1
50
763
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/cd244d83d7853c521a3dab8ef3a32836.pdf
d44550d5710a130c245721fea999ca98
PDF Text
Text
Slovakia - The Oldest State in Central Europe
Prof. Francis Hrušovský
The world, slowly but surely, is learning that the small Slovak nation in the Danube basin is asserting its right to independent national existence.
Since a nation that is relatively small is concerned - a nation which through the fault of its larger neighbors for long ages did not have the possibility of appearing independently before the eyes of the cultural world - some European and non-European nations were not conscious of the existence of the Slovaks as an individual nation and did not, therefore, evince any interest In their existence.
And yet, in the case of the Slovaks, we are concerned with a nation that deserves attention and has the right to strive for a position in the Carpatho-Danube area that belongs to an individual nation with an ancient past and a rich, cultural tradition.
The Slovaks have remained a small nation, but they are neither a young nor a new nation. They are the oldest nation on the central Danube and they were the first nation in Central Europe which had its own Independent state.
The historical destiny of the Slovak nation was determined first of all by the geographical position of the territory which the Slovaks colonized after their arrival in Central Europe in the sixth century. When the Slovaks crossed the Carpathians and established their permanent colonies on the banks of the central Danube and Its tributaries, they occupied the territory that lay on the very western edge of the Slovanic world and was in direct contact with the eastern countries of the Germans.
The more numerous, militarily stronger, politically more developed and culturally more advanced Germans, especially since the times of Emperor Charles the Great (768-814), exerted a pressure on their Slovanic neighbors. This political and cultural pressure of the Germans was strongest In the area settled by the numerous small Slovak tribes.
It was only natural that the small Slovak tribes, threatened by the growing pressure of their German neighbors, began to realize more clearly their mutual family ties and felt the need of uniting their forces in defense of their common interests which were threatened by a common danger.
By such a unification of the small Slovak principalities already in the first half of the ninth century, there arose on the central Danube the Slovak state - known in historical literature as the Great Moravian Empire.
The Slovak state - the nucleus and main castle of which were near the Morava river - was the first state organized on the territory of Central Europe.
The geographical position of the Slovak territory was the reason why the Slovaks organized their own state as a defense against outside danger. The Slovak rulers who built and managed this state proved that the Slovaks orientated themselves early and well to the situation that evolved near the central Danube and they were quite able and capable to defend their vital interests and to decide their own destiny.
The territory of the Slovak state was gradually extended to include the territories of neighboring Slovanic tribes. It became less dependent on the Frankish empire, and the military might of the Slovak
princes increased to such an extent that they successfully repelled the attacks of the German kings.
In the second half of the ninth century - during the reign of the prudent Rastislav (847-870), the belligerent Svätopluk (870-894), whom contemporary sources called King, and his heroic successor Mojmir II (894-906) - the Slovak state had gained such an international position that Slovak princes could make and keep diplomatic contacts with the Emperor's court in Constantinople and the Holy See.
Slovak rulers were allies of the Emperor of Constantinople against Bulgar-Germanic coalition, and maintained active ties with the Vatican as Christian rulers because they wanted their country to have its own church organization and be an independent ecclesiastical province.
The Slovaks came Into contact with Christianity right at the outset of their history in Central Europe. In the seat of the Slovak princes in Nitra already in 830 there stood a Christian church - the first Christian church on the territory of the western Slavs. The Slovaks received the Christian faith under the leadership of their princes and appropriated unto themselves all the attainments of Christian civilization and cultural progress.
The Slovak state from its very inception was a Christian state. The new faith - due to the merits of western and eastern missionaries, especially the merits of Sts. Cyril and Methodius - was so deeply rooted in the Slovaks that no pagan reaction could grow on Slovak territory. Slovak Christianity became so firm, in fact, that Slovakia already in the ninth century became the mediator of the Christian faith and Christian culture even in neighboring countries to the east and performed this function even in the centuries that followed. In the very first centuries of its Christian life, Slovakia became a strong support of the Christian faith in the Danube basin and for whole ages it was a bastion of the Christian culture which was threatened by the invasion of eastern barbarians.
Slovak rulers tried to solidify and safeguard the Independence of the Slovak state with the help of an independent ecclesiastical organization and the aid of an Independent ecclesiastical hierarchy. King Svätopluk, on the advice of Archbishop Methodius, went so far in his efforts that in 879 he sent a special delegation to Pope John VIII and placed himself, his princes, magnates and people under the protection of the Holy See. The Papal See accepted the Slovak state under the protection of St. Peter, and the successors of Pope John VIII most condescendingly showed their paternal altruism to the Slovak rulers and their anxiety for the fate of the ecclesiastical organization on the territory of the Slovak state.
The Slovak rulers and the Slovak people sacrificed everything to preserve the independence of their country. They fought valiantly against their enemies in the east and the west. The Slovaks were greatly outnumbered and the continual defensive battles sapped the blood of their nation. Finally they were overcome by the superior forces of the enemy - the Germans and the Magyars - at the beginning of the tenth century and Slovakia lost its independence. At the beginning of the 11th century the Slovak territory became a part of the Hungarian state.
Slovakia lost its independence in the tenth century, but the Slovak nation did not lose its rights to a free life. The picture of the Slovak state of the ninth century has been preserved throughout the long centuries in the mind of the Slovak nation and, revived In the works of Slovak writers and poets, has maintained in all Slovak generations the hope that Slovakia once again shall be an independent state and the free homeland of all Slovaks.
SLOVAKIA
1
SLOVAKIATHE OLDEST STATE IN CENTRAL EUROPE
PROF. FRANCIS HRUSOVSKY
The world, slowly but surely, is learning that the small Slovak
na,tion in the Danube basin is asserting its right to independent national existence.
Since a nation that is relatively ,small Is concerned - a nation
which through the fault of Its larger neighbors for long ~es did not
have the possibility of a,ppearlng Independently before the eyes of the
cultural world - some European and non-European nations were not
conscious of the existence of the Slovaks as an individual nation and
did not, therefore, evince any interest In their existence.
And yet, in the ca,se of the Slovaks, we are concerned with a nation that deserves attention and has the right to strive for a posttlon
in the Carpatho-Danube area that belongs to an Individual nation with
an ancient past and a rich, cultural ,tradition.
The Slovaks have r emain,ed a small nation, but they are neither
a young nor a new nation. They are the oldest nation on the central
Danube and they were the first nation in Central Europe which had
its own Independent state.
The historical destiny of the Slovak nation was determined flr~t
of all by the geographical position of the territory which the Slovaks
colonized after their arrival in Central Europe in the slxth century.
When ,the Slovaks crossed the Carpathians and established their permanent colonies on the banks of the central Danube and Its tribu•
tarles, they occupied the territory that lay on the very western edge
of the Slovanic world and was In direct contact with -the eastern
countries of the Germans.
The more numerous, militari1y stronger, politically more developed
and culturally more advanced Germans, especially since the times of
Emperor Charles the Great (768-&14), exerted a pressure on their
Slovanic neighbors. This political and cultural pressure of the Germans was strongest In the area settled by the numerous small Slovak
tribes.
It was only natural that the small Slovak tribes, threaitened by
the growing pressure of their German neighbors, began to realize
more clearly their mutual family ties and felt the need of uniting
their forces In defense of ,their common interests which were threatened by a common danger.
By such a unification of the small Slovak principalities already In
the first half of the ninth century, there arose on the central Danube
the Slovak state - known in historical literature as the Great Moravian Empire.
The Slovak state - the nucleus and main castle of which were
near the Morava river - was the first state organized on the territory
of Central Europe.
The geographical ,posl,Uon of the Slovak territory wa,s the reason
why the Slovaks organized their own state a,s a defense against outside danger. The Slovak rulers who built and managed this state
proved that the Slovaks orientated themselves early and well to the
�2
SLOVAKIA
situation that evolved near the central Danube and the) wer0 quite
able and capable to defend their vital interests anJ to decide their
own destiny.
The territory of the Slovak state was gradually ex;tended to in·
elude the territories of neighboring Slov:i!1ic tribes. It became less
dependent on the Frankish empire, and the military might of the Slovak princes increased to such an extent that they sucoessfully re•
pelied the attacks of the German kings.
In the second half of the ninth century during the re ign of
the prudent Rastislav (847--870), the belligerent Svatopluk (870-894),
whom contemporary sources called King, and his heroic successor
Mojmir 11 (894--906) th e Slovak state had gained such an international position that Slovak princes could make and keep diplomatic
contacts with the Emperor's court in Constantinople and the Holy Sec.
Slovak rulers were allies of the Emperor of Constantinople against
Bulgar-Germanic coalition, and maintained active ties with the Vatican
as Christian rulers because they wanted their country to have its own
church organization and be an independent ecclesiastical province.
The Slovaks came Into contact with Christianity right at the out•
set of their history in Central Europe. In the seat of the Slovak
princes in Nltra already in 830 there stood a Christian chu rch the
first Christian church on the territory of the western Slavs. The Slo•
vaks received the Christian faith under the leadership of th~r princes
and appropriated unto themselves all the attainments of Christian
civilization and cultural progress.
The Slovak state from its very inception was a Christian state.
The new faith - due to the merits of western and eastern missionaries, especially the merits of Sts. Cyril and Methodius - was &o
deeply rooted in the Slovaks that no pagan reaction could grow on
Slovak territory. Slovak Christianity became so firm, in tact, that
Slovakia already in the ninth century became the mediator of the
Christian faith and Christian culture even in neighboring countries to
the east and performed this function even in the centuries ,that !ol·
lowed. In the very first centuries of its Christian life, Slovakia became a strong support of the Christian faith in the Danube basin and
for whole ages it was a bastion of the Christian culture which was
threatened by the invasion of eastern barbarians.
Slovak rulers tried to ,solidify and safeguard the Independence of
the Slovak state wtth the help of an independent ecclesiastical organization and the aid of an Independent eccLesiastical hierarchy. King
Sviitopluk, on the advice of Archbishop Methodius, went so far in his
efforts that in 879 he sent a special delegation to Pope John VIII and
placed hmself, his princes, magnates and people under the protection
of the Holy See-. The Papal See accepted the Slovak state under the
protection or St. Peter, and the successors of Pope John VIII most
condescendingly showed their paternal altruism to the Slovak rulers
and their anxiety for the Cate of the acclesiastical organization on the
territory of the Slovak state.
The Slovak rulers and the Slovak people sacrificed everything to
pre11erve the independence of their country. They fought valiantly
against their enemies in the east and ,the west. The Slovaks we1 e
greatly outnumbered and the continual defensive battles sapped the
�SLOVAKIA
3
blood of. their nation. Finally they were overcome by the superior
forces of the enemy - the Germans and the Magyars - at ,the beginning of the tenth century and Slovakia lost its Independence. At
the b eginning of the 11th century the Slovak territory became a part
of the Hungarian state.
Slovakla lost its independence in the tenth century, but the Slovak
nation did not lose its rights to a free life. The picture of the Slovak
state of the ninth century has been preserved throughout the long
centuries in the mind of the Slovak nation and, revived In the works
of Slovak writers and poets, has maintained in all S lovak generations
the hope that Slovakia once again shall be an independent state and
the free homeland of all S lovaks.
• •
•
PEOPLE'S COURTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
As a result at Teheran and Yalta, so-called People's Courts
were immediately organized in the countries that were "liberated" by the Soviet armies. Naturally these courts w-ere set up
on the paittern on those in the Soviet countries. In Bulgaria, tor
example, th ey were set up in September 1944 and in Hungary In
January 1945, even though the war was ,still on and t h ere were
no governments elected by the people in those respective countries.
These two states are still under Soviet occupation (P aris Peace Con•
ference) and so it actually was not possible to <'Onduct free and democratic elections there.
People's Courts, then, were established on the incentive of outside countries. This pro\1'8s -the veracity of the statement: "might
makes right." These courts quite obviously rendered such verdicts
as were prescribed by ,the power of the state or by the power of
the foreign state to which the state in question was subject.
Benes, as the president of Czechoslovakia, Immediately after the
"liberation" ruled t he state on the basis of the decrees h e himself
issued. He received the authority to rule by decrees from the State
Council which he personally appointed in London. So that these
decrees might have a legal color, the National Assembly in Prague
was elected in 1946 and its deputies approved all of the "presidential"
decrees of Benes. It is doubtful, however, whether these decrees
were constitutional and whether the elected Constitutional National
Assembly was actually elected democratically in 1946.
The system of People's Courts developed ind-ependently of each
other in the so-called historic lands (Bohemia and Moravia) and In
Slovakia.
As president of the state, Benes Issu ed the decree No. 16/1945
for Bohemia and Moravia on June 19, 1945. With •this decree B enes
established the People's Courts in Bohemia and Moravia.
It is interesting to note here that this decree carries the signat ure not only of the Pesident, but also the signatures of several
Czech ministers, who today are proclaiming in free America that
they are democrats, that they "fought" against dictatorship, etc.
These same pseudodemocrats had the audacity to form the Council
of Free Czechoslovakia. The names of the ministers on that decree,
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
Slovakia - The Oldest State in Central Europe
Prof. Francis Hrušovský
The world, slowly but surely, is learning that the small Slovak nation in the Danube basin is asserting its right to independent national existence.
Since a nation that is relatively small is concerned - a nation which through the fault of its larger neighbors for long ages did not have the possibility of appearing independently before the eyes of the cultural world - some European and non-European nations were not conscious of the existence of the Slovaks as an individual nation and did not, therefore, evince any interest In their existence.
And yet, in the case of the Slovaks, we are concerned with a nation that deserves attention and has the right to strive for a position in the Carpatho-Danube area that belongs to an individual nation with an ancient past and a rich, cultural tradition.
The Slovaks have remained a small nation, but they are neither a young nor a new nation. They are the oldest nation on the central Danube and they were the first nation in Central Europe which had its own Independent state.
The historical destiny of the Slovak nation was determined first of all by the geographical position of the territory which the Slovaks colonized after their arrival in Central Europe in the sixth century. When the Slovaks crossed the Carpathians and established their permanent colonies on the banks of the central Danube and Its tributaries, they occupied the territory that lay on the very western edge of the Slovanic world and was in direct contact with the eastern countries of the Germans.
The more numerous, militarily stronger, politically more developed and culturally more advanced Germans, especially since the times of Emperor Charles the Great (768-814), exerted a pressure on their Slovanic neighbors. This political and cultural pressure of the Germans was strongest In the area settled by the numerous small Slovak tribes.
It was only natural that the small Slovak tribes, threatened by the growing pressure of their German neighbors, began to realize more clearly their mutual family ties and felt the need of uniting their forces in defense of their common interests which were threatened by a common danger.
By such a unification of the small Slovak principalities already in the first half of the ninth century, there arose on the central Danube the Slovak state - known in historical literature as the Great Moravian Empire.
The Slovak state - the nucleus and main castle of which were near the Morava river - was the first state organized on the territory of Central Europe.
The geographical position of the Slovak territory was the reason why the Slovaks organized their own state as a defense against outside danger. The Slovak rulers who built and managed this state proved that the Slovaks orientated themselves early and well to the situation that evolved near the central Danube and they were quite able and capable to defend their vital interests and to decide their own destiny.
The territory of the Slovak state was gradually extended to include the territories of neighboring Slovanic tribes. It became less dependent on the Frankish empire, and the military might of the Slovak
princes increased to such an extent that they successfully repelled the attacks of the German kings.
In the second half of the ninth century - during the reign of the prudent Rastislav (847-870), the belligerent Svätopluk (870-894), whom contemporary sources called King, and his heroic successor Mojmir II (894-906) - the Slovak state had gained such an international position that Slovak princes could make and keep diplomatic contacts with the Emperor's court in Constantinople and the Holy See.
Slovak rulers were allies of the Emperor of Constantinople against Bulgar-Germanic coalition, and maintained active ties with the Vatican as Christian rulers because they wanted their country to have its own church organization and be an independent ecclesiastical province.
The Slovaks came Into contact with Christianity right at the outset of their history in Central Europe. In the seat of the Slovak princes in Nitra already in 830 there stood a Christian church - the first Christian church on the territory of the western Slavs. The Slovaks received the Christian faith under the leadership of their princes and appropriated unto themselves all the attainments of Christian civilization and cultural progress.
The Slovak state from its very inception was a Christian state. The new faith - due to the merits of western and eastern missionaries, especially the merits of Sts. Cyril and Methodius - was so deeply rooted in the Slovaks that no pagan reaction could grow on Slovak territory. Slovak Christianity became so firm, in fact, that Slovakia already in the ninth century became the mediator of the Christian faith and Christian culture even in neighboring countries to the east and performed this function even in the centuries that followed. In the very first centuries of its Christian life, Slovakia became a strong support of the Christian faith in the Danube basin and for whole ages it was a bastion of the Christian culture which was threatened by the invasion of eastern barbarians.
Slovak rulers tried to solidify and safeguard the Independence of the Slovak state with the help of an independent ecclesiastical organization and the aid of an Independent ecclesiastical hierarchy. King Svätopluk, on the advice of Archbishop Methodius, went so far in his efforts that in 879 he sent a special delegation to Pope John VIII and placed himself, his princes, magnates and people under the protection of the Holy See. The Papal See accepted the Slovak state under the protection of St. Peter, and the successors of Pope John VIII most condescendingly showed their paternal altruism to the Slovak rulers and their anxiety for the fate of the ecclesiastical organization on the territory of the Slovak state.
The Slovak rulers and the Slovak people sacrificed everything to preserve the independence of their country. They fought valiantly against their enemies in the east and the west. The Slovaks were greatly outnumbered and the continual defensive battles sapped the blood of their nation. Finally they were overcome by the superior forces of the enemy - the Germans and the Magyars - at the beginning of the tenth century and Slovakia lost its independence. At the beginning of the 11th century the Slovak territory became a part of the Hungarian state.
Slovakia lost its independence in the tenth century, but the Slovak nation did not lose its rights to a free life. The picture of the Slovak state of the ninth century has been preserved throughout the long centuries in the mind of the Slovak nation and, revived In the works of Slovak writers and poets, has maintained in all Slovak generations the hope that Slovakia once again shall be an independent state and the free homeland of all Slovaks.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Slovakia - The Oldest State in Central Europe
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
May 1951
Description
An account of the resource
Prof. Francis Hrušovský
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951
pp. 1-3
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Hrušovský, František, 1903-1956
LCNAF
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/0f66e5a174a7be747db7d3ffc4b50cbe.pdf
1c7c2c0082cd8e3046bfa21c1c960bfd
PDF Text
Text
People's Courts in Czechoslovakia
As a result at Teheran and Yalta, so-called People's Courts were immediately organized in the countries that were "liberated" by the Soviet armies. Naturally these courts were set up on the pattern on those in the Soviet countries. In Bulgaria, for example, they were set up in September 1944 and in Hungary In January 1945, even though the war was still on and there were no governments elected by the people in those respective countries. These two states are still under Soviet occupation (Paris Peace Conference) and so it actually was not possible to conduct free and democratic elections there.
People's Courts, then, were established on the incentive of outside countries. This proves the veracity of the statement: "might makes right." These courts quite obviously rendered such verdicts as were prescribed by, the power of the state or by the power of the foreign state to which the state in question was subject.
Beneš, as the president of Czechoslovakia, Immediately after the "liberation" ruled the state on the basis of the decrees he himself issued. He received the authority to rule by decrees from the State Council which he personally appointed in London. So that these decrees might have a legal color, the National Assembly in Prague was elected in 1946 and its deputies approved all of the "presidential" decrees of Beneš. It is doubtful, however, whether these decrees were constitutional and whether the elected Constitutional National Assembly was actually elected democratically in 1946.
The system of People's Courts developed independently of each other in the so-called historic lands (Bohemia and Moravia) and In Slovakia.
As president of the state, Beneš Issued the decree No. 16/1945 for Bohemia and Moravia on June 19, 1945. With this decree Beneš established the People's Courts in Bohemia and Moravia.
It is interesting to note here that this decree carries the signature not only of the President, but also the signatures of several Czech ministers, who today are proclaiming in free America that they are democrats, that they "fought" against dictatorship, etc. These same pseudodemocrats had the audacity to form the Council of Free Czechoslovakia. The names of the ministers on that decree, are: Dr. Hubert Ripka, Dr. Jaroslav Stránsky, General Hasal, Dr. Ferjenčik and Minister Majer.
According to that presidential decree a People's Court consisted of five members: one was a judge by profession and the other four members were "from the people." President Beneš reserved the right for himself to personally appoint the president and the vice-president of the People's Court, while the whole Prague government appointed the other members. Of course, Beneš and his government named only such people to the People's Court on whom they could fully rely to carry out their bidding in the court. The decree stated that in rendering the verdict the members "from the people" shall vote first.
According to the decree only a citizen who was a member of one of the four political parties that were allowed by Beneš and his government could become a judge in the People's Courts. The parties prepared a list of candidates for the People's Courts; the government then named the judges of the People's Courts from these lists. The decree made It possible in many cases to appoint as People's Judge a person who was punished at various times for various transgressions and crimes.
State prosecutors for these People’s Courts were appointed by the Minister of Justice, Dr. Jaroslav Stránsky. They were selected by him from a list prepared by the District People's Courts. It so happened that people without a Jaw degree were named as representatives and prosecutors, and their ignorance of the law was responsible for many injustices.
The most interesting provision of the decree was the paragraph that allowed a person freed by the People's Court to be tried on the same score by the regular process of law. Later a so-called Honorary Court was established before which could be tried all those who were freed. The State Attorney General and prosecutor had the right to try within three months any person who was freed by the Courts. So a person that was freed by the Courts had to wait three whole months to find out whether he was actually cleared of all charges or whether he shall be put on trial again.
The procedure in a People's Court began with a speech by the state prosecutor, who reminded the members of the Court what the state demanded in the case. The president of the People's Court had the right only to read the testimony of the witnesses and experts, as well as the testimony of the accused from the police records; this was done so that the accused and the witnesses could not say anything else during the opening hearing but what had already been said at the police station.
There was no appeal from a verdict of the People's Court. When the verdict of death was rendered, the order was to be executed within two hours. Beneš did not want to be bothered with appeals for mercy from condemned people. He thus sanctioned all judicial murders by not wanting to use his constitutional right to change a verdict of death to one of life sentence.
On June 19, 1945, Beneš and his ministers also Issued Decree No. 17/1945, whereby the so-called National Court was Instituted. It consisted of seven members and took care of the biggest "war criminals."
But Beneš and his ministers were no.t satisfied with just the People's Courts and the National Court. On October 27, 1945, Beneš issued a new decree In which he gave the District National Committee the right to try all citizens that had sinned against so-called "national honor." Before this court were tried all persons wh.om the regular court, the People's Court and the National Court had no cause to prosecute.
In Slovakia in 1945, Dr. Joseph Lettrich's Slovak National Council was the body supreme in all legislative, judicial and executive matters. There Is no mention of this Council in the Constitution of Czechoslovakia. The Slovak National Council consisted of members of the political parties allowed by Prague. All the ordinances of Lettrich's Council were without constitutional foundation and yet thousands of persons were thrown into jail, placed against the wall or hanged because of them.
The ordinance of Lettrich's National Council about the establishment of the People's Courts was issued on May 16, 1945, under the number 33/1945. Under this Illegal ordinance we find the signature of the great "democrat," who today is living a free life In America: Dr. Joseph Lettrich.
On the basis of this Illegal ordinance there were three kinds of People's Courts established In Slovakia: the National Court in Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia; the District People's Court in every administrative district; and the Common People's Courts in every Slovak community.
Any citizen and any office could place a complaint against any citizen. No objections were allowed against the accusation, and no appeal was possible against a verdict of the People's Courts.
The National Court In Bratislava was composed of seven members, and only the president of the court had to be a judge by calling. The members of the National Court were named by Lettrich's National Council on motion made by the legal political parties. Political parties also named the members of the district and common courts.
A legal defense counsel could only be a lawyer whom the Commissar of Justice In Bratislava recognized. An accused person could not freely select his counsel.
To this ordinance of Lettrlch's National Council, the Board of Commissars issued articles of procedure (No. 56/1945), and these, too, were signed the great "democrat" Lettrlch.
The People's Courts In Slovakia were valid until December 31, 1947. After that date only the regularly Instituted courts could handle the remaining cases, keeping In line, of course, with the regulations concerning the People's Courts.
In February 1948, the Parliament at Prague-elected In 1946 unanimously approved a law, whereby all regulations concerning Czech and Slovak National Courts and People's Courts were again In force. President Beneš sanctioned even this law; It may be found In the Czechoslovak legal code under No. 33/1948.
On the basis of this Jaw, persecution began anew and very many of those citizens who were released by the courts found themselves once again before the People's Courts.
This is in short a description of the legal structure of the People's Courts in Czechoslovakia.
We must regard the whole People's judicial system as an act of revenge of people, who took over Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia in 1945.
Beneš placed all his personal opponents before the court. Rudolph Beran, premier of Czechoslovakia, spent four years in a German concentration camp. That did not save him. He was given 20 years and his party was outlawed. Beneš thought that by outlawing the Agrarian Party, all Agrarians would join his party, the Czech National Socialist Party (often referred to as the Czech Nazi Party), and so his party would become the largest in the Republic. The condemnation of Beran created a great scandal in the whole of Czechoslovakia. No one doubted that Beran was dealt with contrary to all principles of justice.
The chairman of Beneš's party, Dr. Peter Zenkl, also was a minister in the two post-Munich governments, and yet he was not tried by the People's Court. Until recently he headed the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and together with Lettrich still poses as a great "democrat."
According to the regulations governing the People's Courts, only Beneš had the right to grant mercy. Yet he did not grant mercy to any one of his political opponents. Nor did he show any mercy to the president of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso. He explained clumsily that Lettrich's Slovak National Council had sent the Tiso matter to Prague without a motion or recommendation. The ministerial council in Prague gave the appeal for mercy to Beneš, but he preferred not to use his power of mercy and, as a result, the Catholic priest and first president of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso, was hung.
But even that was not enough for Beneš and his government. The Church strictly forbids the cremation of corpses. Reports had it that the dead body of Dr. Tiso was burnt in the crematory at Brno.
Beneš had his propaganda give him a nice name: "President-Builder." But in Bohemia and in Slovakia as well Beneš is called: "The President-Avenger."
That is how the people judge Beneš and his political companions. In this case the voice of the people is truly the voice of God. - (S. O.-'49)
WHO SAID IT?
"I am against any sort of totalitarianism, and I won't serve any cause that would mean that in the long run.... We hear a great deal about the Iron Curtain. I assure you there is no iron Curtain We are living next to a great power. We cooperate with them as much as we can. But we are keeping ourselves free. That's my final plea, or whatever you want to call it.... I am not frightened by economic changes in Czechoslovakia. But I am terribly interested in the Inner freedom. That's what I am trying to devote the remaining days of my life to. It's the freedom of the individual, immortal, human soul." - (Ján Masaryk, Address before the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, Jan. 9, 1947; NEW YORK TIMES, 1-10-47).
SLOVAKIA
3
blood of. their nation. Finally they were overcome by the superior
forces of the enemy
the Germans and the Magyars - at the be
ginning of the tenth century and Slovakia lost its Independence. At
the b eginning of the 11th century the Slovak territory became a part
of the Hungarian state.
Slovakla lost its independence in the tenth century, but the Slovak
nation did not lose its rights to a free life. The picture of the Slovak
state of the ninth century has been preserved throughout the long
centuries in the mind of the Slovak nation and, revived In the works
of Slovak writers and poets, has maintained in all S lovak generations
the hope that Slovakia once again shall be an independent state and
the free homeland of all S lovaks.
• •
•
PEOPLE'S COURTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
As a result at Teheran and Yalta, so-called People's Courts
were immediately organized in the countries that were "liber
ated" by the Soviet armies. Naturally these courts were set up
on the pattern on those in the Soviet countries. In Bulgaria, for
example, th ey were set up in September 1944 and in Hungary In
January 1945, even though the war was still on and t h ere were
no governments elected by the people in those respective countries.
These two states are still under Soviet occupation (P aris Peace Con•
ference) and so it actually was not possible to conduct free and demo
cratic elections there.
People's Courts, then, were established on the incentive of out
side countries. This proves the veracity of the statement: "might
makes right." These courts quite obviously rendered such verdicts
as were prescribed by ,the power of the state or by the power of
the foreign state to which the state in question was subject.
Bene, as the president of Czechoslovakia, Immediately after the
"liberation" ruled t he state on the basis of the decrees h e himself
issued. He received the authority to rule by decrees from the State
Council which he personally appointed in London. So that these
decrees might have a legal color, the National Assembly in Prague
was elected in 1946 and its deputies approved all of the "presidential"
decrees of Bene. It is doubtful, however, whether these decrees
were constitutional and whether the elected Constitutional National
Assembly was actually elected democratically in 1946.
The system of People's Courts developed independently
of each
other in the so-called historic lands (Bohemia and Moravia) and In
Slovakia.
As president of the state, Bene Issu ed the decree No. 16/1945
for Bohemia and Moravia on June 19, 1945. With •this decree Bene
established the People's Courts in Bohemia and Moravia.
It is interesting to note here that this decree carries the signa
ture not only of the Pesident, but also the signatures of several
Czech ministers, who today are proclaiming in free America that
they are democrats, that they "fought" against dictatorship, etc.
These same pseudodemocrats had the audacity to form the Council
of Free Czechoslovakia. The names of the ministers on that decree,
�43
SLOVAKI A
are: Dr. Hubert Ripka, Dr. Jaroslav Stransky, Ge neral
Ferjencik and Minister Majer.
Hasal,
Dr,
According to that presidential decree a People's Court con
sisted of five member,s: one was a ju dge by frofession and the
other four members were "from t he people." President Bene re
served the right for himself to personally appoint t h e president and
the vice-president of the People's Court, while the whole Prague
government
appointed the other members. Of course, Bene and
his government named only such p eople to the People's Court on
whom they could fully rely to carry ou t their bidding in the cou rt.
The decree stated that in rendering the verdict the members "from
the people" shall vote first.
According to the decree only a citizen who was a member of
one of the four political parties tha t were al lowed by Bene and his
government could become a judge in the P eople's Courts. The
parties prepared a list of candidates for the People's Cou rts; the
government then named the judges of the P eople's Courts from these
lists. The decree made It possible in many cases to appoint as
P eople's Judge a person who was punished at various times for various transgressions and crimes.
State prosecutors for these People'.s Cour.ts were appointed by
the Minister of Justice, Dr. Jaroslav Stransky. They were selected
by h im from a list prepared by the Distr ict People's Courts. It so
happened that people without a Jaw degree were named as represen
tatives and prosecutors, and their ignorance of the law was re•
sponslble for many injustices.
The most interesting provision of the decree was the paragraph
that allowed a person freed by the P eople's Cou rt to be tried on the
same score by the regular process of law. Later a so-called Honor
ary Court was established before which could be ,tried all those who
were freed. The State Attorney General and prosecutor had the
right to try within three months any person who was freed by the
Courts. So a person that was freed by the Courts had to wait
three whole month s to find out whether he was actually cleared of
a ll charges or whether he shall be put on trial again.
The procedure in a People's Court began with a speech by the
state prosecutor, who reminded the members of the Court what the
state demanded in the case. The president of the People's Court
had the right only to read the testimony of the witnesses and ex
perts, as well as the testimony of the accused from the police rec
ords; this was done so that the accused and the witnesses could not
say anything else during the opening hearing but what had already
been said at the police station.
There was no appeal from a verdict of the People's Court.
When the verdict of death was rendered, the order was to be exe
cuted within two hours. Bene did not want to be bothered with
appeals for mercy from condemned people. H e thus sanctioned all
judicial murders by not wanting to use his constitutional right to
change a verdict of death to one of life sentence.
On J une 19, 1945, Bene and his ministers also Issued Decree
No. 17/1945, whereby the so-called National Court was Instituted. It
consisted of seven members and took care of the biggest "war
c riminals."
�SLOVAKIA
5
But Bene and his ministers were no.t satisfied with just t he
People's Courts and the National Court. On October 27, 1945,
Bene issued a new decree In which he gave the District National
Committee the right to try all citizens that had sinned against socalled "national honor." Before this court were tried all persons
wh.om the regular court, the P eople's Court and the National Court
had no cause to prosecute.
In Slovakia in 1945, D r. Joseph L ettrich's Slovak National Coun
cil was the body supreme in all legislative, judicial and executive
matters. There Is no mention of this Council in the Constitution of
Czechoslovakia. The Slovak National Council consisted of members
of the political parties allowed by Prague. All the ordinances of
Lettrich's Council were without constitutional f oundation and yet
thousands of persons were thrown into jail, placed against the wall
or hanged because of them.
The ordinance of Lettrich's National Council about the estab
lishment of the People's Courts was issued on May •16, 1945, under
t he number 33/1945.
Under this Illegal ordinance we find the signature of .the great "democrat," who today ls living a free life In
America: Dr. J oseph Lettrich.
On the basis of this Illegal ordinance there were three kinds of
People's Courts established In Slovakia: the National Court in Bra•
tlslava, the capital of Slovakia; the District People's Court In every
administrative distriot; and the Common People's Courts In every
Slovak community.
Any citizen and any office could place a complaint against any
citizen. No objections were allowed a.galnst the accusation, and no
appeal was ,possible against a verdict of the People's Courts.
The National Court In Bratislava was composed of seven mem
bers, and only the president of the cour.t had to be a judge by call.
ing. The members of the National Court were named by Lettrich's
National Council on motion made by the l egal political parties.
Political parties also named the members of the district and common
courts.
A legal defense counsel could only be a lawyer whom the Com
missar of Justice In Bratislava recognized. An accused person could
not freely select his counsel.
To this ordinance of Lettrlch's National Council, the Board of
Commissars issued articles of procedure (No. 56/1945), and these,
too, were signed the great "democrat" Lettrlch.
The People's Courts In Slovakia were valid until December 31,
1947. After that date only the regularly Instituted courts could
handle the remaining cases, keeping In line, of cou rse, with the
regulations concerning the People's Courts.
In February 1948, the Parliament at Prague - elected In 1946 unanimously approved a la.w, whereby all regulations concerning
Czech and Slova,k National Courts and People'·s Courts were again In
force. President Bene sanctioned even .this law ; It may be found
In the Czechoslovak legal code under No. 33/1948.
On the basis of this Jaw, persecution began anew and very many
of those citizens who were released by the courts found themselves
once again before the People's Courts.
�6
S LOVAKI A
This is in short a description of the legal structure of the Peo
ple's Courts in Czechoslovakia.
We must regard the whole P eople's judicial sy stem as an act of
revenge of people, who took over Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia in
1945.
Bene placed all his ,personal opponents before the court. Ru
dolph Beran, premier of Czechoslova kia, spent fou r years in a Ger
man concentration camp. That did not save him. He was given 20
years and his party was ou tlawed. Bene thought that by ou tlaw
ing the Agr ar ian P arty, all Agr arians would join his party, the Czech
Nation al Socialist P arty (often referred to as the Czech Nazi Party ),
and so his party would become the largest in the Repu blic. T he condem
nation of Beran created a great scandal in the whole of Czechoslovak la. No one doub ted that Beran was dealt with contrary t o all
principles of justice.
T he cha irm an of Bene's
iste r in the two post-Munich
by the People' s Court. Until
Czechoslovakia and together
"democrat."
party, Dr. Pe ter Zenkl, a lso was a min
governments, and yet he was not tried
recently he headed the Counci l of Free
with Lettrich still poses as a great
According to the regulations governing the P eople's Courts, only
Bene h ad the right to grant mercy. Yet he did not grant mercy
to any one of his political opponents. Nor did he show a ny mercy
to the president of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph T iso. He ex
pla ined clumsily that Lettrich's Slovak National Council had sent the
Tiso matter to Prague without a motion or recommendation. The
ministerial council in Prague gave the appeal for mercy to Bene,
but he preferred not to use his power of mercy and, as a resul t, th e
Catholic priest and first president of the Slovak Re public, Dr. J o
seph Tiso, was hung.
But even that was not enough for Bene and his government.
The Church strictly forbids the cremation of corpses. Reports had
it that the dead body of Dr. Tiso was bu rnt in the crematory at
Brno.
Bene had his propaganda give h im a nice name: "President
Builder." But in Bohemia and in Slovakia as well Bene is called:
"The P resident-Avenger."
That is how t he people judge Bene and his political compan ions.
In this case the voice of the people ls truty the voice of God.-( S. 0.-'49 )
•
•
•
W H O SAID IT?
"I am against any sort of totalitarianism, and I won't serve any
cause that would mean that in the long run . . •. We hear a great
deal a bout the Iron Curtain. I assure you there is no iron Curtain
We a r e llvlng next to a great power. We coope rate with them as
much as we can. But we a re keeping ourselves f ree. T hat's my final
plea, or whatever you want to call it. . . . I am not frighte ned by
economic changes in Czechoslovakia. But I am terribly interested in
the Inner freedo m . T hat's what 1 am trying to devote the remaining
days of my life to. It's the freedom of the lndlvidai, immortal, human
soul." - (Ján Masaryk, Address before the Chamber of Com merce of
the State of New York, Jan. 9, 1947; NEW YORK TIMES , 1-10-47).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
People's Courts in Czechoslovakia
As a result at Teheran and Yalta, so-called People's Courts were immediately organized in the countries that were "liberated" by the Soviet armies. Naturally these courts were set up on the pattern on those in the Soviet countries. In Bulgaria, for example, they were set up in September 1944 and in Hungary In January 1945, even though the war was still on and there were no governments elected by the people in those respective countries. These two states are still under Soviet occupation (Paris Peace Conference) and so it actually was not possible to conduct free and democratic elections there.
People's Courts, then, were established on the incentive of outside countries. This proves the veracity of the statement: "might makes right." These courts quite obviously rendered such verdicts as were prescribed by, the power of the state or by the power of the foreign state to which the state in question was subject.
Beneš, as the president of Czechoslovakia, Immediately after the "liberation" ruled the state on the basis of the decrees he himself issued. He received the authority to rule by decrees from the State Council which he personally appointed in London. So that these decrees might have a legal color, the National Assembly in Prague was elected in 1946 and its deputies approved all of the "presidential" decrees of Beneš. It is doubtful, however, whether these decrees were constitutional and whether the elected Constitutional National Assembly was actually elected democratically in 1946.
The system of People's Courts developed independently of each other in the so-called historic lands (Bohemia and Moravia) and In Slovakia.
As president of the state, Beneš Issued the decree No. 16/1945 for Bohemia and Moravia on June 19, 1945. With this decree Beneš established the People's Courts in Bohemia and Moravia.
It is interesting to note here that this decree carries the signature not only of the President, but also the signatures of several Czech ministers, who today are proclaiming in free America that they are democrats, that they "fought" against dictatorship, etc. These same pseudodemocrats had the audacity to form the Council of Free Czechoslovakia. The names of the ministers on that decree, are: Dr. Hubert Ripka, Dr. Jaroslav Stránsky, General Hasal, Dr. Ferjenčik and Minister Majer.
According to that presidential decree a People's Court consisted of five members: one was a judge by profession and the other four members were "from the people." President Beneš reserved the right for himself to personally appoint the president and the vice-president of the People's Court, while the whole Prague government appointed the other members. Of course, Beneš and his government named only such people to the People's Court on whom they could fully rely to carry out their bidding in the court. The decree stated that in rendering the verdict the members "from the people" shall vote first.
According to the decree only a citizen who was a member of one of the four political parties that were allowed by Beneš and his government could become a judge in the People's Courts. The parties prepared a list of candidates for the People's Courts; the government then named the judges of the People's Courts from these lists. The decree made It possible in many cases to appoint as People's Judge a person who was punished at various times for various transgressions and crimes.
State prosecutors for these People’s Courts were appointed by the Minister of Justice, Dr. Jaroslav Stránsky. They were selected by him from a list prepared by the District People's Courts. It so happened that people without a Jaw degree were named as representatives and prosecutors, and their ignorance of the law was responsible for many injustices.
The most interesting provision of the decree was the paragraph that allowed a person freed by the People's Court to be tried on the same score by the regular process of law. Later a so-called Honorary Court was established before which could be tried all those who were freed. The State Attorney General and prosecutor had the right to try within three months any person who was freed by the Courts. So a person that was freed by the Courts had to wait three whole months to find out whether he was actually cleared of all charges or whether he shall be put on trial again.
The procedure in a People's Court began with a speech by the state prosecutor, who reminded the members of the Court what the state demanded in the case. The president of the People's Court had the right only to read the testimony of the witnesses and experts, as well as the testimony of the accused from the police records; this was done so that the accused and the witnesses could not say anything else during the opening hearing but what had already been said at the police station.
There was no appeal from a verdict of the People's Court. When the verdict of death was rendered, the order was to be executed within two hours. Beneš did not want to be bothered with appeals for mercy from condemned people. He thus sanctioned all judicial murders by not wanting to use his constitutional right to change a verdict of death to one of life sentence.
On June 19, 1945, Beneš and his ministers also Issued Decree No. 17/1945, whereby the so-called National Court was Instituted. It consisted of seven members and took care of the biggest "war criminals."
But Beneš and his ministers were no.t satisfied with just the People's Courts and the National Court. On October 27, 1945, Beneš issued a new decree In which he gave the District National Committee the right to try all citizens that had sinned against so-called "national honor." Before this court were tried all persons wh.om the regular court, the People's Court and the National Court had no cause to prosecute.
In Slovakia in 1945, Dr. Joseph Lettrich's Slovak National Council was the body supreme in all legislative, judicial and executive matters. There Is no mention of this Council in the Constitution of Czechoslovakia. The Slovak National Council consisted of members of the political parties allowed by Prague. All the ordinances of Lettrich's Council were without constitutional foundation and yet thousands of persons were thrown into jail, placed against the wall or hanged because of them.
The ordinance of Lettrich's National Council about the establishment of the People's Courts was issued on May 16, 1945, under the number 33/1945. Under this Illegal ordinance we find the signature of the great "democrat," who today is living a free life In America: Dr. Joseph Lettrich.
On the basis of this Illegal ordinance there were three kinds of People's Courts established In Slovakia: the National Court in Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia; the District People's Court in every administrative district; and the Common People's Courts in every Slovak community.
Any citizen and any office could place a complaint against any citizen. No objections were allowed against the accusation, and no appeal was possible against a verdict of the People's Courts.
The National Court In Bratislava was composed of seven members, and only the president of the court had to be a judge by calling. The members of the National Court were named by Lettrich's National Council on motion made by the legal political parties. Political parties also named the members of the district and common courts.
A legal defense counsel could only be a lawyer whom the Commissar of Justice In Bratislava recognized. An accused person could not freely select his counsel.
To this ordinance of Lettrlch's National Council, the Board of Commissars issued articles of procedure (No. 56/1945), and these, too, were signed the great "democrat" Lettrlch.
The People's Courts In Slovakia were valid until December 31, 1947. After that date only the regularly Instituted courts could handle the remaining cases, keeping In line, of course, with the regulations concerning the People's Courts.
In February 1948, the Parliament at Prague-elected In 1946 unanimously approved a law, whereby all regulations concerning Czech and Slovak National Courts and People's Courts were again In force. President Beneš sanctioned even this law; It may be found In the Czechoslovak legal code under No. 33/1948.
On the basis of this Jaw, persecution began anew and very many of those citizens who were released by the courts found themselves once again before the People's Courts.
This is in short a description of the legal structure of the People's Courts in Czechoslovakia.
We must regard the whole People's judicial system as an act of revenge of people, who took over Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia in 1945.
Beneš placed all his personal opponents before the court. Rudolph Beran, premier of Czechoslovakia, spent four years in a German concentration camp. That did not save him. He was given 20 years and his party was outlawed. Beneš thought that by outlawing the Agrarian Party, all Agrarians would join his party, the Czech National Socialist Party (often referred to as the Czech Nazi Party), and so his party would become the largest in the Republic. The condemnation of Beran created a great scandal in the whole of Czechoslovakia. No one doubted that Beran was dealt with contrary to all principles of justice.
The chairman of Beneš's party, Dr. Peter Zenkl, also was a minister in the two post-Munich governments, and yet he was not tried by the People's Court. Until recently he headed the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and together with Lettrich still poses as a great "democrat."
According to the regulations governing the People's Courts, only Beneš had the right to grant mercy. Yet he did not grant mercy to any one of his political opponents. Nor did he show any mercy to the president of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso. He explained clumsily that Lettrich's Slovak National Council had sent the Tiso matter to Prague without a motion or recommendation. The ministerial council in Prague gave the appeal for mercy to Beneš, but he preferred not to use his power of mercy and, as a result, the Catholic priest and first president of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso, was hung.
But even that was not enough for Beneš and his government. The Church strictly forbids the cremation of corpses. Reports had it that the dead body of Dr. Tiso was burnt in the crematory at Brno.
Beneš had his propaganda give him a nice name: "President-Builder." But in Bohemia and in Slovakia as well Beneš is called: "The President-Avenger."
That is how the people judge Beneš and his political companions. In this case the voice of the people is truly the voice of God. - (S. O.-'49)
WHO SAID IT?
"I am against any sort of totalitarianism, and I won't serve any cause that would mean that in the long run.... We hear a great deal about the Iron Curtain. I assure you there is no iron Curtain We are living next to a great power. We cooperate with them as much as we can. But we are keeping ourselves free. That's my final plea, or whatever you want to call it.... I am not frightened by economic changes in Czechoslovakia. But I am terribly interested in the Inner freedom. That's what I am trying to devote the remaining days of my life to. It's the freedom of the individual, immortal, human soul." - (Ján Masaryk, Address before the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, Jan. 9, 1947; NEW YORK TIMES, 1-10-47).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
People's Courts in Czechoslovakia
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951
pp. 3-6
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
May 1951
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/c924276d9ff80efe173d5f9a83750a28.pdf
6aff34fe68eea9cc883d406cdf4ea461
PDF Text
Text
Why Separate Slovak Politics?
Long before the putsch of February 1948, the communists of Czecho-Slovakia labeled all Slovaks who opposed them as Fascists and Nazis. When they came into power -by the graces of Beneš and Stalin -they got rid of all opposition in the usual Red manner.
On the other hand, the followers of the ruinous policies of Dr. Edward Beneš call the Slovaks "Fascists and Nazis," because they insist on a separate Slovak state, the renewal of the Slovakia that they had proclaimed an independent state before World War II began. Lately they are going a bit farther than that; they have decided to prove that the Slovaks who had anything to do with the Slovak state, -the Hlinka Home Guard, and the Slovak People's Party -also collaborated with the Communists, especially during the 1946 parliamentary elections. That, or course, is just plain silly, because it was not the Czechs or the followers of Beneš, but the Slovaks and the followers of Hlinka and Tiso, who openly opposed the Communists. Not only since 1948, but during the life of the first and second republics as well.
The Slovaks are through with all forms of Czecho-Slovakia. They have had their fill of Magyars, Czechs and Germans. They are determined to fight for an independent Slovak state within or without a European federation. The Slovak Republic was destroyed against their will and illegally by the United Nations, and they still want to know why.
Czecho-Slovak opponents of Slovak independence qualify the formation of the Slovak state as a betrayal of the Czechs and CzechoSlovakia. They have no facts to prove that. They rest satisfied that Beneš had said so. What about the Slovaks themselves? Have they nothing to say about a matter that vitally concerns them? When all facts are considered in the light of the truth, we shall have to come to the conclusion that it was not the Slovak leaders who betrayed the Czechs and Czecho-Slovakia, but the Czech leaders - the Czech Socialists, especially the Czech Nazis (Czech National Socialists) headed by Dr. Edward Beneš.
The difficult situation of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938-1939 is still fresh In our minds. What was responsible for that situation? It was the ruinous policy of Dr. Edward Beneš, who served many years as Foreign Minister and then President of Czecho-Slovakia. The Slovak deputies often cautioned Beneš to change his course, but to no avail. That the Slovaks were able to get out of that hopeless situation and kept themselves not only above water throughout the war, but progressed immensely, that fact itself speaks In favor of the Slovak state.
Now, take the situation that Slovakia finds itself in at the present time. Who is responsible for that situation?
During the war the Slovak nation lived In the conviction that its future life after the conclusion of the war and the defeat of Germany would be able to develop only alongside and after the manner of the western democracies. The influence of German politics was undesirable. Let us only recall that the London broadcast was heard publicly in Slovakia and that despite the fact that it was influenced by people who had a most negative stand toward the Slovak state. It is known that many aviators of the western armies found refuge In Slovakia and even the military authorities treated them as guests. It is also known that many Czechs, fleeing to the west, found refuge and aid in Slovakia.
Cžech politicians - specifically Beneš who posed as President of Czechoslovakia - went to Moscow despite the warnings of the western powers at a time when the formation of a Polish-Czechoslovak Federation was being negotiated. It was there that they sold out the Czech and Slovak nations to communistic Moscow. The Poles were embarrassed; any federation with the Czechs became a dead issue. This was not the result of a political compromise and good will. It was a singular triumph for Gottwald and Stalin.
Then came 1944. It was evident that the end of the war was not far off. The Slovaks were preparing for a new life; pians were being made for a Christian and democratic order without the tutorship of the German Reich. A genuine Slovak revolt was included In the plans. Moscow and Beneš knew about these plans but they were determined to cross up the Slovaks. They could not allow the Slovaks, who were for an independent Slovakia and sympathized with the west, to rebel against the Germans.
Beneš planned the strategy with Stalin. Soviet soldiers and saboteurs were parachuted into the mountains of Slovakia and the fake "national" rebellion of August 1944 was prepared. The result: about 70,000 Slovak dead, persecutions by the enraged Nazis, murder and destruction by both the desperate Nazis and the Red saboteurs. Soon after the war came the "Košice Agreement" which was cooked up In Moscow, and the fate of Slovakia was sealed.
The Slovaks were disappointed. They expected a victory of right and truth, but had to be satisfied again with subordination. But they did not betray their Christian and democratic traditions and convictions. They proved that In the 1946 elections. Little Slovakia, overshadowed by the Red giant, spoke decisively in favor of the west. In Bohemia and Moravia - the CZECH lands - the Reds bested all parties; with the socialists they had a decided majority. In Slovakia, the best the Reds could do - even with the help of the Czech Reds, Beneš's spies and Secret Police, and the army - was about 32 per cent of the total vote.
The Slovak Democratic Party - led by the political unknown Dr. Jozef Lettrich - became the victorious party with about 62 per cent of the total vote. Not by any of its own merits. The followers of Hlinka and Tiso - the overwhelming majority of the Slovak population - had little choice in the matter. Their party -the largest political party in pre-war Slovakia - was outlawed by the Red regime of Beneš. They could vote only for the candidates of the Communist and the Democratic Parties and, so, chose the lesser of two evils - the Democratic Party led by Lettrich. It was a vote against Communism. Of course, the Reds were furious.
But Dr. Lettrich and other leaders of the Democratic Party failed to take advantage of the situation. They betrayed the confidence of the voters by continuing the Sovietophile policy of Beneš. The Reds of Slovakia lost the elections decisively and yet won the most important posts in the state! The voters of Slovakia had decided for a separate Slovak policy, but the leaders of the party blindly continued to follow Beneš and Moscow in their anti-Slovak policy.
A group of bankrupt collaborators with Beneš and Stalin is playing the same politics today that brought disaster to the Slovak nation in February 1948. This group has organized the "COUNCIL OF FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA" which is anything but representative of the will of the Slovak and Czech peoples ln America, at home or elsewhere In emigration. Most of the members of this Council are former members of the NATIONAL FRONT of Czechoslovakia, a fact that they would rather not be reminded of. The Slovaks want no part of them or their Council. They despise them as Red collaborators.
After the terrible experience of the past, the Slovaks cannot trust the very people who betrayed their interests and collaborated with their enslavers. As In the elections of 1946, the Slovaks In emigration today proclaim themselves against the Council of Free Czechoslovakia that is comprised of the men who in a large measure are responsible for the unfortunate situation the Slovak and Czech nations find themselves In today. They are for a separate Slovak policy in emigration and In Slovakia. No more do they want a common policy with the Czechs. Slovak leaders have learned their lesson after living with the Czechs in a common state for 20 years; they remember Munich 1938, December 12, 1943, and the post-war period. They have lost their appetite to hazard with the life of their people.
Slovak political leaders have on many occasions in the past shown their good will to come to some sensible agreement. They pleaded, begged and threatened many times, but to no avail. The only answer they received was the gallows and the courts. Let the Czechs, therefore, not reproach them for deciding to go their own way. They gladly accept full responsibility for the outcome. The Slovaks are convinced that they can thus better safeguard Slovakia from the catastrophes and sufferings that were her lot in the past decades, when she was ruled by others.
WHO SAID IT?
"Russia is for the liberation of Czechoslovakia... Russia is the strongest Slav brother and must be regarded as such... RUSSIA IS THE SOURCE OF TRUE OEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM THAT OUR PEOPLE IS EXPECTING." Dr. Edward Beneš, Chicago ĽUDOVÝ DENNÍK, April 21, 1939.
"For Russia the importance of the (Czechoslovak-Soviet) treaty lies In the fact she has another ally whose leader, Dr. Beneš, is highly esteemed in Allied councils, and in the fact that Czechoslovakia WILL NOT participate in any European FEDERATION whose purpose is re-establishment of a policy of the cordon sanitaire. This was the second time Dr. Beneš and Czechoslovakia have blazed a trail toward amity of the Soviet Union and neighboring states in eastern Europe." - (NEW YORK TIMES, 12-13-43).
SLOVAKIA
7
WHY SEPARATE SLOVAK POLITICS?
{k l-) - Long before the putsch of Feb ruary 1948, the communists of Czecho-Slovakia labeled all Slovaks who opposed them as
Fascists and Nazis. When they came into power - by the graces of
Beneš and Stalin - they got rid of all oppositlon in the usual Red
manner.
On the other hand, the followers of the ruinous policles of Dr.
Edward Beneš call the Slovaks "Fascísts and Nazis," because they insist
on a separate Slovak state, the renewal of the Slovakia that they had
proclaimed an independent state before World War II began. Lately
they are golng a bit farther than that; they have decided to prove
that the Slovaks who had anything to do with the Slovak state, - the
Hlinka Home Guard, and the Slovak People's Party - also collabor ated
with the Communists, especlally durlng the 1946 parliamentary elections. That, or course, is just p lain silly, because it was not the
Czechs or the followers of Beneš, but the Slovaks and tbe followers
of Hlinka and Tiso, who openly opposed the Communists. Not only
slnce 1948, but during the life of the first and second republics as
well.
The Slovaks are through with all forms of Czecho-Slovakia. They
have had their fill of Magyars, Czechs and Germans. They are determined to flght for an Independent Slovak state withln or wlthout a
European federation. The Slovak Republic was destroyed agalnst
their will and lllegally by tbe Unlted Nations, and they stlll want
to know why.
Czecho-Slovak opponents of Slovak independence qualify the formatlon of tbe Slovak state as a betrayal of the Czechs and CzechoSlovakia. They have no facts to prove that. 'ľhey rest satlsfied that
Beneš had said so. What about the Slovaks themselves? H ave tbey
nothing to say about a matter tbat vitally concerns them? When all
facts are considered in the light of the truth, we shall have to come
to the conclusion that lt was not the Slovak Jeaders who betr ayed
the Czechs and Czecho-Slovakla, but the Czech leaders - the Czech
Soclalists, especially the Czech Nazls {Czech Natlonal Socialists)
headed by Dr. Edward Beneš.
The dlfficult situatlon of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938- 1939 is still
fresh In our mlnds. What was responslble for that sltuatlon? It was
the rulnous pollcy of Dr. Edward Beneš, who served many years as
Foreign Minister and then Presldent of Czecho-Slovakia. T h e Slovak
deputles often cautioned Beneš to change his course, but t o no aval!.
That the Slovaks were able to get out of that hopeless sltuatlon and
kept themselves not only above water throughout the war, but progressed lmmensely, tbat fact itself speaks In favor of the Slovak state.
Now, take tbe sltuatlon that Slovakla finds ltself in at the present
time. Who is responsible for that sltuation?
Durlng the war the Slovak natlon lived In the convict!on that lts
future llfe after the conclusfon of the war and tbe defeat of Germany
would be able to develop only alongslde and after the manner of the
western democracles. The lnfluence of German politlcs was undeslrable. Let us only recall that the London broadcast was heard publicly
�8
SLOVAKIA
in Slovakla and that desplte the fact that lt was lnfluenced by people
who had a most negatlve stand toward the Slovak state. It ls known
that many aviators of the western armles found refuge In Slovakla
and even the milltary authorltles treated them as guests. It is also
known that many Czechs, fleelng to the west, found refuge and ald in
Slova kla.
Cžech pollticians - speclflcally Beneš who posed as Presldent of
Czechoslovakia - went to Moscow desplte the warnlngs of the western powers at a Ume when the formatlon of a Pollsh-Czechoslovak
Federatlon was belng negotlated. It was there that they sold out the
Czech and Slovak natlons to communlstlc Moscow. The Poles were
embarrassed; any federatlon wlth the Czechs became a dead lssue.
Thls was not the result of a polltlcal compromlse and good wlll. It was
a slngular trlumph for Gottwald and Stalln.
Then came 1944. It was evldent that the end of the war was not
far off. The Slovaks were preparlng for a new llfe; pians were belng
made for a Christlan and democratlc order wlthout the tutorship of
the German Reich. A genuine Slovak revolt was lncluded In the
plans. Moscow and Beneš knew about these plans but they were determ.lned to cross up the Slovaks. They could not a llow the Slovaks,
who were for an independent Slovakia and sympathized wlth the
west, to rebel agalnst the Germans.
Bene• planned the strategy wlth Stalln. Soviet soldiers and saboteurs were parachuted lnto the mountalns of Slovakia and the fake
"natlonal" rebelllon of August 1944 was prepared. The result: about
70,000 Slovak dead, persecutlons by the enraged Nazis, murder and destruction by both the desperate Nazls and the Red saboteurs. Soon
after the war came the "Košice Agreement" whlch was cooked up In
Moscow, and the fate of Slovakia was sealed.
The Slovaks were dlsappointed. They expected a vlctory ot right
and truth, but had to be satisfied again wlth subordlnatlon. But they
did not betray their Chrlstlan and democratic traditions and convictions. They proved that In the 1946 elections. Llttle Slovakla,
overshadowed by the Red giant, spoke declsively in favor ot the
west. In Bohemia and Moravla - the CZECH lands - the Reds bested
all partles; wlth the soclallsts they had a decided majority. In Slovakia, the best the Reds could do - even with the help of the Czech
Reds, Beneš's spies and Secret Police, and the army - was about
32 per cent of the total vote.
The Slovak Democratlc Party - led by the political unknown
Dr. Jozef Lettrlch - became the victorlous party with about 62 per
cent o! the total vote. Not by any of its own merits. The followers of
Hlinka and Tlso - the overwhelming majority of the Slovak populatlon - had Jlttle choice In the matter. Thelr party - the largest
polltlcal party In pre-war Slovakla - was outlawed by the Red re•
glme of Beneš. They could vote only for the candldates of the Communist and the Democratlc Partles and, so, chose the lesser of two
evils - the Democratlc Party Jed by Lettrlch. It was a vote agalnst
Communism. Of course, the Reds were furlous.
But Dr. Leltrlch and other leaders of the Democratlc Party
failed to take advantage of the sltuatlon. They betrayed the contldence of the voters by contlnulng the Sovietophlle pollcy ot Bene•.
�SLOVAKIA
9
The Reds of Slovakla Iost the electlons declsively and yet won the
most important posts ln the state! The voters of Slovakia had declded
for a separate Slovak pollcy, but the leaders of the party bllndly contlnued to follow Beneš and Moscow in thelr anti-Slovak pollcy.
A group of bankrupt collaborators wlth Beneš and StaUn ls
playlng the same poutlcs today that brought dlsaster to the Slovak
natlon ln February 1948. This group has organlzed the "COUNCIL OF
FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA" whlch is anything but representatlve of
the wlll of the Slovak and Czech peoples ln America, at home or
elsewhere In emigratlon. Most of the merobers of this Council are
former members of the NATIONAL FRONT of Czechoslovakia, a fact
that they would rather not be remlnded of. The Slovaks want no part
of them or their Councll. They desplse them as Red collaborators.
After the terrlble experience of the past, the Slovaks cannot trust
the very people who betrayed their lnterests and collaborated wlth
thelr enslavers. As In the elections of 1946, the Slovaks In emlgration
today proclalm themselves against the Councll of Free Czechoslovakla
that ls comprlsed of the men who In a large mea.s ure a re responslble for the unfortunate sltuatlon the Slovak and Czech nations find
themselves In today. They are for a separate Slovak pollcy In emlgratlon and In Slovakia. No more do they want a common policy with
1he Czechs. Slovak leaders have learned thelr lesson after llvlng wlth
the Czechs In a common state for 20 years; they remember Munlch
1938, December 12, 1943, and the post-war perlod. They have lost the!r
appetlte to hazard with the llfe of thelr people.
Slovak polltlcal leaders have on many occaslons In the past shown
their good wlll to come to some senslble agreement. They pleaded,
begged and threatened many times, but to no aval!. The only answer
they recelved was the gallows and the courts. Let the Czechs, therelore, not reproach them for decld!ng to go thelr own way. They gladly
a ccept full responsibllity for the outcome. The Slovaks are convlnced that they can thus better safeguard Slovak!a trom the catastrophles and sufferlngs that were her Jot in the past decades, when
she was ruled by others.
•
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT ?
"Russia 1s for the liber ation of Czechoslovakia ..• Russia is the
strong eat Slav b rothe r and must be regarded as such •• • RUSSIA IS
THE SOURCE OF TRUE OEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM THAT OUR
PEOPLE IS E X PECTING."
DENNfK, Apr!l 21, 1939.
Dr. Edward Beneš, Chicago L' UDOV'Í'
•
"For Russ1a the lmportance of the (CzechosJovak-Sovlet) treaty
lies In the fact she has another ally whose leatler, Dr. Bene•, 1s
hlghly esteemed In Allied counclls, and In the tact that Czechoslovakla
WILL NOT participate in any European FEDERATION whose purpose is re-establishment or a pollcy of the cordon sanitaire. Thla waa
the aecond t l me Dr, Be.nea and Czechoalovakia have blazed a trail
toward amlty of the Soviet Union and nelghborlng states in eaatern
Europe." (NEW YORK TIMES, 12-13-43).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
Why Separate Slovak Politics?
Long before the putsch of February 1948, the communists of Czecho-Slovakia labeled all Slovaks who opposed them as Fascists and Nazis. When they came into power -by the graces of Beneš and Stalin -they got rid of all opposition in the usual Red manner.
On the other hand, the followers of the ruinous policies of Dr. Edward Beneš call the Slovaks "Fascists and Nazis," because they insist on a separate Slovak state, the renewal of the Slovakia that they had proclaimed an independent state before World War II began. Lately they are going a bit farther than that; they have decided to prove that the Slovaks who had anything to do with the Slovak state, -the Hlinka Home Guard, and the Slovak People's Party -also collaborated with the Communists, especially during the 1946 parliamentary elections. That, or course, is just plain silly, because it was not the Czechs or the followers of Beneš, but the Slovaks and the followers of Hlinka and Tiso, who openly opposed the Communists. Not only since 1948, but during the life of the first and second republics as well.
The Slovaks are through with all forms of Czecho-Slovakia. They have had their fill of Magyars, Czechs and Germans. They are determined to fight for an independent Slovak state within or without a European federation. The Slovak Republic was destroyed against their will and illegally by the United Nations, and they still want to know why.
Czecho-Slovak opponents of Slovak independence qualify the formation of the Slovak state as a betrayal of the Czechs and CzechoSlovakia. They have no facts to prove that. They rest satisfied that Beneš had said so. What about the Slovaks themselves? Have they nothing to say about a matter that vitally concerns them? When all facts are considered in the light of the truth, we shall have to come to the conclusion that it was not the Slovak leaders who betrayed the Czechs and Czecho-Slovakia, but the Czech leaders - the Czech Socialists, especially the Czech Nazis (Czech National Socialists) headed by Dr. Edward Beneš.
The difficult situation of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938-1939 is still fresh In our minds. What was responsible for that situation? It was the ruinous policy of Dr. Edward Beneš, who served many years as Foreign Minister and then President of Czecho-Slovakia. The Slovak deputies often cautioned Beneš to change his course, but to no avail. That the Slovaks were able to get out of that hopeless situation and kept themselves not only above water throughout the war, but progressed immensely, that fact itself speaks In favor of the Slovak state.
Now, take the situation that Slovakia finds itself in at the present time. Who is responsible for that situation?
During the war the Slovak nation lived In the conviction that its future life after the conclusion of the war and the defeat of Germany would be able to develop only alongside and after the manner of the western democracies. The influence of German politics was undesirable. Let us only recall that the London broadcast was heard publicly in Slovakia and that despite the fact that it was influenced by people who had a most negative stand toward the Slovak state. It is known that many aviators of the western armies found refuge In Slovakia and even the military authorities treated them as guests. It is also known that many Czechs, fleeing to the west, found refuge and aid in Slovakia.
Cžech politicians - specifically Beneš who posed as President of Czechoslovakia - went to Moscow despite the warnings of the western powers at a time when the formation of a Polish-Czechoslovak Federation was being negotiated. It was there that they sold out the Czech and Slovak nations to communistic Moscow. The Poles were embarrassed; any federation with the Czechs became a dead issue. This was not the result of a political compromise and good will. It was a singular triumph for Gottwald and Stalin.
Then came 1944. It was evident that the end of the war was not far off. The Slovaks were preparing for a new life; pians were being made for a Christian and democratic order without the tutorship of the German Reich. A genuine Slovak revolt was included In the plans. Moscow and Beneš knew about these plans but they were determined to cross up the Slovaks. They could not allow the Slovaks, who were for an independent Slovakia and sympathized with the west, to rebel against the Germans.
Beneš planned the strategy with Stalin. Soviet soldiers and saboteurs were parachuted into the mountains of Slovakia and the fake "national" rebellion of August 1944 was prepared. The result: about 70,000 Slovak dead, persecutions by the enraged Nazis, murder and destruction by both the desperate Nazis and the Red saboteurs. Soon after the war came the "Košice Agreement" which was cooked up In Moscow, and the fate of Slovakia was sealed.
The Slovaks were disappointed. They expected a victory of right and truth, but had to be satisfied again with subordination. But they did not betray their Christian and democratic traditions and convictions. They proved that In the 1946 elections. Little Slovakia, overshadowed by the Red giant, spoke decisively in favor of the west. In Bohemia and Moravia - the CZECH lands - the Reds bested all parties; with the socialists they had a decided majority. In Slovakia, the best the Reds could do - even with the help of the Czech Reds, Beneš's spies and Secret Police, and the army - was about 32 per cent of the total vote.
The Slovak Democratic Party - led by the political unknown Dr. Jozef Lettrich - became the victorious party with about 62 per cent of the total vote. Not by any of its own merits. The followers of Hlinka and Tiso - the overwhelming majority of the Slovak population - had little choice in the matter. Their party -the largest political party in pre-war Slovakia - was outlawed by the Red regime of Beneš. They could vote only for the candidates of the Communist and the Democratic Parties and, so, chose the lesser of two evils - the Democratic Party led by Lettrich. It was a vote against Communism. Of course, the Reds were furious.
But Dr. Lettrich and other leaders of the Democratic Party failed to take advantage of the situation. They betrayed the confidence of the voters by continuing the Sovietophile policy of Beneš. The Reds of Slovakia lost the elections decisively and yet won the most important posts in the state! The voters of Slovakia had decided for a separate Slovak policy, but the leaders of the party blindly continued to follow Beneš and Moscow in their anti-Slovak policy.
A group of bankrupt collaborators with Beneš and Stalin is playing the same politics today that brought disaster to the Slovak nation in February 1948. This group has organized the "COUNCIL OF FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA" which is anything but representative of the will of the Slovak and Czech peoples ln America, at home or elsewhere In emigration. Most of the members of this Council are former members of the NATIONAL FRONT of Czechoslovakia, a fact that they would rather not be reminded of. The Slovaks want no part of them or their Council. They despise them as Red collaborators.
After the terrible experience of the past, the Slovaks cannot trust the very people who betrayed their interests and collaborated with their enslavers. As In the elections of 1946, the Slovaks In emigration today proclaim themselves against the Council of Free Czechoslovakia that is comprised of the men who in a large measure are responsible for the unfortunate situation the Slovak and Czech nations find themselves In today. They are for a separate Slovak policy in emigration and In Slovakia. No more do they want a common policy with the Czechs. Slovak leaders have learned their lesson after living with the Czechs in a common state for 20 years; they remember Munich 1938, December 12, 1943, and the post-war period. They have lost their appetite to hazard with the life of their people.
Slovak political leaders have on many occasions in the past shown their good will to come to some sensible agreement. They pleaded, begged and threatened many times, but to no avail. The only answer they received was the gallows and the courts. Let the Czechs, therefore, not reproach them for deciding to go their own way. They gladly accept full responsibility for the outcome. The Slovaks are convinced that they can thus better safeguard Slovakia from the catastrophes and sufferings that were her lot in the past decades, when she was ruled by others.
WHO SAID IT?
"Russia is for the liberation of Czechoslovakia... Russia is the strongest Slav brother and must be regarded as such... RUSSIA IS THE SOURCE OF TRUE OEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM THAT OUR PEOPLE IS EXPECTING." Dr. Edward Beneš, Chicago ĽUDOVÝ DENNÍK, April 21, 1939.
"For Russia the importance of the (Czechoslovak-Soviet) treaty lies In the fact she has another ally whose leader, Dr. Beneš, is highly esteemed in Allied councils, and in the fact that Czechoslovakia WILL NOT participate in any European FEDERATION whose purpose is re-establishment of a policy of the cordon sanitaire. This was the second time Dr. Beneš and Czechoslovakia have blazed a trail toward amity of the Soviet Union and neighboring states in eastern Europe." - (NEW YORK TIMES, 12-13-43).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Why Separate Slovak Politics?
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951
pp. 7-9
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
May 1951
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5793659afca5cb0ddbe869ddb332e6da.pdf
addf4730244a97b946fc8badbc0bbea4
PDF Text
Text
THE CAUSES OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S DISINTEGRATION
(k) - "The Slovaks, dissatisfied with autonomy within the framework of a diminished Czechoslovak state, went after independence as their ultimate goal. For that their leaders were accused of treason. I doubt whether that was in place...." (John F. Montgomery, former U. S. Ambassador to Hungary: "Hungary, the Satellite against its own W111.")
The disintegration of Czechoslovakia in 1939 and her agony in the fall of 1938 will form interesting chapters in the history of the Europe created by treaties from 1919-1920. During that memorable 1938 and the spring that followed the Munich "capitulation" of the western democracies before German expansion, it was not only a state that collapsed, but also the whole European political and strategic system - a legal and moral system.
In Slovakia some of the foremost personalities were executed, thousands exiled and other thousands were jailed because they were accused of "causing the collapse of Czechoslovakia." But some of the Slovak leaders were fortunate to escape from their country. They were tried in absentia, sentenced to the gallows or hard labor for many years. Czech propaganda, favoring the followers of the late Dr. Beneš, refers to those Slovaks as traitors, fascists and nazis even today.
Will the accusation stand up before the objective judgment of history, or at least before the impartial criticism of factors who are better acquainted with the causes of the European drama of 1938J939 and followed the whole struggle for peace, or who in some cases had even taken part in it?
There is no doubt that Slovak political leaders did not even think of playing so important a role as is ascribed to them. While they had participated in the drama, their action was only a reaction to the phenomenon for which they were not responsible: they simply defended the natural rights and principles that were the foundation of an order that was the subject of a struggle between the great powers.
To ascribe to Slovak politicians such great importance. therefore, is unreal, and, as far as Czechoslovakia 1s concerned, 1t would be overestimating the interna] causes of her disintegration if her ruin were ascribed exclusively to internal phenomena and the centrifugal efforts of the discontented nations and nationalities that comprised Czechoslovakia.
Czechoslovakia did not collapse only because of internal troubles. The causes of her ruination rest above all else on the fact that she was a part of the political order that Germany and several Danubian states, who had lost the first World War, were determined to ruin. It was the political order that the western European creators could not defend at the time.
The causes of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia must be sought in the European situation, especially In the moral and political crisis of Europe and in the change in the forces and presuppositions on which the European order was being built in 1919-1920.
The blunders of Czech political factors in foreign and domestic politics hastened the disintegration and it was these blunders that were responsible even for the internal centrifugal efforts among the majority of inhabitants of Czechoslovakia. An analysis of the European political situation, as well as a closer look at the conditions in Czechoslovakia during its entire existence, leads us to that conclusion.
According to Dr. Edward Beneš, "a fatal blow was dealt from the outside" at Munich, where four great powers - England, France, Germany and Italy - decided on September 29, 1938, to annex the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia to Germany (See: Dr. E. Beneš, NOVÁ SLOVANSKÁ POLITIKA -The New Slovanic Policy -Prague, 1946, pg. 48).
In reality the consequences of the Munich conference, at which of representatives of the Prague government could only listen to the decision of the four great powers and silently yield to their decision or start a war against Germany forsaken by all allies -were the beginning of the end of the state that was the pillar of the political order of central Europe, the state that defended this system even when real political sense demanded that it be changed. Munich forced this system to fall and with it collapsed also Czechoslovakia. The nations situated between Germany and Russia had to suffer the consequences of this reality.
Nobody in the capitals of Europe doubted this in 1938. "All is lost," cried Winston Churchill in his parliamentary speech only six days after Munich. "Let us not try to conceal this reality from ourselves In this regard. We must now assume as certain, that all the states of central and eastern Europe will try to obtain from the triumphant Nazi power the best conditions that they shall be able to get. The system of alliances of central European states, which France thus far regarded as a guarantee of its security, was swept away, and I do not see any possibility of renewing lt."
He said that the road along the Danube basin to the Black Sea, the road to Turkey, was open. Militarily and economically the states of Europe will be, in fact if not formally, drawn into the circle of a wide system of the political power of Berlin. He predicted that would happen without much resistance and probably without a shot being fired. "You shall see," said Churchill, "how from day to day, from week to week, these countries shall become hostile to us....."
It was just as clear In Paris what Munich meant to France and her Danubian allies. "Germany once again is master of central Europe," André Tardieu wrote in his book "L'année de Munich" (pg. 168). And the last French ambassador in Berlin, M. Coulondre, said in his political report on March 19, 1939: "The Munich Pact, complemented by the German-British and Franco-German declarations, according to the German conception means the right of the Reich to organize Central and Southeastern Europe as it pleases with the unexpressed agreement or at least with the tolerance of the great western powers"
That the Germans felt that Munich gave them a free hand in Central Europe was soon demonstrated, when the great powers failed to protest the Magyar and Polish seizure of Czechoslovak territory only a month after Munich. And Munich, according to Chamberlain, had guaranteed no further territorial changes: "I believe that under the present system of guarantees the New Czechoslovakia will find greater security than she has ever enjoyed In the past."
Germany actually was absolute master of the Danube basin. The confusion created by Munich In the southeastern states of Europe worked to the advantage of the Reich (G. Gafencu, former Rumanian minister, In bis book "The Last Days of Europe.) The prestige of Geneva fell, and there was no time to organize a new system of collective security. As far as America and the Russians were concerned, the former were too far away, and the latter preferred not to intervene.
But Munich had far-reaching effects even from another standpoint, especially as far as the politics of Russia was concerned. Russia was isolated by Munich; the Kremlin was not invited to participate at Munich. With the annexation of the Sudetenland, the strategic position of Czechoslovakia was ruined. According to Walter Lippman's "USA Foreign Policy," England and France sacrificed their alliance with Russia when they surrendered Czechoslovakia to the mercy of Hitler.
We mention these things, because Munich did affect what happened later In the Danubian states and the politics of its leading statesmen after 1938. As far as Slovakia ls concerned, the stand of Russia after Munich ls especially interesting.
Soviet Russia not only recognized the Independent Slovak Republic and established regular diplomatic contacts with her, but the Russian ambassador G. Pushkin, handing over bis credentials to the president of Slovakia, Dr. Joseph Tiso, said: "Handing over to you the documents that accredit me as special ambassador and minister plenipotentiary to your Republic, nominated by the Presidency of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, I can tell you with joy that the nations of the Soviet Union have taken note of the establishment of diplomatic contacts between the Soviet Union and the Slovak Republic with deep satisfaction. As a result of war in Europe, the establishment of these contacts transcends the framework of mutual interests of both our states."
II
MUNICH AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA
When the British Prime Minister Chamberlain was confronted with the German demands relative to the Sudetenland at Godesberg, he replied to Hitler by letter on September 26 saying that "the national and economic independence of Czechoslovakia automatically would disappear if the German pian were accepted."
On September 29, 1938, this pian was accepted, nevertheless, and not only by the four powers -England, France, Italy and Germany who participated in the Munich Conference, but on September 30 also by the Prague Government which was headed by Dr. Edward Beneš.
Was Chamberlain right about the destruction of the independence of Czechoslovakia.?
If the Czechoslovak Republic formally preserved the character of an Independent state even after Munich, in reality the new situation limited free decisions by the Prague Government In internal as well as in foreign policy. Furthermore, there hung over the rump state, like a dark cloud, the knowledge that even the new situation was only temporary and that it depended entirely on the Germans when new situations would arise.
"The population of Czechoslovakia,'' wrote Graham Hutton in a book published in the spring of 1939, "reduced to less than 10 million people, is completely under the political, economic and military control of Germany. The new policy of the State is already working entirely in the Interest of Germany and to the disadvantage of the western powers, Poland, Rumania and other Slovanic states. Its human resources are as much at the disposition of Germany as are its economic resources and the production of weapons. . . . The new Czechoslovakia has come under the rule of Germany and her borders cannot be regarded otherwise than as German borders." (Les Nouveaux destine du Danube, pgs. 46, 52).
Of course, it was clear to every sober observer of German policy that the Germans did not consider this advantageous situation as a definite solution. The successes of Hitler’s regime after the occupation of the Rhineland In 1936, attained without great difficulties. could only encourage the Germans in their "Drang nach Osten,'' because for such a policy, especially as far as Czechoslovakia was concerned, they already had allies In the Magyars, but also in the over-all order of conditions in the Danube basin after 1918. The liquidation of the Czechoslovak Republic, therefore, could be clearly foreseen In 1938, and the British ambassador in Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson, wrote In his book "Failure of a Mission" (1939) that the decision to occupy Czechoslovakia was reached on March 12.
Winston Churchill, too, knew what Munich meant for Czechoslovakia, because he said in Parliament on October 5, 1938: "AU is over. Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken, Czechoslovakia recedes into the darkness. . . . I venture to think that In the future the Czechoslovak state cannot be maintained as an Independent entity. I think you will find that in a period of time which may be measured In years, but may be measured only by months, Czechoslovakia will be engulfed In the nazi regime....."
Seton-Watson, one of the greatest admirers of the Czech nation and the former Czechoslovak Republic, remarked bluntly: "Churchill was only too true a prophet." He noted, too, that "In this period the process of disintegration was continued from within."
Even Seton-Watson regarded Munich as "the surrender of a key position to the Pan-Germans." In his "History of the Czechs and Slovaks," he goes on to say that the borders of Bohemia, one of the oldest boundaries of Europe and never changed even In the darkest days of national decline, suddenly became defenseless and the whole Danube region was surrendered to the mercy of the Germans.
In his pro-Czech and anti-Slovak "Czechoslovakia in European History," Prof. S. H. Thomson of the University of Colorado wrote: "The n1mp of Czechoslovakia was obviously incapable of independent economic or political existence" (pg. 348) and that "after Munich the only hope for the country's survival lay in complete reorientation toward Nazi Germany'' (pg. 350), while "In the domain of economics the maimed state was completely at the mercy of Germany (pg. 352).
We could, thus, continue to quote almost indefinitely the views of statesmen, politicians, history professors and publicists, who saw in the Munich decision the end of Czechoslovakia and giving the Germans a free hand in central and southeastern Europe.
After the loss of the Sudetenland, the fertile Slovak valleys, Tešín and the strategic heights on the north and the Slovak border, nay even a few kilometers of land not far from Bratislava (Devin), the territory of Czechoslovakia in reality would have been able to exist independently only if every inhabitant would exert all his strength to hold the state and if maimed and demoralized Czechoslovakia had not been a small island in the German sea, which the Germans wanted to liquidate, since no one - not even the allies and creators of Czechoslovakia in Versailles - wanted to prevent them in doing that.
It was the British Prime Minister himself who said only a week after Munich that even with the greatest sympathies toward Czechoslovakia, he could not allow the British Empire to become enveigled in war under any circumstances "because of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing." We know that France became a second rate military power after the Germans occupied the Saar. And disunited internally, France did not even want to shed blood for Czechoslovakia. It was thus that the Czechoslovak-Franco-Russian Treaty of 1936 became ineffective. The Soviet Union "regretted," but it could come to the aid of Czechoslovakia only if France first defended the Beneš republic.
Czechoslovakia did not get any help from the outside before Munich, and after Munich she definitely could not expect it. The English publisher, Graham Hutton, in the book quoted above (pg. 143), did not hesitate to express the view that Czechoslovakia finds herself So dependent on Germany, economically, that undoubtedly ft would be better for her, from a purely objective standpoint, to establish a complete custom and exchange union with Germany, than to try to hold to the view of nominal and false independence.
That no outside help would be forthcoming was quite clear in Prague itself. Dr. Ivan Derer, the greatest Czechoslovak of Slovak origin, in a broadcast from Prague said among other things: "The Munich Pact not only means that France and England will not help us in the event of war, but it also means that we would find ourselves at war with Germany, because we did not want to give up the Sudeten-German territory. In this war France and England would be obligated to help the Germans and not us."
The Czechs were the chosen people of Czechoslovakia, even though they formed less than half the population. They always Jived In the historical past, boasting of the glory of their kings and the "historical lands" of the Bohemian Crown. Their minds were on the enterprises, the factories and the lands which Munich gave their three neighbors. Masaryk and Beneš had continued the legend of Libuša and Přemysl, that the Czech people was a ruling nation and the other peoples of Czechoslovakia - the Slovaks. Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ukrainians and Rusins - existed only to serve the needs of the Czechs.. They really got a build up from 1918 to 1938, not only at home but also abroad by Beneš's propaganda machinery. The sorry part of it for them was that they had begun to believe the "stories." When the first grave crisis appeared and their great Beneš chose to resign and flee, the Czechs even forgot they had a well• equipped army and the Škoda works. They were soon broken even morally.
The rapid disintegration within the Republic encouraged the Germans to go ahead with their plans of aggression. Beneš's "Island of Democracy" collapsed without offering the slightest physical resistance to the Nazis. The Czechs were not taught by Masaryk and Beneš to fight for freedom and democracy, but only to be the "ruling nation," whereas the other nations of the Republic could not see why they should fight for a system and a state that had exploited and mistreated them.
III
SLOVAK POLITICS AFTER MUNICH
Under such circumstances, there remained for the nations comprising Czecho-Slovakia nothing else to do but accept the consequences of that given situation and to work In their own interests to save whatever could be saved. In reality the politics of Prague, and to a certain extent even that of Slovak leaders, changed after Munich. In the foreign field Prague informed Moscow that it no longer regarded the Russo-Czecho-Slovak agreement as valid. The Little Entente finished In the same fashion and great changes took place also in internal politics.
Slovakia and her political factors, however, acted in a positive manner toward the state and the Czech nation even after Munich. After a 20-year fight with Prague centralism, after innumerable injustices perpetrated against the Slovak Nation, the existence of which they even denied, the Slovaks did not say "Goodbye! " to Prague, but only demanded the fulfillment of the Pittsburgh Pact, on the basis of which they had entered into the single state with the Czech nation In 1918.
The demands -formulated in the Žilina Manifesto, signed by the representatives of all political parties in Slovakia, excepting the Communist and Social Democratic parties - in no way exceeded the framework of the Pittsburgh Pact, nay not even the obligations of Dr. Beneš during the Peace Conference, where he proclaimed: "It is the intention of the Czecho-Slovak Government to organize the state by accepting as the basis of national rights the principles applied in the constitution of the Swiss Republic, that is, to make of the Czecho-Slovak Republic a second Switzerland. .. . " -D. H. Miller, MY DIARY, pg. 69).
Finally, even the motion for the autonomy of Slovakia -passed November 18, 1988, by the Prague Parliament by a vote of 144-25 did not go so far as Dr. Beneš had assured the Peace Conference and noted the adhesion of the Slovaks to the Czecho-Slovak Republic.
In attaining autonomy Slovakia saw the realization of its twenty-year struggle and the removal of the causes that had placed it in opposition not only to Prague, but had also dug a chasm between the Czechs and the Slovaks. "The old Czecho-Slovakia," said Dr. Martin Sokol in Parliament on the day Slovak autonomy became law, "in no small measure fell also because there was no agreement and sincere cooperation between the Slovak and Czech nations. if we wish the new, smaller Czecho-Slovakia to be healthy and capable of life, wo must build it not only with new methods, but also with a new spirit of mutual, fraternal understanding."
At the session of Parliament on December 14, 1938, Dr. Nicholas Pružinský said among other things: "We have faith in the new Government because of objective reasons, too. We have here before our eyes the fulfillment of the legal demands of Slovakia. To the Government that stands back of the autonomy of Slovakia belongs the trust of the Slovaks and Slovakia."
The Slovaks voted unanimously for the successor of Dr. E. Beneš, Dr. Emil Hácha, on November 30, 1988, as they had voted for Dr. Beneš In 1935, on the basis of the promises given.
From the expressions of their representatives it is plainly evident that the Slovaks wanted a new, healthy Czecho-Slovakia, hoped for a mutual, fraternal understanding with the Czechs and expressed their confidence in the government which backed the autonomy of Slovakia, but only to such a government and as long as it backed that autonomy.
But the Czechs, it seems, regretted granting autonomy to Slovakia after they had recovered from the first shock of Munich. They were exceedingly sorry that they had "given" the Slovaks what rightfully was theirs and began to plot against the autonomy of Slovakia. They sought legal and illegal means of circumventing the law that gave Slovakia autonomy. Czech political leaders were determined again to prove that Slovakia was not able to live an autonomous life. "At the same Ume they acted systematically to squeeze Slovakia against the wall economically and financially." (Dr. Ďurčanský: POHĽAD na slovenskú politickú minulosť, pg. 218).
As a result of this policy of Czech representatives and after considering the international situation, more and more voices began to cry out against such autonomy. The first to protest was Dr. V. Tuka, who, after serving 9 years of a 15-year term given him by a Czech court for "treason," never became reconciled with Prague. Dr. Tuka, a university professor was sentenced without sufficient proof, with the aid of false witnesses and only on indictments. When the verdict was pronounced In 1929, Dr. Tuka said: "On this verdict shall be laid the foundations of the Slovak state for a hundred and hundred future years." It was the same Dr. Tuka who previously (in 1924) had proclaimed that Slovakia was mature for independence.
In their contacts with the Third Reich, especially with its economic representatives, Slovak representatives learned early In 1939 that the Germans were preparing for new political deals with their Magyar allies against the Czecho-Slovak Republic in the spring. About the middle of February one of the foremost factors of the Third Reich, Dr. Vehnsenmayer notified several Slovak political representatives that Hungary wants to occupy the territory of Slovakia on March 15, and indicated that an eventual proclamation of the independence of Slovakia could forestall this action.
In the meantime, Czech leaders "were unbelievably shortsighted and haughty In their treatment of the Slovaks," as Sir Neville Henderson wrote ("Failure of a Mission," pg. 232). The Prague government went so far as to ask Berlin how German circles would regard military intervention In Slovakia. Berlin answered that such action was entirely an internal affair of Czecho-Slovakia. Encouraged by Berlin, the Czechs prepared to liquidate Slovak autonomy. And on March 10th, writes Henderson, "the Czech president deposed the Slovak Prime Minister, Dr. Tiso, from his office and occupied Bratislava with the Czech army and gendarmery and by force installed a new government there."
The story, however, is not complete without stating the fact that Slovak soldiers were disarmed and put under guard in barracks, the military commissioner of the Slovak government was deprived of his function, 300-400 outstanding Slovak men were arrested at night and taken into Moravia and university students also were disarmed and incarcerated, etc.
This act of the Prague Government was the coup re grace for the Czecho-Slovak Republic that suffered in agony since Munich. This was too favorable an opportunity to be missed by Hitler's opportunism; disregarding the consequences, he decided to pull the right plan out of bis brief-case and act with lightning speed, Henderson writes and adds: "My warning ambassador Mastný that his Government (that is the Prague Government) was playing into the hands of Hitler and that its foolhardiness would end in catastrophe fell upon deaf ears.... The Czech Government persevered in its stubbornness . ... (Opus cit., pg. 233).
If any other nation were confronted with a situation such as the Slovaks were faced with In 1939, how would it have acted? And what did the Slovaks do?
This sounds like an irony of fate, but they did only what Dr. Beneš considered as correct in 1936 when he told Count C. Sforza, the Italian statesman: "... I would turn to Berlin and accept any compromise I could to preserve the independence of my country.... (Vd ILLUSIONS ET RÉALITÉS de L'EUROPE, Fribourg, 1944). Nay, while Dr. Beneš wanted to do that willingly, the Czechs forced the Slovaks into the situation and made Hitler call Msgr. Dr. Joseph Tiso to Berlin on March 13, 1939. - (S. N., 1949).
• • • •
WHO SAID IT?: - Masaryk on Collaboration With USSR. - Broadcasting to Czechoslovakia, on November 8, Jan Masaryk congratulated the Soviet people on their anniversary. He said that the Russian revolution produced a new type of state. War was necessary to convince the world that there could be no peace without the Soviet Union. Therefore, collaboration with the Soviet Union will be sought The Soviet Union having no imperialistic aims, Stalin has again stressed the independence of other States. Czechoslovakia fears nothing because her traditional characteristics of democracy and progress are respected by Russia, with whom Czechoslovakia will collaborate on an equal basis. The Soviet Union accepts the friendship of the Slav nations, respects their independence, and seeks the collaboration of Britain and the United States for peace. The Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty, protecting Czechoslovakia from German aggression, guarantees our internal freedom and State independence, Masaryk concluded." - (News Flashes From Czechoslovakia, Chicago, III., November 27, 1944).
10
SLOVAKIA
THE CAUSES OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S
DISINTEGRATION
I
(k)- "The Slovaks, dissatlsfied with autonomy within the framework of a diminished Czechoslovak state, went after independence
as their ultlmate goal. For that their leaders were accused of treason.
I doubht whether that was in place. . . ." (John F. Montgomery, former U. S. Ambassador to Hungary: "Hungary, the Satellite agalnst
its own W111.")
The disintegratlon of Czechoslovakia In 1939 and her agony in the
fall of 1938 will form interesting chapters in the history of the Europe
created by treaties from 1919- 1920. Durlng that memorable 1938
and the sprlng that followed the Munich "capltulatlon" of the western democracles before German expansion, it was not only a state
that collapsed, but also the whole European political and strategic
system - a !ega! and mora! system.
In Slovakia some of the foremost personalitles were executed,
thousands exiled and other thousands were jailed because they were
accused of "causing the collapse of Czechoslovakia." But some of
the Slovak Ieaders were fortunate to escape from their country. They
were tried in absentia, sentenced to the gallows or hard labor for
many years. Czech propaganda, favorlng the followers of the late Dr.
Beneš, refers to those Slovaks as traitors, fascists and nazis even
today.
Will the accusation stand up before the objecttve judgment of
history, or at least before the impartial criticism of factors who are
better acquainted with the causes of the European drama of 1938J 939 and followed the whole struggle for peace, or who in some
cases had even taken part in it?
There ls no doubt that Slovak political leaders d!d not even
th!nk of playing so !mportant a role as is ascrlbed to them. While
they had partlcipated in the drama, their action was only a reaction
to the phenomenon for which they were not responsible: they slmply
defended the natural r!ghts and pr!nciples that were the foundation
of an order that was the subject of a struggle between the great
powers.
To ascribe to Slovak politicians such great !mportance. therefore,
is unreal, and, as far as Czechoslovakia 1s concerned, 1t would be
overestlmating the interna] causes of her dlslntegratlon if her ruin
were ascribed exclusively to interna! phenomena and the centrifugal
efforts of the dlscontented natlons and natlonalitles that comprised
Czechoslovakia.
Czechoslovakia did not collapse only because of interna! troubles.
The causes of her ruinatlon rest above all else on the fact that she
was a part of the political order that Germany and several Danubian
states, who had lost the flrst World War, were determined to ruln. It
was the political order that the western European creators could not
defend at the tlme.
The causes of the dlslntegration of Czechoslovakla must be sought
in the European sltuatlon, especlally In the mora! and polltlcal crlsls
�SLOVAKIA
11
of Europe and in the change in the forces and presuppositlons on
whlch the European order was being built in 1919-1920.
The blunders of Czech polltlcal factors in foreign and domestic
politics hastened the disintegration and it was these blunders that
wer responsible even for the interna! centrlfugal efforts among the
majority of lnhabltants of Czechoslovakia. An analysls ot the European
political situation, as well as a closer look at the conditions in Czecho
slovakia during its entlre exlstence, Jeads us to that concluslon.
Accordlng to Dr. Edward Beneš, "a fatal blow was dealt from the
outside" at Munich, where four great powers - England, France, Germany and Italy - declded on September 29, 1938, to annex the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakla to Germany (See: Dr. E. Beneš, NOVÁ
SLOVANSKÁ POLITIKA - The New Slovanlc Policy - Prague, 1946,
pg. 48).
In reality the consequences of the Munich conference, at whlch
of representatives of the Prague government could only listen to the
decision of the four great powers and silently yield to thelr declslon
or start a war agalnst Germany forsaken by all allies - were the be•
glnnlng of the end of the state that was the piliar of the politlcal
order of centra! Europe, the state that defended thls system even
when real polltlcal sense demanded that 1t be changed. Munlch forced
this system to fall and with it collapsed also Czechoslovakla. The nations sltuated between Germany and Russla had to suffer the consequences of thls reality.
Nobody In the capitals of Europe doubted thls in 1938. "All is
Jost," eried Winston Churchill in bis parllamentary speech only six
days after Munlch. "Let us not try to conceal thls reality from ourselves In thls regard. We must now assume as certaln, that all the
states of centra! and eastern Europe will try to obtain from the
triumphant Nazl power the best conditions that they shall be able
to get. The system of alliances of centra! European states, whlch
France thus far regarded as a guarantee of its securlty, was swept
away, and I do not see any posslbillty of renewlng lt."
He sald that the road along the Danube basln to the Black Sea,
the road to Turkey, was open. Mllitarily and economically the states
of Europe w!Jl be, in fact if not formally, drawn lnto the clrcle of a
wide system of the polltlcal power of Berlin. He predlcted that would
happen without much reslstance and probably wlthout a shot belng
fired. "You shall see," sald Churchlll, "how from day to day, trom
week to week, these countrles shall become hostile to us. . . .."
It was just as clear In Parls what Munlch meant to France and
her Danublan allies. "Germany once again is master of centra! Europe,"
André Tardleu wrote In hls book "L'année de Munlch" (pg. 168). And
the Iast French ambassador In Berlin, M. Coulondre, said in hls poJitical report on March 19, 1939: "The Munich Pact, coroplemented
by the Gerroan-Brltlsh and Franco-German declarations, accordlng to
the German conception means the right of the Relch to erganlze Centra! and Southeastern Europe as it pleases wlth the unexpressed
agreement or at least with the tolerance of the great western powers"
That the Germans felt that Munlch gave them a free hand in
Centra! Europe was soon demonstrated, when the great powers falled
to protest the Magyar and Polish selzure of Czechoslovak territory
only a month after Munich. And Munlch, accordlng to Chamberlaln,
�12
SLOVAKIA
had guaranteed no further terrltorlal changes: "I believe that under
the present system of guarantees the New Czchoslovakla will flnd
greater security than she has ever enjoyed In the past."
Germany actually was absolute master of the Danube basln. The
confuslon created by Munlch In the southeastern states of Europe
worked to the advantage of the Reich (G. Gafencu, former Rumanlan
minister, In bis book "The Last Days of Europe.) The prestlge of
Geneva fell, and there was no tlme to organize a new system of colIective security. As far as Amerlca and the Russians were concerned, the former were too far away, and the latter preferred not
to lntervene.
But Munlch had far-reachlng effects even trom another standpolnt,
especlally as far as the polltlcs ot Russla was concerned. Russla was
lsolated by Munich; the Kremlln was not lnvlted to partlclpate at
Munlch. W!th the annexatlon of the Sudetenland, the strategic position of Czechoslovakia was rulned. Accordlng to Walter Lippman's
"USA Fore!gn Policy," England and France sacrlflced the!r alllance
with Russla when they surrendered Czechoslovak!a to the mercy
ot Hitler.
We mention these thlngs, beca.use Mun!ch dld affect what happened later In the Danublan states and the polltlcs of lts leadlng
sta.tesmen after 1938. As far as Slovakia ls concerned, the stand of
Russla after Munlch ls especlally lnterestlng.
Soviet Russla not only recognlzed the Independent Slovak Republlc and establlshed regula.r dlplomatic contacts wlth ber, but the Russian a.mbassador G. Pushkin, handlng over bis credentlals to the
presldent of Slovakla, Dr. Joseph Tis o, sald: "Handlng over to you
the documents that accredlt me as speclal ambassador and minister
plenlpotentiary to your Republlc, nomlna.ted by the Presldency of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR, I can tel1 you wlth joy that the natlons
ot the Soviet Union ha.ve ta.ken note of the establishment of dlplomatlc
contacts between the Soviet Union and the Slovak Republlc with deep
satlsfactlon. As a result of war in Europe, the establishment of these
contacts transcends the framework of mutua.I interests of both our
sta.tes."
II
MUNICH AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA
When the Brltlsh Prime Minister Chamberlain was confronted
wlth the German dema.nds relatlve to the Sudetenland at Godesburg,
he replled to Hitler by letter on September 26 saylng that "the natlonal and economlc lndependence ot Czechoslovakia automatlcally
would dlsa.ppea.r lf the German pian were accepted."
On September 29, 1938, thls pian was accepted, nevertheless, and
not only by the four powers - England, France, Italy and Germany who partlclpated in the Munlcb Conference, but on September 30 also
by the Prague Government whlch was headed by Dr. Edward Beneš.
Was Chamberlaln rlght a.bout the destructlon of tbe lndependence
of Czechoslovakla.?
Jf the Czechoslovak Republic forma.By preserved the character
of an Independent state even after Munlch, In reality the new sltuatlon
limited free declslons by the Prague Government In lnternal as well as
In foreign policy. Furthermore, tbere hung over the rump state, llke
�SLOVAKIA
13
a dark cloud, the knowledge that even the new situation was only
temporary and that it depended entlrely on the Germans when new
situatlons would arise.
"The populatlon of Czechoslovakla,'' wrote Graham Hutton in a
book publlshed in the sprlng of 1939, "reduced to less than 10 million
people, Js completely under the polltlcal, economlc and military control
of Germany. The new pollcy of the State is already worklng entlrely
in the Jnterest of Germany and to the disadvantage of the western
powers, Poland, Rumanla and other Slovanlc states. Its human resources are as much at the dlsposltlon of Germany as are lts economic
resources and the productlon of weapons. . . . The new Czechoslo•
vakia has come under the rule of Germany and her borders cannot
be regarded otherwlse than as German borders." (Les Nouveaux destlns du Danube, pgs. 46, 52).
Of course, it was clear to every sober observer of German
pollcy that the Germans dld not consider this advantageous sltuation
AS a definite solution. The successes of Hltler's reglme after the occupatlon of the Rhineland In 1936, attained wlthout great dlfflcultles.
could only encourage the Germans in their "Drang nach Osten,''
because for such a policy, especially as far as Czechoslovakia was eon
cerned, they already had allles In the Magyars, but also in the
over-all order of condltlons in the Danube basln after 1918. The llquidatlon of the Czechoslovak Republlc, therefore, could be clearly foreseen In 1938, and the Britlsh ambassador in Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson, wrote In hls book "Failure of a Mlssion" (1939) that the declsion to occupy Czechoslovakla was reached on March 12.
Wlnston Churchtll, too, knew what Munich meant for Czechoslovakla, because he said in Parllament on October 5, 1938: "AU is over.
Sllent, mournful, abandoned, broken, Czechoslovakla recedes lnto the
darkness. . . . I venture to thlnk that In the future the Czechoslovak state cannot be maintalned as an Independent entity. I thlnk
you will flnd that in a perlod of Ume which may be measured In
years, but may be measured only by months, Czechoslovakia will be
engulfed In the nazl reglme. . . .."
Seton-Watson, one of the greatest admirers of the Czech natlon
and the former Czechoslovak Republic, remarked bluntly: "Churchlll
was only too true a prophet." He noted, too, that "In thls period the
process of dislntegration was continued trom wlthin."
Even Seton-Watson regarded Munlch as "the surrender of a key
posltlon to the Pan-Germans." In hls "History of the Czechs and
Slovaks," he goes on to say that the borders of Bohemia, one of the
oldest boundaries of Europe and never changed even In the darkest
days of national decllne, suddenly became defenseless and the whole
Danube reglon was surrendered to the mercy of the Germans.
In his pro-Czech and anti-Slovak "Czechoslovakla in European
History," Prof. S. H. Thomson of the University of Colorado wrote:
"The n1mp of Czechoslovakla was obviously incapable of independent
economic or polltlcal existence" (pg. 348) and that "after Munlch
the only hope for the country's survlval lay in complete reorlentatlon toward Nazl Germany'' (pg. 350), while "In the domain of economlcs the malmed state was completely at the mercy of Germany (pg. 352).
We could, thus, contlnue to quote almost !ndeflnltely the views
�14
SLOVAKIA
of statesmen, pollticians, hlstory professors and publlclsts, who saw
In the Munlch decision the end of Czechoslovakia and giving the
Germans a free hand in central and southeastern Europe.
After the loss of the Sudetenland, the fertile Slovak valleys,
Tešin and the strategic heights on the north and the Slovak border,
nay even a few kilometers of land not far from Bratislava (Devin),
the territory of Czechoslovakia in reality would have been able to
cxist independently only lf every inhabitant would exert all his
strength to hold the state and if malmed and demoralized Czechoslovakia had not been a small island in the German sea, wh!ch the
Germans wanted to llquidate, slnce no one - not even the allles
and creators of Czechoslovakia in Versailles - wanted to prevent
them in doing that.
lt was the British Prime Minister himself who said only a week
after Munich that even with the greatest sympathles toward Czecho•
slovakia, he could not allow the Brit!sh Empire to become enveigled
In war under any c!rcumstances "because of a quarrel in a faraway
country between people of whom we know nothlng." We know that
F rance became a second rate mllitary power after the Germans
occupied the Saar. And disunited internally, France did not even
want to shed blood for Czechoslovakia. It was thus that the Czechoslovak-Franco-Russian Treaty of 1936 became ineffectlve. The
Soviet Union "regretted," but lt could come to the ald of Czecho•
slovakia only if France first defended the Beneš republlc.
Czechoslovakia did not get any help from the outslde before
Munich, and after Munich she deflnitely could not expect it. The
Engl!sh publisher, Graham Hutton, in the book quoted above (pg.
143), dld not hesitate to express the view that Czechoslovak!a flnds
herself So dependent on Germany, economically, that undoubtedly ft
would be better for her, from a purely object!ve standpoint, to establish a complete custom and exchange union with Germany, than to
try to hold to the view of nominal and false independence.
That no outside help would be forthcoming was quite clear in
Prague itself. Dr. Ivan Derer, the greatest Czechoslovak of Slovak
origin, in a broadcast trom Prague sald among other things: "The
Munich Pact not only means that France and England w!ll not help
us in the event of war, but it also means that we would find ourselves at war with Germany, because we did not want to glve up the
Sudeten-German territory. In tbls war France and England would be
obligated to help the Germans and not us."
The Czechs were the chosen people of Czechoslovakia, even
though they formed less than half the population. They always
Jived In the hlstorical past, boast!ng of the glory of the!r klngs and
the "histor!cal lands" of the Bohemian Crown. THeir mlnds were on
tbe enterprises, the factorles and the lands which Munich gave
tbeir three neighbors. Masaryk and Beneš had continued the legend
of Libuša and þÿ P Y e m ythat
s l , the Czech people was a rullng natlon and
the other peoples of Czechoslovakla - the Slovaks. Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ukralnlans and Ruslns - exlsted only to serve the
needs of the Czechs.. They really got a bu!ld up from 1918 to 1938,
not only at home but also abroad by Beneš's propaganda machinery.
The sorry part of lt for them was tbat they had begun to belleve the
"stories." When the first grave crisis appeared and thelr great Beneš
�SLOVAKIA
15
chose to resign and flee, the Czechs even forgot they had a well•
equipped army and the Škoda works. They were soon broken even
morally.
The rapid disintegration wlthln the Republlc encouraged the
Germans to go ahead wlth thelr plans of aggresslon. Beneš's "Island
of Democracy" collapsed wlthout offerlng the slightest physical reslstance to the Nazis. The Czechs were not taught by Masaryk and
Beneš to fight for freedom and democracy, but only to be the "ruling nation," whereas the other natlons of the Republlc could not
see why they should fight for a system and a state that had exploited and mistreated them.
III
SLOVAK POLITICS AFTER MUNICH
Under such circumstances, there remalned for the natlons comprlslng Czecho-Slovakia nothing else to do but accept the consequences of that given sltuation and to work In thelr own interests
to save whatever could be saved. In reality the politics of Prague,
and to a certaln extent even that of Slovak leaders, changed after
Munich. In the foreign field Prague lnformed Moscow that it no
longer regarded the Russo-Czecho-Slovak agreement as valid. The
Little Entente flnlshed In the same fashion and great changes took
place also in interna! polltics.
Slovakia and ber polltical factors, however, acted in a posltlve
manner toward the state and the Czech nation even after Munich.
After a 20-year fight wlth Prague centrallsm, after innumerable
lnjustices perpetrated against the Slovak Natlon, the exlstence of
which they even denied, the Slovaks did not say "Goodbye ! " to
Prague, but only demanded the fu lfi llment of the Pittsburgh Pact,
on the basis of which they had entered into the single state with
the Czech nation In 1918.
The demands - formulated in the Žilina Manlfesto, signed by
the representatives of all politlcal partles in Slovakla, excepting the
Communist and Social Democratic partles - in no way exceeded
the framework of the Plttsburgh Pact, nay not even the obllgations
of Dr. Beneš during the Peace Conference, where he proclaimed:
"lt is the intention of the Czecho-Slovak Government to organize the
state by accepting as the basis of national rlghts the principles applied in the constitution of the Swiss Republlc, that is, to make of the
Czecho-Slovak Republic a second Switzerland. .. . " - D. H. Miller,
MY DlARY, pg. 69).
Finally, even the motion for the autonomy of Slovakia - passed
November 18, 1988, by the Prague Parliament by a vote of 144-25 did not go so far as Dr. Beneš had assured the Peace Conference and
noted the adheslon of the Slovaks to the Czecho-Slovak Republic.
In attaining autonomy Slovakla saw the realizatlon of its twentyyear struggle and the removal of the causes that had placed it in
opposltlon not only to Prague, but had also dug a chasm between the
Czechs and the Slovaks. "The old Czecho-Slovakia," sald Dr. Martin
Sokol in Parliament on the day Slovak autonomy became law, "in no
small measure fell also because there was no agreement and sincere
cooperatlon between the Slovak and Czech natlons. lf we wlsh the
�16
SLOVAKIA
new, amaller Czecho-Slovakla to be healthy and capable of llfe, wo
must bulld lt not only wlth new methoda, but a lao wlth a new spirit
of mutual, fraternal understanding."
At the sesslon of Parliament on December 14, 1938, Dr. Nlcholas
Pružlnský said among other thlngs: "We have falth in the new Government becauae of objectlve reasona, too. We have here before our
eyes the fulfillment of the legal demands of Slovakia. To the Government that standa back of the autonomy of Slovakla belongs the
trust of the Slovak• and Slovakla."
The Slovaks voted unanlmously for the successor of Dr. E. Beneš,
Dr. Emil Hácha, on November 30, 1988, as they had voted for Dr.
Beneš In 1935, on the basls of the promlses glven.
From the expresslons of thelr representatlves lt ls plalnly evldent
that the Slovaks wanted a new, healthy Czecho-Slovakia, hoped for a
mutual, fraternal understandlng wlth the Czechs and expressed thelr
confidence in the government whlch backed the autonomy of Slovakia,
but only to such a government and as long as lt backed that autonomy.
But the Czechs, lt seems, regretted grantlng autonomy to Slovakla after they had recovered from the flrst shock of Munlch. They
were exceedlngly sorry that they had "glven" the S lovaks what
rightfully was thelrs and began to plot against the autonomy of Slovakia. They sought legal and lllegal means ot clrcumventing the law
that gave Slovakla autonomy. Czech political leaders were determlned
agaln to prove that Slovakla was not able to live an autonomous
llfe. "At the same Ume they acted systematically to squeeze Slova•
kla agalnst the wall econom!cally and flnancially." (Dr. Ďurčanský:
POHL'AD na slovenskú politickú mlnulose, pg. 218).
As a result of thls pollcy of Czech representatlves and after eon•
slderlng the lnternatlonal sltuation, more and more voices began to
cry out agalnst such autonomy. The flrst to protest was Dr. V.
Tuka, who, after serving 9 years of a 15-year term glven bim by a
Czech court for "treason," never became reconciled wlth Prague. Dr.
Tuka, a unlverslty professor was sentenced wlthout sufficient proof,
with the ald of false wltnesses and only on lndlctments. When the
verdlct was pronounced In 1929, Dr. Tuka sald: "On thls verdlct
shall be lald the foundations of the Slovak state for a hundred and
hundred future years." It was the same Dr. Tulca who previously (In
1924) had proclalmed that Slovakla was mature for lndependence.
In thelr contacts wlth the Thlrd Relch, especially wlth lts eco•
nomlc representatives, Slovak representatives learned early In 1939
that the Germans were preparlng for new politlcal deals wlth thelr
Magyar allies agalnst the Czecho-Slovak Republlc In the sprlng.
About the mlddle of February one of the foremost factors of the
Thlrd Relch, Dr. Vehnsenmayer notlfled several Slovak polltical rep•
resentatlves that Hungary wants to occupy the terrltory of Slovakla
on March 15, and lndlcated that an eventual proclamation of the lndependence of Slovakla could forestall thls actlon.
In the meantlme, Czech leaders "were unbelleva.bly shortslghted
and haughty In thelr treatment of the Slovaks," as Sir Neville
Henderson wrote ("Fallure of a Mlsslon," pg. 232). The Prague government went so far as to ask Berlin how German clrcles would
regard milltary lntervention In Slovak.ia. Berlin answered that such
actlon was entirely an lnternal affalr of Czecho•Slovakla. Encouraged
�SLOVAKIA
17
by Berlln, the Czechs prepared to llquidate Slovak autonomy. And on
March 10th, wrltes Henderson, "the Czech president deposed the
Slovak Prime Minister, Dr. Tiso, from his office and occupied Bratislava with the Czech army and gendarmery and by force installed
a new government there."
The story, however, is not complete without stating the fact that
Slovak soldiers were disarmed and put under guard in barracks, the
military commlssioner of the Slovak government was deprived of bis
functlon, 300-400 outstanding Slovak men were arrested at night
and taken into Moravia and universlty students also were disarmed
and lncarcerated, etc.
This act of the Prague Government was the coup re grace for the
Czecho-Slovak Republic that suffered in agony slnce Munich. Th!s
was too favorable an opportunity to be mlssed by Hitler's opportunism; disregarding the consequences, he decided to puli the right
pian out of bis brief-case and act wlth lightning speed, Henderson
writes and adds: "My warning ambassador Mastný that his Government (that is the Prague Government) was playing into the hands
of Hitler and that its foolhardiness would end in catastrophe fell
lipon deaf ears. . . . The Czech Government persevered in its stubborness. . . . (Opus cit., pg. 233).
If any other nation were confronted with a situation such as
the Slovaks were faced with In 1939, how would lt have acted? And
what did the Slovaks do?
This sounds like an irony of fate, but they dld only what Dr.
Beneš considered as correct in 1936 when he told Count C. Sforza,
the !talian statesman: " . . . 1 would turn to Berlin and accept any
compromise I could to preserve the independence of my country... .
(Vd ILLUSIONS ET RÉALITÉS de L'EUROPE, Fribourg, 1944).
Nay, while Dr. Beneš wanted to do that willingly, the Czechs forced
the Slovaks lnto the situation and made Hitler call Msgr. Dr.
Joseph Tlso to Berlin on March 13, 1939. - (S. N., 1949) .
•
•
• •
WHO SAID IT?: - Masaryk on Collaboration With USSR. Broadcastlng to Czechoslovakia, on November 8, Jan Masaryk con•
gratulated the Soviet people on their anniversary. He said that the
Russian revolution produced a new type of state. War was necessary
to convince the world that there could be no peace without the Soviet Union. Therefore, collaboration with the Soviet Union will be
sought The Soviet Union having no imperialistic aims, Stalin has
again stressed the independence of other States. Czechoslovakia fears
nothing because her traditional characteristics of democracy and progress are respected by Russia, with whom Czechoslovakia will collaborate on an equal basis. The Soviet Union accepts the frlendshlp
of the Slav nations, respects their independence, and seeks the collaboration of Britain and the United States for peace. The Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty, protecting Czechoslovakia from German aggression,
guarantees our internal freedom and State independence, Masaryk
concluded." (News Flashes From Czechoslovakia, Chicago, III.,
November 27, 1944).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
THE CAUSES OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S DISINTEGRATION
(k) - "The Slovaks, dissatisfied with autonomy within the framework of a diminished Czechoslovak state, went after independence as their ultimate goal. For that their leaders were accused of treason. I doubt whether that was in place...." (John F. Montgomery, former U. S. Ambassador to Hungary: "Hungary, the Satellite against its own W111.")
The disintegration of Czechoslovakia in 1939 and her agony in the fall of 1938 will form interesting chapters in the history of the Europe created by treaties from 1919-1920. During that memorable 1938 and the spring that followed the Munich "capitulation" of the western democracies before German expansion, it was not only a state that collapsed, but also the whole European political and strategic system - a legal and moral system.
In Slovakia some of the foremost personalities were executed, thousands exiled and other thousands were jailed because they were accused of "causing the collapse of Czechoslovakia." But some of the Slovak leaders were fortunate to escape from their country. They were tried in absentia, sentenced to the gallows or hard labor for many years. Czech propaganda, favoring the followers of the late Dr. Beneš, refers to those Slovaks as traitors, fascists and nazis even today.
Will the accusation stand up before the objective judgment of history, or at least before the impartial criticism of factors who are better acquainted with the causes of the European drama of 1938J939 and followed the whole struggle for peace, or who in some cases had even taken part in it?
There is no doubt that Slovak political leaders did not even think of playing so important a role as is ascribed to them. While they had participated in the drama, their action was only a reaction to the phenomenon for which they were not responsible: they simply defended the natural rights and principles that were the foundation of an order that was the subject of a struggle between the great powers.
To ascribe to Slovak politicians such great importance. therefore, is unreal, and, as far as Czechoslovakia 1s concerned, 1t would be overestimating the interna] causes of her disintegration if her ruin were ascribed exclusively to internal phenomena and the centrifugal efforts of the discontented nations and nationalities that comprised Czechoslovakia.
Czechoslovakia did not collapse only because of internal troubles. The causes of her ruination rest above all else on the fact that she was a part of the political order that Germany and several Danubian states, who had lost the first World War, were determined to ruin. It was the political order that the western European creators could not defend at the time.
The causes of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia must be sought in the European situation, especially In the moral and political crisis of Europe and in the change in the forces and presuppositions on which the European order was being built in 1919-1920.
The blunders of Czech political factors in foreign and domestic politics hastened the disintegration and it was these blunders that were responsible even for the internal centrifugal efforts among the majority of inhabitants of Czechoslovakia. An analysis of the European political situation, as well as a closer look at the conditions in Czechoslovakia during its entire existence, leads us to that conclusion.
According to Dr. Edward Beneš, "a fatal blow was dealt from the outside" at Munich, where four great powers - England, France, Germany and Italy - decided on September 29, 1938, to annex the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia to Germany (See: Dr. E. Beneš, NOVÁ SLOVANSKÁ POLITIKA -The New Slovanic Policy -Prague, 1946, pg. 48).
In reality the consequences of the Munich conference, at which of representatives of the Prague government could only listen to the decision of the four great powers and silently yield to their decision or start a war against Germany forsaken by all allies -were the beginning of the end of the state that was the pillar of the political order of central Europe, the state that defended this system even when real political sense demanded that it be changed. Munich forced this system to fall and with it collapsed also Czechoslovakia. The nations situated between Germany and Russia had to suffer the consequences of this reality.
Nobody in the capitals of Europe doubted this in 1938. "All is lost," cried Winston Churchill in his parliamentary speech only six days after Munich. "Let us not try to conceal this reality from ourselves In this regard. We must now assume as certain, that all the states of central and eastern Europe will try to obtain from the triumphant Nazi power the best conditions that they shall be able to get. The system of alliances of central European states, which France thus far regarded as a guarantee of its security, was swept away, and I do not see any possibility of renewing lt."
He said that the road along the Danube basin to the Black Sea, the road to Turkey, was open. Militarily and economically the states of Europe will be, in fact if not formally, drawn into the circle of a wide system of the political power of Berlin. He predicted that would happen without much resistance and probably without a shot being fired. "You shall see," said Churchill, "how from day to day, from week to week, these countries shall become hostile to us....."
It was just as clear In Paris what Munich meant to France and her Danubian allies. "Germany once again is master of central Europe," André Tardieu wrote in his book "L'année de Munich" (pg. 168). And the last French ambassador in Berlin, M. Coulondre, said in his political report on March 19, 1939: "The Munich Pact, complemented by the German-British and Franco-German declarations, according to the German conception means the right of the Reich to organize Central and Southeastern Europe as it pleases with the unexpressed agreement or at least with the tolerance of the great western powers"
That the Germans felt that Munich gave them a free hand in Central Europe was soon demonstrated, when the great powers failed to protest the Magyar and Polish seizure of Czechoslovak territory only a month after Munich. And Munich, according to Chamberlain, had guaranteed no further territorial changes: "I believe that under the present system of guarantees the New Czechoslovakia will find greater security than she has ever enjoyed In the past."
Germany actually was absolute master of the Danube basin. The confusion created by Munich In the southeastern states of Europe worked to the advantage of the Reich (G. Gafencu, former Rumanian minister, In bis book "The Last Days of Europe.) The prestige of Geneva fell, and there was no time to organize a new system of collective security. As far as America and the Russians were concerned, the former were too far away, and the latter preferred not to intervene.
But Munich had far-reaching effects even from another standpoint, especially as far as the politics of Russia was concerned. Russia was isolated by Munich; the Kremlin was not invited to participate at Munich. With the annexation of the Sudetenland, the strategic position of Czechoslovakia was ruined. According to Walter Lippman's "USA Foreign Policy," England and France sacrificed their alliance with Russia when they surrendered Czechoslovakia to the mercy of Hitler.
We mention these things, because Munich did affect what happened later In the Danubian states and the politics of its leading statesmen after 1938. As far as Slovakia ls concerned, the stand of Russia after Munich ls especially interesting.
Soviet Russia not only recognized the Independent Slovak Republic and established regular diplomatic contacts with her, but the Russian ambassador G. Pushkin, handing over bis credentials to the president of Slovakia, Dr. Joseph Tiso, said: "Handing over to you the documents that accredit me as special ambassador and minister plenipotentiary to your Republic, nominated by the Presidency of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, I can tell you with joy that the nations of the Soviet Union have taken note of the establishment of diplomatic contacts between the Soviet Union and the Slovak Republic with deep satisfaction. As a result of war in Europe, the establishment of these contacts transcends the framework of mutual interests of both our states."
II
MUNICH AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA
When the British Prime Minister Chamberlain was confronted with the German demands relative to the Sudetenland at Godesberg, he replied to Hitler by letter on September 26 saying that "the national and economic independence of Czechoslovakia automatically would disappear if the German pian were accepted."
On September 29, 1938, this pian was accepted, nevertheless, and not only by the four powers -England, France, Italy and Germany who participated in the Munich Conference, but on September 30 also by the Prague Government which was headed by Dr. Edward Beneš.
Was Chamberlain right about the destruction of the independence of Czechoslovakia.?
If the Czechoslovak Republic formally preserved the character of an Independent state even after Munich, in reality the new situation limited free decisions by the Prague Government In internal as well as in foreign policy. Furthermore, there hung over the rump state, like a dark cloud, the knowledge that even the new situation was only temporary and that it depended entirely on the Germans when new situations would arise.
"The population of Czechoslovakia,'' wrote Graham Hutton in a book published in the spring of 1939, "reduced to less than 10 million people, is completely under the political, economic and military control of Germany. The new policy of the State is already working entirely in the Interest of Germany and to the disadvantage of the western powers, Poland, Rumania and other Slovanic states. Its human resources are as much at the disposition of Germany as are its economic resources and the production of weapons. . . . The new Czechoslovakia has come under the rule of Germany and her borders cannot be regarded otherwise than as German borders." (Les Nouveaux destine du Danube, pgs. 46, 52).
Of course, it was clear to every sober observer of German policy that the Germans did not consider this advantageous situation as a definite solution. The successes of Hitler’s regime after the occupation of the Rhineland In 1936, attained without great difficulties. could only encourage the Germans in their "Drang nach Osten,'' because for such a policy, especially as far as Czechoslovakia was concerned, they already had allies In the Magyars, but also in the over-all order of conditions in the Danube basin after 1918. The liquidation of the Czechoslovak Republic, therefore, could be clearly foreseen In 1938, and the British ambassador in Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson, wrote In his book "Failure of a Mission" (1939) that the decision to occupy Czechoslovakia was reached on March 12.
Winston Churchill, too, knew what Munich meant for Czechoslovakia, because he said in Parliament on October 5, 1938: "AU is over. Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken, Czechoslovakia recedes into the darkness. . . . I venture to think that In the future the Czechoslovak state cannot be maintained as an Independent entity. I think you will find that in a period of time which may be measured In years, but may be measured only by months, Czechoslovakia will be engulfed In the nazi regime....."
Seton-Watson, one of the greatest admirers of the Czech nation and the former Czechoslovak Republic, remarked bluntly: "Churchill was only too true a prophet." He noted, too, that "In this period the process of disintegration was continued from within."
Even Seton-Watson regarded Munich as "the surrender of a key position to the Pan-Germans." In his "History of the Czechs and Slovaks," he goes on to say that the borders of Bohemia, one of the oldest boundaries of Europe and never changed even In the darkest days of national decline, suddenly became defenseless and the whole Danube region was surrendered to the mercy of the Germans.
In his pro-Czech and anti-Slovak "Czechoslovakia in European History," Prof. S. H. Thomson of the University of Colorado wrote: "The n1mp of Czechoslovakia was obviously incapable of independent economic or political existence" (pg. 348) and that "after Munich the only hope for the country's survival lay in complete reorientation toward Nazi Germany'' (pg. 350), while "In the domain of economics the maimed state was completely at the mercy of Germany (pg. 352).
We could, thus, continue to quote almost indefinitely the views of statesmen, politicians, history professors and publicists, who saw in the Munich decision the end of Czechoslovakia and giving the Germans a free hand in central and southeastern Europe.
After the loss of the Sudetenland, the fertile Slovak valleys, Tešín and the strategic heights on the north and the Slovak border, nay even a few kilometers of land not far from Bratislava (Devin), the territory of Czechoslovakia in reality would have been able to exist independently only if every inhabitant would exert all his strength to hold the state and if maimed and demoralized Czechoslovakia had not been a small island in the German sea, which the Germans wanted to liquidate, since no one - not even the allies and creators of Czechoslovakia in Versailles - wanted to prevent them in doing that.
It was the British Prime Minister himself who said only a week after Munich that even with the greatest sympathies toward Czechoslovakia, he could not allow the British Empire to become enveigled in war under any circumstances "because of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing." We know that France became a second rate military power after the Germans occupied the Saar. And disunited internally, France did not even want to shed blood for Czechoslovakia. It was thus that the Czechoslovak-Franco-Russian Treaty of 1936 became ineffective. The Soviet Union "regretted," but it could come to the aid of Czechoslovakia only if France first defended the Beneš republic.
Czechoslovakia did not get any help from the outside before Munich, and after Munich she definitely could not expect it. The English publisher, Graham Hutton, in the book quoted above (pg. 143), did not hesitate to express the view that Czechoslovakia finds herself So dependent on Germany, economically, that undoubtedly ft would be better for her, from a purely objective standpoint, to establish a complete custom and exchange union with Germany, than to try to hold to the view of nominal and false independence.
That no outside help would be forthcoming was quite clear in Prague itself. Dr. Ivan Derer, the greatest Czechoslovak of Slovak origin, in a broadcast from Prague said among other things: "The Munich Pact not only means that France and England will not help us in the event of war, but it also means that we would find ourselves at war with Germany, because we did not want to give up the Sudeten-German territory. In this war France and England would be obligated to help the Germans and not us."
The Czechs were the chosen people of Czechoslovakia, even though they formed less than half the population. They always Jived In the historical past, boasting of the glory of their kings and the "historical lands" of the Bohemian Crown. Their minds were on the enterprises, the factories and the lands which Munich gave their three neighbors. Masaryk and Beneš had continued the legend of Libuša and Přemysl, that the Czech people was a ruling nation and the other peoples of Czechoslovakia - the Slovaks. Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ukrainians and Rusins - existed only to serve the needs of the Czechs.. They really got a build up from 1918 to 1938, not only at home but also abroad by Beneš's propaganda machinery. The sorry part of it for them was that they had begun to believe the "stories." When the first grave crisis appeared and their great Beneš chose to resign and flee, the Czechs even forgot they had a well• equipped army and the Škoda works. They were soon broken even morally.
The rapid disintegration within the Republic encouraged the Germans to go ahead with their plans of aggression. Beneš's "Island of Democracy" collapsed without offering the slightest physical resistance to the Nazis. The Czechs were not taught by Masaryk and Beneš to fight for freedom and democracy, but only to be the "ruling nation," whereas the other nations of the Republic could not see why they should fight for a system and a state that had exploited and mistreated them.
III
SLOVAK POLITICS AFTER MUNICH
Under such circumstances, there remained for the nations comprising Czecho-Slovakia nothing else to do but accept the consequences of that given situation and to work In their own interests to save whatever could be saved. In reality the politics of Prague, and to a certain extent even that of Slovak leaders, changed after Munich. In the foreign field Prague informed Moscow that it no longer regarded the Russo-Czecho-Slovak agreement as valid. The Little Entente finished In the same fashion and great changes took place also in internal politics.
Slovakia and her political factors, however, acted in a positive manner toward the state and the Czech nation even after Munich. After a 20-year fight with Prague centralism, after innumerable injustices perpetrated against the Slovak Nation, the existence of which they even denied, the Slovaks did not say "Goodbye! " to Prague, but only demanded the fulfillment of the Pittsburgh Pact, on the basis of which they had entered into the single state with the Czech nation In 1918.
The demands -formulated in the Žilina Manifesto, signed by the representatives of all political parties in Slovakia, excepting the Communist and Social Democratic parties - in no way exceeded the framework of the Pittsburgh Pact, nay not even the obligations of Dr. Beneš during the Peace Conference, where he proclaimed: "It is the intention of the Czecho-Slovak Government to organize the state by accepting as the basis of national rights the principles applied in the constitution of the Swiss Republic, that is, to make of the Czecho-Slovak Republic a second Switzerland. .. . " -D. H. Miller, MY DIARY, pg. 69).
Finally, even the motion for the autonomy of Slovakia -passed November 18, 1988, by the Prague Parliament by a vote of 144-25 did not go so far as Dr. Beneš had assured the Peace Conference and noted the adhesion of the Slovaks to the Czecho-Slovak Republic.
In attaining autonomy Slovakia saw the realization of its twenty-year struggle and the removal of the causes that had placed it in opposition not only to Prague, but had also dug a chasm between the Czechs and the Slovaks. "The old Czecho-Slovakia," said Dr. Martin Sokol in Parliament on the day Slovak autonomy became law, "in no small measure fell also because there was no agreement and sincere cooperation between the Slovak and Czech nations. if we wish the new, smaller Czecho-Slovakia to be healthy and capable of life, wo must build it not only with new methods, but also with a new spirit of mutual, fraternal understanding."
At the session of Parliament on December 14, 1938, Dr. Nicholas Pružinský said among other things: "We have faith in the new Government because of objective reasons, too. We have here before our eyes the fulfillment of the legal demands of Slovakia. To the Government that stands back of the autonomy of Slovakia belongs the trust of the Slovaks and Slovakia."
The Slovaks voted unanimously for the successor of Dr. E. Beneš, Dr. Emil Hácha, on November 30, 1988, as they had voted for Dr. Beneš In 1935, on the basis of the promises given.
From the expressions of their representatives it is plainly evident that the Slovaks wanted a new, healthy Czecho-Slovakia, hoped for a mutual, fraternal understanding with the Czechs and expressed their confidence in the government which backed the autonomy of Slovakia, but only to such a government and as long as it backed that autonomy.
But the Czechs, it seems, regretted granting autonomy to Slovakia after they had recovered from the first shock of Munich. They were exceedingly sorry that they had "given" the Slovaks what rightfully was theirs and began to plot against the autonomy of Slovakia. They sought legal and illegal means of circumventing the law that gave Slovakia autonomy. Czech political leaders were determined again to prove that Slovakia was not able to live an autonomous life. "At the same Ume they acted systematically to squeeze Slovakia against the wall economically and financially." (Dr. Ďurčanský: POHĽAD na slovenskú politickú minulosť, pg. 218).
As a result of this policy of Czech representatives and after considering the international situation, more and more voices began to cry out against such autonomy. The first to protest was Dr. V. Tuka, who, after serving 9 years of a 15-year term given him by a Czech court for "treason," never became reconciled with Prague. Dr. Tuka, a university professor was sentenced without sufficient proof, with the aid of false witnesses and only on indictments. When the verdict was pronounced In 1929, Dr. Tuka said: "On this verdict shall be laid the foundations of the Slovak state for a hundred and hundred future years." It was the same Dr. Tuka who previously (in 1924) had proclaimed that Slovakia was mature for independence.
In their contacts with the Third Reich, especially with its economic representatives, Slovak representatives learned early In 1939 that the Germans were preparing for new political deals with their Magyar allies against the Czecho-Slovak Republic in the spring. About the middle of February one of the foremost factors of the Third Reich, Dr. Vehnsenmayer notified several Slovak political representatives that Hungary wants to occupy the territory of Slovakia on March 15, and indicated that an eventual proclamation of the independence of Slovakia could forestall this action.
In the meantime, Czech leaders "were unbelievably shortsighted and haughty In their treatment of the Slovaks," as Sir Neville Henderson wrote ("Failure of a Mission," pg. 232). The Prague government went so far as to ask Berlin how German circles would regard military intervention In Slovakia. Berlin answered that such action was entirely an internal affair of Czecho-Slovakia. Encouraged by Berlin, the Czechs prepared to liquidate Slovak autonomy. And on March 10th, writes Henderson, "the Czech president deposed the Slovak Prime Minister, Dr. Tiso, from his office and occupied Bratislava with the Czech army and gendarmery and by force installed a new government there."
The story, however, is not complete without stating the fact that Slovak soldiers were disarmed and put under guard in barracks, the military commissioner of the Slovak government was deprived of his function, 300-400 outstanding Slovak men were arrested at night and taken into Moravia and university students also were disarmed and incarcerated, etc.
This act of the Prague Government was the coup re grace for the Czecho-Slovak Republic that suffered in agony since Munich. This was too favorable an opportunity to be missed by Hitler's opportunism; disregarding the consequences, he decided to pull the right plan out of bis brief-case and act with lightning speed, Henderson writes and adds: "My warning ambassador Mastný that his Government (that is the Prague Government) was playing into the hands of Hitler and that its foolhardiness would end in catastrophe fell upon deaf ears.... The Czech Government persevered in its stubbornness . ... (Opus cit., pg. 233).
If any other nation were confronted with a situation such as the Slovaks were faced with In 1939, how would it have acted? And what did the Slovaks do?
This sounds like an irony of fate, but they did only what Dr. Beneš considered as correct in 1936 when he told Count C. Sforza, the Italian statesman: "... I would turn to Berlin and accept any compromise I could to preserve the independence of my country.... (Vd ILLUSIONS ET RÉALITÉS de L'EUROPE, Fribourg, 1944). Nay, while Dr. Beneš wanted to do that willingly, the Czechs forced the Slovaks into the situation and made Hitler call Msgr. Dr. Joseph Tiso to Berlin on March 13, 1939. - (S. N., 1949).
• • • •
WHO SAID IT?: - Masaryk on Collaboration With USSR. - Broadcasting to Czechoslovakia, on November 8, Jan Masaryk congratulated the Soviet people on their anniversary. He said that the Russian revolution produced a new type of state. War was necessary to convince the world that there could be no peace without the Soviet Union. Therefore, collaboration with the Soviet Union will be sought The Soviet Union having no imperialistic aims, Stalin has again stressed the independence of other States. Czechoslovakia fears nothing because her traditional characteristics of democracy and progress are respected by Russia, with whom Czechoslovakia will collaborate on an equal basis. The Soviet Union accepts the friendship of the Slav nations, respects their independence, and seeks the collaboration of Britain and the United States for peace. The Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty, protecting Czechoslovakia from German aggression, guarantees our internal freedom and State independence, Masaryk concluded." - (News Flashes From Czechoslovakia, Chicago, III., November 27, 1944).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Causes of Czechoslovakia's Disintegration
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951
pp. 10-17
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
May 1951
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9035ed3667ef69ed4467ca94b766f781.pdf
5d5b464c4fe3e22d910d612a1c2eeffd
PDF Text
Text
AMERICAN SLOVAKS AND SLOVAK STATEHOOD
CONSTANTINE ČULEN (Member of the Board of the Slovak National Council Abroad)
We are witnesses of an incredible phenomenon. The demand of the Slovak nation to decide for itself its own fate, to have its own state, has often been classified as a crime. If it is a crime, then we must state clearly at the outset that the roots of this crime stem not in Slovakia, but in America.
No other country in the world has had as much influence as America on the development of the political destinies of the Slovak nation. Even today in Slovakia there Jive several hundred thousand mature citizens who spent the best years of their lives in America. English and American prisoners of war attest to the fact that wherever they traveled in Slovakia they found people who could speak English and felt a burning love for the United States.
There were times when 2 per cent of the total Slovak population left its native home for America annually. In the years between 1889 and 1915 about 600,000 Slovaks emigrated out of a total population of about 2,750,000. Of course, many Slovaks later returned to their homes beneath the majestic Tatras, but the majority of Slovak emigrants remained in America. Today about a million and a half Americans are of Slovak descent. The Slovaks who returned to Slovakia, however, were not the same people who had left lt. They were distinctly different in certain respects, because America had done something to them, America had, in fact, transformed them.
In old Hungary the Slovak people was an oppressed nation. The Slovaks were dying materially and nationally under the yoke of Magyar feudalism. They had very little or no schooling and no representation in parliament. Their language was not tolerated outside the church and family circle. It was such Slovaks who first came to America in large numbers. They had no idea of the rights they were entitled to. In America they began to organize themselves on a national basis.
It may seem strange, but it 1s a fact that the Slovaks as a whole did not awaken nationally at home, but in America. For the first time in their history, it was In America that the Slovaks could parade freely under the Slovak flag. In America they could establish Slovak organizations. In America they could freely and without fear of censorship and confiscation publish their own Slovak newspapers. They could freely and without interference present their political demands. All this was forbidden them at home, In Slovakia.
In a short Ume, this small nation, oppressed at home, awakened nationally on American soil and soon made its influence felt even at home. In Slovakia under the Magyars. the Slovaks could not even elect a squire, but In the USA they could elect even the President of the USA after they had become citizens. The Slovaks, who lived in thraldom in their native land, became full-fledged citizens In America. And since thousands of Slovaks returned to Slovakia from America annually, they brought with themselves not only money, with which they paid off their debts, bought homes and established businesses, but they also brought with themselves national consciousness. The influence of these re-emigrants was so effective that the Slovak nation, which had only two deputies in parliament during a whole century, already had twenty of them during the first decade of this century. All political battles of the twentieth century were waged with American money and were influenced by the American spirit of freedom.
From America, the Slovaks brought many things to their homeland, especially, however, 1. capital; 2. technical experiences; 3. human and national self-consciousness; 4. a love for democracy; 6. a knowledge of English; and 6. a love for America and the American way of life.
What the Slovaks brought from America they sought to validate at home. The American way of life encouraged and directed their plans in Slovakia. Slovak life waxed strong even during the hardest times, because it was nourished materially and ideologically by a current of material and spiritual wealth from America.
In the recent past, American Slovaks formed the most nationalistic group of the Slovak nation. What the Slovak at home could not say, the Slovak in America expressed for him. It is undoubtedly an interesting reality that the wide Slovak masses became ardent nationalists in America. And the fact that Slovak newspapers became an indispensable necessity of the Slovak people, that, too, must be credited to America.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the most widely distributed Slovak newspaper in America had about ten times more subscribers than all the Slovak newspapers in Slovakia combined. Without the national consciousness which the emigrants brought home from America, there never would have been any political awakening of the Slovaks during the first decade of this century. And without the money, which the Slovaks earned and saved in America, the living standard of the Slovak people would not have attained the high level that it did. For that reason, the Idea of "the new homeland of the Slovaks" - in reference to America - is not an empty expression. America actually became the new homeland of Slovak emigrants, in fact, the homeland of approximately one-third of the entire Slovak nation.
The Slovaks at home always mentioned and still do mention America with grateful affection. In Slovakia, even today the words Pittsburgh, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, New York, Milwaukee, Scranton and other American cities with large Slovak populations are as familiar as Budapest, Berlin, Vienna, Paris and Prague.
If one looks through the oldest newspapers published in Slovakia, he will ascertain that Slovakia regarded the results of American democracy with great admiration and respect long before hundreds of thousands of Slovaks settled in America. American freedom was their model.
The old "Prešpurské Noviny" (Pressburg News) already in 1783 published quite a few articles about the American struggle for freedom. And American democracy – “where there are no citizens with special privileges" - was offered as a model to the Slovaks by Štúr's "Orol Tatranský (The Eagle of the Tatras). The youthful followers of Štúr already In 1843 contributed an article about Slovak poetry to the "North American Review." Joseph Miloslav Hurban, Slovak patriot, said in his biography of Štúr:
"Wise and just laws, founded on inalienable natural rights, will provide strength and welfare to nations. For us the evident proof of this has become the free United States of North America."
His son, Svetozár Hurban Vajanský renowned Slovak poet and writer, sent a greeting to his countrymen in America while in jail. In that greeting, among other things, he has America saying to Slovak emigrants:
"Oh, come to me, foresaken children!
Gifts I have not, but one thing I do give you:
Time to work in freedom, respect for human rights."
And he further wrote:
"And Columbia? Thou hast rent the shackles,
Lifted them up closer to humanity, to God, to heaven.
Land of Christopher, may Christ reward thee,
For what thou bast done for my wretched brethren."
That the American flag was held in great respect by the first Slovak immigrants is attested to by a leaflet that was published some fifty years ago. It reads:
"Under this flag you are a free citizen.
Under this flag there is freedom, equality and fraternity.
Under this flag is justice and truth.
Under this flag you have meat and bread.
Under this flag you worship no one and are not persecuted by the Government.
Under this flag you were received as a human being and freedom was given you.
Under this flag you praise the Lord in your own tongue and no one ridicules or persecutes you for it.
To this flag you have sworn loyalty, you have become a citizen.
Do you want to break your oath, do you want to be a perjurer and traitor? ! "
That is how the Slovaks regarded and respected the American flag fifty years ago. In such a manner the Slovaks rallied around the American f\ag and everything that is symbolized: American democracy, American regard for the rights of nations. It was the American way of life that first motivated the Slovaks to fight for the right of the Slovak nation to its own state.
Unfortunately, false and mendacious propaganda succeeded in convincing the statesmen of America that there is only one nation In the world that did not want freedom and independence - and that nation was the Slovak nation. They fell for the story that there was one nation In this world that wanted to be a vassal of others and not an independent nation, and that was the Slovak nation - the nation which drank from the pure stream of American freedom and democracy, the nation which so long ago propagated from America what its enslaved adherents at home dared to translate into deeds a half century later.
American democracy and the American way of life gave the Slovaks the first motive to demand all their inherent rights. Fifty years ago American Slovaks propagated and financed the fight of their nation for the right of a general, equal and secret ballot in Slovakia. The Slovaks in America sent their first "Memorandum" to the rulers of Slovakia in 1900. In it they requested the Magyar government to grant the Slovaks at home as much freedom as the Slovaks enjoyed in America.
Peter Rovnianek, one of the outstanding Slovaks of his time, already in 1894 wrote in the first Slovak Almanac (Kalendár) published in America:
"American-Slovak life is shining proof of Slovak capability. Only in America have we seen all that the Slovaks would be able to create at home, if the boot of the tyrant would not press them to the earth."
But even Dr. Edward Beneš himself wrote in 1918: "American Slovaks are manifesting how the entire Slovak nation would think, speak and act, if it could freely think, speak and act. They are demonstrating on what level of mora! and cultural development they would be today, if they could live their own national life for at least two or three decades." - (ČESKOSLOVENSKÁ SAMOSTATNOSŤ, September 4, 1918).
The idea of Slovak statehood did not originate in Germany, as is frequently claimed, but in America.
The first Slovak book which told the Slovaks why they must work for their own state was published in Pittsburgh, Pa., some forty years ago. It is altogether understandable and natural that the Slovaks, who grew up under the sun of American freedom, should demand for the nation they are descended from all that had proved to be so sound in America. For that very reason it was the American Slovaks who first came with the idea of Slovak statehood. and it is they who even today in an overwhelming majority hold to the idea that only an independent Slovakia can fully secure the national existence of the Slovak nation.
The Slovak state originated from the ideals of American freedom. Its most zealous defenders are people who know and love America. The spirit of independence has its roots in America. The first Slovaks who claimed that the Slovak nation was entitled to a state of its own lived in America. The Slovaks, brought up in America in the spirit of freedom, were the first to foster the Idea of Slovak state independence.
It is tragic misunderstanding, caused by bolshevik and Czech propaganda connected with bolshevism, that from the large states it was only the American statesmen who did not recognize the Slovak State, even though that State ideologically and practically had its roots in the great and noble principles of American freedom and democracy and was born, so to speak, on American soil.
Already at the outset we had mentioned that the Slovak, who at home could not elect even a squire. in America could elect the President when he became a citizen. No little wonder, then, that such a difference in political rights evoked In the common Slovak immigrant a sound reaction and urged him to think about the causes for such a difference.
How is it - he asked himself - that here In America I can do these things, but at home I cannot? He learned that in a foreign land he could freely establish societies, schools, church organizations and businesses; that he even could march under the Slovak flag; that he could pin the Slovak emblem on his coat. But all these things were taboo at home, why?
He compared himself with members of other nations and asked: What’s wrong with me? Am I inferior to others? Am I not a member of the family of nations of this earth? Is my child more backward intellectually than others in school? - And again he had to answer: certainly not! He saw that the Slovak, given an equal opportunity, was equal to any member of the ancient and wealthy nations as far as work, dexterity and readiness were concerned. Why can't the Slovaks at home enjoy the things the Slovaks can have in America? Who are we? What is our history? And so it was that the Slovaks gradually became self-conscious and it was altogether natural for them to seek the same rights and opportunities even for their own people over there.
Thus it was that some 50 years ago, there began to appear in the American Slovak press the declaration: Slovaks, we are entitled to our own Slovak State!
In the "Amerikánsko Slovenské Noviny" (American Slovak News), the "Slovenský Denník" (Slovak Daily), the "Jednota" (Union), the "Slovák v Amerike" (Slovak in America) and the "Slovenský Hlásnik" (Slovak Herald) - to name at least the most important papers - an interesting discussion developed. Dissertation followed dissertation and thoughts were being crystallized. Among the first propagators of the idea of an independent Slovak State was Adalbert Tholt-Veľkoštiavnický. Then came Hušek, Salva and many others.
And it was entirely natural that those people saw the industry, the organizing ability of the Slovak In America who was aroused nationally and secured materially. They saw that in the Slovak nation were to be found all the prerequisites for the attainment of the highest right - state independence.
At the same Ume, when the Slovaks at home dreamed about having a single secondary school and about the re-established Slovak Institute (Matica Slovenská) as the pinnacle of national attainment, the voice of the Slovaks in America thundered: Not one school, but all schools! Not a few rights, but all rights! Not the easement of thraldom, but the abolition of slavery! And these things are possible only in an Independent state life. At the time, when even those Slovaks at home did not believe in their hearts the Slovak credo which they publicly professed, the voice of the Slovaks In America boomed:
"You must believe in the resurrection of our Slovak nation and also in its complete independence and self-sufficiency, because the Lord of all nations is not God of the dead nations, but of those which are corporeally and spiritually alive. Long live the independent Slovak nation!" - (Slovenský Denník, Pittsburgh, Pa., April 10, 1909).
That was the kind of faith that transformed mountains and cured the sick. But that kind of faith could be attained only in an atmosphere enlightened by the sun of American freedom and democracy. And we must admit that this faith, developed In America. worked miracles in Slovakia. The Magyars could prohibit the publication of Slovak periodicals, they could forbid the entry of Slovak Almanacs into Slovakia, but the living bearers of this faith kept returning home to fire their countrymen with it. Without this faith there would have been no miraculous turn of events In 1918. And it was this faith, too, that in an instant washed away all foreign deposits like fine dust.
18
SLOVAKIA
AMERICAN SWVAKS AND SLOVAK STATEHOOD
CONSTANTINE ČULEN
(Member of the Board of the Slovak National Council Abroad)
We are witnesses of an incredlble phenomenon. The demand of
the Slovak natlon to decide for itself its own fate, to have its own
state, has often been classified as a crime. If it 1s a crlme, then we
must state clearly at the outset that the roots of thls crlme stem
not in Slovakia, but in Amerlca.
No other country in the world has had as much influence as
Amerlca on the development of the political destinles of the Slovak
natlon. Even today in Slovakia there Jive several hundred thousand
mature cltlzens who spent the best years of their lives in America.
Engllsh and American prisoners of war attest to the fact that wherever they traveled in Slovakla they found people who could speak
Engllsh and felt a burning love for the Unlted States.
There were tlmes when 2 per cent of the total Slovak population
Jeft its natlve home for America annually. In the years between 1889
and 1915 about 600,000 Slovaks emlgrated out of a total populatlon
of about 2,750,000. Of course, many Slovaks later returned to thelr
homes beneath the majestlc Tatras, but the majority of Slovak emigrants remalned in America. Today about a million and a half
Americans are of Slovak descent. The Slovaks who returned to Slovakia, however, were not the same people who had left lt. Tbey were
dlstlnctly dlfferent In certaln respects, because America had done
something to them, Amerlca had, In fact, t ransformed them.
In old Hungary the Slovak people was an oppressed nation. The
Slovaks were dylng materlally and nationally under the yoke of
Magyar feudallsm. They had very llttle or no schooling and no
representatlon In parllament. Thelr language was not tolerated outslde the church and family clrcle. It was such Slovaks who flrst
came to America in large numbers. They had no idea of the rlghts
they were entltled to. In America they began to organlze themselves
on a natlonal basls.
It may seem strange, but it 1s a fact that the Slovaks as a whole
dld not awaken natlonally at home, but in Amerlca. For the flrst Ume
In thelr hlstory, lt was In America that the Slovaks could parade freeJy under the Slovak flag. In Amerlca they could establlsh Slovak organlzatlons. In America they could freely and without fear of censors hlp and conflscatlon publish thelr own Slovak newspapers. They could
freely and wlthout lnterference present their political demands. All
thls was forbldden them at home, In Slovakla.
In a short Ume, this small natlon, oppressed at home, awakened
natlonally on Amerlcan son and soon made its influence felt even at
home. In Slovakia under the Magyars. the Slovaks could not even
elect a squlre, but In the USA they could elect even the Presldent of
the USA after they had become cltizens. The Slovaks, who l!ved in
thraldom In thelr natlve land, became full-fledged cltlzens In America.
And slnce thousands of Slovaks returned to Slovakla from Amerlca
annually, they brought wlth themselves not only money, wlth which
they paid off thelr debts, bought homes and established buslnesses,
but they also brougbt witb tbemselves natlonal consclousness. Tbe
�SLOVAKIA
19
influence of these re-emigrants was so effective that the Slovak nation,
whlch had only two deputies In parUament durlng a whole century,
a.lready had twenty of them durlng the flrst decade of thls century.
All politícal battles of the twentieth century were waged wlth Ameri•
can money and were lnfluenced by the American spirit of freedom.
From America, the Slovaks brought many things to thelr homeland, especially, however, 1. capi tal; 2. technical experiences; 3. human and national self-consciousness; 4. a love for democracy; 6. a
knowledge of English; and 6. a love for Amerlca and the Amerlcan
way of llfe.
Wbat the Slovaks brought trom Amerlca they sought to valldate
at home. The Amerlcan way of llfe encouraged and dlrected their
plans in Slovakia. Slovak life waxed strong even durlng the hardest
times, because lt was nourlshed materlally and ldeologically by a eurrent of material and spiritual wealth from Amerlca.
In the recent past, American Slovaks formed the most nationalistlc group of the Slovak nation. What the Slovak at home could not
say, the Slovak In Amerlca expressed for bim. It Js undoubtedly an
lnterestlng reality that the wide Slovak masses became ardent nationalists in Amerlca. And tbe fact that Slovak newspapers became
an indispensable necessity of the Slovak people, that, too, must be
credited to America.
At the beginnlng of the twentieth century, the most wldely distributed Slovak newspaper In America had about ten times more subscribers than all the Slovak newspapers in Slovakla combined. Wlthout
the national consclousness whlch the emigrants brought home from
America, there never would bave been any polltical awakening of the
Slovaks during the first decade of this century. And wlthout the
money, which the Slovaks earned and saved in Amerlca, the llvlng
standard of the Slovak people would not have attained the hlgh level
that it dld. For that reason, the Idea of "the new homeland of the
Slovaks" - In reference to America - is not an empty expression.
Amerlca actually became the new homeland of Slovak emlgrants, in
fact, the homeland of approxlmately one-thlrd of the entire Slovak
nation.
The Slovaks at bome always mentloned and stlll do mentlon
America wlth grateful affectlon. In Slovakia, even today tbe words
Pittsburgh, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, New York, Wllwaukee, Scranton and otber Amerlcan citles witb large Slovak populations are as
famil!ar as Budapest, Berlin, Vienna, Paris and Prague.
If one looks tbrougb the oldest newspapers publlsbed In Slovakla,
he will ascertaln that Slovakia regarded the results of American democracy wltb great admlration and respect long before hundreds of
thousands of Slovaks settled in America. Amerlcan freedom was the!r
model.
The old "Prešpurské Noviny" {Pressburg News) already In 1783
published qulte a few articles about the American struggle for freedom. And Amerlcan democracy - ·'where there are no cltlzens wltb
speclal privlleges" - was offered as a model to the Slovaks by Štúr's
"Orol Tatranský" {The Eagle of the Tatras). The youthful followers
ot Štúr already In 1843 contrlbuted an artlcle about Slovak 'poetry
to the "North Amerlcan Review." Joseph MIioslav Hurban, Slova'k patriot, sa!d In bis b!ography of Štúr:
�20
SLOVAKIA
"Wise and just laws, founded on inalienable natural rights, will
provide strength and welfare to nations. For us the evident proof of
this has become the free United States of North America."
His son, Svetozár Hurban Vajanský, renowned Slovak poet and
writer, sent a greeting to his countrymen in America while in jail.
In that greeting, among other things, he has America saying to
Slovak emigrants:
"Oh, come to me, foresaken children !
Gifts I have not, but one thing I do give you:
Tlme to work in freedom. respect for human rights."
And he further wrote:
"And Columbia? Thou bast rent the shackles,
Lifted them up closer to humanity, to God, to beaven.
Land of Christopher, may Christ reward tbee,
For what thou bast done for my wretched brethren."
That the American flag was held in great respect by the first
Slovak lmmigrants is attested to by a leaflet that was pubiisbed some
fifty years ago. It reads:
"Under this flag you are a free citizen.
Under this flag there is freedom, equality and fraternity.
Under this flag is justice and truth.
Under this flag you have meat and bread.
Under thls flag you worship no one and are not persecuted by t he Government.
Under this flag you were received as a buman being and
freedom was given you.
Under thls flag you praise the Lord in your own tongue
and no one ridicules or persecutes you for it.
To this flag you have sworn loyalty, you have become a
Citizen.
Do you want to break your oath, do you want to be a
perjurer and traitor? ! "
That is how the Slovaks regarded and respected the American
flag fifty years ago. In such a manner the Slovaks rallied around the
American f\ag and everything that is symbolized: American democracy, American regard for the rights of nations. It was the American
way of \ife that first motivated the Slovaks to fight for the right of
the Slovak nation to its own state.
Unfortunately, false and mendacious propaganda succeeded in
convinclng the statesmen of America that there ls only one natlon
In the world that dld not want fredom and independence - and that
nation was the Slovak nation. They fell for the story that there was
one nation In this world that wanted to be a vassal of others and not
an independent nation, and that was the Slovak nation - the natlon
whlch drank ftom the pure stream of American freedom and democracy,
the natlon whlch so long ago propagated from America what lts enslaved adherents at home dared to translate lnto deeds a half cen•
tury later.
American democracy and the American way of life gave t he Slovaks the first motlve to demand all their inherent rlghts. Fify years
ago Amerlcan Slovaks propagated and Cinanced the flght of thelr
natlon for the rlght of a general, equa\ and secret ballot In Slovak la.
�SLOVAKIA
21
The Slovaks in America sent their first "Memorandum" to the rulers
of Slovakia in 1900. In it tbey requested the Magyar government to
grant the Slovaks at home as much freedom as the Slovaks enjoyed
in America.
Peter Rovnianek, one of the outstandlng Slovaks of hls Ume, already in 1894 wrote in the first Slovak Almanac (Kalendár) publlshed
in America:
"American-Slovak life ls shining proof of Slovak capability. Only
in America have we seen all that the Slovaks would be able to create
at bome, if the boot of tbe tyrant would not press them to the earth."
But even Dr. Edward Beneš himself wrote in 1918:
"American Slovaks are manifesting how the entire Slovak natlon
would think, speak and act, if it could freely tbink, speak and act.
They are demonstrating on what level of mora! and cultural development they would be today, if they could live their own national Ufe
for at least two or three decades." - (ČESKOSLOVENSKÁ SAMO·
STATNOSŤ, September 4, 1918).
The ide a of Slovak statehood did no t orig i na te in Germany, as la
frequently cl ai m ed, but in Ame r i ca.
The first Slovak book which told the Slovaks why th ey must work
for their own state was published in Pittsburgh, Pa., some forty years
ago. It !s altogether understandable and natural tbat the Slovaks, wbo
grew up under the sun of American freedom, sbould demand for tbe
nation tbey are descended trom all that had proved to be so sound
in America. For that very reason it was tbe Amerlcan Slovaks wbo
first came with tbe idea of Slovak statehood. and it is they wbo even
today in an overwhelming majority hold to the Idea that only an Independent Slovakia can fully secure tbe national existence of tbe
Slovak nation.
The Slovak state originated from tbe ideals of American freedom. Its most zealous defenclers are people wbo know and love
America. The spirit of independence has its roots In Amerlca. Tbe
first Slovaks who clalmed that the Slovak nation was entltled to a
state of its own lived in Amer!ca. Tbe Slovaks, brought up In Amerlca
in tbe spirit of freedom, were the first to foster tbe Idea of Slovak
state lndependence.
It ls traglc misunderstandlng, caused by bolshevik and Czech
propaganda connected with bolsbevlsm, that from tbe large states lt
was only the American statesmen wbo did not recognize the Slovak
State, even though tbat State !deologically and practlcally had lts
roots In the great and noble princ!oles of American freedom and democracy and was born, so to speak, on Amerlcan soll.
Already at the outset we had mentloned that the Slovak, who at
home could not elect even a sQuire. in America could elect tbe President when he became a cltlzen. No llttle wonder, then, that such
a difference in political r!ghts evoked In the common Slovak lmmigrant a sound reaction and urged bim to thlnk about the causes for
such a dlfference.
How ls it - he asked h!mself - that here In America I can do
these things, but at home I cannot? He learned that In a forelgn
!and he could freely establish societies, schools, chu rch organlzatlons
and businesses; tbat he even could marcb under the Slovak flag; tbat
�22
SLOVAKIA
he could pin the Slovak emblem on his coat. But all these things
were taboo at home, why?
He compared himself with members of other nations and asked:
Whaťs wrong with me? Am I inferior to others? Am I not a member
of the famlly of natlons ot this earth? Is my child more backward
intellectually than others in school? - And again he had to answer:
certalnly not! He saw that the Slovak, given an equal opportunlty,
was equal to any member of the ancient and wealthy nations as far as
work, dexterity and readiness were concerned. Why can't the S lovaks at
home enjoy the things the Slovaks can have in Amerlca? Who are we?
What is our history? And so it was that the Slovaks gradually became
selt-conscious and it was altogether natural for them to seek the same
rlghts and opportunities even for their own people over there.
Thus it was that some 50 years ago, there began to appear in
the Amerlcan Slovak press the declaration: Slova ks, we are entitled
to our own Slovak State!
In the "Amerikánsko Slovenské Noviny" (American Slovak News),
the "Slovenský Dennik" (Slovak Dal\y), the "J ednota" (Union), the
"Slovák v Amerike" (Slovak in Amerlca) and the "Slovenský Hläsnik"
(Slovak Herald) - to name at Jeast the most important papers - an
interestlng dlscussion developed. Dlssertation followed dlssertation
and thoughts were being crystalllzed. Among the tlrst propagators ot
the Idea of an independent Slovak State was Adalbert Tholt- Vel'koštiavnický. Then came Hušek, Salva and many others.
And it was entirely natural that those people saw the industry,
the organlzlng ablllty of the Slovak In America who was aroused
natlonally and secured materially. They saw that in the Slovak natlon
were to be found all the prerequlsltes for the attainment of the hlghest right - state lndependence.
At the same Ume, when the Slovaks at horne dreamed ahout
having a single secondary school and about the re-establlshed Slovak
Instltute (Matica Slovenská) as the plnnacle of natlonal attalnment,
the volce of the Slovaks in America thundered: Not one school, but all
schools ! Not a few rights, but all rights ! Not the easement of thraldom, but the abolition of slavery! And these thlngs are posslble only
in an Independent state life. At the tlme, when even those Slovaks
at home dld not believe In tbelr hearts the Slovak credo which they
publlcly professed, tbe voice of the Slovaks In America boomed:
"You must belleve in the resurrectlon of our Slovak natlon and
also ln its complete lndependence and self-sufficiency, because the
Lord of all natlons is not God ot tbe dead natlons. but of those whlch
are corporeally and splrltually allve. Long live the Independent Slovak natlon!" - (Slovenský Denn!k, Plttsburgh, Pa., Aprll 10, 1909).
That was the klnd of falth that transformed mountalns and cured
the slck. But that klnd of falth could be attalned only in an atmospbere
enllgbtened by tbe sun of Amerlcan freedom and democracy. And we
must admlt that thls faitb, developed In Amerlca. worked mlracles In
Slovakla. The Magyars could problblt the publlcatlon of Slovak
perlodicals, they could forbld tbe entry of Slovak Almanacs lnto Slovakla, but the llving b earers of thls faith kept returnlng home to
flre thelr countrymen wlth lt. Wltbout thls faltb there would have
been no mlraculous turn of events In 1918. And lt was thls faitb, too,
tbat in an lnstant washed away all forelgn deposlts llke fine dust.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
AMERICAN SLOVAKS AND SLOVAK STATEHOOD
CONSTANTINE ČULEN (Member of the Board of the Slovak National Council Abroad)
We are witnesses of an incredible phenomenon. The demand of the Slovak nation to decide for itself its own fate, to have its own state, has often been classified as a crime. If it is a crime, then we must state clearly at the outset that the roots of this crime stem not in Slovakia, but in America.
No other country in the world has had as much influence as America on the development of the political destinies of the Slovak nation. Even today in Slovakia there Jive several hundred thousand mature citizens who spent the best years of their lives in America. English and American prisoners of war attest to the fact that wherever they traveled in Slovakia they found people who could speak English and felt a burning love for the United States.
There were times when 2 per cent of the total Slovak population left its native home for America annually. In the years between 1889 and 1915 about 600,000 Slovaks emigrated out of a total population of about 2,750,000. Of course, many Slovaks later returned to their homes beneath the majestic Tatras, but the majority of Slovak emigrants remained in America. Today about a million and a half Americans are of Slovak descent. The Slovaks who returned to Slovakia, however, were not the same people who had left lt. They were distinctly different in certain respects, because America had done something to them, America had, in fact, transformed them.
In old Hungary the Slovak people was an oppressed nation. The Slovaks were dying materially and nationally under the yoke of Magyar feudalism. They had very little or no schooling and no representation in parliament. Their language was not tolerated outside the church and family circle. It was such Slovaks who first came to America in large numbers. They had no idea of the rights they were entitled to. In America they began to organize themselves on a national basis.
It may seem strange, but it 1s a fact that the Slovaks as a whole did not awaken nationally at home, but in America. For the first time in their history, it was In America that the Slovaks could parade freely under the Slovak flag. In America they could establish Slovak organizations. In America they could freely and without fear of censorship and confiscation publish their own Slovak newspapers. They could freely and without interference present their political demands. All this was forbidden them at home, In Slovakia.
In a short Ume, this small nation, oppressed at home, awakened nationally on American soil and soon made its influence felt even at home. In Slovakia under the Magyars. the Slovaks could not even elect a squire, but In the USA they could elect even the President of the USA after they had become citizens. The Slovaks, who lived in thraldom in their native land, became full-fledged citizens In America. And since thousands of Slovaks returned to Slovakia from America annually, they brought with themselves not only money, with which they paid off their debts, bought homes and established businesses, but they also brought with themselves national consciousness. The influence of these re-emigrants was so effective that the Slovak nation, which had only two deputies in parliament during a whole century, already had twenty of them during the first decade of this century. All political battles of the twentieth century were waged with American money and were influenced by the American spirit of freedom.
From America, the Slovaks brought many things to their homeland, especially, however, 1. capital; 2. technical experiences; 3. human and national self-consciousness; 4. a love for democracy; 6. a knowledge of English; and 6. a love for America and the American way of life.
What the Slovaks brought from America they sought to validate at home. The American way of life encouraged and directed their plans in Slovakia. Slovak life waxed strong even during the hardest times, because it was nourished materially and ideologically by a current of material and spiritual wealth from America.
In the recent past, American Slovaks formed the most nationalistic group of the Slovak nation. What the Slovak at home could not say, the Slovak in America expressed for him. It is undoubtedly an interesting reality that the wide Slovak masses became ardent nationalists in America. And the fact that Slovak newspapers became an indispensable necessity of the Slovak people, that, too, must be credited to America.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the most widely distributed Slovak newspaper in America had about ten times more subscribers than all the Slovak newspapers in Slovakia combined. Without the national consciousness which the emigrants brought home from America, there never would have been any political awakening of the Slovaks during the first decade of this century. And without the money, which the Slovaks earned and saved in America, the living standard of the Slovak people would not have attained the high level that it did. For that reason, the Idea of "the new homeland of the Slovaks" - in reference to America - is not an empty expression. America actually became the new homeland of Slovak emigrants, in fact, the homeland of approximately one-third of the entire Slovak nation.
The Slovaks at home always mentioned and still do mention America with grateful affection. In Slovakia, even today the words Pittsburgh, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, New York, Milwaukee, Scranton and other American cities with large Slovak populations are as familiar as Budapest, Berlin, Vienna, Paris and Prague.
If one looks through the oldest newspapers published in Slovakia, he will ascertain that Slovakia regarded the results of American democracy with great admiration and respect long before hundreds of thousands of Slovaks settled in America. American freedom was their model.
The old "Prešpurské Noviny" (Pressburg News) already in 1783 published quite a few articles about the American struggle for freedom. And American democracy – “where there are no citizens with special privileges" - was offered as a model to the Slovaks by Štúr's "Orol Tatranský (The Eagle of the Tatras). The youthful followers of Štúr already In 1843 contributed an article about Slovak poetry to the "North American Review." Joseph Miloslav Hurban, Slovak patriot, said in his biography of Štúr:
"Wise and just laws, founded on inalienable natural rights, will provide strength and welfare to nations. For us the evident proof of this has become the free United States of North America."
His son, Svetozár Hurban Vajanský renowned Slovak poet and writer, sent a greeting to his countrymen in America while in jail. In that greeting, among other things, he has America saying to Slovak emigrants:
"Oh, come to me, foresaken children!
Gifts I have not, but one thing I do give you:
Time to work in freedom, respect for human rights."
And he further wrote:
"And Columbia? Thou hast rent the shackles,
Lifted them up closer to humanity, to God, to heaven.
Land of Christopher, may Christ reward thee,
For what thou bast done for my wretched brethren."
That the American flag was held in great respect by the first Slovak immigrants is attested to by a leaflet that was published some fifty years ago. It reads:
"Under this flag you are a free citizen.
Under this flag there is freedom, equality and fraternity.
Under this flag is justice and truth.
Under this flag you have meat and bread.
Under this flag you worship no one and are not persecuted by the Government.
Under this flag you were received as a human being and freedom was given you.
Under this flag you praise the Lord in your own tongue and no one ridicules or persecutes you for it.
To this flag you have sworn loyalty, you have become a citizen.
Do you want to break your oath, do you want to be a perjurer and traitor? ! "
That is how the Slovaks regarded and respected the American flag fifty years ago. In such a manner the Slovaks rallied around the American f\ag and everything that is symbolized: American democracy, American regard for the rights of nations. It was the American way of life that first motivated the Slovaks to fight for the right of the Slovak nation to its own state.
Unfortunately, false and mendacious propaganda succeeded in convincing the statesmen of America that there is only one nation In the world that did not want freedom and independence - and that nation was the Slovak nation. They fell for the story that there was one nation In this world that wanted to be a vassal of others and not an independent nation, and that was the Slovak nation - the nation which drank from the pure stream of American freedom and democracy, the nation which so long ago propagated from America what its enslaved adherents at home dared to translate into deeds a half century later.
American democracy and the American way of life gave the Slovaks the first motive to demand all their inherent rights. Fifty years ago American Slovaks propagated and financed the fight of their nation for the right of a general, equal and secret ballot in Slovakia. The Slovaks in America sent their first "Memorandum" to the rulers of Slovakia in 1900. In it they requested the Magyar government to grant the Slovaks at home as much freedom as the Slovaks enjoyed in America.
Peter Rovnianek, one of the outstanding Slovaks of his time, already in 1894 wrote in the first Slovak Almanac (Kalendár) published in America:
"American-Slovak life is shining proof of Slovak capability. Only in America have we seen all that the Slovaks would be able to create at home, if the boot of the tyrant would not press them to the earth."
But even Dr. Edward Beneš himself wrote in 1918: "American Slovaks are manifesting how the entire Slovak nation would think, speak and act, if it could freely think, speak and act. They are demonstrating on what level of mora! and cultural development they would be today, if they could live their own national life for at least two or three decades." - (ČESKOSLOVENSKÁ SAMOSTATNOSŤ, September 4, 1918).
The idea of Slovak statehood did not originate in Germany, as is frequently claimed, but in America.
The first Slovak book which told the Slovaks why they must work for their own state was published in Pittsburgh, Pa., some forty years ago. It is altogether understandable and natural that the Slovaks, who grew up under the sun of American freedom, should demand for the nation they are descended from all that had proved to be so sound in America. For that very reason it was the American Slovaks who first came with the idea of Slovak statehood. and it is they who even today in an overwhelming majority hold to the idea that only an independent Slovakia can fully secure the national existence of the Slovak nation.
The Slovak state originated from the ideals of American freedom. Its most zealous defenders are people who know and love America. The spirit of independence has its roots in America. The first Slovaks who claimed that the Slovak nation was entitled to a state of its own lived in America. The Slovaks, brought up in America in the spirit of freedom, were the first to foster the Idea of Slovak state independence.
It is tragic misunderstanding, caused by bolshevik and Czech propaganda connected with bolshevism, that from the large states it was only the American statesmen who did not recognize the Slovak State, even though that State ideologically and practically had its roots in the great and noble principles of American freedom and democracy and was born, so to speak, on American soil.
Already at the outset we had mentioned that the Slovak, who at home could not elect even a squire. in America could elect the President when he became a citizen. No little wonder, then, that such a difference in political rights evoked In the common Slovak immigrant a sound reaction and urged him to think about the causes for such a difference.
How is it - he asked himself - that here In America I can do these things, but at home I cannot? He learned that in a foreign land he could freely establish societies, schools, church organizations and businesses; that he even could march under the Slovak flag; that he could pin the Slovak emblem on his coat. But all these things were taboo at home, why?
He compared himself with members of other nations and asked: What’s wrong with me? Am I inferior to others? Am I not a member of the family of nations of this earth? Is my child more backward intellectually than others in school? - And again he had to answer: certainly not! He saw that the Slovak, given an equal opportunity, was equal to any member of the ancient and wealthy nations as far as work, dexterity and readiness were concerned. Why can't the Slovaks at home enjoy the things the Slovaks can have in America? Who are we? What is our history? And so it was that the Slovaks gradually became self-conscious and it was altogether natural for them to seek the same rights and opportunities even for their own people over there.
Thus it was that some 50 years ago, there began to appear in the American Slovak press the declaration: Slovaks, we are entitled to our own Slovak State!
In the "Amerikánsko Slovenské Noviny" (American Slovak News), the "Slovenský Denník" (Slovak Daily), the "Jednota" (Union), the "Slovák v Amerike" (Slovak in America) and the "Slovenský Hlásnik" (Slovak Herald) - to name at least the most important papers - an interesting discussion developed. Dissertation followed dissertation and thoughts were being crystallized. Among the first propagators of the idea of an independent Slovak State was Adalbert Tholt-Veľkoštiavnický. Then came Hušek, Salva and many others.
And it was entirely natural that those people saw the industry, the organizing ability of the Slovak In America who was aroused nationally and secured materially. They saw that in the Slovak nation were to be found all the prerequisites for the attainment of the highest right - state independence.
At the same Ume, when the Slovaks at home dreamed about having a single secondary school and about the re-established Slovak Institute (Matica Slovenská) as the pinnacle of national attainment, the voice of the Slovaks in America thundered: Not one school, but all schools! Not a few rights, but all rights! Not the easement of thraldom, but the abolition of slavery! And these things are possible only in an Independent state life. At the time, when even those Slovaks at home did not believe in their hearts the Slovak credo which they publicly professed, the voice of the Slovaks In America boomed:
"You must believe in the resurrection of our Slovak nation and also in its complete independence and self-sufficiency, because the Lord of all nations is not God of the dead nations, but of those which are corporeally and spiritually alive. Long live the independent Slovak nation!" - (Slovenský Denník, Pittsburgh, Pa., April 10, 1909).
That was the kind of faith that transformed mountains and cured the sick. But that kind of faith could be attained only in an atmosphere enlightened by the sun of American freedom and democracy. And we must admit that this faith, developed In America. worked miracles in Slovakia. The Magyars could prohibit the publication of Slovak periodicals, they could forbid the entry of Slovak Almanacs into Slovakia, but the living bearers of this faith kept returning home to fire their countrymen with it. Without this faith there would have been no miraculous turn of events In 1918. And it was this faith, too, that in an instant washed away all foreign deposits like fine dust.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
American Slovaks and Slovak Statehood
Description
An account of the resource
Constantine Čulen
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951
pp. 18-22
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
May 1951
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Čulen, Konštantín, 1904-1964
SNK
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f43bd8cfd70fb8336671ddd436b87d4d.pdf
a8df0a4e7cf4c85f4d2625e04f1db0b0
PDF Text
Text
INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC
DR. JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM
Because of years of relentless propaganda by Czech emigres and the renewal of the Czechoslovak Republic by the merits of the Soviet Union, the origin of the Slovak Republic and its incorporation into the European organization is often placed in a bad light even by persons and nations who a priori do not have an unfavorable opinion of the Slovak efforts for independence. In the interest of the truth, it will not be amiss to answer the question of how European public opinion and the governments of European states received the proclamation of Slovak independence.
The question is all the more significant when we consider that changes of the map of Europe are not and never were indifferent to the European nations and especially to the great powers, and that the Slovak Republic was proclaimed in a period of peace. European nations, therefore, had an unhindered opportunity of taking a stand to the newly established State and that in a two-fold manner:
1. By not recognizing the new State and refusing to establish diplomatic contacts with the Slovak Republic.
2. All States, and especially those which guaranteed the independence and integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic after Munich, had the opportunity, by peaceful means or by war, of making the existence of the Slovak State impossible and renewing the old state of affairs.
What happened In the case of Slovakia?
There was not a single state in Europe or elsewhere which did that in 1939. There was no protest against the origin of the State of Slovakia even from some of the great powers that were in some way obligated to Czechoslovakia. But there were protests only against the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by the Germans. Even President Roosevelt, answering Dr. Beneš's telegram (March 16, 1939), wrote in his letter March 27, 1939, that "even though the Government of the United States is aware that the lands of Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by the German military forces and are now factually under German authority, it has not recognized this situation as a legal condition." (Beneš: Memoirs, 1947).
As far as Slovakia was concerned, practically every European State recognized Slovakia and established diplomatic contacts with lt. England and Soviet Russia not excepted. Just about two months after the proclamation of Slovakia’s independence the Foreign Minister of Great Britain ordered the following note delivered to the first Foreign Minister of the Slovak Republic:
Bratislava, May 4th, 1989. Your Excellency:
On the instruction of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs I have the honour to Inform you that His Majesty’s Government ln the United Kingdom propose to appoint me as Consul for Slovakia with residence in Bratislava.
Pending preparation of my Commission I have the honour to request provisional recognition by the Slovak Government of myself as His Majesty's Consul for Slovakia.
I avail myself of this opportunity to express to your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.
PARES, M. P., H. M. Consul.
The Slovaks in turn sent Ing. Harminc as General Consul to London to represent the Slovak Republic. The exchange of diplomatic representatives between London and Bratislava was prevented only by war which broke out six months after the proclamation of Slovak independence.
Soviet Russia, which did not enter the war against Germany on September 1, 1939, set up one of the largest embassies in Bratislava, and the first Russian ambassador, G. Puškin, upon presenting his credentials to the President of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso, said among other things:
"Presenting to you the documents which accredit me as Extraordinary Ambassador and Minister Plenipotentiary, appointed by the Presidency of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, I can announce to you with joy that the nations of the Soviet Union have taken cognizance of the establishment of diplomatic contacts between the Soviet Union and the Slovak Republic with deep satisfaction. Because of the war in Europe the establishment of these contacts oversteps the framework of mutual interests of both our states."
Before Moscow sent its ambassador to Bratislava, however, the Soviet Government had notified the diplomatic representative of the Czechoslovak Republic, Dr. Zdenek Fierlinger, that it no longer regards him as a diplomatic character. Fierlinger himself wrote about this as follows:
"On December 14, I was called to the Foreign Commissariat by Mr. Barkov, the Chief of the Protocol. Barkov told me that the Soviet Government regrets that it can no longer acknowledge my diplomatic character. He added that I could remain in Moscow with my officials and their families as a private individual."
Barkov, according to Fierlinger, even "refused to mediate a visit with the Commissar of Foreign Affairs" as he had also refused to send any written report for the Commissariat or any other official person. So it was only by a private letter that Fierlinger could write to the representative of Foreign Affairs: "I understand fully the stand taken by your Government and I am grateful for the permission to remain in Moscow as a private individual." (Z. Fierlinger: "Ve službách ČSR," Prague, 1947, pgs. 313-314).
Pre-war France readily recognized the new State in the heart of Europe, but formal diplomatic contacts could not be established, because war had broken out. In the case of France, which recognized the Slovak Republic de facto on July 14. 1939, and de jure on April 25, 1942, an interesting detail bas been noted. While the French Foreign Minister, M. Dalladier, refused to see Dr. Beneš and negotiate with him, the French General Consul in Bratislava was trying to convince the Slovak Government that an exchange of ambassadors had not taken place immediately after March 14, 1939, only because of the previous relationship between France and Czechoslovakia. The reasons concerned prestige. However, he considered an exchange of ambassadors in the near future as a self-evident matter. As the General Secretary of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, even I had acted personally as mediator between Dalladier and the Slovak Government. Beneš referred to the incident in his MEMOIRS:
"Dalladier - when I asked for an audience -refused to see me and refused to discuss any political matters with me. Later he brought this matter up before the Government and supported his action with reasons for doing so." (Beneš: MEMOIRS, 1947, pg. 139).
Germany and Italy also recognized Slovakia. The Slovak Republic was recognized by all great powers which were deciding the fate of Europe. It was recognized even by the Vatican. The western powers, who got into the conflict against Germany in September 1939, did not change their stand toward Slovakia even after the war began, but only several years later (1942-1943). The decision of the western powers, of course, had no influence on the actual or legal existence of the Slovak State as far as international law was concerned. For that reason the Vatican and the other neutral States did not change their relationship with Slovakia during the entire war-time period.
The neighbors of Slovakia likewise did not oppose her independent status. Poland recognized Slovakia March 16, 1939, and Hungary on March 15, 1939. And this is especially significant in the light of the conditions and tendencies which appeared in centra) Europe after the break-up of Austria-Hungary. The changes effected by the proclamation of Slovak independence concerned, in the first place, the neighbors of Slovakia from the economic and strategic point of view. By its historical development, its position and natural resources the central European area has its own laws, needs and demands. The individual nations of that area jealously watch so that no single nation among them might grow at the expense of the others and so disturb the natural balance of military and economic forces.
The Slovak Republic, however, fitted into this area not as a disturbing element, but, conversely, as a fulfillment of conditions of balance and the removal of one of the significant causes of instability of the Centro-European organization. That is why even Yugoslavia and Rumania, which until 1938 together with the Czechoslovak Republic within the framework of the Little Entente had been the pillars of the post-war organization in the Danube basin, made regular diplomatic contacts and collaborated economically with the Slovak Republic soon after it was established. Bulgaria did likewise.
Among the neutral States, besides the Vatican, which recognized the Slovak State and made diplomatic and economic contacts with it were Switzerland and Sweden. Spain, which had declared itself neutral later, recognized Slovakia on May 4, 1939, and sent its ambassador to Slovakia forthwith. Belgium accorded de facto recognition to Slovakia.
Other European States, thus far not mentioned, which recognized Slovakia were: Finland, Denmark, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Croatia. And States outside of Europe: Japan, Manchuria, China (Nanking), Siam, Costa Rica, and Ecuador.
Slovakia, then, was recognized by a total of 27 countries: by great powers and small powers, by neutral States and by powers of both warring camps. It is interesting to note that the majority or the States which granted recognition to Slovakia as an independent State was on the side of Anglo-Russian coalition. The claim that Slovakia was recognized only by Germany and its satellites is, therefore, a willful deception of the international public. Seventeen of the 27 States recognizing Slovakia fought against Germany or were neutral.
This comparison is significant not only because it uproots the falsehoods of the propaganda which presented Slovakia to the Allies as a State recognized only by Germany and its satellites, but because it also confirms - as has been shown - that European States without exception recognized the right of the Slovaks to an independent existence, an Independent State. Furthermore, it also confirms the fact that these European States did not see anything unnatural or disturbing in the establishment of Independent Slovakia, even though they did see it in the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia. In this connection it is interesting to note how the League of Nations regarded the collapse of Czechoslovakia. In his MEMOIRS, Beneš himself complained that the General Secretary, J. Avenol, refused to place his protest before the League of Nations for official discussion with the argument that the protest was not placed before the body the regular way, but my a "private individual." (Pg. 109).
The fact that no European States protested against the existence of the independent State of Slovakia is important, especially when we consider that Central Europe was the way out of two World Wars and that its organization after World War I made a powder keg out of this area, the explosion of which was feared for twenty years.
From the Slovak standpoint this recognition of the Slovak Republic by such a large number of States has the significance that the Slovaks can always point to it when demanding Slovak independence. And it is important to remember, too, that the Slovak Republic was proclaimed six months before the start of World War II which at the outset divided the nations of the world into two camps. This fact and the fact that Slovakia was placed into the German-Italian sphere because of her geographical position, prevented many other nations from recognizing her diplomatically, nations which undoubtedly would have recognized her under more favorable conditions. Considering the spontaneity and speed with which the individual States responded to the notification of the proclamation of Slovak independence and arranged diplomatic or consular offices in Bratislava, it can be correctly assumed that the Slovak Republic would have been recognized universally if the war had been delayed only a year or two.
Slovakia., then, was accepted into the family of independent nations not only by central European States, but also by the great European powers. European, and especially Central European interests correctly comprehended, could not, of course, permit the denial of this right to one of the oldest Central European nations, when this right today is acknowledged even to colonial nations and without the validation of which there can hardly be any sensible talk about justice or even a guaranteed peace.
II
The recognition of the Slovak Republic by such a large number of European and non-European States, despite the tense international situation, was in a great measure the merit of the young Slovak diplomacy. In order to have a complete picture of the international position of the Slovak Republic, it would be well to list not only the States which recognized Slovakia and established regular diplomatic relations with her, but also the individuals who represented the Slovak nation in the international forum and point out the tendencies represented by the first Slovak diplomats. And, of course, it is also necessary to mention the countries which did not recognize the Slovak State.
As a result of the international recognition of the Slovak Republic, the Slovak flag - so ignored and trampled upon previously - for the first time in Slovak history waved proudly over the Slovak diplomatic and consular offices In the capitols of almost every European State. In eternal Rome, as well as in Moscow; in the proud city of Albion, as well as in Berlin; in Warsaw, Belgrade, Sophia, Bucharest, Budapest, Berne, and Stockholm; in Helsinki, Vienna and even over the general consulate in Prague. And in all these places, the Slovak emblem hung independently for the first time: it was not attached to the emblem of St. Stephen's Crown, nor to the Czech Lion.
For those who harbor a respect for the symbols of nations, this reality can hardly be a sentimental one only. It has its own deep political and moral meaning. We can evidence this fact best from the time that the Slovak flag had to be hauled down temporarily.
As far as the diplomatic representatives of the Slovak Republic are concerned, not all were trained for the task, because in the Czechoslovak Republic out of 1246 officials in the Foreign Service only 33 were Slovak, and only a few of these were diplomats. However, in the Slovak nature there are certain talents for this kind of service, so that even in this field much of what the past did not allow to be done was caught up with shortly.
Altogether there were three categories among Slovak diplomatic representatives in leading positions: Six former officials from Prague (Dr. Ivan Milecz, Dr. Joseph Cleker, Dr. Joseph Mlkuš, Dr. Plssko, Dr. Radlinský and Dr. Szatmáry); three from internal politics (Karol Sidor, Matthew Černak and Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum); and the others came from various professions (Francis Tiso. Dr. Spišiak, Dr. J. Šimko, Dr. Zvrškovec, Tido J. Gašpar, Dr. Galvánek, Dr. Becko, etc). The majority of these, therefore were men who had prepared for other tasks in life. But even large states, which have a sufficient number of diplomatic personnel, place persona of other professions in leading diplomatic positions.
Keeping in mind the tense situation of the world at that Ume and the reality that Slovakia was practically unknown in foreign lands and was consistently being presented in a bad light by anti=Slovak propaganda, we must admit that the tasks facing the diplomatic representatives of the newly established Slovak Republic were by no means easy. And yet, the Slovak diplomatic representatives -excepting Dr. Szatmáry - defended the right of the Slovak nation to its own State to the end and performed their tasks well in the diplomatic, cultural and propaganda fields.
There was one task they had, however, failed to do, and that one was probably the most important one: they did not prepare for the transfer of Slovakia to the side of the Allies at the right time. However, it is a bit premature to pass judgment in this matter ln view of the world situation and the present position of Slovakia, and especially in view of the fact that all Slovak diplomatic representatives in neutral countries, upon whom this task fell, have not as yet been heard from. For the present we can make several general remarks and logical conclusions which emanate from the over-all situation existing at the end of the war and from the tendencies that made themselves apparent with the Allies in general, and in the relation to Slovakia in particular. And from this, then, we can learn what alternatives presented themselves to the Slovaks.
After considering all the circumstances under which the war was waged and those under which the so-called "National Uprising" in Slovakia was organized later, this problem looks decidedly different than it appeared to be at first sight. But aside from the fact that diplomacy always only prepares the way for the policies of a government and is in itself only an executive organ, no other nation had to contend with such impediments as the Slovak nation in the matter of transferring to the Allies. Let us consider only one:
When the Anglo-Saxon Allies (in 1941-1942) and the Soviet Union (1943) came out for the renewal of the Czechoslovak Republic and even concluded agreements with the Government of Dr. Beneš, the joining of the Slovak Government and the Slovak diplomats with the Allies would have meant the acceptance of Czechoslovakia - already recognized by the Allies - and the renouncing of independence. Slovak political leaders at home and Slovak diplomats abroad had to decide the dilemma: Either to remain loyal to the right to independence and defend it to the end even at the cost of great personal sacrifices, or to join those who did not recognize the right of the Slovak nation to its own State and thus secure tor themselves definite personal interests.
That is how the problem looked when the "Slovak Revolt" broke out in August 1944. While the Italians, Rumanians, Magyars and Bulgarians joined the Allies to safeguard their independence, the leaders of the rebellion in Slovakia were proclaiming the annexation of Slovakia to the Czech lands, renewing the Czechoslovak Republic and ridding their own nation of its independent State.
The position of Slovakia in the war and, therefore, even the actions of Slovak diplomats, were determined in the over-all framework by the policy of the Allies themselves and in the narrower framework by the alms of the "rebellion" in Slovakia.
If it were not for this situation, there would have been among the Slovak politicians, as well as among the Slovak diplomats. representatives in the individual states of Europe who would have had the political and moral Legitimacy to speak in the name of the Slovak nation. In the Vatican, one of the most important centers of world diplomacy, Slovakia was represented by Karol Sidor, whose anti-German stand cannot be disputed. The General Secretary of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, ousted from his office by Nazi pressure, was sent to Switzerland to represent Slovakia. In Sweden Slovakia had the career diplomat, Dr. Pissko, and in Spain Dr. Mikuš and Dr. Cieker, both of whom were not only first-class diplomats, but were outstanding in their generation.
It is evident, then, that the Slovak Republic did have people in important places abroad who were predetermined to prepare the transfer of the Slovaks to the victorious camp. And undoubtedly it shall once become known that these Slovak representatives did not lack the initiative, either. But there were no real possibilities for such a policy, if the Slovaks themselves were not to surrender their right to independence. This they could not do, because they knew that the rights which were taken away by force could always be regained, but the rights which a nation once surrendered could never be regained.
A policy that redeems apparent, temporary advantages by surrendering natural rights never did end up well. And conversely, history was wont to reward with victory the fight which had an upright aim. Whether the Slovak Government and the Slovak diplomats did right by consistently holding to their anti-communist stand and defending the inalienable rights of their nation, history and probably even the near future shall render a definite verdict. That they acted honorably and did not pursue their personal interests is already clear today.
III
Dr. Edward Beneš and his followers always denied the individuality of the Slovak nation and were always opposed to Slovak autonomy. This group of Czech politicians and several individuals of Slovak origin, who subscribed to the ideology of a "Czechoslovak nation," stubbornly refused to recognize the right of the Slovaks to their own State and the acceptance of the Slovak Republic into the international community. They used all means at their disposal to misrepresent the Slovak question before the Allies to effect the destruction of the Slovak Republic and force its annexation to the Czech lands.
Dr. Edward Beneš even attempted to deceive the Vatican, but did not fare so well. In a Memorandum, sent to the Holy See on May 12, 1943, through President Roosevelt, Dr. Edward Beneš stated among other things: "The Slovak people, in its great majority, today stands without any reservations behind the present Czechoslovak Government. In Slovakia political, social, economical and moral conditions are extremely sad. The majority of the Slovak people considers the present regime in Bratislava responsible for this situation and as a traitor of the Slovak people and the Czechoslovak Republic. Former governmental Slovak parties (the Agrarians, Liberals, Socialists) are almost completely behind the Czechoslovak Government and against the present regime in Slovakia, while the former Catholic People's Party, which took over the rule of Slovak affairs from the hands of the Germans in 1939, today stands - according to our reports - at least 60 per cent against the present regime." (Beneš: MEMOIRS, Documents).
Of course, the Vatican knew what the actual situation in Slovakia was. The Slovak Government was represented at the Vatican, and the Holy See had its representative in Bratislava. Beneš was fully aware of that fact, but he thought he might persuade the Holy See to see things his way, since it was pretty evident at that time that he would be back in the driver's seat when the war ended. The Vatican’s refusal to recognize him and his London Government made Beneš furious.
Because of the war situation and the fact that Slovakia fell into the Axis bloc because of its geographical position, the actions of Dr. Beneš and the Czech Slovaks (Czechoslovaks) was more successful than that of the Magyars after World War I who also tried to mobilize world opinion for the return of Slovakia to the Magyar State. The Magyar action was also supported by several renegade politicians of Slovak descent and yet it failed because the Slovak nation was determined to live its own life. History itself tells us that it is only logical for every nation to strive for an independent State. The temporary victory of Dr. Beneš will not reverse the logic of history. The Slovaks firmly believe that in the end their natural rights to an independent State shall be recognized, as they have been recognized in the case of other nations. It is only a question of time and an appropriate international situation.
If the revisionist efforts of Dr. Beneš seem to have found a greater response in Slovakia than Magyar revision, that certainly cannot be considered as proof that the Slovak nation in its entirety, or even in its greater part, has renounced its right to an independent State.
The Slovak nation was not given the opportunity to say whether it wants to live in its own State or in a comon State with the Czechs. The Slovaks who accepted the Czechoslovak solution did so out of fear emanating from the fate of a vanquished State, under the pressure of military events, and in the endeavor to assure themselves of an advantageous position to rule over Slovakia with the help of the Czechs, because they had no chance of getting into leading positions any other way. That this solution was accepted even by the small group only out of opportunism is attested to by the fact that already toward the end of 1943, when the outcome of the war was known, this group went into action for the renewal of the Czechoslovak Republic, stressing at the same time that the renewed State would be a federation and the question of the individuality of the Slovak nation was a reality which would not be debated.
The Czechoslovak Republic, therefore, was forced on the Slovak nation not only by the opportunism of a negligible minority of the Slovak nation which followed its own egotistic aims and served Czech imperialism, but also by the international situation. On such foundations, however, no State can exist permanently and must perish unconditionally when the causes and circumstances responsible for its existence disappear.
And so, just as the recognition of the conception of Dr. Beneš by the western powers had a fatal influence on the politics of the Slovak Republic during the war, just so the fact that the Slovak Republic was Incorporated in the Czechoslovak Republic without
regard for the will of the Slovak nation and without regard for the proclamation of the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations has its influence on the stand of the Slovaks in the contemporary world struggle.
If the Allies would have promised to preserve Slovak independence, as they did in the case of the Italians, Magyars, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Finns and Australians - who also fought on the side of the Axis - then it would have been possible to expect that the Slovaks, too, would have found their place at the right time on their side. None of the aforementioned peoples lost their independent States or were forced to become members of other States, but the Slovak State was annexed to Bohemia-Moravia.
It is, therefore, self-evident that the Slovak nation considers the present condition as an occupation and together with its emigration is fighting simultaneously for the victory of democracy over communism and the liberation of the Slovak Republic from Soviet-Czech occupation.
WHO SAID IT?
"We shall be eternally grateful to those who helped us, above all our great Slav brother, the SOVIET UNION. This gratitude, however, must not permit us into believing all is won because we have so powerful an ally. We must arrange our lives in such a way that we may never become a burden to those who are bound to us by alliance or friendship. On the contrary our friends must be made to feel that they have gained a loyal and effective ally worthy or such an alliance." - (Jaroslav Stránsky, Minister of Justice, Mass meeting in Most, June 19, 1945).
•
"Personally I trust the Russians; they think as they speak. I believe that they will cooperate fully with England and America. They will hold strictly to the decisions of the Teheran Conference to guarantee the peace for several generations. I do not believe that Russia will interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbors. I assure you that Stalin is willing to confirm his statement that he is completely against all efforts to force communistic principles on the Danubian countries." - (Dr. Beneš, Interview with Charles Goley, London "DAILY EXPRIDSS," 3-13-44).
•
"Our position in Europe is different from that in 1918. Today we are approaching far-reaching revolution. Our whole world is changing. This war has formed a solid and impregnable bloc of Slav nations and states. Today there is the RED ARMY, the army of Marshall TITO, brave Polish divisions and the Czechoslovak PEOPLE'S army, and if all those forces are put together we shall have SOME SAY in Europe." - (Zdenek Nejedlý Minister of Education, Address to Physical Training Societies, Prague, May 31, 1945).
•
The belief that Czechoslovakia is a part of Russia or that the Russians are DICTATING to us is not true. And you don't find a Russian soldier in our whole country." - Stanislav Novak, Czech Consul, CLEVELAND PRESS, 8-19-46).
SLOVAKIA
23
INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION
OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC
DR. JOSEPH
KIRSCHBAUM
Because of years of relentless propaganda by Czech emigrés
and the renewal of the Czechoslovak Republic by the merlts of the
Soviet Union, the orlgln of the Slovak Republlc and lts lncorporation
lnto the European organizatlon ls often placed In a bad llght even
by persons and nations who a priori do not have an unfavorable
oplnlon of the Slovak efforts for lndependence. In the interest of the
truth, lt wllJ not be amlss to answer the questlon of how European
public oplnlon and the governments of European states recelved the
proclamatlon of Slovak lndependence.
The questlon !s au the more slgnlflcant when we conslder
that changes of the map of Europe are not and never were in·
different to the European natlons and especla11y to the great powers,
and that the Slovak Republlc was proclalmed In a period of peace.
European natlons, therefore, had an unhlndered opportunlty of tak•
Ing a stand to the newly establlshed State and that In a two-fold
manner:
1. By not recognlzlng the new State and refuslng to establlsh
diplomatlc contacts w!th the Slovak Republlc.
2. AU States, and especlally those whlch guaranteed the lndependence and integrity of the Czechoslovak Republlc after Munich,
had the opportunlty, by peaceful means or by war, of maklng the
exlstence of the Slovak State lmposslble and renewlng the old
state of affalrs.
What happened In the case of Slovakla?
There was not a slngle state in Europe or elsewhere which dld
that in 1939. There was no protest agalnst the orlgln of the State
of Slovakla even from some of the great powers that were in some
way obllgated to Czechoslovakla. But there were protests only agalnat
the occupation of Bohemia and Moravla by the Germans. Even Presldent Roosevelt, answerlng Dr. Beneš's telegram (March 16, 1939),
wrote In his letter March 27, 1939, that "even though the Government of the United States is aware that the lands of Bohemla and
Moravia were eccupled by the German milltary forces and are now
factually under German authorlty, lt has not recognlzed thls situatlon a.s a legal condltlon." (Beneš: Memolrs, 1947).
As far as Slovakla was concerned, practlcally every European
State recognized Slovakia and establlshed dlplomatlc contacts wlth
lt. England and Soviet Russla not excepted. Just about two montbs
after the proclamatlon of Slovakla's independence the Forelgn Minister of Great Brltain ordered the fo11owlng note dellvered to the flrst
Forelgn Minister ot the Slovak Republlc:
Bratislava, May 4th, 1989.
Your Excellency:
On the lnstructlon of the Secretary of State for Forelgn Affalrs
I have the honour to Inform you that Hls Majesfy's Government ln
�24
SLOVAKIA
the United Kingdom propose to appoint me as Consul for Slovak.ia
with residence in Bratis lava.
Pendlng preparation of my Commlssion I have the honour to
request provlsional recognitlon by the Slovak Government of myself as His Majesty's Consul for Slovakia.
I avail myself of this opportunlty to express to your Excellency
the assurance of my hlghest consideration.
PARES, M. P., H. M. Consul.
The Slovaks in turn sent Ing. Harminc as General Consul to
London to represent the Slovak Republic. The exchange of dlplomatic
representatives between London and Bratislava was prevented only
by war which b roke out six months after the proclamatlon of Slovak
independence.
Soviet Russia, wbich did not enter the war against Germany on
September 1, 1939, set u p one of tbe largest embassies in Bratislava,
and the flrst Russlan ambassador, G. Puškin, upon presentlng his
credentials to the Presldent of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tlso,
sald among other thlngs:
"Presentlng to you the documents which accredit me as Extraordinary Ambassador and Minister Plenipotentiary, appointed by
the Presidency of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, I can announce
to you with joy that the nations of the Soviet Union have taken
cognizance of the establishment of dlplomatic contac:ts between the
Soviet Union and the Slovak Republic with deep satlsfaction. Because of the war in Europe the establishment of these contacts
oversteps the framework of mutual interests of both our states."
Before Moscow sent lts ambassador to Bratislava, however, the
Soviet Government had notified the dlplomatic representatlve of the
Czechoslovak Republic, Dr. Zdenek Fierlinger, that lt no longer
regards him as a dlplomatic character. Fierlinger bimselt wrote
about this as follows:
"On December 14, I was called to the Forelgn Commissariat by
Mr. Barkov, the Chief of the Protocol. Barkov told me that the
Soviet Government regrets that it can no longer acknowledge my
dlplomatic character. He added that I could remain in Moscow with
my officials and their families as a private indivldual."
Barkov, accor dlng to Flerlinger, even "refused to mediate a
visit wlth the Commissar of Foreign Affairs" as he had also refused to send any written report for the Commissariat or any other
offlcial person. So it was only by a prlvate Jetter that Fierllnger
could write to the representative of Forelgn Affairs: "1 understand
fully the stand taken by your Government and I am grateful for the
permlssion to remaln in Moscow as a prlvate individual." (Z. Fierlinger: "Ve službách ČSR," Prague, 1947, pgs. 313-314).
Pre-war France readlly recognlzed the new State in the heart
of Europe, but forma! diplomatic contacts could not be established,
because war had broken out. In the case or France, which recognized the Slovak Republic de facto on July 14. 1939, and de jure on
April 25, 1942, an interesting detail bas been noted. Whlle the
French Foreign Minister, M. Dalladler, refused to see Dr. Bene§
and negotlate wlth bim, the French General Consul in Bratislava
�SLOVAKIA
25
was trying to convince the Slovak Government that an exchange
of ambassadors had not taken place immediately after March 14,
1939, only because of the previous relationship between France and
Czechoslovakia. The reasons concerned prestige. However, he considered an exchange of ambassadors in the near future as a selfevident matter. As the General Secretary of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, even I had acted personally as mediator between Dalladier and the Slovak Government. Beneš referred to the incident
in his MEMOIRS:
•
" Dalladier - when I asked for an audience - refused to see
me and refused to discuss any polltical matters with me. Later he
brought this matter up before the Government and supported his
action with reasons for doing so." (Beneš: MEMOIRS, 1947, pg. 139).
