations were so arranged that Magyar communities were assured of easy access •to the poll, while non-Magyar communities had ,to travel great distances. It wa-s no uncommon trick for the local authorities to declare roads and bridges unsafe for traffic on the day of election, or for all the hors es in non-Magyar districts to be placed under veterinary supervision and forbidd en to move outside the commune.17 The Slovaks had grievances against the judicial system. Until 1871 the judicial and administrative spheres were not separated. In that year judicial reform was inaugurated. Criminal and civil cases were dealt with in the District and Sedrial courts as the first instance, the Tables as the second, and the Royal Curia in Budapest as the final one. 18 The Slovaks complained too that the nationality of the legal officers did not correspond to the national distribution of population. In 1910 there were 2,633 judges and official lawyers in Hungary; 2,601 were Magyars, 31 Germans, 1 Slovak. This was the proportion of legal officers in a country where the Slovaks formed 12 % of the population.19 Moreover, in spite of the fact that the law of Nationalities (1868) admitted other languages to court, 20 the law remained a dead letter, for summonses were issued in Magyar, and verdicts given in Magyar, and the need of an interpreter was disregarded. 21 Slovaks also called for freedom of the press. 22 Between 1905 and 1908 there were 43 court actions against fourteen Slovak newspapers ; sentences totaling eleven years and three months were imposed as well as fines totaling 11,000 crowns for Pan-Slavistic activities. 23 Besides these unsettling political factors, other social causes added to the sense of national frustration. SLOVAKIA 7 At the basis of the cultural conflict was the idea of the Magyar state. The law of Hungary recognized only one nation in Hungary, and that was the Magyar. To be secure, Hungary had to be Magyar. The objective of political action became to create one nation, Magyar in sentiment and speech, from the multinational and polylingual Hungarian lands. 24 This ideal was pushed by every means: newspapers, the society for the Magyarization of Proper Names founded in 1880, and 1898 law to give all towns Magyar names; suppression of the Slovak language in rail, postal, and telegraph service. 25 As one reaction against the process of forcible assimilation, the Slovak sought comfort and national security in Pan-Slavism. Having become conscious of the larger Slav community, the Slovak nationalist leaders shook off their feeling of inferiority and began to place their hopes of realizing national ideals in the larger Slav group. 26 The Hungarians reacted by denouncing as Pan-Slav any Slovak who refused to renounce his nationality and language. 27 The chief means of transforming Slovaks into Magyars were to be the schools. After the Compromise of 1867, an attack was launched against German, Slovak, and Ruthenian schools. Bela Grunwald in 1873 began publishing Svornost', a bi-monthly, attacking the Slovak gymnasia as hot-beds of Pan-Slavism. 28 The gymnasium at Revuca was closed August 20, 1874; the one at Klastor pod Znievom, on September 21, 1874; and the one at Turciansky Sv. Martin, on December 30, 1874. 29 All Slovak elements were expelled from secondary and technical schools, and permission was refused to erect a chair of Slovak at the University of Budapest.30 The school statistics reveal this Magyarizing tendency: SCHOOLS IN SLOVAKIA 1910-1918 Schools Primary Grammar Indus., Comm., Agric. Teacher training Middle (High Schools) University Magyar Slovak German 3,777 101 118 419 20 39 8 SLOVAKIA Source: Nicholas Timashe!f, PEDIA (1948), p. 262. "Education," SLAVONIC ENCYCW- The official statistics of the Hungarian government in 1914 reveal the extent of Magyarization. They list 256,020 children of Slovak language as attending school. Of these, 214,267 Slovak children were in purely Magyar elementary schools, and only 42,186 in 365 Slovak elementary schools. 31 Educational standards were low. Attendance was weakly enforced; in most villages the schools remained open for five or six months per year. In 1913, just before World War I, 32,700 Slovak children of school age were not enrolled.32 Naturally the results were bad. Those able to read and write averaged 63 per cent of the Slovak population; but individual counties had worse records. In the county of Saris, only 48.6 per cent, in Spis 58 per cent, in Zemplin 51.4 per cent, in Ung 43.5 per cent could read and write. 33 The Matica Slovenska or Slovak Institute, a national cultural society founded in 1863, was dissolved in 1875. The charges were unlawful political activity and mismanagement. The government seized not only money and property but also the library and museum. 34 Even the churches were made instruments of Magyarization. The religious history of the period 1867-1914 is dark, indeed. Bishop Parvy of Spis lived in Budapest for many years; Bishop Balasz of Roznava ignored everything Slovak as though it were non-existent. The Cardinal-Primate of Hungary, Czernoch, was of Slovak birth, but Magyar in thought and sentiment. 35 Often other priests felt their people's cultural humiliation and endeavoured to alleviate it, but were placed so that their influence was limited. The Lutheran General Assembly resolved against "Pan-Slavism" in 1882; in no district did the Slovak Lutherans have a majority.36 However, the chief reasons for Slovak emigration in the latter half of the nineteenth century seem to have been economic.37 The predominantly agricultural nature of the country's economy is best illustrated by the following chart on agriculture: SLOVAKIA 9 POPULATION ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE 1910 Total Population in 1,000 Austrian Provinces Counties of Hungarian Crown Bosnia and Herzogovina Total Total engaged in Agriculture in 1,000 Agricultural Percentage 28,572 13,842 48.5 % 20,886 13,470 64.5% 1,932 1,674 86.6 % ----------------- - -- - -- - ----- --- - --51,390 28,982 Source: Oscar Ja,szi, THE DIS,SOLUTION MONARCHY (Chicago, 1929) p. 195. 56.4 % OF THE IHABSBUHG The soil was not of the best quality. Woodland averaged about 15 per cent of the total. In Turiec county 33 per cent was unfit for cultivation; in Orava, 30 per cent; in Zvolen, 32 per cent; in Liptov, 41 per cent; in Novohrad, 26 per cent; in Gerner, 47 per cent; Spis, 37 per cent; in Saris, 43 per cent. In Orava county there were 2761 farms that averaged one to five acres; of this land only 43 per cent was arable. 38 In addition to the problem of poor soil, there existed the problem of the great estates. Speaking of Hungary in general, Jaszi says that 40 per cent of the total area of Hungary was occupied in 1913 by a small number of large and very large estates. The medium sized farms of 142 to 1,420 acres embraced a smaller area, but with the greater estates covered 54.4 per cent of the total territory. Over 64.4 per cent of the country was possessed by small farmers holding less than 142 acres. Moreover, only 34.5 per cent of Hungarian territory belonged to those who actually cultivated the soil. 39 In Hungary proper, without !Croatia, there lived 2,280,000 farmer families. According to the most optimistic calculation only 460,000 families owned property on the average above 20 acres, guaranteeing an independent livelihood, whereas 1,820,000 families, that is to say four fifths of them possessed only so-called "dwarf" properties or no property at all.40 10 SLOVAKIA If we consider the situation of Slovakia in particular, an equally cheerless picture presents itself. In Slovakia 1,000 persons owned 2,100,000 hectares, that is, about 8,000 square miles; 21.5 per cent of the holdings were less than a half hectare in size; 41 75 per cent of the land was held by the great landlords. 42 The agricultural areas compared unfavorably with the western and northwestern parts of the Habsburg Monarchy. The industrialized parts did not exceed three-tenths of the entire territory of the Monarchy, whereas over seven-tenths were populated by peasants, poor, almost on the level of slow starvation. 43 One way to raise the peasant's standard of living was to raise the productivity of agricultural labor and the growth of crops. Between 1850 and 1895 there was progress in agricultural production. Improvements were made in Hungary after 1848, e.g., the iron plow replaced the wooden. The great landlords led the advance and the peasants imitated them. These landlords in Hungary between 1850 and 1890 were deeply interested in improving agricultural production, chiefly because of the high price of wheat in the world market. They were anxious to increase wheat production for export. After 1885 the world market price began to decline and the landlords gradually lost interest. Indeed, they began to cut production. The strategy was to create a domestic scarcity so that wheat would have to be imported. The objective of the policy was to transform a grain exporting country into a grain importing one. This would enable the landlords to raise the price of domestic grain to the world price augmented by the tariff. By 1907 the tariffs began to have a constant effect. In this situation the lot of the agricultural worker grew steadily worse. Unemployment grew, wages decreased, and the cost of living rose. Jaszi observes that the heavy hand of the landlord-controlled economy pushed the Monarchy toward disaster. 44 The workers' wages in Hungary averaged the equivalent of sixty to a hundred dollars a year, while a woman's wages averaged yearly only between forty and fifty dollars. 45 In Slovakia the agricultural worker earned 25 cents a day.46 His staple food in winter was cabbage and potatoes. 47 To the low wages and the agricultural poverty we must SLOVAKIA 11 add the difficulty of buying land in Slovakia. The price of land in Slovakia by 1906 had risen in some cases 100 percent; the amount of money sent from America helped cause this price rise. The Postal Bank of Kosice received in 1896 six and a half million florins from America. 48 Over and above these burdens, the poor peasant had to bear the load of usurious banking. In pre-war Slovakia almost every town had a little joint-stock institution; although this was called a bank, it did not carry on real banking operations, but was only a savings and loan bank. The majority of these banks dispersed capital which was not available where it was needed. The banks under Magyar control followed a policy of dividends, whereas the Slovak banks paid a lower rate of interest. 49 Virtually no institutions provided long term mortgage credits; in fact, only two banks, both unsound, engaged in this business in Slovakia. Besides these banks, there were cooperative societies which offered limited cr,edit facilities to the peasants. 50 The small farmer ended up borrowing at rates of 7 per cent to 8 per cent, and sometimes rates were as high as 14 per cent. On short term loans rates of 50 per cent were not unknown. Consequently the profits of the banks were high. One bank in Slovakia with a capitalization of 60,000 crowns and reserves of 18,000 profited one year to the amount of 22,000 crowns. The average profit of the banks in 1888 was 29.56 per cent on the capital invested; in 1894 the profit was 13.58 per cent. 51 The economic situation worsened by the national addiction to drink. On this all the sources seem agreed. Impoverishing effects of overindulgence in drink were a factor in driving the Slovaks to seek improved economic conditions in America. 52 This lack of economic opportunity and security led to the migration. The following figures, though somewhat suspect because of the tendency of Magyarization, still tell an eloquent story. This table is a modification of the original. NATIONALITIES IN HUNGARY Nationality Slovaks 1880 1,855,000 1890 1,897,000 1900 2,002,000 1910 1,946,000 12 SLOVAKIA Source: Robert A. Kann, THE -MULTINATIONAL EJMP]RE: NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL REF1ORM IN THE HABSBURG MONAROHY 1848-1914 {New York, 19 50) I, 278. The Slovaks in considerable numbers migrated to America after 1880 as part of the "new immigration". Until 1880 the bulk of the new additions to American population by immigration was predominantly either English in speech or at least derived from the northern and western areas of Europe; this was the "old immigration." Thereafter newcomers from southern and eastern Europe arrived, representing peoples who were very different in language, customs, political experiences, and personal standards of living. Italian, Greek, and the confusion of Slavic languages sounded strange indeed to ears attuned to English or Germanic sounds. Invidious comparisons were made. The "Nordic" was more akin to the American in blood; the "new immigrants" had not the Anglo-Saxon training in self-government, and they were merely birds of passage. Besides the fact that he spoke a strange language, the "new immigrant" was more often than not a Catholic. All these things set him apart from the "old immigrant." 53 The year 1873 saw the beginning of the flood. Even though the political, cultural, social, and economic causes were ripe for emigration, other causes operated to bring America to the attention of the hardpressed Slovak immigrants. The steamship company agents urged the peasants to emigrate, for the companies derived a large part of their income from transport of immigrants. In most countries there were laws prohibiting advertisements of prosperous conditions in another country. Two leading steamship companies were reported to have five or six thousand agents in Galicia alone. In Hungary, Immigration Commission members saw letters written by agents instructing prospective immigrants on how to leave the country without the government's consent, what routes to follow, and other related information. 54 Other agents who increased emigration from Hungary after 1870 were labor contractors, who came to hire workers for the mines and steel mills. These agents promised everything. Archduke Rudolph, they said, was living in South America, establishing there a new ideal state; immigrants to, SLOVAKIA 13 the United States were to receive grants of land and aid in buying equipment and in constructing necessary buildings.55 Many peasants who went with the agents wrote back letters reporting high wages. These lett'ers were undoubtedly one of the most powerful means of persuading the Slovak peasants to cross the ocean. 56 In the earlier phases of immigration many emigrants returned to their native country after they had laid by a sufficiency of this world's goods. The figures given by the Hungarian government for emigration and return for the year of 1905 show the extent of this return movement and suggest the breadth of influence exercised by returning emigrants. In 1905 the Magyar figures list 38,770 as leaving the country, while they give 4,038 as returning to Hungary.57 The news of work and wages certainly had an effect in stimulating further emigration. The Slovak emigrants moved generally westward by rail for German or Dutch ports. During the years 1881-1900 some 372,979 Slovaks were reported to have passed through the port of Hamburg, whereas only 9,501 embarked from Italian ports. 58 During 1886-1907 the German ports handled 348,808 emigrants from Hungary, Antwerp 57,170, Dutch ports 33,762, and Italian ports 3,785. 59 The low cost of steamship crossing attracted many to undertake the difficult journey. Passage from Hamburg on the way out was $20; the return journey as far as Oderburg, a station on the Hungarian frontier, was $23.60. The Hungarian Government granted the Cunard Line the monopoly of transporting emigrants from Hungary. So great was the rush to America that the Cunard Line called on other companies and formed the "Continental Pool" to handle the traffic. This "Pool" provided the worst accommodations, the worst diet, and the worst navigation. 61 The journey's length varied from fifteen to sixty days. The emigrants fortified themselves against sea-sickness with prunes and brought their own supplies of sausage, bacon, plum brandy, and gin. Water was distributed only at intervals, sometimes only once a day. The ventilation in the living quarters was bad. 62 One emigrant described his journey in these words: "It was in the year 1883 that, with three men, I set out from Trebis ov for America. We got on a wagon that took us to Obisovce, 14 SLOVAKIA where we boarded a train and rode to Vrutky. There we obtained travel permits for Bohumfn, and from Bohumin to Bremen, where we boug1hit our steamship tickets, for which we paid 53 ,gold pieces. A chill comes over me even now when I think of that ship of ours. We were afloat almost 18 days and twice the shi p was in danger of sinking. Everything on the deck rwas broken, a nd water poured into it. And as the boat rocked, one could feel that even in one's s-tomach."63 Among the ports of entry New York easily ranked first for the Slovak immigrants; then in order followed Baltimore, Philadelphia, New Orleans, Boston and Portland. 64 Nor did the ills of the immigrants cease when they landed in the United States. Often enough their meagre funds and they were quickly parted. One immigrant paid a fare of $60 for a ride from the harbor to the Lackawanna railroad station. Hotels deliberately detained the immigrants by telling them that the train to their destination made the trip only once a week. Other swindlers met the immigrants as they came ashore and offered to send a telegram to their relatives or friends for the price of twenty five cents ; needless to say, no telegram was sent, and the immigrants were only so much poorer. One porter kidnapped two young girls who ended in brothels.85 The Slovak immigrants of the 1880's were not the first Slovaks to set foot upon American soil. The very first Slovak to come to America, so far as we know, was Andrew Jelik, a tailor on a Dutch ship which sailed to America in 17541755. He did not remain in America and eventually died in Budin, Hungary, 1783.66 Another Slovak who had arrived in America in the eighteenth century was Count Maurice Benovsky who landed at Baltimore in 1775. He was but an adventurer whose later career took him to Madagascar where he became king and where he also perished. 67 In the year 1800 a Slovak dealer in oils surprised a Slovak Jesuit in Mexico City by making his confession in Slovak. 68 The first Slovak settlement was made in Philadelphia by drotari, wireworkers, in 1840 at 412-414 Front Street. 69 Martin Chalan landed in the United States in 1872, took out his first papers in 1876, and became a citizen in 1879. Making the trip back and forth across the ocean, he was h1 America twenty six times. He died in 1915. 70 In the wake of these individuals the larger numbers began to come, first, from eastern Slovakia, especially from the SLOVAKIA 15 counties of Zemplin, Sari~, and Spis. 71 Between the years 18691890 the county of Spis lost 14% of her youths between 20 to 25 years of age, and 31 % of the men between 26 and 30; Saris lost 34% of those between 20 and 25, 44 % of the men between 26 and 30. 72 Only after the eastern counties did the western ones take to emigration. To give exact figures on Slovak immigration before 1899 is impossible because prior to 1899 the immigration authorities counted the immigrants according to country of last residence, and many Slovaks listed Hungary as their country of last residence. Since 1899 the immigrants are counted according to race or language. Therefore the figures before 1899 do not give us exact data on Slovak immigrants; but according to Emily Green Balch the earlier immigrants from Hungary may be presumed to be Slovaks with some Jews and Magyars included. 73 In 1873 immigrants from Hungary numbered 1,300; in 1880 4,000 entered the United States, and in 1884 the number rose to 15,000. 74 The following table shows the total number of Slovaks coming into this country in the years 1899 to 1909: SLOVAK IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES Year ending June 30 Number 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 15,838 29,243 29,343 36,934 34,427 27,940 52,368 38,221 42,041 16,170 Source: Emily Green Balch, OUR (New York, 1910), P. 103. 22,568 SLAVIC FELLOW CITI ZENS In the period 1899-1910 the total immigration to the United States numbered 9,555,673; in this number there were 337,527 Slovaks. 75 Consideration of Table 5 shows that Hl SLOVAKIA 1905 was the peak year for the Slovaks in which 52,368 of them were admitted. Numerically in the twelve years ending June 30, 1910 Slovakia ranked eighth among the nations providing immigrant material. 76 The rate of emigration of Slovaks per 1,000 was 18.6; this was double that of any other race of people, except the Hebrews (18.3), Croatian-Slovenians (13.1), and South Italians (11.9). The rate was the highest of any group. 77 Having arrived in the United States, the Slovak immigrants began to look for a place to live and to work. The first areas to draw them were the coal mine centers; only in the second instance did the Slovaks settle in the factory cities.78 One focus of settlement was the hard-coal area of northeastern Pennsylvania where the center was Hazleton, Pennsylvania. Before World War I the mines in this district employed 75,000 to 100,000 men; of this group 12% were Slovaks. 79 In the soft coal area of southwestern Pennsylvania Mt. Pleasant was the center of dispersion. From there the Slovaks moved northward to Latrobe or Greensburg, southward to Connellsville and Uniontown. The chief centers of Slovak settlement were: Alice, Standard, Bessemer, Bridgeport, Mammouth, Old Hecla, New Hecla, Calumet, Old Tarrs, Donnelly, Buckeye, Moyer, Johnstown, Pittsburgh, Gayette City, Brownsville, Masontown, Fairchance, Point Marion, Cannonsburg, Perryopolis, Republic, and others. 80 Only later did pockets of immigrants form in Chicago, Cleveland, and Detroit. About the geographic dispersion of Slovaks an interesting note occurs in a letter sent to the Jednota in 1913 by a J . P. Kapas, who had been traveling in the west. He wrote: "There had been plenty of Slovak people in the west, but almost all returned to the eastern states, and only for this r eason that in the west the people were all foreigners and wild." 81 Alaska seems to have been the limit of immigration, at least as far as the group was concerned. John Miklas, writing from Alaska, recommended against coming and said that he had not found any Slovaks there as yet. He surmised, however, that after his return from the "Old Country", where he meant to go for a visit, he might settle in Alaska.82 By 1885 large groups of Slovaks had settled in the fol- SLOVAKIA 17 lowing states: Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Illinois. 83 In the hard coal area in northeastern Pennsylvania a sub-employment system was used in which an operator hired the men who dug and loaded the coal; the mine company paid the operator and he paid off his hired men. The Slovaks, inexperienced in mine work and unskilled in language, worked merely as the hired men; this left them exposed to the wiles of unscrupulous operators who kept some of the pay from them. 84 In 1856 the Pennsylvania Railroad had reached Pittsburgh from Philadelphia; the Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railroad in 1871 built tracks to Pittsburgh, thus giving Pittsburgh an outlet to Baltimore. The demand for laborers in the mine fields of Westmoreland and Fayette Counties in Pennsylvania was answered by many Slovak men from the hard coal area and "the old country." But who the first Slovak was to enter the Pittsburgh area we do not know. When the agents of the Frick Company from the coke and coal region of southwestern Pennsylvania hired new immigrants · at Castle Garden, but for trivial exceptions the hired men were Slovaks. The company transported them by rail to Alverton, lying between Scottdale and Mt. Pleasant, Pa. Thence they walked to Morewood, Pa., where a company house awaited them. It is impossible to tell how many Slovaks there were in the coke region. We do know that in Morewood by 1893 there were four hundred men engaged in work, and how many Slovaks there were in this group we do not know. As early as 1880 John and Sophia Hvizdo~ had eighteen Slovak boarders in their house. 85 Until 1900 Slovaks worked mostly in the coal mines and at the coke ovens of Frick and Company. This firm had been organized in 1871 as Frick and Company, with about 300 acres of coal area and 50 coke ovens around Connellsville, Pa. By 1889 it had about 35,000 acres and 15,000 coke ovens. The lowest paid worker in 1890 was the "yard worker" who earned $1.40 for a ten hour day; the best wages were paid the "road man" who received $2.10 for nine hours of work. 86 At first the Slovaks worked beside the Czechs in the coal mines, while the Poles worked at the coke ovens; but gradually, the Slovaks too began to work their way up to jobs at the ovens. 18 SLOVAKIA Most Slovaks were satisfied with their wages, which varied from $16.00 to $25.00 every two weeks. Strange as it may seem, it was possible to live and also to lay something by from these wages. A pound of beef soup meat cost three cents; for six dollars a man could dress himself rather well; rent cost three or four dollars a month for a small four room house. Nevertheless, not all miners were satisfied; demands were made for more pay and less work. When the mine operators refused, there were strikes, often riotous and bloody. 87 The Slovaks were also employed in the Egdar Thompson Iron Works of Andrew Carnegie. Carnegie with Frick employed the greatest number of Slovaks; others, like Rainey, Oliver, and Jones and Laughlin also engaged considerable numbers of Slovaks, but the number cannot be exactly stated. However, until 1900 most of the Slovaks worked in the mines and at the coke ovens.88 When the Slovaks got jobs in the mines, they lived in "company houses ",which were built practically at the site of the mine. This was a settlement of large houses built by the company and rented to the worker, who had also to pay for water, gas and coal. 89 To buy his food and other necessities the miner had to patronize the company store. This made the dependence of the worker on the comp:.my complete; the threat of expulsion during a strike was a powerful weapon in keeping the miners submissive. 90 The company r ented a house to a married couple on condition that they take in "boarders," the usual number being ten, but in the larger houses the number varied upward to thirty or forty. 91 The cleanliness d 2p::!nded on the character, ability, or sheer physical strength of the housewife. Within the household food arrangements provided that except for meat, flour, and coffee, the food was purchased in common. One meal a day wa:; eaten together, on Sunday at noon and during the week in the evening. For the other meals the gazdina or housewife cooked individually for the men whatever they bought. Beer by the barrel was also bought in common; sometimes this ran to a hundred barrels per month. At the end of the month the common bill was divided: the housewife did not pay; the men including the husband, paid equally, and two children were counted as one adult. 92 Moreover, on pay day several barrels of beer would be bought as well as whiskey, SLOVAKIA 19 and much meat was prepared for a gay evening. At first, dancing was the chief recreation. One man pulled out an accordion, and the dancing began, even men dancing with men because of the shortage of women partners; frequently this mixure of drink, food, and music led to drunken brawls sometimes over the excellence of their home towns in Slovakia, often enough over women. Dancing was not limited to pay day; any celebration of even slight importance had to be combined with dancing and shouting of the most vigorous sort. The Cardas was a universal favorite. Family life was injured by many men coming to America without their wives and families and by the dearth of marriageable Slovak girls. To find a wife many young men on week ends went to Passaic, New Jersey, where many Slovak girls worked in the textile mills, and the men watched the girls as they came from work and made their choice. On Sundays in Passaic there often were ten to twenty weddings. Difficult as family life was, the "boarding house," allowing for so little privacy, did not help very much; sometimes it led to the wife's running off with a boarder. 93 Organizational life among the Slovaks began in the lodges and societies so common in America after the Civil War. By 1914 in the United States principal organizations had 15,600,000 members. Economic and social need led the Slovaks to form lodges. Mine disasters often took the lives of husbands and fathers, leaving the family not only destitute, but even without the money for a funeral. In answer to the need of sickness and funeral benefits a large number of societies grew up in industrial and .mining towns. The first of these was the Persi Uhorszko-Slovenszky v nemoczi podporujuci Szpolek, established in New York, on March 3, 1883. In this society, which lasted for eight years, Slovak was made the official language. Fraternal and mutual benefit iocieties mushroomed in the Slovak settlements. The Spolok Sv. Stefana in Passaic, N. J. was organized 1884 and already in 1887 was calling for a unification with other Slovak fraternal organizations. Under the influence of a Polish organization whose constituti-on it used, the Cirkevny a v ntmoci pl!>dporujuci spolok arose in Hazleton, Pa., in 1884. The Slovaks in Houtzdale, Pa., organized the Bratstvo Najsvatejsieho Srdca Pana Jezisa, on November 14, 1886; on December 12, 1884 the Spolok Sv. Stefana in Plymouth, Pa., came 20 SLOVAKIA into existence. A touch of humor accompanied the difficulties of the lodge in Bayonne City, N. J., where the Spolok Princa Rudolfa, set up in 1887, had to change its name after the tragic death of Archduke Rudolph of Hapsburg at Mayerling, because the other Slovaks ridiculed the members for having lost their patron. Bayonne City, N. J., had one of the largest mutual benefit societies, the Prvy bednarsky vypomocny spolok, an organization of Coopers engaged in making barrels, staves, chests, boxes; it was organized in 1888 and acted also as a bargaining agent for the membership with their employees. They were the first to have their own flag, whereas the other groups used the Hungarian flag. The Spolok Sv. Cyrila a Methoda in Minneapolis, Minn., and the Slovensky Spolok Sv. Petra i Pavla of McKeesport, Pa., both came into existence in 1888; the Slovensky v nemoci podporujuci spolok in Braddock, Pa., arose in 1889. The chief purpose of these societies was help in need, especially providing an elaborate funeral. In these funerals all the local lodges took part with flags, uniforms, and mourning bands. The secondary purpose was to aid in the organization of parishes, the building of churches and schools and lodge halls. 94 In spite of the success of these lodges, financial problems arose from the system of assessment which they used. The system required a contribution of about fourteen cents a month to meet administrative costs; on the death or sickness of a member the others had to contribute as much as would be needed for the stipulated sum. A considerable number of deaths or cases of sickness within a month or a short time made the financial burden too great for the small lodges. 95 The first appeal for unification came from the Society of St. Stephen in Passaic, N. J., as early as 1887. Julius Schwartz-Markovic in Nova Vlast' (a periodical that lasted only from March to December, 1888) made appeals for consolidation; Peter Rovnianek repeated this appeal in the October issue, as did B. Lajciak in the December issue. The Rev. Joseph Kossalko, a Roman Catholic priest of proMagyar conviction, seeing the nationalist tendency of these lodges in their use of Slovak as the official language and their gradual abandonment of the Hungarian flag, opposed this movement in a new periodical, the Zastava. The consolidation did not come until the 1890's. 96 When the Slovak immigrants, of whom the bulk was SLOVAKIA 21 Catholic, first came to the United States, they were financially unable to build churches for their own use. Before the Slovak Catholics had their own churches, they attended Polish, German, Czech, or Irish churches; if they happened to be regular attendants at a church where their languago was not understood, they often went a considerable distance to receive the sacraments, especially that of Penance, from someone who understood their language. In the southwestern Pennsylvania mining area the Slovaks were fortunate to have in their midst St. Vincent's Archabbey, a Benedictine institution, which took special care to provide priests who could understand the Slovak language. Priests from this archabbey went from settlement to settlement taking care of the spiritual needs of the Slovaks. The first to do "mission" work among the Slovaks was Rev. Nepomuk Yaeger, O.S.B., who for three years in southwestern Pennsylvania visited the mining camps, where often enough he had to offer the· Mass to the accompaniment of card-playing, drunken singing, swearing and quarreling. 97 First to organize on a religious basis were the Slovak Lutherans. The first Lutheran parish was established in Streator, Illinois, where the church was ready for services on October 5, 1884. Karol Horak, ordained in 1883, was the first minister, but he gave up ministerial work and became a real estate agent. While the parish was withouth a minister's services, the Slovak Lutherans met in the home of Mr. G. Kozlej, who read the Bible to them. A minister, Cyril Droppa, reached Streator on March 26, 1884 and stayed there until 1887; eventually his spiritual labors took him to Russia. This first Lutheran parish had 49 members; the pastor's salary was fixed at forty dollars a month. The name of the parish was the Parish of the Blessed Trinity. Lutheran parishes were organized in Freeland, Pa., and Nanticoke, Pa., in 1886, and Minneapolis, Minn., in 1888. 98 Almost simultaneously with the Lutherans, the Slovak Catholics organized themselves into parishes. However, before this could go on apace, priests able to speak Slovak were needed. Even among the first priests, 99 the division into Slo·vak nationalists and Madarones disturbed their relations with one another and their work among Slovaks, Protestant as _well as Catholics. In 1882 the Rev. Ignatius Jaskovic, who came to Hazle- 22 SLOVAKIA ton, Pa., was the first active Slovak Catholic priest in the United States. He built St. Joseph's church in Hazleton, where the first Mass was said on December 6, 1885. He stayed in Hazleton until 1890. The Rev. J. Kossalko, arriving in 1884, had his first parish in Streator, Ill.; he said the first Mass in the new church of St. Stephen on December 10, 1885, just four days after the first mass had been said in Hazleton, Pa. The Rev. Samuel Bella, also a Catholic priest, became the pastor of Nanticoke, Pa., and later of Bayonne City, N. J. These three priests were all Madarones, that is, Slovaks with pro-Magyar convictions, and firmly opposed to any Slovak nationalism. 100 This Madarone element introduced the first division of the Slovak group into the factions that played a part among the pre-World War Slovaks of America. In 1887 in Scranton, Pa., the Slovak Calvinists first organized as a religious group. The Slovak Calvinists of Jessup, Pa., had a chapel there since 1888, but the building of churches had to wait until the 189O's. To conduct services in their parishes the Calvinists hired Magyar and English ministers; the Slovaks and Magyars fought about the language to be used in the divine service, Slovak or Magyar. There was no general solution for these churches, but the language varied from church to church. 101 At first some Slovaks objected to building schools on the score of uselessness; these untutored peasants had to be taught that schools were important. Some Slovak immigrants had come to make money and were in America only temporarily. Schools meant permanence. Why should they contribute to the education of other people's chidren? However a beginning was made. St. Stephen's parish, Streator, Ill., built the first Slovak Catholic parochial school in 1889, a wooden structure, costing $4,500, a considerable sum for those days. From the very beginning the schools were not strictly Slovak, for there were not enough Slovak teachers; this led to many subjects being taught by "English" teachers and "Irish" nuns. Slovak nationalists were satisfied by having the pastor teach the children on Saturday afternoons, when they studied the Slovak language, Slovak history, and Slovak geography.102 The 11cattered Slovak settlements were brought in touch with one another by newspapers written in the Slovak language. John Slovensky, a trained teacher from Slovakia, had SLOVAKIA 23 come to the United States in 1879, and had obtained a clerical job in the Austro-Hungarian consulate. This put him in contact with the Slovak immigrants, who came to the consulate often seeking information about conditions in the Monarchy, as for instance, was the Monarchy at war with the Turk? This suggested to Slovensky the idea of a Slovak periodical. In 1885 he launched a lithographed paper called Rulletin, which contained news from Europe and items about Slovak immigrants. Especially the tavern keepers subscribed to it for their taverns where Slovaks met to read it. Success prompted John Slovensky to embark on · a larger enterprise, the publication of Amerikanszko-Slovenszke Noviny. J. Schwartz-Markovic and the Rev. Erwin Gelhoff, a Catholic priest, published the Nova Vlast' in Streator, Illinois, in March 1888; this venture lasted only until December of that very year. The year 1889 saw the birth of two other newspapers, the Slovak v Amerike and Rev. J. Kossalko's Madarone newspaper, Zastava. 103 These newspapers became the sounding boards of popular opinion as well as a unifying force among the Slovaks. Discussion in the newspapers led to the consolidation of local lodges during the 1890's. With the beginning of the 1890's the Slovaks began to unify the many individual lodges into a federation for greater economic security. However, from the very start factions divided the Slovaks. The leaders of the Slovak immigrants disagreed on whether the principle of organization should be religious or nationalist. The Rev. Stephen Furdek, a Catholic priest, believed that the new national organization should be based upon religious uniformity within the organization; the Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists should each have their own organization. Peter Rovnianek, a Slovak nationalist, wanted nationality to be the principle of organization. Any Slovak, no matter what his religious convictions or lack of them, could be a member. 104 Because of this difference of principle, two separate, and in many ways rival, organizations arose. On February 16, 1890, Peter V. Rovnianek led in founding the National Slovak Society in Pittsburgh, Pa. All Slovaks, Catholics, Protestants, Freemasons, Freethinkers or indifferentists, were welcome. Openly nationalist, the National Slovak Society played down religious differences, emphas- 24 SLOVAKIA izing all Slovaks were one. The frank nationalism and liberalism antagonized the Madarone Slovaks and some Catholici. The Rev. J. Kossalko, the most outstanding Madarone, refused absolution to Catholic members of the National Slovak Society. 105 Others besides the Madarone element opposed the liberal National Slovak Society. The Rev. Stephen Furdek established a Catholic fraternal organization, the First Catholic Slovak Union, September 4, 1890. The objectives of this First Catholic Slovak Union were to preserve the Catholic Faith, to support fellow-members, widows, and orphans in need, to preserve and extend the use of the Slovak language and Slovak nationality. Conditions of membership were recognition of the bishop of Rome as head of the Catholic Church, faithful performance of religious duties, attendance of one's children at a Catholic school, support of parish and parochial school, no ridicule of religious ceremonies, and no writing against the Church and the clergy. 106 Slovak women felt that they, too, should have their own organizations independent of male control. They established the Zivena Beneficial Society in the year 1891. In 1892 the Slovak Catholic women organized a similar society, the First Catholic Slovak Ladies' Union. 107 The Slovak Lutherans organized their own beneficial society in 1893, the Slovak Evangelical Union; and soon afterwards the Slovak Calvinists formed the Slovak Calvinist Union. 108 For reasons that are not evident, almost all these groups felt the strain of internal strife. A split in the First Catholic Slovak Union provided members for a new organization, the Pennsylvania Roman and Greek Catholic Union in 1893. This society intended to encourage religion, temperance, and morality, to train its members in obedience and respect for civil law and in performance of civil duties, to collect funds to pay burial benefits.109 In Chicago the local lodge of the National Slovak Society left the national organization and formed the Slovak National Society. 110 Later a similar break occurred in the Slovak Evangelical Union. In 1890 P. V. Rovnianek and his associates published the First Slovak National Almanac. Almanacs were already a Slovak European tradition. The National Slovak Society first issued its own almanac in 1893; and the First Catholic SLOVAKIA 25 Slovak Union began its series with the Kalendar Jednota in 1896. These almanacs provided the literary reading that most Slovaks did: short stories, political essays on conditions in the United States, reviews of the year's important events, religious essays, articles on the Indians and Negroes, moral essays on how to spend Sundays, counseling articles on marriage, and almost any subject useful to the Slovak readers. In these almanacs the best Slovak writers reached their limited Slovak American public; eventually the almanacs became so popular that ,twenty-nine were published. 111 Newspapers received the strongest impetus from the national societies. The Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny were the mouthpiece of the National Slovak Society; the First Catholic Slovak Union published an official organ, the Jednota. These were real newspapers with world news, reports from the domestic scene in America, and organization news in their columns. One feature distinguished these papers from the trend turning American newspapers into large business enterprises; the Slovak immigrant papers remained very much the voice of the individual editors. However, many Slovaks had no desire to read a newspaper. The editors, who usually combined editing with other work to earn their living, on Saturday and Sunday toured Slovak settlements to get subscriptions for their periodicals. 112 Very soon after the organization of the two fraternal societies the Slovaks learned how effective and necessary cooperation on a national level can be. When the price of steel billets began to fall, the Edgar Thompson Works in Braddock, Pa., announced a wage cut. This led to a strike late in 1890. On the night of January 1, 1891, Michael Quinn, a guard at the mill was slain. Many Slovaks were arrested, among them persons who had been strolling about after a pleasant evening in a tavern. The police arrested about sixty persons and charged them with being involved in the crime. Most of them received light sentences, but on April 8, 1891, Andrew Toth, Michael Sabol, and George Rusnak received the death sentence for the murder of Michael Quinn. Only by heroic efforts did the Slovak leaders and organizations secure on February 7, 1892 a commutation of sentence to life imprisonment. 113 The efforts of Rev. F. Wider, president of the First Catholic Slovak Union, Peter V. Rovnianek of the National 26 SLOVAKIA Slovak Society, Rev. Stephen Furdek, and Julius Wolf, won the release of Michael Sabol, suffering from tuberculosis, in 1895; he died ten days after leaving prison. Peter V. Rovnianek, engaging a lawyer, Clarence Burleigh, secured the freedom of George Rusnak in 1897; George Rusnak, too, had tuberculosis. Andrew Toth left prison only twenty years later, a man sixty two years old. After the efforts of the Slovak League had failed, Edward Goehring, an attorney, succeeded in showing that the evidence which convicted Toth was contradictory. Toth was freed in 1911. The Pennsylvania legislature rejected a motion to give Toth $300.00 for every year he had spent unjustly in jail. However, the Carnegie Foundation fixed a grant of $40 a month on him. 114 During February, 1891, a strike against the firm of Henry Clay Frick, Frick and Company, bec:;_me general in the Connellsville, Pa., area of coke ovens and soft coal. By 1889 Frick had acquired 35,000 acres of coal area and 15,000 coke ovens and employed about 30,000 workers. Andrew Virostek, a worker in the Tip Top Mine and member of the United Mine Workers of America, threatened miners who loaded more coal than union regulations permitted. Then the company fired him. The union fought the mine operators over the dismissal, and by February a strike flared throughout the region. On April 2, 1892 when about five hundred miners attacked the Southwest Company shops in Morewood, Pa., three Slovaks, three Poles, and one Italian were shot to death. The state militia came in to restore order, and some men drifted to work. Frick hired Pinkerton detectives to expel the remaining strikers from the company homes. During the week of April 18, 1892 these detectives were to oust seven hundred families in Fayette county alone. When the agents began the evictions, a Slovak man and woman perished in the violence in Leisenring No. 3, two Slovak women were wounded at Adelaide, and at Trotter, sixteen men and thirteen women were shot. Then in the following month Frick began hiring Negroes and Italians to replace the Slovaks. 115 Julius Wolf and Peter V. Rovnianek figured secretly in the settlement of the strike. The Frick company paid them sums of money for persuading the miners to return to the pits. Unwisely, the two men discussed the deal in letters, SLOVAKIA 27 which their enemies subsequently published. Slovak immigrant writing has branded these letters as the "Four Letters of Betrayal. " 116 The Slovaks' preoccupation with wages, bad housing, and mine disasters seem to have led to a decline in religious fervor. Causes suggested to explain the decline varied: nonconfessional schools, public schools, neglect by religious authorities, too great preoccupation with earning a living. 117 Evidence exists to show that some Catholics fell away. A "Home Mission among the Slavic Immigrants" in 1885 supported a Congregational Church in Cleveland; it also provided a Presbyterian Church in New York. 118 The effectiveness of these efforts among the Slovaks, it is impossible to judge. In Mt. Pleasant, Pa., a Slovak preacher came to the "Church of God" and succeeded in bringing at least 7 SloYak Catholic families into it. 119 Higganum, Conn., had a Slovak colony of about 20 families; some Slovak Catholics went to church only to keep their benefits in the Jednota; others were entirely indifferent, so far gone that they married in the Lutheran church, even though a Catholic priest was always available. 120 The namecalling contest between P. V. Rovnianek and the Rev. Stephen Furdek, unedifying as it was, certainly spread anti-clericalism among the nationalist element. This apparent religious decline should not blind us to the extensive church building activities of the Slovak immigrants during the 1890's. Frequently the construction of a church or organization of a parish began in cooperation with another national group, Poles, Croatians, Irish, or Germans; sometimes many different nationalities cooperated, Lithuanians, Poles, Italians, and Irish. Often cooperation failed, because each group felt its rights were ignored. 121 Still, for instance, at least eight new Slovak parishes were opened in the Pittsburgh diocese; and in Cleveland from St. Ladislaus' parish St. Martin's was created in 1893. 122 A Slovak parish was organized in Kangley, Ill., as a mission of the Streator congregation, in 1892. 123 The Slovak Catholics of Chicago finally got their own parish in 1898, the Roman Catholic Church of St. Michael the Archangel. 214 Expansion was the keynote. Just after the decade ended, in 1903, there were 78 Roman Catholic Slovak churches. 125 However, the Slovaks failed to build parochial schools; this had to wait for the next decade. 28 SLOVAKIA The Slovak Lutherans of Chicago organized the Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Blessed Trinity in 1893; in 1894 the Rev. L. Boor became the pastor and in that very year began teaching the children of the parish the Slovak language. 126 Hand in hand with progress in organization appeared the elements of culture. Such efforts as the organization of the First Catholic Slovak Band in Johnstown, Pa., in 1892, were only straws in the wind. The Rev. S. Furdek in 1893 led in a move to establish a cultural organization to be called the Matica Slovenska in memory of the Slovak cultural institution disbanded by the Magyars in 1875. It held a convention in Chicago, September 26, 1893, and was incorporated in Columbus, Ohio, October 26, 1893. The Matica was to be a central organization to improve the cultural life of the Slovaks in Europe and America. On February 18, 1894 Peter V. Rovnianek, not to be behind hand, organized a Majak, literarne kola, that is, the Beacon Literary Circle, partly in opposition to the Matica, although he fervently disavowed any such a purpose. The Majak's objectives were encouragement of Slovak literature and culture, establishment of a Slovak cultural press, and nationalist agitation. The Literary Circle began publishing the first Slovak literary "journal, a forty page periodical, Majak, literary, political, and nationalist. It survived only six months. Both these organizations failed, partly through division of effort, partly through lack of interest among the Slovaks. 127 During this decade another society arose in Chicago, the First Slovak Sokol. The Sokol groups were gymnastic societies with a planned program of calisthenics, track events, and eventually all sports. Just when the first Sokol group was organized is doubtful; one source says that the First Slovak Sokol was organized in Chicago in 1892128 ; another gives the date as 1895. 129 Whatever be the case, the Sokol developed into a federation national in scope. The Slovak Catholic priests, divided though they were on the question of Slovak nationalism, united in an organization known as the Society of Roman Catholic Slovak Priests in 1896. Peter V. Rovnianek originated another club in the same year, the first Slavonic Political Club with 100 members, and its influence was soon felt in politics. 130 Both of these organizations were successful, in contrast to the cul- SLOVAKIA 29 tural societies; it seems that the early Slovak immigrants were not sufficiently interested to support purely cultural groups. The cultural society and literary circle failed because labor conflicts occupied the Slovaks' attention. The Connellsville mine region was again the scene of a strike and violence that began in April, 1894. On April 4 a Slovak was slain; two days later Joseph Paddock, chief engineer of Frick's company in Davison, Pa., was killed. Blame for this crime fell on the Poles and Slovaks and over a hundred were thrown into the Uniontown jail. The court sentenced John Husar to twelve years and Michael Furin to three years in prison. Violence continued: one Slovak was killed on the main street of Connellsville and two others in the rioting at Stickle Hollow around the Washington Coal and Coke shops. At the beginning of August most of the Strikers had returned to work, but about 5,000 Slovaks remained on strike. These gradually drifted back to work or abandoned the Connellsville mines. The Rev. Orbach, a Lutheran minister, founded a Slovak colony in Wisconsin; on September 4 about 300 Slovaks set out for Wisconsin. Another farm settlement originated from the Connellsville strike. Industrial life was, after all, strange to the Slovak; he had either been a small farmer, peasant, or agricultural worker in Slovakia. His interest in acquiring a farm remained; but he did not become a farmer immediately after he landed simply because he did not have the money to invest in such a project. 131 Besides, the city gave him the companionship he would not find on the farm. Still the desire grew to place as many Slovaks as possible on the land. In the summer of 1894 Peter V. Rovnianek, Francis Pucher, Julius Tatraj, Rev. btephen Furdek, Rev. Vaclav Panu~ka, and Rev. Alexander Dzubaj examined land in Arkansas near Grand Prairie; they intended to settle Slovaks on some 40,000 acres of land. Peter Rovnianek and Francis Pucher received a charter for the Slovak Colonization Company of Pittsburgh on September 24, 1894, the land was bought, and sales began. After the prospective settlers had saved enough money, they bought forty or so acre farms from the Slovak Colonization Company. The cost of land was $2 to $3 an acre. 132 30 SLOVAKIA Slovak settlers established a farm community near Stuttgart, Arkansas, and named their community Slovaktown. The settlers had been born in the "old country" but came to Arkansas chiefly from the coalfields of Pennsylvania and Illinois. The chief produce included corn, oats, hay, fruits, vegetables, and dairy products. The children attended the public schools. The settlers were mostly Catholics, but there were a few Lutherans. 133 The new farmers in Slovaktown were more than satisfied with their new lives; their letters continually encouraged their fellow Slovaks to flee from the factories and the mines; but only in the 1900's did anything like a movement to the farm begin. To publicize the project and success of Slovaktown the Slovak Colonization Company began publishing a periodical, Slovaktownske Hlasy, in Pittsburgh in 1896; but it lasted only six months. 134 It might indeed have been well for the Slovaks to leave the mines and go to the farms, for violence once again found them; this time it was in the anthracite region of northeastern Pennsylvania. One day in September, 1897 a group of strikers set out for Latimer. Sheriff Martin informed of the move, summoned his deputies and attempted to halt the men. Sharp words were exchanged, and Sheriff Martin ordered his deputies to fire upon the unarmed men. Twenty-one fell before the murderous gunfire and died; many others were wounded. Most of the victims were Slovaks. In spite of the unprovoked nature of the attack, the courts declared Sheriff Martin innocent, for he had ordered the shooting while performing his duty. The outcry against this verdict was most violent in the Slav press, but nothing further could be done. 135 Despite the internal dissensions among themselves and difficulties in the mines, a new interest appeared among the Slovaks during this decade; the most public manifestation of their nationalism came in 1899. Strange as it may seem, most Slovaks were not violent nationalists when they came to this country; the growth of nationalism was gradual and almost imperceptible. Slovak became the official language for the lodges; the societies abandoned the Hungarian flag. P. V. Rovnianek, joining the staff of the Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny in 1889, infused 31 SLOVAKIA a nationalist spirit into that paper; his National Slovak Society was nationalist in principle. Rev. S. Furdek, whose nationalism was of a very moderate kind, wanted American Slovaks to Americanize themselves; but he also felt it their duty to help the oppressed Slovaks overseas. 136 Under the force of this nationalism the Slovak immigrants gradually became more interested in the fate of Slovakia. In 1899 Father Furdek sent a lengthy memorandum to the Hungarian government, discussing the "Slovak question", but to no avail, except the publicity which such a memorandum aroused. It effected nothing practical; but it was the shadow of coming events; for the "Slovak question", was in the next decades to assume first place among the Slovaks. As the nineties passed, the Slovaks had made solid progress. Their economic and social life had improved through the national fraternal societies, which by 1899 had become important factors in Slovak life. Their membership stood as follows: THE FRATERNAL SOCIETIES Society Number of Members First Catholic Slovak Union __ _________ _ National Slovak Society _________ ___ ___ __ Pennsylvania Slovak Union ______ ___ ____ _ Evangelical Slovak Union ____ __ _______ _ First Catholic Slovak Ladies' Union _____ _ iivena --------- --- -------------- -- ---Source: "Slovenske (1899), IV, 38. pomery v Amerike", KALENDAR 11,000 9,450 1,727 909 1,600 1,000 JEDNOTA The religious life of the Slovaks had a chance to develop now that churches had been built. For the Roman Catholics there were now in America 33 priests, and for the Greek Catholics 32; and more were needed. 137 However, not all the picture was bright. Indeed, these were the things the Slovaks needed; but it was only after 1900 that the advance in education, the business world, political life, became pronounced. FOOTNOTES 1. Emily Green Balch, Our Slavic Fellow Citizens (New York, 1910), p. 86, pp. 88-89, p. 93. 32 SLOVAKIA 2. •F ranti§ek Hru§ovsky, Slovenske Dejiny (Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1939), p. 14. 3. Ibid., pp. 95-97. 4. I bid., p . 216. 5. Ibid., pp. 342-S43. 6. Joseph S,k ultety, Sketches from Slovak History (Middl etown, 1'930), pp. 106-109. 7. I bid., pp. 109-110. 8. Frantisek •Hrusovsky, This Is Slovakia (Scranton, 1953) , p . 40. 9. Ibid., pp. 40-41. 10. Peter P. Yurchak, The Slovaks: Their History and Traditions (Scranton, 1947), p. 28 . 11. Thomas Capek, The Slovaks of Hungary (New York, 1906), p . 108; 1Hrusovsky, This Is Slovakia, pp. 44-46. 12. Frantisek :J3okes, Dejiny Slovenska i Slovakov (;Bratislava, 1946), p . 158. 13. Robert A. ,Ka,nn, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National 'Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1914 (New York, 1950), I. 278. 14. Frantisek iHrusovsk y, This Is Slovakia, pp. ,47-48. 15. Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago, 1929), p. 107. 16. Ibid., p. 108. 17. Ibid., p. 59 . 18 . R. W. Seton-Watson, ed. , Slovakia Then and Now (London, 1931), pp. 244-245. 19. Street, Hungary and Democracy, p. ·65 . 20. Seton-Watson, Slovakia, p. 245. 21. Street, Hungary and Democracy, p . 64 . 22. Bokes, Deji ny Slovenska, p. 158. 23. C. J . Stree t, Slovakia: Past and Present (Westmins,ter, n.d .), p. 24. 24 . •Capek, Slovaks of Hungary, p. 96; Hrusovsky, Dejiny, p. 323. 25. ,Capek , Slovaks of Hungary, p. 166. 26 . Jirusovsky, Dejiny, p. 252. 27. Ibid., p. 325. 28. Ib i d., p. 319. 29. I bid., p. 319. 30. Seton-Watson, Slovakia, p. 117. 31. Seton•Watson, Slovakia, pp. 117-118. -3•2. I bid., p. 119. 33. I bid., p. 118. 34. Hrus ovsky, Dejiny, pp. 320-321; Bokes, Dejiny Slovenska, pp. 272-273 . 35. Seton-Watson, Slovakia, p. 176. 36 . Hrusovsky, Dejiny, p. -329 . 37. Bokes, Dejiny Slovenska, p. 276. 38 . Capek, Slovaks of Hungary, p. 150. 39. Jaszi, The Dissolution, p. 222. 40 . Ibid., p . 223 . 41. Street, •Slovakia: Past and Present, p. 56. 42. Harrison 'Thompson, Czechoslovakia in Europe (Princeton, 194-1) , p. 294. 43. Jaszi, The Dissolution, pp . 196-199. H. Ibid., p. 238. 45. Ibid., p. 231. SLOVAKIA 33 46. F. J . Hask in s, The Immigrant: An Asset and a Liab ility (New York , 1913) , p . 35. 47. Capek, Slovaks of Hungary, p . 162. 48. I b id., p. 156. 49. Seton-Watso n , Slovakia, p. 275. 50. Ibid., p. 276. 51. Capek , Slovaks of Hungary, p. 152. 52. Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny, A u g u st 19, 1897. 53. Geor ge Stephen son , A H istory of American Immigrat ion 18201924 (New Yor k , 1926), P. 61; Carl W ittk e, We Who Built Amer ica (New York , 1939) , p. 405. 54. J eremiah J enk s a nd W. Jebt Lau ck , The Imm igration Problem: A Study of American Immigration Conditions and Needs (New York, 1922), pp. 21-22. 55 . Konstantin Culen, Dejiny Slovakov v Amerike (B r atislava, 1942), I , 38; Caspar Molch an, "Th e Developmen t of the S lovak Community in Pittsburgh 1880-1920", (Unpublished Master of Arts dissertation, U n iversity of Notr e Dame, 1948), p. 23. 56. Cul en, Deji ny, I, 38; Stephenson , History of Ame ri can I mm igrat ion , p. 89. 57. Balch , Slav ic Fellow Citizens, p . 102. 58. I bid., p. 25. 69. I b id., p. 437. 60. I bid., p. 101. 61. Culen, Dejiny, I, 60-61. 62. Ibid., I, 67. 63. Ibid., I, 67-68. ~4. Ibid., I, 60. 65. Na rodn e Noviny, Ap ril 9, 1914. 66. Cule n , Dejiny, I, 24-25. -67. Ibid., I , 26; Molchan, "Development of the S lovak Community" , p. 8. 6'8. Konsta'!lltfn Cu len, Slovenska Liga v Amerike styridsaf rocn a (Scr anton , 1947). p. 4. 69. Cul e n , Dej i ny , I, 28. 70. Ib id., I , 28-29. 71. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Comr;mnity", p. 25. 72 . Capek, Slovaks of Hunga r y , p. 156. 73. Balch, Sl a vic Fe ! low C itizens, p. 100. 74. Ibid , p. 100. 75 . William P. Dillingham, Reports of the Immigration Commision, Vol. I: Abs t racts of Reports of Immigration Commision (Washington, D . C., 1911), I, 97. 76. I b id., I, 215. 77. Ibid., I, 277. 78. J. A. F., "Nacrtok Dejin Slov. prist'ahovalectva v Amerike", Sborn ik Narodn e ho Slovenske ho Spolku (1915), I, 12. 79. Culen, Deji ny , I, 96. 80. Ib id ., I. 96; Jos e ph Kushn e r, Sl ov a c i ka tol ici pi t t sbu-rghsk e ho b is kupstv a (Passaic, 19 -16), pp. 16-17 ._ 81. J ednota , March 19, 1913. 82. Na rodn e Noviny, May 26, 1910. 83. Culen, Dejiny, I, 99. 84. Kushner, S lov a ci, p. 6. 85. Ibid., p. 12, p. 16. 34 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. l09. ll0. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. SLOVAKIA Ibid., p. 7. I bid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 7. Narodne Noviny, March 12, 19·1.!; April 27, 1911. Narodne Novlny, March 12, 1914. Culen, Dejiny, I, 82-83. Ibid., I, ·82-831; J. A. F., 'INe.crtok Dejin", Sbornik, (1915), I, 11. Culen, Dejiny, I , 82-83; "Jedno-druhe", Narodny Kalendar, (1908), XVIII, 154. Culen, DeJiny, I, 195-199. "Prorocke slova dp. Matusa Jankolu o novom systeme", Sbornik Slovenskeho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX, 81. Culen, Dejiny, I, 200. Kushner, Slov;ici, pp. 13-14; Jednota, July 15, 1914. Culen, Dejiny, I, 111-114. Culen, Dejiny, I, 108. I bid., I, 111. Ibid., I, 114-115. Ibid., 1, 115; Kon§tantin Culen, Slovaci v Amerike (Tur~lansk:r Sv. Martin, 11138), pp. 384-385. Culen, DeJlny, I, 213-214. Culen, Dejiny, I, 202. Ibid., I, 208-209. Ibid., I, 207-208. Souvenir Program: 19th Regular Convention, The National Slovak Society, (Young~town, 1946), p. i>4; P. V. Rovnianek, "Slovenslce organ!zacie v Amerike", World's Fair -Memorial of the Czechoslovak Group (,Chicago, 1933), p . 67 . IP. V. Rovnlanek, op. cit., pp . 67-68. Pennsylvanska Slovenaka Jednota (Wilkes-Barre), June 24, 1943. Jaroslav ·Pelikan, "Cesi a .Slovacl v Chicagu ", World's Fair Memorial of the Czechoslovak Group (Oh!cago,1933), p. 9•. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, p. 162. Culen, Dejiny, I, 214-215. Kushner, Slovaci, p . 10; Molchan, ''Development or the Slovak Community", p . 48. Kushner, Slovacl, pp. 10-11. Ibid., p. 8. Culen, Dejlny, I, 138-139. :Fr. Sasinek, "Mysllenky o stave nabozenstva medzi Slovakm!", Kalendar Jednota, (1,8 97), II, 139-140. Narodne Novlny, August 11, 1910. !Kushner, Slov;icl, p. 21. Jednota, March 4, 1914. Kushner, Slovacl, p . 22; Michael J . Hynes, History of the Dioceae of Cleveland (Cleveland, 1953), p. 1'53. Hynes, Diocese of Cleveland, p . 255. Kushner, Slovaci, p . 41. Kushner, Slovacl, p . 41. Kalendar J.ednota, (1903), VIII, 210-211. Jaromir Psenka a Jan Pelikan, "<'.:es! a Slovac! v Chicagu", World's Fair Memorial, p . 95 . <'.:ulen, DeJiny, I, 222-227. Pellkan a Paenka, "Cesl a Slovacl v Chicagu", World's Fair Memor ial", p. 94. 35 SLOVAKIA 1211. Joseph Cermak, "·Physical Education among the Czechs and SloTaks", World'• Fair Memorial, p. 44 . 130. Molchan, "Development o! the Slovak Community", p. 67. 131. 1Narodne Noviny, July 17, 1113. 132. Narodne Noviny, May 5, 1910. 133. Kushner, Slovaoi, p. 9; Balch, Slavic Fellow Citizens, pp. 337-33·8. 134. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, p . 115. 185. Culen, Dejlny, I, 162-18'3; Amerlkansk0-Slovenske Novlny, Feb· ruary 5, 1898. 136. Kalendar Jednota, (1899), IV, 37-41. 137. "Slovenske pomery v Amerike", Kalendar Jednota (1899), IV, 39-40. BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCES - PUBLIC DOCUMENTS U. S. Bureau o! Census Thirteenth Census of the United States: 1910, Population Statistics, Vol. I. Washington : Government Printing omce, 1913. U. S. Congress. Senate Documents. 61 Cong., 3 Session. Washington: Government Printing O!f!ce, 1911. Vols. XI and XX. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS Jednota (Middletown., Pa.), Vols. XXI-XXII (19113cl9H). Kalendar Jednota. Middletown: The First Cathol!c Slovak Union. Vols. I-XXI (1896-1915). Kalendar Narodneho Slovenekeho Spolku. Plit.ts·burgh: National Slovak Society. Vols. XX-XXIV (1912-1!116). Narodne Noviny (Pittsburgh, Pa.), Vols. I·V (1910-1914). SECONDARY SOURCES - BOOKS Abbot, Edith. Historical Aspects of the Immigration Problem. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1924. Balch, Emily Green. Our Slavic Fellow Citi.aiens. New York: Charities Publication Company, 11110. Bokes, Frantisek. Dejiny Slovenska t Slovakov. Bratislava: SloTenska Akademia Vied a Umeaii, 1946. Capek, Thomas. The Slovaks of Hrungary, Slavs and Panslavism. New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1,906. Culen, Konstantin. Dejiny Slovakov v Amerike. 2 vols. Bratislava: Matica Slovenskii., 19 42. Culen, Konstantin. Slovaci v Amerilc:e: Crty z kulturnych deJfn. Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1938. Culen, Konstantin. Slovenska Liga v Amerike styridsat'rocna. Scranton : Obrana Press, Lnc., 19,47. Eaton, A. H . Immigrant Gifts to American Life. New York: Russell Sage Foundati,m, 1933. Fairchild, Henry 0. (ed .). Immigrant Backgrounds. New York: Wiley and Sons, lnc., 1927. • Yairchild, Henry 0. (ed.). Immigration: A World Movement and its American Significance. New York: The Mcmillan Company, 1926. i'aulkner, Harold U. The Quest for Social Justice, 189-8-1914. Vol. XI or Hi-story o! America12 Life. Edited by Arthur M. Schlesinger 36 SLOVAKIA and· Dixon Ryan Fox, 13 vols . Ne1v York : Macmillan Company, 1931. Handlin, Oscar. The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that Made the American People. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951. Hansen, Marcus Lee. The Atlantic Migration, 1607-1860. Cam bri dge: . The H arvard Un iversity Press, 1940. Hansen, Marcus Lee. The Immigrant in American History. Cambridge : The Harvard Univer sity Press, 1940. Hrusovsky, F rantisek . Slovenske Dejiny. Turcian sky Sv. Martin: Matica Slove'nska, 1939. Hrusovsky, Frantisek. This is Slovakia. Scranton: Obrana Press, Inc., 1953. Hynes, Michael J. History of the Diocese of Cleveland. Cleveland : Diocese of •Cleveland, 1953. Jaszi, O'scar. The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1929. Jenks, Jeremiah W. and Lauck, W . Jett. The Immigration Problem . New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 19 22 . Kann, Robert A. The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918. 2 vols. New York: The Columbia U niversity Press, 1950. Kushner, Jos eph. Slovaci katolfci pittsburghskeho b iskup:::tva. P as saic: The Slovak Catholic Sokol, ·1946. Nev ins, Allan. The Emergence of Modern America, 1865-1878. Vol. VIII of A History of American Life. Edited by Ar t hur M. Schlesinger and Dixon Ryan Fox, 13 vols. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927. . Orth, Samuel P. Our Foreigners: A Chronicle of J).mericans in the Making . Vol. 35 of the .Chronicles of America. Edited by ;\llen Johnson, 56 vols. New Haven ·: Yale University Press, 1920. · Park, •Robert. The lmmigran_t Press an~ its Control. New York: Harper and Bro-thers, 1922. Pauco, J oseph. l.!.udovychova u Sturovcov: Obdobie Slovenskych Na rodnych Novin. Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1943. Purcell, William J. (ed.). Catholic Pittsburgh 's One Hundred Years. Chicago: Loyola U n iversity Press, 1943. Seton-Watson , R . W. Racial Problems in Hungary. London: Constable, 1908. Seton-Watson, R. W. (ed.). Slovakia Then and Now. Prague: Orb is Publishing Company, 1931. Shaugnessy, . Gerald. Has t he l.mmigrant Kept the Faith ? New York:: The Macmillan Company, 1925 . · Sidor, Karol. Andrej H linka, 1864-1926. Bratislava: St. Andrew's. Press, 1934. Skultety, Joseph. Sketches from Slovak History. Middletown: The First Catholic Slova~ Union, 1930. Stephenson, George M. A History of American Immigration, 18201924. Boston: Ginn Publishing Company, 1926. Street, C. J.C. Slovakia: Past and Present. Westminster: P . S. Kingston and Son, Ltd., n. d . Tarbell, Ida. The Nationalizing of Business, 1878-1898. V ol. IX of A 'History of Ameri can Life. Edited by Arthur -M. Schlesinger and Dixo~ Ryan Fox, 13 vols. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936. SLOVAKIA 37 Thompson, S. Harrison. Czechoslovakia in European History. Princeton: The Princeton U niversity Press, 19-44. Wittke, Carl. We Who Bui It America: The Saga of the Immigrant. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940. Yurchak, Peter P. The Slovaks: Their History and Trad itions. Revised edition. Scranton: Obrana Press, Inc., 1947. ARTICLES F., J. A. "Nacrtok dejin s lov. prisfahovalectva v Amerike", Sbornik Narodneho Slovenskeho Spolku, I (1915), 20-39 . Jamar ik, Paul. "Zivot Americkych .Slovakov dakedy a teraz_" , Sbornik Na rodneho Slovenskeho Spolku, I (1915), 98-109. "Prorocke slova dp. Matusa Jankolu o novom systeme", Sborn ik Slovensk e ho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX. Shipman, Andr ew J . "Slavs ~-n America", The Catholic Encyclopedia, XIV (1913). 51-57. Stephenson, George M. "Immigration", Dictionary of American History, III (1940), 73-75. "The Slovak Sokol", Sborn ik S lovenske ho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX, 242-243. Timasheff, Nicholas. "Education", Slavonic Encyclopedia. Edited by Joseph .S. 1Roucek. New York: The Philosophical Library, Inc., 1949, pp. 261-269. Ware, Caroline. "Immigration", Encyclopedia of Soc ia l Sc iences, VII (1932), 587-595. World 's Fair Memorial of the Czechos lo va k Group. Chicago: Czechoslovak Group, 1933. Bradac, John S. "Slovenski Evanjelici-Luterani v Spojenych Statoch", pp. 81-83. Cermak, Joseph. "Physical Education among the Czechs and Slovaks in America", pp. 42-45. ·· Pelikan, J. and Psenka, R. Jaromir. "Cesi a Slovaci v Chicagu", pp. 89-97. Rovnianek, Peter V. "Slovenske organizacie v Amerike", pp. 66-68. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES Gregorovic, Sister M. Counsuela, SS.C.M . "Father Jankola's Con tribution t0 Catholic Education in America". Unpublis hed Master of Arts dissertation. History Department, Catholic University, 1943. Molchan, Caspar, C.S.C . "The Development of the Slovak Comqiunity in Pittsburgh, 1880-1920". Unp ub lished Master of Arts di sserta·,£ion. History Department, U niversity of Notre Dame, 1948. · Stefan, Sister M. Leocadia, SS.C .M. "The Reverend Stephen Furdek" . Unpublis-h ed Master of Arts dis se r tation. History Depar tment, Catholic University, _ 1952. Teplicky, Sister M. Berchmans, SS .C.M. "Educational Activities of the Sisters of SS. Cy,ril and Methodius". Unpublishe d Master of Arts diss ertation. Education Department, Marywood College, 1945.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Early Beginnings of the Slovaks in America Description An account of the resource James J. Zatko, Ph.D. Slovakia, Vol. 15 (No. 38), 1965 pp. 1-37 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zatko, James J. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1965 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8ece0905832f6c07ea3b4ef134836c1b.pdf 8b7a48ca63cf6a9520576e837e68fe19 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 41 New Interests 1900-1914 SLOVAKS IN THE U.S.A. By James J. Zatk o, Ph. D ., University of Notre D ame By 1900 growing Slovak nationalism had begun to grip the Slovak immigrants, and during the next decade and a half the Slovaks agitated for distinotly Slovak institutions, for Slovak education, and for Slovak liberation overseas from Hungarian control. What seemed the most important need of the Slovak immigrants to many thinking minds was Slovak education. Some Catholics found the cause of religious decline in the non-confessional Slovak schools that others advocated and established. Public schools seemed equally pernicious to their mind as being Protestant schools. Too much Americanization injured faith and morals. To them the great answer was Slovak Catholic schools; but these were practically non-existent. Some pastors just were not interested in schools, Slovak or Catholic. The debts resulting from building churches weighted down the parishes and blocked any ambitious program of school construction. Often Slovaks were too scattered throughout a region to support their own church and school.1 However, the crucial obstacle was a lack of Slovak teachers. Even if schools were built, they might be Catholic schools, but they would not be Slovak schools, for there were not enough Slovak teachers. As early as 1900 Rev. M. Jankola, a Catholic priest, suggested a solution, Slovak nuns to teach in Slovak schools, but this suggestion took almost ten years to mature. 2 Nevertheless, schools were not entirely neglected during these first years of the twentieth century. In 1900 the Rev. Bartholomew Kvitek, a Catholic priest, organized the Slovak school of St. Michael's parish in Chicago; and in 1902 the first Vincentian Sisters of Charity arrived from Slovakia to serve in St. Michael's parish in Braddock, Pa., where they took charge of the parochial school's 65 students. 3 Plans for non-confessional schools never came to very much, because the Slovaks were opposed to education without religion. 4 In 1900 the Slovaks won a local victory over the Hungarians when their protests blocked the erection of Louis Kossuth's statue in the public square of Cleveland. When Count �42 SLOVAKIA Albert Apponyi and forty delegates arrived in America during the World's Fair at St. Louis in 1904, the Slovaks presented a Memorandum recounting their objections against the electoral system in Hungary and Magyarization. Although the Count refused even to discuss Slovak grievances, ,the Memorandum at least informed public opinion about undemocratic election procedures and anti-Slovak schools. 5 However, all anti-Magyar agitation was focussed by the creation in 1907 of the Slovak League of America on May 26, in Cleveland, Ohio, by seven thousand delegates. The League became an alliance of Slovak educational, fraternal, and religious groups in this country. The purposes of the League were to educate Slovaks everywhere, to uplift them here in America and elsewhere morally, economically, socially and politically. 6 It became the leader in the drive to alleviate political conditions in Slovakia, but its efforts might have been still-born had not the Massacre of Cernova on the 27th of October, 1907 aroused not only Slovaks but world opinion. To understand this ev,e nt some facts need to be reviewed. The Rev. Andrew Hlinka, a Catholic priest both pious and devoted to the political and social welfare of the Slovaks, in 1897 became editor of The People's News and fought the Magyarization program of the gov,e rnment; his speeches and writings helped elect seven Slovaks to the Hungarian Parliament in 1906. He and fifteen other Slovaks were arrested and tried for "agitation against Hungarian nationality". Hlinka was fined 1500 crowns and costs of 680 crowns and sentenced to two years in prison. In a farewell message to his parishioners he declared thart he would gladly suffer imprisonment to secure recognition of the Slovak nation. For this he received another eighteen months and a fine of 400 crowns. 7 Prior to this the Rev. A. Hlinka had been appointed pastor in his native city, Ruzomberok; in the quarter known as Cernova he had begun building a new church for which he collected funds from all over Slovakia. He had in the meantime been suspended by Bishop Parvy, an ardent pro-Magyar. When the church in Cernova was to be dedicated, the parishioners refused to permit the blessing, unless their pastor returned to them. On October 27, 1907 gendarmes marched into Cernova to help keep order, and they lined the streets leading to the church. That morning coaches arrived bringing the Rev. Pazurik from Llkavka and other visitors to conduct the dedi- �SLOVAKIA 43 cation. When the people blockaded the road, the coachman began to lay about his whip in order to drive his horses through the crowd ; some men seized the horses' bridles to turn them around. An order was given to the gendarmes to open fire. Instantly nine people fell dead, men, women, and children, and six more died of their wounds later. 8 The National Slovak Society immediately took in hand the problem of aid for the widows and orphans that resulted from the Cernova Massacre and voted $2,000 for r•elief.9 While political nationalism received immense stimulus from the Massacre, nationalism began to play a greater role in the sphere of religion after 1900. Under the influence of their nationalism, the Slovaks began to feel their unity as a group and their need of exclusivness as a nation. This led to organization on a unique national basis in religion and to demands for r•ecognizing the "rights of Slovaks" in religious matters, like organization of synods for the Lutherans, Catholic action groups for the Slovak Catholics, and teaching of Slovak in the schools. The Slovak Lutherans formed the Slovak Evangelical Lutheran Synod of the United States of America with headquarters in Whiting, Indiana. This Synod was founded in the church of St. Peter, September 2, 1902, at Connellsville, Pa. A beginning had been made in Mahanoy City, Pa., but more definite steps were taken at conferences in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., and Braddock, Pa.; in the actual founding all the Slovak ministers and congregations cooperated. The Synod used the Slovak language in services and sermons, except where unusual circumstances required the use of English. Even the children wer,e taught their religion in Slovak. The Synod obtained its funds from prescribed contributions of the various parishes belonging to it. In Cleveland it owned a considerable prope1;ty intended for a Lutheran orphanage. The of.ficial organ was the Svedo k, which began in 1906 and was published twice a month.10 The troubled relations of Catholicism with Slovak nationalism continued to split various groups. A National Slovak Sokol had been established to include all Sokol activities in the United States; but discrimination against Catholics led to the creation of the Slovak Catholic Sokol in 1905; the headquarters of this group were in Passaic, N. J. The Slovak Catholic Sokol began publishing its own paper, the Katolicky �44 SLOVAKIA Sokol, and launched an extensive program to attract Slovak youth in gymnastics, athletics, and social activities. 11 The most violent conflict among Slovaks of the first decade of the twentieth century involved Slovak nationalism, but it was a conflict within the Catholic group between Catholic Nationalists and the Madarones. The founder of the First Catholic Slovak Union, the Rev. Stephen Furdek, called for an annual Slovak day that was to renew the Catholic spirit and attachment to Slovak nationality. The first Slovak day was to be called the Catholic Congress. This evoked bitter opposition in letters and even a telegram to Bishop Michael J . Hoban of Scranton from the Rev. Kossalko who denounced the whole project as "pan-slavistic" and as an attempt to set up a national church. When Bishop Hoban sanctioned the Slovak Day or Catholic Congress in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., by addressing it on September 3, 1906, Kossalko's rage knew no bounds. He addressed a Memorandum, signed by a large number of Madarone Slovak clergy, to the Apostolic Delegate and the archbishops of the United States. He demanded a condemnation of the affair. The Memorandum expressed fear for the unity of the church and the salvation of 500,000 souls, and accused the Slovak Catholics of working for "panslavism", which was inimical to Hungary, Germany, and the United States. However, Bishop Hoban's influence shielded the Catholic Slovak clergy and no action was taken.12 This event discredited the Madarones. Within the framework of the Catholic Church in the United States Slovak Catholics became involved in a struggle to preserve what they considered their national rights. There were arguments with non-Slovak pastors over hiring organists who would be able to teach Slovak to the children. 13 At other times Slovak Catholic efforts to obtain Slovak priests who could minister to them in their own language conflicted with bishops who did not always agree on Slovak "rights" .14 One bitter quarrel led to a schism in the Slovak settlement of Masontown, Pa. In Leckrone, Pa., a settlement of Irish and Slovaks, the Church of Our Lady of Perpetual help was blessed by Bishop Richard Phelan of Pittsburgh on October 9, 1904. In 1907 the church burned down, but a hall was built in which religious services were held. The Slovaks by this time had a Slovak pastor, but they still wanted a parish all their own. Bishop �SLOVAKIA 45 Francis R. Canevin of Pittsburgh requested the Rev. Charles Janda to look for a suitable location ; Rev. C. Janda sugg,ested Masontown. Since the Irish Catholics also wanted to have a parish in Masontown, the Slovaks were told to take the church in Leckrone for their use; but the Slovaks in Masontown were not satisfied. They went ahead and built their own church, and when the bishop would not cooperate with them, they cast about for a priest who might be willing to serve their church. Eventually they found an "independent" priest and so fell into schism.15 In sptte of such trouble, the Slovak Catholic body remained generally healthy. On February 22, 1911 a Slovak Catholic Priest and inventor, the Rev. Joseph Murgas, led in forming The Slovak Catholic Federation in America in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Und,e r the control of Slovak Catholic priests this group was to spread and coordinate Catholic action among Slovaks in America; until this year Slovak Catholic activities had been unorganized and subordinated to political and social ends.16 Exact religious statistics for ·t he Slovak immigrant group for that time are not available, but the best estimate suggests that of the 560,000 Slovak immigrants in America in 1911, 450,000 were Roman Catholics. The Slovak Catholics had 134 parishes in the United States. Protestants among the Slovaks numbered 95,000 .17 Of this Protestant group, Calvinists are estimated to run about 15,000. 18 After 1905 the development of Slovak Catholic elementary schools gained momentum. A system both Slovak and Catholic had been impossible without Slovak Catholic teachers. The Rev. M. Jankola, a Catholic priest, organized the Priests' Society of St. Anthony's Burse in the United States of America in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. , in 1903 and it was chartered in 1905. In the Kalendar Jednota of 1908 Rev. M. Jankola proposed the Burse of St. Anthony for Catholics generally to support students preparing to be teachers and Slovak girls preparing to be teaching nuns. 19 Although the Slovak Catholics supported this program generously with frequent collections and donations 20 , the fund proved insufficient for the purpose. Three Slovak girls who had been sent to the novitiate of the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary in 1906 were the nucleus of a Slovak sisterhood. In 1909 interested Slovak priests petitioned for the foundation of a distinctly �46 SLOVAKIA Slovak sisterhood, the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. On June 26, 1909 the Congregation for Religious approved this project, and the motherhouse of the new Slovak congregation was established in Danville, Pa.21 In the year 1911 the Most Reverend Joseph Koudelka, the bishop of Superior sent a request to the general motherhouse of the Congregation of School Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis in Prague. He asked the sisters to come to his diocese to work. Mother General M. Xavier sent Sister M. Georgia and Sister M. Hyacinth to look over the possibilities. These sisters stopped in Pittsburgh, where the Rev. J. Vrana persuaded them that the Pittsburgh diocese offered them greater opportunities and had greater need. When Sister M. Hyacinth took sick and died on March 10, 1912, the Mother General herself came to Pittsburgh. Rev. Ferdinand Prikazky, who at the moment was struggling to get nuns to teach in his St. Gabriel's parochial school, convinc,e d the sisters to settle in Pittsburgh. This was the beginning. By 1914 twenty three sisters of this congregation were teaching 579 children in three Slovak Catholic parishes.22 Progress had been made in solving the problem of elementary school education; schools were built in the parishes almost as quickly as teachers could be provided. The question of secondary school education also began to agitate Slovak circles. Very early, the Rev. Stephen Furdek suggested the idea of a Slovak high school for boys; he was seconded in this by the Rev. M. Jankola. However, nothing came of the idea until 1921 when it revived and resulted in the Benedictine High School in Cleveland in 1927.23 The Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius opened a high school for girls at Danville in 1922, and the Sisters of St. Francis opened one at Bellevue, Pa., in 1927. 24 There was continuous agitation for a college. A Slovak business college was suggested to improve the Slovak economic position.25 P. J . Kunovsky worked out a whole scheme for a Slovak school on a higher level. He argued that $100,000 would put up a building, and then he suggested that each fraternal organization ought to support a professor. This school was to include business and technical courses. As to religious affiliation, the school would be non-confessional, but the Oatholics could have a lecturer on the Catholic Faith and the Lutherans could support one to lecture on the Lutheran faith. This in- �SLOVAKIA 47 stitution was to be coeducational. Nothing came of this project.2s Very few Slovak children of the first immigrants had a chance to go to college, but those who did go generally took advantag,e of existing colleges. In 1901 the Czech Benedictines had established St. Procopius College at Lisle, Ill., and by 1907 there were ten Slovak youths studying there. They organized the "Literary Society of Stephen Moyses" and issued a monthly multigraphed little paper, Horlivost'. The club and the paper lasted for four years. The Slovaks also owed a special debt to the College and Seminary of St. Vincent's Archabbey in Latrobe, Pa., for in this college and seminary almost all the Catholic Slovak priests and many Slovak young men were trained. 27 During the years between 1902 and 1936 545 Slovak students attended St. Vincent's. 28 Informal education made most progress among the Slovaks. Clubs, multiplied, political, social, cultural, and literary. The political club seems to have been the most popular. It had a variety of purposes: to fighrt political apathy among the Slovaks, to help the Slovaks gain their political rights, and to help Slovaks become American citizens. In one year a club in Rankin, Pa., succeeded in getting thirteen Slovaks to obtain their citizenship papers. 29 Literary clubs also became popular among the Slovaks as a mean of self- improvement. 30 Both the newspapers and the almanacs were also instrumental in educating the Slovak immigrants. The Jednota discussed Darwinism, the "higher criticism" and socialism. 31 The almanacs explained the procedure of becoming citizens, American electoral system, stocks and bonds, and even discussed the origin of the world. 32 One of the complaints about the Slovaks made by their own leaders is their lack of interest in books and good reading. To make the Slovaks book-lovers, Slovak political and literary clubs founded Slovak libraries. 33 The national fraternal organizations sometimes contributed money to help in the acquisition of a building, or, if the Slovaks already possessed a lodge hall, to aid in the purchase of books. 34 That a demand actually developed for Slovak books is suggested by the special sections for Slovak readers in public libraries, as for instance, the Oarnegie Library in Homestead, Pa., 35 and the public library in Cleveland. 36 The most ambitious project launched to interest the Slo- �48 SLOVAKIA vaks in reading was a book club. P. J. Kunovsky suggested in 1912 the formation of a book club to consist of 5,000 Slovaks. This number would enable the club to sell four books for a dollar. 37 By July 11, 1912 a literary committee to choose books had been elected. 38 Even this cultural project could not move along without factions; for there were some objections to the composition of the literary committee. Only "one side" was represented. 39 There were complaints by Kunovsky that progress was slow; in fact, after six months of vigorous propaganda, there were not even 1,000 members, and the club needed 5,000 members in one year. 40 By November, 1914, the "Four Books for a Dollar" was still going and growing somewhat, 41 but the Slovaks were apparently still not too interested in books. One book promotion was quite successful. The Rev. J. Murgas led a drive to get 3,000 subscribers for a Cathechetical Encyclopedia, written by Rev. Vaclav Melchior, C. Ss. R. 42 Enough subscribers undertook to buy the book. It was a project more adapted to Slovak ideas; it seemed worthwhile to invest in a book on religion. The taste of Slovaks in reading was quite varied. We cannot judge from actual reports of reading, but the types of books published for them may serve as an indication of their reading tast,e. There were romances dealing with the Janosik cycle, a Slovak Robin Hood; others dealt with the adventures of a likeable thief, Rinaldo Rinaldini; sensational stories included Dracula, Harry Tracy, Most Desperate Criminal of Our Time , and World Detective Romances and Novel series.43 Other books published dealt with Slovak history and Magyar oppression. 44 One anti-clerical work was Z dejin Cirkvi by A. M. Spera, an anti-Catholic church history: 45 there was even a socialist work, Socialisti idu. 46 Publications included readers and catechisms, 47 dictionaries and grammars, 48 and devotional works. 49 The translations printed in the Narodne Noviny from American literature included Edgar A. Poe's The Black Cat 50 and Washington Irving's The Legend of Sleepy Hollow.51 Whatever reading may have been done by the Slovaks besides the almanacs and newspapers, these books are a suggestion of its type. Another form of informal education proposed was a Slovak Chautauqua. The Rev. W. Regnemer, a Calvinist minister, suggested that a fraternal organization hire a pleasure �SLOVAKIA 49 park during the summer for one day, prepare a cultural and entertaining program and charge an admission of twenty fiv,e or fifty cents. 52 This idea was still-born. Theatrical productions were very common among the Slovaks, 53 but the drama was not on a very high level. Most popular were plays in Slovak portraying Slovakia and Slovak life. There was no attempt to translate the English classics of the stage into Slovak. 54 Both the Narodne Noviny and the Jednota encouraged the staging of plays by publishing a large number of them in their columns, 55 for plays portraying Slovak life served to arouse national consciousness, besides being good entertainment. 56 One complaint about the theatrical entertainment was the bad conduct of the audience, which frequently shouted to their friends on the stage, whistled, stamped their feet. Mothers brought very young children or babies who disturbed the performance with their crying. 57 The Slovaks organized bands and choirs ;58 popular music was also encouraged by the publication of songs in the almanacs. Some of the choirs advanced so rapidly that they were able to stage small operettas. 59 One obstacle to further Slovak progress was intemperance. The drink problem, its source in poverty, was an old one for the Slovaks. All sources agree that drink, especially whisk,ey, was the curse of Slovakia and helped impoverish the country. 60 During the 1840',s Rev. Stephan Zavodnik, a Catholic priest, influenced by Father Matthew, inaugurated the struggle against intemperance in Slovakia. Father Matthew's influence had trav,elled through Germany, Bohemia, Poland, and finally reached Slovakia. 61 Temperance societies were first organized in Orava in 1845 and in half a year had 20,000 members. The city councils assisted the societies; the ecclesiastical authorities put their prestige behind the movement. In 1847 the bishop of Banska Bystrica asked his clergy to publicize these societies during Lent ; the bishop of Roznava issued a pastoral letter on the subject in 1846. The Lutherans too supported the movement. 62 The nationalistic agitation and revolution in 1848 disrupted the growth of these societies, but by 1870 the fight against drink revived. 63 When the Slovaks came to America, they brought their weakness for drink with them. Still there were Slovaks who understood the pernicious effect of over-indulgence in strong �50 SLOVAKIA drink. Saloon keepers were attacked for disrupting family life. Slovak saloon keepers were urged to remove the national disgrace by going into another line of business. 64 The agitation against the use and abuse of alcohol filled many a column in the N arodne N oviny and J ednota. Alcohol was the cause of disease, for example, tuberculosis, of many economic and social losses ; whiskey was the root of all social evils.65 The most eff.ective agitation against intemperance was the total abstinence society. The best reason for creating such societies was their need. There were such sodeties already in existence in 1911 for example, in Hazleton, Pa., McAdoo, Pa. , St. Clair, Pa., and Mahanoy City, Pa.66 When the temperance club was organized in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., forty five prospective members attended the meeting; but only eight were willing to take the pledge and join the society. Eventually twenty women and girls joined; since then five or six members were added at each meeting, and the number finally grew to forty five! 67 Hand in hand with the progress in religious organization, in education, and political action, went the bettering of the Slovak economic conditions. As with the other activities, economic life among the Slovaks began to be colored by nationalism. The Slovaks set up Slovak grocery stores and Slovak banks. Surprisingly enough, a farm movement among the Slovaks developed from many causes. The success of the Slovaktown venture was continually reported in the newspapers: news of hay selling for $7 a ton, in November, 1912, seven weddings, good markets, freedom from the bleak life of a miners' town and from strikes. 68 To some life on the farm meant a life less dangerous to the faith and a healthier family life;69 to others it meant protection against too quick an assimilation to American ways, especially American morals.70 In 1910 the National Slovak Society embarked on a considerable farm colonization venture. The Society's national convention had voted in 1909 that not less than 1,000 acres of farm land should be bought for an orphanage. A committee investigated real estate in Prince George, Calvert, and St. Mary's counties in Maryland; enough land was to be bought to build an orphanage and to form a Slovak settlement to help in the upkeep of the orphanage. After considerable debate on whether the primary purpose was a settlement �SLOVAKIA 51 or an orphanage, 2,813 acres of land were purchased for F 0,000 in St. Mary's county, near St. Mary's, Maryland. One thousand one hundred acres were arable and the rest was woodland ; there was a three mile frontage on St. Mary's River. 71 Eight hundred acres were to be set aside for the orphanage and old folks ' home, and two thousand acres were to be put up for sale.72 The land was divided into thirty nine farms, ranging in size from 33 acres to 132, and classified in value thus: class A farms at $40-$50 an acre, class B farms at $25-$40 an acre, and Class C at $10-$25 an acre. The price of the farms varied from $600 to $3,100.73 The land sales went so well that the National Slovak Society decided to reserve only 500 acres for the orphanage and to sell 2,300 acres for farms.74 Such was the venture's success that by June, 1912, the Slovak Farmers Association was chartered in Maryland with a capitalization of $25,000. First class stock was to get 5% dividend; and as soon as the second class stock reached 5%, the rate of the first class was to jump to 7%. The organization's purpose was to settle Slovaks on good farms, especially in Maryland. The association also had a hotel where Slovaks might disport themselves in the summer for longer or shorter periods of time. 75 Behind the scenes, however, some financial skulduggery was afoot and the exposure of "commission-masters" definitely dampened enthusiasm for the project. A. S. Ambrose, the president of the National Slovak Society, had taken a ten percent commission on $48,735 worth of land sales and netted himself a tidy $4,875.30. Of the sales themselves $16,156.70 in cash had been placed into the Society's treasury, while $28,580 had been mortgaged to the Society. 76 On this transaction the Society was estimated to have lost nearly $20,000 through various "commissions." 77 At least on paper in 1911 the Slovak American Colonization Company was organized with an intended Capitalization of $50,000 at $50 a share. It planned the erection of houses, business structures, saw-mills, and other needed buildings. It remained a paper organization. 78 In spite of the publicity giv,en these projects, the influx of Slovaks onto the land came from individual initiative for most part. Small colonies of Slovak farmers grew up around Denmark, Maine, 79 Phillips, Wisconsin, 80 Tabor, Minnesota,81 Louisiana and Mississippi,82 Callahan and Pine Land, Flo- �52 SLOVAKIA rida,83 Michigan,84 and North Emporia and Antioch, Virginia.a5 If the Slovak farmer struck upon land already cleared, he did not have too difficult a time making a success of farming; but if he bought land that had yet to be cleared, like the second growth timberlands in Wisconsin, the first few years on the "blessed" land were murderous in their demands of labor and capital. For instance, two brothers and their families, having read accounts of successful farming in Wisconsin, used their savings to buy a farm in northern Wisconsin. The land had to be cleared, and ,even the women were put to work carrying away the heavy wood. Besides, the brothers had to build a log house big enough to shelter the two families. During the winter months, the men worked as lumberjacks, and in order to have enough capital to begin farming in spring had to borrow at six percent. After plowing and buying seed, the two new farmers were without money. One of them went to work in a glass mill in Illinois, while the other continued the back-breaking work clearing the land and farming. To add to their troubles, the nearby creek dried up in the summer, and the water could be brought in only from a distant spring. A horse had to be bought ! The beginning of farming was bitter for the Slovaks in northern Wisconsin.86 Although the Slovak farmers did organize locally, they did not form any national Slovak farmer societies. In Moquah, Wis. , for instance, a special farmers' society was established in 1911. The two national fraternal organizations served their social purposes sufficiently. One farmer from Tabor, Minn., did suggest that the Slovak farmers in the west needed a "clearing house" in a city like Pittsburgh, where they could sell their products, especially, grain, directly to the consumer. This would save the farmer some of his profits and the workingman some of his hard earned money. This remained only a suggestion. 87 Generally the new farmers were quite successful. The land was good, profits were high, and there were no strikes. 88 In Slovaktown hay was sold for $7 a ton in 1913; a Slovak farmer in Virginia made $1 ,100 on peanuts and $220 on cotton on a 220 acre farm . Still there were failures . A considerable number of advertisements announcing the farm sales appeared in the Jednota and the Narodne Noviny. 89 Some- �SLOVAKIA 53 times the reason was the mortgag,e ;90 at other times the family found the life too difficult and drab.9 1 While some Slovaks managed to escape to the farm from the hard life of mine and mill, most Slovaks remained city-dwellers. One of the problems of the city-dweller was the high cost of living as compared with wages. 92 The high prices led to a large number of cooperative ventures on a nationality basis. Most frequently this was a meat and grocery store. The enterprise resembled a corporation more than a cooperative. A share might cost $10 and a board of directors headed and managed the enterprise. Sometimes a limit was placed on the number of shares an individual might hold, lest any one person should capture control of the corporation.93 In Yukon, Pa., for instance, 200 families established a share-holding grocery store which was successful despite the opposition of some Slovaks. The corporation charter provided that any man could belong, but no one was allowed to invest more than $1 ,000! In 9 months a dividend of $4.85 was paid for each share. The cooperative enterprise could save a working man about fifteen cents a day on his food bill. In spite of considerable propaganda in the papers heralding these ventures, the Slovaks did not support these "Slovak stores" universally. The proprietors complained that Slovaks continued to patronize non-Slovak businesses. 9 4 There were many suggestions for Slovak enterprise: the organization of all Slovak businessmen in America, a law firm to take care of Slovak interests, a hospital for Slovak immigrants, a shoe factory to be built by the National Slovak Society or the Slovak League. 95 Of all the ephemeral proposals made, one did become actual. A Slovak bank to handle Slovak business was considered a necessity; but the idea was only gingerly approached after the failure of Peter V. Rovnianek's Bank in Pittsburgh, in 1907. Michael Bosak founded the State Slovak Bank in Wilkes-Barre, Pa.; the bank opened for business on December 2, 1912, and in its first five months showed a profit of $7,250. 96 Progress was also the keynote of the First Catholic Slovak Union. In 1910 the Union established its own printery in Middletown, Pa. This was a two story red brick building, one hundred twenty feet long and forty feet wide. The equipment included Duplex printing press and a linotype machine. The blessing of the printery took place on October 27, 1910.97 �54 SLOVAKIA In 1914 the Union also opened an orphanage, which the Sisters of Ss. Cyril and Methodius took under their supervision. The building itself cost $97,000, and the total cost was about $110,000. The chapel had an altar of Vermont marble worth $1,200 and a seating capacity of 150. 98 This orphanage was located in Middletown, Pa. The Slovak Catholics wer,e justly very proud of this achievement, especially when they remembered how poor they had been when they landed in the United States. The National Slovak Society showed its energy by creating an official newspaper for its own use, the Narodne Noviny, in 1910; this paper replaced the Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny which had spoken for the National Slovak Society but had never been adopted as the official organ of the Society. This new newspaper became definitely anti-clerical and sometimes anti-Catholic. In 1910 an editorial defended the modernists and attacked the Catholic Church as being an Italian and Roman Church, and not truly Catholic. 99 Any clerical scandal was written up with glee, and cartoons were not only anti-clerical but in very bad taste. These attacks and insults became so violent that the Bishop of Altoona, Eugene A. Garvey, banned the newspaper from his diocese on the grounds that it was written and published by "Jews, unbelievers, and heretics," spreading anarchism, unbelief, and socialism.100 The National Slovak Society did more constructive work when it organized the Youth Circles of the National Slovak Society in 1913. The chief purpose of these circles was educational. The elder and chief gymnast had to be total abstainers and men of sound general educa:tion. 101 The official language was Slovak. Dues were to be twenty cents a month for each child; of this amount fifteen cents were to be forwarded to the treasurer of the National Slovak Society. All meetings were to begin with Slovak and American patriotic songs; the American songs were to be translated into Slovak.102 Besides one official meeting a month to transact business, there were frequent meetings for lectures, study, and general education. 103 These circles presented programs which featured recitation of poems in Slovak, Slovak songs sung as solos and in chorus, instrumental solos, lectures by visitors. 104 The circles were beneficial to young Slovaks, and their growth �SLOVAKIA 55 was very rapid. By September, 1914, sixty nine circles had been established. 105 In spite of all the discussion of an orphanage, the National Slovak Society finally abandoned the plan. The matter was dropped because of the religious problem. The Society consisted of members belonging to various religious sects and claimed that it could not without showing favoritism provide for religious instruction. An orphanage without religious instruction and education was unacceptable to the Slovaks. 106 The fraternal organizations during this time suffered somewhat from embezzlement and swindling. Joseph Joscak, an editor of the Narodne Noviny , had taken a $19,000 "commission" from the National Slovak Society but was caught up with in 1913. 107 During the same years a William Vokolek swindled the Slovak fraternal organizations to the extent of $300,000. 108 Of course, A. S. Amrose's "commission" on the St. Mary's settlement must also be recalled here. Another common feature of fraternal life in this period was the construction of lodge halls, which were built almost in every settlement. These lodge halls became the centers of social life; they provided places for lodge meetings, theatrical productions, dances, gymnastic exercises, and quarters for the political and literary clubs. 109 One of the storms that troubled the fraternal organizations was the debate on the "old system" as against the "new system." Almost any issue of the Jednota after 1906 and the Narodne Noviny after 1910 contained letters with arguments on both sides of the question. 110 While operating under the older method of assessment, the organizations failed to build up a reserve for times of special demand; they were merely collecting agencies. For instance, if the organization needed $3,000 and had 12,000 members, each member was obliged to pay twenty five cents, which were collected to meet the cost. The new system involved paying dues r,e gularly, determined according to age. As early as 1906 the Rev. S. Furdek, the Rev. M. Jankola, and A. S. Ambrose pointed out the advantages of the new system, but there was much opposition. By 1914 both the First Catholic Slovak Union and the National Slovak Society had adopted the modern method. m Although progress was considerable among the Slovak immigrants in education, business enterprise, and farming , in many ways the lot of the workingman remained a hard �56 SLOVAKIA one. For instance, mine disasters continued to take lives. At Fernie, Pa. , in June, 1902, 200 miners perished, 50 of them Slovaks. Forty two Slovak miners were killed at Cambria, Pa. , during July, 1902. 112 Strikes still plagued the coal fields in which Slovaks were working. In Westmoreland county a strike began at Greensburg, Pa., on March 10, 1910 over union recognition and as a protest against the company store system. It spread to the neighboring mining centers of K,eystone, Irwin, Latrobe, and Westmoreland. Then in the confusion a mine guard shot an eighteen year old youth, and 15,000 miners went on strike. Eleven thousand wer•e said to be Slovaks. They joined the union to show their defiance and to emphasize their demands. As a counter-measure, the company called in the Pinkerton detectives, and the striking miners were blacklisted.113 During the strike the miners had very little to subsist upon, and that little came from the United Mine Workers of America. The union provided $2.50 a week for each man, $1.00 a week for each woman dependent, and $0 .50 a week for each child. 114 The president of the National Slovak Society, Mr. A. S. Ambrose, visited the strike-bound coal-fields. In his newspaper articles he estimated that about 20,000 men were on strike ; about 95 % were Slavs, and of this latter group about 60 % were Slovaks. The striking miners lived in shacks that could not protect them against the bitter cold, the children went about bare-foot and hungry. 115 Since 500 strikers were members of the National Slovak Society, the Society published appeals for help and even began a collection for relief of the strikers in Westmoreland county.116 Gradually the strike was broken and nothing substantial was won. Another strike in which many Slovaks were involved began in 1913, led by the Industrial Workers of the World. It started in the broad-loom silk mills of Patterson, N. J. , on February 25, 1913. Over twenty five thousand workers were affected. There were two factors that prolonged the bitter strife. One was the introduction of the three and four loom system; this involved the question of whether Patterson should invade the cheap silk field in opposition to the Pennsylvania mills. Fear of lower wages and loss of work followed as a consequence. The second factor was resentment of I.W.W. tactics. The Jednota condemned the I. W. W.'s socialist tendencies and opposition to the American Federation of Labor. 117 �SLOVAKIA 57 Still these defects of the union did not blind the First Catholic Slovak Union to the needs of the strikers, many of whom were Slovaks. 118 For five months the leadership of the I. W. W. kept the strikers' ranks intact, but lack of funds and loss of morale at last broke the strike. After twenty one weeks of bitter struggle the strike was settled without any gains for the workers. The J ednota laid the blame on the socialists. 119 Both newspapers were strong supporters of unions. They considered it the duty of every Slovak to belong to the unions, especially the American Federation of Labor. After all, it was the unions that improved the worker's lot and gave labor a position of influence in the world. 120 The strike-breaker and the "scab" were excluded from Slovak organizations. 121 In their attitude toward socialism the two newspapers differed. The Narodne Noviny showed itself definitely hospitable to socialist ideas. Articles were featured insisting that there could be no friendly contacts between capitalists and workers; workers were urged to abandon the Democratic and Republican parties and to join the party of the working class! 122 The Jednota unreservedly repudiated socialism. It condemned socialist anti-religious tactics and ridicule of Catholics. 123 Socialism was anti-Christian in its very essence, and had been consistently opposed to religion. The only agency that did in fact transform slave labor into free human labor was the Catholic Church. 124 As the first decade of the twentieth century ended and another began, the dawn of new interests appeared on the horizon. In 1911 Count Albert Apponyi, who has been mentioned before, returned to the United States on behalf of Hungary which he described as "an island of freedom" in central Europe. Slovak publicity about Hungarian mistreatment of Slovaks caused the mission of Count Apponyi to fail.1 25 Hard upon the heels of this came the Balkan wars. Slovak efforts at war relief were conditioned by nationalism. Within the months from November 21, 1912 to June 19, 1913, the Narodne Noviny collected $1,547.95 for the Slavonic Red Cross; and it was made clear that this collection was only for the Slavs. 126 By January 22, 1913 the Jednota had collected $2,350.00 for the same cause. 127 With regard to the "Slovak question," which was on the verge of becoming the paramouth one for the Slovaks, opinion among the American Slovaks had undergone quite a change. �58 SLOVAKIA Almost up to 1914 Slovaks sought concessions from Hungary for Slovakia; but these concessions of political and cultural rights wer-e understood within the existing framework of government. However, in April, 1914, when Count Michael Karolyi came to the United States to win Slovak favor for a Slovak and Hungarian union in a completely independent Hungary, the Slovaks questioned the sincerity of the Count and the government. In New York, on May 24, 1914, a debate took place on the question: "Can the Slovaks trust the Hungarian government in its movement for general suffrage in Hungary and with complete Hungarian independence?" The debate solved no real problem, but stated clearly the issues: what was to be the Slovaks' future relation to Hungary? The Slovak League arranged several protest meetings, and on April 28, 1914 issued a Memorandum, which was practically a declaration of independence and demanded autonomy for Slovakia. The League did not explain the kind of autonomy Slovakia should have, whether within Austro-Hungary or with Hungary as an independent state or complete independence for Slovakia for the Slovaks in America themselves disagreed on what they wanted. In order to clarify their position, a Congress of the Slovak League was held in Pittsburgh, September 10, 1914. After everybody had aired their views, it appeared that in 1914, as late as September of that year, the American Slovaks had not generally accepted political plans for Slovakia. 128 They were divided into three camps: one demanded complete independence for Slovakia, another wanted autonomy within Hungary, and a third desired the creation of a new state in which Czechs and Slovaks would be united. 129 With the coming of the World War, Slovak attention was diverted from the creation of Slovak institutions here in America to the creation of Slovakia. The World War found the Slovaks anti-German and anti-Habsburg. 130 The Jednota printed German atrocity stories and even went so far as to charge that German Protestantism was serving German mili'tarism.131 The Slovak League managed to chanel the desire for a better Slovakia and the anti-Habsburg feeling into an extensive Slovak nationalist movement. Through the Slovak League over a million dollars was poured into the cause of Slovak freedom. 132 By 1914 the Slovak immigrants had made themselves �SLOVAKIA 59 economically secure as far as a group of working people could in the American economy. Socially they had made progress in organizing national fraternal organizations, establishing Slovak schools, creating Slovak parishes. Their nationalism, manifested in efforts to form distinct Slovak institutions and their interest in European Slovakia, prevented their complete integration with American life; but the Slovak institutions seemed foredoomed to failure. The explanation for much of this lies outside the special character of the Slovaks. After 1890, the close of the frontier, the new industrial city became the characteristic of American life ; it became the center of production, the leader in social and cultural lif.e, and great center of communication. By the very fact that Slovaks were immersed in industrial and eventually city rather than farm life, they were exposed to the influence of this most Americanizing force. The problems of new city life, the economic opportunities offered them in industry, and economic competition made the attempt to establish particularly Slovak institutions a struggle against the current. The attempted settlement on ,t he farms was also against the trends of the times which led toward the city. The crucial factor in American Slovak social history seems to be their engaging in industry and their settlement in industrial centers. Slovak nationalism attempted to modify the influence of this industrial city, and in so far as it did, it hindered progress among the Slovak immigrants in America. FOOTNOTES 1. Francis Sasinek, "Myslienky o stave nabozenstva medzi Slovakmi," Kalendar Jednota (1897 ) , II, 139. 2. M. Jankola, " Nase Skoly," Kalendar Jedno ta ( 1900), V, 135-136. 3. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," pp. 69-70. 4. Culen, Slovaci v Ameri ke, p. 394; Jednota, June 18, 1913, September 3, 1913. 5. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p. 187; Hrusovsky, This i s Slovakia, p. 50. 6. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," pp. 82-83 ; Yurchak, .The ,Slovaks, p . 190. 7. Yurchak, The Slovaks, pp. 229-230. 8. Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka 1864-1938 (Bratislava, 1934), pp. 186191 ; Bokes, Dejiny Slovenska, pp. 313-315; Yurchak, The Slovaks, pp. 230-232. 9. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," p. 81. 10. John S. Bradac, "Slovenski Evanjelici-Lutherani v Spojenych Statoch Arnerickych," World's Fair Memorial, pp. 81-82. 11. "The Slovak Sokol," Sborni k Slovenskeho Katoli ckeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXVIII, 242-243 . 12. Culen, Dejiny, II, 80-81, 93-94. �60 SLOVAKIA 13. J ednota, February 5, 1913. The pastor told the organist " the Slovak language was nothing." The organist quit. 14. Jednota, July 8, 1914. After the Slovaks had brought a priest from Slovakia and paid his way, the bishop refused to let him be their pastor. 15. Narodne Noviny, September 15, 1910; Kushner, Slovaci, p . 32. 16. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," p. 94-95. 17. Andrew J. Shipman, " Slavs in America," Th e Catholic Encyclop edia ( 1912), XIV, p. 55. 18. Culen, Dejiny, I. 114-115. 19. M. Jankola, " Pokladnica sv. Antona v Amerike," Kalendar Jedn ota (1908), XIII, 177-178. 20. Jednota, February 12, 1913. 21. Culen Slovaci v A merike, p . 418; " Slovenska zenska rehol'a ssv. Cyrilla i Me thoda v Amerike ," Ka lendar J ednot a ( 1911 ), XVI, 97-98 ; M. Jankola , " Prvotiny pr vej slovenskej zenskej rehole" , Ka lendar Jednot a (1909), XIV, 17-176; "Dcery ssv. Cyrilla i Methoda", Kalendar J ednota (1914 ), XIX, 194-195. 22. Kushner, Slovaci, pp. 150-152. 23. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, pp. 408-409. 24. Ibi d., 418,424. 25. Narodne Noviny, August 15, 1913, August 29,1913. 26. Narodne Noviny, October 3, 1912. 27. Kushner, Slovaci, pp. 156-157. 28. Culen, Slovaci v A merike, p. 401. 29. Narodne Noviny, June 9, 1910, April 27, 1911 ; September 5, 1912; August 29, 1912; Jednota, July 2, 1913. 30. Narodne Noviny, June 23, 1910, February 15, 1913 ; Jednota, April 1, 1914. 31. J ednota, March 4, 1913, March 12, 1913. 32. Stephan Furdek, "Dlfobny upis a ucastina," Kalendar Jednota (1909 ), XIV, pp. 192-195; "Ako povstal svet," Kalendar Jednota (1910), XV, pp. 141-145; J. Porubsky, "Ako volia v Amerike prezidenta," Kalendar J ednota (1913) , XVII, pp. 97-103; I. G., "Ako stat' sa obcanom Spoj. Statov," Kalendar Narodneho Slov enskeho Spolku (1913 ), XX, pp. 83-96. 33. Nar odne Noviny, June 12, 1913 ; Jednota, November 19, 1913. 34. N arodne Noviny, April 25, 1912; Jednota, June 11, 1913. 35. Narodne Noviny , August 10, 1911. 36. J . A. F ., " Pokrok," Sborni k (1915) , I, 43. 37. N arodne Noviny, April 4, 1912. 38. Narodne Noviny, July 11, 1912. 39. Narodne Noviny, July 25, 1912. 40. Narodne Noviny, August 8, 1912, September 19, 1912. 41. Narodne Noviny, November 12, 1914. 42. Jednota, January 1, 1913, February 12, 1913, May 7, 1913. 43. Culen, Slovaci v A m erike, pp. 175-190. 44. Ibi d., pp. 236-237. 45. Ibid. , p. 266. 46. Ibi d., p. 267. 47. Ibid., pp. 294-296. 48. Ibi d., pp. 297-305. 49. Ibid., pp. 306-337. 50. N arodne Noviny, February 3, 1910. �SLOVAKIA 61 51. Narodne Noviny, March 27, 1913. 52. Narodne Noviny, February 10, 1910, October 24, 1912. 53. Jednota, January 8, 1913, February 19, 1913, June 18, 1913, July 16, 1913. 54. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, p. 191. 55. Narodne Noviny, July 7, 1910, June 27, 1912, April 17, 1913 ; Jednota, November 4, 1914, December 23, 1914. 56. Narodne Noviny, October 3, 1912. 57. Narodne Noviny, October 6, 1910. 58. Narodne Noviny, January 27, 1910; Jednota, May 14, 1913, December 31, 1913 ; Kalendar Jednota (1915), XX, 75. 59. Narodne Noviny, March 7, 1912. 60. Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny, August 19, 1897. 61. Joseph Pauco, ~udovychorn u Sturovcov (Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1943) , pp. 107-108. 62. Ibid. , pp. 137-140. 63. Jednota, February 5, 1913. 64. Narodne Noviny, April 28, 1910, April 4, 1912, March 21, 1912. 65. Narodne Noviny, April 4, 1912; Paul Jamarik, " Opojny a krcma, " Kalendar Narodneho Slovenskeho Spolku ( 1914), XXII, 198-206 ; Jednota, February 19, 1913, June 25, 1913. 66. !1udomil, "Zakladajme spolky uplnej striezlivosti," Kalendar Jednota, (1911), XVI, 41-42. 67. Jednota, March 5, 1913. 68. Narodne Noviny, February 24, 1910, August 4, 1910; Jednota, January 29, 1913. 69. Jednota, July 30, 1913. 70. Narodne Noviny, April 25, 1912. 71. Narodne Noviny, January 13, 1910, May 12, 1912, August 25, 1910. 72. Narodne Noviny, November 2, 1911. 73. Narodne Noviny, November 9, 1911. 74. Narodne Noviny, January 25, 1912. 75. Narodne Noviny, June 6, 1912. 76. Narodne Noviny, September 18, 1913. 77. Narodne Noviny, October 1, 1914. 78. Narodne Noviny, November 16, 1911. 79. Jednota, September 17, 1913 ; Narodne Noviny, May 25, 1911. 80. Jednota, February 4, 1914; Narodne Noviny , March 19, 1914, June 11, 1914. 81. Jednota, February 19, 1913. 82. Narodne Noviny, October 7, 1910. 83. Jednota, July 9, 1913 Narodne Noviny, May 11, 1912. 84. Jednota, January 1, 1913 ; January 21, 1914. 85. Narodne Noviny, March 19, 1914, April 25, 1912. 86. Jednota, January 21, 1914, January 28, 1914. 87. Jednota, February 12, 1913, August 13, 1913. 88. Jednota, August 13, 1913; Narodne Noviny, March 19, 1914; Jednota, September 17, 1913, January 21 , 1914. 89. Jednota, December 9, 1914, October 14, 1914, December 30, 1914. 90. Narodne Noviny, April 25, 1912. 91. Narodne Noviny, August 8, 1912. 92. Narodne Noviny, February 17, 1910, April 27, 1911. 93 . Narodne Noviny, February 29, 1914; Jednota, July 1, 1914; Narodne Noviny, May 14, 1914. 94. Jednota, July 1, 1914. �62 SLOVAKIA 95. N<irodne Noviny, December 28, 1911, September 12, 1912, October 12, 1911, June 11, 1914. 96. N<irodne Noviny, March 7, 1912; Jednota, May 21, 1913. 97. A. V. Kozak, "Ustav I . Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty," Kalend<ir Jednota (1912) , XVII, 22. 98. " Ustav I. Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty," Kalend<ir Jednota ( 1915), xx, 163-164. 99. N<irodne Noviny, July 14, 1910. 100. N<irodne Noviny, July 13, 1911. 101. N<irodne Noviny, October 13, 1913. 102. N<irodne Noviny, January 8, 1914. 103. N<irodne Noviny, January 29, 1914. 104. N<irodne Noviny, April 16, 1914. 105. N<irodne Noviny, September 17, 1914. 106. Pamiitnica k zlatemu Jubileu N<irodneho Slov enskeho Spolku v U .S.A . (Pittsburgh, 1940) , p. 47. 107. N<irodne Noviny, March 13, 1913. 108. N<irodne Noviny, January 16, 1913. 109. N <irodn e Noviny, March 24, 1910, April 28, 1910, June 30, 1910. 110. Jednota, January 1, 1913. 111. "Prorocke slova dp. Matufa Jankolu o novom systeme," Sbornik Slovenskeho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX, 82; Jednota, January 1, 1913. 112. Culen, Dejiny, I, 125. 113. Ibid., I, 122-123. 114. N<irodne Noviny, March 23 , 1911. 115. N<irodn e Noviny, March 16, 1911. 116. N<irodne Noviny, September 22, 1910. 117. Jednota, May 14, 1913, May 21, 1913, July 2, 1913, September 10. 1913. 118. Jednota, June 18, 1913. 119. Jednot a, July 30, 1913. 120. N<irodn e Noviny, August 22, 1912, October 23, 1913 ; S. F., "Robotnicka otazka," Ka lend<ir J ednota (1906 ), XIII, 56. 121. Culen, Deji ny, I, 123-124; N<irodne Noviny, February 24, 1913. 122. N<irodne Noviny, January 15, 1914, February 12, 1914, February 26, 1914, June 11, 1914. 123. Jednota, January 1, 1913. 124. Jednota, May 7, 1913, July 2, 1913, May 14, 1913. 125. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p. 187. 126. N<irodne Noviny, November 21, 1912, June 19, 1913. 127. J ednota, January 22, 1913. 128. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," pp. 99-102. 129. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p. 190. 130. Jednota, September 30, 1914, October 14, 1914. 131. Jednot a, October 21, 1914, November 4, 1914. 132. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p . 191. � SLOVAKIA 41 New Interests 1900-1914 SLOVAKS IN THE U.S.A. By James J. Zatk o, Ph. D ., University of Notre D ame By 1900 growing Slovak nationalism had begun to grip the Slovak immigrants, and during the next decade and a half the Slovaks agitated for distinotly Slovak institutions, for Slovak education, and for Slovak liberation overseas from Hungarian control. What seemed the most important need of the Slovak immigrants to many thinking minds was Slovak education. Some Catholics found the cause of religious decline in the non-confessional Slovak schools that others advocated and established. Public schools seemed equally pernicious to their mind as being Protestant schools. Too much Americanization injured faith and morals. To them the great answer was Slovak Catholic schools; but these were practically non-existent. Some pastors just were not interested in schools, Slovak or Catholic. The debts resulting from building churches weighted down the parishes and blocked any ambitious program of school construction. Often Slovaks were too scattered throughout a region to support their own church and school.1 However, the crucial obstacle was a lack of Slovak teachers. Even if schools were built, they might be Catholic schools, but they would not be Slovak schools, for there were not enough Slovak teachers. As early as 1900 Rev. M. Jankola, a Catholic priest, suggested a solution, Slovak nuns to teach in Slovak schools, but this suggestion took almost ten years to mature. 2 Nevertheless, schools were not entirely neglected during these first years of the twentieth century. In 1900 the Rev. Bartholomew Kvitek, a Catholic priest, organized the Slovak school of St. Michael's parish in Chicago; and in 1902 the first Vincentian Sisters of Charity arrived from Slovakia to serve in St. Michael's parish in Braddock, Pa., where they took charge of the parochial school's 65 students. 3 Plans for non-confessional schools never came to very much, because the Slovaks were opposed to education without religion. 4 In 1900 the Slovaks won a local victory over the Hungarians when their protests blocked the erection of Louis Kossuth's statue in the public square of Cleveland. When Count �42 SLOVAKIA Albert Apponyi and forty delegates arrived in America during the World's Fair at St. Louis in 1904, the Slovaks presented a Memorandum recounting their objections against the electoral system in Hungary and Magyarization. Although the Count refused even to discuss Slovak grievances, ,the Memorandum at least informed public opinion about undemocratic election procedures and anti-Slovak schools. 5 However, all anti-Magyar agitation was focussed by the creation in 1907 of the Slovak League of America on May 26, in Cleveland, Ohio, by seven thousand delegates. The League became an alliance of Slovak educational, fraternal, and religious groups in this country. The purposes of the League were to educate Slovaks everywhere, to uplift them here in America and elsewhere morally, economically, socially and politically. 6 It became the leader in the drive to alleviate political conditions in Slovakia, but its efforts might have been still-born had not the Massacre of Cernova on the 27th of October, 1907 aroused not only Slovaks but world opinion. To understand this ev,e nt some facts need to be reviewed. The Rev. Andrew Hlinka, a Catholic priest both pious and devoted to the political and social welfare of the Slovaks, in 1897 became editor of The People's News and fought the Magyarization program of the gov,e rnment; his speeches and writings helped elect seven Slovaks to the Hungarian Parliament in 1906. He and fifteen other Slovaks were arrested and tried for "agitation against Hungarian nationality". Hlinka was fined 1500 crowns and costs of 680 crowns and sentenced to two years in prison. In a farewell message to his parishioners he declared thart he would gladly suffer imprisonment to secure recognition of the Slovak nation. For this he received another eighteen months and a fine of 400 crowns. 7 Prior to this the Rev. A. Hlinka had been appointed pastor in his native city, Ruzomberok; in the quarter known as Cernova he had begun building a new church for which he collected funds from all over Slovakia. He had in the meantime been suspended by Bishop Parvy, an ardent pro-Magyar. When the church in Cernova was to be dedicated, the parishioners refused to permit the blessing, unless their pastor returned to them. On October 27, 1907 gendarmes marched into Cernova to help keep order, and they lined the streets leading to the church. That morning coaches arrived bringing the Rev. Pazurik from Llkavka and other visitors to conduct the dedi- �SLOVAKIA 43 cation. When the people blockaded the road, the coachman began to lay about his whip in order to drive his horses through the crowd ; some men seized the horses' bridles to turn them around. An order was given to the gendarmes to open fire. Instantly nine people fell dead, men, women, and children, and six more died of their wounds later. 8 The National Slovak Society immediately took in hand the problem of aid for the widows and orphans that resulted from the Cernova Massacre and voted $2,000 for r•elief.9 While political nationalism received immense stimulus from the Massacre, nationalism began to play a greater role in the sphere of religion after 1900. Under the influence of their nationalism, the Slovaks began to feel their unity as a group and their need of exclusivness as a nation. This led to organization on a unique national basis in religion and to demands for r•ecognizing the "rights of Slovaks" in religious matters, like organization of synods for the Lutherans, Catholic action groups for the Slovak Catholics, and teaching of Slovak in the schools. The Slovak Lutherans formed the Slovak Evangelical Lutheran Synod of the United States of America with headquarters in Whiting, Indiana. This Synod was founded in the church of St. Peter, September 2, 1902, at Connellsville, Pa. A beginning had been made in Mahanoy City, Pa., but more definite steps were taken at conferences in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., and Braddock, Pa.; in the actual founding all the Slovak ministers and congregations cooperated. The Synod used the Slovak language in services and sermons, except where unusual circumstances required the use of English. Even the children wer,e taught their religion in Slovak. The Synod obtained its funds from prescribed contributions of the various parishes belonging to it. In Cleveland it owned a considerable prope1;ty intended for a Lutheran orphanage. The of.ficial organ was the Svedo k, which began in 1906 and was published twice a month.10 The troubled relations of Catholicism with Slovak nationalism continued to split various groups. A National Slovak Sokol had been established to include all Sokol activities in the United States; but discrimination against Catholics led to the creation of the Slovak Catholic Sokol in 1905; the headquarters of this group were in Passaic, N. J. The Slovak Catholic Sokol began publishing its own paper, the Katolicky �44 SLOVAKIA Sokol, and launched an extensive program to attract Slovak youth in gymnastics, athletics, and social activities. 11 The most violent conflict among Slovaks of the first decade of the twentieth century involved Slovak nationalism, but it was a conflict within the Catholic group between Catholic Nationalists and the Madarones. The founder of the First Catholic Slovak Union, the Rev. Stephen Furdek, called for an annual Slovak day that was to renew the Catholic spirit and attachment to Slovak nationality. The first Slovak day was to be called the Catholic Congress. This evoked bitter opposition in letters and even a telegram to Bishop Michael J . Hoban of Scranton from the Rev. Kossalko who denounced the whole project as "pan-slavistic" and as an attempt to set up a national church. When Bishop Hoban sanctioned the Slovak Day or Catholic Congress in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., by addressing it on September 3, 1906, Kossalko's rage knew no bounds. He addressed a Memorandum, signed by a large number of Madarone Slovak clergy, to the Apostolic Delegate and the archbishops of the United States. He demanded a condemnation of the affair. The Memorandum expressed fear for the unity of the church and the salvation of 500,000 souls, and accused the Slovak Catholics of working for "panslavism", which was inimical to Hungary, Germany, and the United States. However, Bishop Hoban's influence shielded the Catholic Slovak clergy and no action was taken.12 This event discredited the Madarones. Within the framework of the Catholic Church in the United States Slovak Catholics became involved in a struggle to preserve what they considered their national rights. There were arguments with non-Slovak pastors over hiring organists who would be able to teach Slovak to the children. 13 At other times Slovak Catholic efforts to obtain Slovak priests who could minister to them in their own language conflicted with bishops who did not always agree on Slovak "rights" .14 One bitter quarrel led to a schism in the Slovak settlement of Masontown, Pa. In Leckrone, Pa., a settlement of Irish and Slovaks, the Church of Our Lady of Perpetual help was blessed by Bishop Richard Phelan of Pittsburgh on October 9, 1904. In 1907 the church burned down, but a hall was built in which religious services were held. The Slovaks by this time had a Slovak pastor, but they still wanted a parish all their own. Bishop �SLOVAKIA 45 Francis R. Canevin of Pittsburgh requested the Rev. Charles Janda to look for a suitable location ; Rev. C. Janda sugg,ested Masontown. Since the Irish Catholics also wanted to have a parish in Masontown, the Slovaks were told to take the church in Leckrone for their use; but the Slovaks in Masontown were not satisfied. They went ahead and built their own church, and when the bishop would not cooperate with them, they cast about for a priest who might be willing to serve their church. Eventually they found an "independent" priest and so fell into schism.15 In sptte of such trouble, the Slovak Catholic body remained generally healthy. On February 22, 1911 a Slovak Catholic Priest and inventor, the Rev. Joseph Murgas, led in forming The Slovak Catholic Federation in America in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Und,e r the control of Slovak Catholic priests this group was to spread and coordinate Catholic action among Slovaks in America; until this year Slovak Catholic activities had been unorganized and subordinated to political and social ends.16 Exact religious statistics for ·t he Slovak immigrant group for that time are not available, but the best estimate suggests that of the 560,000 Slovak immigrants in America in 1911, 450,000 were Roman Catholics. The Slovak Catholics had 134 parishes in the United States. Protestants among the Slovaks numbered 95,000 .17 Of this Protestant group, Calvinists are estimated to run about 15,000. 18 After 1905 the development of Slovak Catholic elementary schools gained momentum. A system both Slovak and Catholic had been impossible without Slovak Catholic teachers. The Rev. M. Jankola, a Catholic priest, organized the Priests' Society of St. Anthony's Burse in the United States of America in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. , in 1903 and it was chartered in 1905. In the Kalendar Jednota of 1908 Rev. M. Jankola proposed the Burse of St. Anthony for Catholics generally to support students preparing to be teachers and Slovak girls preparing to be teaching nuns. 19 Although the Slovak Catholics supported this program generously with frequent collections and donations 20 , the fund proved insufficient for the purpose. Three Slovak girls who had been sent to the novitiate of the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary in 1906 were the nucleus of a Slovak sisterhood. In 1909 interested Slovak priests petitioned for the foundation of a distinctly �46 SLOVAKIA Slovak sisterhood, the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. On June 26, 1909 the Congregation for Religious approved this project, and the motherhouse of the new Slovak congregation was established in Danville, Pa.21 In the year 1911 the Most Reverend Joseph Koudelka, the bishop of Superior sent a request to the general motherhouse of the Congregation of School Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis in Prague. He asked the sisters to come to his diocese to work. Mother General M. Xavier sent Sister M. Georgia and Sister M. Hyacinth to look over the possibilities. These sisters stopped in Pittsburgh, where the Rev. J. Vrana persuaded them that the Pittsburgh diocese offered them greater opportunities and had greater need. When Sister M. Hyacinth took sick and died on March 10, 1912, the Mother General herself came to Pittsburgh. Rev. Ferdinand Prikazky, who at the moment was struggling to get nuns to teach in his St. Gabriel's parochial school, convinc,e d the sisters to settle in Pittsburgh. This was the beginning. By 1914 twenty three sisters of this congregation were teaching 579 children in three Slovak Catholic parishes.22 Progress had been made in solving the problem of elementary school education; schools were built in the parishes almost as quickly as teachers could be provided. The question of secondary school education also began to agitate Slovak circles. Very early, the Rev. Stephen Furdek suggested the idea of a Slovak high school for boys; he was seconded in this by the Rev. M. Jankola. However, nothing came of the idea until 1921 when it revived and resulted in the Benedictine High School in Cleveland in 1927.23 The Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius opened a high school for girls at Danville in 1922, and the Sisters of St. Francis opened one at Bellevue, Pa., in 1927. 24 There was continuous agitation for a college. A Slovak business college was suggested to improve the Slovak economic position.25 P. J . Kunovsky worked out a whole scheme for a Slovak school on a higher level. He argued that $100,000 would put up a building, and then he suggested that each fraternal organization ought to support a professor. This school was to include business and technical courses. As to religious affiliation, the school would be non-confessional, but the Oatholics could have a lecturer on the Catholic Faith and the Lutherans could support one to lecture on the Lutheran faith. This in- �SLOVAKIA 47 stitution was to be coeducational. Nothing came of this project.2s Very few Slovak children of the first immigrants had a chance to go to college, but those who did go generally took advantag,e of existing colleges. In 1901 the Czech Benedictines had established St. Procopius College at Lisle, Ill., and by 1907 there were ten Slovak youths studying there. They organized the "Literary Society of Stephen Moyses" and issued a monthly multigraphed little paper, Horlivost'. The club and the paper lasted for four years. The Slovaks also owed a special debt to the College and Seminary of St. Vincent's Archabbey in Latrobe, Pa., for in this college and seminary almost all the Catholic Slovak priests and many Slovak young men were trained. 27 During the years between 1902 and 1936 545 Slovak students attended St. Vincent's. 28 Informal education made most progress among the Slovaks. Clubs, multiplied, political, social, cultural, and literary. The political club seems to have been the most popular. It had a variety of purposes: to fighrt political apathy among the Slovaks, to help the Slovaks gain their political rights, and to help Slovaks become American citizens. In one year a club in Rankin, Pa., succeeded in getting thirteen Slovaks to obtain their citizenship papers. 29 Literary clubs also became popular among the Slovaks as a mean of self- improvement. 30 Both the newspapers and the almanacs were also instrumental in educating the Slovak immigrants. The Jednota discussed Darwinism, the "higher criticism" and socialism. 31 The almanacs explained the procedure of becoming citizens, American electoral system, stocks and bonds, and even discussed the origin of the world. 32 One of the complaints about the Slovaks made by their own leaders is their lack of interest in books and good reading. To make the Slovaks book-lovers, Slovak political and literary clubs founded Slovak libraries. 33 The national fraternal organizations sometimes contributed money to help in the acquisition of a building, or, if the Slovaks already possessed a lodge hall, to aid in the purchase of books. 34 That a demand actually developed for Slovak books is suggested by the special sections for Slovak readers in public libraries, as for instance, the Oarnegie Library in Homestead, Pa., 35 and the public library in Cleveland. 36 The most ambitious project launched to interest the Slo- �48 SLOVAKIA vaks in reading was a book club. P. J. Kunovsky suggested in 1912 the formation of a book club to consist of 5,000 Slovaks. This number would enable the club to sell four books for a dollar. 37 By July 11, 1912 a literary committee to choose books had been elected. 38 Even this cultural project could not move along without factions; for there were some objections to the composition of the literary committee. Only "one side" was represented. 39 There were complaints by Kunovsky that progress was slow; in fact, after six months of vigorous propaganda, there were not even 1,000 members, and the club needed 5,000 members in one year. 40 By November, 1914, the "Four Books for a Dollar" was still going and growing somewhat, 41 but the Slovaks were apparently still not too interested in books. One book promotion was quite successful. The Rev. J. Murgas led a drive to get 3,000 subscribers for a Cathechetical Encyclopedia, written by Rev. Vaclav Melchior, C. Ss. R. 42 Enough subscribers undertook to buy the book. It was a project more adapted to Slovak ideas; it seemed worthwhile to invest in a book on religion. The taste of Slovaks in reading was quite varied. We cannot judge from actual reports of reading, but the types of books published for them may serve as an indication of their reading tast,e. There were romances dealing with the Janosik cycle, a Slovak Robin Hood; others dealt with the adventures of a likeable thief, Rinaldo Rinaldini; sensational stories included Dracula, Harry Tracy, Most Desperate Criminal of Our Time , and World Detective Romances and Novel series.43 Other books published dealt with Slovak history and Magyar oppression. 44 One anti-clerical work was Z dejin Cirkvi by A. M. Spera, an anti-Catholic church history: 45 there was even a socialist work, Socialisti idu. 46 Publications included readers and catechisms, 47 dictionaries and grammars, 48 and devotional works. 49 The translations printed in the Narodne Noviny from American literature included Edgar A. Poe's The Black Cat 50 and Washington Irving's The Legend of Sleepy Hollow.51 Whatever reading may have been done by the Slovaks besides the almanacs and newspapers, these books are a suggestion of its type. Another form of informal education proposed was a Slovak Chautauqua. The Rev. W. Regnemer, a Calvinist minister, suggested that a fraternal organization hire a pleasure �SLOVAKIA 49 park during the summer for one day, prepare a cultural and entertaining program and charge an admission of twenty fiv,e or fifty cents. 52 This idea was still-born. Theatrical productions were very common among the Slovaks, 53 but the drama was not on a very high level. Most popular were plays in Slovak portraying Slovakia and Slovak life. There was no attempt to translate the English classics of the stage into Slovak. 54 Both the Narodne Noviny and the Jednota encouraged the staging of plays by publishing a large number of them in their columns, 55 for plays portraying Slovak life served to arouse national consciousness, besides being good entertainment. 56 One complaint about the theatrical entertainment was the bad conduct of the audience, which frequently shouted to their friends on the stage, whistled, stamped their feet. Mothers brought very young children or babies who disturbed the performance with their crying. 57 The Slovaks organized bands and choirs ;58 popular music was also encouraged by the publication of songs in the almanacs. Some of the choirs advanced so rapidly that they were able to stage small operettas. 59 One obstacle to further Slovak progress was intemperance. The drink problem, its source in poverty, was an old one for the Slovaks. All sources agree that drink, especially whisk,ey, was the curse of Slovakia and helped impoverish the country. 60 During the 1840',s Rev. Stephan Zavodnik, a Catholic priest, influenced by Father Matthew, inaugurated the struggle against intemperance in Slovakia. Father Matthew's influence had trav,elled through Germany, Bohemia, Poland, and finally reached Slovakia. 61 Temperance societies were first organized in Orava in 1845 and in half a year had 20,000 members. The city councils assisted the societies; the ecclesiastical authorities put their prestige behind the movement. In 1847 the bishop of Banska Bystrica asked his clergy to publicize these societies during Lent ; the bishop of Roznava issued a pastoral letter on the subject in 1846. The Lutherans too supported the movement. 62 The nationalistic agitation and revolution in 1848 disrupted the growth of these societies, but by 1870 the fight against drink revived. 63 When the Slovaks came to America, they brought their weakness for drink with them. Still there were Slovaks who understood the pernicious effect of over-indulgence in strong �50 SLOVAKIA drink. Saloon keepers were attacked for disrupting family life. Slovak saloon keepers were urged to remove the national disgrace by going into another line of business. 64 The agitation against the use and abuse of alcohol filled many a column in the N arodne N oviny and J ednota. Alcohol was the cause of disease, for example, tuberculosis, of many economic and social losses ; whiskey was the root of all social evils.65 The most eff.ective agitation against intemperance was the total abstinence society. The best reason for creating such societies was their need. There were such sodeties already in existence in 1911 for example, in Hazleton, Pa., McAdoo, Pa. , St. Clair, Pa., and Mahanoy City, Pa.66 When the temperance club was organized in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., forty five prospective members attended the meeting; but only eight were willing to take the pledge and join the society. Eventually twenty women and girls joined; since then five or six members were added at each meeting, and the number finally grew to forty five! 67 Hand in hand with the progress in religious organization, in education, and political action, went the bettering of the Slovak economic conditions. As with the other activities, economic life among the Slovaks began to be colored by nationalism. The Slovaks set up Slovak grocery stores and Slovak banks. Surprisingly enough, a farm movement among the Slovaks developed from many causes. The success of the Slovaktown venture was continually reported in the newspapers: news of hay selling for $7 a ton, in November, 1912, seven weddings, good markets, freedom from the bleak life of a miners' town and from strikes. 68 To some life on the farm meant a life less dangerous to the faith and a healthier family life;69 to others it meant protection against too quick an assimilation to American ways, especially American morals.70 In 1910 the National Slovak Society embarked on a considerable farm colonization venture. The Society's national convention had voted in 1909 that not less than 1,000 acres of farm land should be bought for an orphanage. A committee investigated real estate in Prince George, Calvert, and St. Mary's counties in Maryland; enough land was to be bought to build an orphanage and to form a Slovak settlement to help in the upkeep of the orphanage. After considerable debate on whether the primary purpose was a settlement �SLOVAKIA 51 or an orphanage, 2,813 acres of land were purchased for F 0,000 in St. Mary's county, near St. Mary's, Maryland. One thousand one hundred acres were arable and the rest was woodland ; there was a three mile frontage on St. Mary's River. 71 Eight hundred acres were to be set aside for the orphanage and old folks ' home, and two thousand acres were to be put up for sale.72 The land was divided into thirty nine farms, ranging in size from 33 acres to 132, and classified in value thus: class A farms at $40-$50 an acre, class B farms at $25-$40 an acre, and Class C at $10-$25 an acre. The price of the farms varied from $600 to $3,100.73 The land sales went so well that the National Slovak Society decided to reserve only 500 acres for the orphanage and to sell 2,300 acres for farms.74 Such was the venture's success that by June, 1912, the Slovak Farmers Association was chartered in Maryland with a capitalization of $25,000. First class stock was to get 5% dividend; and as soon as the second class stock reached 5%, the rate of the first class was to jump to 7%. The organization's purpose was to settle Slovaks on good farms, especially in Maryland. The association also had a hotel where Slovaks might disport themselves in the summer for longer or shorter periods of time. 75 Behind the scenes, however, some financial skulduggery was afoot and the exposure of "commission-masters" definitely dampened enthusiasm for the project. A. S. Ambrose, the president of the National Slovak Society, had taken a ten percent commission on $48,735 worth of land sales and netted himself a tidy $4,875.30. Of the sales themselves $16,156.70 in cash had been placed into the Society's treasury, while $28,580 had been mortgaged to the Society. 76 On this transaction the Society was estimated to have lost nearly $20,000 through various "commissions." 77 At least on paper in 1911 the Slovak American Colonization Company was organized with an intended Capitalization of $50,000 at $50 a share. It planned the erection of houses, business structures, saw-mills, and other needed buildings. It remained a paper organization. 78 In spite of the publicity giv,en these projects, the influx of Slovaks onto the land came from individual initiative for most part. Small colonies of Slovak farmers grew up around Denmark, Maine, 79 Phillips, Wisconsin, 80 Tabor, Minnesota,81 Louisiana and Mississippi,82 Callahan and Pine Land, Flo- �52 SLOVAKIA rida,83 Michigan,84 and North Emporia and Antioch, Virginia.a5 If the Slovak farmer struck upon land already cleared, he did not have too difficult a time making a success of farming; but if he bought land that had yet to be cleared, like the second growth timberlands in Wisconsin, the first few years on the "blessed" land were murderous in their demands of labor and capital. For instance, two brothers and their families, having read accounts of successful farming in Wisconsin, used their savings to buy a farm in northern Wisconsin. The land had to be cleared, and ,even the women were put to work carrying away the heavy wood. Besides, the brothers had to build a log house big enough to shelter the two families. During the winter months, the men worked as lumberjacks, and in order to have enough capital to begin farming in spring had to borrow at six percent. After plowing and buying seed, the two new farmers were without money. One of them went to work in a glass mill in Illinois, while the other continued the back-breaking work clearing the land and farming. To add to their troubles, the nearby creek dried up in the summer, and the water could be brought in only from a distant spring. A horse had to be bought ! The beginning of farming was bitter for the Slovaks in northern Wisconsin.86 Although the Slovak farmers did organize locally, they did not form any national Slovak farmer societies. In Moquah, Wis. , for instance, a special farmers' society was established in 1911. The two national fraternal organizations served their social purposes sufficiently. One farmer from Tabor, Minn., did suggest that the Slovak farmers in the west needed a "clearing house" in a city like Pittsburgh, where they could sell their products, especially, grain, directly to the consumer. This would save the farmer some of his profits and the workingman some of his hard earned money. This remained only a suggestion. 87 Generally the new farmers were quite successful. The land was good, profits were high, and there were no strikes. 88 In Slovaktown hay was sold for $7 a ton in 1913; a Slovak farmer in Virginia made $1 ,100 on peanuts and $220 on cotton on a 220 acre farm . Still there were failures . A considerable number of advertisements announcing the farm sales appeared in the Jednota and the Narodne Noviny. 89 Some- �SLOVAKIA 53 times the reason was the mortgag,e ;90 at other times the family found the life too difficult and drab.9 1 While some Slovaks managed to escape to the farm from the hard life of mine and mill, most Slovaks remained city-dwellers. One of the problems of the city-dweller was the high cost of living as compared with wages. 92 The high prices led to a large number of cooperative ventures on a nationality basis. Most frequently this was a meat and grocery store. The enterprise resembled a corporation more than a cooperative. A share might cost $10 and a board of directors headed and managed the enterprise. Sometimes a limit was placed on the number of shares an individual might hold, lest any one person should capture control of the corporation.93 In Yukon, Pa., for instance, 200 families established a share-holding grocery store which was successful despite the opposition of some Slovaks. The corporation charter provided that any man could belong, but no one was allowed to invest more than $1 ,000! In 9 months a dividend of $4.85 was paid for each share. The cooperative enterprise could save a working man about fifteen cents a day on his food bill. In spite of considerable propaganda in the papers heralding these ventures, the Slovaks did not support these "Slovak stores" universally. The proprietors complained that Slovaks continued to patronize non-Slovak businesses. 9 4 There were many suggestions for Slovak enterprise: the organization of all Slovak businessmen in America, a law firm to take care of Slovak interests, a hospital for Slovak immigrants, a shoe factory to be built by the National Slovak Society or the Slovak League. 95 Of all the ephemeral proposals made, one did become actual. A Slovak bank to handle Slovak business was considered a necessity; but the idea was only gingerly approached after the failure of Peter V. Rovnianek's Bank in Pittsburgh, in 1907. Michael Bosak founded the State Slovak Bank in Wilkes-Barre, Pa.; the bank opened for business on December 2, 1912, and in its first five months showed a profit of $7,250. 96 Progress was also the keynote of the First Catholic Slovak Union. In 1910 the Union established its own printery in Middletown, Pa. This was a two story red brick building, one hundred twenty feet long and forty feet wide. The equipment included Duplex printing press and a linotype machine. The blessing of the printery took place on October 27, 1910.97 �54 SLOVAKIA In 1914 the Union also opened an orphanage, which the Sisters of Ss. Cyril and Methodius took under their supervision. The building itself cost $97,000, and the total cost was about $110,000. The chapel had an altar of Vermont marble worth $1,200 and a seating capacity of 150. 98 This orphanage was located in Middletown, Pa. The Slovak Catholics wer,e justly very proud of this achievement, especially when they remembered how poor they had been when they landed in the United States. The National Slovak Society showed its energy by creating an official newspaper for its own use, the Narodne Noviny, in 1910; this paper replaced the Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny which had spoken for the National Slovak Society but had never been adopted as the official organ of the Society. This new newspaper became definitely anti-clerical and sometimes anti-Catholic. In 1910 an editorial defended the modernists and attacked the Catholic Church as being an Italian and Roman Church, and not truly Catholic. 99 Any clerical scandal was written up with glee, and cartoons were not only anti-clerical but in very bad taste. These attacks and insults became so violent that the Bishop of Altoona, Eugene A. Garvey, banned the newspaper from his diocese on the grounds that it was written and published by "Jews, unbelievers, and heretics," spreading anarchism, unbelief, and socialism.100 The National Slovak Society did more constructive work when it organized the Youth Circles of the National Slovak Society in 1913. The chief purpose of these circles was educational. The elder and chief gymnast had to be total abstainers and men of sound general educa:tion. 101 The official language was Slovak. Dues were to be twenty cents a month for each child; of this amount fifteen cents were to be forwarded to the treasurer of the National Slovak Society. All meetings were to begin with Slovak and American patriotic songs; the American songs were to be translated into Slovak.102 Besides one official meeting a month to transact business, there were frequent meetings for lectures, study, and general education. 103 These circles presented programs which featured recitation of poems in Slovak, Slovak songs sung as solos and in chorus, instrumental solos, lectures by visitors. 104 The circles were beneficial to young Slovaks, and their growth �SLOVAKIA 55 was very rapid. By September, 1914, sixty nine circles had been established. 105 In spite of all the discussion of an orphanage, the National Slovak Society finally abandoned the plan. The matter was dropped because of the religious problem. The Society consisted of members belonging to various religious sects and claimed that it could not without showing favoritism provide for religious instruction. An orphanage without religious instruction and education was unacceptable to the Slovaks. 106 The fraternal organizations during this time suffered somewhat from embezzlement and swindling. Joseph Joscak, an editor of the Narodne Noviny , had taken a $19,000 "commission" from the National Slovak Society but was caught up with in 1913. 107 During the same years a William Vokolek swindled the Slovak fraternal organizations to the extent of $300,000. 108 Of course, A. S. Amrose's "commission" on the St. Mary's settlement must also be recalled here. Another common feature of fraternal life in this period was the construction of lodge halls, which were built almost in every settlement. These lodge halls became the centers of social life; they provided places for lodge meetings, theatrical productions, dances, gymnastic exercises, and quarters for the political and literary clubs. 109 One of the storms that troubled the fraternal organizations was the debate on the "old system" as against the "new system." Almost any issue of the Jednota after 1906 and the Narodne Noviny after 1910 contained letters with arguments on both sides of the question. 110 While operating under the older method of assessment, the organizations failed to build up a reserve for times of special demand; they were merely collecting agencies. For instance, if the organization needed $3,000 and had 12,000 members, each member was obliged to pay twenty five cents, which were collected to meet the cost. The new system involved paying dues r,e gularly, determined according to age. As early as 1906 the Rev. S. Furdek, the Rev. M. Jankola, and A. S. Ambrose pointed out the advantages of the new system, but there was much opposition. By 1914 both the First Catholic Slovak Union and the National Slovak Society had adopted the modern method. m Although progress was considerable among the Slovak immigrants in education, business enterprise, and farming , in many ways the lot of the workingman remained a hard �56 SLOVAKIA one. For instance, mine disasters continued to take lives. At Fernie, Pa. , in June, 1902, 200 miners perished, 50 of them Slovaks. Forty two Slovak miners were killed at Cambria, Pa. , during July, 1902. 112 Strikes still plagued the coal fields in which Slovaks were working. In Westmoreland county a strike began at Greensburg, Pa., on March 10, 1910 over union recognition and as a protest against the company store system. It spread to the neighboring mining centers of K,eystone, Irwin, Latrobe, and Westmoreland. Then in the confusion a mine guard shot an eighteen year old youth, and 15,000 miners went on strike. Eleven thousand wer•e said to be Slovaks. They joined the union to show their defiance and to emphasize their demands. As a counter-measure, the company called in the Pinkerton detectives, and the striking miners were blacklisted.113 During the strike the miners had very little to subsist upon, and that little came from the United Mine Workers of America. The union provided $2.50 a week for each man, $1.00 a week for each woman dependent, and $0 .50 a week for each child. 114 The president of the National Slovak Society, Mr. A. S. Ambrose, visited the strike-bound coal-fields. In his newspaper articles he estimated that about 20,000 men were on strike ; about 95 % were Slavs, and of this latter group about 60 % were Slovaks. The striking miners lived in shacks that could not protect them against the bitter cold, the children went about bare-foot and hungry. 115 Since 500 strikers were members of the National Slovak Society, the Society published appeals for help and even began a collection for relief of the strikers in Westmoreland county.116 Gradually the strike was broken and nothing substantial was won. Another strike in which many Slovaks were involved began in 1913, led by the Industrial Workers of the World. It started in the broad-loom silk mills of Patterson, N. J. , on February 25, 1913. Over twenty five thousand workers were affected. There were two factors that prolonged the bitter strife. One was the introduction of the three and four loom system; this involved the question of whether Patterson should invade the cheap silk field in opposition to the Pennsylvania mills. Fear of lower wages and loss of work followed as a consequence. The second factor was resentment of I.W.W. tactics. The Jednota condemned the I. W. W.'s socialist tendencies and opposition to the American Federation of Labor. 117 �SLOVAKIA 57 Still these defects of the union did not blind the First Catholic Slovak Union to the needs of the strikers, many of whom were Slovaks. 118 For five months the leadership of the I. W. W. kept the strikers' ranks intact, but lack of funds and loss of morale at last broke the strike. After twenty one weeks of bitter struggle the strike was settled without any gains for the workers. The J ednota laid the blame on the socialists. 119 Both newspapers were strong supporters of unions. They considered it the duty of every Slovak to belong to the unions, especially the American Federation of Labor. After all, it was the unions that improved the worker's lot and gave labor a position of influence in the world. 120 The strike-breaker and the "scab" were excluded from Slovak organizations. 121 In their attitude toward socialism the two newspapers differed. The Narodne Noviny showed itself definitely hospitable to socialist ideas. Articles were featured insisting that there could be no friendly contacts between capitalists and workers; workers were urged to abandon the Democratic and Republican parties and to join the party of the working class! 122 The Jednota unreservedly repudiated socialism. It condemned socialist anti-religious tactics and ridicule of Catholics. 123 Socialism was anti-Christian in its very essence, and had been consistently opposed to religion. The only agency that did in fact transform slave labor into free human labor was the Catholic Church. 124 As the first decade of the twentieth century ended and another began, the dawn of new interests appeared on the horizon. In 1911 Count Albert Apponyi, who has been mentioned before, returned to the United States on behalf of Hungary which he described as "an island of freedom" in central Europe. Slovak publicity about Hungarian mistreatment of Slovaks caused the mission of Count Apponyi to fail.1 25 Hard upon the heels of this came the Balkan wars. Slovak efforts at war relief were conditioned by nationalism. Within the months from November 21, 1912 to June 19, 1913, the Narodne Noviny collected $1,547.95 for the Slavonic Red Cross; and it was made clear that this collection was only for the Slavs. 126 By January 22, 1913 the Jednota had collected $2,350.00 for the same cause. 127 With regard to the "Slovak question," which was on the verge of becoming the paramouth one for the Slovaks, opinion among the American Slovaks had undergone quite a change. �58 SLOVAKIA Almost up to 1914 Slovaks sought concessions from Hungary for Slovakia; but these concessions of political and cultural rights wer-e understood within the existing framework of government. However, in April, 1914, when Count Michael Karolyi came to the United States to win Slovak favor for a Slovak and Hungarian union in a completely independent Hungary, the Slovaks questioned the sincerity of the Count and the government. In New York, on May 24, 1914, a debate took place on the question: "Can the Slovaks trust the Hungarian government in its movement for general suffrage in Hungary and with complete Hungarian independence?" The debate solved no real problem, but stated clearly the issues: what was to be the Slovaks' future relation to Hungary? The Slovak League arranged several protest meetings, and on April 28, 1914 issued a Memorandum, which was practically a declaration of independence and demanded autonomy for Slovakia. The League did not explain the kind of autonomy Slovakia should have, whether within Austro-Hungary or with Hungary as an independent state or complete independence for Slovakia for the Slovaks in America themselves disagreed on what they wanted. In order to clarify their position, a Congress of the Slovak League was held in Pittsburgh, September 10, 1914. After everybody had aired their views, it appeared that in 1914, as late as September of that year, the American Slovaks had not generally accepted political plans for Slovakia. 