Germany and Italy also recognized Slovak.ia. The Slovak Republic was recognized by all great powers which were deciding the
fate of Europe. It was recognized even by the Vatican. The western
powers, who got into the conflict against Germany in September
1939, did not change thelr s tand toward Slovakia even after the
war began, but only several years later (1942-1943). The decision
of the western powers, of course, had no influence on the actual or
legal existence of the Slovak State as far as lnternational law was
concerned. For that reason the Vatican and the other neutral
States did not change their relationship with Slovakia during the
ent!re war-t!me perlod.
The neighbors of Slovak.ia likewise did not oppose her independent status. Poland recognlzed Slovakia March 16, 1939, and
Hungary on March 15, 1939. And this is espec!ally significant in the
light of the conditions and tendenc!es which appeared in centra)
Europe after the break-up of Austr!a-Hungary. The changes effected
by the proclamation of Slovak independence concerued, in the first
place, the neighbors of Slovakia from the econom!c and strategic
point of view. By its hlstorical development, its position and natural resources the central European area has its own laws, needs and
demands. The lndividual nat!ons of that area jealously watch so
that no single nation among them might grow at the expense of the
others and so disturb the natural balanc e of mllitary and economic
forces.
The Slovak Republic, however, f!tted into this area not as a
disturbing element, but, conversely, as a fulfillment of conditions
of balance and the removal of one of the s!gniflcant causes of lnstabllity of the Centro-European organizatlon. That is why even
Yugoslavla and Rumania, which untll 1938 together with the Czechoslovak Republic within the framework of the Little Entente
had been the pillars of the post-war organization in the Danube
basin, made regular diplomatic contacts and collaborated economically with the Slovak Republic soon after it was establlshed. Bulgaria
did likewlse.
Among the neutra) States, besides the Vatican, which recognized the Slovak State and made diplomatlc and economlc contacts
with it were Sw!tzerland and Sweden. Spaln, whlch had declared
itself neutra) later, recognlzed Slovakia on May 4, 1939, and sent lts
ambassador to Slovakia forthwith. Belgium accorded de facto recognition to Slovakla.
�26
SLOVAKIA
Other European States, thus far not mentioned, whlch recog•
nlzed Slovakla were: Flnland, Denmark, Latvia, Estonla, Lithuanla,
and Croatia. And States outslde of Europe: Japan, Manchuria, Chlna
(Nankfag), Siam, Costa Rlca, and Ecuador.
Slovakia, then, was recogn!zed by a total of 27 countries: by
great powers and small powers, by neutra! States and by powers
of both warrlng camps. It !s lnteresting to note that the majority
or the States which granted recognitlon to Slovak!a as an inde•
pendent State was on the s!de of Anglo•Russian coalltlon. The
clalm that Slovakia was recognized only by Germany and its satel•
lites !s, therefore, a w!llful deceptlon o! the lnternat!onal public.
Seventeen of the 27 States recognizlng Slovakia fought against
Germany or were neutra!.
Th!s comparison is slgnlflcant not only because it uproots the
falsehoods of the propaganda which presented Slovakla to the Allles
as a State recognlzed only by Germany and lts satellites, but because it also conflrms - as has been shown - that F,uropean States
w!thout exceptlon recognized the right of the Slovaks to an Independent existence, an Independent State. Furthermore, lt also confirms the fact that these European States did not see anything
unnatural or dlsturblng in the establishment of Independent Slovakia, even though they dld see lt in the occupation of Bohemla and
Moravla. In this connectlon lt !s lnterestlng to note how the League
of Nat!ons regarded the collapse of Czechoslovakia. In h!s MEMOIRS,
Beneš himself complalned that the General Secretary, J. Avenol,
refused to 11Jace h!s protest before the League of Natlons for ortlc!al
dlscusslon wlth the argument that the protest was not placed before
the body the regular way, but my a "prlvate !ndlvldual." (Pg. 109).
The fact that no European States protested against the existence of the independent State of Slovakia 1s lmportant, especlally
when we consider that Centra! Europe was the way out of two World
Wars and that its organizat!on after World War I made a powder
keg out of this area, the explosl~n of which was feared for twenty
years.
From the Slovak standpolnt thls recognit!on of the Slovak Republic by such a Jarge number of States has the significance that the
Slovaks can always point to it when demanding Slovak independence.
And it 1s lmportant to remember, too, that the Slovak Republlc was
proclaimed six months before the start of World War II which at the
outset dlvlded the natlons of the world lnto two camps. This fact
and the fact that Slovakia was placed lnto the German-Itallan sphere
because of her geographlcal posltlon, prevented many other natlons
from recognlzlng her dlplomatlcally, natlons which undoubtedly would
have recognlzed her under more favorable condltlons. Conslderlng
the spontaneity and speed wlth whlch the lndividual States re•
sponded to the notlflcatlon of the proclamatlon ot Slovak lndependence and arranged d!plomatlc or consular offlces in Bratislava, tt
can be correctly assumed that the Slovak Republlc would have been
recognized unlversally lf the war had been delayed only a yea.r or two.
Slovakia., then, was a.ccepted into the fa.mlly ot independent na•
tions not only by centra! European States, but also by the great
European powers. European, and especlaJJy Centra! European lnterests, correctly comprehended, could not, ot course, permit the denlal
�SLOVAKIA
27
or thls rlght to one or the oldest Centra! European natlons, when
thls rlght today is acknowledged even to colonlal nations and without
the valldation or whlch there can hardly be any sensible talk about
justlce or even a guaranteed peace.
II
The recognltlon ot the Slovak Republlc by such a large number
of European and non-European States, desplte the tense international
sltuation, was in a great measure the merit of the young Slovak
dlplomacy. In order to have a complete plcture ot the internatlonal
posltion ot the Slovak Republlc, lt would be well to list not only
the States whlch recognlzed Slovakia and established regular diplomatlc relatlons wlth her, but also the lndlviduals who represented
the Slovak natlon in the lnternatlonal forum and point out the
tendencles represented by the flrst Slovak diplomata. And, of course,
it ls also necessary to mention the countrles whlch did not recognize
the Slovak State.
As a result ot the internatlonal recognitlon of the Slovak Republic, the Slovak nag - so lgnored and trampled upon previously
- for the flrst tlme in Slovak hlstory waved proudly over the Slovak
dlplomatlc and consular offlces In the capltols ot almost every European State. In eternal Rome, as well as in Moscow; in the proud
city of Albion, as well as In Berlin; In Warsaw, Belgrade, Sophia,
Bucharest, Budapest, Berne, and Stockholm; In Helsinki, Vlenna and
even over the general consulate in Prague. And in all these places,
the Slovak emblem hung lndependently for the flrst tlme: lt was
not attached to the emblem of St. Stephen's Crown, nor to the
Czech Llon.
For those who harbor a respect for the symbols of nations, thls
reallty can hardly be a sentlmental one only. It has lts own deep
polltlcal and moral meantng. We can evldence th!s fact best from
the tlme that the Slovak flag had to be hauled down temporarily.
As far as the dlplomatic representatives of the Slovak Republlc
are concerned, not all were tralned for the task, because in the
Czecboslovak Republlc out of 1246 offlclals In the Forelgn Service
only 33 were Slovak, and only a few ot these were diplomata. HowP.ver, In the Slovak nature there are certa!n talents for th!s kind of
servlce, so that even in thls fleld much ot what the past dld not allow to be done was caught up with shortly.
Altogether there were three categories among Slovak dlplomatlc representatlves In leadlng posltlons: Slx former otflclals from
Prague (Dr. Ivan Milecz, Dr. Joseph Cleker, Dr. Joseph Mlku!í, Dr.
Plssko, Dr. Radllnský and Dr. Szatmáry); three !rom interna! polltics
(Karol Sldor, Matthew Cernák and Dr. Joseph Klrschbaum); and
the others came from varlous protesslons (l<'rancls Tlso. Dr. Spišiak,
Dr. J. Šlmko, Dr. Zvrškovec, Tldo J . Gašpar, Dr. Galvánek, Dr.
Bečko, etc). The majority ot these, therefore were men who had
prepared for other tasks in llfe. But even large states, wh!ch bave
a sufrlclent number of dlplomatic personnel, place persona ot other
protesslons In leadlng dlplomatlc posltlons.
Keeplng In mlnd the tense sltuatlon of the world at that Ume
and the reality that Slovakla was practically unknown In forelgn
lands and was conslstently belng presented in a bad light by anti•
�28
SLOVAKIA
Slovak propaganda, we must admlt that the tasks faclng the dlplomatlc representatlves of the newly establlsbed Slovak Republic
were by no means easy. And yet, the Slovak diplomatic representatives - exceptlng Dr. Szatmáry - defended the rlgbt of tbe Slovak
nation to its own State to the end and performed thelr tasks well
in the dlplomatlc, cultural and propaganda flelds.
There was one task tbey had, bowever, failed to do, and that
one was probably the most lmportant one: they dld not prepare
for the transfer of Slovakla to the slde of the Allles at the right
time. However, lt is a bit premature to pass judgment In this matter
ln view of the world sltuatlon and the present posltion of Slovakia,
and especlally In view of the fact that all Slovak dlplomatlc representatives In neutra! countries, upon whom thls task fell, have not as
yet been heard from. For the present we can make several general
remarks and loglcal conclusions whlch emanate !rom the over-al!
situation exlstlng at the end of the war and trom the tendencles that
made themselves apparent wlth the All!es In general, and In the rela•
tlon to Slovakla in partlcular. And from this, then, we can learn what
alternatlves presented themselves to the Slovaks.
After considerlng all the clrcumstances under whlch the war
was waged and those under which the so•called "Natlonal Uprlslng"
In Slovakia was organized Jater, thls problem looks decldedly dlfferent
than lt appeared to be at flrst slght. But aslde trom tbe fact that
diplomacy always only prepares the way for the pollcles of a government and is in ltself only an execut!ve organ, no other natlon had
to contend with such impedlments as the Slovak natlon in the matter of transferrlng to the Allles. Let us conslder only one:
When the Anglo-Saxon Allies (in 1941-1942) and the Soviet
Union (1943) came out for the renewal of the Czechoslovak Republic
and even concluded agreements wlth the Government of Dr. Beneš,
the jolnlng of the Slovak Government and the Slovak diplomata
wlth the Allles would have meant the acceptance ot Czechoslovakia
- already recognized by the Allles - and the renouncing of independence. Slovak political leaders at horne and Slovak dlplomats
abroad had to declde the dllemma: Elther to remain loyal to the
rlght to lndependence and defend lt to the end even at the cost of
great persona) sacrlflces, or to joln those who dld not recogn!ze the
right of the Slovak nation to lts own State and thus secure tor
themselves definlte persona! lnterests.
That ls how the problem Jooked when the "Slovak Revolt" broke
out in August 1944. Whlle the Itallans, Rumanians, Magyars and
Bulgarlans jolned the Allles to safeguard thelr lndependence, the
Jeaders of the rebelllon In Slovakla were proclalmlng the annexation
of Slovakla to the Czech lands, renewlng the Czechoslovak Republic
and riddlng thelr own nation of lts Independent State.
The posltion of Slovakla In the war and, therefore, even the actions of Slovak dlplomats, were determlned In the over-all framework by the pollcy of the Allles themselves and in the narrower
framework by the alms of the "rebelllon" In Slovakla.
If it were not for thls situatlon, there would have been among
the Slovak polltlcians, as well as among the Slovak dlplomats. rep•
resentatlves In the lndlvldual states of Europe who would have had
the polltlcal and moral Iegltimacy to speak In the name of the Slo-
�SLOVAKIA
29
vak natlon. In the Vatican, one of the most important centers of
world diplomacy, Slovakia was represented by Karol Sidor, whose
antl-German stand cannot be disputed. The General Secretary ot the
Hlinka Slovak People's Party, ousted from his off!ce by Nazl pressure, was sent to Swltzerland to represent Slovakia. In Sweden
Slovakla had the career diplomat, Dr. Pissko, and In Spaln Dr. Mikuš and Dr. Cieker, both of whom were not only first-class dlplomats, but were outstandlng In their generation.
It 1s evident, then, that the Slovak Republic did have people
in important places abroad who were predetermined to prepare the
transfer of the Slovaks to the vlctorlous camp. And undoubtedly it
shall once become known that these Slovak representatlves did
not lack the initlatlve, either. But there were no real possibllit!es
for such a policy, if the Slovaks themselves were not to surrender
their right to independence. This they could not do, because they
knew that the rlghts whlch were taken away by force could always
be regained, but the r!ghts which a nat!on once surrendered could
never be regained.
A policy that redeems apparent, temporary advantages by surrendering natural rights never did end up well. And conversely, history was wont to reward with victory the fight whlch had an upright alm. Whether the Slovak Government and the Slovak dlplomats did right by conslstently holding to their ant!-communist stand
and defend!ng the lnal!enable rights of their nation, history and
probably even the near future shall render a deflnite verdict. That
they acted honorably and did not pursue their persona! lnterests !s
already clear today.
III
Dr. Edward Beneš and his fo\lowers always denied the individuality of the Slovak natlon and were always opposed to Slovak autonomy. This group of Czech pol!t!clans and several indlvlduals of Slovak
orlgin, who subscrlbed to the ideology of a "Czechoslovak natlon,"
stubbornly refused to recognize the right of the Slovaks to thelr own
State and the acceptance of the Slovak Republ!c into the internat!onal
commu11ity. They used all means at their disposal to misrepresent
the Slovak questlon before the Allies to effect the destniction of
the Slovak Republ!c and force its annexatlon to the Czech lands.
Dr. Edward Beneš even attempted to deceive the Vatlcan, but
did not fare s o well. In a Memorandum, sent to the Holy See on
May 12, 1943, through President Roosevelt, Dr. Edward Beneš
stated among other things: "The Slovak people, in its great majority,
today stands without any reservations behlnd the present Czecho·
slovak Government. In Slovakia pol!tical, social, economlcal and
moral condlt!ons are extremely sad. The majority of the Slovak
people considers the present reglme In Bratislava responsible for thls
sltuatlon and as a traltor of the Slovak people and the Czechoslovak
Republ!c. Former governmental Slovak parties (the Agrarians, Llberals, Soclalists) are almost completely behlnd the Czechoslovak
Government and agalnst the present reglme in Slovakia, whlle the
former Cathollc People's Party, which took over the rule of Slovak
affalrs from the hands of the Germans In 1939, today stands - according to our reports - at least 60 per cent agalnst the present
regime." (Beneš: MEMOIRS, Documents).
�30
SLOVAKIA
Of course, the Vatlcan knew what the actual situatlon in Slovakia was. The Slovak Government was represented at the Vatlcan,
and the Holy See had its representatlve In Bratislava. Benelí was
fully aware of that fact, but he thought he mlght persuade the
Holy See to see things bis way, slnce lt was pretty evident at t hat
tlme that he would be back in the driver's seat when the war ended.
The Vatlcan's refusal to recognize bim and bis London Government
made Beneš furlous.
Because of the war sltuation and the fact that Slovakia fell
into the Axis bloc because of its geographical posltion, the actlons
of Dr. Beneš and the Czech Slovaks (Czechoslovaks l was more suc•
cessful than that of the Magyars a!ter World War I who also tried
to mobllize world oplnion for the return ot SlovakJa to the Magyar
State. The Magyar actlon was also supported by several renegade
politlcians of Slovak descent and yet it falled because the Slovak
natlon was determined to live its own life. History ltself tells us that
lt is only loglcal for every natlon to strive for an Independent State.
The temporary victory of Dr. Beneš will not reverse the loglc of
blstory. The Slovaks firmly belleve that in the end their natural
rights to an independent State shall be recognlzed, as they have been
recognlzed In the case of other nations. It ls only a question ot
tlme and an approprlate internatlonal situatlon.
If the revlslonlstlc efforts of Dr. Beneš seem to have found a
greater response In Slovakla than Magyar revlsion, that certainly
cannot be consldered as proof that the Slovak natlon in lts entirety, or even In lts greater part, has renounced lts right to an Independent State.
The Slovak natlon was not glven the opportunlty to say whether
it wants to live in lts own State or In a comon State wlth the
Czechs. The Slovaks who accepted the Czechoslovak solutlon dld
so out of fear emanatlng from the fate of a vanqulshed State, under
the pressure of mllltary events, and In the endeavor to assure them•
selves of an advantageous positlon to rule over Slovakla wlth the
help of the Czechs, because they had no chance of gettlng lnto
leading posltlons any other way. That thls solutlou was accepted
even by the small group only out of opportunlsm !s attested to by
the fact that already toward the end of 1943, when the outcome of the
war was known, thls group went lnto actlon for the renewal of the
Czechoslovak Republlc, stresslng at the same Ume that the renewed State would be a federatlon and the questlon of the lndl·
vlduality of the Slovak nation was a reality whlch would not be
debated.
The Czechoslovak Republlc, therefore, was forced on the Slovak
nation not only by the opportunlsm of a negliglble minority ot the·
Slovak natlon whlch followed lts own egotlstlc aims and served Czech
imperlallsm, but also by the lnternatlonal sltuatlon. On such foun•
datlons, however, no State can exlst permanently and must perlsh
uncondltlonally when the causes and clrcumstances responslble for
lts exlstence dlsappear.
And so, just as the recognltlon of the conception of Dr. Beneš
by the western powers had a fatal lnfluence on the polltlcs of the
Slovak Republ!c durlng the war, just so the fact that the Slovak
Republlc was Incorporated In the Czechoslovak Republlc without
�SLOVAKIA
31
regard for the will of the Slovak nation and without regard for the
proclamation of the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United
Nations has its influence on the stand of the Slovaks in the contemporary world struggle.
If the Allies would have promlsed to preserve Slovak independence, as they did In the case of the Itallans, Magyars, Rumanians,
Bulgarians, Finns and Austrlans - who also fought on the side of
the Axis - then it would have been possible to expect that the
Slovaks, too, would have found their place at the rlght time on their
side. None of the aforementioned peoples lost their independent
States or were forced to become members of other States, but the
Slovak State was annexed to Bohemla-Moravla.
It ls, therefore, self-evident that the Slovak natlon conslders the
present condition as an occupation and together with lts emlgration is fighting slmultaneously for the victory of democracy over
communism and the libe'ration of the Slovak Republic from SovietCzech occupation.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"We shaU be eternally gra,teful to those who helped us, above
all our great Slav brother, the SOVIET UNION. This gra,titude, bow•
ever, must not permit us mto belleving all ls won because we have
so powerful an ally. We must arrange our lives in such a way that
we may never become a burden to those who are bound to us by
alliance or friend&hlp. On the contrary our frien ds must be ma'de to
feel that they have galned a loyal and effectíve ally worthy or sucb
an alllance." - (Jaroslav Stränsky, Minister ot J ustlce, Mass meeting
In Most, June 19, 1945).
•
•
"Personally I trust the Russdans; they thin k as they apeak. I oelieve that they wiH cooperate fully wlth England and Amerlca. They
will hold strlctly to the declsions of the Teheran Conference to guarant&e the peace for several genera,tions. I do not bel!eve that Russia wili
lnterfere in the interna! aftail'S of tts neighbors. 1 a ssure you that
Stalin ia w illing to confirm his statement t hat he ia completely against
all efforts t o force communistic pri nci ples on the Danublan countri es." (Dr. Benes, Interview with Charles Goley, London "DAIL Y
EXPRIDSS," 3-13-44).
•
"Our pos!tion in Europe 1s ditferent from that m 1918. Today we
are approaching far-reaching revolution. Our whole world is changlng.
This war has formed a solid and impregnable bloc of Slav nations
and states. T oday there ia t he RED A RM Y, the a rm y of Marahall
TITO, b rave Pollsh dlvlalons a nd the Czechoslovak P EOP L E'S a rmy,
a nd lf all t hoae forcea a re put t ogethe r we s ha ll ha ve SOM E SAY in
Europe." - (2ldenek Nejedlý, Minister of Educ811.ion, Address to Physlcal Trainlng Soclet!es, Prague, May 31, 1945) .
•
The bellef that Czechoslovakla la a part of Russla or t hat t he
Russiana a re DICTATING t o ua la not t rue. And you do n't flnd a Rua.
sian soldier In our whole c ountry." - Stanislav Novak, Czech Consul, CLEVELAND PRESS, 8-19-46).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC
DR. JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM
Because of years of relentless propaganda by Czech emigres and the renewal of the Czechoslovak Republic by the merits of the Soviet Union, the origin of the Slovak Republic and its incorporation into the European organization is often placed in a bad light even by persons and nations who a priori do not have an unfavorable opinion of the Slovak efforts for independence. In the interest of the truth, it will not be amiss to answer the question of how European public opinion and the governments of European states received the proclamation of Slovak independence.
The question is all the more significant when we consider that changes of the map of Europe are not and never were indifferent to the European nations and especially to the great powers, and that the Slovak Republic was proclaimed in a period of peace. European nations, therefore, had an unhindered opportunity of taking a stand to the newly established State and that in a two-fold manner:
1. By not recognizing the new State and refusing to establish diplomatic contacts with the Slovak Republic.
2. All States, and especially those which guaranteed the independence and integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic after Munich, had the opportunity, by peaceful means or by war, of making the existence of the Slovak State impossible and renewing the old state of affairs.
What happened In the case of Slovakia?
There was not a single state in Europe or elsewhere which did that in 1939. There was no protest against the origin of the State of Slovakia even from some of the great powers that were in some way obligated to Czechoslovakia. But there were protests only against the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by the Germans. Even President Roosevelt, answering Dr. Beneš's telegram (March 16, 1939), wrote in his letter March 27, 1939, that "even though the Government of the United States is aware that the lands of Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by the German military forces and are now factually under German authority, it has not recognized this situation as a legal condition." (Beneš: Memoirs, 1947).
As far as Slovakia was concerned, practically every European State recognized Slovakia and established diplomatic contacts with lt. England and Soviet Russia not excepted. Just about two months after the proclamation of Slovakia’s independence the Foreign Minister of Great Britain ordered the following note delivered to the first Foreign Minister of the Slovak Republic:
Bratislava, May 4th, 1989. Your Excellency:
On the instruction of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs I have the honour to Inform you that His Majesty’s Government ln the United Kingdom propose to appoint me as Consul for Slovakia with residence in Bratislava.
Pending preparation of my Commission I have the honour to request provisional recognition by the Slovak Government of myself as His Majesty's Consul for Slovakia.
I avail myself of this opportunity to express to your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.
PARES, M. P., H. M. Consul.
The Slovaks in turn sent Ing. Harminc as General Consul to London to represent the Slovak Republic. The exchange of diplomatic representatives between London and Bratislava was prevented only by war which broke out six months after the proclamation of Slovak independence.
Soviet Russia, which did not enter the war against Germany on September 1, 1939, set up one of the largest embassies in Bratislava, and the first Russian ambassador, G. Puškin, upon presenting his credentials to the President of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso, said among other things:
"Presenting to you the documents which accredit me as Extraordinary Ambassador and Minister Plenipotentiary, appointed by the Presidency of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, I can announce to you with joy that the nations of the Soviet Union have taken cognizance of the establishment of diplomatic contacts between the Soviet Union and the Slovak Republic with deep satisfaction. Because of the war in Europe the establishment of these contacts oversteps the framework of mutual interests of both our states."
Before Moscow sent its ambassador to Bratislava, however, the Soviet Government had notified the diplomatic representative of the Czechoslovak Republic, Dr. Zdenek Fierlinger, that it no longer regards him as a diplomatic character. Fierlinger himself wrote about this as follows:
"On December 14, I was called to the Foreign Commissariat by Mr. Barkov, the Chief of the Protocol. Barkov told me that the Soviet Government regrets that it can no longer acknowledge my diplomatic character. He added that I could remain in Moscow with my officials and their families as a private individual."
Barkov, according to Fierlinger, even "refused to mediate a visit with the Commissar of Foreign Affairs" as he had also refused to send any written report for the Commissariat or any other official person. So it was only by a private letter that Fierlinger could write to the representative of Foreign Affairs: "I understand fully the stand taken by your Government and I am grateful for the permission to remain in Moscow as a private individual." (Z. Fierlinger: "Ve službách ČSR," Prague, 1947, pgs. 313-314).
Pre-war France readily recognized the new State in the heart of Europe, but formal diplomatic contacts could not be established, because war had broken out. In the case of France, which recognized the Slovak Republic de facto on July 14. 1939, and de jure on April 25, 1942, an interesting detail bas been noted. While the French Foreign Minister, M. Dalladier, refused to see Dr. Beneš and negotiate with him, the French General Consul in Bratislava was trying to convince the Slovak Government that an exchange of ambassadors had not taken place immediately after March 14, 1939, only because of the previous relationship between France and Czechoslovakia. The reasons concerned prestige. However, he considered an exchange of ambassadors in the near future as a self-evident matter. As the General Secretary of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, even I had acted personally as mediator between Dalladier and the Slovak Government. Beneš referred to the incident in his MEMOIRS:
"Dalladier - when I asked for an audience -refused to see me and refused to discuss any political matters with me. Later he brought this matter up before the Government and supported his action with reasons for doing so." (Beneš: MEMOIRS, 1947, pg. 139).
Germany and Italy also recognized Slovakia. The Slovak Republic was recognized by all great powers which were deciding the fate of Europe. It was recognized even by the Vatican. The western powers, who got into the conflict against Germany in September 1939, did not change their stand toward Slovakia even after the war began, but only several years later (1942-1943). The decision of the western powers, of course, had no influence on the actual or legal existence of the Slovak State as far as international law was concerned. For that reason the Vatican and the other neutral States did not change their relationship with Slovakia during the entire war-time period.
The neighbors of Slovakia likewise did not oppose her independent status. Poland recognized Slovakia March 16, 1939, and Hungary on March 15, 1939. And this is especially significant in the light of the conditions and tendencies which appeared in centra) Europe after the break-up of Austria-Hungary. The changes effected by the proclamation of Slovak independence concerned, in the first place, the neighbors of Slovakia from the economic and strategic point of view. By its historical development, its position and natural resources the central European area has its own laws, needs and demands. The individual nations of that area jealously watch so that no single nation among them might grow at the expense of the others and so disturb the natural balance of military and economic forces.
The Slovak Republic, however, fitted into this area not as a disturbing element, but, conversely, as a fulfillment of conditions of balance and the removal of one of the significant causes of instability of the Centro-European organization. That is why even Yugoslavia and Rumania, which until 1938 together with the Czechoslovak Republic within the framework of the Little Entente had been the pillars of the post-war organization in the Danube basin, made regular diplomatic contacts and collaborated economically with the Slovak Republic soon after it was established. Bulgaria did likewise.
Among the neutral States, besides the Vatican, which recognized the Slovak State and made diplomatic and economic contacts with it were Switzerland and Sweden. Spain, which had declared itself neutral later, recognized Slovakia on May 4, 1939, and sent its ambassador to Slovakia forthwith. Belgium accorded de facto recognition to Slovakia.
Other European States, thus far not mentioned, which recognized Slovakia were: Finland, Denmark, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Croatia. And States outside of Europe: Japan, Manchuria, China (Nanking), Siam, Costa Rica, and Ecuador.
Slovakia, then, was recognized by a total of 27 countries: by great powers and small powers, by neutral States and by powers of both warring camps. It is interesting to note that the majority or the States which granted recognition to Slovakia as an independent State was on the side of Anglo-Russian coalition. The claim that Slovakia was recognized only by Germany and its satellites is, therefore, a willful deception of the international public. Seventeen of the 27 States recognizing Slovakia fought against Germany or were neutral.
This comparison is significant not only because it uproots the falsehoods of the propaganda which presented Slovakia to the Allies as a State recognized only by Germany and its satellites, but because it also confirms - as has been shown - that European States without exception recognized the right of the Slovaks to an independent existence, an Independent State. Furthermore, it also confirms the fact that these European States did not see anything unnatural or disturbing in the establishment of Independent Slovakia, even though they did see it in the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia. In this connection it is interesting to note how the League of Nations regarded the collapse of Czechoslovakia. In his MEMOIRS, Beneš himself complained that the General Secretary, J. Avenol, refused to place his protest before the League of Nations for official discussion with the argument that the protest was not placed before the body the regular way, but my a "private individual." (Pg. 109).
The fact that no European States protested against the existence of the independent State of Slovakia is important, especially when we consider that Central Europe was the way out of two World Wars and that its organization after World War I made a powder keg out of this area, the explosion of which was feared for twenty years.
From the Slovak standpoint this recognition of the Slovak Republic by such a large number of States has the significance that the Slovaks can always point to it when demanding Slovak independence. And it is important to remember, too, that the Slovak Republic was proclaimed six months before the start of World War II which at the outset divided the nations of the world into two camps. This fact and the fact that Slovakia was placed into the German-Italian sphere because of her geographical position, prevented many other nations from recognizing her diplomatically, nations which undoubtedly would have recognized her under more favorable conditions. Considering the spontaneity and speed with which the individual States responded to the notification of the proclamation of Slovak independence and arranged diplomatic or consular offices in Bratislava, it can be correctly assumed that the Slovak Republic would have been recognized universally if the war had been delayed only a year or two.
Slovakia., then, was accepted into the family of independent nations not only by central European States, but also by the great European powers. European, and especially Central European interests correctly comprehended, could not, of course, permit the denial of this right to one of the oldest Central European nations, when this right today is acknowledged even to colonial nations and without the validation of which there can hardly be any sensible talk about justice or even a guaranteed peace.
II
The recognition of the Slovak Republic by such a large number of European and non-European States, despite the tense international situation, was in a great measure the merit of the young Slovak diplomacy. In order to have a complete picture of the international position of the Slovak Republic, it would be well to list not only the States which recognized Slovakia and established regular diplomatic relations with her, but also the individuals who represented the Slovak nation in the international forum and point out the tendencies represented by the first Slovak diplomats. And, of course, it is also necessary to mention the countries which did not recognize the Slovak State.
As a result of the international recognition of the Slovak Republic, the Slovak flag - so ignored and trampled upon previously - for the first time in Slovak history waved proudly over the Slovak diplomatic and consular offices In the capitols of almost every European State. In eternal Rome, as well as in Moscow; in the proud city of Albion, as well as in Berlin; in Warsaw, Belgrade, Sophia, Bucharest, Budapest, Berne, and Stockholm; in Helsinki, Vienna and even over the general consulate in Prague. And in all these places, the Slovak emblem hung independently for the first time: it was not attached to the emblem of St. Stephen's Crown, nor to the Czech Lion.
For those who harbor a respect for the symbols of nations, this reality can hardly be a sentimental one only. It has its own deep political and moral meaning. We can evidence this fact best from the time that the Slovak flag had to be hauled down temporarily.
As far as the diplomatic representatives of the Slovak Republic are concerned, not all were trained for the task, because in the Czechoslovak Republic out of 1246 officials in the Foreign Service only 33 were Slovak, and only a few of these were diplomats. However, in the Slovak nature there are certain talents for this kind of service, so that even in this field much of what the past did not allow to be done was caught up with shortly.
Altogether there were three categories among Slovak diplomatic representatives in leading positions: Six former officials from Prague (Dr. Ivan Milecz, Dr. Joseph Cleker, Dr. Joseph Mlkuš, Dr. Plssko, Dr. Radlinský and Dr. Szatmáry); three from internal politics (Karol Sidor, Matthew Černak and Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum); and the others came from various professions (Francis Tiso. Dr. Spišiak, Dr. J. Šimko, Dr. Zvrškovec, Tido J. Gašpar, Dr. Galvánek, Dr. Becko, etc). The majority of these, therefore were men who had prepared for other tasks in life. But even large states, which have a sufficient number of diplomatic personnel, place persona of other professions in leading diplomatic positions.
Keeping in mind the tense situation of the world at that Ume and the reality that Slovakia was practically unknown in foreign lands and was consistently being presented in a bad light by anti=Slovak propaganda, we must admit that the tasks facing the diplomatic representatives of the newly established Slovak Republic were by no means easy. And yet, the Slovak diplomatic representatives -excepting Dr. Szatmáry - defended the right of the Slovak nation to its own State to the end and performed their tasks well in the diplomatic, cultural and propaganda fields.
There was one task they had, however, failed to do, and that one was probably the most important one: they did not prepare for the transfer of Slovakia to the side of the Allies at the right time. However, it is a bit premature to pass judgment in this matter ln view of the world situation and the present position of Slovakia, and especially in view of the fact that all Slovak diplomatic representatives in neutral countries, upon whom this task fell, have not as yet been heard from. For the present we can make several general remarks and logical conclusions which emanate from the over-all situation existing at the end of the war and from the tendencies that made themselves apparent with the Allies in general, and in the relation to Slovakia in particular. And from this, then, we can learn what alternatives presented themselves to the Slovaks.
After considering all the circumstances under which the war was waged and those under which the so-called "National Uprising" in Slovakia was organized later, this problem looks decidedly different than it appeared to be at first sight. But aside from the fact that diplomacy always only prepares the way for the policies of a government and is in itself only an executive organ, no other nation had to contend with such impediments as the Slovak nation in the matter of transferring to the Allies. Let us consider only one:
When the Anglo-Saxon Allies (in 1941-1942) and the Soviet Union (1943) came out for the renewal of the Czechoslovak Republic and even concluded agreements with the Government of Dr. Beneš, the joining of the Slovak Government and the Slovak diplomats with the Allies would have meant the acceptance of Czechoslovakia - already recognized by the Allies - and the renouncing of independence. Slovak political leaders at home and Slovak diplomats abroad had to decide the dilemma: Either to remain loyal to the right to independence and defend it to the end even at the cost of great personal sacrifices, or to join those who did not recognize the right of the Slovak nation to its own State and thus secure tor themselves definite personal interests.
That is how the problem looked when the "Slovak Revolt" broke out in August 1944. While the Italians, Rumanians, Magyars and Bulgarians joined the Allies to safeguard their independence, the leaders of the rebellion in Slovakia were proclaiming the annexation of Slovakia to the Czech lands, renewing the Czechoslovak Republic and ridding their own nation of its independent State.
The position of Slovakia in the war and, therefore, even the actions of Slovak diplomats, were determined in the over-all framework by the policy of the Allies themselves and in the narrower framework by the alms of the "rebellion" in Slovakia.
If it were not for this situation, there would have been among the Slovak politicians, as well as among the Slovak diplomats. representatives in the individual states of Europe who would have had the political and moral Legitimacy to speak in the name of the Slovak nation. In the Vatican, one of the most important centers of world diplomacy, Slovakia was represented by Karol Sidor, whose anti-German stand cannot be disputed. The General Secretary of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, ousted from his office by Nazi pressure, was sent to Switzerland to represent Slovakia. In Sweden Slovakia had the career diplomat, Dr. Pissko, and in Spain Dr. Mikuš and Dr. Cieker, both of whom were not only first-class diplomats, but were outstanding in their generation.
It is evident, then, that the Slovak Republic did have people in important places abroad who were predetermined to prepare the transfer of the Slovaks to the victorious camp. And undoubtedly it shall once become known that these Slovak representatives did not lack the initiative, either. But there were no real possibilities for such a policy, if the Slovaks themselves were not to surrender their right to independence. This they could not do, because they knew that the rights which were taken away by force could always be regained, but the rights which a nation once surrendered could never be regained.
A policy that redeems apparent, temporary advantages by surrendering natural rights never did end up well. And conversely, history was wont to reward with victory the fight which had an upright aim. Whether the Slovak Government and the Slovak diplomats did right by consistently holding to their anti-communist stand and defending the inalienable rights of their nation, history and probably even the near future shall render a definite verdict. That they acted honorably and did not pursue their personal interests is already clear today.
III
Dr. Edward Beneš and his followers always denied the individuality of the Slovak nation and were always opposed to Slovak autonomy. This group of Czech politicians and several individuals of Slovak origin, who subscribed to the ideology of a "Czechoslovak nation," stubbornly refused to recognize the right of the Slovaks to their own State and the acceptance of the Slovak Republic into the international community. They used all means at their disposal to misrepresent the Slovak question before the Allies to effect the destruction of the Slovak Republic and force its annexation to the Czech lands.
Dr. Edward Beneš even attempted to deceive the Vatican, but did not fare so well. In a Memorandum, sent to the Holy See on May 12, 1943, through President Roosevelt, Dr. Edward Beneš stated among other things: "The Slovak people, in its great majority, today stands without any reservations behind the present Czechoslovak Government. In Slovakia political, social, economical and moral conditions are extremely sad. The majority of the Slovak people considers the present regime in Bratislava responsible for this situation and as a traitor of the Slovak people and the Czechoslovak Republic. Former governmental Slovak parties (the Agrarians, Liberals, Socialists) are almost completely behind the Czechoslovak Government and against the present regime in Slovakia, while the former Catholic People's Party, which took over the rule of Slovak affairs from the hands of the Germans in 1939, today stands - according to our reports - at least 60 per cent against the present regime." (Beneš: MEMOIRS, Documents).
Of course, the Vatican knew what the actual situation in Slovakia was. The Slovak Government was represented at the Vatican, and the Holy See had its representative in Bratislava. Beneš was fully aware of that fact, but he thought he might persuade the Holy See to see things his way, since it was pretty evident at that time that he would be back in the driver's seat when the war ended. The Vatican’s refusal to recognize him and his London Government made Beneš furious.
Because of the war situation and the fact that Slovakia fell into the Axis bloc because of its geographical position, the actions of Dr. Beneš and the Czech Slovaks (Czechoslovaks) was more successful than that of the Magyars after World War I who also tried to mobilize world opinion for the return of Slovakia to the Magyar State. The Magyar action was also supported by several renegade politicians of Slovak descent and yet it failed because the Slovak nation was determined to live its own life. History itself tells us that it is only logical for every nation to strive for an independent State. The temporary victory of Dr. Beneš will not reverse the logic of history. The Slovaks firmly believe that in the end their natural rights to an independent State shall be recognized, as they have been recognized in the case of other nations. It is only a question of time and an appropriate international situation.
If the revisionist efforts of Dr. Beneš seem to have found a greater response in Slovakia than Magyar revision, that certainly cannot be considered as proof that the Slovak nation in its entirety, or even in its greater part, has renounced its right to an independent State.
The Slovak nation was not given the opportunity to say whether it wants to live in its own State or in a comon State with the Czechs. The Slovaks who accepted the Czechoslovak solution did so out of fear emanating from the fate of a vanquished State, under the pressure of military events, and in the endeavor to assure themselves of an advantageous position to rule over Slovakia with the help of the Czechs, because they had no chance of getting into leading positions any other way. That this solution was accepted even by the small group only out of opportunism is attested to by the fact that already toward the end of 1943, when the outcome of the war was known, this group went into action for the renewal of the Czechoslovak Republic, stressing at the same time that the renewed State would be a federation and the question of the individuality of the Slovak nation was a reality which would not be debated.
The Czechoslovak Republic, therefore, was forced on the Slovak nation not only by the opportunism of a negligible minority of the Slovak nation which followed its own egotistic aims and served Czech imperialism, but also by the international situation. On such foundations, however, no State can exist permanently and must perish unconditionally when the causes and circumstances responsible for its existence disappear.
And so, just as the recognition of the conception of Dr. Beneš by the western powers had a fatal influence on the politics of the Slovak Republic during the war, just so the fact that the Slovak Republic was Incorporated in the Czechoslovak Republic without
regard for the will of the Slovak nation and without regard for the proclamation of the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations has its influence on the stand of the Slovaks in the contemporary world struggle.
If the Allies would have promised to preserve Slovak independence, as they did in the case of the Italians, Magyars, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Finns and Australians - who also fought on the side of the Axis - then it would have been possible to expect that the Slovaks, too, would have found their place at the right time on their side. None of the aforementioned peoples lost their independent States or were forced to become members of other States, but the Slovak State was annexed to Bohemia-Moravia.
It is, therefore, self-evident that the Slovak nation considers the present condition as an occupation and together with its emigration is fighting simultaneously for the victory of democracy over communism and the liberation of the Slovak Republic from Soviet-Czech occupation.
WHO SAID IT?
"We shall be eternally grateful to those who helped us, above all our great Slav brother, the SOVIET UNION. This gratitude, however, must not permit us into believing all is won because we have so powerful an ally. We must arrange our lives in such a way that we may never become a burden to those who are bound to us by alliance or friendship. On the contrary our friends must be made to feel that they have gained a loyal and effective ally worthy or such an alliance." - (Jaroslav Stránsky, Minister of Justice, Mass meeting in Most, June 19, 1945).
•
"Personally I trust the Russians; they think as they speak. I believe that they will cooperate fully with England and America. They will hold strictly to the decisions of the Teheran Conference to guarantee the peace for several generations. I do not believe that Russia will interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbors. I assure you that Stalin is willing to confirm his statement that he is completely against all efforts to force communistic principles on the Danubian countries." - (Dr. Beneš, Interview with Charles Goley, London "DAILY EXPRIDSS," 3-13-44).
•
"Our position in Europe is different from that in 1918. Today we are approaching far-reaching revolution. Our whole world is changing. This war has formed a solid and impregnable bloc of Slav nations and states. Today there is the RED ARMY, the army of Marshall TITO, brave Polish divisions and the Czechoslovak PEOPLE'S army, and if all those forces are put together we shall have SOME SAY in Europe." - (Zdenek Nejedlý Minister of Education, Address to Physical Training Societies, Prague, May 31, 1945).
•
The belief that Czechoslovakia is a part of Russia or that the Russians are DICTATING to us is not true. And you don't find a Russian soldier in our whole country." - Stanislav Novak, Czech Consul, CLEVELAND PRESS, 8-19-46).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
International Recognition of the Slovak Republic
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951
pp. 23-31
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
May 1951
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001
SNK
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/062c531c3b28c8bfd1e8c6c2539754f4.pdf
508637756155c65ecc6b711fe5a50b84
PDF Text
Text
32
SLOVAKIA
THE SLOVAKS HAVE A RIGHT TO A STATE
CONSTA NTI N E ČU L EN
Why? Because 1. It is their natural and God-given right.
2. The Slovaks have a historical rlght to their own state.
3. They never relinquished that right.
4. The Slovaks never abandoned their state and let another nation
inhabit lt.
5. Nationally they have matured to such a degree that they feel
ihey not only have the right, but even the solemn duty to take over
their destiny into their own hands.
6. They want to be an equal member in the family of nations.
7. What the Slovaks want does not constltute an injustice to
others, because they do not want what belongs to others, but only
what they are rightfully entltled to.
8. The Slovaks are not willing to have their necks in a foreign
yoke.
9. The Slovaks have definitely proven that tbey know how to
manage their own state on a European level. They can do that better
than was done in their name, wlthout their consent, and on their territory by the Magyars or the Czechs.
10. Everybody that ruled over the Slovaks is trying to prove that
the Slovaks cost them money. The Slovaks, during the years of their
statehood (1939- 1945), have definltely proven that no one need lose
money on Slovakia. It is_ therefore, in the interest of the economlc
progress not only of Slovakia but even that of the natlons who ruled
over the Slovaks to have the Slovaks rule themselves. The Slovaks
do not want any country to suffer economically because of them,
slnce - as the Czechs and Magyars say - they are not worth it.
11. Flnally the Slovaks want only what has been acclalmed by all
great natlons on earth - freedom anct independence - for whlch
all natlons - large and small - fought for twlce wlthin a quarter ot
a century. That is the wlll of the Slovak nation. That is its supreme
alm.
Did the Slovaks enjoy the rights of a free nation In Hungary?
Definltely not!
Did they enjoy the rights of a free nation In the Czecho-Slovak
Republic?
Absolutely not!
For the flrst tlme slnce the tragic end of the first Slovak State
over a thousand years ago the Slovaks definitely ran their own interna! affairs In the independent State of Slovakia (1939- 1945). The
head of the State was Slovak and the overwhelming majority of those
employed by the state were Slovaks. The Slovak language was the
official language of the state and the language of the schools. Slnce
the fall of the first Slovak State, it was the flrst time that the
Slovaks had Slovak schools, a Slovak army, a Slovak parliament, a
Slovak government, a Slovak president, Slovak money, a Slovak emblem and a Slovak flag. lt was also the first tlme that Slovakla
appeared as an independent State on the map of the world.
�SLOVAKIA
33
The Slovaks fared better even during the last war than they had
at any tíme during the past 1000 years. They managed their own
household and loved lt. Their homes really became their castles. They
breathed and lived as free men, even though forced into war and all
its hardships.
Whosoever denies the Slovaks the right to their own way of life,
- to freedom, independence and statehood denies the law of God and
nature and betrays the ideals of true democracy.
•
•
*
•
RED TRAITORS
(h) - We have pointed to the danger of Communlsm for many
years in our paper. We have also cautioned the gentlemen in Washington about thls enemy of human freedom and dignity. lt ls not our
fault lf some of the gentlemen preferred to listen to Beneš and hls
underlings and paid no attention to American citizens.
We have, however, saved many of oor countrymen, whom the
Reds wanted to ensnare with nice and enticing mottos. We can say,
therefore, that the Slovaks kept away from Communlsm. They dld
not want to have anything to do wlth it.
But such was not the case wlth the so-called "Czechoslovaks."
When the professional revolutionists could not galn the Slovaks, they
became friendly wlth Communists and paved the way for them to get
to Washington.
It is to the credit of American Slovaks that they dld not play
second flddle to the Communists, that they dld not collaborate with
them and that they did not allow them among themselves.
The Czechoslovaks, however, are deslgnated as collaborators with
Communism. The NEW YORKSKÝ DENNÚ{ (New York Daily) and
the Czech NEW YORKSKÉ LISTY (New York News) even imported
communist editors. And they even published many, many artlcles
of communist wr!ters. This they cannot deny, because lt ls all perpetuated black on white. These journals were no better than the
communist ĽUDOVli: NOVINY (People's News) or the Canadian
ĽUDOVÉ ZVESTI (People's Tidings).
Today it is difficult to distingulsh between a Commun!st and a
Czechoslovak, because both are so closely united. Both walked along
the same road, both spoke and wrote the same thlngs. Both villified
the Slovaks, because they exposed their dirty plans. Even Washington is fina\ly noting whence the wind is blowlng.
The aim of the Communists !s clear, because it was stated by
Stalin in simple words. Twenty-two years ago Stalin told us who was
an internatlonalist. He said: "An internatlonallst 1s a person who unconditionally, without hesitation and without limitation is willing to
defend the USSR, because the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) is the foundation of the world revolutlonary movement, and to
defend this movement, make lt progress is not posslble wlthout the
protection of the USSR. Who WQUld defend the world revolutionary
movement wlthout and against the USSR. that person goes agalnst
the revolution, that person necessarlly falls into the camp of the
enemles ot the revolutlon."
�
32
SLOVAKIA
THE SLOVAKS HAVE A RIGHT TO A STATE
CONSTA NTI N E ČU L EN
Why? Because 1. It is their natural and God-given right.
2. The Slovaks have a historical rlght to their own state.
3. They never relinquished that right.
4. The Slovaks never abandoned their state and let another nation
inhabit lt.
5. Nationally they have matured to such a degree that they feel
ihey not only have the right, but even the solemn duty to take over
their destiny into their own hands.
6. They want to be an equal member in the family of nations.
7. What the Slovaks want does not constltute an injustice to
others, because they do not want what belongs to others, but only
what they are rightfully entltled to.
8. The Slovaks are not willing to have their necks in a foreign
yoke.
9. The Slovaks have definitely proven that tbey know how to
manage their own state on a European level. They can do that better
than was done in their name, wlthout their consent, and on their territory by the Magyars or the Czechs.
10. Everybody that ruled over the Slovaks is trying to prove that
the Slovaks cost them money. The Slovaks, during the years of their
statehood (1939- 1945), have definltely proven that no one need lose
money on Slovakia. It is_ therefore, in the interest of the economlc
progress not only of Slovakia but even that of the natlons who ruled
over the Slovaks to have the Slovaks rule themselves. The Slovaks
do not want any country to suffer economically because of them,
slnce - as the Czechs and Magyars say - they are not worth it.
11. Flnally the Slovaks want only what has been acclalmed by all
great natlons on earth - freedom anct independence - for whlch
all natlons - large and small - fought for twlce wlthin a quarter ot
a century. That is the wlll of the Slovak nation. That is its supreme
alm.
Did the Slovaks enjoy the rights of a free nation In Hungary?
Definltely not!
Did they enjoy the rights of a free nation In the Czecho-Slovak
Republic?
Absolutely not!
For the flrst tlme slnce the tragic end of the first Slovak State
over a thousand years ago the Slovaks definitely ran their own interna! affairs In the independent State of Slovakia (1939- 1945). The
head of the State was Slovak and the overwhelming majority of those
employed by the state were Slovaks. The Slovak language was the
official language of the state and the language of the schools. Slnce
the fall of the first Slovak State, it was the flrst time that the
Slovaks had Slovak schools, a Slovak army, a Slovak parliament, a
Slovak government, a Slovak president, Slovak money, a Slovak emblem and a Slovak flag. lt was also the first tlme that Slovakla
appeared as an independent State on the map of the world.
�SLOVAKIA
33
The Slovaks fared better even during the last war than they had
at any tíme during the past 1000 years. They managed their own
household and loved lt. Their homes really became their castles. They
breathed and lived as free men, even though forced into war and all
its hardships.
Whosoever denies the Slovaks the right to their own way of life,
- to freedom, independence and statehood denies the law of God and
nature and betrays the ideals of true democracy.
•
•
*
•
RED TRAITORS
(h) - We have pointed to the danger of Communlsm for many
years in our paper. We have also cautioned the gentlemen in Washington about thls enemy of human freedom and dignity. lt ls not our
fault lf some of the gentlemen preferred to listen to Beneš and hls
underlings and paid no attention to American citizens.
We have, however, saved many of oor countrymen, whom the
Reds wanted to ensnare with nice and enticing mottos. We can say,
therefore, that the Slovaks kept away from Communlsm. They dld
not want to have anything to do wlth it.
But such was not the case wlth the so-called "Czechoslovaks."
When the professional revolutionists could not galn the Slovaks, they
became friendly wlth Communists and paved the way for them to get
to Washington.
It is to the credit of American Slovaks that they dld not play
second flddle to the Communists, that they dld not collaborate with
them and that they did not allow them among themselves.
The Czechoslovaks, however, are deslgnated as collaborators with
Communism. The NEW YORKSKÝ DENNÚ{ (New York Daily) and
the Czech NEW YORKSKÉ LISTY (New York News) even imported
communist editors. And they even published many, many artlcles
of communist wr!ters. This they cannot deny, because lt ls all perpetuated black on white. These journals were no better than the
communist ĽUDOVli: NOVINY (People's News) or the Canadian
ĽUDOVÉ ZVESTI (People's Tidings).
Today it is difficult to distingulsh between a Commun!st and a
Czechoslovak, because both are so closely united. Both walked along
the same road, both spoke and wrote the same thlngs. Both villified
the Slovaks, because they exposed their dirty plans. Even Washington is fina\ly noting whence the wind is blowlng.
The aim of the Communists !s clear, because it was stated by
Stalin in simple words. Twenty-two years ago Stalin told us who was
an internatlonalist. He said: "An internatlonallst 1s a person who unconditionally, without hesitation and without limitation is willing to
defend the USSR, because the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) is the foundation of the world revolutlonary movement, and to
defend this movement, make lt progress is not posslble wlthout the
protection of the USSR. Who WQUld defend the world revolutionary
movement wlthout and against the USSR. that person goes agalnst
the revolution, that person necessarlly falls into the camp of the
enemles ot the revolutlon."
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
32
SLOVAKIA
THE SLOVAKS HAVE A RIGHT TO A STATE
CONSTA NTI N E ČU L EN
Why? Because 1. It is their natural and God-given right.
2. The Slovaks have a historical rlght to their own state.
3. They never relinquished that right.
4. The Slovaks never abandoned their state and let another nation
inhabit lt.
5. Nationally they have matured to such a degree that they feel
ihey not only have the right, but even the solemn duty to take over
their destiny into their own hands.
6. They want to be an equal member in the family of nations.
7. What the Slovaks want does not constltute an injustice to
others, because they do not want what belongs to others, but only
what they are rightfully entltled to.
8. The Slovaks are not willing to have their necks in a foreign
yoke.
9. The Slovaks have definitely proven that tbey know how to
manage their own state on a European level. They can do that better
than was done in their name, wlthout their consent, and on their territory by the Magyars or the Czechs.
10. Everybody that ruled over the Slovaks is trying to prove that
the Slovaks cost them money. The Slovaks, during the years of their
statehood (1939- 1945), have definltely proven that no one need lose
money on Slovakia. It is_ therefore, in the interest of the economlc
progress not only of Slovakia but even that of the natlons who ruled
over the Slovaks to have the Slovaks rule themselves. The Slovaks
do not want any country to suffer economically because of them,
slnce - as the Czechs and Magyars say - they are not worth it.
11. Flnally the Slovaks want only what has been acclalmed by all
great natlons on earth - freedom anct independence - for whlch
all natlons - large and small - fought for twlce wlthin a quarter ot
a century. That is the wlll of the Slovak nation. That is its supreme
alm.
Did the Slovaks enjoy the rights of a free nation In Hungary?
Definltely not!
Did they enjoy the rights of a free nation In the Czecho-Slovak
Republic?
Absolutely not!
For the flrst tlme slnce the tragic end of the first Slovak State
over a thousand years ago the Slovaks definitely ran their own interna! affairs In the independent State of Slovakia (1939- 1945). The
head of the State was Slovak and the overwhelming majority of those
employed by the state were Slovaks. The Slovak language was the
official language of the state and the language of the schools. Slnce
the fall of the first Slovak State, it was the flrst time that the
Slovaks had Slovak schools, a Slovak army, a Slovak parliament, a
Slovak government, a Slovak president, Slovak money, a Slovak emblem and a Slovak flag. lt was also the first tlme that Slovakla
appeared as an independent State on the map of the world.
SLOVAKIA
33
The Slovaks fared better even during the last war than they had
at any tíme during the past 1000 years. They managed their own
household and loved lt. Their homes really became their castles. They
breathed and lived as free men, even though forced into war and all
its hardships.
Whosoever denies the Slovaks the right to their own way of life,
- to freedom, independence and statehood denies the law of God and
nature and betrays the ideals of true democracy.
•
•
*
•
RED TRAITORS
(h) - We have pointed to the danger of Communlsm for many
years in our paper. We have also cautioned the gentlemen in Washington about thls enemy of human freedom and dignity. lt ls not our
fault lf some of the gentlemen preferred to listen to Beneš and hls
underlings and paid no attention to American citizens.
We have, however, saved many of oor countrymen, whom the
Reds wanted to ensnare with nice and enticing mottos. We can say,
therefore, that the Slovaks kept away from Communlsm. They dld
not want to have anything to do wlth it.
But such was not the case wlth the so-called "Czechoslovaks."
When the professional revolutionists could not galn the Slovaks, they
became friendly wlth Communists and paved the way for them to get
to Washington.
It is to the credit of American Slovaks that they dld not play
second flddle to the Communists, that they dld not collaborate with
them and that they did not allow them among themselves.
The Czechoslovaks, however, are deslgnated as collaborators with
Communism. The NEW YORKSKÝ DENNÚ{ (New York Daily) and
the Czech NEW YORKSKÉ LISTY (New York News) even imported
communist editors. And they even published many, many artlcles
of communist wr!ters. This they cannot deny, because lt ls all perpetuated black on white. These journals were no better than the
communist ĽUDOVli: NOVINY (People's News) or the Canadian
ĽUDOVÉ ZVESTI (People's Tidings).
Today it is difficult to distingulsh between a Commun!st and a
Czechoslovak, because both are so closely united. Both walked along
the same road, both spoke and wrote the same thlngs. Both villified
the Slovaks, because they exposed their dirty plans. Even Washington is fina\ly noting whence the wind is blowlng.
The aim of the Communists !s clear, because it was stated by
Stalin in simple words. Twenty-two years ago Stalin told us who was
an internatlonalist. He said: "An internatlonallst 1s a person who unconditionally, without hesitation and without limitation is willing to
defend the USSR, because the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) is the foundation of the world revolutlonary movement, and to
defend this movement, make lt progress is not posslble wlthout the
protection of the USSR. Who WQUld defend the world revolutionary
movement wlthout and against the USSR. that person goes agalnst
the revolution, that person necessarlly falls into the camp of the
enemles ot the revolutlon."
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Slovaks Have a Right to a State
Description
An account of the resource
Constantine Čulen
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951
pp. 32-33
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
May 1951
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Čulen, Konštantín, 1904-1964
SNK
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f2743a1b81c3613d99ff1c7f593cdace.pdf
34d976aff6498f6356c62713eb72ce0a
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
33
The Slovaks fared better even during the last war than they had
at any tíme during the past 1000 years. They managed their own
household and loved lt. Their homes really became their castles. They
breathed and lived as free men, even though forced into war and all
its hardships.
Whosoever denies the Slovaks the right to their own way of life,
- to freedom, independence and statehood denies the law of God and
nature and betrays the ideals of true democracy.
•
•
*
•
RED TRAITORS
(h) - We have pointed to the danger of Communlsm for many
years in our paper. We have also cautioned the gentlemen in Washington about thls enemy of human freedom and dignity. lt ls not our
fault lf some of the gentlemen preferred to listen to Beneš and hls
underlings and paid no attention to American citizens.
We have, however, saved many of oor countrymen, whom the
Reds wanted to ensnare with nice and enticing mottos. We can say,
therefore, that the Slovaks kept away from Communlsm. They dld
not want to have anything to do wlth it.
But such was not the case wlth the so-called "Czechoslovaks."
When the professional revolutionists could not galn the Slovaks, they
became friendly wlth Communists and paved the way for them to get
to Washington.
It is to the credit of American Slovaks that they dld not play
second flddle to the Communists, that they dld not collaborate with
them and that they did not allow them among themselves.
The Czechoslovaks, however, are deslgnated as collaborators with
Communism. The NEW YORKSKÝ DENNÚ{ (New York Daily) and
the Czech NEW YORKSKÉ LISTY (New York News) even imported
communist editors. And they even published many, many artlcles
of communist wr!ters. This they cannot deny, because lt ls all perpetuated black on white. These journals were no better than the
communist ĽUDOVli: NOVINY (People's News) or the Canadian
ĽUDOVÉ ZVESTI (People's Tidings).
Today it is difficult to distingulsh between a Commun!st and a
Czechoslovak, because both are so closely united. Both walked along
the same road, both spoke and wrote the same thlngs. Both villified
the Slovaks, because they exposed their dirty plans. Even Washington is fina\ly noting whence the wind is blowlng.
The aim of the Communists !s clear, because it was stated by
Stalin in simple words. Twenty-two years ago Stalin told us who was
an internatlonalist. He said: "An internatlonallst 1s a person who unconditionally, without hesitation and without limitation is willing to
defend the USSR, because the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) is the foundation of the world revolutlonary movement, and to
defend this movement, make lt progress is not posslble wlthout the
protection of the USSR. Who WQUld defend the world revolutionary
movement wlthout and against the USSR. that person goes agalnst
the revolution, that person necessarlly falls into the camp of the
enemles ot the revolutlon."
�34
SLOVAKIA
lt is not long ago that the ĽUDOVÝ DENNll{ (today the shrunken
ĽUDOVl!l NOVINY) wrote:
"We are internatlonalists." And Stalin
explained what internationalists are. That means that Communists
must defend and work for Russia even against the interests of their
own country.
In the past several months several of these loyal servants of
Moscow, who betrayed our atomic secrets, were apprehended in
America. Just recently Julíus Rosenberg was arrested. Before he was
taken, Harry Gold, David Greenglass and Alfred Slack had been apprehended.
There are more of the same kind of communist scamps around.
Not every one had the opportunity to betray but every one of them
is Ioyal to Moscow. lf the opportunity presents itself, they will sabo•
tage, strike, and probably even murder. The Communlsts form the
interna! Fifth Column which is more dangerous than an armed, open
enemy. These Flfth-Columnists conceal themselves and work like
thieves and gangsters.
We must be on our guard against these evil-doers, especially
now. It is the duty of every Citizen to report all Communlsts to the
FBI. The latter will then see to it that these interna! enemles are properly inveslgated. - (SLOVENSKÁ OBRANA, Scranton, Pa., 7-25·50) .
• •
•
WHO SAID IT?
"Dr, Benei never faltered . . . . He wa.s party to no sch~e to di·
vide the n.atural enemles ot fascist aggresslon. Dr. Benei 1tood with
hl1 people. He stood and he stands today for right to govern themselves and to make democra.tic social progresa." - (Congressman
Hugh De Lacy, THE SLAVONIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1945) .
•
"CZECH COMMUNISTS ARE FRIENDS OF THE USA - AH
m&mbeľ1! o! the Communlst Party in Prestice, a town in southern
Boh&mla, became members ot t.he society "Friends o! the Unlted
States." - (HLASATEL, Chicago, Ill., 6-13-47) .
•
"We know that without Russia's fr lendshlp none or her small
neigilbors can r&vert to independent natlonal Ufe. In negotiating the
treaty we have jwit signed, I DID NOT SELL OUT TO RUSSIA. We
lntend to live our own life i n our own way and WE KNOW THAT
RUSSIA WILL RESPECT OUR WAY OF LIVING. . . You and we
are golng to contlnue our pollcy of collaboration, trlendship, confi·
äence In and good falth towards Soviet Russla. I am never golng to
undertake anything - and neither are you - wblch could be in any
way against the interests ot the vitally nec&asary collaboration." (Jan Masaryk, Dinner speech, Russian War Rellef, lne., NEW YORK
TIMES, 12-21-43).
•
" There ls definitely no Iron curtain in Czechoslovakia. Forelgn
correspondents are free to travel about the country and write as they
please, and the people are not afrald to volce their oplnion1. The
CZECHS are a hard-worklng people and POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY THEY ARE MAKING A SPLENDID RECOVERV."
(Laur&nce A. Stelnhardt, NEW YORK TIMES, 2-1-47).
�
SLOVAKIA
33
The Slovaks fared better even during the last war than they had
at any tíme during the past 1000 years. They managed their own
household and loved lt. Their homes really became their castles. They
breathed and lived as free men, even though forced into war and all
its hardships.
Whosoever denies the Slovaks the right to their own way of life,
- to freedom, independence and statehood denies the law of God and
nature and betrays the ideals of true democracy.
•
•
*
•
RED TRAITORS
(h) - We have pointed to the danger of Communlsm for many
years in our paper. We have also cautioned the gentlemen in Washington about thls enemy of human freedom and dignity. lt ls not our
fault lf some of the gentlemen preferred to listen to Beneš and hls
underlings and paid no attention to American citizens.
We have, however, saved many of oor countrymen, whom the
Reds wanted to ensnare with nice and enticing mottos. We can say,
therefore, that the Slovaks kept away from Communlsm. They dld
not want to have anything to do wlth it.
But such was not the case wlth the so-called "Czechoslovaks."
When the professional revolutionists could not galn the Slovaks, they
became friendly wlth Communists and paved the way for them to get
to Washington.
It is to the credit of American Slovaks that they dld not play
second flddle to the Communists, that they dld not collaborate with
them and that they did not allow them among themselves.
The Czechoslovaks, however, are deslgnated as collaborators with
Communism. The NEW YORKSKÝ DENNÚ{ (New York Daily) and
the Czech NEW YORKSKÉ LISTY (New York News) even imported
communist editors. And they even published many, many artlcles
of communist wr!ters. This they cannot deny, because lt ls all perpetuated black on white. These journals were no better than the
communist ĽUDOVli: NOVINY (People's News) or the Canadian
ĽUDOVÉ ZVESTI (People's Tidings).
Today it is difficult to distingulsh between a Commun!st and a
Czechoslovak, because both are so closely united. Both walked along
the same road, both spoke and wrote the same thlngs. Both villified
the Slovaks, because they exposed their dirty plans. Even Washington is fina\ly noting whence the wind is blowlng.
The aim of the Communists !s clear, because it was stated by
Stalin in simple words. Twenty-two years ago Stalin told us who was
an internatlonalist. He said: "An internatlonallst 1s a person who unconditionally, without hesitation and without limitation is willing to
defend the USSR, because the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) is the foundation of the world revolutlonary movement, and to
defend this movement, make lt progress is not posslble wlthout the
protection of the USSR. Who WQUld defend the world revolutionary
movement wlthout and against the USSR. that person goes agalnst
the revolution, that person necessarlly falls into the camp of the
enemles ot the revolutlon."
�34
SLOVAKIA
lt is not long ago that the ĽUDOVÝ DENNll{ (today the shrunken
ĽUDOVl!l NOVINY) wrote:
"We are internatlonalists." And Stalin
explained what internationalists are. That means that Communists
must defend and work for Russia even against the interests of their
own country.
In the past several months several of these loyal servants of
Moscow, who betrayed our atomic secrets, were apprehended in
America. Just recently Julíus Rosenberg was arrested. Before he was
taken, Harry Gold, David Greenglass and Alfred Slack had been apprehended.
There are more of the same kind of communist scamps around.
Not every one had the opportunity to betray but every one of them
is Ioyal to Moscow. lf the opportunity presents itself, they will sabo•
tage, strike, and probably even murder. The Communlsts form the
interna! Fifth Column which is more dangerous than an armed, open
enemy. These Flfth-Columnists conceal themselves and work like
thieves and gangsters.
We must be on our guard against these evil-doers, especially
now. It is the duty of every Citizen to report all Communlsts to the
FBI. The latter will then see to it that these interna! enemles are properly inveslgated. - (SLOVENSKÁ OBRANA, Scranton, Pa., 7-25·50) .
• •
•
WHO SAID IT?
"Dr, Benei never faltered . . . . He wa.s party to no sch~e to di·
vide the n.atural enemles ot fascist aggresslon. Dr. Benei 1tood with
hl1 people. He stood and he stands today for right to govern themselves and to make democra.tic social progresa." - (Congressman
Hugh De Lacy, THE SLAVONIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1945) .
•
"CZECH COMMUNISTS ARE FRIENDS OF THE USA - AH
m&mbeľ1! o! the Communlst Party in Prestice, a town in southern
Boh&mla, became members ot t.he society "Friends o! the Unlted
States." - (HLASATEL, Chicago, Ill., 6-13-47) .
•
"We know that without Russia's fr lendshlp none or her small
neigilbors can r&vert to independent natlonal Ufe. In negotiating the
treaty we have jwit signed, I DID NOT SELL OUT TO RUSSIA. We
lntend to live our own life i n our own way and WE KNOW THAT
RUSSIA WILL RESPECT OUR WAY OF LIVING. . . You and we
are golng to contlnue our pollcy of collaboration, trlendship, confi·
äence In and good falth towards Soviet Russla. I am never golng to
undertake anything - and neither are you - wblch could be in any
way against the interests ot the vitally nec&asary collaboration." (Jan Masaryk, Dinner speech, Russian War Rellef, lne., NEW YORK
TIMES, 12-21-43).
•
" There ls definitely no Iron curtain in Czechoslovakia. Forelgn
correspondents are free to travel about the country and write as they
please, and the people are not afrald to volce their oplnion1. The
CZECHS are a hard-worklng people and POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY THEY ARE MAKING A SPLENDID RECOVERV."
(Laur&nce A. Stelnhardt, NEW YORK TIMES, 2-1-47).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
33
The Slovaks fared better even during the last war than they had
at any tíme during the past 1000 years. They managed their own
household and loved lt. Their homes really became their castles. They
breathed and lived as free men, even though forced into war and all
its hardships.
Whosoever denies the Slovaks the right to their own way of life,
- to freedom, independence and statehood denies the law of God and
nature and betrays the ideals of true democracy.
•
•
*
•
RED TRAITORS
(h) - We have pointed to the danger of Communlsm for many
years in our paper. We have also cautioned the gentlemen in Washington about thls enemy of human freedom and dignity. lt ls not our
fault lf some of the gentlemen preferred to listen to Beneš and hls
underlings and paid no attention to American citizens.
We have, however, saved many of oor countrymen, whom the
Reds wanted to ensnare with nice and enticing mottos. We can say,
therefore, that the Slovaks kept away from Communlsm. They dld
not want to have anything to do wlth it.
But such was not the case wlth the so-called "Czechoslovaks."
When the professional revolutionists could not galn the Slovaks, they
became friendly wlth Communists and paved the way for them to get
to Washington.
It is to the credit of American Slovaks that they dld not play
second flddle to the Communists, that they dld not collaborate with
them and that they did not allow them among themselves.
The Czechoslovaks, however, are deslgnated as collaborators with
Communism. The NEW YORKSKÝ DENNÚ{ (New York Daily) and
the Czech NEW YORKSKÉ LISTY (New York News) even imported
communist editors. And they even published many, many artlcles
of communist wr!ters. This they cannot deny, because lt ls all perpetuated black on white. These journals were no better than the
communist ĽUDOVli: NOVINY (People's News) or the Canadian
ĽUDOVÉ ZVESTI (People's Tidings).
Today it is difficult to distingulsh between a Commun!st and a
Czechoslovak, because both are so closely united. Both walked along
the same road, both spoke and wrote the same thlngs. Both villified
the Slovaks, because they exposed their dirty plans. Even Washington is fina\ly noting whence the wind is blowlng.
The aim of the Communists !s clear, because it was stated by
Stalin in simple words. Twenty-two years ago Stalin told us who was
an internatlonalist. He said: "An internatlonallst 1s a person who unconditionally, without hesitation and without limitation is willing to
defend the USSR, because the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) is the foundation of the world revolutlonary movement, and to
defend this movement, make lt progress is not posslble wlthout the
protection of the USSR. Who WQUld defend the world revolutionary
movement wlthout and against the USSR. that person goes agalnst
the revolution, that person necessarlly falls into the camp of the
enemles ot the revolutlon."
34
SLOVAKIA
lt is not long ago that the ĽUDOVÝ DENNll{ (today the shrunken
ĽUDOVl!l NOVINY) wrote:
"We are internatlonalists." And Stalin
explained what internationalists are. That means that Communists
must defend and work for Russia even against the interests of their
own country.
In the past several months several of these loyal servants of
Moscow, who betrayed our atomic secrets, were apprehended in
America. Just recently Julíus Rosenberg was arrested. Before he was
taken, Harry Gold, David Greenglass and Alfred Slack had been apprehended.
There are more of the same kind of communist scamps around.
Not every one had the opportunity to betray but every one of them
is Ioyal to Moscow. lf the opportunity presents itself, they will sabo•
tage, strike, and probably even murder. The Communlsts form the
interna! Fifth Column which is more dangerous than an armed, open
enemy. These Flfth-Columnists conceal themselves and work like
thieves and gangsters.
We must be on our guard against these evil-doers, especially
now. It is the duty of every Citizen to report all Communlsts to the
FBI. The latter will then see to it that these interna! enemles are properly inveslgated. - (SLOVENSKÁ OBRANA, Scranton, Pa., 7-25·50) .
• •
•
WHO SAID IT?
"Dr, Benei never faltered . . . . He wa.s party to no sch~e to di·
vide the n.atural enemles ot fascist aggresslon. Dr. Benei 1tood with
hl1 people. He stood and he stands today for right to govern themselves and to make democra.tic social progresa." - (Congressman
Hugh De Lacy, THE SLAVONIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1945) .
•
"CZECH COMMUNISTS ARE FRIENDS OF THE USA - AH
m&mbeľ1! o! the Communlst Party in Prestice, a town in southern
Boh&mla, became members ot t.he society "Friends o! the Unlted
States." - (HLASATEL, Chicago, Ill., 6-13-47) .
•
"We know that without Russia's fr lendshlp none or her small
neigilbors can r&vert to independent natlonal Ufe. In negotiating the
treaty we have jwit signed, I DID NOT SELL OUT TO RUSSIA. We
lntend to live our own life i n our own way and WE KNOW THAT
RUSSIA WILL RESPECT OUR WAY OF LIVING. . . You and we
are golng to contlnue our pollcy of collaboration, trlendship, confi·
äence In and good falth towards Soviet Russla. I am never golng to
undertake anything - and neither are you - wblch could be in any
way against the interests ot the vitally nec&asary collaboration." (Jan Masaryk, Dinner speech, Russian War Rellef, lne., NEW YORK
TIMES, 12-21-43).
•
" There ls definitely no Iron curtain in Czechoslovakia. Forelgn
correspondents are free to travel about the country and write as they
please, and the people are not afrald to volce their oplnion1. The
CZECHS are a hard-worklng people and POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY THEY ARE MAKING A SPLENDID RECOVERV."
(Laur&nce A. Stelnhardt, NEW YORK TIMES, 2-1-47).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Red Traitors
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951
pp. 33-34
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
May 1951
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/91ad09c524a8a98dd3dbc8e5c9de1e88.pdf
11f84f34e13eda26f65190698bd9b2e7
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
35
"CZECHOSLOVAK" DEMOCRACY
(SP) - No one in the world boasted as much about "people's
democracy" as the Czechs and Slovak Czechs (the so-called "Czechoslovaks"). The Soviet fraud wlth people's democracy seemed to be
made to order accordlng to the pattern of Zenkl, Beneš, Lettrich and
cthers of the same pollt!cal camp. They ldentifled themselves wlth
thls idea rlght after the war, because it expressed thelr stand toward
the people, polltics and the management ot the state. The idea represented them; they were people's democrats before Soviet propaganda
discovered the expression "people's democracy" !
How else can we explain what happened after an lnsigniflcant
camariJJa, placed at the helm ot the shlp of state wlth the aid ot
forelgners and really drunk wlth power, proclaimed a "people's democracy" and lts lmmense advantages? All we have to do !s take
the newspapers and parllament records from 1945-1948 and we'll
see that the Czechoslovaks used every occaslon to publlcly pralse the
"people's democracy." Western powers could flnd a Jot of interestlng
materlal there about the "democratic" sentiment of the people who
today are golng from door to door In Washington and London clalming they are martyrs to the cause of democracy.
Czechoslovaklsm (Czech lmperiallsm) was the hlstorlc vanguard
and predecessor ot "people's democracy." Today we au know that
"people's democracy" is a denlal ot democracy and slgnifles a polltlcal
police system whlch prohlblts free expresslon ot an oplonlon and
demands of all an uncondlt!onal acceptance of the ideas and platforms
of the rullng ca.ste. "People's democracy" outrages the oplnlon of the
majority and forces lt to adapť itself to the minority; lt 1s brutal
in the means lt uses to force assent wlth lts ideas and program.
The Czechoslovaks were péople's democrats already durlng the
first Czecho-Slovak republic: because the Slovaks wanted to be free
they persecuted them with ruthless police methods; they dld not
respect the oplnlon of the vast majority of the Slovaks and forc1>d tbe
wbole Slovak natlon to live In polltlcal, economlcal and cultural subjection; as good "people's democrats" they lntroduced In Slovakla
methods ot economlc exploltatlon and by arttrlclal means kept the
whole of Slovakla In a mlserable social posltlon; they were forclng
the Slovak nat!on to regard Czecho-Slovakla as lts bome at a Ume
when they were maklng that state a prlson for Slovaks. Of course,
that dld not work out as planned.
It was not strange at all that Czechoslovak circles accepted "people's
democracy" with enthusiasm In 1945. That klnd ot democracy helped
them to occupy Slovakla. In Slovakla lt gave them the power' 1. to
murder, dlspossess, dlsfranchlse and exile au pol!t!cal opponents; 2. to
persecute Slovak patrlotlsm as "tasclst"; 3. to abol!sh democratlc
freedoms and install a government ot suppresslon and terror; 4. to
suppress every free expresslon In Slovakia and persecute every effort
of the Slovaks to free themselves trom a sltuatlon forced on them;
5. to estabUsh concentratlon ca.mps and present the Slovaks. f!ght!ng
for the freedom of thelr natlon, as fascists and enemles of democracy; and, 6. to falslfy the actual condltlons prevaillng in Slovakla.
After tbelr departure from the so-called "people's democracy'' of
�36
SLOVAKIA
Czecho-Slovakia, these "superdemocrats" continued in the work they
were taught to do by Beneš. They are stlll propagating the !ie that
the Slovaks do not want their own state, but prefer Czechoslovakia;
they are vilifying the Slovaks and telling the west that the Slovaks
are backward culturally, economically and politically and lacklng In
democratlc traditions. The Slovaks, accordlng to them, are possessed
by psychic complexes of an inferlor mass.
According to the Czechoslovaks it is democratic to bave tbe Slovaks
1. the Czechs have the rlght to rule Slovakia; 2. Slovakia must be
again annexed to Czech lands, because Czech interests - whlch is to
them the supreme measure of democracy - demands it; 3. whatever harms Czech imperialism In its relationship to Slovakia is undemocratic, non-progressive and reactionary.
Acordlng to the Czechoslovaks it is democratlc to have the Slovaks
live under Czech rule and acoept the Czech concept that the Slovaks
do not exist, that polltically the Slovak natlon is immature and incapable, and that lt should let itself be Jed on a leash which the
Czechs thrust around its neck out of "love" and for "protection."
According to the "people's democrats" it would be utterly undemocratlc to grant the Slovaks the right of self-determination, the right
to their own state, the rlght to declde thelr own fate, and the rlght
to live in their own fashion accordlng to thelr own means. These enemies of tbe Slovak natlon know that the S lovaks are almost to a man
for an independent Slovak state, so they sound the alarm that the
renewal of the Slovak Republic would be a threat to democracy.
They are determined to carry on their propaganda of lles to deceive
the western democracles just as Beneš had done so effectlvely for
some 30 years.
But the Slovaks are determined, too - especially now more than
ever before - to expose and flght the Czechoslovak pseudodemo•
crats. The Slovak nation rid itself of the Magyar cancer and it shall,
with the help of God, also rid !tself of the Czecboslovak ulcer. The
western powers are gradually beglnning to realize that Zenkl, Papánek, Ripka, Lettrich and company are masked enemles of democracles
and are, in fact, responsible in a large measure for the conditions
prevailing in Czechoslovakia today. And also, the world must soon
realize that Czechoslovakism was the handmald of Communism and,
as such, the enemy of true democracy.
• • • •
WHO SAI D IT?
"Czeohoslovakia was THE ONLY COUNTRY in Europe tha4 had
a hlgh consistent leadership of suob men as Masaryk an"d Benes. . . .
Czechoalovakia could not trust the countriea wh ich betrayed her, Britain and F rance. She was compelled to cast her lot under t,he overpowering mlght of Russla. But I am not at all alarmed at the prospect.
The Anglo-Saxon countrles wlll always stand for LIBERTY AND
LOY ALTY to the prlnclples or rellgion. They alwaya fail, however,
In the matter of economic justice and racia! brotherhood. RUSSIA
STANDS ALWAYS FOR THESE TWO THINGS. 1 belleve that Czechoslovakla wlll play a Jarge part In helplng to keep Russla loyal to
the Charter or the Unlted Nations." - (Dr. Sherwood Eddy, THE
SLA VONJC MONTHLY, Sept. 1945).
�
SLOVAKIA
35
"CZECHOSLOVAK" DEMOCRACY
(SP) - No one in the world boasted as much about "people's
democracy" as the Czechs and Slovak Czechs (the so-called "Czechoslovaks"). The Soviet fraud wlth people's democracy seemed to be
made to order accordlng to the pattern of Zenkl, Beneš, Lettrich and
cthers of the same pollt!cal camp. They ldentifled themselves wlth
thls idea rlght after the war, because it expressed thelr stand toward
the people, polltics and the management ot the state. The idea represented them; they were people's democrats before Soviet propaganda
discovered the expression "people's democracy" !
How else can we explain what happened after an lnsigniflcant
camariJJa, placed at the helm ot the shlp of state wlth the aid ot
forelgners and really drunk wlth power, proclaimed a "people's democracy" and lts lmmense advantages? All we have to do !s take
the newspapers and parllament records from 1945-1948 and we'll
see that the Czechoslovaks used every occaslon to publlcly pralse the
"people's democracy." Western powers could flnd a Jot of interestlng
materlal there about the "democratic" sentiment of the people who
today are golng from door to door In Washington and London clalming they are martyrs to the cause of democracy.
Czechoslovaklsm (Czech lmperiallsm) was the hlstorlc vanguard
and predecessor ot "people's democracy." Today we au know that
"people's democracy" is a denlal ot democracy and slgnifles a polltlcal
police system whlch prohlblts free expresslon ot an oplonlon and
demands of all an uncondlt!onal acceptance of the ideas and platforms
of the rullng ca.ste. "People's democracy" outrages the oplnlon of the
majority and forces lt to adapť itself to the minority; lt 1s brutal
in the means lt uses to force assent wlth lts ideas and program.
The Czechoslovaks were péople's democrats already durlng the
first Czecho-Slovak republic: because the Slovaks wanted to be free
they persecuted them with ruthless police methods; they dld not
respect the oplnlon of the vast majority of the Slovaks and forc1>d tbe
wbole Slovak natlon to live In polltlcal, economlcal and cultural subjection; as good "people's democrats" they lntroduced In Slovakla
methods ot economlc exploltatlon and by arttrlclal means kept the
whole of Slovakla In a mlserable social posltlon; they were forclng
the Slovak nat!on to regard Czecho-Slovakla as lts bome at a Ume
when they were maklng that state a prlson for Slovaks. Of course,
that dld not work out as planned.
It was not strange at all that Czechoslovak circles accepted "people's
democracy" with enthusiasm In 1945. That klnd ot democracy helped
them to occupy Slovakla. In Slovakla lt gave them the power' 1. to
murder, dlspossess, dlsfranchlse and exile au pol!t!cal opponents; 2. to
persecute Slovak patrlotlsm as "tasclst"; 3. to abol!sh democratlc
freedoms and install a government ot suppresslon and terror; 4. to
suppress every free expresslon In Slovakia and persecute every effort
of the Slovaks to free themselves trom a sltuatlon forced on them;
5. to estabUsh concentratlon ca.mps and present the Slovaks. f!ght!ng
for the freedom of thelr natlon, as fascists and enemles of democracy; and, 6. to falslfy the actual condltlons prevaillng in Slovakla.
After tbelr departure from the so-called "people's democracy'' of
�36
SLOVAKIA
Czecho-Slovakia, these "superdemocrats" continued in the work they
were taught to do by Beneš. They are stlll propagating the !ie that
the Slovaks do not want their own state, but prefer Czechoslovakia;
they are vilifying the Slovaks and telling the west that the Slovaks
are backward culturally, economically and politically and lacklng In
democratlc traditions. The Slovaks, accordlng to them, are possessed
by psychic complexes of an inferlor mass.
According to the Czechoslovaks it is democratic to bave tbe Slovaks
1. the Czechs have the rlght to rule Slovakia; 2. Slovakia must be
again annexed to Czech lands, because Czech interests - whlch is to
them the supreme measure of democracy - demands it; 3. whatever harms Czech imperialism In its relationship to Slovakia is undemocratic, non-progressive and reactionary.
Acordlng to the Czechoslovaks it is democratlc to have the Slovaks
live under Czech rule and acoept the Czech concept that the Slovaks
do not exist, that polltically the Slovak natlon is immature and incapable, and that lt should let itself be Jed on a leash which the
Czechs thrust around its neck out of "love" and for "protection."
According to the "people's democrats" it would be utterly undemocratlc to grant the Slovaks the right of self-determination, the right
to their own state, the rlght to declde thelr own fate, and the rlght
to live in their own fashion accordlng to thelr own means. These enemies of tbe Slovak natlon know that the S lovaks are almost to a man
for an independent Slovak state, so they sound the alarm that the
renewal of the Slovak Republic would be a threat to democracy.
They are determined to carry on their propaganda of lles to deceive
the western democracles just as Beneš had done so effectlvely for
some 30 years.
But the Slovaks are determined, too - especially now more than
ever before - to expose and flght the Czechoslovak pseudodemo•
crats. The Slovak nation rid itself of the Magyar cancer and it shall,
with the help of God, also rid !tself of the Czecboslovak ulcer. The
western powers are gradually beglnning to realize that Zenkl, Papánek, Ripka, Lettrich and company are masked enemles of democracles
and are, in fact, responsible in a large measure for the conditions
prevailing in Czechoslovakia today. And also, the world must soon
realize that Czechoslovakism was the handmald of Communism and,
as such, the enemy of true democracy.
• • • •
WHO SAI D IT?
"Czeohoslovakia was THE ONLY COUNTRY in Europe tha4 had
a hlgh consistent leadership of suob men as Masaryk an"d Benes. . . .
Czechoalovakia could not trust the countriea wh ich betrayed her, Britain and F rance. She was compelled to cast her lot under t,he overpowering mlght of Russla. But I am not at all alarmed at the prospect.
The Anglo-Saxon countrles wlll always stand for LIBERTY AND
LOY ALTY to the prlnclples or rellgion. They alwaya fail, however,
In the matter of economic justice and racia! brotherhood. RUSSIA
STANDS ALWAYS FOR THESE TWO THINGS. 1 belleve that Czechoslovakla wlll play a Jarge part In helplng to keep Russla loyal to
the Charter or the Unlted Nations." - (Dr. Sherwood Eddy, THE
SLA VONJC MONTHLY, Sept. 1945).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
35
"CZECHOSLOVAK" DEMOCRACY
(SP) - No one in the world boasted as much about "people's
democracy" as the Czechs and Slovak Czechs (the so-called "Czechoslovaks"). The Soviet fraud wlth people's democracy seemed to be
made to order accordlng to the pattern of Zenkl, Beneš, Lettrich and
cthers of the same pollt!cal camp. They ldentifled themselves wlth
thls idea rlght after the war, because it expressed thelr stand toward
the people, polltics and the management ot the state. The idea represented them; they were people's democrats before Soviet propaganda
discovered the expression "people's democracy" !
How else can we explain what happened after an lnsigniflcant
camariJJa, placed at the helm ot the shlp of state wlth the aid ot
forelgners and really drunk wlth power, proclaimed a "people's democracy" and lts lmmense advantages? All we have to do !s take
the newspapers and parllament records from 1945-1948 and we'll
see that the Czechoslovaks used every occaslon to publlcly pralse the
"people's democracy." Western powers could flnd a Jot of interestlng
materlal there about the "democratic" sentiment of the people who
today are golng from door to door In Washington and London clalming they are martyrs to the cause of democracy.
Czechoslovaklsm (Czech lmperiallsm) was the hlstorlc vanguard
and predecessor ot "people's democracy." Today we au know that
"people's democracy" is a denlal ot democracy and slgnifles a polltlcal
police system whlch prohlblts free expresslon ot an oplonlon and
demands of all an uncondlt!onal acceptance of the ideas and platforms
of the rullng ca.ste. "People's democracy" outrages the oplnlon of the
majority and forces lt to adapť itself to the minority; lt 1s brutal
in the means lt uses to force assent wlth lts ideas and program.
The Czechoslovaks were péople's democrats already durlng the
first Czecho-Slovak republic: because the Slovaks wanted to be free
they persecuted them with ruthless police methods; they dld not
respect the oplnlon of the vast majority of the Slovaks and forc1>d tbe
wbole Slovak natlon to live In polltlcal, economlcal and cultural subjection; as good "people's democrats" they lntroduced In Slovakla
methods ot economlc exploltatlon and by arttrlclal means kept the
whole of Slovakla In a mlserable social posltlon; they were forclng
the Slovak nat!on to regard Czecho-Slovakla as lts bome at a Ume
when they were maklng that state a prlson for Slovaks. Of course,
that dld not work out as planned.
It was not strange at all that Czechoslovak circles accepted "people's
democracy" with enthusiasm In 1945. That klnd ot democracy helped
them to occupy Slovakla. In Slovakla lt gave them the power' 1. to
murder, dlspossess, dlsfranchlse and exile au pol!t!cal opponents; 2. to
persecute Slovak patrlotlsm as "tasclst"; 3. to abol!sh democratlc
freedoms and install a government ot suppresslon and terror; 4. to
suppress every free expresslon In Slovakia and persecute every effort
of the Slovaks to free themselves trom a sltuatlon forced on them;
5. to estabUsh concentratlon ca.mps and present the Slovaks. f!ght!ng
for the freedom of thelr natlon, as fascists and enemles of democracy; and, 6. to falslfy the actual condltlons prevaillng in Slovakla.
After tbelr departure from the so-called "people's democracy'' of
36
SLOVAKIA
Czecho-Slovakia, these "superdemocrats" continued in the work they
were taught to do by Beneš. They are stlll propagating the !ie that
the Slovaks do not want their own state, but prefer Czechoslovakia;
they are vilifying the Slovaks and telling the west that the Slovaks
are backward culturally, economically and politically and lacklng In
democratlc traditions. The Slovaks, accordlng to them, are possessed
by psychic complexes of an inferlor mass.
According to the Czechoslovaks it is democratic to bave tbe Slovaks
1. the Czechs have the rlght to rule Slovakia; 2. Slovakia must be
again annexed to Czech lands, because Czech interests - whlch is to
them the supreme measure of democracy - demands it; 3. whatever harms Czech imperialism In its relationship to Slovakia is undemocratic, non-progressive and reactionary.
Acordlng to the Czechoslovaks it is democratlc to have the Slovaks
live under Czech rule and acoept the Czech concept that the Slovaks
do not exist, that polltically the Slovak natlon is immature and incapable, and that lt should let itself be Jed on a leash which the
Czechs thrust around its neck out of "love" and for "protection."
According to the "people's democrats" it would be utterly undemocratlc to grant the Slovaks the right of self-determination, the right
to their own state, the rlght to declde thelr own fate, and the rlght
to live in their own fashion accordlng to thelr own means. These enemies of tbe Slovak natlon know that the S lovaks are almost to a man
for an independent Slovak state, so they sound the alarm that the
renewal of the Slovak Republic would be a threat to democracy.
They are determined to carry on their propaganda of lles to deceive
the western democracles just as Beneš had done so effectlvely for
some 30 years.
But the Slovaks are determined, too - especially now more than
ever before - to expose and flght the Czechoslovak pseudodemo•
crats. The Slovak nation rid itself of the Magyar cancer and it shall,
with the help of God, also rid !tself of the Czecboslovak ulcer. The
western powers are gradually beglnning to realize that Zenkl, Papánek, Ripka, Lettrich and company are masked enemles of democracles
and are, in fact, responsible in a large measure for the conditions
prevailing in Czechoslovakia today. And also, the world must soon
realize that Czechoslovakism was the handmald of Communism and,
as such, the enemy of true democracy.
• • • •
WHO SAI D IT?
"Czeohoslovakia was THE ONLY COUNTRY in Europe tha4 had
a hlgh consistent leadership of suob men as Masaryk an"d Benes. . . .
Czechoalovakia could not trust the countriea wh ich betrayed her, Britain and F rance. She was compelled to cast her lot under t,he overpowering mlght of Russla. But I am not at all alarmed at the prospect.
The Anglo-Saxon countrles wlll always stand for LIBERTY AND
LOY ALTY to the prlnclples or rellgion. They alwaya fail, however,
In the matter of economic justice and racia! brotherhood. RUSSIA
STANDS ALWAYS FOR THESE TWO THINGS. 1 belleve that Czechoslovakla wlll play a Jarge part In helplng to keep Russla loyal to
the Charter or the Unlted Nations." - (Dr. Sherwood Eddy, THE
SLA VONJC MONTHLY, Sept. 1945).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
"Czechoslovak" Democracy
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951
pp. 35-36
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
May 1951
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8ffad088f5a2634f75e2008d08718d3e.pdf
7e46dcc03dca9649b811d8266585809b
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
37
THE CZECHOSWVAKS AND ANTI-SEMITISM
( JK ) The Czechoslovaks (Czech Slovaks) apparently are getting a bit jittery. While the democratlc peoples gradually are findlng
out the truth about Czecho-Slovakla and its former Jeaders, who talked
democracy but collaborated with Stalin and the Czech Reds, the socalled "Czechoslovaks" are sweating in a desperate attempt to smear
all freedom-loving, patriotic Slovaks.
Take the NEW YORKSKÝ DENNO< ("Czechoslovak daily pub·
lished in Slovak language" ! ) , for example. For the lack of better arguments it has threatened to expose the Slovak patriots - who always
fought against Communlsm and for the lnherent and God-given rlghts
of their people to freedom and lndependence - as antl-Semites. For
the Czechoslovaks, there are no exceptions: all Slova ks, who believe
their nation has a right to be free and independent, are collectively
and tota lly supposed to be anti-Semites.
For those who are familiar with the Slovak questlon, such an
accusation is just a plain lie. But while we are on the question of
anti-Semitlsm, leťs look at the record of leading Czechoslovaks and see
how these recently born "superdemocrats" (People's Democrats) stood
on the Jewlsh question in Slovakla.
The Czechoslovaks mmally get up in the morning and go to bed
at night with the name of T. G. Masaryk on their lips. What he taught,
what he wrote and what he said, that for them ls like the Gospel.
Well, how did T. G. Masaryk, the so-called "founder" of the
Czecho-Slovak Republic, regard the J ews?
Dr. Vavro Šrobär wrote a book in 1946. He was one of Masaryk's
most loyal servants in Slovakia and one of the leaders of the so-called
"glorious Slovak national rebellion" (1944), during which the Slovak
public for the flrst time found out that so many of the present
"eminent" Czechoslovaks existed. The book, published in Prague, is
called "Z môjho života" (From My Life). Masaryk - the teacher, the
model and ideologist of the Czechoslovaks - accordlng to the book:
"reproached the Jews, because in a Christian world they did not know
how to free themselves from the O!d Testament, the Talmud and the
Ghetto. T hey are lsolating themselves from all the subjugated natlons
and are slding, according to religious precept, wlth the ruling natlons;
a.nd in our country that means they are Germanlzlng and Magyarizing."
And the teacher and model of Lettrich, Papanek, Slävik and other
Slovak renegades continued ln thls manner: "The Jews ot the ghetto
are alien to us with their faith, thelr llves, their views, philosophy
and sociology; they are isolating themselves so, that we do not understand them, we fear them and do not llke them" (pg. 245).
Masaryk, according to Šrobär, "acknowledged that tbe fight
agalnst J ewlsb greed, usury and materlalism, agalnst thelr alllance with
our enemles, is justified, especlally in Moravia and Slovakla, where
in the villages they bave become the ruín of the nalve, gulllble people.
Here tbe privlleges of the tavern trades should be taken away from
tbem, or tbere sbould b e a Jaw passed which would protect the people
agalnst the temptation of alcohollsm and against Jewisb usury" (op.
cit. pg. 246).
�38
SLOVAKIA
And in like manner argued a ll the "salon anti-Semltes." The socalled vulgar antl-Semltes reallzed these salon vlews only la ter on.
Šrobár bimself admits in bis book that wben "tbe farmers came to
my office to ask me to talk, on sucb occaslons we used to talk pollUcs
and I spared nelther omces nor tbe government, not even the Jews"
{pg. 383). For Šrobár tbe Jews were the same red clotb as Magyar
omces In government. And that is quite a strong word! And the socalled Czechoslovaks (Czecb S lovaks!) in exlle negotlated with sucb
an anti-Semite durlng the "revolution" and even after lt!
But T. G. i\lasaryk and Vavro šrobár were not the only Czecboslovaks who felt t ha t way about the Israelltes in Slovakia. Dr. J osepb
Lettrlch, Vlce-President ot th e Councll of Free Czechoslovakla and
former Chairman of both the Slovak Natlonal Councll and the socalled Democratlc Party ot Slovakia, felt ll ke tbat about the J ews, too.
In 1945-1946, by Presldentlal decrees the Magyars and the Germans in Czechoslovakia were robbed not only ot tbelr civil rights, but
also ot thelr entire wealtb. Naturally, their properties were conflscated
wlthout compensatlon. The fate ot the Magyars and Germans was
In no manner envlable: they were placed outslde the law, bunted llke
wlld beasts and dellvered to tbe rldicule and brutality ot the n ew
" P eople's democratlc" admlnistratton. Decent people anywhere could
not want such a rate to overtake even thelr worst enemy.
At that Ume Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, as presldent ot the Slovak National Council, demanded that the Jews be dealt witb In the same
manner as the Germans and Magyars. In 1945, he proclalmerl:
"We must endeavor to drive out of our country wlthout mercy the
Magyars and Germans. The Jewa, w ho by their sentiment• and thelr
language show ay mpathy t o t he Ger mana o r Magyars, we ahall rega rd
those Jews as Germa ns a nd Ma gyars and they w lll have t o auffer the
fat e of Germans and M agyars."
The pettlfoggery of Mr. Lettrich was perfidlous: the great majority of J ews In Slovakla, as a result of the tralning ot previous reglmes, used German and Magyar as thelr languages in thelr homes
and buslnesses. The greatest part of the J ews In Slovakla has traditlonal sympathles for the culture and way of llfe ot the Magyars and
the Germans. Accordlng to Lettrich's statement In 1945, the overwhelming majority ot the Jews had to be drlven out ot Slovakla. Is
it any wonder, then, that some zealous partners ot Lettrlch saw in
thls proclamatlon dlrectlves on how "to get rid ot the J ews"?
Actually in 1945- 1946, one could often read in the forelgn press
a bout "antf-Semltic deeds in Slovakla." In reality nothing else was
happening except that the mentloned directfves ot Lettrich were belng applled by bis zealous followers. However, slnce such expresslona were unpleasant to the reglme, they simply blamed all ot tbls
on Slovak "tascists."
It ls slgnlflcant that not one ot the leadlng politlclans ot tbat
reglme In Slovakla - who are now in emlgratlon organized in tbe
Councll ot Free Czechoslovakla - dld not conslder lt necessary to
protest agalnst thls antf-Semltlc exploslon of Mr. Lettrlch. And tbere
are among them even Ruch people who not only were not bis partfsans,
but were also bis competltors In seeklng and galnlng for themselves the
favor of tbe Prague governments.
�SLOVAKIA
39
Slnce the "NEW YORKSKÝ DENNÍK (New York Dally) seems t o
be the organ ot the Czechoslovaks, maybe some of h ls people could
offer a plau sible explanatlon for Lettrlch's statement. Or dld they
agree In the lnnermost parts of thelr souls wlth Lettrich? They were
partlclpan ts of power and every polltlcal chlld recognizes the prlnclple: Sllence means agr eement.
Before th e 1946 elections Lettrlch's polltlcal campaigners dld not
hesltate to use antl•Semltlc slogans just to gain votes tor Lettrlch. For
example In the Žilina dlstrlct, Lettrlch' s men scattered leaflets t hat
were tltled: " On ly Jews and dogs vote for Communi11t11.'' In Llplany
L ettrlch's dlstrlct secretarlate issued a flyer entltled: "Death to the
Jews !" In H rabkov bis followers lssued leaflets th at began wlth th e
words: " We w ant S lovakia without the Jewa." S lmilar antl-Semltlc
slogans were used by Lettrlch' s followers In many other Slovak t owns
and vlllages.
It ls strange that Dr. Lettrlch never publlcly condemned such
utterances and slogana of the election b attle even though the Slovak
press polnted to them several tlmes. And lt ls lnterestlng that even
other so-called polltlclans of that reglme - and here we a re not
thlnklng of some of the pr esent servants of the New Yorkský Dennlk,
(such as Beh arka, Blaho and others) - dld not utter a slngle word
of protest agalnst the use of antl-Semltlc lnstlncts ln the pre-electlon
campalgn of 1946. - (J-9-6-50) .
•
•
•
WHO SAID I T?
" I have looked with a great deal of satiafaction upon the accomp.
li1hment1 of Prealdent Benes and the people of Czechoslovakia shou ld
be congra tulated In havlng auch a reaourceful, capable and loyal
c it izen, who has CONSE NTEO to continue In servlce. . . . Under his
leadershlp the country attained a reputation for SOL IDARITY and
aeh ieved 1uccess UNEQUALLEO by any other FREE natlon.'' ( Congressman Adolph J . Sabath, T H E SLAVONI C MONTHLY, SepLember 1945).
•
" l never deamed Lhat llttle country (Czecho-Slovakla) would fall
inlo the clutches or the Communlsts. The CZECHS a lw ays looked to
Rusala. . . Russla was the ONLY country trylng to save tbem
from Hitler at Munlch. . . . When the Russlan anny drove out Lhe
Nazis and Benes was abl e to return. the country was In a serious condltion. The Gennans h ad looted a nd destroyed. Benes dld EVERY·
T H ING posslb le, but some peoole were stlll dissatis!led. Tbe Communists took advantage and promisetl they could do better. They
made ralse promises:• - (Representative Adolph Sabath, THE WASHINGTON P OST, 3-H -48).
•
"Dr. Hubert Rlpka, Czecbos lovak Minister or Fore ign T rade, told
a rarewell press conference bere (London) today that he did not eon
slder the Western Allies' apprebenslon11 that bis country MIGH T BECOME A VASSAL OF THE SOVIET UNION were grounded . . . . He
sald lt waa natural t hat Czechoslovakla sbould seek be r secunty pr lmarlly In rrlendsb lp w ltb the Soviet Union . . . " - (NEW YORK
TIMES. 4-15-45) .
�
SLOVAKIA
37
THE CZECHOSWVAKS AND ANTI-SEMITISM
( JK ) The Czechoslovaks (Czech Slovaks) apparently are getting a bit jittery. While the democratlc peoples gradually are findlng
out the truth about Czecho-Slovakla and its former Jeaders, who talked
democracy but collaborated with Stalin and the Czech Reds, the socalled "Czechoslovaks" are sweating in a desperate attempt to smear
all freedom-loving, patriotic Slovaks.
Take the NEW YORKSKÝ DENNO< ("Czechoslovak daily pub·
lished in Slovak language" ! ) , for example. For the lack of better arguments it has threatened to expose the Slovak patriots - who always
fought against Communlsm and for the lnherent and God-given rlghts
of their people to freedom and lndependence - as antl-Semites. For
the Czechoslovaks, there are no exceptions: all Slova ks, who believe
their nation has a right to be free and independent, are collectively
and tota lly supposed to be anti-Semites.
For those who are familiar with the Slovak questlon, such an
accusation is just a plain lie. But while we are on the question of
anti-Semitlsm, leťs look at the record of leading Czechoslovaks and see
how these recently born "superdemocrats" (People's Democrats) stood
on the Jewlsh question in Slovakla.
The Czechoslovaks mmally get up in the morning and go to bed
at night with the name of T. G. Masaryk on their lips. What he taught,
what he wrote and what he said, that for them ls like the Gospel.
Well, how did T. G. Masaryk, the so-called "founder" of the
Czecho-Slovak Republic, regard the J ews?
Dr. Vavro Šrobär wrote a book in 1946. He was one of Masaryk's
most loyal servants in Slovakia and one of the leaders of the so-called
"glorious Slovak national rebellion" (1944), during which the Slovak
public for the flrst time found out that so many of the present
"eminent" Czechoslovaks existed. The book, published in Prague, is
called "Z môjho života" (From My Life). Masaryk - the teacher, the
model and ideologist of the Czechoslovaks - accordlng to the book:
"reproached the Jews, because in a Christian world they did not know
how to free themselves from the O!d Testament, the Talmud and the
Ghetto. T hey are lsolating themselves from all the subjugated natlons
and are slding, according to religious precept, wlth the ruling natlons;
a.nd in our country that means they are Germanlzlng and Magyarizing."
And the teacher and model of Lettrich, Papanek, Slävik and other
Slovak renegades continued ln thls manner: "The Jews ot the ghetto
are alien to us with their faith, thelr llves, their views, philosophy
and sociology; they are isolating themselves so, that we do not understand them, we fear them and do not llke them" (pg. 245).
Masaryk, according to Šrobär, "acknowledged that tbe fight
agalnst J ewlsb greed, usury and materlalism, agalnst thelr alllance with
our enemles, is justified, especlally in Moravia and Slovakla, where
in the villages they bave become the ruín of the nalve, gulllble people.
Here tbe privlleges of the tavern trades should be taken away from
tbem, or tbere sbould b e a Jaw passed which would protect the people
agalnst the temptation of alcohollsm and against Jewisb usury" (op.
cit. pg. 246).
�38
SLOVAKIA
And in like manner argued a ll the "salon anti-Semltes." The socalled vulgar antl-Semltes reallzed these salon vlews only la ter on.
Šrobár bimself admits in bis book that wben "tbe farmers came to
my office to ask me to talk, on sucb occaslons we used to talk pollUcs
and I spared nelther omces nor tbe government, not even the Jews"
{pg. 383). For Šrobár tbe Jews were the same red clotb as Magyar
omces In government. And that is quite a strong word! And the socalled Czechoslovaks (Czecb S lovaks!) in exlle negotlated with sucb
an anti-Semite durlng the "revolution" and even after lt!
But T. G. i\lasaryk and Vavro šrobár were not the only Czecboslovaks who felt t ha t way about the Israelltes in Slovakia. Dr. J osepb
Lettrlch, Vlce-President ot th e Councll of Free Czechoslovakla and
former Chairman of both the Slovak Natlonal Councll and the socalled Democratlc Party ot Slovakia, felt ll ke tbat about the J ews, too.
In 1945-1946, by Presldentlal decrees the Magyars and the Germans in Czechoslovakia were robbed not only ot tbelr civil rights, but
also ot thelr entire wealtb. Naturally, their properties were conflscated
wlthout compensatlon. The fate ot the Magyars and Germans was
In no manner envlable: they were placed outslde the law, bunted llke
wlld beasts and dellvered to tbe rldicule and brutality ot the n ew
" P eople's democratlc" admlnistratton. Decent people anywhere could
not want such a rate to overtake even thelr worst enemy.
At that Ume Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, as presldent ot the Slovak National Council, demanded that the Jews be dealt witb In the same
manner as the Germans and Magyars. In 1945, he proclalmerl:
"We must endeavor to drive out of our country wlthout mercy the
Magyars and Germans. The Jewa, w ho by their sentiment• and thelr
language show ay mpathy t o t he Ger mana o r Magyars, we ahall rega rd
those Jews as Germa ns a nd Ma gyars and they w lll have t o auffer the
fat e of Germans and M agyars."
The pettlfoggery of Mr. Lettrich was perfidlous: the great majority of J ews In Slovakla, as a result of the tralning ot previous reglmes, used German and Magyar as thelr languages in thelr homes
and buslnesses. The greatest part of the J ews In Slovakla has traditlonal sympathles for the culture and way of llfe ot the Magyars and
the Germans. Accordlng to Lettrich's statement In 1945, the overwhelming majority ot the Jews had to be drlven out ot Slovakla. Is
it any wonder, then, that some zealous partners ot Lettrlch saw in
thls proclamatlon dlrectlves on how "to get rid ot the J ews"?
Actually in 1945- 1946, one could often read in the forelgn press
a bout "antf-Semltic deeds in Slovakla." In reality nothing else was
happening except that the mentloned directfves ot Lettrich were belng applled by bis zealous followers. However, slnce such expresslona were unpleasant to the reglme, they simply blamed all ot tbls
on Slovak "tascists."
It ls slgnlflcant that not one ot the leadlng politlclans ot tbat
reglme In Slovakla - who are now in emlgratlon organized in tbe
Councll ot Free Czechoslovakla - dld not conslder lt necessary to
protest agalnst thls antf-Semltlc exploslon of Mr. Lettrlch. And tbere
are among them even Ruch people who not only were not bis partfsans,
but were also bis competltors In seeklng and galnlng for themselves the
favor of tbe Prague governments.
�SLOVAKIA
39
Slnce the "NEW YORKSKÝ DENNÍK (New York Dally) seems t o
be the organ ot the Czechoslovaks, maybe some of h ls people could
offer a plau sible explanatlon for Lettrlch's statement. Or dld they
agree In the lnnermost parts of thelr souls wlth Lettrich? They were
partlclpan ts of power and every polltlcal chlld recognizes the prlnclple: Sllence means agr eement.
Before th e 1946 elections Lettrlch's polltlcal campaigners dld not
hesltate to use antl•Semltlc slogans just to gain votes tor Lettrlch. For
example In the Žilina dlstrlct, Lettrlch' s men scattered leaflets t hat
were tltled: " On ly Jews and dogs vote for Communi11t11.'' In Llplany
L ettrlch's dlstrlct secretarlate issued a flyer entltled: "Death to the
Jews !" In H rabkov bis followers lssued leaflets th at began wlth th e
words: " We w ant S lovakia without the Jewa." S lmilar antl-Semltlc
slogans were used by Lettrlch' s followers In many other Slovak t owns
and vlllages.
It ls strange that Dr. Lettrlch never publlcly condemned such
utterances and slogana of the election b attle even though the Slovak
press polnted to them several tlmes. And lt ls lnterestlng that even
other so-called polltlclans of that reglme - and here we a re not
thlnklng of some of the pr esent servants of the New Yorkský Dennlk,
(such as Beh arka, Blaho and others) - dld not utter a slngle word
of protest agalnst the use of antl-Semltlc lnstlncts ln the pre-electlon
campalgn of 1946. - (J-9-6-50) .
•
•
•
WHO SAID I T?
" I have looked with a great deal of satiafaction upon the accomp.
li1hment1 of Prealdent Benes and the people of Czechoslovakia shou ld
be congra tulated In havlng auch a reaourceful, capable and loyal
c it izen, who has CONSE NTEO to continue In servlce. . . . Under his
leadershlp the country attained a reputation for SOL IDARITY and
aeh ieved 1uccess UNEQUALLEO by any other FREE natlon.'' ( Congressman Adolph J . Sabath, T H E SLAVONI C MONTHLY, SepLember 1945).
•
" l never deamed Lhat llttle country (Czecho-Slovakla) would fall
inlo the clutches or the Communlsts. The CZECHS a lw ays looked to
Rusala. . . Russla was the ONLY country trylng to save tbem
from Hitler at Munlch. . . . When the Russlan anny drove out Lhe
Nazis and Benes was abl e to return. the country was In a serious condltion. The Gennans h ad looted a nd destroyed. Benes dld EVERY·
T H ING posslb le, but some peoole were stlll dissatis!led. Tbe Communists took advantage and promisetl they could do better. They
made ralse promises:• - (Representative Adolph Sabath, THE WASHINGTON P OST, 3-H -48).
•
"Dr. Hubert Rlpka, Czecbos lovak Minister or Fore ign T rade, told
a rarewell press conference bere (London) today that he did not eon
slder the Western Allies' apprebenslon11 that bis country MIGH T BECOME A VASSAL OF THE SOVIET UNION were grounded . . . . He
sald lt waa natural t hat Czechoslovakla sbould seek be r secunty pr lmarlly In rrlendsb lp w ltb the Soviet Union . . . " - (NEW YORK
TIMES. 4-15-45) .
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
37
THE CZECHOSWVAKS AND ANTI-SEMITISM
( JK ) The Czechoslovaks (Czech Slovaks) apparently are getting a bit jittery. While the democratlc peoples gradually are findlng
out the truth about Czecho-Slovakla and its former Jeaders, who talked
democracy but collaborated with Stalin and the Czech Reds, the socalled "Czechoslovaks" are sweating in a desperate attempt to smear
all freedom-loving, patriotic Slovaks.
Take the NEW YORKSKÝ DENNO< ("Czechoslovak daily pub·
lished in Slovak language" ! ) , for example. For the lack of better arguments it has threatened to expose the Slovak patriots - who always
fought against Communlsm and for the lnherent and God-given rlghts
of their people to freedom and lndependence - as antl-Semites. For
the Czechoslovaks, there are no exceptions: all Slova ks, who believe
their nation has a right to be free and independent, are collectively
and tota lly supposed to be anti-Semites.
For those who are familiar with the Slovak questlon, such an
accusation is just a plain lie. But while we are on the question of
anti-Semitlsm, leťs look at the record of leading Czechoslovaks and see
how these recently born "superdemocrats" (People's Democrats) stood
on the Jewlsh question in Slovakla.
The Czechoslovaks mmally get up in the morning and go to bed
at night with the name of T. G. Masaryk on their lips. What he taught,
what he wrote and what he said, that for them ls like the Gospel.
Well, how did T. G. Masaryk, the so-called "founder" of the
Czecho-Slovak Republic, regard the J ews?
Dr. Vavro Šrobär wrote a book in 1946. He was one of Masaryk's
most loyal servants in Slovakia and one of the leaders of the so-called
"glorious Slovak national rebellion" (1944), during which the Slovak
public for the flrst time found out that so many of the present
"eminent" Czechoslovaks existed. The book, published in Prague, is
called "Z môjho života" (From My Life). Masaryk - the teacher, the
model and ideologist of the Czechoslovaks - accordlng to the book:
"reproached the Jews, because in a Christian world they did not know
how to free themselves from the O!d Testament, the Talmud and the
Ghetto. T hey are lsolating themselves from all the subjugated natlons
and are slding, according to religious precept, wlth the ruling natlons;
a.nd in our country that means they are Germanlzlng and Magyarizing."
And the teacher and model of Lettrich, Papanek, Slävik and other
Slovak renegades continued ln thls manner: "The Jews ot the ghetto
are alien to us with their faith, thelr llves, their views, philosophy
and sociology; they are isolating themselves so, that we do not understand them, we fear them and do not llke them" (pg. 245).
Masaryk, according to Šrobär, "acknowledged that tbe fight
agalnst J ewlsb greed, usury and materlalism, agalnst thelr alllance with
our enemles, is justified, especlally in Moravia and Slovakla, where
in the villages they bave become the ruín of the nalve, gulllble people.
Here tbe privlleges of the tavern trades should be taken away from
tbem, or tbere sbould b e a Jaw passed which would protect the people
agalnst the temptation of alcohollsm and against Jewisb usury" (op.
cit. pg. 246).
38
SLOVAKIA
And in like manner argued a ll the "salon anti-Semltes." The socalled vulgar antl-Semltes reallzed these salon vlews only la ter on.
Šrobár bimself admits in bis book that wben "tbe farmers came to
my office to ask me to talk, on sucb occaslons we used to talk pollUcs
and I spared nelther omces nor tbe government, not even the Jews"
{pg. 383). For Šrobár tbe Jews were the same red clotb as Magyar
omces In government. And that is quite a strong word! And the socalled Czechoslovaks (Czecb S lovaks!) in exlle negotlated with sucb
an anti-Semite durlng the "revolution" and even after lt!
But T. G. i\lasaryk and Vavro šrobár were not the only Czecboslovaks who felt t ha t way about the Israelltes in Slovakia. Dr. J osepb
Lettrlch, Vlce-President ot th e Councll of Free Czechoslovakla and
former Chairman of both the Slovak Natlonal Councll and the socalled Democratlc Party ot Slovakia, felt ll ke tbat about the J ews, too.
In 1945-1946, by Presldentlal decrees the Magyars and the Germans in Czechoslovakia were robbed not only ot tbelr civil rights, but
also ot thelr entire wealtb. Naturally, their properties were conflscated
wlthout compensatlon. The fate ot the Magyars and Germans was
In no manner envlable: they were placed outslde the law, bunted llke
wlld beasts and dellvered to tbe rldicule and brutality ot the n ew
" P eople's democratlc" admlnistratton. Decent people anywhere could
not want such a rate to overtake even thelr worst enemy.
At that Ume Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, as presldent ot the Slovak National Council, demanded that the Jews be dealt witb In the same
manner as the Germans and Magyars. In 1945, he proclalmerl:
"We must endeavor to drive out of our country wlthout mercy the
Magyars and Germans. The Jewa, w ho by their sentiment• and thelr
language show ay mpathy t o t he Ger mana o r Magyars, we ahall rega rd
those Jews as Germa ns a nd Ma gyars and they w lll have t o auffer the
fat e of Germans and M agyars."
The pettlfoggery of Mr. Lettrich was perfidlous: the great majority of J ews In Slovakla, as a result of the tralning ot previous reglmes, used German and Magyar as thelr languages in thelr homes
and buslnesses. The greatest part of the J ews In Slovakla has traditlonal sympathles for the culture and way of llfe ot the Magyars and
the Germans. Accordlng to Lettrich's statement In 1945, the overwhelming majority ot the Jews had to be drlven out ot Slovakla. Is
it any wonder, then, that some zealous partners ot Lettrlch saw in
thls proclamatlon dlrectlves on how "to get rid ot the J ews"?
Actually in 1945- 1946, one could often read in the forelgn press
a bout "antf-Semltic deeds in Slovakla." In reality nothing else was
happening except that the mentloned directfves ot Lettrich were belng applled by bis zealous followers. However, slnce such expresslona were unpleasant to the reglme, they simply blamed all ot tbls
on Slovak "tascists."
It ls slgnlflcant that not one ot the leadlng politlclans ot tbat
reglme In Slovakla - who are now in emlgratlon organized in tbe
Councll ot Free Czechoslovakla - dld not conslder lt necessary to
protest agalnst thls antf-Semltlc exploslon of Mr. Lettrlch. And tbere
are among them even Ruch people who not only were not bis partfsans,
but were also bis competltors In seeklng and galnlng for themselves the
favor of tbe Prague governments.
SLOVAKIA
39
Slnce the "NEW YORKSKÝ DENNÍK (New York Dally) seems t o
be the organ ot the Czechoslovaks, maybe some of h ls people could
offer a plau sible explanatlon for Lettrlch's statement. Or dld they
agree In the lnnermost parts of thelr souls wlth Lettrich? They were
partlclpan ts of power and every polltlcal chlld recognizes the prlnclple: Sllence means agr eement.
Before th e 1946 elections Lettrlch's polltlcal campaigners dld not
hesltate to use antl•Semltlc slogans just to gain votes tor Lettrlch. For
example In the Žilina dlstrlct, Lettrlch' s men scattered leaflets t hat
were tltled: " On ly Jews and dogs vote for Communi11t11.'' In Llplany
L ettrlch's dlstrlct secretarlate issued a flyer entltled: "Death to the
Jews !" In H rabkov bis followers lssued leaflets th at began wlth th e
words: " We w ant S lovakia without the Jewa." S lmilar antl-Semltlc
slogans were used by Lettrlch' s followers In many other Slovak t owns
and vlllages.
It ls strange that Dr. Lettrlch never publlcly condemned such
utterances and slogana of the election b attle even though the Slovak
press polnted to them several tlmes. And lt ls lnterestlng that even
other so-called polltlclans of that reglme - and here we a re not
thlnklng of some of the pr esent servants of the New Yorkský Dennlk,
(such as Beh arka, Blaho and others) - dld not utter a slngle word
of protest agalnst the use of antl-Semltlc lnstlncts ln the pre-electlon
campalgn of 1946. - (J-9-6-50) .
•
•
•
WHO SAID I T?
" I have looked with a great deal of satiafaction upon the accomp.
li1hment1 of Prealdent Benes and the people of Czechoslovakia shou ld
be congra tulated In havlng auch a reaourceful, capable and loyal
c it izen, who has CONSE NTEO to continue In servlce. . . . Under his
leadershlp the country attained a reputation for SOL IDARITY and
aeh ieved 1uccess UNEQUALLEO by any other FREE natlon.'' ( Congressman Adolph J . Sabath, T H E SLAVONI C MONTHLY, SepLember 1945).
•
" l never deamed Lhat llttle country (Czecho-Slovakla) would fall
inlo the clutches or the Communlsts. The CZECHS a lw ays looked to
Rusala. . . Russla was the ONLY country trylng to save tbem
from Hitler at Munlch. . . . When the Russlan anny drove out Lhe
Nazis and Benes was abl e to return. the country was In a serious condltion. The Gennans h ad looted a nd destroyed. Benes dld EVERY·
T H ING posslb le, but some peoole were stlll dissatis!led. Tbe Communists took advantage and promisetl they could do better. They
made ralse promises:• - (Representative Adolph Sabath, THE WASHINGTON P OST, 3-H -48).
•
"Dr. Hubert Rlpka, Czecbos lovak Minister or Fore ign T rade, told
a rarewell press conference bere (London) today that he did not eon
slder the Western Allies' apprebenslon11 that bis country MIGH T BECOME A VASSAL OF THE SOVIET UNION were grounded . . . . He
sald lt waa natural t hat Czechoslovakla sbould seek be r secunty pr lmarlly In rrlendsb lp w ltb the Soviet Union . . . " - (NEW YORK
TIMES. 4-15-45) .
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Czechoslovaks and Anti-Semitism
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951
pp. 37-39
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
May 1951
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/aad58eb703bc6e6ce687d8b8f3cfa0bf.pdf
7572f46d746b8a61cd64bbd04e172821
PDF Text
Text
40
SLOVAK]A
CZECH C.APITULATION TO COMMUNISM
The ease with which the communists came into absolute power
In Prague, with the assent of Dr. Beneš and tbe participation of Jan
Masaryk, surprised even many lnformed people in Europe and the
western world. Mucb had been written about the political maturity
of the Czecb nation, its loyaJty to democracy and western culture and,
therefore, many were willing to believe that Prague actually was a
bastion of western democracy. Some expected tbat it would be a
bridge between the East and tbe West. Otbers tbougbt tbat tbe
Czechs were called to perform an lmportant mlssion in the contemporary tense situation of tbe world.
But before the people of America and Europe had a chance to
rub their eyes after reading the reports about the crisis in Prague,
the bubble about the loyalty of the Czechs to democracy and the
story of their world m.ission burst. The Communists had no trouble
at all in taklng Prague. There was not a slngle person in tbe entlre
state of tbis "mature, democratic nation" to offer any notlceable
resistance to the communist putsch.
History had repeated itself. Ten years before tbere was not a
single Czech who dared to defend the independence of the Czech
nation and Beneš's "democratlc" state by flrlng even a single shot at
the nazls.
In tbe Czech nation there could not be found a Petkov or a
Maniu, and much less a Tiso, who preferred the gallows to nego•
tiating wltb communism and serving the communlsts.
And this fact probably stunned the western world more than it
did the people of centra! Europe, because the people of the former
were really taken in by Beneš's high-geard propaganda machine.
The European and American public was suddenly faced with the fact
that Dr. Beneš not only did not offer any resistance to the communist minority, but that he even gave the communlst putsch a legal
form and a democratic appearance. And lt was the same Dr. Edward
Beneš who had publlshed the book "Democracy 'ľoday and Tomorrow,"
wherein he portrayed himself as a piliar of European democracy!
Another well-known representative of "Czech democracy," Jan Masaryk, even accepted a posltion In the "people's democratic government" of tbe Russian gaulelter, Klement Gottwald.
The former French Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, compared
what happened with such llghtning speed in Prague In 1948 with what
happened in 1938 in Munlch, when Dr. Edward Beneš, bis government and the whole Czech nation accepted without reslstance the
factual surrender of the Czechoslovak Republic to Hitler.
As far as the role of Dr. Beneš is concerned, there is without
debate a great simllarity between bis polltics of 1938 and 1948. And
especially the results were similar.
In 1938, Dr. Beneš not only surrendered unconstltutlonally a plece
of Czechoslovak terrltory to Germany, but also advised to make concesslons to the Germans, when threatened by bis own people and refuslng to collaborate with Hitler he fled to England. And so it was
even In 1945, when unconstltutlonally he surrendered Ruthenla to
Moscow and made concesslons to bolshevism.
�SLOVAKIA
41
But thls tíme, lf we do not want to talk about the cleverness of
Moscow, fate wanted Dr. Beneš to play the role of Dr. Hácha, who
in the spring of 1939 had to accept the German protectorate and sanction the end of the Czechoslovak Republlc after Beneš had fled.
Today practically no one doubts that Dr. Beneš formally surrendered
Bohemia and Slovakia into the hands of Moscow and bolshevlsm when
he surrendered the Government into the hands of Gottwald and the
Czech communists.
And Beneš did that without offering any reslstance. He did not
even attempt to defend fľeedom, democracy and Christian traditions.
There is in all this a bit of tragedy as far as the Czech nation
and even Beneš himself are concerned. But it was the logical consequence of the Czech politics of Dr. Beneš. Even the most clever
fraud and most deceitful player cannot get away all the time wlth his
frauds and deceptlon. A time comes when he gets caught and
rapped. And so it is even in politics.
Dr. Edward Beneš and a great part of the Czech politicians based
their interna! and foreign policies on intrigues on the assumption
that they could deceive their partner. T. G. Masaryk himself w rote
about this in his better years in "The Czech Problem," saying: "If
one Jooks at our public life a bit carefully, he shall see not only
weak beggary, but he shall a lso meet up with a particular type of
lntriguers. Intriguery !s poisoning our entire all!ed life, because
people who cannot be lions are becoming foxes, and those who cannot
be heroes are becoming lackeys and are helping themselves by mans
of Iackey intr!gue. And the ideal of these numerous people is
'politics'."
Dr. Beneš was a prototype of such a "politician." This is not
the opinion of Siovaks only. Lloyd George said as much in his book
"The Truth About the Peace Treaties" which he published in 1938:
" Of the many misfortunes that befell Austrla in the day of her
great calam!ty, one of the worst was that Czecho-Slovak!a was represented at the Peace Conference not by her wise leader, President
Masaryk but by an impulsive, clever but much Iess sagacious and
more short-sighted politician, who did not foresee tbat the more he
grasped, the Iess could he retain."
Today it would be undoubtedly in place to remark that Beneš's
pollcy was a great calamity not only for Austria, but also for the
so-called "Third" Czechoslovak Republic.
Dr. Edward Beneš always had a pian. To make certa!n that he
would rule over Slovakia, tbe Sudeteners and German property, he
flew to Moscow already in 1943 to negotlate a pact with Russla. Of
course, on the assumption that later on he could circumvent it and
break it - as he had done in the case or the Pittsburgh Pact in 1918,
at the Peace Conference in 1918 when he promised that Czechoslovakia would be a confederation, and in other lnstances as well.
Moscow, however, was wlse to Dr. Beneš. The little man with a
pian seemed to forget that he was deallng wlth the master in the art
or deceptlon and broken pacts. And so lt was that Dr. Beneš, because
or his extreme amb!tlon and imperiallstlc tendencies, brought the
Czech natlon to the brink of disaster twice with!n a decade.
But tbis t!me the catastrophic consequences of his polltlcs artect
not only the Czech natlon, but his capltulation to bolshevtsm has an
�42
SLOVAK.IA
lmmeasurable slgnlficance for the whole of Europe, and already today
is fatal for the Slovak natlon which today is without the servlces ot
Dr. Tiso to save it !rom bolshevism, as he once saved it trom nazlsm.
A handful of communists had llttle trouble In overpowering Slovakia
and subjecting it to its totalltarian dlctatorshlp only because they had
the support of Prague - the same Prague that had prevlously ordered
to kill, jali and deport the elite ot the Slovak nation and placed morally irresponsible and politically immature puppets Jn charge of Slovakia.
The Slovaks shall never forget the terrible and wanton destructlon of Slovak lives and property caused by the 1944 rebellion whlch
was planned by Beneš and hls followers and executed by the so-called
Czechoslovaks (Czech Slovaks ! ) and the communists.
lf proper steps are not taken In tíme, the results of the Czech
capitulation to bolshevism shall be just as immeasurable for Europe.
Czechoslovakia now is in fact a hive of communism and a most im•
portant air base of Moscow. Bohemla and Slovakla have great stra•
tegical signlficance even though mllitary techniques have changed.
And more so today than ever before, because Europe from the Czech
borders to the West is ruined, defenseless and disorganized. Bis•
marcťs "who rules Bohemla, rules Europe" did not !ose its signifi•
cance completely.
Of course some one could say - and Beneš's polltical followers
in exlle are repeatlng it almost lncessantly - that the Czech capltulatlon to bolshevlsm was caused by the over-all world situatlon. We
still remember that Czech propaganda tried to convlnce the world
after 1938 that the West had betrayed Czechoslovalda, even though
that country dld nothing to save itself.
But the song of bankrupt Czech polltlcians "we had to capltulate"
sounds a bit off key today. We have had Ume to consider what Beneii
and his tollowers had done, written and said slnce 1938. We know that
the Bene§ government rejected the Marshall Pian and that his representatlve in the United Natlons. Jan Papanek, always voted as the
USSR delegate did. Iťs all a matter of record.
In hls message to the Provislonal Natlonal Assembly, October 28,
1945, Dr. Beneš said: "We are the allles of the Soviet Union and
shall remaln faithful to that alllance . . . and we sha.ll pursue sin•
cerely the new Slav pollcy."
DNEŠEK (Today), Dr. Beneš's perlodical, wrote on July 17, 1947:
"The tundamental plllar of our foreign pollcy is our allled agreement
ot frlendshlp and mutual asslstance with the Soviet Union of Decem•
ber 12, 1943. In that year we had decided to adhere to the East. And,
therefore, even lf the present economlc war should become so acute
that we would not be able to get even one wagon of cotton from the
West, we shall stm remaln loyal to the East."
And Jan Masaryk, talklng about hls Moscow trip (Marshall Pian),
told a. correspondent of the London DAILY MAIL: "Any talk ot
threats or an ultlmatum agalnst Czecho-Slovakia ls sllly. We made
a declslon whlch I cannot but conslder the rlght one under the circumstances."
Saplentl aat l
�
40
SLOVAK]A
CZECH C.APITULATION TO COMMUNISM
The ease with which the communists came into absolute power
In Prague, with the assent of Dr. Beneš and tbe participation of Jan
Masaryk, surprised even many lnformed people in Europe and the
western world. Mucb had been written about the political maturity
of the Czecb nation, its loyaJty to democracy and western culture and,
therefore, many were willing to believe that Prague actually was a
bastion of western democracy. Some expected tbat it would be a
bridge between the East and tbe West. Otbers tbougbt tbat tbe
Czechs were called to perform an lmportant mlssion in the contemporary tense situation of tbe world.
But before the people of America and Europe had a chance to
rub their eyes after reading the reports about the crisis in Prague,
the bubble about the loyalty of the Czechs to democracy and the
story of their world m.ission burst. The Communists had no trouble
at all in taklng Prague. There was not a slngle person in tbe entlre
state of tbis "mature, democratic nation" to offer any notlceable
resistance to the communist putsch.
History had repeated itself. Ten years before tbere was not a
single Czech who dared to defend the independence of the Czech
nation and Beneš's "democratlc" state by flrlng even a single shot at
the nazls.
In tbe Czech nation there could not be found a Petkov or a
Maniu, and much less a Tiso, who preferred the gallows to nego•
tiating wltb communism and serving the communlsts.
And this fact probably stunned the western world more than it
did the people of centra! Europe, because the people of the former
were really taken in by Beneš's high-geard propaganda machine.
The European and American public was suddenly faced with the fact
that Dr. Beneš not only did not offer any resistance to the communist minority, but that he even gave the communlst putsch a legal
form and a democratic appearance. And lt was the same Dr. Edward
Beneš who had publlshed the book "Democracy 'ľoday and Tomorrow,"
wherein he portrayed himself as a piliar of European democracy!
Another well-known representative of "Czech democracy," Jan Masaryk, even accepted a posltion In the "people's democratic government" of tbe Russian gaulelter, Klement Gottwald.
The former French Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, compared
what happened with such llghtning speed in Prague In 1948 with what
happened in 1938 in Munlch, when Dr. Edward Beneš, bis government and the whole Czech nation accepted without reslstance the
factual surrender of the Czechoslovak Republic to Hitler.
As far as the role of Dr. Beneš is concerned, there is without
debate a great simllarity between bis polltics of 1938 and 1948. And
especially the results were similar.
In 1938, Dr. Beneš not only surrendered unconstltutlonally a plece
of Czechoslovak terrltory to Germany, but also advised to make concesslons to the Germans, when threatened by bis own people and refuslng to collaborate with Hitler he fled to England. And so it was
even In 1945, when unconstltutlonally he surrendered Ruthenla to
Moscow and made concesslons to bolshevism.
�SLOVAKIA
41
But thls tíme, lf we do not want to talk about the cleverness of
Moscow, fate wanted Dr. Beneš to play the role of Dr. Hácha, who
in the spring of 1939 had to accept the German protectorate and sanction the end of the Czechoslovak Republlc after Beneš had fled.
Today practically no one doubts that Dr. Beneš formally surrendered
Bohemia and Slovakia into the hands of Moscow and bolshevlsm when
he surrendered the Government into the hands of Gottwald and the
Czech communists.
And Beneš did that without offering any reslstance. He did not
even attempt to defend fľeedom, democracy and Christian traditions.
There is in all this a bit of tragedy as far as the Czech nation
and even Beneš himself are concerned. But it was the logical consequence of the Czech politics of Dr. Beneš. Even the most clever
fraud and most deceitful player cannot get away all the time wlth his
frauds and deceptlon. A time comes when he gets caught and
rapped. And so it is even in politics.
Dr. Edward Beneš and a great part of the Czech politicians based
their interna! and foreign policies on intrigues on the assumption
that they could deceive their partner. T. G. Masaryk himself w rote
about this in his better years in "The Czech Problem," saying: "If
one Jooks at our public life a bit carefully, he shall see not only
weak beggary, but he shall a lso meet up with a particular type of
lntriguers. Intriguery !s poisoning our entire all!ed life, because
people who cannot be lions are becoming foxes, and those who cannot
be heroes are becoming lackeys and are helping themselves by mans
of Iackey intr!gue. And the ideal of these numerous people is
'politics'."
Dr. Beneš was a prototype of such a "politician." This is not
the opinion of Siovaks only. Lloyd George said as much in his book
"The Truth About the Peace Treaties" which he published in 1938:
" Of the many misfortunes that befell Austrla in the day of her
great calam!ty, one of the worst was that Czecho-Slovak!a was represented at the Peace Conference not by her wise leader, President
Masaryk but by an impulsive, clever but much Iess sagacious and
more short-sighted politician, who did not foresee tbat the more he
grasped, the Iess could he retain."
Today it would be undoubtedly in place to remark that Beneš's
pollcy was a great calamity not only for Austria, but also for the
so-called "Third" Czechoslovak Republic.
Dr. Edward Beneš always had a pian. To make certa!n that he
would rule over Slovakia, tbe Sudeteners and German property, he
flew to Moscow already in 1943 to negotlate a pact with Russla. Of
course, on the assumption that later on he could circumvent it and
break it - as he had done in the case or the Pittsburgh Pact in 1918,
at the Peace Conference in 1918 when he promised that Czechoslovakia would be a confederation, and in other lnstances as well.
Moscow, however, was wlse to Dr. Beneš. The little man with a
pian seemed to forget that he was deallng wlth the master in the art
or deceptlon and broken pacts. And so lt was that Dr. Beneš, because
or his extreme amb!tlon and imperiallstlc tendencies, brought the
Czech natlon to the brink of disaster twice with!n a decade.
But tbis t!me the catastrophic consequences of his polltlcs artect
not only the Czech natlon, but his capltulation to bolshevtsm has an
�42
SLOVAK.IA
lmmeasurable slgnlficance for the whole of Europe, and already today
is fatal for the Slovak natlon which today is without the servlces ot
Dr. Tiso to save it !rom bolshevism, as he once saved it trom nazlsm.
A handful of communists had llttle trouble In overpowering Slovakia
and subjecting it to its totalltarian dlctatorshlp only because they had
the support of Prague - the same Prague that had prevlously ordered
to kill, jali and deport the elite ot the Slovak nation and placed morally irresponsible and politically immature puppets Jn charge of Slovakia.
The Slovaks shall never forget the terrible and wanton destructlon of Slovak lives and property caused by the 1944 rebellion whlch
was planned by Beneš and hls followers and executed by the so-called
Czechoslovaks (Czech Slovaks ! ) and the communists.
lf proper steps are not taken In tíme, the results of the Czech
capitulation to bolshevism shall be just as immeasurable for Europe.
Czechoslovakia now is in fact a hive of communism and a most im•
portant air base of Moscow. Bohemla and Slovakla have great stra•
tegical signlficance even though mllitary techniques have changed.
And more so today than ever before, because Europe from the Czech
borders to the West is ruined, defenseless and disorganized. Bis•
marcťs "who rules Bohemla, rules Europe" did not !ose its signifi•
cance completely.
Of course some one could say - and Beneš's polltical followers
in exlle are repeatlng it almost lncessantly - that the Czech capltulatlon to bolshevlsm was caused by the over-all world situatlon. We
still remember that Czech propaganda tried to convlnce the world
after 1938 that the West had betrayed Czechoslovalda, even though
that country dld nothing to save itself.
But the song of bankrupt Czech polltlcians "we had to capltulate"
sounds a bit off key today. We have had Ume to consider what Beneii
and his tollowers had done, written and said slnce 1938. We know that
the Bene§ government rejected the Marshall Pian and that his representatlve in the United Natlons. Jan Papanek, always voted as the
USSR delegate did. Iťs all a matter of record.
In hls message to the Provislonal Natlonal Assembly, October 28,
1945, Dr. Beneš said: "We are the allles of the Soviet Union and
shall remaln faithful to that alllance . . . and we sha.ll pursue sin•
cerely the new Slav pollcy."
DNEŠEK (Today), Dr. Beneš's perlodical, wrote on July 17, 1947:
"The tundamental plllar of our foreign pollcy is our allled agreement
ot frlendshlp and mutual asslstance with the Soviet Union of Decem•
ber 12, 1943. In that year we had decided to adhere to the East. And,
therefore, even lf the present economlc war should become so acute
that we would not be able to get even one wagon of cotton from the
West, we shall stm remaln loyal to the East."
And Jan Masaryk, talklng about hls Moscow trip (Marshall Pian),
told a. correspondent of the London DAILY MAIL: "Any talk ot
threats or an ultlmatum agalnst Czecho-Slovakia ls sllly. We made
a declslon whlch I cannot but conslder the rlght one under the circumstances."
Saplentl aat l
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
40
SLOVAK]A
CZECH C.APITULATION TO COMMUNISM
The ease with which the communists came into absolute power
In Prague, with the assent of Dr. Beneš and tbe participation of Jan
Masaryk, surprised even many lnformed people in Europe and the
western world. Mucb had been written about the political maturity
of the Czecb nation, its loyaJty to democracy and western culture and,
therefore, many were willing to believe that Prague actually was a
bastion of western democracy. Some expected tbat it would be a
bridge between the East and tbe West. Otbers tbougbt tbat tbe
Czechs were called to perform an lmportant mlssion in the contemporary tense situation of tbe world.
But before the people of America and Europe had a chance to
rub their eyes after reading the reports about the crisis in Prague,
the bubble about the loyalty of the Czechs to democracy and the
story of their world m.ission burst. The Communists had no trouble
at all in taklng Prague. There was not a slngle person in tbe entlre
state of tbis "mature, democratic nation" to offer any notlceable
resistance to the communist putsch.
History had repeated itself. Ten years before tbere was not a
single Czech who dared to defend the independence of the Czech
nation and Beneš's "democratlc" state by flrlng even a single shot at
the nazls.
In tbe Czech nation there could not be found a Petkov or a
Maniu, and much less a Tiso, who preferred the gallows to nego•
tiating wltb communism and serving the communlsts.
And this fact probably stunned the western world more than it
did the people of centra! Europe, because the people of the former
were really taken in by Beneš's high-geard propaganda machine.
The European and American public was suddenly faced with the fact
that Dr. Beneš not only did not offer any resistance to the communist minority, but that he even gave the communlst putsch a legal
form and a democratic appearance. And lt was the same Dr. Edward
Beneš who had publlshed the book "Democracy 'ľoday and Tomorrow,"
wherein he portrayed himself as a piliar of European democracy!
Another well-known representative of "Czech democracy," Jan Masaryk, even accepted a posltion In the "people's democratic government" of tbe Russian gaulelter, Klement Gottwald.
The former French Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, compared
what happened with such llghtning speed in Prague In 1948 with what
happened in 1938 in Munlch, when Dr. Edward Beneš, bis government and the whole Czech nation accepted without reslstance the
factual surrender of the Czechoslovak Republic to Hitler.
As far as the role of Dr. Beneš is concerned, there is without
debate a great simllarity between bis polltics of 1938 and 1948. And
especially the results were similar.
In 1938, Dr. Beneš not only surrendered unconstltutlonally a plece
of Czechoslovak terrltory to Germany, but also advised to make concesslons to the Germans, when threatened by bis own people and refuslng to collaborate with Hitler he fled to England. And so it was
even In 1945, when unconstltutlonally he surrendered Ruthenla to
Moscow and made concesslons to bolshevism.
SLOVAKIA
41
But thls tíme, lf we do not want to talk about the cleverness of
Moscow, fate wanted Dr. Beneš to play the role of Dr. Hácha, who
in the spring of 1939 had to accept the German protectorate and sanction the end of the Czechoslovak Republlc after Beneš had fled.
Today practically no one doubts that Dr. Beneš formally surrendered
Bohemia and Slovakia into the hands of Moscow and bolshevlsm when
he surrendered the Government into the hands of Gottwald and the
Czech communists.
And Beneš did that without offering any reslstance. He did not
even attempt to defend fľeedom, democracy and Christian traditions.
There is in all this a bit of tragedy as far as the Czech nation
and even Beneš himself are concerned. But it was the logical consequence of the Czech politics of Dr. Beneš. Even the most clever
fraud and most deceitful player cannot get away all the time wlth his
frauds and deceptlon. A time comes when he gets caught and
rapped. And so it is even in politics.
Dr. Edward Beneš and a great part of the Czech politicians based
their interna! and foreign policies on intrigues on the assumption
that they could deceive their partner. T. G. Masaryk himself w rote
about this in his better years in "The Czech Problem," saying: "If
one Jooks at our public life a bit carefully, he shall see not only
weak beggary, but he shall a lso meet up with a particular type of
lntriguers. Intriguery !s poisoning our entire all!ed life, because
people who cannot be lions are becoming foxes, and those who cannot
be heroes are becoming lackeys and are helping themselves by mans
of Iackey intr!gue. And the ideal of these numerous people is
'politics'."
Dr. Beneš was a prototype of such a "politician." This is not
the opinion of Siovaks only. Lloyd George said as much in his book
"The Truth About the Peace Treaties" which he published in 1938:
" Of the many misfortunes that befell Austrla in the day of her
great calam!ty, one of the worst was that Czecho-Slovak!a was represented at the Peace Conference not by her wise leader, President
Masaryk but by an impulsive, clever but much Iess sagacious and
more short-sighted politician, who did not foresee tbat the more he
grasped, the Iess could he retain."
Today it would be undoubtedly in place to remark that Beneš's
pollcy was a great calamity not only for Austria, but also for the
so-called "Third" Czechoslovak Republic.
Dr. Edward Beneš always had a pian. To make certa!n that he
would rule over Slovakia, tbe Sudeteners and German property, he
flew to Moscow already in 1943 to negotlate a pact with Russla. Of
course, on the assumption that later on he could circumvent it and
break it - as he had done in the case or the Pittsburgh Pact in 1918,
at the Peace Conference in 1918 when he promised that Czechoslovakia would be a confederation, and in other lnstances as well.
Moscow, however, was wlse to Dr. Beneš. The little man with a
pian seemed to forget that he was deallng wlth the master in the art
or deceptlon and broken pacts. And so lt was that Dr. Beneš, because
or his extreme amb!tlon and imperiallstlc tendencies, brought the
Czech natlon to the brink of disaster twice with!n a decade.
But tbis t!me the catastrophic consequences of his polltlcs artect
not only the Czech natlon, but his capltulation to bolshevtsm has an
42
SLOVAK.IA
lmmeasurable slgnlficance for the whole of Europe, and already today
is fatal for the Slovak natlon which today is without the servlces ot
Dr. Tiso to save it !rom bolshevism, as he once saved it trom nazlsm.
A handful of communists had llttle trouble In overpowering Slovakia
and subjecting it to its totalltarian dlctatorshlp only because they had
the support of Prague - the same Prague that had prevlously ordered
to kill, jali and deport the elite ot the Slovak nation and placed morally irresponsible and politically immature puppets Jn charge of Slovakia.
The Slovaks shall never forget the terrible and wanton destructlon of Slovak lives and property caused by the 1944 rebellion whlch
was planned by Beneš and hls followers and executed by the so-called
Czechoslovaks (Czech Slovaks ! ) and the communists.
lf proper steps are not taken In tíme, the results of the Czech
capitulation to bolshevism shall be just as immeasurable for Europe.
Czechoslovakia now is in fact a hive of communism and a most im•
portant air base of Moscow. Bohemla and Slovakla have great stra•
tegical signlficance even though mllitary techniques have changed.
And more so today than ever before, because Europe from the Czech
borders to the West is ruined, defenseless and disorganized. Bis•
marcťs "who rules Bohemla, rules Europe" did not !ose its signifi•
cance completely.
Of course some one could say - and Beneš's polltical followers
in exlle are repeatlng it almost lncessantly - that the Czech capltulatlon to bolshevlsm was caused by the over-all world situatlon. We
still remember that Czech propaganda tried to convlnce the world
after 1938 that the West had betrayed Czechoslovalda, even though
that country dld nothing to save itself.
But the song of bankrupt Czech polltlcians "we had to capltulate"
sounds a bit off key today. We have had Ume to consider what Beneii
and his tollowers had done, written and said slnce 1938. We know that
the Bene§ government rejected the Marshall Pian and that his representatlve in the United Natlons. Jan Papanek, always voted as the
USSR delegate did. Iťs all a matter of record.
In hls message to the Provislonal Natlonal Assembly, October 28,
1945, Dr. Beneš said: "We are the allles of the Soviet Union and
shall remaln faithful to that alllance . . . and we sha.ll pursue sin•
cerely the new Slav pollcy."
DNEŠEK (Today), Dr. Beneš's perlodical, wrote on July 17, 1947:
"The tundamental plllar of our foreign pollcy is our allled agreement
ot frlendshlp and mutual asslstance with the Soviet Union of Decem•
ber 12, 1943. In that year we had decided to adhere to the East. And,
therefore, even lf the present economlc war should become so acute
that we would not be able to get even one wagon of cotton from the
West, we shall stm remaln loyal to the East."
And Jan Masaryk, talklng about hls Moscow trip (Marshall Pian),
told a. correspondent of the London DAILY MAIL: "Any talk ot
threats or an ultlmatum agalnst Czecho-Slovakia ls sllly. We made
a declslon whlch I cannot but conslder the rlght one under the circumstances."
Saplentl aat l
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Czech Capitulation to Communism
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951
pp. 40-42
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
May 1951
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a4829aa90812842d138553e424271452.pdf
a156b41d572d5a6feffcf8f54343047a
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
43
THE POLITICS OF HLINKA'S PARTY IN THE
SLOVAK REPUBLIC
(jk) - On October 6, 1938, representatlves of all SLOVAK polltical parties and branches of au CZECH polltical partles - excepting th e Communist and the Social Democratlc parties - met in Žilina,
Slovakia. There it was agreed to accept the program of Hllnka's Slovak People's Party (HSPP).
The same representatives met in Bratislava on November 8, 1938,
and, in the natlonal lnterest, decided to unite all polltical forces In a
single party under the name of the Party of Natlonal Unity (PNU).
No coerclon of any kind was used to brlng about this accompllshment. The representatlves of all Slovak and Czech parties were hapPY that representatlves of the vlctorlous autonomlstlc movement did
not resort to reprlsals, but gave all of them a chance to take part
in the pol!tlcal llfe of Slovakia.
Autonomy or Slovakla was the polltlcal program of Hllnka's Slo•
vak People's Party and Rázus's Slovak National Party (SNP) excluslvely. National interest and interna! and forelgn polltlcal de·
velopments led the representatlves of Slovak autonomy to unlte all
polltlcal parties In Slovakla in the Party or Natlonal Unity. After a
twenty-year fight, Prague was forced to grant Slovakla autonomy and,
so, to capitulate In the matter of the fiction of a united "Czechoslo·
vak" nation (ethnlcally speaklng). AII polltlcal partles in Slovakia exceptlng the parties of Andrew Hlinka and Martin RAzus - also
capltulated by jolnlng the Party of National Unity, because they had
stood centrallsm and dld not recognize the exlstence of the Slovak
natlon.
Unity was not forced on any political party, as was later clalmed
by the enemles of the Slovak Republic. We repeat: all political partie• of Slovakia realized that lt was in the natlonal lnterest to unite
all political forces in 1938 and, therefore, joined the Pai-ty of National Unity voluntarily.
The news that this feat was accompllshed was joyously acclalmed by the whole of Slovakla. At that Ume, Dr. Joseph Tlso
wrote ln the "SLOVÁK":
"The Slovak natlon has become united in the spirit of Bernolák
and Štúr, ln the spirit of Moyses and Kuzmány, and ln the spirit of
Hlinka and Rázus. Class dlstinctlons bave ceased and we now have
only the united Slovak natlon."
Representatives of other polltical parties (naturally, excluding
the Communists and Social Democrats, whose partles were dlssolved)
thought, spoke and wrote along the same llnes. The Executive Commlttee of the Slovak National Party, assembled at Žilina, December
15, 1938, lssued a proclamation ln whlch lt sald:
"The adherents of the Slovak National Party recognlze the nec·esslty of unltlng all Slovaks in one polltlcal party and wholeheartedly offer to work for the welfare and happlness of the whole natlon.
We are convinced that thls unlty shall evoke In all Slovaks - at
horne and abroad - the greatest joy and satisfactlon. Long live the
unlted Slovak natlon ! "
�44
SLOVAK:IA
In its Christmas message, published in the NA TIONAL NEWS,
the SNP spoke even more clearly and forcefnlly:
"Political reconclllation has come to our nation. We have declded
to build our new future in the fleld of politics united on a natlonal
program. This fact was received wlth joy by the Slovak public, because in these uncertaln times lt assures the most reliable and safest
way to save our national individuality and its validation to the fullest
extent in public life."
The message was underslgned by. Dr. Emil Stodola. Dr. Ján Paulíny-T oth, Dr. Miloš Vančo, prof. Vladlmlr Cernák, Senior Otto Škrovina, Senior L'udovit Šenšel, Ing. Štefan Kada, and Dr. Martin Kvetko.
Not only polltlcal clrcles felt the need for politlcal unlty and joyously welcomed lt when it was realized, but literary and cultural
clrcles as well. One needs only to refer to the journals and newspapers of that tíme to convince hlmself of that fact. Irregardless of
political affiliation or creed the vast majority of the Slovak natlon
approved politlcal unity. Naturally, there were a few dlssenters in the
Services of Czech imperlallsm who could not see any posslblllty of
playlng a leading role In the new Slovak life. But even these did
not make themselves heard at that tlme; in the new formulatlon of
Slovak polltical life they dld not see "the successlon of fasclsm
and the death of democracy" and they did not defend thelr "democratlc" convictions.
Such was the polltical atmosphere to March 1939. In March 1939
national unlty was a bit s haken when the Czech army occupied Bratislava and some polltlcal leaders of former Czech political parties
agaln offered thelr services to Czech imperiallsm and jolned wlth it.
But the shock was or very short duratlon and did not bring any
changes In the polltlcal life of Slovakia, b ecause the representatlves
of Czechoslovaklsm did not know how to fight for their convlctlons.
They always served the regime in power and, acted accordingly even
after the proclamation of the Independent Slovak Republlc.
Naturally, the prestlge of Hllnka's party only increased wltb these
events, because not only Slovak autonomy. but even the Slovak State
was, above all, tbe result of the fight of HSPP and lts leadership.
The Party's 20-year struggle against Czech efforts to assimiliate the
Slovaks nationally and gain political and economic control of Slovakla - alded only by Rázus's Slovak National Party - Jed to the
autonomy of Slovakla and then, by the law of evolution and logic,
to independence. The Slovak State was the result of the organlzed
wlll of the Slovak nation. While others were deaf to the pulse of the
tlmes and based thelr politics on fiction, Hllnka's Slovak People's
Party - sprlnging ldeologlcally from the Slovak earth and the heart
of the Slovak natlon, set out on the road that Jed to political and
state lndependence. (Vd. Tiso, SLOVÁK - No. 32, 1941, and Klrschbaum, NÁSTUP - No. 19, 1939).
It was only natural, then, that HSPP remalned at the head of
political llfe even In the Slovak Republlc, especially slnce there were
no other political parties when lndependence was proclalmed and no
serious attempts were made to create them. Tbe Magyars and the
Germans, as natlonal mlnoritles, had thelr own political parties, so
that trom the beglnnlng to the end ot the Slovak Republlc there were
three parties that were protected by the Constitution and duly rep·
�SLOVAKIA
45
resented in Parliament by their own representatlves. Even the small
minortly of the Ukrainian-speaklng population had its own representatives within the fold of the HSPP.
After the proclamation of indendence of Slovakia, Hllnka's
Slovak People's Party - the opposition party that had fought for Slovak autonomy up to October 1938 - ,s uddenly became the ruling party,
the Government, and almost exclusively became responsible for the
building of the State and for the fate or the Slovak nation. After the
revolutlon it still retained the name or the Party of National Unity.
Up to 1938 HSPP had few paid workers In its ranks; most of t he
work was done voluntarlly by zealous, untlrlng young Slovak patriots
fired with the idea of freedom and independence. After March 14,
1939, the leaders of the HSPP were confronted with the arduous task
of settlng up the State admlnistratlon to serve the politlcal, economic
and social needs of the Slovak Republlc. The task was entrusted to
the younger lntelllgentsia of the HSPP that had proven its loyalty in
the struggle for lndependence and worked selflessly and courageously
in the interest or t he Slovak people. This accession of younger people
into high functions in the political and state life of Slovakia was,
however, a general prenomenom. It was necessitated by the fact that
the older members of the HSPP were in government and parllament
positions, the diplomatlc corps, etc.
Tnto the organlzation apparatus were taken young representatlves
or the other civic parties that exlsted before 1939. Along with outstanding workers of the HSPP, ther,e were in responsible positions
also adherents or the former parties of Hodža, Rázus, the National
Democratlc Party, nay, even workers wlth soclal-democratic tend encies. They were not only in the Centra! Committee, but in the
branch organlzations also.
But even under the conditions and events that had been caused
by the revolution of March 1939, the ldeology and the program
of the HSPP did not have to undergo any changes. The Party's program in the past followed the interests of the Slovak nat!on, stood
on the Christian and social principles both in the spiritual and
materlal regard, and defended the presldent of the Party, could rlghtfully say even in the Slovak Republic:
"Here we stand with our ideology, with which we have for
centuries long struggled in the past, so that we might keep golng
and organizlng under the great motto: For God and Natlon. Therefore: No declination from ou r old !deology, because we would then
deviate from the root. The building of the Government and State
l.fiall go along with the same party, based on the very same
program that has led us in the past so that by our polltlcal and
structural activity we might lead the nation along the lines t hat
would safeguard its future. We need not b ring into the natlon values
and ideals of foreign orlg!n, but we must develop our old spirit"
(SLOVAK, 1940, No. 189).
The stand of the younger generation was clearly formulated on
the eve of the tirst meeting of the Party which took place October 1,
1939. Tn the "NÁSTUP" (Accession) , No. 19. 1939, we flnd the following:
"It 1s our good fortune that the basic principles of our ideology,
which had Jed our Party in the struggle, need not be altered even
now after vlctory. After adding to the organlzatlonal structure of
�SLOVAKIA
the Party, !t w!ll be necessary only to glve form to this ideology and
apply !t to every phase of our state and natlonal l!fe. We were true
to ourselves In the struggle and we shall rema!n true to ourselves
also In work. Th!s healthy realism, whlch has told us to come out
of the natlon and turn all attentlon and work to its welfare, must
be the characterlstlc symbol of every act ot our pol!t!cs even now."
Just as the pres!dent of the Party, so the younger generatlon in
the leadershlp ot the Party stressed that forelgn models need not
be lmitated. When Dr. Jose,p.h Klrschbaum became the General Secretary of the HSPP, he sa!d:
"In these changing tlmes we shall have ,to organlze our Party
in such a way so that !t could sateguard the !nterests of the Slovak
nation under any polltlcal changes - Interna! or forelgn. The Party
will, therefore, have to develop accord!ng to g!ven, polit!cal Slovak
relations, working and organizatlon prem!ses, ,such as preva!l in
Slovakia, and it shall have to suff!ce for our natlonal character.
No klnd or senseless copylng could help us, lf we did not bave any
psychic and factual premlses for so doing" (NÁSTUP - AprU 1, 1939).
Naturally, the roles of the Party in Slovakia lncreased. lt became
"the only bearer of the polltlcal wlll of the natlon" and was supposed
to be "the connecting llnk of all those forces that are partaking in
the polltlcal and economic bullding of the state" ("SLOVÁK," No. 98,
1939). The Party ·became "the oll and the brains In the state apparatus, the bearer of polltical consciousness; it provlded the program and became the foundation ot State authority" (SLOVÁK, No.
99, 1940).
What klnd of program d!d the Party give tl·e nat!on?
Here are several noteworthy points:
"For labor we want a social justice which reconciles our wage
policy. We want to validate it for the remalning ranks of the natlon
for the wbole worklng class of Slovak people, especially for tbe
agronomlsts. The farmers certalnly deserve to have thelr patr!otic
patlence ot past years respected and that !ncreased attentlon be
given thelr needs.
"Our tradesmen and buslnessmen shall be insured against old
age, invalidity or unemployment. A healthy undertaklng and an adequate wage must be our gu!de for regulatlng employer-employee
relationsh!ps."
Furthermore, the Party demanded "a true management of public
mon!es, lncreased wages for the lower categorles to a measure that
would enable the establishment and upkeep ot a fam!ly and do away
w!th offic!al graft and corrUPtlon."
To lmprove the llvlng standard of the Slovak people, the Party
demanded regulatory and melloratlve projects, the harnesslng ot
water power and the electrification ot industria!, trade and agrlcultural projects, bolstering and bu!lding up of domestlc lndustry,
of homes, various schools, etc. (SLOVÁK, No. 13, 1941). In a word,
lt dld just about everychlng to convlnce the people that it can fare
well economlcally, soclally and culturally only In a state of lts own,
one In whlch the natlon ltself manages lts own affalrs.
The HSPP endeavored to do all this tor the natlon as a whole,
wlthout regard to polltical or religlous aftlllation in the past. Dr.
Joseph Tlso, presldent ot the Party, proclalmed categorlcally:
�SLOVAKIA
47
"Hlinka'a Slovak People's Party in lts struggle for the rights
of the Slovak nation has never made a partisan affalr ot the great
idea ot the nation. It has always tried to unite all Slovaks into the
union which we have now achleved. And as in that fight, so now in
the building of free Slovakla, we do not exclude a single Slovak,
but conversely, we invite every one who thinks sincerely and well
with the Slovak nation, because we want all Slovak minds and all
Slovak hands to work together ror the welfare of the Slovak natlon"
(TISOVA NÁUKA, dr. Štefan Polakovič, page 214).
It was in this spirit that tbe Party actually began the buildlng
of the new Slovakia. No one was driven from public li!e - not even
tbe Slovaks who for twenty years served forelgn lnterests for persona! gain - nor were tbe adherents of the Communlst Party de'Prived of bread. AU got a chance to do somethlng and acqulre
property, sometbing they could never have even dreamed to get in
the Czecboslovak Republic.
This spirit or Christian conciliation and national tolerance carried witbin itself, of course, certaln dangers, as was demonstrated
later. Wbat the Party and its leadersbip did in 1939 In the interest
of the unlty of the nation, many former servants of Prague centrallsm
a international communism regarded as a weakness and began to
upset the nlce ldeas of the new Slovak llte, belng aided In thls work
by some dlssatisfied elements in tbe ranka of the HSPP ltselt.
After an objective study of tbe program, ideology and practlcal
policy or the HSPP, !s it posslble to say truthfully that the Party
was a rasclst or Nazi party, which necessarlly means also an anti·
Chrlstían party? Did it imitate foreign models or dld it grow out of
non-Slovak traditlons and needs? There ls only one truthtul answer
to these questions: Certalnly not!
During the war even the propagandists of Dr. Edward Beneš
were qulte careful what they said publicly about tbe HSPP. Only
the reglme of Lettrlch and Husák Jabeled the HSPP as fascist and
nazl so that they could have an excuse for confiscating the property
o r the HSPP and for persecuting its representatives.
Dr. Kúnoši, present Ambassador or Czechoslovakia to Buenos
Aires, published a book about the Czecho-Slovak problem wlth an
introductlon by Lord Cecil. In it this -son of former commlssar Béla
Khun reluctantly proves that the Party was not nazi or fascist by
quotlng from speeches of leading factors of the HSPP. For example,
he quotes the following from a speech of Dr. Joseph Tlso (3-16-40):
"We want to attaln not what we admire In other natlons, but
what happens In the circumstances to be J)08Sible. When the poductive
conditions of each ciass are different, we do not mechanically bring
all classes to a common denomlnator: we introduce a corporatlve
system."
About the time when the HSPP and the HG (Hlinka Guard)
fought bitterly for the leadership in the nation and state, Kúnoši
writes:
"Whlle Mach claimed for the Guard the directorship of the Gov•
ernment, Dr. Kirschbaum, as the Party's Secretary General, was saylng: The party sees to lt that polltlcal and ideologlcal development
should not depart from tbe Slovak natlonal tradltlon and that by
means or the party the people should take part in dlrectlng the pollcy
�48
SLOVAKIA
of the State" (A. Kú noši, THE BASIS OF CZECHOSLOVAK UNITY,
London, 1944, pages 63, 76).
And Kúnoši quotes otber expressions whicb teli us tbat tbe HSPP
did not change its Christian-National program even after t he proc Jamation of Slovak independence. Quotlng trom an Interview which
tbe Secretary General (K!rschbaum) of the HSPP had with the editor
of the "Hrvatska Straž" (The Croatian Guard) on Marcb 13, 1940,
Kúnoš! writes:
"The programme of the Hlinka Populist Party has not altered
even after the dizzy changes which brought about the declaratlon of
our independence. Just as Andrej Hl!nka embodled the aims of tbe
party in the slogan 'For God and Nation,' so th!s doctrine has been
taken over by the party's present leader, Dr. T!so" (Idem, page 64)Cer tainly, because of the d!fficult war situat!on and the pressure
exerted by Germany on the wbole of E urope, the HSPP and its
leadership were not always successful in making Slovak politics in
the interest of the nation as they wished. But, on the whole, the
HSPP kept Slovakia away from every ideological influence which
was not compatible with Christianity and Slovak traditions. After
Salzburg (July 1940) , the HSPP had at first very little influence
on practical policy of the Government and, tberefore, cannot be held
respons!ble for !t. But the HSPP and its president Dr. Joseph Tiso
certainly deserve credit for the fact that even the most del!cate
problems were solved in Slovakia in a mu ch more humane manner
than in the other states of centra! Europe. It is also to the credit
of the HSPP and Tiso that nazism did not spread among tbe Slovaks
more than it did. And the HSPP certa!nly was responsible for the
fact that Slovakla, despite the tense international situation, not only
fared well and safeguarded persona! and property rights, but in fact
enjoyed more freedom and democracy than she did under the reg!me
of Dr. Beneš and Dr. Lettrlcb after 1945.
"Not a single political execution took piace in the Slovak State,''
we read in a booklet issued by Lettrich's Bureau of Information in
1946. And the International Committee of the Red Cross has it recorded in an official report that "at definite periods Slovakia was
actually regarded as a relative asylum for J ews, especially those
trom Poland. The J ews that remained in Slovakia were comparatlvely
safe until tbe revolt which took place at the end of August 1944"
(Revue Internatlonal de la Croix Rouge, 1947, N. 348, pgs. 957-959).
Therefore, considering the difficult war conditions and the sltuatlon in which the Slovak nation was left by Dr. Beneš in 1938, lt
can be sald quite frankly ,that the HSPP actually d!d more than was
expected of it. The party saved the nation and its substance at a
Ume when !t was faced wlth physical and spir!tual ruín.
After bis flight from "l!berated" Czecho-Slovak!a that was also
admitted by one of the leaders of Lettrich's regime, who wrote
confidentially:
"The fact remains, that a sign!ficant part of the pol!t!c!ans of
the Slovak People's Par ty and especially its the populace was not
incl!ned to fascism and lt prevented its spread so effectively that,
exceptlng retaliations against J ews and Commun!sts, no speclal
act!ons were undertaken against tbe vast majority of the people.
"And so, with regard to the fact that Slovak people managed tbe
affairs in Slovakia, we can hardly speak of treason and collabora-
�SLOVAKIA
49
tion - like the Communlsts tried to do in order to frighten the
people and create chaos, so that they could come to power."
Nevertheless, Lettrlch's regime planted a forest of gallows instead of trees of freedom, and Hllnka's Slovak People's Party was
not only outlawed, but its members were exposed to the most cruel
persecution recorded In Slovak hlstory.
• •
•
•
THE SLOVA.KS AND COMMUNJSM
KAROL SIDOR
For ages our Slovak program has been identical both at home and
in Amerlca. Only the forms and the Ume of lts reallzatlon change.
The basis of our program remalns the adherence to God as the
Creator of heaven and earth on Whom all thlngs depend. We do not
recognize any reglme or state in which God has no place, or which
enacts laws that are dlrectly opposed to God and the falth.
That ls why we proclalm ourselves agalnst Bolshevlsm and
agalnst everythlng that leads to lt. We are agalnst Bolshevlsm for
fundamental reasons and not because Bolshevlsm has taken our
properties, driven us from our homes, or because it has imprlsoned
or kllled some members of our famllles.
To America have come such polltlclans who praised Bolshevism
and co-governed with Bolshevlks. But wben Bolsbevism deprlved tbem
of polltical power and materlal wealtb, in a word when Bolshevlsm
harmed tbem materlally, only tben dld they take a stand against lt.
These men oppose Communlsm for material reasons, whereas we
Slovaks stand opposed to lt for ldeologlcal reasons, for rellglous
reasons.
Our own Louis Stur wrote in bis work "The Slovanlc Peoples
and tbe World ot the Future" - written over a bundred years ago,
in 1849:
"Communism has arrived at the same goal as atheism and apostacy from Christlanity. In every form of Communism the outlook on
llfe !s gloomy, bereft of every tender joy. lt leads to the most cruel
slavery. Communism, let it pretend and endeavor as !t will to make
mankind sbare in all rlghts, nevertheless knows notbing about
humanity. It degrades buman belngs. lt belongs among the most
senseless lnnovations thus far hatched out of the human mlnd."
After the first world war when Bolshevlsm came into power
Iu Russia, Pope Plus XI wrote Quite clearly In bis "Quadrageslmo
Anno" that llberalism had helped social democracy come lnto the
world. He sald: "Let us bear In mlnd that tbe parent of thls cultural
Soclallsm was Llberallsm, and that lts offsprlng was Bolshevlsm."
The Holy Father warned the rulers of the world when he further
sald: "We cannot contemplate wlthout profound sorrow the heedlessness of those who seem to make llght ot these lmmlnent
dangers and wlth stolld lndlfference allow the propagatlon far and
wlde ot tbose doctrlnes whlch seek by violence and bloodshed the
destructlon of all soclety. Even more severely must be condemned
the foolhardlness of those who neglect to remove or modlfy such
condltlons as exasperate tbe mlnds of the people, and so prepare the
way for the overthrow and ruln of the social order."
�
SLOVAKIA
43
THE POLITICS OF HLINKA'S PARTY IN THE
SLOVAK REPUBLIC
(jk) - On October 6, 1938, representatlves of all SLOVAK polltical parties and branches of au CZECH polltical partles - excepting th e Communist and the Social Democratlc parties - met in Žilina,
Slovakia. There it was agreed to accept the program of Hllnka's Slovak People's Party (HSPP).
The same representatives met in Bratislava on November 8, 1938,
and, in the natlonal lnterest, decided to unite all polltical forces In a
single party under the name of the Party of Natlonal Unity (PNU).
No coerclon of any kind was used to brlng about this accompllshment. The representatlves of all Slovak and Czech parties were hapPY that representatlves of the vlctorlous autonomlstlc movement did
not resort to reprlsals, but gave all of them a chance to take part
in the pol!tlcal llfe of Slovakia.
Autonomy or Slovakla was the polltlcal program of Hllnka's Slo•
vak People's Party and Rázus's Slovak National Party (SNP) excluslvely. National interest and interna! and forelgn polltlcal de·
velopments led the representatlves of Slovak autonomy to unlte all
polltlcal parties In Slovakla in the Party or Natlonal Unity. After a
twenty-year fight, Prague was forced to grant Slovakla autonomy and,
so, to capitulate In the matter of the fiction of a united "Czechoslo·
vak" nation (ethnlcally speaklng). AII polltlcal partles in Slovakia exceptlng the parties of Andrew Hlinka and Martin RAzus - also
capltulated by jolnlng the Party of National Unity, because they had
stood centrallsm and dld not recognize the exlstence of the Slovak
natlon.
Unity was not forced on any political party, as was later clalmed
by the enemles of the Slovak Republic. We repeat: all political partie• of Slovakia realized that lt was in the natlonal lnterest to unite
all political forces in 1938 and, therefore, joined the Pai-ty of National Unity voluntarily.
The news that this feat was accompllshed was joyously acclalmed by the whole of Slovakla. At that Ume, Dr. Joseph Tlso
wrote ln the "SLOVÁK":
"The Slovak natlon has become united in the spirit of Bernolák
and Štúr, ln the spirit of Moyses and Kuzmány, and ln the spirit of
Hlinka and Rázus. Class dlstinctlons bave ceased and we now have
only the united Slovak natlon."
Representatives of other polltical parties (naturally, excluding
the Communists and Social Democrats, whose partles were dlssolved)
thought, spoke and wrote along the same llnes. The Executive Commlttee of the Slovak National Party, assembled at Žilina, December
15, 1938, lssued a proclamation ln whlch lt sald:
"The adherents of the Slovak National Party recognlze the nec·esslty of unltlng all Slovaks in one polltlcal party and wholeheartedly offer to work for the welfare and happlness of the whole natlon.
We are convinced that thls unlty shall evoke In all Slovaks - at
horne and abroad - the greatest joy and satisfactlon. Long live the
unlted Slovak natlon ! "
�44
SLOVAK:IA
In its Christmas message, published in the NA TIONAL NEWS,
the SNP spoke even more clearly and forcefnlly:
"Political reconclllation has come to our nation. We have declded
to build our new future in the fleld of politics united on a natlonal
program. This fact was received wlth joy by the Slovak public, because in these uncertaln times lt assures the most reliable and safest
way to save our national individuality and its validation to the fullest
extent in public life."
The message was underslgned by. Dr. Emil Stodola. Dr. Ján Paulíny-T oth, Dr. Miloš Vančo, prof. Vladlmlr Cernák, Senior Otto Škrovina, Senior L'udovit Šenšel, Ing. Štefan Kada, and Dr. Martin Kvetko.
Not only polltlcal clrcles felt the need for politlcal unlty and joyously welcomed lt when it was realized, but literary and cultural
clrcles as well. One needs only to refer to the journals and newspapers of that tíme to convince hlmself of that fact. Irregardless of
political affiliation or creed the vast majority of the Slovak natlon
approved politlcal unity. Naturally, there were a few dlssenters in the
Services of Czech imperlallsm who could not see any posslblllty of
playlng a leading role In the new Slovak life. But even these did
not make themselves heard at that tlme; in the new formulatlon of
Slovak polltical life they dld not see "the successlon of fasclsm
and the death of democracy" and they did not defend thelr "democratlc" convictions.
Such was the polltical atmosphere to March 1939. In March 1939
national unlty was a bit s haken when the Czech army occupied Bratislava and some polltlcal leaders of former Czech political parties
agaln offered thelr services to Czech imperiallsm and jolned wlth it.
But the shock was or very short duratlon and did not bring any
changes In the polltlcal life of Slovakia, b ecause the representatlves
of Czechoslovaklsm did not know how to fight for their convlctlons.
They always served the regime in power and, acted accordingly even
after the proclamation of the Independent Slovak Republlc.
Naturally, the prestlge of Hllnka's party only increased wltb these
events, because not only Slovak autonomy. but even the Slovak State
was, above all, tbe result of the fight of HSPP and lts leadership.
The Party's 20-year struggle against Czech efforts to assimiliate the
Slovaks nationally and gain political and economic control of Slovakla - alded only by Rázus's Slovak National Party - Jed to the
autonomy of Slovakla and then, by the law of evolution and logic,
to independence. The Slovak State was the result of the organlzed
wlll of the Slovak nation. While others were deaf to the pulse of the
tlmes and based thelr politics on fiction, Hllnka's Slovak People's
Party - sprlnging ldeologlcally from the Slovak earth and the heart
of the Slovak natlon, set out on the road that Jed to political and
state lndependence. (Vd. Tiso, SLOVÁK - No. 32, 1941, and Klrschbaum, NÁSTUP - No. 19, 1939).
It was only natural, then, that HSPP remalned at the head of
political llfe even In the Slovak Republlc, especially slnce there were
no other political parties when lndependence was proclalmed and no
serious attempts were made to create them. Tbe Magyars and the
Germans, as natlonal mlnoritles, had thelr own political parties, so
that trom the beglnnlng to the end ot the Slovak Republlc there were
three parties that were protected by the Constitution and duly rep·
�SLOVAKIA
45
resented in Parliament by their own representatlves. Even the small
minortly of the Ukrainian-speaklng population had its own representatives within the fold of the HSPP.
After the proclamation of indendence of Slovakia, Hllnka's
Slovak People's Party - the opposition party that had fought for Slovak autonomy up to October 1938 - ,s uddenly became the ruling party,
the Government, and almost exclusively became responsible for the
building of the State and for the fate or the Slovak nation. After the
revolutlon it still retained the name or the Party of National Unity.
Up to 1938 HSPP had few paid workers In its ranks; most of t he
work was done voluntarlly by zealous, untlrlng young Slovak patriots
fired with the idea of freedom and independence. After March 14,
1939, the leaders of the HSPP were confronted with the arduous task
of settlng up the State admlnistratlon to serve the politlcal, economic
and social needs of the Slovak Republlc. The task was entrusted to
the younger lntelllgentsia of the HSPP that had proven its loyalty in
the struggle for lndependence and worked selflessly and courageously
in the interest or t he Slovak people. This accession of younger people
into high functions in the political and state life of Slovakia was,
however, a general prenomenom. It was necessitated by the fact that
the older members of the HSPP were in government and parllament
positions, the diplomatlc corps, etc.
Tnto the organlzation apparatus were taken young representatlves
or the other civic parties that exlsted before 1939. Along with outstanding workers of the HSPP, ther,e were in responsible positions
also adherents or the former parties of Hodža, Rázus, the National
Democratlc Party, nay, even workers wlth soclal-democratic tend encies. They were not only in the Centra! Committee, but in the
branch organlzations also.
But even under the conditions and events that had been caused
by the revolution of March 1939, the ldeology and the program
of the HSPP did not have to undergo any changes. The Party's program in the past followed the interests of the Slovak nat!on, stood
on the Christian and social principles both in the spiritual and
materlal regard, and defended the presldent of the Party, could rlghtfully say even in the Slovak Republic:
"Here we stand with our ideology, with which we have for
centuries long struggled in the past, so that we might keep golng
and organizlng under the great motto: For God and Natlon. Therefore: No declination from ou r old !deology, because we would then
deviate from the root. The building of the Government and State
l.fiall go along with the same party, based on the very same
program that has led us in the past so that by our polltlcal and
structural activity we might lead the nation along the lines t hat
would safeguard its future. We need not b ring into the natlon values
and ideals of foreign orlg!n, but we must develop our old spirit"
(SLOVAK, 1940, No. 189).
The stand of the younger generation was clearly formulated on
the eve of the tirst meeting of the Party which took place October 1,
1939. Tn the "NÁSTUP" (Accession) , No. 19. 1939, we flnd the following:
"It 1s our good fortune that the basic principles of our ideology,
which had Jed our Party in the struggle, need not be altered even
now after vlctory. After adding to the organlzatlonal structure of
�SLOVAKIA
the Party, !t w!ll be necessary only to glve form to this ideology and
apply !t to every phase of our state and natlonal l!fe. We were true
to ourselves In the struggle and we shall rema!n true to ourselves
also In work. Th!s healthy realism, whlch has told us to come out
of the natlon and turn all attentlon and work to its welfare, must
be the characterlstlc symbol of every act ot our pol!t!cs even now."
Just as the pres!dent of the Party, so the younger generatlon in
the leadershlp ot the Party stressed that forelgn models need not
be lmitated. When Dr. Jose,p.h Klrschbaum became the General Secretary of the HSPP, he sa!d:
"In these changing tlmes we shall have ,to organlze our Party
in such a way so that !t could sateguard the !nterests of the Slovak
nation under any polltlcal changes - Interna! or forelgn. The Party
will, therefore, have to develop accord!ng to g!ven, polit!cal Slovak
relations, working and organizatlon prem!ses, ,such as preva!l in
Slovakia, and it shall have to suff!ce for our natlonal character.
No klnd or senseless copylng could help us, lf we did not bave any
psychic and factual premlses for so doing" (NÁSTUP - AprU 1, 1939).
Naturally, the roles of the Party in Slovakia lncreased. lt became
"the only bearer of the polltlcal wlll of the natlon" and was supposed
to be "the connecting llnk of all those forces that are partaking in
the polltlcal and economic bullding of the state" ("SLOVÁK," No. 98,
1939). The Party ·became "the oll and the brains In the state apparatus, the bearer of polltical consciousness; it provlded the program and became the foundation ot State authority" (SLOVÁK, No.
99, 1940).
What klnd of program d!d the Party give tl·e nat!on?
Here are several noteworthy points:
"For labor we want a social justice which reconciles our wage
policy. We want to validate it for the remalning ranks of the natlon
for the wbole worklng class of Slovak people, especially for tbe
agronomlsts. The farmers certalnly deserve to have thelr patr!otic
patlence ot past years respected and that !ncreased attentlon be
given thelr needs.
"Our tradesmen and buslnessmen shall be insured against old
age, invalidity or unemployment. A healthy undertaklng and an adequate wage must be our gu!de for regulatlng employer-employee
relationsh!ps."
Furthermore, the Party demanded "a true management of public
mon!es, lncreased wages for the lower categorles to a measure that
would enable the establishment and upkeep ot a fam!ly and do away
w!th offic!al graft and corrUPtlon."
To lmprove the llvlng standard of the Slovak people, the Party
demanded regulatory and melloratlve projects, the harnesslng ot
water power and the electrification ot industria!, trade and agrlcultural projects, bolstering and bu!lding up of domestlc lndustry,
of homes, various schools, etc. (SLOVÁK, No. 13, 1941). In a word,
lt dld just about everychlng to convlnce the people that it can fare
well economlcally, soclally and culturally only In a state of lts own,
one In whlch the natlon ltself manages lts own affalrs.
The HSPP endeavored to do all this tor the natlon as a whole,
wlthout regard to polltical or religlous aftlllation in the past. Dr.
Joseph Tlso, presldent ot the Party, proclalmed categorlcally:
�SLOVAKIA
47
"Hlinka'a Slovak People's Party in lts struggle for the rights
of the Slovak nation has never made a partisan affalr ot the great
idea ot the nation. It has always tried to unite all Slovaks into the
union which we have now achleved. And as in that fight, so now in
the building of free Slovakla, we do not exclude a single Slovak,
but conversely, we invite every one who thinks sincerely and well
with the Slovak nation, because we want all Slovak minds and all
Slovak hands to work together ror the welfare of the Slovak natlon"
(TISOVA NÁUKA, dr. Štefan Polakovič, page 214).
It was in this spirit that tbe Party actually began the buildlng
of the new Slovakia. No one was driven from public li!e - not even
tbe Slovaks who for twenty years served forelgn lnterests for persona! gain - nor were tbe adherents of the Communlst Party de'Prived of bread. AU got a chance to do somethlng and acqulre
property, sometbing they could never have even dreamed to get in
the Czecboslovak Republic.
This spirit or Christian conciliation and national tolerance carried witbin itself, of course, certaln dangers, as was demonstrated
later. Wbat the Party and its leadersbip did in 1939 In the interest
of the unlty of the nation, many former servants of Prague centrallsm
a international communism regarded as a weakness and began to
upset the nlce ldeas of the new Slovak llte, belng aided In thls work
by some dlssatisfied elements in tbe ranka of the HSPP ltselt.
After an objective study of tbe program, ideology and practlcal
policy or the HSPP, !s it posslble to say truthfully that the Party
was a rasclst or Nazi party, which necessarlly means also an anti·
Chrlstían party? Did it imitate foreign models or dld it grow out of
non-Slovak traditlons and needs? There ls only one truthtul answer
to these questions: Certalnly not!
During the war even the propagandists of Dr. Edward Beneš
were qulte careful what they said publicly about tbe HSPP. Only
the reglme of Lettrlch and Husák Jabeled the HSPP as fascist and
nazl so that they could have an excuse for confiscating the property
o r the HSPP and for persecuting its representatives.
Dr. Kúnoši, present Ambassador or Czechoslovakia to Buenos
Aires, published a book about the Czecho-Slovak problem wlth an
introductlon by Lord Cecil. In it this -son of former commlssar Béla
Khun reluctantly proves that the Party was not nazi or fascist by
quotlng from speeches of leading factors of the HSPP. For example,
he quotes the following from a speech of Dr. Joseph Tlso (3-16-40):
"We want to attaln not what we admire In other natlons, but
what happens In the circumstances to be J)08Sible. When the poductive
conditions of each ciass are different, we do not mechanically bring
all classes to a common denomlnator: we introduce a corporatlve
system."
About the time when the HSPP and the HG (Hlinka Guard)
fought bitterly for the leadership in the nation and state, Kúnoši
writes:
"Whlle Mach claimed for the Guard the directorship of the Gov•
ernment, Dr. Kirschbaum, as the Party's Secretary General, was saylng: The party sees to lt that polltlcal and ideologlcal development
should not depart from tbe Slovak natlonal tradltlon and that by
means or the party the people should take part in dlrectlng the pollcy
�48
SLOVAKIA
of the State" (A. Kú noši, THE BASIS OF CZECHOSLOVAK UNITY,
London, 1944, pages 63, 76).
And Kúnoši quotes otber expressions whicb teli us tbat tbe HSPP
did not change its Christian-National program even after t he proc Jamation of Slovak independence. Quotlng trom an Interview which
tbe Secretary General (K!rschbaum) of the HSPP had with the editor
of the "Hrvatska Straž" (The Croatian Guard) on Marcb 13, 1940,
Kúnoš! writes:
"The programme of the Hlinka Populist Party has not altered
even after the dizzy changes which brought about the declaratlon of
our independence. Just as Andrej Hl!nka embodled the aims of tbe
party in the slogan 'For God and Nation,' so th!s doctrine has been
taken over by the party's present leader, Dr. T!so" (Idem, page 64)Cer tainly, because of the d!fficult war situat!on and the pressure
exerted by Germany on the wbole of E urope, the HSPP and its
leadership were not always successful in making Slovak politics in
the interest of the nation as they wished. But, on the whole, the
HSPP kept Slovakia away from every ideological influence which
was not compatible with Christianity and Slovak traditions. After
Salzburg (July 1940) , the HSPP had at first very little influence
on practical policy of the Government and, tberefore, cannot be held
respons!ble for !t. But the HSPP and its president Dr. Joseph Tiso
certainly deserve credit for the fact that even the most del!cate
problems were solved in Slovakia in a mu ch more humane manner
than in the other states of centra! Europe. It is also to the credit
of the HSPP and Tiso that nazism did not spread among tbe Slovaks
more than it did. And the HSPP certa!nly was responsible for the
fact that Slovakla, despite the tense international situation, not only
fared well and safeguarded persona! and property rights, but in fact
enjoyed more freedom and democracy than she did under the reg!me
of Dr. Beneš and Dr. Lettrlcb after 1945.
"Not a single political execution took piace in the Slovak State,''
we read in a booklet issued by Lettrich's Bureau of Information in
1946. And the International Committee of the Red Cross has it recorded in an official report that "at definite periods Slovakia was
actually regarded as a relative asylum for J ews, especially those
trom Poland. The J ews that remained in Slovakia were comparatlvely
safe until tbe revolt which took place at the end of August 1944"
(Revue Internatlonal de la Croix Rouge, 1947, N. 348, pgs. 957-959).
Therefore, considering the difficult war conditions and the sltuatlon in which the Slovak nation was left by Dr. Beneš in 1938, lt
can be sald quite frankly ,that the HSPP actually d!d more than was
expected of it. The party saved the nation and its substance at a
Ume when !t was faced wlth physical and spir!tual ruín.
After bis flight from "l!berated" Czecho-Slovak!a that was also
admitted by one of the leaders of Lettrich's regime, who wrote
confidentially:
"The fact remains, that a sign!ficant part of the pol!t!c!ans of
the Slovak People's Par ty and especially its the populace was not
incl!ned to fascism and lt prevented its spread so effectively that,
exceptlng retaliations against J ews and Commun!sts, no speclal
act!ons were undertaken against tbe vast majority of the people.
"And so, with regard to the fact that Slovak people managed tbe
affairs in Slovakia, we can hardly speak of treason and collabora-
�SLOVAKIA
49
tion - like the Communlsts tried to do in order to frighten the
people and create chaos, so that they could come to power."
Nevertheless, Lettrlch's regime planted a forest of gallows instead of trees of freedom, and Hllnka's Slovak People's Party was
not only outlawed, but its members were exposed to the most cruel
persecution recorded In Slovak hlstory.
• •
•
•
THE SLOVA.KS AND COMMUNJSM
KAROL SIDOR
For ages our Slovak program has been identical both at home and
in Amerlca. Only the forms and the Ume of lts reallzatlon change.
The basis of our program remalns the adherence to God as the
Creator of heaven and earth on Whom all thlngs depend. We do not
recognize any reglme or state in which God has no place, or which
enacts laws that are dlrectly opposed to God and the falth.
That ls why we proclalm ourselves agalnst Bolshevlsm and
agalnst everythlng that leads to lt. We are agalnst Bolshevlsm for
fundamental reasons and not because Bolshevlsm has taken our
properties, driven us from our homes, or because it has imprlsoned
or kllled some members of our famllles.
To America have come such polltlclans who praised Bolshevism
and co-governed with Bolshevlks. But wben Bolsbevism deprlved tbem
of polltical power and materlal wealtb, in a word when Bolshevlsm
harmed tbem materlally, only tben dld they take a stand against lt.
These men oppose Communlsm for material reasons, whereas we
Slovaks stand opposed to lt for ldeologlcal reasons, for rellglous
reasons.
Our own Louis Stur wrote in bis work "The Slovanlc Peoples
and tbe World ot the Future" - written over a bundred years ago,
in 1849:
"Communism has arrived at the same goal as atheism and apostacy from Christlanity. In every form of Communism the outlook on
llfe !s gloomy, bereft of every tender joy. lt leads to the most cruel
slavery. Communism, let it pretend and endeavor as !t will to make
mankind sbare in all rlghts, nevertheless knows notbing about
humanity. It degrades buman belngs. lt belongs among the most
senseless lnnovations thus far hatched out of the human mlnd."
After the first world war when Bolshevlsm came into power
Iu Russia, Pope Plus XI wrote Quite clearly In bis "Quadrageslmo
Anno" that llberalism had helped social democracy come lnto the
world. He sald: "Let us bear In mlnd that tbe parent of thls cultural
Soclallsm was Llberallsm, and that lts offsprlng was Bolshevlsm."
The Holy Father warned the rulers of the world when he further
sald: "We cannot contemplate wlthout profound sorrow the heedlessness of those who seem to make llght ot these lmmlnent
dangers and wlth stolld lndlfference allow the propagatlon far and
wlde ot tbose doctrlnes whlch seek by violence and bloodshed the
destructlon of all soclety. Even more severely must be condemned
the foolhardlness of those who neglect to remove or modlfy such
condltlons as exasperate tbe mlnds of the people, and so prepare the
way for the overthrow and ruln of the social order."
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
43
THE POLITICS OF HLINKA'S PARTY IN THE
SLOVAK REPUBLIC
(jk) - On October 6, 1938, representatlves of all SLOVAK polltical parties and branches of au CZECH polltical partles - excepting th e Communist and the Social Democratlc parties - met in Žilina,
Slovakia. There it was agreed to accept the program of Hllnka's Slovak People's Party (HSPP).
The same representatives met in Bratislava on November 8, 1938,
and, in the natlonal lnterest, decided to unite all polltical forces In a
single party under the name of the Party of Natlonal Unity (PNU).
No coerclon of any kind was used to brlng about this accompllshment. The representatlves of all Slovak and Czech parties were hapPY that representatlves of the vlctorlous autonomlstlc movement did
not resort to reprlsals, but gave all of them a chance to take part
in the pol!tlcal llfe of Slovakia.
Autonomy or Slovakla was the polltlcal program of Hllnka's Slo•
vak People's Party and Rázus's Slovak National Party (SNP) excluslvely. National interest and interna! and forelgn polltlcal de·
velopments led the representatlves of Slovak autonomy to unlte all
polltlcal parties In Slovakla in the Party or Natlonal Unity. After a
twenty-year fight, Prague was forced to grant Slovakla autonomy and,
so, to capitulate In the matter of the fiction of a united "Czechoslo·
vak" nation (ethnlcally speaklng). AII polltlcal partles in Slovakia exceptlng the parties of Andrew Hlinka and Martin RAzus - also
capltulated by jolnlng the Party of National Unity, because they had
stood centrallsm and dld not recognize the exlstence of the Slovak
natlon.
Unity was not forced on any political party, as was later clalmed
by the enemles of the Slovak Republic. We repeat: all political partie• of Slovakia realized that lt was in the natlonal lnterest to unite
all political forces in 1938 and, therefore, joined the Pai-ty of National Unity voluntarily.
The news that this feat was accompllshed was joyously acclalmed by the whole of Slovakla. At that Ume, Dr. Joseph Tlso
wrote ln the "SLOVÁK":
"The Slovak natlon has become united in the spirit of Bernolák
and Štúr, ln the spirit of Moyses and Kuzmány, and ln the spirit of
Hlinka and Rázus. Class dlstinctlons bave ceased and we now have
only the united Slovak natlon."
Representatives of other polltical parties (naturally, excluding
the Communists and Social Democrats, whose partles were dlssolved)
thought, spoke and wrote along the same llnes. The Executive Commlttee of the Slovak National Party, assembled at Žilina, December
15, 1938, lssued a proclamation ln whlch lt sald:
"The adherents of the Slovak National Party recognlze the nec·esslty of unltlng all Slovaks in one polltlcal party and wholeheartedly offer to work for the welfare and happlness of the whole natlon.
We are convinced that thls unlty shall evoke In all Slovaks - at
horne and abroad - the greatest joy and satisfactlon. Long live the
unlted Slovak natlon ! "
44
SLOVAK:IA
In its Christmas message, published in the NA TIONAL NEWS,
the SNP spoke even more clearly and forcefnlly:
"Political reconclllation has come to our nation. We have declded
to build our new future in the fleld of politics united on a natlonal
program. This fact was received wlth joy by the Slovak public, because in these uncertaln times lt assures the most reliable and safest
way to save our national individuality and its validation to the fullest
extent in public life."
The message was underslgned by. Dr. Emil Stodola. Dr. Ján Paulíny-T oth, Dr. Miloš Vančo, prof. Vladlmlr Cernák, Senior Otto Škrovina, Senior L'udovit Šenšel, Ing. Štefan Kada, and Dr. Martin Kvetko.
Not only polltlcal clrcles felt the need for politlcal unlty and joyously welcomed lt when it was realized, but literary and cultural
clrcles as well. One needs only to refer to the journals and newspapers of that tíme to convince hlmself of that fact. Irregardless of
political affiliation or creed the vast majority of the Slovak natlon
approved politlcal unity. Naturally, there were a few dlssenters in the
Services of Czech imperlallsm who could not see any posslblllty of
playlng a leading role In the new Slovak life. But even these did
not make themselves heard at that tlme; in the new formulatlon of
Slovak polltical life they dld not see "the successlon of fasclsm
and the death of democracy" and they did not defend thelr "democratlc" convictions.
Such was the polltical atmosphere to March 1939. In March 1939
national unlty was a bit s haken when the Czech army occupied Bratislava and some polltlcal leaders of former Czech political parties
agaln offered thelr services to Czech imperiallsm and jolned wlth it.
But the shock was or very short duratlon and did not bring any
changes In the polltlcal life of Slovakia, b ecause the representatlves
of Czechoslovaklsm did not know how to fight for their convlctlons.
They always served the regime in power and, acted accordingly even
after the proclamation of the Independent Slovak Republlc.
Naturally, the prestlge of Hllnka's party only increased wltb these
events, because not only Slovak autonomy. but even the Slovak State
was, above all, tbe result of the fight of HSPP and lts leadership.
The Party's 20-year struggle against Czech efforts to assimiliate the
Slovaks nationally and gain political and economic control of Slovakla - alded only by Rázus's Slovak National Party - Jed to the
autonomy of Slovakla and then, by the law of evolution and logic,
to independence. The Slovak State was the result of the organlzed
wlll of the Slovak nation. While others were deaf to the pulse of the
tlmes and based thelr politics on fiction, Hllnka's Slovak People's
Party - sprlnging ldeologlcally from the Slovak earth and the heart
of the Slovak natlon, set out on the road that Jed to political and
state lndependence. (Vd. Tiso, SLOVÁK - No. 32, 1941, and Klrschbaum, NÁSTUP - No. 19, 1939).
It was only natural, then, that HSPP remalned at the head of
political llfe even In the Slovak Republlc, especially slnce there were
no other political parties when lndependence was proclalmed and no
serious attempts were made to create them. Tbe Magyars and the
Germans, as natlonal mlnoritles, had thelr own political parties, so
that trom the beglnnlng to the end ot the Slovak Republlc there were
three parties that were protected by the Constitution and duly rep·
SLOVAKIA
45
resented in Parliament by their own representatlves. Even the small
minortly of the Ukrainian-speaklng population had its own representatives within the fold of the HSPP.
After the proclamation of indendence of Slovakia, Hllnka's
Slovak People's Party - the opposition party that had fought for Slovak autonomy up to October 1938 - ,s uddenly became the ruling party,
the Government, and almost exclusively became responsible for the
building of the State and for the fate or the Slovak nation. After the
revolutlon it still retained the name or the Party of National Unity.
Up to 1938 HSPP had few paid workers In its ranks; most of t he
work was done voluntarlly by zealous, untlrlng young Slovak patriots
fired with the idea of freedom and independence. After March 14,
1939, the leaders of the HSPP were confronted with the arduous task
of settlng up the State admlnistratlon to serve the politlcal, economic
and social needs of the Slovak Republlc. The task was entrusted to
the younger lntelllgentsia of the HSPP that had proven its loyalty in
the struggle for lndependence and worked selflessly and courageously
in the interest or t he Slovak people. This accession of younger people
into high functions in the political and state life of Slovakia was,
however, a general prenomenom. It was necessitated by the fact that
the older members of the HSPP were in government and parllament
positions, the diplomatlc corps, etc.
Tnto the organlzation apparatus were taken young representatlves
or the other civic parties that exlsted before 1939. Along with outstanding workers of the HSPP, ther,e were in responsible positions
also adherents or the former parties of Hodža, Rázus, the National
Democratlc Party, nay, even workers wlth soclal-democratic tend encies. They were not only in the Centra! Committee, but in the
branch organlzations also.
But even under the conditions and events that had been caused
by the revolution of March 1939, the ldeology and the program
of the HSPP did not have to undergo any changes. The Party's program in the past followed the interests of the Slovak nat!on, stood
on the Christian and social principles both in the spiritual and
materlal regard, and defended the presldent of the Party, could rlghtfully say even in the Slovak Republic:
"Here we stand with our ideology, with which we have for
centuries long struggled in the past, so that we might keep golng
and organizlng under the great motto: For God and Natlon. Therefore: No declination from ou r old !deology, because we would then
deviate from the root. The building of the Government and State
l.fiall go along with the same party, based on the very same
program that has led us in the past so that by our polltlcal and
structural activity we might lead the nation along the lines t hat
would safeguard its future. We need not b ring into the natlon values
and ideals of foreign orlg!n, but we must develop our old spirit"
(SLOVAK, 1940, No. 189).
The stand of the younger generation was clearly formulated on
the eve of the tirst meeting of the Party which took place October 1,
1939. Tn the "NÁSTUP" (Accession) , No. 19. 1939, we flnd the following:
"It 1s our good fortune that the basic principles of our ideology,
which had Jed our Party in the struggle, need not be altered even
now after vlctory. After adding to the organlzatlonal structure of
SLOVAKIA
the Party, !t w!ll be necessary only to glve form to this ideology and
apply !t to every phase of our state and natlonal l!fe. We were true
to ourselves In the struggle and we shall rema!n true to ourselves
also In work. Th!s healthy realism, whlch has told us to come out
of the natlon and turn all attentlon and work to its welfare, must
be the characterlstlc symbol of every act ot our pol!t!cs even now."
Just as the pres!dent of the Party, so the younger generatlon in
the leadershlp ot the Party stressed that forelgn models need not
be lmitated. When Dr. Jose,p.h Klrschbaum became the General Secretary of the HSPP, he sa!d:
"In these changing tlmes we shall have ,to organlze our Party
in such a way so that !t could sateguard the !nterests of the Slovak
nation under any polltlcal changes - Interna! or forelgn. The Party
will, therefore, have to develop accord!ng to g!ven, polit!cal Slovak
relations, working and organizatlon prem!ses, ,such as preva!l in
Slovakia, and it shall have to suff!ce for our natlonal character.
No klnd or senseless copylng could help us, lf we did not bave any
psychic and factual premlses for so doing" (NÁSTUP - AprU 1, 1939).
Naturally, the roles of the Party in Slovakia lncreased. lt became
"the only bearer of the polltlcal wlll of the natlon" and was supposed
to be "the connecting llnk of all those forces that are partaking in
the polltlcal and economic bullding of the state" ("SLOVÁK," No. 98,
1939). The Party ·became "the oll and the brains In the state apparatus, the bearer of polltical consciousness; it provlded the program and became the foundation ot State authority" (SLOVÁK, No.
99, 1940).
What klnd of program d!d the Party give tl·e nat!on?
Here are several noteworthy points:
"For labor we want a social justice which reconciles our wage
policy. We want to validate it for the remalning ranks of the natlon
for the wbole worklng class of Slovak people, especially for tbe
agronomlsts. The farmers certalnly deserve to have thelr patr!otic
patlence ot past years respected and that !ncreased attentlon be
given thelr needs.
"Our tradesmen and buslnessmen shall be insured against old
age, invalidity or unemployment. A healthy undertaklng and an adequate wage must be our gu!de for regulatlng employer-employee
relationsh!ps."
Furthermore, the Party demanded "a true management of public
mon!es, lncreased wages for the lower categorles to a measure that
would enable the establishment and upkeep ot a fam!ly and do away
w!th offic!al graft and corrUPtlon."
To lmprove the llvlng standard of the Slovak people, the Party
demanded regulatory and melloratlve projects, the harnesslng ot
water power and the electrification ot industria!, trade and agrlcultural projects, bolstering and bu!lding up of domestlc lndustry,
of homes, various schools, etc. (SLOVÁK, No. 13, 1941). In a word,
lt dld just about everychlng to convlnce the people that it can fare
well economlcally, soclally and culturally only In a state of lts own,
one In whlch the natlon ltself manages lts own affalrs.
The HSPP endeavored to do all this tor the natlon as a whole,
wlthout regard to polltical or religlous aftlllation in the past. Dr.
Joseph Tlso, presldent ot the Party, proclalmed categorlcally:
SLOVAKIA
47
"Hlinka'a Slovak People's Party in lts struggle for the rights
of the Slovak nation has never made a partisan affalr ot the great
idea ot the nation. It has always tried to unite all Slovaks into the
union which we have now achleved. And as in that fight, so now in
the building of free Slovakla, we do not exclude a single Slovak,
but conversely, we invite every one who thinks sincerely and well
with the Slovak nation, because we want all Slovak minds and all
Slovak hands to work together ror the welfare of the Slovak natlon"
(TISOVA NÁUKA, dr. Štefan Polakovič, page 214).
It was in this spirit that tbe Party actually began the buildlng
of the new Slovakia. No one was driven from public li!e - not even
tbe Slovaks who for twenty years served forelgn lnterests for persona! gain - nor were tbe adherents of the Communlst Party de'Prived of bread. AU got a chance to do somethlng and acqulre
property, sometbing they could never have even dreamed to get in
the Czecboslovak Republic.
This spirit or Christian conciliation and national tolerance carried witbin itself, of course, certaln dangers, as was demonstrated
later. Wbat the Party and its leadersbip did in 1939 In the interest
of the unlty of the nation, many former servants of Prague centrallsm
a international communism regarded as a weakness and began to
upset the nlce ldeas of the new Slovak llte, belng aided In thls work
by some dlssatisfied elements in tbe ranka of the HSPP ltselt.
After an objective study of tbe program, ideology and practlcal
policy or the HSPP, !s it posslble to say truthfully that the Party
was a rasclst or Nazi party, which necessarlly means also an anti·
Chrlstían party? Did it imitate foreign models or dld it grow out of
non-Slovak traditlons and needs? There ls only one truthtul answer
to these questions: Certalnly not!
During the war even the propagandists of Dr. Edward Beneš
were qulte careful what they said publicly about tbe HSPP. Only
the reglme of Lettrlch and Husák Jabeled the HSPP as fascist and
nazl so that they could have an excuse for confiscating the property
o r the HSPP and for persecuting its representatives.
Dr. Kúnoši, present Ambassador or Czechoslovakia to Buenos
Aires, published a book about the Czecho-Slovak problem wlth an
introductlon by Lord Cecil. In it this -son of former commlssar Béla
Khun reluctantly proves that the Party was not nazi or fascist by
quotlng from speeches of leading factors of the HSPP. For example,
he quotes the following from a speech of Dr. Joseph Tlso (3-16-40):
"We want to attaln not what we admire In other natlons, but
what happens In the circumstances to be J)08Sible. When the poductive
conditions of each ciass are different, we do not mechanically bring
all classes to a common denomlnator: we introduce a corporatlve
system."
About the time when the HSPP and the HG (Hlinka Guard)
fought bitterly for the leadership in the nation and state, Kúnoši
writes:
"Whlle Mach claimed for the Guard the directorship of the Gov•
ernment, Dr. Kirschbaum, as the Party's Secretary General, was saylng: The party sees to lt that polltlcal and ideologlcal development
should not depart from tbe Slovak natlonal tradltlon and that by
means or the party the people should take part in dlrectlng the pollcy
48
SLOVAKIA
of the State" (A. Kú noši, THE BASIS OF CZECHOSLOVAK UNITY,
London, 1944, pages 63, 76).
And Kúnoši quotes otber expressions whicb teli us tbat tbe HSPP
did not change its Christian-National program even after t he proc Jamation of Slovak independence. Quotlng trom an Interview which
tbe Secretary General (K!rschbaum) of the HSPP had with the editor
of the "Hrvatska Straž" (The Croatian Guard) on Marcb 13, 1940,
Kúnoš! writes:
"The programme of the Hlinka Populist Party has not altered
even after the dizzy changes which brought about the declaratlon of
our independence. Just as Andrej Hl!nka embodled the aims of tbe
party in the slogan 'For God and Nation,' so th!s doctrine has been
taken over by the party's present leader, Dr. T!so" (Idem, page 64)Cer tainly, because of the d!fficult war situat!on and the pressure
exerted by Germany on the wbole of E urope, the HSPP and its
leadership were not always successful in making Slovak politics in
the interest of the nation as they wished. But, on the whole, the
HSPP kept Slovakia away from every ideological influence which
was not compatible with Christianity and Slovak traditions. After
Salzburg (July 1940) , the HSPP had at first very little influence
on practical policy of the Government and, tberefore, cannot be held
respons!ble for !t. But the HSPP and its president Dr. Joseph Tiso
certainly deserve credit for the fact that even the most del!cate
problems were solved in Slovakia in a mu ch more humane manner
than in the other states of centra! Europe. It is also to the credit
of the HSPP and Tiso that nazism did not spread among tbe Slovaks
more than it did. And the HSPP certa!nly was responsible for the
fact that Slovakla, despite the tense international situation, not only
fared well and safeguarded persona! and property rights, but in fact
enjoyed more freedom and democracy than she did under the reg!me
of Dr. Beneš and Dr. Lettrlcb after 1945.
"Not a single political execution took piace in the Slovak State,''
we read in a booklet issued by Lettrich's Bureau of Information in
1946. And the International Committee of the Red Cross has it recorded in an official report that "at definite periods Slovakia was
actually regarded as a relative asylum for J ews, especially those
trom Poland. The J ews that remained in Slovakia were comparatlvely
safe until tbe revolt which took place at the end of August 1944"
(Revue Internatlonal de la Croix Rouge, 1947, N. 348, pgs. 957-959).
Therefore, considering the difficult war conditions and the sltuatlon in which the Slovak nation was left by Dr. Beneš in 1938, lt
can be sald quite frankly ,that the HSPP actually d!d more than was
expected of it. The party saved the nation and its substance at a
Ume when !t was faced wlth physical and spir!tual ruín.
After bis flight from "l!berated" Czecho-Slovak!a that was also
admitted by one of the leaders of Lettrich's regime, who wrote
confidentially:
"The fact remains, that a sign!ficant part of the pol!t!c!ans of
the Slovak People's Par ty and especially its the populace was not
incl!ned to fascism and lt prevented its spread so effectively that,
exceptlng retaliations against J ews and Commun!sts, no speclal
act!ons were undertaken against tbe vast majority of the people.
"And so, with regard to the fact that Slovak people managed tbe
affairs in Slovakia, we can hardly speak of treason and collabora-
SLOVAKIA
49
tion - like the Communlsts tried to do in order to frighten the
people and create chaos, so that they could come to power."
Nevertheless, Lettrlch's regime planted a forest of gallows instead of trees of freedom, and Hllnka's Slovak People's Party was
not only outlawed, but its members were exposed to the most cruel
persecution recorded In Slovak hlstory.
• •
•
•
THE SLOVA.KS AND COMMUNJSM
KAROL SIDOR
For ages our Slovak program has been identical both at home and
in Amerlca. Only the forms and the Ume of lts reallzatlon change.
The basis of our program remalns the adherence to God as the
Creator of heaven and earth on Whom all thlngs depend. We do not
recognize any reglme or state in which God has no place, or which
enacts laws that are dlrectly opposed to God and the falth.
That ls why we proclalm ourselves agalnst Bolshevlsm and
agalnst everythlng that leads to lt. We are agalnst Bolshevlsm for
fundamental reasons and not because Bolshevlsm has taken our
properties, driven us from our homes, or because it has imprlsoned
or kllled some members of our famllles.
To America have come such polltlclans who praised Bolshevism
and co-governed with Bolshevlks. But wben Bolsbevism deprlved tbem
of polltical power and materlal wealtb, in a word when Bolshevlsm
harmed tbem materlally, only tben dld they take a stand against lt.
These men oppose Communlsm for material reasons, whereas we
Slovaks stand opposed to lt for ldeologlcal reasons, for rellglous
reasons.
Our own Louis Stur wrote in bis work "The Slovanlc Peoples
and tbe World ot the Future" - written over a bundred years ago,
in 1849:
"Communism has arrived at the same goal as atheism and apostacy from Christlanity. In every form of Communism the outlook on
llfe !s gloomy, bereft of every tender joy. lt leads to the most cruel
slavery. Communism, let it pretend and endeavor as !t will to make
mankind sbare in all rlghts, nevertheless knows notbing about
humanity. It degrades buman belngs. lt belongs among the most
senseless lnnovations thus far hatched out of the human mlnd."
After the first world war when Bolshevlsm came into power
Iu Russia, Pope Plus XI wrote Quite clearly In bis "Quadrageslmo
Anno" that llberalism had helped social democracy come lnto the
world. He sald: "Let us bear In mlnd that tbe parent of thls cultural
Soclallsm was Llberallsm, and that lts offsprlng was Bolshevlsm."
The Holy Father warned the rulers of the world when he further
sald: "We cannot contemplate wlthout profound sorrow the heedlessness of those who seem to make llght ot these lmmlnent
dangers and wlth stolld lndlfference allow the propagatlon far and
wlde ot tbose doctrlnes whlch seek by violence and bloodshed the
destructlon of all soclety. Even more severely must be condemned
the foolhardlness of those who neglect to remove or modlfy such
condltlons as exasperate tbe mlnds of the people, and so prepare the
way for the overthrow and ruln of the social order."
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Politics of Hlinka's Party in the Slovak Republic
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951
pp. 43-49
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
May 1951
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a9230ce701969a3116e56c25baa775ce.pdf
9363d905134d5e2ad731a87c58149661
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
49
tion - like the Communlsts tried to do in order to frighten the
people and create chaos, so that they could come to power."
Nevertheless, Lettrlch's regime planted a forest of gallows instead of trees of freedom, and Hllnka's Slovak People's Party was
not only outlawed, but its members were exposed to the most cruel
persecution recorded In Slovak hlstory.
• •
•
•
THE SLOVA.KS AND COMMUNJSM
KAROL SIDOR
For ages our Slovak program has been identical both at home and
in Amerlca. Only the forms and the Ume of lts reallzatlon change.
The basis of our program remalns the adherence to God as the
Creator of heaven and earth on Whom all thlngs depend. We do not
recognize any reglme or state in which God has no place, or which
enacts laws that are dlrectly opposed to God and the falth.
That ls why we proclalm ourselves agalnst Bolshevlsm and
agalnst everythlng that leads to lt. We are agalnst Bolshevlsm for
fundamental reasons and not because Bolshevlsm has taken our
properties, driven us from our homes, or because it has imprlsoned
or kllled some members of our famllles.
To America have come such polltlclans who praised Bolshevism
and co-governed with Bolshevlks. But wben Bolsbevism deprlved tbem
of polltical power and materlal wealtb, in a word when Bolshevlsm
harmed tbem materlally, only tben dld they take a stand against lt.
These men oppose Communlsm for material reasons, whereas we
Slovaks stand opposed to lt for ldeologlcal reasons, for rellglous
reasons.
Our own Louis Stur wrote in bis work "The Slovanlc Peoples
and tbe World ot the Future" - written over a bundred years ago,
in 1849:
"Communism has arrived at the same goal as atheism and apostacy from Christlanity. In every form of Communism the outlook on
llfe !s gloomy, bereft of every tender joy. lt leads to the most cruel
slavery. Communism, let it pretend and endeavor as !t will to make
mankind sbare in all rlghts, nevertheless knows notbing about
humanity. It degrades buman belngs. lt belongs among the most
senseless lnnovations thus far hatched out of the human mlnd."
After the first world war when Bolshevlsm came into power
Iu Russia, Pope Plus XI wrote Quite clearly In bis "Quadrageslmo
Anno" that llberalism had helped social democracy come lnto the
world. He sald: "Let us bear In mlnd that tbe parent of thls cultural
Soclallsm was Llberallsm, and that lts offsprlng was Bolshevlsm."
The Holy Father warned the rulers of the world when he further
sald: "We cannot contemplate wlthout profound sorrow the heedlessness of those who seem to make llght ot these lmmlnent
dangers and wlth stolld lndlfference allow the propagatlon far and
wlde ot tbose doctrlnes whlch seek by violence and bloodshed the
destructlon of all soclety. Even more severely must be condemned
the foolhardlness of those who neglect to remove or modlfy such
condltlons as exasperate tbe mlnds of the people, and so prepare the
way for the overthrow and ruln of the social order."
�60
SLOVA.KIA
Allow me, if you will, to quote from my speech of Novembe1
6, 1936 - the speech which I addressed directly to Minister Edward
Beneš in his presence, when in the Prague Parliament he presented
for approval the first Soviet-Czech Pact concluded by himself. lt was
then - in 1935 - that I told the members of the Prague Parliament:
"We reject Bolshevism and its bloody practlce, as well as its
inhumane methods. We do not unite our national future with the
tuture of the Soviet Union. We do not build on the agreements which
the Bolsheviks undersign. I consider it the greatest mistake that Mr.
Minister Beneš has ever made in foreign policy. He has had the borders of the State guaranteed, though he knows that Bolshevism
recognizes no state borders, because it recognizes the borders of
only one state - the World Soviet Republic. We Slovaks do not
wish to connect our fate with that of the Soviet Union and we shall
vote no confidence to such a policy of Mr. Minister Beneil."
Today we know that we always were on the right road. Publicly
and open1y in parliament, at our rallies and in our Slovak Press. But
the mistake was that the great ones of this world - as Pius XI
expressed it - viewed those thlngs wlth a stolld indifference and
made llght of those imminent dangers which threatened society.
What can the Pope do? What can the Church do in this case?
Why the first thlng that the modern State dld was to separate the
State from the Church. People In power separated it and then went
their own way, according to their laws and reasoning, degrading
Chrisťs teachlng whlch the Church preaches and recalls for us
constantly.
We had strayed far. I could quote you from many speeches of
Hlinka, Tiso and Razus that went unheeded. Don't believe the priests,
that was the fashion or the day - and Hlinka was a priest, so was
Tiso, and so was Razus. So the statesmen dld not believe them, because - well, what did a priest know anyway? They were not concerned with their politlcs but only with what they and other priests
preached about Chrisťs gospel in the churches.
lf there is any nation in the world that is anti-communist, that
nation certainly is the Slovak natlon. The Slovaks never did want
Communism, and voted against it when Soviet armles occupied
Slovakia. But little Slovakia cannot herself liberate the half of Europe
that is in the hands of the Bolsheviks. In this case the natlons
must unite and wln for themselves true freedom.
Americans of Slovak descent have already long ago accepted
as their motto: Fight against Communlsm, Fascism and Nazism. The
last two - isms have just about been wiped out. Now the fight is commencing against the greatest evll the world has ever known - agalnst
Communism. Amerlcans of Slovak descent must unite as one man
under the banner of the Slovak League of America, wblch has for
the past 43 years Jed them well In public pollcy. All good Slovaks
trust the Slovak League of America and support it flnanclally and
morally.
General Montecuccoli once said: To wage war three things are
needed: 1. Money; 2. Money; and 3. MONEY ! And the flght against
Communism ia, indeed, a war that must be waged to the finish. Every
good Slovak - as every patriotlc American - 1s proud to go along
�SLOVAKIA
51
with the Slovak L eague of Amerlca to help crush the greatest
scourge of mankind - godless Communlsm.
If, then, In al! serlousness, you have understood the words of the
H oly Father t hat Communism ia really an lmmlnent danger, if you
believe what your relatlves wrlte you about life In Slovakia under
Communism, t h en take actlon that this scourge of humanity does not
overtake you bere in America and enslave you as it has enslaved
mlllions of people a fter World W ar I and mor e millions after World
War II.
My advice to my countrymen in America: Join the ranks of the
Slovak League of Amerlca, support it financially and morally so
that it mlgh t actually fulfill lts mlssion a mong our Slovak people in
America In the fight against Communism and the Jiberation of our
Slovak natlon.
• • • •
WHO SAID IT?
"In Prague we guarded ourselves against the impending catastrophe as best we could. On e of the ways that Jed to thls we sought
In cooperation wlth the SOVIE T UNION and In its direct participation
In the politics of E urope and Geneva. From the year 1927, when Com•
missar M . Litvlnov first came to Geneva, to the sesslon of the preparatory disarmament commlssion, in frlnedly and constant contact wlth
bim and his comrades I never ceased trylng tbat we work together
on the exchange of ideas and friendship. Already then I stressed to
hlm some of the m aln principles of our politlcs, above al! else, that
Ozechoslovaikia was convinced that without the partlcipation of the
Soviet Union in the pol!tlcs of Eur ope and es,p ecially that of Centra!
Europe, German preponderance in Europe would again be renewel:I and
t hreaten European peace. . .. 1 cons ldered t he entrance of the Soviet
Union lnto the League of Nations In Septembe r 1934 as a triumph of
peace politlcs, and the undersigning of the French and our treaties
with the Soviet Union as the beginning of a new French and Czechoslovak policy, that would bind the Soviet Union to Western Eul"Ope
and would create collaboration of the East w ith the West, a bsolutely
necessary t o prevent the expanslon of Hltler's Germany to the East,
and thereby a lso to the West." - Dr. Edward Beneš, MEMOIRS, 1947 .
•
"The all iance with the USSR is the most lmportant guarantee
of peaceful d evelopment a nd progress of Czechoslovakla a nd without
the allia nce with the USSR we ca~not lmaglne a free and Indepe ndent
Czechos lovakia." Klement Gottwald, Moscow broadcast, 7-19-47;
Č:AS. 7-12-47.
•
"Czechoslovakia, an ally of Soviet Russia, which ls a Slav country,
1s wHllng to be a friend of and to co~e to an agreement with all
natlons that wish to be friendly, provided that such agreements
come within the scope of Czechoslovakia's present-day alliances and
wlthln the scope of the Unlted Natlons Charter. OUR TWENTY-YEAR
1'REATY WITH SOVIET RUSSIA IS AND WILL REMAIN THE
KEYSTONE OF OUR FOREIGN P OLICY. We also have a treaty wlth
Yugoslavia of the same duratlon." (Jan Masaryk, NEW YORK
TIMES 2-13-47).
�
SLOVAKIA
49
tion - like the Communlsts tried to do in order to frighten the
people and create chaos, so that they could come to power."
Nevertheless, Lettrlch's regime planted a forest of gallows instead of trees of freedom, and Hllnka's Slovak People's Party was
not only outlawed, but its members were exposed to the most cruel
persecution recorded In Slovak hlstory.
• •
•
•
THE SLOVA.KS AND COMMUNJSM
KAROL SIDOR
For ages our Slovak program has been identical both at home and
in Amerlca. Only the forms and the Ume of lts reallzatlon change.
The basis of our program remalns the adherence to God as the
Creator of heaven and earth on Whom all thlngs depend. We do not
recognize any reglme or state in which God has no place, or which
enacts laws that are dlrectly opposed to God and the falth.
That ls why we proclalm ourselves agalnst Bolshevlsm and
agalnst everythlng that leads to lt. We are agalnst Bolshevlsm for
fundamental reasons and not because Bolshevlsm has taken our
properties, driven us from our homes, or because it has imprlsoned
or kllled some members of our famllles.
To America have come such polltlclans who praised Bolshevism
and co-governed with Bolshevlks. But wben Bolsbevism deprlved tbem
of polltical power and materlal wealtb, in a word when Bolshevlsm
harmed tbem materlally, only tben dld they take a stand against lt.
These men oppose Communlsm for material reasons, whereas we
Slovaks stand opposed to lt for ldeologlcal reasons, for rellglous
reasons.
Our own Louis Stur wrote in bis work "The Slovanlc Peoples
and tbe World ot the Future" - written over a bundred years ago,
in 1849:
"Communism has arrived at the same goal as atheism and apostacy from Christlanity. In every form of Communism the outlook on
llfe !s gloomy, bereft of every tender joy. lt leads to the most cruel
slavery. Communism, let it pretend and endeavor as !t will to make
mankind sbare in all rlghts, nevertheless knows notbing about
humanity. It degrades buman belngs. lt belongs among the most
senseless lnnovations thus far hatched out of the human mlnd."
After the first world war when Bolshevlsm came into power
Iu Russia, Pope Plus XI wrote Quite clearly In bis "Quadrageslmo
Anno" that llberalism had helped social democracy come lnto the
world. He sald: "Let us bear In mlnd that tbe parent of thls cultural
Soclallsm was Llberallsm, and that lts offsprlng was Bolshevlsm."
The Holy Father warned the rulers of the world when he further
sald: "We cannot contemplate wlthout profound sorrow the heedlessness of those who seem to make llght ot these lmmlnent
dangers and wlth stolld lndlfference allow the propagatlon far and
wlde ot tbose doctrlnes whlch seek by violence and bloodshed the
destructlon of all soclety. Even more severely must be condemned
the foolhardlness of those who neglect to remove or modlfy such
condltlons as exasperate tbe mlnds of the people, and so prepare the
way for the overthrow and ruln of the social order."
�60
SLOVA.KIA
Allow me, if you will, to quote from my speech of Novembe1
6, 1936 - the speech which I addressed directly to Minister Edward
Beneš in his presence, when in the Prague Parliament he presented
for approval the first Soviet-Czech Pact concluded by himself. lt was
then - in 1935 - that I told the members of the Prague Parliament:
"We reject Bolshevism and its bloody practlce, as well as its
inhumane methods. We do not unite our national future with the
tuture of the Soviet Union. We do not build on the agreements which
the Bolsheviks undersign. I consider it the greatest mistake that Mr.
Minister Beneš has ever made in foreign policy. He has had the borders of the State guaranteed, though he knows that Bolshevism
recognizes no state borders, because it recognizes the borders of
only one state - the World Soviet Republic. We Slovaks do not
wish to connect our fate with that of the Soviet Union and we shall
vote no confidence to such a policy of Mr. Minister Beneil."
Today we know that we always were on the right road. Publicly
and open1y in parliament, at our rallies and in our Slovak Press. But
the mistake was that the great ones of this world - as Pius XI
expressed it - viewed those thlngs wlth a stolld indifference and
made llght of those imminent dangers which threatened society.
What can the Pope do? What can the Church do in this case?
Why the first thlng that the modern State dld was to separate the
State from the Church. People In power separated it and then went
their own way, according to their laws and reasoning, degrading
Chrisťs teachlng whlch the Church preaches and recalls for us
constantly.
We had strayed far. I could quote you from many speeches of
Hlinka, Tiso and Razus that went unheeded. Don't believe the priests,
that was the fashion or the day - and Hlinka was a priest, so was
Tiso, and so was Razus. So the statesmen dld not believe them, because - well, what did a priest know anyway? They were not concerned with their politlcs but only with what they and other priests
preached about Chrisťs gospel in the churches.
lf there is any nation in the world that is anti-communist, that
nation certainly is the Slovak natlon. The Slovaks never did want
Communism, and voted against it when Soviet armles occupied
Slovakia. But little Slovakia cannot herself liberate the half of Europe
that is in the hands of the Bolsheviks. In this case the natlons
must unite and wln for themselves true freedom.
Americans of Slovak descent have already long ago accepted
as their motto: Fight against Communlsm, Fascism and Nazism. The
last two - isms have just about been wiped out. Now the fight is commencing against the greatest evll the world has ever known - agalnst
Communism. Amerlcans of Slovak descent must unite as one man
under the banner of the Slovak League of America, wblch has for
the past 43 years Jed them well In public pollcy. All good Slovaks
trust the Slovak League of America and support it flnanclally and
morally.
General Montecuccoli once said: To wage war three things are
needed: 1. Money; 2. Money; and 3. MONEY ! And the flght against
Communism ia, indeed, a war that must be waged to the finish. Every
good Slovak - as every patriotlc American - 1s proud to go along
�SLOVAKIA
51
with the Slovak L eague of Amerlca to help crush the greatest
scourge of mankind - godless Communlsm.
If, then, In al! serlousness, you have understood the words of the
H oly Father t hat Communism ia really an lmmlnent danger, if you
believe what your relatlves wrlte you about life In Slovakia under
Communism, t h en take actlon that this scourge of humanity does not
overtake you bere in America and enslave you as it has enslaved
mlllions of people a fter World W ar I and mor e millions after World
War II.
My advice to my countrymen in America: Join the ranks of the
Slovak League of Amerlca, support it financially and morally so
that it mlgh t actually fulfill lts mlssion a mong our Slovak people in
America In the fight against Communism and the Jiberation of our
Slovak natlon.
• • • •
WHO SAID IT?
"In Prague we guarded ourselves against the impending catastrophe as best we could. On e of the ways that Jed to thls we sought
In cooperation wlth the SOVIE T UNION and In its direct participation
In the politics of E urope and Geneva. From the year 1927, when Com•
missar M . Litvlnov first came to Geneva, to the sesslon of the preparatory disarmament commlssion, in frlnedly and constant contact wlth
bim and his comrades I never ceased trylng tbat we work together
on the exchange of ideas and friendship. Already then I stressed to
hlm some of the m aln principles of our politlcs, above al! else, that
Ozechoslovaikia was convinced that without the partlcipation of the
Soviet Union in the pol!tlcs of Eur ope and es,p ecially that of Centra!
Europe, German preponderance in Europe would again be renewel:I and
t hreaten European peace. . .. 1 cons ldered t he entrance of the Soviet
Union lnto the League of Nations In Septembe r 1934 as a triumph of
peace politlcs, and the undersigning of the French and our treaties
with the Soviet Union as the beginning of a new French and Czechoslovak policy, that would bind the Soviet Union to Western Eul"Ope
and would create collaboration of the East w ith the West, a bsolutely
necessary t o prevent the expanslon of Hltler's Germany to the East,
and thereby a lso to the West." - Dr. Edward Beneš, MEMOIRS, 1947 .
•
"The all iance with the USSR is the most lmportant guarantee
of peaceful d evelopment a nd progress of Czechoslovakla a nd without
the allia nce with the USSR we ca~not lmaglne a free and Indepe ndent
Czechos lovakia." Klement Gottwald, Moscow broadcast, 7-19-47;
Č:AS. 7-12-47.
•
"Czechoslovakia, an ally of Soviet Russia, which ls a Slav country,
1s wHllng to be a friend of and to co~e to an agreement with all
natlons that wish to be friendly, provided that such agreements
come within the scope of Czechoslovakia's present-day alliances and
wlthln the scope of the Unlted Natlons Charter. OUR TWENTY-YEAR
1'REATY WITH SOVIET RUSSIA IS AND WILL REMAIN THE
KEYSTONE OF OUR FOREIGN P OLICY. We also have a treaty wlth
Yugoslavia of the same duratlon." (Jan Masaryk, NEW YORK
TIMES 2-13-47).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
49
tion - like the Communlsts tried to do in order to frighten the
people and create chaos, so that they could come to power."
Nevertheless, Lettrlch's regime planted a forest of gallows instead of trees of freedom, and Hllnka's Slovak People's Party was
not only outlawed, but its members were exposed to the most cruel
persecution recorded In Slovak hlstory.
• •
•
•
THE SLOVA.KS AND COMMUNJSM
KAROL SIDOR
For ages our Slovak program has been identical both at home and
in Amerlca. Only the forms and the Ume of lts reallzatlon change.
The basis of our program remalns the adherence to God as the
Creator of heaven and earth on Whom all thlngs depend. We do not
recognize any reglme or state in which God has no place, or which
enacts laws that are dlrectly opposed to God and the falth.
That ls why we proclalm ourselves agalnst Bolshevlsm and
agalnst everythlng that leads to lt. We are agalnst Bolshevlsm for
fundamental reasons and not because Bolshevlsm has taken our
properties, driven us from our homes, or because it has imprlsoned
or kllled some members of our famllles.
To America have come such polltlclans who praised Bolshevism
and co-governed with Bolshevlks. But wben Bolsbevism deprlved tbem
of polltical power and materlal wealtb, in a word when Bolshevlsm
harmed tbem materlally, only tben dld they take a stand against lt.
These men oppose Communlsm for material reasons, whereas we
Slovaks stand opposed to lt for ldeologlcal reasons, for rellglous
reasons.
Our own Louis Stur wrote in bis work "The Slovanlc Peoples
and tbe World ot the Future" - written over a bundred years ago,
in 1849:
"Communism has arrived at the same goal as atheism and apostacy from Christlanity. In every form of Communism the outlook on
llfe !s gloomy, bereft of every tender joy. lt leads to the most cruel
slavery. Communism, let it pretend and endeavor as !t will to make
mankind sbare in all rlghts, nevertheless knows notbing about
humanity. It degrades buman belngs. lt belongs among the most
senseless lnnovations thus far hatched out of the human mlnd."
After the first world war when Bolshevlsm came into power
Iu Russia, Pope Plus XI wrote Quite clearly In bis "Quadrageslmo
Anno" that llberalism had helped social democracy come lnto the
world. He sald: "Let us bear In mlnd that tbe parent of thls cultural
Soclallsm was Llberallsm, and that lts offsprlng was Bolshevlsm."
The Holy Father warned the rulers of the world when he further
sald: "We cannot contemplate wlthout profound sorrow the heedlessness of those who seem to make llght ot these lmmlnent
dangers and wlth stolld lndlfference allow the propagatlon far and
wlde ot tbose doctrlnes whlch seek by violence and bloodshed the
destructlon of all soclety. Even more severely must be condemned
the foolhardlness of those who neglect to remove or modlfy such
condltlons as exasperate tbe mlnds of the people, and so prepare the
way for the overthrow and ruln of the social order."
60
SLOVA.KIA
Allow me, if you will, to quote from my speech of Novembe1
6, 1936 - the speech which I addressed directly to Minister Edward
Beneš in his presence, when in the Prague Parliament he presented
for approval the first Soviet-Czech Pact concluded by himself. lt was
then - in 1935 - that I told the members of the Prague Parliament:
"We reject Bolshevism and its bloody practlce, as well as its
inhumane methods. We do not unite our national future with the
tuture of the Soviet Union. We do not build on the agreements which
the Bolsheviks undersign. I consider it the greatest mistake that Mr.
Minister Beneš has ever made in foreign policy. He has had the borders of the State guaranteed, though he knows that Bolshevism
recognizes no state borders, because it recognizes the borders of
only one state - the World Soviet Republic. We Slovaks do not
wish to connect our fate with that of the Soviet Union and we shall
vote no confidence to such a policy of Mr. Minister Beneil."
Today we know that we always were on the right road. Publicly
and open1y in parliament, at our rallies and in our Slovak Press. But
the mistake was that the great ones of this world - as Pius XI
expressed it - viewed those thlngs wlth a stolld indifference and
made llght of those imminent dangers which threatened society.
What can the Pope do? What can the Church do in this case?
Why the first thlng that the modern State dld was to separate the
State from the Church. People In power separated it and then went
their own way, according to their laws and reasoning, degrading
Chrisťs teachlng whlch the Church preaches and recalls for us
constantly.
We had strayed far. I could quote you from many speeches of
Hlinka, Tiso and Razus that went unheeded. Don't believe the priests,
that was the fashion or the day - and Hlinka was a priest, so was
Tiso, and so was Razus. So the statesmen dld not believe them, because - well, what did a priest know anyway? They were not concerned with their politlcs but only with what they and other priests
preached about Chrisťs gospel in the churches.
lf there is any nation in the world that is anti-communist, that
nation certainly is the Slovak natlon. The Slovaks never did want
Communism, and voted against it when Soviet armles occupied
Slovakia. But little Slovakia cannot herself liberate the half of Europe
that is in the hands of the Bolsheviks. In this case the natlons
must unite and wln for themselves true freedom.
Americans of Slovak descent have already long ago accepted
as their motto: Fight against Communlsm, Fascism and Nazism. The
last two - isms have just about been wiped out. Now the fight is commencing against the greatest evll the world has ever known - agalnst
Communism. Amerlcans of Slovak descent must unite as one man
under the banner of the Slovak League of America, wblch has for
the past 43 years Jed them well In public pollcy. All good Slovaks
trust the Slovak League of America and support it flnanclally and
morally.
General Montecuccoli once said: To wage war three things are
needed: 1. Money; 2. Money; and 3. MONEY ! And the flght against
Communism ia, indeed, a war that must be waged to the finish. Every
good Slovak - as every patriotlc American - 1s proud to go along
SLOVAKIA
51
with the Slovak L eague of Amerlca to help crush the greatest
scourge of mankind - godless Communlsm.
If, then, In al! serlousness, you have understood the words of the
H oly Father t hat Communism ia really an lmmlnent danger, if you
believe what your relatlves wrlte you about life In Slovakia under
Communism, t h en take actlon that this scourge of humanity does not
overtake you bere in America and enslave you as it has enslaved
mlllions of people a fter World W ar I and mor e millions after World
War II.
My advice to my countrymen in America: Join the ranks of the
Slovak League of Amerlca, support it financially and morally so
that it mlgh t actually fulfill lts mlssion a mong our Slovak people in
America In the fight against Communism and the Jiberation of our
Slovak natlon.
• • • •
WHO SAID IT?
"In Prague we guarded ourselves against the impending catastrophe as best we could. On e of the ways that Jed to thls we sought
In cooperation wlth the SOVIE T UNION and In its direct participation
In the politics of E urope and Geneva. From the year 1927, when Com•
missar M . Litvlnov first came to Geneva, to the sesslon of the preparatory disarmament commlssion, in frlnedly and constant contact wlth
bim and his comrades I never ceased trylng tbat we work together
on the exchange of ideas and friendship. Already then I stressed to
hlm some of the m aln principles of our politlcs, above al! else, that
Ozechoslovaikia was convinced that without the partlcipation of the
Soviet Union in the pol!tlcs of Eur ope and es,p ecially that of Centra!
Europe, German preponderance in Europe would again be renewel:I and
t hreaten European peace. . .. 1 cons ldered t he entrance of the Soviet
Union lnto the League of Nations In Septembe r 1934 as a triumph of
peace politlcs, and the undersigning of the French and our treaties
with the Soviet Union as the beginning of a new French and Czechoslovak policy, that would bind the Soviet Union to Western Eul"Ope
and would create collaboration of the East w ith the West, a bsolutely
necessary t o prevent the expanslon of Hltler's Germany to the East,
and thereby a lso to the West." - Dr. Edward Beneš, MEMOIRS, 1947 .
•
"The all iance with the USSR is the most lmportant guarantee
of peaceful d evelopment a nd progress of Czechoslovakla a nd without
the allia nce with the USSR we ca~not lmaglne a free and Indepe ndent
Czechos lovakia." Klement Gottwald, Moscow broadcast, 7-19-47;
Č:AS. 7-12-47.
•
"Czechoslovakia, an ally of Soviet Russia, which ls a Slav country,
1s wHllng to be a friend of and to co~e to an agreement with all
natlons that wish to be friendly, provided that such agreements
come within the scope of Czechoslovakia's present-day alliances and
wlthln the scope of the Unlted Natlons Charter. OUR TWENTY-YEAR
1'REATY WITH SOVIET RUSSIA IS AND WILL REMAIN THE
KEYSTONE OF OUR FOREIGN P OLICY. We also have a treaty wlth
Yugoslavia of the same duratlon." (Jan Masaryk, NEW YORK
TIMES 2-13-47).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Slovaks and Communism
Description
An account of the resource
Karol Sidor
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951
pp. 49-51
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
May 1951
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sidor, Karol, 1901-1953
LCNAF
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/36024209d0873742f12c32c149b2e72d.pdf
caa74e09040271cf19ac65fd2adaa500
PDF Text
Text
52
SLOVAKIA
ABOUT THE SLOVAK STATE
( ks) - An anonymous Slovak had an article publlshed in a Czech
paper about the origin or the Slovak State. Thaťs the way Czech Slo•
vaks (CZECHOSLOVAKS!) do buslness, and the Czechs, o! course,
gladly give them space in thelr papers. Phllosophlzlng on the subject
or the origin of the Slovak Republlc, the author ot the artlcle asks
several questlons:
1. Did the Slovak parliament decide freely (when it voted the
independence of Slovakia in March 1939)?
Yes, lt did. lt declded that freely and unanlmously. Not one
Deputy of the Slovak parllament remalned seated; all stood up and
so voted for Slovak state lndependence. No one forced them to stand
up. At Ieast one could have remained seated and so lndlcate a negatlve
vote; but, I repeat, not one Deputy remalned seated.
2. Was the "Berlin order" In line with the wlll of the nation?
No "order" was concerned. Karol Sidor, as Premier of the Slovak
Government, refused in the name of the Slovaks to execute an "order"
at that time, when he told Keppler, Seys-lnquart and Biirckel - who
had come to him to Bratislava on March 12, 1939, - that he would not
go to Berlin or to Vlenna to proclaim the lndependence ot Slovakia
by radlo. He told them that wa.s the function of the Party and the
Slovak parliament. lf Sldor would have gone to Germany and there
proclalmed the lndependence of Slovakia, that would bave been effected by German order. The Germans wanted the proclamatlon over
the radlo, whereas the Slovaks wanted thelr parllament to do the
proclalming.
Two days later the Slovaks wllled lt that thelr parllament pro•
clalm the lndependence of thelr country. The votlng in parllament
on March 14, 1939, was no klnd ot "Berlin order." lt does not matter
that the elected deputles voted for lt. That the deputies voted for it
unanimously strongly emphaslzes the fact that the Slovak natlon as
a whole, through its duly elected representatlves, voiced ltself for lts
own state.
3. Did the deputies have any right to do what they did?
The representatlves of a sovereign natlon have the rlght to do
anythlng wlthin the llmlts of the laws of the land. The only thlng
they probably could not do - as an old Slovak saylng states lt would be to make a boy out of a girl. They certainly had a greater
rlght to speak for the natlon than dld the formulators of the Martin
Declaration, the undenvrlters of the Pittsburgh Pact, or the deputles
In the Revolutlonary Natlonal Assembly, who in 1920 voted tor the
Constitutlon of the flrst Czechoslovak Republlc, or the self-styled
"deputies" of Communlsts and Democrats of 1944-45, who dlvided up
the power over Slovakia on a 50-50 basls In such a "brotherly" fashion
In the forests or Banská Bystrica.
4. How is it possibfe even now to celebrate such sorrowful annlversarles of our recent past (as the proclamatlon of the lndependence
of Slovakla)?
�63
SLOVAKIA
There are, lndeed, "sorrowful anniversarles In our recent past,"
but the 14th of March, 1939, does not belong among them. Neither formally, nor by content. Among such sad annlversarles, however, do
belong all those acts that Ued up wlth any collaboratlon with natlve
Communlsm from Chrlstmas of 1943 and wlth Moscow collaboratlon
slnce 1945. March 14, 1939, definltely is not responslble for the atrocitles and blunders commltted by and wlth the ald of Beneš and hls
Red Prague reglme slnce 1945.
Say what you wlll, In politics only successes count. The llfe of
the Slovaks after 1945 1s replete wlth sufferlngs, deportations to the
USSR, concentratlon ca.mps, dlsfranchlsements, dlspossesslons and
pol!Ucal murders.
Even the avowed enemies of Slovak freedom and lndependence former members of the NATIONAL FRONT of Czechoslovakla (Lettrich, Zenkl, Heldrlch, Ducháček, etc.) - have admltted that condl·
tlons In Slovakla are worse today than they were under the Nazis.
The Czechs, too, are worse off now than they were under Hitler. And
we belleve lt. But the Czechs have absolutely no rlght to deny the
Slovaks the same freedom and lndependence and "llberatlon" that
they themselves are clamorlng and plead!ng for today.
The Slovaks have learnt thelr lesson well. T. G. Masaryk and
Edward Beneš lgnored thelr just demands for twenty years. Today
thelr followers stlll lnslst that the Slovaks have no right to thelr own
natlonal exlstence and thelr own Independent state. So don't blame
the Slovaks for proclalming:
"NEVER DO WE WANT TO BE A PAR'ľ OF ANY OLD OR NEW
CZECHOSLOVAKIA! "
•
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"The Soviet Union SINCERELY deslres a strong, consolidated,
fully homogeneous Czechoslovak republic which would be a truly good
and strong frlend and a collaborator of the Soviet people In the future
defenae of a lastlng peace In Europe. The same wish also applies to
the future of Poland. The Soviet Union not only desires good and
friendly relatlons wlth her but also a strong Pollsh-Czechoslovak
frlendship and collaboratlon." TIMES, 12-23-43.
Dr. Edward Beneš, THE NEW YORK
•
"The Czechoslovak republlc is, just a.s it had been, a democratlc
state that respects freedom of convictlons and vlewpoints, a state
that always respected and even In the future shall respect, above all
else, freedom of rellgion, the church and religlous culture. lt ls an
independent state and Independent it shall remaln. lt ls a state that
has always u,pheld, above al! else, objectivlty and full tolerance toward the convlctlons and rellglous beller or all lts cltlzens. lt ls a
state that has respected the well-known Four Freedoms of President
F. D. Roosevelt and toí:iay 1s applylng them in a practlcal way In lts
set-up. That 1s how lt 1s today and so shall lt be even In the future."
- Dr. Edward Beneš, Prague, Aprll 8, 1946. (NÁROD, 4-17-46).
�
52
SLOVAKIA
ABOUT THE SLOVAK STATE
( ks) - An anonymous Slovak had an article publlshed in a Czech
paper about the origin or the Slovak State. Thaťs the way Czech Slo•
vaks (CZECHOSLOVAKS!) do buslness, and the Czechs, o! course,
gladly give them space in thelr papers. Phllosophlzlng on the subject
or the origin of the Slovak Republlc, the author ot the artlcle asks
several questlons:
1. Did the Slovak parliament decide freely (when it voted the
independence of Slovakia in March 1939)?
Yes, lt did. lt declded that freely and unanlmously. Not one
Deputy of the Slovak parllament remalned seated; all stood up and
so voted for Slovak state lndependence. No one forced them to stand
up. At Ieast one could have remained seated and so lndlcate a negatlve
vote; but, I repeat, not one Deputy remalned seated.
2. Was the "Berlin order" In line with the wlll of the nation?
No "order" was concerned. Karol Sidor, as Premier of the Slovak
Government, refused in the name of the Slovaks to execute an "order"
at that time, when he told Keppler, Seys-lnquart and Biirckel - who
had come to him to Bratislava on March 12, 1939, - that he would not
go to Berlin or to Vlenna to proclaim the lndependence ot Slovakia
by radlo. He told them that wa.s the function of the Party and the
Slovak parliament. lf Sldor would have gone to Germany and there
proclalmed the lndependence of Slovakia, that would bave been effected by German order. The Germans wanted the proclamatlon over
the radlo, whereas the Slovaks wanted thelr parllament to do the
proclalming.
Two days later the Slovaks wllled lt that thelr parllament pro•
clalm the lndependence of thelr country. The votlng in parllament
on March 14, 1939, was no klnd ot "Berlin order." lt does not matter
that the elected deputles voted for lt. That the deputies voted for it
unanimously strongly emphaslzes the fact that the Slovak natlon as
a whole, through its duly elected representatlves, voiced ltself for lts
own state.
3. Did the deputies have any right to do what they did?
The representatlves of a sovereign natlon have the rlght to do
anythlng wlthin the llmlts of the laws of the land. The only thlng
they probably could not do - as an old Slovak saylng states lt would be to make a boy out of a girl. They certainly had a greater
rlght to speak for the natlon than dld the formulators of the Martin
Declaration, the undenvrlters of the Pittsburgh Pact, or the deputles
In the Revolutlonary Natlonal Assembly, who in 1920 voted tor the
Constitutlon of the flrst Czechoslovak Republlc, or the self-styled
"deputies" of Communlsts and Democrats of 1944-45, who dlvided up
the power over Slovakia on a 50-50 basls In such a "brotherly" fashion
In the forests or Banská Bystrica.
4. How is it possibfe even now to celebrate such sorrowful annlversarles of our recent past (as the proclamatlon of the lndependence
of Slovakla)?
�63
SLOVAKIA
There are, lndeed, "sorrowful anniversarles In our recent past,"
but the 14th of March, 1939, does not belong among them. Neither formally, nor by content. Among such sad annlversarles, however, do
belong all those acts that Ued up wlth any collaboratlon with natlve
Communlsm from Chrlstmas of 1943 and wlth Moscow collaboratlon
slnce 1945. March 14, 1939, definltely is not responslble for the atrocitles and blunders commltted by and wlth the ald of Beneš and hls
Red Prague reglme slnce 1945.
Say what you wlll, In politics only successes count. The llfe of
the Slovaks after 1945 1s replete wlth sufferlngs, deportations to the
USSR, concentratlon ca.mps, dlsfranchlsements, dlspossesslons and
pol!Ucal murders.
Even the avowed enemies of Slovak freedom and lndependence former members of the NATIONAL FRONT of Czechoslovakla (Lettrich, Zenkl, Heldrlch, Ducháček, etc.) - have admltted that condl·
tlons In Slovakla are worse today than they were under the Nazis.
The Czechs, too, are worse off now than they were under Hitler. And
we belleve lt. But the Czechs have absolutely no rlght to deny the
Slovaks the same freedom and lndependence and "llberatlon" that
they themselves are clamorlng and plead!ng for today.
The Slovaks have learnt thelr lesson well. T. G. Masaryk and
Edward Beneš lgnored thelr just demands for twenty years. Today
thelr followers stlll lnslst that the Slovaks have no right to thelr own
natlonal exlstence and thelr own Independent state. So don't blame
the Slovaks for proclalming:
"NEVER DO WE WANT TO BE A PAR'ľ OF ANY OLD OR NEW
CZECHOSLOVAKIA! "
•
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"The Soviet Union SINCERELY deslres a strong, consolidated,
fully homogeneous Czechoslovak republic which would be a truly good
and strong frlend and a collaborator of the Soviet people In the future
defenae of a lastlng peace In Europe. The same wish also applies to
the future of Poland. The Soviet Union not only desires good and
friendly relatlons wlth her but also a strong Pollsh-Czechoslovak
frlendship and collaboratlon." TIMES, 12-23-43.
Dr. Edward Beneš, THE NEW YORK
•
"The Czechoslovak republlc is, just a.s it had been, a democratlc
state that respects freedom of convictlons and vlewpoints, a state
that always respected and even In the future shall respect, above all
else, freedom of rellgion, the church and religlous culture. lt ls an
independent state and Independent it shall remaln. lt ls a state that
has always u,pheld, above al! else, objectivlty and full tolerance toward the convlctlons and rellglous beller or all lts cltlzens. lt ls a
state that has respected the well-known Four Freedoms of President
F. D. Roosevelt and toí:iay 1s applylng them in a practlcal way In lts
set-up. That 1s how lt 1s today and so shall lt be even In the future."
- Dr. Edward Beneš, Prague, Aprll 8, 1946. (NÁROD, 4-17-46).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
52
SLOVAKIA
ABOUT THE SLOVAK STATE
( ks) - An anonymous Slovak had an article publlshed in a Czech
paper about the origin or the Slovak State. Thaťs the way Czech Slo•
vaks (CZECHOSLOVAKS!) do buslness, and the Czechs, o! course,
gladly give them space in thelr papers. Phllosophlzlng on the subject
or the origin of the Slovak Republlc, the author ot the artlcle asks
several questlons:
1. Did the Slovak parliament decide freely (when it voted the
independence of Slovakia in March 1939)?
Yes, lt did. lt declded that freely and unanlmously. Not one
Deputy of the Slovak parllament remalned seated; all stood up and
so voted for Slovak state lndependence. No one forced them to stand
up. At Ieast one could have remained seated and so lndlcate a negatlve
vote; but, I repeat, not one Deputy remalned seated.
2. Was the "Berlin order" In line with the wlll of the nation?
No "order" was concerned. Karol Sidor, as Premier of the Slovak
Government, refused in the name of the Slovaks to execute an "order"
at that time, when he told Keppler, Seys-lnquart and Biirckel - who
had come to him to Bratislava on March 12, 1939, - that he would not
go to Berlin or to Vlenna to proclaim the lndependence ot Slovakia
by radlo. He told them that wa.s the function of the Party and the
Slovak parliament. lf Sldor would have gone to Germany and there
proclalmed the lndependence of Slovakia, that would bave been effected by German order. The Germans wanted the proclamatlon over
the radlo, whereas the Slovaks wanted thelr parllament to do the
proclalming.
Two days later the Slovaks wllled lt that thelr parllament pro•
clalm the lndependence of thelr country. The votlng in parllament
on March 14, 1939, was no klnd ot "Berlin order." lt does not matter
that the elected deputles voted for lt. That the deputies voted for it
unanimously strongly emphaslzes the fact that the Slovak natlon as
a whole, through its duly elected representatlves, voiced ltself for lts
own state.
3. Did the deputies have any right to do what they did?
The representatlves of a sovereign natlon have the rlght to do
anythlng wlthin the llmlts of the laws of the land. The only thlng
they probably could not do - as an old Slovak saylng states lt would be to make a boy out of a girl. They certainly had a greater
rlght to speak for the natlon than dld the formulators of the Martin
Declaration, the undenvrlters of the Pittsburgh Pact, or the deputles
In the Revolutlonary Natlonal Assembly, who in 1920 voted tor the
Constitutlon of the flrst Czechoslovak Republlc, or the self-styled
"deputies" of Communlsts and Democrats of 1944-45, who dlvided up
the power over Slovakia on a 50-50 basls In such a "brotherly" fashion
In the forests or Banská Bystrica.
4. How is it possibfe even now to celebrate such sorrowful annlversarles of our recent past (as the proclamatlon of the lndependence
of Slovakla)?
63
SLOVAKIA
There are, lndeed, "sorrowful anniversarles In our recent past,"
but the 14th of March, 1939, does not belong among them. Neither formally, nor by content. Among such sad annlversarles, however, do
belong all those acts that Ued up wlth any collaboratlon with natlve
Communlsm from Chrlstmas of 1943 and wlth Moscow collaboratlon
slnce 1945. March 14, 1939, definltely is not responslble for the atrocitles and blunders commltted by and wlth the ald of Beneš and hls
Red Prague reglme slnce 1945.
Say what you wlll, In politics only successes count. The llfe of
the Slovaks after 1945 1s replete wlth sufferlngs, deportations to the
USSR, concentratlon ca.mps, dlsfranchlsements, dlspossesslons and
pol!Ucal murders.
Even the avowed enemies of Slovak freedom and lndependence former members of the NATIONAL FRONT of Czechoslovakla (Lettrich, Zenkl, Heldrlch, Ducháček, etc.) - have admltted that condl·
tlons In Slovakla are worse today than they were under the Nazis.
The Czechs, too, are worse off now than they were under Hitler. And
we belleve lt. But the Czechs have absolutely no rlght to deny the
Slovaks the same freedom and lndependence and "llberatlon" that
they themselves are clamorlng and plead!ng for today.
The Slovaks have learnt thelr lesson well. T. G. Masaryk and
Edward Beneš lgnored thelr just demands for twenty years. Today
thelr followers stlll lnslst that the Slovaks have no right to thelr own
natlonal exlstence and thelr own Independent state. So don't blame
the Slovaks for proclalming:
"NEVER DO WE WANT TO BE A PAR'ľ OF ANY OLD OR NEW
CZECHOSLOVAKIA! "
•
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"The Soviet Union SINCERELY deslres a strong, consolidated,
fully homogeneous Czechoslovak republic which would be a truly good
and strong frlend and a collaborator of the Soviet people In the future
defenae of a lastlng peace In Europe. The same wish also applies to
the future of Poland. The Soviet Union not only desires good and
friendly relatlons wlth her but also a strong Pollsh-Czechoslovak
frlendship and collaboratlon." TIMES, 12-23-43.
Dr. Edward Beneš, THE NEW YORK
•
"The Czechoslovak republlc is, just a.s it had been, a democratlc
state that respects freedom of convictlons and vlewpoints, a state
that always respected and even In the future shall respect, above all
else, freedom of rellgion, the church and religlous culture. lt ls an
independent state and Independent it shall remaln. lt ls a state that
has always u,pheld, above al! else, objectivlty and full tolerance toward the convlctlons and rellglous beller or all lts cltlzens. lt ls a
state that has respected the well-known Four Freedoms of President
F. D. Roosevelt and toí:iay 1s applylng them in a practlcal way In lts
set-up. That 1s how lt 1s today and so shall lt be even In the future."
- Dr. Edward Beneš, Prague, Aprll 8, 1946. (NÁROD, 4-17-46).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
About the Slovak State
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951
pp. 52-53
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
May 1951
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/53e9ffe678915216b1f1018220699dbb.pdf
754e04f96045a8f0cca233d2c889e0e5
PDF Text
Text
54
SLOVAKIA
A FREE SWVAK.IA IN A FEDERATED EUROPE
( EZ)
What chances have the Slovak s fo i- an indep en dent st at e?
The answer to that question depends oh one's outlook, hls knowledge or the Slovak poople and his knowledge o! Europe as a whole
The Slovak people think they have a fair chance to re-esttabllsh
the Slovak Republic. The Slovaks at home and in emigration firruly
belleve that their natlonal existence depends on establishing a free
Slovakia in a federated Europe. It is sald that every natlon has as much
treedom as lt deserves and as much as it can gain by flghtlng. Well,
the Slova.ks ait home and a,broad are willing to fight Cor their freedom and independence. They want to prove it. But they want a llttle
understandlng and encouragement !rom the democrat!c powers which
have on so many occaslons proclaimed that all nations, both large
and small, have a God-given and inherent rlght to freedom and
statehood.
In the first place, let u11 remember that the Slovaks already
have had an independent state. The Slovak R epublic e:iG!sted from
1939 to 1945, of course w!th limitatlons. But they liked lt nevertheless.
Slovakia has lts state tradition, even though lt be relatlvely a mergre
one. The Slovak ,state was recognlzed by 27 nations. And it gave a
good account of ltselr culturally, economically and socially. The
Slovaks have proved to the Czechs and thelr neighbors that they are
capable of managing their own afralrs. Every informed, objective
and unprejudiced observer wlll admlt that the Slovak Republic wa.s
democratlc, Christlan and subllme. Slovak national economy has forever refuted the thesis that the Slovaks could not maintain themselves economically_ What they did in six short years, but siic
difficul t years, practically amounts to a miracle.
A natlon which has tasted of the fruit of treedom wlll hardly be
satlsfied with less thereafter. The Slovaks are no exception. They
wlll fight to be free again ! They have been overpowered ond forced
to retreat against terrible odds. What hurts most is that the powers who sought ,to liberate all natlons trom totalitarian tyranny
arhitrarlly forced Slovakia under alien rule and the godless tyrauny
of Moscow through the pseudodemocrat Beneš.
The Slovak state wlth its ,positive achlevements has !nscnbed
itself deeply on the soul of the whole Slovak nation. Many Stovaks
who once were against Slovak statehood, (the Benes or Czech Slovaks:
CZECHOSLOVAKS!) today are for an independent Slovak Repu bllc.
If Slovaks could vote in freedom at the present time, there ls not
the least doubt that at least 95% would vote for an independent Slovak
State.
Never before did the Slovak nation have such a large number
of sons in exile as lt has today. It ls a flghtlng group of exlles, wlth
lts ,sights on a free, democratlc Slovakla. These Slovak exlles are
deeply grateful to Americans of Slovak descent. The Slovak people
at horne and non-part!san exiles In all parts of the world think
hlghly of the work of the Slovak League of America, the organizatlon which represents a solid mora! and cultural value. When this
material and spiritual potentlal is once put into motlon, lt undoubt·
edly wlll lntervene effeotively at the decisive moment. The syste-
�SLOVAKIA
55
matic work of the League in this direction and lts realistic Slovak
ou tlook are more than a promise.
What other facts portend the establishment of a Slova.k state?
Old enemies of the Slovak people have been decimated by the
bolshevik steam roller. In the second (some call it the thlrd) Czecho•
slovak Republic, ihe Czech leadership commlited many blunders
whlch have nothing in common with democracy, Christianity, humanity, and culture. Just a single example to !llustrate: the resolution
of the Sudeten question !
Furthermore, the Czechs under Beneš's leadership set up Communism in Czechoslovakia. This is becoming increasingly clear to
every obj-eetive observer. Beneš ,p repared the way for Moscow into
Czechoslovakia. When Beneš died, the press of Switzerland, France
and Italy described him as a ",traitor ot democracy, a seniLe politlcian who could not see clearly" and Jed not only his nation, but the
Slovak people also lnto bolshev!k s lavery. The legend of Czech political
reali.sm,'' on which the Czechs had counted so much, burst like a
soap bubble.
Colonies are not very fashionabLe today. Even the most backward countries are yearnlng for independellce, for statehood. De Gasperi, Italian P remier, has proclaimed more than once that the days
of colonies are gone forever; Ita\y ls through with colonizing, be·
cause it is against the spirit ot the tlmes. The Czechs have ,ex,ploited
Slovakia as their colony. The Slovaks cannot be and do not want
to be a Czech colony.
The representatlves of c·entral European nations are work!ng
for a federatlon, for a just and democratlc arrangement of the region
between Russia and Germany. This is in favor of the establishment
of an independent Slevakla. The Slovaks at horne and in exile are for
such a federatlon of which Slovakla would be an integral part. Admlttlng Czechoslovakia as a unit within such a federation would not be a
Just and democr atlc settlement of the problem of centra! Europe be•
cause the Slovaks would contlnue to be exploited and gradually exterminated natlonally by the Czechs.
Bolshevlsm is a world problem. The world will have to measure
its strength with Commun!sm sooner or later. But the Slovaks know
that they themselves must settle their problem with the Czechs and
tbe so-called "Czech Slovaks." Experience tells them not to underrate the Czechs. The Slovaks have already been "taken in" by the
Czechs several tlmes by trickery, clever propaganda and legal
hypocrisy. Czech emigration is still aggressive and financially strong.
Because of their many political, cultural and business connections, the
Czechs stlll have access to high diplomatlc circles and influential
people. They want to keep Slovakia, because it has been "such a
good milch cow" !
The Czecbs do not openly clalm that they need Slovakia as a
dumping ground for their "progressive intelligentsia, but the fact 1s
tbat in their hearts they firmly believe it. They want Slovakia, be•
cause of German pressure and fear of German reprisals for the brutalitles committed against the Sudetenlanders. The Czechs need to revitalize themselves with Slovak blood and the slnews of young Slovakla. Indeed, Beneš himself admitted that the continued existence of
Czechoslovakia is a vital interest of the Czechs, hence the Czechs
�56
SLOVAKIA
must ever oppose the creatlon ot a free and independent Slovakla.
Well, the Slovaks flgure they shall have somethlng to say about the
matter, as rightly they should have. And no one can blame them for
wantlng to live thelr own 11ves and belng masters of thelr destlny.
The Slovaks know, too, that the "Czech Slovaks" - the Slovak
traltors - are no less dangerous than the lmperlalistlc Beneli C:techs.
They are the Janlssarles. The Slovaks do not underestlmate the
Czechs, who have been and stm are pJytng a systematlc politlco·
dlplomatlc game, the goal ot whJch 1s the denlal and suppresslon of
the natural and fundamental rlghts of the Slovak natlon.
One day world CÔmmunlsm shall be llquldated. And Czechoslovaklsm, the handmald or Communlsm, must be llquldated also. The
fiction of an ethnlcal "Czechoslovak natlon" must be dlscarded for all
tlmes. Czechoslovakla was a mlstake, an llluslon, politlcally and mo•
rally an unprofltable creatlon, but for the Czechs lt stm ls a reality
and an Idea!. The Slovaks are aware of thls and are just as determlned that they shall never again be subject to the rule of the Czechs
when the plague or Communlsm ls vanquished.
•
•
•
OUR FIGHT FOR DEMOORACY AND INDEPENDENCE
DR. JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM
Slnce 1945 Slovaks In emlgratlon have frequently stated that the
goal of thelr struggle ls a democratlc and Independent Slovakla. The
leaders of Slovak exlles can support thelr declaratlons not only by thelr
IJfetlme flght agalnst communlsm, but also by thelr reslstance to
eftorts to lntroduce the nazl system in Slovakla. The group whlch
later collaborated wlth the communlsts - the so-called "Czechoslovaks" (Czech Slovaks ! ) - cannot and should not be counted among
t.he patrlotlc Slovaks who opposed the nazl avalanche from 194Q.
Hllnka's Slovak Peoples Party, headed by Presldent Joseph Tlso,
fought agalnst nazlsm and communlsm then, and today the members of
that party in exile form the flrst flghting line agalnst communlsm.
lt ls a fact that after the meeting ln Salzburg In 1940, when the
group around Prof. Tuka attempted to force Natlonal Soclallsm on
the Slovaks In the attempt to prevent drastlc interventlon by the
Cermans In Slovak public llfe, lt was not the present adherents ot
Czechoslavakla (the so-called "Czechoslovaks") - later the self-styled
"antl-fasclst warrlors" - who lost thelr hlgh posltlons, but the leaders ot Slovak natlonal emigratlon. That the attempt to force Natlonal
Soclallsm on the Slovaks falled, that, too, cannot be credlted to those
who today denounce Slovaks In exlle as fasclsts and nazls. At that
Ume most ot the "Czech Slovaks" were busy gettlng fat jobs, waxing
rich and llving In luxury. Thelr maln worry was not to !ose the favor
ot the reglme. Thelr tlrst attempts to "revolt" dld not happen In 1939
or 1940, but only In 1944, when the outcome of the war was pretty
clear. But even then they were not lnterested In flghtlng tor democracy, but rather In flghtlng to retaln the rlches and the high
functlons they had attalned In the Slovak State. The few persons
among them who fought for democracy and Slovak lnterests are even
today flghtlng, at home and abroad, for an Independent, democratlc
Slovak republlc.
�
54
SLOVAKIA
A FREE SWVAK.IA IN A FEDERATED EUROPE
( EZ)
What chances have the Slovak s fo i- an indep en dent st at e?
The answer to that question depends oh one's outlook, hls knowledge or the Slovak poople and his knowledge o! Europe as a whole
The Slovak people think they have a fair chance to re-esttabllsh
the Slovak Republic. The Slovaks at home and in emigration firruly
belleve that their natlonal existence depends on establishing a free
Slovakia in a federated Europe. It is sald that every natlon has as much
treedom as lt deserves and as much as it can gain by flghtlng. Well,
the Slova.ks ait home and a,broad are willing to fight Cor their freedom and independence. They want to prove it. But they want a llttle
understandlng and encouragement !rom the democrat!c powers which
have on so many occaslons proclaimed that all nations, both large
and small, have a God-given and inherent rlght to freedom and
statehood.
In the first place, let u11 remember that the Slovaks already
have had an independent state. The Slovak R epublic e:iG!sted from
1939 to 1945, of course w!th limitatlons. But they liked lt nevertheless.
Slovakia has lts state tradition, even though lt be relatlvely a mergre
one. The Slovak ,state was recognlzed by 27 nations. And it gave a
good account of ltselr culturally, economically and socially. The
Slovaks have proved to the Czechs and thelr neighbors that they are
capable of managing their own afralrs. Every informed, objective
and unprejudiced observer wlll admlt that the Slovak Republic wa.s
democratlc, Christlan and subllme. Slovak national economy has forever refuted the thesis that the Slovaks could not maintain themselves economically_ What they did in six short years, but siic
difficul t years, practically amounts to a miracle.
A natlon which has tasted of the fruit of treedom wlll hardly be
satlsfied with less thereafter. The Slovaks are no exception. They
wlll fight to be free again ! They have been overpowered ond forced
to retreat against terrible odds. What hurts most is that the powers who sought ,to liberate all natlons trom totalitarian tyranny
arhitrarlly forced Slovakia under alien rule and the godless tyrauny
of Moscow through the pseudodemocrat Beneš.
The Slovak state wlth its ,positive achlevements has !nscnbed
itself deeply on the soul of the whole Slovak nation. Many Stovaks
who once were against Slovak statehood, (the Benes or Czech Slovaks:
CZECHOSLOVAKS!) today are for an independent Slovak Repu bllc.
If Slovaks could vote in freedom at the present time, there ls not
the least doubt that at least 95% would vote for an independent Slovak
State.
Never before did the Slovak nation have such a large number
of sons in exile as lt has today. It ls a flghtlng group of exlles, wlth
lts ,sights on a free, democratlc Slovakla. These Slovak exlles are
deeply grateful to Americans of Slovak descent. The Slovak people
at horne and non-part!san exiles In all parts of the world think
hlghly of the work of the Slovak League of America, the organizatlon which represents a solid mora! and cultural value. When this
material and spiritual potentlal is once put into motlon, lt undoubt·
edly wlll lntervene effeotively at the decisive moment. The syste-
�SLOVAKIA
55
matic work of the League in this direction and lts realistic Slovak
ou tlook are more than a promise.
What other facts portend the establishment of a Slova.k state?
Old enemies of the Slovak people have been decimated by the
bolshevik steam roller. In the second (some call it the thlrd) Czecho•
slovak Republic, ihe Czech leadership commlited many blunders
whlch have nothing in common with democracy, Christianity, humanity, and culture. Just a single example to !llustrate: the resolution
of the Sudeten question !
Furthermore, the Czechs under Beneš's leadership set up Communism in Czechoslovakia. This is becoming increasingly clear to
every obj-eetive observer. Beneš ,p repared the way for Moscow into
Czechoslovakia. When Beneš died, the press of Switzerland, France
and Italy described him as a ",traitor ot democracy, a seniLe politlcian who could not see clearly" and Jed not only his nation, but the
Slovak people also lnto bolshev!k s lavery. The legend of Czech political
reali.sm,'' on which the Czechs had counted so much, burst like a
soap bubble.
Colonies are not very fashionabLe today. Even the most backward countries are yearnlng for independellce, for statehood. De Gasperi, Italian P remier, has proclaimed more than once that the days
of colonies are gone forever; Ita\y ls through with colonizing, be·
cause it is against the spirit ot the tlmes. The Czechs have ,ex,ploited
Slovakia as their colony. The Slovaks cannot be and do not want
to be a Czech colony.
The representatlves of c·entral European nations are work!ng
for a federatlon, for a just and democratlc arrangement of the region
between Russia and Germany. This is in favor of the establishment
of an independent Slevakla. The Slovaks at horne and in exile are for
such a federatlon of which Slovakla would be an integral part. Admlttlng Czechoslovakia as a unit within such a federation would not be a
Just and democr atlc settlement of the problem of centra! Europe be•
cause the Slovaks would contlnue to be exploited and gradually exterminated natlonally by the Czechs.
Bolshevlsm is a world problem. The world will have to measure
its strength with Commun!sm sooner or later. But the Slovaks know
that they themselves must settle their problem with the Czechs and
tbe so-called "Czech Slovaks." Experience tells them not to underrate the Czechs. The Slovaks have already been "taken in" by the
Czechs several tlmes by trickery, clever propaganda and legal
hypocrisy. Czech emigration is still aggressive and financially strong.
Because of their many political, cultural and business connections, the
Czechs stlll have access to high diplomatlc circles and influential
people. They want to keep Slovakia, because it has been "such a
good milch cow" !
The Czecbs do not openly clalm that they need Slovakia as a
dumping ground for their "progressive intelligentsia, but the fact 1s
tbat in their hearts they firmly believe it. They want Slovakia, be•
cause of German pressure and fear of German reprisals for the brutalitles committed against the Sudetenlanders. The Czechs need to revitalize themselves with Slovak blood and the slnews of young Slovakla. Indeed, Beneš himself admitted that the continued existence of
Czechoslovakia is a vital interest of the Czechs, hence the Czechs
�56
SLOVAKIA
must ever oppose the creatlon ot a free and independent Slovakla.
Well, the Slovaks flgure they shall have somethlng to say about the
matter, as rightly they should have. And no one can blame them for
wantlng to live thelr own 11ves and belng masters of thelr destlny.
The Slovaks know, too, that the "Czech Slovaks" - the Slovak
traltors - are no less dangerous than the lmperlalistlc Beneli C:techs.
They are the Janlssarles. The Slovaks do not underestlmate the
Czechs, who have been and stm are pJytng a systematlc politlco·
dlplomatlc game, the goal ot whJch 1s the denlal and suppresslon of
the natural and fundamental rlghts of the Slovak natlon.
One day world CÔmmunlsm shall be llquldated. And Czechoslovaklsm, the handmald or Communlsm, must be llquldated also. The
fiction of an ethnlcal "Czechoslovak natlon" must be dlscarded for all
tlmes. Czechoslovakla was a mlstake, an llluslon, politlcally and mo•
rally an unprofltable creatlon, but for the Czechs lt stm ls a reality
and an Idea!. The Slovaks are aware of thls and are just as determlned that they shall never again be subject to the rule of the Czechs
when the plague or Communlsm ls vanquished.
•
•
•
OUR FIGHT FOR DEMOORACY AND INDEPENDENCE
DR. JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM
Slnce 1945 Slovaks In emlgratlon have frequently stated that the
goal of thelr struggle ls a democratlc and Independent Slovakla. The
leaders of Slovak exlles can support thelr declaratlons not only by thelr
IJfetlme flght agalnst communlsm, but also by thelr reslstance to
eftorts to lntroduce the nazl system in Slovakla. The group whlch
later collaborated wlth the communlsts - the so-called "Czechoslovaks" (Czech Slovaks ! ) - cannot and should not be counted among
t.he patrlotlc Slovaks who opposed the nazl avalanche from 194Q.
Hllnka's Slovak Peoples Party, headed by Presldent Joseph Tlso,
fought agalnst nazlsm and communlsm then, and today the members of
that party in exile form the flrst flghting line agalnst communlsm.
lt ls a fact that after the meeting ln Salzburg In 1940, when the
group around Prof. Tuka attempted to force Natlonal Soclallsm on
the Slovaks In the attempt to prevent drastlc interventlon by the
Cermans In Slovak public llfe, lt was not the present adherents ot
Czechoslavakla (the so-called "Czechoslovaks") - later the self-styled
"antl-fasclst warrlors" - who lost thelr hlgh posltlons, but the leaders ot Slovak natlonal emigratlon. That the attempt to force Natlonal
Soclallsm on the Slovaks falled, that, too, cannot be credlted to those
who today denounce Slovaks In exlle as fasclsts and nazls. At that
Ume most ot the "Czech Slovaks" were busy gettlng fat jobs, waxing
rich and llving In luxury. Thelr maln worry was not to !ose the favor
ot the reglme. Thelr tlrst attempts to "revolt" dld not happen In 1939
or 1940, but only In 1944, when the outcome of the war was pretty
clear. But even then they were not lnterested In flghtlng tor democracy, but rather In flghtlng to retaln the rlches and the high
functlons they had attalned In the Slovak State. The few persons
among them who fought for democracy and Slovak lnterests are even
today flghtlng, at home and abroad, for an Independent, democratlc
Slovak republlc.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
54
SLOVAKIA
A FREE SWVAK.IA IN A FEDERATED EUROPE
( EZ)
What chances have the Slovak s fo i- an indep en dent st at e?
The answer to that question depends oh one's outlook, hls knowledge or the Slovak poople and his knowledge o! Europe as a whole
The Slovak people think they have a fair chance to re-esttabllsh
the Slovak Republic. The Slovaks at home and in emigration firruly
belleve that their natlonal existence depends on establishing a free
Slovakia in a federated Europe. It is sald that every natlon has as much
treedom as lt deserves and as much as it can gain by flghtlng. Well,
the Slova.ks ait home and a,broad are willing to fight Cor their freedom and independence. They want to prove it. But they want a llttle
understandlng and encouragement !rom the democrat!c powers which
have on so many occaslons proclaimed that all nations, both large
and small, have a God-given and inherent rlght to freedom and
statehood.
In the first place, let u11 remember that the Slovaks already
have had an independent state. The Slovak R epublic e:iG!sted from
1939 to 1945, of course w!th limitatlons. But they liked lt nevertheless.
Slovakia has lts state tradition, even though lt be relatlvely a mergre
one. The Slovak ,state was recognlzed by 27 nations. And it gave a
good account of ltselr culturally, economically and socially. The
Slovaks have proved to the Czechs and thelr neighbors that they are
capable of managing their own afralrs. Every informed, objective
and unprejudiced observer wlll admlt that the Slovak Republic wa.s
democratlc, Christlan and subllme. Slovak national economy has forever refuted the thesis that the Slovaks could not maintain themselves economically_ What they did in six short years, but siic
difficul t years, practically amounts to a miracle.
A natlon which has tasted of the fruit of treedom wlll hardly be
satlsfied with less thereafter. The Slovaks are no exception. They
wlll fight to be free again ! They have been overpowered ond forced
to retreat against terrible odds. What hurts most is that the powers who sought ,to liberate all natlons trom totalitarian tyranny
arhitrarlly forced Slovakia under alien rule and the godless tyrauny
of Moscow through the pseudodemocrat Beneš.
The Slovak state wlth its ,positive achlevements has !nscnbed
itself deeply on the soul of the whole Slovak nation. Many Stovaks
who once were against Slovak statehood, (the Benes or Czech Slovaks:
CZECHOSLOVAKS!) today are for an independent Slovak Repu bllc.
If Slovaks could vote in freedom at the present time, there ls not
the least doubt that at least 95% would vote for an independent Slovak
State.
Never before did the Slovak nation have such a large number
of sons in exile as lt has today. It ls a flghtlng group of exlles, wlth
lts ,sights on a free, democratlc Slovakla. These Slovak exlles are
deeply grateful to Americans of Slovak descent. The Slovak people
at horne and non-part!san exiles In all parts of the world think
hlghly of the work of the Slovak League of America, the organizatlon which represents a solid mora! and cultural value. When this
material and spiritual potentlal is once put into motlon, lt undoubt·
edly wlll lntervene effeotively at the decisive moment. The syste-
SLOVAKIA
55
matic work of the League in this direction and lts realistic Slovak
ou tlook are more than a promise.
What other facts portend the establishment of a Slova.k state?
Old enemies of the Slovak people have been decimated by the
bolshevik steam roller. In the second (some call it the thlrd) Czecho•
slovak Republic, ihe Czech leadership commlited many blunders
whlch have nothing in common with democracy, Christianity, humanity, and culture. Just a single example to !llustrate: the resolution
of the Sudeten question !
Furthermore, the Czechs under Beneš's leadership set up Communism in Czechoslovakia. This is becoming increasingly clear to
every obj-eetive observer. Beneš ,p repared the way for Moscow into
Czechoslovakia. When Beneš died, the press of Switzerland, France
and Italy described him as a ",traitor ot democracy, a seniLe politlcian who could not see clearly" and Jed not only his nation, but the
Slovak people also lnto bolshev!k s lavery. The legend of Czech political
reali.sm,'' on which the Czechs had counted so much, burst like a
soap bubble.
Colonies are not very fashionabLe today. Even the most backward countries are yearnlng for independellce, for statehood. De Gasperi, Italian P remier, has proclaimed more than once that the days
of colonies are gone forever; Ita\y ls through with colonizing, be·
cause it is against the spirit ot the tlmes. The Czechs have ,ex,ploited
Slovakia as their colony. The Slovaks cannot be and do not want
to be a Czech colony.
The representatlves of c·entral European nations are work!ng
for a federatlon, for a just and democratlc arrangement of the region
between Russia and Germany. This is in favor of the establishment
of an independent Slevakla. The Slovaks at horne and in exile are for
such a federatlon of which Slovakla would be an integral part. Admlttlng Czechoslovakia as a unit within such a federation would not be a
Just and democr atlc settlement of the problem of centra! Europe be•
cause the Slovaks would contlnue to be exploited and gradually exterminated natlonally by the Czechs.
Bolshevlsm is a world problem. The world will have to measure
its strength with Commun!sm sooner or later. But the Slovaks know
that they themselves must settle their problem with the Czechs and
tbe so-called "Czech Slovaks." Experience tells them not to underrate the Czechs. The Slovaks have already been "taken in" by the
Czechs several tlmes by trickery, clever propaganda and legal
hypocrisy. Czech emigration is still aggressive and financially strong.
Because of their many political, cultural and business connections, the
Czechs stlll have access to high diplomatlc circles and influential
people. They want to keep Slovakia, because it has been "such a
good milch cow" !
The Czecbs do not openly clalm that they need Slovakia as a
dumping ground for their "progressive intelligentsia, but the fact 1s
tbat in their hearts they firmly believe it. They want Slovakia, be•
cause of German pressure and fear of German reprisals for the brutalitles committed against the Sudetenlanders. The Czechs need to revitalize themselves with Slovak blood and the slnews of young Slovakla. Indeed, Beneš himself admitted that the continued existence of
Czechoslovakia is a vital interest of the Czechs, hence the Czechs
56
SLOVAKIA
must ever oppose the creatlon ot a free and independent Slovakla.
Well, the Slovaks flgure they shall have somethlng to say about the
matter, as rightly they should have. And no one can blame them for
wantlng to live thelr own 11ves and belng masters of thelr destlny.
The Slovaks know, too, that the "Czech Slovaks" - the Slovak
traltors - are no less dangerous than the lmperlalistlc Beneli C:techs.
They are the Janlssarles. The Slovaks do not underestlmate the
Czechs, who have been and stm are pJytng a systematlc politlco·
dlplomatlc game, the goal ot whJch 1s the denlal and suppresslon of
the natural and fundamental rlghts of the Slovak natlon.
One day world CÔmmunlsm shall be llquldated. And Czechoslovaklsm, the handmald or Communlsm, must be llquldated also. The
fiction of an ethnlcal "Czechoslovak natlon" must be dlscarded for all
tlmes. Czechoslovakla was a mlstake, an llluslon, politlcally and mo•
rally an unprofltable creatlon, but for the Czechs lt stm ls a reality
and an Idea!. The Slovaks are aware of thls and are just as determlned that they shall never again be subject to the rule of the Czechs
when the plague or Communlsm ls vanquished.
•
•
•
OUR FIGHT FOR DEMOORACY AND INDEPENDENCE
DR. JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM
Slnce 1945 Slovaks In emlgratlon have frequently stated that the
goal of thelr struggle ls a democratlc and Independent Slovakla. The
leaders of Slovak exlles can support thelr declaratlons not only by thelr
IJfetlme flght agalnst communlsm, but also by thelr reslstance to
eftorts to lntroduce the nazl system in Slovakla. The group whlch
later collaborated wlth the communlsts - the so-called "Czechoslovaks" (Czech Slovaks ! ) - cannot and should not be counted among
t.he patrlotlc Slovaks who opposed the nazl avalanche from 194Q.
Hllnka's Slovak Peoples Party, headed by Presldent Joseph Tlso,
fought agalnst nazlsm and communlsm then, and today the members of
that party in exile form the flrst flghting line agalnst communlsm.
lt ls a fact that after the meeting ln Salzburg In 1940, when the
group around Prof. Tuka attempted to force Natlonal Soclallsm on
the Slovaks In the attempt to prevent drastlc interventlon by the
Cermans In Slovak public llfe, lt was not the present adherents ot
Czechoslavakla (the so-called "Czechoslovaks") - later the self-styled
"antl-fasclst warrlors" - who lost thelr hlgh posltlons, but the leaders ot Slovak natlonal emigratlon. That the attempt to force Natlonal
Soclallsm on the Slovaks falled, that, too, cannot be credlted to those
who today denounce Slovaks In exlle as fasclsts and nazls. At that
Ume most ot the "Czech Slovaks" were busy gettlng fat jobs, waxing
rich and llving In luxury. Thelr maln worry was not to !ose the favor
ot the reglme. Thelr tlrst attempts to "revolt" dld not happen In 1939
or 1940, but only In 1944, when the outcome of the war was pretty
clear. But even then they were not lnterested In flghtlng tor democracy, but rather In flghtlng to retaln the rlches and the high
functlons they had attalned In the Slovak State. The few persons
among them who fought for democracy and Slovak lnterests are even
today flghtlng, at home and abroad, for an Independent, democratlc
Slovak republlc.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
A Free Slovakia in a Federated Europe
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
May 1951
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951
pp. 54-56
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/0e288919931653c213b5dfb2bc8b66b7.pdf
5ecf60cf00d39a547b0345c02ae54c5a
PDF Text
Text
56
SLOVAKIA
must ever oppose the creatlon ot a free and independent Slovakla.
Well, the Slovaks flgure they shall have somethlng to say about the
matter, as rightly they should have. And no one can blame them for
wantlng to live thelr own 11ves and belng masters of thelr destlny.
The Slovaks know, too, that the "Czech Slovaks" - the Slovak
traltors - are no less dangerous than the lmperlalistlc Beneli C:techs.
They are the Janlssarles. The Slovaks do not underestlmate the
Czechs, who have been and stm are pJytng a systematlc politlco·
dlplomatlc game, the goal ot whJch 1s the denlal and suppresslon of
the natural and fundamental rlghts of the Slovak natlon.
One day world CÔmmunlsm shall be llquldated. And Czechoslovaklsm, the handmald or Communlsm, must be llquldated also. The
fiction of an ethnlcal "Czechoslovak natlon" must be dlscarded for all
tlmes. Czechoslovakla was a mlstake, an llluslon, politlcally and mo•
rally an unprofltable creatlon, but for the Czechs lt stm ls a reality
and an Idea!. The Slovaks are aware of thls and are just as determlned that they shall never again be subject to the rule of the Czechs
when the plague or Communlsm ls vanquished.
•
•
•
OUR FIGHT FOR DEMOORACY AND INDEPENDENCE
DR. JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM
Slnce 1945 Slovaks In emlgratlon have frequently stated that the
goal of thelr struggle ls a democratlc and Independent Slovakla. The
leaders of Slovak exlles can support thelr declaratlons not only by thelr
IJfetlme flght agalnst communlsm, but also by thelr reslstance to
eftorts to lntroduce the nazl system in Slovakla. The group whlch
later collaborated wlth the communlsts - the so-called "Czechoslovaks" (Czech Slovaks ! ) - cannot and should not be counted among
t.he patrlotlc Slovaks who opposed the nazl avalanche from 194Q.
Hllnka's Slovak Peoples Party, headed by Presldent Joseph Tlso,
fought agalnst nazlsm and communlsm then, and today the members of
that party in exile form the flrst flghting line agalnst communlsm.
lt ls a fact that after the meeting ln Salzburg In 1940, when the
group around Prof. Tuka attempted to force Natlonal Soclallsm on
the Slovaks In the attempt to prevent drastlc interventlon by the
Cermans In Slovak public llfe, lt was not the present adherents ot
Czechoslavakla (the so-called "Czechoslovaks") - later the self-styled
"antl-fasclst warrlors" - who lost thelr hlgh posltlons, but the leaders ot Slovak natlonal emigratlon. That the attempt to force Natlonal
Soclallsm on the Slovaks falled, that, too, cannot be credlted to those
who today denounce Slovaks In exlle as fasclsts and nazls. At that
Ume most ot the "Czech Slovaks" were busy gettlng fat jobs, waxing
rich and llving In luxury. Thelr maln worry was not to !ose the favor
ot the reglme. Thelr tlrst attempts to "revolt" dld not happen In 1939
or 1940, but only In 1944, when the outcome of the war was pretty
clear. But even then they were not lnterested In flghtlng tor democracy, but rather In flghtlng to retaln the rlches and the high
functlons they had attalned In the Slovak State. The few persons
among them who fought for democracy and Slovak lnterests are even
today flghtlng, at home and abroad, for an Independent, democratlc
Slovak republlc.
�SLOVAKIA
57
Many Slovaks In varlous Iands may be tempted to ask: How, then,
1s lt posslble to explaln thls relentless campalgn agalnst Slovak na·
tlonals In emlgratlon, the attempts to smear and dlscredlt them In the
eyes of the world?
The answer 1s slmple.
Thls whole undemocratlc assault agalnst patrlotlc Slovaks, flght•
Ing In exile for an Independent Slovak State, emanates baslcally
from two causes:
1. The "Czechoslovaks," servlng Czech imperlal lnterests by be•
traylng the highest lnterests of thelr own people, wlsh to divert
attention from thelr collaboratlon wlth communlsm by smearlng and
vllifylng patrlotlc Slovaks.
2. By accuslng patrlotlc Slovaks In democratlc countrles of nazlsm
and fascism, a part of the Czech emlgrants and the Slovak renegades
collaboratlng wlth them, flgure that they can neutralize thelr flght for
an Independent Slovak State and force the Slovaks agaln under Czech
rule.
Those Czech and Slovak emlgrants who clalm that Slovak na•
tionals want a fasclst or nazl state know very well that 1s not true.
They propagate thls Ile lntentlonally and systematlcally In the hope
that by repeatlng lt thousands of tlmes they shall agaln succeed In
convlnclng the world that the Slovak natlon does not want to live
in a state of lts own, but only In thelr Czecho-Slovakia. They are
'4etermined that the Slovaks shall be vlctlms of Czech lmperiallstic
efforts and Slovakla shall be a colony of Bohemla.
In short: al! Slovaks who belleve that Slovakla has a rlght to be
free and Independent and seek to bave that rlght recognlzed and
respected by all clvillzed natlons of the earth are, according to the
Beneš Czechs and Czech Slovaks, "nazis, traltors, fasclsts, enemles
or democracy," etc. In 1946, Dr. Edward Beneš frankly told a Slovak
delegatlon why the Czechs are fightlng agalnst Slovak lndependence,
when he sald:
"The Czechs cannot accept under any circum1tance1 an independent Slovakla in the future . . . . The Czechs, having on the
one side 70 million Germans, must on the other aide have Ru11ia
as their neighbor. Therefore, they could not accept an independent
Slovakia. Thia ia a vital problem for the exiatence of the Czechs
as a nation and a state and that ia also the le11on of Munich..•."
Czech emlgratlon, holding to thls polltlcal legacy of Beneš,
reallzes that the greatest lmpedlment to lts efforts are patrlotlc Slo·
vaks In exile. Slovaks can appreciate Benei's concern for the Czecha,
but they, too, are concerned about thelr own national existence. The
statement made by Beneš certalnly has nothlng In common with democracy. It remlnds us of Adolph Hitler who thought that all natlons
of centra) and eastern Europe should be deprlved of freedom and In•
dependence and forced to serve the lnterests of the German natlon. It
also remlnds us of Stalln who would enslave the whole world and force
all natlons to serve the lnterests of godless communlsm.
Slovak patrlots stand In the way of thls Czech lmperlallst dream.
so the followers or Beneš are determlned to annlhllate them at all
costs. That explalns why they accuse the Slovaks of belng nazls and
fasclsts. That also explains thelr rldlculous accus atlon that the Slo-
�58
SLOVA:KIA
vaks in exile are not fighting for democracy, but for the renewal
ot fasclsm In centra! Europe.
Undoubtedly it is not necessary to stress that thls flght agalnst
Slovak emigrants 1s immoral and undemocratlc, because lts goal is
immoral and undemocratlc. To want to deprive the S lovak nation of
the right to freedom and independence because the interests of the
Czechs "as a nation and a state" demand it, that is a manifestatlon
of the most brutal lmperialism - such as even the Germans did not
perpetrate against the Slovaks. Can anyone of sane mind expect the
Slovaks In exile to agree to commit national sulclde?
It !s not so much the past that separates the Slovaks and Czechs
in emigration as the fact that while the Slovak exiles are fighting for
freedom and democracy In centra! Europe, the Czech exlles headed
by Zenkl, Ripka and Papánek are fighting, in the first place, to prevent the Slovaks from attaining freedom and independence. The main
task of the Czech exiles is not the fight against Communism, but the
fight against the Slovaks, who want the Slovak natlon to be fully free
and happy in lts own democratic state.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT ?
"Slmul<taneously we accepted the principle tha,t only our people
e.t home have the righit to dedde the maln problems o! our Interne.!
policy, and Lhat also the relation between the Cechs and Slovaks be
decided in the future state only a,t home, based on the princíple of
C.OMPLETE EQUALITY Of both Czechs and Slove.ka and that it be
done in a free, democratic way and In complete brotherly agreement.
These were the maln prlnciples on whlch we have bullt our movement for liberation. This ideology of our struggle !or Jiberat!on, CONNECTED WITH OUR COMPLETE PRO-SOVIET ORIENTATION, and
our ideology or the second World War In general was one of the main
causes !or the success or the entire 81.ruggle." - (Dr. Beneš, Broadcaat to the Czechoslovak people, Prague, May 16, 1946) .
•
There 1s no Russian "iron curtain" in Czechoslovakia. . . . Every.
one is free to enter Czechoslovakia and to come and go as he pleases,
to see what he wants to see and hear what he wants to hear. Further.
more Czechs and Slovaks are MAST ERS in their own country. T here
is no Russlan army on Czechoslovak soil and Moscow IS NOT INTERFERING with Czechoslovak interna! affairs. . . . The press,
radio, the school and the church are FREE to carry on their activities
AS BEFORE." - (Dr. Kenneth D. Milier, president o! the New Yvrk
City Mlsslon Society, In an address at the weekly church nlght dinner at the First Presb)"tertan Church, 124 Henry Street, New York
City, published In tihe BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, Nov. 12, 1947) .
•
"I agree wlth you rully that our alllance with the SOVIET UNION
will belp us to a better secur ity or FREEDOM in t he future, and I am
happy to have seen our politlcal orlentatir FROM THE BEGINNING
OF THIS WAR and to have acted accordlngly." - (Dr. Beneš, Reply
to a message from the Slov-ak Natlonal Council In Košice, London,
March 2, 1946).
�
56
SLOVAKIA
must ever oppose the creatlon ot a free and independent Slovakla.
Well, the Slovaks flgure they shall have somethlng to say about the
matter, as rightly they should have. And no one can blame them for
wantlng to live thelr own 11ves and belng masters of thelr destlny.
The Slovaks know, too, that the "Czech Slovaks" - the Slovak
traltors - are no less dangerous than the lmperlalistlc Beneli C:techs.
They are the Janlssarles. The Slovaks do not underestlmate the
Czechs, who have been and stm are pJytng a systematlc politlco·
dlplomatlc game, the goal ot whJch 1s the denlal and suppresslon of
the natural and fundamental rlghts of the Slovak natlon.
One day world CÔmmunlsm shall be llquldated. And Czechoslovaklsm, the handmald or Communlsm, must be llquldated also. The
fiction of an ethnlcal "Czechoslovak natlon" must be dlscarded for all
tlmes. Czechoslovakla was a mlstake, an llluslon, politlcally and mo•
rally an unprofltable creatlon, but for the Czechs lt stm ls a reality
and an Idea!. The Slovaks are aware of thls and are just as determlned that they shall never again be subject to the rule of the Czechs
when the plague or Communlsm ls vanquished.
•
•
•
OUR FIGHT FOR DEMOORACY AND INDEPENDENCE
DR. JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM
Slnce 1945 Slovaks In emlgratlon have frequently stated that the
goal of thelr struggle ls a democratlc and Independent Slovakla. The
leaders of Slovak exlles can support thelr declaratlons not only by thelr
IJfetlme flght agalnst communlsm, but also by thelr reslstance to
eftorts to lntroduce the nazl system in Slovakla. The group whlch
later collaborated wlth the communlsts - the so-called "Czechoslovaks" (Czech Slovaks ! ) - cannot and should not be counted among
t.he patrlotlc Slovaks who opposed the nazl avalanche from 194Q.
Hllnka's Slovak Peoples Party, headed by Presldent Joseph Tlso,
fought agalnst nazlsm and communlsm then, and today the members of
that party in exile form the flrst flghting line agalnst communlsm.
lt ls a fact that after the meeting ln Salzburg In 1940, when the
group around Prof. Tuka attempted to force Natlonal Soclallsm on
the Slovaks In the attempt to prevent drastlc interventlon by the
Cermans In Slovak public llfe, lt was not the present adherents ot
Czechoslavakla (the so-called "Czechoslovaks") - later the self-styled
"antl-fasclst warrlors" - who lost thelr hlgh posltlons, but the leaders ot Slovak natlonal emigratlon. That the attempt to force Natlonal
Soclallsm on the Slovaks falled, that, too, cannot be credlted to those
who today denounce Slovaks In exlle as fasclsts and nazls. At that
Ume most ot the "Czech Slovaks" were busy gettlng fat jobs, waxing
rich and llving In luxury. Thelr maln worry was not to !ose the favor
ot the reglme. Thelr tlrst attempts to "revolt" dld not happen In 1939
or 1940, but only In 1944, when the outcome of the war was pretty
clear. But even then they were not lnterested In flghtlng tor democracy, but rather In flghtlng to retaln the rlches and the high
functlons they had attalned In the Slovak State. The few persons
among them who fought for democracy and Slovak lnterests are even
today flghtlng, at home and abroad, for an Independent, democratlc
Slovak republlc.
�SLOVAKIA
57
Many Slovaks In varlous Iands may be tempted to ask: How, then,
1s lt posslble to explaln thls relentless campalgn agalnst Slovak na·
tlonals In emlgratlon, the attempts to smear and dlscredlt them In the
eyes of the world?
The answer 1s slmple.
Thls whole undemocratlc assault agalnst patrlotlc Slovaks, flght•
Ing In exile for an Independent Slovak State, emanates baslcally
from two causes:
1. The "Czechoslovaks," servlng Czech imperlal lnterests by be•
traylng the highest lnterests of thelr own people, wlsh to divert
attention from thelr collaboratlon wlth communlsm by smearlng and
vllifylng patrlotlc Slovaks.
2. By accuslng patrlotlc Slovaks In democratlc countrles of nazlsm
and fascism, a part of the Czech emlgrants and the Slovak renegades
collaboratlng wlth them, flgure that they can neutralize thelr flght for
an Independent Slovak State and force the Slovaks agaln under Czech
rule.
Those Czech and Slovak emlgrants who clalm that Slovak na•
tionals want a fasclst or nazl state know very well that 1s not true.
They propagate thls Ile lntentlonally and systematlcally In the hope
that by repeatlng lt thousands of tlmes they shall agaln succeed In
convlnclng the world that the Slovak natlon does not want to live
in a state of lts own, but only In thelr Czecho-Slovakia. They are
'4etermined that the Slovaks shall be vlctlms of Czech lmperiallstic
efforts and Slovakla shall be a colony of Bohemla.
In short: al! Slovaks who belleve that Slovakla has a rlght to be
free and Independent and seek to bave that rlght recognlzed and
respected by all clvillzed natlons of the earth are, according to the
Beneš Czechs and Czech Slovaks, "nazis, traltors, fasclsts, enemles
or democracy," etc. In 1946, Dr. Edward Beneš frankly told a Slovak
delegatlon why the Czechs are fightlng agalnst Slovak lndependence,
when he sald:
"The Czechs cannot accept under any circum1tance1 an independent Slovakla in the future . . . . The Czechs, having on the
one side 70 million Germans, must on the other aide have Ru11ia
as their neighbor. Therefore, they could not accept an independent
Slovakia. Thia ia a vital problem for the exiatence of the Czechs
as a nation and a state and that ia also the le11on of Munich..•."
Czech emlgratlon, holding to thls polltlcal legacy of Beneš,
reallzes that the greatest lmpedlment to lts efforts are patrlotlc Slo·
vaks In exile. Slovaks can appreciate Benei's concern for the Czecha,
but they, too, are concerned about thelr own national existence. The
statement made by Beneš certalnly has nothlng In common with democracy. It remlnds us of Adolph Hitler who thought that all natlons
of centra) and eastern Europe should be deprlved of freedom and In•
dependence and forced to serve the lnterests of the German natlon. It
also remlnds us of Stalln who would enslave the whole world and force
all natlons to serve the lnterests of godless communlsm.
Slovak patrlots stand In the way of thls Czech lmperlallst dream.
so the followers or Beneš are determlned to annlhllate them at all
costs. That explalns why they accuse the Slovaks of belng nazls and
fasclsts. That also explains thelr rldlculous accus atlon that the Slo-
�58
SLOVA:KIA
vaks in exile are not fighting for democracy, but for the renewal
ot fasclsm In centra! Europe.
Undoubtedly it is not necessary to stress that thls flght agalnst
Slovak emigrants 1s immoral and undemocratlc, because lts goal is
immoral and undemocratlc. To want to deprive the S lovak nation of
the right to freedom and independence because the interests of the
Czechs "as a nation and a state" demand it, that is a manifestatlon
of the most brutal lmperialism - such as even the Germans did not
perpetrate against the Slovaks. Can anyone of sane mind expect the
Slovaks In exile to agree to commit national sulclde?
It !s not so much the past that separates the Slovaks and Czechs
in emigration as the fact that while the Slovak exiles are fighting for
freedom and democracy In centra! Europe, the Czech exlles headed
by Zenkl, Ripka and Papánek are fighting, in the first place, to prevent the Slovaks from attaining freedom and independence. The main
task of the Czech exiles is not the fight against Communism, but the
fight against the Slovaks, who want the Slovak natlon to be fully free
and happy in lts own democratic state.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT ?
"Slmul<taneously we accepted the principle tha,t only our people
e.t home have the righit to dedde the maln problems o! our Interne.!
policy, and Lhat also the relation between the Cechs and Slovaks be
decided in the future state only a,t home, based on the princíple of
C.OMPLETE EQUALITY Of both Czechs and Slove.ka and that it be
done in a free, democratic way and In complete brotherly agreement.
These were the maln prlnciples on whlch we have bullt our movement for liberation. This ideology of our struggle !or Jiberat!on, CONNECTED WITH OUR COMPLETE PRO-SOVIET ORIENTATION, and
our ideology or the second World War In general was one of the main
causes !or the success or the entire 81.ruggle." - (Dr. Beneš, Broadcaat to the Czechoslovak people, Prague, May 16, 1946) .
•
There 1s no Russian "iron curtain" in Czechoslovakia. . . . Every.
one is free to enter Czechoslovakia and to come and go as he pleases,
to see what he wants to see and hear what he wants to hear. Further.
more Czechs and Slovaks are MAST ERS in their own country. T here
is no Russlan army on Czechoslovak soil and Moscow IS NOT INTERFERING with Czechoslovak interna! affairs. . . . The press,
radio, the school and the church are FREE to carry on their activities
AS BEFORE." - (Dr. Kenneth D. Milier, president o! the New Yvrk
City Mlsslon Society, In an address at the weekly church nlght dinner at the First Presb)"tertan Church, 124 Henry Street, New York
City, published In tihe BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, Nov. 12, 1947) .
•
"I agree wlth you rully that our alllance with the SOVIET UNION
will belp us to a better secur ity or FREEDOM in t he future, and I am
happy to have seen our politlcal orlentatir FROM THE BEGINNING
OF THIS WAR and to have acted accordlngly." - (Dr. Beneš, Reply
to a message from the Slov-ak Natlonal Council In Košice, London,
March 2, 1946).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
56
SLOVAKIA
must ever oppose the creatlon ot a free and independent Slovakla.
Well, the Slovaks flgure they shall have somethlng to say about the
matter, as rightly they should have. And no one can blame them for
wantlng to live thelr own 11ves and belng masters of thelr destlny.
The Slovaks know, too, that the "Czech Slovaks" - the Slovak
traltors - are no less dangerous than the lmperlalistlc Beneli C:techs.
They are the Janlssarles. The Slovaks do not underestlmate the
Czechs, who have been and stm are pJytng a systematlc politlco·
dlplomatlc game, the goal ot whJch 1s the denlal and suppresslon of
the natural and fundamental rlghts of the Slovak natlon.
One day world CÔmmunlsm shall be llquldated. And Czechoslovaklsm, the handmald or Communlsm, must be llquldated also. The
fiction of an ethnlcal "Czechoslovak natlon" must be dlscarded for all
tlmes. Czechoslovakla was a mlstake, an llluslon, politlcally and mo•
rally an unprofltable creatlon, but for the Czechs lt stm ls a reality
and an Idea!. The Slovaks are aware of thls and are just as determlned that they shall never again be subject to the rule of the Czechs
when the plague or Communlsm ls vanquished.
•
•
•
OUR FIGHT FOR DEMOORACY AND INDEPENDENCE
DR. JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM
Slnce 1945 Slovaks In emlgratlon have frequently stated that the
goal of thelr struggle ls a democratlc and Independent Slovakla. The
leaders of Slovak exlles can support thelr declaratlons not only by thelr
IJfetlme flght agalnst communlsm, but also by thelr reslstance to
eftorts to lntroduce the nazl system in Slovakla. The group whlch
later collaborated wlth the communlsts - the so-called "Czechoslovaks" (Czech Slovaks ! ) - cannot and should not be counted among
t.he patrlotlc Slovaks who opposed the nazl avalanche from 194Q.
Hllnka's Slovak Peoples Party, headed by Presldent Joseph Tlso,
fought agalnst nazlsm and communlsm then, and today the members of
that party in exile form the flrst flghting line agalnst communlsm.
lt ls a fact that after the meeting ln Salzburg In 1940, when the
group around Prof. Tuka attempted to force Natlonal Soclallsm on
the Slovaks In the attempt to prevent drastlc interventlon by the
Cermans In Slovak public llfe, lt was not the present adherents ot
Czechoslavakla (the so-called "Czechoslovaks") - later the self-styled
"antl-fasclst warrlors" - who lost thelr hlgh posltlons, but the leaders ot Slovak natlonal emigratlon. That the attempt to force Natlonal
Soclallsm on the Slovaks falled, that, too, cannot be credlted to those
who today denounce Slovaks In exlle as fasclsts and nazls. At that
Ume most ot the "Czech Slovaks" were busy gettlng fat jobs, waxing
rich and llving In luxury. Thelr maln worry was not to !ose the favor
ot the reglme. Thelr tlrst attempts to "revolt" dld not happen In 1939
or 1940, but only In 1944, when the outcome of the war was pretty
clear. But even then they were not lnterested In flghtlng tor democracy, but rather In flghtlng to retaln the rlches and the high
functlons they had attalned In the Slovak State. The few persons
among them who fought for democracy and Slovak lnterests are even
today flghtlng, at home and abroad, for an Independent, democratlc
Slovak republlc.
SLOVAKIA
57
Many Slovaks In varlous Iands may be tempted to ask: How, then,
1s lt posslble to explaln thls relentless campalgn agalnst Slovak na·
tlonals In emlgratlon, the attempts to smear and dlscredlt them In the
eyes of the world?
The answer 1s slmple.
Thls whole undemocratlc assault agalnst patrlotlc Slovaks, flght•
Ing In exile for an Independent Slovak State, emanates baslcally
from two causes:
1. The "Czechoslovaks," servlng Czech imperlal lnterests by be•
traylng the highest lnterests of thelr own people, wlsh to divert
attention from thelr collaboratlon wlth communlsm by smearlng and
vllifylng patrlotlc Slovaks.
2. By accuslng patrlotlc Slovaks In democratlc countrles of nazlsm
and fascism, a part of the Czech emlgrants and the Slovak renegades
collaboratlng wlth them, flgure that they can neutralize thelr flght for
an Independent Slovak State and force the Slovaks agaln under Czech
rule.
Those Czech and Slovak emlgrants who clalm that Slovak na•
tionals want a fasclst or nazl state know very well that 1s not true.
They propagate thls Ile lntentlonally and systematlcally In the hope
that by repeatlng lt thousands of tlmes they shall agaln succeed In
convlnclng the world that the Slovak natlon does not want to live
in a state of lts own, but only In thelr Czecho-Slovakia. They are
'4etermined that the Slovaks shall be vlctlms of Czech lmperiallstic
efforts and Slovakla shall be a colony of Bohemla.
In short: al! Slovaks who belleve that Slovakla has a rlght to be
free and Independent and seek to bave that rlght recognlzed and
respected by all clvillzed natlons of the earth are, according to the
Beneš Czechs and Czech Slovaks, "nazis, traltors, fasclsts, enemles
or democracy," etc. In 1946, Dr. Edward Beneš frankly told a Slovak
delegatlon why the Czechs are fightlng agalnst Slovak lndependence,
when he sald:
"The Czechs cannot accept under any circum1tance1 an independent Slovakla in the future . . . . The Czechs, having on the
one side 70 million Germans, must on the other aide have Ru11ia
as their neighbor. Therefore, they could not accept an independent
Slovakia. Thia ia a vital problem for the exiatence of the Czechs
as a nation and a state and that ia also the le11on of Munich..•."
Czech emlgratlon, holding to thls polltlcal legacy of Beneš,
reallzes that the greatest lmpedlment to lts efforts are patrlotlc Slo·
vaks In exile. Slovaks can appreciate Benei's concern for the Czecha,
but they, too, are concerned about thelr own national existence. The
statement made by Beneš certalnly has nothlng In common with democracy. It remlnds us of Adolph Hitler who thought that all natlons
of centra) and eastern Europe should be deprlved of freedom and In•
dependence and forced to serve the lnterests of the German natlon. It
also remlnds us of Stalln who would enslave the whole world and force
all natlons to serve the lnterests of godless communlsm.
Slovak patrlots stand In the way of thls Czech lmperlallst dream.
so the followers or Beneš are determlned to annlhllate them at all
costs. That explalns why they accuse the Slovaks of belng nazls and
fasclsts. That also explains thelr rldlculous accus atlon that the Slo-
58
SLOVA:KIA
vaks in exile are not fighting for democracy, but for the renewal
ot fasclsm In centra! Europe.
Undoubtedly it is not necessary to stress that thls flght agalnst
Slovak emigrants 1s immoral and undemocratlc, because lts goal is
immoral and undemocratlc. To want to deprive the S lovak nation of
the right to freedom and independence because the interests of the
Czechs "as a nation and a state" demand it, that is a manifestatlon
of the most brutal lmperialism - such as even the Germans did not
perpetrate against the Slovaks. Can anyone of sane mind expect the
Slovaks In exile to agree to commit national sulclde?
It !s not so much the past that separates the Slovaks and Czechs
in emigration as the fact that while the Slovak exiles are fighting for
freedom and democracy In centra! Europe, the Czech exlles headed
by Zenkl, Ripka and Papánek are fighting, in the first place, to prevent the Slovaks from attaining freedom and independence. The main
task of the Czech exiles is not the fight against Communism, but the
fight against the Slovaks, who want the Slovak natlon to be fully free
and happy in lts own democratic state.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT ?
"Slmul<taneously we accepted the principle tha,t only our people
e.t home have the righit to dedde the maln problems o! our Interne.!
policy, and Lhat also the relation between the Cechs and Slovaks be
decided in the future state only a,t home, based on the princíple of
C.OMPLETE EQUALITY Of both Czechs and Slove.ka and that it be
done in a free, democratic way and In complete brotherly agreement.
These were the maln prlnciples on whlch we have bullt our movement for liberation. This ideology of our struggle !or Jiberat!on, CONNECTED WITH OUR COMPLETE PRO-SOVIET ORIENTATION, and
our ideology or the second World War In general was one of the main
causes !or the success or the entire 81.ruggle." - (Dr. Beneš, Broadcaat to the Czechoslovak people, Prague, May 16, 1946) .
•
There 1s no Russian "iron curtain" in Czechoslovakia. . . . Every.
one is free to enter Czechoslovakia and to come and go as he pleases,
to see what he wants to see and hear what he wants to hear. Further.
more Czechs and Slovaks are MAST ERS in their own country. T here
is no Russlan army on Czechoslovak soil and Moscow IS NOT INTERFERING with Czechoslovak interna! affairs. . . . The press,
radio, the school and the church are FREE to carry on their activities
AS BEFORE." - (Dr. Kenneth D. Milier, president o! the New Yvrk
City Mlsslon Society, In an address at the weekly church nlght dinner at the First Presb)"tertan Church, 124 Henry Street, New York
City, published In tihe BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, Nov. 12, 1947) .
•
"I agree wlth you rully that our alllance with the SOVIET UNION
will belp us to a better secur ity or FREEDOM in t he future, and I am
happy to have seen our politlcal orlentatir FROM THE BEGINNING
OF THIS WAR and to have acted accordlngly." - (Dr. Beneš, Reply
to a message from the Slov-ak Natlonal Council In Košice, London,
March 2, 1946).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Our Fight for Democracy and Independence
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951
pp. 56-58
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
May 1951
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001
SNK
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/de135378ad4bce1b596e24d63b7d3cd6.pdf
e9d2cd9f01c7062306feed2915186794
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
59
ABOUT THE COUNCll, OF FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA
( J k) - Thirty years ago Czech political exiles adopted the motto:
"Truth Prevails." At that tíme T. G. Masaryk led the fight to establish
á common state of two legally equal natlons the Czechs and the
Slovaks. ;Masaryk, we know, was successful, and Czecho•Slovakia
was born after World War I.
After Masaryk two generatlons went to battle under this motto.
But the motto "Truth Prevails" has backflred on them. The truth did
i,revail, but at the expense of Czech emigratlon and against its intentions. Recently it happened to the Czech emigranta and their Slovak
fellow•travelers organized in tbe so-called "Council of Free Czechoslovakia."
The institution was presented by lts founders as loyal to democracy and fighting for democracy, and lts members and dlrectors
pose as martyrs of democracy.. Under tbls disguise they got into the
USA. But tbe truth will out! Some of the more serious Czech emigranta, who do not have their hands sullied by collaborating wlth
the Communistš, decided to tear the mask of lies from the faces of
the leaders of the Council of Free Czecboslovakia.
A leading Czech journalist, the eminent Dr. Helen Koželuh found
that the CFC was an undemocratic and totalitarian lnstitution and
its representatives were responsible for many crimes, as well as collaboring with Communism. She tells in detail why she did so in an
article published in "Návrat" (THE RETURN), Paris. It would be interesting to reproduce the whole article, but space In the SLOVAK
NEWSLETTER ls limited. A few paragraphs, that fully cliaracterlze
the people and the policy of the Council, ought to convince our
readers that the SN was right In its appraisal of the CFC right
from the start.
"The CFC (Council of Free Czechoslovakla) is a totalitarian and
undemocratic instltutlon," writes Dr. Koželub. "1 am a conflrmed democrat. I have no right to remain in this organlzation. I had some
justificatlon as long as I could have the lmpresslon that the will to
amend its ways did exist. Evidently the CFC had no intentlons of
amending its ways and I would have to Ile if I wanted to state that
I belleve otherwise. Certainly I am sorry that I cannot recognlze the
CFC as a uniform reslstance organ, because I know that lt would be
well if a uniform reslstance organ could exist. However, I cannot
give preference to unity before democracy, because experlence has
1aught us that we fled from uniformity and because of the loss of
democracy."
"I made a mistake - and this I confess openly - that I dld not
at first deduce the consequences from the fact that the CFC is not a
democratlc organ, but a seJf.appointed continuer of the NATIONAL
FRONT, and that not only wlth lts representatives, but with lts ideology as well. The spirit of the Košice program, agalnst whlch I
fought In valn at horne t.nd trom which I was fortunate to escape,
has conquered In the CFC. It would be not only illogical, but also
dlshonest to support that which I rightly cons!dered as the rulnation
of any natlon."
�60
SLOVAKIA
That 1s wbat Dr. Koželuh thlnks of the CFC as an lnstltulton. She
also had sometblng to say about lts representatlves:
"I wanted to belleve that the people, wbo were members ot the
Natlonal Front and had approved the Košice program, reallzed that
tbey had blundered and committed many mlstakes and tbat tbey
would endeavor to make amends for the crlmes whlch tbey h ad unanlmously a11proved elther because of thelr lnsurtlclency or thelr !nl:Ufflclent understandlng. lt is true that the full measure of responsibility for everything that has happened or is happening in our country falls on the government and polltieal faetors of the Natlonal Front.
There ia no argument about the faet that the Communist Party at
horne was in the minority and eould always have been outvoted. How-
ever, tbat dld not happen, so, we can safely say that all laws, regul atlons and decrees were passed by non-Communist votes, tbat 1s the
votes ot those (the CFC) who now want to rule here, judge us and
make declslons over us."
Dr. Helen Koželuh also says that the factors of the National
F'ront "knew well tha.t t h elr own partles could oust them from the
Jeadershlp ot th elr respectlve partles for their past catastrophic
blunders and, so, they procla.lmed themselves as personalltles Independent of thelr parttes and, therefore, unsea.table. Thls ls perhaps
the flrst ca.se In hlstory where people proclaimed themselves as
personalities because thelr work proved to be bad and rulnous for
the na.tlon. Undoubtedly, they could not expect others to do that for
them and, therefore, these bunglers by mutual agreement elevated
themselves mutually to the posltlon of personalltles. I proclalm wlth
a full knowledge ot responslblllty that thls shady undertaklng ls the
most foollsh and most transparent attempt to decelve thelr own and
other polltlcal partles that has ever happenetl and only a fool would
be taken In and belleve lt."
The above should be sufflclent to condemn the lnstttutlon ot
collaborators wlth Communlsm who are responslble for tbe bloody
tragedy of the Czech and Slovak natlons, for all the crlmes and murders commltted In Bohemla and In Slovakla slnce 1945.
•
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
" Benei defends tie w i th Russla. - Dec. 2ó. - Presltlent Edward
Beneš advlsed Czechos'ovak pollticians In a broad.cast last night to
avold maklng a bitter parliamentary eampaign lssue of the nation's
alllanee with Russia. The Pres!dent, relteratlng a promlse ot l'ree, sec•
ret e lectlons next spr!ng, sa!d that alllan-ce w!th Russla should be regarded as a CORNERSTONE OF CZECH OSLOVAKIA'S POLICY."
- NEW YORK TIMES, 12-26-4ó.
•
"Londo'n, Feb. 19. - The Czecboslovak Government In Exile w!ll
leave London next week for Koelce In Slovak!a, wbere a temporary
capltal wlll be establlshed unt!I Prague !s treed. The group wlll travel
via MOSCOW. T bls fact gave rise to ERRONEOUS reports tbat wbile
there P resldent Eduard Benes would consult the Soviet Government
about the eompoaltlon of his Government. Thls was flatly denled by
the Government bere." - NEW YORK TIMES. 2-20-46.
�
SLOVAKIA
59
ABOUT THE COUNCll, OF FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA
( J k) - Thirty years ago Czech political exiles adopted the motto:
"Truth Prevails." At that tíme T. G. Masaryk led the fight to establish
á common state of two legally equal natlons the Czechs and the
Slovaks. ;Masaryk, we know, was successful, and Czecho•Slovakia
was born after World War I.
After Masaryk two generatlons went to battle under this motto.
But the motto "Truth Prevails" has backflred on them. The truth did
i,revail, but at the expense of Czech emigratlon and against its intentions. Recently it happened to the Czech emigranta and their Slovak
fellow•travelers organized in tbe so-called "Council of Free Czechoslovakia."
The institution was presented by lts founders as loyal to democracy and fighting for democracy, and lts members and dlrectors
pose as martyrs of democracy.. Under tbls disguise they got into the
USA. But tbe truth will out! Some of the more serious Czech emigranta, who do not have their hands sullied by collaborating wlth
the Communistš, decided to tear the mask of lies from the faces of
the leaders of the Council of Free Czecboslovakia.
A leading Czech journalist, the eminent Dr. Helen Koželuh found
that the CFC was an undemocratic and totalitarian lnstitution and
its representatives were responsible for many crimes, as well as collaboring with Communism. She tells in detail why she did so in an
article published in "Návrat" (THE RETURN), Paris. It would be interesting to reproduce the whole article, but space In the SLOVAK
NEWSLETTER ls limited. A few paragraphs, that fully cliaracterlze
the people and the policy of the Council, ought to convince our
readers that the SN was right In its appraisal of the CFC right
from the start.
"The CFC (Council of Free Czechoslovakla) is a totalitarian and
undemocratic instltutlon," writes Dr. Koželub. "1 am a conflrmed democrat. I have no right to remain in this organlzation. I had some
justificatlon as long as I could have the lmpresslon that the will to
amend its ways did exist. Evidently the CFC had no intentlons of
amending its ways and I would have to Ile if I wanted to state that
I belleve otherwise. Certainly I am sorry that I cannot recognlze the
CFC as a uniform reslstance organ, because I know that lt would be
well if a uniform reslstance organ could exist. However, I cannot
give preference to unity before democracy, because experlence has
1aught us that we fled from uniformity and because of the loss of
democracy."
"I made a mistake - and this I confess openly - that I dld not
at first deduce the consequences from the fact that the CFC is not a
democratlc organ, but a seJf.appointed continuer of the NATIONAL
FRONT, and that not only wlth lts representatives, but with lts ideology as well. The spirit of the Košice program, agalnst whlch I
fought In valn at horne t.nd trom which I was fortunate to escape,
has conquered In the CFC. It would be not only illogical, but also
dlshonest to support that which I rightly cons!dered as the rulnation
of any natlon."
�60
SLOVAKIA
That 1s wbat Dr. Koželuh thlnks of the CFC as an lnstltulton. She
also had sometblng to say about lts representatlves:
"I wanted to belleve that the people, wbo were members ot the
Natlonal Front and had approved the Košice program, reallzed that
tbey had blundered and committed many mlstakes and tbat tbey
would endeavor to make amends for the crlmes whlch tbey h ad unanlmously a11proved elther because of thelr lnsurtlclency or thelr !nl:Ufflclent understandlng. lt is true that the full measure of responsibility for everything that has happened or is happening in our country falls on the government and polltieal faetors of the Natlonal Front.
There ia no argument about the faet that the Communist Party at
horne was in the minority and eould always have been outvoted. How-
ever, tbat dld not happen, so, we can safely say that all laws, regul atlons and decrees were passed by non-Communist votes, tbat 1s the
votes ot those (the CFC) who now want to rule here, judge us and
make declslons over us."
Dr. Helen Koželuh also says that the factors of the National
F'ront "knew well tha.t t h elr own partles could oust them from the
Jeadershlp ot th elr respectlve partles for their past catastrophic
blunders and, so, they procla.lmed themselves as personalltles Independent of thelr parttes and, therefore, unsea.table. Thls ls perhaps
the flrst ca.se In hlstory where people proclaimed themselves as
personalities because thelr work proved to be bad and rulnous for
the na.tlon. Undoubtedly, they could not expect others to do that for
them and, therefore, these bunglers by mutual agreement elevated
themselves mutually to the posltlon of personalltles. I proclalm wlth
a full knowledge ot responslblllty that thls shady undertaklng ls the
most foollsh and most transparent attempt to decelve thelr own and
other polltlcal partles that has ever happenetl and only a fool would
be taken In and belleve lt."
The above should be sufflclent to condemn the lnstttutlon ot
collaborators wlth Communlsm who are responslble for tbe bloody
tragedy of the Czech and Slovak natlons, for all the crlmes and murders commltted In Bohemla and In Slovakla slnce 1945.
•
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
" Benei defends tie w i th Russla. - Dec. 2ó. - Presltlent Edward
Beneš advlsed Czechos'ovak pollticians In a broad.cast last night to
avold maklng a bitter parliamentary eampaign lssue of the nation's
alllanee with Russia. The Pres!dent, relteratlng a promlse ot l'ree, sec•
ret e lectlons next spr!ng, sa!d that alllan-ce w!th Russla should be regarded as a CORNERSTONE OF CZECH OSLOVAKIA'S POLICY."
- NEW YORK TIMES, 12-26-4ó.
•
"Londo'n, Feb. 19. - The Czecboslovak Government In Exile w!ll
leave London next week for Koelce In Slovak!a, wbere a temporary
capltal wlll be establlshed unt!I Prague !s treed. The group wlll travel
via MOSCOW. T bls fact gave rise to ERRONEOUS reports tbat wbile
there P resldent Eduard Benes would consult the Soviet Government
about the eompoaltlon of his Government. Thls was flatly denled by
the Government bere." - NEW YORK TIMES. 2-20-46.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA 59 ABOUT THE COUNCll, OF FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA ( J k) - Thirty years ago Czech political exiles adopted the motto: "Truth Prevails." At that tíme T. G. Masaryk led the fight to establish á common state of two legally equal natlons the Czechs and the Slovaks. ;Masaryk, we know, was successful, and Czecho•Slovakia was born after World War I. After Masaryk two generatlons went to battle under this motto. But the motto "Truth Prevails" has backflred on them. The truth did i,revail, but at the expense of Czech emigratlon and against its intentions. Recently it happened to the Czech emigranta and their Slovak fellow•travelers organized in tbe so-called "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." The institution was presented by lts founders as loyal to democracy and fighting for democracy, and lts members and dlrectors pose as martyrs of democracy.. Under tbls disguise they got into the USA. But tbe truth will out! Some of the more serious Czech emigranta, who do not have their hands sullied by collaborating wlth the Communistš, decided to tear the mask of lies from the faces of the leaders of the Council of Free Czecboslovakia. A leading Czech journalist, the eminent Dr. Helen Koželuh found that the CFC was an undemocratic and totalitarian lnstitution and its representatives were responsible for many crimes, as well as collaboring with Communism. She tells in detail why she did so in an article published in "Návrat" (THE RETURN), Paris. It would be interesting to reproduce the whole article, but space In the SLOVAK NEWSLETTER ls limited. A few paragraphs, that fully cliaracterlze the people and the policy of the Council, ought to convince our readers that the SN was right In its appraisal of the CFC right from the start. "The CFC (Council of Free Czechoslovakla) is a totalitarian and undemocratic instltutlon," writes Dr. Koželub. "1 am a conflrmed democrat. I have no right to remain in this organlzation. I had some justificatlon as long as I could have the lmpresslon that the will to amend its ways did exist. Evidently the CFC had no intentlons of amending its ways and I would have to Ile if I wanted to state that I belleve otherwise. Certainly I am sorry that I cannot recognlze the CFC as a uniform reslstance organ, because I know that lt would be well if a uniform reslstance organ could exist. However, I cannot give preference to unity before democracy, because experlence has 1aught us that we fled from uniformity and because of the loss of democracy." "I made a mistake - and this I confess openly - that I dld not at first deduce the consequences from the fact that the CFC is not a democratlc organ, but a seJf.appointed continuer of the NATIONAL FRONT, and that not only wlth lts representatives, but with lts ideology as well. The spirit of the Košice program, agalnst whlch I fought In valn at horne t.nd trom which I was fortunate to escape, has conquered In the CFC. It would be not only illogical, but also dlshonest to support that which I rightly cons!dered as the rulnation of any natlon." 60 SLOVAKIA That 1s wbat Dr. Koželuh thlnks of the CFC as an lnstltulton. She also had sometblng to say about lts representatlves: "I wanted to belleve that the people, wbo were members ot the Natlonal Front and had approved the Košice program, reallzed that tbey had blundered and committed many mlstakes and tbat tbey would endeavor to make amends for the crlmes whlch tbey h ad unanlmously a11proved elther because of thelr lnsurtlclency or thelr !nl:Ufflclent understandlng. lt is true that the full measure of responsibility for everything that has happened or is happening in our country falls on the government and polltieal faetors of the Natlonal Front. There ia no argument about the faet that the Communist Party at horne was in the minority and eould always have been outvoted. How- ever, tbat dld not happen, so, we can safely say that all laws, regul atlons and decrees were passed by non-Communist votes, tbat 1s the votes ot those (the CFC) who now want to rule here, judge us and make declslons over us." Dr. Helen Koželuh also says that the factors of the National F'ront "knew well tha.t t h elr own partles could oust them from the Jeadershlp ot th elr respectlve partles for their past catastrophic blunders and, so, they procla.lmed themselves as personalltles Independent of thelr parttes and, therefore, unsea.table. Thls ls perhaps the flrst ca.se In hlstory where people proclaimed themselves as personalities because thelr work proved to be bad and rulnous for the na.tlon. Undoubtedly, they could not expect others to do that for them and, therefore, these bunglers by mutual agreement elevated themselves mutually to the posltlon of personalltles. I proclalm wlth a full knowledge ot responslblllty that thls shady undertaklng ls the most foollsh and most transparent attempt to decelve thelr own and other polltlcal partles that has ever happenetl and only a fool would be taken In and belleve lt." The above should be sufflclent to condemn the lnstttutlon ot collaborators wlth Communlsm who are responslble for tbe bloody tragedy of the Czech and Slovak natlons, for all the crlmes and murders commltted In Bohemla and In Slovakla slnce 1945. • • • • WHO SAID IT? " Benei defends tie w i th Russla. - Dec. 2ó. - Presltlent Edward Beneš advlsed Czechos'ovak pollticians In a broad.cast last night to avold maklng a bitter parliamentary eampaign lssue of the nation's alllanee with Russia. The Pres!dent, relteratlng a promlse ot l'ree, sec• ret e lectlons next spr!ng, sa!d that alllan-ce w!th Russla should be regarded as a CORNERSTONE OF CZECH OSLOVAKIA'S POLICY." - NEW YORK TIMES, 12-26-4ó. • "Londo'n, Feb. 19. - The Czecboslovak Government In Exile w!ll leave London next week for Koelce In Slovak!a, wbere a temporary capltal wlll be establlshed unt!I Prague !s treed. The group wlll travel via MOSCOW. T bls fact gave rise to ERRONEOUS reports tbat wbile there P resldent Eduard Benes would consult the Soviet Government about the eompoaltlon of his Government. Thls was flatly denled by the Government bere." - NEW YORK TIMES. 2-20-46.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
About the Council of Free Czechoslovakia
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951
pp. 59-60
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
May 1951
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5dd66bc6cf625bb29ac28ec7a9800065.pdf
0c3354164566bf13826593df39835ab0
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
61
TRUTH AND LEGEND ABOUT
THE ORIGIN OF CZEOHO-SLOVA.KIA
(Jk) On October 28th some ot the Bene§ Czechs and the
so-calJed Czech Slovaks (Czechoslovaks ! ) celebrated the 32nd anniversary of the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic. Patrlotlc
and democratlc Czechs and Slovaks, however, had nothlng to celebrate on that date. In fact, they were glad to forget about it.
And yet, less than flfteen years ago that day was a Slovak holiday. Of course, the majority of the Slovak natlon already then dld
not celebrate the event wlth enthusiasm, because the short-sighted
policy of the Prague reglmes had been unbel!evably successful in making enemies of the entlre non-Czech populatlon - the majority of the
population of Czecho-Slovakia - and especially of the Slovaks. But
even under the prevailing clrcumstances, the Slovaks still were In
favor of the Czechoslovak Republ!c. And it probably would b e safe to
say that the Slovaks at home were as much for Czechoslovakia at
that Ume as the Slovaks in the Unlted States, Russia, Italy and the
AJUed fronts were in lts establishment durlng World War I.
A State, however, is not the supreme value in the democratlc and
Christlan books of values. It is, accordlng to modern, democratlc scl•
ence on statecraft, only a means that 1s supposed to make posslble
the physlcal and splrltual Ufe of a natlon. And a natlon must not dle
wlth the support of lnstltutions whlch were ordained to preserve it.
(vd. Paul Janet, HISTOIRE DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE DANS SES
RAPPORTS AVEC LA MORALE, PARIS, 1887).
But the Masaryk and Beneš reglmes did place the Czechoslovak
State above the Slovak natlon. Thelr pol!cy did seek the destructlon
of the Slovak nation. Such a policy certalnly could not be expected to
galn the sympathy of the Slovak people. The Slova.ks reslsted lt resolutely. And that was only natural. The Czech professor, Dr. J. Bušek,
sald the Slovak natlon was performing a mira.cle whlch in no small
measure must be credlted to bad Czech pol!tlcs. The more Prague
oppressed lt, the more self-consclous the Slovak natlon became.
And thls enhanced the pol!tical development of the Slovaks.
The Slovak nation, whlch Dr. Bušek claimed had developed more
in the twenty years withln the framework of Czechoslovakla than 1t
had in the entlre century of Magyar domination, could not be satlsfled wlth a solutlon that prevented its spirltual and materlal expansion. lt traveled the same path taken by other Central-European natlons and wended lts way from cohabltatlon In common unlts to autonomy and then to independence. When the Slova.ks proclalmed their
independence, they were fully aware of the fact that lt was the result of a natural tendency of polltical development, and, therefore,
that they were dolng what was rlght.
October 28, 1918, was a mllestone in the national development of
the Slovaks. But only one of the mllestones marking thelr hlstorlcal
trek from !oss of thelr independence in the tenth century to tbe acqulsltlon of lt aga.In in 1939. March 14, 1939 - Slovak Independence
Day - became the State hollday. The clrcnmstances under which the
Slovak Republlc was born wlll not alter the slgnlficance of thls date
in the least. In tbe la.st centuries, all the states ot centra! and
�62
SLOVAKIA
eastern Europe or!ginated In much the same way. And so dld the
Czechoslovak Republlc.
There exlsts a varlety of legends about the orlgln of the Czechoslovak Republ!c, but the truth !s only one.
THE LEGEND ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Prof. T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Edward Beneš created a legend
about the orlgln of the Czechoslovak Republlc. Accordlng to that
legend, the "Czechoslovak natlon" exlsted already ln the nlnth century. That natlon was overcome by the Germans and Hungarlans, and
the Slovak "branch" was separated from the Czech natlon. After a
thousand years of enslavement, during World War I, Czech Knlghts,
led by Masaryk and Beneš, waged a hero!c struggle against the German and Magyar tyrants and liberated the "Czechoslovak nat!on" and
reestabllshed its independence.
Thls fable was propagated as the holy truth not only at horne,
but also abroad. Here and there slight varlatlons were allowed, but
the substance of the legend always had to remaln the same: the
"Czechoslovak nat!on", after belng subjugated in the nlnth century,
yearned for a thousand years to live In lts own State; lt was llberated by the two Czech heroes, Masaryk and Beneš, who fulfllled the
anclent dream of the unlted "Czechoslovak natlon" for a common
homeland.
A cltlzen of Czechoslovakla doubt!ng thls fable was consldered
a traltor and an enemy ot the State. In bis first publlcatlon for lnternatlonal consumptlon ("Détrulsez l'Autrlche"), Dr. Edward Beneš
had stated that the Czechs and Slovaks were "ONE" natlon, the Slovaks were only a "BRANCH" of the Czech natlon and the Slovak
language was only a "DIALECT" of the Czech language, and so it had
to be, according to Masaryk and Beneš. To seek equallty and justlce
for the Slovavks was punishable, because they were destlned - by
Masaryk and Beneš - to strengthen the number of Czechs and
perish in the Czech nation so that hlstory once might write another
chapter about the heroic exploits of Masaryk and Beneš!
Llfe, however, bls dlspelled that legend. Just as !t has the rest
of the Czech attempts to falslfy history, whether "manuscripts" or
any other famous deeds were concerned which were supposed to be
the foundat!on of the greatness and clalms of some Czech generation.
Llfe does not respect historical romantlclsms and does not confuse
them with reality. It has its own laws and evolutionary ways, and
these hold even in the case of Czechoslovakia. Truth has prevalled,
lndeed, but lt was not the truth acclalmed by Masaryk, who even
"orlginated" the wlsdom that "States are preserved by the ldeas
whlch origlnated them" by borrowlng lt from Sallust!
THE TRUTH ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
A part of the Czech emlgration - the Beneš Czechs and the
Czech Slovaks - are trylng to revlve the fable of the orlgin of the
Czechoslovak Republic, the mlsslon of Czechoslovakla and the "Czechoslovak Republlc, the misslon of Czechoslovakla and the "Czechoslovak natlon." But the truth remalns what lt was: t he Czechoslovak
Republic did not come lnto being as the result of a 1000-year-old
struggle of the " Czechoslovak natlon", because such a nation never
�SLOVAK IA
63
existed. International conditio ns, and especially the intervention of
France, were responslble for lts origin. Of course, smooth, perslstent
propaganda has beclouded the truth and supported the legend.
The same Dr. Edwar d Beneš - w ho in 1916 pr oposed to "Destroy
Austria" and created t he fable th at Czechoslovakla was t h e result of
a 1000-year-old struggle of the "Czechoslovak nat!on" - just a few
years prior to that time wrote in his book "Le Probléme Autrich en
et la Question Tcheque" that he dld not belleve Austria would collapse, b ecause In Bohemla " they saw in independence the greatest
dange r to national existence and, with the exception of a few radicals,
this was the opinion of all sensible (Czech ) politici.ins."
This stand of the Czech natlon, no t even mentloníng that of
the Slovak nation, did not change even after Masaryk and Beneš
went ab road In 1916 to begin the cam paign for the creatlon of a
Czechoslovak Republlc. During the entire first World War, Czech
politlclans and cultural leaders contlnued to p roclaim thelr loyalty to
Austria.
"Närodni Listy," one of the leading Czech papers, wrote early in
1917: " lt is amazing how indefatigably Masaryk endeavors to defile
the honor of the Czec h nation. The enemies have lcarned that the
love of a ll Austrian peoples for their inherited dynasty and their
Fatherland is firm and unshakab le. The enemies ha ve realized that
those who abroad make contradictory statements are liars and
impostors."
Late in 1916, a ll the Czech par t!es In t he Austrlan parllament,
without a slngle exception, lssued a solem n declaration: "The basis
a nd guaranty of the national existence of the Czech people are the
dynasty, called to the throne centuries ago, and the indivisibly constituted Monarchy."
And in J anuary 1917, the assoclation of Czech members of par llament sent the following letter to the forelgn minister of AustriaH ungary: "In view of the Allied answer to Preside nt Wilson in which
the liberatlon of the Czechs figures as a war aim, we reject this lnsinuation which is based on entirely erroneous assumptions. We declare emphatically that the Czech people, as always in the past,
is convinced that it can be assured of a prosperous deve lopment only
un der th e Habsburg scepter and within the Habsburg Monarchy."
T he same part!es asked P rime Ministe r Clam-Mar tlnitz, a Czech
hlmself, to arrange an audlence with the emperor, becau se "we want
to teli His Majesty, that we shall always stand by him and his successors; that our d emands shall a lways be compatible wlth the interests of the Habsburg dynasty and of the realm ; that we are
loyal servants of King and Country, that our complaints have never
s haken our belief that after victory the c laims of the Czech people
shali find satisfaction w ithin the framework of the rea lm and under
the Habsburg crown."
Furthermore, the delegates of the Czech soclalists a t the Stockholm Conference or the Socialist In ternatlonal, In J u ne 1917, volced
t heir demand for " a n indepe nde nt Czec h State w ithin a federated
Austria-Hungary."
AU this caused F. Peroutka, Czech journallst, to ,v-rlte the f ollowing sad commentary in bis book "Budováni státu" (Buildlng of the
State): "In all these manlfestations the one essential lack ln g generally
�64
S LOVAKIA.
was: a clearly expre11ed w ill for freedom. T helr leading motlve was
a perslstent effort to have the Austrlan Government recognlze the
Joyalty of the Czech nation. During the three years (1914-1917), from
what was resoundlng at home, lt was not possible to prove even
weakly that the nation at home had any sympathies for the action
abroad. lt would be muc h eaaler t o pr ove that t he a ction abroad w as
repudiate d by th ese manifeatatlon1."
Prof. Bohdan Chudoba, a representative of the younger Czech
lntellectuals. states only an objectlve truth, the reality, when he says
that the proclamation of the Czechoslovak Republic "was a rather
unexpected event." Thomas Masaryk, contlnues Prof. Chudoba, contlnued to assure "the leadlng American personalltles as late as the
summer of 1918 that there would not be any partltlon of the Habsburg monarchy. Even the manlfesto of the Czech wrlters, lssued In
May, 1917, a very radlcal declaration, dld not mention an independent
State. And the tenth of Presldent Wllson's famous fourteen polnts
spoke only of an autonomous development of the peoples of AustrlaH ungary."
And that !s how lt actually was.
T he forelgn activlty of the Czechs and Slovaks, in whlch American Slovaks along wlth Gen. M. R. štefá.nlk and t he Slovak leglonalres
played a major role, was not very successful as far as the matter of
the so-called "Czechoslovak natlon' 'was concerned. In the flrst place,
there was no such nation and, secondly, the Czechs were voclferously proclalming thelr loyalty to Austria. In Slovakla there was pol!tlcal
stagnatlon.
The destructlon of the Habsburg Monarchy was favored by French
polltlclans, especlally by Clemenceau. To weaken Germany and galn
allles In centra! Europe In J uly 1918, the French supported the pian
to establlsh natlonal States on the rulns of Austrla-Hungary. The
prlnciple of the rlght of self-determlnatlon was supposed to be t he
basis of thls dlv1slon of the Habsburg Monarchy. Thls, however, was
not adhered to and the new organization of centra! Europe, ot whlch
the Czechoslovak Republic and Yugoslavla were supposed to be the
bulwark, proved ltself lncapable of preservatlon and collapsed wlth
the flrst attack from the outslde.
Czechoslovakla fell flrst. No one defended her. And when the
Republlc was reestabllshed In 1945, by the grace ot Moscow, and
annexed by the very same Moscow In 1948, agaln not a slngle shot
was flred In her defense, nay, not even a slngle manly protest was
made In the defense of Czechoslovakla.
Why should the Slovaks want to live In such a State? And why
1Should they celebrate the annlversary of lts orlgin? In the Ufe of the
Slovak natlon, the Czechoslovak State was an lmportant mllestone.
They attalned much In Czechoslovakla, but never as much as they
were entltled to and as much as they mlght attaln In thelr own Independent State In an European or Centra! European federatlon .
• • •
GET THE STORY ABOUT "CZECHOSLOVAK DEMOCRACY"
FROM THE PIOOPLE WHO SU FFERED UNDER IT AND WERE
PERSECUTED BY TT !
SUBSCRIBE TO T HE. SL OVA K NEWSLETTER AT ONCE !
�
SLOVAKIA
61
TRUTH AND LEGEND ABOUT
THE ORIGIN OF CZEOHO-SLOVA.KIA
(Jk) On October 28th some ot the Bene§ Czechs and the
so-calJed Czech Slovaks (Czechoslovaks ! ) celebrated the 32nd anniversary of the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic. Patrlotlc
and democratlc Czechs and Slovaks, however, had nothlng to celebrate on that date. In fact, they were glad to forget about it.
And yet, less than flfteen years ago that day was a Slovak holiday. Of course, the majority of the Slovak natlon already then dld
not celebrate the event wlth enthusiasm, because the short-sighted
policy of the Prague reglmes had been unbel!evably successful in making enemies of the entlre non-Czech populatlon - the majority of the
population of Czecho-Slovakia - and especially of the Slovaks. But
even under the prevailing clrcumstances, the Slovaks still were In
favor of the Czechoslovak Republ!c. And it probably would b e safe to
say that the Slovaks at home were as much for Czechoslovakia at
that Ume as the Slovaks in the Unlted States, Russia, Italy and the
AJUed fronts were in lts establishment durlng World War I.
A State, however, is not the supreme value in the democratlc and
Christlan books of values. It is, accordlng to modern, democratlc scl•
ence on statecraft, only a means that 1s supposed to make posslble
the physlcal and splrltual Ufe of a natlon. And a natlon must not dle
wlth the support of lnstltutions whlch were ordained to preserve it.
(vd. Paul Janet, HISTOIRE DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE DANS SES
RAPPORTS AVEC LA MORALE, PARIS, 1887).
But the Masaryk and Beneš reglmes did place the Czechoslovak
State above the Slovak natlon. Thelr pol!cy did seek the destructlon
of the Slovak nation. Such a policy certalnly could not be expected to
galn the sympathy of the Slovak people. The Slova.ks reslsted lt resolutely. And that was only natural. The Czech professor, Dr. J. Bušek,
sald the Slovak natlon was performing a mira.cle whlch in no small
measure must be credlted to bad Czech pol!tlcs. The more Prague
oppressed lt, the more self-consclous the Slovak natlon became.
And thls enhanced the pol!tical development of the Slovaks.
The Slovak nation, whlch Dr. Bušek claimed had developed more
in the twenty years withln the framework of Czechoslovakla than 1t
had in the entlre century of Magyar domination, could not be satlsfled wlth a solutlon that prevented its spirltual and materlal expansion. lt traveled the same path taken by other Central-European natlons and wended lts way from cohabltatlon In common unlts to autonomy and then to independence. When the Slova.ks proclalmed their
independence, they were fully aware of the fact that lt was the result of a natural tendency of polltical development, and, therefore,
that they were dolng what was rlght.
October 28, 1918, was a mllestone in the national development of
the Slovaks. But only one of the mllestones marking thelr hlstorlcal
trek from !oss of thelr independence in the tenth century to tbe acqulsltlon of lt aga.In in 1939. March 14, 1939 - Slovak Independence
Day - became the State hollday. The clrcnmstances under which the
Slovak Republlc was born wlll not alter the slgnlficance of thls date
in the least. In tbe la.st centuries, all the states ot centra! and
�62
SLOVAKIA
eastern Europe or!ginated In much the same way. And so dld the
Czechoslovak Republlc.
There exlsts a varlety of legends about the orlgln of the Czechoslovak Republ!c, but the truth !s only one.
THE LEGEND ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Prof. T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Edward Beneš created a legend
about the orlgln of the Czechoslovak Republlc. Accordlng to that
legend, the "Czechoslovak natlon" exlsted already ln the nlnth century. That natlon was overcome by the Germans and Hungarlans, and
the Slovak "branch" was separated from the Czech natlon. After a
thousand years of enslavement, during World War I, Czech Knlghts,
led by Masaryk and Beneš, waged a hero!c struggle against the German and Magyar tyrants and liberated the "Czechoslovak nat!on" and
reestabllshed its independence.
Thls fable was propagated as the holy truth not only at horne,
but also abroad. Here and there slight varlatlons were allowed, but
the substance of the legend always had to remaln the same: the
"Czechoslovak nat!on", after belng subjugated in the nlnth century,
yearned for a thousand years to live In lts own State; lt was llberated by the two Czech heroes, Masaryk and Beneš, who fulfllled the
anclent dream of the unlted "Czechoslovak natlon" for a common
homeland.
A cltlzen of Czechoslovakla doubt!ng thls fable was consldered
a traltor and an enemy ot the State. In bis first publlcatlon for lnternatlonal consumptlon ("Détrulsez l'Autrlche"), Dr. Edward Beneš
had stated that the Czechs and Slovaks were "ONE" natlon, the Slovaks were only a "BRANCH" of the Czech natlon and the Slovak
language was only a "DIALECT" of the Czech language, and so it had
to be, according to Masaryk and Beneš. To seek equallty and justlce
for the Slovavks was punishable, because they were destlned - by
Masaryk and Beneš - to strengthen the number of Czechs and
perish in the Czech nation so that hlstory once might write another
chapter about the heroic exploits of Masaryk and Beneš!
Llfe, however, bls dlspelled that legend. Just as !t has the rest
of the Czech attempts to falslfy history, whether "manuscripts" or
any other famous deeds were concerned which were supposed to be
the foundat!on of the greatness and clalms of some Czech generation.
Llfe does not respect historical romantlclsms and does not confuse
them with reality. It has its own laws and evolutionary ways, and
these hold even in the case of Czechoslovakia. Truth has prevalled,
lndeed, but lt was not the truth acclalmed by Masaryk, who even
"orlginated" the wlsdom that "States are preserved by the ldeas
whlch origlnated them" by borrowlng lt from Sallust!
THE TRUTH ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
A part of the Czech emlgration - the Beneš Czechs and the
Czech Slovaks - are trylng to revlve the fable of the orlgin of the
Czechoslovak Republic, the mlsslon of Czechoslovakla and the "Czechoslovak Republlc, the misslon of Czechoslovakla and the "Czechoslovak natlon." But the truth remalns what lt was: t he Czechoslovak
Republic did not come lnto being as the result of a 1000-year-old
struggle of the " Czechoslovak natlon", because such a nation never
�SLOVAK IA
63
existed. International conditio ns, and especially the intervention of
France, were responslble for lts origin. Of course, smooth, perslstent
propaganda has beclouded the truth and supported the legend.
The same Dr. Edwar d Beneš - w ho in 1916 pr oposed to "Destroy
Austria" and created t he fable th at Czechoslovakla was t h e result of
a 1000-year-old struggle of the "Czechoslovak nat!on" - just a few
years prior to that time wrote in his book "Le Probléme Autrich en
et la Question Tcheque" that he dld not belleve Austria would collapse, b ecause In Bohemla " they saw in independence the greatest
dange r to national existence and, with the exception of a few radicals,
this was the opinion of all sensible (Czech ) politici.ins."
This stand of the Czech natlon, no t even mentloníng that of
the Slovak nation, did not change even after Masaryk and Beneš
went ab road In 1916 to begin the cam paign for the creatlon of a
Czechoslovak Republlc. During the entire first World War, Czech
politlclans and cultural leaders contlnued to p roclaim thelr loyalty to
Austria.
"Närodni Listy," one of the leading Czech papers, wrote early in
1917: " lt is amazing how indefatigably Masaryk endeavors to defile
the honor of the Czec h nation. The enemies have lcarned that the
love of a ll Austrian peoples for their inherited dynasty and their
Fatherland is firm and unshakab le. The enemies ha ve realized that
those who abroad make contradictory statements are liars and
impostors."
Late in 1916, a ll the Czech par t!es In t he Austrlan parllament,
without a slngle exception, lssued a solem n declaration: "The basis
a nd guaranty of the national existence of the Czech people are the
dynasty, called to the throne centuries ago, and the indivisibly constituted Monarchy."
And in J anuary 1917, the assoclation of Czech members of par llament sent the following letter to the forelgn minister of AustriaH ungary: "In view of the Allied answer to Preside nt Wilson in which
the liberatlon of the Czechs figures as a war aim, we reject this lnsinuation which is based on entirely erroneous assumptions. We declare emphatically that the Czech people, as always in the past,
is convinced that it can be assured of a prosperous deve lopment only
un der th e Habsburg scepter and within the Habsburg Monarchy."
T he same part!es asked P rime Ministe r Clam-Mar tlnitz, a Czech
hlmself, to arrange an audlence with the emperor, becau se "we want
to teli His Majesty, that we shall always stand by him and his successors; that our d emands shall a lways be compatible wlth the interests of the Habsburg dynasty and of the realm ; that we are
loyal servants of King and Country, that our complaints have never
s haken our belief that after victory the c laims of the Czech people
shali find satisfaction w ithin the framework of the rea lm and under
the Habsburg crown."
Furthermore, the delegates of the Czech soclalists a t the Stockholm Conference or the Socialist In ternatlonal, In J u ne 1917, volced
t heir demand for " a n indepe nde nt Czec h State w ithin a federated
Austria-Hungary."
AU this caused F. Peroutka, Czech journallst, to ,v-rlte the f ollowing sad commentary in bis book "Budováni státu" (Buildlng of the
State): "In all these manlfestations the one essential lack ln g generally
�64
S LOVAKIA.
was: a clearly expre11ed w ill for freedom. T helr leading motlve was
a perslstent effort to have the Austrlan Government recognlze the
Joyalty of the Czech nation. During the three years (1914-1917), from
what was resoundlng at home, lt was not possible to prove even
weakly that the nation at home had any sympathies for the action
abroad. lt would be muc h eaaler t o pr ove that t he a ction abroad w as
repudiate d by th ese manifeatatlon1."
Prof. Bohdan Chudoba, a representative of the younger Czech
lntellectuals. states only an objectlve truth, the reality, when he says
that the proclamation of the Czechoslovak Republic "was a rather
unexpected event." Thomas Masaryk, contlnues Prof. Chudoba, contlnued to assure "the leadlng American personalltles as late as the
summer of 1918 that there would not be any partltlon of the Habsburg monarchy. Even the manlfesto of the Czech wrlters, lssued In
May, 1917, a very radlcal declaration, dld not mention an independent
State. And the tenth of Presldent Wllson's famous fourteen polnts
spoke only of an autonomous development of the peoples of AustrlaH ungary."
And that !s how lt actually was.
T he forelgn activlty of the Czechs and Slovaks, in whlch American Slovaks along wlth Gen. M. R. štefá.nlk and t he Slovak leglonalres
played a major role, was not very successful as far as the matter of
the so-called "Czechoslovak natlon' 'was concerned. In the flrst place,
there was no such nation and, secondly, the Czechs were voclferously proclalming thelr loyalty to Austria. In Slovakla there was pol!tlcal
stagnatlon.
The destructlon of the Habsburg Monarchy was favored by French
polltlclans, especlally by Clemenceau. To weaken Germany and galn
allles In centra! Europe In J uly 1918, the French supported the pian
to establlsh natlonal States on the rulns of Austrla-Hungary. The
prlnciple of the rlght of self-determlnatlon was supposed to be t he
basis of thls dlv1slon of the Habsburg Monarchy. Thls, however, was
not adhered to and the new organization of centra! Europe, ot whlch
the Czechoslovak Republic and Yugoslavla were supposed to be the
bulwark, proved ltself lncapable of preservatlon and collapsed wlth
the flrst attack from the outslde.
Czechoslovakla fell flrst. No one defended her. And when the
Republlc was reestabllshed In 1945, by the grace ot Moscow, and
annexed by the very same Moscow In 1948, agaln not a slngle shot
was flred In her defense, nay, not even a slngle manly protest was
made In the defense of Czechoslovakla.
Why should the Slovaks want to live In such a State? And why
1Should they celebrate the annlversary of lts orlgin? In the Ufe of the
Slovak natlon, the Czechoslovak State was an lmportant mllestone.
They attalned much In Czechoslovakla, but never as much as they
were entltled to and as much as they mlght attaln In thelr own Independent State In an European or Centra! European federatlon .
• • •
GET THE STORY ABOUT "CZECHOSLOVAK DEMOCRACY"
FROM THE PIOOPLE WHO SU FFERED UNDER IT AND WERE
PERSECUTED BY TT !
SUBSCRIBE TO T HE. SL OVA K NEWSLETTER AT ONCE !
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
61
TRUTH AND LEGEND ABOUT
THE ORIGIN OF CZEOHO-SLOVA.KIA
(Jk) On October 28th some ot the Bene§ Czechs and the
so-calJed Czech Slovaks (Czechoslovaks ! ) celebrated the 32nd anniversary of the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic. Patrlotlc
and democratlc Czechs and Slovaks, however, had nothlng to celebrate on that date. In fact, they were glad to forget about it.
And yet, less than flfteen years ago that day was a Slovak holiday. Of course, the majority of the Slovak natlon already then dld
not celebrate the event wlth enthusiasm, because the short-sighted
policy of the Prague reglmes had been unbel!evably successful in making enemies of the entlre non-Czech populatlon - the majority of the
population of Czecho-Slovakia - and especially of the Slovaks. But
even under the prevailing clrcumstances, the Slovaks still were In
favor of the Czechoslovak Republ!c. And it probably would b e safe to
say that the Slovaks at home were as much for Czechoslovakia at
that Ume as the Slovaks in the Unlted States, Russia, Italy and the
AJUed fronts were in lts establishment durlng World War I.
A State, however, is not the supreme value in the democratlc and
Christlan books of values. It is, accordlng to modern, democratlc scl•
ence on statecraft, only a means that 1s supposed to make posslble
the physlcal and splrltual Ufe of a natlon. And a natlon must not dle
wlth the support of lnstltutions whlch were ordained to preserve it.
(vd. Paul Janet, HISTOIRE DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE DANS SES
RAPPORTS AVEC LA MORALE, PARIS, 1887).
But the Masaryk and Beneš reglmes did place the Czechoslovak
State above the Slovak natlon. Thelr pol!cy did seek the destructlon
of the Slovak nation. Such a policy certalnly could not be expected to
galn the sympathy of the Slovak people. The Slova.ks reslsted lt resolutely. And that was only natural. The Czech professor, Dr. J. Bušek,
sald the Slovak natlon was performing a mira.cle whlch in no small
measure must be credlted to bad Czech pol!tlcs. The more Prague
oppressed lt, the more self-consclous the Slovak natlon became.
And thls enhanced the pol!tical development of the Slovaks.
The Slovak nation, whlch Dr. Bušek claimed had developed more
in the twenty years withln the framework of Czechoslovakla than 1t
had in the entlre century of Magyar domination, could not be satlsfled wlth a solutlon that prevented its spirltual and materlal expansion. lt traveled the same path taken by other Central-European natlons and wended lts way from cohabltatlon In common unlts to autonomy and then to independence. When the Slova.ks proclalmed their
independence, they were fully aware of the fact that lt was the result of a natural tendency of polltical development, and, therefore,
that they were dolng what was rlght.
October 28, 1918, was a mllestone in the national development of
the Slovaks. But only one of the mllestones marking thelr hlstorlcal
trek from !oss of thelr independence in the tenth century to tbe acqulsltlon of lt aga.In in 1939. March 14, 1939 - Slovak Independence
Day - became the State hollday. The clrcnmstances under which the
Slovak Republlc was born wlll not alter the slgnlficance of thls date
in the least. In tbe la.st centuries, all the states ot centra! and
62
SLOVAKIA
eastern Europe or!ginated In much the same way. And so dld the
Czechoslovak Republlc.
There exlsts a varlety of legends about the orlgln of the Czechoslovak Republ!c, but the truth !s only one.
THE LEGEND ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Prof. T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Edward Beneš created a legend
about the orlgln of the Czechoslovak Republlc. Accordlng to that
legend, the "Czechoslovak natlon" exlsted already ln the nlnth century. That natlon was overcome by the Germans and Hungarlans, and
the Slovak "branch" was separated from the Czech natlon. After a
thousand years of enslavement, during World War I, Czech Knlghts,
led by Masaryk and Beneš, waged a hero!c struggle against the German and Magyar tyrants and liberated the "Czechoslovak nat!on" and
reestabllshed its independence.
Thls fable was propagated as the holy truth not only at horne,
but also abroad. Here and there slight varlatlons were allowed, but
the substance of the legend always had to remaln the same: the
"Czechoslovak nat!on", after belng subjugated in the nlnth century,
yearned for a thousand years to live In lts own State; lt was llberated by the two Czech heroes, Masaryk and Beneš, who fulfllled the
anclent dream of the unlted "Czechoslovak natlon" for a common
homeland.
A cltlzen of Czechoslovakla doubt!ng thls fable was consldered
a traltor and an enemy ot the State. In bis first publlcatlon for lnternatlonal consumptlon ("Détrulsez l'Autrlche"), Dr. Edward Beneš
had stated that the Czechs and Slovaks were "ONE" natlon, the Slovaks were only a "BRANCH" of the Czech natlon and the Slovak
language was only a "DIALECT" of the Czech language, and so it had
to be, according to Masaryk and Beneš. To seek equallty and justlce
for the Slovavks was punishable, because they were destlned - by
Masaryk and Beneš - to strengthen the number of Czechs and
perish in the Czech nation so that hlstory once might write another
chapter about the heroic exploits of Masaryk and Beneš!
Llfe, however, bls dlspelled that legend. Just as !t has the rest
of the Czech attempts to falslfy history, whether "manuscripts" or
any other famous deeds were concerned which were supposed to be
the foundat!on of the greatness and clalms of some Czech generation.
Llfe does not respect historical romantlclsms and does not confuse
them with reality. It has its own laws and evolutionary ways, and
these hold even in the case of Czechoslovakia. Truth has prevalled,
lndeed, but lt was not the truth acclalmed by Masaryk, who even
"orlginated" the wlsdom that "States are preserved by the ldeas
whlch origlnated them" by borrowlng lt from Sallust!
THE TRUTH ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
A part of the Czech emlgration - the Beneš Czechs and the
Czech Slovaks - are trylng to revlve the fable of the orlgin of the
Czechoslovak Republic, the mlsslon of Czechoslovakla and the "Czechoslovak Republlc, the misslon of Czechoslovakla and the "Czechoslovak natlon." But the truth remalns what lt was: t he Czechoslovak
Republic did not come lnto being as the result of a 1000-year-old
struggle of the " Czechoslovak natlon", because such a nation never
SLOVAK IA
63
existed. International conditio ns, and especially the intervention of
France, were responslble for lts origin. Of course, smooth, perslstent
propaganda has beclouded the truth and supported the legend.
The same Dr. Edwar d Beneš - w ho in 1916 pr oposed to "Destroy
Austria" and created t he fable th at Czechoslovakla was t h e result of
a 1000-year-old struggle of the "Czechoslovak nat!on" - just a few
years prior to that time wrote in his book "Le Probléme Autrich en
et la Question Tcheque" that he dld not belleve Austria would collapse, b ecause In Bohemla " they saw in independence the greatest
dange r to national existence and, with the exception of a few radicals,
this was the opinion of all sensible (Czech ) politici.ins."
This stand of the Czech natlon, no t even mentloníng that of
the Slovak nation, did not change even after Masaryk and Beneš
went ab road In 1916 to begin the cam paign for the creatlon of a
Czechoslovak Republlc. During the entire first World War, Czech
politlclans and cultural leaders contlnued to p roclaim thelr loyalty to
Austria.
"Närodni Listy," one of the leading Czech papers, wrote early in
1917: " lt is amazing how indefatigably Masaryk endeavors to defile
the honor of the Czec h nation. The enemies have lcarned that the
love of a ll Austrian peoples for their inherited dynasty and their
Fatherland is firm and unshakab le. The enemies ha ve realized that
those who abroad make contradictory statements are liars and
impostors."
Late in 1916, a ll the Czech par t!es In t he Austrlan parllament,
without a slngle exception, lssued a solem n declaration: "The basis
a nd guaranty of the national existence of the Czech people are the
dynasty, called to the throne centuries ago, and the indivisibly constituted Monarchy."
And in J anuary 1917, the assoclation of Czech members of par llament sent the following letter to the forelgn minister of AustriaH ungary: "In view of the Allied answer to Preside nt Wilson in which
the liberatlon of the Czechs figures as a war aim, we reject this lnsinuation which is based on entirely erroneous assumptions. We declare emphatically that the Czech people, as always in the past,
is convinced that it can be assured of a prosperous deve lopment only
un der th e Habsburg scepter and within the Habsburg Monarchy."
T he same part!es asked P rime Ministe r Clam-Mar tlnitz, a Czech
hlmself, to arrange an audlence with the emperor, becau se "we want
to teli His Majesty, that we shall always stand by him and his successors; that our d emands shall a lways be compatible wlth the interests of the Habsburg dynasty and of the realm ; that we are
loyal servants of King and Country, that our complaints have never
s haken our belief that after victory the c laims of the Czech people
shali find satisfaction w ithin the framework of the rea lm and under
the Habsburg crown."
Furthermore, the delegates of the Czech soclalists a t the Stockholm Conference or the Socialist In ternatlonal, In J u ne 1917, volced
t heir demand for " a n indepe nde nt Czec h State w ithin a federated
Austria-Hungary."
AU this caused F. Peroutka, Czech journallst, to ,v-rlte the f ollowing sad commentary in bis book "Budováni státu" (Buildlng of the
State): "In all these manlfestations the one essential lack ln g generally
64
S LOVAKIA.
was: a clearly expre11ed w ill for freedom. T helr leading motlve was
a perslstent effort to have the Austrlan Government recognlze the
Joyalty of the Czech nation. During the three years (1914-1917), from
what was resoundlng at home, lt was not possible to prove even
weakly that the nation at home had any sympathies for the action
abroad. lt would be muc h eaaler t o pr ove that t he a ction abroad w as
repudiate d by th ese manifeatatlon1."
Prof. Bohdan Chudoba, a representative of the younger Czech
lntellectuals. states only an objectlve truth, the reality, when he says
that the proclamation of the Czechoslovak Republic "was a rather
unexpected event." Thomas Masaryk, contlnues Prof. Chudoba, contlnued to assure "the leadlng American personalltles as late as the
summer of 1918 that there would not be any partltlon of the Habsburg monarchy. Even the manlfesto of the Czech wrlters, lssued In
May, 1917, a very radlcal declaration, dld not mention an independent
State. And the tenth of Presldent Wllson's famous fourteen polnts
spoke only of an autonomous development of the peoples of AustrlaH ungary."
And that !s how lt actually was.
T he forelgn activlty of the Czechs and Slovaks, in whlch American Slovaks along wlth Gen. M. R. štefá.nlk and t he Slovak leglonalres
played a major role, was not very successful as far as the matter of
the so-called "Czechoslovak natlon' 'was concerned. In the flrst place,
there was no such nation and, secondly, the Czechs were voclferously proclalming thelr loyalty to Austria. In Slovakla there was pol!tlcal
stagnatlon.
The destructlon of the Habsburg Monarchy was favored by French
polltlclans, especlally by Clemenceau. To weaken Germany and galn
allles In centra! Europe In J uly 1918, the French supported the pian
to establlsh natlonal States on the rulns of Austrla-Hungary. The
prlnciple of the rlght of self-determlnatlon was supposed to be t he
basis of thls dlv1slon of the Habsburg Monarchy. Thls, however, was
not adhered to and the new organization of centra! Europe, ot whlch
the Czechoslovak Republic and Yugoslavla were supposed to be the
bulwark, proved ltself lncapable of preservatlon and collapsed wlth
the flrst attack from the outslde.
Czechoslovakla fell flrst. No one defended her. And when the
Republlc was reestabllshed In 1945, by the grace ot Moscow, and
annexed by the very same Moscow In 1948, agaln not a slngle shot
was flred In her defense, nay, not even a slngle manly protest was
made In the defense of Czechoslovakla.
Why should the Slovaks want to live In such a State? And why
1Should they celebrate the annlversary of lts orlgin? In the Ufe of the
Slovak natlon, the Czechoslovak State was an lmportant mllestone.
They attalned much In Czechoslovakla, but never as much as they
were entltled to and as much as they mlght attaln In thelr own Independent State In an European or Centra! European federatlon .
• • •
GET THE STORY ABOUT "CZECHOSLOVAK DEMOCRACY"
FROM THE PIOOPLE WHO SU FFERED UNDER IT AND WERE
PERSECUTED BY TT !
SUBSCRIBE TO T HE. SL OVA K NEWSLETTER AT ONCE !
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Truth and Legend About the Origin of Czecho-Slovakia
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1), May 1951
pp. 61-64
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
May 1951
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f9b44a0bc9f2d8a6194cf8dc60d9da94.pdf
73c53258079388771e6c4b75ee4aad69
PDF Text
Text
Officers of the Slovak League of America
(Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio.)
•
Honnraľy
Preside nt
Rev. John J . Lach
2006 Schrage Ave., Whiting, Ind.
Or. Peter P. H letko
Chicago, lllinois
Joseph Prusa
205 Madison St.. Passaic, N. J.
Pres ident
Michae l Rehak
Philip A . Hrobak
2738 W. 55th St., Chicago 32, 111.
P. O. Box 150, Middletown, Pa.
Vice-President
ADVISORY COUNCIL
Marti n Slimak
Michael J . Vargovich
12511 Madison Avenue
Lakewood 7, Ohio.
National Pľesident
First Catholic Slovak Union
of U. S. A.
Vice-Presideut
Julia Krajcovic
1648 W. 18th Sl., Chicago 8, III.
Helen Kocan
Nationa I President
First Catholic Slovak
Ladies Union
Recording Secretary
Dr. Francis Hrusovsky
10510 Bu<:keye Road
Cleve land 4, Ohio
Frank Bobus
National President
Slovak Catholic Sokol
Financial Secretary
Stephen J. Tkach
Frank J. Gurcak
National President
Peuna. Slovak Union
4755 Baptist Road
Pittsburgh 27, Pa.
Gabriela E. Vavrek
Treasurer
National President
Ladies Pennsylvania
Slovak Union
Stephen Skriba
3235 W. 26th St., Chicago 23, III.
EXECU TIVE COMMITTEE
Martin Cintula
Natlonal P r esideut
Slovak Wreath
of the Free Eagle
Dr. Peter P. Hletko
F'iľst
1943 W. 48th St., Chicago 9, Jll.
Paul P. Jamriska
John Rozboril
810 Montooth Street
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.
National Presideut
Slovak Catholic Cadet Un ion
SLOVAK
NEWSPAPERS
( Affiliated with the Slovak League of America)
JEDNOTA
SLOVENSKÁ OBRANA
ŽENSKÁ JEDNOTA
Middlet own, Pa.
Scranton, Pa.
Cleveland, Ohlo.
BRATSTVO
SLOVENSKÉ
NOVINY
ZORNIČKA
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
Cle veland, Ohio.
Wilkes-Barre, P a.
KATOLÍCKY SOKOL
SVORNOSŤ
Whitaker, Pa.
OSADNÉ HLASY
Chicago, lll.
Passaic, N. J.
�0
šAšriw
TRNAVA
0
�
Officers of the Slovak League of America
(Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio.)
•
Honnraľy
Preside nt
Rev. John J . Lach
2006 Schrage Ave., Whiting, Ind.
Or. Peter P. H letko
Chicago, lllinois
Joseph Prusa
205 Madison St.. Passaic, N. J.
Pres ident
Michae l Rehak
Philip A . Hrobak
2738 W. 55th St., Chicago 32, 111.
P. O. Box 150, Middletown, Pa.
Vice-President
ADVISORY COUNCIL
Marti n Slimak
Michael J . Vargovich
12511 Madison Avenue
Lakewood 7, Ohio.
National Pľesident
First Catholic Slovak Union
of U. S. A.
Vice-Presideut
Julia Krajcovic
1648 W. 18th Sl., Chicago 8, III.
Helen Kocan
Nationa I President
First Catholic Slovak
Ladies Union
Recording Secretary
Dr. Francis Hrusovsky
10510 Bu<:keye Road
Cleve land 4, Ohio
Frank Bobus
National President
Slovak Catholic Sokol
Financial Secretary
Stephen J. Tkach
Frank J. Gurcak
National President
Peuna. Slovak Union
4755 Baptist Road
Pittsburgh 27, Pa.
Gabriela E. Vavrek
Treasurer
National President
Ladies Pennsylvania
Slovak Union
Stephen Skriba
3235 W. 26th St., Chicago 23, III.
EXECU TIVE COMMITTEE
Martin Cintula
Natlonal P r esideut
Slovak Wreath
of the Free Eagle
Dr. Peter P. Hletko
F'iľst
1943 W. 48th St., Chicago 9, Jll.
Paul P. Jamriska
John Rozboril
810 Montooth Street
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.
National Presideut
Slovak Catholic Cadet Un ion
SLOVAK
NEWSPAPERS
( Affiliated with the Slovak League of America)
JEDNOTA
SLOVENSKÁ OBRANA
ŽENSKÁ JEDNOTA
Middlet own, Pa.
Scranton, Pa.
Cleveland, Ohlo.
BRATSTVO
SLOVENSKÉ
NOVINY
ZORNIČKA
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
Cle veland, Ohio.
Wilkes-Barre, P a.
KATOLÍCKY SOKOL
SVORNOSŤ
Whitaker, Pa.
OSADNÉ HLASY
Chicago, lll.
Passaic, N. J.
�0
šAšriw
TRNAVA
0
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1)
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
May 1951
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b72760b77ff4568a403a0d8dea2446bc.pdf
bf73774357287baf814b134699c23b33
PDF Text
Text
�8LOYAK1A is published periodiéally by the Slovak L cague of America,
a cnlturnl and eh ·i(' federnti011 oť Ame1·irans of Slovak des<·ent.
'ľhe
('hief pm·posc of SLOYAKIA
is to lJťomote a better understanding
and apprec·iation of the Slovak nation
and its lon g sh-ug-gle foľ freeclom and
incle penden('e.
As Americ·ans, members of the
81ovak League of America firmly believe t hat the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
ľight to freedom and independence.
'Phe_\. aľe dedicatecl to the cause of the
J\merican \\'U_\' of life, Slovak freedom
and world peace and are determined to
oppose thľ plague oť Commnnism an d
al! otlwr totalitarian political s_vstems.
_\'t'H ľ
Snbsc·ri ption to Slovakia $1.00 J)ťľ
in thf' r. S. J\. - $2.00 elsewher e.
Selld subscriptious to:
SLOYAKIA
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA PR ESS
Middletown, Pa.
�
�8LOYAK1A is published periodiéally by the Slovak L cague of America,
a cnlturnl and eh ·i(' federnti011 oť Ame1·irans of Slovak des<·ent.
'ľhe
('hief pm·posc of SLOYAKIA
is to lJťomote a better understanding
and apprec·iation of the Slovak nation
and its lon g sh-ug-gle foľ freeclom and
incle penden('e.
As Americ·ans, members of the
81ovak League of America firmly believe t hat the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
ľight to freedom and independence.
'Phe_\. aľe dedicatecl to the cause of the
J\merican \\'U_\' of life, Slovak freedom
and world peace and are determined to
oppose thľ plague oť Commnnism an d
al! otlwr totalitarian political s_vstems.
_\'t'H ľ
Snbsc·ri ption to Slovakia $1.00 J)ťľ
in thf' r. S. J\. - $2.00 elsewher e.
Selld subscriptious to:
SLOYAKIA
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA PR ESS
Middletown, Pa.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2)
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/240911e14f80fa5ed63d8c7ff1008704.pdf
7da4603378f53dbfad11508d2b2dba57
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
1
THE BETRAYAL OF SWVAKIA
E DWARD L. DELANEY
{Internatlonally known novelist, speaker, publicist, foreign correspondent, news commentator and world traveler, Edward Delaney 1s
now d!.~closing for audiences throughout the count.ry his on the spot
observat!ons and persona) experlences durlng the war and the subsequent perlod ot "peace:· Many of the vital toplcs of our tlmes are
dealt wlth - plalnly and forcefully. Although bom In Amerlca, he bas
reslded abroad for almost two decades; four years In Asla, Australla,
Hrltlsh India, Dutch East Indies and two years in Afrlca, followed by
extenslve stay.s In Centra) America and several years in Europe. During the war his fact-flndlng travels were from the Baltlc Sea to the
llalkans, trom Paris to Poland, In Germany, Italy, Rumanla, Bu1gana,
Yugoslavla, Hungary and Czechoslovakla when the "Iron Curtaln"
teli. His book "Europe in War Daze" was published In 1948.)
T he presidentlal death rate In Czechoslovakla has been phenomenal. Eduard Benes was the last of three presldents to dle thP.re In
sJlghtly more than three years. Slngularly enough there 1s a surprlsing analogy between certaln of hi.s acts and those ot Dr. Emil Hacha
and Dr. Jozef Tlso. the two who prece<led hlm lnto eternity.
Another singularity ls that Czechoslovakla had lts inceptlon in
this country and lt was due to declsions made here that lt came to an
ignominlous endlng thirty years later.
On May 30, 1918, at whal was afterwards known as the Pittsburgh
Conventio)'l, Czechoslovakia was born. The consensus of opinion
among the foundlng fathers wa.s that by some feat ot Jegerdemain
the age-old differences between Czech1i, Slovaks, Hungarians and Ger·
mans, who comprised the populatlon, were now dlssolved. The agri·
cultural area of Slovakia was fused wlth the industria) reglons ot Bo•
hemia and Moravla and God would bless the bonds.
But soon the slgners of that agreement found they had put too
much falth In God and not enough checks on the natlonall.st alms ot
thelr co-partners. Prague whlch had long been the Czech capltal began to assert authority over the whole state. The autonomy that bad
been guaranteed tbe Slovaks never materlallzed.
With the death of Thomas Masaryk, the couDltry's first president,
Eduard Benes lnberlted hls offlce. The government under hls leader•
shlp sought to relegate the Slovaks to what mlght be regarded as a
pastora) communlty. lndustry, the buslness of government and all the
petty offlclals were to a large extent Czech. The Czech language
would supplant that ot the Slovak minority even in distrlcts where
there were few Czecbs. The matter of "autonomy" could be shelve<1
for an lndeflnite perlod.
As was to be expected there was opposltion from the Slovaks
over the flagrant abandonment ot the pledges made at the Plttsburgh
Conventlon. One fllmsy excuse offered by Prague for lgnorlng that
agreement was that lt had been slgned on a legal hollday In Amerlca
and was therefore not blndlng.
Andrej Hlinka, a parlsh prlest In Ruzomberok, a town ot some rew
thousand populatlon In western Slovak!a, was one ot those ldeallsts
�2
SLOVAKIA
who believed that the precepts or the Sermon on the Mount could be
applied to a nation's problems. His supporters ga!ned nuruencal
strengtb, formed tbe Hlinka Party and allied themselves c losely with
1he next largest political group which, oddly enough, was headed by
a prominent Protestant clergyman. They did not seek to impose their
wlll on the Czechs but regarded it as their patriotlc duty to figbt
!or Slovak lnterests. As one observes tbroughont Europe there is
usually a fine blending or pariotism and natlonallsm.
There were arrests and prison sentences !or those wbo were too
critical of the suzerainty exercised by the Prague govemment. Hlinka,
Dr. Jozef Tiso, bis deputy, Professor Bela Tuka, later Slovak premier,
and otbers tanded in jalls for various periods, cbarged with subversive actlvities.
Had the Pragu.e politicians been more astute, they would have
bridged the gap between Slovak aspirations and Czech impositions.
I.ly not doing so, they pa ved the way for Hitler to $plit the country
in two. The revolt of tbe Slovaks and the overtbrowing of Prague's
authority on March 14, 1939, was ostensibly an interna! affair. It is
~ignificant, however, thait within twenty-four hours after asseľling
their independence they recei ved recogn!tion and guarantee of protection by Gennany from "any foreign power," Hitler's forces marched
into Prague. The sovereignty of Czecboslovakia ceased to exist. Bo•
hemia and Moravla became the ·'Protectorate" of Germany. Slovakia
was regarded as self-determinlng and independent.
Eduard Benes had reslgned as presldent of Czechoslovakia on
October 5, 1938. November thirtieth, following, Dr. Emil Hacha was
elected president of the Republic wilh the felicitations of Benes who
departed for England and later came to America. Dr. Hac ha had accepted a thankless post. lt was utterly hopeless for bim to oppose any
clemands of Germany slnce France and England had reneged on their
pledges of military alliance.
Early in March, 1939, Hitler's scheme for splitting Czechoslovakia in two had been decided upon. Dr. Hacha was summoned to Berlin
and told to sign on the dotted line. Hacha did not go to Berlin of bis
own volition and make compromlslng terms wlth the Nazi dictator.
He was glven no alternative. He submitted.
When he returned to Prague he was but a flgurehead for the
Czechs. Some called bim a collaborator. To associates he declared that
•·co-operation under coerclon 1s not collaboratlon." He remalned as
chief Czech executive after the German occupat!on, agalnst whlch
he was powerless. Governor General Frank, sent there by Hitler, was
supreme. It was generally regarded that Dr. Hacha occupied the position of puppet for the Nazi regime.
The Czechs liked to belleve that Hacha Pxerclsed some influence
in their behalf. Perhaps he dld, Cor the fact remains that until the end
of tbe war living c-ondltlons in the "Protectorate" were better than in
any part of Germany or Austria. For that reason many Germans contrived to go there and live. When the Red Army arrlved in Prague
in May, 1945, Hacha was imprisoned. He was to bave been put through
a form of tria! but he dled before being brought lnto court, thus
cheatlng the Red gallows.
For six years, from March 14, 1939 to April 5, 1945. there were two
�SLOVAKIA
3
presidents in the country that had been and was again to be - In
name at Ieast - Czechoslovak!a.
Andrej Hlinka died in the autumn of 1938. Hls successor, Monsignor Jozef Tiso, deputy head of the Hlinka Party. was also summoned to Berlin that eventful week or .March 1939. Agreements were
entered into a,t Berlin for the recognitíon of Slovakia as a self•determlning republic. Frontlers were established, Tiso was to be tbe
provlslonal president with Bratislava as the capital. The Slovaks felt
they had everything to galn by setting up their own state rather than
to remaln part of Czechoslovakia whlcb Hitler was about to occupy.
The phrase "self-determinaition for small nations" suddenly became
a reality to them.
Although the United States did not offlclally recognlze the new•
bom Republir. of Slovakia, it rlid receive recognition from many countries. no less than seventeen of them opening consulates and leg:ttlons
in Bratislava. People throughout Europe who were faced with realltles
also recognlzed the fact that the state existed.
Viewed dlspassionately and wlthout the bias that must lmpair
a just perspectlve of the Slovak picture, there was glven the country
at that tlme a new out!ook wblch was sometb!ng more than a mirage.
Contrary ito expectations, Germany did not exercise control over the
press, the radlo, their currency or customs. Certain of their national
assets such as coal, timber, beet grow!ng. gotd and silľer mining and
the production of steel and cellulose were brought to higher levels.
Almost over night they began playing a,t the game of capitalism,
natlonal!sm, Industria) expansion, educatlon anrl the extremely fntricate
buslness of government. After a tria) and error period some sounrl
progress was recorded. 'ľbe country 1s actually a melange of the medlaeval and modem. Trackless trollies of reťent vintage and motor
c ars of lntrlnsic wortb sbared the streets of Bratislava wlth lumberlng
mule carts. Lad!es in expensive furs rubbed sboulders witb peasant
women In horne made sheep skin coats and cow bide boots.
Because of their favorable trade balance witb other European
countries the people of Slovakia did not want for neťessitles. On tbe
contrary, all during the war. tbey barl many luxurles that were un•
dreamed of by tbe people of Germany and, of course. many of the
occupied areas. Coming from Austrla or Germanr lnto Slovakla was
stepplng into a veritable paradise of food, drink, clotbing and other
com.modities that had long since vanlsbed trom tbe Relch. Knowlng
these things tbe people of Siovakia could not be blamed for declarlng
tbat tbe course adopted by tbeir politlcal leaders had been the best
for them. Tbey never had it so 11,"ood before - or since.
Tbe state had been in existence for nearly four years berore I
had an opportunlty to vlslt Presldent Tlso In the sumptuous old Hungarian palare tbat had been ronverted lnto bis offlclal resictenre.
He was tben In bis mirl-fiftles. Hls black hair had but a few thre~<ls of
grey and bis dark blue eyes radlated energy and keen intere1;t In
whatever he was rloing at the moment
After some general conversation I asked lf it was true. whicb was
cbarged by bis critlcs, that tbe Slovak pollcles were dictate,t by Ger•
many.
"No," he lnsisted. "In forelgn aftairs 011r pollcies are shaped so
tbey do not conflict wltb tbe Axis Powers. 'ľbey turround 118 com•
�4
SLOV.AKIA
pletely. lt would be suiclde to oppose them. But in domestic matters
we form our own pollcies and programs and carry them out. In many
instances they are not in accord with the polictes of Germauy."
ln detail he cited several examples. Thetr system of ťood conser1•atlon and distributtng was VIU!tly different from oither Germany, the
'·Protectorate" or Hungary. They were in disagreement with the
Aryan edicts then in effect in Germany. There were other points on
which they clashed.
Some people in Europe, I told hlm, declared that he and the Slovak Repu,bllc were subject to instructiomi trom the V,a.tican.
"The usual charge ot the uninformed," he replied. ·•1 have no connection with the Vatican, other than through the diplomatic channels,
the same as other countrles. Any communications from Rome affect•
ing the rellgious affairs or our people would be transmitted througb
the blshops. In so far as matters of state are concerned, I am separated from the Church."
Was lt likely, I asked, that the Slovaks would be united with the
Czechs after the war?
There was no direct answer to that question. He pointed out that
the Slovaks had been discriminated agalnst by the Prague gov.ernment. He himself had been lmpľlsoned foľ many months because of
his agitation Cor Slovak autonomy. Later he became Minister of Heatth
in the Benes cablnet. The Slovaks desired to live in harmony with
the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Poles and Germans. But they also believed they were entitled to the autonomy that had been denled them.
Now, after efforts of nearly nine hundred years they were an independent country.
He then made a comparison between Slovakia and Ireland. Both
are largely agricultural, both had been under outside rule for centuries, both are predominantly Christian and both counted moľe or
their people in America than in their horne lands.
"Our gľeatest problem," he continued, •'is in getting technicians,
instructors ln the schools, colleges and university and specialists foľ
industria! projects. We are sufferlng from growlng pains. But I do
hope we shall not have to call ln too many forelgn doctors." That
remark was understood. Already there was resentment In the country
agalnst the flood of Germans who had come to ald In thelr development. They would have welcomed more of some other nationallty.
They had sent a small armed force agalnst the Soviet, but later
t hey were recalled and developed lnto horne defenses and for lndustrles.
I polnted out to hlm that they were Slavs, the same as the Russians. Should ,they ,not, therefore, be unltied with thelr blood brothers?
"True, there is that racial kinship. But when those blood brothers
are Bolsheviks and Communists," his fist pounded on the table 1n front
of him, "then we'II oppose them to the last man."
That deflant attitude and his unceasing battle agatnst the intiltratlon of Communist ideology tnto his country, explalns why he was
anathema to Moscow. His rtoom was pre-ordained. It merely remained
for the Amerlcan officlals to assist Stalin In carrylng lt out.',;· iTlso declared that closer co-operatlon lnvlted domlnatlon by thP
Red reglme of Moscow. That meant obllteratton of all the polltlťal ,
rellgioW! and economic rreedom they enjoyed. Th?y had i;evolted
�SLOVAKIA
6
agalnst lnjustices o! the Prague government. They_ dlď not c~mmlt
the helnous crlme· of banlshlng the allen mlnorlťie-s· ·trom the country, as the Rediťhad done In the Balllc states (and were to do later
In Czechoslovakla). Czechs were deposed froni lmportant poslllons in
the Slova:k government, but 1hey were not deported, nor we11e the
Polea, the Hungarlans, the Ukralnians, or the Germána. In fact many
Czech lndustrlallsts fled from the German occupled areas of Bohemla
and Moravla and re-establlshed themselves In Slovakla.
Subsequently I had many discusslons wlth presldent Tlso, bis
cousin Stefan Tlso, premler In the Jatter part of the state's exlstence,
as well as others of hls offlclal famlly. To assert that they were
donilnated by the Nazls does not check wlth the facts.
Ot tlie hundred and flfty thou11and population in Bratislava, approxlmately twenty per cent were Germans. There were other cltie11
and areas throughout the country wlth substantlal Germa11 mlnorlties.
One ot the Nazl methods for undermlnlng rellglous tralnlng was to
schedule meetlngs of the Hitler Youth and Girls on Sunday mornlngs.
That usually necessltated thelr absence from church on that day.
To counter such measures a law or resolutlon was passed In S lovakla
forblddlng group meetlngs of youths for sneh activltleR on Sunday un til after noon.
When MuHolini waa demoted and the Badoglio government waa
formed, the entire !talian dilpomatic and consular ataff In Slovakia
declared their allegiance to Badoglio and the Alliea. Germany exerted
preHure to have them sent into Northern ltaly - then still In the
handa. of the Fascists. President Tiso and his miniatera opposed it.
lnatead they were interned at the expense of the Slovak government
for over a year in one of the beat hotela of Pieatany, a celebrated eure
reaort in the country. "lnternment" meant that they had freedom to
roam the country aide, retained thelr motor cara and were glven
permiHlon to visit the capital whenever neceHary - even for such
trlfling thlngs as an appointment with their dentista. Moreover, slnce
they were cut off from their source of income, the Bratislava government provlded a limited amount of money for them durlng their fourteen month period of detentlon there in addltion to footing the bili for
medlcal care and hoapitalization of those who needed it.
After the !ll•advlsed "putsch" that was staged In nanska Bystrica
by the antl-Nazl partlsans, most ot the rlng•leaders were evacuated to
England by plane. Those who dld not escape were taken lnto custody
by the Slovak mllltary authorltles.
The Slovak courts, belng unsympathetlc to Germany sentenced
the ring leaders to prlson. That seemed the slmplest way to kPep
them safe untll they could be freed after the war.
The imperioua Heinrlch Hlmmler came to Bratislava and In high
dudgeon demanded the death penalty for them. The presldent and
premler refuaed hla demands. The latter told me of the atormy scene
with Himmler.
"We have our own judlciary and trlbunals," he remlnded Hlmmler,
"and we shall ablde by thelr declslons. Thelr sentences wlll not be
made more severe, nor wlll we surrender them to you.''
The repulsed SS chleftaln returned to Berlin. The pigmy had vanqulshed the glant.
�6
SLOVAKIA
Even after the occupatlon or the country by the German m1litáry forces in September 1944, the Bratislava regime did not submit
suplnely to all their demands. One or the resort hotels had been par•
tially converted lnto a hospital wlth the appropriate Red Cross roark·
ings on roof and walls. The German general staff for that area com·
mandeered quarters in the hotel. The Slovak authorltles insisted
tbat Red Cross markings or. the German offlcers be removed. After
heated arguments the Germans remained but the Red Cross symbols
of protectlon were removed. Puppets do not as a rule show such de•
flance to thelr over-lords.
The Red army advanced to the fľinge of the capltal. On April
6, 1946, President Tiso, the premier and vthers of the government
fled into Austrla where they expected to be and wero? interned by the
advancing American forces. Being unable to obtain transportatlon to
Bava1ia, I evacua-ted on that same day from Piestauy to Pľ'ague.
Five weeks later General Patton's army was In Pilsen, about
fifty míles from Prague. Believing their day of liberation was near
and confidently awaiting the arrival of the Americans, the Czechs re·
volted. Thelr volunteer defense ťorce cons isted of old men and boys.
women and girls. The only trained military help they r eceived was
from the ani-Communlst Russian soldiers under General Vlassov who
arrived four days after the revolution began. For six days the flghting contlnued w!th the loss of hundreds of lives and enormous property damage, while General Patton seethed in anger at being ordered
to ignore the piteous pleas of th e Prague radio for ass1~tance and balt
his tanks and military vehicles a rew miles outside Prague.
The pseudo liberation of Prague by the Red army was one of the
most ghastly travesties of the war. It was staged for the news-reels,
the radlo broadcasts and tbe impression it would implant in the minds
or the "liberated" slaves behind the Iron Curtaln.
On bis own initlatlve Eduard Benes had made a pilgr!mage to
Moscow and signed an agrePmPnt with Stalin which delivered his
country lnto the Red orbít. Six years before Dr. Emil Hacha had
journeyed to Berlin and put bis signature to tbe demand note handed
him by Hitler. Just slx years before Jozef T!so flew to Berlin and
entered into an agreement that established bis short-lived Republic of
Slovakia. Now both or those presldents were deposed or lmprisoned.
The modus ope randi of t he deals subm!tted to Hacha and Tiso by
Hitler and the one entered into by Benes with Stalin are strikingly
similar - but wlth one !mportant difference. Benes made his journey to Moscow volu ntarily. The t erms of surrender he signed with
Stalin were not revealed to the Czechs or Slovaks at t h e time. Hitler's
deals and objectives at least had the virtue of brutal frankness.
But Hitler, the imitator of Communist and Fascist dictators. did
not clamp control measures on the so-called puppet Republic of Slovakia as Stalln decreed for the reborn state of Czechoslovakia.
Wlthln forty-eight hours of the Red army entry lnto Prague, the
Czech radlo and press were under Communist domtnatlon. Wlnston
Churchill directed a radio broadcast to the Czechs at that tíme, expresslng tbe deslre that the re-establlshed state be a democracy such
as Britain and Amerlca understod that word. Hls s peech was omitted
from two of the Prague newspapers. The third reported part of it
but carefully deleted tbat irrltatlng paragraph.
�SLOVAKI.A.
7
Before Benes arrived - ten days after the "liberation" - the
MVD had taken possesslon of the former citadel of the Gestapo In Bre•
dauergasse. They set up at once a police organizatíon even more ruth·
les.s than the Germans. Communist cells wlthin the country pointed
accuslng flngers at persona! enemies, business rival$ or hated rela·
tlves and tbey were jailed without a hearing.
The several jalls ln the city were Jlterally filled to overnowlng,
Having been one ot those caught up ln their dragnets I can speak au•
thoratlvely. The barred celi at Bartholomegasse lnto whlch I was
ushered had been designed for elght persons. Twenty-slx occupled the
space. Among them were the mayor or burgermelster, a professor ot
the universlly, the governor of the clty's largest !ina,ncial lnstitutlon,
also the director of the Union Bank, a colonel of the Czech gendarmerle, and two captalns. A newspaper man, an Au,;trian consultlng
englneer, a physician, a flfteen-year-old boy, an orchestra leader and a
wealthy industriallst shared one corner of the room. The slxty-seven·
year-old mother of the industrialist was In an adjolnlng celi. They
were capitallsts. Like the others they had been so lndlscreet as to express their lack of appreclatlon for the form of Reel Jlberatlon that had
been imposed on them.
Many young glrls and women were jalled in that sombre bullding.
New arrivals came at all hours of the day and others were hauled
away to destlnations unknown. Red soldiers made perlodic raids and
took away those they wished. How many vanished without a trace,
we shall never know.
In the lll-fated state of Slovakia, even the all-powerful Hlmmler
could not demand that prlsoners be released to bim. In the Moscow•
managed Czechoslovakian state Red soldiers and MVD men took whom
they wlshed without protest from the "democratlc" olflclals.
Although the prison inmates were held without benefit of consul
and incommunicado, an underground system of communication carried
messages outside. The method of its operation was never quite clear
to me, but I can attest to its effi ciency, as a scribbled message of
mine reached the American Legation.
Fear and terror gripped the people a\though th~ shocking !acts
were convenlently suppressed, because to reveal them then wou\d be
embarrassing to those who partlclpated ln the fraud.
When the Communist premier Klement Gottwald handed Benes the
tlnal papers of surrender ln Prague March 1948 and demanded that
he sign on the dotted llne, lt was hut a routlne endlng to what was a
fait accompll three years before.
Presldent Hacha had died, thus escaplng executlon by the Reds.
Presldent Tlso was delivered by the Unlted States forces to Stalln's
henchmen and was hanged. The status of president Benes would have
been helghtened and perhaps hls llfe lengthened had he not returned.
Far better that he had remained away and exposed to the world
what it knows now. That they had been sold lnto bondage at Teheran.
The bias briga.de and pressure groups in Amerlra dlsgraced our country- qnd demanded President Tiso as a sacrlfice. Though our StateDepartment, llke Pilate, may wash lts hands, they permitted hhn
to be t.ortured before de\lvering hlm to the Reds The bloocl or that
Slovak patriot 1s on our heads.
�
SLOVAKIA
1
THE BETRAYAL OF SWVAKIA
E DWARD L. DELANEY
{Internatlonally known novelist, speaker, publicist, foreign correspondent, news commentator and world traveler, Edward Delaney 1s
now d!.~closing for audiences throughout the count.ry his on the spot
observat!ons and persona) experlences durlng the war and the subsequent perlod ot "peace:· Many of the vital toplcs of our tlmes are
dealt wlth - plalnly and forcefully. Although bom In Amerlca, he bas
reslded abroad for almost two decades; four years In Asla, Australla,
Hrltlsh India, Dutch East Indies and two years in Afrlca, followed by
extenslve stay.s In Centra) America and several years in Europe. During the war his fact-flndlng travels were from the Baltlc Sea to the
llalkans, trom Paris to Poland, In Germany, Italy, Rumanla, Bu1gana,
Yugoslavla, Hungary and Czechoslovakla when the "Iron Curtaln"
teli. His book "Europe in War Daze" was published In 1948.)
T he presidentlal death rate In Czechoslovakla has been phenomenal. Eduard Benes was the last of three presldents to dle thP.re In
sJlghtly more than three years. Slngularly enough there 1s a surprlsing analogy between certaln of hi.s acts and those ot Dr. Emil Hacha
and Dr. Jozef Tlso. the two who prece<led hlm lnto eternity.
Another singularity ls that Czechoslovakla had lts inceptlon in
this country and lt was due to declsions made here that lt came to an
ignominlous endlng thirty years later.
On May 30, 1918, at whal was afterwards known as the Pittsburgh
Conventio)'l, Czechoslovakia was born. The consensus of opinion
among the foundlng fathers wa.s that by some feat ot Jegerdemain
the age-old differences between Czech1i, Slovaks, Hungarians and Ger·
mans, who comprised the populatlon, were now dlssolved. The agri·
cultural area of Slovakia was fused wlth the industria) reglons ot Bo•
hemia and Moravla and God would bless the bonds.
But soon the slgners of that agreement found they had put too
much falth In God and not enough checks on the natlonall.st alms ot
thelr co-partners. Prague whlch had long been the Czech capltal began to assert authority over the whole state. The autonomy that bad
been guaranteed tbe Slovaks never materlallzed.
With the death of Thomas Masaryk, the couDltry's first president,
Eduard Benes lnberlted hls offlce. The government under hls leader•
shlp sought to relegate the Slovaks to what mlght be regarded as a
pastora) communlty. lndustry, the buslness of government and all the
petty offlclals were to a large extent Czech. The Czech language
would supplant that ot the Slovak minority even in distrlcts where
there were few Czecbs. The matter of "autonomy" could be shelve<1
for an lndeflnite perlod.
As was to be expected there was opposltion from the Slovaks
over the flagrant abandonment ot the pledges made at the Plttsburgh
Conventlon. One fllmsy excuse offered by Prague for lgnorlng that
agreement was that lt had been slgned on a legal hollday In Amerlca
and was therefore not blndlng.
Andrej Hlinka, a parlsh prlest In Ruzomberok, a town ot some rew
thousand populatlon In western Slovak!a, was one ot those ldeallsts
�2
SLOVAKIA
who believed that the precepts or the Sermon on the Mount could be
applied to a nation's problems. His supporters ga!ned nuruencal
strengtb, formed tbe Hlinka Party and allied themselves c losely with
1he next largest political group which, oddly enough, was headed by
a prominent Protestant clergyman. They did not seek to impose their
wlll on the Czechs but regarded it as their patriotlc duty to figbt
!or Slovak lnterests. As one observes tbroughont Europe there is
usually a fine blending or pariotism and natlonallsm.
There were arrests and prison sentences !or those wbo were too
critical of the suzerainty exercised by the Prague govemment. Hlinka,
Dr. Jozef Tiso, bis deputy, Professor Bela Tuka, later Slovak premier,
and otbers tanded in jalls for various periods, cbarged with subversive actlvities.
Had the Pragu.e politicians been more astute, they would have
bridged the gap between Slovak aspirations and Czech impositions.
I.ly not doing so, they pa ved the way for Hitler to $plit the country
in two. The revolt of tbe Slovaks and the overtbrowing of Prague's
authority on March 14, 1939, was ostensibly an interna! affair. It is
~ignificant, however, thait within twenty-four hours after asseľling
their independence they recei ved recogn!tion and guarantee of protection by Gennany from "any foreign power," Hitler's forces marched
into Prague. The sovereignty of Czecboslovakia ceased to exist. Bo•
hemia and Moravla became the ·'Protectorate" of Germany. Slovakia
was regarded as self-determinlng and independent.
Eduard Benes had reslgned as presldent of Czechoslovakia on
October 5, 1938. November thirtieth, following, Dr. Emil Hacha was
elected president of the Republic wilh the felicitations of Benes who
departed for England and later came to America. Dr. Hac ha had accepted a thankless post. lt was utterly hopeless for bim to oppose any
clemands of Germany slnce France and England had reneged on their
pledges of military alliance.
Early in March, 1939, Hitler's scheme for splitting Czechoslovakia in two had been decided upon. Dr. Hacha was summoned to Berlin
and told to sign on the dotted line. Hacha did not go to Berlin of bis
own volition and make compromlslng terms wlth the Nazi dictator.
He was glven no alternative. He submitted.
When he returned to Prague he was but a flgurehead for the
Czechs. Some called bim a collaborator. To associates he declared that
•·co-operation under coerclon 1s not collaboratlon." He remalned as
chief Czech executive after the German occupat!on, agalnst whlch
he was powerless. Governor General Frank, sent there by Hitler, was
supreme. It was generally regarded that Dr. Hacha occupied the position of puppet for the Nazi regime.
The Czechs liked to belleve that Hacha Pxerclsed some influence
in their behalf. Perhaps he dld, Cor the fact remains that until the end
of tbe war living c-ondltlons in the "Protectorate" were better than in
any part of Germany or Austria. For that reason many Germans contrived to go there and live. When the Red Army arrlved in Prague
in May, 1945, Hacha was imprisoned. He was to bave been put through
a form of tria! but he dled before being brought lnto court, thus
cheatlng the Red gallows.
For six years, from March 14, 1939 to April 5, 1945. there were two
�SLOVAKIA
3
presidents in the country that had been and was again to be - In
name at Ieast - Czechoslovak!a.
Andrej Hlinka died in the autumn of 1938. Hls successor, Monsignor Jozef Tiso, deputy head of the Hlinka Party. was also summoned to Berlin that eventful week or .March 1939. Agreements were
entered into a,t Berlin for the recognitíon of Slovakia as a self•determlning republic. Frontlers were established, Tiso was to be tbe
provlslonal president with Bratislava as the capital. The Slovaks felt
they had everything to galn by setting up their own state rather than
to remaln part of Czechoslovakia whlcb Hitler was about to occupy.
The phrase "self-determinaition for small nations" suddenly became
a reality to them.
Although the United States did not offlclally recognlze the new•
bom Republir. of Slovakia, it rlid receive recognition from many countries. no less than seventeen of them opening consulates and leg:ttlons
in Bratislava. People throughout Europe who were faced with realltles
also recognlzed the fact that the state existed.
Viewed dlspassionately and wlthout the bias that must lmpair
a just perspectlve of the Slovak picture, there was glven the country
at that tlme a new out!ook wblch was sometb!ng more than a mirage.
Contrary ito expectations, Germany did not exercise control over the
press, the radlo, their currency or customs. Certain of their national
assets such as coal, timber, beet grow!ng. gotd and silľer mining and
the production of steel and cellulose were brought to higher levels.
Almost over night they began playing a,t the game of capitalism,
natlonal!sm, Industria) expansion, educatlon anrl the extremely fntricate
buslness of government. After a tria) and error period some sounrl
progress was recorded. 'ľbe country 1s actually a melange of the medlaeval and modem. Trackless trollies of reťent vintage and motor
c ars of lntrlnsic wortb sbared the streets of Bratislava wlth lumberlng
mule carts. Lad!es in expensive furs rubbed sboulders witb peasant
women In horne made sheep skin coats and cow bide boots.
Because of their favorable trade balance witb other European
countries the people of Slovakia did not want for neťessitles. On tbe
contrary, all during the war. tbey barl many luxurles that were un•
dreamed of by tbe people of Germany and, of course. many of the
occupied areas. Coming from Austrla or Germanr lnto Slovakla was
stepplng into a veritable paradise of food, drink, clotbing and other
com.modities that had long since vanlsbed trom tbe Relch. Knowlng
these things tbe people of Siovakia could not be blamed for declarlng
tbat tbe course adopted by tbeir politlcal leaders had been the best
for them. Tbey never had it so 11,"ood before - or since.
Tbe state had been in existence for nearly four years berore I
had an opportunlty to vlslt Presldent Tlso In the sumptuous old Hungarian palare tbat had been ronverted lnto bis offlclal resictenre.
He was tben In bis mirl-fiftles. Hls black hair had but a few thre~<ls of
grey and bis dark blue eyes radlated energy and keen intere1;t In
whatever he was rloing at the moment
After some general conversation I asked lf it was true. whicb was
cbarged by bis critlcs, that tbe Slovak pollcles were dictate,t by Ger•
many.
"No," he lnsisted. "In forelgn aftairs 011r pollcies are shaped so
tbey do not conflict wltb tbe Axis Powers. 'ľbey turround 118 com•
�4
SLOV.AKIA
pletely. lt would be suiclde to oppose them. But in domestic matters
we form our own pollcies and programs and carry them out. In many
instances they are not in accord with the polictes of Germauy."
ln detail he cited several examples. Thetr system of ťood conser1•atlon and distributtng was VIU!tly different from oither Germany, the
'·Protectorate" or Hungary. They were in disagreement with the
Aryan edicts then in effect in Germany. There were other points on
which they clashed.
Some people in Europe, I told hlm, declared that he and the Slovak Repu,bllc were subject to instructiomi trom the V,a.tican.
"The usual charge ot the uninformed," he replied. ·•1 have no connection with the Vatican, other than through the diplomatic channels,
the same as other countrles. Any communications from Rome affect•
ing the rellgious affairs or our people would be transmitted througb
the blshops. In so far as matters of state are concerned, I am separated from the Church."
Was lt likely, I asked, that the Slovaks would be united with the
Czechs after the war?
There was no direct answer to that question. He pointed out that
the Slovaks had been discriminated agalnst by the Prague gov.ernment. He himself had been lmpľlsoned foľ many months because of
his agitation Cor Slovak autonomy. Later he became Minister of Heatth
in the Benes cablnet. The Slovaks desired to live in harmony with
the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Poles and Germans. But they also believed they were entitled to the autonomy that had been denled them.
Now, after efforts of nearly nine hundred years they were an independent country.
He then made a comparison between Slovakia and Ireland. Both
are largely agricultural, both had been under outside rule for centuries, both are predominantly Christian and both counted moľe or
their people in America than in their horne lands.