128 They were divided into three camps: one demanded complete independence for Slovakia, another wanted autonomy within Hungary, and a third desired the creation of a new state in which Czechs and Slovaks would be united. 129 With the coming of the World War, Slovak attention was diverted from the creation of Slovak institutions here in America to the creation of Slovakia. The World War found the Slovaks anti-German and anti-Habsburg. 130 The Jednota printed German atrocity stories and even went so far as to charge that German Protestantism was serving German mili'tarism.131 The Slovak League managed to chanel the desire for a better Slovakia and the anti-Habsburg feeling into an extensive Slovak nationalist movement. Through the Slovak League over a million dollars was poured into the cause of Slovak freedom. 132 By 1914 the Slovak immigrants had made themselves �SLOVAKIA 59 economically secure as far as a group of working people could in the American economy. Socially they had made progress in organizing national fraternal organizations, establishing Slovak schools, creating Slovak parishes. Their nationalism, manifested in efforts to form distinct Slovak institutions and their interest in European Slovakia, prevented their complete integration with American life; but the Slovak institutions seemed foredoomed to failure. The explanation for much of this lies outside the special character of the Slovaks. After 1890, the close of the frontier, the new industrial city became the characteristic of American life ; it became the center of production, the leader in social and cultural lif.e, and great center of communication. By the very fact that Slovaks were immersed in industrial and eventually city rather than farm life, they were exposed to the influence of this most Americanizing force. The problems of new city life, the economic opportunities offered them in industry, and economic competition made the attempt to establish particularly Slovak institutions a struggle against the current. The attempted settlement on ,t he farms was also against the trends of the times which led toward the city. The crucial factor in American Slovak social history seems to be their engaging in industry and their settlement in industrial centers. Slovak nationalism attempted to modify the influence of this industrial city, and in so far as it did, it hindered progress among the Slovak immigrants in America. FOOTNOTES 1. Francis Sasinek, "Myslienky o stave nabozenstva medzi Slovakmi," Kalendar Jednota (1897 ) , II, 139. 2. M. Jankola, " Nase Skoly," Kalendar Jedno ta ( 1900), V, 135-136. 3. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," pp. 69-70. 4. Culen, Slovaci v Ameri ke, p. 394; Jednota, June 18, 1913, September 3, 1913. 5. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p. 187; Hrusovsky, This i s Slovakia, p. 50. 6. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," pp. 82-83 ; Yurchak, .The ,Slovaks, p . 190. 7. Yurchak, The Slovaks, pp. 229-230. 8. Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka 1864-1938 (Bratislava, 1934), pp. 186191 ; Bokes, Dejiny Slovenska, pp. 313-315; Yurchak, The Slovaks, pp. 230-232. 9. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," p. 81. 10. John S. Bradac, "Slovenski Evanjelici-Lutherani v Spojenych Statoch Arnerickych," World's Fair Memorial, pp. 81-82. 11. "The Slovak Sokol," Sborni k Slovenskeho Katoli ckeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXVIII, 242-243 . 12. Culen, Dejiny, II, 80-81, 93-94. �60 SLOVAKIA 13. J ednota, February 5, 1913. The pastor told the organist " the Slovak language was nothing." The organist quit. 14. Jednota, July 8, 1914. After the Slovaks had brought a priest from Slovakia and paid his way, the bishop refused to let him be their pastor. 15. Narodne Noviny, September 15, 1910; Kushner, Slovaci, p . 32. 16. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," p. 94-95. 17. Andrew J. Shipman, " Slavs in America," Th e Catholic Encyclop edia ( 1912), XIV, p. 55. 18. Culen, Dejiny, I. 114-115. 19. M. Jankola, " Pokladnica sv. Antona v Amerike," Kalendar Jedn ota (1908), XIII, 177-178. 20. Jednota, February 12, 1913. 21. Culen Slovaci v A merike, p . 418; " Slovenska zenska rehol'a ssv. Cyrilla i Me thoda v Amerike ," Ka lendar J ednot a ( 1911 ), XVI, 97-98 ; M. Jankola , " Prvotiny pr vej slovenskej zenskej rehole" , Ka lendar Jednot a (1909), XIV, 17-176; "Dcery ssv. Cyrilla i Methoda", Kalendar J ednota (1914 ), XIX, 194-195. 22. Kushner, Slovaci, pp. 150-152. 23. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, pp. 408-409. 24. Ibi d., 418,424. 25. Narodne Noviny, August 15, 1913, August 29,1913. 26. Narodne Noviny, October 3, 1912. 27. Kushner, Slovaci, pp. 156-157. 28. Culen, Slovaci v A merike, p. 401. 29. Narodne Noviny, June 9, 1910, April 27, 1911 ; September 5, 1912; August 29, 1912; Jednota, July 2, 1913. 30. Narodne Noviny, June 23, 1910, February 15, 1913 ; Jednota, April 1, 1914. 31. J ednota, March 4, 1913, March 12, 1913. 32. Stephan Furdek, "Dlfobny upis a ucastina," Kalendar Jednota (1909 ), XIV, pp. 192-195; "Ako povstal svet," Kalendar Jednota (1910), XV, pp. 141-145; J. Porubsky, "Ako volia v Amerike prezidenta," Kalendar J ednota (1913) , XVII, pp. 97-103; I. G., "Ako stat' sa obcanom Spoj. Statov," Kalendar Narodneho Slov enskeho Spolku (1913 ), XX, pp. 83-96. 33. Nar odne Noviny, June 12, 1913 ; Jednota, November 19, 1913. 34. N arodne Noviny, April 25, 1912; Jednota, June 11, 1913. 35. Narodne Noviny , August 10, 1911. 36. J . A. F ., " Pokrok," Sborni k (1915) , I, 43. 37. N arodne Noviny, April 4, 1912. 38. Narodne Noviny, July 11, 1912. 39. Narodne Noviny, July 25, 1912. 40. Narodne Noviny, August 8, 1912, September 19, 1912. 41. Narodne Noviny, November 12, 1914. 42. Jednota, January 1, 1913, February 12, 1913, May 7, 1913. 43. Culen, Slovaci v A m erike, pp. 175-190. 44. Ibi d., pp. 236-237. 45. Ibid. , p. 266. 46. Ibi d., p. 267. 47. Ibid., pp. 294-296. 48. Ibi d., pp. 297-305. 49. Ibid., pp. 306-337. 50. N arodne Noviny, February 3, 1910. �SLOVAKIA 61 51. Narodne Noviny, March 27, 1913. 52. Narodne Noviny, February 10, 1910, October 24, 1912. 53. Jednota, January 8, 1913, February 19, 1913, June 18, 1913, July 16, 1913. 54. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, p. 191. 55. Narodne Noviny, July 7, 1910, June 27, 1912, April 17, 1913 ; Jednota, November 4, 1914, December 23, 1914. 56. Narodne Noviny, October 3, 1912. 57. Narodne Noviny, October 6, 1910. 58. Narodne Noviny, January 27, 1910; Jednota, May 14, 1913, December 31, 1913 ; Kalendar Jednota (1915), XX, 75. 59. Narodne Noviny, March 7, 1912. 60. Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny, August 19, 1897. 61. Joseph Pauco, ~udovychorn u Sturovcov (Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1943) , pp. 107-108. 62. Ibid. , pp. 137-140. 63. Jednota, February 5, 1913. 64. Narodne Noviny, April 28, 1910, April 4, 1912, March 21, 1912. 65. Narodne Noviny, April 4, 1912; Paul Jamarik, " Opojny a krcma, " Kalendar Narodneho Slovenskeho Spolku ( 1914), XXII, 198-206 ; Jednota, February 19, 1913, June 25, 1913. 66. !1udomil, "Zakladajme spolky uplnej striezlivosti," Kalendar Jednota, (1911), XVI, 41-42. 67. Jednota, March 5, 1913. 68. Narodne Noviny, February 24, 1910, August 4, 1910; Jednota, January 29, 1913. 69. Jednota, July 30, 1913. 70. Narodne Noviny, April 25, 1912. 71. Narodne Noviny, January 13, 1910, May 12, 1912, August 25, 1910. 72. Narodne Noviny, November 2, 1911. 73. Narodne Noviny, November 9, 1911. 74. Narodne Noviny, January 25, 1912. 75. Narodne Noviny, June 6, 1912. 76. Narodne Noviny, September 18, 1913. 77. Narodne Noviny, October 1, 1914. 78. Narodne Noviny, November 16, 1911. 79. Jednota, September 17, 1913 ; Narodne Noviny, May 25, 1911. 80. Jednota, February 4, 1914; Narodne Noviny , March 19, 1914, June 11, 1914. 81. Jednota, February 19, 1913. 82. Narodne Noviny, October 7, 1910. 83. Jednota, July 9, 1913 Narodne Noviny, May 11, 1912. 84. Jednota, January 1, 1913 ; January 21, 1914. 85. Narodne Noviny, March 19, 1914, April 25, 1912. 86. Jednota, January 21, 1914, January 28, 1914. 87. Jednota, February 12, 1913, August 13, 1913. 88. Jednota, August 13, 1913; Narodne Noviny, March 19, 1914; Jednota, September 17, 1913, January 21 , 1914. 89. Jednota, December 9, 1914, October 14, 1914, December 30, 1914. 90. Narodne Noviny, April 25, 1912. 91. Narodne Noviny, August 8, 1912. 92. Narodne Noviny, February 17, 1910, April 27, 1911. 93 . Narodne Noviny, February 29, 1914; Jednota, July 1, 1914; Narodne Noviny, May 14, 1914. 94. Jednota, July 1, 1914. �62 SLOVAKIA 95. N<irodne Noviny, December 28, 1911, September 12, 1912, October 12, 1911, June 11, 1914. 96. N<irodne Noviny, March 7, 1912; Jednota, May 21, 1913. 97. A. V. Kozak, "Ustav I . Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty," Kalend<ir Jednota (1912) , XVII, 22. 98. " Ustav I. Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty," Kalend<ir Jednota ( 1915), xx, 163-164. 99. N<irodne Noviny, July 14, 1910. 100. N<irodne Noviny, July 13, 1911. 101. N<irodne Noviny, October 13, 1913. 102. N<irodne Noviny, January 8, 1914. 103. N<irodne Noviny, January 29, 1914. 104. N<irodne Noviny, April 16, 1914. 105. N<irodne Noviny, September 17, 1914. 106. Pamiitnica k zlatemu Jubileu N<irodneho Slov enskeho Spolku v U .S.A . (Pittsburgh, 1940) , p. 47. 107. N<irodne Noviny, March 13, 1913. 108. N<irodne Noviny, January 16, 1913. 109. N <irodn e Noviny, March 24, 1910, April 28, 1910, June 30, 1910. 110. Jednota, January 1, 1913. 111. "Prorocke slova dp. Matufa Jankolu o novom systeme," Sbornik Slovenskeho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX, 82; Jednota, January 1, 1913. 112. Culen, Dejiny, I, 125. 113. Ibid., I, 122-123. 114. N<irodne Noviny, March 23 , 1911. 115. N<irodn e Noviny, March 16, 1911. 116. N<irodne Noviny, September 22, 1910. 117. Jednota, May 14, 1913, May 21, 1913, July 2, 1913, September 10. 1913. 118. Jednota, June 18, 1913. 119. Jednot a, July 30, 1913. 120. N<irodn e Noviny, August 22, 1912, October 23, 1913 ; S. F., "Robotnicka otazka," Ka lend<ir J ednota (1906 ), XIII, 56. 121. Culen, Deji ny, I, 123-124; N<irodne Noviny, February 24, 1913. 122. N<irodne Noviny, January 15, 1914, February 12, 1914, February 26, 1914, June 11, 1914. 123. Jednota, January 1, 1913. 124. Jednota, May 7, 1913, July 2, 1913, May 14, 1913. 125. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p. 187. 126. N<irodne Noviny, November 21, 1912, June 19, 1913. 127. J ednota, January 22, 1913. 128. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," pp. 99-102. 129. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p. 190. 130. Jednota, September 30, 1914, October 14, 1914. 131. Jednot a, October 21, 1914, November 4, 1914. 132. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p . 191. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1966, Vol. 16 Description An account of the resource Vol. 16 (No. 39), 1966. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1966 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 41 New Interests 1900-1914 SLOVAKS IN THE U.S.A. By James J. Zatk o, Ph. D ., University of Notre D ame By 1900 growing Slovak nationalism had begun to grip the Slovak immigrants, and during the next decade and a half the Slovaks agitated for distinotly Slovak institutions, for Slovak education, and for Slovak liberation overseas from Hungarian control. What seemed the most important need of the Slovak immigrants to many thinking minds was Slovak education. Some Catholics found the cause of religious decline in the non-confessional Slovak schools that others advocated and established. Public schools seemed equally pernicious to their mind as being Protestant schools. Too much Americanization injured faith and morals. To them the great answer was Slovak Catholic schools; but these were practically non-existent. Some pastors just were not interested in schools, Slovak or Catholic. The debts resulting from building churches weighted down the parishes and blocked any ambitious program of school construction. Often Slovaks were too scattered throughout a region to support their own church and school.1 However, the crucial obstacle was a lack of Slovak teachers. Even if schools were built, they might be Catholic schools, but they would not be Slovak schools, for there were not enough Slovak teachers. As early as 1900 Rev. M. Jankola, a Catholic priest, suggested a solution, Slovak nuns to teach in Slovak schools, but this suggestion took almost ten years to mature. 2 Nevertheless, schools were not entirely neglected during these first years of the twentieth century. In 1900 the Rev. Bartholomew Kvitek, a Catholic priest, organized the Slovak school of St. Michael's parish in Chicago; and in 1902 the first Vincentian Sisters of Charity arrived from Slovakia to serve in St. Michael's parish in Braddock, Pa., where they took charge of the parochial school's 65 students. 3 Plans for non-confessional schools never came to very much, because the Slovaks were opposed to education without religion. 4 In 1900 the Slovaks won a local victory over the Hungarians when their protests blocked the erection of Louis Kossuth's statue in the public square of Cleveland. When Count 42 SLOVAKIA Albert Apponyi and forty delegates arrived in America during the World's Fair at St. Louis in 1904, the Slovaks presented a Memorandum recounting their objections against the electoral system in Hungary and Magyarization. Although the Count refused even to discuss Slovak grievances, ,the Memorandum at least informed public opinion about undemocratic election procedures and anti-Slovak schools. 5 However, all anti-Magyar agitation was focussed by the creation in 1907 of the Slovak League of America on May 26, in Cleveland, Ohio, by seven thousand delegates. The League became an alliance of Slovak educational, fraternal, and religious groups in this country. The purposes of the League were to educate Slovaks everywhere, to uplift them here in America and elsewhere morally, economically, socially and politically. 6 It became the leader in the drive to alleviate political conditions in Slovakia, but its efforts might have been still-born had not the Massacre of Cernova on the 27th of October, 1907 aroused not only Slovaks but world opinion. To understand this ev,e nt some facts need to be reviewed. The Rev. Andrew Hlinka, a Catholic priest both pious and devoted to the political and social welfare of the Slovaks, in 1897 became editor of The People's News and fought the Magyarization program of the gov,e rnment; his speeches and writings helped elect seven Slovaks to the Hungarian Parliament in 1906. He and fifteen other Slovaks were arrested and tried for "agitation against Hungarian nationality". Hlinka was fined 1500 crowns and costs of 680 crowns and sentenced to two years in prison. In a farewell message to his parishioners he declared thart he would gladly suffer imprisonment to secure recognition of the Slovak nation. For this he received another eighteen months and a fine of 400 crowns. 7 Prior to this the Rev. A. Hlinka had been appointed pastor in his native city, Ruzomberok; in the quarter known as Cernova he had begun building a new church for which he collected funds from all over Slovakia. He had in the meantime been suspended by Bishop Parvy, an ardent pro-Magyar. When the church in Cernova was to be dedicated, the parishioners refused to permit the blessing, unless their pastor returned to them. On October 27, 1907 gendarmes marched into Cernova to help keep order, and they lined the streets leading to the church. That morning coaches arrived bringing the Rev. Pazurik from Llkavka and other visitors to conduct the dedi- SLOVAKIA 43 cation. When the people blockaded the road, the coachman began to lay about his whip in order to drive his horses through the crowd ; some men seized the horses' bridles to turn them around. An order was given to the gendarmes to open fire. Instantly nine people fell dead, men, women, and children, and six more died of their wounds later. 8 The National Slovak Society immediately took in hand the problem of aid for the widows and orphans that resulted from the Cernova Massacre and voted $2,000 for r•elief.9 While political nationalism received immense stimulus from the Massacre, nationalism began to play a greater role in the sphere of religion after 1900. Under the influence of their nationalism, the Slovaks began to feel their unity as a group and their need of exclusivness as a nation. This led to organization on a unique national basis in religion and to demands for r•ecognizing the "rights of Slovaks" in religious matters, like organization of synods for the Lutherans, Catholic action groups for the Slovak Catholics, and teaching of Slovak in the schools. The Slovak Lutherans formed the Slovak Evangelical Lutheran Synod of the United States of America with headquarters in Whiting, Indiana. This Synod was founded in the church of St. Peter, September 2, 1902, at Connellsville, Pa. A beginning had been made in Mahanoy City, Pa., but more definite steps were taken at conferences in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., and Braddock, Pa.; in the actual founding all the Slovak ministers and congregations cooperated. The Synod used the Slovak language in services and sermons, except where unusual circumstances required the use of English. Even the children wer,e taught their religion in Slovak. The Synod obtained its funds from prescribed contributions of the various parishes belonging to it. In Cleveland it owned a considerable prope1;ty intended for a Lutheran orphanage. The of.ficial organ was the Svedo k, which began in 1906 and was published twice a month.10 The troubled relations of Catholicism with Slovak nationalism continued to split various groups. A National Slovak Sokol had been established to include all Sokol activities in the United States; but discrimination against Catholics led to the creation of the Slovak Catholic Sokol in 1905; the headquarters of this group were in Passaic, N. J. The Slovak Catholic Sokol began publishing its own paper, the Katolicky 44 SLOVAKIA Sokol, and launched an extensive program to attract Slovak youth in gymnastics, athletics, and social activities. 11 The most violent conflict among Slovaks of the first decade of the twentieth century involved Slovak nationalism, but it was a conflict within the Catholic group between Catholic Nationalists and the Madarones. The founder of the First Catholic Slovak Union, the Rev. Stephen Furdek, called for an annual Slovak day that was to renew the Catholic spirit and attachment to Slovak nationality. The first Slovak day was to be called the Catholic Congress. This evoked bitter opposition in letters and even a telegram to Bishop Michael J . Hoban of Scranton from the Rev. Kossalko who denounced the whole project as "pan-slavistic" and as an attempt to set up a national church. When Bishop Hoban sanctioned the Slovak Day or Catholic Congress in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., by addressing it on September 3, 1906, Kossalko's rage knew no bounds. He addressed a Memorandum, signed by a large number of Madarone Slovak clergy, to the Apostolic Delegate and the archbishops of the United States. He demanded a condemnation of the affair. The Memorandum expressed fear for the unity of the church and the salvation of 500,000 souls, and accused the Slovak Catholics of working for "panslavism", which was inimical to Hungary, Germany, and the United States. However, Bishop Hoban's influence shielded the Catholic Slovak clergy and no action was taken.12 This event discredited the Madarones. Within the framework of the Catholic Church in the United States Slovak Catholics became involved in a struggle to preserve what they considered their national rights. There were arguments with non-Slovak pastors over hiring organists who would be able to teach Slovak to the children. 13 At other times Slovak Catholic efforts to obtain Slovak priests who could minister to them in their own language conflicted with bishops who did not always agree on Slovak "rights" .14 One bitter quarrel led to a schism in the Slovak settlement of Masontown, Pa. In Leckrone, Pa., a settlement of Irish and Slovaks, the Church of Our Lady of Perpetual help was blessed by Bishop Richard Phelan of Pittsburgh on October 9, 1904. In 1907 the church burned down, but a hall was built in which religious services were held. The Slovaks by this time had a Slovak pastor, but they still wanted a parish all their own. Bishop SLOVAKIA 45 Francis R. Canevin of Pittsburgh requested the Rev. Charles Janda to look for a suitable location ; Rev. C. Janda sugg,ested Masontown. Since the Irish Catholics also wanted to have a parish in Masontown, the Slovaks were told to take the church in Leckrone for their use; but the Slovaks in Masontown were not satisfied. They went ahead and built their own church, and when the bishop would not cooperate with them, they cast about for a priest who might be willing to serve their church. Eventually they found an "independent" priest and so fell into schism.15 In sptte of such trouble, the Slovak Catholic body remained generally healthy. On February 22, 1911 a Slovak Catholic Priest and inventor, the Rev. Joseph Murgas, led in forming The Slovak Catholic Federation in America in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Und,e r the control of Slovak Catholic priests this group was to spread and coordinate Catholic action among Slovaks in America; until this year Slovak Catholic activities had been unorganized and subordinated to political and social ends.16 Exact religious statistics for ·t he Slovak immigrant group for that time are not available, but the best estimate suggests that of the 560,000 Slovak immigrants in America in 1911, 450,000 were Roman Catholics. The Slovak Catholics had 134 parishes in the United States. Protestants among the Slovaks numbered 95,000 .17 Of this Protestant group, Calvinists are estimated to run about 15,000. 18 After 1905 the development of Slovak Catholic elementary schools gained momentum. A system both Slovak and Catholic had been impossible without Slovak Catholic teachers. The Rev. M. Jankola, a Catholic priest, organized the Priests' Society of St. Anthony's Burse in the United States of America in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. , in 1903 and it was chartered in 1905. In the Kalendar Jednota of 1908 Rev. M. Jankola proposed the Burse of St. Anthony for Catholics generally to support students preparing to be teachers and Slovak girls preparing to be teaching nuns. 19 Although the Slovak Catholics supported this program generously with frequent collections and donations 20 , the fund proved insufficient for the purpose. Three Slovak girls who had been sent to the novitiate of the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary in 1906 were the nucleus of a Slovak sisterhood. In 1909 interested Slovak priests petitioned for the foundation of a distinctly 46 SLOVAKIA Slovak sisterhood, the Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius. On June 26, 1909 the Congregation for Religious approved this project, and the motherhouse of the new Slovak congregation was established in Danville, Pa.21 In the year 1911 the Most Reverend Joseph Koudelka, the bishop of Superior sent a request to the general motherhouse of the Congregation of School Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis in Prague. He asked the sisters to come to his diocese to work. Mother General M. Xavier sent Sister M. Georgia and Sister M. Hyacinth to look over the possibilities. These sisters stopped in Pittsburgh, where the Rev. J. Vrana persuaded them that the Pittsburgh diocese offered them greater opportunities and had greater need. When Sister M. Hyacinth took sick and died on March 10, 1912, the Mother General herself came to Pittsburgh. Rev. Ferdinand Prikazky, who at the moment was struggling to get nuns to teach in his St. Gabriel's parochial school, convinc,e d the sisters to settle in Pittsburgh. This was the beginning. By 1914 twenty three sisters of this congregation were teaching 579 children in three Slovak Catholic parishes.22 Progress had been made in solving the problem of elementary school education; schools were built in the parishes almost as quickly as teachers could be provided. The question of secondary school education also began to agitate Slovak circles. Very early, the Rev. Stephen Furdek suggested the idea of a Slovak high school for boys; he was seconded in this by the Rev. M. Jankola. However, nothing came of the idea until 1921 when it revived and resulted in the Benedictine High School in Cleveland in 1927.23 The Sisters of SS. Cyril and Methodius opened a high school for girls at Danville in 1922, and the Sisters of St. Francis opened one at Bellevue, Pa., in 1927. 24 There was continuous agitation for a college. A Slovak business college was suggested to improve the Slovak economic position.25 P. J . Kunovsky worked out a whole scheme for a Slovak school on a higher level. He argued that $100,000 would put up a building, and then he suggested that each fraternal organization ought to support a professor. This school was to include business and technical courses. As to religious affiliation, the school would be non-confessional, but the Oatholics could have a lecturer on the Catholic Faith and the Lutherans could support one to lecture on the Lutheran faith. This in- SLOVAKIA 47 stitution was to be coeducational. Nothing came of this project.2s Very few Slovak children of the first immigrants had a chance to go to college, but those who did go generally took advantag,e of existing colleges. In 1901 the Czech Benedictines had established St. Procopius College at Lisle, Ill., and by 1907 there were ten Slovak youths studying there. They organized the "Literary Society of Stephen Moyses" and issued a monthly multigraphed little paper, Horlivost'. The club and the paper lasted for four years. The Slovaks also owed a special debt to the College and Seminary of St. Vincent's Archabbey in Latrobe, Pa., for in this college and seminary almost all the Catholic Slovak priests and many Slovak young men were trained. 27 During the years between 1902 and 1936 545 Slovak students attended St. Vincent's. 28 Informal education made most progress among the Slovaks. Clubs, multiplied, political, social, cultural, and literary. The political club seems to have been the most popular. It had a variety of purposes: to fighrt political apathy among the Slovaks, to help the Slovaks gain their political rights, and to help Slovaks become American citizens. In one year a club in Rankin, Pa., succeeded in getting thirteen Slovaks to obtain their citizenship papers. 29 Literary clubs also became popular among the Slovaks as a mean of self- improvement. 30 Both the newspapers and the almanacs were also instrumental in educating the Slovak immigrants. The Jednota discussed Darwinism, the "higher criticism" and socialism. 31 The almanacs explained the procedure of becoming citizens, American electoral system, stocks and bonds, and even discussed the origin of the world. 32 One of the complaints about the Slovaks made by their own leaders is their lack of interest in books and good reading. To make the Slovaks book-lovers, Slovak political and literary clubs founded Slovak libraries. 33 The national fraternal organizations sometimes contributed money to help in the acquisition of a building, or, if the Slovaks already possessed a lodge hall, to aid in the purchase of books. 34 That a demand actually developed for Slovak books is suggested by the special sections for Slovak readers in public libraries, as for instance, the Oarnegie Library in Homestead, Pa., 35 and the public library in Cleveland. 36 The most ambitious project launched to interest the Slo- 48 SLOVAKIA vaks in reading was a book club. P. J. Kunovsky suggested in 1912 the formation of a book club to consist of 5,000 Slovaks. This number would enable the club to sell four books for a dollar. 37 By July 11, 1912 a literary committee to choose books had been elected. 38 Even this cultural project could not move along without factions; for there were some objections to the composition of the literary committee. Only "one side" was represented. 39 There were complaints by Kunovsky that progress was slow; in fact, after six months of vigorous propaganda, there were not even 1,000 members, and the club needed 5,000 members in one year. 40 By November, 1914, the "Four Books for a Dollar" was still going and growing somewhat, 41 but the Slovaks were apparently still not too interested in books. One book promotion was quite successful. The Rev. J. Murgas led a drive to get 3,000 subscribers for a Cathechetical Encyclopedia, written by Rev. Vaclav Melchior, C. Ss. R. 42 Enough subscribers undertook to buy the book. It was a project more adapted to Slovak ideas; it seemed worthwhile to invest in a book on religion. The taste of Slovaks in reading was quite varied. We cannot judge from actual reports of reading, but the types of books published for them may serve as an indication of their reading tast,e. There were romances dealing with the Janosik cycle, a Slovak Robin Hood; others dealt with the adventures of a likeable thief, Rinaldo Rinaldini; sensational stories included Dracula, Harry Tracy, Most Desperate Criminal of Our Time , and World Detective Romances and Novel series.43 Other books published dealt with Slovak history and Magyar oppression. 44 One anti-clerical work was Z dejin Cirkvi by A. M. Spera, an anti-Catholic church history: 45 there was even a socialist work, Socialisti idu. 46 Publications included readers and catechisms, 47 dictionaries and grammars, 48 and devotional works. 49 The translations printed in the Narodne Noviny from American literature included Edgar A. Poe's The Black Cat 50 and Washington Irving's The Legend of Sleepy Hollow.51 Whatever reading may have been done by the Slovaks besides the almanacs and newspapers, these books are a suggestion of its type. Another form of informal education proposed was a Slovak Chautauqua. The Rev. W. Regnemer, a Calvinist minister, suggested that a fraternal organization hire a pleasure SLOVAKIA 49 park during the summer for one day, prepare a cultural and entertaining program and charge an admission of twenty fiv,e or fifty cents. 52 This idea was still-born. Theatrical productions were very common among the Slovaks, 53 but the drama was not on a very high level. Most popular were plays in Slovak portraying Slovakia and Slovak life. There was no attempt to translate the English classics of the stage into Slovak. 54 Both the Narodne Noviny and the Jednota encouraged the staging of plays by publishing a large number of them in their columns, 55 for plays portraying Slovak life served to arouse national consciousness, besides being good entertainment. 56 One complaint about the theatrical entertainment was the bad conduct of the audience, which frequently shouted to their friends on the stage, whistled, stamped their feet. Mothers brought very young children or babies who disturbed the performance with their crying. 57 The Slovaks organized bands and choirs ;58 popular music was also encouraged by the publication of songs in the almanacs. Some of the choirs advanced so rapidly that they were able to stage small operettas. 59 One obstacle to further Slovak progress was intemperance. The drink problem, its source in poverty, was an old one for the Slovaks. All sources agree that drink, especially whisk,ey, was the curse of Slovakia and helped impoverish the country. 60 During the 1840',s Rev. Stephan Zavodnik, a Catholic priest, influenced by Father Matthew, inaugurated the struggle against intemperance in Slovakia. Father Matthew's influence had trav,elled through Germany, Bohemia, Poland, and finally reached Slovakia. 61 Temperance societies were first organized in Orava in 1845 and in half a year had 20,000 members. The city councils assisted the societies; the ecclesiastical authorities put their prestige behind the movement. In 1847 the bishop of Banska Bystrica asked his clergy to publicize these societies during Lent ; the bishop of Roznava issued a pastoral letter on the subject in 1846. The Lutherans too supported the movement. 62 The nationalistic agitation and revolution in 1848 disrupted the growth of these societies, but by 1870 the fight against drink revived. 63 When the Slovaks came to America, they brought their weakness for drink with them. Still there were Slovaks who understood the pernicious effect of over-indulgence in strong 50 SLOVAKIA drink. Saloon keepers were attacked for disrupting family life. Slovak saloon keepers were urged to remove the national disgrace by going into another line of business. 64 The agitation against the use and abuse of alcohol filled many a column in the N arodne N oviny and J ednota. Alcohol was the cause of disease, for example, tuberculosis, of many economic and social losses ; whiskey was the root of all social evils.65 The most eff.ective agitation against intemperance was the total abstinence society. The best reason for creating such societies was their need. There were such sodeties already in existence in 1911 for example, in Hazleton, Pa., McAdoo, Pa. , St. Clair, Pa., and Mahanoy City, Pa.66 When the temperance club was organized in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., forty five prospective members attended the meeting; but only eight were willing to take the pledge and join the society. Eventually twenty women and girls joined; since then five or six members were added at each meeting, and the number finally grew to forty five! 67 Hand in hand with the progress in religious organization, in education, and political action, went the bettering of the Slovak economic conditions. As with the other activities, economic life among the Slovaks began to be colored by nationalism. The Slovaks set up Slovak grocery stores and Slovak banks. Surprisingly enough, a farm movement among the Slovaks developed from many causes. The success of the Slovaktown venture was continually reported in the newspapers: news of hay selling for $7 a ton, in November, 1912, seven weddings, good markets, freedom from the bleak life of a miners' town and from strikes. 68 To some life on the farm meant a life less dangerous to the faith and a healthier family life;69 to others it meant protection against too quick an assimilation to American ways, especially American morals.70 In 1910 the National Slovak Society embarked on a considerable farm colonization venture. The Society's national convention had voted in 1909 that not less than 1,000 acres of farm land should be bought for an orphanage. A committee investigated real estate in Prince George, Calvert, and St. Mary's counties in Maryland; enough land was to be bought to build an orphanage and to form a Slovak settlement to help in the upkeep of the orphanage. After considerable debate on whether the primary purpose was a settlement SLOVAKIA 51 or an orphanage, 2,813 acres of land were purchased for F 0,000 in St. Mary's county, near St. Mary's, Maryland. One thousand one hundred acres were arable and the rest was woodland ; there was a three mile frontage on St. Mary's River. 71 Eight hundred acres were to be set aside for the orphanage and old folks ' home, and two thousand acres were to be put up for sale.72 The land was divided into thirty nine farms, ranging in size from 33 acres to 132, and classified in value thus: class A farms at $40-$50 an acre, class B farms at $25-$40 an acre, and Class C at $10-$25 an acre. The price of the farms varied from $600 to $3,100.73 The land sales went so well that the National Slovak Society decided to reserve only 500 acres for the orphanage and to sell 2,300 acres for farms.74 Such was the venture's success that by June, 1912, the Slovak Farmers Association was chartered in Maryland with a capitalization of $25,000. First class stock was to get 5% dividend; and as soon as the second class stock reached 5%, the rate of the first class was to jump to 7%. The organization's purpose was to settle Slovaks on good farms, especially in Maryland. The association also had a hotel where Slovaks might disport themselves in the summer for longer or shorter periods of time. 75 Behind the scenes, however, some financial skulduggery was afoot and the exposure of "commission-masters" definitely dampened enthusiasm for the project. A. S. Ambrose, the president of the National Slovak Society, had taken a ten percent commission on $48,735 worth of land sales and netted himself a tidy $4,875.30. Of the sales themselves $16,156.70 in cash had been placed into the Society's treasury, while $28,580 had been mortgaged to the Society. 76 On this transaction the Society was estimated to have lost nearly $20,000 through various "commissions." 77 At least on paper in 1911 the Slovak American Colonization Company was organized with an intended Capitalization of $50,000 at $50 a share. It planned the erection of houses, business structures, saw-mills, and other needed buildings. It remained a paper organization. 78 In spite of the publicity giv,en these projects, the influx of Slovaks onto the land came from individual initiative for most part. Small colonies of Slovak farmers grew up around Denmark, Maine, 79 Phillips, Wisconsin, 80 Tabor, Minnesota,81 Louisiana and Mississippi,82 Callahan and Pine Land, Flo- 52 SLOVAKIA rida,83 Michigan,84 and North Emporia and Antioch, Virginia.a5 If the Slovak farmer struck upon land already cleared, he did not have too difficult a time making a success of farming; but if he bought land that had yet to be cleared, like the second growth timberlands in Wisconsin, the first few years on the "blessed" land were murderous in their demands of labor and capital. For instance, two brothers and their families, having read accounts of successful farming in Wisconsin, used their savings to buy a farm in northern Wisconsin. The land had to be cleared, and ,even the women were put to work carrying away the heavy wood. Besides, the brothers had to build a log house big enough to shelter the two families. During the winter months, the men worked as lumberjacks, and in order to have enough capital to begin farming in spring had to borrow at six percent. After plowing and buying seed, the two new farmers were without money. One of them went to work in a glass mill in Illinois, while the other continued the back-breaking work clearing the land and farming. To add to their troubles, the nearby creek dried up in the summer, and the water could be brought in only from a distant spring. A horse had to be bought ! The beginning of farming was bitter for the Slovaks in northern Wisconsin.86 Although the Slovak farmers did organize locally, they did not form any national Slovak farmer societies. In Moquah, Wis. , for instance, a special farmers' society was established in 1911. The two national fraternal organizations served their social purposes sufficiently. One farmer from Tabor, Minn., did suggest that the Slovak farmers in the west needed a "clearing house" in a city like Pittsburgh, where they could sell their products, especially, grain, directly to the consumer. This would save the farmer some of his profits and the workingman some of his hard earned money. This remained only a suggestion. 87 Generally the new farmers were quite successful. The land was good, profits were high, and there were no strikes. 88 In Slovaktown hay was sold for $7 a ton in 1913; a Slovak farmer in Virginia made $1 ,100 on peanuts and $220 on cotton on a 220 acre farm . Still there were failures . A considerable number of advertisements announcing the farm sales appeared in the Jednota and the Narodne Noviny. 89 Some- SLOVAKIA 53 times the reason was the mortgag,e ;90 at other times the family found the life too difficult and drab.9 1 While some Slovaks managed to escape to the farm from the hard life of mine and mill, most Slovaks remained city-dwellers. One of the problems of the city-dweller was the high cost of living as compared with wages. 92 The high prices led to a large number of cooperative ventures on a nationality basis. Most frequently this was a meat and grocery store. The enterprise resembled a corporation more than a cooperative. A share might cost $10 and a board of directors headed and managed the enterprise. Sometimes a limit was placed on the number of shares an individual might hold, lest any one person should capture control of the corporation.93 In Yukon, Pa., for instance, 200 families established a share-holding grocery store which was successful despite the opposition of some Slovaks. The corporation charter provided that any man could belong, but no one was allowed to invest more than $1 ,000! In 9 months a dividend of $4.85 was paid for each share. The cooperative enterprise could save a working man about fifteen cents a day on his food bill. In spite of considerable propaganda in the papers heralding these ventures, the Slovaks did not support these "Slovak stores" universally. The proprietors complained that Slovaks continued to patronize non-Slovak businesses. 9 4 There were many suggestions for Slovak enterprise: the organization of all Slovak businessmen in America, a law firm to take care of Slovak interests, a hospital for Slovak immigrants, a shoe factory to be built by the National Slovak Society or the Slovak League. 95 Of all the ephemeral proposals made, one did become actual. A Slovak bank to handle Slovak business was considered a necessity; but the idea was only gingerly approached after the failure of Peter V. Rovnianek's Bank in Pittsburgh, in 1907. Michael Bosak founded the State Slovak Bank in Wilkes-Barre, Pa.; the bank opened for business on December 2, 1912, and in its first five months showed a profit of $7,250. 96 Progress was also the keynote of the First Catholic Slovak Union. In 1910 the Union established its own printery in Middletown, Pa. This was a two story red brick building, one hundred twenty feet long and forty feet wide. The equipment included Duplex printing press and a linotype machine. The blessing of the printery took place on October 27, 1910.97 54 SLOVAKIA In 1914 the Union also opened an orphanage, which the Sisters of Ss. Cyril and Methodius took under their supervision. The building itself cost $97,000, and the total cost was about $110,000. The chapel had an altar of Vermont marble worth $1,200 and a seating capacity of 150. 98 This orphanage was located in Middletown, Pa. The Slovak Catholics wer,e justly very proud of this achievement, especially when they remembered how poor they had been when they landed in the United States. The National Slovak Society showed its energy by creating an official newspaper for its own use, the Narodne Noviny, in 1910; this paper replaced the Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny which had spoken for the National Slovak Society but had never been adopted as the official organ of the Society. This new newspaper became definitely anti-clerical and sometimes anti-Catholic. In 1910 an editorial defended the modernists and attacked the Catholic Church as being an Italian and Roman Church, and not truly Catholic. 99 Any clerical scandal was written up with glee, and cartoons were not only anti-clerical but in very bad taste. These attacks and insults became so violent that the Bishop of Altoona, Eugene A. Garvey, banned the newspaper from his diocese on the grounds that it was written and published by "Jews, unbelievers, and heretics," spreading anarchism, unbelief, and socialism.100 The National Slovak Society did more constructive work when it organized the Youth Circles of the National Slovak Society in 1913. The chief purpose of these circles was educational. The elder and chief gymnast had to be total abstainers and men of sound general educa:tion. 101 The official language was Slovak. Dues were to be twenty cents a month for each child; of this amount fifteen cents were to be forwarded to the treasurer of the National Slovak Society. All meetings were to begin with Slovak and American patriotic songs; the American songs were to be translated into Slovak.102 Besides one official meeting a month to transact business, there were frequent meetings for lectures, study, and general education. 103 These circles presented programs which featured recitation of poems in Slovak, Slovak songs sung as solos and in chorus, instrumental solos, lectures by visitors. 104 The circles were beneficial to young Slovaks, and their growth SLOVAKIA 55 was very rapid. By September, 1914, sixty nine circles had been established. 105 In spite of all the discussion of an orphanage, the National Slovak Society finally abandoned the plan. The matter was dropped because of the religious problem. The Society consisted of members belonging to various religious sects and claimed that it could not without showing favoritism provide for religious instruction. An orphanage without religious instruction and education was unacceptable to the Slovaks. 106 The fraternal organizations during this time suffered somewhat from embezzlement and swindling. Joseph Joscak, an editor of the Narodne Noviny , had taken a $19,000 "commission" from the National Slovak Society but was caught up with in 1913. 107 During the same years a William Vokolek swindled the Slovak fraternal organizations to the extent of $300,000. 108 Of course, A. S. Amrose's "commission" on the St. Mary's settlement must also be recalled here. Another common feature of fraternal life in this period was the construction of lodge halls, which were built almost in every settlement. These lodge halls became the centers of social life; they provided places for lodge meetings, theatrical productions, dances, gymnastic exercises, and quarters for the political and literary clubs. 109 One of the storms that troubled the fraternal organizations was the debate on the "old system" as against the "new system." Almost any issue of the Jednota after 1906 and the Narodne Noviny after 1910 contained letters with arguments on both sides of the question. 110 While operating under the older method of assessment, the organizations failed to build up a reserve for times of special demand; they were merely collecting agencies. For instance, if the organization needed $3,000 and had 12,000 members, each member was obliged to pay twenty five cents, which were collected to meet the cost. The new system involved paying dues r,e gularly, determined according to age. As early as 1906 the Rev. S. Furdek, the Rev. M. Jankola, and A. S. Ambrose pointed out the advantages of the new system, but there was much opposition. By 1914 both the First Catholic Slovak Union and the National Slovak Society had adopted the modern method. m Although progress was considerable among the Slovak immigrants in education, business enterprise, and farming , in many ways the lot of the workingman remained a hard 56 SLOVAKIA one. For instance, mine disasters continued to take lives. At Fernie, Pa. , in June, 1902, 200 miners perished, 50 of them Slovaks. Forty two Slovak miners were killed at Cambria, Pa. , during July, 1902. 112 Strikes still plagued the coal fields in which Slovaks were working. In Westmoreland county a strike began at Greensburg, Pa., on March 10, 1910 over union recognition and as a protest against the company store system. It spread to the neighboring mining centers of K,eystone, Irwin, Latrobe, and Westmoreland. Then in the confusion a mine guard shot an eighteen year old youth, and 15,000 miners went on strike. Eleven thousand wer•e said to be Slovaks. They joined the union to show their defiance and to emphasize their demands. As a counter-measure, the company called in the Pinkerton detectives, and the striking miners were blacklisted.113 During the strike the miners had very little to subsist upon, and that little came from the United Mine Workers of America. The union provided $2.50 a week for each man, $1.00 a week for each woman dependent, and $0 .50 a week for each child. 114 The president of the National Slovak Society, Mr. A. S. Ambrose, visited the strike-bound coal-fields. In his newspaper articles he estimated that about 20,000 men were on strike ; about 95 % were Slavs, and of this latter group about 60 % were Slovaks. The striking miners lived in shacks that could not protect them against the bitter cold, the children went about bare-foot and hungry. 115 Since 500 strikers were members of the National Slovak Society, the Society published appeals for help and even began a collection for relief of the strikers in Westmoreland county.116 Gradually the strike was broken and nothing substantial was won. Another strike in which many Slovaks were involved began in 1913, led by the Industrial Workers of the World. It started in the broad-loom silk mills of Patterson, N. J. , on February 25, 1913. Over twenty five thousand workers were affected. There were two factors that prolonged the bitter strife. One was the introduction of the three and four loom system; this involved the question of whether Patterson should invade the cheap silk field in opposition to the Pennsylvania mills. Fear of lower wages and loss of work followed as a consequence. The second factor was resentment of I.W.W. tactics. The Jednota condemned the I. W. W.'s socialist tendencies and opposition to the American Federation of Labor. 117 SLOVAKIA 57 Still these defects of the union did not blind the First Catholic Slovak Union to the needs of the strikers, many of whom were Slovaks. 118 For five months the leadership of the I. W. W. kept the strikers' ranks intact, but lack of funds and loss of morale at last broke the strike. After twenty one weeks of bitter struggle the strike was settled without any gains for the workers. The J ednota laid the blame on the socialists. 119 Both newspapers were strong supporters of unions. They considered it the duty of every Slovak to belong to the unions, especially the American Federation of Labor. After all, it was the unions that improved the worker's lot and gave labor a position of influence in the world. 120 The strike-breaker and the "scab" were excluded from Slovak organizations. 121 In their attitude toward socialism the two newspapers differed. The Narodne Noviny showed itself definitely hospitable to socialist ideas. Articles were featured insisting that there could be no friendly contacts between capitalists and workers; workers were urged to abandon the Democratic and Republican parties and to join the party of the working class! 122 The Jednota unreservedly repudiated socialism. It condemned socialist anti-religious tactics and ridicule of Catholics. 123 Socialism was anti-Christian in its very essence, and had been consistently opposed to religion. The only agency that did in fact transform slave labor into free human labor was the Catholic Church. 124 As the first decade of the twentieth century ended and another began, the dawn of new interests appeared on the horizon. In 1911 Count Albert Apponyi, who has been mentioned before, returned to the United States on behalf of Hungary which he described as "an island of freedom" in central Europe. Slovak publicity about Hungarian mistreatment of Slovaks caused the mission of Count Apponyi to fail.1 25 Hard upon the heels of this came the Balkan wars. Slovak efforts at war relief were conditioned by nationalism. Within the months from November 21, 1912 to June 19, 1913, the Narodne Noviny collected $1,547.95 for the Slavonic Red Cross; and it was made clear that this collection was only for the Slavs. 126 By January 22, 1913 the Jednota had collected $2,350.00 for the same cause. 127 With regard to the "Slovak question," which was on the verge of becoming the paramouth one for the Slovaks, opinion among the American Slovaks had undergone quite a change. 58 SLOVAKIA Almost up to 1914 Slovaks sought concessions from Hungary for Slovakia; but these concessions of political and cultural rights wer-e understood within the existing framework of government. However, in April, 1914, when Count Michael Karolyi came to the United States to win Slovak favor for a Slovak and Hungarian union in a completely independent Hungary, the Slovaks questioned the sincerity of the Count and the government. In New York, on May 24, 1914, a debate took place on the question: "Can the Slovaks trust the Hungarian government in its movement for general suffrage in Hungary and with complete Hungarian independence?" The debate solved no real problem, but stated clearly the issues: what was to be the Slovaks' future relation to Hungary? The Slovak League arranged several protest meetings, and on April 28, 1914 issued a Memorandum, which was practically a declaration of independence and demanded autonomy for Slovakia. The League did not explain the kind of autonomy Slovakia should have, whether within Austro-Hungary or with Hungary as an independent state or complete independence for Slovakia for the Slovaks in America themselves disagreed on what they wanted. In order to clarify their position, a Congress of the Slovak League was held in Pittsburgh, September 10, 1914. After everybody had aired their views, it appeared that in 1914, as late as September of that year, the American Slovaks had not generally accepted political plans for Slovakia. 128 They were divided into three camps: one demanded complete independence for Slovakia, another wanted autonomy within Hungary, and a third desired the creation of a new state in which Czechs and Slovaks would be united. 129 With the coming of the World War, Slovak attention was diverted from the creation of Slovak institutions here in America to the creation of Slovakia. The World War found the Slovaks anti-German and anti-Habsburg. 130 The Jednota printed German atrocity stories and even went so far as to charge that German Protestantism was serving German mili'tarism.131 The Slovak League managed to chanel the desire for a better Slovakia and the anti-Habsburg feeling into an extensive Slovak nationalist movement. Through the Slovak League over a million dollars was poured into the cause of Slovak freedom. 132 By 1914 the Slovak immigrants had made themselves SLOVAKIA 59 economically secure as far as a group of working people could in the American economy. Socially they had made progress in organizing national fraternal organizations, establishing Slovak schools, creating Slovak parishes. Their nationalism, manifested in efforts to form distinct Slovak institutions and their interest in European Slovakia, prevented their complete integration with American life; but the Slovak institutions seemed foredoomed to failure. The explanation for much of this lies outside the special character of the Slovaks. After 1890, the close of the frontier, the new industrial city became the characteristic of American life ; it became the center of production, the leader in social and cultural lif.e, and great center of communication. By the very fact that Slovaks were immersed in industrial and eventually city rather than farm life, they were exposed to the influence of this most Americanizing force. The problems of new city life, the economic opportunities offered them in industry, and economic competition made the attempt to establish particularly Slovak institutions a struggle against the current. The attempted settlement on ,t he farms was also against the trends of the times which led toward the city. The crucial factor in American Slovak social history seems to be their engaging in industry and their settlement in industrial centers. Slovak nationalism attempted to modify the influence of this industrial city, and in so far as it did, it hindered progress among the Slovak immigrants in America. FOOTNOTES 1. Francis Sasinek, "Myslienky o stave nabozenstva medzi Slovakmi," Kalendar Jednota (1897 ) , II, 139. 2. M. Jankola, " Nase Skoly," Kalendar Jedno ta ( 1900), V, 135-136. 3. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," pp. 69-70. 4. Culen, Slovaci v Ameri ke, p. 394; Jednota, June 18, 1913, September 3, 1913. 5. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p. 187; Hrusovsky, This i s Slovakia, p. 50. 6. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," pp. 82-83 ; Yurchak, .The ,Slovaks, p . 190. 7. Yurchak, The Slovaks, pp. 229-230. 8. Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka 1864-1938 (Bratislava, 1934), pp. 186191 ; Bokes, Dejiny Slovenska, pp. 313-315; Yurchak, The Slovaks, pp. 230-232. 9. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," p. 81. 10. John S. Bradac, "Slovenski Evanjelici-Lutherani v Spojenych Statoch Arnerickych," World's Fair Memorial, pp. 81-82. 11. "The Slovak Sokol," Sborni k Slovenskeho Katoli ckeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXVIII, 242-243 . 12. Culen, Dejiny, II, 80-81, 93-94. 60 SLOVAKIA 13. J ednota, February 5, 1913. The pastor told the organist " the Slovak language was nothing." The organist quit. 14. Jednota, July 8, 1914. After the Slovaks had brought a priest from Slovakia and paid his way, the bishop refused to let him be their pastor. 15. Narodne Noviny, September 15, 1910; Kushner, Slovaci, p . 32. 16. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," p. 94-95. 17. Andrew J. Shipman, " Slavs in America," Th e Catholic Encyclop edia ( 1912), XIV, p. 55. 18. Culen, Dejiny, I. 114-115. 19. M. Jankola, " Pokladnica sv. Antona v Amerike," Kalendar Jedn ota (1908), XIII, 177-178. 20. Jednota, February 12, 1913. 21. Culen Slovaci v A merike, p . 418; " Slovenska zenska rehol'a ssv. Cyrilla i Me thoda v Amerike ," Ka lendar J ednot a ( 1911 ), XVI, 97-98 ; M. Jankola , " Prvotiny pr vej slovenskej zenskej rehole" , Ka lendar Jednot a (1909), XIV, 17-176; "Dcery ssv. Cyrilla i Methoda", Kalendar J ednota (1914 ), XIX, 194-195. 22. Kushner, Slovaci, pp. 150-152. 23. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, pp. 408-409. 24. Ibi d., 418,424. 25. Narodne Noviny, August 15, 1913, August 29,1913. 26. Narodne Noviny, October 3, 1912. 27. Kushner, Slovaci, pp. 156-157. 28. Culen, Slovaci v A merike, p. 401. 29. Narodne Noviny, June 9, 1910, April 27, 1911 ; September 5, 1912; August 29, 1912; Jednota, July 2, 1913. 30. Narodne Noviny, June 23, 1910, February 15, 1913 ; Jednota, April 1, 1914. 31. J ednota, March 4, 1913, March 12, 1913. 32. Stephan Furdek, "Dlfobny upis a ucastina," Kalendar Jednota (1909 ), XIV, pp. 192-195; "Ako povstal svet," Kalendar Jednota (1910), XV, pp. 141-145; J. Porubsky, "Ako volia v Amerike prezidenta," Kalendar J ednota (1913) , XVII, pp. 97-103; I. G., "Ako stat' sa obcanom Spoj. Statov," Kalendar Narodneho Slov enskeho Spolku (1913 ), XX, pp. 83-96. 33. Nar odne Noviny, June 12, 1913 ; Jednota, November 19, 1913. 34. N arodne Noviny, April 25, 1912; Jednota, June 11, 1913. 35. Narodne Noviny , August 10, 1911. 36. J . A. F ., " Pokrok," Sborni k (1915) , I, 43. 37. N arodne Noviny, April 4, 1912. 38. Narodne Noviny, July 11, 1912. 39. Narodne Noviny, July 25, 1912. 40. Narodne Noviny, August 8, 1912, September 19, 1912. 41. Narodne Noviny, November 12, 1914. 42. Jednota, January 1, 1913, February 12, 1913, May 7, 1913. 43. Culen, Slovaci v A m erike, pp. 175-190. 44. Ibi d., pp. 236-237. 45. Ibid. , p. 266. 46. Ibi d., p. 267. 47. Ibid., pp. 294-296. 48. Ibi d., pp. 297-305. 49. Ibid., pp. 306-337. 50. N arodne Noviny, February 3, 1910. SLOVAKIA 61 51. Narodne Noviny, March 27, 1913. 52. Narodne Noviny, February 10, 1910, October 24, 1912. 53. Jednota, January 8, 1913, February 19, 1913, June 18, 1913, July 16, 1913. 54. Culen, Slovaci v Amerike, p. 191. 55. Narodne Noviny, July 7, 1910, June 27, 1912, April 17, 1913 ; Jednota, November 4, 1914, December 23, 1914. 56. Narodne Noviny, October 3, 1912. 57. Narodne Noviny, October 6, 1910. 58. Narodne Noviny, January 27, 1910; Jednota, May 14, 1913, December 31, 1913 ; Kalendar Jednota (1915), XX, 75. 59. Narodne Noviny, March 7, 1912. 60. Amerikansko-Slovenske Noviny, August 19, 1897. 61. Joseph Pauco, ~udovychorn u Sturovcov (Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1943) , pp. 107-108. 62. Ibid. , pp. 137-140. 63. Jednota, February 5, 1913. 64. Narodne Noviny, April 28, 1910, April 4, 1912, March 21, 1912. 65. Narodne Noviny, April 4, 1912; Paul Jamarik, " Opojny a krcma, " Kalendar Narodneho Slovenskeho Spolku ( 1914), XXII, 198-206 ; Jednota, February 19, 1913, June 25, 1913. 66. !1udomil, "Zakladajme spolky uplnej striezlivosti," Kalendar Jednota, (1911), XVI, 41-42. 67. Jednota, March 5, 1913. 68. Narodne Noviny, February 24, 1910, August 4, 1910; Jednota, January 29, 1913. 69. Jednota, July 30, 1913. 70. Narodne Noviny, April 25, 1912. 71. Narodne Noviny, January 13, 1910, May 12, 1912, August 25, 1910. 72. Narodne Noviny, November 2, 1911. 73. Narodne Noviny, November 9, 1911. 74. Narodne Noviny, January 25, 1912. 75. Narodne Noviny, June 6, 1912. 76. Narodne Noviny, September 18, 1913. 77. Narodne Noviny, October 1, 1914. 78. Narodne Noviny, November 16, 1911. 79. Jednota, September 17, 1913 ; Narodne Noviny, May 25, 1911. 80. Jednota, February 4, 1914; Narodne Noviny , March 19, 1914, June 11, 1914. 81. Jednota, February 19, 1913. 82. Narodne Noviny, October 7, 1910. 83. Jednota, July 9, 1913 Narodne Noviny, May 11, 1912. 84. Jednota, January 1, 1913 ; January 21, 1914. 85. Narodne Noviny, March 19, 1914, April 25, 1912. 86. Jednota, January 21, 1914, January 28, 1914. 87. Jednota, February 12, 1913, August 13, 1913. 88. Jednota, August 13, 1913; Narodne Noviny, March 19, 1914; Jednota, September 17, 1913, January 21 , 1914. 89. Jednota, December 9, 1914, October 14, 1914, December 30, 1914. 90. Narodne Noviny, April 25, 1912. 91. Narodne Noviny, August 8, 1912. 92. Narodne Noviny, February 17, 1910, April 27, 1911. 93 . Narodne Noviny, February 29, 1914; Jednota, July 1, 1914; Narodne Noviny, May 14, 1914. 94. Jednota, July 1, 1914. 62 SLOVAKIA 95. N<irodne Noviny, December 28, 1911, September 12, 1912, October 12, 1911, June 11, 1914. 96. N<irodne Noviny, March 7, 1912; Jednota, May 21, 1913. 97. A. V. Kozak, "Ustav I . Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty," Kalend<ir Jednota (1912) , XVII, 22. 98. " Ustav I. Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty," Kalend<ir Jednota ( 1915), xx, 163-164. 99. N<irodne Noviny, July 14, 1910. 100. N<irodne Noviny, July 13, 1911. 101. N<irodne Noviny, October 13, 1913. 102. N<irodne Noviny, January 8, 1914. 103. N<irodne Noviny, January 29, 1914. 104. N<irodne Noviny, April 16, 1914. 105. N<irodne Noviny, September 17, 1914. 106. Pamiitnica k zlatemu Jubileu N<irodneho Slov enskeho Spolku v U .S.A . (Pittsburgh, 1940) , p. 47. 107. N<irodne Noviny, March 13, 1913. 108. N<irodne Noviny, January 16, 1913. 109. N <irodn e Noviny, March 24, 1910, April 28, 1910, June 30, 1910. 110. Jednota, January 1, 1913. 111. "Prorocke slova dp. Matufa Jankolu o novom systeme," Sbornik Slovenskeho Katolickeho Sokola na rok 1942, XXIX, 82; Jednota, January 1, 1913. 112. Culen, Dejiny, I, 125. 113. Ibid., I, 122-123. 114. N<irodne Noviny, March 23 , 1911. 115. N<irodn e Noviny, March 16, 1911. 116. N<irodne Noviny, September 22, 1910. 117. Jednota, May 14, 1913, May 21, 1913, July 2, 1913, September 10. 1913. 118. Jednota, June 18, 1913. 119. Jednot a, July 30, 1913. 120. N<irodn e Noviny, August 22, 1912, October 23, 1913 ; S. F., "Robotnicka otazka," Ka lend<ir J ednota (1906 ), XIII, 56. 121. Culen, Deji ny, I, 123-124; N<irodne Noviny, February 24, 1913. 122. N<irodne Noviny, January 15, 1914, February 12, 1914, February 26, 1914, June 11, 1914. 123. Jednota, January 1, 1913. 124. Jednota, May 7, 1913, July 2, 1913, May 14, 1913. 125. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p. 187. 126. N<irodne Noviny, November 21, 1912, June 19, 1913. 127. J ednota, January 22, 1913. 128. Molchan, "Development of the Slovak Community," pp. 99-102. 129. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p. 190. 130. Jednota, September 30, 1914, October 14, 1914. 131. Jednot a, October 21, 1914, November 4, 1914. 132. Yurchak, The Slovaks, p . 191.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovaks in the U.S.A. Description An account of the resource James J. Zatko, Ph.D. Slovakia, Vol. 16 (No. 39), 1966 pp. 41-62 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zatko, James J. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1966 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/75b0d395160903025a155a55faab5aac.pdf 7b8f354a00a8669aaf5911cbeb2b518f PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 155 Novak-speaking as a revived ethnic-says that more and more he thinks in family terms. His Slovak, Catholic, middle income origin gives him a sense of identity. And Novak thinks that the politics of the future will be based on the family and the neighborhood. Ethnics show the ability to keep the family together, and to find within it the opportunities to enable each member to grow and develop. Dissatisfaction with society or with money-experienced by the adults-doesn't poison the young. And Coles middle Americans retain a certain pride and sense of dignity, even though the going is rough. It's fairly well accepted that the isolated, nuclear . family failed to meet the challenge of modern living. And the nuclear family has already given way to new kinship patterns. We can expect a revitalization of the family as today's young families find new ways to adapt to the challenges of tomorrow. The American Political Question Edward M. Zelenak In May of 1972, at the Slovak League of America Convention in Chicago, Illinois, a direct play was made by the elected leadership of this civic organization to channel future efforts towards involving the membership in an active campaign to organize the Slovaks of the United States in more vocal political activities. Specific intentions were expressed concerning organizational efforts of the Slovaks within the two major parties in the precincts, wards, cities, counties, and even on a national scale. With that effort as a foundation, the able leadership of the Slovak League urged all delegates and officers to return to their cities and embark on a substantial effort at getting the Slovak people interested and eventually active in those very same causes. �156 SLOVAKIA The secondar y goal consisted of involving even further the young American-Slovaks in first the Slovak causes and logically political activities at the same time. Both goals are ideally sound and require much more than parental urging to get the young out. It has been stated that the youth of today are more aware of the affairs of the world, of the ills and injustices , and that is debatable . However , acting on the assumpti on of that being true, Slovaks should renew in 1972 all previousl y intensifie d efforts at achieving a balance in both the political field and the youth movemen t. 1972 ended with the reelectio n of Richard M. Nixon, a Republic an, as Presiden t of the United States. Whether one can say that Richard Nixon represen ts the beliefs of the American-Slovaks as an entity is debatable , yet his reelectio n signifies a coalition of numerou s groups analogous to many of the ideal Slovak causes. Yet that presents a sort of predicam ent, because the labor-ori ented Slovak in the urban American cities typically congrega tes and identifies with the Democra tic Party. The scattered Slovak commun ities througho ut the United States do not present definite figures to examine the voting pattern this past year by, yet, realizing the loyalty the Slovak holds to God, America and the Slovak nationali ty, one can assume that the Slovaks who were Democra ts voted Democra tic and the Republic an Slovaks voted Republic an. Presiden t Nixon used the slogan: "Four more years" to lead his reelectio n campaign , and it is the advice from that campaign chant that the young American Slovaks in particula r can take either a hint or begin to worry. We have less than four years now to once again enact the machiner y to bring about the changes we desire in our country. My own particula r involvem ent in partisan politics has been with the Democra tic Party. In 1972 I was elected to a position of precinct delegate from the city of Lincoln Park. That particula r election, the May 16 Presiden tial Primary, was significa nt to the Slovaks of Michigan, because three Slovaks were elected as precinct delegates from Lincoln Park, and two were youths. In June I was selected as a delegate to the Democra tic National Conventi on in Miami Beach, committe d to Governo r George Wallace, �SLOVAKIA 157 representing the 15th Congressional district of Michigan. The Democratic National Convention was perhaps the most representative body of all the facets of America, a feat that the Republicans failed to attain at their own a month later. The significance of the McGovern-Fraser guidelines employed by the Democratic Party offers more than a fair opportunity for all minority groups to seek representation in a political system, and particularly the young Slovaks. The youthful idealists ensured the nomiruv tion of George S. McGovern last July and a coalition of equally-interested young Slovaks and other ethnic-oriented youths can conceivably achieve the same goal. Thus I stress the need for young Slovaks to take part in our political structure, working for their beliefs and goals, not forgetting the goals of America and their Slovak elders. We cannot sit back and allow either of the two parties to become stagnant or indifferent to our needs. But one does not gain in politics by sitting at home. I have chosen to work within the Democratic Party, by my own selection. The basic principles of that party best correlate with the people I associate and my personal viewpoints. From the young McGovern supporters in Miami Beach I have taken notice. A Republican is president, yet the young Democratic organization behind George McGovern succeeded in nominating him as the Democratic candidate for president, a task pronounced as impossible only four months prior to the convention. By their movement we can learn and profit, and the same goes for the young Slovaks adhering to the principles of the Republican Party. Gone are the days of the great ethnic machinery in political wards ( or so is evident in Detroit), yet machinery does not die, needing only replacement and oiling. The Slovaks can rejuvenate life in the political system, for it is from politics whence all good comes. In Michigan, one Slovak from Lincoln Park has been elected to the governing board of the state Democratic Party, and she is a woman. That in itself is significant. The Slovaks in Chicago, Cleveland and Pittsburgh have been equally successful. The youth, in seeking to lead America to a time of peace and prosperity, must regard the example of the elders. But it will be by their youth and their Slovak heritage that they succeed. � SLOVAKIA 155 Novak-speaking as a revived ethnic-says that more and more he thinks in family terms. His Slovak, Catholic, middle income origin gives him a sense of identity. And Novak thinks that the politics of the future will be based on the family and the neighborhood. Ethnics show the ability to keep the family together, and to find within it the opportunities to enable each member to grow and develop. Dissatisfaction with society or with money-experienced by the adults-doesn't poison the young. And Coles middle Americans retain a certain pride and sense of dignity, even though the going is rough. It's fairly well accepted that the isolated, nuclear . family failed to meet the challenge of modern living. And the nuclear family has already given way to new kinship patterns. We can expect a revitalization of the family as today's young families find new ways to adapt to the challenges of tomorrow. The American Political Question Edward M. Zelenak In May of 1972, at the Slovak League of America Convention in Chicago, Illinois, a direct play was made by the elected leadership of this civic organization to channel future efforts towards involving the membership in an active campaign to organize the Slovaks of the United States in more vocal political activities. Specific intentions were expressed concerning organizational efforts of the Slovaks within the two major parties in the precincts, wards, cities, counties, and even on a national scale. With that effort as a foundation, the able leadership of the Slovak League urged all delegates and officers to return to their cities and embark on a substantial effort at getting the Slovak people interested and eventually active in those very same causes. �156 SLOVAKIA The secondar y goal consisted of involving even further the young American-Slovaks in first the Slovak causes and logically political activities at the same time. Both goals are ideally sound and require much more than parental urging to get the young out. It has been stated that the youth of today are more aware of the affairs of the world, of the ills and injustices , and that is debatable . However , acting on the assumpti on of that being true, Slovaks should renew in 1972 all previousl y intensifie d efforts at achieving a balance in both the political field and the youth movemen t. 1972 ended with the reelectio n of Richard M. Nixon, a Republic an, as Presiden t of the United States. Whether one can say that Richard Nixon represen ts the beliefs of the American-Slovaks as an entity is debatable , yet his reelectio n signifies a coalition of numerou s groups analogous to many of the ideal Slovak causes. Yet that presents a sort of predicam ent, because the labor-ori ented Slovak in the urban American cities typically congrega tes and identifies with the Democra tic Party. The scattered Slovak commun ities througho ut the United States do not present definite figures to examine the voting pattern this past year by, yet, realizing the loyalty the Slovak holds to God, America and the Slovak nationali ty, one can assume that the Slovaks who were Democra ts voted Democra tic and the Republic an Slovaks voted Republic an. Presiden t Nixon used the slogan: "Four more years" to lead his reelectio n campaign , and it is the advice from that campaign chant that the young American Slovaks in particula r can take either a hint or begin to worry. We have less than four years now to once again enact the machiner y to bring about the changes we desire in our country. My own particula r involvem ent in partisan politics has been with the Democra tic Party. In 1972 I was elected to a position of precinct delegate from the city of Lincoln Park. That particula r election, the May 16 Presiden tial Primary, was significa nt to the Slovaks of Michigan, because three Slovaks were elected as precinct delegates from Lincoln Park, and two were youths. In June I was selected as a delegate to the Democra tic National Conventi on in Miami Beach, committe d to Governo r George Wallace, �SLOVAKIA 157 representing the 15th Congressional district of Michigan. The Democratic National Convention was perhaps the most representative body of all the facets of America, a feat that the Republicans failed to attain at their own a month later. The significance of the McGovern-Fraser guidelines employed by the Democratic Party offers more than a fair opportunity for all minority groups to seek representation in a political system, and particularly the young Slovaks. The youthful idealists ensured the nomiruv tion of George S. McGovern last July and a coalition of equally-interested young Slovaks and other ethnic-oriented youths can conceivably achieve the same goal. Thus I stress the need for young Slovaks to take part in our political structure, working for their beliefs and goals, not forgetting the goals of America and their Slovak elders. We cannot sit back and allow either of the two parties to become stagnant or indifferent to our needs. But one does not gain in politics by sitting at home. I have chosen to work within the Democratic Party, by my own selection. The basic principles of that party best correlate with the people I associate and my personal viewpoints. From the young McGovern supporters in Miami Beach I have taken notice. A Republican is president, yet the young Democratic organization behind George McGovern succeeded in nominating him as the Democratic candidate for president, a task pronounced as impossible only four months prior to the convention. By their movement we can learn and profit, and the same goes for the young Slovaks adhering to the principles of the Republican Party. Gone are the days of the great ethnic machinery in political wards ( or so is evident in Detroit), yet machinery does not die, needing only replacement and oiling. The Slovaks can rejuvenate life in the political system, for it is from politics whence all good comes. In Michigan, one Slovak from Lincoln Park has been elected to the governing board of the state Democratic Party, and she is a woman. That in itself is significant. The Slovaks in Chicago, Cleveland and Pittsburgh have been equally successful. The youth, in seeking to lead America to a time of peace and prosperity, must regard the example of the elders. But it will be by their youth and their Slovak heritage that they succeed. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1973, Vol. 23 Description An account of the resource Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 155 Novak-speaking as a revived ethnic-says that more and more he thinks in family terms. His Slovak, Catholic, middle income origin gives him a sense of identity. And Novak thinks that the politics of the future will be based on the family and the neighborhood. Ethnics show the ability to keep the family together, and to find within it the opportunities to enable each member to grow and develop. Dissatisfaction with society or with money-experienced by the adults-doesn't poison the young. And Coles middle Americans retain a certain pride and sense of dignity, even though the going is rough. It's fairly well accepted that the isolated, nuclear . family failed to meet the challenge of modern living. And the nuclear family has already given way to new kinship patterns. We can expect a revitalization of the family as today's young families find new ways to adapt to the challenges of tomorrow. The American Political Question Edward M. Zelenak In May of 1972, at the Slovak League of America Convention in Chicago, Illinois, a direct play was made by the elected leadership of this civic organization to channel future efforts towards involving the membership in an active campaign to organize the Slovaks of the United States in more vocal political activities. Specific intentions were expressed concerning organizational efforts of the Slovaks within the two major parties in the precincts, wards, cities, counties, and even on a national scale. With that effort as a foundation, the able leadership of the Slovak League urged all delegates and officers to return to their cities and embark on a substantial effort at getting the Slovak people interested and eventually active in those very same causes. 156 SLOVAKIA The secondar y goal consisted of involving even further the young American-Slovaks in first the Slovak causes and logically political activities at the same time. Both goals are ideally sound and require much more than parental urging to get the young out. It has been stated that the youth of today are more aware of the affairs of the world, of the ills and injustices , and that is debatable . However , acting on the assumpti on of that being true, Slovaks should renew in 1972 all previousl y intensifie d efforts at achieving a balance in both the political field and the youth movemen t. 1972 ended with the reelectio n of Richard M. Nixon, a Republic an, as Presiden t of the United States. Whether one can say that Richard Nixon represen ts the beliefs of the American-Slovaks as an entity is debatable , yet his reelectio n signifies a coalition of numerou s groups analogous to many of the ideal Slovak causes. Yet that presents a sort of predicam ent, because the labor-ori ented Slovak in the urban American cities typically congrega tes and identifies with the Democra tic Party. The scattered Slovak commun ities througho ut the United States do not present definite figures to examine the voting pattern this past year by, yet, realizing the loyalty the Slovak holds to God, America and the Slovak nationali ty, one can assume that the Slovaks who were Democra ts voted Democra tic and the Republic an Slovaks voted Republic an. Presiden t Nixon used the slogan: "Four more years" to lead his reelectio n campaign , and it is the advice from that campaign chant that the young American Slovaks in particula r can take either a hint or begin to worry. We have less than four years now to once again enact the machiner y to bring about the changes we desire in our country. My own particula r involvem ent in partisan politics has been with the Democra tic Party. In 1972 I was elected to a position of precinct delegate from the city of Lincoln Park. That particula r election, the May 16 Presiden tial Primary, was significa nt to the Slovaks of Michigan, because three Slovaks were elected as precinct delegates from Lincoln Park, and two were youths. In June I was selected as a delegate to the Democra tic National Conventi on in Miami Beach, committe d to Governo r George Wallace, SLOVAKIA 157 representing the 15th Congressional district of Michigan. The Democratic National Convention was perhaps the most representative body of all the facets of America, a feat that the Republicans failed to attain at their own a month later. The significance of the McGovern-Fraser guidelines employed by the Democratic Party offers more than a fair opportunity for all minority groups to seek representation in a political system, and particularly the young Slovaks. The youthful idealists ensured the nomiruv tion of George S. McGovern last July and a coalition of equally-interested young Slovaks and other ethnic-oriented youths can conceivably achieve the same goal. Thus I stress the need for young Slovaks to take part in our political structure, working for their beliefs and goals, not forgetting the goals of America and their Slovak elders. We cannot sit back and allow either of the two parties to become stagnant or indifferent to our needs. But one does not gain in politics by sitting at home. I have chosen to work within the Democratic Party, by my own selection. The basic principles of that party best correlate with the people I associate and my personal viewpoints. From the young McGovern supporters in Miami Beach I have taken notice. A Republican is president, yet the young Democratic organization behind George McGovern succeeded in nominating him as the Democratic candidate for president, a task pronounced as impossible only four months prior to the convention. By their movement we can learn and profit, and the same goes for the young Slovaks adhering to the principles of the Republican Party. Gone are the days of the great ethnic machinery in political wards ( or so is evident in Detroit), yet machinery does not die, needing only replacement and oiling. The Slovaks can rejuvenate life in the political system, for it is from politics whence all good comes. In Michigan, one Slovak from Lincoln Park has been elected to the governing board of the state Democratic Party, and she is a woman. That in itself is significant. The Slovaks in Chicago, Cleveland and Pittsburgh have been equally successful. The youth, in seeking to lead America to a time of peace and prosperity, must regard the example of the elders. But it will be by their youth and their Slovak heritage that they succeed.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The American Political Question Description An account of the resource Edward M. Zelenak Slovakia, Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973 pp. 155-157 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zelenak, Edward M. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a26e78cce5aaaba26b6aa159393a855a.pdf 51bfe3ef9f258946af07a9a1b0deebc0 PDF Text Text 10 SLOVAKIA THE TRADITION OF SLOVAK STATEHOOD Marian Žiar In the contemporary great conflict of the free world agairuit thé ideology and forceful aggression of Commun!sm, we look upon the tradition of Slovak statehood trom two view·points. It 1s from these two viewpoints that our f!ght against Communism and for the renewal of Slovak statehood is waged. The Slovak nation at horne and the great majority of Slovak ex!les in the free world reject not only the Communist regime in Czecho-SJovakia, installed by and serving Moscow, but also the anti• Slovak ideology of ethnical and pollt!cal "Czechoslovaklsm," the standard•bearers of which are the very Czecho-Slovak politicians in exile, wbo installe<i the violent "people's democratlcal" regime in Slovakia after 194'5 and In 1948 cowardly surrendered power to the Communists. Just as the Slovak nat!on at horne is valiantly resist!ng the forceful pressure of Moscow and Prague Communism, so the great majority of Slovak ex.iles is supl)Ort!ng, in every way possi'ble, tbe effort of the free world against Communist aggression and totality and, in accord with tbe tradition of the Slovak nation, is flghtlng for the restorat!on of its statehood within the framework of a future federated Europe. Th!s fight of the Slovak ex!les is based not only on historical, but politlcal and practlcal consideratlons as well. Already at the beglnning of the n!nth century, the Slovaks had the!r own State, which the Byzant!ne Chronicler called Great Moravia, because it extended beyond both b anks of the Morava River. The nucleus of this State was the territory of western Slovak!a, and lts bullders were the Slovak rulers Mojmír, Rastislav, Svätopluk and Mojmír II. Already Jn the eightb century, the Slovaks were among the first in Centra! Europe to accept Christlan!ty and thereby also western Christian culture and civ!l!zat!on. Thls Slovak State Jasted untll 907, when it succumbed to the joint onslaugbt of the Magyars, Germans and ~ecbs. In old Hungary, Slovakia formed a separate pol!t!cal unit witb its own administrat!ve, military and financial autborlties. It was separated from the rest of Hungary by a customs boundary. In the fourteentb century, Slovak!a was an independent territory under the rule of Matúš Čák of Trenčín, wbo had bis own army, colned bis own money, and concluded agreements '\vlth allles independently. And in the fifteenth century, Slovakia was an Independent administratlve unit under Jobn Jiskra of Brandýs. After the terrlble Turks invaded Centra] Europe, Slovakia was completely separated !rom Magyar lands and was a klnd of independent State unit under the rule of tbe Haibsburgs. It remained so unt!l the end of the seventeenth century. At tbe beginning of tbe eighteenth century, when the Slovaks b e,. came increaslngly consclous natlonally, thelr desires agaln tended to thelr own lndependence. George Fándly cried out to the Slovaks at that t!me: "Slovaks, recall the times when our nation lived under �SLOVAKIA 11 kings of its own people." And the great Slovak poet, John Hollý, wrote beautiful epochs about Svätopluk ·'who founded the great kingdom or tbe Slovaks and became an lndepenrlent sovereigu." In the nineteenth century, the Slovaks were organizing their fight for the polltical rights of thelr nation. Louls Štúr, leader or that movement, Qrganized a milltary rebellion In 1848 to sever Slovak.ia from the Magyars and proclaimed the independence of Slovakia in Myjava on September 19, 1848. Even though thls mllitary revolution failed, the Slovaks kept on flghtlng politlcally against Magyarizat!on and the political pressure of Pešť. The Slovaks wanted to be an independent country under the H a bsburg rule.~ Vlenna, howevet; rejected the efforts of the Slovaks for a federat!on, even though 1:Cr-aus, Finance Minister of Austria, backed tbem. The result was that the solution or the important natlonality problems In Centra! Europe were side-tracked for over a half century, whlch was to the detriment not only of Vienna, but also the whole of Europe and the Central European nations. On June 7, 1861, Slovaks from all parts of t he country assembled at Turčiansky Svätý Martin and demanded that Slovakia be constituted as the Slovak area o f Upper Hungary. This was followed by the Spiš petition of 1868, the massacre Jn Černová in 1907, and the heroic struggle of Svetozar Hur:ban Vajanský, great Slovak patriot, publlsher and writer, wbo wrote in the NÁRODN:l!: NOVINY (The l'fatlonal News) in 1910: "To have one's own State is the supreme deslre of every nation." But the demands of the Slovaks went unheeded; the Magyars were stubborn and determined to keep the Slova,ks under their rule. When the first World War broke out in 1914, the Slovaks at ltome and rubroad p repared the ground .for the liberation of the Slovak nation. Es-pecially tbe Amerlcan Slovaks of wbom there was close to a n1illion. The latter clamored for Slovak independence in the SLOVENSK'{° DJDNNÍK (The Slovak Daily), published in Pltts,burgh, . on January 21, 1910. Tbelr action, carried on dnring World War I under the motto "For An Independent S lovakia," was expressed in th e Cleveland Agreement of October 22, 1915, wblch stated that the Slovaks and the Czecbs will live In a federated union of States with complete autonomy of Slovakia, that Slovakla would bave lts own parliaroent and its own State adminlstration. In a slmllar manner, th e Slovaks were guaranteed autonomy also by the Pittsburgb Pact, of l\lay 30, 1918, wbich was signed by T. G. Masaryk. It was on th e basis ot these suppositions that the Slovaks entered the Czecho-Slovak Republic in 1918. However, Czech politicians under the leadershlp of Edward Beneš created the fictitious ideotogy of an ethnical and polltlcal union of the so-called "Czechoslovak natlon," which meant in practlce the polltlcal hegemony of the Czechs over the Slovaks. Just as the Slovaks had to flght for their natural rlghts in Hungary, so they had to fight again for their politlcal rights in the Czecho-Slovak Republlc. The Slovak nation was denled the right to call ltself the Slovak nation in a State which was created by the joint efforts of the Czechs and Slovaks. American Slovaks alone had g!ven Masaryk almost a milllon dollars during the first World War for the Jfberat!on movement. Under the circumstances, therefore, the Slovak nation had only �12 SLOVAKIA one choice: to fight with all legal means for autonomy as a basis for the complete political independence of the Slovaks. By sens!ble and logical arguments it was not possible to convince the Czechs that the Slovaks, too, had a right to full political sovereignty on Slovak territory. It was not untll 1938, when the Re• public was threatened from the outs!de, that Beneš finally concurred with the idea that the Slovaks be granted autonomy. The development, however, was going forward speedily at that time. And under the given s!tuation, the Slovak parliamentar!ans on March 14, 1939, took the historicalJy s!gnlficant step, when they accepted the responsibility for the fate of t heir own natlon and proclaimed the independence o! Slovakia. From the democratic standpoint, formally it would be possible to censure almost anything about March 14, 1939, but historicalJy it meant and stlll means the day of renewal of Slovak lndependence, whlch is the desire and the goal of the Slovak nation. Even though at the present time national viewpoints are giving way to the broader perspective of a political federation ot the whole of Europe, or at least of Central Europe, nevertheless the real bas!s for every federation still remain the nations, whether large or small, wlth which and on whicb a new form of political society of Europe can be built. That ls why the tradition of Slovak statehood is for us a fundamental issue for every form of European political organizatlon. And with Chrlstlanity, deeply rooted in the soul of our people since the eighth century, thls is the only real basis for liberating Slovakla from the hegemony of Communlsm. • • • WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "Monsignor Tiso's execution was a travesty o[ justice. The fact that he could have remained president of the Slovak nation if he had only bent bis knee to the communist tyrant makes bim a martyr to the cause of freedom and rellgion. Although the Slovaks have suffered much from their political appressors for centuries, thls is the greatest crime against them in their h!storic struggle for national freedom. His tragic deatb cannot help but inspire Slovaks for centurles to come to defend their God-given politlcal and religious rights." - Abbot Theodore Kojiš, O.S.B., Cleveland, Ohio. • • • • • • "Condemnation of Tiso to death was taken as an indication tbat the Beneš government has surrendered completely to Moscow. Also indicative of thls ls the fact that the Beneš regime, after piously professing friendllness to tbe Cathollc Church. has begun an effort to seize Catholic schools and establish a state monopoly." - CathoJic Universe BulJetin, Cleveland, Ohlo. "Edward Beneš, murderer of the freedom of tbe Slovak nation, killed a good man, a zealous priest of Christ, a loyal Slovak patriot. the flrst president of the Slovak Republic' elected by the Slovak nation. The crlme of murderer Bene!i ls worsll, uglier and more wicked than the crime of Cain." - Peter Prídavok, Presldent Slovak National Council, London, England, April 1947. � 10 SLOVAKIA THE TRADITION OF SLOVAK STATEHOOD Marian Žiar In the contemporary great conflict of the free world agairuit thé ideology and forceful aggression of Commun!sm, we look upon the tradition of Slovak statehood trom two view·points. It 1s from these two viewpoints that our f!ght against Communism and for the renewal of Slovak statehood is waged. The Slovak nation at horne and the great majority of Slovak ex!les in the free world reject not only the Communist regime in Czecho-SJovakia, installed by and serving Moscow, but also the anti• Slovak ideology of ethnical and pollt!cal "Czechoslovaklsm," the standard•bearers of which are the very Czecho-Slovak politicians in exile, wbo installe<i the violent "people's democratlcal" regime in Slovakia after 194'5 and In 1948 cowardly surrendered power to the Communists. Just as the Slovak nat!on at horne is valiantly resist!ng the forceful pressure of Moscow and Prague Communism, so the great majority of Slovak ex.iles is supl)Ort!ng, in every way possi'ble, tbe effort of the free world against Communist aggression and totality and, in accord with tbe tradition of the Slovak nation, is flghtlng for the restorat!on of its statehood within the framework of a future federated Europe. Th!s fight of the Slovak ex!les is based not only on historical, but politlcal and practlcal consideratlons as well. Already at the beglnning of the n!nth century, the Slovaks had the!r own State, which the Byzant!ne Chronicler called Great Moravia, because it extended beyond both b anks of the Morava River. The nucleus of this State was the territory of western Slovak!a, and lts bullders were the Slovak rulers Mojmír, Rastislav, Svätopluk and Mojmír II. Already Jn the eightb century, the Slovaks were among the first in Centra! Europe to accept Christlan!ty and thereby also western Christian culture and civ!l!zat!on. Thls Slovak State Jasted untll 907, when it succumbed to the joint onslaugbt of the Magyars, Germans and ~ecbs. In old Hungary, Slovakia formed a separate pol!t!cal unit witb its own administrat!ve, military and financial autborlties. It was separated from the rest of Hungary by a customs boundary. In the fourteentb century, Slovak!a was an independent territory under the rule of Matúš Čák of Trenčín, wbo had bis own army, colned bis own money, and concluded agreements '\vlth allles independently. And in the fifteenth century, Slovakia was an Independent administratlve unit under Jobn Jiskra of Brandýs. After the terrlble Turks invaded Centra] Europe, Slovakia was completely separated !rom Magyar lands and was a klnd of independent State unit under the rule of tbe Haibsburgs. It remained so unt!l the end of the seventeenth century. At tbe beginning of tbe eighteenth century, when the Slovaks b e,. came increaslngly consclous natlonally, thelr desires agaln tended to thelr own lndependence. George Fándly cried out to the Slovaks at that t!me: "Slovaks, recall the times when our nation lived under �SLOVAKIA 11 kings of its own people." And the great Slovak poet, John Hollý, wrote beautiful epochs about Svätopluk ·'who founded the great kingdom or tbe Slovaks and became an lndepenrlent sovereigu." In the nineteenth century, the Slovaks were organizing their fight for the polltical rights of thelr nation. Louls Štúr, leader or that movement, Qrganized a milltary rebellion In 1848 to sever Slovak.ia from the Magyars and proclaimed the independence of Slovakia in Myjava on September 19, 1848. Even though thls mllitary revolution failed, the Slovaks kept on flghtlng politlcally against Magyarizat!on and the political pressure of Pešť. The Slovaks wanted to be an independent country under the H a bsburg rule.~ Vlenna, howevet; rejected the efforts of the Slovaks for a federat!on, even though 1:Cr-aus, Finance Minister of Austria, backed tbem. The result was that the solution or the important natlonality problems In Centra! Europe were side-tracked for over a half century, whlch was to the detriment not only of Vienna, but also the whole of Europe and the Central European nations. On June 7, 1861, Slovaks from all parts of t he country assembled at Turčiansky Svätý Martin and demanded that Slovakia be constituted as the Slovak area o f Upper Hungary. This was followed by the Spiš petition of 1868, the massacre Jn Černová in 1907, and the heroic struggle of Svetozar Hur:ban Vajanský, great Slovak patriot, publlsher and writer, wbo wrote in the NÁRODN:l!: NOVINY (The l'fatlonal News) in 1910: "To have one's own State is the supreme deslre of every nation." But the demands of the Slovaks went unheeded; the Magyars were stubborn and determined to keep the Slova,ks under their rule. When the first World War broke out in 1914, the Slovaks at ltome and rubroad p repared the ground .for the liberation of the Slovak nation. Es-pecially tbe Amerlcan Slovaks of wbom there was close to a n1illion. The latter clamored for Slovak independence in the SLOVENSK'{° DJDNNÍK (The Slovak Daily), published in Pltts,burgh, . on January 21, 1910. Tbelr action, carried on dnring World War I under the motto "For An Independent S lovakia," was expressed in th e Cleveland Agreement of October 22, 1915, wblch stated that the Slovaks and the Czecbs will live In a federated union of States with complete autonomy of Slovakia, that Slovakla would bave lts own parliaroent and its own State adminlstration. In a slmllar manner, th e Slovaks were guaranteed autonomy also by the Pittsburgb Pact, of l\lay 30, 1918, wbich was signed by T. G. Masaryk. It was on th e basis ot these suppositions that the Slovaks entered the Czecho-Slovak Republic in 1918. However, Czech politicians under the leadershlp of Edward Beneš created the fictitious ideotogy of an ethnical and polltlcal union of the so-called "Czechoslovak natlon," which meant in practlce the polltlcal hegemony of the Czechs over the Slovaks. Just as the Slovaks had to flght for their natural rlghts in Hungary, so they had to fight again for their politlcal rights in the Czecho-Slovak Republlc. The Slovak nation was denled the right to call ltself the Slovak nation in a State which was created by the joint efforts of the Czechs and Slovaks. American Slovaks alone had g!ven Masaryk almost a milllon dollars during the first World War for the Jfberat!on movement. Under the circumstances, therefore, the Slovak nation had only �12 SLOVAKIA one choice: to fight with all legal means for autonomy as a basis for the complete political independence of the Slovaks. By sens!ble and logical arguments it was not possible to convince the Czechs that the Slovaks, too, had a right to full political sovereignty on Slovak territory. It was not untll 1938, when the Re• public was threatened from the outs!de, that Beneš finally concurred with the idea that the Slovaks be granted autonomy. The development, however, was going forward speedily at that time. And under the given s!tuation, the Slovak parliamentar!ans on March 14, 1939, took the historicalJy s!gnlficant step, when they accepted the responsibility for the fate of t heir own natlon and proclaimed the independence o! Slovakia. From the democratic standpoint, formally it would be possible to censure almost anything about March 14, 1939, but historicalJy it meant and stlll means the day of renewal of Slovak lndependence, whlch is the desire and the goal of the Slovak nation. Even though at the present time national viewpoints are giving way to the broader perspective of a political federation ot the whole of Europe, or at least of Central Europe, nevertheless the real bas!s for every federation still remain the nations, whether large or small, wlth which and on whicb a new form of political society of Europe can be built. That ls why the tradition of Slovak statehood is for us a fundamental issue for every form of European political organizatlon. And with Chrlstlanity, deeply rooted in the soul of our people since the eighth century, thls is the only real basis for liberating Slovakla from the hegemony of Communlsm. • • • WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "Monsignor Tiso's execution was a travesty o[ justice. The fact that he could have remained president of the Slovak nation if he had only bent bis knee to the communist tyrant makes bim a martyr to the cause of freedom and rellgion. Although the Slovaks have suffered much from their political appressors for centuries, thls is the greatest crime against them in their h!storic struggle for national freedom. His tragic deatb cannot help but inspire Slovaks for centurles to come to defend their God-given politlcal and religious rights." - Abbot Theodore Kojiš, O.S.B., Cleveland, Ohio. • • • • • • "Condemnation of Tiso to death was taken as an indication tbat the Beneš government has surrendered completely to Moscow. Also indicative of thls ls the fact that the Beneš regime, after piously professing friendllness to tbe Cathollc Church. has begun an effort to seize Catholic schools and establish a state monopoly." - CathoJic Universe BulJetin, Cleveland, Ohlo. "Edward Beneš, murderer of the freedom of tbe Slovak nation, killed a good man, a zealous priest of Christ, a loyal Slovak patriot. the flrst president of the Slovak Republic' elected by the Slovak nation. The crlme of murderer Bene!i ls worsll, uglier and more wicked than the crime of Cain." - Peter Prídavok, Presldent Slovak National Council, London, England, April 1947. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 10 SLOVAKIA THE TRADITION OF SLOVAK STATEHOOD Marian Žiar In the contemporary great conflict of the free world agairuit thé ideology and forceful aggression of Commun!sm, we look upon the tradition of Slovak statehood trom two view·points. It 1s from these two viewpoints that our f!ght against Communism and for the renewal of Slovak statehood is waged. The Slovak nation at horne and the great majority of Slovak ex!les in the free world reject not only the Communist regime in Czecho-SJovakia, installed by and serving Moscow, but also the anti• Slovak ideology of ethnical and pollt!cal "Czechoslovaklsm," the standard•bearers of which are the very Czecho-Slovak politicians in exile, wbo installe<i the violent "people's democratlcal" regime in Slovakia after 194'5 and In 1948 cowardly surrendered power to the Communists. Just as the Slovak nat!on at horne is valiantly resist!ng the forceful pressure of Moscow and Prague Communism, so the great majority of Slovak ex.iles is supl)Ort!ng, in every way possi'ble, tbe effort of the free world against Communist aggression and totality and, in accord with tbe tradition of the Slovak nation, is flghtlng for the restorat!on of its statehood within the framework of a future federated Europe. Th!s fight of the Slovak ex!les is based not only on historical, but politlcal and practlcal consideratlons as well. Already at the beglnning of the n!nth century, the Slovaks had the!r own State, which the Byzant!ne Chronicler called Great Moravia, because it extended beyond both b anks of the Morava River. The nucleus of this State was the territory of western Slovak!a, and lts bullders were the Slovak rulers Mojmír, Rastislav, Svätopluk and Mojmír II. Already Jn the eightb century, the Slovaks were among the first in Centra! Europe to accept Christlan!ty and thereby also western Christian culture and civ!l!zat!on. Thls Slovak State Jasted untll 907, when it succumbed to the joint onslaugbt of the Magyars, Germans and ~ecbs. In old Hungary, Slovakia formed a separate pol!t!cal unit witb its own administrat!ve, military and financial autborlties. It was separated from the rest of Hungary by a customs boundary. In the fourteentb century, Slovak!a was an independent territory under the rule of Matúš Čák of Trenčín, wbo had bis own army, colned bis own money, and concluded agreements '\vlth allles independently. And in the fifteenth century, Slovakia was an Independent administratlve unit under Jobn Jiskra of Brandýs. After the terrlble Turks invaded Centra] Europe, Slovakia was completely separated !rom Magyar lands and was a klnd of independent State unit under the rule of tbe Haibsburgs. It remained so unt!l the end of the seventeenth century. At tbe beginning of tbe eighteenth century, when the Slovaks b e,. came increaslngly consclous natlonally, thelr desires agaln tended to thelr own lndependence. George Fándly cried out to the Slovaks at that t!me: "Slovaks, recall the times when our nation lived under SLOVAKIA 11 kings of its own people." And the great Slovak poet, John Hollý, wrote beautiful epochs about Svätopluk ·'who founded the great kingdom or tbe Slovaks and became an lndepenrlent sovereigu." In the nineteenth century, the Slovaks were organizing their fight for the polltical rights of thelr nation. Louls Štúr, leader or that movement, Qrganized a milltary rebellion In 1848 to sever Slovak.ia from the Magyars and proclaimed the independence of Slovakia in Myjava on September 19, 1848. Even though thls mllitary revolution failed, the Slovaks kept on flghtlng politlcally against Magyarizat!on and the political pressure of Pešť. The Slovaks wanted to be an independent country under the H a bsburg rule.~ Vlenna, howevet; rejected the efforts of the Slovaks for a federat!on, even though 1:Cr-aus, Finance Minister of Austria, backed tbem. The result was that the solution or the important natlonality problems In Centra! Europe were side-tracked for over a half century, whlch was to the detriment not only of Vienna, but also the whole of Europe and the Central European nations. On June 7, 1861, Slovaks from all parts of t he country assembled at Turčiansky Svätý Martin and demanded that Slovakia be constituted as the Slovak area o f Upper Hungary. This was followed by the Spiš petition of 1868, the massacre Jn Černová in 1907, and the heroic struggle of Svetozar Hur:ban Vajanský, great Slovak patriot, publlsher and writer, wbo wrote in the NÁRODN:l!: NOVINY (The l'fatlonal News) in 1910: "To have one's own State is the supreme deslre of every nation." But the demands of the Slovaks went unheeded; the Magyars were stubborn and determined to keep the Slova,ks under their rule. When the first World War broke out in 1914, the Slovaks at ltome and rubroad p repared the ground .for the liberation of the Slovak nation. Es-pecially tbe Amerlcan Slovaks of wbom there was close to a n1illion. The latter clamored for Slovak independence in the SLOVENSK'{° DJDNNÍK (The Slovak Daily), published in Pltts,burgh, . on January 21, 1910. Tbelr action, carried on dnring World War I under the motto "For An Independent S lovakia," was expressed in th e Cleveland Agreement of October 22, 1915, wblch stated that the Slovaks and the Czecbs will live In a federated union of States with complete autonomy of Slovakia, that Slovakla would bave lts own parliaroent and its own State adminlstration. In a slmllar manner, th e Slovaks were guaranteed autonomy also by the Pittsburgb Pact, of l\lay 30, 1918, wbich was signed by T. G. Masaryk. It was on th e basis ot these suppositions that the Slovaks entered the Czecho-Slovak Republic in 1918. However, Czech politicians under the leadershlp of Edward Beneš created the fictitious ideotogy of an ethnical and polltlcal union of the so-called "Czechoslovak natlon," which meant in practlce the polltlcal hegemony of the Czechs over the Slovaks. Just as the Slovaks had to flght for their natural rlghts in Hungary, so they had to fight again for their politlcal rights in the Czecho-Slovak Republlc. The Slovak nation was denled the right to call ltself the Slovak nation in a State which was created by the joint efforts of the Czechs and Slovaks. American Slovaks alone had g!ven Masaryk almost a milllon dollars during the first World War for the Jfberat!on movement. Under the circumstances, therefore, the Slovak nation had only 12 SLOVAKIA one choice: to fight with all legal means for autonomy as a basis for the complete political independence of the Slovaks. By sens!ble and logical arguments it was not possible to convince the Czechs that the Slovaks, too, had a right to full political sovereignty on Slovak territory. It was not untll 1938, when the Re• public was threatened from the outs!de, that Beneš finally concurred with the idea that the Slovaks be granted autonomy. The development, however, was going forward speedily at that time. And under the given s!tuation, the Slovak parliamentar!ans on March 14, 1939, took the historicalJy s!gnlficant step, when they accepted the responsibility for the fate of t heir own natlon and proclaimed the independence o! Slovakia. From the democratic standpoint, formally it would be possible to censure almost anything about March 14, 1939, but historicalJy it meant and stlll means the day of renewal of Slovak lndependence, whlch is the desire and the goal of the Slovak nation. Even though at the present time national viewpoints are giving way to the broader perspective of a political federation ot the whole of Europe, or at least of Central Europe, nevertheless the real bas!s for every federation still remain the nations, whether large or small, wlth which and on whicb a new form of political society of Europe can be built. That ls why the tradition of Slovak statehood is for us a fundamental issue for every form of European political organizatlon. And with Chrlstlanity, deeply rooted in the soul of our people since the eighth century, thls is the only real basis for liberating Slovakla from the hegemony of Communlsm. • • • WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "Monsignor Tiso's execution was a travesty o[ justice. The fact that he could have remained president of the Slovak nation if he had only bent bis knee to the communist tyrant makes bim a martyr to the cause of freedom and rellgion. Although the Slovaks have suffered much from their political appressors for centuries, thls is the greatest crime against them in their h!storic struggle for national freedom. His tragic deatb cannot help but inspire Slovaks for centurles to come to defend their God-given politlcal and religious rights." - Abbot Theodore Kojiš, O.S.B., Cleveland, Ohio. • • • • • • "Condemnation of Tiso to death was taken as an indication tbat the Beneš government has surrendered completely to Moscow. Also indicative of thls ls the fact that the Beneš regime, after piously professing friendllness to tbe Cathollc Church. has begun an effort to seize Catholic schools and establish a state monopoly." - CathoJic Universe BulJetin, Cleveland, Ohlo. "Edward Beneš, murderer of the freedom of tbe Slovak nation, killed a good man, a zealous priest of Christ, a loyal Slovak patriot. the flrst president of the Slovak Republic' elected by the Slovak nation. The crlme of murderer Bene!i ls worsll, uglier and more wicked than the crime of Cain." - Peter Prídavok, Presldent Slovak National Council, London, England, April 1947.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Tradition of Slovak Statehood Description An account of the resource Marian Žiar Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 10-12 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Žiar, Marian Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/94c1d1026b44c4673ea2f6736dca92f9.pdf d0930017799086d61978cab8dca4a544 PDF Text Text 6 SLOVAK1IA tions under which the nation lives at .ho~e under Communism, it is our moral duty to acquaint ourselves with the endeavons of those who a:lready over a hundred years ago .warned us against the plague of Oommunism. With r-egard to the political mission of our geineratiO!Il, it wouild be to our advantage to. study the ideas of Stur, because then we shall learn that the credo and politicaJl legacy of Louis Stur was: "So that we ourselves might be revived and take the place in history which according to our strength and abilities belongs to us, we must once and for all free ourselves from the hated, alien yoke and gain state independence for ourselves: because a nation which is enslaved has lits hands tied, its spirit stifled, and is forever threatened with the danger that sooner or later it will perish." 1 • • • STOR : FATHER OF MODERN SIJOVAK NATIONALISM Marian ~iar In 1948 !Slovaks had an o,pportunity to assess the revolutionary events of a hundred years ago•. ,r t was our duty at that time to recall the legacy of Stur and his folJl.owers and to appraise their ,political program. Unfortunate:ly, due to circumstances !beyond our control, the year 1948 was not ·an opportune time for a ceJebration of such g,reat significance and extent as was the revolution of 11848-49. In 1956, however, during the .centennial of Stur's death, another opportunity presents itself to ponder over the fate, the Jife, the struggle, and the aim of the entire generation of Stur. Stephen Krcmery, eminent historian of Slova,k literature, said that Stu.r's generation .began "a new chapter in the rustle-fbu'Stle of a thousand years." Representatives of the previous generation - Holly, Kollar and Safarik - still lived, Slovak poets still argued aibout rythm and accent, and the nation still looked for consolation in Svatopluk's Great Moravian Empire (iHolly), or to RusS:ia - to that Slav "giant oak," a:s Kollar ca111ed: i t when suddenly new people began to appear and new voices were heard. Kuzmany, from the distant and wide scope of his predecessors, drew attention of the world to the heart �SLOVAKIA and morality of the .Slovak people. But in all thes.e manifestations there was as yet no revolutionary dynamics, a political program was sadly la0king, and, it seems, only poets dreamed romantically about the better days to come. Hollly and Kollar enlivened Slovak life by 'l ooking back to Slovak history and around themselves; •b ut that was not enough for the period ahead. When Stur and his foliowers came upon the scene they recognized the fact that the cultural process, ,beg,un in Slovakia already with the activity of the JUnilversity of Trnava and formulated and propagated by Bernolak, had to ,be completed and had to serve as a basis for the political ascension of the nation. What was realized by the· merits of Stur, Hur,ban and Hodza in our country in the cultura1 field - the codification of a uniform literary langua,ge - that was on[y the harvest of the products planted by past generations from the time of Balthazar Magin, Hugoiin Gavlovi,c, and others before them. Thanks to. the followers of Stur that they became '3Jware of the pollitical necessity of having an independent Slovak literary language, that they did not philo.: sophize about the maturity of Slovak nationalism but accepted it as something granted which had to be pl-aced on a proper basis and given a :Proper place. Stu•r understood that in hris time the Slovak nationaU process had matured and that Slovakia must appear on the scene of history as an independent political factor. It is in this that Stur's greatest merit lies. The question did not concern any Cze., cho-S:lovak separation, a:bout which those like to talk who do not want to understand natural law in the develqiment of nations. The people of 1Sloivakia never ceased truLkmg in Slovak and "Bible Czech" was always aUien to the Slovaks even though the Slo.va:k iProtestants used it for their reli-gious services, and even if some used it as a medium of Slovak literatuTe. Jaroslav Vlcek himself says in reference to this: "Such a situation of things was impossible; that was the feeling of all the better Slovak spirits . . . Evangelical clergymen wrote in a language that was not spoken anywhere in the world; it was not typical, lacked euphony and regularity." 1 �8 SLOVAKIA No foreign language, not even Czech, could move the SlovaJk people politically; only the Slovak language could do that. iin five short years the J.atter ,perfovmed a miracle; it not only .stirred up life rin the entire na;tio;n, but placed it under the revolutionary banners of Hwrban. In short: Stur was the first to formulate the Slova!k problem, the first one moved to armed r ebellion for the rights of the Slova;k nation, and the first (Sept. 1848) to proclaim the independence of Slovaikia ("We hereby proc}aim ourselves independent of the Mrugyars"). In the history of the 'Slovak nation, no one <lid as much in so short a time as St-t1r, who was only 41 whe:n he died. This was possible an1ly •b ecause the ground for the ascension of the new generation was ripe and properly prepared. Stur approved what already existed in Slovakia; he formulated what the nation felt and demanded. Stiir caUISed quite a sensation with his article "Zaloby a ponosy Slova!kov v Uhorsku" (Accusations and Complaints of the S'lovruks in Hungary), published in Le1pzig in 1843, in which he excoriated the chief inspecto r of the Evangelical Church and Schools in Hungary, Count Zay, for wanting to Magyarize the Slovaks. for political reasons. Count Zay, aware of the political currents in Slova:kia, in ,principle divided the inhabitants of Slovakia into three groUJps: the fir,s.t concerns itse~f harmlessly with the Slovak language; the second yearns to establish a western-Slav kingdom under the crown of Austria; the third has secret contacts with Russia. Whether these groups reaHy grasped the situation of those times or noit is debatable, but it is quite certain .that all ,w ere occupied with one thought: t,o save the 1Slova1ks from Magyarization and t,o secure for the Slovak nation an independent political status within the framewol"k of the Habsburg Empire. "We do not want ,r ights est·aiblished on favor, 'but we demand our rights on the basii,s of rig.ht," Stur declared. And these w,o vds became the foundation of al;J. petitioos and demands which were presented in Vienna and the Hungarian iDiet in Bratislava. From thJs moral and democratic viewpoint also issued aH of Stuir's controversies with Louis Kossuth. Writing in the name of his nation Stur demanded 1 1 �SLOVAKIA 9 ".p eace based on right and mutual understanding," declaring: "In the Pest Hirlap, Kossuth is fighting for equality of rights, but in the Diet he wants to give the orders to investigate and punish those who stand up for their rights ... That is his freedom and liberalism!" Art the Slav Coingress in Prague, 1848, again it was Stur who together with Safari.i1k defined the political direction of the entire Congress. Safarik spoike like a prophet, but Stur was aJlready forming a cilear .p olitical p11ogram. "Our aim should be t,o preserve ourselves! First of all we must serve ourselves, then others. Thus far Austria has existed but we have been perishing. What would the world say to us if we would stand for nothing else but the preservation of Austria? Let us say that we want to stand as independent Slovanic communities under the government of Austria!'' Strur's articles in the "Narodnje Noviny," his manifestations and ,p etitions in the Hungarian Diet, his letters to his friends - all these clearly state a clear political view: Slovakia as an independent crown land under the Habsburg,s; the Slovaks mu:Slt be recognized and respected as an equrul partner of the other nations in the empire. Sholl!ld we wish to ex.press Soo.r's politica:l ,p rogram in terms of the political terminology of today, we would have to say: Stiir was for a program to federalize central Europe. He was the first Slovak who demanded equality with the rest of the nations for his o,wn nation in the Central-EurQpean political constellation. He opposed Pa.Jacky's Austrophi-lism and sharply condemned Kossuth, who demanded the Magyarization of the 1Slovaks in the name of ,t he right of the Hungarian State. Stur inter,preted the Slo,vaik standpoint democratically by res,pecting the rights of others; he said: "Each nation is only one part of humanity and no nation can claim for itself that it alone has comprehended best human evolution and possible perfection. Therefore, no nation has a right to force upon another nation its way of life when that nation wants to move for itself and educate itself as it sees fit ..." The way to Slova:k independeince was supposed to• start �SLOVAKIA from the rebellion of 1848. The w:hole of Europe was once again in motion. After Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Prague and Italy, revolutionary explosions resounded also Hungary. It is not important that this revOilution was squaslhed; nor is it important that Vienna failed to, fll!lfill the promises and eXipectations of the Slo.v aks. For history and for our generation it is only necessary to know that the Slovaks afready one hundred years ago fought to change the po~ litical structure of Centra;l Burope, that they demanded an jndependent status for their nation within the framework of a solid federation ,b uilt on the ,p rinciples of justice and equality. Louis Stur, preeminent leader of the SlovaJk movement for independence apparently was quite ahead of his time. His philosQphica;l views, his democra,tic thinkiing and principles, his social demands, and his admiration for ,t he democratic system in the West call for serious study and interpretation. The controversies between Stur and Kossuth are very interesting from the democratic point of view; they tell us how Stuir and his foHowers interpreted their poJitica!l and social program in comparison to Kossuth, who wanted democracy only for the Magyars at the expense of the other nations of Hungary. ·S tur, a memlber of the Protestant Evangelical Church, was not afraid to accept and complete the wo,11k of ,p receding Cathohlc generations to preserve the heritage of the Slovruk nation. We must recall foir ourselves and for the free worid that the Slovaiks played a serious poilitica:l role in the revolutionary movement in Central Burope in 1'848-49, and that a!lready at thaJt time they clearly formulated a political program which satisfies even t'he demands of the prese1D.t time, so that on it the contempo~ rary Slovak generation can build its own, modern program orf federrulizaJtion. Stur belongs among the greatest of :European revoJ,u_, tli.onaries of his time. The Mrugyars gratefully built Kossuth a monument in free America, and the Cizechs haJVe one of Masaryk in Chicago. If they deserved to be reimembeired, surely Stur, who was a greater apostle of democracy and freedom for all people, should be no less honored in the �11 SLOVAKIA land of the free and the home of the brave. Ame,r icans of Slova)k descent should give this serious thought dwring Stu.r's centennial. The nation which produced Joseph Milan Hurban, Paul Joseph Safariik, John iKollar, John Holly, John Chalupka, Johnny Kral', Andrew Sladlwvic, Jonah Zaborsky, John Palarik, John Ka.lincia!k, Peter Bohu,ii, Joseph Bo:zetech Klemens, and Diony,z Sbur - is not a small nation. The shining light among the Slovaks of the nineteenth century, the formulator of their .p rogram, and the ·interpreter of their desires was Louis Stur - the father of modern Slovak nationalism . • • • STUR'S GROUP IN THE SERVICE OF THE PEOPLE Joseph Pauco Sturr's school exerted every effort to serve the people from which it descended in order to elevate it intellectually and to save it from physical ·a nd spiritual decline. Whatever was attempted in the cultural, economic, and social fields, all closely allied with the efforts in the political field, was dome with these aims in mind. From the beginning of thei.ir public activity, the Stu.rites were aware of the fact that they could elevate the people entrusted to and dependent on them only if they themse,1ves could obta·i n the- authority which wouid give them a mora;l right to reach and lead the Slovak people. Fo,r this they prepared thorough'ly. Their moral iprinciples are connected with perseverance, courage and nobility. The Institute of the Slovak Language and Literature dn Bratislava ailready ha:d thus fomned the yound and fiery souls: without morality, the first prerequisite, no one could get into the Irnstitute. Therefrom emanated the rest of the obligations of the members, such as love for Slovak, perseverance in preparing and presenting lectures, or in performing tas!ks outside the ·I nstitute. Whosoever is moral wdill not ibecome lost; therein was the assurance and safeguard. From this morally strengthened y,outh glowed a fire which overextended the frame,w ork of purely internal work. Gradua'lly the followers of Stur came into contact with the � 6 SLOVAK1IA tions under which the nation lives at .ho~e under Communism, it is our moral duty to acquaint ourselves with the endeavons of those who a:lready over a hundred years ago .warned us against the plague of Oommunism. With r-egard to the political mission of our geineratiO!Il, it wouild be to our advantage to. study the ideas of Stur, because then we shall learn that the credo and politicaJl legacy of Louis Stur was: "So that we ourselves might be revived and take the place in history which according to our strength and abilities belongs to us, we must once and for all free ourselves from the hated, alien yoke and gain state independence for ourselves: because a nation which is enslaved has lits hands tied, its spirit stifled, and is forever threatened with the danger that sooner or later it will perish." 1 • • • STOR : FATHER OF MODERN SIJOVAK NATIONALISM Marian ~iar In 1948 !Slovaks had an o,pportunity to assess the revolutionary events of a hundred years ago•. ,r t was our duty at that time to recall the legacy of Stur and his folJl.owers and to appraise their ,political program. Unfortunate:ly, due to circumstances !beyond our control, the year 1948 was not ·an opportune time for a ceJebration of such g,reat significance and extent as was the revolution of 11848-49. In 1956, however, during the .centennial of Stur's death, another opportunity presents itself to ponder over the fate, the Jife, the struggle, and the aim of the entire generation of Stur. Stephen Krcmery, eminent historian of Slova,k literature, said that Stu.r's generation .began "a new chapter in the rustle-fbu'Stle of a thousand years." Representatives of the previous generation - Holly, Kollar and Safarik - still lived, Slovak poets still argued aibout rythm and accent, and the nation still looked for consolation in Svatopluk's Great Moravian Empire (iHolly), or to RusS:ia - to that Slav "giant oak," a:s Kollar ca111ed: i t when suddenly new people began to appear and new voices were heard. Kuzmany, from the distant and wide scope of his predecessors, drew attention of the world to the heart �SLOVAKIA and morality of the .Slovak people. But in all thes.e manifestations there was as yet no revolutionary dynamics, a political program was sadly la0king, and, it seems, only poets dreamed romantically about the better days to come. Hollly and Kollar enlivened Slovak life by 'l ooking back to Slovak history and around themselves; •b ut that was not enough for the period ahead. When Stur and his foliowers came upon the scene they recognized the fact that the cultural process, ,beg,un in Slovakia already with the activity of the JUnilversity of Trnava and formulated and propagated by Bernolak, had to ,be completed and had to serve as a basis for the political ascension of the nation. What was realized by the· merits of Stur, Hur,ban and Hodza in our country in the cultura1 field - the codification of a uniform literary langua,ge - that was on[y the harvest of the products planted by past generations from the time of Balthazar Magin, Hugoiin Gavlovi,c, and others before them. Thanks to. the followers of Stur that they became '3Jware of the pollitical necessity of having an independent Slovak literary language, that they did not philo.: sophize about the maturity of Slovak nationalism but accepted it as something granted which had to be pl-aced on a proper basis and given a :Proper place. Stu•r understood that in hris time the Slovak nationaU process had matured and that Slovakia must appear on the scene of history as an independent political factor. It is in this that Stur's greatest merit lies. The question did not concern any Cze., cho-S:lovak separation, a:bout which those like to talk who do not want to understand natural law in the develqiment of nations. The people of 1Sloivakia never ceased truLkmg in Slovak and "Bible Czech" was always aUien to the Slovaks even though the Slo.va:k iProtestants used it for their reli-gious services, and even if some used it as a medium of Slovak literatuTe. Jaroslav Vlcek himself says in reference to this: "Such a situation of things was impossible; that was the feeling of all the better Slovak spirits . . . Evangelical clergymen wrote in a language that was not spoken anywhere in the world; it was not typical, lacked euphony and regularity." 1 �8 SLOVAKIA No foreign language, not even Czech, could move the SlovaJk people politically; only the Slovak language could do that. iin five short years the J.atter ,perfovmed a miracle; it not only .stirred up life rin the entire na;tio;n, but placed it under the revolutionary banners of Hwrban. In short: Stur was the first to formulate the Slova!k problem, the first one moved to armed r ebellion for the rights of the Slova;k nation, and the first (Sept. 1848) to proclaim the independence of Slovaikia ("We hereby proc}aim ourselves independent of the Mrugyars"). In the history of the 'Slovak nation, no one <lid as much in so short a time as St-t1r, who was only 41 whe:n he died. This was possible an1ly •b ecause the ground for the ascension of the new generation was ripe and properly prepared. Stur approved what already existed in Slovakia; he formulated what the nation felt and demanded. Stiir caUISed quite a sensation with his article "Zaloby a ponosy Slova!kov v Uhorsku" (Accusations and Complaints of the S'lovruks in Hungary), published in Le1pzig in 1843, in which he excoriated the chief inspecto r of the Evangelical Church and Schools in Hungary, Count Zay, for wanting to Magyarize the Slovaks. for political reasons. Count Zay, aware of the political currents in Slova:kia, in ,principle divided the inhabitants of Slovakia into three groUJps: the fir,s.t concerns itse~f harmlessly with the Slovak language; the second yearns to establish a western-Slav kingdom under the crown of Austria; the third has secret contacts with Russia. Whether these groups reaHy grasped the situation of those times or noit is debatable, but it is quite certain .that all ,w ere occupied with one thought: t,o save the 1Slova1ks from Magyarization and t,o secure for the Slovak nation an independent political status within the framewol"k of the Habsburg Empire. "We do not want ,r ights est·aiblished on favor, 'but we demand our rights on the basii,s of rig.ht," Stur declared. And these w,o vds became the foundation of al;J. petitioos and demands which were presented in Vienna and the Hungarian iDiet in Bratislava. From thJs moral and democratic viewpoint also issued aH of Stuir's controversies with Louis Kossuth. Writing in the name of his nation Stur demanded 1 1 �SLOVAKIA 9 ".p eace based on right and mutual understanding," declaring: "In the Pest Hirlap, Kossuth is fighting for equality of rights, but in the Diet he wants to give the orders to investigate and punish those who stand up for their rights ... That is his freedom and liberalism!" Art the Slav Coingress in Prague, 1848, again it was Stur who together with Safari.i1k defined the political direction of the entire Congress. Safarik spoike like a prophet, but Stur was aJlready forming a cilear .p olitical p11ogram. "Our aim should be t,o preserve ourselves! First of all we must serve ourselves, then others. Thus far Austria has existed but we have been perishing. What would the world say to us if we would stand for nothing else but the preservation of Austria? Let us say that we want to stand as independent Slovanic communities under the government of Austria!'' Strur's articles in the "Narodnje Noviny," his manifestations and ,p etitions in the Hungarian Diet, his letters to his friends - all these clearly state a clear political view: Slovakia as an independent crown land under the Habsburg,s; the Slovaks mu:Slt be recognized and respected as an equrul partner of the other nations in the empire. Sholl!ld we wish to ex.press Soo.r's politica:l ,p rogram in terms of the political terminology of today, we would have to say: Stiir was for a program to federalize central Europe. He was the first Slovak who demanded equality with the rest of the nations for his o,wn nation in the Central-EurQpean political constellation. He opposed Pa.Jacky's Austrophi-lism and sharply condemned Kossuth, who demanded the Magyarization of the 1Slovaks in the name of ,t he right of the Hungarian State. Stur inter,preted the Slo,vaik standpoint democratically by res,pecting the rights of others; he said: "Each nation is only one part of humanity and no nation can claim for itself that it alone has comprehended best human evolution and possible perfection. Therefore, no nation has a right to force upon another nation its way of life when that nation wants to move for itself and educate itself as it sees fit ..." The way to Slova:k independeince was supposed to• start �SLOVAKIA from the rebellion of 1848. The w:hole of Europe was once again in motion. After Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Prague and Italy, revolutionary explosions resounded also Hungary. It is not important that this revOilution was squaslhed; nor is it important that Vienna failed to, fll!lfill the promises and eXipectations of the Slo.v aks. For history and for our generation it is only necessary to know that the Slovaks afready one hundred years ago fought to change the po~ litical structure of Centra;l Burope, that they demanded an jndependent status for their nation within the framework of a solid federation ,b uilt on the ,p rinciples of justice and equality. Louis Stur, preeminent leader of the SlovaJk movement for independence apparently was quite ahead of his time. His philosQphica;l views, his democra,tic thinkiing and principles, his social demands, and his admiration for ,t he democratic system in the West call for serious study and interpretation. The controversies between Stur and Kossuth are very interesting from the democratic point of view; they tell us how Stuir and his foHowers interpreted their poJitica!l and social program in comparison to Kossuth, who wanted democracy only for the Magyars at the expense of the other nations of Hungary. ·S tur, a memlber of the Protestant Evangelical Church, was not afraid to accept and complete the wo,11k of ,p receding Cathohlc generations to preserve the heritage of the Slovruk nation. We must recall foir ourselves and for the free worid that the Slovaiks played a serious poilitica:l role in the revolutionary movement in Central Burope in 1'848-49, and that a!lready at thaJt time they clearly formulated a political program which satisfies even t'he demands of the prese1D.t time, so that on it the contempo~ rary Slovak generation can build its own, modern program orf federrulizaJtion. Stur belongs among the greatest of :European revoJ,u_, tli.onaries of his time. The Mrugyars gratefully built Kossuth a monument in free America, and the Cizechs haJVe one of Masaryk in Chicago. If they deserved to be reimembeired, surely Stur, who was a greater apostle of democracy and freedom for all people, should be no less honored in the �11 SLOVAKIA land of the free and the home of the brave. Ame,r icans of Slova)k descent should give this serious thought dwring Stu.r's centennial. The nation which produced Joseph Milan Hurban, Paul Joseph Safariik, John iKollar, John Holly, John Chalupka, Johnny Kral', Andrew Sladlwvic, Jonah Zaborsky, John Palarik, John Ka.lincia!k, Peter Bohu,ii, Joseph Bo:zetech Klemens, and Diony,z Sbur - is not a small nation. The shining light among the Slovaks of the nineteenth century, the formulator of their .p rogram, and the ·interpreter of their desires was Louis Stur - the father of modern Slovak nationalism . • • • STUR'S GROUP IN THE SERVICE OF THE PEOPLE Joseph Pauco Sturr's school exerted every effort to serve the people from which it descended in order to elevate it intellectually and to save it from physical ·a nd spiritual decline. Whatever was attempted in the cultural, economic, and social fields, all closely allied with the efforts in the political field, was dome with these aims in mind. From the beginning of thei.ir public activity, the Stu.rites were aware of the fact that they could elevate the people entrusted to and dependent on them only if they themse,1ves could obta·i n the- authority which wouid give them a mora;l right to reach and lead the Slovak people. Fo,r this they prepared thorough'ly. Their moral iprinciples are connected with perseverance, courage and nobility. The Institute of the Slovak Language and Literature dn Bratislava ailready ha:d thus fomned the yound and fiery souls: without morality, the first prerequisite, no one could get into the Irnstitute. Therefrom emanated the rest of the obligations of the members, such as love for Slovak, perseverance in preparing and presenting lectures, or in performing tas!ks outside the ·I nstitute. Whosoever is moral wdill not ibecome lost; therein was the assurance and safeguard. From this morally strengthened y,outh glowed a fire which overextended the frame,w ork of purely internal work. Gradua'lly the followers of Stur came into contact with the � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1956, Vol. 6 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1956 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 6 SLOVAK1IA tions under which the nation lives at .ho~e under Communism, it is our moral duty to acquaint ourselves with the endeavons of those who a:lready over a hundred years ago .warned us against the plague of Oommunism. With r-egard to the political mission of our geineratiO!Il, it wouild be to our advantage to. study the ideas of Stur, because then we shall learn that the credo and politicaJl legacy of Louis Stur was: "So that we ourselves might be revived and take the place in history which according to our strength and abilities belongs to us, we must once and for all free ourselves from the hated, alien yoke and gain state independence for ourselves: because a nation which is enslaved has lits hands tied, its spirit stifled, and is forever threatened with the danger that sooner or later it will perish." 1 • • • STOR : FATHER OF MODERN SIJOVAK NATIONALISM Marian ~iar In 1948 !Slovaks had an o,pportunity to assess the revolutionary events of a hundred years ago•. ,r t was our duty at that time to recall the legacy of Stur and his folJl.owers and to appraise their ,political program. Unfortunate:ly, due to circumstances !beyond our control, the year 1948 was not ·an opportune time for a ceJebration of such g,reat significance and extent as was the revolution of 11848-49. In 1956, however, during the .centennial of Stur's death, another opportunity presents itself to ponder over the fate, the Jife, the struggle, and the aim of the entire generation of Stur. Stephen Krcmery, eminent historian of Slova,k literature, said that Stu.r's generation .began "a new chapter in the rustle-fbu'Stle of a thousand years." Representatives of the previous generation - Holly, Kollar and Safarik - still lived, Slovak poets still argued aibout rythm and accent, and the nation still looked for consolation in Svatopluk's Great Moravian Empire (iHolly), or to RusS:ia - to that Slav "giant oak," a:s Kollar ca111ed: i t when suddenly new people began to appear and new voices were heard. Kuzmany, from the distant and wide scope of his predecessors, drew attention of the world to the heart SLOVAKIA and morality of the .Slovak people. But in all thes.e manifestations there was as yet no revolutionary dynamics, a political program was sadly la0king, and, it seems, only poets dreamed romantically about the better days to come. Hollly and Kollar enlivened Slovak life by 'l ooking back to Slovak history and around themselves; •b ut that was not enough for the period ahead. When Stur and his foliowers came upon the scene they recognized the fact that the cultural process, ,beg,un in Slovakia already with the activity of the JUnilversity of Trnava and formulated and propagated by Bernolak, had to ,be completed and had to serve as a basis for the political ascension of the nation. What was realized by the· merits of Stur, Hur,ban and Hodza in our country in the cultura1 field - the codification of a uniform literary langua,ge - that was on[y the harvest of the products planted by past generations from the time of Balthazar Magin, Hugoiin Gavlovi,c, and others before them. Thanks to. the followers of Stur that they became '3Jware of the pollitical necessity of having an independent Slovak literary language, that they did not philo.: sophize about the maturity of Slovak nationalism but accepted it as something granted which had to be pl-aced on a proper basis and given a :Proper place. Stu•r understood that in hris time the Slovak nationaU process had matured and that Slovakia must appear on the scene of history as an independent political factor. It is in this that Stur's greatest merit lies. The question did not concern any Cze., cho-S:lovak separation, a:bout which those like to talk who do not want to understand natural law in the develqiment of nations. The people of 1Sloivakia never ceased truLkmg in Slovak and "Bible Czech" was always aUien to the Slovaks even though the Slo.va:k iProtestants used it for their reli-gious services, and even if some used it as a medium of Slovak literatuTe. Jaroslav Vlcek himself says in reference to this: "Such a situation of things was impossible; that was the feeling of all the better Slovak spirits . . . Evangelical clergymen wrote in a language that was not spoken anywhere in the world; it was not typical, lacked euphony and regularity." 1 8 SLOVAKIA No foreign language, not even Czech, could move the SlovaJk people politically; only the Slovak language could do that. iin five short years the J.atter ,perfovmed a miracle; it not only .stirred up life rin the entire na;tio;n, but placed it under the revolutionary banners of Hwrban. In short: Stur was the first to formulate the Slova!k problem, the first one moved to armed r ebellion for the rights of the Slova;k nation, and the first (Sept. 1848) to proclaim the independence of Slovaikia ("We hereby proc}aim ourselves independent of the Mrugyars"). In the history of the 'Slovak nation, no one <lid as much in so short a time as St-t1r, who was only 41 whe:n he died. This was possible an1ly •b ecause the ground for the ascension of the new generation was ripe and properly prepared. Stur approved what already existed in Slovakia; he formulated what the nation felt and demanded. Stiir caUISed quite a sensation with his article "Zaloby a ponosy Slova!kov v Uhorsku" (Accusations and Complaints of the S'lovruks in Hungary), published in Le1pzig in 1843, in which he excoriated the chief inspecto r of the Evangelical Church and Schools in Hungary, Count Zay, for wanting to Magyarize the Slovaks. for political reasons. Count Zay, aware of the political currents in Slova:kia, in ,principle divided the inhabitants of Slovakia into three groUJps: the fir,s.t concerns itse~f harmlessly with the Slovak language; the second yearns to establish a western-Slav kingdom under the crown of Austria; the third has secret contacts with Russia. Whether these groups reaHy grasped the situation of those times or noit is debatable, but it is quite certain .that all ,w ere occupied with one thought: t,o save the 1Slova1ks from Magyarization and t,o secure for the Slovak nation an independent political status within the framewol"k of the Habsburg Empire. "We do not want ,r ights est·aiblished on favor, 'but we demand our rights on the basii,s of rig.ht," Stur declared. And these w,o vds became the foundation of al;J. petitioos and demands which were presented in Vienna and the Hungarian iDiet in Bratislava. From thJs moral and democratic viewpoint also issued aH of Stuir's controversies with Louis Kossuth. Writing in the name of his nation Stur demanded 1 1 SLOVAKIA 9 ".p eace based on right and mutual understanding," declaring: "In the Pest Hirlap, Kossuth is fighting for equality of rights, but in the Diet he wants to give the orders to investigate and punish those who stand up for their rights ... That is his freedom and liberalism!" Art the Slav Coingress in Prague, 1848, again it was Stur who together with Safari.i1k defined the political direction of the entire Congress. Safarik spoike like a prophet, but Stur was aJlready forming a cilear .p olitical p11ogram. "Our aim should be t,o preserve ourselves! First of all we must serve ourselves, then others. Thus far Austria has existed but we have been perishing. What would the world say to us if we would stand for nothing else but the preservation of Austria? Let us say that we want to stand as independent Slovanic communities under the government of Austria!'' Strur's articles in the "Narodnje Noviny," his manifestations and ,p etitions in the Hungarian Diet, his letters to his friends - all these clearly state a clear political view: Slovakia as an independent crown land under the Habsburg,s; the Slovaks mu:Slt be recognized and respected as an equrul partner of the other nations in the empire. Sholl!ld we wish to ex.press Soo.r's politica:l ,p rogram in terms of the political terminology of today, we would have to say: Stiir was for a program to federalize central Europe. He was the first Slovak who demanded equality with the rest of the nations for his o,wn nation in the Central-EurQpean political constellation. He opposed Pa.Jacky's Austrophi-lism and sharply condemned Kossuth, who demanded the Magyarization of the 1Slovaks in the name of ,t he right of the Hungarian State. Stur inter,preted the Slo,vaik standpoint democratically by res,pecting the rights of others; he said: "Each nation is only one part of humanity and no nation can claim for itself that it alone has comprehended best human evolution and possible perfection. Therefore, no nation has a right to force upon another nation its way of life when that nation wants to move for itself and educate itself as it sees fit ..." The way to Slova:k independeince was supposed to• start SLOVAKIA from the rebellion of 1848. The w:hole of Europe was once again in motion. After Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Prague and Italy, revolutionary explosions resounded also Hungary. It is not important that this revOilution was squaslhed; nor is it important that Vienna failed to, fll!lfill the promises and eXipectations of the Slo.v aks. For history and for our generation it is only necessary to know that the Slovaks afready one hundred years ago fought to change the po~ litical structure of Centra;l Burope, that they demanded an jndependent status for their nation within the framework of a solid federation ,b uilt on the ,p rinciples of justice and equality. Louis Stur, preeminent leader of the SlovaJk movement for independence apparently was quite ahead of his time. His philosQphica;l views, his democra,tic thinkiing and principles, his social demands, and his admiration for ,t he democratic system in the West call for serious study and interpretation. The controversies between Stur and Kossuth are very interesting from the democratic point of view; they tell us how Stuir and his foHowers interpreted their poJitica!l and social program in comparison to Kossuth, who wanted democracy only for the Magyars at the expense of the other nations of Hungary. ·S tur, a memlber of the Protestant Evangelical Church, was not afraid to accept and complete the wo,11k of ,p receding Cathohlc generations to preserve the heritage of the Slovruk nation. We must recall foir ourselves and for the free worid that the Slovaiks played a serious poilitica:l role in the revolutionary movement in Central Burope in 1'848-49, and that a!lready at thaJt time they clearly formulated a political program which satisfies even t'he demands of the prese1D.t time, so that on it the contempo~ rary Slovak generation can build its own, modern program orf federrulizaJtion. Stur belongs among the greatest of :European revoJ,u_, tli.onaries of his time. The Mrugyars gratefully built Kossuth a monument in free America, and the Cizechs haJVe one of Masaryk in Chicago. If they deserved to be reimembeired, surely Stur, who was a greater apostle of democracy and freedom for all people, should be no less honored in the 11 SLOVAKIA land of the free and the home of the brave. Ame,r icans of Slova)k descent should give this serious thought dwring Stu.r's centennial. The nation which produced Joseph Milan Hurban, Paul Joseph Safariik, John iKollar, John Holly, John Chalupka, Johnny Kral', Andrew Sladlwvic, Jonah Zaborsky, John Palarik, John Ka.lincia!k, Peter Bohu,ii, Joseph Bo:zetech Klemens, and Diony,z Sbur - is not a small nation. The shining light among the Slovaks of the nineteenth century, the formulator of their .p rogram, and the ·interpreter of their desires was Louis Stur - the father of modern Slovak nationalism . • • • STUR'S GROUP IN THE SERVICE OF THE PEOPLE Joseph Pauco Sturr's school exerted every effort to serve the people from which it descended in order to elevate it intellectually and to save it from physical ·a nd spiritual decline. Whatever was attempted in the cultural, economic, and social fields, all closely allied with the efforts in the political field, was dome with these aims in mind. From the beginning of thei.ir public activity, the Stu.rites were aware of the fact that they could elevate the people entrusted to and dependent on them only if they themse,1ves could obta·i n the- authority which wouid give them a mora;l right to reach and lead the Slovak people. Fo,r this they prepared thorough'ly. Their moral iprinciples are connected with perseverance, courage and nobility. The Institute of the Slovak Language and Literature dn Bratislava ailready ha:d thus fomned the yound and fiery souls: without morality, the first prerequisite, no one could get into the Irnstitute. Therefrom emanated the rest of the obligations of the members, such as love for Slovak, perseverance in preparing and presenting lectures, or in performing tas!ks outside the ·I nstitute. Whosoever is moral wdill not ibecome lost; therein was the assurance and safeguard. From this morally strengthened y,outh glowed a fire which overextended the frame,w ork of purely internal work. Gradua'lly the followers of Stur came into contact with the  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Štúr: Father of Modern Slovak Nationalism Description An account of the resource Marián Žiar Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 1 (18), March 1956 pp. 6-11 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Žiar, Marian Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1956 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f6ae8ca91a79ec7fce08f88c521a2e71.pdf 9c9c0537daff002f613c92fa6496f927 PDF Text Text 62 SLOVAKIA EDWARD BENEš - STALIN'S STOOGE DR. MICHAEL Z IB R IN Even if we could hear recordings of all the telephone convel'Sat.lons whioh took place in Prague in 1948 and see all tbe stenograpbl<: protocols of tbe secret conferences of Beneš, Zenkl and Zorin, or tbose of tbe Czech and Slovak Politburo, many o! us even then would not have a clear picture of how the Communist putsch of February 1948 could have happened in the Czecho-Slovak Republic. But tbe fact is that the Commumst putsch of February 1948 did not happen accidentally. And it did not •happen because Deneš had deceived the people of bis country, or because the Mlnisters resigned prematurely and wiťhout agreement. The fact is that the February 1mtsoh of 1948 has old roots. The victory of the Communist,s was the truit of a Iong, systematlc and relentless activity of the Moscow •Reds and, we can say, the characterle.ss Ieaders-hlp of "CzeC'hoslovak" politicians and thelr old connections with Moscow and the Communists. lt is said tbat Moscow seldom undertakes anytbing which lt cannot s urely and suc cessfu11y finish, i.e., it will not start anyťhlng unless everytbing ls fully planned and prepared to guarantee success. Time has always worked in favor of the men of the Kremlin. And so, when tbe "-CzeC'hoslovak" Ministers lost their heads and resigned, Moscow gave the word and Stalin's general manager in Czecho-Slovakia, ZORIN. leaped into ac tlon. Gottwald and bis companions had no trouble at au In taking over the Government of Czecho-Slovakla. Looking into the memoirs and wrltings of Dr. Edward Beneš and Winston Churchill, we flnd that President Beneš betrayed the so· ca1led anti-Stalin cons plracy of Marshal Tuchačevský and Rlkov in 1937. The betrayal destroyed more than 5000 army offlcers and lntellectuals who opposed Communlsm and wa,nted to put an end to lt. Beneš writes about the affair in his Memoirs on pages 33-34, and on page 231 he admlts that it was he who had betrayed what was 'b elng planned agalnst Stalln to the Soviet ambassador in Prague, Alexander Alexandrovský, Commissar of the hated OGPU, which later became the NKV.O. Churchill also wrote about the episode in bis book. Des-crlblng political events of World War II, Churchill reproaohes Beneš for bis betrayal of Tu'kaohevský, saylng that thereby Beneš became the servant of Moscow and the NKVD. During practically every conversat!on with Beneš, Ohurchill returned to the theme of Tukachevský and reminded bim that he had been taken in by an agent of the NKVíD and was doing the blddlng of Moscow. With Tukachevský fell not only the 18 who were convicted, but also about 5000 Russlan officers, offlclals and lntellectuals. And they were destroyed only because they wanted to do in 1936 what Stalin, Molotov and Litvínov dld in 1939, tha:t is make a temporary treaty wlth Betilin. After that ·betrayal in 1937, Dr. Edward Beneš became the lnstrument and agent of ťhe NKVD and served that agency because he was completely in thelr ,bands. Right there and then was prepared the way for all the shameful a cts whloh wrote finis to the "regulated democracy" of Dr. Beneš. The followers of Dr. EdwaTd Beneš, enjoy- �SLOVAKIA ing politlical asylum in free America and other democratic countries, do not llke to talk about thls matter, but even that is quite under· standable. From thM ,moment in 1937, w,hen Dr. Edward Beneš - according to the report of his own ambassador in Berlin, Dr. Mastný - gave the report of Tukachevský's betrayal to ambassador Alexandrovský in Pr,ague, he ceased to be a free man and the Calvary of the servant of Moscow and the NKVD actually began. ·when we consider what Dr. Beneš did from lhat moment on, we see that he did everything against the will of the western democracies who already had been shedding their blood several yoars Wben Beneä's Soviet friend consldered the war with Nazi Germany as a private af• fair of the capitallst world. In bis book ".Six Years in Exile," Dr. Edward Beneš expressed surprise that 'his former coNeagues in Parls did not want to receive him and acted qulte coolly toward him. Of course, Beneš was not sur• prised, but he only pretended to be. He knew that his former Paris friends were well aware of the fact that 'he had sold out to the Communist NKVD. His political friends - such as Gabriel P-a.ux, the French Ambassador in Vienna from 1933 to 1939, described the actions of Beneš as "symptoms of a loyal adherence of Dr. Beneš to hiJ Slav communist brot,her." We recall that Beneš traveled to Moscow in 1943 agalnst the wlshes of Eden, Churchill and other statesmen. There he approved the sell-out of Ruthenia and cleared the road to Czecho-Slovakla for Lhe Soviet Union. This he dtd wlthout any regard to the will of the peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia. Nay, even without the fuU consent of the "Provislon-al Czechos-Jovak Government" In London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia ,Moravia and nuthenia certainly had noMrlng to do with it. I recall the speeches of October and November, 1943, in the chamber of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in London. They were made not only by the admirers of the Kremlln, but also by the socalled civH politiclans who were blinded by Moscow. Among them were L auschman, Dr. Uhl!r and Paul Macháček. They strongly approved the journey to Moscow and insisted on going along with Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant bhe 1oss of asyrium in England and the good will of the allies. Beneš simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the ",hlg,her lnterests of our nations" demanded it. When Beneš returned from hls trip to Moscow, he brought the request to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a large part of Poland to the Soviets. If any one s•h ould quest:!on the truth of my statements, I am ready and willing at all limes to produce the reports of the "Czechoslovak State Council," the speech&<J of Lauschman and Uhlíf, and even lleneš's speech In its entirely after he returned from Moscow. They tell us clearly why the Communist putsch of February 1948 took place so smoothly. Beneš played bis game of politics not only within the lim!ts of the State, but also acted as advlser to ~he Poles. Later, as related by Gabriel Pam,, he even acted as adviser to bis 'Rumanlan fr!end, Ml· nlster l\faniu, who ended his life In a Communist jail. lt was Beneš who counselled Maniu to discard bis policy of reserve toward the �SLOVAK.IA Communists and •trust bbem, because, he sald, the Soviet guarantees were good. In the same manner lt was that Beneš spoke to Iran!an state.s.men and even to FrankUn D. Roosev&lt. Th!s !s a.II confírmed by the articles whloh appeared in the September 1948 and March 1949 lssues of the REVUE DE PARIS. There can be no doubt In any impartňal observer's mlnd that Beneš dld promote Stalln's stock wherever he went. THE SELL-OUT OF RUTHENIA After the first World War, the victorious nations acceded to the demands made by the people of Ruthenla (Sub-Carpatho-Russia) to annex Ruthenla to CzechoiSiovakla as an autonomous uru.t. Thls was accomplls-hed by the St. Germalne agreement, whlch was concluded September 10, 1919. The Ruthenes inslsted on parting wlth the Magyars and being lncluded in a Slovanic polltlcal formatlon, such as Czecho<Slovakla. Durlng the second World War, when the powers aga.in r~ognized the existence of Czecho-Slovakia, they did so In toto as far as lts boundaries were concerned, l.e., wlth Rutbenla lncluded. The Unlted States of North America never withdrew thelr recognition of the Czecho-'Slovak Republic, s o lt was not nece-ssary for the U. S. to renew thelr recognltion. Beneš wa.s well aware of that fact and governed himselt accord· mgly. He nominated Dr. Clbere, a fo11mer agrarian and Magya.T Com• mun.lst who could not even sign his name In Ruthenlan, to represent Ruthenla in the Czecho~lovak State Councll. After HiNer attacked Sov'Jet Russla In 1941, the bolshevlks In Prague turned thelr eml>assy over to Dr. Fierlinger and declared solemnly that 1:hey never recognized the Munloh Pact and that CzechoSlovakia must be restored in toto, i.e., as it exlsted before Munlch. Of course, they dld not mean that, but lt was good propaganda. Ruthenla was the topic of several dlscus.slons In London. When Francis Nemec was sent to Ruthenia !nstead of Dr. Juraj Slávik, the awl began to show from the sack. Nemec was not g!ven a cordlal receptlon Jn Ruthenla at all. The lnhabitants every-;vhere were slgn!ng petltJons, sponsored by the communist Petruščák, whioh stated that the Ruthenlans no longer ex!sted and t hat there were only Sub-Carpath!an Ukralnians in Ruthenia w·h o yearned to be embraced by the!r great mother, UkraJnia. A.fter many Iong squabble.s, Nemec flnally got a message through to Beneš in London through General Pika. 'Ilhe telegrams that Beneä sent throug,h Flerllnger were never seen by Nemec, because Flerlln• ger already then was Stalln's envoy and never a patrlotlc c:ltizen of bis own state. lt 1s slgn!ficant, therefore, bhat desplte these experl· ences thls same traltor Flerlinger was named, several months later, as the premier by Beneš. Nemec was In a very trying po.sitlon. When he wanted to be connected with London, he had to ask for perm!ssion to do so from t he Chlef of bhe Russian Staff so that he could trave1 to Moscow, where with the help of the radlo connectlon of General Pika, who was the Ohief of the Mllitary M.lsslon, Nemec could teli Beneš how matters were going and keep bim informed on Flerllnger. The latter was dolng rlght well. He stlll 1s a minister In the Prague Government, but General Pika was killed by the Communlsts. �SLOVA.Kl.A 66 When Nemec returned to Ruthenla, Bene§ sent him several new a!des as advisors, among them also Dr. Fedor Hodža and Dr. Cibere. The l a tter, however, was picked up by the NKVD as soon as he landed in Ruthenla. Later Nemec was joined by other members of Lettrlch's Slovak Natlonal Councll, but that did not lmprove matters. In J anuary, 1945, Husäk and Novomeský told the non-Communlst representatlves of the Councll that Ruthenla was deflnltely lost and that lt was tlme they realized 1t. He said the same thlng to the Czech members of the London delegatlon who wanted to install the !ega! order whlch was worked out in London on the basls of "contlnu1ty ot the ·Republlc," that is the flrst ConstltutJ.on, and accordlng to the hapless proclamation of the London Czeoh Government of June 30, 1944, whlch procla:imed a unlted "Czechoslovak" nation and state. At that tlme the Communists had asked the Slovak non-Communists whether lt would not be more profitable to support the idea of a Slovak SovJet Republlc so that the Slovaks could govern thelr own terrltory rather than adhere to the "Czeohoslovak" .ldeology whlch denied the existence of the Slovak natlon. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Republlc cou1d be promoted wlthout difficulty, because the Slovak State still exlsted. Husák and Novomeský, however, dld not get anywhere wlth thelr proposal. The Slovak non-COmmunists turned lt down, declarlng that lt was contrary to the Chrlstmas Agreement of December 1943, as well as the agreement which Ursfny concluded wlth Dr. Beneš In October, 1944, when he acted In the name of the Slovak National Council. When Husák and Novomeský falled to promote the idea of a S lovak Soviet Republlc in London, they lmmedlately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakla to present the proposal to Presldent Joseph Tfao and the Slovak Government. But Tlso and the Slovak Government would not hear about !t. Husák and Novomeský fa,Jled In thelr mission. Several months later, wlth many Slovaks in emigratlon, Clement!s took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today all the leading Reds of Slovakia are awaJting trlal for failing in their misslon. Clement!s has already paid with hls llfe. Ruthenia was lost. Beneš's deJegation had to go to Trebišov and after that things went ratber smootlbly. Flerllnger made tbe proposltions and Beneš accepted them. When he was returnlng from Moscow jn March 1945, Beneš could no looger enter Ruthenla. In fact he renounced lt solemnly on several occaslons. FinaJly, Bene§ had an agreement prepared whioh Flerllnger slgned for the Czechoslovak Government with great solemnity in the Kremlln on June 29, 1945. No one, outside the Communlsts, agreed wlth thls act of Beneš. No law, however, could contaln or restraln Bene§. He acted dlctatorially at any Ume tbat it beoefltted him. On August 24, 1945, witbout even consultlng the Parllament, Bene§ lssued bis presidentlal decree No. 4, concludlng the pact between the USSR and the CSR. Thls decree was the basls !or assigning new borders to Slovakia In the East. In October, 1946, everythlng legalized on the basis or foregolog decrees was publlshed In the Collection of Laws and Regulations. �56 SLOVAKlA 'l\he text of lhe above-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as slgnificant. lt beglns with the words: " . . . being c0rtaln that the provjsional National Assembly of the Czechoslovak •Republlc ehall concur with this agreement . . ." Beneš dld not wait. He and John Masaryk and Vlado Clementis decided matters without Parliament. Jv,; good prophets, they knew that Parliament wou1d certainly approve the agreement! Since Ruthenia was not a very big gulp, Beneš did not stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2, 1945, he lssued decree No. 8; whereby a number of homes in the most beautiful sectlon of Bubenec - in the modern sectlon of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, t he great sacrmces the nations of the USSR had made on the altar of liberation of humanity. Well, jt is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great extent did Uber.ate Slovakia from a great many things the Slovaks could use themselves, but it certainly was not ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them without even consulting the natiou about it. Only dictators act like that. And Beneš was a dictator by the grace of Moscow, even if only a temporary one. Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later Beneš showed bis appreciation to tbe so-called "llberator" of Prague, Marshal Konev, by ~iving him several very beautiful villas wmch were con• tiscated from the good cltizens of Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiful view of Prague. They are occupied by the Commun!st gestapo which was sent to Prague from Moscow to pian the enslavement and destruction of humanity and Christianlty In Europe. Such is the fruit of Beneš's actlvity - bis collaboration with the men of the Ifremlin and the hated NKVD. IN THE MAST ER'S FOOTSTEPS What Jed to the defeat of democracy and to so easy a victory of Communism in Czecho'8lovakia in February 1948, that !s a theme that wrn be expounded In as many books and dlssertations as there are vlews on that subject. Consequently dates and events wlll be multiplied. However, lt must remain lndisputably true that the date of June 25, 1945, ls a sad one, lndeed. On that f-ateful day the Czech socialist parties represented by Dr. Peter Zenkl, F'ierlinger and Gottwald, got together and w.illingly concluded an agreement whereby tbe "Na;tiona,J Front of tbe Worklng People" was formed. Slnce no one threatened the soclalists, lt was not clear agalnst whom the National Front was established. It is botb !nteresting and slgnificant ,that not a single Slovak attended lhat meeting and that among those who called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka and other leaders of Dr. Benes' old National Socialist Party - tbe very same people wbo today are telling the American public and the world that they always bated the Reds and thrut tbe Red.s ousted them from Government. But the truth is somethlng else again. The fact 1s that both 7.enkl and Ripka welcomed tbe Communisls, sought their favor, and wanted to win political prestige w!th lhe help of the Reds at the expense of the other polltical partles. Of course, today we know tbat they failed. The same thing happened to them that had ba<ppened �SLOVAKIA 67 and is still happening to all those who try to collaborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are worth, and then s1w allow them up or get rid of them. The "National Front of the Worklng People" created a "Centra! Coordinating Committee," In which every a.ffiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This commlrtee had the task of coordinating the work of the socialist parties. The socialist bloc prepared the ground for the various actlv!ties which led to the suppression of politlcal and reli~ious freedom and were the first steps taken toward a sociall11t dictatorship. The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the Agraria:n Party would be suppressed, the Catbolic Eagle organization outla,wed and fäat Catholic youth, as such, would not be allowed to organize. Together .they worked out a pian whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would be done away with and, at the same time, how tbese ľOtes, together with the Commuruist-controlled peasant unions, would be brought lnto the Communist Party. They also created and later legalized the Communist trade organizatlons, then the non-political Federation of Farmers and the United Youth Organization - au of which were supposed to be formed by the joint particlpatlon of all parties, but actually served only to communize Czecho,Slovakia trom the time they began to functlon. Therefore, lt is not true that Zenkl, Rlpka, and Vilem, and other Social Democrats opposed Communist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is that from the moment they accepted the so-called " Košice Agreement," they were always subordinate to and In the train of the Communlst Party and willingly continued that way not only on Russlan soil, or In Russian-occupied Košice, but a!so in "lib erated" Pl'ague. Even the "Joint Declaration" to the nation of June 28, 1945, 1s indisputable proof of the fact that they wanted to get into government with the help of the Communists even at the expense of democracy, Christlanity and freedom. This is a sound lesson for all who would collaborate with Communists. AU such people are digging their own graves, because Communism recognizes no agreements, concessions or compromises, and sw.allows up all who collaborate with it. This was made quite clear in the case of Husák, Clementis and Novomeský. They were exploited by the men of the Kremlin as long as they were needed to install Communist dictatorship over the Slovak people. But once that task was accomplished, they were discarded. In like manner the Commull'ists dumped Zenkl and Ripka, and thelr companions, and replaced them with Dr. Neuman, Ing. Šlechta and others; but even the latter will wlnd up the same way as Clement!s and his companions dld. So will also those non--Communists in Bratislava who even today try to collaborate with the Reds. But not all will be lucky enough to escape Red "justlce." Zenkl, Rlpka and thelr eompa:nions pose as martyrs of Communist injustlce as they bask in the sunshine of Amerlcan freedom, but the fact 1s that they were a substantia! part of the "National Front of the Working People" and, tberefore, helped to install the reign of Communist lnjustice in Czecho-Slovakia in 1945 . • • • � 62 SLOVAKIA EDWARD BENEš - STALIN'S STOOGE DR. MICHAEL Z IB R IN Even if we could hear recordings of all the telephone convel'Sat.lons whioh took place in Prague in 1948 and see all tbe stenograpbl<: protocols of tbe secret conferences of Beneš, Zenkl and Zorin, or tbose of tbe Czech and Slovak Politburo, many o! us even then would not have a clear picture of how the Communist putsch of February 1948 could have happened in the Czecho-Slovak Republic. But tbe fact is that the Commumst putsch of February 1948 did not happen accidentally. And it did not •happen because Deneš had deceived the people of bis country, or because the Mlnisters resigned prematurely and wiťhout agreement. The fact is that the February 1mtsoh of 1948 has old roots. The victory of the Communist,s was the truit of a Iong, systematlc and relentless activity of the Moscow •Reds and, we can say, the characterle.ss Ieaders-hlp of "CzeC'hoslovak" politicians and thelr old connections with Moscow and the Communists. lt is said tbat Moscow seldom undertakes anytbing which lt cannot s urely and suc cessfu11y finish, i.e., it will not start anyťhlng unless everytbing ls fully planned and prepared to guarantee success. Time has always worked in favor of the men of the Kremlin. And so, when tbe "-CzeC'hoslovak" Ministers lost their heads and resigned, Moscow gave the word and Stalin's general manager in Czecho-Slovakia, ZORIN. leaped into ac tlon. Gottwald and bis companions had no trouble at au In taking over the Government of Czecho-Slovakla. Looking into the memoirs and wrltings of Dr. Edward Beneš and Winston Churchill, we flnd that President Beneš betrayed the so· ca1led anti-Stalin cons plracy of Marshal Tuchačevský and Rlkov in 1937. The betrayal destroyed more than 5000 army offlcers and lntellectuals who opposed Communlsm and wa,nted to put an end to lt. Beneš writes about the affair in his Memoirs on pages 33-34, and on page 231 he admlts that it was he who had betrayed what was 'b elng planned agalnst Stalln to the Soviet ambassador in Prague, Alexander Alexandrovský, Commissar of the hated OGPU, which later became the NKV.O. Churchill also wrote about the episode in bis book. Des-crlblng political events of World War II, Churchill reproaohes Beneš for bis betrayal of Tu'kaohevský, saylng that thereby Beneš became the servant of Moscow and the NKVD. During practically every conversat!on with Beneš, Ohurchill returned to the theme of Tukachevský and reminded bim that he had been taken in by an agent of the NKVíD and was doing the blddlng of Moscow. With Tukachevský fell not only the 18 who were convicted, but also about 5000 Russlan officers, offlclals and lntellectuals. And they were destroyed only because they wanted to do in 1936 what Stalin, Molotov and Litvínov dld in 1939, tha:t is make a temporary treaty wlth Betilin. After that ·betrayal in 1937, Dr. Edward Beneš became the lnstrument and agent of ťhe NKVD and served that agency because he was completely in thelr ,bands. Right there and then was prepared the way for all the shameful a cts whloh wrote finis to the "regulated democracy" of Dr. Beneš. The followers of Dr. EdwaTd Beneš, enjoy- �SLOVAKIA ing politlical asylum in free America and other democratic countries, do not llke to talk about thls matter, but even that is quite under· standable. From thM ,moment in 1937, w,hen Dr. Edward Beneš - according to the report of his own ambassador in Berlin, Dr. Mastný - gave the report of Tukachevský's betrayal to ambassador Alexandrovský in Pr,ague, he ceased to be a free man and the Calvary of the servant of Moscow and the NKVD actually began. ·when we consider what Dr. Beneš did from lhat moment on, we see that he did everything against the will of the western democracies who already had been shedding their blood several yoars Wben Beneä's Soviet friend consldered the war with Nazi Germany as a private af• fair of the capitallst world. In bis book ".Six Years in Exile," Dr. Edward Beneš expressed surprise that 'his former coNeagues in Parls did not want to receive him and acted qulte coolly toward him. Of course, Beneš was not sur• prised, but he only pretended to be. He knew that his former Paris friends were well aware of the fact that 'he had sold out to the Communist NKVD. His political friends - such as Gabriel P-a.ux, the French Ambassador in Vienna from 1933 to 1939, described the actions of Beneš as "symptoms of a loyal adherence of Dr. Beneš to hiJ Slav communist brot,her." We recall that Beneš traveled to Moscow in 1943 agalnst the wlshes of Eden, Churchill and other statesmen. There he approved the sell-out of Ruthenia and cleared the road to Czecho-Slovakla for Lhe Soviet Union. This he dtd wlthout any regard to the will of the peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia. Nay, even without the fuU consent of the "Provislon-al Czechos-Jovak Government" In London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia ,Moravia and nuthenia certainly had noMrlng to do with it. I recall the speeches of October and November, 1943, in the chamber of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in London. They were made not only by the admirers of the Kremlln, but also by the socalled civH politiclans who were blinded by Moscow. Among them were L auschman, Dr. Uhl!r and Paul Macháček. They strongly approved the journey to Moscow and insisted on going along with Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant bhe 1oss of asyrium in England and the good will of the allies. Beneš simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the ",hlg,her lnterests of our nations" demanded it. When Beneš returned from hls trip to Moscow, he brought the request to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a large part of Poland to the Soviets. If any one s•h ould quest:!on the truth of my statements, I am ready and willing at all limes to produce the reports of the "Czechoslovak State Council," the speech&<J of Lauschman and Uhlíf, and even lleneš's speech In its entirely after he returned from Moscow. They tell us clearly why the Communist putsch of February 1948 took place so smoothly. Beneš played bis game of politics not only within the lim!ts of the State, but also acted as advlser to ~he Poles. Later, as related by Gabriel Pam,, he even acted as adviser to bis 'Rumanlan fr!end, Ml· nlster l\faniu, who ended his life In a Communist jail. lt was Beneš who counselled Maniu to discard bis policy of reserve toward the �SLOVAK.IA Communists and •trust bbem, because, he sald, the Soviet guarantees were good. In the same manner lt was that Beneš spoke to Iran!an state.s.men and even to FrankUn D. Roosev&lt. Th!s !s a.II confírmed by the articles whloh appeared in the September 1948 and March 1949 lssues of the REVUE DE PARIS. There can be no doubt In any impartňal observer's mlnd that Beneš dld promote Stalln's stock wherever he went. THE SELL-OUT OF RUTHENIA After the first World War, the victorious nations acceded to the demands made by the people of Ruthenla (Sub-Carpatho-Russia) to annex Ruthenla to CzechoiSiovakla as an autonomous uru.t. Thls was accomplls-hed by the St. Germalne agreement, whlch was concluded September 10, 1919. The Ruthenes inslsted on parting wlth the Magyars and being lncluded in a Slovanic polltlcal formatlon, such as Czecho<Slovakla. Durlng the second World War, when the powers aga.in r~ognized the existence of Czecho-Slovakia, they did so In toto as far as lts boundaries were concerned, l.e., wlth Rutbenla lncluded. The Unlted States of North America never withdrew thelr recognition of the Czecho-'Slovak Republic, s o lt was not nece-ssary for the U. S. to renew thelr recognltion. Beneš wa.s well aware of that fact and governed himselt accord· mgly. He nominated Dr. Clbere, a fo11mer agrarian and Magya.T Com• mun.lst who could not even sign his name In Ruthenlan, to represent Ruthenla in the Czecho~lovak State Councll. After HiNer attacked Sov'Jet Russla In 1941, the bolshevlks In Prague turned thelr eml>assy over to Dr. Fierlinger and declared solemnly that 1:hey never recognized the Munloh Pact and that CzechoSlovakia must be restored in toto, i.e., as it exlsted before Munlch. Of course, they dld not mean that, but lt was good propaganda. Ruthenla was the topic of several dlscus.slons In London. When Francis Nemec was sent to Ruthenia !nstead of Dr. Juraj Slávik, the awl began to show from the sack. Nemec was not g!ven a cordlal receptlon Jn Ruthenla at all. The lnhabitants every-;vhere were slgn!ng petltJons, sponsored by the communist Petruščák, whioh stated that the Ruthenlans no longer ex!sted and t hat there were only Sub-Carpath!an Ukralnians in Ruthenia w·h o yearned to be embraced by the!r great mother, UkraJnia. A.fter many Iong squabble.s, Nemec flnally got a message through to Beneš in London through General Pika. 'Ilhe telegrams that Beneä sent throug,h Flerllnger were never seen by Nemec, because Flerlln• ger already then was Stalln's envoy and never a patrlotlc c:ltizen of bis own state. lt 1s slgn!ficant, therefore, bhat desplte these experl· ences thls same traltor Flerlinger was named, several months later, as the premier by Beneš. Nemec was In a very trying po.sitlon. When he wanted to be connected with London, he had to ask for perm!ssion to do so from t he Chlef of bhe Russian Staff so that he could trave1 to Moscow, where with the help of the radlo connectlon of General Pika, who was the Ohief of the Mllitary M.lsslon, Nemec could teli Beneš how matters were going and keep bim informed on Flerllnger. The latter was dolng rlght well. He stlll 1s a minister In the Prague Government, but General Pika was killed by the Communlsts. �SLOVA.Kl.A 66 When Nemec returned to Ruthenla, Bene§ sent him several new a!des as advisors, among them also Dr. Fedor Hodža and Dr. Cibere. The l a tter, however, was picked up by the NKVD as soon as he landed in Ruthenla. Later Nemec was joined by other members of Lettrlch's Slovak Natlonal Councll, but that did not lmprove matters. In J anuary, 1945, Husäk and Novomeský told the non-Communlst representatlves of the Councll that Ruthenla was deflnltely lost and that lt was tlme they realized 1t. He said the same thlng to the Czech members of the London delegatlon who wanted to install the !ega! order whlch was worked out in London on the basls of "contlnu1ty ot the ·Republlc," that is the flrst ConstltutJ.on, and accordlng to the hapless proclamation of the London Czeoh Government of June 30, 1944, whlch procla:imed a unlted "Czechoslovak" nation and state. At that tlme the Communists had asked the Slovak non-Communists whether lt would not be more profitable to support the idea of a Slovak SovJet Republlc so that the Slovaks could govern thelr own terrltory rather than adhere to the "Czeohoslovak" .ldeology whlch denied the existence of the Slovak natlon. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Republlc cou1d be promoted wlthout difficulty, because the Slovak State still exlsted. Husák and Novomeský, however, dld not get anywhere wlth thelr proposal. The Slovak non-COmmunists turned lt down, declarlng that lt was contrary to the Chrlstmas Agreement of December 1943, as well as the agreement which Ursfny concluded wlth Dr. Beneš In October, 1944, when he acted In the name of the Slovak National Council. When Husák and Novomeský falled to promote the idea of a S lovak Soviet Republlc in London, they lmmedlately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakla to present the proposal to Presldent Joseph Tfao and the Slovak Government. But Tlso and the Slovak Government would not hear about !t. Husák and Novomeský fa,Jled In thelr mission. Several months later, wlth many Slovaks in emigratlon, Clement!s took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today all the leading Reds of Slovakia are awaJting trlal for failing in their misslon. Clement!s has already paid with hls llfe. Ruthenia was lost. Beneš's deJegation had to go to Trebišov and after that things went ratber smootlbly. Flerllnger made tbe proposltions and Beneš accepted them. When he was returnlng from Moscow jn March 1945, Beneš could no looger enter Ruthenla. In fact he renounced lt solemnly on several occaslons. FinaJly, Bene§ had an agreement prepared whioh Flerllnger slgned for the Czechoslovak Government with great solemnity in the Kremlln on June 29, 1945. No one, outside the Communlsts, agreed wlth thls act of Beneš. No law, however, could contaln or restraln Bene§. He acted dlctatorially at any Ume tbat it beoefltted him. On August 24, 1945, witbout even consultlng the Parllament, Bene§ lssued bis presidentlal decree No. 4, concludlng the pact between the USSR and the CSR. Thls decree was the basls !or assigning new borders to Slovakia In the East. In October, 1946, everythlng legalized on the basis or foregolog decrees was publlshed In the Collection of Laws and Regulations. �56 SLOVAKlA 'l\he text of lhe above-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as slgnificant. lt beglns with the words: " . . . being c0rtaln that the provjsional National Assembly of the Czechoslovak •Republlc ehall concur with this agreement . . ." Beneš dld not wait. He and John Masaryk and Vlado Clementis decided matters without Parliament. Jv,; good prophets, they knew that Parliament wou1d certainly approve the agreement! Since Ruthenia was not a very big gulp, Beneš did not stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2, 1945, he lssued decree No. 8; whereby a number of homes in the most beautiful sectlon of Bubenec - in the modern sectlon of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, t he great sacrmces the nations of the USSR had made on the altar of liberation of humanity. Well, jt is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great extent did Uber.ate Slovakia from a great many things the Slovaks could use themselves, but it certainly was not ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them without even consulting the natiou about it. Only dictators act like that. And Beneš was a dictator by the grace of Moscow, even if only a temporary one. Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later Beneš showed bis appreciation to tbe so-called "llberator" of Prague, Marshal Konev, by ~iving him several very beautiful villas wmch were con• tiscated from the good cltizens of Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiful view of Prague. They are occupied by the Commun!st gestapo which was sent to Prague from Moscow to pian the enslavement and destruction of humanity and Christianlty In Europe. Such is the fruit of Beneš's actlvity - bis collaboration with the men of the Ifremlin and the hated NKVD. IN THE MAST ER'S FOOTSTEPS What Jed to the defeat of democracy and to so easy a victory of Communism in Czecho'8lovakia in February 1948, that !s a theme that wrn be expounded In as many books and dlssertations as there are vlews on that subject. Consequently dates and events wlll be multiplied. However, lt must remain lndisputably true that the date of June 25, 1945, ls a sad one, lndeed. On that f-ateful day the Czech socialist parties represented by Dr. Peter Zenkl, F'ierlinger and Gottwald, got together and w.illingly concluded an agreement whereby tbe "Na;tiona,J Front of tbe Worklng People" was formed. Slnce no one threatened the soclalists, lt was not clear agalnst whom the National Front was established. It is botb !nteresting and slgnificant ,that not a single Slovak attended lhat meeting and that among those who called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka and other leaders of Dr. Benes' old National Socialist Party - tbe very same people wbo today are telling the American public and the world that they always bated the Reds and thrut tbe Red.s ousted them from Government. But the truth is somethlng else again. The fact 1s that both 7.enkl and Ripka welcomed tbe Communisls, sought their favor, and wanted to win political prestige w!th lhe help of the Reds at the expense of the other polltical partles. Of course, today we know tbat they failed. The same thing happened to them that had ba<ppened �SLOVAKIA 67 and is still happening to all those who try to collaborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are worth, and then s1w allow them up or get rid of them. The "National Front of the Worklng People" created a "Centra! Coordinating Committee," In which every a.ffiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This commlrtee had the task of coordinating the work of the socialist parties. The socialist bloc prepared the ground for the various actlv!ties which led to the suppression of politlcal and reli~ious freedom and were the first steps taken toward a sociall11t dictatorship. The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the Agraria:n Party would be suppressed, the Catbolic Eagle organization outla,wed and fäat Catholic youth, as such, would not be allowed to organize. Together .they worked out a pian whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would be done away with and, at the same time, how tbese ľOtes, together with the Commuruist-controlled peasant unions, would be brought lnto the Communist Party. They also created and later legalized the Communist trade organizatlons, then the non-political Federation of Farmers and the United Youth Organization - au of which were supposed to be formed by the joint particlpatlon of all parties, but actually served only to communize Czecho,Slovakia trom the time they began to functlon. Therefore, lt is not true that Zenkl, Rlpka, and Vilem, and other Social Democrats opposed Communist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is that from the moment they accepted the so-called " Košice Agreement," they were always subordinate to and In the train of the Communlst Party and willingly continued that way not only on Russlan soil, or In Russian-occupied Košice, but a!so in "lib erated" Pl'ague. Even the "Joint Declaration" to the nation of June 28, 1945, 1s indisputable proof of the fact that they wanted to get into government with the help of the Communists even at the expense of democracy, Christlanity and freedom. This is a sound lesson for all who would collaborate with Communists. AU such people are digging their own graves, because Communism recognizes no agreements, concessions or compromises, and sw.allows up all who collaborate with it. This was made quite clear in the case of Husák, Clementis and Novomeský. They were exploited by the men of the Kremlin as long as they were needed to install Communist dictatorship over the Slovak people. But once that task was accomplished, they were discarded. In like manner the Commull'ists dumped Zenkl and Ripka, and thelr companions, and replaced them with Dr. Neuman, Ing. Šlechta and others; but even the latter will wlnd up the same way as Clement!s and his companions dld. So will also those non--Communists in Bratislava who even today try to collaborate with the Reds. But not all will be lucky enough to escape Red "justlce." Zenkl, Rlpka and thelr eompa:nions pose as martyrs of Communist injustlce as they bask in the sunshine of Amerlcan freedom, but the fact 1s that they were a substantia! part of the "National Front of the Working People" and, tberefore, helped to install the reign of Communist lnjustice in Czecho-Slovakia in 1945 . • • • � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 62 SLOVAKIA EDWARD BENEš - STALIN'S STOOGE DR. MICHAEL Z IB R IN Even if we could hear recordings of all the telephone convel'Sat.lons whioh took place in Prague in 1948 and see all tbe stenograpbl<: protocols of tbe secret conferences of Beneš, Zenkl and Zorin, or tbose of tbe Czech and Slovak Politburo, many o! us even then would not have a clear picture of how the Communist putsch of February 1948 could have happened in the Czecho-Slovak Republic. But tbe fact is that the Commumst putsch of February 1948 did not happen accidentally. And it did not •happen because Deneš had deceived the people of bis country, or because the Mlnisters resigned prematurely and wiťhout agreement. The fact is that the February 1mtsoh of 1948 has old roots. The victory of the Communist,s was the truit of a Iong, systematlc and relentless activity of the Moscow •Reds and, we can say, the characterle.ss Ieaders-hlp of "CzeC'hoslovak" politicians and thelr old connections with Moscow and the Communists. lt is said tbat Moscow seldom undertakes anytbing which lt cannot s urely and suc cessfu11y finish, i.e., it will not start anyťhlng unless everytbing ls fully planned and prepared to guarantee success. Time has always worked in favor of the men of the Kremlin. And so, when tbe "-CzeC'hoslovak" Ministers lost their heads and resigned, Moscow gave the word and Stalin's general manager in Czecho-Slovakia, ZORIN. leaped into ac tlon. Gottwald and bis companions had no trouble at au In taking over the Government of Czecho-Slovakla. Looking into the memoirs and wrltings of Dr. Edward Beneš and Winston Churchill, we flnd that President Beneš betrayed the so· ca1led anti-Stalin cons plracy of Marshal Tuchačevský and Rlkov in 1937. The betrayal destroyed more than 5000 army offlcers and lntellectuals who opposed Communlsm and wa,nted to put an end to lt. Beneš writes about the affair in his Memoirs on pages 33-34, and on page 231 he admlts that it was he who had betrayed what was 'b elng planned agalnst Stalln to the Soviet ambassador in Prague, Alexander Alexandrovský, Commissar of the hated OGPU, which later became the NKV.O. Churchill also wrote about the episode in bis book. Des-crlblng political events of World War II, Churchill reproaohes Beneš for bis betrayal of Tu'kaohevský, saylng that thereby Beneš became the servant of Moscow and the NKVD. During practically every conversat!on with Beneš, Ohurchill returned to the theme of Tukachevský and reminded bim that he had been taken in by an agent of the NKVíD and was doing the blddlng of Moscow. With Tukachevský fell not only the 18 who were convicted, but also about 5000 Russlan officers, offlclals and lntellectuals. And they were destroyed only because they wanted to do in 1936 what Stalin, Molotov and Litvínov dld in 1939, tha:t is make a temporary treaty wlth Betilin. After that ·betrayal in 1937, Dr. Edward Beneš became the lnstrument and agent of ťhe NKVD and served that agency because he was completely in thelr ,bands. Right there and then was prepared the way for all the shameful a cts whloh wrote finis to the "regulated democracy" of Dr. Beneš. The followers of Dr. EdwaTd Beneš, enjoy- SLOVAKIA ing politlical asylum in free America and other democratic countries, do not llke to talk about thls matter, but even that is quite under· standable. From thM ,moment in 1937, w,hen Dr. Edward Beneš - according to the report of his own ambassador in Berlin, Dr. Mastný - gave the report of Tukachevský's betrayal to ambassador Alexandrovský in Pr,ague, he ceased to be a free man and the Calvary of the servant of Moscow and the NKVD actually began. ·when we consider what Dr. Beneš did from lhat moment on, we see that he did everything against the will of the western democracies who already had been shedding their blood several yoars Wben Beneä's Soviet friend consldered the war with Nazi Germany as a private af• fair of the capitallst world. In bis book ".Six Years in Exile," Dr. Edward Beneš expressed surprise that 'his former coNeagues in Parls did not want to receive him and acted qulte coolly toward him. Of course, Beneš was not sur• prised, but he only pretended to be. He knew that his former Paris friends were well aware of the fact that 'he had sold out to the Communist NKVD. His political friends - such as Gabriel P-a.ux, the French Ambassador in Vienna from 1933 to 1939, described the actions of Beneš as "symptoms of a loyal adherence of Dr. Beneš to hiJ Slav communist brot,her." We recall that Beneš traveled to Moscow in 1943 agalnst the wlshes of Eden, Churchill and other statesmen. There he approved the sell-out of Ruthenia and cleared the road to Czecho-Slovakla for Lhe Soviet Union. This he dtd wlthout any regard to the will of the peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia. Nay, even without the fuU consent of the "Provislon-al Czechos-Jovak Government" In London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia ,Moravia and nuthenia certainly had noMrlng to do with it. I recall the speeches of October and November, 1943, in the chamber of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in London. They were made not only by the admirers of the Kremlln, but also by the socalled civH politiclans who were blinded by Moscow. Among them were L auschman, Dr. Uhl!r and Paul Macháček. They strongly approved the journey to Moscow and insisted on going along with Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant bhe 1oss of asyrium in England and the good will of the allies. Beneš simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the ",hlg,her lnterests of our nations" demanded it. When Beneš returned from hls trip to Moscow, he brought the request to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a large part of Poland to the Soviets. If any one s•h ould quest:!on the truth of my statements, I am ready and willing at all limes to produce the reports of the "Czechoslovak State Council," the speech&<J of Lauschman and Uhlíf, and even lleneš's speech In its entirely after he returned from Moscow. They tell us clearly why the Communist putsch of February 1948 took place so smoothly. Beneš played bis game of politics not only within the lim!ts of the State, but also acted as advlser to ~he Poles. Later, as related by Gabriel Pam,, he even acted as adviser to bis 'Rumanlan fr!end, Ml· nlster l\faniu, who ended his life In a Communist jail. lt was Beneš who counselled Maniu to discard bis policy of reserve toward the SLOVAK.IA Communists and •trust bbem, because, he sald, the Soviet guarantees were good. In the same manner lt was that Beneš spoke to Iran!an state.s.men and even to FrankUn D. Roosev&lt. Th!s !s a.II confírmed by the articles whloh appeared in the September 1948 and March 1949 lssues of the REVUE DE PARIS. There can be no doubt In any impartňal observer's mlnd that Beneš dld promote Stalln's stock wherever he went. THE SELL-OUT OF RUTHENIA After the first World War, the victorious nations acceded to the demands made by the people of Ruthenla (Sub-Carpatho-Russia) to annex Ruthenla to CzechoiSiovakla as an autonomous uru.t. Thls was accomplls-hed by the St. Germalne agreement, whlch was concluded September 10, 1919. The Ruthenes inslsted on parting wlth the Magyars and being lncluded in a Slovanic polltlcal formatlon, such as Czecho<Slovakla. Durlng the second World War, when the powers aga.in r~ognized the existence of Czecho-Slovakia, they did so In toto as far as lts boundaries were concerned, l.e., wlth Rutbenla lncluded. The Unlted States of North America never withdrew thelr recognition of the Czecho-'Slovak Republic, s o lt was not nece-ssary for the U. S. to renew thelr recognltion. Beneš wa.s well aware of that fact and governed himselt accord· mgly. He nominated Dr. Clbere, a fo11mer agrarian and Magya.T Com• mun.lst who could not even sign his name In Ruthenlan, to represent Ruthenla in the Czecho~lovak State Councll. After HiNer attacked Sov'Jet Russla In 1941, the bolshevlks In Prague turned thelr eml>assy over to Dr. Fierlinger and declared solemnly that 1:hey never recognized the Munloh Pact and that CzechoSlovakia must be restored in toto, i.e., as it exlsted before Munlch. Of course, they dld not mean that, but lt was good propaganda. Ruthenla was the topic of several dlscus.slons In London. When Francis Nemec was sent to Ruthenia !nstead of Dr. Juraj Slávik, the awl began to show from the sack. Nemec was not g!ven a cordlal receptlon Jn Ruthenla at all. The lnhabitants every-;vhere were slgn!ng petltJons, sponsored by the communist Petruščák, whioh stated that the Ruthenlans no longer ex!sted and t hat there were only Sub-Carpath!an Ukralnians in Ruthenia w·h o yearned to be embraced by the!r great mother, UkraJnia. A.fter many Iong squabble.s, Nemec flnally got a message through to Beneš in London through General Pika. 'Ilhe telegrams that Beneä sent throug,h Flerllnger were never seen by Nemec, because Flerlln• ger already then was Stalln's envoy and never a patrlotlc c:ltizen of bis own state. lt 1s slgn!ficant, therefore, bhat desplte these experl· ences thls same traltor Flerlinger was named, several months later, as the premier by Beneš. Nemec was In a very trying po.sitlon. When he wanted to be connected with London, he had to ask for perm!ssion to do so from t he Chlef of bhe Russian Staff so that he could trave1 to Moscow, where with the help of the radlo connectlon of General Pika, who was the Ohief of the Mllitary M.lsslon, Nemec could teli Beneš how matters were going and keep bim informed on Flerllnger. The latter was dolng rlght well. He stlll 1s a minister In the Prague Government, but General Pika was killed by the Communlsts. SLOVA.Kl.A 66 When Nemec returned to Ruthenla, Bene§ sent him several new a!des as advisors, among them also Dr. Fedor Hodža and Dr. Cibere. The l a tter, however, was picked up by the NKVD as soon as he landed in Ruthenla. Later Nemec was joined by other members of Lettrlch's Slovak Natlonal Councll, but that did not lmprove matters. In J anuary, 1945, Husäk and Novomeský told the non-Communlst representatlves of the Councll that Ruthenla was deflnltely lost and that lt was tlme they realized 1t. He said the same thlng to the Czech members of the London delegatlon who wanted to install the !ega! order whlch was worked out in London on the basls of "contlnu1ty ot the ·Republlc," that is the flrst ConstltutJ.on, and accordlng to the hapless proclamation of the London Czeoh Government of June 30, 1944, whlch procla:imed a unlted "Czechoslovak" nation and state. At that tlme the Communists had asked the Slovak non-Communists whether lt would not be more profitable to support the idea of a Slovak SovJet Republlc so that the Slovaks could govern thelr own terrltory rather than adhere to the "Czeohoslovak" .ldeology whlch denied the existence of the Slovak natlon. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Republlc cou1d be promoted wlthout difficulty, because the Slovak State still exlsted. Husák and Novomeský, however, dld not get anywhere wlth thelr proposal. The Slovak non-COmmunists turned lt down, declarlng that lt was contrary to the Chrlstmas Agreement of December 1943, as well as the agreement which Ursfny concluded wlth Dr. Beneš In October, 1944, when he acted In the name of the Slovak National Council. When Husák and Novomeský falled to promote the idea of a S lovak Soviet Republlc in London, they lmmedlately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakla to present the proposal to Presldent Joseph Tfao and the Slovak Government. But Tlso and the Slovak Government would not hear about !t. Husák and Novomeský fa,Jled In thelr mission. Several months later, wlth many Slovaks in emigratlon, Clement!s took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today all the leading Reds of Slovakia are awaJting trlal for failing in their misslon. Clement!s has already paid with hls llfe. Ruthenia was lost. Beneš's deJegation had to go to Trebišov and after that things went ratber smootlbly. Flerllnger made tbe proposltions and Beneš accepted them. When he was returnlng from Moscow jn March 1945, Beneš could no looger enter Ruthenla. In fact he renounced lt solemnly on several occaslons. FinaJly, Bene§ had an agreement prepared whioh Flerllnger slgned for the Czechoslovak Government with great solemnity in the Kremlln on June 29, 1945. No one, outside the Communlsts, agreed wlth thls act of Beneš. No law, however, could contaln or restraln Bene§. He acted dlctatorially at any Ume tbat it beoefltted him. On August 24, 1945, witbout even consultlng the Parllament, Bene§ lssued bis presidentlal decree No. 4, concludlng the pact between the USSR and the CSR. Thls decree was the basls !or assigning new borders to Slovakia In the East. In October, 1946, everythlng legalized on the basis or foregolog decrees was publlshed In the Collection of Laws and Regulations. 56 SLOVAKlA 'l\he text of lhe above-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as slgnificant. lt beglns with the words: " . . . being c0rtaln that the provjsional National Assembly of the Czechoslovak •Republlc ehall concur with this agreement . . ." Beneš dld not wait. He and John Masaryk and Vlado Clementis decided matters without Parliament. Jv,; good prophets, they knew that Parliament wou1d certainly approve the agreement! Since Ruthenia was not a very big gulp, Beneš did not stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2, 1945, he lssued decree No. 8; whereby a number of homes in the most beautiful sectlon of Bubenec - in the modern sectlon of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, t he great sacrmces the nations of the USSR had made on the altar of liberation of humanity. Well, jt is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great extent did Uber.ate Slovakia from a great many things the Slovaks could use themselves, but it certainly was not ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them without even consulting the natiou about it. Only dictators act like that. And Beneš was a dictator by the grace of Moscow, even if only a temporary one. Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later Beneš showed bis appreciation to tbe so-called "llberator" of Prague, Marshal Konev, by ~iving him several very beautiful villas wmch were con• tiscated from the good cltizens of Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiful view of Prague. They are occupied by the Commun!st gestapo which was sent to Prague from Moscow to pian the enslavement and destruction of humanity and Christianlty In Europe. Such is the fruit of Beneš's actlvity - bis collaboration with the men of the Ifremlin and the hated NKVD. IN THE MAST ER'S FOOTSTEPS What Jed to the defeat of democracy and to so easy a victory of Communism in Czecho'8lovakia in February 1948, that !s a theme that wrn be expounded In as many books and dlssertations as there are vlews on that subject. Consequently dates and events wlll be multiplied. However, lt must remain lndisputably true that the date of June 25, 1945, ls a sad one, lndeed. On that f-ateful day the Czech socialist parties represented by Dr. Peter Zenkl, F'ierlinger and Gottwald, got together and w.illingly concluded an agreement whereby tbe "Na;tiona,J Front of tbe Worklng People" was formed. Slnce no one threatened the soclalists, lt was not clear agalnst whom the National Front was established. It is botb !nteresting and slgnificant ,that not a single Slovak attended lhat meeting and that among those who called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka and other leaders of Dr. Benes' old National Socialist Party - tbe very same people wbo today are telling the American public and the world that they always bated the Reds and thrut tbe Red.s ousted them from Government. But the truth is somethlng else again. The fact 1s that both 7.enkl and Ripka welcomed tbe Communisls, sought their favor, and wanted to win political prestige w!th lhe help of the Reds at the expense of the other polltical partles. Of course, today we know tbat they failed. The same thing happened to them that had ba<ppened SLOVAKIA 67 and is still happening to all those who try to collaborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are worth, and then s1w allow them up or get rid of them. The "National Front of the Worklng People" created a "Centra! Coordinating Committee," In which every a.ffiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This commlrtee had the task of coordinating the work of the socialist parties. The socialist bloc prepared the ground for the various actlv!ties which led to the suppression of politlcal and reli~ious freedom and were the first steps taken toward a sociall11t dictatorship. The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the Agraria:n Party would be suppressed, the Catbolic Eagle organization outla,wed and fäat Catholic youth, as such, would not be allowed to organize. Together .they worked out a pian whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would be done away with and, at the same time, how tbese ľOtes, together with the Commuruist-controlled peasant unions, would be brought lnto the Communist Party. They also created and later legalized the Communist trade organizatlons, then the non-political Federation of Farmers and the United Youth Organization - au of which were supposed to be formed by the joint particlpatlon of all parties, but actually served only to communize Czecho,Slovakia trom the time they began to functlon. Therefore, lt is not true that Zenkl, Rlpka, and Vilem, and other Social Democrats opposed Communist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is that from the moment they accepted the so-called " Košice Agreement," they were always subordinate to and In the train of the Communlst Party and willingly continued that way not only on Russlan soil, or In Russian-occupied Košice, but a!so in "lib erated" Pl'ague. Even the "Joint Declaration" to the nation of June 28, 1945, 1s indisputable proof of the fact that they wanted to get into government with the help of the Communists even at the expense of democracy, Christlanity and freedom. This is a sound lesson for all who would collaborate with Communists. AU such people are digging their own graves, because Communism recognizes no agreements, concessions or compromises, and sw.allows up all who collaborate with it. This was made quite clear in the case of Husák, Clementis and Novomeský. They were exploited by the men of the Kremlin as long as they were needed to install Communist dictatorship over the Slovak people. But once that task was accomplished, they were discarded. In like manner the Commull'ists dumped Zenkl and Ripka, and thelr companions, and replaced them with Dr. Neuman, Ing. Šlechta and others; but even the latter will wlnd up the same way as Clement!s and his companions dld. So will also those non--Communists in Bratislava who even today try to collaborate with the Reds. But not all will be lucky enough to escape Red "justlce." Zenkl, Rlpka and thelr eompa:nions pose as martyrs of Communist injustlce as they bask in the sunshine of Amerlcan freedom, but the fact 1s that they were a substantia! part of the "National Front of the Working People" and, tberefore, helped to install the reign of Communist lnjustice in Czecho-Slovakia in 1945 . • • •  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Edward Beneš - Stalin's Stooge Description An account of the resource Dr. Michael Zibrin Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 52-57 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zibrín, Michal, 1899-1968 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/3a30f0930fb14252cce15b5ae15d325c.pdf 67b79a93269b6588ade3875e6c82c94e PDF Text Text AUGUST, 1952 SLOVAKIA THE CASE OF DR. JOSEPH TISO B Y DR. M ICHAEL ZIBRIN F rom a legal standpo111t. the case of Dľ. Joseph Tlso may be di"ided into two parts, the first part taking place in the American Zone of Germany, and the second part in the National Court or Bratislava, the capltal of Slovakia. 1 was a witness at the Nuremberg T rials, where I had taken copious notes. There 1 met people in Czecho-Slovak uniforms who had Slo vak and Czech-souncling names, but spoke with a strong Magyar and German accent. Tbey were neither Czech nor Slovak by origin. One army captain could not even speak Czech correctly. These people were under Major Ečer, a Ieft·"' inger, wbo had borrowed the title or " General." His department boasted that it had tracked down Hr . .tosepb Tiso. President of the independent State of Slovakia and, later, alao the entire Goveľllment of the Slovak Republic. Ečer and bis group were sent to Germany by the Provislonal ľzecho-Slovak Government of Dr. J ohn Šrámek (the premier), but rbey were in contact more with Dr. Hubert Ripka or directly witb Dr. l~dward Beneš than they were with Šrámek. Formally, they were to <"Oncern themselves w!th Cze<"ho-Slovak refugees as a I enatriation c-ominission and also follow the Nuremberg Trials against war criminals. Tbey had a department for eve•·yth lng; and experts In every de1,artment. Of course. Ečer's outfit had at it~ disposal huge sum., of money to tr ack down the members of the Government of the Slovak Republlc, and especially P resident Tiso. When Beneš returned to l'rague. Ečer recelved his instructlons directly from bim. NO POLITICAL ASYLUM FOR TI SO After Presldent Tlso and thP Slovak Government !1ad fJeJ Sloľakia in Apríl, 1945. tbey sought ref11ge in Kremsmiinster Tbe Iast .,.et>k ot Aprll, Dr. Joseph Tlso set 0 111. for Mnnich to Carclinal Faul•11 1>er's residence, but was delayed two days in bis jOtl''D';!Y, oecause Munlch was occupied by the Aroeri()an Army by April 30. 194á. It was th•1~ t hat Dr. Josepb Tlso became senarated trom his Government and had a bsolutely no contact with 1I. That explains wby l:!•3 signature ;5 mil'~lng on the "Surrender No•t>·' of May 8. 1945, wbirh w1s b anded !o fi 0 1eral Walton H. Walker or thf' Amerlcan Army in J< .. 0 .nsmiinst.er. .\.r!C'0rd,ng to a report In the "STARS AN D ST R!"~:S" at that ••mP when Dr. J osepb Tiso C'Onld not reach l\funich. h .. •·"!tire.i to a umall monastery in Bavaria, wbere he remainerl until mi!irnry unlls Jlicked bim up for questloning and then Jed hlm off to 111 "itnerican roncentration renter. Tlso reroained in the roncentra• :on r 11 mp ror Quite some Ume. He was questionecl not only by Amerlcan •·1thoritles. but also by Ečer's soldlers until, finally. he was surren,➔ ..red by t)Je lT. S. ·Army to Ečer and taken to Prague In November 194u, This. in short, relates to the first part ot Tii;o's case, h :, we čan­ not pass it over so llgbtly. because hls brief account éontalns many tpgal lncons'ÍRtencies. náy even illegalltles, and is contrar y to every·thing whtch has heretofore or therellfter taken place anywbere· irÍrPtnlltion-ally aťrordlng to AmeriC'an Law �2 SLOVAKIA As soon as the Slovak Government of Dr. Stephen Tlso, a co usin ol Dr. Joseph Tiso, in the name of all t he refugees fľom S lovakia, handed over to the representative of the American Army the note given below and subjected itself to its commands, at that moment the status of all escapees and, therefore, even that of the leading Slovak politlcos, should have been considered according to international practices and American la,ws, where the right of asylum, except in this one case, had never before been vlolated, at least not as far as I can recollect. The "Surrender Note" of the Slovak Government to the Ameri• cau Army read as tollows: GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AT KREMSM0NSTER, AUSTRIA SLOVAKIAN To Lieuteuant General Walton H. Walker of the U. S. Army For the Commanding General XX Corps of the U. S. Army On behalf of the S lovakia n Government In exile at Krems• miinster, Austria, I, Dr. Štefan Tiso, as Prime Minister thereof, . do submit myself, the members of my Government, our famílied and our governmental policy completely to the Comm anding General of the XX Corps of the Third Army of the United State:1. W e submit ourselves for such disposltion as may b e wise and ordered by the Allied High Comand. We beg full protectlon of the Armies of the United States in whose homeland are living about one-thlrd of our natlon and accept the democratic prlnciples of the people, for the people and by the people. W e take the liberty on this occasion to beg for protection for the entire Slov,ak colony whlch was forced to leave its country and is now iu Kremsmiinster, Austria, also for a ll our couu• trymen who live in territories occupled by the Allied forces. Kremsmiinster, 1fay 8, 1945. (Seal of the Prime Ministry) Dr. Štefan Tiso, Premier. Or. Mikuláš Pružinský, Mlnister of Financa. Medricky, Minister of Agrlculture. Kočiš, Minister of Education. T. J. Gašpar, Deputy. W. O. Collier, Brig. Gen. U. S. Army. T. O. Curtls, Col. G. S. C. Davld W. Allard, Capt. Inf. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STARTS TISO ON ROAD TO GALLOWS True it is that all the Allies met in London as a joint International Commisslon to discuss the punishment of "War Crininals." Dr. Ečer was the Czecho·Slovak member of this Commlssion. It is also true that certain directives were agreed tiPOn for the surrender of war crlminals to indlvidual states on whose terrltorles the gullty or accused were supposed to have committed war crimes. Offlcial �SLOVAKIA 3 clocuments o( the Supreme Command o( the United Armies are supposed to tel1 ns jnst how many times such surrenders were effected, the negotiations that took pla<'e. as well as the decision reached ln each <'ase. Copies of these documenL~ were sent automatically to the Nuremberg Court to ascertain whether the persons to be surrenderecl to indivldual states ,vere needed or not at any bearings of the Court. or wbether the Court itself intended to try tbe lndividuals in questlon. 1 checked over these documents quite thoroughly but failed to flnd ?.nything of the sort relating to Dr. Joseph Tiso, or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso. I am, therefore, inclined to believe tbe whispered reports which circulated in Nuremberg át that tíme both among the Allies and the members of Ečer's commisslon tbat the surrender ot Dr. Joseph Tlso was not in accord with accepted legal precepts or p1,actices and that some violations of accepted laws and practlces had occurred in Tiso's case. On June 25th, and agaln on J une 27, 1945, the Czecho-Slovak Hadio clalmed that Dr. Joseph Tiso and, later, even ibe Slovak Government, were taken into custody by American authorities. Reports had it tbat they were transportecl to Pilsen. But the reports were false. Americans of Slovak descent were lntensely interested in the tate of Tiso and Slovakia. They requested their State Department not to surrender Tiso and the members of the Slovak Government to nenes• "Provisional Czechoslovak Government," because that certainly wo111<1 mean death for Tiso. But thls availed them nothing, Al the insistence of Benes' Government. the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. authoritles In Austrla to surrender Tiso and bis group to Benes' "Czechos lovak War Crimes Commisslon" wlthout even lnvestigating their statns as is evidenced from a letter of Actlng Secretary DEAN ACHESO~. written August 30, 19H. and published ln the "JEDNOTA" {Middlelown, Pa.) '.\{arch 5, 1947. Tbe letter read: "Since detalls concerning the surrender of Dr. Stephen Tiso and members of his Government are not available to the Department of State, a copy of your letlf'r has been transmittecl to the W ar Department together \ľith a request that the Secretary of War <'Ommunicate \ľl th you dlrectly on this particular matter. "A totJal of flfteen high officials af the former Slovak Government weľe arrested by the Unlted States Army at varions limes during tbe montbs of May and June. 1945. . . . "The arrest of these individuals and their rel ease to the CzechoSlovak Government was in conformity with United States policy re. garding the disposition of United Nations' nationals who cÓllaborated with or assisted the enemy. The policy is to apprehend such coJlat.orators as may be founcl within the jnrisdictión of tTnited States milltary authorities. to notify the respertive United Nations' Governments of such apprehension, and to hold such persons pending the clecision of the respective government~ as to their <lis_posltlon unless they are to de detained as war criminals or for other reasons. In view of ~bis policy, the Department of State, in October, 1945, informed the Commandíng General of thc Uníted States Forces, European �SLOVAKJA T.beater, that the fifteen individuala in hia cuatody who had been membera of ·· the collaborationiat Slovak Government ahould be re• leaaed to the appropriate Czechoalovak authoritiea. They were handed over in November, 1945. . . . From Acbeson's letter it ls quite evldent that Benes' "Provision,u Czechoslovak Government" was included among the "United Natlon,ľ t:overnments." All Benes had to do 1, as label any citlzen of Czecho· Slovakia a "collaborator'' and the U. S. State Department, "in r.011 · tormity with United States policy" pursued at tbat tlme, delivered He11es' politicdl opponents to Ečer witbout even investlgating tbe cbll,rges of collaboration. American tradltions went down tbe draln. 'ľbe rigbt of political asylum, always regarded as something sacred by tbe people of tbe Unlted States was violated in the case of Tlso and the Slovak Government. Benes. it seems, could get away with everyt,blng, because he knew the right people. Tbe ract that he 1 esigned as president and left his country wheu it faced a grave r-risis aud tben congratulated bi~ successor, wbo was elected coasti· tutlonally, meant nuthing to the U. S. State Department. But. it meant certain death to many patriotic Slovaks and untolll sufferings to many t housands more. It !s quite certain that negotiations were tied u1> several t lme!I. because the Engllsh were reluctant to agree tbat 'ľi so be surrendered to Ečer at a tíme when Prague had alreally announcect his deliveraiLce to Ečer. No matter how tb.e events of that time were distorted, the ract remalns that an unexpected telepbone call from the airport was rec·eived during a session of tbe Prague Parliament, reportlng that Dr. Joseph Tiso was brought to Prague. Shortly thereafter, Minister Ko· pecký gleefully displayed a pboto taken at tbe Prague airport which showed bow Tiso was being led under heavy guard with bands bound by a cbain and a loc-k. All the Communlsl papers and eveu tbe organ of Šrámek's Czec-h Populist Party, LlDOVÁ DEMOKRACIA (People's IJemocracy), displayed the picture promlnently. . Shortly aftE>r bis arrlval in Pragne, Tl~o was transported to Bratislava. wbere one wing of the Jail was em.ptied to take care of bim and bis ľOmpan!ons Tbey werE> guarded not by ordlnary jail guards. bm by !',elect. members of tbe Nationality Securlty Ouard. EV ERYTHING SET AGAINST TISO Investigation of • Tiso began at onre. But not according to accepted practice and, bence. wbole month~ pasRed witbout a regular preparation to review tht: case of Dr Tlso. As ROOn as Tiso was, placed in the jail or the Federal Co11rt. bis case. arcording to the laws in force at that time. belonged before the National Conrt and the lnves1:gation had to be made by the procurators or prosecutlng attorneys or tbe Natlonal Court. The prosecuting attornP.vs assigned to prosecute '.ľiso and his group were: Dr. George Šujan. Dr. l{lgan and Dr. Ra§la. Since each prosecutor waR assigned particular persons to prosecute. the whole investlgatlon suffered from a taek of unity ancl wa.s casual; hence, lt could malte little headway. Secondly, tbe prosecutlon. it seems. could not or dld not wan t to flnd any wltnesses besldes those who were arreste,I. �Sl,OVAKIA 5 And, thirdly, the Prague State Court constautly kept sendlng c1emands to have Dr. Tiso tPstiľy Iu varlous cases which were tried there. T lso was beard as a w1tness, and theše hearings took up much of tbe .tlme of the inveseigating organs. And so, for techoical reasons, as well as polltical efforts to oostpone Dr. Tlso's trial, the case of Dr. Tiso was not even ready up 10 the electlons or May, 1946, and, hence, could not even get started before tbat time. as the Communlsts had reckoned that it would. They exerted tremendous pressure to have the trial begln before the elections. but there were so many compllcatlons that it was imposslble to do so. After the electlons wblť'h the Slovak Democratic Party had won so decisively and In which tn<> promis,i of sparing Tiso's llfe plaýéd such a prominent role, it appeared for a time that Dr. Joseph Tlso would get a fair tria!. There is a great dlfference between a court and a court When a person appears in court, there can be doubts and objectlons as to bis personallty and morallty. The C'ourt exlsts for tbe purpose of removing such doubts; when that happens , the accused person Ie morally rehabl»tated. Very grave charges were made agalnst Tls o not only In the emigratlon. of Dr. Beneš, but also on the podlum of the Prague parllament. l3ut there al"o were promises and guarantees that t he worst would not happen. 'rhe beginning of 1946 was s igniflcant for its polltical ferment. witb pressure on the Slovak Democratlc Party. and the pressure or Dr. Beneš and the Prague Government on the supreme rlgbts or a soverelgn nation. These rlghts. it was thought. the Slovak NaUonal Coun<'ll, beaded by Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, had been assured by the socalled Košie.e Agreement of March 2. 1945. Tberefore, whatever t.he representatlves of tbe Slovak Natlonal C'ouncll had willingly ylelded to the Benešltt>s and the Zenklltes must be evaluated in terms of the infltu•nce these concesslons had on the fate of Dr. Joseph Tlso. If -w e woul<I glauce over t he resolutlons ot the Slovak National ('ounc il of March 2. 1945. wbere that body stressed the plcture ot Hate llte as it visuallzed it, t hen there !s llttle dlfference between 1hat co.n<'eption and the Slovak State as lt actually was. And lf the a:c<'epted princlples and resolutions had been adhered to and not devlated trom after t he electlons, In whlch the Slovak Democratlc Party had beaten t he Commnnlsts cleclslvely, Dr. Tlso unquestlonably would bave been allve today. From Aprll to June, 1943. Šrám ek's provislonal Czecho-Slovak Government In T,ondon was preparing the St.ate Act. whicb was pro<'lalmed' ón Jnne 30, 1943. It was plalnly evldent that thls act tbreat: Pned Tis6 and the entlre body of the Slovak Government. On March 2, 1945, the Slovak Natlonal Council clemanded In the very tlrst paragraph of the KošlcP Agreement that the new government of Czecho-Slovakla decJare that it does not identity itselt wlth tbe proclamatlon or June 30, 1943, of the Czecho-Slovak Government in I..ondon. �6 SLOVAKIA BE N EŠ H A S HIS WAY Shortly after arrivin~ in Prague, Dr. Edward Ileneš formally betray~d · Ruthenia to the U .,S.S.R., and, being recognized by Stalin, felt that he \ľas firmly in the saddle again. Alrea.dy on June 22, 1945, be demanded that the Slovaks relinqulsh what they had voted for on ?>farch 2, 1945. Dr. Beneš disregarded the wishes of tbe Slovak majority and begau to push bis own exponents to the forefront - Slávik. Hečka, etc. but when this dld not go well for bim, he turned to Dr. Vavro Šrobár •and Dr. Vladimír Clementis and several other more compliant persons wbo were willing to repudlate everything tbat Beneš had to promise in Moscow and Košice. Clementis was a leading Communist In Slovakia, while Dr. Šrobár, whom Beneš had named Financa Minister against the will off tbe entire Slovak Nalional Councll, was the foremost proponent of Beneš's National Socialism among the Slovaks. Confrontea w1th the promises he had made and the note wlllcb he had seut to the Slovak National Council trom London by means or Ursíny and Novomeský, Dr. Beneš sald that these were forced out ot him, just as the Pittsburgh Pact of 1918 had been forced on Masaryk. And, he aclded, tbat "everything was not in order even in MosBeneš remonstrated and demonstrated that an absolutely indeJJendent Slovakia was out of the question, that the threat of Russia was ever present, and that after Rutheuia, Slovakia woulcl surely be next in line for absorption by the USSR. The dlscussions and debates finally ended with the first. Prague Treaty of June 2, 1945. whiC'h cleflned the ľunctions of the various ministries, the matters 011 wbicb only the Prague Government could rule, and the matters that ,ľere s11ppose<1 to belong to the competency of tbe Slovak Natlonal Council. It is rathe r amusing that the seventh article of tbat Prague Agreement stated that tbe seat of he Supreme Court would -be in Hrntislava. That seat is still in Prague as it always had been. DEMOCRATS W IN E L ECTION S, B U T L OS E EVERYT HI N G Agreement or no agreement. Dr. 13eneš and bis Goľernment did what they pleased. Llfe in the state went according to the Prague Agreement more or less untll April 1946 - a month before the flrst JJOSt-war parliamentary elections. Then beli itself broke loose • The Slovak Democratic Party was attacked furiously by all Czech partles, being incited by Beneš, as well as the Communists. Despite this, ho,i,·ever. notbing can justify tbose "ho concluded tbe Prague Agreement of June 22, 1945. Even though the Freedom Party came into being at that Ume with money supplied by Šrobár, Beneš ancl thP Communists, or wa.« organized by Široký, and the concessions, made at a tíme when the Communists strongly demanded thE' tria! of Dr. Joseph Tlso, may in ~ome way be justified, there is no one who can teli me that Lettrlch was in any ,ľay justified to renounce the right to gra.nt amnesty. The man who did that knew well that Tiso was in the custody oľ the Fecleral Court in Bratislava and that he was surrendered from Slovak juriscliction ·into the hands of Beneš and the Czechs who hated him fanatically and undivldedly. ····· �SLOVAKIA 7 Iu Article 1 of the second Prague Agreement there is a section O, which speaks about clemency and states: "The President of tbe Republic grants mercy even in Slovakia and that also in matters which belong before the People's Courts and the National Court - on the motion of the Commissloner of Justice, who presents lt to the Government through the Officers of tbe Slovak NaUonal Council; the Government then returns the motion to tbe Ofticers of tbe Slovak National Council, if it has objections against it from the standpoint of all-state interests. bnt otherwise presents it to the President of the Republlc." When Dr. Lettriťh together with John Ursiny presented this agreement to the officers of the Democratic Party for approval and later a lso, when they explained it, expressly gave assurances that before signing this agreement they had dellberated with Dr. Beneš and that he ha.cl deflnltely promised and assured them that he would grant mercy to Dr. Tiso and they could safely transfer the power ot amnesty to bim. It is interesling, however, that nothing about tbis assurance ls D1entioned either in Dr. Kvetko's book, whlch was published in Bratislava in 1947, or in the article of Dr. Lettrich which descrlbes the case or Dr. Tiso. In bis articles Dr. Lettrich refers to the assurance of Dr. Beneš of September 1946 in Topoľčianky, where Beneš expressly promised that he would grant mercy to 'ľiso and added: "By my declsion I shall not cause any complications in Slovakia." In evaluating the truth and the proclamations of Beneš we must admit that in June, 1945, both presidents of the Slovak National Counc!I - Schmldtke, as well as Lettrich - had expressed themselves very sharply against Tlso in offlclal manifestations, when they already knew that Dr. Tlso was under arrest in Bavaria slnce June 9, 1945. We must not forget tbat the Premier at that time was Fierlinger who had attacked Tlso very sharply, and aJ.so the Democratic Party for standing back of Tiso. Per· 5onal expressions of Beneš, sneh as "Tiso wi ll hang," were known •o Lettrich and also to Ursiny. And that is more reason why they ;,honld have considered well whether they could believe Beneš, slnce they themselves had sald on various occasions, relating from their own P.Xperiences, that Beneš cannot be believed and especially not when be was concerned with the problem of savlng or destroying an enemy which he hated so insanely as he dld Dr. Joseph Tlso. As soon as the second Prague Agreement went into effect, Tiso c-ould have been saved only before the Court, if the Court would have rendered any other verdict but that of death. Despite the fact that Tiso's fate was sealed In such a way, we must not · end this chapter after the second Prague Agreement, because, in my oplnion, it is just at such limes that people prove best whether they possess character and a spina! column. L ETTRICH'S PRE-E LECTION PROMISES I know that many „people pleaded with :Beneš to grant clemency to· TiS-O even before the tria! was lnitlated. Beneš promlsed everybody ·that he would. But despite Beneš's promlse, leadlng polltlclans o! the Rlov1tk Democratlc Party should not have believed bim. if they thougbt �8 SLOVAKIA seriously and bonorably about tbe promises the Party had giveo tbe representatives of the Catbolic wing. Io Aprll 1946, the ,econd Prague agreemeot wa.s not tbe ooly iigreement made; an agreement was also concluded witb tb.e so-called <..:atbolic wing of tbe Democratic Party, wbicb was actlng more lndel'endeotly, and foť quite a Ume it was not known wbetber or not lt would bolt tbe Democratlc Party and join wltb tbe Freedom Party. Tbis so-called Catbolic agreement of tbe Democratlc Party was attacked viciously not only by tbe Communists, but also by tbe Beaeš Czechs. One of tbe main polnts of this agreement, even tbougb lt was oot expressed in writing, was that Tiso's life would be spared. In tbe May, 1946 elections, the Communists suftered a territlc l;teing, tbe Democratlc Party taking 62 per cent of the total vote cast iu Slovakia. So. everybody, especially tbose who voted for tbe Democratlc Party candidates, thought that the Party would keep lts pro mise to save the life of Dr. Tiso. The <..:ommunists and various representatives of tbe Trade Uuions, ho" ever. kept poundlng the tables all summer in 1946 to instltute the tria! of Tiso. It was clear that the matter could not bé delayed ľor long. Suddenly in the second half or October, 1946, without the Tiso matter stralghtened out, Dr. Lettrlch embarked on a visit to tbe llnlted States. Lettrlch claims that before his departure he had come to ao uoclerstandlng witb Pollák and Cvinček, Vice-Presidents of tbe Slovak ,\ .'atlonal Council, tbat the matter would not be asslgned to the Natio nal Court oefore h1s return home. Cvinček, however, denled that Lettrlcb had ,ald anything of the sort. But even 1t if was the trutn, !r is a very weak and slok alibi. Dr. Lettrloh was aware of the fa.cc , na· whlle he 1\!'aS preslrlent of the Slovak Natlonal Councll, tbe Com• •nunists got i.ny one tbey wanted on the Councll of Commissloners. Aud he knew that tbe most important minlstry, the Mlnlstry of tbe lnterlor, did not go to a member of the strongest party, but, lt was said, to a 11on-party man, Beneš's man, a servant of the Communlsts, tó General Ferjenčik. Tbe signature of Dr. Lettrich is on Ferjenčik's deoree. Arter tbese experiences could Lettr!ch belleve that Cvinček and Pollák would be able to hold the )lne w!thout hlm, when he hlmseU adm!ts in hls artlcle that Milan Pollák was uncertaln, tick.le and for tbe executlon of Dr. Tiso? · · The fact ls that after the departure ot Dr. Lettrlch, the case ot Dr. Tlso was presented to the National Court, and tbe presldent of the court senate became the feared Dr. Igor Da.xner, And here I see for Uié second Ume the sealed will of Dr. Beneš to bang Tlso at all costs. And for the second tlme I see Tlso's fate sealed with the a.s· slsiance of the representatlves of the Slovak Democratlc Party despite the promises and obllgatlons to tbe eleotorate. " I W tL L HANG OR. T ISO!" · Wben Dr. Daxner was allowed to become tbe presiding judge, 1Íolbfog good could be expected. All the assumptlons in thls regard XJaxner manitested by hls behavlor long before the tria! -and proved lt afterward. ·: . �SLOVAKIA 9 The day before the date of the main hearing was set, I myselt waé convinced of thls when I tried to help to remove Daxner. The Communiste, however, were so firmly anchored in the Slovak NaUonal Council that Dr. Daxner was approved as preslding judge of the National Court wlthout any dltflculty. On November 18, 1946, the National Court was supposed to eonvene an"d,determine the term of the maln hearing, begin the trlal anil present the decument ot charges agalnst Tiso. The previous day, when I had gone to Dr. Daxner to ask for a permanent admlttance pass to tbe tria!, Dr. Daxner began to argue and tried to persuade me to go along wlbh ševčik and Pollák, and not with the "popullsts and separatlsts." He asked me to follow the tria! of Dr.l Tlso and use my lnfluence In the Democratlc Party so that lt would not ldentlfy Itself wlth Dr. Tlso and would not make any dlfflculties for Da.xner. When I retueed, he banged bis flst on the table and screamed: "You are doing wrong. The Communiata will devour you, tear you to piecea, and I will hang Dr. Tiao!"1 tried to quiet bim ciown and cautioned him 'that a judge should not talk that way and that lt also was against the law for a judge to express his opinion so resolutely against the accused. But Daxner oniy grew more exclted, banged the table agaln and agaln and yelled: " Do whatever you want to, but I shall hang him !" I related the incident to Andrew Cvlnček, addlng that I was williog to teit:fy to it a.t any th:p.e. I reminded hlm that I knew Daxner well. I knew that Daxner WltS a paralytlc, a sadlst and a person of very bad mora! and · spirltual qualitles. I also told hlm that I did not belleve that Beneš would grant amnesty to Dr. Tlso. I refused to talk about the matter before the body o! o!ficers of tbe Democratlc Party, because ševčik and Pollák were among them, and · r knew definitely that they were betraylng our matters to the Communlsts. In fact I knew that ševčík was a paid agent ot tbe )JKVD (secret police). Thereupon the offlcers or the Party named a five-member commlttee to hear my story. Urslny, Cvlnček and Dr. Pietor reallzed the gravity of the situatlon and promlsed to try to do somethlng in Prague before December 2, the date when the hearings in the case or Dr. Tiso were to be concluded. THE M OCK TRIAL BEGINS But, alas, nothing happened. On December 2, 1946, Dr. Daxner opened the tria! with Dr. Joseph Tlso before the Natlonal Court in Bratislav-a. The trial took place in the jury room. The prosecutlon was represented by Dr. Rigan, Dr. Šujan anu Dr. Rašla. Dr. Tlso ,via.s defended by Dr. Grečo and Dr. Ža!Íkay. That is how a correspondenťs repor.t would read. And tbat is jus t about how the reports of the Slovak Press Bureau lookec\. But the truth 1s altogether differenl Tlso's frlends and bis famlly had engaged the servlces of a very respectable counsellor, Dr. Lojek, to defend Tiso. However, as soon as D"r. Lojek presented the full authorlzatlon or Dr. Joseph Tlso, he was ordered to appear before the poliťe, who began to inVesfigate hlm. They as ked why he wanted to defend Tlso, who dlscussed the defe nse wlth htm, how much he was pald, and other Jess sensLble Queatlons. What Lojek actually went tbrough ls known only to bim and the �10 SLOVAKIA police. The fact is that he gave up the defense o[ Tiso, and there was nothing else for T!so to do but ask the court to provide defense counsels. This incident, !( everythiug else Iu the tria! against Tiso would be iu order, ra!sed a reasou.ab!e doubt that the tria! would be just and in order. At the same time it made people th!nk and assume that the tria! would be carried on according to some agreement, that it would be a forma! process and. therefore, could not be just and fair. In a word that everyth!ng was cut and drled and Tiso's fate was sealed. I do not press the faet that Dr. Daxner was the presiding judge, but for the sake of the truth I must remlnd that attempts were made to remove Daxner before lhe tria! started. Of course, the tria! wa.,; prepared and no one could degress from the prepared program or could successfully take exception to it. Besides Daxner, there were six attendant justices, one a judge by profession, and tbree attendant justices as a reserve, in case one or the other attendant justices would drop out or get sick. It is a universal custom, that against such a court - whether it be called a senate or a jury - the accused, the prosecutor and the defense have the rlght to testify whether a certain person is accepta ble to them or not, and, also to state wbat objections they might entertain against any person of lhe jury or court. Likewise the principle holds universaJJy that when one is proposed as a wltness he cannot be in tbe same tria! also as an attendant or part of the court, and much less so as the presid!ng judge of the court. Slnce the Slovak Democratic Party could uot remove Daxner, tbe defense attomeys tried to replace bim as was their right to do. In the first place they objected because Daxner was incarcerated during the Slovak Republic and, later, had expressed himself on various occasions that all the accused must be hanged and, therefore, it was evldent that he was prejudiced. According to all pena! laws. prejudlce 1s an excluding circumstance. Then they proposed to have Dr. Daxner as a witness to testify that after Da.·rner was freed from jail, Dr. Tlso had allowed bim to take over hls judgeshlp again. Alexander Mach wanted Daxner to testify that it was only by the grace of Mach that Daxner was freed from prison on the basis of the false med!cal testimony and a false X•Ray picture. Daxner simply admltted Mach's statement and proclaimed that bis testimony was no longer needed. As far as prejudice was concerned. he sa!d that the objection was not proper, because he sald he was objeetive, and imediately ordered the tria! to begin. AL L OBJECTION S OVE RRU L ED According to every Jaw. objections cannot be overruled by a •judge against whom they are made. This is a fundamental princlple of pena! procedure. But laws were no gulde for Daxner. He had only one gulde: to condude the process as speE!dily a.s poss!ble and render the verdict he had promlsed bis bosses. When the defense counsels saw that they were gett!ng nowhere, they began to tackle the matter from a Jegal standpoint. They ob- �SLOVAKIA ll jected that the court was not made up properly, and that the de<:rees of lhe Slovak ::-l'ational Council about people's courts were not valid and, finally, that Dr. Tiso was not surrendered properly by the American occupation authorltles, as prescribed in accepted 1nter· natlonal regulations, but that Tiso was forcefully transported lnto Czecho-Slovakia without the knowledge of the four powers concerned, or only with the knowledge of one of those powers. The defense sald that if Tiso was a war crlmlnal, then bis surrender should have been determined by t he Internatlonal Tribunal in :-.1Uremberg. U he was not a war crimlnal, and the American General In command in Kremsmlinster May 8, 1945, accepted the capitulatlon or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso, then, in that case, all members of that Government, and so much more the Presldent, have the rlght the right of asylum, thls belng based on the following arguments: l. According to the Atlantlc Charter, i!IS\ted by the Presldent or llle United States and the Engllsh Prime Minister, every nation has the · right to choose the form of government under which it shall live· and to its own statehood; 2. the head of such a state was not subject to the legislative power of a foreign state for pena! acts, which may have been committed during the existence of and on the territory of such a State; 3. the Slovak State was recognized by some 27 States, including Great Britaln, with which it had diplomatlc rela· tions; also with the Soviet Union: 4. neither Great Drltain nor France agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso and, therefore, Dr. Tlso should be returned to Altčitting, in Bavaria, wbere on Jtme 9, 1945. he was arrested by American Military Police. 'l"hls contention o[ the defense still holds today. I myself can eonflrm that Britaln and France never agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso. According to the International Agreement oť J anuary 13, 1942, eoncluded in London, which refers to the Atlantlc Charter and the proclama.tion of Roosevelt and Churchill of October 25, 1941, lliternatlonii:lly only those criminals were to be surrendered who had undertaken, besides mllitary acts, such attacks against clvillzed populntions whlch were considered criminal among clvilized natlons. Tiso was not accused of such a crime. Furthermore, others who could be surrendered were those·,, who as occup,tnts, or representatives of occupants, committed or allowed to be committed punishable acts against the clvillan popu!a:tion. · Tiso was not accused of ,any such punlsha.ble acts by the In· habitants of the ló Slovak vlllages which were taken by the Slovak Hepubllc from the Polish territory. If, however, he or bis subordinates had commltted a pena! act on Pollsh terrltory, then, accordlng to the agreement above, Dr. Tiso could be accused only by the Poles and tried II! Warsaw. . Na.turally, Dr. Daxner repucliated any and all such objectlons and announced that bis court was competent to try Dr. Tlso. Then the tleťense counsels requested that the tria! take place before a regular and not before a revolutionary national court, because all the preferred pena! acts were commltted before the two decrees of 1945 ot tbe Slovak National Councll were effective. The defense clalmed that only Cor pena! acts commltted after the issuance of some pena! form ,vas 1-t posslble to carry ·on a pena! procedure arcording to sucb a norm. �12 SLOVAKIA even though penal sanctions remain according to some Jater norm. The pena! procedure itself, however, should be carrled on according to thé norma! penal oťder. Even Tlso hlmself declared that he dld not recognlze the decree of the Slovak National Court, by whlch the socalled National Court and the People's Courts were establlshed, because he was under arrest trom June 9, 1945, and, therefore, could not have committed any pena! act against the regulations lssued by the Slovak National Councll. We la.wyers had debated whole hours before the Tiso tria! · about these very weighty Jegal problems and then even durlng the trial, but Daxner repudiated them in a s ingle moment by banglng on the table and screaming: "I . repudiate all objections. ľll take care of all pena! procedures here!" And that is how the tria) against Tiso began. Up to that tíme, the tria) room was fllled wlth Slovak and Czech reporters and forelgn observers, but after that moment all who were not resldents of Bratislava left the proceedlngs, because they reallzed that the fate of Tlso was sealed and only a mock tria) was to be staged. During the two hours, which I have thus f.ar desctibed, Daxner several tlmes howled llke a jackall, banged on the table and threat• ened Dr. ~abkay, and even Dr. Kšinan, who defended Mach, tbat he would tbrow tbem out of the court room. The whole procedure was recorded on sound tape and tbat evenlng the newsmen wbo _gave a report. about the trial, p•ayed this portion of the recorded tape, wblch was falthfully recorded. The popula.tlon of Slovakl-a bega.n to sound off because of Da.xner's conduct. Tbe Democratic Party and lts representatlv01, were the target of bitter and viclous attacks; the people inslsted that the Party keep lts promlses. It began to be generally sald that Tiso's verdict was already settled and that what• ever Da.xner was doing was only a comedy. Desplte the fact that tbi!I was true, thls process nevertheless. brought out some hlstorical trutbs which we shall need In the future and whicb without tbi.B trial would not have come to l!ght. Wh~n Dr. Žabkay rose to bis feet on March 6th and said only t.hree words - "Prosim, aby bolo ..." ("l beg, in order that lt be") he was lnterrupted by Daxner who jumped to bis feet and barked: "Tbe court overrules tbat!" When Žabkay protested and explained that the court could not overrule something which he had not al! yet aaid, Dr. Daxner bellowed: "But I tel1 you tbat the court does over• rule lt!" THE W I TNESSES The wltnesses who testified in the Tlso tria) might be ·p laced in three categories: . • l, The Catholic clergymen toward whom I)axner acted . arro· gantly. I thtnk tbat it was on account or tbem that Dr. Tiso decided tQ (!Pl!&k In h!s own defen$e, They were Archblshop Charles Kmefko and BJshop Michael Bm;alka. From the leg.al standpo!nt, I regarded it as the greatest tnsult When Dr.. Daxner announced in the name of the Court that , he woul<l �SLOVAKIA 13 not swear ln tbese witnesses. Ordinarily, according to prevalling la.ws in Europe, the court does not swear in a wltness when there are reasons why it does not want to believe hlm. That 1s, In Europe a witness is first heard and then the court determlnes whether he ah!Wi be sworn io or not. Daxner's conduct was openly provocatlve and in· s ulting to disbonor such a serlous, aged man, as was Dr. Kmetko, wbo was respected by all decent Slovaks regar-dless of thelr rellgious beliefs. It is sigo1ficant that at tbe time Dr. Kmeťko was teslfylng, the Czech Catholic clergymen had several deliberatlons and lssued memoranda and reports, but displayed practically no open interest in what was happening In Slovakia. Not even Archbishop Joseph Beran, the Czech Primate, could find anything to say in tbe interest of the honor of the Catholic priesthood of Slovakia representéd by Pr, KmeCko. Tbe Czech clergymen followed Beran's example and. failed to ralse their volces and to rally tbe Catholic Czechs !n defense ot Justlce and righteousness. 2. In· the second category belonged the Slovak members of Gottwa.lďs government, namely, Ursiny and Lichner. Daxner talked to Ursíny as thóuugh he were an underling. From flve meters away Daxner greeted htm: "Why we, Mr. VlcePreinler of the Government, know each otber well, because we or• ganlzed the underground together." - Ursíny broke out lnto a broad s mlle and said nothing, though he should bave said: You, Mr. presidlng judge, were nowhere and did nothing, unless you were in some tavern, Sir, and there I, John Ursíny, did not go. Otberwise Ursíny did not say anything substantial, except that 'ľiso did not want bim in the Slovak Government. nor in the Peasant Banks, and that he was In the concentratlon camp at Illava for three days, but was not beaten there and was fed well. Daxner exploited Ursiny, however, by using general expres11ions, s·uch as, "Why we know that ... Why we did that together ... Why that does not have to be explained to us." Of course, the Communist press immediately glorified Daxner as a great hero of the underground movement, to whose actlvlty_ UT· Ríny hlmself had attested. Minlste.r .Tohn Lichner, however. ,v,as a witness of another type. Daxner did not welcome bim with a smile or a greetlng, but with the questlon: "You were a minister of Dr. Tiso's Government?" - He -then asked Lichner whether he traveled and delivered speeches in a uniform of tbe (Hlinka) Guard and why Tiso later dlsmlseed hlm. ' .Licbner expla!ned as best he could, but it must have been evident even to hlm tbat Daxner was not even remotely lnterestjid. 3. The third group of witnesses was the most interestlng. I be· ·11evé I can· characterize thls group properly, because I had wltnessed t hé N'uremberg trlals. There I saw ield Marshal von Paulus go before the :rrtternational Trlbunal, and in Bratislava I saw General Ferdin,and Čatld!ľ go béfore the National Cou-rt. Both men had much in common Both were soldlers, generals; thelr appearance In court w.as .a -surprlse; and both appeared a.t a time when lt. was opportune for tbe. Commun!sta and einbárrasslng for the defense. · In Nuremberg, ·Goerlng read romances and detectlve storles and generally was not lnterested In the tria!. When, to hls great surprlse, �14 SLOVAKTA the American Police brought Paulus, the heroic "defender" of Stalingrad, into the court room, Goering for a moment took off bis glasses, looked around, llstened and then said to the leading personaJities of the German General Staff: "'Fhis is hopeless ! this is swinishness ! " Should I repeat only thls sentence In reference to Čatloš, I would help the reader of these lines, because the result wlll be the same. Paulus entered the Nuremberg court room slowly with a oautious step; he was attired in an elegant dark blue sult, a starc-hed whJte s hirt, as if it was out of porcelain. He spoke slowly and pretended to be deaf; bis eyes were glassy, his frame strlkingly numb, and hli< eyes up1ifted almost straight to the heavens. The same could be s-ald for Čatloš. He, too, was dressed In a dark blue suit and was about twice as deaf as Paulus; but bis eyes, s tance were the same - just as if twlns appeared on two different stages. Paulus saw nothing but evil in everythlng that Hitler dld. Čatloš tried to prove to Tiso that he knew about all thlngs - the posslble and the impossible - because he, Čatloš, reported to bim on everything every morning ,at nine o'clock. Tlso smiled ironically and saíd: "To report, report he did, but whether he told me everything, I do not know." The fact is, according to what Čatloš said, that Čatloš sbould have sat in Tiso's place; for those acts Čatloš and not Tiso should have answered. It is interesting that bctb generals stuck to the orders or MosťOW, that they preferred to be deaf and more deaf, so tbey could speak slowly and thus have time to think thlngs over. Both held up faiľly well the first several hours, but then both slipped up a bit. Paulus was taken back to Moscow, and Catloš to the Rratislava jail. Later Catloš was taken to Prague, where Czéťh mllltary correspondents questloned him. I had not met Paulus before and, hence, did not know bim. But I knew Čatloš from my cbildhood days, and the last time I saw ·hlm was In September, 1939, in Prešov. The Catloš, who seven years later ťame to the court room of Dr. Daxner, seemed to be about twenty years older and bis mind compared wlth that or a tbird grader and not that of a general. I am wllling to testlfy under oath even today that the Catloš who sat before Daxner was not the master of his own wlll, tbat he was a broken man actlng under pressure of some one else. Catloš definitely was not a.ťtlng as a norma! person. Another such wltness was Dr. Martin Sokol, former Premier or the Slovak Parliament. The first day he acted as Catloš did; ma.ny t!mes he made it aggravating for Tiso; h e was stupified, deaf and gazed toward tbec eiling. On the second day Sokol reacted differently; as lf the Slovak environment began to affect bim and the lnjections were Joslng tbelr force (here I remind tbat the expression "!njectlons" was used by Dr. Tiso when answerlng ča.tloš); his answers took on a Slovak color and he talked clearly and lntelligently abotu the confllcts between Dr. Joseph Tlso and Dr. Vojtech Tuka. Dr. Sokol conld not revoke everytbing he had saia, but on the seťond day Dr. Sokol definitely appeared wlth bis old smlle in tbe lE>ft ťorner of bis month. nespite thlfl, bowever. the characteristic lnfluen('e.'! of Rmislan indodrinatlon were planlly evldent. This was �SLOVAKIA 15 intluences also by the thlrd par:ticipant of the Moscow school, D1. John Spišiak, the former ambassador of the Slovak Republic in Budapest. Were I to repeat how Spišiak appeared and what he said, I would only be repeating what I had said about Paulus. It was the same school, the very same school wlthout regard to the fact where the s tudents dld the answerlng, whether In Athens, Budapest, Bratislava, or Prague. Then there was a special group, a group of German origin, who al one tlme or auother were actlve in Slovakia. As a Slovak, or as a defense couusel of Slovak orlgin, I would never rely on thelr testi• mony. I was very glad, nay even proud, that Dr. Tlso never appealed to the testimony of these Germans. We can thank Dr. Tlso that we do not have disputes s uch as the Czechs have among themselves over what answers of Ludin are correct and which are false. K. H. Frank, Hitler's man in Prague, signed a different protocol every hour before his death. According to one, Krajina was the leader of the Czech reslstance and, according to another, Dr. J . Krajina, the future secretary-general of Zenkľs party, was the greatest collaborator with the Germans . We Slovaks do not have such differences. And for that we can be thankful to Dr. Tlso, who never concerned himself with German testlmony. Defense speeches refuted the propriety of the court and demanded that Dr. Tiso be returned to the American occupation authoritles in Germany. They pointed out that if Tiso had acted in the manner of Daxner, Da.xner would today be a natlonal corpse and not the presldlng judge of the Natlonal Coun. The defense counsels further polnted out that General Kristin, :VIinister Široký and Minister Ďuriš - who were sentenced to dle. but were saved by Tlso - would have Jong been dead, if Tiso had followed Daxner's example. The defense demonstrated that it was not true, as the prosecu· tion stated, that America, Great Britain and France were at war with Slovakla, but conversely officers of the Slovak Army played tennis with Amerlcan flyers, because every one regarded them not as enemles, but as interned persons of a forelgn state. T H E V ERDICT : " DEATH" - A S FORECAST On the 18th of March, 1947, the Court adjourned to prepare the verdlct. Suddenly, llke a bolt out of clear sky, the report came at 10 P. M. on Apríl 14, 1947, when the officers of the Democratlc Party were in session, that Dr. Daxner had designated the next day, April 15, 1947, as the day he would render the verdict. The Ume was set for 9:0 OA. M. AU of us turned pale, because none of us had expected it. Of course, the Communists were not surprised at all, because they knew l'verything that Daxner was going to do. On Aprll 15, 1947 at 9:30 A. M. the rea.ding of the verdict be· gan; it lasted until 9 P. M. We had expected almost anything to happen. However, that a judge would subordinate hlmself or become subservient to a political party - that no lawyer, no senstble man expected to happen. lt was a s urprise for everybody. �16 SLOVAKIA After the verdict was rendered, the third pbase of the Dr, Tlso ca se began - the final chapter: the fight for amnesty. After the judge rendered the verdict of death on the gallows for Tiso,. Daxner asked the condemned Tiso whether he would request the Court for clemency. Tlso measured DaxneT carefully and said slowly: "I do ask for clemency on mora! grounds." Dr. Žabkay, the defense attorney, presented the Court the rea· sons why Tlso sbould receive mercy and asked tbe Court that Dr. Josepb Tiso's request be placed before tbe proper authorities without delay. Dr. Rigan, State Prosecutor, stated: "1 bave no objections against a favorable executlon or tbe request of Dr. Tiso for mercy." However, all the more disgraceful is wnat continued to take place In the secret sesslon of tbe Court Senate which, accordlng to Jaw, was supposed to consider the request or the condemned man and take a definite stand on it. Generally when the verdict rendered is not unanimous, that 1s wben al! the attendant justices do not vote for the same punishment, then amnesty 1s recommended, and the condemned man usually gets a 30-year or a lite sentence in prison. Tbe verdlct in Tiso's case was not unanimou11; in some things it was 5-2 and in others again 4-3 against Tiso. Here, then, were all t he prerequ!sltes for the Senate to recommend mercy for Tiso. But Da.'<ner, tbe presiding judge, by a Jong and violent procedure, prevailed in bis demand that tbe request of Dr. Tiso be not consldered, but handed over to the Commissar of Justice, Dr. Ivan Štefä.nlk, so that he mi~ht put it before the National Court. F ROM CAIPHAS TO PILATE - TO HE ROD Everything had to be done speedily, because only 48 bours remained <to study and debate the amnesty <1Ue0<tion, and during that time tbe matter had to pass through the Commlss-ary, tbe Slovak National Council, the Government and, finally, the matter could be resolved only by tbe presldent of the Czecbo-Slovak Re-public, Dr. Edward Beneš. Wednesd·ay mornlng, April 16, 1947, the Communi&ts began to demonstrate; deputations o( partisans and polltical prisoners began to pour toto the offlce of tbe S lovak National Councll, and it was feared that the Communists would start some disturbances and riots. The Commlssar delivered the documenl,; in the morning at 9: 00 A. M. to tbe President of !,he 'Slovak National Council, Dr. Joseph Let· trich, and requested that he not only take care of the documents at once, bll't at the same Ume that he place a recommendatlon for the request o! clemency. As s oon as Dr. štefánik prepared the necessary motlon. the officers of ,the 'SNC assembled a bit before 11: 00 A. M. to coni,ider the request of Dr. Joseph Tiso. . The two Communist members of this of!iclal body, Schmldtke and Dr. Horväth, did not attend the sesslon and notiffed the SNC that they \O'OUld Mt -attend lt. The request witb all documents, therefore, was to be consldered by three members of the Slovak Democratlc Party: Dr. Lettrich. Ml· lan Pollák 11nd Canon Msgr. ,Andrew Cvlnček. This tbreesome decided �SLOVAKIA 17 that all the documents or Dr. 'ľiso, as well as the motlon or the Commissar and the request of Dr. Tiso, as prepared by Dr. Žabkay, shall be ceded to the Go\'ernment WľťHOUT COM:\1ENT or recommendation; also that they would immediately inform the Government by phone of their declslon and that they are sending their blghest officer, Dr. Martinček, by auto to Prague so that the documents might get tbere as soon as possible. If the president of the SNC had not made tbe so-called second agreement in Prague on Aprll 11, 1946, thereby surrendering its right to grant amnesty, tbe !ate or Dr. Tlso could have been de• ided with final validity by tbe tbree above-mentlooed members of tbe SNC. According to tbe new Jegal order, tbat is according to the fatal Prague agreement, it was obligatory on tbe motion of the Commissar for Justice to place documents before the Government. The latter then returns tbe recommendation to tbe praesldlum of tbe SNC i( it bas any objections to it from tbe standpoint of State lnterests; otherwlse it places it before the president of tbe Republic . That was the way tbe Jaw read. Tbe commissar did place tbe documents witb the opinion that amnesty be granted, but the praesidium of the SNC did not even do as muc b as the Commissar; witbout backing Tiso it surrendered al! documents and Tiso into tbe hands or tbe Government and Dr. Beneš. 'ľhis ls all tbat the Slovak National Councll said: "The doc uments, in the intent of agreement No. 2, art. 1, par. B, are being ceded to the presidency of the Government in Prague, April 17, 1947." Tbat is all and notbing more. Actually the three Democ rats, members or tbe Executlve or the SNC - of whom only Dr. Lettricb is alive today - did not even say a word in Tiso's bebalf; and none of them did anything about lt. 'ľhe people who criticized the way Dr. Lettrich acted, are stlll reproaching him for it today. On t he other band, the Government and l:leneš began to to wash their Judas' hands and said: well, how could we grant mercy, wben the Slovaks themselves -- even when no Communlsts were present, when only representatives of the Democratic Party were present, like Lettrich, Cvinček and Pollák - could not agree upon a word of recommendation? Of course, as far as the Government and Beneš are concerned. tbey knew better, even if such a senseless alibi partially was supported by the impossible stand of the SNC. But Dr. Lettrich never will be able to justlfy bis actlon before :rnyone in tbe world; and he must not be angry when the Slovaks and the Czechs claím that he is guilty for Tiso not getting clemency. For the sake or objectivity, I shall quote a few paragraphs from Lettriclťs hanclwritten report about those moments: "On April 17. 1947, when the praesidium of the SNC was assembllng, the situation was very difficult. Tbe Communists tbreate ned w-ith strikes and riots; the Oommissar of Jnstice dld not present a recommendatlon to grant mercy; and the request could hardly wln in the praes idíum of the SNC. That 1s to say, tbe praesidlum of the SNC had 5 members: three for the Democratic Party and two for the Slovak Communlst Party. One of the representatlves of the Democratíc Party was nnrertain: elther he would have voted against grantlng �18 SLO~A.KIA mercy or he would have ábstáined from voting. In both cases a ·majority was not assured for clemency: This was a delicate situation. It was necessary to flnd a way out. The idea was to get a recommendatlon !rom the Commissars for clemency and so forestall a posslble negatíve declsion of the praesidium o[ the SNC and outride au ominous, open politicaJ crisis, which could have had unforeseen consequences. "After dellberating the matter with political co-workers and after discussing it with the Communist members of the praesidium of the SNC, lt was decided that the SNC would return Tiso's request for mercy to the Commissar· or Justice; Commissar Dr. šte[ánik would complement lt with a positive recommendation for grantlng clemency and then would send · i t 'to · the praesidlum of the SNC. The latter would then agree that the Commissar's recommendati0)1, for granting mercy be placed before the Government with t he request to ·present it to the Pľesident for me1:itorious judgment." LETTRICH CANNOT ESCAPE BLAME FOR TISO'S DEATH - . Betwe~n my account and the h:µid-written account of Lettrlch there is the difference : I. clai~ that štefánik hlmself brought the documents to the praesidiuµi , 'ôt. the SNC and there immediately made the recommendation fo r clemency, whereupon the praesidium went into session at once. Almost to t he last moment before the praesldium began lts ses·s ion, I was in the same room in which thé meeting was to také place and I know definitely that Dr. Štefánik hád the documents with bim and that one of the secretaries - either Lettrich's Dr. Haviar, or Cvinček's Dr. Bystrický ·_ announced that the <.:ommunist members would not come to the meeting. When Dr. Lettricb knew that the Coinmunist members would be i.bsent, did he still fear that Milan Pollák alone would outvote bim? Wby did he not at least move a finger to indicate in some way that he would try to fulflll what he had promised bis constituents and wh'<tt it was his mora! duly to fulfill? He knew that the overwhelming majority or the population of Slovakia demanded everythlng possible be done to-save the life of Dr. Joseph Tiso. After the decision of the praesidium, I asked Cvinček why he agreed to such a solutlon. He expressly referred to Lettrich, who explained to him tbat according to Article 1, par. B of the Prague Document, the p'residency of the SN€ only' pre!lents• 'documents, but does not have to give its opinion about them, and ·that in law the right of opinion for the praesidium, of .the SNC doeS'·not exist. . I remember that · several members of the praesidium. of the Democratlc Party strongly crltlcized the prodeedings; óne · of, 'them, Dr. Emanuel Bohm, Js. In the U.S.A,, and ..,anotb,er,., Ing. K-orneJ . Filo is in France. Bohui made rep1w\<w,es1 ,~herejlS, li'ilo- in.sisted that everything wlthln the pow!lr_o! ,all,?f us, ou!íp,t ~.o b~,.~one sp ,that Ppague would grant c lemencr to ,Tiso. And .,he himself . 11oq ;~veral.,.o th~r ľri~n~s at. once cal)~d ' thelr_ tr\ends In Pragu_e; h1(?rixie.<;1_', thé1ii'.;ap,out the mistake tha.t wa~., made :an.d req\lested their lnteryenJlpq, w.!th, indivldual mlnis~ers. ~t' was_ t~ps ~hjl;~_.:prtina, Š,ráme,k°,J~</,.. oteers 'ťere <:alled. . . , , , , ,. When the _ge~?.ral. public ,;a_rq~iJ a~ou~ the maúer: .,tbe ó9yei-nment, ·:áeneš, nay _e_x~n ~ettrich, _rec~iv(ld ),i..u_ndredii pf lelegrams from Bratislava a.lone. · · f �SLOVAKIA 19 The Ministers of the Democratic Party w.e re then already in Prague. Every one of them received telephone requests from us private and offlclal - to correct the mlstake. But all were pessimistlc, dominated by an "oh, whaľs the use" attltnde. For example, Dr. Johu Ursíny said by phone and two days Jater publicly stated that Zenkľs answer. after talking to bim over an hour was: - "For our voters it is impossible for us to vote for mercy for T iso and for us it is unprofitable." Zenkl repeated this also to other Ministers, w ho intervened for Tiso and, finally, he gave the same answer even to Dr. John Šrámek. BENEŠ'S ALIBI: THE SLOVAK$ DID IT The greatest surprise waa when our Ministers ascertained that even John Maaaryk would vote to reject the plea for mercy. 'rhis was one of J án Masaryk's most despicable deeds; I know not how 11 months later he alibied thls sin In the otber world. E ven individ,ľal church councils and superiors of various religlous bodies intervened in Prague in behalf of Tiso. On the other hand, the Trade Organizations, Jed by Dezider Benau, ·and other Communist organlzations includlng local units of industria! unions, demanded the execution of the verdict. The situation was tense, lndeed. The performance of the praes ldlnm of the SNC was condemned by every one. Tbus, for example, t he :p}lÁVO LIDU, organ of the Social Uemocrats, in a long article blamed the Slovaks for everylhing and in bold-faced letters sald: " It seemed that the SNC took a neutra) stand on the question and, tberefore, there was no reason for tne Prague govern ment to recommend to the Presirtent of the Republic to change everytbing in the verdict of the Slovak court. . . . Dr. Lettricb, president of the SNC and chairman of the Slovak De mocratic Party, has almost a two-1hlrds majority in Slovakla. And yet up to Wednesday he did not decide wh ether he should recommend to the Government to grant cle mency to Tiso." In the US A Czech Cathollc newsman Anthony Jandáček, wrote: " The bl.a.me for the execution of tbe verdlct of death rest!\ with sevoral weaklings, who did not oppose the Communist demand and, as official representatlves of the SNC. di d not even manage as mucb as to recommend to t he Presldent of the Republic to grant clemency." Furthermore. Jandáček ·said : "Dr. J oseph Lettrich shall once have a dlfflcult problem and task to explain why he was a weakllng and wby he did ,not recommend m ercy." The Amerlcan correspondent (NCWC) John l\lauthner similarly C'baracterlzed the whole procedure agalnst Dr. Tiso and especially the behavlor of the presidenC'y of the SNC. A. Ross. another American <'Orrespondent and hundrecls of others also expressed themsel\'es Rimilarly. Even before the Government renderecl a decision and Dr. Edwanl Deneš could express himself on the matter, the welghtle!!l step in behalf of Tlso was made. Archbisho o Xaverio Ritter. the Papal Jnter.nunclo In Prague. vislted Dr. Beneš. Despite Rltter's ardent JJ)ea for Tiso. Denell fulfilled what he had planned long ago and somet hing that several gentlemen attempted to Jegalize for bim. �20 SLOVAKJA The documents were not as yet in Prague, but the Government was called together at 5:00 P. M., because it thought that by that time they would certainly arrive. When they diel not arrive by 5: 00 P. M., Gottwald forced a vote which was not for the benefit of Ti5o. The Czech Populists and the Slovak Democrats voted for c lemency, while the others were for execution. We learned about this decision or the Government a few minutes after it was macle and, therefore, the praesidium of the Democratic Party m et again at the residence of Dr. Lettrich. Every one phoned to whom he could; even Lettrich attempted to get Beneš, hut could no t ľontact him. That certainly wa.5 strange, ·because at other times he could contact him in a matter or two minutes. At that fatal moment he could not reach Beneš. So telegrams were sent instead. An American correspondent for the NCCW characterized tbose telegrams thus: "The popularity of Dr. Lettrich quickly diminished, because in the whole question of Dr. Tiso he washed his hands and hesitated to personally request mercy for Tiso. Lettrich waited until Tiso was dead and then immediately he sent a telegraphic protest against the execution." In the USA we must recall and note that members of the GovernU\ent knew that the Communists were forcing the execution of Dr. Tiso, because they wanted to weaken t he Democratic Party. The Comruunists failed to weaken the DP in May, 1946, by forming the Freedom Party, so they sought to wreck it by forcing Tiso's execution. Every minister in Prague knew that very well and, without exception, every one was visited several limes and informed about this by some Slovak politician in Prague. These ministers, however, i.,referred to belp tbe Comnrnnfsts break np the anti-Communist ranks in Slovakia tban to vote clemency for Tiso. And today these same Czech politici ans are enjoying life in Washington, D. C.; among them are Zenkl, Ripka, Stránsky, and Mayer. As tar as I am concerned all these confirmed their collaboration with Communism when they voted to reject Tiso's plea for clemency. Tbe sbort session of the ministerial council was interrupted once for a sbort tíme, wben Ursíny and Šrámek requested the National Socialists to at least abstain from voting on the Tiso plea. Zenkl. howpver, would hear none of it. Tbe Government presented the motion to reject mercy, even tbough the court documents of Dr. Tiso were not even in Prague at the time, and Dr. Beneš, also witbout even looking at the documents, complied witb the motion and rejected the request for mercy as early as Wednesday, tbat is Apríl 16th. The rejection was announeed by tf'letype by Beneš's cbancery to the police station of Ferjenčík's cffice in the late night hours. However. wp had Beneš's decision by phone from Prague much earlier. BENEŠ WAS THE LAW It is interesting that Beneš, rejecting amnesty, diel not make usf' of the means prescribed by law and did not a.nnounce his decisfon by returning the documents through ttle praesidium of tbe SNC wbich would tben hand them over to tbe Commissar of Justice. Why did Beneš do that? Diel he not belleve tbem? �SLOVAKIA 21 No. When Beneš rejected Tlso's request, the documents as yet were not in Prague and therefore he could not stamp the customary formula "nelze vyhoveli" (cannot be granted) on them. But he was interested in the execution taking place already Friday morning and, therefore, through bis servants, Ferjenčík's per· sonal office and Ferjenčik' s police, already on \Vednesrlay night, several hours after the decision of the Government, he notified Bratislava about bis decision and told them to be ready to go through with everything he had o rdered. Tbe Chief of Police announced this to Dr. L ettri<·h at midnight, and the State machinery at Bratislava began preparations for the execution, which no one could now stop according to law or regula· tions. On the morning of the second day, wben Dr. Daxner visited Tiso in bis ·celi to inform bim in tbe presence of hls counsellors that Beneš rejected the plea for mercy, the documents were not In Bratislava. AII were still in P rague and it was only about an hour later that the Presidenťs office placed the seal of the •Republic on them and the ;,ignalure of the Chief ef the Chancery. Tbe documents were not on hand when the Government made its clecision, or when the President macle bis clecision, or when Tiso was lnformed about the mat ter in bis cell by Daxner. Everything was done by telegrams. Wben Daxner lett Tiso's cell, Tiso's sister came to vtsit htm, then bis Jegal counsellors. wbile ever at bis slde was a Capuchln priest. At that ttm e tbere still were several sesslons and it was wbtspered in secret just what migbt yet be done in Tiso's bebalf. •TISO LOYA L TO GOD AND NATION TO T H E E N D Tiso. however, dlel not want to bear about any indication; very s harply he repeatecl what he had demonstratecl several limes during the trial: he was not concerned about his life. because if he. must make the sacrifice, he will do so proudly, but by no word or act would he change wbat he diel or saicl -as the Presiclent of Slovakia. This was also well known at tbat time and so it was with anxiety t hat the last ho·urs of Dr. Tiso were followed to see how all this woulcl thuncler over excitecl Slovakia. To the last moment Tiso was nnbroken, manly, just as he was before in the Court in macl Daxner's presence. wben he clefended bis truth and many limes crossed the interests of bis defense, who wanted to help bim. But Tlso never once in bis tria! clenied or revoked anything tbat he had proclaimed at any ti me. From his defense speech one sentence resonn<ied for hours in the E-ars of every llstener: "And if I were agaín placed by Provldence in a pos ition to deC"icle, I would decide, on tbe whole, tbe same way as I did In the past." Witb this sentence Dr. Tiso rejected even tbe Jast extenuating <·i rcumsta.nce. For tbe historian. Dr. Tiso even in the last moments of bis life gave the fundamental sketch and the greatest proof of his manliness. determination and steadfastness for everything that he had preached and done. �JJ SLOVAKIA Two hours before bis execution he wrote bis final l egať'y it\ bis own hand, in which he demanded the nation to be barmonious and unite<I In the prosecution of the great princi ple "For God and for :s;ation" In every regard and at all times. His !lnal sentences, wriHen in tbe jail of tbe Federal Court are most serious sentences and the greatest proof of Tiso's personality. The next day "ČAS" was supposed to explain at length wby Tiso was denied clemency. Ferjenčíťs police, however, confiscated that issue, and tbe Slova.ks found out officially from the Communist ''PRAVDA" and the -broadcast of April 18th -- a report conslstlng of a single sentence - tbat the execution had taken place. TISO MORE DANGEROUS DEAD THAN ALIVE Tiso was dead. Ileneš's servants had done t heir work. -but tbe questton still remains unanswered: Why did the praestdium of the Slovak National Council refuse to surrender the corpse of Dr. Joseph 'ľlso so that it might be buried according to the rttes of the Catholiľ Church? Between the tíme lhat clemency was denied and the execution there passed some 40 hours and no directives \ľere given - at least not publicly - as to what disposition was to be made of the body or Tiso. After tbe execution, wben the defense counsellors asked for · tlie body in the name of Tlso's family, the request was telegraphed to I'rague. It was only then that Prague. as well a!< the Bratislava factors, became aware of the mistake they had made by not granting cle· mency_ A certain Prague politlco characterlzed the situation with the cxpression: "lt seems that the cleacl Tiso is golng to be mo;e dangerous than the live one." l felt the same way about the matter. and so did quite . a few or my frlends whÓ intervened prlvately in the interest of Tiso. And ,ľe. felt that way long before the executlon. · Prague deli-berated at length and found it hard to reuder a deci• sion in the matter of the disposition of the body of Dr. Tiso. Already then reports were heard in Prague that ,the bitter silence of the Slo, ak people might have serious consequences for the future. No one wanted to be held responsible for imythlng. 1t was useless to sene! the matter to Prague because, accordlng to the law, the Natlonal Court had the rlght to decide the disposition of the body of Tlso, as it had clone in several instances previously. Everybody was afrairl of the con!<equences and no one was willing to guarantee that peace woul<I be r,reserved. Ftnally, by telegram Prague agreed with Dr. Daxner and Dr. Ferjenčík that Daxner shall suTrender tbe body not to the Tiso family , but to Ferjenčík, who in turn shall have the body bmied secret\y. Ferjenčik's police covered the casket and hauled it to St. Martin's ťemetery on Racišdorfská Road. where three graves had been dug. Tbe prlest brought in by the police. after identlfying tbe body, performed a quiet burial. Ferjenčik and his people were not successful in keepln~ tbe matter secret, because universlty student!I were near the scene during the whole eplsode and, tberefore. for a tíme it was known wbere Dr. Tlso ,vas burled. :. =•: �SLOVAKIA 23 For several hours the students clashed with the police near tbe grave of Tiso, and despite tbe fact tbat the police questioned tbem and ascertained who they were, the students showered Tiso's grave with flowers and wreaths. The second and following days, the police constantly guarded St. Martin's cemetery, People were beaten and jailed, because they tried to get near Tiso's grave under variou3 pretexts. Some students were expellecl from Svoraclov and others even from hlgh schools. WHO KILLED TI SO ? Tbe Czech press immediately began tbe process of washing hands and placing the whole responsibility for tbe execution of Tiso on the Slovaks, especially on Dr. J osepb Lettrich, president of the Slovak NationaJ Council and head of tbe Slovak Democratic Party. It was plalnly evident that Prague was nervous. The Communists were happy, and the Freedom Party maliciously reproached the Democrats. be· ,. c-ause they did not save the life of Tiso. The fact remains that ·an overwbelmingly majority of the Catholic voters wbic h supported the Democr.atic Party wa.s not fooled by tb.e overtures of the Freedom Party, because it knew that its member·s were the servant.-s of the Communists. But this electorate did let it be known that it was terribly disappointed and that it lost falth 1·1 tbe leadership of the Slovak Democratic Party and absolutely all confi<lence in Prague. Prague felt generally that the Slovaks would neve'r ngain want to live togethei, witb tbe Czec hs in a common state. And 'ľlso's execution did not make the Slovaks flock to the Communists or even into the ranks of tbe servants of Beneš, as were the members of the Freedom Party, and so much tbe less to the Social Democrats. The Slovaks regarded tbe decision of the minlsterlal council, as well as the declsion of Beneš as a step that was neitber statelike nor diplomatlc, but rather as a blunder which would WTe<.'k the State. F.:verybody became suspicious of the members of the praesidium o[ tbe Slovak National Council, when they dld not support an amnesty ;ind did not exact it, but acted like weaklings and s pineless men, violating· the- promlse given the electorate. Undoubtedly all those involved began to feel that way also. }!ut lt was too late. U nity of resistance against Communism was being lost. and after Tiso's execution the Communists were coercing the Government and, later, even Beneš hlmself, to commit more blunders and make more concessions to them. The integrity of the State was s haken so badly that the Government one day unanimously voted to accept the invitation to tbe Marshall pian, and three days Jater, under pressure of tbe Communists, repudlated lts clecision just as unanimously. It was a Government wlthout government. 'I'he Communlst.'I did whatever they wanted wlth lt. Tbe mlnlsters lost th elr backbone, some bowed to Beneš and others to the Communlsts; tbelr uprootecl consciences persecuted tbem for their sbameful votlng in the Tlso case. N O ~SCAPE FROM PUNISHMENT Wben Dr. Beneš began to fall pbyslcally and bis spiritual condi• tion worsened, all ascrlbed it to bis unfortunate decision of denying <'lemenc-y to 'ľiso. �24 SLOVAKIA Beneš, the Zenklites (followers or Dr. Zenkl) and tbe . Communists tbought that witb the extorted execution of Tiso they would sbake only t be Slovak Democratic Party. But they were sadly mistaken. Wlth the execution of Tiso they shook the entire State to its foundations. The curse of those who shall not forget April 18, 1947, broke all connections which were stm preventlng the downfall of the CzechoSlovak St.ate. The lost faith of the Slovak people could not be regained. And when the supports of a united Slovakia were uprooted, the Communists realized their pian altogether smootbly, accorcllng to the plans and orders of the Moscow Politburo. I clo not want to believe tbat any one would want to ascribe to Dr. Tiso that he would avenge himself beyond the grave, but when in March, 1948, - less than a year after bis execution - John Masaryk committed sufoide, a large part of the people pointed to the hand oť justice for his shameful voting on April 16, 1947. When the Communists played around witb Beneš like a puppet for a while, and he was practically under house arrest and shortly thereafter died, qulte a few people recalled those to whom he had denied clemency ancl who had suffered so much during bis regime. In Slovakia every one recalled April 18, 1947. And even if not maliciously, but at least confirmed in the faith that none of the guilty would escape justice, every one saw the hane! of Providence, Who deals out justly and does not let Himself be carried away or frightened. TISO' S STATURE GROWS WITH YEARS Dr. Tiso made the greatest sacritice that any human can make. He acted bravely and hono1,ably. This made a great impression on every one. But the shameful, cowardly behavior whether of Slovaks or Czechs, whether of the people of Prague or Bratislava, who had anything to do with bis amnesty, elevated the dead Tiso to a national hero and martyr, who is mentioned reverently in Slovakia even by those who previously were agalnst bim. Immature political factors, Jed by anger and hatred, had attained tbe opposite of what tbey had desired. They diel not divide but a'?tually united tbe Slovaks as they were never before united. And they showed them a new road for the future, whicb even today is full of sufferings, but eventually sball mean salvation and a free life for the nation of Tiso. Those. were the motives and thought:; which Jed me to ,vrite this dissertatlon, so that I could point out tbe tmth and expla!n, wben the persons ·involved are free again. After the events of February, 1948, lt was reported that the Commun!sts removed the body of Tiso from its grave and had !t cremated in Brno, Moravia. I recelved the report from Bratislava in 1948, but it remains unconfirmed. Let the tmth be whatever it may, the Gloriola, Faitb and Mytb of Dr. Joseph Tiso - despite all the evil deeds and designs of bis and our enem!es - shall always remain so sublime th at no malignities oť the Communists or the Beneš followel'S s hall ever dim them and they sball nev& Iose their lustre as long as a single Slovak shall live beneath the Tatras. � AUGUST, 1952 SLOVAKIA THE CASE OF DR. JOSEPH TISO B Y DR. M ICHAEL ZIBRIN F rom a legal standpo111t. the case of Dľ. Joseph Tlso may be di"ided into two parts, the first part taking place in the American Zone of Germany, and the second part in the National Court or Bratislava, the capltal of Slovakia. 1 was a witness at the Nuremberg T rials, where I had taken copious notes. There 1 met people in Czecho-Slovak uniforms who had Slo vak and Czech-souncling names, but spoke with a strong Magyar and German accent. Tbey were neither Czech nor Slovak by origin. One army captain could not even speak Czech correctly. These people were under Major Ečer, a Ieft·"' inger, wbo had borrowed the title or " General." His department boasted that it had tracked down Hr . .tosepb Tiso. President of the independent State of Slovakia and, later, alao the entire Goveľllment of the Slovak Republic. Ečer and bis group were sent to Germany by the Provislonal ľzecho-Slovak Government of Dr. J ohn Šrámek (the premier), but rbey were in contact more with Dr. Hubert Ripka or directly witb Dr. l~dward Beneš than they were with Šrámek. Formally, they were to <"Oncern themselves w!th Cze<"ho-Slovak refugees as a I enatriation c-ominission and also follow the Nuremberg Trials against war criminals. Tbey had a department for eve•·yth lng; and experts In every de1,artment. Of course. Ečer's outfit had at it~ disposal huge sum., of money to tr ack down the members of the Government of the Slovak Republlc, and especially P resident Tiso. When Beneš returned to l'rague. Ečer recelved his instructlons directly from bim. NO POLITICAL ASYLUM FOR TI SO After Presldent Tlso and thP Slovak Government !1ad fJeJ Sloľakia in Apríl, 1945. tbey sought ref11ge in Kremsmiinster Tbe Iast .,.et>k ot Aprll, Dr. Joseph Tlso set 0 111. for Mnnich to Carclinal Faul•11 1>er's residence, but was delayed two days in bis jOtl''D';!Y, oecause Munlch was occupied by the Aroeri()an Army by April 30. 194á. It was th•1~ t hat Dr. Josepb Tlso became senarated trom his Government and had a bsolutely no contact with 1I. That explains wby l:!•3 signature ;5 mil'~lng on the "Surrender No•t>·' of May 8. 1945, wbirh w1s b anded !o fi 0 1eral Walton H. Walker or thf' Amerlcan Army in J< .. 0 .nsmiinst.er. .\.r!C'0rd,ng to a report In the "STARS AN D ST R!"~:S" at that ••mP when Dr. J osepb Tiso C'Onld not reach l\funich. h .. •·"!tire.i to a umall monastery in Bavaria, wbere he remainerl until mi!irnry unlls Jlicked bim up for questloning and then Jed hlm off to 111 "itnerican roncentration renter. Tlso reroained in the roncentra• :on r 11 mp ror Quite some Ume. He was questionecl not only by Amerlcan •·1thoritles. but also by Ečer's soldlers until, finally. he was surren,➔ ..red by t)Je lT. S. ·Army to Ečer and taken to Prague In November 194u, This. in short, relates to the first part ot Tii;o's case, h :, we čan­ not pass it over so llgbtly. because hls brief account éontalns many tpgal lncons'ÍRtencies. náy even illegalltles, and is contrar y to every·thing whtch has heretofore or therellfter taken place anywbere· irÍrPtnlltion-ally aťrordlng to AmeriC'an Law �2 SLOVAKIA As soon as the Slovak Government of Dr. Stephen Tlso, a co usin ol Dr. Joseph Tiso, in the name of all t he refugees fľom S lovakia, handed over to the representative of the American Army the note given below and subjected itself to its commands, at that moment the status of all escapees and, therefore, even that of the leading Slovak politlcos, should have been considered according to international practices and American la,ws, where the right of asylum, except in this one case, had never before been vlolated, at least not as far as I can recollect. The "Surrender Note" of the Slovak Government to the Ameri• cau Army read as tollows: GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AT KREMSM0NSTER, AUSTRIA SLOVAKIAN To Lieuteuant General Walton H. Walker of the U. S. Army For the Commanding General XX Corps of the U. S. Army On behalf of the S lovakia n Government In exile at Krems• miinster, Austria, I, Dr. Štefan Tiso, as Prime Minister thereof, . do submit myself, the members of my Government, our famílied and our governmental policy completely to the Comm anding General of the XX Corps of the Third Army of the United State:1. W e submit ourselves for such disposltion as may b e wise and ordered by the Allied High Comand. We beg full protectlon of the Armies of the United States in whose homeland are living about one-thlrd of our natlon and accept the democratic prlnciples of the people, for the people and by the people. W e take the liberty on this occasion to beg for protection for the entire Slov,ak colony whlch was forced to leave its country and is now iu Kremsmiinster, Austria, also for a ll our couu• trymen who live in territories occupled by the Allied forces. Kremsmiinster, 1fay 8, 1945. (Seal of the Prime Ministry) Dr. Štefan Tiso, Premier. Or. Mikuláš Pružinský, Mlnister of Financa. Medricky, Minister of Agrlculture. Kočiš, Minister of Education. T. J. Gašpar, Deputy. W. O. Collier, Brig. Gen. U. S. Army. T. O. Curtls, Col. G. S. C. Davld W. Allard, Capt. Inf. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STARTS TISO ON ROAD TO GALLOWS True it is that all the Allies met in London as a joint International Commisslon to discuss the punishment of "War Crininals." Dr. Ečer was the Czecho·Slovak member of this Commlssion. It is also true that certain directives were agreed tiPOn for the surrender of war crlminals to indlvidual states on whose terrltorles the gullty or accused were supposed to have committed war crimes. Offlcial �SLOVAKIA 3 clocuments o( the Supreme Command o( the United Armies are supposed to tel1 ns jnst how many times such surrenders were effected, the negotiations that took pla<'e. as well as the decision reached ln each <'ase. Copies of these documenL~ were sent automatically to the Nuremberg Court to ascertain whether the persons to be surrenderecl to indivldual states ,vere needed or not at any bearings of the Court. or wbether the Court itself intended to try tbe lndividuals in questlon. 1 checked over these documents quite thoroughly but failed to flnd ?.nything of the sort relating to Dr. Joseph Tiso, or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso. I am, therefore, inclined to believe tbe whispered reports which circulated in Nuremberg át that tíme both among the Allies and the members of Ečer's commisslon tbat the surrender ot Dr. Joseph Tlso was not in accord with accepted legal precepts or p1,actices and that some violations of accepted laws and practlces had occurred in Tiso's case. On June 25th, and agaln on J une 27, 1945, the Czecho-Slovak Hadio clalmed that Dr. Joseph Tiso and, later, even ibe Slovak Government, were taken into custody by American authorities. Reports had it tbat they were transportecl to Pilsen. But the reports were false. Americans of Slovak descent were lntensely interested in the tate of Tiso and Slovakia. They requested their State Department not to surrender Tiso and the members of the Slovak Government to nenes• "Provisional Czechoslovak Government," because that certainly wo111<1 mean death for Tiso. But thls availed them nothing, Al the insistence of Benes' Government. the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. authoritles In Austrla to surrender Tiso and bis group to Benes' "Czechos lovak War Crimes Commisslon" wlthout even lnvestigating their statns as is evidenced from a letter of Actlng Secretary DEAN ACHESO~. written August 30, 19H. and published ln the "JEDNOTA" {Middlelown, Pa.) '.\{arch 5, 1947. Tbe letter read: "Since detalls concerning the surrender of Dr. Stephen Tiso and members of his Government are not available to the Department of State, a copy of your letlf'r has been transmittecl to the W ar Department together \ľith a request that the Secretary of War <'Ommunicate \ľl th you dlrectly on this particular matter. "A totJal of flfteen high officials af the former Slovak Government weľe arrested by the Unlted States Army at varions limes during tbe montbs of May and June. 1945. . . . "The arrest of these individuals and their rel ease to the CzechoSlovak Government was in conformity with United States policy re. garding the disposition of United Nations' nationals who cÓllaborated with or assisted the enemy. The policy is to apprehend such coJlat.orators as may be founcl within the jnrisdictión of tTnited States milltary authorities. to notify the respertive United Nations' Governments of such apprehension, and to hold such persons pending the clecision of the respective government~ as to their <lis_posltlon unless they are to de detained as war criminals or for other reasons. In view of ~bis policy, the Department of State, in October, 1945, informed the Commandíng General of thc Uníted States Forces, European �SLOVAKJA T.beater, that the fifteen individuala in hia cuatody who had been membera of ·· the collaborationiat Slovak Government ahould be re• leaaed to the appropriate Czechoalovak authoritiea. They were handed over in November, 1945. . . . From Acbeson's letter it ls quite evldent that Benes' "Provision,u Czechoslovak Government" was included among the "United Natlon,ľ t:overnments." All Benes had to do 1, as label any citlzen of Czecho· Slovakia a "collaborator'' and the U. S. State Department, "in r.011 · tormity with United States policy" pursued at tbat tlme, delivered He11es' politicdl opponents to Ečer witbout even investlgating tbe cbll,rges of collaboration. American tradltions went down tbe draln. 'ľbe rigbt of political asylum, always regarded as something sacred by tbe people of tbe Unlted States was violated in the case of Tlso and the Slovak Government. Benes. it seems, could get away with everyt,blng, because he knew the right people. Tbe ract that he 1 esigned as president and left his country wheu it faced a grave r-risis aud tben congratulated bi~ successor, wbo was elected coasti· tutlonally, meant nuthing to the U. S. State Department. But. it meant certain death to many patriotic Slovaks and untolll sufferings to many t housands more. It !s quite certain that negotiations were tied u1> several t lme!I. because the Engllsh were reluctant to agree tbat 'ľi so be surrendered to Ečer at a tíme when Prague had alreally announcect his deliveraiLce to Ečer. No matter how tb.e events of that time were distorted, the ract remalns that an unexpected telepbone call from the airport was rec·eived during a session of tbe Prague Parliament, reportlng that Dr. Joseph Tiso was brought to Prague. Shortly thereafter, Minister Ko· pecký gleefully displayed a pboto taken at tbe Prague airport which showed bow Tiso was being led under heavy guard with bands bound by a cbain and a loc-k. All the Communlsl papers and eveu tbe organ of Šrámek's Czec-h Populist Party, LlDOVÁ DEMOKRACIA (People's IJemocracy), displayed the picture promlnently. . Shortly aftE>r bis arrlval in Pragne, Tl~o was transported to Bratislava. wbere one wing of the Jail was em.ptied to take care of bim and bis ľOmpan!ons Tbey werE> guarded not by ordlnary jail guards. bm by !',elect. members of tbe Nationality Securlty Ouard. EV ERYTHING SET AGAINST TISO Investigation of • Tiso began at onre. But not according to accepted practice and, bence. wbole month~ pasRed witbout a regular preparation to review tht: case of Dr Tlso. As ROOn as Tiso was, placed in the jail or the Federal Co11rt. bis case. arcording to the laws in force at that time. belonged before the National Conrt and the lnves1:gation had to be made by the procurators or prosecutlng attorneys or tbe Natlonal Court. The prosecuting attornP.vs assigned to prosecute '.ľiso and his group were: Dr. George Šujan. Dr. l{lgan and Dr. Ra§la. Since each prosecutor waR assigned particular persons to prosecute. the whole investlgatlon suffered from a taek of unity ancl wa.s casual; hence, lt could malte little headway. Secondly, tbe prosecutlon. it seems. could not or dld not wan t to flnd any wltnesses besldes those who were arreste,I. �Sl,OVAKIA 5 And, thirdly, the Prague State Court constautly kept sendlng c1emands to have Dr. Tiso tPstiľy Iu varlous cases which were tried there. T lso was beard as a w1tness, and theše hearings took up much of tbe .tlme of the inveseigating organs. And so, for techoical reasons, as well as polltical efforts to oostpone Dr. Tlso's trial, the case of Dr. Tiso was not even ready up 10 the electlons or May, 1946, and, hence, could not even get started before tbat time. as the Communlsts had reckoned that it would. They exerted tremendous pressure to have the trial begln before the elections. but there were so many compllcatlons that it was imposslble to do so. After the electlons wblť'h the Slovak Democratic Party had won so decisively and In which tn<> promis,i of sparing Tiso's llfe plaýéd such a prominent role, it appeared for a time that Dr. Joseph Tlso would get a fair tria!. There is a great dlfference between a court and a court When a person appears in court, there can be doubts and objectlons as to bis personallty and morallty. The C'ourt exlsts for tbe purpose of removing such doubts; when that happens , the accused person Ie morally rehabl»tated. Very grave charges were made agalnst Tls o not only In the emigratlon. of Dr. Beneš, but also on the podlum of the Prague parllament. l3ut there al"o were promises and guarantees that t he worst would not happen. 'rhe beginning of 1946 was s igniflcant for its polltical ferment. witb pressure on the Slovak Democratlc Party. and the pressure or Dr. Beneš and the Prague Government on the supreme rlgbts or a soverelgn nation. These rlghts. it was thought. the Slovak NaUonal Coun<'ll, beaded by Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, had been assured by the socalled Košie.e Agreement of March 2. 1945. Tberefore, whatever t.he representatlves of tbe Slovak Natlonal C'ouncll had willingly ylelded to the Benešltt>s and the Zenklltes must be evaluated in terms of the infltu•nce these concesslons had on the fate of Dr. Joseph Tlso. If -w e woul<I glauce over t he resolutlons ot the Slovak National ('ounc il of March 2. 1945. wbere that body stressed the plcture ot Hate llte as it visuallzed it, t hen there !s llttle dlfference between 1hat co.n<'eption and the Slovak State as lt actually was. And lf the a:c<'epted princlples and resolutions had been adhered to and not devlated trom after t he electlons, In whlch the Slovak Democratlc Party had beaten t he Commnnlsts cleclslvely, Dr. Tlso unquestlonably would bave been allve today. From Aprll to June, 1943. Šrám ek's provislonal Czecho-Slovak Government In T,ondon was preparing the St.ate Act. whicb was pro<'lalmed' ón Jnne 30, 1943. It was plalnly evldent that thls act tbreat: Pned Tis6 and the entlre body of the Slovak Government. On March 2, 1945, the Slovak Natlonal Council clemanded In the very tlrst paragraph of the KošlcP Agreement that the new government of Czecho-Slovakla decJare that it does not identity itselt wlth tbe proclamatlon or June 30, 1943, of the Czecho-Slovak Government in I..ondon. �6 SLOVAKIA BE N EŠ H A S HIS WAY Shortly after arrivin~ in Prague, Dr. Edward Ileneš formally betray~d · Ruthenia to the U .,S.S.R., and, being recognized by Stalin, felt that he \ľas firmly in the saddle again. Alrea.dy on June 22, 1945, be demanded that the Slovaks relinqulsh what they had voted for on ?>farch 2, 1945. Dr. Beneš disregarded the wishes of tbe Slovak majority and begau to push bis own exponents to the forefront - Slávik. Hečka, etc. but when this dld not go well for bim, he turned to Dr. Vavro Šrobár •and Dr. Vladimír Clementis and several other more compliant persons wbo were willing to repudlate everything tbat Beneš had to promise in Moscow and Košice. Clementis was a leading Communist In Slovakia, while Dr. Šrobár, whom Beneš had named Financa Minister against the will off tbe entire Slovak Nalional Councll, was the foremost proponent of Beneš's National Socialism among the Slovaks. Confrontea w1th the promises he had made and the note wlllcb he had seut to the Slovak National Council trom London by means or Ursíny and Novomeský, Dr. Beneš sald that these were forced out ot him, just as the Pittsburgh Pact of 1918 had been forced on Masaryk. And, he aclded, tbat "everything was not in order even in MosBeneš remonstrated and demonstrated that an absolutely indeJJendent Slovakia was out of the question, that the threat of Russia was ever present, and that after Rutheuia, Slovakia woulcl surely be next in line for absorption by the USSR. The dlscussions and debates finally ended with the first. Prague Treaty of June 2, 1945. whiC'h cleflned the ľunctions of the various ministries, the matters 011 wbicb only the Prague Government could rule, and the matters that ,ľere s11ppose<1 to belong to the competency of tbe Slovak Natlonal Council. It is rathe r amusing that the seventh article of tbat Prague Agreement stated that tbe seat of he Supreme Court would -be in Hrntislava. That seat is still in Prague as it always had been. DEMOCRATS W IN E L ECTION S, B U T L OS E EVERYT HI N G Agreement or no agreement. Dr. 13eneš and bis Goľernment did what they pleased. Llfe in the state went according to the Prague Agreement more or less untll April 1946 - a month before the flrst JJOSt-war parliamentary elections. Then beli itself broke loose • The Slovak Democratic Party was attacked furiously by all Czech partles, being incited by Beneš, as well as the Communists. Despite this, ho,i,·ever. notbing can justify tbose "ho concluded tbe Prague Agreement of June 22, 1945. Even though the Freedom Party came into being at that Ume with money supplied by Šrobár, Beneš ancl thP Communists, or wa.« organized by Široký, and the concessions, made at a tíme when the Communists strongly demanded thE' tria! of Dr. Joseph Tlso, may in ~ome way be justified, there is no one who can teli me that Lettrlch was in any ,ľay justified to renounce the right to gra.nt amnesty. The man who did that knew well that Tiso was in the custody oľ the Fecleral Court in Bratislava and that he was surrendered from Slovak juriscliction ·into the hands of Beneš and the Czechs who hated him fanatically and undivldedly. ····· �SLOVAKIA 7 Iu Article 1 of the second Prague Agreement there is a section O, which speaks about clemency and states: "The President of tbe Republic grants mercy even in Slovakia and that also in matters which belong before the People's Courts and the National Court - on the motion of the Commissloner of Justice, who presents lt to the Government through the Officers of tbe Slovak NaUonal Council; the Government then returns the motion to tbe Ofticers of tbe Slovak National Council, if it has objections against it from the standpoint of all-state interests. bnt otherwise presents it to the President of the Republlc." When Dr. Lettriťh together with John Ursiny presented this agreement to the officers of the Democratic Party for approval and later a lso, when they explained it, expressly gave assurances that before signing this agreement they had dellberated with Dr. Beneš and that he ha.cl deflnltely promised and assured them that he would grant mercy to Dr. Tiso and they could safely transfer the power ot amnesty to bim. It is interesling, however, that nothing about tbis assurance ls D1entioned either in Dr. Kvetko's book, whlch was published in Bratislava in 1947, or in the article of Dr. Lettrich which descrlbes the case or Dr. Tiso. In bis articles Dr. Lettrich refers to the assurance of Dr. Beneš of September 1946 in Topoľčianky, where Beneš expressly promised that he would grant mercy to 'ľiso and added: "By my declsion I shall not cause any complications in Slovakia." In evaluating the truth and the proclamations of Beneš we must admit that in June, 1945, both presidents of the Slovak National Counc!I - Schmldtke, as well as Lettrich - had expressed themselves very sharply against Tlso in offlclal manifestations, when they already knew that Dr. Tlso was under arrest in Bavaria slnce June 9, 1945. We must not forget tbat the Premier at that time was Fierlinger who had attacked Tlso very sharply, and aJ.so the Democratic Party for standing back of Tiso. Per· 5onal expressions of Beneš, sneh as "Tiso wi ll hang," were known •o Lettrich and also to Ursiny. And that is more reason why they ;,honld have considered well whether they could believe Beneš, slnce they themselves had sald on various occasions, relating from their own P.Xperiences, that Beneš cannot be believed and especially not when be was concerned with the problem of savlng or destroying an enemy which he hated so insanely as he dld Dr. Joseph Tlso. As soon as the second Prague Agreement went into effect, Tiso c-ould have been saved only before the Court, if the Court would have rendered any other verdict but that of death. Despite the fact that Tiso's fate was sealed In such a way, we must not · end this chapter after the second Prague Agreement, because, in my oplnion, it is just at such limes that people prove best whether they possess character and a spina! column. L ETTRICH'S PRE-E LECTION PROMISES I know that many „people pleaded with :Beneš to grant clemency to· TiS-O even before the tria! was lnitlated. Beneš promlsed everybody ·that he would. But despite Beneš's promlse, leadlng polltlclans o! the Rlov1tk Democratlc Party should not have believed bim. if they thougbt �8 SLOVAKIA seriously and bonorably about tbe promises the Party had giveo tbe representatives of the Catbolic wing. Io Aprll 1946, the ,econd Prague agreemeot wa.s not tbe ooly iigreement made; an agreement was also concluded witb tb.e so-called <..:atbolic wing of tbe Democratic Party, wbicb was actlng more lndel'endeotly, and foť quite a Ume it was not known wbetber or not lt would bolt tbe Democratlc Party and join wltb tbe Freedom Party. Tbis so-called Catbolic agreement of tbe Democratlc Party was attacked viciously not only by tbe Communists, but also by tbe Beaeš Czechs. One of tbe main polnts of this agreement, even tbougb lt was oot expressed in writing, was that Tiso's life would be spared. In tbe May, 1946 elections, the Communists suftered a territlc l;teing, tbe Democratlc Party taking 62 per cent of the total vote cast iu Slovakia. So. everybody, especially tbose who voted for tbe Democratlc Party candidates, thought that the Party would keep lts pro mise to save the life of Dr. Tiso. The <..:ommunists and various representatives of tbe Trade Uuions, ho" ever. kept poundlng the tables all summer in 1946 to instltute the tria! of Tiso. It was clear that the matter could not bé delayed ľor long. Suddenly in the second half or October, 1946, without the Tiso matter stralghtened out, Dr. Lettrlch embarked on a visit to tbe llnlted States. Lettrlch claims that before his departure he had come to ao uoclerstandlng witb Pollák and Cvinček, Vice-Presidents of tbe Slovak ,\ .'atlonal Council, tbat the matter would not be asslgned to the Natio nal Court oefore h1s return home. Cvinček, however, denled that Lettrlcb had ,ald anything of the sort. But even 1t if was the trutn, !r is a very weak and slok alibi. Dr. Lettrloh was aware of the fa.cc , na· whlle he 1\!'aS preslrlent of the Slovak Natlonal Councll, tbe Com• •nunists got i.ny one tbey wanted on the Councll of Commissloners. Aud he knew that tbe most important minlstry, the Mlnlstry of tbe lnterlor, did not go to a member of the strongest party, but, lt was said, to a 11on-party man, Beneš's man, a servant of the Communlsts, tó General Ferjenčik. Tbe signature of Dr. Lettrich is on Ferjenčik's deoree. Arter tbese experiences could Lettr!ch belleve that Cvinček and Pollák would be able to hold the )lne w!thout hlm, when he hlmseU adm!ts in hls artlcle that Milan Pollák was uncertaln, tick.le and for tbe executlon of Dr. Tiso? · · The fact ls that after the departure ot Dr. Lettrlch, the case ot Dr. Tlso was presented to the National Court, and tbe presldent of the court senate became the feared Dr. Igor Da.xner, And here I see for Uié second Ume the sealed will of Dr. Beneš to bang Tlso at all costs. And for the second tlme I see Tlso's fate sealed with the a.s· slsiance of the representatlves of the Slovak Democratlc Party despite the promises and obllgatlons to tbe eleotorate. " I W tL L HANG OR. T ISO!" · Wben Dr. Daxner was allowed to become tbe presiding judge, 1Íolbfog good could be expected. All the assumptlons in thls regard XJaxner manitested by hls behavlor long before the tria! -and proved lt afterward. ·: . �SLOVAKIA 9 The day before the date of the main hearing was set, I myselt waé convinced of thls when I tried to help to remove Daxner. The Communiste, however, were so firmly anchored in the Slovak NaUonal Council that Dr. Daxner was approved as preslding judge of the National Court wlthout any dltflculty. On November 18, 1946, the National Court was supposed to eonvene an"d,determine the term of the maln hearing, begin the trlal anil present the decument ot charges agalnst Tiso. The previous day, when I had gone to Dr. Daxner to ask for a permanent admlttance pass to tbe tria!, Dr. Daxner began to argue and tried to persuade me to go along wlbh ševčik and Pollák, and not with the "popullsts and separatlsts." He asked me to follow the tria! of Dr.l Tlso and use my lnfluence In the Democratlc Party so that lt would not ldentlfy Itself wlth Dr. Tlso and would not make any dlfflculties for Da.xner. When I retueed, he banged bis flst on the table and screamed: "You are doing wrong. The Communiata will devour you, tear you to piecea, and I will hang Dr. Tiao!"1 tried to quiet bim ciown and cautioned him 'that a judge should not talk that way and that lt also was against the law for a judge to express his opinion so resolutely against the accused. But Daxner oniy grew more exclted, banged the table agaln and agaln and yelled: " Do whatever you want to, but I shall hang him !" I related the incident to Andrew Cvlnček, addlng that I was williog to teit:fy to it a.t any th:p.e. I reminded hlm that I knew Daxner well. I knew that Daxner WltS a paralytlc, a sadlst and a person of very bad mora! and · spirltual qualitles. I also told hlm that I did not belleve that Beneš would grant amnesty to Dr. Tlso. I refused to talk about the matter before the body o! o!ficers of tbe Democratlc Party, because ševčik and Pollák were among them, and · r knew definitely that they were betraylng our matters to the Communlsts. In fact I knew that ševčík was a paid agent ot tbe )JKVD (secret police). Thereupon the offlcers or the Party named a five-member commlttee to hear my story. Urslny, Cvlnček and Dr. Pietor reallzed the gravity of the situatlon and promlsed to try to do somethlng in Prague before December 2, the date when the hearings in the case or Dr. Tiso were to be concluded. THE M OCK TRIAL BEGINS But, alas, nothing happened. On December 2, 1946, Dr. Daxner opened the tria! with Dr. Joseph Tlso before the Natlonal Court in Bratislav-a. The trial took place in the jury room. The prosecutlon was represented by Dr. Rigan, Dr. Šujan anu Dr. Rašla. Dr. Tlso ,via.s defended by Dr. Grečo and Dr. Ža!Íkay. That is how a correspondenťs repor.t would read. And tbat is jus t about how the reports of the Slovak Press Bureau lookec\. But the truth 1s altogether differenl Tlso's frlends and bis famlly had engaged the servlces of a very respectable counsellor, Dr. Lojek, to defend Tiso. However, as soon as D"r. Lojek presented the full authorlzatlon or Dr. Joseph Tlso, he was ordered to appear before the poliťe, who began to inVesfigate hlm. They as ked why he wanted to defend Tlso, who dlscussed the defe nse wlth htm, how much he was pald, and other Jess sensLble Queatlons. What Lojek actually went tbrough ls known only to bim and the �10 SLOVAKIA police. The fact is that he gave up the defense o[ Tiso, and there was nothing else for T!so to do but ask the court to provide defense counsels. This incident, !( everythiug else Iu the tria! against Tiso would be iu order, ra!sed a reasou.ab!e doubt that the tria! would be just and in order. At the same time it made people th!nk and assume that the tria! would be carried on according to some agreement, that it would be a forma! process and. therefore, could not be just and fair. In a word that everyth!ng was cut and drled and Tiso's fate was sealed. I do not press the faet that Dr. Daxner was the presiding judge, but for the sake of the truth I must remlnd that attempts were made to remove Daxner before lhe tria! started. Of course, the tria! wa.,; prepared and no one could degress from the prepared program or could successfully take exception to it. Besides Daxner, there were six attendant justices, one a judge by profession, and tbree attendant justices as a reserve, in case one or the other attendant justices would drop out or get sick. It is a universal custom, that against such a court - whether it be called a senate or a jury - the accused, the prosecutor and the defense have the rlght to testify whether a certain person is accepta ble to them or not, and, also to state wbat objections they might entertain against any person of lhe jury or court. Likewise the principle holds universaJJy that when one is proposed as a wltness he cannot be in tbe same tria! also as an attendant or part of the court, and much less so as the presid!ng judge of the court. Slnce the Slovak Democratic Party could uot remove Daxner, tbe defense attomeys tried to replace bim as was their right to do. In the first place they objected because Daxner was incarcerated during the Slovak Republic and, later, had expressed himself on various occasions that all the accused must be hanged and, therefore, it was evldent that he was prejudiced. According to all pena! laws. prejudlce 1s an excluding circumstance. Then they proposed to have Dr. Daxner as a witness to testify that after Da.·rner was freed from jail, Dr. Tlso had allowed bim to take over hls judgeshlp again. Alexander Mach wanted Daxner to testify that it was only by the grace of Mach that Daxner was freed from prison on the basis of the false med!cal testimony and a false X•Ray picture. Daxner simply admltted Mach's statement and proclaimed that bis testimony was no longer needed. As far as prejudice was concerned. he sa!d that the objection was not proper, because he sald he was objeetive, and imediately ordered the tria! to begin. AL L OBJECTION S OVE RRU L ED According to every Jaw. objections cannot be overruled by a •judge against whom they are made. This is a fundamental princlple of pena! procedure. But laws were no gulde for Daxner. He had only one gulde: to condude the process as speE!dily a.s poss!ble and render the verdict he had promlsed bis bosses. When the defense counsels saw that they were gett!ng nowhere, they began to tackle the matter from a Jegal standpoint. They ob- �SLOVAKIA ll jected that the court was not made up properly, and that the de<:rees of lhe Slovak ::-l'ational Council about people's courts were not valid and, finally, that Dr. Tiso was not surrendered properly by the American occupation authorltles, as prescribed in accepted 1nter· natlonal regulations, but that Tiso was forcefully transported lnto Czecho-Slovakia without the knowledge of the four powers concerned, or only with the knowledge of one of those powers. The defense sald that if Tiso was a war crlmlnal, then bis surrender should have been determined by t he Internatlonal Tribunal in :-.1Uremberg. U he was not a war crimlnal, and the American General In command in Kremsmlinster May 8, 1945, accepted the capitulatlon or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso, then, in that case, all members of that Government, and so much more the Presldent, have the rlght the right of asylum, thls belng based on the following arguments: l. According to the Atlantlc Charter, i!IS\ted by the Presldent or llle United States and the Engllsh Prime Minister, every nation has the · right to choose the form of government under which it shall live· and to its own statehood; 2. the head of such a state was not subject to the legislative power of a foreign state for pena! acts, which may have been committed during the existence of and on the territory of such a State; 3. the Slovak State was recognized by some 27 States, including Great Britaln, with which it had diplomatlc rela· tions; also with the Soviet Union: 4. neither Great Drltain nor France agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso and, therefore, Dr. Tlso should be returned to Altčitting, in Bavaria, wbere on Jtme 9, 1945. he was arrested by American Military Police. 'l"hls contention o[ the defense still holds today. I myself can eonflrm that Britaln and France never agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso. According to the International Agreement oť J anuary 13, 1942, eoncluded in London, which refers to the Atlantlc Charter and the proclama.tion of Roosevelt and Churchill of October 25, 1941, lliternatlonii:lly only those criminals were to be surrendered who had undertaken, besides mllitary acts, such attacks against clvillzed populntions whlch were considered criminal among clvilized natlons. Tiso was not accused of such a crime. Furthermore, others who could be surrendered were those·,, who as occup,tnts, or representatives of occupants, committed or allowed to be committed punishable acts against the clvillan popu!a:tion. · Tiso was not accused of ,any such punlsha.ble acts by the In· habitants of the ló Slovak vlllages which were taken by the Slovak Hepubllc from the Polish territory. If, however, he or bis subordinates had commltted a pena! act on Pollsh terrltory, then, accordlng to the agreement above, Dr. Tiso could be accused only by the Poles and tried II! Warsaw. . Na.turally, Dr. Daxner repucliated any and all such objectlons and announced that bis court was competent to try Dr. Tlso. Then the tleťense counsels requested that the tria! take place before a regular and not before a revolutionary national court, because all the preferred pena! acts were commltted before the two decrees of 1945 ot tbe Slovak National Councll were effective. The defense clalmed that only Cor pena! acts commltted after the issuance of some pena! form ,vas 1-t posslble to carry ·on a pena! procedure arcording to sucb a norm. �12 SLOVAKIA even though penal sanctions remain according to some Jater norm. The pena! procedure itself, however, should be carrled on according to thé norma! penal oťder. Even Tlso hlmself declared that he dld not recognlze the decree of the Slovak National Court, by whlch the socalled National Court and the People's Courts were establlshed, because he was under arrest trom June 9, 1945, and, therefore, could not have committed any pena! act against the regulations lssued by the Slovak National Councll. We la.wyers had debated whole hours before the Tiso tria! · about these very weighty Jegal problems and then even durlng the trial, but Daxner repudiated them in a s ingle moment by banglng on the table and screaming: "I . repudiate all objections. ľll take care of all pena! procedures here!" And that is how the tria) against Tiso began. Up to that tíme, the tria) room was fllled wlth Slovak and Czech reporters and forelgn observers, but after that moment all who were not resldents of Bratislava left the proceedlngs, because they reallzed that the fate of Tlso was sealed and only a mock tria) was to be staged. During the two hours, which I have thus f.ar desctibed, Daxner several tlmes howled llke a jackall, banged on the table and threat• ened Dr. ~abkay, and even Dr. Kšinan, who defended Mach, tbat he would tbrow tbem out of the court room. The whole procedure was recorded on sound tape and tbat evenlng the newsmen wbo _gave a report. about the trial, p•ayed this portion of the recorded tape, wblch was falthfully recorded. The popula.tlon of Slovakl-a bega.n to sound off because of Da.xner's conduct. Tbe Democratic Party and lts representatlv01, were the target of bitter and viclous attacks; the people inslsted that the Party keep lts promlses. It began to be generally sald that Tiso's verdict was already settled and that what• ever Da.xner was doing was only a comedy. Desplte the fact that tbi!I was true, thls process nevertheless. brought out some hlstorical trutbs which we shall need In the future and whicb without tbi.B trial would not have come to l!ght. Wh~n Dr. Žabkay rose to bis feet on March 6th and said only t.hree words - "Prosim, aby bolo ..." ("l beg, in order that lt be") he was lnterrupted by Daxner who jumped to bis feet and barked: "Tbe court overrules tbat!" When Žabkay protested and explained that the court could not overrule something which he had not al! yet aaid, Dr. Daxner bellowed: "But I tel1 you tbat the court does over• rule lt!" THE W I TNESSES The wltnesses who testified in the Tlso tria) might be ·p laced in three categories: . • l, The Catholic clergymen toward whom I)axner acted . arro· gantly. I thtnk tbat it was on account or tbem that Dr. Tiso decided tQ (!Pl!&k In h!s own defen$e, They were Archblshop Charles Kmefko and BJshop Michael Bm;alka. From the leg.al standpo!nt, I regarded it as the greatest tnsult When Dr.. Daxner announced in the name of the Court that , he woul<l �SLOVAKIA 13 not swear ln tbese witnesses. Ordinarily, according to prevalling la.ws in Europe, the court does not swear in a wltness when there are reasons why it does not want to believe hlm. That 1s, In Europe a witness is first heard and then the court determlnes whether he ah!Wi be sworn io or not. Daxner's conduct was openly provocatlve and in· s ulting to disbonor such a serlous, aged man, as was Dr. Kmetko, wbo was respected by all decent Slovaks regar-dless of thelr rellgious beliefs. It is sigo1ficant that at tbe time Dr. Kmeťko was teslfylng, the Czech Catholic clergymen had several deliberatlons and lssued memoranda and reports, but displayed practically no open interest in what was happening In Slovakia. Not even Archbishop Joseph Beran, the Czech Primate, could find anything to say in tbe interest of the honor of the Catholic priesthood of Slovakia representéd by Pr, KmeCko. Tbe Czech clergymen followed Beran's example and. failed to ralse their volces and to rally tbe Catholic Czechs !n defense ot Justlce and righteousness. 2. In· the second category belonged the Slovak members of Gottwa.lďs government, namely, Ursiny and Lichner. Daxner talked to Ursíny as thóuugh he were an underling. From flve meters away Daxner greeted htm: "Why we, Mr. VlcePreinler of the Government, know each otber well, because we or• ganlzed the underground together." - Ursíny broke out lnto a broad s mlle and said nothing, though he should bave said: You, Mr. presidlng judge, were nowhere and did nothing, unless you were in some tavern, Sir, and there I, John Ursíny, did not go. Otberwise Ursíny did not say anything substantial, except that 'ľiso did not want bim in the Slovak Government. nor in the Peasant Banks, and that he was In the concentratlon camp at Illava for three days, but was not beaten there and was fed well. Daxner exploited Ursiny, however, by using general expres11ions, s·uch as, "Why we know that ... Why we did that together ... Why that does not have to be explained to us." Of course, the Communist press immediately glorified Daxner as a great hero of the underground movement, to whose actlvlty_ UT· Ríny hlmself had attested. Minlste.r .Tohn Lichner, however. ,v,as a witness of another type. Daxner did not welcome bim with a smile or a greetlng, but with the questlon: "You were a minister of Dr. Tiso's Government?" - He -then asked Lichner whether he traveled and delivered speeches in a uniform of tbe (Hlinka) Guard and why Tiso later dlsmlseed hlm. ' .Licbner expla!ned as best he could, but it must have been evident even to hlm tbat Daxner was not even remotely lnterestjid. 3. The third group of witnesses was the most interestlng. I be· ·11evé I can· characterize thls group properly, because I had wltnessed t hé N'uremberg trlals. There I saw ield Marshal von Paulus go before the :rrtternational Trlbunal, and in Bratislava I saw General Ferdin,and Čatld!ľ go béfore the National Cou-rt. Both men had much in common Both were soldlers, generals; thelr appearance In court w.as .a -surprlse; and both appeared a.t a time when lt. was opportune for tbe. Commun!sta and einbárrasslng for the defense. · In Nuremberg, ·Goerlng read romances and detectlve storles and generally was not lnterested In the tria!. When, to hls great surprlse, �14 SLOVAKTA the American Police brought Paulus, the heroic "defender" of Stalingrad, into the court room, Goering for a moment took off bis glasses, looked around, llstened and then said to the leading personaJities of the German General Staff: "'Fhis is hopeless ! this is swinishness ! " Should I repeat only thls sentence In reference to Čatloš, I would help the reader of these lines, because the result wlll be the same. Paulus entered the Nuremberg court room slowly with a oautious step; he was attired in an elegant dark blue sult, a starc-hed whJte s hirt, as if it was out of porcelain. He spoke slowly and pretended to be deaf; bis eyes were glassy, his frame strlkingly numb, and hli< eyes up1ifted almost straight to the heavens. The same could be s-ald for Čatloš. He, too, was dressed In a dark blue suit and was about twice as deaf as Paulus; but bis eyes, s tance were the same - just as if twlns appeared on two different stages. Paulus saw nothing but evil in everythlng that Hitler dld. Čatloš tried to prove to Tiso that he knew about all thlngs - the posslble and the impossible - because he, Čatloš, reported to bim on everything every morning ,at nine o'clock. Tlso smiled ironically and saíd: "To report, report he did, but whether he told me everything, I do not know." The fact is, according to what Čatloš said, that Čatloš sbould have sat in Tiso's place; for those acts Čatloš and not Tiso should have answered. It is interesting that bctb generals stuck to the orders or MosťOW, that they preferred to be deaf and more deaf, so tbey could speak slowly and thus have time to think thlngs over. Both held up faiľly well the first several hours, but then both slipped up a bit. Paulus was taken back to Moscow, and Catloš to the Rratislava jail. Later Catloš was taken to Prague, where Czéťh mllltary correspondents questloned him. I had not met Paulus before and, hence, did not know bim. But I knew Čatloš from my cbildhood days, and the last time I saw ·hlm was In September, 1939, in Prešov. The Catloš, who seven years later ťame to the court room of Dr. Daxner, seemed to be about twenty years older and bis mind compared wlth that or a tbird grader and not that of a general. I am wllling to testlfy under oath even today that the Catloš who sat before Daxner was not the master of his own wlll, tbat he was a broken man actlng under pressure of some one else. Catloš definitely was not a.ťtlng as a norma! person. Another such wltness was Dr. Martin Sokol, former Premier or the Slovak Parliament. The first day he acted as Catloš did; ma.ny t!mes he made it aggravating for Tiso; h e was stupified, deaf and gazed toward tbec eiling. On the second day Sokol reacted differently; as lf the Slovak environment began to affect bim and the lnjections were Joslng tbelr force (here I remind tbat the expression "!njectlons" was used by Dr. Tiso when answerlng ča.tloš); his answers took on a Slovak color and he talked clearly and lntelligently abotu the confllcts between Dr. Joseph Tlso and Dr. Vojtech Tuka. Dr. Sokol conld not revoke everytbing he had saia, but on the seťond day Dr. Sokol definitely appeared wlth bis old smlle in tbe lE>ft ťorner of bis month. nespite thlfl, bowever. the characteristic lnfluen('e.'! of Rmislan indodrinatlon were planlly evldent. This was �SLOVAKIA 15 intluences also by the thlrd par:ticipant of the Moscow school, D1. John Spišiak, the former ambassador of the Slovak Republic in Budapest. Were I to repeat how Spišiak appeared and what he said, I would only be repeating what I had said about Paulus. It was the same school, the very same school wlthout regard to the fact where the s tudents dld the answerlng, whether In Athens, Budapest, Bratislava, or Prague. Then there was a special group, a group of German origin, who al one tlme or auother were actlve in Slovakia. As a Slovak, or as a defense couusel of Slovak orlgin, I would never rely on thelr testi• mony. I was very glad, nay even proud, that Dr. Tlso never appealed to the testimony of these Germans. We can thank Dr. Tlso that we do not have disputes s uch as the Czechs have among themselves over what answers of Ludin are correct and which are false. K. H. Frank, Hitler's man in Prague, signed a different protocol every hour before his death. According to one, Krajina was the leader of the Czech reslstance and, according to another, Dr. J . Krajina, the future secretary-general of Zenkľs party, was the greatest collaborator with the Germans . We Slovaks do not have such differences. And for that we can be thankful to Dr. Tlso, who never concerned himself with German testlmony. Defense speeches refuted the propriety of the court and demanded that Dr. Tiso be returned to the American occupation authoritles in Germany. They pointed out that if Tiso had acted in the manner of Daxner, Da.xner would today be a natlonal corpse and not the presldlng judge of the Natlonal Coun. The defense counsels further polnted out that General Kristin, :VIinister Široký and Minister Ďuriš - who were sentenced to dle. but were saved by Tlso - would have Jong been dead, if Tiso had followed Daxner's example. The defense demonstrated that it was not true, as the prosecu· tion stated, that America, Great Britain and France were at war with Slovakla, but conversely officers of the Slovak Army played tennis with Amerlcan flyers, because every one regarded them not as enemles, but as interned persons of a forelgn state. T H E V ERDICT : " DEATH" - A S FORECAST On the 18th of March, 1947, the Court adjourned to prepare the verdlct. Suddenly, llke a bolt out of clear sky, the report came at 10 P. M. on Apríl 14, 1947, when the officers of the Democratlc Party were in session, that Dr. Daxner had designated the next day, April 15, 1947, as the day he would render the verdict. The Ume was set for 9:0 OA. M. AU of us turned pale, because none of us had expected it. Of course, the Communists were not surprised at all, because they knew l'verything that Daxner was going to do. On Aprll 15, 1947 at 9:30 A. M. the rea.ding of the verdict be· gan; it lasted until 9 P. M. We had expected almost anything to happen. However, that a judge would subordinate hlmself or become subservient to a political party - that no lawyer, no senstble man expected to happen. lt was a s urprise for everybody. �16 SLOVAKIA After the verdict was rendered, the third pbase of the Dr, Tlso ca se began - the final chapter: the fight for amnesty. After the judge rendered the verdict of death on the gallows for Tiso,. Daxner asked the condemned Tiso whether he would request the Court for clemency. Tlso measured DaxneT carefully and said slowly: "I do ask for clemency on mora! grounds." Dr. Žabkay, the defense attorney, presented the Court the rea· sons why Tlso sbould receive mercy and asked tbe Court that Dr. Josepb Tiso's request be placed before tbe proper authorities without delay. Dr. Rigan, State Prosecutor, stated: "1 bave no objections against a favorable executlon or tbe request of Dr. Tiso for mercy." However, all the more disgraceful is wnat continued to take place In the secret sesslon of tbe Court Senate which, accordlng to Jaw, was supposed to consider the request or the condemned man and take a definite stand on it. Generally when the verdict rendered is not unanimous, that 1s wben al! the attendant justices do not vote for the same punishment, then amnesty 1s recommended, and the condemned man usually gets a 30-year or a lite sentence in prison. Tbe verdlct in Tiso's case was not unanimou11; in some things it was 5-2 and in others again 4-3 against Tiso. Here, then, were all t he prerequ!sltes for the Senate to recommend mercy for Tiso. But Da.'<ner, tbe presiding judge, by a Jong and violent procedure, prevailed in bis demand that tbe request of Dr. Tiso be not consldered, but handed over to the Commissar of Justice, Dr. Ivan Štefä.nlk, so that he mi~ht put it before the National Court. F ROM CAIPHAS TO PILATE - TO HE ROD Everything had to be done speedily, because only 48 bours remained <to study and debate the amnesty <1Ue0<tion, and during that time tbe matter had to pass through the Commlss-ary, tbe Slovak National Council, the Government and, finally, the matter could be resolved only by tbe presldent of the Czecbo-Slovak Re-public, Dr. Edward Beneš. Wednesd·ay mornlng, April 16, 1947, the Communi&ts began to demonstrate; deputations o( partisans and polltical prisoners began to pour toto the offlce of tbe S lovak National Councll, and it was feared that the Communists would start some disturbances and riots. The Commlssar delivered the documenl,; in the morning at 9: 00 A. M. to tbe President of !,he 'Slovak National Council, Dr. Joseph Let· trich, and requested that he not only take care of the documents at once, bll't at the same Ume that he place a recommendatlon for the request o! clemency. As s oon as Dr. štefánik prepared the necessary motlon. the officers of ,the 'SNC assembled a bit before 11: 00 A. M. to coni,ider the request of Dr. Joseph Tiso. . The two Communist members of this of!iclal body, Schmldtke and Dr. Horväth, did not attend the sesslon and notiffed the SNC that they \O'OUld Mt -attend lt. The request witb all documents, therefore, was to be consldered by three members of the Slovak Democratlc Party: Dr. Lettrich. Ml· lan Pollák 11nd Canon Msgr. ,Andrew Cvlnček. This tbreesome decided �SLOVAKIA 17 that all the documents or Dr. 