"Our gľeatest problem," he continued, •'is in getting technicians,
instructors ln the schools, colleges and university and specialists foľ
industria! projects. We are sufferlng from growlng pains. But I do
hope we shall not have to call ln too many forelgn doctors." That
remark was understood. Already there was resentment In the country
agalnst the flood of Germans who had come to ald In thelr development. They would have welcomed more of some other nationallty.
They had sent a small armed force agalnst the Soviet, but later
t hey were recalled and developed lnto horne defenses and for lndustrles.
I polnted out to hlm that they were Slavs, the same as the Russians. Should ,they ,not, therefore, be unltied with thelr blood brothers?
"True, there is that racial kinship. But when those blood brothers
are Bolsheviks and Communists," his fist pounded on the table 1n front
of him, "then we'II oppose them to the last man."
That deflant attitude and his unceasing battle agatnst the intiltratlon of Communist ideology tnto his country, explalns why he was
anathema to Moscow. His rtoom was pre-ordained. It merely remained
for the Amerlcan officlals to assist Stalin In carrylng lt out.',;· iTlso declared that closer co-operatlon lnvlted domlnatlon by thP
Red reglme of Moscow. That meant obllteratton of all the polltlťal ,
rellgioW! and economic rreedom they enjoyed. Th?y had i;evolted
�SLOVAKIA
6
agalnst lnjustices o! the Prague government. They_ dlď not c~mmlt
the helnous crlme· of banlshlng the allen mlnorlťie-s· ·trom the country, as the Rediťhad done In the Balllc states (and were to do later
In Czechoslovakla). Czechs were deposed froni lmportant poslllons in
the Slova:k government, but 1hey were not deported, nor we11e the
Polea, the Hungarlans, the Ukralnians, or the Germána. In fact many
Czech lndustrlallsts fled from the German occupled areas of Bohemla
and Moravla and re-establlshed themselves In Slovakla.
Subsequently I had many discusslons wlth presldent Tlso, bis
cousin Stefan Tlso, premler In the Jatter part of the state's exlstence,
as well as others of hls offlclal famlly. To assert that they were
donilnated by the Nazls does not check wlth the facts.
Ot tlie hundred and flfty thou11and population in Bratislava, approxlmately twenty per cent were Germans. There were other cltie11
and areas throughout the country wlth substantlal Germa11 mlnorlties.
One ot the Nazl methods for undermlnlng rellglous tralnlng was to
schedule meetlngs of the Hitler Youth and Girls on Sunday mornlngs.
That usually necessltated thelr absence from church on that day.
To counter such measures a law or resolutlon was passed In S lovakla
forblddlng group meetlngs of youths for sneh activltleR on Sunday un til after noon.
When MuHolini waa demoted and the Badoglio government waa
formed, the entire !talian dilpomatic and consular ataff In Slovakia
declared their allegiance to Badoglio and the Alliea. Germany exerted
preHure to have them sent into Northern ltaly - then still In the
handa. of the Fascists. President Tiso and his miniatera opposed it.
lnatead they were interned at the expense of the Slovak government
for over a year in one of the beat hotela of Pieatany, a celebrated eure
reaort in the country. "lnternment" meant that they had freedom to
roam the country aide, retained thelr motor cara and were glven
permiHlon to visit the capital whenever neceHary - even for such
trlfling thlngs as an appointment with their dentista. Moreover, slnce
they were cut off from their source of income, the Bratislava government provlded a limited amount of money for them durlng their fourteen month period of detentlon there in addltion to footing the bili for
medlcal care and hoapitalization of those who needed it.
After the !ll•advlsed "putsch" that was staged In nanska Bystrica
by the antl-Nazl partlsans, most ot the rlng•leaders were evacuated to
England by plane. Those who dld not escape were taken lnto custody
by the Slovak mllltary authorltles.
The Slovak courts, belng unsympathetlc to Germany sentenced
the ring leaders to prlson. That seemed the slmplest way to kPep
them safe untll they could be freed after the war.
The imperioua Heinrlch Hlmmler came to Bratislava and In high
dudgeon demanded the death penalty for them. The presldent and
premler refuaed hla demands. The latter told me of the atormy scene
with Himmler.
"We have our own judlciary and trlbunals," he remlnded Hlmmler,
"and we shall ablde by thelr declslons. Thelr sentences wlll not be
made more severe, nor wlll we surrender them to you.''
The repulsed SS chleftaln returned to Berlin. The pigmy had vanqulshed the glant.
�6
SLOVAKIA
Even after the occupatlon or the country by the German m1litáry forces in September 1944, the Bratislava regime did not submit
suplnely to all their demands. One or the resort hotels had been par•
tially converted lnto a hospital wlth the appropriate Red Cross roark·
ings on roof and walls. The German general staff for that area com·
mandeered quarters in the hotel. The Slovak authorltles insisted
tbat Red Cross markings or. the German offlcers be removed. After
heated arguments the Germans remained but the Red Cross symbols
of protectlon were removed. Puppets do not as a rule show such de•
flance to thelr over-lords.
The Red army advanced to the fľinge of the capltal. On April
6, 1946, President Tiso, the premier and vthers of the government
fled into Austrla where they expected to be and wero? interned by the
advancing American forces. Being unable to obtain transportatlon to
Bava1ia, I evacua-ted on that same day from Piestauy to Pľ'ague.
Five weeks later General Patton's army was In Pilsen, about
fifty míles from Prague. Believing their day of liberation was near
and confidently awaiting the arrival of the Americans, the Czechs re·
volted. Thelr volunteer defense ťorce cons isted of old men and boys.
women and girls. The only trained military help they r eceived was
from the ani-Communlst Russian soldiers under General Vlassov who
arrived four days after the revolution began. For six days the flghting contlnued w!th the loss of hundreds of lives and enormous property damage, while General Patton seethed in anger at being ordered
to ignore the piteous pleas of th e Prague radio for ass1~tance and balt
his tanks and military vehicles a rew miles outside Prague.
The pseudo liberation of Prague by the Red army was one of the
most ghastly travesties of the war. It was staged for the news-reels,
the radlo broadcasts and tbe impression it would implant in the minds
or the "liberated" slaves behind the Iron Curtaln.
On bis own initlatlve Eduard Benes had made a pilgr!mage to
Moscow and signed an agrePmPnt with Stalin which delivered his
country lnto the Red orbít. Six years before Dr. Emil Hacha had
journeyed to Berlin and put bis signature to tbe demand note handed
him by Hitler. Just slx years before Jozef T!so flew to Berlin and
entered into an agreement that established bis short-lived Republic of
Slovakia. Now both or those presldents were deposed or lmprisoned.
The modus ope randi of t he deals subm!tted to Hacha and Tiso by
Hitler and the one entered into by Benes with Stalin are strikingly
similar - but wlth one !mportant difference. Benes made his journey to Moscow volu ntarily. The t erms of surrender he signed with
Stalin were not revealed to the Czechs or Slovaks at t h e time. Hitler's
deals and objectives at least had the virtue of brutal frankness.
But Hitler, the imitator of Communist and Fascist dictators. did
not clamp control measures on the so-called puppet Republic of Slovakia as Stalln decreed for the reborn state of Czechoslovakia.
Wlthln forty-eight hours of the Red army entry lnto Prague, the
Czech radlo and press were under Communist domtnatlon. Wlnston
Churchill directed a radio broadcast to the Czechs at that tíme, expresslng tbe deslre that the re-establlshed state be a democracy such
as Britain and Amerlca understod that word. Hls s peech was omitted
from two of the Prague newspapers. The third reported part of it
but carefully deleted tbat irrltatlng paragraph.
�SLOVAKI.A.
7
Before Benes arrived - ten days after the "liberation" - the
MVD had taken possesslon of the former citadel of the Gestapo In Bre•
dauergasse. They set up at once a police organizatíon even more ruth·
les.s than the Germans. Communist cells wlthin the country pointed
accuslng flngers at persona! enemies, business rival$ or hated rela·
tlves and tbey were jailed without a hearing.
The several jalls ln the city were Jlterally filled to overnowlng,
Having been one ot those caught up ln their dragnets I can speak au•
thoratlvely. The barred celi at Bartholomegasse lnto whlch I was
ushered had been designed for elght persons. Twenty-slx occupled the
space. Among them were the mayor or burgermelster, a professor ot
the universlly, the governor of the clty's largest !ina,ncial lnstitutlon,
also the director of the Union Bank, a colonel of the Czech gendarmerle, and two captalns. A newspaper man, an Au,;trian consultlng
englneer, a physician, a flfteen-year-old boy, an orchestra leader and a
wealthy industriallst shared one corner of the room. The slxty-seven·
year-old mother of the industrialist was In an adjolnlng celi. They
were capitallsts. Like the others they had been so lndlscreet as to express their lack of appreclatlon for the form of Reel Jlberatlon that had
been imposed on them.
Many young glrls and women were jalled in that sombre bullding.
New arrivals came at all hours of the day and others were hauled
away to destlnations unknown. Red soldiers made perlodic raids and
took away those they wished. How many vanished without a trace,
we shall never know.
In the lll-fated state of Slovakia, even the all-powerful Hlmmler
could not demand that prlsoners be released to bim. In the Moscow•
managed Czechoslovakian state Red soldiers and MVD men took whom
they wlshed without protest from the "democratlc" olflclals.
Although the prison inmates were held without benefit of consul
and incommunicado, an underground system of communication carried
messages outside. The method of its operation was never quite clear
to me, but I can attest to its effi ciency, as a scribbled message of
mine reached the American Legation.
Fear and terror gripped the people a\though th~ shocking !acts
were convenlently suppressed, because to reveal them then wou\d be
embarrassing to those who partlclpated ln the fraud.
When the Communist premier Klement Gottwald handed Benes the
tlnal papers of surrender ln Prague March 1948 and demanded that
he sign on the dotted llne, lt was hut a routlne endlng to what was a
fait accompll three years before.
Presldent Hacha had died, thus escaplng executlon by the Reds.
Presldent Tlso was delivered by the Unlted States forces to Stalln's
henchmen and was hanged. The status of president Benes would have
been helghtened and perhaps hls llfe lengthened had he not returned.
Far better that he had remained away and exposed to the world
what it knows now. That they had been sold lnto bondage at Teheran.
The bias briga.de and pressure groups in Amerlra dlsgraced our country- qnd demanded President Tiso as a sacrlfice. Though our StateDepartment, llke Pilate, may wash lts hands, they permitted hhn
to be t.ortured before de\lvering hlm to the Reds The bloocl or that
Slovak patriot 1s on our heads.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
1
THE BETRAYAL OF SWVAKIA
E DWARD L. DELANEY
{Internatlonally known novelist, speaker, publicist, foreign correspondent, news commentator and world traveler, Edward Delaney 1s
now d!.~closing for audiences throughout the count.ry his on the spot
observat!ons and persona) experlences durlng the war and the subsequent perlod ot "peace:· Many of the vital toplcs of our tlmes are
dealt wlth - plalnly and forcefully. Although bom In Amerlca, he bas
reslded abroad for almost two decades; four years In Asla, Australla,
Hrltlsh India, Dutch East Indies and two years in Afrlca, followed by
extenslve stay.s In Centra) America and several years in Europe. During the war his fact-flndlng travels were from the Baltlc Sea to the
llalkans, trom Paris to Poland, In Germany, Italy, Rumanla, Bu1gana,
Yugoslavla, Hungary and Czechoslovakla when the "Iron Curtaln"
teli. His book "Europe in War Daze" was published In 1948.)
T he presidentlal death rate In Czechoslovakla has been phenomenal. Eduard Benes was the last of three presldents to dle thP.re In
sJlghtly more than three years. Slngularly enough there 1s a surprlsing analogy between certaln of hi.s acts and those ot Dr. Emil Hacha
and Dr. Jozef Tlso. the two who prece<led hlm lnto eternity.
Another singularity ls that Czechoslovakla had lts inceptlon in
this country and lt was due to declsions made here that lt came to an
ignominlous endlng thirty years later.
On May 30, 1918, at whal was afterwards known as the Pittsburgh
Conventio)'l, Czechoslovakia was born. The consensus of opinion
among the foundlng fathers wa.s that by some feat ot Jegerdemain
the age-old differences between Czech1i, Slovaks, Hungarians and Ger·
mans, who comprised the populatlon, were now dlssolved. The agri·
cultural area of Slovakia was fused wlth the industria) reglons ot Bo•
hemia and Moravla and God would bless the bonds.
But soon the slgners of that agreement found they had put too
much falth In God and not enough checks on the natlonall.st alms ot
thelr co-partners. Prague whlch had long been the Czech capltal began to assert authority over the whole state. The autonomy that bad
been guaranteed tbe Slovaks never materlallzed.
With the death of Thomas Masaryk, the couDltry's first president,
Eduard Benes lnberlted hls offlce. The government under hls leader•
shlp sought to relegate the Slovaks to what mlght be regarded as a
pastora) communlty. lndustry, the buslness of government and all the
petty offlclals were to a large extent Czech. The Czech language
would supplant that ot the Slovak minority even in distrlcts where
there were few Czecbs. The matter of "autonomy" could be shelve<1
for an lndeflnite perlod.
As was to be expected there was opposltion from the Slovaks
over the flagrant abandonment ot the pledges made at the Plttsburgh
Conventlon. One fllmsy excuse offered by Prague for lgnorlng that
agreement was that lt had been slgned on a legal hollday In Amerlca
and was therefore not blndlng.
Andrej Hlinka, a parlsh prlest In Ruzomberok, a town ot some rew
thousand populatlon In western Slovak!a, was one ot those ldeallsts
2
SLOVAKIA
who believed that the precepts or the Sermon on the Mount could be
applied to a nation's problems. His supporters ga!ned nuruencal
strengtb, formed tbe Hlinka Party and allied themselves c losely with
1he next largest political group which, oddly enough, was headed by
a prominent Protestant clergyman. They did not seek to impose their
wlll on the Czechs but regarded it as their patriotlc duty to figbt
!or Slovak lnterests. As one observes tbroughont Europe there is
usually a fine blending or pariotism and natlonallsm.
There were arrests and prison sentences !or those wbo were too
critical of the suzerainty exercised by the Prague govemment. Hlinka,
Dr. Jozef Tiso, bis deputy, Professor Bela Tuka, later Slovak premier,
and otbers tanded in jalls for various periods, cbarged with subversive actlvities.
Had the Pragu.e politicians been more astute, they would have
bridged the gap between Slovak aspirations and Czech impositions.
I.ly not doing so, they pa ved the way for Hitler to $plit the country
in two. The revolt of tbe Slovaks and the overtbrowing of Prague's
authority on March 14, 1939, was ostensibly an interna! affair. It is
~ignificant, however, thait within twenty-four hours after asseľling
their independence they recei ved recogn!tion and guarantee of protection by Gennany from "any foreign power," Hitler's forces marched
into Prague. The sovereignty of Czecboslovakia ceased to exist. Bo•
hemia and Moravla became the ·'Protectorate" of Germany. Slovakia
was regarded as self-determinlng and independent.
Eduard Benes had reslgned as presldent of Czechoslovakia on
October 5, 1938. November thirtieth, following, Dr. Emil Hacha was
elected president of the Republic wilh the felicitations of Benes who
departed for England and later came to America. Dr. Hac ha had accepted a thankless post. lt was utterly hopeless for bim to oppose any
clemands of Germany slnce France and England had reneged on their
pledges of military alliance.
Early in March, 1939, Hitler's scheme for splitting Czechoslovakia in two had been decided upon. Dr. Hacha was summoned to Berlin
and told to sign on the dotted line. Hacha did not go to Berlin of bis
own volition and make compromlslng terms wlth the Nazi dictator.
He was glven no alternative. He submitted.
When he returned to Prague he was but a flgurehead for the
Czechs. Some called bim a collaborator. To associates he declared that
•·co-operation under coerclon 1s not collaboratlon." He remalned as
chief Czech executive after the German occupat!on, agalnst whlch
he was powerless. Governor General Frank, sent there by Hitler, was
supreme. It was generally regarded that Dr. Hacha occupied the position of puppet for the Nazi regime.
The Czechs liked to belleve that Hacha Pxerclsed some influence
in their behalf. Perhaps he dld, Cor the fact remains that until the end
of tbe war living c-ondltlons in the "Protectorate" were better than in
any part of Germany or Austria. For that reason many Germans contrived to go there and live. When the Red Army arrlved in Prague
in May, 1945, Hacha was imprisoned. He was to bave been put through
a form of tria! but he dled before being brought lnto court, thus
cheatlng the Red gallows.
For six years, from March 14, 1939 to April 5, 1945. there were two
SLOVAKIA
3
presidents in the country that had been and was again to be - In
name at Ieast - Czechoslovak!a.
Andrej Hlinka died in the autumn of 1938. Hls successor, Monsignor Jozef Tiso, deputy head of the Hlinka Party. was also summoned to Berlin that eventful week or .March 1939. Agreements were
entered into a,t Berlin for the recognitíon of Slovakia as a self•determlning republic. Frontlers were established, Tiso was to be tbe
provlslonal president with Bratislava as the capital. The Slovaks felt
they had everything to galn by setting up their own state rather than
to remaln part of Czechoslovakia whlcb Hitler was about to occupy.
The phrase "self-determinaition for small nations" suddenly became
a reality to them.
Although the United States did not offlclally recognlze the new•
bom Republir. of Slovakia, it rlid receive recognition from many countries. no less than seventeen of them opening consulates and leg:ttlons
in Bratislava. People throughout Europe who were faced with realltles
also recognlzed the fact that the state existed.
Viewed dlspassionately and wlthout the bias that must lmpair
a just perspectlve of the Slovak picture, there was glven the country
at that tlme a new out!ook wblch was sometb!ng more than a mirage.
Contrary ito expectations, Germany did not exercise control over the
press, the radlo, their currency or customs. Certain of their national
assets such as coal, timber, beet grow!ng. gotd and silľer mining and
the production of steel and cellulose were brought to higher levels.
Almost over night they began playing a,t the game of capitalism,
natlonal!sm, Industria) expansion, educatlon anrl the extremely fntricate
buslness of government. After a tria) and error period some sounrl
progress was recorded. 'ľbe country 1s actually a melange of the medlaeval and modem. Trackless trollies of reťent vintage and motor
c ars of lntrlnsic wortb sbared the streets of Bratislava wlth lumberlng
mule carts. Lad!es in expensive furs rubbed sboulders witb peasant
women In horne made sheep skin coats and cow bide boots.
Because of their favorable trade balance witb other European
countries the people of Slovakia did not want for neťessitles. On tbe
contrary, all during the war. tbey barl many luxurles that were un•
dreamed of by tbe people of Germany and, of course. many of the
occupied areas. Coming from Austrla or Germanr lnto Slovakla was
stepplng into a veritable paradise of food, drink, clotbing and other
com.modities that had long since vanlsbed trom tbe Relch. Knowlng
these things tbe people of Siovakia could not be blamed for declarlng
tbat tbe course adopted by tbeir politlcal leaders had been the best
for them. Tbey never had it so 11,"ood before - or since.
Tbe state had been in existence for nearly four years berore I
had an opportunlty to vlslt Presldent Tlso In the sumptuous old Hungarian palare tbat had been ronverted lnto bis offlclal resictenre.
He was tben In bis mirl-fiftles. Hls black hair had but a few thre~<ls of
grey and bis dark blue eyes radlated energy and keen intere1;t In
whatever he was rloing at the moment
After some general conversation I asked lf it was true. whicb was
cbarged by bis critlcs, that tbe Slovak pollcles were dictate,t by Ger•
many.
"No," he lnsisted. "In forelgn aftairs 011r pollcies are shaped so
tbey do not conflict wltb tbe Axis Powers. 'ľbey turround 118 com•
4
SLOV.AKIA
pletely. lt would be suiclde to oppose them. But in domestic matters
we form our own pollcies and programs and carry them out. In many
instances they are not in accord with the polictes of Germauy."
ln detail he cited several examples. Thetr system of ťood conser1•atlon and distributtng was VIU!tly different from oither Germany, the
'·Protectorate" or Hungary. They were in disagreement with the
Aryan edicts then in effect in Germany. There were other points on
which they clashed.
Some people in Europe, I told hlm, declared that he and the Slovak Repu,bllc were subject to instructiomi trom the V,a.tican.
"The usual charge ot the uninformed," he replied. ·•1 have no connection with the Vatican, other than through the diplomatic channels,
the same as other countrles. Any communications from Rome affect•
ing the rellgious affairs or our people would be transmitted througb
the blshops. In so far as matters of state are concerned, I am separated from the Church."
Was lt likely, I asked, that the Slovaks would be united with the
Czechs after the war?
There was no direct answer to that question. He pointed out that
the Slovaks had been discriminated agalnst by the Prague gov.ernment. He himself had been lmpľlsoned foľ many months because of
his agitation Cor Slovak autonomy. Later he became Minister of Heatth
in the Benes cablnet. The Slovaks desired to live in harmony with
the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Poles and Germans. But they also believed they were entitled to the autonomy that had been denled them.
Now, after efforts of nearly nine hundred years they were an independent country.
He then made a comparison between Slovakia and Ireland. Both
are largely agricultural, both had been under outside rule for centuries, both are predominantly Christian and both counted moľe or
their people in America than in their horne lands.
"Our gľeatest problem," he continued, •'is in getting technicians,
instructors ln the schools, colleges and university and specialists foľ
industria! projects. We are sufferlng from growlng pains. But I do
hope we shall not have to call ln too many forelgn doctors." That
remark was understood. Already there was resentment In the country
agalnst the flood of Germans who had come to ald In thelr development. They would have welcomed more of some other nationallty.
They had sent a small armed force agalnst the Soviet, but later
t hey were recalled and developed lnto horne defenses and for lndustrles.
I polnted out to hlm that they were Slavs, the same as the Russians. Should ,they ,not, therefore, be unltied with thelr blood brothers?
"True, there is that racial kinship. But when those blood brothers
are Bolsheviks and Communists," his fist pounded on the table 1n front
of him, "then we'II oppose them to the last man."
That deflant attitude and his unceasing battle agatnst the intiltratlon of Communist ideology tnto his country, explalns why he was
anathema to Moscow. His rtoom was pre-ordained. It merely remained
for the Amerlcan officlals to assist Stalin In carrylng lt out.',;· iTlso declared that closer co-operatlon lnvlted domlnatlon by thP
Red reglme of Moscow. That meant obllteratton of all the polltlťal ,
rellgioW! and economic rreedom they enjoyed. Th?y had i;evolted
SLOVAKIA
6
agalnst lnjustices o! the Prague government. They_ dlď not c~mmlt
the helnous crlme· of banlshlng the allen mlnorlťie-s· ·trom the country, as the Rediťhad done In the Balllc states (and were to do later
In Czechoslovakla). Czechs were deposed froni lmportant poslllons in
the Slova:k government, but 1hey were not deported, nor we11e the
Polea, the Hungarlans, the Ukralnians, or the Germána. In fact many
Czech lndustrlallsts fled from the German occupled areas of Bohemla
and Moravla and re-establlshed themselves In Slovakla.
Subsequently I had many discusslons wlth presldent Tlso, bis
cousin Stefan Tlso, premler In the Jatter part of the state's exlstence,
as well as others of hls offlclal famlly. To assert that they were
donilnated by the Nazls does not check wlth the facts.
Ot tlie hundred and flfty thou11and population in Bratislava, approxlmately twenty per cent were Germans. There were other cltie11
and areas throughout the country wlth substantlal Germa11 mlnorlties.
One ot the Nazl methods for undermlnlng rellglous tralnlng was to
schedule meetlngs of the Hitler Youth and Girls on Sunday mornlngs.
That usually necessltated thelr absence from church on that day.
To counter such measures a law or resolutlon was passed In S lovakla
forblddlng group meetlngs of youths for sneh activltleR on Sunday un til after noon.
When MuHolini waa demoted and the Badoglio government waa
formed, the entire !talian dilpomatic and consular ataff In Slovakia
declared their allegiance to Badoglio and the Alliea. Germany exerted
preHure to have them sent into Northern ltaly - then still In the
handa. of the Fascists. President Tiso and his miniatera opposed it.
lnatead they were interned at the expense of the Slovak government
for over a year in one of the beat hotela of Pieatany, a celebrated eure
reaort in the country. "lnternment" meant that they had freedom to
roam the country aide, retained thelr motor cara and were glven
permiHlon to visit the capital whenever neceHary - even for such
trlfling thlngs as an appointment with their dentista. Moreover, slnce
they were cut off from their source of income, the Bratislava government provlded a limited amount of money for them durlng their fourteen month period of detentlon there in addltion to footing the bili for
medlcal care and hoapitalization of those who needed it.
After the !ll•advlsed "putsch" that was staged In nanska Bystrica
by the antl-Nazl partlsans, most ot the rlng•leaders were evacuated to
England by plane. Those who dld not escape were taken lnto custody
by the Slovak mllltary authorltles.
The Slovak courts, belng unsympathetlc to Germany sentenced
the ring leaders to prlson. That seemed the slmplest way to kPep
them safe untll they could be freed after the war.
The imperioua Heinrlch Hlmmler came to Bratislava and In high
dudgeon demanded the death penalty for them. The presldent and
premler refuaed hla demands. The latter told me of the atormy scene
with Himmler.
"We have our own judlciary and trlbunals," he remlnded Hlmmler,
"and we shall ablde by thelr declslons. Thelr sentences wlll not be
made more severe, nor wlll we surrender them to you.''
The repulsed SS chleftaln returned to Berlin. The pigmy had vanqulshed the glant.
6
SLOVAKIA
Even after the occupatlon or the country by the German m1litáry forces in September 1944, the Bratislava regime did not submit
suplnely to all their demands. One or the resort hotels had been par•
tially converted lnto a hospital wlth the appropriate Red Cross roark·
ings on roof and walls. The German general staff for that area com·
mandeered quarters in the hotel. The Slovak authorltles insisted
tbat Red Cross markings or. the German offlcers be removed. After
heated arguments the Germans remained but the Red Cross symbols
of protectlon were removed. Puppets do not as a rule show such de•
flance to thelr over-lords.
The Red army advanced to the fľinge of the capltal. On April
6, 1946, President Tiso, the premier and vthers of the government
fled into Austrla where they expected to be and wero? interned by the
advancing American forces. Being unable to obtain transportatlon to
Bava1ia, I evacua-ted on that same day from Piestauy to Pľ'ague.
Five weeks later General Patton's army was In Pilsen, about
fifty míles from Prague. Believing their day of liberation was near
and confidently awaiting the arrival of the Americans, the Czechs re·
volted. Thelr volunteer defense ťorce cons isted of old men and boys.
women and girls. The only trained military help they r eceived was
from the ani-Communlst Russian soldiers under General Vlassov who
arrived four days after the revolution began. For six days the flghting contlnued w!th the loss of hundreds of lives and enormous property damage, while General Patton seethed in anger at being ordered
to ignore the piteous pleas of th e Prague radio for ass1~tance and balt
his tanks and military vehicles a rew miles outside Prague.
The pseudo liberation of Prague by the Red army was one of the
most ghastly travesties of the war. It was staged for the news-reels,
the radlo broadcasts and tbe impression it would implant in the minds
or the "liberated" slaves behind the Iron Curtaln.
On bis own initlatlve Eduard Benes had made a pilgr!mage to
Moscow and signed an agrePmPnt with Stalin which delivered his
country lnto the Red orbít. Six years before Dr. Emil Hacha had
journeyed to Berlin and put bis signature to tbe demand note handed
him by Hitler. Just slx years before Jozef T!so flew to Berlin and
entered into an agreement that established bis short-lived Republic of
Slovakia. Now both or those presldents were deposed or lmprisoned.
The modus ope randi of t he deals subm!tted to Hacha and Tiso by
Hitler and the one entered into by Benes with Stalin are strikingly
similar - but wlth one !mportant difference. Benes made his journey to Moscow volu ntarily. The t erms of surrender he signed with
Stalin were not revealed to the Czechs or Slovaks at t h e time. Hitler's
deals and objectives at least had the virtue of brutal frankness.
But Hitler, the imitator of Communist and Fascist dictators. did
not clamp control measures on the so-called puppet Republic of Slovakia as Stalln decreed for the reborn state of Czechoslovakia.
Wlthln forty-eight hours of the Red army entry lnto Prague, the
Czech radlo and press were under Communist domtnatlon. Wlnston
Churchill directed a radio broadcast to the Czechs at that tíme, expresslng tbe deslre that the re-establlshed state be a democracy such
as Britain and Amerlca understod that word. Hls s peech was omitted
from two of the Prague newspapers. The third reported part of it
but carefully deleted tbat irrltatlng paragraph.
SLOVAKI.A.
7
Before Benes arrived - ten days after the "liberation" - the
MVD had taken possesslon of the former citadel of the Gestapo In Bre•
dauergasse. They set up at once a police organizatíon even more ruth·
les.s than the Germans. Communist cells wlthin the country pointed
accuslng flngers at persona! enemies, business rival$ or hated rela·
tlves and tbey were jailed without a hearing.
The several jalls ln the city were Jlterally filled to overnowlng,
Having been one ot those caught up ln their dragnets I can speak au•
thoratlvely. The barred celi at Bartholomegasse lnto whlch I was
ushered had been designed for elght persons. Twenty-slx occupled the
space. Among them were the mayor or burgermelster, a professor ot
the universlly, the governor of the clty's largest !ina,ncial lnstitutlon,
also the director of the Union Bank, a colonel of the Czech gendarmerle, and two captalns. A newspaper man, an Au,;trian consultlng
englneer, a physician, a flfteen-year-old boy, an orchestra leader and a
wealthy industriallst shared one corner of the room. The slxty-seven·
year-old mother of the industrialist was In an adjolnlng celi. They
were capitallsts. Like the others they had been so lndlscreet as to express their lack of appreclatlon for the form of Reel Jlberatlon that had
been imposed on them.
Many young glrls and women were jalled in that sombre bullding.
New arrivals came at all hours of the day and others were hauled
away to destlnations unknown. Red soldiers made perlodic raids and
took away those they wished. How many vanished without a trace,
we shall never know.
In the lll-fated state of Slovakia, even the all-powerful Hlmmler
could not demand that prlsoners be released to bim. In the Moscow•
managed Czechoslovakian state Red soldiers and MVD men took whom
they wlshed without protest from the "democratlc" olflclals.
Although the prison inmates were held without benefit of consul
and incommunicado, an underground system of communication carried
messages outside. The method of its operation was never quite clear
to me, but I can attest to its effi ciency, as a scribbled message of
mine reached the American Legation.
Fear and terror gripped the people a\though th~ shocking !acts
were convenlently suppressed, because to reveal them then wou\d be
embarrassing to those who partlclpated ln the fraud.
When the Communist premier Klement Gottwald handed Benes the
tlnal papers of surrender ln Prague March 1948 and demanded that
he sign on the dotted llne, lt was hut a routlne endlng to what was a
fait accompll three years before.
Presldent Hacha had died, thus escaplng executlon by the Reds.
Presldent Tlso was delivered by the Unlted States forces to Stalln's
henchmen and was hanged. The status of president Benes would have
been helghtened and perhaps hls llfe lengthened had he not returned.
Far better that he had remained away and exposed to the world
what it knows now. That they had been sold lnto bondage at Teheran.
The bias briga.de and pressure groups in Amerlra dlsgraced our country- qnd demanded President Tiso as a sacrlfice. Though our StateDepartment, llke Pilate, may wash lts hands, they permitted hhn
to be t.ortured before de\lvering hlm to the Reds The bloocl or that
Slovak patriot 1s on our heads.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Betrayal of Slovakia
Description
An account of the resource
Edward L. Delaney
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951
pp. 1-7
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Delaney, Edward L.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
LCNAF
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/10029788e7f575435cf4af118dd06ced.pdf
5bb4e9251654dd57696a86b37ddefc5e
PDF Text
Text
8
SLOVAKIA
T11E TWO EUROP:ES
OR. JOSEPH CIEKER
The divi:sion ot Europe is not only a military, political and social
reality, but also a mora! and spiritual reality. The indlvislble body,
ot Europe wa.s violeutly ,spllt into ,two parbs, each or which lives its
own speclal llfe-it the mora! and material misery int.o which the
ualtions of centra! and eastern Europe were cast can be called· Jifeat all.
·
The entire milltary and political effort ot the past war resulled
in the terrible reality of two Europes which do not understand each
other, which cannot and ,shall not b€' able to tind a form of cooperation and positive cohabitatlon, which .stand agalnst each other, and
which one day, sooner or later, shall have to !lght the declsive battle
which shall force common norms on the whole ot the European
contln.eu t.
The present s!tuation cannot be consldered a definite solution
under any clrcumstance,s. Two Europes cannot exlst on the territory of the continent whlch creat.ed the idea of EUROPE, whlctt
tormed its unity throughout the centuries, and the members of whlch
cannot live without belng united. lndestructible torces are ever endeavorlng to unite that whlch was artitlcially dlvided, to eradii'ate
that which was brought into being by force as a resull ot ignorance,
illusions, cowardice, an1i treachery. We are witnesses ot a vlolent
process whlch 1s being suffered by the fatally wounded Europe, wrlthing in a traglc effort to once agaln attaln its historlcal form, to reconstruot 11.<S centuries-old ,personality.
There is no doubt that th<ese two Europes-the Jegitimate result
or contemporary errors which hav-e been committed not only by pollticlans, diplomats and soldiers, but also by European lntellectualsshall cease to ex.lst and that there shall •be only one Europe, assumlng,
however, that whatever takes th~ place of ithe present ,s ltuatlon shall
be able to carry the name whlch symbolizes all that humanity has
orealted throughout the centnrles. The divlsion of the European body
wlll uot he able to be maintained forever. The maimed Idea of Europe shall !ose its historical sense, its mora! content and lts real mh,sion, 1f it cannot live and be enjoyed in !ts '8Iltire eX>tent. What 1s
or the utmost im.portance to humanity is the question ot what forces
shall brlng about the heal!ng of the div!ded parbs into one European body.
Behind the boundary line, whlch once leadlng European factorsespecially forelgn factors--wanted tlo regard only as a symbolic
boundary between mutual influences, there 1s now being bom a new
world, an alien, terrlble world, a frankenstein world. On the rulns
of th,e Chrlstlan countrles of eastern and centra! IEurope, Communi,sm 1s bulld!ng a new "humanity," a mon,strous humanity, whlch
baslcally 1s in contlict wlth the prlnciples of ancloot and hlstorlcal
Europe.
The Soviet system-and in th!s name we need not see only a
terr!ble police instrument, a vislble instrumoot !or physical tortureselzlng ,totally and without any llmltatlons whatsoever a half of Eu•
�SLOVAKIA
9
rope, ia lnJectlng into the severe<! part of the European body new
forms of llfe, a n-ew notlon of culture, a new ldeology, a new mlsslon. Communlsm, already partlally destroylng every1thlng which re•
called the idea of anclent Europe, !.s forcing a new idea. which ls sev•
erlng tradltlonal ties an<l lifting itselt a-s a legitimate resutt of the
unfettered forces ot human periphery. This process of tundamental
changes, made posslble by the use of cruel means of -violence, as
well as the conscious or unconscious COII!Plicity of gullt of the west,
is creating before ithe terrltled eyes of the western peoples "a humanity bereft of humanity" which is bendlng over the boundary line, is
showing lts a.nti-Europea,n a.nd anti-Christian face and is causlng
understandable cha.os a.nd uncertalnty In ,the west.
To better understand the eX!tent of the da:nger whlch threatens
the very idea of Europe, we would have to go on -the other slde or
the Iron Curta.ln. What ls taklng place in that immense human IM:,oratory, in that area of mlsery and slav-ery, canno.t be fully real!z.ed
by lndlvldual n&wspaper reports and reports or news agencles. The
Soviet machine is exerting itself to the utmos,t. T,h ere is no rest.
The process of change does not have t he character of development,
because it is the most a.wful revolution whlch is shaklng the deepest fo1.1:ndatlons of this part of Europe. And thls Europe s,tands
ta.ce to face with the forces which are incompatlble with the ma.nner
of Evropean Jife. There is no competitlon of thoughts, there are no
lntellectuals. There is no asslmilation between what represents tradition a.nd wbat brlngs somethlng new. lt would be a. big mlsta.ke,
indeed, to suppose that this historlcal process can glve blrth to something new which might be acceptable to the Idea or Europe. Communism burns evolutlonary eras, destroys l!ves and kills ideas. What
1s ha,ppening behlnd the Iron Curtain is not a renaissance, a. rerorma.tion, a. klnd of enllghtenwent, or a llterary movement; a.nd it certainly is not an expression of Jlberallsm or constitut!onalism. But it
is an aotual rlgh>t ,between llfe and death.
If Communism were only a force which caused changes of a . political nature, if l!t requlred only a new ,social system, !! lt would
want to reallze only the parcelling or large estates, if lt would only
want to national!2e industry and economy, the danger of lt would
not be or ,such historlcal dimen-slons. But Communlsm 1s much more
tha.n a slmple, social reform. Those who vlew the phenomenon of
Communism only from that vlewpolnt shall notlce only that whlch ls
secondary in it, forgettlng at the same ,tlme to look at lts actual
substance.
The results attalned by Communism in tha,t part of Europe
where it came !nto power by force relate not only to a polltlcal, social and ,physlcal change, but prlmarlly to a mora! a.nd splrltual
change. Barbarians have inva.d-ed Uterature, culture, the sciences and
arts and the tabernacles. They kllled crea.tive splrlts, or enslaved
them, tran.sforming them into lntellectual automats. Poets, romance
wrŕters, publlcists, sclentlfic worker,s, and proressors, wh0,; dld not.
want to or could not orl~tate themsele,es to the brutlsh norms or
ignorance and splrltual prosUtutlon, have elther dled or a.re dying.
The schools are produclng a youth whlch 1s not allowed to know anythlng of the pa.st. Unlverslty halls are belng rmoo wtth th6 atmos•
phere of Soviet factorles, where the product or Soviet dissolution )s
�10
SLOVAKIA
offered, where instructions are given to deform the youth morally
and intellectually, where the culture of the periphery is forced
upon iL
This radical ľevolution which concerns fundamental human values, this sup,pression of the human person, thls eradication of everythlng Divine and -eternal, this materializing ot the noble deslres of
mankind-all this is creatlng the new world, a steippe without a
horizon, an earthly tlre-rulns, the splrltless, inhuman, fanatical,
mechanlzed robot.s.
To eJGpect such an environment a blessed productiveness of crea•
tive s pirlts, works of real art, works of unlversal culture, to SIL{)pose
that on this dead soli can grow intellectuals wlth a world-wide per•
s~tive, with a European soul and a Christian love-that would
mean as much as not to realize what Communlsm really 1.5. True it
is that heroes of unattainable moral heights are !Íl existence and are
being born, bu,t they are also dying like torches in the desert wbich
the hurricane sweeping down fľom the steppes 1s ex.tlnguishlng.
The division of Europe ls being deepened, systematized and
widened. Everyit,hing is being destroyed so that a "new" Europe can
be built. Things are belng produced not only in the pbyslcal,
but also the splritual field in an environment of •terror, corporeal
fear, in an environment of unceasing haste. Stachanov is the
idea! not only for the manual worker, but also for the sp.rltual
worker. And this new type of standardized intellectual works and
produces like a machine filled with blood and spirit. U the w,,rth
of moral and spirit-lial values would ,b e measured in terms of the
number of books -published, fabrlcated artistic works, in .terms of
their propagatlon, the creatlvE> ability of rthe tradltional and Chrlstian European world would be surpassed. But something that !s
fundamental, et<Qornal and unlversally valid, is lacking in all thls
produclion whlch was crea.ted and accumulated so feverlshly. On
thls steppe of the world that is being born, gigantic pyramlds are
rlslng which were ordered to be bullt by Pharaohs, but from them
are blowlng the breezes of death. Robots cannot create, because
they lack the divine spark and do not have any inspiration, either
human or divine. They denied God and killed ,the man In themselves.
Today there no longer exlst any llluslons about the inevitable
and historlcal disentangllng of the tragedy of the two Europes.
Only bltnd people and su\cides-and some of these still exlstdo not see the shadow which thls spectľe is casting over .the most
distant corners of Europe, lf not the world, and ls making ready
to take the flnal step to unlte dlvlded 1l)urope in tis own fashion.
The forces of human perlphery, the forces of darkness and barbarism, organh:lng themselves accord!ng to the Jaws of the jungle,
present t o 1the western world a concrete problem of European
unlty. This 1s paradoxlcal, but it !s the truth. Barbarians . want
to unite that which Europeans had divlded. A ·b oundary line ls
not a barrÍ'er for them and it never was. \After swallowlng and
digestlng a half or Europe they must thrust themselves on the
second half and devoU1° lt, or perlsh in the atitempt.
In the meantlme, whlle this barbarlsm-whlch untll recently
was evaluated as a pos~tlve and ,equlvalent component ot Euro•
peantsm, as a value comparable wlth mora! and splrltual no-
�SLOVAKIA
11
blesse-:-is offering a pian ,for uuiting Europe, which in reality is
already destroyed_ aQ.d dead Iu embryo and Iu its. very suQl}t.a.nce.
the west, polsoned by the poison of dissolu.tlon, nE)glect an:d collective fear, ls wasting tim!l with formalltles and naivities, in con!erences and in solemn though frequent useless assembl!es, as it
the lrreconcllable totalitarian beast sensed a duty or some klnd
or necesslty to respect -these "European experiences," which it
already had destroyed in a brutal manner In the countries behlnd
the Iron Curtaiu.
The uniflcation of divi-ded EuľoPe is not only a necessity for
Communlsm, whlch it doouces ťrom the established progr8./1Il ot
lts ideology, hu t also the result of persistent forces of the European whole whlch are calling for the unification of that which
was dlvlded, that which was· cu,t off !rom it without analyzing
the methods and forms. of thls u nlficatlon. This unlfication by
Communism means dea.th for Europe.
It 1s sad, indeed, even it 'not tragic, that this anti-European,
anti-Chrlstian spectre holds the initiatlve of this unification in its
11ands. The western world would, perhaps, be satisfled with a
maimed Europe, if that were ' posslble and if the barbarlans would
allow it. Some IE}uropean-s m1ght consider it possible to live in a
divlded Europe and probably would even be satlsfied with the loss
-of the Chrlstian countries of central and eastern Europe, if at
such a prlce they might gain weltare and comfort.
This defensive stand, these methods to preserve what has remained of E urope, are the fundamental differences which distlngulsh
the traditional world !rom the one which is belng born behind the
boundary line or dlvldoo Euro,pe. Whlle it seemed that the west was
no Ionger inteľested in rts indivisible part, the east-personlfied by
the Sovleit spectres--was very muoh lnte-re-sted. This stand can be e xplained, but it can never l>e justifioo. lt ls slgnlflcan-t that it was
the Europeans themselves who were abandoning the Idea of Europe.
R seemed, as if the weariness caused by two successlve wars, had
overwhelmed the very -substance of European sentiment.
In European society there has appeared an une:x;pected phenomenon: the attempt to accustom itsel[ e=n to lrreparable losses. The
mind was captured by the fiction that the questlon of the European
idea would b e resol~ by the hauling of foodstufts and machlnery
into Europe by both Americas. lt is, therefore, understandable that
in such an envlroument there could not be and was not bom any
force of unlversal grea,tness which could be vlctorlous over the forces
of dissoluton which were ga;therlng strength from ·fäe east. The
undertakings of European dimenslons- the Crusades, ,the herolsm of
Lepant, the Tridentine Councll!-these joint efforts of European h e ro·
ism, it seems, were all forgotten. In ,the face of the crude ln!tlatlve
-of the east, the west created ,t he conditions for a gradual retreat.
Even though the situatlon ls extremely grave, we must not de•
s pair. The hlstorical forces of the west wlth thelľ vitality, with ,their
mora) and spiritual designs, with thelr own orlgln, can and must excel
over the forces that would destroy Europe. Europe can and must f!nd
itself. Agalnst the concrete program proferred by Communism, Eu•
rope must offer Lts own concrete program-not only a defens!ve one.
but an offensive one as well. There !s no place, neither is thPre
�12
SLOVAKIA
much tlme, for hesitation, for useless phlloéophislng, for nalvltles,
for half-way declslons, for neutrality. 'ľhe formula, which the -communistlc system offers the remalnder or Europe for European unlfication, !nevl.tably !ncludes all natlons, all ideologŇls, all confessions,
aml. ' all peoples. In 1he cage ot the Soviet system there is room for
everything: for materlal and splritual tn!ngs, for ordinary Ml well as
sacred things, for the work&r and the lntellectual. Not to recognize
rthis law ot Communlsm and attempt to argue lt away would mean to
commrt an unpardonable and lrreparable blunder. Either all Eu ropean1 1hall aave themaelve- r elae alt ahall perlah.
So that ,t he wesť could save !tself and not perlsh In 4he embrace
ot the spectre, lt is being given a last opportunlty to rehablli.ta.te !t·
self and ·perform !ts h!stor!cal m!sslon. On-e thl.ng, however, !s certain: l!t shall not be a-ble to fulflll th!s mlsslon by ,the me4hods it
has used thus far, the methods w-hlch led to the dlvlslon of Europe.
And lt certainly wlll not be able to do !t wlth ,people who have grown
old morally a.nd splrLtually.
It .ithe west w!shes •to avoid ,the fate ot centra! and ~ste~n Europe, !.f it w!shes to come to terms with the un!fy!ng spectre- of Commun!sm ln a dlgnltled manner, !t must revlve the permanent torces
ot the west-ern natlon-s, !t must breathe in,to <the idea of Europe a
real European and Chri-stlan content, !t must sleze the lnltiatlve ot
un!fy!ng Europe. Even barbar!ans know how to produce and bu!l<i
tactories, br!dges, great iron and steel entemprises, rallroads, airfields
and bomba. Wha1 •they do not know, and what they shall never
know !s how to glve materlal a breath ot humanity, subord!nate it
t o the !nterests of the dlgn!ty ot mankind and glve the world a sense
ot lts true mission.
The positlons are well defined. The hour ha.s come to declde the
fate of Europe. The sys tem ot two Europes, which arose and was
malntalned by the tault ot the west, cannot last. The west is not
Europe, and we cannot regard the east as Europe e•ther. The west
cannot harbor bopes ithat lt shall avol-d an lnvaslon by the barbarians
by toresaklng the east-ern part of Europe to Communlsm. Al!, long a s
one substantlal portlon of Europe 1-s undergolng a feverlsh change.
as long as everythlng there, which symbolized the Chrlstlan and European splr•t, is retreating before th-e aggresslveness of the barbarlan and is wlthdrawlng to the hlllsldes and int.o the catacombs, a s
long as half of 1Europe -does not live, belleve and t~I accordlng to
the thousand-year-old Chrl&tlan and Europeain laws, there shall be no
contentmen,t ot •the spirit, ,n or shall th-ere be material welfare In the
the west.
Tbe Idea of Europe lncludes In itself tbe west as equally a s the
ea st. lt -embraces 1he distant plalns of Poland, the Ukraine, White
Russla, the Slovak and Rumanla,n valleys, as well as ,th& green fleld s
ot France and Germany, and even the broad Iberlan horizons. We
must resolve: There shall be only one Europe--a Chrlstlan, hlstorlcal Europe-a free and democratlc Europe.
�
8
SLOVAKIA
T11E TWO EUROP:ES
OR. JOSEPH CIEKER
The divi:sion ot Europe is not only a military, political and social
reality, but also a mora! and spiritual reality. The indlvislble body,
ot Europe wa.s violeutly ,spllt into ,two parbs, each or which lives its
own speclal llfe-it the mora! and material misery int.o which the
ualtions of centra! and eastern Europe were cast can be called· Jifeat all.
·
The entire milltary and political effort ot the past war resulled
in the terrible reality of two Europes which do not understand each
other, which cannot and ,shall not b€' able to tind a form of cooperation and positive cohabitatlon, which .stand agalnst each other, and
which one day, sooner or later, shall have to !lght the declsive battle
which shall force common norms on the whole ot the European
contln.eu t.
The present s!tuation cannot be consldered a definite solution
under any clrcumstance,s. Two Europes cannot exlst on the territory of the continent whlch creat.ed the idea of EUROPE, whlctt
tormed its unity throughout the centuries, and the members of whlch
cannot live without belng united. lndestructible torces are ever endeavorlng to unite that whlch was artitlcially dlvided, to eradii'ate
that which was brought into being by force as a resull ot ignorance,
illusions, cowardice, an1i treachery. We are witnesses ot a vlolent
process whlch 1s being suffered by the fatally wounded Europe, wrlthing in a traglc effort to once agaln attaln its historlcal form, to reconstruot 11.<S centuries-old ,personality.
There is no doubt that th<ese two Europes-the Jegitimate result
or contemporary errors which hav-e been committed not only by pollticlans, diplomats and soldiers, but also by European lntellectualsshall cease to ex.lst and that there shall •be only one Europe, assumlng,
however, that whatever takes th~ place of ithe present ,s ltuatlon shall
be able to carry the name whlch symbolizes all that humanity has
orealted throughout the centnrles. The divlsion of the European body
wlll uot he able to be maintained forever. The maimed Idea of Europe shall !ose its historical sense, its mora! content and lts real mh,sion, 1f it cannot live and be enjoyed in !ts '8Iltire eX>tent. What 1s
or the utmost im.portance to humanity is the question ot what forces
shall brlng about the heal!ng of the div!ded parbs into one European body.
Behind the boundary line, whlch once leadlng European factorsespecially forelgn factors--wanted tlo regard only as a symbolic
boundary between mutual influences, there 1s now being bom a new
world, an alien, terrlble world, a frankenstein world. On the rulns
of th,e Chrlstlan countrles of eastern and centra! IEurope, Communi,sm 1s bulld!ng a new "humanity," a mon,strous humanity, whlch
baslcally 1s in contlict wlth the prlnciples of ancloot and hlstorlcal
Europe.
The Soviet system-and in th!s name we need not see only a
terr!ble police instrument, a vislble instrumoot !or physical tortureselzlng ,totally and without any llmltatlons whatsoever a half of Eu•
�SLOVAKIA
9
rope, ia lnJectlng into the severe<! part of the European body new
forms of llfe, a n-ew notlon of culture, a new ldeology, a new mlsslon. Communlsm, already partlally destroylng every1thlng which re•
called the idea of anclent Europe, !.s forcing a new idea. which ls sev•
erlng tradltlonal ties an<l lifting itselt a-s a legitimate resutt of the
unfettered forces ot human periphery. This process of tundamental
changes, made posslble by the use of cruel means of -violence, as
well as the conscious or unconscious COII!Plicity of gullt of the west,
is creating before ithe terrltled eyes of the western peoples "a humanity bereft of humanity" which is bendlng over the boundary line, is
showing lts a.nti-Europea,n a.nd anti-Christian face and is causlng
understandable cha.os a.nd uncertalnty In ,the west.
To better understand the eX!tent of the da:nger whlch threatens
the very idea of Europe, we would have to go on -the other slde or
the Iron Curta.ln. What ls taklng place in that immense human IM:,oratory, in that area of mlsery and slav-ery, canno.t be fully real!z.ed
by lndlvldual n&wspaper reports and reports or news agencles. The
Soviet machine is exerting itself to the utmos,t. T,h ere is no rest.
The process of change does not have t he character of development,
because it is the most a.wful revolution whlch is shaklng the deepest fo1.1:ndatlons of this part of Europe. And thls Europe s,tands
ta.ce to face with the forces which are incompatlble with the ma.nner
of Evropean Jife. There is no competitlon of thoughts, there are no
lntellectuals. There is no asslmilation between what represents tradition a.nd wbat brlngs somethlng new. lt would be a. big mlsta.ke,
indeed, to suppose that this historlcal process can glve blrth to something new which might be acceptable to the Idea or Europe. Communism burns evolutlonary eras, destroys l!ves and kills ideas. What
1s ha,ppening behlnd the Iron Curtain is not a renaissance, a. rerorma.tion, a. klnd of enllghtenwent, or a llterary movement; a.nd it certainly is not an expression of Jlberallsm or constitut!onalism. But it
is an aotual rlgh>t ,between llfe and death.
If Communism were only a force which caused changes of a . political nature, if l!t requlred only a new ,social system, !! lt would
want to reallze only the parcelling or large estates, if lt would only
want to national!2e industry and economy, the danger of lt would
not be or ,such historlcal dimen-slons. But Communlsm 1s much more
tha.n a slmple, social reform. Those who vlew the phenomenon of
Communism only from that vlewpolnt shall notlce only that whlch ls
secondary in it, forgettlng at the same ,tlme to look at lts actual
substance.
The results attalned by Communism in tha,t part of Europe
where it came !nto power by force relate not only to a polltlcal, social and ,physlcal change, but prlmarlly to a mora! a.nd splrltual
change. Barbarians have inva.d-ed Uterature, culture, the sciences and
arts and the tabernacles. They kllled crea.tive splrlts, or enslaved
them, tran.sforming them into lntellectual automats. Poets, romance
wrŕters, publlcists, sclentlfic worker,s, and proressors, wh0,; dld not.
want to or could not orl~tate themsele,es to the brutlsh norms or
ignorance and splrltual prosUtutlon, have elther dled or a.re dying.
The schools are produclng a youth whlch 1s not allowed to know anythlng of the pa.st. Unlverslty halls are belng rmoo wtth th6 atmos•
phere of Soviet factorles, where the product or Soviet dissolution )s
�10
SLOVAKIA
offered, where instructions are given to deform the youth morally
and intellectually, where the culture of the periphery is forced
upon iL
This radical ľevolution which concerns fundamental human values, this sup,pression of the human person, thls eradication of everythlng Divine and -eternal, this materializing ot the noble deslres of
mankind-all this is creatlng the new world, a steippe without a
horizon, an earthly tlre-rulns, the splrltless, inhuman, fanatical,
mechanlzed robot.s.
To eJGpect such an environment a blessed productiveness of crea•
tive s pirlts, works of real art, works of unlversal culture, to SIL{)pose
that on this dead soli can grow intellectuals wlth a world-wide per•
s~tive, with a European soul and a Christian love-that would
mean as much as not to realize what Communlsm really 1.5. True it
is that heroes of unattainable moral heights are !Íl existence and are
being born, bu,t they are also dying like torches in the desert wbich
the hurricane sweeping down fľom the steppes 1s ex.tlnguishlng.
The division of Europe ls being deepened, systematized and
widened. Everyit,hing is being destroyed so that a "new" Europe can
be built. Things are belng produced not only in the pbyslcal,
but also the splritual field in an environment of •terror, corporeal
fear, in an environment of unceasing haste. Stachanov is the
idea! not only for the manual worker, but also for the sp.rltual
worker. And this new type of standardized intellectual works and
produces like a machine filled with blood and spirit. U the w,,rth
of moral and spirit-lial values would ,b e measured in terms of the
number of books -published, fabrlcated artistic works, in .terms of
their propagatlon, the creatlvE> ability of rthe tradltional and Chrlstian European world would be surpassed. But something that !s
fundamental, et<Qornal and unlversally valid, is lacking in all thls
produclion whlch was crea.ted and accumulated so feverlshly. On
thls steppe of the world that is being born, gigantic pyramlds are
rlslng which were ordered to be bullt by Pharaohs, but from them
are blowlng the breezes of death. Robots cannot create, because
they lack the divine spark and do not have any inspiration, either
human or divine. They denied God and killed ,the man In themselves.
Today there no longer exlst any llluslons about the inevitable
and historlcal disentangllng of the tragedy of the two Europes.
Only bltnd people and su\cides-and some of these still exlstdo not see the shadow which thls spectľe is casting over .the most
distant corners of Europe, lf not the world, and ls making ready
to take the flnal step to unlte dlvlded 1l)urope in tis own fashion.
The forces of human perlphery, the forces of darkness and barbarism, organh:lng themselves accord!ng to the Jaws of the jungle,
present t o 1the western world a concrete problem of European
unlty. This 1s paradoxlcal, but it !s the truth. Barbarians . want
to unite that which Europeans had divlded. A ·b oundary line ls
not a barrÍ'er for them and it never was. \After swallowlng and
digestlng a half or Europe they must thrust themselves on the
second half and devoU1° lt, or perlsh in the atitempt.
In the meantlme, whlle this barbarlsm-whlch untll recently
was evaluated as a pos~tlve and ,equlvalent component ot Euro•
peantsm, as a value comparable wlth mora! and splrltual no-
�SLOVAKIA
11
blesse-:-is offering a pian ,for uuiting Europe, which in reality is
already destroyed_ aQ.d dead Iu embryo and Iu its. very suQl}t.a.nce.
the west, polsoned by the poison of dissolu.tlon, nE)glect an:d collective fear, ls wasting tim!l with formalltles and naivities, in con!erences and in solemn though frequent useless assembl!es, as it
the lrreconcllable totalitarian beast sensed a duty or some klnd
or necesslty to respect -these "European experiences," which it
already had destroyed in a brutal manner In the countries behlnd
the Iron Curtaiu.
The uniflcation of divi-ded EuľoPe is not only a necessity for
Communlsm, whlch it doouces ťrom the established progr8./1Il ot
lts ideology, hu t also the result of persistent forces of the European whole whlch are calling for the unification of that which
was dlvlded, that which was· cu,t off !rom it without analyzing
the methods and forms. of thls u nlficatlon. This unlfication by
Communism means dea.th for Europe.
It 1s sad, indeed, even it 'not tragic, that this anti-European,
anti-Chrlstian spectre holds the initiatlve of this unification in its
11ands. The western world would, perhaps, be satisfled with a
maimed Europe, if that were ' posslble and if the barbarlans would
allow it. Some IE}uropean-s m1ght consider it possible to live in a
divlded Europe and probably would even be satlsfied with the loss
-of the Chrlstian countries of central and eastern Europe, if at
such a prlce they might gain weltare and comfort.
This defensive stand, these methods to preserve what has remained of E urope, are the fundamental differences which distlngulsh
the traditional world !rom the one which is belng born behind the
boundary line or dlvldoo Euro,pe. Whlle it seemed that the west was
no Ionger inteľested in rts indivisible part, the east-personlfied by
the Sovleit spectres--was very muoh lnte-re-sted. This stand can be e xplained, but it can never l>e justifioo. lt ls slgnlflcan-t that it was
the Europeans themselves who were abandoning the Idea of Europe.
R seemed, as if the weariness caused by two successlve wars, had
overwhelmed the very -substance of European sentiment.
In European society there has appeared an une:x;pected phenomenon: the attempt to accustom itsel[ e=n to lrreparable losses. The
mind was captured by the fiction that the questlon of the European
idea would b e resol~ by the hauling of foodstufts and machlnery
into Europe by both Americas. lt is, therefore, understandable that
in such an envlroument there could not be and was not bom any
force of unlversal grea,tness which could be vlctorlous over the forces
of dissoluton which were ga;therlng strength from ·fäe east. The
undertakings of European dimenslons- the Crusades, ,the herolsm of
Lepant, the Tridentine Councll!-these joint efforts of European h e ro·
ism, it seems, were all forgotten. In ,the face of the crude ln!tlatlve
-of the east, the west created ,t he conditions for a gradual retreat.
Even though the situatlon ls extremely grave, we must not de•
s pair. The hlstorical forces of the west wlth thelľ vitality, with ,their
mora) and spiritual designs, with thelr own orlgln, can and must excel
over the forces that would destroy Europe. Europe can and must f!nd
itself. Agalnst the concrete program proferred by Communism, Eu•
rope must offer Lts own concrete program-not only a defens!ve one.
but an offensive one as well. There !s no place, neither is thPre
�12
SLOVAKIA
much tlme, for hesitation, for useless phlloéophislng, for nalvltles,
for half-way declslons, for neutrality. 'ľhe formula, which the -communistlc system offers the remalnder or Europe for European unlfication, !nevl.tably !ncludes all natlons, all ideologŇls, all confessions,
aml. ' all peoples. In 1he cage ot the Soviet system there is room for
everything: for materlal and splritual tn!ngs, for ordinary Ml well as
sacred things, for the work&r and the lntellectual. Not to recognize
rthis law ot Communlsm and attempt to argue lt away would mean to
commrt an unpardonable and lrreparable blunder. Either all Eu ropean1 1hall aave themaelve- r elae alt ahall perlah.
So that ,t he wesť could save !tself and not perlsh In 4he embrace
ot the spectre, lt is being given a last opportunlty to rehablli.ta.te !t·
self and ·perform !ts h!stor!cal m!sslon. On-e thl.ng, however, !s certain: l!t shall not be a-ble to fulflll th!s mlsslon by ,the me4hods it
has used thus far, the methods w-hlch led to the dlvlslon of Europe.
And lt certainly wlll not be able to do !t wlth ,people who have grown
old morally a.nd splrLtually.
It .ithe west w!shes •to avoid ,the fate ot centra! and ~ste~n Europe, !.f it w!shes to come to terms with the un!fy!ng spectre- of Commun!sm ln a dlgnltled manner, !t must revlve the permanent torces
ot the west-ern natlon-s, !t must breathe in,to <the idea of Europe a
real European and Chri-stlan content, !t must sleze the lnltiatlve ot
un!fy!ng Europe. Even barbar!ans know how to produce and bu!l<i
tactories, br!dges, great iron and steel entemprises, rallroads, airfields
and bomba. Wha1 •they do not know, and what they shall never
know !s how to glve materlal a breath ot humanity, subord!nate it
t o the !nterests of the dlgn!ty ot mankind and glve the world a sense
ot lts true mission.
The positlons are well defined. The hour ha.s come to declde the
fate of Europe. The sys tem ot two Europes, which arose and was
malntalned by the tault ot the west, cannot last. The west is not
Europe, and we cannot regard the east as Europe e•ther. The west
cannot harbor bopes ithat lt shall avol-d an lnvaslon by the barbarians
by toresaklng the east-ern part of Europe to Communlsm. Al!, long a s
one substantlal portlon of Europe 1-s undergolng a feverlsh change.
as long as everythlng there, which symbolized the Chrlstlan and European splr•t, is retreating before th-e aggresslveness of the barbarlan and is wlthdrawlng to the hlllsldes and int.o the catacombs, a s
long as half of 1Europe -does not live, belleve and t~I accordlng to
the thousand-year-old Chrl&tlan and Europeain laws, there shall be no
contentmen,t ot •the spirit, ,n or shall th-ere be material welfare In the
the west.
Tbe Idea of Europe lncludes In itself tbe west as equally a s the
ea st. lt -embraces 1he distant plalns of Poland, the Ukraine, White
Russla, the Slovak and Rumanla,n valleys, as well as ,th& green fleld s
ot France and Germany, and even the broad Iberlan horizons. We
must resolve: There shall be only one Europe--a Chrlstlan, hlstorlcal Europe-a free and democratlc Europe.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
8
SLOVAKIA
T11E TWO EUROP:ES
OR. JOSEPH CIEKER
The divi:sion ot Europe is not only a military, political and social
reality, but also a mora! and spiritual reality. The indlvislble body,
ot Europe wa.s violeutly ,spllt into ,two parbs, each or which lives its
own speclal llfe-it the mora! and material misery int.o which the
ualtions of centra! and eastern Europe were cast can be called· Jifeat all.
·
The entire milltary and political effort ot the past war resulled
in the terrible reality of two Europes which do not understand each
other, which cannot and ,shall not b€' able to tind a form of cooperation and positive cohabitatlon, which .stand agalnst each other, and
which one day, sooner or later, shall have to !lght the declsive battle
which shall force common norms on the whole ot the European
contln.eu t.
The present s!tuation cannot be consldered a definite solution
under any clrcumstance,s. Two Europes cannot exlst on the territory of the continent whlch creat.ed the idea of EUROPE, whlctt
tormed its unity throughout the centuries, and the members of whlch
cannot live without belng united. lndestructible torces are ever endeavorlng to unite that whlch was artitlcially dlvided, to eradii'ate
that which was brought into being by force as a resull ot ignorance,
illusions, cowardice, an1i treachery. We are witnesses ot a vlolent
process whlch 1s being suffered by the fatally wounded Europe, wrlthing in a traglc effort to once agaln attaln its historlcal form, to reconstruot 11.<S centuries-old ,personality.
There is no doubt that th<ese two Europes-the Jegitimate result
or contemporary errors which hav-e been committed not only by pollticlans, diplomats and soldiers, but also by European lntellectualsshall cease to ex.lst and that there shall •be only one Europe, assumlng,
however, that whatever takes th~ place of ithe present ,s ltuatlon shall
be able to carry the name whlch symbolizes all that humanity has
orealted throughout the centnrles. The divlsion of the European body
wlll uot he able to be maintained forever. The maimed Idea of Europe shall !ose its historical sense, its mora! content and lts real mh,sion, 1f it cannot live and be enjoyed in !ts '8Iltire eX>tent. What 1s
or the utmost im.portance to humanity is the question ot what forces
shall brlng about the heal!ng of the div!ded parbs into one European body.
Behind the boundary line, whlch once leadlng European factorsespecially forelgn factors--wanted tlo regard only as a symbolic
boundary between mutual influences, there 1s now being bom a new
world, an alien, terrlble world, a frankenstein world. On the rulns
of th,e Chrlstlan countrles of eastern and centra! IEurope, Communi,sm 1s bulld!ng a new "humanity," a mon,strous humanity, whlch
baslcally 1s in contlict wlth the prlnciples of ancloot and hlstorlcal
Europe.
The Soviet system-and in th!s name we need not see only a
terr!ble police instrument, a vislble instrumoot !or physical tortureselzlng ,totally and without any llmltatlons whatsoever a half of Eu•
SLOVAKIA
9
rope, ia lnJectlng into the severe<! part of the European body new
forms of llfe, a n-ew notlon of culture, a new ldeology, a new mlsslon. Communlsm, already partlally destroylng every1thlng which re•
called the idea of anclent Europe, !.s forcing a new idea. which ls sev•
erlng tradltlonal ties an<l lifting itselt a-s a legitimate resutt of the
unfettered forces ot human periphery. This process of tundamental
changes, made posslble by the use of cruel means of -violence, as
well as the conscious or unconscious COII!Plicity of gullt of the west,
is creating before ithe terrltled eyes of the western peoples "a humanity bereft of humanity" which is bendlng over the boundary line, is
showing lts a.nti-Europea,n a.nd anti-Christian face and is causlng
understandable cha.os a.nd uncertalnty In ,the west.
To better understand the eX!tent of the da:nger whlch threatens
the very idea of Europe, we would have to go on -the other slde or
the Iron Curta.ln. What ls taklng place in that immense human IM:,oratory, in that area of mlsery and slav-ery, canno.t be fully real!z.ed
by lndlvldual n&wspaper reports and reports or news agencles. The
Soviet machine is exerting itself to the utmos,t. T,h ere is no rest.
The process of change does not have t he character of development,
because it is the most a.wful revolution whlch is shaklng the deepest fo1.1:ndatlons of this part of Europe. And thls Europe s,tands
ta.ce to face with the forces which are incompatlble with the ma.nner
of Evropean Jife. There is no competitlon of thoughts, there are no
lntellectuals. There is no asslmilation between what represents tradition a.nd wbat brlngs somethlng new. lt would be a. big mlsta.ke,
indeed, to suppose that this historlcal process can glve blrth to something new which might be acceptable to the Idea or Europe. Communism burns evolutlonary eras, destroys l!ves and kills ideas. What
1s ha,ppening behlnd the Iron Curtain is not a renaissance, a. rerorma.tion, a. klnd of enllghtenwent, or a llterary movement; a.nd it certainly is not an expression of Jlberallsm or constitut!onalism. But it
is an aotual rlgh>t ,between llfe and death.
If Communism were only a force which caused changes of a . political nature, if l!t requlred only a new ,social system, !! lt would
want to reallze only the parcelling or large estates, if lt would only
want to national!2e industry and economy, the danger of lt would
not be or ,such historlcal dimen-slons. But Communlsm 1s much more
tha.n a slmple, social reform. Those who vlew the phenomenon of
Communism only from that vlewpolnt shall notlce only that whlch ls
secondary in it, forgettlng at the same ,tlme to look at lts actual
substance.
The results attalned by Communism in tha,t part of Europe
where it came !nto power by force relate not only to a polltlcal, social and ,physlcal change, but prlmarlly to a mora! a.nd splrltual
change. Barbarians have inva.d-ed Uterature, culture, the sciences and
arts and the tabernacles. They kllled crea.tive splrlts, or enslaved
them, tran.sforming them into lntellectual automats. Poets, romance
wrŕters, publlcists, sclentlfic worker,s, and proressors, wh0,; dld not.
want to or could not orl~tate themsele,es to the brutlsh norms or
ignorance and splrltual prosUtutlon, have elther dled or a.re dying.
The schools are produclng a youth whlch 1s not allowed to know anythlng of the pa.st. Unlverslty halls are belng rmoo wtth th6 atmos•
phere of Soviet factorles, where the product or Soviet dissolution )s
10
SLOVAKIA
offered, where instructions are given to deform the youth morally
and intellectually, where the culture of the periphery is forced
upon iL
This radical ľevolution which concerns fundamental human values, this sup,pression of the human person, thls eradication of everythlng Divine and -eternal, this materializing ot the noble deslres of
mankind-all this is creatlng the new world, a steippe without a
horizon, an earthly tlre-rulns, the splrltless, inhuman, fanatical,
mechanlzed robot.s.
To eJGpect such an environment a blessed productiveness of crea•
tive s pirlts, works of real art, works of unlversal culture, to SIL{)pose
that on this dead soli can grow intellectuals wlth a world-wide per•
s~tive, with a European soul and a Christian love-that would
mean as much as not to realize what Communlsm really 1.5. True it
is that heroes of unattainable moral heights are !Íl existence and are
being born, bu,t they are also dying like torches in the desert wbich
the hurricane sweeping down fľom the steppes 1s ex.tlnguishlng.
The division of Europe ls being deepened, systematized and
widened. Everyit,hing is being destroyed so that a "new" Europe can
be built. Things are belng produced not only in the pbyslcal,
but also the splritual field in an environment of •terror, corporeal
fear, in an environment of unceasing haste. Stachanov is the
idea! not only for the manual worker, but also for the sp.rltual
worker. And this new type of standardized intellectual works and
produces like a machine filled with blood and spirit. U the w,,rth
of moral and spirit-lial values would ,b e measured in terms of the
number of books -published, fabrlcated artistic works, in .terms of
their propagatlon, the creatlvE> ability of rthe tradltional and Chrlstian European world would be surpassed. But something that !s
fundamental, et<Qornal and unlversally valid, is lacking in all thls
produclion whlch was crea.ted and accumulated so feverlshly. On
thls steppe of the world that is being born, gigantic pyramlds are
rlslng which were ordered to be bullt by Pharaohs, but from them
are blowlng the breezes of death. Robots cannot create, because
they lack the divine spark and do not have any inspiration, either
human or divine. They denied God and killed ,the man In themselves.
Today there no longer exlst any llluslons about the inevitable
and historlcal disentangllng of the tragedy of the two Europes.
Only bltnd people and su\cides-and some of these still exlstdo not see the shadow which thls spectľe is casting over .the most
distant corners of Europe, lf not the world, and ls making ready
to take the flnal step to unlte dlvlded 1l)urope in tis own fashion.
The forces of human perlphery, the forces of darkness and barbarism, organh:lng themselves accord!ng to the Jaws of the jungle,
present t o 1the western world a concrete problem of European
unlty. This 1s paradoxlcal, but it !s the truth. Barbarians . want
to unite that which Europeans had divlded. A ·b oundary line ls
not a barrÍ'er for them and it never was. \After swallowlng and
digestlng a half or Europe they must thrust themselves on the
second half and devoU1° lt, or perlsh in the atitempt.
In the meantlme, whlle this barbarlsm-whlch untll recently
was evaluated as a pos~tlve and ,equlvalent component ot Euro•
peantsm, as a value comparable wlth mora! and splrltual no-
SLOVAKIA
11
blesse-:-is offering a pian ,for uuiting Europe, which in reality is
already destroyed_ aQ.d dead Iu embryo and Iu its. very suQl}t.a.nce.
the west, polsoned by the poison of dissolu.tlon, nE)glect an:d collective fear, ls wasting tim!l with formalltles and naivities, in con!erences and in solemn though frequent useless assembl!es, as it
the lrreconcllable totalitarian beast sensed a duty or some klnd
or necesslty to respect -these "European experiences," which it
already had destroyed in a brutal manner In the countries behlnd
the Iron Curtaiu.
The uniflcation of divi-ded EuľoPe is not only a necessity for
Communlsm, whlch it doouces ťrom the established progr8./1Il ot
lts ideology, hu t also the result of persistent forces of the European whole whlch are calling for the unification of that which
was dlvlded, that which was· cu,t off !rom it without analyzing
the methods and forms. of thls u nlficatlon. This unlfication by
Communism means dea.th for Europe.
It 1s sad, indeed, even it 'not tragic, that this anti-European,
anti-Chrlstian spectre holds the initiatlve of this unification in its
11ands. The western world would, perhaps, be satisfled with a
maimed Europe, if that were ' posslble and if the barbarlans would
allow it. Some IE}uropean-s m1ght consider it possible to live in a
divlded Europe and probably would even be satlsfied with the loss
-of the Chrlstian countries of central and eastern Europe, if at
such a prlce they might gain weltare and comfort.
This defensive stand, these methods to preserve what has remained of E urope, are the fundamental differences which distlngulsh
the traditional world !rom the one which is belng born behind the
boundary line or dlvldoo Euro,pe. Whlle it seemed that the west was
no Ionger inteľested in rts indivisible part, the east-personlfied by
the Sovleit spectres--was very muoh lnte-re-sted. This stand can be e xplained, but it can never l>e justifioo. lt ls slgnlflcan-t that it was
the Europeans themselves who were abandoning the Idea of Europe.
R seemed, as if the weariness caused by two successlve wars, had
overwhelmed the very -substance of European sentiment.
In European society there has appeared an une:x;pected phenomenon: the attempt to accustom itsel[ e=n to lrreparable losses. The
mind was captured by the fiction that the questlon of the European
idea would b e resol~ by the hauling of foodstufts and machlnery
into Europe by both Americas. lt is, therefore, understandable that
in such an envlroument there could not be and was not bom any
force of unlversal grea,tness which could be vlctorlous over the forces
of dissoluton which were ga;therlng strength from ·fäe east. The
undertakings of European dimenslons- the Crusades, ,the herolsm of
Lepant, the Tridentine Councll!-these joint efforts of European h e ro·
ism, it seems, were all forgotten. In ,the face of the crude ln!tlatlve
-of the east, the west created ,t he conditions for a gradual retreat.
Even though the situatlon ls extremely grave, we must not de•
s pair. The hlstorical forces of the west wlth thelľ vitality, with ,their
mora) and spiritual designs, with thelr own orlgln, can and must excel
over the forces that would destroy Europe. Europe can and must f!nd
itself. Agalnst the concrete program proferred by Communism, Eu•
rope must offer Lts own concrete program-not only a defens!ve one.
but an offensive one as well. There !s no place, neither is thPre
12
SLOVAKIA
much tlme, for hesitation, for useless phlloéophislng, for nalvltles,
for half-way declslons, for neutrality. 'ľhe formula, which the -communistlc system offers the remalnder or Europe for European unlfication, !nevl.tably !ncludes all natlons, all ideologŇls, all confessions,
aml. ' all peoples. In 1he cage ot the Soviet system there is room for
everything: for materlal and splritual tn!ngs, for ordinary Ml well as
sacred things, for the work&r and the lntellectual. Not to recognize
rthis law ot Communlsm and attempt to argue lt away would mean to
commrt an unpardonable and lrreparable blunder. Either all Eu ropean1 1hall aave themaelve- r elae alt ahall perlah.
So that ,t he wesť could save !tself and not perlsh In 4he embrace
ot the spectre, lt is being given a last opportunlty to rehablli.ta.te !t·
self and ·perform !ts h!stor!cal m!sslon. On-e thl.ng, however, !s certain: l!t shall not be a-ble to fulflll th!s mlsslon by ,the me4hods it
has used thus far, the methods w-hlch led to the dlvlslon of Europe.
And lt certainly wlll not be able to do !t wlth ,people who have grown
old morally a.nd splrLtually.
It .ithe west w!shes •to avoid ,the fate ot centra! and ~ste~n Europe, !.f it w!shes to come to terms with the un!fy!ng spectre- of Commun!sm ln a dlgnltled manner, !t must revlve the permanent torces
ot the west-ern natlon-s, !t must breathe in,to <the idea of Europe a
real European and Chri-stlan content, !t must sleze the lnltiatlve ot
un!fy!ng Europe. Even barbar!ans know how to produce and bu!l<i
tactories, br!dges, great iron and steel entemprises, rallroads, airfields
and bomba. Wha1 •they do not know, and what they shall never
know !s how to glve materlal a breath ot humanity, subord!nate it
t o the !nterests of the dlgn!ty ot mankind and glve the world a sense
ot lts true mission.
The positlons are well defined. The hour ha.s come to declde the
fate of Europe. The sys tem ot two Europes, which arose and was
malntalned by the tault ot the west, cannot last. The west is not
Europe, and we cannot regard the east as Europe e•ther. The west
cannot harbor bopes ithat lt shall avol-d an lnvaslon by the barbarians
by toresaklng the east-ern part of Europe to Communlsm. Al!, long a s
one substantlal portlon of Europe 1-s undergolng a feverlsh change.
as long as everythlng there, which symbolized the Chrlstlan and European splr•t, is retreating before th-e aggresslveness of the barbarlan and is wlthdrawlng to the hlllsldes and int.o the catacombs, a s
long as half of 1Europe -does not live, belleve and t~I accordlng to
the thousand-year-old Chrl&tlan and Europeain laws, there shall be no
contentmen,t ot •the spirit, ,n or shall th-ere be material welfare In the
the west.
Tbe Idea of Europe lncludes In itself tbe west as equally a s the
ea st. lt -embraces 1he distant plalns of Poland, the Ukraine, White
Russla, the Slovak and Rumanla,n valleys, as well as ,th& green fleld s
ot France and Germany, and even the broad Iberlan horizons. We
must resolve: There shall be only one Europe--a Chrlstlan, hlstorlcal Europe-a free and democratlc Europe.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Two Europes
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Joseph Cieker
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951
pp. 8-12
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Cieker, Jozef, 1907-1969
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
LCNAF+dates
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2d812967aec21ecc4b3d1cd617c4b6c2.pdf
230ca8ed744f32fe091968328a55ad98
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
13
THE SWVAIK REPUBLIC - FRUIT OF
HLINKA'S STRUGGLE
Ka.rol Sidor
(Preaident of the Slovak Natlonal Couneil Abroad)
The great Polish phllosopher and polltlclan Roman Dmowski, who
labored for the resurrection of Poland In 1918 and dled In 1939, wrote
these noteworthy words:
" Here in Poland we are tired of reading p0lemics on the theme:
who, In recent Umes, flrst used the expression INDEl'ENDENCE and
whlch polltlcal party flrst loudly proclalmed that lt wants state Inde•
pendence. Thls makes a chlldlsh and unsavory dlscusslon. We have
s tate lndependence not because some one repeated voclferously that he
wanted lndependence. We have lt because there were people who
worked systematlcally for lts attalnment, orlentated themselves well to
cxlsting condltlons and knew how to use well all the clrcumstances
leading to lndependence. People must know not only what they want,
but also what they must do, what road they shall travel to reach
the desired goal. Programs of wlshing are only empty and trultless
mottoes."
As in Poland, so also among the Slovaks in Slovakia much has
already been written and sald about thls subject. But Slovaks at
horne and abroad seem to be forgettlng that there would have been no
Slovak State lndependence without the untirlng po\ltlcal labors of
tbe thousands and thousands of outstanding and ordinai:y people
of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party who worked for the polltlcal lndependence of thelr country slnce the inauguratlon of the party In 1905
untll Slovak lndependence Day, March 14, 1939. Wlthout Hlinka and
his party the terrain would not have been prepared for independence.
We can say wlthout fear of contradlction that the leaders of
Hlinka's polltlcal party expressed the will and deslres of the Slovak
people for an Independent Slovak llfe both durlng the exlstence of old
Hungary and also durlng the llfe of the Czechoslovak Repul!llc. or
course, always in a way sulted to condltlons, because cven an Idea has
evolutionary forma. A dlfferent form for the cblldlsh age of a natlon
and another for bis mature years. The followers of štar, Radllnský
and Vajanský up to 1918 expressed themselves moderately In form but
convlnclngly in substance. When lt came to the breaklng of bread In
1918, however, Andrew Hlinka, leader of bis party, proclalmed on
May 24th at Turčiansky Svätý Martin: "The 1000-year-old marrlage
with the Magyars was a tallure. We must part."
Such a resolutlon of the Slovak program was both modern and
s ultable to the tlmes. Thls sentiment was expressed more forcefully
on October 19, 1918, In the Budapest parllament by Dr. Ferdl!'! Juriga,
a depu ty of H llnka's Slovak Party, when he sald:
"On the basls of natural and hlstorlcal rlghts we demand our
right of self-determlnation so that we, as a natlonal entity, could form
our own, separate community on tbe terrltory we bave settled."
An~ on January 23, 1920, this same Juriga emphaslzed in the
�14
SLOVAKIA
Prague Parliament even the form of future Slovak life, when he said:
"Federalism is the system of the future. The order of the future
ís not centralism but federalism. We mu.st preserve our individuality
and not let ourselves be absorbed. We must let every national unit
crystalllze out into a Jegal personallty so that these various national
units could then federalize into one great world republic. This would
be only the hlghest idea! and only one road leads to it: federalism."
Other deputies of Hlinka's party expressed themselves in a
slmilar vein in the Prague Parllament until 1939. They demanded
independent Slovak army units for Slovakia, with Slovak as the language of command, and separate Slovak diplomatic representation
abroad. It is known that the most significant signs of sovereignty
are: one's own natlonal army and national representatlon abroad.
The climax for this whole endeavor for Slovak polit!cal independence was the Žilina proclamation of October 6, 1938, In which
the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, the Agrarian Party, the Trade Union
Party, the Fascist Party, the National Sociallsts and the Slovak Natlonal Party (of Rázus) united on a slngle Slovak program.
"We, the undersigned," says the document accepted and und"lrsigned by duly authorlzed representatives of the partles mentionerl.
"adopt the motion of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party to lssue a
constltutional Iaw apropos Slovak autonomy in such form as prE:sented in the As.sembly of Deputles and published in the perlodical
SLOVÁK, No. 129, June 5, 1938. We promlse to use all our strengtb
to have this mot!on accepted constitutionalJy by the National Assembly."
"We demand that the Vice-Chairman of the Hlinka S lovak Peo•
ple's Party, Deputy Dr. Joseph Tiso, lmmediately be authorlzed so that
as chalrman-deslgnate he set up the first Slovak Government In agreement wlth the underslgned polltlcal partles."
At that time (October 1938), ther~ were 45 Slovak deputies in the
Prague Parllament: 19 representatives of the Hlinka Slovak People's
Party, 11 Agrarlans, 5 Social Democrats, 5 Communists, 1 National
Socialist, 1 National Unity member, 1 Trades Union member, 1 Fasclst, and 1 member ot the Natlonal Slovak Party. AII, · except thi>
Communists and the Social Democrats · (10), signed the Žilina docu•
ment of October 6, 1938.
This was a unlfication ou program which eveu the Czechs respected. On November 22, 1938, a new constltutional document wns
publlshed. Thls new Constitution was voted for by a fully qualifleď
majority not only of the Slovak but also of the Czech deputies and
senators. And in thls Const!tutlon the Slovak Government and the
Slovak Parliament were already well anchored by flrm paragraphs.
So it was that the future destlny of Slovakia - in a legal anď
democratlc way - pas.sed over lnto the banda of the Slovak Government and the Slovak Parllament whlch was authorized by all Slovaks.
This was the foundatlon on which the Slovaks cont!nued to build theirState and on March 14, 1939, this foundatlon served as a means to
proclalm even the independence of the Slovak State -- again legally
and demociatically.
From this brie! sketch we see clearly that without the preparatory
Iabors - ideological and organizational - of the Hlinka Slovak Peo
�SLOVAKIA
15
ple's Party, fir.st in Hungary then in Czechoslovakia, the proclamation
of Slovakia's independence on March 14, 1939, would not have been
possible.
For that reason, not indivldual persons, but whole generations of
humble and forgotten Slovak patriots have merited recognitlon. The
least we can do is honor them for working so assidiously and uncompromlslngly for the politlcal independence of the Slovaks. The spirit
of Andrej Hlinka dominated all of them. In Andrej Hlinka all these
indefatigable workers for freedom saw themselves. H linka was their
leader and theh- idea!. When he was honored, they felt honored also.
And so it was when the Slovak legislat!ve assem bly passed the law
(No. 83) on Aprll 25, 1939, <to memorialize Hlinka and the generations
of Slovak patriots who labored with him for Slovak freedom by placing
a bust of Hlinka in the Slovak Nat!onal Assembly_
The Slovaks at horne and abroad shall never forget And rej
Hlinka, his Slovak People's Party - the Slovak patriots who llved and
died for the freedom of the Slovak nation. It is a fact that the Slovak Republic was the fruit of Hlinka's fight (or the inherent right o[
the Slovak people to polltical freedom .
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
'"Today we have received from Alex Kendrick in Vienna the first
solid explanation of what was behind the recent drastic shake-up in
the Czechoslovakian Communist Party and Government. Apparently
what happened was that Slovakian autonomy, both political and eco·
nomic, was wiped out. A considerable number of Slovak Party mem•
bers were flung into jail. Bratislava, the capila! of Slovakla, was the
real center of a separatist movem ent deeply influenced by Tlto's success. Czechoslovakia is Russia's most important satellite. But di ffe re nces between Czechs and S lova ks are much o lde r than co mmun ism.
What Moscow decided to do was to destroy the independence of the
Slovaklan communist party, and all hopes of economic and polltlcal
independence for the Slovak.s. This is an effort by the Soviet Union
to counteract the attractlon of Yugoslavia that ls felt by Czech and
Slovak allke." - EDWARD IR. MURROW With the News, The Columbia Broadcasting System, Sept. 21, 1951.
•
"In complete harmony with the thinking or the Czech and Slovak
nation, the agreemenl of frlendshlp, mutual aid a nd post-war cooperation between the ÔSR and tbe USSR was com pleted in Mosco\\·
on December 12, 1943, for a period of 20 years. . . . This or ientat ion
is an unchangable note eve n for our futu re politic al life." - Dr. Josepb
Lettrich, ÔAS, 1-27-48.
•
" No ne of us has the r lght to obligate defin it e ly for the futu re our
people and st at e in fundamental matters, i ntern a ! or inte rnational,
t o anyth ing . . .. That holds for all of us and, above all, e ven for me
personally. 1 t hlnk that it is necess ary that th is be altogethe r c lear.
That is why from the beginnning I ha ve r efused to make any fundamental, interna! o r international, t ies ..... ." - (Dr. Edward Benes, to
the Czechoslovak State Councll, Nov. 2:\, 19Hl.
�
SLOVAKIA
13
THE SWVAIK REPUBLIC - FRUIT OF
HLINKA'S STRUGGLE
Ka.rol Sidor
(Preaident of the Slovak Natlonal Couneil Abroad)
The great Polish phllosopher and polltlclan Roman Dmowski, who
labored for the resurrection of Poland In 1918 and dled In 1939, wrote
these noteworthy words:
" Here in Poland we are tired of reading p0lemics on the theme:
who, In recent Umes, flrst used the expression INDEl'ENDENCE and
whlch polltlcal party flrst loudly proclalmed that lt wants state Inde•
pendence. Thls makes a chlldlsh and unsavory dlscusslon. We have
s tate lndependence not because some one repeated voclferously that he
wanted lndependence. We have lt because there were people who
worked systematlcally for lts attalnment, orlentated themselves well to
cxlsting condltlons and knew how to use well all the clrcumstances
leading to lndependence. People must know not only what they want,
but also what they must do, what road they shall travel to reach
the desired goal. Programs of wlshing are only empty and trultless
mottoes."
As in Poland, so also among the Slovaks in Slovakia much has
already been written and sald about thls subject. But Slovaks at
horne and abroad seem to be forgettlng that there would have been no
Slovak State lndependence without the untirlng po\ltlcal labors of
tbe thousands and thousands of outstanding and ordinai:y people
of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party who worked for the polltlcal lndependence of thelr country slnce the inauguratlon of the party In 1905
untll Slovak lndependence Day, March 14, 1939. Wlthout Hlinka and
his party the terrain would not have been prepared for independence.
We can say wlthout fear of contradlction that the leaders of
Hlinka's polltlcal party expressed the will and deslres of the Slovak
people for an Independent Slovak llfe both durlng the exlstence of old
Hungary and also durlng the llfe of the Czechoslovak Repul!llc. or
course, always in a way sulted to condltlons, because cven an Idea has
evolutionary forma. A dlfferent form for the cblldlsh age of a natlon
and another for bis mature years. The followers of štar, Radllnský
and Vajanský up to 1918 expressed themselves moderately In form but
convlnclngly in substance. When lt came to the breaklng of bread In
1918, however, Andrew Hlinka, leader of bis party, proclalmed on
May 24th at Turčiansky Svätý Martin: "The 1000-year-old marrlage
with the Magyars was a tallure. We must part."
Such a resolutlon of the Slovak program was both modern and
s ultable to the tlmes. Thls sentiment was expressed more forcefully
on October 19, 1918, In the Budapest parllament by Dr. Ferdl!'! Juriga,
a depu ty of H llnka's Slovak Party, when he sald:
"On the basls of natural and hlstorlcal rlghts we demand our
right of self-determlnation so that we, as a natlonal entity, could form
our own, separate community on tbe terrltory we bave settled."
An~ on January 23, 1920, this same Juriga emphaslzed in the
�14
SLOVAKIA
Prague Parliament even the form of future Slovak life, when he said:
"Federalism is the system of the future. The order of the future
ís not centralism but federalism. We mu.st preserve our individuality
and not let ourselves be absorbed. We must let every national unit
crystalllze out into a Jegal personallty so that these various national
units could then federalize into one great world republic. This would
be only the hlghest idea! and only one road leads to it: federalism."
Other deputies of Hlinka's party expressed themselves in a
slmilar vein in the Prague Parllament until 1939. They demanded
independent Slovak army units for Slovakia, with Slovak as the language of command, and separate Slovak diplomatic representation
abroad. It is known that the most significant signs of sovereignty
are: one's own natlonal army and national representatlon abroad.
The climax for this whole endeavor for Slovak polit!cal independence was the Žilina proclamation of October 6, 1938, In which
the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, the Agrarian Party, the Trade Union
Party, the Fascist Party, the National Sociallsts and the Slovak Natlonal Party (of Rázus) united on a slngle Slovak program.
"We, the undersigned," says the document accepted and und"lrsigned by duly authorlzed representatives of the partles mentionerl.
"adopt the motion of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party to lssue a
constltutional Iaw apropos Slovak autonomy in such form as prE:sented in the As.sembly of Deputles and published in the perlodical
SLOVÁK, No. 129, June 5, 1938. We promlse to use all our strengtb
to have this mot!on accepted constitutionalJy by the National Assembly."
"We demand that the Vice-Chairman of the Hlinka S lovak Peo•
ple's Party, Deputy Dr. Joseph Tiso, lmmediately be authorlzed so that
as chalrman-deslgnate he set up the first Slovak Government In agreement wlth the underslgned polltlcal partles."
At that time (October 1938), ther~ were 45 Slovak deputies in the
Prague Parllament: 19 representatives of the Hlinka Slovak People's
Party, 11 Agrarlans, 5 Social Democrats, 5 Communists, 1 National
Socialist, 1 National Unity member, 1 Trades Union member, 1 Fasclst, and 1 member ot the Natlonal Slovak Party. AII, · except thi>
Communists and the Social Democrats · (10), signed the Žilina docu•
ment of October 6, 1938.
This was a unlfication ou program which eveu the Czechs respected. On November 22, 1938, a new constltutional document wns
publlshed. Thls new Constitution was voted for by a fully qualifleď
majority not only of the Slovak but also of the Czech deputies and
senators. And in thls Const!tutlon the Slovak Government and the
Slovak Parliament were already well anchored by flrm paragraphs.
So it was that the future destlny of Slovakia - in a legal anď
democratlc way - pas.sed over lnto the banda of the Slovak Government and the Slovak Parllament whlch was authorized by all Slovaks.
This was the foundatlon on which the Slovaks cont!nued to build theirState and on March 14, 1939, this foundatlon served as a means to
proclalm even the independence of the Slovak State -- again legally
and demociatically.
From this brie! sketch we see clearly that without the preparatory
Iabors - ideological and organizational - of the Hlinka Slovak Peo
�SLOVAKIA
15
ple's Party, fir.st in Hungary then in Czechoslovakia, the proclamation
of Slovakia's independence on March 14, 1939, would not have been
possible.
For that reason, not indivldual persons, but whole generations of
humble and forgotten Slovak patriots have merited recognitlon. The
least we can do is honor them for working so assidiously and uncompromlslngly for the politlcal independence of the Slovaks. The spirit
of Andrej Hlinka dominated all of them. In Andrej Hlinka all these
indefatigable workers for freedom saw themselves. H linka was their
leader and theh- idea!. When he was honored, they felt honored also.
And so it was when the Slovak legislat!ve assem bly passed the law
(No. 83) on Aprll 25, 1939, <to memorialize Hlinka and the generations
of Slovak patriots who labored with him for Slovak freedom by placing
a bust of Hlinka in the Slovak Nat!onal Assembly_
The Slovaks at horne and abroad shall never forget And rej
Hlinka, his Slovak People's Party - the Slovak patriots who llved and
died for the freedom of the Slovak nation. It is a fact that the Slovak Republic was the fruit of Hlinka's fight (or the inherent right o[
the Slovak people to polltical freedom .
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
'"Today we have received from Alex Kendrick in Vienna the first
solid explanation of what was behind the recent drastic shake-up in
the Czechoslovakian Communist Party and Government. Apparently
what happened was that Slovakian autonomy, both political and eco·
nomic, was wiped out. A considerable number of Slovak Party mem•
bers were flung into jail. Bratislava, the capila! of Slovakla, was the
real center of a separatist movem ent deeply influenced by Tlto's success. Czechoslovakia is Russia's most important satellite. But di ffe re nces between Czechs and S lova ks are much o lde r than co mmun ism.
What Moscow decided to do was to destroy the independence of the
Slovaklan communist party, and all hopes of economic and polltlcal
independence for the Slovak.s. This is an effort by the Soviet Union
to counteract the attractlon of Yugoslavia that ls felt by Czech and
Slovak allke." - EDWARD IR. MURROW With the News, The Columbia Broadcasting System, Sept. 21, 1951.
•
"In complete harmony with the thinking or the Czech and Slovak
nation, the agreemenl of frlendshlp, mutual aid a nd post-war cooperation between the ÔSR and tbe USSR was com pleted in Mosco\\·
on December 12, 1943, for a period of 20 years. . . . This or ientat ion
is an unchangable note eve n for our futu re politic al life." - Dr. Josepb
Lettrich, ÔAS, 1-27-48.
•
" No ne of us has the r lght to obligate defin it e ly for the futu re our
people and st at e in fundamental matters, i ntern a ! or inte rnational,
t o anyth ing . . .. That holds for all of us and, above all, e ven for me
personally. 1 t hlnk that it is necess ary that th is be altogethe r c lear.
That is why from the beginnning I ha ve r efused to make any fundamental, interna! o r international, t ies ..... ." - (Dr. Edward Benes, to
the Czechoslovak State Councll, Nov. 2:\, 19Hl.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
13
THE SWVAIK REPUBLIC - FRUIT OF
HLINKA'S STRUGGLE
Ka.rol Sidor
(Preaident of the Slovak Natlonal Couneil Abroad)
The great Polish phllosopher and polltlclan Roman Dmowski, who
labored for the resurrection of Poland In 1918 and dled In 1939, wrote
these noteworthy words:
" Here in Poland we are tired of reading p0lemics on the theme:
who, In recent Umes, flrst used the expression INDEl'ENDENCE and
whlch polltlcal party flrst loudly proclalmed that lt wants state Inde•
pendence. Thls makes a chlldlsh and unsavory dlscusslon. We have
s tate lndependence not because some one repeated voclferously that he
wanted lndependence. We have lt because there were people who
worked systematlcally for lts attalnment, orlentated themselves well to
cxlsting condltlons and knew how to use well all the clrcumstances
leading to lndependence. People must know not only what they want,
but also what they must do, what road they shall travel to reach
the desired goal. Programs of wlshing are only empty and trultless
mottoes."
As in Poland, so also among the Slovaks in Slovakia much has
already been written and sald about thls subject. But Slovaks at
horne and abroad seem to be forgettlng that there would have been no
Slovak State lndependence without the untirlng po\ltlcal labors of
tbe thousands and thousands of outstanding and ordinai:y people
of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party who worked for the polltlcal lndependence of thelr country slnce the inauguratlon of the party In 1905
untll Slovak lndependence Day, March 14, 1939. Wlthout Hlinka and
his party the terrain would not have been prepared for independence.
We can say wlthout fear of contradlction that the leaders of
Hlinka's polltlcal party expressed the will and deslres of the Slovak
people for an Independent Slovak llfe both durlng the exlstence of old
Hungary and also durlng the llfe of the Czechoslovak Repul!llc. or
course, always in a way sulted to condltlons, because cven an Idea has
evolutionary forma. A dlfferent form for the cblldlsh age of a natlon
and another for bis mature years. The followers of štar, Radllnský
and Vajanský up to 1918 expressed themselves moderately In form but
convlnclngly in substance. When lt came to the breaklng of bread In
1918, however, Andrew Hlinka, leader of bis party, proclalmed on
May 24th at Turčiansky Svätý Martin: "The 1000-year-old marrlage
with the Magyars was a tallure. We must part."
Such a resolutlon of the Slovak program was both modern and
s ultable to the tlmes. Thls sentiment was expressed more forcefully
on October 19, 1918, In the Budapest parllament by Dr. Ferdl!'! Juriga,
a depu ty of H llnka's Slovak Party, when he sald:
"On the basls of natural and hlstorlcal rlghts we demand our
right of self-determlnation so that we, as a natlonal entity, could form
our own, separate community on tbe terrltory we bave settled."
An~ on January 23, 1920, this same Juriga emphaslzed in the
14
SLOVAKIA
Prague Parliament even the form of future Slovak life, when he said:
"Federalism is the system of the future. The order of the future
ís not centralism but federalism. We mu.st preserve our individuality
and not let ourselves be absorbed. We must let every national unit
crystalllze out into a Jegal personallty so that these various national
units could then federalize into one great world republic. This would
be only the hlghest idea! and only one road leads to it: federalism."
Other deputies of Hlinka's party expressed themselves in a
slmilar vein in the Prague Parllament until 1939. They demanded
independent Slovak army units for Slovakia, with Slovak as the language of command, and separate Slovak diplomatic representation
abroad. It is known that the most significant signs of sovereignty
are: one's own natlonal army and national representatlon abroad.
The climax for this whole endeavor for Slovak polit!cal independence was the Žilina proclamation of October 6, 1938, In which
the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, the Agrarian Party, the Trade Union
Party, the Fascist Party, the National Sociallsts and the Slovak Natlonal Party (of Rázus) united on a slngle Slovak program.
"We, the undersigned," says the document accepted and und"lrsigned by duly authorlzed representatives of the partles mentionerl.
"adopt the motion of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party to lssue a
constltutional Iaw apropos Slovak autonomy in such form as prE:sented in the As.sembly of Deputles and published in the perlodical
SLOVÁK, No. 129, June 5, 1938. We promlse to use all our strengtb
to have this mot!on accepted constitutionalJy by the National Assembly."
"We demand that the Vice-Chairman of the Hlinka S lovak Peo•
ple's Party, Deputy Dr. Joseph Tiso, lmmediately be authorlzed so that
as chalrman-deslgnate he set up the first Slovak Government In agreement wlth the underslgned polltlcal partles."
At that time (October 1938), ther~ were 45 Slovak deputies in the
Prague Parllament: 19 representatives of the Hlinka Slovak People's
Party, 11 Agrarlans, 5 Social Democrats, 5 Communists, 1 National
Socialist, 1 National Unity member, 1 Trades Union member, 1 Fasclst, and 1 member ot the Natlonal Slovak Party. AII, · except thi>
Communists and the Social Democrats · (10), signed the Žilina docu•
ment of October 6, 1938.
This was a unlfication ou program which eveu the Czechs respected. On November 22, 1938, a new constltutional document wns
publlshed. Thls new Constitution was voted for by a fully qualifleď
majority not only of the Slovak but also of the Czech deputies and
senators. And in thls Const!tutlon the Slovak Government and the
Slovak Parliament were already well anchored by flrm paragraphs.
So it was that the future destlny of Slovakia - in a legal anď
democratlc way - pas.sed over lnto the banda of the Slovak Government and the Slovak Parllament whlch was authorized by all Slovaks.
This was the foundatlon on which the Slovaks cont!nued to build theirState and on March 14, 1939, this foundatlon served as a means to
proclalm even the independence of the Slovak State -- again legally
and demociatically.
From this brie! sketch we see clearly that without the preparatory
Iabors - ideological and organizational - of the Hlinka Slovak Peo
SLOVAKIA
15
ple's Party, fir.st in Hungary then in Czechoslovakia, the proclamation
of Slovakia's independence on March 14, 1939, would not have been
possible.
For that reason, not indivldual persons, but whole generations of
humble and forgotten Slovak patriots have merited recognitlon. The
least we can do is honor them for working so assidiously and uncompromlslngly for the politlcal independence of the Slovaks. The spirit
of Andrej Hlinka dominated all of them. In Andrej Hlinka all these
indefatigable workers for freedom saw themselves. H linka was their
leader and theh- idea!. When he was honored, they felt honored also.
And so it was when the Slovak legislat!ve assem bly passed the law
(No. 83) on Aprll 25, 1939, <to memorialize Hlinka and the generations
of Slovak patriots who labored with him for Slovak freedom by placing
a bust of Hlinka in the Slovak Nat!onal Assembly_
The Slovaks at horne and abroad shall never forget And rej
Hlinka, his Slovak People's Party - the Slovak patriots who llved and
died for the freedom of the Slovak nation. It is a fact that the Slovak Republic was the fruit of Hlinka's fight (or the inherent right o[
the Slovak people to polltical freedom .
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
'"Today we have received from Alex Kendrick in Vienna the first
solid explanation of what was behind the recent drastic shake-up in
the Czechoslovakian Communist Party and Government. Apparently
what happened was that Slovakian autonomy, both political and eco·
nomic, was wiped out. A considerable number of Slovak Party mem•
bers were flung into jail. Bratislava, the capila! of Slovakla, was the
real center of a separatist movem ent deeply influenced by Tlto's success. Czechoslovakia is Russia's most important satellite. But di ffe re nces between Czechs and S lova ks are much o lde r than co mmun ism.
What Moscow decided to do was to destroy the independence of the
Slovaklan communist party, and all hopes of economic and polltlcal
independence for the Slovak.s. This is an effort by the Soviet Union
to counteract the attractlon of Yugoslavia that ls felt by Czech and
Slovak allke." - EDWARD IR. MURROW With the News, The Columbia Broadcasting System, Sept. 21, 1951.
•
"In complete harmony with the thinking or the Czech and Slovak
nation, the agreemenl of frlendshlp, mutual aid a nd post-war cooperation between the ÔSR and tbe USSR was com pleted in Mosco\\·
on December 12, 1943, for a period of 20 years. . . . This or ientat ion
is an unchangable note eve n for our futu re politic al life." - Dr. Josepb
Lettrich, ÔAS, 1-27-48.
•
" No ne of us has the r lght to obligate defin it e ly for the futu re our
people and st at e in fundamental matters, i ntern a ! or inte rnational,
t o anyth ing . . .. That holds for all of us and, above all, e ven for me
personally. 1 t hlnk that it is necess ary that th is be altogethe r c lear.
That is why from the beginnning I ha ve r efused to make any fundamental, interna! o r international, t ies ..... ." - (Dr. Edward Benes, to
the Czechoslovak State Councll, Nov. 2:\, 19Hl.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Slovak Republic - Fruit of Hlinka's Struggle
Description
An account of the resource
Karol Sidor
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951
pp. 13-15
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sidor, Karol, 1901-1953
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
LCNAF
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5e5e2567ea318500d36591c95c2961fb.pdf
1955ec5ec45e0530005398f324b39d77
PDF Text
Text
16
SLOVAKIA
WHY NO MORE CZEOHOSLOVAKIA ?
DR. JOSEPH K I RSCHBAUM
After the communist reglme Jn Bohemla and Slovakia came to
power in February 1948, there appeared ln Europe, the Unlted States
and In other non-European countrles a new "Czechoslovak" emlgration,
conststlng of dlsmlssed diplomats and escaped politlcal leaders of the
varlous Czech and Slovak civil partles. This emlgration, lf we are to
appraise it by lts actlvlty, contlnues in the pollcles of Dr. Eward
Beneš and hls followers, whlch means a contlnuatlon in the same
mistakes and blunders whlch have evoked two dangerous crises in
Europe durlng the past thlrty years. As a result of thls blundering
policy more than half the population of the Czecboslovak Republic
(Slovaks, Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ukralnlans and Carpatho-Russlans) was elther deprlved of the most fundamental human and civil
rlghts, or deslgnedly lmpeded In lts polltlcal and economical development.
Prince Adolf zu Schwarzenberg, head of one of tbe oldest families in Bohemia, had thls to say about Czech policy:
"Even In norma! tlmes the double game of Czecb policy can be
seen Quite clearly. As long as Czecboslovakia adopted the role of
dependence on the West, Benes was at the helm and from 1945 onward prepared the dellvery of hls country to the Communists. Al!
the mlndste-rs in hls Cablnet {there were about two dozen of them)
worked with thelr ldollzed Presldent, and in a most masterly fashion
steered thelr country lnto Communlsm, always hop!ng for a good job
as a reward for thelr laudable work In the Bolshevist interest." NEW ENGLISH REVIEW MAGAZINE, 1949, Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 20-22).
It is a fact that Czechoslovakia was re-establlshed at the end
of World War II agalnst the w111 of the absolute majori ty of the Slovaks and the many mlll!ons of national minorltles by the polllical
actlv!ty of a small group of Czech exiles, who were not concerned
"·lth the lnterests of the Czech and Slovak nations, or the interests
of the ,vbole of Europe, but were rather Jed by imperlallsm, their
persona! amblt!ons and a des!re for revenge. And it ls a historical
fact that the Czecboslovak State was surrendered, without res!stance,
to the power of Mosoow by these pollticlans just as in 1938-1939,
w!thout the least resistance, they surrendered it to Berlin.
In tbe llgbt of these faots and In the interest of better organ!·
zation and cooperatlon or the Centra! European natlons, as well as In
the interest of trutb and justlce, lt appea:-s necessary to point out
the arguments whlch speak agalnst the exlstence or the Czechoslovak
Republlc.
An analysis, lssuing from European and Centro-European points
of vlew and not only from the lnterests of natlons and mlnorlt!es
whlch were forced tnto the Czecboslovak Republ!c agalnst their wlll,
is demanded In this connectlon by our slde, because !t !s based on the
motlve contained In the Declaratlon o! Independence of the Unlted
~tates, In whlcb we read:
" W hen in t he course of human events, it becomes necessary for
�SLOVAKIA
17
one people to dissolve the political banda which have connected them
with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the
separated and equal station to whi ch the Laws of Nature and of
Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opíníons of mankind requ ires that they should declare the causes which impel them
to the separation."
What are the causes which led the Slovaks and the minorities to
demand the dlssolution of political ties with the Czech nation in t he
Czechoslovak Republic?
Generally speaking, we can mention, first of all, the following:
1. Tendencies for the preservatlon or restoration of the Czechos lovak Republic do not meet with the approval of the majority of lts
inhabitants and the principle of democracy and the principles ex·
pressed in the Atlantic Charter.
2. The Czechoslovak Republic has no cause to exist in a just
arrangement of Europe even from the standpoint of European in·
terests.
3. The Czechoslovak Republic has no place in a federated Europe
or a federated Centra! Europe.
More than thirty years of clever Czech propaganda migh t, at a
first glance, contradict these allegations. There Js no argument ahout
that. In the mirror of our experience with the propaganda of Goebels,
and, today, that of Moscow, we see, however, that even a propaganda
of falsehoods can be successful for a time, deceiving and convinclng
many people. But the force of truth is eternal. By resorting to lies we
may enjoy successes temporarily, but the truth shall prevail in the
end.
In the case of the Czechoslovak Republic, we are concerned
witili nothing more than the truth. Tbat is why we are analyzing the
above-mentioned arguments at least in their main outlines. And in
dolng this, we pu.rposely refer to the testimonies of· objective, politlcal European observers, so that no one rnight say that the Slovak
s truggle for freedom and independence issues from an exaggerated
nationalism or natlonal intolerenace, as Cz&eh propaganda designedly claims that it does.
The Slovaks were co-founders of the Czechoslovak Republic and
would have wished its preservation, if the Czechoslovak State would
bave had possessed the prerequisites to fulfill the task that falls to a
state in the sense of a modem, sociologlcal conception, on the one
hand, and, on the other, from the standpolnt of European interests.
The Czechoslovak Repu blic, however, diel not. The Slovaks, therefore,
in the lntent of democracy, the Atlantic Charter, and the Charter
of the United Nations Organization, are demanding a new order of
Centro-Eu.ropean relationships. to which the Czechoslovak Republic
definitely 1s an obstacle, as shall be made clear in the arguments
that follow.
Are the tendenciea to preserve or restore the Czechoslovak Republic in harmony with the will of the majority of ita inhabítanta and
the princ iples upon which a modern state ia founded ?
�18
SLOVAKIA
This question was already asked at the Paris Peace Conference
in 1919, at whlch the Czechoslovak Republlc was born, as Lloyd George
tells us in bis book "The Truth About the Peace Treaties":
"Czechs,
Germans,
Slovaks,
Hungarians,
Poles,
Ukrainians -
is this not a new Austria which will thus arise under the Czech ban•
ner, a new polyglot state in which six nations will be packed together,
all filled with hatred of one against the other, arrested in their whole
economic and social development and in the progress of their civilization by hate and national strife, nourished by tyranny and poisoning
their whole public llfe? - How can the new polyglot State, the artificial work of an imperialist diplomacy, exist without any economic
community, geographical unity, or common history?" - {pp. 944, 946).
Lloyd George evldently wa.s troubled wlth the prOl)osltion of setting up Czechoslovakia and stated bluntly: "The Czechs were specially favored by the Allies. The result was the recognition of the
polyglot and incoherent state of Czechoslovakia." - (p. 948).
We see, then, at the very beglnning of the Czechoslovak RepubJic, that nelther the lnterests o( the lnhabitants ot the newly-rlsing
s tate, nor tbe prlnclple or the rlght of self-determlnation and of democratlc freedoms were tbe decldlng factors, but only the "special
favor of tbe Allles." It was, tberefore, only natural tbat the Czecbo•
slovak Republlc durlng al! lts 20 years was troubled with interna!
controversles - cleverly masked abroad by a great propaganda apparatu.s - and that lt collapsed wltbout the least resistance of its
populatlon with tbe flrst lmpact from outslde in 1938-1939. What is
more, we can show that ,tbe majority of the inhabitants even deslred
the collapse of the Czechoslovak Republic by quotlng statements of
Czech polltlclans themselves and recalllng those made durlng the
polltlcal trlals of the "people's" democracy of Czechoslovakla versus
the Slovaks, Germans and Magyars - the trials staged by the Czech
Government after 1945.
Why dld they deslre lts dlssolutlon?
Indisputably because the Czechoslovak Republi c dld not satisfy
the polltlcal and economlc !nterests and aspirations of its inhabitants,
except those of the Czech minority which managed tbe State. Al the
Par!s Peace Conference (1919), Dr. Edward Beneš declared that:
"lt is the intention of the Czechoslovak Government to create the organlzatlon of tbe State by accepting as a basis of natural rights tbe
prlnclples applled in the Constitutlon of tbe Swlss Republlc, tbat !s,
to make the Czechoslovak Republlc a sor-t of Swltzerland . . ." Tbe Czecb governments, bowever, did not manage tbe Czechoslovak
Republlc as Beneš had promlsed, but In sucb manner as Jf only an
exclusive Czecb State was concerned, whose mission apparently wa,s
to asslmilate the non-Czech populat!on, and espec!ally the Slovaks,
and hold them in cbeck economlcally and soc!ally. Tbe resistance
of the other lnhabltants and the support of tbe efforts whlch almed
at the dlssolutlon of tbe Czechoslovak Republlc, therefore, became
an entlrely logical r~ult of the sltuation in whlcb tbe non-Czech
inha.b!tants llved.
Tbi.s was abundantly clear to objectlve observers already in
1938. Lloyd George said: "Had the Czech leaders, in tíme and without
�SLOVAKIA
19
waiting for the menacing preasure of Germany, redeemed their promise to grant local autonomy to the various races in their Republic
on the llnes of the Swiu Confederation, the present troubles would
(p. 952).
Long before 1938, but especlally in the stlrr!ng months before
MuniC'h and in the Sprlng of 1939, many dlscern!ng representatlves
of the Czech and Slovak natlons were certaln that the Czechoslovak
Republlc dld not develop into a forma,tion whlch could more lastlngly
assure the secur!ty and the vltal !nterests of both these natlons wh!ch
were the ethnlcal foundatlon of the Republlc. Ir the Czech natlon for
a Ume enjoyed certa!n advantages because of the exlstence ot Czechoslovak!a, lt was only at the expense of the rest of the inhabitants.
But the Czechs later had to pay dearly for those advantages and
also had to become aware o[ the fact that the Czechoslovak State
could not guarantee the securRy even or the Czech natlon agalnst a
slngle nelghbor.
As far as the S lovaks are conceTned, they could not resolve tbe
ma,tter any other way, because the Slovak natlon In the Czechoslovak
State - actually, however, in a CZECH State -· was In a posltlon
altogether unbecomlng a cultured natlon, belng exposed to planned
ass:lmllatlon and economical exploltatlon by the Czechs, wbom the
whole state apparatus served. Here we are not even mentlon!ng th e
status of the mlnorities as a problem, which occup!ed the League or
Na.Uons for twenty years and, later, was an opportune alibi for the
liquldation of the Cz-echoslovak Republ!c. Th!s problem, as well as
t hat of the Slovak.s, was dealt with by such personallties as Lord Run•
clman and C. A. Macartney. Rererrlng to Czechoslovak!a, the latter
wrote:
have been averted" -
"The fact remains that the Government has been obliged more
often than not to rule Slovakia against the wishes of most of its
inhabltants, maintaining itself only by the expedienta of restrictlng
the power, of the self-governing bodies to within the narrowest
posslble limita, of filling the seats designated for 'experu' with its
own nominees, and utilizing freely weapons of censorship and police
supervision" (H UNGAIRY AND HER SUCCESSORS, p. 145).
After completlng bis miss!on In 1938, Lord Runciman made even
more unfavorable statements In reportlng on the status or the more
than three and a half mlll!on German minority in the Republ!c. He
said:
" I have been left with the impreaaion that Czechoslovak rule in
the Sudeten areas for the last twenty years ... has been marked by
tactlessness, lack of understanding, petty intolerance and discriminatio n, to a point where the resentment of the German populatlon was
inevitably moving in the d irection of revolt. The Sudeten Germans
fel>t, too, that in the past they had been given many promises by
the Czechoslovak Government, but that llttle or no action had fol lowed these promises...." (Britlsh White Paper, Cmd. 5847).
That is why the Republlc was not derended when Its in tegrity
was threatened and, la,ter, not even when lts very exlstence was In
danger. Not by a single nation of Czechoslovakia, not even the Czech
natlon!
�20
S LOVAKIA
On the contrary, its dlssolutlon was made possible by its own
inha.bitan,ts, the majority of whom could realize their natural right
to freedom and their o wn State only by the destruction of Czechos lovakia. So it happened in the case of the Slovaks.
W ri ting about the S lovaks in 1942, Macartney said: " ... most of
them found themselves unable to accept the Peace Confe rence thesis
of a unitary Czechoslovak nation. Some of them fe lt this to mean, in
practice, domination by the economically and socially atronger Czecha,
and they reacted in the form of a flamboyant Slovak nationalism
which was the main reason for the absence of revolt with which they
accepted the dissolution of the Czechos lovak State" (PRO BLEMS
OF T HE DANUBE BASIN, p. 122).
Dur ing the Second World War, a group of Czech exiles in London
(The Czech Natio nal Commiltee) and Slovak exiles (The S lovak Na•
tional Council in London), both fighting on the sid e of the Allies,
tried to find a diťferent solutlon to the Czech and S lovak pr oblem
than that which the fľamework of Czechoslovakia offered. Representatives of the Czech and Slovak natlons, in accord w ith the prlnciple
of the right of self-determlnation and the r ight of every nation to independence, proposed ,the organlzing of a separate Slovak State and a
separate Czech State within the framewo rk of a larger federalive
Centro-European unit. Their efforts were prompted not only by t he
interests of their own nations, but also by the interests of Eu ropean
peace and prosperity, as well as by a sense for justice and the righ t.
A g roup of Czech poli ticians headed by Ben eš, however, motivated by persona! prestige, by a desfre for revenge a nd the re newal
of Czech i mperia'lism more than by t he interests of its own nation,
did not hes.ltate to surrender the destiny of the Czech and Slovak
natlons to the "tender" mercies of th~ Soviet Un ion. Unfortunately for
the nations concerned, for Europe and the democratic world, this
group of political madmen realized tbeir program. The Czechoslovak
Republlc was restored by the grace of Moscow. Of course, no t in
the interests of the Czecbs and the Slovaks, but, as it is abundantly
clear today, in the interests of Moscow.
Robert Ingrim, forelgn correspondent of leading European newspapers, wrote in 1946: " Russia's aim, when signing that t reaty against
the wishes of Ame rica and Britain, was, of course, not to sec ure
Czechia as an a ll y. They made use of Benes' fea r of a frontier revision in order to get a strong foothold in the he art of th e Continent"
- (AFTER HITLER STALIN? - P. 180).
What develo ped in the Czechoslovak Republic after 1945, and
es pecially th e events of Feb ruary 1948, definitely prove that point.
flut we must a lso state tbat restored Czechoslovakia realized it could
exist only by having a Czecb majority assured. Beneš and his group
were only too well aware of that and, therefore, promoted tbeir pian
for ousting the Germans and Magyars trom Czechoslovakia. Because
they were successful, over three million Germans and almost a half
m illlon Magya rs were expelled from the ·Republic. Tbe consequences
of thls " hum ane and orderly " expulsion by Beneš and bis regime
will be feLt for a long time to the detriment of cooperation between
the natlons of Centra! Europe.
�SLOVAKIA
21
The majority of the Slovaks was definitely against the restoration
of Czechoslovakla. Because the Slovak nation was not given an opportunity to express itself about i.ts own destlny, it felt and even today
feels that lt was wrong, morally and otherwise, to destroy the independent State o! Slovakla, and that it was deprived of its rlght to
ind ependence illegally and by vlolence. What happened in Slovakia
s ince the restoration of the Czechoslovak Republic has only steeled
the Slovaks In thelr determination to revolt agains.t the Czech lmperialistic St.rute at the fil'st opportnne moment and 1-.estore their own
S lovak State.
F. A. VoigU had this to say a bout the Czech-Slovak relat!onship:
"The conflict between the Czechs and Slovaks appears to be irreconcilable. lt would seem that the Czechoslovak State is, today, a
fiction and that it will never again be a reality, for if RuHian overlordahip were removed, the Czechs could only reaHert their authority
over the Slovaks by force of arms - and in this they would surely
fail, for they have not one friend in Central Europe, whereas the
Slovaks have many" (THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, Nov. 1945).
As a result of the sltuation prevailing today, thousands of Slovak
exiles in Europe, a million and a half Americans of Slovak descent,
and many thousands of Slovaks in Canada, England, Argentína, Belgium, Spain, France, I,taly, Austria and Swltzerland, as well as an
overwhelming majority of the Slovak nation at horne, are fighting for
an Independent Slovak State, the only pol!tlcal formation which can
guarantee their national existence and happlness
According to the repo11t of the Prague Ministry of the Interi01•,
there were uncovered 36 conspiracies in Slovakia against the Republic in Jess than two years. Thls reslstance against the State of the
Czechs and Slovaks continues despite the fact that a large percentage of Slovak intellectuals has been cast into jall, tortured and exiled.
and despite the fact that about 300,000 Slovaks have been transferred
to the Czech-German border to weaken resistancP. in Slovakia.
The logical concluslon to be drawn from all this is that from
1945 restored Czechoslovakia is belng preserved only by brute force
and suppression of the most fundamental natlonal and indivldual
rights, and that Czechoslovakla is a negation of all the rlghts which
modern society has des igna.ted to a state for the purpose and lntent of
its existence: to guarantee a free political and economical development of its people.
II
The Czechoslovak Republic has no reason to exist in a righteous
arrangement of Europe from the viewpoint of European interests.
While the Czechoslovak Republic, in the democratic sense, did
not and does not fulfill the functlons of a state in relation to the majority of lts inhabitants, it is not difficult to find proofs that there
ls no reason for this State to exist even as far as the interests of
Europe are concerned, and much less so as far as the interests of
Centra! Europe are concerned.
At the end of World War I, Czechoslovakia was formed with the
intention that lt would perform the function of a defensive barrier
�22
SLOVAKIA
agalnst Germany and that it would be a part of the cordon sanitaire
against Russla. Lloyd George wrote that Beneš assured the Peace
Conference that "the Czecha were protectors of democracy against
Germaniam" and that "it was their duty at all timea to fi ght the
Germans" - (p. 932).
Czechoslovakia, however, did not fulflll a slngle functlon it was
supposed to, but conversely, wlth lts senseless policy towards the
non-Czech majority of its lnhabitant.s, lt flrst weakened the proposed
system of defense against Germany and then was the alibi and the
cause for the collapse of thls system and, therefore, helped German
aggression In Centra! Europe.
Durlng all twenty years of its existence, the Czecbóslovak Repub•
lic could not find a posltlve relationship toward even a slngle one
ot its nelghbors. With its Interna! and forelgn policles, it actually
prevented the consoUdat!on of the Oentro-European area and indirectly prepared the ground for the s uccess of the policy of Natlonal
Sociallsm of Germany whlch, on the other hand, galned not only the
mlnorlties of Czechoslovakia, but also the na.tions to which these
mlnorltles belonged, by promislng to apply and abide by the natlonality prlnclple. And so, instead of becoming a barrler agalnst Germany,
Czechoslovakia actually became the gate whereby Germany passed
into the Danube area and southeastern Europe without any opposltion
whatsoever. Instead of stopping German aggression and German im
periallsm, Czechoslovakla substaf\tially facilitated the German "Drang
nach Osten."
And looktng from that va.ntage point, what is the situation slnce
1945?
After 1-ts restoration in 1945, did the Czechoslovak State become a
"bastlon o! democracy" as promis'E!d by the Czech pol!ticlans who requested the Allies to restore lt? Of course, we kno1~ that it did not.
The fact 1s that it did not even become a brldge between the East
and the West In the posltive sense, but only a brldge for the trafflc
of the Soviet Union and lts satellltes. Over this brldge the Soviet
Union went unlmpedéd into the heart of Europe. At the same Ume
Czechoslovakla became the gate through which the Soviet Union
and communlsm will attack the democratlc world. And who is to
blame for that? In a large mea.sure all those who worked so energetioally for the restoration of Czechoslovakia
In order to assure their "trlumphant" return home, the restoratlon of the Czechoslovak State w.hich collapsed so utterly in 1939, and
also the assent of the Allles to expel the German and Magyar mlnorities, the Czech polltlcians, headed by Beneš, not only concluded an
agreement wlth Moscow, whereby the Soviet Union w.as enabled to
interfere In the affairs of Czechoslovakia, but also allowed the Soviet
Union to take Ruthenia wlthout any regard for the will of the inhabltanta thereof and in violatlon of ~he Czechoslovak Con.stitutlon.
Thus, Russla for the flrst tlme in its hlstory got a foothold in
the Danube Basin only a few kllometers from Bu<lapest and Vlenna.
The transfer of Ruthenla to the Soviet Union took place In the
Sprlng of 19!l5--as compensatlon for the Sovleťs assent to expel the
G-ermana .and -•Magyars from Czechoslovakla. From a polltlcal· and
�SLOVAK.IA
23
strategic viewpoint, this was a great victory for the Soviet Union.
Robert l ngrim had this to say about the matter:
"The alliance with the Czechs who, wlthout Aussian aupport,
would have been unable to re-establish their rule over a non-Czech
majority of Germans, Slovaks, Magyars, Poles, and Authenians, is
one prong of Stalin's great hayfork.... A look at the map of Europe
showa the meaning of that hayfork. By including the eaatern part of
formerly Auatrian Galícia in her Poliah booty, Ruaaia establishes territori al contact with the Czech satellite. The westernmoat tip of Bohernia is but 200 miles off the French border" (Op. cit. p. 181-182).
Furthermore, Czech polltlclans under the leadershlp of Beneš
not only prevented the possiblllty of harmonious cooperatlon of the
nations of Centra! Europe, but wf.th the!r deportatlons evoked s-uch a
fear of German retrlbution that they themselves see a guarantee of
the exlstence of Czechoslovakia only In the politlcal and mil!tary
support of the Soviet Union. In thls respect, note,.vorthy is the statement of Dr. Beneš hlmself, addressed In 1947 to a Slovak delegatlon
headed by Dr. Joseph Lettrich:
" T he Czechs cannot accept under any circumstances an independent Slovakia i n the future •.• The Czechs, having on the one side 70
million Germans, must on the other side have Aussia as their neighbor. Therefore, they could not accept an independent Slovakia. This
is a vítal problem for the existence of the Czechs as a nation and as a
State" (Feb. 16, 1947).
Consequently the inhabltants of Czechoslovak\a are forced to
support the pollcles of the Soviet Union In the interest of the exlstence of Czechoslovakia, even though thelr polltlcal convictlons and sympathies are In dlametrical confllct wlth those pol!cles. On the otber
hand, however, lt follow-s that the Czecboslovak State bases 1s exlstence only on the mllltary and pol!tlcal m1ght of a forelgn power;
consequently lt has become a tool of that power and does not possess
abll!ty and vítal force of !ts own to exlst as a sovereign state.
T.bereln we must also seek the reason why the communist putsch
of February 1948 dld not meet witb any reslstance even from the
Czech nation. The very exdstence of the Czechoslovak State, whlch
was not capable of exlstlng by ltself and was founded on the suppresslon of freedoms of other nat!ons, demanded the subjugat!on not only
of the Czech people, hut also the Slovak natlon, w,h lch was over
70 per cent antl-communlst, by the commun!st totalltarian dlctatorshlp. The consequences of thla pollcy, whereby the so-called "raJson
d'Etat" was placed before the interest of the freedom and the llfe
of the lnhabltants, are lll-fated not only for the Czech and Slovak na•
tions, but the Soviet Union, by means of th!s pollcy, got lnto the very
heart of the E uropean contlnent and communlsm galned an important
gateway through whi-ch lt can attack western Europe.
Thus Czechoslovakla, twlce wlthln a slngle decade, made it posslble or substantlally easler for lmperlallsm to enter Europe and
thréaten the freedoms of lts natlons: In 1938 the lmperlal!sm ot
natlonally soclalistlc Germany and, In 1946-48, the lmper!allsm of
communlst Russla. So, the functlon given the Czechoslovak Republlc,
or that whlch !ts creators promlsed lt would perform. was not only not
fulfllled, but, conversely, th!s State - besldes preventlng the coop-
�24
SLOVAKIA
eration of the nations of Centra! Europe and oppressing the majority
of lts inhabitants - has cast Europe into dangerou.s crises twlce
within a single decade and facilitated the victory of those forces,
against wh1ch lt was supposed to serve, directly or indirectly, as a
barrler.
Therefore, it appears evldent that the exlstence of this State
uot only does not have motivatlon, but that it is in the interest of
Europe and its healthy organlzation that this synthetlc formatien.
founded on violence and the suppression of the most fundamental
freedoms of millions of human beings and existing only with the help
oľ a foreign power, definitely disappear from the map of Europe.
Such is the conviction not only of the absolute majoľ'ity of the
S lovak nation and its true representatives, who never agreed with
the restoration of the Czechoslovak Republlc, but also the convictlon
of many upright and freedom-Jovlng Czechs, who fought on the side
of the Allies during the past war for the creation of a separate Czech
State and a separate Slovak State within a framework of a federated
Centra) Europe. These Czechs have refused to return to the synthetic political creation which does not reflect the will of the majority
or its !nha'bitants, but is in fact the tool of the policy and aims of
the Soviet Union.
111
The Czechoslovak Republic has no place in a federated Europe
or a federated C entral Europe.
If the Czechoslovak Republic has no raison ďetre in a system
of sovereign states fľom a standpoint of European interests - the
securlty of Central Europe and a harmonious relationship of lts na•
tions - then the existence of this unnatura! formation appears to be
utterly useless and unjust in the case of federating Europe, or at
least Central Europe. There are several logical and objective argu•
ip.ents in support of this statement.
The Czechoslovak Republic, as we have seen, was created wíth the
intent of forming a barrier against German expansion, and in 1945 it
was restored so it could be a bastion of democracy and a bridge be·
tween the East and the West. In these functions !t falled miserably.
And these motlves do not hold in the case of a federation of Europe,
or at least Centra! Europe. Indivldual states, whlch could not stop aggression in Europe even with a system of alliances, certainly wlll not
play the role, in a federated Europe, of preventlng a repetition of a
German attack or Russlan hegemony; that wlll be the role of the
federation of the Continent, or that of Centra! Europe.
The argument that Czechoslovakia should be retained, because it
is a larger unit than would ·be either a Czech or Slovak unit, cannot
play a part in the case of a European or Centro-European federation.
Strategic and economic arguments, which give priority to larger for·
mations, have not proved themselves in the case of Czechoslovak!a
even wlth a system of soverelgn states, because factually it could not
defend ltself against any one of its neighbors. The lnclusion of the
minorities and the creation of a Czechoslovakia wlth some 15 mill!on
inhabitants would conmct w!th the basic principle of federalism and
the expressed right of nations to self-determination.
�SLOVAKIA
25
Furtherm ore the Czech nation, which has gone over to the cam p
of the satelltes of the Soviet Union more or less wlllingly, cannot
h31Ve any claims w hich would give it preference over all its other
neighbors and allow the Czechs to annex territories occupied by nonCzech inh ab itants.
After 1945, when Hungary and Germany were defeated States,
and Cz~ hoslovakia - whether deservingly or not - was included
a mong the victorious Allles, it was possible to restore Czechoslovakia
with lts old borders, especially when Slovakia was to be punished for
not being on the border of P ortugal, but on t he border of Germany,
and, therefore, was included in the camp of the defeated.
In a E urope liberated from t he hegemony of Moscow, not a single
argument used to validate the orlgin or the restoration of -the Czechos lovak Re public wlll be aible to be used in the future, especially no t
in the case of federalization of Europe or Centra! Europe. The feder•
ative principle excludes hegemony of one nation over another.
In the case of Slovakia, then, what logical argument can there be
against the Slovak natlon h aving its own independen t State? 1s lt
logical and just to say that every nation, no matter how small, EXCEPT THE SLOVAK NA'l'ION, has an inherent right to fr~dom and
independence? What lnterest of the United States, England or France
- or t hat of the Cent ro-European nations, wh o do not wlsh the exist·
ence of the Czechoslovak Republic and already in 1939 r ecognized the
righ t of th e Slov.aks to independence - could be served by such an arg ument? What loglcal arguments can there be against the just dem and of the Slovaks to be recognized legally as equal wHh other
nations?
In 1918 the Slovak nation was included in Czechoslovakia, by the
great powers, because Dr. Edward Beneš, T. G. Masaryk and Czech
propaganda claimed t hat Slovaks were Czechs who spoke a dialect o f
the Czech language and, therefore, the principle of self-determination
did no t a pply to them. W hen Andrew Hlinka wanted to expose this
fah,e claim, he was expelled from P aris at the request of Dr. Beneš
u nder th e pr etext that he was an agent of the Vatican and the Habsbu rgs. And Dr. Beneš was successful with bis "big lie" a bout the
non-existence of the Slovak nation. The distinguished Eng lish
historian, C. A. Macartney has this to say on the matt&r:
"The story of the gradual adoption by the Allies of the theses of
Masaryk and his group cannot and need not be reto ld here. By patient
and indefatigable propaganda, they implanted their major postulatea
- the existence of a "Czechoslovak nation" and the desire of the
Slovak branch of it to form a part of Czechoslovak State- so firm ly in the minds of the Allies that they were never serious ly questioned
at the Peace Conference. The "Czecho-Slovak" Govern ment had been
recognized by a ll the princ ipal Allied and Assoc iated Powers even
before the peace negotiations began -- an act whic h implied that the
Slovak queation waa in principle already s ettled - while when t he
moment arrived for settling a ll questions of detai l, including the drafting of a frontier, it found the Czecho-Slovak Government firmly
establiahed as a negotiating party; indeed, in something like a priv ileged position" (HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS, p. 98).
�26
SLOVAKIA
Can the arguments of Masaryk and Beneš be appl!ed today or Iu
the future? The fabrlcator ot that falsebood hlmself "had to" capltulate and recognlze the exlstence ot the Independent Slovak natlon.
In the end Beneš was opposed to only "the proclalmlng and a manifestatlonal recognitlon of the Slovaks a.s a natlon wholly soverelgn,"
because, accordlng to bim, "any klnd of proclamation and manitestatlonal recognltlon of the Slovaks as a natlon totally soverelgn, not
dependent on the Czechs, must lead firat to the deaire and then even to
the realization of Slovak atatehood ltaelf" - (ÚVAHY O SLOVAN•
STv1, p. 353).
Beneš was not the only one who capltulated on that score. Other
Czeohs and many Slovak adherents of the thesls o! a "unita.ry Czecboslova.k nation" - wbo made a good llvlng out of lt at the expense
o! -the Slovak uation - also caplitulated. Is lt still posslble to prevent
the Slovak natlon from passlng from the deslre to the "realizatlon
of thelr own Slovak statehood"? What arguments are there to pre•
vent thls?
The argument that the Slovaks are not sufficiently mature to
manage thelr own affalrs certalnly does not hold today. Even sucb a
Cze-0hophlle as Dr. Mllan Hodža admltted tbat "Slovaki;i has reached
if not paased the Central European's civilization level ... Some political writers in thia country used to be rather skeptical about Slova.
kla and her position and even about her political ability to live. Today
it is evidently proved that these doubts were unfounded" - (FEDERATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE, Jarolds, London, 1942, p. 94).
The Engllsh expert on Centro-European questlons, C. A. Macartney,
stated that In Slovakia there exlsts "a distinctive Slovak nationalism as
a factor of the Danubian situation" (PROBLEMS OF THE
DANUBE BASIN, London, 1942, p. 122).
And let us ask a further question: Wlll lt be loglcally possible to
use the argument that the Slovaks, whether in emlgratlon or at home,
would not flght for thelr independence on the slde of the democracles?
The Slovaks, who are dedlcated to an Independent Slovakla, are In
thls !lght, wblch 1s being waged agalnst communist aggresslon, tor
over a hundred years as a natlon and their past 1s not sullled by collaboratlon with communlsm. Could the western democracles, therefore,
belleve the propaganda of a few Beneš Slovaks (Czechoslovaks) who collaborated with communls m and helped lt to power and then
escaped abroad only when they could no Jonger hold government
posltlons to enrich themselves - and dlsregard the will of the overwhelmlng majority of the Slovak natlon and lts representatlves In
E>migratlon wbo stand for a separate, democratlc Slovak State witbln
the framework of a federated Europe or Centra! EurQpe?
·. 1For what reasons?
By an objectlve analysls, we can come to only one concluslon:
in a federated Europe or Centra! Europe, the Czechoslovak Repub11c
bas no rea:son to exlst and can exlst only by tbe grace of some greá.t
power, just as lt dld up to 1938 by the grace of France and England,
and just as lt does today by tbe grace of tbe Soviet Union. But outslde tbe Soviet Union, there ls no sucb great power whlch In tbe
future would need a heterogenous Czechoslovak State founded on
�BLOVAKIA
27
violence and preventing the cooperatlon of the European natlons.
Centra! Europe wlll need peace and a harmonlous cohabltatlon of
natlons to recover from the wounds infllcted by the war and the
Russlan occupation.
Czech-oslovakla has definltely shown - as up to 1938, so even
after 1945 - that it cannot flnd a positlve relatlonshlp toward lts
neighbors, that lts exlstence evokes an atmosphere of dlstrust and
revlslonism and violates the natural order of the Central-European
area. Therefore, there can be no place for the Czechoslovak State In
that area.
•
•
•
MUSEUMS OF SLOVAKIA
The three Jeading museums of Slovakia are in Bratislava, TurSvätý Martin, and Košice. The Agrlcultural Museum In Bratislava, seriously damaged by bombs in 1944, 1s devoted principally
to geology, soil, t he cultlvatlon or plants, lncluding frult trees and
vegetables, animal husbandry, forestry, and zoology_ The museum
iu the capital or Slovakia has In its program to present as complete a
plcture as possible of the archaeology, of the creatlve arts, and of the
Natural Hlstory of the land, with spe<:ial emphasls on Western Slovak1a. Its ethnographic collect!ons are not as extensive as those at
Turčiansky Svätý Martin whlch was establlshed iJl 1896 by local
patrlots and was maintalned by them.
Ln a.ddltion to the aforemeniioned unu-sually rich e thnogra,phic materlal, the museum possesses a noteworthy collectlon o! models of
typical Slovak wooden bulldings. Slnce the city was the prlnclpal
headquarters of Slovak natlonal and cultural actlvity, there is assembled here also invaluable source material concernlng the literary
progress of the !and.
The Eastern Slovakla Museum at Košice possesses a valuable
library of over thirty thousand volumes and interestlng collectlons
of archeologloal and Natural History Qlbjects. The paintings, whlcb the
museum had, were taken to Budapest In 1918.
Local museums are organlzed territorlally elther as regional or
city lnstltutions. To the former group belong the museums at Trenčín, Nitra, Banská Štiavnica, Komarno, Banská Bystrica, Ružomberok,
Bardlov, Levoča, and Rimavská Sobota. The leadlng city museums
are at Bratislava and at Kremnica.
Speclalized museums are the Agricultural Museum at Bratislava,
the Tatra Museums at Poprad and Veľká, and the Jewlsh Museum at
Prešov.
čiansky
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?: - "Durlng my stay in the Unlted States, I spoke
with almost all the leaders of Amerlcan democracy, and, as I expected.
l found they all had a full understandlng of our just cause. Dr. Benei'a
journey to Moacow and ita hiatorical aignificance la a pproved and recognized in Amerlca. Of course, there are a few reactlonarles there
who nurse thelr selfish lnterests with exaggerated fear 'of Bolshevism.
I dld not even try to convlnce them." -- (Jan Masaryk: l :.ondon Broadcast, February 16, 1944).
�
16
SLOVAKIA
WHY NO MORE CZEOHOSLOVAKIA ?
DR. JOSEPH K I RSCHBAUM
After the communist reglme Jn Bohemla and Slovakia came to
power in February 1948, there appeared ln Europe, the Unlted States
and In other non-European countrles a new "Czechoslovak" emlgration,
conststlng of dlsmlssed diplomats and escaped politlcal leaders of the
varlous Czech and Slovak civil partles. This emlgration, lf we are to
appraise it by lts actlvlty, contlnues in the pollcles of Dr. Eward
Beneš and hls followers, whlch means a contlnuatlon in the same
mistakes and blunders whlch have evoked two dangerous crises in
Europe durlng the past thlrty years. As a result of thls blundering
policy more than half the population of the Czecboslovak Republic
(Slovaks, Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ukralnlans and Carpatho-Russlans) was elther deprlved of the most fundamental human and civil
rlghts, or deslgnedly lmpeded In lts polltlcal and economical development.
Prince Adolf zu Schwarzenberg, head of one of tbe oldest families in Bohemia, had thls to say about Czech policy:
"Even In norma! tlmes the double game of Czecb policy can be
seen Quite clearly. As long as Czecboslovakia adopted the role of
dependence on the West, Benes was at the helm and from 1945 onward prepared the dellvery of hls country to the Communists. Al!
the mlndste-rs in hls Cablnet {there were about two dozen of them)
worked with thelr ldollzed Presldent, and in a most masterly fashion
steered thelr country lnto Communlsm, always hop!ng for a good job
as a reward for thelr laudable work In the Bolshevist interest." NEW ENGLISH REVIEW MAGAZINE, 1949, Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 20-22).
It is a fact that Czechoslovakia was re-establlshed at the end
of World War II agalnst the w111 of the absolute majori ty of the Slovaks and the many mlll!ons of national minorltles by the polllical
actlv!ty of a small group of Czech exiles, who were not concerned
"·lth the lnterests of the Czech and Slovak nations, or the interests
of the ,vbole of Europe, but were rather Jed by imperlallsm, their
persona! amblt!ons and a des!re for revenge. And it ls a historical
fact that the Czecboslovak State was surrendered, without res!stance,
to the power of Mosoow by these pollticlans just as in 1938-1939,
w!thout the least resistance, they surrendered it to Berlin.
In tbe llgbt of these faots and In the interest of better organ!·
zation and cooperatlon or the Centra! European natlons, as well as In
the interest of trutb and justlce, lt appea:-s necessary to point out
the arguments whlch speak agalnst the exlstence or the Czechoslovak
Republlc.
An analysis, lssuing from European and Centro-European points
of vlew and not only from the lnterests of natlons and mlnorlt!es
whlch were forced tnto the Czecboslovak Republ!c agalnst their wlll,
is demanded In this connectlon by our slde, because !t !s based on the
motlve contained In the Declaratlon o! Independence of the Unlted
~tates, In whlcb we read:
" W hen in t he course of human events, it becomes necessary for
�SLOVAKIA
17
one people to dissolve the political banda which have connected them
with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the
separated and equal station to whi ch the Laws of Nature and of
Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opíníons of mankind requ ires that they should declare the causes which impel them
to the separation."
What are the causes which led the Slovaks and the minorities to
demand the dlssolution of political ties with the Czech nation in t he
Czechoslovak Republic?
Generally speaking, we can mention, first of all, the following:
1. Tendencies for the preservatlon or restoration of the Czechos lovak Republic do not meet with the approval of the majority of lts
inhabitants and the principle of democracy and the principles ex·
pressed in the Atlantic Charter.
2. The Czechoslovak Republic has no cause to exist in a just
arrangement of Europe even from the standpoint of European in·
terests.
3. The Czechoslovak Republic has no place in a federated Europe
or a federated Centra! Europe.
More than thirty years of clever Czech propaganda migh t, at a
first glance, contradict these allegations. There Js no argument ahout
that. In the mirror of our experience with the propaganda of Goebels,
and, today, that of Moscow, we see, however, that even a propaganda
of falsehoods can be successful for a time, deceiving and convinclng
many people. But the force of truth is eternal. By resorting to lies we
may enjoy successes temporarily, but the truth shall prevail in the
end.
In the case of the Czechoslovak Republic, we are concerned
witili nothing more than the truth. Tbat is why we are analyzing the
above-mentioned arguments at least in their main outlines. And in
dolng this, we pu.rposely refer to the testimonies of· objective, politlcal European observers, so that no one rnight say that the Slovak
s truggle for freedom and independence issues from an exaggerated
nationalism or natlonal intolerenace, as Cz&eh propaganda designedly claims that it does.
The Slovaks were co-founders of the Czechoslovak Republic and
would have wished its preservation, if the Czechoslovak State would
bave had possessed the prerequisites to fulfill the task that falls to a
state in the sense of a modem, sociologlcal conception, on the one
hand, and, on the other, from the standpolnt of European interests.
The Czechoslovak Repu blic, however, diel not. The Slovaks, therefore,
in the lntent of democracy, the Atlantic Charter, and the Charter
of the United Nations Organization, are demanding a new order of
Centro-Eu.ropean relationships. to which the Czechoslovak Republic
definitely 1s an obstacle, as shall be made clear in the arguments
that follow.
Are the tendenciea to preserve or restore the Czechoslovak Republic in harmony with the will of the majority of ita inhabítanta and
the princ iples upon which a modern state ia founded ?
�18
SLOVAKIA
This question was already asked at the Paris Peace Conference
in 1919, at whlch the Czechoslovak Republlc was born, as Lloyd George
tells us in bis book "The Truth About the Peace Treaties":
"Czechs,
Germans,
Slovaks,
Hungarians,
Poles,
Ukrainians -
is this not a new Austria which will thus arise under the Czech ban•
ner, a new polyglot state in which six nations will be packed together,
all filled with hatred of one against the other, arrested in their whole
economic and social development and in the progress of their civilization by hate and national strife, nourished by tyranny and poisoning
their whole public llfe? - How can the new polyglot State, the artificial work of an imperialist diplomacy, exist without any economic
community, geographical unity, or common history?" - {pp. 944, 946).
Lloyd George evldently wa.s troubled wlth the prOl)osltion of setting up Czechoslovakia and stated bluntly: "The Czechs were specially favored by the Allies. The result was the recognition of the
polyglot and incoherent state of Czechoslovakia." - (p. 948).
We see, then, at the very beglnning of the Czechoslovak RepubJic, that nelther the lnterests o( the lnhabitants ot the newly-rlsing
s tate, nor tbe prlnclple or the rlght of self-determlnation and of democratlc freedoms were tbe decldlng factors, but only the "special
favor of tbe Allles." It was, tberefore, only natural tbat the Czecbo•
slovak Republlc durlng al! lts 20 years was troubled with interna!
controversles - cleverly masked abroad by a great propaganda apparatu.s - and that lt collapsed wltbout the least resistance of its
populatlon with tbe flrst lmpact from outslde in 1938-1939. What is
more, we can show that ,tbe majority of the inhabitants even deslred
the collapse of the Czechoslovak Republic by quotlng statements of
Czech polltlclans themselves and recalllng those made durlng the
polltlcal trlals of the "people's" democracy of Czechoslovakla versus
the Slovaks, Germans and Magyars - the trials staged by the Czech
Government after 1945.
Why dld they deslre lts dlssolutlon?
Indisputably because the Czechoslovak Republi c dld not satisfy
the polltlcal and economlc !nterests and aspirations of its inhabitants,
except those of the Czech minority which managed tbe State. Al the
Par!s Peace Conference (1919), Dr. Edward Beneš declared that:
"lt is the intention of the Czechoslovak Government to create the organlzatlon of tbe State by accepting as a basis of natural rights tbe
prlnclples applled in the Constitutlon of tbe Swlss Republlc, tbat !s,
to make the Czechoslovak Republlc a sor-t of Swltzerland . . ." Tbe Czecb governments, bowever, did not manage tbe Czechoslovak
Republlc as Beneš had promlsed, but In sucb manner as Jf only an
exclusive Czecb State was concerned, whose mission apparently wa,s
to asslmilate the non-Czech populat!on, and espec!ally the Slovaks,
and hold them in cbeck economlcally and soc!ally. Tbe resistance
of the other lnhabltants and the support of tbe efforts whlch almed
at the dlssolutlon of tbe Czechoslovak Republlc, therefore, became
an entlrely logical r~ult of the sltuation in whlcb tbe non-Czech
inha.b!tants llved.
Tbi.s was abundantly clear to objectlve observers already in
1938. Lloyd George said: "Had the Czech leaders, in tíme and without
�SLOVAKIA
19
waiting for the menacing preasure of Germany, redeemed their promise to grant local autonomy to the various races in their Republic
on the llnes of the Swiu Confederation, the present troubles would
(p. 952).
Long before 1938, but especlally in the stlrr!ng months before
MuniC'h and in the Sprlng of 1939, many dlscern!ng representatlves
of the Czech and Slovak natlons were certaln that the Czechoslovak
Republlc dld not develop into a forma,tion whlch could more lastlngly
assure the secur!ty and the vltal !nterests of both these natlons wh!ch
were the ethnlcal foundatlon of the Republlc. Ir the Czech natlon for
a Ume enjoyed certa!n advantages because of the exlstence ot Czechoslovak!a, lt was only at the expense of the rest of the inhabitants.
But the Czechs later had to pay dearly for those advantages and
also had to become aware o[ the fact that the Czechoslovak State
could not guarantee the securRy even or the Czech natlon agalnst a
slngle nelghbor.
As far as the S lovaks are conceTned, they could not resolve tbe
ma,tter any other way, because the Slovak natlon In the Czechoslovak
State - actually, however, in a CZECH State -· was In a posltlon
altogether unbecomlng a cultured natlon, belng exposed to planned
ass:lmllatlon and economical exploltatlon by the Czechs, wbom the
whole state apparatus served. Here we are not even mentlon!ng th e
status of the mlnorities as a problem, which occup!ed the League or
Na.Uons for twenty years and, later, was an opportune alibi for the
liquldation of the Cz-echoslovak Republ!c. Th!s problem, as well as
t hat of the Slovak.s, was dealt with by such personallties as Lord Run•
clman and C. A. Macartney. Rererrlng to Czechoslovak!a, the latter
wrote:
have been averted" -
"The fact remains that the Government has been obliged more
often than not to rule Slovakia against the wishes of most of its
inhabltants, maintaining itself only by the expedienta of restrictlng
the power, of the self-governing bodies to within the narrowest
posslble limita, of filling the seats designated for 'experu' with its
own nominees, and utilizing freely weapons of censorship and police
supervision" (H UNGAIRY AND HER SUCCESSORS, p. 145).
After completlng bis miss!on In 1938, Lord Runciman made even
more unfavorable statements In reportlng on the status or the more
than three and a half mlll!on German minority in the Republ!c. He
said:
" I have been left with the impreaaion that Czechoslovak rule in
the Sudeten areas for the last twenty years ... has been marked by
tactlessness, lack of understanding, petty intolerance and discriminatio n, to a point where the resentment of the German populatlon was
inevitably moving in the d irection of revolt. The Sudeten Germans
fel>t, too, that in the past they had been given many promises by
the Czechoslovak Government, but that llttle or no action had fol lowed these promises...." (Britlsh White Paper, Cmd. 5847).
That is why the Republlc was not derended when Its in tegrity
was threatened and, la,ter, not even when lts very exlstence was In
danger. Not by a single nation of Czechoslovakia, not even the Czech
natlon!
�20
S LOVAKIA
On the contrary, its dlssolutlon was made possible by its own
inha.bitan,ts, the majority of whom could realize their natural right
to freedom and their o wn State only by the destruction of Czechos lovakia. So it happened in the case of the Slovaks.
W ri ting about the S lovaks in 1942, Macartney said: " ... most of
them found themselves unable to accept the Peace Confe rence thesis
of a unitary Czechoslovak nation. Some of them fe lt this to mean, in
practice, domination by the economically and socially atronger Czecha,
and they reacted in the form of a flamboyant Slovak nationalism
which was the main reason for the absence of revolt with which they
accepted the dissolution of the Czechos lovak State" (PRO BLEMS
OF T HE DANUBE BASIN, p. 122).
Dur ing the Second World War, a group of Czech exiles in London
(The Czech Natio nal Commiltee) and Slovak exiles (The S lovak Na•
tional Council in London), both fighting on the sid e of the Allies,
tried to find a diťferent solutlon to the Czech and S lovak pr oblem
than that which the fľamework of Czechoslovakia offered. Representatives of the Czech and Slovak natlons, in accord w ith the prlnciple
of the right of self-determlnation and the r ight of every nation to independence, proposed ,the organlzing of a separate Slovak State and a
separate Czech State within the framewo rk of a larger federalive
Centro-European unit. Their efforts were prompted not only by t he
interests of their own nations, but also by the interests of Eu ropean
peace and prosperity, as well as by a sense for justice and the righ t.
A g roup of Czech poli ticians headed by Ben eš, however, motivated by persona! prestige, by a desfre for revenge a nd the re newal
of Czech i mperia'lism more than by t he interests of its own nation,
did not hes.ltate to surrender the destiny of the Czech and Slovak
natlons to the "tender" mercies of th~ Soviet Un ion. Unfortunately for
the nations concerned, for Europe and the democratic world, this
group of political madmen realized tbeir program. The Czechoslovak
Republlc was restored by the grace of Moscow. Of course, no t in
the interests of the Czecbs and the Slovaks, but, as it is abundantly
clear today, in the interests of Moscow.
Robert Ingrim, forelgn correspondent of leading European newspapers, wrote in 1946: " Russia's aim, when signing that t reaty against
the wishes of Ame rica and Britain, was, of course, not to sec ure
Czechia as an a ll y. They made use of Benes' fea r of a frontier revision in order to get a strong foothold in the he art of th e Continent"
- (AFTER HITLER STALIN? - P. 180).
What develo ped in the Czechoslovak Republic after 1945, and
es pecially th e events of Feb ruary 1948, definitely prove that point.
flut we must a lso state tbat restored Czechoslovakia realized it could
exist only by having a Czecb majority assured. Beneš and his group
were only too well aware of that and, therefore, promoted tbeir pian
for ousting the Germans and Magyars trom Czechoslovakia. Because
they were successful, over three million Germans and almost a half
m illlon Magya rs were expelled from the ·Republic. Tbe consequences
of thls " hum ane and orderly " expulsion by Beneš and bis regime
will be feLt for a long time to the detriment of cooperation between
the natlons of Centra! Europe.
�SLOVAKIA
21
The majority of the Slovaks was definitely against the restoration
of Czechoslovakla. Because the Slovak nation was not given an opportunity to express itself about i.ts own destlny, it felt and even today
feels that lt was wrong, morally and otherwise, to destroy the independent State o! Slovakla, and that it was deprived of its rlght to
ind ependence illegally and by vlolence. What happened in Slovakia
s ince the restoration of the Czechoslovak Republic has only steeled
the Slovaks In thelr determination to revolt agains.t the Czech lmperialistic St.rute at the fil'st opportnne moment and 1-.estore their own
S lovak State.
F. A. VoigU had this to say a bout the Czech-Slovak relat!onship:
"The conflict between the Czechs and Slovaks appears to be irreconcilable. lt would seem that the Czechoslovak State is, today, a
fiction and that it will never again be a reality, for if RuHian overlordahip were removed, the Czechs could only reaHert their authority
over the Slovaks by force of arms - and in this they would surely
fail, for they have not one friend in Central Europe, whereas the
Slovaks have many" (THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, Nov. 1945).
As a result of the sltuation prevailing today, thousands of Slovak
exiles in Europe, a million and a half Americans of Slovak descent,
and many thousands of Slovaks in Canada, England, Argentína, Belgium, Spain, France, I,taly, Austria and Swltzerland, as well as an
overwhelming majority of the Slovak nation at horne, are fighting for
an Independent Slovak State, the only pol!tlcal formation which can
guarantee their national existence and happlness
According to the repo11t of the Prague Ministry of the Interi01•,
there were uncovered 36 conspiracies in Slovakia against the Republic in Jess than two years. Thls reslstance against the State of the
Czechs and Slovaks continues despite the fact that a large percentage of Slovak intellectuals has been cast into jall, tortured and exiled.
and despite the fact that about 300,000 Slovaks have been transferred
to the Czech-German border to weaken resistancP. in Slovakia.
The logical concluslon to be drawn from all this is that from
1945 restored Czechoslovakia is belng preserved only by brute force
and suppression of the most fundamental natlonal and indivldual
rights, and that Czechoslovakla is a negation of all the rlghts which
modern society has des igna.ted to a state for the purpose and lntent of
its existence: to guarantee a free political and economical development of its people.
II
The Czechoslovak Republic has no reason to exist in a righteous
arrangement of Europe from the viewpoint of European interests.
While the Czechoslovak Republic, in the democratic sense, did
not and does not fulfill the functlons of a state in relation to the majority of lts inhabitants, it is not difficult to find proofs that there
ls no reason for this State to exist even as far as the interests of
Europe are concerned, and much less so as far as the interests of
Centra! Europe are concerned.
At the end of World War I, Czechoslovakia was formed with the
intention that lt would perform the function of a defensive barrier
�22
SLOVAKIA
agalnst Germany and that it would be a part of the cordon sanitaire
against Russla. Lloyd George wrote that Beneš assured the Peace
Conference that "the Czecha were protectors of democracy against
Germaniam" and that "it was their duty at all timea to fi ght the
Germans" - (p. 932).
Czechoslovakia, however, did not fulflll a slngle functlon it was
supposed to, but conversely, wlth lts senseless policy towards the
non-Czech majority of its lnhabitant.s, lt flrst weakened the proposed
system of defense against Germany and then was the alibi and the
cause for the collapse of thls system and, therefore, helped German
aggression In Centra! Europe.
Durlng all twenty years of its existence, the Czecbóslovak Repub•
lic could not find a posltlve relationship toward even a slngle one
ot its nelghbors. With its Interna! and forelgn policles, it actually
prevented the consoUdat!on of the Oentro-European area and indirectly prepared the ground for the s uccess of the policy of Natlonal
Sociallsm of Germany whlch, on the other hand, galned not only the
mlnorlties of Czechoslovakia, but also the na.tions to which these
mlnorltles belonged, by promislng to apply and abide by the natlonality prlnclple. And so, instead of becoming a barrler agalnst Germany,
Czechoslovakia actually became the gate whereby Germany passed
into the Danube area and southeastern Europe without any opposltion
whatsoever. Instead of stopping German aggression and German im
periallsm, Czechoslovakla substaf\tially facilitated the German "Drang
nach Osten."
And looktng from that va.ntage point, what is the situation slnce
1945?
After 1-ts restoration in 1945, did the Czechoslovak State become a
"bastlon o! democracy" as promis'E!d by the Czech pol!ticlans who requested the Allies to restore lt? Of course, we kno1~ that it did not.
The fact 1s that it did not even become a brldge between the East
and the West In the posltive sense, but only a brldge for the trafflc
of the Soviet Union and lts satellltes. Over this brldge the Soviet
Union went unlmpedéd into the heart of Europe. At the same Ume
Czechoslovakla became the gate through which the Soviet Union
and communlsm will attack the democratlc world. And who is to
blame for that? In a large mea.sure all those who worked so energetioally for the restoration of Czechoslovakia
In order to assure their "trlumphant" return home, the restoratlon of the Czechoslovak State w.hich collapsed so utterly in 1939, and
also the assent of the Allles to expel the German and Magyar mlnorities, the Czech polltlcians, headed by Beneš, not only concluded an
agreement wlth Moscow, whereby the Soviet Union w.as enabled to
interfere In the affairs of Czechoslovakia, but also allowed the Soviet
Union to take Ruthenia wlthout any regard for the will of the inhabltanta thereof and in violatlon of ~he Czechoslovak Con.stitutlon.
Thus, Russla for the flrst tlme in its hlstory got a foothold in
the Danube Basin only a few kllometers from Bu<lapest and Vlenna.
The transfer of Ruthenla to the Soviet Union took place In the
Sprlng of 19!l5--as compensatlon for the Sovleťs assent to expel the
G-ermana .and -•Magyars from Czechoslovakla. From a polltlcal· and
�SLOVAK.IA
23
strategic viewpoint, this was a great victory for the Soviet Union.
Robert l ngrim had this to say about the matter:
"The alliance with the Czechs who, wlthout Aussian aupport,
would have been unable to re-establish their rule over a non-Czech
majority of Germans, Slovaks, Magyars, Poles, and Authenians, is
one prong of Stalin's great hayfork.... A look at the map of Europe
showa the meaning of that hayfork. By including the eaatern part of
formerly Auatrian Galícia in her Poliah booty, Ruaaia establishes territori al contact with the Czech satellite. The westernmoat tip of Bohernia is but 200 miles off the French border" (Op. cit. p. 181-182).
Furthermore, Czech polltlclans under the leadershlp of Beneš
not only prevented the possiblllty of harmonious cooperatlon of the
nations of Centra! Europe, but wf.th the!r deportatlons evoked s-uch a
fear of German retrlbution that they themselves see a guarantee of
the exlstence of Czechoslovakia only In the politlcal and mil!tary
support of the Soviet Union. In thls respect, note,.vorthy is the statement of Dr. Beneš hlmself, addressed In 1947 to a Slovak delegatlon
headed by Dr. Joseph Lettrich:
" T he Czechs cannot accept under any circumstances an independent Slovakia i n the future •.• The Czechs, having on the one side 70
million Germans, must on the other side have Aussia as their neighbor. Therefore, they could not accept an independent Slovakia. This
is a vítal problem for the existence of the Czechs as a nation and as a
State" (Feb. 16, 1947).
Consequently the inhabltants of Czechoslovak\a are forced to
support the pollcles of the Soviet Union In the interest of the exlstence of Czechoslovakia, even though thelr polltlcal convictlons and sympathies are In dlametrical confllct wlth those pol!cles. On the otber
hand, however, lt follow-s that the Czecboslovak State bases 1s exlstence only on the mllltary and pol!tlcal m1ght of a forelgn power;
consequently lt has become a tool of that power and does not possess
abll!ty and vítal force of !ts own to exlst as a sovereign state.
T.bereln we must also seek the reason why the communist putsch
of February 1948 dld not meet witb any reslstance even from the
Czech nation. The very exdstence of the Czechoslovak State, whlch
was not capable of exlstlng by ltself and was founded on the suppresslon of freedoms of other nat!ons, demanded the subjugat!on not only
of the Czech people, hut also the Slovak natlon, w,h lch was over
70 per cent antl-communlst, by the commun!st totalltarian dlctatorshlp. The consequences of thla pollcy, whereby the so-called "raJson
d'Etat" was placed before the interest of the freedom and the llfe
of the lnhabltants, are lll-fated not only for the Czech and Slovak na•
tions, but the Soviet Union, by means of th!s pollcy, got lnto the very
heart of the E uropean contlnent and communlsm galned an important
gateway through whi-ch lt can attack western Europe.
Thus Czechoslovakla, twlce wlthln a slngle decade, made it posslble or substantlally easler for lmperlallsm to enter Europe and
thréaten the freedoms of lts natlons: In 1938 the lmperlal!sm ot
natlonally soclalistlc Germany and, In 1946-48, the lmper!allsm of
communlst Russla. So, the functlon given the Czechoslovak Republlc,
or that whlch !ts creators promlsed lt would perform. was not only not
fulfllled, but, conversely, th!s State - besldes preventlng the coop-
�24
SLOVAKIA
eration of the nations of Centra! Europe and oppressing the majority
of lts inhabitants - has cast Europe into dangerou.s crises twlce
within a single decade and facilitated the victory of those forces,
against wh1ch lt was supposed to serve, directly or indirectly, as a
barrler.
Therefore, it appears evldent that the exlstence of this State
uot only does not have motivatlon, but that it is in the interest of
Europe and its healthy organlzation that this synthetlc formatien.
founded on violence and the suppression of the most fundamental
freedoms of millions of human beings and existing only with the help
oľ a foreign power, definitely disappear from the map of Europe.
Such is the conviction not only of the absolute majoľ'ity of the
S lovak nation and its true representatives, who never agreed with
the restoration of the Czechoslovak Republlc, but also the convictlon
of many upright and freedom-Jovlng Czechs, who fought on the side
of the Allies during the past war for the creation of a separate Czech
State and a separate Slovak State within a framework of a federated
Centra) Europe. These Czechs have refused to return to the synthetic political creation which does not reflect the will of the majority
or its !nha'bitants, but is in fact the tool of the policy and aims of
the Soviet Union.
111
The Czechoslovak Republic has no place in a federated Europe
or a federated C entral Europe.
If the Czechoslovak Republic has no raison ďetre in a system
of sovereign states fľom a standpoint of European interests - the
securlty of Central Europe and a harmonious relationship of lts na•
tions - then the existence of this unnatura! formation appears to be
utterly useless and unjust in the case of federating Europe, or at
least Central Europe. There are several logical and objective argu•
ip.ents in support of this statement.
The Czechoslovak Republic, as we have seen, was created wíth the
intent of forming a barrier against German expansion, and in 1945 it
was restored so it could be a bastion of democracy and a bridge be·
tween the East and the West. In these functions !t falled miserably.
And these motlves do not hold in the case of a federation of Europe,
or at least Centra! Europe. Indivldual states, whlch could not stop aggression in Europe even with a system of alliances, certainly wlll not
play the role, in a federated Europe, of preventlng a repetition of a
German attack or Russlan hegemony; that wlll be the role of the
federation of the Continent, or that of Centra! Europe.
The argument that Czechoslovakia should be retained, because it
is a larger unit than would ·be either a Czech or Slovak unit, cannot
play a part in the case of a European or Centro-European federation.
Strategic and economic arguments, which give priority to larger for·
mations, have not proved themselves in the case of Czechoslovak!a
even wlth a system of soverelgn states, because factually it could not
defend ltself against any one of its neighbors. The lnclusion of the
minorities and the creation of a Czechoslovakia wlth some 15 mill!on
inhabitants would conmct w!th the basic principle of federalism and
the expressed right of nations to self-determination.
�SLOVAKIA
25
Furtherm ore the Czech nation, which has gone over to the cam p
of the satelltes of the Soviet Union more or less wlllingly, cannot
h31Ve any claims w hich would give it preference over all its other
neighbors and allow the Czechs to annex territories occupied by nonCzech inh ab itants.
After 1945, when Hungary and Germany were defeated States,
and Cz~ hoslovakia - whether deservingly or not - was included
a mong the victorious Allles, it was possible to restore Czechoslovakia
with lts old borders, especially when Slovakia was to be punished for
not being on the border of P ortugal, but on t he border of Germany,
and, therefore, was included in the camp of the defeated.
In a E urope liberated from t he hegemony of Moscow, not a single
argument used to validate the orlgin or the restoration of -the Czechos lovak Re public wlll be aible to be used in the future, especially no t
in the case of federalization of Europe or Centra! Europe. The feder•
ative principle excludes hegemony of one nation over another.
In the case of Slovakia, then, what logical argument can there be
against the Slovak natlon h aving its own independen t State? 1s lt
logical and just to say that every nation, no matter how small, EXCEPT THE SLOVAK NA'l'ION, has an inherent right to fr~dom and
independence? What lnterest of the United States, England or France
- or t hat of the Cent ro-European nations, wh o do not wlsh the exist·
ence of the Czechoslovak Republic and already in 1939 r ecognized the
righ t of th e Slov.aks to independence - could be served by such an arg ument? What loglcal arguments can there be against the just dem and of the Slovaks to be recognized legally as equal wHh other
nations?
In 1918 the Slovak nation was included in Czechoslovakia, by the
great powers, because Dr. Edward Beneš, T. G. Masaryk and Czech
propaganda claimed t hat Slovaks were Czechs who spoke a dialect o f
the Czech language and, therefore, the principle of self-determination
did no t a pply to them. W hen Andrew Hlinka wanted to expose this
fah,e claim, he was expelled from P aris at the request of Dr. Beneš
u nder th e pr etext that he was an agent of the Vatican and the Habsbu rgs. And Dr. Beneš was successful with bis "big lie" a bout the
non-existence of the Slovak nation. The distinguished Eng lish
historian, C. A. Macartney has this to say on the matt&r:
"The story of the gradual adoption by the Allies of the theses of
Masaryk and his group cannot and need not be reto ld here. By patient
and indefatigable propaganda, they implanted their major postulatea
- the existence of a "Czechoslovak nation" and the desire of the
Slovak branch of it to form a part of Czechoslovak State- so firm ly in the minds of the Allies that they were never serious ly questioned
at the Peace Conference. The "Czecho-Slovak" Govern ment had been
recognized by a ll the princ ipal Allied and Assoc iated Powers even
before the peace negotiations began -- an act whic h implied that the
Slovak queation waa in principle already s ettled - while when t he
moment arrived for settling a ll questions of detai l, including the drafting of a frontier, it found the Czecho-Slovak Government firmly
establiahed as a negotiating party; indeed, in something like a priv ileged position" (HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS, p. 98).
�26
SLOVAKIA
Can the arguments of Masaryk and Beneš be appl!ed today or Iu
the future? The fabrlcator ot that falsebood hlmself "had to" capltulate and recognlze the exlstence ot the Independent Slovak natlon.
In the end Beneš was opposed to only "the proclalmlng and a manifestatlonal recognitlon of the Slovaks a.s a natlon wholly soverelgn,"
because, accordlng to bim, "any klnd of proclamation and manitestatlonal recognltlon of the Slovaks as a natlon totally soverelgn, not
dependent on the Czechs, must lead firat to the deaire and then even to
the realization of Slovak atatehood ltaelf" - (ÚVAHY O SLOVAN•
STv1, p. 353).
Beneš was not the only one who capltulated on that score. Other
Czeohs and many Slovak adherents of the thesls o! a "unita.ry Czecboslova.k nation" - wbo made a good llvlng out of lt at the expense
o! -the Slovak uation - also caplitulated. Is lt still posslble to prevent
the Slovak natlon from passlng from the deslre to the "realizatlon
of thelr own Slovak statehood"? What arguments are there to pre•
vent thls?
The argument that the Slovaks are not sufficiently mature to
manage thelr own affalrs certalnly does not hold today. Even sucb a
Cze-0hophlle as Dr. Mllan Hodža admltted tbat "Slovaki;i has reached
if not paased the Central European's civilization level ... Some political writers in thia country used to be rather skeptical about Slova.
kla and her position and even about her political ability to live. Today
it is evidently proved that these doubts were unfounded" - (FEDERATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE, Jarolds, London, 1942, p. 94).
The Engllsh expert on Centro-European questlons, C. A. Macartney,
stated that In Slovakia there exlsts "a distinctive Slovak nationalism as
a factor of the Danubian situation" (PROBLEMS OF THE
DANUBE BASIN, London, 1942, p. 122).
And let us ask a further question: Wlll lt be loglcally possible to
use the argument that the Slovaks, whether in emlgratlon or at home,
would not flght for thelr independence on the slde of the democracles?
The Slovaks, who are dedlcated to an Independent Slovakla, are In
thls !lght, wblch 1s being waged agalnst communist aggresslon, tor
over a hundred years as a natlon and their past 1s not sullled by collaboratlon with communlsm. Could the western democracles, therefore,
belleve the propaganda of a few Beneš Slovaks (Czechoslovaks) who collaborated with communls m and helped lt to power and then
escaped abroad only when they could no Jonger hold government
posltlons to enrich themselves - and dlsregard the will of the overwhelmlng majority of the Slovak natlon and lts representatlves In
E>migratlon wbo stand for a separate, democratlc Slovak State witbln
the framework of a federated Europe or Centra! EurQpe?
·. 1For what reasons?
By an objectlve analysls, we can come to only one concluslon:
in a federated Europe or Centra! Europe, the Czechoslovak Repub11c
bas no rea:son to exlst and can exlst only by tbe grace of some greá.t
power, just as lt dld up to 1938 by the grace of France and England,
and just as lt does today by tbe grace of tbe Soviet Union. But outslde tbe Soviet Union, there ls no sucb great power whlch In tbe
future would need a heterogenous Czechoslovak State founded on
�BLOVAKIA
27
violence and preventing the cooperatlon of the European natlons.
Centra! Europe wlll need peace and a harmonlous cohabltatlon of
natlons to recover from the wounds infllcted by the war and the
Russlan occupation.
Czech-oslovakla has definltely shown - as up to 1938, so even
after 1945 - that it cannot flnd a positlve relatlonshlp toward lts
neighbors, that lts exlstence evokes an atmosphere of dlstrust and
revlslonism and violates the natural order of the Central-European
area. Therefore, there can be no place for the Czechoslovak State In
that area.
•
•
•
MUSEUMS OF SLOVAKIA
The three Jeading museums of Slovakia are in Bratislava, TurSvätý Martin, and Košice. The Agrlcultural Museum In Bratislava, seriously damaged by bombs in 1944, 1s devoted principally
to geology, soil, t he cultlvatlon or plants, lncluding frult trees and
vegetables, animal husbandry, forestry, and zoology_ The museum
iu the capital or Slovakia has In its program to present as complete a
plcture as possible of the archaeology, of the creatlve arts, and of the
Natural Hlstory of the land, with spe<:ial emphasls on Western Slovak1a. Its ethnographic collect!ons are not as extensive as those at
Turčiansky Svätý Martin whlch was establlshed iJl 1896 by local
patrlots and was maintalned by them.
Ln a.ddltion to the aforemeniioned unu-sually rich e thnogra,phic materlal, the museum possesses a noteworthy collectlon o! models of
typical Slovak wooden bulldings. Slnce the city was the prlnclpal
headquarters of Slovak natlonal and cultural actlvity, there is assembled here also invaluable source material concernlng the literary
progress of the !and.
The Eastern Slovakla Museum at Košice possesses a valuable
library of over thirty thousand volumes and interestlng collectlons
of archeologloal and Natural History Qlbjects. The paintings, whlcb the
museum had, were taken to Budapest In 1918.
Local museums are organlzed territorlally elther as regional or
city lnstltutions. To the former group belong the museums at Trenčín, Nitra, Banská Štiavnica, Komarno, Banská Bystrica, Ružomberok,
Bardlov, Levoča, and Rimavská Sobota. The leadlng city museums
are at Bratislava and at Kremnica.
Speclalized museums are the Agricultural Museum at Bratislava,
the Tatra Museums at Poprad and Veľká, and the Jewlsh Museum at
Prešov.
čiansky
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?: - "Durlng my stay in the Unlted States, I spoke
with almost all the leaders of Amerlcan democracy, and, as I expected.
l found they all had a full understandlng of our just cause. Dr. Benei'a
journey to Moacow and ita hiatorical aignificance la a pproved and recognized in Amerlca. Of course, there are a few reactlonarles there
who nurse thelr selfish lnterests with exaggerated fear 'of Bolshevism.
I dld not even try to convlnce them." -- (Jan Masaryk: l :.ondon Broadcast, February 16, 1944).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
16
SLOVAKIA
WHY NO MORE CZEOHOSLOVAKIA ?
DR. JOSEPH K I RSCHBAUM
After the communist reglme Jn Bohemla and Slovakia came to
power in February 1948, there appeared ln Europe, the Unlted States
and In other non-European countrles a new "Czechoslovak" emlgration,
conststlng of dlsmlssed diplomats and escaped politlcal leaders of the
varlous Czech and Slovak civil partles. This emlgration, lf we are to
appraise it by lts actlvlty, contlnues in the pollcles of Dr. Eward
Beneš and hls followers, whlch means a contlnuatlon in the same
mistakes and blunders whlch have evoked two dangerous crises in
Europe durlng the past thlrty years. As a result of thls blundering
policy more than half the population of the Czecboslovak Republic
(Slovaks, Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ukralnlans and Carpatho-Russlans) was elther deprlved of the most fundamental human and civil
rlghts, or deslgnedly lmpeded In lts polltlcal and economical development.
Prince Adolf zu Schwarzenberg, head of one of tbe oldest families in Bohemia, had thls to say about Czech policy:
"Even In norma! tlmes the double game of Czecb policy can be
seen Quite clearly. As long as Czecboslovakia adopted the role of
dependence on the West, Benes was at the helm and from 1945 onward prepared the dellvery of hls country to the Communists. Al!
the mlndste-rs in hls Cablnet {there were about two dozen of them)
worked with thelr ldollzed Presldent, and in a most masterly fashion
steered thelr country lnto Communlsm, always hop!ng for a good job
as a reward for thelr laudable work In the Bolshevist interest." NEW ENGLISH REVIEW MAGAZINE, 1949, Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 20-22).
It is a fact that Czechoslovakia was re-establlshed at the end
of World War II agalnst the w111 of the absolute majori ty of the Slovaks and the many mlll!ons of national minorltles by the polllical
actlv!ty of a small group of Czech exiles, who were not concerned
"·lth the lnterests of the Czech and Slovak nations, or the interests
of the ,vbole of Europe, but were rather Jed by imperlallsm, their
persona! amblt!ons and a des!re for revenge. And it ls a historical
fact that the Czecboslovak State was surrendered, without res!stance,
to the power of Mosoow by these pollticlans just as in 1938-1939,
w!thout the least resistance, they surrendered it to Berlin.
In tbe llgbt of these faots and In the interest of better organ!·
zation and cooperatlon or the Centra! European natlons, as well as In
the interest of trutb and justlce, lt appea:-s necessary to point out
the arguments whlch speak agalnst the exlstence or the Czechoslovak
Republlc.
An analysis, lssuing from European and Centro-European points
of vlew and not only from the lnterests of natlons and mlnorlt!es
whlch were forced tnto the Czecboslovak Republ!c agalnst their wlll,
is demanded In this connectlon by our slde, because !t !s based on the
motlve contained In the Declaratlon o! Independence of the Unlted
~tates, In whlcb we read:
" W hen in t he course of human events, it becomes necessary for
SLOVAKIA
17
one people to dissolve the political banda which have connected them
with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the
separated and equal station to whi ch the Laws of Nature and of
Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opíníons of mankind requ ires that they should declare the causes which impel them
to the separation."
What are the causes which led the Slovaks and the minorities to
demand the dlssolution of political ties with the Czech nation in t he
Czechoslovak Republic?
Generally speaking, we can mention, first of all, the following:
1. Tendencies for the preservatlon or restoration of the Czechos lovak Republic do not meet with the approval of the majority of lts
inhabitants and the principle of democracy and the principles ex·
pressed in the Atlantic Charter.
2. The Czechoslovak Republic has no cause to exist in a just
arrangement of Europe even from the standpoint of European in·
terests.
3. The Czechoslovak Republic has no place in a federated Europe
or a federated Centra! Europe.
More than thirty years of clever Czech propaganda migh t, at a
first glance, contradict these allegations. There Js no argument ahout
that. In the mirror of our experience with the propaganda of Goebels,
and, today, that of Moscow, we see, however, that even a propaganda
of falsehoods can be successful for a time, deceiving and convinclng
many people. But the force of truth is eternal. By resorting to lies we
may enjoy successes temporarily, but the truth shall prevail in the
end.
In the case of the Czechoslovak Republic, we are concerned
witili nothing more than the truth. Tbat is why we are analyzing the
above-mentioned arguments at least in their main outlines. And in
dolng this, we pu.rposely refer to the testimonies of· objective, politlcal European observers, so that no one rnight say that the Slovak
s truggle for freedom and independence issues from an exaggerated
nationalism or natlonal intolerenace, as Cz&eh propaganda designedly claims that it does.
The Slovaks were co-founders of the Czechoslovak Republic and
would have wished its preservation, if the Czechoslovak State would
bave had possessed the prerequisites to fulfill the task that falls to a
state in the sense of a modem, sociologlcal conception, on the one
hand, and, on the other, from the standpolnt of European interests.
The Czechoslovak Repu blic, however, diel not. The Slovaks, therefore,
in the lntent of democracy, the Atlantic Charter, and the Charter
of the United Nations Organization, are demanding a new order of
Centro-Eu.ropean relationships. to which the Czechoslovak Republic
definitely 1s an obstacle, as shall be made clear in the arguments
that follow.
Are the tendenciea to preserve or restore the Czechoslovak Republic in harmony with the will of the majority of ita inhabítanta and
the princ iples upon which a modern state ia founded ?
18
SLOVAKIA
This question was already asked at the Paris Peace Conference
in 1919, at whlch the Czechoslovak Republlc was born, as Lloyd George
tells us in bis book "The Truth About the Peace Treaties":
"Czechs,
Germans,
Slovaks,
Hungarians,
Poles,
Ukrainians -
is this not a new Austria which will thus arise under the Czech ban•
ner, a new polyglot state in which six nations will be packed together,
all filled with hatred of one against the other, arrested in their whole
economic and social development and in the progress of their civilization by hate and national strife, nourished by tyranny and poisoning
their whole public llfe? - How can the new polyglot State, the artificial work of an imperialist diplomacy, exist without any economic
community, geographical unity, or common history?" - {pp. 944, 946).
Lloyd George evldently wa.s troubled wlth the prOl)osltion of setting up Czechoslovakia and stated bluntly: "The Czechs were specially favored by the Allies. The result was the recognition of the
polyglot and incoherent state of Czechoslovakia." - (p. 948).
We see, then, at the very beglnning of the Czechoslovak RepubJic, that nelther the lnterests o( the lnhabitants ot the newly-rlsing
s tate, nor tbe prlnclple or the rlght of self-determlnation and of democratlc freedoms were tbe decldlng factors, but only the "special
favor of tbe Allles." It was, tberefore, only natural tbat the Czecbo•
slovak Republlc durlng al! lts 20 years was troubled with interna!
controversles - cleverly masked abroad by a great propaganda apparatu.s - and that lt collapsed wltbout the least resistance of its
populatlon with tbe flrst lmpact from outslde in 1938-1939. What is
more, we can show that ,tbe majority of the inhabitants even deslred
the collapse of the Czechoslovak Republic by quotlng statements of
Czech polltlclans themselves and recalllng those made durlng the
polltlcal trlals of the "people's" democracy of Czechoslovakla versus
the Slovaks, Germans and Magyars - the trials staged by the Czech
Government after 1945.
Why dld they deslre lts dlssolutlon?
Indisputably because the Czechoslovak Republi c dld not satisfy
the polltlcal and economlc !nterests and aspirations of its inhabitants,
except those of the Czech minority which managed tbe State. Al the
Par!s Peace Conference (1919), Dr. Edward Beneš declared that:
"lt is the intention of the Czechoslovak Government to create the organlzatlon of tbe State by accepting as a basis of natural rights tbe
prlnclples applled in the Constitutlon of tbe Swlss Republlc, tbat !s,
to make the Czechoslovak Republlc a sor-t of Swltzerland . . ." Tbe Czecb governments, bowever, did not manage tbe Czechoslovak
Republlc as Beneš had promlsed, but In sucb manner as Jf only an
exclusive Czecb State was concerned, whose mission apparently wa,s
to asslmilate the non-Czech populat!on, and espec!ally the Slovaks,
and hold them in cbeck economlcally and soc!ally. Tbe resistance
of the other lnhabltants and the support of tbe efforts whlch almed
at the dlssolutlon of tbe Czechoslovak Republlc, therefore, became
an entlrely logical r~ult of the sltuation in whlcb tbe non-Czech
inha.b!tants llved.
Tbi.s was abundantly clear to objectlve observers already in
1938. Lloyd George said: "Had the Czech leaders, in tíme and without
SLOVAKIA
19
waiting for the menacing preasure of Germany, redeemed their promise to grant local autonomy to the various races in their Republic
on the llnes of the Swiu Confederation, the present troubles would
(p. 952).
Long before 1938, but especlally in the stlrr!ng months before
MuniC'h and in the Sprlng of 1939, many dlscern!ng representatlves
of the Czech and Slovak natlons were certaln that the Czechoslovak
Republlc dld not develop into a forma,tion whlch could more lastlngly
assure the secur!ty and the vltal !nterests of both these natlons wh!ch
were the ethnlcal foundatlon of the Republlc. Ir the Czech natlon for
a Ume enjoyed certa!n advantages because of the exlstence ot Czechoslovak!a, lt was only at the expense of the rest of the inhabitants.
But the Czechs later had to pay dearly for those advantages and
also had to become aware o[ the fact that the Czechoslovak State
could not guarantee the securRy even or the Czech natlon agalnst a
slngle nelghbor.
As far as the S lovaks are conceTned, they could not resolve tbe
ma,tter any other way, because the Slovak natlon In the Czechoslovak
State - actually, however, in a CZECH State -· was In a posltlon
altogether unbecomlng a cultured natlon, belng exposed to planned
ass:lmllatlon and economical exploltatlon by the Czechs, wbom the
whole state apparatus served. Here we are not even mentlon!ng th e
status of the mlnorities as a problem, which occup!ed the League or
Na.Uons for twenty years and, later, was an opportune alibi for the
liquldation of the Cz-echoslovak Republ!c. Th!s problem, as well as
t hat of the Slovak.s, was dealt with by such personallties as Lord Run•
clman and C. A. Macartney. Rererrlng to Czechoslovak!a, the latter
wrote:
have been averted" -
"The fact remains that the Government has been obliged more
often than not to rule Slovakia against the wishes of most of its
inhabltants, maintaining itself only by the expedienta of restrictlng
the power, of the self-governing bodies to within the narrowest
posslble limita, of filling the seats designated for 'experu' with its
own nominees, and utilizing freely weapons of censorship and police
supervision" (H UNGAIRY AND HER SUCCESSORS, p. 145).
After completlng bis miss!on In 1938, Lord Runciman made even
more unfavorable statements In reportlng on the status or the more
than three and a half mlll!on German minority in the Republ!c. He
said:
" I have been left with the impreaaion that Czechoslovak rule in
the Sudeten areas for the last twenty years ... has been marked by
tactlessness, lack of understanding, petty intolerance and discriminatio n, to a point where the resentment of the German populatlon was
inevitably moving in the d irection of revolt. The Sudeten Germans
fel>t, too, that in the past they had been given many promises by
the Czechoslovak Government, but that llttle or no action had fol lowed these promises...." (Britlsh White Paper, Cmd. 5847).
That is why the Republlc was not derended when Its in tegrity
was threatened and, la,ter, not even when lts very exlstence was In
danger. Not by a single nation of Czechoslovakia, not even the Czech
natlon!
20
S LOVAKIA
On the contrary, its dlssolutlon was made possible by its own
inha.bitan,ts, the majority of whom could realize their natural right
to freedom and their o wn State only by the destruction of Czechos lovakia. So it happened in the case of the Slovaks.
W ri ting about the S lovaks in 1942, Macartney said: " ... most of
them found themselves unable to accept the Peace Confe rence thesis
of a unitary Czechoslovak nation. Some of them fe lt this to mean, in
practice, domination by the economically and socially atronger Czecha,
and they reacted in the form of a flamboyant Slovak nationalism
which was the main reason for the absence of revolt with which they
accepted the dissolution of the Czechos lovak State" (PRO BLEMS
OF T HE DANUBE BASIN, p. 122).
Dur ing the Second World War, a group of Czech exiles in London
(The Czech Natio nal Commiltee) and Slovak exiles (The S lovak Na•
tional Council in London), both fighting on the sid e of the Allies,
tried to find a diťferent solutlon to the Czech and S lovak pr oblem
than that which the fľamework of Czechoslovakia offered. Representatives of the Czech and Slovak natlons, in accord w ith the prlnciple
of the right of self-determlnation and the r ight of every nation to independence, proposed ,the organlzing of a separate Slovak State and a
separate Czech State within the framewo rk of a larger federalive
Centro-European unit. Their efforts were prompted not only by t he
interests of their own nations, but also by the interests of Eu ropean
peace and prosperity, as well as by a sense for justice and the righ t.
A g roup of Czech poli ticians headed by Ben eš, however, motivated by persona! prestige, by a desfre for revenge a nd the re newal
of Czech i mperia'lism more than by t he interests of its own nation,
did not hes.ltate to surrender the destiny of the Czech and Slovak
natlons to the "tender" mercies of th~ Soviet Un ion. Unfortunately for
the nations concerned, for Europe and the democratic world, this
group of political madmen realized tbeir program. The Czechoslovak
Republlc was restored by the grace of Moscow. Of course, no t in
the interests of the Czecbs and the Slovaks, but, as it is abundantly
clear today, in the interests of Moscow.
Robert Ingrim, forelgn correspondent of leading European newspapers, wrote in 1946: " Russia's aim, when signing that t reaty against
the wishes of Ame rica and Britain, was, of course, not to sec ure
Czechia as an a ll y. They made use of Benes' fea r of a frontier revision in order to get a strong foothold in the he art of th e Continent"
- (AFTER HITLER STALIN? - P. 180).
What develo ped in the Czechoslovak Republic after 1945, and
es pecially th e events of Feb ruary 1948, definitely prove that point.
flut we must a lso state tbat restored Czechoslovakia realized it could
exist only by having a Czecb majority assured. Beneš and his group
were only too well aware of that and, therefore, promoted tbeir pian
for ousting the Germans and Magyars trom Czechoslovakia. Because
they were successful, over three million Germans and almost a half
m illlon Magya rs were expelled from the ·Republic. Tbe consequences
of thls " hum ane and orderly " expulsion by Beneš and bis regime
will be feLt for a long time to the detriment of cooperation between
the natlons of Centra! Europe.
SLOVAKIA
21
The majority of the Slovaks was definitely against the restoration
of Czechoslovakla. Because the Slovak nation was not given an opportunity to express itself about i.ts own destlny, it felt and even today
feels that lt was wrong, morally and otherwise, to destroy the independent State o! Slovakla, and that it was deprived of its rlght to
ind ependence illegally and by vlolence. What happened in Slovakia
s ince the restoration of the Czechoslovak Republic has only steeled
the Slovaks In thelr determination to revolt agains.t the Czech lmperialistic St.rute at the fil'st opportnne moment and 1-.estore their own
S lovak State.
F. A. VoigU had this to say a bout the Czech-Slovak relat!onship:
"The conflict between the Czechs and Slovaks appears to be irreconcilable. lt would seem that the Czechoslovak State is, today, a
fiction and that it will never again be a reality, for if RuHian overlordahip were removed, the Czechs could only reaHert their authority
over the Slovaks by force of arms - and in this they would surely
fail, for they have not one friend in Central Europe, whereas the
Slovaks have many" (THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, Nov. 1945).
As a result of the sltuation prevailing today, thousands of Slovak
exiles in Europe, a million and a half Americans of Slovak descent,
and many thousands of Slovaks in Canada, England, Argentína, Belgium, Spain, France, I,taly, Austria and Swltzerland, as well as an
overwhelming majority of the Slovak nation at horne, are fighting for
an Independent Slovak State, the only pol!tlcal formation which can
guarantee their national existence and happlness
According to the repo11t of the Prague Ministry of the Interi01•,
there were uncovered 36 conspiracies in Slovakia against the Republic in Jess than two years. Thls reslstance against the State of the
Czechs and Slovaks continues despite the fact that a large percentage of Slovak intellectuals has been cast into jall, tortured and exiled.
and despite the fact that about 300,000 Slovaks have been transferred
to the Czech-German border to weaken resistancP. in Slovakia.
The logical concluslon to be drawn from all this is that from
1945 restored Czechoslovakia is belng preserved only by brute force
and suppression of the most fundamental natlonal and indivldual
rights, and that Czechoslovakla is a negation of all the rlghts which
modern society has des igna.ted to a state for the purpose and lntent of
its existence: to guarantee a free political and economical development of its people.
II
The Czechoslovak Republic has no reason to exist in a righteous
arrangement of Europe from the viewpoint of European interests.
While the Czechoslovak Republic, in the democratic sense, did
not and does not fulfill the functlons of a state in relation to the majority of lts inhabitants, it is not difficult to find proofs that there
ls no reason for this State to exist even as far as the interests of
Europe are concerned, and much less so as far as the interests of
Centra! Europe are concerned.
At the end of World War I, Czechoslovakia was formed with the
intention that lt would perform the function of a defensive barrier
22
SLOVAKIA
agalnst Germany and that it would be a part of the cordon sanitaire
against Russla. Lloyd George wrote that Beneš assured the Peace
Conference that "the Czecha were protectors of democracy against
Germaniam" and that "it was their duty at all timea to fi ght the
Germans" - (p. 932).
Czechoslovakia, however, did not fulflll a slngle functlon it was
supposed to, but conversely, wlth lts senseless policy towards the
non-Czech majority of its lnhabitant.s, lt flrst weakened the proposed
system of defense against Germany and then was the alibi and the
cause for the collapse of thls system and, therefore, helped German
aggression In Centra! Europe.
Durlng all twenty years of its existence, the Czecbóslovak Repub•
lic could not find a posltlve relationship toward even a slngle one
ot its nelghbors. With its Interna! and forelgn policles, it actually
prevented the consoUdat!on of the Oentro-European area and indirectly prepared the ground for the s uccess of the policy of Natlonal
Sociallsm of Germany whlch, on the other hand, galned not only the
mlnorlties of Czechoslovakia, but also the na.tions to which these
mlnorltles belonged, by promislng to apply and abide by the natlonality prlnclple. And so, instead of becoming a barrler agalnst Germany,
Czechoslovakia actually became the gate whereby Germany passed
into the Danube area and southeastern Europe without any opposltion
whatsoever. Instead of stopping German aggression and German im
periallsm, Czechoslovakla substaf\tially facilitated the German "Drang
nach Osten."
And looktng from that va.ntage point, what is the situation slnce
1945?
After 1-ts restoration in 1945, did the Czechoslovak State become a
"bastlon o! democracy" as promis'E!d by the Czech pol!ticlans who requested the Allies to restore lt? Of course, we kno1~ that it did not.
The fact 1s that it did not even become a brldge between the East
and the West In the posltive sense, but only a brldge for the trafflc
of the Soviet Union and lts satellltes. Over this brldge the Soviet
Union went unlmpedéd into the heart of Europe. At the same Ume
Czechoslovakla became the gate through which the Soviet Union
and communlsm will attack the democratlc world. And who is to
blame for that? In a large mea.sure all those who worked so energetioally for the restoration of Czechoslovakia
In order to assure their "trlumphant" return home, the restoratlon of the Czechoslovak State w.hich collapsed so utterly in 1939, and
also the assent of the Allles to expel the German and Magyar mlnorities, the Czech polltlcians, headed by Beneš, not only concluded an
agreement wlth Moscow, whereby the Soviet Union w.as enabled to
interfere In the affairs of Czechoslovakia, but also allowed the Soviet
Union to take Ruthenia wlthout any regard for the will of the inhabltanta thereof and in violatlon of ~he Czechoslovak Con.stitutlon.
Thus, Russla for the flrst tlme in its hlstory got a foothold in
the Danube Basin only a few kllometers from Bu<lapest and Vlenna.
The transfer of Ruthenla to the Soviet Union took place In the
Sprlng of 19!l5--as compensatlon for the Sovleťs assent to expel the
G-ermana .and -•Magyars from Czechoslovakla. From a polltlcal· and
SLOVAK.IA
23
strategic viewpoint, this was a great victory for the Soviet Union.
Robert l ngrim had this to say about the matter:
"The alliance with the Czechs who, wlthout Aussian aupport,
would have been unable to re-establish their rule over a non-Czech
majority of Germans, Slovaks, Magyars, Poles, and Authenians, is
one prong of Stalin's great hayfork.... A look at the map of Europe
showa the meaning of that hayfork. By including the eaatern part of
formerly Auatrian Galícia in her Poliah booty, Ruaaia establishes territori al contact with the Czech satellite. The westernmoat tip of Bohernia is but 200 miles off the French border" (Op. cit. p. 181-182).
Furthermore, Czech polltlclans under the leadershlp of Beneš
not only prevented the possiblllty of harmonious cooperatlon of the
nations of Centra! Europe, but wf.th the!r deportatlons evoked s-uch a
fear of German retrlbution that they themselves see a guarantee of
the exlstence of Czechoslovakia only In the politlcal and mil!tary
support of the Soviet Union. In thls respect, note,.vorthy is the statement of Dr. Beneš hlmself, addressed In 1947 to a Slovak delegatlon
headed by Dr. Joseph Lettrich:
" T he Czechs cannot accept under any circumstances an independent Slovakia i n the future •.• The Czechs, having on the one side 70
million Germans, must on the other side have Aussia as their neighbor. Therefore, they could not accept an independent Slovakia. This
is a vítal problem for the existence of the Czechs as a nation and as a
State" (Feb. 16, 1947).
Consequently the inhabltants of Czechoslovak\a are forced to
support the pollcles of the Soviet Union In the interest of the exlstence of Czechoslovakia, even though thelr polltlcal convictlons and sympathies are In dlametrical confllct wlth those pol!cles. On the otber
hand, however, lt follow-s that the Czecboslovak State bases 1s exlstence only on the mllltary and pol!tlcal m1ght of a forelgn power;
consequently lt has become a tool of that power and does not possess
abll!ty and vítal force of !ts own to exlst as a sovereign state.
T.bereln we must also seek the reason why the communist putsch
of February 1948 dld not meet witb any reslstance even from the
Czech nation. The very exdstence of the Czechoslovak State, whlch
was not capable of exlstlng by ltself and was founded on the suppresslon of freedoms of other nat!ons, demanded the subjugat!on not only
of the Czech people, hut also the Slovak natlon, w,h lch was over
70 per cent antl-communlst, by the commun!st totalltarian dlctatorshlp. The consequences of thla pollcy, whereby the so-called "raJson
d'Etat" was placed before the interest of the freedom and the llfe
of the lnhabltants, are lll-fated not only for the Czech and Slovak na•
tions, but the Soviet Union, by means of th!s pollcy, got lnto the very
heart of the E uropean contlnent and communlsm galned an important
gateway through whi-ch lt can attack western Europe.
Thus Czechoslovakla, twlce wlthln a slngle decade, made it posslble or substantlally easler for lmperlallsm to enter Europe and
thréaten the freedoms of lts natlons: In 1938 the lmperlal!sm ot
natlonally soclalistlc Germany and, In 1946-48, the lmper!allsm of
communlst Russla. So, the functlon given the Czechoslovak Republlc,
or that whlch !ts creators promlsed lt would perform. was not only not
fulfllled, but, conversely, th!s State - besldes preventlng the coop-
24
SLOVAKIA
eration of the nations of Centra! Europe and oppressing the majority
of lts inhabitants - has cast Europe into dangerou.s crises twlce
within a single decade and facilitated the victory of those forces,
against wh1ch lt was supposed to serve, directly or indirectly, as a
barrler.
Therefore, it appears evldent that the exlstence of this State
uot only does not have motivatlon, but that it is in the interest of
Europe and its healthy organlzation that this synthetlc formatien.
founded on violence and the suppression of the most fundamental
freedoms of millions of human beings and existing only with the help
oľ a foreign power, definitely disappear from the map of Europe.
Such is the conviction not only of the absolute majoľ'ity of the
S lovak nation and its true representatives, who never agreed with
the restoration of the Czechoslovak Republlc, but also the convictlon
of many upright and freedom-Jovlng Czechs, who fought on the side
of the Allies during the past war for the creation of a separate Czech
State and a separate Slovak State within a framework of a federated
Centra) Europe. These Czechs have refused to return to the synthetic political creation which does not reflect the will of the majority
or its !nha'bitants, but is in fact the tool of the policy and aims of
the Soviet Union.
111
The Czechoslovak Republic has no place in a federated Europe
or a federated C entral Europe.
If the Czechoslovak Republic has no raison ďetre in a system
of sovereign states fľom a standpoint of European interests - the
securlty of Central Europe and a harmonious relationship of lts na•
tions - then the existence of this unnatura! formation appears to be
utterly useless and unjust in the case of federating Europe, or at
least Central Europe. There are several logical and objective argu•
ip.ents in support of this statement.
The Czechoslovak Republic, as we have seen, was created wíth the
intent of forming a barrier against German expansion, and in 1945 it
was restored so it could be a bastion of democracy and a bridge be·
tween the East and the West. In these functions !t falled miserably.
And these motlves do not hold in the case of a federation of Europe,
or at least Centra! Europe. Indivldual states, whlch could not stop aggression in Europe even with a system of alliances, certainly wlll not
play the role, in a federated Europe, of preventlng a repetition of a
German attack or Russlan hegemony; that wlll be the role of the
federation of the Continent, or that of Centra! Europe.
The argument that Czechoslovakia should be retained, because it
is a larger unit than would ·be either a Czech or Slovak unit, cannot
play a part in the case of a European or Centro-European federation.
Strategic and economic arguments, which give priority to larger for·
mations, have not proved themselves in the case of Czechoslovak!a
even wlth a system of soverelgn states, because factually it could not
defend ltself against any one of its neighbors. The lnclusion of the
minorities and the creation of a Czechoslovakia wlth some 15 mill!on
inhabitants would conmct w!th the basic principle of federalism and
the expressed right of nations to self-determination.
SLOVAKIA
25
Furtherm ore the Czech nation, which has gone over to the cam p
of the satelltes of the Soviet Union more or less wlllingly, cannot
h31Ve any claims w hich would give it preference over all its other
neighbors and allow the Czechs to annex territories occupied by nonCzech inh ab itants.
After 1945, when Hungary and Germany were defeated States,
and Cz~ hoslovakia - whether deservingly or not - was included
a mong the victorious Allles, it was possible to restore Czechoslovakia
with lts old borders, especially when Slovakia was to be punished for
not being on the border of P ortugal, but on t he border of Germany,
and, therefore, was included in the camp of the defeated.
In a E urope liberated from t he hegemony of Moscow, not a single
argument used to validate the orlgin or the restoration of -the Czechos lovak Re public wlll be aible to be used in the future, especially no t
in the case of federalization of Europe or Centra! Europe. The feder•
ative principle excludes hegemony of one nation over another.
In the case of Slovakia, then, what logical argument can there be
against the Slovak natlon h aving its own independen t State? 1s lt
logical and just to say that every nation, no matter how small, EXCEPT THE SLOVAK NA'l'ION, has an inherent right to fr~dom and
independence? What lnterest of the United States, England or France
- or t hat of the Cent ro-European nations, wh o do not wlsh the exist·
ence of the Czechoslovak Republic and already in 1939 r ecognized the
righ t of th e Slov.aks to independence - could be served by such an arg ument? What loglcal arguments can there be against the just dem and of the Slovaks to be recognized legally as equal wHh other
nations?
In 1918 the Slovak nation was included in Czechoslovakia, by the
great powers, because Dr. Edward Beneš, T. G. Masaryk and Czech
propaganda claimed t hat Slovaks were Czechs who spoke a dialect o f
the Czech language and, therefore, the principle of self-determination
did no t a pply to them. W hen Andrew Hlinka wanted to expose this
fah,e claim, he was expelled from P aris at the request of Dr. Beneš
u nder th e pr etext that he was an agent of the Vatican and the Habsbu rgs. And Dr. Beneš was successful with bis "big lie" a bout the
non-existence of the Slovak nation. The distinguished Eng lish
historian, C. A. Macartney has this to say on the matt&r:
"The story of the gradual adoption by the Allies of the theses of
Masaryk and his group cannot and need not be reto ld here. By patient
and indefatigable propaganda, they implanted their major postulatea
- the existence of a "Czechoslovak nation" and the desire of the
Slovak branch of it to form a part of Czechoslovak State- so firm ly in the minds of the Allies that they were never serious ly questioned
at the Peace Conference. The "Czecho-Slovak" Govern ment had been
recognized by a ll the princ ipal Allied and Assoc iated Powers even
before the peace negotiations began -- an act whic h implied that the
Slovak queation waa in principle already s ettled - while when t he
moment arrived for settling a ll questions of detai l, including the drafting of a frontier, it found the Czecho-Slovak Government firmly
establiahed as a negotiating party; indeed, in something like a priv ileged position" (HUNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS, p. 98).
26
SLOVAKIA
Can the arguments of Masaryk and Beneš be appl!ed today or Iu
the future? The fabrlcator ot that falsebood hlmself "had to" capltulate and recognlze the exlstence ot the Independent Slovak natlon.
In the end Beneš was opposed to only "the proclalmlng and a manifestatlonal recognitlon of the Slovaks a.s a natlon wholly soverelgn,"
because, accordlng to bim, "any klnd of proclamation and manitestatlonal recognltlon of the Slovaks as a natlon totally soverelgn, not
dependent on the Czechs, must lead firat to the deaire and then even to
the realization of Slovak atatehood ltaelf" - (ÚVAHY O SLOVAN•
STv1, p. 353).
Beneš was not the only one who capltulated on that score. Other
Czeohs and many Slovak adherents of the thesls o! a "unita.ry Czecboslova.k nation" - wbo made a good llvlng out of lt at the expense
o! -the Slovak uation - also caplitulated. Is lt still posslble to prevent
the Slovak natlon from passlng from the deslre to the "realizatlon
of thelr own Slovak statehood"? What arguments are there to pre•
vent thls?
The argument that the Slovaks are not sufficiently mature to
manage thelr own affalrs certalnly does not hold today. Even sucb a
Cze-0hophlle as Dr. Mllan Hodža admltted tbat "Slovaki;i has reached
if not paased the Central European's civilization level ... Some political writers in thia country used to be rather skeptical about Slova.
kla and her position and even about her political ability to live. Today
it is evidently proved that these doubts were unfounded" - (FEDERATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE, Jarolds, London, 1942, p. 94).
The Engllsh expert on Centro-European questlons, C. A. Macartney,
stated that In Slovakia there exlsts "a distinctive Slovak nationalism as
a factor of the Danubian situation" (PROBLEMS OF THE
DANUBE BASIN, London, 1942, p. 122).
And let us ask a further question: Wlll lt be loglcally possible to
use the argument that the Slovaks, whether in emlgratlon or at home,
would not flght for thelr independence on the slde of the democracles?
The Slovaks, who are dedlcated to an Independent Slovakla, are In
thls !lght, wblch 1s being waged agalnst communist aggresslon, tor
over a hundred years as a natlon and their past 1s not sullled by collaboratlon with communlsm. Could the western democracles, therefore,
belleve the propaganda of a few Beneš Slovaks (Czechoslovaks) who collaborated with communls m and helped lt to power and then
escaped abroad only when they could no Jonger hold government
posltlons to enrich themselves - and dlsregard the will of the overwhelmlng majority of the Slovak natlon and lts representatlves In
E>migratlon wbo stand for a separate, democratlc Slovak State witbln
the framework of a federated Europe or Centra! EurQpe?
·. 1For what reasons?
By an objectlve analysls, we can come to only one concluslon:
in a federated Europe or Centra! Europe, the Czechoslovak Repub11c
bas no rea:son to exlst and can exlst only by tbe grace of some greá.t
power, just as lt dld up to 1938 by the grace of France and England,
and just as lt does today by tbe grace of tbe Soviet Union. But outslde tbe Soviet Union, there ls no sucb great power whlch In tbe
future would need a heterogenous Czechoslovak State founded on
BLOVAKIA
27
violence and preventing the cooperatlon of the European natlons.
Centra! Europe wlll need peace and a harmonlous cohabltatlon of
natlons to recover from the wounds infllcted by the war and the
Russlan occupation.
Czech-oslovakla has definltely shown - as up to 1938, so even
after 1945 - that it cannot flnd a positlve relatlonshlp toward lts
neighbors, that lts exlstence evokes an atmosphere of dlstrust and
revlslonism and violates the natural order of the Central-European
area. Therefore, there can be no place for the Czechoslovak State In
that area.
•
•
•
MUSEUMS OF SLOVAKIA
The three Jeading museums of Slovakia are in Bratislava, TurSvätý Martin, and Košice. The Agrlcultural Museum In Bratislava, seriously damaged by bombs in 1944, 1s devoted principally
to geology, soil, t he cultlvatlon or plants, lncluding frult trees and
vegetables, animal husbandry, forestry, and zoology_ The museum
iu the capital or Slovakia has In its program to present as complete a
plcture as possible of the archaeology, of the creatlve arts, and of the
Natural Hlstory of the land, with spe<:ial emphasls on Western Slovak1a. Its ethnographic collect!ons are not as extensive as those at
Turčiansky Svätý Martin whlch was establlshed iJl 1896 by local
patrlots and was maintalned by them.
Ln a.ddltion to the aforemeniioned unu-sually rich e thnogra,phic materlal, the museum possesses a noteworthy collectlon o! models of
typical Slovak wooden bulldings. Slnce the city was the prlnclpal
headquarters of Slovak natlonal and cultural actlvity, there is assembled here also invaluable source material concernlng the literary
progress of the !and.
The Eastern Slovakla Museum at Košice possesses a valuable
library of over thirty thousand volumes and interestlng collectlons
of archeologloal and Natural History Qlbjects. The paintings, whlcb the
museum had, were taken to Budapest In 1918.
Local museums are organlzed territorlally elther as regional or
city lnstltutions. To the former group belong the museums at Trenčín, Nitra, Banská Štiavnica, Komarno, Banská Bystrica, Ružomberok,
Bardlov, Levoča, and Rimavská Sobota. The leadlng city museums
are at Bratislava and at Kremnica.
Speclalized museums are the Agricultural Museum at Bratislava,
the Tatra Museums at Poprad and Veľká, and the Jewlsh Museum at
Prešov.
čiansky
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?: - "Durlng my stay in the Unlted States, I spoke
with almost all the leaders of Amerlcan democracy, and, as I expected.
l found they all had a full understandlng of our just cause. Dr. Benei'a
journey to Moacow and ita hiatorical aignificance la a pproved and recognized in Amerlca. Of course, there are a few reactlonarles there
who nurse thelr selfish lnterests with exaggerated fear 'of Bolshevism.
I dld not even try to convlnce them." -- (Jan Masaryk: l :.ondon Broadcast, February 16, 1944).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Why No More Czechoslovakia?
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951
pp. 16-27
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
SNK
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/1246d85d021543acb464bfff70daf251.pdf
0c1947d1937f921a4b513ed0ba6c9322
PDF Text
Text
BLOVAKIA
27
violence and preventing the cooperatlon of the European natlons.
Centra! Europe wlll need peace and a harmonlous cohabltatlon of
natlons to recover from the wounds infllcted by the war and the
Russlan occupation.
Czech-oslovakla has definltely shown - as up to 1938, so even
after 1945 - that it cannot flnd a positlve relatlonshlp toward lts
neighbors, that lts exlstence evokes an atmosphere of dlstrust and
revlslonism and violates the natural order of the Central-European
area. Therefore, there can be no place for the Czechoslovak State In
that area.
•
•
•
MUSEUMS OF SLOVAKIA
The three Jeading museums of Slovakia are in Bratislava, TurSvätý Martin, and Košice. The Agrlcultural Museum In Bratislava, seriously damaged by bombs in 1944, 1s devoted principally
to geology, soil, t he cultlvatlon or plants, lncluding frult trees and
vegetables, animal husbandry, forestry, and zoology_ The museum
iu the capital or Slovakia has In its program to present as complete a
plcture as possible of the archaeology, of the creatlve arts, and of the
Natural Hlstory of the land, with spe<:ial emphasls on Western Slovak1a. Its ethnographic collect!ons are not as extensive as those at
Turčiansky Svätý Martin whlch was establlshed iJl 1896 by local
patrlots and was maintalned by them.
Ln a.ddltion to the aforemeniioned unu-sually rich e thnogra,phic materlal, the museum possesses a noteworthy collectlon o! models of
typical Slovak wooden bulldings. Slnce the city was the prlnclpal
headquarters of Slovak natlonal and cultural actlvity, there is assembled here also invaluable source material concernlng the literary
progress of the !and.
The Eastern Slovakla Museum at Košice possesses a valuable
library of over thirty thousand volumes and interestlng collectlons
of archeologloal and Natural History Qlbjects. The paintings, whlcb the
museum had, were taken to Budapest In 1918.
Local museums are organlzed territorlally elther as regional or
city lnstltutions. To the former group belong the museums at Trenčín, Nitra, Banská Štiavnica, Komarno, Banská Bystrica, Ružomberok,
Bardlov, Levoča, and Rimavská Sobota. The leadlng city museums
are at Bratislava and at Kremnica.
Speclalized museums are the Agricultural Museum at Bratislava,
the Tatra Museums at Poprad and Veľká, and the Jewlsh Museum at
Prešov.
čiansky
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?: - "Durlng my stay in the Unlted States, I spoke
with almost all the leaders of Amerlcan democracy, and, as I expected.
l found they all had a full understandlng of our just cause. Dr. Benei'a
journey to Moacow and ita hiatorical aignificance la a pproved and recognized in Amerlca. Of course, there are a few reactlonarles there
who nurse thelr selfish lnterests with exaggerated fear 'of Bolshevism.
I dld not even try to convlnce them." -- (Jan Masaryk: l :.ondon Broadcast, February 16, 1944).
�
BLOVAKIA
27
violence and preventing the cooperatlon of the European natlons.
Centra! Europe wlll need peace and a harmonlous cohabltatlon of
natlons to recover from the wounds infllcted by the war and the
Russlan occupation.
Czech-oslovakla has definltely shown - as up to 1938, so even
after 1945 - that it cannot flnd a positlve relatlonshlp toward lts
neighbors, that lts exlstence evokes an atmosphere of dlstrust and
revlslonism and violates the natural order of the Central-European
area. Therefore, there can be no place for the Czechoslovak State In
that area.
•
•
•
MUSEUMS OF SLOVAKIA
The three Jeading museums of Slovakia are in Bratislava, TurSvätý Martin, and Košice. The Agrlcultural Museum In Bratislava, seriously damaged by bombs in 1944, 1s devoted principally
to geology, soil, t he cultlvatlon or plants, lncluding frult trees and
vegetables, animal husbandry, forestry, and zoology_ The museum
iu the capital or Slovakia has In its program to present as complete a
plcture as possible of the archaeology, of the creatlve arts, and of the
Natural Hlstory of the land, with spe<:ial emphasls on Western Slovak1a. Its ethnographic collect!ons are not as extensive as those at
Turčiansky Svätý Martin whlch was establlshed iJl 1896 by local
patrlots and was maintalned by them.
Ln a.ddltion to the aforemeniioned unu-sually rich e thnogra,phic materlal, the museum possesses a noteworthy collectlon o! models of
typical Slovak wooden bulldings. Slnce the city was the prlnclpal
headquarters of Slovak natlonal and cultural actlvity, there is assembled here also invaluable source material concernlng the literary
progress of the !and.
The Eastern Slovakla Museum at Košice possesses a valuable
library of over thirty thousand volumes and interestlng collectlons
of archeologloal and Natural History Qlbjects. The paintings, whlcb the
museum had, were taken to Budapest In 1918.
Local museums are organlzed territorlally elther as regional or
city lnstltutions. To the former group belong the museums at Trenčín, Nitra, Banská Štiavnica, Komarno, Banská Bystrica, Ružomberok,
Bardlov, Levoča, and Rimavská Sobota. The leadlng city museums
are at Bratislava and at Kremnica.
Speclalized museums are the Agricultural Museum at Bratislava,
the Tatra Museums at Poprad and Veľká, and the Jewlsh Museum at
Prešov.
čiansky
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?: - "Durlng my stay in the Unlted States, I spoke
with almost all the leaders of Amerlcan democracy, and, as I expected.
l found they all had a full understandlng of our just cause. Dr. Benei'a
journey to Moacow and ita hiatorical aignificance la a pproved and recognized in Amerlca. Of course, there are a few reactlonarles there
who nurse thelr selfish lnterests with exaggerated fear 'of Bolshevism.
I dld not even try to convlnce them." -- (Jan Masaryk: l :.ondon Broadcast, February 16, 1944).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
BLOVAKIA
27
violence and preventing the cooperatlon of the European natlons.
Centra! Europe wlll need peace and a harmonlous cohabltatlon of
natlons to recover from the wounds infllcted by the war and the
Russlan occupation.
Czech-oslovakla has definltely shown - as up to 1938, so even
after 1945 - that it cannot flnd a positlve relatlonshlp toward lts
neighbors, that lts exlstence evokes an atmosphere of dlstrust and
revlslonism and violates the natural order of the Central-European
area. Therefore, there can be no place for the Czechoslovak State In
that area.
•
•
•
MUSEUMS OF SLOVAKIA
The three Jeading museums of Slovakia are in Bratislava, TurSvätý Martin, and Košice. The Agrlcultural Museum In Bratislava, seriously damaged by bombs in 1944, 1s devoted principally
to geology, soil, t he cultlvatlon or plants, lncluding frult trees and
vegetables, animal husbandry, forestry, and zoology_ The museum
iu the capital or Slovakia has In its program to present as complete a
plcture as possible of the archaeology, of the creatlve arts, and of the
Natural Hlstory of the land, with spe<:ial emphasls on Western Slovak1a. Its ethnographic collect!ons are not as extensive as those at
Turčiansky Svätý Martin whlch was establlshed iJl 1896 by local
patrlots and was maintalned by them.
Ln a.ddltion to the aforemeniioned unu-sually rich e thnogra,phic materlal, the museum possesses a noteworthy collectlon o! models of
typical Slovak wooden bulldings. Slnce the city was the prlnclpal
headquarters of Slovak natlonal and cultural actlvity, there is assembled here also invaluable source material concernlng the literary
progress of the !and.
The Eastern Slovakla Museum at Košice possesses a valuable
library of over thirty thousand volumes and interestlng collectlons
of archeologloal and Natural History Qlbjects. The paintings, whlcb the
museum had, were taken to Budapest In 1918.
Local museums are organlzed territorlally elther as regional or
city lnstltutions. To the former group belong the museums at Trenčín, Nitra, Banská Štiavnica, Komarno, Banská Bystrica, Ružomberok,
Bardlov, Levoča, and Rimavská Sobota. The leadlng city museums
are at Bratislava and at Kremnica.
Speclalized museums are the Agricultural Museum at Bratislava,
the Tatra Museums at Poprad and Veľká, and the Jewlsh Museum at
Prešov.
čiansky
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?: - "Durlng my stay in the Unlted States, I spoke
with almost all the leaders of Amerlcan democracy, and, as I expected.
l found they all had a full understandlng of our just cause. Dr. Benei'a
journey to Moacow and ita hiatorical aignificance la a pproved and recognized in Amerlca. Of course, there are a few reactlonarles there
who nurse thelr selfish lnterests with exaggerated fear 'of Bolshevism.
I dld not even try to convlnce them." -- (Jan Masaryk: l :.ondon Broadcast, February 16, 1944).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Museums of Slovakia
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951
p. 27
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b620bf5179429bfc6dfaa814227e3664.pdf
b0b8bbb833dd36aa1a57c72478e0fa35
PDF Text
Text
28
SLOVAKIA
CA STL~
OF SLOV AKIA
A multitude of picturesque ruins of medieval cru;tles is one of
the special attractions of Slovakia. They bear witness of the centurles during which Slovakia was a frontler bulwark of W estern
European clvlllzaUon agalnst the continuous encroachment of the
rapacious Turks. Llfe was full of romance and of danger.
Wooden forts preceeded the mighty stone edlflces of the thirteenth
and fourteenth centurles. Tbe dlsastrous Mongol incursion of 1241
proved tbe inefficacy of the wooden structures and there followed a
period of intenslve building of castles with stone. Thls building activity continued well lnto the seventeeth century and ended with tbe
foundation of Leopoldov in 1665 by Emperor Leopold 1. It was closely
modeled after P alma Nuova in Northern Italy.
By the beglnnlng of the eigbteenth century, lhe medieval castles
no longer fulf!lled th e demands of mllitary technique and as the
danger of further Turkls h invasions ceased, their owners a bandoned
them to live In more comfortable quarters. Palaces replaced castles.
A few of the old castles were refashloned and to this day remaln
habltable. One of the largest and most lnteresting of the latter is at
Bojnice wblcb has no less tban 21S balls and rooms, is enclrcled by
wlde moats, and has several massive and lofty towers.
As to tJhe number and the picturesgueness of ruins, the Váh
river compares favorably to tbe Rhlne. Tbe setting is possl,bly even
more romantic and certalnly more primltlve. Many of the rulns are
flanked by dense forests. There are some tbirty of tbem, built mostly
upon steep crags overlooking tlhe rlver. In the Middle Ages they were
Quite lmpregnable. Standlng aloof from buman habitatlons of today,
their very lsolation transports tbe vlsltor in spirit to bygone centuries
of armored knlghts and robber barons. In those years royal authority
was rather dlfficult to enforce. Tbe owner was truly lord over the
Iand whlch bis eye could survey.
The mightiest and the most accessible of the citadels on the
Váh is at Trenčin. Between the years 1301-1321 lt was the residence
ot the famous Matthew Cák, "lord of the Váh and of the Tatras," wbo
possessed more than thlrty castles in different parts of tbe land. King
Charles 'Robert of Hungary besleged hlm in vain. The only Ume the
stronghold teli before an enemy was in 1528 after a month's arduous
siege. The large stone can,non bans from this siege are stm visiblP.
in tbe walls of the ruined castle. In 1663 the Turks, and in 1704 Francis Rakoczy II tried to capture it, but falled. Fire in 1790 reduced it
to rulns.
The most extensive ruin In Slovakia is Spišský Hrad, situated in
the Spiš region. Bullt of whlte limestone, it gllstens six hundred feet
a bove th.e surroundlng landscape. It !s huge, bavlng no less tban
five large courtyards and 135 halls and rooms. The lookout tower has
four storles. The walls are ten feet thlck and reach an altitude of
seventy feet. It is also one of the oldest castles in Slovakia, being
mentioned already In tbe year 1120. It was abandoned In 1710 and
was turned into rulns by fire In 1780.
�SLOVAKIA
29
Tbe most memorable of the ruins of S lovakia is magnificent De-v in, sltuated not far {rom Bratislava, some five mlles towards Vlenna.
Devin is unlque. It is unllke anything else to be seen in Europe. A
romantic complex of ruins loom some 240 feet above the confluence
of the Danube and Morava rivers, right on the frontier between Slovakia and Austria. Here end the Carpathiaus, and across the Danube
commence the Alps.
The view from Devín is exquisitely beautiful. Regardless of season and weather it rewards the visitor with a vista which is insplring
and penetrates his soul. Towards sunrise you behold the majestlc
Danube flowlng swlftly towards the Black Sea. Along its left bank
are hllls adorned wlth deciduous forests, and on the slopes, exposed
to the Southern sun, are vlneyards, small and quiltlike, as are the
fields on the more level opposite side or the stream. Also there are
forests, restrul to gaze upon. They ascend hills, outposts of the Alps.
Right beneath the ruins lies the town or Devin, exotic and appealing, where life is placid, more like the gently r1owing Morava
than like the more energetic Danube. Towards sunset you see the
fertile plains of Austria, park-like scenery with villages and an occasional manor set in woods and flelds. You see the Danube approaching,
undulating, and forming many wooded islets. Across the Danube to the
South you behold the Austrlan town of Hainburg nestled beneath
the ruins of the bistoric fortress of Altenburg, the Carnuntum of the
Romans, headquarters of one of their leglons. Finally, on the horlzon
to the Southwest, the real Alps meet your avid gaze. Looking a.bout
upon the wonderful panorama, you forget the woes and worries or
everyday life and for the moment become a poet to whom tbe world
is a paradise.
You are treading upon prehistoric as well as on historic ground.
Man was here long before the commencement of the Cbristian era.
Bits or pottery from the Hallstatt period and remains of abodes from
tbe second La Tene period have been uneartbed by archaeologlsts
wbo bave been carrying on extensive excavations since 1923. Tbe
future is likely to furtber extend tbe past.
During tbe first two centuries of our ern Devín served as an outpost of the Roman Emplre against tbe turbulent Marcomanni and
Quadl, Germanic tribes living north or the Danube. It was fol'tifled by
the fourteenth legion. With the advent of the Slovaks about the sixth
century, the place recelved lts present appellation, named probably
after the national godess, Deva. It became a refuge from the ruth·
less Uralo-Altaic Avars who held to the plains and to the swamps.
As the Slovaks became united and powerful, it became one of thelr
principal centers. It was here that King Louls the German besieged
Rastislav, ruler of the so-called Great Moravian realm, without avail in
864.
Great Moravia fell to piece~ in 906 before the savage onrush of
the Magyar horsemen. Devin, however, remalned in the hands of the
Slovaks well lnto the eleventh century. In 1683 it successfully wlthstood a slege by the Turks. The destruction of the castle was due to
Napoleon who, in 1809, ordered it to be razed.
What a hlstory Devin has had! For untold centuries it was
strateglcally the mos t vila! point of Centra! Europe. In its immediate
�30
SLOVAK.IA
v!clnity were fought the battles whlch determined the fate of the
heart of the contlnent.
I).espite the fact that on the once mlghty stone castle only two
medieval towers and a few walls have been preserved, the ruln.s,
nevertheless, present a majestic appearance. That whlch remalns 1s
stately and lmposing. The site of Devin is truly immense. Its expanse
is large enough for a dozen ordinary castles or fortresses. That, as
well as its lncomparable locatlon, glves lt majesty. The places where
there were once lofty walls and wlde moats can stlll be clearly dlstinguished.
But three hours are required for a vislt to Devin trom Bratisli;wa. Tbe journey can be made most pleasantly by boat. And you
wlll conslder these three hours among the most worthwh!le you bave
spent on the European continent - after Slovakla is llberated from
the agents of Moscow, that 1s.
•
•
•
•
SLOVAK COSTUMES AND CUSTOMS
No other 1-and of Centra! Europe 1s able to display as many unspoiled popular and dlstinctive costumes as Slovakla. They are due
to tbe pure feellngs of the people.
The simple sense for color and ornamentation, wbich can only
sprlng from the soul of the people if lt ls to be of value and ls to be
a true echo of thelr lnner manlfestations, expresses ltself in the
costumes and customs spontaneously and characterlstically, as can
be the case only In a !and whlch has been 3pared trom too mucb
culture and whose lnhabltants llved tranqullly In remote mountalns
and valleys.
The varlous rellgious festivals, such as Easter, Ascenslon, Corpus
Chrlstl, and the celebration of the days of the local patron salnts,
cause the people to dlsplay the best -and the most beautiful lnherlted costumes. In many places, such as Čičmany and Revúca,
a simple folk archltecture of the abodes provldes a plcturesque and
approprlate settlng for such vlvld scenes. The treasures of popular
art, exhlblted at the Museum In Bratklava In systematlc arrangemerrt, stlll live. In the p1'0xlmlty of Bratislava, many places - especlally Vajnory, Chorvatský Grob, Schwannsbach, Čataj, Nemecký
Grob - have preserved much from prlstlne limes. Also there 1s opportunlty at St. Jur to watch the llfe of the people in lts pristlne
fashion. In the Trenčín reglon anclent customs are malntalned in
many vlllages, lncludlng Dubnica near the famous spa Trenčianske
Teplice. In the Tatra reglon the old costumes may be observed at
Valec, Štrba, and štola, and farther East at Ždiar, Podollnec and
elsewhere.
The mountaln pasture season ends wlth the anclent custom
of consecratlng cheese. Shepherds and herdsmen thus express the!r
thanks for a successful sea.'lon. In November and December the unmarrled glrls meet In the evenlngs at some farmhouse for joint spin•
ning and weavlng by hand. The weekly and annual markets, the p!lgrlmages, and the local festivals aftord excellent opportunltles for
observlng the llfe of the Slovak people.
�
28
SLOVAKIA
CA STL~
OF SLOV AKIA
A multitude of picturesque ruins of medieval cru;tles is one of
the special attractions of Slovakia. They bear witness of the centurles during which Slovakia was a frontler bulwark of W estern
European clvlllzaUon agalnst the continuous encroachment of the
rapacious Turks. Llfe was full of romance and of danger.
Wooden forts preceeded the mighty stone edlflces of the thirteenth
and fourteenth centurles. Tbe dlsastrous Mongol incursion of 1241
proved tbe inefficacy of the wooden structures and there followed a
period of intenslve building of castles with stone. Thls building activity continued well lnto the seventeeth century and ended with tbe
foundation of Leopoldov in 1665 by Emperor Leopold 1. It was closely
modeled after P alma Nuova in Northern Italy.
By the beglnnlng of the eigbteenth century, lhe medieval castles
no longer fulf!lled th e demands of mllitary technique and as the
danger of further Turkls h invasions ceased, their owners a bandoned
them to live In more comfortable quarters. Palaces replaced castles.
A few of the old castles were refashloned and to this day remaln
habltable. One of the largest and most lnteresting of the latter is at
Bojnice wblcb has no less tban 21S balls and rooms, is enclrcled by
wlde moats, and has several massive and lofty towers.
As to tJhe number and the picturesgueness of ruins, the Váh
river compares favorably to tbe Rhlne. Tbe setting is possl,bly even
more romantic and certalnly more primltlve. Many of the rulns are
flanked by dense forests. There are some tbirty of tbem, built mostly
upon steep crags overlooking tlhe rlver. In the Middle Ages they were
Quite lmpregnable. Standlng aloof from buman habitatlons of today,
their very lsolation transports tbe vlsltor in spirit to bygone centuries
of armored knlghts and robber barons. In those years royal authority
was rather dlfficult to enforce. Tbe owner was truly lord over the
Iand whlch bis eye could survey.
The mightiest and the most accessible of the citadels on the
Váh is at Trenčin. Between the years 1301-1321 lt was the residence
ot the famous Matthew Cák, "lord of the Váh and of the Tatras," wbo
possessed more than thlrty castles in different parts of tbe land. King
Charles 'Robert of Hungary besleged hlm in vain. The only Ume the
stronghold teli before an enemy was in 1528 after a month's arduous
siege. The large stone can,non bans from this siege are stm visiblP.
in tbe walls of the ruined castle. In 1663 the Turks, and in 1704 Francis Rakoczy II tried to capture it, but falled. Fire in 1790 reduced it
to rulns.
The most extensive ruin In Slovakia is Spišský Hrad, situated in
the Spiš region. Bullt of whlte limestone, it gllstens six hundred feet
a bove th.e surroundlng landscape. It !s huge, bavlng no less tban
five large courtyards and 135 halls and rooms. The lookout tower has
four storles. The walls are ten feet thlck and reach an altitude of
seventy feet. It is also one of the oldest castles in Slovakia, being
mentioned already In tbe year 1120. It was abandoned In 1710 and
was turned into rulns by fire In 1780.
�SLOVAKIA
29
Tbe most memorable of the ruins of S lovakia is magnificent De-v in, sltuated not far {rom Bratislava, some five mlles towards Vlenna.
Devin is unlque. It is unllke anything else to be seen in Europe. A
romantic complex of ruins loom some 240 feet above the confluence
of the Danube and Morava rivers, right on the frontier between Slovakia and Austria. Here end the Carpathiaus, and across the Danube
commence the Alps.
The view from Devín is exquisitely beautiful. Regardless of season and weather it rewards the visitor with a vista which is insplring
and penetrates his soul. Towards sunrise you behold the majestlc
Danube flowlng swlftly towards the Black Sea. Along its left bank
are hllls adorned wlth deciduous forests, and on the slopes, exposed
to the Southern sun, are vlneyards, small and quiltlike, as are the
fields on the more level opposite side or the stream. Also there are
forests, restrul to gaze upon. They ascend hills, outposts of the Alps.
Right beneath the ruins lies the town or Devin, exotic and appealing, where life is placid, more like the gently r1owing Morava
than like the more energetic Danube. Towards sunset you see the
fertile plains of Austria, park-like scenery with villages and an occasional manor set in woods and flelds. You see the Danube approaching,
undulating, and forming many wooded islets. Across the Danube to the
South you behold the Austrlan town of Hainburg nestled beneath
the ruins of the bistoric fortress of Altenburg, the Carnuntum of the
Romans, headquarters of one of their leglons. Finally, on the horlzon
to the Southwest, the real Alps meet your avid gaze. Looking a.bout
upon the wonderful panorama, you forget the woes and worries or
everyday life and for the moment become a poet to whom tbe world
is a paradise.
You are treading upon prehistoric as well as on historic ground.
Man was here long before the commencement of the Cbristian era.
Bits or pottery from the Hallstatt period and remains of abodes from
tbe second La Tene period have been uneartbed by archaeologlsts
wbo bave been carrying on extensive excavations since 1923. Tbe
future is likely to furtber extend tbe past.
During tbe first two centuries of our ern Devín served as an outpost of the Roman Emplre against tbe turbulent Marcomanni and
Quadl, Germanic tribes living north or the Danube. It was fol'tifled by
the fourteenth legion. With the advent of the Slovaks about the sixth
century, the place recelved lts present appellation, named probably
after the national godess, Deva. It became a refuge from the ruth·
less Uralo-Altaic Avars who held to the plains and to the swamps.
As the Slovaks became united and powerful, it became one of thelr
principal centers. It was here that King Louls the German besieged
Rastislav, ruler of the so-called Great Moravian realm, without avail in
864.
Great Moravia fell to piece~ in 906 before the savage onrush of
the Magyar horsemen. Devin, however, remalned in the hands of the
Slovaks well lnto the eleventh century. In 1683 it successfully wlthstood a slege by the Turks. The destruction of the castle was due to
Napoleon who, in 1809, ordered it to be razed.
What a hlstory Devin has had! For untold centuries it was
strateglcally the mos t vila! point of Centra! Europe. In its immediate
�30
SLOVAK.IA
v!clnity were fought the battles whlch determined the fate of the
heart of the contlnent.
I).espite the fact that on the once mlghty stone castle only two
medieval towers and a few walls have been preserved, the ruln.s,
nevertheless, present a majestic appearance. That whlch remalns 1s
stately and lmposing. The site of Devin is truly immense. Its expanse
is large enough for a dozen ordinary castles or fortresses. That, as
well as its lncomparable locatlon, glves lt majesty. The places where
there were once lofty walls and wlde moats can stlll be clearly dlstinguished.
But three hours are required for a vislt to Devin trom Bratisli;wa. Tbe journey can be made most pleasantly by boat. And you
wlll conslder these three hours among the most worthwh!le you bave
spent on the European continent - after Slovakla is llberated from
the agents of Moscow, that 1s.
•
•
•
•
SLOVAK COSTUMES AND CUSTOMS
No other 1-and of Centra! Europe 1s able to display as many unspoiled popular and dlstinctive costumes as Slovakla. They are due
to tbe pure feellngs of the people.
The simple sense for color and ornamentation, wbich can only
sprlng from the soul of the people if lt ls to be of value and ls to be
a true echo of thelr lnner manlfestations, expresses ltself in the
costumes and customs spontaneously and characterlstically, as can
be the case only In a !and whlch has been 3pared trom too mucb
culture and whose lnhabltants llved tranqullly In remote mountalns
and valleys.
The varlous rellgious festivals, such as Easter, Ascenslon, Corpus
Chrlstl, and the celebration of the days of the local patron salnts,
cause the people to dlsplay the best -and the most beautiful lnherlted costumes. In many places, such as Čičmany and Revúca,
a simple folk archltecture of the abodes provldes a plcturesque and
approprlate settlng for such vlvld scenes. The treasures of popular
art, exhlblted at the Museum In Bratklava In systematlc arrangemerrt, stlll live. In the p1'0xlmlty of Bratislava, many places - especlally Vajnory, Chorvatský Grob, Schwannsbach, Čataj, Nemecký
Grob - have preserved much from prlstlne limes. Also there 1s opportunlty at St. Jur to watch the llfe of the people in lts pristlne
fashion. In the Trenčín reglon anclent customs are malntalned in
many vlllages, lncludlng Dubnica near the famous spa Trenčianske
Teplice. In the Tatra reglon the old costumes may be observed at
Valec, Štrba, and štola, and farther East at Ždiar, Podollnec and
elsewhere.
The mountaln pasture season ends wlth the anclent custom
of consecratlng cheese. Shepherds and herdsmen thus express the!r
thanks for a successful sea.'lon. In November and December the unmarrled glrls meet In the evenlngs at some farmhouse for joint spin•
ning and weavlng by hand. The weekly and annual markets, the p!lgrlmages, and the local festivals aftord excellent opportunltles for
observlng the llfe of the Slovak people.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
28
SLOVAKIA
CA STL~
OF SLOV AKIA
A multitude of picturesque ruins of medieval cru;tles is one of
the special attractions of Slovakia. They bear witness of the centurles during which Slovakia was a frontler bulwark of W estern
European clvlllzaUon agalnst the continuous encroachment of the
rapacious Turks. Llfe was full of romance and of danger.
Wooden forts preceeded the mighty stone edlflces of the thirteenth
and fourteenth centurles. Tbe dlsastrous Mongol incursion of 1241
proved tbe inefficacy of the wooden structures and there followed a
period of intenslve building of castles with stone. Thls building activity continued well lnto the seventeeth century and ended with tbe
foundation of Leopoldov in 1665 by Emperor Leopold 1. It was closely
modeled after P alma Nuova in Northern Italy.
By the beglnnlng of the eigbteenth century, lhe medieval castles
no longer fulf!lled th e demands of mllitary technique and as the
danger of further Turkls h invasions ceased, their owners a bandoned
them to live In more comfortable quarters. Palaces replaced castles.
A few of the old castles were refashloned and to this day remaln
habltable. One of the largest and most lnteresting of the latter is at
Bojnice wblcb has no less tban 21S balls and rooms, is enclrcled by
wlde moats, and has several massive and lofty towers.
As to tJhe number and the picturesgueness of ruins, the Váh
river compares favorably to tbe Rhlne. Tbe setting is possl,bly even
more romantic and certalnly more primltlve. Many of the rulns are
flanked by dense forests. There are some tbirty of tbem, built mostly
upon steep crags overlooking tlhe rlver. In the Middle Ages they were
Quite lmpregnable. Standlng aloof from buman habitatlons of today,
their very lsolation transports tbe vlsltor in spirit to bygone centuries
of armored knlghts and robber barons. In those years royal authority
was rather dlfficult to enforce. Tbe owner was truly lord over the
Iand whlch bis eye could survey.
The mightiest and the most accessible of the citadels on the
Váh is at Trenčin. Between the years 1301-1321 lt was the residence
ot the famous Matthew Cák, "lord of the Váh and of the Tatras," wbo
possessed more than thlrty castles in different parts of tbe land. King
Charles 'Robert of Hungary besleged hlm in vain. The only Ume the
stronghold teli before an enemy was in 1528 after a month's arduous
siege. The large stone can,non bans from this siege are stm visiblP.
in tbe walls of the ruined castle. In 1663 the Turks, and in 1704 Francis Rakoczy II tried to capture it, but falled. Fire in 1790 reduced it
to rulns.
The most extensive ruin In Slovakia is Spišský Hrad, situated in
the Spiš region. Bullt of whlte limestone, it gllstens six hundred feet
a bove th.e surroundlng landscape. It !s huge, bavlng no less tban
five large courtyards and 135 halls and rooms. The lookout tower has
four storles. The walls are ten feet thlck and reach an altitude of
seventy feet. It is also one of the oldest castles in Slovakia, being
mentioned already In tbe year 1120. It was abandoned In 1710 and
was turned into rulns by fire In 1780.
SLOVAKIA
29
Tbe most memorable of the ruins of S lovakia is magnificent De-v in, sltuated not far {rom Bratislava, some five mlles towards Vlenna.
Devin is unlque. It is unllke anything else to be seen in Europe. A
romantic complex of ruins loom some 240 feet above the confluence
of the Danube and Morava rivers, right on the frontier between Slovakia and Austria. Here end the Carpathiaus, and across the Danube
commence the Alps.
The view from Devín is exquisitely beautiful. Regardless of season and weather it rewards the visitor with a vista which is insplring
and penetrates his soul. Towards sunrise you behold the majestlc
Danube flowlng swlftly towards the Black Sea. Along its left bank
are hllls adorned wlth deciduous forests, and on the slopes, exposed
to the Southern sun, are vlneyards, small and quiltlike, as are the
fields on the more level opposite side or the stream. Also there are
forests, restrul to gaze upon. They ascend hills, outposts of the Alps.
Right beneath the ruins lies the town or Devin, exotic and appealing, where life is placid, more like the gently r1owing Morava
than like the more energetic Danube. Towards sunset you see the
fertile plains of Austria, park-like scenery with villages and an occasional manor set in woods and flelds. You see the Danube approaching,
undulating, and forming many wooded islets. Across the Danube to the
South you behold the Austrlan town of Hainburg nestled beneath
the ruins of the bistoric fortress of Altenburg, the Carnuntum of the
Romans, headquarters of one of their leglons. Finally, on the horlzon
to the Southwest, the real Alps meet your avid gaze. Looking a.bout
upon the wonderful panorama, you forget the woes and worries or
everyday life and for the moment become a poet to whom tbe world
is a paradise.
You are treading upon prehistoric as well as on historic ground.
Man was here long before the commencement of the Cbristian era.
Bits or pottery from the Hallstatt period and remains of abodes from
tbe second La Tene period have been uneartbed by archaeologlsts
wbo bave been carrying on extensive excavations since 1923. Tbe
future is likely to furtber extend tbe past.
During tbe first two centuries of our ern Devín served as an outpost of the Roman Emplre against tbe turbulent Marcomanni and
Quadl, Germanic tribes living north or the Danube. It was fol'tifled by
the fourteenth legion. With the advent of the Slovaks about the sixth
century, the place recelved lts present appellation, named probably
after the national godess, Deva. It became a refuge from the ruth·
less Uralo-Altaic Avars who held to the plains and to the swamps.
As the Slovaks became united and powerful, it became one of thelr
principal centers. It was here that King Louls the German besieged
Rastislav, ruler of the so-called Great Moravian realm, without avail in
864.
Great Moravia fell to piece~ in 906 before the savage onrush of
the Magyar horsemen. Devin, however, remalned in the hands of the
Slovaks well lnto the eleventh century. In 1683 it successfully wlthstood a slege by the Turks. The destruction of the castle was due to
Napoleon who, in 1809, ordered it to be razed.
What a hlstory Devin has had! For untold centuries it was
strateglcally the mos t vila! point of Centra! Europe. In its immediate
30
SLOVAK.IA
v!clnity were fought the battles whlch determined the fate of the
heart of the contlnent.
I).espite the fact that on the once mlghty stone castle only two
medieval towers and a few walls have been preserved, the ruln.s,
nevertheless, present a majestic appearance. That whlch remalns 1s
stately and lmposing. The site of Devin is truly immense. Its expanse
is large enough for a dozen ordinary castles or fortresses. That, as
well as its lncomparable locatlon, glves lt majesty. The places where
there were once lofty walls and wlde moats can stlll be clearly dlstinguished.
But three hours are required for a vislt to Devin trom Bratisli;wa. Tbe journey can be made most pleasantly by boat. And you
wlll conslder these three hours among the most worthwh!le you bave
spent on the European continent - after Slovakla is llberated from
the agents of Moscow, that 1s.
•
•
•
•
SLOVAK COSTUMES AND CUSTOMS
No other 1-and of Centra! Europe 1s able to display as many unspoiled popular and dlstinctive costumes as Slovakla. They are due
to tbe pure feellngs of the people.
The simple sense for color and ornamentation, wbich can only
sprlng from the soul of the people if lt ls to be of value and ls to be
a true echo of thelr lnner manlfestations, expresses ltself in the
costumes and customs spontaneously and characterlstically, as can
be the case only In a !and whlch has been 3pared trom too mucb
culture and whose lnhabltants llved tranqullly In remote mountalns
and valleys.
The varlous rellgious festivals, such as Easter, Ascenslon, Corpus
Chrlstl, and the celebration of the days of the local patron salnts,
cause the people to dlsplay the best -and the most beautiful lnherlted costumes. In many places, such as Čičmany and Revúca,
a simple folk archltecture of the abodes provldes a plcturesque and
approprlate settlng for such vlvld scenes. The treasures of popular
art, exhlblted at the Museum In Bratklava In systematlc arrangemerrt, stlll live. In the p1'0xlmlty of Bratislava, many places - especlally Vajnory, Chorvatský Grob, Schwannsbach, Čataj, Nemecký
Grob - have preserved much from prlstlne limes. Also there 1s opportunlty at St. Jur to watch the llfe of the people in lts pristlne
fashion. In the Trenčín reglon anclent customs are malntalned in
many vlllages, lncludlng Dubnica near the famous spa Trenčianske
Teplice. In the Tatra reglon the old costumes may be observed at
Valec, Štrba, and štola, and farther East at Ždiar, Podollnec and
elsewhere.
The mountaln pasture season ends wlth the anclent custom
of consecratlng cheese. Shepherds and herdsmen thus express the!r
thanks for a successful sea.'lon. In November and December the unmarrled glrls meet In the evenlngs at some farmhouse for joint spin•
ning and weavlng by hand. The weekly and annual markets, the p!lgrlmages, and the local festivals aftord excellent opportunltles for
observlng the llfe of the Slovak people.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Castles of Slovakia
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951
pp. 28-30
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
castles
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/27b5940f75c9e6f99ce4633b24cd8071.pdf
c1d159333a455b81345effec6f79a2ab
PDF Text
Text
30
SLOVAK.IA
v!clnity were fought the battles whlch determined the fate of the
heart of the contlnent.
I).espite the fact that on the once mlghty stone castle only two
medieval towers and a few walls have been preserved, the ruln.s,
nevertheless, present a majestic appearance. That whlch remalns 1s
stately and lmposing. The site of Devin is truly immense. Its expanse
is large enough for a dozen ordinary castles or fortresses. That, as
well as its lncomparable locatlon, glves lt majesty. The places where
there were once lofty walls and wlde moats can stlll be clearly dlstinguished.
But three hours are required for a vislt to Devin trom Bratisli;wa. Tbe journey can be made most pleasantly by boat. And you
wlll conslder these three hours among the most worthwh!le you bave
spent on the European continent - after Slovakla is llberated from
the agents of Moscow, that 1s.
•
•
•
•
SLOVAK COSTUMES AND CUSTOMS
No other 1-and of Centra! Europe 1s able to display as many unspoiled popular and dlstinctive costumes as Slovakla. They are due
to tbe pure feellngs of the people.
The simple sense for color and ornamentation, wbich can only
sprlng from the soul of the people if lt ls to be of value and ls to be
a true echo of thelr lnner manlfestations, expresses ltself in the
costumes and customs spontaneously and characterlstically, as can
be the case only In a !and whlch has been 3pared trom too mucb
culture and whose lnhabltants llved tranqullly In remote mountalns
and valleys.
The varlous rellgious festivals, such as Easter, Ascenslon, Corpus
Chrlstl, and the celebration of the days of the local patron salnts,
cause the people to dlsplay the best -and the most beautiful lnherlted costumes. In many places, such as Čičmany and Revúca,
a simple folk archltecture of the abodes provldes a plcturesque and
approprlate settlng for such vlvld scenes. The treasures of popular
art, exhlblted at the Museum In Bratklava In systematlc arrangemerrt, stlll live. In the p1'0xlmlty of Bratislava, many places - especlally Vajnory, Chorvatský Grob, Schwannsbach, Čataj, Nemecký
Grob - have preserved much from prlstlne limes. Also there 1s opportunlty at St. Jur to watch the llfe of the people in lts pristlne
fashion. In the Trenčín reglon anclent customs are malntalned in
many vlllages, lncludlng Dubnica near the famous spa Trenčianske
Teplice. In the Tatra reglon the old costumes may be observed at
Valec, Štrba, and štola, and farther East at Ždiar, Podollnec and
elsewhere.
The mountaln pasture season ends wlth the anclent custom
of consecratlng cheese. Shepherds and herdsmen thus express the!r
thanks for a successful sea.'lon. In November and December the unmarrled glrls meet In the evenlngs at some farmhouse for joint spin•
ning and weavlng by hand. The weekly and annual markets, the p!lgrlmages, and the local festivals aftord excellent opportunltles for
observlng the llfe of the Slovak people.
�
30
SLOVAK.IA
v!clnity were fought the battles whlch determined the fate of the
heart of the contlnent.
I).espite the fact that on the once mlghty stone castle only two
medieval towers and a few walls have been preserved, the ruln.s,
nevertheless, present a majestic appearance. That whlch remalns 1s
stately and lmposing. The site of Devin is truly immense. Its expanse
is large enough for a dozen ordinary castles or fortresses. That, as
well as its lncomparable locatlon, glves lt majesty. The places where
there were once lofty walls and wlde moats can stlll be clearly dlstinguished.
But three hours are required for a vislt to Devin trom Bratisli;wa. Tbe journey can be made most pleasantly by boat. And you
wlll conslder these three hours among the most worthwh!le you bave
spent on the European continent - after Slovakla is llberated from
the agents of Moscow, that 1s.
•
•
•
•
SLOVAK COSTUMES AND CUSTOMS
No other 1-and of Centra! Europe 1s able to display as many unspoiled popular and dlstinctive costumes as Slovakla. They are due
to tbe pure feellngs of the people.
The simple sense for color and ornamentation, wbich can only
sprlng from the soul of the people if lt ls to be of value and ls to be
a true echo of thelr lnner manlfestations, expresses ltself in the
costumes and customs spontaneously and characterlstically, as can
be the case only In a !and whlch has been 3pared trom too mucb
culture and whose lnhabltants llved tranqullly In remote mountalns
and valleys.
The varlous rellgious festivals, such as Easter, Ascenslon, Corpus
Chrlstl, and the celebration of the days of the local patron salnts,
cause the people to dlsplay the best -and the most beautiful lnherlted costumes. In many places, such as Čičmany and Revúca,
a simple folk archltecture of the abodes provldes a plcturesque and
approprlate settlng for such vlvld scenes. The treasures of popular
art, exhlblted at the Museum In Bratklava In systematlc arrangemerrt, stlll live. In the p1'0xlmlty of Bratislava, many places - especlally Vajnory, Chorvatský Grob, Schwannsbach, Čataj, Nemecký
Grob - have preserved much from prlstlne limes. Also there 1s opportunlty at St. Jur to watch the llfe of the people in lts pristlne
fashion. In the Trenčín reglon anclent customs are malntalned in
many vlllages, lncludlng Dubnica near the famous spa Trenčianske
Teplice. In the Tatra reglon the old costumes may be observed at
Valec, Štrba, and štola, and farther East at Ždiar, Podollnec and
elsewhere.
The mountaln pasture season ends wlth the anclent custom
of consecratlng cheese. Shepherds and herdsmen thus express the!r
thanks for a successful sea.'lon. In November and December the unmarrled glrls meet In the evenlngs at some farmhouse for joint spin•
ning and weavlng by hand. The weekly and annual markets, the p!lgrlmages, and the local festivals aftord excellent opportunltles for
observlng the llfe of the Slovak people.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
30
SLOVAK.IA
v!clnity were fought the battles whlch determined the fate of the
heart of the contlnent.
I).espite the fact that on the once mlghty stone castle only two
medieval towers and a few walls have been preserved, the ruln.s,
nevertheless, present a majestic appearance. That whlch remalns 1s
stately and lmposing. The site of Devin is truly immense. Its expanse
is large enough for a dozen ordinary castles or fortresses. That, as
well as its lncomparable locatlon, glves lt majesty. The places where
there were once lofty walls and wlde moats can stlll be clearly dlstinguished.
But three hours are required for a vislt to Devin trom Bratisli;wa. Tbe journey can be made most pleasantly by boat. And you
wlll conslder these three hours among the most worthwh!le you bave
spent on the European continent - after Slovakla is llberated from
the agents of Moscow, that 1s.
•
•
•
•
SLOVAK COSTUMES AND CUSTOMS
No other 1-and of Centra! Europe 1s able to display as many unspoiled popular and dlstinctive costumes as Slovakla. They are due
to tbe pure feellngs of the people.
The simple sense for color and ornamentation, wbich can only
sprlng from the soul of the people if lt ls to be of value and ls to be
a true echo of thelr lnner manlfestations, expresses ltself in the
costumes and customs spontaneously and characterlstically, as can
be the case only In a !and whlch has been 3pared trom too mucb
culture and whose lnhabltants llved tranqullly In remote mountalns
and valleys.
The varlous rellgious festivals, such as Easter, Ascenslon, Corpus
Chrlstl, and the celebration of the days of the local patron salnts,
cause the people to dlsplay the best -and the most beautiful lnherlted costumes. In many places, such as Čičmany and Revúca,
a simple folk archltecture of the abodes provldes a plcturesque and
approprlate settlng for such vlvld scenes. The treasures of popular
art, exhlblted at the Museum In Bratklava In systematlc arrangemerrt, stlll live. In the p1'0xlmlty of Bratislava, many places - especlally Vajnory, Chorvatský Grob, Schwannsbach, Čataj, Nemecký
Grob - have preserved much from prlstlne limes. Also there 1s opportunlty at St. Jur to watch the llfe of the people in lts pristlne
fashion. In the Trenčín reglon anclent customs are malntalned in
many vlllages, lncludlng Dubnica near the famous spa Trenčianske
Teplice. In the Tatra reglon the old costumes may be observed at
Valec, Štrba, and štola, and farther East at Ždiar, Podollnec and
elsewhere.
The mountaln pasture season ends wlth the anclent custom
of consecratlng cheese. Shepherds and herdsmen thus express the!r
thanks for a successful sea.'lon. In November and December the unmarrled glrls meet In the evenlngs at some farmhouse for joint spin•
ning and weavlng by hand. The weekly and annual markets, the p!lgrlmages, and the local festivals aftord excellent opportunltles for
observlng the llfe of the Slovak people.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Slovak Costumes and Customs
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951
p. 30
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7244682d680670ec4c562ef840bbef03.pdf
a7ccb8b62904ee62106e826f79d899c1
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKlA
31
THE WlllTE LEGION OF SLOVAKIA
B Y: ANO NYMOU S
There is a strong, anti-oommunlst reslstance in Slovakia, the
eastern porUon of the 111-!ated Czecho-Slovaki-a. The movement is
,;pea11headed by the WHITE LEGION (BIELA LEGIA) which has been
menrtioned i,n the AlmerLcan press from time to time. Liťtle is knowu
ahout M.s compOSiltlon and its leaders, hut there ls no doubt ahout the
fact that the Wh1te Leglon 1s very effective in its work of opposlng
the Red stooges ot ithe Kremlln and preparing Slovakia for the d,a y of
liheraition from the pla,gue of cornmunisro. I know hecause I am directly connec.ted wi:ilth lt.
The Whlte Legion has heen carefully organ.ized and has existP.d
for .some tlme. ]t !s feared by 4he Red regime of Prague, and its
members are the most hunted men in Slovakia. Golt.twia.ld - S,talln's
man "Fl'iday" in Czecho,Slovalda - and Ibis red stooges In Sloviakla
know that the Whd.te Legion has quite a following, bec-ause 1t seems
to know everyl'thlng thaJt is happening or even going to h appen Iu
Slovakla and her nelghbors. That is why purges are frequent in Slov ak'la and pri.som; ,an(I concerutration camps ftlled to capacity. ]jut
the work of the White Legjon goes on . .
The White Legion hroadcas'ts from its hidlng place every Saturday and Sunday. To get a true plcture of llhe effects of tts hroadcast.s,
especlally In Slovakia, one would have to visi-t some communist fa,mlly
durdng one of thes e bTOadcais.ts and observe its reactions. The faces of
the 11steners grow teruie and pale and seem to ask the questlon:
'·Do they also know a,bout me? wm they reveal something about mc,
too?"
About the middle of lasit December, the White Leg!on broadcast
poin,ted out thart Cp'l. Francls Gasparik of Žilina was a communlsit, a
dangerous dndivldual and !Illforaner, and exhorted lts llsteners to be
on guard. Up to that tlm e Gasparlk was quite cocky and imperlous,
hut atlter the broa.doast •b ecame sullen and downcast; he was completely b roken. Ga,s,pardk remained home for a week, felgning illness,
and llhen asked to b e tran.s.fe.i,red from Žilína. The Whlte Legjon was
lnform ed by one of Gasparik's "frlends" that he had revealed resigned-Iy: "Now I k:now ľm a goner!"
'I\he White Leg·i on has proved to the commurústs that their par•
tlsan appara.tus is not as perfect as they thought lit to he and that
their activitles a.re not as secret as t-hey had wished them to he.
The White Legion poses ca serlous prohlem to the Communi-st Party,
hecause lt knows of the disasitrous effeots lt has on lts memhers.
The Reds, of course, have ralsed a hue and a cry to securtty officials
to llquldaite the Wihllte Leg'ion. Red offlclals and memhers ask qutzicatly why ithe White Leglon has not as yet heen uncovered and Ji.
quldated? Seoorlty ofticlals ialways have the same answer: we are on
the trail of the 'trailtors and lhope to make arrests soon. But the underground work ot the Wihiite Leglon goes on.
·
Last December several leadlng communls-ts of Prešov were arre&ted. This was the b eginilllng of the purge in connectrion w1 th th e
so~alled Clemenitls ''deviMlonls,t" affair. It so happened that the
�32
SLOVAKIA
Whtte Legion r1adio beca.me sileni about the same tlme and rema.ined silent for a month. Was Clementis secretly associated witb
the White Legion? Of course not, and <t.he communists knew he was
not, but they had •to make hay. The people of Slovakia were iense
and curfous; they gathered secretly about their receivers and listened for some sign of the Wrute Legion broadcasts. But the voice
of 1Jbe Whiie Legion remained sllen,t. Coonmunist commissars were ex·
tremely nervous. As the days passed, the communi11ts regaáned a
measure of composure and told the Slovaks that tlhe White Legion
had been líquidated. Preparations were in order to celebrate the apprehension and 1iquidation of rthe "traltors" In al! ,t he larger towns.
Then, on the second Sunday of February, 1951, like a bolt out of
t he clear, blue sky, the Wh~te Legion again began beaming its broadéas.ts. "The WMte Legion is broadcasting again and you can he-ar it
bel!ter than ever" spread ex<:!tedly from person to person ihroughout
Slovakla. 'rule stooges of Gottwald and Stalin had to postpone their
fes.ti~tles: the White Legion was stm much alive!
The inmates of the ooncentration camp at Novaky got the news
of the White Legion broadcast that very Sunday evening and patriotic Slovak songs were sung deep into the n•i ght. All thanked God
that the White Legion leaders were not captured as they had aJ.
ready feared they had been.
'Dhe General Secretariate of the Communist Party in Slovakia
meets frequeDJtly In the striotest secrecy. One of t he maln themes
dijscussed 1s the Whlte Legion. With rare sincerity the communlsts
themselves have admitted that tlhe influence of the Whňe Legion and
lis broadca&ts ls much greaiter fäa,n they had supposed it to be. Because of it, the reliabillty o.f •the security organs in Slovakfa is constantly questioned and shake-ups are frequent. It seem.s that even the
leadlng •Reds do not know who 1s trustwo11thy; everybody seems io be
susplcious of everybody else and Ibis brother.
Dlrectlves given by •t he White Legion are simple and clear. The
people of Slovakia have been thoroughly instructed by the Legion
broadcasts how -to protect themselves agalnst snares of ,the hated
Secret Police. The Slovaks know the methods used by the Red secret
agents; they know how to act, whrut to do and what to say in any particular case involváng the security police. They are patiently bldlng
their tlme and avoiding as much open hostility as poss ible to prevent
useless shedding or blood, but they vow that "our tíme shall come!"
The lnfluen,ce of the White Legion is tremendously sign1flcant.
Its services have saved hundreds of Slovaks from lncarcer-a.tion and
persecuUon. 'I'he WhHe Legion flghits against Red tyranny without
itself re.sorting to ,terror. The ranks of aotlve anti-communists in Slovakia are lncreasing steadily and t'he Reds there are displaying a
grea.ter amdety about their future in the !and of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, the Slovak Apostles. The methods employed by the Whlte Legion have been quŕte successful. The White Legion ls teachlng the
people of Slovakda to help and protec,t them selv01! and thus to defend
human ri~ts against communis.tic terror of the regime. In Slovakia
it has been definitely shown that the popuJ.ation, lf counseled properly,
1s capable of resisting its oppre.ssors even for a longer Ume.
�SLOVAKIA
33
Credit must also be given 1the White Legion that the border guards
are not performi-ng their duties very conscientiously. This allows a
greater percentage of escapees to make its way to the free West. Of
course, the communlsrts are aware of this and, consquently, frontitir
guards are ohanged more frequerutly and checked more closely. But
Slovaks, especially many of those tagged by the communists, still make
their way to the West.
Naturally the Whlte Legtion is ",taboo" in Slovakia. Its name must
not be mentioned in public under penalty of imprisonmerut or worse. To
minlmize 4he effectiveness of the White Legion, newspapers and
radlo broadcasts - all government controlled - are forbidden to
mention t!he name of the White Legion or its activities. One of the
chief occupwtions of the Secret Police in Czecho-Slovakla i.s to track
down the Wihilte Legäon. Great efforts have been expended to trace
its transmitter, blrt to no avall. Slovakia is replete with legends about
the movements of the Wblite Legion in the mountalns of Slovakia.
Secret Police following -these leads have been known to disappear
without a trace. As far as the Red bosses of Slovakia are concerned,
the Whi,te Legion is no longer a nuisance, but a real menace to the
securl.ty of the Red regime, which they term the "State."
The view prevails even in high communisit circles thait army officia!ls and securJty agents are in some way connected with the While
Legion, otherwtise - ii !s asked - how would it be possiible for the
W•h lte Legion to carry on its "subversive" actlvities for such a
long Ume wjthout being uncovered? From time to time the White
Legion transmi,tter becomes sdlent. That, too, ls quíte understandable.
It would be folly to carry on when danger threatens or when condi·
tions are not jUS't right for the Legion's functions.
The Reds in Slovak.ia have jammed Whi-te Legion broadcasts. At
flrs,t their jammlng was not S'trong enough to cause too much difflculty, but slnce March of this year they have been more successful
in preventing the White Legion broadcasts from being heard clearly.
The White Legion has counteracted this measure by changing the
wave-leng,th of its broadcasts frequently; before the Reds can change
over to the proper w1ave-length, the W·hirt.e Legion is usually through
witlh iJts most important repor-ts and directives. I have been informed
tha4 the Wh'ite Legion is now coulllteracting the Red jammlng process by more eMectlive means. We must remember that the Reds in
Slovakia have ithe modern appa.ratus of the State at their disposal.
while the Whlte Legion has only whait it can get hold of on the black
market. The duel between the broadca sts of the White Legion and the
Red reglme of Czecho-Slovakla is quite interesting. I listened to the
Whi,te Legion's; broadcasts recenUy and can honestiy say that the
White Legion is winning its battle against the Red jammers of Prague
and Bratislava.
The Wihite Legion ls in existence for almost two years and has
grown dear to the hearts of the Slovaks, who pray and hope for a
hasiened liberatíon day. The White Legion has become a symbol of
hope and courage to the Slovak people. The White Legion keeps lln
telling the people of Slovakia thM the Reds and their stooges can be,
must be, and wlll be driven out of thelr Iand, lf they are on the alert
and follow t he directives of the Legion broadcasts. The White Le-
�34
SLOVA.KlA
gion has returned self-.confildence to the people; they feel that Red oppression can,not la,st long and are determined to be rea.dy for cthe grea,t
drive on the Red tyrants when the opportune tlme presents itsell.
The Wh1te Legion has taken hold of old and young allke and has
influenced communists as well as non-communists. In the latter it
strengthens the falth that their ens-lavement by the Reds shall not
la.st long, wh.lle the fot•mer it divests of courage and underm1nes their
faith in their own strength and their belief in victory. The White
Legion has a.cco.mplished this revolution in the thlnldng of the
Slovak.s in a smooth, peaceful wiay. To help those who are In immediate danger is considered llhe rurst civic duty oť all me.mbers of the
White Leglon.
The White Legion urges the Slovaks to persevere in their resistance to godless communlmn, to unite in the flght agains,t communtsm
and in the defense of human rJghts and freedom. The program.s of tb.e
White Legion are not chauvinistic; they fully realize they are not
the only people who were forced behind the Iron Cur.tain after the war.
Iťs a f,ight between the sons ol evll and the sons of good, a fight
between the fooces of ligl:l't and fäe forces of darkness. The broadcasts of the W•h1te Legion do not mince words; opinions are stated
llirectly and wlthou,t fea:r a bout the most burning question.s of éhe
times.
ShorUy ~ter its inaugurartion in April 1950, tbe White Legion
transmitter reacted enthusia.stically to Presldent Truman's launched
"truth offensive." A:t thait tlime it said that it identifies ltsell utterly
,v;ith the argumeD1ts advanced by Truman and ,that lt shall do everything wirt:hin its power to contrdbute to the succes.s of tlhat of'ďenslve.
Slnce that Ume much has been said and wribten by man,y imporbant
persons of the world, ,b ut I can say wÚhout fear of contradiction that
very few people a.od organizart:íons with almost unMmited resources •have
aotually contributed as much to that oampaign of truth as has the
Whlte Legion of Slovalda with i-t.s very limited resources.
Slova.ks can be 11lg1htfully proud of the fact that the WMte L egion orlginated in Slov,a.kia. But this did not happen by accident. The
White Legion resulted from the century-old fight of the Slovak
people against oommuni:&m. llt is a liv.ing testimony of true SloV'ak
mentaUty - a menta:lity to which violence is alien. It is a system
thait has been brougblt lnto being by v.Jolence, but does not exis,t by
vlolence. Pemecuted by terror and ruthless tyranny, it efffectively
flghts tyrants and terrorists without vengeance and aggressive
violence.
Today, the movement of the White Legion is uo Ionger llmited
to tJhe terratory of Slovaldia; lt already has a foothold in Bohem:la and
Moravfa, Poland and Hungary. Probably we shall not have to wait
too long before the radlo transmitters of the White Legion corps or
these nations begin haunting thelr respeictlve llttle Red dictart.ors and
stooges of the KTemlln.
The Whi-t.e Leg.ion of Slovak.la has a great and serious miss ion:
to liberate the SJov,ak natlon from Red dominat1on and to f-!ght In the
defense of, natural human rights. The Whlte Leglon has proved ltself.
It deserves a ll the mora! and material help the western democraicie~
can give it . . . . BUT N O , W!
�
SLOVAKlA
31
THE WlllTE LEGION OF SLOVAKIA
B Y: ANO NYMOU S
There is a strong, anti-oommunlst reslstance in Slovakia, the
eastern porUon of the 111-!ated Czecho-Slovaki-a. The movement is
,;pea11headed by the WHITE LEGION (BIELA LEGIA) which has been
menrtioned i,n the AlmerLcan press from time to time. Liťtle is knowu
ahout M.s compOSiltlon and its leaders, hut there ls no doubt ahout the
fact that the Wh1te Leglon 1s very effective in its work of opposlng
the Red stooges ot ithe Kremlln and preparing Slovakia for the d,a y of
liheraition from the pla,gue of cornmunisro. I know hecause I am directly connec.ted wi:ilth lt.
The Whlte Legion has heen carefully organ.ized and has existP.d
for .some tlme. ]t !s feared by 4he Red regime of Prague, and its
members are the most hunted men in Slovakia. Golt.twia.ld - S,talln's
man "Fl'iday" in Czecho,Slovalda - and Ibis red stooges In Sloviakla
know that the Whd.te Legion has quite a following, bec-ause 1t seems
to know everyl'thlng thaJt is happening or even going to h appen Iu
Slovakla and her nelghbors. That is why purges are frequent in Slov ak'la and pri.som; ,an(I concerutration camps ftlled to capacity. ]jut
the work of the White Legjon goes on . .
The White Legion hroadcas'ts from its hidlng place every Saturday and Sunday. To get a true plcture of llhe effects of tts hroadcast.s,
especlally In Slovakia, one would have to visi-t some communist fa,mlly
durdng one of thes e bTOadcais.ts and observe its reactions. The faces of
the 11steners grow teruie and pale and seem to ask the questlon:
'·Do they also know a,bout me? wm they reveal something about mc,
too?"
About the middle of lasit December, the White Leg!on broadcast
poin,ted out thart Cp'l. Francls Gasparik of Žilina was a communlsit, a
dangerous dndivldual and !Illforaner, and exhorted lts llsteners to be
on guard. Up to that tlm e Gasparlk was quite cocky and imperlous,
hut atlter the broa.doast •b ecame sullen and downcast; he was completely b roken. Ga,s,pardk remained home for a week, felgning illness,
and llhen asked to b e tran.s.fe.i,red from Žilína. The Whlte Legjon was
lnform ed by one of Gasparik's "frlends" that he had revealed resigned-Iy: "Now I k:now ľm a goner!"
'I\he White Leg·i on has proved to the commurústs that their par•
tlsan appara.tus is not as perfect as they thought lit to he and that
their activitles a.re not as secret as t-hey had wished them to he.
The White Legion poses ca serlous prohlem to the Communi-st Party,
hecause lt knows of the disasitrous effeots lt has on lts memhers.
The Reds, of course, have ralsed a hue and a cry to securtty officials
to llquldaite the Wihllte Leg'ion. Red offlclals and memhers ask qutzicatly why ithe White Leglon has not as yet heen uncovered and Ji.
quldated? Seoorlty ofticlals ialways have the same answer: we are on
the trail of the 'trailtors and lhope to make arrests soon. But the underground work ot the Wihiite Leglon goes on.
·
Last December several leadlng communls-ts of Prešov were arre&ted. This was the b eginilllng of the purge in connectrion w1 th th e
so~alled Clemenitls ''deviMlonls,t" affair. It so happened that the
�32
SLOVAKIA
Whtte Legion r1adio beca.me sileni about the same tlme and rema.ined silent for a month. Was Clementis secretly associated witb
the White Legion? Of course not, and <t.he communists knew he was
not, but they had •to make hay. The people of Slovakia were iense
and curfous; they gathered secretly about their receivers and listened for some sign of the Wrute Legion broadcasts. But the voice
of 1Jbe Whiie Legion remained sllen,t. Coonmunist commissars were ex·
tremely nervous. As the days passed, the communi11ts regaáned a
measure of composure and told the Slovaks that tlhe White Legion
had been líquidated. Preparations were in order to celebrate the apprehension and 1iquidation of rthe "traltors" In al! ,t he larger towns.
Then, on the second Sunday of February, 1951, like a bolt out of
t he clear, blue sky, the Wh~te Legion again began beaming its broadéas.ts. "The WMte Legion is broadcasting again and you can he-ar it
bel!ter than ever" spread ex<:!tedly from person to person ihroughout
Slovakla. 'rule stooges of Gottwald and Stalin had to postpone their
fes.ti~tles: the White Legion was stm much alive!
The inmates of the ooncentration camp at Novaky got the news
of the White Legion broadcast that very Sunday evening and patriotic Slovak songs were sung deep into the n•i ght. All thanked God
that the White Legion leaders were not captured as they had aJ.
ready feared they had been.
'Dhe General Secretariate of the Communist Party in Slovakia
meets frequeDJtly In the striotest secrecy. One of t he maln themes
dijscussed 1s the Whlte Legion. With rare sincerity the communlsts
themselves have admitted that tlhe influence of the Whňe Legion and
lis broadca&ts ls much greaiter fäa,n they had supposed it to be. Because of it, the reliabillty o.f •the security organs in Slovakfa is constantly questioned and shake-ups are frequent. It seem.s that even the
leadlng •Reds do not know who 1s trustwo11thy; everybody seems io be
susplcious of everybody else and Ibis brother.
Dlrectlves given by •t he White Legion are simple and clear. The
people of Slovakia have been thoroughly instructed by the Legion
broadcasts how -to protect themselves agalnst snares of ,the hated
Secret Police. The Slovaks know the methods used by the Red secret
agents; they know how to act, whrut to do and what to say in any particular case involváng the security police. They are patiently bldlng
their tlme and avoiding as much open hostility as poss ible to prevent
useless shedding or blood, but they vow that "our tíme shall come!"
The lnfluen,ce of the White Legion is tremendously sign1flcant.
Its services have saved hundreds of Slovaks from lncarcer-a.tion and
persecuUon. 'I'he WhHe Legion flghits against Red tyranny without
itself re.sorting to ,terror. The ranks of aotlve anti-communists in Slovakia are lncreasing steadily and t'he Reds there are displaying a
grea.ter amdety about their future in the !and of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, the Slovak Apostles. The methods employed by the Whlte Legion have been quŕte successful. The White Legion ls teachlng the
people of Slovakda to help and protec,t them selv01! and thus to defend
human ri~ts against communis.tic terror of the regime. In Slovakia
it has been definitely shown that the popuJ.ation, lf counseled properly,
1s capable of resisting its oppre.ssors even for a longer Ume.
�SLOVAKIA
33
Credit must also be given 1the White Legion that the border guards
are not performi-ng their duties very conscientiously. This allows a
greater percentage of escapees to make its way to the free West. Of
course, the communlsrts are aware of this and, consquently, frontitir
guards are ohanged more frequerutly and checked more closely. But
Slovaks, especially many of those tagged by the communists, still make
their way to the West.
Naturally the Whlte Legtion is ",taboo" in Slovakia. Its name must
not be mentioned in public under penalty of imprisonmerut or worse. To
minlmize 4he effectiveness of the White Legion, newspapers and
radlo broadcasts - all government controlled - are forbidden to
mention t!he name of the White Legion or its activities. One of the
chief occupwtions of the Secret Police in Czecho-Slovakla i.s to track
down the Wihilte Legäon. Great efforts have been expended to trace
its transmitter, blrt to no avall. Slovakia is replete with legends about
the movements of the Wblite Legion in the mountalns of Slovakia.
Secret Police following -these leads have been known to disappear
without a trace. As far as the Red bosses of Slovakia are concerned,
the Whi,te Legion is no longer a nuisance, but a real menace to the
securl.ty of the Red regime, which they term the "State."
The view prevails even in high communisit circles thait army officia!ls and securJty agents are in some way connected with the While
Legion, otherwtise - ii !s asked - how would it be possiible for the
W•h lte Legion to carry on its "subversive" actlvities for such a
long Ume wjthout being uncovered? From time to time the White
Legion transmi,tter becomes sdlent. That, too, ls quíte understandable.
It would be folly to carry on when danger threatens or when condi·
tions are not jUS't right for the Legion's functions.
The Reds in Slovak.ia have jammed Whi-te Legion broadcasts. At
flrs,t their jammlng was not S'trong enough to cause too much difflculty, but slnce March of this year they have been more successful
in preventing the White Legion broadcasts from being heard clearly.
The White Legion has counteracted this measure by changing the
wave-leng,th of its broadcasts frequently; before the Reds can change
over to the proper w1ave-length, the W·hirt.e Legion is usually through
witlh iJts most important repor-ts and directives. I have been informed
tha4 the Wh'ite Legion is now coulllteracting the Red jammlng process by more eMectlive means. We must remember that the Reds in
Slovakia have ithe modern appa.ratus of the State at their disposal.
while the Whlte Legion has only whait it can get hold of on the black
market. The duel between the broadca sts of the White Legion and the
Red reglme of Czecho-Slovakla is quite interesting. I listened to the
Whi,te Legion's; broadcasts recenUy and can honestiy say that the
White Legion is winning its battle against the Red jammers of Prague
and Bratislava.
The Wihite Legion ls in existence for almost two years and has
grown dear to the hearts of the Slovaks, who pray and hope for a
hasiened liberatíon day. The White Legion has become a symbol of
hope and courage to the Slovak people. The White Legion keeps lln
telling the people of Slovakia thM the Reds and their stooges can be,
must be, and wlll be driven out of thelr Iand, lf they are on the alert
and follow t he directives of the Legion broadcasts. The White Le-
�34
SLOVA.KlA
gion has returned self-.confildence to the people; they feel that Red oppression can,not la,st long and are determined to be rea.dy for cthe grea,t
drive on the Red tyrants when the opportune tlme presents itsell.
The Wh1te Legion has taken hold of old and young allke and has
influenced communists as well as non-communists. In the latter it
strengthens the falth that their ens-lavement by the Reds shall not
la.st long, wh.lle the fot•mer it divests of courage and underm1nes their
faith in their own strength and their belief in victory. The White
Legion has a.cco.mplished this revolution in the thlnldng of the
Slovak.s in a smooth, peaceful wiay. To help those who are In immediate danger is considered llhe rurst civic duty oť all me.mbers of the
White Leglon.
The White Legion urges the Slovaks to persevere in their resistance to godless communlmn, to unite in the flght agains,t communtsm
and in the defense of human rJghts and freedom. The program.s of tb.e
White Legion are not chauvinistic; they fully realize they are not
the only people who were forced behind the Iron Cur.tain after the war.
Iťs a f,ight between the sons ol evll and the sons of good, a fight
between the fooces of ligl:l't and fäe forces of darkness. The broadcasts of the W•h1te Legion do not mince words; opinions are stated
llirectly and wlthou,t fea:r a bout the most burning question.s of éhe
times.
ShorUy ~ter its inaugurartion in April 1950, tbe White Legion
transmitter reacted enthusia.stically to Presldent Truman's launched
"truth offensive." A:t thait tlime it said that it identifies ltsell utterly
,v;ith the argumeD1ts advanced by Truman and ,that lt shall do everything wirt:hin its power to contrdbute to the succes.s of tlhat of'ďenslve.
Slnce that Ume much has been said and wribten by man,y imporbant
persons of the world, ,b ut I can say wÚhout fear of contradiction that
very few people a.od organizart:íons with almost unMmited resources •have
aotually contributed as much to that oampaign of truth as has the
Whlte Legion of Slovalda with i-t.s very limited resources.
Slova.ks can be 11lg1htfully proud of the fact that the WMte L egion orlginated in Slov,a.kia. But this did not happen by accident. The
White Legion resulted from the century-old fight of the Slovak
people against oommuni:&m. llt is a liv.ing testimony of true SloV'ak
mentaUty - a menta:lity to which violence is alien. It is a system
thait has been brougblt lnto being by v.Jolence, but does not exis,t by
vlolence. Pemecuted by terror and ruthless tyranny, it efffectively
flghts tyrants and terrorists without vengeance and aggressive
violence.
Today, the movement of the White Legion is uo Ionger llmited
to tJhe terratory of Slovaldia; lt already has a foothold in Bohem:la and
Moravfa, Poland and Hungary. Probably we shall not have to wait
too long before the radlo transmitters of the White Legion corps or
these nations begin haunting thelr respeictlve llttle Red dictart.ors and
stooges of the KTemlln.
The Whi-t.e Leg.ion of Slovak.la has a great and serious miss ion:
to liberate the SJov,ak natlon from Red dominat1on and to f-!ght In the
defense of, natural human rights. The Whlte Leglon has proved ltself.
It deserves a ll the mora! and material help the western democraicie~
can give it . . . . BUT N O , W!
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKlA
31
THE WlllTE LEGION OF SLOVAKIA
B Y: ANO NYMOU S
There is a strong, anti-oommunlst reslstance in Slovakia, the
eastern porUon of the 111-!ated Czecho-Slovaki-a. The movement is
,;pea11headed by the WHITE LEGION (BIELA LEGIA) which has been
menrtioned i,n the AlmerLcan press from time to time. Liťtle is knowu
ahout M.s compOSiltlon and its leaders, hut there ls no doubt ahout the
fact that the Wh1te Leglon 1s very effective in its work of opposlng
the Red stooges ot ithe Kremlln and preparing Slovakia for the d,a y of
liheraition from the pla,gue of cornmunisro. I know hecause I am directly connec.ted wi:ilth lt.
The Whlte Legion has heen carefully organ.ized and has existP.d
for .some tlme. ]t !s feared by 4he Red regime of Prague, and its
members are the most hunted men in Slovakia. Golt.twia.ld - S,talln's
man "Fl'iday" in Czecho,Slovalda - and Ibis red stooges In Sloviakla
know that the Whd.te Legion has quite a following, bec-ause 1t seems
to know everyl'thlng thaJt is happening or even going to h appen Iu
Slovakla and her nelghbors. That is why purges are frequent in Slov ak'la and pri.som; ,an(I concerutration camps ftlled to capacity. ]jut
the work of the White Legjon goes on . .
The White Legion hroadcas'ts from its hidlng place every Saturday and Sunday. To get a true plcture of llhe effects of tts hroadcast.s,
especlally In Slovakia, one would have to visi-t some communist fa,mlly
durdng one of thes e bTOadcais.ts and observe its reactions. The faces of
the 11steners grow teruie and pale and seem to ask the questlon:
'·Do they also know a,bout me? wm they reveal something about mc,
too?"
About the middle of lasit December, the White Leg!on broadcast
poin,ted out thart Cp'l. Francls Gasparik of Žilina was a communlsit, a
dangerous dndivldual and !Illforaner, and exhorted lts llsteners to be
on guard. Up to that tlm e Gasparlk was quite cocky and imperlous,
hut atlter the broa.doast •b ecame sullen and downcast; he was completely b roken. Ga,s,pardk remained home for a week, felgning illness,
and llhen asked to b e tran.s.fe.i,red from Žilína. The Whlte Legjon was
lnform ed by one of Gasparik's "frlends" that he had revealed resigned-Iy: "Now I k:now ľm a goner!"
'I\he White Leg·i on has proved to the commurústs that their par•
tlsan appara.tus is not as perfect as they thought lit to he and that
their activitles a.re not as secret as t-hey had wished them to he.
The White Legion poses ca serlous prohlem to the Communi-st Party,
hecause lt knows of the disasitrous effeots lt has on lts memhers.
The Reds, of course, have ralsed a hue and a cry to securtty officials
to llquldaite the Wihllte Leg'ion. Red offlclals and memhers ask qutzicatly why ithe White Leglon has not as yet heen uncovered and Ji.
quldated? Seoorlty ofticlals ialways have the same answer: we are on
the trail of the 'trailtors and lhope to make arrests soon. But the underground work ot the Wihiite Leglon goes on.
·
Last December several leadlng communls-ts of Prešov were arre&ted. This was the b eginilllng of the purge in connectrion w1 th th e
so~alled Clemenitls ''deviMlonls,t" affair. It so happened that the
32
SLOVAKIA
Whtte Legion r1adio beca.me sileni about the same tlme and rema.ined silent for a month. Was Clementis secretly associated witb
the White Legion? Of course not, and <t.he communists knew he was
not, but they had •to make hay. The people of Slovakia were iense
and curfous; they gathered secretly about their receivers and listened for some sign of the Wrute Legion broadcasts. But the voice
of 1Jbe Whiie Legion remained sllen,t. Coonmunist commissars were ex·
tremely nervous. As the days passed, the communi11ts regaáned a
measure of composure and told the Slovaks that tlhe White Legion
had been líquidated. Preparations were in order to celebrate the apprehension and 1iquidation of rthe "traltors" In al! ,t he larger towns.
Then, on the second Sunday of February, 1951, like a bolt out of
t he clear, blue sky, the Wh~te Legion again began beaming its broadéas.ts. "The WMte Legion is broadcasting again and you can he-ar it
bel!ter than ever" spread ex<:!tedly from person to person ihroughout
Slovakla. 'rule stooges of Gottwald and Stalin had to postpone their
fes.ti~tles: the White Legion was stm much alive!
The inmates of the ooncentration camp at Novaky got the news
of the White Legion broadcast that very Sunday evening and patriotic Slovak songs were sung deep into the n•i ght. All thanked God
that the White Legion leaders were not captured as they had aJ.
ready feared they had been.
'Dhe General Secretariate of the Communist Party in Slovakia
meets frequeDJtly In the striotest secrecy. One of t he maln themes
dijscussed 1s the Whlte Legion. With rare sincerity the communlsts
themselves have admitted that tlhe influence of the Whňe Legion and
lis broadca&ts ls much greaiter fäa,n they had supposed it to be. Because of it, the reliabillty o.f •the security organs in Slovakfa is constantly questioned and shake-ups are frequent. It seem.s that even the
leadlng •Reds do not know who 1s trustwo11thy; everybody seems io be
susplcious of everybody else and Ibis brother.
Dlrectlves given by •t he White Legion are simple and clear. The
people of Slovakia have been thoroughly instructed by the Legion
broadcasts how -to protect themselves agalnst snares of ,the hated
Secret Police. The Slovaks know the methods used by the Red secret
agents; they know how to act, whrut to do and what to say in any particular case involváng the security police. They are patiently bldlng
their tlme and avoiding as much open hostility as poss ible to prevent
useless shedding or blood, but they vow that "our tíme shall come!"
The lnfluen,ce of the White Legion is tremendously sign1flcant.
Its services have saved hundreds of Slovaks from lncarcer-a.tion and
persecuUon. 'I'he WhHe Legion flghits against Red tyranny without
itself re.sorting to ,terror. The ranks of aotlve anti-communists in Slovakia are lncreasing steadily and t'he Reds there are displaying a
grea.ter amdety about their future in the !and of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, the Slovak Apostles. The methods employed by the Whlte Legion have been quŕte successful. The White Legion ls teachlng the
people of Slovakda to help and protec,t them selv01! and thus to defend
human ri~ts against communis.tic terror of the regime. In Slovakia
it has been definitely shown that the popuJ.ation, lf counseled properly,
1s capable of resisting its oppre.ssors even for a longer Ume.
SLOVAKIA
33
Credit must also be given 1the White Legion that the border guards
are not performi-ng their duties very conscientiously. This allows a
greater percentage of escapees to make its way to the free West. Of
course, the communlsrts are aware of this and, consquently, frontitir
guards are ohanged more frequerutly and checked more closely. But
Slovaks, especially many of those tagged by the communists, still make
their way to the West.
Naturally the Whlte Legtion is ",taboo" in Slovakia. Its name must
not be mentioned in public under penalty of imprisonmerut or worse. To
minlmize 4he effectiveness of the White Legion, newspapers and
radlo broadcasts - all government controlled - are forbidden to
mention t!he name of the White Legion or its activities. One of the
chief occupwtions of the Secret Police in Czecho-Slovakla i.s to track
down the Wihilte Legäon. Great efforts have been expended to trace
its transmitter, blrt to no avall. Slovakia is replete with legends about
the movements of the Wblite Legion in the mountalns of Slovakia.
Secret Police following -these leads have been known to disappear
without a trace. As far as the Red bosses of Slovakia are concerned,
the Whi,te Legion is no longer a nuisance, but a real menace to the
securl.ty of the Red regime, which they term the "State."
The view prevails even in high communisit circles thait army officia!ls and securJty agents are in some way connected with the While
Legion, otherwtise - ii !s asked - how would it be possiible for the
W•h lte Legion to carry on its "subversive" actlvities for such a
long Ume wjthout being uncovered? From time to time the White
Legion transmi,tter becomes sdlent. That, too, ls quíte understandable.
It would be folly to carry on when danger threatens or when condi·
tions are not jUS't right for the Legion's functions.
The Reds in Slovak.ia have jammed Whi-te Legion broadcasts. At
flrs,t their jammlng was not S'trong enough to cause too much difflculty, but slnce March of this year they have been more successful
in preventing the White Legion broadcasts from being heard clearly.
The White Legion has counteracted this measure by changing the
wave-leng,th of its broadcasts frequently; before the Reds can change
over to the proper w1ave-length, the W·hirt.e Legion is usually through
witlh iJts most important repor-ts and directives. I have been informed
tha4 the Wh'ite Legion is now coulllteracting the Red jammlng process by more eMectlive means. We must remember that the Reds in
Slovakia have ithe modern appa.ratus of the State at their disposal.
while the Whlte Legion has only whait it can get hold of on the black
market. The duel between the broadca sts of the White Legion and the
Red reglme of Czecho-Slovakla is quite interesting. I listened to the
Whi,te Legion's; broadcasts recenUy and can honestiy say that the
White Legion is winning its battle against the Red jammers of Prague
and Bratislava.
The Wihite Legion ls in existence for almost two years and has
grown dear to the hearts of the Slovaks, who pray and hope for a
hasiened liberatíon day. The White Legion has become a symbol of
hope and courage to the Slovak people. The White Legion keeps lln
telling the people of Slovakia thM the Reds and their stooges can be,
must be, and wlll be driven out of thelr Iand, lf they are on the alert
and follow t he directives of the Legion broadcasts. The White Le-
34
SLOVA.KlA
gion has returned self-.confildence to the people; they feel that Red oppression can,not la,st long and are determined to be rea.dy for cthe grea,t
drive on the Red tyrants when the opportune tlme presents itsell.
The Wh1te Legion has taken hold of old and young allke and has
influenced communists as well as non-communists. In the latter it
strengthens the falth that their ens-lavement by the Reds shall not
la.st long, wh.lle the fot•mer it divests of courage and underm1nes their
faith in their own strength and their belief in victory. The White
Legion has a.cco.mplished this revolution in the thlnldng of the
Slovak.s in a smooth, peaceful wiay. To help those who are In immediate danger is considered llhe rurst civic duty oť all me.mbers of the
White Leglon.
The White Legion urges the Slovaks to persevere in their resistance to godless communlmn, to unite in the flght agains,t communtsm
and in the defense of human rJghts and freedom. The program.s of tb.e
White Legion are not chauvinistic; they fully realize they are not
the only people who were forced behind the Iron Cur.tain after the war.
Iťs a f,ight between the sons ol evll and the sons of good, a fight
between the fooces of ligl:l't and fäe forces of darkness. The broadcasts of the W•h1te Legion do not mince words; opinions are stated
llirectly and wlthou,t fea:r a bout the most burning question.s of éhe
times.
ShorUy ~ter its inaugurartion in April 1950, tbe White Legion
transmitter reacted enthusia.stically to Presldent Truman's launched
"truth offensive." A:t thait tlime it said that it identifies ltsell utterly
,v;ith the argumeD1ts advanced by Truman and ,that lt shall do everything wirt:hin its power to contrdbute to the succes.s of tlhat of'ďenslve.
Slnce that Ume much has been said and wribten by man,y imporbant
persons of the world, ,b ut I can say wÚhout fear of contradiction that
very few people a.od organizart:íons with almost unMmited resources •have
aotually contributed as much to that oampaign of truth as has the
Whlte Legion of Slovalda with i-t.s very limited resources.
Slova.ks can be 11lg1htfully proud of the fact that the WMte L egion orlginated in Slov,a.kia. But this did not happen by accident. The
White Legion resulted from the century-old fight of the Slovak
people against oommuni:&m. llt is a liv.ing testimony of true SloV'ak
mentaUty - a menta:lity to which violence is alien. It is a system
thait has been brougblt lnto being by v.Jolence, but does not exis,t by
vlolence. Pemecuted by terror and ruthless tyranny, it efffectively
flghts tyrants and terrorists without vengeance and aggressive
violence.
Today, the movement of the White Legion is uo Ionger llmited
to tJhe terratory of Slovaldia; lt already has a foothold in Bohem:la and
Moravfa, Poland and Hungary. Probably we shall not have to wait
too long before the radlo transmitters of the White Legion corps or
these nations begin haunting thelr respeictlve llttle Red dictart.ors and
stooges of the KTemlln.
The Whi-t.e Leg.ion of Slovak.la has a great and serious miss ion:
to liberate the SJov,ak natlon from Red dominat1on and to f-!ght In the
defense of, natural human rights. The Whlte Leglon has proved ltself.
It deserves a ll the mora! and material help the western democraicie~
can give it . . . . BUT N O , W!
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The White Legion of Slovakia
Description
An account of the resource
Anonymous
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951
pp. 31-34
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Anonymous
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
LCNAF
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/908f44da0194235f10ad22b09cb45e21.pdf
261c0cee0aaae307821756177eabdb83
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
35
OZEOH DOUBLE-DEALING
PRINCE ADOLF ZU SCHWARZENBERG
(This ls a reprint of the article published in the July, 1949, issue
[Vo!. III, No. 1, pp. 20-22] of the "'New Englh1h Review Ma,ga,zine."
The author heads one of the oldest familles in Bohemia and his ta.mily
played an importa.n1 role in Bohemia's ootional life. The Prince is
unquestionably qualitied to speak about th.e intrigues of Ma-saryk and
Beneš and their undemocratic and un-Christlan pol!cies. This expo-sé
ot Czech hypocrisy should be read by all Amerlcans. - Ed.)
During and after the Flrst World War the ma.in feature in Bohemla's pollcy was a tendency to back both sides at the same Ume, more
par,ticularly during rthe coutinuat!on of ho~tllitie-s. Bohemia. wa.s unt.11
1918 a part ot the Austro-Hungaria.n Monarchy, in whlch it formed a
provlnce under Ha,bsburg rule and at the same Ume a. Kingdom,
though enjoylng a very limrted a.utonomy; if !n<leed thl-s wa.s autonomy at all, for lt was by no mea.n-s self-government.
On the whole, the Czechs, who are and always hav,e been the ma·
Jority o! the inhabitants ot Bohemla and Mora.vla, d!spla.yed, even
during the First World War, in dome-stlc a!fairs a fair!y loyal attttude towards the Governme.nt In Vienna., though cthere were some stgnlfican,t excepitlons. For ex,ample, the 28th Regiment of Infantry wa.s
considered a.-s somewhat unrellable, and occa.slona.lly there were desertions to the enemy, which were more frequent tha.n in the other
Czech regtments, yet at horne the Czechs stressed thelr absolute
Joyalty to the Habsburg regimre and "'collabora.ted" wl!ling!y, more
particular!y where their pockets were a.ffected. Neverthe!ess, while
they aoted in th!s way within the black and yellow fľontier posts oť
th,e Habsburg Monarchy, they had very ,a,bJe ageuts outside beyond
the enemy Unes. In pru<ticular, there were T. G. Ma.sa.ryk, who acted
as pros,pect!ve President or a future Czechoslovakian Republlc, Edward
Beneš, and many others, who escaped beyond the front!ers and ~Ued
down abroad where. wlth the help of the !uture victors, they set up
a free autouomous provislonal government that was to come iruto e:,:istence after the defeat of the Centra! Powers.
What, however, would have happened lf the Centra! Powet'S had
emerged as vlctors? The answ,er ls more rthan slmple: Masaryk :ind
Co. would have dlsappeared lnto oblivlon, and the Ozechs, who had
stayed at ·home ,and had so marvelously pla.yed the rôle of loya.J subjects, would have proclalmed lnc-essa.ntly how fatth!ul they had alwaya
been to the Ha.bsburgs and to the Monarchy, ha.vlng lost rthousands,
or tens of thousands, of thelr best sons for the "Just Cause," and
how enormous thelr contributlons to vlctory had been. Nevertheless,
luck was not on the slde of the Centa! Powers. Iu consequence, from
October 1918, onwards, the Czechs withln the Monarchy had to change
qulckly to other tactlcs, transforming themselves llke chameleons, and
they were forced to a-ppear as, tnnocent vlctims who had been p~rsecuted by ,t he bruta.l Habsburg regime. The same people who fran•
tically roared "Hurmh" to greet the Emperor ~ e now not ashamed
to utter calumnlou!l words agaki.st hlm. " Hallelujah" and "Cruclfy
�36
SLOVAKIA
Him" are so close to each other, but it would appeaľ that "Crucify
Him" is much easier to shout.
It must be admitted that ,the Czechs played this new ľôle with
marvelous skill au<l admiľable flexibility. For Masaryk and hls col•
leagues it was now easy enough to create a Czechoslova:kian Rep11hlic,
hut to the very end Masaryk played a double galffie. When he was
dealing with Framoe and the Unbled States he produced a pian for a
Republic In Czechoslovakla, hut for Russia he put forward a Czech
kingdom, leaving open the question whether a Romanoff or somebody
e lse -should wear the crown of St. Wenceslaus, for so long as the Tsar
reigned In Russia the word republic did not sound g,ood. lncidentally,
Masaryk had promised lthe Slovaks autonomy as well as many other
acceptable privlleges. but these never materialized and serious difficulties la,ter arose owlng to this. Thus, even when the Czechs were
fightlng for indedimpence their double-dealing was proved.
This particular characteristic has been up to the present yielded
good results when it wa,s a question of dealing with the credulcu s.
The situation is the same now, and it will always remain the same,
so long as t-he victors •n a war in which Czechoslovakia is involved
do noi invesligate thoroughly the kind of people wlt•h whom they ,"\.re
dealing.
lt is an old and very cheap trlck to play in wiU1 both sid-es in
such great conflicts as the two World Wars, more particularly when
the outcome is not at all clear, a.t least to the people most concerned.
In the Secoud World War the situation was much the s11Jffie, and
there was a distinct analogy with what happened in rt;s predecessor.
From 1939 Ull'til 1946 Hacha functioned as President, first for the
mu'til<ated second Czechoslovak Republic and then during the Nruzl
occupation of the "Protectorate," therefore dlsplaying a fľiendly attitude, however invol11nta1;1y, towards the Hitler reglme. At the same
time Benes and his associates set up in London a government with
more or less open leanings to the left. If Hitler had won the war
Hacba would have become tbe great man of the day. However, HiUer
was def~ted, and Hacha, who had done his best to save bis country
from tbe borrors of war, and had played this part not unsuccessfully,
died i.n prison as au old and broken man, practically forgotten, while
Beneš emerged as the great man of the future and as President of
a reborn Czechoslovak Republic. Nevertheless, Beneš did not long
enjoy bis exalted position, for in Fellťllary 1948 the Communists, although a minority, seized power, a[ter .which Benes dlsappeaľed and
Gotliwald became President.
Even in normit,I times 1the double game of C1.ech policy caa be
seen quite clearly. As long as Ozechos!ovak!a adopted the rôle ot
dependence on the West, Beneš wa!< at the helm and from 1945 or.ward prepared the dellvery of his country to 'the Communists. All the
mlnls,teľ'S in bis CaLinet (there were about two dozen of them) worked
wlth their idolized Pres-ident, and In a most masterly f.ashion steered
thelr country into Communtsm, always boping ror a good job as a re•
ward for ťheir laudable work in the Bolshevist interest. Unfo11:u.nately
for them, however, thing.s ,took a different turn, for although Bene~
put up a token-resista.nce for 11. rew days against 1tbe overthrow or
democracy just to show a good face to the civilized world in the
�SLOVAKIA
37
West, it was a comparatively easy task to belp Communist Gottwald
lnto tbe Red saddle, thereby preventing a "civil war." From that fatal
day In February 1948 it could no longer he doub'ted rt.hat Czechoslovakla was a Communlst country, leaning away from democracy and
civill.zation, and progressing at full speed towards Red totalitarianlsm.
wbich by now wa,s firmly ,secure as "a peopWs democracy" by force
and terror.
When the gove111men't, with its outward appearance of democracy,
fell, Beneš and the member,s of his Oabin€-t had clearly accomplished
thelr task as laid down by the Kremliu, and from then on they were
no longer use,ful. Reallzing this they immediately "backed the other
horse," each in his own way. Beneš res!gned, and Go'ttwald replaced
him wlt.hout any diffioulty. All went smoothly, and Beneš did even
more for Communlsm: he died. Some of tbe former m!nisters tried to
escape across the frontier, but wel"e arrested; some, however, d!d
reach the American zone in Bava.ria, where they started to play the
part .of heroes and of defenders of democracy wbo had been forced to
fly from tbe peraecutions of the Communlsts. Needless to say they
behaved as lf they had always been ardent anti-Commu.nis'ts, here as
in reality tbey helped Communlsm wherever they could so Jong as
they were in office, and wlllingly or unwillingly pre-pared the overthrow of tlheir own regime. Thls they could have prevented with the
help of 'trhe army, which had remalned Joyal, and with a little couragc,
but courage is an unknown quality with the majorrty of the Czech
nation. In the West, howeveľ, J.itt1e is known about these "heroes,"
or the rôle whlob they are playing In their endeavor to oover up their
more tha.n doubtful past.
At this 'J)Oint, it may be useful to draw a parallel with Nazl Ger•
many. Any German one meets today will be sure to say that he bas
always been opposed to the Naz!s, and will describe how much he has
suffered a,t thelr hands, no matter whether he was In reality a Na.z!
or not. Probably Hitler himself would say tbe same thing if he were
still alive. It is the same in Italy where every It.allan ha~ been a partisan and fought against Mussolini, even lf he were in reality a Fascist. The same is the case wltb tlhe Czechs in e~ile. Take tbeir word
for what lt. is wortb, but never believe tbem at first sight. It is well
known that many Czechs had a very fine tíme under the Nazi occupation; they collabomted willingly and maide a lot of money. The rare
exceptions only served to prove the rule. Durlng the Presidency or
Beneš they wei,e more than ready to collaiborate with Moscow, but
wben this became impossible they gathe!'t:d In London, wbence they
have now mov.ed to Washilllgton, tľying to set up a government in
exile and hoping to be at the helm wben adversity oveľ'tak8-'l Com•
muni,sm. It is a game tbat has been played tíme and again, and the
names of these emigres witb a doubtful pa'St make ,no difference;
what makes a dlfčerence is whether or not they are 1·eliable.
In attempting to answer this question lt can be safely stated that
those wbo worked with and for Beneš until February 1948, wben Cze
choslovakla'-s future became linked wltb Communlsm, are a 'Priori unreliable, wbereas those wbo were persecuted by Beneš and bis ,system
and broke with it before Febuary 1948 are mostly reliable men who
sbould be supportecl. It would be a great mlstake to trust emigres
�38
SLOVAKIA
w.ho are not reliable, and it is surely our duty to lea..rn from the mistakes in this reS'l)eCt whi~h have been made in the .past. It must a!so
be remembered tJhat the. Communists, who a1-e always much more
actlve and quicker than tíheir democratic opponents in the West, have
innumerable agent,; or their own among Czeol1 emigres. Western democracy should be wamed in tlme before it is too late.
•
•
• •
A NOTE ON TISO, HORTHY AND BENES
E. L. DELANEY
Admfral Hoľ,thy, Regen1t of Hungary, alleged collaborllltor with
Germany and castlgated as a "Fasc,i st" by our Reds and "plnks,"
was given sanctuary by our Mil1tary Government in Bavaria a..fter
the end of hoSltlU.ties, and rightly so. Had he been returned t o BudapeBt, he would have been execu<ted by the Communisit rabble. .
But President Josef TisÔ in the adjoining state of Slovakia, even
less a collaborator with Germany than Horthy but who was án implacable foe of Communism, also fled into Bavaria and what he
thought was the sanctuary of the Americans. He was imprisoncd,
mlstreated, manhandled and then delivered to the Reds by our Milit ary Government to be hanged by them in Bratislava.
Duri-ng Lhe war, Presddent Tlso had delegated members of his
own official family to provide the best care and hospl:tal!za1tl.on if
necessary for the Amerlcan and Brltish flyers who were shot down
or who made foreed Jandlngs in his counitry.
Other Amerlcans were given sanctuary there, thls wrlter being one
who knew Dr. Josef Tlso personally and who received such sanctuary.
It was alleged by the mouthpieces of Moscow that Tiso was guilty
of treasonaib1e actions when, for the flrst Ume in nine hundred years,
he and his co-workere gained independence and "a better Ufe" for the
Slovak people. "Self-determination" was what they had been told was
their right, and now they were belng told it was their wrong. Wrong
because, long before the beginning of the war, thelr president had a(•·
cepted the protection of Berlin agalnst outside aggression. The aggression of tihe Soviiet. That was hls sin.
But note the utlter i•nconslsitency and the convincing proof of col·
Juslon and connlvance with the Communist cllque on the parit of our
execut!ves and officdals.
Dr. Eduard Benes Journeyed to Moscow with the approval and
the ald of Frankl!n D. Roosevelt and there slgned with Josef Stálln
the death warran1. of ,the Czecb and Slovak peoples. He represented
nelther Czechs nor Slovaks at that t ime, altbough he had been president of their courutry and reslgned six years prevlously. He came
to Prague with ihe blesslng of Washlngiton and the dlgnllty of an ambassador trom here. The betrayal of the entire country of Czechoslovakia by Benes, Churchill and Rooaevelt, far out-Heroďs anything
Josef Tiso did to gain independence "and . a better life" for his
people during the six years of their Republic. More con.temp,ti.ble
duplieity on the part of any statesman could scarcely be lmagin1:,d.
(REPUBLICANISM versus STATISM, ECA Press, 1950, Los
Angeles, Catif.)
�
SLOVAKIA
35
OZEOH DOUBLE-DEALING
PRINCE ADOLF ZU SCHWARZENBERG
(This ls a reprint of the article published in the July, 1949, issue
[Vo!. III, No. 1, pp. 20-22] of the "'New Englh1h Review Ma,ga,zine."
The author heads one of the oldest familles in Bohemia and his ta.mily
played an importa.n1 role in Bohemia's ootional life. The Prince is
unquestionably qualitied to speak about th.e intrigues of Ma-saryk and
Beneš and their undemocratic and un-Christlan pol!cies. This expo-sé
ot Czech hypocrisy should be read by all Amerlcans. - Ed.)
During and after the Flrst World War the ma.in feature in Bohemla's pollcy was a tendency to back both sides at the same Ume, more
par,ticularly during rthe coutinuat!on of ho~tllitie-s. Bohemia. wa.s unt.11
1918 a part ot the Austro-Hungaria.n Monarchy, in whlch it formed a
provlnce under Ha,bsburg rule and at the same Ume a. Kingdom,
though enjoylng a very limrted a.utonomy; if !n<leed thl-s wa.s autonomy at all, for lt was by no mea.n-s self-government.
On the whole, the Czechs, who are and always hav,e been the ma·
Jority o! the inhabitants ot Bohemla and Mora.vla, d!spla.yed, even
during the First World War, in dome-stlc a!fairs a fair!y loyal attttude towards the Governme.nt In Vienna., though cthere were some stgnlfican,t excepitlons. For ex,ample, the 28th Regiment of Infantry wa.s
considered a.-s somewhat unrellable, and occa.slona.lly there were desertions to the enemy, which were more frequent tha.n in the other
Czech regtments, yet at horne the Czechs stressed thelr absolute
Joyalty to the Habsburg regimre and "'collabora.ted" wl!ling!y, more
particular!y where their pockets were a.ffected. Neverthe!ess, while
they aoted in th!s way within the black and yellow fľontier posts oť
th,e Habsburg Monarchy, they had very ,a,bJe ageuts outside beyond
the enemy Unes. In pru<ticular, there were T. G. Ma.sa.ryk, who acted
as pros,pect!ve President or a future Czechoslovakian Republlc, Edward
Beneš, and many others, who escaped beyond the front!ers and ~Ued
down abroad where. wlth the help of the !uture victors, they set up
a free autouomous provislonal government that was to come iruto e:,:istence after the defeat of the Centra! Powers.
What, however, would have happened lf the Centra! Powet'S had
emerged as vlctors? The answ,er ls more rthan slmple: Masaryk :ind
Co. would have dlsappeared lnto oblivlon, and the Ozechs, who had
stayed at ·home ,and had so marvelously pla.yed the rôle of loya.J subjects, would have proclalmed lnc-essa.ntly how fatth!ul they had alwaya
been to the Ha.bsburgs and to the Monarchy, ha.vlng lost rthousands,
or tens of thousands, of thelr best sons for the "Just Cause," and
how enormous thelr contributlons to vlctory had been. Nevertheless,
luck was not on the slde of the Centa! Powers. Iu consequence, from
October 1918, onwards, the Czechs withln the Monarchy had to change
qulckly to other tactlcs, transforming themselves llke chameleons, and
they were forced to a-ppear as, tnnocent vlctims who had been p~rsecuted by ,t he bruta.l Habsburg regime. The same people who fran•
tically roared "Hurmh" to greet the Emperor ~ e now not ashamed
to utter calumnlou!l words agaki.st hlm. " Hallelujah" and "Cruclfy
�36
SLOVAKIA
Him" are so close to each other, but it would appeaľ that "Crucify
Him" is much easier to shout.
It must be admitted that ,the Czechs played this new ľôle with
marvelous skill au<l admiľable flexibility. For Masaryk and hls col•
leagues it was now easy enough to create a Czechoslova:kian Rep11hlic,
hut to the very end Masaryk played a double galffie. When he was
dealing with Framoe and the Unbled States he produced a pian for a
Republic In Czechoslovakla, hut for Russia he put forward a Czech
kingdom, leaving open the question whether a Romanoff or somebody
e lse -should wear the crown of St. Wenceslaus, for so long as the Tsar
reigned In Russia the word republic did not sound g,ood. lncidentally,
Masaryk had promised lthe Slovaks autonomy as well as many other
acceptable privlleges. but these never materialized and serious difficulties la,ter arose owlng to this. Thus, even when the Czechs were
fightlng for indedimpence their double-dealing was proved.
This particular characteristic has been up to the present yielded
good results when it wa,s a question of dealing with the credulcu s.
The situation is the same now, and it will always remain the same,
so long as t-he victors •n a war in which Czechoslovakia is involved
do noi invesligate thoroughly the kind of people wlt•h whom they ,"\.re
dealing.
lt is an old and very cheap trlck to play in wiU1 both sid-es in
such great conflicts as the two World Wars, more particularly when
the outcome is not at all clear, a.t least to the people most concerned.
In the Secoud World War the situation was much the s11Jffie, and
there was a distinct analogy with what happened in rt;s predecessor.
From 1939 Ull'til 1946 Hacha functioned as President, first for the
mu'til<ated second Czechoslovak Republic and then during the Nruzl
occupation of the "Protectorate," therefore dlsplaying a fľiendly attitude, however invol11nta1;1y, towards the Hitler reglme. At the same
time Benes and his associates set up in London a government with
more or less open leanings to the left. If Hitler had won the war
Hacba would have become tbe great man of the day. However, HiUer
was def~ted, and Hacha, who had done his best to save bis country
from tbe borrors of war, and had played this part not unsuccessfully,
died i.n prison as au old and broken man, practically forgotten, while
Beneš emerged as the great man of the future and as President of
a reborn Czechoslovak Republic. Nevertheless, Beneš did not long
enjoy bis exalted position, for in Fellťllary 1948 the Communists, although a minority, seized power, a[ter .which Benes dlsappeaľed and
Gotliwald became President.
Even in normit,I times 1the double game of C1.ech policy caa be
seen quite clearly. As long as Ozechos!ovak!a adopted the rôle ot
dependence on the West, Beneš wa!< at the helm and from 1945 or.ward prepared the dellvery of his country to 'the Communists. All the
mlnls,teľ'S in bis CaLinet (there were about two dozen of them) worked
wlth their idolized Pres-ident, and In a most masterly f.ashion steered
thelr country into Communtsm, always boping ror a good job as a re•
ward for ťheir laudable work in the Bolshevist interest. Unfo11:u.nately
for them, however, thing.s ,took a different turn, for although Bene~
put up a token-resista.nce for 11. rew days against 1tbe overthrow or
democracy just to show a good face to the civilized world in the
�SLOVAKIA
37
West, it was a comparatively easy task to belp Communist Gottwald
lnto tbe Red saddle, thereby preventing a "civil war." From that fatal
day In February 1948 it could no longer he doub'ted rt.hat Czechoslovakla was a Communlst country, leaning away from democracy and
civill.zation, and progressing at full speed towards Red totalitarianlsm.
wbich by now wa,s firmly ,secure as "a peopWs democracy" by force
and terror.
When the gove111men't, with its outward appearance of democracy,
fell, Beneš and the member,s of his Oabin€-t had clearly accomplished
thelr task as laid down by the Kremliu, and from then on they were
no longer use,ful. Reallzing this they immediately "backed the other
horse," each in his own way. Beneš res!gned, and Go'ttwald replaced
him wlt.hout any diffioulty. All went smoothly, and Beneš did even
more for Communlsm: he died. Some of tbe former m!nisters tried to
escape across the frontier, but wel"e arrested; some, however, d!d
reach the American zone in Bava.ria, where they started to play the
part .of heroes and of defenders of democracy wbo had been forced to
fly from tbe peraecutions of the Communlsts. Needless to say they
behaved as lf they had always been ardent anti-Commu.nis'ts, here as
in reality tbey helped Communlsm wherever they could so Jong as
they were in office, and wlllingly or unwillingly pre-pared the overthrow of tlheir own regime. Thls they could have prevented with the
help of 'trhe army, which had remalned Joyal, and with a little couragc,
but courage is an unknown quality with the majorrty of the Czech
nation. In the West, howeveľ, J.itt1e is known about these "heroes,"
or the rôle whlob they are playing In their endeavor to oover up their
more tha.n doubtful past.
At this 'J)Oint, it may be useful to draw a parallel with Nazl Ger•
many. Any German one meets today will be sure to say that he bas
always been opposed to the Naz!s, and will describe how much he has
suffered a,t thelr hands, no matter whether he was In reality a Na.z!
or not. Probably Hitler himself would say tbe same thing if he were
still alive. It is the same in Italy where every It.allan ha~ been a partisan and fought against Mussolini, even lf he were in reality a Fascist. The same is the case wltb tlhe Czechs in e~ile. Take tbeir word
for what lt. is wortb, but never believe tbem at first sight. It is well
known that many Czechs had a very fine tíme under the Nazi occupation; they collabomted willingly and maide a lot of money. The rare
exceptions only served to prove the rule. Durlng the Presidency or
Beneš they wei,e more than ready to collaiborate with Moscow, but
wben this became impossible they gathe!'t:d In London, wbence they
have now mov.ed to Washilllgton, tľying to set up a government in
exile and hoping to be at the helm wben adversity oveľ'tak8-'l Com•
muni,sm. It is a game tbat has been played tíme and again, and the
names of these emigres witb a doubtful pa'St make ,no difference;
what makes a dlfčerence is whether or not they are 1·eliable.
In attempting to answer this question lt can be safely stated that
those wbo worked with and for Beneš until February 1948, wben Cze
choslovakla'-s future became linked wltb Communlsm, are a 'Priori unreliable, wbereas those wbo were persecuted by Beneš and bis ,system
and broke with it before Febuary 1948 are mostly reliable men who
sbould be supportecl. It would be a great mlstake to trust emigres
�38
SLOVAKIA
w.ho are not reliable, and it is surely our duty to lea..rn from the mistakes in this reS'l)eCt whi~h have been made in the .past. It must a!so
be remembered tJhat the. Communists, who a1-e always much more
actlve and quicker than tíheir democratic opponents in the West, have
innumerable agent,; or their own among Czeol1 emigres. Western democracy should be wamed in tlme before it is too late.
•
•
• •
A NOTE ON TISO, HORTHY AND BENES
E. L. DELANEY
Admfral Hoľ,thy, Regen1t of Hungary, alleged collaborllltor with
Germany and castlgated as a "Fasc,i st" by our Reds and "plnks,"
was given sanctuary by our Mil1tary Government in Bavaria a..fter
the end of hoSltlU.ties, and rightly so. Had he been returned t o BudapeBt, he would have been execu<ted by the Communisit rabble. .
But President Josef TisÔ in the adjoining state of Slovakia, even
less a collaborator with Germany than Horthy but who was án implacable foe of Communism, also fled into Bavaria and what he
thought was the sanctuary of the Americans. He was imprisoncd,
mlstreated, manhandled and then delivered to the Reds by our Milit ary Government to be hanged by them in Bratislava.
Duri-ng Lhe war, Presddent Tlso had delegated members of his
own official family to provide the best care and hospl:tal!za1tl.on if
necessary for the Amerlcan and Brltish flyers who were shot down
or who made foreed Jandlngs in his counitry.
Other Amerlcans were given sanctuary there, thls wrlter being one
who knew Dr. Josef Tlso personally and who received such sanctuary.
It was alleged by the mouthpieces of Moscow that Tiso was guilty
of treasonaib1e actions when, for the flrst Ume in nine hundred years,
he and his co-workere gained independence and "a better Ufe" for the
Slovak people. "Self-determination" was what they had been told was
their right, and now they were belng told it was their wrong. Wrong
because, long before the beginning of the war, thelr president had a(•·
cepted the protection of Berlin agalnst outside aggression. The aggression of tihe Soviiet. That was hls sin.
But note the utlter i•nconslsitency and the convincing proof of col·
Juslon and connlvance with the Communist cllque on the parit of our
execut!ves and officdals.
Dr. Eduard Benes Journeyed to Moscow with the approval and
the ald of Frankl!n D. Roosevelt and there slgned with Josef Stálln
the death warran1. of ,the Czecb and Slovak peoples. He represented
nelther Czechs nor Slovaks at that t ime, altbough he had been president of their courutry and reslgned six years prevlously. He came
to Prague with ihe blesslng of Washlngiton and the dlgnllty of an ambassador trom here. The betrayal of the entire country of Czechoslovakia by Benes, Churchill and Rooaevelt, far out-Heroďs anything
Josef Tiso did to gain independence "and . a better life" for his
people during the six years of their Republic. More con.temp,ti.ble
duplieity on the part of any statesman could scarcely be lmagin1:,d.
(REPUBLICANISM versus STATISM, ECA Press, 1950, Los
Angeles, Catif.)
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
35
OZEOH DOUBLE-DEALING
PRINCE ADOLF ZU SCHWARZENBERG
(This ls a reprint of the article published in the July, 1949, issue
[Vo!. III, No. 1, pp. 20-22] of the "'New Englh1h Review Ma,ga,zine."
The author heads one of the oldest familles in Bohemia and his ta.mily
played an importa.n1 role in Bohemia's ootional life. The Prince is
unquestionably qualitied to speak about th.e intrigues of Ma-saryk and
Beneš and their undemocratic and un-Christlan pol!cies. This expo-sé
ot Czech hypocrisy should be read by all Amerlcans. - Ed.)
During and after the Flrst World War the ma.in feature in Bohemla's pollcy was a tendency to back both sides at the same Ume, more
par,ticularly during rthe coutinuat!on of ho~tllitie-s. Bohemia. wa.s unt.11
1918 a part ot the Austro-Hungaria.n Monarchy, in whlch it formed a
provlnce under Ha,bsburg rule and at the same Ume a. Kingdom,
though enjoylng a very limrted a.utonomy; if !n<leed thl-s wa.s autonomy at all, for lt was by no mea.n-s self-government.
On the whole, the Czechs, who are and always hav,e been the ma·
Jority o! the inhabitants ot Bohemla and Mora.vla, d!spla.yed, even
during the First World War, in dome-stlc a!fairs a fair!y loyal attttude towards the Governme.nt In Vienna., though cthere were some stgnlfican,t excepitlons. For ex,ample, the 28th Regiment of Infantry wa.s
considered a.-s somewhat unrellable, and occa.slona.lly there were desertions to the enemy, which were more frequent tha.n in the other
Czech regtments, yet at horne the Czechs stressed thelr absolute
Joyalty to the Habsburg regimre and "'collabora.ted" wl!ling!y, more
particular!y where their pockets were a.ffected. Neverthe!ess, while
they aoted in th!s way within the black and yellow fľontier posts oť
th,e Habsburg Monarchy, they had very ,a,bJe ageuts outside beyond
the enemy Unes. In pru<ticular, there were T. G. Ma.sa.ryk, who acted
as pros,pect!ve President or a future Czechoslovakian Republlc, Edward
Beneš, and many others, who escaped beyond the front!ers and ~Ued
down abroad where. wlth the help of the !uture victors, they set up
a free autouomous provislonal government that was to come iruto e:,:istence after the defeat of the Centra! Powers.
What, however, would have happened lf the Centra! Powet'S had
emerged as vlctors? The answ,er ls more rthan slmple: Masaryk :ind
Co. would have dlsappeared lnto oblivlon, and the Ozechs, who had
stayed at ·home ,and had so marvelously pla.yed the rôle of loya.J subjects, would have proclalmed lnc-essa.ntly how fatth!ul they had alwaya
been to the Ha.bsburgs and to the Monarchy, ha.vlng lost rthousands,
or tens of thousands, of thelr best sons for the "Just Cause," and
how enormous thelr contributlons to vlctory had been. Nevertheless,
luck was not on the slde of the Centa! Powers. Iu consequence, from
October 1918, onwards, the Czechs withln the Monarchy had to change
qulckly to other tactlcs, transforming themselves llke chameleons, and
they were forced to a-ppear as, tnnocent vlctims who had been p~rsecuted by ,t he bruta.l Habsburg regime. The same people who fran•
tically roared "Hurmh" to greet the Emperor ~ e now not ashamed
to utter calumnlou!l words agaki.st hlm. " Hallelujah" and "Cruclfy
36
SLOVAKIA
Him" are so close to each other, but it would appeaľ that "Crucify
Him" is much easier to shout.
It must be admitted that ,the Czechs played this new ľôle with
marvelous skill au<l admiľable flexibility. For Masaryk and hls col•
leagues it was now easy enough to create a Czechoslova:kian Rep11hlic,
hut to the very end Masaryk played a double galffie. When he was
dealing with Framoe and the Unbled States he produced a pian for a
Republic In Czechoslovakla, hut for Russia he put forward a Czech
kingdom, leaving open the question whether a Romanoff or somebody
e lse -should wear the crown of St. Wenceslaus, for so long as the Tsar
reigned In Russia the word republic did not sound g,ood. lncidentally,
Masaryk had promised lthe Slovaks autonomy as well as many other
acceptable privlleges. but these never materialized and serious difficulties la,ter arose owlng to this. Thus, even when the Czechs were
fightlng for indedimpence their double-dealing was proved.
This particular characteristic has been up to the present yielded
good results when it wa,s a question of dealing with the credulcu s.
The situation is the same now, and it will always remain the same,
so long as t-he victors •n a war in which Czechoslovakia is involved
do noi invesligate thoroughly the kind of people wlt•h whom they ,"\.re
dealing.
lt is an old and very cheap trlck to play in wiU1 both sid-es in
such great conflicts as the two World Wars, more particularly when
the outcome is not at all clear, a.t least to the people most concerned.
In the Secoud World War the situation was much the s11Jffie, and
there was a distinct analogy with what happened in rt;s predecessor.
From 1939 Ull'til 1946 Hacha functioned as President, first for the
mu'til<ated second Czechoslovak Republic and then during the Nruzl
occupation of the "Protectorate," therefore dlsplaying a fľiendly attitude, however invol11nta1;1y, towards the Hitler reglme. At the same
time Benes and his associates set up in London a government with
more or less open leanings to the left. If Hitler had won the war
Hacba would have become tbe great man of the day. However, HiUer
was def~ted, and Hacha, who had done his best to save bis country
from tbe borrors of war, and had played this part not unsuccessfully,
died i.n prison as au old and broken man, practically forgotten, while
Beneš emerged as the great man of the future and as President of
a reborn Czechoslovak Republic. Nevertheless, Beneš did not long
enjoy bis exalted position, for in Fellťllary 1948 the Communists, although a minority, seized power, a[ter .which Benes dlsappeaľed and
Gotliwald became President.
Even in normit,I times 1the double game of C1.ech policy caa be
seen quite clearly. As long as Ozechos!ovak!a adopted the rôle ot
dependence on the West, Beneš wa!< at the helm and from 1945 or.ward prepared the dellvery of his country to 'the Communists. All the
mlnls,teľ'S in bis CaLinet (there were about two dozen of them) worked
wlth their idolized Pres-ident, and In a most masterly f.ashion steered
thelr country into Communtsm, always boping ror a good job as a re•
ward for ťheir laudable work in the Bolshevist interest. Unfo11:u.nately
for them, however, thing.s ,took a different turn, for although Bene~
put up a token-resista.nce for 11. rew days against 1tbe overthrow or
democracy just to show a good face to the civilized world in the
SLOVAKIA
37
West, it was a comparatively easy task to belp Communist Gottwald
lnto tbe Red saddle, thereby preventing a "civil war." From that fatal
day In February 1948 it could no longer he doub'ted rt.hat Czechoslovakla was a Communlst country, leaning away from democracy and
civill.zation, and progressing at full speed towards Red totalitarianlsm.
wbich by now wa,s firmly ,secure as "a peopWs democracy" by force
and terror.
When the gove111men't, with its outward appearance of democracy,
fell, Beneš and the member,s of his Oabin€-t had clearly accomplished
thelr task as laid down by the Kremliu, and from then on they were
no longer use,ful. Reallzing this they immediately "backed the other
horse," each in his own way. Beneš res!gned, and Go'ttwald replaced
him wlt.hout any diffioulty. All went smoothly, and Beneš did even
more for Communlsm: he died. Some of tbe former m!nisters tried to
escape across the frontier, but wel"e arrested; some, however, d!d
reach the American zone in Bava.ria, where they started to play the
part .of heroes and of defenders of democracy wbo had been forced to
fly from tbe peraecutions of the Communlsts. Needless to say they
behaved as lf they had always been ardent anti-Commu.nis'ts, here as
in reality tbey helped Communlsm wherever they could so Jong as
they were in office, and wlllingly or unwillingly pre-pared the overthrow of tlheir own regime. Thls they could have prevented with the
help of 'trhe army, which had remalned Joyal, and with a little couragc,
but courage is an unknown quality with the majorrty of the Czech
nation. In the West, howeveľ, J.itt1e is known about these "heroes,"
or the rôle whlob they are playing In their endeavor to oover up their
more tha.n doubtful past.
At this 'J)Oint, it may be useful to draw a parallel with Nazl Ger•
many. Any German one meets today will be sure to say that he bas
always been opposed to the Naz!s, and will describe how much he has
suffered a,t thelr hands, no matter whether he was In reality a Na.z!
or not. Probably Hitler himself would say tbe same thing if he were
still alive. It is the same in Italy where every It.allan ha~ been a partisan and fought against Mussolini, even lf he were in reality a Fascist. The same is the case wltb tlhe Czechs in e~ile. Take tbeir word
for what lt. is wortb, but never believe tbem at first sight. It is well
known that many Czechs had a very fine tíme under the Nazi occupation; they collabomted willingly and maide a lot of money. The rare
exceptions only served to prove the rule. Durlng the Presidency or
Beneš they wei,e more than ready to collaiborate with Moscow, but
wben this became impossible they gathe!'t:d In London, wbence they
have now mov.ed to Washilllgton, tľying to set up a government in
exile and hoping to be at the helm wben adversity oveľ'tak8-'l Com•
muni,sm. It is a game tbat has been played tíme and again, and the
names of these emigres witb a doubtful pa'St make ,no difference;
what makes a dlfčerence is whether or not they are 1·eliable.
In attempting to answer this question lt can be safely stated that
those wbo worked with and for Beneš until February 1948, wben Cze
choslovakla'-s future became linked wltb Communlsm, are a 'Priori unreliable, wbereas those wbo were persecuted by Beneš and bis ,system
and broke with it before Febuary 1948 are mostly reliable men who
sbould be supportecl. It would be a great mlstake to trust emigres
38
SLOVAKIA
w.ho are not reliable, and it is surely our duty to lea..rn from the mistakes in this reS'l)eCt whi~h have been made in the .past. It must a!so
be remembered tJhat the. Communists, who a1-e always much more
actlve and quicker than tíheir democratic opponents in the West, have
innumerable agent,; or their own among Czeol1 emigres. Western democracy should be wamed in tlme before it is too late.
•
•
• •
A NOTE ON TISO, HORTHY AND BENES
E. L. DELANEY
Admfral Hoľ,thy, Regen1t of Hungary, alleged collaborllltor with
Germany and castlgated as a "Fasc,i st" by our Reds and "plnks,"
was given sanctuary by our Mil1tary Government in Bavaria a..fter
the end of hoSltlU.ties, and rightly so. Had he been returned t o BudapeBt, he would have been execu<ted by the Communisit rabble. .
But President Josef TisÔ in the adjoining state of Slovakia, even
less a collaborator with Germany than Horthy but who was án implacable foe of Communism, also fled into Bavaria and what he
thought was the sanctuary of the Americans. He was imprisoncd,
mlstreated, manhandled and then delivered to the Reds by our Milit ary Government to be hanged by them in Bratislava.
Duri-ng Lhe war, Presddent Tlso had delegated members of his
own official family to provide the best care and hospl:tal!za1tl.on if
necessary for the Amerlcan and Brltish flyers who were shot down
or who made foreed Jandlngs in his counitry.
Other Amerlcans were given sanctuary there, thls wrlter being one
who knew Dr. Josef Tlso personally and who received such sanctuary.
It was alleged by the mouthpieces of Moscow that Tiso was guilty
of treasonaib1e actions when, for the flrst Ume in nine hundred years,
he and his co-workere gained independence and "a better Ufe" for the
Slovak people. "Self-determination" was what they had been told was
their right, and now they were belng told it was their wrong. Wrong
because, long before the beginning of the war, thelr president had a(•·
cepted the protection of Berlin agalnst outside aggression. The aggression of tihe Soviiet. That was hls sin.
But note the utlter i•nconslsitency and the convincing proof of col·
Juslon and connlvance with the Communist cllque on the parit of our
execut!ves and officdals.
Dr. Eduard Benes Journeyed to Moscow with the approval and
the ald of Frankl!n D. Roosevelt and there slgned with Josef Stálln
the death warran1. of ,the Czecb and Slovak peoples. He represented
nelther Czechs nor Slovaks at that t ime, altbough he had been president of their courutry and reslgned six years prevlously. He came
to Prague with ihe blesslng of Washlngiton and the dlgnllty of an ambassador trom here. The betrayal of the entire country of Czechoslovakia by Benes, Churchill and Rooaevelt, far out-Heroďs anything
Josef Tiso did to gain independence "and . a better life" for his
people during the six years of their Republic. More con.temp,ti.ble
duplieity on the part of any statesman could scarcely be lmagin1:,d.
(REPUBLICANISM versus STATISM, ECA Press, 1950, Los
Angeles, Catif.)
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Czech Double-Dealing
Description
An account of the resource
Prince Adolf zu Schwarzenberg
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951
pp. 35-38
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Schwarzenberg, Adolf, 1890-1950
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
LCNAF
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6245d95fd753fdc339b150d063a36d38.pdf
cf8b49fe89d9bb9a208f47c468cbdf5d
PDF Text
Text
38
SLOVAKIA
w.ho are not reliable, and it is surely our duty to lea..rn from the mistakes in this reS'l)eCt whi~h have been made in the .past. It must a!so
be remembered tJhat the. Communists, who a1-e always much more
actlve and quicker than tíheir democratic opponents in the West, have
innumerable agent,; or their own among Czeol1 emigres. Western democracy should be wamed in tlme before it is too late.
•
•
• •
A NOTE ON TISO, HORTHY AND BENES
E. L. DELANEY
Admfral Hoľ,thy, Regen1t of Hungary, alleged collaborllltor with
Germany and castlgated as a "Fasc,i st" by our Reds and "plnks,"
was given sanctuary by our Mil1tary Government in Bavaria a..fter
the end of hoSltlU.ties, and rightly so. Had he been returned t o BudapeBt, he would have been execu<ted by the Communisit rabble. .
But President Josef TisÔ in the adjoining state of Slovakia, even
less a collaborator with Germany than Horthy but who was án implacable foe of Communism, also fled into Bavaria and what he
thought was the sanctuary of the Americans. He was imprisoncd,
mlstreated, manhandled and then delivered to the Reds by our Milit ary Government to be hanged by them in Bratislava.
Duri-ng Lhe war, Presddent Tlso had delegated members of his
own official family to provide the best care and hospl:tal!za1tl.on if
necessary for the Amerlcan and Brltish flyers who were shot down
or who made foreed Jandlngs in his counitry.
Other Amerlcans were given sanctuary there, thls wrlter being one
who knew Dr. Josef Tlso personally and who received such sanctuary.
It was alleged by the mouthpieces of Moscow that Tiso was guilty
of treasonaib1e actions when, for the flrst Ume in nine hundred years,
he and his co-workere gained independence and "a better Ufe" for the
Slovak people. "Self-determination" was what they had been told was
their right, and now they were belng told it was their wrong. Wrong
because, long before the beginning of the war, thelr president had a(•·
cepted the protection of Berlin agalnst outside aggression. The aggression of tihe Soviiet. That was hls sin.
But note the utlter i•nconslsitency and the convincing proof of col·
Juslon and connlvance with the Communist cllque on the parit of our
execut!ves and officdals.
Dr. Eduard Benes Journeyed to Moscow with the approval and
the ald of Frankl!n D. Roosevelt and there slgned with Josef Stálln
the death warran1. of ,the Czecb and Slovak peoples. He represented
nelther Czechs nor Slovaks at that t ime, altbough he had been president of their courutry and reslgned six years prevlously. He came
to Prague with ihe blesslng of Washlngiton and the dlgnllty of an ambassador trom here. The betrayal of the entire country of Czechoslovakia by Benes, Churchill and Rooaevelt, far out-Heroďs anything
Josef Tiso did to gain independence "and . a better life" for his
people during the six years of their Republic. More con.temp,ti.ble
duplieity on the part of any statesman could scarcely be lmagin1:,d.
(REPUBLICANISM versus STATISM, ECA Press, 1950, Los
Angeles, Catif.)
�
38
SLOVAKIA
w.ho are not reliable, and it is surely our duty to lea..rn from the mistakes in this reS'l)eCt whi~h have been made in the .past. It must a!so
be remembered tJhat the. Communists, who a1-e always much more
actlve and quicker than tíheir democratic opponents in the West, have
innumerable agent,; or their own among Czeol1 emigres. Western democracy should be wamed in tlme before it is too late.
•
•
• •
A NOTE ON TISO, HORTHY AND BENES
E. L. DELANEY
Admfral Hoľ,thy, Regen1t of Hungary, alleged collaborllltor with
Germany and castlgated as a "Fasc,i st" by our Reds and "plnks,"
was given sanctuary by our Mil1tary Government in Bavaria a..fter
the end of hoSltlU.ties, and rightly so. Had he been returned t o BudapeBt, he would have been execu<ted by the Communisit rabble. .
But President Josef TisÔ in the adjoining state of Slovakia, even
less a collaborator with Germany than Horthy but who was án implacable foe of Communism, also fled into Bavaria and what he
thought was the sanctuary of the Americans. He was imprisoncd,
mlstreated, manhandled and then delivered to the Reds by our Milit ary Government to be hanged by them in Bratislava.
Duri-ng Lhe war, Presddent Tlso had delegated members of his
own official family to provide the best care and hospl:tal!za1tl.on if
necessary for the Amerlcan and Brltish flyers who were shot down
or who made foreed Jandlngs in his counitry.
Other Amerlcans were given sanctuary there, thls wrlter being one
who knew Dr. Josef Tlso personally and who received such sanctuary.
It was alleged by the mouthpieces of Moscow that Tiso was guilty
of treasonaib1e actions when, for the flrst Ume in nine hundred years,
he and his co-workere gained independence and "a better Ufe" for the
Slovak people. "Self-determination" was what they had been told was
their right, and now they were belng told it was their wrong. Wrong
because, long before the beginning of the war, thelr president had a(•·
cepted the protection of Berlin agalnst outside aggression. The aggression of tihe Soviiet. That was hls sin.
But note the utlter i•nconslsitency and the convincing proof of col·
Juslon and connlvance with the Communist cllque on the parit of our
execut!ves and officdals.
Dr. Eduard Benes Journeyed to Moscow with the approval and
the ald of Frankl!n D. Roosevelt and there slgned with Josef Stálln
the death warran1. of ,the Czecb and Slovak peoples. He represented
nelther Czechs nor Slovaks at that t ime, altbough he had been president of their courutry and reslgned six years prevlously. He came
to Prague with ihe blesslng of Washlngiton and the dlgnllty of an ambassador trom here. The betrayal of the entire country of Czechoslovakia by Benes, Churchill and Rooaevelt, far out-Heroďs anything
Josef Tiso did to gain independence "and . a better life" for his
people during the six years of their Republic. More con.temp,ti.ble
duplieity on the part of any statesman could scarcely be lmagin1:,d.
(REPUBLICANISM versus STATISM, ECA Press, 1950, Los
Angeles, Catif.)
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
38
SLOVAKIA
w.ho are not reliable, and it is surely our duty to lea..rn from the mistakes in this reS'l)eCt whi~h have been made in the .past. It must a!so
be remembered tJhat the. Communists, who a1-e always much more
actlve and quicker than tíheir democratic opponents in the West, have
innumerable agent,; or their own among Czeol1 emigres. Western democracy should be wamed in tlme before it is too late.
•
•
• •
A NOTE ON TISO, HORTHY AND BENES
E. L. DELANEY
Admfral Hoľ,thy, Regen1t of Hungary, alleged collaborllltor with
Germany and castlgated as a "Fasc,i st" by our Reds and "plnks,"
was given sanctuary by our Mil1tary Government in Bavaria a..fter
the end of hoSltlU.ties, and rightly so. Had he been returned t o BudapeBt, he would have been execu<ted by the Communisit rabble. .
But President Josef TisÔ in the adjoining state of Slovakia, even
less a collaborator with Germany than Horthy but who was án implacable foe of Communism, also fled into Bavaria and what he
thought was the sanctuary of the Americans. He was imprisoncd,
mlstreated, manhandled and then delivered to the Reds by our Milit ary Government to be hanged by them in Bratislava.
Duri-ng Lhe war, Presddent Tlso had delegated members of his
own official family to provide the best care and hospl:tal!za1tl.on if
necessary for the Amerlcan and Brltish flyers who were shot down
or who made foreed Jandlngs in his counitry.
Other Amerlcans were given sanctuary there, thls wrlter being one
who knew Dr. Josef Tlso personally and who received such sanctuary.
It was alleged by the mouthpieces of Moscow that Tiso was guilty
of treasonaib1e actions when, for the flrst Ume in nine hundred years,
he and his co-workere gained independence and "a better Ufe" for the
Slovak people. "Self-determination" was what they had been told was
their right, and now they were belng told it was their wrong. Wrong
because, long before the beginning of the war, thelr president had a(•·
cepted the protection of Berlin agalnst outside aggression. The aggression of tihe Soviiet. That was hls sin.
But note the utlter i•nconslsitency and the convincing proof of col·
Juslon and connlvance with the Communist cllque on the parit of our
execut!ves and officdals.
Dr. Eduard Benes Journeyed to Moscow with the approval and
the ald of Frankl!n D. Roosevelt and there slgned with Josef Stálln
the death warran1. of ,the Czecb and Slovak peoples. He represented
nelther Czechs nor Slovaks at that t ime, altbough he had been president of their courutry and reslgned six years prevlously. He came
to Prague with ihe blesslng of Washlngiton and the dlgnllty of an ambassador trom here. The betrayal of the entire country of Czechoslovakia by Benes, Churchill and Rooaevelt, far out-Heroďs anything
Josef Tiso did to gain independence "and . a better life" for his
people during the six years of their Republic. More con.temp,ti.ble
duplieity on the part of any statesman could scarcely be lmagin1:,d.
(REPUBLICANISM versus STATISM, ECA Press, 1950, Los
Angeles, Catif.)
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
A Note on Tiso, Horthy and Beneš
Description
An account of the resource
E. L. Delaney
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951
p. 38
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Delaney, Edward L.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
LCNAF
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/ec19ecb0c01c746e87cfc7dd598574c1.pdf
3705a464cbf3324171bf4a9c6845b6f6
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
39
RADIO FREE EUROPE
BY A SLOVAK EXILE
"Radio Free Europe" !s functionlng ln Munich slnce May 1, 1961.
The enterprise in itself ís proof of wha.t Amerícans are capable of do•
ing and the gligantic ftnancial sacrifkes they are wllling to make to
show the enslaved natlons behind the Iron Curtain that they are not
forsaken and 'that 'the western world ís not forgetting about tlhem.
Indeed, thls !s admlrable of the Amerícan people who have contrlbuted
so generously to make the project possible. lt is a big thing, indeed,
íf we follow the present psychologlcal flght aga.inst communlsm and lf
we regard things objectlvely from a broader world vlewpolnt. Radlo
Free Europe aftords the !atest proof of the gratitude earned by
Amerlcans for resistlng communism so vaľiantly, nay, for taking over
the offensl.ve to defeat militarily and politlcally the communls-t
effort and the endless cha.in of -Red lies. Without thls remarkwble resistance of the United States, communism would have the doors open
to the whole world.
Of course, the question of whether Radlo l<'ree Europe (RFE) i5
using .proper methods to fight communism, whether these methods
sumce for polítical reality or whether they comply to the mentality of t'h
. e natlons to which RFE turns w!th its broadcasts, can be
se11lously quest!loned. We must say frank,l y that Americans stm do
not !ully under$and the complexity of the various, special polltical
and natlonal problems existlng in Europe. But for this we cannot
_bla.me them alone, but aH the more can we blame their European
advisors, w·ho frequently ~Ive them a "pa!nted" plcture of the sttuation.
lf RFE !s to perform and fulfill its mission ln the countries behlnd t:he Iron Curtain, it must above all else respect certain natural
reallties; lts broadcasts must respect the polit!cal mentality of the
individual natíons. The broadcasts must not hurt theír feelings, but
must try to gain as wlde a clrcle of lísteners as posslble and influence them. Tben and only then shall RFE fulfill its missdon and oniy
then American dollars shall not be thrown away uselessly.
Today RFE beams lts broadcasts to Czechoslovakia eleven and onehalf bours daily. And even thougb two nat!ons - the Czechs and the
Slovaks - live In Czecboslovakia, despite tbe fact tbat tbls reality is
stressed even in the new Czecbo.!!lovak Constltutlon, even tbougb thls
actuallty bas been acknowledged by the representatlves of the socalled "Czecboslovak resistance" wbo today are in tbe USA and ln
other western countries, nevertheless RFE does not respect theae political realitles, or at least it does not do so consistently.
At home tbe Czechs bave thelll' own Czech broadcastlng statlons
and the Slovaks, too, bave 1ilielr own. That means tbat the Czecbs are
accustomed to listenlng to tbelr Czech broadcasts, whlle the Slovaks
listen to their Slovak statlons. These realltles are respected also
by state broadCQSts, such as the Brltish Broadcasting Corporallion, th~
Itallan Sta'te Broadcast, tbe Vatlcan, Moscow, etc. Only American
broadéastlng statlons - and the VOICE OF AMERICA and RADIO
I•'REE EUROPE es,pec\ally - still insist on a joint Slovak and Czech
broadcast.
�40
S LOVAKIA
The Slovaks at home and in exile are a,t a !oss t o understand why.
'l'his certaAnly does not enhance the misslon oí the Volce of A.merica
o r that of Radio Free Europe. In fact it degmdes the idea of democ•
racy in the eyes of the Slovaks and does not attain the deslr ed a nd ne•
cessary effect. The Czechs are not and do not want to be Slovak~,
and the S lovaks are not and do not want to be Czechs. The Czec hs
and Slovaks have been fully aware of this fact for decades, but offic ial Washington still is not. Why?
The valiant reslstance of the Slovak nation agalnst communist
terror, the hundreds of dead Slovak patiiots, t he thousands u pon thousands of impiisoned Slovaks and the love of the Slovak people for the
United Sta.tes of Amerlca rlghtfully deserve that the Slovaks have their
own Independent division in the American broadcastlng systems-especíally in the Volce of A.merica and Radlo Free Europe. Th ls demand
does not emanate from any anti-Czech prejudice, but !rom purely prac•
tlcal needs wlth an eye to t he objectlve that the broadcasts to Slovákia
might fulfm their m ission.
According to report.s of the !atest escapees from Slovakia and the
opinion of Slovak exiles in western E urope, the RFE broadcas.ts are
alien cto .the soul of the Slovak índividual, b ecause t he S lovak program:;
ar e there only for show purposes; Slovak vo ices only assist in CZECH
broa.dca.sts. Furthermore, these broadcasts do not even have regard for
the Christian tradition of the Slovak nation and clo not h ave people
who enjoy lts confldence addresslng it.
At present the Czechostovak broadcasts of Rimio Free Europe
have been entrusted to repr esentatlves of Benes's politlcal conceptlons,
to Messrs. Zenkl and llipka, leaders of .the Czech National Socialists.
To make it appear that Slovaks, too, have a part In lt, Zenkl and Ripka
seleoted a few Slovak politlcal unknowns and recommended them to
R FE as "representa.t:lves o f the Slovak natlon." These enemies of
Slovak freedom and independence, all traitors to the Slovak cause, who
for a pr!ce propagate the dlscredited anti-Slovak and undemocratic
poMcles of Benes, are not and cannot be acceptable to the Slovaks at
horne or in exile. Why should exiled Czechs be a.llowed to -select the
Slovaks to be employed by Radlo Free Europe, the instrument of the
National Comanittee for Free E urope, W'hich 1s su pposed to be an
American institution?
The procedure is undemocratic and immoral and we must protest
against lt. We want to be of service to the cause of freedom and the
truth and that is why we feel it our mora! and politlcal duty ,to bring
these matters before responsible American circles that are lncorrectly informed by "Czechoslovak" polltlclans, who prepared the pre,;ent tragedy for the Slov,ak and Czech nations by thelr capltulationary
and pro-Sovi.et policy.
As far as Slovakia !s concerned, we must once again stress the
fact that the Czechoslovak polltical conception 1s not popular among
the Slovak people and, therefore, no Idea presented In the name of thls
conceptlon can catch the mlnds of the Slovaks. Even RFE canno t f,lght
psychologlcally agalnst communlsm In Slovakia in the name of -thls conceptlon. Th e name of Masaryk, popular among Czechs, ls not popular
at all In Slovakla and it canno t arouse the S\ovaks to figh t agalnst
�SLOVAKIA
41
communlsm. Benes, whose name 1s rrequently mentioned ln the RFli:
progra.ma by his adherents, 1s damned and condemned both in Bohemla and In Slovakia.
The tact remalns that in Slovakia it 1s Chrlstlanity and Chrlstlan
traditlon whlch gtves strength to the natlon !or lts self-consclou~
resls-tance to communist terror. Communlsm Ls not only polltically,
but also ldeologlcally dangerous and, thererore, the foundatlon for the
psychologlcal fight agaln.st communlsm must be Chrlstlanity and democra.cy. But the programs of RFE must expressively alS-O emphaslze
this outune and not, as heretofore, at limes allow an antl-rellgious , antlChristlan, or even an evidently antl-Cathollc tendency t o be smugglod
lnto lts broadcasts. Among bellevlng people fäls produces a pltlful
bltterne.ss and antilpathy.
So that •RFE could maintaln a s pirit of antl-commun lst resistan<:e
even in Slovakfa, so that it could educate democratilcall y and preach
and teach democracy to our oppressed natlon cut off by the Iron Curtaln trom the West, so that lt could objectlvely and wlthout prejudice Inform the Slovaks about what 1s happening In the world and
generally wlth the ldeologtcal currents In the free world, lt is very
necessary that thls be done In Independent Slovak broadcasts. lt 1s
also necessary that as many S lovak representativ es ot Slovak reslstance In exile as posslble speak to the Slovak people so that RFl~
could lnfluence the wldest circle ot llsteners.
It 1s not healthy to exclude trom tbe possibility or cooperatlon
In this broadcast, whlch no ta bene carrles the name "The Broadcast
of Free Europe," all Slovak patrlots just because thelr political convlctlons are not in accord wlth speciflc polltlcal cliques.
As the sltuatlon In RFE obtalns today, tbls enterprlse has become
the supply lnstitutlon of tbe rlslng generatlon or Czech soclallsts, many
of whom even today are the detenders of Marxlst sociallsm and who up
to 1948, nay even after 1948, collaborated wlth the communlst Prague
regime.
lt Ie a tact that the Slovaks today are llke a "clnderella" In tbe
RFE, somethlng unwanted, something to be scorned. Only about 20
Slovaks are employed tor 140 Czechs; and In s ubordinate positlons. No
Slovak ls employed In the management of tbe enterprlse. Czecb dlrectors declde about tbe Slovaks to be employed, and the Slovak program.s
also are controlled by Czechs, who are not a cqualnted with Slovak prob
lems, nor understand Slovak mentality, Any correctlon In thls relatio1111blp In a joint broadcast 1s slmply going t.arther aw-ay trom the reaJ
questlon whlch can be resolved only by bavlng a separate Slovak
broadcast managed by patrlotlc Slovak people.
One more thought which must be hlghly stressed and that ls the
thought whtch thls RFE b roadcast carries In lts tltle: FREE EUROPE.
lndeed, what we regard as more lmportant and more necesaary In the
lnterest ot the Slovak nation, and in the lnterest or Europe as a
whole, 1s the propogatlon of <the Idea of a rree and unlted Europe. Tllls
Idea must be propagated especlally by RFE already today so that !t
mlght shlne as a llght lnto the future for all oppressed European natlons. That 1s the best way to lead European na.tlons to the consciousnee.e ot E uropean solidarity, to the Idea of a new, just and u nlted
Enrope. B y stresslng tbl11 thought the beat service would be renderetl
�SLOVA:KIA
42
the European nations themselves whlch were heretofore at Joggerheads because ot chauvinlstlc natlonalism, polltlcal fanatlctsms, syntheti,c politlcal partiitňons and the seclusion of one nation trom
the other.
A federalized united Europe ls the big hope especially ot the small
naitlons. It is necessary, therefore, to resurrect a.nd encourage thts
hope in them, because in a united Europe every natlon, small and
large, shall be able to live freely and democracy shall become the
common property of all natlons.
RFE cannot effectJvely combat communism if lt does not respect the natural rights of the individual nations behind rthe Iron
Curtain, lncluding the Slovak natlon. The crusade for treedom must
include ALL nations and exclude NONE. RFE cannot fultill its mis•
slon by allow~ng its broadcasts to insult the politlcal convictlons, the
mentality, the pa,tríotic feelings and national tradltlons ot the Slovaks. The people of Slovakia cannot have confidence in the RFE as
long as it employs renegade Slovaks to promote the Czech cause 01
Czechoslovakism, the bankrupt and dlscredited policies of the Czech
National Sociallsts as propagated by Benes and his followers. The
Slovaks are conscious or tbe !act that they are an lndlvidual naitlon
and as such have an lnherent and God-given rlght to be free and independent. There is no Joglcal explanatlon for RFE or the Volce l•f
America not recognizing or respecting that right. The anti-Slovak
course of the RFE 1s out or line wlth everything that spells A.merica.
Bu-t Slovaks stm hope tihat RFE shall In a very short tlme become
in fact the TRUE volce of a free and united Europe, the volce
of patriotic Slovaks in exile exhorting thelr brethren In Slovakla tú
remain Joyal to thelr Chrlstian and democratic traditlons, - yes.
RFE can and should become the VOICE OF FREE SLOVAKIA.
•
•
•
WHO SAI D IT?
"Our rore1gn pollcy of 1946 wlll be based on Lhe solid, unalterable,
masslve foundatlon of our agreement with the neighborlng SOVIE'ľ
UNION. WE MUST fulflll fully, without besitation, everything resu1ting from tbis foundation . . . . Our relat!ons with the other nelghboNi will be acco1'11ng to the vlewpolnt of the SOVIET Pact. WE
want a strong, democrat!c Poland WHICH WILL COLLABORATE
'WITH THE SOVIET UNION. For another solution of the POLJSH
ques-tion, WE have no time. We want a decent, democratlc Hungary,
C:OLLABORA TING WITH THE SOVIET UNION whlch lives In peace
w!th us. The same applles to Yugoslav!a, Austria and Romanla. ou·r
relatlons w!th the western Allles HAS NOT changed, and WILL NOT
change. We are grateful to Brltaln for her help when she and WE
stood alone. WE appreciate lmmensely and are ~rateful for Amerlcan
interest and sympartby. We will need the help of the western democracies for economtc and cultural reconstructlon." - (Ján Masa•
ryk. Broadcast to Czechoslovakla, London, December 31, 1944) .
•
"Just as Munic-h was undone and does not exist, just so there is
no Slovakia and it does not exist internationally as a state! There is
no Slovak problem, the Slovak problem 1s onr Interna) problem an<I
it !s recognlzed as such even by our allles." - (Dr. Benes, 6-22-43) .
•
�
SLOVAKIA
39
RADIO FREE EUROPE
BY A SLOVAK EXILE
"Radio Free Europe" !s functionlng ln Munich slnce May 1, 1961.
The enterprise in itself ís proof of wha.t Amerícans are capable of do•
ing and the gligantic ftnancial sacrifkes they are wllling to make to
show the enslaved natlons behind the Iron Curtain that they are not
forsaken and 'that 'the western world ís not forgetting about tlhem.
Indeed, thls !s admlrable of the Amerícan people who have contrlbuted
so generously to make the project possible. lt is a big thing, indeed,
íf we follow the present psychologlcal flght aga.inst communlsm and lf
we regard things objectlvely from a broader world vlewpolnt. Radlo
Free Europe aftords the !atest proof of the gratitude earned by
Amerlcans for resistlng communism so vaľiantly, nay, for taking over
the offensl.ve to defeat militarily and politlcally the communls-t
effort and the endless cha.in of -Red lies. Without thls remarkwble resistance of the United States, communism would have the doors open
to the whole world.
Of course, the question of whether Radlo l<'ree Europe (RFE) i5
using .proper methods to fight communism, whether these methods
sumce for polítical reality or whether they comply to the mentality of t'h
. e natlons to which RFE turns w!th its broadcasts, can be
se11lously quest!loned. We must say frank,l y that Americans stm do
not !ully under$and the complexity of the various, special polltical
and natlonal problems existlng in Europe. But for this we cannot
_bla.me them alone, but aH the more can we blame their European
advisors, w·ho frequently ~Ive them a "pa!nted" plcture of the sttuation.
lf RFE !s to perform and fulfill its mission ln the countries behlnd t:he Iron Curtain, it must above all else respect certain natural
reallties; lts broadcasts must respect the polit!cal mentality of the
individual natíons. The broadcasts must not hurt theír feelings, but
must try to gain as wlde a clrcle of lísteners as posslble and influence them. Tben and only then shall RFE fulfill its missdon and oniy
then American dollars shall not be thrown away uselessly.
Today RFE beams lts broadcasts to Czechoslovakia eleven and onehalf bours daily. And even thougb two nat!ons - the Czechs and the
Slovaks - live In Czecboslovakia, despite tbe fact tbat tbls reality is
stressed even in the new Czecbo.!!lovak Constltutlon, even tbougb thls
actuallty bas been acknowledged by the representatlves of the socalled "Czecboslovak resistance" wbo today are in tbe USA and ln
other western countries, nevertheless RFE does not respect theae political realitles, or at least it does not do so consistently.
At home tbe Czechs bave thelll' own Czech broadcastlng statlons
and the Slovaks, too, bave 1ilielr own. That means tbat the Czecbs are
accustomed to listenlng to tbelr Czech broadcasts, whlle the Slovaks
listen to their Slovak statlons. These realltles are respected also
by state broadCQSts, such as the Brltish Broadcasting Corporallion, th~
Itallan Sta'te Broadcast, tbe Vatlcan, Moscow, etc. Only American
broadéastlng statlons - and the VOICE OF AMERICA and RADIO
I•'REE EUROPE es,pec\ally - still insist on a joint Slovak and Czech
broadcast.
�40
S LOVAKIA
The Slovaks at home and in exile are a,t a !oss t o understand why.
'l'his certaAnly does not enhance the misslon oí the Volce of A.merica
o r that of Radio Free Europe. In fact it degmdes the idea of democ•
racy in the eyes of the Slovaks and does not attain the deslr ed a nd ne•
cessary effect. The Czechs are not and do not want to be Slovak~,
and the S lovaks are not and do not want to be Czechs. The Czec hs
and Slovaks have been fully aware of this fact for decades, but offic ial Washington still is not. Why?
The valiant reslstance of the Slovak nation agalnst communist
terror, the hundreds of dead Slovak patiiots, t he thousands u pon thousands of impiisoned Slovaks and the love of the Slovak people for the
United Sta.tes of Amerlca rlghtfully deserve that the Slovaks have their
own Independent division in the American broadcastlng systems-especíally in the Volce of A.merica and Radlo Free Europe. Th ls demand
does not emanate from any anti-Czech prejudice, but !rom purely prac•
tlcal needs wlth an eye to t he objectlve that the broadcasts to Slovákia
might fulfm their m ission.
According to report.s of the !atest escapees from Slovakia and the
opinion of Slovak exiles in western E urope, the RFE broadcas.ts are
alien cto .the soul of the Slovak índividual, b ecause t he S lovak program:;
ar e there only for show purposes; Slovak vo ices only assist in CZECH
broa.dca.sts. Furthermore, these broadcasts do not even have regard for
the Christian tradition of the Slovak nation and clo not h ave people
who enjoy lts confldence addresslng it.
At present the Czechostovak broadcasts of Rimio Free Europe
have been entrusted to repr esentatlves of Benes's politlcal conceptlons,
to Messrs. Zenkl and llipka, leaders of .the Czech National Socialists.
To make it appear that Slovaks, too, have a part In lt, Zenkl and Ripka
seleoted a few Slovak politlcal unknowns and recommended them to
R FE as "representa.t:lves o f the Slovak natlon." These enemies of
Slovak freedom and independence, all traitors to the Slovak cause, who
for a pr!ce propagate the dlscredited anti-Slovak and undemocratic
poMcles of Benes, are not and cannot be acceptable to the Slovaks at
horne or in exile. Why should exiled Czechs be a.llowed to -select the
Slovaks to be employed by Radlo Free Europe, the instrument of the
National Comanittee for Free E urope, W'hich 1s su pposed to be an
American institution?
The procedure is undemocratic and immoral and we must protest
against lt. We want to be of service to the cause of freedom and the
truth and that is why we feel it our mora! and politlcal duty ,to bring
these matters before responsible American circles that are lncorrectly informed by "Czechoslovak" polltlclans, who prepared the pre,;ent tragedy for the Slov,ak and Czech nations by thelr capltulationary
and pro-Sovi.et policy.
As far as Slovakia !s concerned, we must once again stress the
fact that the Czechoslovak polltical conception 1s not popular among
the Slovak people and, therefore, no Idea presented In the name of thls
conceptlon can catch the mlnds of the Slovaks. Even RFE canno t f,lght
psychologlcally agalnst communlsm In Slovakia in the name of -thls conceptlon. Th e name of Masaryk, popular among Czechs, ls not popular
at all In Slovakla and it canno t arouse the S\ovaks to figh t agalnst
�SLOVAKIA
41
communlsm. Benes, whose name 1s rrequently mentioned ln the RFli:
progra.ma by his adherents, 1s damned and condemned both in Bohemla and In Slovakia.
The tact remalns that in Slovakia it 1s Chrlstlanity and Chrlstlan
traditlon whlch gtves strength to the natlon !or lts self-consclou~
resls-tance to communist terror. Communlsm Ls not only polltically,
but also ldeologlcally dangerous and, thererore, the foundatlon for the
psychologlcal fight agaln.st communlsm must be Chrlstlanity and democra.cy. But the programs of RFE must expressively alS-O emphaslze
this outune and not, as heretofore, at limes allow an antl-rellgious , antlChristlan, or even an evidently antl-Cathollc tendency t o be smugglod
lnto lts broadcasts. Among bellevlng people fäls produces a pltlful
bltterne.ss and antilpathy.
So that •RFE could maintaln a s pirit of antl-commun lst resistan<:e
even in Slovakfa, so that it could educate democratilcall y and preach
and teach democracy to our oppressed natlon cut off by the Iron Curtaln trom the West, so that lt could objectlvely and wlthout prejudice Inform the Slovaks about what 1s happening In the world and
generally wlth the ldeologtcal currents In the free world, lt is very
necessary that thls be done In Independent Slovak broadcasts. lt 1s
also necessary that as many S lovak representativ es ot Slovak reslstance In exile as posslble speak to the Slovak people so that RFl~
could lnfluence the wldest circle ot llsteners.
It 1s not healthy to exclude trom tbe possibility or cooperatlon
In this broadcast, whlch no ta bene carrles the name "The Broadcast
of Free Europe," all Slovak patrlots just because thelr political convlctlons are not in accord wlth speciflc polltlcal cliques.
As the sltuatlon In RFE obtalns today, tbls enterprlse has become
the supply lnstitutlon of tbe rlslng generatlon or Czech soclallsts, many
of whom even today are the detenders of Marxlst sociallsm and who up
to 1948, nay even after 1948, collaborated wlth the communlst Prague
regime.
lt Ie a tact that the Slovaks today are llke a "clnderella" In tbe
RFE, somethlng unwanted, something to be scorned. Only about 20
Slovaks are employed tor 140 Czechs; and In s ubordinate positlons. No
Slovak ls employed In the management of tbe enterprlse. Czecb dlrectors declde about tbe Slovaks to be employed, and the Slovak program.s
also are controlled by Czechs, who are not a cqualnted with Slovak prob
lems, nor understand Slovak mentality, Any correctlon In thls relatio1111blp In a joint broadcast 1s slmply going t.arther aw-ay trom the reaJ
questlon whlch can be resolved only by bavlng a separate Slovak
broadcast managed by patrlotlc Slovak people.
One more thought which must be hlghly stressed and that ls the
thought whtch thls RFE b roadcast carries In lts tltle: FREE EUROPE.
lndeed, what we regard as more lmportant and more necesaary In the
lnterest ot the Slovak nation, and in the lnterest or Europe as a
whole, 1s the propogatlon of <the Idea of a rree and unlted Europe. Tllls
Idea must be propagated especlally by RFE already today so that !t
mlght shlne as a llght lnto the future for all oppressed European natlons. That 1s the best way to lead European na.tlons to the consciousnee.e ot E uropean solidarity, to the Idea of a new, just and u nlted
Enrope. B y stresslng tbl11 thought the beat service would be renderetl
�SLOVA:KIA
42
the European nations themselves whlch were heretofore at Joggerheads because ot chauvinlstlc natlonalism, polltlcal fanatlctsms, syntheti,c politlcal partiitňons and the seclusion of one nation trom
the other.
A federalized united Europe ls the big hope especially ot the small
naitlons. It is necessary, therefore, to resurrect a.nd encourage thts
hope in them, because in a united Europe every natlon, small and
large, shall be able to live freely and democracy shall become the
common property of all natlons.
RFE cannot effectJvely combat communism if lt does not respect the natural rights of the individual nations behind rthe Iron
Curtain, lncluding the Slovak natlon. The crusade for treedom must
include ALL nations and exclude NONE. RFE cannot fultill its mis•
slon by allow~ng its broadcasts to insult the politlcal convictlons, the
mentality, the pa,tríotic feelings and national tradltlons ot the Slovaks. The people of Slovakia cannot have confidence in the RFE as
long as it employs renegade Slovaks to promote the Czech cause 01
Czechoslovakism, the bankrupt and dlscredited policies of the Czech
National Sociallsts as propagated by Benes and his followers. The
Slovaks are conscious or tbe !act that they are an lndlvidual naitlon
and as such have an lnherent and God-given rlght to be free and independent. There is no Joglcal explanatlon for RFE or the Volce l•f
America not recognizing or respecting that right. The anti-Slovak
course of the RFE 1s out or line wlth everything that spells A.merica.
Bu-t Slovaks stm hope tihat RFE shall In a very short tlme become
in fact the TRUE volce of a free and united Europe, the volce
of patriotic Slovaks in exile exhorting thelr brethren In Slovakla tú
remain Joyal to thelr Chrlstian and democratic traditlons, - yes.
RFE can and should become the VOICE OF FREE SLOVAKIA.
•
•
•
WHO SAI D IT?
"Our rore1gn pollcy of 1946 wlll be based on Lhe solid, unalterable,
masslve foundatlon of our agreement with the neighborlng SOVIE'ľ
UNION. WE MUST fulflll fully, without besitation, everything resu1ting from tbis foundation . . . . Our relat!ons with the other nelghboNi will be acco1'11ng to the vlewpolnt of the SOVIET Pact. WE
want a strong, democrat!c Poland WHICH WILL COLLABORATE
'WITH THE SOVIET UNION. For another solution of the POLJSH
ques-tion, WE have no time. We want a decent, democratlc Hungary,
C:OLLABORA TING WITH THE SOVIET UNION whlch lives In peace
w!th us. The same applles to Yugoslav!a, Austria and Romanla. ou·r
relatlons w!th the western Allles HAS NOT changed, and WILL NOT
change. We are grateful to Brltaln for her help when she and WE
stood alone. WE appreciate lmmensely and are ~rateful for Amerlcan
interest and sympartby. We will need the help of the western democracies for economtc and cultural reconstructlon." - (Ján Masa•
ryk. Broadcast to Czechoslovakla, London, December 31, 1944) .
•
"Just as Munic-h was undone and does not exist, just so there is
no Slovakia and it does not exist internationally as a state! There is
no Slovak problem, the Slovak problem 1s onr Interna) problem an<I
it !s recognlzed as such even by our allles." - (Dr. Benes, 6-22-43) .
•
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
39
RADIO FREE EUROPE
BY A SLOVAK EXILE
"Radio Free Europe" !s functionlng ln Munich slnce May 1, 1961.
The enterprise in itself ís proof of wha.t Amerícans are capable of do•
ing and the gligantic ftnancial sacrifkes they are wllling to make to
show the enslaved natlons behind the Iron Curtain that they are not
forsaken and 'that 'the western world ís not forgetting about tlhem.
Indeed, thls !s admlrable of the Amerícan people who have contrlbuted
so generously to make the project possible. lt is a big thing, indeed,
íf we follow the present psychologlcal flght aga.inst communlsm and lf
we regard things objectlvely from a broader world vlewpolnt. Radlo
Free Europe aftords the !atest proof of the gratitude earned by
Amerlcans for resistlng communism so vaľiantly, nay, for taking over
the offensl.ve to defeat militarily and politlcally the communls-t
effort and the endless cha.in of -Red lies. Without thls remarkwble resistance of the United States, communism would have the doors open
to the whole world.
Of course, the question of whether Radlo l<'ree Europe (RFE) i5
using .proper methods to fight communism, whether these methods
sumce for polítical reality or whether they comply to the mentality of t'h
. e natlons to which RFE turns w!th its broadcasts, can be
se11lously quest!loned. We must say frank,l y that Americans stm do
not !ully under$and the complexity of the various, special polltical
and natlonal problems existlng in Europe. But for this we cannot
_bla.me them alone, but aH the more can we blame their European
advisors, w·ho frequently ~Ive them a "pa!nted" plcture of the sttuation.
lf RFE !s to perform and fulfill its mission ln the countries behlnd t:he Iron Curtain, it must above all else respect certain natural
reallties; lts broadcasts must respect the polit!cal mentality of the
individual natíons. The broadcasts must not hurt theír feelings, but
must try to gain as wlde a clrcle of lísteners as posslble and influence them. Tben and only then shall RFE fulfill its missdon and oniy
then American dollars shall not be thrown away uselessly.
Today RFE beams lts broadcasts to Czechoslovakia eleven and onehalf bours daily. And even thougb two nat!ons - the Czechs and the
Slovaks - live In Czecboslovakia, despite tbe fact tbat tbls reality is
stressed even in the new Czecbo.!!lovak Constltutlon, even tbougb thls
actuallty bas been acknowledged by the representatlves of the socalled "Czecboslovak resistance" wbo today are in tbe USA and ln
other western countries, nevertheless RFE does not respect theae political realitles, or at least it does not do so consistently.
At home tbe Czechs bave thelll' own Czech broadcastlng statlons
and the Slovaks, too, bave 1ilielr own. That means tbat the Czecbs are
accustomed to listenlng to tbelr Czech broadcasts, whlle the Slovaks
listen to their Slovak statlons. These realltles are respected also
by state broadCQSts, such as the Brltish Broadcasting Corporallion, th~
Itallan Sta'te Broadcast, tbe Vatlcan, Moscow, etc. Only American
broadéastlng statlons - and the VOICE OF AMERICA and RADIO
I•'REE EUROPE es,pec\ally - still insist on a joint Slovak and Czech
broadcast.
40
S LOVAKIA
The Slovaks at home and in exile are a,t a !oss t o understand why.
'l'his certaAnly does not enhance the misslon oí the Volce of A.merica
o r that of Radio Free Europe. In fact it degmdes the idea of democ•
racy in the eyes of the Slovaks and does not attain the deslr ed a nd ne•
cessary effect. The Czechs are not and do not want to be Slovak~,
and the S lovaks are not and do not want to be Czechs. The Czec hs
and Slovaks have been fully aware of this fact for decades, but offic ial Washington still is not. Why?
The valiant reslstance of the Slovak nation agalnst communist
terror, the hundreds of dead Slovak patiiots, t he thousands u pon thousands of impiisoned Slovaks and the love of the Slovak people for the
United Sta.tes of Amerlca rlghtfully deserve that the Slovaks have their
own Independent division in the American broadcastlng systems-especíally in the Volce of A.merica and Radlo Free Europe. Th ls demand
does not emanate from any anti-Czech prejudice, but !rom purely prac•
tlcal needs wlth an eye to t he objectlve that the broadcasts to Slovákia
might fulfm their m ission.
According to report.s of the !atest escapees from Slovakia and the
opinion of Slovak exiles in western E urope, the RFE broadcas.ts are
alien cto .the soul of the Slovak índividual, b ecause t he S lovak program:;
ar e there only for show purposes; Slovak vo ices only assist in CZECH
broa.dca.sts. Furthermore, these broadcasts do not even have regard for
the Christian tradition of the Slovak nation and clo not h ave people
who enjoy lts confldence addresslng it.
At present the Czechostovak broadcasts of Rimio Free Europe
have been entrusted to repr esentatlves of Benes's politlcal conceptlons,
to Messrs. Zenkl and llipka, leaders of .the Czech National Socialists.
To make it appear that Slovaks, too, have a part In lt, Zenkl and Ripka
seleoted a few Slovak politlcal unknowns and recommended them to
R FE as "representa.t:lves o f the Slovak natlon." These enemies of
Slovak freedom and independence, all traitors to the Slovak cause, who
for a pr!ce propagate the dlscredited anti-Slovak and undemocratic
poMcles of Benes, are not and cannot be acceptable to the Slovaks at
horne or in exile. Why should exiled Czechs be a.llowed to -select the
Slovaks to be employed by Radlo Free Europe, the instrument of the
National Comanittee for Free E urope, W'hich 1s su pposed to be an
American institution?
The procedure is undemocratic and immoral and we must protest
against lt. We want to be of service to the cause of freedom and the
truth and that is why we feel it our mora! and politlcal duty ,to bring
these matters before responsible American circles that are lncorrectly informed by "Czechoslovak" polltlclans, who prepared the pre,;ent tragedy for the Slov,ak and Czech nations by thelr capltulationary
and pro-Sovi.et policy.
As far as Slovakia !s concerned, we must once again stress the
fact that the Czechoslovak polltical conception 1s not popular among
the Slovak people and, therefore, no Idea presented In the name of thls
conceptlon can catch the mlnds of the Slovaks. Even RFE canno t f,lght
psychologlcally agalnst communlsm In Slovakia in the name of -thls conceptlon. Th e name of Masaryk, popular among Czechs, ls not popular
at all In Slovakla and it canno t arouse the S\ovaks to figh t agalnst
SLOVAKIA
41
communlsm. Benes, whose name 1s rrequently mentioned ln the RFli:
progra.ma by his adherents, 1s damned and condemned both in Bohemla and In Slovakia.
The tact remalns that in Slovakia it 1s Chrlstlanity and Chrlstlan
traditlon whlch gtves strength to the natlon !or lts self-consclou~
resls-tance to communist terror. Communlsm Ls not only polltically,
but also ldeologlcally dangerous and, thererore, the foundatlon for the
psychologlcal fight agaln.st communlsm must be Chrlstlanity and democra.cy. But the programs of RFE must expressively alS-O emphaslze
this outune and not, as heretofore, at limes allow an antl-rellgious , antlChristlan, or even an evidently antl-Cathollc tendency t o be smugglod
lnto lts broadcasts. Among bellevlng people fäls produces a pltlful
bltterne.ss and antilpathy.
So that •RFE could maintaln a s pirit of antl-commun lst resistan<:e
even in Slovakfa, so that it could educate democratilcall y and preach
and teach democracy to our oppressed natlon cut off by the Iron Curtaln trom the West, so that lt could objectlvely and wlthout prejudice Inform the Slovaks about what 1s happening In the world and
generally wlth the ldeologtcal currents In the free world, lt is very
necessary that thls be done In Independent Slovak broadcasts. lt 1s
also necessary that as many S lovak representativ es ot Slovak reslstance In exile as posslble speak to the Slovak people so that RFl~
could lnfluence the wldest circle ot llsteners.
It 1s not healthy to exclude trom tbe possibility or cooperatlon
In this broadcast, whlch no ta bene carrles the name "The Broadcast
of Free Europe," all Slovak patrlots just because thelr political convlctlons are not in accord wlth speciflc polltlcal cliques.
As the sltuatlon In RFE obtalns today, tbls enterprlse has become
the supply lnstitutlon of tbe rlslng generatlon or Czech soclallsts, many
of whom even today are the detenders of Marxlst sociallsm and who up
to 1948, nay even after 1948, collaborated wlth the communlst Prague
regime.
lt Ie a tact that the Slovaks today are llke a "clnderella" In tbe
RFE, somethlng unwanted, something to be scorned. Only about 20
Slovaks are employed tor 140 Czechs; and In s ubordinate positlons. No
Slovak ls employed In the management of tbe enterprlse. Czecb dlrectors declde about tbe Slovaks to be employed, and the Slovak program.s
also are controlled by Czechs, who are not a cqualnted with Slovak prob
lems, nor understand Slovak mentality, Any correctlon In thls relatio1111blp In a joint broadcast 1s slmply going t.arther aw-ay trom the reaJ
questlon whlch can be resolved only by bavlng a separate Slovak
broadcast managed by patrlotlc Slovak people.
One more thought which must be hlghly stressed and that ls the
thought whtch thls RFE b roadcast carries In lts tltle: FREE EUROPE.
lndeed, what we regard as more lmportant and more necesaary In the
lnterest ot the Slovak nation, and in the lnterest or Europe as a
whole, 1s the propogatlon of <the Idea of a rree and unlted Europe. Tllls
Idea must be propagated especlally by RFE already today so that !t
mlght shlne as a llght lnto the future for all oppressed European natlons. That 1s the best way to lead European na.tlons to the consciousnee.e ot E uropean solidarity, to the Idea of a new, just and u nlted
Enrope. B y stresslng tbl11 thought the beat service would be renderetl
SLOVA:KIA
42
the European nations themselves whlch were heretofore at Joggerheads because ot chauvinlstlc natlonalism, polltlcal fanatlctsms, syntheti,c politlcal partiitňons and the seclusion of one nation trom
the other.
A federalized united Europe ls the big hope especially ot the small
naitlons. It is necessary, therefore, to resurrect a.nd encourage thts
hope in them, because in a united Europe every natlon, small and
large, shall be able to live freely and democracy shall become the
common property of all natlons.
RFE cannot effectJvely combat communism if lt does not respect the natural rights of the individual nations behind rthe Iron
Curtain, lncluding the Slovak natlon. The crusade for treedom must
include ALL nations and exclude NONE. RFE cannot fultill its mis•
slon by allow~ng its broadcasts to insult the politlcal convictlons, the
mentality, the pa,tríotic feelings and national tradltlons ot the Slovaks. The people of Slovakia cannot have confidence in the RFE as
long as it employs renegade Slovaks to promote the Czech cause 01
Czechoslovakism, the bankrupt and dlscredited policies of the Czech
National Sociallsts as propagated by Benes and his followers. The
Slovaks are conscious or tbe !act that they are an lndlvidual naitlon
and as such have an lnherent and God-given rlght to be free and independent. There is no Joglcal explanatlon for RFE or the Volce l•f
America not recognizing or respecting that right. The anti-Slovak
course of the RFE 1s out or line wlth everything that spells A.merica.
Bu-t Slovaks stm hope tihat RFE shall In a very short tlme become
in fact the TRUE volce of a free and united Europe, the volce
of patriotic Slovaks in exile exhorting thelr brethren In Slovakla tú
remain Joyal to thelr Chrlstian and democratic traditlons, - yes.
RFE can and should become the VOICE OF FREE SLOVAKIA.
•
•
•
WHO SAI D IT?
"Our rore1gn pollcy of 1946 wlll be based on Lhe solid, unalterable,
masslve foundatlon of our agreement with the neighborlng SOVIE'ľ
UNION. WE MUST fulflll fully, without besitation, everything resu1ting from tbis foundation . . . . Our relat!ons with the other nelghboNi will be acco1'11ng to the vlewpolnt of the SOVIET Pact. WE
want a strong, democrat!c Poland WHICH WILL COLLABORATE
'WITH THE SOVIET UNION. For another solution of the POLJSH
ques-tion, WE have no time. We want a decent, democratlc Hungary,
C:OLLABORA TING WITH THE SOVIET UNION whlch lives In peace
w!th us. The same applles to Yugoslav!a, Austria and Romanla. ou·r
relatlons w!th the western Allles HAS NOT changed, and WILL NOT
change. We are grateful to Brltaln for her help when she and WE
stood alone. WE appreciate lmmensely and are ~rateful for Amerlcan
interest and sympartby. We will need the help of the western democracies for economtc and cultural reconstructlon." - (Ján Masa•
ryk. Broadcast to Czechoslovakla, London, December 31, 1944) .
•
"Just as Munic-h was undone and does not exist, just so there is
no Slovakia and it does not exist internationally as a state! There is
no Slovak problem, the Slovak problem 1s onr Interna) problem an<I
it !s recognlzed as such even by our allles." - (Dr. Benes, 6-22-43) .
•
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Radio Free Europe
Description
An account of the resource
By A Slovak Exile
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951
pp. 39-42
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a381cf65883b3c9382b41ca001a3fdce.pdf
b73421c08544cb795b727805d3d56009
PDF Text
Text
SLOV.AKIA
43
IDSTORY OF SWVAK ART
Exposed to many influences, Slovakia bas had a variegated history. Stamped brlcks, excavated at various points. lndicate that the
Romans extended their domlnlon beyond the Danube lnto the area
whlch 1s now Slovakia. As early as the seventh century these reglons
were lnhablted by tbe ancestors of the Slovaks who had to defend
themselves agalnst the Uralo-Altaic Avars. Thls perlod 1s characterlzed
by a mlxture of Slovak and Avar influences. In the nlnth century,
the Great Moravian state was an lmportant factor, but it was extingulshed by the Magyars.
Stability dld not ensue unt!l the time of the bu!lding of castles
and of settlements round about them. Their rulns form one of the
picturesque attract!ons of present-day Slovakla. At flrst the castles
were but rudely bui!t structures for defense. Gradually more ornate
forms of archltecture were employed. The apse of the castle at Nitra
is a remnant of the old baslllca consecrated about the year 830. Some
thlrty years later the Slovak apostles Salnts Cyril and Methodlus,
held servlces here. Parts of the cathedra\ at Spišská Kapitula In
Spiš, and the churches at Deakovce. Saint Benadlk on the Hron,
and a few chapel rotundas. are remnants of thls early perlod.
Gothlc monuments are to be found in the Spiš reglon. There is
evldence here of the influence of the Franklsh school of architecture.
Gothic archltecture spread lnto Slovakla princlpally from Poland and
Sllesia. Remarkable as a well-nlgh perfect example of Gothlc a.rchitecture is the church of Saint James at Levoč:i.. The 21 metre hlgh
altar !s noteworthy. Nothing llke lt ls to be found In the West. King
Zapolya's chapel at Spišský Štvrtok (Donnersmark) is one of the
ruost notable edlflces of thls period, consistlng of two Gothic stories
above eacb otber. Bratislava, Košice, Bardiov, Prešov, and Trnava.
can also boast of Gothic edifices. The oldest frescoes date from the
year 1317. Spišská Kapitula, Levoča, Bardiov, and Kežmarok, have
large wing altar paint!ngs in thelr churches.
The lnfluence of Renalssance archltecture. comlng trom Italy,
affected the buildlng of castles first. Between the flfteenth and
eighteenth centuries most of the cities and towns of Spiš belonged to
Poland. Thls lnfluenced the archltecture of the perlod.
The Jesults built the first baroque churches. From the Danube
the baroque style of archltecture, emanatlng from Vlenna, spread
over all Slovakla. The baroque tower of the Bratislava City Hall resembles that of Diirnsteln In tbe Wachan reglon of Austrla. The
castle at Bratislava was renovated by Maria Theresa, 1740 to 1780.
At the foot of the castle the noblllty, whlch always lmltated royalty,
bullt thelr splendld palaces. The Grassalkovich Palace and the Palace
of the Prlmate, the latter bullt by Hlldebrand, are two remarkably
fine speclmens of thls perlod. The lnterlors were exquisltely deco•
rated. Thls luxury-lovlng era saw the introduction of fine tapestrles
and gobelins. Sculptures decorate the exterlors and carvlngs the lnterlors of these bu!ldlngs.
The Protestant churcb bullding!< disclose the archltectural In·
fluence of Germany. The large wooden churches at Kežmarok and at
�44
SLOVAKIA
tbe village of Veľká Paludza are unique for Centra) Europe. Tbe
wooden Greek Cathollc churches in Eastern Slovakia are of special
interest, because they are creations of the common people.
In the Jarge towns there are beautiful buildings in the Empire
style. Most or them were designed by Vienna architects.
The latter part of the nineteenth century shows the prevalence
of Budapest influences, tbough some architects and artists went to
Vienna, Municb, and Prague to complete their training.
•
•
•
•
SUBTERRANEAN CAVES OF SLOVAKJA
Subterranean caves are found in the immense calcareous complexes of Slovakia. Tbe llmestone masses were convulsed tectonically
by the foldlng of the Carpatbians and turned into Karst formations
during the tertiary and diluvial geological eras. Thus there came into
existence t he multitude of exquisitely beautiful and most interesting
caves which must be regarded as amongst the marvels of Europe.
Depending on how far the Karst process developed, they may be
divided lnto two groups: lone caves comlng into existence on slopes;
and extensive cavern Jabyr!nths.
The ice caverns belong to the f!rst group. Within them ice is
preserved in a natural manner. Magnif!cent ls the world-known ice
cavern at Dobšiná which was discovered In the year 1870 by some
s hepherds. It is now access!ble to the general public and a v!sit does
not require any special physical effort. The lce 1s estimated at about
125,000 cub!c meters and weighs about a mlllion tons.
The cavern labyrlnths of Demänová, discovered in 1921, belong
to the second group. It was found by persons who were seeking the
course of the Domica brook, wbich d!sappeared suddenly. Here are
imposing views upon enormous subterranean s paces, where the wild
scenery of catastrophes wh!ch occurred ages ago still 1s visible. Yet
the exploration of this inferno paradise can be undertaken without the
sllghtest danger. One walks about leisurely througb former beds of
streams and through cool water tunnels. One beholds brooklets
which descend with deafening clamor into terriflc deptbs. To penetrate deeply into this vast labyrinth is an experience of a lifetime. It
is a mysterious world full o[ surprislng variety. 'ľhere are majestic
halls adorned with stalactites situated In many stories underneath
each other. One can see travertine formations in glorious sbapes.
Everyth!ng glistens resplendently. Mysteriously shaped natural sculpture abounds in variegated shades of colors. Such real Venus grottoes
perhaps are not to be found elsewbere. The cllmax of all this mightiness are the 360 foot preclpices at the bottom of whlch are fairly-like
halls wh!ch were discovered In 1927.
lt is a fortunate coincidence that these subterranean marvels are
situated so near to the resorts of the High Tatra Mountalns. From
them also the Bela stalactite caverns and the Važeca cave may be
vis!ted with ease.
Further subterranean Jabyrinths are to he founcl in the Svätojánska dolina near Jasov and at Hosusovo, the latter perhaps the most
magnif!cent of all. It was not discovered unt!I 1926.
�
SLOV.AKIA
43
IDSTORY OF SWVAK ART
Exposed to many influences, Slovakia bas had a variegated history. Stamped brlcks, excavated at various points. lndicate that the
Romans extended their domlnlon beyond the Danube lnto the area
whlch 1s now Slovakia. As early as the seventh century these reglons
were lnhablted by tbe ancestors of the Slovaks who had to defend
themselves agalnst the Uralo-Altaic Avars. Thls perlod 1s characterlzed
by a mlxture of Slovak and Avar influences. In the nlnth century,
the Great Moravian state was an lmportant factor, but it was extingulshed by the Magyars.
Stability dld not ensue unt!l the time of the bu!lding of castles
and of settlements round about them. Their rulns form one of the
picturesque attract!ons of present-day Slovakla. At flrst the castles
were but rudely bui!t structures for defense. Gradually more ornate
forms of archltecture were employed. The apse of the castle at Nitra
is a remnant of the old baslllca consecrated about the year 830. Some
thlrty years later the Slovak apostles Salnts Cyril and Methodlus,
held servlces here. Parts of the cathedra\ at Spišská Kapitula In
Spiš, and the churches at Deakovce. Saint Benadlk on the Hron,
and a few chapel rotundas. are remnants of thls early perlod.
Gothlc monuments are to be found in the Spiš reglon. There is
evldence here of the influence of the Franklsh school of architecture.
Gothic archltecture spread lnto Slovakla princlpally from Poland and
Sllesia. Remarkable as a well-nlgh perfect example of Gothlc a.rchitecture is the church of Saint James at Levoč:i.. The 21 metre hlgh
altar !s noteworthy. Nothing llke lt ls to be found In the West. King
Zapolya's chapel at Spišský Štvrtok (Donnersmark) is one of the
ruost notable edlflces of thls period, consistlng of two Gothic stories
above eacb otber. Bratislava, Košice, Bardiov, Prešov, and Trnava.
can also boast of Gothic edifices. The oldest frescoes date from the
year 1317. Spišská Kapitula, Levoča, Bardiov, and Kežmarok, have
large wing altar paint!ngs in thelr churches.
The lnfluence of Renalssance archltecture. comlng trom Italy,
affected the buildlng of castles first. Between the flfteenth and
eighteenth centuries most of the cities and towns of Spiš belonged to
Poland. Thls lnfluenced the archltecture of the perlod.
The Jesults built the first baroque churches. From the Danube
the baroque style of archltecture, emanatlng from Vlenna, spread
over all Slovakla. The baroque tower of the Bratislava City Hall resembles that of Diirnsteln In tbe Wachan reglon of Austrla. The
castle at Bratislava was renovated by Maria Theresa, 1740 to 1780.
At the foot of the castle the noblllty, whlch always lmltated royalty,
bullt thelr splendld palaces. The Grassalkovich Palace and the Palace
of the Prlmate, the latter bullt by Hlldebrand, are two remarkably
fine speclmens of thls perlod. The lnterlors were exquisltely deco•
rated. Thls luxury-lovlng era saw the introduction of fine tapestrles
and gobelins. Sculptures decorate the exterlors and carvlngs the lnterlors of these bu!ldlngs.
The Protestant churcb bullding!< disclose the archltectural In·
fluence of Germany. The large wooden churches at Kežmarok and at
�44
SLOVAKIA
tbe village of Veľká Paludza are unique for Centra) Europe. Tbe
wooden Greek Cathollc churches in Eastern Slovakia are of special
interest, because they are creations of the common people.
In the Jarge towns there are beautiful buildings in the Empire
style. Most or them were designed by Vienna architects.
The latter part of the nineteenth century shows the prevalence
of Budapest influences, tbough some architects and artists went to
Vienna, Municb, and Prague to complete their training.
•
•
•
•
SUBTERRANEAN CAVES OF SLOVAKJA
Subterranean caves are found in the immense calcareous complexes of Slovakia. Tbe llmestone masses were convulsed tectonically
by the foldlng of the Carpatbians and turned into Karst formations
during the tertiary and diluvial geological eras. Thus there came into
existence t he multitude of exquisitely beautiful and most interesting
caves which must be regarded as amongst the marvels of Europe.
Depending on how far the Karst process developed, they may be
divided lnto two groups: lone caves comlng into existence on slopes;
and extensive cavern Jabyr!nths.
The ice caverns belong to the f!rst group. Within them ice is
preserved in a natural manner. Magnif!cent ls the world-known ice
cavern at Dobšiná which was discovered In the year 1870 by some
s hepherds. It is now access!ble to the general public and a v!sit does
not require any special physical effort. The lce 1s estimated at about
125,000 cub!c meters and weighs about a mlllion tons.
The cavern labyrlnths of Demänová, discovered in 1921, belong
to the second group. It was found by persons who were seeking the
course of the Domica brook, wbich d!sappeared suddenly. Here are
imposing views upon enormous subterranean s paces, where the wild
scenery of catastrophes wh!ch occurred ages ago still 1s visible. Yet
the exploration of this inferno paradise can be undertaken without the
sllghtest danger. One walks about leisurely througb former beds of
streams and through cool water tunnels. One beholds brooklets
which descend with deafening clamor into terriflc deptbs. To penetrate deeply into this vast labyrinth is an experience of a lifetime. It
is a mysterious world full o[ surprislng variety. 'ľhere are majestic
halls adorned with stalactites situated In many stories underneath
each other. One can see travertine formations in glorious sbapes.
Everyth!ng glistens resplendently. Mysteriously shaped natural sculpture abounds in variegated shades of colors. Such real Venus grottoes
perhaps are not to be found elsewbere. The cllmax of all this mightiness are the 360 foot preclpices at the bottom of whlch are fairly-like
halls wh!ch were discovered In 1927.
lt is a fortunate coincidence that these subterranean marvels are
situated so near to the resorts of the High Tatra Mountalns. From
them also the Bela stalactite caverns and the Važeca cave may be
vis!ted with ease.
Further subterranean Jabyrinths are to he founcl in the Svätojánska dolina near Jasov and at Hosusovo, the latter perhaps the most
magnif!cent of all. It was not discovered unt!I 1926.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOV.AKIA
43
IDSTORY OF SWVAK ART
Exposed to many influences, Slovakia bas had a variegated history. Stamped brlcks, excavated at various points. lndicate that the
Romans extended their domlnlon beyond the Danube lnto the area
whlch 1s now Slovakia. As early as the seventh century these reglons
were lnhablted by tbe ancestors of the Slovaks who had to defend
themselves agalnst the Uralo-Altaic Avars. Thls perlod 1s characterlzed
by a mlxture of Slovak and Avar influences. In the nlnth century,
the Great Moravian state was an lmportant factor, but it was extingulshed by the Magyars.
Stability dld not ensue unt!l the time of the bu!lding of castles
and of settlements round about them. Their rulns form one of the
picturesque attract!ons of present-day Slovakla. At flrst the castles
were but rudely bui!t structures for defense. Gradually more ornate
forms of archltecture were employed. The apse of the castle at Nitra
is a remnant of the old baslllca consecrated about the year 830. Some
thlrty years later the Slovak apostles Salnts Cyril and Methodlus,
held servlces here. Parts of the cathedra\ at Spišská Kapitula In
Spiš, and the churches at Deakovce. Saint Benadlk on the Hron,
and a few chapel rotundas. are remnants of thls early perlod.
Gothlc monuments are to be found in the Spiš reglon. There is
evldence here of the influence of the Franklsh school of architecture.
Gothic archltecture spread lnto Slovakla princlpally from Poland and
Sllesia. Remarkable as a well-nlgh perfect example of Gothlc a.rchitecture is the church of Saint James at Levoč:i.. The 21 metre hlgh
altar !s noteworthy. Nothing llke lt ls to be found In the West. King
Zapolya's chapel at Spišský Štvrtok (Donnersmark) is one of the
ruost notable edlflces of thls period, consistlng of two Gothic stories
above eacb otber. Bratislava, Košice, Bardiov, Prešov, and Trnava.
can also boast of Gothic edifices. The oldest frescoes date from the
year 1317. Spišská Kapitula, Levoča, Bardiov, and Kežmarok, have
large wing altar paint!ngs in thelr churches.
The lnfluence of Renalssance archltecture. comlng trom Italy,
affected the buildlng of castles first. Between the flfteenth and
eighteenth centuries most of the cities and towns of Spiš belonged to
Poland. Thls lnfluenced the archltecture of the perlod.
The Jesults built the first baroque churches. From the Danube
the baroque style of archltecture, emanatlng from Vlenna, spread
over all Slovakla. The baroque tower of the Bratislava City Hall resembles that of Diirnsteln In tbe Wachan reglon of Austrla. The
castle at Bratislava was renovated by Maria Theresa, 1740 to 1780.
At the foot of the castle the noblllty, whlch always lmltated royalty,
bullt thelr splendld palaces. The Grassalkovich Palace and the Palace
of the Prlmate, the latter bullt by Hlldebrand, are two remarkably
fine speclmens of thls perlod. The lnterlors were exquisltely deco•
rated. Thls luxury-lovlng era saw the introduction of fine tapestrles
and gobelins. Sculptures decorate the exterlors and carvlngs the lnterlors of these bu!ldlngs.
The Protestant churcb bullding!< disclose the archltectural In·
fluence of Germany. The large wooden churches at Kežmarok and at
44
SLOVAKIA
tbe village of Veľká Paludza are unique for Centra) Europe. Tbe
wooden Greek Cathollc churches in Eastern Slovakia are of special
interest, because they are creations of the common people.
In the Jarge towns there are beautiful buildings in the Empire
style. Most or them were designed by Vienna architects.
The latter part of the nineteenth century shows the prevalence
of Budapest influences, tbough some architects and artists went to
Vienna, Municb, and Prague to complete their training.
•
•
•
•
SUBTERRANEAN CAVES OF SLOVAKJA
Subterranean caves are found in the immense calcareous complexes of Slovakia. Tbe llmestone masses were convulsed tectonically
by the foldlng of the Carpatbians and turned into Karst formations
during the tertiary and diluvial geological eras. Thus there came into
existence t he multitude of exquisitely beautiful and most interesting
caves which must be regarded as amongst the marvels of Europe.
Depending on how far the Karst process developed, they may be
divided lnto two groups: lone caves comlng into existence on slopes;
and extensive cavern Jabyr!nths.
The ice caverns belong to the f!rst group. Within them ice is
preserved in a natural manner. Magnif!cent ls the world-known ice
cavern at Dobšiná which was discovered In the year 1870 by some
s hepherds. It is now access!ble to the general public and a v!sit does
not require any special physical effort. The lce 1s estimated at about
125,000 cub!c meters and weighs about a mlllion tons.
The cavern labyrlnths of Demänová, discovered in 1921, belong
to the second group. It was found by persons who were seeking the
course of the Domica brook, wbich d!sappeared suddenly. Here are
imposing views upon enormous subterranean s paces, where the wild
scenery of catastrophes wh!ch occurred ages ago still 1s visible. Yet
the exploration of this inferno paradise can be undertaken without the
sllghtest danger. One walks about leisurely througb former beds of
streams and through cool water tunnels. One beholds brooklets
which descend with deafening clamor into terriflc deptbs. To penetrate deeply into this vast labyrinth is an experience of a lifetime. It
is a mysterious world full o[ surprislng variety. 'ľhere are majestic
halls adorned with stalactites situated In many stories underneath
each other. One can see travertine formations in glorious sbapes.
Everyth!ng glistens resplendently. Mysteriously shaped natural sculpture abounds in variegated shades of colors. Such real Venus grottoes
perhaps are not to be found elsewbere. The cllmax of all this mightiness are the 360 foot preclpices at the bottom of whlch are fairly-like
halls wh!ch were discovered In 1927.
lt is a fortunate coincidence that these subterranean marvels are
situated so near to the resorts of the High Tatra Mountalns. From
them also the Bela stalactite caverns and the Važeca cave may be
vis!ted with ease.
Further subterranean Jabyrinths are to he founcl in the Svätojánska dolina near Jasov and at Hosusovo, the latter perhaps the most
magnif!cent of all. It was not discovered unt!I 1926.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
History of Slovak Art
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951
pp. 43-44
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/82c911652f06669a035681777a59135b.pdf
4a24bd63f4ddad2faf45a79ce0d14d70
PDF Text
Text
44
SLOVAKIA
tbe village of Veľká Paludza are unique for Centra) Europe. Tbe
wooden Greek Cathollc churches in Eastern Slovakia are of special
interest, because they are creations of the common people.
In the Jarge towns there are beautiful buildings in the Empire
style. Most or them were designed by Vienna architects.
The latter part of the nineteenth century shows the prevalence
of Budapest influences, tbough some architects and artists went to
Vienna, Municb, and Prague to complete their training.
•
•
•
•
SUBTERRANEAN CAVES OF SLOVAKJA
Subterranean caves are found in the immense calcareous complexes of Slovakia. Tbe llmestone masses were convulsed tectonically
by the foldlng of the Carpatbians and turned into Karst formations
during the tertiary and diluvial geological eras. Thus there came into
existence t he multitude of exquisitely beautiful and most interesting
caves which must be regarded as amongst the marvels of Europe.
Depending on how far the Karst process developed, they may be
divided lnto two groups: lone caves comlng into existence on slopes;
and extensive cavern Jabyr!nths.
The ice caverns belong to the f!rst group. Within them ice is
preserved in a natural manner. Magnif!cent ls the world-known ice
cavern at Dobšiná which was discovered In the year 1870 by some
s hepherds. It is now access!ble to the general public and a v!sit does
not require any special physical effort. The lce 1s estimated at about
125,000 cub!c meters and weighs about a mlllion tons.
The cavern labyrlnths of Demänová, discovered in 1921, belong
to the second group. It was found by persons who were seeking the
course of the Domica brook, wbich d!sappeared suddenly. Here are
imposing views upon enormous subterranean s paces, where the wild
scenery of catastrophes wh!ch occurred ages ago still 1s visible. Yet
the exploration of this inferno paradise can be undertaken without the
sllghtest danger. One walks about leisurely througb former beds of
streams and through cool water tunnels. One beholds brooklets
which descend with deafening clamor into terriflc deptbs. To penetrate deeply into this vast labyrinth is an experience of a lifetime. It
is a mysterious world full o[ surprislng variety. 'ľhere are majestic
halls adorned with stalactites situated In many stories underneath
each other. One can see travertine formations in glorious sbapes.
Everyth!ng glistens resplendently. Mysteriously shaped natural sculpture abounds in variegated shades of colors. Such real Venus grottoes
perhaps are not to be found elsewbere. The cllmax of all this mightiness are the 360 foot preclpices at the bottom of whlch are fairly-like
halls wh!ch were discovered In 1927.
lt is a fortunate coincidence that these subterranean marvels are
situated so near to the resorts of the High Tatra Mountalns. From
them also the Bela stalactite caverns and the Važeca cave may be
vis!ted with ease.
Further subterranean Jabyrinths are to he founcl in the Svätojánska dolina near Jasov and at Hosusovo, the latter perhaps the most
magnif!cent of all. It was not discovered unt!I 1926.
�
44
SLOVAKIA
tbe village of Veľká Paludza are unique for Centra) Europe. Tbe
wooden Greek Cathollc churches in Eastern Slovakia are of special
interest, because they are creations of the common people.
In the Jarge towns there are beautiful buildings in the Empire
style. Most or them were designed by Vienna architects.
The latter part of the nineteenth century shows the prevalence
of Budapest influences, tbough some architects and artists went to
Vienna, Municb, and Prague to complete their training.
•
•
•
•
SUBTERRANEAN CAVES OF SLOVAKJA
Subterranean caves are found in the immense calcareous complexes of Slovakia. Tbe llmestone masses were convulsed tectonically
by the foldlng of the Carpatbians and turned into Karst formations
during the tertiary and diluvial geological eras. Thus there came into
existence t he multitude of exquisitely beautiful and most interesting
caves which must be regarded as amongst the marvels of Europe.
Depending on how far the Karst process developed, they may be
divided lnto two groups: lone caves comlng into existence on slopes;
and extensive cavern Jabyr!nths.
The ice caverns belong to the f!rst group. Within them ice is
preserved in a natural manner. Magnif!cent ls the world-known ice
cavern at Dobšiná which was discovered In the year 1870 by some
s hepherds. It is now access!ble to the general public and a v!sit does
not require any special physical effort. The lce 1s estimated at about
125,000 cub!c meters and weighs about a mlllion tons.
The cavern labyrlnths of Demänová, discovered in 1921, belong
to the second group. It was found by persons who were seeking the
course of the Domica brook, wbich d!sappeared suddenly. Here are
imposing views upon enormous subterranean s paces, where the wild
scenery of catastrophes wh!ch occurred ages ago still 1s visible. Yet
the exploration of this inferno paradise can be undertaken without the
sllghtest danger. One walks about leisurely througb former beds of
streams and through cool water tunnels. One beholds brooklets
which descend with deafening clamor into terriflc deptbs. To penetrate deeply into this vast labyrinth is an experience of a lifetime. It
is a mysterious world full o[ surprislng variety. 'ľhere are majestic
halls adorned with stalactites situated In many stories underneath
each other. One can see travertine formations in glorious sbapes.