'ľiso, as well as the motlon or the Commissar and the request of Dr. Tiso, as prepared by Dr. Žabkay, shall be ceded to the Go\'ernment WľťHOUT COM:\1ENT or recommendation; also that they would immediately inform the Government by phone of their declslon and that they are sending their blghest officer, Dr. Martinček, by auto to Prague so that the documents might get tbere as soon as possible. If the president of the SNC had not made tbe so-called second agreement in Prague on Aprll 11, 1946, thereby surrendering its right to grant amnesty, tbe !ate or Dr. Tlso could have been de• ided with final validity by tbe tbree above-mentlooed members of tbe SNC. According to tbe new Jegal order, tbat is according to the fatal Prague agreement, it was obligatory on tbe motion of the Commissar for Justice to place documents before the Government. The latter then returns tbe recommendation to tbe praesldlum of tbe SNC i( it bas any objections to it from tbe standpoint of State lnterests; otherwlse it places it before the president of tbe Republic . That was the way tbe Jaw read. Tbe commissar did place tbe documents witb the opinion that amnesty be granted, but the praesidium of the SNC did not even do as muc b as the Commissar; witbout backing Tiso it surrendered al! documents and Tiso into tbe hands or tbe Government and Dr. Beneš. 'ľhis ls all tbat the Slovak National Councll said: "The doc uments, in the intent of agreement No. 2, art. 1, par. B, are being ceded to the presidency of the Government in Prague, April 17, 1947." Tbat is all and notbing more. Actually the three Democ rats, members or tbe Executlve or the SNC - of whom only Dr. Lettricb is alive today - did not even say a word in Tiso's bebalf; and none of them did anything about lt. 'ľhe people who criticized the way Dr. Lettrich acted, are stlll reproaching him for it today. On t he other band, the Government and l:leneš began to to wash their Judas' hands and said: well, how could we grant mercy, wben the Slovaks themselves -- even when no Communlsts were present, when only representatives of the Democratic Party were present, like Lettrich, Cvinček and Pollák - could not agree upon a word of recommendation? Of course, as far as the Government and Beneš are concerned. tbey knew better, even if such a senseless alibi partially was supported by the impossible stand of the SNC. But Dr. Lettrich never will be able to justlfy bis actlon before :rnyone in tbe world; and he must not be angry when the Slovaks and the Czechs claím that he is guilty for Tiso not getting clemency. For the sake or objectivity, I shall quote a few paragraphs from Lettriclťs hanclwritten report about those moments: "On April 17. 1947, when the praesidium of the SNC was assembllng, the situation was very difficult. Tbe Communists tbreate ned w-ith strikes and riots; the Oommissar of Jnstice dld not present a recommendatlon to grant mercy; and the request could hardly wln in the praes idíum of the SNC. That 1s to say, tbe praesidlum of the SNC had 5 members: three for the Democratic Party and two for the Slovak Communlst Party. One of the representatlves of the Democratíc Party was nnrertain: elther he would have voted against grantlng �18 SLO~A.KIA mercy or he would have ábstáined from voting. In both cases a ·majority was not assured for clemency: This was a delicate situation. It was necessary to flnd a way out. The idea was to get a recommendatlon !rom the Commissars for clemency and so forestall a posslble negatíve declsion of the praesidium o[ the SNC and outride au ominous, open politicaJ crisis, which could have had unforeseen consequences. "After dellberating the matter with political co-workers and after discussing it with the Communist members of the praesidium of the SNC, lt was decided that the SNC would return Tiso's request for mercy to the Commissar· or Justice; Commissar Dr. šte[ánik would complement lt with a positive recommendation for grantlng clemency and then would send · i t 'to · the praesidlum of the SNC. The latter would then agree that the Commissar's recommendati0)1, for granting mercy be placed before the Government with t he request to ·present it to the Pľesident for me1:itorious judgment." LETTRICH CANNOT ESCAPE BLAME FOR TISO'S DEATH - . Betwe~n my account and the h:µid-written account of Lettrlch there is the difference : I. clai~ that štefánik hlmself brought the documents to the praesidiuµi , 'ôt. the SNC and there immediately made the recommendation fo r clemency, whereupon the praesidium went into session at once. Almost to t he last moment before the praesldium began lts ses·s ion, I was in the same room in which thé meeting was to také place and I know definitely that Dr. Štefánik hád the documents with bim and that one of the secretaries - either Lettrich's Dr. Haviar, or Cvinček's Dr. Bystrický ·_ announced that the <.:ommunist members would not come to the meeting. When Dr. Lettricb knew that the Coinmunist members would be i.bsent, did he still fear that Milan Pollák alone would outvote bim? Wby did he not at least move a finger to indicate in some way that he would try to fulflll what he had promised bis constituents and wh'<tt it was his mora! duly to fulfill? He knew that the overwhelming majority or the population of Slovakia demanded everythlng possible be done to-save the life of Dr. Joseph Tiso. After the decision of the praesidium, I asked Cvinček why he agreed to such a solutlon. He expressly referred to Lettrich, who explained to him tbat according to Article 1, par. B of the Prague Document, the p'residency of the SN€ only' pre!lents• 'documents, but does not have to give its opinion about them, and ·that in law the right of opinion for the praesidium, of .the SNC doeS'·not exist. . I remember that · several members of the praesidium. of the Democratlc Party strongly crltlcized the prodeedings; óne · of, 'them, Dr. Emanuel Bohm, Js. In the U.S.A,, and ..,anotb,er,., Ing. K-orneJ . Filo is in France. Bohui made rep1w\<w,es1 ,~herejlS, li'ilo- in.sisted that everything wlthln the pow!lr_o! ,all,?f us, ou!íp,t ~.o b~,.~one sp ,that Ppague would grant c lemencr to ,Tiso. And .,he himself . 11oq ;~veral.,.o th~r ľri~n~s at. once cal)~d ' thelr_ tr\ends In Pragu_e; h1(?rixie.<;1_', thé1ii'.;ap,out the mistake tha.t wa~., made :an.d req\lested their lnteryenJlpq, w.!th, indivldual mlnis~ers. ~t' was_ t~ps ~hjl;~_.:prtina, Š,ráme,k°,J~</,.. oteers 'ťere <:alled. . . , , , , ,. When the _ge~?.ral. public ,;a_rq~iJ a~ou~ the maúer: .,tbe ó9yei-nment, ·:áeneš, nay _e_x~n ~ettrich, _rec~iv(ld ),i..u_ndredii pf lelegrams from Bratislava a.lone. · · f �SLOVAKIA 19 The Ministers of the Democratic Party w.e re then already in Prague. Every one of them received telephone requests from us private and offlclal - to correct the mlstake. But all were pessimistlc, dominated by an "oh, whaľs the use" attltnde. For example, Dr. Johu Ursíny said by phone and two days Jater publicly stated that Zenkľs answer. after talking to bim over an hour was: - "For our voters it is impossible for us to vote for mercy for T iso and for us it is unprofitable." Zenkl repeated this also to other Ministers, w ho intervened for Tiso and, finally, he gave the same answer even to Dr. John Šrámek. BENEŠ'S ALIBI: THE SLOVAK$ DID IT The greatest surprise waa when our Ministers ascertained that even John Maaaryk would vote to reject the plea for mercy. 'rhis was one of J án Masaryk's most despicable deeds; I know not how 11 months later he alibied thls sin In the otber world. E ven individ,ľal church councils and superiors of various religlous bodies intervened in Prague in behalf of Tiso. On the other hand, the Trade Organizations, Jed by Dezider Benau, ·and other Communist organlzations includlng local units of industria! unions, demanded the execution of the verdict. The situation was tense, lndeed. The performance of the praes ldlnm of the SNC was condemned by every one. Tbus, for example, t he :p}lÁVO LIDU, organ of the Social Uemocrats, in a long article blamed the Slovaks for everylhing and in bold-faced letters sald: " It seemed that the SNC took a neutra) stand on the question and, tberefore, there was no reason for tne Prague govern ment to recommend to the Presirtent of the Republic to change everytbing in the verdict of the Slovak court. . . . Dr. Lettricb, president of the SNC and chairman of the Slovak De mocratic Party, has almost a two-1hlrds majority in Slovakla. And yet up to Wednesday he did not decide wh ether he should recommend to the Government to grant cle mency to Tiso." In the US A Czech Cathollc newsman Anthony Jandáček, wrote: " The bl.a.me for the execution of tbe verdlct of death rest!\ with sevoral weaklings, who did not oppose the Communist demand and, as official representatlves of the SNC. di d not even manage as mucb as to recommend to t he Presldent of the Republic to grant clemency." Furthermore. Jandáček ·said : "Dr. J oseph Lettrich shall once have a dlfflcult problem and task to explain why he was a weakllng and wby he did ,not recommend m ercy." The Amerlcan correspondent (NCWC) John l\lauthner similarly C'baracterlzed the whole procedure agalnst Dr. Tiso and especially the behavlor of the presidenC'y of the SNC. A. Ross. another American <'Orrespondent and hundrecls of others also expressed themsel\'es Rimilarly. Even before the Government renderecl a decision and Dr. Edwanl Deneš could express himself on the matter, the welghtle!!l step in behalf of Tlso was made. Archbisho o Xaverio Ritter. the Papal Jnter.nunclo In Prague. vislted Dr. Beneš. Despite Rltter's ardent JJ)ea for Tiso. Denell fulfilled what he had planned long ago and somet hing that several gentlemen attempted to Jegalize for bim. �20 SLOVAKJA The documents were not as yet in Prague, but the Government was called together at 5:00 P. M., because it thought that by that time they would certainly arrive. When they diel not arrive by 5: 00 P. M., Gottwald forced a vote which was not for the benefit of Ti5o. The Czech Populists and the Slovak Democrats voted for c lemency, while the others were for execution. We learned about this decision or the Government a few minutes after it was macle and, therefore, the praesidium of the Democratic Party m et again at the residence of Dr. Lettrich. Every one phoned to whom he could; even Lettrich attempted to get Beneš, hut could no t ľontact him. That certainly wa.5 strange, ·because at other times he could contact him in a matter or two minutes. At that fatal moment he could not reach Beneš. So telegrams were sent instead. An American correspondent for the NCCW characterized tbose telegrams thus: "The popularity of Dr. Lettrich quickly diminished, because in the whole question of Dr. Tiso he washed his hands and hesitated to personally request mercy for Tiso. Lettrich waited until Tiso was dead and then immediately he sent a telegraphic protest against the execution." In the USA we must recall and note that members of the GovernU\ent knew that the Communists were forcing the execution of Dr. Tiso, because they wanted to weaken t he Democratic Party. The Comruunists failed to weaken the DP in May, 1946, by forming the Freedom Party, so they sought to wreck it by forcing Tiso's execution. Every minister in Prague knew that very well and, without exception, every one was visited several limes and informed about this by some Slovak politician in Prague. These ministers, however, i.,referred to belp tbe Comnrnnfsts break np the anti-Communist ranks in Slovakia tban to vote clemency for Tiso. And today these same Czech politici ans are enjoying life in Washington, D. C.; among them are Zenkl, Ripka, Stránsky, and Mayer. As tar as I am concerned all these confirmed their collaboration with Communism when they voted to reject Tiso's plea for clemency. Tbe sbort session of the ministerial council was interrupted once for a sbort tíme, wben Ursíny and Šrámek requested the National Socialists to at least abstain from voting on the Tiso plea. Zenkl. howpver, would hear none of it. Tbe Government presented the motion to reject mercy, even tbough the court documents of Dr. Tiso were not even in Prague at the time, and Dr. Beneš, also witbout even looking at the documents, complied witb the motion and rejected the request for mercy as early as Wednesday, tbat is Apríl 16th. The rejection was announeed by tf'letype by Beneš's cbancery to the police station of Ferjenčík's cffice in the late night hours. However. wp had Beneš's decision by phone from Prague much earlier. BENEŠ WAS THE LAW It is interesting that Beneš, rejecting amnesty, diel not make usf' of the means prescribed by law and did not a.nnounce his decisfon by returning the documents through ttle praesidium of tbe SNC wbich would tben hand them over to tbe Commissar of Justice. Why did Beneš do that? Diel he not belleve tbem? �SLOVAKIA 21 No. When Beneš rejected Tlso's request, the documents as yet were not in Prague and therefore he could not stamp the customary formula "nelze vyhoveli" (cannot be granted) on them. But he was interested in the execution taking place already Friday morning and, therefore, through bis servants, Ferjenčík's per· sonal office and Ferjenčik' s police, already on \Vednesrlay night, several hours after the decision of the Government, he notified Bratislava about bis decision and told them to be ready to go through with everything he had o rdered. Tbe Chief of Police announced this to Dr. L ettri<·h at midnight, and the State machinery at Bratislava began preparations for the execution, which no one could now stop according to law or regula· tions. On the morning of the second day, wben Dr. Daxner visited Tiso in bis ·celi to inform bim in tbe presence of hls counsellors that Beneš rejected the plea for mercy, the documents were not In Bratislava. AII were still in P rague and it was only about an hour later that the Presidenťs office placed the seal of the •Republic on them and the ;,ignalure of the Chief ef the Chancery. Tbe documents were not on hand when the Government made its clecision, or when the President macle bis clecision, or when Tiso was lnformed about the mat ter in bis cell by Daxner. Everything was done by telegrams. Wben Daxner lett Tiso's cell, Tiso's sister came to vtsit htm, then bis Jegal counsellors. wbile ever at bis slde was a Capuchln priest. At that ttm e tbere still were several sesslons and it was wbtspered in secret just what migbt yet be done in Tiso's bebalf. •TISO LOYA L TO GOD AND NATION TO T H E E N D Tiso. however, dlel not want to bear about any indication; very s harply he repeatecl what he had demonstratecl several limes during the trial: he was not concerned about his life. because if he. must make the sacrifice, he will do so proudly, but by no word or act would he change wbat he diel or saicl -as the Presiclent of Slovakia. This was also well known at tbat time and so it was with anxiety t hat the last ho·urs of Dr. Tiso were followed to see how all this woulcl thuncler over excitecl Slovakia. To the last moment Tiso was nnbroken, manly, just as he was before in the Court in macl Daxner's presence. wben he clefended bis truth and many limes crossed the interests of bis defense, who wanted to help bim. But Tlso never once in bis tria! clenied or revoked anything tbat he had proclaimed at any ti me. From his defense speech one sentence resonn<ied for hours in the E-ars of every llstener: "And if I were agaín placed by Provldence in a pos ition to deC"icle, I would decide, on tbe whole, tbe same way as I did In the past." Witb this sentence Dr. Tiso rejected even tbe Jast extenuating <·i rcumsta.nce. For tbe historian. Dr. Tiso even in the last moments of bis life gave the fundamental sketch and the greatest proof of his manliness. determination and steadfastness for everything that he had preached and done. �JJ SLOVAKIA Two hours before bis execution he wrote bis final l egať'y it\ bis own hand, in which he demanded the nation to be barmonious and unite<I In the prosecution of the great princi ple "For God and for :s;ation" In every regard and at all times. His !lnal sentences, wriHen in tbe jail of tbe Federal Court are most serious sentences and the greatest proof of Tiso's personality. The next day "ČAS" was supposed to explain at length wby Tiso was denied clemency. Ferjenčíťs police, however, confiscated that issue, and tbe Slova.ks found out officially from the Communist ''PRAVDA" and the -broadcast of April 18th -- a report conslstlng of a single sentence - tbat the execution had taken place. TISO MORE DANGEROUS DEAD THAN ALIVE Tiso was dead. Ileneš's servants had done t heir work. -but tbe questton still remains unanswered: Why did the praestdium of the Slovak National Council refuse to surrender the corpse of Dr. Joseph 'ľlso so that it might be buried according to the rttes of the Catholiľ Church? Between the tíme lhat clemency was denied and the execution there passed some 40 hours and no directives \ľere given - at least not publicly - as to what disposition was to be made of the body or Tiso. After tbe execution, wben the defense counsellors asked for · tlie body in the name of Tlso's family, the request was telegraphed to I'rague. It was only then that Prague. as well a!< the Bratislava factors, became aware of the mistake they had made by not granting cle· mency_ A certain Prague politlco characterlzed the situation with the cxpression: "lt seems that the cleacl Tiso is golng to be mo;e dangerous than the live one." l felt the same way about the matter. and so did quite . a few or my frlends whÓ intervened prlvately in the interest of Tiso. And ,ľe. felt that way long before the executlon. · Prague deli-berated at length and found it hard to reuder a deci• sion in the matter of the disposition of the body of Dr. Tiso. Already then reports were heard in Prague that ,the bitter silence of the Slo, ak people might have serious consequences for the future. No one wanted to be held responsible for imythlng. 1t was useless to sene! the matter to Prague because, accordlng to the law, the Natlonal Court had the rlght to decide the disposition of the body of Tlso, as it had clone in several instances previously. Everybody was afrairl of the con!<equences and no one was willing to guarantee that peace woul<I be r,reserved. Ftnally, by telegram Prague agreed with Dr. Daxner and Dr. Ferjenčík that Daxner shall suTrender tbe body not to the Tiso family , but to Ferjenčík, who in turn shall have the body bmied secret\y. Ferjenčik's police covered the casket and hauled it to St. Martin's ťemetery on Racišdorfská Road. where three graves had been dug. Tbe prlest brought in by the police. after identlfying tbe body, performed a quiet burial. Ferjenčik and his people were not successful in keepln~ tbe matter secret, because universlty student!I were near the scene during the whole eplsode and, tberefore. for a tíme it was known wbere Dr. Tlso ,vas burled. :. =•: �SLOVAKIA 23 For several hours the students clashed with the police near tbe grave of Tiso, and despite tbe fact tbat the police questioned tbem and ascertained who they were, the students showered Tiso's grave with flowers and wreaths. The second and following days, the police constantly guarded St. Martin's cemetery, People were beaten and jailed, because they tried to get near Tiso's grave under variou3 pretexts. Some students were expellecl from Svoraclov and others even from hlgh schools. WHO KILLED TI SO ? Tbe Czech press immediately began tbe process of washing hands and placing the whole responsibility for tbe execution of Tiso on the Slovaks, especially on Dr. J osepb Lettrich, president of the Slovak NationaJ Council and head of tbe Slovak Democratic Party. It was plalnly evident that Prague was nervous. The Communists were happy, and the Freedom Party maliciously reproached the Democrats. be· ,. c-ause they did not save the life of Tiso. The fact remains that ·an overwbelmingly majority of the Catholic voters wbic h supported the Democr.atic Party wa.s not fooled by tb.e overtures of the Freedom Party, because it knew that its member·s were the servant.-s of the Communists. But this electorate did let it be known that it was terribly disappointed and that it lost falth 1·1 tbe leadership of the Slovak Democratic Party and absolutely all confi<lence in Prague. Prague felt generally that the Slovaks would neve'r ngain want to live togethei, witb tbe Czec hs in a common state. And 'ľlso's execution did not make the Slovaks flock to the Communists or even into the ranks of tbe servants of Beneš, as were the members of the Freedom Party, and so much tbe less to the Social Democrats. The Slovaks regarded tbe decision of the minlsterlal council, as well as the declsion of Beneš as a step that was neitber statelike nor diplomatlc, but rather as a blunder which would WTe<.'k the State. F.:verybody became suspicious of the members of the praesidium o[ tbe Slovak National Council, when they dld not support an amnesty ;ind did not exact it, but acted like weaklings and s pineless men, violating· the- promlse given the electorate. Undoubtedly all those involved began to feel that way also. }!ut lt was too late. U nity of resistance against Communism was being lost. and after Tiso's execution the Communists were coercing the Government and, later, even Beneš hlmself, to commit more blunders and make more concessions to them. The integrity of the State was s haken so badly that the Government one day unanimously voted to accept the invitation to tbe Marshall pian, and three days Jater, under pressure of tbe Communists, repudlated lts clecision just as unanimously. It was a Government wlthout government. 'I'he Communlst.'I did whatever they wanted wlth lt. Tbe mlnlsters lost th elr backbone, some bowed to Beneš and others to the Communlsts; tbelr uprootecl consciences persecuted tbem for their sbameful votlng in the Tlso case. N O ~SCAPE FROM PUNISHMENT Wben Dr. Beneš began to fall pbyslcally and bis spiritual condi• tion worsened, all ascrlbed it to bis unfortunate decision of denying <'lemenc-y to 'ľiso. �24 SLOVAKIA Beneš, the Zenklites (followers or Dr. Zenkl) and tbe . Communists tbought that witb the extorted execution of Tiso they would sbake only t be Slovak Democratic Party. But they were sadly mistaken. Wlth the execution of Tiso they shook the entire State to its foundations. The curse of those who shall not forget April 18, 1947, broke all connections which were stm preventlng the downfall of the CzechoSlovak St.ate. The lost faith of the Slovak people could not be regained. And when the supports of a united Slovakia were uprooted, the Communists realized their pian altogether smootbly, accorcllng to the plans and orders of the Moscow Politburo. I clo not want to believe tbat any one would want to ascribe to Dr. Tiso that he would avenge himself beyond the grave, but when in March, 1948, - less than a year after bis execution - John Masaryk committed sufoide, a large part of the people pointed to the hand oť justice for his shameful voting on April 16, 1947. When the Communists played around witb Beneš like a puppet for a while, and he was practically under house arrest and shortly thereafter died, qulte a few people recalled those to whom he had denied clemency ancl who had suffered so much during bis regime. In Slovakia every one recalled April 18, 1947. And even if not maliciously, but at least confirmed in the faith that none of the guilty would escape justice, every one saw the hane! of Providence, Who deals out justly and does not let Himself be carried away or frightened. TISO' S STATURE GROWS WITH YEARS Dr. Tiso made the greatest sacritice that any human can make. He acted bravely and hono1,ably. This made a great impression on every one. But the shameful, cowardly behavior whether of Slovaks or Czechs, whether of the people of Prague or Bratislava, who had anything to do with bis amnesty, elevated the dead Tiso to a national hero and martyr, who is mentioned reverently in Slovakia even by those who previously were agalnst bim. Immature political factors, Jed by anger and hatred, had attained tbe opposite of what tbey had desired. They diel not divide but a'?tually united tbe Slovaks as they were never before united. And they showed them a new road for the future, whicb even today is full of sufferings, but eventually sball mean salvation and a free life for the nation of Tiso. Those. were the motives and thought:; which Jed me to ,vrite this dissertatlon, so that I could point out tbe tmth and expla!n, wben the persons ·involved are free again. After the events of February, 1948, lt was reported that the Commun!sts removed the body of Tiso from its grave and had !t cremated in Brno, Moravia. I recelved the report from Bratislava in 1948, but it remains unconfirmed. Let the tmth be whatever it may, the Gloriola, Faitb and Mytb of Dr. Joseph Tiso - despite all the evil deeds and designs of bis and our enem!es - shall always remain so sublime th at no malignities oť the Communists or the Beneš followel'S s hall ever dim them and they sball nev& Iose their lustre as long as a single Slovak shall live beneath the Tatras. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document AUGUST, 1952 SLOVAKIA THE CASE OF DR. JOSEPH TISO B Y DR. M ICHAEL ZIBRIN F rom a legal standpo111t. the case of Dľ. Joseph Tlso may be di"ided into two parts, the first part taking place in the American Zone of Germany, and the second part in the National Court or Bratislava, the capltal of Slovakia. 1 was a witness at the Nuremberg T rials, where I had taken copious notes. There 1 met people in Czecho-Slovak uniforms who had Slo vak and Czech-souncling names, but spoke with a strong Magyar and German accent. Tbey were neither Czech nor Slovak by origin. One army captain could not even speak Czech correctly. These people were under Major Ečer, a Ieft·"' inger, wbo had borrowed the title or " General." His department boasted that it had tracked down Hr . .tosepb Tiso. President of the independent State of Slovakia and, later, alao the entire Goveľllment of the Slovak Republic. Ečer and bis group were sent to Germany by the Provislonal ľzecho-Slovak Government of Dr. J ohn Šrámek (the premier), but rbey were in contact more with Dr. Hubert Ripka or directly witb Dr. l~dward Beneš than they were with Šrámek. Formally, they were to <"Oncern themselves w!th Cze<"ho-Slovak refugees as a I enatriation c-ominission and also follow the Nuremberg Trials against war criminals. Tbey had a department for eve•·yth lng; and experts In every de1,artment. Of course. Ečer's outfit had at it~ disposal huge sum., of money to tr ack down the members of the Government of the Slovak Republlc, and especially P resident Tiso. When Beneš returned to l'rague. Ečer recelved his instructlons directly from bim. NO POLITICAL ASYLUM FOR TI SO After Presldent Tlso and thP Slovak Government !1ad fJeJ Sloľakia in Apríl, 1945. tbey sought ref11ge in Kremsmiinster Tbe Iast .,.et>k ot Aprll, Dr. Joseph Tlso set 0 111. for Mnnich to Carclinal Faul•11 1>er's residence, but was delayed two days in bis jOtl''D';!Y, oecause Munlch was occupied by the Aroeri()an Army by April 30. 194á. It was th•1~ t hat Dr. Josepb Tlso became senarated trom his Government and had a bsolutely no contact with 1I. That explains wby l:!•3 signature ;5 mil'~lng on the "Surrender No•t>·' of May 8. 1945, wbirh w1s b anded !o fi 0 1eral Walton H. Walker or thf' Amerlcan Army in J< .. 0 .nsmiinst.er. .\.r!C'0rd,ng to a report In the "STARS AN D ST R!"~:S" at that ••mP when Dr. J osepb Tiso C'Onld not reach l\funich. h .. •·"!tire.i to a umall monastery in Bavaria, wbere he remainerl until mi!irnry unlls Jlicked bim up for questloning and then Jed hlm off to 111 "itnerican roncentration renter. Tlso reroained in the roncentra• :on r 11 mp ror Quite some Ume. He was questionecl not only by Amerlcan •·1thoritles. but also by Ečer's soldlers until, finally. he was surren,➔ ..red by t)Je lT. S. ·Army to Ečer and taken to Prague In November 194u, This. in short, relates to the first part ot Tii;o's case, h :, we čan­ not pass it over so llgbtly. because hls brief account éontalns many tpgal lncons'ÍRtencies. náy even illegalltles, and is contrar y to every·thing whtch has heretofore or therellfter taken place anywbere· irÍrPtnlltion-ally aťrordlng to AmeriC'an Law 2 SLOVAKIA As soon as the Slovak Government of Dr. Stephen Tlso, a co usin ol Dr. Joseph Tiso, in the name of all t he refugees fľom S lovakia, handed over to the representative of the American Army the note given below and subjected itself to its commands, at that moment the status of all escapees and, therefore, even that of the leading Slovak politlcos, should have been considered according to international practices and American la,ws, where the right of asylum, except in this one case, had never before been vlolated, at least not as far as I can recollect. The "Surrender Note" of the Slovak Government to the Ameri• cau Army read as tollows: GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AT KREMSM0NSTER, AUSTRIA SLOVAKIAN To Lieuteuant General Walton H. Walker of the U. S. Army For the Commanding General XX Corps of the U. S. Army On behalf of the S lovakia n Government In exile at Krems• miinster, Austria, I, Dr. Štefan Tiso, as Prime Minister thereof, . do submit myself, the members of my Government, our famílied and our governmental policy completely to the Comm anding General of the XX Corps of the Third Army of the United State:1. W e submit ourselves for such disposltion as may b e wise and ordered by the Allied High Comand. We beg full protectlon of the Armies of the United States in whose homeland are living about one-thlrd of our natlon and accept the democratic prlnciples of the people, for the people and by the people. W e take the liberty on this occasion to beg for protection for the entire Slov,ak colony whlch was forced to leave its country and is now iu Kremsmiinster, Austria, also for a ll our couu• trymen who live in territories occupled by the Allied forces. Kremsmiinster, 1fay 8, 1945. (Seal of the Prime Ministry) Dr. Štefan Tiso, Premier. Or. Mikuláš Pružinský, Mlnister of Financa. Medricky, Minister of Agrlculture. Kočiš, Minister of Education. T. J. Gašpar, Deputy. W. O. Collier, Brig. Gen. U. S. Army. T. O. Curtls, Col. G. S. C. Davld W. Allard, Capt. Inf. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STARTS TISO ON ROAD TO GALLOWS True it is that all the Allies met in London as a joint International Commisslon to discuss the punishment of "War Crininals." Dr. Ečer was the Czecho·Slovak member of this Commlssion. It is also true that certain directives were agreed tiPOn for the surrender of war crlminals to indlvidual states on whose terrltorles the gullty or accused were supposed to have committed war crimes. Offlcial SLOVAKIA 3 clocuments o( the Supreme Command o( the United Armies are supposed to tel1 ns jnst how many times such surrenders were effected, the negotiations that took pla<'e. as well as the decision reached ln each <'ase. Copies of these documenL~ were sent automatically to the Nuremberg Court to ascertain whether the persons to be surrenderecl to indivldual states ,vere needed or not at any bearings of the Court. or wbether the Court itself intended to try tbe lndividuals in questlon. 1 checked over these documents quite thoroughly but failed to flnd ?.nything of the sort relating to Dr. Joseph Tiso, or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso. I am, therefore, inclined to believe tbe whispered reports which circulated in Nuremberg át that tíme both among the Allies and the members of Ečer's commisslon tbat the surrender ot Dr. Joseph Tlso was not in accord with accepted legal precepts or p1,actices and that some violations of accepted laws and practlces had occurred in Tiso's case. On June 25th, and agaln on J une 27, 1945, the Czecho-Slovak Hadio clalmed that Dr. Joseph Tiso and, later, even ibe Slovak Government, were taken into custody by American authorities. Reports had it tbat they were transportecl to Pilsen. But the reports were false. Americans of Slovak descent were lntensely interested in the tate of Tiso and Slovakia. They requested their State Department not to surrender Tiso and the members of the Slovak Government to nenes• "Provisional Czechoslovak Government," because that certainly wo111<1 mean death for Tiso. But thls availed them nothing, Al the insistence of Benes' Government. the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. authoritles In Austrla to surrender Tiso and bis group to Benes' "Czechos lovak War Crimes Commisslon" wlthout even lnvestigating their statns as is evidenced from a letter of Actlng Secretary DEAN ACHESO~. written August 30, 19H. and published ln the "JEDNOTA" {Middlelown, Pa.) '.\{arch 5, 1947. Tbe letter read: "Since detalls concerning the surrender of Dr. Stephen Tiso and members of his Government are not available to the Department of State, a copy of your letlf'r has been transmittecl to the W ar Department together \ľith a request that the Secretary of War <'Ommunicate \ľl th you dlrectly on this particular matter. "A totJal of flfteen high officials af the former Slovak Government weľe arrested by the Unlted States Army at varions limes during tbe montbs of May and June. 1945. . . . "The arrest of these individuals and their rel ease to the CzechoSlovak Government was in conformity with United States policy re. garding the disposition of United Nations' nationals who cÓllaborated with or assisted the enemy. The policy is to apprehend such coJlat.orators as may be founcl within the jnrisdictión of tTnited States milltary authorities. to notify the respertive United Nations' Governments of such apprehension, and to hold such persons pending the clecision of the respective government~ as to their <lis_posltlon unless they are to de detained as war criminals or for other reasons. In view of ~bis policy, the Department of State, in October, 1945, informed the Commandíng General of thc Uníted States Forces, European SLOVAKJA T.beater, that the fifteen individuala in hia cuatody who had been membera of ·· the collaborationiat Slovak Government ahould be re• leaaed to the appropriate Czechoalovak authoritiea. They were handed over in November, 1945. . . . From Acbeson's letter it ls quite evldent that Benes' "Provision,u Czechoslovak Government" was included among the "United Natlon,ľ t:overnments." All Benes had to do 1, as label any citlzen of Czecho· Slovakia a "collaborator'' and the U. S. State Department, "in r.011 · tormity with United States policy" pursued at tbat tlme, delivered He11es' politicdl opponents to Ečer witbout even investlgating tbe cbll,rges of collaboration. American tradltions went down tbe draln. 'ľbe rigbt of political asylum, always regarded as something sacred by tbe people of tbe Unlted States was violated in the case of Tlso and the Slovak Government. Benes. it seems, could get away with everyt,blng, because he knew the right people. Tbe ract that he 1 esigned as president and left his country wheu it faced a grave r-risis aud tben congratulated bi~ successor, wbo was elected coasti· tutlonally, meant nuthing to the U. S. State Department. But. it meant certain death to many patriotic Slovaks and untolll sufferings to many t housands more. It !s quite certain that negotiations were tied u1> several t lme!I. because the Engllsh were reluctant to agree tbat 'ľi so be surrendered to Ečer at a tíme when Prague had alreally announcect his deliveraiLce to Ečer. No matter how tb.e events of that time were distorted, the ract remalns that an unexpected telepbone call from the airport was rec·eived during a session of tbe Prague Parliament, reportlng that Dr. Joseph Tiso was brought to Prague. Shortly thereafter, Minister Ko· pecký gleefully displayed a pboto taken at tbe Prague airport which showed bow Tiso was being led under heavy guard with bands bound by a cbain and a loc-k. All the Communlsl papers and eveu tbe organ of Šrámek's Czec-h Populist Party, LlDOVÁ DEMOKRACIA (People's IJemocracy), displayed the picture promlnently. . Shortly aftE>r bis arrlval in Pragne, Tl~o was transported to Bratislava. wbere one wing of the Jail was em.ptied to take care of bim and bis ľOmpan!ons Tbey werE> guarded not by ordlnary jail guards. bm by !',elect. members of tbe Nationality Securlty Ouard. EV ERYTHING SET AGAINST TISO Investigation of • Tiso began at onre. But not according to accepted practice and, bence. wbole month~ pasRed witbout a regular preparation to review tht: case of Dr Tlso. As ROOn as Tiso was, placed in the jail or the Federal Co11rt. bis case. arcording to the laws in force at that time. belonged before the National Conrt and the lnves1:gation had to be made by the procurators or prosecutlng attorneys or tbe Natlonal Court. The prosecuting attornP.vs assigned to prosecute '.ľiso and his group were: Dr. George Šujan. Dr. l{lgan and Dr. Ra§la. Since each prosecutor waR assigned particular persons to prosecute. the whole investlgatlon suffered from a taek of unity ancl wa.s casual; hence, lt could malte little headway. Secondly, tbe prosecutlon. it seems. could not or dld not wan t to flnd any wltnesses besldes those who were arreste,I. Sl,OVAKIA 5 And, thirdly, the Prague State Court constautly kept sendlng c1emands to have Dr. Tiso tPstiľy Iu varlous cases which were tried there. T lso was beard as a w1tness, and theše hearings took up much of tbe .tlme of the inveseigating organs. And so, for techoical reasons, as well as polltical efforts to oostpone Dr. Tlso's trial, the case of Dr. Tiso was not even ready up 10 the electlons or May, 1946, and, hence, could not even get started before tbat time. as the Communlsts had reckoned that it would. They exerted tremendous pressure to have the trial begln before the elections. but there were so many compllcatlons that it was imposslble to do so. After the electlons wblť'h the Slovak Democratic Party had won so decisively and In which tn<> promis,i of sparing Tiso's llfe plaýéd such a prominent role, it appeared for a time that Dr. Joseph Tlso would get a fair tria!. There is a great dlfference between a court and a court When a person appears in court, there can be doubts and objectlons as to bis personallty and morallty. The C'ourt exlsts for tbe purpose of removing such doubts; when that happens , the accused person Ie morally rehabl»tated. Very grave charges were made agalnst Tls o not only In the emigratlon. of Dr. Beneš, but also on the podlum of the Prague parllament. l3ut there al"o were promises and guarantees that t he worst would not happen. 'rhe beginning of 1946 was s igniflcant for its polltical ferment. witb pressure on the Slovak Democratlc Party. and the pressure or Dr. Beneš and the Prague Government on the supreme rlgbts or a soverelgn nation. These rlghts. it was thought. the Slovak NaUonal Coun<'ll, beaded by Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, had been assured by the socalled Košie.e Agreement of March 2. 1945. Tberefore, whatever t.he representatlves of tbe Slovak Natlonal C'ouncll had willingly ylelded to the Benešltt>s and the Zenklltes must be evaluated in terms of the infltu•nce these concesslons had on the fate of Dr. Joseph Tlso. If -w e woul<I glauce over t he resolutlons ot the Slovak National ('ounc il of March 2. 1945. wbere that body stressed the plcture ot Hate llte as it visuallzed it, t hen there !s llttle dlfference between 1hat co.n<'eption and the Slovak State as lt actually was. And lf the a:c<'epted princlples and resolutions had been adhered to and not devlated trom after t he electlons, In whlch the Slovak Democratlc Party had beaten t he Commnnlsts cleclslvely, Dr. Tlso unquestlonably would bave been allve today. From Aprll to June, 1943. Šrám ek's provislonal Czecho-Slovak Government In T,ondon was preparing the St.ate Act. whicb was pro<'lalmed' ón Jnne 30, 1943. It was plalnly evldent that thls act tbreat: Pned Tis6 and the entlre body of the Slovak Government. On March 2, 1945, the Slovak Natlonal Council clemanded In the very tlrst paragraph of the KošlcP Agreement that the new government of Czecho-Slovakla decJare that it does not identity itselt wlth tbe proclamatlon or June 30, 1943, of the Czecho-Slovak Government in I..ondon. 6 SLOVAKIA BE N EŠ H A S HIS WAY Shortly after arrivin~ in Prague, Dr. Edward Ileneš formally betray~d · Ruthenia to the U .,S.S.R., and, being recognized by Stalin, felt that he \ľas firmly in the saddle again. Alrea.dy on June 22, 1945, be demanded that the Slovaks relinqulsh what they had voted for on ?>farch 2, 1945. Dr. Beneš disregarded the wishes of tbe Slovak majority and begau to push bis own exponents to the forefront - Slávik. Hečka, etc. but when this dld not go well for bim, he turned to Dr. Vavro Šrobár •and Dr. Vladimír Clementis and several other more compliant persons wbo were willing to repudlate everything tbat Beneš had to promise in Moscow and Košice. Clementis was a leading Communist In Slovakia, while Dr. Šrobár, whom Beneš had named Financa Minister against the will off tbe entire Slovak Nalional Councll, was the foremost proponent of Beneš's National Socialism among the Slovaks. Confrontea w1th the promises he had made and the note wlllcb he had seut to the Slovak National Council trom London by means or Ursíny and Novomeský, Dr. Beneš sald that these were forced out ot him, just as the Pittsburgh Pact of 1918 had been forced on Masaryk. And, he aclded, tbat "everything was not in order even in MosBeneš remonstrated and demonstrated that an absolutely indeJJendent Slovakia was out of the question, that the threat of Russia was ever present, and that after Rutheuia, Slovakia woulcl surely be next in line for absorption by the USSR. The dlscussions and debates finally ended with the first. Prague Treaty of June 2, 1945. whiC'h cleflned the ľunctions of the various ministries, the matters 011 wbicb only the Prague Government could rule, and the matters that ,ľere s11ppose<1 to belong to the competency of tbe Slovak Natlonal Council. It is rathe r amusing that the seventh article of tbat Prague Agreement stated that tbe seat of he Supreme Court would -be in Hrntislava. That seat is still in Prague as it always had been. DEMOCRATS W IN E L ECTION S, B U T L OS E EVERYT HI N G Agreement or no agreement. Dr. 13eneš and bis Goľernment did what they pleased. Llfe in the state went according to the Prague Agreement more or less untll April 1946 - a month before the flrst JJOSt-war parliamentary elections. Then beli itself broke loose • The Slovak Democratic Party was attacked furiously by all Czech partles, being incited by Beneš, as well as the Communists. Despite this, ho,i,·ever. notbing can justify tbose "ho concluded tbe Prague Agreement of June 22, 1945. Even though the Freedom Party came into being at that Ume with money supplied by Šrobár, Beneš ancl thP Communists, or wa.« organized by Široký, and the concessions, made at a tíme when the Communists strongly demanded thE' tria! of Dr. Joseph Tlso, may in ~ome way be justified, there is no one who can teli me that Lettrlch was in any ,ľay justified to renounce the right to gra.nt amnesty. The man who did that knew well that Tiso was in the custody oľ the Fecleral Court in Bratislava and that he was surrendered from Slovak juriscliction ·into the hands of Beneš and the Czechs who hated him fanatically and undivldedly. ····· SLOVAKIA 7 Iu Article 1 of the second Prague Agreement there is a section O, which speaks about clemency and states: "The President of tbe Republic grants mercy even in Slovakia and that also in matters which belong before the People's Courts and the National Court - on the motion of the Commissloner of Justice, who presents lt to the Government through the Officers of tbe Slovak NaUonal Council; the Government then returns the motion to tbe Ofticers of tbe Slovak National Council, if it has objections against it from the standpoint of all-state interests. bnt otherwise presents it to the President of the Republlc." When Dr. Lettriťh together with John Ursiny presented this agreement to the officers of the Democratic Party for approval and later a lso, when they explained it, expressly gave assurances that before signing this agreement they had dellberated with Dr. Beneš and that he ha.cl deflnltely promised and assured them that he would grant mercy to Dr. Tiso and they could safely transfer the power ot amnesty to bim. It is interesling, however, that nothing about tbis assurance ls D1entioned either in Dr. Kvetko's book, whlch was published in Bratislava in 1947, or in the article of Dr. Lettrich which descrlbes the case or Dr. Tiso. In bis articles Dr. Lettrich refers to the assurance of Dr. Beneš of September 1946 in Topoľčianky, where Beneš expressly promised that he would grant mercy to 'ľiso and added: "By my declsion I shall not cause any complications in Slovakia." In evaluating the truth and the proclamations of Beneš we must admit that in June, 1945, both presidents of the Slovak National Counc!I - Schmldtke, as well as Lettrich - had expressed themselves very sharply against Tlso in offlclal manifestations, when they already knew that Dr. Tlso was under arrest in Bavaria slnce June 9, 1945. We must not forget tbat the Premier at that time was Fierlinger who had attacked Tlso very sharply, and aJ.so the Democratic Party for standing back of Tiso. Per· 5onal expressions of Beneš, sneh as "Tiso wi ll hang," were known •o Lettrich and also to Ursiny. And that is more reason why they ;,honld have considered well whether they could believe Beneš, slnce they themselves had sald on various occasions, relating from their own P.Xperiences, that Beneš cannot be believed and especially not when be was concerned with the problem of savlng or destroying an enemy which he hated so insanely as he dld Dr. Joseph Tlso. As soon as the second Prague Agreement went into effect, Tiso c-ould have been saved only before the Court, if the Court would have rendered any other verdict but that of death. Despite the fact that Tiso's fate was sealed In such a way, we must not · end this chapter after the second Prague Agreement, because, in my oplnion, it is just at such limes that people prove best whether they possess character and a spina! column. L ETTRICH'S PRE-E LECTION PROMISES I know that many „people pleaded with :Beneš to grant clemency to· TiS-O even before the tria! was lnitlated. Beneš promlsed everybody ·that he would. But despite Beneš's promlse, leadlng polltlclans o! the Rlov1tk Democratlc Party should not have believed bim. if they thougbt 8 SLOVAKIA seriously and bonorably about tbe promises the Party had giveo tbe representatives of the Catbolic wing. Io Aprll 1946, the ,econd Prague agreemeot wa.s not tbe ooly iigreement made; an agreement was also concluded witb tb.e so-called <..:atbolic wing of tbe Democratic Party, wbicb was actlng more lndel'endeotly, and foť quite a Ume it was not known wbetber or not lt would bolt tbe Democratlc Party and join wltb tbe Freedom Party. Tbis so-called Catbolic agreement of tbe Democratlc Party was attacked viciously not only by tbe Communists, but also by tbe Beaeš Czechs. One of tbe main polnts of this agreement, even tbougb lt was oot expressed in writing, was that Tiso's life would be spared. In tbe May, 1946 elections, the Communists suftered a territlc l;teing, tbe Democratlc Party taking 62 per cent of the total vote cast iu Slovakia. So. everybody, especially tbose who voted for tbe Democratlc Party candidates, thought that the Party would keep lts pro mise to save the life of Dr. Tiso. The <..:ommunists and various representatives of tbe Trade Uuions, ho" ever. kept poundlng the tables all summer in 1946 to instltute the tria! of Tiso. It was clear that the matter could not bé delayed ľor long. Suddenly in the second half or October, 1946, without the Tiso matter stralghtened out, Dr. Lettrlch embarked on a visit to tbe llnlted States. Lettrlch claims that before his departure he had come to ao uoclerstandlng witb Pollák and Cvinček, Vice-Presidents of tbe Slovak ,\ .'atlonal Council, tbat the matter would not be asslgned to the Natio nal Court oefore h1s return home. Cvinček, however, denled that Lettrlcb had ,ald anything of the sort. But even 1t if was the trutn, !r is a very weak and slok alibi. Dr. Lettrloh was aware of the fa.cc , na· whlle he 1\!'aS preslrlent of the Slovak Natlonal Councll, tbe Com• •nunists got i.ny one tbey wanted on the Councll of Commissloners. Aud he knew that tbe most important minlstry, the Mlnlstry of tbe lnterlor, did not go to a member of the strongest party, but, lt was said, to a 11on-party man, Beneš's man, a servant of the Communlsts, tó General Ferjenčik. Tbe signature of Dr. Lettrich is on Ferjenčik's deoree. Arter tbese experiences could Lettr!ch belleve that Cvinček and Pollák would be able to hold the )lne w!thout hlm, when he hlmseU adm!ts in hls artlcle that Milan Pollák was uncertaln, tick.le and for tbe executlon of Dr. Tiso? · · The fact ls that after the departure ot Dr. Lettrlch, the case ot Dr. Tlso was presented to the National Court, and tbe presldent of the court senate became the feared Dr. Igor Da.xner, And here I see for Uié second Ume the sealed will of Dr. Beneš to bang Tlso at all costs. And for the second tlme I see Tlso's fate sealed with the a.s· slsiance of the representatlves of the Slovak Democratlc Party despite the promises and obllgatlons to tbe eleotorate. " I W tL L HANG OR. T ISO!" · Wben Dr. Daxner was allowed to become tbe presiding judge, 1Íolbfog good could be expected. All the assumptlons in thls regard XJaxner manitested by hls behavlor long before the tria! -and proved lt afterward. ·: . SLOVAKIA 9 The day before the date of the main hearing was set, I myselt waé convinced of thls when I tried to help to remove Daxner. The Communiste, however, were so firmly anchored in the Slovak NaUonal Council that Dr. Daxner was approved as preslding judge of the National Court wlthout any dltflculty. On November 18, 1946, the National Court was supposed to eonvene an"d,determine the term of the maln hearing, begin the trlal anil present the decument ot charges agalnst Tiso. The previous day, when I had gone to Dr. Daxner to ask for a permanent admlttance pass to tbe tria!, Dr. Daxner began to argue and tried to persuade me to go along wlbh ševčik and Pollák, and not with the "popullsts and separatlsts." He asked me to follow the tria! of Dr.l Tlso and use my lnfluence In the Democratlc Party so that lt would not ldentlfy Itself wlth Dr. Tlso and would not make any dlfflculties for Da.xner. When I retueed, he banged bis flst on the table and screamed: "You are doing wrong. The Communiata will devour you, tear you to piecea, and I will hang Dr. Tiao!"1 tried to quiet bim ciown and cautioned him 'that a judge should not talk that way and that lt also was against the law for a judge to express his opinion so resolutely against the accused. But Daxner oniy grew more exclted, banged the table agaln and agaln and yelled: " Do whatever you want to, but I shall hang him !" I related the incident to Andrew Cvlnček, addlng that I was williog to teit:fy to it a.t any th:p.e. I reminded hlm that I knew Daxner well. I knew that Daxner WltS a paralytlc, a sadlst and a person of very bad mora! and · spirltual qualitles. I also told hlm that I did not belleve that Beneš would grant amnesty to Dr. Tlso. I refused to talk about the matter before the body o! o!ficers of tbe Democratlc Party, because ševčik and Pollák were among them, and · r knew definitely that they were betraylng our matters to the Communlsts. In fact I knew that ševčík was a paid agent ot tbe )JKVD (secret police). Thereupon the offlcers or the Party named a five-member commlttee to hear my story. Urslny, Cvlnček and Dr. Pietor reallzed the gravity of the situatlon and promlsed to try to do somethlng in Prague before December 2, the date when the hearings in the case or Dr. Tiso were to be concluded. THE M OCK TRIAL BEGINS But, alas, nothing happened. On December 2, 1946, Dr. Daxner opened the tria! with Dr. Joseph Tlso before the Natlonal Court in Bratislav-a. The trial took place in the jury room. The prosecutlon was represented by Dr. Rigan, Dr. Šujan anu Dr. Rašla. Dr. Tlso ,via.s defended by Dr. Grečo and Dr. Ža!Íkay. That is how a correspondenťs repor.t would read. And tbat is jus t about how the reports of the Slovak Press Bureau lookec\. But the truth 1s altogether differenl Tlso's frlends and bis famlly had engaged the servlces of a very respectable counsellor, Dr. Lojek, to defend Tiso. However, as soon as D"r. Lojek presented the full authorlzatlon or Dr. Joseph Tlso, he was ordered to appear before the poliťe, who began to inVesfigate hlm. They as ked why he wanted to defend Tlso, who dlscussed the defe nse wlth htm, how much he was pald, and other Jess sensLble Queatlons. What Lojek actually went tbrough ls known only to bim and the 10 SLOVAKIA police. The fact is that he gave up the defense o[ Tiso, and there was nothing else for T!so to do but ask the court to provide defense counsels. This incident, !( everythiug else Iu the tria! against Tiso would be iu order, ra!sed a reasou.ab!e doubt that the tria! would be just and in order. At the same time it made people th!nk and assume that the tria! would be carried on according to some agreement, that it would be a forma! process and. therefore, could not be just and fair. In a word that everyth!ng was cut and drled and Tiso's fate was sealed. I do not press the faet that Dr. Daxner was the presiding judge, but for the sake of the truth I must remlnd that attempts were made to remove Daxner before lhe tria! started. Of course, the tria! wa.,; prepared and no one could degress from the prepared program or could successfully take exception to it. Besides Daxner, there were six attendant justices, one a judge by profession, and tbree attendant justices as a reserve, in case one or the other attendant justices would drop out or get sick. It is a universal custom, that against such a court - whether it be called a senate or a jury - the accused, the prosecutor and the defense have the rlght to testify whether a certain person is accepta ble to them or not, and, also to state wbat objections they might entertain against any person of lhe jury or court. Likewise the principle holds universaJJy that when one is proposed as a wltness he cannot be in tbe same tria! also as an attendant or part of the court, and much less so as the presid!ng judge of the court. Slnce the Slovak Democratic Party could uot remove Daxner, tbe defense attomeys tried to replace bim as was their right to do. In the first place they objected because Daxner was incarcerated during the Slovak Republic and, later, had expressed himself on various occasions that all the accused must be hanged and, therefore, it was evldent that he was prejudiced. According to all pena! laws. prejudlce 1s an excluding circumstance. Then they proposed to have Dr. Daxner as a witness to testify that after Da.·rner was freed from jail, Dr. Tlso had allowed bim to take over hls judgeshlp again. Alexander Mach wanted Daxner to testify that it was only by the grace of Mach that Daxner was freed from prison on the basis of the false med!cal testimony and a false X•Ray picture. Daxner simply admltted Mach's statement and proclaimed that bis testimony was no longer needed. As far as prejudice was concerned. he sa!d that the objection was not proper, because he sald he was objeetive, and imediately ordered the tria! to begin. AL L OBJECTION S OVE RRU L ED According to every Jaw. objections cannot be overruled by a •judge against whom they are made. This is a fundamental princlple of pena! procedure. But laws were no gulde for Daxner. He had only one gulde: to condude the process as speE!dily a.s poss!ble and render the verdict he had promlsed bis bosses. When the defense counsels saw that they were gett!ng nowhere, they began to tackle the matter from a Jegal standpoint. They ob- SLOVAKIA ll jected that the court was not made up properly, and that the de<:rees of lhe Slovak ::-l'ational Council about people's courts were not valid and, finally, that Dr. Tiso was not surrendered properly by the American occupation authorltles, as prescribed in accepted 1nter· natlonal regulations, but that Tiso was forcefully transported lnto Czecho-Slovakia without the knowledge of the four powers concerned, or only with the knowledge of one of those powers. The defense sald that if Tiso was a war crlmlnal, then bis surrender should have been determined by t he Internatlonal Tribunal in :-.1Uremberg. U he was not a war crimlnal, and the American General In command in Kremsmlinster May 8, 1945, accepted the capitulatlon or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso, then, in that case, all members of that Government, and so much more the Presldent, have the rlght the right of asylum, thls belng based on the following arguments: l. According to the Atlantlc Charter, i!IS\ted by the Presldent or llle United States and the Engllsh Prime Minister, every nation has the · right to choose the form of government under which it shall live· and to its own statehood; 2. the head of such a state was not subject to the legislative power of a foreign state for pena! acts, which may have been committed during the existence of and on the territory of such a State; 3. the Slovak State was recognized by some 27 States, including Great Britaln, with which it had diplomatlc rela· tions; also with the Soviet Union: 4. neither Great Drltain nor France agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso and, therefore, Dr. Tlso should be returned to Altčitting, in Bavaria, wbere on Jtme 9, 1945. he was arrested by American Military Police. 'l"hls contention o[ the defense still holds today. I myself can eonflrm that Britaln and France never agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso. According to the International Agreement oť J anuary 13, 1942, eoncluded in London, which refers to the Atlantlc Charter and the proclama.tion of Roosevelt and Churchill of October 25, 1941, lliternatlonii:lly only those criminals were to be surrendered who had undertaken, besides mllitary acts, such attacks against clvillzed populntions whlch were considered criminal among clvilized natlons. Tiso was not accused of such a crime. Furthermore, others who could be surrendered were those·,, who as occup,tnts, or representatives of occupants, committed or allowed to be committed punishable acts against the clvillan popu!a:tion. · Tiso was not accused of ,any such punlsha.ble acts by the In· habitants of the ló Slovak vlllages which were taken by the Slovak Hepubllc from the Polish territory. If, however, he or bis subordinates had commltted a pena! act on Pollsh terrltory, then, accordlng to the agreement above, Dr. Tiso could be accused only by the Poles and tried II! Warsaw. . Na.turally, Dr. Daxner repucliated any and all such objectlons and announced that bis court was competent to try Dr. Tlso. Then the tleťense counsels requested that the tria! take place before a regular and not before a revolutionary national court, because all the preferred pena! acts were commltted before the two decrees of 1945 ot tbe Slovak National Councll were effective. The defense clalmed that only Cor pena! acts commltted after the issuance of some pena! form ,vas 1-t posslble to carry ·on a pena! procedure arcording to sucb a norm. 12 SLOVAKIA even though penal sanctions remain according to some Jater norm. The pena! procedure itself, however, should be carrled on according to thé norma! penal oťder. Even Tlso hlmself declared that he dld not recognlze the decree of the Slovak National Court, by whlch the socalled National Court and the People's Courts were establlshed, because he was under arrest trom June 9, 1945, and, therefore, could not have committed any pena! act against the regulations lssued by the Slovak National Councll. We la.wyers had debated whole hours before the Tiso tria! · about these very weighty Jegal problems and then even durlng the trial, but Daxner repudiated them in a s ingle moment by banglng on the table and screaming: "I . repudiate all objections. ľll take care of all pena! procedures here!" And that is how the tria) against Tiso began. Up to that tíme, the tria) room was fllled wlth Slovak and Czech reporters and forelgn observers, but after that moment all who were not resldents of Bratislava left the proceedlngs, because they reallzed that the fate of Tlso was sealed and only a mock tria) was to be staged. During the two hours, which I have thus f.ar desctibed, Daxner several tlmes howled llke a jackall, banged on the table and threat• ened Dr. ~abkay, and even Dr. Kšinan, who defended Mach, tbat he would tbrow tbem out of the court room. The whole procedure was recorded on sound tape and tbat evenlng the newsmen wbo _gave a report. about the trial, p•ayed this portion of the recorded tape, wblch was falthfully recorded. The popula.tlon of Slovakl-a bega.n to sound off because of Da.xner's conduct. Tbe Democratic Party and lts representatlv01, were the target of bitter and viclous attacks; the people inslsted that the Party keep lts promlses. It began to be generally sald that Tiso's verdict was already settled and that what• ever Da.xner was doing was only a comedy. Desplte the fact that tbi!I was true, thls process nevertheless. brought out some hlstorical trutbs which we shall need In the future and whicb without tbi.B trial would not have come to l!ght. Wh~n Dr. Žabkay rose to bis feet on March 6th and said only t.hree words - "Prosim, aby bolo ..." ("l beg, in order that lt be") he was lnterrupted by Daxner who jumped to bis feet and barked: "Tbe court overrules tbat!" When Žabkay protested and explained that the court could not overrule something which he had not al! yet aaid, Dr. Daxner bellowed: "But I tel1 you tbat the court does over• rule lt!" THE W I TNESSES The wltnesses who testified in the Tlso tria) might be ·p laced in three categories: . • l, The Catholic clergymen toward whom I)axner acted . arro· gantly. I thtnk tbat it was on account or tbem that Dr. Tiso decided tQ (!Pl!&k In h!s own defen$e, They were Archblshop Charles Kmefko and BJshop Michael Bm;alka. From the leg.al standpo!nt, I regarded it as the greatest tnsult When Dr.. Daxner announced in the name of the Court that , he woul<l SLOVAKIA 13 not swear ln tbese witnesses. Ordinarily, according to prevalling la.ws in Europe, the court does not swear in a wltness when there are reasons why it does not want to believe hlm. That 1s, In Europe a witness is first heard and then the court determlnes whether he ah!Wi be sworn io or not. Daxner's conduct was openly provocatlve and in· s ulting to disbonor such a serlous, aged man, as was Dr. Kmetko, wbo was respected by all decent Slovaks regar-dless of thelr rellgious beliefs. It is sigo1ficant that at tbe time Dr. Kmeťko was teslfylng, the Czech Catholic clergymen had several deliberatlons and lssued memoranda and reports, but displayed practically no open interest in what was happening In Slovakia. Not even Archbishop Joseph Beran, the Czech Primate, could find anything to say in tbe interest of the honor of the Catholic priesthood of Slovakia representéd by Pr, KmeCko. Tbe Czech clergymen followed Beran's example and. failed to ralse their volces and to rally tbe Catholic Czechs !n defense ot Justlce and righteousness. 2. In· the second category belonged the Slovak members of Gottwa.lďs government, namely, Ursiny and Lichner. Daxner talked to Ursíny as thóuugh he were an underling. From flve meters away Daxner greeted htm: "Why we, Mr. VlcePreinler of the Government, know each otber well, because we or• ganlzed the underground together." - Ursíny broke out lnto a broad s mlle and said nothing, though he should bave said: You, Mr. presidlng judge, were nowhere and did nothing, unless you were in some tavern, Sir, and there I, John Ursíny, did not go. Otberwise Ursíny did not say anything substantial, except that 'ľiso did not want bim in the Slovak Government. nor in the Peasant Banks, and that he was In the concentratlon camp at Illava for three days, but was not beaten there and was fed well. Daxner exploited Ursiny, however, by using general expres11ions, s·uch as, "Why we know that ... Why we did that together ... Why that does not have to be explained to us." Of course, the Communist press immediately glorified Daxner as a great hero of the underground movement, to whose actlvlty_ UT· Ríny hlmself had attested. Minlste.r .Tohn Lichner, however. ,v,as a witness of another type. Daxner did not welcome bim with a smile or a greetlng, but with the questlon: "You were a minister of Dr. Tiso's Government?" - He -then asked Lichner whether he traveled and delivered speeches in a uniform of tbe (Hlinka) Guard and why Tiso later dlsmlseed hlm. ' .Licbner expla!ned as best he could, but it must have been evident even to hlm tbat Daxner was not even remotely lnterestjid. 3. The third group of witnesses was the most interestlng. I be· ·11evé I can· characterize thls group properly, because I had wltnessed t hé N'uremberg trlals. There I saw ield Marshal von Paulus go before the :rrtternational Trlbunal, and in Bratislava I saw General Ferdin,and Čatld!ľ go béfore the National Cou-rt. Both men had much in common Both were soldlers, generals; thelr appearance In court w.as .a -surprlse; and both appeared a.t a time when lt. was opportune for tbe. Commun!sta and einbárrasslng for the defense. · In Nuremberg, ·Goerlng read romances and detectlve storles and generally was not lnterested In the tria!. When, to hls great surprlse, 14 SLOVAKTA the American Police brought Paulus, the heroic "defender" of Stalingrad, into the court room, Goering for a moment took off bis glasses, looked around, llstened and then said to the leading personaJities of the German General Staff: "'Fhis is hopeless ! this is swinishness ! " Should I repeat only thls sentence In reference to Čatloš, I would help the reader of these lines, because the result wlll be the same. Paulus entered the Nuremberg court room slowly with a oautious step; he was attired in an elegant dark blue sult, a starc-hed whJte s hirt, as if it was out of porcelain. He spoke slowly and pretended to be deaf; bis eyes were glassy, his frame strlkingly numb, and hli< eyes up1ifted almost straight to the heavens. The same could be s-ald for Čatloš. He, too, was dressed In a dark blue suit and was about twice as deaf as Paulus; but bis eyes, s tance were the same - just as if twlns appeared on two different stages. Paulus saw nothing but evil in everythlng that Hitler dld. Čatloš tried to prove to Tiso that he knew about all thlngs - the posslble and the impossible - because he, Čatloš, reported to bim on everything every morning ,at nine o'clock. Tlso smiled ironically and saíd: "To report, report he did, but whether he told me everything, I do not know." The fact is, according to what Čatloš said, that Čatloš sbould have sat in Tiso's place; for those acts Čatloš and not Tiso should have answered. It is interesting that bctb generals stuck to the orders or MosťOW, that they preferred to be deaf and more deaf, so tbey could speak slowly and thus have time to think thlngs over. Both held up faiľly well the first several hours, but then both slipped up a bit. Paulus was taken back to Moscow, and Catloš to the Rratislava jail. Later Catloš was taken to Prague, where Czéťh mllltary correspondents questloned him. I had not met Paulus before and, hence, did not know bim. But I knew Čatloš from my cbildhood days, and the last time I saw ·hlm was In September, 1939, in Prešov. The Catloš, who seven years later ťame to the court room of Dr. Daxner, seemed to be about twenty years older and bis mind compared wlth that or a tbird grader and not that of a general. I am wllling to testlfy under oath even today that the Catloš who sat before Daxner was not the master of his own wlll, tbat he was a broken man actlng under pressure of some one else. Catloš definitely was not a.ťtlng as a norma! person. Another such wltness was Dr. Martin Sokol, former Premier or the Slovak Parliament. The first day he acted as Catloš did; ma.ny t!mes he made it aggravating for Tiso; h e was stupified, deaf and gazed toward tbec eiling. On the second day Sokol reacted differently; as lf the Slovak environment began to affect bim and the lnjections were Joslng tbelr force (here I remind tbat the expression "!njectlons" was used by Dr. Tiso when answerlng ča.tloš); his answers took on a Slovak color and he talked clearly and lntelligently abotu the confllcts between Dr. Joseph Tlso and Dr. Vojtech Tuka. Dr. Sokol conld not revoke everytbing he had saia, but on the seťond day Dr. Sokol definitely appeared wlth bis old smlle in tbe lE>ft ťorner of bis month. nespite thlfl, bowever. the characteristic lnfluen('e.'! of Rmislan indodrinatlon were planlly evldent. This was SLOVAKIA 15 intluences also by the thlrd par:ticipant of the Moscow school, D1. John Spišiak, the former ambassador of the Slovak Republic in Budapest. Were I to repeat how Spišiak appeared and what he said, I would only be repeating what I had said about Paulus. It was the same school, the very same school wlthout regard to the fact where the s tudents dld the answerlng, whether In Athens, Budapest, Bratislava, or Prague. Then there was a special group, a group of German origin, who al one tlme or auother were actlve in Slovakia. As a Slovak, or as a defense couusel of Slovak orlgin, I would never rely on thelr testi• mony. I was very glad, nay even proud, that Dr. Tlso never appealed to the testimony of these Germans. We can thank Dr. Tlso that we do not have disputes s uch as the Czechs have among themselves over what answers of Ludin are correct and which are false. K. H. Frank, Hitler's man in Prague, signed a different protocol every hour before his death. According to one, Krajina was the leader of the Czech reslstance and, according to another, Dr. J . Krajina, the future secretary-general of Zenkľs party, was the greatest collaborator with the Germans . We Slovaks do not have such differences. And for that we can be thankful to Dr. Tlso, who never concerned himself with German testlmony. Defense speeches refuted the propriety of the court and demanded that Dr. Tiso be returned to the American occupation authoritles in Germany. They pointed out that if Tiso had acted in the manner of Daxner, Da.xner would today be a natlonal corpse and not the presldlng judge of the Natlonal Coun. The defense counsels further polnted out that General Kristin, :VIinister Široký and Minister Ďuriš - who were sentenced to dle. but were saved by Tlso - would have Jong been dead, if Tiso had followed Daxner's example. The defense demonstrated that it was not true, as the prosecu· tion stated, that America, Great Britain and France were at war with Slovakla, but conversely officers of the Slovak Army played tennis with Amerlcan flyers, because every one regarded them not as enemles, but as interned persons of a forelgn state. T H E V ERDICT : " DEATH" - A S FORECAST On the 18th of March, 1947, the Court adjourned to prepare the verdlct. Suddenly, llke a bolt out of clear sky, the report came at 10 P. M. on Apríl 14, 1947, when the officers of the Democratlc Party were in session, that Dr. Daxner had designated the next day, April 15, 1947, as the day he would render the verdict. The Ume was set for 9:0 OA. M. AU of us turned pale, because none of us had expected it. Of course, the Communists were not surprised at all, because they knew l'verything that Daxner was going to do. On Aprll 15, 1947 at 9:30 A. M. the rea.ding of the verdict be· gan; it lasted until 9 P. M. We had expected almost anything to happen. However, that a judge would subordinate hlmself or become subservient to a political party - that no lawyer, no senstble man expected to happen. lt was a s urprise for everybody. 16 SLOVAKIA After the verdict was rendered, the third pbase of the Dr, Tlso ca se began - the final chapter: the fight for amnesty. After the judge rendered the verdict of death on the gallows for Tiso,. Daxner asked the condemned Tiso whether he would request the Court for clemency. Tlso measured DaxneT carefully and said slowly: "I do ask for clemency on mora! grounds." Dr. Žabkay, the defense attorney, presented the Court the rea· sons why Tlso sbould receive mercy and asked tbe Court that Dr. Josepb Tiso's request be placed before tbe proper authorities without delay. Dr. Rigan, State Prosecutor, stated: "1 bave no objections against a favorable executlon or tbe request of Dr. Tiso for mercy." However, all the more disgraceful is wnat continued to take place In the secret sesslon of tbe Court Senate which, accordlng to Jaw, was supposed to consider the request or the condemned man and take a definite stand on it. Generally when the verdict rendered is not unanimous, that 1s wben al! the attendant justices do not vote for the same punishment, then amnesty 1s recommended, and the condemned man usually gets a 30-year or a lite sentence in prison. Tbe verdlct in Tiso's case was not unanimou11; in some things it was 5-2 and in others again 4-3 against Tiso. Here, then, were all t he prerequ!sltes for the Senate to recommend mercy for Tiso. But Da.'<ner, tbe presiding judge, by a Jong and violent procedure, prevailed in bis demand that tbe request of Dr. Tiso be not consldered, but handed over to the Commissar of Justice, Dr. Ivan Štefä.nlk, so that he mi~ht put it before the National Court. F ROM CAIPHAS TO PILATE - TO HE ROD Everything had to be done speedily, because only 48 bours remained <to study and debate the amnesty <1Ue0<tion, and during that time tbe matter had to pass through the Commlss-ary, tbe Slovak National Council, the Government and, finally, the matter could be resolved only by tbe presldent of the Czecbo-Slovak Re-public, Dr. Edward Beneš. Wednesd·ay mornlng, April 16, 1947, the Communi&ts began to demonstrate; deputations o( partisans and polltical prisoners began to pour toto the offlce of tbe S lovak National Councll, and it was feared that the Communists would start some disturbances and riots. The Commlssar delivered the documenl,; in the morning at 9: 00 A. M. to tbe President of !,he 'Slovak National Council, Dr. Joseph Let· trich, and requested that he not only take care of the documents at once, bll't at the same Ume that he place a recommendatlon for the request o! clemency. As s oon as Dr. štefánik prepared the necessary motlon. the officers of ,the 'SNC assembled a bit before 11: 00 A. M. to coni,ider the request of Dr. Joseph Tiso. . The two Communist members of this of!iclal body, Schmldtke and Dr. Horväth, did not attend the sesslon and notiffed the SNC that they \O'OUld Mt -attend lt. The request witb all documents, therefore, was to be consldered by three members of the Slovak Democratlc Party: Dr. Lettrich. Ml· lan Pollák 11nd Canon Msgr. ,Andrew Cvlnček. This tbreesome decided SLOVAKIA 17 that all the documents or Dr. 'ľiso, as well as the motlon or the Commissar and the request of Dr. Tiso, as prepared by Dr. Žabkay, shall be ceded to the Go\'ernment WľťHOUT COM:\1ENT or recommendation; also that they would immediately inform the Government by phone of their declslon and that they are sending their blghest officer, Dr. Martinček, by auto to Prague so that the documents might get tbere as soon as possible. If the president of the SNC had not made tbe so-called second agreement in Prague on Aprll 11, 1946, thereby surrendering its right to grant amnesty, tbe !ate or Dr. Tlso could have been de• ided with final validity by tbe tbree above-mentlooed members of tbe SNC. According to tbe new Jegal order, tbat is according to the fatal Prague agreement, it was obligatory on tbe motion of the Commissar for Justice to place documents before the Government. The latter then returns tbe recommendation to tbe praesldlum of tbe SNC i( it bas any objections to it from tbe standpoint of State lnterests; otherwlse it places it before the president of tbe Republic . That was the way tbe Jaw read. Tbe commissar did place tbe documents witb the opinion that amnesty be granted, but the praesidium of the SNC did not even do as muc b as the Commissar; witbout backing Tiso it surrendered al! documents and Tiso into tbe hands or tbe Government and Dr. Beneš. 'ľhis ls all tbat the Slovak National Councll said: "The doc uments, in the intent of agreement No. 2, art. 1, par. B, are being ceded to the presidency of the Government in Prague, April 17, 1947." Tbat is all and notbing more. Actually the three Democ rats, members or tbe Executlve or the SNC - of whom only Dr. Lettricb is alive today - did not even say a word in Tiso's bebalf; and none of them did anything about lt. 'ľhe people who criticized the way Dr. Lettrich acted, are stlll reproaching him for it today. On t he other band, the Government and l:leneš began to to wash their Judas' hands and said: well, how could we grant mercy, wben the Slovaks themselves -- even when no Communlsts were present, when only representatives of the Democratic Party were present, like Lettrich, Cvinček and Pollák - could not agree upon a word of recommendation? Of course, as far as the Government and Beneš are concerned. tbey knew better, even if such a senseless alibi partially was supported by the impossible stand of the SNC. But Dr. Lettrich never will be able to justlfy bis actlon before :rnyone in tbe world; and he must not be angry when the Slovaks and the Czechs claím that he is guilty for Tiso not getting clemency. For the sake or objectivity, I shall quote a few paragraphs from Lettriclťs hanclwritten report about those moments: "On April 17. 1947, when the praesidium of the SNC was assembllng, the situation was very difficult. Tbe Communists tbreate ned w-ith strikes and riots; the Oommissar of Jnstice dld not present a recommendatlon to grant mercy; and the request could hardly wln in the praes idíum of the SNC. That 1s to say, tbe praesidlum of the SNC had 5 members: three for the Democratic Party and two for the Slovak Communlst Party. One of the representatlves of the Democratíc Party was nnrertain: elther he would have voted against grantlng 18 SLO~A.KIA mercy or he would have ábstáined from voting. In both cases a ·majority was not assured for clemency: This was a delicate situation. It was necessary to flnd a way out. The idea was to get a recommendatlon !rom the Commissars for clemency and so forestall a posslble negatíve declsion of the praesidium o[ the SNC and outride au ominous, open politicaJ crisis, which could have had unforeseen consequences. "After dellberating the matter with political co-workers and after discussing it with the Communist members of the praesidium of the SNC, lt was decided that the SNC would return Tiso's request for mercy to the Commissar· or Justice; Commissar Dr. šte[ánik would complement lt with a positive recommendation for grantlng clemency and then would send · i t 'to · the praesidlum of the SNC. The latter would then agree that the Commissar's recommendati0)1, for granting mercy be placed before the Government with t he request to ·present it to the Pľesident for me1:itorious judgment." LETTRICH CANNOT ESCAPE BLAME FOR TISO'S DEATH - . Betwe~n my account and the h:µid-written account of Lettrlch there is the difference : I. clai~ that štefánik hlmself brought the documents to the praesidiuµi , 'ôt. the SNC and there immediately made the recommendation fo r clemency, whereupon the praesidium went into session at once. Almost to t he last moment before the praesldium began lts ses·s ion, I was in the same room in which thé meeting was to také place and I know definitely that Dr. Štefánik hád the documents with bim and that one of the secretaries - either Lettrich's Dr. Haviar, or Cvinček's Dr. Bystrický ·_ announced that the <.:ommunist members would not come to the meeting. When Dr. Lettricb knew that the Coinmunist members would be i.bsent, did he still fear that Milan Pollák alone would outvote bim? Wby did he not at least move a finger to indicate in some way that he would try to fulflll what he had promised bis constituents and wh'<tt it was his mora! duly to fulfill? He knew that the overwhelming majority or the population of Slovakia demanded everythlng possible be done to-save the life of Dr. Joseph Tiso. After the decision of the praesidium, I asked Cvinček why he agreed to such a solutlon. He expressly referred to Lettrich, who explained to him tbat according to Article 1, par. B of the Prague Document, the p'residency of the SN€ only' pre!lents• 'documents, but does not have to give its opinion about them, and ·that in law the right of opinion for the praesidium, of .the SNC doeS'·not exist. . I remember that · several members of the praesidium. of the Democratlc Party strongly crltlcized the prodeedings; óne · of, 'them, Dr. Emanuel Bohm, Js. In the U.S.A,, and ..,anotb,er,., Ing. K-orneJ . Filo is in France. Bohui made rep1w\<w,es1 ,~herejlS, li'ilo- in.sisted that everything wlthln the pow!lr_o! ,all,?f us, ou!íp,t ~.o b~,.~one sp ,that Ppague would grant c lemencr to ,Tiso. And .,he himself . 11oq ;~veral.,.o th~r ľri~n~s at. once cal)~d ' thelr_ tr\ends In Pragu_e; h1(?rixie.<;1_', thé1ii'.;ap,out the mistake tha.t wa~., made :an.d req\lested their lnteryenJlpq, w.!th, indivldual mlnis~ers. ~t' was_ t~ps ~hjl;~_.:prtina, Š,ráme,k°,J~</,.. oteers 'ťere <:alled. . . , , , , ,. When the _ge~?.ral. public ,;a_rq~iJ a~ou~ the maúer: .,tbe ó9yei-nment, ·:áeneš, nay _e_x~n ~ettrich, _rec~iv(ld ),i..u_ndredii pf lelegrams from Bratislava a.lone. · · f SLOVAKIA 19 The Ministers of the Democratic Party w.e re then already in Prague. Every one of them received telephone requests from us private and offlclal - to correct the mlstake. But all were pessimistlc, dominated by an "oh, whaľs the use" attltnde. For example, Dr. Johu Ursíny said by phone and two days Jater publicly stated that Zenkľs answer. after talking to bim over an hour was: - "For our voters it is impossible for us to vote for mercy for T iso and for us it is unprofitable." Zenkl repeated this also to other Ministers, w ho intervened for Tiso and, finally, he gave the same answer even to Dr. John Šrámek. BENEŠ'S ALIBI: THE SLOVAK$ DID IT The greatest surprise waa when our Ministers ascertained that even John Maaaryk would vote to reject the plea for mercy. 'rhis was one of J án Masaryk's most despicable deeds; I know not how 11 months later he alibied thls sin In the otber world. E ven individ,ľal church councils and superiors of various religlous bodies intervened in Prague in behalf of Tiso. On the other hand, the Trade Organizations, Jed by Dezider Benau, ·and other Communist organlzations includlng local units of industria! unions, demanded the execution of the verdict. The situation was tense, lndeed. The performance of the praes ldlnm of the SNC was condemned by every one. Tbus, for example, t he :p}lÁVO LIDU, organ of the Social Uemocrats, in a long article blamed the Slovaks for everylhing and in bold-faced letters sald: " It seemed that the SNC took a neutra) stand on the question and, tberefore, there was no reason for tne Prague govern ment to recommend to the Presirtent of the Republic to change everytbing in the verdict of the Slovak court. . . . Dr. Lettricb, president of the SNC and chairman of the Slovak De mocratic Party, has almost a two-1hlrds majority in Slovakla. And yet up to Wednesday he did not decide wh ether he should recommend to the Government to grant cle mency to Tiso." In the US A Czech Cathollc newsman Anthony Jandáček, wrote: " The bl.a.me for the execution of tbe verdlct of death rest!\ with sevoral weaklings, who did not oppose the Communist demand and, as official representatlves of the SNC. di d not even manage as mucb as to recommend to t he Presldent of the Republic to grant clemency." Furthermore. Jandáček ·said : "Dr. J oseph Lettrich shall once have a dlfflcult problem and task to explain why he was a weakllng and wby he did ,not recommend m ercy." The Amerlcan correspondent (NCWC) John l\lauthner similarly C'baracterlzed the whole procedure agalnst Dr. Tiso and especially the behavlor of the presidenC'y of the SNC. A. Ross. another American <'Orrespondent and hundrecls of others also expressed themsel\'es Rimilarly. Even before the Government renderecl a decision and Dr. Edwanl Deneš could express himself on the matter, the welghtle!!l step in behalf of Tlso was made. Archbisho o Xaverio Ritter. the Papal Jnter.nunclo In Prague. vislted Dr. Beneš. Despite Rltter's ardent JJ)ea for Tiso. Denell fulfilled what he had planned long ago and somet hing that several gentlemen attempted to Jegalize for bim. 20 SLOVAKJA The documents were not as yet in Prague, but the Government was called together at 5:00 P. M., because it thought that by that time they would certainly arrive. When they diel not arrive by 5: 00 P. M., Gottwald forced a vote which was not for the benefit of Ti5o. The Czech Populists and the Slovak Democrats voted for c lemency, while the others were for execution. We learned about this decision or the Government a few minutes after it was macle and, therefore, the praesidium of the Democratic Party m et again at the residence of Dr. Lettrich. Every one phoned to whom he could; even Lettrich attempted to get Beneš, hut could no t ľontact him. That certainly wa.5 strange, ·because at other times he could contact him in a matter or two minutes. At that fatal moment he could not reach Beneš. So telegrams were sent instead. An American correspondent for the NCCW characterized tbose telegrams thus: "The popularity of Dr. Lettrich quickly diminished, because in the whole question of Dr. Tiso he washed his hands and hesitated to personally request mercy for Tiso. Lettrich waited until Tiso was dead and then immediately he sent a telegraphic protest against the execution." In the USA we must recall and note that members of the GovernU\ent knew that the Communists were forcing the execution of Dr. Tiso, because they wanted to weaken t he Democratic Party. The Comruunists failed to weaken the DP in May, 1946, by forming the Freedom Party, so they sought to wreck it by forcing Tiso's execution. Every minister in Prague knew that very well and, without exception, every one was visited several limes and informed about this by some Slovak politician in Prague. These ministers, however, i.,referred to belp tbe Comnrnnfsts break np the anti-Communist ranks in Slovakia tban to vote clemency for Tiso. And today these same Czech politici ans are enjoying life in Washington, D. C.; among them are Zenkl, Ripka, Stránsky, and Mayer. As tar as I am concerned all these confirmed their collaboration with Communism when they voted to reject Tiso's plea for clemency. Tbe sbort session of the ministerial council was interrupted once for a sbort tíme, wben Ursíny and Šrámek requested the National Socialists to at least abstain from voting on the Tiso plea. Zenkl. howpver, would hear none of it. Tbe Government presented the motion to reject mercy, even tbough the court documents of Dr. Tiso were not even in Prague at the time, and Dr. Beneš, also witbout even looking at the documents, complied witb the motion and rejected the request for mercy as early as Wednesday, tbat is Apríl 16th. The rejection was announeed by tf'letype by Beneš's cbancery to the police station of Ferjenčík's cffice in the late night hours. However. wp had Beneš's decision by phone from Prague much earlier. BENEŠ WAS THE LAW It is interesting that Beneš, rejecting amnesty, diel not make usf' of the means prescribed by law and did not a.nnounce his decisfon by returning the documents through ttle praesidium of tbe SNC wbich would tben hand them over to tbe Commissar of Justice. Why did Beneš do that? Diel he not belleve tbem? SLOVAKIA 21 No. When Beneš rejected Tlso's request, the documents as yet were not in Prague and therefore he could not stamp the customary formula "nelze vyhoveli" (cannot be granted) on them. But he was interested in the execution taking place already Friday morning and, therefore, through bis servants, Ferjenčík's per· sonal office and Ferjenčik' s police, already on \Vednesrlay night, several hours after the decision of the Government, he notified Bratislava about bis decision and told them to be ready to go through with everything he had o rdered. Tbe Chief of Police announced this to Dr. L ettri<·h at midnight, and the State machinery at Bratislava began preparations for the execution, which no one could now stop according to law or regula· tions. On the morning of the second day, wben Dr. Daxner visited Tiso in bis ·celi to inform bim in tbe presence of hls counsellors that Beneš rejected the plea for mercy, the documents were not In Bratislava. AII were still in P rague and it was only about an hour later that the Presidenťs office placed the seal of the •Republic on them and the ;,ignalure of the Chief ef the Chancery. Tbe documents were not on hand when the Government made its clecision, or when the President macle bis clecision, or when Tiso was lnformed about the mat ter in bis cell by Daxner. Everything was done by telegrams. Wben Daxner lett Tiso's cell, Tiso's sister came to vtsit htm, then bis Jegal counsellors. wbile ever at bis slde was a Capuchln priest. At that ttm e tbere still were several sesslons and it was wbtspered in secret just what migbt yet be done in Tiso's bebalf. •TISO LOYA L TO GOD AND NATION TO T H E E N D Tiso. however, dlel not want to bear about any indication; very s harply he repeatecl what he had demonstratecl several limes during the trial: he was not concerned about his life. because if he. must make the sacrifice, he will do so proudly, but by no word or act would he change wbat he diel or saicl -as the Presiclent of Slovakia. This was also well known at tbat time and so it was with anxiety t hat the last ho·urs of Dr. Tiso were followed to see how all this woulcl thuncler over excitecl Slovakia. To the last moment Tiso was nnbroken, manly, just as he was before in the Court in macl Daxner's presence. wben he clefended bis truth and many limes crossed the interests of bis defense, who wanted to help bim. But Tlso never once in bis tria! clenied or revoked anything tbat he had proclaimed at any ti me. From his defense speech one sentence resonn<ied for hours in the E-ars of every llstener: "And if I were agaín placed by Provldence in a pos ition to deC"icle, I would decide, on tbe whole, tbe same way as I did In the past." Witb this sentence Dr. Tiso rejected even tbe Jast extenuating <·i rcumsta.nce. For tbe historian. Dr. Tiso even in the last moments of bis life gave the fundamental sketch and the greatest proof of his manliness. determination and steadfastness for everything that he had preached and done. JJ SLOVAKIA Two hours before bis execution he wrote bis final l egať'y it\ bis own hand, in which he demanded the nation to be barmonious and unite<I In the prosecution of the great princi ple "For God and for :s;ation" In every regard and at all times. His !lnal sentences, wriHen in tbe jail of tbe Federal Court are most serious sentences and the greatest proof of Tiso's personality. The next day "ČAS" was supposed to explain at length wby Tiso was denied clemency. Ferjenčíťs police, however, confiscated that issue, and tbe Slova.ks found out officially from the Communist ''PRAVDA" and the -broadcast of April 18th -- a report conslstlng of a single sentence - tbat the execution had taken place. TISO MORE DANGEROUS DEAD THAN ALIVE Tiso was dead. Ileneš's servants had done t heir work. -but tbe questton still remains unanswered: Why did the praestdium of the Slovak National Council refuse to surrender the corpse of Dr. Joseph 'ľlso so that it might be buried according to the rttes of the Catholiľ Church? Between the tíme lhat clemency was denied and the execution there passed some 40 hours and no directives \ľere given - at least not publicly - as to what disposition was to be made of the body or Tiso. After tbe execution, wben the defense counsellors asked for · tlie body in the name of Tlso's family, the request was telegraphed to I'rague. It was only then that Prague. as well a!< the Bratislava factors, became aware of the mistake they had made by not granting cle· mency_ A certain Prague politlco characterlzed the situation with the cxpression: "lt seems that the cleacl Tiso is golng to be mo;e dangerous than the live one." l felt the same way about the matter. and so did quite . a few or my frlends whÓ intervened prlvately in the interest of Tiso. And ,ľe. felt that way long before the executlon. · Prague deli-berated at length and found it hard to reuder a deci• sion in the matter of the disposition of the body of Dr. Tiso. Already then reports were heard in Prague that ,the bitter silence of the Slo, ak people might have serious consequences for the future. No one wanted to be held responsible for imythlng. 1t was useless to sene! the matter to Prague because, accordlng to the law, the Natlonal Court had the rlght to decide the disposition of the body of Tlso, as it had clone in several instances previously. Everybody was afrairl of the con!<equences and no one was willing to guarantee that peace woul<I be r,reserved. Ftnally, by telegram Prague agreed with Dr. Daxner and Dr. Ferjenčík that Daxner shall suTrender tbe body not to the Tiso family , but to Ferjenčík, who in turn shall have the body bmied secret\y. Ferjenčik's police covered the casket and hauled it to St. Martin's ťemetery on Racišdorfská Road. where three graves had been dug. Tbe prlest brought in by the police. after identlfying tbe body, performed a quiet burial. Ferjenčik and his people were not successful in keepln~ tbe matter secret, because universlty student!I were near the scene during the whole eplsode and, tberefore. for a tíme it was known wbere Dr. Tlso ,vas burled. :. =•: SLOVAKIA 23 For several hours the students clashed with the police near tbe grave of Tiso, and despite tbe fact tbat the police questioned tbem and ascertained who they were, the students showered Tiso's grave with flowers and wreaths. The second and following days, the police constantly guarded St. Martin's cemetery, People were beaten and jailed, because they tried to get near Tiso's grave under variou3 pretexts. Some students were expellecl from Svoraclov and others even from hlgh schools. WHO KILLED TI SO ? Tbe Czech press immediately began tbe process of washing hands and placing the whole responsibility for tbe execution of Tiso on the Slovaks, especially on Dr. J osepb Lettrich, president of the Slovak NationaJ Council and head of tbe Slovak Democratic Party. It was plalnly evident that Prague was nervous. The Communists were happy, and the Freedom Party maliciously reproached the Democrats. be· ,. c-ause they did not save the life of Tiso. The fact remains that ·an overwbelmingly majority of the Catholic voters wbic h supported the Democr.atic Party wa.s not fooled by tb.e overtures of the Freedom Party, because it knew that its member·s were the servant.-s of the Communists. But this electorate did let it be known that it was terribly disappointed and that it lost falth 1·1 tbe leadership of the Slovak Democratic Party and absolutely all confi<lence in Prague. Prague felt generally that the Slovaks would neve'r ngain want to live togethei, witb tbe Czec hs in a common state. And 'ľlso's execution did not make the Slovaks flock to the Communists or even into the ranks of tbe servants of Beneš, as were the members of the Freedom Party, and so much tbe less to the Social Democrats. The Slovaks regarded tbe decision of the minlsterlal council, as well as the declsion of Beneš as a step that was neitber statelike nor diplomatlc, but rather as a blunder which would WTe<.'k the State. F.:verybody became suspicious of the members of the praesidium o[ tbe Slovak National Council, when they dld not support an amnesty ;ind did not exact it, but acted like weaklings and s pineless men, violating· the- promlse given the electorate. Undoubtedly all those involved began to feel that way also. }!ut lt was too late. U nity of resistance against Communism was being lost. and after Tiso's execution the Communists were coercing the Government and, later, even Beneš hlmself, to commit more blunders and make more concessions to them. The integrity of the State was s haken so badly that the Government one day unanimously voted to accept the invitation to tbe Marshall pian, and three days Jater, under pressure of tbe Communists, repudlated lts clecision just as unanimously. It was a Government wlthout government. 'I'he Communlst.'I did whatever they wanted wlth lt. Tbe mlnlsters lost th elr backbone, some bowed to Beneš and others to the Communlsts; tbelr uprootecl consciences persecuted tbem for their sbameful votlng in the Tlso case. N O ~SCAPE FROM PUNISHMENT Wben Dr. Beneš began to fall pbyslcally and bis spiritual condi• tion worsened, all ascrlbed it to bis unfortunate decision of denying <'lemenc-y to 'ľiso. 24 SLOVAKIA Beneš, the Zenklites (followers or Dr. Zenkl) and tbe . Communists tbought that witb the extorted execution of Tiso they would sbake only t be Slovak Democratic Party. But they were sadly mistaken. Wlth the execution of Tiso they shook the entire State to its foundations. The curse of those who shall not forget April 18, 1947, broke all connections which were stm preventlng the downfall of the CzechoSlovak St.ate. The lost faith of the Slovak people could not be regained. And when the supports of a united Slovakia were uprooted, the Communists realized their pian altogether smootbly, accorcllng to the plans and orders of the Moscow Politburo. I clo not want to believe tbat any one would want to ascribe to Dr. Tiso that he would avenge himself beyond the grave, but when in March, 1948, - less than a year after bis execution - John Masaryk committed sufoide, a large part of the people pointed to the hand oť justice for his shameful voting on April 16, 1947. When the Communists played around witb Beneš like a puppet for a while, and he was practically under house arrest and shortly thereafter died, qulte a few people recalled those to whom he had denied clemency ancl who had suffered so much during bis regime. In Slovakia every one recalled April 18, 1947. And even if not maliciously, but at least confirmed in the faith that none of the guilty would escape justice, every one saw the hane! of Providence, Who deals out justly and does not let Himself be carried away or frightened. TISO' S STATURE GROWS WITH YEARS Dr. Tiso made the greatest sacritice that any human can make. He acted bravely and hono1,ably. This made a great impression on every one. But the shameful, cowardly behavior whether of Slovaks or Czechs, whether of the people of Prague or Bratislava, who had anything to do with bis amnesty, elevated the dead Tiso to a national hero and martyr, who is mentioned reverently in Slovakia even by those who previously were agalnst bim. Immature political factors, Jed by anger and hatred, had attained tbe opposite of what tbey had desired. They diel not divide but a'?tually united tbe Slovaks as they were never before united. And they showed them a new road for the future, whicb even today is full of sufferings, but eventually sball mean salvation and a free life for the nation of Tiso. Those. were the motives and thought:; which Jed me to ,vrite this dissertatlon, so that I could point out tbe tmth and expla!n, wben the persons ·involved are free again. After the events of February, 1948, lt was reported that the Commun!sts removed the body of Tiso from its grave and had !t cremated in Brno, Moravia. I recelved the report from Bratislava in 1948, but it remains unconfirmed. Let the tmth be whatever it may, the Gloriola, Faitb and Mytb of Dr. Joseph Tiso - despite all the evil deeds and designs of bis and our enem!es - shall always remain so sublime th at no malignities oť the Communists or the Beneš followel'S s hall ever dim them and they sball nev& Iose their lustre as long as a single Slovak shall live beneath the Tatras.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Case of Dr. Joseph Tiso Description An account of the resource Dr. Michael Zibrin Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 1-24 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zibrín, Michal, 1899-1968 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/128273b962ed1383557507a6e0186da5.pdf bd587b3aa0f8dadb8a1f82df17e8e5b7 PDF Text Text 30 SLOVAKIA DR. LETTRICH'S PRINCIPLES Dr. Michael Zibrin Jin the beginning cxf January 1948, when the presidium of the ISlOJVaJk Democratfo ,Party met in session at Bratislav:a, Dr. Joseph iLettrich recei,ved an ordinary card frOIIll an aoquatlntance, iDr. Michael Mudry--Selbilk. The latter · bluntly infomned Lettrich -that he was now in ISwitizerland and did not intend to return to Slovak~1a, It was ju.st a short time prior to th:at date, at the end of •Decemlber, 1947, that Ferjenic£k's pdlice ,c alled Miu.dry in twice for a hearing on account of an alleged meeting of Lettrich with Dr. Peter P. Hfotko during Lettrich's visit in Chicago, in 1946, where he had oome escorted by .a Comnnmist, one Rudolph Martanoivic. Miudvy, saying nothing to any one, sold his furniture and made his exit stealthily, escapmg to Switzerland, whence he sent Lettrich the card referred to aJbove. Lettri'ch .·Jbecame excited, criticized Mud.Ty, and said that the Democratic !Party had erred seriously when it toot him in. As f.a,r M Lettrich, was concerned, he was through forever with Mudry, because he did not have to run off as long -as Lettrich and Ferjentellk rprotected him. Of course, Lettrich evidently did not ik.now th.at some two and a ha1f months later he himself would be an escapee and the services of Michael Mu.dry would again lbe welcome and valuaJble. And it so haJppened that Lettrich landed in Chicago, Illinois, in the spring of ·1J9148, and ,b egan . to woI'lk togetlier again with his old pal Michael M'lidry. As soon as the so-.called "Council of Free 0.zechoslowkia" was orgarnzed lby Zenkl, Ripka :and other Czech socialists Miudry joined up. Later Lettrich was instrumental in getting iMJudry ,a job !With Radio Free Euro:pe where, together with two Ozech Marxists, Peroutka alild Tigrid, he formed the leading Ozech~lovak trio as an "encouragement" to those deputies Olf the Demooratic Party, who sat in Gottwald's prisons and whom, at the begin.ning cxf October 1938, Benes's police oommissioner, Dr. Michael Mu.dry, so energetically jailed. This jaiJer of Dr. Joseph Stas- �SLOVAKIA 31 ko, who is suffering in LeapoldQIV for his Christian and democratic conivicl.ions, was then 1gi,ven a new distinction by Lettric:h. A London report stated that there were three persons fighting for the leading position. of the 'Slova!k section of the "Ozechoslova.Jk" cliMision of Radio Free Europe. One was the well-&nOIWn distr.ilbu:ter of lands, •t he creator of the ,kolchoses and loy.al commissar of Dr. Lettrich, Dr. Martin Kivetlko; the other, a ser.viant of Lettrich, Dr. John Paulmy.fl'oth; and the third, the clever policeman, Dr. Michael Mu.dry. Radio Free Eu.rope wanted the "Council of Free Ozechoslovrukia" decide the issue; the Council in turn told Lettrich to mruke the choiice. And Lettrich did. Forgetting what he had said and thought a/bout Mudry in January, 1948, :he appointed his old friend and, Benes'a policeman headman Of (uondoo.'s Radio Free Europe. We can well imagine how the ISloviaiks at home felt about this. They were Slhooked iby R:adio Free Europe's action amd left their kinsman in exile know just hoiw they felt rubout it. Protests were shocked by Radio Free Europe's action and let their conspiracy, pardon, a policy od' its oiwn to follow. Lettrich knoiws albout the facts referred to above as well as I do. And yet Michael Miudry, who thereto never had been in London, was ,p referred to Dr. John Bauliny, who had spent eight yeaxs in London and had notaJble connections in English diplomaitic ciroles. Bau.Hny .w as smeared by both the Czech 'Socialists and non-Socialists. They !knew that he had visited (PridaJvak, the "separatist," and had written letters to K!8-rol Sidoir, chairman of the !Slovaik National Council Aibroad and chief "sepairatist," so they plied their smearing trade witll gusto. -Dr. Jan •Pauliny...T6th, the diplomat, who succeeded Mar.tin Razus as chairman of the SlO!Valk Nationa:l Party amd was ibetter known a,t home than Mudry, simply did not rate with Lettrich. · This is lesson rfor Pauliny. Not only for !Pa,uliny .hurt for all Slov.aJks, and R:adio. Free Europe, as well. It would be most fortunaJte IlJOt only for the SlQ)\naJcs, lbut for R•F E itself, if the latter would .aict realistically and put an end to its systematic a!llti~Sl-01Vruk policy. For Pauliny and for a �32 SLOVAKIA every 1Slova'k irt rwould be well, if they would speedily become aiware of the faot that they probably coUJld e~h the:mse1ves lby join.mg the Lettrichrites rand Zeruklites, but onl,y at the ~ of their own nation's interests and for the benefit cxf Czech imperialism. We Slavalks, however, are aware that the association is quite complete: Blaho, aJppointed head of State secw-ity, shall issue a list of the "umeliaJble"; Ferjencik will arrest them - 1some will lose their teeth , others will hwve their arms and ri:bs broken, as they did have prior to 1948; those who .still resist shall face the firing sq,uad of lettrich's consul ,g eneral, Gejza Krno. We certainly have somethtng to live for! The sooner every S1ovak lbecOIIlles aware of this, the better. Then every one will know just where to stand, and the Zenklites will no longer find renegades to serve them for Juda.s's pay. The 1Slova!ks who remain with them are outcasts 'Of the Slov8Jk nation. As many times as :I reproached Dr. Lettrich in exile, I neiver said anything !before the execution of Dr. Tiso, that is, !b efore April 18, 1947, when it was quite olbvious to all of us just iwha.t Benes thought ~bout the SlovaJks and that all his promises were plain humbug. Then, when deputies Kempny, Bugar and Stasko were surrendered to stand trial, lli. 1L e.ttrich did nothing to save -t hem. Shortly after thaJt, on Janiuary 27, 1948, John Ursiny, Lettrich's protector, fell. After these events, iwhen Lettrich still sang praises about our freedOIIll and democracy - saying that "our relationship to, the USSR, !based on the treaty of December 12, 1943, is unalter.alble in the poHtioal life of the future. . . " - I was conrvinced thaJt he could not forget the so-called "Christmas Agreement" of 1943, when his group voluntarily surrendered power over the SlovMcs to the Communists, even though the Communists at that time did not represent even 10 peir cent of the electorate! Returning from Prague, Febnmry 25, 1948, sev~al how-s after Gottwald -t ook over the government, Lettrich wanted to distribute functions on the train. Arriving in Bratislaiva, Lettrich called a secret session rwi-thout inV'it1 �SLOVAKIA 33 ing me; It was at this session that he swrrendered the Democratic Party to Milan Polak, LU!kalcovic rund Sevcik and Lettrich knew that Se:vlcilk was a member of the NKVD. When thls happened, there was no doubt in my mind that Lettrich was maJking great mistakes and was not a man of principle. Therefore, let all my critics a;c,know:ledge that I :had reasons, for parting with Lettrich pohtioolly ruid that I had to quit rum, since I did not want to get into serious conflict with my conscience. After that I met iwith :Or. Le:ttrich once more; that was in November, 1951, alfter the crisis in the "Council of Free Ozechoslorvakia," when I received a report that Lettrich had called Zenkl a H•a r and had come to Chicago to explain his conduct. Before meelting with 'him, I was informed that Lettrich vi,s ited .A!b!bot OndraJk at Lisle, lill., that same day and even told him that Zenkl was a political liar and descrilbed his com'Panions similarly. He asked the .A!bibot for help against the dictate orf these political swindlers. The Ozech Oatholic NAROD wrote aJbout that visit.. Lettri~h aipparooitly was through with Zenkl. And yet he waJs not. After the albove episode, Lettrich made up with the ZenJdites He even accompanied Zen!kl on a visit to Chic.ago sho:rtly after that and with him even dared to visit the very same Albbot Ondrruk before ,w hom he had excoriated Zenkl. Now then, is Lettricli a man o!f princi,ple? God only knows why he still continues to sit in the "Council of Free Ozechoslo:vrulcia" and is ready to do practically anything for Zerukl as long as he is paid for it. Oould it possilbly be the $400.00 monthly, as he himself once ac~ knowl€dged? Furthermore, quite a stir was created when Lettrich att€mpted to• get Fedora Piaul01Va (nee KR!NO), a Communist, into the USA, through his beloved friend, the "shooting consul gene~rul," Geijiza Krno. eiven providing the necessary documents. This he did, even thoug,h a year ear• lier in his OfWil paipeT, the CAS, he excoriated Fedora and one Zora JesenSlky for their lectures in the communist organizations orf S1'oiv;ruk women Weill, how could I be !blamed �34 SLOVAKIA for thinlki.Ing that Lettrich was in the train of Marxists, who are willing to become reconciled even with the devil himse1f a!t the exipense .of .the security of the UISA, just so they might earn $400.00 a mont:h from the government of the USA and the American taxpayers. In the meantime, when iRFE was reorganl:zed, Dr. Mu.dry was ma-de the headman of the Slovak pairt of the "Ozechoslo1Vla2k" division of Radio Free Europe in Munich. We can imrugine jusit how the Slovaks at home felt albout this promotion, which rwas engineered ~ Lettrich. As far as I aim concerned, it iwas at this point that Lettrich discarded the last prindple of de,c ency when he appointed Dr. Mu.dry as the head of the resistance broadcast, the very same M!udry who 'boasted in Chica;go how he arrested Stasko and, get this,, .r efused to free him even on the intervenition of Karol. 1Sidor in 11938, lbut ilnstead ,s urrendered him to the c~ech !State .representatirve in Bratislava. As I had asked my friends before, I ask aJgain - the friends who still stand by Lettrfoh: What was more corred, to quit Lettrich and continue to keep silent? Was there not ,a l.ready too much silence since HH8 to the present time? How could any honest Slo;vailr !keep silent .a f:ter Lettrich's open letter to Coingressman Charles, J. Kersten in whkh he denied ,b oth the existence and the right of the Slovrukis to determine their OM7Il destiny and future? And after his i.atest iversion of the Slovak uprising of 1944 in the NEW Y10RK TI!MElS (August 29, 1954), wherein he still promotes the Jegend faJbricated by his group amd the CommU!Ilists? It is not anger or jealousy that has 1prompted me to write as I hwve. I have 1been ,p rompted. to do so, !because I sincerely feel that it is a duty I awe to my people to shed oome light on the road L-eittrich is traiveling. Principles, it seems, do not coI11Cern Letitrich eiven today when there is so much taJ:k -rubout uniting the ISlova;ks in exile. Ho,w could any honest SlorvaJk, imbued with Christian and democratic principles, unite in any undertaiking with a man like Lettri~h? � 30 SLOVAKIA DR. LETTRICH'S PRINCIPLES Dr. Michael Zibrin Jin the beginning cxf January 1948, when the presidium of the ISlOJVaJk Democratfo ,Party met in session at Bratislav:a, Dr. Joseph iLettrich recei,ved an ordinary card frOIIll an aoquatlntance, iDr. Michael Mudry--Selbilk. The latter · bluntly infomned Lettrich -that he was now in ISwitizerland and did not intend to return to Slovak~1a, It was ju.st a short time prior to th:at date, at the end of •Decemlber, 1947, that Ferjenic£k's pdlice ,c alled Miu.dry in twice for a hearing on account of an alleged meeting of Lettrich with Dr. Peter P. Hfotko during Lettrich's visit in Chicago, in 1946, where he had oome escorted by .a Comnnmist, one Rudolph Martanoivic. Miudvy, saying nothing to any one, sold his furniture and made his exit stealthily, escapmg to Switzerland, whence he sent Lettrich the card referred to aJbove. Lettri'ch .·Jbecame excited, criticized Mud.Ty, and said that the Democratic !Party had erred seriously when it toot him in. As f.a,r M Lettrich, was concerned, he was through forever with Mudry, because he did not have to run off as long -as Lettrich and Ferjentellk rprotected him. Of course, Lettrich evidently did not ik.now th.at some two and a ha1f months later he himself would be an escapee and the services of Michael Mu.dry would again lbe welcome and valuaJble. And it so haJppened that Lettrich landed in Chicago, Illinois, in the spring of ·1J9148, and ,b egan . to woI'lk togetlier again with his old pal Michael M'lidry. As soon as the so-.called "Council of Free 0.zechoslowkia" was orgarnzed lby Zenkl, Ripka :and other Czech socialists Miudry joined up. Later Lettrich was instrumental in getting iMJudry ,a job !With Radio Free Euro:pe where, together with two Ozech Marxists, Peroutka alild Tigrid, he formed the leading Ozech~lovak trio as an "encouragement" to those deputies Olf the Demooratic Party, who sat in Gottwald's prisons and whom, at the begin.ning cxf October 1938, Benes's police oommissioner, Dr. Michael Mu.dry, so energetically jailed. This jaiJer of Dr. Joseph Stas- �SLOVAKIA 31 ko, who is suffering in LeapoldQIV for his Christian and democratic conivicl.ions, was then 1gi,ven a new distinction by Lettric:h. A London report stated that there were three persons fighting for the leading position. of the 'Slova!k section of the "Ozechoslova.Jk" cliMision of Radio Free Europe. One was the well-&nOIWn distr.ilbu:ter of lands, •t he creator of the ,kolchoses and loy.al commissar of Dr. Lettrich, Dr. Martin Kivetlko; the other, a ser.viant of Lettrich, Dr. John Paulmy.fl'oth; and the third, the clever policeman, Dr. Michael Mu.dry. Radio Free Eu.rope wanted the "Council of Free Ozechoslovrukia" decide the issue; the Council in turn told Lettrich to mruke the choiice. And Lettrich did. Forgetting what he had said and thought a/bout Mudry in January, 1948, :he appointed his old friend and, Benes'a policeman headman Of (uondoo.'s Radio Free Europe. We can well imagine how the ISloviaiks at home felt about this. They were Slhooked iby R:adio Free Europe's action amd left their kinsman in exile know just hoiw they felt rubout it. Protests were shocked by Radio Free Europe's action and let their conspiracy, pardon, a policy od' its oiwn to follow. Lettrich knoiws albout the facts referred to above as well as I do. And yet Michael Miudry, who thereto never had been in London, was ,p referred to Dr. John Bauliny, who had spent eight yeaxs in London and had notaJble connections in English diplomaitic ciroles. Bau.Hny .w as smeared by both the Czech 'Socialists and non-Socialists. They !knew that he had visited (PridaJvak, the "separatist," and had written letters to K!8-rol Sidoir, chairman of the !Slovaik National Council Aibroad and chief "sepairatist," so they plied their smearing trade witll gusto. -Dr. Jan •Pauliny...T6th, the diplomat, who succeeded Mar.tin Razus as chairman of the SlO!Valk Nationa:l Party amd was ibetter known a,t home than Mudry, simply did not rate with Lettrich. · This is lesson rfor Pauliny. Not only for !Pa,uliny .hurt for all Slov.aJks, and R:adio. Free Europe, as well. It would be most fortunaJte IlJOt only for the SlQ)\naJcs, lbut for R•F E itself, if the latter would .aict realistically and put an end to its systematic a!llti~Sl-01Vruk policy. For Pauliny and for a �32 SLOVAKIA every 1Slova'k irt rwould be well, if they would speedily become aiware of the faot that they probably coUJld e~h the:mse1ves lby join.mg the Lettrichrites rand Zeruklites, but onl,y at the ~ of their own nation's interests and for the benefit cxf Czech imperialism. We Slavalks, however, are aware that the association is quite complete: Blaho, aJppointed head of State secw-ity, shall issue a list of the "umeliaJble"; Ferjencik will arrest them - 1some will lose their teeth , others will hwve their arms and ri:bs broken, as they did have prior to 1948; those who .still resist shall face the firing sq,uad of lettrich's consul ,g eneral, Gejza Krno. We certainly have somethtng to live for! The sooner every S1ovak lbecOIIlles aware of this, the better. Then every one will know just where to stand, and the Zenklites will no longer find renegades to serve them for Juda.s's pay. The 1Slova!ks who remain with them are outcasts 'Of the Slov8Jk nation. As many times as :I reproached Dr. Lettrich in exile, I neiver said anything !before the execution of Dr. Tiso, that is, !b efore April 18, 1947, when it was quite olbvious to all of us just iwha.t Benes thought ~bout the SlovaJks and that all his promises were plain humbug. Then, when deputies Kempny, Bugar and Stasko were surrendered to stand trial, lli. 1L e.ttrich did nothing to save -t hem. Shortly after thaJt, on Janiuary 27, 1948, John Ursiny, Lettrich's protector, fell. After these events, iwhen Lettrich still sang praises about our freedOIIll and democracy - saying that "our relationship to, the USSR, !based on the treaty of December 12, 1943, is unalter.alble in the poHtioal life of the future. . . " - I was conrvinced thaJt he could not forget the so-called "Christmas Agreement" of 1943, when his group voluntarily surrendered power over the SlovMcs to the Communists, even though the Communists at that time did not represent even 10 peir cent of the electorate! Returning from Prague, Febnmry 25, 1948, sev~al how-s after Gottwald -t ook over the government, Lettrich wanted to distribute functions on the train. Arriving in Bratislaiva, Lettrich called a secret session rwi-thout inV'it1 �SLOVAKIA 33 ing me; It was at this session that he swrrendered the Democratic Party to Milan Polak, LU!kalcovic rund Sevcik and Lettrich knew that Se:vlcilk was a member of the NKVD. When thls happened, there was no doubt in my mind that Lettrich was maJking great mistakes and was not a man of principle. Therefore, let all my critics a;c,know:ledge that I :had reasons, for parting with Lettrich pohtioolly ruid that I had to quit rum, since I did not want to get into serious conflict with my conscience. After that I met iwith :Or. Le:ttrich once more; that was in November, 1951, alfter the crisis in the "Council of Free Ozechoslorvakia," when I received a report that Lettrich had called Zenkl a H•a r and had come to Chicago to explain his conduct. Before meelting with 'him, I was informed that Lettrich vi,s ited .A!b!bot OndraJk at Lisle, lill., that same day and even told him that Zenkl was a political liar and descrilbed his com'Panions similarly. He asked the .A!bibot for help against the dictate orf these political swindlers. The Ozech Oatholic NAROD wrote aJbout that visit.. Lettri~h aipparooitly was through with Zenkl. And yet he waJs not. After the albove episode, Lettrich made up with the ZenJdites He even accompanied Zen!kl on a visit to Chic.ago sho:rtly after that and with him even dared to visit the very same Albbot Ondrruk before ,w hom he had excoriated Zenkl. Now then, is Lettricli a man o!f princi,ple? God only knows why he still continues to sit in the "Council of Free Ozechoslo:vrulcia" and is ready to do practically anything for Zerukl as long as he is paid for it. Oould it possilbly be the $400.00 monthly, as he himself once ac~ knowl€dged? Furthermore, quite a stir was created when Lettrich att€mpted to• get Fedora Piaul01Va (nee KR!NO), a Communist, into the USA, through his beloved friend, the "shooting consul gene~rul," Geijiza Krno. eiven providing the necessary documents. This he did, even thoug,h a year ear• lier in his OfWil paipeT, the CAS, he excoriated Fedora and one Zora JesenSlky for their lectures in the communist organizations orf S1'oiv;ruk women Weill, how could I be !blamed �34 SLOVAKIA for thinlki.Ing that Lettrich was in the train of Marxists, who are willing to become reconciled even with the devil himse1f a!t the exipense .of .the security of the UISA, just so they might earn $400.00 a mont:h from the government of the USA and the American taxpayers. In the meantime, when iRFE was reorganl:zed, Dr. Mu.dry was ma-de the headman of the Slovak pairt of the "Ozechoslo1Vla2k" division of Radio Free Europe in Munich. We can imrugine jusit how the Slovaks at home felt albout this promotion, which rwas engineered ~ Lettrich. As far as I aim concerned, it iwas at this point that Lettrich discarded the last prindple of de,c ency when he appointed Dr. Mu.dry as the head of the resistance broadcast, the very same M!udry who 'boasted in Chica;go how he arrested Stasko and, get this,, .r efused to free him even on the intervenition of Karol. 1Sidor in 11938, lbut ilnstead ,s urrendered him to the c~ech !State .representatirve in Bratislava. As I had asked my friends before, I ask aJgain - the friends who still stand by Lettrfoh: What was more corred, to quit Lettrich and continue to keep silent? Was there not ,a l.ready too much silence since HH8 to the present time? How could any honest Slo;vailr !keep silent .a f:ter Lettrich's open letter to Coingressman Charles, J. Kersten in whkh he denied ,b oth the existence and the right of the Slovrukis to determine their OM7Il destiny and future? And after his i.atest iversion of the Slovak uprising of 1944 in the NEW Y10RK TI!MElS (August 29, 1954), wherein he still promotes the Jegend faJbricated by his group amd the CommU!Ilists? It is not anger or jealousy that has 1prompted me to write as I hwve. I have 1been ,p rompted. to do so, !because I sincerely feel that it is a duty I awe to my people to shed oome light on the road L-eittrich is traiveling. Principles, it seems, do not coI11Cern Letitrich eiven today when there is so much taJ:k -rubout uniting the ISlova;ks in exile. Ho,w could any honest SlorvaJk, imbued with Christian and democratic principles, unite in any undertaiking with a man like Lettri~h? � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1954, Vol. 4 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 30 SLOVAKIA DR. LETTRICH'S PRINCIPLES Dr. Michael Zibrin Jin the beginning cxf January 1948, when the presidium of the ISlOJVaJk Democratfo ,Party met in session at Bratislav:a, Dr. Joseph iLettrich recei,ved an ordinary card frOIIll an aoquatlntance, iDr. Michael Mudry--Selbilk. The latter · bluntly infomned Lettrich -that he was now in ISwitizerland and did not intend to return to Slovak~1a, It was ju.st a short time prior to th:at date, at the end of •Decemlber, 1947, that Ferjenic£k's pdlice ,c alled Miu.dry in twice for a hearing on account of an alleged meeting of Lettrich with Dr. Peter P. Hfotko during Lettrich's visit in Chicago, in 1946, where he had oome escorted by .a Comnnmist, one Rudolph Martanoivic. Miudvy, saying nothing to any one, sold his furniture and made his exit stealthily, escapmg to Switzerland, whence he sent Lettrich the card referred to aJbove. Lettri'ch .·Jbecame excited, criticized Mud.Ty, and said that the Democratic !Party had erred seriously when it toot him in. As f.a,r M Lettrich, was concerned, he was through forever with Mudry, because he did not have to run off as long -as Lettrich and Ferjentellk rprotected him. Of course, Lettrich evidently did not ik.now th.at some two and a ha1f months later he himself would be an escapee and the services of Michael Mu.dry would again lbe welcome and valuaJble. And it so haJppened that Lettrich landed in Chicago, Illinois, in the spring of ·1J9148, and ,b egan . to woI'lk togetlier again with his old pal Michael M'lidry. As soon as the so-.called "Council of Free 0.zechoslowkia" was orgarnzed lby Zenkl, Ripka :and other Czech socialists Miudry joined up. Later Lettrich was instrumental in getting iMJudry ,a job !With Radio Free Euro:pe where, together with two Ozech Marxists, Peroutka alild Tigrid, he formed the leading Ozech~lovak trio as an "encouragement" to those deputies Olf the Demooratic Party, who sat in Gottwald's prisons and whom, at the begin.ning cxf October 1938, Benes's police oommissioner, Dr. Michael Mu.dry, so energetically jailed. This jaiJer of Dr. Joseph Stas- SLOVAKIA 31 ko, who is suffering in LeapoldQIV for his Christian and democratic conivicl.ions, was then 1gi,ven a new distinction by Lettric:h. A London report stated that there were three persons fighting for the leading position. of the 'Slova!k section of the "Ozechoslova.Jk" cliMision of Radio Free Europe. One was the well-&nOIWn distr.ilbu:ter of lands, •t he creator of the ,kolchoses and loy.al commissar of Dr. Lettrich, Dr. Martin Kivetlko; the other, a ser.viant of Lettrich, Dr. John Paulmy.fl'oth; and the third, the clever policeman, Dr. Michael Mu.dry. Radio Free Eu.rope wanted the "Council of Free Ozechoslovrukia" decide the issue; the Council in turn told Lettrich to mruke the choiice. And Lettrich did. Forgetting what he had said and thought a/bout Mudry in January, 1948, :he appointed his old friend and, Benes'a policeman headman Of (uondoo.'s Radio Free Europe. We can well imagine how the ISloviaiks at home felt about this. They were Slhooked iby R:adio Free Europe's action amd left their kinsman in exile know just hoiw they felt rubout it. Protests were shocked by Radio Free Europe's action and let their conspiracy, pardon, a policy od' its oiwn to follow. Lettrich knoiws albout the facts referred to above as well as I do. And yet Michael Miudry, who thereto never had been in London, was ,p referred to Dr. John Bauliny, who had spent eight yeaxs in London and had notaJble connections in English diplomaitic ciroles. Bau.Hny .w as smeared by both the Czech 'Socialists and non-Socialists. They !knew that he had visited (PridaJvak, the "separatist," and had written letters to K!8-rol Sidoir, chairman of the !Slovaik National Council Aibroad and chief "sepairatist," so they plied their smearing trade witll gusto. -Dr. Jan •Pauliny...T6th, the diplomat, who succeeded Mar.tin Razus as chairman of the SlO!Valk Nationa:l Party amd was ibetter known a,t home than Mudry, simply did not rate with Lettrich. · This is lesson rfor Pauliny. Not only for !Pa,uliny .hurt for all Slov.aJks, and R:adio. Free Europe, as well. It would be most fortunaJte IlJOt only for the SlQ)\naJcs, lbut for R•F E itself, if the latter would .aict realistically and put an end to its systematic a!llti~Sl-01Vruk policy. For Pauliny and for a 32 SLOVAKIA every 1Slova'k irt rwould be well, if they would speedily become aiware of the faot that they probably coUJld e~h the:mse1ves lby join.mg the Lettrichrites rand Zeruklites, but onl,y at the ~ of their own nation's interests and for the benefit cxf Czech imperialism. We Slavalks, however, are aware that the association is quite complete: Blaho, aJppointed head of State secw-ity, shall issue a list of the "umeliaJble"; Ferjencik will arrest them - 1some will lose their teeth , others will hwve their arms and ri:bs broken, as they did have prior to 1948; those who .still resist shall face the firing sq,uad of lettrich's consul ,g eneral, Gejza Krno. We certainly have somethtng to live for! The sooner every S1ovak lbecOIIlles aware of this, the better. Then every one will know just where to stand, and the Zenklites will no longer find renegades to serve them for Juda.s's pay. The 1Slova!ks who remain with them are outcasts 'Of the Slov8Jk nation. As many times as :I reproached Dr. Lettrich in exile, I neiver said anything !before the execution of Dr. Tiso, that is, !b efore April 18, 1947, when it was quite olbvious to all of us just iwha.t Benes thought ~bout the SlovaJks and that all his promises were plain humbug. Then, when deputies Kempny, Bugar and Stasko were surrendered to stand trial, lli. 1L e.ttrich did nothing to save -t hem. Shortly after thaJt, on Janiuary 27, 1948, John Ursiny, Lettrich's protector, fell. After these events, iwhen Lettrich still sang praises about our freedOIIll and democracy - saying that "our relationship to, the USSR, !based on the treaty of December 12, 1943, is unalter.alble in the poHtioal life of the future. . . " - I was conrvinced thaJt he could not forget the so-called "Christmas Agreement" of 1943, when his group voluntarily surrendered power over the SlovMcs to the Communists, even though the Communists at that time did not represent even 10 peir cent of the electorate! Returning from Prague, Febnmry 25, 1948, sev~al how-s after Gottwald -t ook over the government, Lettrich wanted to distribute functions on the train. Arriving in Bratislaiva, Lettrich called a secret session rwi-thout inV'it1 SLOVAKIA 33 ing me; It was at this session that he swrrendered the Democratic Party to Milan Polak, LU!kalcovic rund Sevcik and Lettrich knew that Se:vlcilk was a member of the NKVD. When thls happened, there was no doubt in my mind that Lettrich was maJking great mistakes and was not a man of principle. Therefore, let all my critics a;c,know:ledge that I :had reasons, for parting with Lettrich pohtioolly ruid that I had to quit rum, since I did not want to get into serious conflict with my conscience. After that I met iwith :Or. Le:ttrich once more; that was in November, 1951, alfter the crisis in the "Council of Free Ozechoslorvakia," when I received a report that Lettrich had called Zenkl a H•a r and had come to Chicago to explain his conduct. Before meelting with 'him, I was informed that Lettrich vi,s ited .A!b!bot OndraJk at Lisle, lill., that same day and even told him that Zenkl was a political liar and descrilbed his com'Panions similarly. He asked the .A!bibot for help against the dictate orf these political swindlers. The Ozech Oatholic NAROD wrote aJbout that visit.. Lettri~h aipparooitly was through with Zenkl. And yet he waJs not. After the albove episode, Lettrich made up with the ZenJdites He even accompanied Zen!kl on a visit to Chic.ago sho:rtly after that and with him even dared to visit the very same Albbot Ondrruk before ,w hom he had excoriated Zenkl. Now then, is Lettricli a man o!f princi,ple? God only knows why he still continues to sit in the "Council of Free Ozechoslo:vrulcia" and is ready to do practically anything for Zerukl as long as he is paid for it. Oould it possilbly be the $400.00 monthly, as he himself once ac~ knowl€dged? Furthermore, quite a stir was created when Lettrich att€mpted to• get Fedora Piaul01Va (nee KR!NO), a Communist, into the USA, through his beloved friend, the "shooting consul gene~rul," Geijiza Krno. eiven providing the necessary documents. This he did, even thoug,h a year ear• lier in his OfWil paipeT, the CAS, he excoriated Fedora and one Zora JesenSlky for their lectures in the communist organizations orf S1'oiv;ruk women Weill, how could I be !blamed 34 SLOVAKIA for thinlki.Ing that Lettrich was in the train of Marxists, who are willing to become reconciled even with the devil himse1f a!t the exipense .of .the security of the UISA, just so they might earn $400.00 a mont:h from the government of the USA and the American taxpayers. In the meantime, when iRFE was reorganl:zed, Dr. Mu.dry was ma-de the headman of the Slovak pairt of the "Ozechoslo1Vla2k" division of Radio Free Europe in Munich. We can imrugine jusit how the Slovaks at home felt albout this promotion, which rwas engineered ~ Lettrich. As far as I aim concerned, it iwas at this point that Lettrich discarded the last prindple of de,c ency when he appointed Dr. Mu.dry as the head of the resistance broadcast, the very same M!udry who 'boasted in Chica;go how he arrested Stasko and, get this,, .r efused to free him even on the intervenition of Karol. 1Sidor in 11938, lbut ilnstead ,s urrendered him to the c~ech !State .representatirve in Bratislava. As I had asked my friends before, I ask aJgain - the friends who still stand by Lettrfoh: What was more corred, to quit Lettrich and continue to keep silent? Was there not ,a l.ready too much silence since HH8 to the present time? How could any honest Slo;vailr !keep silent .a f:ter Lettrich's open letter to Coingressman Charles, J. Kersten in whkh he denied ,b oth the existence and the right of the Slovrukis to determine their OM7Il destiny and future? And after his i.atest iversion of the Slovak uprising of 1944 in the NEW Y10RK TI!MElS (August 29, 1954), wherein he still promotes the Jegend faJbricated by his group amd the CommU!Ilists? It is not anger or jealousy that has 1prompted me to write as I hwve. I have 1been ,p rompted. to do so, !because I sincerely feel that it is a duty I awe to my people to shed oome light on the road L-eittrich is traiveling. Principles, it seems, do not coI11Cern Letitrich eiven today when there is so much taJ:k -rubout uniting the ISlova;ks in exile. Ho,w could any honest SlorvaJk, imbued with Christian and democratic principles, unite in any undertaiking with a man like Lettri~h?  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Lettrich's Principles Description An account of the resource Dr. Michael Zibrin Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 3-4 (12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954 pp. 30-34 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zibrín, Michal, 1899-1968 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource Sept.-Dec. 1954 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/fde68cf3e2a138c471cf9a7af8a0f1b8.pdf 422c447b0c47a3b463fa9461a996b44b PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 49 13. See V. J agic, Entstehungsg eschichte der Kirchenslawischen Sprache, Vjenna, 1900. 14. Annales Fuldenses and Annales r egni Francorum mention '·Sclavos Marabenses" . . . "duces Sclavorum circa Danubiu m habitantium .. ." or "legationes Marvanorum . . ." distingui>shin,g them fro m "legaitiones !Beheimorum," i.e., C2Jechs. In the Reg,e nsburg continuation of Annales Fuldenses we find only "Maravi, M·aravaui, Marehenses, Marabi, Marahav.i," etc. 15. ,see !Dr. J an Dekan, Slovenske dejiny, Iii, Bratislava, 1951, p. 42. 16. J . SkuJ.tety already in 1926 writes in this regard: "With the ,d evelopment of science, particularly Slavonic ph ilology, talk of Carpatho,Danubian and Pannonian Slavs w:ill cease, -a nd t!he SloveneSlovaks w'il'l be def,i nitely m entioned . When it is once clear that ihe inhabitants of present-day Moravia were nothing but Slovaks, t h e nation of Rastislav and Svatopluk will not be called Moravlans .a nd Slovaks, but persistently and definitely Slovaks" (Sketches from Slovak History, p. 30). 17. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 42 . 18. See Chapter, Kievan Russia and Central Europe, p. 236-261. 19. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 10-14. 20. Pogorielov s•a ys em ph a ti cally th at t he Slovakisms in the Slavonic text of th e H oly Scriptures are th e work of Gorazd and calls Gorazd the third h oly apos tl e of Slavdom . 21. Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 14. 22. K. J . Grot, Karpato-dunajs kija zemli v sud'bach slavianstva, 1905, p. 18, and Metodijevskij jubilejnij sbornik, W arsaiw, 1885, p. 5. • • • BENES'S 'JIRiiP TO MOSCOW AND CZECHOSLOVAK PROPAGANDA Dr. Michael Zibrin Benes admits in his Memoirs that Eden made some forJ mal objecUons aigainst his 1943 trip to Moscow, yet he tries to mmimti:ze the opposition of the IDnglish cabinet . Benes pr.opaJgandists of today, h owever, do not admit ev~ this faot and t hey praiise the Benes t rip to Moscow as something by which Benes greatly ,helped the Allies and to which Washington and London consented. Anyone who heard Dr. Ripka's report before the CzechoJSlovak State Council in London, July 26, 19'43 when he talked aib,out the preparaUons for Benes's trip to Moscow, made in a;greement with Ozecho.;S1ov,ak Communists, and how Dr. Benes was expected in Moscow in any case - has an entirely different picture rubout the �50 SLOVAKIA trip. Lausman and Uhlir, too, iboth of whom had just returned foom Moscow, stressed the necessity of the trip. A different view of the tTirp is held also ,b y those who were at the meetings of the Council during September and Octoiber, 1943, or those who read the minutes of these meetings, or even those who in the fall of 11943 read Ripka's mouthpiece in London, the "Czeichoslovak' and the "Nova Doha." In these minutes and newspapers, the Benes trip to Moscow appears in quite a dilfferent light from that the Benes followers present it now. Communist Vafo !best characterized the situation in his speech when he declared that Benes must go to Moscow whether the Englishmen liked it or not. If they do not Hke it, he said, "we shO'Uild leave England." The Ozecho-lSlovak State Council unanimously decided to ask Benes to go to Moscow as soon as possible. Dr. Riipka brought the Council's decision to iBenes and procured the traivel means for him and his 0om,pany. Dr. Papanek and Zenk~ •a t a co:mmemomtion of Benes's birthday praised Benes's decision to go. to Moscow. Their present writings about Benes's trip, however, disrugree with what they wrote in 1943 and with the official news of the Ozecho-Slov8Jk news rugency. The Ozech newspaper Denni lllasatel for August lrJ., 1943, puiblished a report from !Moscow that ,says, "Pravda, the Communist organ, ::received a report from London that the President of the Czecho-1Slaviak go,v eTnment, Dr. Benes, was forced to postpone his long-planned trip to Moscow 'because of the oppos~tion of English ci11cles." On Octolber 4, 1943, the same Denni masatel carried this report: • "The Cizecho-.Slovak govemment-in-e:x.Ue announced today that it wishes to enter a paict of muitua:J. heip and defense with Soviet Russia despite the demand of Foreign Minister Eden and of the PoiJ.ish govermnOOJt...in.-exiJ.e that the debate about the pact 'be postponed. . . Eden asked Dr. Edward Benes, president of the Czecho~Slovak government-in-exile, to ipostrpone his trip to Moscow. . . " This re-• port was issued for news agencies as well as for the Cze cho~Slovak press by iD:r. Ripka himself, as the' ~esult of the Council's decision. In the United States the report �SLOVAKIA 51 was published by IDr. Papanek. The Christian Science Monitor for October 13, 1943, had a long article aJbout Benes's tr1p to !Moscow, and Denni Hlasatel, reprinting it in abbreviated form on October 14, said: "The postponement is being e,cplained probrubly by the official British action resulting from Eden's declaration in Parliament on September 22 this year, in which IDden stated that British intervention - for postponement of Benes's trip - resulted f-rom discussion held du'l'ing Molotov's visit to London in 1942 . .. His Majesty's Government, said Eden thinks that both governments are of the, opinion that it will be better for them at present not to conclude such a paot.. ." The pasS8Jges a.re from Eden's speech. How then could Dr. Ripka state in his book "Cze,ehoslovakia Enslaved" that Dr. Benes went to iMoscow with the consent of the Allies? How can .t he other members of the Council of Free Ozecho-1Slovakia say that Benes went to Moscow to sign an alli,ance with the USSR with the con~ sent of Was-hington and London? Yes, it was they who asked Benes in 1943 to go to Moscow even a;gainst the will of the British Government. This is a matter orf record. Yet today in America the same people from the Oouncil of Free Ozecho-·Slov~kia have the impudence to propagate in official Washington exactly the opposite of the truth. In 1943 the twenty-fifth anniversary of c~echo-Slovakia's creation was commemorated in radio broadcasts and artides. In America bvoadcasts were made by Jan Masaryk and Francis Nemec, and in London by Ripka, Slavik and Sramek. AJl were inspired by Benes's planned trip .to Moscow; they were very much in favor of it Their speeches were published in the officiial Ozecho-S~ovak publications as well as in Denni Hlasatel from October 27. 1943, and through the first week of November. It is of interest to note here that during this same time Denni masatel, as well as other Czecho-SJ:ovak papers, reprinted the texts of various proclamations from the Czecho-Slovak National Oouncil in Paris from October 18, 1918, and also the text of the so-caJ.led "Washington De .. claration. " On these documents we find the name of Gen.. eral Dr. Milan R. Stefanik rus a signer. At that time, how- �52 SLOVAKIA ever, General Stefanik was in Russia; therefore he could not sign any declaration in October, 1918, eiitJher in Washington or in Paris. When Stefa·n ik learned aboot these documents,. according to the memoirs of Fre:noh General Janin, he not onJy did not aJgree with them, but also ,protested through General Janin that his. signature ,w as used without his knowledge iand authorriity. I am referring to this incident in order to show that the Czecho-Slovak politicians did nort change. 'Dhey misrepresented the truth and forged signatures during the first exile (World War I), they did the same during the second exile (World Wax l[) and today diUTing the socalled thi·r d exile, they deny even what they themselves had published earlier througih the Czecho-Slovak press agency. One could document this. rkhly from 1'94·3 British newspapers, the records of the British Parliament, and particularly the Polish pulblications from 1943. I purposely cited only the reference of Dr. Zenkl and Ripka from new:sprupers. This material was ,p ublished at the same time in New York in 'both of Papanek's newspapers, the New Yorksky Dennik and New Yorkske Listy. It is important to note· •t hat Dr. Benes'·s trip to Moscow in 1943 restclted in hiis signing an alliance with the Soviet Union without the approval of the nations at home. DulI'ing this trip he promised Stia1in to cede Ruthenia, which had been part of Czecho-lS lovakia before 19138. The fulfillment of Bene.s's promise materialized on June 2,9, 1945, when Benes formally ceded Ruthenia to the Soviet Union by treaty without consulting the will of its people and in flagrant violation of th e Constitution. As a matter of fact, Benes's dealings anent R.uthenia began earlier than 1943. According to the official report handled lby the chiefs of the Ozecho-1Slovaft{ press agencies in London and New Yovk, Dr. Ripka and Dr. IPaJpaneik, Benes had a conference with ,So-wet Ambassador Majsky in London on September 19, 19319, a:bout the matter of a common boundary to be estalblished between the USS'.R and Czecho-lSlovakia. Benes a:ssured Majsky that as far as Ruthenia wa,s concerned he and StaJlin would come to an agreement between themsel,v es, as this was an internal �SLOVAKIA 53 question. Benes himself admits this fact in his Memoirs on page 207. Jaromir Smutny, who accompanied Benes to Moscow, in his publication The Case of Ruthenia (pubJished by Benes's Institute in London), writes on page 34: "When Benes in Moscow talked about Ruthenia he basically agreed that Ozecho--Sl,ovrukia will not and cannot be against the annexation of Ruthenia by t_h e USSR if the population will wish it." rm January, 19145, Dr. Fierlinger showed me his re-· cords of Benes's ta:llks in Moscow. Dr. Fierlinger was at that time Benes's amib assador in Moscow and together with Smutny ,a ccompanied Benes during his Moscow conferences. Also Dr. Taborsky, then Benes's secretary, states that Benes said ,o n August 28, 1941, when he conferred with .Amlbaissador Majsky: "'Ruthema cannot remain with the Hungarians; the Poles carmot have it; that pr{)!Vince can only belong either to, Ozecho-Slovakia or to ,R:us,sia." Despite aJll these commitments, the Benes proprugandists, particularly Papanek in Washington and Ripka in London, were declaring that Stalin recogni,z ed pre-war Czecho~1Slov~a in its origin.al boundaries, Ruthenia included. It was very important to them to assure everyone of Stalin's "good intentions." On December 1, 1944, when Nemec was acting •a s Benes's representative in Ruthenia, he received from the regional convention of national councils its dedsion that Rutheniia was no lornger a part of Czecho~Slo,vaJldia, and that the National Council of Ruthenia being estaJblished, Nemec IliO '1ongeT represented Ruthenia. This decision was signed 'b y Nemec's adviser Turjanic, who with Communists Pctruscak and Valo had been assigned to Nemec by Benes. It wa:s then that the Czecho-iSlova;k government protested. When Fierlinger on behalf of his government submitted olbjections to what was going on in Ruthenia, Stalin wrote a letter to Benes on January 23, 1945. I was in the office of Ambassadoir Fierlinger in Moscow. In his letter Stalin Uipbraided Benes, saying: "You yourself told me in Moscow of your willingness to give R:uthenia to the So~ viet Union." This quotation is according to the official 1 �54 SLOVAKIA Czech embassy record. Dr. Fierlinger himself assrured me there that Stalin was right and that Benes and his government in London were playing a comedy, because they were afraid of the consequences. Wthen Benes replied to Stalin on Feb.vuaJry 1, he did not deny to Stalin his earlier statement rubout iRuthenria; he also conf:h med ,h is talks with Miajsky, thus: ",J: did not .c hange my stand on this question from that moment when I udked a;bout it fOT the first time with your ,a mbassado:r I. Majsky in London in Sep~ tember, 1939, no,r wiU I ,change it in the futUTe." Stalin, therefore, came west of the Oar:pathi:ans according t9 a previous agreement aJbout whicih official circles in London and Washington did not know. They were informed to the contrary, namely, that "the USSR recognizes and leaves Czecho~lov;akia in its former boundaries, and that Stalin does not have any territorial demands." It wais so that Benes informed Roosevelt in 1943 while an a visit in Washington, and so ,he talked in America and Canada. ThUS; also tJhe memlbers of the present Council of Free Ozecho ..Slovaikia ibroadcast home over the BBC in 1943 and 1944, ,praising Benes as a "lilberator." They lied in 'b oth instances, for neither Washington nor London gave consent to Benes's tri:p to MoS<!OIW, nor did they know anythinig rubout Benes':s promise to Stalin to cede IRuthenia to the 1So.viet Union. Nobody wanted this to haJPPen except 'Stalin, Benes, and their foHowers. 1 • • • WHO SAID IT? "Thus if we can a;void Sociwlism, we escape Communism. On the contrary, if we surrender to Socia1ism, we surrender to Communism at the same time. But what is Socialism? Socialism is government control, government operation and government ownership of the Nation's business. Socialism thus caill!s for the continu'OU:s ex:pansion and cenitraili:zation otf governmental power over prirvat.e production, privat.e property, private employment and privat.e life. Under Socialism a11 'business becomes public 'business, all property 1b ecomes public properl:y, all employees become public employees, and thl\IS, all privacy is abolished." (Dean Clarence Ma;nion, MlBC, 1-16-05). � SLOVAKIA 49 13. See V. J agic, Entstehungsg eschichte der Kirchenslawischen Sprache, Vjenna, 1900. 14. Annales Fuldenses and Annales r egni Francorum mention '·Sclavos Marabenses" . . . "duces Sclavorum circa Danubiu m habitantium .. ." or "legationes Marvanorum . . ." distingui>shin,g them fro m "legaitiones !Beheimorum," i.e., C2Jechs. In the Reg,e nsburg continuation of Annales Fuldenses we find only "Maravi, M·aravaui, Marehenses, Marabi, Marahav.i," etc. 15. ,see !Dr. J an Dekan, Slovenske dejiny, Iii, Bratislava, 1951, p. 42. 16. J . SkuJ.tety already in 1926 writes in this regard: "With the ,d evelopment of science, particularly Slavonic ph ilology, talk of Carpatho,Danubian and Pannonian Slavs w:ill cease, -a nd t!he SloveneSlovaks w'il'l be def,i nitely m entioned . When it is once clear that ihe inhabitants of present-day Moravia were nothing but Slovaks, t h e nation of Rastislav and Svatopluk will not be called Moravlans .a nd Slovaks, but persistently and definitely Slovaks" (Sketches from Slovak History, p. 30). 17. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 42 . 18. See Chapter, Kievan Russia and Central Europe, p. 236-261. 19. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 10-14. 20. Pogorielov s•a ys em ph a ti cally th at t he Slovakisms in the Slavonic text of th e H oly Scriptures are th e work of Gorazd and calls Gorazd the third h oly apos tl e of Slavdom . 21. Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 14. 22. K. J . Grot, Karpato-dunajs kija zemli v sud'bach slavianstva, 1905, p. 18, and Metodijevskij jubilejnij sbornik, W arsaiw, 1885, p. 5. • • • BENES'S 'JIRiiP TO MOSCOW AND CZECHOSLOVAK PROPAGANDA Dr. Michael Zibrin Benes admits in his Memoirs that Eden made some forJ mal objecUons aigainst his 1943 trip to Moscow, yet he tries to mmimti:ze the opposition of the IDnglish cabinet . Benes pr.opaJgandists of today, h owever, do not admit ev~ this faot and t hey praiise the Benes t rip to Moscow as something by which Benes greatly ,helped the Allies and to which Washington and London consented. Anyone who heard Dr. Ripka's report before the CzechoJSlovak State Council in London, July 26, 19'43 when he talked aib,out the preparaUons for Benes's trip to Moscow, made in a;greement with Ozecho.;S1ov,ak Communists, and how Dr. Benes was expected in Moscow in any case - has an entirely different picture rubout the �50 SLOVAKIA trip. Lausman and Uhlir, too, iboth of whom had just returned foom Moscow, stressed the necessity of the trip. A different view of the tTirp is held also ,b y those who were at the meetings of the Council during September and Octoiber, 1943, or those who read the minutes of these meetings, or even those who in the fall of 11943 read Ripka's mouthpiece in London, the "Czeichoslovak' and the "Nova Doha." In these minutes and newspapers, the Benes trip to Moscow appears in quite a dilfferent light from that the Benes followers present it now. Communist Vafo !best characterized the situation in his speech when he declared that Benes must go to Moscow whether the Englishmen liked it or not. If they do not Hke it, he said, "we shO'Uild leave England." The Ozecho-lSlovak State Council unanimously decided to ask Benes to go to Moscow as soon as possible. Dr. Riipka brought the Council's decision to iBenes and procured the traivel means for him and his 0om,pany. Dr. Papanek and Zenk~ •a t a co:mmemomtion of Benes's birthday praised Benes's decision to go. to Moscow. Their present writings about Benes's trip, however, disrugree with what they wrote in 1943 and with the official news of the Ozecho-Slov8Jk news rugency. The Ozech newspaper Denni lllasatel for August lrJ., 1943, puiblished a report from !Moscow that ,says, "Pravda, the Communist organ, ::received a report from London that the President of the Czecho-1Slaviak go,v eTnment, Dr. Benes, was forced to postpone his long-planned trip to Moscow 'because of the oppos~tion of English ci11cles." On Octolber 4, 1943, the same Denni masatel carried this report: • "The Cizecho-.Slovak govemment-in-e:x.Ue announced today that it wishes to enter a paict of muitua:J. heip and defense with Soviet Russia despite the demand of Foreign Minister Eden and of the PoiJ.ish govermnOOJt...in.-exiJ.e that the debate about the pact 'be postponed. . . Eden asked Dr. Edward Benes, president of the Czecho~Slovak government-in-exile, to ipostrpone his trip to Moscow. . . " This re-• port was issued for news agencies as well as for the Cze cho~Slovak press by iD:r. Ripka himself, as the' ~esult of the Council's decision. In the United States the report �SLOVAKIA 51 was published by IDr. Papanek. The Christian Science Monitor for October 13, 1943, had a long article aJbout Benes's tr1p to !Moscow, and Denni Hlasatel, reprinting it in abbreviated form on October 14, said: "The postponement is being e,cplained probrubly by the official British action resulting from Eden's declaration in Parliament on September 22 this year, in which IDden stated that British intervention - for postponement of Benes's trip - resulted f-rom discussion held du'l'ing Molotov's visit to London in 1942 . .. His Majesty's Government, said Eden thinks that both governments are of the, opinion that it will be better for them at present not to conclude such a paot.. ." The pasS8Jges a.re from Eden's speech. How then could Dr. Ripka state in his book "Cze,ehoslovakia Enslaved" that Dr. Benes went to iMoscow with the consent of the Allies? How can .t he other members of the Council of Free Ozecho-1Slovakia say that Benes went to Moscow to sign an alli,ance with the USSR with the con~ sent of Was-hington and London? Yes, it was they who asked Benes in 1943 to go to Moscow even a;gainst the will of the British Government. This is a matter orf record. Yet today in America the same people from the Oouncil of Free Ozecho-·Slov~kia have the impudence to propagate in official Washington exactly the opposite of the truth. In 1943 the twenty-fifth anniversary of c~echo-Slovakia's creation was commemorated in radio broadcasts and artides. In America bvoadcasts were made by Jan Masaryk and Francis Nemec, and in London by Ripka, Slavik and Sramek. AJl were inspired by Benes's planned trip .to Moscow; they were very much in favor of it Their speeches were published in the officiial Ozecho-S~ovak publications as well as in Denni Hlasatel from October 27. 1943, and through the first week of November. It is of interest to note here that during this same time Denni masatel, as well as other Czecho-SJ:ovak papers, reprinted the texts of various proclamations from the Czecho-Slovak National Oouncil in Paris from October 18, 1918, and also the text of the so-caJ.led "Washington De .. claration. " On these documents we find the name of Gen.. eral Dr. Milan R. Stefanik rus a signer. At that time, how- �52 SLOVAKIA ever, General Stefanik was in Russia; therefore he could not sign any declaration in October, 1918, eiitJher in Washington or in Paris. When Stefa·n ik learned aboot these documents,. according to the memoirs of Fre:noh General Janin, he not onJy did not aJgree with them, but also ,protested through General Janin that his. signature ,w as used without his knowledge iand authorriity. I am referring to this incident in order to show that the Czecho-Slovak politicians did nort change. 'Dhey misrepresented the truth and forged signatures during the first exile (World War I), they did the same during the second exile (World Wax l[) and today diUTing the socalled thi·r d exile, they deny even what they themselves had published earlier througih the Czecho-Slovak press agency. One could document this. rkhly from 1'94·3 British newspapers, the records of the British Parliament, and particularly the Polish pulblications from 1943. I purposely cited only the reference of Dr. Zenkl and Ripka from new:sprupers. This material was ,p ublished at the same time in New York in 'both of Papanek's newspapers, the New Yorksky Dennik and New Yorkske Listy. It is important to note· •t hat Dr. Benes'·s trip to Moscow in 1943 restclted in hiis signing an alliance with the Soviet Union without the approval of the nations at home. DulI'ing this trip he promised Stia1in to cede Ruthenia, which had been part of Czecho-lS lovakia before 19138. The fulfillment of Bene.s's promise materialized on June 2,9, 1945, when Benes formally ceded Ruthenia to the Soviet Union by treaty without consulting the will of its people and in flagrant violation of th e Constitution. As a matter of fact, Benes's dealings anent R.uthenia began earlier than 1943. According to the official report handled lby the chiefs of the Ozecho-1Slovaft{ press agencies in London and New Yovk, Dr. Ripka and Dr. IPaJpaneik, Benes had a conference with ,So-wet Ambassador Majsky in London on September 19, 19319, a:bout the matter of a common boundary to be estalblished between the USS'.R and Czecho-lSlovakia. Benes a:ssured Majsky that as far as Ruthenia wa,s concerned he and StaJlin would come to an agreement between themsel,v es, as this was an internal �SLOVAKIA 53 question. Benes himself admits this fact in his Memoirs on page 207. Jaromir Smutny, who accompanied Benes to Moscow, in his publication The Case of Ruthenia (pubJished by Benes's Institute in London), writes on page 34: "When Benes in Moscow talked about Ruthenia he basically agreed that Ozecho--Sl,ovrukia will not and cannot be against the annexation of Ruthenia by t_h e USSR if the population will wish it." rm January, 19145, Dr. Fierlinger showed me his re-· cords of Benes's ta:llks in Moscow. Dr. Fierlinger was at that time Benes's amib assador in Moscow and together with Smutny ,a ccompanied Benes during his Moscow conferences. Also Dr. Taborsky, then Benes's secretary, states that Benes said ,o n August 28, 1941, when he conferred with .Amlbaissador Majsky: "'Ruthema cannot remain with the Hungarians; the Poles carmot have it; that pr{)!Vince can only belong either to, Ozecho-Slovakia or to ,R:us,sia." Despite aJll these commitments, the Benes proprugandists, particularly Papanek in Washington and Ripka in London, were declaring that Stalin recogni,z ed pre-war Czecho~1Slov~a in its origin.al boundaries, Ruthenia included. It was very important to them to assure everyone of Stalin's "good intentions." On December 1, 1944, when Nemec was acting •a s Benes's representative in Ruthenia, he received from the regional convention of national councils its dedsion that Rutheniia was no lornger a part of Czecho~Slo,vaJldia, and that the National Council of Ruthenia being estaJblished, Nemec IliO '1ongeT represented Ruthenia. This decision was signed 'b y Nemec's adviser Turjanic, who with Communists Pctruscak and Valo had been assigned to Nemec by Benes. It wa:s then that the Czecho-iSlova;k government protested. When Fierlinger on behalf of his government submitted olbjections to what was going on in Ruthenia, Stalin wrote a letter to Benes on January 23, 1945. I was in the office of Ambassadoir Fierlinger in Moscow. In his letter Stalin Uipbraided Benes, saying: "You yourself told me in Moscow of your willingness to give R:uthenia to the So~ viet Union." This quotation is according to the official 1 �54 SLOVAKIA Czech embassy record. Dr. Fierlinger himself assrured me there that Stalin was right and that Benes and his government in London were playing a comedy, because they were afraid of the consequences. Wthen Benes replied to Stalin on Feb.vuaJry 1, he did not deny to Stalin his earlier statement rubout iRuthenria; he also conf:h med ,h is talks with Miajsky, thus: ",J: did not .c hange my stand on this question from that moment when I udked a;bout it fOT the first time with your ,a mbassado:r I. Majsky in London in Sep~ tember, 1939, no,r wiU I ,change it in the futUTe." Stalin, therefore, came west of the Oar:pathi:ans according t9 a previous agreement aJbout whicih official circles in London and Washington did not know. They were informed to the contrary, namely, that "the USSR recognizes and leaves Czecho~lov;akia in its former boundaries, and that Stalin does not have any territorial demands." It wais so that Benes informed Roosevelt in 1943 while an a visit in Washington, and so ,he talked in America and Canada. ThUS; also tJhe memlbers of the present Council of Free Ozecho ..Slovaikia ibroadcast home over the BBC in 1943 and 1944, ,praising Benes as a "lilberator." They lied in 'b oth instances, for neither Washington nor London gave consent to Benes's tri:p to MoS<!OIW, nor did they know anythinig rubout Benes':s promise to Stalin to cede IRuthenia to the 1So.viet Union. Nobody wanted this to haJPPen except 'Stalin, Benes, and their foHowers. 1 • • • WHO SAID IT? "Thus if we can a;void Sociwlism, we escape Communism. On the contrary, if we surrender to Socia1ism, we surrender to Communism at the same time. But what is Socialism? Socialism is government control, government operation and government ownership of the Nation's business. Socialism thus caill!s for the continu'OU:s ex:pansion and cenitraili:zation otf governmental power over prirvat.e production, privat.e property, private employment and privat.e life. Under Socialism a11 'business becomes public 'business, all property 1b ecomes public properl:y, all employees become public employees, and thl\IS, all privacy is abolished." (Dean Clarence Ma;nion, MlBC, 1-16-05). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 49 13. See V. J agic, Entstehungsg eschichte der Kirchenslawischen Sprache, Vjenna, 1900. 14. Annales Fuldenses and Annales r egni Francorum mention '·Sclavos Marabenses" . . . "duces Sclavorum circa Danubiu m habitantium .. ." or "legationes Marvanorum . . ." distingui>shin,g them fro m "legaitiones !Beheimorum," i.e., C2Jechs. In the Reg,e nsburg continuation of Annales Fuldenses we find only "Maravi, M·aravaui, Marehenses, Marabi, Marahav.i," etc. 15. ,see !Dr. J an Dekan, Slovenske dejiny, Iii, Bratislava, 1951, p. 42. 16. J . SkuJ.tety already in 1926 writes in this regard: "With the ,d evelopment of science, particularly Slavonic ph ilology, talk of Carpatho,Danubian and Pannonian Slavs w:ill cease, -a nd t!he SloveneSlovaks w'il'l be def,i nitely m entioned . When it is once clear that ihe inhabitants of present-day Moravia were nothing but Slovaks, t h e nation of Rastislav and Svatopluk will not be called Moravlans .a nd Slovaks, but persistently and definitely Slovaks" (Sketches from Slovak History, p. 30). 17. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 42 . 18. See Chapter, Kievan Russia and Central Europe, p. 236-261. 19. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 10-14. 20. Pogorielov s•a ys em ph a ti cally th at t he Slovakisms in the Slavonic text of th e H oly Scriptures are th e work of Gorazd and calls Gorazd the third h oly apos tl e of Slavdom . 21. Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 14. 22. K. J . Grot, Karpato-dunajs kija zemli v sud'bach slavianstva, 1905, p. 18, and Metodijevskij jubilejnij sbornik, W arsaiw, 1885, p. 5. • • • BENES'S 'JIRiiP TO MOSCOW AND CZECHOSLOVAK PROPAGANDA Dr. Michael Zibrin Benes admits in his Memoirs that Eden made some forJ mal objecUons aigainst his 1943 trip to Moscow, yet he tries to mmimti:ze the opposition of the IDnglish cabinet . Benes pr.opaJgandists of today, h owever, do not admit ev~ this faot and t hey praiise the Benes t rip to Moscow as something by which Benes greatly ,helped the Allies and to which Washington and London consented. Anyone who heard Dr. Ripka's report before the CzechoJSlovak State Council in London, July 26, 19'43 when he talked aib,out the preparaUons for Benes's trip to Moscow, made in a;greement with Ozecho.;S1ov,ak Communists, and how Dr. Benes was expected in Moscow in any case - has an entirely different picture rubout the 50 SLOVAKIA trip. Lausman and Uhlir, too, iboth of whom had just returned foom Moscow, stressed the necessity of the trip. A different view of the tTirp is held also ,b y those who were at the meetings of the Council during September and Octoiber, 1943, or those who read the minutes of these meetings, or even those who in the fall of 11943 read Ripka's mouthpiece in London, the "Czeichoslovak' and the "Nova Doha." In these minutes and newspapers, the Benes trip to Moscow appears in quite a dilfferent light from that the Benes followers present it now. Communist Vafo !best characterized the situation in his speech when he declared that Benes must go to Moscow whether the Englishmen liked it or not. If they do not Hke it, he said, "we shO'Uild leave England." The Ozecho-lSlovak State Council unanimously decided to ask Benes to go to Moscow as soon as possible. Dr. Riipka brought the Council's decision to iBenes and procured the traivel means for him and his 0om,pany. Dr. Papanek and Zenk~ •a t a co:mmemomtion of Benes's birthday praised Benes's decision to go. to Moscow. Their present writings about Benes's trip, however, disrugree with what they wrote in 1943 and with the official news of the Ozecho-Slov8Jk news rugency. The Ozech newspaper Denni lllasatel for August lrJ., 1943, puiblished a report from !Moscow that ,says, "Pravda, the Communist organ, ::received a report from London that the President of the Czecho-1Slaviak go,v eTnment, Dr. Benes, was forced to postpone his long-planned trip to Moscow 'because of the oppos~tion of English ci11cles." On Octolber 4, 1943, the same Denni masatel carried this report: • "The Cizecho-.Slovak govemment-in-e:x.Ue announced today that it wishes to enter a paict of muitua:J. heip and defense with Soviet Russia despite the demand of Foreign Minister Eden and of the PoiJ.ish govermnOOJt...in.-exiJ.e that the debate about the pact 'be postponed. . . Eden asked Dr. Edward Benes, president of the Czecho~Slovak government-in-exile, to ipostrpone his trip to Moscow. . . " This re-• port was issued for news agencies as well as for the Cze cho~Slovak press by iD:r. Ripka himself, as the' ~esult of the Council's decision. In the United States the report SLOVAKIA 51 was published by IDr. Papanek. The Christian Science Monitor for October 13, 1943, had a long article aJbout Benes's tr1p to !Moscow, and Denni Hlasatel, reprinting it in abbreviated form on October 14, said: "The postponement is being e,cplained probrubly by the official British action resulting from Eden's declaration in Parliament on September 22 this year, in which IDden stated that British intervention - for postponement of Benes's trip - resulted f-rom discussion held du'l'ing Molotov's visit to London in 1942 . .. His Majesty's Government, said Eden thinks that both governments are of the, opinion that it will be better for them at present not to conclude such a paot.. ." The pasS8Jges a.re from Eden's speech. How then could Dr. Ripka state in his book "Cze,ehoslovakia Enslaved" that Dr. Benes went to iMoscow with the consent of the Allies? How can .t he other members of the Council of Free Ozecho-1Slovakia say that Benes went to Moscow to sign an alli,ance with the USSR with the con~ sent of Was-hington and London? Yes, it was they who asked Benes in 1943 to go to Moscow even a;gainst the will of the British Government. This is a matter orf record. Yet today in America the same people from the Oouncil of Free Ozecho-·Slov~kia have the impudence to propagate in official Washington exactly the opposite of the truth. In 1943 the twenty-fifth anniversary of c~echo-Slovakia's creation was commemorated in radio broadcasts and artides. In America bvoadcasts were made by Jan Masaryk and Francis Nemec, and in London by Ripka, Slavik and Sramek. AJl were inspired by Benes's planned trip .to Moscow; they were very much in favor of it Their speeches were published in the officiial Ozecho-S~ovak publications as well as in Denni Hlasatel from October 27. 1943, and through the first week of November. It is of interest to note here that during this same time Denni masatel, as well as other Czecho-SJ:ovak papers, reprinted the texts of various proclamations from the Czecho-Slovak National Oouncil in Paris from October 18, 1918, and also the text of the so-caJ.led "Washington De .. claration. " On these documents we find the name of Gen.. eral Dr. Milan R. Stefanik rus a signer. At that time, how- 52 SLOVAKIA ever, General Stefanik was in Russia; therefore he could not sign any declaration in October, 1918, eiitJher in Washington or in Paris. When Stefa·n ik learned aboot these documents,. according to the memoirs of Fre:noh General Janin, he not onJy did not aJgree with them, but also ,protested through General Janin that his. signature ,w as used without his knowledge iand authorriity. I am referring to this incident in order to show that the Czecho-Slovak politicians did nort change. 'Dhey misrepresented the truth and forged signatures during the first exile (World War I), they did the same during the second exile (World Wax l[) and today diUTing the socalled thi·r d exile, they deny even what they themselves had published earlier througih the Czecho-Slovak press agency. One could document this. rkhly from 1'94·3 British newspapers, the records of the British Parliament, and particularly the Polish pulblications from 1943. I purposely cited only the reference of Dr. Zenkl and Ripka from new:sprupers. This material was ,p ublished at the same time in New York in 'both of Papanek's newspapers, the New Yorksky Dennik and New Yorkske Listy. It is important to note· •t hat Dr. Benes'·s trip to Moscow in 1943 restclted in hiis signing an alliance with the Soviet Union without the approval of the nations at home. DulI'ing this trip he promised Stia1in to cede Ruthenia, which had been part of Czecho-lS lovakia before 19138. The fulfillment of Bene.s's promise materialized on June 2,9, 1945, when Benes formally ceded Ruthenia to the Soviet Union by treaty without consulting the will of its people and in flagrant violation of th e Constitution. As a matter of fact, Benes's dealings anent R.uthenia began earlier than 1943. According to the official report handled lby the chiefs of the Ozecho-1Slovaft{ press agencies in London and New Yovk, Dr. Ripka and Dr. IPaJpaneik, Benes had a conference with ,So-wet Ambassador Majsky in London on September 19, 19319, a:bout the matter of a common boundary to be estalblished between the USS'.R and Czecho-lSlovakia. Benes a:ssured Majsky that as far as Ruthenia wa,s concerned he and StaJlin would come to an agreement between themsel,v es, as this was an internal SLOVAKIA 53 question. Benes himself admits this fact in his Memoirs on page 207. Jaromir Smutny, who accompanied Benes to Moscow, in his publication The Case of Ruthenia (pubJished by Benes's Institute in London), writes on page 34: "When Benes in Moscow talked about Ruthenia he basically agreed that Ozecho--Sl,ovrukia will not and cannot be against the annexation of Ruthenia by t_h e USSR if the population will wish it." rm January, 19145, Dr. Fierlinger showed me his re-· cords of Benes's ta:llks in Moscow. Dr. Fierlinger was at that time Benes's amib assador in Moscow and together with Smutny ,a ccompanied Benes during his Moscow conferences. Also Dr. Taborsky, then Benes's secretary, states that Benes said ,o n August 28, 1941, when he conferred with .Amlbaissador Majsky: "'Ruthema cannot remain with the Hungarians; the Poles carmot have it; that pr{)!Vince can only belong either to, Ozecho-Slovakia or to ,R:us,sia." Despite aJll these commitments, the Benes proprugandists, particularly Papanek in Washington and Ripka in London, were declaring that Stalin recogni,z ed pre-war Czecho~1Slov~a in its origin.al boundaries, Ruthenia included. It was very important to them to assure everyone of Stalin's "good intentions." On December 1, 1944, when Nemec was acting •a s Benes's representative in Ruthenia, he received from the regional convention of national councils its dedsion that Rutheniia was no lornger a part of Czecho~Slo,vaJldia, and that the National Council of Ruthenia being estaJblished, Nemec IliO '1ongeT represented Ruthenia. This decision was signed 'b y Nemec's adviser Turjanic, who with Communists Pctruscak and Valo had been assigned to Nemec by Benes. It wa:s then that the Czecho-iSlova;k government protested. When Fierlinger on behalf of his government submitted olbjections to what was going on in Ruthenia, Stalin wrote a letter to Benes on January 23, 1945. I was in the office of Ambassadoir Fierlinger in Moscow. In his letter Stalin Uipbraided Benes, saying: "You yourself told me in Moscow of your willingness to give R:uthenia to the So~ viet Union." This quotation is according to the official 1 54 SLOVAKIA Czech embassy record. Dr. Fierlinger himself assrured me there that Stalin was right and that Benes and his government in London were playing a comedy, because they were afraid of the consequences. Wthen Benes replied to Stalin on Feb.vuaJry 1, he did not deny to Stalin his earlier statement rubout iRuthenria; he also conf:h med ,h is talks with Miajsky, thus: ",J: did not .c hange my stand on this question from that moment when I udked a;bout it fOT the first time with your ,a mbassado:r I. Majsky in London in Sep~ tember, 1939, no,r wiU I ,change it in the futUTe." Stalin, therefore, came west of the Oar:pathi:ans according t9 a previous agreement aJbout whicih official circles in London and Washington did not know. They were informed to the contrary, namely, that "the USSR recognizes and leaves Czecho~lov;akia in its former boundaries, and that Stalin does not have any territorial demands." It wais so that Benes informed Roosevelt in 1943 while an a visit in Washington, and so ,he talked in America and Canada. ThUS; also tJhe memlbers of the present Council of Free Ozecho ..Slovaikia ibroadcast home over the BBC in 1943 and 1944, ,praising Benes as a "lilberator." They lied in 'b oth instances, for neither Washington nor London gave consent to Benes's tri:p to MoS<!OIW, nor did they know anythinig rubout Benes':s promise to Stalin to cede IRuthenia to the 1So.viet Union. Nobody wanted this to haJPPen except 'Stalin, Benes, and their foHowers. 1 • • • WHO SAID IT? "Thus if we can a;void Sociwlism, we escape Communism. On the contrary, if we surrender to Socia1ism, we surrender to Communism at the same time. But what is Socialism? Socialism is government control, government operation and government ownership of the Nation's business. Socialism thus caill!s for the continu'OU:s ex:pansion and cenitraili:zation otf governmental power over prirvat.e production, privat.e property, private employment and privat.e life. Under Socialism a11 'business becomes public 'business, all property 1b ecomes public properl:y, all employees become public employees, and thl\IS, all privacy is abolished." (Dean Clarence Ma;nion, MlBC, 1-16-05).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Beneš's Trip to Moscow and Czecho-Slovak Propaganda Description An account of the resource Dr. Michael Zibrin Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17), December 1955 pp. 49-54 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zibrín, Michal, 1899-1968 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1955 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6ac7410f395676e02818cc53fe896984.pdf 6ee6848fb54c5fa492946fff146e6a3a PDF Text Text SLOVAK.IA 72 The Czecho-Slovak Exile CZECH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND RED ESPIONAGE Dr. Mi chael Zibrin July of l91J5 found the "Council of Free Ozechoslovaki:a" just as July of J.ast year left it; without eleded of~ fi.cials, without elected representatives. This is because the CoUIIld, during the 20-month period of its re-organi-. zation, could not reach !any agreement and is operating on a rotation system, i.e., eacth month ,a reipresentati:ve of a diifferent political iparty se:rves as its executive head. This proves what we had said b,e fore: the Council is a coillglomerate of people of quite different bmnds and that Lettrich' s exdamation two years ago - "Gentlemen, I think only dollars keep us here together" - was and is still true. The present chaos in the Council is caused partly by the fact that political partie.s are coming to prevail more than personalities, and the Councril -resembJ.es more and more an enlarged National Front. The purpose of .t his article is to revie;w the past policies and deeds of that part.yin the CoU!Ilcil which did most to communize the o~ooho-1Slov•8Jk Republic and prepare an easy Communist take-over in 1948. ,Such a review is necessitated by the shocking pulblic deception that hias gained influentiral positions for the exile members of th±s ,p arty. Reformed Communists and coUaiboratom can perform valuable functions, but in men who deny their Olbvfous politic,al actions there can be no question of reform. The most flagrant a,id to Communism was given by the Czecho-iSlovak Social ·D emocratic party. In exile today, the leaders of this panty are men who, by their open colfa,boration wit:h Stalin, p~ayed the most important ,part in the bolsheviz;ation o,f Czecho-Slova>k,i1a. These men have always Etood very close to the Communists, even during small political skirmishes like those occasion.any now among Zenkl, Ripka, and Peroutka. Particularly after the Stalin-Benes pact of 1943, they were the most efficient signers and executors of Benes':s bloody decrees, not reaHzing that, once they had finished their jdbs for the Communists, the fate �Sl.JOVAKIA 73 they had prepared for others wo'Ulld become their own. History shows that aliready in 1928 the Soc,i al Demo. cr:ats formulated their program thus: "Today as also in the past we are decided to protect the Soviet Union against any inimical action of the capitalistic governments and against any counter-revolutionary attack." Nine years earlier this belief had been realized in action. When Polish General Pilsudski was fighting a bloody (battle with the Communist ar-my near Wairsaw in 1920, the socialistic ma-· jority in Prague forbade the transportation of military material t.lirnugh ,Ozocho-1Slo,v0Jkia, despite the fact that lhis material was sent by France and a French military mi,s sion was at that time already in Prague. A yea,r earlier, when General Stefanik telegraiphed a wairning to Prague against Bolshevism as the greatest plague o!I' mankind a:nd asked for uruty in tihe f.ight to destroy it, it was this same Social Democratic Party whiclh - wit:h Masarylk's consent - stopped Stefamk's program. Masaryk's consent is less surprising when one remembers that he was actually among the first to hail the Octo!ber Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, which now in Prague !is considered fundamental to the ere. ation of Ozecho-,Slovaki:a. Thus one couid go on ,w ithout end and show that the Social Democratic party was an effective avant garde of Communism in Central Europe, not only in Czecho-!Slovakia. Certainly one of the most important persons in the Czecho-!Slovak .Social Democratic party was V ojta Benes, the oldest brother of the !:ate president. Gottwald officially, on the Cabinet's decision (and Moscow's aippro,vail) , sent him into West Germany in 1949, where he keipt in. regular contact with Prague and acted more oir less ,a,s Gottwald's unofficial ambassador. He did not conce·a l this fact, and t he members of the "Council of Free Czechoslova!ld:a" knew it. Therefore, many times, VojJa Benes took a different position from the official Council and o;piposed some steps undertaken by non.JSocialists in the Council. Benes's brother passed away, ,but equally important representatives remain, particularly: Vacl:av Majer, B. Vilem, the former Sec:retary-General of the Party, and the ill-ifamed Bohumiil Lausman. Ailso, the Social Democratic 1 �74 SLOVAKIA party has its two generalls, Sergei Ingr, and Hasal Niz!borJ sky, and, jn Canada, the former minister Frantisek Nemec, who together with Hasal affected the cession of Ruthenia to .Stalin. To this party belongs also a Communist famous in Europe, Milos Vanek, and some questionaJble individuals in Radio F,ree Europe in MUTI!ich. These are all Czechs. Milos Vanek, who is reported to hruve 1b een a charter mem1ber of the "Czeohoslovak Communist Party," remained an ardent adherent of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship even after he 1had left that .p arty to ~me a left.;win.g Social Democrat. I personaHy know Mr. Vanek and I must confirm that Vanek was one of the founders of the Communist Party in Europe. This is described in the book of Lu. cien Laurat ",Du Komiintern au Kominfo·r m" (!Paris, France Des 1'sles, 1'951), in which on page 10 we read: "The manifest issued by the second Congress of the Kominform, July, 1920, carries a great number of sigrra:tures - Lenin, Zinoviev, Boukarine, Trotski, for iRussia; Vane'k, Hlula, Zapotocky (the president of Ozecho-;Slovakia today), etc." T,his signer and founder of the Communist Party is today the Chief of the Economics Deparbment of Radio Free Europe and a member of the "Colllilcil of Free Ozechoslovalcia" in New York, ·b oth financed by the Free Europe Committee! On the Slovak side there are: Dr. Ziak, well-known Czecho-'SlovaJk; Dr. Joseph Mrazek, the only •Slov;ak s~gner of the oath of fidelity to Communism in 1948, and posing as a Slovak, a certain Belak, whose real name is Berger. A,bout these people, Kurt Glaser, American writer wrote : "The principa.J Czechs and Slovaks associated with the Free Europe Committee and those employed by Radio Free Europe are not - as is commonly supposed - fi•g hters ag,a inst Communism. Quite on the contrary, they fellow-travele<l. with t•he Communists rfrom at least 1939 to 1948, helpe<l. t'hem to power, and even today follow a Communist-sponsored propaganda line. "These indivjduals belong to an or.ganlzation which has systematically be-trayed members of the democratic underground in CzechoSlovalda by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwald's secret police. "A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either Communist a.gents or have criminal records. '1Radio Free Europe's Czecho-Slovak program is helping Stalin �SLOVAKIA 75 by s,a,botaging internation-a l understand ing and promoting rivalry and hatred between European peoples. ' "Mr. Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectdcal materialis m, Dr. Zak and Dr. (Berger) Belak. Dr. Zak is the editor of •a n intellectual magazine called 'Tribuna' w-hich is forbidden in France and a no-llher called 'Reality' (Sk,utecnost) which is fofibidden in Switzerland. Unfortunately, I have not been able to peruse these journals as I do not read c zech, but I am told that their basic thesis is the need for the party m asses to submit to leadership by the elite cadre. Belak was formerly a Communist Party functionary in Slovalda under the n ame of Berger. He puts out a Germ an-language sheet called 'Militant Democracy' which few Germans read because it takes S<talin's anti-Ger,man line." I. who know this gentleman (Belak-Berger) persona1'ly, must confirm that Mr. Glaser's opinion is 100 percent right! The former membe.r of the Social Democratic party in 1Slov akia, Pavel Viboch, need not be dealt with as a party memlber , and the other three Slovaks mentioned are al,so not significant. Never receiving any mandate from the Slovruk nation, they represent colonialism in Central Europe at a time when oolonialism is. dying even in Africa. The best proof is the elections in 1946, when the Social Demo~ crats in Slovakia could not elect even one representaitive without Ozech help. It was an old Prague trick to transfeT unneeded votes from one district to another. As a rule, the Social Democratic ipanty has been a Czech origani·z ation only. To return to the history of this _p arty, however, one can say that its activities during the second World War are very revooling. The majority of the party ,p oliticians fled wiith Benes, or shoritly after, and served in his "c!libi. net.,in-exile." An e~ception was Ambassador Fierlinger, who remained in Moscow serving the Communists instead of Benes, according to Ripka and Benes himself. When it came to .the wol"st, Benes's "govennment-in-exile" reoolled him to London. Having the support of Moscow, however, Fierlinger refused to return, and Benes, in order .to keep his presidency, ha:d :to. ,g o to Moscow and take ordern from his personal enemy. These statements are proved by the cablegrams exchanged by the "government-in--exile" and Fierlinger, which were published in Fierlinger's hodk. In addition to Moscow's rs upport, Fierlinger also had help within the "government-in-exile." This was the left wing of 1 �76 SLOVAKIA the Social Democrats, wirth Lausman and Bechyne as leaders in London. This group, moreover, closely cooperated with other admirers of the Soviet Union in the Czech National Sodalist party, Rip_ka, Firt, and others. This party supporte'd several pro-Communistic organizations, where Rip'ka rused to be president and Josef Ko!'bel and Tig.rid Schonfeld were in leading ,positions, .pleadin,g for help for Stalin. In 1942 and 1943, Vlase:k and Majer organized the Commu:niisrt demonstrations that heiLpe<l to· force the second front against Churchill's will. We recall that Benes traveled to Moscow in 1943 against the wishes of Eden, Churchill, and other statesmen. There he approved the seill-out o<f Ruthenia and cleared the roa:d to Ozecho-SloV'akia for the Soviet Union. This he did without any regard for the will of the peoples of SlovaJki!a, Bohemia, Moravia and Ruthenia. Nay, even without the full consent of the "Provisional Czechosloviruk Government" in London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia, Moravia, and ,Ruthenia certainly had nothing to do with it. 1 I recaH the speeches of Octdber and November, 1943, in the chambers of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in London. They were made not only by the admirers of the Kremlin, but also by the so-called civil politicians who were blinded by Moscow. Among them were Lausman and Majer, Dr. Uhlir and Paul Macha.eek; all strongly approved the journey to Moscow and insisrted on going along with Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant the loss of asylum in England and the good wiU of the allies. Benes simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the "higher interests of our nations" demanded it. When Benes returned from his trip to Moscow, he brought the request to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a la!lge part of Poland to the Soviets. If any one should quesrtion ,t he truth of my statements, I am ready and willing at all times to produce the repo~ts of the "Czechoslovak Srtate Council,." the speeches Lausman and Uhlir, and even Benes's speech in its entirety after he returned fa-om Moscow. They tel11 us clearly why the Communist "putsch" of Februa:ry 1948 took place so �SLOVAKIA 77 smoothly. Repetition o.f these facts is important for understandmg the effective collaboration of the Social Democrats with the Communists after the ,second war. Showing their allegiance to the principle from 1928, "Never against the Soviet Union," tihe Social Demoorats without an exception pressed for the Benes-Stalin agree~ ment in 1943. Therefore, in the first post-war government, formed in Kosice in 1945, and the most communistic of all governments returning ho.me, they dominated. There was no Slovak representative - evidence that Social Democracy had praictically no influence in Slovakia. Besides Prime Minister Zdenek Fierlinger, there was Frantisek Nemec and the liaison officer between the Red Armv and Benes, General Niziborsky (known now as General Hasal), who is at present, I believe, a consultant in the Pentagon Other ministers in that government were the infamous spy, Bohumil Lausman, and a present leader in the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," Vaclav Majer. We know, that all except Fierlinger came unharimed into exile after February, 1948. Lausman, of course, after having accomplished his espionage in Radio Free Europe, returned to Pra:gue. Clearly Lausman has the lowest character among the contemporary •politicians, but he was a most trusted comrade of ,t he present so-called "anti-Communist" politicians in the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." They all were united in their pro-Communist activities, and their claim now to belong to this or that wing is no.t at all convincing. In 1946 the •s ame Vaclav Majer praised the top Communist in Czecho-Slovakia lavishly: "Gottwald's name will be forever connected not only with our fight for national liberation, but also with the struggle for social liberation as well as for new forms of life and work. . . . Gottwald, not only by his determination, but also by his understanding for the opinions of others, showed his great qualities as politician and man." Sudh were then the expressions of Vaola.JV Majer, an "anti-Communist" fighter of today. But Ma:jer is not alone in this. After working together for the Communists at home, the Social Democrats came to the United States and suddenly discovered that they, too, have fought Communism. Their present fabrica- �78 SLOVAKIA tions rubout their post-war aotivity, which the following facts disprove, are a deep offense to the witnesses of their activities back home. The first document signed by the ministers and the members of the Executive Committee of the Social Demo~ cratic Party iby which a smooth Communi!zation of thei,r homeland was assured, was their agreement of June 25, 1945, at once after returning to Praigue, to form the "National Front of the Working People." This agreement shows the serviI.fty of the wholle Social Democralti1c Party, not only of the leaders, because it was discussed and una~ nimously approved by aJll the ;party before being signed by the Executive Commiittee. This means tha,t all politicians of the $ociaJ Democratic Party, now posing as anti-Communists in exile, agreed to the bolshevi zation of CzechoSlovakta. Zenkl aind his National Socialists C'an at least attempt to excuse themsel,v es that they did not want to accept this ag,r eement lbut were forced to by the Social Democrats. But it is not a question of who forced wlhom; they all signed and pulblished this agreement and, what is woTse, they put it into effect. The most important parts of this agreement are the following: 1. While maintaining a politica:l and organizational independence, the three parties wil.l closely cooperate and follow a common policy in all matters of .p u!blio life. 2 . . The political iba;si,s o.f the National Front orf Working People is the government program, unanimously a:g-re.ed upon in conference in MoS<:ow and unanimously accepted by the government in Kosice on April 5, 1945. Through this agreemenit, also a Central Coordinating Committee is being created with an equal numlber of representatives from all participating iparties, and also a United Alliance of Trade Organizations, based on voluntary membership, wJll be formed. F'urther wili be formed a Non-.Political Alliance of Czech Farmers and a United Organization of Czech Youth; both of these organizations shaH be supported ,by all parties. This publicly dedared aigreement was signed for the Social Democrats by Zdenek Fierlinger; for the Commun1 �SLOVAKIA 79 ists by Klement Gottwald, and for the National Socialist Party by Peter Zenkl. It is both very int.eresting and quit,e significant that not a single Slovak att.ended that meeting and that among those who· called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka, and other leaders of Dr. Benes's old Czech National Socilalist Party - the very same people who today are telling the American public and the world that they always hated the Reds and that the Reds "ousted" them from Government. But the truth is something else a;gatin. The fact is that both Zenlcl and Ripika welcomed the Communists, sought their favor, and wanted to win politicrul prestige with the help of the Reds at the exipense of the other political parties. Of course, today we know that they failed. The same thing happened to them ,that had happened and 1s still happening to an tho.se who try to, collruborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are worth and then swallo;w them up or get rid of them. The "National Front of the' Working People" created a "Central Coordinating Committee," in which e'very affiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This committee had the task of coordinating the work of the socialist parties. The sooiwlfst bloc prepared the ground for the various activities which led to the suppression of political and religious fireedom - the first st~s taken toward a socialist dictatorship. The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the Agrarian Party would be suppressed, the Catholic IDaigle organization outiawed, and that Catholic youth, as such, would not be allowed to orgamize. Together t@y wo,r ked out a plan whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would be done away with and, at the same time, how these votes, together with the Communist-contro lled ..peasant unions, , would he brought into the Communist P,a,rty. They also created and later legalized the Communist trade organizations, then the non-political Fedeiration of Farmers and the United Youth Or,g,anization - all of which were SU!ppo.s ed to be fornned by the joint participation of all parties, but �80 SLOVAKlA actually served onlly to communize Ozecho-iSlovakia from the instant they began to function. Therefore, it is not true that Zenlkl, Rtpka, Vilem, Majer, and other Czech Sooial DemocraJts opposed Com~ munist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is that from the moment they accepted the so--called "Kosice Agreement ," they were aJlways subordinat ed to and in the train of .t he Communis t Party and willingly continued tha,t way not only on Russian soil, or in Russian-·occuipied Kosice, but a1so in "Jiberated" Pr'cllgue. The "Joint Declaration " to the nation on June 28, 194'5, is indisputalble proof of the fact that they wanted to get into governmen t with the help of the Oommunist s, even at the roopense of democracy, Christ'ianit y, and freedom. This is the sound lesson for all who would col'la!borate with Oommunist s. All such ,p eople are digging their own graves, because Communism recogn.i'zes no agreements , concessions, or compromis es, and swallows wp all who collaborate with it. A Czech Catholic editor, A. J. Jandacek, commented on major effects of this agreement in this manner: "The aims of the socialist bloc were many: "1. First of all not to allow workers to organiz.e in Catholic trade unions, and so far as they are alread,y organized in them, through a mass effort .to storm them into the socialist bloc by maintaining that Oatholic organizations wm anyhow be in the mi· nority an d that, therefore, it is better to go together. "2. Not to ,a llow an independent unification of Catholic farmers. The party of farm people wi ll not be allowed to exist at all, and as far as the Catholics have their Catholic farmers organized, the Communists will divide them among themselves. "3. A United Organization of Czech Youth will be formed and, thus, the Cat·holic you1Jh wJll not have an opportunity to organize on a Oatholic platform, eitilier politiooJly or religiously. Simply, ,a ll youth will be forced to go into the state-formed and socialist-led organization. Thus, organizing an "Alliance of Catholi c Youtll" or ,a "Czechoslovak Orel" will be .impossible. A daily and weekJ.y have already been published for this so-called united youth organization and are led by the Commundsts. "In view of these three aims, it is possible to call the establishing and maintaining of t!he socialist bloc an intention-al act against political and religious freedom and the establishmen t of a socialist dictatorship." Although I am not a Catholic and never was a member �SLOVAKIA 81 of any clerical party, I am ready to sign this analysis by the editor Jandaceik. Whereais, Ze:rukl and his party, in December, 11947, begain not to abide by the 1946 agreement, the Social Democrats kept it even after the Oommunist "putsch" in Februa:ry, 1948. Professor Macek, for instance, accepted lead~ ing positions in o,rganizations which bolsheviized the University, and as president of the Aotion Committee of the University he expelled those students who had participated in demO'Il!Strations against the Communists in February. Furthermore, for a long time he helped the Constitutional Oommittee of Ozecho-Slovakia:n P.arliam.ent and its chairman, Dr. Procha:zka, a leading Communist. As a matte~ of fact, the whole section on Economics in the Communist constitution is his work. Both as an expert and as a member of the :Sociail Demo:cra,tic Party, he supported the Communist bi1ls; a;ctua:1ly, rhe was the right hrui.d of Dr. Procha:zka, the most Communist jurist in Czecho-Slovakia and chairman of the Constitutional Committee. To us it is not surprising that Macek led in the persecution of democratic students after the Communist putsch, since he had earlier been well known as a fervent exponent of Marx at the tUrnversity of Brno, where he was professor of National Eoonomics. The surprise is that he is now a university professor in the United States. Professor Maicek, during the yearn 1929...1939, was a member of Parliament for the Social Democratic Party. Simultaneously, he edited a left-orientated monthly called "Our Times" which was sponso,r ed by Presidents Masaryk and Benes. He published numerous books, a base of which was, repeatedly, the teachings of Marx. In these books Professor Maicek defended the theories orf Marx very emphatica!lly and wanted to introduce them into our social and economic life, evein as early as 1930-1938. He wanted to sociailize everything. His aim was identical to that of the Communi,s ts. They wanted to put it into practice after 194'5. Origtlnafly, Professor Macek migrated to Canada and lived on the fann of a certain Mr. Karel Buzek,. where he wrote artides for the Ozech newspapers in Canada. In his articles he rejeoted and condemned the very same ideas he �82 SLOVAKIA was not so long ago an apostle of and a very able and thorough propagator. From Canada he came to the United States and at the present time he is active as a professor at some university m Pennsylvania. iB. Vilem, as Genera'} Secretary of the Ozech Social Democratic Party, was more a personal "whip" for Fierliniger than a "whip" for the ,party. While I was a member of the Agricultural Committee, we succeeded sometimes in winning over .t he chairman of the committee, who was a Social Democrat, against the Communist proposa!ls. Vilem, however, before the voting day, and often at midnight, cal'led the members of 'his party and dictated: "Fierlinger lets you know that the party cannot stand for your proposals; you have to vote with the Communist Party." One of these Social Democrats that was forced by Vi1em to vote with the Communists is in exile ; several committee memlbers from the other parties who lost ,w ith me because of Vil.em's actions are now in the "Council of Free Ozechosloviaikia," but they wil'l never forget those defeats (Sliva, Torn, and other.s). Wathout this servility to the Communists, Gottwald would never have gained the majority he had. The saddest chapter of the Social Democrati'C Party, however, was written by its memiber who was the Minister of Industry, Bohumil Dausman. He served the at!reernent of June 25, 1945, so faithfully that he went out to disintegrate even the exile and worked for three years as a spy, after being employed by Radio Free Europe with the help of the Social Democrats and other memlbers of the "Council of Free Czechoslo;vakia," particularly Ripka and his group. The case of Lausman's treason was not yet completely closed when new espionage process was started against further exiponent of Prague government and close collaborator of Dr. Hubert Riipka. Hardly had a French .court sentenced Kubala on a charge of espionage for Communist OzechoSlovakia before the Prague radio reacted in this case and the spea,keir, himself a collaJborator of Mr. Ferdinand Peroutka and a former employee of Radio Free EuTope, used the most despiooble language against the West. Slovak newspapers unanimousily reported - unfOTtunaitely without desirable �SLOVAKIA 83 results on the aictions orf Radio F.ree Europe - that Lausman would be followed by the others. The newspapers asked for effect1ve preventive measures in Radio Free Europe rugainst subversive elements but nothing was done. Many very dubious elements are sitting in Radio F,r ee Europe and are paid by the Amerilcan citizens. In the warning concerning espionage, we have not only staJted several times that there are Marxists ood Oommunists in "Czechoslovak" organizations, but we also said openly that they were, and silll are espionage agents of the Prague government. The Prague broadcasts have confirmed our allegation. On the same ibroadlca;st where, some time a;go, Laus-· man broadcast in Prague, now spoke Bruno Folta, who was working as an employee of Radio Free Europe under the protection of Dr. M. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko. He minutely copied the style of Lausrnan, H~ confessed that originally he betrayed the Communist government in Prague and filed to the West, requesting political asylum. Here in the West, in Radio Free Europe Folta came to the conclusion that the western world was rotten and readily seized the chance to return home and accept what was offered to him in the inteliligence service conducted by the Czech General Moravec. He repented like Lausman and, hruving the desire to make some reparations, he put himself at the disposal of the "people's Democracy" against the West. He went on to threaten that he would use all the knowledge which he ooquired as an employee of Radio Free Europe. Our reports from Munich and behind the Iron Ourtain explain the Folta case as foHo:ws: Like Lausman, he was sent by the Prague government for espionage purposes and to esta:blish the contacts. When he succeeded and gathered enough material and collaborators, especially in Munich and Paris, he simply ,r eturned to Prague as a highly appreciruted a;gent, in order to accUJSe the anti-Communist citizens at home. of whose attitude he learned while abroad. What is Folita telling the peoples of Czecho~Slova;kia? The Vienna newspapers published long articles explaining how Foll.ta, this confident servant of Mr. Peroutka and Dr. Mudry, was blaming Radio Free Europe and the Western World and praising everything he found after his return to �84 SLOVAK.IA Brague: •~Prague has everything good and new, all the new technical inventions, and everything in plenty. Meantime, in the Weslt, o:nlly the capitalist dwpes have all the goods in their possession and the common people are starving." Thrut is the picture cxf the West presented by Folt'a, who coJ:lected American doJlars from RJFE. When will Washington be conV'inced? The case of Folta is certainly a cha,pter of shameful history, but we feair that even this fact will not be strong enough to convince the F1ree Europe Committee or the Department of State in W8!Shi:nigton. We repeat that such exile orga.n±zations, which are SUipported at the ex;pense of genuine demo-cratic and anti-Communist organizations, wre nuisances and wreckers of all the actiOIIlS of the Western. WorJd in the cold war. In the "Ozechoslovak" orgarazations there have been, since the start, members who were sent West by the Prague go,v ernment only for tlhe purpose of serving the Communists. On the roster of "Czechoslovak" organizations in exile you wilil find many persons who were elected to office on the Oommunist baHot, ,p oliticians who mostly helped the Communists not only to gain control of CzechoSlova!kia, but also the whole Danube valley. The same persons, who with Benes in 1939, in London, were in touch with SDalin's ambrussa.dor, agreed on the invasion of U.iS.IS.IR. south of the Carpathian Mountains. To the Americans in Washington and the Einglishmen in London, they disiplayed an rug·r eement concerning the integrity of the Czecho-Slavaik State while knowing the deficiencies of this treaty. They .co!~JIBitted the same crime as did Lausman and Bruno, Folta. These people simply betrayed the Allies. But beyond that are their protectors, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" and its leading representatives Zenkl, Lettrich, IPerou'bka, Mudry and others - iess guilty of betrayal? They 1let Lausma.n into R1adio :ffiree Europe and allowed him to• broadcast for American money. On the payroll they kept Folta, R1.12icka, and others as well; and they still do that and help to betray America. There is no excuse for them, or is there? Parrticipants in a crime are as punishable as the crim1 �SLOVAKIA 86 inal. J>a:rtici:pan.ts in this betriayal can not excuse themselves on the grounds that they did not know anything about suoh action. Several times suspicious caJSes were brought to their notice but they did not pay any ,a ttention to these warnings. What should we say to this criminal negligence on the .part of responsible pemonaHties :in Radio Free Europe Oir in the "Council of ~ree OzechoslovaJda ?" There they are unanimous: Zenkl, Cerny, Osuis'ky -- all plead for the innocence of Peroutka. The continuous scandaJls should waike up the security officials of the Western Powers. Until now only the Germans in Munich asked fo-r a c1erun-1.l'p of Marxists and other elements hostile to democracy in the whole territory of the German Federal Republfo. They aimed at "Czechoslovak" organizations which aire infiltrated with highly suspicious elements. Let us apply our knowledge whi'1e there is still time. Many think that only in Germany are such cases possible. but that is not true. The same oases, even more paradoxi~ cal, we find in Washington where the Czech officers are working. They distinguished themselves in the sell~,ut of Carpathian Ruthenia to the Soviets, or kept in the service of American Intelligence the sister-in-ilaw of a welL known Communist in the old country. Why should we be shocked that in rPairis the Communists received confiden• tial materia'l? Even in Washington security mea5UJres are neglected. We know the persons at wol'k in W81Shington and we will not be surpri,s ed if the Lausman affair breaks out a,gain despite our warning. Those who wHl be suT1prised will be Americans. Let us take lessons from Parts. Since Lausman's return to Prague, the whole CzechoSlovak exile, in its confusion, has been producing deceptions and charges of for.gery. When Mr. Osusky of the "Council of F'lree Ozechoslovakia" does not succeed in his enterprises, .o r the situation changes after his proclamations hawe been pulblished, he simply proclaims them unauthentic or falsified, o:r he simply a&:!rilbes them to Lausman. 'Sometimes the matter is trivial, as it was in the proclamation concerning the is udeten G€Tmans which was allegedly signed by Osusky. There he stressed the necessity �86 SLOVAKIA that the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans are reconciled and charged that Ripka and Zenk! were unsuitalble because of their collaJboration with the Communists. The subj~ct was given great publicity by Josten (a former official of the Foreign Ministry and now editor of "Czechoslovak" in LondO'Il) and his Marxist cell in London, w:hiich always tries to please Prague. In this matter, Osusky probably figured that a dea!l with the ,Sudeten GeI'IDans could per., haps be of he1p to him if he should have trouble in the Council with Ripka and Zenk!. But here chance helped him. R:iipka had difficulties in the United States because of his colla;boration with the Communists and therefore planned to return to his socialist friends in Europe. For this reason he, as weU as Zenkl, did not fight for leading positions .i n the Counchl - a fact that allowed the November reconciliation of the Council. Osusky does not need the Sudeten Germany any longer, whereas for Zenk! and Ripka the Sudeten German question will be a ,problem. So Osusky denied his Sudeten German proclamation and charged tha;t its publfoation in the "Czechoslovak" was a fOTgery . Simila.rly, "Nase Cesta," a Marxist paper printed in the Czech language ,in Vienna, published a who[e issue of articles written by several memibers of the "Council of Free Czechoslovak ia.'' Arfter Osusik y and Zen kl were reconciled and the articles did not fit into the changed opinion of the Council, the editor procilaimed the whole earlier issue a for,g ery. Thus, suddenly we are told that the ,articles were not writt® by the members oif the Council, and that the who'le issue was forged with the purpose of s,plitting the "Czechoslova k" exile. Lt is interesting to see whose names first a;ppea.r as authors o,f the disputed rurticles: Dr. Taiborsky, Benes's secretary; Jan Zak, Slovak socialist and confidant of MaTxists and "Ozechosloivaks" ; Jozef Dieska, member of the Council, etc. I can only dismiss the editor's charge that the whole issue originated with Lau:sman as ridiculous and highly impossible. In the newspruper "Novy Domov," published in Canada, another member of the Council, Fras'tacky, attacked Colonel M~ksohe, who does not go along with the "Ozeichoslova!ks" �f?LOV,AKIA 87 in the Council. (Oolon~l Miksche, a Czecho-Slovak military attache in Pa.r-is, resigned in December, 1947, in protest to the policy of the present members of the Council then in Praigue.) When Colonel Miiksche threatened to sue him, Frastaoky quiokly denied writing the article and declared it a forgery. Certainiy this comedy cannot be cailled anything but ridiculous; fortunately, it did not harm Colonel Miksche. It is regrettruble, however, that the exile "Czechoslovak" press sees in these and other incidents the intervention of Genera:! Molotka of P,r ague, whose assignment, with Lausman, is to influence and distunb the exik It does not at all seem to me that these .incidents, are of Lausman's making, for he would think of different methods among the members of the Ooll!Ilcil. In the Council he feels at home, after spending three years in its midst and working with Council members in Radio Free Europe. There he does not need any mediators and can at any time directly interfere. Using Lausman's name, however, provides Osusky and others wJth a handy scapegoat for the.i~ own failures and a!bandoned projects. SimHarly, the "CzechosloV'ak" exile press is not unanimous and constant in its aocount of the Council's November compromise and in its list of representatives. Sometimes it leaves out Dr. Cerny',s name, and other times it puts it in, depending on whom it serves . .Professor Hlavaty is referred to as a neutraJl sometimes, and at other times as ·a former socialist representative in the temporary National Assembly in Prrugue. Moreover, the "Czechoslovak" exile even today is hel:ping and promoting the accessories of spies as did some other memlbers of the Courrcil while they were ambassadors in the United States and elsewhere. This is the way the "Czechoslovak" organizations operate while the socialist parties in the West do not realize their dange,r . So, for ex-· ample Zdenka Schonova, in :Eingland one of the leading Czech Social Democrats, is supported today by the "Czech Trust Fund," even though her collaboration with the convicted spy, Peter Arton, was proved. It is evident that the persons from the Council do not distinguish between a 1 �88 SLOVAKIA Czech patriot and a Czech spy. For them everyone is first of aH Czech, from Benes down to Lausman, and in this belief they .not only help the spies and pay them, but also pay for their protection and defense It is also well known that Colonel Koenig, who is a leader orf the reporting division of the "Council of Free Ozechos!ovaktla" and also working for the West, still employs the same Hungarian Communis t as his secret,a ry, his sister-in-ilaw, Klara Fedak. Fedfuk is in New York without letting the U. S. authorities know that she is a Oommunist. Her former "1b oy friend" is now chief of the espionage office in Bratislava; yet the persons from the "Co,u ncii of Free Ozechoslov aikia" do not find it difficult to affirm to the West the ,reliaJbiliity of these Communist s. Koonig's group is also responsible for the murder of a Slovak un., dergrmLnd leader and patriot, Pavol Harusiak, and others from Bratislava, whose bordeT-cro ssing they betrayed to the Communis t police. Ifurusiak was my friend, an'd I kn.ow that a member of Koenig's group, iDr. Patek, gained access to him only through representin g himself as from me. When the "Czechosio. vak" exile has such help and affiliations, how lO'Ilg must O'Ile state that this "Czechoslo vak" group is not reliable? It is seen to be a very dangerous group when we realize that it hrus, accomplice s in the un. derground who were given money and introd1..1JCtions by Zenkl and Ripka, as the spy Bohumil Cerny and his accompJices were. This situation is also true orf the "C'zechoslova!k" section of R:adio Flree Europe in Munich, where there is always someone who helps such men as La.usma,,n and Folta, or other ex-Commu nists and .future re-immigrants to Red Prague. Bures, who brought Folta to Radio Free Europe, was dismissed, but his friends - Kvetko, Mudry, and Peroutka - are still in leading positions. If Radio Free Europe and the Voice of Ame11ica would try to lbrea:k the reputation. oif this "Czechoslo vak"' army with truth and with real anti-Comm unist speakers who ha,ve a good reputation and an anti...Communist record at home, it could be done. Not, however, with the present group. What is broadcast and written now - for American money - helps the Oommunis ts more than it harms them. �SLOVAKIA 89 These org,a nizations which are supposed to wage psy. chological warfaire against Communism behind the !iron Curtain do just the opposite - as far as Czecho-Slovakia is concerned. Too often they he:lp spies and broadcast material which does not harm the Communists, but rather amuses them. Sending pigeons and balloons across the Iron Curtain maikes people there laugh or curse, because the police always get some of those who pick up the leaf~ lets. When aJlmost every month someone returns to Pra•g ue and te1'ls of the low moral tone, the scandals, and suicides in the "Czechoslovak" section of Radio Tuee Europe in Munich, the Communists give this excellent publicity. No wonder that Radio· Free Europe does not have any respect there! IDven when Radio Free Euroipe, or the Voice of America, gains some SlovaJk renegade, these organizations are not made 1:.iherelby eiffecti:ve, nor are their names re~ stored at home behind the Iron Curtain. People theTe ceased to believe them loog ago, and after the Lausman and Folta affairs they only curse them. Folta, Ru!zicka, and Bures worked in Radio Free Europe; they were the proteges of those Siova.k employees in Radio Free Europe - Dr. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko - who are supposed to represent the r eal Slovak anti-Communist cause. And yet nothing happened to Mu.dry or Kvetko, much less to Peroutka, because they brought Bures and Ruzicka and Folta to RF'E, nor because they paid their comrade Lausmrun, who is also back in Prague. The new chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on In. vesitigations, Senator McCleUan, who is a capable lawyer to whom the security of the United States is of paramount internst is, we hear, curious about many things. We hope, therefore, thlat this suibcommittee will succeed in this mat~ ter also and that the organizations in question will be cleansed of the ,present "Czecho,slovaJk" group. iLausman was so aggressive that during the second World War, after his return from Moscow to London, he succeeded in the State Council in speeding up Benes's trip to Moscow. Further, as he admits in his book, published in Vienna, he forced Benes to na,tionalize aH private industry by presidential decree before the Pro,v isional National As- �90 SLOVAKIA sembly convened in October, 194'5. He also :points out in his book that, whereas he admits his actions, the associates who agireed with hiim on aU the issues of col1aboration now are renouncing him only in order to be accept., able to Washington. In this way, Lausman has unmasked the Sodal Democrats who in exile pre.tend to fight Communism, but actually are responsi!ble for the :f act that Russian territory extends for the first time in history west of the Carpathians into the Danube basJn. In this bolshevik expansion it was two Social Democrats who represented Benes and the whoJ.e state leadership: Flrantisek Nemec and Generail Ni:ziborsky - Hasal. Both went to Moscow from London in 1944 and then fol., lowed the Red Army into Ozecho-1Slovaiki,a to take over the liberated territory :from the Red Army in accordance with the Benes-lSta:li,n treaty. They did it so successfully with the he1p of Fierlinger in Moscow that in three months they gave Stalin the eastern part of Czecho-1Slovaikia, the whole of Ruthenia. Russia ,o ffered to the Slovaks, through the Communists Dr. Husak and Novomesky, an independent ,Slovak State, provided that it would be another Soviet republic. When Husak and Novomesky made the proposal to the Slov,a ks, to Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of S'lovakia and the Slow.1Jk Government, the Slovaks, however, refused the •bolshevi~atio!Il of their country. Nemec was not given a cordial re:ception ~n Ruthenia at all. The in'haibitants everywh&e were signing petitions, sponsored by the Communist Petruscak, which started that the Ruthenians no longer existed and that there were only Sub-Carpathi an Ukrainians in Ruthenia who yearned to be embrruced by their greait mother, Ukrainia. After many long squabbles, Nemec fina:lly got a message through to Benes in London through General Pika. The telegrams that Benes sent through F1ierlinger were never seen by Nemec, ,b ecause Fierlinger already then was Stalin's envoy and never a paitTiotic cii.ti,z en of his own State. It is significant, therefore, that despite these experiences thi,s same traitor, Fierling&, was named, several months later, as the premier by Benes. Nemec was in a very trying position. When he wanted �SLOVAKIA 91 to be connected with London, he had to ask for permission to do so from the Chief of the Russi,an ISJtafif so that he could travel to Moscow, where with the heilp of the vad.io conneotion of General Biika, who was the Chief of the Mtilitary Mission, Nemec could tell Benes how matters were going and koop him informed on Fierlinger. The latter was doing right well. He still is a minister in the Prague Gov~ ernment, but Genera,1 Bika was killed by the Commund.sts. At that time the Communists had asked the Slovak non-Communists whether it would not he more profitable to support tJhe idea of a Slovak Soviet Republic so that the Slovaks could go,vern their own territory rather than adhere to the "Czecho-slova;k" ideology which denied the existence of the Slovak nation. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Reipulblk could be promoted without diff,iculty, because the Slovak State still existed. Husak and Novomesky, however, did not get anywhere with their proposal. The Slova,k non-Commumsrts turned it down, declaring that it was contrary to the Christmas Agreement of December, 1943, as well as the agreement which Ursiny concluded -w ith Dr. Benes in Octolber, 1944, when he acted iJ?- the name of thie SloViak National Council. When Husak and N01Vomesky failed to promote the idea of a Slovruk Soviet Repwblic in London, they imrmediiately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakia to present the ,p rop·a sal to President Joseph Tiso and the Slovruk Govemment. But Tiso· and the Slovak Government would not hear rubout it. Husak and N ovomesky failed in thek mission. Several months later, with mMly Slova;ks in emigration, Clemenitis took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today an the leading Reds of Slavrukia are paying dearly for failing in theiT mission. Clementis paJid with his life. Ruthenia was loot. Benes's delegation had to go to Trebisov ·a nd after that things went rather smoothly. ~erliillger ma:de the propositions and Benes aocepted them. When he was returning from Moscow in March, 1945, Benes could no longer enter Ruthenia. In fact he renounced it solemnly on severai occasions. FinaMy, Benes had an agreement prepared which Fierlinger signed for the Czecho1 �92 SLOVAKIA SlovaJk Government with great solemnity in the Kremlin on June 29, 1945. No one outside the CommU'Ilists agreed with this act of Benes. No law, however, could contain or restrain Benes. He acted dictatori.ally at any time that it benefited him. On August 24, 1945, without even corum1tling the Parliament, Benes issued his presidential decree No. 4, concluding the pa:ct between the U .S.S.<R. and the C.S.R. This decree was the basis for assigning new borders to Slovakia in the East. In Octoher, 1946, everything "legalized" on the ,b asis orf foregoing decrees was published in the Col~ lection of Laws and Regulations. T.he text orf the rubove-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as significant. It begins with the words: ". . . being certain that the provisional National Assembly of the Orecho-1Slovaik Republic shal[ concur with this ag.reement . . . " Benes did not wait. He and John Masaryk and VI-ado Clementis decided matters without Pa.rlia,ment. As good prophets, they knew tha't Parliament would certainly approve this ag,r eement ! Since Ruthenia was not a very big bite, Benes did not stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2, 1945, he issued decree No. 8, whereby a numbeir of homes in the most beautiful seo'tion of BUJbenec - in the modern section of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, the greaJt s•a crifices the nations of the U .IS.S.R. had made on the altar of liberation of humanity. WeM, it is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great extent did l,iibera-te SlwaJcia from a gre,aJt many things the Slovaks could use themselves, but it certamly was not ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them without evsen consulting the nation about it. Only dictators act like that. And Benes was a dictator by the grace of MoS<!ow, even id: only a temporary one. 'Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later Benes showed his aP!)Teoiation to the so-called "iLiberator" of Prague, M<rurshaJ Konev, by giving him several very •b eautiful vi1las which were oonfiscated from the 1g ood citi- �SLOVAKIA 93 zens .o f Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiflrl view of Prague. All these decTees we re signed by General Hasal-Nizborsky, who was at that time Minister of Thansportation, and •by Vaclav iMajer, who was also a member of Benes's caJbinet. The servility to Stalin and Go'titwald, and the boundless adulation iby HasaJl..,Niziborsky a,nd Frantiseik Nemec would be best illustrated if we pu!blished the congratulatory telegrams sent by them to their idols. I mtend to publish all these facts in a book, but they hawe already !been quoted by Fierlinger and Lausman in their books. Later, many Communists who fell out of favor tried to rescue their political careers in exile with the help of membership cards in the Social Democratic Party. Those Communists, rulmost without exception, we find in Radio Free Europe - (Graf, Berger-!Belak, and Ti.grid Schonfeld), or (Josef Konbel, the with other American institutions Communist amlbas:sador from Prague to Tito in Belgrade, now a member of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" and a uni,versity professor ,i n the United Staltes). Regarding Tigrid Schonfeld, it is only necessary to note what has been written albout him here in the United States. As it is quite a lo't, I only quote some parts of a more serious character: "Tigrid is a former m emb er of the C2:ech Communist Party. According to tJhe newspaper Christ und Welt (Stuttgart, October 16, 1952), •his political ac tivjty began in 1932 when he published the illegal Communist paper Hal lo Noviny, w,hich specialhr.ed in subversion of morale in the Czecho slovak Army. " He was also a contri butor to the Co mmunist magazine Leva Kultura (Left Culture). Dur:ing Wo r ld W ar II he w as a member of the Communfot-domiuated Czechoslovak staff of t'he British Broadcasting Company, where one of his colleagues and iruti mate friend w.as Colonel Otto BlheJer, the Czech mi.Jitary attache whom the United States Government declared persona non grata in 1949 for es pionage activities." I hope this short excerpt will be enough to show what pro-Communist elements were picked 1by the U. S. Ad-· ministration and by the Firee Europe Commitltee for importa,nt pos,itions. These quotations will also prove tha,t SUJCh people cannot be expected to be trusted 'back a,t home by �94 SLOVAK.IA the Nation as anti-Communist fighters and thaJt the whole expensive propa,gand'a program is practicrully useless and ineffective. About the others aJbove, I must confess the same opinion as to character. The deeds of these men, however, I am intentionally separating from the actions of the leaders of the Czec'h Social Democratic Prurty. I am presenting the Communist co1la:"boration of only those Social Democ~ats who represent the party in exile and who :firom 1945 until they went in to exiile were also of some importance back home. I am leaving aside those persons who are now abusing the sympath4es of the Labor Party in London, because they wd not amount to much back home, being only opporlll!Il.ists and regularly havmg two memib ership cards, one of the Communist and the other of the Social Democratic Party. But these also oannot claim that they opposed the agreement of June 25, 1945; everyone conisenited to it and carried it out in h:is capacity. It is no wonder that :b y 1946 their policy of complete conformance with the Communists had negated the party as opposi,t ion. Simifarly now the party is destroying itself in an attempt to gain strength by accepting and proteotin.g even men who were strong Communrists, like Milos Vanek and Tigrid Schonfeld, or men who possessed membership cards of several Marxist parities, like M8!cek, Kwbel, and others. Furthermore, an affidav1t of anti-Communism signed by the Social Demoorat le·aders is ridiculous, indeed, beca use the party's claim to anti--Communism is itself destroyed by the evidence of its history. During the February, 1948 c,r isis, the Social Democratic Party tried to look neutral, but the fact ilid everything to help t'he COIIllmunists succeed. Hol!cling to the agreement of J.une, 1945, the party as a unit gave its support to the Commumsts and so broke the political equilibrium in favor of the Oorrum.1~sts. Even if it is not pos• sible to .state that without the help of the Sociail. Democrats, Gottwald would not have succeeded in the "putsch" of February, 1948, nevertheless it remains a great guilt against the Sooial Democrats that in the time when it was �SLOVAKIA 95 clear to everyone what tJhe Communists were doing, the Czech Social Democrats stood by them and did not help the opposition. This attitude of the Czech Social Democrats is not very well known and evaluated in the United States; if it were, not one of them could pose in Washington as anti-Communists. And their protector, Steinhardt, U. S. am:bassador to, •Prague in 1948, and former Secretary · of State Acheson could not have secured for them influential positions in the United States on the U. S. payroll. It is worthwhile to note that up to 19-38 the Czech Sociall. Democrats cooperated strongly with the Sudeten German Sociail. Democrats in Ozecho-Slovakia. When the German Social Democrats got into trouble with the N a:llis and were persecuted, there was no Czech Social Democrait to help his coHeague in the Sudetenland; they were betrayed. Later the expulsion. decrees bore the signature of aH the Czech Social Democrat ministers, who had no social or human feeling. It will forever remain -a shame against the Czech Social Democrats that they let their coUe,agues from the German Social Democratic Party be so persecuted, robbed, expelled, and even JnUrdered. They ail.so had a similar attitude towards the Slovaks in their domestic .p olky and always helped Prague centralism and imperia•1ism. Furtherimore, they helped to destroy the Slov:ak Democratic Party ,b y dema.ndiing in the fall of 1947 the .p osition of one commissioner. Thiis commissioner, working hand-in-hand with bloody Ferjencik, then commissioner of police but now in the United States, iru::reased the public terror and forced the courts to serve the police. The Social Democrats in the government of Slovakia held to ,t he agreement from June 25, 1945, until they had performed their jobs in 1945 and then were kioked out when no longer needed by the Communists. Looking over the record of the Czech SociaJl Democratic Party, their willing coUaiboration with Communists and their fierce figiht against every anti-Communist, one cannot understand their presel!t a;lilbi thait they acted only under Russian pressure. One incident epitomizes this contradiction. On the sixtieth anniversary of Karl Marx's death, Mareh 14, 1943, they were living in London. On that day the Czech �96 SLOVAKIA Socia:l Democrats and the Communislts made a piJ.grimage to Mairx's torn!b in an English ·c emetery. At this tomlb, in free England, the present representative of the "Council of Free Ozechosl'Ovakia" in Washington, then Benes's mmiister and member oif his State Council, Vaclav Miajer, delivered a speech in the name of t!he Social Democraits in which he said: "WE BELIEVE WITH MARX THAT SOCIALISM 1,s THE WAY TOWARD INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, TOWARD EVERLASTING PEACE, AND THE WELFARE OF NATIONS . TO•DAY HERE WE ARE, A SMALL GROUP OF SOCIALIST EMIGRANTS FROM CZECHO-SLOVAKIA . BUT THE TIME WILL COME WHEN MARX'S TO,MB WILL BE THE SHRINE OF MANKIND LIBERATED FROM THE BLIND IMPRISONMENT O,F DEAD SOCIAL DOCTRINES." 1M inister -Majer's speech was published on March 19, 1'943, in Benes's officiail newspaper in London, the "Czechoslovak," whikh was financed by Jan Masaryk and Hulbert Ri,pka. In conclusion, I say that the basis of the Communist victory in Czecho-iSiovrukia was 1Jhe agreement of June 25, 1945, which was cauied out with the help of the current members of the "Council of Free Czechoslov;rukia." Their present pose as anti-Communists is undemtandable, of course, because by continumg to deceive Americans is now their only means of survival. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Himself a Slovak, though from Moravia, he had to provide a future for the two million Slovaks, who were even less a!ble to stand alone than the Ozechs. Masaryk revived the radical idea of 1848 and proposed to create a single 'Czechoslovak' nation by will-power. Masaryk knew little of the Slovaks; others !knew even less. This was hi's strength in dealing wi,tll the allied leaders; it could not solve the Slovak prdblem. The few conscious Slovak politicians aspired only to cll!ltural autonomy within Hungary; living in the shadow of Magyar arrogance, they could not imagine the dis8ippearance of the Hungarian frontier." - (A. J. P. Taylor, 'NIE HABSBURG MONARCHY, London, 1948; p . 240). � SLOVAK.IA 72 The Czecho-Slovak Exile CZECH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND RED ESPIONAGE Dr. Mi chael Zibrin July of l91J5 found the "Council of Free Ozechoslovaki:a" just as July of J.ast year left it; without eleded of~ fi.cials, without elected representatives. This is because the CoUIIld, during the 20-month period of its re-organi-. zation, could not reach !any agreement and is operating on a rotation system, i.e., eacth month ,a reipresentati:ve of a diifferent political iparty se:rves as its executive head. This proves what we had said b,e fore: the Council is a coillglomerate of people of quite different bmnds and that Lettrich' s exdamation two years ago - "Gentlemen, I think only dollars keep us here together" - was and is still true. The present chaos in the Council is caused partly by the fact that political partie.s are coming to prevail more than personalities, and the Councril -resembJ.es more and more an enlarged National Front. The purpose of .t his article is to revie;w the past policies and deeds of that part.yin the CoU!Ilcil which did most to communize the o~ooho-1Slov•8Jk Republic and prepare an easy Communist take-over in 1948. ,Such a review is necessitated by the shocking pulblic deception that hias gained influentiral positions for the exile members of th±s ,p arty. Reformed Communists and coUaiboratom can perform valuable functions, but in men who deny their Olbvfous politic,al actions there can be no question of reform. The most flagrant a,id to Communism was given by the Czecho-iSlovak Social ·D emocratic party. In exile today, the leaders of this panty are men who, by their open colfa,boration wit:h Stalin, p~ayed the most important ,part in the bolsheviz;ation o,f Czecho-Slova>k,i1a. These men have always Etood very close to the Communists, even during small political skirmishes like those occasion.any now among Zenkl, Ripka, and Peroutka. Particularly after the Stalin-Benes pact of 1943, they were the most efficient signers and executors of Benes':s bloody decrees, not reaHzing that, once they had finished their jdbs for the Communists, the fate �Sl.JOVAKIA 73 they had prepared for others wo'Ulld become their own. History shows that aliready in 1928 the Soc,i al Demo. cr:ats formulated their program thus: "Today as also in the past we are decided to protect the Soviet Union against any inimical action of the capitalistic governments and against any counter-revolutionary attack." Nine years earlier this belief had been realized in action. When Polish General Pilsudski was fighting a bloody (battle with the Communist ar-my near Wairsaw in 1920, the socialistic ma-· jority in Prague forbade the transportation of military material t.lirnugh ,Ozocho-1Slo,v0Jkia, despite the fact that lhis material was sent by France and a French military mi,s sion was at that time already in Prague. A yea,r earlier, when General Stefanik telegraiphed a wairning to Prague against Bolshevism as the greatest plague o!I' mankind a:nd asked for uruty in tihe f.ight to destroy it, it was this same Social Democratic Party whiclh - wit:h Masarylk's consent - stopped Stefamk's program. Masaryk's consent is less surprising when one remembers that he was actually among the first to hail the Octo!ber Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, which now in Prague !is considered fundamental to the ere. ation of Ozecho-,Slovaki:a. Thus one couid go on ,w ithout end and show that the Social Democratic party was an effective avant garde of Communism in Central Europe, not only in Czecho-!Slovakia. Certainly one of the most important persons in the Czecho-!Slovak .Social Democratic party was V ojta Benes, the oldest brother of the !:ate president. Gottwald officially, on the Cabinet's decision (and Moscow's aippro,vail) , sent him into West Germany in 1949, where he keipt in. regular contact with Prague and acted more oir less ,a,s Gottwald's unofficial ambassador. He did not conce·a l this fact, and t he members of the "Council of Free Czechoslova!ld:a" knew it. Therefore, many times, VojJa Benes took a different position from the official Council and o;piposed some steps undertaken by non.JSocialists in the Council. Benes's brother passed away, ,but equally important representatives remain, particularly: Vacl:av Majer, B. Vilem, the former Sec:retary-General of the Party, and the ill-ifamed Bohumiil Lausman. Ailso, the Social Democratic 1 �74 SLOVAKIA party has its two generalls, Sergei Ingr, and Hasal Niz!borJ sky, and, jn Canada, the former minister Frantisek Nemec, who together with Hasal affected the cession of Ruthenia to .Stalin. To this party belongs also a Communist famous in Europe, Milos Vanek, and some questionaJble individuals in Radio F,ree Europe in MUTI!ich. These are all Czechs. Milos Vanek, who is reported to hruve 1b een a charter mem1ber of the "Czeohoslovak Communist Party," remained an ardent adherent of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship even after he 1had left that .p arty to ~me a left.;win.g Social Democrat. I personaHy know Mr. Vanek and I must confirm that Vanek was one of the founders of the Communist Party in Europe. This is described in the book of Lu. cien Laurat ",Du Komiintern au Kominfo·r m" (!Paris, France Des 1'sles, 1'951), in which on page 10 we read: "The manifest issued by the second Congress of the Kominform, July, 1920, carries a great number of sigrra:tures - Lenin, Zinoviev, Boukarine, Trotski, for iRussia; Vane'k, Hlula, Zapotocky (the president of Ozecho-;Slovakia today), etc." T,his signer and founder of the Communist Party is today the Chief of the Economics Deparbment of Radio Free Europe and a member of the "Colllilcil of Free Ozechoslovalcia" in New York, ·b oth financed by the Free Europe Committee! On the Slovak side there are: Dr. Ziak, well-known Czecho-'SlovaJk; Dr. Joseph Mrazek, the only •Slov;ak s~gner of the oath of fidelity to Communism in 1948, and posing as a Slovak, a certain Belak, whose real name is Berger. A,bout these people, Kurt Glaser, American writer wrote : "The principa.J Czechs and Slovaks associated with the Free Europe Committee and those employed by Radio Free Europe are not - as is commonly supposed - fi•g hters ag,a inst Communism. Quite on the contrary, they fellow-travele<l. with t•he Communists rfrom at least 1939 to 1948, helpe<l. t'hem to power, and even today follow a Communist-sponsored propaganda line. "These indivjduals belong to an or.ganlzation which has systematically be-trayed members of the democratic underground in CzechoSlovalda by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwald's secret police. "A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either Communist a.gents or have criminal records. '1Radio Free Europe's Czecho-Slovak program is helping Stalin �SLOVAKIA 75 by s,a,botaging internation-a l understand ing and promoting rivalry and hatred between European peoples. ' "Mr. Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectdcal materialis m, Dr. Zak and Dr. (Berger) Belak. Dr. Zak is the editor of •a n intellectual magazine called 'Tribuna' w-hich is forbidden in France and a no-llher called 'Reality' (Sk,utecnost) which is fofibidden in Switzerland. Unfortunately, I have not been able to peruse these journals as I do not read c zech, but I am told that their basic thesis is the need for the party m asses to submit to leadership by the elite cadre. Belak was formerly a Communist Party functionary in Slovalda under the n ame of Berger. He puts out a Germ an-language sheet called 'Militant Democracy' which few Germans read because it takes S<talin's anti-Ger,man line." I. who know this gentleman (Belak-Berger) persona1'ly, must confirm that Mr. Glaser's opinion is 100 percent right! The former membe.r of the Social Democratic party in 1Slov akia, Pavel Viboch, need not be dealt with as a party memlber , and the other three Slovaks mentioned are al,so not significant. Never receiving any mandate from the Slovruk nation, they represent colonialism in Central Europe at a time when oolonialism is. dying even in Africa. The best proof is the elections in 1946, when the Social Demo~ crats in Slovakia could not elect even one representaitive without Ozech help. It was an old Prague trick to transfeT unneeded votes from one district to another. As a rule, the Social Democratic ipanty has been a Czech origani·z ation only. To return to the history of this _p arty, however, one can say that its activities during the second World War are very revooling. The majority of the party ,p oliticians fled wiith Benes, or shoritly after, and served in his "c!libi. net.,in-exile." An e~ception was Ambassador Fierlinger, who remained in Moscow serving the Communists instead of Benes, according to Ripka and Benes himself. When it came to .the wol"st, Benes's "govennment-in-exile" reoolled him to London. Having the support of Moscow, however, Fierlinger refused to return, and Benes, in order .to keep his presidency, ha:d :to. ,g o to Moscow and take ordern from his personal enemy. These statements are proved by the cablegrams exchanged by the "government-in--exile" and Fierlinger, which were published in Fierlinger's hodk. In addition to Moscow's rs upport, Fierlinger also had help within the "government-in-exile." This was the left wing of 1 �76 SLOVAKIA the Social Democrats, wirth Lausman and Bechyne as leaders in London. This group, moreover, closely cooperated with other admirers of the Soviet Union in the Czech National Sodalist party, Rip_ka, Firt, and others. This party supporte'd several pro-Communistic organizations, where Rip'ka rused to be president and Josef Ko!'bel and Tig.rid Schonfeld were in leading ,positions, .pleadin,g for help for Stalin. In 1942 and 1943, Vlase:k and Majer organized the Commu:niisrt demonstrations that heiLpe<l to· force the second front against Churchill's will. We recall that Benes traveled to Moscow in 1943 against the wishes of Eden, Churchill, and other statesmen. There he approved the seill-out o<f Ruthenia and cleared the roa:d to Ozecho-SloV'akia for the Soviet Union. This he did without any regard for the will of the peoples of SlovaJki!a, Bohemia, Moravia and Ruthenia. Nay, even without the full consent of the "Provisional Czechosloviruk Government" in London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia, Moravia, and ,Ruthenia certainly had nothing to do with it. 1 I recaH the speeches of Octdber and November, 1943, in the chambers of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in London. They were made not only by the admirers of the Kremlin, but also by the so-called civil politicians who were blinded by Moscow. Among them were Lausman and Majer, Dr. Uhlir and Paul Macha.eek; all strongly approved the journey to Moscow and insisrted on going along with Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant the loss of asylum in England and the good wiU of the allies. Benes simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the "higher interests of our nations" demanded it. When Benes returned from his trip to Moscow, he brought the request to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a la!lge part of Poland to the Soviets. If any one should quesrtion ,t he truth of my statements, I am ready and willing at all times to produce the repo~ts of the "Czechoslovak Srtate Council,." the speeches Lausman and Uhlir, and even Benes's speech in its entirety after he returned fa-om Moscow. They tel11 us clearly why the Communist "putsch" of Februa:ry 1948 took place so �SLOVAKIA 77 smoothly. Repetition o.f these facts is important for understandmg the effective collaboration of the Social Democrats with the Communists after the ,second war. Showing their allegiance to the principle from 1928, "Never against the Soviet Union," tihe Social Demoorats without an exception pressed for the Benes-Stalin agree~ ment in 1943. Therefore, in the first post-war government, formed in Kosice in 1945, and the most communistic of all governments returning ho.me, they dominated. There was no Slovak representative - evidence that Social Democracy had praictically no influence in Slovakia. Besides Prime Minister Zdenek Fierlinger, there was Frantisek Nemec and the liaison officer between the Red Armv and Benes, General Niziborsky (known now as General Hasal), who is at present, I believe, a consultant in the Pentagon Other ministers in that government were the infamous spy, Bohumil Lausman, and a present leader in the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," Vaclav Majer. We know, that all except Fierlinger came unharimed into exile after February, 1948. Lausman, of course, after having accomplished his espionage in Radio Free Europe, returned to Pra:gue. Clearly Lausman has the lowest character among the contemporary •politicians, but he was a most trusted comrade of ,t he present so-called "anti-Communist" politicians in the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." They all were united in their pro-Communist activities, and their claim now to belong to this or that wing is no.t at all convincing. In 1946 the •s ame Vaclav Majer praised the top Communist in Czecho-Slovakia lavishly: "Gottwald's name will be forever connected not only with our fight for national liberation, but also with the struggle for social liberation as well as for new forms of life and work. . . . Gottwald, not only by his determination, but also by his understanding for the opinions of others, showed his great qualities as politician and man." Sudh were then the expressions of Vaola.JV Majer, an "anti-Communist" fighter of today. But Ma:jer is not alone in this. After working together for the Communists at home, the Social Democrats came to the United States and suddenly discovered that they, too, have fought Communism. Their present fabrica- �78 SLOVAKIA tions rubout their post-war aotivity, which the following facts disprove, are a deep offense to the witnesses of their activities back home. The first document signed by the ministers and the members of the Executive Committee of the Social Demo~ cratic Party iby which a smooth Communi!zation of thei,r homeland was assured, was their agreement of June 25, 1945, at once after returning to Praigue, to form the "National Front of the Working People." This agreement shows the serviI.fty of the wholle Social Democralti1c Party, not only of the leaders, because it was discussed and una~ nimously approved by aJll the ;party before being signed by the Executive Commiittee. This means tha,t all politicians of the $ociaJ Democratic Party, now posing as anti-Communists in exile, agreed to the bolshevi zation of CzechoSlovakta. Zenkl aind his National Socialists C'an at least attempt to excuse themsel,v es that they did not want to accept this ag,r eement lbut were forced to by the Social Democrats. But it is not a question of who forced wlhom; they all signed and pulblished this agreement and, what is woTse, they put it into effect. The most important parts of this agreement are the following: 1. While maintaining a politica:l and organizational independence, the three parties wil.l closely cooperate and follow a common policy in all matters of .p u!blio life. 2 . . The political iba;si,s o.f the National Front orf Working People is the government program, unanimously a:g-re.ed upon in conference in MoS<:ow and unanimously accepted by the government in Kosice on April 5, 1945. Through this agreemenit, also a Central Coordinating Committee is being created with an equal numlber of representatives from all participating iparties, and also a United Alliance of Trade Organizations, based on voluntary membership, wJll be formed. F'urther wili be formed a Non-.Political Alliance of Czech Farmers and a United Organization of Czech Youth; both of these organizations shaH be supported ,by all parties. This publicly dedared aigreement was signed for the Social Democrats by Zdenek Fierlinger; for the Commun1 �SLOVAKIA 79 ists by Klement Gottwald, and for the National Socialist Party by Peter Zenkl. It is both very int.eresting and quit,e significant that not a single Slovak att.ended that meeting and that among those who· called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka, and other leaders of Dr. Benes's old Czech National Socilalist Party - the very same people who today are telling the American public and the world that they always hated the Reds and that the Reds "ousted" them from Government. But the truth is something else a;gatin. The fact is that both Zenlcl and Ripika welcomed the Communists, sought their favor, and wanted to win politicrul prestige with the help of the Reds at the exipense of the other political parties. Of course, today we know that they failed. The same thing happened to them ,that had happened and 1s still happening to an tho.se who try to, collruborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are worth and then swallo;w them up or get rid of them. The "National Front of the' Working People" created a "Central Coordinating Committee," in which e'very affiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This committee had the task of coordinating the work of the socialist parties. The sooiwlfst bloc prepared the ground for the various activities which led to the suppression of political and religious fireedom - the first st~s taken toward a socialist dictatorship. The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the Agrarian Party would be suppressed, the Catholic IDaigle organization outiawed, and that Catholic youth, as such, would not be allowed to orgamize. Together t@y wo,r ked out a plan whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would be done away with and, at the same time, how these votes, together with the Communist-contro lled ..peasant unions, , would he brought into the Communist P,a,rty. They also created and later legalized the Communist trade organizations, then the non-political Fedeiration of Farmers and the United Youth Or,g,anization - all of which were SU!ppo.s ed to be fornned by the joint participation of all parties, but �80 SLOVAKlA actually served onlly to communize Ozecho-iSlovakia from the instant they began to function. Therefore, it is not true that Zenlkl, Rtpka, Vilem, Majer, and other Czech Sooial DemocraJts opposed Com~ munist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is that from the moment they accepted the so--called "Kosice Agreement ," they were aJlways subordinat ed to and in the train of .t he Communis t Party and willingly continued tha,t way not only on Russian soil, or in Russian-·occuipied Kosice, but a1so in "Jiberated" Pr'cllgue. The "Joint Declaration " to the nation on June 28, 194'5, is indisputalble proof of the fact that they wanted to get into governmen t with the help of the Oommunist s, even at the roopense of democracy, Christ'ianit y, and freedom. This is the sound lesson for all who would col'la!borate with Oommunist s. All such ,p eople are digging their own graves, because Communism recogn.i'zes no agreements , concessions, or compromis es, and swallows wp all who collaborate with it. A Czech Catholic editor, A. J. Jandacek, commented on major effects of this agreement in this manner: "The aims of the socialist bloc were many: "1. First of all not to allow workers to organiz.e in Catholic trade unions, and so far as they are alread,y organized in them, through a mass effort .to storm them into the socialist bloc by maintaining that Oatholic organizations wm anyhow be in the mi· nority an d that, therefore, it is better to go together. "2. Not to ,a llow an independent unification of Catholic farmers. The party of farm people wi ll not be allowed to exist at all, and as far as the Catholics have their Catholic farmers organized, the Communists will divide them among themselves. "3. A United Organization of Czech Youth will be formed and, thus, the Cat·holic you1Jh wJll not have an opportunity to organize on a Oatholic platform, eitilier politiooJly or religiously. Simply, ,a ll youth will be forced to go into the state-formed and socialist-led organization. Thus, organizing an "Alliance of Catholi c Youtll" or ,a "Czechoslovak Orel" will be .impossible. A daily and weekJ.y have already been published for this so-called united youth organization and are led by the Commundsts. "In view of these three aims, it is possible to call the establishing and maintaining of t!he socialist bloc an intention-al act against political and religious freedom and the establishmen t of a socialist dictatorship." Although I am not a Catholic and never was a member �SLOVAKIA 81 of any clerical party, I am ready to sign this analysis by the editor Jandaceik. Whereais, Ze:rukl and his party, in December, 11947, begain not to abide by the 1946 agreement, the Social Democrats kept it even after the Oommunist "putsch" in Februa:ry, 1948. Professor Macek, for instance, accepted lead~ ing positions in o,rganizations which bolsheviized the University, and as president of the Aotion Committee of the University he expelled those students who had participated in demO'Il!Strations against the Communists in February. Furthermore, for a long time he helped the Constitutional Oommittee of Ozecho-Slovakia:n P.arliam.ent and its chairman, Dr. Procha:zka, a leading Communist. As a matte~ of fact, the whole section on Economics in the Communist constitution is his work. Both as an expert and as a member of the :Sociail Demo:cra,tic Party, he supported the Communist bi1ls; a;ctua:1ly, rhe was the right hrui.d of Dr. Procha:zka, the most Communist jurist in Czecho-Slovakia and chairman of the Constitutional Committee. To us it is not surprising that Macek led in the persecution of democratic students after the Communist putsch, since he had earlier been well known as a fervent exponent of Marx at the tUrnversity of Brno, where he was professor of National Eoonomics. The surprise is that he is now a university professor in the United States. Professor Maicek, during the yearn 1929...1939, was a member of Parliament for the Social Democratic Party. Simultaneously, he edited a left-orientated monthly called "Our Times" which was sponso,r ed by Presidents Masaryk and Benes. He published numerous books, a base of which was, repeatedly, the teachings of Marx. In these books Professor Maicek defended the theories orf Marx very emphatica!lly and wanted to introduce them into our social and economic life, evein as early as 1930-1938. He wanted to sociailize everything. His aim was identical to that of the Communi,s ts. They wanted to put it into practice after 194'5. Origtlnafly, Professor Macek migrated to Canada and lived on the fann of a certain Mr. Karel Buzek,. where he wrote artides for the Ozech newspapers in Canada. In his articles he rejeoted and condemned the very same ideas he �82 SLOVAKIA was not so long ago an apostle of and a very able and thorough propagator. From Canada he came to the United States and at the present time he is active as a professor at some university m Pennsylvania. iB. Vilem, as Genera'} Secretary of the Ozech Social Democratic Party, was more a personal "whip" for Fierliniger than a "whip" for the ,party. While I was a member of the Agricultural Committee, we succeeded sometimes in winning over .t he chairman of the committee, who was a Social Democrat, against the Communist proposa!ls. Vilem, however, before the voting day, and often at midnight, cal'led the members of 'his party and dictated: "Fierlinger lets you know that the party cannot stand for your proposals; you have to vote with the Communist Party." One of these Social Democrats that was forced by Vi1em to vote with the Communists is in exile ; several committee memlbers from the other parties who lost ,w ith me because of Vil.em's actions are now in the "Council of Free Ozechosloviaikia," but they wil'l never forget those defeats (Sliva, Torn, and other.s). Wathout this servility to the Communists, Gottwald would never have gained the majority he had. The saddest chapter of the Social Democrati'C Party, however, was written by its memiber who was the Minister of Industry, Bohumil Dausman. He served the at!reernent of June 25, 1945, so faithfully that he went out to disintegrate even the exile and worked for three years as a spy, after being employed by Radio Free Europe with the help of the Social Democrats and other memlbers of the "Council of Free Czechoslo;vakia," particularly Ripka and his group. The case of Lausman's treason was not yet completely closed when new espionage process was started against further exiponent of Prague government and close collaborator of Dr. Hubert Riipka. Hardly had a French .court sentenced Kubala on a charge of espionage for Communist OzechoSlovakia before the Prague radio reacted in this case and the spea,keir, himself a collaJborator of Mr. Ferdinand Peroutka and a former employee of Radio Free EuTope, used the most despiooble language against the West. Slovak newspapers unanimousily reported - unfOTtunaitely without desirable �SLOVAKIA 83 results on the aictions orf Radio F.ree Europe - that Lausman would be followed by the others. The newspapers asked for effect1ve preventive measures in Radio Free Europe rugainst subversive elements but nothing was done. Many very dubious elements are sitting in Radio F,r ee Europe and are paid by the Amerilcan citizens. In the warning concerning espionage, we have not only staJted several times that there are Marxists ood Oommunists in "Czechoslovak" organizations, but we also said openly that they were, and silll are espionage agents of the Prague government. The Prague broadcasts have confirmed our allegation. On the same ibroadlca;st where, some time a;go, Laus-· man broadcast in Prague, now spoke Bruno Folta, who was working as an employee of Radio Free Europe under the protection of Dr. M. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko. He minutely copied the style of Lausrnan, H~ confessed that originally he betrayed the Communist government in Prague and filed to the West, requesting political asylum. Here in the West, in Radio Free Europe Folta came to the conclusion that the western world was rotten and readily seized the chance to return home and accept what was offered to him in the inteliligence service conducted by the Czech General Moravec. He repented like Lausman and, hruving the desire to make some reparations, he put himself at the disposal of the "people's Democracy" against the West. He went on to threaten that he would use all the knowledge which he ooquired as an employee of Radio Free Europe. Our reports from Munich and behind the Iron Ourtain explain the Folta case as foHo:ws: Like Lausman, he was sent by the Prague government for espionage purposes and to esta:blish the contacts. When he succeeded and gathered enough material and collaborators, especially in Munich and Paris, he simply ,r eturned to Prague as a highly appreciruted a;gent, in order to accUJSe the anti-Communist citizens at home. of whose attitude he learned while abroad. What is Folita telling the peoples of Czecho~Slova;kia? The Vienna newspapers published long articles explaining how Foll.ta, this confident servant of Mr. Peroutka and Dr. Mudry, was blaming Radio Free Europe and the Western World and praising everything he found after his return to �84 SLOVAK.IA Brague: •~Prague has everything good and new, all the new technical inventions, and everything in plenty. Meantime, in the Weslt, o:nlly the capitalist dwpes have all the goods in their possession and the common people are starving." Thrut is the picture cxf the West presented by Folt'a, who coJ:lected American doJlars from RJFE. When will Washington be conV'inced? The case of Folta is certainly a cha,pter of shameful history, but we feair that even this fact will not be strong enough to convince the F1ree Europe Committee or the Department of State in W8!Shi:nigton. We repeat that such exile orga.n±zations, which are SUipported at the ex;pense of genuine demo-cratic and anti-Communist organizations, wre nuisances and wreckers of all the actiOIIlS of the Western. WorJd in the cold war. In the "Ozechoslovak" orgarazations there have been, since the start, members who were sent West by the Prague go,v ernment only for tlhe purpose of serving the Communists. On the roster of "Czechoslovak" organizations in exile you wilil find many persons who were elected to office on the Oommunist baHot, ,p oliticians who mostly helped the Communists not only to gain control of CzechoSlova!kia, but also the whole Danube valley. The same persons, who with Benes in 1939, in London, were in touch with SDalin's ambrussa.dor, agreed on the invasion of U.iS.IS.IR. south of the Carpathian Mountains. To the Americans in Washington and the Einglishmen in London, they disiplayed an rug·r eement concerning the integrity of the Czecho-Slavaik State while knowing the deficiencies of this treaty. They .co!~JIBitted the same crime as did Lausman and Bruno, Folta. These people simply betrayed the Allies. But beyond that are their protectors, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" and its leading representatives Zenkl, Lettrich, IPerou'bka, Mudry and others - iess guilty of betrayal? They 1let Lausma.n into R1adio :ffiree Europe and allowed him to• broadcast for American money. On the payroll they kept Folta, R1.12icka, and others as well; and they still do that and help to betray America. There is no excuse for them, or is there? Parrticipants in a crime are as punishable as the crim1 �SLOVAKIA 86 inal. J>a:rtici:pan.ts in this betriayal can not excuse themselves on the grounds that they did not know anything about suoh action. Several times suspicious caJSes were brought to their notice but they did not pay any ,a ttention to these warnings. What should we say to this criminal negligence on the .part of responsible pemonaHties :in Radio Free Europe Oir in the "Council of ~ree OzechoslovaJda ?" There they are unanimous: Zenkl, Cerny, Osuis'ky -- all plead for the innocence of Peroutka. The continuous scandaJls should waike up the security officials of the Western Powers. Until now only the Germans in Munich asked fo-r a c1erun-1.l'p of Marxists and other elements hostile to democracy in the whole territory of the German Federal Republfo. They aimed at "Czechoslovak" organizations which aire infiltrated with highly suspicious elements. Let us apply our knowledge whi'1e there is still time. Many think that only in Germany are such cases possible. but that is not true. The same oases, even more paradoxi~ cal, we find in Washington where the Czech officers are working. They distinguished themselves in the sell~,ut of Carpathian Ruthenia to the Soviets, or kept in the service of American Intelligence the sister-in-ilaw of a welL known Communist in the old country. Why should we be shocked that in rPairis the Communists received confiden• tial materia'l? Even in Washington security mea5UJres are neglected. We know the persons at wol'k in W81Shington and we will not be surpri,s ed if the Lausman affair breaks out a,gain despite our warning. Those who wHl be suT1prised will be Americans. Let us take lessons from Parts. Since Lausman's return to Prague, the whole CzechoSlovak exile, in its confusion, has been producing deceptions and charges of for.gery. When Mr. Osusky of the "Council of F'lree Ozechoslovakia" does not succeed in his enterprises, .o r the situation changes after his proclamations hawe been pulblished, he simply proclaims them unauthentic or falsified, o:r he simply a&:!rilbes them to Lausman. 'Sometimes the matter is trivial, as it was in the proclamation concerning the is udeten G€Tmans which was allegedly signed by Osusky. There he stressed the necessity �86 SLOVAKIA that the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans are reconciled and charged that Ripka and Zenk! were unsuitalble because of their collaJboration with the Communists. The subj~ct was given great publicity by Josten (a former official of the Foreign Ministry and now editor of "Czechoslovak" in LondO'Il) and his Marxist cell in London, w:hiich always tries to please Prague. In this matter, Osusky probably figured that a dea!l with the ,Sudeten GeI'IDans could per., haps be of he1p to him if he should have trouble in the Council with Ripka and Zenk!. But here chance helped him. R:iipka had difficulties in the United States because of his colla;boration with the Communists and therefore planned to return to his socialist friends in Europe. For this reason he, as weU as Zenkl, did not fight for leading positions .i n the Counchl - a fact that allowed the November reconciliation of the Council. Osusky does not need the Sudeten Germany any longer, whereas for Zenk! and Ripka the Sudeten German question will be a ,problem. So Osusky denied his Sudeten German proclamation and charged tha;t its publfoation in the "Czechoslovak" was a fOTgery . Simila.rly, "Nase Cesta," a Marxist paper printed in the Czech language ,in Vienna, published a who[e issue of articles written by several memibers of the "Council of Free Czechoslovak ia.'' Arfter Osusik y and Zen kl were reconciled and the articles did not fit into the changed opinion of the Council, the editor procilaimed the whole earlier issue a for,g ery. Thus, suddenly we are told that the ,articles were not writt® by the members oif the Council, and that the who'le issue was forged with the purpose of s,plitting the "Czechoslova k" exile. Lt is interesting to see whose names first a;ppea.r as authors o,f the disputed rurticles: Dr. Taiborsky, Benes's secretary; Jan Zak, Slovak socialist and confidant of MaTxists and "Ozechosloivaks" ; Jozef Dieska, member of the Council, etc. I can only dismiss the editor's charge that the whole issue originated with Lau:sman as ridiculous and highly impossible. In the newspruper "Novy Domov," published in Canada, another member of the Council, Fras'tacky, attacked Colonel M~ksohe, who does not go along with the "Ozeichoslova!ks" �f?LOV,AKIA 87 in the Council. (Oolon~l Miksche, a Czecho-Slovak military attache in Pa.r-is, resigned in December, 1947, in protest to the policy of the present members of the Council then in Praigue.) When Colonel Miiksche threatened to sue him, Frastaoky quiokly denied writing the article and declared it a forgery. Certainiy this comedy cannot be cailled anything but ridiculous; fortunately, it did not harm Colonel Miksche. It is regrettruble, however, that the exile "Czechoslovak" press sees in these and other incidents the intervention of Genera:! Molotka of P,r ague, whose assignment, with Lausman, is to influence and distunb the exik It does not at all seem to me that these .incidents, are of Lausman's making, for he would think of different methods among the members of the Ooll!Ilcil. In the Council he feels at home, after spending three years in its midst and working with Council members in Radio Free Europe. There he does not need any mediators and can at any time directly interfere. Using Lausman's name, however, provides Osusky and others wJth a handy scapegoat for the.i~ own failures and a!bandoned projects. SimHarly, the "CzechosloV'ak" exile press is not unanimous and constant in its aocount of the Council's November compromise and in its list of representatives. Sometimes it leaves out Dr. Cerny',s name, and other times it puts it in, depending on whom it serves . .Professor Hlavaty is referred to as a neutraJl sometimes, and at other times as ·a former socialist representative in the temporary National Assembly in Prrugue. Moreover, the "Czechoslovak" exile even today is hel:ping and promoting the accessories of spies as did some other memlbers of the Courrcil while they were ambassadors in the United States and elsewhere. This is the way the "Czechoslovak" organizations operate while the socialist parties in the West do not realize their dange,r . So, for ex-· ample Zdenka Schonova, in :Eingland one of the leading Czech Social Democrats, is supported today by the "Czech Trust Fund," even though her collaboration with the convicted spy, Peter Arton, was proved. It is evident that the persons from the Council do not distinguish between a 1 �88 SLOVAKIA Czech patriot and a Czech spy. For them everyone is first of aH Czech, from Benes down to Lausman, and in this belief they .not only help the spies and pay them, but also pay for their protection and defense It is also well known that Colonel Koenig, who is a leader orf the reporting division of the "Council of Free Ozechos!ovaktla" and also working for the West, still employs the same Hungarian Communis t as his secret,a ry, his sister-in-ilaw, Klara Fedak. Fedfuk is in New York without letting the U. S. authorities know that she is a Oommunist. Her former "1b oy friend" is now chief of the espionage office in Bratislava; yet the persons from the "Co,u ncii of Free Ozechoslov aikia" do not find it difficult to affirm to the West the ,reliaJbiliity of these Communist s. Koonig's group is also responsible for the murder of a Slovak un., dergrmLnd leader and patriot, Pavol Harusiak, and others from Bratislava, whose bordeT-cro ssing they betrayed to the Communis t police. Ifurusiak was my friend, an'd I kn.ow that a member of Koenig's group, iDr. Patek, gained access to him only through representin g himself as from me. When the "Czechosio. vak" exile has such help and affiliations, how lO'Ilg must O'Ile state that this "Czechoslo vak" group is not reliable? It is seen to be a very dangerous group when we realize that it hrus, accomplice s in the un. derground who were given money and introd1..1JCtions by Zenkl and Ripka, as the spy Bohumil Cerny and his accompJices were. This situation is also true orf the "C'zechoslova!k" section of R:adio Flree Europe in Munich, where there is always someone who helps such men as La.usma,,n and Folta, or other ex-Commu nists and .future re-immigrants to Red Prague. Bures, who brought Folta to Radio Free Europe, was dismissed, but his friends - Kvetko, Mudry, and Peroutka - are still in leading positions. If Radio Free Europe and the Voice of Ame11ica would try to lbrea:k the reputation. oif this "Czechoslo vak"' army with truth and with real anti-Comm unist speakers who ha,ve a good reputation and an anti...Communist record at home, it could be done. Not, however, with the present group. What is broadcast and written now - for American money - helps the Oommunis ts more than it harms them. �SLOVAKIA 89 These org,a nizations which are supposed to wage psy. chological warfaire against Communism behind the !iron Curtain do just the opposite - as far as Czecho-Slovakia is concerned. Too often they he:lp spies and broadcast material which does not harm the Communists, but rather amuses them. Sending pigeons and balloons across the Iron Curtain maikes people there laugh or curse, because the police always get some of those who pick up the leaf~ lets. When aJlmost every month someone returns to Pra•g ue and te1'ls of the low moral tone, the scandals, and suicides in the "Czechoslovak" section of Radio Tuee Europe in Munich, the Communists give this excellent publicity. No wonder that Radio· Free Europe does not have any respect there! IDven when Radio Free Euroipe, or the Voice of America, gains some SlovaJk renegade, these organizations are not made 1:.iherelby eiffecti:ve, nor are their names re~ stored at home behind the Iron Curtain. People theTe ceased to believe them loog ago, and after the Lausman and Folta affairs they only curse them. Folta, Ru!zicka, and Bures worked in Radio Free Europe; they were the proteges of those Siova.k employees in Radio Free Europe - Dr. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko - who are supposed to represent the r eal Slovak anti-Communist cause. And yet nothing happened to Mu.dry or Kvetko, much less to Peroutka, because they brought Bures and Ruzicka and Folta to RF'E, nor because they paid their comrade Lausmrun, who is also back in Prague. The new chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on In. vesitigations, Senator McCleUan, who is a capable lawyer to whom the security of the United States is of paramount internst is, we hear, curious about many things. We hope, therefore, thlat this suibcommittee will succeed in this mat~ ter also and that the organizations in question will be cleansed of the ,present "Czecho,slovaJk" group. iLausman was so aggressive that during the second World War, after his return from Moscow to London, he succeeded in the State Council in speeding up Benes's trip to Moscow. Further, as he admits in his book, published in Vienna, he forced Benes to na,tionalize aH private industry by presidential decree before the Pro,v isional National As- �90 SLOVAKIA sembly convened in October, 194'5. He also :points out in his book that, whereas he admits his actions, the associates who agireed with hiim on aU the issues of col1aboration now are renouncing him only in order to be accept., able to Washington. In this way, Lausman has unmasked the Sodal Democrats who in exile pre.tend to fight Communism, but actually are responsi!ble for the :f act that Russian territory extends for the first time in history west of the Carpathians into the Danube basJn. In this bolshevik expansion it was two Social Democrats who represented Benes and the whoJ.e state leadership: Flrantisek Nemec and Generail Ni:ziborsky - Hasal. Both went to Moscow from London in 1944 and then fol., lowed the Red Army into Ozecho-1Slovaiki,a to take over the liberated territory :from the Red Army in accordance with the Benes-lSta:li,n treaty. They did it so successfully with the he1p of Fierlinger in Moscow that in three months they gave Stalin the eastern part of Czecho-1Slovaikia, the whole of Ruthenia. Russia ,o ffered to the Slovaks, through the Communists Dr. Husak and Novomesky, an independent ,Slovak State, provided that it would be another Soviet republic. When Husak and Novomesky made the proposal to the Slov,a ks, to Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of S'lovakia and the Slow.1Jk Government, the Slovaks, however, refused the •bolshevi~atio!Il of their country. Nemec was not given a cordial re:ception ~n Ruthenia at all. The in'haibitants everywh&e were signing petitions, sponsored by the Communist Petruscak, which started that the Ruthenians no longer existed and that there were only Sub-Carpathi an Ukrainians in Ruthenia who yearned to be embrruced by their greait mother, Ukrainia. After many long squabbles, Nemec fina:lly got a message through to Benes in London through General Pika. The telegrams that Benes sent through F1ierlinger were never seen by Nemec, ,b ecause Fierlinger already then was Stalin's envoy and never a paitTiotic cii.ti,z en of his own State. It is significant, therefore, that despite these experiences thi,s same traitor, Fierling&, was named, several months later, as the premier by Benes. Nemec was in a very trying position. When he wanted �SLOVAKIA 91 to be connected with London, he had to ask for permission to do so from the Chief of the Russi,an ISJtafif so that he could travel to Moscow, where with the heilp of the vad.io conneotion of General Biika, who was the Chief of the Mtilitary Mission, Nemec could tell Benes how matters were going and koop him informed on Fierlinger. The latter was doing right well. He still is a minister in the Prague Gov~ ernment, but Genera,1 Bika was killed by the Commund.sts. At that time the Communists had asked the Slovak non-Communists whether it would not he more profitable to support tJhe idea of a Slovak Soviet Republic so that the Slovaks could go,vern their own territory rather than adhere to the "Czecho-slova;k" ideology which denied the existence of the Slovak nation. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Reipulblk could be promoted without diff,iculty, because the Slovak State still existed. Husak and Novomesky, however, did not get anywhere with their proposal. The Slova,k non-Commumsrts turned it down, declaring that it was contrary to the Christmas Agreement of December, 1943, as well as the agreement which Ursiny concluded -w ith Dr. Benes in Octolber, 1944, when he acted iJ?- the name of thie SloViak National Council. When Husak and N01Vomesky failed to promote the idea of a Slovruk Soviet Repwblic in London, they imrmediiately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakia to present the ,p rop·a sal to President Joseph Tiso and the Slovruk Govemment. But Tiso· and the Slovak Government would not hear rubout it. Husak and N ovomesky failed in thek mission. Several months later, with mMly Slova;ks in emigration, Clemenitis took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today an the leading Reds of Slavrukia are paying dearly for failing in theiT mission. Clementis paJid with his life. Ruthenia was loot. Benes's delegation had to go to Trebisov ·a nd after that things went rather smoothly. ~erliillger ma:de the propositions and Benes aocepted them. When he was returning from Moscow in March, 1945, Benes could no longer enter Ruthenia. In fact he renounced it solemnly on severai occasions. FinaMy, Benes had an agreement prepared which Fierlinger signed for the Czecho1 �92 SLOVAKIA SlovaJk Government with great solemnity in the Kremlin on June 29, 1945. No one outside the CommU'Ilists agreed with this act of Benes. No law, however, could contain or restrain Benes. He acted dictatori.ally at any time that it benefited him. On August 24, 1945, without even corum1tling the Parliament, Benes issued his presidential decree No. 4, concluding the pa:ct between the U .S.S.<R. and the C.S.R. This decree was the basis for assigning new borders to Slovakia in the East. In Octoher, 1946, everything "legalized" on the ,b asis orf foregoing decrees was published in the Col~ lection of Laws and Regulations. T.he text orf the rubove-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as significant. It begins with the words: ". . . being certain that the provisional National Assembly of the Orecho-1Slovaik Republic shal[ concur with this ag.reement . . . " Benes did not wait. He and John Masaryk and VI-ado Clementis decided matters without Pa.rlia,ment. As good prophets, they knew tha't Parliament would certainly approve this ag,r eement ! Since Ruthenia was not a very big bite, Benes did not stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2, 1945, he issued decree No. 8, whereby a numbeir of homes in the most beautiful seo'tion of BUJbenec - in the modern section of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, the greaJt s•a crifices the nations of the U .IS.S.R. had made on the altar of liberation of humanity. WeM, it is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great extent did l,iibera-te SlwaJcia from a gre,aJt many things the Slovaks could use themselves, but it certamly was not ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them without evsen consulting the nation about it. Only dictators act like that. And Benes was a dictator by the grace of MoS<!ow, even id: only a temporary one. 'Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later Benes showed his aP!)Teoiation to the so-called "iLiberator" of Prague, M<rurshaJ Konev, by giving him several very •b eautiful vi1las which were oonfiscated from the 1g ood citi- �SLOVAKIA 93 zens .o f Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiflrl view of Prague. All these decTees we re signed by General Hasal-Nizborsky, who was at that time Minister of Thansportation, and •by Vaclav iMajer, who was also a member of Benes's caJbinet. The servility to Stalin and Go'titwald, and the boundless adulation iby HasaJl..,Niziborsky a,nd Frantiseik Nemec would be best illustrated if we pu!blished the congratulatory telegrams sent by them to their idols. I mtend to publish all these facts in a book, but they hawe already !been quoted by Fierlinger and Lausman in their books. Later, many Communists who fell out of favor tried to rescue their political careers in exile with the help of membership cards in the Social Democratic Party. Those Communists, rulmost without exception, we find in Radio Free Europe - (Graf, Berger-!Belak, and Ti.grid Schonfeld), or (Josef Konbel, the with other American institutions Communist amlbas:sador from Prague to Tito in Belgrade, now a member of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" and a uni,versity professor ,i n the United Staltes). Regarding Tigrid Schonfeld, it is only necessary to note what has been written albout him here in the United States. As it is quite a lo't, I only quote some parts of a more serious character: "Tigrid is a former m emb er of the C2:ech Communist Party. According to tJhe newspaper Christ und Welt (Stuttgart, October 16, 1952), •his political ac tivjty began in 1932 when he published the illegal Communist paper Hal lo Noviny, w,hich specialhr.ed in subversion of morale in the Czecho slovak Army. " He was also a contri butor to the Co mmunist magazine Leva Kultura (Left Culture). Dur:ing Wo r ld W ar II he w as a member of the Communfot-domiuated Czechoslovak staff of t'he British Broadcasting Company, where one of his colleagues and iruti mate friend w.as Colonel Otto BlheJer, the Czech mi.Jitary attache whom the United States Government declared persona non grata in 1949 for es pionage activities." I hope this short excerpt will be enough to show what pro-Communist elements were picked 1by the U. S. Ad-· ministration and by the Firee Europe Commitltee for importa,nt pos,itions. These quotations will also prove tha,t SUJCh people cannot be expected to be trusted 'back a,t home by �94 SLOVAK.IA the Nation as anti-Communist fighters and thaJt the whole expensive propa,gand'a program is practicrully useless and ineffective. About the others aJbove, I must confess the same opinion as to character. The deeds of these men, however, I am intentionally separating from the actions of the leaders of the Czec'h Social Democratic Prurty. I am presenting the Communist co1la:"boration of only those Social Democ~ats who represent the party in exile and who :firom 1945 until they went in to exiile were also of some importance back home. I am leaving aside those persons who are now abusing the sympath4es of the Labor Party in London, because they wd not amount to much back home, being only opporlll!Il.ists and regularly havmg two memib ership cards, one of the Communist and the other of the Social Democratic Party. But these also oannot claim that they opposed the agreement of June 25, 1945; everyone conisenited to it and carried it out in h:is capacity. It is no wonder that :b y 1946 their policy of complete conformance with the Communists had negated the party as opposi,t ion. Simifarly now the party is destroying itself in an attempt to gain strength by accepting and proteotin.g even men who were strong Communrists, like Milos Vanek and Tigrid Schonfeld, or men who possessed membership cards of several Marxist parities, like M8!cek, Kwbel, and others. Furthermore, an affidav1t of anti-Communism signed by the Social Demoorat le·aders is ridiculous, indeed, beca use the party's claim to anti--Communism is itself destroyed by the evidence of its history. During the February, 1948 c,r isis, the Social Democratic Party tried to look neutral, but the fact ilid everything to help t'he COIIllmunists succeed. Hol!cling to the agreement of J.une, 1945, the party as a unit gave its support to the Commumsts and so broke the political equilibrium in favor of the Oorrum.1~sts. Even if it is not pos• sible to .state that without the help of the Sociail. Democrats, Gottwald would not have succeeded in the "putsch" of February, 1948, nevertheless it remains a great guilt against the Sooial Democrats that in the time when it was �SLOVAKIA 95 clear to everyone what tJhe Communists were doing, the Czech Social Democrats stood by them and did not help the opposition. This attitude of the Czech Social Democrats is not very well known and evaluated in the United States; if it were, not one of them could pose in Washington as anti-Communists. And their protector, Steinhardt, U. S. am:bassador to, •Prague in 1948, and former Secretary · of State Acheson could not have secured for them influential positions in the United States on the U. S. payroll. It is worthwhile to note that up to 19-38 the Czech Sociall. Democrats cooperated strongly with the Sudeten German Sociail. Democrats in Ozecho-Slovakia. When the German Social Democrats got into trouble with the N a:llis and were persecuted, there was no Czech Social Democrait to help his coHeague in the Sudetenland; they were betrayed. Later the expulsion. decrees bore the signature of aH the Czech Social Democrat ministers, who had no social or human feeling. It will forever remain -a shame against the Czech Social Democrats that they let their coUe,agues from the German Social Democratic Party be so persecuted, robbed, expelled, and even JnUrdered. They ail.so had a similar attitude towards the Slovaks in their domestic .p olky and always helped Prague centralism and imperia•1ism. Furtherimore, they helped to destroy the Slov:ak Democratic Party ,b y dema.ndiing in the fall of 1947 the .p osition of one commissioner. Thiis commissioner, working hand-in-hand with bloody Ferjencik, then commissioner of police but now in the United States, iru::reased the public terror and forced the courts to serve the police. The Social Democrats in the government of Slovakia held to ,t he agreement from June 25, 1945, until they had performed their jobs in 1945 and then were kioked out when no longer needed by the Communists. Looking over the record of the Czech SociaJl Democratic Party, their willing coUaiboration with Communists and their fierce figiht against every anti-Communist, one cannot understand their presel!t a;lilbi thait they acted only under Russian pressure. One incident epitomizes this contradiction. On the sixtieth anniversary of Karl Marx's death, Mareh 14, 1943, they were living in London. On that day the Czech �96 SLOVAKIA Socia:l Democrats and the Communislts made a piJ.grimage to Mairx's torn!b in an English ·c emetery. At this tomlb, in free England, the present representative of the "Council of Free Ozechosl'Ovakia" in Washington, then Benes's mmiister and member oif his State Council, Vaclav Miajer, delivered a speech in the name of t!he Social Democraits in which he said: "WE BELIEVE WITH MARX THAT SOCIALISM 1,s THE WAY TOWARD INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, TOWARD EVERLASTING PEACE, AND THE WELFARE OF NATIONS . TO•DAY HERE WE ARE, A SMALL GROUP OF SOCIALIST EMIGRANTS FROM CZECHO-SLOVAKIA . BUT THE TIME WILL COME WHEN MARX'S TO,MB WILL BE THE SHRINE OF MANKIND LIBERATED FROM THE BLIND IMPRISONMENT O,F DEAD SOCIAL DOCTRINES." 1M inister -Majer's speech was published on March 19, 1'943, in Benes's officiail newspaper in London, the "Czechoslovak," whikh was financed by Jan Masaryk and Hulbert Ri,pka. In conclusion, I say that the basis of the Communist victory in Czecho-iSiovrukia was 1Jhe agreement of June 25, 1945, which was cauied out with the help of the current members of the "Council of Free Czechoslov;rukia." Their present pose as anti-Communists is undemtandable, of course, because by continumg to deceive Americans is now their only means of survival. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Himself a Slovak, though from Moravia, he had to provide a future for the two million Slovaks, who were even less a!ble to stand alone than the Ozechs. Masaryk revived the radical idea of 1848 and proposed to create a single 'Czechoslovak' nation by will-power. Masaryk knew little of the Slovaks; others !knew even less. This was hi's strength in dealing wi,tll the allied leaders; it could not solve the Slovak prdblem. The few conscious Slovak politicians aspired only to cll!ltural autonomy within Hungary; living in the shadow of Magyar arrogance, they could not imagine the dis8ippearance of the Hungarian frontier." - (A. J. P. Taylor, 'NIE HABSBURG MONARCHY, London, 1948; p . 240). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAK.IA 72 The Czecho-Slovak Exile CZECH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND RED ESPIONAGE Dr. Mi chael Zibrin July of l91J5 found the "Council of Free Ozechoslovaki:a" just as July of J.ast year left it; without eleded of~ fi.cials, without elected representatives. This is because the CoUIIld, during the 20-month period of its re-organi-. zation, could not reach !any agreement and is operating on a rotation system, i.e., eacth month ,a reipresentati:ve of a diifferent political iparty se:rves as its executive head. This proves what we had said b,e fore: the Council is a coillglomerate of people of quite different bmnds and that Lettrich' s exdamation two years ago - "Gentlemen, I think only dollars keep us here together" - was and is still true. The present chaos in the Council is caused partly by the fact that political partie.s are coming to prevail more than personalities, and the Councril -resembJ.es more and more an enlarged National Front. The purpose of .t his article is to revie;w the past policies and deeds of that part.yin the CoU!Ilcil which did most to communize the o~ooho-1Slov•8Jk Republic and prepare an easy Communist take-over in 1948. ,Such a review is necessitated by the shocking pulblic deception that hias gained influentiral positions for the exile members of th±s ,p arty. Reformed Communists and coUaiboratom can perform valuable functions, but in men who deny their Olbvfous politic,al actions there can be no question of reform. The most flagrant a,id to Communism was given by the Czecho-iSlovak Social ·D emocratic party. In exile today, the leaders of this panty are men who, by their open colfa,boration wit:h Stalin, p~ayed the most important ,part in the bolsheviz;ation o,f Czecho-Slova>k,i1a. These men have always Etood very close to the Communists, even during small political skirmishes like those occasion.any now among Zenkl, Ripka, and Peroutka. Particularly after the Stalin-Benes pact of 1943, they were the most efficient signers and executors of Benes':s bloody decrees, not reaHzing that, once they had finished their jdbs for the Communists, the fate Sl.JOVAKIA 73 they had prepared for others wo'Ulld become their own. History shows that aliready in 1928 the Soc,i al Demo. cr:ats formulated their program thus: "Today as also in the past we are decided to protect the Soviet Union against any inimical action of the capitalistic governments and against any counter-revolutionary attack." Nine years earlier this belief had been realized in action. When Polish General Pilsudski was fighting a bloody (battle with the Communist ar-my near Wairsaw in 1920, the socialistic ma-· jority in Prague forbade the transportation of military material t.lirnugh ,Ozocho-1Slo,v0Jkia, despite the fact that lhis material was sent by France and a French military mi,s sion was at that time already in Prague. A yea,r earlier, when General Stefanik telegraiphed a wairning to Prague against Bolshevism as the greatest plague o!I' mankind a:nd asked for uruty in tihe f.ight to destroy it, it was this same Social Democratic Party whiclh - wit:h Masarylk's consent - stopped Stefamk's program. Masaryk's consent is less surprising when one remembers that he was actually among the first to hail the Octo!ber Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, which now in Prague !is considered fundamental to the ere. ation of Ozecho-,Slovaki:a. Thus one couid go on ,w ithout end and show that the Social Democratic party was an effective avant garde of Communism in Central Europe, not only in Czecho-!Slovakia. Certainly one of the most important persons in the Czecho-!Slovak .Social Democratic party was V ojta Benes, the oldest brother of the !:ate president. Gottwald officially, on the Cabinet's decision (and Moscow's aippro,vail) , sent him into West Germany in 1949, where he keipt in. regular contact with Prague and acted more oir less ,a,s Gottwald's unofficial ambassador. He did not conce·a l this fact, and t he members of the "Council of Free Czechoslova!ld:a" knew it. Therefore, many times, VojJa Benes took a different position from the official Council and o;piposed some steps undertaken by non.JSocialists in the Council. Benes's brother passed away, ,but equally important representatives remain, particularly: Vacl:av Majer, B. Vilem, the former Sec:retary-General of the Party, and the ill-ifamed Bohumiil Lausman. Ailso, the Social Democratic 1 74 SLOVAKIA party has its two generalls, Sergei Ingr, and Hasal Niz!borJ sky, and, jn Canada, the former minister Frantisek Nemec, who together with Hasal affected the cession of Ruthenia to .Stalin. To this party belongs also a Communist famous in Europe, Milos Vanek, and some questionaJble individuals in Radio F,ree Europe in MUTI!ich. These are all Czechs. Milos Vanek, who is reported to hruve 1b een a charter mem1ber of the "Czeohoslovak Communist Party," remained an ardent adherent of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship even after he 1had left that .p arty to ~me a left.;win.g Social Democrat. I personaHy know Mr. Vanek and I must confirm that Vanek was one of the founders of the Communist Party in Europe. This is described in the book of Lu. cien Laurat ",Du Komiintern au Kominfo·r m" (!Paris, France Des 1'sles, 1'951), in which on page 10 we read: "The manifest issued by the second Congress of the Kominform, July, 1920, carries a great number of sigrra:tures - Lenin, Zinoviev, Boukarine, Trotski, for iRussia; Vane'k, Hlula, Zapotocky (the president of Ozecho-;Slovakia today), etc." T,his signer and founder of the Communist Party is today the Chief of the Economics Deparbment of Radio Free Europe and a member of the "Colllilcil of Free Ozechoslovalcia" in New York, ·b oth financed by the Free Europe Committee! On the Slovak side there are: Dr. Ziak, well-known Czecho-'SlovaJk; Dr. Joseph Mrazek, the only •Slov;ak s~gner of the oath of fidelity to Communism in 1948, and posing as a Slovak, a certain Belak, whose real name is Berger. A,bout these people, Kurt Glaser, American writer wrote : "The principa.J Czechs and Slovaks associated with the Free Europe Committee and those employed by Radio Free Europe are not - as is commonly supposed - fi•g hters ag,a inst Communism. Quite on the contrary, they fellow-travele<l. with t•he Communists rfrom at least 1939 to 1948, helpe<l. t'hem to power, and even today follow a Communist-sponsored propaganda line. "These indivjduals belong to an or.ganlzation which has systematically be-trayed members of the democratic underground in CzechoSlovalda by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwald's secret police. "A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either Communist a.gents or have criminal records. '1Radio Free Europe's Czecho-Slovak program is helping Stalin SLOVAKIA 75 by s,a,botaging internation-a l understand ing and promoting rivalry and hatred between European peoples. ' "Mr. Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectdcal materialis m, Dr. Zak and Dr. (Berger) Belak. Dr. Zak is the editor of •a n intellectual magazine called 'Tribuna' w-hich is forbidden in France and a no-llher called 'Reality' (Sk,utecnost) which is fofibidden in Switzerland. Unfortunately, I have not been able to peruse these journals as I do not read c zech, but I am told that their basic thesis is the need for the party m asses to submit to leadership by the elite cadre. Belak was formerly a Communist Party functionary in Slovalda under the n ame of Berger. He puts out a Germ an-language sheet called 'Militant Democracy' which few Germans read because it takes S<talin's anti-Ger,man line." I. who know this gentleman (Belak-Berger) persona1'ly, must confirm that Mr. Glaser's opinion is 100 percent right! The former membe.r of the Social Democratic party in 1Slov akia, Pavel Viboch, need not be dealt with as a party memlber , and the other three Slovaks mentioned are al,so not significant. Never receiving any mandate from the Slovruk nation, they represent colonialism in Central Europe at a time when oolonialism is. dying even in Africa. The best proof is the elections in 1946, when the Social Demo~ crats in Slovakia could not elect even one representaitive without Ozech help. It was an old Prague trick to transfeT unneeded votes from one district to another. As a rule, the Social Democratic ipanty has been a Czech origani·z ation only. To return to the history of this _p arty, however, one can say that its activities during the second World War are very revooling. The majority of the party ,p oliticians fled wiith Benes, or shoritly after, and served in his "c!libi. net.,in-exile." An e~ception was Ambassador Fierlinger, who remained in Moscow serving the Communists instead of Benes, according to Ripka and Benes himself. When it came to .the wol"st, Benes's "govennment-in-exile" reoolled him to London. Having the support of Moscow, however, Fierlinger refused to return, and Benes, in order .to keep his presidency, ha:d :to. ,g o to Moscow and take ordern from his personal enemy. These statements are proved by the cablegrams exchanged by the "government-in--exile" and Fierlinger, which were published in Fierlinger's hodk. In addition to Moscow's rs upport, Fierlinger also had help within the "government-in-exile." This was the left wing of 1 76 SLOVAKIA the Social Democrats, wirth Lausman and Bechyne as leaders in London. This group, moreover, closely cooperated with other admirers of the Soviet Union in the Czech National Sodalist party, Rip_ka, Firt, and others. This party supporte'd several pro-Communistic organizations, where Rip'ka rused to be president and Josef Ko!'bel and Tig.rid Schonfeld were in leading ,positions, .pleadin,g for help for Stalin. In 1942 and 1943, Vlase:k and Majer organized the Commu:niisrt demonstrations that heiLpe<l to· force the second front against Churchill's will. We recall that Benes traveled to Moscow in 1943 against the wishes of Eden, Churchill, and other statesmen. There he approved the seill-out o<f Ruthenia and cleared the roa:d to Ozecho-SloV'akia for the Soviet Union. This he did without any regard for the will of the peoples of SlovaJki!a, Bohemia, Moravia and Ruthenia. Nay, even without the full consent of the "Provisional Czechosloviruk Government" in London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia, Moravia, and ,Ruthenia certainly had nothing to do with it. 1 I recaH the speeches of Octdber and November, 1943, in the chambers of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in London. They were made not only by the admirers of the Kremlin, but also by the so-called civil politicians who were blinded by Moscow. Among them were Lausman and Majer, Dr. Uhlir and Paul Macha.eek; all strongly approved the journey to Moscow and insisrted on going along with Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant the loss of asylum in England and the good wiU of the allies. Benes simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the "higher interests of our nations" demanded it. When Benes returned from his trip to Moscow, he brought the request to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a la!lge part of Poland to the Soviets. If any one should quesrtion ,t he truth of my statements, I am ready and willing at all times to produce the repo~ts of the "Czechoslovak Srtate Council,." the speeches Lausman and Uhlir, and even Benes's speech in its entirety after he returned fa-om Moscow. They tel11 us clearly why the Communist "putsch" of Februa:ry 1948 took place so SLOVAKIA 77 smoothly. Repetition o.f these facts is important for understandmg the effective collaboration of the Social Democrats with the Communists after the ,second war. Showing their allegiance to the principle from 1928, "Never against the Soviet Union," tihe Social Demoorats without an exception pressed for the Benes-Stalin agree~ ment in 1943. Therefore, in the first post-war government, formed in Kosice in 1945, and the most communistic of all governments returning ho.me, they dominated. There was no Slovak representative - evidence that Social Democracy had praictically no influence in Slovakia. Besides Prime Minister Zdenek Fierlinger, there was Frantisek Nemec and the liaison officer between the Red Armv and Benes, General Niziborsky (known now as General Hasal), who is at present, I believe, a consultant in the Pentagon Other ministers in that government were the infamous spy, Bohumil Lausman, and a present leader in the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," Vaclav Majer. We know, that all except Fierlinger came unharimed into exile after February, 1948. Lausman, of course, after having accomplished his espionage in Radio Free Europe, returned to Pra:gue. Clearly Lausman has the lowest character among the contemporary •politicians, but he was a most trusted comrade of ,t he present so-called "anti-Communist" politicians in the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." They all were united in their pro-Communist activities, and their claim now to belong to this or that wing is no.t at all convincing. In 1946 the •s ame Vaclav Majer praised the top Communist in Czecho-Slovakia lavishly: "Gottwald's name will be forever connected not only with our fight for national liberation, but also with the struggle for social liberation as well as for new forms of life and work. . . . Gottwald, not only by his determination, but also by his understanding for the opinions of others, showed his great qualities as politician and man." Sudh were then the expressions of Vaola.JV Majer, an "anti-Communist" fighter of today. But Ma:jer is not alone in this. After working together for the Communists at home, the Social Democrats came to the United States and suddenly discovered that they, too, have fought Communism. Their present fabrica- 78 SLOVAKIA tions rubout their post-war aotivity, which the following facts disprove, are a deep offense to the witnesses of their activities back home. The first document signed by the ministers and the members of the Executive Committee of the Social Demo~ cratic Party iby which a smooth Communi!zation of thei,r homeland was assured, was their agreement of June 25, 1945, at once after returning to Praigue, to form the "National Front of the Working People." This agreement shows the serviI.fty of the wholle Social Democralti1c Party, not only of the leaders, because it was discussed and una~ nimously approved by aJll the ;party before being signed by the Executive Commiittee. This means tha,t all politicians of the $ociaJ Democratic Party, now posing as anti-Communists in exile, agreed to the bolshevi zation of CzechoSlovakta. Zenkl aind his National Socialists C'an at least attempt to excuse themsel,v es that they did not want to accept this ag,r eement lbut were forced to by the Social Democrats. But it is not a question of who forced wlhom; they all signed and pulblished this agreement and, what is woTse, they put it into effect. The most important parts of this agreement are the following: 1. While maintaining a politica:l and organizational independence, the three parties wil.l closely cooperate and follow a common policy in all matters of .p u!blio life. 2 . . The political iba;si,s o.f the National Front orf Working People is the government program, unanimously a:g-re.ed upon in conference in MoS<:ow and unanimously accepted by the government in Kosice on April 5, 1945. Through this agreemenit, also a Central Coordinating Committee is being created with an equal numlber of representatives from all participating iparties, and also a United Alliance of Trade Organizations, based on voluntary membership, wJll be formed. F'urther wili be formed a Non-.Political Alliance of Czech Farmers and a United Organization of Czech Youth; both of these organizations shaH be supported ,by all parties. This publicly dedared aigreement was signed for the Social Democrats by Zdenek Fierlinger; for the Commun1 SLOVAKIA 79 ists by Klement Gottwald, and for the National Socialist Party by Peter Zenkl. It is both very int.eresting and quit,e significant that not a single Slovak att.ended that meeting and that among those who· called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka, and other leaders of Dr. Benes's old Czech National Socilalist Party - the very same people who today are telling the American public and the world that they always hated the Reds and that the Reds "ousted" them from Government. But the truth is something else a;gatin. The fact is that both Zenlcl and Ripika welcomed the Communists, sought their favor, and wanted to win politicrul prestige with the help of the Reds at the exipense of the other political parties. Of course, today we know that they failed. The same thing happened to them ,that had happened and 1s still happening to an tho.se who try to, collruborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are worth and then swallo;w them up or get rid of them. The "National Front of the' Working People" created a "Central Coordinating Committee," in which e'very affiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This committee had the task of coordinating the work of the socialist parties. The sooiwlfst bloc prepared the ground for the various activities which led to the suppression of political and religious fireedom - the first st~s taken toward a socialist dictatorship. The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the Agrarian Party would be suppressed, the Catholic IDaigle organization outiawed, and that Catholic youth, as such, would not be allowed to orgamize. Together t@y wo,r ked out a plan whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would be done away with and, at the same time, how these votes, together with the Communist-contro lled ..peasant unions, , would he brought into the Communist P,a,rty. They also created and later legalized the Communist trade organizations, then the non-political Fedeiration of Farmers and the United Youth Or,g,anization - all of which were SU!ppo.s ed to be fornned by the joint participation of all parties, but 80 SLOVAKlA actually served onlly to communize Ozecho-iSlovakia from the instant they began to function. Therefore, it is not true that Zenlkl, Rtpka, Vilem, Majer, and other Czech Sooial DemocraJts opposed Com~ munist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is that from the moment they accepted the so--called "Kosice Agreement ," they were aJlways subordinat ed to and in the train of .t he Communis t Party and willingly continued tha,t way not only on Russian soil, or in Russian-·occuipied Kosice, but a1so in "Jiberated" Pr'cllgue. The "Joint Declaration " to the nation on June 28, 194'5, is indisputalble proof of the fact that they wanted to get into governmen t with the help of the Oommunist s, even at the roopense of democracy, Christ'ianit y, and freedom. This is the sound lesson for all who would col'la!borate with Oommunist s. All such ,p eople are digging their own graves, because Communism recogn.i'zes no agreements , concessions, or compromis es, and swallows wp all who collaborate with it. A Czech Catholic editor, A. J. Jandacek, commented on major effects of this agreement in this manner: "The aims of the socialist bloc were many: "1. First of all not to allow workers to organiz.e in Catholic trade unions, and so far as they are alread,y organized in them, through a mass effort .to storm them into the socialist bloc by maintaining that Oatholic organizations wm anyhow be in the mi· nority an d that, therefore, it is better to go together. "2. Not to ,a llow an independent unification of Catholic farmers. The party of farm people wi ll not be allowed to exist at all, and as far as the Catholics have their Catholic farmers organized, the Communists will divide them among themselves. "3. A United Organization of Czech Youth will be formed and, thus, the Cat·holic you1Jh wJll not have an opportunity to organize on a Oatholic platform, eitilier politiooJly or religiously. Simply, ,a ll youth will be forced to go into the state-formed and socialist-led organization. Thus, organizing an "Alliance of Catholi c Youtll" or ,a "Czechoslovak Orel" will be .impossible. A daily and weekJ.y have already been published for this so-called united youth organization and are led by the Commundsts. "In view of these three aims, it is possible to call the establishing and maintaining of t!he socialist bloc an intention-al act against political and religious freedom and the establishmen t of a socialist dictatorship." Although I am not a Catholic and never was a member SLOVAKIA 81 of any clerical party, I am ready to sign this analysis by the editor Jandaceik. Whereais, Ze:rukl and his party, in December, 11947, begain not to abide by the 1946 agreement, the Social Democrats kept it even after the Oommunist "putsch" in Februa:ry, 1948. Professor Macek, for instance, accepted lead~ ing positions in o,rganizations which bolsheviized the University, and as president of the Aotion Committee of the University he expelled those students who had participated in demO'Il!Strations against the Communists in February. Furthermore, for a long time he helped the Constitutional Oommittee of Ozecho-Slovakia:n P.arliam.ent and its chairman, Dr. Procha:zka, a leading Communist. As a matte~ of fact, the whole section on Economics in the Communist constitution is his work. Both as an expert and as a member of the :Sociail Demo:cra,tic Party, he supported the Communist bi1ls; a;ctua:1ly, rhe was the right hrui.d of Dr. Procha:zka, the most Communist jurist in Czecho-Slovakia and chairman of the Constitutional Committee. To us it is not surprising that Macek led in the persecution of democratic students after the Communist putsch, since he had earlier been well known as a fervent exponent of Marx at the tUrnversity of Brno, where he was professor of National Eoonomics. The surprise is that he is now a university professor in the United States. Professor Maicek, during the yearn 1929...1939, was a member of Parliament for the Social Democratic Party. Simultaneously, he edited a left-orientated monthly called "Our Times" which was sponso,r ed by Presidents Masaryk and Benes. He published numerous books, a base of which was, repeatedly, the teachings of Marx. In these books Professor Maicek defended the theories orf Marx very emphatica!lly and wanted to introduce them into our social and economic life, evein as early as 1930-1938. He wanted to sociailize everything. His aim was identical to that of the Communi,s ts. They wanted to put it into practice after 194'5. Origtlnafly, Professor Macek migrated to Canada and lived on the fann of a certain Mr. Karel Buzek,. where he wrote artides for the Ozech newspapers in Canada. In his articles he rejeoted and condemned the very same ideas he 82 SLOVAKIA was not so long ago an apostle of and a very able and thorough propagator. From Canada he came to the United States and at the present time he is active as a professor at some university m Pennsylvania. iB. Vilem, as Genera'} Secretary of the Ozech Social Democratic Party, was more a personal "whip" for Fierliniger than a "whip" for the ,party. While I was a member of the Agricultural Committee, we succeeded sometimes in winning over .t he chairman of the committee, who was a Social Democrat, against the Communist proposa!ls. Vilem, however, before the voting day, and often at midnight, cal'led the members of 'his party and dictated: "Fierlinger lets you know that the party cannot stand for your proposals; you have to vote with the Communist Party." One of these Social Democrats that was forced by Vi1em to vote with the Communists is in exile ; several committee memlbers from the other parties who lost ,w ith me because of Vil.em's actions are now in the "Council of Free Ozechosloviaikia," but they wil'l never forget those defeats (Sliva, Torn, and other.s). Wathout this servility to the Communists, Gottwald would never have gained the majority he had. The saddest chapter of the Social Democrati'C Party, however, was written by its memiber who was the Minister of Industry, Bohumil Dausman. He served the at!reernent of June 25, 1945, so faithfully that he went out to disintegrate even the exile and worked for three years as a spy, after being employed by Radio Free Europe with the help of the Social Democrats and other memlbers of the "Council of Free Czechoslo;vakia," particularly Ripka and his group. The case of Lausman's treason was not yet completely closed when new espionage process was started against further exiponent of Prague government and close collaborator of Dr. Hubert Riipka. Hardly had a French .court sentenced Kubala on a charge of espionage for Communist OzechoSlovakia before the Prague radio reacted in this case and the spea,keir, himself a collaJborator of Mr. Ferdinand Peroutka and a former employee of Radio Free EuTope, used the most despiooble language against the West. Slovak newspapers unanimousily reported - unfOTtunaitely without desirable SLOVAKIA 83 results on the aictions orf Radio F.ree Europe - that Lausman would be followed by the others. The newspapers asked for effect1ve preventive measures in Radio Free Europe rugainst subversive elements but nothing was done. Many very dubious elements are sitting in Radio F,r ee Europe and are paid by the Amerilcan citizens. In the warning concerning espionage, we have not only staJted several times that there are Marxists ood Oommunists in "Czechoslovak" organizations, but we also said openly that they were, and silll are espionage agents of the Prague government. The Prague broadcasts have confirmed our allegation. On the same ibroadlca;st where, some time a;go, Laus-· man broadcast in Prague, now spoke Bruno Folta, who was working as an employee of Radio Free Europe under the protection of Dr. M. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko. He minutely copied the style of Lausrnan, H~ confessed that originally he betrayed the Communist government in Prague and filed to the West, requesting political asylum. Here in the West, in Radio Free Europe Folta came to the conclusion that the western world was rotten and readily seized the chance to return home and accept what was offered to him in the inteliligence service conducted by the Czech General Moravec. He repented like Lausman and, hruving the desire to make some reparations, he put himself at the disposal of the "people's Democracy" against the West. He went on to threaten that he would use all the knowledge which he ooquired as an employee of Radio Free Europe. Our reports from Munich and behind the Iron Ourtain explain the Folta case as foHo:ws: Like Lausman, he was sent by the Prague government for espionage purposes and to esta:blish the contacts. When he succeeded and gathered enough material and collaborators, especially in Munich and Paris, he simply ,r eturned to Prague as a highly appreciruted a;gent, in order to accUJSe the anti-Communist citizens at home. of whose attitude he learned while abroad. What is Folita telling the peoples of Czecho~Slova;kia? The Vienna newspapers published long articles explaining how Foll.ta, this confident servant of Mr. Peroutka and Dr. Mudry, was blaming Radio Free Europe and the Western World and praising everything he found after his return to 84 SLOVAK.IA Brague: •~Prague has everything good and new, all the new technical inventions, and everything in plenty. Meantime, in the Weslt, o:nlly the capitalist dwpes have all the goods in their possession and the common people are starving." Thrut is the picture cxf the West presented by Folt'a, who coJ:lected American doJlars from RJFE. When will Washington be conV'inced? The case of Folta is certainly a cha,pter of shameful history, but we feair that even this fact will not be strong enough to convince the F1ree Europe Committee or the Department of State in W8!Shi:nigton. We repeat that such exile orga.n±zations, which are SUipported at the ex;pense of genuine demo-cratic and anti-Communist organizations, wre nuisances and wreckers of all the actiOIIlS of the Western. WorJd in the cold war. In the "Ozechoslovak" orgarazations there have been, since the start, members who were sent West by the Prague go,v ernment only for tlhe purpose of serving the Communists. On the roster of "Czechoslovak" organizations in exile you wilil find many persons who were elected to office on the Oommunist baHot, ,p oliticians who mostly helped the Communists not only to gain control of CzechoSlova!kia, but also the whole Danube valley. The same persons, who with Benes in 1939, in London, were in touch with SDalin's ambrussa.dor, agreed on the invasion of U.iS.IS.IR. south of the Carpathian Mountains. To the Americans in Washington and the Einglishmen in London, they disiplayed an rug·r eement concerning the integrity of the Czecho-Slavaik State while knowing the deficiencies of this treaty. They .co!~JIBitted the same crime as did Lausman and Bruno, Folta. These people simply betrayed the Allies. But beyond that are their protectors, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" and its leading representatives Zenkl, Lettrich, IPerou'bka, Mudry and others - iess guilty of betrayal? They 1let Lausma.n into R1adio :ffiree Europe and allowed him to• broadcast for American money. On the payroll they kept Folta, R1.12icka, and others as well; and they still do that and help to betray America. There is no excuse for them, or is there? Parrticipants in a crime are as punishable as the crim1 SLOVAKIA 86 inal. J>a:rtici:pan.ts in this betriayal can not excuse themselves on the grounds that they did not know anything about suoh action. Several times suspicious caJSes were brought to their notice but they did not pay any ,a ttention to these warnings. What should we say to this criminal negligence on the .part of responsible pemonaHties :in Radio Free Europe Oir in the "Council of ~ree OzechoslovaJda ?" There they are unanimous: Zenkl, Cerny, Osuis'ky -- all plead for the innocence of Peroutka. The continuous scandaJls should waike up the security officials of the Western Powers. Until now only the Germans in Munich asked fo-r a c1erun-1.l'p of Marxists and other elements hostile to democracy in the whole territory of the German Federal Republfo. They aimed at "Czechoslovak" organizations which aire infiltrated with highly suspicious elements. Let us apply our knowledge whi'1e there is still time. Many think that only in Germany are such cases possible. but that is not true. The same oases, even more paradoxi~ cal, we find in Washington where the Czech officers are working. They distinguished themselves in the sell~,ut of Carpathian Ruthenia to the Soviets, or kept in the service of American Intelligence the sister-in-ilaw of a welL known Communist in the old country. Why should we be shocked that in rPairis the Communists received confiden• tial materia'l? Even in Washington security mea5UJres are neglected. We know the persons at wol'k in W81Shington and we will not be surpri,s ed if the Lausman affair breaks out a,gain despite our warning. Those who wHl be suT1prised will be Americans. Let us take lessons from Parts. Since Lausman's return to Prague, the whole CzechoSlovak exile, in its confusion, has been producing deceptions and charges of for.gery. When Mr. Osusky of the "Council of F'lree Ozechoslovakia" does not succeed in his enterprises, .o r the situation changes after his proclamations hawe been pulblished, he simply proclaims them unauthentic or falsified, o:r he simply a&:!rilbes them to Lausman. 'Sometimes the matter is trivial, as it was in the proclamation concerning the is udeten G€Tmans which was allegedly signed by Osusky. There he stressed the necessity 86 SLOVAKIA that the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans are reconciled and charged that Ripka and Zenk! were unsuitalble because of their collaJboration with the Communists. The subj~ct was given great publicity by Josten (a former official of the Foreign Ministry and now editor of "Czechoslovak" in LondO'Il) and his Marxist cell in London, w:hiich always tries to please Prague. In this matter, Osusky probably figured that a dea!l with the ,Sudeten GeI'IDans could per., haps be of he1p to him if he should have trouble in the Council with Ripka and Zenk!. But here chance helped him. R:iipka had difficulties in the United States because of his colla;boration with the Communists and therefore planned to return to his socialist friends in Europe. For this reason he, as weU as Zenkl, did not fight for leading positions .i n the Counchl - a fact that allowed the November reconciliation of the Council. Osusky does not need the Sudeten Germany any longer, whereas for Zenk! and Ripka the Sudeten German question will be a ,problem. So Osusky denied his Sudeten German proclamation and charged tha;t its publfoation in the "Czechoslovak" was a fOTgery . Simila.rly, "Nase Cesta," a Marxist paper printed in the Czech language ,in Vienna, published a who[e issue of articles written by several memibers of the "Council of Free Czechoslovak ia.'' Arfter Osusik y and Zen kl were reconciled and the articles did not fit into the changed opinion of the Council, the editor procilaimed the whole earlier issue a for,g ery. Thus, suddenly we are told that the ,articles were not writt® by the members oif the Council, and that the who'le issue was forged with the purpose of s,plitting the "Czechoslova k" exile. Lt is interesting to see whose names first a;ppea.r as authors o,f the disputed rurticles: Dr. Taiborsky, Benes's secretary; Jan Zak, Slovak socialist and confidant of MaTxists and "Ozechosloivaks" ; Jozef Dieska, member of the Council, etc. I can only dismiss the editor's charge that the whole issue originated with Lau:sman as ridiculous and highly impossible. In the newspruper "Novy Domov," published in Canada, another member of the Council, Fras'tacky, attacked Colonel M~ksohe, who does not go along with the "Ozeichoslova!ks" f?LOV,AKIA 87 in the Council. (Oolon~l Miksche, a Czecho-Slovak military attache in Pa.r-is, resigned in December, 1947, in protest to the policy of the present members of the Council then in Praigue.) When Colonel Miiksche threatened to sue him, Frastaoky quiokly denied writing the article and declared it a forgery. Certainiy this comedy cannot be cailled anything but ridiculous; fortunately, it did not harm Colonel Miksche. It is regrettruble, however, that the exile "Czechoslovak" press sees in these and other incidents the intervention of Genera:! Molotka of P,r ague, whose assignment, with Lausman, is to influence and distunb the exik It does not at all seem to me that these .incidents, are of Lausman's making, for he would think of different methods among the members of the Ooll!Ilcil. In the Council he feels at home, after spending three years in its midst and working with Council members in Radio Free Europe. There he does not need any mediators and can at any time directly interfere. Using Lausman's name, however, provides Osusky and others wJth a handy scapegoat for the.i~ own failures and a!bandoned projects. SimHarly, the "CzechosloV'ak" exile press is not unanimous and constant in its aocount of the Council's November compromise and in its list of representatives. Sometimes it leaves out Dr. Cerny',s name, and other times it puts it in, depending on whom it serves . .Professor Hlavaty is referred to as a neutraJl sometimes, and at other times as ·a former socialist representative in the temporary National Assembly in Prrugue. Moreover, the "Czechoslovak" exile even today is hel:ping and promoting the accessories of spies as did some other memlbers of the Courrcil while they were ambassadors in the United States and elsewhere. This is the way the "Czechoslovak" organizations operate while the socialist parties in the West do not realize their dange,r . So, for ex-· ample Zdenka Schonova, in :Eingland one of the leading Czech Social Democrats, is supported today by the "Czech Trust Fund," even though her collaboration with the convicted spy, Peter Arton, was proved. It is evident that the persons from the Council do not distinguish between a 1 88 SLOVAKIA Czech patriot and a Czech spy. For them everyone is first of aH Czech, from Benes down to Lausman, and in this belief they .not only help the spies and pay them, but also pay for their protection and defense It is also well known that Colonel Koenig, who is a leader orf the reporting division of the "Council of Free Ozechos!ovaktla" and also working for the West, still employs the same Hungarian Communis t as his secret,a ry, his sister-in-ilaw, Klara Fedak. Fedfuk is in New York without letting the U. S. authorities know that she is a Oommunist. Her former "1b oy friend" is now chief of the espionage office in Bratislava; yet the persons from the "Co,u ncii of Free Ozechoslov aikia" do not find it difficult to affirm to the West the ,reliaJbiliity of these Communist s. Koonig's group is also responsible for the murder of a Slovak un., dergrmLnd leader and patriot, Pavol Harusiak, and others from Bratislava, whose bordeT-cro ssing they betrayed to the Communis t police. Ifurusiak was my friend, an'd I kn.ow that a member of Koenig's group, iDr. Patek, gained access to him only through representin g himself as from me. When the "Czechosio. vak" exile has such help and affiliations, how lO'Ilg must O'Ile state that this "Czechoslo vak" group is not reliable? It is seen to be a very dangerous group when we realize that it hrus, accomplice s in the un. derground who were given money and introd1..1JCtions by Zenkl and Ripka, as the spy Bohumil Cerny and his accompJices were. This situation is also true orf the "C'zechoslova!k" section of R:adio Flree Europe in Munich, where there is always someone who helps such men as La.usma,,n and Folta, or other ex-Commu nists and .future re-immigrants to Red Prague. Bures, who brought Folta to Radio Free Europe, was dismissed, but his friends - Kvetko, Mudry, and Peroutka - are still in leading positions. If Radio Free Europe and the Voice of Ame11ica would try to lbrea:k the reputation. oif this "Czechoslo vak"' army with truth and with real anti-Comm unist speakers who ha,ve a good reputation and an anti...Communist record at home, it could be done. Not, however, with the present group. What is broadcast and written now - for American money - helps the Oommunis ts more than it harms them. SLOVAKIA 89 These org,a nizations which are supposed to wage psy. chological warfaire against Communism behind the !iron Curtain do just the opposite - as far as Czecho-Slovakia is concerned. Too often they he:lp spies and broadcast material which does not harm the Communists, but rather amuses them. Sending pigeons and balloons across the Iron Curtain maikes people there laugh or curse, because the police always get some of those who pick up the leaf~ lets. When aJlmost every month someone returns to Pra•g ue and te1'ls of the low moral tone, the scandals, and suicides in the "Czechoslovak" section of Radio Tuee Europe in Munich, the Communists give this excellent publicity. No wonder that Radio· Free Europe does not have any respect there! IDven when Radio Free Euroipe, or the Voice of America, gains some SlovaJk renegade, these organizations are not made 1:.iherelby eiffecti:ve, nor are their names re~ stored at home behind the Iron Curtain. People theTe ceased to believe them loog ago, and after the Lausman and Folta affairs they only curse them. Folta, Ru!zicka, and Bures worked in Radio Free Europe; they were the proteges of those Siova.k employees in Radio Free Europe - Dr. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko - who are supposed to represent the r eal Slovak anti-Communist cause. And yet nothing happened to Mu.dry or Kvetko, much less to Peroutka, because they brought Bures and Ruzicka and Folta to RF'E, nor because they paid their comrade Lausmrun, who is also back in Prague. The new chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on In. vesitigations, Senator McCleUan, who is a capable lawyer to whom the security of the United States is of paramount internst is, we hear, curious about many things. We hope, therefore, thlat this suibcommittee will succeed in this mat~ ter also and that the organizations in question will be cleansed of the ,present "Czecho,slovaJk" group. iLausman was so aggressive that during the second World War, after his return from Moscow to London, he succeeded in the State Council in speeding up Benes's trip to Moscow. Further, as he admits in his book, published in Vienna, he forced Benes to na,tionalize aH private industry by presidential decree before the Pro,v isional National As- 90 SLOVAKIA sembly convened in October, 194'5. He also :points out in his book that, whereas he admits his actions, the associates who agireed with hiim on aU the issues of col1aboration now are renouncing him only in order to be accept., able to Washington. In this way, Lausman has unmasked the Sodal Democrats who in exile pre.tend to fight Communism, but actually are responsi!ble for the :f act that Russian territory extends for the first time in history west of the Carpathians into the Danube basJn. In this bolshevik expansion it was two Social Democrats who represented Benes and the whoJ.e state leadership: Flrantisek Nemec and Generail Ni:ziborsky - Hasal. Both went to Moscow from London in 1944 and then fol., lowed the Red Army into Ozecho-1Slovaiki,a to take over the liberated territory :from the Red Army in accordance with the Benes-lSta:li,n treaty. They did it so successfully with the he1p of Fierlinger in Moscow that in three months they gave Stalin the eastern part of Czecho-1Slovaikia, the whole of Ruthenia. Russia ,o ffered to the Slovaks, through the Communists Dr. Husak and Novomesky, an independent ,Slovak State, provided that it would be another Soviet republic. When Husak and Novomesky made the proposal to the Slov,a ks, to Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of S'lovakia and the Slow.1Jk Government, the Slovaks, however, refused the •bolshevi~atio!Il of their country. Nemec was not given a cordial re:ception ~n Ruthenia at all. The in'haibitants everywh&e were signing petitions, sponsored by the Communist Petruscak, which started that the Ruthenians no longer existed and that there were only Sub-Carpathi an Ukrainians in Ruthenia who yearned to be embrruced by their greait mother, Ukrainia. After many long squabbles, Nemec fina:lly got a message through to Benes in London through General Pika. The telegrams that Benes sent through F1ierlinger were never seen by Nemec, ,b ecause Fierlinger already then was Stalin's envoy and never a paitTiotic cii.ti,z en of his own State. It is significant, therefore, that despite these experiences thi,s same traitor, Fierling&, was named, several months later, as the premier by Benes. Nemec was in a very trying position. When he wanted SLOVAKIA 91 to be connected with London, he had to ask for permission to do so from the Chief of the Russi,an ISJtafif so that he could travel to Moscow, where with the heilp of the vad.io conneotion of General Biika, who was the Chief of the Mtilitary Mission, Nemec could tell Benes how matters were going and koop him informed on Fierlinger. The latter was doing right well. He still is a minister in the Prague Gov~ ernment, but Genera,1 Bika was killed by the Commund.sts. At that time the Communists had asked the Slovak non-Communists whether it would not he more profitable to support tJhe idea of a Slovak Soviet Republic so that the Slovaks could go,vern their own territory rather than adhere to the "Czecho-slova;k" ideology which denied the existence of the Slovak nation. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Reipulblk could be promoted without diff,iculty, because the Slovak State still existed. Husak and Novomesky, however, did not get anywhere with their proposal. The Slova,k non-Commumsrts turned it down, declaring that it was contrary to the Christmas Agreement of December, 1943, as well as the agreement which Ursiny concluded -w ith Dr. Benes in Octolber, 1944, when he acted iJ?- the name of thie SloViak National Council. When Husak and N01Vomesky failed to promote the idea of a Slovruk Soviet Repwblic in London, they imrmediiately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakia to present the ,p rop·a sal to President Joseph Tiso and the Slovruk Govemment. But Tiso· and the Slovak Government would not hear rubout it. Husak and N ovomesky failed in thek mission. Several months later, with mMly Slova;ks in emigration, Clemenitis took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today an the leading Reds of Slavrukia are paying dearly for failing in theiT mission. Clementis paJid with his life. Ruthenia was loot. Benes's delegation had to go to Trebisov ·a nd after that things went rather smoothly. ~erliillger ma:de the propositions and Benes aocepted them. When he was returning from Moscow in March, 1945, Benes could no longer enter Ruthenia. In fact he renounced it solemnly on severai occasions. FinaMy, Benes had an agreement prepared which Fierlinger signed for the Czecho1 92 SLOVAKIA SlovaJk Government with great solemnity in the Kremlin on June 29, 1945. No one outside the CommU'Ilists agreed with this act of Benes. No law, however, could contain or restrain Benes. He acted dictatori.ally at any time that it benefited him. On August 24, 1945, without even corum1tling the Parliament, Benes issued his presidential decree No. 4, concluding the pa:ct between the U .S.S.