Everyth!ng glistens resplendently. Mysteriously shaped natural sculpture abounds in variegated shades of colors. Such real Venus grottoes
perhaps are not to be found elsewbere. The cllmax of all this mightiness are the 360 foot preclpices at the bottom of whlch are fairly-like
halls wh!ch were discovered In 1927.
lt is a fortunate coincidence that these subterranean marvels are
situated so near to the resorts of the High Tatra Mountalns. From
them also the Bela stalactite caverns and the Važeca cave may be
vis!ted with ease.
Further subterranean Jabyrinths are to he founcl in the Svätojánska dolina near Jasov and at Hosusovo, the latter perhaps the most
magnif!cent of all. It was not discovered unt!I 1926.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
44
SLOVAKIA
tbe village of Veľká Paludza are unique for Centra) Europe. Tbe
wooden Greek Cathollc churches in Eastern Slovakia are of special
interest, because they are creations of the common people.
In the Jarge towns there are beautiful buildings in the Empire
style. Most or them were designed by Vienna architects.
The latter part of the nineteenth century shows the prevalence
of Budapest influences, tbough some architects and artists went to
Vienna, Municb, and Prague to complete their training.
•
•
•
•
SUBTERRANEAN CAVES OF SLOVAKJA
Subterranean caves are found in the immense calcareous complexes of Slovakia. Tbe llmestone masses were convulsed tectonically
by the foldlng of the Carpatbians and turned into Karst formations
during the tertiary and diluvial geological eras. Thus there came into
existence t he multitude of exquisitely beautiful and most interesting
caves which must be regarded as amongst the marvels of Europe.
Depending on how far the Karst process developed, they may be
divided lnto two groups: lone caves comlng into existence on slopes;
and extensive cavern Jabyr!nths.
The ice caverns belong to the f!rst group. Within them ice is
preserved in a natural manner. Magnif!cent ls the world-known ice
cavern at Dobšiná which was discovered In the year 1870 by some
s hepherds. It is now access!ble to the general public and a v!sit does
not require any special physical effort. The lce 1s estimated at about
125,000 cub!c meters and weighs about a mlllion tons.
The cavern labyrlnths of Demänová, discovered in 1921, belong
to the second group. It was found by persons who were seeking the
course of the Domica brook, wbich d!sappeared suddenly. Here are
imposing views upon enormous subterranean s paces, where the wild
scenery of catastrophes wh!ch occurred ages ago still 1s visible. Yet
the exploration of this inferno paradise can be undertaken without the
sllghtest danger. One walks about leisurely througb former beds of
streams and through cool water tunnels. One beholds brooklets
which descend with deafening clamor into terriflc deptbs. To penetrate deeply into this vast labyrinth is an experience of a lifetime. It
is a mysterious world full o[ surprislng variety. 'ľhere are majestic
halls adorned with stalactites situated In many stories underneath
each other. One can see travertine formations in glorious sbapes.
Everyth!ng glistens resplendently. Mysteriously shaped natural sculpture abounds in variegated shades of colors. Such real Venus grottoes
perhaps are not to be found elsewbere. The cllmax of all this mightiness are the 360 foot preclpices at the bottom of whlch are fairly-like
halls wh!ch were discovered In 1927.
lt is a fortunate coincidence that these subterranean marvels are
situated so near to the resorts of the High Tatra Mountalns. From
them also the Bela stalactite caverns and the Važeca cave may be
vis!ted with ease.
Further subterranean Jabyrinths are to he founcl in the Svätojánska dolina near Jasov and at Hosusovo, the latter perhaps the most
magnif!cent of all. It was not discovered unt!I 1926.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Subterranean Caves of Slovakia
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951
p. 44
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a2b785ff29172bb25725fc31a56885d4.pdf
6c84b656505739b67f12330875b66208
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
45
POLITICAL REFUGEES OK RED AGENTS?
OR.
JOHN VLK OLIN SKÝ
The large number of Czech politicos, members of parliament, officers and soldiers who fled to Germany in 1940 raised the 11uestion:
Could this possibly have happened without the assent of the Prague
communist regime?
The boundary between Bavaria and Bohemia is only several
kilometers long, and already in the summer of 1948 - just several
mon-ths ai~ter Beneš and ·his followers su1•rEmdered the government
to tbe communists - Dr. Rlpka announced in Parls that some 18,000
Czecbs had fled to other countrles.
rt is slgnificant that all the aces or Dr. Beneš's National Socialist
Party - The Czech Nazi Party - began leavlng the country as if under orders. And all got away without incidents or accidents. After
them, we flnd a stream of soldiers - tbose who enjoyed the sympatby
or the wes-tern allies - "escaping" into the U. S. Zone of Germany.
But who escaped from SLOVAKIA? Only members of certain
families and a few persona wbo swore to promote the "Czechoslovak"
program and had family ties with the Lettrlchites, ·the Hodžas, Palkos, etc. Many of them departed in luxurlous limouslnes, wlth diplomatlc passes and devlces, wlth visas for European and other countries. All those "little things" had been taken care of in Prague before their "mlraculous" escape.
It is not at all strange, then, if some one asks how these '"enemles" of communism could have "escaped" so easlly without the
consent of Gottwald?
Robert Ingrim - author of the successful book " After Hitler
Stalln ?" - wrote on the subject in 1948. His article " A Secret Czech
'ľreaty?" was published in the Swiss "VATERLANO" September 25,
1948. He wrote:
"Thirteen generals, eight ministers, the Mayor of Prague - this is
but a smalt group of the Czech emigrants that has crossed over to
the west to date.
"They have one thing in common: AII were leading members of
the National Socialist Party of Dr. Beneš. Their famllies are with
lhem, as well as a goodly number of diplomats and consuls, who jolned
them. They have no financial difflcu lties. Tney are working energetically in Washington, London and Paris to establlsh a new exile
government. After America beats up the Soviet Union, this exile
government would be called to lead Bohemia 'back to Beneš.'
"The interestjng thlng a bout all this is the fact that all these
gentlemen had succeeded in crossing the Czech border without difficulty and wlthout incident.
"The <Statement or Peter Zenkl, former Mayor of Ptrag,ue, that he
was saved by some one wbo had blindrotded bim so that he could not
see bis rescuers. is somethlng for political children of whom tbere are
more In America tban in Europe.
"Wberever the communists seizect power, tbere the leading opponent.s of communism were carefully watched, if not arrested. But
�46
SLOVAKIA
in this case, it seems that the Czech commun!st police failed completely. . . . !
"But other extraordlnary and strange things happened before
ihat tlme. Why did not Beneš res!gn lmmedlately as a sign of protest agalnst the communlst putsch? Why dld he recognlze the new
rulers and defend them? Why did he tbus glve them the signlClcant
appearance of legltlmacy?
"Besldes Beneš's trustworthies, there are in exile several of
his politlcal opponents. In the past weeks I have read reports from
varlous parts that motlvate the conjecture that there was a secret
treaty concluded between Beneš and bis successor Gottwald before he declded to instalľ Zápotockťs government. Thls agreemen( is
su pposed to embrace the following polnts:
1. War between America and the Soviet Union is inev!table;
2. but the outcome of thls war ls uncertaln;
3. when the war ends, the Czechs must be on the right side;
4. they must, therefore, be on both sides before the war;
5. the communlsts wlll enable the departure of the leadlng generals and clvllians of the Qzech Natlonal Socialist Party; and
6. In 1,eturn the Czeoh Nat!onal Soclal!sts, when they return to
Czechoslovakla as victors, promi.se to spare the leadlng commun!sts.
"Such an agreement would make many thlngs, wh!ch otherwise
appear puzzllng, lntelligible. In reality the new exlles never openly
attack Gottwald. Conversely they want lt felt that he is moderate
and thlnks nat!onalistlcally.
"Sucb genUemen as Rlpka, Zenkl, etc. - who now offer themselves to the west as the future government and already now are
trying to direct the war aims of Amerlcan politics to their side count on, to be sure, tbe great ignorance and forgetfulness or tbe
west.
"lt was these very National Socialista who prepared the way for
communist dictatorship. During the war they deserted the west for the
east. They demanded that their country be ' liberateď by the Red
army, because Ameríca did not want to consent to the expulsion of
' minorities.' They were responslble for the terrible murders and the
expulsion of Sudeten Germans and so made their own natlon entirely dependent on the Soviets. lt was they who had already In 1946
made Bohemia the most socialist country outside of Russla. lt was
Beneš who, after his return, outlawed the Agrarian Party, the National Democratic Party and the Slovak Populist Party so that he
could assure a majority for the leftlst partles, by means of whlch the
communists became the strongest group in Parliament.
"These parties were outlawed, we were told, because they had
'collaborateď with the Nazis but lt is no secret that very many
leading National Socialista collaborated no less wlth the Nazls!
"The motto 'back to Beneš' - as a basls of any exile pol!tlcs can therefore hardly sound entlclng to the ears of the west. Tbis apparently inevitable alllance with communlsm agalnst nazlsm the
west bas expiated heavlly. It does not want to repeat the same error.
Witb chauvlnists one can bardly bulld a better Europe, and Bohemla
and Moravla can be thought of as politlcal unlts only when the raclsts
sball be excluded trom lnfluence. In the mouths of the Ripkas and the
�SLOVAKIA
47
Zenkls the words •democracy' and 'freedom' sound the same as they
do in the mo ut ha of Gottwald a nd Zápotocky."
Ingrim's article showed that he fully understood the problems of
Europe - especially those of centra! Europe. He is one of the very
few writers who has solved the "Czechoslovak" riddle, the political
emplre that Beneš built to destroy the Slovak nation and enslave other
national "minorlties" to further the aims of Czech Natlonal Socialism
and lmperialism.
The men ,about whom lngrlm wrote in September 1948, formed the
"Council of Free Czechoslovakia" in Washington in February 1949.
They are the persons who collaborated with the communlsts of the
Kremlin and Czechoslovakla and are re.s•p onsible for the terror and
tyranny that reign in Czechoslovakia today.
These "polltical roartyrs" wa.nt to fight ·the communist government in Prague from America, London and France, we are told.
Another "Czechoslovak" fable! They had thelr great chance to fight
the Reds ait home after the war, but failed miserably. Nay, they collaborated wlth the Reds and sold out the Czech and the Slo•
vak nations to the Kremlin.
And these same polltical opportunists and pseudodemocrats are
telling the Slovaks at home and In exile that the United States and
the other democratlc countries of the world are not interested in Slo•
vak freedom and independence, in fact that they are oppO.'led to it.
lf that were not so, they say, then "official" Washington, the Voice
of America, and Radlo Free Europe would not recognize them and
employ them. Imaglne: traitors representing the peoples they betrayed !
•
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT ?
"The Czechosfovak government, from the beginning, maintained
the rlght ot the people at home to decide the Republic's future. The
governmenťs task abroad has been to ensure the freedom of this
declsion and to take care tha4 the isola.ted home country does not
lose the opportunities ensulng from the polltical and economic collaboratlon with the Allles. T he Czechoalovak gover nment achieved th is
through t he st ron g, invio la ble SOVIET PACT, and the friendly relatlons with the greait western Allles. Thus the country is safeguarded
BETT ER than ever before." - Msgr. Ján Šrámek, Prime Minister,
Broadcast to Czechoslovakia, London, Jan. 1, 1945) .
•
"How far does Russla influence Czechoslovakia today? For some
two years the Germans assured us that Czechoslovakia would be enslaved as soon as the Russian army came. Now, one year 1ater, we can
see whether they were right. Our relations with Russfa are very coroial. WE ARE AN INDEPENDENT STATE, and our democratlc
system has been re-established. The promise or Soviet Russia NO'ľ
TO INTERFERE In our lnner struoture has been kept, The Russian
army left our terrltory on the very day they had promised. The administration of the country ia In CZECHOSLOVAK hands." - (Prof.
F. Bednár, D86n ot the Hus Theolog!cal Faculty, Prague, in the
~'SLOVAK SOKOL," Passa!c, N. J., September 26, 1946).
�
SLOVAKIA
45
POLITICAL REFUGEES OK RED AGENTS?
OR.
JOHN VLK OLIN SKÝ
The large number of Czech politicos, members of parliament, officers and soldiers who fled to Germany in 1940 raised the 11uestion:
Could this possibly have happened without the assent of the Prague
communist regime?
The boundary between Bavaria and Bohemia is only several
kilometers long, and already in the summer of 1948 - just several
mon-ths ai~ter Beneš and ·his followers su1•rEmdered the government
to tbe communists - Dr. Rlpka announced in Parls that some 18,000
Czecbs had fled to other countrles.
rt is slgnificant that all the aces or Dr. Beneš's National Socialist
Party - The Czech Nazi Party - began leavlng the country as if under orders. And all got away without incidents or accidents. After
them, we flnd a stream of soldiers - tbose who enjoyed the sympatby
or the wes-tern allies - "escaping" into the U. S. Zone of Germany.
But who escaped from SLOVAKIA? Only members of certain
families and a few persona wbo swore to promote the "Czechoslovak"
program and had family ties with the Lettrlchites, ·the Hodžas, Palkos, etc. Many of them departed in luxurlous limouslnes, wlth diplomatlc passes and devlces, wlth visas for European and other countries. All those "little things" had been taken care of in Prague before their "mlraculous" escape.
It is not at all strange, then, if some one asks how these '"enemles" of communism could have "escaped" so easlly without the
consent of Gottwald?
Robert Ingrim - author of the successful book " After Hitler
Stalln ?" - wrote on the subject in 1948. His article " A Secret Czech
'ľreaty?" was published in the Swiss "VATERLANO" September 25,
1948. He wrote:
"Thirteen generals, eight ministers, the Mayor of Prague - this is
but a smalt group of the Czech emigrants that has crossed over to
the west to date.
"They have one thing in common: AII were leading members of
the National Socialist Party of Dr. Beneš. Their famllies are with
lhem, as well as a goodly number of diplomats and consuls, who jolned
them. They have no financial difflcu lties. Tney are working energetically in Washington, London and Paris to establlsh a new exile
government. After America beats up the Soviet Union, this exile
government would be called to lead Bohemia 'back to Beneš.'
"The interestjng thlng a bout all this is the fact that all these
gentlemen had succeeded in crossing the Czech border without difficulty and wlthout incident.
"The <Statement or Peter Zenkl, former Mayor of Ptrag,ue, that he
was saved by some one wbo had blindrotded bim so that he could not
see bis rescuers. is somethlng for political children of whom tbere are
more In America tban in Europe.
"Wberever the communists seizect power, tbere the leading opponent.s of communism were carefully watched, if not arrested. But
�46
SLOVAKIA
in this case, it seems that the Czech commun!st police failed completely. . . . !
"But other extraordlnary and strange things happened before
ihat tlme. Why did not Beneš res!gn lmmedlately as a sign of protest agalnst the communlst putsch? Why dld he recognlze the new
rulers and defend them? Why did he tbus glve them the signlClcant
appearance of legltlmacy?
"Besldes Beneš's trustworthies, there are in exile several of
his politlcal opponents. In the past weeks I have read reports from
varlous parts that motlvate the conjecture that there was a secret
treaty concluded between Beneš and bis successor Gottwald before he declded to instalľ Zápotockťs government. Thls agreemen( is
su pposed to embrace the following polnts:
1. War between America and the Soviet Union is inev!table;
2. but the outcome of thls war ls uncertaln;
3. when the war ends, the Czechs must be on the right side;
4. they must, therefore, be on both sides before the war;
5. the communlsts wlll enable the departure of the leadlng generals and clvllians of the Qzech Natlonal Socialist Party; and
6. In 1,eturn the Czeoh Nat!onal Soclal!sts, when they return to
Czechoslovakla as victors, promi.se to spare the leadlng commun!sts.
"Such an agreement would make many thlngs, wh!ch otherwise
appear puzzllng, lntelligible. In reality the new exlles never openly
attack Gottwald. Conversely they want lt felt that he is moderate
and thlnks nat!onalistlcally.
"Sucb genUemen as Rlpka, Zenkl, etc. - who now offer themselves to the west as the future government and already now are
trying to direct the war aims of Amerlcan politics to their side count on, to be sure, tbe great ignorance and forgetfulness or tbe
west.
"lt was these very National Socialista who prepared the way for
communist dictatorship. During the war they deserted the west for the
east. They demanded that their country be ' liberateď by the Red
army, because Ameríca did not want to consent to the expulsion of
' minorities.' They were responslble for the terrible murders and the
expulsion of Sudeten Germans and so made their own natlon entirely dependent on the Soviets. lt was they who had already In 1946
made Bohemia the most socialist country outside of Russla. lt was
Beneš who, after his return, outlawed the Agrarian Party, the National Democratic Party and the Slovak Populist Party so that he
could assure a majority for the leftlst partles, by means of whlch the
communists became the strongest group in Parliament.
"These parties were outlawed, we were told, because they had
'collaborateď with the Nazis but lt is no secret that very many
leading National Socialista collaborated no less wlth the Nazls!
"The motto 'back to Beneš' - as a basls of any exile pol!tlcs can therefore hardly sound entlclng to the ears of the west. Tbis apparently inevitable alllance with communlsm agalnst nazlsm the
west bas expiated heavlly. It does not want to repeat the same error.
Witb chauvlnists one can bardly bulld a better Europe, and Bohemla
and Moravla can be thought of as politlcal unlts only when the raclsts
sball be excluded trom lnfluence. In the mouths of the Ripkas and the
�SLOVAKIA
47
Zenkls the words •democracy' and 'freedom' sound the same as they
do in the mo ut ha of Gottwald a nd Zápotocky."
Ingrim's article showed that he fully understood the problems of
Europe - especially those of centra! Europe. He is one of the very
few writers who has solved the "Czechoslovak" riddle, the political
emplre that Beneš built to destroy the Slovak nation and enslave other
national "minorlties" to further the aims of Czech Natlonal Socialism
and lmperialism.
The men ,about whom lngrlm wrote in September 1948, formed the
"Council of Free Czechoslovakia" in Washington in February 1949.
They are the persons who collaborated with the communlsts of the
Kremlin and Czechoslovakla and are re.s•p onsible for the terror and
tyranny that reign in Czechoslovakia today.
These "polltical roartyrs" wa.nt to fight ·the communist government in Prague from America, London and France, we are told.
Another "Czechoslovak" fable! They had thelr great chance to fight
the Reds ait home after the war, but failed miserably. Nay, they collaborated wlth the Reds and sold out the Czech and the Slo•
vak nations to the Kremlin.
And these same polltical opportunists and pseudodemocrats are
telling the Slovaks at home and In exile that the United States and
the other democratlc countries of the world are not interested in Slo•
vak freedom and independence, in fact that they are oppO.'led to it.
lf that were not so, they say, then "official" Washington, the Voice
of America, and Radlo Free Europe would not recognize them and
employ them. Imaglne: traitors representing the peoples they betrayed !
•
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT ?
"The Czechosfovak government, from the beginning, maintained
the rlght ot the people at home to decide the Republic's future. The
governmenťs task abroad has been to ensure the freedom of this
declsion and to take care tha4 the isola.ted home country does not
lose the opportunities ensulng from the polltical and economic collaboratlon with the Allles. T he Czechoalovak gover nment achieved th is
through t he st ron g, invio la ble SOVIET PACT, and the friendly relatlons with the greait western Allles. Thus the country is safeguarded
BETT ER than ever before." - Msgr. Ján Šrámek, Prime Minister,
Broadcast to Czechoslovakia, London, Jan. 1, 1945) .
•
"How far does Russla influence Czechoslovakia today? For some
two years the Germans assured us that Czechoslovakia would be enslaved as soon as the Russian army came. Now, one year 1ater, we can
see whether they were right. Our relations with Russfa are very coroial. WE ARE AN INDEPENDENT STATE, and our democratlc
system has been re-established. The promise or Soviet Russia NO'ľ
TO INTERFERE In our lnner struoture has been kept, The Russian
army left our terrltory on the very day they had promised. The administration of the country ia In CZECHOSLOVAK hands." - (Prof.
F. Bednár, D86n ot the Hus Theolog!cal Faculty, Prague, in the
~'SLOVAK SOKOL," Passa!c, N. J., September 26, 1946).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
45
POLITICAL REFUGEES OK RED AGENTS?
OR.
JOHN VLK OLIN SKÝ
The large number of Czech politicos, members of parliament, officers and soldiers who fled to Germany in 1940 raised the 11uestion:
Could this possibly have happened without the assent of the Prague
communist regime?
The boundary between Bavaria and Bohemia is only several
kilometers long, and already in the summer of 1948 - just several
mon-ths ai~ter Beneš and ·his followers su1•rEmdered the government
to tbe communists - Dr. Rlpka announced in Parls that some 18,000
Czecbs had fled to other countrles.
rt is slgnificant that all the aces or Dr. Beneš's National Socialist
Party - The Czech Nazi Party - began leavlng the country as if under orders. And all got away without incidents or accidents. After
them, we flnd a stream of soldiers - tbose who enjoyed the sympatby
or the wes-tern allies - "escaping" into the U. S. Zone of Germany.
But who escaped from SLOVAKIA? Only members of certain
families and a few persona wbo swore to promote the "Czechoslovak"
program and had family ties with the Lettrlchites, ·the Hodžas, Palkos, etc. Many of them departed in luxurlous limouslnes, wlth diplomatlc passes and devlces, wlth visas for European and other countries. All those "little things" had been taken care of in Prague before their "mlraculous" escape.
It is not at all strange, then, if some one asks how these '"enemles" of communism could have "escaped" so easlly without the
consent of Gottwald?
Robert Ingrim - author of the successful book " After Hitler
Stalln ?" - wrote on the subject in 1948. His article " A Secret Czech
'ľreaty?" was published in the Swiss "VATERLANO" September 25,
1948. He wrote:
"Thirteen generals, eight ministers, the Mayor of Prague - this is
but a smalt group of the Czech emigrants that has crossed over to
the west to date.
"They have one thing in common: AII were leading members of
the National Socialist Party of Dr. Beneš. Their famllies are with
lhem, as well as a goodly number of diplomats and consuls, who jolned
them. They have no financial difflcu lties. Tney are working energetically in Washington, London and Paris to establlsh a new exile
government. After America beats up the Soviet Union, this exile
government would be called to lead Bohemia 'back to Beneš.'
"The interestjng thlng a bout all this is the fact that all these
gentlemen had succeeded in crossing the Czech border without difficulty and wlthout incident.
"The <Statement or Peter Zenkl, former Mayor of Ptrag,ue, that he
was saved by some one wbo had blindrotded bim so that he could not
see bis rescuers. is somethlng for political children of whom tbere are
more In America tban in Europe.
"Wberever the communists seizect power, tbere the leading opponent.s of communism were carefully watched, if not arrested. But
46
SLOVAKIA
in this case, it seems that the Czech commun!st police failed completely. . . . !
"But other extraordlnary and strange things happened before
ihat tlme. Why did not Beneš res!gn lmmedlately as a sign of protest agalnst the communlst putsch? Why dld he recognlze the new
rulers and defend them? Why did he tbus glve them the signlClcant
appearance of legltlmacy?
"Besldes Beneš's trustworthies, there are in exile several of
his politlcal opponents. In the past weeks I have read reports from
varlous parts that motlvate the conjecture that there was a secret
treaty concluded between Beneš and bis successor Gottwald before he declded to instalľ Zápotockťs government. Thls agreemen( is
su pposed to embrace the following polnts:
1. War between America and the Soviet Union is inev!table;
2. but the outcome of thls war ls uncertaln;
3. when the war ends, the Czechs must be on the right side;
4. they must, therefore, be on both sides before the war;
5. the communlsts wlll enable the departure of the leadlng generals and clvllians of the Qzech Natlonal Socialist Party; and
6. In 1,eturn the Czeoh Nat!onal Soclal!sts, when they return to
Czechoslovakla as victors, promi.se to spare the leadlng commun!sts.
"Such an agreement would make many thlngs, wh!ch otherwise
appear puzzllng, lntelligible. In reality the new exlles never openly
attack Gottwald. Conversely they want lt felt that he is moderate
and thlnks nat!onalistlcally.
"Sucb genUemen as Rlpka, Zenkl, etc. - who now offer themselves to the west as the future government and already now are
trying to direct the war aims of Amerlcan politics to their side count on, to be sure, tbe great ignorance and forgetfulness or tbe
west.
"lt was these very National Socialista who prepared the way for
communist dictatorship. During the war they deserted the west for the
east. They demanded that their country be ' liberateď by the Red
army, because Ameríca did not want to consent to the expulsion of
' minorities.' They were responslble for the terrible murders and the
expulsion of Sudeten Germans and so made their own natlon entirely dependent on the Soviets. lt was they who had already In 1946
made Bohemia the most socialist country outside of Russla. lt was
Beneš who, after his return, outlawed the Agrarian Party, the National Democratic Party and the Slovak Populist Party so that he
could assure a majority for the leftlst partles, by means of whlch the
communists became the strongest group in Parliament.
"These parties were outlawed, we were told, because they had
'collaborateď with the Nazis but lt is no secret that very many
leading National Socialista collaborated no less wlth the Nazls!
"The motto 'back to Beneš' - as a basls of any exile pol!tlcs can therefore hardly sound entlclng to the ears of the west. Tbis apparently inevitable alllance with communlsm agalnst nazlsm the
west bas expiated heavlly. It does not want to repeat the same error.
Witb chauvlnists one can bardly bulld a better Europe, and Bohemla
and Moravla can be thought of as politlcal unlts only when the raclsts
sball be excluded trom lnfluence. In the mouths of the Ripkas and the
SLOVAKIA
47
Zenkls the words •democracy' and 'freedom' sound the same as they
do in the mo ut ha of Gottwald a nd Zápotocky."
Ingrim's article showed that he fully understood the problems of
Europe - especially those of centra! Europe. He is one of the very
few writers who has solved the "Czechoslovak" riddle, the political
emplre that Beneš built to destroy the Slovak nation and enslave other
national "minorlties" to further the aims of Czech Natlonal Socialism
and lmperialism.
The men ,about whom lngrlm wrote in September 1948, formed the
"Council of Free Czechoslovakia" in Washington in February 1949.
They are the persons who collaborated with the communlsts of the
Kremlin and Czechoslovakla and are re.s•p onsible for the terror and
tyranny that reign in Czechoslovakia today.
These "polltical roartyrs" wa.nt to fight ·the communist government in Prague from America, London and France, we are told.
Another "Czechoslovak" fable! They had thelr great chance to fight
the Reds ait home after the war, but failed miserably. Nay, they collaborated wlth the Reds and sold out the Czech and the Slo•
vak nations to the Kremlin.
And these same polltical opportunists and pseudodemocrats are
telling the Slovaks at home and In exile that the United States and
the other democratlc countries of the world are not interested in Slo•
vak freedom and independence, in fact that they are oppO.'led to it.
lf that were not so, they say, then "official" Washington, the Voice
of America, and Radlo Free Europe would not recognize them and
employ them. Imaglne: traitors representing the peoples they betrayed !
•
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT ?
"The Czechosfovak government, from the beginning, maintained
the rlght ot the people at home to decide the Republic's future. The
governmenťs task abroad has been to ensure the freedom of this
declsion and to take care tha4 the isola.ted home country does not
lose the opportunities ensulng from the polltical and economic collaboratlon with the Allles. T he Czechoalovak gover nment achieved th is
through t he st ron g, invio la ble SOVIET PACT, and the friendly relatlons with the greait western Allles. Thus the country is safeguarded
BETT ER than ever before." - Msgr. Ján Šrámek, Prime Minister,
Broadcast to Czechoslovakia, London, Jan. 1, 1945) .
•
"How far does Russla influence Czechoslovakia today? For some
two years the Germans assured us that Czechoslovakia would be enslaved as soon as the Russian army came. Now, one year 1ater, we can
see whether they were right. Our relations with Russfa are very coroial. WE ARE AN INDEPENDENT STATE, and our democratlc
system has been re-established. The promise or Soviet Russia NO'ľ
TO INTERFERE In our lnner struoture has been kept, The Russian
army left our terrltory on the very day they had promised. The administration of the country ia In CZECHOSLOVAK hands." - (Prof.
F. Bednár, D86n ot the Hus Theolog!cal Faculty, Prague, in the
~'SLOVAK SOKOL," Passa!c, N. J., September 26, 1946).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Political Refugees or Red Agents?
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. John Vlkolinský
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951
pp. 45-47
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Vlkolinský, John
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
name
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/229d5ee6eca6e6abde0a43f9ad6e53fa.pdf
a496aa4c7f8cd43ea73f60fb8e1e9599
PDF Text
Text
48
SLOVAKIA
THE SWVAKS AND DR. JOSEPH LE'ITRICH
OR. JOSEPH BYSTRICKÝ
(The author of this article is the former persona) secretary of
Rt. Rev. Msgr. Andrew Cvlnček, Vice President of the Slovak Demo•
cratic Party and the Slovak National Council In Bratislava of whlch
Dr. Lettrich was Presldent. Mr. Bystrlck:9' also was Chairman of the·
Universlty Students' Club of tbe Slovak Democratlc Party.)
Dr. Joseph Lettrich became very exclted over the H. R. Concurrent
Resolution 139, which was introduced In the U. S. Congress In July, 1951,
by the Hon. Charles J. Kersten of M!lwaukee, Wls. In thls resolution
Congressman Kersten asks the Unlted States to allow the Slovak nation
decide In free elections whether lt wants to live in a joint State with
the Czech nation, or in an independent, national State of its own.
In a letter to Kersten, Dr. Joseph Lettr!ch presented himself as
a representatlve of tbe "absolute majority" of the Slovak people, because, he said, in the elections of May, 1946, the Slovak nat!on voted
62% for the Slovak Democratic Party of which he was pres!dent.
Lettrich was not the only one who protested against the Kersten
Resolutlon. Dr. George Slávik, former ambassador of Beneš's communistdominated Prague regime, also protested, saying that Slovak lndependence is demanded only by those Slovaks "who collaborated with
nazism" and who fled from the "just " punishment of the "People's
Courts."
Both allegations, malicious and false, are very serious and indicate
that here we have to do wlth people whose political means of combat
are falsehoods, decepttons, dlshonorable acts and a false presentation
of the struggle of the Slovak natlon for State lndependence.
Dr. Lettrlch attempts to show that all who voted in the May 1946
elect!ons for the Slovak Democratic Party are for the continued exlstence of the synthetlc Czechoslovak State, because the Slovak Demo•
cratlc Party - his political party - was for tbat State. What a terrible
mistake!
Why did the Slovaks vote for the Democratic Party of Slovakla?
Today it 1s abundantly clear to all objective and informed observers
that after the advent of the Bolshevik Army to Košice, the Jargest city
in east Slovakla, the so-called "provislonal" Czechoslovak Government
of Dr. Beneš, wlth its "Košice Program," declded that only two polltical
parties shall be allowed in Slovakia, to wit: The Communist Party and
the Democr atic Party. The platform of the Slovak Communlst Party
was well-known to everybody, because it was an old party. But the
Slovak Democrattc Party was a new party whose program was not
deflned clearly and was unknown to the public.
In 1945, there really was no dlfference between the Communlst
and tbe Democrat!c part!es of Slovakia as far as policy was concerned.
Dr. Lettrlch was well aware of that fact and admltted it when, as
presldent of the Democratic Party, he wrote:
"Basically, our political program - our politlcal li ne - completely
agrees with the line and the program of the Slovak Communist Party.
Up to the rebellion there r eally was no dlfference between an adherent
�SLOVAKIA
49
of the Slovak Communiat Party and an adhe rent of the Democratic
Party ... 1 emphaaize that we must mutually help each other and that
all of ua must solve common problems together, becauae for once and
for all t lme we must reallze that there l1 no fundamental dlfference between the Communist Party and the De mocratlc Party of Slovakia."
- ("MY 1946) - Prague, No. 23, June 8, 1946.)
Both partles participated In equal measure in all the crimes which
the Soviet and natlve communlsts perpetrated in Slovakla; both are
responsible for the 30,0()'{), Slovaks deported to Siberla In 1945; and
both parties are responsible for the incarceratlon of Slovak cltizens,
priests and bishops. Communists and representatlves of tbe Democratic Party stole in equal measure and in "brotherly" fashion, threw
people out of thelr own homes into the streets In the name of t'he "new
people's democratlc" order and then, when these people protested they
had no place to live, in both parties sent them 10 concentration camps
as elements detrlmental to society and hostlle to the "people's"
democracy.
During the time of the " triumphant" march of the Bolshevik army,
there was not a slngle famUy in Slovakia which dld not have some
one to sh ed tears for. To rid itself of the Slovaks who d!d not want
to become frlendly with the communist "Jegal" order and wlU1 the
Czechoslovak State idea, the new regime used to send them - wfrhout training, with insufficient raiment and arms, in the blisterlng
cold, at the beginnlng of 1945 - into battle against the Germans in
the Llptovsk~ Svät~ Mikuláä sector. The so-called "Fourth Czechoslovak Brigade", formed in Levoča at th e beginning of February 1945
excluslvely of people who were agalnst communism and Czechos lovaklsm, shed its blood practically to a man in that sector. Those
mlssed by the Germans were kllled by Soviet soldiers, who used
machine guns and automatlcs to chase barefooted and unarmed
Slovaks into the fight.
T h is 1s the manner In which the new Czechoslovak communist
regime wanted to rid ltself of lts opponents. Despite all this, however,
the Idea of an independent Slovak State contlnued to grow, and the
Slovak nation ideallzed lt completely and wrapped lt In a robe of
sacredness. People could not talk about it in a loud volce, because the
"People's Courts," created by the National Front of the Communist
and Democratlc parties, arbitrarlly dealt death even for trlvlal matters.
Already in July 1945, just before the St. Cyril and Methodius celebration at Devín, the communist pollce arrested some 100 university
students in Bratislava, accusing them of attemptlng to make a demonstratlon for an independent Slovak State. Slovak students were daily
"guests" of the people's democratlc police who were fully aware of
the fact that the unlverslty students were for Slovak State lndependence
in an overwhelmlng majority. The communist pollce used to raid the
fľaternity houses of the students every March 14 to ascertaln whether
t he students were celebratlng the "Slovak Independence Day."
The hostlle attitude of the Slovak natlon to the Democratic Party,
óf · whlch Dr. Lettrich was chairman, was a lso manltested by leading
Cathollc politlcians ot that Ume, who parted wlth Lettrich's party and
aniiounced the formation of a new politlcal party, the Chrlstlan Republican Party. Monslgnor Andrew Cvlnček, Dr. Emanuel Bohm, Ing.
K. F ilo and others wanted a party which, under the given circumstances
�50
SLOVAKIA
and possibllities, would best satisfy the feeling and the needs of the
Slovak nation, that is a party which would be democratic and Chrlstlan
in practice, one that would defend all democratic freedoms and especially the freedom of rel!gion, which at that Ume exlsted only on paper,
because all - and I repeat - ALL existlng Catholic societles were
dissolved and thelr actlvity forbidden.
In the Spring of 194.6, when the new Christlan Republican Party
was to be organized - a party in whlch the Slovak saw a ray of a new
and better llfe - the National Front of communists and Lettrichites
would not allow lt. At that time Dr. Joseph Lettrich announced: "The
National Front shall not allow a party w ith a confessional program."
- Indeed, it was clear to the communists that a party founded on
Christlan principles would be the greatest adversary or communism.
Lettrlch and his group also were aware of that, but they also knew
that by allowing t his party to organize and function, their Democratic
Party would certainly be ruined in tJie coming elections.
Consequently, the Christian Republican Party was not allowed
to organize, but soon thereafter an announcement was made that permission was granted for a new Marxist party, the Social Democratlc
Party. Then Dr. Lettrich offered the representatives of the Christian
Republicans a proposal, whereby the Catbolics would get appropriate
representation in government and leglslative organs. The Democratic
Party agreed to add the toilowing points to its program: a) to do away
with the People's Courts; b) to return religious schools, rraternities
and other natlonalized properties to the Church; c) to permit Catholic
societles to exist and runction without government interference; d) to
f!ght the execution or Dr. Joseph Tiso.
The Slovak people, however, had little or no falth in the agree·
ment of the Catholics and the Democratic Party concluded In April
1946, because Dr. Lettrich remained as head of the Democratic Party
- the same Lettrich who compromised himself so strongly in tbe Fall
ot 1944 by collaborating with the communists to nationalize all Catholic
schools, churches and other properties, to lnstitute People's Courts,
etc. The absolute majority or the Slovak nation was determined to
use the "White Ballot" in the May 1946 elections to expresa its opposition to the communlst regirne and the Czechoslovak State idea. It
was only when the Council of Catbolic Bishops of Slovakia, after careful and lengthy deliberation, decided that it was necessary to choose
tbe lesser of two evils, that tbe vast majority of Slovaks decided to
vote for the Democratic Party.
It is true that 62% ot the voters of Slovakia voted for the Demo•
cratic Party, but lt is just as true that this bappened not out or love or
respect for Dr. Joseph Lettrich or the Czechoslovak Republlc, but
because the great Catholic majority respected the dlcision or the
Bishop's Council and voted against communlsm and the communlsts in
Slovakla.
Dr. Lettrich was the head ot a party whicb in its absolute majority
was against bim, but could not unseat him because the voter in the
so-called "Third Czecboslovak Republlc" had only one right - the
right to obey and keep his mouth sbut. The fact stlll remains: the
idea of Slovak State lndependence was the decidlng factor in the 1946
elections.
�SLOV.AKJA
51
The Democratic Party saw that it could not gain Slovak voters by
simply preaching Czechoslovak mutuality, therefore, it decided to use
Slovak State independence as a silent means of propaganda. Dr. Nicholas Franek, at that time a candidate for the deputy mandate of the
Bratislava dlstrlct {later Minister of Unlflcation in Prague and now a
refugee in America and a member of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia ! ), attended a secret meeting of Slovak un!verslty students,
before the electlons of May 1946, at the Centra! Secretariate of the
Democratlc Party, and, among other thlngs, sa!d:
"None ot us believes Dr. Lettrich. He is overly compromised with
his close collaboration wlth the communists. For us Dr. Lettrich cannot
be any kind of guarantee that freedoms shall be restored in our country. However, we must keep him as president for the Ume being, otherwise the communists would see to it that we are Jiquidated. After the
electlons we shall endeavor to have tbe elected Slovak deput!es procla!m the Slovak State legally in the Prague Parl!ament and in the
Slovak National Councll in Bratislava."
That is how Dr. Franek got the unlversity students to vote for
the Democratlc Party; they belleved that Dr. Franek and bis colleagues
would keep their promlses after the elections. And tbe students really
worked to assure the victory of the Democratic Party. The Slovak
s tudents, whom I sent out into all the districts of Slovakia to conv!nce
the people to vote for the Democratlc Party, spoke in the spirit of Dr.
Franek's speech. That is why we are so much more disappointed now
that Dr. Franek, enjoying politlcal asylum in America, 1s stlll supporting the Czechoslovaks, when he knows fully well that t hey were and
s tlJJ are responsible for the naitlonal catastrophe or the Slovak nation.
The electlons in May 1946 were elect!ons for the independence of
the Slovak State. Propaganda of the Democratic Party was dlrected in
that spirit, and it was only that kind of propaganda that made the
Slovaks forget some of the sufferlngs they llved through, because they
firmly believed that lt was worth whlle to flght, suffer and die for
State independence.
The enthusiasm of Slovakia in the May 1946 elections reflected
this spirit. And for the idea ot an independent Slovak State six university students were wounded by communist bullets in front of Svoradov
and 329 were deprived of stipends and expelled from the student boarding houses. But the idea for national and State independence was much
stronger than incarcerations and sufferings.
True, the Democratlc Party got 62% of the votes in 1946. But we
must remember that: a) some citlzens were deprlved of their right to
vote; b) 2% voted for the Freedom Party which had State independence
in lts platform; c) several percent or the votes went to the Communlst
Party because or opposltlon to Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, the voters tlguring
that it was wlser or smarter to vote outrlght for the Communist Party,
instead of its affillate, the Democratic Party. So, all factors considered,
more than 75% of the Slovak votes in May 1946 were cast for an independent Slovak State.
That is why we - who :proudly claim the program of national and
State independence - are not afraid of the elections proposed by Congressman Kersten in hla Resolution R. H. 139. The people who are
afraid of such elections know fully well that if the Slovaks were glven
an oppQrtunlty to declde whether they wanted to Jive In Czechoslovakla
�52
SLOVAKIA
or not, they would answer forcefully and conslsten tly: NO! That is why
Lettrich and Company would want to to convince the Government of
the United States that the Slovaks are for CzechosJovakia and that an
independent Slovakia ls promoted only by some "nazis" who escaped
the "just" punishment of the "people's" courts. If Dr. Lettrich really ls
the great democrat he poses to be, Jet him not be a!rald or the de!eat
he would have to suffer with hls several frlends in case such an election
is held. It the Slovaks are for the Czechoslovak Republlc, as Dr. Lett•
rich claims, then they certalnly wlll say so in such an electlon.
When I talked wlth Dr. Lettrlch after the executlon or Dr. Joseph
Tlso, he told me that accord!ng to reports he has in his possession, the
absolute majority of Slovak university students was !or a Slovak State
and regards Dr. Joseph Tlso as a martyr and those who condemned
him as murderers who should be brought to tria!. "In Prague," Dr.
Lettrich told me at that Ume, "I met a certaln unlversity student and
asked hlm what he thougbt about the executlon or Dr. T!so. Tb!s student
replied: ' The Czecha put General Štefänik out of the way, they jailed
Hlinka and now hanged Tiso with them'."
we have nothing further to talk about
After tbe executlon of the Presldent of Slovakia, Msgr. Andrew
told me: "Wlth the executlon of Dr. Joseph Tlso Czechos lovakla ls llquldated and no one shall restore !t by means of free
electlons." And before I fled from Slovakla, he sald: "Figbt for the
State lndependence or Slovakla!"
With the executlon of Dr. Tlso a revolutlou and the destruction of
the Democratic Party threatened In Slovakla. So the presidency of the
Democratic Party called together the executlve commlttee of the Party
(1 was present also), and at thls meeting the delegates or the lndlvlclual distrlcts said in one accord: "After the execution of Dr. Joseph
Tiao we loat all our members. The Democratic Party exiata only theoretically, but for all pactical purposea it is liquldated."
Adm!ttlng that he was a general without an army, and that bis
program or collaboratlon wlth the communlsts and Czechoslovakism
was not the program of the Slovak nat!on, Dr. Joseph Lettrlch asked
the delegates present for advice how to save the Democratlc Party.
It was after thls meeting that Lettrlch assumed the role or Pilate and
attempted to just!fy hlmself In the eyes of the Slovak people by proclalmlng In the newspapers that Dr. Edward Bene!\ and the Natlonal
Soclallsts, and not he and the Democratlc Party, were responslble for
the execution of Tlso. But thls came too late.
Wlth the execution of Dr. Joseph Tlso nails were sunk deep into
the Czechoslovak comn by all classes of the Slovak people - the
tradesmen, buslnessmen, workers and farmers and the lntelllgentsia.
The Slovak nation deflnltely is for an independent Slovakla. The
Slovak natlon reallzes tbat the road to independence !s fuH of sorrow
and suf\ferlng, but !s, nevertheless, determlned to attain lndependence
at all costs. It ls provlng that dally. Therefore, we welcome the resolutlon ot Congressman Kersten "for the freedom of the Slovaks," because free elections wlll prove who was rlght: we, who are for an
jndependent Slovak Republlc, or those who are trying to enslave
Slovakla.
Cvlnček
�
48
SLOVAKIA
THE SWVAKS AND DR. JOSEPH LE'ITRICH
OR. JOSEPH BYSTRICKÝ
(The author of this article is the former persona) secretary of
Rt. Rev. Msgr. Andrew Cvlnček, Vice President of the Slovak Demo•
cratic Party and the Slovak National Council In Bratislava of whlch
Dr. Lettrich was Presldent. Mr. Bystrlck:9' also was Chairman of the·
Universlty Students' Club of tbe Slovak Democratlc Party.)
Dr. Joseph Lettrich became very exclted over the H. R. Concurrent
Resolution 139, which was introduced In the U. S. Congress In July, 1951,
by the Hon. Charles J. Kersten of M!lwaukee, Wls. In thls resolution
Congressman Kersten asks the Unlted States to allow the Slovak nation
decide In free elections whether lt wants to live in a joint State with
the Czech nation, or in an independent, national State of its own.
In a letter to Kersten, Dr. Joseph Lettr!ch presented himself as
a representatlve of tbe "absolute majority" of the Slovak people, because, he said, in the elections of May, 1946, the Slovak nat!on voted
62% for the Slovak Democratic Party of which he was pres!dent.
Lettrich was not the only one who protested against the Kersten
Resolutlon. Dr. George Slávik, former ambassador of Beneš's communistdominated Prague regime, also protested, saying that Slovak lndependence is demanded only by those Slovaks "who collaborated with
nazism" and who fled from the "just " punishment of the "People's
Courts."
Both allegations, malicious and false, are very serious and indicate
that here we have to do wlth people whose political means of combat
are falsehoods, decepttons, dlshonorable acts and a false presentation
of the struggle of the Slovak natlon for State lndependence.
Dr. Lettrlch attempts to show that all who voted in the May 1946
elect!ons for the Slovak Democratic Party are for the continued exlstence of the synthetlc Czechoslovak State, because the Slovak Demo•
cratlc Party - his political party - was for tbat State. What a terrible
mistake!
Why did the Slovaks vote for the Democratic Party of Slovakla?
Today it 1s abundantly clear to all objective and informed observers
that after the advent of the Bolshevik Army to Košice, the Jargest city
in east Slovakla, the so-called "provislonal" Czechoslovak Government
of Dr. Beneš, wlth its "Košice Program," declded that only two polltical
parties shall be allowed in Slovakia, to wit: The Communist Party and
the Democr atic Party. The platform of the Slovak Communlst Party
was well-known to everybody, because it was an old party. But the
Slovak Democrattc Party was a new party whose program was not
deflned clearly and was unknown to the public.
In 1945, there really was no dlfference between the Communlst
and tbe Democrat!c part!es of Slovakia as far as policy was concerned.
Dr. Lettrlch was well aware of that fact and admltted it when, as
presldent of the Democratic Party, he wrote:
"Basically, our political program - our politlcal li ne - completely
agrees with the line and the program of the Slovak Communist Party.
Up to the rebellion there r eally was no dlfference between an adherent
�SLOVAKIA
49
of the Slovak Communiat Party and an adhe rent of the Democratic
Party ... 1 emphaaize that we must mutually help each other and that
all of ua must solve common problems together, becauae for once and
for all t lme we must reallze that there l1 no fundamental dlfference between the Communist Party and the De mocratlc Party of Slovakia."
- ("MY 1946) - Prague, No. 23, June 8, 1946.)
Both partles participated In equal measure in all the crimes which
the Soviet and natlve communlsts perpetrated in Slovakla; both are
responsible for the 30,0()'{), Slovaks deported to Siberla In 1945; and
both parties are responsible for the incarceratlon of Slovak cltizens,
priests and bishops. Communists and representatlves of tbe Democratic Party stole in equal measure and in "brotherly" fashion, threw
people out of thelr own homes into the streets In the name of t'he "new
people's democratlc" order and then, when these people protested they
had no place to live, in both parties sent them 10 concentration camps
as elements detrlmental to society and hostlle to the "people's"
democracy.
During the time of the " triumphant" march of the Bolshevik army,
there was not a slngle famUy in Slovakia which dld not have some
one to sh ed tears for. To rid itself of the Slovaks who d!d not want
to become frlendly with the communist "Jegal" order and wlU1 the
Czechoslovak State idea, the new regime used to send them - wfrhout training, with insufficient raiment and arms, in the blisterlng
cold, at the beginnlng of 1945 - into battle against the Germans in
the Llptovsk~ Svät~ Mikuláä sector. The so-called "Fourth Czechoslovak Brigade", formed in Levoča at th e beginning of February 1945
excluslvely of people who were agalnst communism and Czechos lovaklsm, shed its blood practically to a man in that sector. Those
mlssed by the Germans were kllled by Soviet soldiers, who used
machine guns and automatlcs to chase barefooted and unarmed
Slovaks into the fight.
T h is 1s the manner In which the new Czechoslovak communist
regime wanted to rid ltself of lts opponents. Despite all this, however,
the Idea of an independent Slovak State contlnued to grow, and the
Slovak nation ideallzed lt completely and wrapped lt In a robe of
sacredness. People could not talk about it in a loud volce, because the
"People's Courts," created by the National Front of the Communist
and Democratlc parties, arbitrarlly dealt death even for trlvlal matters.
Already in July 1945, just before the St. Cyril and Methodius celebration at Devín, the communist pollce arrested some 100 university
students in Bratislava, accusing them of attemptlng to make a demonstratlon for an independent Slovak State. Slovak students were daily
"guests" of the people's democratlc police who were fully aware of
the fact that the unlverslty students were for Slovak State lndependence
in an overwhelmlng majority. The communist pollce used to raid the
fľaternity houses of the students every March 14 to ascertaln whether
t he students were celebratlng the "Slovak Independence Day."
The hostlle attitude of the Slovak natlon to the Democratic Party,
óf · whlch Dr. Lettrich was chairman, was a lso manltested by leading
Cathollc politlcians ot that Ume, who parted wlth Lettrich's party and
aniiounced the formation of a new politlcal party, the Chrlstlan Republican Party. Monslgnor Andrew Cvlnček, Dr. Emanuel Bohm, Ing.
K. F ilo and others wanted a party which, under the given circumstances
�50
SLOVAKIA
and possibllities, would best satisfy the feeling and the needs of the
Slovak nation, that is a party which would be democratic and Chrlstlan
in practice, one that would defend all democratic freedoms and especially the freedom of rel!gion, which at that Ume exlsted only on paper,
because all - and I repeat - ALL existlng Catholic societles were
dissolved and thelr actlvity forbidden.
In the Spring of 194.6, when the new Christlan Republican Party
was to be organized - a party in whlch the Slovak saw a ray of a new
and better llfe - the National Front of communists and Lettrichites
would not allow lt. At that time Dr. Joseph Lettrich announced: "The
National Front shall not allow a party w ith a confessional program."
- Indeed, it was clear to the communists that a party founded on
Christlan principles would be the greatest adversary or communism.
Lettrlch and his group also were aware of that, but they also knew
that by allowing t his party to organize and function, their Democratic
Party would certainly be ruined in tJie coming elections.
Consequently, the Christian Republican Party was not allowed
to organize, but soon thereafter an announcement was made that permission was granted for a new Marxist party, the Social Democratlc
Party. Then Dr. Lettrich offered the representatives of the Christian
Republicans a proposal, whereby the Catbolics would get appropriate
representation in government and leglslative organs. The Democratic
Party agreed to add the toilowing points to its program: a) to do away
with the People's Courts; b) to return religious schools, rraternities
and other natlonalized properties to the Church; c) to permit Catholic
societles to exist and runction without government interference; d) to
f!ght the execution or Dr. Joseph Tiso.
The Slovak people, however, had little or no falth in the agree·
ment of the Catholics and the Democratic Party concluded In April
1946, because Dr. Lettrich remained as head of the Democratic Party
- the same Lettrich who compromised himself so strongly in tbe Fall
ot 1944 by collaborating with the communists to nationalize all Catholic
schools, churches and other properties, to lnstitute People's Courts,
etc. The absolute majority or the Slovak nation was determined to
use the "White Ballot" in the May 1946 elections to expresa its opposition to the communlst regirne and the Czechoslovak State idea. It
was only when the Council of Catbolic Bishops of Slovakia, after careful and lengthy deliberation, decided that it was necessary to choose
tbe lesser of two evils, that tbe vast majority of Slovaks decided to
vote for the Democratic Party.
It is true that 62% ot the voters of Slovakia voted for the Demo•
cratic Party, but lt is just as true that this bappened not out or love or
respect for Dr. Joseph Lettrich or the Czechoslovak Republlc, but
because the great Catholic majority respected the dlcision or the
Bishop's Council and voted against communlsm and the communlsts in
Slovakla.
Dr. Lettrich was the head ot a party whicb in its absolute majority
was against bim, but could not unseat him because the voter in the
so-called "Third Czecboslovak Republlc" had only one right - the
right to obey and keep his mouth sbut. The fact stlll remains: the
idea of Slovak State lndependence was the decidlng factor in the 1946
elections.
�SLOV.AKJA
51
The Democratic Party saw that it could not gain Slovak voters by
simply preaching Czechoslovak mutuality, therefore, it decided to use
Slovak State independence as a silent means of propaganda. Dr. Nicholas Franek, at that time a candidate for the deputy mandate of the
Bratislava dlstrlct {later Minister of Unlflcation in Prague and now a
refugee in America and a member of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia ! ), attended a secret meeting of Slovak un!verslty students,
before the electlons of May 1946, at the Centra! Secretariate of the
Democratlc Party, and, among other thlngs, sa!d:
"None ot us believes Dr. Lettrich. He is overly compromised with
his close collaboration wlth the communists. For us Dr. Lettrich cannot
be any kind of guarantee that freedoms shall be restored in our country. However, we must keep him as president for the Ume being, otherwise the communists would see to it that we are Jiquidated. After the
electlons we shall endeavor to have tbe elected Slovak deput!es procla!m the Slovak State legally in the Prague Parl!ament and in the
Slovak National Councll in Bratislava."
That is how Dr. Franek got the unlversity students to vote for
the Democratlc Party; they belleved that Dr. Franek and bis colleagues
would keep their promlses after the elections. And tbe students really
worked to assure the victory of the Democratic Party. The Slovak
s tudents, whom I sent out into all the districts of Slovakia to conv!nce
the people to vote for the Democratlc Party, spoke in the spirit of Dr.
Franek's speech. That is why we are so much more disappointed now
that Dr. Franek, enjoying politlcal asylum in America, 1s stlll supporting the Czechoslovaks, when he knows fully well that t hey were and
s tlJJ are responsible for the naitlonal catastrophe or the Slovak nation.
The electlons in May 1946 were elect!ons for the independence of
the Slovak State. Propaganda of the Democratic Party was dlrected in
that spirit, and it was only that kind of propaganda that made the
Slovaks forget some of the sufferlngs they llved through, because they
firmly believed that lt was worth whlle to flght, suffer and die for
State independence.
The enthusiasm of Slovakia in the May 1946 elections reflected
this spirit. And for the idea ot an independent Slovak State six university students were wounded by communist bullets in front of Svoradov
and 329 were deprived of stipends and expelled from the student boarding houses. But the idea for national and State independence was much
stronger than incarcerations and sufferings.
True, the Democratlc Party got 62% of the votes in 1946. But we
must remember that: a) some citlzens were deprlved of their right to
vote; b) 2% voted for the Freedom Party which had State independence
in lts platform; c) several percent or the votes went to the Communlst
Party because or opposltlon to Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, the voters tlguring
that it was wlser or smarter to vote outrlght for the Communist Party,
instead of its affillate, the Democratic Party. So, all factors considered,
more than 75% of the Slovak votes in May 1946 were cast for an independent Slovak State.
That is why we - who :proudly claim the program of national and
State independence - are not afraid of the elections proposed by Congressman Kersten in hla Resolution R. H. 139. The people who are
afraid of such elections know fully well that if the Slovaks were glven
an oppQrtunlty to declde whether they wanted to Jive In Czechoslovakla
�52
SLOVAKIA
or not, they would answer forcefully and conslsten tly: NO! That is why
Lettrich and Company would want to to convince the Government of
the United States that the Slovaks are for CzechosJovakia and that an
independent Slovakia ls promoted only by some "nazis" who escaped
the "just" punishment of the "people's" courts. If Dr. Lettrich really ls
the great democrat he poses to be, Jet him not be a!rald or the de!eat
he would have to suffer with hls several frlends in case such an election
is held. It the Slovaks are for the Czechoslovak Republlc, as Dr. Lett•
rich claims, then they certalnly wlll say so in such an electlon.
When I talked wlth Dr. Lettrlch after the executlon or Dr. Joseph
Tlso, he told me that accord!ng to reports he has in his possession, the
absolute majority of Slovak university students was !or a Slovak State
and regards Dr. Joseph Tlso as a martyr and those who condemned
him as murderers who should be brought to tria!. "In Prague," Dr.
Lettrich told me at that Ume, "I met a certaln unlversity student and
asked hlm what he thougbt about the executlon or Dr. T!so. Tb!s student
replied: ' The Czecha put General Štefänik out of the way, they jailed
Hlinka and now hanged Tiso with them'."
we have nothing further to talk about
After tbe executlon of the Presldent of Slovakia, Msgr. Andrew
told me: "Wlth the executlon of Dr. Joseph Tlso Czechos lovakla ls llquldated and no one shall restore !t by means of free
electlons." And before I fled from Slovakla, he sald: "Figbt for the
State lndependence or Slovakla!"
With the executlon of Dr. Tlso a revolutlou and the destruction of
the Democratic Party threatened In Slovakla. So the presidency of the
Democratic Party called together the executlve commlttee of the Party
(1 was present also), and at thls meeting the delegates or the lndlvlclual distrlcts said in one accord: "After the execution of Dr. Joseph
Tiao we loat all our members. The Democratic Party exiata only theoretically, but for all pactical purposea it is liquldated."
Adm!ttlng that he was a general without an army, and that bis
program or collaboratlon wlth the communlsts and Czechoslovakism
was not the program of the Slovak nat!on, Dr. Joseph Lettrlch asked
the delegates present for advice how to save the Democratlc Party.
It was after thls meeting that Lettrlch assumed the role or Pilate and
attempted to just!fy hlmself In the eyes of the Slovak people by proclalmlng In the newspapers that Dr. Edward Bene!\ and the Natlonal
Soclallsts, and not he and the Democratlc Party, were responslble for
the execution of Tlso. But thls came too late.
Wlth the execution of Dr. Joseph Tlso nails were sunk deep into
the Czechoslovak comn by all classes of the Slovak people - the
tradesmen, buslnessmen, workers and farmers and the lntelllgentsia.
The Slovak nation deflnltely is for an independent Slovakla. The
Slovak natlon reallzes tbat the road to independence !s fuH of sorrow
and suf\ferlng, but !s, nevertheless, determlned to attain lndependence
at all costs. It ls provlng that dally. Therefore, we welcome the resolutlon ot Congressman Kersten "for the freedom of the Slovaks," because free elections wlll prove who was rlght: we, who are for an
jndependent Slovak Republlc, or those who are trying to enslave
Slovakla.
Cvlnček
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
48
SLOVAKIA
THE SWVAKS AND DR. JOSEPH LE'ITRICH
OR. JOSEPH BYSTRICKÝ
(The author of this article is the former persona) secretary of
Rt. Rev. Msgr. Andrew Cvlnček, Vice President of the Slovak Demo•
cratic Party and the Slovak National Council In Bratislava of whlch
Dr. Lettrich was Presldent. Mr. Bystrlck:9' also was Chairman of the·
Universlty Students' Club of tbe Slovak Democratlc Party.)
Dr. Joseph Lettrich became very exclted over the H. R. Concurrent
Resolution 139, which was introduced In the U. S. Congress In July, 1951,
by the Hon. Charles J. Kersten of M!lwaukee, Wls. In thls resolution
Congressman Kersten asks the Unlted States to allow the Slovak nation
decide In free elections whether lt wants to live in a joint State with
the Czech nation, or in an independent, national State of its own.
In a letter to Kersten, Dr. Joseph Lettr!ch presented himself as
a representatlve of tbe "absolute majority" of the Slovak people, because, he said, in the elections of May, 1946, the Slovak nat!on voted
62% for the Slovak Democratic Party of which he was pres!dent.
Lettrich was not the only one who protested against the Kersten
Resolutlon. Dr. George Slávik, former ambassador of Beneš's communistdominated Prague regime, also protested, saying that Slovak lndependence is demanded only by those Slovaks "who collaborated with
nazism" and who fled from the "just " punishment of the "People's
Courts."
Both allegations, malicious and false, are very serious and indicate
that here we have to do wlth people whose political means of combat
are falsehoods, decepttons, dlshonorable acts and a false presentation
of the struggle of the Slovak natlon for State lndependence.
Dr. Lettrlch attempts to show that all who voted in the May 1946
elect!ons for the Slovak Democratic Party are for the continued exlstence of the synthetlc Czechoslovak State, because the Slovak Demo•
cratlc Party - his political party - was for tbat State. What a terrible
mistake!
Why did the Slovaks vote for the Democratic Party of Slovakla?
Today it 1s abundantly clear to all objective and informed observers
that after the advent of the Bolshevik Army to Košice, the Jargest city
in east Slovakla, the so-called "provislonal" Czechoslovak Government
of Dr. Beneš, wlth its "Košice Program," declded that only two polltical
parties shall be allowed in Slovakia, to wit: The Communist Party and
the Democr atic Party. The platform of the Slovak Communlst Party
was well-known to everybody, because it was an old party. But the
Slovak Democrattc Party was a new party whose program was not
deflned clearly and was unknown to the public.
In 1945, there really was no dlfference between the Communlst
and tbe Democrat!c part!es of Slovakia as far as policy was concerned.
Dr. Lettrlch was well aware of that fact and admltted it when, as
presldent of the Democratic Party, he wrote:
"Basically, our political program - our politlcal li ne - completely
agrees with the line and the program of the Slovak Communist Party.
Up to the rebellion there r eally was no dlfference between an adherent
SLOVAKIA
49
of the Slovak Communiat Party and an adhe rent of the Democratic
Party ... 1 emphaaize that we must mutually help each other and that
all of ua must solve common problems together, becauae for once and
for all t lme we must reallze that there l1 no fundamental dlfference between the Communist Party and the De mocratlc Party of Slovakia."
- ("MY 1946) - Prague, No. 23, June 8, 1946.)
Both partles participated In equal measure in all the crimes which
the Soviet and natlve communlsts perpetrated in Slovakla; both are
responsible for the 30,0()'{), Slovaks deported to Siberla In 1945; and
both parties are responsible for the incarceratlon of Slovak cltizens,
priests and bishops. Communists and representatlves of tbe Democratic Party stole in equal measure and in "brotherly" fashion, threw
people out of thelr own homes into the streets In the name of t'he "new
people's democratlc" order and then, when these people protested they
had no place to live, in both parties sent them 10 concentration camps
as elements detrlmental to society and hostlle to the "people's"
democracy.
During the time of the " triumphant" march of the Bolshevik army,
there was not a slngle famUy in Slovakia which dld not have some
one to sh ed tears for. To rid itself of the Slovaks who d!d not want
to become frlendly with the communist "Jegal" order and wlU1 the
Czechoslovak State idea, the new regime used to send them - wfrhout training, with insufficient raiment and arms, in the blisterlng
cold, at the beginnlng of 1945 - into battle against the Germans in
the Llptovsk~ Svät~ Mikuláä sector. The so-called "Fourth Czechoslovak Brigade", formed in Levoča at th e beginning of February 1945
excluslvely of people who were agalnst communism and Czechos lovaklsm, shed its blood practically to a man in that sector. Those
mlssed by the Germans were kllled by Soviet soldiers, who used
machine guns and automatlcs to chase barefooted and unarmed
Slovaks into the fight.
T h is 1s the manner In which the new Czechoslovak communist
regime wanted to rid ltself of lts opponents. Despite all this, however,
the Idea of an independent Slovak State contlnued to grow, and the
Slovak nation ideallzed lt completely and wrapped lt In a robe of
sacredness. People could not talk about it in a loud volce, because the
"People's Courts," created by the National Front of the Communist
and Democratlc parties, arbitrarlly dealt death even for trlvlal matters.
Already in July 1945, just before the St. Cyril and Methodius celebration at Devín, the communist pollce arrested some 100 university
students in Bratislava, accusing them of attemptlng to make a demonstratlon for an independent Slovak State. Slovak students were daily
"guests" of the people's democratlc police who were fully aware of
the fact that the unlverslty students were for Slovak State lndependence
in an overwhelmlng majority. The communist pollce used to raid the
fľaternity houses of the students every March 14 to ascertaln whether
t he students were celebratlng the "Slovak Independence Day."
The hostlle attitude of the Slovak natlon to the Democratic Party,
óf · whlch Dr. Lettrich was chairman, was a lso manltested by leading
Cathollc politlcians ot that Ume, who parted wlth Lettrich's party and
aniiounced the formation of a new politlcal party, the Chrlstlan Republican Party. Monslgnor Andrew Cvlnček, Dr. Emanuel Bohm, Ing.
K. F ilo and others wanted a party which, under the given circumstances
50
SLOVAKIA
and possibllities, would best satisfy the feeling and the needs of the
Slovak nation, that is a party which would be democratic and Chrlstlan
in practice, one that would defend all democratic freedoms and especially the freedom of rel!gion, which at that Ume exlsted only on paper,
because all - and I repeat - ALL existlng Catholic societles were
dissolved and thelr actlvity forbidden.
In the Spring of 194.6, when the new Christlan Republican Party
was to be organized - a party in whlch the Slovak saw a ray of a new
and better llfe - the National Front of communists and Lettrichites
would not allow lt. At that time Dr. Joseph Lettrich announced: "The
National Front shall not allow a party w ith a confessional program."
- Indeed, it was clear to the communists that a party founded on
Christlan principles would be the greatest adversary or communism.
Lettrlch and his group also were aware of that, but they also knew
that by allowing t his party to organize and function, their Democratic
Party would certainly be ruined in tJie coming elections.
Consequently, the Christian Republican Party was not allowed
to organize, but soon thereafter an announcement was made that permission was granted for a new Marxist party, the Social Democratlc
Party. Then Dr. Lettrich offered the representatives of the Christian
Republicans a proposal, whereby the Catbolics would get appropriate
representation in government and leglslative organs. The Democratic
Party agreed to add the toilowing points to its program: a) to do away
with the People's Courts; b) to return religious schools, rraternities
and other natlonalized properties to the Church; c) to permit Catholic
societles to exist and runction without government interference; d) to
f!ght the execution or Dr. Joseph Tiso.
The Slovak people, however, had little or no falth in the agree·
ment of the Catholics and the Democratic Party concluded In April
1946, because Dr. Lettrich remained as head of the Democratic Party
- the same Lettrich who compromised himself so strongly in tbe Fall
ot 1944 by collaborating with the communists to nationalize all Catholic
schools, churches and other properties, to lnstitute People's Courts,
etc. The absolute majority or the Slovak nation was determined to
use the "White Ballot" in the May 1946 elections to expresa its opposition to the communlst regirne and the Czechoslovak State idea. It
was only when the Council of Catbolic Bishops of Slovakia, after careful and lengthy deliberation, decided that it was necessary to choose
tbe lesser of two evils, that tbe vast majority of Slovaks decided to
vote for the Democratic Party.
It is true that 62% ot the voters of Slovakia voted for the Demo•
cratic Party, but lt is just as true that this bappened not out or love or
respect for Dr. Joseph Lettrich or the Czechoslovak Republlc, but
because the great Catholic majority respected the dlcision or the
Bishop's Council and voted against communlsm and the communlsts in
Slovakla.
Dr. Lettrich was the head ot a party whicb in its absolute majority
was against bim, but could not unseat him because the voter in the
so-called "Third Czecboslovak Republlc" had only one right - the
right to obey and keep his mouth sbut. The fact stlll remains: the
idea of Slovak State lndependence was the decidlng factor in the 1946
elections.
SLOV.AKJA
51
The Democratic Party saw that it could not gain Slovak voters by
simply preaching Czechoslovak mutuality, therefore, it decided to use
Slovak State independence as a silent means of propaganda. Dr. Nicholas Franek, at that time a candidate for the deputy mandate of the
Bratislava dlstrlct {later Minister of Unlflcation in Prague and now a
refugee in America and a member of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia ! ), attended a secret meeting of Slovak un!verslty students,
before the electlons of May 1946, at the Centra! Secretariate of the
Democratlc Party, and, among other thlngs, sa!d:
"None ot us believes Dr. Lettrich. He is overly compromised with
his close collaboration wlth the communists. For us Dr. Lettrich cannot
be any kind of guarantee that freedoms shall be restored in our country. However, we must keep him as president for the Ume being, otherwise the communists would see to it that we are Jiquidated. After the
electlons we shall endeavor to have tbe elected Slovak deput!es procla!m the Slovak State legally in the Prague Parl!ament and in the
Slovak National Councll in Bratislava."
That is how Dr. Franek got the unlversity students to vote for
the Democratlc Party; they belleved that Dr. Franek and bis colleagues
would keep their promlses after the elections. And tbe students really
worked to assure the victory of the Democratic Party. The Slovak
s tudents, whom I sent out into all the districts of Slovakia to conv!nce
the people to vote for the Democratlc Party, spoke in the spirit of Dr.
Franek's speech. That is why we are so much more disappointed now
that Dr. Franek, enjoying politlcal asylum in America, 1s stlll supporting the Czechoslovaks, when he knows fully well that t hey were and
s tlJJ are responsible for the naitlonal catastrophe or the Slovak nation.
The electlons in May 1946 were elect!ons for the independence of
the Slovak State. Propaganda of the Democratic Party was dlrected in
that spirit, and it was only that kind of propaganda that made the
Slovaks forget some of the sufferlngs they llved through, because they
firmly believed that lt was worth whlle to flght, suffer and die for
State independence.
The enthusiasm of Slovakia in the May 1946 elections reflected
this spirit. And for the idea ot an independent Slovak State six university students were wounded by communist bullets in front of Svoradov
and 329 were deprived of stipends and expelled from the student boarding houses. But the idea for national and State independence was much
stronger than incarcerations and sufferings.
True, the Democratlc Party got 62% of the votes in 1946. But we
must remember that: a) some citlzens were deprlved of their right to
vote; b) 2% voted for the Freedom Party which had State independence
in lts platform; c) several percent or the votes went to the Communlst
Party because or opposltlon to Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, the voters tlguring
that it was wlser or smarter to vote outrlght for the Communist Party,
instead of its affillate, the Democratic Party. So, all factors considered,
more than 75% of the Slovak votes in May 1946 were cast for an independent Slovak State.
That is why we - who :proudly claim the program of national and
State independence - are not afraid of the elections proposed by Congressman Kersten in hla Resolution R. H. 139. The people who are
afraid of such elections know fully well that if the Slovaks were glven
an oppQrtunlty to declde whether they wanted to Jive In Czechoslovakla
52
SLOVAKIA
or not, they would answer forcefully and conslsten tly: NO! That is why
Lettrich and Company would want to to convince the Government of
the United States that the Slovaks are for CzechosJovakia and that an
independent Slovakia ls promoted only by some "nazis" who escaped
the "just" punishment of the "people's" courts. If Dr. Lettrich really ls
the great democrat he poses to be, Jet him not be a!rald or the de!eat
he would have to suffer with hls several frlends in case such an election
is held. It the Slovaks are for the Czechoslovak Republlc, as Dr. Lett•
rich claims, then they certalnly wlll say so in such an electlon.
When I talked wlth Dr. Lettrlch after the executlon or Dr. Joseph
Tlso, he told me that accord!ng to reports he has in his possession, the
absolute majority of Slovak university students was !or a Slovak State
and regards Dr. Joseph Tlso as a martyr and those who condemned
him as murderers who should be brought to tria!. "In Prague," Dr.
Lettrich told me at that Ume, "I met a certaln unlversity student and
asked hlm what he thougbt about the executlon or Dr. T!so. Tb!s student
replied: ' The Czecha put General Štefänik out of the way, they jailed
Hlinka and now hanged Tiso with them'."
we have nothing further to talk about
After tbe executlon of the Presldent of Slovakia, Msgr. Andrew
told me: "Wlth the executlon of Dr. Joseph Tlso Czechos lovakla ls llquldated and no one shall restore !t by means of free
electlons." And before I fled from Slovakla, he sald: "Figbt for the
State lndependence or Slovakla!"
With the executlon of Dr. Tlso a revolutlou and the destruction of
the Democratic Party threatened In Slovakla. So the presidency of the
Democratic Party called together the executlve commlttee of the Party
(1 was present also), and at thls meeting the delegates or the lndlvlclual distrlcts said in one accord: "After the execution of Dr. Joseph
Tiao we loat all our members. The Democratic Party exiata only theoretically, but for all pactical purposea it is liquldated."
Adm!ttlng that he was a general without an army, and that bis
program or collaboratlon wlth the communlsts and Czechoslovakism
was not the program of the Slovak nat!on, Dr. Joseph Lettrlch asked
the delegates present for advice how to save the Democratlc Party.
It was after thls meeting that Lettrlch assumed the role or Pilate and
attempted to just!fy hlmself In the eyes of the Slovak people by proclalmlng In the newspapers that Dr. Edward Bene!\ and the Natlonal
Soclallsts, and not he and the Democratlc Party, were responslble for
the execution of Tlso. But thls came too late.
Wlth the execution of Dr. Joseph Tlso nails were sunk deep into
the Czechoslovak comn by all classes of the Slovak people - the
tradesmen, buslnessmen, workers and farmers and the lntelllgentsia.
The Slovak nation deflnltely is for an independent Slovakla. The
Slovak natlon reallzes tbat the road to independence !s fuH of sorrow
and suf\ferlng, but !s, nevertheless, determlned to attain lndependence
at all costs. It ls provlng that dally. Therefore, we welcome the resolutlon ot Congressman Kersten "for the freedom of the Slovaks," because free elections wlll prove who was rlght: we, who are for an
jndependent Slovak Republlc, or those who are trying to enslave
Slovakla.
Cvlnček
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Slovaks and Dr. Joseph Lettrich
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Joseph Bystrický
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951
pp. 48-52
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Bystrický, Joseph
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
name
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2f9ee0bdd6e035a6cf1554a603a9b7bc.pdf
c5d53e854ee68e8d0df6cc0216ae73b8
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
53
THE SLOV~ WILL NOT BE SILENCED
DR. JOSEPH PAUČO
Even though enemles of Slovak freedom and independence shall
contlnue to exert themselves to silence the Slovaks, they shall not
succeed. Thelr sacred cause shall !Ind honorable and noble defenders.
And, In Ume, it shall prevall. Thelr falth In eventual victory is increasing every day.
At one Ume many people tJhought th-a,t the idea and t he trufä
about the lndependence of the Slovak natlon would forever remaln
foreign to the Un1ted States. But, lo and behold, today only totally
uninformed people belleve that the Slovaks are Czechs or' CzechosJovaks. Mostly those who do not follow events outside of Amerlca.
t hose who have not been beyond the ocean, or those who are stub•
horn. Thelr numbers are few.
On the other hand, as time goes on, more is belng said about
Slovakla and the Slovak natlon. But even more than that. Today
there are many honest men in politlcs, publlshers, newsmen and commentators, who do not hesitate to lance tbe boil of Czechoslovakism.
Tbe dlstlngulshed CBS commentator Edward R. Murrow, for example,
dld not hesltate to state the trutb as he aaw it. He not only made
known that there was a strong movement for Slovak !ndependenee,
but even mentioned the fact that th e antagonism between t he Czechs
a nd the Slovaks dates back farth er t han comm unism ltself.
Tbe so-called "Czecboslovaks" (Czech Slovaks ! ) are trylng to Iure
the Slovaks lnto a joint flght against communism. All other tblngs llke Slovak freedom, independence and national existence - must not
be considered for the tlme belng. True, we must all comblne in tbe
fight agalnst communlsm. But why teli the Slovaks that tbey must
fight ~a!nst communlsm with the Czechs a nd on ly w ith t he
Czechs - when it 1s a matter of historical record that the Slovaks
fought commun1sm for over a hundred years without the Czechs ·t
There 1s no force under tbe sun to force the Slovaks to play the
"Czechoslovak" game, wblch threatens tbe very existence of the Slovak natlon by subordinatlng lt to tbe Czechs. Tbe Slovaks bave had
tbelr flll of Magyars, Czechs, Russlans and Germans. Tbey are no
Ionger lnterested In the joint st-ate of Czechoslovakia. They have outllved all tbat and lnslst on freedom and lndependence.
The Slovaks have fought and are stlll vallantly fightlng communlsm, but not for the sake of belng enslaved and explolted by the
Czechs or any other natlon. They do not want any one to teli them
to flght communism for the sake of the prlnclples of T. G. Masaryk
or Dr. Edward Beneš, because thelr pollcles were anti-Slovak and antiChristlan, undemocratlc and totally allen and opposed to Slovak national tradltlons and rellgious convictlons. The Slovaks wlll not be
forced to flght communlsm with any group tbat fosters and promotes
Czechoslovaklsm - the ideology that claims the S lova ks are only
a bra nch of the Czech n at ion a nd t hat th e Slovak la nguage is only a
dialect of the Czech nation ; in aho rt that the Slovak natlon doea
not exlat - because that ldeology ls dedlcated to the enslavement
�54
S LOVAKIA
and destruction of tbe Slovak people, just a s communism 1s dedicated
to the destructlon of all libertles and tbe ens la vement of al! peoples.
Tbe old quarrel between tbe Czecbs and the Slovaks must be
liquldated In the interests of botb the Czecbs and tbe Slovak.s, and
in tbe lnterests of tbe democratic world as well. J ustice and tbe
right demand it. The Slovaks fought against communism long before
the Czech s and many other natlons; and the Stalin Reds were well
aware or that fact in 1945. That is why the independent state of Slo•
vakia had to be destroyed after the war and the Reds put into power
there. Beneš and bis followers helped Stalin and his agents in their
infll.IIlous work, believing that they would not attempt the same thing
in Bohemia and Moravla. They were dead wrong then. and they are
just as wrong today wben they promote tbe cause of Czechoslovakism - t he handmaid of communism - in the United States and other
democratic countries of tbe world.
T he Slovaks are fighting communism and want to keep fighting
it together with ALL nations and national groups, even includlng the
Czechs, but not specif ica ll y and jo ínt ly only wi th the Czec hs. Tbeir
reward for their fight against communism must not be tbe !oss of
their national existence, tbe surrender of their inberent right to freedom and independence. And even exiled Beneš Czechs, former Czech
colla borators witb the Reds now enjoying the freedom of America,
s bould be able to understand and appreciate that today.
•
•
•
•
THE SLOVA.KS DO NOT WANT CZECHOSLOVA.KIA
OR. ANDREW SLOVAK
(The autbor of tbis artlcle is considered one of the foremost Slovak socialists. Recently he quit the "Czechoslovak" ranks and joined
the Slovak National Council Abroad, the organlzation of Slovak
exlles whose chief alm is to see Slovakla free and independent after
her liberation from communism and tbe Soviet spbere of intluence
thTust upon her by the victors in 1945. The vlews expressed by Dr.
Slovak, who formerly favored the "Czechoslovak" ideology of Dr.
Beneš, clearly indicate that there has been a change in the thinking
of Slovak socialists.)
The year 1945 was a surprise to every Slovak of the "Czecho•
slovak" orientation. S\ovakia did not welcome the re-creatlon of the
Czechoslovak State with great enthusiasm as was heralded by the
propaganda apparatus of Dr. Beneš. The truth !s that apathy re!gned
in practlcally all strata of tbe inhabitants of Slovakia without re•
gard to differences In political convictions.
Another surprising fact was the economic prosperity of the Slo·
vak 1Republic. Slovak national economlsts proved to the world, and
to the prO'tectors trom the W est and the Rast, that Slovakia is a se\f.
sufficient economic unit whlch can get along wlthout outslde help.
I believe tbat this fact surprised even tbe greatest adversaries of the
idea of Slovak statehood.
Another argument whlch compels every Slovak to a ction is the
statemenl of Prof. Dr. J aroslav Stránsky that a talented, young Czech
national economist cannot validate hlmself for the sake of tbe Slovaks.
�
SLOVAKIA
53
THE SLOV~ WILL NOT BE SILENCED
DR. JOSEPH PAUČO
Even though enemles of Slovak freedom and independence shall
contlnue to exert themselves to silence the Slovaks, they shall not
succeed. Thelr sacred cause shall !Ind honorable and noble defenders.
And, In Ume, it shall prevall. Thelr falth In eventual victory is increasing every day.
At one Ume many people tJhought th-a,t the idea and t he trufä
about the lndependence of the Slovak natlon would forever remaln
foreign to the Un1ted States. But, lo and behold, today only totally
uninformed people belleve that the Slovaks are Czechs or' CzechosJovaks. Mostly those who do not follow events outside of Amerlca.
t hose who have not been beyond the ocean, or those who are stub•
horn. Thelr numbers are few.
On the other hand, as time goes on, more is belng said about
Slovakla and the Slovak natlon. But even more than that. Today
there are many honest men in politlcs, publlshers, newsmen and commentators, who do not hesitate to lance tbe boil of Czechoslovakism.
Tbe dlstlngulshed CBS commentator Edward R. Murrow, for example,
dld not hesltate to state the trutb as he aaw it. He not only made
known that there was a strong movement for Slovak !ndependenee,
but even mentioned the fact that th e antagonism between t he Czechs
a nd the Slovaks dates back farth er t han comm unism ltself.
Tbe so-called "Czecboslovaks" (Czech Slovaks ! ) are trylng to Iure
the Slovaks lnto a joint flght against communism. All other tblngs llke Slovak freedom, independence and national existence - must not
be considered for the tlme belng. True, we must all comblne in tbe
fight agalnst communlsm. But why teli the Slovaks that tbey must
fight ~a!nst communlsm with the Czechs a nd on ly w ith t he
Czechs - when it 1s a matter of historical record that the Slovaks
fought commun1sm for over a hundred years without the Czechs ·t
There 1s no force under tbe sun to force the Slovaks to play the
"Czechoslovak" game, wblch threatens tbe very existence of the Slovak natlon by subordinatlng lt to tbe Czechs. Tbe Slovaks bave had
tbelr flll of Magyars, Czechs, Russlans and Germans. Tbey are no
Ionger lnterested In the joint st-ate of Czechoslovakia. They have outllved all tbat and lnslst on freedom and lndependence.
The Slovaks have fought and are stlll vallantly fightlng communlsm, but not for the sake of belng enslaved and explolted by the
Czechs or any other natlon. They do not want any one to teli them
to flght communism for the sake of the prlnclples of T. G. Masaryk
or Dr. Edward Beneš, because thelr pollcles were anti-Slovak and antiChristlan, undemocratlc and totally allen and opposed to Slovak national tradltlons and rellgious convictlons. The Slovaks wlll not be
forced to flght communlsm with any group tbat fosters and promotes
Czechoslovaklsm - the ideology that claims the S lova ks are only
a bra nch of the Czech n at ion a nd t hat th e Slovak la nguage is only a
dialect of the Czech nation ; in aho rt that the Slovak natlon doea
not exlat - because that ldeology ls dedlcated to the enslavement
�54
S LOVAKIA
and destruction of tbe Slovak people, just a s communism 1s dedicated
to the destructlon of all libertles and tbe ens la vement of al! peoples.
Tbe old quarrel between tbe Czecbs and the Slovaks must be
liquldated In the interests of botb the Czecbs and tbe Slovak.s, and
in tbe lnterests of tbe democratic world as well. J ustice and tbe
right demand it. The Slovaks fought against communism long before
the Czech s and many other natlons; and the Stalin Reds were well
aware or that fact in 1945. That is why the independent state of Slo•
vakia had to be destroyed after the war and the Reds put into power
there. Beneš and bis followers helped Stalin and his agents in their
infll.IIlous work, believing that they would not attempt the same thing
in Bohemia and Moravla. They were dead wrong then. and they are
just as wrong today wben they promote tbe cause of Czechoslovakism - t he handmaid of communism - in the United States and other
democratic countries of tbe world.
T he Slovaks are fighting communism and want to keep fighting
it together with ALL nations and national groups, even includlng the
Czechs, but not specif ica ll y and jo ínt ly only wi th the Czec hs. Tbeir
reward for their fight against communism must not be tbe !oss of
their national existence, tbe surrender of their inberent right to freedom and independence. And even exiled Beneš Czechs, former Czech
colla borators witb the Reds now enjoying the freedom of America,
s bould be able to understand and appreciate that today.
•
•
•
•
THE SLOVA.KS DO NOT WANT CZECHOSLOVA.KIA
OR. ANDREW SLOVAK
(The autbor of tbis artlcle is considered one of the foremost Slovak socialists. Recently he quit the "Czechoslovak" ranks and joined
the Slovak National Council Abroad, the organlzation of Slovak
exlles whose chief alm is to see Slovakla free and independent after
her liberation from communism and tbe Soviet spbere of intluence
thTust upon her by the victors in 1945. The vlews expressed by Dr.
Slovak, who formerly favored the "Czechoslovak" ideology of Dr.
Beneš, clearly indicate that there has been a change in the thinking
of Slovak socialists.)
The year 1945 was a surprise to every Slovak of the "Czecho•
slovak" orientation. S\ovakia did not welcome the re-creatlon of the
Czechoslovak State with great enthusiasm as was heralded by the
propaganda apparatus of Dr. Beneš. The truth !s that apathy re!gned
in practlcally all strata of tbe inhabitants of Slovakia without re•
gard to differences In political convictions.
Another surprising fact was the economic prosperity of the Slo·
vak 1Republic. Slovak national economlsts proved to the world, and
to the prO'tectors trom the W est and the Rast, that Slovakia is a se\f.
sufficient economic unit whlch can get along wlthout outslde help.
I believe tbat this fact surprised even tbe greatest adversaries of the
idea of Slovak statehood.
Another argument whlch compels every Slovak to a ction is the
statemenl of Prof. Dr. J aroslav Stránsky that a talented, young Czech
national economist cannot validate hlmself for the sake of tbe Slovaks.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
53
THE SLOV~ WILL NOT BE SILENCED
DR. JOSEPH PAUČO
Even though enemles of Slovak freedom and independence shall
contlnue to exert themselves to silence the Slovaks, they shall not
succeed. Thelr sacred cause shall !Ind honorable and noble defenders.
And, In Ume, it shall prevall. Thelr falth In eventual victory is increasing every day.
At one Ume many people tJhought th-a,t the idea and t he trufä
about the lndependence of the Slovak natlon would forever remaln
foreign to the Un1ted States. But, lo and behold, today only totally
uninformed people belleve that the Slovaks are Czechs or' CzechosJovaks. Mostly those who do not follow events outside of Amerlca.
t hose who have not been beyond the ocean, or those who are stub•
horn. Thelr numbers are few.
On the other hand, as time goes on, more is belng said about
Slovakla and the Slovak natlon. But even more than that. Today
there are many honest men in politlcs, publlshers, newsmen and commentators, who do not hesitate to lance tbe boil of Czechoslovakism.
Tbe dlstlngulshed CBS commentator Edward R. Murrow, for example,
dld not hesltate to state the trutb as he aaw it. He not only made
known that there was a strong movement for Slovak !ndependenee,
but even mentioned the fact that th e antagonism between t he Czechs
a nd the Slovaks dates back farth er t han comm unism ltself.
Tbe so-called "Czecboslovaks" (Czech Slovaks ! ) are trylng to Iure
the Slovaks lnto a joint flght against communism. All other tblngs llke Slovak freedom, independence and national existence - must not
be considered for the tlme belng. True, we must all comblne in tbe
fight agalnst communlsm. But why teli the Slovaks that tbey must
fight ~a!nst communlsm with the Czechs a nd on ly w ith t he
Czechs - when it 1s a matter of historical record that the Slovaks
fought commun1sm for over a hundred years without the Czechs ·t
There 1s no force under tbe sun to force the Slovaks to play the
"Czechoslovak" game, wblch threatens tbe very existence of the Slovak natlon by subordinatlng lt to tbe Czechs. Tbe Slovaks bave had
tbelr flll of Magyars, Czechs, Russlans and Germans. Tbey are no
Ionger lnterested In the joint st-ate of Czechoslovakia. They have outllved all tbat and lnslst on freedom and lndependence.
The Slovaks have fought and are stlll vallantly fightlng communlsm, but not for the sake of belng enslaved and explolted by the
Czechs or any other natlon. They do not want any one to teli them
to flght communism for the sake of the prlnclples of T. G. Masaryk
or Dr. Edward Beneš, because thelr pollcles were anti-Slovak and antiChristlan, undemocratlc and totally allen and opposed to Slovak national tradltlons and rellgious convictlons. The Slovaks wlll not be
forced to flght communlsm with any group tbat fosters and promotes
Czechoslovaklsm - the ideology that claims the S lova ks are only
a bra nch of the Czech n at ion a nd t hat th e Slovak la nguage is only a
dialect of the Czech nation ; in aho rt that the Slovak natlon doea
not exlat - because that ldeology ls dedlcated to the enslavement
54
S LOVAKIA
and destruction of tbe Slovak people, just a s communism 1s dedicated
to the destructlon of all libertles and tbe ens la vement of al! peoples.
Tbe old quarrel between tbe Czecbs and the Slovaks must be
liquldated In the interests of botb the Czecbs and tbe Slovak.s, and
in tbe lnterests of tbe democratic world as well. J ustice and tbe
right demand it. The Slovaks fought against communism long before
the Czech s and many other natlons; and the Stalin Reds were well
aware or that fact in 1945. That is why the independent state of Slo•
vakia had to be destroyed after the war and the Reds put into power
there. Beneš and bis followers helped Stalin and his agents in their
infll.IIlous work, believing that they would not attempt the same thing
in Bohemia and Moravla. They were dead wrong then. and they are
just as wrong today wben they promote tbe cause of Czechoslovakism - t he handmaid of communism - in the United States and other
democratic countries of tbe world.
T he Slovaks are fighting communism and want to keep fighting
it together with ALL nations and national groups, even includlng the
Czechs, but not specif ica ll y and jo ínt ly only wi th the Czec hs. Tbeir
reward for their fight against communism must not be tbe !oss of
their national existence, tbe surrender of their inberent right to freedom and independence. And even exiled Beneš Czechs, former Czech
colla borators witb the Reds now enjoying the freedom of America,
s bould be able to understand and appreciate that today.
•
•
•
•
THE SLOVA.KS DO NOT WANT CZECHOSLOVA.KIA
OR. ANDREW SLOVAK
(The autbor of tbis artlcle is considered one of the foremost Slovak socialists. Recently he quit the "Czechoslovak" ranks and joined
the Slovak National Council Abroad, the organlzation of Slovak
exlles whose chief alm is to see Slovakla free and independent after
her liberation from communism and tbe Soviet spbere of intluence
thTust upon her by the victors in 1945. The vlews expressed by Dr.
Slovak, who formerly favored the "Czechoslovak" ideology of Dr.
Beneš, clearly indicate that there has been a change in the thinking
of Slovak socialists.)
The year 1945 was a surprise to every Slovak of the "Czecho•
slovak" orientation. S\ovakia did not welcome the re-creatlon of the
Czechoslovak State with great enthusiasm as was heralded by the
propaganda apparatus of Dr. Beneš. The truth !s that apathy re!gned
in practlcally all strata of tbe inhabitants of Slovakia without re•
gard to differences In political convictions.
Another surprising fact was the economic prosperity of the Slo·
vak 1Republic. Slovak national economlsts proved to the world, and
to the prO'tectors trom the W est and the Rast, that Slovakia is a se\f.
sufficient economic unit whlch can get along wlthout outslde help.
I believe tbat this fact surprised even tbe greatest adversaries of the
idea of Slovak statehood.
Another argument whlch compels every Slovak to a ction is the
statemenl of Prof. Dr. J aroslav Stránsky that a talented, young Czech
national economist cannot validate hlmself for the sake of tbe Slovaks.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Slovaks Will Not Be Silenced...
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Joseph Paučo
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951
pp. 53-54
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Paučo, Jozef, 1914-1975
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
SNK
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5c09054c2c8a653f3c653bd4cad00439.pdf
6ba3219f01480f8c2a8671bce204f0be
PDF Text
Text
54
S LOVAKIA
and destruction of tbe Slovak people, just a s communism 1s dedicated
to the destructlon of all libertles and tbe ens la vement of al! peoples.
Tbe old quarrel between tbe Czecbs and the Slovaks must be
liquldated In the interests of botb the Czecbs and tbe Slovak.s, and
in tbe lnterests of tbe democratic world as well. J ustice and tbe
right demand it. The Slovaks fought against communism long before
the Czech s and many other natlons; and the Stalin Reds were well
aware or that fact in 1945. That is why the independent state of Slo•
vakia had to be destroyed after the war and the Reds put into power
there. Beneš and bis followers helped Stalin and his agents in their
infll.IIlous work, believing that they would not attempt the same thing
in Bohemia and Moravla. They were dead wrong then. and they are
just as wrong today wben they promote tbe cause of Czechoslovakism - t he handmaid of communism - in the United States and other
democratic countries of tbe world.
T he Slovaks are fighting communism and want to keep fighting
it together with ALL nations and national groups, even includlng the
Czechs, but not specif ica ll y and jo ínt ly only wi th the Czec hs. Tbeir
reward for their fight against communism must not be tbe !oss of
their national existence, tbe surrender of their inberent right to freedom and independence. And even exiled Beneš Czechs, former Czech
colla borators witb the Reds now enjoying the freedom of America,
s bould be able to understand and appreciate that today.
•
•
•
•
THE SLOVA.KS DO NOT WANT CZECHOSLOVA.KIA
OR. ANDREW SLOVAK
(The autbor of tbis artlcle is considered one of the foremost Slovak socialists. Recently he quit the "Czechoslovak" ranks and joined
the Slovak National Council Abroad, the organlzation of Slovak
exlles whose chief alm is to see Slovakla free and independent after
her liberation from communism and tbe Soviet spbere of intluence
thTust upon her by the victors in 1945. The vlews expressed by Dr.
Slovak, who formerly favored the "Czechoslovak" ideology of Dr.
Beneš, clearly indicate that there has been a change in the thinking
of Slovak socialists.)
The year 1945 was a surprise to every Slovak of the "Czecho•
slovak" orientation. S\ovakia did not welcome the re-creatlon of the
Czechoslovak State with great enthusiasm as was heralded by the
propaganda apparatus of Dr. Beneš. The truth !s that apathy re!gned
in practlcally all strata of tbe inhabitants of Slovakia without re•
gard to differences In political convictions.
Another surprising fact was the economic prosperity of the Slo·
vak 1Republic. Slovak national economlsts proved to the world, and
to the prO'tectors trom the W est and the Rast, that Slovakia is a se\f.
sufficient economic unit whlch can get along wlthout outslde help.
I believe tbat this fact surprised even tbe greatest adversaries of the
idea of Slovak statehood.
Another argument whlch compels every Slovak to a ction is the
statemenl of Prof. Dr. J aroslav Stránsky that a talented, young Czech
national economist cannot validate hlmself for the sake of tbe Slovaks.
�SLOVA.KU.
66
We do not want to restrict any one, but neltber do we wish to be
restricted.
The three actualities mentioned above mean much for every Intel•
ligent Slovak.
The f!rst factor means that the Slovak nation wishes to travel
along its own Slovak road wlthout hatred and to live on friendly
terms with all its neighbors - on the west with the Czechs, wlth
the Poles on the north and with the Magyars on the south.
The second fact surprised all o( us. Though we knew that Slo•
vakia was rich in materials, nevertheless even the biggest optimista
were s u rp,rlsed that it was so sel(-1:;ufricient.
The third fact is really a memento for all of us. When Dr. Strán&ky mentioned that the Slovaks were to continue the role of the
smaller, unwanted brother, he opened the eyes of all o( us. even
though he did not lntend to.
It is In the interest of all the nations of Centra! Europe that
Slovakla should exlst as an Independent state unit, because the Slovak wishes to live in peace and contentment, as our poet has ex·
pressed lt: " The Slovak sows on bis own and reaps only on hls own."
H istory has proved that the poet was also rlght when he sald: " If
it is the s word, swords have we too, and you know tbat we know
how to use them."
I thlnk it is necessary that memb ers of all nations of the
Danub e Basin become aware of t he fact that the Slovaks are capable
of taklng car e of themselves and that tbey want to Jive In peace and
contentment, but independently.
*
WHO SAID IT ?: -
*
*
"Th e treaty is a historic landmark In the
relations between our two countries; lt is undoubtedly one of the
foundation stones of security, prosperity, and strength of the Czechoslovak Repub lic. The treaty revealed ltself as one of the most lm•
portant Instruments of a constructive European pollcy. . . . It 1s in•
tended, not. only for the special needs of Czechoslovakia and the
Soviet Union, but it serves also, the common European interests on
the basis of Britls h-Soviet-Amerlcan cooperatlon . . . . lt enables other
natlons of Centra! Europe, partlcularly tbe Polisb natlon, to arrive at
such a degree of cooperation with tbe neighboring Soviet power as
dlstinguished the Soviet-Czecboslovak relatlonsbip - cooperation which
is based upon the principle of mutual respect for their freedom and
lndependence and also upon tbat of non-interference In tbe!r natlonal
affairs . . . . The Czechoslovak-Soviet Pact is welcomed, first and foremost, by our nation, for in this w ay, the great expectatlon of our people receives its fulfillment .... The his toric merlts of the CzechoslO·
vaklan treaty are due to President Deneš, who, a year ago, provided
tbe lnltlative for the whole undertaklng, both by his general polit ical
program, as well as by his concrete proposals, and who hlmself dlrected the particularly important negotiations. All of us, together wltb
the whole nation, congratulate President Deneš on bis h!gbly s lgnlflcant and meritorious success and we are all slncerely gratifled by bis
present offlclal vislt to the Soviet Union. wblcb wlll undoubtedly
s trengtµen Czechoslovak-Sovlet frlendsblp." {Dr. Hubert Rlpka
to tbe Czecholllovak State Councll. London, December 15, 1943).
�
54
S LOVAKIA
and destruction of tbe Slovak people, just a s communism 1s dedicated
to the destructlon of all libertles and tbe ens la vement of al! peoples.
Tbe old quarrel between tbe Czecbs and the Slovaks must be
liquldated In the interests of botb the Czecbs and tbe Slovak.s, and
in tbe lnterests of tbe democratic world as well. J ustice and tbe
right demand it. The Slovaks fought against communism long before
the Czech s and many other natlons; and the Stalin Reds were well
aware or that fact in 1945. That is why the independent state of Slo•
vakia had to be destroyed after the war and the Reds put into power
there. Beneš and bis followers helped Stalin and his agents in their
infll.IIlous work, believing that they would not attempt the same thing
in Bohemia and Moravla. They were dead wrong then. and they are
just as wrong today wben they promote tbe cause of Czechoslovakism - t he handmaid of communism - in the United States and other
democratic countries of tbe world.
T he Slovaks are fighting communism and want to keep fighting
it together with ALL nations and national groups, even includlng the
Czechs, but not specif ica ll y and jo ínt ly only wi th the Czec hs. Tbeir
reward for their fight against communism must not be tbe !oss of
their national existence, tbe surrender of their inberent right to freedom and independence. And even exiled Beneš Czechs, former Czech
colla borators witb the Reds now enjoying the freedom of America,
s bould be able to understand and appreciate that today.
•
•
•
•
THE SLOVA.KS DO NOT WANT CZECHOSLOVA.KIA
OR. ANDREW SLOVAK
(The autbor of tbis artlcle is considered one of the foremost Slovak socialists. Recently he quit the "Czechoslovak" ranks and joined
the Slovak National Council Abroad, the organlzation of Slovak
exlles whose chief alm is to see Slovakla free and independent after
her liberation from communism and tbe Soviet spbere of intluence
thTust upon her by the victors in 1945. The vlews expressed by Dr.
Slovak, who formerly favored the "Czechoslovak" ideology of Dr.
Beneš, clearly indicate that there has been a change in the thinking
of Slovak socialists.)
The year 1945 was a surprise to every Slovak of the "Czecho•
slovak" orientation. S\ovakia did not welcome the re-creatlon of the
Czechoslovak State with great enthusiasm as was heralded by the
propaganda apparatus of Dr. Beneš. The truth !s that apathy re!gned
in practlcally all strata of tbe inhabitants of Slovakia without re•
gard to differences In political convictions.
Another surprising fact was the economic prosperity of the Slo·
vak 1Republic. Slovak national economlsts proved to the world, and
to the prO'tectors trom the W est and the Rast, that Slovakia is a se\f.
sufficient economic unit whlch can get along wlthout outslde help.
I believe tbat this fact surprised even tbe greatest adversaries of the
idea of Slovak statehood.
Another argument whlch compels every Slovak to a ction is the
statemenl of Prof. Dr. J aroslav Stránsky that a talented, young Czech
national economist cannot validate hlmself for the sake of tbe Slovaks.
�SLOVA.KU.
66
We do not want to restrict any one, but neltber do we wish to be
restricted.
The three actualities mentioned above mean much for every Intel•
ligent Slovak.
The f!rst factor means that the Slovak nation wishes to travel
along its own Slovak road wlthout hatred and to live on friendly
terms with all its neighbors - on the west with the Czechs, wlth
the Poles on the north and with the Magyars on the south.
The second fact surprised all o( us. Though we knew that Slo•
vakia was rich in materials, nevertheless even the biggest optimista
were s u rp,rlsed that it was so sel(-1:;ufricient.
The third fact is really a memento for all of us. When Dr. Strán&ky mentioned that the Slovaks were to continue the role of the
smaller, unwanted brother, he opened the eyes of all o( us. even
though he did not lntend to.
It is In the interest of all the nations of Centra! Europe that
Slovakla should exlst as an Independent state unit, because the Slovak wishes to live in peace and contentment, as our poet has ex·
pressed lt: " The Slovak sows on bis own and reaps only on hls own."
H istory has proved that the poet was also rlght when he sald: " If
it is the s word, swords have we too, and you know tbat we know
how to use them."
I thlnk it is necessary that memb ers of all nations of the
Danub e Basin become aware of t he fact that the Slovaks are capable
of taklng car e of themselves and that tbey want to Jive In peace and
contentment, but independently.
*
WHO SAID IT ?: -
*
*
"Th e treaty is a historic landmark In the
relations between our two countries; lt is undoubtedly one of the
foundation stones of security, prosperity, and strength of the Czechoslovak Repub lic. The treaty revealed ltself as one of the most lm•
portant Instruments of a constructive European pollcy. . . . It 1s in•
tended, not. only for the special needs of Czechoslovakia and the
Soviet Union, but it serves also, the common European interests on
the basis of Britls h-Soviet-Amerlcan cooperatlon . . . . lt enables other
natlons of Centra! Europe, partlcularly tbe Polisb natlon, to arrive at
such a degree of cooperation with tbe neighboring Soviet power as
dlstinguished the Soviet-Czecboslovak relatlonsbip - cooperation which
is based upon the principle of mutual respect for their freedom and
lndependence and also upon tbat of non-interference In tbe!r natlonal
affairs . . . . The Czechoslovak-Soviet Pact is welcomed, first and foremost, by our nation, for in this w ay, the great expectatlon of our people receives its fulfillment .... The his toric merlts of the CzechoslO·
vaklan treaty are due to President Deneš, who, a year ago, provided
tbe lnltlative for the whole undertaklng, both by his general polit ical
program, as well as by his concrete proposals, and who hlmself dlrected the particularly important negotiations. All of us, together wltb
the whole nation, congratulate President Deneš on bis h!gbly s lgnlflcant and meritorious success and we are all slncerely gratifled by bis
present offlclal vislt to the Soviet Union. wblcb wlll undoubtedly
s trengtµen Czechoslovak-Sovlet frlendsblp." {Dr. Hubert Rlpka
to tbe Czecholllovak State Councll. London, December 15, 1943).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
54
S LOVAKIA
and destruction of tbe Slovak people, just a s communism 1s dedicated
to the destructlon of all libertles and tbe ens la vement of al! peoples.
Tbe old quarrel between tbe Czecbs and the Slovaks must be
liquldated In the interests of botb the Czecbs and tbe Slovak.s, and
in tbe lnterests of tbe democratic world as well. J ustice and tbe
right demand it. The Slovaks fought against communism long before
the Czech s and many other natlons; and the Stalin Reds were well
aware or that fact in 1945. That is why the independent state of Slo•
vakia had to be destroyed after the war and the Reds put into power
there. Beneš and bis followers helped Stalin and his agents in their
infll.IIlous work, believing that they would not attempt the same thing
in Bohemia and Moravla. They were dead wrong then. and they are
just as wrong today wben they promote tbe cause of Czechoslovakism - t he handmaid of communism - in the United States and other
democratic countries of tbe world.
T he Slovaks are fighting communism and want to keep fighting
it together with ALL nations and national groups, even includlng the
Czechs, but not specif ica ll y and jo ínt ly only wi th the Czec hs. Tbeir
reward for their fight against communism must not be tbe !oss of
their national existence, tbe surrender of their inberent right to freedom and independence. And even exiled Beneš Czechs, former Czech
colla borators witb the Reds now enjoying the freedom of America,
s bould be able to understand and appreciate that today.
•
•
•
•
THE SLOVA.KS DO NOT WANT CZECHOSLOVA.KIA
OR. ANDREW SLOVAK
(The autbor of tbis artlcle is considered one of the foremost Slovak socialists. Recently he quit the "Czechoslovak" ranks and joined
the Slovak National Council Abroad, the organlzation of Slovak
exlles whose chief alm is to see Slovakla free and independent after
her liberation from communism and tbe Soviet spbere of intluence
thTust upon her by the victors in 1945. The vlews expressed by Dr.
Slovak, who formerly favored the "Czechoslovak" ideology of Dr.
Beneš, clearly indicate that there has been a change in the thinking
of Slovak socialists.)
The year 1945 was a surprise to every Slovak of the "Czecho•
slovak" orientation. S\ovakia did not welcome the re-creatlon of the
Czechoslovak State with great enthusiasm as was heralded by the
propaganda apparatus of Dr. Beneš. The truth !s that apathy re!gned
in practlcally all strata of tbe inhabitants of Slovakia without re•
gard to differences In political convictions.
Another surprising fact was the economic prosperity of the Slo·
vak 1Republic. Slovak national economlsts proved to the world, and
to the prO'tectors trom the W est and the Rast, that Slovakia is a se\f.
sufficient economic unit whlch can get along wlthout outslde help.
I believe tbat this fact surprised even tbe greatest adversaries of the
idea of Slovak statehood.
Another argument whlch compels every Slovak to a ction is the
statemenl of Prof. Dr. J aroslav Stránsky that a talented, young Czech
national economist cannot validate hlmself for the sake of tbe Slovaks.
SLOVA.KU.
66
We do not want to restrict any one, but neltber do we wish to be
restricted.
The three actualities mentioned above mean much for every Intel•
ligent Slovak.
The f!rst factor means that the Slovak nation wishes to travel
along its own Slovak road wlthout hatred and to live on friendly
terms with all its neighbors - on the west with the Czechs, wlth
the Poles on the north and with the Magyars on the south.
The second fact surprised all o( us. Though we knew that Slo•
vakia was rich in materials, nevertheless even the biggest optimista
were s u rp,rlsed that it was so sel(-1:;ufricient.
The third fact is really a memento for all of us. When Dr. Strán&ky mentioned that the Slovaks were to continue the role of the
smaller, unwanted brother, he opened the eyes of all o( us. even
though he did not lntend to.
It is In the interest of all the nations of Centra! Europe that
Slovakla should exlst as an Independent state unit, because the Slovak wishes to live in peace and contentment, as our poet has ex·
pressed lt: " The Slovak sows on bis own and reaps only on hls own."
H istory has proved that the poet was also rlght when he sald: " If
it is the s word, swords have we too, and you know tbat we know
how to use them."
I thlnk it is necessary that memb ers of all nations of the
Danub e Basin become aware of t he fact that the Slovaks are capable
of taklng car e of themselves and that tbey want to Jive In peace and
contentment, but independently.
*
WHO SAID IT ?: -
*
*
"Th e treaty is a historic landmark In the
relations between our two countries; lt is undoubtedly one of the
foundation stones of security, prosperity, and strength of the Czechoslovak Repub lic. The treaty revealed ltself as one of the most lm•
portant Instruments of a constructive European pollcy. . . . It 1s in•
tended, not. only for the special needs of Czechoslovakia and the
Soviet Union, but it serves also, the common European interests on
the basis of Britls h-Soviet-Amerlcan cooperatlon . . . . lt enables other
natlons of Centra! Europe, partlcularly tbe Polisb natlon, to arrive at
such a degree of cooperation with tbe neighboring Soviet power as
dlstinguished the Soviet-Czecboslovak relatlonsbip - cooperation which
is based upon the principle of mutual respect for their freedom and
lndependence and also upon tbat of non-interference In tbe!r natlonal
affairs . . . . The Czechoslovak-Soviet Pact is welcomed, first and foremost, by our nation, for in this w ay, the great expectatlon of our people receives its fulfillment .... The his toric merlts of the CzechoslO·
vaklan treaty are due to President Deneš, who, a year ago, provided
tbe lnltlative for the whole undertaklng, both by his general polit ical
program, as well as by his concrete proposals, and who hlmself dlrected the particularly important negotiations. All of us, together wltb
the whole nation, congratulate President Deneš on bis h!gbly s lgnlflcant and meritorious success and we are all slncerely gratifled by bis
present offlclal vislt to the Soviet Union. wblcb wlll undoubtedly
s trengtµen Czechoslovak-Sovlet frlendsblp." {Dr. Hubert Rlpka
to tbe Czecholllovak State Councll. London, December 15, 1943).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Slovaks Do Not Want Czechoslovakia
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Andrew Slovak
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951
pp. 54-55
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Slovak, Andrew
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
name
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/1029af3398a2c9fa89f1a6e4991ec2ca.pdf
a632d718bcae98511576910a6922921c
PDF Text
Text
56
SLOVAKIA
CZ.ECH INTRIGUES AGAINST THE SWVAK STATE
DR. A . GRÉBERT
Slovakia was saved from a great catastrophe by proclaiming her
independence: from the danger or belng partitloned between Poland,
Hungary and Germany.
For the Czech and Magyar imperialists, however, the proclama•
tion of an independent Slovakia meant a fatal defeat. The Slovaks at
last had a chance to prove to themselves and the world that they
were able and capable of taklng care of themselves and thelr country.
The Czechs on the other hand knew well that lt meant a na.II in the
coffín of Czech imperlallsm In Slov.akta. That is why the Czech imperlallsts are f!ghtlng so furlously agalnst the Idea of Slovak state
independence ror over thlrty years. In thls regard, the rightist Hacha,
the lertist Flerllnger, and "me-always-president" Beneš spoke and
acted allke. Czech post-war politlcal literature offers conclusive proofs
o[ thls.
When Hitler called Hacha to Berlin on March 15, 1949 - a day
after the proclamatlon of the lndependence of Slovakia - the Czech
presldent dld not fall to use the opportunity to lntrigue agalnst the
Slovaks. In bis conversa.tlon wlth Hitler, he said that he belleved
"the F Uhrer s hall not have too many favora ble experiences w ith the
Slovaks." Furthermore Hacha sald that the Czechs always had "closer
ties w ith Ge rmany than wlth Slovakia, wh ic h is more inclin ed t o
Hungary" (vd.: Czechoslovakla and the Nuremberg Trials, pg. 326).
True lt is that in the past the Czechs always felt ctoser to
Germany than to Siovakla, but In the case referred to, Bacha was
lnterested only In presentlng the Czechs in a most favorable light,
whlle on the Slova.ks he cast the susplclon of sympathlzlng with Hungary, whom Hitler nelther llked nor trusted. Base dlplomatlc lntrigue
was concerned. It was generally known that Hitler knew llttle about
Slovakla; cleverly lnclted susplclon about the inclinatlon of the Slovaks toward the Magyars could have catastrophic results for the development of the Slovak state. And that certalnly would have been
most pleaslng to Czech lmperlallsts.
Magyar dlplomats In Berlin also never let up intriguing against
Slovak state lndependence. Slova.kla certainly was In a dlfficult altu·
atlon. · For example, on March 25, 1989, Hitler gave the tollowlng lnformation to the supreme commander of the German army regardlng
bis stand toward Slovakla: "It 1s not certalu how long the Fiihrer
shall feel hlmself bound by the agreement concluded wlth Slovakia.
The supreme army commander thlnks that t he Fiihrer would want to
1id himself of the obligation at the flrst opportune moment and use
Slovakla as a basis of negotiation between blmself, Poland and Hungary. In the meantlme, however, Hungary is supposed to restrain
herself." (op. cit. pg. 332).
Czech and Magyar lntrlgues bore fruit.
lt took a Jot of dlplomatic cleverness and perseverance on the part
of President Tlso, bis Minister of Forelgn Affalrs and Slovak diplo·
macy to save Slovakia from the deadly danger lnclted by the Magyars
�SLOVAK.IA
67
and the Czechs. If foť nothlng else, then for avertlng this danger Dr.
Tiso and bis government deserve the gratltude and respect of the
Slovak na.tlon. Thus tbey saved the Slovak6 trom one of the great86t
catastrophies that could have overtaken them.
Czech politiclans and diplomats lntrigued even later and on otbeť
fronts of tbe diplomatic battlefield against the Slovak state. In October 1939 the USSIR declded to recognize the Slovak Republic "de
jure." At that tlme Zdenek Fierlinger, former Czech envoy, was stil\
in Moscow. H e dld everything possible to prevent the recognitlon. "I
was very much concerned," writes Fierlinger in bis Memolrs, "to have
the undeslrable psychologlcal effect of the recognltion of Slovakia
a nd our deep disappolntment explained at the Commissariat of Interna) Affalrs. I demanded very emphatically that my o bjectlons be
interpreted to competent authorities."
But the USSR dld recognize the Slovak State "de jure" and Czech
cliplomacy and Czech lntrlgues suffered a complete setback. The
Czechs sought to weaken the political situatlon of the Slovak State
internatlona.lly by having the USSR renounce recognl:tlon. But thelr
dlplomatic guns backftred. Flerllnger himself states that sendlng a
Soviet envoy to Bratislava only emphasized the lndependence of the
Slovak State.
The Soviets, like the Vatican, probably have the best information
servlce in the world. They knew well how the Slovak people felt
about the Slovak State: they knew that over 90 per cent were for lt.
That i., wby the Sovlets did not hesltate to recognlze the Slovak
State as a full-fledged member of the lnternational soclety of states.
And it ls signlficant that even at the conclusion of the war the Sovlets offered to respect Slovak statehood. They changed thelr stand
only after Dľ. Tlso refused resolutely to collaborate wlth International
Communism.
Beneš lntrlgued even at the Vatican. The Holy See was among
the ftrst to recognlze the Slovak State. Slovakia had an ambassador at
the Vatican, and the Vatican had one In Bratislava. Beneš could
not see thls.
puffed and he huffed to have the Vatlcan renounce
recognitlon.
On January 7, 1941, Beneš gave the apostolic representatlve .. ln
Great Brttain, Msgr. W. Godfrey, a letter In wblch, among other thlngs,
he stated that "the time has arrlved when we ought to come to establi.sh some sort of unofflcial contact between the new Czechoslovak
government, resldlng now In London, and the ~oly See."
Beneš knew that the existence of the Slovak State and its abllity
to live were the greatest obstacles to his des!gns. That 1s why he tried
to present Slovakla to the Roly See In the gloomiest colors: "Conditions In Slovak.la are very bad and the severity of the contemporary
government of Tlso shall have a deep influence on the situatlon of
the Catholic Church ln Slovakla after the war."
Evidently Beneš threatened the Holy See to see things his way
and recognlze hi.s government or else suffer the consequences for
the Church In Slovakla once he got back lnto power af<ter the war.
To aggravat-e the sltuation and tbe sta.tlu:& of the Slovak ambassa.dor a,t
the Vatlcan, Beneš sa id In his letter that "the Slovak delegate at tbe
He
�58
SLOVAKI.A
Holy See is a representative of a State that is entirely in the hands
of the Nazi government."
It is lnteresting on the one hand, to note that Beneš called tbe
Slovak ambassador a "delegate" - even tbough be was recognlzed as
an ambassador by the Vatlcan which had at lts dis posal men wbo
were at least as well-versed in international law and polltics as were
Deneš and his colleagues. On tbe other hand. however, Beneš wrote
about a STATE and not about a "SO-CALLED" State: the latter terminology he reserved for the lnternal-polltical front and for his nalve
admlrers. Beneš knew that he could talk about a "so-called" state
before his agents, but not before the experlenced and educated diplomats or the Vatican.
Beneš said t hat tbe Slovak government was ·•entirely in the hands
of the Nazi government." However, wben he came to Košice in 1945 according to Pápanek's statement before the Security Council of tbe
Uniled Nations in March 1948 - Beneš was completely under tbe surveillance of the Soviet army and it was even impossible for him to
make contacts wlth the surroundlng countries. "\\'ell, tbe fact still
remains that Dr. Tiso and bis government were never so "totally"
under tbe care of the Nazi government!
Tbe answer tbe Vatican gave Beneš was not the one that he had
E>xpected. Tbe Vatican answered courteously, but clearly and empbatlcally that it will not "establish some form of unofficial contact"
as Beneš desired. In the answer of the Vatican it says that " His
Em!nence is conv!nced that Your Excellency w!l.J understand. how
dellcate the contemporary situation ls and bow diCficult it would be
In the present perlod to proffer the Czechoslovak people the ad•
vantage of such contacts."
Translated into plain language that mean t: "NO!"
Evldently the Vatican gave priority to the diplomatic contacts
with the Slovak natlon and not to tbose with "the Czechoslovak
people" as Benel\ had wished. This was an apparent failure of and defeat for Beneš's diplomacy.
Beneš was angered, but not overly discouraged. Two years later,
on May 12, 1943, he sent the Vat!can a Memorandum in which he
demanded establishing contacts between tbe Vatican and tbe Czechoslovak government in London.
In it he told bis version of tbe "sad" conditions at horne: The
Czechs he satd, are without exception for the Czecboslovak government in London and "the Slovak people in its greater majority bolds
the same position. In Slovakia, polltical, social, economic and mora!
condltlons are most sad. The majori ty of the Slovak nation regards the
present regime in Bratislava gullty of thi& situaiion and as a trattor
of the Slovak people and the Czechoslovak Republlc. Former governmental Slovak parties from tbe period before March 15, 1939, (Tbe
Agrarians, Liberals, Sociallsts). are almost completely bebind the Czer hos lovak government and against the present regime in Slovakla,
wb!le from tbe ranks of former Cathollc People's Party, which took
over tbe rule of Slovak affairs from tbe hands of tbe Germans tn
1939, at least 60 per cent today - according to our reports - stand
agalnst tbe present r egime."
�fiLOVAKlA
69
That statement contalns just about as many !les and hal!truths as
it does words ! Beneš himself must have known that, because he further sald that "the Holy See mlght have other information about the
situatlon in Slovak!a, but I consider lt my duty," etc.
No doubt about lt: the Holy See dld have other information; it
had the true plcture of Slovakla. The Vatlcan had lts representative
in Bratislava! Beneš undoubtedly knew that he was lying, but the
Czech cause was built on Jies and it was possible to defend it only
with more lies.
To glve the memorandum more weight, Beneš had lt sent through
the Br!tlsh and American Government.s. Despite all thls, t he Vatican
contlnued to recogn!ze the Slovak S.tate to the end of the war. Of
course, that made Beneš all the more furious.
1t is interesting to note that Beneš did not have the courage to
r,ubllsh the Vatican's reply i o his memorandum in hls Memoirs. It
probably was not as nlce as that recelved in 1941. The stand of the
Vatican through 1943-1944 at least indicates as much.
Beneš Jived long enough to avenge himself: he had Dr. Tiso murdered, thousands upon thousands of Slovaks and Czechs - all his
opponents - jailed, pauperized, disfranchised, beaten, maimed, and
exlled to Siberia and Jachymov. He collaborated "totally" with Stalln
and h!s Czechoslovak agents to sell out the Czech and Slovak nations to the scourge of communism. He had warned the Vatlcan, but
was spurned. The Slovaks asked for it and so did the Vatican, accord·
ing to Beneš, and both got what they deserved. Beneš had won again
and gloated over bis victory. What a vlctory - for Communism!
•
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"We believe that it is unconditionally necessary for RUSSI A to
take a PE RMANENT part in European politlcs and that the present
collaboratlon between the Britisb In the west and the Soviets In tbe
east, together with the partlcipation of the United St·a tes, !s a fundamental condition of the permanence or a genuinely new world order,
for the realizatlon of which WE are figbtlng. However, as far as tbe
homeland 1s concerned, only the Czechoslovak people itself, through
FREE expression of its will, will decide on how we are to arrange
our homeland." - (Msgr. Ján Šrámek, Broadcast, London, Sept. 1,
1943).
•
"Our alliance with Russia was accepted UNAN IMOUSLY BY ALL
OF US, not only by our Communists and Socialista, BUT BY AL L
TH E PART( ES - and there are four of them in the government by Catholics and Protestants alike. . . . Any American or foreign cor.
respondent will tell you that WE HAVE NO CE NSORSH IP on for.
eign news from the leading world agencies, including the Associated
Press and United Press. . . . WE are the ONLY Slav country which
has diplomatic and friendly relations with the Vatican. 1 have an
ambassador at the Holy See and there is a Nuncio In Prague." (Ján Masaryk, Address at the 15th Annua l New York Herald Tribune
Forum on. Current Problems, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel , N. Y., October
!10. l 946, 4th sess!on).
�
56
SLOVAKIA
CZ.ECH INTRIGUES AGAINST THE SWVAK STATE
DR. A . GRÉBERT
Slovakia was saved from a great catastrophe by proclaiming her
independence: from the danger or belng partitloned between Poland,
Hungary and Germany.
For the Czech and Magyar imperialists, however, the proclama•
tion of an independent Slovakia meant a fatal defeat. The Slovaks at
last had a chance to prove to themselves and the world that they
were able and capable of taklng care of themselves and thelr country.
The Czechs on the other hand knew well that lt meant a na.II in the
coffín of Czech imperlallsm In Slov.akta. That is why the Czech imperlallsts are f!ghtlng so furlously agalnst the Idea of Slovak state
independence ror over thlrty years. In thls regard, the rightist Hacha,
the lertist Flerllnger, and "me-always-president" Beneš spoke and
acted allke. Czech post-war politlcal literature offers conclusive proofs
o[ thls.
When Hitler called Hacha to Berlin on March 15, 1949 - a day
after the proclamatlon of the lndependence of Slovakia - the Czech
presldent dld not fall to use the opportunity to lntrigue agalnst the
Slovaks. In bis conversa.tlon wlth Hitler, he said that he belleved
"the F Uhrer s hall not have too many favora ble experiences w ith the
Slovaks." Furthermore Hacha sald that the Czechs always had "closer
ties w ith Ge rmany than wlth Slovakia, wh ic h is more inclin ed t o
Hungary" (vd.: Czechoslovakla and the Nuremberg Trials, pg. 326).
True lt is that in the past the Czechs always felt ctoser to
Germany than to Siovakla, but In the case referred to, Bacha was
lnterested only In presentlng the Czechs in a most favorable light,
whlle on the Slova.ks he cast the susplclon of sympathlzlng with Hungary, whom Hitler nelther llked nor trusted. Base dlplomatlc lntrigue
was concerned. It was generally known that Hitler knew llttle about
Slovakla; cleverly lnclted susplclon about the inclinatlon of the Slovaks toward the Magyars could have catastrophic results for the development of the Slovak state. And that certalnly would have been
most pleaslng to Czech lmperlallsts.
Magyar dlplomats In Berlin also never let up intriguing against
Slovak state lndependence. Slova.kla certainly was In a dlfficult altu·
atlon. · For example, on March 25, 1989, Hitler gave the tollowlng lnformation to the supreme commander of the German army regardlng
bis stand toward Slovakla: "It 1s not certalu how long the Fiihrer
shall feel hlmself bound by the agreement concluded wlth Slovakia.
The supreme army commander thlnks that t he Fiihrer would want to
1id himself of the obligation at the flrst opportune moment and use
Slovakla as a basis of negotiation between blmself, Poland and Hungary. In the meantlme, however, Hungary is supposed to restrain
herself." (op. cit. pg. 332).
Czech and Magyar lntrlgues bore fruit.
lt took a Jot of dlplomatic cleverness and perseverance on the part
of President Tlso, bis Minister of Forelgn Affalrs and Slovak diplo·
macy to save Slovakia from the deadly danger lnclted by the Magyars
�SLOVAK.IA
67
and the Czechs. If foť nothlng else, then for avertlng this danger Dr.
Tiso and bis government deserve the gratltude and respect of the
Slovak na.tlon. Thus tbey saved the Slovak6 trom one of the great86t
catastrophies that could have overtaken them.
Czech politiclans and diplomats lntrigued even later and on otbeť
fronts of tbe diplomatic battlefield against the Slovak state. In October 1939 the USSIR declded to recognize the Slovak Republic "de
jure." At that tlme Zdenek Fierlinger, former Czech envoy, was stil\
in Moscow. H e dld everything possible to prevent the recognitlon. "I
was very much concerned," writes Fierlinger in bis Memolrs, "to have
the undeslrable psychologlcal effect of the recognltion of Slovakia
a nd our deep disappolntment explained at the Commissariat of Interna) Affalrs. I demanded very emphatically that my o bjectlons be
interpreted to competent authorities."
But the USSR dld recognize the Slovak State "de jure" and Czech
cliplomacy and Czech lntrlgues suffered a complete setback. The
Czechs sought to weaken the political situatlon of the Slovak State
internatlona.lly by having the USSR renounce recognl:tlon. But thelr
dlplomatic guns backftred. Flerllnger himself states that sendlng a
Soviet envoy to Bratislava only emphasized the lndependence of the
Slovak State.
The Soviets, like the Vatican, probably have the best information
servlce in the world. They knew well how the Slovak people felt
about the Slovak State: they knew that over 90 per cent were for lt.
That i., wby the Sovlets did not hesltate to recognlze the Slovak
State as a full-fledged member of the lnternational soclety of states.
And it ls signlficant that even at the conclusion of the war the Sovlets offered to respect Slovak statehood. They changed thelr stand
only after Dľ. Tlso refused resolutely to collaborate wlth International
Communism.
Beneš lntrlgued even at the Vatican. The Holy See was among
the ftrst to recognlze the Slovak State. Slovakia had an ambassador at
the Vatican, and the Vatican had one In Bratislava. Beneš could
not see thls.
puffed and he huffed to have the Vatlcan renounce
recognitlon.
On January 7, 1941, Beneš gave the apostolic representatlve .. ln
Great Brttain, Msgr. W. Godfrey, a letter In wblch, among other thlngs,
he stated that "the time has arrlved when we ought to come to establi.sh some sort of unofflcial contact between the new Czechoslovak
government, resldlng now In London, and the ~oly See."
Beneš knew that the existence of the Slovak State and its abllity
to live were the greatest obstacles to his des!gns. That 1s why he tried
to present Slovakla to the Roly See In the gloomiest colors: "Conditions In Slovak.la are very bad and the severity of the contemporary
government of Tlso shall have a deep influence on the situatlon of
the Catholic Church ln Slovakla after the war."
Evidently Beneš threatened the Holy See to see things his way
and recognlze hi.s government or else suffer the consequences for
the Church In Slovakla once he got back lnto power af<ter the war.
To aggravat-e the sltuation and tbe sta.tlu:& of the Slovak ambassa.dor a,t
the Vatlcan, Beneš sa id In his letter that "the Slovak delegate at tbe
He
�58
SLOVAKI.A
Holy See is a representative of a State that is entirely in the hands
of the Nazi government."
It is lnteresting on the one hand, to note that Beneš called tbe
Slovak ambassador a "delegate" - even tbough be was recognlzed as
an ambassador by the Vatlcan which had at lts dis posal men wbo
were at least as well-versed in international law and polltics as were
Deneš and his colleagues. On tbe other hand. however, Beneš wrote
about a STATE and not about a "SO-CALLED" State: the latter terminology he reserved for the lnternal-polltical front and for his nalve
admlrers. Beneš knew that he could talk about a "so-called" state
before his agents, but not before the experlenced and educated diplomats or the Vatican.
Beneš said t hat tbe Slovak government was ·•entirely in the hands
of the Nazi government." However, wben he came to Košice in 1945 according to Pápanek's statement before the Security Council of tbe
Uniled Nations in March 1948 - Beneš was completely under tbe surveillance of the Soviet army and it was even impossible for him to
make contacts wlth the surroundlng countries. "\\'ell, tbe fact still
remains that Dr. Tiso and bis government were never so "totally"
under tbe care of the Nazi government!
Tbe answer tbe Vatican gave Beneš was not the one that he had
E>xpected. Tbe Vatican answered courteously, but clearly and empbatlcally that it will not "establish some form of unofficial contact"
as Beneš desired. In the answer of the Vatican it says that " His
Em!nence is conv!nced that Your Excellency w!l.J understand. how
dellcate the contemporary situation ls and bow diCficult it would be
In the present perlod to proffer the Czechoslovak people the ad•
vantage of such contacts."
Translated into plain language that mean t: "NO!"
Evldently the Vatican gave priority to the diplomatic contacts
with the Slovak natlon and not to tbose with "the Czechoslovak
people" as Benel\ had wished. This was an apparent failure of and defeat for Beneš's diplomacy.
Beneš was angered, but not overly discouraged. Two years later,
on May 12, 1943, he sent the Vat!can a Memorandum in which he
demanded establishing contacts between tbe Vatican and tbe Czechoslovak government in London.
In it he told bis version of tbe "sad" conditions at horne: The
Czechs he satd, are without exception for the Czecboslovak government in London and "the Slovak people in its greater majority bolds
the same position. In Slovakia, polltical, social, economic and mora!
condltlons are most sad. The majori ty of the Slovak nation regards the
present regime in Bratislava gullty of thi& situaiion and as a trattor
of the Slovak people and the Czechoslovak Republlc. Former governmental Slovak parties from tbe period before March 15, 1939, (Tbe
Agrarians, Liberals, Sociallsts). are almost completely bebind the Czer hos lovak government and against the present regime in Slovakla,
wb!le from tbe ranks of former Cathollc People's Party, which took
over tbe rule of Slovak affairs from tbe hands of tbe Germans tn
1939, at least 60 per cent today - according to our reports - stand
agalnst tbe present r egime."
�fiLOVAKlA
69
That statement contalns just about as many !les and hal!truths as
it does words ! Beneš himself must have known that, because he further sald that "the Holy See mlght have other information about the
situatlon in Slovak!a, but I consider lt my duty," etc.
No doubt about lt: the Holy See dld have other information; it
had the true plcture of Slovakla. The Vatlcan had lts representative
in Bratislava! Beneš undoubtedly knew that he was lying, but the
Czech cause was built on Jies and it was possible to defend it only
with more lies.
To glve the memorandum more weight, Beneš had lt sent through
the Br!tlsh and American Government.s. Despite all thls, t he Vatican
contlnued to recogn!ze the Slovak S.tate to the end of the war. Of
course, that made Beneš all the more furious.
1t is interesting to note that Beneš did not have the courage to
r,ubllsh the Vatican's reply i o his memorandum in hls Memoirs. It
probably was not as nlce as that recelved in 1941. The stand of the
Vatican through 1943-1944 at least indicates as much.
Beneš Jived long enough to avenge himself: he had Dr. Tiso murdered, thousands upon thousands of Slovaks and Czechs - all his
opponents - jailed, pauperized, disfranchised, beaten, maimed, and
exlled to Siberia and Jachymov. He collaborated "totally" with Stalln
and h!s Czechoslovak agents to sell out the Czech and Slovak nations to the scourge of communism. He had warned the Vatlcan, but
was spurned. The Slovaks asked for it and so did the Vatican, accord·
ing to Beneš, and both got what they deserved. Beneš had won again
and gloated over bis victory. What a vlctory - for Communism!
•
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"We believe that it is unconditionally necessary for RUSSI A to
take a PE RMANENT part in European politlcs and that the present
collaboratlon between the Britisb In the west and the Soviets In tbe
east, together with the partlcipation of the United St·a tes, !s a fundamental condition of the permanence or a genuinely new world order,
for the realizatlon of which WE are figbtlng. However, as far as tbe
homeland 1s concerned, only the Czechoslovak people itself, through
FREE expression of its will, will decide on how we are to arrange
our homeland." - (Msgr. Ján Šrámek, Broadcast, London, Sept. 1,
1943).
•
"Our alliance with Russia was accepted UNAN IMOUSLY BY ALL
OF US, not only by our Communists and Socialista, BUT BY AL L
TH E PART( ES - and there are four of them in the government by Catholics and Protestants alike. . . . Any American or foreign cor.
respondent will tell you that WE HAVE NO CE NSORSH IP on for.
eign news from the leading world agencies, including the Associated
Press and United Press. . . . WE are the ONLY Slav country which
has diplomatic and friendly relations with the Vatican. 1 have an
ambassador at the Holy See and there is a Nuncio In Prague." (Ján Masaryk, Address at the 15th Annua l New York Herald Tribune
Forum on. Current Problems, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel , N. Y., October
!10. l 946, 4th sess!on).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
56
SLOVAKIA
CZ.ECH INTRIGUES AGAINST THE SWVAK STATE
DR. A . GRÉBERT
Slovakia was saved from a great catastrophe by proclaiming her
independence: from the danger or belng partitloned between Poland,
Hungary and Germany.
For the Czech and Magyar imperialists, however, the proclama•
tion of an independent Slovakia meant a fatal defeat. The Slovaks at
last had a chance to prove to themselves and the world that they
were able and capable of taklng care of themselves and thelr country.
The Czechs on the other hand knew well that lt meant a na.II in the
coffín of Czech imperlallsm In Slov.akta. That is why the Czech imperlallsts are f!ghtlng so furlously agalnst the Idea of Slovak state
independence ror over thlrty years. In thls regard, the rightist Hacha,
the lertist Flerllnger, and "me-always-president" Beneš spoke and
acted allke. Czech post-war politlcal literature offers conclusive proofs
o[ thls.
When Hitler called Hacha to Berlin on March 15, 1949 - a day
after the proclamatlon of the lndependence of Slovakia - the Czech
presldent dld not fall to use the opportunity to lntrigue agalnst the
Slovaks. In bis conversa.tlon wlth Hitler, he said that he belleved
"the F Uhrer s hall not have too many favora ble experiences w ith the
Slovaks." Furthermore Hacha sald that the Czechs always had "closer
ties w ith Ge rmany than wlth Slovakia, wh ic h is more inclin ed t o
Hungary" (vd.: Czechoslovakla and the Nuremberg Trials, pg. 326).
True lt is that in the past the Czechs always felt ctoser to
Germany than to Siovakla, but In the case referred to, Bacha was
lnterested only In presentlng the Czechs in a most favorable light,
whlle on the Slova.ks he cast the susplclon of sympathlzlng with Hungary, whom Hitler nelther llked nor trusted. Base dlplomatlc lntrigue
was concerned. It was generally known that Hitler knew llttle about
Slovakla; cleverly lnclted susplclon about the inclinatlon of the Slovaks toward the Magyars could have catastrophic results for the development of the Slovak state. And that certalnly would have been
most pleaslng to Czech lmperlallsts.
Magyar dlplomats In Berlin also never let up intriguing against
Slovak state lndependence. Slova.kla certainly was In a dlfficult altu·
atlon. · For example, on March 25, 1989, Hitler gave the tollowlng lnformation to the supreme commander of the German army regardlng
bis stand toward Slovakla: "It 1s not certalu how long the Fiihrer
shall feel hlmself bound by the agreement concluded wlth Slovakia.
The supreme army commander thlnks that t he Fiihrer would want to
1id himself of the obligation at the flrst opportune moment and use
Slovakla as a basis of negotiation between blmself, Poland and Hungary. In the meantlme, however, Hungary is supposed to restrain
herself." (op. cit. pg. 332).
Czech and Magyar lntrlgues bore fruit.
lt took a Jot of dlplomatic cleverness and perseverance on the part
of President Tlso, bis Minister of Forelgn Affalrs and Slovak diplo·
macy to save Slovakia from the deadly danger lnclted by the Magyars
SLOVAK.IA
67
and the Czechs. If foť nothlng else, then for avertlng this danger Dr.
Tiso and bis government deserve the gratltude and respect of the
Slovak na.tlon. Thus tbey saved the Slovak6 trom one of the great86t
catastrophies that could have overtaken them.
Czech politiclans and diplomats lntrigued even later and on otbeť
fronts of tbe diplomatic battlefield against the Slovak state. In October 1939 the USSIR declded to recognize the Slovak Republic "de
jure." At that tlme Zdenek Fierlinger, former Czech envoy, was stil\
in Moscow. H e dld everything possible to prevent the recognitlon. "I
was very much concerned," writes Fierlinger in bis Memolrs, "to have
the undeslrable psychologlcal effect of the recognltion of Slovakia
a nd our deep disappolntment explained at the Commissariat of Interna) Affalrs. I demanded very emphatically that my o bjectlons be
interpreted to competent authorities."
But the USSR dld recognize the Slovak State "de jure" and Czech
cliplomacy and Czech lntrlgues suffered a complete setback. The
Czechs sought to weaken the political situatlon of the Slovak State
internatlona.lly by having the USSR renounce recognl:tlon. But thelr
dlplomatic guns backftred. Flerllnger himself states that sendlng a
Soviet envoy to Bratislava only emphasized the lndependence of the
Slovak State.
The Soviets, like the Vatican, probably have the best information
servlce in the world. They knew well how the Slovak people felt
about the Slovak State: they knew that over 90 per cent were for lt.
That i., wby the Sovlets did not hesltate to recognlze the Slovak
State as a full-fledged member of the lnternational soclety of states.
And it ls signlficant that even at the conclusion of the war the Sovlets offered to respect Slovak statehood. They changed thelr stand
only after Dľ. Tlso refused resolutely to collaborate wlth International
Communism.
Beneš lntrlgued even at the Vatican. The Holy See was among
the ftrst to recognlze the Slovak State. Slovakia had an ambassador at
the Vatican, and the Vatican had one In Bratislava. Beneš could
not see thls.
puffed and he huffed to have the Vatlcan renounce
recognitlon.
On January 7, 1941, Beneš gave the apostolic representatlve .. ln
Great Brttain, Msgr. W. Godfrey, a letter In wblch, among other thlngs,
he stated that "the time has arrlved when we ought to come to establi.sh some sort of unofflcial contact between the new Czechoslovak
government, resldlng now In London, and the ~oly See."
Beneš knew that the existence of the Slovak State and its abllity
to live were the greatest obstacles to his des!gns. That 1s why he tried
to present Slovakla to the Roly See In the gloomiest colors: "Conditions In Slovak.la are very bad and the severity of the contemporary
government of Tlso shall have a deep influence on the situatlon of
the Catholic Church ln Slovakla after the war."
Evidently Beneš threatened the Holy See to see things his way
and recognlze hi.s government or else suffer the consequences for
the Church In Slovakla once he got back lnto power af<ter the war.
To aggravat-e the sltuation and tbe sta.tlu:& of the Slovak ambassa.dor a,t
the Vatlcan, Beneš sa id In his letter that "the Slovak delegate at tbe
He
58
SLOVAKI.A
Holy See is a representative of a State that is entirely in the hands
of the Nazi government."
It is lnteresting on the one hand, to note that Beneš called tbe
Slovak ambassador a "delegate" - even tbough be was recognlzed as
an ambassador by the Vatlcan which had at lts dis posal men wbo
were at least as well-versed in international law and polltics as were
Deneš and his colleagues. On tbe other hand. however, Beneš wrote
about a STATE and not about a "SO-CALLED" State: the latter terminology he reserved for the lnternal-polltical front and for his nalve
admlrers. Beneš knew that he could talk about a "so-called" state
before his agents, but not before the experlenced and educated diplomats or the Vatican.
Beneš said t hat tbe Slovak government was ·•entirely in the hands
of the Nazi government." However, wben he came to Košice in 1945 according to Pápanek's statement before the Security Council of tbe
Uniled Nations in March 1948 - Beneš was completely under tbe surveillance of the Soviet army and it was even impossible for him to
make contacts wlth the surroundlng countries. "\\'ell, tbe fact still
remains that Dr. Tiso and bis government were never so "totally"
under tbe care of the Nazi government!
Tbe answer tbe Vatican gave Beneš was not the one that he had
E>xpected. Tbe Vatican answered courteously, but clearly and empbatlcally that it will not "establish some form of unofficial contact"
as Beneš desired. In the answer of the Vatican it says that " His
Em!nence is conv!nced that Your Excellency w!l.J understand. how
dellcate the contemporary situation ls and bow diCficult it would be
In the present perlod to proffer the Czechoslovak people the ad•
vantage of such contacts."
Translated into plain language that mean t: "NO!"
Evldently the Vatican gave priority to the diplomatic contacts
with the Slovak natlon and not to tbose with "the Czechoslovak
people" as Benel\ had wished. This was an apparent failure of and defeat for Beneš's diplomacy.
Beneš was angered, but not overly discouraged. Two years later,
on May 12, 1943, he sent the Vat!can a Memorandum in which he
demanded establishing contacts between tbe Vatican and tbe Czechoslovak government in London.
In it he told bis version of tbe "sad" conditions at horne: The
Czechs he satd, are without exception for the Czecboslovak government in London and "the Slovak people in its greater majority bolds
the same position. In Slovakia, polltical, social, economic and mora!
condltlons are most sad. The majori ty of the Slovak nation regards the
present regime in Bratislava gullty of thi& situaiion and as a trattor
of the Slovak people and the Czechoslovak Republlc. Former governmental Slovak parties from tbe period before March 15, 1939, (Tbe
Agrarians, Liberals, Sociallsts). are almost completely bebind the Czer hos lovak government and against the present regime in Slovakla,
wb!le from tbe ranks of former Cathollc People's Party, which took
over tbe rule of Slovak affairs from tbe hands of tbe Germans tn
1939, at least 60 per cent today - according to our reports - stand
agalnst tbe present r egime."
fiLOVAKlA
69
That statement contalns just about as many !les and hal!truths as
it does words ! Beneš himself must have known that, because he further sald that "the Holy See mlght have other information about the
situatlon in Slovak!a, but I consider lt my duty," etc.
No doubt about lt: the Holy See dld have other information; it
had the true plcture of Slovakla. The Vatlcan had lts representative
in Bratislava! Beneš undoubtedly knew that he was lying, but the
Czech cause was built on Jies and it was possible to defend it only
with more lies.
To glve the memorandum more weight, Beneš had lt sent through
the Br!tlsh and American Government.s. Despite all thls, t he Vatican
contlnued to recogn!ze the Slovak S.tate to the end of the war. Of
course, that made Beneš all the more furious.
1t is interesting to note that Beneš did not have the courage to
r,ubllsh the Vatican's reply i o his memorandum in hls Memoirs. It
probably was not as nlce as that recelved in 1941. The stand of the
Vatican through 1943-1944 at least indicates as much.
Beneš Jived long enough to avenge himself: he had Dr. Tiso murdered, thousands upon thousands of Slovaks and Czechs - all his
opponents - jailed, pauperized, disfranchised, beaten, maimed, and
exlled to Siberia and Jachymov. He collaborated "totally" with Stalln
and h!s Czechoslovak agents to sell out the Czech and Slovak nations to the scourge of communism. He had warned the Vatlcan, but
was spurned. The Slovaks asked for it and so did the Vatican, accord·
ing to Beneš, and both got what they deserved. Beneš had won again
and gloated over bis victory. What a vlctory - for Communism!
•
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"We believe that it is unconditionally necessary for RUSSI A to
take a PE RMANENT part in European politlcs and that the present
collaboratlon between the Britisb In the west and the Soviets In tbe
east, together with the partlcipation of the United St·a tes, !s a fundamental condition of the permanence or a genuinely new world order,
for the realizatlon of which WE are figbtlng. However, as far as tbe
homeland 1s concerned, only the Czechoslovak people itself, through
FREE expression of its will, will decide on how we are to arrange
our homeland." - (Msgr. Ján Šrámek, Broadcast, London, Sept. 1,
1943).
•
"Our alliance with Russia was accepted UNAN IMOUSLY BY ALL
OF US, not only by our Communists and Socialista, BUT BY AL L
TH E PART( ES - and there are four of them in the government by Catholics and Protestants alike. . . . Any American or foreign cor.
respondent will tell you that WE HAVE NO CE NSORSH IP on for.
eign news from the leading world agencies, including the Associated
Press and United Press. . . . WE are the ONLY Slav country which
has diplomatic and friendly relations with the Vatican. 1 have an
ambassador at the Holy See and there is a Nuncio In Prague." (Ján Masaryk, Address at the 15th Annua l New York Herald Tribune
Forum on. Current Problems, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel , N. Y., October
!10. l 946, 4th sess!on).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Czech Intrigues Against the Slovak State
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. A. Grébert
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951
pp. 56-59
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Grébert, Arvéd, 1915-2001
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
LCNAF+dates
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a21d54db609ec35b652b11a433b72aa5.pdf
a4cf2e12e8894cac1637514bfacdde6a
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKJA
CZEOHOSWVAK ROMANTICISM
JOHN F. GLEI MAN
Modern propaganda has attalned great perfectlon. Applying the
attalnment of mass psychology, falslfylng hlstory and statlstlcs, twist•
Ing economlc theorles and other polltlcal sclences, modern psychology
rs able to prove that black 1s whlte. That ls the propaganda that ls
used especlally by the to talltarlan states. But even the "Czechoslovak
democracy" of Masaryk and Beneš resorted to such propaganda, especlally wlth regard to the Slovak questlon. Little wonder that world
dlplomacy, ignorant as it was about the Slovaks, believed it, nay, that
some Slovaks were taken in by it. But truth will out sooner or later,
and wh en misled people (Ind it out, they wlll discard false fictions
and wlll follow the truth. The fiction a bout "Czečhoslovak unlty" -whether national or state union - is the product of the subtle propaganda machlne of Masaryk and Beneš. lt wrui born of the falslfication
of hlstory and other "scientlfic" researches. The Czechoslovak republic 1s a structure bullt on lies.
But what 1s the truth?
Modern natlons developed fľom the cohabitation of many tribes.
'ľhe bistorlc fact is that during 1500 years of Slovak hlstory the
Slovaks did not live in a common state wlth the Czechs until 1918.
The fact that a Czech prince pald trlbute for several years to the
ruler of Great Moravia has fallen into the sea or years wlthout a
trace. The Ozechs lived for centuries in the Czech klngdom, in the
Roman-Germanlc empire, and they lived in Austrla. The Slovaks
llved their separate llves In Hungary. The fact that some Slovaks
used the Czech language as a m edium of writing does not prove
tbat Slovak is a dialect of tbe Czech. Tbe Serbs and Bulgarians used
the old Slovanic cburcb language up to the 19th century just llke the
Russlans, but that did not make them Russians.
But a century ago, wben romanticism was in (lower, the Czecb
publlclst Charles Havl!ček appeared on the scene with a typlcally
romantic idea that tbe Slovaks really are Czechs. He himself openly
revealed what had led him to that concluslon. The Czechs, he said,
are surrounded on three sides by tbe Germans. So that Grmany would
not strangle them, they needed a b ridge to the Slovanlc natlons and
to international navigatlon on the Danube. But tbe only brldge Jed
through Slovakia. So. cost what lt may, they needed Slovakla. To
have some legal clalm to the !and of the Slovaks, he said - referring
to tbe temporary literary assoclatlon - that the Slovaks are a CzP.cb
trl be.
True, t his fiction was discarded by the generation of Štúr, Daxuer and Hurban Vajanský. Even the Czecb generatlon of •Rleger discarded lt. But lt was revlved by Masaryk and then by hls understudy
Beneš. Wben tbe Slovaks would not digest tbat story, they flrst called
1t "CzecbOBlovanic" (Czechoslavic); wben that dld not work out, tbey
called 1t "Czecboslovak." No matter how tbey cbanged the name, the
substance of lt always remalned tbe same. And that was utterly Czeťh
- Czech national imperlallsm.
�61
SLOVAKIA
Industry was falrly well developed durlng Masaryk's llfetime.
Bohemla became an Industria! country. Industria! countries were
looking for raw matreials and markets for their Industria! products.
They found these in their colonles. Because Bohemla 1s not a coastal
s tate, Masaryk "dlscovered" Slovakla for Czech colonlzatlon. He took
Havliček's romantic theory off the shelf, dusted lt off and peddled
it to the world. He fooled qulte a few people, even some Slovaks.
The Allies fell for the story at the Parls Conference in 1919. Thaťs
how the Czechoslovak republic orlglnated.
Americans or Slovak origin saw more clearly in•to ,the matter than
thelr brethren in the old country and tried to guarantee a federative
autonomy for Slovakia with the Cleveland and then the Plttsburgh
Pact. But Masaryk, once he was in the driver's seat, proclalmed the
bilateral agreements null and void, and proceeded to make Slovakia
a Czech colony. Of course, the Slovaks did not relish that. They
fought for their inherent and God•given rlghts for twenty years and
then declared S lovakla Independent on March 14, 1939.
The most unreal "realist" - Beneš - heated up this old romantlc
soup or HavUook and Masaryk during World Waľ ii. When he saw
that nobody had an appetite for sour soup, he hooked up wlth t he
Communlsts so that he could keep the Czech hold on the Slovaks.
Commun!.sm, whlch 1s also a creation of Hegelian romantlcism, readily
understood Havlícek's and Masaryk's romanticism, lnterpreted by
Beneš, and in 1943 they came to an agreement, especlally slnce the
Communists knew how to " realize" romanticlsm. Tbey took thelr
fishlng line and balted lt for the Slovaks with the "Program of Košice." Lettrich and his followers sn a.pped at the balt - hook, line
and slnker. Since t hat time the Czechs are agaln explolting Slovakla
and murderlng the Slovaks. But the bolsheviks also came into their
own. They swallowed the whole Czechoslovak republic a11 well as
Czech romantlcism.
The period of romanticism 1s, bowever, inadvertently comlng to a
close. Tbe by•products of politlcal romanticism, Fascism an<l Nazism,
have already dlsappeared. The tlme is not far distant when romantlc
socialism, Communism, too, shall dlsappear. Wlth lt shall go to the
devll even Czech natlonalism, called Czechoslovakism. Tbat !s the
unalterable Joglc of h!story.
Tbe Slovak nation wants to live. It does not walllt to ,perish as
the victlm of Czecboslovak romantlcism. Therefore, it shall go torward to meet the ideas or the future wlth all the strength of lts
vitality to take over the place in the new rational order of the world
that rlghtfully belongs to lt accordlng to God•glven natural right and
accordlng to the Atlantlc Charter.
•
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT ? - "The lmportance of our treaty wlth the U. S.
S. R. ls selr-evldent. Soviet Russla 1s rapldly freelng Europe trom
Nazl tyranny. Cloae tl ea have always exiated between Ruaala and
Czechoalovakia, and they have now been atrengthened. We are proud
to be an ally of that great power, whlch ls bound to play the leading
ľole In Europe after the war." (Jan Masaryk to "Overseas News
Agency," February 6, 1944).
�
SLOVAKJA
CZEOHOSWVAK ROMANTICISM
JOHN F. GLEI MAN
Modern propaganda has attalned great perfectlon. Applying the
attalnment of mass psychology, falslfylng hlstory and statlstlcs, twist•
Ing economlc theorles and other polltlcal sclences, modern psychology
rs able to prove that black 1s whlte. That ls the propaganda that ls
used especlally by the to talltarlan states. But even the "Czechoslovak
democracy" of Masaryk and Beneš resorted to such propaganda, especlally wlth regard to the Slovak questlon. Little wonder that world
dlplomacy, ignorant as it was about the Slovaks, believed it, nay, that
some Slovaks were taken in by it. But truth will out sooner or later,
and wh en misled people (Ind it out, they wlll discard false fictions
and wlll follow the truth. The fiction a bout "Czečhoslovak unlty" -whether national or state union - is the product of the subtle propaganda machlne of Masaryk and Beneš. lt wrui born of the falslfication
of hlstory and other "scientlfic" researches. The Czechoslovak republic 1s a structure bullt on lies.
But what 1s the truth?
Modern natlons developed fľom the cohabitation of many tribes.
'ľhe bistorlc fact is that during 1500 years of Slovak hlstory the
Slovaks did not live in a common state wlth the Czechs until 1918.
The fact that a Czech prince pald trlbute for several years to the
ruler of Great Moravia has fallen into the sea or years wlthout a
trace. The Ozechs lived for centuries in the Czech klngdom, in the
Roman-Germanlc empire, and they lived in Austrla. The Slovaks
llved their separate llves In Hungary. The fact that some Slovaks
used the Czech language as a m edium of writing does not prove
tbat Slovak is a dialect of tbe Czech. Tbe Serbs and Bulgarians used
the old Slovanic cburcb language up to the 19th century just llke the
Russlans, but that did not make them Russians.
But a century ago, wben romanticism was in (lower, the Czecb
publlclst Charles Havl!ček appeared on the scene with a typlcally
romantic idea that tbe Slovaks really are Czechs. He himself openly
revealed what had led him to that concluslon. The Czechs, he said,
are surrounded on three sides by tbe Germans. So that Grmany would
not strangle them, they needed a b ridge to the Slovanlc natlons and
to international navigatlon on the Danube. But tbe only brldge Jed
through Slovakia. So. cost what lt may, they needed Slovakla. To
have some legal clalm to the !and of the Slovaks, he said - referring
to tbe temporary literary assoclatlon - that the Slovaks are a CzP.cb
trl be.
True, t his fiction was discarded by the generation of Štúr, Daxuer and Hurban Vajanský. Even the Czecb generatlon of •Rleger discarded lt. But lt was revlved by Masaryk and then by hls understudy
Beneš. Wben tbe Slovaks would not digest tbat story, they flrst called
1t "CzecbOBlovanic" (Czechoslavic); wben that dld not work out, tbey
called 1t "Czecboslovak." No matter how tbey cbanged the name, the
substance of lt always remalned tbe same. And that was utterly Czeťh
- Czech national imperlallsm.
�61
SLOVAKIA
Industry was falrly well developed durlng Masaryk's llfetime.
Bohemla became an Industria! country. Industria! countries were
looking for raw matreials and markets for their Industria! products.
They found these in their colonles. Because Bohemla 1s not a coastal
s tate, Masaryk "dlscovered" Slovakla for Czech colonlzatlon. He took
Havliček's romantic theory off the shelf, dusted lt off and peddled
it to the world. He fooled qulte a few people, even some Slovaks.
The Allies fell for the story at the Parls Conference in 1919. Thaťs
how the Czechoslovak republic orlglnated.
Americans or Slovak origin saw more clearly in•to ,the matter than
thelr brethren in the old country and tried to guarantee a federative
autonomy for Slovakia with the Cleveland and then the Plttsburgh
Pact. But Masaryk, once he was in the driver's seat, proclalmed the
bilateral agreements null and void, and proceeded to make Slovakia
a Czech colony. Of course, the Slovaks did not relish that. They
fought for their inherent and God•given rlghts for twenty years and
then declared S lovakla Independent on March 14, 1939.
The most unreal "realist" - Beneš - heated up this old romantlc
soup or HavUook and Masaryk during World Waľ ii. When he saw
that nobody had an appetite for sour soup, he hooked up wlth t he
Communlsts so that he could keep the Czech hold on the Slovaks.
Commun!.sm, whlch 1s also a creation of Hegelian romantlcism, readily
understood Havlícek's and Masaryk's romanticism, lnterpreted by
Beneš, and in 1943 they came to an agreement, especlally slnce the
Communists knew how to " realize" romanticlsm. Tbey took thelr
fishlng line and balted lt for the Slovaks with the "Program of Košice." Lettrich and his followers sn a.pped at the balt - hook, line
and slnker. Since t hat time the Czechs are agaln explolting Slovakla
and murderlng the Slovaks. But the bolsheviks also came into their
own. They swallowed the whole Czechoslovak republic a11 well as
Czech romantlcism.
The period of romanticism 1s, bowever, inadvertently comlng to a
close. Tbe by•products of politlcal romanticism, Fascism an<l Nazism,
have already dlsappeared. The tlme is not far distant when romantlc
socialism, Communism, too, shall dlsappear. Wlth lt shall go to the
devll even Czech natlonalism, called Czechoslovakism. Tbat !s the
unalterable Joglc of h!story.
Tbe Slovak nation wants to live. It does not walllt to ,perish as
the victlm of Czecboslovak romantlcism. Therefore, it shall go torward to meet the ideas or the future wlth all the strength of lts
vitality to take over the place in the new rational order of the world
that rlghtfully belongs to lt accordlng to God•glven natural right and
accordlng to the Atlantlc Charter.
•
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT ? - "The lmportance of our treaty wlth the U. S.
S. R. ls selr-evldent. Soviet Russla 1s rapldly freelng Europe trom
Nazl tyranny. Cloae tl ea have always exiated between Ruaala and
Czechoalovakia, and they have now been atrengthened. We are proud
to be an ally of that great power, whlch ls bound to play the leading
ľole In Europe after the war." (Jan Masaryk to "Overseas News
Agency," February 6, 1944).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKJA
CZEOHOSWVAK ROMANTICISM
JOHN F. GLEI MAN
Modern propaganda has attalned great perfectlon. Applying the
attalnment of mass psychology, falslfylng hlstory and statlstlcs, twist•
Ing economlc theorles and other polltlcal sclences, modern psychology
rs able to prove that black 1s whlte. That ls the propaganda that ls
used especlally by the to talltarlan states. But even the "Czechoslovak
democracy" of Masaryk and Beneš resorted to such propaganda, especlally wlth regard to the Slovak questlon. Little wonder that world
dlplomacy, ignorant as it was about the Slovaks, believed it, nay, that
some Slovaks were taken in by it. But truth will out sooner or later,
and wh en misled people (Ind it out, they wlll discard false fictions
and wlll follow the truth. The fiction a bout "Czečhoslovak unlty" -whether national or state union - is the product of the subtle propaganda machlne of Masaryk and Beneš. lt wrui born of the falslfication
of hlstory and other "scientlfic" researches. The Czechoslovak republic 1s a structure bullt on lies.
But what 1s the truth?
Modern natlons developed fľom the cohabitation of many tribes.
'ľhe bistorlc fact is that during 1500 years of Slovak hlstory the
Slovaks did not live in a common state wlth the Czechs until 1918.
The fact that a Czech prince pald trlbute for several years to the
ruler of Great Moravia has fallen into the sea or years wlthout a
trace. The Ozechs lived for centuries in the Czech klngdom, in the
Roman-Germanlc empire, and they lived in Austrla. The Slovaks
llved their separate llves In Hungary. The fact that some Slovaks
used the Czech language as a m edium of writing does not prove
tbat Slovak is a dialect of tbe Czech. Tbe Serbs and Bulgarians used
the old Slovanic cburcb language up to the 19th century just llke the
Russlans, but that did not make them Russians.
But a century ago, wben romanticism was in (lower, the Czecb
publlclst Charles Havl!ček appeared on the scene with a typlcally
romantic idea that tbe Slovaks really are Czechs. He himself openly
revealed what had led him to that concluslon. The Czechs, he said,
are surrounded on three sides by tbe Germans. So that Grmany would
not strangle them, they needed a b ridge to the Slovanlc natlons and
to international navigatlon on the Danube. But tbe only brldge Jed
through Slovakia. So. cost what lt may, they needed Slovakla. To
have some legal clalm to the !and of the Slovaks, he said - referring
to tbe temporary literary assoclatlon - that the Slovaks are a CzP.cb
trl be.
True, t his fiction was discarded by the generation of Štúr, Daxuer and Hurban Vajanský. Even the Czecb generatlon of •Rleger discarded lt. But lt was revlved by Masaryk and then by hls understudy
Beneš. Wben tbe Slovaks would not digest tbat story, they flrst called
1t "CzecbOBlovanic" (Czechoslavic); wben that dld not work out, tbey
called 1t "Czecboslovak." No matter how tbey cbanged the name, the
substance of lt always remalned tbe same. And that was utterly Czeťh
- Czech national imperlallsm.
61
SLOVAKIA
Industry was falrly well developed durlng Masaryk's llfetime.
Bohemla became an Industria! country. Industria! countries were
looking for raw matreials and markets for their Industria! products.
They found these in their colonles. Because Bohemla 1s not a coastal
s tate, Masaryk "dlscovered" Slovakla for Czech colonlzatlon. He took
Havliček's romantic theory off the shelf, dusted lt off and peddled
it to the world. He fooled qulte a few people, even some Slovaks.
The Allies fell for the story at the Parls Conference in 1919. Thaťs
how the Czechoslovak republic orlglnated.
Americans or Slovak origin saw more clearly in•to ,the matter than
thelr brethren in the old country and tried to guarantee a federative
autonomy for Slovakia with the Cleveland and then the Plttsburgh
Pact. But Masaryk, once he was in the driver's seat, proclalmed the
bilateral agreements null and void, and proceeded to make Slovakia
a Czech colony. Of course, the Slovaks did not relish that. They
fought for their inherent and God•given rlghts for twenty years and
then declared S lovakla Independent on March 14, 1939.
The most unreal "realist" - Beneš - heated up this old romantlc
soup or HavUook and Masaryk during World Waľ ii. When he saw
that nobody had an appetite for sour soup, he hooked up wlth t he
Communlsts so that he could keep the Czech hold on the Slovaks.
Commun!.sm, whlch 1s also a creation of Hegelian romantlcism, readily
understood Havlícek's and Masaryk's romanticism, lnterpreted by
Beneš, and in 1943 they came to an agreement, especlally slnce the
Communists knew how to " realize" romanticlsm. Tbey took thelr
fishlng line and balted lt for the Slovaks with the "Program of Košice." Lettrich and his followers sn a.pped at the balt - hook, line
and slnker. Since t hat time the Czechs are agaln explolting Slovakla
and murderlng the Slovaks. But the bolsheviks also came into their
own. They swallowed the whole Czechoslovak republic a11 well as
Czech romantlcism.
The period of romanticism 1s, bowever, inadvertently comlng to a
close. Tbe by•products of politlcal romanticism, Fascism an<l Nazism,
have already dlsappeared. The tlme is not far distant when romantlc
socialism, Communism, too, shall dlsappear. Wlth lt shall go to the
devll even Czech natlonalism, called Czechoslovakism. Tbat !s the
unalterable Joglc of h!story.
Tbe Slovak nation wants to live. It does not walllt to ,perish as
the victlm of Czecboslovak romantlcism. Therefore, it shall go torward to meet the ideas or the future wlth all the strength of lts
vitality to take over the place in the new rational order of the world
that rlghtfully belongs to lt accordlng to God•glven natural right and
accordlng to the Atlantlc Charter.
•
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT ? - "The lmportance of our treaty wlth the U. S.
S. R. ls selr-evldent. Soviet Russla 1s rapldly freelng Europe trom
Nazl tyranny. Cloae tl ea have always exiated between Ruaala and
Czechoalovakia, and they have now been atrengthened. We are proud
to be an ally of that great power, whlch ls bound to play the leading
ľole In Europe after the war." (Jan Masaryk to "Overseas News
Agency," February 6, 1944).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Czechoslovak Romanticism
Description
An account of the resource
John F. Gleiman
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951
pp. 60-61
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Gleiman, John F.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
name
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/40e81e2fe8d5b5c0bf9262cf1e0bc665.pdf
14c54436e9ee99212664b4d1318fffa9
PDF Text
Text
62
SLOVAKIA
FREE CZECHS SPEAK OUT
J. Sed.lak
We have become accustomed to speaking plainly. Wbat are we
figbting for? We are figbting for the return of buman rights and dignity. That is why we are determined to fight against the installatio•1
of neo-communism after tihe defeat of communism.
We are opposed resolutely to every terror and totalitarian system
of government. That ls why we are in exile today. Tbat is why we
are also fighting uncompromisingly against bolshevism for the liberation of our country so that free nations could live happlly in a free
world. It is the fight for the unalienable rights of indivlduals and na.tions, which we must defend as such.
Faithful to this principle, we recognize and respect tbe rights
of the Sudeten Germans and the Slovak nation to national selfdetermination. We are not, therefore, bartering wlth a right that is
natural and sacred, and we reject the so-called "Czechoslovaks" who
are doing so even today. After all the faithlessness - committed by
the representatives of this so-called "CzechosJovaklsm" from 1918 to
the present tíme, and especially after April 18, 1947, when the first
Slovak president, a Catholic priest, Dr. Joseph Tlso, was ~hamefully
murdered - we have no business in Slovakla. We are not, do not
want to be and we cannot be the occupants or the conquerors of freedom-loving Slovakia, because we would thereby betray the very ideals
of democracy and freedom we are fighting for. It is better to be accla!med a sincere frlend in Slovakia tban a hated ruler.
· We welcome the cooperatlon of all democra.tic peoples, especially
tbe Czechs, with our free Czech National Council. However, we reject
tbe collaborators witb bolsbevism of yes'terday who a.re adherents
of the group Jed by Dr. Zenkl and Dr. Ripka. We cannot collaborat.e
with the Zenkl-Ripka outfit because we are resolutely oppoS'Eld to the
installatlon of neo-communism after tbe defeat of bolsbevism. We
reject most resolutely the bolsbevik dictatorship against wbich wc
are striving to arouse tbe western democracies. But just as resolutely
do we reject even tbe "people's-democratic" dictatorsbip which in our
country is represented by Gottwalďs "Government Program of Košice"
- the program whicb Messrs. Zenkl, Ripka, Majer and their group
are trying to propagate and defend in exile.
We are fighting for real freedom and democracy; for the release
of a ll political prisoners incarcerated slnce 1945 to tbe present time:
for a return of the Jand to our agriculturists and nationallzed businesses to their rigbtful owners; we are fighting foť the inviolabillty
of private ownersbip. Furtbermore we are fig,hting to carry througb
and insuring extensive social reforms in tbe interest:; of workers and
laborers and foľ their rigbt to organize freely. We are fighting fo!·
basic human freedoms, formulated by great democrats of tbe West,
as well as tbe inviolability and sacredness of the family as the· foundat!on of a nation. We are fighting, tberefore, for thé return of h uman dign!ty to our enslaved brothers and sisters in oúr· betraye<l
country so tbat they migbt live and build free,Jy and withou t fear.
�SLOVAKIA
63
Our fight is in fact a fight for the realization of the principles of
Christian morality. And since the lnterest of welfare and development
of the Europ,ean nations demands larger federalized units, we a re
fľom the beglnnlng of our struggle for a federatlon of free nations.
Furthermore, we also reject yesterday's collaborators wlth the
c ommunu;ts because we are in no way responsi ble for the c rimes
c ommitted by th em while they were in th e services of the Kremlin.
In t he interests of justice we shall not cease demanding the just
pun!shment of t he gullty. At this time we emphaslze th at we stand
o pposed also to the shady speculations of the guilty to promo te
chaos after libe r ation and to repeat "May 1946" wh ich would work
injustlce to hundreds of thousands of innocent persons and would
place power into the hands of the "street" and crimina.ls. The injustlces
of retribution shall never again be repeated, but impar tial law of norma! courts s hall prevail.
T o the aUempts of yesterday's collaborators with bolsh evism to
picture and explain to the West, and especlally to the American
public, our b asic stan d towards them in s uch a way as if th e matter
c oncerued were only Zenkl and Prchala, we proclaim: We are not
c once rned with Prchala or Zenkl, but our nation. We reject most
<lecisively Zenkľs totality and his system of leadership hypocritically
wrapped in a cloak of democracy. We reject dangerous neo-communism which with the rest of the bolshevik collaborators they are
striving to smuggle into the USA, Canada, Australia, England and
other countries of the West, and there gain fertile soil for it. That is
t he pian of the conspiracy of neo-communism agains! democracy !
To realize th eir pian, the Zenk lites today are trying to s ell themselves to the West. But the democ rats of the W est should be aware
of the fact that the Zenklltes are only as devoted to them today as
they were only yesterday to the Soviets, and that by a lding them th ey
are only strength ening traitors of democracy, who can never gain
our natlon for the West. Czech exiles and their nation shall never
be led by traitors or confidantes or y esterday's infor mers of their
f ellow-citizens who w anted to seize their properties, and so much the
less by those who are responsible for the present national tragedy.
Czech exiles and their nation shall never be led and shall not be inf luenced by people who went into exil e on a special perm it and with
the knowledge of Gottwald and Nosek ( as Vojta Beneš, brother of
Dr. E. Beneš, and others). Nor shall they be led by the agents oť
Prague or their confidentlal friends.
T,he r ecent case of agent K. Strausse in London is still fresh in
our me mories. We must guide ourselves accordingly. Certainly the
West has b een warned by the chief of the atomic esplonage network
who stole lnto England as a "political refugee" and roused the whole
of England wlth hls presence. And does the West know how many
sples ot the Czech neo-com munists have successfully gotten into
mllltar y an d other lmportant enterprises?
We are not bitter with hatred. We c an, however, have no truck
with t'he followers of neo-communism, who attack us with falsehoods
in t he "New Yo rkské Listy" and other publicatlons. It 1s symbolic,
because hatred, falsehoods and half-truths are the weapons of communism. W e plead and warn b ecause we are opposed to terror. We
�64
SLOVAKIA
cannot, therefore, remaln sllent to the vlolence perpetrated by
neo-communists against Czech antl-commun!st ex!les w:hlch has at•
tained such a degree that Czech patriota, not havlng a hearlng or
support anywhere, are asklng confusedly: "ls lt now a curse to have
a clean past?" T he neo-communists, outraglng lmpoverlshed exlles,
are uslng the beggar's staff to torce them lnto submisslon. That is
the trled metbod of c ommunists and neo-communlsts trom the Nazl
concentratlon camps, where these people, even though prlsoners, were
absolute rulers in t-he Interna! management. There they also tried. to
llquidate everything that wlli; not lncllned toward communlsm. Why,
Dr. Zenkl was famiUar fa Buchenwald wlth these meth ods of the
communist "arch,prlsoners" and ithe camp "polltboro" as were A. Zápotocký and Joseph Plojhar in other concentratlon camps. Some wlt•
nesses have returned ,vho stlll remember how Zenkl carrled on Jn
Buchenwald.
Thls is our basic stand to whlch we adhere firmly and uncompromlslngly. - ("BOHEMIA," Vo!. 4, Nos. 7- 8, 1951) .
•
•
•
•
WH O SAID IT?
" The re are a lso such people who wou ld want t o apply t he Atla ntic Charter in the case of Slovakia. T hat is not only shortsig htedneH,
b ut also a gross insult t o Czechoslovakia. T he Czechoslovak problem
is ou r ve ry own, an interna! problem." - (Jan Masaryk, London,
J an. 20, 1943).
•
"Czechoslovakia 1s and shall remain a FREE country . . . . Some
people say that we have no freedom, that there is religlous persecutlon and propagate all klnds of nonsense about us. I proclalm that all
these statements are false. lt 1s not true that we bave rel!gious oppresslon or tdlat democrastlc and indivldual treedoms are suppressec!.
1 AM A PERSON OEEPL Y FOUNOED RELIGJOUSLY and I would not
remaln bome even five mlnutes, lf everything that is written about us
here were true. . . . I KNOW GOTTWALD A GOOD MANY YEARS,
HE IS AN EMI:-.IENT PERSON AND A GREAT CZECH PATRIOT.
. . . IT IS NOT TRUE THAT THE COMMUNIST S WANT T O DRI VE
(Ján Masaryk, DinANYBODY FROM THE GOVERNMENT." neľ Address, Piótsbu rgh Unlvel'sity Club, fanu,ary 13, 1947) .
•
"Today we base ourselves on our alliance with Russia which has
NO INTENTION ot lnfluenclng us but whlch wlll not permit base
torces of reactlon to plot agalnst us to enact another Munlch and another March 15, 1939. Our Interna! situatlon. too, ts completely dlfrerent. . . . Our program does not mean forclble bring1ng lnto line,
or TOTALITARIANISM; it slmply means tha.t the múPLE are takIng the management of public affalrs lnto thelr own hands by means
o! natlonal committees, whlcb wlll In due course constltute a natlonal
assemb!y. Later parllament wlll declde wbat our Constltutlon and
laws are to be. Our people wlll choose the right path." - (Zdenek
Flerllnger, Prime Minister, Address at Social Democratlc Party meet·
Ing, Prague, June • • 19. 5).
�
62
SLOVAKIA
FREE CZECHS SPEAK OUT
J. Sed.lak
We have become accustomed to speaking plainly. Wbat are we
figbting for? We are figbting for the return of buman rights and dignity. That is why we are determined to fight against the installatio•1
of neo-communism after tihe defeat of communism.
We are opposed resolutely to every terror and totalitarian system
of government. That ls why we are in exile today. Tbat is why we
are also fighting uncompromisingly against bolshevism for the liberation of our country so that free nations could live happlly in a free
world. It is the fight for the unalienable rights of indivlduals and na.tions, which we must defend as such.
Faithful to this principle, we recognize and respect tbe rights
of the Sudeten Germans and the Slovak nation to national selfdetermination. We are not, therefore, bartering wlth a right that is
natural and sacred, and we reject the so-called "Czechoslovaks" who
are doing so even today. After all the faithlessness - committed by
the representatives of this so-called "CzechosJovaklsm" from 1918 to
the present tíme, and especially after April 18, 1947, when the first
Slovak president, a Catholic priest, Dr. Joseph Tlso, was ~hamefully
murdered - we have no business in Slovakla. We are not, do not
want to be and we cannot be the occupants or the conquerors of freedom-loving Slovakia, because we would thereby betray the very ideals
of democracy and freedom we are fighting for. It is better to be accla!med a sincere frlend in Slovakia tban a hated ruler.
· We welcome the cooperatlon of all democra.tic peoples, especially
tbe Czechs, with our free Czech National Council. However, we reject
tbe collaborators witb bolsbevism of yes'terday who a.re adherents
of the group Jed by Dr. Zenkl and Dr. Ripka. We cannot collaborat.e
with the Zenkl-Ripka outfit because we are resolutely oppoS'Eld to the
installatlon of neo-communism after tbe defeat of bolsbevism. We
reject most resolutely the bolsbevik dictatorship against wbich wc
are striving to arouse tbe western democracies. But just as resolutely
do we reject even tbe "people's-democratic" dictatorsbip which in our
country is represented by Gottwalďs "Government Program of Košice"
- the program whicb Messrs. Zenkl, Ripka, Majer and their group
are trying to propagate and defend in exile.
We are fighting for real freedom and democracy; for the release
of a ll political prisoners incarcerated slnce 1945 to tbe present time:
for a return of the Jand to our agriculturists and nationallzed businesses to their rigbtful owners; we are fighting foť the inviolabillty
of private ownersbip. Furtbermore we are fig,hting to carry througb
and insuring extensive social reforms in tbe interest:; of workers and
laborers and foľ their rigbt to organize freely. We are fighting fo!·
basic human freedoms, formulated by great democrats of tbe West,
as well as tbe inviolability and sacredness of the family as the· foundat!on of a nation. We are fighting, tberefore, for thé return of h uman dign!ty to our enslaved brothers and sisters in oúr· betraye<l
country so tbat they migbt live and build free,Jy and withou t fear.
�SLOVAKIA
63
Our fight is in fact a fight for the realization of the principles of
Christian morality. And since the lnterest of welfare and development
of the Europ,ean nations demands larger federalized units, we a re
fľom the beglnnlng of our struggle for a federatlon of free nations.
Furthermore, we also reject yesterday's collaborators wlth the
c ommunu;ts because we are in no way responsi ble for the c rimes
c ommitted by th em while they were in th e services of the Kremlin.
In t he interests of justice we shall not cease demanding the just
pun!shment of t he gullty. At this time we emphaslze th at we stand
o pposed also to the shady speculations of the guilty to promo te
chaos after libe r ation and to repeat "May 1946" wh ich would work
injustlce to hundreds of thousands of innocent persons and would
place power into the hands of the "street" and crimina.ls. The injustlces
of retribution shall never again be repeated, but impar tial law of norma! courts s hall prevail.
T o the aUempts of yesterday's collaborators with bolsh evism to
picture and explain to the West, and especlally to the American
public, our b asic stan d towards them in s uch a way as if th e matter
c oncerued were only Zenkl and Prchala, we proclaim: We are not
c once rned with Prchala or Zenkl, but our nation. We reject most
<lecisively Zenkľs totality and his system of leadership hypocritically
wrapped in a cloak of democracy. We reject dangerous neo-communism which with the rest of the bolshevik collaborators they are
striving to smuggle into the USA, Canada, Australia, England and
other countries of the West, and there gain fertile soil for it. That is
t he pian of the conspiracy of neo-communism agains! democracy !
To realize th eir pian, the Zenk lites today are trying to s ell themselves to the West. But the democ rats of the W est should be aware
of the fact that the Zenklltes are only as devoted to them today as
they were only yesterday to the Soviets, and that by a lding them th ey
are only strength ening traitors of democracy, who can never gain
our natlon for the West. Czech exiles and their nation shall never
be led by traitors or confidantes or y esterday's infor mers of their
f ellow-citizens who w anted to seize their properties, and so much the
less by those who are responsible for the present national tragedy.
Czech exiles and their nation shall never be led and shall not be inf luenced by people who went into exil e on a special perm it and with
the knowledge of Gottwald and Nosek ( as Vojta Beneš, brother of
Dr. E. Beneš, and others). Nor shall they be led by the agents oť
Prague or their confidentlal friends.
T,he r ecent case of agent K. Strausse in London is still fresh in
our me mories. We must guide ourselves accordingly. Certainly the
West has b een warned by the chief of the atomic esplonage network
who stole lnto England as a "political refugee" and roused the whole
of England wlth hls presence. And does the West know how many
sples ot the Czech neo-com munists have successfully gotten into
mllltar y an d other lmportant enterprises?
We are not bitter with hatred. We c an, however, have no truck
with t'he followers of neo-communism, who attack us with falsehoods
in t he "New Yo rkské Listy" and other publicatlons. It 1s symbolic,
because hatred, falsehoods and half-truths are the weapons of communism. W e plead and warn b ecause we are opposed to terror. We
�64
SLOVAKIA
cannot, therefore, remaln sllent to the vlolence perpetrated by
neo-communists against Czech antl-commun!st ex!les w:hlch has at•
tained such a degree that Czech patriota, not havlng a hearlng or
support anywhere, are asklng confusedly: "ls lt now a curse to have
a clean past?" T he neo-communists, outraglng lmpoverlshed exlles,
are uslng the beggar's staff to torce them lnto submisslon. That is
the trled metbod of c ommunists and neo-communlsts trom the Nazl
concentratlon camps, where these people, even though prlsoners, were
absolute rulers in t-he Interna! management. There they also tried. to
llquidate everything that wlli; not lncllned toward communlsm. Why,
Dr. Zenkl was famiUar fa Buchenwald wlth these meth ods of the
communist "arch,prlsoners" and ithe camp "polltboro" as were A. Zápotocký and Joseph Plojhar in other concentratlon camps. Some wlt•
nesses have returned ,vho stlll remember how Zenkl carrled on Jn
Buchenwald.
Thls is our basic stand to whlch we adhere firmly and uncompromlslngly. - ("BOHEMIA," Vo!. 4, Nos. 7- 8, 1951) .
•
•
•
•
WH O SAID IT?
" The re are a lso such people who wou ld want t o apply t he Atla ntic Charter in the case of Slovakia. T hat is not only shortsig htedneH,
b ut also a gross insult t o Czechoslovakia. T he Czechoslovak problem
is ou r ve ry own, an interna! problem." - (Jan Masaryk, London,
J an. 20, 1943).
•
"Czechoslovakia 1s and shall remain a FREE country . . . . Some
people say that we have no freedom, that there is religlous persecutlon and propagate all klnds of nonsense about us. I proclalm that all
these statements are false. lt 1s not true that we bave rel!gious oppresslon or tdlat democrastlc and indivldual treedoms are suppressec!.
1 AM A PERSON OEEPL Y FOUNOED RELIGJOUSLY and I would not
remaln bome even five mlnutes, lf everything that is written about us
here were true. . . . I KNOW GOTTWALD A GOOD MANY YEARS,
HE IS AN EMI:-.IENT PERSON AND A GREAT CZECH PATRIOT.
. . . IT IS NOT TRUE THAT THE COMMUNIST S WANT T O DRI VE
(Ján Masaryk, DinANYBODY FROM THE GOVERNMENT." neľ Address, Piótsbu rgh Unlvel'sity Club, fanu,ary 13, 1947) .
•
"Today we base ourselves on our alliance with Russia which has
NO INTENTION ot lnfluenclng us but whlch wlll not permit base
torces of reactlon to plot agalnst us to enact another Munlch and another March 15, 1939. Our Interna! situatlon. too, ts completely dlfrerent. . . . Our program does not mean forclble bring1ng lnto line,
or TOTALITARIANISM; it slmply means tha.t the múPLE are takIng the management of public affalrs lnto thelr own hands by means
o! natlonal committees, whlcb wlll In due course constltute a natlonal
assemb!y. Later parllament wlll declde wbat our Constltutlon and
laws are to be. Our people wlll choose the right path." - (Zdenek
Flerllnger, Prime Minister, Address at Social Democratlc Party meet·
Ing, Prague, June • • 19. 5).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
62
SLOVAKIA
FREE CZECHS SPEAK OUT
J. Sed.lak
We have become accustomed to speaking plainly. Wbat are we
figbting for? We are figbting for the return of buman rights and dignity. That is why we are determined to fight against the installatio•1
of neo-communism after tihe defeat of communism.
We are opposed resolutely to every terror and totalitarian system
of government. That ls why we are in exile today. Tbat is why we
are also fighting uncompromisingly against bolshevism for the liberation of our country so that free nations could live happlly in a free
world. It is the fight for the unalienable rights of indivlduals and na.tions, which we must defend as such.
Faithful to this principle, we recognize and respect tbe rights
of the Sudeten Germans and the Slovak nation to national selfdetermination. We are not, therefore, bartering wlth a right that is
natural and sacred, and we reject the so-called "Czechoslovaks" who
are doing so even today. After all the faithlessness - committed by
the representatives of this so-called "CzechosJovaklsm" from 1918 to
the present tíme, and especially after April 18, 1947, when the first
Slovak president, a Catholic priest, Dr. Joseph Tlso, was ~hamefully
murdered - we have no business in Slovakla. We are not, do not
want to be and we cannot be the occupants or the conquerors of freedom-loving Slovakia, because we would thereby betray the very ideals
of democracy and freedom we are fighting for. It is better to be accla!med a sincere frlend in Slovakia tban a hated ruler.
· We welcome the cooperatlon of all democra.tic peoples, especially
tbe Czechs, with our free Czech National Council. However, we reject
tbe collaborators witb bolsbevism of yes'terday who a.re adherents
of the group Jed by Dr. Zenkl and Dr. Ripka. We cannot collaborat.e
with the Zenkl-Ripka outfit because we are resolutely oppoS'Eld to the
installatlon of neo-communism after tbe defeat of bolsbevism. We
reject most resolutely the bolsbevik dictatorship against wbich wc
are striving to arouse tbe western democracies. But just as resolutely
do we reject even tbe "people's-democratic" dictatorsbip which in our
country is represented by Gottwalďs "Government Program of Košice"
- the program whicb Messrs. Zenkl, Ripka, Majer and their group
are trying to propagate and defend in exile.
We are fighting for real freedom and democracy; for the release
of a ll political prisoners incarcerated slnce 1945 to tbe present time:
for a return of the Jand to our agriculturists and nationallzed businesses to their rigbtful owners; we are fighting foť the inviolabillty
of private ownersbip. Furtbermore we are fig,hting to carry througb
and insuring extensive social reforms in tbe interest:; of workers and
laborers and foľ their rigbt to organize freely. We are fighting fo!·
basic human freedoms, formulated by great democrats of tbe West,
as well as tbe inviolability and sacredness of the family as the· foundat!on of a nation. We are fighting, tberefore, for thé return of h uman dign!ty to our enslaved brothers and sisters in oúr· betraye<l
country so tbat they migbt live and build free,Jy and withou t fear.
SLOVAKIA
63
Our fight is in fact a fight for the realization of the principles of
Christian morality. And since the lnterest of welfare and development
of the Europ,ean nations demands larger federalized units, we a re
fľom the beglnnlng of our struggle for a federatlon of free nations.
Furthermore, we also reject yesterday's collaborators wlth the
c ommunu;ts because we are in no way responsi ble for the c rimes
c ommitted by th em while they were in th e services of the Kremlin.
In t he interests of justice we shall not cease demanding the just
pun!shment of t he gullty. At this time we emphaslze th at we stand
o pposed also to the shady speculations of the guilty to promo te
chaos after libe r ation and to repeat "May 1946" wh ich would work
injustlce to hundreds of thousands of innocent persons and would
place power into the hands of the "street" and crimina.ls. The injustlces
of retribution shall never again be repeated, but impar tial law of norma! courts s hall prevail.
T o the aUempts of yesterday's collaborators with bolsh evism to
picture and explain to the West, and especlally to the American
public, our b asic stan d towards them in s uch a way as if th e matter
c oncerued were only Zenkl and Prchala, we proclaim: We are not
c once rned with Prchala or Zenkl, but our nation. We reject most
<lecisively Zenkľs totality and his system of leadership hypocritically
wrapped in a cloak of democracy. We reject dangerous neo-communism which with the rest of the bolshevik collaborators they are
striving to smuggle into the USA, Canada, Australia, England and
other countries of the West, and there gain fertile soil for it. That is
t he pian of the conspiracy of neo-communism agains! democracy !
To realize th eir pian, the Zenk lites today are trying to s ell themselves to the West. But the democ rats of the W est should be aware
of the fact that the Zenklltes are only as devoted to them today as
they were only yesterday to the Soviets, and that by a lding them th ey
are only strength ening traitors of democracy, who can never gain
our natlon for the West. Czech exiles and their nation shall never
be led by traitors or confidantes or y esterday's infor mers of their
f ellow-citizens who w anted to seize their properties, and so much the
less by those who are responsible for the present national tragedy.
Czech exiles and their nation shall never be led and shall not be inf luenced by people who went into exil e on a special perm it and with
the knowledge of Gottwald and Nosek ( as Vojta Beneš, brother of
Dr. E. Beneš, and others). Nor shall they be led by the agents oť
Prague or their confidentlal friends.
T,he r ecent case of agent K. Strausse in London is still fresh in
our me mories. We must guide ourselves accordingly. Certainly the
West has b een warned by the chief of the atomic esplonage network
who stole lnto England as a "political refugee" and roused the whole
of England wlth hls presence. And does the West know how many
sples ot the Czech neo-com munists have successfully gotten into
mllltar y an d other lmportant enterprises?
We are not bitter with hatred. We c an, however, have no truck
with t'he followers of neo-communism, who attack us with falsehoods
in t he "New Yo rkské Listy" and other publicatlons. It 1s symbolic,
because hatred, falsehoods and half-truths are the weapons of communism. W e plead and warn b ecause we are opposed to terror. We
64
SLOVAKIA
cannot, therefore, remaln sllent to the vlolence perpetrated by
neo-communists against Czech antl-commun!st ex!les w:hlch has at•
tained such a degree that Czech patriota, not havlng a hearlng or
support anywhere, are asklng confusedly: "ls lt now a curse to have
a clean past?" T he neo-communists, outraglng lmpoverlshed exlles,
are uslng the beggar's staff to torce them lnto submisslon. That is
the trled metbod of c ommunists and neo-communlsts trom the Nazl
concentratlon camps, where these people, even though prlsoners, were
absolute rulers in t-he Interna! management. There they also tried. to
llquidate everything that wlli; not lncllned toward communlsm. Why,
Dr. Zenkl was famiUar fa Buchenwald wlth these meth ods of the
communist "arch,prlsoners" and ithe camp "polltboro" as were A. Zápotocký and Joseph Plojhar in other concentratlon camps. Some wlt•
nesses have returned ,vho stlll remember how Zenkl carrled on Jn
Buchenwald.
Thls is our basic stand to whlch we adhere firmly and uncompromlslngly. - ("BOHEMIA," Vo!. 4, Nos. 7- 8, 1951) .
•
•
•
•
WH O SAID IT?
" The re are a lso such people who wou ld want t o apply t he Atla ntic Charter in the case of Slovakia. T hat is not only shortsig htedneH,
b ut also a gross insult t o Czechoslovakia. T he Czechoslovak problem
is ou r ve ry own, an interna! problem." - (Jan Masaryk, London,
J an. 20, 1943).
•
"Czechoslovakia 1s and shall remain a FREE country . . . . Some
people say that we have no freedom, that there is religlous persecutlon and propagate all klnds of nonsense about us. I proclalm that all
these statements are false. lt 1s not true that we bave rel!gious oppresslon or tdlat democrastlc and indivldual treedoms are suppressec!.
1 AM A PERSON OEEPL Y FOUNOED RELIGJOUSLY and I would not
remaln bome even five mlnutes, lf everything that is written about us
here were true. . . . I KNOW GOTTWALD A GOOD MANY YEARS,
HE IS AN EMI:-.IENT PERSON AND A GREAT CZECH PATRIOT.
. . . IT IS NOT TRUE THAT THE COMMUNIST S WANT T O DRI VE
(Ján Masaryk, DinANYBODY FROM THE GOVERNMENT." neľ Address, Piótsbu rgh Unlvel'sity Club, fanu,ary 13, 1947) .
•
"Today we base ourselves on our alliance with Russia which has
NO INTENTION ot lnfluenclng us but whlch wlll not permit base
torces of reactlon to plot agalnst us to enact another Munlch and another March 15, 1939. Our Interna! situatlon. too, ts completely dlfrerent. . . . Our program does not mean forclble bring1ng lnto line,
or TOTALITARIANISM; it slmply means tha.t the múPLE are takIng the management of public affalrs lnto thelr own hands by means
o! natlonal committees, whlcb wlll In due course constltute a natlonal
assemb!y. Later parllament wlll declde wbat our Constltutlon and
laws are to be. Our people wlll choose the right path." - (Zdenek
Flerllnger, Prime Minister, Address at Social Democratlc Party meet·
Ing, Prague, June • • 19. 5).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Free Czechs Speak Out
Description
An account of the resource
J. Sedlak
Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951
pp. 62-64
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sedlak, J.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
name
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/62d8bf281c11a13fdbc1a16bf1801964.pdf
cff62a63b570183b9523e931ef1c7a2b
PDF Text
Text
Officers of the Slovak League of America
(Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio.)
•
John J. Sirotn ak
Houorary President
610-612 Lincoln Trus t Bldg.
Scranton 3, Pa.
Or. Peter P. Hletko
1943 W . 48th Street
Chicago 9, Illinois
Dr. Jul ius J. Janci
311 W. King St., Owosso, Mich .
President
Stephanie O. H usek
Philip A. Hrobak
Georgian Court College
P. O. Box 150, Middletown, Pa.
Lakewood, N. J .
Vice-President
ADVISORY COUNCIL
M ichael Sinchak
333 Schoonmaker Avenue
!'.Ionessen, Pa.
Michael J . Vargovich
National P resident
First Catholic Slovak Union
of U. S. A.
Vice-P resident
Julia Krajcovi c
1648 W. 18th St., Chicago 8, III.
H elen K ocan
National President
First Catholic Slovak
Ladies Union
Recor ding Secretary
Dr. F rancis Hrusovsky
10510 Buckeye Road
Cleveland 4. Ohio
Frank Bobus
National President
Slovak Catholic Sokol
Secretary- Treasurer
Frank J . Gurcak
Stephen ·J. Tk ach
4755 Haptist Road
Pittsburgh 27, Pa.
National P resident
Pe nna. Slovak U nion
Gabri el a E. Vavrek
EXE CU T IVE COMMI TTEE
National President
Ladies P ennsylvan ia
Slovak Union
Paul P. Jamriska
810 Montooth Street
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.
John Rozbo r il
Joseph Prusa
205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J.
National President
Slovak Cathollc Cadet Union
SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affi liated w ith the S lovak League of America)
JEDNOTA
SLOV E NSKÁ OBRANA
ŽENSKÁ J EDN OTA
Middletown, Pa.
Scranton, Pa.
Cleveland, Ohlo.
BRATSTVO
SLOVE NSKÉ NOVI NY
Wilkes-Ba rre, Pa.
Cleveland, Ohio.
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
KAT OLÍCKY SOKO L
SVORNOSŤ
Passalc, N. J .
Whitaker. Pa.
OSADNÉ H L ASY
Chicago, Tli.
ZORN I Č KA
�CASTLE ORAVA,
one of the most beautiful castles in Slovakia, nestles some
360 ft. above t he Orava river. The stronghold consists of
t hree sections, built at different times; the lower, built in
1543; the centra!, built in about 1010; and the upper, built
in 1561 .
�
Officers of the Slovak League of America
(Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio.)
•
John J. Sirotn ak
Houorary President
610-612 Lincoln Trus t Bldg.
Scranton 3, Pa.
Or. Peter P. Hletko
1943 W . 48th Street
Chicago 9, Illinois
Dr. Jul ius J. Janci
311 W. King St., Owosso, Mich .
President
Stephanie O. H usek
Philip A. Hrobak
Georgian Court College
P. O. Box 150, Middletown, Pa.
Lakewood, N. J .
Vice-President
ADVISORY COUNCIL
M ichael Sinchak
333 Schoonmaker Avenue
!'.Ionessen, Pa.
Michael J . Vargovich
National P resident
First Catholic Slovak Union
of U. S. A.
Vice-P resident
Julia Krajcovi c
1648 W. 18th St., Chicago 8, III.
H elen K ocan
National President
First Catholic Slovak
Ladies Union
Recor ding Secretary
Dr. F rancis Hrusovsky
10510 Buckeye Road
Cleveland 4. Ohio
Frank Bobus
National President
Slovak Catholic Sokol
Secretary- Treasurer
Frank J . Gurcak
Stephen ·J. Tk ach
4755 Haptist Road
Pittsburgh 27, Pa.
National P resident
Pe nna. Slovak U nion
Gabri el a E. Vavrek
EXE CU T IVE COMMI TTEE
National President
Ladies P ennsylvan ia
Slovak Union
Paul P. Jamriska
810 Montooth Street
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.
John Rozbo r il
Joseph Prusa
205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J.
National President
Slovak Cathollc Cadet Union
SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affi liated w ith the S lovak League of America)
JEDNOTA
SLOV E NSKÁ OBRANA
ŽENSKÁ J EDN OTA
Middletown, Pa.
Scranton, Pa.
Cleveland, Ohlo.
BRATSTVO
SLOVE NSKÉ NOVI NY
Wilkes-Ba rre, Pa.
Cleveland, Ohio.
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
KAT OLÍCKY SOKO L
SVORNOSŤ
Passalc, N. J .
Whitaker. Pa.
OSADNÉ H L ASY
Chicago, Tli.
ZORN I Č KA
�CASTLE ORAVA,
one of the most beautiful castles in Slovakia, nestles some
360 ft. above t he Orava river. The stronghold consists of
t hree sections, built at different times; the lower, built in
1543; the centra!, built in about 1010; and the upper, built
in 1561 .
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2)
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1951
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f30c64a4bd4a22b37d12baac6a29f30f.pdf
e73e7263a4953f406560710ee0c95f84
PDF Text
Text
�SLOVAKIA is published periodically by the Slovak League of America,
a cultural and civi<: fedetation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOVAKIA
is to promote a better understanding
and appreciation of the S lovak nation
and its long struggle for freedom and
independence.
As Americans, members of the
Slovak League of America firrnly beliP. ve that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
r ight to freedom and independence.
They are dedicated to the cause of the
American way of life, S lovak freedom
and world peace and are determined to
oppose the plague of Communism and
all other totalitarian political systems.
THE SLOV AK LEAGUE OF AMERICA
P . O. Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOT A PRESS
Mlddletown, Pa.
�
�SLOVAKIA is published periodically by the Slovak League of America,
a cultural and civi<: fedetation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOVAKIA
is to promote a better understanding
and appreciation of the S lovak nation
and its long struggle for freedom and
independence.
As Americans, members of the
Slovak League of America firrnly beliP. ve that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
r ight to freedom and independence.
They are dedicated to the cause of the
American way of life, S lovak freedom
and world peace and are determined to
oppose the plague of Communism and
all other totalitarian political systems.
THE SLOV AK LEAGUE OF AMERICA
P . O. Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOT A PRESS
Mlddletown, Pa.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1951, Vol. 1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1951
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li>
</ul>
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
<ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1)
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
May 1951
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/0c1574aed9759ceac81f746ecc985631.pdf
48197f46eb317f88e9b972eea385fe07
PDF Text
Text
YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAl(
as easily as you can any other modern language. Slovak
should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages,
because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to
all of them. Prove it to youi self with the most scholarly
text on Slovak, the
SLOVAl LESSO S
A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92
lessons, 400 pages; exercises in Slovak and English;
English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. B ard
cover, bound in cloth, $3.50
HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and
most complete dictionary of its kind ; 702 pages with a
brief sumar y of the Slovak Grammar. Bard cover, bound
in cloth, $4.00
THE SLOVAK.S, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by
all students interested in the history and traditions of
the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover , bound in cloth
- $3.00; paper cover - $2.00
SKETCHES F ROl\l SLOV AK HISTORY
by Joseph škultéty, translation by O. D. Koreff ;
a documented refutat ion of several errors propagated by writers and hist orians; 229 pages, bard
cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00.
Order from :
P.A. HROBAK
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
�Sept. 2, 1855 - REV. S~EPHEN FURDEK - January 18, 1915
Organizer, publis her, writer, c hampion of Slovak freedom.
Born in Trstená, Orava County, Slovakia, died in Cleveland, Ohio. Founder of the First Catholic Slovak Union of the
U . S. A., the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union of the U.
S. A., and the Slovak League of America. Furdek is referred
to as the apostle of Americans of Slovak descent.
�
YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAl(
as easily as you can any other modern language. Slovak
should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages,
because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to
all of them. Prove it to youi self with the most scholarly
text on Slovak, the
SLOVAl LESSO S
A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92
lessons, 400 pages; exercises in Slovak and English;
English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. B ard
cover, bound in cloth, $3.50
HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and
most complete dictionary of its kind ; 702 pages with a
brief sumar y of the Slovak Grammar. Bard cover, bound
in cloth, $4.00
THE SLOVAK.S, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by
all students interested in the history and traditions of
the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover , bound in cloth
- $3.00; paper cover - $2.00
SKETCHES F ROl\l SLOV AK HISTORY
by Joseph škultéty, translation by O. D. Koreff ;
a documented refutat ion of several errors propagated by writers and hist orians; 229 pages, bard
cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00.
Order from :
P.A. HROBAK
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
�Sept. 2, 1855 - REV. S~EPHEN FURDEK - January 18, 1915
Organizer, publis her, writer, c hampion of Slovak freedom.
Born in Trstená, Orava County, Slovakia, died in Cleveland, Ohio. Founder of the First Catholic Slovak Union of the
U . S. A., the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union of the U.
S. A., and the Slovak League of America. Furdek is referred
to as the apostle of Americans of Slovak descent.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5)
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1952
Description
An account of the resource
includes portrait of Rev. Stephen Furdek (January 18, 1915)
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8db9dd47a0cbc4f10cc1ef6b84edb23c.pdf
83131de0e65840790ccb5638a6cb6ae1
PDF Text
Text
58
SLOVA:KIA
ARE TIIE SWVAKS AND CZECHS
TWO "CWSELY RELATED'' NATIONS?