<R. and the C.S.R. This decree was the basis for assigning new borders to Slovakia in the East. In Octoher, 1946, everything "legalized" on the ,b asis orf foregoing decrees was published in the Col~ lection of Laws and Regulations. T.he text orf the rubove-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as significant. It begins with the words: ". . . being certain that the provisional National Assembly of the Orecho-1Slovaik Republic shal[ concur with this ag.reement . . . " Benes did not wait. He and John Masaryk and VI-ado Clementis decided matters without Pa.rlia,ment. As good prophets, they knew tha't Parliament would certainly approve this ag,r eement ! Since Ruthenia was not a very big bite, Benes did not stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2, 1945, he issued decree No. 8, whereby a numbeir of homes in the most beautiful seo'tion of BUJbenec - in the modern section of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, the greaJt s•a crifices the nations of the U .IS.S.R. had made on the altar of liberation of humanity. WeM, it is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great extent did l,iibera-te SlwaJcia from a gre,aJt many things the Slovaks could use themselves, but it certamly was not ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them without evsen consulting the nation about it. Only dictators act like that. And Benes was a dictator by the grace of MoS<!ow, even id: only a temporary one. 'Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later Benes showed his aP!)Teoiation to the so-called "iLiberator" of Prague, M<rurshaJ Konev, by giving him several very •b eautiful vi1las which were oonfiscated from the 1g ood citi- SLOVAKIA 93 zens .o f Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiflrl view of Prague. All these decTees we re signed by General Hasal-Nizborsky, who was at that time Minister of Thansportation, and •by Vaclav iMajer, who was also a member of Benes's caJbinet. The servility to Stalin and Go'titwald, and the boundless adulation iby HasaJl..,Niziborsky a,nd Frantiseik Nemec would be best illustrated if we pu!blished the congratulatory telegrams sent by them to their idols. I mtend to publish all these facts in a book, but they hawe already !been quoted by Fierlinger and Lausman in their books. Later, many Communists who fell out of favor tried to rescue their political careers in exile with the help of membership cards in the Social Democratic Party. Those Communists, rulmost without exception, we find in Radio Free Europe - (Graf, Berger-!Belak, and Ti.grid Schonfeld), or (Josef Konbel, the with other American institutions Communist amlbas:sador from Prague to Tito in Belgrade, now a member of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" and a uni,versity professor ,i n the United Staltes). Regarding Tigrid Schonfeld, it is only necessary to note what has been written albout him here in the United States. As it is quite a lo't, I only quote some parts of a more serious character: "Tigrid is a former m emb er of the C2:ech Communist Party. According to tJhe newspaper Christ und Welt (Stuttgart, October 16, 1952), •his political ac tivjty began in 1932 when he published the illegal Communist paper Hal lo Noviny, w,hich specialhr.ed in subversion of morale in the Czecho slovak Army. " He was also a contri butor to the Co mmunist magazine Leva Kultura (Left Culture). Dur:ing Wo r ld W ar II he w as a member of the Communfot-domiuated Czechoslovak staff of t'he British Broadcasting Company, where one of his colleagues and iruti mate friend w.as Colonel Otto BlheJer, the Czech mi.Jitary attache whom the United States Government declared persona non grata in 1949 for es pionage activities." I hope this short excerpt will be enough to show what pro-Communist elements were picked 1by the U. S. Ad-· ministration and by the Firee Europe Commitltee for importa,nt pos,itions. These quotations will also prove tha,t SUJCh people cannot be expected to be trusted 'back a,t home by 94 SLOVAK.IA the Nation as anti-Communist fighters and thaJt the whole expensive propa,gand'a program is practicrully useless and ineffective. About the others aJbove, I must confess the same opinion as to character. The deeds of these men, however, I am intentionally separating from the actions of the leaders of the Czec'h Social Democratic Prurty. I am presenting the Communist co1la:"boration of only those Social Democ~ats who represent the party in exile and who :firom 1945 until they went in to exiile were also of some importance back home. I am leaving aside those persons who are now abusing the sympath4es of the Labor Party in London, because they wd not amount to much back home, being only opporlll!Il.ists and regularly havmg two memib ership cards, one of the Communist and the other of the Social Democratic Party. But these also oannot claim that they opposed the agreement of June 25, 1945; everyone conisenited to it and carried it out in h:is capacity. It is no wonder that :b y 1946 their policy of complete conformance with the Communists had negated the party as opposi,t ion. Simifarly now the party is destroying itself in an attempt to gain strength by accepting and proteotin.g even men who were strong Communrists, like Milos Vanek and Tigrid Schonfeld, or men who possessed membership cards of several Marxist parities, like M8!cek, Kwbel, and others. Furthermore, an affidav1t of anti-Communism signed by the Social Demoorat le·aders is ridiculous, indeed, beca use the party's claim to anti--Communism is itself destroyed by the evidence of its history. During the February, 1948 c,r isis, the Social Democratic Party tried to look neutral, but the fact ilid everything to help t'he COIIllmunists succeed. Hol!cling to the agreement of J.une, 1945, the party as a unit gave its support to the Commumsts and so broke the political equilibrium in favor of the Oorrum.1~sts. Even if it is not pos• sible to .state that without the help of the Sociail. Democrats, Gottwald would not have succeeded in the "putsch" of February, 1948, nevertheless it remains a great guilt against the Sooial Democrats that in the time when it was SLOVAKIA 95 clear to everyone what tJhe Communists were doing, the Czech Social Democrats stood by them and did not help the opposition. This attitude of the Czech Social Democrats is not very well known and evaluated in the United States; if it were, not one of them could pose in Washington as anti-Communists. And their protector, Steinhardt, U. S. am:bassador to, •Prague in 1948, and former Secretary · of State Acheson could not have secured for them influential positions in the United States on the U. S. payroll. It is worthwhile to note that up to 19-38 the Czech Sociall. Democrats cooperated strongly with the Sudeten German Sociail. Democrats in Ozecho-Slovakia. When the German Social Democrats got into trouble with the N a:llis and were persecuted, there was no Czech Social Democrait to help his coHeague in the Sudetenland; they were betrayed. Later the expulsion. decrees bore the signature of aH the Czech Social Democrat ministers, who had no social or human feeling. It will forever remain -a shame against the Czech Social Democrats that they let their coUe,agues from the German Social Democratic Party be so persecuted, robbed, expelled, and even JnUrdered. They ail.so had a similar attitude towards the Slovaks in their domestic .p olky and always helped Prague centralism and imperia•1ism. Furtherimore, they helped to destroy the Slov:ak Democratic Party ,b y dema.ndiing in the fall of 1947 the .p osition of one commissioner. Thiis commissioner, working hand-in-hand with bloody Ferjencik, then commissioner of police but now in the United States, iru::reased the public terror and forced the courts to serve the police. The Social Democrats in the government of Slovakia held to ,t he agreement from June 25, 1945, until they had performed their jobs in 1945 and then were kioked out when no longer needed by the Communists. Looking over the record of the Czech SociaJl Democratic Party, their willing coUaiboration with Communists and their fierce figiht against every anti-Communist, one cannot understand their presel!t a;lilbi thait they acted only under Russian pressure. One incident epitomizes this contradiction. On the sixtieth anniversary of Karl Marx's death, Mareh 14, 1943, they were living in London. On that day the Czech 96 SLOVAKIA Socia:l Democrats and the Communislts made a piJ.grimage to Mairx's torn!b in an English ·c emetery. At this tomlb, in free England, the present representative of the "Council of Free Ozechosl'Ovakia" in Washington, then Benes's mmiister and member oif his State Council, Vaclav Miajer, delivered a speech in the name of t!he Social Democraits in which he said: "WE BELIEVE WITH MARX THAT SOCIALISM 1,s THE WAY TOWARD INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, TOWARD EVERLASTING PEACE, AND THE WELFARE OF NATIONS . TO•DAY HERE WE ARE, A SMALL GROUP OF SOCIALIST EMIGRANTS FROM CZECHO-SLOVAKIA . BUT THE TIME WILL COME WHEN MARX'S TO,MB WILL BE THE SHRINE OF MANKIND LIBERATED FROM THE BLIND IMPRISONMENT O,F DEAD SOCIAL DOCTRINES." 1M inister -Majer's speech was published on March 19, 1'943, in Benes's officiail newspaper in London, the "Czechoslovak," whikh was financed by Jan Masaryk and Hulbert Ri,pka. In conclusion, I say that the basis of the Communist victory in Czecho-iSiovrukia was 1Jhe agreement of June 25, 1945, which was cauied out with the help of the current members of the "Council of Free Czechoslov;rukia." Their present pose as anti-Communists is undemtandable, of course, because by continumg to deceive Americans is now their only means of survival. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Himself a Slovak, though from Moravia, he had to provide a future for the two million Slovaks, who were even less a!ble to stand alone than the Ozechs. Masaryk revived the radical idea of 1848 and proposed to create a single 'Czechoslovak' nation by will-power. Masaryk knew little of the Slovaks; others !knew even less. This was hi's strength in dealing wi,tll the allied leaders; it could not solve the Slovak prdblem. The few conscious Slovak politicians aspired only to cll!ltural autonomy within Hungary; living in the shadow of Magyar arrogance, they could not imagine the dis8ippearance of the Hungarian frontier." - (A. J. P. Taylor, 'NIE HABSBURG MONARCHY, London, 1948; p . 240).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Czecho-Slovak Exile: Czech Social Democrats and Red Espionage Description An account of the resource Dr. Michael Zibrin Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), June-September 1955 pp.72-96 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zibrín, Michal, 1899-1968 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-September 1955 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b39a1656e960f4eb12a2ef6d79601d00.pdf b13ae9748db576ed4e4a1e2d6018043b PDF Text Text 70 SLOVAKIA The Battle Over Presidential Power In Slovakia Spencer Zifcak On the 5th May, 1995 the National Council of the Slovak Republic, the country's parliament, passed a motion of no confidence in the President, Mr. Michal Kovac. This motion was passed 80 votes to 40 with 30 abstentions. It was a clear victory - but Mr. Kovac stayed put. Kovac declared that the parliament's vote was unconstitutional and meaningless, indicating to the press and the public that he would not, under any circumstances, be forced to resign. The Prime Minister, Vladimir Meciar, responded by saying that the President had acted contrary to the interest of the state and of the democratically-elected parliament. He renewed his calls for Mr. Kovac to vacate his office. This was a test of strength, he asserted, between the will of the democratically-elected government and a President who had lost both his mandate and authority. The two then traded further insults in bitter personal exchanges that would make most western observers blanch. It was these vitriolic exchanges that captured the attention of the press and the public. It is a sad fact of the recent Slovak political life that invective has tended to replace debate as the "modus vivendi" of political and journalistic discourse. Beneath these exchanges, however, lay more fundamental political and constitutional issues. For the impasse that was reached in May would not have occured had the institutional and constitutional structure of Slovakia been different. Without the �SLOVAKIA 71 clear appreciation of these latter difficulties, therefore, the political brawling that has recently taken place cannot be seen in its proper perspective. In the remainder of this article, I will examine this flawed constitutional framework with a view to casting a clearer light on current political development. The Curious Constitutional Relationship between President, Government and Parliament. The Slovak Constitution establishes a parliamentary form of government. 1 That is, it provides that the government is drawn from the parliament which is directly elected by the people. The government is then responsible to the parliament and through the parliament to the people. The government, headed by the Prime Minister, is designated as the principal repository of state power. It is the government, therefore, which has stewardship of the affairs of state. The President is the head of state. In this role he/she performs a number of important but essentially residual functions. Unlike the parliament, however, the President is not elected directly. He or she is elected for a five year term by the parliament and requires a three-fifths majority of the parliament in order to assume the position. The President appoints and recalls the Prime Minister, the government and heads of important state authorities. He or she convenes sessions of the parliament and may dissolve it under certain specified conditions. The President signs all laws and may return them to the parliament for comment, thus exercising a limited form of veto. But here the similarities in the well-understood relationship between President, government and parliament end. For the position of the President in Slovakia also possesses some rather 1 See further Shugart M. "Of Presidents and Parliaments" East European Constitutional Review (Winter, 1993), pp. 30-32. �72 SLOVAKIA unusual features which, for example, set it apart from its counterparts in Hungary and the Czech Republic. Unlike the constitutions of Hungary and the Czech Republic, the Slovak Constitution does not distinguish clearly between the powers its President exercises independently and those which he or she must exercise upon government advice. From a purely textual reading, it would appear that, with the notable exeption of declaring war, the President may exercise each and every one of his or her other powers independently of the recommendation of the government of the day. Potentially, therefore, the Presidency may assume considerable political importance. The strength of the office is also enhanced by a number of other constitutional provisions. For example, the President may submit reports on the state of the nation and other serious political issues to the parliament and may also submit bills and other decrees for its consideration. More extraordinarily, however, the President has the right not only to attend sessions of the parliament but also to attend sessions of the government, to chair them and to demand reports from the government and its members as he or she sees fit. 2 This confuses the position of President and Prime Minister in a parliamentary system and injects an immediate element of conflict between them. Although the President's position in relation to the government is a strong one, his or her position in relation to the parliament is weak. The President may disolve the parliament only if the Government' s programme is rejected by the parliament three times within six months of it assuming office. Once the government's programme is accepted, however, the parliament may not be disolved until the time of the next election. More importantly, the parliament may remove the President from office at any time during his or her term. So, the President may be recalled if he or 2 This latter provision is contained in Article 102(q) of the Constitution and, as far as I am aware, has no other counterpart in the Central European region. �SLOVAKIA 73 she "undertakes activities directed against the sovereignty and integrity of the Slovak Republic or if his (or her) activities undermine the democratic order of the Slovak Republic." 3 The votes of three-fifths of the members of parliament are needed to remove the President from office. Again, this provision is inconsistent with traditional understanding of parliamentary democracy. According to these understandings, the Presidency exists to guard the constitution, to act as a counterweight to the abuse of governmental power and provide the means through which governmental and parliamentary crises may be resolved. It is incompatible with each of these roles for the President to be removable on broadly defined grounds at the will of either the government or parliament. It is against this somewhat strange constitutional backround that the present political turmoil is best understood. Presidential and Prime Ministerial Power In 1993 a row erupted between Prime Minister Meciar and his foreign minister Milan Knazko. Meciar accused Knazko of treachery in that he had persuaded some members of the governing coalition to vote against Meciar' s preferred candidate for the Presidency. Knazko denied the charges and counterattacked, saying that Meciar conducted government in an authoritarian manner and ought to consult more widely with the parliament and the public. Meciar then advised the new President, Mr. Kovac, to recall Mr. Knazko from his ministerial post. At first, Kovac cavilled at this request, preferring instead to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court. More specifically, the President petitioned the Court to determine whether he was under a duty to follow the Prime Minister's advice when appointing and 3 Article 106 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. �74 SLOVAKIA recalling ministers. Undeterred, Meciar threatened to resign unless Knazko was removed. To defuse the situation, Kovac then recalled Knazko from office before the Court had rolled on his petition. The Court's decision appeared in June and favoured the President. After an extensive examination of the relevant constitutional provisions and an exploration of the political and constitutional history of the office of President, the Court decided that the President was not obliged to follow the Prime Minister's recomendations.4 The Court remarked that the Constitution had created a Presidency possessing considerable power. Further, it observed that article 111, which provides that the President appoints and recalls ministers on the Prime Minister's recomendation, was cast in discretionary rather then imperative terms. For these and other reasons it determined that the President exercised his powers of appointment and recall independently. This decission had no impact in the Knazko case but ignited new fires in November, 1993 when Prime Minister Meciar submitted a new cabinet for the President's approval. Meciar submitted seven names as a package, indicating to the President that he must appoint every person nominated or appoint no one at all. Kovac, however, took exception to the appointment of Ivan Lexa as minister for privatisation on the grounds that Lexa was unqualified for the position and that a conflict of interest rendered him unfit to hold the post. He refused to appoint him, calling the Prime Minister's bluff and provoking a hostile governmental response. Three months later, Meciar' s government come to an end. The Prime Minister proposed to amend privatisation laws in a manner that would have concentrated all power over privati- • Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, Volume 1, C.5. �SLOVAKIA 75 sation in his own hands and slowed the privatisation program significantly. President Kovac publicly criticised the Prime Minister, warning that his dictatorial style could produce significant problems for Slovak democracy. With Kovac's tacit approval, a number of opposition parties then banded together to pass a vote of no confidence in the government. Meciar resigned and Kovac installed the new government led by Jozef Moravcik five days afterwards. New elections were held in September, 1994 and, despite his setback, Meciar' s HZDS emerged with the largest single block of votes. HZDS deputies were infuriated, however, when President Kovac failed immediately to appoint Meciar as Prime Minister, prefering instead to allow the new parliamentary deputies to explore a number of different governmental configurations. A Meciar-led coalition was finally appointed however and parliament reconvened on November 3. After its first formal session, the governing parties reconvened parliament immediately for a second sitting which took place throughout the night. During that evening, the new coalition partners moved a vote of no confidence in two former Moravcfk government ministers and dismissed a swath of senior governmental officials including members of the boards of Slovak Radio and television, members of the National Property Fund and the chairman and vice chairman of the Supreme Auditing Office. 5 The coalition also attempted to introduce retrospective amendments to privatisation laws instituted by the previous government but this initiative met with a Presidential veto a few days later. The relationship between the Prime Minister and the President had sunk to an all-time low and it was simply a matter of time before their political and personal animosity would be rekindled. 5 For further details of these disturbing parliamentary developments see "Slovakia" East European Constitutional Review (Winter, 1995), pp. 30-32. �76 SLOVAKIA The Parliament's Vote of No Confidence in the President On May, 5 1995 and without notice, HZDS deputies in the parliament moved a vote of no confidence in President Kovac. The HZDS statement which accompanied the motion declared that after two years in office, the President "is not capable of carrying out his duties because he is causing a polarisation of society, his actions are not impartial and he has failed to respect the seriousness of the democratic decisions approved by the parliament, and, thus, the will of the majority of Slovak people." The motion of no confidence was based on a confidential report produced by OKO, the parliamentary committee responsible for overseeing the operation of the state intelligence services (SIS). This committee was headed by Ivan Lexa, whose appointment as privatisation minister the President had rejected one year before. The contents of the report are not known. Nor is the content of the parliamentary discussion about it. This is because the government and some members of the opposition parties voted ' to close the session of parliament at which the report was considered. The Constitution permits the closure of parliament if three-fifths of the deputies vote in favor of doing so. 6 For one day, democracy in Slovakia was suspended. In any event, the parliament voted in favor of the motion of no confidence but failed to achieve the three-fifths majority that was required to remove the President from office. The President was not given a copy of the report and it was not until six days later that he was permitted to enter parliament to deliver his defence. As he stood to address the parliament, every member of the governing coalition rose and left the chamber leaving the parliament in tatters. In his address, the President denied the 6 Article 83(4). �SLOVAKIA 77 rumoured charges against him, which included the allegation that he had requested the SIS to produce confidential security reports on his political opponents. He criticized the Meciar government's propensity to concentrate power in its own hands. He argued that the parliament's resolution conformed neither with parliamentary standing orders nor with the terms of the constitution. He concluded by reaffirming that he would not be driven from his position. The following day, the Prime Minister was on the attack again asserting that the President's mandate had concluded with his own re-election. In the light of the parliament's vote of no confidence, therefore, the only principled position the President could take was to resign. Constitutional Travail It is clear from this account of events that the marriage between former political allies Kovac and Meciar has broken down irretrievably. But to say this is to tell only half the relevant story. The constitutional problematic is just as important and far more interesting. In conclusion, therefore, let me draw out this salient points. 1. The constitution itself established the preconditions for the current political debacle. It juxtaposes a strong government with a strong presidency, leaving it quite unclear, therefore, how the respective roles of President and Prime Minister should properly be reconciled. In certain key respects, the constitutional text is uncertain or indefinite. The problem of whether and when the President should exercise his or her designated constitutional functions independently provides the clearest and most pressing example of this textual ambiguity. The lack of clarity in these two respects is aggravated by the absence of established constitutional conventions governing the relationship between �78 SLOVAKIA the two offices in question. In the absence of either mutual respect or good will between the protagonists, the political traditions that are now being established are likely to create even greater conflict and uncertainty in the future. 2. The stability of the Presidency and hence the effective operation of the separation of powers is undermined completely by the parliament's power to remove the President from office. Such a provision does not exist in other comparable constitutions in the region and this for good reason. Symbolically, the role of the President is to unify the nation and to protect its democratic institutions. In practice, the President can cause a government to think before it acts precipitously, either to misuse or enhance its own power or to deny other institutions and individuals the capacity to exercise theirs. It is in recognition of the fact that the President represents the continuity and certainty of constitutional values, that the office holder is, in most cases, elected for a term which exceeds that of any one government. But the Slovak provision fails entirely to recognize this. Instead it establishes an irreconcilable tension between the President with the power to check the actions of the government, and the parliament which may, at one and the same time, remove the President at the behest of the government. 7 3. Article 106 which gives the parliament this power is itself fundamentally flawed. It casts the grounds for the President's removal in such broad terms that it is difficult to attribute any precise meaning to them. In fact, the form of words used resembles the definition of treason contained in some other Central European constitutions. But article 107 of the Slovak Constitution deals separately with treason, leaving the scope of 7 For an earlier analysis of a similar effect see Hollander, P. "The New Slovak Constitution: A Critique", in East European Constitutional Review (Fall 1992). �SLOVAKIA 79 Article 106 quite unclear. Further, Article 106 provides no indication as to how the parliament should proceed in determining whether the President meets the grounds for dismissal set down. To prevent the parliament from engaging in a political witchhunt, one might have expected that any charges against the President would have been referred to an independent body, for example the Constitutional Court, for determination. But no such procedure is set down and no such independent body was called upon during the recent fracas. 4. By failing to make it clear which of the President's powers should be exercised independently and which should be exercised upon governmental advice, the constitution provides an avenue for Presidents with pretentions to greater power to interfere significantly in the day-to-day affairs of state. This is bound to be a source of irritation to an elected government and, when combined with personal animosity between leaders and a marked lack of respect for the institutions of government, sets the scene for just the kind of escalating political conflict which Slovakia has witnessed. 5. Article 83(4), which allows the National Council of the Slovak Republic to hold closed sessions in circumstances defined by law or where three-fifths of the deputies agree that sessions be held in secret, is a flat denial of fundamental democratic principle and should never have been countenacted. Its effect, when combined with Article 106, is to permit a President to be removed from office in secret without the opportunity to defend himself or herself against the allegations made and to deprive the courts, the media and the public of any opportunity to asses the validity of such allegations and, therefore, to hold the President or parliament responsible for their actions. �80 SLOVAKIA Conclusion Very little that is good has come out of the recent battle over Presidential power. The intensity of the conflict has left the principal protagonists bruised, Slovak politics is more divided than at any time since 1989, and the flaws in the constitution are more clearly and dangerously exposed than ever before. But there has been one hopeful sign. Not long after the President delivered his defence to parliament, two of the major opposition parties called a protest rally. Over 30,000 people attended, making it the biggest since the revolutionary rallies of 1989. In his speach to the rally Jan Carnogursky, the leader of the Christian Democratic Movement, declared that neither he, nor any of the participants, should let the current government "steal the Slovak nation from its people." The implication of his remark was that the new Slovakia should be identified not only as a national, but also as a democratic and constitutional entity. The many people at the rally took the point. Part of the problem with the entire fabric of Slovak constitutionalism and politics has been that the people themselves have taken so little interest in it. Perhaps this rally might mark the beginning of a new, more active and more democratic awareness. � 70 SLOVAKIA The Battle Over Presidential Power In Slovakia Spencer Zifcak On the 5th May, 1995 the National Council of the Slovak Republic, the country's parliament, passed a motion of no confidence in the President, Mr. Michal Kovac. This motion was passed 80 votes to 40 with 30 abstentions. It was a clear victory - but Mr. Kovac stayed put. Kovac declared that the parliament's vote was unconstitutional and meaningless, indicating to the press and the public that he would not, under any circumstances, be forced to resign. The Prime Minister, Vladimir Meciar, responded by saying that the President had acted contrary to the interest of the state and of the democratically-elected parliament. He renewed his calls for Mr. Kovac to vacate his office. This was a test of strength, he asserted, between the will of the democratically-elected government and a President who had lost both his mandate and authority. The two then traded further insults in bitter personal exchanges that would make most western observers blanch. It was these vitriolic exchanges that captured the attention of the press and the public. It is a sad fact of the recent Slovak political life that invective has tended to replace debate as the "modus vivendi" of political and journalistic discourse. Beneath these exchanges, however, lay more fundamental political and constitutional issues. For the impasse that was reached in May would not have occured had the institutional and constitutional structure of Slovakia been different. Without the �SLOVAKIA 71 clear appreciation of these latter difficulties, therefore, the political brawling that has recently taken place cannot be seen in its proper perspective. In the remainder of this article, I will examine this flawed constitutional framework with a view to casting a clearer light on current political development. The Curious Constitutional Relationship between President, Government and Parliament. The Slovak Constitution establishes a parliamentary form of government. 1 That is, it provides that the government is drawn from the parliament which is directly elected by the people. The government is then responsible to the parliament and through the parliament to the people. The government, headed by the Prime Minister, is designated as the principal repository of state power. It is the government, therefore, which has stewardship of the affairs of state. The President is the head of state. In this role he/she performs a number of important but essentially residual functions. Unlike the parliament, however, the President is not elected directly. He or she is elected for a five year term by the parliament and requires a three-fifths majority of the parliament in order to assume the position. The President appoints and recalls the Prime Minister, the government and heads of important state authorities. He or she convenes sessions of the parliament and may dissolve it under certain specified conditions. The President signs all laws and may return them to the parliament for comment, thus exercising a limited form of veto. But here the similarities in the well-understood relationship between President, government and parliament end. For the position of the President in Slovakia also possesses some rather 1 See further Shugart M. "Of Presidents and Parliaments" East European Constitutional Review (Winter, 1993), pp. 30-32. �72 SLOVAKIA unusual features which, for example, set it apart from its counterparts in Hungary and the Czech Republic. Unlike the constitutions of Hungary and the Czech Republic, the Slovak Constitution does not distinguish clearly between the powers its President exercises independently and those which he or she must exercise upon government advice. From a purely textual reading, it would appear that, with the notable exeption of declaring war, the President may exercise each and every one of his or her other powers independently of the recommendation of the government of the day. Potentially, therefore, the Presidency may assume considerable political importance. The strength of the office is also enhanced by a number of other constitutional provisions. For example, the President may submit reports on the state of the nation and other serious political issues to the parliament and may also submit bills and other decrees for its consideration. More extraordinarily, however, the President has the right not only to attend sessions of the parliament but also to attend sessions of the government, to chair them and to demand reports from the government and its members as he or she sees fit. 2 This confuses the position of President and Prime Minister in a parliamentary system and injects an immediate element of conflict between them. Although the President's position in relation to the government is a strong one, his or her position in relation to the parliament is weak. The President may disolve the parliament only if the Government' s programme is rejected by the parliament three times within six months of it assuming office. Once the government's programme is accepted, however, the parliament may not be disolved until the time of the next election. More importantly, the parliament may remove the President from office at any time during his or her term. So, the President may be recalled if he or 2 This latter provision is contained in Article 102(q) of the Constitution and, as far as I am aware, has no other counterpart in the Central European region. �SLOVAKIA 73 she "undertakes activities directed against the sovereignty and integrity of the Slovak Republic or if his (or her) activities undermine the democratic order of the Slovak Republic." 3 The votes of three-fifths of the members of parliament are needed to remove the President from office. Again, this provision is inconsistent with traditional understanding of parliamentary democracy. According to these understandings, the Presidency exists to guard the constitution, to act as a counterweight to the abuse of governmental power and provide the means through which governmental and parliamentary crises may be resolved. It is incompatible with each of these roles for the President to be removable on broadly defined grounds at the will of either the government or parliament. It is against this somewhat strange constitutional backround that the present political turmoil is best understood. Presidential and Prime Ministerial Power In 1993 a row erupted between Prime Minister Meciar and his foreign minister Milan Knazko. Meciar accused Knazko of treachery in that he had persuaded some members of the governing coalition to vote against Meciar' s preferred candidate for the Presidency. Knazko denied the charges and counterattacked, saying that Meciar conducted government in an authoritarian manner and ought to consult more widely with the parliament and the public. Meciar then advised the new President, Mr. Kovac, to recall Mr. Knazko from his ministerial post. At first, Kovac cavilled at this request, preferring instead to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court. More specifically, the President petitioned the Court to determine whether he was under a duty to follow the Prime Minister's advice when appointing and 3 Article 106 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. �74 SLOVAKIA recalling ministers. Undeterred, Meciar threatened to resign unless Knazko was removed. To defuse the situation, Kovac then recalled Knazko from office before the Court had rolled on his petition. The Court's decision appeared in June and favoured the President. After an extensive examination of the relevant constitutional provisions and an exploration of the political and constitutional history of the office of President, the Court decided that the President was not obliged to follow the Prime Minister's recomendations.4 The Court remarked that the Constitution had created a Presidency possessing considerable power. Further, it observed that article 111, which provides that the President appoints and recalls ministers on the Prime Minister's recomendation, was cast in discretionary rather then imperative terms. For these and other reasons it determined that the President exercised his powers of appointment and recall independently. This decission had no impact in the Knazko case but ignited new fires in November, 1993 when Prime Minister Meciar submitted a new cabinet for the President's approval. Meciar submitted seven names as a package, indicating to the President that he must appoint every person nominated or appoint no one at all. Kovac, however, took exception to the appointment of Ivan Lexa as minister for privatisation on the grounds that Lexa was unqualified for the position and that a conflict of interest rendered him unfit to hold the post. He refused to appoint him, calling the Prime Minister's bluff and provoking a hostile governmental response. Three months later, Meciar' s government come to an end. The Prime Minister proposed to amend privatisation laws in a manner that would have concentrated all power over privati- • Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, Volume 1, C.5. �SLOVAKIA 75 sation in his own hands and slowed the privatisation program significantly. President Kovac publicly criticised the Prime Minister, warning that his dictatorial style could produce significant problems for Slovak democracy. With Kovac's tacit approval, a number of opposition parties then banded together to pass a vote of no confidence in the government. Meciar resigned and Kovac installed the new government led by Jozef Moravcik five days afterwards. New elections were held in September, 1994 and, despite his setback, Meciar' s HZDS emerged with the largest single block of votes. HZDS deputies were infuriated, however, when President Kovac failed immediately to appoint Meciar as Prime Minister, prefering instead to allow the new parliamentary deputies to explore a number of different governmental configurations. A Meciar-led coalition was finally appointed however and parliament reconvened on November 3. After its first formal session, the governing parties reconvened parliament immediately for a second sitting which took place throughout the night. During that evening, the new coalition partners moved a vote of no confidence in two former Moravcfk government ministers and dismissed a swath of senior governmental officials including members of the boards of Slovak Radio and television, members of the National Property Fund and the chairman and vice chairman of the Supreme Auditing Office. 5 The coalition also attempted to introduce retrospective amendments to privatisation laws instituted by the previous government but this initiative met with a Presidential veto a few days later. The relationship between the Prime Minister and the President had sunk to an all-time low and it was simply a matter of time before their political and personal animosity would be rekindled. 5 For further details of these disturbing parliamentary developments see "Slovakia" East European Constitutional Review (Winter, 1995), pp. 30-32. �76 SLOVAKIA The Parliament's Vote of No Confidence in the President On May, 5 1995 and without notice, HZDS deputies in the parliament moved a vote of no confidence in President Kovac. The HZDS statement which accompanied the motion declared that after two years in office, the President "is not capable of carrying out his duties because he is causing a polarisation of society, his actions are not impartial and he has failed to respect the seriousness of the democratic decisions approved by the parliament, and, thus, the will of the majority of Slovak people." The motion of no confidence was based on a confidential report produced by OKO, the parliamentary committee responsible for overseeing the operation of the state intelligence services (SIS). This committee was headed by Ivan Lexa, whose appointment as privatisation minister the President had rejected one year before. The contents of the report are not known. Nor is the content of the parliamentary discussion about it. This is because the government and some members of the opposition parties voted ' to close the session of parliament at which the report was considered. The Constitution permits the closure of parliament if three-fifths of the deputies vote in favor of doing so. 6 For one day, democracy in Slovakia was suspended. In any event, the parliament voted in favor of the motion of no confidence but failed to achieve the three-fifths majority that was required to remove the President from office. The President was not given a copy of the report and it was not until six days later that he was permitted to enter parliament to deliver his defence. As he stood to address the parliament, every member of the governing coalition rose and left the chamber leaving the parliament in tatters. In his address, the President denied the 6 Article 83(4). �SLOVAKIA 77 rumoured charges against him, which included the allegation that he had requested the SIS to produce confidential security reports on his political opponents. He criticized the Meciar government's propensity to concentrate power in its own hands. He argued that the parliament's resolution conformed neither with parliamentary standing orders nor with the terms of the constitution. He concluded by reaffirming that he would not be driven from his position. The following day, the Prime Minister was on the attack again asserting that the President's mandate had concluded with his own re-election. In the light of the parliament's vote of no confidence, therefore, the only principled position the President could take was to resign. Constitutional Travail It is clear from this account of events that the marriage between former political allies Kovac and Meciar has broken down irretrievably. But to say this is to tell only half the relevant story. The constitutional problematic is just as important and far more interesting. In conclusion, therefore, let me draw out this salient points. 1. The constitution itself established the preconditions for the current political debacle. It juxtaposes a strong government with a strong presidency, leaving it quite unclear, therefore, how the respective roles of President and Prime Minister should properly be reconciled. In certain key respects, the constitutional text is uncertain or indefinite. The problem of whether and when the President should exercise his or her designated constitutional functions independently provides the clearest and most pressing example of this textual ambiguity. The lack of clarity in these two respects is aggravated by the absence of established constitutional conventions governing the relationship between �78 SLOVAKIA the two offices in question. In the absence of either mutual respect or good will between the protagonists, the political traditions that are now being established are likely to create even greater conflict and uncertainty in the future. 2. The stability of the Presidency and hence the effective operation of the separation of powers is undermined completely by the parliament's power to remove the President from office. Such a provision does not exist in other comparable constitutions in the region and this for good reason. Symbolically, the role of the President is to unify the nation and to protect its democratic institutions. In practice, the President can cause a government to think before it acts precipitously, either to misuse or enhance its own power or to deny other institutions and individuals the capacity to exercise theirs. It is in recognition of the fact that the President represents the continuity and certainty of constitutional values, that the office holder is, in most cases, elected for a term which exceeds that of any one government. But the Slovak provision fails entirely to recognize this. Instead it establishes an irreconcilable tension between the President with the power to check the actions of the government, and the parliament which may, at one and the same time, remove the President at the behest of the government. 7 3. Article 106 which gives the parliament this power is itself fundamentally flawed. It casts the grounds for the President's removal in such broad terms that it is difficult to attribute any precise meaning to them. In fact, the form of words used resembles the definition of treason contained in some other Central European constitutions. But article 107 of the Slovak Constitution deals separately with treason, leaving the scope of 7 For an earlier analysis of a similar effect see Hollander, P. "The New Slovak Constitution: A Critique", in East European Constitutional Review (Fall 1992). �SLOVAKIA 79 Article 106 quite unclear. Further, Article 106 provides no indication as to how the parliament should proceed in determining whether the President meets the grounds for dismissal set down. To prevent the parliament from engaging in a political witchhunt, one might have expected that any charges against the President would have been referred to an independent body, for example the Constitutional Court, for determination. But no such procedure is set down and no such independent body was called upon during the recent fracas. 4. By failing to make it clear which of the President's powers should be exercised independently and which should be exercised upon governmental advice, the constitution provides an avenue for Presidents with pretentions to greater power to interfere significantly in the day-to-day affairs of state. This is bound to be a source of irritation to an elected government and, when combined with personal animosity between leaders and a marked lack of respect for the institutions of government, sets the scene for just the kind of escalating political conflict which Slovakia has witnessed. 5. Article 83(4), which allows the National Council of the Slovak Republic to hold closed sessions in circumstances defined by law or where three-fifths of the deputies agree that sessions be held in secret, is a flat denial of fundamental democratic principle and should never have been countenacted. Its effect, when combined with Article 106, is to permit a President to be removed from office in secret without the opportunity to defend himself or herself against the allegations made and to deprive the courts, the media and the public of any opportunity to asses the validity of such allegations and, therefore, to hold the President or parliament responsible for their actions. �80 SLOVAKIA Conclusion Very little that is good has come out of the recent battle over Presidential power. The intensity of the conflict has left the principal protagonists bruised, Slovak politics is more divided than at any time since 1989, and the flaws in the constitution are more clearly and dangerously exposed than ever before. But there has been one hopeful sign. Not long after the President delivered his defence to parliament, two of the major opposition parties called a protest rally. Over 30,000 people attended, making it the biggest since the revolutionary rallies of 1989. In his speach to the rally Jan Carnogursky, the leader of the Christian Democratic Movement, declared that neither he, nor any of the participants, should let the current government "steal the Slovak nation from its people." The implication of his remark was that the new Slovakia should be identified not only as a national, but also as a democratic and constitutional entity. The many people at the rally took the point. Part of the problem with the entire fabric of Slovak constitutionalism and politics has been that the people themselves have taken so little interest in it. Perhaps this rally might mark the beginning of a new, more active and more democratic awareness. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1998, Vol. 36 Description An account of the resource Vol. 36 (No. 66-67), 1998. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1998 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 70 SLOVAKIA The Battle Over Presidential Power In Slovakia Spencer Zifcak On the 5th May, 1995 the National Council of the Slovak Republic, the country's parliament, passed a motion of no confidence in the President, Mr. Michal Kovac. This motion was passed 80 votes to 40 with 30 abstentions. It was a clear victory - but Mr. Kovac stayed put. Kovac declared that the parliament's vote was unconstitutional and meaningless, indicating to the press and the public that he would not, under any circumstances, be forced to resign. The Prime Minister, Vladimir Meciar, responded by saying that the President had acted contrary to the interest of the state and of the democratically-elected parliament. He renewed his calls for Mr. Kovac to vacate his office. This was a test of strength, he asserted, between the will of the democratically-elected government and a President who had lost both his mandate and authority. The two then traded further insults in bitter personal exchanges that would make most western observers blanch. It was these vitriolic exchanges that captured the attention of the press and the public. It is a sad fact of the recent Slovak political life that invective has tended to replace debate as the "modus vivendi" of political and journalistic discourse. Beneath these exchanges, however, lay more fundamental political and constitutional issues. For the impasse that was reached in May would not have occured had the institutional and constitutional structure of Slovakia been different. Without the SLOVAKIA 71 clear appreciation of these latter difficulties, therefore, the political brawling that has recently taken place cannot be seen in its proper perspective. In the remainder of this article, I will examine this flawed constitutional framework with a view to casting a clearer light on current political development. The Curious Constitutional Relationship between President, Government and Parliament. The Slovak Constitution establishes a parliamentary form of government. 1 That is, it provides that the government is drawn from the parliament which is directly elected by the people. The government is then responsible to the parliament and through the parliament to the people. The government, headed by the Prime Minister, is designated as the principal repository of state power. It is the government, therefore, which has stewardship of the affairs of state. The President is the head of state. In this role he/she performs a number of important but essentially residual functions. Unlike the parliament, however, the President is not elected directly. He or she is elected for a five year term by the parliament and requires a three-fifths majority of the parliament in order to assume the position. The President appoints and recalls the Prime Minister, the government and heads of important state authorities. He or she convenes sessions of the parliament and may dissolve it under certain specified conditions. The President signs all laws and may return them to the parliament for comment, thus exercising a limited form of veto. But here the similarities in the well-understood relationship between President, government and parliament end. For the position of the President in Slovakia also possesses some rather 1 See further Shugart M. "Of Presidents and Parliaments" East European Constitutional Review (Winter, 1993), pp. 30-32. 72 SLOVAKIA unusual features which, for example, set it apart from its counterparts in Hungary and the Czech Republic. Unlike the constitutions of Hungary and the Czech Republic, the Slovak Constitution does not distinguish clearly between the powers its President exercises independently and those which he or she must exercise upon government advice. From a purely textual reading, it would appear that, with the notable exeption of declaring war, the President may exercise each and every one of his or her other powers independently of the recommendation of the government of the day. Potentially, therefore, the Presidency may assume considerable political importance. The strength of the office is also enhanced by a number of other constitutional provisions. For example, the President may submit reports on the state of the nation and other serious political issues to the parliament and may also submit bills and other decrees for its consideration. More extraordinarily, however, the President has the right not only to attend sessions of the parliament but also to attend sessions of the government, to chair them and to demand reports from the government and its members as he or she sees fit. 2 This confuses the position of President and Prime Minister in a parliamentary system and injects an immediate element of conflict between them. Although the President's position in relation to the government is a strong one, his or her position in relation to the parliament is weak. The President may disolve the parliament only if the Government' s programme is rejected by the parliament three times within six months of it assuming office. Once the government's programme is accepted, however, the parliament may not be disolved until the time of the next election. More importantly, the parliament may remove the President from office at any time during his or her term. So, the President may be recalled if he or 2 This latter provision is contained in Article 102(q) of the Constitution and, as far as I am aware, has no other counterpart in the Central European region. SLOVAKIA 73 she "undertakes activities directed against the sovereignty and integrity of the Slovak Republic or if his (or her) activities undermine the democratic order of the Slovak Republic." 3 The votes of three-fifths of the members of parliament are needed to remove the President from office. Again, this provision is inconsistent with traditional understanding of parliamentary democracy. According to these understandings, the Presidency exists to guard the constitution, to act as a counterweight to the abuse of governmental power and provide the means through which governmental and parliamentary crises may be resolved. It is incompatible with each of these roles for the President to be removable on broadly defined grounds at the will of either the government or parliament. It is against this somewhat strange constitutional backround that the present political turmoil is best understood. Presidential and Prime Ministerial Power In 1993 a row erupted between Prime Minister Meciar and his foreign minister Milan Knazko. Meciar accused Knazko of treachery in that he had persuaded some members of the governing coalition to vote against Meciar' s preferred candidate for the Presidency. Knazko denied the charges and counterattacked, saying that Meciar conducted government in an authoritarian manner and ought to consult more widely with the parliament and the public. Meciar then advised the new President, Mr. Kovac, to recall Mr. Knazko from his ministerial post. At first, Kovac cavilled at this request, preferring instead to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court. More specifically, the President petitioned the Court to determine whether he was under a duty to follow the Prime Minister's advice when appointing and 3 Article 106 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. 74 SLOVAKIA recalling ministers. Undeterred, Meciar threatened to resign unless Knazko was removed. To defuse the situation, Kovac then recalled Knazko from office before the Court had rolled on his petition. The Court's decision appeared in June and favoured the President. After an extensive examination of the relevant constitutional provisions and an exploration of the political and constitutional history of the office of President, the Court decided that the President was not obliged to follow the Prime Minister's recomendations.4 The Court remarked that the Constitution had created a Presidency possessing considerable power. Further, it observed that article 111, which provides that the President appoints and recalls ministers on the Prime Minister's recomendation, was cast in discretionary rather then imperative terms. For these and other reasons it determined that the President exercised his powers of appointment and recall independently. This decission had no impact in the Knazko case but ignited new fires in November, 1993 when Prime Minister Meciar submitted a new cabinet for the President's approval. Meciar submitted seven names as a package, indicating to the President that he must appoint every person nominated or appoint no one at all. Kovac, however, took exception to the appointment of Ivan Lexa as minister for privatisation on the grounds that Lexa was unqualified for the position and that a conflict of interest rendered him unfit to hold the post. He refused to appoint him, calling the Prime Minister's bluff and provoking a hostile governmental response. Three months later, Meciar' s government come to an end. The Prime Minister proposed to amend privatisation laws in a manner that would have concentrated all power over privati- • Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, Volume 1, C.5. SLOVAKIA 75 sation in his own hands and slowed the privatisation program significantly. President Kovac publicly criticised the Prime Minister, warning that his dictatorial style could produce significant problems for Slovak democracy. With Kovac's tacit approval, a number of opposition parties then banded together to pass a vote of no confidence in the government. Meciar resigned and Kovac installed the new government led by Jozef Moravcik five days afterwards. New elections were held in September, 1994 and, despite his setback, Meciar' s HZDS emerged with the largest single block of votes. HZDS deputies were infuriated, however, when President Kovac failed immediately to appoint Meciar as Prime Minister, prefering instead to allow the new parliamentary deputies to explore a number of different governmental configurations. A Meciar-led coalition was finally appointed however and parliament reconvened on November 3. After its first formal session, the governing parties reconvened parliament immediately for a second sitting which took place throughout the night. During that evening, the new coalition partners moved a vote of no confidence in two former Moravcfk government ministers and dismissed a swath of senior governmental officials including members of the boards of Slovak Radio and television, members of the National Property Fund and the chairman and vice chairman of the Supreme Auditing Office. 5 The coalition also attempted to introduce retrospective amendments to privatisation laws instituted by the previous government but this initiative met with a Presidential veto a few days later. The relationship between the Prime Minister and the President had sunk to an all-time low and it was simply a matter of time before their political and personal animosity would be rekindled. 5 For further details of these disturbing parliamentary developments see "Slovakia" East European Constitutional Review (Winter, 1995), pp. 30-32. 76 SLOVAKIA The Parliament's Vote of No Confidence in the President On May, 5 1995 and without notice, HZDS deputies in the parliament moved a vote of no confidence in President Kovac. The HZDS statement which accompanied the motion declared that after two years in office, the President "is not capable of carrying out his duties because he is causing a polarisation of society, his actions are not impartial and he has failed to respect the seriousness of the democratic decisions approved by the parliament, and, thus, the will of the majority of Slovak people." The motion of no confidence was based on a confidential report produced by OKO, the parliamentary committee responsible for overseeing the operation of the state intelligence services (SIS). This committee was headed by Ivan Lexa, whose appointment as privatisation minister the President had rejected one year before. The contents of the report are not known. Nor is the content of the parliamentary discussion about it. This is because the government and some members of the opposition parties voted ' to close the session of parliament at which the report was considered. The Constitution permits the closure of parliament if three-fifths of the deputies vote in favor of doing so. 6 For one day, democracy in Slovakia was suspended. In any event, the parliament voted in favor of the motion of no confidence but failed to achieve the three-fifths majority that was required to remove the President from office. The President was not given a copy of the report and it was not until six days later that he was permitted to enter parliament to deliver his defence. As he stood to address the parliament, every member of the governing coalition rose and left the chamber leaving the parliament in tatters. In his address, the President denied the 6 Article 83(4). SLOVAKIA 77 rumoured charges against him, which included the allegation that he had requested the SIS to produce confidential security reports on his political opponents. He criticized the Meciar government's propensity to concentrate power in its own hands. He argued that the parliament's resolution conformed neither with parliamentary standing orders nor with the terms of the constitution. He concluded by reaffirming that he would not be driven from his position. The following day, the Prime Minister was on the attack again asserting that the President's mandate had concluded with his own re-election. In the light of the parliament's vote of no confidence, therefore, the only principled position the President could take was to resign. Constitutional Travail It is clear from this account of events that the marriage between former political allies Kovac and Meciar has broken down irretrievably. But to say this is to tell only half the relevant story. The constitutional problematic is just as important and far more interesting. In conclusion, therefore, let me draw out this salient points. 1. The constitution itself established the preconditions for the current political debacle. It juxtaposes a strong government with a strong presidency, leaving it quite unclear, therefore, how the respective roles of President and Prime Minister should properly be reconciled. In certain key respects, the constitutional text is uncertain or indefinite. The problem of whether and when the President should exercise his or her designated constitutional functions independently provides the clearest and most pressing example of this textual ambiguity. The lack of clarity in these two respects is aggravated by the absence of established constitutional conventions governing the relationship between 78 SLOVAKIA the two offices in question. In the absence of either mutual respect or good will between the protagonists, the political traditions that are now being established are likely to create even greater conflict and uncertainty in the future. 2. The stability of the Presidency and hence the effective operation of the separation of powers is undermined completely by the parliament's power to remove the President from office. Such a provision does not exist in other comparable constitutions in the region and this for good reason. Symbolically, the role of the President is to unify the nation and to protect its democratic institutions. In practice, the President can cause a government to think before it acts precipitously, either to misuse or enhance its own power or to deny other institutions and individuals the capacity to exercise theirs. It is in recognition of the fact that the President represents the continuity and certainty of constitutional values, that the office holder is, in most cases, elected for a term which exceeds that of any one government. But the Slovak provision fails entirely to recognize this. Instead it establishes an irreconcilable tension between the President with the power to check the actions of the government, and the parliament which may, at one and the same time, remove the President at the behest of the government. 7 3. Article 106 which gives the parliament this power is itself fundamentally flawed. It casts the grounds for the President's removal in such broad terms that it is difficult to attribute any precise meaning to them. In fact, the form of words used resembles the definition of treason contained in some other Central European constitutions. But article 107 of the Slovak Constitution deals separately with treason, leaving the scope of 7 For an earlier analysis of a similar effect see Hollander, P. "The New Slovak Constitution: A Critique", in East European Constitutional Review (Fall 1992). SLOVAKIA 79 Article 106 quite unclear. Further, Article 106 provides no indication as to how the parliament should proceed in determining whether the President meets the grounds for dismissal set down. To prevent the parliament from engaging in a political witchhunt, one might have expected that any charges against the President would have been referred to an independent body, for example the Constitutional Court, for determination. But no such procedure is set down and no such independent body was called upon during the recent fracas. 4. By failing to make it clear which of the President's powers should be exercised independently and which should be exercised upon governmental advice, the constitution provides an avenue for Presidents with pretentions to greater power to interfere significantly in the day-to-day affairs of state. This is bound to be a source of irritation to an elected government and, when combined with personal animosity between leaders and a marked lack of respect for the institutions of government, sets the scene for just the kind of escalating political conflict which Slovakia has witnessed. 5. Article 83(4), which allows the National Council of the Slovak Republic to hold closed sessions in circumstances defined by law or where three-fifths of the deputies agree that sessions be held in secret, is a flat denial of fundamental democratic principle and should never have been countenacted. Its effect, when combined with Article 106, is to permit a President to be removed from office in secret without the opportunity to defend himself or herself against the allegations made and to deprive the courts, the media and the public of any opportunity to asses the validity of such allegations and, therefore, to hold the President or parliament responsible for their actions. 80 SLOVAKIA Conclusion Very little that is good has come out of the recent battle over Presidential power. The intensity of the conflict has left the principal protagonists bruised, Slovak politics is more divided than at any time since 1989, and the flaws in the constitution are more clearly and dangerously exposed than ever before. But there has been one hopeful sign. Not long after the President delivered his defence to parliament, two of the major opposition parties called a protest rally. Over 30,000 people attended, making it the biggest since the revolutionary rallies of 1989. In his speach to the rally Jan Carnogursky, the leader of the Christian Democratic Movement, declared that neither he, nor any of the participants, should let the current government "steal the Slovak nation from its people." The implication of his remark was that the new Slovakia should be identified not only as a national, but also as a democratic and constitutional entity. The many people at the rally took the point. Part of the problem with the entire fabric of Slovak constitutionalism and politics has been that the people themselves have taken so little interest in it. Perhaps this rally might mark the beginning of a new, more active and more democratic awareness.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Battle Over Presidential Power in Slovakia Description An account of the resource Spencer Žifčák Slovakia, Vol. 36 (No. 66-67), 1998 pp. 70-80 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zifcak, Spencer, 1950- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1998 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/49378d5a099dfe61c26faeae31bbfda6.pdf 84f2a8cbb7560e0f3580292b2413ae76 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 15 MONSIGNOR JOZEF TISO - CONTROVERSIAL PERSONALITY By Th. J. Zubek, 0.F.M., S.T.D. The name of Msgr. Jozef Tiso, S.T.D., the executed president of the Slovak Republic, is generally known . .However, his ,p ersonality is not sufficiently recognized and understood in the Western world. The concept of a priest as an active politician and high state functionary is today somewhat unusual in Western Europe, more so in the United States. Too, it is generally ,k nown that the standpoint of the Holy See is against Catholic priests actively engaging in political activity. Moreover, cwtain gr,o ups present Msgr. Tiso as a disrupter of the Czecho..:Slova;k Repuiblic, a traitor, Nazi, Quisling, and a lackey of Adolf Hitler. This i:s done solely for the political motiives of presenting Sl()IVaks, their political aspirations, and their leaders in an unfavorable light. It is not strange, then, that in the Western world the .p ersonality of Msgir. T-iso appem-s Olbscured, incomprehensi'ble, controversial. To reach a true understanding and evaluation of Jozef Tiso, it is necessary to look upon his persona1ity and activities in the environment in which he lived and wo:riked; it is necessary to delve mo'l:'e deeply into the inner man, into his motiva·t ions and ideological ,bac:kground. Slovaik Clergy and Politics The Slovak nation lived for many centuries in the Hungarian Kingdom. The awaikening to national conscious.ness by the nations of Hungary brought a!bout nationalistic struggles among these nations. The national consciousness of the MaJgyars, the leading nation in Hungary, culminated in the idea of a great Magyar state, politically, culturally and lingu~tically hornogenous. The Ma. gyars wished to Magyarize the non~Magyar nations of Hungary, namely, the Slovaks, Roumanians, Croats, and Germans. The first victims of the forced Magyarization were 1 �16 SLOVAKIA the Slovaks. The overwhelming majority of the intelligent.. sia of Slovak origin succumbed to Magyar pressure and followed the official Magyar line, for .this was a prerequisite in the furtherance of one's career. Of the inteMigentsia it was almost exclusively the clerigy who remained loyal to the Slovak nation. The clergy became bearers of the Slovak populace with religious instruction and cultural and social enlightenment. They were Catholic priests and Lutheran minister s. Outstanding among the priests were Anton Bernolak (1762-1813), formulator of the Slovak literary language; Juraj Fandly (17514~1810) , social educator and popular writer on husbandry; Jan Holly (1785--1849), a poet who wrote heroic epics about the Slovaik past; Bishop Stephen Moyses (1797-1869) , founder and first .president of the cultural institute, Matica Sloven.ska; Andrej RadlinSlky (1818.---1879) , founder of St. Adalbert Society, a Catholic publishing house ; Ferdis Juriga (1874- 1953), an excellent orator and political leader,1 and Andrej Hlinka, (1864 -1938), a fiery defender orf Slova:k rights and founder of the Slovak People's Party. Of the Lutheran ministers~patriots there were Michal M. Hodza (1811-1880) and J ozef M. Hurban (1817-1888), writers who ,o rganized and led the armed uprising of thB SlovaJks against the 'Magyars in 1'948; Karol iKuzmany (1806-1866) , poet and ,c o-founder of the Matica Sloven.ska, and Martin Razus (1888-1937), poet and politica1 leader. Upon the basis of solidifying the Slovaks against Magyarization and fighting for their political and social rights, the clergy entered into the politcal life of Hungary. Jozef Tiso in the Parliament at Prague Wllen, in 1918, Slovakia became a part •o f the CzechoSlovak Republic, it appeared at first that more favorable conditions ,w ould prevail for the Slovaks. However, it soon became apparent that the Czechs had much the same conceptions as the !Magyars. The Czechs, too, dreamed of a great Czechoslovak national state, with a politically insignificant minority of Germans and Magyars. The Slovaks were to cede their national individuality and merge with �SLOVAKIA 17 the Czechs to create a new Czechoslovak nationality and to become Czechs eventually. The Slovaks, however, had long ago developed the consciousness of a distinct nationality and had no intention of ceding their national individuality in the interest of the Czechs. The Slovaks also felt the impact of the economic exploitation which the Czechs initiated imrne4iately after 1918 when they practically made Slovakia their colony. It was almost impossible for a ~ovak to enter civil service, since almost all civil positions and important economic functions in SlorvaJkia weTe occupied by the Czechs. Further, the Slorvaks, as a deeply religious Catholic nation (80 %- ), resented the anti-religious acts of the Czechs, which were also provocatively perpetrated in Slovaikia. In the struggle against Ozechization of the Slov,alks and in defense of Slovak rights, the Slovak People's Party, founded and led by Msgr. Andrej Hlinka, took the lead. Hlinka and Juriga, even as they had fought Magyar machinations,, began to fight Czech improprieties in the parliament at Prague, in the 1press, and through political campaigns among the people. The ,p olitical pla;tform of the S10vak People's Party was autonomy for Slovakia as guaran_ teed by the pact between American Slov.aks and the representative of Czecho-Slovakia, Professor Thomas G. Masaryk, in ·P ittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in 1918. 'I'he Slovak People's Party with its program and motto, "·F or God and Nation," aippealed to the feelings of the Slovaik populace, and soon became the most important political party in Slovakia. The autonomistic program was also foUowed by the Slorvak National Party of Martin Razus, a Lutheran minister. From the beginning of Czecho-Slovakia (1918), Jozef Tiso, a young a;nd zeailous priest, spiritual director and professor at the diocesan ·s eminary in Nitra, joined the autonomistic movement of Hlinka's Slovak Peoiple's Party. In 1925, Tiso became a member oif the Czecho--1Slovak par_ liament and then vice-president of the Slo,vaJk People's Party. When the Slorvak People's Party entered the government, he became Minister of Health (1927-1929). Tiso �18 SLOV.A!KIA. evolved soon into the staunchest e~ponent of Slovak autonomistic policies. Tiso as President of the Slovak People's Party Andrej iHlinka died in August of the critical year of 1938. At that time the Slovak People's Party was the most powerful. political group in SlovaJkia. It had in its ranks many young workers of the Slovaik inteHigentsia. None compared to Msgr. Tiso in moral and in political acumen and in expeTience. Commanding great esteem among the Slovaik populace and clergy, Tiso logically became the successor of Msgr. Hilinka in the leadership of the Slovak People's Party. Under the pressuxe of Hitler's driive, following H!Linka's death in 1938, events in CzechC>-iSlovakfa and in Europe moved quickly. That which the Czechs were loathe to grant the Slorvaiks under nonnal oonditions, they were foreed to grant in the enfeebled post-Munich Czecho...Slov-a kia. On October 6, 1938, the Slovaiks gained their political autonomy; they became the masters in Slorvakia. Msgr. 'l"iso, as the president of the Poople',s Party became the premier of the Slovak autonomous government, with the permission of his Bishop and the Vatican. Even :when Slovakia suffered by ceding territory to Hung,ary as a result of the Vienna A11bitration on Novem•b er 2, 1938, the ,Slovaiks were hruppy with the newly-gained autonomy. The Czechs left Slorva!kia; the Slovaiks began to manage their own affairs in the ·b est interests of the nation. It appeared that with the attainment of autonomy the aspirations of the Slovaiks were fulfilled and that the staJbilization of conditions in Slovakia would ·b e enduring. Tiso, President of the Republic Hitler was not satisfied with the dismemberment an.d neutralization of Czecho-Slovakia. When he decided to wa-ge war aigainst Poland, he wanted Ozecho-,SloviaJkia oom,p letcly under his control, particularly the western part (Bdhemia and Moravia) which was heavil'Y industriaJUzed and entirely encircled by the German Reich. On March 13, 1939, !H itler summoned Tiso• to Berlin �SLOVAKIA 19 and confronted him with the German decision regarding Slrovakia : Either secede from the Czechs and proclaim an independent Slorvak State or suffer the oonsequence of partition between Germany and Hungary. On IMa.Tch 14, 1939, Tiso presented the German proposition to the Slovak pavliament for decision. 'Ehe Slovak parliament voted for independence of !Slovakia. Msgr. Tiso became the ,p re. sident of the Slovak Republic.2 Msgr. Tiso and other Slovak political [eaders were somewhat hesitant to proclaim Slovak independence. Said Tiso, in his defense before the National Court in Bratislava (1947) : "Were it not for Hitler's pressure, the Slo:vak parliament would never have proclaimed indeipendence. "3 The MaJgyars amd the Czechs, to justify their claims upon Slo:va,kia, ha,d in the past repeatedly asserted that Siovllikia, for economic reasons, was incapable of independence. Slovak politica:l lea,ders, suddenly confronted with the question of independence for Sl01V,a kia, were aipprehensive of the future. But rather than have their country partitioned and occupied, they logi,cally chose the attempt at independence. And after this decision, they strove for the economic prosperity and cultural development of Slova,kia, permanently to integrate Slovakia into the family of European nations. It can be said that the Slovruk attempt was successful. The wave of naJtional enthusiasm engulfed the coll'Iltry, and Siovaikia's eoonomi:c and cultural standards flourished. The Slovaks. even those who at first were reserved, warmed to the Slorva!k .State and ha,d faith in its chief, Msgr. Jozef Tiso. 4 Even the most bitter enemies of the Slovaks had to acknowledge that the Slova;k Republic was capable of existence. That which Slovakia had proved in the years 1939-1945 is in no small measure ithe result of the political activity of Msgr. Tiso. But it is also the most controversial period of his political career. 1 The Fundamentals and Components of Tiso's Policies Msgr. Tiso's defense plea before the National COU'rt at Bratislava, encompasses many noteworthy ,p ronouncements �20 SLOVAKIA that point out the principles of his political activity. Con. sider but a few characteristic quotations. The key to the evaluation of my activity is my character of the priest with its motivations and regulations, established by Christian teaching for public activity. 5 Tiso as president of the Slovak Republic tried to lead his nation like a solicitous father according to Christian principles,, to which, as a priest, he consecrated his life. Politically I only did that which the well-being and inter est of the Slovak n::.ttion dictated. What I did, I always did according to, the best dictates of my knowledge and conscience, ... always guided by the rules of morality ... I fought evil with all my power, yielding to evil only when a greater evil threatened the nation. G 'In this light, Msgr. Tiso explained his aHeged collaboration with the Nazis. Msgr. Tiso• stated that some collaboration with Germany was at that time a necessity dictated by Slovakia 's geographic position, the develorpment of European events and the law of self..preservation. Slovakia did not have its own foreign policy, but neither did other larger nations in Hitleir-controUed Europe. Tiso pleaded that he was so concerned with the internal consolidation and development of Slovakia that he wa,s unruble to study the problems of international politics, including the war, upon which, because of his position, he could wield no influence. Slovak participation in the war against Russia, with two divisions, was merely symbolic, Tiso explained. 7 According to Msgr. Tiso, his paramount ;po'1icy was t o secure the maximum of internal freedom and independence within the German sphere. Outwardly it was necessary to yield somewhat to German pressure, to keep them apart, thus avoiding armed intervention. For this reason it was necessary to ban the Communist Party (one of the main accusations against Tiso) ; it was necessary to participate in the war against Russia, and it was necessary to institute some elements of a totalitarian regime. All this was done , however, to pull wool over the eyes of the Germans. Inter- �SLOVAKIA 21 nally, pleaded Tiso, Slovrukia was governed democratically - and there was freedom. & In this light -Msgr. Tiso aJ,s,o ex;plained anti-semitic activity in Slovakia. Msgr. 'Di.so stated that the rationalization of the Jewish problem was <based on a percentual partic1pation in the nation's economy. There were aibout 100,000 Jews in Sloivakia, or 4 % of the total .p opulation. Therefore only 4 % of the nation's economy was pe:mnitted to Jews. Jewish ,b usinesses were being aryanized, that is, a non-Jew would buy 51 % of a business, at an officially esta:blished rate, and the former Jewish proprietor would remain as a partrn~r. Later, at the dictate of the Gernnans, Jews were put into con centration camps and e vacuated into Poland under the pretext that land would be ,p rovided for them so that they wou!ld be able to Hve under their own ru:le. Tiso justified his position ·b y saying that he did not know at that time that the evacuated Jews would be exterminated in Polish and German concentration camps.9 A Weak Defense Herein In regard to the Jewish question, Msgr. Giuseppe Burzio, r epresentative of the Holy See in Slovakia, intervened with President Tiso in behalf of the Jews. It was rumored that Msigr. Tiso, 'a s a Catholic priest, should have resigned from the presidency, since he was unable to curtail the antisemitic campaign dictated by the Germans and waged by Slovak extremists unde r the direction of Premier Dr. Vojtech Tuka. Concerning the possibility o.f his resignation, let Tiso speak: I did not resign because I felt a moral obligation to fulfill. the duty that I had undertaken until I had been released from it by lega1ly constituted functionaries ... My action would have been egotistica,l had I left my nation in those difficult times and entered ;pri.., vate life. My action would haive been irresponsible and against the nation had I not truken into private life the moral values that I felt I represented 10 He stated further that had he received an official request from his ecclesiastical authorities, he would ha,ve re. �22 SLOV.i\KIA signed, for then there would have been no- decision to maJke, the responsibility would have been the Church authorities'. It is generally known that even repre sentatiives of the Jews had begged him to remain in office, for it would have been a total catastrophe for the Jews if someone else would have ,b een president oif the Slovak Republic. Tiso managed to insert into- ithe anti.Jewish law a provision to exempt some Jews. He wa:s a:ble to qualify a Jew as indispensa:ble to Slovak economy and thus save him from deportation. About 9,000 such exemptions were made. Despite this, howeveT, the Jewish question was really a weak point of Tiso's policy and of his defense. The End of Msgr. Tiso Msgr. Tiso's trial beg,an at the end of 1946 and lasted until April of 1947. On April 17, 1947, the jury of the Naticmal Court at Bratisla'Va brought forth the verdict of death by hanging, and the sentence was carried out on the following morning. Msgr. Tiso died peacefully, committing himself to God. His body was either destroyed or buried secretly to iprevent the SloIVaks from paying their respects. The standpoint of the Holy See, dissuading priests from participating directly in political actirvity and not identifying the Church with any particular politicail system or party, ,proved itself very much correct during the trial. Ev~ though Msgr. Tiso was tried as a politcian, it was difficult to separate his priesthood from his political function. Through Msg,r. Tiso's trial the Catholic Church of Slovakia was pilloried, ,altho'll!g'h unjustly. From the Church's point of view, it would ha.ve been 'b etter if, during the years of 1939 to 1945, the political life of Slovakia had been headed by a layman rather than a C'lex,gyman. On the other hand, it is certain that Tiso had been unj,u stly condemned. Under German ·control it was imposs1ble oo conduct a 'better policy in the interests of Slovakia than the one Tiso im:Plemented. Outright collaboration with Nazism, whkh Dr. 'Iuka attempted, would have �SLOVAKIA 23 done an immeasurably greater harm to Slovrukia. Msgr. Tiso constantly thwarted TU!ka's attempts. Msgr. Tiso's trial cuhninated. during Lent when Chris... tians are reminded. of the trial and death of Christ. Slovaks openly compared. Tiso's trial with the trial of Ohrist. Tiso, too, in his defense, alluded to this circumstance. The court that sentenced Tiso was dominated by Communists. The president of the court, Dr. Ivan Daxner and the state prosecutors, Dr. Juraj Sujan and Dr. Anton Rasla, were die-hard Communists. Furthermore, it seemed that the first two mentioned were predisposed against Msgr. Tiso, the Catholic priest, on religious grounds. Msgr. Tiso in his testament to the nation, written an hour before his death, rightfully sitated: ". . . I consider myself, in the first place a martyr in the defense of Christianity against Communism."11 "Martyr of Love" Msgr. Tiso was a victim of political revenge. It was expected. that even if he were condemned, he would be granted amnesty ,b y Dr. IDdward Benes, President of the new Czecho-Slo:v akia. Benes refused. "Osservatore Romano," of April 28, 1947, wrote that in the event of Msgr. Tiso's condemnation "political discretion would make it necessary to grant amnesty, even though in self interest ... " to amelfo,r ate the tense situation ·b etween S1-ovaiks and Czechs. "As a martyr of love toward his homeland, Dr. Tiso will live on in the Slovaik Catholic nation," "Osservatore Romano," concluded. Although Dr. Benes had rid himself of Msgr. Tiso, it is certain that Tiso in death is a greater pro'b lem in the relationship between Czechs and Slova:ks than Tiso would have boon in life. Msgr. Tiso lives in the Sl01Vak nation as a hero and martyr. To the SlOIVruks he is a symbol of a crusader for the God.given rights 'Of the Slovak nation. The Slovak Republic, with its six years of successful existence, is an actuality that ca:nnot be eradicated from history. The SlavaJks at home and wbroad. in the absolute majority stand �24 SLOVAKIA behind the ideals for which Msgr. Tiso, .p resident of the "The Homiletic and Slovak R epublic, Lived and died. 1955. Pastoral Review," N 01Vember, 1. Coura,geous member of the Hungarian Parliament (1905-1918). 2. In parall el, Msgr. J an Sram ek, a Czech priest, becam e premier of the Czecho-Slovak governm ent in exile. 3. Dr. J ozef Tiso Abou t Him self, Edited by Dr. J oseph Pauco, Passaic, N. J . 4. As the war-front b egan to app roach Slo vakia, certain grou ps within the country, inspi.red d'rom a broad, provoked an u pri-sin g in August of 1944. T o ga_in the support of the Slovak populace, t h ey spread r umors that Tiso had been imprisoned by the Germ ans and, therefore, it was necessary to fight Ge rmany. 5. Op. cit., p. 121. 6. Op. cit., p. 111. 7. Op. cit., p. 37, 277 . 8. Op. cit., p . 213 ss., 199, 201. 9. Op. ci t., p. 313 ss. 10. Op. cit., p . 21. 11. Op. cit., p. 8. • • • WHO SAID IT? "The relations of today and tomorro,w between Cze,c hoSloivaikia and the Sorviet Union a.re defined in the treaty of Deceim:be.r 1'2, 1943, . . It proclaims the lasting friMdshir, of the two nations, for the future whic h will be, strengthened by widespread economic cooperation af t e r the war. The fu hire general collaJboratiion is defined as that of two ftree alilld independent ,s tates, in whi ch there wrn be no inter1fore111ce (Jan Papane k , Interin the internrul affairs of either.'' York, 19415 ) New Inc., Press, nati-onrul Universities 1 • • • "Norvemlber 7, 1917, is t he day thaJt is ma:riked in history as the beginning of a new era, which sought the guarantee of happiness to mankind by means of a new me1Jhod of equalling differences among people and th.us achi&ving contentment on earth. Today it is- stNa too eaJI'ly from thaJt epochal occasion to judge objootively the consequences of that great deed. One thing, however, is certain: it was the beginndng of an enormous process full of ideas bo:rn of idealism." - (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, V ~ of the Executive Conu:mttee of the "Council of Free OzecboslolV'a:kia," NOW PR.ODY, Novemiber 18, 1946). � SLOVAKIA 15 MONSIGNOR JOZEF TISO - CONTROVERSIAL PERSONALITY By Th. J. Zubek, 0.F.M., S.T.D. The name of Msgr. Jozef Tiso, S.T.D., the executed president of the Slovak Republic, is generally known . .However, his ,p ersonality is not sufficiently recognized and understood in the Western world. The concept of a priest as an active politician and high state functionary is today somewhat unusual in Western Europe, more so in the United States. Too, it is generally ,k nown that the standpoint of the Holy See is against Catholic priests actively engaging in political activity. Moreover, cwtain gr,o ups present Msgr. Tiso as a disrupter of the Czecho..:Slova;k Repuiblic, a traitor, Nazi, Quisling, and a lackey of Adolf Hitler. This i:s done solely for the political motiives of presenting Sl()IVaks, their political aspirations, and their leaders in an unfavorable light. It is not strange, then, that in the Western world the .p ersonality of Msgir. T-iso appem-s Olbscured, incomprehensi'ble, controversial. To reach a true understanding and evaluation of Jozef Tiso, it is necessary to look upon his persona1ity and activities in the environment in which he lived and wo:riked; it is necessary to delve mo'l:'e deeply into the inner man, into his motiva·t ions and ideological ,bac:kground. Slovaik Clergy and Politics The Slovak nation lived for many centuries in the Hungarian Kingdom. The awaikening to national conscious.ness by the nations of Hungary brought a!bout nationalistic struggles among these nations. The national consciousness of the MaJgyars, the leading nation in Hungary, culminated in the idea of a great Magyar state, politically, culturally and lingu~tically hornogenous. The Ma. gyars wished to Magyarize the non~Magyar nations of Hungary, namely, the Slovaks, Roumanians, Croats, and Germans. The first victims of the forced Magyarization were 1 �16 SLOVAKIA the Slovaks. The overwhelming majority of the intelligent.. sia of Slovak origin succumbed to Magyar pressure and followed the official Magyar line, for .this was a prerequisite in the furtherance of one's career. Of the inteMigentsia it was almost exclusively the clerigy who remained loyal to the Slovak nation. The clergy became bearers of the Slovak populace with religious instruction and cultural and social enlightenment. They were Catholic priests and Lutheran minister s. Outstanding among the priests were Anton Bernolak (1762-1813), formulator of the Slovak literary language; Juraj Fandly (17514~1810) , social educator and popular writer on husbandry; Jan Holly (1785--1849), a poet who wrote heroic epics about the Slovaik past; Bishop Stephen Moyses (1797-1869) , founder and first .president of the cultural institute, Matica Sloven.ska; Andrej RadlinSlky (1818.---1879) , founder of St. Adalbert Society, a Catholic publishing house ; Ferdis Juriga (1874- 1953), an excellent orator and political leader,1 and Andrej Hlinka, (1864 -1938), a fiery defender orf Slova:k rights and founder of the Slovak People's Party. Of the Lutheran ministers~patriots there were Michal M. Hodza (1811-1880) and J ozef M. Hurban (1817-1888), writers who ,o rganized and led the armed uprising of thB SlovaJks against the 'Magyars in 1'948; Karol iKuzmany (1806-1866) , poet and ,c o-founder of the Matica Sloven.ska, and Martin Razus (1888-1937), poet and politica1 leader. Upon the basis of solidifying the Slovaks against Magyarization and fighting for their political and social rights, the clergy entered into the politcal life of Hungary. Jozef Tiso in the Parliament at Prague Wllen, in 1918, Slovakia became a part •o f the CzechoSlovak Republic, it appeared at first that more favorable conditions ,w ould prevail for the Slovaks. However, it soon became apparent that the Czechs had much the same conceptions as the !Magyars. The Czechs, too, dreamed of a great Czechoslovak national state, with a politically insignificant minority of Germans and Magyars. The Slovaks were to cede their national individuality and merge with �SLOVAKIA 17 the Czechs to create a new Czechoslovak nationality and to become Czechs eventually. The Slovaks, however, had long ago developed the consciousness of a distinct nationality and had no intention of ceding their national individuality in the interest of the Czechs. The Slovaks also felt the impact of the economic exploitation which the Czechs initiated imrne4iately after 1918 when they practically made Slovakia their colony. It was almost impossible for a ~ovak to enter civil service, since almost all civil positions and important economic functions in SlorvaJkia weTe occupied by the Czechs. Further, the Slorvaks, as a deeply religious Catholic nation (80 %- ), resented the anti-religious acts of the Czechs, which were also provocatively perpetrated in Slovaikia. In the struggle against Ozechization of the Slov,alks and in defense of Slovak rights, the Slovak People's Party, founded and led by Msgr. Andrej Hlinka, took the lead. Hlinka and Juriga, even as they had fought Magyar machinations,, began to fight Czech improprieties in the parliament at Prague, in the 1press, and through political campaigns among the people. The ,p olitical pla;tform of the S10vak People's Party was autonomy for Slovakia as guaran_ teed by the pact between American Slov.aks and the representative of Czecho-Slovakia, Professor Thomas G. Masaryk, in ·P ittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in 1918. 'I'he Slovak People's Party with its program and motto, "·F or God and Nation," aippealed to the feelings of the Slovaik populace, and soon became the most important political party in Slovakia. The autonomistic program was also foUowed by the Slorvak National Party of Martin Razus, a Lutheran minister. From the beginning of Czecho-Slovakia (1918), Jozef Tiso, a young a;nd zeailous priest, spiritual director and professor at the diocesan ·s eminary in Nitra, joined the autonomistic movement of Hlinka's Slovak Peoiple's Party. In 1925, Tiso became a member oif the Czecho--1Slovak par_ liament and then vice-president of the Slo,vaJk People's Party. When the Slorvak People's Party entered the government, he became Minister of Health (1927-1929). Tiso �18 SLOV.A!KIA. evolved soon into the staunchest e~ponent of Slovak autonomistic policies. Tiso as President of the Slovak People's Party Andrej iHlinka died in August of the critical year of 1938. At that time the Slovak People's Party was the most powerful. political group in SlovaJkia. It had in its ranks many young workers of the Slovaik inteHigentsia. None compared to Msgr. Tiso in moral and in political acumen and in expeTience. Commanding great esteem among the Slovaik populace and clergy, Tiso logically became the successor of Msgr. Hilinka in the leadership of the Slovak People's Party. Under the pressuxe of Hitler's driive, following H!Linka's death in 1938, events in CzechC>-iSlovakfa and in Europe moved quickly. That which the Czechs were loathe to grant the Slorvaiks under nonnal oonditions, they were foreed to grant in the enfeebled post-Munich Czecho...Slov-a kia. On October 6, 1938, the Slovaiks gained their political autonomy; they became the masters in Slorvakia. Msgr. 'l"iso, as the president of the Poople',s Party became the premier of the Slovak autonomous government, with the permission of his Bishop and the Vatican. Even :when Slovakia suffered by ceding territory to Hung,ary as a result of the Vienna A11bitration on Novem•b er 2, 1938, the ,Slovaiks were hruppy with the newly-gained autonomy. The Czechs left Slorva!kia; the Slovaiks began to manage their own affairs in the ·b est interests of the nation. It appeared that with the attainment of autonomy the aspirations of the Slovaiks were fulfilled and that the staJbilization of conditions in Slovakia would ·b e enduring. Tiso, President of the Republic Hitler was not satisfied with the dismemberment an.d neutralization of Czecho-Slovakia. When he decided to wa-ge war aigainst Poland, he wanted Ozecho-,SloviaJkia oom,p letcly under his control, particularly the western part (Bdhemia and Moravia) which was heavil'Y industriaJUzed and entirely encircled by the German Reich. On March 13, 1939, !H itler summoned Tiso• to Berlin �SLOVAKIA 19 and confronted him with the German decision regarding Slrovakia : Either secede from the Czechs and proclaim an independent Slorvak State or suffer the oonsequence of partition between Germany and Hungary. On IMa.Tch 14, 1939, Tiso presented the German proposition to the Slovak pavliament for decision. 'Ehe Slovak parliament voted for independence of !Slovakia. Msgr. Tiso became the ,p re. sident of the Slovak Republic.2 Msgr. Tiso and other Slovak political [eaders were somewhat hesitant to proclaim Slovak independence. Said Tiso, in his defense before the National Court in Bratislava (1947) : "Were it not for Hitler's pressure, the Slo:vak parliament would never have proclaimed indeipendence. "3 The MaJgyars amd the Czechs, to justify their claims upon Slo:va,kia, ha,d in the past repeatedly asserted that Siovllikia, for economic reasons, was incapable of independence. Slovak politica:l lea,ders, suddenly confronted with the question of independence for Sl01V,a kia, were aipprehensive of the future. But rather than have their country partitioned and occupied, they logi,cally chose the attempt at independence. And after this decision, they strove for the economic prosperity and cultural development of Slova,kia, permanently to integrate Slovakia into the family of European nations. It can be said that the Slovruk attempt was successful. The wave of naJtional enthusiasm engulfed the coll'Iltry, and Siovaikia's eoonomi:c and cultural standards flourished. The Slovaks. even those who at first were reserved, warmed to the Slorva!k .State and ha,d faith in its chief, Msgr. Jozef Tiso. 4 Even the most bitter enemies of the Slovaks had to acknowledge that the Slova;k Republic was capable of existence. That which Slovakia had proved in the years 1939-1945 is in no small measure ithe result of the political activity of Msgr. Tiso. But it is also the most controversial period of his political career. 1 The Fundamentals and Components of Tiso's Policies Msgr. Tiso's defense plea before the National COU'rt at Bratislava, encompasses many noteworthy ,p ronouncements �20 SLOVAKIA that point out the principles of his political activity. Con. sider but a few characteristic quotations. The key to the evaluation of my activity is my character of the priest with its motivations and regulations, established by Christian teaching for public activity. 5 Tiso as president of the Slovak Republic tried to lead his nation like a solicitous father according to Christian principles,, to which, as a priest, he consecrated his life. Politically I only did that which the well-being and inter est of the Slovak n::.ttion dictated. What I did, I always did according to, the best dictates of my knowledge and conscience, ... always guided by the rules of morality ... I fought evil with all my power, yielding to evil only when a greater evil threatened the nation. G 'In this light, Msgr. Tiso explained his aHeged collaboration with the Nazis. Msgr. Tiso• stated that some collaboration with Germany was at that time a necessity dictated by Slovakia 's geographic position, the develorpment of European events and the law of self..preservation. Slovakia did not have its own foreign policy, but neither did other larger nations in Hitleir-controUed Europe. Tiso pleaded that he was so concerned with the internal consolidation and development of Slovakia that he wa,s unruble to study the problems of international politics, including the war, upon which, because of his position, he could wield no influence. Slovak participation in the war against Russia, with two divisions, was merely symbolic, Tiso explained. 7 According to Msgr. Tiso, his paramount ;po'1icy was t o secure the maximum of internal freedom and independence within the German sphere. Outwardly it was necessary to yield somewhat to German pressure, to keep them apart, thus avoiding armed intervention. For this reason it was necessary to ban the Communist Party (one of the main accusations against Tiso) ; it was necessary to participate in the war against Russia, and it was necessary to institute some elements of a totalitarian regime. All this was done , however, to pull wool over the eyes of the Germans. Inter- �SLOVAKIA 21 nally, pleaded Tiso, Slovrukia was governed democratically - and there was freedom. & In this light -Msgr. Tiso aJ,s,o ex;plained anti-semitic activity in Slovakia. Msgr. 'Di.so stated that the rationalization of the Jewish problem was <based on a percentual partic1pation in the nation's economy. There were aibout 100,000 Jews in Sloivakia, or 4 % of the total .p opulation. Therefore only 4 % of the nation's economy was pe:mnitted to Jews. Jewish ,b usinesses were being aryanized, that is, a non-Jew would buy 51 % of a business, at an officially esta:blished rate, and the former Jewish proprietor would remain as a partrn~r. Later, at the dictate of the Gernnans, Jews were put into con centration camps and e vacuated into Poland under the pretext that land would be ,p rovided for them so that they wou!ld be able to Hve under their own ru:le. Tiso justified his position ·b y saying that he did not know at that time that the evacuated Jews would be exterminated in Polish and German concentration camps.9 A Weak Defense Herein In regard to the Jewish question, Msgr. Giuseppe Burzio, r epresentative of the Holy See in Slovakia, intervened with President Tiso in behalf of the Jews. It was rumored that Msigr. Tiso, 'a s a Catholic priest, should have resigned from the presidency, since he was unable to curtail the antisemitic campaign dictated by the Germans and waged by Slovak extremists unde r the direction of Premier Dr. Vojtech Tuka. Concerning the possibility o.f his resignation, let Tiso speak: I did not resign because I felt a moral obligation to fulfill. the duty that I had undertaken until I had been released from it by lega1ly constituted functionaries ... My action would have been egotistica,l had I left my nation in those difficult times and entered ;pri.., vate life. My action would haive been irresponsible and against the nation had I not truken into private life the moral values that I felt I represented 10 He stated further that had he received an official request from his ecclesiastical authorities, he would ha,ve re. �22 SLOV.i\KIA signed, for then there would have been no- decision to maJke, the responsibility would have been the Church authorities'. It is generally known that even repre sentatiives of the Jews had begged him to remain in office, for it would have been a total catastrophe for the Jews if someone else would have ,b een president oif the Slovak Republic. Tiso managed to insert into- ithe anti.Jewish law a provision to exempt some Jews. He wa:s a:ble to qualify a Jew as indispensa:ble to Slovak economy and thus save him from deportation. About 9,000 such exemptions were made. Despite this, howeveT, the Jewish question was really a weak point of Tiso's policy and of his defense. The End of Msgr. Tiso Msgr. Tiso's trial beg,an at the end of 1946 and lasted until April of 1947. On April 17, 1947, the jury of the Naticmal Court at Bratisla'Va brought forth the verdict of death by hanging, and the sentence was carried out on the following morning. Msgr. Tiso died peacefully, committing himself to God. His body was either destroyed or buried secretly to iprevent the SloIVaks from paying their respects. The standpoint of the Holy See, dissuading priests from participating directly in political actirvity and not identifying the Church with any particular politicail system or party, ,proved itself very much correct during the trial. Ev~ though Msgr. Tiso was tried as a politcian, it was difficult to separate his priesthood from his political function. Through Msg,r. Tiso's trial the Catholic Church of Slovakia was pilloried, ,altho'll!g'h unjustly. From the Church's point of view, it would ha.ve been 'b etter if, during the years of 1939 to 1945, the political life of Slovakia had been headed by a layman rather than a C'lex,gyman. On the other hand, it is certain that Tiso had been unj,u stly condemned. Under German ·control it was imposs1ble oo conduct a 'better policy in the interests of Slovakia than the one Tiso im:Plemented. Outright collaboration with Nazism, whkh Dr. 'Iuka attempted, would have �SLOVAKIA 23 done an immeasurably greater harm to Slovrukia. Msgr. Tiso constantly thwarted TU!ka's attempts. Msgr. Tiso's trial cuhninated. during Lent when Chris... tians are reminded. of the trial and death of Christ. Slovaks openly compared. Tiso's trial with the trial of Ohrist. Tiso, too, in his defense, alluded to this circumstance. The court that sentenced Tiso was dominated by Communists. The president of the court, Dr. Ivan Daxner and the state prosecutors, Dr. Juraj Sujan and Dr. Anton Rasla, were die-hard Communists. Furthermore, it seemed that the first two mentioned were predisposed against Msgr. Tiso, the Catholic priest, on religious grounds. Msgr. Tiso in his testament to the nation, written an hour before his death, rightfully sitated: ". . . I consider myself, in the first place a martyr in the defense of Christianity against Communism."11 "Martyr of Love" Msgr. Tiso was a victim of political revenge. It was expected. that even if he were condemned, he would be granted amnesty ,b y Dr. IDdward Benes, President of the new Czecho-Slo:v akia. Benes refused. "Osservatore Romano," of April 28, 1947, wrote that in the event of Msgr. Tiso's condemnation "political discretion would make it necessary to grant amnesty, even though in self interest ... " to amelfo,r ate the tense situation ·b etween S1-ovaiks and Czechs. "As a martyr of love toward his homeland, Dr. Tiso will live on in the Slovaik Catholic nation," "Osservatore Romano," concluded. Although Dr. Benes had rid himself of Msgr. Tiso, it is certain that Tiso in death is a greater pro'b lem in the relationship between Czechs and Slova:ks than Tiso would have boon in life. Msgr. Tiso lives in the Sl01Vak nation as a hero and martyr. To the SlOIVruks he is a symbol of a crusader for the God.given rights 'Of the Slovak nation. The Slovak Republic, with its six years of successful existence, is an actuality that ca:nnot be eradicated from history. The SlavaJks at home and wbroad. in the absolute majority stand �24 SLOVAKIA behind the ideals for which Msgr. Tiso, .p resident of the "The Homiletic and Slovak R epublic, Lived and died. 1955. Pastoral Review," N 01Vember, 1. Coura,geous member of the Hungarian Parliament (1905-1918). 2. In parall el, Msgr. J an Sram ek, a Czech priest, becam e premier of the Czecho-Slovak governm ent in exile. 3. Dr. J ozef Tiso Abou t Him self, Edited by Dr. J oseph Pauco, Passaic, N. J . 4. As the war-front b egan to app roach Slo vakia, certain grou ps within the country, inspi.red d'rom a broad, provoked an u pri-sin g in August of 1944. T o ga_in the support of the Slovak populace, t h ey spread r umors that Tiso had been imprisoned by the Germ ans and, therefore, it was necessary to fight Ge rmany. 5. Op. cit., p. 121. 6. Op. cit., p. 111. 7. Op. cit., p. 37, 277 . 8. Op. cit., p . 213 ss., 199, 201. 9. Op. ci t., p. 313 ss. 10. Op. cit., p . 21. 11. Op. cit., p. 8. • • • WHO SAID IT? "The relations of today and tomorro,w between Cze,c hoSloivaikia and the Sorviet Union a.re defined in the treaty of Deceim:be.r 1'2, 1943, . . It proclaims the lasting friMdshir, of the two nations, for the future whic h will be, strengthened by widespread economic cooperation af t e r the war. The fu hire general collaJboratiion is defined as that of two ftree alilld independent ,s tates, in whi ch there wrn be no inter1fore111ce (Jan Papane k , Interin the internrul affairs of either.'' York, 19415 ) New Inc., Press, nati-onrul Universities 1 • • • "Norvemlber 7, 1917, is t he day thaJt is ma:riked in history as the beginning of a new era, which sought the guarantee of happiness to mankind by means of a new me1Jhod of equalling differences among people and th.us achi&ving contentment on earth. Today it is- stNa too eaJI'ly from thaJt epochal occasion to judge objootively the consequences of that great deed. One thing, however, is certain: it was the beginndng of an enormous process full of ideas bo:rn of idealism." - (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, V ~ of the Executive Conu:mttee of the "Council of Free OzecboslolV'a:kia," NOW PR.ODY, Novemiber 18, 1946). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1956, Vol. 6 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1956 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 15 MONSIGNOR JOZEF TISO - CONTROVERSIAL PERSONALITY By Th. J. Zubek, 0.F.M., S.T.D. The name of Msgr. Jozef Tiso, S.T.D., the executed president of the Slovak Republic, is generally known . .However, his ,p ersonality is not sufficiently recognized and understood in the Western world. The concept of a priest as an active politician and high state functionary is today somewhat unusual in Western Europe, more so in the United States. Too, it is generally ,k nown that the standpoint of the Holy See is against Catholic priests actively engaging in political activity. Moreover, cwtain gr,o ups present Msgr. Tiso as a disrupter of the Czecho..:Slova;k Repuiblic, a traitor, Nazi, Quisling, and a lackey of Adolf Hitler. This i:s done solely for the political motiives of presenting Sl()IVaks, their political aspirations, and their leaders in an unfavorable light. It is not strange, then, that in the Western world the .p ersonality of Msgir. T-iso appem-s Olbscured, incomprehensi'ble, controversial. To reach a true understanding and evaluation of Jozef Tiso, it is necessary to look upon his persona1ity and activities in the environment in which he lived and wo:riked; it is necessary to delve mo'l:'e deeply into the inner man, into his motiva·t ions and ideological ,bac:kground. Slovaik Clergy and Politics The Slovak nation lived for many centuries in the Hungarian Kingdom. The awaikening to national conscious.ness by the nations of Hungary brought a!bout nationalistic struggles among these nations. The national consciousness of the MaJgyars, the leading nation in Hungary, culminated in the idea of a great Magyar state, politically, culturally and lingu~tically hornogenous. The Ma. gyars wished to Magyarize the non~Magyar nations of Hungary, namely, the Slovaks, Roumanians, Croats, and Germans. The first victims of the forced Magyarization were 1 16 SLOVAKIA the Slovaks. The overwhelming majority of the intelligent.. sia of Slovak origin succumbed to Magyar pressure and followed the official Magyar line, for .this was a prerequisite in the furtherance of one's career. Of the inteMigentsia it was almost exclusively the clerigy who remained loyal to the Slovak nation. The clergy became bearers of the Slovak populace with religious instruction and cultural and social enlightenment. They were Catholic priests and Lutheran minister s. Outstanding among the priests were Anton Bernolak (1762-1813), formulator of the Slovak literary language; Juraj Fandly (17514~1810) , social educator and popular writer on husbandry; Jan Holly (1785--1849), a poet who wrote heroic epics about the Slovaik past; Bishop Stephen Moyses (1797-1869) , founder and first .president of the cultural institute, Matica Sloven.ska; Andrej RadlinSlky (1818.---1879) , founder of St. Adalbert Society, a Catholic publishing house ; Ferdis Juriga (1874- 1953), an excellent orator and political leader,1 and Andrej Hlinka, (1864 -1938), a fiery defender orf Slova:k rights and founder of the Slovak People's Party. Of the Lutheran ministers~patriots there were Michal M. Hodza (1811-1880) and J ozef M. Hurban (1817-1888), writers who ,o rganized and led the armed uprising of thB SlovaJks against the 'Magyars in 1'948; Karol iKuzmany (1806-1866) , poet and ,c o-founder of the Matica Sloven.ska, and Martin Razus (1888-1937), poet and politica1 leader. Upon the basis of solidifying the Slovaks against Magyarization and fighting for their political and social rights, the clergy entered into the politcal life of Hungary. Jozef Tiso in the Parliament at Prague Wllen, in 1918, Slovakia became a part •o f the CzechoSlovak Republic, it appeared at first that more favorable conditions ,w ould prevail for the Slovaks. However, it soon became apparent that the Czechs had much the same conceptions as the !Magyars. The Czechs, too, dreamed of a great Czechoslovak national state, with a politically insignificant minority of Germans and Magyars. The Slovaks were to cede their national individuality and merge with SLOVAKIA 17 the Czechs to create a new Czechoslovak nationality and to become Czechs eventually. The Slovaks, however, had long ago developed the consciousness of a distinct nationality and had no intention of ceding their national individuality in the interest of the Czechs. The Slovaks also felt the impact of the economic exploitation which the Czechs initiated imrne4iately after 1918 when they practically made Slovakia their colony. It was almost impossible for a ~ovak to enter civil service, since almost all civil positions and important economic functions in SlorvaJkia weTe occupied by the Czechs. Further, the Slorvaks, as a deeply religious Catholic nation (80 %- ), resented the anti-religious acts of the Czechs, which were also provocatively perpetrated in Slovaikia. In the struggle against Ozechization of the Slov,alks and in defense of Slovak rights, the Slovak People's Party, founded and led by Msgr. Andrej Hlinka, took the lead. Hlinka and Juriga, even as they had fought Magyar machinations,, began to fight Czech improprieties in the parliament at Prague, in the 1press, and through political campaigns among the people. The ,p olitical pla;tform of the S10vak People's Party was autonomy for Slovakia as guaran_ teed by the pact between American Slov.aks and the representative of Czecho-Slovakia, Professor Thomas G. Masaryk, in ·P ittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in 1918. 'I'he Slovak People's Party with its program and motto, "·F or God and Nation," aippealed to the feelings of the Slovaik populace, and soon became the most important political party in Slovakia. The autonomistic program was also foUowed by the Slorvak National Party of Martin Razus, a Lutheran minister. From the beginning of Czecho-Slovakia (1918), Jozef Tiso, a young a;nd zeailous priest, spiritual director and professor at the diocesan ·s eminary in Nitra, joined the autonomistic movement of Hlinka's Slovak Peoiple's Party. In 1925, Tiso became a member oif the Czecho--1Slovak par_ liament and then vice-president of the Slo,vaJk People's Party. When the Slorvak People's Party entered the government, he became Minister of Health (1927-1929). Tiso 18 SLOV.A!KIA. evolved soon into the staunchest e~ponent of Slovak autonomistic policies. Tiso as President of the Slovak People's Party Andrej iHlinka died in August of the critical year of 1938. At that time the Slovak People's Party was the most powerful. political group in SlovaJkia. It had in its ranks many young workers of the Slovaik inteHigentsia. None compared to Msgr. Tiso in moral and in political acumen and in expeTience. Commanding great esteem among the Slovaik populace and clergy, Tiso logically became the successor of Msgr. Hilinka in the leadership of the Slovak People's Party. Under the pressuxe of Hitler's driive, following H!Linka's death in 1938, events in CzechC>-iSlovakfa and in Europe moved quickly. That which the Czechs were loathe to grant the Slorvaiks under nonnal oonditions, they were foreed to grant in the enfeebled post-Munich Czecho...Slov-a kia. On October 6, 1938, the Slovaiks gained their political autonomy; they became the masters in Slorvakia. Msgr. 'l"iso, as the president of the Poople',s Party became the premier of the Slovak autonomous government, with the permission of his Bishop and the Vatican. Even :when Slovakia suffered by ceding territory to Hung,ary as a result of the Vienna A11bitration on Novem•b er 2, 1938, the ,Slovaiks were hruppy with the newly-gained autonomy. The Czechs left Slorva!kia; the Slovaiks began to manage their own affairs in the ·b est interests of the nation. It appeared that with the attainment of autonomy the aspirations of the Slovaiks were fulfilled and that the staJbilization of conditions in Slovakia would ·b e enduring. Tiso, President of the Republic Hitler was not satisfied with the dismemberment an.d neutralization of Czecho-Slovakia. When he decided to wa-ge war aigainst Poland, he wanted Ozecho-,SloviaJkia oom,p letcly under his control, particularly the western part (Bdhemia and Moravia) which was heavil'Y industriaJUzed and entirely encircled by the German Reich. On March 13, 1939, !H itler summoned Tiso• to Berlin SLOVAKIA 19 and confronted him with the German decision regarding Slrovakia : Either secede from the Czechs and proclaim an independent Slorvak State or suffer the oonsequence of partition between Germany and Hungary. On IMa.Tch 14, 1939, Tiso presented the German proposition to the Slovak pavliament for decision. 'Ehe Slovak parliament voted for independence of !Slovakia. Msgr. Tiso became the ,p re. sident of the Slovak Republic.2 Msgr. Tiso and other Slovak political [eaders were somewhat hesitant to proclaim Slovak independence. Said Tiso, in his defense before the National Court in Bratislava (1947) : "Were it not for Hitler's pressure, the Slo:vak parliament would never have proclaimed indeipendence. "3 The MaJgyars amd the Czechs, to justify their claims upon Slo:va,kia, ha,d in the past repeatedly asserted that Siovllikia, for economic reasons, was incapable of independence. Slovak politica:l lea,ders, suddenly confronted with the question of independence for Sl01V,a kia, were aipprehensive of the future. But rather than have their country partitioned and occupied, they logi,cally chose the attempt at independence. And after this decision, they strove for the economic prosperity and cultural development of Slova,kia, permanently to integrate Slovakia into the family of European nations. It can be said that the Slovruk attempt was successful. The wave of naJtional enthusiasm engulfed the coll'Iltry, and Siovaikia's eoonomi:c and cultural standards flourished. The Slovaks. even those who at first were reserved, warmed to the Slorva!k .State and ha,d faith in its chief, Msgr. Jozef Tiso. 4 Even the most bitter enemies of the Slovaks had to acknowledge that the Slova;k Republic was capable of existence. That which Slovakia had proved in the years 1939-1945 is in no small measure ithe result of the political activity of Msgr. Tiso. But it is also the most controversial period of his political career. 1 The Fundamentals and Components of Tiso's Policies Msgr. Tiso's defense plea before the National COU'rt at Bratislava, encompasses many noteworthy ,p ronouncements 20 SLOVAKIA that point out the principles of his political activity. Con. sider but a few characteristic quotations. The key to the evaluation of my activity is my character of the priest with its motivations and regulations, established by Christian teaching for public activity. 5 Tiso as president of the Slovak Republic tried to lead his nation like a solicitous father according to Christian principles,, to which, as a priest, he consecrated his life. Politically I only did that which the well-being and inter est of the Slovak n::.ttion dictated. What I did, I always did according to, the best dictates of my knowledge and conscience, ... always guided by the rules of morality ... I fought evil with all my power, yielding to evil only when a greater evil threatened the nation. G 'In this light, Msgr. Tiso explained his aHeged collaboration with the Nazis. Msgr. Tiso• stated that some collaboration with Germany was at that time a necessity dictated by Slovakia 's geographic position, the develorpment of European events and the law of self..preservation. Slovakia did not have its own foreign policy, but neither did other larger nations in Hitleir-controUed Europe. Tiso pleaded that he was so concerned with the internal consolidation and development of Slovakia that he wa,s unruble to study the problems of international politics, including the war, upon which, because of his position, he could wield no influence. Slovak participation in the war against Russia, with two divisions, was merely symbolic, Tiso explained. 7 According to Msgr. Tiso, his paramount ;po'1icy was t o secure the maximum of internal freedom and independence within the German sphere. Outwardly it was necessary to yield somewhat to German pressure, to keep them apart, thus avoiding armed intervention. For this reason it was necessary to ban the Communist Party (one of the main accusations against Tiso) ; it was necessary to participate in the war against Russia, and it was necessary to institute some elements of a totalitarian regime. All this was done , however, to pull wool over the eyes of the Germans. Inter- SLOVAKIA 21 nally, pleaded Tiso, Slovrukia was governed democratically - and there was freedom. & In this light -Msgr. Tiso aJ,s,o ex;plained anti-semitic activity in Slovakia. Msgr. 'Di.so stated that the rationalization of the Jewish problem was <based on a percentual partic1pation in the nation's economy. There were aibout 100,000 Jews in Sloivakia, or 4 % of the total .p opulation. Therefore only 4 % of the nation's economy was pe:mnitted to Jews. Jewish ,b usinesses were being aryanized, that is, a non-Jew would buy 51 % of a business, at an officially esta:blished rate, and the former Jewish proprietor would remain as a partrn~r. Later, at the dictate of the Gernnans, Jews were put into con centration camps and e vacuated into Poland under the pretext that land would be ,p rovided for them so that they wou!ld be able to Hve under their own ru:le. Tiso justified his position ·b y saying that he did not know at that time that the evacuated Jews would be exterminated in Polish and German concentration camps.9 A Weak Defense Herein In regard to the Jewish question, Msgr. Giuseppe Burzio, r epresentative of the Holy See in Slovakia, intervened with President Tiso in behalf of the Jews. It was rumored that Msigr. Tiso, 'a s a Catholic priest, should have resigned from the presidency, since he was unable to curtail the antisemitic campaign dictated by the Germans and waged by Slovak extremists unde r the direction of Premier Dr. Vojtech Tuka. Concerning the possibility o.f his resignation, let Tiso speak: I did not resign because I felt a moral obligation to fulfill. the duty that I had undertaken until I had been released from it by lega1ly constituted functionaries ... My action would have been egotistica,l had I left my nation in those difficult times and entered ;pri.., vate life. My action would haive been irresponsible and against the nation had I not truken into private life the moral values that I felt I represented 10 He stated further that had he received an official request from his ecclesiastical authorities, he would ha,ve re. 22 SLOV.i\KIA signed, for then there would have been no- decision to maJke, the responsibility would have been the Church authorities'. It is generally known that even repre sentatiives of the Jews had begged him to remain in office, for it would have been a total catastrophe for the Jews if someone else would have ,b een president oif the Slovak Republic. Tiso managed to insert into- ithe anti.Jewish law a provision to exempt some Jews. He wa:s a:ble to qualify a Jew as indispensa:ble to Slovak economy and thus save him from deportation. About 9,000 such exemptions were made. Despite this, howeveT, the Jewish question was really a weak point of Tiso's policy and of his defense. The End of Msgr. Tiso Msgr. Tiso's trial beg,an at the end of 1946 and lasted until April of 1947. On April 17, 1947, the jury of the Naticmal Court at Bratisla'Va brought forth the verdict of death by hanging, and the sentence was carried out on the following morning. Msgr. Tiso died peacefully, committing himself to God. His body was either destroyed or buried secretly to iprevent the SloIVaks from paying their respects. The standpoint of the Holy See, dissuading priests from participating directly in political actirvity and not identifying the Church with any particular politicail system or party, ,proved itself very much correct during the trial. Ev~ though Msgr. Tiso was tried as a politcian, it was difficult to separate his priesthood from his political function. Through Msg,r. Tiso's trial the Catholic Church of Slovakia was pilloried, ,altho'll!g'h unjustly. From the Church's point of view, it would ha.ve been 'b etter if, during the years of 1939 to 1945, the political life of Slovakia had been headed by a layman rather than a C'lex,gyman. On the other hand, it is certain that Tiso had been unj,u stly condemned. Under German ·control it was imposs1ble oo conduct a 'better policy in the interests of Slovakia than the one Tiso im:Plemented. Outright collaboration with Nazism, whkh Dr. 'Iuka attempted, would have SLOVAKIA 23 done an immeasurably greater harm to Slovrukia. Msgr. Tiso constantly thwarted TU!ka's attempts. Msgr. Tiso's trial cuhninated. during Lent when Chris... tians are reminded. of the trial and death of Christ. Slovaks openly compared. Tiso's trial with the trial of Ohrist. Tiso, too, in his defense, alluded to this circumstance. The court that sentenced Tiso was dominated by Communists. The president of the court, Dr. Ivan Daxner and the state prosecutors, Dr. Juraj Sujan and Dr. Anton Rasla, were die-hard Communists. Furthermore, it seemed that the first two mentioned were predisposed against Msgr. Tiso, the Catholic priest, on religious grounds. Msgr. Tiso in his testament to the nation, written an hour before his death, rightfully sitated: ". . . I consider myself, in the first place a martyr in the defense of Christianity against Communism."11 "Martyr of Love" Msgr. Tiso was a victim of political revenge. It was expected. that even if he were condemned, he would be granted amnesty ,b y Dr. IDdward Benes, President of the new Czecho-Slo:v akia. Benes refused. "Osservatore Romano," of April 28, 1947, wrote that in the event of Msgr. Tiso's condemnation "political discretion would make it necessary to grant amnesty, even though in self interest ... " to amelfo,r ate the tense situation ·b etween S1-ovaiks and Czechs. "As a martyr of love toward his homeland, Dr. Tiso will live on in the Slovaik Catholic nation," "Osservatore Romano," concluded. Although Dr. Benes had rid himself of Msgr. Tiso, it is certain that Tiso in death is a greater pro'b lem in the relationship between Czechs and Slova:ks than Tiso would have boon in life. Msgr. Tiso lives in the Sl01Vak nation as a hero and martyr. To the SlOIVruks he is a symbol of a crusader for the God.given rights 'Of the Slovak nation. The Slovak Republic, with its six years of successful existence, is an actuality that ca:nnot be eradicated from history. The SlavaJks at home and wbroad. in the absolute majority stand 24 SLOVAKIA behind the ideals for which Msgr. Tiso, .p resident of the "The Homiletic and Slovak R epublic, Lived and died. 1955. Pastoral Review," N 01Vember, 1. Coura,geous member of the Hungarian Parliament (1905-1918). 2. In parall el, Msgr. J an Sram ek, a Czech priest, becam e premier of the Czecho-Slovak governm ent in exile. 3. Dr. J ozef Tiso Abou t Him self, Edited by Dr. J oseph Pauco, Passaic, N. J . 4. As the war-front b egan to app roach Slo vakia, certain grou ps within the country, inspi.red d'rom a broad, provoked an u pri-sin g in August of 1944. T o ga_in the support of the Slovak populace, t h ey spread r umors that Tiso had been imprisoned by the Germ ans and, therefore, it was necessary to fight Ge rmany. 5. Op. cit., p. 121. 6. Op. cit., p. 111. 7. Op. cit., p. 37, 277 . 8. Op. cit., p . 213 ss., 199, 201. 9. Op. ci t., p. 313 ss. 10. Op. cit., p . 21. 11. Op. cit., p. 8. • • • WHO SAID IT? "The relations of today and tomorro,w between Cze,c hoSloivaikia and the Sorviet Union a.re defined in the treaty of Deceim:be.r 1'2, 1943, . . It proclaims the lasting friMdshir, of the two nations, for the future whic h will be, strengthened by widespread economic cooperation af t e r the war. The fu hire general collaJboratiion is defined as that of two ftree alilld independent ,s tates, in whi ch there wrn be no inter1fore111ce (Jan Papane k , Interin the internrul affairs of either.'' York, 19415 ) New Inc., Press, nati-onrul Universities 1 • • • "Norvemlber 7, 1917, is t he day thaJt is ma:riked in history as the beginning of a new era, which sought the guarantee of happiness to mankind by means of a new me1Jhod of equalling differences among people and th.us achi&ving contentment on earth. Today it is- stNa too eaJI'ly from thaJt epochal occasion to judge objootively the consequences of that great deed. One thing, however, is certain: it was the beginndng of an enormous process full of ideas bo:rn of idealism." - (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, V ~ of the Executive Conu:mttee of the "Council of Free OzecboslolV'a:kia," NOW PR.ODY, Novemiber 18, 1946).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Monsignor Jozef Tiso - Controversial Personality Description An account of the resource Th. J. Zubek, O.F.M., S.T.D. Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956 pp. 15-24 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zúbek, Teodorik J., 1914-1988 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September-December 1956 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4ee8bccf87776b5436ecb3ea05c0ef6a.pdf e39480df46c62f5715cc2298fe8e25e9 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA HEROIC SLOVAK B]SiHiOP - 99 WiCT]M OF COMMUNISM When 'One talks rubout Catholic bishops behind ·t he Iron Ountain - victims of Communist ,persecution - tJhe names of Cardinals Aloysius Stepinac, Joseph Mindszenty amd Joseph Berran usually come to our mind. But there is qruiite an imposing number of other heroic bishops in Communist jails and labor camps, hidden from the eyes of the world. They are som~how forigotten even in the Catholic press, but certia:inly not in t:he eyers orf God for Wlhom they are suffering. One orf these heroic victims of Communism was John Vojrba;sM1,k, bishop of rtilie Sipis Diocese in Slovakia, who died on August 4, 1965, after fifiteen years of imprisonment and confinement. He was the most ,beloved amd revered Slova,k bishop whose martyrdom is a source of inspiraition to t:he WJhole Slova;k nation. Vojtassruk's position in Slovrukia cam be compared to tJhat of Cardinal Stepi:nac in Croaitia. Bishop Vojtassak was !born on November 14, 1877, in Zaikmnenne in Orava, the poorest district orf Slovakia, from poor peasant parenrts. Among tJhe S-Eovak people, to have a son in the priesthood was considered trhe highest ideal and distincti'(){n. To attain that goal they did nOlt hesitate to make it:Jhe greatest sacrifices 0,nd undergo 1:Jhe greatest hardsihiips. To the overwhelmiJng joy of his p3irents Jahn Vojtassaik was ordained a priest on July 1, 1901. It was at a time when Slovakia was suffering under rbhe burden orf imposed magyarization. It was considered harmful and daingerous to one's career t'O ,s how his 1Sfovaik patriotism . .Patriotic priests were l8ibeled by Magyar civil a;nd ecclesiastica:l authorities as Pam-Slavs, and their priestly ,l ives would be spent in 1:lhe poorest and remotest parishes of rbhe diocese. John Vojtassak knew this very well, ibut lhe did not waver. He always remained fairthful to tJhe Slovak people. After working as assistant pastor in several small parishes, he became, in 1911, ,p astor in Veli:cna, a poor vi-llag,e orf Orava, where he stayed until 1919. As a ,p riest, John Vojta;ssak exoolied in pastoral zeal. Besides his regular priesitily duties he wrote articles in Slovak ma:gazines, particularly for the "SVATA RODINA" ('Dhe Holy Family), of whioh he became ediitor. In his articles, Vojtassaik tried to bolster the nationa:l and religious conscientiousness of the Slovruk people. He acquired a nationltl renown throughout all of S'lovrukia. 1 1 �SLOVAKIA His generosity toward Slovak national caiuses was ibotmdless. When as a young ,p riest he did not have any money to contribute for ithe estaiblishment of the Sfovaik National Museum, lhe g,ave his most va,lued treasur,e, his go'lden wa•tclh 01nd -ohain, wlhioh he received a;s a gift ifor his priestly oroinaUon. Tihis gesture became a legendary iHustr,aition of his ardent 'love for his nation. T,he end of World WaT I mea:nt the end of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy •a nd the fo11maition of the new Czecho~Slovak Republic. It was aJ1so the end of the imposed ma,gayairization of tJhe Slovak nation. In the Czeoho-Slovaik Republic, the apostolic zeai and work done by John Vojt•a ssak i.for the welfare of the Slova,k people were rewaroed. He W8Js named rector of the Diocesan Seminary in Spisska Kapituila in 1919, and a year later he W8JS arppoiinted bishop of the Spis Diocese by tihe Holy See. With great enthusiasm ihe plunged info the work of reforming his diocese. His primary preoccupation was the Catholirc education of yoUlbh. He founded a Te8ic'her's A:cademy for men in Spisska Kaipitwl.ia and another for women in Levoca. In Levioca he a!1so est8Jbliished a Minor Seminary. The Major Seminary at Spisska KapitJula became a model for a11 other seminaries in Slova!kia. To pr,omote viarious apostolaJtes rbishop Vojt8Jssak supported the religious orders and congregations in his diocese. He ail so iinrkoduced into his diocese School Brotheris as well as Missionaries of the DiviM Word. At the same time Vojtassfuk's concern wiitJh Slovak nrationa1 affairs did not diminish. As his stature among the Slovak !hierarchy grew, so did ,his influence in the political ilife of Slo-vakia. After the war, the Czechs came to Sfovrukia to help in its -administrative a,nd cultural tasks. But from the -beginnin.g the Czechs manifested a certain· a'loofness towaird the S:lovaks. With the ove11t:hrow of the Haibsburg Catholic Monarchy, chauvinistic Czechs tried to overthrow the Crutholic Church in the new Republic and return ito Hu.ssitism. 'I1he Czechs in Slovaikia did not respect Slovak tra,ditions nor their aJttaohment to their priests rand their Catholic reli!gion. Furthermore, bhe S1ov.aks soon realized that Czecih intentiOIJl.S toward · Slovakia in other respects were not the best·eirther. The Ozeoh:s in Slovwkia oocrupied not only positions for. .which -there was not enoug,h q,ua,l ified Slovaik per- �SLOVAKIA 101 soninel, -but even petty clerica:l jobs for which tlhere was more than enough Slovia:k mam,power. Tihe Prague government did not care to develop ·Slovruk industria!l caipacitty, but rather J-iindered it. 'Dhe Czechs did not respect tihe Slovwk language, and tried to engulf the Slovalk s under ,f oe guise of so-called Czechoslovak nation. This irritated Sloviak .p atriots. Msgr. Andrew Hlinka, who during the Magya,r regime ,s uffered prison terms for his Slovak patri<otism, now became the staunohest fighter :rgainst Czech encrooohments ilil 1Sfovakia. The program of his Peoples' Party was the ,culitura!l ,and administrative autonomy of Slovrukia in ithe framework of the Czeoho-S'lovak Republic. 'Dhls •policy was based on 1:Jhe Pittsbu~g,h Pact, conoll\lded between the American Slovaks aind Czechs in P1Usburg,h, ,P a., on May 30, 1918, and signed by Prof. 'Ilhomas G. Masaryk, the first president of the Republic. But Masruryk reneged on Jij,s own words and pursued a ,p olicy of strict centralism toward Slovakia directed from Prague. In the struggle for Slovak autonomy bishop Vojtassak was a dose co-worker of Msgr. Hlinlka. Jin 1939 Adolf Hitler occupied the Czech territories (Bohemia •amd Moravia), and Slovakia ,b ecame independent. After tJhe deait:Jh of :Msgr. Andrew Hlilllka on August 16, 1938, Msgr. Joseph Tiso became •t he head of Hlinlka's SlovaJk Peoples' Party. He was elected president of the Slovak Republic on October 26, 1939. Slova:kia, being in Gemnany's sphere orf influence, could not pur,s ue an independent foreign policy. Neveritheless, in internal a:Hiairs the regi<me of Msgr. Tiso was relatively free and democratic. German efforts to nazi!fy Slovakia were thwarted by Msgr. Tiso. Even the Jewish question, despite German pressure, was solved in a mi'lder manner than in other countries under Germ.'8JI1 influence. During the S<lovak R epublic B1shop Vojtassak brought his diocese to fu:11 blossom. 'Ilhe Retreat Movement, which spread tlhroug,hoUJt Slovakia during the war, was most flourishing in the Spis diocese. Bishop Vojtassak was ,prominent in aH tlhe nationia!l Catholic enterpdses. Through his efforts the S:lovaik Cait:Jholic Oharities was organized on a national basis. He was instrumental in founding the Catholic Press Bureau and the ,Slovia:k Catholic Academy, comprising aU 8-lova,k soholars of distinction. Bishop Vojtassak became the �102 SLOVAKIA first military bishop of the .Slova:k Republi-c and a member of the State Council, an advisory body to ,bhe .President of the Republic. 'I'he Slov'8Jk Republic was of a shor.t duration. In the spring of 1945 the Russian a:rmies ovel"I"an SlovaJkia. 'Dhe Allied Power.s agreed to the restoration of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. By the Ya.'lta Agreement, the new Cz.oohoSlovarkia was to be under Soviet _politioal influence. The communi:uation of Czecho-Slovaiki!a began to some degree immediately after the Second World War. fu the new Ozeoho..:Slovaik Republic thou.sands of Slovak patriots were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment for alleged c0Ha1boration witJh the Nazis. iMsgr. Joseph Tiso and scores of others were executed. Bishop Vojtassak was imprisoned for the firist time in May, 1945, and was confined for seven months. Further trirbulatio:ns for the S1ovruk nation were to come after February 25, 1948, when the Commuinists took full control of 0:uedho-Slovakia. Since June 1949, all the bishops were under constant police surveillance and detained in their residences. Those considered as most opposed to the Conummist regime were imprisoned. Bi<Slhop Vojtassaik was i,mprisoned in Braitislav,a in September 1950. After months of brainwashing in the Bratislava police prison, on Janua:ry 15, 1951, togetfuer with Paul Gojdic, bishop of the Presov Byzantine rite Diocese, and Michael Buzalk!a, auxiliary ,bishop of the Trnava Apostolic Admiinistratu~e, ihe was sentenced to 24 yeacrs of imprisonment, his properties were confiscated, and he was deprived of aU civil. rights. Bishop Vojta,ssaik was 73 years old at the time of hi!s triral. Conspiracy and treason against the Czecho-Slova:k Republic were 'his alleged crimes. Only those witnesses who testified against him were admitted to the trirul. The ·l awyer assigned for •his defense by the Communist regime made no plea for his client. The whole trial hinged on the "confession" of the defendant which had been extorted by the weH-known methods of Communist police mvestigation. We do not know all the detJails of the torments Bishop Vojtassak ,s uffered in various prisons where he spent more than seven years. Prison life is ·h ar.sh in any cir.cumstances, parti•c ularly irn Communi!st dungeons. 'Db.ere acre reports, smuggled through the Iron Curta:irn, tJhat in the case of Bish- �103 SLOVAKIA op Vojtassivk there were instances of s•adistic torture. Brutal Communist jaHers occasionally poured out their hatred of God on the aged Bishop. They .malig:ned him in the presence of other ,prisoners. At one time, they kept him in a cell witlh a feeble-minded inmate. At other times they assigned him the most repulsive jobs. Yet, Bishop Vojtassivk never lost ,h is composure and dignity, being always aware of the fact that he was suffering for Christ at the hands of his cruellest enemies. The rea:l reason for sentencing Bishop Vojtassivk was his unoompromi,sing loyalty to God, the Church and the Slovaik people. 'Dhe Communists were aware of Bishop VojtJassak's unique position in tihe '8'1-0vak nation. By destroying him tJhey intended to destroy t:Jhe resistance of the priests and the Slovak Catholic to their regime. But they achieved just the opposite reslrlrts. The Slovak people regard their imprisoned bishops and priests a,s martyrs of Christ. The heroic resistance of these witnesses of Obrist serves as Ml inspiration to them in t:Jhei,r resistamce to Communism. Wihen Bishop Vojitassak was about 80 yeairs old, the Communists released 1him from prison. BUit they kept him under constant surveillance in the 'house of detention in Bohemia. His .p leas to be permitted to live in Slovrukia wiit:Jh his relaitives were rejected. He died in exile, in Seno'hraby in Bohemia, on August 4, 1965, . almost 88 years old. His funeral at hi,s native viliage of Zakamenne was a maiss demonstraJtion of the Slovaik people for the beloved Bishop and a protest against Communist brutality. It is reported from Slova:kia that even a young 'SlovaJk Communist who was Sl\.l!pposed to ta.1!k at the ifuneraJl aibout the alleged "crimes" of the deceased Bishop spoke aJbout the injustice committed on an innocent man amd a,boUJt an imminent accounting for this crime. T. J. Zubek, O.F.M. LITERATURE Joseph M. Kirschbaum, Slovakia - Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe . New York, 1960. Joseph A. Mikus, Slovakia - A political History (1918-1950). Milwaukee, Wis., 1963. Gilbert L. Oddo, Slovakia and Its People. Cleveland, Ohio, 1960. T. J . Zubek, O.F.M. , The Church of Silence in Slovakia, Whiting, Ind., 1956. T. J . Zubek, O.F.M., Slovak Bishops - Martyrs of Christ. Toronto, Ont., 1963. � SLOVAKIA HEROIC SLOVAK B]SiHiOP - 99 WiCT]M OF COMMUNISM When 'One talks rubout Catholic bishops behind ·t he Iron Ountain - victims of Communist ,persecution - tJhe names of Cardinals Aloysius Stepinac, Joseph Mindszenty amd Joseph Berran usually come to our mind. But there is qruiite an imposing number of other heroic bishops in Communist jails and labor camps, hidden from the eyes of the world. They are som~how forigotten even in the Catholic press, but certia:inly not in t:he eyers orf God for Wlhom they are suffering. One orf these heroic victims of Communism was John Vojrba;sM1,k, bishop of rtilie Sipis Diocese in Slovakia, who died on August 4, 1965, after fifiteen years of imprisonment and confinement. He was the most ,beloved amd revered Slova,k bishop whose martyrdom is a source of inspiraition to t:he WJhole Slova;k nation. Vojtassruk's position in Slovrukia cam be compared to tJhat of Cardinal Stepi:nac in Croaitia. Bishop Vojtassak was !born on November 14, 1877, in Zaikmnenne in Orava, the poorest district orf Slovakia, from poor peasant parenrts. Among tJhe S-Eovak people, to have a son in the priesthood was considered trhe highest ideal and distincti'(){n. To attain that goal they did nOlt hesitate to make it:Jhe greatest sacrifices 0,nd undergo 1:Jhe greatest hardsihiips. To the overwhelmiJng joy of his p3irents Jahn Vojtassaik was ordained a priest on July 1, 1901. It was at a time when Slovakia was suffering under rbhe burden orf imposed magyarization. It was considered harmful and daingerous to one's career t'O ,s how his 1Sfovaik patriotism . .Patriotic priests were l8ibeled by Magyar civil a;nd ecclesiastica:l authorities as Pam-Slavs, and their priestly ,l ives would be spent in 1:lhe poorest and remotest parishes of rbhe diocese. John Vojtassak knew this very well, ibut lhe did not waver. He always remained fairthful to tJhe Slovak people. After working as assistant pastor in several small parishes, he became, in 1911, ,p astor in Veli:cna, a poor vi-llag,e orf Orava, where he stayed until 1919. As a ,p riest, John Vojta;ssak exoolied in pastoral zeal. Besides his regular priesitily duties he wrote articles in Slovak ma:gazines, particularly for the "SVATA RODINA" ('Dhe Holy Family), of whioh he became ediitor. In his articles, Vojtassaik tried to bolster the nationa:l and religious conscientiousness of the Slovruk people. He acquired a nationltl renown throughout all of S'lovrukia. 1 1 �SLOVAKIA His generosity toward Slovak national caiuses was ibotmdless. When as a young ,p riest he did not have any money to contribute for ithe estaiblishment of the Sfovaik National Museum, lhe g,ave his most va,lued treasur,e, his go'lden wa•tclh 01nd -ohain, wlhioh he received a;s a gift ifor his priestly oroinaUon. Tihis gesture became a legendary iHustr,aition of his ardent 'love for his nation. T,he end of World WaT I mea:nt the end of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy •a nd the fo11maition of the new Czecho~Slovak Republic. It was aJ1so the end of the imposed ma,gayairization of tJhe Slovak nation. In the Czeoho-Slovaik Republic, the apostolic zeai and work done by John Vojt•a ssak i.for the welfare of the Slova,k people were rewaroed. He W8Js named rector of the Diocesan Seminary in Spisska Kapituila in 1919, and a year later he W8JS arppoiinted bishop of the Spis Diocese by tihe Holy See. With great enthusiasm ihe plunged info the work of reforming his diocese. His primary preoccupation was the Catholirc education of yoUlbh. He founded a Te8ic'her's A:cademy for men in Spisska Kaipitwl.ia and another for women in Levoca. In Levioca he a!1so est8Jbliished a Minor Seminary. The Major Seminary at Spisska KapitJula became a model for a11 other seminaries in Slova!kia. To pr,omote viarious apostolaJtes rbishop Vojt8Jssak supported the religious orders and congregations in his diocese. He ail so iinrkoduced into his diocese School Brotheris as well as Missionaries of the DiviM Word. At the same time Vojtassfuk's concern wiitJh Slovak nrationa1 affairs did not diminish. As his stature among the Slovak !hierarchy grew, so did ,his influence in the political ilife of Slo-vakia. After the war, the Czechs came to Sfovrukia to help in its -administrative a,nd cultural tasks. But from the -beginnin.g the Czechs manifested a certain· a'loofness towaird the S:lovaks. With the ove11t:hrow of the Haibsburg Catholic Monarchy, chauvinistic Czechs tried to overthrow the Crutholic Church in the new Republic and return ito Hu.ssitism. 'I1he Czechs in Slovaikia did not respect Slovak tra,ditions nor their aJttaohment to their priests rand their Catholic reli!gion. Furthermore, bhe S1ov.aks soon realized that Czecih intentiOIJl.S toward · Slovakia in other respects were not the best·eirther. The Ozeoh:s in Slovwkia oocrupied not only positions for. .which -there was not enoug,h q,ua,l ified Slovaik per- �SLOVAKIA 101 soninel, -but even petty clerica:l jobs for which tlhere was more than enough Slovia:k mam,power. Tihe Prague government did not care to develop ·Slovruk industria!l caipacitty, but rather J-iindered it. 'Dhe Czechs did not respect tihe Slovwk language, and tried to engulf the Slovalk s under ,f oe guise of so-called Czechoslovak nation. This irritated Sloviak .p atriots. Msgr. Andrew Hlinka, who during the Magya,r regime ,s uffered prison terms for his Slovak patri<otism, now became the staunohest fighter :rgainst Czech encrooohments ilil 1Sfovakia. The program of his Peoples' Party was the ,culitura!l ,and administrative autonomy of Slovrukia in ithe framework of the Czeoho-S'lovak Republic. 'Dhls •policy was based on 1:Jhe Pittsbu~g,h Pact, conoll\lded between the American Slovaks aind Czechs in P1Usburg,h, ,P a., on May 30, 1918, and signed by Prof. 'Ilhomas G. Masaryk, the first president of the Republic. But Masruryk reneged on Jij,s own words and pursued a ,p olicy of strict centralism toward Slovakia directed from Prague. In the struggle for Slovak autonomy bishop Vojtassak was a dose co-worker of Msgr. Hlinlka. Jin 1939 Adolf Hitler occupied the Czech territories (Bohemia •amd Moravia), and Slovakia ,b ecame independent. After tJhe deait:Jh of :Msgr. Andrew Hlilllka on August 16, 1938, Msgr. Joseph Tiso became •t he head of Hlinlka's SlovaJk Peoples' Party. He was elected president of the Slovak Republic on October 26, 1939. Slova:kia, being in Gemnany's sphere orf influence, could not pur,s ue an independent foreign policy. Neveritheless, in internal a:Hiairs the regi<me of Msgr. Tiso was relatively free and democratic. German efforts to nazi!fy Slovakia were thwarted by Msgr. Tiso. Even the Jewish question, despite German pressure, was solved in a mi'lder manner than in other countries under Germ.'8JI1 influence. During the S<lovak R epublic B1shop Vojtassak brought his diocese to fu:11 blossom. 'Ilhe Retreat Movement, which spread tlhroug,hoUJt Slovakia during the war, was most flourishing in the Spis diocese. Bishop Vojtassak was ,prominent in aH tlhe nationia!l Catholic enterpdses. Through his efforts the S:lovaik Cait:Jholic Oharities was organized on a national basis. He was instrumental in founding the Catholic Press Bureau and the ,Slovia:k Catholic Academy, comprising aU 8-lova,k soholars of distinction. Bishop Vojtassak became the �102 SLOVAKIA first military bishop of the .Slova:k Republi-c and a member of the State Council, an advisory body to ,bhe .President of the Republic. 'I'he Slov'8Jk Republic was of a shor.t duration. In the spring of 1945 the Russian a:rmies ovel"I"an SlovaJkia. 'Dhe Allied Power.s agreed to the restoration of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. By the Ya.'lta Agreement, the new Cz.oohoSlovarkia was to be under Soviet _politioal influence. The communi:uation of Czecho-Slovaiki!a began to some degree immediately after the Second World War. fu the new Ozeoho..:Slovaik Republic thou.sands of Slovak patriots were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment for alleged c0Ha1boration witJh the Nazis. iMsgr. Joseph Tiso and scores of others were executed. Bishop Vojtassak was imprisoned for the firist time in May, 1945, and was confined for seven months. Further trirbulatio:ns for the S1ovruk nation were to come after February 25, 1948, when the Commuinists took full control of 0:uedho-Slovakia. Since June 1949, all the bishops were under constant police surveillance and detained in their residences. Those considered as most opposed to the Conummist regime were imprisoned. Bi<Slhop Vojtassaik was i,mprisoned in Braitislav,a in September 1950. After months of brainwashing in the Bratislava police prison, on Janua:ry 15, 1951, togetfuer with Paul Gojdic, bishop of the Presov Byzantine rite Diocese, and Michael Buzalk!a, auxiliary ,bishop of the Trnava Apostolic Admiinistratu~e, ihe was sentenced to 24 yeacrs of imprisonment, his properties were confiscated, and he was deprived of aU civil. rights. Bishop Vojta,ssaik was 73 years old at the time of hi!s triral. Conspiracy and treason against the Czecho-Slova:k Republic were 'his alleged crimes. Only those witnesses who testified against him were admitted to the trirul. The ·l awyer assigned for •his defense by the Communist regime made no plea for his client. The whole trial hinged on the "confession" of the defendant which had been extorted by the weH-known methods of Communist police mvestigation. We do not know all the detJails of the torments Bishop Vojtassak ,s uffered in various prisons where he spent more than seven years. Prison life is ·h ar.sh in any cir.cumstances, parti•c ularly irn Communi!st dungeons. 'Db.ere acre reports, smuggled through the Iron Curta:irn, tJhat in the case of Bish- �103 SLOVAKIA op Vojtassivk there were instances of s•adistic torture. Brutal Communist jaHers occasionally poured out their hatred of God on the aged Bishop. They .malig:ned him in the presence of other ,prisoners. At one time, they kept him in a cell witlh a feeble-minded inmate. At other times they assigned him the most repulsive jobs. Yet, Bishop Vojtassivk never lost ,h is composure and dignity, being always aware of the fact that he was suffering for Christ at the hands of his cruellest enemies. The rea:l reason for sentencing Bishop Vojtassivk was his unoompromi,sing loyalty to God, the Church and the Slovaik people. 'Dhe Communists were aware of Bishop VojtJassak's unique position in tihe '8'1-0vak nation. By destroying him tJhey intended to destroy t:Jhe resistance of the priests and the Slovak Catholic to their regime. But they achieved just the opposite reslrlrts. The Slovak people regard their imprisoned bishops and priests a,s martyrs of Christ. The heroic resistance of these witnesses of Obrist serves as Ml inspiration to them in t:Jhei,r resistamce to Communism. Wihen Bishop Vojitassak was about 80 yeairs old, the Communists released 1him from prison. BUit they kept him under constant surveillance in the 'house of detention in Bohemia. His .p leas to be permitted to live in Slovrukia wiit:Jh his relaitives were rejected. He died in exile, in Seno'hraby in Bohemia, on August 4, 1965, . almost 88 years old. His funeral at hi,s native viliage of Zakamenne was a maiss demonstraJtion of the Slovaik people for the beloved Bishop and a protest against Communist brutality. It is reported from Slova:kia that even a young 'SlovaJk Communist who was Sl\.l!pposed to ta.1!k at the ifuneraJl aibout the alleged "crimes" of the deceased Bishop spoke aJbout the injustice committed on an innocent man amd a,boUJt an imminent accounting for this crime. T. J. Zubek, O.F.M. LITERATURE Joseph M. Kirschbaum, Slovakia - Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe . New York, 1960. Joseph A. Mikus, Slovakia - A political History (1918-1950). Milwaukee, Wis., 1963. Gilbert L. Oddo, Slovakia and Its People. Cleveland, Ohio, 1960. T. J . Zubek, O.F.M. , The Church of Silence in Slovakia, Whiting, Ind., 1956. T. J . Zubek, O.F.M., Slovak Bishops - Martyrs of Christ. Toronto, Ont., 1963. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1966, Vol. 16 Description An account of the resource Vol. 16 (No. 39), 1966. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1966 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA HEROIC SLOVAK B]SiHiOP - 99 WiCT]M OF COMMUNISM When 'One talks rubout Catholic bishops behind ·t he Iron Ountain - victims of Communist ,persecution - tJhe names of Cardinals Aloysius Stepinac, Joseph Mindszenty amd Joseph Berran usually come to our mind. But there is qruiite an imposing number of other heroic bishops in Communist jails and labor camps, hidden from the eyes of the world. They are som~how forigotten even in the Catholic press, but certia:inly not in t:he eyers orf God for Wlhom they are suffering. One orf these heroic victims of Communism was John Vojrba;sM1,k, bishop of rtilie Sipis Diocese in Slovakia, who died on August 4, 1965, after fifiteen years of imprisonment and confinement. He was the most ,beloved amd revered Slova,k bishop whose martyrdom is a source of inspiraition to t:he WJhole Slova;k nation. Vojtassruk's position in Slovrukia cam be compared to tJhat of Cardinal Stepi:nac in Croaitia. Bishop Vojtassak was !born on November 14, 1877, in Zaikmnenne in Orava, the poorest district orf Slovakia, from poor peasant parenrts. Among tJhe S-Eovak people, to have a son in the priesthood was considered trhe highest ideal and distincti'(){n. To attain that goal they did nOlt hesitate to make it:Jhe greatest sacrifices 0,nd undergo 1:Jhe greatest hardsihiips. To the overwhelmiJng joy of his p3irents Jahn Vojtassaik was ordained a priest on July 1, 1901. It was at a time when Slovakia was suffering under rbhe burden orf imposed magyarization. It was considered harmful and daingerous to one's career t'O ,s how his 1Sfovaik patriotism . .Patriotic priests were l8ibeled by Magyar civil a;nd ecclesiastica:l authorities as Pam-Slavs, and their priestly ,l ives would be spent in 1:lhe poorest and remotest parishes of rbhe diocese. John Vojtassak knew this very well, ibut lhe did not waver. He always remained fairthful to tJhe Slovak people. After working as assistant pastor in several small parishes, he became, in 1911, ,p astor in Veli:cna, a poor vi-llag,e orf Orava, where he stayed until 1919. As a ,p riest, John Vojta;ssak exoolied in pastoral zeal. Besides his regular priesitily duties he wrote articles in Slovak ma:gazines, particularly for the "SVATA RODINA" ('Dhe Holy Family), of whioh he became ediitor. In his articles, Vojtassaik tried to bolster the nationa:l and religious conscientiousness of the Slovruk people. He acquired a nationltl renown throughout all of S'lovrukia. 1 1 SLOVAKIA His generosity toward Slovak national caiuses was ibotmdless. When as a young ,p riest he did not have any money to contribute for ithe estaiblishment of the Sfovaik National Museum, lhe g,ave his most va,lued treasur,e, his go'lden wa•tclh 01nd -ohain, wlhioh he received a;s a gift ifor his priestly oroinaUon. Tihis gesture became a legendary iHustr,aition of his ardent 'love for his nation. T,he end of World WaT I mea:nt the end of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy •a nd the fo11maition of the new Czecho~Slovak Republic. It was aJ1so the end of the imposed ma,gayairization of tJhe Slovak nation. In the Czeoho-Slovaik Republic, the apostolic zeai and work done by John Vojt•a ssak i.for the welfare of the Slova,k people were rewaroed. He W8Js named rector of the Diocesan Seminary in Spisska Kapituila in 1919, and a year later he W8JS arppoiinted bishop of the Spis Diocese by tihe Holy See. With great enthusiasm ihe plunged info the work of reforming his diocese. His primary preoccupation was the Catholirc education of yoUlbh. He founded a Te8ic'her's A:cademy for men in Spisska Kaipitwl.ia and another for women in Levoca. In Levioca he a!1so est8Jbliished a Minor Seminary. The Major Seminary at Spisska KapitJula became a model for a11 other seminaries in Slova!kia. To pr,omote viarious apostolaJtes rbishop Vojt8Jssak supported the religious orders and congregations in his diocese. He ail so iinrkoduced into his diocese School Brotheris as well as Missionaries of the DiviM Word. At the same time Vojtassfuk's concern wiitJh Slovak nrationa1 affairs did not diminish. As his stature among the Slovak !hierarchy grew, so did ,his influence in the political ilife of Slo-vakia. After the war, the Czechs came to Sfovrukia to help in its -administrative a,nd cultural tasks. But from the -beginnin.g the Czechs manifested a certain· a'loofness towaird the S:lovaks. With the ove11t:hrow of the Haibsburg Catholic Monarchy, chauvinistic Czechs tried to overthrow the Crutholic Church in the new Republic and return ito Hu.ssitism. 'I1he Czechs in Slovaikia did not respect Slovak tra,ditions nor their aJttaohment to their priests rand their Catholic reli!gion. Furthermore, bhe S1ov.aks soon realized that Czecih intentiOIJl.S toward · Slovakia in other respects were not the best·eirther. The Ozeoh:s in Slovwkia oocrupied not only positions for. .which -there was not enoug,h q,ua,l ified Slovaik per- SLOVAKIA 101 soninel, -but even petty clerica:l jobs for which tlhere was more than enough Slovia:k mam,power. Tihe Prague government did not care to develop ·Slovruk industria!l caipacitty, but rather J-iindered it. 'Dhe Czechs did not respect tihe Slovwk language, and tried to engulf the Slovalk s under ,f oe guise of so-called Czechoslovak nation. This irritated Sloviak .p atriots. Msgr. Andrew Hlinka, who during the Magya,r regime ,s uffered prison terms for his Slovak patri<otism, now became the staunohest fighter :rgainst Czech encrooohments ilil 1Sfovakia. The program of his Peoples' Party was the ,culitura!l ,and administrative autonomy of Slovrukia in ithe framework of the Czeoho-S'lovak Republic. 'Dhls •policy was based on 1:Jhe Pittsbu~g,h Pact, conoll\lded between the American Slovaks aind Czechs in P1Usburg,h, ,P a., on May 30, 1918, and signed by Prof. 'Ilhomas G. Masaryk, the first president of the Republic. But Masruryk reneged on Jij,s own words and pursued a ,p olicy of strict centralism toward Slovakia directed from Prague. In the struggle for Slovak autonomy bishop Vojtassak was a dose co-worker of Msgr. Hlinlka. Jin 1939 Adolf Hitler occupied the Czech territories (Bohemia •amd Moravia), and Slovakia ,b ecame independent. After tJhe deait:Jh of :Msgr. Andrew Hlilllka on August 16, 1938, Msgr. Joseph Tiso became •t he head of Hlinlka's SlovaJk Peoples' Party. He was elected president of the Slovak Republic on October 26, 1939. Slova:kia, being in Gemnany's sphere orf influence, could not pur,s ue an independent foreign policy. Neveritheless, in internal a:Hiairs the regi<me of Msgr. Tiso was relatively free and democratic. German efforts to nazi!fy Slovakia were thwarted by Msgr. Tiso. Even the Jewish question, despite German pressure, was solved in a mi'lder manner than in other countries under Germ.'8JI1 influence. During the S<lovak R epublic B1shop Vojtassak brought his diocese to fu:11 blossom. 'Ilhe Retreat Movement, which spread tlhroug,hoUJt Slovakia during the war, was most flourishing in the Spis diocese. Bishop Vojtassak was ,prominent in aH tlhe nationia!l Catholic enterpdses. Through his efforts the S:lovaik Cait:Jholic Oharities was organized on a national basis. He was instrumental in founding the Catholic Press Bureau and the ,Slovia:k Catholic Academy, comprising aU 8-lova,k soholars of distinction. Bishop Vojtassak became the 102 SLOVAKIA first military bishop of the .Slova:k Republi-c and a member of the State Council, an advisory body to ,bhe .President of the Republic. 'I'he Slov'8Jk Republic was of a shor.t duration. In the spring of 1945 the Russian a:rmies ovel"I"an SlovaJkia. 'Dhe Allied Power.s agreed to the restoration of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. By the Ya.'lta Agreement, the new Cz.oohoSlovarkia was to be under Soviet _politioal influence. The communi:uation of Czecho-Slovaiki!a began to some degree immediately after the Second World War. fu the new Ozeoho..:Slovaik Republic thou.sands of Slovak patriots were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment for alleged c0Ha1boration witJh the Nazis. iMsgr. Joseph Tiso and scores of others were executed. Bishop Vojtassak was imprisoned for the firist time in May, 1945, and was confined for seven months. Further trirbulatio:ns for the S1ovruk nation were to come after February 25, 1948, when the Commuinists took full control of 0:uedho-Slovakia. Since June 1949, all the bishops were under constant police surveillance and detained in their residences. Those considered as most opposed to the Conummist regime were imprisoned. Bi<Slhop Vojtassaik was i,mprisoned in Braitislav,a in September 1950. After months of brainwashing in the Bratislava police prison, on Janua:ry 15, 1951, togetfuer with Paul Gojdic, bishop of the Presov Byzantine rite Diocese, and Michael Buzalk!a, auxiliary ,bishop of the Trnava Apostolic Admiinistratu~e, ihe was sentenced to 24 yeacrs of imprisonment, his properties were confiscated, and he was deprived of aU civil. rights. Bishop Vojta,ssaik was 73 years old at the time of hi!s triral. Conspiracy and treason against the Czecho-Slova:k Republic were 'his alleged crimes. Only those witnesses who testified against him were admitted to the trirul. The ·l awyer assigned for •his defense by the Communist regime made no plea for his client. The whole trial hinged on the "confession" of the defendant which had been extorted by the weH-known methods of Communist police mvestigation. We do not know all the detJails of the torments Bishop Vojtassak ,s uffered in various prisons where he spent more than seven years. Prison life is ·h ar.sh in any cir.cumstances, parti•c ularly irn Communi!st dungeons. 'Db.ere acre reports, smuggled through the Iron Curta:irn, tJhat in the case of Bish- 103 SLOVAKIA op Vojtassivk there were instances of s•adistic torture. Brutal Communist jaHers occasionally poured out their hatred of God on the aged Bishop. They .malig:ned him in the presence of other ,prisoners. At one time, they kept him in a cell witlh a feeble-minded inmate. At other times they assigned him the most repulsive jobs. Yet, Bishop Vojtassivk never lost ,h is composure and dignity, being always aware of the fact that he was suffering for Christ at the hands of his cruellest enemies. The rea:l reason for sentencing Bishop Vojtassivk was his unoompromi,sing loyalty to God, the Church and the Slovaik people. 'Dhe Communists were aware of Bishop VojtJassak's unique position in tihe '8'1-0vak nation. By destroying him tJhey intended to destroy t:Jhe resistance of the priests and the Slovak Catholic to their regime. But they achieved just the opposite reslrlrts. The Slovak people regard their imprisoned bishops and priests a,s martyrs of Christ. The heroic resistance of these witnesses of Obrist serves as Ml inspiration to them in t:Jhei,r resistamce to Communism. Wihen Bishop Vojitassak was about 80 yeairs old, the Communists released 1him from prison. BUit they kept him under constant surveillance in the 'house of detention in Bohemia. His .p leas to be permitted to live in Slovrukia wiit:Jh his relaitives were rejected. He died in exile, in Seno'hraby in Bohemia, on August 4, 1965, . almost 88 years old. His funeral at hi,s native viliage of Zakamenne was a maiss demonstraJtion of the Slovaik people for the beloved Bishop and a protest against Communist brutality. It is reported from Slova:kia that even a young 'SlovaJk Communist who was Sl\.l!pposed to ta.1!k at the ifuneraJl aibout the alleged "crimes" of the deceased Bishop spoke aJbout the injustice committed on an innocent man amd a,boUJt an imminent accounting for this crime. T. J. Zubek, O.F.M. LITERATURE Joseph M. Kirschbaum, Slovakia - Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe . New York, 1960. Joseph A. Mikus, Slovakia - A political History (1918-1950). Milwaukee, Wis., 1963. Gilbert L. Oddo, Slovakia and Its People. Cleveland, Ohio, 1960. T. J . Zubek, O.F.M. , The Church of Silence in Slovakia, Whiting, Ind., 1956. T. J . Zubek, O.F.M., Slovak Bishops - Martyrs of Christ. Toronto, Ont., 1963.