DR. A . GRÉBERT
Official propaganda of all Czech governments trom 1918 to 1938
(the era of T. G. Masaryk and Edward Beneš) stated cat&gorically
that the Slovaks and the Czechs were "two very closely related" na·
tiona. We say "Czech" governments advlsedly, because the Slovaks
had llttle or no lnfluence In them; the wm o! the Slovak natlon was
totally lgnored when lt came to policy and natlonal and lnternatlonal
relationships. The "Czecho-Slovak" (wlth or wlthout the hyphen) admlnlstrations during that tlme were in reality "Czech" admlnlstratlons; "Czecho-Slovak" government was In fact a "Czech" govern·
ment. Even the national "Czechoslovak" church was strlctly a "Czech"
en terprise.
During and immedlately after World War I, T. G. Masary'k and
Edward Beneš had to offer some "loglcal" reasons for the creation
of a joint political stalte for the Czechs and the Slovaks, because
Presldent Wllson had insisted on the appllcation of the democratlc
principle of the right of self-determinatlon to all natlons. So. T. G.
Masaryk and Beneš set out to prove that the Slov,aks really were not
a distinct nation, but only a branch of the Czech natlon, and that the
Slovak language was but a dialect of the Czech language. 'l'he CzechoSlovak Republlc was bom of th'!s "big Ile" In 1918. Slnce that tlme, the
"big !ie" was promoted constantly by the propaganda aP'l)aratus of the
Czecbo·Slovak state. Many non-CZech politiclana, statesmen, hlstorlans
and writers succumbed to lt. Among them were some who repudlated
the concept ot a "common state," but still thought that the Slovaks
and Czechs were, nevertheless, "two very closely related" nations.
Among the factors which dec!de the Individuality of a nation, we
find: the natural framework within which a nation Ilves, lts racia!
composltlon, language, cultural !nfluences, llterature, rellglous develop.
ment, social structure, economlc relations, etc. Now, how "very close-Jy related" are the Slovaks and the Czechs?
IN THE BEGINNING THERE WERE TWO NATIONS
The Slovaks and Czechs already at the beginnlng ot the!r recorded
hlstor!es were not members of one natlon, or a common polltlcal
state, as most Czech pol!tlcians, hlstorlans an<l writers - and many
unlnformed non-Czech commE\lltators, writers, hlstor!ans and polit!·
cians, lnfluenced by or in tbe pay ot Czech propaganda - would
have the world believe. There !s nothlng in recorded blstory to ind!·
cate that the Slovaks and tbe Cze-cbs dld not go separate ways. Thls
hlstorlcal fact was upheld even by sueh a typlcal representatlve ot
pol!tlcal and cultural "Czechoslovaklsm" as Dr. K. Krofta (Tchéques
et Slovaques jusqu' á leur union polltlque," in the LE MONDE SLAVE,
March·April, 1933, pg. 2).
Chronlclers of the nlntb and tenth centurles clearly dlstlngulshed
betwen the two natlons. Paul J. Šafárlk clted many examples to prove
thls point In hls "Slawlsche Alterttimer" (Vo!. 2, pages 208, 458, 493).
Tbe dlt!erentatlon between the Slovaks and tbe Czecbs, however, be•
�SLO:YAKIA
69
gan a Jong tíme ,be!ore that. 1t already began In their ancient, prehlstorlc, common Slovanic homeland. Later, In their new homelands, the
indlvJduallty of both natloM became more pronounced.
NATURE SEPARATED THEM
The Slovak.s are a natlon whose core lives in mountains and
hllls, whereas the c ore of the Czech people lnhabits plains. And molllltains and hllls generaJly breed an altogether d<ifferent type of man,
psychologically and even physically, than do the Jowlands. Rivers of
Czech lands empty lnto the North Sea, whereas the rlvers of Slovaltia, w1th ihe exceptlon of the Dunajec, flow lnto the Black Sea. Wlth
the rlV'ers even Slovak !ife gravitated In a d.ifferent directlon from
the llfe of úhe Czech nation. The Czech lands, on the one hand, and
the Slovak lands, on the other, represent two very distlnct geographical environments, which tended to create two dlstlnct national in•
dividualltles. In some Czech propaganda publlcations deslgned for the
Engllsh-speaking world, it ls even admitted that after one crosses the
Czech border lnto Slovakla "we have the impresslon that we have
come to a different world. Nature ls different and the people, too, ls
dlstinctly drnferent" (J. Czeoh-J. E. Mellon: "Czechoslovakla, Land
of Dream and Enterprise," pg, 132).
lf nothing else but nature separated the Slovaks from the Czechs,
it undoubtedly would suffice to create and to preserve the dlstlnctly
;;,pecial lndlvlduality of the Slovak natlon. But the Slovaks were un!lke the Czechs In other respects as well.
RACIAL COMPOSITION SEPARATE D THEM
T•he Czech natlon, surrounded on three sldes as it !s by the German world, undoubtedly was open to racia! lnfluences of tha,t world.
T he racia! structure of the Slovaks, on the other hand, was lnfluenced
to some extent not only by the Germans, but also by the Slovanlc
nat!ons (Poles, Ruthenes, Czechs) and -the U ralo-Alta:!c Magyars,
A vars, Pechengs, Cumans, Turks, etc.
The Avars ruled over the !and of the Slovaks almost 250 years
(to bhe end of the 8th century) and, hence, certainly must have had
s ome influence on the racia} structure of t-he Slovak popula,t!on, held
in bondage. And hlstory tells u.s, too, that the Slovaks llved In a com•
mon poli-tlcal state wlth the Magyars over 900 yeans; and close to the
Turks, when they conquered most of Hungary, for some 150 years.
And we know that the Poles ruled the Spiš reg.ion of Slovakla from
1412 to 1772. The racia! structure of the Czechs was not affected by
the.se lnfluences.
Hence, we are lnclined to agree with Podhradszky that raclal
composltlon "sharply separates the Slovaks from all the nelghborlng
nations and In a special manner deflnes thelr place among all other
natlons of the unlverse" ( A t6toklata feldold politikai és kultúrgeo1
gráflája, pg. 53).
THEY SPEAK DIFFERENT LANGUAGES
Professor Louis Novák once wrote that the Slovak language was
a "very ancient" llngual formatlon, one "whlch has had an orlglnal
and independent evolutlon, Quite dlfferent from the Czech langua.ge."
And he added that "the language ot centra! Slovakla today 1s the
�60
SLOVAKIA
direct organic contlnuation of the older centra! Slovak tongue, whlch
in turn was the direct organlc con-tinuation o[ the respective pre-Slovanlc dialect" (Jazykovedné glosy k čsl. otázke, pg. 89).
Pro[essor Henrich Bartek, noted Slovak philologist who ma.de an
t'xhaustlve study of the Slovak and Czech languages, concluded that
•·the Slovak language in many of its aspects had a different evolution
than the Czech language and this fact guarantees it an independent
place in the family of Slovanic languages" ( Príspevok k dejinám
slovenčiny, pg. 117).
'l'he diHerences between the Slovak and Czech languages are
greater than most people are aware of, especially people who have
been confounded by Ozech propaganda, Czech schools and books. The
Czech language belongs to the group of languages which have a preponderance of the higher vowels, and 1-t has sounds or vocala whlch
are not to be found in Slovak. On the oúher hand, we flnd various
vocals In Slovak that are foreign to the Czech tongue. The Slovak employs an abundance of diphthongs, while the Czech has only a few.
The centra) dialect of Slovakia, the basis of llterary Slovak, has only
one declenslon of adjectives, while the Czech has three. 'l'hey also
d.tffer greatly in the matter of inflectlon of nouns and verbs. Rules
of acc811t, syllable formation, rhythm, composition and syntax, and
word formation are also different. The languages are dlfferent lexically, too. Miroslav Kálal, Czech lexicograpber, collected over 35,000
words in three years for hls differential dictionary whlch are not
found In Czech, or which have an entirely different meaning ťha.n the
corresponding Slovak words. 'l'he language ques'lion has been doolt
with in great detail by Trnovský; if the reader is interested he mlght
consult bis work "K rečovej otázke Slovákov" - especially pages
126-157 (published by the "Spolok sv. Vojtecha," Trnava, 1937).
Little wonder then that M. Sečenský wrote a book (about 1700)
for Slovaks "llving In Hungary" who wanted to learn Czech. The
book, called "Swétlonos Cžeský," would teaoh talented and industrlous
Slovaks how to read Czech correctly in a week and eventually how to
dlst!nguish between words and ,nite correctly in Czech. Thls also
proves that the Czecb language was a foreign language to Slovaks,
wbo had to learn lt just as any other forelgn language, if they wanted
to acqulre the use of lt.
But even lf the Slovaks did speak the same language as the
Czechs, would that be a valid argument for ~he formatlon of a "Czechoslovak" natlon, ethnically speaklng? Certainly not. And it is less
valid as an argument for a joint state lJfe. We have German-speaklng
Sw!ss, French-speaking Belgians, Engllsh.,speaklng Irlsh, South Americans speaking Spanish and Portuguese. When books are written in
the same language, tbey often belong to dlstlnct llteratures. And the
Slovaks are indlsput.ably distinct from tbe Czechs wibh thelr Independent
Slovak llterature, whlch is the expre,ssion of Slovak cultural individuality.
THE PAST SEPARATES THEM
The Slovaks and Czechs neve-r formed a joint state up to 1918.
True, Svätopluk annexed the Czecb lamds to tbe Slovak state and held
them a few years, but these were politlcally completely autonomous
under their own Czech princes. History tells us, too, tbat •the Czechs
used the first opportunity that came thefr way to break away from the
Slovak state with the help of tbe Germans. Whlle the Czechs l!ved in
�SLOVAKIA
61
the broad framework of the German empire, "the Roman Empi•re of
the German nation," that is witl1in the framework of the Austrian
Erop,ire, the Slovaks on the other hand, were within the framework
of the Hungarian empire. T•hese were two distinct worlds, which could
not remaln wil!hout influence on the political thought, cultural development, economlc cond,i tlons and social status of both these natlons.
"We Czechs know well," wrote the "Narodní Listy" {Nationa l
~ews) at the end of the last centUľY, "that even the strongest movement, wh1ch stlrred our na,tion in all Czech lands from the lowest
to <the hlghest strata, was halted at the Hungarian border. The entire
past does not show even a single example that a,t home in Bohemia
{Czechia), or again in Slovak-ia, t.here was evldent any desire for a
political union of the Czechs and Slovaks, not even at the tlme when
the Czech kindom was independen,t and the Czech na,tion the ruling
element in it."
The economic history of Slovakia was altogether different from
that of the Cz.ech lands. W,hlle in l!he Cz.eoh lands, under the lnfluence of the indus,trlalization policy of the Habsburgs, capitallstic forms
of economy b egan to talke root comparatively very early, In Slovakia
the conserva,tive nobility, with the aid of the dominant posltion l<t
held in the Hungarian s,tate, successfully defended feudalism until the
middle of the nineteen,th century. In Czech Jands, capitallsm could
thus begin muoh sooner to form t,he Czech person. while In Slovakia
Lhe Slovak person still lived a long time back and worked and was
influenced by the economic forms of feudalism. To thls very day •there
have been preserved in the Slovaks and Czechs distinct traces of thls
1•ar!ed economic development.
CZECH ORIENTATION SEPARATES THEM
While the Czechs lived primarily under the cultural influence of
the German world and looked out into the world through t,he medium
of German windows, the Slovaks Jlved in an entirely different cultural environment. Medieval Hungary .gravltated more towards fäe
culture of the Italian peninsula, to Roman culture. Besides that, Hungary on its southern and eastern borders was in contact w!th the culture of the Byzanit:ine,Slovanic world, Into all thls came the cult ure
of an Aslatic nation w!tb its own particular flavor: the culture of
tbe Magyar nation. F. Wollman, a Czech univers!,ty professor, pointed
to the intenslty of Roman cultural influences on the '81ovaks. According to -bim, the Slovaks are In substance slmilarly Romanized as the
Poles are. Wbile the Czechs represent a ty.pe of culture common to
Germanlzed Slovana {'81avs), the Slovaks are a type of Romanized Slovana ("Východ, východnosť, východnictví," in Nová Svoboda, Feb.
20, 1924).
RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS SEPARATE THEM
While the Czech religious organizations were influenced by the
German world, the Slovaks were in direct contact wlth Roman Christian!ty. While Huss'.itism, Protestantism and the Czedh Brethren Jeft
deep traces in Czech religlous hlstory, the rellgious development of
the Slovaks went in an entirely different d irect!on. It 1s very slgniflcant and most ,highly characterlstlc that Hu.ssltism, which ls perhaps
the mos,t marked manifestat!on of Czech religious development, and
one w·hloh took hold to some extent In southern Hungary, malnly
�SLOVAKIA
among 1:he Rumanlans, evoked practlcally no response in the Slovaks,
as wa.s demonstrated by Prof. Varsik in hls book " Husiti a reformácia na Slovensku" (Tbe Hussites and the Reformatlon In Slovak.ia) .
Similarly -the movement of the so-called "Czechoslovak Chureh, ' whlch
cost Czech Cathollclsm over a million souls, remained completely wlthout response In Slovakla. The national "Czechoslovak" churoh was
strictly a Czech enterprise with notihing Slovak about it. The name,
of course, was meant to confuse the little-informed and deceive the
world in general. This holds for practically all things called "Czechoslovak."
Whlle in Bohemia, In 1930, over 10 per cent or the populatlon
was wlthout any religlous fa:lth, In Slovakia only 0.51 per cent belonged ,to that category - and tlie greatest part of this was made up
of lmmigrant Czech officials, soldiers and police. Indlrectly, the dlsUnctness of rellgious traditions is also shown by the dJstln ct stand
taken by the Czech collecUve toward Communism: the Czechs are
less negative towards Jt than are the Slovaks.
SOCIAL STRUCTURE SEPARATES THEM
While in Czechia, In 1921, only 29 per cent of the lnhab itants
was engaged in agriculture, in Slovalda 60 per cent of the inhab itants
belonged to that category. In Czechia 46 per cent of the lnhabltants
lived from industry and buslness, In Slovakia only 21 per cent. It 1s
not necessary to stress that people and natlons living from agriculture,
represent an altogetber different type of person and natlon tban
peoples and nations engaged In buslness and industry.
The varied social and economlc struoture of both these natlons
and countries appears In other rubrics of statls-tics. The denslty
ot the population in Bobemla 1s about 128 lnhabitanots per .square
kilometer, while in Slovakia lt is only 62. The biological potentlal 1s
different also: Jn 1932, 17.10 Jlving chlldren were bom for each
1000 Czechs In Bobemia, whlle in Slovakla 28.46 Slovak children were
born. The Czechs belong to the group of biologically very weak
nations, whlle the Slovaks be long to -the group of nations which are
biologically strong. Whlle a large part of the Czech nation llves in
small towns, the core of the Slovak nation lives in vlllages. Tbe
dominant Czech type 1s the small4.owner and industria) worker, whlle
the Slovak type is tbe agrlculturlst.
ŠVEJK V ERSUS JÁNOŠÍK
These actualitles engraved their own deep traces on booth natlon.s.
Il dld not happen by chance that the ratlonal, materialistlc, calculatlng "small Czech fellow" found adequate expression for the most
popular of his own people's hero In the figure of tbe legendary "good
soldler "Švejk" (Shveyk). We find nothlng llke bim wltb. the Slo•
va.ks, wbose most typical and most popular type of people's hero 1s
tb& rebel Jánošík (Yabnowsheek), tbe romantlc, ldea!ISltlc, magnanimous and herolc Slovak Robin Hood.
švejk flghts against Austrian begemony wltb a hunched ba.ek,
wi-tb cunning and stealth, petty "sabotage." and wlth polsonous
needles. Jánošik. on the other hand, goes lnto the mountalns, flghts
herolcally and rallles the people untll he dles for bis idea!. Švejk
�63
and J áno!!lk stand agalnst each other as two absolutely distlnct,
special tlgures of popu\ar "reslslance" types of two absolutely dlslinot natlonal indlvlduallties.
TWO DISTIN CT WORLD S
There !s no doubt that the Slovak and Czech worlds are two
substantlally dlstlnct worlds. "SlovakJa !s a component part of our
Republlc," wrote the Czech newspaperma n Václav Kapllcký in the
"Svobodný Zlti'ek" (Free Tomorrow) of July 24, 1947, "but it ls,
nevertheless, still forelgn to us, unkuown; a dlfferent people llves
there and there are there altogebher d!fferent condltlons of !1fe
than In our country."
Slmllarly, the French unlverslty professor Ancel, after a stay in
Slovakla, declared that "the vila! form.s of the Slovak.s are just as
dlstinct trom Czech llfe as they are from Magyar llfe" ( Lea frontierea slovaquea, pg. 28). A Swiss corresponden t, after studylng Jlfe
In Slova.kla, wrote: "Only 800 kilometera separate Bratislava from
Prague, but arrlvlng In Slovakia, you meet wlth the sounds of a dlfrerent language, a dlfferent ma.nner of llfe, a different manner of
thlnklog, a dlfferent po\ltlcal atmosphere" (Journal de Geneve, Sep.
tember 30, 1947).
Today the Slova.ks and Czechs are more dlstant trom and more
allen to each other than they were a thousand years ago, or than
they were even In 1938. And as tlme goes on, these natlonal lndivlduallsts wlll be even more pronounced. Thls statement 1s based on
the self-evldent soclologlcal development, whlch no one wlll be able
to stop or alter. It wlll go on whetber any one likes lt or not. The
so-called "<:zechO&lovaks," together wlth thelr Czeoh masters, are
effect1vely speedlng thls process wlth thelr limited, short-slghted, un•
realistlc pollcy. Once hi.Story undoubtedly wlll prove thls convlnclngly.
We bave mentloned only tbe most Jmportaut actuaJltles, whlch
&cted together ln tbe dlfferent formatlon of the Slovak nation anu
the Czeoh natlon. Tbe narrow tramework ot this perlodlcal does not
al\ow us to go lnto more detail. But the tact.s presented clearly lndlcate that the expresslcm referrlng to the Slovaks and Czechs as
"two very closely related natlons" slmply wlll not stand up under the
cr1tlcal eye of sclentlflc analysls. Conversely, it ls very strlklng that
these two nelghborlng natlons have so llttle In common.
TWO DIFFERENT MI SSIONS
Not only tbe past and present separate the S\ovaks and Czechs,
but the tuture as well. The mlsslon of the Slovak natlon 1s In substance altogether dlfferent from that of the Czech natlon. The geo1>olltlcal tunotlon of Slovakla ls dlstinct !rom the runctlon of the
Czech lands. Wblle Slova.kla occuples the centra] locatlon In the
defense o! the Central-Euro pean area, Czech terrltory occuples the
border posltlon. Wblle the Czech lands have a defenslve role agal nst
the pressure o! the German world In the Danube, Basin, Slova.kla la
supposed to ,bave a coordlnatlng role, and that not only toward
German pressure, but even toward lncldental Russlan pressure.
After the flrst World War the vlctorlous power.s gave SlovakJa
the role to be "a support or the Czechs agalnst German pressure.
�64
SLOVAKIA.
This conceptlon proved to be !neffective. T he Danube Basin, or
Centra! E urope, can be defended only with joint forces. And that !.s
possible only when Slovakia wlll not be the cause of any CzechoMagyar or Czecho-Polis h antagonis ms. That will be so only wh en
Slovakia is independent. The n s he will be able to fuJflll the function
of a consolidating and coord!natlng factor in the pol!t!cal atmosphere
of Centra! Europe.
•
•
•
WHO SAI D IT?
"It is difficul t, nay right impossible, in a short artlcle to no te even
in slogan for m the things that are connected with h istor!c November 7, 1947, for the USSR, for us, for Europe, for the whole cultural
world. But one thlng can be expre ssed and interpreted fully. And
th at is the sincere, deep hearty and undying gratitude of all Czechs
a nd Slova ks t o the Soviet Union, to its people, to its Army and to it s
s kipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everyth ing they ha ve done and
sti ll are doing for us. It is an unfalsified, selfless and clean feeling
of friendshlp and sympathy, which we have for this great country
that is so close to us and !s our ne!ghbor. l t is a pur e joy from the
,oys, the su ccesses and the progress of the USSR; !t !s the lnflexible
hope that Slavdom, in its own new perception, w ill assure for itself
and the world the deserved peace, in wh!ch all nations shall live a ccording to their manner, freely, without fears, democratically and w!th
dign!ty, as well as in understanding, prosperity and happiness. In this
s pirit, from my so ul I greet the jubileeing USSR, and congratulate lt
from my heart for the results attained in peace and war. 1 wlsh it to
continue to prosper, grow and become m ightier unto its own greatness, but a lso for the we lfa re of al l humanity. Long live the Soviet
Un io n, and may its leader and ski pper, J . V. Stalin, live in fu ll health
to see many more jubilees !" - (Dr. J oseph Lettrich, Pres!dent of the
Slovak Democratic Party and the Slovak National Counc!I; ÔAS,
~ovember 7, 1947.)
•
•
•
•
•
•
" Czechoslovakia a nd th e Uni on of Soviet Socialist Repub lics
have united in the midst of fire a nd b lood - thls a lliance, the refore,
is for eternity, as love and friendsh ip proven in affliction._,___, We are
aware of th e fact that the USSR could sti ll exist w lthout us, but our
free State certainly cou ld not exist without th e USS R .. .. Long live
the victorlous Soviet Army ! Long live its Supreme Commande r, Gene ral issimo Stali n ! Long live the li berator of Bratislava, Marshal Ma•
(ÔAS, the off!cial organ of Lettr!ch's Democratlc
linovský !" Party. Apr!I 4. 19-17 '
"In parl!ament on November 7, 1935, when I spoke a bout the international sltuatlon, I s aid that it was my deep conviction that our
contacts w ith t he Soviet Un io n shall be good and lasting, that Soviet
Rus sia wi ll again beco me a powe rful Slova nic factor, a nd as the most
powerfu l S lova n ic fact or would bri ng S lavdom muc h good. We are not
c hang ing our stand - a nd th is is the permanent sta nd of the Demo(John U rsi ny, Vice-Premier of Czecho-Slovakla and
c rati c Party." Vice-President of tbe Democ ratlr P arty. in Bratislava. February 22.
1947, according to ÔAS. offlclal orga n of tbe SDP, February 27, 1947.)
�
58
SLOVA:KIA
ARE TIIE SWVAKS AND CZECHS
TWO "CWSELY RELATED'' NATIONS?
DR. A . GRÉBERT
Official propaganda of all Czech governments trom 1918 to 1938
(the era of T. G. Masaryk and Edward Beneš) stated cat&gorically
that the Slovaks and the Czechs were "two very closely related" na·
tiona. We say "Czech" governments advlsedly, because the Slovaks
had llttle or no lnfluence In them; the wm o! the Slovak natlon was
totally lgnored when lt came to policy and natlonal and lnternatlonal
relationships. The "Czecho-Slovak" (wlth or wlthout the hyphen) admlnlstrations during that tlme were in reality "Czech" admlnlstratlons; "Czecho-Slovak" government was In fact a "Czech" govern·
ment. Even the national "Czechoslovak" church was strlctly a "Czech"
en terprise.
During and immedlately after World War I, T. G. Masary'k and
Edward Beneš had to offer some "loglcal" reasons for the creation
of a joint political stalte for the Czechs and the Slovaks, because
Presldent Wllson had insisted on the appllcation of the democratlc
principle of the right of self-determinatlon to all natlons. So. T. G.
Masaryk and Beneš set out to prove that the Slov,aks really were not
a distinct nation, but only a branch of the Czech natlon, and that the
Slovak language was but a dialect of the Czech language. 'l'he CzechoSlovak Republlc was bom of th'!s "big Ile" In 1918. Slnce that tlme, the
"big !ie" was promoted constantly by the propaganda aP'l)aratus of the
Czecbo·Slovak state. Many non-CZech politiclana, statesmen, hlstorlans
and writers succumbed to lt. Among them were some who repudlated
the concept ot a "common state," but still thought that the Slovaks
and Czechs were, nevertheless, "two very closely related" nations.
Among the factors which dec!de the Individuality of a nation, we
find: the natural framework within which a nation Ilves, lts racia!
composltlon, language, cultural !nfluences, llterature, rellglous develop.
ment, social structure, economlc relations, etc. Now, how "very close-Jy related" are the Slovaks and the Czechs?
IN THE BEGINNING THERE WERE TWO NATIONS
The Slovaks and Czechs already at the beginnlng ot the!r recorded
hlstor!es were not members of one natlon, or a common polltlcal
state, as most Czech pol!tlcians, hlstorlans an<l writers - and many
unlnformed non-Czech commE\lltators, writers, hlstor!ans and polit!·
cians, lnfluenced by or in tbe pay ot Czech propaganda - would
have the world believe. There !s nothlng in recorded blstory to ind!·
cate that the Slovaks and tbe Cze-cbs dld not go separate ways. Thls
hlstorlcal fact was upheld even by sueh a typlcal representatlve ot
pol!tlcal and cultural "Czechoslovaklsm" as Dr. K. Krofta (Tchéques
et Slovaques jusqu' á leur union polltlque," in the LE MONDE SLAVE,
March·April, 1933, pg. 2).
Chronlclers of the nlntb and tenth centurles clearly dlstlngulshed
betwen the two natlons. Paul J. Šafárlk clted many examples to prove
thls point In hls "Slawlsche Alterttimer" (Vo!. 2, pages 208, 458, 493).
Tbe dlt!erentatlon between the Slovaks and tbe Czecbs, however, be•
�SLO:YAKIA
69
gan a Jong tíme ,be!ore that. 1t already began In their ancient, prehlstorlc, common Slovanic homeland. Later, In their new homelands, the
indlvJduallty of both natloM became more pronounced.
NATURE SEPARATED THEM
The Slovak.s are a natlon whose core lives in mountains and
hllls, whereas the c ore of the Czech people lnhabits plains. And molllltains and hllls generaJly breed an altogether d<ifferent type of man,
psychologically and even physically, than do the Jowlands. Rivers of
Czech lands empty lnto the North Sea, whereas the rlvers of Slovaltia, w1th ihe exceptlon of the Dunajec, flow lnto the Black Sea. Wlth
the rlV'ers even Slovak !ife gravitated In a d.ifferent directlon from
the llfe of úhe Czech nation. The Czech lands, on the one hand, and
the Slovak lands, on the other, represent two very distlnct geographical environments, which tended to create two dlstlnct national in•
dividualltles. In some Czech propaganda publlcations deslgned for the
Engllsh-speaking world, it ls even admitted that after one crosses the
Czech border lnto Slovakla "we have the impresslon that we have
come to a different world. Nature ls different and the people, too, ls
dlstinctly drnferent" (J. Czeoh-J. E. Mellon: "Czechoslovakla, Land
of Dream and Enterprise," pg, 132).
lf nothing else but nature separated the Slovaks from the Czechs,
it undoubtedly would suffice to create and to preserve the dlstlnctly
;;,pecial lndlvlduality of the Slovak natlon. But the Slovaks were un!lke the Czechs In other respects as well.
RACIAL COMPOSITION SEPARATE D THEM
T•he Czech natlon, surrounded on three sldes as it !s by the German world, undoubtedly was open to racia! lnfluences of tha,t world.
T he racia! structure of the Slovaks, on the other hand, was lnfluenced
to some extent not only by the Germans, but also by the Slovanlc
nat!ons (Poles, Ruthenes, Czechs) and -the U ralo-Alta:!c Magyars,
A vars, Pechengs, Cumans, Turks, etc.
The Avars ruled over the !and of the Slovaks almost 250 years
(to bhe end of the 8th century) and, hence, certainly must have had
s ome influence on the racia} structure of t-he Slovak popula,t!on, held
in bondage. And hlstory tells u.s, too, that the Slovaks llved In a com•
mon poli-tlcal state wlth the Magyars over 900 yeans; and close to the
Turks, when they conquered most of Hungary, for some 150 years.
And we know that the Poles ruled the Spiš reg.ion of Slovakla from
1412 to 1772. The racia! structure of the Czechs was not affected by
the.se lnfluences.
Hence, we are lnclined to agree with Podhradszky that raclal
composltlon "sharply separates the Slovaks from all the nelghborlng
nations and In a special manner deflnes thelr place among all other
natlons of the unlverse" ( A t6toklata feldold politikai és kultúrgeo1
gráflája, pg. 53).
THEY SPEAK DIFFERENT LANGUAGES
Professor Louis Novák once wrote that the Slovak language was
a "very ancient" llngual formatlon, one "whlch has had an orlglnal
and independent evolutlon, Quite dlfferent from the Czech langua.ge."
And he added that "the language ot centra! Slovakla today 1s the
�60
SLOVAKIA
direct organic contlnuation of the older centra! Slovak tongue, whlch
in turn was the direct organlc con-tinuation o[ the respective pre-Slovanlc dialect" (Jazykovedné glosy k čsl. otázke, pg. 89).
Pro[essor Henrich Bartek, noted Slovak philologist who ma.de an
t'xhaustlve study of the Slovak and Czech languages, concluded that
•·the Slovak language in many of its aspects had a different evolution
than the Czech language and this fact guarantees it an independent
place in the family of Slovanic languages" ( Príspevok k dejinám
slovenčiny, pg. 117).
'l'he diHerences between the Slovak and Czech languages are
greater than most people are aware of, especially people who have
been confounded by Ozech propaganda, Czech schools and books. The
Czech language belongs to the group of languages which have a preponderance of the higher vowels, and 1-t has sounds or vocala whlch
are not to be found in Slovak. On the oúher hand, we flnd various
vocals In Slovak that are foreign to the Czech tongue. The Slovak employs an abundance of diphthongs, while the Czech has only a few.
The centra) dialect of Slovakia, the basis of llterary Slovak, has only
one declenslon of adjectives, while the Czech has three. 'l'hey also
d.tffer greatly in the matter of inflectlon of nouns and verbs. Rules
of acc811t, syllable formation, rhythm, composition and syntax, and
word formation are also different. The languages are dlfferent lexically, too. Miroslav Kálal, Czech lexicograpber, collected over 35,000
words in three years for hls differential dictionary whlch are not
found In Czech, or which have an entirely different meaning ťha.n the
corresponding Slovak words. 'l'he language ques'lion has been doolt
with in great detail by Trnovský; if the reader is interested he mlght
consult bis work "K rečovej otázke Slovákov" - especially pages
126-157 (published by the "Spolok sv. Vojtecha," Trnava, 1937).
Little wonder then that M. Sečenský wrote a book (about 1700)
for Slovaks "llving In Hungary" who wanted to learn Czech. The
book, called "Swétlonos Cžeský," would teaoh talented and industrlous
Slovaks how to read Czech correctly in a week and eventually how to
dlst!nguish between words and ,nite correctly in Czech. Thls also
proves that the Czecb language was a foreign language to Slovaks,
wbo had to learn lt just as any other forelgn language, if they wanted
to acqulre the use of lt.
But even lf the Slovaks did speak the same language as the
Czechs, would that be a valid argument for ~he formatlon of a "Czechoslovak" natlon, ethnically speaklng? Certainly not. And it is less
valid as an argument for a joint state lJfe. We have German-speaklng
Sw!ss, French-speaking Belgians, Engllsh.,speaklng Irlsh, South Americans speaking Spanish and Portuguese. When books are written in
the same language, tbey often belong to dlstlnct llteratures. And the
Slovaks are indlsput.ably distinct from tbe Czechs wibh thelr Independent
Slovak llterature, whlch is the expre,ssion of Slovak cultural individuality.
THE PAST SEPARATES THEM
The Slovaks and Czechs neve-r formed a joint state up to 1918.
True, Svätopluk annexed the Czecb lamds to tbe Slovak state and held
them a few years, but these were politlcally completely autonomous
under their own Czech princes. History tells us, too, tbat •the Czechs
used the first opportunity that came thefr way to break away from the
Slovak state with the help of tbe Germans. Whlle the Czechs l!ved in
�SLOVAKIA
61
the broad framework of the German empire, "the Roman Empi•re of
the German nation," that is witl1in the framework of the Austrian
Erop,ire, the Slovaks on the other hand, were within the framework
of the Hungarian empire. T•hese were two distinct worlds, which could
not remaln wil!hout influence on the political thought, cultural development, economlc cond,i tlons and social status of both these natlons.
"We Czechs know well," wrote the "Narodní Listy" {Nationa l
~ews) at the end of the last centUľY, "that even the strongest movement, wh1ch stlrred our na,tion in all Czech lands from the lowest
to <the hlghest strata, was halted at the Hungarian border. The entire
past does not show even a single example that a,t home in Bohemia
{Czechia), or again in Slovak-ia, t.here was evldent any desire for a
political union of the Czechs and Slovaks, not even at the tlme when
the Czech kindom was independen,t and the Czech na,tion the ruling
element in it."
The economic history of Slovakia was altogether different from
that of the Cz.ech lands. W,hlle in l!he Cz.eoh lands, under the lnfluence of the indus,trlalization policy of the Habsburgs, capitallstic forms
of economy b egan to talke root comparatively very early, In Slovakia
the conserva,tive nobility, with the aid of the dominant posltion l<t
held in the Hungarian s,tate, successfully defended feudalism until the
middle of the nineteen,th century. In Czech Jands, capitallsm could
thus begin muoh sooner to form t,he Czech person. while In Slovakia
Lhe Slovak person still lived a long time back and worked and was
influenced by the economic forms of feudalism. To thls very day •there
have been preserved in the Slovaks and Czechs distinct traces of thls
1•ar!ed economic development.
CZECH ORIENTATION SEPARATES THEM
While the Czechs lived primarily under the cultural influence of
the German world and looked out into the world through t,he medium
of German windows, the Slovaks Jlved in an entirely different cultural environment. Medieval Hungary .gravltated more towards fäe
culture of the Italian peninsula, to Roman culture. Besides that, Hungary on its southern and eastern borders was in contact w!th the culture of the Byzanit:ine,Slovanic world, Into all thls came the cult ure
of an Aslatic nation w!tb its own particular flavor: the culture of
tbe Magyar nation. F. Wollman, a Czech univers!,ty professor, pointed
to the intenslty of Roman cultural influences on the '81ovaks. According to -bim, the Slovaks are In substance slmilarly Romanized as the
Poles are. Wbile the Czechs represent a ty.pe of culture common to
Germanlzed Slovana {'81avs), the Slovaks are a type of Romanized Slovana ("Východ, východnosť, východnictví," in Nová Svoboda, Feb.
20, 1924).
RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS SEPARATE THEM
While the Czech religious organizations were influenced by the
German world, the Slovaks were in direct contact wlth Roman Christian!ty. While Huss'.itism, Protestantism and the Czedh Brethren Jeft
deep traces in Czech religlous hlstory, the rellgious development of
the Slovaks went in an entirely different d irect!on. It 1s very slgniflcant and most ,highly characterlstlc that Hu.ssltism, which ls perhaps
the mos,t marked manifestat!on of Czech religious development, and
one w·hloh took hold to some extent In southern Hungary, malnly
�SLOVAKIA
among 1:he Rumanlans, evoked practlcally no response in the Slovaks,
as wa.s demonstrated by Prof. Varsik in hls book " Husiti a reformácia na Slovensku" (Tbe Hussites and the Reformatlon In Slovak.ia) .
Similarly -the movement of the so-called "Czechoslovak Chureh, ' whlch
cost Czech Cathollclsm over a million souls, remained completely wlthout response In Slovakla. The national "Czechoslovak" churoh was
strictly a Czech enterprise with notihing Slovak about it. The name,
of course, was meant to confuse the little-informed and deceive the
world in general. This holds for practically all things called "Czechoslovak."
Whlle in Bohemia, In 1930, over 10 per cent or the populatlon
was wlthout any religlous fa:lth, In Slovakia only 0.51 per cent belonged ,to that category - and tlie greatest part of this was made up
of lmmigrant Czech officials, soldiers and police. Indlrectly, the dlsUnctness of rellgious traditions is also shown by the dJstln ct stand
taken by the Czech collecUve toward Communism: the Czechs are
less negative towards Jt than are the Slovaks.
SOCIAL STRUCTURE SEPARATES THEM
While in Czechia, In 1921, only 29 per cent of the lnhab itants
was engaged in agriculture, in Slovalda 60 per cent of the inhab itants
belonged to that category. In Czechia 46 per cent of the lnhabltants
lived from industry and buslness, In Slovakia only 21 per cent. It 1s
not necessary to stress that people and natlons living from agriculture,
represent an altogetber different type of person and natlon tban
peoples and nations engaged In buslness and industry.
The varied social and economlc struoture of both these natlons
and countries appears In other rubrics of statls-tics. The denslty
ot the population in Bobemla 1s about 128 lnhabitanots per .square
kilometer, while in Slovakia lt is only 62. The biological potentlal 1s
different also: Jn 1932, 17.10 Jlving chlldren were bom for each
1000 Czechs In Bobemia, whlle in Slovakla 28.46 Slovak children were
born. The Czechs belong to the group of biologically very weak
nations, whlle the Slovaks be long to -the group of nations which are
biologically strong. Whlle a large part of the Czech nation llves in
small towns, the core of the Slovak nation lives in vlllages. Tbe
dominant Czech type 1s the small4.owner and industria) worker, whlle
the Slovak type is tbe agrlculturlst.
ŠVEJK V ERSUS JÁNOŠÍK
These actualitles engraved their own deep traces on booth natlon.s.
Il dld not happen by chance that the ratlonal, materialistlc, calculatlng "small Czech fellow" found adequate expression for the most
popular of his own people's hero In the figure of tbe legendary "good
soldler "Švejk" (Shveyk). We find nothlng llke bim wltb. the Slo•
va.ks, wbose most typical and most popular type of people's hero 1s
tb& rebel Jánošík (Yabnowsheek), tbe romantlc, ldea!ISltlc, magnanimous and herolc Slovak Robin Hood.
švejk flghts against Austrian begemony wltb a hunched ba.ek,
wi-tb cunning and stealth, petty "sabotage." and wlth polsonous
needles. Jánošik. on the other hand, goes lnto the mountalns, flghts
herolcally and rallles the people untll he dles for bis idea!. Švejk
�63
and J áno!!lk stand agalnst each other as two absolutely distlnct,
special tlgures of popu\ar "reslslance" types of two absolutely dlslinot natlonal indlvlduallties.
TWO DISTIN CT WORLD S
There !s no doubt that the Slovak and Czech worlds are two
substantlally dlstlnct worlds. "SlovakJa !s a component part of our
Republlc," wrote the Czech newspaperma n Václav Kapllcký in the
"Svobodný Zlti'ek" (Free Tomorrow) of July 24, 1947, "but it ls,
nevertheless, still forelgn to us, unkuown; a dlfferent people llves
there and there are there altogebher d!fferent condltlons of !1fe
than In our country."
Slmllarly, the French unlverslty professor Ancel, after a stay in
Slovakla, declared that "the vila! form.s of the Slovak.s are just as
dlstinct trom Czech llfe as they are from Magyar llfe" ( Lea frontierea slovaquea, pg. 28). A Swiss corresponden t, after studylng Jlfe
In Slova.kla, wrote: "Only 800 kilometera separate Bratislava from
Prague, but arrlvlng In Slovakia, you meet wlth the sounds of a dlfrerent language, a dlfferent ma.nner of llfe, a different manner of
thlnklog, a dlfferent po\ltlcal atmosphere" (Journal de Geneve, Sep.
tember 30, 1947).
Today the Slova.ks and Czechs are more dlstant trom and more
allen to each other than they were a thousand years ago, or than
they were even In 1938. And as tlme goes on, these natlonal lndivlduallsts wlll be even more pronounced. Thls statement 1s based on
the self-evldent soclologlcal development, whlch no one wlll be able
to stop or alter. It wlll go on whetber any one likes lt or not. The
so-called "<:zechO&lovaks," together wlth thelr Czeoh masters, are
effect1vely speedlng thls process wlth thelr limited, short-slghted, un•
realistlc pollcy. Once hi.Story undoubtedly wlll prove thls convlnclngly.
We bave mentloned only tbe most Jmportaut actuaJltles, whlch
&cted together ln tbe dlfferent formatlon of the Slovak nation anu
the Czeoh natlon. Tbe narrow tramework ot this perlodlcal does not
al\ow us to go lnto more detail. But the tact.s presented clearly lndlcate that the expresslcm referrlng to the Slovaks and Czechs as
"two very closely related natlons" slmply wlll not stand up under the
cr1tlcal eye of sclentlflc analysls. Conversely, it ls very strlklng that
these two nelghborlng natlons have so llttle In common.
TWO DIFFERENT MI SSIONS
Not only tbe past and present separate the S\ovaks and Czechs,
but the tuture as well. The mlsslon of the Slovak natlon 1s In substance altogether dlfferent from that of the Czech natlon. The geo1>olltlcal tunotlon of Slovakla ls dlstinct !rom the runctlon of the
Czech lands. Wblle Slova.kla occuples the centra] locatlon In the
defense o! the Central-Euro pean area, Czech terrltory occuples the
border posltlon. Wblle the Czech lands have a defenslve role agal nst
the pressure o! the German world In the Danube, Basin, Slova.kla la
supposed to ,bave a coordlnatlng role, and that not only toward
German pressure, but even toward lncldental Russlan pressure.
After the flrst World War the vlctorlous power.s gave SlovakJa
the role to be "a support or the Czechs agalnst German pressure.
�64
SLOVAKIA.
This conceptlon proved to be !neffective. T he Danube Basin, or
Centra! E urope, can be defended only with joint forces. And that !.s
possible only when Slovakia wlll not be the cause of any CzechoMagyar or Czecho-Polis h antagonis ms. That will be so only wh en
Slovakia is independent. The n s he will be able to fuJflll the function
of a consolidating and coord!natlng factor in the pol!t!cal atmosphere
of Centra! Europe.
•
•
•
WHO SAI D IT?
"It is difficul t, nay right impossible, in a short artlcle to no te even
in slogan for m the things that are connected with h istor!c November 7, 1947, for the USSR, for us, for Europe, for the whole cultural
world. But one thlng can be expre ssed and interpreted fully. And
th at is the sincere, deep hearty and undying gratitude of all Czechs
a nd Slova ks t o the Soviet Union, to its people, to its Army and to it s
s kipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everyth ing they ha ve done and
sti ll are doing for us. It is an unfalsified, selfless and clean feeling
of friendshlp and sympathy, which we have for this great country
that is so close to us and !s our ne!ghbor. l t is a pur e joy from the
,oys, the su ccesses and the progress of the USSR; !t !s the lnflexible
hope that Slavdom, in its own new perception, w ill assure for itself
and the world the deserved peace, in wh!ch all nations shall live a ccording to their manner, freely, without fears, democratically and w!th
dign!ty, as well as in understanding, prosperity and happiness. In this
s pirit, from my so ul I greet the jubileeing USSR, and congratulate lt
from my heart for the results attained in peace and war. 1 wlsh it to
continue to prosper, grow and become m ightier unto its own greatness, but a lso for the we lfa re of al l humanity. Long live the Soviet
Un io n, and may its leader and ski pper, J . V. Stalin, live in fu ll health
to see many more jubilees !" - (Dr. J oseph Lettrich, Pres!dent of the
Slovak Democratic Party and the Slovak National Counc!I; ÔAS,
~ovember 7, 1947.)
•
•
•
•
•
•
" Czechoslovakia a nd th e Uni on of Soviet Socialist Repub lics
have united in the midst of fire a nd b lood - thls a lliance, the refore,
is for eternity, as love and friendsh ip proven in affliction._,___, We are
aware of th e fact that the USSR could sti ll exist w lthout us, but our
free State certainly cou ld not exist without th e USS R .. .. Long live
the victorlous Soviet Army ! Long live its Supreme Commande r, Gene ral issimo Stali n ! Long live the li berator of Bratislava, Marshal Ma•
(ÔAS, the off!cial organ of Lettr!ch's Democratlc
linovský !" Party. Apr!I 4. 19-17 '
"In parl!ament on November 7, 1935, when I spoke a bout the international sltuatlon, I s aid that it was my deep conviction that our
contacts w ith t he Soviet Un io n shall be good and lasting, that Soviet
Rus sia wi ll again beco me a powe rful Slova nic factor, a nd as the most
powerfu l S lova n ic fact or would bri ng S lavdom muc h good. We are not
c hang ing our stand - a nd th is is the permanent sta nd of the Demo(John U rsi ny, Vice-Premier of Czecho-Slovakla and
c rati c Party." Vice-President of tbe Democ ratlr P arty. in Bratislava. February 22.
1947, according to ÔAS. offlclal orga n of tbe SDP, February 27, 1947.)
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
58
SLOVA:KIA
ARE TIIE SWVAKS AND CZECHS
TWO "CWSELY RELATED'' NATIONS?
DR. A . GRÉBERT
Official propaganda of all Czech governments trom 1918 to 1938
(the era of T. G. Masaryk and Edward Beneš) stated cat&gorically
that the Slovaks and the Czechs were "two very closely related" na·
tiona. We say "Czech" governments advlsedly, because the Slovaks
had llttle or no lnfluence In them; the wm o! the Slovak natlon was
totally lgnored when lt came to policy and natlonal and lnternatlonal
relationships. The "Czecho-Slovak" (wlth or wlthout the hyphen) admlnlstrations during that tlme were in reality "Czech" admlnlstratlons; "Czecho-Slovak" government was In fact a "Czech" govern·
ment. Even the national "Czechoslovak" church was strlctly a "Czech"
en terprise.
During and immedlately after World War I, T. G. Masary'k and
Edward Beneš had to offer some "loglcal" reasons for the creation
of a joint political stalte for the Czechs and the Slovaks, because
Presldent Wllson had insisted on the appllcation of the democratlc
principle of the right of self-determinatlon to all natlons. So. T. G.
Masaryk and Beneš set out to prove that the Slov,aks really were not
a distinct nation, but only a branch of the Czech natlon, and that the
Slovak language was but a dialect of the Czech language. 'l'he CzechoSlovak Republlc was bom of th'!s "big Ile" In 1918. Slnce that tlme, the
"big !ie" was promoted constantly by the propaganda aP'l)aratus of the
Czecbo·Slovak state. Many non-CZech politiclana, statesmen, hlstorlans
and writers succumbed to lt. Among them were some who repudlated
the concept ot a "common state," but still thought that the Slovaks
and Czechs were, nevertheless, "two very closely related" nations.
Among the factors which dec!de the Individuality of a nation, we
find: the natural framework within which a nation Ilves, lts racia!
composltlon, language, cultural !nfluences, llterature, rellglous develop.
ment, social structure, economlc relations, etc. Now, how "very close-Jy related" are the Slovaks and the Czechs?
IN THE BEGINNING THERE WERE TWO NATIONS
The Slovaks and Czechs already at the beginnlng ot the!r recorded
hlstor!es were not members of one natlon, or a common polltlcal
state, as most Czech pol!tlcians, hlstorlans an<l writers - and many
unlnformed non-Czech commE\lltators, writers, hlstor!ans and polit!·
cians, lnfluenced by or in tbe pay ot Czech propaganda - would
have the world believe. There !s nothlng in recorded blstory to ind!·
cate that the Slovaks and tbe Cze-cbs dld not go separate ways. Thls
hlstorlcal fact was upheld even by sueh a typlcal representatlve ot
pol!tlcal and cultural "Czechoslovaklsm" as Dr. K. Krofta (Tchéques
et Slovaques jusqu' á leur union polltlque," in the LE MONDE SLAVE,
March·April, 1933, pg. 2).
Chronlclers of the nlntb and tenth centurles clearly dlstlngulshed
betwen the two natlons. Paul J. Šafárlk clted many examples to prove
thls point In hls "Slawlsche Alterttimer" (Vo!. 2, pages 208, 458, 493).
Tbe dlt!erentatlon between the Slovaks and tbe Czecbs, however, be•
SLO:YAKIA
69
gan a Jong tíme ,be!ore that. 1t already began In their ancient, prehlstorlc, common Slovanic homeland. Later, In their new homelands, the
indlvJduallty of both natloM became more pronounced.
NATURE SEPARATED THEM
The Slovak.s are a natlon whose core lives in mountains and
hllls, whereas the c ore of the Czech people lnhabits plains. And molllltains and hllls generaJly breed an altogether d<ifferent type of man,
psychologically and even physically, than do the Jowlands. Rivers of
Czech lands empty lnto the North Sea, whereas the rlvers of Slovaltia, w1th ihe exceptlon of the Dunajec, flow lnto the Black Sea. Wlth
the rlV'ers even Slovak !ife gravitated In a d.ifferent directlon from
the llfe of úhe Czech nation. The Czech lands, on the one hand, and
the Slovak lands, on the other, represent two very distlnct geographical environments, which tended to create two dlstlnct national in•
dividualltles. In some Czech propaganda publlcations deslgned for the
Engllsh-speaking world, it ls even admitted that after one crosses the
Czech border lnto Slovakla "we have the impresslon that we have
come to a different world. Nature ls different and the people, too, ls
dlstinctly drnferent" (J. Czeoh-J. E. Mellon: "Czechoslovakla, Land
of Dream and Enterprise," pg, 132).
lf nothing else but nature separated the Slovaks from the Czechs,
it undoubtedly would suffice to create and to preserve the dlstlnctly
;;,pecial lndlvlduality of the Slovak natlon. But the Slovaks were un!lke the Czechs In other respects as well.
RACIAL COMPOSITION SEPARATE D THEM
T•he Czech natlon, surrounded on three sldes as it !s by the German world, undoubtedly was open to racia! lnfluences of tha,t world.
T he racia! structure of the Slovaks, on the other hand, was lnfluenced
to some extent not only by the Germans, but also by the Slovanlc
nat!ons (Poles, Ruthenes, Czechs) and -the U ralo-Alta:!c Magyars,
A vars, Pechengs, Cumans, Turks, etc.
The Avars ruled over the !and of the Slovaks almost 250 years
(to bhe end of the 8th century) and, hence, certainly must have had
s ome influence on the racia} structure of t-he Slovak popula,t!on, held
in bondage. And hlstory tells u.s, too, that the Slovaks llved In a com•
mon poli-tlcal state wlth the Magyars over 900 yeans; and close to the
Turks, when they conquered most of Hungary, for some 150 years.
And we know that the Poles ruled the Spiš reg.ion of Slovakla from
1412 to 1772. The racia! structure of the Czechs was not affected by
the.se lnfluences.
Hence, we are lnclined to agree with Podhradszky that raclal
composltlon "sharply separates the Slovaks from all the nelghborlng
nations and In a special manner deflnes thelr place among all other
natlons of the unlverse" ( A t6toklata feldold politikai és kultúrgeo1
gráflája, pg. 53).
THEY SPEAK DIFFERENT LANGUAGES
Professor Louis Novák once wrote that the Slovak language was
a "very ancient" llngual formatlon, one "whlch has had an orlglnal
and independent evolutlon, Quite dlfferent from the Czech langua.ge."
And he added that "the language ot centra! Slovakla today 1s the
60
SLOVAKIA
direct organic contlnuation of the older centra! Slovak tongue, whlch
in turn was the direct organlc con-tinuation o[ the respective pre-Slovanlc dialect" (Jazykovedné glosy k čsl. otázke, pg. 89).
Pro[essor Henrich Bartek, noted Slovak philologist who ma.de an
t'xhaustlve study of the Slovak and Czech languages, concluded that
•·the Slovak language in many of its aspects had a different evolution
than the Czech language and this fact guarantees it an independent
place in the family of Slovanic languages" ( Príspevok k dejinám
slovenčiny, pg. 117).
'l'he diHerences between the Slovak and Czech languages are
greater than most people are aware of, especially people who have
been confounded by Ozech propaganda, Czech schools and books. The
Czech language belongs to the group of languages which have a preponderance of the higher vowels, and 1-t has sounds or vocala whlch
are not to be found in Slovak. On the oúher hand, we flnd various
vocals In Slovak that are foreign to the Czech tongue. The Slovak employs an abundance of diphthongs, while the Czech has only a few.
The centra) dialect of Slovakia, the basis of llterary Slovak, has only
one declenslon of adjectives, while the Czech has three. 'l'hey also
d.tffer greatly in the matter of inflectlon of nouns and verbs. Rules
of acc811t, syllable formation, rhythm, composition and syntax, and
word formation are also different. The languages are dlfferent lexically, too. Miroslav Kálal, Czech lexicograpber, collected over 35,000
words in three years for hls differential dictionary whlch are not
found In Czech, or which have an entirely different meaning ťha.n the
corresponding Slovak words. 'l'he language ques'lion has been doolt
with in great detail by Trnovský; if the reader is interested he mlght
consult bis work "K rečovej otázke Slovákov" - especially pages
126-157 (published by the "Spolok sv. Vojtecha," Trnava, 1937).
Little wonder then that M. Sečenský wrote a book (about 1700)
for Slovaks "llving In Hungary" who wanted to learn Czech. The
book, called "Swétlonos Cžeský," would teaoh talented and industrlous
Slovaks how to read Czech correctly in a week and eventually how to
dlst!nguish between words and ,nite correctly in Czech. Thls also
proves that the Czecb language was a foreign language to Slovaks,
wbo had to learn lt just as any other forelgn language, if they wanted
to acqulre the use of lt.
But even lf the Slovaks did speak the same language as the
Czechs, would that be a valid argument for ~he formatlon of a "Czechoslovak" natlon, ethnically speaklng? Certainly not. And it is less
valid as an argument for a joint state lJfe. We have German-speaklng
Sw!ss, French-speaking Belgians, Engllsh.,speaklng Irlsh, South Americans speaking Spanish and Portuguese. When books are written in
the same language, tbey often belong to dlstlnct llteratures. And the
Slovaks are indlsput.ably distinct from tbe Czechs wibh thelr Independent
Slovak llterature, whlch is the expre,ssion of Slovak cultural individuality.
THE PAST SEPARATES THEM
The Slovaks and Czechs neve-r formed a joint state up to 1918.
True, Svätopluk annexed the Czecb lamds to tbe Slovak state and held
them a few years, but these were politlcally completely autonomous
under their own Czech princes. History tells us, too, tbat •the Czechs
used the first opportunity that came thefr way to break away from the
Slovak state with the help of tbe Germans. Whlle the Czechs l!ved in
SLOVAKIA
61
the broad framework of the German empire, "the Roman Empi•re of
the German nation," that is witl1in the framework of the Austrian
Erop,ire, the Slovaks on the other hand, were within the framework
of the Hungarian empire. T•hese were two distinct worlds, which could
not remaln wil!hout influence on the political thought, cultural development, economlc cond,i tlons and social status of both these natlons.
"We Czechs know well," wrote the "Narodní Listy" {Nationa l
~ews) at the end of the last centUľY, "that even the strongest movement, wh1ch stlrred our na,tion in all Czech lands from the lowest
to <the hlghest strata, was halted at the Hungarian border. The entire
past does not show even a single example that a,t home in Bohemia
{Czechia), or again in Slovak-ia, t.here was evldent any desire for a
political union of the Czechs and Slovaks, not even at the tlme when
the Czech kindom was independen,t and the Czech na,tion the ruling
element in it."
The economic history of Slovakia was altogether different from
that of the Cz.ech lands. W,hlle in l!he Cz.eoh lands, under the lnfluence of the indus,trlalization policy of the Habsburgs, capitallstic forms
of economy b egan to talke root comparatively very early, In Slovakia
the conserva,tive nobility, with the aid of the dominant posltion l<t
held in the Hungarian s,tate, successfully defended feudalism until the
middle of the nineteen,th century. In Czech Jands, capitallsm could
thus begin muoh sooner to form t,he Czech person. while In Slovakia
Lhe Slovak person still lived a long time back and worked and was
influenced by the economic forms of feudalism. To thls very day •there
have been preserved in the Slovaks and Czechs distinct traces of thls
1•ar!ed economic development.
CZECH ORIENTATION SEPARATES THEM
While the Czechs lived primarily under the cultural influence of
the German world and looked out into the world through t,he medium
of German windows, the Slovaks Jlved in an entirely different cultural environment. Medieval Hungary .gravltated more towards fäe
culture of the Italian peninsula, to Roman culture. Besides that, Hungary on its southern and eastern borders was in contact w!th the culture of the Byzanit:ine,Slovanic world, Into all thls came the cult ure
of an Aslatic nation w!tb its own particular flavor: the culture of
tbe Magyar nation. F. Wollman, a Czech univers!,ty professor, pointed
to the intenslty of Roman cultural influences on the '81ovaks. According to -bim, the Slovaks are In substance slmilarly Romanized as the
Poles are. Wbile the Czechs represent a ty.pe of culture common to
Germanlzed Slovana {'81avs), the Slovaks are a type of Romanized Slovana ("Východ, východnosť, východnictví," in Nová Svoboda, Feb.
20, 1924).
RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS SEPARATE THEM
While the Czech religious organizations were influenced by the
German world, the Slovaks were in direct contact wlth Roman Christian!ty. While Huss'.itism, Protestantism and the Czedh Brethren Jeft
deep traces in Czech religlous hlstory, the rellgious development of
the Slovaks went in an entirely different d irect!on. It 1s very slgniflcant and most ,highly characterlstlc that Hu.ssltism, which ls perhaps
the mos,t marked manifestat!on of Czech religious development, and
one w·hloh took hold to some extent In southern Hungary, malnly
SLOVAKIA
among 1:he Rumanlans, evoked practlcally no response in the Slovaks,
as wa.s demonstrated by Prof. Varsik in hls book " Husiti a reformácia na Slovensku" (Tbe Hussites and the Reformatlon In Slovak.ia) .
Similarly -the movement of the so-called "Czechoslovak Chureh, ' whlch
cost Czech Cathollclsm over a million souls, remained completely wlthout response In Slovakla. The national "Czechoslovak" churoh was
strictly a Czech enterprise with notihing Slovak about it. The name,
of course, was meant to confuse the little-informed and deceive the
world in general. This holds for practically all things called "Czechoslovak."
Whlle in Bohemia, In 1930, over 10 per cent or the populatlon
was wlthout any religlous fa:lth, In Slovakia only 0.51 per cent belonged ,to that category - and tlie greatest part of this was made up
of lmmigrant Czech officials, soldiers and police. Indlrectly, the dlsUnctness of rellgious traditions is also shown by the dJstln ct stand
taken by the Czech collecUve toward Communism: the Czechs are
less negative towards Jt than are the Slovaks.
SOCIAL STRUCTURE SEPARATES THEM
While in Czechia, In 1921, only 29 per cent of the lnhab itants
was engaged in agriculture, in Slovalda 60 per cent of the inhab itants
belonged to that category. In Czechia 46 per cent of the lnhabltants
lived from industry and buslness, In Slovakia only 21 per cent. It 1s
not necessary to stress that people and natlons living from agriculture,
represent an altogetber different type of person and natlon tban
peoples and nations engaged In buslness and industry.
The varied social and economlc struoture of both these natlons
and countries appears In other rubrics of statls-tics. The denslty
ot the population in Bobemla 1s about 128 lnhabitanots per .square
kilometer, while in Slovakia lt is only 62. The biological potentlal 1s
different also: Jn 1932, 17.10 Jlving chlldren were bom for each
1000 Czechs In Bobemia, whlle in Slovakla 28.46 Slovak children were
born. The Czechs belong to the group of biologically very weak
nations, whlle the Slovaks be long to -the group of nations which are
biologically strong. Whlle a large part of the Czech nation llves in
small towns, the core of the Slovak nation lives in vlllages. Tbe
dominant Czech type 1s the small4.owner and industria) worker, whlle
the Slovak type is tbe agrlculturlst.
ŠVEJK V ERSUS JÁNOŠÍK
These actualitles engraved their own deep traces on booth natlon.s.
Il dld not happen by chance that the ratlonal, materialistlc, calculatlng "small Czech fellow" found adequate expression for the most
popular of his own people's hero In the figure of tbe legendary "good
soldler "Švejk" (Shveyk). We find nothlng llke bim wltb. the Slo•
va.ks, wbose most typical and most popular type of people's hero 1s
tb& rebel Jánošík (Yabnowsheek), tbe romantlc, ldea!ISltlc, magnanimous and herolc Slovak Robin Hood.
švejk flghts against Austrian begemony wltb a hunched ba.ek,
wi-tb cunning and stealth, petty "sabotage." and wlth polsonous
needles. Jánošik. on the other hand, goes lnto the mountalns, flghts
herolcally and rallles the people untll he dles for bis idea!. Švejk
63
and J áno!!lk stand agalnst each other as two absolutely distlnct,
special tlgures of popu\ar "reslslance" types of two absolutely dlslinot natlonal indlvlduallties.
TWO DISTIN CT WORLD S
There !s no doubt that the Slovak and Czech worlds are two
substantlally dlstlnct worlds. "SlovakJa !s a component part of our
Republlc," wrote the Czech newspaperma n Václav Kapllcký in the
"Svobodný Zlti'ek" (Free Tomorrow) of July 24, 1947, "but it ls,
nevertheless, still forelgn to us, unkuown; a dlfferent people llves
there and there are there altogebher d!fferent condltlons of !1fe
than In our country."
Slmllarly, the French unlverslty professor Ancel, after a stay in
Slovakla, declared that "the vila! form.s of the Slovak.s are just as
dlstinct trom Czech llfe as they are from Magyar llfe" ( Lea frontierea slovaquea, pg. 28). A Swiss corresponden t, after studylng Jlfe
In Slova.kla, wrote: "Only 800 kilometera separate Bratislava from
Prague, but arrlvlng In Slovakia, you meet wlth the sounds of a dlfrerent language, a dlfferent ma.nner of llfe, a different manner of
thlnklog, a dlfferent po\ltlcal atmosphere" (Journal de Geneve, Sep.
tember 30, 1947).
Today the Slova.ks and Czechs are more dlstant trom and more
allen to each other than they were a thousand years ago, or than
they were even In 1938. And as tlme goes on, these natlonal lndivlduallsts wlll be even more pronounced. Thls statement 1s based on
the self-evldent soclologlcal development, whlch no one wlll be able
to stop or alter. It wlll go on whetber any one likes lt or not. The
so-called "<:zechO&lovaks," together wlth thelr Czeoh masters, are
effect1vely speedlng thls process wlth thelr limited, short-slghted, un•
realistlc pollcy. Once hi.Story undoubtedly wlll prove thls convlnclngly.
We bave mentloned only tbe most Jmportaut actuaJltles, whlch
&cted together ln tbe dlfferent formatlon of the Slovak nation anu
the Czeoh natlon. Tbe narrow tramework ot this perlodlcal does not
al\ow us to go lnto more detail. But the tact.s presented clearly lndlcate that the expresslcm referrlng to the Slovaks and Czechs as
"two very closely related natlons" slmply wlll not stand up under the
cr1tlcal eye of sclentlflc analysls. Conversely, it ls very strlklng that
these two nelghborlng natlons have so llttle In common.
TWO DIFFERENT MI SSIONS
Not only tbe past and present separate the S\ovaks and Czechs,
but the tuture as well. The mlsslon of the Slovak natlon 1s In substance altogether dlfferent from that of the Czech natlon. The geo1>olltlcal tunotlon of Slovakla ls dlstinct !rom the runctlon of the
Czech lands. Wblle Slova.kla occuples the centra] locatlon In the
defense o! the Central-Euro pean area, Czech terrltory occuples the
border posltlon. Wblle the Czech lands have a defenslve role agal nst
the pressure o! the German world In the Danube, Basin, Slova.kla la
supposed to ,bave a coordlnatlng role, and that not only toward
German pressure, but even toward lncldental Russlan pressure.
After the flrst World War the vlctorlous power.s gave SlovakJa
the role to be "a support or the Czechs agalnst German pressure.
64
SLOVAKIA.
This conceptlon proved to be !neffective. T he Danube Basin, or
Centra! E urope, can be defended only with joint forces. And that !.s
possible only when Slovakia wlll not be the cause of any CzechoMagyar or Czecho-Polis h antagonis ms. That will be so only wh en
Slovakia is independent. The n s he will be able to fuJflll the function
of a consolidating and coord!natlng factor in the pol!t!cal atmosphere
of Centra! Europe.
•
•
•
WHO SAI D IT?
"It is difficul t, nay right impossible, in a short artlcle to no te even
in slogan for m the things that are connected with h istor!c November 7, 1947, for the USSR, for us, for Europe, for the whole cultural
world. But one thlng can be expre ssed and interpreted fully. And
th at is the sincere, deep hearty and undying gratitude of all Czechs
a nd Slova ks t o the Soviet Union, to its people, to its Army and to it s
s kipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everyth ing they ha ve done and
sti ll are doing for us. It is an unfalsified, selfless and clean feeling
of friendshlp and sympathy, which we have for this great country
that is so close to us and !s our ne!ghbor. l t is a pur e joy from the
,oys, the su ccesses and the progress of the USSR; !t !s the lnflexible
hope that Slavdom, in its own new perception, w ill assure for itself
and the world the deserved peace, in wh!ch all nations shall live a ccording to their manner, freely, without fears, democratically and w!th
dign!ty, as well as in understanding, prosperity and happiness. In this
s pirit, from my so ul I greet the jubileeing USSR, and congratulate lt
from my heart for the results attained in peace and war. 1 wlsh it to
continue to prosper, grow and become m ightier unto its own greatness, but a lso for the we lfa re of al l humanity. Long live the Soviet
Un io n, and may its leader and ski pper, J . V. Stalin, live in fu ll health
to see many more jubilees !" - (Dr. J oseph Lettrich, Pres!dent of the
Slovak Democratic Party and the Slovak National Counc!I; ÔAS,
~ovember 7, 1947.)
•
•
•
•
•
•
" Czechoslovakia a nd th e Uni on of Soviet Socialist Repub lics
have united in the midst of fire a nd b lood - thls a lliance, the refore,
is for eternity, as love and friendsh ip proven in affliction._,___, We are
aware of th e fact that the USSR could sti ll exist w lthout us, but our
free State certainly cou ld not exist without th e USS R .. .. Long live
the victorlous Soviet Army ! Long live its Supreme Commande r, Gene ral issimo Stali n ! Long live the li berator of Bratislava, Marshal Ma•
(ÔAS, the off!cial organ of Lettr!ch's Democratlc
linovský !" Party. Apr!I 4. 19-17 '
"In parl!ament on November 7, 1935, when I spoke a bout the international sltuatlon, I s aid that it was my deep conviction that our
contacts w ith t he Soviet Un io n shall be good and lasting, that Soviet
Rus sia wi ll again beco me a powe rful Slova nic factor, a nd as the most
powerfu l S lova n ic fact or would bri ng S lavdom muc h good. We are not
c hang ing our stand - a nd th is is the permanent sta nd of the Demo(John U rsi ny, Vice-Premier of Czecho-Slovakla and
c rati c Party." Vice-President of tbe Democ ratlr P arty. in Bratislava. February 22.
1947, according to ÔAS. offlclal orga n of tbe SDP, February 27, 1947.)
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Are the Slovaks and Czechs Two "Closely Related" Nations?
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. A. Grébert
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952
pp. 58-64
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Grébert, Arvéd, 1915-2001
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1952
LCNAF+dates
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f6ae8ca91a79ec7fce08f88c521a2e71.pdf
9c9c0537daff002f613c92fa6496f927
PDF Text
Text
62
SLOVAKIA
EDWARD BENEš -
STALIN'S STOOGE
DR. MICHAEL Z IB R IN
Even if we could hear recordings of all the telephone convel'Sat.lons
whioh took place in Prague in 1948 and see all tbe stenograpbl<: protocols of tbe secret conferences of Beneš, Zenkl and Zorin, or tbose
of tbe Czech and Slovak Politburo, many o! us even then would not
have a clear picture of how the Communist putsch of February 1948
could have happened in the Czecho-Slovak Republic.
But tbe fact is that the Commumst putsch of February 1948 did
not happen accidentally. And it did not •happen because Deneš had
deceived the people of bis country, or because the Mlnisters resigned
prematurely and wiťhout agreement. The fact is that the February
1mtsoh of 1948 has old roots. The victory of the Communist,s was the
truit of a Iong, systematlc and relentless activity of the Moscow •Reds
and, we can say, the characterle.ss Ieaders-hlp of "CzeC'hoslovak" politicians and thelr old connections with Moscow and the Communists.
lt is said tbat Moscow seldom undertakes anytbing which lt cannot
s urely and suc cessfu11y finish, i.e., it will not start anyťhlng unless
everytbing ls fully planned and prepared to guarantee success. Time
has always worked in favor of the men of the Kremlin. And so, when
tbe "-CzeC'hoslovak" Ministers lost their heads and resigned, Moscow
gave the word and Stalin's general manager in Czecho-Slovakia, ZORIN.
leaped into ac tlon. Gottwald and bis companions had no trouble at au
In taking over the Government of Czecho-Slovakla.
Looking into the memoirs and wrltings of Dr. Edward Beneš
and Winston Churchill, we flnd that President Beneš betrayed the so·
ca1led anti-Stalin cons plracy of Marshal Tuchačevský and Rlkov in
1937. The betrayal destroyed more than 5000 army offlcers and lntellectuals who opposed Communlsm and wa,nted to put an end to lt.
Beneš writes about the affair in his Memoirs on pages 33-34, and
on page 231 he admlts that it was he who had betrayed what was
'b elng planned agalnst Stalln to the Soviet ambassador in Prague,
Alexander Alexandrovský, Commissar of the hated OGPU, which later
became the NKV.O.
Churchill also wrote about the episode in bis book. Des-crlblng
political events of World War II, Churchill reproaohes Beneš for
bis betrayal of Tu'kaohevský, saylng that thereby Beneš became the
servant of Moscow and the NKVD. During practically every conversat!on with Beneš, Ohurchill returned to the theme of Tukachevský
and reminded bim that he had been taken in by an agent of the
NKVíD and was doing the blddlng of Moscow. With Tukachevský
fell not only the 18 who were convicted, but also about 5000 Russlan officers, offlclals and lntellectuals. And they were destroyed only
because they wanted to do in 1936 what Stalin, Molotov and Litvínov
dld in 1939, tha:t is make a temporary treaty wlth Betilin.
After that ·betrayal in 1937, Dr. Edward Beneš became the lnstrument and agent of ťhe NKVD and served that agency because he was
completely in thelr ,bands. Right there and then was prepared the
way for all the shameful a cts whloh wrote finis to the "regulated
democracy" of Dr. Beneš. The followers of Dr. EdwaTd Beneš, enjoy-
�SLOVAKIA
ing politlical asylum in free America and other democratic countries,
do not llke to talk about thls matter, but even that is quite under·
standable.
From thM ,moment in 1937, w,hen Dr. Edward Beneš - according
to the report of his own ambassador in Berlin, Dr. Mastný - gave the
report of Tukachevský's betrayal to ambassador Alexandrovský in
Pr,ague, he ceased to be a free man and the Calvary of the servant
of Moscow and the NKVD actually began.
·when we consider what Dr. Beneš did from lhat moment on, we
see that he did everything against the will of the western democracies
who already had been shedding their blood several yoars Wben Beneä's
Soviet friend consldered the war with Nazi Germany as a private af•
fair of the capitallst world.
In bis book ".Six Years in Exile," Dr. Edward Beneš expressed
surprise that 'his former coNeagues in Parls did not want to receive
him and acted qulte coolly toward him. Of course, Beneš was not sur•
prised, but he only pretended to be. He knew that his former Paris
friends were well aware of the fact that 'he had sold out to the Communist NKVD. His political friends - such as Gabriel P-a.ux, the
French Ambassador in Vienna from 1933 to 1939, described the actions of Beneš as "symptoms of a loyal adherence of Dr. Beneš to hiJ
Slav communist brot,her."
We recall that Beneš traveled to Moscow in 1943 agalnst the
wlshes of Eden, Churchill and other statesmen. There he approved
the sell-out of Ruthenia and cleared the road to Czecho-Slovakla for
Lhe Soviet Union. This he dtd wlthout any regard to the will of the
peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia. Nay, even without the
fuU consent of the "Provislon-al Czechos-Jovak Government" In London.
The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia ,Moravia and nuthenia certainly
had noMrlng to do with it.
I recall the speeches of October and November, 1943, in the
chamber of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in London. They were
made not only by the admirers of the Kremlln, but also by the socalled civH politiclans who were blinded by Moscow. Among them
were L auschman, Dr. Uhl!r and Paul Macháček. They strongly approved the journey to Moscow and insisted on going along with Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant bhe 1oss of asyrium in England and the good will of the allies. Beneš simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the ",hlg,her lnterests of our nations" demanded
it. When Beneš returned from hls trip to Moscow, he brought the request to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a large part
of Poland to the Soviets.
If any one s•h ould quest:!on the truth of my statements, I am ready
and willing at all limes to produce the reports of the "Czechoslovak
State Council," the speech&<J of Lauschman and Uhlíf, and even
lleneš's speech In its entirely after he returned from Moscow. They
tell us clearly why the Communist putsch of February 1948 took place
so smoothly.
Beneš played bis game of politics not only within the lim!ts of
the State, but also acted as advlser to ~he Poles. Later, as related by
Gabriel Pam,, he even acted as adviser to bis 'Rumanlan fr!end, Ml·
nlster l\faniu, who ended his life In a Communist jail. lt was Beneš
who counselled Maniu to discard bis policy of reserve toward the
�SLOVAK.IA
Communists and •trust bbem, because, he sald, the Soviet guarantees
were good. In the same manner lt was that Beneš spoke to Iran!an
state.s.men and even to FrankUn D. Roosev<. Th!s !s a.II confírmed
by the articles whloh appeared in the September 1948 and March 1949
lssues of the REVUE DE PARIS. There can be no doubt In any impartňal observer's mlnd that Beneš dld promote Stalln's stock wherever
he went.
THE SELL-OUT OF RUTHENIA
After the first World War, the victorious nations acceded to the
demands made by the people of Ruthenla (Sub-Carpatho-Russia) to annex Ruthenla to CzechoiSiovakla as an autonomous uru.t. Thls was accomplls-hed by the St. Germalne agreement, whlch was concluded
September 10, 1919. The Ruthenes inslsted on parting wlth the Magyars and being lncluded in a Slovanic polltlcal formatlon, such as
Czecho<Slovakla.
Durlng the second World War, when the powers aga.in r~ognized
the existence of Czecho-Slovakia, they did so In toto as far as lts
boundaries were concerned, l.e., wlth Rutbenla lncluded. The Unlted
States of North America never withdrew thelr recognition of the
Czecho-'Slovak Republic, s o lt was not nece-ssary for the U. S. to renew
thelr recognltion.
Beneš wa.s well aware of that fact and governed himselt accord·
mgly. He nominated Dr. Clbere, a fo11mer agrarian and Magya.T Com•
mun.lst who could not even sign his name In Ruthenlan, to represent
Ruthenla in the Czecho~lovak State Councll.
After HiNer attacked Sov'Jet Russla In 1941, the bolshevlks In
Prague turned thelr eml>assy over to Dr. Fierlinger and declared
solemnly that 1:hey never recognized the Munloh Pact and that CzechoSlovakia must be restored in toto, i.e., as it exlsted before Munlch.
Of course, they dld not mean that, but lt was good propaganda. Ruthenla was the topic of several dlscus.slons In London. When Francis
Nemec was sent to Ruthenia !nstead of Dr. Juraj Slávik, the awl
began to show from the sack.
Nemec was not g!ven a cordlal receptlon Jn Ruthenla at all.
The lnhabitants every-;vhere were slgn!ng petltJons, sponsored by the
communist Petruščák, whioh stated that the Ruthenlans no longer
ex!sted and t hat there were only Sub-Carpath!an Ukralnians in Ruthenia w·h o yearned to be embraced by the!r great mother, UkraJnia.
A.fter many Iong squabble.s, Nemec flnally got a message through
to Beneš in London through General Pika. 'Ilhe telegrams that Beneä
sent throug,h Flerllnger were never seen by Nemec, because Flerlln•
ger already then was Stalln's envoy and never a patrlotlc c:ltizen of
bis own state. lt 1s slgn!ficant, therefore, bhat desplte these experl·
ences thls same traltor Flerlinger was named, several months later,
as the premier by Beneš.
Nemec was In a very trying po.sitlon. When he wanted to be
connected with London, he had to ask for perm!ssion to do so from
t he Chlef of bhe Russian Staff so that he could trave1 to Moscow,
where with the help of the radlo connectlon of General Pika, who was
the Ohief of the Mllitary M.lsslon, Nemec could teli Beneš how matters were going and keep bim informed on Flerllnger. The latter
was dolng rlght well. He stlll 1s a minister In the Prague Government,
but General Pika was killed by the Communlsts.
�SLOVA.Kl.A
66
When Nemec returned to Ruthenla, Bene§ sent him several new
a!des as advisors, among them also Dr. Fedor Hodža and Dr. Cibere.
The l a tter, however, was picked up by the NKVD as soon as he
landed in Ruthenla.
Later Nemec was joined by other members of Lettrlch's Slovak
Natlonal Councll, but that did not lmprove matters.
In J anuary, 1945, Husäk and Novomeský told the non-Communlst
representatlves of the Councll that Ruthenla was deflnltely lost and
that lt was tlme they realized 1t. He said the same thlng to the Czech
members of the London delegatlon who wanted to install the !ega!
order whlch was worked out in London on the basls of "contlnu1ty ot
the ·Republlc," that is the flrst ConstltutJ.on, and accordlng to the
hapless proclamation of the London Czeoh Government of June 30,
1944, whlch procla:imed a unlted "Czechoslovak" nation and state.
At that tlme the Communists had asked the Slovak non-Communists whether lt would not be more profitable to support the idea
of a Slovak SovJet Republlc so that the Slovaks could govern thelr
own terrltory rather than adhere to the "Czeohoslovak" .ldeology whlch
denied the existence of the Slovak natlon. They added that such a
Slovak Soviet Republlc cou1d be promoted wlthout difficulty, because
the Slovak State still exlsted. Husák and Novomeský, however, dld not
get anywhere wlth thelr proposal. The Slovak non-COmmunists turned
lt down, declarlng that lt was contrary to the Chrlstmas Agreement
of December 1943, as well as the agreement which Ursfny concluded
wlth Dr. Beneš In October, 1944, when he acted In the name of the
Slovak National Council.
When Husák and Novomeský falled to promote the idea of a
S lovak Soviet Republlc in London, they lmmedlately contacted and
ordered their followers in Slovakla to present the proposal to Presldent Joseph Tfao and the Slovak Government. But Tlso and the Slovak Government would not hear about !t. Husák and Novomeský
fa,Jled In thelr mission. Several months later, wlth many Slovaks in
emigratlon, Clement!s took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today all the leading Reds of Slovakia are awaJting trlal for failing in
their misslon. Clement!s has already paid with hls llfe.
Ruthenia was lost. Beneš's deJegation had to go to Trebišov and
after that things went ratber smootlbly. Flerllnger made tbe proposltions and Beneš accepted them. When he was returnlng from Moscow
jn March 1945, Beneš could no looger enter Ruthenla. In fact he renounced lt solemnly on several occaslons. FinaJly, Bene§ had an
agreement prepared whioh Flerllnger slgned for the Czechoslovak
Government with great solemnity in the Kremlln on June 29, 1945.
No one, outside the Communlsts, agreed wlth thls act of Beneš.
No law, however, could contaln or restraln Bene§. He acted dlctatorially at any Ume tbat it beoefltted him.
On August 24, 1945, witbout even consultlng the Parllament, Bene§ lssued bis presidentlal decree No. 4, concludlng the pact between the USSR and the CSR. Thls decree was the basls !or assigning new borders to Slovakia In the East. In October, 1946, everythlng
legalized on the basis or foregolog decrees was publlshed In the Collection of Laws and Regulations.
�56
SLOVAKlA
'l\he text of lhe above-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well
as slgnificant. lt beglns with the words: " . . . being c0rtaln that the
provjsional National Assembly of the Czechoslovak •Republlc ehall
concur with this agreement . . ."
Beneš dld not wait. He and John Masaryk and Vlado Clementis
decided matters without Parliament. Jv,; good prophets, they knew that
Parliament wou1d certainly approve the agreement!
Since Ruthenia was not a very big gulp, Beneš did not stop
there, but became even more generous. On June 2, 1945, he lssued
decree No. 8; whereby a number of homes in the most beautiful
sectlon of Bubenec - in the modern sectlon of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, t he
great sacrmces the nations of the USSR had made on the altar of
liberation of humanity.
Well, jt is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great extent
did Uber.ate Slovakia from a great many things the Slovaks could
use themselves, but it certainly was not ethical or democratic to sign
over whole streets to them without even consulting the natiou
about it. Only dictators act like that. And Beneš was a dictator by the
grace of Moscow, even if only a temporary one.
Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later Beneš showed
bis appreciation to tbe so-called "llberator" of Prague, Marshal Konev, by ~iving him several very beautiful villas wmch were con•
tiscated from the good cltizens of Prague. From these villas Konev
has a beautiful view of Prague. They are occupied by the Commun!st
gestapo which was sent to Prague from Moscow to pian the enslavement and destruction of humanity and Christianlty In Europe.
Such is the fruit of Beneš's actlvity - bis collaboration with
the men of the Ifremlin and the hated NKVD.
IN THE MAST ER'S FOOTSTEPS
What Jed to the defeat of democracy and to so easy a victory
of Communism in Czecho'8lovakia in February 1948, that !s a theme
that wrn be expounded In as many books and dlssertations as there
are vlews on that subject. Consequently dates and events wlll be multiplied. However, lt must remain lndisputably true that the date of
June 25, 1945, ls a sad one, lndeed.
On that f-ateful day the Czech socialist parties represented by
Dr. Peter Zenkl, F'ierlinger and Gottwald, got together and w.illingly
concluded an agreement whereby tbe "Na;tiona,J Front of tbe Worklng
People" was formed. Slnce no one threatened the soclalists, lt was not
clear agalnst whom the National Front was established.
It is botb !nteresting and slgnificant ,that not a single Slovak
attended lhat meeting and that among those who called it were Dr.
Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka and other leaders of Dr. Benes' old
National Socialist Party - tbe very same people wbo today are telling the American public and the world that they always bated the
Reds and thrut tbe Red.s ousted them from Government.
But the truth is somethlng else again. The fact 1s that both
7.enkl and Ripka welcomed tbe Communisls, sought their favor, and
wanted to win political prestige w!th lhe help of the Reds at the
expense of the other polltical partles. Of course, today we know tbat
they failed. The same thing happened to them that had ba<ppened
�SLOVAKIA
67
and is still happening to all those who try to collaborate with the
Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are worth,
and then s1w allow them up or get rid of them.
The "National Front of the Worklng People" created a "Centra!
Coordinating Committee," In which every a.ffiliated party had an
equal number of representatives. This commlrtee had the task of
coordinating the work of the socialist parties. The socialist bloc prepared the ground for the various actlv!ties which led to the suppression of politlcal and reli~ious freedom and were the first steps taken
toward a sociall11t dictatorship.
The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the Agraria:n
Party would be suppressed, the Catbolic Eagle organization outla,wed
and fäat Catholic youth, as such, would not be allowed to organize.
Together .they worked out a pian whereby the non-Communist peasant
votes would be done away with and, at the same time, how tbese
ľOtes, together with the Commuruist-controlled peasant unions, would
be brought lnto the Communist Party. They also created and later
legalized the Communist trade organizatlons, then the non-political
Federation of Farmers and the United Youth Organization - au of
which were supposed to be formed by the joint particlpatlon of all
parties, but actually served only to communize Czecho,Slovakia trom
the time they began to functlon.
Therefore, lt is not true that Zenkl, Rlpka, and Vilem, and other
Social Democrats opposed Communist hegemony from the beginning,
but the truth is that from the moment they accepted the so-called
" Košice Agreement," they were always subordinate to and In the
train of the Communlst Party and willingly continued that way not
only on Russlan soil, or In Russian-occupied Košice, but a!so in
"lib erated" Pl'ague. Even the "Joint Declaration" to the nation of
June 28, 1945, 1s indisputable proof of the fact that they wanted to
get into government with the help of the Communists even at the
expense of democracy, Christlanity and freedom.
This is a sound lesson for all who would collaborate with Communists. AU such people are digging their own graves, because
Communism recognizes no agreements, concessions or compromises,
and sw.allows up all who collaborate with it. This was made quite
clear in the case of Husák, Clementis and Novomeský. They were
exploited by the men of the Kremlin as long as they were needed
to install Communist dictatorship over the Slovak people. But once
that task was accomplished, they were discarded.
In like manner the Commull'ists dumped Zenkl and Ripka, and
thelr companions, and replaced them with Dr. Neuman, Ing. Šlechta
and others; but even the latter will wlnd up the same way as Clement!s and his companions dld. So will also those non--Communists in
Bratislava who even today try to collaborate with the Reds. But not
all will be lucky enough to escape Red "justlce."
Zenkl, Rlpka and thelr eompa:nions pose as martyrs of Communist
injustlce as they bask in the sunshine of Amerlcan freedom, but the
fact 1s that they were a substantia! part of the "National Front of
the Working People" and, tberefore, helped to install the reign of
Communist lnjustice in Czecho-Slovakia in 1945 .
•
•
•
�
62
SLOVAKIA
EDWARD BENEš -
STALIN'S STOOGE
DR. MICHAEL Z IB R IN
Even if we could hear recordings of all the telephone convel'Sat.lons
whioh took place in Prague in 1948 and see all tbe stenograpbl<: protocols of tbe secret conferences of Beneš, Zenkl and Zorin, or tbose
of tbe Czech and Slovak Politburo, many o! us even then would not
have a clear picture of how the Communist putsch of February 1948
could have happened in the Czecho-Slovak Republic.
But tbe fact is that the Commumst putsch of February 1948 did
not happen accidentally. And it did not •happen because Deneš had
deceived the people of bis country, or because the Mlnisters resigned
prematurely and wiťhout agreement. The fact is that the February
1mtsoh of 1948 has old roots. The victory of the Communist,s was the
truit of a Iong, systematlc and relentless activity of the Moscow •Reds
and, we can say, the characterle.ss Ieaders-hlp of "CzeC'hoslovak" politicians and thelr old connections with Moscow and the Communists.
lt is said tbat Moscow seldom undertakes anytbing which lt cannot
s urely and suc cessfu11y finish, i.e., it will not start anyťhlng unless
everytbing ls fully planned and prepared to guarantee success. Time
has always worked in favor of the men of the Kremlin. And so, when
tbe "-CzeC'hoslovak" Ministers lost their heads and resigned, Moscow
gave the word and Stalin's general manager in Czecho-Slovakia, ZORIN.
leaped into ac tlon. Gottwald and bis companions had no trouble at au
In taking over the Government of Czecho-Slovakla.
Looking into the memoirs and wrltings of Dr. Edward Beneš
and Winston Churchill, we flnd that President Beneš betrayed the so·
ca1led anti-Stalin cons plracy of Marshal Tuchačevský and Rlkov in
1937. The betrayal destroyed more than 5000 army offlcers and lntellectuals who opposed Communlsm and wa,nted to put an end to lt.
Beneš writes about the affair in his Memoirs on pages 33-34, and
on page 231 he admlts that it was he who had betrayed what was
'b elng planned agalnst Stalln to the Soviet ambassador in Prague,
Alexander Alexandrovský, Commissar of the hated OGPU, which later
became the NKV.O.
Churchill also wrote about the episode in bis book. Des-crlblng
political events of World War II, Churchill reproaohes Beneš for
bis betrayal of Tu'kaohevský, saylng that thereby Beneš became the
servant of Moscow and the NKVD. During practically every conversat!on with Beneš, Ohurchill returned to the theme of Tukachevský
and reminded bim that he had been taken in by an agent of the
NKVíD and was doing the blddlng of Moscow. With Tukachevský
fell not only the 18 who were convicted, but also about 5000 Russlan officers, offlclals and lntellectuals. And they were destroyed only
because they wanted to do in 1936 what Stalin, Molotov and Litvínov
dld in 1939, tha:t is make a temporary treaty wlth Betilin.
After that ·betrayal in 1937, Dr. Edward Beneš became the lnstrument and agent of ťhe NKVD and served that agency because he was
completely in thelr ,bands. Right there and then was prepared the
way for all the shameful a cts whloh wrote finis to the "regulated
democracy" of Dr. Beneš. The followers of Dr. EdwaTd Beneš, enjoy-
�SLOVAKIA
ing politlical asylum in free America and other democratic countries,
do not llke to talk about thls matter, but even that is quite under·
standable.
From thM ,moment in 1937, w,hen Dr. Edward Beneš - according
to the report of his own ambassador in Berlin, Dr. Mastný - gave the
report of Tukachevský's betrayal to ambassador Alexandrovský in
Pr,ague, he ceased to be a free man and the Calvary of the servant
of Moscow and the NKVD actually began.
·when we consider what Dr. Beneš did from lhat moment on, we
see that he did everything against the will of the western democracies
who already had been shedding their blood several yoars Wben Beneä's
Soviet friend consldered the war with Nazi Germany as a private af•
fair of the capitallst world.
In bis book ".Six Years in Exile," Dr. Edward Beneš expressed
surprise that 'his former coNeagues in Parls did not want to receive
him and acted qulte coolly toward him. Of course, Beneš was not sur•
prised, but he only pretended to be. He knew that his former Paris
friends were well aware of the fact that 'he had sold out to the Communist NKVD. His political friends - such as Gabriel P-a.ux, the
French Ambassador in Vienna from 1933 to 1939, described the actions of Beneš as "symptoms of a loyal adherence of Dr. Beneš to hiJ
Slav communist brot,her."
We recall that Beneš traveled to Moscow in 1943 agalnst the
wlshes of Eden, Churchill and other statesmen. There he approved
the sell-out of Ruthenia and cleared the road to Czecho-Slovakla for
Lhe Soviet Union. This he dtd wlthout any regard to the will of the
peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia. Nay, even without the
fuU consent of the "Provislon-al Czechos-Jovak Government" In London.
The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia ,Moravia and nuthenia certainly
had noMrlng to do with it.
I recall the speeches of October and November, 1943, in the
chamber of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in London. They were
made not only by the admirers of the Kremlln, but also by the socalled civH politiclans who were blinded by Moscow. Among them
were L auschman, Dr. Uhl!r and Paul Macháček. They strongly approved the journey to Moscow and insisted on going along with Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant bhe 1oss of asyrium in England and the good will of the allies. Beneš simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the ",hlg,her lnterests of our nations" demanded
it. When Beneš returned from hls trip to Moscow, he brought the request to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a large part
of Poland to the Soviets.
If any one s•h ould quest:!on the truth of my statements, I am ready
and willing at all limes to produce the reports of the "Czechoslovak
State Council," the speech&<J of Lauschman and Uhlíf, and even
lleneš's speech In its entirely after he returned from Moscow. They
tell us clearly why the Communist putsch of February 1948 took place
so smoothly.
Beneš played bis game of politics not only within the lim!ts of
the State, but also acted as advlser to ~he Poles. Later, as related by
Gabriel Pam,, he even acted as adviser to bis 'Rumanlan fr!end, Ml·
nlster l\faniu, who ended his life In a Communist jail. lt was Beneš
who counselled Maniu to discard bis policy of reserve toward the
�SLOVAK.IA
Communists and •trust bbem, because, he sald, the Soviet guarantees
were good. In the same manner lt was that Beneš spoke to Iran!an
state.s.men and even to FrankUn D. Roosev<. Th!s !s a.II confírmed
by the articles whloh appeared in the September 1948 and March 1949
lssues of the REVUE DE PARIS. There can be no doubt In any impartňal observer's mlnd that Beneš dld promote Stalln's stock wherever
he went.
THE SELL-OUT OF RUTHENIA
After the first World War, the victorious nations acceded to the
demands made by the people of Ruthenla (Sub-Carpatho-Russia) to annex Ruthenla to CzechoiSiovakla as an autonomous uru.t. Thls was accomplls-hed by the St. Germalne agreement, whlch was concluded
September 10, 1919. The Ruthenes inslsted on parting wlth the Magyars and being lncluded in a Slovanic polltlcal formatlon, such as
Czecho<Slovakla.
Durlng the second World War, when the powers aga.in r~ognized
the existence of Czecho-Slovakia, they did so In toto as far as lts
boundaries were concerned, l.e., wlth Rutbenla lncluded. The Unlted
States of North America never withdrew thelr recognition of the
Czecho-'Slovak Republic, s o lt was not nece-ssary for the U. S. to renew
thelr recognltion.
Beneš wa.s well aware of that fact and governed himselt accord·
mgly. He nominated Dr. Clbere, a fo11mer agrarian and Magya.T Com•
mun.lst who could not even sign his name In Ruthenlan, to represent
Ruthenla in the Czecho~lovak State Councll.
After HiNer attacked Sov'Jet Russla In 1941, the bolshevlks In
Prague turned thelr eml>assy over to Dr. Fierlinger and declared
solemnly that 1:hey never recognized the Munloh Pact and that CzechoSlovakia must be restored in toto, i.e., as it exlsted before Munlch.
Of course, they dld not mean that, but lt was good propaganda. Ruthenla was the topic of several dlscus.slons In London. When Francis
Nemec was sent to Ruthenia !nstead of Dr. Juraj Slávik, the awl
began to show from the sack.
Nemec was not g!ven a cordlal receptlon Jn Ruthenla at all.
The lnhabitants every-;vhere were slgn!ng petltJons, sponsored by the
communist Petruščák, whioh stated that the Ruthenlans no longer
ex!sted and t hat there were only Sub-Carpath!an Ukralnians in Ruthenia w·h o yearned to be embraced by the!r great mother, UkraJnia.
A.fter many Iong squabble.s, Nemec flnally got a message through
to Beneš in London through General Pika. 'Ilhe telegrams that Beneä
sent throug,h Flerllnger were never seen by Nemec, because Flerlln•
ger already then was Stalln's envoy and never a patrlotlc c:ltizen of
bis own state. lt 1s slgn!ficant, therefore, bhat desplte these experl·
ences thls same traltor Flerlinger was named, several months later,
as the premier by Beneš.
Nemec was In a very trying po.sitlon. When he wanted to be
connected with London, he had to ask for perm!ssion to do so from
t he Chlef of bhe Russian Staff so that he could trave1 to Moscow,
where with the help of the radlo connectlon of General Pika, who was
the Ohief of the Mllitary M.lsslon, Nemec could teli Beneš how matters were going and keep bim informed on Flerllnger. The latter
was dolng rlght well. He stlll 1s a minister In the Prague Government,
but General Pika was killed by the Communlsts.
�SLOVA.Kl.A
66
When Nemec returned to Ruthenla, Bene§ sent him several new
a!des as advisors, among them also Dr. Fedor Hodža and Dr. Cibere.
The l a tter, however, was picked up by the NKVD as soon as he
landed in Ruthenla.
Later Nemec was joined by other members of Lettrlch's Slovak
Natlonal Councll, but that did not lmprove matters.
In J anuary, 1945, Husäk and Novomeský told the non-Communlst
representatlves of the Councll that Ruthenla was deflnltely lost and
that lt was tlme they realized 1t. He said the same thlng to the Czech
members of the London delegatlon who wanted to install the !ega!
order whlch was worked out in London on the basls of "contlnu1ty ot
the ·Republlc," that is the flrst ConstltutJ.on, and accordlng to the
hapless proclamation of the London Czeoh Government of June 30,
1944, whlch procla:imed a unlted "Czechoslovak" nation and state.
At that tlme the Communists had asked the Slovak non-Communists whether lt would not be more profitable to support the idea
of a Slovak SovJet Republlc so that the Slovaks could govern thelr
own terrltory rather than adhere to the "Czeohoslovak" .ldeology whlch
denied the existence of the Slovak natlon. They added that such a
Slovak Soviet Republlc cou1d be promoted wlthout difficulty, because
the Slovak State still exlsted. Husák and Novomeský, however, dld not
get anywhere wlth thelr proposal. The Slovak non-COmmunists turned
lt down, declarlng that lt was contrary to the Chrlstmas Agreement
of December 1943, as well as the agreement which Ursfny concluded
wlth Dr. Beneš In October, 1944, when he acted In the name of the
Slovak National Council.
When Husák and Novomeský falled to promote the idea of a
S lovak Soviet Republlc in London, they lmmedlately contacted and
ordered their followers in Slovakla to present the proposal to Presldent Joseph Tfao and the Slovak Government. But Tlso and the Slovak Government would not hear about !t. Husák and Novomeský
fa,Jled In thelr mission. Several months later, wlth many Slovaks in
emigratlon, Clement!s took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today all the leading Reds of Slovakia are awaJting trlal for failing in
their misslon. Clement!s has already paid with hls llfe.
Ruthenia was lost. Beneš's deJegation had to go to Trebišov and
after that things went ratber smootlbly. Flerllnger made tbe proposltions and Beneš accepted them. When he was returnlng from Moscow
jn March 1945, Beneš could no looger enter Ruthenla. In fact he renounced lt solemnly on several occaslons. FinaJly, Bene§ had an
agreement prepared whioh Flerllnger slgned for the Czechoslovak
Government with great solemnity in the Kremlln on June 29, 1945.
No one, outside the Communlsts, agreed wlth thls act of Beneš.
No law, however, could contaln or restraln Bene§. He acted dlctatorially at any Ume tbat it beoefltted him.
On August 24, 1945, witbout even consultlng the Parllament, Bene§ lssued bis presidentlal decree No. 4, concludlng the pact between the USSR and the CSR. Thls decree was the basls !or assigning new borders to Slovakia In the East. In October, 1946, everythlng
legalized on the basis or foregolog decrees was publlshed In the Collection of Laws and Regulations.
�56
SLOVAKlA
'l\he text of lhe above-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well
as slgnificant. lt beglns with the words: " . . . being c0rtaln that the
provjsional National Assembly of the Czechoslovak •Republlc ehall
concur with this agreement . . ."
Beneš dld not wait. He and John Masaryk and Vlado Clementis
decided matters without Parliament. Jv,; good prophets, they knew that
Parliament wou1d certainly approve the agreement!
Since Ruthenia was not a very big gulp, Beneš did not stop
there, but became even more generous. On June 2, 1945, he lssued
decree No. 8; whereby a number of homes in the most beautiful
sectlon of Bubenec - in the modern sectlon of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, t he
great sacrmces the nations of the USSR had made on the altar of
liberation of humanity.
Well, jt is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great extent
did Uber.ate Slovakia from a great many things the Slovaks could
use themselves, but it certainly was not ethical or democratic to sign
over whole streets to them without even consulting the natiou
about it. Only dictators act like that. And Beneš was a dictator by the
grace of Moscow, even if only a temporary one.
Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later Beneš showed
bis appreciation to tbe so-called "llberator" of Prague, Marshal Konev, by ~iving him several very beautiful villas wmch were con•
tiscated from the good cltizens of Prague. From these villas Konev
has a beautiful view of Prague. They are occupied by the Commun!st
gestapo which was sent to Prague from Moscow to pian the enslavement and destruction of humanity and Christianlty In Europe.
Such is the fruit of Beneš's actlvity - bis collaboration with
the men of the Ifremlin and the hated NKVD.
IN THE MAST ER'S FOOTSTEPS
What Jed to the defeat of democracy and to so easy a victory
of Communism in Czecho'8lovakia in February 1948, that !s a theme
that wrn be expounded In as many books and dlssertations as there
are vlews on that subject. Consequently dates and events wlll be multiplied. However, lt must remain lndisputably true that the date of
June 25, 1945, ls a sad one, lndeed.
On that f-ateful day the Czech socialist parties represented by
Dr. Peter Zenkl, F'ierlinger and Gottwald, got together and w.illingly
concluded an agreement whereby tbe "Na;tiona,J Front of tbe Worklng
People" was formed. Slnce no one threatened the soclalists, lt was not
clear agalnst whom the National Front was established.
It is botb !nteresting and slgnificant ,that not a single Slovak
attended lhat meeting and that among those who called it were Dr.
Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka and other leaders of Dr. Benes' old
National Socialist Party - tbe very same people wbo today are telling the American public and the world that they always bated the
Reds and thrut tbe Red.s ousted them from Government.
But the truth is somethlng else again. The fact 1s that both
7.enkl and Ripka welcomed tbe Communisls, sought their favor, and
wanted to win political prestige w!th lhe help of the Reds at the
expense of the other polltical partles. Of course, today we know tbat
they failed. The same thing happened to them that had ba<ppened
�SLOVAKIA
67
and is still happening to all those who try to collaborate with the
Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are worth,
and then s1w allow them up or get rid of them.
The "National Front of the Worklng People" created a "Centra!
Coordinating Committee," In which every a.ffiliated party had an
equal number of representatives. This commlrtee had the task of
coordinating the work of the socialist parties. The socialist bloc prepared the ground for the various actlv!ties which led to the suppression of politlcal and reli~ious freedom and were the first steps taken
toward a sociall11t dictatorship.
The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the Agraria:n
Party would be suppressed, the Catbolic Eagle organization outla,wed
and fäat Catholic youth, as such, would not be allowed to organize.
Together .they worked out a pian whereby the non-Communist peasant
votes would be done away with and, at the same time, how tbese
ľOtes, together with the Commuruist-controlled peasant unions, would
be brought lnto the Communist Party. They also created and later
legalized the Communist trade organizatlons, then the non-political
Federation of Farmers and the United Youth Organization - au of
which were supposed to be formed by the joint particlpatlon of all
parties, but actually served only to communize Czecho,Slovakia trom
the time they began to functlon.
Therefore, lt is not true that Zenkl, Rlpka, and Vilem, and other
Social Democrats opposed Communist hegemony from the beginning,
but the truth is that from the moment they accepted the so-called
" Košice Agreement," they were always subordinate to and In the
train of the Communlst Party and willingly continued that way not
only on Russlan soil, or In Russian-occupied Košice, but a!so in
"lib erated" Pl'ague. Even the "Joint Declaration" to the nation of
June 28, 1945, 1s indisputable proof of the fact that they wanted to
get into government with the help of the Communists even at the
expense of democracy, Christlanity and freedom.
This is a sound lesson for all who would collaborate with Communists. AU such people are digging their own graves, because
Communism recognizes no agreements, concessions or compromises,
and sw.allows up all who collaborate with it. This was made quite
clear in the case of Husák, Clementis and Novomeský. They were
exploited by the men of the Kremlin as long as they were needed
to install Communist dictatorship over the Slovak people. But once
that task was accomplished, they were discarded.
In like manner the Commull'ists dumped Zenkl and Ripka, and
thelr companions, and replaced them with Dr. Neuman, Ing. Šlechta
and others; but even the latter will wlnd up the same way as Clement!s and his companions dld. So will also those non--Communists in
Bratislava who even today try to collaborate with the Reds. But not
all will be lucky enough to escape Red "justlce."
Zenkl, Rlpka and thelr eompa:nions pose as martyrs of Communist
injustlce as they bask in the sunshine of Amerlcan freedom, but the
fact 1s that they were a substantia! part of the "National Front of
the Working People" and, tberefore, helped to install the reign of
Communist lnjustice in Czecho-Slovakia in 1945 .
•
•
•
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
62
SLOVAKIA
EDWARD BENEš -
STALIN'S STOOGE
DR. MICHAEL Z IB R IN
Even if we could hear recordings of all the telephone convel'Sat.lons
whioh took place in Prague in 1948 and see all tbe stenograpbl<: protocols of tbe secret conferences of Beneš, Zenkl and Zorin, or tbose
of tbe Czech and Slovak Politburo, many o! us even then would not
have a clear picture of how the Communist putsch of February 1948
could have happened in the Czecho-Slovak Republic.
But tbe fact is that the Commumst putsch of February 1948 did
not happen accidentally. And it did not •happen because Deneš had
deceived the people of bis country, or because the Mlnisters resigned
prematurely and wiťhout agreement. The fact is that the February
1mtsoh of 1948 has old roots. The victory of the Communist,s was the
truit of a Iong, systematlc and relentless activity of the Moscow •Reds
and, we can say, the characterle.ss Ieaders-hlp of "CzeC'hoslovak" politicians and thelr old connections with Moscow and the Communists.
lt is said tbat Moscow seldom undertakes anytbing which lt cannot
s urely and suc cessfu11y finish, i.e., it will not start anyťhlng unless
everytbing ls fully planned and prepared to guarantee success. Time
has always worked in favor of the men of the Kremlin. And so, when
tbe "-CzeC'hoslovak" Ministers lost their heads and resigned, Moscow
gave the word and Stalin's general manager in Czecho-Slovakia, ZORIN.
leaped into ac tlon. Gottwald and bis companions had no trouble at au
In taking over the Government of Czecho-Slovakla.
Looking into the memoirs and wrltings of Dr. Edward Beneš
and Winston Churchill, we flnd that President Beneš betrayed the so·
ca1led anti-Stalin cons plracy of Marshal Tuchačevský and Rlkov in
1937. The betrayal destroyed more than 5000 army offlcers and lntellectuals who opposed Communlsm and wa,nted to put an end to lt.
Beneš writes about the affair in his Memoirs on pages 33-34, and
on page 231 he admlts that it was he who had betrayed what was
'b elng planned agalnst Stalln to the Soviet ambassador in Prague,
Alexander Alexandrovský, Commissar of the hated OGPU, which later
became the NKV.O.
Churchill also wrote about the episode in bis book. Des-crlblng
political events of World War II, Churchill reproaohes Beneš for
bis betrayal of Tu'kaohevský, saylng that thereby Beneš became the
servant of Moscow and the NKVD. During practically every conversat!on with Beneš, Ohurchill returned to the theme of Tukachevský
and reminded bim that he had been taken in by an agent of the
NKVíD and was doing the blddlng of Moscow. With Tukachevský
fell not only the 18 who were convicted, but also about 5000 Russlan officers, offlclals and lntellectuals. And they were destroyed only
because they wanted to do in 1936 what Stalin, Molotov and Litvínov
dld in 1939, tha:t is make a temporary treaty wlth Betilin.
After that ·betrayal in 1937, Dr. Edward Beneš became the lnstrument and agent of ťhe NKVD and served that agency because he was
completely in thelr ,bands. Right there and then was prepared the
way for all the shameful a cts whloh wrote finis to the "regulated
democracy" of Dr. Beneš. The followers of Dr. EdwaTd Beneš, enjoy-
SLOVAKIA
ing politlical asylum in free America and other democratic countries,
do not llke to talk about thls matter, but even that is quite under·
standable.
From thM ,moment in 1937, w,hen Dr. Edward Beneš - according
to the report of his own ambassador in Berlin, Dr. Mastný - gave the
report of Tukachevský's betrayal to ambassador Alexandrovský in
Pr,ague, he ceased to be a free man and the Calvary of the servant
of Moscow and the NKVD actually began.
·when we consider what Dr. Beneš did from lhat moment on, we
see that he did everything against the will of the western democracies
who already had been shedding their blood several yoars Wben Beneä's
Soviet friend consldered the war with Nazi Germany as a private af•
fair of the capitallst world.
In bis book ".Six Years in Exile," Dr. Edward Beneš expressed
surprise that 'his former coNeagues in Parls did not want to receive
him and acted qulte coolly toward him. Of course, Beneš was not sur•
prised, but he only pretended to be. He knew that his former Paris
friends were well aware of the fact that 'he had sold out to the Communist NKVD. His political friends - such as Gabriel P-a.ux, the
French Ambassador in Vienna from 1933 to 1939, described the actions of Beneš as "symptoms of a loyal adherence of Dr. Beneš to hiJ
Slav communist brot,her."
We recall that Beneš traveled to Moscow in 1943 agalnst the
wlshes of Eden, Churchill and other statesmen. There he approved
the sell-out of Ruthenia and cleared the road to Czecho-Slovakla for
Lhe Soviet Union. This he dtd wlthout any regard to the will of the
peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia. Nay, even without the
fuU consent of the "Provislon-al Czechos-Jovak Government" In London.
The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia ,Moravia and nuthenia certainly
had noMrlng to do with it.
I recall the speeches of October and November, 1943, in the
chamber of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in London. They were
made not only by the admirers of the Kremlln, but also by the socalled civH politiclans who were blinded by Moscow. Among them
were L auschman, Dr. Uhl!r and Paul Macháček. They strongly approved the journey to Moscow and insisted on going along with Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant bhe 1oss of asyrium in England and the good will of the allies. Beneš simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the ",hlg,her lnterests of our nations" demanded
it. When Beneš returned from hls trip to Moscow, he brought the request to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a large part
of Poland to the Soviets.
If any one s•h ould quest:!on the truth of my statements, I am ready
and willing at all limes to produce the reports of the "Czechoslovak
State Council," the speech&<J of Lauschman and Uhlíf, and even
lleneš's speech In its entirely after he returned from Moscow. They
tell us clearly why the Communist putsch of February 1948 took place
so smoothly.
Beneš played bis game of politics not only within the lim!ts of
the State, but also acted as advlser to ~he Poles. Later, as related by
Gabriel Pam,, he even acted as adviser to bis 'Rumanlan fr!end, Ml·
nlster l\faniu, who ended his life In a Communist jail. lt was Beneš
who counselled Maniu to discard bis policy of reserve toward the
SLOVAK.IA
Communists and •trust bbem, because, he sald, the Soviet guarantees
were good. In the same manner lt was that Beneš spoke to Iran!an
state.s.men and even to FrankUn D. Roosev<. Th!s !s a.II confírmed
by the articles whloh appeared in the September 1948 and March 1949
lssues of the REVUE DE PARIS. There can be no doubt In any impartňal observer's mlnd that Beneš dld promote Stalln's stock wherever
he went.
THE SELL-OUT OF RUTHENIA
After the first World War, the victorious nations acceded to the
demands made by the people of Ruthenla (Sub-Carpatho-Russia) to annex Ruthenla to CzechoiSiovakla as an autonomous uru.t. Thls was accomplls-hed by the St. Germalne agreement, whlch was concluded
September 10, 1919. The Ruthenes inslsted on parting wlth the Magyars and being lncluded in a Slovanic polltlcal formatlon, such as
Czecho<Slovakla.
Durlng the second World War, when the powers aga.in r~ognized
the existence of Czecho-Slovakia, they did so In toto as far as lts
boundaries were concerned, l.e., wlth Rutbenla lncluded. The Unlted
States of North America never withdrew thelr recognition of the
Czecho-'Slovak Republic, s o lt was not nece-ssary for the U. S. to renew
thelr recognltion.
Beneš wa.s well aware of that fact and governed himselt accord·
mgly. He nominated Dr. Clbere, a fo11mer agrarian and Magya.T Com•
mun.lst who could not even sign his name In Ruthenlan, to represent
Ruthenla in the Czecho~lovak State Councll.
After HiNer attacked Sov'Jet Russla In 1941, the bolshevlks In
Prague turned thelr eml>assy over to Dr. Fierlinger and declared
solemnly that 1:hey never recognized the Munloh Pact and that CzechoSlovakia must be restored in toto, i.e., as it exlsted before Munlch.
Of course, they dld not mean that, but lt was good propaganda. Ruthenla was the topic of several dlscus.slons In London. When Francis
Nemec was sent to Ruthenia !nstead of Dr. Juraj Slávik, the awl
began to show from the sack.
Nemec was not g!ven a cordlal receptlon Jn Ruthenla at all.
The lnhabitants every-;vhere were slgn!ng petltJons, sponsored by the
communist Petruščák, whioh stated that the Ruthenlans no longer
ex!sted and t hat there were only Sub-Carpath!an Ukralnians in Ruthenia w·h o yearned to be embraced by the!r great mother, UkraJnia.
A.fter many Iong squabble.s, Nemec flnally got a message through
to Beneš in London through General Pika. 'Ilhe telegrams that Beneä
sent throug,h Flerllnger were never seen by Nemec, because Flerlln•
ger already then was Stalln's envoy and never a patrlotlc c:ltizen of
bis own state. lt 1s slgn!ficant, therefore, bhat desplte these experl·
ences thls same traltor Flerlinger was named, several months later,
as the premier by Beneš.
Nemec was In a very trying po.sitlon. When he wanted to be
connected with London, he had to ask for perm!ssion to do so from
t he Chlef of bhe Russian Staff so that he could trave1 to Moscow,
where with the help of the radlo connectlon of General Pika, who was
the Ohief of the Mllitary M.lsslon, Nemec could teli Beneš how matters were going and keep bim informed on Flerllnger. The latter
was dolng rlght well. He stlll 1s a minister In the Prague Government,
but General Pika was killed by the Communlsts.
SLOVA.Kl.A
66
When Nemec returned to Ruthenla, Bene§ sent him several new
a!des as advisors, among them also Dr. Fedor Hodža and Dr. Cibere.
The l a tter, however, was picked up by the NKVD as soon as he
landed in Ruthenla.
Later Nemec was joined by other members of Lettrlch's Slovak
Natlonal Councll, but that did not lmprove matters.
In J anuary, 1945, Husäk and Novomeský told the non-Communlst
representatlves of the Councll that Ruthenla was deflnltely lost and
that lt was tlme they realized 1t. He said the same thlng to the Czech
members of the London delegatlon who wanted to install the !ega!
order whlch was worked out in London on the basls of "contlnu1ty ot
the ·Republlc," that is the flrst ConstltutJ.on, and accordlng to the
hapless proclamation of the London Czeoh Government of June 30,
1944, whlch procla:imed a unlted "Czechoslovak" nation and state.
At that tlme the Communists had asked the Slovak non-Communists whether lt would not be more profitable to support the idea
of a Slovak SovJet Republlc so that the Slovaks could govern thelr
own terrltory rather than adhere to the "Czeohoslovak" .ldeology whlch
denied the existence of the Slovak natlon. They added that such a
Slovak Soviet Republlc cou1d be promoted wlthout difficulty, because
the Slovak State still exlsted. Husák and Novomeský, however, dld not
get anywhere wlth thelr proposal. The Slovak non-COmmunists turned
lt down, declarlng that lt was contrary to the Chrlstmas Agreement
of December 1943, as well as the agreement which Ursfny concluded
wlth Dr. Beneš In October, 1944, when he acted In the name of the
Slovak National Council.
When Husák and Novomeský falled to promote the idea of a
S lovak Soviet Republlc in London, they lmmedlately contacted and
ordered their followers in Slovakla to present the proposal to Presldent Joseph Tfao and the Slovak Government. But Tlso and the Slovak Government would not hear about !t. Husák and Novomeský
fa,Jled In thelr mission. Several months later, wlth many Slovaks in
emigratlon, Clement!s took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today all the leading Reds of Slovakia are awaJting trlal for failing in
their misslon. Clement!s has already paid with hls llfe.
Ruthenia was lost. Beneš's deJegation had to go to Trebišov and
after that things went ratber smootlbly. Flerllnger made tbe proposltions and Beneš accepted them. When he was returnlng from Moscow
jn March 1945, Beneš could no looger enter Ruthenla. In fact he renounced lt solemnly on several occaslons. FinaJly, Bene§ had an
agreement prepared whioh Flerllnger slgned for the Czechoslovak
Government with great solemnity in the Kremlln on June 29, 1945.
No one, outside the Communlsts, agreed wlth thls act of Beneš.
No law, however, could contaln or restraln Bene§. He acted dlctatorially at any Ume tbat it beoefltted him.
On August 24, 1945, witbout even consultlng the Parllament, Bene§ lssued bis presidentlal decree No. 4, concludlng the pact between the USSR and the CSR. Thls decree was the basls !or assigning new borders to Slovakia In the East. In October, 1946, everythlng
legalized on the basis or foregolog decrees was publlshed In the Collection of Laws and Regulations.
56
SLOVAKlA
'l\he text of lhe above-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well
as slgnificant. lt beglns with the words: " . . . being c0rtaln that the
provjsional National Assembly of the Czechoslovak •Republlc ehall
concur with this agreement . . ."
Beneš dld not wait. He and John Masaryk and Vlado Clementis
decided matters without Parliament. Jv,; good prophets, they knew that
Parliament wou1d certainly approve the agreement!
Since Ruthenia was not a very big gulp, Beneš did not stop
there, but became even more generous. On June 2, 1945, he lssued
decree No. 8; whereby a number of homes in the most beautiful
sectlon of Bubenec - in the modern sectlon of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, t he
great sacrmces the nations of the USSR had made on the altar of
liberation of humanity.
Well, jt is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great extent
did Uber.ate Slovakia from a great many things the Slovaks could
use themselves, but it certainly was not ethical or democratic to sign
over whole streets to them without even consulting the natiou
about it. Only dictators act like that. And Beneš was a dictator by the
grace of Moscow, even if only a temporary one.
Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later Beneš showed
bis appreciation to tbe so-called "llberator" of Prague, Marshal Konev, by ~iving him several very beautiful villas wmch were con•
tiscated from the good cltizens of Prague. From these villas Konev
has a beautiful view of Prague. They are occupied by the Commun!st
gestapo which was sent to Prague from Moscow to pian the enslavement and destruction of humanity and Christianlty In Europe.
Such is the fruit of Beneš's actlvity - bis collaboration with
the men of the Ifremlin and the hated NKVD.
IN THE MAST ER'S FOOTSTEPS
What Jed to the defeat of democracy and to so easy a victory
of Communism in Czecho'8lovakia in February 1948, that !s a theme
that wrn be expounded In as many books and dlssertations as there
are vlews on that subject. Consequently dates and events wlll be multiplied. However, lt must remain lndisputably true that the date of
June 25, 1945, ls a sad one, lndeed.
On that f-ateful day the Czech socialist parties represented by
Dr. Peter Zenkl, F'ierlinger and Gottwald, got together and w.illingly
concluded an agreement whereby tbe "Na;tiona,J Front of tbe Worklng
People" was formed. Slnce no one threatened the soclalists, lt was not
clear agalnst whom the National Front was established.
It is botb !nteresting and slgnificant ,that not a single Slovak
attended lhat meeting and that among those who called it were Dr.
Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka and other leaders of Dr. Benes' old
National Socialist Party - tbe very same people wbo today are telling the American public and the world that they always bated the
Reds and thrut tbe Red.s ousted them from Government.
But the truth is somethlng else again. The fact 1s that both
7.enkl and Ripka welcomed tbe Communisls, sought their favor, and
wanted to win political prestige w!th lhe help of the Reds at the
expense of the other polltical partles. Of course, today we know tbat
they failed. The same thing happened to them that had ba<ppened
SLOVAKIA
67
and is still happening to all those who try to collaborate with the
Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are worth,
and then s1w allow them up or get rid of them.
The "National Front of the Worklng People" created a "Centra!
Coordinating Committee," In which every a.ffiliated party had an
equal number of representatives. This commlrtee had the task of
coordinating the work of the socialist parties. The socialist bloc prepared the ground for the various actlv!ties which led to the suppression of politlcal and reli~ious freedom and were the first steps taken
toward a sociall11t dictatorship.
The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the Agraria:n
Party would be suppressed, the Catbolic Eagle organization outla,wed
and fäat Catholic youth, as such, would not be allowed to organize.
Together .they worked out a pian whereby the non-Communist peasant
votes would be done away with and, at the same time, how tbese
ľOtes, together with the Commuruist-controlled peasant unions, would
be brought lnto the Communist Party. They also created and later
legalized the Communist trade organizatlons, then the non-political
Federation of Farmers and the United Youth Organization - au of
which were supposed to be formed by the joint particlpatlon of all
parties, but actually served only to communize Czecho,Slovakia trom
the time they began to functlon.
Therefore, lt is not true that Zenkl, Rlpka, and Vilem, and other
Social Democrats opposed Communist hegemony from the beginning,
but the truth is that from the moment they accepted the so-called
" Košice Agreement," they were always subordinate to and In the
train of the Communlst Party and willingly continued that way not
only on Russlan soil, or In Russian-occupied Košice, but a!so in
"lib erated" Pl'ague. Even the "Joint Declaration" to the nation of
June 28, 1945, 1s indisputable proof of the fact that they wanted to
get into government with the help of the Communists even at the
expense of democracy, Christlanity and freedom.
This is a sound lesson for all who would collaborate with Communists. AU such people are digging their own graves, because
Communism recognizes no agreements, concessions or compromises,
and sw.allows up all who collaborate with it. This was made quite
clear in the case of Husák, Clementis and Novomeský. They were
exploited by the men of the Kremlin as long as they were needed
to install Communist dictatorship over the Slovak people. But once
that task was accomplished, they were discarded.
In like manner the Commull'ists dumped Zenkl and Ripka, and
thelr companions, and replaced them with Dr. Neuman, Ing. Šlechta
and others; but even the latter will wlnd up the same way as Clement!s and his companions dld. So will also those non--Communists in
Bratislava who even today try to collaborate with the Reds. But not
all will be lucky enough to escape Red "justlce."
Zenkl, Rlpka and thelr eompa:nions pose as martyrs of Communist
injustlce as they bask in the sunshine of Amerlcan freedom, but the
fact 1s that they were a substantia! part of the "National Front of
the Working People" and, tberefore, helped to install the reign of
Communist lnjustice in Czecho-Slovakia in 1945 .
•
•
•
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Edward Beneš - Stalin's Stooge
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Michael Zibrin
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952
pp. 52-57
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Zibrín, Michal, 1899-1968
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1952
name
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/73ed61a7432b837fbbfd88aed839943e.pdf
a139e2a752f4a4675e186a5ee6b6a376
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
~2
----------------------------JANO.ŠIK -
THE SWVAK ROBIN HOOD
IVAN HOUDEK
Much has been written about Juro (George) Jánošik, the les.der
of the Slovak mountaln boys, w,bo has b&come the greatest Jegendary
hero in Slovakia country, and undouMedly much more wtll still be
written about hlm In hls natlve !and where hls name ls an insplration to both the old and the young. lt ls rather approprlate <to recall,
at thls tlme, the &Xploits of bis so-called rebel against society in
his day, for Jánošík ls the symbol ot a people's just indignatlon
agadnst lnjustlce and oppresslon, as well as a symbol of hope of
ultimate vlctory of jusit.lce and ot truth.
The sources from which we were able to draw a reillable character sketch of thls remarkable man are twofold: the offlcial r&cords
of his tria!, and the numerous folk songs, storles, and lege,ndary accounts of his explolt.s. The forwer are ne,cess,ar!ly dry, the latter rich
and varled. Th ese sources represent people, of confllctlng vlews:
the one class feared and hated the hold youth as its enemy; the
other loved and immol'tallz&d hlm as a natlonal hero. lt is a dlfficult
task to reconclle these wldely dlvergent points of vlew and, yet, these
sources, whlch glve us two dlfferent plctures of hlm, are not re,ally
contradlctory, but rather complement each other.
The orlglnal Lartln,Slovak judlclal documents were kept In a
~peclall file In the coun,ty archlve,s of the Liptov Dis.trlct records, in
St. Mlkulal'i, the county seait. Unfortunately, these disappeared rather
mysterlously In the second half of the last century. Duplicates of
these documents, howe,ver, have been preserved and thelr contents
were flrst publlclzed by Gaspar Fejerpataky in tb.e Vlastenský Kalendár (1831-1832). These are a faithful copy of the authentlc record
known as F assio Janossikiana, dated 1713. In 1880, Paul Dobšinský
publ!shed hls vlews in the Prostonarodné Obyčaje (National Customs) In tbe Slovak Museum's publlcatlon ot <that year Muf. sl. spol.;
VIIl,Podtatranský Juro J ánoiik). Paul Sochaň's Zbojnik Juro J ánoifk, published Jn 1924, 1s a good source ot inform-atlon and from lt
and the other contemporary records and Jegendary accounts whlch
have been handed down for gene,rablons, we are able to reconstruct
most of the scenes of the Ume and re-enact the events In the Ufe
of thls popular hero, so that they may be consldered to be truly
hl.storlcal, not merely legendary.
Both sources glve Ťarchová In Trenčfn County as hls blrthplace,
where he wa,s born about 1688. But research has lndlcated tbat Jánoillk was actually born on a small farm In the bighlands In tbe vlclnlty
of that hamlet, and the, spot today ls marked by a small, dllapldated
hut wlth the number "676" on lt. It stands between two llnden trees
In a place caaled Janošov, whlch boasts of a populatlon of 17 persona,
most ot wbom bea.r the name Jánošlk.
Jánošfk was s tm a chlld when the revolutlon under Rakoczy II
(1703-1711) took place,, but he jolned the lnsurgents, whose motto, "Pro
Llberate," was emblazoned on thelr banner. Later, he jolned the lmperlal army and was sent to Bytča Castle as a guard, where he met
�SLOVAKIA
43
one of the Emperor's prisoners, an adventurous brigand and soldler of
fortune, Thom-as Uhorčik. Thls fateful acqualntance proved to be the
turning-point of bis life.
Rakoczy's iJHaited rebellion was purt down In 1711, and the
youthful Jánošlk returned horne after belng ransomed out of the
army by his paren,t s. Tradltion has it that he bocame an outlaw
and a highiw,ayman because his father was flogged to death by the
lord of the manor when he refused to leave the deathbed of bis wlfe
in order to work in the fields of hls master. This fatal flogg·i ng took
place in Ťarohová, at the vlllage bridge, aocording to one account,
and at the castle In Teplice in Žilina, according to another report.
The judic-lal documents, however, merely record ,the fact that Uhorčlk,
who had escaped from prlsón, had come to Ťarchová and had persuaded J ánošlk to join his robber b and in the forest.
As a background to the future of Jänošlk, lt may be well t o r&call that social conditions in Slovakla at the tlme were, perhaps, at
their worst. The Revdlution had falled, but many a peasanťs son was
unw!Hlng to bow down under the yoke of a feudal system after tastlng
freedom as a sold,ier of fortune. Conditions among the peasants in
the klngdoon of Rungary after t,he death of the liberal monarch,
"Mathias th e J ust," became steadily worse until they became unbearable. The peasants' revolt under George Doža in Tran.sylv ania and in
the Dolná. valley was cruelly stamped out by lihe nobffllty, and the
lot of the peasants was vlrtual ~lavery.
Although t!he rlght to emigrate was restored to the peasantry, In
view of the fact that the people were subject to burdensome taxatlon
and many restrlctlons, their status by the end of the seventeenth
century had grown worse, so that In reality the nobility had assumed
the .rlght of life and death over its subjects. The Slovaks, especially,
beoame the vlctims of a cunnlng and unscrupulous no)>llirty whtc'h en.;;Javed them. Frequent cla.ss struggles, wars. and plagues added to the
mlsfortunes of the Slovak people. Many areas were reduced to poverty-stI'icken regfons where extreme mlsery and want prevalled.
Northern Slovakia which had, perhaps, suffered the most in
these trying <limes, became the horne of the discontented, the dise ouraged, and the desperate. These men organized rob'ber banda
and preyed on t!he surroundlng countryside from th eir mountain hideouts. Tbomas Uborčik was a member of one of these bands as early
as 1704. J ánošfk became a member in 1711, after taking tbe briganďs pledge and sealing bis oath w.! th bis blood. Hls explolts soon
won hlm far-reaching fame not only In hls own country, but also in
Moravla, P dland, Hungary and Silesla. After belng elected chleftiain,
the youthful bandlt extended the zone of bis operatlons from tbe
eastern count!es of Liptov, Spiš, Orava, Turiec Tekov, Malohont,
and Šariš to Zvolen, Trenčln, and Nitra, and even crossed lnto Mora.vla, SHesla, Poland and Hungary.
Hls comrades were, accord!ng to bis own ·a dmlsslon: Tihomas
lJhorčlk (•Uhrlk); Paul Gašparec-Mlynarčlk from Rakov; Barte, the
sbepherd from Predmier; "Red" Ondraš from D1há; Plavčlk from
Dunajov; Gábor trom Valkov; Juro Turlak (Hun<:aga or Hunčlk);
Kubo Chlastiak trom Otožnlc; J urlak, Sato ra, Gavel, and aeveral
Poles. Not a few secret accompllces, llke J uro and Kubo štukovec In
Kräsna, furnlsbed hlm wlth suppl!es and informatlon.
�f4
SLOVAKIA
Folk stories about this interesting outlaw are, undoubtedly, gullty
of several anachroni.sms. They list the following as Ms associatss:
Uhorčik, Gajdošík-Mlynárčik, Surovec, Hrajnoha, Adamčik, llčík (the
chief scout), Garaj, Postavčík, Tarke, Mucha, Durica. Most of these,
however, were not even Jánošik's contemporaries. F or lnstance,
James Surovec, from Rovný In Trenčin, who terrorized Orava, Trenčín, and Pohroni&, wa.s not born untH 1715, two years after Jánošik's
death, and he himself was executed fn 1740. Hrajnoba, the famous
dancer from Nitra, lived in the middle of the 18th century and wai;
broken on the wheel in !lbe Smolen Castle. In 1878 Hrajnoha's treasure was unearthed by some laborers who were buildíng a highway
1:ear Nadaš. Adamčfk was a notorious bandit in Moravia, and Ilčik
lived in Trenčin. Garaj must have preceded Jánoš!k, because a brook
ls mentioned by that name in the judlclal documents covering the
tria! of Slovakia's most famous outlaw. Some of J ánošik's asso ciates
are, perhaps, p.roducts of Lhe popular imaginatlon.
A triangular area, known as the K ing's Plateau, lies on a hlgh
point overlooking the countles of Liptov, the Hron area and Malohont,
near Hochwald, or Hovald, at a spot known as the "Tall Plne," directly above the road runnlng from Liptov to Spiš. This region was at
one time covered with a thick forest, which was the hiding place of
robber gangs in every century. Q.ueen Maria T,h eresa destroyed th!s
picturesque rendezvous of the hlghwaymen by havlng the forest cut
down by royal proclamatlon. But in J ánošík's time, thls area was the
favorite h:rnnt of brigands, and lt was there that Lord Jáu Radvanský,
whlle on bis way to tbe funeral of the former revolutionary general.
Petrcx:zy, was robbed by tbe Slovak Robin Hood. Lord Paul Revay,
Lady Schardon, and Lord Ladlslaus Zmeškal were also held up in t hls
region by Jánošík's merry band. Lord Skalka fell into their hands,
as dld Sipoš trom Žilina, some hO'rse dealers from the same town,
~everal wine merchants, and many others.
Some of the booty was given to the poor and needy. Henc e, the
story c irculated that Jánošik robbed 1he rich to give to tbe poor.
This is not quite In keeping with the facts, for h!s comrades preyed
upon the lower classe.s as well as on the wealthy nobillty. The jewels
1aken from Lord Skalka were dlstrfäuted among the young ladies In
Ťa-rcbová. Romantic tales, which bave little historical basis, however, h ave become a part of the Jánošik saga in Slovakia. The authentic documents do not even allude to most of t,he feats attributed
to Slovakla's legendary hero.
At bis trlal, Jánošik admltted that he often raided the sheepfolds
of the lords of the manor, that some of tbe shepherds, elther trom
ľear of friendsbip, cooperated in these robberies and tben accompanled bim to celebra.te at the "Black Ant" In Klenovce, owned by
tbe lnn-keeper, Martin Mravec, or at the "Wbite Horse" in Dunajov,
and sometlmes at the "Blne Star" In Krásna, or tbe "Golden Eagle"
in Ťarcbová.
Winter tlme fonnd the moun,taln boys seeklng employment In tbe
nearby bomesteads b ecanse the snow would bave betrayed thelr footprlnts leadlng to their 'bldlng-places, deep In the plne forests of
Klng's Plateau. Tbus, Jánošík served as a farmhand ln tbe wlnter
of 1712-1713 at Kovatlčik's and Ondrejčik's In Kokava. In tbe .~pring
they bastened to tbeir mountaln rendezvous at tbe foot of the Tall Pine.
�SLOVAKIA
45
Jánošík's romantic career as Slovak!a's Robin Hood W'3.S a short
one, Jastlng Jess tban two years. Although he escaped after his flrst
ťapture at Klooovce in the autumn of 1712, he was caught in tbe
summer of tbe next year. The commissioner at Malohont had granted
him an amnesty after he had been confined in Jakoffy Ca.stle in
Hrachov, but aMer tbe county po'l!ce of Liptov arrested bim he neveT
regained bis rreedom. No ofriclal record glves us the exact details
of bis final capture; but, accordlng to tradition, Jánošik was apprebended elther b&eause of the treachery of one of his band, namely,
Gajdošík, who had given away t he secret of bis ch!eťs gigant!c
strength (the mag-ic belt), or because of the treachery of J ánošik's
rormer swðeart, w·ho ,!ost her heart to the Police Captaln Joseph
Lehotský, when he came to ber father's inn, the Golden Goose,
in searcb of the renowned outlaw. The scene of bis arrest, in the flr&t
version, was said to have been In the Little Mountain Inn in Polhora,
Zvolen County, between Brru:no and Tisovec. At any rate, t he famed
outlaw was taken in chalns to Liptov, where he was lodged in Vranov Castle, bui1lt by Franei11 Palugyay. There, In a dark celi, Jánoš!k
was chained to the wall to await his tria! and death.
Jánošik was aHowed to plead bis case. He pleaded gullty to
c·ertain charges of robbery, but denied havlng committed crlmes attributed to him. Some or the acts he was accused of were perpetrat&d whlle he was In prison. Thus, he denied having anything to do
with the robbery of a priest from Orava, or the hold-up or Vitko from
Sllesia, the murder of the blacksmlth's son in Dobrovce, the robblng
of the Galusovecs, the looting of churches in Hungary, PO'land, Slles!a,
or Moravia, where the sacrilegious robbeľl! are alleged to have nailed
the sacred hosts to a tree in order to determine whether blood would
flow from them when ahots were flred into the.m. He was also accused of having freed one of bis band as he was ll!bout to be hanged
in Žilina. It ls notewor.thy that the county sheriff, John L itlský, and
!he mayor of the town of Osčadn!ce were suspected or being overly
friendly w!th Jánošik.
To au the charges of which he was ra,sely accused the stoutllea!'ted robber-chieftain simply pleaded innocent. Attempts to prove
that he was in collusion wi,th other notorious brlgands in Slovakla,
Poland, and Hungary were unsuccessful. Wben he was accused of
having sbot a priest from Domanlže, 4t was proved that two or bis
associates, Tu ria k and PJavčlk, had comml tted this dastardly crime
in bis absence. No crime, other .than robbery, was p.roved against
JáJ!lošlk, w,bo never killed anyone. But in those days a !Jhief, as well
as a murderer, might be hanged.
Legendary accounts of tbe tria:! picture Jánošík as remaining
silent about the ldenUty of bis comrades, but the officlal records
indlcate that he gave the Court a list of ťbelr names, but refused to
reveal their whereabouts. As to the burled treasure, he told bis
llsteners that it was hidden in a Jarge fir <tree opposlte an oak on
whioh a hand was carved lndlcatlng the exact locatlon of the flr
tree, In the glade where the road winds down {rom Jablonka to Klenovce. Lord Ska\ka's jewels he had hidden In the mountalns of
Handlov, althougb legends have it they were bestowed on the matdens
of the village of Ťarcbová.
�SLOVAKIA.
Jánošik was tried by the county court of Liptov, presided over by
the vice-commissioner, Ladts laus Okol!csany•I, on March 16-17, 1713, in
the county courthouse of St. Mlkulaš In Liptov. The other members
of the court were the magl.strates of the four dlstrict-s ot Liptov
county, namely, John and AndTew Rády, Andrew Andreanský, and
Matthew Joob. The oftlclal prosecutor was Alexander Cemlcký, and
the attorney for the defense was Balthasar Palugyay. The d&fense
p leaded guilty to the charges of robbery and asked the clemency of
the Cour,t. Moreover, Jánošík promLsed to glve up bis former way of
llfe .and wlshed to become once a.gain a 0aw-abldlng cLtlzen. The prosecutlon, however, demanued tihe hig,hest penalty and succeeded in
exactlng a two-fold sentence from the Court, so that the "doubledeallng" prisoner mlght !lrst pay the penalty for bis lighter crlmes
by belng tortured on the rack, and then by belng hanged on the
gallows to forfeit hls llfe for bis graver transgress1ons. T hls was in
accordance witJb the laws o! the TripaTtitum ot 1515, 1625, and 1655.
The death sentence was carrled out on March 17 or 18, 1713,
before a vast assembly of people, on the executlon grounds of St.
Mfäulaš, on the Váh near the Paludzký bridge. There the young
robber-chleftaln was hanged on the gaHows, and bis llteless body was
buried beneath lt as the custom of thatl. ttme.
Äccordlng ,to the popular legends, Jánošík, though welgbed down
by bis heavy shackles, danced the "hajduc hy" (a llvely folk da.nce)
four tlmes aTound the gal!ows, just before bis death. Another legendary story tells or a courler who came dlrectly from the Emperor
with hls lmperlal pardon, ,but lt was too late, for the darlng you.th,
who h-ad prom.lsed to recrult four reglment.q of soldlers for the Emperor, was aAready hanglng on the rack. H e refused the amnesty
wtth the words, "Now tha,t you have roasted me, you might as well
devour me." He ls said to have dled after belng suspended by hls rib
on the rack for three days.
All natme seemed to go lnto mouring for this yout:h, whose mel'lry
songs once resounded through the glen. The babbl!ng brooks became sllent, ťhe anlmals In the forest ceased their act!vity momentarlly in silent trlbute to their departed hero. A sudden hush came
over all, and bis many trlends, far and near, were overcome by
sorrow at bis passing. An annual penalty was lmposed on Liptov
by the Emperor for havlng sentenced Jánošík to death, and, untll
~ecent times, four measures of gold ducats were pald to the lmperillll
treasury each year. That is the story In legendary accounts.
The people belleved in Jánošík's nobillty of character. It ls sald
that hls body was buried In a crypt of the church of St. Mikulaš,
where it lles In state of comp]ete preservation awaltlng the day when
a new Jánošik wlll arise and strlke down the oppressors of hls
poople. Many years a1!ter thls sad event, lt was reported thatl. whlle
some youngsters were p.laylng nea,r the town of Hajasov, one of the
boys play,f ully l!fle'd the corner of a nearby hut and hld hls cap underneath. 'Ilhls feat or amazing strength reached -the eaTs of the
nobMity, ,viho qulckly remov.ed thls new performer, whom they consldered another Jánošlk.
Jánošik's execution was the slgnal for the authorities to capture
all the remalnlng outla,ws stm at large in Slovakla. Emerich Kublny,
The reglstrar of Liptov, was sent to Malohont wltb warra,nts to arrest
�SLOVAKIA
au
suspec.ts. In Apr!l, Uhorčik, alias M.a.rtin Mravec, was captured
at St. Mlkulaš, where he had marrled and seltled down as a tavern•
keeper, lhe proprletor of llhe Gray Failcon. He was given a hasty
trlal and condemned to d1e on the rack. An lmperiaI decree was
issued by whlch bhe county magistrates would be held r-esponslble
in the future for all banditry In thelr areas, and on April 17, 1713, the
assembly at Liptov approved of the motlon to round up the outlaws. The imperlal marshal, John Palty, arrived to enforce the emperor's ln&tructlons.
Authentlc documents, w'ith the record of Jánošlk's apprehenslon
.and ,tria!, make b.lm out to be an ordlnary hlghwayman, simllar to
hundreds of •bis klnd who roamed about the country and terrorlzed
the gentry. He was consldered to be a da,ngerous chaTacter, as were
the others of hla notorlous professlon. Neveiitheless, the fa,ct that
hls name has become an lllustrlous one In the Jegendary songs e.nd
storles of h1s people, la In sharp contrast wlth the oi'ficlal p!cture or
thls colorful, albelt lawless, personallty. The questlon arlses, why
·has he, alone, maintalued bis posltlon as an !dol ot the Slovak natlon? Obviously, he must have been dltferent from all bis companions
and con.temporarles, both In vice and vlrtue. Although lihe aura of
glory and honor that surrounds bis memory ls no doubt the result,
in some measure, of th-e people's rich lmaglnatlon, yet, bis deeds
durlng bis llfe are a,n argument In favor of some · outstan.dlng quallties
in hls makeup. We cannot account for h1s tremendous popularity
among the people, nor can we explain why bis name Ls a symbol
ot vlntue rather than vice, UDJ!ess we attrlbute vlrluous qua!itles to
t his youth who so fired the lmagination of the old and the young
that he has become the Jmmortal hero of bis natlve !and.
·T he areas known as th'e "Queen's Meadow, Warm Sprlngs," and
many other regions In tre Pohron and Malohont dl.strlcts, aboun.d
even today In folk songs, ballads, and storles of bis explolts ln be·
half of the poor and lhe oppres.sed.
We can safely conclude that the offlclal records suppressed
muoh of the truth in regard to Jánošik's aotual personallty and deeds.
Slnce he was the self-constltuted champlon of the 01>pressed everywhere, one can understand why bis name should be slmp4y put on the
11st as an ordina1-y cť.iminal by the oppressors, who used thelr power
to llquldate all fäose who were dangerous rebels agalnst thelr form
of soclety. But despite thelr precautlons, Jánošlk's name, for almost
two and a half centurles, has been the symbol of hope and courage
to bis people.
Unllke other parts ot the Austrlan Emplre, which revoJ.ted trom
time to tlme (Magyar, Romanian, Croatlan and Serblan outbreaks
occurred lntermlttently ln 1514, 1569, 1'571, 1635, 1655, 1784, etc.),
the Slovaks revolted oilliy once. Thls uprlslng happened In the
Potlsle reglon when a rumor was spread througbout Eastern Slovakla
that the nobility had polsoned their wells. It turned out, however,
that the cause ot wldespread death w.a,s actually the chlorea epldemic of that year, 1631. Historloal facts make it evldent that the
S!ovaks were a patient peoplil who would not rise In rebelllon In defense of thelr Jlfe as a natlon.
Passlv& endurance and reslstance under the merclless system
ot polltlcal oppression was, however, aC'companled by the actlve revolt
�48
SLOVAKIA
of the more hlghly spirited Slovak youths, who rebelled against the
existing order of things by tak!ng the law lnto their own hands, and
,by retlring lnto -the.lr mountain strongholds from which they emerged
at nigbt to rígbt tbe wrongs inflicted on tbeir people. Tbey pa.id for
their daring and coul'age by their lives, sooner or later. But t heir
sprit kept alive 1'he spark of freedom and the love of justice in the
bearts of tbe Slovak.s. They wer e, to be sure, common felons and
blackguards among tbe forest bigbwaymen, but Jánošík was not one
of them. He was the true embodiment of bis age, wild and untamed
but not ignoble and ruthless, not savage and unrestralned, b ut gallant,
generous, honest, and ·honorable with his people.
T he first at:tiempts to trace the popular series of Slovak poem s,
ballads, songs, and legends were made in the early l&tb century.
T~b lic published a poem entltled "J ánoší k, lyptovský loupežník"
(J ánošik the Robber of Liptov) in his collection called Slovenšti
ve ršovc i (Vol. II, 1809). Ján Konár discovered several poems a bout
S lovak h ighwaymen and published them in bis Národné Zpievanky
(National Ballads) in 1834 and 1835. Slovak news-buHetins a nd almanacs contained poems and folk stories about Jánošik. The Časopis
a Sborní k Muzeál nej Slovens kej Spo ločnosti (The Periodical and
Almanac of the Slovak Museum Association) also published a number
of works on J ánošik, based largely on early manuscrip,ts found in the
museums in Liptov and Ružomberok. The Matica Slovenská (Slovak
Institute) planned to continue its splendid task of collecting these old
publica,!Jions, wihich are rich in folklore. By bhe m iddle of the l as.t
century, the last of the outlaws in Slovakia had disappeared, but
the stories of their daring exploits contlnued to interes.t the common people because of their highly imaginatlve appea,i.
J ánošik's fame is preserved for the ages in the many poems that
have been a distinct contribution to his nation's literature. The following poems have immortalized bis memory: Paul Šafarik's "Jáno.
šík" in the S laveni pac holu S lovanských 1814; Absolon Meško's
" Pieseň Jánošíková," 1842, (S lovenské Pohrady, 1897, sqq.); Michal
Hodž.a's poem in the Mator; Sáva Pepkin-Medňanský's "J á nošík" in bis
Poezi, Vol II ; Ján Botto's "Piese: J á nošíková" in Zpevy, 1847, and
"Sm rť J ánošíková" in Lipa; Samo Chalupk a's " Likavský Väzeň" In
the Orol, 1846, "Na K ráľovej Holí," 1862, and "Ju nak," 1860; August
Lojko's "Jánoš íkov Stol" and " Jánoší ková Podkova"; J akub Graich•
mann's " Horní Chla pc i' in the Sokol, 1861); William P auliny-Toth's
" Jánoš ík s mi lou"; Ján ČaJák's "Já noší k" in the Oro l, 1870. a nd
" J á nošíková Náhrada," 1875; J onas Záborský's "Smrť J á nošíková"
In the S lov. Po h ľady, 1894.
Paul Beblavý wrote an interesting his.torlcal story about bim in
the S lov. Pohrady, 1889; Augustus Marschal-Petrovský, a long no ve!,
J á nošík, Kapi t á n Ho rských Chlapcov, In 1901. Samo Zdyobavský wrote
a play, J ánošík; J ona:s Zaborský, a drama, Jánošíková Večera ;
Michal Skačkanský, a tragedy, J á nošík, 1880; Ľud. Kubaný, a play,
Ho rní Chlapci ; Júr Mahen, a moving lragedy, Jánošík, 1910; Frances
Svoboda-Goldman, a histoi,ical drama: J ohn P orod, a play, J á noliik,
1928, etc. Other articles and historlcal .•tudles about bim were written
by ,the followlng: Gaspar Fejérpal11ky In Vlaste nský Kal endár,
1831: Stephen Hýroš In his Zá mok Ly ka va, 1876; Pavel Dobšinský ln
Prostonárod né obyčaje, 1880; Rudolph Pokorný's Z potulek po
�SLOVAKIA
49
Slovensku, 1883; Ján Bobula's Jánošík, 1863; K. Salva-Cebradskťs
Jánošík; Julius Botto in bis article "Leopold I and Francis Rákoczi
II" ln the Slov. Pohrady, 1904 mentions Jánoš í; Carl Kálaľs Slováci a
Slovensko, 1905, and bis Na Krásnem Slovensku, 1903; Oarl Dúbravský's Jánošík, 1911; Gregor Uram·Podtatranský's "Juro Jánošík in
the S bor. Muz. Slov. Sp. VIII, 1908; J aroslav Tuma's "Jánoší k," in
1911, Naše Slovensko; Michal Jiránek's " Zbojníci" in Slov. Čitanka,
1911; Samo Czambeľs "Jánošík" in Páričkov's Ružomberský Ka lendár,
1913; Joseph Škultety's Jánošíková Doba" in Slov. Pohrady, 1913;
Jgnac Gessay in the A!Lmanac of the Slovák v Amerike; Pavel Sochaň's
"Zbojník Juro Jánoší k," 1924. Ján L. Bella put Botto's poem "Svadba
Jánošíková" to music for solo, with piano accompan.lment and oches-
tr-ation. Vitezslav Novák also composed an orginaJ musical score on
the subject called "Jánošík," which is to be found in Mladí, op. 55.
Almost without exception the foregoing works pre.sented Jánošík
as bhe idol of bis people, as por,trayed in bhe folk songs and ballads
which have become a rich heritage of the Slovak nation. In some
he is a patriot, in others a young t,beologian who has been Jed away
from bis hlgb calling by the cruel circumstamces of bis tlme, ,vthile
in all of them, with one exception, he ls depicted as a knightly hig,h•
wayman who ls devoted to bis poor, oppressed poople. The one exception is Pavel Sochaň, who endeavors to debunk all the Iegendary
glory surrounding the name o! Jánošík by basing bis Zbojník Juro
Jánošík, akým bol v Skutočnosti (The Reail Jánošik) entirely on the
cas~ records found in the County Court House of Liptov. But this
is, perha,ps, the passing fancy of the times, to smash all the traditional
ldols of bbe past, and Sochaň is one of tbls class of modern iconoclasts. Despite his efforts and those of others to defame the character
of tlhe l~gendary heroes of yesterday, the fact remains that Jánoš!k
has been an influence in popular Slovak poetry, llterature, and drama,
and his name is imperisbable in tbe history of bis people. Botto's
poems, alone, would make bis fame immortaJ.
Not only did Slovak and Czech wrlters devote their talent.s
to the singing o! •bis praises, but we find that the Polisb autbor,
Przerwa-Tetmajer, wrote a whole ser.les of ballads about bim, as well
as a beautlful, touobingľ poem about bis deatb. His collection of fables,
folk stori~. folk songs, and poems ( Báje z Tatier) was very popular
in bis n,a tive Poland. Vlad. Hnatjuk, ťhe famous Ukralnian etbnographer, wrote a treatise on Jánošík in 1889, and included numerous
Slovakian songs about this national figure in bis collection of Russian, Slovak, Moravjan, and Polisb folklore.
Jánoš!k has been the frequent subject of creatlve are in bis
native country. Tbus, his likeness appears on glassware, prlmitive
palntings, pottery, etc., in wbicb he and his gay mountain Iads are
shown dres.sed in green blouses, red and wbite breecbes, shlny black
boots, gally colored hats wlťb feathers in tbem, wďde walsbbands
ricbly studded with gold, silver, and precious stones, and armed with
muskets and hatcbets (valašky). J ánošik always has the place of
honor as tbe leader, while Surovec is sbown brandishlng bis valaška; Hrajnoba shoots off tbe tip of a tall plne as he Ieaps high lnto
the air in a playful mood; and Gajdošik plays h!s bagpipes, wbile tbe
others dance to bis mountain music. Tbe Slovak art!sts, Mikulaš Aleš,
:\fartln Benka, and Ján Alexy, have made palntlngs of J ánoli!k. Tbe
�liO
sculptor Franta Uprka made a number of fJgures of Jánošlk and his
companions, the best of them being hls sculpture of the entlre group
gathered around a bontlre on the mountalntop near the Tall Fine.
l,'. Fulla executed a gorgeous linoleum design of the group. Vla.dyslav
Skovzylaš, a Polls'h artist, ma.de several exqulsite wood carvings of
these T atra mountaineers of Jong ago. Among them are one ot Jánošlk, alone, another of Jánošík and hls sweetheart, one of his profile,
and a fourth of b.is men on the march.
Jánošlk's buried treasure has engaged the popular lmaginat!on
everywhere in Slovakia for centuries. The probable hlding places
most frequently mentloned are: Kozia Skala, located In the šutov
valiey in Turiec; Jánoiíkoá Pivnica, a cavern near Balna In tbe valley
of Nemecká Lupča; Biela Skala in the Suchá Valley near Liptov; and
Zemský Kľúč. Belopotecký's Mss., 1835, now in t'he Liptov Museum
in Ružoml>erok, refers to all these places, besldes Pod Jedlou near
Trnovec in Liptov, the Baránec Meadow near St. Andrew's in Liptov
county, and many others. Pavel Sochaň's "Jánošíkové Poklady" in the
Slov. Pohra.dy, 1922-23, and Ján Poroďs "Poklad a iné povesti z okolia Bytče" also conta.in clues to lhe secret hlding places of gold,
silver and gems. Numerous al'tlcles have appeared in the off-lclal publlcatlons of the Sborník Muz. Sl. Spol. in recent years under the title
of "Jánošíkov Poklad. Emo Bohúň wrote a fantastlc novel on the
subject.
The following places have been named after the famous outaaw:
Jánošíková Kolkáreň (JáJnošlk's Bowling Alley) located In Liptov;
Jánošíkové Husle (Jánošik's F\iddle) in Malé Smrekovice; Jánošíková
Jaskyňa (Jánošilťs Cave) in the Prosiecká valley; Jánošíkov Stôl
(Jánošlk's Table) In Važec; Jánošíkové Sedlo (Jánošlk's Sa.ddle) in
the Queen's Meadow; Jánošíková Stupa (Jánošík's Footprlnt) in !;he
Gadierská valley, In Turiec; Jánošíková Stolica (Jánošlk's County in
the v;ratná valley Ťarchová; Jánošíková Skala (Jánošlk'c Rock) at
L1šenlk, near Polhora, Zvolen county; Jánošíkov Chodník (Jánošlk's
Path) and Jánoš íková Jaskyňa (Jánošík's Cave) near Tisovce; Jánošíková Podkova (Jánošík's Horseshoe) in the Rimavská valley under
Zlamenečin Hill; 81lld Jánošíkov Skok (Jánošlk's Leap) at Dunajec.
These and many otber names wlll preserve the name of Jánošík even
ir all poems and stories about hlm dlsappear.
Jánošlk'.s hat 1s in the Liptov museum in Ružomberok. lt 1s ma.de
of clot1h rlohly embroidered with gold Jace and decorated with mussel shells, and is higb and cyllndrical in shape. Hls hatchet ls now in
the natlonal museum at Budapest, whlle his plpe 1s in the Slovak Instltute's collection. Th~ famous belt, whlch had been given hlm by a
fairy and was sald to have glvsn the Slovak hero preternatural powers,
is now in t,he Slovak Nat1ooal Museum In St. Martln's in Turiec. A cane
and tJwo ancient plctures or 'h ls band depicted on glass are there a lso.
Two plctures or him are In the collectlon of the Moravian Natural
Museum In Brno. The Liptov Museum at Ružomberok has a photograph of hls halrchet, a copy of the paintlngs Iu Brno, a copy ot the
orlginal court records ot t,he tria! of Jánošík, several palntlngs by Fulla
and Skoczylaša, and a large number of llterary works. In Rovno, Joseph
Buchčar !s the proud po~essor ot an artlstlc leather belt, flllgreed
lengthwise wltn goose qullls, w'hicb was found In his old mlll Jn the
course ot some repairs. Although lt is sald that thls belonged to Jáno1
�SLOV.A.KU.
61
šik, it was more proba.bly the properly of Jánošík's lieutenant, Surovec,
as Rovno was Suroveťs horne town. The Tatranský Museum has six
old Polish g!ass likenesses of Jánošlk and hls merry men, similar to
the glassware in St. Martin's in Turiec. One, however, shows the outlaiws oarrying a bag of ducats, another has the picture ot his sweetheart. The collection there contains four pistols, ten knives, four
powder hom_s, and a bag in whlch the robbers used to carry thelr
stolen ducats.
Beneath the paintlngs of t?hese colorful personalitles of Slovak
folklore there !s a brief explanation of the lnitlatlon of new members
to the ro'bber gangs. 'l'hey were required to prove the:ir prowess In
,<,hooting oiif the tip of a tree with a pistol, or cuttlng lt otf wlth a
throw of the hatchet, by drinldng a bottle of brandy, and then by
performlng the d!fflcult "Robber's Dance." The lnitiat!on took p!ace in
the evenlng around thelr bonflre. Eaoh outlaw was armed to the teeth
wlth a hatohet in hls b elt, a brace of pistols, and a musket. Of course,
there was the powder horn, the wlde oell, the knapsack, a Hussar's
hat, and the bni:ghtly colored shirt and trousers to m ake up the rest
of the1r accoutrement. Jánošiťs breeohes were said to have been
red and w,hite In color.
It seems lncredible, in view of Jánošlk'.s fame, that no monument
stiands to honor his memory, or bhat no plaque marks bis birthplace.
But he llves in the hearts of •h is people, hence needs no image of iron
or stone to remind them of his life and his deeds. No other record
t:Xists of the merry mountain boys who had been Jánošílťs companions.
Mo.st probabtly they disbanded and under assumed names followed
peaceful and honorable professions until the end of thelr lives. Uhorčik, however, was cau~ht and executed; and "Red" Ondraš disappeared
In the vlclnlty of Tešlnka whlle Jánošik was stlll at Iarge.
'l1he woodlands grew silent and peaceful wlth the passlng of Jánošík from the scene. 'l'he songs of hls merry men were silenced forever, and the fores ts were left undisturbed for the deer, bear, fox, and
wlld boar as they went about unchallenged. And hlgh o'erhead, an
eagle on swift and silent wings surveyed the glen far below, abandoned
and cheerless, for tbe ,happy throng of Jánošik's youths ba.d dlspersed,
and their ohlef was dead. - (Slovenské Pohrady, V. XLV. Nos. 1-2,
1929).
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT ? "The Czechs bave been at all times all too
rea.dy to look on most Slovaks as Magyarones and potentlal traltors,
and have employed battallons of censors, police agents, and other
customary Instruments of unpopu!ar Governments, wblcb always end
by maklng the sltuation worse than hefore. Neltber the pollcy of
Prague nor the attltude of the Czech offlclals In Slovakla was al•
ways elther wlse or tactful. Tbe Czech Soclallsts. wbo played such
a large part in the Government or tlle flrst years, incorporated all
those Czech characterlstlcs most obnoxlous to the Slovaks. They were
crude, tbey were 111-mannered, tbey were aggresslvely egalitarlan, and
they were almost fanatlcally antl-clerlcal, seelng in the churches In
Slovakla a two-fold enemy. i<ocial and natlonal." - (C. A. Macartney:
H UNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS; 1937, London).
�
SLOVAKIA
~2
----------------------------JANO.ŠIK -
THE SWVAK ROBIN HOOD
IVAN HOUDEK
Much has been written about Juro (George) Jánošik, the les.der
of the Slovak mountaln boys, w,bo has b&come the greatest Jegendary
hero in Slovakia country, and undouMedly much more wtll still be
written about hlm In hls natlve !and where hls name ls an insplration to both the old and the young. lt ls rather approprlate <to recall,
at thls tlme, the &Xploits of bis so-called rebel against society in
his day, for Jánošík ls the symbol ot a people's just indignatlon
agadnst lnjustlce and oppresslon, as well as a symbol of hope of
ultimate vlctory of jusit.lce and ot truth.
The sources from which we were able to draw a reillable character sketch of thls remarkable man are twofold: the offlcial r&cords
of his tria!, and the numerous folk songs, storles, and lege,ndary accounts of his explolt.s. The forwer are ne,cess,ar!ly dry, the latter rich
and varled. Th ese sources represent people, of confllctlng vlews:
the one class feared and hated the hold youth as its enemy; the
other loved and immol'tallz&d hlm as a natlonal hero. lt is a dlfficult
task to reconclle these wldely dlvergent points of vlew and, yet, these
sources, whlch glve us two dlfferent plctures of hlm, are not re,ally
contradlctory, but rather complement each other.
The orlglnal Lartln,Slovak judlclal documents were kept In a
~peclall file In the coun,ty archlve,s of the Liptov Dis.trlct records, in
St. Mlkulal'i, the county seait. Unfortunately, these disappeared rather
mysterlously In the second half of the last century. Duplicates of
these documents, howe,ver, have been preserved and thelr contents
were flrst publlclzed by Gaspar Fejerpataky in tb.e Vlastenský Kalendár (1831-1832). These are a faithful copy of the authentlc record
known as F assio Janossikiana, dated 1713. In 1880, Paul Dobšinský
publ!shed hls vlews in the Prostonarodné Obyčaje (National Customs) In tbe Slovak Museum's publlcatlon ot <that year Muf. sl. spol.;
VIIl,Podtatranský Juro J ánoiik). Paul Sochaň's Zbojnik Juro J ánoifk, published Jn 1924, 1s a good source ot inform-atlon and from lt
and the other contemporary records and Jegendary accounts whlch
have been handed down for gene,rablons, we are able to reconstruct
most of the scenes of the Ume and re-enact the events In the Ufe
of thls popular hero, so that they may be consldered to be truly
hl.storlcal, not merely legendary.
Both sources glve Ťarchová In Trenčfn County as hls blrthplace,
where he wa,s born about 1688. But research has lndlcated tbat Jánoillk was actually born on a small farm In the bighlands In tbe vlclnlty
of that hamlet, and the, spot today ls marked by a small, dllapldated
hut wlth the number "676" on lt. It stands between two llnden trees
In a place caaled Janošov, whlch boasts of a populatlon of 17 persona,
most ot wbom bea.r the name Jánošlk.
Jánošfk was s tm a chlld when the revolutlon under Rakoczy II
(1703-1711) took place,, but he jolned the lnsurgents, whose motto, "Pro
Llberate," was emblazoned on thelr banner. Later, he jolned the lmperlal army and was sent to Bytča Castle as a guard, where he met
�SLOVAKIA
43
one of the Emperor's prisoners, an adventurous brigand and soldler of
fortune, Thom-as Uhorčik. Thls fateful acqualntance proved to be the
turning-point of bis life.
Rakoczy's iJHaited rebellion was purt down In 1711, and the
youthful Jánošlk returned horne after belng ransomed out of the
army by his paren,t s. Tradltion has it that he bocame an outlaw
and a highiw,ayman because his father was flogged to death by the
lord of the manor when he refused to leave the deathbed of bis wlfe
in order to work in the fields of hls master. This fatal flogg·i ng took
place in Ťarohová, at the vlllage bridge, aocording to one account,
and at the castle In Teplice in Žilina, according to another report.
The judic-lal documents, however, merely record ,the fact that Uhorčlk,
who had escaped from prlsón, had come to Ťarchová and had persuaded J ánošlk to join his robber b and in the forest.
As a background to the future of Jänošlk, lt may be well t o r&call that social conditions in Slovakla at the tlme were, perhaps, at
their worst. The Revdlution had falled, but many a peasanťs son was
unw!Hlng to bow down under the yoke of a feudal system after tastlng
freedom as a sold,ier of fortune. Conditions among the peasants in
the klngdoon of Rungary after t,he death of the liberal monarch,
"Mathias th e J ust," became steadily worse until they became unbearable. The peasants' revolt under George Doža in Tran.sylv ania and in
the Dolná. valley was cruelly stamped out by lihe nobffllty, and the
lot of the peasants was vlrtual ~lavery.
Although t!he rlght to emigrate was restored to the peasantry, In
view of the fact that the people were subject to burdensome taxatlon
and many restrlctlons, their status by the end of the seventeenth
century had grown worse, so that In reality the nobility had assumed
the .rlght of life and death over its subjects. The Slovaks, especially,
beoame the vlctims of a cunnlng and unscrupulous no)>llirty whtc'h en.;;Javed them. Frequent cla.ss struggles, wars. and plagues added to the
mlsfortunes of the Slovak people. Many areas were reduced to poverty-stI'icken regfons where extreme mlsery and want prevalled.
Northern Slovakia which had, perhaps, suffered the most in
these trying <limes, became the horne of the discontented, the dise ouraged, and the desperate. These men organized rob'ber banda
and preyed on t!he surroundlng countryside from th eir mountain hideouts. Tbomas Uborčik was a member of one of these bands as early
as 1704. J ánošfk became a member in 1711, after taking tbe briganďs pledge and sealing bis oath w.! th bis blood. Hls explolts soon
won hlm far-reaching fame not only In hls own country, but also in
Moravla, P dland, Hungary and Silesla. After belng elected chleftiain,
the youthful bandlt extended the zone of bis operatlons from tbe
eastern count!es of Liptov, Spiš, Orava, Turiec Tekov, Malohont,
and Šariš to Zvolen, Trenčln, and Nitra, and even crossed lnto Mora.vla, SHesla, Poland and Hungary.
Hls comrades were, accord!ng to bis own ·a dmlsslon: Tihomas
lJhorčlk (•Uhrlk); Paul Gašparec-Mlynarčlk from Rakov; Barte, the
sbepherd from Predmier; "Red" Ondraš from D1há; Plavčlk from
Dunajov; Gábor trom Valkov; Juro Turlak (Hun<:aga or Hunčlk);
Kubo Chlastiak trom Otožnlc; J urlak, Sato ra, Gavel, and aeveral
Poles. Not a few secret accompllces, llke J uro and Kubo štukovec In
Kräsna, furnlsbed hlm wlth suppl!es and informatlon.
�f4
SLOVAKIA
Folk stories about this interesting outlaw are, undoubtedly, gullty
of several anachroni.sms. They list the following as Ms associatss:
Uhorčik, Gajdošík-Mlynárčik, Surovec, Hrajnoha, Adamčik, llčík (the
chief scout), Garaj, Postavčík, Tarke, Mucha, Durica. Most of these,
however, were not even Jánošik's contemporaries. F or lnstance,
James Surovec, from Rovný In Trenčin, who terrorized Orava, Trenčín, and Pohroni&, wa.s not born untH 1715, two years after Jánošik's
death, and he himself was executed fn 1740. Hrajnoba, the famous
dancer from Nitra, lived in the middle of the 18th century and wai;
broken on the wheel in !lbe Smolen Castle. In 1878 Hrajnoha's treasure was unearthed by some laborers who were buildíng a highway
1:ear Nadaš. Adamčfk was a notorious bandit in Moravia, and Ilčik
lived in Trenčin. Garaj must have preceded Jánoš!k, because a brook
ls mentioned by that name in the judlclal documents covering the
tria! of Slovakia's most famous outlaw. Some of J ánošik's asso ciates
are, perhaps, p.roducts of Lhe popular imaginatlon.
A triangular area, known as the K ing's Plateau, lies on a hlgh
point overlooking the countles of Liptov, the Hron area and Malohont,
near Hochwald, or Hovald, at a spot known as the "Tall Plne," directly above the road runnlng from Liptov to Spiš. This region was at
one time covered with a thick forest, which was the hiding place of
robber gangs in every century. Q.ueen Maria T,h eresa destroyed th!s
picturesque rendezvous of the hlghwaymen by havlng the forest cut
down by royal proclamatlon. But in J ánošík's time, thls area was the
favorite h:rnnt of brigands, and lt was there that Lord Jáu Radvanský,
whlle on bis way to tbe funeral of the former revolutionary general.
Petrcx:zy, was robbed by tbe Slovak Robin Hood. Lord Paul Revay,
Lady Schardon, and Lord Ladlslaus Zmeškal were also held up in t hls
region by Jánošík's merry band. Lord Skalka fell into their hands,
as dld Sipoš trom Žilina, some hO'rse dealers from the same town,
~everal wine merchants, and many others.
Some of the booty was given to the poor and needy. Henc e, the
story c irculated that Jánošik robbed 1he rich to give to tbe poor.
This is not quite In keeping with the facts, for h!s comrades preyed
upon the lower classe.s as well as on the wealthy nobillty. The jewels
1aken from Lord Skalka were dlstrfäuted among the young ladies In
Ťa-rcbová. Romantic tales, which bave little historical basis, however, h ave become a part of the Jánošik saga in Slovakia. The authentic documents do not even allude to most of t,he feats attributed
to Slovakla's legendary hero.
At bis trlal, Jánošik admltted that he often raided the sheepfolds
of the lords of the manor, that some of tbe shepherds, elther trom
ľear of friendsbip, cooperated in these robberies and tben accompanled bim to celebra.te at the "Black Ant" In Klenovce, owned by
tbe lnn-keeper, Martin Mravec, or at the "Wbite Horse" in Dunajov,
and sometlmes at the "Blne Star" In Krásna, or tbe "Golden Eagle"
in Ťarcbová.
Winter tlme fonnd the moun,taln boys seeklng employment In tbe
nearby bomesteads b ecanse the snow would bave betrayed thelr footprlnts leadlng to their 'bldlng-places, deep In the plne forests of
Klng's Plateau. Tbus, Jánošík served as a farmhand ln tbe wlnter
of 1712-1713 at Kovatlčik's and Ondrejčik's In Kokava. In tbe .~pring
they bastened to tbeir mountaln rendezvous at tbe foot of the Tall Pine.
�SLOVAKIA
45
Jánošík's romantic career as Slovak!a's Robin Hood W'3.S a short
one, Jastlng Jess tban two years. Although he escaped after his flrst
ťapture at Klooovce in the autumn of 1712, he was caught in tbe
summer of tbe next year. The commissioner at Malohont had granted
him an amnesty after he had been confined in Jakoffy Ca.stle in
Hrachov, but aMer tbe county po'l!ce of Liptov arrested bim he neveT
regained bis rreedom. No ofriclal record glves us the exact details
of bis final capture; but, accordlng to tradition, Jánošik was apprebended elther b&eause of the treachery of one of his band, namely,
Gajdošík, who had given away t he secret of bis ch!eťs gigant!c
strength (the mag-ic belt), or because of the treachery of J ánošik's
rormer swðeart, w·ho ,!ost her heart to the Police Captaln Joseph
Lehotský, when he came to ber father's inn, the Golden Goose,
in searcb of the renowned outlaw. The scene of bis arrest, in the flr&t
version, was said to have been In the Little Mountain Inn in Polhora,
Zvolen County, between Brru:no and Tisovec. At any rate, t he famed
outlaw was taken in chalns to Liptov, where he was lodged in Vranov Castle, bui1lt by Franei11 Palugyay. There, In a dark celi, Jánoš!k
was chained to the wall to await his tria! and death.
Jánošik was aHowed to plead bis case. He pleaded gullty to
c·ertain charges of robbery, but denied havlng committed crlmes attributed to him. Some or the acts he was accused of were perpetrat&d whlle he was In prison. Thus, he denied having anything to do
with the robbery of a priest from Orava, or the hold-up or Vitko from
Sllesia, the murder of the blacksmlth's son in Dobrovce, the robblng
of the Galusovecs, the looting of churches in Hungary, PO'land, Slles!a,
or Moravia, where the sacrilegious robbeľl! are alleged to have nailed
the sacred hosts to a tree in order to determine whether blood would
flow from them when ahots were flred into the.m. He was also accused of having freed one of bis band as he was ll!bout to be hanged
in Žilina. It ls notewor.thy that the county sheriff, John L itlský, and
!he mayor of the town of Osčadn!ce were suspected or being overly
friendly w!th Jánošik.
To au the charges of which he was ra,sely accused the stoutllea!'ted robber-chieftain simply pleaded innocent. Attempts to prove
that he was in collusion wi,th other notorious brlgands in Slovakla,
Poland, and Hungary were unsuccessful. Wben he was accused of
having sbot a priest from Domanlže, 4t was proved that two or bis
associates, Tu ria k and PJavčlk, had comml tted this dastardly crime
in bis absence. No crime, other .than robbery, was p.roved against
JáJ!lošlk, w,bo never killed anyone. But in those days a !Jhief, as well
as a murderer, might be hanged.
Legendary accounts of tbe tria:! picture Jánošík as remaining
silent about the ldenUty of bis comrades, but the officlal records
indlcate that he gave the Court a list of ťbelr names, but refused to
reveal their whereabouts. As to the burled treasure, he told bis
llsteners that it was hidden in a Jarge fir <tree opposlte an oak on
whioh a hand was carved lndlcatlng the exact locatlon of the flr
tree, In the glade where the road winds down {rom Jablonka to Klenovce. Lord Ska\ka's jewels he had hidden In the mountalns of
Handlov, althougb legends have it they were bestowed on the matdens
of the village of Ťarcbová.
�SLOVAKIA.
Jánošik was tried by the county court of Liptov, presided over by
the vice-commissioner, Ladts laus Okol!csany•I, on March 16-17, 1713, in
the county courthouse of St. Mlkulaš In Liptov. The other members
of the court were the magl.strates of the four dlstrict-s ot Liptov
county, namely, John and AndTew Rády, Andrew Andreanský, and
Matthew Joob. The oftlclal prosecutor was Alexander Cemlcký, and
the attorney for the defense was Balthasar Palugyay. The d&fense
p leaded guilty to the charges of robbery and asked the clemency of
the Cour,t. Moreover, Jánošík promLsed to glve up bis former way of
llfe .and wlshed to become once a.gain a 0aw-abldlng cLtlzen. The prosecutlon, however, demanued tihe hig,hest penalty and succeeded in
exactlng a two-fold sentence from the Court, so that the "doubledeallng" prisoner mlght !lrst pay the penalty for bis lighter crlmes
by belng tortured on the rack, and then by belng hanged on the
gallows to forfeit hls llfe for bis graver transgress1ons. T hls was in
accordance witJb the laws o! the TripaTtitum ot 1515, 1625, and 1655.
The death sentence was carrled out on March 17 or 18, 1713,
before a vast assembly of people, on the executlon grounds of St.
Mfäulaš, on the Váh near the Paludzký bridge. There the young
robber-chleftaln was hanged on the gaHows, and bis llteless body was
buried beneath lt as the custom of thatl. ttme.
Äccordlng ,to the popular legends, Jánošík, though welgbed down
by bis heavy shackles, danced the "hajduc hy" (a llvely folk da.nce)
four tlmes aTound the gal!ows, just before bis death. Another legendary story tells or a courler who came dlrectly from the Emperor
with hls lmperlal pardon, ,but lt was too late, for the darlng you.th,
who h-ad prom.lsed to recrult four reglment.q of soldlers for the Emperor, was aAready hanglng on the rack. H e refused the amnesty
wtth the words, "Now tha,t you have roasted me, you might as well
devour me." He ls said to have dled after belng suspended by hls rib
on the rack for three days.
All natme seemed to go lnto mouring for this yout:h, whose mel'lry
songs once resounded through the glen. The babbl!ng brooks became sllent, ťhe anlmals In the forest ceased their act!vity momentarlly in silent trlbute to their departed hero. A sudden hush came
over all, and bis many trlends, far and near, were overcome by
sorrow at bis passing. An annual penalty was lmposed on Liptov
by the Emperor for havlng sentenced Jánošík to death, and, untll
~ecent times, four measures of gold ducats were pald to the lmperillll
treasury each year. That is the story In legendary accounts.
The people belleved in Jánošík's nobillty of character. It ls sald
that hls body was buried In a crypt of the church of St. Mikulaš,
where it lles In state of comp]ete preservation awaltlng the day when
a new Jánošik wlll arise and strlke down the oppressors of hls
poople. Many years a1!ter thls sad event, lt was reported thatl. whlle
some youngsters were p.laylng nea,r the town of Hajasov, one of the
boys play,f ully l!fle'd the corner of a nearby hut and hld hls cap underneath. 'Ilhls feat or amazing strength reached -the eaTs of the
nobMity, ,viho qulckly remov.ed thls new performer, whom they consldered another Jánošlk.
Jánošik's execution was the slgnal for the authorities to capture
all the remalnlng outla,ws stm at large in Slovakla. Emerich Kublny,
The reglstrar of Liptov, was sent to Malohont wltb warra,nts to arrest
�SLOVAKIA
au
suspec.ts. In Apr!l, Uhorčik, alias M.a.rtin Mravec, was captured
at St. Mlkulaš, where he had marrled and seltled down as a tavern•
keeper, lhe proprletor of llhe Gray Failcon. He was given a hasty
trlal and condemned to d1e on the rack. An lmperiaI decree was
issued by whlch bhe county magistrates would be held r-esponslble
in the future for all banditry In thelr areas, and on April 17, 1713, the
assembly at Liptov approved of the motlon to round up the outlaws. The imperlal marshal, John Palty, arrived to enforce the emperor's ln&tructlons.
Authentlc documents, w'ith the record of Jánošlk's apprehenslon
.and ,tria!, make b.lm out to be an ordlnary hlghwayman, simllar to
hundreds of •bis klnd who roamed about the country and terrorlzed
the gentry. He was consldered to be a da,ngerous chaTacter, as were
the others of hla notorlous professlon. Neveiitheless, the fa,ct that
hls name has become an lllustrlous one In the Jegendary songs e.nd
storles of h1s people, la In sharp contrast wlth the oi'ficlal p!cture or
thls colorful, albelt lawless, personallty. The questlon arlses, why
·has he, alone, maintalued bis posltlon as an !dol ot the Slovak natlon? Obviously, he must have been dltferent from all bis companions
and con.temporarles, both In vice and vlrtue. Although lihe aura of
glory and honor that surrounds bis memory ls no doubt the result,
in some measure, of th-e people's rich lmaglnatlon, yet, bis deeds
durlng bis llfe are a,n argument In favor of some · outstan.dlng quallties
in hls makeup. We cannot account for h1s tremendous popularity
among the people, nor can we explain why bis name Ls a symbol
ot vlntue rather than vice, UDJ!ess we attrlbute vlrluous qua!itles to
t his youth who so fired the lmagination of the old and the young
that he has become the Jmmortal hero of bis natlve !and.
·T he areas known as th'e "Queen's Meadow, Warm Sprlngs," and
many other regions In tre Pohron and Malohont dl.strlcts, aboun.d
even today In folk songs, ballads, and storles of bis explolts ln be·
half of the poor and lhe oppres.sed.
We can safely conclude that the offlclal records suppressed
muoh of the truth in regard to Jánošik's aotual personallty and deeds.
Slnce he was the self-constltuted champlon of the 01>pressed everywhere, one can understand why bis name should be slmp4y put on the
11st as an ordina1-y cť.iminal by the oppressors, who used thelr power
to llquldate all fäose who were dangerous rebels agalnst thelr form
of soclety. But despite thelr precautlons, Jánošlk's name, for almost
two and a half centurles, has been the symbol of hope and courage
to bis people.
Unllke other parts ot the Austrlan Emplre, which revoJ.ted trom
time to tlme (Magyar, Romanian, Croatlan and Serblan outbreaks
occurred lntermlttently ln 1514, 1569, 1'571, 1635, 1655, 1784, etc.),
the Slovaks revolted oilliy once. Thls uprlslng happened In the
Potlsle reglon when a rumor was spread througbout Eastern Slovakla
that the nobility had polsoned their wells. It turned out, however,
that the cause ot wldespread death w.a,s actually the chlorea epldemic of that year, 1631. Historloal facts make it evldent that the
S!ovaks were a patient peoplil who would not rise In rebelllon In defense of thelr Jlfe as a natlon.
Passlv& endurance and reslstance under the merclless system
ot polltlcal oppression was, however, aC'companled by the actlve revolt
�48
SLOVAKIA
of the more hlghly spirited Slovak youths, who rebelled against the
existing order of things by tak!ng the law lnto their own hands, and
,by retlring lnto -the.lr mountain strongholds from which they emerged
at nigbt to rígbt tbe wrongs inflicted on tbeir people. Tbey pa.id for
their daring and coul'age by their lives, sooner or later. But t heir
sprit kept alive 1'he spark of freedom and the love of justice in the
bearts of tbe Slovak.s. They wer e, to be sure, common felons and
blackguards among tbe forest bigbwaymen, but Jánošík was not one
of them. He was the true embodiment of bis age, wild and untamed
but not ignoble and ruthless, not savage and unrestralned, b ut gallant,
generous, honest, and ·honorable with his people.
T he first at:tiempts to trace the popular series of Slovak poem s,
ballads, songs, and legends were made in the early l&tb century.
T~b lic published a poem entltled "J ánoší k, lyptovský loupežník"
(J ánošik the Robber of Liptov) in his collection called Slovenšti
ve ršovc i (Vol. II, 1809). Ján Konár discovered several poems a bout
S lovak h ighwaymen and published them in bis Národné Zpievanky
(National Ballads) in 1834 and 1835. Slovak news-buHetins a nd almanacs contained poems and folk stories about Jánošik. The Časopis
a Sborní k Muzeál nej Slovens kej Spo ločnosti (The Periodical and
Almanac of the Slovak Museum Association) also published a number
of works on J ánošik, based largely on early manuscrip,ts found in the
museums in Liptov and Ružomberok. The Matica Slovenská (Slovak
Institute) planned to continue its splendid task of collecting these old
publica,!Jions, wihich are rich in folklore. By bhe m iddle of the l as.t
century, the last of the outlaws in Slovakia had disappeared, but
the stories of their daring exploits contlnued to interes.t the common people because of their highly imaginatlve appea,i.
J ánošik's fame is preserved for the ages in the many poems that
have been a distinct contribution to his nation's literature. The following poems have immortalized bis memory: Paul Šafarik's "Jáno.
šík" in the S laveni pac holu S lovanských 1814; Absolon Meško's
" Pieseň Jánošíková," 1842, (S lovenské Pohrady, 1897, sqq.); Michal
Hodž.a's poem in the Mator; Sáva Pepkin-Medňanský's "J á nošík" in bis
Poezi, Vol II ; Ján Botto's "Piese: J á nošíková" in Zpevy, 1847, and
"Sm rť J ánošíková" in Lipa; Samo Chalupk a's " Likavský Väzeň" In
the Orol, 1846, "Na K ráľovej Holí," 1862, and "Ju nak," 1860; August
Lojko's "Jánoš íkov Stol" and " Jánoší ková Podkova"; J akub Graich•
mann's " Horní Chla pc i' in the Sokol, 1861); William P auliny-Toth's
" Jánoš ík s mi lou"; Ján ČaJák's "Já noší k" in the Oro l, 1870. a nd
" J á nošíková Náhrada," 1875; J onas Záborský's "Smrť J á nošíková"
In the S lov. Po h ľady, 1894.
Paul Beblavý wrote an interesting his.torlcal story about bim in
the S lov. Pohrady, 1889; Augustus Marschal-Petrovský, a long no ve!,
J á nošík, Kapi t á n Ho rských Chlapcov, In 1901. Samo Zdyobavský wrote
a play, J ánošík; J ona:s Zaborský, a drama, Jánošíková Večera ;
Michal Skačkanský, a tragedy, J á nošík, 1880; Ľud. Kubaný, a play,
Ho rní Chlapci ; Júr Mahen, a moving lragedy, Jánošík, 1910; Frances
Svoboda-Goldman, a histoi,ical drama: J ohn P orod, a play, J á noliik,
1928, etc. Other articles and historlcal .•tudles about bim were written
by ,the followlng: Gaspar Fejérpal11ky In Vlaste nský Kal endár,
1831: Stephen Hýroš In his Zá mok Ly ka va, 1876; Pavel Dobšinský ln
Prostonárod né obyčaje, 1880; Rudolph Pokorný's Z potulek po
�SLOVAKIA
49
Slovensku, 1883; Ján Bobula's Jánošík, 1863; K. Salva-Cebradskťs
Jánošík; Julius Botto in bis article "Leopold I and Francis Rákoczi
II" ln the Slov. Pohrady, 1904 mentions Jánoš í; Carl Kálaľs Slováci a
Slovensko, 1905, and bis Na Krásnem Slovensku, 1903; Oarl Dúbravský's Jánošík, 1911; Gregor Uram·Podtatranský's "Juro Jánošík in
the S bor. Muz. Slov. Sp. VIII, 1908; J aroslav Tuma's "Jánoší k," in
1911, Naše Slovensko; Michal Jiránek's " Zbojníci" in Slov. Čitanka,
1911; Samo Czambeľs "Jánošík" in Páričkov's Ružomberský Ka lendár,
1913; Joseph Škultety's Jánošíková Doba" in Slov. Pohrady, 1913;
Jgnac Gessay in the A!Lmanac of the Slovák v Amerike; Pavel Sochaň's
"Zbojník Juro Jánoší k," 1924. Ján L. Bella put Botto's poem "Svadba
Jánošíková" to music for solo, with piano accompan.lment and oches-
tr-ation. Vitezslav Novák also composed an orginaJ musical score on
the subject called "Jánošík," which is to be found in Mladí, op. 55.
Almost without exception the foregoing works pre.sented Jánošík
as bhe idol of bis people, as por,trayed in bhe folk songs and ballads
which have become a rich heritage of the Slovak nation. In some
he is a patriot, in others a young t,beologian who has been Jed away
from bis hlgb calling by the cruel circumstamces of bis tlme, ,vthile
in all of them, with one exception, he ls depicted as a knightly hig,h•
wayman who ls devoted to bis poor, oppressed poople. The one exception is Pavel Sochaň, who endeavors to debunk all the Iegendary
glory surrounding the name o! Jánošík by basing bis Zbojník Juro
Jánošík, akým bol v Skutočnosti (The Reail Jánošik) entirely on the
cas~ records found in the County Court House of Liptov. But this
is, perha,ps, the passing fancy of the times, to smash all the traditional
ldols of bbe past, and Sochaň is one of tbls class of modern iconoclasts. Despite his efforts and those of others to defame the character
of tlhe l~gendary heroes of yesterday, the fact remains that Jánoš!k
has been an influence in popular Slovak poetry, llterature, and drama,
and his name is imperisbable in tbe history of bis people. Botto's
poems, alone, would make bis fame immortaJ.
Not only did Slovak and Czech wrlters devote their talent.s
to the singing o! •bis praises, but we find that the Polisb autbor,
Przerwa-Tetmajer, wrote a whole ser.les of ballads about bim, as well
as a beautlful, touobingľ poem about bis deatb. His collection of fables,
folk stori~. folk songs, and poems ( Báje z Tatier) was very popular
in bis n,a tive Poland. Vlad. Hnatjuk, ťhe famous Ukralnian etbnographer, wrote a treatise on Jánošík in 1889, and included numerous
Slovakian songs about this national figure in bis collection of Russian, Slovak, Moravjan, and Polisb folklore.
Jánoš!k has been the frequent subject of creatlve are in bis
native country. Tbus, his likeness appears on glassware, prlmitive
palntings, pottery, etc., in wbicb he and his gay mountain Iads are
shown dres.sed in green blouses, red and wbite breecbes, shlny black
boots, gally colored hats wlťb feathers in tbem, wďde walsbbands
ricbly studded with gold, silver, and precious stones, and armed with
muskets and hatcbets (valašky). J ánošik always has the place of
honor as tbe leader, while Surovec is sbown brandishlng bis valaška; Hrajnoba shoots off tbe tip of a tall plne as he Ieaps high lnto
the air in a playful mood; and Gajdošik plays h!s bagpipes, wbile tbe
others dance to bis mountain music. Tbe Slovak art!sts, Mikulaš Aleš,
:\fartln Benka, and Ján Alexy, have made palntlngs of J ánoli!k. Tbe
�liO
sculptor Franta Uprka made a number of fJgures of Jánošlk and his
companions, the best of them being hls sculpture of the entlre group
gathered around a bontlre on the mountalntop near the Tall Fine.
l,'. Fulla executed a gorgeous linoleum design of the group. Vla.dyslav
Skovzylaš, a Polls'h artist, ma.de several exqulsite wood carvings of
these T atra mountaineers of Jong ago. Among them are one ot Jánošlk, alone, another of Jánošík and hls sweetheart, one of his profile,
and a fourth of b.is men on the march.
Jánošlk's buried treasure has engaged the popular lmaginat!on
everywhere in Slovakia for centuries. The probable hlding places
most frequently mentloned are: Kozia Skala, located In the šutov
valiey in Turiec; Jánoiíkoá Pivnica, a cavern near Balna In tbe valley
of Nemecká Lupča; Biela Skala in the Suchá Valley near Liptov; and
Zemský Kľúč. Belopotecký's Mss., 1835, now in t'he Liptov Museum
in Ružoml>erok, refers to all these places, besldes Pod Jedlou near
Trnovec in Liptov, the Baránec Meadow near St. Andrew's in Liptov
county, and many others. Pavel Sochaň's "Jánošíkové Poklady" in the
Slov. Pohra.dy, 1922-23, and Ján Poroďs "Poklad a iné povesti z okolia Bytče" also conta.in clues to lhe secret hlding places of gold,
silver and gems. Numerous al'tlcles have appeared in the off-lclal publlcatlons of the Sborník Muz. Sl. Spol. in recent years under the title
of "Jánošíkov Poklad. Emo Bohúň wrote a fantastlc novel on the
subject.
The following places have been named after the famous outaaw:
Jánošíková Kolkáreň (JáJnošlk's Bowling Alley) located In Liptov;
Jánošíkové Husle (Jánošik's F\iddle) in Malé Smrekovice; Jánošíková
Jaskyňa (Jánošilťs Cave) in the Prosiecká valley; Jánošíkov Stôl
(Jánošlk's Table) In Važec; Jánošíkové Sedlo (Jánošlk's Sa.ddle) in
the Queen's Meadow; Jánošíková Stupa (Jánošík's Footprlnt) in !;he
Gadierská valley, In Turiec; Jánošíková Stolica (Jánošlk's County in
the v;ratná valley Ťarchová; Jánošíková Skala (Jánošlk'c Rock) at
L1šenlk, near Polhora, Zvolen county; Jánošíkov Chodník (Jánošlk's
Path) and Jánoš íková Jaskyňa (Jánošík's Cave) near Tisovce; Jánošíková Podkova (Jánošík's Horseshoe) in the Rimavská valley under
Zlamenečin Hill; 81lld Jánošíkov Skok (Jánošlk's Leap) at Dunajec.
These and many otber names wlll preserve the name of Jánošík even
ir all poems and stories about hlm dlsappear.
Jánošlk'.s hat 1s in the Liptov museum in Ružomberok. lt 1s ma.de
of clot1h rlohly embroidered with gold Jace and decorated with mussel shells, and is higb and cyllndrical in shape. Hls hatchet ls now in
the natlonal museum at Budapest, whlle his plpe 1s in the Slovak Instltute's collection. Th~ famous belt, whlch had been given hlm by a
fairy and was sald to have glvsn the Slovak hero preternatural powers,
is now in t,he Slovak Nat1ooal Museum In St. Martln's in Turiec. A cane
and tJwo ancient plctures or 'h ls band depicted on glass are there a lso.
Two plctures or him are In the collectlon of the Moravian Natural
Museum In Brno. The Liptov Museum at Ružomberok has a photograph of hls halrchet, a copy of the paintlngs Iu Brno, a copy ot the
orlginal court records ot t,he tria! of Jánošík, several palntlngs by Fulla
and Skoczylaša, and a large number of llterary works. In Rovno, Joseph
Buchčar !s the proud po~essor ot an artlstlc leather belt, flllgreed
lengthwise wltn goose qullls, w'hicb was found In his old mlll Jn the
course ot some repairs. Although lt is sald that thls belonged to Jáno1
�SLOV.A.KU.
61
šik, it was more proba.bly the properly of Jánošík's lieutenant, Surovec,
as Rovno was Suroveťs horne town. The Tatranský Museum has six
old Polish g!ass likenesses of Jánošlk and hls merry men, similar to
the glassware in St. Martin's in Turiec. One, however, shows the outlaiws oarrying a bag of ducats, another has the picture ot his sweetheart. The collection there contains four pistols, ten knives, four
powder hom_s, and a bag in whlch the robbers used to carry thelr
stolen ducats.
Beneath the paintlngs of t?hese colorful personalitles of Slovak
folklore there !s a brief explanation of the lnitlatlon of new members
to the ro'bber gangs. 'l'hey were required to prove the:ir prowess In
,<,hooting oiif the tip of a tree with a pistol, or cuttlng lt otf wlth a
throw of the hatchet, by drinldng a bottle of brandy, and then by
performlng the d!fflcult "Robber's Dance." The lnitiat!on took p!ace in
the evenlng around thelr bonflre. Eaoh outlaw was armed to the teeth
wlth a hatohet in hls b elt, a brace of pistols, and a musket. Of course,
there was the powder horn, the wlde oell, the knapsack, a Hussar's
hat, and the bni:ghtly colored shirt and trousers to m ake up the rest
of the1r accoutrement. Jánošiťs breeohes were said to have been
red and w,hite In color.
It seems lncredible, in view of Jánošlk'.s fame, that no monument
stiands to honor his memory, or bhat no plaque marks bis birthplace.
But he llves in the hearts of •h is people, hence needs no image of iron
or stone to remind them of his life and his deeds. No other record
t:Xists of the merry mountain boys who had been Jánošílťs companions.
Mo.st probabtly they disbanded and under assumed names followed
peaceful and honorable professions until the end of thelr lives. Uhorčik, however, was cau~ht and executed; and "Red" Ondraš disappeared
In the vlclnlty of Tešlnka whlle Jánošik was stlll at Iarge.
'l1he woodlands grew silent and peaceful wlth the passlng of Jánošík from the scene. 'l'he songs of hls merry men were silenced forever, and the fores ts were left undisturbed for the deer, bear, fox, and
wlld boar as they went about unchallenged. And hlgh o'erhead, an
eagle on swift and silent wings surveyed the glen far below, abandoned
and cheerless, for tbe ,happy throng of Jánošik's youths ba.d dlspersed,
and their ohlef was dead. - (Slovenské Pohrady, V. XLV. Nos. 1-2,
1929).
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT ? "The Czechs bave been at all times all too
rea.dy to look on most Slovaks as Magyarones and potentlal traltors,
and have employed battallons of censors, police agents, and other
customary Instruments of unpopu!ar Governments, wblcb always end
by maklng the sltuation worse than hefore. Neltber the pollcy of
Prague nor the attltude of the Czech offlclals In Slovakla was al•
ways elther wlse or tactful. Tbe Czech Soclallsts. wbo played such
a large part in the Government or tlle flrst years, incorporated all
those Czech characterlstlcs most obnoxlous to the Slovaks. They were
crude, tbey were 111-mannered, tbey were aggresslvely egalitarlan, and
they were almost fanatlcally antl-clerlcal, seelng in the churches In
Slovakla a two-fold enemy. i<ocial and natlonal." - (C. A. Macartney:
H UNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS; 1937, London).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
~2
----------------------------JANO.ŠIK -
THE SWVAK ROBIN HOOD
IVAN HOUDEK
Much has been written about Juro (George) Jánošik, the les.der
of the Slovak mountaln boys, w,bo has b&come the greatest Jegendary
hero in Slovakia country, and undouMedly much more wtll still be
written about hlm In hls natlve !and where hls name ls an insplration to both the old and the young. lt ls rather approprlate <to recall,
at thls tlme, the &Xploits of bis so-called rebel against society in
his day, for Jánošík ls the symbol ot a people's just indignatlon
agadnst lnjustlce and oppresslon, as well as a symbol of hope of
ultimate vlctory of jusit.lce and ot truth.
The sources from which we were able to draw a reillable character sketch of thls remarkable man are twofold: the offlcial r&cords
of his tria!, and the numerous folk songs, storles, and lege,ndary accounts of his explolt.s. The forwer are ne,cess,ar!ly dry, the latter rich
and varled. Th ese sources represent people, of confllctlng vlews:
the one class feared and hated the hold youth as its enemy; the
other loved and immol'tallz&d hlm as a natlonal hero. lt is a dlfficult
task to reconclle these wldely dlvergent points of vlew and, yet, these
sources, whlch glve us two dlfferent plctures of hlm, are not re,ally
contradlctory, but rather complement each other.
The orlglnal Lartln,Slovak judlclal documents were kept In a
~peclall file In the coun,ty archlve,s of the Liptov Dis.trlct records, in
St. Mlkulal'i, the county seait. Unfortunately, these disappeared rather
mysterlously In the second half of the last century. Duplicates of
these documents, howe,ver, have been preserved and thelr contents
were flrst publlclzed by Gaspar Fejerpataky in tb.e Vlastenský Kalendár (1831-1832). These are a faithful copy of the authentlc record
known as F assio Janossikiana, dated 1713. In 1880, Paul Dobšinský
publ!shed hls vlews in the Prostonarodné Obyčaje (National Customs) In tbe Slovak Museum's publlcatlon ot <that year Muf. sl. spol.;
VIIl,Podtatranský Juro J ánoiik). Paul Sochaň's Zbojnik Juro J ánoifk, published Jn 1924, 1s a good source ot inform-atlon and from lt
and the other contemporary records and Jegendary accounts whlch
have been handed down for gene,rablons, we are able to reconstruct
most of the scenes of the Ume and re-enact the events In the Ufe
of thls popular hero, so that they may be consldered to be truly
hl.storlcal, not merely legendary.
Both sources glve Ťarchová In Trenčfn County as hls blrthplace,
where he wa,s born about 1688. But research has lndlcated tbat Jánoillk was actually born on a small farm In the bighlands In tbe vlclnlty
of that hamlet, and the, spot today ls marked by a small, dllapldated
hut wlth the number "676" on lt. It stands between two llnden trees
In a place caaled Janošov, whlch boasts of a populatlon of 17 persona,
most ot wbom bea.r the name Jánošlk.
Jánošfk was s tm a chlld when the revolutlon under Rakoczy II
(1703-1711) took place,, but he jolned the lnsurgents, whose motto, "Pro
Llberate," was emblazoned on thelr banner. Later, he jolned the lmperlal army and was sent to Bytča Castle as a guard, where he met
SLOVAKIA
43
one of the Emperor's prisoners, an adventurous brigand and soldler of
fortune, Thom-as Uhorčik. Thls fateful acqualntance proved to be the
turning-point of bis life.
Rakoczy's iJHaited rebellion was purt down In 1711, and the
youthful Jánošlk returned horne after belng ransomed out of the
army by his paren,t s. Tradltion has it that he bocame an outlaw
and a highiw,ayman because his father was flogged to death by the
lord of the manor when he refused to leave the deathbed of bis wlfe
in order to work in the fields of hls master. This fatal flogg·i ng took
place in Ťarohová, at the vlllage bridge, aocording to one account,
and at the castle In Teplice in Žilina, according to another report.
The judic-lal documents, however, merely record ,the fact that Uhorčlk,
who had escaped from prlsón, had come to Ťarchová and had persuaded J ánošlk to join his robber b and in the forest.
As a background to the future of Jänošlk, lt may be well t o r&call that social conditions in Slovakla at the tlme were, perhaps, at
their worst. The Revdlution had falled, but many a peasanťs son was
unw!Hlng to bow down under the yoke of a feudal system after tastlng
freedom as a sold,ier of fortune. Conditions among the peasants in
the klngdoon of Rungary after t,he death of the liberal monarch,
"Mathias th e J ust," became steadily worse until they became unbearable. The peasants' revolt under George Doža in Tran.sylv ania and in
the Dolná. valley was cruelly stamped out by lihe nobffllty, and the
lot of the peasants was vlrtual ~lavery.
Although t!he rlght to emigrate was restored to the peasantry, In
view of the fact that the people were subject to burdensome taxatlon
and many restrlctlons, their status by the end of the seventeenth
century had grown worse, so that In reality the nobility had assumed
the .rlght of life and death over its subjects. The Slovaks, especially,
beoame the vlctims of a cunnlng and unscrupulous no)>llirty whtc'h en.;;Javed them. Frequent cla.ss struggles, wars. and plagues added to the
mlsfortunes of the Slovak people. Many areas were reduced to poverty-stI'icken regfons where extreme mlsery and want prevalled.
Northern Slovakia which had, perhaps, suffered the most in
these trying <limes, became the horne of the discontented, the dise ouraged, and the desperate. These men organized rob'ber banda
and preyed on t!he surroundlng countryside from th eir mountain hideouts. Tbomas Uborčik was a member of one of these bands as early
as 1704. J ánošfk became a member in 1711, after taking tbe briganďs pledge and sealing bis oath w.! th bis blood. Hls explolts soon
won hlm far-reaching fame not only In hls own country, but also in
Moravla, P dland, Hungary and Silesla. After belng elected chleftiain,
the youthful bandlt extended the zone of bis operatlons from tbe
eastern count!es of Liptov, Spiš, Orava, Turiec Tekov, Malohont,
and Šariš to Zvolen, Trenčln, and Nitra, and even crossed lnto Mora.vla, SHesla, Poland and Hungary.
Hls comrades were, accord!ng to bis own ·a dmlsslon: Tihomas
lJhorčlk (•Uhrlk); Paul Gašparec-Mlynarčlk from Rakov; Barte, the
sbepherd from Predmier; "Red" Ondraš from D1há; Plavčlk from
Dunajov; Gábor trom Valkov; Juro Turlak (Hun<:aga or Hunčlk);
Kubo Chlastiak trom Otožnlc; J urlak, Sato ra, Gavel, and aeveral
Poles. Not a few secret accompllces, llke J uro and Kubo štukovec In
Kräsna, furnlsbed hlm wlth suppl!es and informatlon.
f4
SLOVAKIA
Folk stories about this interesting outlaw are, undoubtedly, gullty
of several anachroni.sms. They list the following as Ms associatss:
Uhorčik, Gajdošík-Mlynárčik, Surovec, Hrajnoha, Adamčik, llčík (the
chief scout), Garaj, Postavčík, Tarke, Mucha, Durica. Most of these,
however, were not even Jánošik's contemporaries. F or lnstance,
James Surovec, from Rovný In Trenčin, who terrorized Orava, Trenčín, and Pohroni&, wa.s not born untH 1715, two years after Jánošik's
death, and he himself was executed fn 1740. Hrajnoba, the famous
dancer from Nitra, lived in the middle of the 18th century and wai;
broken on the wheel in !lbe Smolen Castle. In 1878 Hrajnoha's treasure was unearthed by some laborers who were buildíng a highway
1:ear Nadaš. Adamčfk was a notorious bandit in Moravia, and Ilčik
lived in Trenčin. Garaj must have preceded Jánoš!k, because a brook
ls mentioned by that name in the judlclal documents covering the
tria! of Slovakia's most famous outlaw. Some of J ánošik's asso ciates
are, perhaps, p.roducts of Lhe popular imaginatlon.