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Heroic Slovak Bishop - Victim of Communism Description An account of the resource T. J. Zubek, O.F.M. Slovakia, Vol. 16 (No. 39), 1966 pp. 99-103 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zúbek, Teodorik J., 1914-1988 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1966 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/82efa56c7bee59fa9fb4ec1ba55521d4.pdf 0007048043183d6c353791f1a5db6802 PDF Text Text 36 SLOVAKIA Dark Hours of the Church in Slovakia After the shock of the Russian invasion of CzechoSlovakia on August 21, 1968, the first task of Moscow and its collaborators in that country was to "normalize" the situation. The term "normalization" in communist jargon meant the abrogation of all civil liberties gained during the Dubcek regime and the imposition of rigid control on public and private life of all citizens. After Alexander Dubcek fell in disgrace of Moscow, Gustav Eusak, his former right hand, used all available methods to get to the top of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia and to stay there with the blessing of Moscow. He did not hesitate to renege on all the principles of Dubcek's "Communism with human face". Under the supervision of Moscow's emissaries it did not take long before the country returned to the brutal Stalinist era of Antonin Novotny. The so-called "normalization" applies to all sections of life in Czecho-Slovakia, including religious life. Since 1969 the atheistic propaganda is steadily increasing in printed publications and in broadcasting. The teachers are pressed to spread anti-religious indoctrination on all levels of education, in all subject-matters taught in schools. It is permissible for the priests to teach religion in school buildings after the regular curriculum in grade schoolsone hour weekly for lower grades and one hour bi-weekly for upper grades. But it can be done only with a written petition of both parents who must come personally to the principal of the school. In such an interview, the principal, as a rule, tries to influence even to intimidate the parents. Children who have attended religious classes are not admitted to higher education and their parents are branded as unreliable to the Communist regime. Public servants are dissuaded from attending Masses and receiving the sacraments. �SLOVAKIA 37 Freedom of press, so much enjoyed during the short period of Dubcek regime, was again suppressed. The only Slovak Catholic weekly newspaper, Katolicke noviny ( Catholic News) is under strict Communist control. The editor of this newspaper since September 1973 is Rev. Francis Marko. The newspaper prints only selected religious news, and the readers of the paper are fed with Communist Party line editorials and articles. The same applies to the monthly priestly magazine Duchovny pastier (Spiritual Shepherd) under the editorship of Rev. Michal Krovina, and to the almanac Putnik svatovojtessky (Pilgrim of St. Vojtech), published annually. All these publications appear under the sponsorship of the Society of St. Vojtech. The Society of St. Vojtech played a unique role in the history of Slovak Catholics and of the Slovak nation. It was founded in 1870 by Rev. Andrew Radlinsky in the time of great magyarization of the Slovak nation. By its large membership and publications this Society kept alive the faith in the souls of Slovak people and the hope for better future . From 1918 till 1945 it made a great progress in its scope and activity. The Society of St. Vojtech became the heart of the Slovak Catholic culture. The Communists after the take-over in 1948 put the Society under their control. They took away its printery and book bindery, discarded its membership and completely changed its structure and mission. Besides the three above mentioned regular publications they permitted to publish under the name of the Society of St. Vojtech some prayer and liturgical books and parish administration forms. The main purpose of the "nationalized" Society of St. Vojtech became the selling of liturgical and devotional objects and the distribution of Mass wine to all the parishes of Slovakia. Since 1948 the new Society of St. Vojtech was managed by an Executive Committee, headed by Rev. Alexander Horak, a well known pro-Communist priest. With the arrival of Dubcek thaw, this Executive Committee was replaced by two representatives from each diocese of Slovakia. Msgr. John Postenyi, administrative manager of the Society for several decades, was elected president of the Society of St. Vojtech. Under Postenyi's leadership the Society, during the short period of more favorable condi- �38 SLOVAKIA tions, published a series of much needed liturgical books and the whole new Slovak translation of the Bible. Msgr. Postenyi also began preparations for the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the Society to be held in 1970. But, meanwhile, the situation worsened again. Msgr. Postenyi was replaced by Rev. Alexander Horak as the president of the Society, and the principal centenary celebrations on September 24, 1970 were held in the pro-government spirit under the supervision of Communist big wheels. During the years 1968-1969, the new spirit came also to the Catholic seminary in Bratislava. So many candidates for the priesthood enrolled to the seminary that there was a serious talk about asking permission for opening another one in eastern Slovakia. The barriers in accepting seminarians were broken and in 1968-1969 more than a hundred candidates were accepted into the seminary. But here too the "normalization" took place. In later years many of these candidates for the priesthood were dismissed. And those who were ordained in 1973 and 1974, were sent to military service. The "numerus clausus" and strict selection of candidates were reinforced. Sixty newly ordained priests in one year seemed much too many for the communist supervisors of religious life. On the other hand, several priests who showed extraordinary zeal in performing their ministry, were deprived of state permission to perform parish work and were sent to non-priestly employment or were forced to retire. Some were sentenced to imprisonment on various pretexts. How could the religious situation worsen so rapidly after all the signs of hope in 1968? During the years 1950-1968 the Catholic Church in Czecho-Slovakia was kept in firm grips by the Communist government with the help of priests-collaborators organized in the "Peace Movement of the Catholic Clergy". Priests of this organization closely cooperated with the Communist Agencies for Ecclesiastical Affairs and practically dominated the institutional Church in Czecho-Slovakia. Only priests active in this association had some measure of security and possibility of being promoted to higher positions in Church hierarchy, and thus getting higher state salaries. In the �SLOVAKIA 39 early sixties "The Peace Movement" h~d ample following among the priests, thougb. not all of them were collaborat~g with Communist governm~nt in equal degree. On March 21, 1968, in the general of anti-Stalinjst mood in all spheres of life, the pro-Communist "Peace MPVlement of the Catholic Clergy" was forced to disband. The :vriests loyal to the Church and unburdened by tJ'}e past organiied themselves in a new association called "The Task for the Council Renewal". They began the difficult work of correcting the evils of the precedent ·era, trymg to get rid of the strict control of thi Church by Communist agenctes and to purge the Church -administration from, t~ most compromised collaborators 'Yith the former regime. The most meritorious fruit of these efforts were the re,tqration of the Greek Catholic Diocese of Prespv, Slovakia, which has been forcibly made Orthodpx in April 1950. Whe~ in 1968 two collaborating vicars capitulars, namely Rev. John Dechet and Rev. Andrew Scheffer died, two $Olid priests were appointed by Slovak bishop 4mbrose Lazik, namely Rev. Joseph Ligos to take place of Scheffer as administrator of Spis Diocese and Rev. Francis Haspra as acuninistrator of Banska Bystrica Diocese. T~re were hope(ul signs of restoration of some monasteries and convents ~uppressed in 1950, as well as of establishing more normal COild,itions for religious life in general. But the Russian invasion of August 1968 shattered all premature hopes. New enslavement of the Church was the order of the day of the new post-Dubcek regime. Since Septeµib13r 1969, the government was set up to restore the status quo before 1968 in the Church-State relations. For this goal an organization of collaborating priest.5, similar to the defunct "Peace Movement of the Catholic Cler~" was a~solutely necessary. It was pretty difficult to re-organize iji~ discredited priestly pro-Communist orga~ati9n of "Peace Movements". Finally, on August 31, 1971, the society was resurrected under the n&me of "The Fede~tion of the Catholic Clergy - Pacem ·in Terris". The same;old collaborators from the ranks of th~ clergy worked on the reyival of the ill-famed priestly "Peace Movement" and are now leading it, namely, Rev. Nicholas Visnovsky, Rev. Stephen Onderko, Rev. Alexan~er Horak �40 SLOVAKIA et al. They openly claim the continuity with the defunct "Peace Movement of the Catholic Clergy". The new organization has the same structure, the same goals and means as the previous one. In close collaboration with State and Provincial agencies for the ecclesiastical affairs the members of this organization gradually took over the Society of St. Vojtech, the residual Catholic press, Catholic Charity, diocesan chanceries, the Cyrilo-Methodian Theological Faculty in Bratislava and whatever Catholic institutions still exist. They pretend to be spokesmen for the Catholic Church in Czecho-Slovakia. After long discussions between the representative of the Holy See (Agostino Casaroli) and the Czecho-Slovak government four new bishops were appointed, three for Slovakia, and one for Moravia in March 1973. The leaders of the "Pacem in Terris" claim that they took part in these negotiations and that the new bishops were members of the "Peace Movement of the Catholic Clergy" and two of them are active members of the "Pacem in Terris". They also claim that all newly appointed canons are active members of the new "Federation of the Catholic Clergy"; that members of this organization have preference in getting free board and room in spas and recreation centers reserved for priest.* It is quite shameful that the same discredited priests, who were swept away by the dawn of freedom during the Dubcek era, did not hesitate to get involved in collaborating with the atheistic Communism for the second time. If Catholic priests stood unified and not let their ranks infiltrate by collaborators, the Communist aims for enslaving the Church again would have been much more difficult. New set of priests, not burdened with the stained past, probably would have withstood the Communist pressure and preserved at least some measure of independence which the Church gained during the Dubcek era. Theodoric J. Zubek, O.F.M. *) Duchovni pastyr, 1974, pp. 30-32; Duchovny pastier, 1974, pp. 145-146. � 36 SLOVAKIA Dark Hours of the Church in Slovakia After the shock of the Russian invasion of CzechoSlovakia on August 21, 1968, the first task of Moscow and its collaborators in that country was to "normalize" the situation. The term "normalization" in communist jargon meant the abrogation of all civil liberties gained during the Dubcek regime and the imposition of rigid control on public and private life of all citizens. After Alexander Dubcek fell in disgrace of Moscow, Gustav Eusak, his former right hand, used all available methods to get to the top of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia and to stay there with the blessing of Moscow. He did not hesitate to renege on all the principles of Dubcek's "Communism with human face". Under the supervision of Moscow's emissaries it did not take long before the country returned to the brutal Stalinist era of Antonin Novotny. The so-called "normalization" applies to all sections of life in Czecho-Slovakia, including religious life. Since 1969 the atheistic propaganda is steadily increasing in printed publications and in broadcasting. The teachers are pressed to spread anti-religious indoctrination on all levels of education, in all subject-matters taught in schools. It is permissible for the priests to teach religion in school buildings after the regular curriculum in grade schoolsone hour weekly for lower grades and one hour bi-weekly for upper grades. But it can be done only with a written petition of both parents who must come personally to the principal of the school. In such an interview, the principal, as a rule, tries to influence even to intimidate the parents. Children who have attended religious classes are not admitted to higher education and their parents are branded as unreliable to the Communist regime. Public servants are dissuaded from attending Masses and receiving the sacraments. �SLOVAKIA 37 Freedom of press, so much enjoyed during the short period of Dubcek regime, was again suppressed. The only Slovak Catholic weekly newspaper, Katolicke noviny ( Catholic News) is under strict Communist control. The editor of this newspaper since September 1973 is Rev. Francis Marko. The newspaper prints only selected religious news, and the readers of the paper are fed with Communist Party line editorials and articles. The same applies to the monthly priestly magazine Duchovny pastier (Spiritual Shepherd) under the editorship of Rev. Michal Krovina, and to the almanac Putnik svatovojtessky (Pilgrim of St. Vojtech), published annually. All these publications appear under the sponsorship of the Society of St. Vojtech. The Society of St. Vojtech played a unique role in the history of Slovak Catholics and of the Slovak nation. It was founded in 1870 by Rev. Andrew Radlinsky in the time of great magyarization of the Slovak nation. By its large membership and publications this Society kept alive the faith in the souls of Slovak people and the hope for better future . From 1918 till 1945 it made a great progress in its scope and activity. The Society of St. Vojtech became the heart of the Slovak Catholic culture. The Communists after the take-over in 1948 put the Society under their control. They took away its printery and book bindery, discarded its membership and completely changed its structure and mission. Besides the three above mentioned regular publications they permitted to publish under the name of the Society of St. Vojtech some prayer and liturgical books and parish administration forms. The main purpose of the "nationalized" Society of St. Vojtech became the selling of liturgical and devotional objects and the distribution of Mass wine to all the parishes of Slovakia. Since 1948 the new Society of St. Vojtech was managed by an Executive Committee, headed by Rev. Alexander Horak, a well known pro-Communist priest. With the arrival of Dubcek thaw, this Executive Committee was replaced by two representatives from each diocese of Slovakia. Msgr. John Postenyi, administrative manager of the Society for several decades, was elected president of the Society of St. Vojtech. Under Postenyi's leadership the Society, during the short period of more favorable condi- �38 SLOVAKIA tions, published a series of much needed liturgical books and the whole new Slovak translation of the Bible. Msgr. Postenyi also began preparations for the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the Society to be held in 1970. But, meanwhile, the situation worsened again. Msgr. Postenyi was replaced by Rev. Alexander Horak as the president of the Society, and the principal centenary celebrations on September 24, 1970 were held in the pro-government spirit under the supervision of Communist big wheels. During the years 1968-1969, the new spirit came also to the Catholic seminary in Bratislava. So many candidates for the priesthood enrolled to the seminary that there was a serious talk about asking permission for opening another one in eastern Slovakia. The barriers in accepting seminarians were broken and in 1968-1969 more than a hundred candidates were accepted into the seminary. But here too the "normalization" took place. In later years many of these candidates for the priesthood were dismissed. And those who were ordained in 1973 and 1974, were sent to military service. The "numerus clausus" and strict selection of candidates were reinforced. Sixty newly ordained priests in one year seemed much too many for the communist supervisors of religious life. On the other hand, several priests who showed extraordinary zeal in performing their ministry, were deprived of state permission to perform parish work and were sent to non-priestly employment or were forced to retire. Some were sentenced to imprisonment on various pretexts. How could the religious situation worsen so rapidly after all the signs of hope in 1968? During the years 1950-1968 the Catholic Church in Czecho-Slovakia was kept in firm grips by the Communist government with the help of priests-collaborators organized in the "Peace Movement of the Catholic Clergy". Priests of this organization closely cooperated with the Communist Agencies for Ecclesiastical Affairs and practically dominated the institutional Church in Czecho-Slovakia. Only priests active in this association had some measure of security and possibility of being promoted to higher positions in Church hierarchy, and thus getting higher state salaries. In the �SLOVAKIA 39 early sixties "The Peace Movement" h~d ample following among the priests, thougb. not all of them were collaborat~g with Communist governm~nt in equal degree. On March 21, 1968, in the general of anti-Stalinjst mood in all spheres of life, the pro-Communist "Peace MPVlement of the Catholic Clergy" was forced to disband. The :vriests loyal to the Church and unburdened by tJ'}e past organiied themselves in a new association called "The Task for the Council Renewal". They began the difficult work of correcting the evils of the precedent ·era, trymg to get rid of the strict control of thi Church by Communist agenctes and to purge the Church -administration from, t~ most compromised collaborators 'Yith the former regime. The most meritorious fruit of these efforts were the re,tqration of the Greek Catholic Diocese of Prespv, Slovakia, which has been forcibly made Orthodpx in April 1950. Whe~ in 1968 two collaborating vicars capitulars, namely Rev. John Dechet and Rev. Andrew Scheffer died, two $Olid priests were appointed by Slovak bishop 4mbrose Lazik, namely Rev. Joseph Ligos to take place of Scheffer as administrator of Spis Diocese and Rev. Francis Haspra as acuninistrator of Banska Bystrica Diocese. T~re were hope(ul signs of restoration of some monasteries and convents ~uppressed in 1950, as well as of establishing more normal COild,itions for religious life in general. But the Russian invasion of August 1968 shattered all premature hopes. New enslavement of the Church was the order of the day of the new post-Dubcek regime. Since Septeµib13r 1969, the government was set up to restore the status quo before 1968 in the Church-State relations. For this goal an organization of collaborating priest.5, similar to the defunct "Peace Movement of the Catholic Cler~" was a~solutely necessary. It was pretty difficult to re-organize iji~ discredited priestly pro-Communist orga~ati9n of "Peace Movements". Finally, on August 31, 1971, the society was resurrected under the n&me of "The Fede~tion of the Catholic Clergy - Pacem ·in Terris". The same;old collaborators from the ranks of th~ clergy worked on the reyival of the ill-famed priestly "Peace Movement" and are now leading it, namely, Rev. Nicholas Visnovsky, Rev. Stephen Onderko, Rev. Alexan~er Horak �40 SLOVAKIA et al. They openly claim the continuity with the defunct "Peace Movement of the Catholic Clergy". The new organization has the same structure, the same goals and means as the previous one. In close collaboration with State and Provincial agencies for the ecclesiastical affairs the members of this organization gradually took over the Society of St. Vojtech, the residual Catholic press, Catholic Charity, diocesan chanceries, the Cyrilo-Methodian Theological Faculty in Bratislava and whatever Catholic institutions still exist. They pretend to be spokesmen for the Catholic Church in Czecho-Slovakia. After long discussions between the representative of the Holy See (Agostino Casaroli) and the Czecho-Slovak government four new bishops were appointed, three for Slovakia, and one for Moravia in March 1973. The leaders of the "Pacem in Terris" claim that they took part in these negotiations and that the new bishops were members of the "Peace Movement of the Catholic Clergy" and two of them are active members of the "Pacem in Terris". They also claim that all newly appointed canons are active members of the new "Federation of the Catholic Clergy"; that members of this organization have preference in getting free board and room in spas and recreation centers reserved for priest.* It is quite shameful that the same discredited priests, who were swept away by the dawn of freedom during the Dubcek era, did not hesitate to get involved in collaborating with the atheistic Communism for the second time. If Catholic priests stood unified and not let their ranks infiltrate by collaborators, the Communist aims for enslaving the Church again would have been much more difficult. New set of priests, not burdened with the stained past, probably would have withstood the Communist pressure and preserved at least some measure of independence which the Church gained during the Dubcek era. Theodoric J. Zubek, O.F.M. *) Duchovni pastyr, 1974, pp. 30-32; Duchovny pastier, 1974, pp. 145-146. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1975, Vol. 25 Description An account of the resource Vol. 25 (No. 48), 1975. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1975 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 36 SLOVAKIA Dark Hours of the Church in Slovakia After the shock of the Russian invasion of CzechoSlovakia on August 21, 1968, the first task of Moscow and its collaborators in that country was to "normalize" the situation. The term "normalization" in communist jargon meant the abrogation of all civil liberties gained during the Dubcek regime and the imposition of rigid control on public and private life of all citizens. After Alexander Dubcek fell in disgrace of Moscow, Gustav Eusak, his former right hand, used all available methods to get to the top of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia and to stay there with the blessing of Moscow. He did not hesitate to renege on all the principles of Dubcek's "Communism with human face". Under the supervision of Moscow's emissaries it did not take long before the country returned to the brutal Stalinist era of Antonin Novotny. The so-called "normalization" applies to all sections of life in Czecho-Slovakia, including religious life. Since 1969 the atheistic propaganda is steadily increasing in printed publications and in broadcasting. The teachers are pressed to spread anti-religious indoctrination on all levels of education, in all subject-matters taught in schools. It is permissible for the priests to teach religion in school buildings after the regular curriculum in grade schoolsone hour weekly for lower grades and one hour bi-weekly for upper grades. But it can be done only with a written petition of both parents who must come personally to the principal of the school. In such an interview, the principal, as a rule, tries to influence even to intimidate the parents. Children who have attended religious classes are not admitted to higher education and their parents are branded as unreliable to the Communist regime. Public servants are dissuaded from attending Masses and receiving the sacraments. SLOVAKIA 37 Freedom of press, so much enjoyed during the short period of Dubcek regime, was again suppressed. The only Slovak Catholic weekly newspaper, Katolicke noviny ( Catholic News) is under strict Communist control. The editor of this newspaper since September 1973 is Rev. Francis Marko. The newspaper prints only selected religious news, and the readers of the paper are fed with Communist Party line editorials and articles. The same applies to the monthly priestly magazine Duchovny pastier (Spiritual Shepherd) under the editorship of Rev. Michal Krovina, and to the almanac Putnik svatovojtessky (Pilgrim of St. Vojtech), published annually. All these publications appear under the sponsorship of the Society of St. Vojtech. The Society of St. Vojtech played a unique role in the history of Slovak Catholics and of the Slovak nation. It was founded in 1870 by Rev. Andrew Radlinsky in the time of great magyarization of the Slovak nation. By its large membership and publications this Society kept alive the faith in the souls of Slovak people and the hope for better future . From 1918 till 1945 it made a great progress in its scope and activity. The Society of St. Vojtech became the heart of the Slovak Catholic culture. The Communists after the take-over in 1948 put the Society under their control. They took away its printery and book bindery, discarded its membership and completely changed its structure and mission. Besides the three above mentioned regular publications they permitted to publish under the name of the Society of St. Vojtech some prayer and liturgical books and parish administration forms. The main purpose of the "nationalized" Society of St. Vojtech became the selling of liturgical and devotional objects and the distribution of Mass wine to all the parishes of Slovakia. Since 1948 the new Society of St. Vojtech was managed by an Executive Committee, headed by Rev. Alexander Horak, a well known pro-Communist priest. With the arrival of Dubcek thaw, this Executive Committee was replaced by two representatives from each diocese of Slovakia. Msgr. John Postenyi, administrative manager of the Society for several decades, was elected president of the Society of St. Vojtech. Under Postenyi's leadership the Society, during the short period of more favorable condi- 38 SLOVAKIA tions, published a series of much needed liturgical books and the whole new Slovak translation of the Bible. Msgr. Postenyi also began preparations for the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the Society to be held in 1970. But, meanwhile, the situation worsened again. Msgr. Postenyi was replaced by Rev. Alexander Horak as the president of the Society, and the principal centenary celebrations on September 24, 1970 were held in the pro-government spirit under the supervision of Communist big wheels. During the years 1968-1969, the new spirit came also to the Catholic seminary in Bratislava. So many candidates for the priesthood enrolled to the seminary that there was a serious talk about asking permission for opening another one in eastern Slovakia. The barriers in accepting seminarians were broken and in 1968-1969 more than a hundred candidates were accepted into the seminary. But here too the "normalization" took place. In later years many of these candidates for the priesthood were dismissed. And those who were ordained in 1973 and 1974, were sent to military service. The "numerus clausus" and strict selection of candidates were reinforced. Sixty newly ordained priests in one year seemed much too many for the communist supervisors of religious life. On the other hand, several priests who showed extraordinary zeal in performing their ministry, were deprived of state permission to perform parish work and were sent to non-priestly employment or were forced to retire. Some were sentenced to imprisonment on various pretexts. How could the religious situation worsen so rapidly after all the signs of hope in 1968? During the years 1950-1968 the Catholic Church in Czecho-Slovakia was kept in firm grips by the Communist government with the help of priests-collaborators organized in the "Peace Movement of the Catholic Clergy". Priests of this organization closely cooperated with the Communist Agencies for Ecclesiastical Affairs and practically dominated the institutional Church in Czecho-Slovakia. Only priests active in this association had some measure of security and possibility of being promoted to higher positions in Church hierarchy, and thus getting higher state salaries. In the SLOVAKIA 39 early sixties "The Peace Movement" h~d ample following among the priests, thougb. not all of them were collaborat~g with Communist governm~nt in equal degree. On March 21, 1968, in the general of anti-Stalinjst mood in all spheres of life, the pro-Communist "Peace MPVlement of the Catholic Clergy" was forced to disband. The :vriests loyal to the Church and unburdened by tJ'}e past organiied themselves in a new association called "The Task for the Council Renewal". They began the difficult work of correcting the evils of the precedent ·era, trymg to get rid of the strict control of thi Church by Communist agenctes and to purge the Church -administration from, t~ most compromised collaborators 'Yith the former regime. The most meritorious fruit of these efforts were the re,tqration of the Greek Catholic Diocese of Prespv, Slovakia, which has been forcibly made Orthodpx in April 1950. Whe~ in 1968 two collaborating vicars capitulars, namely Rev. John Dechet and Rev. Andrew Scheffer died, two $Olid priests were appointed by Slovak bishop 4mbrose Lazik, namely Rev. Joseph Ligos to take place of Scheffer as administrator of Spis Diocese and Rev. Francis Haspra as acuninistrator of Banska Bystrica Diocese. T~re were hope(ul signs of restoration of some monasteries and convents ~uppressed in 1950, as well as of establishing more normal COild,itions for religious life in general. But the Russian invasion of August 1968 shattered all premature hopes. New enslavement of the Church was the order of the day of the new post-Dubcek regime. Since Septeµib13r 1969, the government was set up to restore the status quo before 1968 in the Church-State relations. For this goal an organization of collaborating priest.5, similar to the defunct "Peace Movement of the Catholic Cler~" was a~solutely necessary. It was pretty difficult to re-organize iji~ discredited priestly pro-Communist orga~ati9n of "Peace Movements". Finally, on August 31, 1971, the society was resurrected under the n&me of "The Fede~tion of the Catholic Clergy - Pacem ·in Terris". The same;old collaborators from the ranks of th~ clergy worked on the reyival of the ill-famed priestly "Peace Movement" and are now leading it, namely, Rev. Nicholas Visnovsky, Rev. Stephen Onderko, Rev. Alexan~er Horak 40 SLOVAKIA et al. They openly claim the continuity with the defunct "Peace Movement of the Catholic Clergy". The new organization has the same structure, the same goals and means as the previous one. In close collaboration with State and Provincial agencies for the ecclesiastical affairs the members of this organization gradually took over the Society of St. Vojtech, the residual Catholic press, Catholic Charity, diocesan chanceries, the Cyrilo-Methodian Theological Faculty in Bratislava and whatever Catholic institutions still exist. They pretend to be spokesmen for the Catholic Church in Czecho-Slovakia. After long discussions between the representative of the Holy See (Agostino Casaroli) and the Czecho-Slovak government four new bishops were appointed, three for Slovakia, and one for Moravia in March 1973. The leaders of the "Pacem in Terris" claim that they took part in these negotiations and that the new bishops were members of the "Peace Movement of the Catholic Clergy" and two of them are active members of the "Pacem in Terris". They also claim that all newly appointed canons are active members of the new "Federation of the Catholic Clergy"; that members of this organization have preference in getting free board and room in spas and recreation centers reserved for priest.* It is quite shameful that the same discredited priests, who were swept away by the dawn of freedom during the Dubcek era, did not hesitate to get involved in collaborating with the atheistic Communism for the second time. If Catholic priests stood unified and not let their ranks infiltrate by collaborators, the Communist aims for enslaving the Church again would have been much more difficult. New set of priests, not burdened with the stained past, probably would have withstood the Communist pressure and preserved at least some measure of independence which the Church gained during the Dubcek era. Theodoric J. Zubek, O.F.M. *) Duchovni pastyr, 1974, pp. 30-32; Duchovny pastier, 1974, pp. 145-146.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dark Hours of the Church in Slovakia Description An account of the resource Theodoric J. Zúbek, O.F.M. Slovakia, Vol. 25 (No. 48), 1975 pp. 36-40 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zúbek, Teodorik J., 1914-1988 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1975 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/61f7383a7c1f833e76ab21ff25507d49.pdf cbe51529c06c366ec59bc030c5e6ac8b PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 91 Preludes to nCharter '77" THEODORIC J. ZUBEK, O.F.M. The occupation of Czecho-Slovakia by the Soviet armies and their satellites in August, 1968, brought new enslavement. The Soviets did not achieve their goal immediately, but they gradually tightened the political relaxations of the Dubcek era. The Russians imprisoned Dubcek and his closest associates and dragged them to Russia. This gravely irritated public opinion. The leadership of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia insisted on the release of Dubcek and his co-workers and their own restoration to positions of leadership in Czecho-Slovakia. At first, the Russians were not able to find a person agreeable to collaborate with occupation authorities. They had to restore Dubcek and permit him to continue as the first Secretary of the Central Committee and leading member of the Presidium of the Communist Party. But the Russians worked feverishly to split the leadership of the Party. Dr. Gustav Husak proved to be the most able and articulate politician in the chaotic situation. In the early fifties, Husak, a Slovak, had been imprisoned and condemned for so-called bourgeois nationalistic deviation. He was ousted from the Communist party. In the period of de-Stalinization in 1963, he was released from prison and re-admitted into the Party, but held no official position. But, he was active behind the scenes in fomenting a movement against President Novotny and his Stalinist methods. In April, 1968, Husak became one of the vice-premiers of the government, and after the occupation also became a member of the Presidium. Though he had been politically rehabilitated through the moderate policy of Alexander Dubcek, it was, after the occupation that Husak became an open critic of "Communism with a human face." Dubcek was gradually pushed to the background, and lost one position after another. Finally, under increasing pressure, on April 17, 1969, Dubcek resigned as first secretary of the Communist Party, and was stripped of his membership in the Party. On the same day, Husak took his position as first secretary. Husak had considerable support among the people, especially in Slovakia, since he had suffered 12 years of imprisonment for his Slovak nationalism and later fought against Prague centralism. He had promoted the federalization of Czecho-Slovakia. He also seemed to favor Dubcek's liberalization. After the Russian occupation, many accepted Husak's argument that there was no military possibility of defending the country, and that it was necessary to yield to Russian pressure to some degree, and to consolidate the internal situation in the country in order to persuade Moscow that there was no need for the �92 SLOVAKIA continued presence of Russian armies in Czecho-Slovakia. Some also believed Husak's pledge that there would never be a return to Stalinism and that the earlier process of democratization would continue. Nevertheless , it became clear that Husak was primarily interested in gaining Moscow's confidence and in strengthening his own leading position. He fully accepted suppression and terrorism and in a short time, under the guise of "normalization, " he once again enslaved the country. In his hatred of religion, Husak outdid his Moscow bosses. Religion had strong roots, especially in Slovakia, so Husak's antireligious campaign is aimed particularly against the Catholic Church. Present day persecution of the Catholic Church in Czecho-Slovakia is more brutal than in any other communist-dominated country of Europe. It is more pervasive and more cunning than it was during the regimes of Gottwald or Novotny. In recent years, more and more news stories about the terrorism of Husak's regime and the suppression of human rights appeared in the free world. At the beginning of 1977, a transcript of Charter '77 was published in many newspapers of the Western world. In this document, more than 600 Czech and Slovak signers protested against the suppression of human rights, specifically mentioning suppression of the rights to religious conviction. These rights are guaranteed by the . Czecho-Slovak Constitution as well as by the Helsinki Agreement which was by signed Czecho-Slovakia. This Charter '77 was preceded by several public protests of individual citizens, laymen and priests, who openly denounced the abuses of government power and the systematic campaign against religion. Some of these written protests found their way to the free world. A number of them were written before the Helsinki Agreement (September, 1975) and they refer to the Czecho-Slovak Constitution and other laws; later protests also refer to the Helsinki Agreement. It was a number of these protests that prepared the mood for Charter '77. It is proper to express admiration and respect for these individual dissidents for their courage and strength. In a Communist regime, it is riskier for an individual to protest against government abuses than it is for a group. Individual internationally unknown dissidents are taken care of quickly. Under the pretext of anti-state activity, they are silenced in prison or labor camps without much notice or commotion, and without comment in the free world. The Case of Pavol Carnogursky Pavol Carnogursky is a sixty-eight year old layman, who from his youth played an important role in the Catholic life of Slovakia. As an employee of the Catholic Agency in Bratislava, he organized and led Catholic Action programs among Slovak young people, patterned �SLOVAKIA 93 largely on the practices of the French and Belgian Catholic Workers and Catholic Organizations of intellectuals. During the period of Slovak autonomy and independence (19381945), he was a member of the Slovak Parliament and was esteemed as an expert on education and school matters. He opposed the Nazi tendencies of some Slovak politicians and belonged to the group of Slovak Catholic moderates headed by President Joseph Tiso and Dr. Martin Sokol, speaker of the Slovak Parliament . For this reason the Germans regarded him as a persona non grata. Immediately after World War II , Pavol Carnogursky tried to organize the Christian Republican Party as a platform for defending human rights and freedom of conscience in Slovakia, when the country was again made part of Czecho-Slovakia. On the insistence of Slovak bishops, however, the Slovak Catholics joined forces with the predominantly Lutheran Democratic Party and helped it attain an overwhelming victory in Slovakia, triumphing over the communists and other small parties in the 1946 elections. Although Carnogursky was clearly anti-Nazi, yet because of his position as a deputy during the Slovak Republic, he was not found acceptable for any public role in the political life of post-war Slovakia. In 1947 , because of his well known anti-communist stand and his involvement in re-organizing the Catholic workers and the intelligentsia, he was imprisoned and eventually forced into seclusion and silence, providing for his family as a manual worker in a Bratislava factory . Nevertheless, during all those years of seclusion, Carnogursky carefully observed the political and religious situation in Slovakia, read all the biased works of communist historians about the Slovak Republic, and occasionally expressed his critical views in letters he sent to his friends abroad . After the fall of Dubcek in 1969, there began an era of brutal suppression of human rights and a systematic denial of freedom of religion. A pro-communist organization of the clergy, called Pacem in Terris, was established and the priests of Czecho-Slovakia were again torn into two groups, each distrusting the other. The Catholic press, i.e. the Katolicke nouiny (Catholic News) and Duchouny Pastier (Spiritual Shepherd) were put under strict communist control. The pro-communist speeches and articles of Canon Jozef Dovala, pastor in Ziar nad Hronom in the Banska Bystrica Diocese and vicar general of the Diocese , a prominent member of the Pacem in Terris movement, brought the patience and silence of Pavol Carnogursky to an end. The corruption of the Katolicke nouiny offended Carnogursky in a special way, since for some time after the war he had been the editor of this Catholic weekly and worked earnestly to bring it to a high journalistic level. On September 11 , 1974, the executive board of the Federal Association of the Catholic Clergymen, Pacem in Terris , celebrated the �94 SLOVAKIA thirtieth a nniversary of the Slovak upri sing in Banska Bystrica. Canon Joze f Dov ala was the main speaker. He equated the so-called '' political Catholicism ' ' of the Slovak Republic with collaboration with Ge rman Naz ism, and made it co-responsible for the death of about four thou sand priests in Nazi concentration camps. In a letter to Dovala, Carnogursky said it was ab surd to draw a connection between the regime of the Slovak Republic and Ge rman atrocities during the war. He wrote: In a few months it will be thirty years since the e nd of the S econd World War. During this p eriod a countless multitude of articles, political or pseudo-political, as well as scholarly and professional works on the current situation in Slo vakia appeared. Only in exceptional cases are they free of anti-Catholic tendencies. The great majority of the m obtusely describe the situation prejudicially, as you did. I read all tho se articles and books. In the last analysis, they have the same goal: to destroy Catholic ideology and Catholic life in Slo vakia. For that reason the arguments, of which even a mildly honest man and more so a scholar would be ashamed, are crude, unfounded, even hostile, negative and degrading. But what you, Father, associated with the ideas of political Catholicism in Slovakia, surpasses e verything. W e should give credit to anti-Catholic propaganda for using such tricks. The Slo vak State had to be proclaimed at that particular time (March 14, 1939, ed.) and under prevailing circumstances, if we were to make sure that among the thousands of priests murdered (in other countries) in Hitler 's concentration camps there would not be Slo vak priests. In the last analysis, our administrative authorities were not motivated only by a concern for the priests, but for the whole nation as well. And the nation has been saved. I cannot understand why you are angered and prompted to attack it (Slovak independence), since its existence gave you guarantees assuring that you yourself did not become a victim of Hitler 's concentration camp, if you were ordained before World War II. (Douala was ordained March 17, 1938.) I cannot understand why they talk only about political Catholicism and not about political Lutheranism, political Judaism, political atheism, and about the means by which these denominations and institutions have in that day and even to our day influenced and affected public life. Catholicism in Slovakia was a historical force in the nation. Without the care of the Catholic church for education, the social structure, schools, the press, agriculture and social and economic institutions, especially without the work and sacrifices of the best sons of the nation who as Catholic priests defended its voice and language, developing and enriching it through the centuries and assuring its cultural and economic growth - we would have perished. I can well understand why in the Protestant milieu, among the Jews and other denominations in Slovakia, there was not a similar �SLOVAKIA 95 attack on their own. They are fully conscious of the consequences of such a step. Your attack on so-called political Catholicism during the span of the Slovak Republic, unfounded and, to say in openly, irresponsible as it is, is the more tragic because it came at the time when large-scale militant atheism was active in Slovakia and aimed its fury against the Catholic Church, its doctrine, essence and its historical influence upon the thinking and feeling of our people. And this is done by repressive methods not invoked now at the end of the twentieth century by any other Socialist country, not even in black Africa. No teacher, no educator among us, is permitted to enter a classroom, to work among the students, to teach even technical subject matter, unless he declares that he has solved the religious question, which means that he proclaims that he is an atheist. He must avow that he is an atheist not only in his private convictions, but in an active sense as well, ready to teach and educate in the atheistic way. Any doubt in this area, any evidence of religious feelings, such as attendance at divine services, reception of any sacrament, excludes him from a teaching position. Parents who enrolled their children for religious instruction are exposed to unheard of pressure from the school officials and from their employers. Children who attended religious instruction are denied advanced studies. There is a general rule valid even among the most primitive social groups that under-age children are not responsible for a transgression of the law. In our case, children are punished for attending religious instructions, while the Constitution of the peoples' democratic system ironically guarantees freedom of religious conviction. And these sanctions against children are not for a limited period of time, but for their whole lifetime. Father, how will the history of the Church in Slovakia and the general history of mankind call this kind of Catholicism, which, witnessing all this, still feels and expresses itself as you did in this case? My letter to you cannot delineate a complete description of the tragic situation of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. This situation has the dimensions of a world problem that cannot be contained in one letter. The core of the problem is the effort at the eradication of Christian consciousness in the life and culture of a nation which by its very nature and because of its Christian Catholic roots contributed to the civilization process in the heart of Europe ever since the ninth century. We cannot blind our eyes with illusions, assuming that the working of divine grace alone will defeat the imperiled Christianity of our n(!,tion. Without our personal co-operation, our struggle and our living faith, we cannot count on perpetuating the religious life and spirit of our universally Christian country. Doubtless, this struggle demands not only our standing up as Christians but also our intelligent approach to find reasonable �96 SLOVAKIA possibilities to solve the problems facing us without craven concessions and compromises. But an attack like yours, coming in such a form and content, inveighing upon political Catholicism as you have done, cannot be accounted as an acceptable line of conduct. Pavol Camogursky's second letter of protest was addressed to Bishop Jozef Feranec, Ordinary of the Diocese of Banska Bystrica. It deals with an article by Jozef Dovala published in the Katolicke Nouiny (Catholic News) August 29, 1976, in which the author states that the priests and laity participate in up building the new way of life in CzechoSlovakia where freedom of religion is constitutionally safeguarded. Dovala wrote this article after his return from the Eucharistic Congress in Philadelphia (August 1-7, 1976) where he attended the Slovak services as the only priest from Slovakia. The text of Camogursky' s letter of August 29, 1976, is as follows: Your Excellency, after reading the editorial in the last issue of the Katolicke Nouiny (no. 53, August 29, 1976) even the simplest believer cannot refrain from reacting in protest, realizing how severe is the extermination process against the Church in Slovakia and how this bitter reality opposes his religious conviction and undermines his devotion to the duties which bind him to the Church. In this article vicar Jozef Douala of Banska Bystrica, wrote among other things: 'Priests as well as laymen participate in the up building of our new life and they also share in its fruits. The Constitution of our state system respects the conviction of every citizen and guarantees the freedom of religion'. With pain in my heart I must state that reality in no way bears out the import of these words. Only a cynical scoffer could write thus, bringing the paper to the level of absurdity and compromising the reader in whose name he so dares to write. What then is the factual status of religious affairs, notwithstanding what the Constitution and Article 7 of the Helsinki Agreement provide? Two weeks ago, on August 18, 1976, the daily Pravda, organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, published a report on the conclusions of the Party Congress and on atheistic education in Slovakia. The gist of these conclusions by the reporting officer read: 'Slovakia became a country of mass atheism. 'A competent representative would hardly dare to make such a bold and far reaching statement in the Party organ of any other Socialist state. Since it cannot be doubted that P. Prusak 's report was factual, even if he did not elaborate about what means were used where it was attained, one must take it as a hard fact. In Slovakia there is a special campaign against religion. I am convinced that Church leadership in Slovakia definitely and carefully concerns itself with the gravity of this article and will weigh its consequences both for itself and for the sake of the Church in Slovakia. �SLOVAKIA 97 I am merely emphasizing the fact that the core of such purported success of atheism in Slovakia is viewed by the author as a purposeful atheistic work which has assumed a systematic character, as he specifically underlines it. In this systematic character of mass abandonment of the paternal heritage - the Catholic Church - by her sons and daughters, one must also see the fact that in Church leadership there are some persons whose high positions serve as the necessary front windows for facilitating apostasy and promoting mass atheism by playing a role assigned to them in their high functions. On the very same level, alas, one must also place the paper Katolicke Noviny which is degenerating into a publication of professional flatterers writing explicitly about themes that have very little in common with authentic religion. This attitude is in total contradiction to the contemporary difficult position of the Church, especially with the mentality of tormented parent-believers. It does not serve the serious matter of peace and rapprochement and easing of tensions. Forgive me, my Bishop, for the bitter tone of this letter. Truly, it is not as bitter as it is painful. And it is precisely for that reason that I must react to the slap on the face inflicted by the aforementioned writing of your vicar general. But not to write would pose an impossible dilemma for me: Am I still a Catholic? Has Mr. Prusak also rightfully included me in his concept of 'mass atheism' in Slovakia? For a responsible member of the Church not to react righteously to this critical development at a time when the very existence of the Church is at stake would be tantamount to not being in rapport with her, with this historic force which endowed Slovakia with all her spiritual, moral and cultural wealth. (1) Pavol Camogursky was imprisoned on November 10, 1976, undoubtedly for this daring analysis of the religious situation in Slovakia and his sharp criticism of Jozef Dovala. In such cases, stock charges of anti-state activities are readily found in the deformed communist system of justice. When Carnogursky ' s case evoked wide publicity in the free world, he was released from prison. He is awaiting trial for purported anti-state activity in the near future. A Speech by Aloysius Tkac Aloysius Tkac is a Catholic priest of the Diocese of Kosice (Eastern Slovakia). He is now 43 years old. He was an archivist in the bishop's chancery and as such he was a member of the pro-communist priestly organization Pacem in Terris. Seeing all the abuses perpetrated against the Church by the communist regime, he decided to publicly denounce them at the festive meeting of this organization on October 23, 1974. On the occasion of the celebration of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Slovak Uprising, in the presence of communist officials controlling �98 SLOVAKIA all activities of the said organization, he first recalled the Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Socialist Republic (art. 32) guaranteeing religious freedom of all citizens. Then he cited the government decrees and pertinent regulations of the Ministry of Culture from 1970 and 1972, by which religious education of children of second to seventh grades is permitted. He mentioned recent statements of the President about religious freedom; and no. 326 of the criminal code, by which all those hindering religious freedom and religious activity by force should be prosecuted and punished. He then proceeded to give accounts of actual religious situations in the country: We cannot pass with silence the unpleasant fact which causes both priests and believers great suffering; we feel we are being discriminated against. The procedure in regard to the spiritual needs many times is reckless and we consider it extremely harsh. The guidelines of the Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Socialist Republic concerning the enrollment of children for religious instructions are in many places disregarded. Groups were formed which not only belittle religious instructions, but hold back parents from the enrollment of their children in religious instruction by direct terror. Contrary to official guidelines about the enrollment, both parents have to present the enrollment petition; often the father or the mother have to excuse themselves from their jobs and complete their work after working hours. It was brought forth to some parents: 'Don't you want to send your children to a higher level of education? Do you want to bury the future of your children in technical schooling?' The behavior of many teachers was harsh, arrogant (such as tearing to pieces the enrollment petition or throwing it away), an illegal act, and it offended the dignity of the citizen-believers. Children attending religious instructions are often excluded from activities with their peers; they cannot make the Pioneers' pledge. During the school year there is also a great deal of peer and teacher pressure put on them. Parents and their children are going through Calvary. They are really martyrs. But how does all this square with the above mentioned state decrees? Even if there were only a few of thse examples, still we must not be silent. Unfortunately, such incidents are very frequent! The fact is that only a small percentage of the children are enrolled for religious instructions. Does this mean that parents and students have renounced their faith and become atheists? By no means! It is largely the result of a natural fear concerning the future! Citizen-believers are being deterred from fulfilling their religious needs, from receiving sacraments (Mass, Holy Communion, Confirmation, Matrimony). Only with difficulty can a priest secretly administer the sacraments of the dying in a hospital. Under various, even false, accusations state permission for priestly work has been revoked to several priests. Does that not bother �SLOVAKIA 99 us? Does not the fate of our brothers in the priesthood concern us? Do we not stand up for the defense of the honor of the priestly state? If not, it is a tragedy! Fifteen newly ordained priests, four months after their ordination, are still waiting for their assignments. Other college graduates have their work assignments in their pockets the moment they have finished their studies. And there are so many parishes and chaplaincies unoccupied/ There are other pains, but others should speak about them! Brothers, friends, I have brought up our common pains. I have spoken to you about the suffering of our believing people. We are not too sensitive, nor are we asking for privileges. We are in pain from the thorns that we have to wear with our people. We are happy to live in our Czecho-Slovak Socialist Republic. We would not betray it for anything. But let us eliminate the mistakes and inadequacies which make our lives difficult. This frank statement shocked the priests and the communist government representatives who always attend such meetings . As a rule, only praise of and gratitude to the regime are expressed at such gatherings. The statement was not even mentioned in the so-called Catholic press of Czecho-Slovakia, or other newspapers. It was secretly smuggled to the free world. What happened to this brave Catholic priest who openly expressed both the facts and the feelings of all conscientious priests and Catholic lay people? Nothing immediately . But then in July of 1975 , almost a year later, news came from Slovakia that several priests who expressed their anti-communist feelings were attacked and some of them severely injured by some individuals who were never apprehended by the police . One of those attacked and severely injured was Aloysius Tkac. In December , 1975 the state permit of Aloysius Tkac to perform priestly duties was withdrawn. His present fate is not known . It may be either manual work or jail. (2) Protests of Monsignor Trstensky Monsignor Victor Trstensky is a prominent Slovak priest. He was born in Trstena (District Orava) on March 29, 1908. After finishing his basic and high school studies in Trstena, he enrolled in the Spis Diocesan Seminary, and was ordained on June 29, 1931. Because of his pastoral zeal and exemplary priestly life, he early became pastor of St. Catherine Church in Dolny Kubin, where he was also a teacher of religion at the local gynmasium. On the recommendation of his Bishop, John Vojtassak, he was made Papal Prelate (Monsignor) while still a very young priest. During the Slovak Republic (1939-1945), as a prominent member of the Hlinka Slovak Populist Party, he took an active part in the public life of his town; at the same time he was involved in the Catholic Action Movement. �100 SLOVAKIA For this activity, after the Second World War he was imprisoned and spent twenty-one years in various prisons, in labor camps, and in manual work. During the Dubcek era, he was rehabilitated and received a state permit for pastoral work on October 7, 1969. The Ordinary of the Spis Diocese , Reverend Joseph Ligos, appointed him adminstrator of St. Nicholas Church in Stara Lubovna where he worked tirelessly for four years. In the post-Dubcek era, the communists in Czecho-Slovakia could not tolerate strong personalities like Monsignor Trstensky in pastoral work . They were afraid of his moral influence on parishioners and particularly on youth. With the year 1974, a new Calvary began for Monsignor Trstensky. The communist-dominated District Committee in Stara Lubovna decided that Trstensky had to leave the town and again be removed from pastoral work . He was notified about his imminent dismissal on January 21, 1974 by the new Ordinary of the Diocese, Stephen Garaj. On January 27, 1974 , Monsignor Trstensky preached to his stunned parishioners a memorable homily, which was secretly taped and later found its way to the free world. The principal reasons for Trstensky's dismissal, given to the vicar capitular by Communist officials, were as follows: 1. preaching against atheism and atheists; 2. sending gifts to old people on Christmas; 3. meetings with altar boys in the church and rectory; 4. keeping in his parish religious Sisters in violation of state regulations; 5. blessing the homes of parishioners after Epiphany. In his classic homily, Monsignor Trstensky explained his activity as pastor of the church in Stara Lubovna and argued convincingly that there was nothing illegal in his pastoral work . He concluded his homily with these words: What does matter is the truth. Whoever distorts the truth cannot build the country. Only truth can save the nation and the country. Remember, if I have to leave here, I am not leaving as a criminal, murderer, traitor of the nation and country. I love my country. Twice I was abroad - in Vienna, Rome, Paris. I could have stayed there. I was invited to do so. But I said: 'I am a Slovak. I did not do anything wrong. I want to live among our people because I love my country and my people.' I returned home. I sincerely love my country, and not only in words but more so by teaching you to love God and one another; by teaching you to work diligently and to live morally. I do not talk about peace, but I promote it with my whole life and work. (3) The decision of the County Committee, Department of Culture, in Stara Lubovna, prohibiting Trstensky to perform priestly ministry was dated January 30, 1974 and delivered to him on February 1, 1974. The reasons for his dismissal are formulated as follows : From the beginning of his assignment to Stara Lubovna, Victor Trstensky in various ways manifested his dissent with the development �SLOVAKIA 101 of our socialist society. For that reason, several sessions were held with him where he was notified that he was breaking the norms established for state-church relationships. In recent times he has increased his reactionary activity and in his sermons he openly and vituperatively spoke against progressively thinking citizens and incited against them. In one of his sermons he said that the unbelievers will once again experience the supremacy of god (sic) and will wish to become believers, but it will be too late. By this activity he was systematically breaking the established laws regarding state-church relations. Such was the case during the last Christmas season, when with the help of school children he distributed to some families packages containing wine, oranges, soap and other items. During his assignment to the parish of Stara Lubovna he intentionally infringed upon the directives on religious instructions by gathering a group of altar boys and choir singers in the church and rectory for practice; furthermore, he organized meetings with a considerable number of children in the rectory. During his assignment at the parish of Stara Lubovna, three religious Sisters came to him and, under his direction, performed church functions and worked actively on the revitalization of the church in the city and among the youth. For these reasons and for his dangerously anti-socialist stand, shown particularly in recent times and in these last days, when he caused among the believers a high and dangerous tension, his continuance in church administration would seriously endanger peaceful social life and the interests of our working people; therefore, with immediate effectiveness, we take away his state permit to work in church administration. On February 14, 1974, Monsignor Trstensky appealed this verdict. As a preliminary to his letter of appeal, he pointed to the irregularities in the whole procedure against him by quoting eight paragraphs of law 71-1967, which were disregarded in his case. Then, in eight pages, he convincingly refuted all the vague or completely false charges against him. He referred to the public and well-known record of his activity as pastor of Stara Lubovna parish. He emphatically stated that he only fulfilled his duties as pastor of a parish, never acting against the state laws and official regulations. The only real reason for the removal of Monsignor Trstensky from pastoral work was his exemplary priestly life and his zealous work for the spiritual welfare of his flock. The appeal of Monsignor Trstensky had no effect and the District Committee in Kosice which by the decision of February 19, 1974, confirmed the verdict of the County Committee in Stara Lubovna and made the decision final, precluding any further appeal. Monsignor Trstensky thereafter went to live in his town of birth, Trstena, in the region of Orava. Grateful parishioners of Stara Lubovna did not forget their beloved pastor. As a token of their appreciation and �102 SLOVAKIA gratitude during the rest of the year 1974, they traveled to Trstena in trucks loaded with construction material and built a home for him. He lives there today. Letters to Highest Authorities After spending years in prison and now being deprived of the permit to work as a priest, Monsignor Trstensky became a fearless witness to communist persecution of loyal priests, and a bold defender of the minimal rights of religion. Monsignor Trstensky carefully observes the situation in his country, sharply analyzes it, and sends his observations to the highest government places. He is sending protest letters to Dr. Peter Colotka, Prime Minister of Slovakia, and even to the President of Czecho-Slovakia, Dr. Gustav Husak. Copies of some of his letters have found their way to the free world. They are quite revealing, since they contain the first-hand experiences and observations of a man who lives there, sees with open eyes, and is able to analyze the situation. One such letter was addressed to Dr. Colotka as a reaction to his television talk on the occasion of the International Year of Women, on March 7, 1974. Colotka is a native of Orava region, and Trstensky was his teacher of religion in Dolny Kubin gymnasium. The letter starts with acknowledgements to Colotka for his fine tribute to women, to Slovak mothers and grandmothers, who taught their children honesty, loyalty and readiness to sacrifice for the truth even with their lives. In his letter Trstensky asks Colotka what these women get from the communist regime. Isn't it tearing apart the hearts of our mothers and grandmothers and their offspring, when religious education of children is being hindered more and more? I heard, for example, that in Banska Bystrica, because of brutal terror at the time of enrollment for religious instructions, not one child was registered. It is the same in many cities of Slovakia. Not that the parents and children would not be interested in religion, as purported, but because of the fear for their existence, they do not dare to register their children for religious instructions. Isn't it a punishment for our mothers and grandmothers, when it is made impossible for their sons to devote themselves to a priestly state of life? And even when they have achieved it after years of demanding studies, obtusely to deprive them of a permit to work in the Church ministry, despite a great shortage of priests? In Slovakia, every year 50 to 60 priests die, while hardly 20 to 22 newly ordained priests come out of the seminary. The reason for this is the unfortunate numerous clauses (restricted number) by which only a small number of the candidates can be accepted into the seminary, and this number only on the evaluation of various non-ecclesiastical authorities. Isn't it a punishment for our mothers and grandmothers, when their daughters and granddaughters are not permitted to choose a vocation in which �SLOVAKIA 103 they could peacefully serve God and their neighbors? Even those religious Sisters who previously had chosen this vocation are, so to say, thrown out from their own houses to the streets? lsn 't it hurting our mothers and grandmothers to see how their children, plying their vocations as teachers, civil servants, or factory foremen cannot fulfill their religious obligations for fear of being/ired or transferred to some other job with a lower salary? What can our mothers and grandmothers say about the so-called Catholic press, which in fact does not exist? ''The statements of Pacem in Terris officers that everything is all right here in the matters of religion, do not change these sad facts. By such statements they compromise not only themselves and the Church, but put into a bad perspective our whole system. We are like open cards, and whoever stops here can evaluate religious situations himself and can see the one-sidedness of such self-serving statements. It would be much more fruitful, it those from our priestly ranks who are writing for Pacem in Terris and who think they are promoting peace and social progress, mainly and openly told the heads of our regime that man is not only a body, but also a soul, which is in need of spiritual food. Our simple old women in Orava are shaking their heads when, while reading in the Katolicke Noviny all those praises about religious life in our country, they live in sadness with their daughters who were thrown out of religious life not by Church but by State authorities, or with their sons who were stripped of the State permit for Church administration, or when they see their sons and daughters sneaking away, if they want to pray, get married in church, or have their child baptized. (4) In July, 1976, Monsignor Trstensky asked for travel permission to see his sick brother and his aged sister living in the U.S.A. His petition was turned down by the government officials. Trstensky again sent appeals to the Slovak Prime Minister, Peter Colotka, and to the President of Czecho-Slovakia, Dr. Gustav Husak. In his letter to the President dated January 6, 1977, Trstensky again presented a sharp analysis of the situation in Slovakia. I still have not received an answer about my own sufferings and those of believing people. Probably the reason is that it regards a Roman Catholic priest, thus a man outside the law. This confirms my conviction that the main task of some of our circles is to harrass the citizens, especially believers, and to unleash a ruthless war against religion and its adherents. By watching television, by reading newspapers, and magazines and books about so-called "scientific" atheism, by talking with believers, by watching their sad faces, by seeing hundreds of priests outside pastoral work, tormented Sisters, the fear of teachers, civil servants, nurses, foremen in factories, one gets a clear testimony what injustices are being perpetrated against believers. A member of the Party can be like a stump of wood, as long as he knows some phrases about atheism, Marxism. He is preferred to a non- �104 SLOVAKIA Party man, no matter how intelligent, conscientious and patriotic the latter may be. How much more useful would it be to our country, if those much needed billions squandered on anti-religious propaganda, on so-called civil baptisms, weddings, burials, and on the tens of thousands of atheistic propagandists, were used for real re-education in the spirit of justice and mutual love, and for the promotion of material, spiritual, cultural and social development. Wherever there is an anti-religious campaign and justice is trampled upon, morality declines, the families fall apart, enthusiasm for work vanishes, honesty and responsibility disappear, criminality among adults and even among adolescents increases, and the very foundations of the country are undermined. If there is to be a lasting peace, it must be built on justice, truth, freedom and love. (5) It is interesting to note that despite his sharp protest letters, some of which were published in the Western press , Monsignor Trstensky is still not in jail. He is harrassed and intimidated, as appears from his letters . The reason for his not being imprisoned may be the notoriety of his case throughout Czecho-Slovakia and, to some extent, even throughout the free world. The regime fears the out-cry of the free world which follows the imprisonment of well-known dissidents. Examples of Living Faith Not all opponents of militant atheism express their protests against the persecution of the Church by letters and manifestos. In Slovakia there are many priests and lay people resisting the communist oppression of religion with their lives. There are people filling the churches on Sundays and holy days, receiving the sacraments regularly , enrolling their children for religious instructions - ready to pay for it with a loss of better jobs and in some instances with a loss of personal freedom. There are still priests who are in a real sense spiritual fathers of their flock, risking the loss of a state permit to function as priests, or risking the loss of liberty. There are priests and lay people who by the depth of their religious life equal the heroism of the Christians of the early Church. They are luminaries of deep faith in these hours of darkness. One such is John Chrysostom Korec. At the time of the suppression of religious orders in 1950, John Korec was a Jesuit cleric. After nearly completing his regular theological studies, he was secretly ordained a priest and in 1951, bishop. He was then 27 years old, the youngest bishop in the world. He had to go through military service. He then became a factory worker. He worked as a bishop in the underground by secretly preaching to small groups of people, administering the sacrament of Confirmation , teaching young clerics, ~d �SLOVAKIA 105 eventually ordaining them as priests. In 1960, communist spies discovered who John Korec really was. He was sentenced to twelve years in a high security prison. But even in those years of imprisonment, he continued his priestly work among his fellow inmates. In 1968, Bishop Korec was released from jail, weakened in body. He became one of the leading personalities in revitalizing the religious life of Slovakia during this period of thaw. In 1969, he visited Rome and had a private audience with the Holy Father, who gave him one of his personal croziers and a pectoral cross as a sign of his appreciation for the young bishop's work. After the fall of Dubcek (April 17, 1969), renewed terrorism began in Czecho-Slovakia. The state permit to publicly celebrate the Mass was taken away from Bishop Korec. He was not permitted to take part in any official functions of the Church. He became a factory worker in Bratislava. Today, the whole of Slovakia knows about the case of Bishop Korec. People distressed by harsh religious repression, particularly the highly educated, come to Bishop Korec for his words of advice and consolation. This is not looked upon favorably by the communist authorities. They would like to get rid of Bishop Korec, but without further disturbing the populace. They offered him an opporutnity to emigrate from Slovakia. Bishop Korec rejected the suggestion. They offered him a state permit to perform a ministry in some parish outside Bratislava. Bishop Korec said he would accept the ministry outside Bratislava, on the condition that all other priests to whom the state permit was denied or taken away be given permission to function as priests. The communist authorities rejected this condition. The case of the heroic Bishop Korec was reported in the Catholic press throughout the free world. Perhaps this will protect him temporarily against imprisonment. (6) Stephen J avorsky, a Salesian priest, administrator of the parish in Muran, was imprisoned by the state police on November 26, 1975 and sentenced to eighteen months in jail. His state permit to perform his priestly duties was suspended for two years after the expiration of his jail sentence. For this verdict the following reasons are given by the County Court in Muran: ''He enticed youth, especially university students, by inducing them to listen to the Vatican Radio; he distributed books among them; in their presence, he projected film strips and played tapes containing unacceptable conferences on religious philosophy directed against the interests of our socialist society and against materialistic philosophy, with the aim of involving into this work a large group of religious lay people who besides their regular vocation should exercise missionary activity as well. On June 1, 1975, during the divine services in the parish church of Muran, he tried to influence parents, calling the County Spartakiad (gymnastic exhibition) a worldly vanity fair to be opposed by the parents in the future. " Javorsky's appeal of this verdict to a higher court was rejected and the length of his prison term was prolonged to two full years. (7) �106 SLOVAKIA Among Slovak dissidents are also brave writers and distributors of anonymous pamphlets which sporadically appear in various parts of the country. Such a leaflet distributed in June, 1975, analyzes the religious situation in Slovakia and exhorts Christian believers to defend religious rights guaranteed by the Constitution and state laws.(8) Another pamphlet, distributed in Slovakia in April of 1976, warns Slovak Catholics of the biased news published in the Katolicke Noviny and against the priest-collaborators active in the pro-communist organization Pacem in Terris. (9) It is proper to express our respect and admiration of these known and unknown heroes. They suffer for their deep religious convictions . The whole country lives in an atmosphere of imprisonment. Their suffering sooner or later will bring about the liberty of the Church and of the people in Slovakia. FOOTNOTES The complete text of both Camogursky letters was published in HORIZONT ' 77 , March-April , 1977, p . 8-9. (2) The text of Rev. Tkac 's speech can be found in " SITUATION DER KATHOLISHEN KIRCHE IN DER TSCHECHOSLOWAKEI," Ed . JUSTITIA ET PAX 1976, p. 134138. (3) Frantisek Vnuk : Prenasledo uanie katolickeho ducho uenst ua sa stupi'tuje . (Mounting Persecution of the Catholic Clergy) . SLOVAK V AMERIKE (Slovak in America), May 8, 1974, p . 1, 3. (4) The text of this Jetter was published in HLASY Z RIMA (Voices of Rome), July 1976, p. 22-23. (5) The main parts of this letter were published in JEDNOTA , March 30, 1977, p. 20, 17; also in HLASY Z RIMA , April 1977, p. 21-23 . (6) " Narodeniny biskupa-robotnika Jana Korea " (The Birthday of Bishop-Worker, John Korec) . SLOVAK V AMERIKE , Jan. 26, 1977 , p . 1. (7) HLASY Z RIMA , January 1977, p . 22. (8) The complete text of this pamphlet was published in " SITUATION DER KATHOLISCHEN KIRCHE IN DER TSCHECHOSLOWAKEI," p. 123-130. (9) Ibid. , p . 84-85 ; HLASY Z RIMA , August-September, 1976, p . 31. (1) � SLOVAKIA 91 Preludes to nCharter '77" THEODORIC J. ZUBEK, O.F.M. The occupation of Czecho-Slovakia by the Soviet armies and their satellites in August, 1968, brought new enslavement. The Soviets did not achieve their goal immediately, but they gradually tightened the political relaxations of the Dubcek era. The Russians imprisoned Dubcek and his closest associates and dragged them to Russia. This gravely irritated public opinion. The leadership of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia insisted on the release of Dubcek and his co-workers and their own restoration to positions of leadership in Czecho-Slovakia. At first, the Russians were not able to find a person agreeable to collaborate with occupation authorities. They had to restore Dubcek and permit him to continue as the first Secretary of the Central Committee and leading member of the Presidium of the Communist Party. But the Russians worked feverishly to split the leadership of the Party. Dr. Gustav Husak proved to be the most able and articulate politician in the chaotic situation. In the early fifties, Husak, a Slovak, had been imprisoned and condemned for so-called bourgeois nationalistic deviation. He was ousted from the Communist party. In the period of de-Stalinization in 1963, he was released from prison and re-admitted into the Party, but held no official position. But, he was active behind the scenes in fomenting a movement against President Novotny and his Stalinist methods. In April, 1968, Husak became one of the vice-premiers of the government, and after the occupation also became a member of the Presidium. Though he had been politically rehabilitated through the moderate policy of Alexander Dubcek, it was, after the occupation that Husak became an open critic of "Communism with a human face." Dubcek was gradually pushed to the background, and lost one position after another. Finally, under increasing pressure, on April 17, 1969, Dubcek resigned as first secretary of the Communist Party, and was stripped of his membership in the Party. On the same day, Husak took his position as first secretary. Husak had considerable support among the people, especially in Slovakia, since he had suffered 12 years of imprisonment for his Slovak nationalism and later fought against Prague centralism. He had promoted the federalization of Czecho-Slovakia. He also seemed to favor Dubcek's liberalization. After the Russian occupation, many accepted Husak's argument that there was no military possibility of defending the country, and that it was necessary to yield to Russian pressure to some degree, and to consolidate the internal situation in the country in order to persuade Moscow that there was no need for the �92 SLOVAKIA continued presence of Russian armies in Czecho-Slovakia. Some also believed Husak's pledge that there would never be a return to Stalinism and that the earlier process of democratization would continue. Nevertheless , it became clear that Husak was primarily interested in gaining Moscow's confidence and in strengthening his own leading position. He fully accepted suppression and terrorism and in a short time, under the guise of "normalization, " he once again enslaved the country. In his hatred of religion, Husak outdid his Moscow bosses. Religion had strong roots, especially in Slovakia, so Husak's antireligious campaign is aimed particularly against the Catholic Church. Present day persecution of the Catholic Church in Czecho-Slovakia is more brutal than in any other communist-dominated country of Europe. It is more pervasive and more cunning than it was during the regimes of Gottwald or Novotny. In recent years, more and more news stories about the terrorism of Husak's regime and the suppression of human rights appeared in the free world. At the beginning of 1977, a transcript of Charter '77 was published in many newspapers of the Western world. In this document, more than 600 Czech and Slovak signers protested against the suppression of human rights, specifically mentioning suppression of the rights to religious conviction. These rights are guaranteed by the . Czecho-Slovak Constitution as well as by the Helsinki Agreement which was by signed Czecho-Slovakia. This Charter '77 was preceded by several public protests of individual citizens, laymen and priests, who openly denounced the abuses of government power and the systematic campaign against religion. Some of these written protests found their way to the free world. A number of them were written before the Helsinki Agreement (September, 1975) and they refer to the Czecho-Slovak Constitution and other laws; later protests also refer to the Helsinki Agreement. It was a number of these protests that prepared the mood for Charter '77. It is proper to express admiration and respect for these individual dissidents for their courage and strength. In a Communist regime, it is riskier for an individual to protest against government abuses than it is for a group. Individual internationally unknown dissidents are taken care of quickly. Under the pretext of anti-state activity, they are silenced in prison or labor camps without much notice or commotion, and without comment in the free world. The Case of Pavol Carnogursky Pavol Carnogursky is a sixty-eight year old layman, who from his youth played an important role in the Catholic life of Slovakia. As an employee of the Catholic Agency in Bratislava, he organized and led Catholic Action programs among Slovak young people, patterned �SLOVAKIA 93 largely on the practices of the French and Belgian Catholic Workers and Catholic Organizations of intellectuals. During the period of Slovak autonomy and independence (19381945), he was a member of the Slovak Parliament and was esteemed as an expert on education and school matters. He opposed the Nazi tendencies of some Slovak politicians and belonged to the group of Slovak Catholic moderates headed by President Joseph Tiso and Dr. Martin Sokol, speaker of the Slovak Parliament . For this reason the Germans regarded him as a persona non grata. Immediately after World War II , Pavol Carnogursky tried to organize the Christian Republican Party as a platform for defending human rights and freedom of conscience in Slovakia, when the country was again made part of Czecho-Slovakia. On the insistence of Slovak bishops, however, the Slovak Catholics joined forces with the predominantly Lutheran Democratic Party and helped it attain an overwhelming victory in Slovakia, triumphing over the communists and other small parties in the 1946 elections. Although Carnogursky was clearly anti-Nazi, yet because of his position as a deputy during the Slovak Republic, he was not found acceptable for any public role in the political life of post-war Slovakia. In 1947 , because of his well known anti-communist stand and his involvement in re-organizing the Catholic workers and the intelligentsia, he was imprisoned and eventually forced into seclusion and silence, providing for his family as a manual worker in a Bratislava factory . Nevertheless, during all those years of seclusion, Carnogursky carefully observed the political and religious situation in Slovakia, read all the biased works of communist historians about the Slovak Republic, and occasionally expressed his critical views in letters he sent to his friends abroad . After the fall of Dubcek in 1969, there began an era of brutal suppression of human rights and a systematic denial of freedom of religion. A pro-communist organization of the clergy, called Pacem in Terris, was established and the priests of Czecho-Slovakia were again torn into two groups, each distrusting the other. The Catholic press, i.e. the Katolicke nouiny (Catholic News) and Duchouny Pastier (Spiritual Shepherd) were put under strict communist control. The pro-communist speeches and articles of Canon Jozef Dovala, pastor in Ziar nad Hronom in the Banska Bystrica Diocese and vicar general of the Diocese , a prominent member of the Pacem in Terris movement, brought the patience and silence of Pavol Carnogursky to an end. The corruption of the Katolicke nouiny offended Carnogursky in a special way, since for some time after the war he had been the editor of this Catholic weekly and worked earnestly to bring it to a high journalistic level. On September 11 , 1974, the executive board of the Federal Association of the Catholic Clergymen, Pacem in Terris , celebrated the �94 SLOVAKIA thirtieth a nniversary of the Slovak upri sing in Banska Bystrica. Canon Joze f Dov ala was the main speaker. He equated the so-called '' political Catholicism ' ' of the Slovak Republic with collaboration with Ge rman Naz ism, and made it co-responsible for the death of about four thou sand priests in Nazi concentration camps. In a letter to Dovala, Carnogursky said it was ab surd to draw a connection between the regime of the Slovak Republic and Ge rman atrocities during the war. He wrote: In a few months it will be thirty years since the e nd of the S econd World War. During this p eriod a countless multitude of articles, political or pseudo-political, as well as scholarly and professional works on the current situation in Slo vakia appeared. Only in exceptional cases are they free of anti-Catholic tendencies. The great majority of the m obtusely describe the situation prejudicially, as you did. I read all tho se articles and books. In the last analysis, they have the same goal: to destroy Catholic ideology and Catholic life in Slo vakia. For that reason the arguments, of which even a mildly honest man and more so a scholar would be ashamed, are crude, unfounded, even hostile, negative and degrading. But what you, Father, associated with the ideas of political Catholicism in Slovakia, surpasses e verything. W e should give credit to anti-Catholic propaganda for using such tricks. The Slo vak State had to be proclaimed at that particular time (March 14, 1939, ed.) and under prevailing circumstances, if we were to make sure that among the thousands of priests murdered (in other countries) in Hitler 's concentration camps there would not be Slo vak priests. In the last analysis, our administrative authorities were not motivated only by a concern for the priests, but for the whole nation as well. And the nation has been saved. I cannot understand why you are angered and prompted to attack it (Slovak independence), since its existence gave you guarantees assuring that you yourself did not become a victim of Hitler 's concentration camp, if you were ordained before World War II. (Douala was ordained March 17, 1938.) I cannot understand why they talk only about political Catholicism and not about political Lutheranism, political Judaism, political atheism, and about the means by which these denominations and institutions have in that day and even to our day influenced and affected public life. Catholicism in Slovakia was a historical force in the nation. Without the care of the Catholic church for education, the social structure, schools, the press, agriculture and social and economic institutions, especially without the work and sacrifices of the best sons of the nation who as Catholic priests defended its voice and language, developing and enriching it through the centuries and assuring its cultural and economic growth - we would have perished. I can well understand why in the Protestant milieu, among the Jews and other denominations in Slovakia, there was not a similar �SLOVAKIA 95 attack on their own. They are fully conscious of the consequences of such a step. Your attack on so-called political Catholicism during the span of the Slovak Republic, unfounded and, to say in openly, irresponsible as it is, is the more tragic because it came at the time when large-scale militant atheism was active in Slovakia and aimed its fury against the Catholic Church, its doctrine, essence and its historical influence upon the thinking and feeling of our people. And this is done by repressive methods not invoked now at the end of the twentieth century by any other Socialist country, not even in black Africa. No teacher, no educator among us, is permitted to enter a classroom, to work among the students, to teach even technical subject matter, unless he declares that he has solved the religious question, which means that he proclaims that he is an atheist. He must avow that he is an atheist not only in his private convictions, but in an active sense as well, ready to teach and educate in the atheistic way. Any doubt in this area, any evidence of religious feelings, such as attendance at divine services, reception of any sacrament, excludes him from a teaching position. Parents who enrolled their children for religious instruction are exposed to unheard of pressure from the school officials and from their employers. Children who attended religious instruction are denied advanced studies. There is a general rule valid even among the most primitive social groups that under-age children are not responsible for a transgression of the law. In our case, children are punished for attending religious instructions, while the Constitution of the peoples' democratic system ironically guarantees freedom of religious conviction. And these sanctions against children are not for a limited period of time, but for their whole lifetime. Father, how will the history of the Church in Slovakia and the general history of mankind call this kind of Catholicism, which, witnessing all this, still feels and expresses itself as you did in this case? My letter to you cannot delineate a complete description of the tragic situation of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. This situation has the dimensions of a world problem that cannot be contained in one letter. The core of the problem is the effort at the eradication of Christian consciousness in the life and culture of a nation which by its very nature and because of its Christian Catholic roots contributed to the civilization process in the heart of Europe ever since the ninth century. We cannot blind our eyes with illusions, assuming that the working of divine grace alone will defeat the imperiled Christianity of our n(!,tion. Without our personal co-operation, our struggle and our living faith, we cannot count on perpetuating the religious life and spirit of our universally Christian country. Doubtless, this struggle demands not only our standing up as Christians but also our intelligent approach to find reasonable �96 SLOVAKIA possibilities to solve the problems facing us without craven concessions and compromises. But an attack like yours, coming in such a form and content, inveighing upon political Catholicism as you have done, cannot be accounted as an acceptable line of conduct. Pavol Camogursky's second letter of protest was addressed to Bishop Jozef Feranec, Ordinary of the Diocese of Banska Bystrica. It deals with an article by Jozef Dovala published in the Katolicke Nouiny (Catholic News) August 29, 1976, in which the author states that the priests and laity participate in up building the new way of life in CzechoSlovakia where freedom of religion is constitutionally safeguarded. Dovala wrote this article after his return from the Eucharistic Congress in Philadelphia (August 1-7, 1976) where he attended the Slovak services as the only priest from Slovakia. The text of Camogursky' s letter of August 29, 1976, is as follows: Your Excellency, after reading the editorial in the last issue of the Katolicke Nouiny (no. 53, August 29, 1976) even the simplest believer cannot refrain from reacting in protest, realizing how severe is the extermination process against the Church in Slovakia and how this bitter reality opposes his religious conviction and undermines his devotion to the duties which bind him to the Church. In this article vicar Jozef Douala of Banska Bystrica, wrote among other things: 'Priests as well as laymen participate in the up building of our new life and they also share in its fruits. The Constitution of our state system respects the conviction of every citizen and guarantees the freedom of religion'. With pain in my heart I must state that reality in no way bears out the import of these words. Only a cynical scoffer could write thus, bringing the paper to the level of absurdity and compromising the reader in whose name he so dares to write. What then is the factual status of religious affairs, notwithstanding what the Constitution and Article 7 of the Helsinki Agreement provide? Two weeks ago, on August 18, 1976, the daily Pravda, organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, published a report on the conclusions of the Party Congress and on atheistic education in Slovakia. The gist of these conclusions by the reporting officer read: 'Slovakia became a country of mass atheism. 'A competent representative would hardly dare to make such a bold and far reaching statement in the Party organ of any other Socialist state. Since it cannot be doubted that P. Prusak 's report was factual, even if he did not elaborate about what means were used where it was attained, one must take it as a hard fact. In Slovakia there is a special campaign against religion. I am convinced that Church leadership in Slovakia definitely and carefully concerns itself with the gravity of this article and will weigh its consequences both for itself and for the sake of the Church in Slovakia. �SLOVAKIA 97 I am merely emphasizing the fact that the core of such purported success of atheism in Slovakia is viewed by the author as a purposeful atheistic work which has assumed a systematic character, as he specifically underlines it. In this systematic character of mass abandonment of the paternal heritage - the Catholic Church - by her sons and daughters, one must also see the fact that in Church leadership there are some persons whose high positions serve as the necessary front windows for facilitating apostasy and promoting mass atheism by playing a role assigned to them in their high functions. On the very same level, alas, one must also place the paper Katolicke Noviny which is degenerating into a publication of professional flatterers writing explicitly about themes that have very little in common with authentic religion. This attitude is in total contradiction to the contemporary difficult position of the Church, especially with the mentality of tormented parent-believers. It does not serve the serious matter of peace and rapprochement and easing of tensions. Forgive me, my Bishop, for the bitter tone of this letter. Truly, it is not as bitter as it is painful. And it is precisely for that reason that I must react to the slap on the face inflicted by the aforementioned writing of your vicar general. But not to write would pose an impossible dilemma for me: Am I still a Catholic? Has Mr. Prusak also rightfully included me in his concept of 'mass atheism' in Slovakia? For a responsible member of the Church not to react righteously to this critical development at a time when the very existence of the Church is at stake would be tantamount to not being in rapport with her, with this historic force which endowed Slovakia with all her spiritual, moral and cultural wealth. (1) Pavol Camogursky was imprisoned on November 10, 1976, undoubtedly for this daring analysis of the religious situation in Slovakia and his sharp criticism of Jozef Dovala. In such cases, stock charges of anti-state activities are readily found in the deformed communist system of justice. When Carnogursky ' s case evoked wide publicity in the free world, he was released from prison. He is awaiting trial for purported anti-state activity in the near future. A Speech by Aloysius Tkac Aloysius Tkac is a Catholic priest of the Diocese of Kosice (Eastern Slovakia). He is now 43 years old. He was an archivist in the bishop's chancery and as such he was a member of the pro-communist priestly organization Pacem in Terris. Seeing all the abuses perpetrated against the Church by the communist regime, he decided to publicly denounce them at the festive meeting of this organization on October 23, 1974. On the occasion of the celebration of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Slovak Uprising, in the presence of communist officials controlling �98 SLOVAKIA all activities of the said organization, he first recalled the Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Socialist Republic (art. 32) guaranteeing religious freedom of all citizens. Then he cited the government decrees and pertinent regulations of the Ministry of Culture from 1970 and 1972, by which religious education of children of second to seventh grades is permitted. He mentioned recent statements of the President about religious freedom; and no. 326 of the criminal code, by which all those hindering religious freedom and religious activity by force should be prosecuted and punished. He then proceeded to give accounts of actual religious situations in the country: We cannot pass with silence the unpleasant fact which causes both priests and believers great suffering; we feel we are being discriminated against. The procedure in regard to the spiritual needs many times is reckless and we consider it extremely harsh. The guidelines of the Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Socialist Republic concerning the enrollment of children for religious instructions are in many places disregarded. Groups were formed which not only belittle religious instructions, but hold back parents from the enrollment of their children in religious instruction by direct terror. Contrary to official guidelines about the enrollment, both parents have to present the enrollment petition; often the father or the mother have to excuse themselves from their jobs and complete their work after working hours. It was brought forth to some parents: 'Don't you want to send your children to a higher level of education? Do you want to bury the future of your children in technical schooling?' The behavior of many teachers was harsh, arrogant (such as tearing to pieces the enrollment petition or throwing it away), an illegal act, and it offended the dignity of the citizen-believers. Children attending religious instructions are often excluded from activities with their peers; they cannot make the Pioneers' pledge. During the school year there is also a great deal of peer and teacher pressure put on them. Parents and their children are going through Calvary. They are really martyrs. But how does all this square with the above mentioned state decrees? Even if there were only a few of thse examples, still we must not be silent. Unfortunately, such incidents are very frequent! The fact is that only a small percentage of the children are enrolled for religious instructions. Does this mean that parents and students have renounced their faith and become atheists? By no means! It is largely the result of a natural fear concerning the future! Citizen-believers are being deterred from fulfilling their religious needs, from receiving sacraments (Mass, Holy Communion, Confirmation, Matrimony). Only with difficulty can a priest secretly administer the sacraments of the dying in a hospital. Under various, even false, accusations state permission for priestly work has been revoked to several priests. Does that not bother �SLOVAKIA 99 us? Does not the fate of our brothers in the priesthood concern us? Do we not stand up for the defense of the honor of the priestly state? If not, it is a tragedy! Fifteen newly ordained priests, four months after their ordination, are still waiting for their assignments. Other college graduates have their work assignments in their pockets the moment they have finished their studies. And there are so many parishes and chaplaincies unoccupied/ There are other pains, but others should speak about them! Brothers, friends, I have brought up our common pains. I have spoken to you about the suffering of our believing people. We are not too sensitive, nor are we asking for privileges. We are in pain from the thorns that we have to wear with our people. We are happy to live in our Czecho-Slovak Socialist Republic. We would not betray it for anything. But let us eliminate the mistakes and inadequacies which make our lives difficult. This frank statement shocked the priests and the communist government representatives who always attend such meetings . As a rule, only praise of and gratitude to the regime are expressed at such gatherings. The statement was not even mentioned in the so-called Catholic press of Czecho-Slovakia, or other newspapers. It was secretly smuggled to the free world. What happened to this brave Catholic priest who openly expressed both the facts and the feelings of all conscientious priests and Catholic lay people? Nothing immediately . But then in July of 1975 , almost a year later, news came from Slovakia that several priests who expressed their anti-communist feelings were attacked and some of them severely injured by some individuals who were never apprehended by the police . One of those attacked and severely injured was Aloysius Tkac. In December , 1975 the state permit of Aloysius Tkac to perform priestly duties was withdrawn. His present fate is not known . It may be either manual work or jail. (2) Protests of Monsignor Trstensky Monsignor Victor Trstensky is a prominent Slovak priest. He was born in Trstena (District Orava) on March 29, 1908. After finishing his basic and high school studies in Trstena, he enrolled in the Spis Diocesan Seminary, and was ordained on June 29, 1931. Because of his pastoral zeal and exemplary priestly life, he early became pastor of St. Catherine Church in Dolny Kubin, where he was also a teacher of religion at the local gynmasium. On the recommendation of his Bishop, John Vojtassak, he was made Papal Prelate (Monsignor) while still a very young priest. During the Slovak Republic (1939-1945), as a prominent member of the Hlinka Slovak Populist Party, he took an active part in the public life of his town; at the same time he was involved in the Catholic Action Movement. �100 SLOVAKIA For this activity, after the Second World War he was imprisoned and spent twenty-one years in various prisons, in labor camps, and in manual work. During the Dubcek era, he was rehabilitated and received a state permit for pastoral work on October 7, 1969. The Ordinary of the Spis Diocese , Reverend Joseph Ligos, appointed him adminstrator of St. Nicholas Church in Stara Lubovna where he worked tirelessly for four years. In the post-Dubcek era, the communists in Czecho-Slovakia could not tolerate strong personalities like Monsignor Trstensky in pastoral work . They were afraid of his moral influence on parishioners and particularly on youth. With the year 1974, a new Calvary began for Monsignor Trstensky. The communist-dominated District Committee in Stara Lubovna decided that Trstensky had to leave the town and again be removed from pastoral work . He was notified about his imminent dismissal on January 21, 1974 by the new Ordinary of the Diocese, Stephen Garaj. On January 27, 1974 , Monsignor Trstensky preached to his stunned parishioners a memorable homily, which was secretly taped and later found its way to the free world. The principal reasons for Trstensky's dismissal, given to the vicar capitular by Communist officials, were as follows: 1. preaching against atheism and atheists; 2. sending gifts to old people on Christmas; 3. meetings with altar boys in the church and rectory; 4. keeping in his parish religious Sisters in violation of state regulations; 5. blessing the homes of parishioners after Epiphany. In his classic homily, Monsignor Trstensky explained his activity as pastor of the church in Stara Lubovna and argued convincingly that there was nothing illegal in his pastoral work . He concluded his homily with these words: What does matter is the truth. Whoever distorts the truth cannot build the country. Only truth can save the nation and the country. Remember, if I have to leave here, I am not leaving as a criminal, murderer, traitor of the nation and country. I love my country. Twice I was abroad - in Vienna, Rome, Paris. I could have stayed there. I was invited to do so. But I said: 'I am a Slovak. I did not do anything wrong. I want to live among our people because I love my country and my people.' I returned home. I sincerely love my country, and not only in words but more so by teaching you to love God and one another; by teaching you to work diligently and to live morally. I do not talk about peace, but I promote it with my whole life and work. (3) The decision of the County Committee, Department of Culture, in Stara Lubovna, prohibiting Trstensky to perform priestly ministry was dated January 30, 1974 and delivered to him on February 1, 1974. The reasons for his dismissal are formulated as follows : From the beginning of his assignment to Stara Lubovna, Victor Trstensky in various ways manifested his dissent with the development �SLOVAKIA 101 of our socialist society. For that reason, several sessions were held with him where he was notified that he was breaking the norms established for state-church relationships. In recent times he has increased his reactionary activity and in his sermons he openly and vituperatively spoke against progressively thinking citizens and incited against them. In one of his sermons he said that the unbelievers will once again experience the supremacy of god (sic) and will wish to become believers, but it will be too late. By this activity he was systematically breaking the established laws regarding state-church relations. Such was the case during the last Christmas season, when with the help of school children he distributed to some families packages containing wine, oranges, soap and other items. During his assignment to the parish of Stara Lubovna he intentionally infringed upon the directives on religious instructions by gathering a group of altar boys and choir singers in the church and rectory for practice; furthermore, he organized meetings with a considerable number of children in the rectory. During his assignment at the parish of Stara Lubovna, three religious Sisters came to him and, under his direction, performed church functions and worked actively on the revitalization of the church in the city and among the youth. For these reasons and for his dangerously anti-socialist stand, shown particularly in recent times and in these last days, when he caused among the believers a high and dangerous tension, his continuance in church administration would seriously endanger peaceful social life and the interests of our working people; therefore, with immediate effectiveness, we take away his state permit to work in church administration. On February 14, 1974, Monsignor Trstensky appealed this verdict. As a preliminary to his letter of appeal, he pointed to the irregularities in the whole procedure against him by quoting eight paragraphs of law 71-1967, which were disregarded in his case. Then, in eight pages, he convincingly refuted all the vague or completely false charges against him. He referred to the public and well-known record of his activity as pastor of Stara Lubovna parish. He emphatically stated that he only fulfilled his duties as pastor of a parish, never acting against the state laws and official regulations. The only real reason for the removal of Monsignor Trstensky from pastoral work was his exemplary priestly life and his zealous work for the spiritual welfare of his flock. The appeal of Monsignor Trstensky had no effect and the District Committee in Kosice which by the decision of February 19, 1974, confirmed the verdict of the County Committee in Stara Lubovna and made the decision final, precluding any further appeal. Monsignor Trstensky thereafter went to live in his town of birth, Trstena, in the region of Orava. Grateful parishioners of Stara Lubovna did not forget their beloved pastor. As a token of their appreciation and �102 SLOVAKIA gratitude during the rest of the year 1974, they traveled to Trstena in trucks loaded with construction material and built a home for him. He lives there today. Letters to Highest Authorities After spending years in prison and now being deprived of the permit to work as a priest, Monsignor Trstensky became a fearless witness to communist persecution of loyal priests, and a bold defender of the minimal rights of religion. Monsignor Trstensky carefully observes the situation in his country, sharply analyzes it, and sends his observations to the highest government places. He is sending protest letters to Dr. Peter Colotka, Prime Minister of Slovakia, and even to the President of Czecho-Slovakia, Dr. Gustav Husak. Copies of some of his letters have found their way to the free world. They are quite revealing, since they contain the first-hand experiences and observations of a man who lives there, sees with open eyes, and is able to analyze the situation. One such letter was addressed to Dr. Colotka as a reaction to his television talk on the occasion of the International Year of Women, on March 7, 1974. Colotka is a native of Orava region, and Trstensky was his teacher of religion in Dolny Kubin gymnasium. The letter starts with acknowledgements to Colotka for his fine tribute to women, to Slovak mothers and grandmothers, who taught their children honesty, loyalty and readiness to sacrifice for the truth even with their lives. In his letter Trstensky asks Colotka what these women get from the communist regime. Isn't it tearing apart the hearts of our mothers and grandmothers and their offspring, when religious education of children is being hindered more and more? I heard, for example, that in Banska Bystrica, because of brutal terror at the time of enrollment for religious instructions, not one child was registered. It is the same in many cities of Slovakia. Not that the parents and children would not be interested in religion, as purported, but because of the fear for their existence, they do not dare to register their children for religious instructions. Isn't it a punishment for our mothers and grandmothers, when it is made impossible for their sons to devote themselves to a priestly state of life? And even when they have achieved it after years of demanding studies, obtusely to deprive them of a permit to work in the Church ministry, despite a great shortage of priests? In Slovakia, every year 50 to 60 priests die, while hardly 20 to 22 newly ordained priests come out of the seminary. The reason for this is the unfortunate numerous clauses (restricted number) by which only a small number of the candidates can be accepted into the seminary, and this number only on the evaluation of various non-ecclesiastical authorities. Isn't it a punishment for our mothers and grandmothers, when their daughters and granddaughters are not permitted to choose a vocation in which �SLOVAKIA 103 they could peacefully serve God and their neighbors? Even those religious Sisters who previously had chosen this vocation are, so to say, thrown out from their own houses to the streets? lsn 't it hurting our mothers and grandmothers to see how their children, plying their vocations as teachers, civil servants, or factory foremen cannot fulfill their religious obligations for fear of being/ired or transferred to some other job with a lower salary? What can our mothers and grandmothers say about the so-called Catholic press, which in fact does not exist? ''The statements of Pacem in Terris officers that everything is all right here in the matters of religion, do not change these sad facts. By such statements they compromise not only themselves and the Church, but put into a bad perspective our whole system. We are like open cards, and whoever stops here can evaluate religious situations himself and can see the one-sidedness of such self-serving statements. It would be much more fruitful, it those from our priestly ranks who are writing for Pacem in Terris and who think they are promoting peace and social progress, mainly and openly told the heads of our regime that man is not only a body, but also a soul, which is in need of spiritual food. Our simple old women in Orava are shaking their heads when, while reading in the Katolicke Noviny all those praises about religious life in our country, they live in sadness with their daughters who were thrown out of religious life not by Church but by State authorities, or with their sons who were stripped of the State permit for Church administration, or when they see their sons and daughters sneaking away, if they want to pray, get married in church, or have their child baptized. (4) In July, 1976, Monsignor Trstensky asked for travel permission to see his sick brother and his aged sister living in the U.S.A. His petition was turned down by the government officials. Trstensky again sent appeals to the Slovak Prime Minister, Peter Colotka, and to the President of Czecho-Slovakia, Dr. Gustav Husak. In his letter to the President dated January 6, 1977, Trstensky again presented a sharp analysis of the situation in Slovakia. I still have not received an answer about my own sufferings and those of believing people. Probably the reason is that it regards a Roman Catholic priest, thus a man outside the law. This confirms my conviction that the main task of some of our circles is to harrass the citizens, especially believers, and to unleash a ruthless war against religion and its adherents. By watching television, by reading newspapers, and magazines and books about so-called "scientific" atheism, by talking with believers, by watching their sad faces, by seeing hundreds of priests outside pastoral work, tormented Sisters, the fear of teachers, civil servants, nurses, foremen in factories, one gets a clear testimony what injustices are being perpetrated against believers. A member of the Party can be like a stump of wood, as long as he knows some phrases about atheism, Marxism. He is preferred to a non- �104 SLOVAKIA Party man, no matter how intelligent, conscientious and patriotic the latter may be. How much more useful would it be to our country, if those much needed billions squandered on anti-religious propaganda, on so-called civil baptisms, weddings, burials, and on the tens of thousands of atheistic propagandists, were used for real re-education in the spirit of justice and mutual love, and for the promotion of material, spiritual, cultural and social development. Wherever there is an anti-religious campaign and justice is trampled upon, morality declines, the families fall apart, enthusiasm for work vanishes, honesty and responsibility disappear, criminality among adults and even among adolescents increases, and the very foundations of the country are undermined. If there is to be a lasting peace, it must be built on justice, truth, freedom and love. (5) It is interesting to note that despite his sharp protest letters, some of which were published in the Western press , Monsignor Trstensky is still not in jail. He is harrassed and intimidated, as appears from his letters . The reason for his not being imprisoned may be the notoriety of his case throughout Czecho-Slovakia and, to some extent, even throughout the free world. The regime fears the out-cry of the free world which follows the imprisonment of well-known dissidents. Examples of Living Faith Not all opponents of militant atheism express their protests against the persecution of the Church by letters and manifestos. In Slovakia there are many priests and lay people resisting the communist oppression of religion with their lives. There are people filling the churches on Sundays and holy days, receiving the sacraments regularly , enrolling their children for religious instructions - ready to pay for it with a loss of better jobs and in some instances with a loss of personal freedom. There are still priests who are in a real sense spiritual fathers of their flock, risking the loss of a state permit to function as priests, or risking the loss of liberty. There are priests and lay people who by the depth of their religious life equal the heroism of the Christians of the early Church. They are luminaries of deep faith in these hours of darkness. One such is John Chrysostom Korec. At the time of the suppression of religious orders in 1950, John Korec was a Jesuit cleric. After nearly completing his regular theological studies, he was secretly ordained a priest and in 1951, bishop. He was then 27 years old, the youngest bishop in the world. He had to go through military service. He then became a factory worker. He worked as a bishop in the underground by secretly preaching to small groups of people, administering the sacrament of Confirmation , teaching young clerics, ~d �SLOVAKIA 105 eventually ordaining them as priests. In 1960, communist spies discovered who John Korec really was. He was sentenced to twelve years in a high security prison. But even in those years of imprisonment, he continued his priestly work among his fellow inmates. In 1968, Bishop Korec was released from jail, weakened in body. He became one of the leading personalities in revitalizing the religious life of Slovakia during this period of thaw. In 1969, he visited Rome and had a private audience with the Holy Father, who gave him one of his personal croziers and a pectoral cross as a sign of his appreciation for the young bishop's work. After the fall of Dubcek (April 17, 1969), renewed terrorism began in Czecho-Slovakia. The state permit to publicly celebrate the Mass was taken away from Bishop Korec. He was not permitted to take part in any official functions of the Church. He became a factory worker in Bratislava. Today, the whole of Slovakia knows about the case of Bishop Korec. People distressed by harsh religious repression, particularly the highly educated, come to Bishop Korec for his words of advice and consolation. This is not looked upon favorably by the communist authorities. They would like to get rid of Bishop Korec, but without further disturbing the populace. They offered him an opporutnity to emigrate from Slovakia. Bishop Korec rejected the suggestion. They offered him a state permit to perform a ministry in some parish outside Bratislava. Bishop Korec said he would accept the ministry outside Bratislava, on the condition that all other priests to whom the state permit was denied or taken away be given permission to function as priests. The communist authorities rejected this condition. The case of the heroic Bishop Korec was reported in the Catholic press throughout the free world. Perhaps this will protect him temporarily against imprisonment. (6) Stephen J avorsky, a Salesian priest, administrator of the parish in Muran, was imprisoned by the state police on November 26, 1975 and sentenced to eighteen months in jail. His state permit to perform his priestly duties was suspended for two years after the expiration of his jail sentence. For this verdict the following reasons are given by the County Court in Muran: ''He enticed youth, especially university students, by inducing them to listen to the Vatican Radio; he distributed books among them; in their presence, he projected film strips and played tapes containing unacceptable conferences on religious philosophy directed against the interests of our socialist society and against materialistic philosophy, with the aim of involving into this work a large group of religious lay people who besides their regular vocation should exercise missionary activity as well. On June 1, 1975, during the divine services in the parish church of Muran, he tried to influence parents, calling the County Spartakiad (gymnastic exhibition) a worldly vanity fair to be opposed by the parents in the future. " Javorsky's appeal of this verdict to a higher court was rejected and the length of his prison term was prolonged to two full years. (7) �106 SLOVAKIA Among Slovak dissidents are also brave writers and distributors of anonymous pamphlets which sporadically appear in various parts of the country. Such a leaflet distributed in June, 1975, analyzes the religious situation in Slovakia and exhorts Christian believers to defend religious rights guaranteed by the Constitution and state laws.(8) Another pamphlet, distributed in Slovakia in April of 1976, warns Slovak Catholics of the biased news published in the Katolicke Noviny and against the priest-collaborators active in the pro-communist organization Pacem in Terris. (9) It is proper to express our respect and admiration of these known and unknown heroes. They suffer for their deep religious convictions . The whole country lives in an atmosphere of imprisonment. Their suffering sooner or later will bring about the liberty of the Church and of the people in Slovakia. FOOTNOTES The complete text of both Camogursky letters was published in HORIZONT ' 77 , March-April , 1977, p . 8-9. (2) The text of Rev. Tkac 's speech can be found in " SITUATION DER KATHOLISHEN KIRCHE IN DER TSCHECHOSLOWAKEI," Ed . JUSTITIA ET PAX 1976, p. 134138. (3) Frantisek Vnuk : Prenasledo uanie katolickeho ducho uenst ua sa stupi'tuje . (Mounting Persecution of the Catholic Clergy) . SLOVAK V AMERIKE (Slovak in America), May 8, 1974, p . 1, 3. (4) The text of this Jetter was published in HLASY Z RIMA (Voices of Rome), July 1976, p. 22-23. (5) The main parts of this letter were published in JEDNOTA , March 30, 1977, p. 20, 17; also in HLASY Z RIMA , April 1977, p. 21-23 . (6) " Narodeniny biskupa-robotnika Jana Korea " (The Birthday of Bishop-Worker, John Korec) . SLOVAK V AMERIKE , Jan. 26, 1977 , p . 1. (7) HLASY Z RIMA , January 1977, p . 22. (8) The complete text of this pamphlet was published in " SITUATION DER KATHOLISCHEN KIRCHE IN DER TSCHECHOSLOWAKEI," p. 123-130. (9) Ibid. , p . 84-85 ; HLASY Z RIMA , August-September, 1976, p . 31. (1) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1977, Vol. 27 Description An account of the resource Vol. 27 (No. 50), 1977. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1977 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 91 Preludes to nCharter '77" THEODORIC J. ZUBEK, O.F.M. The occupation of Czecho-Slovakia by the Soviet armies and their satellites in August, 1968, brought new enslavement. The Soviets did not achieve their goal immediately, but they gradually tightened the political relaxations of the Dubcek era. The Russians imprisoned Dubcek and his closest associates and dragged them to Russia. This gravely irritated public opinion. The leadership of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia insisted on the release of Dubcek and his co-workers and their own restoration to positions of leadership in Czecho-Slovakia. At first, the Russians were not able to find a person agreeable to collaborate with occupation authorities. They had to restore Dubcek and permit him to continue as the first Secretary of the Central Committee and leading member of the Presidium of the Communist Party. But the Russians worked feverishly to split the leadership of the Party. Dr. Gustav Husak proved to be the most able and articulate politician in the chaotic situation. In the early fifties, Husak, a Slovak, had been imprisoned and condemned for so-called bourgeois nationalistic deviation. He was ousted from the Communist party. In the period of de-Stalinization in 1963, he was released from prison and re-admitted into the Party, but held no official position. But, he was active behind the scenes in fomenting a movement against President Novotny and his Stalinist methods. In April, 1968, Husak became one of the vice-premiers of the government, and after the occupation also became a member of the Presidium. Though he had been politically rehabilitated through the moderate policy of Alexander Dubcek, it was, after the occupation that Husak became an open critic of "Communism with a human face." Dubcek was gradually pushed to the background, and lost one position after another. Finally, under increasing pressure, on April 17, 1969, Dubcek resigned as first secretary of the Communist Party, and was stripped of his membership in the Party. On the same day, Husak took his position as first secretary. Husak had considerable support among the people, especially in Slovakia, since he had suffered 12 years of imprisonment for his Slovak nationalism and later fought against Prague centralism. He had promoted the federalization of Czecho-Slovakia. He also seemed to favor Dubcek's liberalization. After the Russian occupation, many accepted Husak's argument that there was no military possibility of defending the country, and that it was necessary to yield to Russian pressure to some degree, and to consolidate the internal situation in the country in order to persuade Moscow that there was no need for the 92 SLOVAKIA continued presence of Russian armies in Czecho-Slovakia. Some also believed Husak's pledge that there would never be a return to Stalinism and that the earlier process of democratization would continue. Nevertheless , it became clear that Husak was primarily interested in gaining Moscow's confidence and in strengthening his own leading position. He fully accepted suppression and terrorism and in a short time, under the guise of "normalization, " he once again enslaved the country. In his hatred of religion, Husak outdid his Moscow bosses. Religion had strong roots, especially in Slovakia, so Husak's antireligious campaign is aimed particularly against the Catholic Church. Present day persecution of the Catholic Church in Czecho-Slovakia is more brutal than in any other communist-dominated country of Europe. It is more pervasive and more cunning than it was during the regimes of Gottwald or Novotny. In recent years, more and more news stories about the terrorism of Husak's regime and the suppression of human rights appeared in the free world. At the beginning of 1977, a transcript of Charter '77 was published in many newspapers of the Western world. In this document, more than 600 Czech and Slovak signers protested against the suppression of human rights, specifically mentioning suppression of the rights to religious conviction. These rights are guaranteed by the . Czecho-Slovak Constitution as well as by the Helsinki Agreement which was by signed Czecho-Slovakia. This Charter '77 was preceded by several public protests of individual citizens, laymen and priests, who openly denounced the abuses of government power and the systematic campaign against religion. Some of these written protests found their way to the free world. A number of them were written before the Helsinki Agreement (September, 1975) and they refer to the Czecho-Slovak Constitution and other laws; later protests also refer to the Helsinki Agreement. It was a number of these protests that prepared the mood for Charter '77. It is proper to express admiration and respect for these individual dissidents for their courage and strength. In a Communist regime, it is riskier for an individual to protest against government abuses than it is for a group. Individual internationally unknown dissidents are taken care of quickly. Under the pretext of anti-state activity, they are silenced in prison or labor camps without much notice or commotion, and without comment in the free world. The Case of Pavol Carnogursky Pavol Carnogursky is a sixty-eight year old layman, who from his youth played an important role in the Catholic life of Slovakia. As an employee of the Catholic Agency in Bratislava, he organized and led Catholic Action programs among Slovak young people, patterned SLOVAKIA 93 largely on the practices of the French and Belgian Catholic Workers and Catholic Organizations of intellectuals. During the period of Slovak autonomy and independence (19381945), he was a member of the Slovak Parliament and was esteemed as an expert on education and school matters. He opposed the Nazi tendencies of some Slovak politicians and belonged to the group of Slovak Catholic moderates headed by President Joseph Tiso and Dr. Martin Sokol, speaker of the Slovak Parliament . For this reason the Germans regarded him as a persona non grata. Immediately after World War II , Pavol Carnogursky tried to organize the Christian Republican Party as a platform for defending human rights and freedom of conscience in Slovakia, when the country was again made part of Czecho-Slovakia. On the insistence of Slovak bishops, however, the Slovak Catholics joined forces with the predominantly Lutheran Democratic Party and helped it attain an overwhelming victory in Slovakia, triumphing over the communists and other small parties in the 1946 elections. Although Carnogursky was clearly anti-Nazi, yet because of his position as a deputy during the Slovak Republic, he was not found acceptable for any public role in the political life of post-war Slovakia. In 1947 , because of his well known anti-communist stand and his involvement in re-organizing the Catholic workers and the intelligentsia, he was imprisoned and eventually forced into seclusion and silence, providing for his family as a manual worker in a Bratislava factory . Nevertheless, during all those years of seclusion, Carnogursky carefully observed the political and religious situation in Slovakia, read all the biased works of communist historians about the Slovak Republic, and occasionally expressed his critical views in letters he sent to his friends abroad . After the fall of Dubcek in 1969, there began an era of brutal suppression of human rights and a systematic denial of freedom of religion. A pro-communist organization of the clergy, called Pacem in Terris, was established and the priests of Czecho-Slovakia were again torn into two groups, each distrusting the other. The Catholic press, i.e. the Katolicke nouiny (Catholic News) and Duchouny Pastier (Spiritual Shepherd) were put under strict communist control. The pro-communist speeches and articles of Canon Jozef Dovala, pastor in Ziar nad Hronom in the Banska Bystrica Diocese and vicar general of the Diocese , a prominent member of the Pacem in Terris movement, brought the patience and silence of Pavol Carnogursky to an end. The corruption of the Katolicke nouiny offended Carnogursky in a special way, since for some time after the war he had been the editor of this Catholic weekly and worked earnestly to bring it to a high journalistic level. On September 11 , 1974, the executive board of the Federal Association of the Catholic Clergymen, Pacem in Terris , celebrated the 94 SLOVAKIA thirtieth a nniversary of the Slovak upri sing in Banska Bystrica. Canon Joze f Dov ala was the main speaker. He equated the so-called '' political Catholicism ' ' of the Slovak Republic with collaboration with Ge rman Naz ism, and made it co-responsible for the death of about four thou sand priests in Nazi concentration camps. In a letter to Dovala, Carnogursky said it was ab surd to draw a connection between the regime of the Slovak Republic and Ge rman atrocities during the war. He wrote: In a few months it will be thirty years since the e nd of the S econd World War. During this p eriod a countless multitude of articles, political or pseudo-political, as well as scholarly and professional works on the current situation in Slo vakia appeared. Only in exceptional cases are they free of anti-Catholic tendencies. The great majority of the m obtusely describe the situation prejudicially, as you did. I read all tho se articles and books. In the last analysis, they have the same goal: to destroy Catholic ideology and Catholic life in Slo vakia. For that reason the arguments, of which even a mildly honest man and more so a scholar would be ashamed, are crude, unfounded, even hostile, negative and degrading. But what you, Father, associated with the ideas of political Catholicism in Slovakia, surpasses e verything. W e should give credit to anti-Catholic propaganda for using such tricks. The Slo vak State had to be proclaimed at that particular time (March 14, 1939, ed.) and under prevailing circumstances, if we were to make sure that among the thousands of priests murdered (in other countries) in Hitler 's concentration camps there would not be Slo vak priests. In the last analysis, our administrative authorities were not motivated only by a concern for the priests, but for the whole nation as well. And the nation has been saved. I cannot understand why you are angered and prompted to attack it (Slovak independence), since its existence gave you guarantees assuring that you yourself did not become a victim of Hitler 's concentration camp, if you were ordained before World War II. (Douala was ordained March 17, 1938.) I cannot understand why they talk only about political Catholicism and not about political Lutheranism, political Judaism, political atheism, and about the means by which these denominations and institutions have in that day and even to our day influenced and affected public life. Catholicism in Slovakia was a historical force in the nation. Without the care of the Catholic church for education, the social structure, schools, the press, agriculture and social and economic institutions, especially without the work and sacrifices of the best sons of the nation who as Catholic priests defended its voice and language, developing and enriching it through the centuries and assuring its cultural and economic growth - we would have perished. I can well understand why in the Protestant milieu, among the Jews and other denominations in Slovakia, there was not a similar SLOVAKIA 95 attack on their own. They are fully conscious of the consequences of such a step. Your attack on so-called political Catholicism during the span of the Slovak Republic, unfounded and, to say in openly, irresponsible as it is, is the more tragic because it came at the time when large-scale militant atheism was active in Slovakia and aimed its fury against the Catholic Church, its doctrine, essence and its historical influence upon the thinking and feeling of our people. And this is done by repressive methods not invoked now at the end of the twentieth century by any other Socialist country, not even in black Africa. No teacher, no educator among us, is permitted to enter a classroom, to work among the students, to teach even technical subject matter, unless he declares that he has solved the religious question, which means that he proclaims that he is an atheist. He must avow that he is an atheist not only in his private convictions, but in an active sense as well, ready to teach and educate in the atheistic way. Any doubt in this area, any evidence of religious feelings, such as attendance at divine services, reception of any sacrament, excludes him from a teaching position. Parents who enrolled their children for religious instruction are exposed to unheard of pressure from the school officials and from their employers. Children who attended religious instruction are denied advanced studies. There is a general rule valid even among the most primitive social groups that under-age children are not responsible for a transgression of the law. In our case, children are punished for attending religious instructions, while the Constitution of the peoples' democratic system ironically guarantees freedom of religious conviction. And these sanctions against children are not for a limited period of time, but for their whole lifetime. Father, how will the history of the Church in Slovakia and the general history of mankind call this kind of Catholicism, which, witnessing all this, still feels and expresses itself as you did in this case? My letter to you cannot delineate a complete description of the tragic situation of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. This situation has the dimensions of a world problem that cannot be contained in one letter. The core of the problem is the effort at the eradication of Christian consciousness in the life and culture of a nation which by its very nature and because of its Christian Catholic roots contributed to the civilization process in the heart of Europe ever since the ninth century. We cannot blind our eyes with illusions, assuming that the working of divine grace alone will defeat the imperiled Christianity of our n(!,tion. Without our personal co-operation, our struggle and our living faith, we cannot count on perpetuating the religious life and spirit of our universally Christian country. Doubtless, this struggle demands not only our standing up as Christians but also our intelligent approach to find reasonable 96 SLOVAKIA possibilities to solve the problems facing us without craven concessions and compromises. But an attack like yours, coming in such a form and content, inveighing upon political Catholicism as you have done, cannot be accounted as an acceptable line of conduct. Pavol Camogursky's second letter of protest was addressed to Bishop Jozef Feranec, Ordinary of the Diocese of Banska Bystrica. It deals with an article by Jozef Dovala published in the Katolicke Nouiny (Catholic News) August 29, 1976, in which the author states that the priests and laity participate in up building the new way of life in CzechoSlovakia where freedom of religion is constitutionally safeguarded. Dovala wrote this article after his return from the Eucharistic Congress in Philadelphia (August 1-7, 1976) where he attended the Slovak services as the only priest from Slovakia. The text of Camogursky' s letter of August 29, 1976, is as follows: Your Excellency, after reading the editorial in the last issue of the Katolicke Nouiny (no. 53, August 29, 1976) even the simplest believer cannot refrain from reacting in protest, realizing how severe is the extermination process against the Church in Slovakia and how this bitter reality opposes his religious conviction and undermines his devotion to the duties which bind him to the Church. In this article vicar Jozef Douala of Banska Bystrica, wrote among other things: 'Priests as well as laymen participate in the up building of our new life and they also share in its fruits. The Constitution of our state system respects the conviction of every citizen and guarantees the freedom of religion'. With pain in my heart I must state that reality in no way bears out the import of these words. Only a cynical scoffer could write thus, bringing the paper to the level of absurdity and compromising the reader in whose name he so dares to write. What then is the factual status of religious affairs, notwithstanding what the Constitution and Article 7 of the Helsinki Agreement provide? Two weeks ago, on August 18, 1976, the daily Pravda, organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, published a report on the conclusions of the Party Congress and on atheistic education in Slovakia. The gist of these conclusions by the reporting officer read: 'Slovakia became a country of mass atheism. 'A competent representative would hardly dare to make such a bold and far reaching statement in the Party organ of any other Socialist state. Since it cannot be doubted that P. Prusak 's report was factual, even if he did not elaborate about what means were used where it was attained, one must take it as a hard fact. In Slovakia there is a special campaign against religion. I am convinced that Church leadership in Slovakia definitely and carefully concerns itself with the gravity of this article and will weigh its consequences both for itself and for the sake of the Church in Slovakia. SLOVAKIA 97 I am merely emphasizing the fact that the core of such purported success of atheism in Slovakia is viewed by the author as a purposeful atheistic work which has assumed a systematic character, as he specifically underlines it. In this systematic character of mass abandonment of the paternal heritage - the Catholic Church - by her sons and daughters, one must also see the fact that in Church leadership there are some persons whose high positions serve as the necessary front windows for facilitating apostasy and promoting mass atheism by playing a role assigned to them in their high functions. On the very same level, alas, one must also place the paper Katolicke Noviny which is degenerating into a publication of professional flatterers writing explicitly about themes that have very little in common with authentic religion. This attitude is in total contradiction to the contemporary difficult position of the Church, especially with the mentality of tormented parent-believers. It does not serve the serious matter of peace and rapprochement and easing of tensions. Forgive me, my Bishop, for the bitter tone of this letter. Truly, it is not as bitter as it is painful. And it is precisely for that reason that I must react to the slap on the face inflicted by the aforementioned writing of your vicar general. But not to write would pose an impossible dilemma for me: Am I still a Catholic? Has Mr. Prusak also rightfully included me in his concept of 'mass atheism' in Slovakia? For a responsible member of the Church not to react righteously to this critical development at a time when the very existence of the Church is at stake would be tantamount to not being in rapport with her, with this historic force which endowed Slovakia with all her spiritual, moral and cultural wealth. (1) Pavol Camogursky was imprisoned on November 10, 1976, undoubtedly for this daring analysis of the religious situation in Slovakia and his sharp criticism of Jozef Dovala. In such cases, stock charges of anti-state activities are readily found in the deformed communist system of justice. When Carnogursky ' s case evoked wide publicity in the free world, he was released from prison. He is awaiting trial for purported anti-state activity in the near future. A Speech by Aloysius Tkac Aloysius Tkac is a Catholic priest of the Diocese of Kosice (Eastern Slovakia). He is now 43 years old. He was an archivist in the bishop's chancery and as such he was a member of the pro-communist priestly organization Pacem in Terris. Seeing all the abuses perpetrated against the Church by the communist regime, he decided to publicly denounce them at the festive meeting of this organization on October 23, 1974. On the occasion of the celebration of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Slovak Uprising, in the presence of communist officials controlling 98 SLOVAKIA all activities of the said organization, he first recalled the Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Socialist Republic (art. 32) guaranteeing religious freedom of all citizens. Then he cited the government decrees and pertinent regulations of the Ministry of Culture from 1970 and 1972, by which religious education of children of second to seventh grades is permitted. He mentioned recent statements of the President about religious freedom; and no. 326 of the criminal code, by which all those hindering religious freedom and religious activity by force should be prosecuted and punished. He then proceeded to give accounts of actual religious situations in the country: We cannot pass with silence the unpleasant fact which causes both priests and believers great suffering; we feel we are being discriminated against. The procedure in regard to the spiritual needs many times is reckless and we consider it extremely harsh. The guidelines of the Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Socialist Republic concerning the enrollment of children for religious instructions are in many places disregarded. Groups were formed which not only belittle religious instructions, but hold back parents from the enrollment of their children in religious instruction by direct terror. Contrary to official guidelines about the enrollment, both parents have to present the enrollment petition; often the father or the mother have to excuse themselves from their jobs and complete their work after working hours. It was brought forth to some parents: 'Don't you want to send your children to a higher level of education? Do you want to bury the future of your children in technical schooling?' The behavior of many teachers was harsh, arrogant (such as tearing to pieces the enrollment petition or throwing it away), an illegal act, and it offended the dignity of the citizen-believers. Children attending religious instructions are often excluded from activities with their peers; they cannot make the Pioneers' pledge. During the school year there is also a great deal of peer and teacher pressure put on them. Parents and their children are going through Calvary. They are really martyrs. But how does all this square with the above mentioned state decrees? Even if there were only a few of thse examples, still we must not be silent. Unfortunately, such incidents are very frequent! The fact is that only a small percentage of the children are enrolled for religious instructions. Does this mean that parents and students have renounced their faith and become atheists? By no means! It is largely the result of a natural fear concerning the future! Citizen-believers are being deterred from fulfilling their religious needs, from receiving sacraments (Mass, Holy Communion, Confirmation, Matrimony). Only with difficulty can a priest secretly administer the sacraments of the dying in a hospital. Under various, even false, accusations state permission for priestly work has been revoked to several priests. Does that not bother SLOVAKIA 99 us? Does not the fate of our brothers in the priesthood concern us? Do we not stand up for the defense of the honor of the priestly state? If not, it is a tragedy! Fifteen newly ordained priests, four months after their ordination, are still waiting for their assignments. Other college graduates have their work assignments in their pockets the moment they have finished their studies. And there are so many parishes and chaplaincies unoccupied/ There are other pains, but others should speak about them! Brothers, friends, I have brought up our common pains. I have spoken to you about the suffering of our believing people. We are not too sensitive, nor are we asking for privileges. We are in pain from the thorns that we have to wear with our people. We are happy to live in our Czecho-Slovak Socialist Republic. We would not betray it for anything. But let us eliminate the mistakes and inadequacies which make our lives difficult. This frank statement shocked the priests and the communist government representatives who always attend such meetings . As a rule, only praise of and gratitude to the regime are expressed at such gatherings. The statement was not even mentioned in the so-called Catholic press of Czecho-Slovakia, or other newspapers. It was secretly smuggled to the free world. What happened to this brave Catholic priest who openly expressed both the facts and the feelings of all conscientious priests and Catholic lay people? Nothing immediately . But then in July of 1975 , almost a year later, news came from Slovakia that several priests who expressed their anti-communist feelings were attacked and some of them severely injured by some individuals who were never apprehended by the police . One of those attacked and severely injured was Aloysius Tkac. In December , 1975 the state permit of Aloysius Tkac to perform priestly duties was withdrawn. His present fate is not known . It may be either manual work or jail. (2) Protests of Monsignor Trstensky Monsignor Victor Trstensky is a prominent Slovak priest. He was born in Trstena (District Orava) on March 29, 1908. After finishing his basic and high school studies in Trstena, he enrolled in the Spis Diocesan Seminary, and was ordained on June 29, 1931. Because of his pastoral zeal and exemplary priestly life, he early became pastor of St. Catherine Church in Dolny Kubin, where he was also a teacher of religion at the local gynmasium. On the recommendation of his Bishop, John Vojtassak, he was made Papal Prelate (Monsignor) while still a very young priest. During the Slovak Republic (1939-1945), as a prominent member of the Hlinka Slovak Populist Party, he took an active part in the public life of his town; at the same time he was involved in the Catholic Action Movement. 100 SLOVAKIA For this activity, after the Second World War he was imprisoned and spent twenty-one years in various prisons, in labor camps, and in manual work. During the Dubcek era, he was rehabilitated and received a state permit for pastoral work on October 7, 1969. The Ordinary of the Spis Diocese , Reverend Joseph Ligos, appointed him adminstrator of St. Nicholas Church in Stara Lubovna where he worked tirelessly for four years. In the post-Dubcek era, the communists in Czecho-Slovakia could not tolerate strong personalities like Monsignor Trstensky in pastoral work . They were afraid of his moral influence on parishioners and particularly on youth. With the year 1974, a new Calvary began for Monsignor Trstensky. The communist-dominated District Committee in Stara Lubovna decided that Trstensky had to leave the town and again be removed from pastoral work . He was notified about his imminent dismissal on January 21, 1974 by the new Ordinary of the Diocese, Stephen Garaj. On January 27, 1974 , Monsignor Trstensky preached to his stunned parishioners a memorable homily, which was secretly taped and later found its way to the free world. The principal reasons for Trstensky's dismissal, given to the vicar capitular by Communist officials, were as follows: 1. preaching against atheism and atheists; 2. sending gifts to old people on Christmas; 3. meetings with altar boys in the church and rectory; 4. keeping in his parish religious Sisters in violation of state regulations; 5. blessing the homes of parishioners after Epiphany. In his classic homily, Monsignor Trstensky explained his activity as pastor of the church in Stara Lubovna and argued convincingly that there was nothing illegal in his pastoral work . He concluded his homily with these words: What does matter is the truth. Whoever distorts the truth cannot build the country. Only truth can save the nation and the country. Remember, if I have to leave here, I am not leaving as a criminal, murderer, traitor of the nation and country. I love my country. Twice I was abroad - in Vienna, Rome, Paris. I could have stayed there. I was invited to do so. But I said: 'I am a Slovak. I did not do anything wrong. I want to live among our people because I love my country and my people.' I returned home. I sincerely love my country, and not only in words but more so by teaching you to love God and one another; by teaching you to work diligently and to live morally. I do not talk about peace, but I promote it with my whole life and work. (3) The decision of the County Committee, Department of Culture, in Stara Lubovna, prohibiting Trstensky to perform priestly ministry was dated January 30, 1974 and delivered to him on February 1, 1974. The reasons for his dismissal are formulated as follows : From the beginning of his assignment to Stara Lubovna, Victor Trstensky in various ways manifested his dissent with the development SLOVAKIA 101 of our socialist society. For that reason, several sessions were held with him where he was notified that he was breaking the norms established for state-church relationships. In recent times he has increased his reactionary activity and in his sermons he openly and vituperatively spoke against progressively thinking citizens and incited against them. In one of his sermons he said that the unbelievers will once again experience the supremacy of god (sic) and will wish to become believers, but it will be too late. By this activity he was systematically breaking the established laws regarding state-church relations. Such was the case during the last Christmas season, when with the help of school children he distributed to some families packages containing wine, oranges, soap and other items. During his assignment to the parish of Stara Lubovna he intentionally infringed upon the directives on religious instructions by gathering a group of altar boys and choir singers in the church and rectory for practice; furthermore, he organized meetings with a considerable number of children in the rectory. During his assignment at the parish of Stara Lubovna, three religious Sisters came to him and, under his direction, performed church functions and worked actively on the revitalization of the church in the city and among the youth. For these reasons and for his dangerously anti-socialist stand, shown particularly in recent times and in these last days, when he caused among the believers a high and dangerous tension, his continuance in church administration would seriously endanger peaceful social life and the interests of our working people; therefore, with immediate effectiveness, we take away his state permit to work in church administration. On February 14, 1974, Monsignor Trstensky appealed this verdict. As a preliminary to his letter of appeal, he pointed to the irregularities in the whole procedure against him by quoting eight paragraphs of law 71-1967, which were disregarded in his case. Then, in eight pages, he convincingly refuted all the vague or completely false charges against him. He referred to the public and well-known record of his activity as pastor of Stara Lubovna parish. He emphatically stated that he only fulfilled his duties as pastor of a parish, never acting against the state laws and official regulations. The only real reason for the removal of Monsignor Trstensky from pastoral work was his exemplary priestly life and his zealous work for the spiritual welfare of his flock. The appeal of Monsignor Trstensky had no effect and the District Committee in Kosice which by the decision of February 19, 1974, confirmed the verdict of the County Committee in Stara Lubovna and made the decision final, precluding any further appeal. Monsignor Trstensky thereafter went to live in his town of birth, Trstena, in the region of Orava. Grateful parishioners of Stara Lubovna did not forget their beloved pastor. As a token of their appreciation and 102 SLOVAKIA gratitude during the rest of the year 1974, they traveled to Trstena in trucks loaded with construction material and built a home for him. He lives there today. Letters to Highest Authorities After spending years in prison and now being deprived of the permit to work as a priest, Monsignor Trstensky became a fearless witness to communist persecution of loyal priests, and a bold defender of the minimal rights of religion. Monsignor Trstensky carefully observes the situation in his country, sharply analyzes it, and sends his observations to the highest government places. He is sending protest letters to Dr. Peter Colotka, Prime Minister of Slovakia, and even to the President of Czecho-Slovakia, Dr. Gustav Husak. Copies of some of his letters have found their way to the free world. They are quite revealing, since they contain the first-hand experiences and observations of a man who lives there, sees with open eyes, and is able to analyze the situation. One such letter was addressed to Dr. Colotka as a reaction to his television talk on the occasion of the International Year of Women, on March 7, 1974. Colotka is a native of Orava region, and Trstensky was his teacher of religion in Dolny Kubin gymnasium. The letter starts with acknowledgements to Colotka for his fine tribute to women, to Slovak mothers and grandmothers, who taught their children honesty, loyalty and readiness to sacrifice for the truth even with their lives. In his letter Trstensky asks Colotka what these women get from the communist regime. Isn't it tearing apart the hearts of our mothers and grandmothers and their offspring, when religious education of children is being hindered more and more? I heard, for example, that in Banska Bystrica, because of brutal terror at the time of enrollment for religious instructions, not one child was registered. It is the same in many cities of Slovakia. Not that the parents and children would not be interested in religion, as purported, but because of the fear for their existence, they do not dare to register their children for religious instructions. Isn't it a punishment for our mothers and grandmothers, when it is made impossible for their sons to devote themselves to a priestly state of life? And even when they have achieved it after years of demanding studies, obtusely to deprive them of a permit to work in the Church ministry, despite a great shortage of priests? In Slovakia, every year 50 to 60 priests die, while hardly 20 to 22 newly ordained priests come out of the seminary. The reason for this is the unfortunate numerous clauses (restricted number) by which only a small number of the candidates can be accepted into the seminary, and this number only on the evaluation of various non-ecclesiastical authorities. Isn't it a punishment for our mothers and grandmothers, when their daughters and granddaughters are not permitted to choose a vocation in which SLOVAKIA 103 they could peacefully serve God and their neighbors? Even those religious Sisters who previously had chosen this vocation are, so to say, thrown out from their own houses to the streets? lsn 't it hurting our mothers and grandmothers to see how their children, plying their vocations as teachers, civil servants, or factory foremen cannot fulfill their religious obligations for fear of being/ired or transferred to some other job with a lower salary? What can our mothers and grandmothers say about the so-called Catholic press, which in fact does not exist? ''The statements of Pacem in Terris officers that everything is all right here in the matters of religion, do not change these sad facts. By such statements they compromise not only themselves and the Church, but put into a bad perspective our whole system. We are like open cards, and whoever stops here can evaluate religious situations himself and can see the one-sidedness of such self-serving statements. It would be much more fruitful, it those from our priestly ranks who are writing for Pacem in Terris and who think they are promoting peace and social progress, mainly and openly told the heads of our regime that man is not only a body, but also a soul, which is in need of spiritual food. Our simple old women in Orava are shaking their heads when, while reading in the Katolicke Noviny all those praises about religious life in our country, they live in sadness with their daughters who were thrown out of religious life not by Church but by State authorities, or with their sons who were stripped of the State permit for Church administration, or when they see their sons and daughters sneaking away, if they want to pray, get married in church, or have their child baptized. (4) In July, 1976, Monsignor Trstensky asked for travel permission to see his sick brother and his aged sister living in the U.S.A. His petition was turned down by the government officials. Trstensky again sent appeals to the Slovak Prime Minister, Peter Colotka, and to the President of Czecho-Slovakia, Dr. Gustav Husak. In his letter to the President dated January 6, 1977, Trstensky again presented a sharp analysis of the situation in Slovakia. I still have not received an answer about my own sufferings and those of believing people. Probably the reason is that it regards a Roman Catholic priest, thus a man outside the law. This confirms my conviction that the main task of some of our circles is to harrass the citizens, especially believers, and to unleash a ruthless war against religion and its adherents. By watching television, by reading newspapers, and magazines and books about so-called "scientific" atheism, by talking with believers, by watching their sad faces, by seeing hundreds of priests outside pastoral work, tormented Sisters, the fear of teachers, civil servants, nurses, foremen in factories, one gets a clear testimony what injustices are being perpetrated against believers. A member of the Party can be like a stump of wood, as long as he knows some phrases about atheism, Marxism. He is preferred to a non- 104 SLOVAKIA Party man, no matter how intelligent, conscientious and patriotic the latter may be. How much more useful would it be to our country, if those much needed billions squandered on anti-religious propaganda, on so-called civil baptisms, weddings, burials, and on the tens of thousands of atheistic propagandists, were used for real re-education in the spirit of justice and mutual love, and for the promotion of material, spiritual, cultural and social development. Wherever there is an anti-religious campaign and justice is trampled upon, morality declines, the families fall apart, enthusiasm for work vanishes, honesty and responsibility disappear, criminality among adults and even among adolescents increases, and the very foundations of the country are undermined. If there is to be a lasting peace, it must be built on justice, truth, freedom and love. (5) It is interesting to note that despite his sharp protest letters, some of which were published in the Western press , Monsignor Trstensky is still not in jail. He is harrassed and intimidated, as appears from his letters . The reason for his not being imprisoned may be the notoriety of his case throughout Czecho-Slovakia and, to some extent, even throughout the free world. The regime fears the out-cry of the free world which follows the imprisonment of well-known dissidents. Examples of Living Faith Not all opponents of militant atheism express their protests against the persecution of the Church by letters and manifestos. In Slovakia there are many priests and lay people resisting the communist oppression of religion with their lives. There are people filling the churches on Sundays and holy days, receiving the sacraments regularly , enrolling their children for religious instructions - ready to pay for it with a loss of better jobs and in some instances with a loss of personal freedom. There are still priests who are in a real sense spiritual fathers of their flock, risking the loss of a state permit to function as priests, or risking the loss of liberty. There are priests and lay people who by the depth of their religious life equal the heroism of the Christians of the early Church. They are luminaries of deep faith in these hours of darkness. One such is John Chrysostom Korec. At the time of the suppression of religious orders in 1950, John Korec was a Jesuit cleric. After nearly completing his regular theological studies, he was secretly ordained a priest and in 1951, bishop. He was then 27 years old, the youngest bishop in the world. He had to go through military service. He then became a factory worker. He worked as a bishop in the underground by secretly preaching to small groups of people, administering the sacrament of Confirmation , teaching young clerics, ~d SLOVAKIA 105 eventually ordaining them as priests. In 1960, communist spies discovered who John Korec really was. He was sentenced to twelve years in a high security prison. But even in those years of imprisonment, he continued his priestly work among his fellow inmates. In 1968, Bishop Korec was released from jail, weakened in body. He became one of the leading personalities in revitalizing the religious life of Slovakia during this period of thaw. In 1969, he visited Rome and had a private audience with the Holy Father, who gave him one of his personal croziers and a pectoral cross as a sign of his appreciation for the young bishop's work. After the fall of Dubcek (April 17, 1969), renewed terrorism began in Czecho-Slovakia. The state permit to publicly celebrate the Mass was taken away from Bishop Korec. He was not permitted to take part in any official functions of the Church. He became a factory worker in Bratislava. Today, the whole of Slovakia knows about the case of Bishop Korec. People distressed by harsh religious repression, particularly the highly educated, come to Bishop Korec for his words of advice and consolation. This is not looked upon favorably by the communist authorities. They would like to get rid of Bishop Korec, but without further disturbing the populace. They offered him an opporutnity to emigrate from Slovakia. Bishop Korec rejected the suggestion. They offered him a state permit to perform a ministry in some parish outside Bratislava. Bishop Korec said he would accept the ministry outside Bratislava, on the condition that all other priests to whom the state permit was denied or taken away be given permission to function as priests. The communist authorities rejected this condition. The case of the heroic Bishop Korec was reported in the Catholic press throughout the free world. Perhaps this will protect him temporarily against imprisonment. (6) Stephen J avorsky, a Salesian priest, administrator of the parish in Muran, was imprisoned by the state police on November 26, 1975 and sentenced to eighteen months in jail. His state permit to perform his priestly duties was suspended for two years after the expiration of his jail sentence. For this verdict the following reasons are given by the County Court in Muran: ''He enticed youth, especially university students, by inducing them to listen to the Vatican Radio; he distributed books among them; in their presence, he projected film strips and played tapes containing unacceptable conferences on religious philosophy directed against the interests of our socialist society and against materialistic philosophy, with the aim of involving into this work a large group of religious lay people who besides their regular vocation should exercise missionary activity as well. On June 1, 1975, during the divine services in the parish church of Muran, he tried to influence parents, calling the County Spartakiad (gymnastic exhibition) a worldly vanity fair to be opposed by the parents in the future. " Javorsky's appeal of this verdict to a higher court was rejected and the length of his prison term was prolonged to two full years. (7) 106 SLOVAKIA Among Slovak dissidents are also brave writers and distributors of anonymous pamphlets which sporadically appear in various parts of the country. Such a leaflet distributed in June, 1975, analyzes the religious situation in Slovakia and exhorts Christian believers to defend religious rights guaranteed by the Constitution and state laws.(8) Another pamphlet, distributed in Slovakia in April of 1976, warns Slovak Catholics of the biased news published in the Katolicke Noviny and against the priest-collaborators active in the pro-communist organization Pacem in Terris. (9) It is proper to express our respect and admiration of these known and unknown heroes. They suffer for their deep religious convictions . The whole country lives in an atmosphere of imprisonment. Their suffering sooner or later will bring about the liberty of the Church and of the people in Slovakia. FOOTNOTES The complete text of both Camogursky letters was published in HORIZONT ' 77 , March-April , 1977, p . 