A triangular area, known as the K ing's Plateau, lies on a hlgh
point overlooking the countles of Liptov, the Hron area and Malohont,
near Hochwald, or Hovald, at a spot known as the "Tall Plne," directly above the road runnlng from Liptov to Spiš. This region was at
one time covered with a thick forest, which was the hiding place of
robber gangs in every century. Q.ueen Maria T,h eresa destroyed th!s
picturesque rendezvous of the hlghwaymen by havlng the forest cut
down by royal proclamatlon. But in J ánošík's time, thls area was the
favorite h:rnnt of brigands, and lt was there that Lord Jáu Radvanský,
whlle on bis way to tbe funeral of the former revolutionary general.
Petrcx:zy, was robbed by tbe Slovak Robin Hood. Lord Paul Revay,
Lady Schardon, and Lord Ladlslaus Zmeškal were also held up in t hls
region by Jánošík's merry band. Lord Skalka fell into their hands,
as dld Sipoš trom Žilina, some hO'rse dealers from the same town,
~everal wine merchants, and many others.
Some of the booty was given to the poor and needy. Henc e, the
story c irculated that Jánošik robbed 1he rich to give to tbe poor.
This is not quite In keeping with the facts, for h!s comrades preyed
upon the lower classe.s as well as on the wealthy nobillty. The jewels
1aken from Lord Skalka were dlstrfäuted among the young ladies In
Ťa-rcbová. Romantic tales, which bave little historical basis, however, h ave become a part of the Jánošik saga in Slovakia. The authentic documents do not even allude to most of t,he feats attributed
to Slovakla's legendary hero.
At bis trlal, Jánošik admltted that he often raided the sheepfolds
of the lords of the manor, that some of tbe shepherds, elther trom
ľear of friendsbip, cooperated in these robberies and tben accompanled bim to celebra.te at the "Black Ant" In Klenovce, owned by
tbe lnn-keeper, Martin Mravec, or at the "Wbite Horse" in Dunajov,
and sometlmes at the "Blne Star" In Krásna, or tbe "Golden Eagle"
in Ťarcbová.
Winter tlme fonnd the moun,taln boys seeklng employment In tbe
nearby bomesteads b ecanse the snow would bave betrayed thelr footprlnts leadlng to their 'bldlng-places, deep In the plne forests of
Klng's Plateau. Tbus, Jánošík served as a farmhand ln tbe wlnter
of 1712-1713 at Kovatlčik's and Ondrejčik's In Kokava. In tbe .~pring
they bastened to tbeir mountaln rendezvous at tbe foot of the Tall Pine.
SLOVAKIA
45
Jánošík's romantic career as Slovak!a's Robin Hood W'3.S a short
one, Jastlng Jess tban two years. Although he escaped after his flrst
ťapture at Klooovce in the autumn of 1712, he was caught in tbe
summer of tbe next year. The commissioner at Malohont had granted
him an amnesty after he had been confined in Jakoffy Ca.stle in
Hrachov, but aMer tbe county po'l!ce of Liptov arrested bim he neveT
regained bis rreedom. No ofriclal record glves us the exact details
of bis final capture; but, accordlng to tradition, Jánošik was apprebended elther b&eause of the treachery of one of his band, namely,
Gajdošík, who had given away t he secret of bis ch!eťs gigant!c
strength (the mag-ic belt), or because of the treachery of J ánošik's
rormer swðeart, w·ho ,!ost her heart to the Police Captaln Joseph
Lehotský, when he came to ber father's inn, the Golden Goose,
in searcb of the renowned outlaw. The scene of bis arrest, in the flr&t
version, was said to have been In the Little Mountain Inn in Polhora,
Zvolen County, between Brru:no and Tisovec. At any rate, t he famed
outlaw was taken in chalns to Liptov, where he was lodged in Vranov Castle, bui1lt by Franei11 Palugyay. There, In a dark celi, Jánoš!k
was chained to the wall to await his tria! and death.
Jánošik was aHowed to plead bis case. He pleaded gullty to
c·ertain charges of robbery, but denied havlng committed crlmes attributed to him. Some or the acts he was accused of were perpetrat&d whlle he was In prison. Thus, he denied having anything to do
with the robbery of a priest from Orava, or the hold-up or Vitko from
Sllesia, the murder of the blacksmlth's son in Dobrovce, the robblng
of the Galusovecs, the looting of churches in Hungary, PO'land, Slles!a,
or Moravia, where the sacrilegious robbeľl! are alleged to have nailed
the sacred hosts to a tree in order to determine whether blood would
flow from them when ahots were flred into the.m. He was also accused of having freed one of bis band as he was ll!bout to be hanged
in Žilina. It ls notewor.thy that the county sheriff, John L itlský, and
!he mayor of the town of Osčadn!ce were suspected or being overly
friendly w!th Jánošik.
To au the charges of which he was ra,sely accused the stoutllea!'ted robber-chieftain simply pleaded innocent. Attempts to prove
that he was in collusion wi,th other notorious brlgands in Slovakla,
Poland, and Hungary were unsuccessful. Wben he was accused of
having sbot a priest from Domanlže, 4t was proved that two or bis
associates, Tu ria k and PJavčlk, had comml tted this dastardly crime
in bis absence. No crime, other .than robbery, was p.roved against
JáJ!lošlk, w,bo never killed anyone. But in those days a !Jhief, as well
as a murderer, might be hanged.
Legendary accounts of tbe tria:! picture Jánošík as remaining
silent about the ldenUty of bis comrades, but the officlal records
indlcate that he gave the Court a list of ťbelr names, but refused to
reveal their whereabouts. As to the burled treasure, he told bis
llsteners that it was hidden in a Jarge fir <tree opposlte an oak on
whioh a hand was carved lndlcatlng the exact locatlon of the flr
tree, In the glade where the road winds down {rom Jablonka to Klenovce. Lord Ska\ka's jewels he had hidden In the mountalns of
Handlov, althougb legends have it they were bestowed on the matdens
of the village of Ťarcbová.
SLOVAKIA.
Jánošik was tried by the county court of Liptov, presided over by
the vice-commissioner, Ladts laus Okol!csany•I, on March 16-17, 1713, in
the county courthouse of St. Mlkulaš In Liptov. The other members
of the court were the magl.strates of the four dlstrict-s ot Liptov
county, namely, John and AndTew Rády, Andrew Andreanský, and
Matthew Joob. The oftlclal prosecutor was Alexander Cemlcký, and
the attorney for the defense was Balthasar Palugyay. The d&fense
p leaded guilty to the charges of robbery and asked the clemency of
the Cour,t. Moreover, Jánošík promLsed to glve up bis former way of
llfe .and wlshed to become once a.gain a 0aw-abldlng cLtlzen. The prosecutlon, however, demanued tihe hig,hest penalty and succeeded in
exactlng a two-fold sentence from the Court, so that the "doubledeallng" prisoner mlght !lrst pay the penalty for bis lighter crlmes
by belng tortured on the rack, and then by belng hanged on the
gallows to forfeit hls llfe for bis graver transgress1ons. T hls was in
accordance witJb the laws o! the TripaTtitum ot 1515, 1625, and 1655.
The death sentence was carrled out on March 17 or 18, 1713,
before a vast assembly of people, on the executlon grounds of St.
Mfäulaš, on the Váh near the Paludzký bridge. There the young
robber-chleftaln was hanged on the gaHows, and bis llteless body was
buried beneath lt as the custom of thatl. ttme.
Äccordlng ,to the popular legends, Jánošík, though welgbed down
by bis heavy shackles, danced the "hajduc hy" (a llvely folk da.nce)
four tlmes aTound the gal!ows, just before bis death. Another legendary story tells or a courler who came dlrectly from the Emperor
with hls lmperlal pardon, ,but lt was too late, for the darlng you.th,
who h-ad prom.lsed to recrult four reglment.q of soldlers for the Emperor, was aAready hanglng on the rack. H e refused the amnesty
wtth the words, "Now tha,t you have roasted me, you might as well
devour me." He ls said to have dled after belng suspended by hls rib
on the rack for three days.
All natme seemed to go lnto mouring for this yout:h, whose mel'lry
songs once resounded through the glen. The babbl!ng brooks became sllent, ťhe anlmals In the forest ceased their act!vity momentarlly in silent trlbute to their departed hero. A sudden hush came
over all, and bis many trlends, far and near, were overcome by
sorrow at bis passing. An annual penalty was lmposed on Liptov
by the Emperor for havlng sentenced Jánošík to death, and, untll
~ecent times, four measures of gold ducats were pald to the lmperillll
treasury each year. That is the story In legendary accounts.
The people belleved in Jánošík's nobillty of character. It ls sald
that hls body was buried In a crypt of the church of St. Mikulaš,
where it lles In state of comp]ete preservation awaltlng the day when
a new Jánošik wlll arise and strlke down the oppressors of hls
poople. Many years a1!ter thls sad event, lt was reported thatl. whlle
some youngsters were p.laylng nea,r the town of Hajasov, one of the
boys play,f ully l!fle'd the corner of a nearby hut and hld hls cap underneath. 'Ilhls feat or amazing strength reached -the eaTs of the
nobMity, ,viho qulckly remov.ed thls new performer, whom they consldered another Jánošlk.
Jánošik's execution was the slgnal for the authorities to capture
all the remalnlng outla,ws stm at large in Slovakla. Emerich Kublny,
The reglstrar of Liptov, was sent to Malohont wltb warra,nts to arrest
SLOVAKIA
au
suspec.ts. In Apr!l, Uhorčik, alias M.a.rtin Mravec, was captured
at St. Mlkulaš, where he had marrled and seltled down as a tavern•
keeper, lhe proprletor of llhe Gray Failcon. He was given a hasty
trlal and condemned to d1e on the rack. An lmperiaI decree was
issued by whlch bhe county magistrates would be held r-esponslble
in the future for all banditry In thelr areas, and on April 17, 1713, the
assembly at Liptov approved of the motlon to round up the outlaws. The imperlal marshal, John Palty, arrived to enforce the emperor's ln&tructlons.
Authentlc documents, w'ith the record of Jánošlk's apprehenslon
.and ,tria!, make b.lm out to be an ordlnary hlghwayman, simllar to
hundreds of •bis klnd who roamed about the country and terrorlzed
the gentry. He was consldered to be a da,ngerous chaTacter, as were
the others of hla notorlous professlon. Neveiitheless, the fa,ct that
hls name has become an lllustrlous one In the Jegendary songs e.nd
storles of h1s people, la In sharp contrast wlth the oi'ficlal p!cture or
thls colorful, albelt lawless, personallty. The questlon arlses, why
·has he, alone, maintalued bis posltlon as an !dol ot the Slovak natlon? Obviously, he must have been dltferent from all bis companions
and con.temporarles, both In vice and vlrtue. Although lihe aura of
glory and honor that surrounds bis memory ls no doubt the result,
in some measure, of th-e people's rich lmaglnatlon, yet, bis deeds
durlng bis llfe are a,n argument In favor of some · outstan.dlng quallties
in hls makeup. We cannot account for h1s tremendous popularity
among the people, nor can we explain why bis name Ls a symbol
ot vlntue rather than vice, UDJ!ess we attrlbute vlrluous qua!itles to
t his youth who so fired the lmagination of the old and the young
that he has become the Jmmortal hero of bis natlve !and.
·T he areas known as th'e "Queen's Meadow, Warm Sprlngs," and
many other regions In tre Pohron and Malohont dl.strlcts, aboun.d
even today In folk songs, ballads, and storles of bis explolts ln be·
half of the poor and lhe oppres.sed.
We can safely conclude that the offlclal records suppressed
muoh of the truth in regard to Jánošik's aotual personallty and deeds.
Slnce he was the self-constltuted champlon of the 01>pressed everywhere, one can understand why bis name should be slmp4y put on the
11st as an ordina1-y cť.iminal by the oppressors, who used thelr power
to llquldate all fäose who were dangerous rebels agalnst thelr form
of soclety. But despite thelr precautlons, Jánošlk's name, for almost
two and a half centurles, has been the symbol of hope and courage
to bis people.
Unllke other parts ot the Austrlan Emplre, which revoJ.ted trom
time to tlme (Magyar, Romanian, Croatlan and Serblan outbreaks
occurred lntermlttently ln 1514, 1569, 1'571, 1635, 1655, 1784, etc.),
the Slovaks revolted oilliy once. Thls uprlslng happened In the
Potlsle reglon when a rumor was spread througbout Eastern Slovakla
that the nobility had polsoned their wells. It turned out, however,
that the cause ot wldespread death w.a,s actually the chlorea epldemic of that year, 1631. Historloal facts make it evldent that the
S!ovaks were a patient peoplil who would not rise In rebelllon In defense of thelr Jlfe as a natlon.
Passlv& endurance and reslstance under the merclless system
ot polltlcal oppression was, however, aC'companled by the actlve revolt
48
SLOVAKIA
of the more hlghly spirited Slovak youths, who rebelled against the
existing order of things by tak!ng the law lnto their own hands, and
,by retlring lnto -the.lr mountain strongholds from which they emerged
at nigbt to rígbt tbe wrongs inflicted on tbeir people. Tbey pa.id for
their daring and coul'age by their lives, sooner or later. But t heir
sprit kept alive 1'he spark of freedom and the love of justice in the
bearts of tbe Slovak.s. They wer e, to be sure, common felons and
blackguards among tbe forest bigbwaymen, but Jánošík was not one
of them. He was the true embodiment of bis age, wild and untamed
but not ignoble and ruthless, not savage and unrestralned, b ut gallant,
generous, honest, and ·honorable with his people.
T he first at:tiempts to trace the popular series of Slovak poem s,
ballads, songs, and legends were made in the early l&tb century.
T~b lic published a poem entltled "J ánoší k, lyptovský loupežník"
(J ánošik the Robber of Liptov) in his collection called Slovenšti
ve ršovc i (Vol. II, 1809). Ján Konár discovered several poems a bout
S lovak h ighwaymen and published them in bis Národné Zpievanky
(National Ballads) in 1834 and 1835. Slovak news-buHetins a nd almanacs contained poems and folk stories about Jánošik. The Časopis
a Sborní k Muzeál nej Slovens kej Spo ločnosti (The Periodical and
Almanac of the Slovak Museum Association) also published a number
of works on J ánošik, based largely on early manuscrip,ts found in the
museums in Liptov and Ružomberok. The Matica Slovenská (Slovak
Institute) planned to continue its splendid task of collecting these old
publica,!Jions, wihich are rich in folklore. By bhe m iddle of the l as.t
century, the last of the outlaws in Slovakia had disappeared, but
the stories of their daring exploits contlnued to interes.t the common people because of their highly imaginatlve appea,i.
J ánošik's fame is preserved for the ages in the many poems that
have been a distinct contribution to his nation's literature. The following poems have immortalized bis memory: Paul Šafarik's "Jáno.
šík" in the S laveni pac holu S lovanských 1814; Absolon Meško's
" Pieseň Jánošíková," 1842, (S lovenské Pohrady, 1897, sqq.); Michal
Hodž.a's poem in the Mator; Sáva Pepkin-Medňanský's "J á nošík" in bis
Poezi, Vol II ; Ján Botto's "Piese: J á nošíková" in Zpevy, 1847, and
"Sm rť J ánošíková" in Lipa; Samo Chalupk a's " Likavský Väzeň" In
the Orol, 1846, "Na K ráľovej Holí," 1862, and "Ju nak," 1860; August
Lojko's "Jánoš íkov Stol" and " Jánoší ková Podkova"; J akub Graich•
mann's " Horní Chla pc i' in the Sokol, 1861); William P auliny-Toth's
" Jánoš ík s mi lou"; Ján ČaJák's "Já noší k" in the Oro l, 1870. a nd
" J á nošíková Náhrada," 1875; J onas Záborský's "Smrť J á nošíková"
In the S lov. Po h ľady, 1894.
Paul Beblavý wrote an interesting his.torlcal story about bim in
the S lov. Pohrady, 1889; Augustus Marschal-Petrovský, a long no ve!,
J á nošík, Kapi t á n Ho rských Chlapcov, In 1901. Samo Zdyobavský wrote
a play, J ánošík; J ona:s Zaborský, a drama, Jánošíková Večera ;
Michal Skačkanský, a tragedy, J á nošík, 1880; Ľud. Kubaný, a play,
Ho rní Chlapci ; Júr Mahen, a moving lragedy, Jánošík, 1910; Frances
Svoboda-Goldman, a histoi,ical drama: J ohn P orod, a play, J á noliik,
1928, etc. Other articles and historlcal .•tudles about bim were written
by ,the followlng: Gaspar Fejérpal11ky In Vlaste nský Kal endár,
1831: Stephen Hýroš In his Zá mok Ly ka va, 1876; Pavel Dobšinský ln
Prostonárod né obyčaje, 1880; Rudolph Pokorný's Z potulek po
SLOVAKIA
49
Slovensku, 1883; Ján Bobula's Jánošík, 1863; K. Salva-Cebradskťs
Jánošík; Julius Botto in bis article "Leopold I and Francis Rákoczi
II" ln the Slov. Pohrady, 1904 mentions Jánoš í; Carl Kálaľs Slováci a
Slovensko, 1905, and bis Na Krásnem Slovensku, 1903; Oarl Dúbravský's Jánošík, 1911; Gregor Uram·Podtatranský's "Juro Jánošík in
the S bor. Muz. Slov. Sp. VIII, 1908; J aroslav Tuma's "Jánoší k," in
1911, Naše Slovensko; Michal Jiránek's " Zbojníci" in Slov. Čitanka,
1911; Samo Czambeľs "Jánošík" in Páričkov's Ružomberský Ka lendár,
1913; Joseph Škultety's Jánošíková Doba" in Slov. Pohrady, 1913;
Jgnac Gessay in the A!Lmanac of the Slovák v Amerike; Pavel Sochaň's
"Zbojník Juro Jánoší k," 1924. Ján L. Bella put Botto's poem "Svadba
Jánošíková" to music for solo, with piano accompan.lment and oches-
tr-ation. Vitezslav Novák also composed an orginaJ musical score on
the subject called "Jánošík," which is to be found in Mladí, op. 55.
Almost without exception the foregoing works pre.sented Jánošík
as bhe idol of bis people, as por,trayed in bhe folk songs and ballads
which have become a rich heritage of the Slovak nation. In some
he is a patriot, in others a young t,beologian who has been Jed away
from bis hlgb calling by the cruel circumstamces of bis tlme, ,vthile
in all of them, with one exception, he ls depicted as a knightly hig,h•
wayman who ls devoted to bis poor, oppressed poople. The one exception is Pavel Sochaň, who endeavors to debunk all the Iegendary
glory surrounding the name o! Jánošík by basing bis Zbojník Juro
Jánošík, akým bol v Skutočnosti (The Reail Jánošik) entirely on the
cas~ records found in the County Court House of Liptov. But this
is, perha,ps, the passing fancy of the times, to smash all the traditional
ldols of bbe past, and Sochaň is one of tbls class of modern iconoclasts. Despite his efforts and those of others to defame the character
of tlhe l~gendary heroes of yesterday, the fact remains that Jánoš!k
has been an influence in popular Slovak poetry, llterature, and drama,
and his name is imperisbable in tbe history of bis people. Botto's
poems, alone, would make bis fame immortaJ.
Not only did Slovak and Czech wrlters devote their talent.s
to the singing o! •bis praises, but we find that the Polisb autbor,
Przerwa-Tetmajer, wrote a whole ser.les of ballads about bim, as well
as a beautlful, touobingľ poem about bis deatb. His collection of fables,
folk stori~. folk songs, and poems ( Báje z Tatier) was very popular
in bis n,a tive Poland. Vlad. Hnatjuk, ťhe famous Ukralnian etbnographer, wrote a treatise on Jánošík in 1889, and included numerous
Slovakian songs about this national figure in bis collection of Russian, Slovak, Moravjan, and Polisb folklore.
Jánoš!k has been the frequent subject of creatlve are in bis
native country. Tbus, his likeness appears on glassware, prlmitive
palntings, pottery, etc., in wbicb he and his gay mountain Iads are
shown dres.sed in green blouses, red and wbite breecbes, shlny black
boots, gally colored hats wlťb feathers in tbem, wďde walsbbands
ricbly studded with gold, silver, and precious stones, and armed with
muskets and hatcbets (valašky). J ánošik always has the place of
honor as tbe leader, while Surovec is sbown brandishlng bis valaška; Hrajnoba shoots off tbe tip of a tall plne as he Ieaps high lnto
the air in a playful mood; and Gajdošik plays h!s bagpipes, wbile tbe
others dance to bis mountain music. Tbe Slovak art!sts, Mikulaš Aleš,
:\fartln Benka, and Ján Alexy, have made palntlngs of J ánoli!k. Tbe
liO
sculptor Franta Uprka made a number of fJgures of Jánošlk and his
companions, the best of them being hls sculpture of the entlre group
gathered around a bontlre on the mountalntop near the Tall Fine.
l,'. Fulla executed a gorgeous linoleum design of the group. Vla.dyslav
Skovzylaš, a Polls'h artist, ma.de several exqulsite wood carvings of
these T atra mountaineers of Jong ago. Among them are one ot Jánošlk, alone, another of Jánošík and hls sweetheart, one of his profile,
and a fourth of b.is men on the march.
Jánošlk's buried treasure has engaged the popular lmaginat!on
everywhere in Slovakia for centuries. The probable hlding places
most frequently mentloned are: Kozia Skala, located In the šutov
valiey in Turiec; Jánoiíkoá Pivnica, a cavern near Balna In tbe valley
of Nemecká Lupča; Biela Skala in the Suchá Valley near Liptov; and
Zemský Kľúč. Belopotecký's Mss., 1835, now in t'he Liptov Museum
in Ružoml>erok, refers to all these places, besldes Pod Jedlou near
Trnovec in Liptov, the Baránec Meadow near St. Andrew's in Liptov
county, and many others. Pavel Sochaň's "Jánošíkové Poklady" in the
Slov. Pohra.dy, 1922-23, and Ján Poroďs "Poklad a iné povesti z okolia Bytče" also conta.in clues to lhe secret hlding places of gold,
silver and gems. Numerous al'tlcles have appeared in the off-lclal publlcatlons of the Sborník Muz. Sl. Spol. in recent years under the title
of "Jánošíkov Poklad. Emo Bohúň wrote a fantastlc novel on the
subject.
The following places have been named after the famous outaaw:
Jánošíková Kolkáreň (JáJnošlk's Bowling Alley) located In Liptov;
Jánošíkové Husle (Jánošik's F\iddle) in Malé Smrekovice; Jánošíková
Jaskyňa (Jánošilťs Cave) in the Prosiecká valley; Jánošíkov Stôl
(Jánošlk's Table) In Važec; Jánošíkové Sedlo (Jánošlk's Sa.ddle) in
the Queen's Meadow; Jánošíková Stupa (Jánošík's Footprlnt) in !;he
Gadierská valley, In Turiec; Jánošíková Stolica (Jánošlk's County in
the v;ratná valley Ťarchová; Jánošíková Skala (Jánošlk'c Rock) at
L1šenlk, near Polhora, Zvolen county; Jánošíkov Chodník (Jánošlk's
Path) and Jánoš íková Jaskyňa (Jánošík's Cave) near Tisovce; Jánošíková Podkova (Jánošík's Horseshoe) in the Rimavská valley under
Zlamenečin Hill; 81lld Jánošíkov Skok (Jánošlk's Leap) at Dunajec.
These and many otber names wlll preserve the name of Jánošík even
ir all poems and stories about hlm dlsappear.
Jánošlk'.s hat 1s in the Liptov museum in Ružomberok. lt 1s ma.de
of clot1h rlohly embroidered with gold Jace and decorated with mussel shells, and is higb and cyllndrical in shape. Hls hatchet ls now in
the natlonal museum at Budapest, whlle his plpe 1s in the Slovak Instltute's collection. Th~ famous belt, whlch had been given hlm by a
fairy and was sald to have glvsn the Slovak hero preternatural powers,
is now in t,he Slovak Nat1ooal Museum In St. Martln's in Turiec. A cane
and tJwo ancient plctures or 'h ls band depicted on glass are there a lso.
Two plctures or him are In the collectlon of the Moravian Natural
Museum In Brno. The Liptov Museum at Ružomberok has a photograph of hls halrchet, a copy of the paintlngs Iu Brno, a copy ot the
orlginal court records ot t,he tria! of Jánošík, several palntlngs by Fulla
and Skoczylaša, and a large number of llterary works. In Rovno, Joseph
Buchčar !s the proud po~essor ot an artlstlc leather belt, flllgreed
lengthwise wltn goose qullls, w'hicb was found In his old mlll Jn the
course ot some repairs. Although lt is sald that thls belonged to Jáno1
SLOV.A.KU.
61
šik, it was more proba.bly the properly of Jánošík's lieutenant, Surovec,
as Rovno was Suroveťs horne town. The Tatranský Museum has six
old Polish g!ass likenesses of Jánošlk and hls merry men, similar to
the glassware in St. Martin's in Turiec. One, however, shows the outlaiws oarrying a bag of ducats, another has the picture ot his sweetheart. The collection there contains four pistols, ten knives, four
powder hom_s, and a bag in whlch the robbers used to carry thelr
stolen ducats.
Beneath the paintlngs of t?hese colorful personalitles of Slovak
folklore there !s a brief explanation of the lnitlatlon of new members
to the ro'bber gangs. 'l'hey were required to prove the:ir prowess In
,<,hooting oiif the tip of a tree with a pistol, or cuttlng lt otf wlth a
throw of the hatchet, by drinldng a bottle of brandy, and then by
performlng the d!fflcult "Robber's Dance." The lnitiat!on took p!ace in
the evenlng around thelr bonflre. Eaoh outlaw was armed to the teeth
wlth a hatohet in hls b elt, a brace of pistols, and a musket. Of course,
there was the powder horn, the wlde oell, the knapsack, a Hussar's
hat, and the bni:ghtly colored shirt and trousers to m ake up the rest
of the1r accoutrement. Jánošiťs breeohes were said to have been
red and w,hite In color.
It seems lncredible, in view of Jánošlk'.s fame, that no monument
stiands to honor his memory, or bhat no plaque marks bis birthplace.
But he llves in the hearts of •h is people, hence needs no image of iron
or stone to remind them of his life and his deeds. No other record
t:Xists of the merry mountain boys who had been Jánošílťs companions.
Mo.st probabtly they disbanded and under assumed names followed
peaceful and honorable professions until the end of thelr lives. Uhorčik, however, was cau~ht and executed; and "Red" Ondraš disappeared
In the vlclnlty of Tešlnka whlle Jánošik was stlll at Iarge.
'l1he woodlands grew silent and peaceful wlth the passlng of Jánošík from the scene. 'l'he songs of hls merry men were silenced forever, and the fores ts were left undisturbed for the deer, bear, fox, and
wlld boar as they went about unchallenged. And hlgh o'erhead, an
eagle on swift and silent wings surveyed the glen far below, abandoned
and cheerless, for tbe ,happy throng of Jánošik's youths ba.d dlspersed,
and their ohlef was dead. - (Slovenské Pohrady, V. XLV. Nos. 1-2,
1929).
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT ? "The Czechs bave been at all times all too
rea.dy to look on most Slovaks as Magyarones and potentlal traltors,
and have employed battallons of censors, police agents, and other
customary Instruments of unpopu!ar Governments, wblcb always end
by maklng the sltuation worse than hefore. Neltber the pollcy of
Prague nor the attltude of the Czech offlclals In Slovakla was al•
ways elther wlse or tactful. Tbe Czech Soclallsts. wbo played such
a large part in the Government or tlle flrst years, incorporated all
those Czech characterlstlcs most obnoxlous to the Slovaks. They were
crude, tbey were 111-mannered, tbey were aggresslvely egalitarlan, and
they were almost fanatlcally antl-clerlcal, seelng in the churches In
Slovakla a two-fold enemy. i<ocial and natlonal." - (C. A. Macartney:
H UNGARY AND HER SUCCESSORS; 1937, London).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Jánošík - The Slovak Robin Hood
Description
An account of the resource
Ivan Houdek
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952
pp. 42-51
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Houdek, Ivan
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1952
name
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d377e2402045defeb8c0365217471579.pdf
07ff1183ac8e8c98dd57469c932c6c68
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
33
THE SWVAK ASSEMBLY AND GOVERNMENT
ľt !s very interesting to follow the developement of the Slovak
national idea trom the oldest limes to the pre.sent. As one of the
oldest expressions of Slovak nationalism, made in wr~ting, we must
regard the foreword to the Catholic hymnal "Canthus Cathollci,"
pubJished in 1655, in whlch the author, the learned Jesuit Szôlôsi, with
words of wonderment and love, calls the aittention of his readers
to the first Slovak State, to Svätopluk and to Saints Cyril and
Methodius.
And since Szôlôsi's time, Slovak patriots have frequenrtly returned
to this theme: Magin in 1728; George Papánek in 1780, in his history
of Slovak ľtllers; George Sklenár In 1784, In his history of Great Moravia; in the "S'taré Noviny" (Old Newl',) in 1786. The period 1787-1792
is climaxed with the publlcation of the firs,t Slovak Grammar, the organization of the "Learned Guild" (Učené tovarišstvo), and the publication of Fándly's book, in which the author speaks warmly to the
Slovaks and calls their a,ttention to the flrst Slov,ak State. In 1793
Fándly again publishes the history of Great Moravia, and in 1833
John Hollý publishes his famed epic "Svätopluk." This perlod, lasting
over 130 years, is marked in learned books wlth a constant return to
the theme of ťhe first Slovak State.
At the end of this epoch, three years after Hollý's "Svätopluk"
was published, on the Devin ramparts the young friends of Louis
Štúr spoke from the rulns of Svä,topluk's stronghold, repeating everything that had t o that time appeared only in books. This is the
•border line. With the book of a young follower of Štúr, Benjamiu
Pravoslav Červenák,
titled "Zrcadlo Slovenska"
(Mirror of
Slovakla), which Hurban publlshed in 1844, ends ,this epoch of returning to the past without a single chapter about what we want in the
present and the future. We could s.ay, then, that Slovak patriots kept
the flames of their nationalism burning for 150 years by returning to
the past. However, they did not state clearly just how they pictured
Slovak life of the future.
In 1845, when Štúr began pu,biishing the first Slovak polltlcal
newspaper, a change was gradually taking place in the thinking of
the people. Slovaks began to talk about what should be done to
preserve the Slovak nation, to increase 1-ts spiritual and material welf,are. They talked about concrete Slovak demands. In 1842, Dr. Paul
Jozeffy placed a petition before the emperor, requesting that t he
Slovak lan.guage be .the medium of teachlng !n Slovakla, of preaching
in tbe cburches, and that cJrnrch records (vltal staitlstlcs) be kept in
Slovak. Jozeffy's demands concerned only the linguistic questlon.
But in 1848, the Slovaks went much farther. They proclaimed
themselves independent from the Magyars. Mil'hael Milan Hodža,
Loufs Štúr and Joseph Miloslav Hurban proclalmed the first Slovak
Government, the Slovak National Council as the "supreme Slovak
authorlty issulng out of the bosom of the natlon." That same year,
In the historic demands known as the Nitra and Liptovský Svätý
Mikuláš rlemands, the Slovaks pleaded ardently tor ~utonomy of the
Slovak terrltory, whose laws would be passed by a Slovak parllament.
�34
SLOVAKIA .
Furthermor e, they demanded: Slovak schools, Slovak cour ts, Slovak as
the offlclal language In SlovakJa, and teachlng In Slovak a t the
Unlverslty.
In every Slovak demand, trom May 10, 1848, and In every Slovak
program the demand for a S lovak Parllament w,as predomlnan t. It
had deep roots.
To Brezová and Liptovský Svätý M.lkulä§ not even a hundred people came to the rally In 1848 to demand a Slovak parllament . In 1861,
about 6000 Slovaks oam e together to demand a Natlonal Assembly for
SlovakJa. The Plttsburgh manifesta:t lon of May 30, 1918, w as attend ed
by some 30,000 people. But In 1938, on P ent.ecost Day (June 6th ),
about 120,000 Slovaks gathered In Bratislava at a hlstorlc rally to
commemor ate lhe twentleth annlversary of th e Plttsbugh P act . It was
he re that lhe Slovak natlon saw the hlstorlc document whlch was
proposed ,and slgned by T. G. Masazyk In 1918. The Plttsburgh Pact,
whlch In fact guaranteed autonomy t o the Slovaks, was brought to
Slovakla by a delega tlon of lhe Slovak League of Amerlca.
T hese m anlfestation s show just how the concept of self-admlnistratlon in Slovakia grew In depth In the wlde masses of the naitlon.
In 1848 lt wa.<i supported by a small group of Slovak hrtellectual s, but
In 1938, in Bratislava, pract!cally the entlre Slovak natlon was back
of it.
In a contldenlla l report (T. 1370/33) to Pres.Ident M,asaryk , Dr.
Schnleszl wrote:
"Today a ll of S lovakla 1, for autonomy. Several pre.revolu.
tlonary Slovak, are completely lnsignlflcan t for the splrltual life
of the people. Moreover, if some were not bound by thelr paat,
and other, by the ir public statu,, they, t oo, would be on the other
• Ide o penly."
The Slovak newspapen nan in Amerlca, Adalbert Tholt,Vel'koštlavnlcký, was not faml11ar w!th the correspondence of old Slovak
leaders, and yet he evaluated the polltical demands of the Slovaks
quite correctly. He stated that they were demands not only for a
narrow autonomy, but lhat thelr content actually called for the Jndependence of Slovakia. It 1s interestlng t hat Tholt came to this concluslon even though he was not acqua!nted wlth the signlflcant quota.
tion trom Šttlr's book "Slovanstv o a svet budtlcnostl " (Slavdom and
the WOTld of lhe Future), which read:
"So that we could occupy and take ove r the place whlch belong1 to u1 accordlng to our atrength a nd capabllltles , we must
once and for a ll t lme f ree ourselvea from the unbearable y oke of
foreignera a nd gain for ouraelvea state INDEPEND ENCE, bec auae
a natlon that i• enslaved has ltl hand, t led and mu,t perlsh
sooner or lat er."
What crystal-clea x words! And Šttlr said them openly and fearlessly after the sad experlence s of 1848-49. Šttlr states clearly that
the penalty awa!Ung the nat!on whlch wlll not flght for its state
in dependence is death.
After the natlonal rally of 1861, the flght at home in Slovakla
weakened; there was not a slngle publ!c expression or demand voted
on manlfestati onally which could compare to the demands of 1848 and
1861: In whlch .a demand was volced for a Slovak governmen t, or a
Slovak parl!ament. In Slovakla a bard flght was fou ght t o preserve
�SLOVAKIA
86
S lovak schools. But the flght for the inherent rlghts of the Slovak natlon was carrled over lnto America. The questlon was taken up by the
Slovak press and became the subject of several hundred public manlfestatlons. Flnally lt matured wlth the "Memorandum of ťhe Slovak
League," whlch to a certaln extent repeated the demands voiced In
1848 and 1861: autonomy for Slovakla, a separate Slovak Assembly
or Dlet, Slovaklzatlon of the schools, Slovak courts, and the use of
Slovak In public llfe.
After thls foll<JW the agreements wlth representatives of the
Czech natlon. The Cleveland ~reement, In 1915, In wlllch the Czechs
agree to a federatlve form of the hopeful Czecho-Slovak Republlc, and
then the memorable Plttsburgh Pact of May 30, 1918, in whlch again
ls renewed the promlse that the Slovaks shall have thelr own Slov,ak
admlnlstration, thelr own Slovak schools and courts, and, above all
else, thelr own Slovak parliament or state leglslature. Even though
Thomas Garrigue Masaryk underslgned thls agreement on May 30,
1918, and then agaln on the second day following bis electlon as
Presldent of Czecho-Slovakia, he later dlsavowed it, declarlng it a falsehood and a mere scrap of paper. That ls how the Czechs kept thelr
promlses.
If we call the perlod from 1655 to 1845 as the perlod which turned
to the past, then we can call 1:he perlod from 1845 to to 1918 a.s the
perlod present!ng the program of the !uture. And thls 1s followed by
a perlod of actlve fightlng for the recognltlon of prom!ses and agreements. A short artlcle does not allow us to take up in mlnute de•
tal! every parliamentary expresslon, every motlon or proposal for
autonomy, every public manlfestatlon; and every remlnder that promlses made durlng the war be kept and fulfilled.
It remalns a sad reality, but the hlstorlcal truth nevertheless,
that the Czechs dld not live up to thelr promlses any more after 1918,
than they d1d after 1945. Tlle fate of every agreement wlth the
Czechs was the same: ,all agreements wlth the Slova.ks were repudiated by the Czechs. The Czechs were w11llng to make concesslons
only when they needed the Slovaks; later, they repudlated every
agreement. Practlcally all Czech.s were the same In thls regard: T.
G. Masaryk, the so-called reallst and humanlst; Ediward Beneií,
t he so-called "democrat and statesman," and Monslgnor John Šrámek, the Cathollc prlest; Czech agrarlans, democrats, soclallsts,
communlsts and fasclsts; Czech Cathollcs, Lutherans, Jews, Ta:bor·
ltes, Husaltes, members of the "Czechoslovak Natlonal Church," Unl•
tarlans and Baptista: all repudiated the promlses made to Slova.ks,
all repudlated the lnberent and God-glven rlght of the Slovak natlon
to freedom and state lndependence. No llttle wonder, then, t,bat the
SlovalG cry out today: Don't belleve the Czech.s - no more agreements wlth the Czechs!
Joseph P~kar, the Czech hlstorlan repudlated by Masaryk and
Beneli, declared In hls Ume that the Slovak demands were moderate.
Was lt not a terrible tragedy that these moderate and rlghtful demands were not reallzed in the Czeoho Slovak Republic? For twenty
long year-s the Slovaks fouglrt not only for thelr own parllament, but
also for t.he Slovaklzat!on of tbelr schools, especlally for addttlonal
hlgher lnstltutlons of loo.rnlng. Many of the demands of 1848 and
0
�36
SLOVAKIA
1861 were still timely even ln 1938; and the demand for a Slovak
parllament W&S the most imporllant.
The Czechs, supported by Slovak Czechoslovaks (Slovaks ln the
serVice of the Czechs: renegades), proclaimed that there was nothing more dangerous for the Slovaks than a Slovak parliament.
V,avro Šro,b ár, one of the foremost "Czechoslovaks," wrote a letter
to Americans of Slovak descent to "prove" that point. Of course,
to do so he had to give incorrect or falsified statistios; ln fact,
he outdid the Magyars in -that respect. šrobár used the false figures,
1 epresenting the various nationa.lities of the populatlon of Slovakia,
to show that in a Slovak parliament the Slovaks themselves would
be a minority, which the non-Slovak population - the Magyars, Jews
and Germans - could outvote at any Ume. But he was not very convincing. During varlous negotiations wlth a P.r-ague Government,
the Czech ministers promised: We shall glve you everything, but
not a Slovak parliament. And -the Slovaks answered adamantly: We
want nothing except a Slovak parliament, because with it we shall
rea.lize al! the rest of our demands.
Czech policy was incredibly short-sighted. Czech politicians and
ministers would debate day.s on end In the Ministerlal Council to
send Czech maLl-carriers and janitors to Slovakia to "help out" the
Slovaks. .ánd they usually did even agalnst the will of the Slovak
pul)lic and its representatlves In Government. Thls only convinced
the Slovaks all ťhe more thai w:ithout thelr own State Legislature
or Parliament, they would actually be only a subordinate colony of
the Czech nation. Tbe more Prague opposed the Idea of a Slovak parliamen t, however, the more the Slovaks demanded lt. Th·a t was the
situa:tlon up to October 6, 1938.
Czech diplomacy and democracy created such a situation that the
Czecho-Slovak Repul)ll<: collapsed wlth the first blow. Not a single
shot was fired in its defense. In the annals of hlstory there is probably not a single case where a political state disappeared with
less ado about it. In the fall of 1938 lt was c.Jear even to those
In power in Prague that the Slovak demands of 1915-1918 must be
fulfilled. Even Beneš bimself - who told the delegation of the Slovak League of Amerlca In 1938 that be was in principle agalnst t he
Pittsburgh Pact only because of the one word "parllament" - began to
see the llght. On October 4, 1938, that very same Beneš wrote a letter to Dr. Joseph Tiso - a letter overflowing wlth reverence and
k!ndly feellng - in which we flnd:
"The question of a parllament, designated by Mr. President
in principle and onJy in the maln outlines and In proposltlons,
requlres precise defln!tion and preclse legal formulatlon. The
new Government, in agreement wlth the Slovaks, shall have to
conclude the rest of this work as speedily as posslble."
Beneš wrote the letter and correcled it tbree times, as was
a.scertained In the archlves, but lt was slgned by. Dr. Schleszl.
On October 4, Beneš had lt mailed, but that very day requested lt
returned to hlm, because, under pressure from the generals, he
declded to reslgn the Presldency of the Republic. But what dld Beneš have io propose about a Slovak parliament? Only thls:
" It ls agreed that future acts of admlnistratlve reforms, if
it shall be based on the county system, shall preserve the unlty
�SLOVAKIA
37
of SloV'aJtia as a !and and that a union of the counties be reallzed
withln the fmmework of the territorial parliament of Slovakia."
True, thls proposition could not be seriously considered, because
Beneš resigned his office and fled the country. The Pra~e ParHament fLnally voted the autonomy of Slovakia wit hout Beneš
on 0 ctober 6, 1938. In December the first Slovak parliament•ary eJections were held, and In January, 1939, sixty-three deputies were seated
in the flrst legislative ,assembly of Slovakia. Dr. Martin Sokol became
t he first president of the Slovak Parliament. The dream of Slovak
,generatlons was at long last realized.
The Slovak ParJiament, just as every ,human work, had lts
shortcomings. But we must judge every mlstake in the light of the
times in which it happened. The Slovak Legislature began to function
in extraordinarily difficult tlmes, when the worud situation was extraordinarily tense and confusion reigned In Slov·a kia.
Almost simultaneously with the Parliament, Slovak rule passed
!nto the hands of the Slovak Government in 0ctober, 1938. State
executive and leglslative power in Slovakia passed into Slovak hands.
But the Ozechs were not satisfied wit h this status of affairs. It
was difficult for th em to suffer the thought that the Slovaks would
now decide about Slovak matters w-ithout Prague. They began to
hinder development. 'I'he.y especially wanted to prove that their
progno.stiootions about the Czeťhs ha-ving to pay for the Slovaks
were true. The financial policy pursued was suoh that it forebo<le
the prediction of Kramár, that 1s, that if the Slovaks gained autonomy,
they wouid not be aJble to pay their state employees even three
months. They refused to give money for Slovak !mports from the
common fund, even though t he Slovaks contributed to it, because
now, they said, Slovakia is no longer a money--creating part of the
·state. Events were climaxed wHh a new occupation of Slovakia and
the unseatlng of fäe first Slovak Government in Marcl:t, 1939. When
this happened, the recently executed Vladlmir Clementis, in London
at that tilne, wrote:
" . . . The unseatlng of Tlso's Government by Prague (better
said: by Hácha, Beran and Chvalkovský - at the direction of
Berlin) was negoti'ated polit!cally In a very bung,Jed manner,
nay in a si-niiully awkward manner" ( Hnev Svätý, London, 1944,
pg. 21).
The result of this lntervention was tha.t Slovakia tore herself
compl etely from the Czech lands, and the Parliament of Slove.kla by
unan!mous vote, proclaimed the lndependence of the Slovak State
on Maroh 14, 1939. Thus, Štúr',s wish of 1850 was realized in 1939.
,Shortly after the Parliament and government of autonomous
Slovak!a oame into being, the enti-re apparatus of government legislat!ve and executive power - oame lnto Slovak hands. And
just aibout that time we w!tnes.sed an interesting phenomenon. From
1940, after the events of the so-calle d '\Salzburg In,tervention," we
noted a e hange in the relatlons between the Parllament Md the
Government - which caused a serious tension and often threatened
to explo<le lnto a sharp public conWct and wreck the whole structure
of the State.
Vojtech Tuka wanted to remodel Slovakia completely after the
German model ; he was for NaUonal Soc!alism. 0f course, he ex-
�38
SLOVAKIA
pected to become the flrst cltlzen of the remodeled State. Tuka and
bis followers began to lntrigue agalnst the Parllament, and the
stM1ggle cllmaxed with Tuka's demand that Parliament vote Tuka
fulJ authority, and that even In Constltut1onal mattera. In a word,
Tuka wa.nted dlctatorlal powers. Accordlng to Tuka, the PaTllament
was supposed to be only a representative body, whlch he would convoke once a year to hear some proclamatlon of hfs and then would
solemnly and unanlmously approve everythlng he proposed. Tuka
wanted a "rubber stamp" parllament whlch would say "so be lt" to
everyth!ng he recommended, then go home and ref.raln from meddllng
In the politlcs of the State. Charles Mmgaš, Chlef of Propaganda,
speaklng In the name of the "leadershlp," deolared that only one
or two persons of the "lea.dership" would be -a.ble to play polltics and,
of course, he reckoned tha.t •he would be one of them.
Accordlng to these promoters of Natlonal Soclallsm, lt w,as
necessary to Temove two personalltlee from government: Dr. J oseph
Tlso and Dr. Martin Sokol. President Tlso delegated Dr. Sokol to dellbemt e about these questlons. To the great surprlse of Dr. Tuka
hlmself, Dr. Sokol declared that he fully agreed wlth Tuka's proposal that the Natlonal-Soclallstlc system should prevall in Slovakla.
.And now, sald Dr. Sokol, slnce th1ngs are done In thls manner In the
Reich - and here Sokol enumerated how varlous matters were transacted in Germany - we &hall do likewlse in Slovakla. In the fkst
place, of course, cont:lnued Dr. Sokol, we know that In the Relch
aJl State power rests In the hands of the head of the State - and
that head 1s the Presldent.
Dr. Tuka, lmmedlately realizlng that he was dlsarmed and In a
bllnd alley, revoked hls proposal for a Natlonal Socla\lst!c Slevakla.
He was fully 11.ware that under the ciTcumstances lt could happen
that he would drop out of government completely, lf h1s proposal was
adopted.
But peace dld not ensue between Tuka, Mach and the ParHament. The deputles, who once sat in the Prague Parll,ament, often
declared that the Prague Parllament could never have allowed such
Independent action against the Government as the Bratislava Parl!amen.t dld durlng its mhole exlstence. lit often hapl)ened that the Government sent to Parllament a draft of a 1Mv for consideratlon and
pas&age. When Parllament was thro~h with lt, the law approved
was In most cases not based on the orlglnal dra~t. but was the opposJ te In lts effec,ts from what Tuka and Mach had lntended lt to
be. There was no opposltlon ,to speak of In Parllament, but there
was plenty of lt ag,alnst the Government. Thls had not onJy lts
good, but bad polnts as well.
Undoubtedly, lf -tlmes were normal, Tuka's government never
would have held together. Tuka and Mach, who represented one
tendency In the Government, had practlcally no support In Parllament. Later on, however, even the other mlnlsters could not
have galned t-he majority, because, just as 'Iluka and Mach were reproached for belng too radlcal and subordlnated to the Germans. they,
on the other hand, were reproached for belng too colorless. Aga.In it
1s true, that we could talk about the polltlcs or Dr. Tuka and Mach,
but hardly that of Dr. Pruf.!nský, Frltz, St-a.no and Medrlcký. The
latter were completely lnfluenced by "Czechoslovak" c lrcles.
�SLOVAKIA
39
-Relatlons between the Government were not ldyllic. Tuka's !lret
attempt to dlssolve Parllament ended lnglorlousJy. But he and hli!
foJlowers dld not glve up easlly. When Tuka categorlcally demanded
that he wanted a new Government formed, whlch would include
only M-ach and Catioš !rom the exlstlng Government, he agaln wae
de!eated. Tuka then demanded the Presldent to appoint Ciiarles
Murga§ as Minister of Educatlon, John Farka§ as Finance Minister, and a new man to head the Minlstry of Justice. Tlso, however,
remalned adamant; he repudlated Tuka's demands. Tlso inslsted en
keeplng the iBame Government he had a!ter the Sal11Jburg events of
July, 1940.
After many rebuffs and bitter dlsappolntments, Tuka's spľrlt
and energy began to wane. He was an old, slck man, obsessed with
the thought that he should have been the !lrst man in the !and,
because he had, he thought, suffered for the cause more than any
one el.se. Hls aggre.sslveness gone, Tuk.a In later years was a minister in name only; he was seldom seen in hls offlce and was not In
a posltion to make decislons. There was no change In government
personnel until after Catloš's !llght to the putschJsts at the end of
August, 1944. Catloš wa.s replaced by Stephen Haäšik; Tuka by Dr.
Stephen Tlso, who also took over Frltz's post (Justlce and Forelgn
Affalrs); Stano was replaced by Ing. Lednár, and .Sivák by Dr.
Aladar Kočiš.
Some people dld not flnd it difflcult to crltlclze the actlvlty of
lndlvidual mlnlsters. When converslng wlth such bitter crltlcs, I
cften asked the questlon: And what would you have done under the
same clrcumstances? After a momenťs thought, the crltlcs usually
an,swered that they probably would have done the same thlng, because there w-as a war on, German pressure dld exist, the sltuatlon
was extraordlnary and, hence, strongly lntluenced everythlng the
Government dld. Nevertheless, it remalns lnd1sputably true that as
long as the Slovak Parllament and the Slovak Government ruled In
Slovakia, the llvlng Standard of the Slovak people was hlgher than
that of -a.ny nelghborlng country.
Let people say w.hat they wlll about Sivák, the !act remalus
that wblle he was Minister of Educatlon, more secondary schools
arose tban ever before, more Slovak professors were appolnted to the
unlversltles, and at least three tlmes as many students studled during the war than before or after ft. W e may crlt!clze T uka's act!ons,
but the fact remalns that he did not seek reprlsals agalnst the false
wltnesses, brlbed by Prague as -the Prague archlves dlsolosed, who
helped to convlot bim to 15 years In prlson durlng the flrst CzechoSlovak Republlc.
During the admlnlstratlon of Jullus Stano, more rallroad tracks,
roads and buildings were bullt than ever before. The fact remalns
that whlle Frltz was Minister of Justlce, and even after he was
replaced, there was not a slngle offlclal executlon in Slovakia. Wben
Medrický was in charge of Slovak economy, there was no ratlonlng
of food and clothJng. And when Pružlnský was Mlnlster of Flnance,
deposlts soared t o unbeard of belghts and the Slovak Koruna (Crown),
one of the most prized means of exchange In the wbole of Europe, enjoyed the legend or the Tatra dollar. EvEm Catloš hlmself pursued a po
llcy wbereby Slovakla contrlbuted as llttle as posslble to the tax of blood.
�40
SLOVAKIA
Alexander Mach mlght be blamed for almost anythlng and everytblng, but perhap.s no one man stood up so fearlessly against the German propaganda concerning the Germanlsm of the Habans, agalnst
1,he founcllng of German schools for Czecbs who s uddenly discovered
tbat tbey had some German blood coursing In tbeir velns. And lt remains a fact that tbe Communlsts, even though their Party wias
outlawed, suffered less in &Jovakla than elsewhere. It may sound
strange, but it is true nevertheless, that Mach - thls most Germanophile Minister of the Interior - used to sit at a whlte table
with Communist inte11ectuals, converse with them, ententain them,
and, above all else, protect them.
During the existence of the Slovak State, neither the Presldent
nor the Mlnisters of State had to fear going among the people without a retinue of armed guards. The President never wanted a motorlzed police escort, in fact, could not even use one going to the
altar, the pulpit, the baptlsmal font, or into the confesslonal. President Tiso was truly loved and esteemed by all the people of Slovakia.
If his politicaJ enemies b e excepted, and tbey were only few in number, tben we must say t hat even they respected him. What a difference between Tiso and Beneš ! T,iso needed no protection wben he
went out among tbe people, but Beneš and bis Communis.t-dominated
regime had to have an army around tbem when they entered Slovakia
after tbe war.
About the Slovak Parllament we migbt say what the followers
of Gbandi were wont to say: "Even the worst Indian Government
1s better for I ndia than the best Engllsh Government, because tbe
English Government bas no business in India." Similarly, the Slovaks
can express tbemselves about every Czech government. The past has
shown definitely that a Czecho-Slovak government is in reality always a Czech government, regardless of whether it follows a rightls.t or Communist tendency. A Czec h-Slovak parliament always was
and always will be a Czech parJ.iament, even lf lt contains several
Slovak members.
A nation whlcb bas matured does not want to be regulated or
directed by laws t hat are promulgated by an alien parliament and
then enforced by an alien government. That is so especially witb a
nation wbicb has had lts own parliament and its own government.
The Slovak nation had its own parliament and its own government
from 1938- 1945, And tbe Slovaks stm wanted to rule themselves,
thelr Slovak Republlc, after the war ended in 1945, but thelr will
,v,as violated, They were violently forced back into the political
state which had explolted them for thirty years.
Slovak ministers, as peopl e, could have a nd undoubtedly did have
their faults, but one tbing cannot be denied tbem, the one lndlsputal>Je fact tbat tbey worked for the welfare of the entire Slovak nation as best they could under given circumstances, and the Slovak
people never fared better under any otber government - before or
slnce that time. In a word, tbe Slovak ministers governed well. Not
one of tbem became wealthy through polltlcs; and they lived more
modestily, more democratically than the present rulers of Slovakia,
they cost the people less than tbe present commissloners.
Tbe .same can be sald for the parUament. Tbe work of tbe Slovak Parliament undoubtedly had lts shortcomlngs. Circumstances and
�SLOVAKIA
events often tled the hands of the deputies, but we need not fear
the criticism whlch history shall r&eord about the Slovak Parliament.
After the war many deputies were tortured and some were k!lled.
Most of them recelved an average of ten years in prison. It is good
always to remember this, when some Czech In the world says that the
Slovaks never had it so good as they had it under the Czechs before
1939 or after 1945.
The fact remains that the Czechs in Prague oppressed and exploited the Slovaks before 1939 and, af,ter 1945 avenged -themselves by
murdering Dr. Tiso and others, jaillng, persecuting and dispossessing
thousands of others, and exlling tens of thousands of Slovaks to
Siberla and other regions of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The
Slovaks at home and everywhere in exile know tha.t they dld not
sell out the Czech people to Moscow, but that Dr. Edward Beneš
and hls followers sold out not only the Slovak nation, but the
Czech peoI11e as we11, to the tyranny of ,t he hammer and sickJe.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
BENEŠ IN RETROSPECT: - "In an interview published In a
London Sunday paper, REYNOLDS NEWS, on February 20, Presldent
Beneš of Czechoslovakia, emphatically declared that he does not fear
Russla's return to imperlalism under the pretext of a so-called Al!•
Slav policy. The alliance and harmonious collaboratlon of the USSR,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia would deter Germany from provoking
another world war. Such an agreement may, therefore, have a far•
reaching slgnificance for the future peace of Europe as a whole. To
the question as to whether the pact will not make Czechoslovakia too
dependent on the Soviet Union, President Beneš r eplied that the pact
represents the fundamental strengthening of Czechoslovakia's security a nd consolidates her independence. Friendshlp wlth Soviet Russla
means a mutual collaboration. The Czechoslovakian people, as the
most mature people politically in Europe, would never accept vassalage under any nation." - (News Flashes From Czechoslovakia, Chicago, Ill., March 20, 1944).
•
•
•
DR. HUBERT RIPKA:-'IMany siliy rumors and guesses ,have arlsen
concerning a quarrel with the Soviet Union about Carpathian-Russia.
Many conJectures have been made about our Governmental delegate,
NE!mec. T hese are all nonsensical speculations ! The Soviet and Czechoslovak Governments are firmly resolved to proceed in all matters, now
and in the future, strlctly accordlng to the Treaty. Governmental dele•
gate NE!mec, wlth hls political advisors and the representatlves of the
Slovak Natlonal Council, ls already in llberated eastern Slovakia and
in a few days wlll start worklng in Košice, to organize a new free
Ufe in llberated parts of Slovakla, accordlng to the government on
relatlons between the Government delegate and the Slovak Natlonal
Councll. President Beneš wlll also come soon to the llberated country,
where, under hls leadershlp, a new Government authority wlll be created, based on the wlll of the llberated peoples. Be calm and falth·
ful. Liberatlon 1s in slght." - (London Broadcast, January 29, 1945).
�
SLOVAKIA
33
THE SWVAK ASSEMBLY AND GOVERNMENT
ľt !s very interesting to follow the developement of the Slovak
national idea trom the oldest limes to the pre.sent. As one of the
oldest expressions of Slovak nationalism, made in wr~ting, we must
regard the foreword to the Catholic hymnal "Canthus Cathollci,"
pubJished in 1655, in whlch the author, the learned Jesuit Szôlôsi, with
words of wonderment and love, calls the aittention of his readers
to the first Slovak State, to Svätopluk and to Saints Cyril and
Methodius.
And since Szôlôsi's time, Slovak patriots have frequenrtly returned
to this theme: Magin in 1728; George Papánek in 1780, in his history
of Slovak ľtllers; George Sklenár In 1784, In his history of Great Moravia; in the "S'taré Noviny" (Old Newl',) in 1786. The period 1787-1792
is climaxed with the publlcation of the firs,t Slovak Grammar, the organization of the "Learned Guild" (Učené tovarišstvo), and the publication of Fándly's book, in which the author speaks warmly to the
Slovaks and calls their a,ttention to the flrst Slov,ak State. In 1793
Fándly again publishes the history of Great Moravia, and in 1833
John Hollý publishes his famed epic "Svätopluk." This perlod, lasting
over 130 years, is marked in learned books wlth a constant return to
the theme of ťhe first Slovak State.
At the end of this epoch, three years after Hollý's "Svätopluk"
was published, on the Devin ramparts the young friends of Louis
Štúr spoke from the rulns of Svä,topluk's stronghold, repeating everything that had t o that time appeared only in books. This is the
•border line. With the book of a young follower of Štúr, Benjamiu
Pravoslav Červenák,
titled "Zrcadlo Slovenska"
(Mirror of
Slovakla), which Hurban publlshed in 1844, ends ,this epoch of returning to the past without a single chapter about what we want in the
present and the future. We could s.ay, then, that Slovak patriots kept
the flames of their nationalism burning for 150 years by returning to
the past. However, they did not state clearly just how they pictured
Slovak life of the future.
In 1845, when Štúr began pu,biishing the first Slovak polltlcal
newspaper, a change was gradually taking place in the thinking of
the people. Slovaks began to talk about what should be done to
preserve the Slovak nation, to increase 1-ts spiritual and material welf,are. They talked about concrete Slovak demands. In 1842, Dr. Paul
Jozeffy placed a petition before the emperor, requesting that t he
Slovak lan.guage be .the medium of teachlng !n Slovakla, of preaching
in tbe cburches, and that cJrnrch records (vltal staitlstlcs) be kept in
Slovak. Jozeffy's demands concerned only the linguistic questlon.
But in 1848, the Slovaks went much farther. They proclaimed
themselves independent from the Magyars. Mil'hael Milan Hodža,
Loufs Štúr and Joseph Miloslav Hurban proclalmed the first Slovak
Government, the Slovak National Council as the "supreme Slovak
authorlty issulng out of the bosom of the natlon." That same year,
In the historic demands known as the Nitra and Liptovský Svätý
Mikuláš rlemands, the Slovaks pleaded ardently tor ~utonomy of the
Slovak terrltory, whose laws would be passed by a Slovak parllament.
�34
SLOVAKIA .
Furthermor e, they demanded: Slovak schools, Slovak cour ts, Slovak as
the offlclal language In SlovakJa, and teachlng In Slovak a t the
Unlverslty.
In every Slovak demand, trom May 10, 1848, and In every Slovak
program the demand for a S lovak Parllament w,as predomlnan t. It
had deep roots.
To Brezová and Liptovský Svätý M.lkulä§ not even a hundred people came to the rally In 1848 to demand a Slovak parllament . In 1861,
about 6000 Slovaks oam e together to demand a Natlonal Assembly for
SlovakJa. The Plttsburgh manifesta:t lon of May 30, 1918, w as attend ed
by some 30,000 people. But In 1938, on P ent.ecost Day (June 6th ),
about 120,000 Slovaks gathered In Bratislava at a hlstorlc rally to
commemor ate lhe twentleth annlversary of th e Plttsbugh P act . It was
he re that lhe Slovak natlon saw the hlstorlc document whlch was
proposed ,and slgned by T. G. Masazyk In 1918. The Plttsburgh Pact,
whlch In fact guaranteed autonomy t o the Slovaks, was brought to
Slovakla by a delega tlon of lhe Slovak League of Amerlca.
T hese m anlfestation s show just how the concept of self-admlnistratlon in Slovakia grew In depth In the wlde masses of the naitlon.
In 1848 lt wa.<i supported by a small group of Slovak hrtellectual s, but
In 1938, in Bratislava, pract!cally the entlre Slovak natlon was back
of it.
In a contldenlla l report (T. 1370/33) to Pres.Ident M,asaryk , Dr.
Schnleszl wrote:
"Today a ll of S lovakla 1, for autonomy. Several pre.revolu.
tlonary Slovak, are completely lnsignlflcan t for the splrltual life
of the people. Moreover, if some were not bound by thelr paat,
and other, by the ir public statu,, they, t oo, would be on the other
• Ide o penly."
The Slovak newspapen nan in Amerlca, Adalbert Tholt,Vel'koštlavnlcký, was not faml11ar w!th the correspondence of old Slovak
leaders, and yet he evaluated the polltical demands of the Slovaks
quite correctly. He stated that they were demands not only for a
narrow autonomy, but lhat thelr content actually called for the Jndependence of Slovakia. It 1s interestlng t hat Tholt came to this concluslon even though he was not acqua!nted wlth the signlflcant quota.
tion trom Šttlr's book "Slovanstv o a svet budtlcnostl " (Slavdom and
the WOTld of lhe Future), which read:
"So that we could occupy and take ove r the place whlch belong1 to u1 accordlng to our atrength a nd capabllltles , we must
once and for a ll t lme f ree ourselvea from the unbearable y oke of
foreignera a nd gain for ouraelvea state INDEPEND ENCE, bec auae
a natlon that i• enslaved has ltl hand, t led and mu,t perlsh
sooner or lat er."
What crystal-clea x words! And Šttlr said them openly and fearlessly after the sad experlence s of 1848-49. Šttlr states clearly that
the penalty awa!Ung the nat!on whlch wlll not flght for its state
in dependence is death.
After the natlonal rally of 1861, the flght at home in Slovakla
weakened; there was not a slngle publ!c expression or demand voted
on manlfestati onally which could compare to the demands of 1848 and
1861: In whlch .a demand was volced for a Slovak governmen t, or a
Slovak parl!ament. In Slovakla a bard flght was fou ght t o preserve
�SLOVAKIA
86
S lovak schools. But the flght for the inherent rlghts of the Slovak natlon was carrled over lnto America. The questlon was taken up by the
Slovak press and became the subject of several hundred public manlfestatlons. Flnally lt matured wlth the "Memorandum of ťhe Slovak
League," whlch to a certaln extent repeated the demands voiced In
1848 and 1861: autonomy for Slovakla, a separate Slovak Assembly
or Dlet, Slovaklzatlon of the schools, Slovak courts, and the use of
Slovak In public llfe.
After thls foll<JW the agreements wlth representatives of the
Czech natlon. The Cleveland ~reement, In 1915, In wlllch the Czechs
agree to a federatlve form of the hopeful Czecho-Slovak Republlc, and
then the memorable Plttsburgh Pact of May 30, 1918, in whlch again
ls renewed the promlse that the Slovaks shall have thelr own Slov,ak
admlnlstration, thelr own Slovak schools and courts, and, above all
else, thelr own Slovak parliament or state leglslature. Even though
Thomas Garrigue Masaryk underslgned thls agreement on May 30,
1918, and then agaln on the second day following bis electlon as
Presldent of Czecho-Slovakia, he later dlsavowed it, declarlng it a falsehood and a mere scrap of paper. That ls how the Czechs kept thelr
promlses.
If we call the perlod from 1655 to 1845 as the perlod which turned
to the past, then we can call 1:he perlod from 1845 to to 1918 a.s the
perlod present!ng the program of the !uture. And thls 1s followed by
a perlod of actlve fightlng for the recognltlon of prom!ses and agreements. A short artlcle does not allow us to take up in mlnute de•
tal! every parliamentary expresslon, every motlon or proposal for
autonomy, every public manlfestatlon; and every remlnder that promlses made durlng the war be kept and fulfilled.
It remalns a sad reality, but the hlstorlcal truth nevertheless,
that the Czechs dld not live up to thelr promlses any more after 1918,
than they d1d after 1945. Tlle fate of every agreement wlth the
Czechs was the same: ,all agreements wlth the Slova.ks were repudiated by the Czechs. The Czechs were w11llng to make concesslons
only when they needed the Slovaks; later, they repudlated every
agreement. Practlcally all Czech.s were the same In thls regard: T.
G. Masaryk, the so-called reallst and humanlst; Ediward Beneií,
t he so-called "democrat and statesman," and Monslgnor John Šrámek, the Cathollc prlest; Czech agrarlans, democrats, soclallsts,
communlsts and fasclsts; Czech Cathollcs, Lutherans, Jews, Ta:bor·
ltes, Husaltes, members of the "Czechoslovak Natlonal Church," Unl•
tarlans and Baptista: all repudiated the promlses made to Slova.ks,
all repudlated the lnberent and God-glven rlght of the Slovak natlon
to freedom and state lndependence. No llttle wonder, then, t,bat the
SlovalG cry out today: Don't belleve the Czech.s - no more agreements wlth the Czechs!
Joseph P~kar, the Czech hlstorlan repudlated by Masaryk and
Beneli, declared In hls Ume that the Slovak demands were moderate.
Was lt not a terrible tragedy that these moderate and rlghtful demands were not reallzed in the Czeoho Slovak Republic? For twenty
long year-s the Slovaks fouglrt not only for thelr own parllament, but
also for t.he Slovaklzat!on of tbelr schools, especlally for addttlonal
hlgher lnstltutlons of loo.rnlng. Many of the demands of 1848 and
0
�36
SLOVAKIA
1861 were still timely even ln 1938; and the demand for a Slovak
parllament W&S the most imporllant.
The Czechs, supported by Slovak Czechoslovaks (Slovaks ln the
serVice of the Czechs: renegades), proclaimed that there was nothing more dangerous for the Slovaks than a Slovak parliament.
V,avro Šro,b ár, one of the foremost "Czechoslovaks," wrote a letter
to Americans of Slovak descent to "prove" that point. Of course,
to do so he had to give incorrect or falsified statistios; ln fact,
he outdid the Magyars in -that respect. šrobár used the false figures,
1 epresenting the various nationa.lities of the populatlon of Slovakia,
to show that in a Slovak parliament the Slovaks themselves would
be a minority, which the non-Slovak population - the Magyars, Jews
and Germans - could outvote at any Ume. But he was not very convincing. During varlous negotiations wlth a P.r-ague Government,
the Czech ministers promised: We shall glve you everything, but
not a Slovak parliament. And -the Slovaks answered adamantly: We
want nothing except a Slovak parliament, because with it we shall
rea.lize al! the rest of our demands.
Czech policy was incredibly short-sighted. Czech politicians and
ministers would debate day.s on end In the Ministerlal Council to
send Czech maLl-carriers and janitors to Slovakia to "help out" the
Slovaks. .ánd they usually did even agalnst the will of the Slovak
pul)lic and its representatlves In Government. Thls only convinced
the Slovaks all ťhe more thai w:ithout thelr own State Legislature
or Parliament, they would actually be only a subordinate colony of
the Czech nation. Tbe more Prague opposed the Idea of a Slovak parliamen t, however, the more the Slovaks demanded lt. Th·a t was the
situa:tlon up to October 6, 1938.
Czech diplomacy and democracy created such a situation that the
Czecho-Slovak Repul)ll<: collapsed wlth the first blow. Not a single
shot was fired in its defense. In the annals of hlstory there is probably not a single case where a political state disappeared with
less ado about it. In the fall of 1938 lt was c.Jear even to those
In power in Prague that the Slovak demands of 1915-1918 must be
fulfilled. Even Beneš bimself - who told the delegation of the Slovak League of Amerlca In 1938 that be was in principle agalnst t he
Pittsburgh Pact only because of the one word "parllament" - began to
see the llght. On October 4, 1938, that very same Beneš wrote a letter to Dr. Joseph Tiso - a letter overflowing wlth reverence and
k!ndly feellng - in which we flnd:
"The question of a parllament, designated by Mr. President
in principle and onJy in the maln outlines and In proposltlons,
requlres precise defln!tion and preclse legal formulatlon. The
new Government, in agreement wlth the Slovaks, shall have to
conclude the rest of this work as speedily as posslble."
Beneš wrote the letter and correcled it tbree times, as was
a.scertained In the archlves, but lt was slgned by. Dr. Schleszl.
On October 4, Beneš had lt mailed, but that very day requested lt
returned to hlm, because, under pressure from the generals, he
declded to reslgn the Presldency of the Republic. But what dld Beneš have io propose about a Slovak parliament? Only thls:
" It ls agreed that future acts of admlnistratlve reforms, if
it shall be based on the county system, shall preserve the unlty
�SLOVAKIA
37
of SloV'aJtia as a !and and that a union of the counties be reallzed
withln the fmmework of the territorial parliament of Slovakia."
True, thls proposition could not be seriously considered, because
Beneš resigned his office and fled the country. The Pra~e ParHament fLnally voted the autonomy of Slovakia wit hout Beneš
on 0 ctober 6, 1938. In December the first Slovak parliament•ary eJections were held, and In January, 1939, sixty-three deputies were seated
in the flrst legislative ,assembly of Slovakia. Dr. Martin Sokol became
t he first president of the Slovak Parliament. The dream of Slovak
,generatlons was at long last realized.
The Slovak ParJiament, just as every ,human work, had lts
shortcomings. But we must judge every mlstake in the light of the
times in which it happened. The Slovak Legislature began to function
in extraordinarily difficult tlmes, when the worud situation was extraordinarily tense and confusion reigned In Slov·a kia.
Almost simultaneously with the Parliament, Slovak rule passed
!nto the hands of the Slovak Government in 0ctober, 1938. State
executive and leglslative power in Slovakia passed into Slovak hands.
But the Ozechs were not satisfied wit h this status of affairs. It
was difficult for th em to suffer the thought that the Slovaks would
now decide about Slovak matters w-ithout Prague. They began to
hinder development. 'I'he.y especially wanted to prove that their
progno.stiootions about the Czeťhs ha-ving to pay for the Slovaks
were true. The financial policy pursued was suoh that it forebo<le
the prediction of Kramár, that 1s, that if the Slovaks gained autonomy,
they wouid not be aJble to pay their state employees even three
months. They refused to give money for Slovak !mports from the
common fund, even though t he Slovaks contributed to it, because
now, they said, Slovakia is no longer a money--creating part of the
·state. Events were climaxed wHh a new occupation of Slovakia and
the unseatlng of fäe first Slovak Government in Marcl:t, 1939. When
this happened, the recently executed Vladlmir Clementis, in London
at that tilne, wrote:
" . . . The unseatlng of Tlso's Government by Prague (better
said: by Hácha, Beran and Chvalkovský - at the direction of
Berlin) was negoti'ated polit!cally In a very bung,Jed manner,
nay in a si-niiully awkward manner" ( Hnev Svätý, London, 1944,
pg. 21).
The result of this lntervention was tha.t Slovakia tore herself
compl etely from the Czech lands, and the Parliament of Slove.kla by
unan!mous vote, proclaimed the lndependence of the Slovak State
on Maroh 14, 1939. Thus, Štúr',s wish of 1850 was realized in 1939.
,Shortly after the Parliament and government of autonomous
Slovak!a oame into being, the enti-re apparatus of government legislat!ve and executive power - oame lnto Slovak hands. And
just aibout that time we w!tnes.sed an interesting phenomenon. From
1940, after the events of the so-calle d '\Salzburg In,tervention," we
noted a e hange in the relatlons between the Parllament Md the
Government - which caused a serious tension and often threatened
to explo<le lnto a sharp public conWct and wreck the whole structure
of the State.
Vojtech Tuka wanted to remodel Slovakia completely after the
German model ; he was for NaUonal Soc!alism. 0f course, he ex-
�38
SLOVAKIA
pected to become the flrst cltlzen of the remodeled State. Tuka and
bis followers began to lntrigue agalnst the Parllament, and the
stM1ggle cllmaxed with Tuka's demand that Parliament vote Tuka
fulJ authority, and that even In Constltut1onal mattera. In a word,
Tuka wa.nted dlctatorlal powers. Accordlng to Tuka, the PaTllament
was supposed to be only a representative body, whlch he would convoke once a year to hear some proclamatlon of hfs and then would
solemnly and unanlmously approve everythlng he proposed. Tuka
wanted a "rubber stamp" parllament whlch would say "so be lt" to
everyth!ng he recommended, then go home and ref.raln from meddllng
In the politlcs of the State. Charles Mmgaš, Chlef of Propaganda,
speaklng In the name of the "leadershlp," deolared that only one
or two persons of the "lea.dership" would be -a.ble to play polltics and,
of course, he reckoned tha.t •he would be one of them.
Accordlng to these promoters of Natlonal Soclallsm, lt w,as
necessary to Temove two personalltlee from government: Dr. J oseph
Tlso and Dr. Martin Sokol. President Tlso delegated Dr. Sokol to dellbemt e about these questlons. To the great surprlse of Dr. Tuka
hlmself, Dr. Sokol declared that he fully agreed wlth Tuka's proposal that the Natlonal-Soclallstlc system should prevall in Slovakla.
.And now, sald Dr. Sokol, slnce th1ngs are done In thls manner In the
Reich - and here Sokol enumerated how varlous matters were transacted in Germany - we &hall do likewlse in Slovakla. In the fkst
place, of course, cont:lnued Dr. Sokol, we know that In the Relch
aJl State power rests In the hands of the head of the State - and
that head 1s the Presldent.
Dr. Tuka, lmmedlately realizlng that he was dlsarmed and In a
bllnd alley, revoked hls proposal for a Natlonal Socla\lst!c Slevakla.
He was fully 11.ware that under the ciTcumstances lt could happen
that he would drop out of government completely, lf h1s proposal was
adopted.
But peace dld not ensue between Tuka, Mach and the ParHament. The deputles, who once sat in the Prague Parll,ament, often
declared that the Prague Parllament could never have allowed such
Independent action against the Government as the Bratislava Parl!amen.t dld durlng its mhole exlstence. lit often hapl)ened that the Government sent to Parllament a draft of a 1Mv for consideratlon and
pas&age. When Parllament was thro~h with lt, the law approved
was In most cases not based on the orlglnal dra~t. but was the opposJ te In lts effec,ts from what Tuka and Mach had lntended lt to
be. There was no opposltlon ,to speak of In Parllament, but there
was plenty of lt ag,alnst the Government. Thls had not onJy lts
good, but bad polnts as well.
Undoubtedly, lf -tlmes were normal, Tuka's government never
would have held together. Tuka and Mach, who represented one
tendency In the Government, had practlcally no support In Parllament. Later on, however, even the other mlnlsters could not
have galned t-he majority, because, just as 'Iluka and Mach were reproached for belng too radlcal and subordlnated to the Germans. they,
on the other hand, were reproached for belng too colorless. Aga.In it
1s true, that we could talk about the polltlcs or Dr. Tuka and Mach,
but hardly that of Dr. Pruf.!nský, Frltz, St-a.no and Medrlcký. The
latter were completely lnfluenced by "Czechoslovak" c lrcles.
�SLOVAKIA
39
-Relatlons between the Government were not ldyllic. Tuka's !lret
attempt to dlssolve Parllament ended lnglorlousJy. But he and hli!
foJlowers dld not glve up easlly. When Tuka categorlcally demanded
that he wanted a new Government formed, whlch would include
only M-ach and Catioš !rom the exlstlng Government, he agaln wae
de!eated. Tuka then demanded the Presldent to appoint Ciiarles
Murga§ as Minister of Educatlon, John Farka§ as Finance Minister, and a new man to head the Minlstry of Justice. Tlso, however,
remalned adamant; he repudlated Tuka's demands. Tlso inslsted en
keeplng the iBame Government he had a!ter the Sal11Jburg events of
July, 1940.
After many rebuffs and bitter dlsappolntments, Tuka's spľrlt
and energy began to wane. He was an old, slck man, obsessed with
the thought that he should have been the !lrst man in the !and,
because he had, he thought, suffered for the cause more than any
one el.se. Hls aggre.sslveness gone, Tuk.a In later years was a minister in name only; he was seldom seen in hls offlce and was not In
a posltion to make decislons. There was no change In government
personnel until after Catloš's !llght to the putschJsts at the end of
August, 1944. Catloš wa.s replaced by Stephen Haäšik; Tuka by Dr.
Stephen Tlso, who also took over Frltz's post (Justlce and Forelgn
Affalrs); Stano was replaced by Ing. Lednár, and .Sivák by Dr.
Aladar Kočiš.
Some people dld not flnd it difflcult to crltlclze the actlvlty of
lndlvidual mlnlsters. When converslng wlth such bitter crltlcs, I
cften asked the questlon: And what would you have done under the
same clrcumstances? After a momenťs thought, the crltlcs usually
an,swered that they probably would have done the same thlng, because there w-as a war on, German pressure dld exist, the sltuatlon
was extraordlnary and, hence, strongly lntluenced everythlng the
Government dld. Nevertheless, it remalns lnd1sputably true that as
long as the Slovak Parllament and the Slovak Government ruled In
Slovakia, the llvlng Standard of the Slovak people was hlgher than
that of -a.ny nelghborlng country.
Let people say w.hat they wlll about Sivák, the !act remalus
that wblle he was Minister of Educatlon, more secondary schools
arose tban ever before, more Slovak professors were appolnted to the
unlversltles, and at least three tlmes as many students studled during the war than before or after ft. W e may crlt!clze T uka's act!ons,
but the fact remalns that he did not seek reprlsals agalnst the false
wltnesses, brlbed by Prague as -the Prague archlves dlsolosed, who
helped to convlot bim to 15 years In prlson durlng the flrst CzechoSlovak Republlc.
During the admlnlstratlon of Jullus Stano, more rallroad tracks,
roads and buildings were bullt than ever before. The fact remalns
that whlle Frltz was Minister of Justlce, and even after he was
replaced, there was not a slngle offlclal executlon in Slovakia. Wben
Medrický was in charge of Slovak economy, there was no ratlonlng
of food and clothJng. And when Pružlnský was Mlnlster of Flnance,
deposlts soared t o unbeard of belghts and the Slovak Koruna (Crown),
one of the most prized means of exchange In the wbole of Europe, enjoyed the legend or the Tatra dollar. EvEm Catloš hlmself pursued a po
llcy wbereby Slovakla contrlbuted as llttle as posslble to the tax of blood.
�40
SLOVAKIA
Alexander Mach mlght be blamed for almost anythlng and everytblng, but perhap.s no one man stood up so fearlessly against the German propaganda concerning the Germanlsm of the Habans, agalnst
1,he founcllng of German schools for Czecbs who s uddenly discovered
tbat tbey had some German blood coursing In tbeir velns. And lt remains a fact that tbe Communlsts, even though their Party wias
outlawed, suffered less in &Jovakla than elsewhere. It may sound
strange, but it is true nevertheless, that Mach - thls most Germanophile Minister of the Interior - used to sit at a whlte table
with Communist inte11ectuals, converse with them, ententain them,
and, above all else, protect them.
During the existence of the Slovak State, neither the Presldent
nor the Mlnisters of State had to fear going among the people without a retinue of armed guards. The President never wanted a motorlzed police escort, in fact, could not even use one going to the
altar, the pulpit, the baptlsmal font, or into the confesslonal. President Tiso was truly loved and esteemed by all the people of Slovakia.
If his politicaJ enemies b e excepted, and tbey were only few in number, tben we must say t hat even they respected him. What a difference between Tiso and Beneš ! T,iso needed no protection wben he
went out among tbe people, but Beneš and bis Communis.t-dominated
regime had to have an army around tbem when they entered Slovakia
after tbe war.
About the Slovak Parllament we migbt say what the followers
of Gbandi were wont to say: "Even the worst Indian Government
1s better for I ndia than the best Engllsh Government, because tbe
English Government bas no business in India." Similarly, the Slovaks
can express tbemselves about every Czech government. The past has
shown definitely that a Czecho-Slovak government is in reality always a Czech government, regardless of whether it follows a rightls.t or Communist tendency. A Czec h-Slovak parliament always was
and always will be a Czech parJ.iament, even lf lt contains several
Slovak members.
A nation whlcb bas matured does not want to be regulated or
directed by laws t hat are promulgated by an alien parliament and
then enforced by an alien government. That is so especially witb a
nation wbicb has had lts own parliament and its own government.
The Slovak nation had its own parliament and its own government
from 1938- 1945, And tbe Slovaks stm wanted to rule themselves,
thelr Slovak Republlc, after the war ended in 1945, but thelr will
,v,as violated, They were violently forced back into the political
state which had explolted them for thirty years.
Slovak ministers, as peopl e, could have a nd undoubtedly did have
their faults, but one tbing cannot be denied tbem, the one lndlsputal>Je fact tbat tbey worked for the welfare of the entire Slovak nation as best they could under given circumstances, and the Slovak
people never fared better under any otber government - before or
slnce that time. In a word, tbe Slovak ministers governed well. Not
one of tbem became wealthy through polltlcs; and they lived more
modestily, more democratically than the present rulers of Slovakia,
they cost the people less than tbe present commissloners.
Tbe .same can be sald for the parUament. Tbe work of tbe Slovak Parliament undoubtedly had lts shortcomlngs. Circumstances and
�SLOVAKIA
events often tled the hands of the deputies, but we need not fear
the criticism whlch history shall r&eord about the Slovak Parliament.
After the war many deputies were tortured and some were k!lled.
Most of them recelved an average of ten years in prison. It is good
always to remember this, when some Czech In the world says that the
Slovaks never had it so good as they had it under the Czechs before
1939 or after 1945.
The fact remains that the Czechs in Prague oppressed and exploited the Slovaks before 1939 and, af,ter 1945 avenged -themselves by
murdering Dr. Tiso and others, jaillng, persecuting and dispossessing
thousands of others, and exlling tens of thousands of Slovaks to
Siberla and other regions of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The
Slovaks at home and everywhere in exile know tha.t they dld not
sell out the Czech people to Moscow, but that Dr. Edward Beneš
and hls followers sold out not only the Slovak nation, but the
Czech peoI11e as we11, to the tyranny of ,t he hammer and sickJe.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
BENEŠ IN RETROSPECT: - "In an interview published In a
London Sunday paper, REYNOLDS NEWS, on February 20, Presldent
Beneš of Czechoslovakia, emphatically declared that he does not fear
Russla's return to imperlalism under the pretext of a so-called Al!•
Slav policy. The alliance and harmonious collaboratlon of the USSR,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia would deter Germany from provoking
another world war. Such an agreement may, therefore, have a far•
reaching slgnificance for the future peace of Europe as a whole. To
the question as to whether the pact will not make Czechoslovakia too
dependent on the Soviet Union, President Beneš r eplied that the pact
represents the fundamental strengthening of Czechoslovakia's security a nd consolidates her independence. Friendshlp wlth Soviet Russla
means a mutual collaboration. The Czechoslovakian people, as the
most mature people politically in Europe, would never accept vassalage under any nation." - (News Flashes From Czechoslovakia, Chicago, Ill., March 20, 1944).
•
•
•
DR. HUBERT RIPKA:-'IMany siliy rumors and guesses ,have arlsen
concerning a quarrel with the Soviet Union about Carpathian-Russia.
Many conJectures have been made about our Governmental delegate,
NE!mec. T hese are all nonsensical speculations ! The Soviet and Czechoslovak Governments are firmly resolved to proceed in all matters, now
and in the future, strlctly accordlng to the Treaty. Governmental dele•
gate NE!mec, wlth hls political advisors and the representatlves of the
Slovak Natlonal Council, ls already in llberated eastern Slovakia and
in a few days wlll start worklng in Košice, to organize a new free
Ufe in llberated parts of Slovakla, accordlng to the government on
relatlons between the Government delegate and the Slovak Natlonal
Councll. President Beneš wlll also come soon to the llberated country,
where, under hls leadershlp, a new Government authority wlll be created, based on the wlll of the llberated peoples. Be calm and falth·
ful. Liberatlon 1s in slght." - (London Broadcast, January 29, 1945).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
33
THE SWVAK ASSEMBLY AND GOVERNMENT
ľt !s very interesting to follow the developement of the Slovak
national idea trom the oldest limes to the pre.sent. As one of the
oldest expressions of Slovak nationalism, made in wr~ting, we must
regard the foreword to the Catholic hymnal "Canthus Cathollci,"
pubJished in 1655, in whlch the author, the learned Jesuit Szôlôsi, with
words of wonderment and love, calls the aittention of his readers
to the first Slovak State, to Svätopluk and to Saints Cyril and
Methodius.
And since Szôlôsi's time, Slovak patriots have frequenrtly returned
to this theme: Magin in 1728; George Papánek in 1780, in his history
of Slovak ľtllers; George Sklenár In 1784, In his history of Great Moravia; in the "S'taré Noviny" (Old Newl',) in 1786. The period 1787-1792
is climaxed with the publlcation of the firs,t Slovak Grammar, the organization of the "Learned Guild" (Učené tovarišstvo), and the publication of Fándly's book, in which the author speaks warmly to the
Slovaks and calls their a,ttention to the flrst Slov,ak State. In 1793
Fándly again publishes the history of Great Moravia, and in 1833
John Hollý publishes his famed epic "Svätopluk." This perlod, lasting
over 130 years, is marked in learned books wlth a constant return to
the theme of ťhe first Slovak State.
At the end of this epoch, three years after Hollý's "Svätopluk"
was published, on the Devin ramparts the young friends of Louis
Štúr spoke from the rulns of Svä,topluk's stronghold, repeating everything that had t o that time appeared only in books. This is the
•border line. With the book of a young follower of Štúr, Benjamiu
Pravoslav Červenák,
titled "Zrcadlo Slovenska"
(Mirror of
Slovakla), which Hurban publlshed in 1844, ends ,this epoch of returning to the past without a single chapter about what we want in the
present and the future. We could s.ay, then, that Slovak patriots kept
the flames of their nationalism burning for 150 years by returning to
the past. However, they did not state clearly just how they pictured
Slovak life of the future.
In 1845, when Štúr began pu,biishing the first Slovak polltlcal
newspaper, a change was gradually taking place in the thinking of
the people. Slovaks began to talk about what should be done to
preserve the Slovak nation, to increase 1-ts spiritual and material welf,are. They talked about concrete Slovak demands. In 1842, Dr. Paul
Jozeffy placed a petition before the emperor, requesting that t he
Slovak lan.guage be .the medium of teachlng !n Slovakla, of preaching
in tbe cburches, and that cJrnrch records (vltal staitlstlcs) be kept in
Slovak. Jozeffy's demands concerned only the linguistic questlon.
But in 1848, the Slovaks went much farther. They proclaimed
themselves independent from the Magyars. Mil'hael Milan Hodža,
Loufs Štúr and Joseph Miloslav Hurban proclalmed the first Slovak
Government, the Slovak National Council as the "supreme Slovak
authorlty issulng out of the bosom of the natlon." That same year,
In the historic demands known as the Nitra and Liptovský Svätý
Mikuláš rlemands, the Slovaks pleaded ardently tor ~utonomy of the
Slovak terrltory, whose laws would be passed by a Slovak parllament.
34
SLOVAKIA .
Furthermor e, they demanded: Slovak schools, Slovak cour ts, Slovak as
the offlclal language In SlovakJa, and teachlng In Slovak a t the
Unlverslty.
In every Slovak demand, trom May 10, 1848, and In every Slovak
program the demand for a S lovak Parllament w,as predomlnan t. It
had deep roots.
To Brezová and Liptovský Svätý M.lkulä§ not even a hundred people came to the rally In 1848 to demand a Slovak parllament . In 1861,
about 6000 Slovaks oam e together to demand a Natlonal Assembly for
SlovakJa. The Plttsburgh manifesta:t lon of May 30, 1918, w as attend ed
by some 30,000 people. But In 1938, on P ent.ecost Day (June 6th ),
about 120,000 Slovaks gathered In Bratislava at a hlstorlc rally to
commemor ate lhe twentleth annlversary of th e Plttsbugh P act . It was
he re that lhe Slovak natlon saw the hlstorlc document whlch was
proposed ,and slgned by T. G. Masazyk In 1918. The Plttsburgh Pact,
whlch In fact guaranteed autonomy t o the Slovaks, was brought to
Slovakla by a delega tlon of lhe Slovak League of Amerlca.
T hese m anlfestation s show just how the concept of self-admlnistratlon in Slovakia grew In depth In the wlde masses of the naitlon.
In 1848 lt wa.<i supported by a small group of Slovak hrtellectual s, but
In 1938, in Bratislava, pract!cally the entlre Slovak natlon was back
of it.
In a contldenlla l report (T. 1370/33) to Pres.Ident M,asaryk , Dr.
Schnleszl wrote:
"Today a ll of S lovakla 1, for autonomy. Several pre.revolu.
tlonary Slovak, are completely lnsignlflcan t for the splrltual life
of the people. Moreover, if some were not bound by thelr paat,
and other, by the ir public statu,, they, t oo, would be on the other
• Ide o penly."
The Slovak newspapen nan in Amerlca, Adalbert Tholt,Vel'koštlavnlcký, was not faml11ar w!th the correspondence of old Slovak
leaders, and yet he evaluated the polltical demands of the Slovaks
quite correctly. He stated that they were demands not only for a
narrow autonomy, but lhat thelr content actually called for the Jndependence of Slovakia. It 1s interestlng t hat Tholt came to this concluslon even though he was not acqua!nted wlth the signlflcant quota.
tion trom Šttlr's book "Slovanstv o a svet budtlcnostl " (Slavdom and
the WOTld of lhe Future), which read:
"So that we could occupy and take ove r the place whlch belong1 to u1 accordlng to our atrength a nd capabllltles , we must
once and for a ll t lme f ree ourselvea from the unbearable y oke of
foreignera a nd gain for ouraelvea state INDEPEND ENCE, bec auae
a natlon that i• enslaved has ltl hand, t led and mu,t perlsh
sooner or lat er."
What crystal-clea x words! And Šttlr said them openly and fearlessly after the sad experlence s of 1848-49. Šttlr states clearly that
the penalty awa!Ung the nat!on whlch wlll not flght for its state
in dependence is death.
After the natlonal rally of 1861, the flght at home in Slovakla
weakened; there was not a slngle publ!c expression or demand voted
on manlfestati onally which could compare to the demands of 1848 and
1861: In whlch .a demand was volced for a Slovak governmen t, or a
Slovak parl!ament. In Slovakla a bard flght was fou ght t o preserve
SLOVAKIA
86
S lovak schools. But the flght for the inherent rlghts of the Slovak natlon was carrled over lnto America. The questlon was taken up by the
Slovak press and became the subject of several hundred public manlfestatlons. Flnally lt matured wlth the "Memorandum of ťhe Slovak
League," whlch to a certaln extent repeated the demands voiced In
1848 and 1861: autonomy for Slovakla, a separate Slovak Assembly
or Dlet, Slovaklzatlon of the schools, Slovak courts, and the use of
Slovak In public llfe.
After thls foll<JW the agreements wlth representatives of the
Czech natlon. The Cleveland ~reement, In 1915, In wlllch the Czechs
agree to a federatlve form of the hopeful Czecho-Slovak Republlc, and
then the memorable Plttsburgh Pact of May 30, 1918, in whlch again
ls renewed the promlse that the Slovaks shall have thelr own Slov,ak
admlnlstration, thelr own Slovak schools and courts, and, above all
else, thelr own Slovak parliament or state leglslature. Even though
Thomas Garrigue Masaryk underslgned thls agreement on May 30,
1918, and then agaln on the second day following bis electlon as
Presldent of Czecho-Slovakia, he later dlsavowed it, declarlng it a falsehood and a mere scrap of paper. That ls how the Czechs kept thelr
promlses.
If we call the perlod from 1655 to 1845 as the perlod which turned
to the past, then we can call 1:he perlod from 1845 to to 1918 a.s the
perlod present!ng the program of the !uture. And thls 1s followed by
a perlod of actlve fightlng for the recognltlon of prom!ses and agreements. A short artlcle does not allow us to take up in mlnute de•
tal! every parliamentary expresslon, every motlon or proposal for
autonomy, every public manlfestatlon; and every remlnder that promlses made durlng the war be kept and fulfilled.
It remalns a sad reality, but the hlstorlcal truth nevertheless,
that the Czechs dld not live up to thelr promlses any more after 1918,
than they d1d after 1945. Tlle fate of every agreement wlth the
Czechs was the same: ,all agreements wlth the Slova.ks were repudiated by the Czechs. The Czechs were w11llng to make concesslons
only when they needed the Slovaks; later, they repudlated every
agreement. Practlcally all Czech.s were the same In thls regard: T.
G. Masaryk, the so-called reallst and humanlst; Ediward Beneií,
t he so-called "democrat and statesman," and Monslgnor John Šrámek, the Cathollc prlest; Czech agrarlans, democrats, soclallsts,
communlsts and fasclsts; Czech Cathollcs, Lutherans, Jews, Ta:bor·
ltes, Husaltes, members of the "Czechoslovak Natlonal Church," Unl•
tarlans and Baptista: all repudiated the promlses made to Slova.ks,
all repudlated the lnberent and God-glven rlght of the Slovak natlon
to freedom and state lndependence. No llttle wonder, then, t,bat the
SlovalG cry out today: Don't belleve the Czech.s - no more agreements wlth the Czechs!
Joseph P~kar, the Czech hlstorlan repudlated by Masaryk and
Beneli, declared In hls Ume that the Slovak demands were moderate.
Was lt not a terrible tragedy that these moderate and rlghtful demands were not reallzed in the Czeoho Slovak Republic? For twenty
long year-s the Slovaks fouglrt not only for thelr own parllament, but
also for t.he Slovaklzat!on of tbelr schools, especlally for addttlonal
hlgher lnstltutlons of loo.rnlng. Many of the demands of 1848 and
0
36
SLOVAKIA
1861 were still timely even ln 1938; and the demand for a Slovak
parllament W&S the most imporllant.
The Czechs, supported by Slovak Czechoslovaks (Slovaks ln the
serVice of the Czechs: renegades), proclaimed that there was nothing more dangerous for the Slovaks than a Slovak parliament.
V,avro Šro,b ár, one of the foremost "Czechoslovaks," wrote a letter
to Americans of Slovak descent to "prove" that point. Of course,
to do so he had to give incorrect or falsified statistios; ln fact,
he outdid the Magyars in -that respect. šrobár used the false figures,
1 epresenting the various nationa.lities of the populatlon of Slovakia,
to show that in a Slovak parliament the Slovaks themselves would
be a minority, which the non-Slovak population - the Magyars, Jews
and Germans - could outvote at any Ume. But he was not very convincing. During varlous negotiations wlth a P.r-ague Government,
the Czech ministers promised: We shall glve you everything, but
not a Slovak parliament. And -the Slovaks answered adamantly: We
want nothing except a Slovak parliament, because with it we shall
rea.lize al! the rest of our demands.
Czech policy was incredibly short-sighted. Czech politicians and
ministers would debate day.s on end In the Ministerlal Council to
send Czech maLl-carriers and janitors to Slovakia to "help out" the
Slovaks. .ánd they usually did even agalnst the will of the Slovak
pul)lic and its representatlves In Government. Thls only convinced
the Slovaks all ťhe more thai w:ithout thelr own State Legislature
or Parliament, they would actually be only a subordinate colony of
the Czech nation. Tbe more Prague opposed the Idea of a Slovak parliamen t, however, the more the Slovaks demanded lt. Th·a t was the
situa:tlon up to October 6, 1938.
Czech diplomacy and democracy created such a situation that the
Czecho-Slovak Repul)ll<: collapsed wlth the first blow. Not a single
shot was fired in its defense. In the annals of hlstory there is probably not a single case where a political state disappeared with
less ado about it. In the fall of 1938 lt was c.Jear even to those
In power in Prague that the Slovak demands of 1915-1918 must be
fulfilled. Even Beneš bimself - who told the delegation of the Slovak League of Amerlca In 1938 that be was in principle agalnst t he
Pittsburgh Pact only because of the one word "parllament" - began to
see the llght. On October 4, 1938, that very same Beneš wrote a letter to Dr. Joseph Tiso - a letter overflowing wlth reverence and
k!ndly feellng - in which we flnd:
"The question of a parllament, designated by Mr. President
in principle and onJy in the maln outlines and In proposltlons,
requlres precise defln!tion and preclse legal formulatlon. The
new Government, in agreement wlth the Slovaks, shall have to
conclude the rest of this work as speedily as posslble."
Beneš wrote the letter and correcled it tbree times, as was
a.scertained In the archlves, but lt was slgned by. Dr. Schleszl.
On October 4, Beneš had lt mailed, but that very day requested lt
returned to hlm, because, under pressure from the generals, he
declded to reslgn the Presldency of the Republic. But what dld Beneš have io propose about a Slovak parliament? Only thls:
" It ls agreed that future acts of admlnistratlve reforms, if
it shall be based on the county system, shall preserve the unlty
SLOVAKIA
37
of SloV'aJtia as a !and and that a union of the counties be reallzed
withln the fmmework of the territorial parliament of Slovakia."
True, thls proposition could not be seriously considered, because
Beneš resigned his office and fled the country. The Pra~e ParHament fLnally voted the autonomy of Slovakia wit hout Beneš
on 0 ctober 6, 1938. In December the first Slovak parliament•ary eJections were held, and In January, 1939, sixty-three deputies were seated
in the flrst legislative ,assembly of Slovakia. Dr. Martin Sokol became
t he first president of the Slovak Parliament. The dream of Slovak
,generatlons was at long last realized.
The Slovak ParJiament, just as every ,human work, had lts
shortcomings. But we must judge every mlstake in the light of the
times in which it happened. The Slovak Legislature began to function
in extraordinarily difficult tlmes, when the worud situation was extraordinarily tense and confusion reigned In Slov·a kia.
Almost simultaneously with the Parliament, Slovak rule passed
!nto the hands of the Slovak Government in 0ctober, 1938. State
executive and leglslative power in Slovakia passed into Slovak hands.
But the Ozechs were not satisfied wit h this status of affairs. It
was difficult for th em to suffer the thought that the Slovaks would
now decide about Slovak matters w-ithout Prague. They began to
hinder development. 'I'he.y especially wanted to prove that their
progno.stiootions about the Czeťhs ha-ving to pay for the Slovaks
were true. The financial policy pursued was suoh that it forebo<le
the prediction of Kramár, that 1s, that if the Slovaks gained autonomy,
they wouid not be aJble to pay their state employees even three
months. They refused to give money for Slovak !mports from the
common fund, even though t he Slovaks contributed to it, because
now, they said, Slovakia is no longer a money--creating part of the
·state. Events were climaxed wHh a new occupation of Slovakia and
the unseatlng of fäe first Slovak Government in Marcl:t, 1939. When
this happened, the recently executed Vladlmir Clementis, in London
at that tilne, wrote:
" . . . The unseatlng of Tlso's Government by Prague (better
said: by Hácha, Beran and Chvalkovský - at the direction of
Berlin) was negoti'ated polit!cally In a very bung,Jed manner,
nay in a si-niiully awkward manner" ( Hnev Svätý, London, 1944,
pg. 21).
The result of this lntervention was tha.t Slovakia tore herself
compl etely from the Czech lands, and the Parliament of Slove.kla by
unan!mous vote, proclaimed the lndependence of the Slovak State
on Maroh 14, 1939. Thus, Štúr',s wish of 1850 was realized in 1939.
,Shortly after the Parliament and government of autonomous
Slovak!a oame into being, the enti-re apparatus of government legislat!ve and executive power - oame lnto Slovak hands. And
just aibout that time we w!tnes.sed an interesting phenomenon. From
1940, after the events of the so-calle d '\Salzburg In,tervention," we
noted a e hange in the relatlons between the Parllament Md the
Government - which caused a serious tension and often threatened
to explo<le lnto a sharp public conWct and wreck the whole structure
of the State.
Vojtech Tuka wanted to remodel Slovakia completely after the
German model ; he was for NaUonal Soc!alism. 0f course, he ex-
38
SLOVAKIA
pected to become the flrst cltlzen of the remodeled State. Tuka and
bis followers began to lntrigue agalnst the Parllament, and the
stM1ggle cllmaxed with Tuka's demand that Parliament vote Tuka
fulJ authority, and that even In Constltut1onal mattera. In a word,
Tuka wa.nted dlctatorlal powers. Accordlng to Tuka, the PaTllament
was supposed to be only a representative body, whlch he would convoke once a year to hear some proclamatlon of hfs and then would
solemnly and unanlmously approve everythlng he proposed. Tuka
wanted a "rubber stamp" parllament whlch would say "so be lt" to
everyth!ng he recommended, then go home and ref.raln from meddllng
In the politlcs of the State. Charles Mmgaš, Chlef of Propaganda,
speaklng In the name of the "leadershlp," deolared that only one
or two persons of the "lea.dership" would be -a.ble to play polltics and,
of course, he reckoned tha.t •he would be one of them.
Accordlng to these promoters of Natlonal Soclallsm, lt w,as
necessary to Temove two personalltlee from government: Dr. J oseph
Tlso and Dr. Martin Sokol. President Tlso delegated Dr. Sokol to dellbemt e about these questlons. To the great surprlse of Dr. Tuka
hlmself, Dr. Sokol declared that he fully agreed wlth Tuka's proposal that the Natlonal-Soclallstlc system should prevall in Slovakla.
.And now, sald Dr. Sokol, slnce th1ngs are done In thls manner In the
Reich - and here Sokol enumerated how varlous matters were transacted in Germany - we &hall do likewlse in Slovakla. In the fkst
place, of course, cont:lnued Dr. Sokol, we know that In the Relch
aJl State power rests In the hands of the head of the State - and
that head 1s the Presldent.
Dr. Tuka, lmmedlately realizlng that he was dlsarmed and In a
bllnd alley, revoked hls proposal for a Natlonal Socla\lst!c Slevakla.
He was fully 11.ware that under the ciTcumstances lt could happen
that he would drop out of government completely, lf h1s proposal was
adopted.
But peace dld not ensue between Tuka, Mach and the ParHament. The deputles, who once sat in the Prague Parll,ament, often
declared that the Prague Parllament could never have allowed such
Independent action against the Government as the Bratislava Parl!amen.t dld durlng its mhole exlstence. lit often hapl)ened that the Government sent to Parllament a draft of a 1Mv for consideratlon and
pas&age. When Parllament was thro~h with lt, the law approved
was In most cases not based on the orlglnal dra~t. but was the opposJ te In lts effec,ts from what Tuka and Mach had lntended lt to
be. There was no opposltlon ,to speak of In Parllament, but there
was plenty of lt ag,alnst the Government. Thls had not onJy lts
good, but bad polnts as well.
Undoubtedly, lf -tlmes were normal, Tuka's government never
would have held together. Tuka and Mach, who represented one
tendency In the Government, had practlcally no support In Parllament. Later on, however, even the other mlnlsters could not
have galned t-he majority, because, just as 'Iluka and Mach were reproached for belng too radlcal and subordlnated to the Germans. they,
on the other hand, were reproached for belng too colorless. Aga.In it
1s true, that we could talk about the polltlcs or Dr. Tuka and Mach,
but hardly that of Dr. Pruf.!nský, Frltz, St-a.no and Medrlcký. The
latter were completely lnfluenced by "Czechoslovak" c lrcles.
SLOVAKIA
39
-Relatlons between the Government were not ldyllic. Tuka's !lret
attempt to dlssolve Parllament ended lnglorlousJy. But he and hli!
foJlowers dld not glve up easlly. When Tuka categorlcally demanded
that he wanted a new Government formed, whlch would include
only M-ach and Catioš !rom the exlstlng Government, he agaln wae
de!eated. Tuka then demanded the Presldent to appoint Ciiarles
Murga§ as Minister of Educatlon, John Farka§ as Finance Minister, and a new man to head the Minlstry of Justice. Tlso, however,
remalned adamant; he repudlated Tuka's demands. Tlso inslsted en
keeplng the iBame Government he had a!ter the Sal11Jburg events of
July, 1940.
After many rebuffs and bitter dlsappolntments, Tuka's spľrlt
and energy began to wane. He was an old, slck man, obsessed with
the thought that he should have been the !lrst man in the !and,
because he had, he thought, suffered for the cause more than any
one el.se. Hls aggre.sslveness gone, Tuk.a In later years was a minister in name only; he was seldom seen in hls offlce and was not In
a posltion to make decislons. There was no change In government
personnel until after Catloš's !llght to the putschJsts at the end of
August, 1944. Catloš wa.s replaced by Stephen Haäšik; Tuka by Dr.
Stephen Tlso, who also took over Frltz's post (Justlce and Forelgn
Affalrs); Stano was replaced by Ing. Lednár, and .Sivák by Dr.
Aladar Kočiš.
Some people dld not flnd it difflcult to crltlclze the actlvlty of
lndlvidual mlnlsters. When converslng wlth such bitter crltlcs, I
cften asked the questlon: And what would you have done under the
same clrcumstances? After a momenťs thought, the crltlcs usually
an,swered that they probably would have done the same thlng, because there w-as a war on, German pressure dld exist, the sltuatlon
was extraordlnary and, hence, strongly lntluenced everythlng the
Government dld. Nevertheless, it remalns lnd1sputably true that as
long as the Slovak Parllament and the Slovak Government ruled In
Slovakia, the llvlng Standard of the Slovak people was hlgher than
that of -a.ny nelghborlng country.
Let people say w.hat they wlll about Sivák, the !act remalus
that wblle he was Minister of Educatlon, more secondary schools
arose tban ever before, more Slovak professors were appolnted to the
unlversltles, and at least three tlmes as many students studled during the war than before or after ft. W e may crlt!clze T uka's act!ons,
but the fact remalns that he did not seek reprlsals agalnst the false
wltnesses, brlbed by Prague as -the Prague archlves dlsolosed, who
helped to convlot bim to 15 years In prlson durlng the flrst CzechoSlovak Republlc.
During the admlnlstratlon of Jullus Stano, more rallroad tracks,
roads and buildings were bullt than ever before. The fact remalns
that whlle Frltz was Minister of Justlce, and even after he was
replaced, there was not a slngle offlclal executlon in Slovakia. Wben
Medrický was in charge of Slovak economy, there was no ratlonlng
of food and clothJng. And when Pružlnský was Mlnlster of Flnance,
deposlts soared t o unbeard of belghts and the Slovak Koruna (Crown),
one of the most prized means of exchange In the wbole of Europe, enjoyed the legend or the Tatra dollar. EvEm Catloš hlmself pursued a po
llcy wbereby Slovakla contrlbuted as llttle as posslble to the tax of blood.
40
SLOVAKIA
Alexander Mach mlght be blamed for almost anythlng and everytblng, but perhap.s no one man stood up so fearlessly against the German propaganda concerning the Germanlsm of the Habans, agalnst
1,he founcllng of German schools for Czecbs who s uddenly discovered
tbat tbey had some German blood coursing In tbeir velns. And lt remains a fact that tbe Communlsts, even though their Party wias
outlawed, suffered less in &Jovakla than elsewhere. It may sound
strange, but it is true nevertheless, that Mach - thls most Germanophile Minister of the Interior - used to sit at a whlte table
with Communist inte11ectuals, converse with them, ententain them,
and, above all else, protect them.
During the existence of the Slovak State, neither the Presldent
nor the Mlnisters of State had to fear going among the people without a retinue of armed guards. The President never wanted a motorlzed police escort, in fact, could not even use one going to the
altar, the pulpit, the baptlsmal font, or into the confesslonal. President Tiso was truly loved and esteemed by all the people of Slovakia.
If his politicaJ enemies b e excepted, and tbey were only few in number, tben we must say t hat even they respected him. What a difference between Tiso and Beneš ! T,iso needed no protection wben he
went out among tbe people, but Beneš and bis Communis.t-dominated
regime had to have an army around tbem when they entered Slovakia
after tbe war.
About the Slovak Parllament we migbt say what the followers
of Gbandi were wont to say: "Even the worst Indian Government
1s better for I ndia than the best Engllsh Government, because tbe
English Government bas no business in India." Similarly, the Slovaks
can express tbemselves about every Czech government. The past has
shown definitely that a Czecho-Slovak government is in reality always a Czech government, regardless of whether it follows a rightls.t or Communist tendency. A Czec h-Slovak parliament always was
and always will be a Czech parJ.iament, even lf lt contains several
Slovak members.
A nation whlcb bas matured does not want to be regulated or
directed by laws t hat are promulgated by an alien parliament and
then enforced by an alien government. That is so especially witb a
nation wbicb has had lts own parliament and its own government.
The Slovak nation had its own parliament and its own government
from 1938- 1945, And tbe Slovaks stm wanted to rule themselves,
thelr Slovak Republlc, after the war ended in 1945, but thelr will
,v,as violated, They were violently forced back into the political
state which had explolted them for thirty years.
Slovak ministers, as peopl e, could have a nd undoubtedly did have
their faults, but one tbing cannot be denied tbem, the one lndlsputal>Je fact tbat tbey worked for the welfare of the entire Slovak nation as best they could under given circumstances, and the Slovak
people never fared better under any otber government - before or
slnce that time. In a word, tbe Slovak ministers governed well. Not
one of tbem became wealthy through polltlcs; and they lived more
modestily, more democratically than the present rulers of Slovakia,
they cost the people less than tbe present commissloners.
Tbe .same can be sald for the parUament. Tbe work of tbe Slovak Parliament undoubtedly had lts shortcomlngs. Circumstances and
SLOVAKIA
events often tled the hands of the deputies, but we need not fear
the criticism whlch history shall r&eord about the Slovak Parliament.
After the war many deputies were tortured and some were k!lled.
Most of them recelved an average of ten years in prison. It is good
always to remember this, when some Czech In the world says that the
Slovaks never had it so good as they had it under the Czechs before
1939 or after 1945.
The fact remains that the Czechs in Prague oppressed and exploited the Slovaks before 1939 and, af,ter 1945 avenged -themselves by
murdering Dr. Tiso and others, jaillng, persecuting and dispossessing
thousands of others, and exlling tens of thousands of Slovaks to
Siberla and other regions of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The
Slovaks at home and everywhere in exile know tha.t they dld not
sell out the Czech people to Moscow, but that Dr. Edward Beneš
and hls followers sold out not only the Slovak nation, but the
Czech peoI11e as we11, to the tyranny of ,t he hammer and sickJe.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
BENEŠ IN RETROSPECT: - "In an interview published In a
London Sunday paper, REYNOLDS NEWS, on February 20, Presldent
Beneš of Czechoslovakia, emphatically declared that he does not fear
Russla's return to imperlalism under the pretext of a so-called Al!•
Slav policy. The alliance and harmonious collaboratlon of the USSR,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia would deter Germany from provoking
another world war. Such an agreement may, therefore, have a far•
reaching slgnificance for the future peace of Europe as a whole. To
the question as to whether the pact will not make Czechoslovakia too
dependent on the Soviet Union, President Beneš r eplied that the pact
represents the fundamental strengthening of Czechoslovakia's security a nd consolidates her independence. Friendshlp wlth Soviet Russla
means a mutual collaboration. The Czechoslovakian people, as the
most mature people politically in Europe, would never accept vassalage under any nation." - (News Flashes From Czechoslovakia, Chicago, Ill., March 20, 1944).
•
•
•
DR. HUBERT RIPKA:-'IMany siliy rumors and guesses ,have arlsen
concerning a quarrel with the Soviet Union about Carpathian-Russia.
Many conJectures have been made about our Governmental delegate,
NE!mec. T hese are all nonsensical speculations ! The Soviet and Czechoslovak Governments are firmly resolved to proceed in all matters, now
and in the future, strlctly accordlng to the Treaty. Governmental dele•
gate NE!mec, wlth hls political advisors and the representatlves of the
Slovak Natlonal Council, ls already in llberated eastern Slovakia and
in a few days wlll start worklng in Košice, to organize a new free
Ufe in llberated parts of Slovakla, accordlng to the government on
relatlons between the Government delegate and the Slovak Natlonal
Councll. President Beneš wlll also come soon to the llberated country,
where, under hls leadershlp, a new Government authority wlll be created, based on the wlll of the llberated peoples. Be calm and falth·
ful. Liberatlon 1s in slght." - (London Broadcast, January 29, 1945).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Slovak Assembly and Government
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952
pp. 33-41
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1952
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5d874ab3ff3e920b5c4045f562f1bea1.pdf
069341f7fa513c43e52d7f06e07296cf
PDF Text
Text
30
SLOVA.KIA
THEY WANTED TO BE FREE
Enemles of Slovak independence and their servants claim that
the proclamat!on of Slovak independence in 1939 was excluslvely the
work of the Nazis, and the Slovaks, they say, did not want to be
independent.
At the end of May, 1952, there was publ!shed in Paris the d!ary
ot Count John Szembek, who for many years was a State Secretary
In the Pol!sh Mlnlstry of Forelgn Affairs. In his function as ViceMlnlster of Foreign Affairs he had the possib!llty of following at
elose range Pollsh Foreign pollcy and to a certain extent even !nfluence lt. His "Diary," ,therefore, is an unusually valuable and worthy documentary work for European pol!tlcs and diplomatlc hlstory,
as 1s emphaslzed In the introductlon of the book by Léon Noel, the
former French ambassador to Warsow.
For the Slovaks, thls book contains unusually valuable notes for
assesslng Pol!sh-Slovak relatlonships, especlaJiy those of 1938-1939.
Perhaps one of ,t he most interestlng ls the en1.ry about the conversatlon with Minister Karol Sidor. It ls one or the Jongest of his notes,
oven though the book deals almost excluslvely with records of meetlngs with presldents, m!nlsters, ambassadora and other outstandlng
public rtgures. The followlng passage, taken from Szembeťs "Dlary,"
refers to Sldor's vislts.
·,
"OCTOBER 19, 1938"
CONVERSATION WITH SIDOR
"Today this SJov,ak representat!ve pald me a courtesy caJI. I
assured h!m that we entertain the greatest aympathles for all the
deslres of the Slovak natlon; I expressed the hope that bis country
would !Ind a way af com!ng to some agreemenrt with the Magyars,
•and I assured hlm that we are advlslng Budapest to proceed wlth
moderation when formulatlng territorjal demands to the address of
the Slovaks."
·
Furthermore, Szembek notes: "During the dinner whlch I gave in
honor ot Sldor, and In whlch Arclszewsk1 and Kobylanskl particlpated,
my guest descrlbed the situatlon in Slovakia. He told us that hls
countrymen are endeavorlng to proclalm a completely Independent
Slovak State, whlch, however, polltlcally, mllitarlly, as well aa from
the cultural standpolnt would depend on Po!and and economlcally
on Germany and Hungary. The Slovaks did not want to let In German
and Magyar cultural lnfluences, but wished to place thelr country
under some k.ind of polltlcal and m!Jlllary protectlon of Poland. Thls
pro-Pol!&h oo'ientat!on is supportea by the entlre Slovak natlon. The
natlon, however, 1s stunned - as he expres.sed lt - by the questlon
of Pollsh demands regarding Spiš and Orava. Thls Ume Sldor spoke
very cryfully. I answered that lf we were going to be concerned wlth
1md Independent Slovak State, thls questlon would no longer present
1my dlflcultles, because we woulld not present any terrltorial demands
to Independent Slovakla and that OUT demands !or the adjustment of
the border could not be regarded as unconditlonally necessary for the
�SLOVA.KIA
31
norma! development of relatlon.s between Poland and Slovakla. The
sltuatlon apparently would be dltferent, lf we had to present thls
problem to the Czechoslovak State."
In another part of the report, we read: "1 gave Sldor an audlence
on October 20th. I asked hlm what lnstructions he had gotten kom
hls own Government when he was leavlng !or Warsaw and what wa.s
the actuall purpose of hls trip. He answered that the Slovak Government authorlzed bim to decla.re in Warsaw what Msgr. Tiso, as well
as Papée (the Pollsh ambassador In Pra,gue), had already told us
oarller, namely that tbe alm ot hls country 1s the creatlon of an independent Slovak State. I asked him to explaln to me what now was
tbe 11tand ot the Slovak Government in regards to Prague. Sldor replled that hls country at present S'till forms a part of the Czechoslovak Republllc and that Slovak minister.s were members of the Czechoslovak Government, even though they do not actually take part In
lts negotiations. Thus far only one minister pa11tlclpated in two ses•
sions ot the Government. As far as questlons of forelgn affalrs are
c oncerned, the Slovaks are pursulng thelr own policy, and thelr
emissarles, who just a short time ago went to European oa.pitale,
were sent there by the pres.ident or the Slovak Government, Tiso,
and not by Prague.
"I then asked Sidor the question what klnd of methods hls
countrymen lntended to use to galn complete lndependence. According
to him ('Sidor), Tiso intends to attaln his goal by legal means. It
emanates from the following prlnciple: in the present sltuatlon, as
a result of the chaos whlch relgns in the Republlc, and especlally
because one half mllMon men of the Czech Army 1s garrisoned in
Slovakla, which does not have an Independent army and whose
Slovak soldlers are on tihe Czech borders (whlch presents a serlous
:mpedlment to the deflnlte separatlon of Slovakla from Czechla, as
Sldor underscored so empbatlca.lly), lt was not posslble to thlnk
of uslng more radlcal method,s. Sldor pe rsonally would be willlng to
use them and thlnks that lt mlght be usetul to us e what ls called
t he 'Hlinka Guarď and the Natlonal Commlttees, which he d lrects.
But In a spirit of loyalty, he obeya the Slovak Gove rnment.
"Such ls the polltlcal program of Tls o, endeavorlng to adhere
to legal methods: the electlon of a new presldent of tbe CzechosJovak
Republlc !s supposed to take place not later tban October 28. The
Slovaks are golng to demand the electlon ot a Catholic, who would
guarantee a separatlon flrom Francophlle and Sovletophlle orlentatlon
in Forelgn pollcy. ChvaJkovský 1s a candldate, and R llnka's Party
!s golng to vote for him. Thls presldency, however, ls going to have
only a temporary character and wrn end wlth a new adjustment of
the Constitutlon. The new Constltutlon wlll create a federatlon,
thanka to whlch Slovakla w111 attaln lte own parllament and a
broad autonomy. From that moment on the Slovaks wlll negotlate
wlth Pi,a,gue regardlng thelT demands. Sldor !s certaln that the
Czeohs wlll never be able to flll them. The Slovak Parllament wlll
lhen deflnitely proclatm the separation of Slovak.la from Czechla, as
once bappened In the case of Sweden and Norway. Sldor thlnks
th'at lt wlll be necessary t o watt two months before that point 1s
reached. In the meantlme, the Slovak Government wlll complete its
work ot decentrallzation and organlze Hs own police, gendarmery and
�32
SLOVAK.IA
army, whlch lt allready began to do. Int.ernal admlnistration already
now !s in a large measure in Slovak hands. As far as finances are
concerned, the Siovaks are taklng over all State properties on thelr
terrltory. Tax incomes are already flowlng lnto Bratis,Java. The State
Bank is already in the process of organlzation."
So muoh for the Diary of the Polish Vice-Minister about bis
conversation with Minister K. Sidor on October 20, 1938, therefore
14 days after the proclamation of Slovak autonomy in ~Uina and
almost five months before the proclamation of the independence of
Slovakia on March 14, 1939.
This report proves that the Slovaks wanted to be independent
long before Hitler offered to protect their independence. Furthermore, the Slovaks rejected unilateral German preponderance over
the territory of Slovakia and would have preferred to replace it wilh
a polilical and military protootion of Poland, cooperating only economically with the Germans and Magyars.
Sidor was for Slovak independence. The development tended,
emphasized by the intention of Tls o's Government, toward complete
Slovak lndependence.
Looking at lt from a historlcal perspectlve, German intervention
in March, 1939, greatly harmed Slovak efforts for independence
In substance. That is it cast a shadow of German interventlon on the
actuality of the proc lamation of Sllovak independence, which hurt
Slovak aspirations then and is damaging to them even today. Slovak
development tended toward the idea! of Slovak independence. It is
necessary to admit that, in the main and above all else, it was
the fault of Czech imperiallsts, who unseated the Jega!I government
of Tiso with a military putsch on March 9, 1939, and again installed
Czech hegemony over Slovakia, which all served as a pretext for
Hitler to lntervene into the development of the relationship of the
Slovaks to the Czechs.
Szembek's "Diary" also clearly shows that Czech imperlalists
drove the Slovaks into cooperation with the national-socialistic Germany of Adolph Hitler. Their treatment of Slovak problems only
hurried the day of Slovak independence. (JAS) .
•
•
•
WHO SAID lT?: - "In negotiating the treaty we have just
slgned, I did not betray my country to Russia. The Czechoslovaks are
very bad deceivers. We intend to live our own llfe in our own way,
and we know that Russia wlll reapect our way of living... , And so,
my frlends, you and we are going to contlnue our policy of collaboration, friendship, confidence In, and good falth towards Soviet Russia.
1 am never going to undertake anythlng and nelther are you, whlch
could be in any way agalnst the lntereat of thia vitally necessary
collaboratlon. There are stm people Jeft who are afrald of thls collaboratlon. So far, Soviet Russla more than proved herself at Stalingrad, at Sevastapol, and on the Don. . .. I know the Russlan way o!
llvlng; 1 belleve In lt; and I admire lt. We have a great deal In common wlth Soviet Russla. . . . So, wlth you, 1 half Soviet RuHla as a
great and eHentlally necesaary factor In the present and future fortunes of Europe." - (Jan Masaryk, Hotel Commodore, New York City,
December 21, 1943).
�
30
SLOVA.KIA
THEY WANTED TO BE FREE
Enemles of Slovak independence and their servants claim that
the proclamat!on of Slovak independence in 1939 was excluslvely the
work of the Nazis, and the Slovaks, they say, did not want to be
independent.
At the end of May, 1952, there was publ!shed in Paris the d!ary
ot Count John Szembek, who for many years was a State Secretary
In the Pol!sh Mlnlstry of Forelgn Affairs. In his function as ViceMlnlster of Foreign Affairs he had the possib!llty of following at
elose range Pollsh Foreign pollcy and to a certain extent even !nfluence lt. His "Diary," ,therefore, is an unusually valuable and worthy documentary work for European pol!tlcs and diplomatlc hlstory,
as 1s emphaslzed In the introductlon of the book by Léon Noel, the
former French ambassador to Warsow.
For the Slovaks, thls book contains unusually valuable notes for
assesslng Pol!sh-Slovak relatlonships, especlaJiy those of 1938-1939.
Perhaps one of ,t he most interestlng ls the en1.ry about the conversatlon with Minister Karol Sidor. It ls one or the Jongest of his notes,
oven though the book deals almost excluslvely with records of meetlngs with presldents, m!nlsters, ambassadora and other outstandlng
public rtgures. The followlng passage, taken from Szembeťs "Dlary,"
refers to Sldor's vislts.
·,
"OCTOBER 19, 1938"
CONVERSATION WITH SIDOR
"Today this SJov,ak representat!ve pald me a courtesy caJI. I
assured h!m that we entertain the greatest aympathles for all the
deslres of the Slovak natlon; I expressed the hope that bis country
would !Ind a way af com!ng to some agreemenrt with the Magyars,
•and I assured hlm that we are advlslng Budapest to proceed wlth
moderation when formulatlng territorjal demands to the address of
the Slovaks."
·
Furthermore, Szembek notes: "During the dinner whlch I gave in
honor ot Sldor, and In whlch Arclszewsk1 and Kobylanskl particlpated,
my guest descrlbed the situatlon in Slovakia. He told us that hls
countrymen are endeavorlng to proclalm a completely Independent
Slovak State, whlch, however, polltlcally, mllitarlly, as well aa from
the cultural standpolnt would depend on Po!and and economlcally
on Germany and Hungary. The Slovaks did not want to let In German
and Magyar cultural lnfluences, but wished to place thelr country
under some k.ind of polltlcal and m!Jlllary protectlon of Poland. Thls
pro-Pol!&h oo'ientat!on is supportea by the entlre Slovak natlon. The
natlon, however, 1s stunned - as he expres.sed lt - by the questlon
of Pollsh demands regarding Spiš and Orava. Thls Ume Sldor spoke
very cryfully. I answered that lf we were going to be concerned wlth
1md Independent Slovak State, thls questlon would no longer present
1my dlflcultles, because we woulld not present any terrltorial demands
to Independent Slovakla and that OUT demands !or the adjustment of
the border could not be regarded as unconditlonally necessary for the
�SLOVA.KIA
31
norma! development of relatlon.s between Poland and Slovakla. The
sltuatlon apparently would be dltferent, lf we had to present thls
problem to the Czechoslovak State."
In another part of the report, we read: "1 gave Sldor an audlence
on October 20th. I asked hlm what lnstructions he had gotten kom
hls own Government when he was leavlng !or Warsaw and what wa.s
the actuall purpose of hls trip. He answered that the Slovak Government authorlzed bim to decla.re in Warsaw what Msgr. Tiso, as well
as Papée (the Pollsh ambassador In Pra,gue), had already told us
oarller, namely that tbe alm ot hls country 1s the creatlon of an independent Slovak State. I asked him to explaln to me what now was
tbe 11tand ot the Slovak Government in regards to Prague. Sldor replled that hls country at present S'till forms a part of the Czechoslovak Republllc and that Slovak minister.s were members of the Czechoslovak Government, even though they do not actually take part In
lts negotiations. Thus far only one minister pa11tlclpated in two ses•
sions ot the Government. As far as questlons of forelgn affalrs are
c oncerned, the Slovaks are pursulng thelr own policy, and thelr
emissarles, who just a short time ago went to European oa.pitale,
were sent there by the pres.ident or the Slovak Government, Tiso,
and not by Prague.
"I then asked Sidor the question what klnd of methods hls
countrymen lntended to use to galn complete lndependence. According
to him ('Sidor), Tiso intends to attaln his goal by legal means. It
emanates from the following prlnciple: in the present sltuatlon, as
a result of the chaos whlch relgns in the Republlc, and especlally
because one half mllMon men of the Czech Army 1s garrisoned in
Slovakla, which does not have an Independent army and whose
Slovak soldlers are on tihe Czech borders (whlch presents a serlous
:mpedlment to the deflnlte separatlon of Slovakla from Czechla, as
Sldor underscored so empbatlca.lly), lt was not posslble to thlnk
of uslng more radlcal method,s. Sldor pe rsonally would be willlng to
use them and thlnks that lt mlght be usetul to us e what ls called
t he 'Hlinka Guarď and the Natlonal Commlttees, which he d lrects.
But In a spirit of loyalty, he obeya the Slovak Gove rnment.
"Such ls the polltlcal program of Tls o, endeavorlng to adhere
to legal methods: the electlon of a new presldent of tbe CzechosJovak
Republlc !s supposed to take place not later tban October 28. The
Slovaks are golng to demand the electlon ot a Catholic, who would
guarantee a separatlon flrom Francophlle and Sovletophlle orlentatlon
in Forelgn pollcy. ChvaJkovský 1s a candldate, and R llnka's Party
!s golng to vote for him. Thls presldency, however, ls going to have
only a temporary character and wrn end wlth a new adjustment of
the Constitutlon. The new Constltutlon wlll create a federatlon,
thanka to whlch Slovakla w111 attaln lte own parllament and a
broad autonomy. From that moment on the Slovaks wlll negotlate
wlth Pi,a,gue regardlng thelT demands. Sldor !s certaln that the
Czeohs wlll never be able to flll them. The Slovak Parllament wlll
lhen deflnitely proclatm the separation of Slovak.la from Czechla, as
once bappened In the case of Sweden and Norway. Sldor thlnks
th'at lt wlll be necessary t o watt two months before that point 1s
reached. In the meantlme, the Slovak Government wlll complete its
work ot decentrallzation and organlze Hs own police, gendarmery and
�32
SLOVAK.IA
army, whlch lt allready began to do. Int.ernal admlnistration already
now !s in a large measure in Slovak hands. As far as finances are
concerned, the Siovaks are taklng over all State properties on thelr
terrltory. Tax incomes are already flowlng lnto Bratis,Java. The State
Bank is already in the process of organlzation."
So muoh for the Diary of the Polish Vice-Minister about bis
conversation with Minister K. Sidor on October 20, 1938, therefore
14 days after the proclamation of Slovak autonomy in ~Uina and
almost five months before the proclamation of the independence of
Slovakia on March 14, 1939.
This report proves that the Slovaks wanted to be independent
long before Hitler offered to protect their independence. Furthermore, the Slovaks rejected unilateral German preponderance over
the territory of Slovakia and would have preferred to replace it wilh
a polilical and military protootion of Poland, cooperating only economically with the Germans and Magyars.
Sidor was for Slovak independence. The development tended,
emphasized by the intention of Tls o's Government, toward complete
Slovak lndependence.
Looking at lt from a historlcal perspectlve, German intervention
in March, 1939, greatly harmed Slovak efforts for independence
In substance. That is it cast a shadow of German interventlon on the
actuality of the proc lamation of Sllovak independence, which hurt
Slovak aspirations then and is damaging to them even today. Slovak
development tended toward the idea! of Slovak independence. It is
necessary to admit that, in the main and above all else, it was
the fault of Czech imperiallsts, who unseated the Jega!I government
of Tiso with a military putsch on March 9, 1939, and again installed
Czech hegemony over Slovakia, which all served as a pretext for
Hitler to lntervene into the development of the relationship of the
Slovaks to the Czechs.
Szembek's "Diary" also clearly shows that Czech imperlalists
drove the Slovaks into cooperation with the national-socialistic Germany of Adolph Hitler. Their treatment of Slovak problems only
hurried the day of Slovak independence. (JAS) .
•
•
•
WHO SAID lT?: - "In negotiating the treaty we have just
slgned, I did not betray my country to Russia. The Czechoslovaks are
very bad deceivers. We intend to live our own llfe in our own way,
and we know that Russia wlll reapect our way of living... , And so,
my frlends, you and we are going to contlnue our policy of collaboration, friendship, confidence In, and good falth towards Soviet Russia.
1 am never going to undertake anythlng and nelther are you, whlch
could be in any way agalnst the lntereat of thia vitally necessary
collaboratlon. There are stm people Jeft who are afrald of thls collaboratlon. So far, Soviet Russla more than proved herself at Stalingrad, at Sevastapol, and on the Don. . .. I know the Russlan way o!
llvlng; 1 belleve In lt; and I admire lt. We have a great deal In common wlth Soviet Russla. . . . So, wlth you, 1 half Soviet RuHla as a
great and eHentlally necesaary factor In the present and future fortunes of Europe." - (Jan Masaryk, Hotel Commodore, New York City,
December 21, 1943).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
30
SLOVA.KIA
THEY WANTED TO BE FREE
Enemles of Slovak independence and their servants claim that
the proclamat!on of Slovak independence in 1939 was excluslvely the
work of the Nazis, and the Slovaks, they say, did not want to be
independent.
At the end of May, 1952, there was publ!shed in Paris the d!ary
ot Count John Szembek, who for many years was a State Secretary
In the Pol!sh Mlnlstry of Forelgn Affairs. In his function as ViceMlnlster of Foreign Affairs he had the possib!llty of following at
elose range Pollsh Foreign pollcy and to a certain extent even !nfluence lt. His "Diary," ,therefore, is an unusually valuable and worthy documentary work for European pol!tlcs and diplomatlc hlstory,
as 1s emphaslzed In the introductlon of the book by Léon Noel, the
former French ambassador to Warsow.
For the Slovaks, thls book contains unusually valuable notes for
assesslng Pol!sh-Slovak relatlonships, especlaJiy those of 1938-1939.
Perhaps one of ,t he most interestlng ls the en1.ry about the conversatlon with Minister Karol Sidor. It ls one or the Jongest of his notes,
oven though the book deals almost excluslvely with records of meetlngs with presldents, m!nlsters, ambassadora and other outstandlng
public rtgures. The followlng passage, taken from Szembeťs "Dlary,"
refers to Sldor's vislts.
·,
"OCTOBER 19, 1938"
CONVERSATION WITH SIDOR
"Today this SJov,ak representat!ve pald me a courtesy caJI. I
assured h!m that we entertain the greatest aympathles for all the
deslres of the Slovak natlon; I expressed the hope that bis country
would !Ind a way af com!ng to some agreemenrt with the Magyars,
•and I assured hlm that we are advlslng Budapest to proceed wlth
moderation when formulatlng territorjal demands to the address of
the Slovaks."
·
Furthermore, Szembek notes: "During the dinner whlch I gave in
honor ot Sldor, and In whlch Arclszewsk1 and Kobylanskl particlpated,
my guest descrlbed the situatlon in Slovakia. He told us that hls
countrymen are endeavorlng to proclalm a completely Independent
Slovak State, whlch, however, polltlcally, mllitarlly, as well aa from
the cultural standpolnt would depend on Po!and and economlcally
on Germany and Hungary. The Slovaks did not want to let In German
and Magyar cultural lnfluences, but wished to place thelr country
under some k.ind of polltlcal and m!Jlllary protectlon of Poland. Thls
pro-Pol!&h oo'ientat!on is supportea by the entlre Slovak natlon. The
natlon, however, 1s stunned - as he expres.sed lt - by the questlon
of Pollsh demands regarding Spiš and Orava. Thls Ume Sldor spoke
very cryfully. I answered that lf we were going to be concerned wlth
1md Independent Slovak State, thls questlon would no longer present
1my dlflcultles, because we woulld not present any terrltorial demands
to Independent Slovakla and that OUT demands !or the adjustment of
the border could not be regarded as unconditlonally necessary for the
SLOVA.KIA
31
norma! development of relatlon.s between Poland and Slovakla. The
sltuatlon apparently would be dltferent, lf we had to present thls
problem to the Czechoslovak State."
In another part of the report, we read: "1 gave Sldor an audlence
on October 20th. I asked hlm what lnstructions he had gotten kom
hls own Government when he was leavlng !or Warsaw and what wa.s
the actuall purpose of hls trip. He answered that the Slovak Government authorlzed bim to decla.re in Warsaw what Msgr. Tiso, as well
as Papée (the Pollsh ambassador In Pra,gue), had already told us
oarller, namely that tbe alm ot hls country 1s the creatlon of an independent Slovak State. I asked him to explaln to me what now was
tbe 11tand ot the Slovak Government in regards to Prague. Sldor replled that hls country at present S'till forms a part of the Czechoslovak Republllc and that Slovak minister.s were members of the Czechoslovak Government, even though they do not actually take part In
lts negotiations. Thus far only one minister pa11tlclpated in two ses•
sions ot the Government. As far as questlons of forelgn affalrs are
c oncerned, the Slovaks are pursulng thelr own policy, and thelr
emissarles, who just a short time ago went to European oa.pitale,
were sent there by the pres.ident or the Slovak Government, Tiso,
and not by Prague.
"I then asked Sidor the question what klnd of methods hls
countrymen lntended to use to galn complete lndependence. According
to him ('Sidor), Tiso intends to attaln his goal by legal means. It
emanates from the following prlnciple: in the present sltuatlon, as
a result of the chaos whlch relgns in the Republlc, and especlally
because one half mllMon men of the Czech Army 1s garrisoned in
Slovakla, which does not have an Independent army and whose
Slovak soldlers are on tihe Czech borders (whlch presents a serlous
:mpedlment to the deflnlte separatlon of Slovakla from Czechla, as
Sldor underscored so empbatlca.lly), lt was not posslble to thlnk
of uslng more radlcal method,s. Sldor pe rsonally would be willlng to
use them and thlnks that lt mlght be usetul to us e what ls called
t he 'Hlinka Guarď and the Natlonal Commlttees, which he d lrects.
But In a spirit of loyalty, he obeya the Slovak Gove rnment.
"Such ls the polltlcal program of Tls o, endeavorlng to adhere
to legal methods: the electlon of a new presldent of tbe CzechosJovak
Republlc !s supposed to take place not later tban October 28. The
Slovaks are golng to demand the electlon ot a Catholic, who would
guarantee a separatlon flrom Francophlle and Sovletophlle orlentatlon
in Forelgn pollcy. ChvaJkovský 1s a candldate, and R llnka's Party
!s golng to vote for him. Thls presldency, however, ls going to have
only a temporary character and wrn end wlth a new adjustment of
the Constitutlon. The new Constltutlon wlll create a federatlon,
thanka to whlch Slovakla w111 attaln lte own parllament and a
broad autonomy. From that moment on the Slovaks wlll negotlate
wlth Pi,a,gue regardlng thelT demands. Sldor !s certaln that the
Czeohs wlll never be able to flll them. The Slovak Parllament wlll
lhen deflnitely proclatm the separation of Slovak.la from Czechla, as
once bappened In the case of Sweden and Norway. Sldor thlnks
th'at lt wlll be necessary t o watt two months before that point 1s
reached. In the meantlme, the Slovak Government wlll complete its
work ot decentrallzation and organlze Hs own police, gendarmery and
32
SLOVAK.IA
army, whlch lt allready began to do. Int.ernal admlnistration already
now !s in a large measure in Slovak hands. As far as finances are
concerned, the Siovaks are taklng over all State properties on thelr
terrltory. Tax incomes are already flowlng lnto Bratis,Java. The State
Bank is already in the process of organlzation."
So muoh for the Diary of the Polish Vice-Minister about bis
conversation with Minister K. Sidor on October 20, 1938, therefore
14 days after the proclamation of Slovak autonomy in ~Uina and
almost five months before the proclamation of the independence of
Slovakia on March 14, 1939.
This report proves that the Slovaks wanted to be independent
long before Hitler offered to protect their independence. Furthermore, the Slovaks rejected unilateral German preponderance over
the territory of Slovakia and would have preferred to replace it wilh
a polilical and military protootion of Poland, cooperating only economically with the Germans and Magyars.
Sidor was for Slovak independence. The development tended,
emphasized by the intention of Tls o's Government, toward complete
Slovak lndependence.
Looking at lt from a historlcal perspectlve, German intervention
in March, 1939, greatly harmed Slovak efforts for independence
In substance. That is it cast a shadow of German interventlon on the
actuality of the proc lamation of Sllovak independence, which hurt
Slovak aspirations then and is damaging to them even today. Slovak
development tended toward the idea! of Slovak independence. It is
necessary to admit that, in the main and above all else, it was
the fault of Czech imperiallsts, who unseated the Jega!I government
of Tiso with a military putsch on March 9, 1939, and again installed
Czech hegemony over Slovakia, which all served as a pretext for
Hitler to lntervene into the development of the relationship of the
Slovaks to the Czechs.
Szembek's "Diary" also clearly shows that Czech imperlalists
drove the Slovaks into cooperation with the national-socialistic Germany of Adolph Hitler. Their treatment of Slovak problems only
hurried the day of Slovak independence. (JAS) .
•
•
•
WHO SAID lT?: - "In negotiating the treaty we have just
slgned, I did not betray my country to Russia. The Czechoslovaks are
very bad deceivers. We intend to live our own llfe in our own way,
and we know that Russia wlll reapect our way of living... , And so,
my frlends, you and we are going to contlnue our policy of collaboration, friendship, confidence In, and good falth towards Soviet Russia.
1 am never going to undertake anythlng and nelther are you, whlch
could be in any way agalnst the lntereat of thia vitally necessary
collaboratlon. There are stm people Jeft who are afrald of thls collaboratlon. So far, Soviet Russla more than proved herself at Stalingrad, at Sevastapol, and on the Don. . .. I know the Russlan way o!
llvlng; 1 belleve In lt; and I admire lt. We have a great deal In common wlth Soviet Russla. . . . So, wlth you, 1 half Soviet RuHla as a
great and eHentlally necesaary factor In the present and future fortunes of Europe." - (Jan Masaryk, Hotel Commodore, New York City,
December 21, 1943).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
They Wanted to Be Free
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952
pp. 30-32
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1952
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4cf23d1de317242aa7b3b53d9845a1ba.pdf
5ae41e4c22c3723c5c58f0fff39e3903
PDF Text
Text
28
SLOVAKIA
mE PURGE IN PRAGUE
JOSEPH A. MIKUŠ
Two very prominent Communis,t personalities were executed recently in Prague: Karel Slansky, former Seeretary General of the
Czech Communist Party, and Vladimír C lementis, former Forelgn
Minister of Czecho-Slovakia.
To Central-European observers probably the grealtest a,urprjse
of the Prague purge tria! was the faot that two different "deviationisms" were tried and convicted by the same court a.'t one and the
same Ume: the "Zionism" or the Jewish group, headed by Slansky,
and the ",Slovak nationalism" of Clementis. This may appear as the
same kind of crime ~rom an external and purely Jegalistic view or
Communist "justice," bu:t politioally there Js a clear distinction between the two "deviaitionisms."
Three years ago Slansky and Clementis were regarded as antagonistic personalities in the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia.
At that time Slansky w-as an lmportant leader of "proletarlan internationalism," the accepted Communi-st concept of international colJaboration. For a long tíme he was considered as "a man of Moscow."
But being an lntellectual, he was obsessed wlth the very dangerous
ambltlon of trylng to overshadow "the man from the people," Mr.
Gdttwald. Slansky was, therefore, the victim of a persona! rivalry
with Gottwald in their struggle for power. As Secretary General of
the Czech Communlst Party, Slansky thought he could play the role
of Stalln in Czecho-61ovakla, while for Gdttwald it would be sufficient
to play the role of Shvernlk. Now, at the brlal, this rlvalry had to be
ťonsidered and expresseed in terms of criminal law. Slnce the Soviet
Union bad to change its aVtltude toward Israel, consldering the Ara:b
world of more lmportance on the po!itical chessboard, lt was eai!y
to construct the crlme of Slansky as a colluslon wlth a foreign power
agalnst -the interests of the Czecho-'Slovak State.
The story of Clementls !s a different one. In the eyes of Moscow,
his Communist record slnce 1939 w,as not good; 1t did not conform
wifä Stalinlst pollcy. At .fäat time, you wlll recall, he expresseď
Mmself agaln1>t the Rlbbentrop•Molotov Pact. At the end of Worlcl
War II, even though he was a member of the Benes Government In
London, Clementis preferred not to return to Prague via Moscow.
And Moscow remembered. So did Gottwald. Molotov was cool toward
Clementis at 11.he Peace Conference In Parls in 1946. Durlng a dlplomatlc receptlon, Mr. Molotov went fi.rst to exchange greetlngs with Mr.
Hajdu, then only a member of the Czech0-'Slovak delegatlon, and only
'then approached Mr. Clementls, the Under.Secretary of State and
Actlng Chief of the delegatlon.
After the death of Jan Masaryk, Clementls became Minister of
Foreign Affairs. Mr. Slansky, Secretary General of the Communist
Party, together with three Under-Seoretarles in the Ministry or
Foreign Affalra - Vavro Hajdu, Arthur London and Friedrich Gemlnder consplred against hlm. While -a ttending the UNO General
A.ssemb!y sess!ons in New York, in 1949, as Chief of the Czecho-Slovak
�iLOVAKIA
29
delegation, Clementls lost control of hls Ministry a:t home. Under the
direction of Wllllam Siroky, then Vice-Premler, Hajdu, London and
Geminder took over the controls of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and
from that Ume on Mr. Clementis became their potential cal}tive.
In November, 1949, rumors began to circulate in the world press
that Mr. Clemen,us was not dispos ed to return to Czecho-Slovakia any
more. But then Mr. Gottwald sent Mrs. Clementls by plane to New
York to convince her husband that everythlng was in order and he
could fully depend on the Presldenťs trust and protection.
Mir. Clementis gave in to the pleadings of his wife and returned
to Prague aibout the middle or December, 1949. There he wa.s greeted
at the former Wilson Station by Mr. Slroky and the consplring
Under-sSecretaries. Four months Iater, on Marc-h 14, 1950, Olementis
was obliged ·to resign bis office "voluntair!ly" and a year later,
in February 1951, he was lncarcerated.
As far as intern,a l politics is concerned, Mr. Clementis wa.s partisan to a federative reform in Czecho-Slovakia and stood for certain
nat:ional liberties in bis na:tive Slovakla. Clemel'lJtis, therefore
became a victlm both of the "StallnL~m" of Moscow and the centralism of Prague.
The next purge tria! is supposed to take place in a short time
in Bratislava, capital of Slovakia, against a group of "Titoist" devia tion:lsts, among whom we may flnd: Gustav H usak, former Chief of
the autonomous Government of Slovakla, Karol Schmidke, former
president of the autonomous Parliament In Bratislava, Ladislav "Novomesky, former Minister of Educa:tion ln tbe Slov,ak autonomous Government, Daniel Okaly, b.rother-Jn-law of Clementis and former
Minister of Interlor ln Slov-akia, Ivan Horvat, former M!nlsier Plenipotentiary in Budapest, and otbers.
•
• •
WHO SAI D IT ?
"The Czech People's Party regards the transfer of Germans as a
historical success, lndeed, whlch with its slgnlficance falls In line
immediatly next to the successful conclusion of the treaty with the
USSR. . . , For thls success we are obllgated to Šrámek's government
with great gratltude. . . . We were interested in gettlng rld of
t he Germans as speedily as possible. Allow me on this occaslon to mentlon a pol!tician, who alongslde of President Beneš and Monsignor Šrámek had a signiflcant share in this plan of transfer. lt was Mr. Minister
Dr. Rlpka (applause). Slnce the Autumn of 1938 I have been bis intimate
fellow-worker. . . Ripka worked on the transfer of Germans, because
he regarded the war that had erupted at that Ume as a really historlcal
opportunity to clean our !and of burdensome German ballast ... AU the
groups of the National Front at the end of 1943 even fully agreed
wlth thls line and, therefore, the trans fer of the Germans ls also the
result of the joint effort of all the groups and partles of the Natlonal
Front. We shall exclude no one from thls success even though lt !s
true that, e.g., the Communist Party in 1939- 1941 did not have so
unanlmous and so uncompromlslngly Slovanic a conceptlon of the matter as lt ha.s today." - (Dr. Ivo Ducháček in the Prague Provis1onal
Natlonal Assembly, March 8, 1946. He ls now supposed to be the "big
wheel" in the Czechoslovak Divlslon of the VOICE OF AMERICA).
�
28
SLOVAKIA
mE PURGE IN PRAGUE
JOSEPH A. MIKUŠ
Two very prominent Communis,t personalities were executed recently in Prague: Karel Slansky, former Seeretary General of the
Czech Communist Party, and Vladimír C lementis, former Forelgn
Minister of Czecho-Slovakia.
To Central-European observers probably the grealtest a,urprjse
of the Prague purge tria! was the faot that two different "deviationisms" were tried and convicted by the same court a.'t one and the
same Ume: the "Zionism" or the Jewish group, headed by Slansky,
and the ",Slovak nationalism" of Clementis. This may appear as the
same kind of crime ~rom an external and purely Jegalistic view or
Communist "justice," bu:t politioally there Js a clear distinction between the two "deviaitionisms."
Three years ago Slansky and Clementis were regarded as antagonistic personalities in the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia.
At that time Slansky w-as an lmportant leader of "proletarlan internationalism," the accepted Communi-st concept of international colJaboration. For a long tíme he was considered as "a man of Moscow."
But being an lntellectual, he was obsessed wlth the very dangerous
ambltlon of trylng to overshadow "the man from the people," Mr.
Gdttwald. Slansky was, therefore, the victim of a persona! rivalry
with Gottwald in their struggle for power. As Secretary General of
the Czech Communlst Party, Slansky thought he could play the role
of Stalln in Czecho-61ovakla, while for Gdttwald it would be sufficient
to play the role of Shvernlk. Now, at the brlal, this rlvalry had to be
ťonsidered and expresseed in terms of criminal law. Slnce the Soviet
Union bad to change its aVtltude toward Israel, consldering the Ara:b
world of more lmportance on the po!itical chessboard, lt was eai!y
to construct the crlme of Slansky as a colluslon wlth a foreign power
agalnst -the interests of the Czecho-'Slovak State.
The story of Clementls !s a different one. In the eyes of Moscow,
his Communist record slnce 1939 w,as not good; 1t did not conform
wifä Stalinlst pollcy. At .fäat time, you wlll recall, he expresseď
Mmself agaln1>t the Rlbbentrop•Molotov Pact. At the end of Worlcl
War II, even though he was a member of the Benes Government In
London, Clementis preferred not to return to Prague via Moscow.
And Moscow remembered. So did Gottwald. Molotov was cool toward
Clementis at 11.he Peace Conference In Parls in 1946. Durlng a dlplomatlc receptlon, Mr. Molotov went fi.rst to exchange greetlngs with Mr.
Hajdu, then only a member of the Czech0-'Slovak delegatlon, and only
'then approached Mr. Clementls, the Under.Secretary of State and
Actlng Chief of the delegatlon.
After the death of Jan Masaryk, Clementls became Minister of
Foreign Affairs. Mr. Slansky, Secretary General of the Communist
Party, together with three Under-Seoretarles in the Ministry or
Foreign Affalra - Vavro Hajdu, Arthur London and Friedrich Gemlnder consplred against hlm. While -a ttending the UNO General
A.ssemb!y sess!ons in New York, in 1949, as Chief of the Czecho-Slovak
�iLOVAKIA
29
delegation, Clementls lost control of hls Ministry a:t home. Under the
direction of Wllllam Siroky, then Vice-Premler, Hajdu, London and
Geminder took over the controls of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and
from that Ume on Mr. Clementis became their potential cal}tive.
In November, 1949, rumors began to circulate in the world press
that Mr. Clemen,us was not dispos ed to return to Czecho-Slovakia any
more. But then Mr. Gottwald sent Mrs. Clementls by plane to New
York to convince her husband that everythlng was in order and he
could fully depend on the Presldenťs trust and protection.
Mir. Clementis gave in to the pleadings of his wife and returned
to Prague aibout the middle or December, 1949. There he wa.s greeted
at the former Wilson Station by Mr. Slroky and the consplring
Under-sSecretaries. Four months Iater, on Marc-h 14, 1950, Olementis
was obliged ·to resign bis office "voluntair!ly" and a year later,
in February 1951, he was lncarcerated.
As far as intern,a l politics is concerned, Mr. Clementis wa.s partisan to a federative reform in Czecho-Slovakia and stood for certain
nat:ional liberties in bis na:tive Slovakla. Clemel'lJtis, therefore
became a victlm both of the "StallnL~m" of Moscow and the centralism of Prague.
The next purge tria! is supposed to take place in a short time
in Bratislava, capital of Slovakia, against a group of "Titoist" devia tion:lsts, among whom we may flnd: Gustav H usak, former Chief of
the autonomous Government of Slovakla, Karol Schmidke, former
president of the autonomous Parliament In Bratislava, Ladislav "Novomesky, former Minister of Educa:tion ln tbe Slov,ak autonomous Government, Daniel Okaly, b.rother-Jn-law of Clementis and former
Minister of Interlor ln Slov-akia, Ivan Horvat, former M!nlsier Plenipotentiary in Budapest, and otbers.
•
• •
WHO SAI D IT ?
"The Czech People's Party regards the transfer of Germans as a
historical success, lndeed, whlch with its slgnlficance falls In line
immediatly next to the successful conclusion of the treaty with the
USSR. . . , For thls success we are obllgated to Šrámek's government
with great gratltude. . . . We were interested in gettlng rld of
t he Germans as speedily as possible. Allow me on this occaslon to mentlon a pol!tician, who alongslde of President Beneš and Monsignor Šrámek had a signiflcant share in this plan of transfer. lt was Mr. Minister
Dr. Rlpka (applause). Slnce the Autumn of 1938 I have been bis intimate
fellow-worker. . . Ripka worked on the transfer of Germans, because
he regarded the war that had erupted at that Ume as a really historlcal
opportunity to clean our !and of burdensome German ballast ... AU the
groups of the National Front at the end of 1943 even fully agreed
wlth thls line and, therefore, the trans fer of the Germans ls also the
result of the joint effort of all the groups and partles of the Natlonal
Front. We shall exclude no one from thls success even though lt !s
true that, e.g., the Communist Party in 1939- 1941 did not have so
unanlmous and so uncompromlslngly Slovanic a conceptlon of the matter as lt ha.s today." - (Dr. Ivo Ducháček in the Prague Provis1onal
Natlonal Assembly, March 8, 1946. He ls now supposed to be the "big
wheel" in the Czechoslovak Divlslon of the VOICE OF AMERICA).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
28
SLOVAKIA
mE PURGE IN PRAGUE
JOSEPH A. MIKUŠ
Two very prominent Communis,t personalities were executed recently in Prague: Karel Slansky, former Seeretary General of the
Czech Communist Party, and Vladimír C lementis, former Forelgn
Minister of Czecho-Slovakia.
To Central-European observers probably the grealtest a,urprjse
of the Prague purge tria! was the faot that two different "deviationisms" were tried and convicted by the same court a.'t one and the
same Ume: the "Zionism" or the Jewish group, headed by Slansky,
and the ",Slovak nationalism" of Clementis. This may appear as the
same kind of crime ~rom an external and purely Jegalistic view or
Communist "justice," bu:t politioally there Js a clear distinction between the two "deviaitionisms."
Three years ago Slansky and Clementis were regarded as antagonistic personalities in the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia.
At that time Slansky w-as an lmportant leader of "proletarlan internationalism," the accepted Communi-st concept of international colJaboration. For a long tíme he was considered as "a man of Moscow."
But being an lntellectual, he was obsessed wlth the very dangerous
ambltlon of trylng to overshadow "the man from the people," Mr.
Gdttwald. Slansky was, therefore, the victim of a persona! rivalry
with Gottwald in their struggle for power. As Secretary General of
the Czech Communlst Party, Slansky thought he could play the role
of Stalln in Czecho-61ovakla, while for Gdttwald it would be sufficient
to play the role of Shvernlk. Now, at the brlal, this rlvalry had to be
ťonsidered and expresseed in terms of criminal law. Slnce the Soviet
Union bad to change its aVtltude toward Israel, consldering the Ara:b
world of more lmportance on the po!itical chessboard, lt was eai!y
to construct the crlme of Slansky as a colluslon wlth a foreign power
agalnst -the interests of the Czecho-'Slovak State.
The story of Clementls !s a different one. In the eyes of Moscow,
his Communist record slnce 1939 w,as not good; 1t did not conform
wifä Stalinlst pollcy. At .fäat time, you wlll recall, he expresseď
Mmself agaln1>t the Rlbbentrop•Molotov Pact. At the end of Worlcl
War II, even though he was a member of the Benes Government In
London, Clementis preferred not to return to Prague via Moscow.
And Moscow remembered. So did Gottwald. Molotov was cool toward
Clementis at 11.he Peace Conference In Parls in 1946. Durlng a dlplomatlc receptlon, Mr. Molotov went fi.rst to exchange greetlngs with Mr.
Hajdu, then only a member of the Czech0-'Slovak delegatlon, and only
'then approached Mr. Clementls, the Under.Secretary of State and
Actlng Chief of the delegatlon.
After the death of Jan Masaryk, Clementls became Minister of
Foreign Affairs. Mr. Slansky, Secretary General of the Communist
Party, together with three Under-Seoretarles in the Ministry or
Foreign Affalra - Vavro Hajdu, Arthur London and Friedrich Gemlnder consplred against hlm. While -a ttending the UNO General
A.ssemb!y sess!ons in New York, in 1949, as Chief of the Czecho-Slovak
iLOVAKIA
29
delegation, Clementls lost control of hls Ministry a:t home. Under the
direction of Wllllam Siroky, then Vice-Premler, Hajdu, London and
Geminder took over the controls of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and
from that Ume on Mr. Clementis became their potential cal}tive.
In November, 1949, rumors began to circulate in the world press
that Mr. Clemen,us was not dispos ed to return to Czecho-Slovakia any
more. But then Mr. Gottwald sent Mrs. Clementls by plane to New
York to convince her husband that everythlng was in order and he
could fully depend on the Presldenťs trust and protection.
Mir. Clementis gave in to the pleadings of his wife and returned
to Prague aibout the middle or December, 1949. There he wa.s greeted
at the former Wilson Station by Mr. Slroky and the consplring
Under-sSecretaries. Four months Iater, on Marc-h 14, 1950, Olementis
was obliged ·to resign bis office "voluntair!ly" and a year later,
in February 1951, he was lncarcerated.
As far as intern,a l politics is concerned, Mr. Clementis wa.s partisan to a federative reform in Czecho-Slovakia and stood for certain
nat:ional liberties in bis na:tive Slovakla. Clemel'lJtis, therefore
became a victlm both of the "StallnL~m" of Moscow and the centralism of Prague.
The next purge tria! is supposed to take place in a short time
in Bratislava, capital of Slovakia, against a group of "Titoist" devia tion:lsts, among whom we may flnd: Gustav H usak, former Chief of
the autonomous Government of Slovakla, Karol Schmidke, former
president of the autonomous Parliament In Bratislava, Ladislav "Novomesky, former Minister of Educa:tion ln tbe Slov,ak autonomous Government, Daniel Okaly, b.rother-Jn-law of Clementis and former
Minister of Interlor ln Slov-akia, Ivan Horvat, former M!nlsier Plenipotentiary in Budapest, and otbers.
•
• •
WHO SAI D IT ?
"The Czech People's Party regards the transfer of Germans as a
historical success, lndeed, whlch with its slgnlficance falls In line
immediatly next to the successful conclusion of the treaty with the
USSR. . . , For thls success we are obllgated to Šrámek's government
with great gratltude. . . . We were interested in gettlng rld of
t he Germans as speedily as possible. Allow me on this occaslon to mentlon a pol!tician, who alongslde of President Beneš and Monsignor Šrámek had a signiflcant share in this plan of transfer. lt was Mr. Minister
Dr. Rlpka (applause). Slnce the Autumn of 1938 I have been bis intimate
fellow-worker. . . Ripka worked on the transfer of Germans, because
he regarded the war that had erupted at that Ume as a really historlcal
opportunity to clean our !and of burdensome German ballast ... AU the
groups of the National Front at the end of 1943 even fully agreed
wlth thls line and, therefore, the trans fer of the Germans ls also the
result of the joint effort of all the groups and partles of the Natlonal
Front. We shall exclude no one from thls success even though lt !s
true that, e.g., the Communist Party in 1939- 1941 did not have so
unanlmous and so uncompromlslngly Slovanic a conceptlon of the matter as lt ha.s today." - (Dr. Ivo Ducháček in the Prague Provis1onal
Natlonal Assembly, March 8, 1946. He ls now supposed to be the "big
wheel" in the Czechoslovak Divlslon of the VOICE OF AMERICA).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Purge in Prague
Description
An account of the resource
Joseph A. Mikuš
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952
pp. 28-29
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Mikuš, Joseph A., 1909-2005
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1952
LCNAF+dates
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/633239456f9942d65640c2f1d5618b0a.pdf
e11fbcd5c8fa5b411ed329bd1daa0656
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
THE STORY OF THE TWO "KRNOS"
DR. I VA N K RNO ( KE RNO), wbo retired as United Nations as•
sistant secretary-general for legal affalrs on September 10, does not
want to go bome to Czecho-Slovakia. He wlll seek asylum bere. Krno
saJd as mucb September 29 on the "United or Not" television program.
Now 61, Krno was a member of tbe "CZECH" (the papers bad tt, and
bow rigbt tbey were!) diplomatic service smce 1918 and also served
as aide to Or. Edward Beneš, wbo resigned tbe presldency and ned bis
country in 1938 and tben returned behind Soviet bayonets In 1945 to
become president again by tbe grace of Stalin. Krno, born a SLOVAK,
chose to betray his own people and serve the Beneš Czechs - the
Czech Socialists. It paid bim well. And Beneš and bis followers could
always point to Krno and say: See, Slovaks also have representation.
Just as they always did with Hodža, Lettrlch, Osuský, Papánek, Slávik, Gejza Krno and otbers. It was good wlndow dressing. Patr iotlc
Slovaks, however, regarded the m as traitors a nd r enegades. They st ill
do. And one can hardly blame tbem. because tbese so-called "Czechoslovaks" actually worked and are still working for the destruction of
the national existence of tbe natlon they are descended from.
Krno is one of tbe new breed of men created by the United Nations - an "1nternational civil servant." Interviewed on TV, Krno explained tbat tbe fate of bis country (Czecbo-Slovakla) proved in 1948
that "you can make no deals witb dictators." When asked why it took
bim so long (over four yea rs!) to utter the obvious, Dr. Krno was
rather embarrassed for a moment and then blurted: " I had to eon.
form with UN staff regulations and to reserve my opinion." Wbat a
confession for a UN assistant secretary-general to make! He was
fully convinced, as he said, that "you can make no deals witb dictators," and yet he kept on trying to do just tbat! Boy, call Senator
McCarran ! Not only to questlon Dr. Ivan Krno, but bis pals as well the otber "Czecboslovaks" (Beneš Socialists), wbo did not do badly
as members and followers of the NATIONAL FRONT government In
Czecho-Slovakia after 1945 - and who are not doing badly at all even
now as heralded "democratic, anti-communist" refugees In tbe USA.
But there is a story about anotber "Czecboslovak" Krno.
GEJZA L K RNO, Gottwalďs former general-consul in Chicago,
Ill., gave vent to bis "democratlc" feelings at a meeting in Chicago on
August 27, 1952. Present were 107 Czecbs and 4 Slovaks. At tbls
meeting, Dr. Josepb Černý. former Czecho·Slovak minister for the
C2,ecb Agrarian Party, had the gumption to renounce the fiction or the
"Czechoslovak" natlon, ethnically speaking, and stand up for the lnherent rigbt of the Slovak nation to its own existence and to declde
freely lts own destlny. "T he Slovak nation shall decide its future lndependently and its decision will bind every judicious person," Or.
Cerny sald.
Krno dld not agree with Černý and. to the surprlse or 99 per cent
ot those present, exploded · "We S lovaks, wh o st a nd beh ind the Czechoslovak Republic, Mr. Minister, cannot agree with you r pr inciples;
a nd we are of the opinion that even if 90 per cent of the Slovaks
would not want the Czechoslova k Republic, then we wo uld have to
creat e such a situation which would force it upon t hem, just as we d id
�SLOVAKIA
26
in 1944 at the time of the Slovak rebellion. The refore, the Council (of
Free C:zechosclovakia) should pian its home coming in such a way so
that it would have lts own mllitary force, occupy Slovak ia and dominate
public opinion, and then we need not fear violence or shooting. Why,
even in America the South fought against the North and, therefore,
why should 1944 not be repeated once more in Slovakia ?"
Quite a mouthful of "democracy" from a member of the "Counc!l
or Free Czechoslovakia" who once served as Gottwalďs representaUve
in Chicago and no w enjoys "political" asylum in the good old USA as
a "democratlc, ant!•Communist" retugee! "WE SLOVAKS," sald Krno,
as if he had any righ t to speak tor them, "we Slovaks" would torce
Czechoslovakla upon 90 per cent of the Slovaks against thelr wlll!
And that, ladles and gentleman, defines qulte accurately a "Czecho•
slovak" and a "Beneš Czech". Gejza L. Krno 1s a model "Czecho.slovak"
and a loyal "Beneš Czech" all in one package. Any wonder, then, that
over 90 per cent ot the S lovaks are opposed to him or hls klnd? But
there is more to the story.
One of those present at that meeting noted what had taken place.
The whole account was then glven to Dr. Michael Zibrin, former member of the Prague Parliament, who wrote about the Incident in the
"JEDNOTA" - the most wldely read Slovak paper In the USA - on
September 10. Dr. Zibrins reactlons to Krno's statement follow:
" It this were the opinlon of Krno himselt, it would sumce Just to
make a note of it. It would be a wa.ste ot time to debate much about
bis nonsense. But Krno spoke in Chicago, where he once was the exponent of communist Prague and where, since that time, his residence
serves as the meeting place when any one from the "Council of Free
C:zechoslovakia" comes to Chicago to see certain 'Slovak men or Slovak women.' Krno ls a willing and genial host. He is generally regard.
ed as the mouthpiece of Dr. Joseph Lettrich and likes to boast of the
i,romises and assurances for the future made to him by the politlcal
twins Lettrich•Zenkl.
"After this claritlcatlon, ot course, we must Iook into the statement made by Krno, because to us it is abundantly clear that Krno'a
mouth expressed the thoughts which were given expression at the
conferences of Lettrich, Zenkl, Ferienčík and other men of power
from the Council of Free C:zechoslovakia. Furthermore, lt 1s well
known to us that at similar conferences. when those present did not
s peak and pian so undiplomatically, the matter was reported generally
in such a way that there would be some kind of election under an
American occupation, and when the Americans assure liberation, then
the S lovaks out of gratitude will accept the Ame rican concept, which
is, they say, that of Lettrich and Zen kl. 'ľhls bitter pili, coated so
nlcely, made every one smile and shake thelr heads. No one wanted
to believe that Americans at some tuture time would want to violate
the free will of a nation. $uch a thing !s not in the American nature
and does not contorm with American democracy.
"But Krno reveal ed eve n more when he blasted at Dr. Černý. He
told us, in fact, that the members of the Council of Free C:zechoslovakia are reckoning wlth a 90 per ce nt majority of the S lovak
nation which is for an independent solution excluding any conception
of C:zechoslovak statehood. We know that such reports have come
from Slovakia even to Lettrich and Slávik. vVe could even name tbe
�H
SLOVAKIA
persons who brought those reports, but we do not want any one lnvestigated or tortured a second or even a third tlme, as it happened
to martyr Johnny Hvasta.
"Krno also revealed that hla companions and his poiitical representativea are not willing to reapect even a 90 per cent majority,
but are planning to resort to the drastic and brutal methods, wh?ch
prevailed in Slovakia during and after the 'rebellion' ot 1944, and tor
whlch, in severai lnstances, the political representatives or Krno
were responsible in the judgment of the natlon. Slovak emigranta
.should take note of this and call it to the attentlon ot Amerlcan-Slovak socleties, which, In turn, should call lt to the attentlon of their
own polit:ical representat!ves so they could know and see what klnd
of democracy is planned in the heart of Centra! Europe for Amerlcan
money.
When our nat!on at horne learns about it, the loud speakers of
Radlo Free Europe wlll not be able to outshout Krno's words, and
wasted are the mllllons put into varlous "freedom" movements and
lnst!tutlons, because thelr work. carrled on by euch people and ln•
fluenced by their thoughts, helps Communlsm more than lt harms lt."
Thls, then, ls the story of the two Krnos, who judased the holy
cause of their own n,ation for a career. They are not sorry for ~he
part they played In the exploltation and enslavement of the Slovak
people. lf they are, they have not glven expresslon to any sorrow In
any vlslble manuer. Of course, lf they were sorry, they would not
be associated today wlth the enemles of Slovak freedom and lndependence, the Beneš Czechs. Gejza Krno and other Slovaks In the
services of the Beneš Czechs believe that Zenkl-Ripka-LettMch stlll
hold a "promise" or important functlons, if and when the Communlsts are ousted from power in Czecho-Slovakia. They believe that
Amerlcan pollcy is in reality the pollcy of Zenkl and Lettrlch, l.e. of
the "Councll of Free Czecboslovakia," and they have reason for that
belief. They ask: Who gets to work in the VOICE OF AMERlCA,
RADlO FREE EUH.OPE and other governmental and seml-governmental instltutlons? And answer: Only the Beneš Czechs, tbe followers ot Zenkl and Lettrlch. Want to get in on Amerlcan doliars?
now and, later, to the pork barrel of Prague and Bratislava? lf you
do, get In and pitch for the Beneš Czechs ! Remember UNRRA? Belng
a man or prlnclple and a stubborn Slovak gets you nothlng, but
·b elng a Beneš Czech gets you everythlng ! 'l\hat 1s the maglc Zenkl
and Lettrich are using today on all Czech and Slovak refugees to
get them In line wlth the Beneš Czechs.
Gejza Krno's argument is understandable. Zenkl and Lettrich
Ilave a slmple pian. Czecho-Slovakia was glven to the Czechs on a
platter in 1918; after !t collapsed in 1939. when no one, not even the
Czechs rallled to save lt, lt was recreated In 1946 and handed over
to Beneš and bis followers. Atter three short years or the Natlonal
Front Government. In whlcb they were the majority, the Bene§
Czechs del! v Pred Czecho-Slovakla. lock, stock and barrel, to Gottwald and otber stooges ot the Kremlin. The transactlon took place
smoothly, wlthout any apparent physlcal resistance. Now, lťs up to
Amerlcans again to do their part: liberate Czecbo·Slovakla trom the
Gottwaldmen and again band lt over to the Beneš Czechs. Krno has
the word of Zenkl and LettMch tbat the pian cannot miss, because
�SLOVAKIA
27
Zenkl and Lettrlch have the lnslde track In the U. S. State Department.
Well, there 1s evidence aplenty that the Beneli Czechs got away
wlth murder. but we do not want to belleve that thelr "slmple pian"
wlll work. 'ľhere are a Jot of gulllble people In Amerlca, and some
pecullar Americans in the State Deparament, but we honestly bel!eve
that the Beneš Czechs sha.11 not prevail thls tlme. Americans ot Slovak descent wlll contlnne to demand the ouster of all un-Amerlcan,
anti-Slovak, antl-democratlc and pro-Sovlet elements from all offlclal
and seml-offlclal agencles ol government - and that includes the
Beneli Czechs, thé so-called ''Czechoslovaks." represented among
others by Zenkl, Lettrlch, Rlpka, Slávik and the two Krnos. Amerlcan princlples must not be surrendered for the polltlcal advantage ot
forelgners who are In a large measure responslble for the Red enslavement ot thefr · own natlons. The blond of bundreds of thousa:ids
ot our bonored dead crles out agalnst them. America stands for the
lib eratlon of ALL natlons, lncludlng and not excluding the SLOVAK
natlon. The Slovak nat!on bas an lnberent rlght to freedom and In•
dependence, anytblng that Zenkl, Lettrlch and Gejza Krno mlght
have to say to the contrary notwlthstandlng!
• • •
WHO SAID IT?
"l do not believe there ls any danger that Rusala wlll swallow up
Czechoslovakla, as some people thlnk. In fact, almost a year ago
Russla and the Government ot Ozechoslovakla slgned, In Moscow, a
treaty whlch can best be descrlbed as a treaty of frlendshlp and respect. In it, Czechoslovakla ia guaranteed freedom a nd independence.
It remalns a soverelgn state, and the two countrles blnd themselves
to respect each other's rlghts in every fleld. 1 belleve that t he RuHoCzechoslovak T reaty of December, 1943, should be the model of a ll
treatles between all the peoples of Europe. I have no fears about
Russla, but I thlnk that Jtussla 1s entltled to have her close nelghbors frlendly. None must ever be a pawn on the che.ssboard of Europe
agaln. For-tunately, Czechoslovakia has always been frien dly toward
Russia, and I am aure t h at in the future Czechoslovakia w ill maintai n t hat friendship and her ow n freedom and independence." Edward O. Tabor, a Beneš Czech, WWSW, Plttsburgh, Pa., 10-26-44).
•
•
•
"To n-a.tions in CzechÓlSJovakia the Americans are selllng democracy through so-called CZECHOSLOVAKS. They are the Czech
imperlallsts who have been the bane of all the natlons In CzechoSlovakla slnce 1918. To whom do these gentlemen, the Zenkls and
Peroutkas, wish to speak? To the Slovak• who, apar-t from a handful
of Quislings, do not wish to have anything to do with Czecho-Slovakia
and Czech domlnatlon? Not only natňona11st Slovaks, but also S1ovaklan communlsts wish to be rld of Prague. Of five S'lovaklan communlst leaders in 1945, four are today in prlson and expectlng trlal
for natlonal devlatlons. Does Mr. Peroutka, w1th bis lavishly pald
crew, wlsh to speak to Hungarlans w;ho were forcibly incorporated
lnto Czecho-Slovakla in 1919? If not, then to whom? To Czechs?
T hen he 1hould speak as a Czech a nd not as a Czecho1lovak." (The Czech "PRAVDA" - London - June 1951).
�
SLOVAKIA
THE STORY OF THE TWO "KRNOS"
DR. I VA N K RNO ( KE RNO), wbo retired as United Nations as•
sistant secretary-general for legal affalrs on September 10, does not
want to go bome to Czecho-Slovakia. He wlll seek asylum bere. Krno
saJd as mucb September 29 on the "United or Not" television program.
Now 61, Krno was a member of tbe "CZECH" (the papers bad tt, and
bow rigbt tbey were!) diplomatic service smce 1918 and also served
as aide to Or. Edward Beneš, wbo resigned tbe presldency and ned bis
country in 1938 and tben returned behind Soviet bayonets In 1945 to
become president again by tbe grace of Stalin. Krno, born a SLOVAK,
chose to betray his own people and serve the Beneš Czechs - the
Czech Socialists. It paid bim well. And Beneš and bis followers could
always point to Krno and say: See, Slovaks also have representation.
Just as they always did with Hodža, Lettrlch, Osuský, Papánek, Slávik, Gejza Krno and otbers. It was good wlndow dressing. Patr iotlc
Slovaks, however, regarded the m as traitors a nd r enegades. They st ill
do. And one can hardly blame tbem. because tbese so-called "Czechoslovaks" actually worked and are still working for the destruction of
the national existence of tbe natlon they are descended from.
Krno is one of tbe new breed of men created by the United Nations - an "1nternational civil servant." Interviewed on TV, Krno explained tbat tbe fate of bis country (Czecbo-Slovakla) proved in 1948
that "you can make no deals witb dictators." When asked why it took
bim so long (over four yea rs!) to utter the obvious, Dr. Krno was
rather embarrassed for a moment and then blurted: " I had to eon.
form with UN staff regulations and to reserve my opinion." Wbat a
confession for a UN assistant secretary-general to make! He was
fully convinced, as he said, that "you can make no deals witb dictators," and yet he kept on trying to do just tbat! Boy, call Senator
McCarran ! Not only to questlon Dr. Ivan Krno, but bis pals as well the otber "Czecboslovaks" (Beneš Socialists), wbo did not do badly
as members and followers of the NATIONAL FRONT government In
Czecho-Slovakia after 1945 - and who are not doing badly at all even
now as heralded "democratic, anti-communist" refugees In tbe USA.
But there is a story about anotber "Czecboslovak" Krno.
GEJZA L K RNO, Gottwalďs former general-consul in Chicago,
Ill., gave vent to bis "democratlc" feelings at a meeting in Chicago on
August 27, 1952. Present were 107 Czecbs and 4 Slovaks. At tbls
meeting, Dr. Josepb Černý. former Czecho·Slovak minister for the
C2,ecb Agrarian Party, had the gumption to renounce the fiction or the
"Czechoslovak" natlon, ethnically speaking, and stand up for the lnherent rigbt of the Slovak nation to its own existence and to declde
freely lts own destlny. "T he Slovak nation shall decide its future lndependently and its decision will bind every judicious person," Or.
Cerny sald.
Krno dld not agree with Černý and. to the surprlse or 99 per cent
ot those present, exploded · "We S lovaks, wh o st a nd beh ind the Czechoslovak Republic, Mr. Minister, cannot agree with you r pr inciples;
a nd we are of the opinion that even if 90 per cent of the Slovaks
would not want the Czechoslova k Republic, then we wo uld have to
creat e such a situation which would force it upon t hem, just as we d id
�SLOVAKIA
26
in 1944 at the time of the Slovak rebellion. The refore, the Council (of
Free C:zechosclovakia) should pian its home coming in such a way so
that it would have lts own mllitary force, occupy Slovak ia and dominate
public opinion, and then we need not fear violence or shooting. Why,
even in America the South fought against the North and, therefore,
why should 1944 not be repeated once more in Slovakia ?"
Quite a mouthful of "democracy" from a member of the "Counc!l
or Free Czechoslovakia" who once served as Gottwalďs representaUve
in Chicago and no w enjoys "political" asylum in the good old USA as
a "democratlc, ant!•Communist" retugee! "WE SLOVAKS," sald Krno,
as if he had any righ t to speak tor them, "we Slovaks" would torce
Czechoslovakla upon 90 per cent of the Slovaks against thelr wlll!
And that, ladles and gentleman, defines qulte accurately a "Czecho•
slovak" and a "Beneš Czech". Gejza L. Krno 1s a model "Czecho.slovak"
and a loyal "Beneš Czech" all in one package. Any wonder, then, that
over 90 per cent ot the S lovaks are opposed to him or hls klnd? But
there is more to the story.
One of those present at that meeting noted what had taken place.
The whole account was then glven to Dr. Michael Zibrin, former member of the Prague Parliament, who wrote about the Incident in the
"JEDNOTA" - the most wldely read Slovak paper In the USA - on
September 10. Dr. Zibrins reactlons to Krno's statement follow:
" It this were the opinlon of Krno himselt, it would sumce Just to
make a note of it. It would be a wa.ste ot time to debate much about
bis nonsense. But Krno spoke in Chicago, where he once was the exponent of communist Prague and where, since that time, his residence
serves as the meeting place when any one from the "Council of Free
C:zechoslovakia" comes to Chicago to see certain 'Slovak men or Slovak women.' Krno ls a willing and genial host. He is generally regard.
ed as the mouthpiece of Dr. Joseph Lettrich and likes to boast of the
i,romises and assurances for the future made to him by the politlcal
twins Lettrich•Zenkl.
"After this claritlcatlon, ot course, we must Iook into the statement made by Krno, because to us it is abundantly clear that Krno'a
mouth expressed the thoughts which were given expression at the
conferences of Lettrich, Zenkl, Ferienčík and other men of power
from the Council of Free C:zechoslovakia. Furthermore, lt 1s well
known to us that at similar conferences. when those present did not
s peak and pian so undiplomatically, the matter was reported generally
in such a way that there would be some kind of election under an
American occupation, and when the Americans assure liberation, then
the S lovaks out of gratitude will accept the Ame rican concept, which
is, they say, that of Lettrich and Zen kl. 'ľhls bitter pili, coated so
nlcely, made every one smile and shake thelr heads. No one wanted
to believe that Americans at some tuture time would want to violate
the free will of a nation. $uch a thing !s not in the American nature
and does not contorm with American democracy.
"But Krno reveal ed eve n more when he blasted at Dr. Černý. He
told us, in fact, that the members of the Council of Free C:zechoslovakia are reckoning wlth a 90 per ce nt majority of the S lovak
nation which is for an independent solution excluding any conception
of C:zechoslovak statehood. We know that such reports have come
from Slovakia even to Lettrich and Slávik. vVe could even name tbe
�H
SLOVAKIA
persons who brought those reports, but we do not want any one lnvestigated or tortured a second or even a third tlme, as it happened
to martyr Johnny Hvasta.
"Krno also revealed that hla companions and his poiitical representativea are not willing to reapect even a 90 per cent majority,
but are planning to resort to the drastic and brutal methods, wh?ch
prevailed in Slovakia during and after the 'rebellion' ot 1944, and tor
whlch, in severai lnstances, the political representatives or Krno
were responsible in the judgment of the natlon. Slovak emigranta
.should take note of this and call it to the attentlon ot Amerlcan-Slovak socleties, which, In turn, should call lt to the attentlon of their
own polit:ical representat!ves so they could know and see what klnd
of democracy is planned in the heart of Centra! Europe for Amerlcan
money.
When our nat!on at horne learns about it, the loud speakers of
Radlo Free Europe wlll not be able to outshout Krno's words, and
wasted are the mllllons put into varlous "freedom" movements and
lnst!tutlons, because thelr work. carrled on by euch people and ln•
fluenced by their thoughts, helps Communlsm more than lt harms lt."
Thls, then, ls the story of the two Krnos, who judased the holy
cause of their own n,ation for a career. They are not sorry for ~he
part they played In the exploltation and enslavement of the Slovak
people. lf they are, they have not glven expresslon to any sorrow In
any vlslble manuer. Of course, lf they were sorry, they would not
be associated today wlth the enemles of Slovak freedom and lndependence, the Beneš Czechs. Gejza Krno and other Slovaks In the
services of the Beneš Czechs believe that Zenkl-Ripka-LettMch stlll
hold a "promise" or important functlons, if and when the Communlsts are ousted from power in Czecho-Slovakia. They believe that
Amerlcan pollcy is in reality the pollcy of Zenkl and Lettrlch, l.e. of
the "Councll of Free Czecboslovakia," and they have reason for that
belief. They ask: Who gets to work in the VOICE OF AMERlCA,
RADlO FREE EUH.OPE and other governmental and seml-governmental instltutlons? And answer: Only the Beneš Czechs, tbe followers ot Zenkl and Lettrlch. Want to get in on Amerlcan doliars?
now and, later, to the pork barrel of Prague and Bratislava? lf you
do, get In and pitch for the Beneš Czechs ! Remember UNRRA? Belng
a man or prlnclple and a stubborn Slovak gets you nothlng, but
·b elng a Beneš Czech gets you everythlng ! 'l\hat 1s the maglc Zenkl
and Lettrich are using today on all Czech and Slovak refugees to
get them In line wlth the Beneš Czechs.
Gejza Krno's argument is understandable. Zenkl and Lettrich
Ilave a slmple pian. Czecho-Slovakia was glven to the Czechs on a
platter in 1918; after !t collapsed in 1939. when no one, not even the
Czechs rallled to save lt, lt was recreated In 1946 and handed over
to Beneš and bis followers. Atter three short years or the Natlonal
Front Government. In whlcb they were the majority, the Bene§
Czechs del! v Pred Czecho-Slovakla. lock, stock and barrel, to Gottwald and otber stooges ot the Kremlin. The transactlon took place
smoothly, wlthout any apparent physlcal resistance. Now, lťs up to
Amerlcans again to do their part: liberate Czecbo·Slovakla trom the
Gottwaldmen and again band lt over to the Beneš Czechs. Krno has
the word of Zenkl and LettMch tbat the pian cannot miss, because
�SLOVAKIA
27
Zenkl and Lettrlch have the lnslde track In the U. S. State Department.
Well, there 1s evidence aplenty that the Beneli Czechs got away
wlth murder. but we do not want to belleve that thelr "slmple pian"
wlll work. 'ľhere are a Jot of gulllble people In Amerlca, and some
pecullar Americans in the State Deparament, but we honestly bel!eve
that the Beneš Czechs sha.11 not prevail thls tlme. Americans ot Slovak descent wlll contlnne to demand the ouster of all un-Amerlcan,
anti-Slovak, antl-democratlc and pro-Sovlet elements from all offlclal
and seml-offlclal agencles ol government - and that includes the
Beneli Czechs, thé so-called ''Czechoslovaks." represented among
others by Zenkl, Lettrlch, Rlpka, Slávik and the two Krnos. Amerlcan princlples must not be surrendered for the polltlcal advantage ot
forelgners who are In a large measure responslble for the Red enslavement ot thefr · own natlons. The blond of bundreds of thousa:ids
ot our bonored dead crles out agalnst them. America stands for the
lib eratlon of ALL natlons, lncludlng and not excluding the SLOVAK
natlon. The Slovak nat!on bas an lnberent rlght to freedom and In•
dependence, anytblng that Zenkl, Lettrlch and Gejza Krno mlght
have to say to the contrary notwlthstandlng!
• • •
WHO SAID IT?
"l do not believe there ls any danger that Rusala wlll swallow up
Czechoslovakla, as some people thlnk. In fact, almost a year ago
Russla and the Government ot Ozechoslovakla slgned, In Moscow, a
treaty whlch can best be descrlbed as a treaty of frlendshlp and respect. In it, Czechoslovakla ia guaranteed freedom a nd independence.
It remalns a soverelgn state, and the two countrles blnd themselves
to respect each other's rlghts in every fleld. 1 belleve that t he RuHoCzechoslovak T reaty of December, 1943, should be the model of a ll
treatles between all the peoples of Europe. I have no fears about
Russla, but I thlnk that Jtussla 1s entltled to have her close nelghbors frlendly. None must ever be a pawn on the che.ssboard of Europe
agaln. For-tunately, Czechoslovakia has always been frien dly toward
Russia, and I am aure t h at in the future Czechoslovakia w ill maintai n t hat friendship and her ow n freedom and independence." Edward O. Tabor, a Beneš Czech, WWSW, Plttsburgh, Pa., 10-26-44).
•
•
•
"To n-a.tions in CzechÓlSJovakia the Americans are selllng democracy through so-called CZECHOSLOVAKS. They are the Czech
imperlallsts who have been the bane of all the natlons In CzechoSlovakla slnce 1918. To whom do these gentlemen, the Zenkls and
Peroutkas, wish to speak? To the Slovak• who, apar-t from a handful
of Quislings, do not wish to have anything to do with Czecho-Slovakia
and Czech domlnatlon? Not only natňona11st Slovaks, but also S1ovaklan communlsts wish to be rld of Prague. Of five S'lovaklan communlst leaders in 1945, four are today in prlson and expectlng trlal
for natlonal devlatlons. Does Mr. Peroutka, w1th bis lavishly pald
crew, wlsh to speak to Hungarlans w;ho were forcibly incorporated
lnto Czecho-Slovakla in 1919? If not, then to whom? To Czechs?
T hen he 1hould speak as a Czech a nd not as a Czecho1lovak." (The Czech "PRAVDA" - London - June 1951).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1952, Vol. 2
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1952
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li>
<li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li>
</ul>
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
THE STORY OF THE TWO "KRNOS"
DR. I VA N K RNO ( KE RNO), wbo retired as United Nations as•
sistant secretary-general for legal affalrs on September 10, does not
want to go bome to Czecho-Slovakia. He wlll seek asylum bere. Krno
saJd as mucb September 29 on the "United or Not" television program.
Now 61, Krno was a member of tbe "CZECH" (the papers bad tt, and
bow rigbt tbey were!) diplomatic service smce 1918 and also served
as aide to Or. Edward Beneš, wbo resigned tbe presldency and ned bis
country in 1938 and tben returned behind Soviet bayonets In 1945 to
become president again by tbe grace of Stalin. Krno, born a SLOVAK,
chose to betray his own people and serve the Beneš Czechs - the
Czech Socialists. It paid bim well. And Beneš and bis followers could
always point to Krno and say: See, Slovaks also have representation.
Just as they always did with Hodža, Lettrlch, Osuský, Papánek, Slávik, Gejza Krno and otbers. It was good wlndow dressing. Patr iotlc
Slovaks, however, regarded the m as traitors a nd r enegades. They st ill
do. And one can hardly blame tbem. because tbese so-called "Czechoslovaks" actually worked and are still working for the destruction of
the national existence of tbe natlon they are descended from.
Krno is one of tbe new breed of men created by the United Nations - an "1nternational civil servant." Interviewed on TV, Krno explained tbat tbe fate of bis country (Czecbo-Slovakla) proved in 1948
that "you can make no deals witb dictators." When asked why it took
bim so long (over four yea rs!) to utter the obvious, Dr. Krno was
rather embarrassed for a moment and then blurted: " I had to eon.
form with UN staff regulations and to reserve my opinion." Wbat a
confession for a UN assistant secretary-general to make! He was
fully convinced, as he said, that "you can make no deals witb dictators," and yet he kept on trying to do just tbat! Boy, call Senator
McCarran ! Not only to questlon Dr. Ivan Krno, but bis pals as well the otber "Czecboslovaks" (Beneš Socialists), wbo did not do badly
as members and followers of the NATIONAL FRONT government In
Czecho-Slovakia after 1945 - and who are not doing badly at all even
now as heralded "democratic, anti-communist" refugees In tbe USA.
But there is a story about anotber "Czecboslovak" Krno.
GEJZA L K RNO, Gottwalďs former general-consul in Chicago,
Ill., gave vent to bis "democratlc" feelings at a meeting in Chicago on
August 27, 1952. Present were 107 Czecbs and 4 Slovaks. At tbls
meeting, Dr. Josepb Černý. former Czecho·Slovak minister for the
C2,ecb Agrarian Party, had the gumption to renounce the fiction or the
"Czechoslovak" natlon, ethnically speaking, and stand up for the lnherent rigbt of the Slovak nation to its own existence and to declde
freely lts own destlny. "T he Slovak nation shall decide its future lndependently and its decision will bind every judicious person," Or.
Cerny sald.
Krno dld not agree with Černý and. to the surprlse or 99 per cent
ot those present, exploded · "We S lovaks, wh o st a nd beh ind the Czechoslovak Republic, Mr. Minister, cannot agree with you r pr inciples;
a nd we are of the opinion that even if 90 per cent of the Slovaks
would not want the Czechoslova k Republic, then we wo uld have to
creat e such a situation which would force it upon t hem, just as we d id
SLOVAKIA
26
in 1944 at the time of the Slovak rebellion. The refore, the Council (of
Free C:zechosclovakia) should pian its home coming in such a way so
that it would have lts own mllitary force, occupy Slovak ia and dominate
public opinion, and then we need not fear violence or shooting. Why,
even in America the South fought against the North and, therefore,
why should 1944 not be repeated once more in Slovakia ?"
Quite a mouthful of "democracy" from a member of the "Counc!l
or Free Czechoslovakia" who once served as Gottwalďs representaUve
in Chicago and no w enjoys "political" asylum in the good old USA as
a "democratlc, ant!•Communist" retugee! "WE SLOVAKS," sald Krno,
as if he had any righ t to speak tor them, "we Slovaks" would torce
Czechoslovakla upon 90 per cent of the Slovaks against thelr wlll!
And that, ladles and gentleman, defines qulte accurately a "Czecho•
slovak" and a "Beneš Czech". Gejza L. Krno 1s a model "Czecho.slovak"
and a loyal "Beneš Czech" all in one package. Any wonder, then, that
over 90 per cent ot the S lovaks are opposed to him or hls klnd? But
there is more to the story.
One of those present at that meeting noted what had taken place.
The whole account was then glven to Dr. Michael Zibrin, former member of the Prague Parliament, who wrote about the Incident in the
"JEDNOTA" - the most wldely read Slovak paper In the USA - on
September 10. Dr. Zibrins reactlons to Krno's statement follow:
" It this were the opinlon of Krno himselt, it would sumce Just to
make a note of it. It would be a wa.ste ot time to debate much about
bis nonsense. But Krno spoke in Chicago, where he once was the exponent of communist Prague and where, since that time, his residence
serves as the meeting place when any one from the "Council of Free
C:zechoslovakia" comes to Chicago to see certain 'Slovak men or Slovak women.' Krno ls a willing and genial host. He is generally regard.
ed as the mouthpiece of Dr. Joseph Lettrich and likes to boast of the
i,romises and assurances for the future made to him by the politlcal
twins Lettrich•Zenkl.
"After this claritlcatlon, ot course, we must Iook into the statement made by Krno, because to us it is abundantly clear that Krno'a
mouth expressed the thoughts which were given expression at the
conferences of Lettrich, Zenkl, Ferienčík and other men of power
from the Council of Free C:zechoslovakia. Furthermore, lt 1s well
known to us that at similar conferences. when those present did not
s peak and pian so undiplomatically, the matter was reported generally
in such a way that there would be some kind of election under an
American occupation, and when the Americans assure liberation, then
the S lovaks out of gratitude will accept the Ame rican concept, which
is, they say, that of Lettrich and Zen kl. 'ľhls bitter pili, coated so
nlcely, made every one smile and shake thelr heads. No one wanted
to believe that Americans at some tuture time would want to violate
the free will of a nation. $uch a thing !s not in the American nature
and does not contorm with American democracy.
"But Krno reveal ed eve n more when he blasted at Dr. Černý. He
told us, in fact, that the members of the Council of Free C:zechoslovakia are reckoning wlth a 90 per ce nt majority of the S lovak
nation which is for an independent solution excluding any conception
of C:zechoslovak statehood. We know that such reports have come
from Slovakia even to Lettrich and Slávik. vVe could even name tbe
H
SLOVAKIA
persons who brought those reports, but we do not want any one lnvestigated or tortured a second or even a third tlme, as it happened
to martyr Johnny Hvasta.
"Krno also revealed that hla companions and his poiitical representativea are not willing to reapect even a 90 per cent majority,
but are planning to resort to the drastic and brutal methods, wh?ch
prevailed in Slovakia during and after the 'rebellion' ot 1944, and tor
whlch, in severai lnstances, the political representatives or Krno
were responsible in the judgment of the natlon. Slovak emigranta
.should take note of this and call it to the attentlon ot Amerlcan-Slovak socleties, which, In turn, should call lt to the attentlon of their
own polit:ical representat!ves so they could know and see what klnd
of democracy is planned in the heart of Centra! Europe for Amerlcan
money.
When our nat!on at horne learns about it, the loud speakers of
Radlo Free Europe wlll not be able to outshout Krno's words, and
wasted are the mllllons put into varlous "freedom" movements and
lnst!tutlons, because thelr work. carrled on by euch people and ln•
fluenced by their thoughts, helps Communlsm more than lt harms lt."
Thls, then, ls the story of the two Krnos, who judased the holy
cause of their own n,ation for a career. They are not sorry for ~he
part they played In the exploltation and enslavement of the Slovak
people. lf they are, they have not glven expresslon to any sorrow In
any vlslble manuer. Of course, lf they were sorry, they would not
be associated today wlth the enemles of Slovak freedom and lndependence, the Beneš Czechs. Gejza Krno and other Slovaks In the
services of the Beneš Czechs believe that Zenkl-Ripka-LettMch stlll
hold a "promise" or important functlons, if and when the Communlsts are ousted from power in Czecho-Slovakia. They believe that
Amerlcan pollcy is in reality the pollcy of Zenkl and Lettrlch, l.e. of
the "Councll of Free Czecboslovakia," and they have reason for that
belief. They ask: Who gets to work in the VOICE OF AMERlCA,
RADlO FREE EUH.OPE and other governmental and seml-governmental instltutlons? And answer: Only the Beneš Czechs, tbe followers ot Zenkl and Lettrlch. Want to get in on Amerlcan doliars?
now and, later, to the pork barrel of Prague and Bratislava? lf you
do, get In and pitch for the Beneš Czechs ! Remember UNRRA? Belng
a man or prlnclple and a stubborn Slovak gets you nothlng, but
·b elng a Beneš Czech gets you everythlng ! 'l\hat 1s the maglc Zenkl
and Lettrich are using today on all Czech and Slovak refugees to
get them In line wlth the Beneš Czechs.
Gejza Krno's argument is understandable. Zenkl and Lettrich
Ilave a slmple pian. Czecho-Slovakia was glven to the Czechs on a
platter in 1918; after !t collapsed in 1939. when no one, not even the
Czechs rallled to save lt, lt was recreated In 1946 and handed over
to Beneš and bis followers. Atter three short years or the Natlonal
Front Government. In whlcb they were the majority, the Bene§
Czechs del! v Pred Czecho-Slovakla. lock, stock and barrel, to Gottwald and otber stooges ot the Kremlin. The transactlon took place
smoothly, wlthout any apparent physlcal resistance. Now, lťs up to
Amerlcans again to do their part: liberate Czecbo·Slovakla trom the
Gottwaldmen and again band lt over to the Beneš Czechs. Krno has
the word of Zenkl and LettMch tbat the pian cannot miss, because
SLOVAKIA
27
Zenkl and Lettrlch have the lnslde track In the U. S. State Department.
Well, there 1s evidence aplenty that the Beneli Czechs got away
wlth murder. but we do not want to belleve that thelr "slmple pian"
wlll work. 'ľhere are a Jot of gulllble people In Amerlca, and some
pecullar Americans in the State Deparament, but we honestly bel!eve
that the Beneš Czechs sha.11 not prevail thls tlme. Americans ot Slovak descent wlll contlnne to demand the ouster of all un-Amerlcan,
anti-Slovak, antl-democratlc and pro-Sovlet elements from all offlclal
and seml-offlclal agencles ol government - and that includes the
Beneli Czechs, thé so-called ''Czechoslovaks." represented among
others by Zenkl, Lettrlch, Rlpka, Slávik and the two Krnos. Amerlcan princlples must not be surrendered for the polltlcal advantage ot
forelgners who are In a large measure responslble for the Red enslavement ot thefr · own natlons. The blond of bundreds of thousa:ids
ot our bonored dead crles out agalnst them. America stands for the
lib eratlon of ALL natlons, lncludlng and not excluding the SLOVAK
natlon. The Slovak nat!on bas an lnberent rlght to freedom and In•
dependence, anytblng that Zenkl, Lettrlch and Gejza Krno mlght
have to say to the contrary notwlthstandlng!
• • •
WHO SAID IT?
"l do not believe there ls any danger that Rusala wlll swallow up
Czechoslovakla, as some people thlnk. In fact, almost a year ago
Russla and the Government ot Ozechoslovakla slgned, In Moscow, a
treaty whlch can best be descrlbed as a treaty of frlendshlp and respect. In it, Czechoslovakla ia guaranteed freedom a nd independence.
It remalns a soverelgn state, and the two countrles blnd themselves
to respect each other's rlghts in every fleld. 1 belleve that t he RuHoCzechoslovak T reaty of December, 1943, should be the model of a ll
treatles between all the peoples of Europe. I have no fears about
Russla, but I thlnk that Jtussla 1s entltled to have her close nelghbors frlendly. None must ever be a pawn on the che.ssboard of Europe
agaln. For-tunately, Czechoslovakia has always been frien dly toward
Russia, and I am aure t h at in the future Czechoslovakia w ill maintai n t hat friendship and her ow n freedom and independence." Edward O. Tabor, a Beneš Czech, WWSW, Plttsburgh, Pa., 10-26-44).
•
•
•
"To n-a.tions in CzechÓlSJovakia the Americans are selllng democracy through so-called CZECHOSLOVAKS. They are the Czech
imperlallsts who have been the bane of all the natlons In CzechoSlovakla slnce 1918. To whom do these gentlemen, the Zenkls and
Peroutkas, wish to speak? To the Slovak• who, apar-t from a handful
of Quislings, do not wish to have anything to do with Czecho-Slovakia
and Czech domlnatlon? Not only natňona11st Slovaks, but also S1ovaklan communlsts wish to be rld of Prague. Of five S'lovaklan communlst leaders in 1945, four are today in prlson and expectlng trlal
for natlonal devlatlons. Does Mr. Peroutka, w1th bis lavishly pald
crew, wlsh to speak to Hungarlans w;ho were forcibly incorporated
lnto Czecho-Slovakla in 1919? If not, then to whom? To Czechs?
T hen he 1hould speak as a Czech a nd not as a Czecho1lovak." (The Czech "PRAVDA" - London - June 1951).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Story of the Two "Krnos"
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952
pp. 24-27
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1952