8-9. (2) The text of Rev. Tkac 's speech can be found in " SITUATION DER KATHOLISHEN KIRCHE IN DER TSCHECHOSLOWAKEI," Ed . JUSTITIA ET PAX 1976, p. 134138. (3) Frantisek Vnuk : Prenasledo uanie katolickeho ducho uenst ua sa stupi'tuje . (Mounting Persecution of the Catholic Clergy) . SLOVAK V AMERIKE (Slovak in America), May 8, 1974, p . 1, 3. (4) The text of this Jetter was published in HLASY Z RIMA (Voices of Rome), July 1976, p. 22-23. (5) The main parts of this letter were published in JEDNOTA , March 30, 1977, p. 20, 17; also in HLASY Z RIMA , April 1977, p. 21-23 . (6) " Narodeniny biskupa-robotnika Jana Korea " (The Birthday of Bishop-Worker, John Korec) . SLOVAK V AMERIKE , Jan. 26, 1977 , p . 1. (7) HLASY Z RIMA , January 1977, p . 22. (8) The complete text of this pamphlet was published in " SITUATION DER KATHOLISCHEN KIRCHE IN DER TSCHECHOSLOWAKEI," p. 123-130. (9) Ibid. , p . 84-85 ; HLASY Z RIMA , August-September, 1976, p . 31. (1)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Preludes to "Charter '77" Description An account of the resource Theodoric J. Zubek, O.F.M. Slovakia, Vol. 27 (No. 50), 1977 pp. 91-106 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zúbek, Teodorik J., 1914-1988 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1977 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f4534c5c55ca7eeded195ef90f4bd3eb.pdf d8cb7f8c71034ded72ea4f91239ea526 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 11 3 Review Article THEODORIC J . ZUBEK , O.F.M. AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM Eva Slavkovska. " Vzt'ah statu k cirkvam v prvych rokoch vystavby socializmu na Slovensku ," Historick y casopis, XXX, 2 (1982), 223-49. In her article Eva Slavkovska attempts to give a comple te account of the mo st important events in the worsening relations between the Czechoslovak government and the Catholic Church in Slovakia during the two critical years following the Communist coup d'etat of February 1948 . She b ases he r work most! y on the official records of the Slovak Commissariat for Schools, Sciences, and Arts prese rved in the Central State Archives of the Slovak Socialist Republic. Furthermore, she quotes from the works of seve ral Communist authors who wrote about the same subject matter , as well as articles from the so-called Catholic press, which soon after the coup was subjected to complete Communist control. As a result , her evaluation of the religious situation in Slovakia is one-sided and biased by he r Communist perception . Slavkovska begins h er article with a falsely precon ce ived idea tha t the deep reli giou s co nvictions of the Slovak people stemmed from econom ic, social, a nd cultural backwardness , supported in great part b y the Catholic hie rarchy a nd the tradition al political clericalism which until the Communist ta keover in 1948 affected Slova k Catholics. Although quite frequently Slavkovska looks back to the years before the Comm uni st coup d'e tat in February , 1948, she n eglects to m ention that immed iately after the war ( 1945) the Catholic Church suffered much more in Slovakia than it did in Bohemia and Moravia (Czech territories). Wh ereas in the Czech lands Catholi cs were represe nted b y th eir own politi cal party (Msgr. J a n Sramek's Czech P eople's P arty), Slovak Catholi cs were branded as "cle ri co -fascists" a nd h ad no political representation. The decrees of the Slovak National Council, which was dominated by Communists, h ad the aut hority of law in th e territory �114 SLOVAKIA of Slovakia . By these decrees all Catholic schools, publications , and societies were suppressed immediately after the war, while during the same period their counterparts in Bohemia and Moravia remained untouched. Only the elections of May 25, 1946 (the last free elections) brought some relief to Slovak Catholics. In April, 1946, the representatives of Slovak Catholics who had showed some opposition to Dr. Jozef Tiso's regime and were acceptable in the new political situation made an agreement with the representatives of the Slovak Democratic Party, previously completely dominated by Lutherans. With the help of Slovak Catholics, the Democratic Party won in Slovakia 62 % of the votes, while the Communist Party of Slovakia received less than half of that amount (30 % ). As a result of these elections, Slovak Catholics gained some political influence . Several of their periodical publications and some of the strictly religious societies were restored . But no Catholic schools, except the nine theologates, were allowed. It was only after the Communist takeover that the restrictions against the Catholic Church were conducted on a national basis and applied in the same way to Catholics in the whole country. Not surprisingly, Slavkovska omits these important facts and distinctions. She then proceeds by chronologically describing protracted and frustrating negotiations between the government and Church representatives. The bishops asked for a guarantee of freedom in the admin istration of the dioceses and parishes, for the preservation of the remaining Catholic schools in Bohemia and Moravia and for their restoration in Slovakia , for the existence of a free Catholic press and religious societies - rights that graduall y had been restricted after the Communist coup d'etat. The government pressed the bishops for a public proclamation of their loyalty to the new regime , for a renewal of their loyalty oath to the Communist government, and for influencing pries ts and Catholic people in promoting a pro-governm ent spirit. At thi s stage the Catholic bishops of the Czech territories a nd Slovakia acted together for the defense of the basic rights of the Catholic Church. The State-Church negotiations ended in failure in March , 1949 . Slavkovska blames the bishops for this failure, accusing them of a n un yieldin g a nd insin cere stand toward the Communist regime. Actually, the Communist regime was interes ted only in subjugating the Church and not in a ny workable agreement. While the nego ti a tions were still �SLOVAKIA 11 5 going on, the Central Action Committee of the National Front in Prague and its branches throughout the whole country , together with other government agencies, systematically en croach ed ever m o re d eeply on the rights of the Church . In 1949 , under various pretex ts , the regime suppressed several monasteries and convents, confiscated man y church buildings , and imprisoned a number of Catholic priests, both diocesan and religious , and Catholic laymen . Secret agents spied on all Catholic priests and members of religious orders and congregations . On the basis of h er research , Slavkovska - perhaps unwittingly - gives an interesting report on this matter. She states that this surveillance of the priests by the state agencies resulted in putting the priests into four categories: reliable to the regime (13.21 % ); those with a positive stand toward the regime , but not unequivocally (15.65 % ); apolitical (28 .65%); and unreliable (42.41 %). According to Slavkovska, the Communist agents worked with the reliable priests and tried to influence those in the second a nd third categories . The main part of the article is devoted to the so-called P eople's Catholic Action . Since the pontificate of Pius XI Catholic Action was an important m eans used by the Church to activate the faithful toward a deeper Christian life and to help priests bring Christian principles into family life and the whole of society . There was a well-organized Catholic Action in the Slovak dioceses and parishes under the supervision of the bishops and priests . In their effort to destroy the Church organization in Czechoslovakia, the Communist agencies attempted to alienate the priests from their bishops and the lay people from the uncompromising pries ts . Since Catholic Action was basically a laymen' s organization, the Communists con voked on June 10 , 1949 a meeting of n ominally Catholic lay people and several " reliable" priests in Pragu e. They establish ed their own '' P eople's Catholic A ct ion.' ' I ts purported aim was to promote moral life in the family , support constru ct ive efforts of the Czechoslovak governm ent , prevent the persecuti on of priests loyal to the re gim e by their bishops , a nd elimin ate all foreign interfe ren ce in the Church m a tters of Czechoslovakia. In this vein they issu ed a M a nifesto which was publi shed in all n ewspap ers and b roadcast on the state radio . An inten sive campa ign for the signin g of the M a nifesto was cond u cted throughout the whole country. The bishops of Czechoslovakia were still able secretl y �116 SLOVAKIA to meet and to issue a pastoral letter warning the people of the schismatic character of this spurious organization . On June 20, 1949, the Holy Office in Rome published a declaration by which all organizers and active members of the schismatic "Catholic Action" were automatically penalized with the highest ecclesiastical censure ( excommunication reserved in a special way to the Holy See). Despite the frantic efforts of the Communist regime to win supporters for this anti-Church campaign, the "Catholic Action" movement soon became a complete fiasco . It caused a great turmoil throughout the whole country and in Slovakia strikes in several factories and confrontations with the state police . The Communist government had to retreat. It even called on the maligned bishops to send a letter to the faithful to calm them down and exhort them to return to their work. Slavkovska describes in detail the organizational structure of the "Catholic Action" and various meetings of its organizers, but fails to mention that almost from the beginning it was only a paper organization doomed to an early demise. Still, the Communist government was not ready and willing to stop its efforts to subjugate the Church. With the failure of its ''Catholic Action" it took a new approach in this direction. It decided to legalize its attempts to enslave the Church . In a Communist country the parliament is a rubber-stamp assembly which can be counted on to pass all legislation unanimously put before it by the Communist Party. On October 14, 1949 , the Czechoslovak parliament enacted two laws which put the Church under the complete control of the state: Law No . 217/1949, which set up a State Agency for Ecclesiastical Affairs, and Law No. 218/1949 on the economic safeguarding of churches and religious bodies by the state. The State Agency for Ecclesiastical Affairs (and in Slovakia the Slovak Agency for Ecclesiastical Affairs) took control over all religious activities in the country. The second law gave the government all buildings of the churches and religious denominations and the exclusive right to grant ( or take away) licenses to clergymen for performing their ministry after they had taken an oath of loyalty to the government, and to pay them salaries according to their rank, seniority, and efficiency. The bishops first vehemently protested against this legalized enslavement of the Church. In the chaotic situation resulting from this new situation , they finally permitted their priests to take the prescribed oath with the mental reservation that they did not intend thereby to act against �SLOVAKIA 117 the laws of God, the Church, and the legitimate ecclesiastical authorities. In that sense, several bishops in March and April of 1950 also took the oath of loyalty. In that year ( 1950) of crude pressure on and persecution of the Church, the Communists rapidly proceeded in their efforts completely to subjugate the Church . They imprisoned or interned on trumped-up charges, or without any charges, several bishops Uosef Beran, Stepan Trochta, Jan Vojtassak, Stanislav Zela, Stefan Barnas, Michal Buzalka, Pavel Gojdic, and Basil Hopko). In public trials in the national courts they condemned to long prison terms Bishops V ojtassak, Gojdic, Buzalka, and Zela. Several representatives of larger religious orders and prominent prelates of Czechoslovakia were also publicly tried and condemned during this reign of terror. Still others were imprisoned and tried secretly. In the same year all monasteries, convents, and houses of religious orders and congregations were suppressed, and their members were confined to concentration houses . The Greek Catholic diocese of Presov was fraudulently and forcibly taken over by Orthodox bishops .The legitimate bishops of the diocese, Pavel Gojdic and Basil Hopko, were imprisoned, and Greek Catholic priests, loyal to Rome, were dispersed throughout the country as manual workers. Meanwhile, the Communists intensively worked on priests who showed an inclination to collaborate with the regime. First they established the organization of so-called patriotic priests , which later changed its name to ''Peace Movement of the Catholic Priests .'' In the dioceses whose bishops were imprisoned they forced the elections of vicars capitular as heads of the dioceses. The remaining bishops were confined to their residences and were under the surveillance of government agents who controlled all the activities of ligitimate ordinaries. Priestcollaborators intruded into the administration of the dioceses as vicars general, chancellors, and similar high officials. Slavkovska hardly mentions these rude encroachments on the administration and the life of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. But she does try to justify all these cruel interferences of the Communist regime in the very structure of the Catholic Church and in the field of human rights of the Catholic clergy and people. In her evaluation, there was no persecution of the Church, only legitimate steps for eliminating political clericalism in Slovakia. She praises the anti-Church laws of 1949 because they granted adequate financial remuneration to the priests for �118 SLOVAKIA their work as state employees . Furthermore, she wantonly states that all these provisions were welcomed by the "lower clergy" and the Catholic people. Slavkovska does not realize, or does not want to admit, that the governmental mingling with the innermost Church affairs and the erection of the pro-Communist priestly organizations, established under government pressure and protected by it, brought about the grossest form of caesaropapism, incomparably more destructive to the Church than the purported political clericalism during the previous regimes. In her article Slavkovska does not go as far as to the late sixties, to the Dubcek era. As soon as the cruel pressure on the Church was lifted in 1968, the Catholics, led by their remaining bishops and priests loyal to the Church, publicly denounced the persecution of the past decades and demanded abolition of all the previous abuses against the Church. They were supported even by many high ranking Communists of that era (Ladislav Holdos, Daniel Okali, Erika Kadlecova, and others). They achieved the restoration of the Greek Catholic diocese of Presov, the only seemingly permanent correction of the anti-Church abuses of the early fifties. Unfortunately , the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968 , and Husak 's process of so-called normalization destroyed all other rights which the Church had regained during the short-lived period of the "Prague-Spring." � SLOVAKIA 11 3 Review Article THEODORIC J . ZUBEK , O.F.M. AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM Eva Slavkovska. " Vzt'ah statu k cirkvam v prvych rokoch vystavby socializmu na Slovensku ," Historick y casopis, XXX, 2 (1982), 223-49. In her article Eva Slavkovska attempts to give a comple te account of the mo st important events in the worsening relations between the Czechoslovak government and the Catholic Church in Slovakia during the two critical years following the Communist coup d'etat of February 1948 . She b ases he r work most! y on the official records of the Slovak Commissariat for Schools, Sciences, and Arts prese rved in the Central State Archives of the Slovak Socialist Republic. Furthermore, she quotes from the works of seve ral Communist authors who wrote about the same subject matter , as well as articles from the so-called Catholic press, which soon after the coup was subjected to complete Communist control. As a result , her evaluation of the religious situation in Slovakia is one-sided and biased by he r Communist perception . Slavkovska begins h er article with a falsely precon ce ived idea tha t the deep reli giou s co nvictions of the Slovak people stemmed from econom ic, social, a nd cultural backwardness , supported in great part b y the Catholic hie rarchy a nd the tradition al political clericalism which until the Communist ta keover in 1948 affected Slova k Catholics. Although quite frequently Slavkovska looks back to the years before the Comm uni st coup d'e tat in February , 1948, she n eglects to m ention that immed iately after the war ( 1945) the Catholic Church suffered much more in Slovakia than it did in Bohemia and Moravia (Czech territories). Wh ereas in the Czech lands Catholi cs were represe nted b y th eir own politi cal party (Msgr. J a n Sramek's Czech P eople's P arty), Slovak Catholi cs were branded as "cle ri co -fascists" a nd h ad no political representation. The decrees of the Slovak National Council, which was dominated by Communists, h ad the aut hority of law in th e territory �114 SLOVAKIA of Slovakia . By these decrees all Catholic schools, publications , and societies were suppressed immediately after the war, while during the same period their counterparts in Bohemia and Moravia remained untouched. Only the elections of May 25, 1946 (the last free elections) brought some relief to Slovak Catholics. In April, 1946, the representatives of Slovak Catholics who had showed some opposition to Dr. Jozef Tiso's regime and were acceptable in the new political situation made an agreement with the representatives of the Slovak Democratic Party, previously completely dominated by Lutherans. With the help of Slovak Catholics, the Democratic Party won in Slovakia 62 % of the votes, while the Communist Party of Slovakia received less than half of that amount (30 % ). As a result of these elections, Slovak Catholics gained some political influence . Several of their periodical publications and some of the strictly religious societies were restored . But no Catholic schools, except the nine theologates, were allowed. It was only after the Communist takeover that the restrictions against the Catholic Church were conducted on a national basis and applied in the same way to Catholics in the whole country. Not surprisingly, Slavkovska omits these important facts and distinctions. She then proceeds by chronologically describing protracted and frustrating negotiations between the government and Church representatives. The bishops asked for a guarantee of freedom in the admin istration of the dioceses and parishes, for the preservation of the remaining Catholic schools in Bohemia and Moravia and for their restoration in Slovakia , for the existence of a free Catholic press and religious societies - rights that graduall y had been restricted after the Communist coup d'etat. The government pressed the bishops for a public proclamation of their loyalty to the new regime , for a renewal of their loyalty oath to the Communist government, and for influencing pries ts and Catholic people in promoting a pro-governm ent spirit. At thi s stage the Catholic bishops of the Czech territories a nd Slovakia acted together for the defense of the basic rights of the Catholic Church. The State-Church negotiations ended in failure in March , 1949 . Slavkovska blames the bishops for this failure, accusing them of a n un yieldin g a nd insin cere stand toward the Communist regime. Actually, the Communist regime was interes ted only in subjugating the Church and not in a ny workable agreement. While the nego ti a tions were still �SLOVAKIA 11 5 going on, the Central Action Committee of the National Front in Prague and its branches throughout the whole country , together with other government agencies, systematically en croach ed ever m o re d eeply on the rights of the Church . In 1949 , under various pretex ts , the regime suppressed several monasteries and convents, confiscated man y church buildings , and imprisoned a number of Catholic priests, both diocesan and religious , and Catholic laymen . Secret agents spied on all Catholic priests and members of religious orders and congregations . On the basis of h er research , Slavkovska - perhaps unwittingly - gives an interesting report on this matter. She states that this surveillance of the priests by the state agencies resulted in putting the priests into four categories: reliable to the regime (13.21 % ); those with a positive stand toward the regime , but not unequivocally (15.65 % ); apolitical (28 .65%); and unreliable (42.41 %). According to Slavkovska, the Communist agents worked with the reliable priests and tried to influence those in the second a nd third categories . The main part of the article is devoted to the so-called P eople's Catholic Action . Since the pontificate of Pius XI Catholic Action was an important m eans used by the Church to activate the faithful toward a deeper Christian life and to help priests bring Christian principles into family life and the whole of society . There was a well-organized Catholic Action in the Slovak dioceses and parishes under the supervision of the bishops and priests . In their effort to destroy the Church organization in Czechoslovakia, the Communist agencies attempted to alienate the priests from their bishops and the lay people from the uncompromising pries ts . Since Catholic Action was basically a laymen' s organization, the Communists con voked on June 10 , 1949 a meeting of n ominally Catholic lay people and several " reliable" priests in Pragu e. They establish ed their own '' P eople's Catholic A ct ion.' ' I ts purported aim was to promote moral life in the family , support constru ct ive efforts of the Czechoslovak governm ent , prevent the persecuti on of priests loyal to the re gim e by their bishops , a nd elimin ate all foreign interfe ren ce in the Church m a tters of Czechoslovakia. In this vein they issu ed a M a nifesto which was publi shed in all n ewspap ers and b roadcast on the state radio . An inten sive campa ign for the signin g of the M a nifesto was cond u cted throughout the whole country. The bishops of Czechoslovakia were still able secretl y �116 SLOVAKIA to meet and to issue a pastoral letter warning the people of the schismatic character of this spurious organization . On June 20, 1949, the Holy Office in Rome published a declaration by which all organizers and active members of the schismatic "Catholic Action" were automatically penalized with the highest ecclesiastical censure ( excommunication reserved in a special way to the Holy See). Despite the frantic efforts of the Communist regime to win supporters for this anti-Church campaign, the "Catholic Action" movement soon became a complete fiasco . It caused a great turmoil throughout the whole country and in Slovakia strikes in several factories and confrontations with the state police . The Communist government had to retreat. It even called on the maligned bishops to send a letter to the faithful to calm them down and exhort them to return to their work. Slavkovska describes in detail the organizational structure of the "Catholic Action" and various meetings of its organizers, but fails to mention that almost from the beginning it was only a paper organization doomed to an early demise. Still, the Communist government was not ready and willing to stop its efforts to subjugate the Church. With the failure of its ''Catholic Action" it took a new approach in this direction. It decided to legalize its attempts to enslave the Church . In a Communist country the parliament is a rubber-stamp assembly which can be counted on to pass all legislation unanimously put before it by the Communist Party. On October 14, 1949 , the Czechoslovak parliament enacted two laws which put the Church under the complete control of the state: Law No . 217/1949, which set up a State Agency for Ecclesiastical Affairs, and Law No. 218/1949 on the economic safeguarding of churches and religious bodies by the state. The State Agency for Ecclesiastical Affairs (and in Slovakia the Slovak Agency for Ecclesiastical Affairs) took control over all religious activities in the country. The second law gave the government all buildings of the churches and religious denominations and the exclusive right to grant ( or take away) licenses to clergymen for performing their ministry after they had taken an oath of loyalty to the government, and to pay them salaries according to their rank, seniority, and efficiency. The bishops first vehemently protested against this legalized enslavement of the Church. In the chaotic situation resulting from this new situation , they finally permitted their priests to take the prescribed oath with the mental reservation that they did not intend thereby to act against �SLOVAKIA 117 the laws of God, the Church, and the legitimate ecclesiastical authorities. In that sense, several bishops in March and April of 1950 also took the oath of loyalty. In that year ( 1950) of crude pressure on and persecution of the Church, the Communists rapidly proceeded in their efforts completely to subjugate the Church . They imprisoned or interned on trumped-up charges, or without any charges, several bishops Uosef Beran, Stepan Trochta, Jan Vojtassak, Stanislav Zela, Stefan Barnas, Michal Buzalka, Pavel Gojdic, and Basil Hopko). In public trials in the national courts they condemned to long prison terms Bishops V ojtassak, Gojdic, Buzalka, and Zela. Several representatives of larger religious orders and prominent prelates of Czechoslovakia were also publicly tried and condemned during this reign of terror. Still others were imprisoned and tried secretly. In the same year all monasteries, convents, and houses of religious orders and congregations were suppressed, and their members were confined to concentration houses . The Greek Catholic diocese of Presov was fraudulently and forcibly taken over by Orthodox bishops .The legitimate bishops of the diocese, Pavel Gojdic and Basil Hopko, were imprisoned, and Greek Catholic priests, loyal to Rome, were dispersed throughout the country as manual workers. Meanwhile, the Communists intensively worked on priests who showed an inclination to collaborate with the regime. First they established the organization of so-called patriotic priests , which later changed its name to ''Peace Movement of the Catholic Priests .'' In the dioceses whose bishops were imprisoned they forced the elections of vicars capitular as heads of the dioceses. The remaining bishops were confined to their residences and were under the surveillance of government agents who controlled all the activities of ligitimate ordinaries. Priestcollaborators intruded into the administration of the dioceses as vicars general, chancellors, and similar high officials. Slavkovska hardly mentions these rude encroachments on the administration and the life of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. But she does try to justify all these cruel interferences of the Communist regime in the very structure of the Catholic Church and in the field of human rights of the Catholic clergy and people. In her evaluation, there was no persecution of the Church, only legitimate steps for eliminating political clericalism in Slovakia. She praises the anti-Church laws of 1949 because they granted adequate financial remuneration to the priests for �118 SLOVAKIA their work as state employees . Furthermore, she wantonly states that all these provisions were welcomed by the "lower clergy" and the Catholic people. Slavkovska does not realize, or does not want to admit, that the governmental mingling with the innermost Church affairs and the erection of the pro-Communist priestly organizations, established under government pressure and protected by it, brought about the grossest form of caesaropapism, incomparably more destructive to the Church than the purported political clericalism during the previous regimes. In her article Slavkovska does not go as far as to the late sixties, to the Dubcek era. As soon as the cruel pressure on the Church was lifted in 1968, the Catholics, led by their remaining bishops and priests loyal to the Church, publicly denounced the persecution of the past decades and demanded abolition of all the previous abuses against the Church. They were supported even by many high ranking Communists of that era (Ladislav Holdos, Daniel Okali, Erika Kadlecova, and others). They achieved the restoration of the Greek Catholic diocese of Presov, the only seemingly permanent correction of the anti-Church abuses of the early fifties. Unfortunately , the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968 , and Husak 's process of so-called normalization destroyed all other rights which the Church had regained during the short-lived period of the "Prague-Spring." � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1984, Vol. 31 Description An account of the resource Vol. 31 (No. 57), 1984. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1984 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 11 3 Review Article THEODORIC J . ZUBEK , O.F.M. AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM Eva Slavkovska. " Vzt'ah statu k cirkvam v prvych rokoch vystavby socializmu na Slovensku ," Historick y casopis, XXX, 2 (1982), 223-49. In her article Eva Slavkovska attempts to give a comple te account of the mo st important events in the worsening relations between the Czechoslovak government and the Catholic Church in Slovakia during the two critical years following the Communist coup d'etat of February 1948 . She b ases he r work most! y on the official records of the Slovak Commissariat for Schools, Sciences, and Arts prese rved in the Central State Archives of the Slovak Socialist Republic. Furthermore, she quotes from the works of seve ral Communist authors who wrote about the same subject matter , as well as articles from the so-called Catholic press, which soon after the coup was subjected to complete Communist control. As a result , her evaluation of the religious situation in Slovakia is one-sided and biased by he r Communist perception . Slavkovska begins h er article with a falsely precon ce ived idea tha t the deep reli giou s co nvictions of the Slovak people stemmed from econom ic, social, a nd cultural backwardness , supported in great part b y the Catholic hie rarchy a nd the tradition al political clericalism which until the Communist ta keover in 1948 affected Slova k Catholics. Although quite frequently Slavkovska looks back to the years before the Comm uni st coup d'e tat in February , 1948, she n eglects to m ention that immed iately after the war ( 1945) the Catholic Church suffered much more in Slovakia than it did in Bohemia and Moravia (Czech territories). Wh ereas in the Czech lands Catholi cs were represe nted b y th eir own politi cal party (Msgr. J a n Sramek's Czech P eople's P arty), Slovak Catholi cs were branded as "cle ri co -fascists" a nd h ad no political representation. The decrees of the Slovak National Council, which was dominated by Communists, h ad the aut hority of law in th e territory 114 SLOVAKIA of Slovakia . By these decrees all Catholic schools, publications , and societies were suppressed immediately after the war, while during the same period their counterparts in Bohemia and Moravia remained untouched. Only the elections of May 25, 1946 (the last free elections) brought some relief to Slovak Catholics. In April, 1946, the representatives of Slovak Catholics who had showed some opposition to Dr. Jozef Tiso's regime and were acceptable in the new political situation made an agreement with the representatives of the Slovak Democratic Party, previously completely dominated by Lutherans. With the help of Slovak Catholics, the Democratic Party won in Slovakia 62 % of the votes, while the Communist Party of Slovakia received less than half of that amount (30 % ). As a result of these elections, Slovak Catholics gained some political influence . Several of their periodical publications and some of the strictly religious societies were restored . But no Catholic schools, except the nine theologates, were allowed. It was only after the Communist takeover that the restrictions against the Catholic Church were conducted on a national basis and applied in the same way to Catholics in the whole country. Not surprisingly, Slavkovska omits these important facts and distinctions. She then proceeds by chronologically describing protracted and frustrating negotiations between the government and Church representatives. The bishops asked for a guarantee of freedom in the admin istration of the dioceses and parishes, for the preservation of the remaining Catholic schools in Bohemia and Moravia and for their restoration in Slovakia , for the existence of a free Catholic press and religious societies - rights that graduall y had been restricted after the Communist coup d'etat. The government pressed the bishops for a public proclamation of their loyalty to the new regime , for a renewal of their loyalty oath to the Communist government, and for influencing pries ts and Catholic people in promoting a pro-governm ent spirit. At thi s stage the Catholic bishops of the Czech territories a nd Slovakia acted together for the defense of the basic rights of the Catholic Church. The State-Church negotiations ended in failure in March , 1949 . Slavkovska blames the bishops for this failure, accusing them of a n un yieldin g a nd insin cere stand toward the Communist regime. Actually, the Communist regime was interes ted only in subjugating the Church and not in a ny workable agreement. While the nego ti a tions were still SLOVAKIA 11 5 going on, the Central Action Committee of the National Front in Prague and its branches throughout the whole country , together with other government agencies, systematically en croach ed ever m o re d eeply on the rights of the Church . In 1949 , under various pretex ts , the regime suppressed several monasteries and convents, confiscated man y church buildings , and imprisoned a number of Catholic priests, both diocesan and religious , and Catholic laymen . Secret agents spied on all Catholic priests and members of religious orders and congregations . On the basis of h er research , Slavkovska - perhaps unwittingly - gives an interesting report on this matter. She states that this surveillance of the priests by the state agencies resulted in putting the priests into four categories: reliable to the regime (13.21 % ); those with a positive stand toward the regime , but not unequivocally (15.65 % ); apolitical (28 .65%); and unreliable (42.41 %). According to Slavkovska, the Communist agents worked with the reliable priests and tried to influence those in the second a nd third categories . The main part of the article is devoted to the so-called P eople's Catholic Action . Since the pontificate of Pius XI Catholic Action was an important m eans used by the Church to activate the faithful toward a deeper Christian life and to help priests bring Christian principles into family life and the whole of society . There was a well-organized Catholic Action in the Slovak dioceses and parishes under the supervision of the bishops and priests . In their effort to destroy the Church organization in Czechoslovakia, the Communist agencies attempted to alienate the priests from their bishops and the lay people from the uncompromising pries ts . Since Catholic Action was basically a laymen' s organization, the Communists con voked on June 10 , 1949 a meeting of n ominally Catholic lay people and several " reliable" priests in Pragu e. They establish ed their own '' P eople's Catholic A ct ion.' ' I ts purported aim was to promote moral life in the family , support constru ct ive efforts of the Czechoslovak governm ent , prevent the persecuti on of priests loyal to the re gim e by their bishops , a nd elimin ate all foreign interfe ren ce in the Church m a tters of Czechoslovakia. In this vein they issu ed a M a nifesto which was publi shed in all n ewspap ers and b roadcast on the state radio . An inten sive campa ign for the signin g of the M a nifesto was cond u cted throughout the whole country. The bishops of Czechoslovakia were still able secretl y 116 SLOVAKIA to meet and to issue a pastoral letter warning the people of the schismatic character of this spurious organization . On June 20, 1949, the Holy Office in Rome published a declaration by which all organizers and active members of the schismatic "Catholic Action" were automatically penalized with the highest ecclesiastical censure ( excommunication reserved in a special way to the Holy See). Despite the frantic efforts of the Communist regime to win supporters for this anti-Church campaign, the "Catholic Action" movement soon became a complete fiasco . It caused a great turmoil throughout the whole country and in Slovakia strikes in several factories and confrontations with the state police . The Communist government had to retreat. It even called on the maligned bishops to send a letter to the faithful to calm them down and exhort them to return to their work. Slavkovska describes in detail the organizational structure of the "Catholic Action" and various meetings of its organizers, but fails to mention that almost from the beginning it was only a paper organization doomed to an early demise. Still, the Communist government was not ready and willing to stop its efforts to subjugate the Church. With the failure of its ''Catholic Action" it took a new approach in this direction. It decided to legalize its attempts to enslave the Church . In a Communist country the parliament is a rubber-stamp assembly which can be counted on to pass all legislation unanimously put before it by the Communist Party. On October 14, 1949 , the Czechoslovak parliament enacted two laws which put the Church under the complete control of the state: Law No . 217/1949, which set up a State Agency for Ecclesiastical Affairs, and Law No. 218/1949 on the economic safeguarding of churches and religious bodies by the state. The State Agency for Ecclesiastical Affairs (and in Slovakia the Slovak Agency for Ecclesiastical Affairs) took control over all religious activities in the country. The second law gave the government all buildings of the churches and religious denominations and the exclusive right to grant ( or take away) licenses to clergymen for performing their ministry after they had taken an oath of loyalty to the government, and to pay them salaries according to their rank, seniority, and efficiency. The bishops first vehemently protested against this legalized enslavement of the Church. In the chaotic situation resulting from this new situation , they finally permitted their priests to take the prescribed oath with the mental reservation that they did not intend thereby to act against SLOVAKIA 117 the laws of God, the Church, and the legitimate ecclesiastical authorities. In that sense, several bishops in March and April of 1950 also took the oath of loyalty. In that year ( 1950) of crude pressure on and persecution of the Church, the Communists rapidly proceeded in their efforts completely to subjugate the Church . They imprisoned or interned on trumped-up charges, or without any charges, several bishops Uosef Beran, Stepan Trochta, Jan Vojtassak, Stanislav Zela, Stefan Barnas, Michal Buzalka, Pavel Gojdic, and Basil Hopko). In public trials in the national courts they condemned to long prison terms Bishops V ojtassak, Gojdic, Buzalka, and Zela. Several representatives of larger religious orders and prominent prelates of Czechoslovakia were also publicly tried and condemned during this reign of terror. Still others were imprisoned and tried secretly. In the same year all monasteries, convents, and houses of religious orders and congregations were suppressed, and their members were confined to concentration houses . The Greek Catholic diocese of Presov was fraudulently and forcibly taken over by Orthodox bishops .The legitimate bishops of the diocese, Pavel Gojdic and Basil Hopko, were imprisoned, and Greek Catholic priests, loyal to Rome, were dispersed throughout the country as manual workers. Meanwhile, the Communists intensively worked on priests who showed an inclination to collaborate with the regime. First they established the organization of so-called patriotic priests , which later changed its name to ''Peace Movement of the Catholic Priests .'' In the dioceses whose bishops were imprisoned they forced the elections of vicars capitular as heads of the dioceses. The remaining bishops were confined to their residences and were under the surveillance of government agents who controlled all the activities of ligitimate ordinaries. Priestcollaborators intruded into the administration of the dioceses as vicars general, chancellors, and similar high officials. Slavkovska hardly mentions these rude encroachments on the administration and the life of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. But she does try to justify all these cruel interferences of the Communist regime in the very structure of the Catholic Church and in the field of human rights of the Catholic clergy and people. In her evaluation, there was no persecution of the Church, only legitimate steps for eliminating political clericalism in Slovakia. She praises the anti-Church laws of 1949 because they granted adequate financial remuneration to the priests for 118 SLOVAKIA their work as state employees . Furthermore, she wantonly states that all these provisions were welcomed by the "lower clergy" and the Catholic people. Slavkovska does not realize, or does not want to admit, that the governmental mingling with the innermost Church affairs and the erection of the pro-Communist priestly organizations, established under government pressure and protected by it, brought about the grossest form of caesaropapism, incomparably more destructive to the Church than the purported political clericalism during the previous regimes. In her article Slavkovska does not go as far as to the late sixties, to the Dubcek era. As soon as the cruel pressure on the Church was lifted in 1968, the Catholics, led by their remaining bishops and priests loyal to the Church, publicly denounced the persecution of the past decades and demanded abolition of all the previous abuses against the Church. They were supported even by many high ranking Communists of that era (Ladislav Holdos, Daniel Okali, Erika Kadlecova, and others). They achieved the restoration of the Greek Catholic diocese of Presov, the only seemingly permanent correction of the anti-Church abuses of the early fifties. Unfortunately , the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968 , and Husak 's process of so-called normalization destroyed all other rights which the Church had regained during the short-lived period of the "Prague-Spring."  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 'Audi Alteram Partem': Eva Slavkovská, "Vzťah štátu k cirkvám v prvých rokoch výstavby socializmu na Slovensku" Description An account of the resource Theodoric J. Zubek Slovakia, Vol. 31 (No. 57), 1984 pp. 113-118 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zúbek, Teodorik J., 1914-1988 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Historickvý časopis, XXX, 2 (1982), 223-49 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1984 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7f3d57178064ccbd9b8bd1ad0e27fe50.pdf 3b95456ae0ac5fc7ae94b9895f63519f PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 3 The Slovak Word Abroad Gorazd Z V O ni C ky A man on a motorcycle cried out as he whizzed by a motorist driving a Mercedes Benz rather leisurely: "Do you know something about Lambretta ?" The elderly man at the wheel of the car stepped on the gas to show the cyclist that he, too, had power, power and speed to pass up the Lambretta! Later he slowed down, and soon the motorcycle came into view and before long was passing him again. The young man on the motorcycle waved his hand and cried out as he passed the car a second time; "Say, do you know anything about a Lambretta." The man in the car this time did not resume the chase, thinking it was no use to race with a speed demon. Soon afterwards he came upon the Lambretta and its occupant piled up by the side of the road. As the young man disengaged himself from his motorcycle, the man in the car stopped and yelled out: "See there, you young smart aleck, where did it get you to show off, anyway?" Whereupon the slightly shaken up young motorcyclist retorted: "Who was showing off? I was merely asking you if you know anything about a Lambretta to tell me how to stop it." The same can happen to an inexperienced speaker; he may know how to start but not how to stop. In our case a sheet of paper is the best brake in the world. One mu.st first stop to reflect and then write it down. To perceive the kernel of a theme, we must first of all touch upon a few peripheral points on the subject at hand. A person seldom stops to consider what a word means. We are so accustomed to speak and converse that we do not even think about a situation that might arise when we cannot even utter a single word. A mute can best evaluate the value of the gift the spoken word. I speak of a gift because the spoken word is, in a sense, par t of a dowry bequeathed to us by the Creator. Think for a moment what a joyful event it is in a family circle when �4 SLOVAKIA a child comes out with its first word, which is somehow an integral part of every being as he says for the first time, 'Papa,' or 'Mama.' These first intelligible sounds are not only a pleasant surprise for the child's parents who gave him life, but a vital expression of his very being. The first words are important enough to be registered in a family album and an occasion for a family treat or celebration. Everyday life employs the spoken word as a usual, easy and effective means of communicatio n. The spoken word introduces us to the outside world, and works either for good or evil, according to one's inner motives and purposes. The word is a manifestation of our being and thoughts. If human thoughts are good and proper, so will be their outward expression, according to the saying: "What is in the heart is on the tip of our tongue.'' And Holy Scripture notes: "Out of the fullness of the heart the mouth speaketh." Imagine what our life would be like if we were limited to sign language. How far could we advance in civilization and culture? What would be our future destiny as thinking beings? On the other hand, how unbearable life would become if words were misused for lying, chicanery, deceit and instigation, or for indulging the passions and evil desires instead of being put to good use in promoting peace, justice and harmony in society. The meaning of the spoken word, like the written word, has a profound effect and has infinite range. We are aware of the fact that the Slovak spoken word reaches us and our fellow countrymen via radio broadcasts, e. g. from the Vatican, Radio Free Europe and other radio stations. I want to emphasize the Vatican Broadcast in that it unquestionab ly exercises widespread influence in the spiritual life of our Slovak countrymen in their native homeland. Until recently, dozens of letters came from listeners who expressed thanks for every word, declaring that the talks they heard were highly informative, enlightening and a powerful shield to defend themselves against the incessant tempest of anti-religious propaganda in the schools, from the press and radio, on television, in meetings of workingmen's associations, in army barracks, and reams of mis- �SLOVAKIA 5 information in textbooks, etc. This is a vital factor in preserving truth and a sense of justice in a country where all the forces militate against what is just, what is right and truthful. For obvious reasons we cannot publicize these letters, but they indicate beyond a shadow of a doubt that they get the message despite many obstacles that are set up to prevent them from hearing the truth. Permit us to quote briefly from one of these letters that speaks for many: "You have no idea how eagerly we wait for your broadcast. We pass on the information to others who cannot listen. The spiritual message about the Christian way of life for the faithful who constitute the healthy kernel of our Slovak nation is like a falling rain on a desert in our land in which the official press is forever agitating and scandalous. During the recent lull in the anti-religious movement not even such prominent persons as Archbishop Necsey or Bishop Trochta were given the opportunity to express what was in their minds and hearts, as if they did not have anything worthwhile to say to their unseen television audience of millions of fellow countrymen." The written non-Slovak word that has as its subject the Slovak and his life in his native land, or abroad. whether in the original or as a translation, has exceedingly great value. For example, in English we find a series of publications that deal with Slovak themes: history, folklore, folk songs, science, sociology, and almost every phase of Slovak culture and art. Dr. Inovecky's books in Italian truthfully inform the Italian public about the situation of the Catholic Intelligentsia, youth, priests and nuns in Slovakia where they are subjected to atheistic attacks. Although defenseless, they must face a formidable and heavily armed foe who daily attacks them with a barrage of diabolical propaganda. Dr. :ourica, professor of political science at the University of Padua, in his works presents a true picture of our times in the light of historical analysis and perception with precision and conclusive proof, while contemporary Slovak historians in Slovakia under pressing orders from the Party (Communist) must twist, falsify, blacken and distort everything, particularly the events of the second world war and its aftermath. �6 SLOVAKIA A number of valuable works have been published, too, in German, Spanish, and French. For detailed information Professor Michael Lacko, S. J. edited a Slovak bibliography for the years from 1945 to 1965. This come off the press as the 7th volume of Slovak Studies under the auspices of the Slovak Institute (Cleveland-Rome). Works by the old and new generations of Slovak writers in exile have been simply overwhelming. As we all know, perhaps, the old emigrants from Slovakia left their native land mainly for economic reasons. They emigrated to find employment and to assure their future existence. Most of them came from villages where literary tastes usually had as yet not developed beyond the stage of the almanac and the prayerbook. This was much the same in their new environment where the prayerbook and almanac were read but with one notable exception: now they had their own Slovak newspapers. The new wave of emigrants, to which we belong (after World War II) was quite different; it was more idealistic and ideological, and without false pride, it may be said, too, that it was more educated. And therefore, this new generation of emigrants from Slovakia had more estethic and literary tastes, which soon necessitated the publication of books and the establishment of publishing centers to keep alive the fires of Slovak literary and spiritual life abroad. Alphabetically, we may list Buenos Aires, Chicago, Cleveland, Danville, Middletown, Pittsburgh and Scranton in Pennsylvania, Munich, New York, Passaic in New Jersey, Toronto in Canada, Valparaiso and the Slovak Franciscans; Whiting, Indiana, the home of the immortal Father Lach, a great patron of Slovak literature, and Winnipeg, Man., in Canada, where Culen published several noteworthy works. Rome, however, must be recognized for its primacy in the field of Slovak publications abroad, both because here is concentrated the largest single group of Slovak emigrant writers under the sponsorship of the SS. Cyril and Methodius Slovak Institute. To date, the number of editions here has totaled 142, in all more than 30,000 pages of the Slovak word in print. This amazing output of the Slovak press, considering the brief span of the existence of the Institute in Rome, as well as, bearing in mind what �SLOVAKIA 7 obstacles it had to face and overcome, and new difficulties that keep on coming in its way, it is truly a priceless contribution to the spiritual treasury of the Slovak nation. Add to this fact, the Hlasy z Rima monthly over a period of almost twenty years (5,000 pages of printed matter), and you have a tremendous accomplishment which, to borrow a Biblical phrase in our case, these have worked long and perseveringly like the Israelites of old who in rebuilding the Temple in Jerusalem worked with a tool in one hand and a weapon in the other to defend themselves against the enemy in the event of a sudden attack. Let us look at the contents and supplementary material of the Slovak word (written) abroad. Its primary and foremost inspiration is Slovakia and its people: the country, the nation, the history of the country and its people, state institutions, political movements and currents and economic conditions, then, too, the religious aspect and the situation of the people of faith, the activity of the Church and its spokesmen and leaders, Slovak philology, literary history and criticism, architecture, archeology, medicine, the arts, music, books, about Slovaks living abroad, philosophical handbooks, catechetical works, notably Bystrik's catechism, (Nova Cesta) homiletic sources for preachers of the Word of God in Slovak, especially the various revised editions of Sacred Scripture, liturgical texts and prayerbooks, biographies of heroic men, Christian meditations, and finally general works in prose and poetry. Obviously, this is a great treasure, a rich inheritance, an almost inexhaustible source of infinite variety that helps to keep alive the genuine spirit of the Slovak nation in its historic homeland, as well as far beyond its natural boundaries throughout all parts of the free world. Now it is easier to reply to the question: "Of what importance are our Slovak publications abroad?" At the very outset of our brief study, let us reflect upon the religious angle. It is no secret, neither an untruth, to declare that the regime now ruling Slovakia is not only unfriendly but inimical to religion, employing all of its machinery to destroy the religious life of the people after depriving them of every means of publication and communication to resist godless warfare upon their Faith. What little religious publication the regime tolerates is so negligible that it serves the state rather than the Church �8 SLOVAKIA or religion, as far the press is concerned. This applies to the Spolok sv . Vojtecha, which once was the chief source of religious instruction and religious literary publications for the common people, as well as for the intelligentsia, but at present its publishing activities in the religious program have been reduced almost to zero. Meanwhile, its resources are actually being misused in the planning of the Party system for abetting and supplementing its ideological struggle against religion all along the line. A liturgical renewal from which an intensification of the spiritual life was naturally expected was announced as necessary to those who believe in God. This, of course, went against the grain of an actively aggressive atheism. Permission for paper and printing for this purpose advanced at a snail's pace and virtually came to a standstill as government requisition failed to materialize. Quite surprisingly, but soon fully understood, was a motherly concern by the atheistic regime to preserve the Latin liturgy intact, it was fearful of the introduction of the vernacular because the language of the people would strengthen the position of the church. Meanwhile, the Slovak Institute of SS. Cyril and Methodius in Rome edited and published a complete Slovak-Latin Missal which, under the circumstances (the result of Divine Providence actually), the civil authorities in Slovakia could not refuse entry because that would have given them a bad image abroad. Thus, the liturgical movement gained momentum and reached all parishes and became at the same time a manifestation of the strong faith of the people and a source of spiritual nourishment. In Rome a Slovak missal appeared in the latest postconciliar form and is now in use in Slovak parishes outside Slovakia. This has not only activated a spiritual renewal among the Slovak faithful abroad but has assured the preservation of the Slovak language in various parts of the free world, which is indirectly a vital contribution to the entire Slovak nation. Last year, only because of pressure from abroad, an edition of new canons for the Mass was published in Slovakia. Our people in Slovakia were unable to obtain prayerbooks to strengthen them morally and spiritually in their everyday struggle for their temporal as well as for their �SLOVAKIA 9 ~piritual welfare. They, therefore, begged their brethren abroad not for bread but rather for prayerbooks that were denied them in their own native land. Their more fortunate brethren heeded their plea even though it required sacrifices beyond the call of duty . . . and for this the public activists in Slovakia ought to be grateful, too, because prayer contributes to public morality, to borrow a contemporary and timely phrase. Moreover, morality suffers a sharp decline where prayer ceases. The people who work most conscientously in our native country are certainly those who pray ... and, thank God, there are few exceptions, if any. If the rulers of our country were not blinded by their fanatical hatred of God and religious beliefs, we could suggest a helpful program, namely, to give the people more prayerbooks, assuring them that then the morale of the workers everywhere would improve considerably and the working standards would increase, too, because a vital religious faith is a source of action: it inevitably inspires an optimistic attitude and fosters initiative. Without these primary principles there cannot be spontaneous and fruitful productivity. Ideological atheism in practice spawns laziness, indifference, indolence, and exploitation, in fact, to put it bluntly, eventually it robs both the individual and society. For the above cited reasons the majority of Slovak tourists from abroad sought to bring into Slovakia, particularly during the year before the Soviet invasion of 1968, a generous supply of prayerbooks and religious literature. The spiritual hunger of the Slovak people, subjected to a planned scarcity of religious sources of the printed word, was satisfied temporarily, at least, by a welcome influx of books, which offered conclusive proof or evidence that there was a universal need for religious literature as the result of anti-religious policies of the governing regime. At the same time, it manifested beyond any doubt that the best part of the people understood the need and value of such books for their temporal and spiritual welfare. Karel Havlicek-Borovsky who said many obscene things elsewhere, did, however, express something nice about books as being "a universal school, a school for young and old, a school with many wise teachers." If he really meant 'good' books, he certainly deserves an A plus. �SLOVAKIA Dr. Montaigne consiqered books to be the best preparation for life's journey, and he felt pity for all who did not possess books. In our times, he would have felt sorry, too, for those who are forced to read books that are contrary to their way of sound thinking. Ruskin wrote that books are as necessary to man as wings for a bird. And in this respect the Slovak book abroad became practically the only means for a Christian training of our Slovak youth in their native homeland. The various catechisms for old and young, life stories of virtuous young men and women, reflections on various themes for the sophisticated, e. g., Hlinka's works (K sirsim obzorom -To wider horizons and Cesty-Highways) are rich sources from which all may benefit, both those who are being trained and the trainers themselves personally. In no way it is rash or a breach of confidence to statethat Marxism-Leninism, as we know it so far, has has not proved successful in the development or the advancement of man. While on a state visit to Hungary the late Khruschev said quite frankly in jest (but truthfully at any rate ) that Russian specialists were unable to train even a young ox, it was enough for the animal to start kicking, the Ukrainian politician said, and the socalled experts scattered in all directions. Particularly in the training of youth the communist system proved to be a failure, for which we have more evidence than is necessary to prove our point. If the communist (Marxist-Leninist) system accomplished something it has been one-sided and doubtful because it does not consider the whole person: it ignores his religious instincts and warps his moral nature. It knows only how to harness instincts and human resources to serve its own perverse purposes and designs. Unfortunately, this is not the place nor the time to dwell upon the moral condition of the Slovak youth today. I will leave the discussion to authorities on the subject and hope that they will devote more time to study the situation in depth and give a more factual and detailed report at some future date. Slovak editions abroad are a great help to our students in their own country. The well known 'scripts' of profes- �SLOVAKIA 11 sors-primarily in the theological schools-are far from complete, if for no other reason than that they are lacking in proper information on the subject and they ignore the development of reasoning and leave out the basic fundamentals of theological and philosophical truths. Theologians in the city of Bratislava have various handbooks at their disposal, even though concise, for teaching philosophy, theology, sociology and the Bible, both the Old and New Testament. Undoubtedly, many are acquainted with the works, "Posolstvo--Mission," and "Za svetlom-Towards the Light" by dedicated men like Msgr. Botek and Msgr. Vrablec. Authoritative handbooks, though lacking much in details, are still far superior to mere 'scripts.' Not even in the field of prose, simply literature, is our group of authors in exile out of step with the times . This fact was admitted in Slovakia when there was some freedom of speech, and when, for a short time several years ago, publications in the country were permitted without being subject to orders 'from above.' Dante's Inferno was translated about the same time both in and outside of Slovakia. In my opinion, in many ways, the translation in exile excelled the domestic edition. The translation and selections of Claudel's poetry in exile, too, are far better than that of the edition in Slovakia. It was not without ulterior motives, therefore, that Karol Strmen, author of the above mentioned translations, became the subject of a virulent attack in the domestic press of Slovakia. Hronsky's original novels and short stories, written and published in exile, were admitted for publication in his native homeland. Meciar's critical reviews of Kukucin's works, too, were permitted entry as a source of vital information about this Slovak novelist who lived in Argentina for many years. The Most quarterly and the Slovak v Amerike's Almanach somehow get into Slovakia and are circulated throughout the country. Slovak poems from abroad are copied and circulated, memorized and recited in closed circles. This, too, belongs to popular education, esthetics, literature, etc. as an answer to those who would deny �12 SLOVAKIA not only political and religious liberty but cultural freedom to the Slovak nation in its native homeland. A word about the meaning and mission of Slovak political literature abroad, particularly for these reasons: 1) In the free world alone can one express himself freely in behalf of the self-determination of the Slovak nation, and nations in the same predicament, or for freedom to manifest its will to control its own national destiny. 2) The truth can be spoken, written and proved in the free world alone as to the past history of the Slovak nation in the light of the facts and truth without fear of police interference and judicial reprisals. We are responsible for the destiny of our Slovak nation that cannot, at this time under the present circumstances, know the full truth of its past because the truth is hidden or falsified and distorted in behalf of the party in power. That is why the Slovak nation is thankful to God that beyond the reach of the politbureau events as they actually happen are factually reported and registered without any pressure from directives or threats from the Party meetings. These are the reasons why I recommend that we have a common center for our historic and political publications of our writers abroad, and no one can hold this against me, justly, that is. A common and mutual endeavor is our responsibility because history-life's teacher-must also be a teacher in our political life. 'I'he late Matus cernak, Karol Sidor, Dr. Frantisek Hrusovsky and Konstantin culen, as well as the living, namely, Professor Vojtech Bucko, Dr. Arved Grebert, Kristof Greiner, Dr. Ferdinand i'.>urcansky, Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum, Dr. Jozef Mikus, Dr. Jozef Pauco, Dr. Jan Rekem, Professor Frantisek Vnuk and many, many others in our Slovak life have made invaluable contributions to the Slovak nation's cause, and to the world in general, by their numerous efforts and achievements. All these will someday provide inexhaustible sources for those who will write the history of Slovakia and the Slovak nation without any bias or prejudice. The future will be concerned not only with historic events but with the truth about personalities who come LIBRARY �SLOVAKIA 13 to the fore in the re-creation of history as it actually happened. For example, the history of Hlinka or Tiso, and of their closest collaborators, and adversaries, too, can now be known only in the writings of authors in the free world because in their homeland a furious campaign to erase their names from history pages, a hate campaign to smear their names and to eliminate them as persons who in their time exercised profound influence. That must be adequately evaluated in Slovak history in the future. Personal biographical profiles sketched by the pens of Dr. Pauco, Bor and others in the free world will one day hold a place of honor in the national album of the great men in the history of the Slovak nation and its historic homeland of a thousand and more years. Finally, the meaning of the Slovak word, written, spoken, in exile, and somewhat exemphasized, perhaps, will one day be understood and properly evaluated in the future when the Slovaks will once again control their national destiny as a free nation in central Europe. The governing regime in Slovakia has unwittingly given public testimony of the intrinsic value of the Slovak word from abroad. The Postal Center 120 in Praha put a ban on Slovak periodicals and publications from abroad and has consistently returned or destroyed the Slovak printed word from the free world. The first document presented here is that of the postal administration addressed to the sender of a parcel of books. I submit it fully with the exception of the name of the publication and the date to prevent tracing the source of my information. It reads: Posta Praha 120. In Prague, date ... Dear Sir, Dear sirs, We inform you that your inclosed postal parcel contains, among other items, the following publication: .. . The entry and circulation of such publications is prohibited by a law on publication and information, given on the basis of Law 23, No. 8/ 1966 Sb., relating to periodicals, publications and other informational mediums according to Law No. 23, 127/1968, Sb. That is why these publications were forbidden postal delivery. Items not admitted for postal delivery fall under Par. 6, Art. 4 of the official regulation No. 240/1949, Sb. under postal laws for the welfare of the state. Greeting-Peace to the world. �14 SLOVAKIA The refusal is officially stamped: "Posta Praha 120". Instead of a signature, there is only the letter K. When such restrictions of freedom of expression are based upon so many laws or regulations, this campaign against the means of formation or information, the spiritual isolation of the people cannot be anything less than illegal legislation and legal spiritual homicide. The second document even more graphically illustrates opposition against religion, which, apparently to all intents and purposes, the state is developing in a legalistic form. It reads: Dissemination of information garnered from foreign publications. Letter and disposition of the Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Socialist Republic, N. MK, 4525/1971 of June 17. 1971. To all the centers of church and religious bodies in Slovakia. Through assorted channels a variety of foreign periodicals and publications dealing with religious and church problems have been brought into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, whose contents in many cases are biased and in conflict with the interests of our socialist state. Their evaluation has shown that they contain articles which untruthfully and rudely slander the CSSR. Future distribution or circulations of such materials, or any part thereof, is not permitted. This regulation also is in force in regards to the distribution or publication of certain informative instructions, etc., whether by internal religious organs, in official bulletins or in any form whatsoever. We warn that any activity that is contrary to the interest of socialist society is a misdemeanor, according to P. 5, Law No. 150/1969, Sb. We direct that you inform all branches subject to your authority of the contents of these instructions. K. Homola, Secretary General and Director for Church Affairs. This communique (signed by K. Homola) in general refers to "foreign" periodicals and publications, as if it avoided labeling them properly "Slovak," but which subsequently became clear because only these were returned by the postal outhorities with the words: "Non admis ... Not admitted ... " Later the explanation in French was added: "Returned. Violates Custom Regulations." Attempts to obtain official copies of the specific government regulations in order to comply with the law have been in vain. Non-admittance of publications from the outside world is now absolute and arbitrary. The returned publications with the official stamp of rejection attached have been filed in the archives of Slovak organizations �15 SLOVAKIA as real proofs and evidence for the future of the present spiritual enslavement of the people by the ruling regime for which the light of truth is obviously a much-feared scarecrow. The dialectics of the communist party defines everything as "biased" if it does not come off its own press, if it fails to idolize Marxism-Leninism, if it does not propagate the idea of the world revolution of the proletariat, etc. Of course, this type of "bias" is detrimentally opposed to the interests of a socialist state, namely the CSSR. Note that even 'internal church information and instructions from abroad' constitute misdemeanors if distributed (if they are not favorable to the spread of communism) because by the very fact they are not pro, they must be con-according to the borrowed Biblical phrase, "Who is not for me, is against me . . ." twisted to suit their own ends and purposes! Someone once observed that the burning of books furnishes light in darkness. We can surely applay this remark in the case of Slovak books arriving at postal centers in Czecho-Slovakia, particularly in Prague. Their fate may be that they are merely censored and confiscated, then returned to the sender, but more often consigned officially to be burned. Despite this, they continue to have their influence. The fear, in official circles of Czecho• Slovakia, of the Slovak word from abroad is clearly a case of a bad conscience. I conclude this review of past events with reference to a recent article in our press in Slovakia that labelled Slovak emigration as a dry, lifeless branch of the Slovak nation. How much or little truth there is in that arbitrary <;tatement an unprejudiced person can easily determine. lil THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA through its Ladies luud.liary, the "VCIELKY" (Bees), sponsors Slovak cultttrai displays. concerts, lectures, art exhibits, folk festjvals, social evenings, etc. Our aim is to have a "Hive" of our "V~ielky" in every large Slovak community. � SLOVAKIA 3 The Slovak Word Abroad Gorazd Z V O ni C ky A man on a motorcycle cried out as he whizzed by a motorist driving a Mercedes Benz rather leisurely: "Do you know something about Lambretta ?" The elderly man at the wheel of the car stepped on the gas to show the cyclist that he, too, had power, power and speed to pass up the Lambretta! Later he slowed down, and soon the motorcycle came into view and before long was passing him again. The young man on the motorcycle waved his hand and cried out as he passed the car a second time; "Say, do you know anything about a Lambretta." The man in the car this time did not resume the chase, thinking it was no use to race with a speed demon. Soon afterwards he came upon the Lambretta and its occupant piled up by the side of the road. As the young man disengaged himself from his motorcycle, the man in the car stopped and yelled out: "See there, you young smart aleck, where did it get you to show off, anyway?" Whereupon the slightly shaken up young motorcyclist retorted: "Who was showing off? I was merely asking you if you know anything about a Lambretta to tell me how to stop it." The same can happen to an inexperienced speaker; he may know how to start but not how to stop. In our case a sheet of paper is the best brake in the world. One mu.st first stop to reflect and then write it down. To perceive the kernel of a theme, we must first of all touch upon a few peripheral points on the subject at hand. A person seldom stops to consider what a word means. We are so accustomed to speak and converse that we do not even think about a situation that might arise when we cannot even utter a single word. A mute can best evaluate the value of the gift the spoken word. I speak of a gift because the spoken word is, in a sense, par t of a dowry bequeathed to us by the Creator. Think for a moment what a joyful event it is in a family circle when �4 SLOVAKIA a child comes out with its first word, which is somehow an integral part of every being as he says for the first time, 'Papa,' or 'Mama.' These first intelligible sounds are not only a pleasant surprise for the child's parents who gave him life, but a vital expression of his very being. The first words are important enough to be registered in a family album and an occasion for a family treat or celebration. Everyday life employs the spoken word as a usual, easy and effective means of communicatio n. The spoken word introduces us to the outside world, and works either for good or evil, according to one's inner motives and purposes. The word is a manifestation of our being and thoughts. If human thoughts are good and proper, so will be their outward expression, according to the saying: "What is in the heart is on the tip of our tongue.'' And Holy Scripture notes: "Out of the fullness of the heart the mouth speaketh." Imagine what our life would be like if we were limited to sign language. How far could we advance in civilization and culture? What would be our future destiny as thinking beings? On the other hand, how unbearable life would become if words were misused for lying, chicanery, deceit and instigation, or for indulging the passions and evil desires instead of being put to good use in promoting peace, justice and harmony in society. The meaning of the spoken word, like the written word, has a profound effect and has infinite range. We are aware of the fact that the Slovak spoken word reaches us and our fellow countrymen via radio broadcasts, e. g. from the Vatican, Radio Free Europe and other radio stations. I want to emphasize the Vatican Broadcast in that it unquestionab ly exercises widespread influence in the spiritual life of our Slovak countrymen in their native homeland. Until recently, dozens of letters came from listeners who expressed thanks for every word, declaring that the talks they heard were highly informative, enlightening and a powerful shield to defend themselves against the incessant tempest of anti-religious propaganda in the schools, from the press and radio, on television, in meetings of workingmen's associations, in army barracks, and reams of mis- �SLOVAKIA 5 information in textbooks, etc. This is a vital factor in preserving truth and a sense of justice in a country where all the forces militate against what is just, what is right and truthful. For obvious reasons we cannot publicize these letters, but they indicate beyond a shadow of a doubt that they get the message despite many obstacles that are set up to prevent them from hearing the truth. Permit us to quote briefly from one of these letters that speaks for many: "You have no idea how eagerly we wait for your broadcast. We pass on the information to others who cannot listen. The spiritual message about the Christian way of life for the faithful who constitute the healthy kernel of our Slovak nation is like a falling rain on a desert in our land in which the official press is forever agitating and scandalous. During the recent lull in the anti-religious movement not even such prominent persons as Archbishop Necsey or Bishop Trochta were given the opportunity to express what was in their minds and hearts, as if they did not have anything worthwhile to say to their unseen television audience of millions of fellow countrymen." The written non-Slovak word that has as its subject the Slovak and his life in his native land, or abroad. whether in the original or as a translation, has exceedingly great value. For example, in English we find a series of publications that deal with Slovak themes: history, folklore, folk songs, science, sociology, and almost every phase of Slovak culture and art. Dr. Inovecky's books in Italian truthfully inform the Italian public about the situation of the Catholic Intelligentsia, youth, priests and nuns in Slovakia where they are subjected to atheistic attacks. Although defenseless, they must face a formidable and heavily armed foe who daily attacks them with a barrage of diabolical propaganda. Dr. :ourica, professor of political science at the University of Padua, in his works presents a true picture of our times in the light of historical analysis and perception with precision and conclusive proof, while contemporary Slovak historians in Slovakia under pressing orders from the Party (Communist) must twist, falsify, blacken and distort everything, particularly the events of the second world war and its aftermath. �6 SLOVAKIA A number of valuable works have been published, too, in German, Spanish, and French. For detailed information Professor Michael Lacko, S. J. edited a Slovak bibliography for the years from 1945 to 1965. This come off the press as the 7th volume of Slovak Studies under the auspices of the Slovak Institute (Cleveland-Rome). Works by the old and new generations of Slovak writers in exile have been simply overwhelming. As we all know, perhaps, the old emigrants from Slovakia left their native land mainly for economic reasons. They emigrated to find employment and to assure their future existence. Most of them came from villages where literary tastes usually had as yet not developed beyond the stage of the almanac and the prayerbook. This was much the same in their new environment where the prayerbook and almanac were read but with one notable exception: now they had their own Slovak newspapers. The new wave of emigrants, to which we belong (after World War II) was quite different; it was more idealistic and ideological, and without false pride, it may be said, too, that it was more educated. And therefore, this new generation of emigrants from Slovakia had more estethic and literary tastes, which soon necessitated the publication of books and the establishment of publishing centers to keep alive the fires of Slovak literary and spiritual life abroad. Alphabetically, we may list Buenos Aires, Chicago, Cleveland, Danville, Middletown, Pittsburgh and Scranton in Pennsylvania, Munich, New York, Passaic in New Jersey, Toronto in Canada, Valparaiso and the Slovak Franciscans; Whiting, Indiana, the home of the immortal Father Lach, a great patron of Slovak literature, and Winnipeg, Man., in Canada, where Culen published several noteworthy works. Rome, however, must be recognized for its primacy in the field of Slovak publications abroad, both because here is concentrated the largest single group of Slovak emigrant writers under the sponsorship of the SS. Cyril and Methodius Slovak Institute. To date, the number of editions here has totaled 142, in all more than 30,000 pages of the Slovak word in print. This amazing output of the Slovak press, considering the brief span of the existence of the Institute in Rome, as well as, bearing in mind what �SLOVAKIA 7 obstacles it had to face and overcome, and new difficulties that keep on coming in its way, it is truly a priceless contribution to the spiritual treasury of the Slovak nation. Add to this fact, the Hlasy z Rima monthly over a period of almost twenty years (5,000 pages of printed matter), and you have a tremendous accomplishment which, to borrow a Biblical phrase in our case, these have worked long and perseveringly like the Israelites of old who in rebuilding the Temple in Jerusalem worked with a tool in one hand and a weapon in the other to defend themselves against the enemy in the event of a sudden attack. Let us look at the contents and supplementary material of the Slovak word (written) abroad. Its primary and foremost inspiration is Slovakia and its people: the country, the nation, the history of the country and its people, state institutions, political movements and currents and economic conditions, then, too, the religious aspect and the situation of the people of faith, the activity of the Church and its spokesmen and leaders, Slovak philology, literary history and criticism, architecture, archeology, medicine, the arts, music, books, about Slovaks living abroad, philosophical handbooks, catechetical works, notably Bystrik's catechism, (Nova Cesta) homiletic sources for preachers of the Word of God in Slovak, especially the various revised editions of Sacred Scripture, liturgical texts and prayerbooks, biographies of heroic men, Christian meditations, and finally general works in prose and poetry. Obviously, this is a great treasure, a rich inheritance, an almost inexhaustible source of infinite variety that helps to keep alive the genuine spirit of the Slovak nation in its historic homeland, as well as far beyond its natural boundaries throughout all parts of the free world. Now it is easier to reply to the question: "Of what importance are our Slovak publications abroad?" At the very outset of our brief study, let us reflect upon the religious angle. It is no secret, neither an untruth, to declare that the regime now ruling Slovakia is not only unfriendly but inimical to religion, employing all of its machinery to destroy the religious life of the people after depriving them of every means of publication and communication to resist godless warfare upon their Faith. What little religious publication the regime tolerates is so negligible that it serves the state rather than the Church �8 SLOVAKIA or religion, as far the press is concerned. This applies to the Spolok sv . Vojtecha, which once was the chief source of religious instruction and religious literary publications for the common people, as well as for the intelligentsia, but at present its publishing activities in the religious program have been reduced almost to zero. Meanwhile, its resources are actually being misused in the planning of the Party system for abetting and supplementing its ideological struggle against religion all along the line. A liturgical renewal from which an intensification of the spiritual life was naturally expected was announced as necessary to those who believe in God. This, of course, went against the grain of an actively aggressive atheism. Permission for paper and printing for this purpose advanced at a snail's pace and virtually came to a standstill as government requisition failed to materialize. Quite surprisingly, but soon fully understood, was a motherly concern by the atheistic regime to preserve the Latin liturgy intact, it was fearful of the introduction of the vernacular because the language of the people would strengthen the position of the church. Meanwhile, the Slovak Institute of SS. Cyril and Methodius in Rome edited and published a complete Slovak-Latin Missal which, under the circumstances (the result of Divine Providence actually), the civil authorities in Slovakia could not refuse entry because that would have given them a bad image abroad. Thus, the liturgical movement gained momentum and reached all parishes and became at the same time a manifestation of the strong faith of the people and a source of spiritual nourishment. In Rome a Slovak missal appeared in the latest postconciliar form and is now in use in Slovak parishes outside Slovakia. This has not only activated a spiritual renewal among the Slovak faithful abroad but has assured the preservation of the Slovak language in various parts of the free world, which is indirectly a vital contribution to the entire Slovak nation. Last year, only because of pressure from abroad, an edition of new canons for the Mass was published in Slovakia. Our people in Slovakia were unable to obtain prayerbooks to strengthen them morally and spiritually in their everyday struggle for their temporal as well as for their �SLOVAKIA 9 ~piritual welfare. They, therefore, begged their brethren abroad not for bread but rather for prayerbooks that were denied them in their own native land. Their more fortunate brethren heeded their plea even though it required sacrifices beyond the call of duty . . . and for this the public activists in Slovakia ought to be grateful, too, because prayer contributes to public morality, to borrow a contemporary and timely phrase. Moreover, morality suffers a sharp decline where prayer ceases. The people who work most conscientously in our native country are certainly those who pray ... and, thank God, there are few exceptions, if any. If the rulers of our country were not blinded by their fanatical hatred of God and religious beliefs, we could suggest a helpful program, namely, to give the people more prayerbooks, assuring them that then the morale of the workers everywhere would improve considerably and the working standards would increase, too, because a vital religious faith is a source of action: it inevitably inspires an optimistic attitude and fosters initiative. Without these primary principles there cannot be spontaneous and fruitful productivity. Ideological atheism in practice spawns laziness, indifference, indolence, and exploitation, in fact, to put it bluntly, eventually it robs both the individual and society. For the above cited reasons the majority of Slovak tourists from abroad sought to bring into Slovakia, particularly during the year before the Soviet invasion of 1968, a generous supply of prayerbooks and religious literature. The spiritual hunger of the Slovak people, subjected to a planned scarcity of religious sources of the printed word, was satisfied temporarily, at least, by a welcome influx of books, which offered conclusive proof or evidence that there was a universal need for religious literature as the result of anti-religious policies of the governing regime. At the same time, it manifested beyond any doubt that the best part of the people understood the need and value of such books for their temporal and spiritual welfare. Karel Havlicek-Borovsky who said many obscene things elsewhere, did, however, express something nice about books as being "a universal school, a school for young and old, a school with many wise teachers." If he really meant 'good' books, he certainly deserves an A plus. �SLOVAKIA Dr. Montaigne consiqered books to be the best preparation for life's journey, and he felt pity for all who did not possess books. In our times, he would have felt sorry, too, for those who are forced to read books that are contrary to their way of sound thinking. Ruskin wrote that books are as necessary to man as wings for a bird. And in this respect the Slovak book abroad became practically the only means for a Christian training of our Slovak youth in their native homeland. The various catechisms for old and young, life stories of virtuous young men and women, reflections on various themes for the sophisticated, e. g., Hlinka's works (K sirsim obzorom -To wider horizons and Cesty-Highways) are rich sources from which all may benefit, both those who are being trained and the trainers themselves personally. In no way it is rash or a breach of confidence to statethat Marxism-Leninism, as we know it so far, has has not proved successful in the development or the advancement of man. While on a state visit to Hungary the late Khruschev said quite frankly in jest (but truthfully at any rate ) that Russian specialists were unable to train even a young ox, it was enough for the animal to start kicking, the Ukrainian politician said, and the socalled experts scattered in all directions. Particularly in the training of youth the communist system proved to be a failure, for which we have more evidence than is necessary to prove our point. If the communist (Marxist-Leninist) system accomplished something it has been one-sided and doubtful because it does not consider the whole person: it ignores his religious instincts and warps his moral nature. It knows only how to harness instincts and human resources to serve its own perverse purposes and designs. Unfortunately, this is not the place nor the time to dwell upon the moral condition of the Slovak youth today. I will leave the discussion to authorities on the subject and hope that they will devote more time to study the situation in depth and give a more factual and detailed report at some future date. Slovak editions abroad are a great help to our students in their own country. The well known 'scripts' of profes- �SLOVAKIA 11 sors-primarily in the theological schools-are far from complete, if for no other reason than that they are lacking in proper information on the subject and they ignore the development of reasoning and leave out the basic fundamentals of theological and philosophical truths. Theologians in the city of Bratislava have various handbooks at their disposal, even though concise, for teaching philosophy, theology, sociology and the Bible, both the Old and New Testament. Undoubtedly, many are acquainted with the works, "Posolstvo--Mission," and "Za svetlom-Towards the Light" by dedicated men like Msgr. Botek and Msgr. Vrablec. Authoritative handbooks, though lacking much in details, are still far superior to mere 'scripts.' Not even in the field of prose, simply literature, is our group of authors in exile out of step with the times . This fact was admitted in Slovakia when there was some freedom of speech, and when, for a short time several years ago, publications in the country were permitted without being subject to orders 'from above.' Dante's Inferno was translated about the same time both in and outside of Slovakia. In my opinion, in many ways, the translation in exile excelled the domestic edition. The translation and selections of Claudel's poetry in exile, too, are far better than that of the edition in Slovakia. It was not without ulterior motives, therefore, that Karol Strmen, author of the above mentioned translations, became the subject of a virulent attack in the domestic press of Slovakia. Hronsky's original novels and short stories, written and published in exile, were admitted for publication in his native homeland. Meciar's critical reviews of Kukucin's works, too, were permitted entry as a source of vital information about this Slovak novelist who lived in Argentina for many years. The Most quarterly and the Slovak v Amerike's Almanach somehow get into Slovakia and are circulated throughout the country. Slovak poems from abroad are copied and circulated, memorized and recited in closed circles. This, too, belongs to popular education, esthetics, literature, etc. as an answer to those who would deny �12 SLOVAKIA not only political and religious liberty but cultural freedom to the Slovak nation in its native homeland. A word about the meaning and mission of Slovak political literature abroad, particularly for these reasons: 1) In the free world alone can one express himself freely in behalf of the self-determination of the Slovak nation, and nations in the same predicament, or for freedom to manifest its will to control its own national destiny. 2) The truth can be spoken, written and proved in the free world alone as to the past history of the Slovak nation in the light of the facts and truth without fear of police interference and judicial reprisals. We are responsible for the destiny of our Slovak nation that cannot, at this time under the present circumstances, know the full truth of its past because the truth is hidden or falsified and distorted in behalf of the party in power. That is why the Slovak nation is thankful to God that beyond the reach of the politbureau events as they actually happen are factually reported and registered without any pressure from directives or threats from the Party meetings. These are the reasons why I recommend that we have a common center for our historic and political publications of our writers abroad, and no one can hold this against me, justly, that is. A common and mutual endeavor is our responsibility because history-life's teacher-must also be a teacher in our political life. 'I'he late Matus cernak, Karol Sidor, Dr. Frantisek Hrusovsky and Konstantin culen, as well as the living, namely, Professor Vojtech Bucko, Dr. Arved Grebert, Kristof Greiner, Dr. Ferdinand i'.>urcansky, Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum, Dr. Jozef Mikus, Dr. Jozef Pauco, Dr. Jan Rekem, Professor Frantisek Vnuk and many, many others in our Slovak life have made invaluable contributions to the Slovak nation's cause, and to the world in general, by their numerous efforts and achievements. All these will someday provide inexhaustible sources for those who will write the history of Slovakia and the Slovak nation without any bias or prejudice. The future will be concerned not only with historic events but with the truth about personalities who come LIBRARY �SLOVAKIA 13 to the fore in the re-creation of history as it actually happened. For example, the history of Hlinka or Tiso, and of their closest collaborators, and adversaries, too, can now be known only in the writings of authors in the free world because in their homeland a furious campaign to erase their names from history pages, a hate campaign to smear their names and to eliminate them as persons who in their time exercised profound influence. That must be adequately evaluated in Slovak history in the future. Personal biographical profiles sketched by the pens of Dr. Pauco, Bor and others in the free world will one day hold a place of honor in the national album of the great men in the history of the Slovak nation and its historic homeland of a thousand and more years. Finally, the meaning of the Slovak word, written, spoken, in exile, and somewhat exemphasized, perhaps, will one day be understood and properly evaluated in the future when the Slovaks will once again control their national destiny as a free nation in central Europe. The governing regime in Slovakia has unwittingly given public testimony of the intrinsic value of the Slovak word from abroad. The Postal Center 120 in Praha put a ban on Slovak periodicals and publications from abroad and has consistently returned or destroyed the Slovak printed word from the free world. The first document presented here is that of the postal administration addressed to the sender of a parcel of books. I submit it fully with the exception of the name of the publication and the date to prevent tracing the source of my information. It reads: Posta Praha 120. In Prague, date ... Dear Sir, Dear sirs, We inform you that your inclosed postal parcel contains, among other items, the following publication: .. . The entry and circulation of such publications is prohibited by a law on publication and information, given on the basis of Law 23, No. 8/ 1966 Sb., relating to periodicals, publications and other informational mediums according to Law No. 23, 127/1968, Sb. That is why these publications were forbidden postal delivery. Items not admitted for postal delivery fall under Par. 6, Art. 4 of the official regulation No. 240/1949, Sb. under postal laws for the welfare of the state. Greeting-Peace to the world. �14 SLOVAKIA The refusal is officially stamped: "Posta Praha 120". Instead of a signature, there is only the letter K. When such restrictions of freedom of expression are based upon so many laws or regulations, this campaign against the means of formation or information, the spiritual isolation of the people cannot be anything less than illegal legislation and legal spiritual homicide. The second document even more graphically illustrates opposition against religion, which, apparently to all intents and purposes, the state is developing in a legalistic form. It reads: Dissemination of information garnered from foreign publications. Letter and disposition of the Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Socialist Republic, N. MK, 4525/1971 of June 17. 1971. To all the centers of church and religious bodies in Slovakia. Through assorted channels a variety of foreign periodicals and publications dealing with religious and church problems have been brought into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, whose contents in many cases are biased and in conflict with the interests of our socialist state. Their evaluation has shown that they contain articles which untruthfully and rudely slander the CSSR. Future distribution or circulations of such materials, or any part thereof, is not permitted. This regulation also is in force in regards to the distribution or publication of certain informative instructions, etc., whether by internal religious organs, in official bulletins or in any form whatsoever. We warn that any activity that is contrary to the interest of socialist society is a misdemeanor, according to P. 5, Law No. 150/1969, Sb. We direct that you inform all branches subject to your authority of the contents of these instructions. K. Homola, Secretary General and Director for Church Affairs. This communique (signed by K. Homola) in general refers to "foreign" periodicals and publications, as if it avoided labeling them properly "Slovak," but which subsequently became clear because only these were returned by the postal outhorities with the words: "Non admis ... Not admitted ... " Later the explanation in French was added: "Returned. Violates Custom Regulations." Attempts to obtain official copies of the specific government regulations in order to comply with the law have been in vain. Non-admittance of publications from the outside world is now absolute and arbitrary. The returned publications with the official stamp of rejection attached have been filed in the archives of Slovak organizations �15 SLOVAKIA as real proofs and evidence for the future of the present spiritual enslavement of the people by the ruling regime for which the light of truth is obviously a much-feared scarecrow. The dialectics of the communist party defines everything as "biased" if it does not come off its own press, if it fails to idolize Marxism-Leninism, if it does not propagate the idea of the world revolution of the proletariat, etc. Of course, this type of "bias" is detrimentally opposed to the interests of a socialist state, namely the CSSR. Note that even 'internal church information and instructions from abroad' constitute misdemeanors if distributed (if they are not favorable to the spread of communism) because by the very fact they are not pro, they must be con-according to the borrowed Biblical phrase, "Who is not for me, is against me . . ." twisted to suit their own ends and purposes! Someone once observed that the burning of books furnishes light in darkness. We can surely applay this remark in the case of Slovak books arriving at postal centers in Czecho-Slovakia, particularly in Prague. Their fate may be that they are merely censored and confiscated, then returned to the sender, but more often consigned officially to be burned. Despite this, they continue to have their influence. The fear, in official circles of Czecho• Slovakia, of the Slovak word from abroad is clearly a case of a bad conscience. I conclude this review of past events with reference to a recent article in our press in Slovakia that labelled Slovak emigration as a dry, lifeless branch of the Slovak nation. How much or little truth there is in that arbitrary <;tatement an unprejudiced person can easily determine. lil THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA through its Ladies luud.liary, the "VCIELKY" (Bees), sponsors Slovak cultttrai displays. concerts, lectures, art exhibits, folk festjvals, social evenings, etc. Our aim is to have a "Hive" of our "V~ielky" in every large Slovak community. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1973, Vol. 23 Description An account of the resource Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 3 The Slovak Word Abroad Gorazd Z V O ni C ky A man on a motorcycle cried out as he whizzed by a motorist driving a Mercedes Benz rather leisurely: "Do you know something about Lambretta ?" The elderly man at the wheel of the car stepped on the gas to show the cyclist that he, too, had power, power and speed to pass up the Lambretta! Later he slowed down, and soon the motorcycle came into view and before long was passing him again. The young man on the motorcycle waved his hand and cried out as he passed the car a second time; "Say, do you know anything about a Lambretta." The man in the car this time did not resume the chase, thinking it was no use to race with a speed demon. Soon afterwards he came upon the Lambretta and its occupant piled up by the side of the road. As the young man disengaged himself from his motorcycle, the man in the car stopped and yelled out: "See there, you young smart aleck, where did it get you to show off, anyway?" Whereupon the slightly shaken up young motorcyclist retorted: "Who was showing off? I was merely asking you if you know anything about a Lambretta to tell me how to stop it." The same can happen to an inexperienced speaker; he may know how to start but not how to stop. In our case a sheet of paper is the best brake in the world. One mu.st first stop to reflect and then write it down. To perceive the kernel of a theme, we must first of all touch upon a few peripheral points on the subject at hand. A person seldom stops to consider what a word means. We are so accustomed to speak and converse that we do not even think about a situation that might arise when we cannot even utter a single word. A mute can best evaluate the value of the gift the spoken word. I speak of a gift because the spoken word is, in a sense, par t of a dowry bequeathed to us by the Creator. Think for a moment what a joyful event it is in a family circle when 4 SLOVAKIA a child comes out with its first word, which is somehow an integral part of every being as he says for the first time, 'Papa,' or 'Mama.' These first intelligible sounds are not only a pleasant surprise for the child's parents who gave him life, but a vital expression of his very being. The first words are important enough to be registered in a family album and an occasion for a family treat or celebration. Everyday life employs the spoken word as a usual, easy and effective means of communicatio n. The spoken word introduces us to the outside world, and works either for good or evil, according to one's inner motives and purposes. The word is a manifestation of our being and thoughts. If human thoughts are good and proper, so will be their outward expression, according to the saying: "What is in the heart is on the tip of our tongue.'' And Holy Scripture notes: "Out of the fullness of the heart the mouth speaketh." Imagine what our life would be like if we were limited to sign language. How far could we advance in civilization and culture? What would be our future destiny as thinking beings? On the other hand, how unbearable life would become if words were misused for lying, chicanery, deceit and instigation, or for indulging the passions and evil desires instead of being put to good use in promoting peace, justice and harmony in society. The meaning of the spoken word, like the written word, has a profound effect and has infinite range. We are aware of the fact that the Slovak spoken word reaches us and our fellow countrymen via radio broadcasts, e. g. from the Vatican, Radio Free Europe and other radio stations. I want to emphasize the Vatican Broadcast in that it unquestionab ly exercises widespread influence in the spiritual life of our Slovak countrymen in their native homeland. Until recently, dozens of letters came from listeners who expressed thanks for every word, declaring that the talks they heard were highly informative, enlightening and a powerful shield to defend themselves against the incessant tempest of anti-religious propaganda in the schools, from the press and radio, on television, in meetings of workingmen's associations, in army barracks, and reams of mis- SLOVAKIA 5 information in textbooks, etc. This is a vital factor in preserving truth and a sense of justice in a country where all the forces militate against what is just, what is right and truthful. For obvious reasons we cannot publicize these letters, but they indicate beyond a shadow of a doubt that they get the message despite many obstacles that are set up to prevent them from hearing the truth. Permit us to quote briefly from one of these letters that speaks for many: "You have no idea how eagerly we wait for your broadcast. We pass on the information to others who cannot listen. The spiritual message about the Christian way of life for the faithful who constitute the healthy kernel of our Slovak nation is like a falling rain on a desert in our land in which the official press is forever agitating and scandalous. During the recent lull in the anti-religious movement not even such prominent persons as Archbishop Necsey or Bishop Trochta were given the opportunity to express what was in their minds and hearts, as if they did not have anything worthwhile to say to their unseen television audience of millions of fellow countrymen." The written non-Slovak word that has as its subject the Slovak and his life in his native land, or abroad. whether in the original or as a translation, has exceedingly great value. For example, in English we find a series of publications that deal with Slovak themes: history, folklore, folk songs, science, sociology, and almost every phase of Slovak culture and art. Dr. Inovecky's books in Italian truthfully inform the Italian public about the situation of the Catholic Intelligentsia, youth, priests and nuns in Slovakia where they are subjected to atheistic attacks. Although defenseless, they must face a formidable and heavily armed foe who daily attacks them with a barrage of diabolical propaganda. Dr. :ourica, professor of political science at the University of Padua, in his works presents a true picture of our times in the light of historical analysis and perception with precision and conclusive proof, while contemporary Slovak historians in Slovakia under pressing orders from the Party (Communist) must twist, falsify, blacken and distort everything, particularly the events of the second world war and its aftermath. 6 SLOVAKIA A number of valuable works have been published, too, in German, Spanish, and French. For detailed information Professor Michael Lacko, S. J. edited a Slovak bibliography for the years from 1945 to 1965. This come off the press as the 7th volume of Slovak Studies under the auspices of the Slovak Institute (Cleveland-Rome). Works by the old and new generations of Slovak writers in exile have been simply overwhelming. As we all know, perhaps, the old emigrants from Slovakia left their native land mainly for economic reasons. They emigrated to find employment and to assure their future existence. Most of them came from villages where literary tastes usually had as yet not developed beyond the stage of the almanac and the prayerbook. This was much the same in their new environment where the prayerbook and almanac were read but with one notable exception: now they had their own Slovak newspapers. The new wave of emigrants, to which we belong (after World War II) was quite different; it was more idealistic and ideological, and without false pride, it may be said, too, that it was more educated. And therefore, this new generation of emigrants from Slovakia had more estethic and literary tastes, which soon necessitated the publication of books and the establishment of publishing centers to keep alive the fires of Slovak literary and spiritual life abroad. Alphabetically, we may list Buenos Aires, Chicago, Cleveland, Danville, Middletown, Pittsburgh and Scranton in Pennsylvania, Munich, New York, Passaic in New Jersey, Toronto in Canada, Valparaiso and the Slovak Franciscans; Whiting, Indiana, the home of the immortal Father Lach, a great patron of Slovak literature, and Winnipeg, Man., in Canada, where Culen published several noteworthy works. Rome, however, must be recognized for its primacy in the field of Slovak publications abroad, both because here is concentrated the largest single group of Slovak emigrant writers under the sponsorship of the SS. Cyril and Methodius Slovak Institute. To date, the number of editions here has totaled 142, in all more than 30,000 pages of the Slovak word in print. This amazing output of the Slovak press, considering the brief span of the existence of the Institute in Rome, as well as, bearing in mind what SLOVAKIA 7 obstacles it had to face and overcome, and new difficulties that keep on coming in its way, it is truly a priceless contribution to the spiritual treasury of the Slovak nation. Add to this fact, the Hlasy z Rima monthly over a period of almost twenty years (5,000 pages of printed matter), and you have a tremendous accomplishment which, to borrow a Biblical phrase in our case, these have worked long and perseveringly like the Israelites of old who in rebuilding the Temple in Jerusalem worked with a tool in one hand and a weapon in the other to defend themselves against the enemy in the event of a sudden attack. Let us look at the contents and supplementary material of the Slovak word (written) abroad. Its primary and foremost inspiration is Slovakia and its people: the country, the nation, the history of the country and its people, state institutions, political movements and currents and economic conditions, then, too, the religious aspect and the situation of the people of faith, the activity of the Church and its spokesmen and leaders, Slovak philology, literary history and criticism, architecture, archeology, medicine, the arts, music, books, about Slovaks living abroad, philosophical handbooks, catechetical works, notably Bystrik's catechism, (Nova Cesta) homiletic sources for preachers of the Word of God in Slovak, especially the various revised editions of Sacred Scripture, liturgical texts and prayerbooks, biographies of heroic men, Christian meditations, and finally general works in prose and poetry. Obviously, this is a great treasure, a rich inheritance, an almost inexhaustible source of infinite variety that helps to keep alive the genuine spirit of the Slovak nation in its historic homeland, as well as far beyond its natural boundaries throughout all parts of the free world. Now it is easier to reply to the question: "Of what importance are our Slovak publications abroad?" At the very outset of our brief study, let us reflect upon the religious angle. It is no secret, neither an untruth, to declare that the regime now ruling Slovakia is not only unfriendly but inimical to religion, employing all of its machinery to destroy the religious life of the people after depriving them of every means of publication and communication to resist godless warfare upon their Faith. What little religious publication the regime tolerates is so negligible that it serves the state rather than the Church 8 SLOVAKIA or religion, as far the press is concerned. This applies to the Spolok sv . Vojtecha, which once was the chief source of religious instruction and religious literary publications for the common people, as well as for the intelligentsia, but at present its publishing activities in the religious program have been reduced almost to zero. Meanwhile, its resources are actually being misused in the planning of the Party system for abetting and supplementing its ideological struggle against religion all along the line. A liturgical renewal from which an intensification of the spiritual life was naturally expected was announced as necessary to those who believe in God. This, of course, went against the grain of an actively aggressive atheism. Permission for paper and printing for this purpose advanced at a snail's pace and virtually came to a standstill as government requisition failed to materialize. Quite surprisingly, but soon fully understood, was a motherly concern by the atheistic regime to preserve the Latin liturgy intact, it was fearful of the introduction of the vernacular because the language of the people would strengthen the position of the church. Meanwhile, the Slovak Institute of SS. Cyril and Methodius in Rome edited and published a complete Slovak-Latin Missal which, under the circumstances (the result of Divine Providence actually), the civil authorities in Slovakia could not refuse entry because that would have given them a bad image abroad. Thus, the liturgical movement gained momentum and reached all parishes and became at the same time a manifestation of the strong faith of the people and a source of spiritual nourishment. In Rome a Slovak missal appeared in the latest postconciliar form and is now in use in Slovak parishes outside Slovakia. This has not only activated a spiritual renewal among the Slovak faithful abroad but has assured the preservation of the Slovak language in various parts of the free world, which is indirectly a vital contribution to the entire Slovak nation. Last year, only because of pressure from abroad, an edition of new canons for the Mass was published in Slovakia. Our people in Slovakia were unable to obtain prayerbooks to strengthen them morally and spiritually in their everyday struggle for their temporal as well as for their SLOVAKIA 9 ~piritual welfare. They, therefore, begged their brethren abroad not for bread but rather for prayerbooks that were denied them in their own native land. Their more fortunate brethren heeded their plea even though it required sacrifices beyond the call of duty . . . and for this the public activists in Slovakia ought to be grateful, too, because prayer contributes to public morality, to borrow a contemporary and timely phrase. Moreover, morality suffers a sharp decline where prayer ceases. The people who work most conscientously in our native country are certainly those who pray ... and, thank God, there are few exceptions, if any. If the rulers of our country were not blinded by their fanatical hatred of God and religious beliefs, we could suggest a helpful program, namely, to give the people more prayerbooks, assuring them that then the morale of the workers everywhere would improve considerably and the working standards would increase, too, because a vital religious faith is a source of action: it inevitably inspires an optimistic attitude and fosters initiative. Without these primary principles there cannot be spontaneous and fruitful productivity. Ideological atheism in practice spawns laziness, indifference, indolence, and exploitation, in fact, to put it bluntly, eventually it robs both the individual and society. For the above cited reasons the majority of Slovak tourists from abroad sought to bring into Slovakia, particularly during the year before the Soviet invasion of 1968, a generous supply of prayerbooks and religious literature. The spiritual hunger of the Slovak people, subjected to a planned scarcity of religious sources of the printed word, was satisfied temporarily, at least, by a welcome influx of books, which offered conclusive proof or evidence that there was a universal need for religious literature as the result of anti-religious policies of the governing regime. At the same time, it manifested beyond any doubt that the best part of the people understood the need and value of such books for their temporal and spiritual welfare. Karel Havlicek-Borovsky who said many obscene things elsewhere, did, however, express something nice about books as being "a universal school, a school for young and old, a school with many wise teachers." If he really meant 'good' books, he certainly deserves an A plus. SLOVAKIA Dr. Montaigne consiqered books to be the best preparation for life's journey, and he felt pity for all who did not possess books. In our times, he would have felt sorry, too, for those who are forced to read books that are contrary to their way of sound thinking. Ruskin wrote that books are as necessary to man as wings for a bird. And in this respect the Slovak book abroad became practically the only means for a Christian training of our Slovak youth in their native homeland. The various catechisms for old and young, life stories of virtuous young men and women, reflections on various themes for the sophisticated, e. g., Hlinka's works (K sirsim obzorom -To wider horizons and Cesty-Highways) are rich sources from which all may benefit, both those who are being trained and the trainers themselves personally. In no way it is rash or a breach of confidence to statethat Marxism-Leninism, as we know it so far, has has not proved successful in the development or the advancement of man. While on a state visit to Hungary the late Khruschev said quite frankly in jest (but truthfully at any rate ) that Russian specialists were unable to train even a young ox, it was enough for the animal to start kicking, the Ukrainian politician said, and the socalled experts scattered in all directions. Particularly in the training of youth the communist system proved to be a failure, for which we have more evidence than is necessary to prove our point. If the communist (Marxist-Leninist) system accomplished something it has been one-sided and doubtful because it does not consider the whole person: it ignores his religious instincts and warps his moral nature. It knows only how to harness instincts and human resources to serve its own perverse purposes and designs. Unfortunately, this is not the place nor the time to dwell upon the moral condition of the Slovak youth today. I will leave the discussion to authorities on the subject and hope that they will devote more time to study the situation in depth and give a more factual and detailed report at some future date. Slovak editions abroad are a great help to our students in their own country. The well known 'scripts' of profes- SLOVAKIA 11 sors-primarily in the theological schools-are far from complete, if for no other reason than that they are lacking in proper information on the subject and they ignore the development of reasoning and leave out the basic fundamentals of theological and philosophical truths. Theologians in the city of Bratislava have various handbooks at their disposal, even though concise, for teaching philosophy, theology, sociology and the Bible, both the Old and New Testament. Undoubtedly, many are acquainted with the works, "Posolstvo--Mission," and "Za svetlom-Towards the Light" by dedicated men like Msgr. Botek and Msgr. Vrablec. Authoritative handbooks, though lacking much in details, are still far superior to mere 'scripts.' Not even in the field of prose, simply literature, is our group of authors in exile out of step with the times . This fact was admitted in Slovakia when there was some freedom of speech, and when, for a short time several years ago, publications in the country were permitted without being subject to orders 'from above.' Dante's Inferno was translated about the same time both in and outside of Slovakia. In my opinion, in many ways, the translation in exile excelled the domestic edition. The translation and selections of Claudel's poetry in exile, too, are far better than that of the edition in Slovakia. It was not without ulterior motives, therefore, that Karol Strmen, author of the above mentioned translations, became the subject of a virulent attack in the domestic press of Slovakia. Hronsky's original novels and short stories, written and published in exile, were admitted for publication in his native homeland. Meciar's critical reviews of Kukucin's works, too, were permitted entry as a source of vital information about this Slovak novelist who lived in Argentina for many years. The Most quarterly and the Slovak v Amerike's Almanach somehow get into Slovakia and are circulated throughout the country. Slovak poems from abroad are copied and circulated, memorized and recited in closed circles. This, too, belongs to popular education, esthetics, literature, etc. as an answer to those who would deny 12 SLOVAKIA not only political and religious liberty but cultural freedom to the Slovak nation in its native homeland. A word about the meaning and mission of Slovak political literature abroad, particularly for these reasons: 1) In the free world alone can one express himself freely in behalf of the self-determination of the Slovak nation, and nations in the same predicament, or for freedom to manifest its will to control its own national destiny. 2) The truth can be spoken, written and proved in the free world alone as to the past history of the Slovak nation in the light of the facts and truth without fear of police interference and judicial reprisals. We are responsible for the destiny of our Slovak nation that cannot, at this time under the present circumstances, know the full truth of its past because the truth is hidden or falsified and distorted in behalf of the party in power. That is why the Slovak nation is thankful to God that beyond the reach of the politbureau events as they actually happen are factually reported and registered without any pressure from directives or threats from the Party meetings. These are the reasons why I recommend that we have a common center for our historic and political publications of our writers abroad, and no one can hold this against me, justly, that is. A common and mutual endeavor is our responsibility because history-life's teacher-must also be a teacher in our political life. 'I'he late Matus cernak, Karol Sidor, Dr. Frantisek Hrusovsky and Konstantin culen, as well as the living, namely, Professor Vojtech Bucko, Dr. Arved Grebert, Kristof Greiner, Dr. Ferdinand i'.>urcansky, Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum, Dr. Jozef Mikus, Dr. Jozef Pauco, Dr. Jan Rekem, Professor Frantisek Vnuk and many, many others in our Slovak life have made invaluable contributions to the Slovak nation's cause, and to the world in general, by their numerous efforts and achievements. All these will someday provide inexhaustible sources for those who will write the history of Slovakia and the Slovak nation without any bias or prejudice. The future will be concerned not only with historic events but with the truth about personalities who come LIBRARY SLOVAKIA 13 to the fore in the re-creation of history as it actually happened. For example, the history of Hlinka or Tiso, and of their closest collaborators, and adversaries, too, can now be known only in the writings of authors in the free world because in their homeland a furious campaign to erase their names from history pages, a hate campaign to smear their names and to eliminate them as persons who in their time exercised profound influence. That must be adequately evaluated in Slovak history in the future. Personal biographical profiles sketched by the pens of Dr. Pauco, Bor and others in the free world will one day hold a place of honor in the national album of the great men in the history of the Slovak nation and its historic homeland of a thousand and more years. Finally, the meaning of the Slovak word, written, spoken, in exile, and somewhat exemphasized, perhaps, will one day be understood and properly evaluated in the future when the Slovaks will once again control their national destiny as a free nation in central Europe. The governing regime in Slovakia has unwittingly given public testimony of the intrinsic value of the Slovak word from abroad. The Postal Center 120 in Praha put a ban on Slovak periodicals and publications from abroad and has consistently returned or destroyed the Slovak printed word from the free world. The first document presented here is that of the postal administration addressed to the sender of a parcel of books. I submit it fully with the exception of the name of the publication and the date to prevent tracing the source of my information. It reads: Posta Praha 120. In Prague, date ... Dear Sir, Dear sirs, We inform you that your inclosed postal parcel contains, among other items, the following publication: .. . The entry and circulation of such publications is prohibited by a law on publication and information, given on the basis of Law 23, No. 8/ 1966 Sb., relating to periodicals, publications and other informational mediums according to Law No. 23, 127/1968, Sb. That is why these publications were forbidden postal delivery. Items not admitted for postal delivery fall under Par. 6, Art. 4 of the official regulation No. 240/1949, Sb. under postal laws for the welfare of the state. Greeting-Peace to the world. 14 SLOVAKIA The refusal is officially stamped: "Posta Praha 120". Instead of a signature, there is only the letter K. When such restrictions of freedom of expression are based upon so many laws or regulations, this campaign against the means of formation or information, the spiritual isolation of the people cannot be anything less than illegal legislation and legal spiritual homicide. The second document even more graphically illustrates opposition against religion, which, apparently to all intents and purposes, the state is developing in a legalistic form. It reads: Dissemination of information garnered from foreign publications. Letter and disposition of the Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Socialist Republic, N. MK, 4525/1971 of June 17. 1971. To all the centers of church and religious bodies in Slovakia. Through assorted channels a variety of foreign periodicals and publications dealing with religious and church problems have been brought into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, whose contents in many cases are biased and in conflict with the interests of our socialist state. Their evaluation has shown that they contain articles which untruthfully and rudely slander the CSSR. Future distribution or circulations of such materials, or any part thereof, is not permitted. This regulation also is in force in regards to the distribution or publication of certain informative instructions, etc., whether by internal religious organs, in official bulletins or in any form whatsoever. We warn that any activity that is contrary to the interest of socialist society is a misdemeanor, according to P. 5, Law No. 150/1969, Sb. We direct that you inform all branches subject to your authority of the contents of these instructions. K. Homola, Secretary General and Director for Church Affairs. This communique (signed by K. Homola) in general refers to "foreign" periodicals and publications, as if it avoided labeling them properly "Slovak," but which subsequently became clear because only these were returned by the postal outhorities with the words: "Non admis ... Not admitted ... " Later the explanation in French was added: "Returned. Violates Custom Regulations." Attempts to obtain official copies of the specific government regulations in order to comply with the law have been in vain. Non-admittance of publications from the outside world is now absolute and arbitrary. The returned publications with the official stamp of rejection attached have been filed in the archives of Slovak organizations 15 SLOVAKIA as real proofs and evidence for the future of the present spiritual enslavement of the people by the ruling regime for which the light of truth is obviously a much-feared scarecrow. The dialectics of the communist party defines everything as "biased" if it does not come off its own press, if it fails to idolize Marxism-Leninism, if it does not propagate the idea of the world revolution of the proletariat, etc. Of course, this type of "bias" is detrimentally opposed to the interests of a socialist state, namely the CSSR. Note that even 'internal church information and instructions from abroad' constitute misdemeanors if distributed (if they are not favorable to the spread of communism) because by the very fact they are not pro, they must be con-according to the borrowed Biblical phrase, "Who is not for me, is against me . . ." twisted to suit their own ends and purposes! Someone once observed that the burning of books furnishes light in darkness. We can surely applay this remark in the case of Slovak books arriving at postal centers in Czecho-Slovakia, particularly in Prague. Their fate may be that they are merely censored and confiscated, then returned to the sender, but more often consigned officially to be burned. Despite this, they continue to have their influence. The fear, in official circles of Czecho• Slovakia, of the Slovak word from abroad is clearly a case of a bad conscience. I conclude this review of past events with reference to a recent article in our press in Slovakia that labelled Slovak emigration as a dry, lifeless branch of the Slovak nation. How much or little truth there is in that arbitrary <;tatement an unprejudiced person can easily determine. lil THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA through its Ladies luud.liary, the "VCIELKY" (Bees), sponsors Slovak cultttrai displays. concerts, lectures, art exhibits, folk festjvals, social evenings, etc. Our aim is to have a "Hive" of our "V~ielky" in every large Slovak community.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Slovak Word Abroad Description An account of the resource Gorazd Zvonický Slovakia, Vol. 23 (No. 46), 1973 pp. 3-15 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zvonický, Gorazd, 1913-1995 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1973 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/0f66e5a174a7be747db7d3ffc4b50cbe.pdf 1c7c2c0082cd8e3046bfa21c1c960bfd PDF Text Text People's Courts in Czechoslovakia As a result at Teheran and Yalta, so-called People's Courts were immediately organized in the countries that were "liber­ated" by the Soviet armies. Naturally these courts were set up on the pattern on those in the Soviet countries. In Bulgaria, for example, they were set up in September 1944 and in Hungary In January 1945, even though the war was still on and there were no governments elected by the people in those respective countries. These two states are still under Soviet occupation (Paris Peace Conference) and so it actually was not possible to conduct free and demo­cratic elections there. People's Courts, then, were established on the incentive of out­side countries. This proves the veracity of the statement: "might makes right." These courts quite obviously rendered such verdicts as were prescribed by, the power of the state or by the power of the foreign state to which the state in question was subject. Beneš, as the president of Czechoslovakia, Immediately after the "liberation" ruled the state on the basis of the decrees he himself issued. He received the authority to rule by decrees from the State Council which he personally appointed in London. So that these decrees might have a legal color, the National Assembly in Prague was elected in 1946 and its deputies approved all of the "presidential" decrees of Beneš. It is doubtful, however, whether these decrees were constitutional and whether the elected Constitutional National Assembly was actually elected democratically in 1946. The system of People's Courts developed independently of each other in the so-called historic lands (Bohemia and Moravia) and In Slovakia. As president of the state, Beneš Issued the decree No. 16/1945 for Bohemia and Moravia on June 19, 1945. With this decree Beneš established the People's Courts in Bohemia and Moravia. It is interesting to note here that this decree carries the signa­ture not only of the President, but also the signatures of several Czech ministers, who today are proclaiming in free America that they are democrats, that they "fought" against dictatorship, etc. These same pseudodemocrats had the audacity to form the Council of Free Czechoslovakia. The names of the ministers on that decree, are: Dr. Hubert Ripka, Dr. Jaroslav Stránsky, General Hasal, Dr. Ferjenčik and Minister Majer. According to that presidential decree a People's Court con­sisted of five members: one was a judge by profession and the other four members were "from the people." President Beneš re­served the right for himself to personally appoint the president and the vice-president of the People's Court, while the whole Prague government appointed the other members. Of course, Beneš and his government named only such people to the People's Court on whom they could fully rely to carry out their bidding in the court. The decree stated that in rendering the verdict the members "from the people" shall vote first. According to the decree only a citizen who was a member of one of the four political parties that were allowed by Beneš and his government could become a judge in the People's Courts. The parties prepared a list of candidates for the People's Courts; the government then named the judges of the People's Courts from these lists. The decree made It possible in many cases to appoint as People's Judge a person who was punished at various times for var­ious transgressions and crimes. State prosecutors for these People’s Courts were appointed by the Minister of Justice, Dr. Jaroslav Stránsky. They were selected by him from a list prepared by the District People's Courts. It so happened that people without a Jaw degree were named as represen­tatives and prosecutors, and their ignorance of the law was responsible for many injustices. The most interesting provision of the decree was the paragraph that allowed a person freed by the People's Court to be tried on the same score by the regular process of law. Later a so-called Honor­ary Court was established before which could be tried all those who were freed. The State Attorney General and prosecutor had the right to try within three months any person who was freed by the Courts. So a person that was freed by the Courts had to wait three whole months to find out whether he was actually cleared of all charges or whether he shall be put on trial again. The procedure in a People's Court began with a speech by the state prosecutor, who reminded the members of the Court what the state demanded in the case. The president of the People's Court had the right only to read the testimony of the witnesses and ex­perts, as well as the testimony of the accused from the police rec­ords; this was done so that the accused and the witnesses could not say anything else during the opening hearing but what had already been said at the police station. There was no appeal from a verdict of the People's Court. When the verdict of death was rendered, the order was to be exe­cuted within two hours. Beneš did not want to be bothered with appeals for mercy from condemned people. He thus sanctioned all judicial murders by not wanting to use his constitutional right to change a verdict of death to one of life sentence. On June 19, 1945, Beneš and his ministers also Issued Decree No. 17/1945, whereby the so-called National Court was Instituted. It consisted of seven members and took care of the biggest "war criminals." But Beneš and his ministers were no.t satisfied with just the People's Courts and the National Court. On October 27, 1945, Beneš issued a new decree In which he gave the District National Committee the right to try all citizens that had sinned against so-called "national honor." Before this court were tried all persons wh.om the regular court, the People's Court and the National Court had no cause to prosecute. In Slovakia in 1945, Dr. Joseph Lettrich's Slovak National Coun­cil was the body supreme in all legislative, judicial and executive matters. There Is no mention of this Council in the Constitution of Czechoslovakia. The Slovak National Council consisted of members of the political parties allowed by Prague. All the ordinances of Lettrich's Council were without constitutional foundation and yet thousands of persons were thrown into jail, placed against the wall or hanged because of them. The ordinance of Lettrich's National Council about the estab­lishment of the People's Courts was issued on May 16, 1945, under the number 33/1945. Under this Illegal ordinance we find the signature of the great "democrat," who today is living a free life In America: Dr. Joseph Lettrich. On the basis of this Illegal ordinance there were three kinds of People's Courts established In Slovakia: the National Court in Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia; the District People's Court in every administrative district; and the Common People's Courts in every Slovak community. Any citizen and any office could place a complaint against any citizen. No objections were allowed against the accusation, and no appeal was possible against a verdict of the People's Courts. The National Court In Bratislava was composed of seven mem­bers, and only the president of the court had to be a judge by calling. The members of the National Court were named by Lettrich's National Council on motion made by the legal political parties. Political parties also named the members of the district and common courts. A legal defense counsel could only be a lawyer whom the Com­missar of Justice In Bratislava recognized. An accused person could not freely select his counsel. To this ordinance of Lettrlch's National Council, the Board of Commissars issued articles of procedure (No. 56/1945), and these, too, were signed the great "democrat" Lettrlch. The People's Courts In Slovakia were valid until December 31, 1947. After that date only the regularly Instituted courts could handle the remaining cases, keeping In line, of course, with the regulations concerning the People's Courts. In February 1948, the Parliament at Prague-elected In 1946 unanimously approved a law, whereby all regulations concerning Czech and Slovak National Courts and People's Courts were again In force. President Beneš sanctioned even this law; It may be found In the Czechoslovak legal code under No. 33/1948. On the basis of this Jaw, persecution began anew and very many of those citizens who were released by the courts found themselves once again before the People's Courts. This is in short a description of the legal structure of the People's Courts in Czechoslovakia. We must regard the whole People's judicial system as an act of revenge of people, who took over Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia in 1945. Beneš placed all his personal opponents before the court. Rudolph Beran, premier of Czechoslovakia, spent four years in a Ger­man concentration camp. That did not save him. He was given 20 years and his party was outlawed. Beneš thought that by outlaw­ing the Agrarian Party, all Agrarians would join his party, the Czech National Socialist Party (often referred to as the Czech Nazi Party), and so his party would become the largest in the Republic. The condemnation of Beran created a great scandal in the whole of Czechoslovakia. No one doubted that Beran was dealt with contrary to all principles of justice. The chairman of Beneš's party, Dr. Peter Zenkl, also was a min­ister in the two post-Munich governments, and yet he was not tried by the People's Court. Until recently he headed the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and together with Lettrich still poses as a great "democrat." According to the regulations governing the People's Courts, only Beneš had the right to grant mercy. Yet he did not grant mercy to any one of his political opponents. Nor did he show any mercy to the president of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso. He ex­plained clumsily that Lettrich's Slovak National Council had sent the Tiso matter to Prague without a motion or recommendation. The ministerial council in Prague gave the appeal for mercy to Beneš, but he preferred not to use his power of mercy and, as a result, the Catholic priest and first president of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Jo­seph Tiso, was hung. But even that was not enough for Beneš and his government. The Church strictly forbids the cremation of corpses. Reports had it that the dead body of Dr. Tiso was burnt in the crematory at Brno. Beneš had his propaganda give him a nice name: "President-Builder." But in Bohemia and in Slovakia as well Beneš is called: "The President-Avenger." That is how the people judge Beneš and his political companions. In this case the voice of the people is truly the voice of God. - (S. O.-'49) WHO SAID IT? "I am against any sort of totalitarianism, and I won't serve any cause that would mean that in the long run.... We hear a great deal about the Iron Curtain. I assure you there is no iron Curtain We are living next to a great power. We cooperate with them as much as we can. But we are keeping ourselves free. That's my final plea, or whatever you want to call it.... I am not frightened by economic changes in Czechoslovakia. But I am terribly interested in the Inner freedom. That's what I am trying to devote the remaining days of my life to. It's the freedom of the individual, immortal, human soul." - (Ján Masaryk, Address before the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, Jan. 9, 1947; NEW YORK TIMES, 1-10-47). SLOVAKIA 3 blood of. their nation. Finally they were overcome by the superior forces of the enemy the Germans and the Magyars - at the be­ ginning of the tenth century and Slovakia lost its Independence. At the b eginning of the 11th century the Slovak territory became a part of the Hungarian state. Slovakla lost its independence in the tenth century, but the Slovak nation did not lose its rights to a free life. The picture of the Slovak state of the ninth century has been preserved throughout the long centuries in the mind of the Slovak nation and, revived In the works of Slovak writers and poets, has maintained in all S lovak generations the hope that Slovakia once again shall be an independent state and the free homeland of all S lovaks. • • • PEOPLE'S COURTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA As a result at Teheran and Yalta, so-called People's Courts were immediately organized in the countries that were "liber­ ated" by the Soviet armies. Naturally these courts were set up on the pattern on those in the Soviet countries. In Bulgaria, for example, th ey were set up in September 1944 and in Hungary In January 1945, even though the war was still on and t h ere were no governments elected by the people in those respective countries. These two states are still under Soviet occupation (P aris Peace Con• ference) and so it actually was not possible to conduct free and demo­ cratic elections there. People's Courts, then, were established on the incentive of out­ side countries. This proves the veracity of the statement: "might makes right." These courts quite obviously rendered such verdicts as were prescribed by ,the power of the state or by the power of the foreign state to which the state in question was subject. Bene, as the president of Czechoslovakia, Immediately after the "liberation" ruled t he state on the basis of the decrees h e himself issued. He received the authority to rule by decrees from the State Council which he personally appointed in London. So that these decrees might have a legal color, the National Assembly in Prague was elected in 1946 and its deputies approved all of the "presidential" decrees of Bene. It is doubtful, however, whether these decrees were constitutional and whether the elected Constitutional National Assembly was actually elected democratically in 1946. The system of People's Courts developed independently of each other in the so-called historic lands (Bohemia and Moravia) and In Slovakia. As president of the state, Bene Issu ed the decree No. 16/1945 for Bohemia and Moravia on June 19, 1945. With •this decree Bene established the People's Courts in Bohemia and Moravia. It is interesting to note here that this decree carries the signa­ ture not only of the Pesident, but also the signatures of several Czech ministers, who today are proclaiming in free America that they are democrats, that they "fought" against dictatorship, etc. These same pseudodemocrats had the audacity to form the Council of Free Czechoslovakia. The names of the ministers on that decree, �43 SLOVAKI A are: Dr. Hubert Ripka, Dr. Jaroslav Stransky, Ge neral Ferjencik and Minister Majer. Hasal, Dr, According to that presidential decree a People's Court con­ sisted of five member,s: one was a ju dge by frofession and the other four members were "from t he people." President Bene re­ served the right for himself to personally appoint t h e president and the vice-president of the People's Court, while the whole Prague government appointed the other members. Of course, Bene and his government named only such p eople to the People's Court on whom they could fully rely to carry ou t their bidding in the cou rt. The decree stated that in rendering the verdict the members "from the people" shall vote first. According to the decree only a citizen who was a member of one of the four political parties tha t were al lowed by Bene and his government could become a judge in the P eople's Courts. The parties prepared a list of candidates for the People's Cou rts; the government then named the judges of the P eople's Courts from these lists. The decree made It possible in many cases to appoint as P eople's Judge a person who was punished at various times for various transgressions and crimes. State prosecutors for these People'.s Cour.ts were appointed by the Minister of Justice, Dr. Jaroslav Stransky. They were selected by h im from a list prepared by the Distr ict People's Courts. It so happened that people without a Jaw degree were named as represen­ tatives and prosecutors, and their ignorance of the law was re• sponslble for many injustices. The most interesting provision of the decree was the paragraph that allowed a person freed by the P eople's Cou rt to be tried on the same score by the regular process of law. Later a so-called Honor­ ary Court was established before which could be ,tried all those who were freed. The State Attorney General and prosecutor had the right to try within three months any person who was freed by the Courts. So a person that was freed by the Courts had to wait three whole month s to find out whether he was actually cleared of a ll charges or whether he shall be put on trial again. The procedure in a People's Court began with a speech by the state prosecutor, who reminded the members of the Court what the state demanded in the case. The president of the People's Court had the right only to read the testimony of the witnesses and ex­ perts, as well as the testimony of the accused from the police rec­ ords; this was done so that the accused and the witnesses could not say anything else during the opening hearing but what had already been said at the police station. There was no appeal from a verdict of the People's Court. When the verdict of death was rendered, the order was to be exe­ cuted within two hours. Bene did not want to be bothered with appeals for mercy from condemned people. H e thus sanctioned all judicial murders by not wanting to use his constitutional right to change a verdict of death to one of life sentence. On J une 19, 1945, Bene and his ministers also Issued Decree No. 17/1945, whereby the so-called National Court was Instituted. It consisted of seven members and took care of the biggest "war c riminals." �SLOVAKIA 5 But Bene and his ministers were no.t satisfied with just t he People's Courts and the National Court. On October 27, 1945, Bene issued a new decree In which he gave the District National Committee the right to try all citizens that had sinned against socalled "national honor." Before this court were tried all persons wh.om the regular court, the P eople's Court and the National Court had no cause to prosecute. In Slovakia in 1945, D r. Joseph L ettrich's Slovak National Coun­ cil was the body supreme in all legislative, judicial and executive matters. There Is no mention of this Council in the Constitution of Czechoslovakia. The Slovak National Council consisted of members of the political parties allowed by Prague. All the ordinances of Lettrich's Council were without constitutional f oundation and yet thousands of persons were thrown into jail, placed against the wall or hanged because of them. The ordinance of Lettrich's National Council about the estab­ lishment of the People's Courts was issued on May •16, 1945, under t he number 33/1945. Under this Illegal ordinance we find the signature of .the great "democrat," who today ls living a free life In America: Dr. J oseph Lettrich. On the basis of this Illegal ordinance there were three kinds of People's Courts established In Slovakia: the National Court in Bra• tlslava, the capital of Slovakia; the District People's Court In every administrative distriot; and the Common People's Courts In every Slovak community. Any citizen and any office could place a complaint against any citizen. No objections were allowed a.galnst the accusation, and no appeal was ,possible against a verdict of the People's Courts. The National Court In Bratislava was composed of seven mem­ bers, and only the president of the cour.t had to be a judge by call. ing. The members of the National Court were named by Lettrich's National Council on motion made by the l egal political parties. Political parties also named the members of the district and common courts. A legal defense counsel could only be a lawyer whom the Com­ missar of Justice In Bratislava recognized. An accused person could not freely select his counsel. To this ordinance of Lettrlch's National Council, the Board of Commissars issued articles of procedure (No. 56/1945), and these, too, were signed the great "democrat" Lettrlch. The People's Courts In Slovakia were valid until December 31, 1947. After that date only the regularly Instituted courts could handle the remaining cases, keeping In line, of cou rse, with the regulations concerning the People's Courts. In February 1948, the Parliament at Prague - elected In 1946 unanimously approved a la.w, whereby all regulations concerning Czech and Slova,k National Courts and People'·s Courts were again In force. President Bene sanctioned even .this law ; It may be found In the Czechoslovak legal code under No. 33/1948. On the basis of this Jaw, persecution began anew and very many of those citizens who were released by the courts found themselves once again before the People's Courts. �6 S LOVAKI A This is in short a description of the legal structure of the Peo­ ple's Courts in Czechoslovakia. We must regard the whole P eople's judicial sy stem as an act of revenge of people, who took over Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia in 1945. Bene placed all his ,personal opponents before the court. Ru­ dolph Beran, premier of Czechoslova kia, spent fou r years in a Ger­ man concentration camp. That did not save him. He was given 20 years and his party was ou tlawed. Bene thought that by ou tlaw­ ing the Agr ar ian P arty, all Agr arians would join his party, the Czech Nation al Socialist P arty (often referred to as the Czech Nazi Party ), and so his party would become the largest in the Repu blic. T he condem­ nation of Beran created a great scandal in the whole of Czechoslovak la. No one doub ted that Beran was dealt with contrary t o all principles of justice. T he cha irm an of Bene's iste r in the two post-Munich by the People' s Court. Until Czechoslovakia and together "democrat." party, Dr. Pe ter Zenkl, a lso was a min­ governments, and yet he was not tried recently he headed the Counci l of Free with Lettrich still poses as a great According to the regulations governing the P eople's Courts, only Bene h ad the right to grant mercy. Yet he did not grant mercy to any one of his political opponents. Nor did he show a ny mercy to the president of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph T iso. He ex­ pla ined clumsily that Lettrich's Slovak National Council had sent the Tiso matter to Prague without a motion or recommendation. The ministerial council in Prague gave the appeal for mercy to Bene, but he preferred not to use his power of mercy and, as a resul t, th e Catholic priest and first president of the Slovak Re public, Dr. J o­ seph Tiso, was hung. But even that was not enough for Bene and his government. The Church strictly forbids the cremation of corpses. Reports had it that the dead body of Dr. Tiso was bu rnt in the crematory at Brno. Bene had his propaganda give h im a nice name: "President­ Builder." But in Bohemia and in Slovakia as well Bene is called: "The P resident-Avenger." That is how t he people judge Bene and his political compan ions. In this case the voice of the people ls truty the voice of God.-( S. 0.-'49 ) • • • W H O SAID IT? "I am against any sort of totalitarianism, and I won't serve any cause that would mean that in the long run . . •. We hear a great deal a bout the Iron Curtain. I assure you there is no iron Curtain We a r e llvlng next to a great power. We coope rate with them as much as we can. But we a re keeping ourselves f ree. T hat's my final plea, or whatever you want to call it. . . . I am not frighte ned by economic changes in Czechoslovakia. But I am terribly interested in the Inner freedo m . T hat's what 1 am trying to devote the remaining days of my life to. It's the freedom of the lndlvidai, immortal, human soul." - (Ján Masaryk, Address before the Chamber of Com merce of the State of New York, Jan. 9, 1947; NEW YORK TIMES , 1-10-47). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document People's Courts in Czechoslovakia As a result at Teheran and Yalta, so-called People's Courts were immediately organized in the countries that were "liber­ated" by the Soviet armies. Naturally these courts were set up on the pattern on those in the Soviet countries. In Bulgaria, for example, they were set up in September 1944 and in Hungary In January 1945, even though the war was still on and there were no governments elected by the people in those respective countries. These two states are still under Soviet occupation (Paris Peace Conference) and so it actually was not possible to conduct free and demo­cratic elections there. People's Courts, then, were established on the incentive of out­side countries. This proves the veracity of the statement: "might makes right." These courts quite obviously rendered such verdicts as were prescribed by, the power of the state or by the power of the foreign state to which the state in question was subject. Beneš, as the president of Czechoslovakia, Immediately after the "liberation" ruled the state on the basis of the decrees he himself issued. He received the authority to rule by decrees from the State Council which he personally appointed in London. So that these decrees might have a legal color, the National Assembly in Prague was elected in 1946 and its deputies approved all of the "presidential" decrees of Beneš. It is doubtful, however, whether these decrees were constitutional and whether the elected Constitutional National Assembly was actually elected democratically in 1946. The system of People's Courts developed independently of each other in the so-called historic lands (Bohemia and Moravia) and In Slovakia. As president of the state, Beneš Issued the decree No. 16/1945 for Bohemia and Moravia on June 19, 1945. With this decree Beneš established the People's Courts in Bohemia and Moravia. It is interesting to note here that this decree carries the signa­ture not only of the President, but also the signatures of several Czech ministers, who today are proclaiming in free America that they are democrats, that they "fought" against dictatorship, etc. These same pseudodemocrats had the audacity to form the Council of Free Czechoslovakia. The names of the ministers on that decree, are: Dr. Hubert Ripka, Dr. Jaroslav Stránsky, General Hasal, Dr. Ferjenčik and Minister Majer. According to that presidential decree a People's Court con­sisted of five members: one was a judge by profession and the other four members were "from the people." President Beneš re­served the right for himself to personally appoint the president and the vice-president of the People's Court, while the whole Prague government appointed the other members. Of course, Beneš and his government named only such people to the People's Court on whom they could fully rely to carry out their bidding in the court. The decree stated that in rendering the verdict the members "from the people" shall vote first. According to the decree only a citizen who was a member of one of the four political parties that were allowed by Beneš and his government could become a judge in the People's Courts. The parties prepared a list of candidates for the People's Courts; the government then named the judges of the People's Courts from these lists. The decree made It possible in many cases to appoint as People's Judge a person who was punished at various times for var­ious transgressions and crimes. State prosecutors for these People’s Courts were appointed by the Minister of Justice, Dr. Jaroslav Stránsky. They were selected by him from a list prepared by the District People's Courts. It so happened that people without a Jaw degree were named as represen­tatives and prosecutors, and their ignorance of the law was responsible for many injustices. The most interesting provision of the decree was the paragraph that allowed a person freed by the People's Court to be tried on the same score by the regular process of law. Later a so-called Honor­ary Court was established before which could be tried all those who were freed. The State Attorney General and prosecutor had the right to try within three months any person who was freed by the Courts. So a person that was freed by the Courts had to wait three whole months to find out whether he was actually cleared of all charges or whether he shall be put on trial again. The procedure in a People's Court began with a speech by the state prosecutor, who reminded the members of the Court what the state demanded in the case. The president of the People's Court had the right only to read the testimony of the witnesses and ex­perts, as well as the testimony of the accused from the police rec­ords; this was done so that the accused and the witnesses could not say anything else during the opening hearing but what had already been said at the police station. There was no appeal from a verdict of the People's Court. When the verdict of death was rendered, the order was to be exe­cuted within two hours. Beneš did not want to be bothered with appeals for mercy from condemned people. He thus sanctioned all judicial murders by not wanting to use his constitutional right to change a verdict of death to one of life sentence. On June 19, 1945, Beneš and his ministers also Issued Decree No. 17/1945, whereby the so-called National Court was Instituted. It consisted of seven members and took care of the biggest "war criminals." But Beneš and his ministers were no.t satisfied with just the People's Courts and the National Court. On October 27, 1945, Beneš issued a new decree In which he gave the District National Committee the right to try all citizens that had sinned against so-called "national honor." Before this court were tried all persons wh.om the regular court, the People's Court and the National Court had no cause to prosecute. In Slovakia in 1945, Dr. Joseph Lettrich's Slovak National Coun­cil was the body supreme in all legislative, judicial and executive matters. There Is no mention of this Council in the Constitution of Czechoslovakia. The Slovak National Council consisted of members of the political parties allowed by Prague. All the ordinances of Lettrich's Council were without constitutional foundation and yet thousands of persons were thrown into jail, placed against the wall or hanged because of them. The ordinance of Lettrich's National Council about the estab­lishment of the People's Courts was issued on May 16, 1945, under the number 33/1945. Under this Illegal ordinance we find the signature of the great "democrat," who today is living a free life In America: Dr. Joseph Lettrich. On the basis of this Illegal ordinance there were three kinds of People's Courts established In Slovakia: the National Court in Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia; the District People's Court in every administrative district; and the Common People's Courts in every Slovak community. Any citizen and any office could place a complaint against any citizen. No objections were allowed against the accusation, and no appeal was possible against a verdict of the People's Courts. The National Court In Bratislava was composed of seven mem­bers, and only the president of the court had to be a judge by calling. The members of the National Court were named by Lettrich's National Council on motion made by the legal political parties. Political parties also named the members of the district and common courts. A legal defense counsel could only be a lawyer whom the Com­missar of Justice In Bratislava recognized. An accused person could not freely select his counsel. To this ordinance of Lettrlch's National Council, the Board of Commissars issued articles of procedure (No. 56/1945), and these, too, were signed the great "democrat" Lettrlch. The People's Courts In Slovakia were valid until December 31, 1947. After that date only the regularly Instituted courts could handle the remaining cases, keeping In line, of course, with the regulations concerning the People's Courts. In February 1948, the Parliament at Prague-elected In 1946 unanimously approved a law, whereby all regulations concerning Czech and Slovak National Courts and People's Courts were again In force. President Beneš sanctioned even this law; It may be found In the Czechoslovak legal code under No. 33/1948. On the basis of this Jaw, persecution began anew and very many of those citizens who were released by the courts found themselves once again before the People's Courts. This is in short a description of the legal structure of the People's Courts in Czechoslovakia. We must regard the whole People's judicial system as an act of revenge of people, who took over Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia in 1945. Beneš placed all his personal opponents before the court. Rudolph Beran, premier of Czechoslovakia, spent four years in a Ger­man concentration camp. That did not save him. He was given 20 years and his party was outlawed. Beneš thought that by outlaw­ing the Agrarian Party, all Agrarians would join his party, the Czech National Socialist Party (often referred to as the Czech Nazi Party), and so his party would become the largest in the Republic. The condemnation of Beran created a great scandal in the whole of Czechoslovakia. No one doubted that Beran was dealt with contrary to all principles of justice. The chairman of Beneš's party, Dr. Peter Zenkl, also was a min­ister in the two post-Munich governments, and yet he was not tried by the People's Court. Until recently he headed the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and together with Lettrich still poses as a great "democrat." According to the regulations governing the People's Courts, only Beneš had the right to grant mercy. Yet he did not grant mercy to any one of his political opponents. Nor did he show any mercy to the president of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso. He ex­plained clumsily that Lettrich's Slovak National Council had sent the Tiso matter to Prague without a motion or recommendation. The ministerial council in Prague gave the appeal for mercy to Beneš, but he preferred not to use his power of mercy and, as a result, the Catholic priest and first president of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Jo­seph Tiso, was hung. But even that was not enough for Beneš and his government. The Church strictly forbids the cremation of corpses. Reports had it that the dead body of Dr. Tiso was burnt in the crematory at Brno. Beneš had his propaganda give him a nice name: "President-Builder." But in Bohemia and in Slovakia as well Beneš is called: "The President-Avenger." That is how the people judge Beneš and his political companions. In this case the voice of the people is truly the voice of God. - (S. O.-'49) WHO SAID IT? "I am against any sort of totalitarianism, and I won't serve any cause that would mean that in the long run.... We hear a great deal about the Iron Curtain. I assure you there is no iron Curtain We are living next to a great power. We cooperate with them as much as we can. But we are keeping ourselves free. That's my final plea, or whatever you want to call it.... I am not frightened by economic changes in Czechoslovakia. But I am terribly interested in the Inner freedom. That's what I am trying to devote the remaining days of my life to. It's the freedom of the individual, immortal, human soul." - (Ján Masaryk, Address before the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, Jan. 9, 1947; NEW YORK TIMES, 1-10-47). Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource People's Courts in Czechoslovakia Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951 pp. 3-6 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource May 1951